Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04426/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04426-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOYD HALL,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.P. KANE,

Respondent. ______________________________

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No. C 05-4426 MMC (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS; ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE

(Docket No. 4)

On October 31, 2005, petitioner, a California prisoner incarcerated at the San Quentin

State Prison, filed the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254, challenging the decision by the California Board of Prison Terms (“Board”) finding

petitioner unsuitable for parole. The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the

petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition,

petitioner has filed an opposition, and respondent has filed a reply. 

BACKGROUND

In 1987, in San Bernardino County Superior Court, petitioner was convicted of second

degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to a state prison term of

fifteen years to life plus five years. In 2003, the Board, for the third time, found him

unsuitable for parole. Petitioner has challenged this finding in habeas petitions filed at all

three levels of the California courts. 

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United States District Court

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If the Board finds the individual eligible for parole pursuant to § 3041(b), the Board sets a

minimum parole eligibility date pursuant to § 3041(a), with the goal of providing uniform terms for

individuals with similar offenses. In re. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1098 (Cal. 2005). 

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DISCUSSION

Respondent argues the petition should be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction because petitioner has no federally protected liberty interest in parole. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court finds respondent’s argument unpersuasive.

Although there is “no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,” a state’s statutory parole

scheme, if it uses mandatory language, “creates a presumption that parole release will be

granted” when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a

constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal &

Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 11-12 (1979) (finding Nebraska parole statute, providing

board “shall” release prisoner subject to certain restrictions, creates due process liberty

interest in release on parole); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987)

(finding Montana parole statute, providing board “shall” release prisoner subject to certain

restrictions, creates due process liberty interest in release on parole). Where such mandatory

language is used, a prisoner gains a legitimate expectation in parole that cannot be denied

without adequate procedural due process protections. See id. at 373-81; Greenholtz, 442

U.S. at 11-16. 

California’s parole scheme is set forth in California Penal Code § 3041. Section

3041(b) states that the parole board “shall set a release date unless it determines that the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or

past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a

more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore,

cannot be fixed at this meeting.” Cal. Pen. Code § 3041(b).1

 Respondent’s argument that

this language does not give rise to a federally protected liberty interest has been rejected by

the Ninth Circuit on two separate occasions. First, in McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895

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The Ninth Circuit further noted that, in light of Greenholtz and Allen, its holding was based

on “clearly established” federal law within the meaning of AEDPA. See id.

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(9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit found § 3041(b) contains the same type of mandatory

language as the parole statutes at issue in Allen and Greenholtz, which language, as

determined by the Supreme Court, gives rise to a protected liberty interest in release on

parole. See id. at 901-02. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded, “California’s parole

scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.” Id. at 902.2

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following year, in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit

reaffirmed this holding, finding § 3041(b) contains mandatory language that gives rise to a

federally protected liberty interest in release on parole. See id. at 914-16 (finding Board’s

decision that petitioner was unsuitable for parole implicated his federally protected liberty

interest in release on parole). Consequently, the law of this Circuit is that § 3041(b) gives

rise to a federally protected liberty interest in release on parole, an interest implicated in the

instant case by the Board’s determination that petitioner is unsuitable for parole.

Respondent argues that the decisions in Greenholtz and Allen are not applicable to the

instant case in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472

(1995). This argument was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in both McQuillion, see 306 F.3d at

903, and Biggs, see 334 F.3d at 914.

Respondent also argues that the decisions in McQuillion and Biggs are no longer

applicable in light of the California Supreme Court’s more recent decision in In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (Cal. 2005). In Dannenberg, the Board determined

Dannenberg to be unsuitable for parole under § 3041(b) based on a finding that the nature of

his second degree murder conviction demonstrated a continuing danger to public safety; the

Board performed no analysis pursuant to § 3041(a) as to whether his term of incarceration

conformed to that of other second degree murderers. See id. at 1074-75. The California

Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether § 3041 prevents the Board from denying

parole without conducting the uniformity analysis specified in § 3041(a), see id. at 1077, and

held the Board need not engage in such an analysis under § 3041(a) if it first determines that

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The Court notes that district courts in California have reached differing conclusions as to this

question. Compare Murillo v. Perez, 2005 WL 2592420 at *3 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2005) (finding

Dannenberg holding limited to uniform term provision of subsection (a) of § 3041; finding holding in

McQuillon, that mandatory language of subsection (b) creates liberty interest, remains unchanged);

Saif’ullah v. Carey, 2005 WL 1555389 at * 8 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2005) (finding, after Dannenberg, liberty interest in parole in California); Hudson v. Kane, 2005 WL 2035590 at * 7 (N.D. Cal. Aug.

23, 2005) (same); with Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 376 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (E.D. Cal.

2005) (finding no protected liberty interest in parole under § 3041 after Dannenberg). 

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public safety concerns require a lengthier period of incarceration, thereby making an inmate

unsuitable for parole under § 3041(b). See id. at 1098. 

This Court is required to give considerable weight to a state court’s definitive

interpretation of a state statute. See Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 208 (1975). 

Dannenberg, however, did not decide the question raised herein, namely, whether § 3041(b)

gives rise to a protected liberty interest in release on parole. Rather, because it found the

language in § 3041 was not “mandatory” with respect to uniformity of release dates under

§ 3041(a), see Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1086-87, the California Supreme Court concluded

that a California inmate has no liberty interest in a “uniform parole release date” under

§ 3041(a). See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1098 n.18. In so holding, Dannenberg did not

address the question of whether the language in § 3041(b) contains the kind of mandatory

language that creates a federally protected liberty interest in release on parole. Absent some

further pronouncement from the California Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit on that

question, this Court follows the decisions in McQuillion and Biggs, and finds the Board’s

decision in this case implicates a federally protected liberty interest in release on parole.3

Accordingly, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to

decide whether petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated by the

Board’s determination that he was not suitable for parole.

CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

2. Respondent shall file with the Court and serve on petitioner, within 60 days of

the date this order is filed, an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules

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Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be

granted based on petitioner’s cognizable claim. Respondent shall file with the answer and

serve on petitioner a copy of all portions of the state trial record that have been transcribed

previously and that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition. 

If petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he shall do so by filing a traverse with

the Court and serving it on respondent within 30 days of the date the answer is filed.

This order terminates Docket No. 4.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 25, 2006 _________________________ MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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