Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01567/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01567-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

William Jackson Kitchens,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Margaret Mims, et al.,

Defendants. 

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 CV-05-1567-DCB P

ORDER

Plaintiff William Jackson Kitchens , who is confined in the Coalinga 1

State Hospital, Coalinga, California, filed this pro se civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 in a First Amended Complaint against

Sheriff Margaret Mims and Lt. Gary Johnson of Fresno County (County

Defendants), as well as Derrick Watkins, Monica Garcia and Nora Varela

(Transport Defendants), individuals formerly employed by Transcor

Plaintiff has been adjudicated a sexually violent predator (SVP). 1

The sexual psychopath laws provide for examination and commitment of

certain offenders upon conviction of certain crimes. This classification

involves the following elements: (1) a mental disorder; (2) a propensity

to commit sexual acts; and (3) dangerousness to others. The SVP laws are

designed to extend the person's confinement for society's protection. 

Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code §§ 6600–6609.3; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346

(1997).

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America, LLC, a private third-party prisoner extradition company . 

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Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against County Defendants

(Doc. No. 90). County Defendants filed a Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 99) and Transport Defendants filed a Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 98). Plaintiff opposed both dispositive motions (Doc.

Nos. 116, 117, 118). In addition, Defendants filed Requests for Judicial

Notice of documents attached to the Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.

The motions are ready for ruling.

The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion, grant Defendants’ motions,

and terminate the case.

SUMMARY

Plaintiff is a SVP civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff filed the instant action on December 5, 2005, in the Sacramento

Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

California. The case was transferred to the Fresno Division and received

on December 9, 2005. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on August

5, 2008. (Doc. No. 75.) A discovery schedule was entered on October 17,

2008. This action was transferred to Judge David C. Bury of the United

States District Court for the District of Arizona on November 25, 2008. 

On March 9, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was

supplemented on July 27, 2009. On June 15, 2009, Transport Defendants

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and on the same date, County

Defendant Transcor was voluntarily dismissed from the action by 2

Plaintiff, leaving three individual employees as the remaining Transport

Defendants.

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Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. All motions were at issue

on August 13, 2009. 

In a nutshell, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights were violated when County Defendants failed to protect him

pursuant to California Penal Code §§1610 and 4002 when Plaintiff, a SVP

civil detainee, was housed with criminal inmates and failed to provide

constitutionally adequate conditions of detention for a SVP civil

detainee. In addition, Plaintiff claims that he was protected under the

Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPSA). Plaintiff alleges that County

Defendants Mimms and Johnson were responsible for implementation of

policies, practices, and procedures which, when followed, resulted in

denial of privileges and risks to Plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff alleged

that County Defendants denied him law library privileges to which he was

entitled and that he was subject to an unclothed body search and a visual

body-cavity search, without his consent, upon his arrival at the jail.

Plaintiff alleges that he was treated improperly under laws governing the

rights of SVP civil detainees by being housed with penal commitment

inmates, placed in disciplinary isolation and denied privileges and

access to the law library. Plaintiff also alleges that he was not given

access to psychiatric treatment at the jail. Plaintiff makes reference

to all of these incidents together as examples of his claim that County

Defendants improperly housed him at the jail. 

Plaintiff’s claims against the Transport Defendants are that he was

not properly segregated during transport from Atascadero to the Fresno

County Jail (FCJ) on August 25, 2005, and, upon arrival at the county

jail, he was not properly placed in a segregated area designated for SVP

civil detainees.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND/UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

A. Transport from Atascadero to Fresno County Jail

On August 12, 2005, the Fresno County Superior Court issued an order

to both the Fresno County Sheriff and the Director of the Atascadero

State Hospital regarding Plaintiff’s legal status. The court order states

that “Mr. Kitchens is held pending civil process under the sexually

violent predator laws and shall be administratively segregated and

treated as required by the California Penal Code §§4002(b) and 1610.”

Transcor America is a private third-party prisoner extradition company

which provides transportation services to law enforcement and corrections

agencies throughout the country, including the State of California. The

transportation by Transcor of a person detained by the State of

California is arranged by the particular agency and/or holding facility

which contacts Transcor to request that the individual be moved from one

location to another. When a request for transportation is received, a

schedule is created which determines when the individual will reach his

or her specified location. At proximately the same time, information is

gathered about the individual to ensure that the employees of Transcor

will pickup the correct person at the sending facility and be aware of

any pertinent information regarding safety or security concerns.

As a result of potential scheduling demands, individuals being

transported by Transcor are not always driven to their ultimate

destination in the most geographically direct manner possible. This is

due to the fact that other individuals being transported in the same

vehicle may need to reach a particular location at a specific time. Such

scheduling limitations are imposed on Transcor by the State of California

and/or the agency which has contracted with Transcor for its services.

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Transcor uses a fleet of highly secure vehicles to facilitate the

transportation of individuals in state custody from one facility to

another. The interior design of its vehicles allows for limited

segregation of certain passengers via seating compartments separated by

metal walls. Most individuals are placed in the same seating area,

although the vehicles have at least one segregated compartment which can

hold a limited number of passengers. It is Transcor’s policy to restrain

all of the individuals which it transports so as to prevent the

passengers from being able to physically harm another person. The use

of restraints prevents the transported individuals from committing acts

of violence towards each other by limiting the range of their physical

movement through the use of handcuffs and other approved restraining

devices. Such restraints are also necessary to ensure that Transcor

employees are able to maintain control over the passengers while the

vehicle is traveling to its destination; there are usually more

individuals being transported than there are employees of Transcor

present in the vehicle. The exact arrangement of the persons being

transported on a given journey is based upon a determination of how to

best maintain the security and safety of all occupants of the vehicle.

However, it is the responsibility of the holding facility where the

individual is being picked up and/or dropped off to provide Transcor with

any special instructions to segregate that person from other individuals

traveling in the vehicle. Any such instructions are then noted in

Transcor’s internal documentation. Otherwise, neither Transcor nor its

employees are provided with information regarding the nature of a

person’s crime or reason for detention. 

On August 25, 2005, Transcor transported Plaintiff from Atascadero

State Hospital in Atascadero, CA to the Fresno County Jail in Fresno, CA. 

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Transcor performed this transportation service pursuant to a request from

the Fresno County Sheriff’s Department. Transcor Defendants are former

employees of Transcor and were the Transcor officers/agents who

supervised and effectuated the transportation of Plaintiff on the date

in question. 

Plaintiff was picked up by Transcor Defendants at Atascadero State

Hospital at approximately 11:58 a.m. and dropped off at the Fresno County

Jail at approximately 10:48 p.m. that same day. (Smith Declaration, Ex.

B.) This secure vehicular transport was supervised and effectuated by

the individual Transport Defendants. En route to the jail, Plaintiff was

not segregated from the prison inmates on the bus. Several other

individuals were transported in the same vehicle in which Plaintiff was

traveling. From Atascadero and prior to the arrival in Fresno,

additional stops were made in San Louis Obispo and other locations to

pick up and drop off various prisoners and detainees. 

Transcor picked up two female prisoners in San Louis Obispo and

transported them in the same vehicle that was carrying Plaintiff. The

female prisoners were placed into a segregated seating area inside of the

vehicle. This area was reserved for the female inmates on this trip and

none of the male passengers were segregated from one another. During

Defendants’ transportation of Plaintiff on August 25, 2005, Plaintiff’s

hands were shackled and handcuffed to his waist. Plaintiff’s feet were

also shackled with a chain. All other passengers were restrained in the

same manner. Neither the Atascadero State Hospital nor the Fresno County

Sheriff’s Department provided any specific instructions to Transcor to

segregate Plaintiff from any other individuals being transported in its

vehicle. Notwithstanding that fact, Plaintiff was never assaulted or

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physically harmed at any point during his journey from Atascadero State

Hospital to FCJ on August 25, 2005.

B. Temporary County Detention 

Plaintiff arrived at the FCJ at approximately 10:30 p.m., and his

restraints were removed. At approximately 11:45 p.m., Plaintiff was

medically processed. Plaintiff took off his clothes to his boxer shorts,

and then turned around in order to be searched. After this search,

Plaintiff was placed in a holding cell. 

On August 26, 2005, Plaintiff was classified and housed in MSEGAJ1A, a 45-man open dormitory area at the annex within the FCJ that

contained detainees who had been charged or were being prosecuted for sex

offenses. MSEG-AJ1A contained bunk beds, television, coffee, a telephone

area, and access to an exercise area. It was the practice of the FCJ to

keep SVPs housed separately from pre-trial detainees. Plaintiff’s initial

classification was based on the classification unit’s lack of sufficient

information related to Plaintiff’s SVP status. At the time Plaintiff was

classified, the classification officer did not have information that

Plaintiff was a pre-trial SVP. Plaintiff’s initial classification and

housing in MSEG-AJ1A was not done for a punitive purpose.

On August 29, 2005, Plaintiff appeared in front of Superior Court

Judge Gary Austin, who denied Plaintiff’s writ of habeas corpus without

prejudice, and ordered that Plaintiff be housed pursuant to Penal Code

§§4002(b) and 1610. There is no evidence that the FCJ classification

unit found out about Plaintiff’s SVP status until September 5, 2005. On

September 5, 2005, after the classification unit received knowledge of

Plaintiff’s SVP status, Plaintiff was re-classified from MSEG-AJ1A to

Isolation. Plaintiff’s reclassification was not done for a punitive

purpose. Isolation is not a disciplinary cell area at the FCJ but merely

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a housing location. During the relevant time period, the FCJ had no

specific section for SVPs. The FCJ had an area for ordinary civil

detainees, but the FCJ did not house SVPs with ordinary civil detainees

because of safety issues. If there was no compatible cell mate for an

SVP, the SVP would be housed in Isolation because of FCJ’s policy against

wasting bed space. Housing in Isolation was the only option available

at the time. On September 18, 2005, Plaintiff was re-classified from

Isolation to MSEG-MJ3A4, a two man cell. Plaintiff’s re-classification

was based on the fact the classification unit found another SVP, with

whom Plaintiff was familiar (Rick Horn), who could be housed with

Plaintiff. Plaintiff had no objection to this arrangement. Plaintiff

remained housed with Mr. Horn in MSEG until he left the FCJ and returned

to Atascadero. At no time was Plaintiff housed in the general population

of the FCJ. 

On September 6, 2005, the Superior Court issued an order returning

Plaintiff to Atascadero State Hospital. On September 29, 2005, Plaintiff

filed a grievance demanding that he be returned to Atascadero. When

informed that the FCJ staff was waiting for the hospital to notify them

that it was ready to receive Plaintiff, Plaintiff withdrew his grievance.

On September 30, 2005, Plaintiff requested access to the FCJ’s law

library to work on an earlier civil rights case. On October 5, 2005,

Plaintiff was informed that he must be in pro per regarding the current

criminal case for which he was in custody. On October 8, 2005, Plaintiff

filed a grievance over the denial, which became moot when he was returned

to Atascadero on October 11, 2005. 

Plaintiff was not being treated as an SVP at the time of the subject

incidents. Plaintiff never requested any counseling while at the FCJ

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during the relevant time period. Plaintiff was rejecting treatment for

being an SVP. 

During the relevant time period, defendant Sheriff Margaret Mims was

the Assistant Sheriff in charge of the Fresno County FCJ. Defendant Gary

Johnson was a Lieutenant at the County FCJ who oversaw inmate

classification. Plaintiff is suing Sheriff Mims and Gary Johnson in

their individual capacities. Neither Defendant had any direct involvement

with Plaintiff’s stay at the FCJ. 

LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting

documents, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,

“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial

responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying

those portions of the record, together with affidavits, which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex,

477 U.S. at 323. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden

then shifts to the opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of

a factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a

fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 250; see Triton

Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule

56(e) compels the non-moving party to “set out specific facts showing a

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genuine issue for trial” and not to “rely merely on allegations or

denials in its own pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The

opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively

in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown

to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of

the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co.,

391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). However, Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of

summary judgment against a party who, after adequate time for discovery,

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case and on which the party will bear

the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. 

When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At

summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the non-movant is “to

be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his

favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the non-moving party is

merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may

be granted. Id. at 249-50.

DISCUSSION

I. County Defendants

A. Visual Body-Cavity Search

When the strip searches took place, Plaintiff’s status was that of

someone awaiting civil commitment proceedings. Civil commitment

proceedings were pending against him under California's Sexually Violent

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Predators Act (SVP), Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code §§ 6600-6609.3. The search

occurred at the medical processing area in the FCJ after Plaintiff was

transported in a vehicle with other prisoners from Atascadero to the 

FCJ, with several stops inbetween.

Based on the uncontroverted facts, this Court must make an initial

determination whether, under the facts as viewed in a light most

favorable to Plaintiff, subjecting Plaintiff to a strip search that

included a visual body-cavity search when he arrived at the FCJ after

transport with other prisoners from Atascadero violated his

constitutional rights. A strip search that includes a visual body-cavity

search complies with the requirement of the Fourth Amendment so long as

it is reasonable. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)(holding that

visual body-cavity searches after every contact visit with a person from

outside of the institution constitutional). Here, County Defendants

maintain that the search of Plaintiff upon his arrival was reasonable

based on the FCJ’s legitimate security interests. Plaintiff’s primary

argument appears to be that any prison actions that did not specifically

take into account his classification as a SVP is per se a constitutional

violation. The manner and place in which Plaintiff was strip-searched

were reasonable. There was no physical touching by the guards and the

searches were done in a holding cell. There was no evidence that the

searches were observed by any other detainees or by staff members of the

opposite sex. There also was no evidence that the searches were done in

a menacing manner.

The justification for the policy is the critical inquiry in the

reasonableness equation. See Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157,

1161 (9 Cir. 2006). A policy is not “constitutionally acceptable simply th

by virtue of FCJ officials' invocation of security concerns.... Rather,

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the policy must be ‘reasonably related’ to the [detention facility's]

interest in maintaining security.” Id. (citations omitted). Defendants

here have invoked FCJ security as the basis for the search policy. The

Court considers whether the policy of strip-searching everyone who had

been in contact with outsiders or outside of the FCJ upon his return to

the facility or housing unit was, in actuality, reasonably related to the

Sheriff's interest in maintaining security.

The most important factor in the analysis is that Plaintiff had been

outside the physical confines of the FCJ just before he was searched. His

contacts with the outside world provided him with opportunities to obtain

contraband before he entered the FCJ from Atascadero. The existence of

these opportunities to obtain contraband provided a legitimate basis for

application of Defendants' strip-search policy to Plaintiff. The evidence

is undisputed that detainees can and do attempt to bring contraband into

the FCJ.

The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether he suffered a violation of a constitutional

right when he was searched. The search was conducted pursuant to a

policy requiring all inmates who has been outside of the facility to be

strip searched and visually inspected upon their arrival. The evidence

is undisputed that Plaintiff was transferred from Atascadero State

Hospital and that individuals arriving from state detention facilities

attempt to smuggle contraband and weapons. Here, County Defendants

employed a search policy designed to protect both the legitimate security

interests threatened by such smuggling and the privacy interests of the

individual being searched. Bull v. City and County of San Francisco,

—F.3d—, 2010 WL 431790 (9 Cir. 2010); see also Sundquist v. Philip, 2008 th

WL 859452 (N.D. Cal. 2008), affirmed, 2009 WL 2353267 (9 Cir. 2009). th

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This Court will adhere to the Supreme Court’s directive not to substitute

its judgment for that of corrections facility officials. Bell, 441 U.S.

at 540 n. 23. County Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in

their favor on this claim.

B. Classification

Plaintiff claims County Defendants violated his right to due process

by housing him with penal detainees and/or prisoners at the FCJ.

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was housed with penal detainees

and/or prisoners; they argue they are entitled to summary judgment

because the evidence shows they had legitimate, non-punitive interests

justifying Plaintiff's conditions of confinement, and that the

restrictions imposed on Plaintiff were not excessive in relation to those

interests.

The Fourteenth Amendment applies to conditions of confinement claims

brought by individuals who have not been convicted of a crime. Jones v.

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004). Consequently, individuals

detained on criminal charges may not be subjected to conditions that

amount to punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt. Id. Further,

individuals who are awaiting civil commitment proceedings are entitled

to protections at least as great as those afforded to civilly committed

individuals and to individuals accused but not convicted of a crime.

Jones, 393 F.3d at 931-32.

In short, at a minimum, individuals detained under civil process but

not yet committed cannot be subjected to conditions that amount to

punishment, id. at 932. Punitive conditions may be shown where challenged

restrictions are expressly intended to punish, where they are excessive

in relation to a non-punitive purpose, or where they are employed to

achieve objectives that could be accomplished by alternative and less

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harsh methods. Jones, 393 F.3d at 932. Additionally, a presumption of

punitive conditions of confinement applies when an individual awaiting

adjudication as an SVP is confined “in conditions identical to, similar

to, or more restrictive than those in which his criminal counterparts are

held,” id., or “in conditions more restrictive than those the individual

would face following SVPA commitment,” id. at 933.

As noted, Plaintiff alleges he was subjected to punitive conditions

of confinement because he was housed with penal detainees and/or

prisoners during his temporary confinement at the FCJ. Because the record

is unclear, the Court in an abundance of caution assumes, arguendo, that

Plaintiff was not serving a term of civil commitment when he arrived at

the FCJ, but was a civil detainee awaiting final adjudication as an SVP;

consequently, the Court will apply to Plaintiff's claims the presumption

of punitive conditions of confinement set forth in Jones. Under this

standard plaintiff could not be subjected to more restrictive conditions

than those imposed on an individual already committed as an SVP.

The Jones presumption is a rebuttable one; when such a presumption

arises, the defendant must be given an opportunity to show that

legitimate, non-punitive interests justified the conditions to which an

SVP was subjected and that the restrictions imposed upon the SVP were not

excessive in relation to those interests. Id. Here, Defendants assert

they had legitimate, non-punitive interests justifying Plaintiff's

placement in the FCJ protective-custody housing unit and that the

restrictions imposed upon Plaintiff while he was housed in protective

custody were not excessive in relation to those interests. In support of

Defendants' argument, Gary Johnson, the Classifications Officer for the

FCJ, offered evidence as to the manner in which housing decisions were

made for FCJ inmates in general, and how the decision as to Plaintiff's

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housing, in particular, was made. (Doc. No. 99-7.) Further, there were

no alternative and less harsh methods that could have been employed

because the FCJ did not have a separate area for SVP and SVPs were not

able to be housed with ordinary civil detainees.

The Court finds County defendants have produced evidence sufficient

to rebut the presumption that the conditions of confinement to which

Plaintiff was subjected in the FCJ were punitive and that Plaintiff has

failed to carry his burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material

fact with respect thereto. Plaintiff's sole argument is that, as a matter

of law, Defendants violated his constitutional rights because he was not

housed in a non-FCJ facility; in other words, he claims that the

incarceration of SVPs with those who are facing or have been convicted

of criminal charges is unconstitutional per se. Plaintiff does not cite

to, nor is this Court aware of, any United States Supreme Court or Ninth

Circuit case that so holds. Rather, the case law to date leads to the

conclusion that there is no per se prohibition on housing SVPs in

facilities where criminal detainees or convicts are also housed. Seling

v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d at 932; Munoz

v. Klender, 208 F.Supp.2d 1125 (S.D.Cal.2002) (“the need to safely

produce dangerous detainees for judicial proceedings and associated

logistical challenges support the use of local law enforcement detention

facilities for that purpose and do not run afoul of any constitutional

right [plaintiff] has identified.” Munoz, 208 F.Supp.2d at 1144.)

In sum, County Defendants have produced evidence sufficient to rebut

the presumption that the conditions of Plaintiff's confinement at the FCJ

were punitive, and Plaintiff has not carried his burden of producing

evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact with respect

thereto. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a triable issue as to whether

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the conditions of his confinement were excessive in relation to the

municipal government’s legitimate non-punitive interests in security and

effective facility management. Jones, 393 F.3d at 932-35. Accordingly,

County Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's due

process claim.

C. Lack of Treatment

Plaintiff claims that he was deprived of due process based on lack

of treatment. Pen. Code Section 4002 (and Section 1610) requires that

persons subject to SVP proceedings held in county detention facilities

to the extent possible should continue their course of treatment, if any. 

At the time Plaintiff was confined in the FCJ - as best as the Court can

discern - he was going through the process of SVP adjudication. In fact,

the uncontroverted facts are that Plaintiff was contesting being

determined to be a SVP and continually refused sex offender treatment,

according to Plaintiff’s own deposition. 

In addition, the Court finds persuasive the reasoning of other

district courts that have addressed the question and found that

individuals facing commitment under the SVP Act are not similarly

situated to those detained under the LPS Act. See Munoz v. Kolender, 208

F.Supp.2d 1125, 1136 & n. 8 (S.D.Cal. 2002) (distinguishing SVP from LPS

Act and other California involuntary confinement statutes; finding

persons committed under SVP and LPS Act are not similarly situated).

This argument lacks merit.

D. Access-to-Law-Library Claim

The uncontroverted facts surrounding Plaintiff’s request to have

access to the law library support a finding that he suffered no actual

prejudice as the result of the denial to allow Plaintiff to work on an

unrelated civil rights case, rather than an ongoing criminal case.

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The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits state

officials from actively interfering with inmates’ attempts to prepare or

file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). However,

the right “guarantees no particular [means to assist inmates in the

preparation and filing of legal papers] but rather the conferral of a

capability – the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to

sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.” Id. at 356-57.

To establish that he was denied meaningful access to the courts, a

plaintiff must submit evidence showing that he suffered an “actual injury”

as a result of the defendants’ actions. Id. at 348. An “actual injury”

is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation,

such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” 

Id. at 348. To show actual injury with respect to contemplated litigation,

the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct of the defendants

prevented him from bringing to court a nonfrivolous claim that he wished

to present. Id. at 352-53. That nonfrivolous claim must be a direct or

collateral attack on the inmate’s sentence, or a challenge to the

conditions of his confinement. Id. at 355. “Impairment of any other

litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly

constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id.

In their moving papers, County Defendants offered uncontroverted

evidence that Plaintiff’s request to access the law library was denied

because he represented that he was going to work on a civil rights action,

not the criminal case that provided the basis for his stay at the FCJ. In

his Opposition, Plaintiff makes no attempt to dispute this evidence, and

offers no authority supporting this claim. The restriction imposed by the

FCJ is reasonable, as “limiting law library access is inherent in managing

a limited resource for a large group of individuals who all want to use

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it, ...” Halbert v. Herbert, 2008 WL 4460213, p. 5 (N.D. 2008).

Furthermore, Plaintiff has not identified any actual prejudice. Maine v.

Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985). Accordingly, this claim has no merit.

E. No link between County Defendants and Alleged Conduct

Finally, neither County Defendant has been factually linked to the 

the conduct alleged by Plaintiff to be wrongful. Plaintiff must prove that

each of the individual defendants personally participated in the alleged

constitutional violations. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir.

2002). As to Sheriff Mims, while she was the Assistant Sheriff in charge

of the FCJ facility, she had no involvement whatsoever with Plaintiff’s

stay at the FCJ. While Gary Johnson was a lieutenant at the FCJ who

oversaw inmate classification, he did not make any decision, or take any

action, related to Plaintiff.

To plead an individual capacity claim against a supervisor in a

Section 1983 case, a plaintiff must show (1) the supervisor’s personal

involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

constitutional deprivation. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir.

2001). Here, no facts are alleged supporting a connection between any of

the conduct on the part of the County Defendants and any alleged

constitutional injury. As such, it cannot be concluded that either

Defendant set in motion a series of acts that they knew or should have

known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury. Larez v. City

of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff offers no

evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to the lack of involvement

of both Sheriff Mims and Lieutenant Johnson.

Plaintiff claims that he “has sufficiently alleged that the

constitutional violations he suffered were ‘set in motion’ by Defendants’

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policy decisions, or at the very least, that Defendants knew of these

abuses and demonstrated a deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff’s

plight.” To this end, Plaintiff contends that when Sheriff Mims was the

Assistant Sheriff and in charge of the detentions bureau, “she was

empowered with the authority to effectuate policies and procedures within

the facility.” It is true that civil rights liability can be imposed

against a municipality for injuries inflicted pursuant to a governmental

“policy or custom.” Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,

691 (1978). However, the County of Fresno is not a defendant, and there

is no official capacity claim against Sheriff Mims (or Lieutenant

Johnson). Therefore, Sheriff Mims cannot be liable for an alleged

unconstitutional policy or custom. Furthermore, Plaintiff has offered no

evidence that Sheriff Mims effectuated any policies or procedures related

to inmate classification when she was Assistant Sheriff. While Plaintiff

contends that Sheriff Mims “directed the personnel under her direct

supervision,” he offers no evidence that Sheriff Mims “directed” any

person to take any action related to Plaintiff’s stay at the FCJ.

Therefore, there is no evidence that Sheriff Mims participated in any

wrongful actions, directed any wrongful actions, or knew that the wrongful

actions were taking place and failed to prevent them. 

Plaintiff has also offered no evidence to support a claim against

Lieutenant Johnson. While Plaintiff concludes that Lieutenant Johnson “was

delegated with sufficient authority in the enforcement of the

Classification process to incur tort liability in this action,” he has

offered no evidence that Lieutenant Johnson had any direct or indirect

involvement in the alleged wrongful actions. Plaintiff has also offered

no evidence of any policies put in place by Lieutenant Johnson that led

to his alleged injuries. Furthermore, even assuming that Lieutenant

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Johnson promulgated any such policies, the fact that Plaintiff was

initially classified as a pre-trial detainee was based on a lack of

sufficient information, not a policy or custom. 

Plaintiff makes several references in his Opposition brief to the

acts or omissions of County Defendants “agents.” However, a municipality

cannot be held liable under § 1983 simply on the basis of respondeat

superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

II. Transport Company Defendants

A. Transport to FCJ

Generally Plaintiff alleges that the individual Transport Defendants

violated his due process rights by housing him with criminal detainees

during the transport from Atascadero State Hospital to FCJ. Defendants

presented uncontroverted evidence that they had no control over these

conditions. See Harper v. City of L.A., 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir.

2008) (“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must ... demonstrate that the

defendant's conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”). 

Further, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a triable issue as to whether the

conditions of his transportation were excessive in relation to the

legitimate, non-punitive interests of the Transport Defendants and the

government in safety and effective management of its transportation

services. Jones, 393 F.3d at 932-35. 

Plaintiff’s argument perseverates on whether or not the Defendants

were in possession of the August 12, 2005 Order from the Fresno Superior

Court prior to transport. The August 12, 2005 Order merely stated that

Plaintiff was to be “administratively segregated and treated as required

by the California Penal Code §§4002(b) and 1610.” Defendants maintain that

neither section 1610 nor section 4002 required Plaintiff to be separated

from other individuals outside of the FCJ and during secure vehicular

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transports between correctional facilities. Plaintiff has failed to refute

this argument. 

The uncontroverted facts support Defendants’ explanation that the

interior design of Transcor vehicles allows for limited segregation of

individuals via compartments separated by metal walls. While most

individuals are placed in a larger seating area, there are one or two

smaller compartments which have the capacity to seat one to three persons.

The exact arrangement of the persons being transported on a given journey

is based upon the determination of how to best maintain the security and

safety of all occupants of the vehicle. Male and female prisoners are

always segregated from one another and never placed in the same

compartment of the vehicle. While the individuals are being transported,

they are restrained so as to prevent a person from being able to

physically harm another person. Also, the use of restraints is necessary

in order to ensure that employees of Transcor are able to maintain control

over the transported individuals while the vehicle is traveling to its

destination, since there are more individuals being transported than

employees of Transcor present in the vehicle. The use of restraints

prevents the transported individuals from committing acts of violence

towards each other by limiting the range of their physical movement

through the use of handcuffs and other approved restraining devices. When

a request is received from the State of California to move an individual

from one facility to another, neither Transcor nor its employees are

provided with any information regarding the nature of a person’s crime or

reason for detention unless such information is necessary for safety

and/or security purposes.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that transporting him in a van

in which he was not segregated from penal detainees and/or prisoners is

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per se unconstitutional, but he points to no case authority supporting

such an assertion. The Transport Defendants argue they did not violate

Plaintiff's constitutional rights because cases establishing the due

process requirements applicable to an SVP’s conditions of confinement do

not apply to an SVP’s claim based on the manner in which he was

transported from one location to another. Additionally, Transport

Defendants argue that they did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights because legitimate, non-punitive interests justified the conditions

to which Plaintiff was subjected when he was transported, and the

restrictions imposed upon Plaintiff were not excessive in relation to

those interests. See Jones, 393 F.3d at 934.

Plaintiff has pointed to no case, and the Court is aware of none,

that holds transporting SVPs, or other civilly detained individuals, under

conditions in which they are not segregated from persons charged with or

convicted of crimes is unconstitutional per se. There exists some support

for the proposition that an SVP plaintiff could state a claim for the

violation of his constitutional right to personal security were he to

allege facts showing he was injured by criminal detainees while being

transported, see Bacon v. Kolender, 2007 WL 2669541, *12 (S.D.Cal. Sept.

6, 2007). Here, however, Plaintiff makes no such allegations, nor can the

inference of such constitutional injury be drawn from his single

allegation that he was transported in a van where he “was not segregated

from the Penal Detainees/Prisoners that were already present in the

vehicle.”

In particular, Defendants point out, Jones addressed a claim

concerning conditions of confinement incident to the housing of SVPs;

specifically, whether housing an SVP pursuant to California Penal Code 

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§§ 4001 and 4002(a) constituted punitive conditions of confinement. See

Jones, 393 F.3d at 923, 934. Thus, Defendants argue, the matter of

transportation simply was not at issue in the Jones case. Accordingly,

there is no case law expressly supporting Plaintiff's argument that the

manner in which he was transported was unconstitutional.

Finally, even if the presumption of punishment established in Jones

applies to transportation claims brought by an individual such as

Plaintiff who is awaiting adjudication as an SVP, Defendants argue they

have rebutted the presumption of punitive conditions by showing that

legitimate, non-punitive interests justified the conditions to which

Plaintiff was subjected when he was transported, and that the restrictions

imposed upon Plaintiff were not excessive in relation to those interests.

See Jones, 393 F.3d at 934. The Court finds that the Transport Defendants

have rebutted the presumption of punitive conditions by producing

undisputed evidence showing that the individual employees used their

professional judgment in determining where Plaintiff would be seated in

the van, based on the need to maintain the security and safety of all of

the van occupants, and that Plaintiff was not subjected to restrictions

that were excessive in relation to Defendants’ legitimate security

concerns.

It is unclear exactly what Plaintiff’s complaint with reference to

the Transport Defendants is: whether he was too confined and therefore

he was "punished" or that he was not safe because he was not separated

from the others. If Plaintiff is claiming the Transport Defendants were

jeopardizing his safety, he must allege more than a generalized fear. The

threat must be objectively serious and the standards for pretrial

detainees are the same as for prisoners.

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To prevail on a claim under the Eighth Amendment for a threat to

health and safety, a prisoner must demonstrate deliberate indifference to

a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828

(1994). Eighth Amendment liability requires “more than ordinary lack of

due care,” in other words, the inmate must show more than negligence. Id.

at 835. A plaintiff must show a “substantial risk of serious harm”—the

risk must be objectively sufficiently serious. Id. at 834. In addition,

the defendant official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind;

that is, he must be deliberately indifferent. Id.

To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both

know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; the official

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that

a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference. Id. at 837. However, the inmate need not show that the

defendant acted or failed to act believing that harm would actually befall

the inmate; “it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite

his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. 

Whether the official had the necessary knowledge is a question of

fact; it may be demonstrated in the usual ways, including inferences drawn

from circumstantial evidence, “and a fact-finder may conclude that a

prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the

risk was obvious.” Id.3

In sum, when the facts alleged by Plaintiff are viewed in the light

most favorable to him, the Court finds Plaintiff has not shown the

violation of a constitutional right. See McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135,

1142 (9 Cir. 2000). Accordingly, as Plaintiff has not raised a genuine th

Plaintiff’s complaint concerning “extreme heat” does not state a

3

cognizable claim for relief. (Plaintiff’s Opposition Brief at 6: Doc. No.

121.)

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issue of material fact as to whether his constitutional rights were

violated by the Transport Defendants, they are entitled to summary

judgment on this claim.

B. Placement in Holding Cell 

Plaintiff claims Transport Defendants violated his constitutional

rights when Plaintiff was dropped off at the FCJ where Plaintiff was

placed in a holding cell. The Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot

establish any constitutional violation by them resulting from Plaintiff's

conditions of confinement at the FCJ because he has not shown that

Transport Defendants either had custody over Plaintiff or any authority

over the conditions of his confinement at the time he was at the FCJ. 

These undisputed facts render this claim meritless as to the Transport

Defendants.

CONCLUSION

After review, this Court finds that no genuine issue as to any

material fact precludes resolution of this action as a matter of law in

favor of Defendants. The uncontroverted fact is that Plaintiff was never

injured or harmed or placed in harm’s way in the course of his transport

or brief stay with FCJ; none of the events involved punitive action

against Plaintiff. The other uncontroverted fact is that both the

Transport Defendants and the County Defendants acted reasonably under the

constraints of the situation: the transportation of multiple prisoners and

detainees going to and from secure facilities with ample opportunity for

things to go terribly wrong unless certain general security and safety

measures are employed. In this setting, there was no feasible way to

treat Plaintiff differently from everybody else, with the clear

understanding that as a SVP, Plaintiff presents his own security and

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safety concerns. In sum, the Court unqualifiedly finds that Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights were not violated. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office is directed to correct the

description of the following docket number: Doc. No. 100 should reflect

that it is a Request for Judicial Notice by Transport Defendants not a

Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants’ unopposed Requests for Judicial

Notice (Doc. Nos. 96, 100, 101, 102) are granted pursuant to Fed.R.Evid.

201.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the County Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 99) is granted; the Transport Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 98) is granted; and, the Plaintiff’s Motion of

Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 90) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is terminated and closed.

The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter a Final Judgment conforming to

this Order.

DATED this 23 day of March, 2010.

rd

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