Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00076/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00076-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD D. KEELER,

CDCR # F-87223 Civil

No. 

08-0076 JAH (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; MICHAEL

ESPINOSA; RICHARD MURPHY;

FRANCISCO P. MARTY, Jr; SAN DIEGO

COUNTY PROBATION DEPARTMENT;

LAW OFFICES OF QUIRK & QUIRK;

CHARLES QUIRK,

Defendant.

I. Procedural History

On January 11, 2008, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Sierra

Conservation Center located in Jamestown, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff did not prepay the $350 filing fee mandated

by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]. This Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

IFP but simultaneously dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim and for seeking

monetary damages against immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) &

1915A(b). (See February 27, 2008 Order at 6-7.)

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Plaintiff was permitted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the

deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. (Id.) On April 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed his First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) [Doc. No. 6].

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

As stated by the Court in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”)’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 obligates the Court to review complaints filed by

all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any

facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law

or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as

soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under

these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP

complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which

seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A;

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit

make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the Complaint be served by the

U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits,

but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a

claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing

§ 1915A). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Here, however, even

presuming Plaintiff’s factual allegations true, the Court finds his First Amended Complaint fails

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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(b);

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446, n.1.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages pursuant to the following causes of action: “intentional

infliction of emotional distress, interference with constitutionally protected family relationship,

illegal arrest and imprisonment, cruel and unusual punishment, summary punishment without

a trial, the denial of due process, the use of excessive force, unlawful seizure of person, the

negligent performance of probation duties by probation officers, malicious prosecution, and

different treatment due to racial discrimination.” (FAC at 3.) However, the factual basis for each

of these causes of action is the same. Plaintiff claims that probation officers, Michael Espinosa

and Richard Murphy, “negligently” or “intentionally submitted” evidence at Plaintiff’s probation

violation hearing that led to his current incarceration. 

However, these claims amount to an attack on the constitutional validity of an underlying

state criminal proceeding, and as such, may not be maintained pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

unless and until he can show that his conviction based his probation violation has already been

invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850,

855-56 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted

available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983....’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at

489). 

“In any § 1983 action, the first question is whether § 1983 is the appropriate avenue to

remedy the alleged wrong.” Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (en

banc). A prisoner in state custody simply may not use a § 1983 civil rights action to challenge

the “fact or duration of his confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). The

prisoner must seek federal habeas corpus relief instead. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78

(2005) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489). Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 action “is barred (absent

prior invalidation)--no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target

of his suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)--if success in that

action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson,

544 U.S. at 82. 

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In this case, Plaintiff’s claims that the Probation Officers provided false information in

their reports “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his criminal proceedings and continuing

incarceration. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. In creating the favorable termination rule in Heck, the

Supreme Court relied on “the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles

for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Heck, 511 U.S. at 486

(emphasis added); see also Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2005).

This is precisely what Plaintiff attempts to accomplish here. Therefore, to satisfy Heck’s

“favorable termination” rule, Plaintiff must first allege facts which show that the conviction

and/or sentence which forms the basis of his § 1983 Complaint has already been: (1) reversed

on direct appeal; (2) expunged by executive order; (3) declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such a determination; or (4) called into question by the grant of a writ of

habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added); see also Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d

1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges no facts sufficient to satisfy Heck. Thus, because Plaintiff

seeks damages for allegedly unconstitutional probation revocation proceedings and because he

has not shown that his conviction has been invalidated, either by way of direct appeal, state

habeas or pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a section 1983 claim for damages cannot be maintained,

see Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90, and his First Amended Complaint must be dismissed without

prejudice. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that an

action barred by Heck has not yet accrued and thus, must be dismissed without prejudice so that

the plaintiff may reassert his § 1983 claims if he ever succeeds in invalidating the underlying

conviction or sentence); accord Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997).

Because it is possible that Plaintiff can show that his conviction based on his alleged

probation violations has been invalidated, the Court will provide Plaintiff with one final

opportunity to amend. However, the Court cautions Plaintiff that if he fails to satisfy Heck in

his amended pleading, this action will be dismissed without further leave to amend.

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III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b).

However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed”

in which to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the

superseded pleading. See S. D.CAL.CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814

F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Further, if Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, it will be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter

be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-

79 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a form civil rights Complaint to Plaintiff.

DATED: July 23, 2008 _________________________________________ HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON 

 United States District Judge

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