Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02409/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02409-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM J. PRICE,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-2409 FCD EFB P

vs.

BRIAN FLICKER, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a civilly committed person proceeding pro se with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges in his November 29, 2005, complaint that defendants

violated his constitutional rights by the maintenance of certain conditions and policies at the

Butte County Jail. On March 27, 2007, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative

for summary judgment, based on the claim that plaintiff’s action is barred by res judicata. 

Specifically, defendants argue that plaintiff was party to a state court action challenging inmate

conditions in the Butte County Jail that resulted in a Comprehensive Consent Decree in July

2005, under the current jurisdiction of the Butte County Superior Court, and his instant

complaint contains the same causes of action and challenges the same conditions as his

complaint, filed only four months later.

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I. Standards on Motion to Dismiss

In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must

contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic

Corporation v. Twombly, U.S. , 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 1970 (2007) (stating that the

12(b)(6) standard that dismissal is warranted if plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its 

claims which would entitle plaintiff to relief “has been questioned, criticized, and explained

away long enough,” and that having “earned its retirement,” it “is best forgotten as an

incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard”). Thus, the grounds must amount

to “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action. Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. Instead, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the

compliant are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. Dismissal may be based either on the lack of

cognizable legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal

theories. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

The complaint’s factual allegations are accepted as true. Church of Scientology of

California v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1984). The court construes the pleading in the light

most favorable to plaintiff and resolves all doubts in plaintiff’s favor. Parks School of Business,

Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). General allegations are presumed to

include specific facts necessary to support the claim. NOW, 510 U.S. at 256 (quoting Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). 

The court may disregard allegations contradicted by the complaint’s attached exhibits. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987); Steckman v. Hart Brewing,

Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir.1998). Furthermore, the court is not required to accept as true

allegations contradicted by judicially noticed facts. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828

F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may consider matters of public record, including

pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors,

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798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986) (abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Federal Savings

and Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991)). “The court is not required to accept legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be

drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.

1994). Neither need the court accept unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. 

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

 Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Unless it is clear that no amendment can cure

its defects, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend the complaint before

dismissal. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Noll v. Carlson,

809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

II. Analysis

Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

on the grounds that plaintiff’s complaint is barred by res judicata; is filed in an improper venue,

is barred by the Younger abstention and Rooker-Feldman doctrines, is not ripe for adjudication,

and is subject to judicial estoppel. Defendants generally claim that plaintiff has failed to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted because he is barred from seeking legal relief on his

claims as a result of having entered into a binding consent decree in a separate case filed in state

court.

The defense of res judicata may be presented on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

where, as here, the defense involves no disputed issues of fact. See Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d

1377, 1378 (9th Cir.1984).

In non-diversity cases, federal courts apply federal law to determine the preclusive effect

of prior federal court judgments. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.

313, 324 n. 12 (1971). The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, provides that a final

judgment on the merits bars further claims by the parties or their privies based on the same cause

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of action. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077

(9th Cir. 2003). The doctrine prohibits the re-litigation of any claims that were raised or could

have been raised in a prior action. W. Radio Servs. Co., Inc. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192

(9th Cir. 1997). It is irrelevant whether the new claims that plaintiff seeks to pursue now were

actually pursued in the action that led to the judgment; rather, the question is whether they could

have been brought in the previous case. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 322 F.3d at 1078.

The Ninth Circuit has listed four factors which may be considered when determining

whether successive claims constitute the same cause of action: (1) whether rights or interests

established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second

action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether

the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of

the same transactional nucleus of facts. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers-Employers, 994

F.2d at 1429. These factors, however, are “tools of analysis, not requirements.” Id. at 1430. For

example, the Ninth Circuit has previously applied the doctrine of res judicata solely on the

ground that the two claims arose out of the same transaction, without reaching the other factors.

See id. at 1430. Determining whether two events are part of the same transaction is essentially

dependent on whether the events are related to the same set of facts and whether the events could

conveniently be tried together. See id. at 1429.

A final judgment is present when parties enter a consent decree. Rein v. Providian

Financial Corp., 270 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2001). The Consent Decree in the state action was

signed on June 28, 2005, as the result of litigation on the part of plaintiff and two other

individuals regarding the conditions of the Butte County Jail. Defs.’ Req. for Jud. Ntc., Part 2, at

2. That consent decree concerns overcrowding, adequate facilities for disabled inmates, housing

classification, diet, exercise, dental and medical care, mental health policies, access to legal

materials, access to services and attorneys, reasonable access to toilet facilities, access to crisis

intervention programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous, and provision

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of sweatshirts based on changes in weather conditions. Id. at pages 5-9. The Consent Decree

provides that “[t]he [e]nforcement of this DECREE may be sought by any party . . . . If sought

by the parties, it shall be duly noticed motion or Order to Show Cause. In either event,

enforcement issues will be heard and decided by the Superior Court, County of Butte.” Id. at 23. 

The Consent Decree further provides that “Petitioners/Plaintiffs shall seek no further equitable or

legal relief for the acts, practices or omissions alleged in the Petition/Complaint . . . .” Defs.’

Mot. to Dism., Exs. at 4:14-16. 

Plaintiff brought suit in this action only five months later, alleging civil rights violations

that arose in August and September of 2005. These alleged violations concern the conditions of

his incarceration en route to and in the Butte County jail, including access to medical care and

mental health services, overcrowding or inadequate holding areas for processing detainees or

inmates, and asserting that he has been housed, clothed, and transported as a criminal defendant

although he is a civil detainee facing recommitment proceedings. Plaintiff also claims

inadequate access to legal materials, mail operation, and processing of grievances. It cannot be

refuted, therefore that the events leading to the present litigation are related to the same set of

facts and could have been litigated in enforcement of the Consent Decree in Butte County

Superior Court. 

Whether or not the present claims were actually litigated in the previous case, “res

judicata bars not only all claims that were actually litigated, but also all claims that ‘could have

been asserted’ in the prior action.” See Int’l Union of Operating Engineers-Employers Constr.

Indus. Pension, Welfare and Training Trust Funds v. Karr, 994 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1993).

That is, even if the present claims were not in the previous case, they clearly could have been,

because, at the time plaintiff filed this action, the Consent Decree had ongoing supervision and

enforcement by the Butte County Superior court. That is enough to preclude the present case. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss must be granted.

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III. Conclusion

Accordingly, defendant’s request for judicial notice, contained within their March 27,

2007, motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Further, it is RECOMMENDED that defendants’ March 27, 2007, motion to dismiss be

granted and that the Clerk be directed to close the case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 19, 2008.

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