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Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 13-3252

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Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Audrain County Joint Communications

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - Hannibal

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 Submitted: March 9, 2015

 Filed: March 17, 2015

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Before BYE, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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BYE, Circuit Judge.

Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company (Argonaut) sued Audrain County

Joint Communications (ACJC) alleging ACJC's negligence in monitoring a security

alarm panel caused or contributed to damages arising out of the burglary and fire of

a grocery store insured by Argonaut. ACJC brought a motion for summary judgment

arguing it was entitled to sovereign immunity as a Missouri state entity, and to

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statutory immunity as a 911 call center. The district court denied summary judgment

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after finding ACJC had waived its sovereign and statutory immunity by purchasing

insurance. ACJC then filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's

order denying summary judgment. We dismiss part of the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction, and otherwise affirm.

I

The origins of this suit date back to 1977, when Hickman Foods, Inc.

(Hickman's) contracted with a private company for burglar alarm services at its IGA

grocery store in Mexico, Missouri. Hickman's originally contracted with a company

called Crow Security, Inc. In 2005, Q Security Solutions, L.L.C., (Q Security)

purchased Crow Security. The purchase agreement between the two security

companies provided that Q Security would take over Crow Security's contracts,

including the contract with Hickman's.

For reasons not fully explained in the record before us, Q Security's alarm

panels were located at the public 911 call center operated by ACJC. Public

employees at the ACJC call center monitored the private company's alarm panels. 

When an alarm at a Q Security customer's location was triggered, ACJC employees

would hear an audible alarm at the panel board. As soon as the audible alarm

sounded, a light bulb corresponding to a particular customer was supposed to

illuminate. In April 2006, however, two ACJC employees tested the Q Security alarm

panels and discovered six of the light bulbs – including the one for Hickman's IGA

– were not working. Argonaut asserts that the two ACJC employees reported the

problem to their supervisor, but ACJC never informed Q Security of the inoperable

bulbs and the problem was never rectified. ACJC disputes Argonaut's assertions.

The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the

1

Eastern District of Missouri.

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About three months later, on July 24, 2006, burglars entered the Hickman's

IGA grocery store and triggered the store's alarm system. The audible alarm sounded

at the ACJC call center, but the dispatcher on duty was unable to tell which particular

Q Security customer's alarm had been triggered because no corresponding light bulb

illuminated. Argonaut assertsthe dispatcher ignored the audible alarm. The burglars 2

set fire to the grocery store before fleeing the scene. Thirty minutes after the first

audible alarmhad sounded at ACJC, a second audible alarmsounded, likely triggered

by the burglars setting fire to the building. Argonaut asserts the dispatcher at ACJC

again ignored the alarm. About thirty minutes later (approximately a full hour after

the first audible alarm had sounded at ACJC), a passerby saw smoke coming out of

the grocery store and called 911 to report the fire. By the time the fire department

suppressed the fire, it had caused more than $2 million in damages.

The grocery store was insured under a policy issued by Argonaut. After

Argonaut paid Hickman's for the property damage caused by the burglary and fire,

Hickman's assigned to Argonaut the right to sue any parties that may be responsible

for the damage. In May 2011, Argonaut filed this action against ACJC in federal

district court alleging ACJC's negligence in monitoring Q Security's alarm panels

caused or contributed to the damages arising out of the burglary and fire. Argonaut

also asserted ACJC had waived its sovereign immunity by purchasing a liability

insurance policy through American Alternative Insurance Corporation (the Policy).3

The dispatcher says she contacted a police officer to report the audible alarm 2

had sounded, but the officer to whom she spoke said he was not going to check every

Q Security customer to determine at which location an alarm had been triggered. 

Argonaut asserts there is no record of the dispatcher having made such a call.

Section 537.610 of the Missouri Revised Statutes states the political 3

subdivisions of the state "may purchase liability insurance for tort claims[] made

against the state or the politicalsubdivision" and if they do so "[s]overeign immunity

for the state of Missouri and its political subdivisions is waived . . . to the maximum

amount of and only for the purposes covered by such policy of insurance[.]"

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Argonaut further asserted the inoperable light bulbs on the alarm panel at the ACJC

call center amounted to a dangerous condition of property, such that sovereign

immunitywould not apply in any event. Finally, Argonaut asserted ACJC acted with

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gross negligence by consciously ignoring the problems with the alarmpanel, and thus

was not entitled to the statutory immunity the call center might otherwise have under

Section 190.307 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.5

ACJC filed a motion for summary judgment. In relevant part, ACJC asserted

that it and its insurer had retroactively reformed the Policy to include an endorsement

excluding coverage for claims to which its sovereign immunity applied. ACJC also

argued it was entitled to statutory immunity under § 190.307 for its operation of an

emergency 911 call system.

The district court denied ACJC's motion for summary judgment on the issue

of immunity. In a bench trial, the district court decided the threshold question

Section 537.600 of the Missouri Revised Statutes generally provides that the

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state of Missouri and its politicalsubdivisions have common law sovereign immunity

"from liability and suit for compensatory damages." The general rule is subject to

two exceptions, however, one of which is when injuries are caused by a dangerous

condition of a public entity's property in certain situations. See Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 537.600.1(2).

Section 190.307 of the Missouri Revised Statutes provides in relevant part: 5

No public agency or public safety agency, nor any officer, agent or

employee of any public agency, shall be liable for any civil damages as

a result of any act or omission except willful and wanton misconduct or

gross negligence, in connection with developing, adopting, operating or

implementing any plan or system required by sections 190.300 to

190.340.

Sections 190.300 to 190.340, in turn, discuss the operation of an emergency 911

telephone service.

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whether ACJC and its insurer had properly reformed the Policy to include an

endorsement preserving the call center's sovereign immunity. The district court found

ACJC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it had a pre-existing

agreement with its insurer to preserve sovereign immunity. The district court further

determined ACJC's purchase of insurance waived both its common law sovereign

immunity and any statutory immunity it might enjoy under § 190.307 as a 911 call

center.

ACJC then filed thisinterlocutory appeal. On appeal, ACJC argues the district

court erred in denying its request to reform the contract to include an endorsement

preserving its sovereign immunity. It further argues its statutory immunity under

§ 190.307 is distinct from its common law sovereign immunity, and that its purchase

of insurance did not waive this separate statutory immunity. In addition, ACJC

challenges aspects of the district court's order unrelated to immunity, such as a

determination that there are genuine issues ofmaterialfact about whether ACJC owed

a duty to Hickman's IGA under the facts of this case. Argonaut filed a motion to

strike most of ACJC's brief on the grounds that we have limited jurisdiction in an

interlocutory appeal raising an issue of sovereign immunity. Argonaut contends the

only issue over which we have jurisdiction is the district court's determination that

ACJC's purchase of insurance waived not only its common law sovereign immunity,

but also any statutory immunity ACJC might enjoy under § 190.307 as a 911 call

center.

II

Before reaching the issues raised by ACJC, we must address Argonaut's

jurisdictional concerns.

"Ordinarily, we lack jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal challenging the

denial ofsummary judgment, but an immediate appeal is appropriate where summary

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judgment is denied on the grounds of sovereign immunity or qualified immunity,

because immunity is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." 

Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 647-48 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). The key to our jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal

addressing sovereign immunity is whether the immunity is an "immunity from suit

rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526

(1985). Where a state statute merely provides immunity from liability for damages,

rather than complete immunity fromsuit, interlocutory review is not appropriate. See

Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011) (listing the circuit court

decisions which have applied the principles of Mitchell v. Forsyth to the denial of

summary judgment on the issue of state sovereign immunity and recognized that an

interlocutory appeal is only available when state law provides immunity from suit).

The collateral order doctrine does not permit interlocutory review "[w]here

immunity from liability is involved [because] any error of the district court is

effectively reviewable in an appealfromthe final judgment." Gray-Hopkins v. Prince

George's Cnty., Md., 309 F.3d 224, 231 (4th Cir. 2002). "[T]he right to an

interlocutory appeal from the denial of a claim of . . . immunity under state law can

only exist where the state has extended an underlying substantive right to be free from

the burdens of litigation[.]" Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1106-07 (3d Cir.

1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

With these principles in mind, we turn to an examination of the two sources of

immunity involved in this case, Missouri Revised Statutes §§ 537.600 and 190.307.

Section 537.600 generallypreserves Missouri's "sovereign or governmental tort

immunity as existed at common law[.]" In addition, the statute specifically refers to

"the immunity of [a] public entity from liability and suit[.]" Id. By granting not only

immunity fromdamages, but also immunity fromsuit, the Missouri legislature clearly

extended to ACJC the substantive right to be free from the burdens of litigation for

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the negligence claim Argonaut brought against it unless, of course, ACJC waived

such immunity. As a result, we have jurisdiction in thisinterlocutory appeal over the

question whether ACJC's purchase of insurance waived the common law sovereign

immunity it might otherwise enjoy under § 537.600.6

At oral argument, Argonaut's counsel argued the necessity for a trial on its

6

dangerous condition claim robs us of jurisdiction to address whether ACJC waived

its sovereign immunity by purchasing insurance. In its summary judgment order, the

district court left unresolved the question whether the exception for a dangerous

condition found in § 537.600.1(2) could apply to the facts of this case. The district

court reasoned that it need only address the exception if it first determined ACJC had

not waived its common law and statutory immunity. Arguing ACJC will have to face

the burden of a trial on the dangerous condition claim irrespective of whether we

address the insurance waiver issue now, or wait until an appeal froma final judgment,

Argonaut's counsel contends interlocutory review ofthe waiver issue isinappropriate. 

See, e.g., Schrob v. Catterson, 967 F.2d 929, 942 (3d Cir. 1992) (dismissing an

interlocutory appeal of an immunity issue in a case alleging "numerous theories of

recovery [all] stem[ming] fromthe same common nucleus offact" where a trial would

be necessary on some claims, reasoning "little would be gained by permitting

immediate appeal of the denial of immunity of some claims where other claims for

money damages remain").

We disagree the presence of the unresolved dangerous condition claim

precludes us from addressing whether ACJC is immune from suit for the separate

negligence claim brought against it. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311-12

(1996) (addressing jurisdiction over an issue of immunity in an interlocutory appeal

of a multiple-claim suit and concluding "when immunity with respect to [some]

claims has been finally denied, appeal must be available, and cannot be foreclosed by

the mere addition of other claims to the suit").

One additional comment about the dangerous condition claim is warranted. 

ACJC's appeal brief arguably contends the evidence to support application of the

dangerous condition exception is insufficient as a matter of law. The district court

did not, however, enter a final order on the exception, reasoning that its resolution of

the § 537.600 and § 190.307 immunity issues rendered such a decision unnecessary. 

Because the district court did not dispositively address the dangerous condition

exception in its order denying summary judgment, we lack jurisdiction to address

ACJC's argument regarding the sufficiency of the claim.

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Section 190.307, in turn, provides that "[n]o public agency . . . shall be liable

for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission except willful and wanton

misconduct or gross negligence, in connection with" the operation of a 911 system. 

The statute does not refer to immunity from suit, but merely provides ACJC limited

protection from liability for damages. As a consequence, the statute does not extend

to ACJC a substantive right to be free from the burdens of litigation. We therefore

lack jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal to address the question whether ACJC's

purchase of insurance also waived any statutory immunity it might enjoy under

§ 190.307 as a 911 call center.7

III

Having satisfied ourselves we have jurisdiction over the question whether

ACJC waived § 537.600 immunity through the purchase of insurance, we turn to the

merits of that issue. In the district court, ACJC asserted that it and its insurer had

retroactively reformed the Policy by attaching an endorsement which excluded

coverage for claims to which its sovereign immunity applied. See Langley v.

Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 73 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) ("A public

entity does not waive its sovereign immunity by maintaining an insurance policy

where that policy includes a provision stating that the policy is not meant to constitute

a waiver of sovereign immunity."). ACJC contends the district court erred in the

bench trial by finding ACJC had not proven the Policy had been properly reformed.

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Having concluded we lack jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal over the

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broader question whether ACJC is immune from suit under § 190.307 as a 911 call

center, we similarly lack jurisdiction to address ACJC's narrower contention that the

gross negligence claim alleged by Argonaut – which is an exception to the limited

immunity granted under § 190.307 – is insufficient as a matter of law.

"Although we may not review in an interlocutory appeal a district court's 8

finding that certain facts are in dispute," Lockridge v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark.,

315 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 2003), here the bench trial resulted in a final resolution

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To prove its claim for reformation, ACJC had to present evidence that it and

its insurer had a pre-existing agreement to attach the sovereign immunity

endorsement to the Policy and made a mutual mistake when they failed to do so. See

Cardinal Partners, LLC v. Desco Inv. Co., 301 S.W.3d 104, 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)

(providing that a party must prove the following elements to reform a written

instrument: "1) a preexisting agreement between the parties affected by the proposed

reformation is consistent with the change sought; 2) a mistake was made in that the

[written instrument] was prepared other than as agreed; and 3) the mistake was

mutual, i.e., it was common to both parties").

In addition, "[r]eformation of a written instrument is an extraordinary equitable

remedy and should be granted with great caution and only in clear cases of fraud or

mistake." Ethridge v. TierOne Bank, 226 S.W.3d 127, 132 (Mo. 2007) (internal

quotations omitted). As a consequence, there is a high burden of proof for the party

seeking reformation: "The court can reform a written instrument only upon clear,

cogent, and convincing evidence that leaves no roomfor reasonable doubt." Cardinal

Partners, 301 S.W.3d at 110.

We agree with the district court that ACJC did not present sufficient evidence

of a pre-existing agreement, let alone prove such an agreement by clear, cogent, and

convincing evidence. The testimony presented to the district court in the bench trial

showed ACJC never discussed sovereign immunity, or even thought about immunity,

when it sought a policy from an insurance broker. Similarly, ACJC's evidence failed

to show that representatives of the insurer ever discussed sovereign immunity with

of a threshold fact question necessary to determine whether ACJC had waived its

immunity. This is different than a finding that facts are in dispute. This is a situation

where AJCJ may lose its immunity if the case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. 

We therefore have jurisdiction to review the result of the bench trial in this

interlocutory appeal.

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ACJC. In addition, ACJC accepted the Policy as written and renewed itseveral times

even though the Policy did not contain an endorsement preserving sovereign

immunity. See, e.g., Dairy Farmers of Am. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 292 F.3d 567, 575

(8th Cir. 2002) (finding no grounds for reformation where an insured accepted

insurance policies as written and renewed the policies). Based upon this record, we

find no clear error in the district court's determination that ACJC did not prove the

existence of a pre-existing agreement between itself and the insurer to include the

sovereign immunity endorsement with the original policy.

IV

We affirmthe district court's determination that ACJC waived the common law

sovereign immunity provided by § 537.600 through its purchase of insurance. We

dismiss the remaining portions of this interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

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______________________________

Because our jurisdiction was contested and unclear, we deny Argonaut's 9

motion to strike the portions of ACJC's brief that addressed issues we ultimately

determined we lack jurisdiction to consider.

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