Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00312/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00312-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HALL-MAGNER GROUP,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11-CV-312 JLS (DHB)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS; AND (2) DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SANCTIONS

(ECF Nos. 22, 24)

vs.

CONVOCATION FLOWERS, INC., and

COMMENCEMENT FLOWERS, INC.

Defendants.

Presently before the Court is Defendants Convocation Flowers, Inc. and Commencement

Flowers, Inc.’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for lack of

personal jurisdiction (MTD, ECF No. 22), as well as Plaintiff’s opposition (Opp’n to MTD, ECF

No. 26) and Defendants’ reply (Reply ISO MTD, ECF No. 27). Also before the Court is

Defendants’ motion for sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel (Mot. for Sanctions, ECF

No. 24), which Plaintiff has opposed (Opp’n to Sanctions, ECF No. 25), and Defendants have

supported in reply (Reply ISO Sanctions, ECF No. 28). Having fully considered the parties’

- 1 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

arguments and the law, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction, and DENIES Defendants’ motion for sanctions.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Hall-Manger Group, which does business as “Commencement Flowers,” provides

flowers for university graduations throughout the United States, including in California. (FAC ¶

1-2, ECF No. 16). On November 9, 2010, Plaintiff registered the mark “Commencement Flowers”

on the Supplemental Registry of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, with a first use in

commerce date in 1988. (Id. at ¶ 16). 

Plaintiff brought this action on February 15, 2011, asserting six causes of action against

Darryl Firsten—three for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, and three related causes

of action under California Law—and seeking an injunction as well as damages. (Compl., ECF No.

1.) The Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on October

24, 2011, giving Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint that alleged facts to support the

existence of personal jurisdiction. (Oct. 24, 2011 Order 10, ECF No. 15.) 

On November 3, 2011, Plaintiff filed the operative FAC. Instead of against Darryl Firsten,

the FAC asserts the same six claims against Defendants Convocation Flowers, Inc. (“Convocation

Flowers”), a Canadian corporation, and Commencement Flowers, Inc., (“Commencement

Flowers”), a New Jersey corporation. (FAC ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges Darryl Firsten owns both

corporations, and that Convocation Flowers is the alter ego of Commencement Flowers. (Id. at

¶ 22.) Defendants operate two identical websites, convocationflowers.ca and

commencementflowers.com, which sell flowers for graduations. (Id.) Using these websites,

individuals—such as the parents of students who attend specific participating universities in the

Midwestern or Eastern United States, or Canada—are able to log onto one of Defendants’ websites

through a special link at the school’s event page to purchase flowers for pickup at that university’s

commencement. (See Opp’n to MTD, Ex. 12 at 1-2; Reply 5.) Although anyone may access

Defendants’ websites directly, the sites do not allow a general user who has not accessed them

1

 The Court has already recounted much of the factual history relevant to the instant motion

in its previous Order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Oct. 24, 2011

Order 1-2, ECF No. 6), which is incorporated by reference here.

- 2 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

through an affiliated school’s link to enter credit card information or finalize a purchase; instead, a

page indicates that Defendants “do not sell flowers to the general public at this time.” (Opp’n to

MTD 1.) On these websites, as well as in printed advertising, e-mail communications, marketing

literature passed out at commencements, and in direct communication with schools and

universities that comprise Plaintiff’s market, Defendants use Plaintiff’s registered mark,

“Commencement Flowers,” thereby infringing upon Plaintiff’s mark. (FAC ¶ 3-4.) 

Plaintiff discovered Defendants’ alleged infringement “[o]n or before November 22, 2010,

as a result of a search on the internet” which revealed that Defendants “were operating a retail

website service business in which they sold Flower Products throughout the United States under

the mark ‘Commencement Flowers’ and under the trade name ‘Commencement Flowers.’” 

(FAC ¶ 25.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants use the above-referenced websites to solicit

business to sell flowers in California. (Id. at ¶ 26.) On November 24, 2010, Plaintiff requested

Defendants cease and desist using the infringing trade name and mark, but Defendants have

refused to comply. (Id. at ¶ 27.)

Although not alleged in the FAC, in opposing Defendants’ instant motion Plaintiff asserts,

through the Declaration of Robert Hall, that on May 15, 2008, an incident occurred in Fullerton,

California on the campus of the University of California, Irvine, where Concordia University was

holding its graduation ceremony. (Hall Decl., Ex. 11 to Opp’n to MTD.) In this declaration, Mr.

Hall attests that on or about May 15, 2008, he was “advised via telephone by [his] team supervisor

of a problem at the campus of University of California in Irvine, California [UCI]. . . . [The] team

supervisor, Matt Gilbert, observed that defendant Darryl Firsten’s team was present on the

campus. They also called themselves Commencement Flowers and they were trying to sell

flowers at [Concordia University’s] graduation.” (Id.) Mr. Hall further states he instructed Matt

Gilbert to contact the campus police, which stopped Defendants’ team while they were “in the

process of setting up a kiosk on the campus,” and “escorted the defendant’s crew off the campus

because their products and services were in breach of an existing contract between Hall-Manger

Group and UCI for the exclusive right to provide graduation flowers.” (Id.) Defendants deny

these allegations entirely, explaining that they do “service” a Concordia University, but that it is

- 3 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

located in Quebec, Canada, not California. (Reply ISO MTD 10.) Defendants instead assert,

through the Declaration of Darryl Firsten, that neither Defendant has ever “sold flowers in

connection with events at any schools in California.” (MTD 5; Firsten Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. A to MTD.)

1. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows district courts to dismiss an action for lack

of personal jurisdiction. “Where defendants move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction, plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate.” Dole

Food Co. Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002). “The court may consider evidence

presented in affidavits to assist in its determination and may order discovery on the jurisdictional

issues.” Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys.

Tech. Ass’n, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977)). “When a district court acts on the

defendant’s motion to dismiss without holding an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need make only

a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. (citing Ballard

v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995)).

In establishing personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s uncontroverted allegations are taken as

true. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). However,

this same assumption does not apply to allegations that are contradicted by affidavit. Data Disc,

557 F.2d at 1284. If the parties submit conflicting affidavits, the plaintiff’s version trumps. 

Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We may not

assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are contradicted by affidavit, but we resolve

factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Harris

Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Unless directly contravened, [the plaintiff’s] version of the facts is taken as true, and ‘conflicts

between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in [the plaintiff’s] favor for

purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.’”) (citing Unocal

Corp., 248 F.3d at 922). 

//

- 4 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Where no federal statute authorizes personal jurisdiction, district courts apply the law of

the state in which they sit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1223. California’s

long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction so long as it comports with federal

due process. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10; Fred Martin Motor, 374 F.3d at 800–01. 

Accordingly, the Court’s jurisdictional analysis under California law is coextensive with a federal

due process analysis. “For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,

that defendant must have at least ‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum such that the

exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”

Fred Martin Motor, 374 F.3d at 801 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

(1945) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Under the minimum contacts test, jurisdiction can be either “specific” or “general.” Doe,

248 F.3d at 923. “Specific jurisdiction exists ‘where the cause of action arises out of or has

substantial connection to the defendant’s contact with the forum.’” ChemRisk v. Chappel, 2011

WL 1807436, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2011) (quoting Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v.

Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002)). “[G]eneral jurisdiction

depends on the defendant’s ‘substantial, continuous and systematic’ contacts with the forum, ‘even

if the suit concerns matters not arising out of his contacts with the forum.’” Id.

B. Analysis

(i) General Jurisdiction

“For general jurisdiction to exist over a nonresident defendant . . . the defendant must

engage in continuous and systematic general business contacts . . . that approximate physical

presence in the forum state.” Fred Martin Motor, 374 F.3d at 801 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). In determining whether a defendant’s contacts are sufficiently continuous and

systematic to confer general jurisdiction, courts consider such factors as the longevity, continuity,

volume, and economic impact of the defendant’s contacts in the forum state; other indications of

the defendant’s physical presence in the forum state; and the extent to which defendant’s contacts

are integrated into the state’s regulatory or economic markets. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1224

(citing Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006)). The standard

- 5 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for general jurisdiction is an exacting one, “as it should be, because a finding of general

jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court in the forum state to answer for any of its

activities anywhere in the world.” Fred Martin Motor, 374 F.3d at 801. 

Plaintiff argues Defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in the forum state on the

basis of contacts established through their websites and one disputed instance of physical presence

in California. Specifically, Defendants’ interactive websites allow California residents to purchase

flowers for students to pick up at kiosks at school graduations outside of the California, and are

“intentionally marketed in the State of California via association with college and university

websites” even though Defendants have set up a “charade”2 whereby the websites “pretend[] to

avoid contacts in the State of California.” (Opp’n to MTD 1-3.) Additionally, on one occasion in

May 2008, Plaintiff asserts Defendants and/or its employees were present and attempting to sell

flowers at the graduation of Concordia University in Fullerton, California, until these efforts were

stymied by campus police. (Id. at 2.) 

These contacts don’t even approach the requisite approximation of physical presence in

California to confer general jurisdiction in this forum. Even accepting Plaintiff’s version of the

Concordia incident,3 Defendants’ physical presence in California was a one-time occurrence, not

2

 Plaintiff’s allegations, raised for the first time in opposition to the instant motion to dismiss,

that Defendants’ websites are a “charade,” or have been “recently tailored,” are far from clear. (See

Opp’n 1-3, 8, 14.) Plaintiff seems to believe Defendants have altered their websites to appear to

exclude transactions from residents of California “[u]sing JavaScript and other software features” to

program their websites “such that transactions that use the ‘CA’ state designator in their credit card

address [are] greeted with a ‘Sorry-We do not accept orders from the public at this time,’ or a similar

message” when an individual accesses the website directly. (Id. at 8.) However, individuals in

California—or any state—can also access the websites by means of links established through

participating universities, because Defendants “graft a hot-button onto an existing university’s or

college’s active web site as a parasite [to] solicit flowers business state-by-state thereby.” (Id. at 14.) 

Although any implications that Defendants have acted to deceive the Court or the general public are

too vague to discern at this time, the Court accepts as true for the purposes of this motion that

California residents are able to purchase flowers directly from Defendants’ websites, at least if they

access the websites through a participating school’s link. The Court also accepts as undisputed that

none of these participating schools are located in California. 

3

 As described, supra at 3-4, no facts relating to the Concordia incident were alleged in the

FAC. However, Plaintiff has presented the Declaration of Robert Hall in support of its opposition

to Defendants’ motion, which the Court may properly consider as evidence in its determination of

jurisdictional issues. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 922. And, although Defendants dispute

the Concordia incident, the Court resolves factual disputes in the Plaintiff’s favor for the purposes of

this motion. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1223, supra at 4. The Court discusses the disputed Concordia

incident and the inferences which may be made at greater length, infra at 11-12. 

- 6 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

systematic, and did not have continuity or longevity. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (corporate

agent’s “conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf are

not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there.”). 

Indeed, this isolated instance falls far short of even “occasional” sales to forum residents, see

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1086, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000), or the

physical presence of a “substantial sales force,” Congoleum Corp. v. DLW Aktiengesellschaft, 729

F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1984), both of which have been held insufficient contacts to confer

general jurisdiction. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1226. 

Nor is Defendants’ operation of interactive websites sufficient to confer general

jurisdiction. As the Ninth Circuit recently clarified, the interactivity of a website, as articulated in

the widely-accepted Zippo4

 “sliding scale” test, is intended for use only in the context of a specific

jurisdiction inquiry. Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1227. “The level of interactivity of a nonresident

defendant’s website provides limited help in answering the distinct question whether the

defendant’s forum contacts are sufficiently substantial, continuous, and systematic to justify

general jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 712 (8th Cir. 2003)

(“Under the Zippo test, it is possible for a Web site to be very interactive but to have no quantity of

contacts. In other words, the contacts would be continuous, but not substantial. This is untenable

in a general jurisdiction analysis.”)). 

Here, Plaintiff has proffered an affidavit from one California resident, attesting that he was

able to access the Commencement Flowers website from his home in Fallbrook, California, and

placed an order for flowers to be delivered to a student at Johns Hopkins University’s

commencement in June 2011. (See Noyes Decl. ¶ 2-3, Ex. 12 to Opp’n to MTD.) Aside from this

one California purchase, Plaintiff has offered no evidence to support a finding that California

residents interact with Defendants’ websites with any sort of continuity, volume, or economic

impact. And Plaintiff does not dispute that “[n]either Defendant is incorporated in California nor

registered or licensed to do business here. They pay no taxes in California, maintain no bank

accounts in California, and target no print, television, internet or radio advertising toward

4

 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

- 7 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

California.” (Reply ISO MTD 2.) As in Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1225, the Court finds the absence of

such contacts significant. Ultimately, the Court agrees with Defendants that the “occasional sales

of flowers to California buyers (linked from the website of one of the 200 schools Defendants

serve and for delivery in that school’s jurisdiction every single time) are not sufficient to create

general jurisdiction” without a much greater showing by Plaintiff. (See Reply ISO MTD 2-3.) For

these reasons, the Court finds Defendants’ activities do not approximate physical presence in

California, and that Defendants consequently cannot be subject to general jurisdiction in

California.

(ii) Specific Jurisdiction

Where, as here, general jurisdiction is not proper over Defendants, the Court must ask

whether the “nature and quality” of Defendants’ contacts are sufficient to justify the exercise of

specific jurisdiction in a given case. Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1287. The three-prong test applied by

the Ninth Circuit to determine specific jurisdiction over non-resident defendants requires the Court

to ask whether (1) Defendants purposefully directed their activities at California or performed

some act by which they purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in

California; (2) Plaintiff’s claims arise out of these forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of

specific jurisdiction over Defendants is reasonable. See Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d at 802. 

Plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying both of the first two prongs. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d

1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 2001). If Plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to Defendants to “‘present a

compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Fred Martin Motor,

374 F.3d at 802 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–78 (1985)). The

Court examines these prongs in turn.

(a) First Prong: Purposeful Direction

The first prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis comprises both “purposeful direction”

and “purposeful availment.” Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1228. In cases alleging tort-like causes of

action, such as Plaintiff’s trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition

claims against Defendants in this case, the Ninth Circuit focuses on “purposeful direction,”

applying the “Calder effects” test originated in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). See

- 8 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Facebook, Inc. v. Pedersen, 2012 WL 1836257, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2012) (“The Court finds

that the Calder effects test is the proper framework for analyzing the exercise of specific personal

jurisdiction over defendants, because [the plaintiff] alleges trademark dilution and infringement,

both of which are tort-like causes of action.”); Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1228 (applying Calder effects

test under purposeful direction analysis to claims of copyright infringement). Accordingly, the

Court must examine whether Defendants have “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly

aimed at that forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the

forum state.” Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1111. All three elements of the test must be satisfied. Fred

Martin Motor, 374 F.3d at 805. 

(1) Intentional Act

In the context of the Calder effects test, an intentional act refers to an “actual, physical act

in the real world.” Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Juniper Media, LLC, 2012 WL 160248, at *2 (N.D.

Cal. Jan. 17, 2012). A defendant need only have performed an act, any act, and need not have

intended “to accomplish a result or consequence of that act.” Fred Martin Motor, 374 F.3d at 805. 

Generally, this element is easily met, and it is well-established that the creation and operation of a

website suffices. Id. (citing Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128-

29 (9th Cir. 2010)). The Court concludes, and the parties do not contest, that Defendants have

committed an intentional act.

(2) Express Aiming

The express aiming requirement of the Calder effects test is met when “the defendant is

alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to

be a resident of the forum state.” Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1111. Whether tortious conduct on a

nationally accessible website is expressly aimed at a particular forum in which the website may be

accessed is an evolving legal question that courts have struggled to answer since the invention of

the Internet. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1229 (citing cases). Many courts have employed some

version of the Zippo sliding scale, supra at 7 and n.4, to assist in categorizing websites and

assessing the type of activity they conduct in the forum. See, e.g., Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1226-27,

29; Pebble Beach v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1156-58 (9th Cir. 2006); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell,

- 9 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1997). At one end of the Zippo scale are “passive” websites,

on which a defendant simply posts information that individuals in the forum state may

access—these do not support personal jurisdiction. Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1226-27. At the other end

are “active” websites, through which a defendant engages in business transactions over the

Internet, thereby entering into contracts with residents of the forum state “that involve the knowing

and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet,” Zippo, 952 F.Supp at

1124—conversely, these do support personal jurisdiction. In between these two extremes lie most

commercial websites. Precisely where a particular website fits on the continuum depends upon the

“level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange . . . that occurs on the Web site.” Id.

at 1124. 

Adopting Zippo’s general framework, the Ninth Circuit has elaborated that a passive

website alone, without “something more” to establish conduct directly targeting the form, cannot

satisfy the express aiming prong. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019-21

(9th Cir. 2002). Courts may consider a variety of factors in deciding whether a defendant has done

“something more,” including the interactivity of the website, the geographical breadth of the

website’s commercial reach, and whether the defendant “individually targeted” individuals in the

forum through the website. See, e.g., Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1230 (concluding based on the subject

matter of defendant’s celebrity-focused website, as well as the size and commercial value of the

California market, that defendant “anticipated, desired, and achieved” a substantial California

audience, in satisfaction of the “something more” requirement); Rio Props., 284 F.3d 1007, 1020

(9th Cir. 2002) (finding “something more” where defendant ran a for-profit marketing campaign in

the forum and purposefully operated a website whose content infringed plaintiff’s trademarks);

Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1158 (concluding that the “foreseeable effect” of harm in California

was not sufficient to establish “something more” where defendant operated a non-interactive

website and no wrongful conduct could be construed as being directed at or targeting California). 

Defendants’ websites are certainly interactive. By allowing individuals to purchase

flowers for delivery to graduations on their websites, even if only accessible through some

redirection through a participating school, Defendants clearly engage in business transactions

- 10 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

through the Internet. However, the scope of their commercial ambition is more limited. Although

they have not precluded individuals in California from purchasing flowers for graduating students

at participating schools, none of these 200 or so schools is located in California. Instead, the

schools are on the other side of the continent, in the eastern United States and Canada, with some

extending into the Midwest. (See Reply 1.) That some customers would inevitably reside in

California, especially given the large population of the state,5 may render it foreseeable that harm

would occur in California by way of California residents accessing the websites and viewing

Defendants’ infringing trademarks, but mere foreseeability of harm is not enough to establish

personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has long held that “a defendant’s awareness that the

stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere

act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum state.” 

Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Sup. Ct. of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). 

And where, as here, the product itself (flowers) is never delivered to California, even if the friend

or family member who purchased the flowers lives in California, there is even less to indicate

purposeful direction.

Aside from the Concordia incident, which the Court addresses below, Plaintiff has not

pointed to a single commercial action Defendants have directed towards California to indicate

Defendants’ intent to serve a market in California. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (listing examples of

additional conduct of the defendant that may indicate purposeful direction, such as “designing the

product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for

providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a

distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State”). Consequently, the

Court finds that through their websites, Defendants, who market their product exclusively in

//

5

 Plaintiff argues that the large size of California’s population should satisfy the “express aim”

element because Defendants consequently enjoy a substantial California customer base. (Opp’n to

MTD 13-14.) Specifically, Plaintiff states that “approximately 12 percent of the population of U.S.

college students reside in the State of California. On average then, 12% of the population at any of

the ‘200’ schools would also be 12%.” (Id. at 13.) The Court rejects this argument as statistically and

logically flawed, and unpersuasive. 

- 11 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

relation to schools located outside of California and never deliver the product to California, have

not expressly aimed any wrongful conduct toward California citizens. 

Nor does Plaintiff’s vague second-hand account of an incident in California through the

Declaration of Mr. Hall suffice to satisfy the express aiming requirement. Even resolving conflicts

in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff has not established how Defendants were involved in the incident. 

Mr. Hall states that on May 15, 2008, he received a telephone call from an employee informing

him that “Darryl Firsten’s team was present on campus [in California]. They also called

themselves Commencement Flowers and they were trying to sell flowers at the University

graduation.” (Hall Decl. ¶ 5.) Mr. Hall apparently “did not recognize the significance of the

Concordia incident until [he] discovered online that Darryl Firsten was infringing upon my

trademark in November, 2010.” (Id. at ¶ 6.) Mr. Hall does not explain why he did not realize “the

significance” of the incident until seeing Defendants’ websites, nor does he indicate whether

Darryl Firsten himself was present in California, what “Darryl Firsten’s team” means, or how the

identity of any of these team members was ascertained by Mr. Hall’s employee, whose declaration

is not supplied. In response to these vague and conclusory statements, Defendants supply the

Declaration of Mr. Firsten, who states unequivocally that neither Defendant corporation “has ever

sold flowers in connection with any events at any schools in California,” nor have they “ever

shipped flowers or other merchandise to California” or “ever intentionally marketed to individuals

in California.” (Firsten Decl. ¶ 14, 17, 18.) The Court need not accept Plaintiff’s attenuated and

conclusory allegations in the face of specific denials made by Defendants. See Terracom v. Valley

Nat’l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 562 (9th Cir. 1995).

Moreover, the Concordia incident would also be an insufficient basis to satisfy the second

prong of specific jurisdiction, which requires that Plaintiff’s claims arise out of Defendants’

forum-related activities. See Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1988)

(“We must determine if the plaintiff . . . would not have been injured ‘but for’ the

defendant[’s] . . . conduct directed toward [the plaintiff] in California.”). Plaintiff’s claims as

stated in the FAC focus entirely on Defendants’ websites. Indeed, no facts pertaining to physical

presence in California are even alleged, and the FAC does not assert Defendants serve schools in

- 12 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

California through their websites. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met its

burden of showing that Defendants expressly aimed any conduct underlying the claims at

California. 

(3) Harm

Finally, Plaintiff has also not established that the third prong of the Calder effects test,

which asks whether Defendants have caused harm that they know is likely to be suffered in the

forum state, is satisfied here. Aside from the vague allegations regarding the Concordia incident—

the deficiencies of which have already been noted—Plaintiff has not indicated that Defendants

compete in any direct way to sell flowers at any of the same schools or locations as Plaintiff. Even

if Defendants knew of Plaintiff’s existence and residence in California, it remains unclear whether

economic loss to Plaintiff caused by Defendants’ sale of flowers in entirely separate markets

would constitute foreseeable harm in the forum. 

(b) Second and Third Prongs: Forum-Related Activities and Reasonableness

Because Plaintiff has failed to establish the first prong of the specific jurisdiction inquiry,

the Court need not inquire into whether the second or third prongs are met. See Sher v. Johnson,

911 F.2d at 1361. Accordingly, the Court finds that its exertion of personal jurisdiction over

Defendants would exceed the limits of due process.

2. Limited Jurisdictional Discovery

Plaintiff requests the Court grant limited jurisdictional discovery in the event it is inclined

to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Pl.’s Opp’n 14.) The Court has “broad

discretion to permit or deny [jurisdictional] discovery.” Calix Networks, Inc. v. Wi-Lan, Inc., 2010

WL 3515759, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010) (quoting Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 342 F.3d

1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003)). The district court should ordinarily grant jurisdictional discovery

where “pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more

satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.” Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1285 n. 1. However,

“[w]here a plaintiff’s claim of personal jurisdiction appears to be both attenuated and based on

bare allegations in the face of specific denials made by defendants, the Court need not permit even

limited discovery. . . .” Terracom v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 562 (9th Cir. 1995). 

- 13 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“Although there is no definitive Ninth Circuit authority specifically addressing the level of

showing that a plaintiff must make to be entitled to jurisdictional discovery, district courts in this

circuit have required a plaintiff to establish a ‘colorable basis’ for personal jurisdiction before

discovery is ordered.” Martinez v. Manheim Cent. Cal., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41666, at *10

(E.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Mitan v. Feeney, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2007)).

As previously discussed, Plaintiff has failed to provide even a colorable basis for personal

jurisdiction. Even accepting Plaintiff’s vague version of the Concordia incident, the Court cannot

conclude Plaintiff has met its burden to demonstrate jurisdiction is proper. Nor has Plaintiff

provided any level of detailed indication as to what discovery would establish. In contrast,

Defendants’ affidavits explicitly and unequivocally deny any physical presence in California. 

For these reasons, the Court declines to permit jurisdictional discovery as it would appear to be

futile in this case. 

3. Motion for Sanctions

On December 15, 2011, less than a month after bringing its motion to dismiss the FAC and

before Plaintiff had filed an opposition to that motion, Defendants brought a motion for sanctions

against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel. In it, Defendants seek an order requiring Plaintiff to pay

their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in responding to Plaintiff’s FAC. According to

Defendants, such an award is merited based on Plaintiff’s unreasonable pursuit of frivolous claims

in the FAC against Defendants, over whom the Court has no personal jurisdiction, which was

intended to harass Defendants, improperly multiply the proceedings, and cause unwarranted

expense. (Mot. for Sanctions 1.) Sanctions are further warranted based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s

knowingly false representations to the Court regarding the date of Plaintiff’s knowledge of

Defendants’ use of the mark at issue and the extent of protection Plaintiff’s generic mark receives

under federal trademark law. (Id. at 7-9.) 

For this improper conduct, Defendants argue that the award of sanctions is justified under

three legal theories. First, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c), the Court may impose an

appropriate sanction on an attorney who violates the requirements of section (b), which states

attorneys must certify, inter alia, that all filings are: presented for proper purposes; warranted by

- 14 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

existing law or by a nonfrivolous legal argument; and supported by evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 

Second, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides: “Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any

case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess

costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” Third,

Defendants argue the Court may award attorneys’ fees and costs “under its inherent powers,” for

the dual purposes of vindicating its judicial authority and making the prevailing party whole for

expenses caused by its opponent’s obstinancy. (Mot. for Sanctions 5-6) (citing Primus Auto. Fin.

Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997); China Healthways Inst., Inc. v. Hsin Ten

Enter. USA, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16286, at *9-12 (C.D. Cal. 2003)). 

The Court declines to award sanctions on any of these bases at this time. Although

Defendants correctly enumerate the three primary sources of the Court’s authority to sanction

parties or their lawyers for improper conduct,6

 they fail to convince the Court that any sanctionable

conduct has occurred. “[S]anctions should be reserved for the ‘rare and exceptional case where

the action is clearly frivolous, legally unreasonable or without legal foundation, or brought for an

improper purpose.’” Primus Auto., 115 F.3d at 649 (quoting Operating Engineers Pension Trust

v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s FAC for lack of personal jurisdiction. The action is again dismissed WITHOUT

PREJUDICE, and the Court will grant Plaintiff a second opportunity to remedy the deficiencies

noted above. If Plaintiff wishes, he may file a second amended complaint within fourteen days

6

 In Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit summarized these

three authorities succinctly as follows: “(1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which applies to

signed writings filed with the court, (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which is aimed at penalizing conduct that

unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies the proceedings, and (3) the court’s inherent power,” which

is “both broader and narrower than other means of imposing sanctions.” The first two authorities only

allow sanctions for specific forms of attorney misconduct, Primus, 115 F.3d at 648, whereas under

a court’s inherent power it may sanction a party or counsel for a wide range of conduct, so long as the

sanctioned action was made “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Granite

Rock Co. v. Teamsters Local 287, 2012 WL 726645, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2012). However, before

awarding sanctions under inherent authority, the court must make an explicit finding of bad faith or

conduct tantamount to bad faith. Fink, 239 F.3d at 994 (“[A]n attorney’s reckless misstatements of

law and fact, when coupled with an improper purpose . . . are sanctionable under the court’s inherent

power.”).

- 15 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

after this Order is electronically docketed. Additionally, Defendants’ motion for sanctions is

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 27, 2012

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

- 16 - 11cv312

Case 3:11-cv-00312-JLS-DHB Document 31 Filed 07/27/12 Page 16 of 16