Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05932/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05932-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VIOLETA GRIGORESCU,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SAN 

MATEO COUNTY COMMUNITY 

COLLEGE DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-05932-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; AND 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

STRIKE

Docket Nos. 40-41

Plaintiff Violeta Grigorescu (“Ms. Grigorescu”) filed her third amended complaint 

(“TAC”) against Eugene Whitlock (“Mr. Whitlock”), the former Vice Chancellor of Human 

Resources (“VCHR”) at the San Mateo County Community College District (the “District”). 

Docket No. 39. In previous pleadings, Ms. Grigorescu raised claims against multiple defendants 

(e.g., the District and various supervisors in their individual capacity). See Docket No. 1. The 

Court dismissed Ms. Grigorescu’s first and second amended complaints with leave to amend, 

permitting Ms. Grigorescu to plead only two claims against Mr. Whitlock: (1) race-based 

termination under Section 1981; and (2) retaliatory harassment (First Amendment) claims under 

Section 1983. Pending before the Court is Mr. Whitlock’s motion to dismiss that pleading. 

Docket No. 41 (“Mot.”). Mr. Whitlock also concurrently filed a motion to strike certain factual 

allegations in TAC that support claims previously dismissed with prejudice. Docket No. 40. For 

the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in PART and DENIES in PART Mr. 

Whitlock’s motion to dismiss. Additionally, Mr. Whitlock’s motion to strike is GRANTED in 

PART and DENIED in PART.

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I. BACKGROUND1

In 2004, Ms. Grigorescu was employed by the District as a laboratory technician. TAC ¶ 

17. In 2008, she became a part-time, adjunct physics instructor. Id. In 2011, Ms. Grigorescu

organized a group called Friends of CSM Gardens to oppose the conversion of an open-space 

garden into a parking lot. According to Ms. Grigorescu, she “organized students, contacted 

political figures, and advised members of the CSM Garden Club to attend campaign events of the 

President of the District’s Board of Trustees.” Id. ¶ 18. Ms. Grigorescu’s activities with Friends 

of CSM Gardens led to a lawsuit (the “Friends lawsuit”). Id. ¶ 19. Ultimately, the litigation made 

its way to the California Supreme Court, and the court decided in favor of the plaintiffs in July 

2017. Id. While the litigation was ongoing, in April 2011, the Board of Trustees openly attacked 

faculty members and students who participated in the Friends lawsuit. Id. ¶ 20 (“the students 

were badly led by some faculty representatives”). 

Several days before filing of the Friends lawsuit in 2011, Ms. Grigorescu began to have 

medical problems which required treatment. TAC ¶ 21. Joel (then-VCHR, i.e. Mr. Whitlock’s 

predecessor) was resistant to her returning to work and made efforts to prevent her return. Id. ¶¶ 

22–24. After Ms. Grigorescu’s union intervened, she was allowed to resume her position as an 

adjunct professor of physics. Id. ¶ 25. In 2013, Ms. Grigorescu began to have different medical 

problems which required treatment, and Joel, Frontiera (Dean of the District’s Math and Science 

division), and the District again made efforts to bar Ms. Grigorescu from working for the District. 

Id. ¶¶ 28–32. Eventually, in January 2014, Ms. Grigorescu was allowed to return to work as a lab 

technician, but the District gave the class that Ms. Grigorescu was scheduled to teach “to an 

instructor with less seniority.” Id. ¶ 33. 

Mr. Whitlock became VCHR in July 2014, although it is unclear when he fully assumed 

the role. TAC ¶ 35 (After Mr. Whitlock assumed the position, Joel remained active handling 

number of issues for a while). Mr. Whitlock, as outside County Counsel, previously represented

 

1 Much of the facts alleged in the TAC are pled in the first amended complaint and in the second 

amended complaint. See Docket Nos. 25, 38. For purposes of brevity, the Court will not recite 

the facts in detail, unless where necessary. 

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the District in the Friends lawsuit. Id. After Mr. Whitlock assumed the VCHR position, a series 

of firings began, and “[p]laintiff was among the first to be targeted and fired.” Id. Within weeks 

after assuming the VCHR position, Mr. Whitlock—either acting alone or with an aid and 

assistance of Frontiera2—subjected Ms. Grigorescu to various discriminatory incidents or actions 

that had an effect of isolating Ms. Grigorescu from her professional community and preventing her 

from supporting the Friends lawsuit. See id. ¶ 36. For instance, according to the TAC, Mr. 

Whitlock attempted to bypass Ms. Grigorescu’s seniority right to which she was entitled by the 

American Federation of Teachers union contract. Id ¶ 37. 

On August 4, 2014, Human Resource informed Ms. Grigorescu that her pay was going to 

be less than in the past due to the changes in HR policy that applies to employees holding both 

faculty and staff positions. TAC ¶ 38. Ms. Grigorescu subsequently was paid only the base rate 

for her work after hours, while other similarly situated employees were paid overtime. Id. Later 

in August, Ms. Grigorescu obtained permission from Frontiera to take part in the UMOJA 

community, an on-campus organization in support of minority communities in the District. Id. ¶ 

39. Frontiera permitted Ms. Grigorescu to attend the September 2014 UMOJA gathering. Id. 

Three days after, however, Frontiera told Ms. Grigorescu that she cannot just leave work and 

participate in various events on campus. Id. ¶ 40. In following three weeks, Ms. Grigorescu

consulted with her union representatives. Id. ¶ 41. Frontiera told Ms. Grigorescu’s 

representatives that Ms. Grigorescu could not attend UMOJA because Ms. Grigorescu is white and 

UMOJA is for students of color. Id. ¶ 42. Ms. Grigorescu was ultimately prevented from 

interacting with UMOJA and, as a result, was unable to build her extracurricular portfolio 

necessary to her professional growth in the District. Id. ¶ 42. When discussing the issues of unfair 

treatment, discrimination, and lack of accommodations with Ms. Grigorescu’s union 

representatives, Frontiera stated that she was following Mr. Whitlock’s orders and that any 

conversation on the topic had to be carried on in the presence of Mr. Whitlock and Joel. Id. ¶ 43. 

 

2 The TAC contains some factual allegations regarding Frontiera’s retaliatory actions, but all 

Section 1983 claims against Frontiera have been dismissed with prejudice by the Court’s previous 

Order. See Docket No. 38 (“Order”) at 14. 

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In September 2014, Frontiera sent an e-mail to Ms. Grigorescu that accused Ms. 

Grigorescu of “double-dipping” her substitute teaching during her lab work hours. Upon Ms. 

Grigorescu’s denial, Frontiera asked Ms. Grigorescu to provide official document showing her 

presence in the office. TAC ¶ 44. Later, under the direction of Mr. Whitlock, Frontiera banned 

Ms. Grigorescu from substitute teaching. Id. ¶ 45. Frontiera nonetheless permitted another lab 

technician to continue to teach who was a male, not Romanian, and not involved in the Friends 

lawsuit. Id. 

In October 2014, Frontiera informed Ms. Grigorescu that the dean will consider Ms. 

Grigorescu’s extracurricular activities in evaluating her teaching performance. TAC ¶ 46. A few 

days later, Frontiera submitted Ms. Grigorescu’s teaching performance evaluation where Frontiera 

marked lower performance ratings without justification. Despite Ms. Grigorescu’s request of 

correction, Frontiera did not erase the lower ratings, which were recorded in Ms. Grigorescu’s file. 

Id. ¶ 47. 

Later in October 2014, for the first time in ten years, a full-time physics professor position 

was approved by the District. Mr. Whitlock changed the policy regarding the minimum

qualification for the position, in order to create disadvantages to internal applicants like Ms. 

Grigorescu. TAC ¶ 48. Within days after Ms. Grigorescu applied for the full-time position in 

May 2015, Mr. Whitlock removed Ms. Grigorescu from the application pool for the full-time 

physics position. Id. ¶ 49. With respect to Ms. Grigorescu’s educational credentials, Mr. 

Whitlock claimed that she misrepresented her degree she received in Romania as a master’s 

degree, although the degree is only equivalent to a bachelor’s degree. Id. ¶ 50. When Ms. 

Grigorescu responded that other universities had recognized her Romanian degree as a master’s, 

Mr. Whitlock called each educational institution. Id. ¶ 51. As a result of Mr. Whitlock’s calls, 

some universities changed their designation of her degree from a master’s to bachelor’s, and one 

university decided to offer no teaching appointments for the following year. Id. Later in 2015, 

Ms. Grigorescu was ultimately not selected for the full-time teaching position despite her 

qualification and teaching experience. See id. ¶¶ 52–61. Mr. Whitlock and Frontiera prevented 

Ms. Grigorescu from teaching classes on the basis of Ms. Grigorescu’s physical injuries. See id. 

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¶¶ 62–63. Regarding her physical disabilities, Ms. Grigorescu additionally alleges in TAC that 

other employees were allowed to teach despite physical disabilities because they were not 

Romanian and were not involved in the Friends suit. Id. ¶ 63.

In May 2015, Mr. Whitlock told Ms. Grigorescu that she would be fired if she had not 

resigned. TAC ¶ 67. In TAC, Ms. Grigorescu asserts that Mr. Whitlock’s attempt to terminate 

her was motived by the fact that Ms. Grigorescu is Romanian and participated in the Friends 

lawsuit. Id. Throughout 2015, the District attacked Ms. Grigorescu’s academic credentials 

without justification and refused to accommodate her physical and emotional disabilities. Id. ¶¶ 

68–80.

In 2016, the District issued its first letter of suspension after Ms. Grigorescu notified the 

District about her teaching at San Francisco State University (“SFSU”).3 TAC ¶ 81. After the 

District retracted the first suspension, Mr. Whitlock reissued the letter of suspension and proposed 

termination on the ground that Ms. Grigorescu missed six consecutive Fridays without prior 

approval.4 Id. ¶ 84. Mr. Whitlock also attempted to reclassify Ms. Grigorescu as a temporary 

employee who would not be eligible for grievance rights. Id. ¶ 87. During a Skelly hearing in 

November 2016, the hearing officer found Ms. Grigorescu was entitled to accept the teaching 

appointment at SFSU to mitigate her wage loss. Id. ¶ 91. The officer, however, recommended 

termination of Ms. Grigorescu’s employment on the basis of Ms. Grigorescu’s misrepresentation 

of her math minor and her Baccalaureates high school diploma. Id. ¶ 91. 

In January 2017, Ms. Grigorescu’s employment was terminated, and she was banned from

coming on campus until September 27, 2018. TAC ¶¶ 92–93.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain 

 

3 Plaintiff alleges that because the District only allowed Plaintiff to work as a lab technician, 

Plaintiff had suffered from economic hardship and accepted the teaching position at SFSU to 

mitigate her wage losses. See TAC ¶ 76.

4 The District later retracted two days: one because Plaintiff was at the District all day and another 

that was officially closed as President Day. TAC ¶ 84.

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A 

complaint that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 

after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a plaintiff’s “factual allegations [in the complaint] ‘must 

. . . suggest that the claim has at least a plausible chance of success.’” Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 

F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014). The court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true 

and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. 

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But “allegations in a 

complaint . . . may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action [and] must contain sufficient 

allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively.” Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1135 (internal quotation marks omitted).5 “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. Discussion

1. Race-Based Termination (42 U.S.C. § 1981)

To establish a race-based termination claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was a 

member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was discharged or 

suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated, non-protected employees were 

treated more favorably. McDonnel Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The Court 

previously found that Ms. Grigorescu alleged the first three elements. See Order at 12. With 

regard to (4), however, the Court found that Ms. Grigorescu failed to show that similarly situated, 

non-protected employees were treated more favorably. Id. The Court specifically pointed that

 

5 A court “need not . . . accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to 

judicial notice or by exhibit.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

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Ms. Grigorescu did not allege that her replacement was hired at or close in time to her termination:

As to (4), [Ms. Grigorescu] alleges that an individual of a different 

race and inferior qualifications filled her position. Her replacement 

was not Romanian, recently received a master’s degree, and had less 

teaching experience. [citation omitted.] However, [Ms. Grigorescu] 

did not allege that her alleged replacement was hired at or close in 

time to her termination. If there was a substantial gap of time 

between her termination and subsequent replacement, the new 

person may not be similarly situated, and thus inference of racebased termination will be problematic.

Id. With that, the Court instructed Ms. Grigorescu to “set forth factual allegations that her 

replacement assumed her prior position in a timeframe that would lead to a reasonable inference of 

discrimination, provided that she can do consistent with Rule 11.” Id. 

However, Ms. Grigorescu’s TAC contains no additional facts as to the time gap between 

her termination and the hiring of her replacement. Instead, Ms. Grigorescu repeats her claims 

asserting Mr. Whitlock’s violation of Section 1981, including claims for race-based harassment

that were previously dismissed without leave to amend. See Order at 14. Although the Court in 

its last Order granted leave to amend only to her race-based termination claims, Ms. Grigorescu

realleges her Section 1981 claims altogether—race-based termination and race-based 

harassment—under the title of “Race-Based Harassment (42 United States Code § 1981).” See

TAC at 24. 

To the extent she attempts to replead, Ms. Grigorescu’s Section 1981 race-based 

harassment claim remains DISMISSED with prejudice. See Tavake v. Alameda County Bd. Of 

Supervisors, 2005 WL 2290308 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2005) (dismissing a claim with 

prejudice that was previously dismissed with prejudice); Rodriguez v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff's Dep., 

2014 WL 12703416 at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2014) (granting a motion to dismiss, noting that 

Plaintiff erroneously realleges claims against Defendant that the Court previously dismissed 

without leave to amend).

Ms. Grigorescu renewed many race-based harassment factual allegations in support for her

unlawful termination claim. These allegations, as found previously, are conclusory and do not 

lead to a reasonable inference they were based on race or national origin. Plaintiff failed to 

respond to the Court’s instruction to enhance the pleading relative to her replacement.

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Since Ms. Grigorescu fails to cure the deficiencies the Court raised in its last Order, her

Section 1981 claim is DISMISSED without leave to amend.

2. Retaliatory Harassment (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

a. Background

A plaintiff may assert a Section 1983 claim where a plaintiff alleges retaliation by state 

actors for the exercise of the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. Of 

Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283–84 (1977). To state a claim for violation of First Amendment

under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was engaged in protected activity; (2) the 

defendant took adverse employment action; and (3) her speech was a substantial or motivating 

factor for the adverse employment action. Coszalter v. Cty. of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.

2003). 

Here, parties do not dispute factor no. (2) that Mr. Whitlock took an adverse action against 

Plaintiff. See Order at 13. The parties dispute, however, (1) whether Plaintiff was engaged in 

protected activity; and (3) whether her allegedly protected activity was a substantial or motivating 

factor for the adverse employment action. Id. As to (1), the Court previously found that Ms. 

Grigorescu has made some allegations of her participation in the Friends lawsuit and has provided 

details inferring that Mr. Whitlock had both constructive and actual notice of Ms. Grigorescu’s 

participation in the lawsuit. Id. The Court noted, however, that Ms. Grigorescu failed to allege 

facts showing the substantial or motivating factor. Id. The Court rejected Ms. Grigorescu’s 

argument that the fact Mr. Whitlock served as counsel for the District in the lawsuit alone 

establishes that Ms. Grigorescu’s participation in the suit was the substantial and motivating of 

Mr. Whitlock’s adverse employment action.6 Id. at 13. The Court specifically pointed that 

according to her second amended complaint, Mr. Whitlock’s first adverse action against Ms. 

Grigorescu came years after the onset of the Friends suit and nine months after Mr. Whitlock

 

6 Plaintiff nonetheless asserts in her opposition, “Defendant, as lead counsel representing the 

District . . . was well acquainted with Plaintiff’s active role”. See Opp. at 3–4. Plaintiff contends 

that combined with Plaintiff’s strong reputation in the community, Defendant’s role as lead 

counsel shows his retaliatory intent that had persisted for three years until he assumed the VCHR 

position. Id. at 4. 

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assumed the VCHR position. Id. at 13–14. The Court concluded that the time gaps indicated a

lack of “temporal proximity” i.e., Ms. Grigorescu failed to establish a causal link between the 

protected activity and the adverse actions. See id. 14. In addressing the Court’s concerns, counsel 

for Ms. Grigorescu under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 represented at the hearing:

[Ms. Grigorescu’s counsel] could supplement the pleadings with 

additional factual allegations that [Mr. Whitlock] took adverse 

actions against [Ms. Grigorescu] before he assumed the role of 

VCHR. Stated differently, plaintiff’s counsel represented that there 

are allegations that [Mr. Whitlock] adversely affected Plaintiff’s 

appointment as early as 2011 (by influencing District employees 

with decision-making authority vis-à-vis [Plaintiff’s] involvement 

with Friends). He also represented there is evidence that [Mr. 

Whitlock] took adverse action shortly after he became VCHR. 

Id. (emphasis added). Based on Ms. Grigorescu’s counsel’s representation, the Court granted 

leave to amend and specifically instructed Ms. Grigorescu to add factual allegations, if she could 

under her Rule 11 obligations, showing (1) Mr. Whitlock’s adverse actions before he became 

VCHR, i.e., as early as 2011; and (2) Mr. Whitlock’s adverse actions immediately after he 

assumed the position in July 2014. Id. 

Ms. Grigorescu accordingly amended her complaint. Although the TAC adds no 

allegation regarding Mr. Whitlock’s action before he became the VCHR, it does add factual 

allegations that Mr. Whitlock started retaliating shortly—within just weeks—after he assumed the 

VCHR position in July 2014. See TAC ¶¶ 36–47. 

b. Analysis

Whether an employment action is in retaliation for protected activities is a question of fact 

that must be decided in the light of the timing and other surrounding circumstances. Coszalter, 

320 F.3d at 977–78 [noting that there is no set time beyond which acts cannot support an inference 

of retaliation]). A causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action “may be 

inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the employer’s knowledge that the plaintiff

engaged in protected activity and the proximity in time between the protected activity and the 

allegedly retaliatory employment decision.” Yartfzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 

1987). 

With respect to the proximity in time, there are two time gaps at issue: (1) the time gap 

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between her protected activity (the Friends lawsuit in 2011) and the first alleged adverse action 

(May 2015); and (2) the time gap relating to the period Mr. Whitlock became VCHR (July 2014) 

and the first alleged adverse action (May 2015).

As for (1), the Court notes that Ms. Grigorescu fails to add facts alleging adverse actions 

before he became VCHR in July 2014. Ms. Grigorescu’s allegations as to Mr. Whitlock’s action 

in 2011, 2012, or 2013 have remained unchanged from her previous pleading. The omission does 

not necessarily end the inquiry.

A rule that any period over a certain time is per se too long (or, 

conversely, a rule that any period under a certain time is per se short 

enough) would be unrealistically simplistic. [Citation omitted] 

Retaliation often follows quickly upon the act that offended the 

retaliator, but this is not always so. For a variety of reasons, some 

retaliators prefer to take their time: They may wait until the victim is 

especially vulnerable or until an especially hurtful action becomes 

possible. Or they may wait until they think the lapse of time 

disguises their true motivation. We should be particularly sensitive 

to this last point, for if we establish a per se rule that a specified time 

period is too long to support an inference of retaliation, well-advised 

retaliators will simply wait until that period has passed. Then—

provided that the retaliator has not revealed to others his intention, 

and has not provided demonstrably false or pretextual reasons for 

his act—he may retaliate with impunity. 

Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 978. 

The TAC strengthens the inference of retaliation, adding factual allegations of adverse 

actions that started immediately after Mr. Whitlock became VCHR:

• Within weeks after assuming the VCHR position, Mr. Whitlock—either acting alone or 

with an aid and assistance of Frontiera7—subjected Ms. Grigorescu to various 

discriminatory incidents or actions that had an effect of isolating Ms. Grigorescu form 

her professional community and preventing her from supporting the Friends lawsuit. 

TAC ¶ 36; 

• Mr. Whitlock attempted to bypass Ms. Grigorescu’s seniority right to which she was 

entitled by the American Federation of Teachers union contract. Id. ¶ 37; 

 

7 The TAC contains some factual allegations regarding Frontiera’s retaliatory actions, but all 

Section 1983 claims against Frontiera have been dismissed with prejudice by the Court’s previous 

Order. See Order at 14.

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• Due to the HR policy change made in August 2014, Ms. Grigorescu subsequently was 

paid only the base rate for her work after hours, while other similarly situated 

employees were paid overtime. Id. ¶ 38;

• Frontiera prevented Ms. Grigorescu from participating in the UMOJA community, an 

on-campus organization in support of minority communities in the District. Id. ¶¶ 39, 

40. In discussing the issue with Ms. Grigorescu’s union representatives, Frontiera 

stated that she was following Mr. Whitlock’s orders and that any conversation on the 

topic had to be carried on in the presence of Mr. Whitlock and Joel. Id. ¶¶ 41–43; 

• In October 2014, Frontiera informed Ms. Grigorescu that the dean will consider Ms. 

Grigorescu’s extracurricular activities in evaluating her teaching performance. Id. ¶ 

46. Later, Frontiera submitted Ms. Grigorescu’s teaching performance evaluation 

where Frontiera had marked lower ratings without justification. Id. ¶ 47. 

The Court finds that these new allegations sufficiently plead a substantial and motivating 

factor. Although the alleged retaliation occurs years after Mr. Whitlock’s involvement in the 

lawsuit, he was not in a position to retaliate against Ms. Grigorescu since he did not work for the 

District. In assessing the time proximity at issue, a fair argument can be made that the time should

be measured from the point at which Mr. Whitlock obtained the authority to adversely affect Ms. 

Grigorescu’s employment—here within weeks of Mr. Whitlock actually taking over the VCHR 

position. See Lindner v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., No. 06–CV–4751, 2008 WL 2461934, at 

*7 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008) (noting that “retaliation claims are rarely dismissed pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) where the Plaintiff has alleged a time period of less than one year between the protected 

activity and the alleged retaliatory conduct”). 

Ms. Grigorescu further makes allegations that support inference of retaliatory motive by 

Mr. Whitlock. 

• Mr. Whitlock explained that he removed Ms. Grigorescu from the application pool 

for the full-time teaching position, because base on his research, Ms. Grigorescu’s 

master’s degree she received in Romania was only equivalent to a bachelor’s 

degree and Ms. Grigorescu knowingly misrepresented it as master’s degree. TAC ¶ 

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50. Although Skelly hearing later recommended termination of Ms. Grigorescu’s 

employment due to her alleged misrepresentation of her degrees, Ms. Grigorescu

maintains that her Romanian academic credentials are equivalent to master’s 

degree, and thus Mr. Whitlock’s explanation is factually incorrect. Id. ¶ 91.

• Frontier—allegedly under the control and direction of Mr. Whitlock—explained

that Ms. Grigorescu could not teach, because her injuries would prevent her from 

handing emergencies in class. Id. ¶ 62. Ms. Grigorescu contends that this 

explanation is pretextual because other employees in similar situation were allowed 

to teach despite their physical constraints. Id. ¶ 63. 

• Mr. Whitlock issued the letter of suspension and termination on the grounds Ms. 

Grigorescu missed six consecutive days.8 TAC ¶ 84. Ms. Grigorescu counters that 

she is entitled to take three days off within her CFRA (California Family Rights 

Act) leave and has a contractual right to take additional day for a sick leave. Id. 

Mr. Whitlock nonetheless contends that Ms. Grigorescu fails to adequately plead the 

element of substantial and motivating factor, because no facts suggest that Mr. Whitlock had any 

knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged First Amendment activities. Mot. at 7–8 (“distinct from the 

litigation itself-was generally known to the community”). Particularly, with respect to the time 

before he was hired by the District in July 2014, Mr. Whitlock contends that he was not aware of

Ms. Grigorescu’s activities in the Friends lawsuit, therefore could not take any action in 

retaliation. Id.; see Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, Pa., 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002) 

(suggesting that, “for protected conduct to be a substantial or motiving factor in a decision, the 

decisionmakers must be aware of the protected conduct”). The Court concludes that Ms. 

Grigorescu sufficiently alleges that Mr. Whitlock had knowledge of Ms. Grigorescu’s activities at 

issue. In TAC, Ms. Grigorescu specifically alleges that within weeks after Mr. Whitlock assumed 

the VCHR position—when he took the adverse employment action for the first time, Mr. Whitlock

acted “because of Plaintiff’s protected activity.” TAC ¶ 36. Such an allegation is also implicit in 

 

8 The District later retracted two days: one because Plaintiff was at the District all day and, another 

that was officially closed as national holiday. TAC ¶ 84.

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Ms. Grigorescu’s assertion that Mr. Whitlock’s conduct “had the effect of dissuading [her] from 

continuing to engage in protected activity; namely: her continuing support of the ongoing 

lawsuit.” Id. Ms. Grigorescu alleges Defendant was aware of her activities when he committed 

alleged retaliation. He was lead counsel for the defendant in the lawsuit. Id. ¶ 4. Ms. Grigorescu

has made sufficient allegations as to Mr. Whitlock’s knowledge. See Jones v. Quintana, 831 F. 

Supp. 2d 75, 84–85 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying a motion to dismiss, because Plaintiff has sufficiently 

pled Defendant’s knowledge by alleging that Defendant “was aware of [Plaintiff’s speech] by the 

time Defendant took the challenged employment action for the first time).

To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs need to only plausibly allege that retaliatory 

animus was a substantial or motivating factor to state a First Amendment retaliation claim. See, 

e.g., The Koala v. Khosla, 931 F.3d 887, 905 (9th Cir. 2019) (reversing the district court’s 

dismissal of a Section 1983 claim, noting, “[a]t this early stage of litigation, [the Court] takes

[Plaintiff’s] allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff]”); Ariz. 

Students’ Ass’n v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2016) (circumstantial evidence 

sufficiently establishes retaliatory intent for 12(b)(6) purposes). Here, Ms. Grigorescu added 

factual allegations which in the aggregate may give rise to a plausible inference of retaliatory 

motivation. Her theory of retaliation, even if vague, withstands a 12(b)(6) motion on the basis of 

liberal rules of notice pleading. See Hansen v. Malloy, No. 3:10-CV-00110-RCJ-VP, 2010 WL 

3070451, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2010).

Accordingly, Mr. Whitlock’s motion to dismiss Section 1983 claim for First Amendment 

retaliation is DENIED. 

III. MOTION TO STRIKE

Pursuant to Rule 12(f), “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or 

any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). See also

Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir. 2010). The function of a 

12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating 

spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 

1524, 1527 (9th Cir.1993). 

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Here, Mr. Whitlock moves to strike following from Ms. Grigorescu’s pleading: 

• The claims against the District, Frontiera, and Joel as improper Defendants. 

• The paragraphs concerning Ms. Grigorescu’s physical injury and/or disabilities.

• The paragraphs as to Mr. Whitlock’s adverse actions before he was employed with 

the District.

• Ms. Grigorescu’s prayer for relief based on California Government Code Section 

12965(b).

As to the claims against the District, Frontiera, and Joel, Mr. Whitlock asserts that all 

claims against each of them have been dismissed by the Court’s previous orders. See Docket No. 

40 (“MTS”) at 6. As to claims regarding Mr. Whitlock’s adverse action before July 2014 and 

claims concerning Ms. Grigorescu’s physical injuries and disabilities, Mr. Whitlock contends that 

Ms. Grigorescu’s allegations are impertinent and immaterial, and thus have no legal bearing on 

Ms. Grigorescu’s claims for retaliatory harassment or for race-based termination. Id. As to the 

prayer for relief under California Government Code Section 12965(b), Mr. Whitlock moves to 

strike the prayer, on the ground that Ms. Grigorescu’s prayer for relief relies on California Fair 

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), under which Ms. Grigorescu had not brought a claim. 

Id.

Because Ms. Grigorescu did not bring a claim based on FEHA, her prayer for relief relying 

on FEHA should be stricken. All remaining parts of the pleading, however, survives 12(f) motion,

as they are neither immaterial or impertinent. Motions to strike are disfavored and “are generally 

not granted unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the 

subject matter of the litigation.” LeDuc v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. 

Cal. 1992).

Here, paragraphs concerning Ms. Grigorescu’s health issues and claims against the 

District, Frontiera or Joel are not immaterial or impertinent for purposes of a Rule 12(f) motion. 

In conjunction with other allegations, the claims at issue— although not essential to Plaintiff’s 

claim or provides a direct basis of liability—might be probative of Mr. Whitlock’s actions in 

retaliation for the Friends lawsuit. The statements referring to other similarly situated employees 

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may enhance her claim that Mr. Whitlock’s motive is retaliatory, contrary to his explanation that 

Ms. Georgescu was prevented from teaching on the basis of her health issues. Wynes v. Kaiser 

Permanente Hosps., No. 2:10-CV-00702-MCE, 2011 WL 1302916, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 

2011). The claims against other defendants may further support her injuries suffered from their 

alleged retaliation in connection with or under the control of Mr. Whitlock. See Colaprico v. Sun 

Microsystems, Inc. 758 F.Supp. 1335, 1340 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 

Accordingly, Mr. Whitlock’s motion to strike Ms. Grigorescu’s prayer for relief based on 

California Government Code Section 12965(b) is GRANTED. The motion to strike other 

claims/allegations is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Whitlock’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied 

in part:

• The motion to dismiss Section 1981 claim for race-based termination is 

GRANTED with prejudice; 

• The motion to dismiss Section 1983 claim for retaliatory harassment is DENIED.

Mr. Whitlock’s motion to strike is granted in part and denied in part:

• The motion to strike prayer for relief based on California Government Code 

Section 12965(b) is GRANTED;

• The motion to strike other claims are DENIED. 

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 40 and 41.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 23, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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