Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00170/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00170-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLINTON J. FORRISTER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JEANNE WOODFORD, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:05-cv-00170 LJO YNP [DLB] (HC) 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR RULE 60(b)(6) HEARING

[Doc. #26]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a habeas corpus petition pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On March 15, 2007, this Court dismissed Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus as

untimely. (Doc. #19.) In that dismissal, the District Judge explicitly found that the case presented

no indication of a basis for equitable tolling. (Id. at 4.) On May 30, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion

for reconsideration arguing his circumstances were extraordinary thus he should be granted equitable

tolling. (Doc. #21.) Petitioner claimed that his attorney had abandoned him before filing a petition

in the federal court; therefore, the petition should be subject to equitable tolling. (Id.) On January 3,

2008, this Court denied the motion finding that Petitioner’s circumstances were not so extraordinary

as to rise to the level required to receive equitable tolling. (Doc. #25.)

On July 14, 2009, Petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration claiming (1) that he

should receive equitable tolling because his attorney abandoned him before his Federal petition was

filed and (2) that the motion was timely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Respondent

opposed the motion arguing that Petitioner did not file the motion in a timely manner and that this

Court had already ruled that actions of Petitioner’s attorney did not present extraordinary

circumstances. (Doc. #27.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the

district court. The rule permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 1

Case 1:05-cv-00170-LJO -GSA Document 29 Filed 02/03/10 Page 1 of 2
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the grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered

evidence . . . ; (3) fraud . . . of an adverse party; (4) the judgement is void; (5) the judgment has been

satisfied . . . ; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). “A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time–and for

reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the

proceedings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). “Rule 60(b)(6) goes further, however, and empowers the

court to reopen a judgment even after one year has passed for ‘any other reason justifying relief from

the operation of the judgment.’” Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507

U.S. 380, 393 (1993). 

Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin

Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983) (en

banc). To succeed, a partymust set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court

to reverse its prior decision. See e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656,

665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9 Cir. 1987), th

cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[c]lause 60(b)(6) is residual and

‘must be read as being exclusive of the preceding clauses.’” LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser

Cement, 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986), quoting Corex Corp. v. United States, 638 F.2d 119 (9th

Cir. 1981). Accordingly, “the clause is reserved for ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id.

This Court has ruled on two separate occasions that Petitioner is not subject to equitable tolling. 

The instant motion makes the exact same argument raised in Petitioner’sfirst motion for reconsideration,

which this Court already denied.. The Court finds that Petitioner’s claim that his attorney abandoned

him before filing a federal petition does not meet the very high standard required by Rule 60(b)(6) nor

does it constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. 

Petitioner’s arguments do not rise to the level of anyof reasons set forth Rule 60(b) to grant relief

from a judgment, accordingly, Petitioner’s motion is hereby DENIED.IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 2

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