Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05329/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05329-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REYNALDO MYLES,

Plaintiff,

v.

J.W. SULLIVAN, et. al., 

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04 5329 AWI SMS P 

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 16.) 

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK CIVIL RIGHTS

FORM 

Reynaldo Myles (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff filed the instant action on February 23, 2004. The Court dismissed the

Complaint with leave to amend on May 12, 2005. On June 6, 2005, Plaintiff filed an Amended

Complaint. Plaintiff names Warden Sullivan, Facility Captain Quinones, and Correctional

Officers Busby, Fry and Gentry as Defendants. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

On March 20, 2003, Plaintiff and another inmate were escorted by Officer Lippert back to

the culinary area from the Level II Muslim chapel following Ramadan services. As they

approached the kitchen, the officer opened the door and left the two inmates in the culinary area,

where the inmates put the food carts in their proper place. The inmates asked Ms. Jackson, a

civilian employee, to let them out of the kitchen area and were told by her that they needed an

officer to let them out and that she would go get one. Officer Busby then asked the inmates what

they were doing in the kitchen area and wanted to know who had let them in. Plaintiff responded

that they were finished with their duties, that the Chapel Officer escorted them there but that they

did not have keys to leave the kitchen and needed to return to continue with worship. Officer

Busby then became belligerent and angry and ordered Plaintiff to face the wall. Plaintiff

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complied and was placed in handcuffs. Plaintiff noticed Ms. Jackson watching from another

area in the kitchen. Plaintiff indicates that he knew then that Officer Busby was retaliating

against him for “exercising his freedom of speech.” When Plaintiff turned to face Defendant

Busby, the Defendant withdrew his pepper spray and sprayed him in the left eye. The next day,

Plaintiff was charged with Battery on a peace officer and the matter was referred to the Kings

County District Attorney’s Office for possible prosecution. The District Attorney, however,

declined to prosecute. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Busby imposed on him cruel and unusual punishment.

Plaintiff states that Defendant Fry was also present at the incident and assisted in covering up the

incident. Plaintiff also alleged that the Warden and Facility Captain failed to train and supervise

their employees. Plaintiff states that Officer Fry’s actions denied him equal protection. 

Plaintiff states that he was given an Investigative Employee, Defendant Gentry who wrote

a false report. Plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive damages. 

C. ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS

1. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights to speech or to

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). To establish a prima facie case, plaintiff must allege

and show that defendants acted to retaliate for his exercise of a protected activity, and defendants'

actions did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816

(9th Cir. 1994); Pratt 65 F.3d at 807. The injury asserted in retaliation cases is the retaliatory

conduct’s chilling effect on the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. See Hines v. Gomez, 108

F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim must demonstrate a "but-for" causal nexus

between the alleged retaliation and plaintiff's protected activity (i.e., filing a legal action). 

McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1979); see Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of

Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The prisoner must submit evidence, either direct or

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circumstantial, to establish a link between the exercise of constitutional rights and the allegedly

retaliatory action. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806. Timing of the events surrounding the alleged retaliation

may constitute circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent. See Pratt 65 F.3d at 808; Soranno’s

Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff was informed previously of what is needed to state a retaliation claim and again

has failed to allege sufficient facts to make a cognizable claim against any of the Defendants. As

in the prior case, it does not appear from the facts that Plaintiff was engaged in any protected

activity. Thus, he again fails to state a claim of retaliation.

2. Excessive Force

The use of excessive force by a prison official violates the eighth amendment. Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). Determining whether there has been an Eighth

Amendment violation turns upon " 'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain

or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.' " See

id. at 6 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986)).

To prevail on an excessive force claim, an inmate must show the official applied force

"maliciously and sadistically" for the purpose of inflicting pain, rather than in a "good faith effort

to maintain or restore discipline." Id. at 4-5, 7, 112 S.Ct. at 999. Such factors as the need for

the application of the force, the relationship between the need for the application of force and the

amount of force used, and the extent of injury inflicted are relevant to the ultimate determination.

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986). An inmate, however, does not

need to have suffered an injury to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson, 503 U.S.

at 7.

The Supreme Court has further held that not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard

gives rise to a federal cause of action. Id. at 9. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later

seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” 

Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973) (cert. denied sub nom.

Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’

punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical

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force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”

Id. at 9-10.

Here, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Busby sprayed him in the eye while handcuffed

sufficiently states a cognizable claim of excessive force. However, Plaintiff does not state any

facts sufficient to state a claim against any of the other Defendants. 

3. Equal Protection

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are

treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show

that defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff or against a class of

inmates which included plaintiff. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)

(equal protection claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No.

14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.

1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City

of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff again states that Defendant Fry denied him equal protection. However, again, he

provides no further facts as to how any act or omission by Defendant Fry constituted a denial of

equal protection. As such, Plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim for relief of a denial of

equal protection against any defendant. 

In addition, Plaintiff fails to link any of the named defendants to any act or omission

giving rise to the alleged violation of Due Process. The Civil Rights Act under which this action

was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

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the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

Again, Plaintiff fails to link Defendant Gentry and fry to any act or omission giving rise

to a constitutional violation. As such, these Defendants must be dismissed from the action.

4. Supervisory Liability 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). 

To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability,

plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants either:

personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations

and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the

policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading

standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Although Plaintiff states that Defendants Sullivan and Quinones are responsible for

training and supervision of their employees, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that

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these Defendants personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew

of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so

deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force

of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black at 646. As such, he again does not state a

claim against these individuals. 

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

As in the Court’s prior Order, the Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable

claim of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Busby

only. However, Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any other cognizable claims for relief. 

The Court will grant Plaintiff the opportunity to file yet another Amended Complaint to cure the

deficiencies should he choose to do so. However, given Plaintiff’s repeated failure to allege

sufficient facts against all of the Defendants except Defendant Busby for excessive force,

Plaintiff may wish to consider moving ahead with that claim only. If this is the route Plaintiff

wishes to take, he should simply notify the Court in writing that he wishes to proceed directly

with the claims found to be cognizable. 

In the event Plaintiff wishes to proceed on the cognizable claims, the Court will issue

Findings and Recommendations to dismiss those claims not cognizable. The Court will then

forward Plaintiff a summons and USM-285 form to fill out and return to the Court in order to

effect service on the Defendants. Upon the return of these forms, the Court will direct the US

Marshal to initiate service of process on Defendants. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within THIRTY

(30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL either:

a. File a Second Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by

the Court in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file a Second

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Amended Complaint and instead wishes to proceed on the cognizable

claims for relief set forth in this Order.

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 10, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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