Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-01319/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-01319-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Kevin L. Fuqua,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 00-1319 LKK PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Robert Presley, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff is a state prisoner without counsel prosecuting a

civil rights action against private contractors involved in a

construction project at Folsom State Prison (Folsom). The action

proceeds on the May 9, 2003, third amended complaint against

defendants Salmen, Stuckey, Bender and Allen Bender, Inc.

Salmen has not been served and the court recently

recommended he be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 

Now before the court are the December 22, 2004, motion for

summary judgment by defendants Stuckey and Bender, and the motion

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for summary judgment by the corporation, deemed filed the same

date. Plaintiff opposed the corporation’s motion (originally

filed May 4, 2004) but did not oppose the motion of Stuckey and

Bender. 

November 3, 2000, the court advised plaintiff of the

requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d

952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035

(1999), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff alleges defendants, private contractors, violated

his Eighth Amendment rights during an earthquake retrofit of the

prison at California State Prison--Folsom. Plaintiff claims

defendants had “administrative responsibility” to protect

inmates’ safety, monitor inmates’ health, and relocate inmates as

necessary to avoid exposure to airborne particles including lead

dust, and alleges they acted under “color of state law” to

violate Eighth Amendment standards of safe and sanitary prison

conditions. Defendants never provided protective gear to inmates

and failed to clean up debris, leaving inmates’ cells caked with

particles. An employee of QST Environmental, Inc., informed

defendants the project was not being carried out in compliance

with environmental regulations but defendants continued drilling

in an area covered by lead-based paint. Environmental air

testing was conducted because of a dispute with guards and the

administration, and defendants intentionally interfered with the

testing by placing a large fan directly in front of air sampling

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equipment. Defendants knew doctors had requested inmates be

removed from the building and knew inmates should not eat or

drink items possibly contaminated through the retrofitting

project but failed to inform the inmates. Defendants knew

ventilation intake ducts near the work site should have been

sealed to contain airborne particles. Defendants worked with CDC

employees to create a medical surveillance program to protect and

monitor effects of the project on prison guards and construction

employees, but inmates, who faced even greater exposure, were

excluded from the program. Defendants and prison officials

conspired and acted jointly to violate plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment rights to humane living conditions. 

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits,

for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

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trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Id., at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on

an issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence

to support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on

an issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id., at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio

Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

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held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

the party’s burden at trial. Id. at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004). Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no

motion to strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United

States Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979)

(incompetent medical evidence).

To establish a claim for deliberate indifference in

violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment, a plaintiff must show that an identified

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actor denied plaintiff some specifically identified basic human

need such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care or safety,

knowing that plaintiff thereby faced a substantial risk of

serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take or

cause to be taken reasonable measures to abate the risk that were

within his or her power. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825

(1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); see also Wallis

v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 1995) (prison officials acted

with deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety in

requiring inmates to perform work without protection from

exposure to asbestos).

A civil rights plaintiff must show the defendant was acting

“under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988). On occasion, a civil rights claim can proceed against a

private party who is “a willful participant in joint action with

the State or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27

(1980). A court can identify state action under the public

function test, the joint action test, the governmental compulsion

test, or the governmental nexus test. Sutton v. Providence St.

Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 935-38 (9th Cir. 1999). The

fact that a corporation was performing a public contract does not

make it a “state actor” under the civil rights statute. RendellBaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (acts of private corporations

“whose business depends primarily on contracts to build roads,

bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the government . . . do

not become acts of the government by reason of their significant

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or even total engagement in performing public contracts”).

Defendants argue plaintiff’s claims are precluded because

this court granted summary judgment for them in Bishop v.

Terhune, 00-2168 FCD DAD P, a nearly-identical action prosecuted

by another inmate, on the ground they were not state actors

liable under the civil rights statute. As a rule, “a judgment or

decree among parties to a lawsuit . . . does not conclude the

rights of strangers to those proceedings.” Martin v. Wilkes, 490

U.S. 755 (1989), superseded in part by statute as noted in Estate

of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1993). Nor does

this court deem the plaintiff in Bishop, who litigated without

counsel while incarcerated, an “adequate representative” of

plaintiff such that the outcome here is determined by that case. 

Cf. Jackson v. Hayakawa, 605 F.2d 1121, 1125-26; Van Pool v. San

Francisco, 752 F. Supp. 915 (N. D. Cal. 1990). Defendants are

not entitled to summary judgment based on preclusion principles.

They have earned summary judgment on the merits, however. 

Defendants were not state actors under the public function test

because the state’s duty to provide humane conditions of

confinement rested with the department of corrections, and was

not delegated to defendants, who were private construction

contractors. Where a private prison-management corporation

assumes responsibility for running a prison, its actions are

conducted under color of state law because the confinement of

criminals is a fundamental government function. Rosborough v.

Management & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2003);

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Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.3d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1991); see

also Correctional Services Corp. V. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 n. 5

(2001). Here, however, defendants did not assume responsibility

to run the prison.

A person may become a state actor by engaging in joint

activity with state officials. Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702

(9th Cir. 1991); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (doctors

treating inmates were state actors where their contract with the

prison mandated cooperation to provide medical care); George v.

Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 1996)

(internal quotation omitted). The contract between defendants

and the state did not mandate cooperation to house inmates. 

Plaintiff claims “joint action” based on a conspiracy

between defendants and prison officials to violate inmates’

Eighth Amendment rights. “To be liable as co-conspirators, each

participant . . . must at lease share the common objective of the

conspiracy. To be liable as a co-conspirator, a private entity

must share with the public entity the goal of violating a

plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d

423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002). The evidence is undisputed that the

common goal of defendants and the state was to effect a seismic

retrofit so the prison could meet current building standards--

not to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s

argument that defendants conspired with the state, making them

state actors under the joint action test, does not withstand

summary judgment. 

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Plaintiff claims defendants or their agents tampered with

tests to determine exposure to contamination. The contract

between defendants and CDC did not require these tests. The

decision to conduct them came up later after guards protested

having to work in the construction zone. The conspiracy, if any,

was to dummy up data pertaining to CDC’s dispute with its

employees - any impact on prisoner safety was not within the

scope of the conspiracy. Responsibility to consider effects of

the construction on prisoners remained with the jailors, and had

nothing to do with defendants.

Under the nexus test, plaintiff must show that the

relationship, or nexus, between defendants and the state was such

that the actions of one were attributable to the other. Jackson

v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). Plaintiff

has not shown defendants were responsible for incarcerating

plaintiff or had the authority to determine the conditions of

plaintiff’s confinement. Defendants were building contractors

under contract to provide building services to the state. The

contract set out clearly separate areas of authority and isolated

defendants from any control over inmate conditions. At most,

defendants were permitted to suggest certain action, such as

vacating a housing unit during a particular phase of the work. 

This nexus is insufficient to make defendants state actors.

Under the state compulsion test, plaintiff must show

defendants were compelled by the state to act in a manner that

deprived plaintiff of federally protected rights. George, 91

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F.3d at 1231. This test presumes a violation of federally

protected rights and then searches for evidence defendants were

following the dictates of state law or custom with the force of

law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169-70 (1970);

North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601

(1975). Defendants were not under “state compulsion” to refrain

from moving inmates out of construction areas-- defendants never

had any authority to move inmates to begin with and any decision

to move them or not move them rested with prison officials.

The court finds White v. Cooper, 55 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851-52

(N.D. Ill. 1999) a persuasive authority favoring summary judgment

for defendants. In White, a private construction company deactivated fire alarms and smoke evacuation fans during prison

renovation, and the inmate plaintiff was severely injured in a

fire that occurred during the renovation. The court rejected

plaintiff’s argument the contractor was a state actor under the

civil rights statute, noting the state “ultimately held the power

to either relocate prisoners or to ensure” their safety. 55 F.

Supp. 2d at 849. “This burden was in no way assumed by [the

contractor] during on-site construction . . . by virtue of [its]

employment or contractual relationship with the state.” Id.

Here too, the power to relocate and the burden to protect inmates

remained with the state.

For all of these reasons, the court find defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on the ground that they were not

state actors under the civil rights statute. Accordingly, the

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court hereby recommends defendants’ December 22, 2004, motions

for summary judgment be granted.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Within 15 days after being

served with these findings and recommendations, any party may

file written objections. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 

The district judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings

and recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: August 4, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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