Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01491/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01491-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Initially, plaintiff purported to file a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, which was

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dismissed with leave to file a civil rights action. See Order, filed on February 16, 2006. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH MITCHELL,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1491 RRB GGH P

vs.

MARGARITA A. PEREZ, et al., ORDER &

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 

Introduction

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Pending before the court is 1) defendants’ December 27, 2006, motion to dismiss, to 1

which plaintiff filed an opposition on January 10, 2007; 2) plaintiff’s December 1, 2006, request

for reconsideration of this court’s denial of an earlier request by plaintiff for appointment of

counsel, directed to the undersigned, and construed as a renewed request for appointment of

counsel. 

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 The complaint was construed as an amended complaint in light of the earlier, dismissed 2

“petition,” filed on July 25, 2005. See Order, filed on June 26, 2006, p. 1.

 He challenges as “unconstitutionally vague” (AC, pp. 8, 11-14) Cal. Penal Code § 3

2931, which codifies the application of good time credit to the sentences of state prisoners, and

CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 3040(a), which requires, inter alia, “[e]very able-bodied person

committed” to CDCR custody “to work as assigned by department staff ....”, which

“[a]ssignment may be to a full day of work, education, or other program activity or to a

combination....”

 The court notes that in the settlement agreement plaintiff has attached with regard to this 4

individual who was transferred into Swedish custody, that first Mikael Schiold was found

suitable for parole by the Board of Prison Terms, which decision was reversed by former Gov.

Davis, and the state superior court then granted petitioner Schiold’s petition, challenging the

governor’s reversal. Plaintiff makes no representation that the Board has ever recommended his

own parole.

 Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 5

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Allegations

In his amended complaint, filed on March 3, 2006 (construed as an amended

complaint in light of his earlier “petition” ), the gravamen of his allegations is that defendants 2

Margarita Perez, (former) Chairperson of the California Board of Prison Terms (now Board of

Parole Hearings, hereafter, Board), and (former) California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) Director, Jeanne Woodford, in violation of an international treaty and

federal statutes, as well as plaintiff’s constitutional right to equal protection and due process,

have kept plaintiff, an illegal alien, by way of unconstitutional state statutes and regulations, in 3

California’s prison system for 20 years as part of “an alien slave labor work force throughout the

35 separate prisons,” despite plaintiff’s request to be transferred back to the Canadian prison

system, and despite having permitted the transfer to Sweden of a Swedish illegal alien inmate,

Mikael Schiold, also convicted of second degree murder. Amended Complaint (AC), pp. 1-7, 9, 4

11, Exhibit (Exh.) A. Plaintiff maintains that he is denied proximity to family other prisoners

(and the transferred Swede) are allowed and is limited to vocational training that inmates who are

U.S. citizens can use in this country, while he is an illegal alien with an INS (now BICE) hold, 5

who will be immediately deported to the Canadian prison system and unable to use the work

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 To the extent that plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief, the current Board 6

Chairperson and CDCR Secretary would be the appropriate official capacity defendants, pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

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training provided in California prisons. Id., at 5, 8-9. Plaintiff seeks money damages,

declaratory and injunctive relief. 

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Motion to Dismiss 

Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to nonenumerated Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b),

on the ground that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to defendant

Woodford, and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), as to both defendants Perez and Woodford, on the

ground that plaintiff has failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted. Motion to

Dismiss (MTD), p. 1. 

Legal Standard under Non-Enumerated Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)

In a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under nonenumerated Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants “have the burden of

raising and proving exhaustion.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9 Cir. 2003). The th

parties may go outside the pleadings, submitting affidavits or declarations under penalty of

perjury, but plaintiff must be provided with notice of his opportunity to develop a record. Wyatt

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. The court provided plaintiff with such fair notice by Order,

filed on July 31, 2006. 

Should defendants submit declarations and/or other documentation demonstrating

an absence of exhaustion, making a prima facie showing, plaintiff must refute that showing. 

Plaintiff may rely upon statements made under the penalty of perjury in the complaint if the

complaint shows that plaintiff has personal knowledge of the matters stated and plaintiff calls to

the court’s attention those parts of the complaint upon which plaintiff relies. If the court

determines that plaintiff has failed to exhaust, dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate

remedy for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d at 1120.

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PLRA Requirements

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that, 

“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Inmates seeking injunctive relief

must exhaust administrative remedies. Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). In Booth

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,741, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1825 (2001), the Supreme Court held that

inmates must exhaust administrative remedies, regardless of the relief offered through

administrative procedures. Therefore, inmates seeking money damages must also completely

exhaust their administrative remedies. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S. Ct. 1819 (inmates

seeking money damages are required to exhaust administrative remedies even where the

grievance process does not permit awards of money damages). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides

that no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002).

Administrative Exhaustion Procedure

In order for California prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies, they must

proceed through several levels of appeal: 1) informal resolution, 2) formal written appeal on a

CDC 602 inmate appeal form, 3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and 4)

third level appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections. Barry v. Ratelle,

985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5). A final

decision from the Director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 1237-38.

Discussion

Because defendants concede that the administrative grievance procedure within

the Board has been eliminated, defendants do not raise this claim as to defendant Perez. MTD, p.

8. However, as to defendant Woodford, in her capacity (or former capacity) as CDCR Director,

as defendants maintain, the CDCR grievance process is on-going and plaintiff must have

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 “Third level responses shall be completed within 60 working days.” 7

 “Except for the third formal level, if an exceptional delay prevents completion of the 8

review within specified time limits, the appellant shall be informed in writing of the reasons for

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exhausted any claims against her through that process prior to filing his lawsuit. Id. Defendants

contend that there is no record of any CDC 602 appeal having been filed by plaintiff against

defendant Woodford, much less any that was exhausted at the Director’s level. Id. 

P. Dennis, the current CDCR appeals coordinator located at Correctional Training

Facility (CTF) in Soledad, where plaintiff is housed, declares explicitly, under penalty of perjury,

that there is no appeal on record of plaintiff having filed a CDC 602 alleging that defendant

Woodford maintained an illegal alien work force or enforced unconstitutionally vague statutes

which purportedly forced illegal aliens to work (the gravamen of his claims as to this defendant). 

MTD, P. Dennis Declaration (Dec.), ¶¶ 1, 6. S. Pedevilla, CDCR office tech and assistant to the

litigation coordinator at CTF, and an authorized custodian of records likewise declares that there

is no record of plaintiff having filed a CDC 602 appeal regarding his claims against defendant

Woodford. MTD, Exh. B, S. Pedevilla Dec.,¶¶ 1, 2. Finally, CDCR Chief of the Inmate Appeals

Branch in Sacramento, N. Grannis, declares that her review of the Inmate Appeals Branch

records and database reveals that there is no record of plaintiff having brought a CDC 602 appeal

to the third level alleging that defendant Woodford maintained an illegal alien work force or

enforced unconstitutionally vague statutes which purportedly forced illegal aliens to work. 

MTD, Exh. C, N. Grannis Dec., ¶¶ 1, 9. 

In opposition, plaintiff maintains that he has filed, and defendants counsel is

aware that he filed, two CDC 830 transfer appeal applications directly to the Board Chairperson,

defendant Perez, that the first transfer appeal was denied and that plaintiff presented all of his

claims in that appeal. Opposition (Opp.), p. 2. As to the second transfer appeal, plaintiff

maintains that defendant Perez failed to comply with the time limits of Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3084.6 (4) and (6). Id. Plaintiff contends that the CDC 830 transfer application is designed for 7 8

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26 the delay and the estimated completion date.”

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illegal aliens seeking transfer to their native countries, and is equivalent to the CDC 602 process,

and that he has exhausted his administrative remedies by filing two such grievances, one of

which was denied and the other for which he was never provided a response at all. Id., at 2, 4-5,

14 Exh. A. Plaintiff states that the Board has eliminated all inmate appeals, which defendants

have conceded. Defendants, however, do not allege nonexhaustion as to defendant Perez. 

Plaintiff also contends that there are no remedies available within CDCR to

challenge plaintiff’s claims (as to defendant Woodford, presumably), regarding his illegal alien

slave labor work force claims. Opp., p. 12. However, plaintiff is not the arbiter of what genus of

claims may be made via the CDCR inmate appeal system. As noted, the exhaustion requirement

is mandatory, “regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.” 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a); Booth v. Churner, supra, 532 U.S. at 741,121 S. Ct. at 1825. Plaintiff makes no

showing whatever of having ever filed a 602 inmate appeal with respect to his claims herein

against defendant Woodford, any showing he does make goes to his efforts in appeals with

regard to defendant Perez, who is not at issue within this ground of defendants’ motion. 

This court will recommend dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against defendant

Woodford for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to these claims. Dismissal of

defendant Woodford from this action without further leave to amend is appropriate because 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions until

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted, McKinney v. Carey, supra, 311 F.3d

1198, and plaintiff has failed to make any showing of exhaustion whatever as to his claims with

regard to this defendant.

Because the court finds that defendant Woodford should be dismissed from this 

action for plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the undersigned will address

defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion only with respect to the remaining defendant, defendant Perez. 

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Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss

A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts consistent with his allegations which

would entitle him to relief. NOW, Inc. v. Schiedler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803 

(1994); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984), citing Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957), Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d

1273, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1993). Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within it, “can be based

on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990);

see also Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.

Ct. 1848, 1850 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421,

89 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). The court will “‘presume that general

allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’” NOW, 510

U.S. at 256; 114 S. Ct. at 803, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.555, 561, 112 S.

Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972). A

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond

doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to

relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984), citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may disregard

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 Treaty Between the United States and Canada on the Execution of Penal Sentences, July 9

19, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 6263-6272. 

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allegations in the complaint if they are contradicted by facts established by exhibits attached to

the complaint. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Furthermore, the court is not required to accept as true allegations that contradict facts which

may be judicially noticed. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988). The court need not accept as true conclusory

allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). The court

need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). 

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

Discussion

Defendants move for dismissal of plaintiff’s claim against defendant Perez, the

gravamen of which is that she is denying him equal protection of the laws by not permitting his

transfer to Canada, on the ground that plaintiff has not stated an equal protection claim because

plaintiff has no constitutional right to determine the place of his incarceration, citing Meacham v.

Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976); the Ninth Circuit has held that a Canadian

citizen is not entitled to transfer to serve his sentence in his native country under the U.S.-

Canada Treaty, Hogan v. Koenig, 920 F.2d 6, 7-8 (9th Cir. 1990); and a prisoner is not entitled 9

to a transfer because decisions regarding any transfer rest within the unfettered discretion of the

Executive Branch, Bagguley v. Bush, 953 F.2d 660, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1991). MTD, pp. 2-3. 

Further, as to plaintiff’s claims of equal protection violations, plaintiff’s claim fails, according to

defendants, because prisoners from different countries are not similarly situated for transfer

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 “If two or more Parties have already concluded an agreement or treaty on the transfer of 10

sentenced persons or otherwise have established their relations in this matter, or should they in

the future do so, they shall be entitled to apply that agreement or treaty to regulate those relations

accordingly in lieu of the present Convention.” Convention, supra, art. 22, p. 2.

 In addition, although defendants do not mention it, the U.S. is not a signatory to the 11

Convention. 

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purposes, thus plaintiff is unable to show “that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to

discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class,” quoting Thornton

v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005). While prisoners incarcerated in

the U.S. who are Canadians are governed by the U.S.-Canada Treaty, defendants contend, the

transfers of European prisoners housed in the U.S. are governed by the Council of Europe:

Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons., 35 U.S.T. 2867, also citing plaintiff’s

complaint, Exh. C, Schiold Settlement Agreement, ¶ 12. MTD, pp. 3-4. Conceding that Canada

is a signatory to the Convention, defendants maintain that nevertheless the U.S.-Canada Treaty

controls prisoner transfers between the U.S. and Canada because the Convention so provides.10

MTD, p. 4. Another factor rendering plaintiff not similarly situated to Schiold, defendants aver, 11

is that Sweden’s law with regard to second degree murder differs from that of Canada’s

(although defendants do not characterize the differences), and one of the factors used to

determine whether to approve a foreign transfer request is, citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, §

2870(b)(6), “the relevant law within the receiving nation for the criminal offense committed by

the prisoner, including sentencing guidelines.” MTD., p. 4. Finally, defendants contend that

plaintiff is not similarly situated as American inmates due to his status as an illegal alien and the

differences between American and Canadian law. Id. 

Thus, according to defendants, plaintiff fails to demonstrate different treatment for

those similarly situated as he is not similarly situated to a Swedish inmate or inmates who are

American citizens. Id. 

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 Neither in plaintiff’s 60-page complaint, nor in his supporting exhibits, does plaintiff 12

appear to suggest the denial of his requests for transfer arise largely as a result of racial

discrimination.

 Presumably plaintiff is referring to individuals engaged in helping people escape 13

slavery in this country around the time of the American Civil War, a heritage of which plaintiff

might justly be proud but one which would seem to be extremely remote as serving any basis for

racial bigotry directed at him at the beginning of the 21st century.

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In opposition but not in his complaint, plaintiff primarily raises, or at the least

emphasizes, the specter of racial discrimination, arguing that his transfer is not being

implemented because he is a French Canadian of African descent, while Schiold is an “Aryan”

Swede. Opp., at 5-10. Plaintiff alleges that inmate Schiold is “a special transfer due only to his 12

[A]ryan bloodline....” and that plaintiff is being discriminated against because his family

members are descendants of African Americans who were part of the underground railroad. (Id. 13

at 5-6). 

In Meachum, supra, at 225, 96 S. Ct. at 2538, the U.S. Supreme Court does state

that a prisoner does not have a due process right against a transfer:“[t]hat life in one prison is

much more disagreeable than in another does not in itself signify that a Fourteenth Amendment

liberty interest is implicated when a prisoner is transferred to the institution with the more severe

rules.” Generally, prison officials’ housing and classification decisions do not give rise to federal

constitutional claims encompassed by the protection of liberty and property guaranteed by the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S. Ct.

2701 (1972); see also, Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.1985) (prison authorities

may change a prisoner’s “place of confinement even though the degree of confinement may be

different and prison life may be more disagreeable in one institution than in another” without

violating the prisoner's due process rights); Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (7th

Cir.1984) (allegation that prison guard planted false evidence in retaliation for prisoner’s failure

to pay extortion demand fails to state section 1983 claim so long as procedural due process was

provided). While in Meachum, the U. S. Supreme Court is explicitly addressing transfers of

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 Convention of the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, 22 I.L.M. 530 (1983). 14

 The Transfer of Offenders to and from Foreign Countries Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4100, et seq. 15

(1988).

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inmates within the state prison system, the high court has made clear that the reasoning of, inter

alia, Meachum, applies beyond the intrastate context and “compels the conclusion that an

interstate prison transfer...does not deprive an inmate of any liberty interest protected under the

Due Process Clause in and of itself.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248, 103 S. Ct. 1741,

1747 (1983). Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 & n. 4, 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976) (even

“substantially burdensome consequences,” such as separation from home and family due to a

prison transfer, does not implicate due process).

Regardless of his Canadian citizenship, plaintiff is an individual duly convicted in

a state of California superior court of a violation of the state’s penal code and a prisoner of that

state, subject to the regulations and statutes applicable thereto. As the Ninth Circuit has

observed, California is not a party to the U.S. - Canada Treaty, whose parties are the United

States and Canada, and is therefore not bound by the Treaty. Hogan v. Koenig, supra, 920 F.2d

at 8:

California has decided to cause Hogan to serve his sentence where

he committed his crime, and not in his native land. California has

the power to make such a decision, and the Treaty expresses no

limitations on the basis on which California may make that

decision. 

Id. 

Further, the District of Columbia Circuit has found that an alien prisoner has no

protected liberty interest in a transfer to his home country, even in the case of an applicable

ratified treaty providing for transfer of alien prisoners to their home countries, e.g., the treaty

between the U.S. and the United Kingdom, as well as a statute authorizing the chief law 14 15

enforcement officer of the executive branch (in the person of the Attorney General) to implement

the treaty. Bagguley v. Bush, 953 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (absent “substantive limitations on

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official discretion” set forth, prison administrators have “completely unfettered discretion”

regarding prison transfers; moreover, the Attorney General is given “unfettered discretion” by the

Act and Treaty “with respect to transfer decisions”).

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause “directs that ‘all persons

similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S. Ct.

2382, 2394 (1982) (internal citations omitted). On the other hand, “‘[t]he Constitution does not

require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the

same.’” Id. In raising in his opposition an argument that he is being discriminated against on the

basis of race, plaintiff apparently seeks to invoke the protections afforded to a suspect class,

requiring higher scrutiny of government action, with respect to his allegations concerning the

refusal of defendant Perez and the Board to transfer him to Canada. Johnson v. California, 543

U.S. 499, 505, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005), quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S.

200, 207, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (“[w]e have held ‘all racial classifications [imposed by

government]...must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”) [Emphasis in

Johnson, supra.] However, in the first place, while both plaintiff and Schiold were illegal

immigrants convicted in California of second degree murder, taking plaintiff’s allegations as true

as the court must on this motion to dismiss, plaintiff nevertheless does not meet the threshold

requirement of showing himself to be similarly situated to Schiold. Inmate Schiold was a citizen

of another country, apparently in a different posture with respect to his parole consideration, and

whose transfer was effected with respect to a different treaty than the one arguably applicable to

plaintiff’s incarceration. Moreover, even assuming plaintiff does meet the threshold of being

similarly situated, the U.S. Supreme Court has long refused to recognize illegal aliens as a

suspect class. Plyler, supra, at 219, n. 19, 102 S. Ct. at 2396, n. 19 (“Unlike most of the

classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class [illegal aliens], by virtue

of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the class is itself a

crime.”) 

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While a complaint subjected to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff is obligated to provide a basis for his entitlement to relief

beyond “labels and conclusions....[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level....” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (May 21,

2007). Plaintiff must make more than a desperate stab at alleging racial discrimination in his

opposition to a motion to dismiss (but not even in his complaint) in order to qualify to continue

in litigation. Simply picking a person of a different race, in a different situation, in a different

legal regime, and as far as the opposition demonstrates, subject to a transfer decision made by

different decisionmakers, who qualified for something similar to what plaintiff desires, falls far

short of moving an assumed racial discrimination claim past the barest of outright speculations. 

The court finds that defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted as to defendant Perez,

plaintiff having failed to allege a cognizable claim of a violation of his constitutional rights by

the alleged actions of this defendant in not permitting plaintiff’s transfer to Canada.

“Under Ninth Circuit case law, district courts are only required to grant leave to

amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are not required to grant leave to amend if a

complaint lacks merit entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). See also,

Smith v. Pacific Properties and Development Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004), citing

Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497(9th Cir.1995) (“a district court should grant leave to

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading

could not be cured by the allegation of other facts.”) 

Although the court has much doubt that plaintiff can state a claim of racial

discrimination against defendant Perez, plaintiff will be given one opportunity to state facts from

which a reasonable inference of discrimination could be made.

“Reconsideration of Motion for Appointment of Counsel”

By Order, filed on July 31, 2006, this court denied plaintiff’s request for

appointment of counsel. Plaintiff directs a request for reconsideration of that order to the

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undersigned, renewing his request for appointment of counsel. As plaintiff was previously

informed, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require

counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court,

490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the

voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d

1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). In

the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances, particularly in

light of the court’s present recommendation that this matter be dismissed. Plaintiff’s renewed

request for the appointment of counsel will therefore be denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ December 27, 2006, motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, as to defendant Perez, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), is

granted with leave to amend, within thirty days, to set forth factual allegations that support a

claim of racial discrimination; failure to do so will result in a recommendation of dismissal of

this action; and

2. Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration directed to the undersigned, construed as

a renewed request for appointment of counsel, filed on December 1, 2006, is denied.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that defendants’ December 27, 2006, motion to dismiss,

be granted as to defendant Woodford, under nonenumerated Fed. R. Civ. 12(b), for plaintiff’s

failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and this defendant be dismissed from this action.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 7/31/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

mitc1491.mtd

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