Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04324/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04324-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-4324

___________

NORMAN SHELTON,

Appellant

v.

A. JORDAN; WARDEN LEWISBURG USP; 

CHAMBERS; A.W. YOUNG

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-00059)

District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

August 10, 2015

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 25, 2015)

________________

OPINION*

________________

PER CURIAM

Norman Shelton, a federal prisoner, appeals an order of the United States District 

Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons, we will affirm.

In his § 2241 petition, Shelton asserted that he was found guilty of numerous 

prison disciplinary offenses between 2009 and 2012. Shelton claimed that, as a result, he 

“has lost over 400 days” of good conduct time (GCT). He alleged that these sanctions 

were excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment and that the Bureau of Prisons 

(BOP) disallowed more GCT than permitted under the Sentencing Reform Act and 

applicable regulations. The District Court dismissed the petition, holding that “the 

sanction is not sufficiently severe to implicate Shelton’s Eighth Amendment rights” and 

that the BOP correctly calculated and applied the total amount of disallowed GCT. 

Shelton timely appealed.1

The Eighth Amendment is violated only when a punishment is grossly 

disproportionate to the severity of the offense. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 

271-74 (1980). To the extent that a loss of GCT can constitute an Eighth Amendment 

violation, Shelton’s punishment was not excessive in relation to the underlying offenses. 

The record indicates that between September 2009 and September 2012, Shelton was 

found guilty of fourteen “high category” (200-level) violations and four “moderate 

category” (300-level) violations. His offenses included assault, fighting, sexual 

proposals, and bribery. The disciplinary hearing officer sanctioned Shelton to the loss of 

27 days of GCT for each “high category” offense, and to the loss of 14 days of good 

 

1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). We exercise plenary 

review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and review the District Court’s 

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conduct time for each of two “moderate category” violations; no loss of GCT was 

imposed for the remaining two “moderate category” violations. The relevant regulation 

provides for disallowance of 14-27 days of GCT for “high category” offenses, and the 

disallowance of 1-14 days of GCT for “moderate category” offenses. See 28 C.F.R. 

§ 541.13, Table 3 (2010); 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, Table 1 (2012). Given the severity of 

Shelton’s offenses, and because the sanctions fall within the applicable range permitted 

by the regulation, we conclude that the punishment here did not violate the Eighth 

Amendment. See United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1145 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Newby’s 

loss of one thousand days good time credits may at first glance appear to be harsh; 

however, on examination it is necessary in order to bring home to him and others the 

importance of continued good behavior.”).

In addition, contrary to Shelton’s contention, the total GCT loss did not exceed the 

number of GCT days that he is eligible to receive each year. Because Shelton’s 

underlying offenses occurred in 1992, his GCT calculation is governed by the Sentencing 

Reform Act. Under that Act, an inmate can earn up to 54 days of GCT “at the end of 

each year of his term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988); 28 C.F.R. 

§ 523.20(a). Notably, “[s]uch credit toward service of sentence vests at the time that it is 

received. Credit that has vested may not later be withdrawn, and credit that has not been 

earned may not later be granted.” § 3624(b). The Government acknowledged that “[t]he 

most GCT an inmate sentenced under the [Sentencing Reform Act] may be disallowed 

 

findings of fact for clear error. See Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002).

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each year is 54 days.” Second Supplemental Resp. to Pet. for Habeas Corpus, Ex. A, ¶ 7 

(Dist. Ct. Doc. 53-1). Here, between September 2009 and September 2010, the 

disciplinary hearing officer sanctioned Shelton to the loss of 176 days. Between 

September 2010 and September 2011, he was again sanctioned to the loss of 176 days. 

And between September 2011 and September 2012, he was sanctioned to the loss of 54 

days. But, as reflected in Shelton’s sentencing monitoring data, during each of those 

periods only 54 days of GCT were disallowed. Thus, although Shelton was sanctioned to 

a total loss of 406 days between September 2009 and September 2012, the BOP 

disallowed only 162 days of GCT.2 Therefore, the BOP properly calculated Shelton’s 

GCT. 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.3 

 

2 The additional 244 days of sanctioned GCT loss were neither subtracted from Shelton’s 

previously vested GCT nor applied to his future GCT earnings. 

3 Shelton’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

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