Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02318/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02318-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Devin Pellerin, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 2:14-cv-02318 JWS

)

vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION

)

Caryn Wagner, et al., ) [Re: Motions at Dockets 66, 68, 69, 

) and 76]

Defendants. )

)

I. MOTIONS PRESENTED

Before the court are four motions to compel filed by plaintiffs Devin Pellerin,

Angie Pellerin, X.X., and X.Y. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs’ first motion, at

docket 66, seeks an order compelling defendant Caryn Wagner (“Wagner”) to provide

further responses to various interrogatories pursuant to Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iii). Wagner

responds at docket 79; Plaintiffs reply at docket 81.

Plaintiffs’ second motion, at docket 68, seeks an order compelling Wagner to

provide further responses to various requests for admission (“RFAs”). Wagner

responds at docket 77; Plaintiffs reply at docket 82.

Plaintiffs’ third motion, at docket 69, seeks an order compelling defendant

Arizona Department of Economic Security (“ADES”) to provide responses to several of

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs’ requests for production of documents (“RFPs”). ADES responds at

docket 78; Plaintiffs reply at docket 83.

Plaintiffs’ fourth motion, at docket 76, seeks an order compelling third-party Iris

Garcia Maes (“Maes”) to produce documents requested by subpoena. Maes’ nonopposition is at docket 85; Plaintiffs’ reply is at docket 86.

Oral argument was requested, but would not assist the court.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ six-count complaint alleges that Defendants violated their civil rights in

the course of seizing the Pellerin children, X.X. and X.Y., from the Pellerin family home

and placing them in foster care.1

 Plaintiffs allege that on June 13, 2013, a juvenile court

returned X.X. and X.Y. to their parents.2

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 26(b)(1) provides that

[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is

relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of

the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action,

the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant

information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in

resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed

discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

“Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be

discoverable.”3

If a party fails to make disclosures or cooperate in discovery, the requesting

party may move to compel.4 “The party who resists discovery has the burden to show

that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and

1Doc. 1.

2

Id. at 11-12 ¶ 39. Defendants deny this allegation. Doc. 15 at 4 ¶ 39.

3Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

4Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).

-2-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

supporting its objections.”5 “Broad discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or

deny discovery[.]”6

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Wagner’s Boilerplate Objections

Rule 33(b)(4) requires parties to state with specificity the grounds for objecting to

an interrogatory. “Boilerplate, generalized objections are inadequate and tantamount to

not making any objection at all.”7

 The same is true with regard to boilerplate objections

to RFAs.8 Plaintiffs argue that Wagner should be ordered to supplement her responses

to interrogatories three, five, seven, and eight,9 and RFAs nine through twelve, sixteen,

seventeen, and twenty-four, without her boilerplate objections.10

 

5DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

6Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).

7Walker v. Lakewood Condo. Owners Ass’n, 186 F.R.D. 584, 587 (C.D. Cal. 1999). See

also Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[O]bjections should be plain

enough and specific enough so that the court can understand in what way the interrogatories

are alleged to be objectionable.”).

8Marti v. Baires, No. 1:08-CV-00653-AWI, 2012 WL 2029720, at *11 (E.D. Cal. June 5,

2012) (“‘The grounds for objecting to a request must be stated,’ and [as] with other forms of

discovery, it is well established that boilerplate objections do not suffice.”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 36(a)(5)) (collecting cases).

9See Wagner’s response to interrogatory three, doc. 66-3 at 7 (“Objection, vague,

ambiguous, overly broad and unduly burdensome.”); Wagner’s response to interrogatory five,

id. at 8 (“Objection; calls for a purely legal conclusion, overly broad and unduly burdensome.”);

Wagner’s response to interrogatory seven, id. at 9 (“Objection. Overly broad and unduly

burdensome.”); and Wagner’s response to interrogatory eight, id. (“Objection. Compound,

overly broad and unduly burdensome.”).

10See Wagner’s response to RFA nine, doc. 68-2 at 6 (“Objection; vague and

ambiguous.); Wagner’s response to RFA ten, id. at 7 (“Objection; vague and ambiguous.”);

Wagner’s response to RFA eleven, id. (“Objection; compound, vague and ambiguous.”);

Wagner’s response to RFA twelve, id. (“Objection; compound, vague and ambiguous.”);

Wagner’s response to RFA sixteen, id. at 8 (“Objection; vague and ambiguous.”); Wagner’s

response to RFA seventeen, id. (“Objection; vague and ambiguous.); and Wagner’s response

to RFA twenty-four, id. at 9 (“Objection; compound, vague and ambiguous.”).

-3-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs’ argument regarding Wagner’s boilerplate objections is well-taken; each

of her objections to the above-referenced discovery requests is overruled. But,

because Wagner did not withhold any information on account of these objections, this

ruling does not, by itself, establish that any of Wagner’s discovery responses are

deficient.

B. Wagner’s Responses to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories

1. Wagner’s references to Arizona law

Interrogatories three, four, and five, respectively, ask Wagner to explain her

decision to remove X.X. and X.Y. from the custody of Angie Pellerin, identify all of the

evidence she had at the time that the children were “in imminent danger of sustaining

serious bodily injury,” and state all facts that show she did not violate Angie Pellerin’s

due process rights.11 Plaintiffs argue that Wagner should be required to supplement

her responses to these interrogatories because they refer to Arizona’s probable cause

standard for removing children without a warrant, not the federal standard that Plaintiffs

say applies here. Plaintiffs contend that Wagner’s references to Arizona law make her

responses evasive and non-responsive.

Wagner’s responses are not evasive or non-responsive. An evasive discovery

response is one that interprets the request “in an artificially restrictive or hypertechnical

manner to avoid disclosure of information fairly covered by” the request.12 Wagner’s

responses do not avoid disclosure of information. Nor do they fail to respond to the

interrogatories presented. Instead, Plaintiffs take issue with the substance of the

information that Wagner provides. Because Rule 37 does not provide relief to a party

who merely disagrees with the substance of another party’s discovery responses, 

Plaintiffs’ argument lacks merit. 

11Doc. 66-3 at 7-8.

12See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 cmt. to 1993 amendment.

-4-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Interrogatories three and four

While as noted, the court agrees that the boilerplate objections are inappropriate,

Wagner’s answer to interrogatory three is responsive because it recites the facts

Wagner believes supported her decision. It may be added that the last paragraph of

the answer regarding the safety plan is surplusage. In any case, Wagner need not

supplement her answer to interrogatory three.

Plaintiffs’ fourth interrogatory asks Wagner to “identify all specific, articulable

evidence that X.X. and X.Y. were in imminent danger of sustaining serious bodily injury”

when Wagner removed them from their mother’s custody on May 10, 2013.13 Wagner’s

response states: “See response to interrogatory No. 3.”14

Plaintiffs argue that this response is improper because Wagner’s answers to

interrogatories three and four cannot be identical as interrogatory three “asks for facts”

and interrogatory four asks for evidence.15 Wagner responds that this is a “distinction

without a difference.”16 Neither party is entirely correct. “Facts” and “evidence” are

separate, but intersecting sets. In some instances the two sets will completely overlap

and thus be congruent. In others, one set may be larger than the other. For example,

there could be documents that are evidence, but the documents would not strictly

speaking be facts. Wagner’s response to interrogatory four incorporates her response

to interrogatory three. Plaintiffs complain that this means the answer to four is not

“separately and fully” stated.17 Plaintiffs go too far. There is nothing wrong with an

incorporation by reference per se. However, that said, the court finds the answer to

interrogatory four to be incomplete.

13Doc. 66-3 at 8.

14

Id.

15Doc. 66-1 at 10.

16Doc. 79 at 4.

17Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3).

-5-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Wagner’s response to interrogatory four does not identify all of the specific

evidence upon which she relied in reaching her factual conclusion that X.X. and X.Y.

were at risk of harm. For instance, Wagner states that “CPS received a request for

assistance from the U.S. Air Force Family Advocacy Center,” but she does not mention

any documents or other evidence to support this assertion. Similarly, she states that

“X.X. admitted that something bad happened in Japan,” but does not make clear

whether there is any evidence, such as interview notes, to support this assertion. 

Wagner must supplement her answer to interrogatory four so that it fully responds to

the specific question asked.

3. Interrogatory five

Plaintiffs present the inverse argument regarding interrogatory five: they argue

that Wagner’s response improperly references evidence whereas the interrogatory itself

calls for facts.18 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ characterization, however, Wagner did not

answer interrogatory five by merely pointing to a document. Rather, she states that,

among the facts that support her contention that she did not violate Angie Pellerin’s due

process rights is the fact that she gave the Pellerins a document that explains their

rights. This is indeed a statement of fact. Wagner’s answer is responsive.

4. Interrogatories seven and eight

Plaintiffs’ seventh interrogatory asks Wagner to state the number of children she

“removed from the custody of their parent(s)” as an ADES social worker before May 20,

2013.19 After objecting that the question is overly broad and unduly burdensome,

Wagner responds that she is unable to answer this question without reviewing every

case assigned to her since she started working for ADES.20

 Plaintiffs’ eighth

interrogatory asks Wagner to state the number of children she “removed from the

18Doc. 66-1 at 11.

19Doc. 66-3 at 9.

20

Id.

-6-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

custody of their parent(s) without first obtaining a warrant or other court order

authorizing” that removal since she started working for ADES.21 After objecting that the

question is compound, overly broad, and unduly burdensome, Wagner responded that

she does not recall ever obtaining a warrant before taking temporary custody of a

child.22

When answering interrogatories, a party is charged with knowledge of what is in

records available to it.23

 “Though there are limits on the extent to which a party can be

required to hunt out information in order to answer interrogatories, it will be required to

provide facts available to it without undue labor and expense.”24 If a party is unable to

provide the requested information, it must describe under oath the efforts it undertook.25

Wagner’s responses to interrogatories seven and eight are insufficient under

these standards. Although her response to interrogatory seven states that she would

be required to review every case assigned to her, she does not explain how long this

review would take or the burden it would present. With regard to interrogatory eight,

Wagner states that she does not remember obtaining any warrants, but she does not

show that she has satisfied her duty of reviewing the records reasonably available to

her before responding.

Plaintiffs argue that it is clear Wagner “did not undertake any efforts to delve into

the potential sources of responsive information, including the system database she

presumably works with every day.”26 Wagner does not deny this assertion in her

21

Id.

22

Id.

238B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL

§ 2177 (3d ed. 2015).

24

Id.

25See Bryant v. Armstrong, 285 F.R.D. 596, 612 (S.D. Cal. 2012).

26Doc. 66-1 at 13.

-7-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

opposition.27 Presumably, the number of times Wagner has removed a child, and the

number of times she has obtained a warrant before doing so, can be ascertained from

a review of the relevant database or other records. Because Wagner has not met her

burden of showing that such a review would be unduly burdensome, she must review

the records available to her and provide Plaintiffs with the requested information.

C. Wagner’s Responses to Plaintiffs’ RFAs

1. RFAs nine, ten, eleven, and twelve

RFAs nine through twelve ask Wagner to admit that on May 10, 2013, she had

no reason to believe that X.X. and X.Y. were “in immediate danger of sustaining serious

bodily injury at the hands of [their] mother, Angie Pellerin.”28

 Wagner denies these

RFAs, stating that “probable cause existed to believe” that the children were victims “or

would imminently become” victims of “abuse and neglect.”29 Plaintiffs argue that

Wagner’s responses are non-responsive and evasive. The Court agrees.

If a party does not admit to a matter found in a RFA, its answer “must specifically

deny it or state in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it.”30

The denial “must fairly respond to the substance of the matter; and when good faith

requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter, the answer must

specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest.”31

Wagner’s denials do not fairly respond to the substance of the matters presented

in RFAs nine through twelve. These RFAs ask Wagner whether the children were “in

immediate danger” of suffering “serious bodily injury at the hands of” their mother;

Wagner responds to a different question: whether probable cause existed to believe the

27Doc. 79 at 5-6.

28Doc. 68-2 at 6-7.

29

Id.

30Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4).

31

Id.

-8-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

children were victims or would imminently become victims of abuse and neglect. 

Wagner must supplement her responses to these RFAs so that they fairly respond to

the actual matters presented.

2. RFAs sixteen, seventeen, and twenty-four

Wagner’s responses to RFAs sixteen, seventeen, and twenty-four are nonresponsive for the reasons discussed above. Wagner’s opposition states that “after

further consideration” she will “voluntarily amend” her responses to these RFAs “to

eliminate the objection mooting the motion to compel.”32 The meaning of this statement

is unclear to the court, and Wagner’s amended responses are not in the record. In any

event, Wagner’s amended responses to RFAs sixteen, seventeen, and twenty-four

must also fairly respond to the actual matters presented.

D. ADES’ Responses to Plaintiffs’ RFPs Thirty-Seven, Thirty-Nine, and Forty

RFP thirty-seven seeks production of all documents “stating, depicting, and/or

constituting the number of children removed by ADES, CPS, and/or DCS from the

custody of their parent(s), without judicial authorization, between January 1, 2008

through December 31, 2013.”33 ADES provided Plaintiffs with nothing other than the

following response: “Objection: overly broad, seeks confidential information, unduly

burdensome, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to relevant or admissible

evidence[,] vague and ambiguous. This would require review of every report of abuse

or neglect that has been investigated by CPS or DCS over a five year period.”34 (In

fact, there are about six years between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2013.) 

RFP thirty-nine seeks production of all documents that depict “the number of

child interviews conducted by ADES, CPS, and/or DCS at school;” and Plaintiffs’ RFP

forty seeks documents that depict the number of such interviews conducted “without

32Doc. 77 at 6-7.

33Doc. 69-1 at 18 (emphasis added).

34

Id.

-9-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

judicial authorization or parental consent,” between January 1, 2008 and December 31,

2013. ADES responds to these two RFPs by repeating its response to RFP thirtyseven verbatim.

In response to Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, ADES maintains the following three

objections.35

 

1. Vague and ambiguous

ADES argues that the following passage from the RFPs—“stating, depicting

and/or constituting the number of . . .”—is vague and ambiguous because those words

“could mean almost anything.”36 This argument is unpersuasive. Although Plaintiffs’

language may be redundant, the quoted passage clearly seeks documents that reveal a

certain quantity. This objection is overruled.

2. Undue burden

ADES next argues that these RFPs are unduly burdensome because Arizona

“investigates nearly 30,000 reports of abuse or neglect every year” and responding to

Plaintiffs’ RFPs would “require someone to review every file over the requested period

and pull out case notes for every CPS investigator who has interviewed a child . . . to

determine if the note states where the interview was conducted, who was present, and

whether or not there had been any prior judicial involvement.”37 This objection is

irrelevant and overruled with respect to RFP thirty-seven because that RFP seeks

documents that show the number of children removed from their parents, not

interviewed.

With respect to RFPs thirty-nine and forty, Rule 26(b) requires the court to

determine whether the requested discovery is proportional to the needs of the case,

35Doc. 78 at 4-5. ADES waives its relevancy and over-breadth objections by not raising

them in its response to Plaintiffs’ motion. Cf. Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.

1999).

36Doc. 78 at 4.

37

Id. at 5.

-10-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

considering, among other things, “whether the burden or expense of the proposed

discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”38 “A party claiming that a request is important to

resolve the issues should be able to explain the ways in which the underlying

information bears on the issues as that party understands them.”39 Conversely, a party

claiming undue burden or expense “ordinarily has far better information—perhaps the

only information—with respect to that part of the determination;”40 that party cannot rely

on conclusory allegations of burden or expense, “but must provide some evidence

regarding the time or expense required.”41

For their part, Plaintiffs argue that the information requested in RFPs thirty-nine

and forty is important to this case because it will show “the regularity with which minors

are interrogated without judicial authorization or parental consent.”42 This is relevant to

the allegation in Plaintiffs’ complaint that ADES has a practice of conducting

unconstitutional interrogations or examinations of children “outside the presence of

[their] parent(s)—without judicial authorization or parental consent—when there is no

38Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See also 8B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL § 2214 (3d ed. 2015) (“In ruling on an objection that claims of

. . . undue burden or expense should bar discovery . . . the court cannot avoid taking into

account the moving party’s need for the inspection it seeks.”).

39Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 cmt. to 2015 amendment.

40

Id.

41Doe v. Nebraska, 788 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (D. Neb. 2011). See also Jackson v.

Montgomery Ward & Co., 173 F.R.D. 524, 528-29 (D. Nev. 1997) (“The party claiming that a

discovery request is unduly burdensome must allege specific facts which indicate the nature

and extent of the burden, usually by affidavit or other reliable evidence.”); 8B Charles Alan

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL § 2035 (3d ed. 2015) (“The

courts have insisted on a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from

stereotyped and conclusory statements, in order to establish good cause” supporting a

protective order.) (compiling cases).

42Doc. 69-2 at 12.

-11-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

specific, reasonable, and articulable evidence that the [children are] in immediate risk of

suffering serious bodily injury.”43

In response, ADES submits no evidence of its claimed burden, only an assertion

from its counsel. Further, although ADES’ counsel roughly estimates the number of

case files that exist (he states that ADES conducts “nearly” 30,000 investigations per

year, which would translate to approximately 180,000 case files for the relevant time

period), he does not provide the court with any estimate of how long it would take ADES

to review these files to determine which cases involved school interviews conducted

without judicial or parental consent. Based on the absence of evidence in the record

and ADES’ deficient filing, the court is unable to determine the burden presented. 

However, given the sheer volume of material suggested by defense counsel, the court

concludes that ADES should be afforded a chance to restate and properly support the

undue burden objection with evidence in the form of affidavits from ADES personnel or

other actual evidence. In sum, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the requested

discovery is important to the resolution of an issue in this case, and ADES has not yet

established that the burden or expense of producing the discovery outweighs the likely

benefit. ADES’ objection is overruled with leave to make a properly supported undue

burden objection.

3. Confidentiality

Finally, ADES argues that the information requested in RFPs thirty-seven, thirtynine, and forty “is case specific, [and] would require disclosure of documents that

contain personally identifiable information about the children being investigated.”44

ADES appears to be maintaining its objection that Plaintiffs are seeking confidential

information, but this is unclear as its one-sentence argument is unaccompanied by

citation to any evidence or authority.

43Doc. 1 at 22 ¶ 69.d.

44Doc. 78 at 5.

-12-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiffs insist that they are not seeking confidential information, such as names,

addresses, or case details, but rather documents that merely show the frequency of

certain events. ADES does not respond to this argument. Plaintiffs also argue that

because federal law supplies the rule of decision in this case, Arizona privileges or

confidentiality rules need not be honored. Like ADES, Plaintiffs do not identify any

specific Arizona confidentially rules. 

The Arizona confidentiality statute to which the parties may be alluding could be

A.R.S. § 8-542, which broadly declares as confidential any information involved in any

termination proceeding or “indirectly derived from the files, records, reports or other

papers compiled pursuant to” Article 5, Chapter 4, Title 8 of the Arizona Revised

Statutes.45 Or, it could be A.R.S. § 8-807, which states that “[a] person who receives

DCS information shall maintain the confidentiality of the information and shall not

further disclose the information unless the disclosure is authorized by law or a court

order.”46 Although Plaintiffs correctly note that these state statutes are not binding here,

because Plaintiffs’ action arises under federal law, “even in cases where federal law

applies, constitutional and prudential considerations suggest that courts should carefully

assess any attempt to compel disclosure of confidential juvenile court proceedings.”47

ADES has not shown that its confidentiality concerns outweigh the need for the

requested discovery; its objection is overruled. But, based on the fact that the

requested discovery may be confidential under Arizona law, at least in part, the parties

must confer about a potential protective order that would require redaction of the

requested records or otherwise protect confidential information.

45A.R.S. § 8-542(A).

46A.R.S. § 8-807(U).

47Gonzalez v. Spencer, 336 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 2003) abrogated as to other matters

by Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012) (quoting 23 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W.

Graham, Jr., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5428 (1st ed. 1980)).

-13-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

E. Maes’ Documents

Maes was appointed guardian ad litem for X.X. and X.Y. during their dependency

proceedings.

48

 After Plaintiffs served on her a subpoena to produce their files,49

 she

resisted producing them because A.R.S. §§ 8-542 and 8-807 prohibit their disclosure

absent a court order. Because Maes does not oppose Plaintif fs’ current motion to

compel these records,50 Plaintiffs’ motion will be granted.

F. Payment of Expenses 

Rule 37(a)(5)(A) provides that if a motion to compel is granted the court must

award reasonable expenses to the moving party unless “(I) the movant filed the motion

before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court

action; (ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially

justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” When a

motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part, Rule 37(a)(5)(C) provides that

the court has discretion to award such expenses.51

The parties here do not request an award of expenses under Rule 37(a)(5). 

After considering the matter, the court concludes that, given the large number of

discovery requests and the breadth of the discovery requests at issue, there was

substantial justification for the failure to provide complete responses, and further that

under all the circumstances of this litigation an award of expenses would be unjust. 

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding discussion, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel at docket 66 is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: Plaintiffs’ motion to compel

48Doc. 76-2 at 2 ¶ 3.

49

Id. at 6.

50Doc. 85.

51Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C) (“If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the

court may issue any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after giving an

opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.”).

-14-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Wagner to supplement her answers to interrogatories four, seven, and eight is

GRANTED, but in all other respects their motion is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ motion at

docket 68 to compel Wagner to supplement her answers to RFAs nine through twelve,

sixteen, seventeen, and twenty-four is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ motion at docket 69 to

compel ADES to supplement its responses to RFPs thirty-seven, thirty-nine, and forty is

GRANTED provided that ADES may state a properly supported undue burden objection

to RFPs thirty-nine and forty. Plaintiffs’ motion at docket 76 to compel Maes to produce

the documents subject to Plaintiffs’ subpoena is GRANTED.

The parties are ORDERED to confer about the parameters of a protective order. 

The discovery responses compelled by this order will be due 28 days after the court

approves the protective order proposed by the parties. The court recognizes that not all

responses are likely to be subject to this protective order.

DATED this 14th day of March 2016.

/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-15-

Case 2:14-cv-02318-JWS Document 100 Filed 03/14/16 Page 15 of 15