Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01553/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01553-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ANTHONY J. VALADEZ, 

NO. CIV. S-03-1553 WBS PAN-PS

Plaintiff, 

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RE: OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE

JUDGE’S FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

COUNTY OF SIERRA, CALIFORNIA

SIERRA COUNTY JAIL, SIERRA

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,

WESTERN SIERRA MEDICAL CLINIC,

JUDGE WILLIAM PANGMAN, SHERIFF

LELAND ADAMS, CORPORAL LOU

FOXWORTHY, LYNN JAKOBS, FRANK

J. LANG, and DOES 1-20,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff brings claims against defendants for (1)

violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (3) neglect or failure to

prevent a conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1986; (4) false imprisonment; (5) violations of

rights secured by the California Constitution; (6) violation of

California Civil Code § 52.1; and (7) what plaintiff

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characterizes as negligent and intentional infliction of physical

and emotional harm, which the court interprets as claims for

negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendants have filed two separate motions for summary judgment

as to all plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On or about May 6, 2002, plaintiff Anthony Valadez was

injured in a bus accident. (Pl.’s Am. Response to Defs. County

of Sierra, California Sierra County Jail, Sierra County Sheriff

Department, Sheriff Leland Adams, and Corporal Lou Foxworthy’s

Statement of Undisputed Facts (“PRSUF1”) ¶ 5). As a result of

the accident, plaintiff claims he experienced neuropathic pain in

his neck, back, and upper right shoulder. (Am. Decl. of Anthony 

Valadez in Supp. of Opp’n to Mot. For Summ. J. By Sierra County,

et al. (“Am. Valadez Decl.”) ¶ 1). 

Thereafter, on or about July 12, 2002, Judge William

Pangman of the Superior Court of California for the County of

Sierra sentenced Valadez to incarceration for six counts of

contempt of court. (Pl.’s Am. Resp. to Defs. Western Sierra

Medical Clinic, Inc., Lynn Jakobs, and Frank Lang Statement of

Undisputed Facts (“PRSUF2") ¶ 1). Valadez thoroughly read the

order and signed it. (Id. ¶ 3). The order required Valadez to

report to the California Sierra County Jail (“the Jail”) at 9:00

a.m. on Friday, August 9, 2002 to begin serving a five-day

sentence. (Id. ¶ 4). 

Valadez reported to the Jail on August 9, 2002. (Id. ¶

7). Prior to being booked, Valadez complained that he was in

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pain from his injuries from the bus accident. (Id. ¶ 8). Less

than half an hour from this initial complaint, Valadez was seen

by personnel from Western Sierra Medical Clinic (“the Medical

Clinic”). (Id. ¶ 9). Valadez was cleared for incarceration

during that examination and placed in a cell. (Id. ¶ 10). While

in the cell, Valadez claims he suffered extreme and severe pain. 

(Am. Valadez Decl. ¶ 1). He requested medical assistance

numerous times and was seen by medical personnel once in the

afternoon and once that evening. (PRSUF2 ¶¶ 11-12). After the

afternoon visit, Valadez was prescribed pain medication, which he

took. (Id.). After the evening visit, he was released due to

his medical condition at approximately 9:00 p.m. and told to

report back on August 16, 2002 at 9:00 a.m. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 52). 

Before Valadez was released, Judge Pangman called

Cameron Meadows, a correctional officer at the Jail, and told her

that Valadez was only to receive credit for the hours he actually

served as opposed to credit for a full day. (Declaration of

Cameron Meadows in Supp. of Mot. For Summ. J. by Defs. County of

Sierra et al. (“Meadows Decl.”) ¶ 3; Declaration of Cameron

Meadows Submitted With Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Statement of

Undisputed Material Facts in Supp. Of Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J.

By Western Sierra Medical Clinic (“Meadows Dep.”) 10:14-24). 

Officer Bierwerth, presumably unaware of Judge Pangman’s order,

told Valadez that he would receive one full day’s credit for

serving 12 hours in jail when he released him. (Deposition of

William Bierwerth Submitted With Notice of Submission of Dep.

Trs. in Supp. of Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. By Western Sierra

Medical Clinic (“Biewerth Dep.”) 91:20-92:11 ). Leland Adams,

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the Sheriff of Sierra County, also testified in his deposition

that inmates were often credited with a full day’s time served

for serving any portion of a day. (Deposition of Leland Adams

Attached to Pl.’s Notice of Supplemental Submission of Dep. Trs.

(“Adams Dep.”) 51:3-18). However, Adams later clarified that he

did not know how time served was calculated in the Jail and noted

that he was aware that the court could sentence persons by the

hour. (Id. 59:4-15). 

Valadez reported back to jail on August 16, 2002. 

(PGSUF2 ¶ 14). He was examined by Medical Clinic personnel, then

released and told to report back on August 23, 2002. (Id. ¶¶ 14-

16). 

On August 23, 2002, Valadez again reported to the Jail. 

(Id. ¶ 17). While Valadez’s attorney, J. Lon Cooper, waited to

meet with Judge Pangman, Valadez waited in the hallway of the

Sierra County Sheriff’s Department (“the Sheriff’s Department”)

for approximately two hours before going to the Medical Clinic. 

(Id. ¶ 20). A person from the Medical Clinic sent him back to

the Jail. (Declaration of Mark Walker in Supp. of Opp’n to Mot.

for Summ. J. (“Walker Decl.”) ¶ 4). Back at the Jail, sheriff’s

deputy Alison Baca told Valadez to wait in the hallway or outside

the courthouse while Judge Pangman heard other matters on his

calendar. (PRSUF2 ¶¶ 19, 21; Walker Decl. ¶ 9). While Valadez

waited, Mr. Cooper would come out of the courthouse to update him

on the status of his meeting with the judge once or twice every

hour. (PRSUF2 ¶ 22). 

Later that afternoon, Mr. Cooper met with Judge

Pangman. (Id. ¶ 23). After the meeting, Sheriff’s Department

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personnel informed Valadez that he would not be remanded into

custody that day and that he should report back on September 13,

2002. (Id. ¶ 25). 

Between August 9, 2002 and September 13, 2002, Valadez

obtained a letter from his primary care physician, Dr. Wayne

Matthews, intended to prevent Valadez’s incarceration. 

(Deposition of Wayne C. Matthews, M.D. Submitted With Notice of

Submission of Dep. Trs. in Supp. of Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ.

J. by Western Sierra Medical Clinic (“Matthews Dep.”) 31:15-21). 

In that letter, Dr. Matthews failed to specify any limitations or

conditions necessary for incarcerating Valadez in light of his

medical condition. Dr. Matthews later testified in his

deposition that he would defer any determination of whether

Valadez was fit to be incarcerated in the Jail to a medical

practitioner who had knowledge of the Jail facilities and the

opportunity to assess Valadez at the time of incarceration. (Id.

32: 2-11; 37:9-17). However, he clarified that he might not give

such deference to another medical practitioner’s determination if

it were contested. (Id. 68:16-25). In a later declaration,

Matthews further stated that “it would have been appropriate” for

Valadez to have been treated by a physician at a hospital. 

(Declaration of Dr. Wayne C. Matthews, M.D., A.B.F.P. in Supp. of

Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Matthews Decl.”) ¶ 8). 

Valadez never asked any other doctor to provide a list of

conditions under which he could be suitably incarcerated. 

(PRSUF2 ¶ 35). 

On September 13, 2002, Valadez again reported to the

Jail at about 9:00 a.m. (Id. ¶ 26). He claims he was suffering

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from neuropathic pain in his neck, back, and upper right shoulder

and that he walked with a cane and cried all day. The pain was

allegedly so bad that he could not eat. (Id. ¶53). Around 11:30

a.m. he was examined by Lynn Jakobs, a nurse from the Medical

Clinic. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28). Ms. Jakobs consulted with Frank J.

Lang, the executive director of the Medical Clinic and a fellow

nurse, as to Valadez’s fitness for incarceration. (Deposition of

Frank J. Lang Submitted With Pl.’s Notice of Submission of Dep.

Trs. in Supp. of Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. By Western Sierra

Medical Clinic (“Lang Dep.”) 9:10-13; 24:7-15). After this

consultation, Ms. Jakobs determined that Valadez was fit to be

incarcerated in the Jail and that the stay would not adversely

affect his chronic condition. (PRSUF2 ¶ 30). She directed Jail

personnel to provide Valadez with two mattresses on his bed, a

padded chair, and extra pillows. (Id. ¶ 54). Thereafter, thenSergeant Lou Foxworthy was informed that Ms. Jakobs had

determined that Valadez was medically fit for incarceration in

the Jail. (Id. ¶ 31). Valadez was booked into the Jail at about

12:00 p.m. (Id. ¶ 26).

That same day, September 13, 2002, Valadez made two

written complaints regarding pain he was suffering from his preexisting medical condition. (Id. ¶ 36). Both times thenSergeant Foxworthy instructed officer William Bierwerth to inform

Valadez that the matter had been addressed. (Id. ¶ 37). Officer

Bierwerth relayed the messages to Valadez. (Id. ¶ 38). 

Thereafter, Valadez filled out several more written requests for

medical attention and transfer to Sierra Nevada Hospital. (Am.

Valadez Decl. ¶ 4). His requests were all relayed to the Medical

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1 Valadez disputes that Ms. Jakobs made the determination

that he did not need to be hospitalized, suggesting instead that

such a decision would be made by prison personnel. (PRSUF 2 ¶

44). However, the deposition testimony he cites for this

proposition, demonstrates, at best, that the Jail does in fact

rely on medical personnel - in this case Ms. Jakobs - to make

such determinations. (See Deposition of Lynn Jakobs Submitted

With Pl.’s Notice of Submission of Dep. Trs. in Supp. of Opp’n to

Mot. for Summ. J. By Wester Sierra Medical Clinic (“Jakobs Dep.”)

151:14-18, 152:4-153:2; Deposition of Lou Foxworthy Submitted

With Pl.’s Notice of Supp. Dep. Trs. (“Foxworthy Dep.”) 111:11-

13). 

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Clinic. (Declaration of Bill Bierwerth in Supp. of Mot. for

Summ. J. by Sierra County et al. (“Bierwerth Decl.”) ¶ 7). 

On September 14, 2002, Ms. Jakobs again examined

Valadez. During the examination she offered to give Valadez 

a shot of pain medication and to provide him with medicine for

his upset stomach. (PRSUF2 ¶¶ 40-41). Valadez declined. (Id. ¶

41). Jakobs then prescribed him Vicodin for his pain and

determined that he did not need to be hospitalized. (Id. ¶¶ 43-

44).1 Valadez was, however, never provided a padded chair and

extra pillows, and was not given an extra mattress until

September 15, 2002. (Id. ¶¶ 57-58).

Valadez claims that the pain he suffered from his

condition spread to his arms, legs, and feet throughout his

incarceration. (Am. Valadez Decl. ¶ 1). He claims the pain

prohibited him from eating and drinking and caused him to vomit

repeatedly. (Id.). The videotape submitted with the transcript

of the declaration of Officer Bierwerth (“the videotape”) shows

Valadez refusing water and food and frequently vomiting in the

toilet provided him. (Bierwerth Decl., Attach. (Videotape)). In

the videotape, he also complains of an inability to eat and drink

and requests to be transferred to a hospital. (Id.). The

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2 Valadez denies that Ms. Jakobs’ decision was the true

reason he was not released or transferred from the Jail. (PRSUF2

¶ 32). Instead, he contends that other factors influenced the

decision. (Id.). However, none of the evidence Valadez cites to

support this position actually suggests another motive, other

than some of his answers to interrogatories. The relevant

answers to interrogatories consist only of conclusory allegations

that Sheriff’s Department and Medical Clinic personnel kept

Valadez in the Jail at the behest of Judge Pangman in order to

increase Valadez’s suffering. (See Am. Valadez Decl., Ex. 2

(Pl.’s Answers to Interrogs.) at 28-30). Conclusory allegations

unsupported by factual data are not enough to create a genuine

dispute of a material fact. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

(9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, the court treats this fact as

undisputed. 

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videotape also shows Officer Bierwerth conversing over the

telephone with someone from the Medical Clinic regarding

Valadez’s condition and encouraging Valadez to eat and drink. 

(Id.). Despite Valadez’s apparent pain, he was not released or

transferred to a hospital or another jail facility because Ms.

Jakobs had medically cleared him for incarceration. (Declaration

of Lou Foxworthy in Supp. of Sierra County Defs.’ Mot. for Summ.

J. (“Foxworthy” Decl.”) ¶ 5).2 

On September 17, 2002, Officer Bierwerth informed

Valadez that he would be released at about noon that same day and

instructed him to begin preparing for that release. Valadez

requested an ambulance to take him to the hospital on his

release, but later declined Beirwerth’s offer to call him one

after he realized there was no ambulance waiting for him outside. 

(Id. ¶ 45; Am. Valadez Decl. ¶ 9). 

Valadez went to a hospital and was examined by Dr.

Vance J. Vantassell around 3 p.m. that same day. (Deposition of

Vance J. Vantassell, M.D. Submitted With Pl.’s Resp. to Def.

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Supp. of Opp’n to Mot.

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for Summ. J. (“Vantassell Dep.”) 7:11-10:13). Dr. Vantassell

gave Valadez some pain medication and an i.v., ran some tests,

and released Valadez around 6 p.m. that day after Valadez

demonstrated that he could drink without vomiting and asked to go

home (Id. 10:14-19; 15:8-23; 27:4-8). 

On or about July 24, 2004, Valadez filed his complaint

in this court alleging both federal and state causes of action

against defendants. The matter was referred to United States

Magistrate Judge Peter A. Nowinski pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636,

et seq., and Local Rule 72-302. All claims against Judge Pangman

were dismissed on September 28, 2004. Thereafter, defendants

filed two separate motions for summary judgment. The magistrate

judge issued findings and recommendations recommending that

summary judgment be granted as to all defendants. (Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations dated April 20, 2005). On

May 2, 2005, Valadez filed objections to the findings and

recommendations. On May 5, 2005 and May 13, 2005, defendants

filed replies to Valadez’s objections to the findings and

recommendations. The court reviews defendants’ motions for

summary judgment de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b); Local Rule 72-304.

II. Discussion 

The court must grant summary judgment to a moving party

“if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party adverse to a motion for summary

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3 In his complaint, Valadez also referenced the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments. However, in his oppositions to

defendants’ motions for summary judgment he specifically rests

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judgment may not simply deny generally the pleadings of the

movant; the adverse party must designate “specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Simply put, “a

summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on

conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data.” Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). The nonmoving party

must show more than a mere “metaphysical doubt” as to the

material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

A. Plaintiff’s Federal Claims

Valadez has alleged civil rights violations under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. To make out a claim under any of

these statutes, Valadez must first demonstrate that he has been

deprived of a federal right. Dang Vang v. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476,

479 (9th Cir. 1991)(plaintiff must show deprivation of a federal

constitutional or statutory right to state a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983); Giannini v. Real, 911 F.2d 354, 359 (9th Cir.

1990)(same for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985); Loehr v. Ventura

County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1320 (9th Cir.

1984)(“[A]n action under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 depends on a predicate

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. . . .”). 

To meet this burden, Valadez argues that defendants,

acting under orders from Judge Pangman, violated his Eighth

Amendment rights in three ways.3 

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his federal claims on violations of the Eighth Amendment and not

any others. The court is aware that it has a duty to “liberally

construe ‘inartful pleading’ by pro se litigants.” Washington v.

Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1432 n14 (9th Cir. 1993). But the court

does not believe it can be expected or should undertake to

create, analyze, and evaluate arguments that have not been made

by either party. Therefore, the court analyzes Valadez’s claims

in light of the Eighth Amendment only. 

Valadez also contends that defendants violated his

federal rights by purportedly violating state law and local

policies. This argument, however, is invalid on its face. 

Plaintiffs may not sue in federal court under § 1983 for

violations of state law. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382

F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). Nor do §§ 1985 and 1986 cover

violations of state law. Giannini, 911 F.2d at 359; Loehr, 743

F.2d at 1320. 

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First, Valadez argues that defendants - he does not

specify which ones - violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

forcing him to wait outside Judge Pangman’s courtroom on August

23, 2002 while he was hungry and in pain. This claim fails on at

least two grounds. For one, it fails to implicate any of the

named defendants. Valadez appeared and waited at the courthouse

pursuant to Judge Pangman’s order. (See PRSUF2 ¶¶ 16-17, 19,

25). Judge Pangman is no longer a party to this case. (See

Order dated September 28, 2004). Though deputy Baca told Valadez

not to leave the courthouse, Valadez was not remanded into the

custody of the Sierra County Sheriff’s Department that day. 

(PRSUF2 ¶¶ 19, 21, 25; Walker Decl. ¶ 9). Baca is not a party to

this case, and Valadez produces no evidence that any of the

remaining named defendants were responsible for his “detention”

outside the courtroom. 

Furthermore, Valadez’s “detention” outside the

courtroom is not covered by the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth

Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment

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during confinement. Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003). 

Valadez was not in confinement when he was allegedly compelled to

wait outside the courthouse on August 23, 2002. He was not even

in the custody of the Sheriff’s Department. (PRSUF2 ¶¶ 19, 21,

25). Therefore, Valadez has no federal claim based on a

violation of the Eighth Amendment with regards to the time he

waited outside the courthouse on August 23, 2002. 

Valadez further contends that the defendants affiliated

with the Jail violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

incarcerating him beyond the dictates of his sentence. The Ninth

Circuit has held that “[d]etention beyond the termination of a

sentence c[an] constitute cruel and unusual punishment if it is

the result of ‘deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s liberty

interest.” Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir.

1985)(citations omitted). “Deliberate indifference” is

tantamount to a knowing disregard. Gibson v. County of Washoe,

290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Valadez argues that he should have been credited for

“time served” waiting outside the courtroom on August 23, 2002

and for two full days of time served on August 9, 2002 and

September 13, 2002. Because he was not, he argues that he was

detained too long. Valadez produces no evidence to suggest that

his time outside the courthouse would qualify as time served

under the system used by the Jail. He was not even in custody at

the time. (See PRSUF2 ¶ 25). Therefore, Valadez has no claim

for a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights based on the time

he spent waiting outside the courtroom. 

 However, Valadez’s argument regarding the length of his

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actual jail stay is more complex. Jail personnel kept Valadez

incarcerated for twelve hours on August 9, 2002 and then from

September 13, 2002 at 12:00 p.m. to September 17, 2002 at 12:00

p.m., for a total of 12 hours and four additional 24-hour periods

pursuant to Judge Pangman’s orders. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 13, 26, 45). 

According to Valadez, he should have completed his five-day jail

sentence on September 16, 2002, having served one day on August

9, 2002 and then four consecutive “days” from September 13, 2002

to September 16, 2002. His calculation credits him with one full

day of time served on August 9, 2002, and another full day of

time served on September 13, 2002, although he was incarcerated

for only portions of those two days. On this basis, Valadez

argues he was wrongfully held in jail on September 17, 2002 for

12 hours, since he allegedly completed his five-day term at

midnight the night before.

Some of the evidence presented to the court supports

Valadez’s argument and some evidence undermines it. Officer

Biewerth apparently told Valadez that he would be credited for a

full day’s time served for the time he spent in Jail on August 9,

2002. (Bierwerth Dep. 91:20-92:11). Sheriff Adams also

testified that inmates were often credited for a full day’s time

served for any portion of a day spent in Jail. (Adams Dep. 51:3-

18). However, Adams also testified that he did not know how time

served was calculated in the Jail but was aware that judges could

sentence persons by the hour. (Id. 59:4-15). Officer Meadows

states that Judge Pangman told her on August 9, 2002 that Valadez

was to receive credit only for the hours he actually served. 

(Meadows Decl. ¶ 3). Whether this order was also meant to apply

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to the rest of Valadez’s sentence is unclear, though Jail

personnel apparently interpreted it that way.

However, even if Valadez’s calculation were correct,

Valadez could not show that any of the defendants were

deliberately indifferent to his allegedly prolonged detention. 

There is no record that Valadez protested the length of his

incarceration while he was in Jail. Nor was his stay in Jail so

long that Jail personnel would have had a reason to question the

length of that stay. At most, Valadez was kept 12 hours past his

allegedly proper release time without protest and consistent with

an apparent court order to have plaintiff serve his sentence by

the hour. To the extent any of the named defendants were

involved with Valadez’s detention, they did not violate the

Eighth Amendment by briefly detaining someone they had reason to

believe was to be legally detained pursuant to court order.

Finally, Valadez claims that defendants violated his

Eighth Amendment rights by denying his requests for medical

attention and for a transfer to a hospital or to another jail. 

“Denial of medical attention to prisoners constitutes an Eighth

Amendment violation if the denial amounts to deliberate

indifference to serious medicals need of the prisoners.” Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Prison officials show

deliberate indifference when they deny, delay or intentionally

interfere with medical treatment. Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d

198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). However, medical malpractice does not

amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Broughton v.

Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980). Nor can a

prisoner establish an Eighth Amendment violation on the basis of

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a good faith dispute between the prisoner and prison officials

over the necessity for or extent of medical treatment. Mayfield

v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1970).

In the context of a claim for a violation of the Eighth

Amendment, a “serious medical condition” exists if the failure to

treat a prisoner’s condition could cause significant injury or

result in “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Doty v.

County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Indicia of 

a “serious medical condition” include “(1) the existence of an

injury that a reasonable doctor would find important and worthy

of comment or treatment; (2) the presence of a medical condition

that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; and

(3) the existence of chronic or substantial pain.” Id.(citation

omitted). 

The evidence establishes that Valadez complained of

pain throughout his incarceration and vomited frequently. This

behavior suggests that Valadez suffered from chronic pain. 

During his incarceration, Valadez also walked hunched over with a

cane and complained that he was unable to eat and drink. 

(Bierwerth Decl. (Videotape); PRSUF2 ¶¶ 36, 53). These actions 

suggest that Valadez’s daily activities were affected. [Nurse]

Jakobs prescribed Valadez pain medication while he was

incarcerated and Dr. Vantassell prescribed him additional pain

medication shortly after Valadez’s release. (PRSUF2 ¶¶ 43-44;

Vantassell Dep. 10:14-19). Their actions suggest that a

reasonable doctor would treat Valadez’s condition. Therefore,

there is at least a genuine issue of fact as to whether Valadez

had a serious medical condition while he was incarcerated. Doty,

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37 F.3d at 546. 

However, the evidence cannot support a finding that 

any of the individual named defendants exercised deliberate

indifference to Valadez’s medical needs. None of these

defendants associated with the Jail denied Valadez access to

medical personnel. To the extent any of them were responsible

for denying Valadez’s requests for a transfer to a hospital or

another jail, they deferred to Ms. Jakobs’ decision that Valadez

was fit for incarceration. (Foxworthy Decl. ¶ 5). Jail

officials are permitted to rely on the opinions of medical

personnel concerning the proper course of treatment for

prisoners. Joyner v. Greiner, 195 F.Supp. 2d 500, 506 (S.D.N.Y.

2002). By choosing to rely on Ms. Jakobs’ medical opinion, the

relevant defendants did not demonstrate deliberate indifference

to Valadez’s medical needs. Rather, they acted based on a good

faith belief that Valadez’s medical needs could be adequately met

at the Jail. See Mayfield, 433 F.2d at 874.

Valadez complains that Jail personnel never provided

him with a padded chair and extra pillows, and waited two days to

give him an extra mattress as per Ms. Jakobs’ instructions. (See

PRSUF2 ¶¶ 57-58). However, he does not contend that this

oversight adversely affected his condition such that a transfer

to another hospital or jail was necessary. Even if Ms. Jakobs’

continued medical clearance was erroneously premised on the

assumption that these luxury items had been provided to Valadez,

there is no evidence that Jail personnel - much less those named

in Valadez’s complaint - knowingly deprived Valadez of them in

disregard of a risk to his health. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187

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(Prison officials act with “deliberate indifference only if

[they] know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate

health and safety.”)

Nor can Ms. Jakobs or Mr. Lang be found to have

exercised deliberate indifference to Valadez’s medical needs on

the basis of the evidence submitted by Valadez. Valadez does not

dispute that he was treated by Medical Clinic personnel. He

simply disputes that he was able to receive sufficient treatment

at the Jail. His argument in this regard hinges almost

exclusively on a statement in Dr. Matthew’s declaration and on

the fact that Dr. Vantassell treated him for pain and dehydration

after his release. 

Based on his observations of the videotape of Valadez’s

incarceration, Dr. Matthews stated in his declaration that “it

would have been appropriate for Mr. Valadez to have been provided

with immediate medical care by a licensed physician at a hospital

during his incarceration in September 2002. . . ." (Matthews

Decl. ¶ 8). The statement merely expresses an alternative. Dr.

Matthews did not state that he thought it was inappropriate to

continue to incarcerate Valadez at the Jail. Furthermore, the

evidence establishes that Valadez’s requests for transfer were

relayed to the Medical clinic and denied, and that Valadez was

cleared for incarceration. (Bierwerth Decl. ¶ 7; Foxworthy Decl.

¶ 5). The fact that another appropriate treatment and placement

option existed does not mean that Ms. Jakobs or Mr. Lang

exercised deliberate indifference to Valadez’s medical condition

by electing to treat him at the Jail after determining he was fit

for incarceration there. 

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This result is not affected by the fact that Valadez

was treated for pain and dehydration by Dr. Vantassell after his

release. Valadez was given pain medication at the Jail, offered

medicine for his upset stomach, and given food and water. 

(Bierwerth Decl., Attach. (Videotape); PRSUF 2 ¶¶ 40-41, 43-44). 

Except for receiving an i.v., which may not have been necessary

before Valadez’s release if he had chosen to drink more fluids at

the Jail, Valadez received practically the same treatment from

Dr. Vantassell - his doctor of choice - that he received at the

Jail. Perhaps, if Dr. Vantassell had been at the Jail while

Valadez was incarcerated, he might have recommended giving

Valadez an i.v. Even so, a difference of medical opinion between

medical professionals would not have amounted to deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. Sanche v. Vild, 891 F.2d

240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, Ms. Jakobs and Mr. Lang

were not deliberately indifferent to Valadez’s medical needs when

they chose to treat him at the Jail without giving him an i.v. or

transferring him to another facility. 

Valadez’s federal claims against the County of Sierra,

California Sierra County Jail, Sierra County Sheriff’s Department

and Western Sierra Medical Clinic also fail because Valadez

cannot establish the violation of a federal right by any of their

personnel. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)(no

municipal liability under § 1983 absent a deprivation of federal

rights); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979)

(treating municipal defendants sued under § 1985 the same as

those sued under § 1983); see also Rojas v. Alexander’s Dept.

Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 1990)(private employers

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4 Defendants also contend that neither the Sheriff’s

Department nor the Jail are proper parties to this action because

“[n]aming a municipal department as a defendant is not an

appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a

municipality.” Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993,

996 (C.D. Cal. 1996). However, this argument is moot because

there is no violation of a federal right on which to base

Valadez’s federal claims in the first instance. 

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sued under § 1983 for acts of employees treated like

municipalities).4

B. Plaintiff’s State-Law Claims

The court has supplemental jurisdiction over Valadez’s

state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Under 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where the court

has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 

Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1565 (9th Cir. 1995). “In the

usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before

trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent

jurisdiction doctrine – judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

and comity - will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction

over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). The balance of factors

indicates that a case properly belongs in state court when the

federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early

stages and only state-law claims remain. Id. 

Here, Valadez’s federal claims have all been dismissed

prior to trial. Valadez has not presented, nor is the court

aware of, any factors weighing in favor of the court’s continuing

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over his state claims. 

Accordingly, the court declines to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction over Valadez’s state-law claims. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to

plaintiff’s claims for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s civil

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and neglect or failure to prevent

a conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights under

42 U.S.C. § 1986 be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED; and

(2) plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims be, and the

same hereby are, DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

DATED: June 1, 2005

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