Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02106/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02106-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

Before the Court is Petitioner Christopher Lynn Ellsworth’s First Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 5). The 

Honorable James F. Metcalf, United States Magistrate Judge, has issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 19), recommending that the petition be denied. 

Petitioner has filed an Objection to the R&R. (Doc. 22.) For the reasons that follow, the 

Court accepts and adopts the R&R, and denies the petition. 

I. Background 

In July 2012, Petitioner was arrested in a hotel room located in Arizona.1

 In the 

room, police officers found 19.5 grams of methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and 

more than $25,000 in cash. (Doc. 5-1.) On September 21, 2012, a complaint was filed in 

the San Carlos Apache Tribal Court, Case No. CR2012-2526, charging Petitioner with 

racketeering, unlawful drug use, possession of drug paraphernalia, and endangerment. 

 1

 Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the hotel room was located on the San Carlos 

Apache Tribe Reservation. 

 Christopher Lynn Ellsworth, 

 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

State of Arizona, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

No. CV-13-02106-PHX-SPL

ORDER 

Case 2:13-cv-02106-SPL Document 25 Filed 09/24/15 Page 1 of 6
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(Doc. 5-2.) Petitioner entered into a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to one 

count of Racketeering-Unlawful Use of Dangerous Drugs and a fine, in exchange for 

dismissal of the remaining charges and a sentencing recommendation for no jail or 

probation. (Doc. 5-2.) Petitioner also entered into a settlement agreement, agreeing to 

forfeiture of certain confiscated funds, with the balance and other property to be returned 

to him or to his counsel. (Doc. 5-3.) The tribal court accepted the plea agreement, 

directed the payment of the fine, and ordered return of the balance of the funds to defense 

counsel, under the condition that it “may be used as and in evidence the same as the 

original currency against Defendant Ellsworth by the state of Arizona or any Federal 

Court in any other criminal proceedings.” (Docs. 5-2; 5-3.) 

Prior to the conclusion of his tribal court proceedings, on August 8, 2012, 

Petitioner was indicted in Gila County Superior Court, Case No. CR2012-371, on charges 

of possession of dangerous drugs for sale, possession of paraphernalia, and use of 

dangerous drugs. (Doc. 5-4.) 

Following sentencing in tribal court, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss in state 

court arguing that his state court prosecution was barred by his right against double 

jeopardy under state and federal law. (Doc. 5-1.) The state court denied the motion. (Doc. 

5-8.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Special Action on January 29, 2013 with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, seeking interlocutory review on his claim that his prosecution was 

barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. (Doc. 5-5.) On February 20, 2013, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals summarily declined to accept jurisdiction. (Doc. 5-5.) Petitioner then 

sought review of that order by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was summarily denied. 

(Doc. 5-5.) 

Petitioner ultimately proceeded to trial, and was convicted of a lesser included 

offense of possession of dangerous drugs, as well as the paraphernalia and drug use 

charges. (Doc. 5-8.) On March 11, 2013, Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of 

imprisonment totaling 4.5 years. (Doc. 5-8.) Petitioner did not file a direct appeal or a 

Case 2:13-cv-02106-SPL Document 25 Filed 09/24/15 Page 2 of 6
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

petition for post-conviction relief.2 

Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition on October 15, 2013, commencing the 

instant action. (Doc. 1.) On November 18, 2013, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 5), raising one claim for relief. Petitioner claims that his 

state prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because he had previously 

been convicted in San Carlos Apache Tribal Court for the same offenses. The petition 

was fully briefed, and the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R recommending that the 

petition be denied because Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred from review. 

II. Standard of Review 

 The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court 

must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific 

objections are made. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a petitioner is not entitled as of right to de 

novo review of evidence and arguments raised for the first time in an objection to the 

R&R, and whether the Court considers the new facts and arguments presented is 

discretionary. United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621-622 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III. Discussion 

Petitioner has objected to the R&R’s finding that his claim is procedurally 

defaulted and barred from review. Petitioner’s arguments culminate into one primary 

point: he contends that because the state court lacked jurisdiction to convict him, his 

conviction was invalid from the onset and he was therefore not required to comply with 

the state rules to exhaust his claims. This argument is without merit. 

 Here, Petitioner is seeking federal habeas relief from this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. While Petitioner argues that he should not have been required to exhaust state 

remedies because his conviction was inherently unfair or unconstitutional in the first 

 2

 Although Petitioner indicates in his petition that he filed a direct appeal, the reference refers to the interlocutory special action petition. (Doc. 5 at 2-4.) 

Case 2:13-cv-02106-SPL Document 25 Filed 09/24/15 Page 3 of 6
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

instance, that theory does not void ab initio the requirements that must be satisfied in 

order to obtain federal habeas review and relief. 

 A federal petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which 

affords relief to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court in violation 

of the Constitution and laws of the United States, is governed by the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).3

 28 U.S.C. § 2244. Under the AEDPA, 

a federal court may not grant habeas relief if the petitioner has failed to exhaust his claim 

in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839 

(1999). “[A] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) 

through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the 

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations 

omitted). A petitioner must present his claims to the state’s highest court in a 

procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848. A petitioner “must give 

the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one 

complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” Id. at 845. “[C]laims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them” either on direct appeal or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. 

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). If a petitioner fails to invoke the required 

procedure, exhaustion is not satisfied even if the petitioner raises the claim through an 

alternative procedure. See e.g., Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38. 

 As the Magistrate Judge correctly found, Petitioner did not exhaust his claim, and 

the claim is therefore procedurally barred from review by this Court. While a petition for 

special action is the appropriate vehicle to obtain judicial appellate review of an 

interlocutory double jeopardy claim, see State v. Moody, 94 P.3d 1119, 1133 (Ariz. 2004) 

 3

 The AEDPA applies to cases that were filed after its effective date, April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

Case 2:13-cv-02106-SPL Document 25 Filed 09/24/15 Page 4 of 6
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(citing Nalbandian v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, 786 P.2d 977, 981 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)), the Arizona Court of Appeals did not review the claim on its 

merits and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the petition. Therefore, the special action 

petition did not serve to fairly present Petitioner's claims for purposes of the exhaustion 

requirement. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Roettgen, supra. 

Petitioner also did not present his claim on direct appeal or in post-conviction relief 

proceedings following his conviction, and the availability of interlocutory special action 

review did not preclude him from presenting his double jeopardy claim in those forums at 

that time. See State v. Felix, 149 P.3d 488, 490 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(B) (an exception to the exhaustion requirement exists where there is an 

absence of an available state corrective process or circumstances exist that render the 

process ineffective). 

While Petitioner challenges jurisdictional jurisprudence and the fairness of the 

system, he does not assert any basis to establish cause for the procedural default of his 

claims, nor does he maintain a claim of actual innocence. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (discussing “cause” and “prejudice”); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

327 (1995) (discussing “fundamental miscarriage of justice”). Therefore, finding his 

claim is procedurally barred from review, the Court will adopt the R&R recommending 

that the petition be denied. Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. That Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Docs. 19) is 

accepted and adopted by the Court; 

2. That the First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 5) is denied and dismissed with prejudice; 

3. That a Certificate of Appealability is denied because the dismissal of the 

First Amended Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would 

not find the procedural ruling debatable; and 

/ / / 

Case 2:13-cv-02106-SPL Document 25 Filed 09/24/15 Page 5 of 6
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4. That the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 24th day of September, 2015.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

Case 2:13-cv-02106-SPL Document 25 Filed 09/24/15 Page 6 of 6