Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00231/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00231-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JAMES DENNIS COREY,

Plaintiff,

NO. CIV. S-05-0231 FCD JFM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

v.

COUNTY OF PLUMAS; TERRY

BERGSTRAND, Plumas County

Sheriff; Officer N.D. DAWSON;

Officer STEVE PEAY; Officer

RON WOMACK; Officer DWIGHT

CLINE; Officer STEVE WAASDROP;

Officer MIKE SMITH; Officer

BILL ELLIO; and DOES 1 to 100,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on motion to dismiss

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), filed by defendants County

of Plumas (“County”), Plumas County Sheriff Terry Bergstrand, and

Officers N.D. Dawson, Steve Peay, Ron Womack, Dwight Cline, Steve

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1 This defendant was erroneously sued as “Bill Ellio.”

2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230.

2

Waasdrop, Mike Smith, and Bill Elliot1 (collectively

“defendants”).2 Specifically, defendants seek dismissal of all

state law claims (Counts Five through Eleven) on the ground that

they are barred by the applicable six-month statute of

limitations. In addition, defendants seek dismissal of Count

Three, which alleges a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986,

for violation of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff, James

Corey (“plaintiff” or “Corey”), opposes the motion. For the

reasons stated herein, defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. 

BACKGROUND

On December 20, 2002, officers of the Plumas County

Sheriff’s Department arrived at a residence located at 35 Sequoia

Circle, in Plumas Pines, California, with a search warrant. 

(Complaint ¶ 20.) Corey, who was the lessee of the 35 Sequoia

Circle residence, asked to review the warrant. (Id. ¶ 21.) 

Immediately thereafter, Corey alleges that the officers grabbed

him and, “with force and violence slammed him down on a nearby

table, then took him down to the floor.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Corey

alleges he was then sprayed twice in the face with mace and

struck in the head with a police baton. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.) Corey

was then arrested and booked into the Plumas County Jail. (Id. ¶

25.) 

On January 3, 2003, criminal charges of resisting arrest and

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3 There are three separate documents included within

Exhibit A to the Complaint: the Claim Against the County of

Plumas, Proof of Service of the Claim, and the June 30, 2004

Letter from Brian Morris to Larry Baumbach. For ease of

reference, the court numbered the pages of the Exhibit as 1

through 7 and will refer to them accordingly. 

3

battery on a police officer were filed against Corey in

connection with the arrest. (Id. ¶ 18.) After a jury trial,

Corey was found not guilty and charges were dismissed on February

6, 2004. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

Corey presented a tort claim to the County on May 12, 2004,

which was received by the County on May 14, 2004. (Comp. ¶ 15;

Claim Against County of Plumas, Ex. A to Compl. at pp. 1-5.)3 By

letter dated June 30, 2004, the County formally rejected Corey’s

tort claim. (Comp. ¶ 16; June 30, 2004 Letter from Brian Morris

to Larry Baumbach, Ex. A to Comp. at 7.) The Complaint alleges

Corey was notified of the rejection “on or about July 10, 2004.” 

(Comp. ¶ 16.) 

On February 4, 2005, Corey filed the complaint in the

above-captioned matter. The complaint asserts eleven claims

pursuant to federal and state law. On April 21, 2005, defendants

filed the present motion to dismiss on statute of limitations

grounds Counts Five through Eleven, which assert state-based

claims for assault; battery; “battery: unreasonable force in

affecting arrest”; “battery committed by affecting arrest”;

“intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent

infliction of emotional distress; and false imprisonment. In

addition, defendants seek dismissal, also on statute of

limitations grounds, of Count Three, to the extent it asserts a

conspiracy claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986. 

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4

STANDARD 

A complaint will not be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) “unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his [or her] claim that would

entitle him [or her] to relief.” Yamaguchi v. Department of the

Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997)(quoting Lewis v.

Telephone Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir.

1996)). “All allegations of material fact are taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.

1996).

ANALYSIS 

1. State Law Claims

Defendants contend that Corey’s state law claims are

untimely because they were not filed within six months after

written notice of rejection of the claims by the County. Prior

to filing a tort claim against a public entity, a plaintiff must

satisfy the requirements of the California Tort Claims Act by

presenting the claim to the local entity. The process for filing

a claim against a public entity is straightforward. The claim

must be presented to the public entity within six months after

the accrual of the cause of action. Cal. Govt. Code § 911.2. If

the public entity rejects the claim by written notice that

complies with Cal. Govt. Code § 913, the plaintiff is afforded

six months to commence suit against the entity. Cal. Govt. Code

§ 945.6. If, on the other hand, the public entity does not send

notice or sends a deficient written notice, the suit may be filed

within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. Id.

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4 From the rejection letter, which is attached to the

complaint, it appears that statute may have begun to run earlier. 

The letter is dated June 30, 2005. See Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146

F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998.)(finding that, in ruling on a

motion to dismiss, the court may consider documents attached to

the complaint). The six-month statute for filing suit begins to

run as soon as the notice is properly delivered or mailed, even

though not yet received by the claimant. Cal. Govt. Code § 945.6

(providing that suit must be filed “not later than six months

after the date such notice is personally delivered or deposited

in the mail.”) However, there is no indication that date on the

rejection letter also represents the date the letter was

“personally delivered or deposited in the mail.” As a result,

for purposes of the motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true

plaintiff’s allegation that the letter was delivered/deposited in

the mail on or about July 10, 2005. 

5 Presumably, to give rise to a successful tort claim,

the local entity’s reason for rejecting a claim will be invalid. 

5

Here, Corey presented his claim to the County on May 12,

2004. By written notice, the County rejected Corey’s claim on or

about July 10, 2004.4 Thus, to satisfy the statute of

limitations, Corey needed to file the complaint on or before

January 10, 2005. In fact, the complaint was not filed until

February 4, 2005. 

Corey contends that the County’s notice was defective

because the reason provided for the rejection was invalid. 

However, Corey cites no authority, and the court could find none,

for the proposition that a rejection notice is defective under

Cal. Govt. Code § 913 if the reason for the rejection later turns

out to be invalid. In fact, § 913 does not require the county to

provide any reason for rejecting a claim. See Cal. Govt. Code §

913 (providing the form for sufficient notice). Thus, the

validity of the reason provided by the County is irrelevant to

the sufficiency of the notice pursuant to § 913.5 Section 913

provides a sample rejection letter to assist municipalities in

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drafting a compliant rejection letter. The rejection letter must

advise the claimant that the claim has been rejected, in whole or

in part, and must warn the claimant that he has six months to

file a civil complaint. Here, the rejection letter sent by the

County indicates that the claim was rejected by operation of law

and clearly warns Corey that he has six months to file a

complaint: 

The following warning is provided pursuant to

Government Code § 913: 

Subject to certain exceptions, you have only six (6)

months from the date this notice was personally

delivered or deposited in the mail to file a court

action on this claim. See Government Code § 945.6. 

You may seek the advice of an attorney of your choice

in connection with this matter. If you desire to

consult an attorney, you should do so immediately.

(June 30, 2004 Letter from Brian Morris to Larry Baumbach, Ex. A

to Comp. at 7 (emphasis in original).) The court finds that the

rejection letter complies with § 913. As a result, Corey had six

months from the date the rejection letter was mailed to file his

complaint. 

Corey also appears to contend that defendants have waived

the right to assert the statute of limitations as a defense

because they did not provide a notice of insufficiency to

defendant pursuant to Cal. Govt. Code § 910.8. Corey erroneously

conflates two separate statutes of limitation. The government

code provides that claims relating to death or injury must be

presented to the municipality within six months of the date the

cause of action accrues. Cal. Govt. Code § 911.2. The County’s

rejection letter, while not required to provide a reason,

suggests that Corey’s claim was rejected for failure to comply

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6 Corey’s waiver argument is based on the County’s

failure to send a notice of insufficiency pursuant to Cal. Govt.

Code 910.8. The court expresses no position on the validity of

this argument, other than to note that untimely filing is not

expressly listed among the defects enumerated in § 910.8. 

7

with § 911.2's six-month statute of limitations. Once this

rejection letter was mailed, a second six-month statute of

limitations was triggered: Corey had six months from that date to

file a civil complaint. Cal Govt. Code § 945.6. That statute of

limitations is separate and independent from the statute of

limitations in § 911.2. Whether the County waived its § 911.2

statute of limitations defense has no bearing on whether the

Corey timely filed his complaint in this court.6 Accordingly,

defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts 5 through 11 of the

complaint is GRANTED with prejudice.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 Conspiracy Claim

Defendants contend that Corey’s conspiracy claims brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986 are time-barred. Unlike § 1983, 

§ 1986 contains an express statute of limitations: “But no action

under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is

not commenced within one year after the cause of action has

accrued.” 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Federal law determines when a cause

of action accrues. Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d

758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991). A cause of action accrues for purposes 

of § 1986 when Corey “had reason to know of the injury which is

the basis of the action.” Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park,

159 F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Norco Constr., Inc.

v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986); Moore v.

U.S., 193 F.R.D. 647, 652 (N.D. Cal. 2000). However, a civil

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8

rights claim that “if successful would necessarily imply the

invalidity of a conviction in a pending criminal prosecution,

does not accrue so long as the potential for a conviction in the

pending criminal prosecution continues to exist.” Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008,

1014 (9th Cir. 2000).

Corey contends that his conspiracy claims did not accrue

until the date of his acquittal, because such claims, if

successful, would have implied the invalidity of any conviction

in his criminal trial. In response, defendants make several

arguments. First, they note that Heck and its progeny involve

claims brought under § 1983, and thus are inapplicable to claims

under § 1986. Second, defendants contend that the conspiracy

claims Corey alleges would not imply invalidity of any criminal

conviction for resisting arrest and battery on a peace officer. 

Finally, defendants contend that, even if the claim did not

accrue while criminal charges were pending, the one-year statute

of limitations nonetheless expired because the court needs to

include in the limitations period the thirteen days after Corey’s

arrest and before charges were filed. 

Initially, the court rejects defendants argument that Heck

does not apply in the context of § 1986 claims. While defendants

are correct that Heck involved a § 1983 claim, defendants cite no

authority and provide no argument to support their contention

that a different rule should apply to § 1986 cases. The

rationale for the Heck rule is to preserve consistency and

finality, prevent collateral attacks on a conviction via a civil

law suit, and to avoid inconsistent determinations in the civil

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7 The court takes judicial notice of Plumas County

Superior Court Minute Order dated April 18, 2003. (Ex. A to

Defs.’ Request for Judicial Notice.)

9

and criminal cases.” See Harvey, 210 F.3d at 1014. This

rational is equally applicable in the § 1986 context. 

Defendants next argue that Corey’s claim alleging a

“conspiracy to unlawfully arrest, search and seize plaintiff . .

. even if successful . . . does not challenge the legality of the

arrest or search and seizure of Plaintiff.” (Defs.’ Reply at 9.) 

Thus, defendants conclude that “the success of a civil action for

conspiracy would not have necessarily invalidated a potential

conviction on the then-pending charges of resisting [arrest] or

battering a police officer.” (Id.) The court disagrees. 

Corey’s § 1986 claim for “conspiracy to unlawfully arrest, search

and seize” is predicated on the fact that Corey was not lawfully

arrested, searched or seized. If the trier of fact concludes

that these allegations are true, such findings would necessarily

imply that Corey did not resist arrest or batter the officers,

but that he was the victim of their aggression.7 This is

precisely the type of inconsistent adjudication that Heck and

Harvey sought to avoid. 

Finally, defendants argue that, even if tolled during the

pendency of criminal charges against Corey, the one-year statute

of limitations expired prior to the filing of the complaint

because the court must add to the statutory period the thirteen

days after Corey’s arrest but before criminal charges were

brought. This argument too lacks merit. The rule from Heck

states that a civil claim, which “if successful would necessarily

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imply the invalidity of a conviction in a pending criminal

prosecution, does not accrue so long as the potential for a

conviction in the pending criminal prosecution continues to

exist.” Harvey, 210 F.3d at 1014 (emphasis added). “A cause of

action ‘accrues’ when a suit may be maintained thereon. . ..” 

Black’s Law Dictionary 21 (6th ed. 1990). This is to be

distinguished from “tolling,” which means “to suspend or stop

temporarily as the statute of limitations is tolled during the

defendant’s absence from the jurisdiction . . ..” Id. at 1488. 

Heck does not state that the statute of limitations is “tolled”

during the pendency of criminal charges. Rather, the rule

provides that the cause of action does not “accrue” until

criminal charges are no longer pending. Here, the cause of

action accrued on February 6, 2004, the date of Corey’s

acquittal. As a result, Corey’s § 1986 claim, which was filed on

February 4, 2005, was timely. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

(1) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts Five through Eleven of

the complaint is GRANTED with prejudice. 

(2) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count Three of the complaint

is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 26, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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