Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05303/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05303-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 20, 2014 Decided February 6, 2015

No. 13-5303

TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

THOMAS J. VILSACK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLANT

MAURICE MCGINNIS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:97-cv-01978)

Charles W. Scarborough, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the 

briefs were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, 

Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Marleigh D. 

Dover, Attorney.

John M. Shoreman argued the cause and filed the brief 

for appellee Maurice McGinnis.

Before: TATEL and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Appellee Maurice McGinnis 

farmed cotton and soybeans in the Mississippi River Delta

near Yazoo City, Mississippi. Like millions of other small 

family farmers, he sought a loan through federal farm credit 

programs administered by the United States Department of 

Agriculture. And he alleges that, like tens of thousands of 

other African-American farmers, he was denied access to 

those programs by the Department because of his race. 

McGinnis participated in a claims process established by 

a class action settlement agreement to resolve his and other 

farmers’ discrimination claims. There is no question that, 

under this scheme, many claimants’ rights were vindicated. 

Yet in McGinnis’ case the process failed dramatically. 

Repeatedly, the persons tasked under the Consent Decree with 

processing his claim ignored or misinterpreted his clearly 

expressed wishes about how his claim should proceed. 

Finally, over a decade after McGinnis first filed his claim, he 

turned to the courts to vindicate his rights. Recognizing the 

Kafkaesque ordeal he had endured, the District Court awarded 

McGinnis the relief he sought: not an award on the merits of 

his claim, but merely the opportunity to make his case in the 

arbitration forum provided for under the settlement 

agreement. We affirm.

I.

The underlying class action settlement in this case is not 

new to our Court. In 1997, four hundred and one AfricanAmerican farmers from the South and Midwest brought suit 

against the United States Department of Agriculture (the 

“Department”)—now headed by Appellant Secretary Thomas 

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Vilsack—under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1691 et seq., alleging that the Department discriminated 

against them in denying applications for credit and benefit 

programs. See generally Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82

(D.D.C. 1999). The District Court certified a class for the 

purpose of determining the Department’s liability in October 

1998, Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341 (D.D.C. 1998), 

and certified a slightly modified class for all purposes in early 

1999. The class included all African-American farmers who 

(i) farmed between 1981 and 1996, (ii) applied to the 

Department for a federal farm credit or benefit program 

during that period and believed the Department discriminated 

against their application on the basis of race, and (iii) filed a 

discrimination complaint before mid-1997. Pigford v. 

Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 92. 

After several months of negotiations, the parties reached 

a settlement of their claims and filed a proposed consent 

decree (the “Consent Decree”) with the District Court, which 

it approved. Id. at 85-86. We upheld the settlement as “an 

indisputably fair and reasonable resolution of the class 

complaint.” Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212, 1219 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000). Eventually, 21,546 claimants were accepted as 

class members for review under the settlement agreement. 

Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

The Consent Decree establishes a two-track claimresolution process to determine the validity of claims and 

appoints (or empowers the District Court to appoint) several 

third-party neutrals to administer the scheme. Depending on 

which track a claimant chooses, his claim is resolved by either 

an “adjudicator” (Track A) or an “arbitrator” (Track B). 

Under Track A, a claimant’s allegations are reviewed under 

the forgiving “substantial evidence” standard. A prevailing 

claimant is entitled to a one-time payment of $50,000 and 

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forgiveness of any debt he owes the USDA. J.A. 11 

(Consent Decree ¶ 1(l)), 20-22 (Id. ¶ 9). Those who select 

Track B must establish their claim by a preponderance of the 

evidence—a higher burden of proof—but may seek an

unlimited amount in monetary damages if they prevail after a 

day-long live hearing. J.A. 23-26 (Consent Decree ¶ 10). 

The Consent Decree also appoints a “facilitator” to publicize 

the settlement, mail claim packages to claimants, receive and 

process completed claim packages, determine whether those 

who submit a claim package are class members, and transmit 

the claim packages of class members to the adjudicator or 

arbitrator for determination. See J.A. 11 (Consent Decree ¶ 

1(i)) (defining “facilitator” as third-party tasked with 

“assign[ing] claims to adjudicators and arbitrators for final 

resolution”). Finally, the Consent Decree provides for the 

court to select a monitor, who must, among other duties, 

direct the facilitator, adjudicator, or arbitrator to reexamine 

any claim in which it finds “clear and manifest error has 

occurred in the screening, adjudication, or arbitration of the 

claim and has resulted in . . . a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice.” J.A. 28 (Consent Decree ¶ 12(b)(iii)).

Under Paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree, the District 

Court retains jurisdiction to issue orders “concerning the 

alleged violation of any provision.” See J.A. 29 (Consent 

Decree ¶ 13); see also J.A. 34 (Consent Decree ¶ 21) (District 

Court retains authority to enforce the Consent Decree on a 

party’s motion for contempt). However, the Consent Decree 

also includes a “finality provision” that specifies that 

decisions of the adjudicator and arbitrator are “final,” subject 

to review only by the monitor, and the parties consent “to 

forever waive their right to seek review in any court” of “any 

claim that is, or could have been[,] decided by” the 

adjudicator or arbitrator. J.A. 22 (Consent Decree ¶ 9(a)(v)); 

26 (Id. ¶ 10(i)). 

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On August 6, 1999, Appellee Maurice McGinnis filed a 

claim sheet and election form alleging the Department

discriminatorily denied him operating loans between 1991 

and 1996 and emergency loans in 1994 and 1996, purportedly 

because he had an unpaid prior loan balance and insufficient 

cash flow. J.A. 39-40. He alleged that the Department had 

granted loans to similarly situated white farmers during the 

same period. On his claim sheet, McGinnis appears to have 

initially written an “X” in the box corresponding to Track B,

but later crossed that out and initialed beside it and wrote an 

“X” in the box corresponding to Track A. J.A. 38. McGinnis 

then completed in some detail an addendum to the claim sheet 

entitled “TRACK A – ADJUDICATION CLAIM 

AFFIDAVIT” that instructed claimants to “[o]nly complete 

this affidavit if you have elected to settle your claim under the 

Track A – Adjudication option.” J.A. 39; see id. at 38-41. 

The District Court therefore concluded that, although he “may 

have initially selected Track B before changing his mind,” 

McGinnis’ claim sheet “unambiguously selected Track A.” 

Pigford v. Vilsack, 961 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 n.2 (D.D.C. 2013). 

Soon thereafter, however, McGinnis called the 

facilitator—then the Poorman-Douglas Corporation, 

subsequently acquired by Epiq Systems (“Epiq”)—and asked

to switch his choice to Track B, and sent the facilitator a letter 

“confirm[ing] that . . . I have indeed filed my claim and/or 

petition under ‘Plan B’ instead of Plan A as originally 

thought.” J.A. 42. Nevertheless, the facilitator forwarded 

McGinnis’s claim to the adjudicator, responsible for 

determinations of entitlement under Track A, who determined 

on June 14, 2000 that McGinnis had not established his claim 

by substantial evidence and denied his claim. J.A. 43-45.

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McGinnis then filed a Petition for Monitor Review 

(“PMR”), prepared by a member of class counsel and not the 

attorney who assisted him in submitting his initial claim, 

requesting that the monitor remand his claim to the arbitrator 

for determination under Track B. See J.A. 46-48. McGinnis

explained that he had intended to proceed under Track B,1

and therefore omitted certain supporting details of the 

discrimination he suffered from his claim sheet. J.A. 46. In 

the alternative, he requested remand of his case to the 

adjudicator for reconsideration, and submitted additional 

evidence. J.A. 46-48. Over six years later—by which point 

the monitor still had not acted on McGinnis’ four-page 

PMR—Epiq contacted class counsel David Frantz, who had 

not advised McGinnis in completing his claim sheet or 

assisted in preparing his PMR, and asked whether McGinnis 

still wished to switch to Track B. J.A. 91. Neither Epiq nor 

the monitor attempted to contact McGinnis or his counsel 

directly. After speaking with McGinnis, Frantz emailed Epiq

that McGinnis “wishe[d] for his PMR to proceed as is.” J.A. 

94. Rather than request clarification, Epiq interpreted 

Frantz’s vague, one-sentence email, by which he apparently 

meant that McGinnis continued to seek a determination under

Track B, to mean that McGinnis wished to proceed with his 

“original election of Track A.” J.A. 92, 95. Epiq emailed the 

monitor to that effect. In a decision issued in January 2008,

the monitor concluded that the adjudicator made a “clear and 

manifest error” in rejecting McGinnis’ claim sheet and 

 1 Confusingly, McGinnis’s PMR, in trying to explain that he 

believed his claim would be determined under Track B, actually 

states that he “thought he was proceeding under Track A.” J.A. 46. 

As the District Court concluded and as McGinnis’ repeated requests 

to switch to Track B after submitting his claim sheet and 

throughout his PMR demonstrate, however, this reference to Track 

A was merely a “particularly unfortunate” typographical error. 

Pigford v. Vilsack, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 85 n.3. 

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admitted into the record much of McGinnis’s new evidence. 

J.A. 49-80.2

 Although she concluded that the determination 

of McGinnis’s claim under Track A rather than Track B had 

been a “mistake in the claims process,” the monitor explained 

that “pursuant to discussions with the facilitator, the parties 

and the Monitor have established that [McGinnis] will 

proceed as a Track A claimant,” and remanded his case to the 

adjudicator for reconsideration. J.A. 71-72. Upon 

reexamination in May 2008, the adjudicator found McGinnis 

had established an entitlement to relief and awarded him 

$50,000. J.A. 81-84. McGinnis refused to accept payment. 

J.A. 88. 

McGinnis’s sister contacted the arbitrator in the autumn 

of 2010 to explain that McGinnis had intended to pursue a 

Track B claim. The arbitrator expressed his sympathy that, 

due to confusion about his selection, McGinnis had been 

sorted into Track A, but explained that he lacked the authority 

to arbitrate McGinnis’ claim under the Consent Decree. J.A. 

85. 

In November 2012, McGinnis petitioned the District 

Court for an order instructing the arbitrator to determine his 

claim. In granting the petition, the court first rejected the 

Department’s position that Paragraph 13 of the Consent 

 2 The monitor’s response to McGinnis’s PMR provides the most 

comprehensive summary of his claim, since he did not attach his 

full PMR (including exhibits) to his District Court petition, or in the 

Joint Appendix he filed with this Court. See Motion to Enforce 

Consent Order, Pigford v. Vilsack, No. 1:97-cv-01978 (D.D.C. 

Nov. 2, 2012), ECF No. 1853. Her analysis mentions that 

McGinnis claims he lost $160,000 in farm revenue due to the 

Department’s denial of his credit applications, which explains why 

he wishes to proceed under Track B rather than Track A, which 

permits recovery of only $50,000. J.A. 53.

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Decree only authorized court review of the parties’—not the 

third-party neutrals’—actions. Pigford v. Vilsack, 961 F. 

Supp. 2d at 88-89. The Government does not appeal this 

conclusion. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3. It then held that 

McGinnis’s petition did not implicate the finality provisions 

of the Consent Decree because he did not request review of 

the adjudicator’s decision, but rather the facilitator’s decision 

to shunt McGinnis’ claim into Track A adjudication. Pigford 

v. Vilsack, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 89-90. The court reasoned that 

nothing in the text of the Consent Decree renders the 

decisions of the facilitator unreviewable, and the “apparent 

purpose” of the finality provision is to prevent the parties 

from appealing adverse determinations by the adjudicator or 

arbitrator on the merits, not an erroneous claim processing 

decision. Id. at 90. The District Court then found it beyond 

argument that the third-party neutrals had erred both in 

designating McGinnis’ claim a Track A claim at the outset 

and in disregarding his subsequent attempt to change to Track 

B, in violation of Paragraph 3(a)(vii) of the Consent Decree, 

and vacated his Track A award and remanded his claim to the 

arbitrator for Track B consideration. Id. at 91. The 

Department timely appealed the District Court’s decision.

II.

We review a district court decision interpreting a consent 

decree and any underlying agreement de novo. Richardson v. 

Edwards, 127 F.3d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

As a threshold matter, and as the Department notes, the 

District Court only possessed jurisdiction to remedy 

violations of provisions of the Consent Decree. See Appellant 

Br. 16-17. While it may be a “well-established principle. . .

that a district court retains jurisdiction under federal law to 

enforce its consent decree[s],” Beckett v. Airline Pilots Ass’n, 

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995 F.2d 280, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993), it retains this authority 

only if the parties’ agreement or the court order dismissing the 

action reserves jurisdiction to enforce compliance. Kokkonen 

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). 

Even where, as here, the Consent Decree does retain 

jurisdiction in the District Court to enforce its terms, the court 

still lacks a “free-ranging ‘ancillary’ jurisdiction,” and is 

limited by the explicit terms of the parties’ agreement. 

Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 924 (reversing District Court 

order permitting arbitrators to extend the deadlines mandated 

by the Consent Decree). Here, Paragraph 13 of the Consent 

Decree limits the District Court to remedying violations of the 

terms of the Consent Decree and the accompanying order. Id. 

The District Court recognized this limitation on its 

jurisdiction, observing that it only retained jurisdiction to 

enforce the Consent Decree’s specific terms. See Pigford v. 

Vilsack, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 87. 

We conclude that Paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree 

empowers the District Court to correct an error by the 

facilitator in transmitting a claim to the wrong track. The 

Department suggests the court overstepped the narrow scope

of its jurisdiction, but any action by the facilitator transmitting 

to the adjudicator a claim package that selects Track B would 

violate the Consent Decree’s explicit command that the 

facilitator “shall . . . transmit to the arbitrator the claims 

packages of class members . . . who elect to proceed under 

Track B.” J.A. 13 (Consent Decree ¶ 2(a)(vii)) (emphasis 

added). Hence, if it is true that McGinnis selected Track B 

and the facilitator nevertheless sent his claim package to the 

adjudicator, the District Court did no more than enforce the 

parties’ agreement.

The Department makes much of the fact that reversing 

the facilitator’s claim transmittal to the adjudicator 

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incidentally required the District Court to vacate the 

adjudicator’s merits determination that McGinnis was entitled 

to relief. Appellant’s Br. at 15, 18-19. While it is true that 

the Consent Decree renders any determination by the 

adjudicator “final” and unreviewable by any court once the 

monitor has considered any petition for review, J.A. 22 

(Consent Decree ¶ 9(a)(v)); 26 (Id. ¶ 10(i)), this argument 

begs the question. McGinnis’s petition and the court’s review 

focused not on the adjudicator’s conduct, but on the 

facilitator’s. The decision McGinnis appeals—the allocation 

of his claim to Track A—is not one the adjudicator made or 

was empowered to make under the Consent Decree. Only the 

facilitator was authorized to refer a completed claim package 

to the adjudicator or arbitrator. See J.A. 17 (Consent Decree ¶ 

5(f)). The facilitator sorted McGinnis’ claim into Track A 

adjudication, and the adjudicator had no involvement in this 

screening determination. The Consent Decree does nothing to 

insulate the facilitator’s decisions from appeal. 

Moreover, vacating the adjudicator’s determination was a 

matter of black letter contract law. The Consent Decree, as a 

written reflection of the parties’ bargain resolving their case, 

should be interpreted as a contract. United States v. Volvo 

Powertrain Corp., 758 F.3d 330, 339 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing

Segar v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 16, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). In 

interpreting a settlement agreement, the use of aids to 

construction, including “the circumstances surrounding the 

formation of the consent order,” is permitted. United States v. 

ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975). Looking to 

the circumstances that led the parties to strike the bargain 

embodied by the Consent Decree, which it well knew from its 

decades-long supervision of the settlement agreement and 

claims mechanism, the District Court reasonably concluded 

that the purpose of the finality provision was to prevent either 

party from appealing an adverse determination on the merits. 

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Pigford v. Vilsack, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 90. The District Court 

had noted in its 1999 opinion approving the settlement that 

the finality provision stemmed from class counsels’ fears that 

the Government would appeal decisions granting class 

members relief, thereby delaying recovery. See Pigford v. 

Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 107-08. The Government argues 

that even non-adverse adjudicator determinations are 

unappealable because allowing any appeal would disserve the 

goal of “avoid[ing] endless rounds of duplicative litigation,” 

but the incentives of a class member like McGinnis, seeking 

a reversal of the procedural claim processing that landed him 

before the arbitrator, will not lead to such a result. See

Appellant Br. at 13. What he seeks is not a “second bite at the 

apple” but to have a “first bite” in front of the decisionmaker

he asked for to begin with. Even conceding, therefore, that 

the parties “have a strong interest in ensuring the finality” of 

merits determinations under a claimant’s elected track, see 

Appellant Br. at 18, does not imply that determinations made 

on the wrong track are beyond review. 

Given the contradiction between the finality provision 

and the section of the Consent Decree governing the 

facilitator’s duties, the District Court reasonably looked to the 

parties’ purpose in rendering adjudicator decisions final. The 

Department objects, noting that, in Pigford v. Veneman, 292 

F.3d at 924, we foreclosed any reliance on the Consent 

Decree’s “overarching remedial purposes.” Appellant Br. at 

16-18. But disregarding the unambiguous text of the Consent 

Decree in favor of its purpose is a world away from simply 

looking to the “apparent purpose” of one contractual 

provision to resolve a contradiction with another clause. The 

District Court was clearly justified in looking to the finality 

provision’s aims to ensure that its interpretation of the 

potentially contradictory text corresponded to the parties’ 

understanding of their bargain. See Volvo Powertrain, 758 

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F.3d at 339 (“[U]ltimately the question for the lower court, 

when it interprets a consent decree incorporating a settlement 

agreement, is what a reasonable person in the position of the 

parties would have thought the language meant.”) (alteration 

in original) (quoting Richardson, 127 F.3d at 101).

Most importantly, to deny review of a facilitator’s 

erroneous claim transmittal would frustrate the purpose of 

Paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree, in which the parties 

explicitly provided for judicial review to enforce compliance 

with the agreement’s terms. Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 

924. See Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Babbitt, 202 F.3d 349, 

358 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (A reviewing court “must give 

reasonable meaning to all parts of the contract and not render 

portions of [it] meaningless.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 

CONTRACTS § 203 cmt. b (1981) (“Since an agreement is 

interpreted as a whole, it is assumed in the first instance that 

no part of it is superfluous.”). The Consent Decree provides 

no mechanism for a claimant to learn that his claim package 

was transmitted to the adjudicator before he receives a 

decision on the merits. McGinnis consequently did not know 

that the facilitator had ignored his Track B request until after 

he was informed that his claim had been denied by the 

adjudicator in mid-2000. By this point, under the 

Department’s reading of the Consent Decree, the error in 

processing his claim was fully insulated from any judicial 

review. 

The District Court was correct to note the perverse result 

that would follow from allowing the adjudicator or 

arbitrator’s decision to shield the facilitator’s violation of the 

Consent Decree from review, simply because the adjudicator 

or arbitrator had proceeded to a determination on the merits 

before the court could intervene. See Pigford v. Vilsack, 961 

F. Supp. 2d at 89-90. The Court will not sanction a result that 

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would permit, for example, the facilitator to simply refuse to 

transmit any claim packages to the adjudicator, or reject valid 

claim packages based on some arbitrary criteria such as the 

geographical origin or age of a claimant. To hold that any 

action by the facilitator or monitor that violates the Consent 

Decree becomes unreviewable the moment the adjudicator 

unilaterally ratifies it would work a patent injustice and thwart 

the aim of the settlement. See Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 

at 925 (noting that parties bargained to give the District Court 

enforcement authority to correct violations of the decree). We 

therefore affirm the District Court’s conclusion that it could 

review the facilitator’s claim processing and vacate the 

adjudicator’s determination. 

III.

It remains for the Court to determine whether McGinnis’ 

completed claim package actually selected Track B. We think 

that McGinnis’ request to change his claim to Track B was 

sufficiently close in time to his submission of the claim 

package, and the language of the Consent Decree defining 

what constitutes a “completed claim package” is sufficiently 

ambiguous, to justify the District Court in granting his 

petition.

The Consent Decree cautions that “[a]t the time a 

claimant . . . submits his completed claim package, he must 

elect whether to proceed under Track A . . . or Track B,” a 

selection that “shall be irrevocable and exclusive.” J.A. 16 

(Consent Decree ¶ 5(d)). The Department argues that, even if 

the District Court had the authority to reverse the 

adjudicator’s decision based on the facilitator’s error, this 

provision makes McGinnis’ selection of Track A on his claim 

sheet final. Appellant’s Br. at 20-22.

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The Consent Decree does not define what renders a claim 

package “completed,” but it is clear to us from a separate 

definitional provision that McGinnis’ claim package was not 

completed at the moment he sent a claim sheet to the 

facilitator. The agreement defines a “claim package” as “the 

materials sent to claimants who request them in connection 

with submitting a claim for relief . . . includ[ing] (i) a claim 

sheet and election form and a Track A Adjudication claim 

affidavit, . . . and (ii) associated documentation and 

instructions.” J.A. 10 (Consent Decree ¶ 1(d)). As the 

District Court found, McGinnis “unambiguously” selected 

Track A at the time he submitted his claim sheet, election 

form, and Track A affidavit. Pigford v. Vilsack, 961 F. Supp. 

2d at 84 n.2. But, as the above-quoted paragraph indicates, a 

claim sheet, election form and affidavit do not constitute the 

entirety of a “claim package”; it also includes any “associated 

documentation” a claimant chooses to submit. 

A written agreement must be interpreted as a whole, with 

all words interpreted in the light of the circumstances. 

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1)-(2). 

Reading the Consent Decree in a manner that gives effect to 

all its provisions and attempts to render them consistent with 

one another, see Segar, 508 F.3d at 22, we think the meaning 

of “associated documentation” must include McGinnis’ 

written instructions—submitted only days after he mailed his 

claim sheet—that he wished to change his selection to Track 

B.

A contract provision that is “reasonably susceptible of 

different constructions” is ambiguous, but a provision “is not 

ambiguous merely because the parties later disagree on its 

meaning.” Bennett Enters., Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 45 

F.3d 493, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Here, the Court is faced with 

the former situation: there are two potential meanings of 

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“associated documentation.” It could refer to documentation 

about the case that the facilitator was to mail to claimants. 

The Consent Decree states that the claim package consists of 

“materials sent to claimants who request them,” suggesting 

that the parties might have expected the facilitator to mail 

potential claimants some “documentation and instructions” 

along with a blank claim sheet to fill in. We have examined 

the District Court docket, however, and no such materials 

were attached as an exhibit to the copy of the Consent Decree 

that the District Court approved. “[A]ssociated 

documentation” could also, however, refer to additional 

materials that claimants choose to submit as part of their 

claim. Notably, the Consent Decree only makes one other use 

of the word “documentation,” and it supports this meaning.

Paragraph 5 requires claimants to “complete the claim sheet 

and return it and any supporting documentation to the 

facilitator.” J.A. 15 (Consent Decree ¶ 5(b)). The same 

paragraph separately instructs claimants to submit evidence 

that they had filed a discrimination claim with the 

Department, demonstrating that the term “associated

documentation” was meant to include whatever other 

information supporting entitlement to relief a claimant might 

opt to communicate to the facilitator along with his claim 

sheet, election form, and affidavit. After determining the 

existence of ambiguity in a contract term, the Court must 

“determine what a reasonable person in the position of the 

parties would have thought the disputed language meant.” 

Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 758 F.3d 265, 

278 (D.C. Cir. 2014). We find this latter meaning of 

“associated documentation” more plausibly corresponds to 

what a reasonable person in the parties’ shoes would have 

understood, and we believe this supports the District Court’s 

determination that the facilitator erred in transmitting 

McGinnis’ claim to the adjudicator. Pigford v. Vilsack, 961 

F. Supp. 2d at 91. 

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Under this reading of the Consent Decree, McGinnis’ 

claim package did not become complete—and, therefore, his 

claim selection did not become “irrevocable and exclusive”—

until the facilitator received his “associated documentation,” 

that is, his express instructions asking that his claim be 

considered under Track B. In addition to being a reasonable 

interpretation of the parties’ agreement, this result does 

nothing to displace the parties’ expectation about the bargain 

they struck. McGinnis informed the facilitator in writing of 

his desire to proceed under Track B just a few days after he 

submitted his claim sheet. At this time, the facilitator had not 

yet transmitted McGinnis’ claim sheet for resolution under 

either track, and McGinnis’ now completed claim was still 

timely. At the time he “completed” his claim package by 

submitting the letter, then, the Department had no fixed 

expectation about the track on which McGinnis would 

proceed or his ability to recover. The adjudicator did not even 

determine McGinnis’ claim in the first instance until nearly 

ten months later. J.A. 45. 

For a class action settlement scheme—especially one 

with minimal court supervision—to work, its administrators 

must execute their tasks punctually and attentively. 

Thousands of claims have been filed in this case, and it may 

be that in many occasions “both the parties and the neutrals . . 

. expend[ed] every effort to see that [claims processing]

move[d] as quickly and smoothly as possible.” Pigford v. 

Veneman, 355 F. Supp. 2d 148, 160 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying 

motion to modify Consent Decree and to disqualify lead class 

counsel). Yet, in two instances in McGinnis’ case, the 

facilitator’s errors led to miscommunications that significantly 

delayed the proper resolution of his claim. As summarized 

above, McGinnis initially called and wrote to the facilitator in 

1999 requesting that his claim proceed under Track B, after 

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submitting a claim sheet that manifested his indecision 

between the two tracks. He made this request before the 180-

day cutoff for submitting claims mandated by the Consent 

Decree. See J.A. 16 (Consent Decree ¶ 5(d)). At this point, 

given the centrality of a claimant’s choice of track to his 

ability to obtain relief and the amount of monetary damages 

available if he establishes his claim, the facilitator should 

have either informed McGinnis of its understanding that his 

initial choice of Track A was irrevocable, or honored his 

wishes and forwarded his claim package to the arbitrator. The 

facilitator did neither. Instead, it allowed McGinnis to think 

he had successfully switched to Track B, only to be surprised 

nearly a year later when he received an initial decision from 

the adjudicator. Once again, when the facilitator contacted 

class counsel Frantz in late 2007 and received an inscrutable 

reply as to whether McGinnis continued to seek Track B

arbitration, it had the opportunity to demonstrate a modicum 

of capability in its role and follow up to confirm which track 

McGinnis wanted. For the second time, the facilitator failed. 

It pains us to contemplate that such a simple exercise of basic 

administrative competence could have prevented over a 

decade of delay and the need for judicial review at both the 

trial and appellate levels. Instead, fifteen years after he filed a 

claim, McGinnis has not yet had the opportunity to appear 

before the factfinder of his choice. We agree with the District 

Court that McGinnis has earned the remand of his claim to the 

arbitrator.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

District Court.

So ordered.

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