Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01390/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01390-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES L. DAVIS, a.k.a.,

MICHAEL L. HOLMES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-1390 LKK EFB P

vs.

TERESA A. SCHWARTZ,

ORDER AND

Defendant. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a prisoner without counsel suing for alleged civil rights violations. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on the December 20, 2004, amended complaint in which

plaintiff claims that defendant Schwartz assumed a judicial function by implementing a

restitution payment schedule that the sentencing court did not itself impose. In particular,

plaintiff claims the following: (1) defendant’s imposition of a fee to collect and distribute a $100

fine imposed for a 1992 conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) increasing the

percentage deducted from deposits to his trust account in order to satisfy a restitution fine of

$10,000 for a crime committed in 1997 constituted application of an ex post facto law; (3)

charging an administrative fee for collecting and distributing payments for the $10,000

restitution fine constituted application of an ex post facto law; (4) increasing the percentage

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deducted from deposits to his trust account to satisfy the restitution fine for the 1997 offense

violated his right to procedural due process; and (5) charging an administrative fee to collect and

distribute this restitution fine violated due process. The case is currently before the court on

defendant’s motion for summary judgment and plaintiff’s motion for leave to again amend his

complaint. For the reasons explained below, the court finds that the request to amend to add two

new defendants is untimely, and ultimately would be futile. The court further finds that there is

no genuine issue for trial and that defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be granted.

I. Motion for Discovery

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B), plaintiff moves to compel defendant to respond

to requests for production of documents. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not

privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 

Information sought need not be admissible at trial if the discovery is reasonably calculated to

lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. The court may limit discovery if it determines

the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or obtainable from a more convenient or less

expensive source, the party seeking discovery had ample opportunity to obtain the information

sought, or the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26(b)(2). A party has a continuing duty to supplement, correct or amend discovery

responses if the court so orders or if the party learns the responses were in some material respect

incorrect or incomplete and the information has not otherwise been made available to other

parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2).

Any party may request any other party produce for inspection documents including

writings, drawings, graphs, charts or data compilations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). The requesting

party must identify the items to be produced and the party upon whom the request is made must

make a written response stating that inspection will be permitted as requested, unless the party 

objects and states the basis therefor. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b).

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Here, plaintiff’s first request for documents states: 

Identify and attach a written copy of the complete prison restitution fine records

payments and all deductions, and all administration fee payments records, of the

plaintiff James L. Davis, dating from January 7, 2000 to the current date of now,

with the dates of each applied increase, in the restitution percentage rate

payments, that was above the 20%-22% rate established on January 7, 2000,

along with the same information about the administration fee records.

Plaintiff’s second request for documents states:

Identify and attach a copy of all penal code sections amendments, and certificates

of compliance that was sent to the office of administrative law relating to

restitution fine percentage rate increases, and administration fee rate increases,

and any emergency regulation packages, relating to California Code Regulation,

Title 15, section 3097. The penal code sections that relate to an is identified as

relating to restitution fine percentage rate increases and administration fee

percentage rate increases, dated from and including the laws in effect on January

7, 2000 up and until the current date of now, on all requested documents.

Defendant responds that she has produced all documents she could identify as responsive to

these requests. She attaches them to her opposition. Plaintiff has not contested this assertion. 

Accordingly, the motion is denied as to these requests.

Plaintiff’s third request states:

Identify and attach a copy of any and all rules, regulations, policies, and duties

relating to the restitution fine payments and administration fee payments, of the

office of director of institutions division, and office of director of victim services

and restitution, their names and the names of staff directly involved in

implementation of restitution fines increases and administration fee increases

[directors names, and supervisory staff names] from January 7, 2000, to the date

that is currently now.

Defendant objects that the names that plaintiff seeks are outside the scope of discovery. The

court has reviewed the record, including the motion for summary judgment and the opposition

thereto, and finds that the objection is well-taken. Defendant’s objection is sustained. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (district courts have

broad discretion to decide questions of relevance for purposes of discovery).

Defendant further objects that she otherwise has identified and produced the documents

responsive to this request, and she has attached them to her opposition to the motion to compel. 

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This objection is sustained.

Plaintiff’s fourth request states,

Identify and attach a copy of all the information records and documents that

directly relate to the increase in restitution fine percentage rate payments and

administration fee percentage rate increases in payments, since January 7, 2000,

from and including if applicable, the legislature, down to any other state agencies

that had direct involvement in the percentage rate increases of restitution fine

payments, and administration fee increases in payments. Also the names of the

supervisors of these agencies that are in charge of the agency, department, and or

office involved in this request.

Defendant objects that this request seeks documents that are outside the scope of discovery. She

asserts that the facts in this action are not in dispute and that the information sought would not

create any material dispute. This objection is sustained. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Hallett v.

Morgan, 296 F.3d at 751. Defendant also objects that she has produced copies of the relevant

regulations. This objection is sustained.

Plaintiff’s fifth request states,

Identify and attach a written copy of penal code section 1202.4(b) as it was

written January 7, 2000. Also identify and attach a written copy of any changes

to the above penal code section 1202.4(b), whether it is to that specific penal code

section, or a new penal code section that directly changes or effects the substance

of penal code section 1202.49b), as it was written and applied on January 7, 2000.

Defendant objects that she is not obliged to perform legal research for plaintiff. Parties may

conduct discovery to obtain factual information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-36. Plaintiff seeks the

law he believes is necessary to litigate this action. This is not a proper discovery request. The

objection is sustained.

Plaintiff’s sixth request states,

Identify and attach a numbered label to each specific document as associated with

the request within numbered 1 through 5 in this document, for the purpose of

identifying the documents with the within numbered request.

Defendant Schwartz objects that this is not a request for production of documents, but rather a

request for a particular organization thereof. A party producing documents must “produce them

as they are kept in the usual course of business or shall organize and label them to correspond

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with the categories in the request.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(I). Plaintiff makes no showing that

defendant failed to comply with this requirement. Defendant’s objection is sustained.

For these reasons, plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery is denied.

The court next addresses the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Facts

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a prisoner within the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation confined at the California Medical Facility, where

defendant Schwartz was the warden. 

On December 14, 1992, plaintiff was convicted for an offense in the Santa Clara County

Superior Court (case # 160460) for which he was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of

$100. Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (DSUF), Ex. A at 8; Pl.’s Opp’n., Ex. A,

Attach. 2. Deductions were taken from deposits to plaintiff’s trust account, but no administrative

fee was charged. DSUF, Exh. B; Pl.’s Opp.’n, Ex. A, Attach. 2. There is no evidence presented

to establish the date of the offense for which plaintiff was convicted.

In 1997, plaintiff engaged in activities for which he was charged with and tried for

criminal offenses in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, case number 204602. DSUF, Ex. A

at 2-3. As a result, on January 7, 2000, he was convicted of one count of first degree burglary

and one count of attempted first degree burglary, and was sentenced to 90 years to life in prison

with the possibility of parole. See Cal. Pen. Code §§ 459, 460(A), 664, 667(b)-(I); DSUF, Ex. A,

at 2. The trial court imposed a $10,000 restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4(b) of the

California Penal Code, payable “forthwith” as required by section 2085.5 of the California Penal

Code. Id. at 3. It also imposed a $10,000 restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.45, but

ordered it “suspended unless parole is revoked.” Id. The court also ordered direct restitution to

Linda Marsh in the amount of $357.20. Id. As of January 12, 2007, a total of $221.67 had been

withheld for payment of $10,000 fine imposed pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 1202.4(b), with an

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 On April 11, 2006, the court informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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additional $22.16 in administrative fees. DSUF, Ex. B. As of that date, no payments for the

direct restitution to Linda Marsh had been withheld from deposits to plaintiff’s trust account. Id.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).1 The utility of Rule 56 to determine whether there is a

“genuine issue of material fact,” such that the case must be resolved through presentation of

testimony and evidence at trial is well established:

[T]he Supreme Court, by clarifying what the non-moving party

must do to withstand a motion for summary judgment, has

increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the Court has

made clear that if the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and that party

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of

fact with respect to the existence of that element, then summary

judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary judgment,

the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine factual

issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

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bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). There can be no genuine issue as to any

material fact where there is a complete failure of proof as to an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case because all other facts are thereby rendered immaterial. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. 

With these standards in mind, it is important to note that plaintiff bears the burden of

proof at trial over the issues raised on this motion, i.e., whether the defendant enforced an ex post

facto law or violated plaintiff’s right to due process. Therefore, to withstand defendant’s motion,

plaintiff may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. He must demonstrate a

genuine issue for trial. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 1989). He

must rely on evidence based upon which a fair-minded jury "could return a verdict for [him] on

the evidence presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252.

III. Analysis

"As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248. Here, plaintiff’s action arises

under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the prohibition against ex post facto laws contained in Article

I, § 10 of the Constitution, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To

prevail at trial, he must prove that the defendant deprived him of his rights while acting under

color of state law. To prove a violation of the Ex Post Facto clause, plaintiff must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the statute pursuant to which restitution was collected and a

fee was charged was passed after the date he committed the offenses of which he was convicted. 

See Calif. Dept. of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995) (outlining elements of ex post

facto claim). To prevail on his claim that his right to due process was violated, he must prove

that in light of the property interest at stake, he was not afforded adequate process to protect

against an erroneous deprivation of that interest. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.

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833, 845 (1998); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). As

discussed below, plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine dispute for trial over this material

issue.

A. Ex Post Facto

As stated above, plaintiff claims that (1) defendant’s imposition of a fee to collect and

distribute a $100 restitution fine imposed for a crime committed in 1992 violates the Ex Post

Facto Clause; and, (2) increasing the percentage deducted from deposits to his trust account in

order to satisfy a restitution fine for a crime committed in 1997 constituted application of an ex

post facto law. The Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation on legislative power that forbids

passage and application of laws that retroactively either alter the definition of crimes, thereby

increasing punishment therefor, or increase the punishment for criminal acts. Garner v. Jones,

529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000); Calif. Dept. of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995); Marks v.

United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977); Johnson v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 1996). A

change in law is retrospective if a statute and procedures in place at the time of sentencing

presume more onerous punishment than the statute in place when a crime is committed. Miller

v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430-431 (1987) (change to sentencing guidelines making presumptive

sentence two years longer than under guidelines in effect when offense committed violates ex

post facto clause). In California, a restitution fine is considered to be part of the penalty imposed

upon conviction of a crime for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. People v. Saelee, 35

Cal.App.4th 27, 30 (Cal. App. 1995). 

The court first considers plaintiff’s allegations with respect to the $100 restitution

imposed in 1992. As noted above, a restitution fine is punishment for purposes of the Ex Post

Facto Clause. Plaintiff does not allege when he committed the offense resulting in this

punishment, and there is no evidence to clarify this point. The court cannot determine whether

the amounts deducted were pursuant to a statute enacted after he committed the offense. The

court finds that an essential element of plaintiff’s claim, i.e., retrospective effect of a statute, is

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neither alleged nor evidenced in the record. Thus, plaintiff fails to establish that the imposition

of $110 in restitution in 1992 violates the Ex Post Facto clause.

Next, plaintiff claims that the increased deductions from his trust account deposits to

satisfy the $10,000 restitution fine imposed in 2000 for the offense committed in 1997 also

violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. This claim fails as well. In 1997, when plaintiff committed

the acts for which a $10,000 restitution fine was imposed pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code §1202.4(b),

California law provided, in relevant part:

In any case in which a prisoner owes a restitution fine imposed pursuant to . . .

subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, the Director of Corrections shall deduct a

minimum of 20 percent or the balance owing on the fine amount, whichever is

less, up to a maximum of 50 percent from the wages and trust account deposits of

a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law, and shall transfer that amount to the

State Board of Control for deposit in the Restitution Fund in the State Treasury.

Cal. Pen. Code § 2085.5(a) (West Supp. 1997). Plaintiff asserts that initially, deductions of 22%

of the deposits were made to satisfy the restitution fine, and later they were increased to 33%. It

is undisputed that the court made this order pursuant to § 1202.4(b). The version of the statute in

effect in 1997, when plaintiff committed the offense, clearly permitted deductions of 20% to

50% of the deposits to his account. The range of deductions plaintiff alleges fall within what the

statute permitted. Thus, it appears that the deductions were made pursuant to the same version

of the statute throughout the time period in question. No reasonable jury could find that the

larger deductions constituted a retrospective application of a statute which increased the

punishment for his crime. Therefore, defendant Schwartz is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.

Plaintiff claims that charging an administrative fee for collecting and distributing

payments for the $10,000 restitution fine violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The statute in effect

at the time plaintiff committed the offense provided, in relevant part:

The director shall deduct and retain from the wages and trust account deposits of

a prisoner, unless prohibited by federal law, an administrative fee that totals 10

percent of any amount transferred to the State Board of Control pursuant to

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subdivision (a) or (b).

Cal. Pen. Code § 2085.5(c) (West Supp. 1997). This statute clearly permitted in 1997 what

plaintiff alleges to have been unconstitutional: charging a 10% administrative fee for the

deduction and distribution of the restitution fine. There clearly was not a retrospective

application of this provision and this claim fails as well.

B. Due Process

As stated above, plaintiff makes claims that increasing the percentage deducted from

deposits to his trust account to satisfy the restitution fine for the 1997 offense, and charging an

administrative fee to collect and distribute this restitution fine violates due process. 

With respect to the first part of this claim, plaintiff asserts that without an order from the

sentencing court modifying the payment schedule, the increase was made without notice and an

opportunity to be heard. “[T]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against

arbitrary action of government.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998)

(quoting Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)). The first step in assessing a due process

claim is to identify the liberty interest at stake. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) (“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the

deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and

property.”). The process due in any given situation requires a balancing of the private interest at

stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation thereof through the procedures used, and the

additional cost and administrative burdens that more process would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Plaintiff clearly has a protected interest in money deposited to his

trust account. But, at the time plaintiff committed the offense for which he was convicted,

California statute required the sentencing judge to impose a restitution fund fine on any person

convicted of a crime unless it made a finding of “compelling and extraordinary reasons for not

doing so, and states those reasons on the record.” Pen. Code § 1202.4(b) (West Supp. 1997). 

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The order of judgment and sentence clearly imposes a restitution fine and states that it must be

collected and paid pursuant to sections 1202.4(b) and 2085.5 of the California Penal Code. 

While section 2085.5(a) states that anywhere from 20% to 50% of the deposits to a prisoner’s

trust account may be deducted for restitution payments, neither this section nor section 1204.4(b)

creates a schedule of percentages to be deducted. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that

the sentencing court made any sort of payment schedule. Plaintiff submits no evidence that he or

his trial attorney objected to payment as provided by the statutes generally or that they requested

and obtained an order directing a particular percentage of deposits be withdrawn and no more. 

Thus, plaintiff had statutory notice that anywhere from 20% to 50% of the deposits to his trust

account would be deducted to satisfy the restitution fine. See Cal. Pen. Code § 2085.5(a) (West

Supp. 1997). There is no evidence of even ths slightest risk that the procedures used either have

resulted or will result in an erroneous deprivation, i.e., a deprivation beyond the maximum

restitution fine ordered. Nor is there any evidence that the cost of having the sentencing court

issue a new order every time the amount deducted changes would protect against whatever risk

of an erroneous deprivation might exist No reasonable jury could find in plaintiff’s favor on this

evidence. Therefore, defendant Schwartz is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

For like reason, plaintiff’s claim that the imposition of an administrative fee to collect

and distribute the restitution fine violated due process must fail. At the time of sentencing, the

law required payment of an administration fee for collection and distribution of restitution fines. 

Cal. Pen. Code § 2085.5(c) (West Supp. 1997). The order of judgment and sentence cites §

2085.5. Plaintiff offers no evidence that he had no counsel at the time of sentencing or that he

was not informed of this fee. On the evidence before the court, no reasonable jury could find in

plaintiff’s favor. Defendant Schwartz is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.

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IV. Motion to Amend

After the filing of the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff filed a request for leave to

amend his complaint to add as defendants Sandi Menefee, described by plaintiff as the Director

of the Office of Victim Service and Restitution, and Chery Pliler, described by plaintiff as the

Director of Institutions Divisions. The request seeks to assert the same claims discussed above

as to these new defendants.

Federal policy regarding the amendment of pleadings is liberal:

A party may amend the party’s pleading once as a matter of course at any time

before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no

responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial

calendar, the party may so amen amend it at any time within 20 days after it is

served. Otherwise a party may amend the party’s pleading only be leave of court

or by written consent of the adverse party; and eave shall be freely given when

justice so requires.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Where, as here, a responsive pleading has been filed, the following factors

are relevant in determining whether to permit a party to amend a pleading: (1) whether

amendment would be futile; (2) bad faith; (3) undue delay; and (4) undue prejudice to the

opposing party resulting from permitting the amendment. AmericourceBergen Corp v. Dialysist

West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). Futility alone can justify the denial of leave to

amend. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, plaintiff does not assert any

additional factual allegations against these two defendants. Rather, he simply asserts in the

request to amend that they were involved “directly and or indirectly” in the “violations cited

within, as responsable [sic] staff.” Thus, any claims against these two individuals would

ultimately fail for the same reasons discussed above in concluding that summary judgment must

be granted to the defendant. Therefore, adding these parties would be futile and plaintiff’s

motion to add these defendants must be denied.

Plaintiff also seeks to add defendants Dr. Ramen, Nurse Clair Solis, Nurse Mrs. Johnson,

Chief Medical Officer V. Sanchez. While he makes no specific allegations against these

individuals, also, he appears to claim that they violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate

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medical care. A district court may deny leave to file an amended complaint where a plaintiff

substantially delays seeking leave to amend to assert “an entirely new theory of liability which

was inconsistent with the original complaint,” and fails to articulate some justification for the

delay. Parker v. Joe Lujan Enterprises, Inc., 848 F.2d 118, 121 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s

initial complaint contained no cause of action against these defendants or about the adequacy of

the health care he was receiving. The court has reviewed the complaint and can find no

explanation for waiting so long to move to add these defendants and claims. The court declines

to permit plaintiff at this late date to add entirely new defendants based on an entirely new cause

of action, none of which appropriately would have been joined in the initial complaint. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 20(a); League to Save Lake Tahoe v. TRPA, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977)

(defendants properly are joined in one action when plaintiff asserts against each defendant a right

to relief “relating to or arising out of the same transaction or occurrence,” and claims “some

question of law or fact common to all the parties that will arise in the action.”). The court finds

that both the delay and the futility of adding these defendants and claims justify denying

plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff’s November 8, 2006, motion

to compel discovery is denied.

Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s October 20, 2006, motion for leave to file an amended complaint be denied;

2. Defendant’s January 16, 2007, motion for summary judgment be granted and that

 judgment be entered in her favor; and 

3. The Clerk be directed to close the case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

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with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 29, 2007.

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