Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00195/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00195-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KURT ANDREW WELLMAN,

CDC #J-00074, Civil No. 07-0195 BTM (NLS)

Plaintiff,

ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO

APPOINT COUNSEL [Doc. No. 15];

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF

TIME TO FILE FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AS MOOT

[Doc. No. 12]; and

(3) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

vs.

TERRY ALEXANDER; HIV

NEUROLOGICAL RESEARCH

CENTER; AND UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO MEDICAL

CENTER,

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison in Soledad,

California and proceeding pro se, originally brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300w-7.

In his original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was abused by Defendant Terry Alexander,

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a nurse with the HIV Neurological Research Center in San Diego. The Court granted Plaintiff

leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) but sua sponte dismissed his Complaint for failing

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

On April 24, 2007, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In his Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Alexander liable for violation of a variety of

constitutional rights, as well as for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. However,

Plaintiff has failed to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s previous Order

and thus, this action must once again be dismissed for the reasons set forth below.

II. Motion to Appoint Counsel [Doc. No. 15] 

Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil action.

The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however, unless an

indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district courts are

granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may be exercised

only under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

“A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the ‘likelihood of success

on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be

viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d

1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice

nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley,

827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

III. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) obligates the Court to review complaints

filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained

in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary

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program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion

thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194

(noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”);

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, while screening a Complaint under §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A, the Court has the same duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings as it does under

Rule 12, but it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey

v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, because many of the statutes cited by Plaintiff in his First Amended Complaint do

not provide a civil cause of action, the Court liberally construes his claims of constitutional

violations to be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the Court previously informed

Plaintiff, Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a

person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct

deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws

of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117,

2122 (2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

It is not clear from the allegations in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint whether he has

alleged sufficient facts to show that Defendant Terry Campbell is a “state actor” for § 1983

purposes. A private party does not act under color of state law unless Plaintiff can allege some

facts that show some “state involvement which directly or indirectly promoted the challenged

conduct.” Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1118-1120 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff was

informed in the Court’s previous Order that he “must show that the private actor’s [Campbell’s]

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1

 It is also unclear whether the University of California San Diego is a state agency and thus,

Plaintiff’s claims for money damages would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Mitchell v. Los

Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that California state

colleges and universities, as state agencies, are immune from suits for money damages or injunctive

relief brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

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conduct is ‘fairly attributable’ to the government.” See March 26, 2007 Order at 5 (citing

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Alexander

is a Registered Nurse who is “employed at the HIV Neurological Research Center.” (FAC at

3.) In addition, Plaintiff names the University of California at San Diego as a Defendant in this

matter. (Id.) If the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, it appears that

Plaintiff may be attempting to allege that Terry Alexander is a state actor because he is employed

by the University of California at San Diego. However, the Court finds that even if Defendant

Alexander was a state actor for § 1983 purposes, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from

which the Court could find that Defendant Alexander violated his constitutional rights.

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Alexander violated his

right to equal protection when he threatened to remove Plaintiff from the research study unless

Plaintiff agreed to accompany Defendant Alexander to his house. (Id. at 6.) “The Equal

Protection Clause ensures that ‘all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’” City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Here, Plaintiff does not

allege that he was ever prohibited from participating in the research study nor does he provide

the court with any allegations of disparate treatment by any of the named Defendants that would

rise to the level of a violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at 439. Thus, the Court dismisses

Plaintiff’s equal protection claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Court must also dismiss Plaintiff’s respondeat superior claims against the HIV

Neurological Research Center and the University of California, San Diego Medical Center.1

However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson,

9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose

acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844

F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order

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to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each individual

Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at issue. See

Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). As a supervisor, a Defendant may only be held liable for the allegedly

unconstitutional violations of his subordinates if Plaintiff alleges specific facts which show: (1)

how or to what extent this supervisor personally participated in or directed Defendants’ actions,

and (2) in either acting or failing to act, the supervisor was an actual and proximate cause of the

deprivation of his constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Here, Plaintiff not only fails to name individual supervisors, his First Amended Complaint in no

way sets forth facts which might be liberally construed to support an individualized

constitutional claim against the HIV Neurological Research Center and the University of

California, San Diego Medical Center.

It is clear that Plaintiff has failed to correct any of the deficiencies of pleading identified

in the Court’s previous Order. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

must be DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Because it does not appear “at all possible that the plaintiff

can correct the defect(s)” of his pleading, further leave to amend is DENIED as futile. See

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill, 80 F.3d at 339.

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Motion for Extension of Time to File First Amended Complaint is DENIED as

moot [Doc. No. 12];

(2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 15] is DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

 (3) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED for failing to state a claim and

without further leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Plaintiff is

further notified that this dismissal may later be counted as a “strike” against him pursuant to 28

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2

 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) provides that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal

... under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds

that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes,” i.e., prior

federal cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were dismissed on grounds

that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim, “cannot proceed IFP.”).

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U.S.C. § 1915(g).2

The Clerk shall close the file.

DATED: July 9, 2007

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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