Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00767/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00767-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAI CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

INTEGRATED SCIENCE SOLUTIONS, INC.,

et al.

Defendants. /

No. C-06-00767 EDL

ORDER GRANTING IN PART WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND AND DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

STRIKE AND TO DISMISS

Plaintiff PAI Corporation brought this breach of contract action against Defendants

Integrated Science Solutions, Inc. (“ISSi”), Cecelia McCloy and David Dobson. In the first

amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims for breach of contract, inducement of breach of contract,

unfair competition and fraud. On April 6, 2006, Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s

request for treble damages on the breach of contract claims, to dismiss the claims for inducement of

breach of contract, unfair competition, and fraud or, alternatively, to require a more definite

statement as to the claims for inducement, unfair competition and fraud. The matter was fully

briefed and the Court held a hearing on May 16, 2006. For the reasons set forth at the hearing and in

this Order, the Court grants in part with leave to amend and denies in part Defendants’ motion to

strike and to dismiss. 

Facts

Plaintiff, a Tennessee corporation, bids for and contracts with governmental agencies to

provide governmental safety and environmental services. First Am. Compl. ¶ 6. In anticipation of

bidding on a NASA contract, Plaintiff entered into a Teaming Agreement on May 10, 1999 with

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Defendant ISSi that provided that if Plaintiff were awarded the NASA contract, it would hire ISSi as

its subcontractor. First Am. Compl. ¶ 8. The Teaming Agreement provided, inter alia, that ISSi

would not compete for contracts and would not recruit or hire Plaintiff’s employees without prior

consent. First Am. Compl. ¶ 9. The parties also agreed to keep confidential for three years any

information received under the Teaming Agreement, except in certain circumstances. First Am.

Compl. ¶ 11. 

Plaintiff was awarded the NASA contract and subsequently, on March 6, 2000, entered into a

Subcontract Agreement with ISSi. First Am. Compl. ¶ 12. The Subcontract Agreement identified

Defendant McCloy as an officer of ISSi and Defendant Dobson as the vice-president. First Am.

Compl. ¶ 13. The Subcontract Agreement contained, inter alia, a confidentiality clause, and stated

that Defendants agreed not to solicit or offer employment to Plaintiff’s employees. First Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16. 

Plaintiff entered into three Employment Agreements with Defendant McCloy, one

Agreement Regarding Confidentiality of PAI Executive Information and two Potential Conflict of

Interest Disclosures. First Am. Compl. ¶ 18. Under those agreements, Ms. McCloy promised to

keep proprietary information confidential and to return all documents containing confidential

information at the end of the agreements. First Am. Compl. ¶ 18. Handwritten on the first

Agreement by Ms. McCloy was: “I will remain President of ISSi and continue marketing and

business development activities in that capacity.” Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A; First Am. Compl. ¶ 19. 

On a later Agreement, Ms. McCloy wrote: “I am corporate officer w/ISSi.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 19. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subsequently competed against Plaintiff for an extension of

the very contract under which ISSi was Plaintiff’s subcontractor. First Am. Compl. ¶ 19. Plaintiff

alleges that in 2004 NASA issued a Request for Proposals to provide environmental services to

replace the scope of the environmental services contract that Plaintiff won in 1999/2000. First Am.

Compl. ¶ 20. According to Plaintiff, Defendants wrongfully solicited Plaintiff’s employees to work

for ISSi in the event that ISSi won the new contract, and included some of Plaintiff’s key employees

in ISSi’s proposal for the new contract. First Am. Compl. ¶ 20. NASA awarded the contract to

ISSi, with Plaintiff placing second in the bidding. First Am. Compl. ¶ 20. 

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//

Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that “the court may order stricken from any

pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The function of a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid the expenditure of time and

money that arises from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues before trial. 

Fantasy Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993). Because striking a portion of a

pleading is a drastic remedy and because it is often sought by the movant as a dilatory tactic,

motions under Rule 12(f) are disfavored. 5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d, § 1380 at 394 (2004); see also Judge William W. Schwarzer, et al.,

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, § 9:375 (Rutter Group 2003). On a motion to strike, the Court

must construe all allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Botosan v. Fitzhugh, 13

F.Supp.2d 1047, 1051 ( S.D. Cal. 1998). 

Defendant moves to strike the treble damages allegations contained in Plaintiff’s breach of

contract claims. In those claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant ISSi breached the Teaming

Agreement and the Subcontractor Agreement by, inter alia, competing against Plaintiff using

Plaintiff’s proprietary information, soliciting Plaintiff’s employees, and misappropriating Plaintiff’s

confidential information, and that Defendant McCloy breached the Confidential Agreements that she

signed by, inter alia, using Plaintiff’s proprietary information, soliciting Plaintiff’s employees, and

misappropriating Plaintiff’s confidential information. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 32. Plaintiff alleges

that it is entitled to treble damages against Defendants “resulting from or incidental to the breach of

contract, including attorney fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this action and such other relief as

the Court deems necessary and proper.” First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 36. 

Plaintiff bases its claim for treble damages on the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act

(“TCPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109(a). Notably, Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege a claim

for violation of the TCPA. The trebling of damages under the TCPA is in the nature of punitive

damages. Smith Corona Corp. v. Pelikan, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 452, 483-84 (1992). Treble or punitive

damages are generally not available for breach of contract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §

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355 (2005). Unless Plaintiff can state a claim for a violation of the TCPA, it is not entitled to the

Act’s remedies. See Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 926 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1998)

(affirming dismissal of TCPA claim and stating that the plaintiff was not entitled to the TCPA

remedies because there had been no violation of the Act). The Court will grant leave to amend to

state such a claim, but cautions Plaintiff that it may not be able to do so in good faith because the

TCPA is focused on consumer transactions, not contractor/subcontractor agreements as here. 

Therefore, Defendant’s motion to strike the treble damages allegations in paragraphs 28 and 36 and

in the prayer for relief is granted. 

Defendants also request that the language “PAI Corporation Potential Conflict of Interest

Disclosure,” in paragraph 24, lines 24-25, be stricken because there are no factual allegations that

there was such an agreement or that it was breached. However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

McCloy entered into two Potential Conflict of Interest Disclosure Forms on which she wrote that she

was a corporate officer of Defendant ISSi and that she would pursue marketing and development

activities for ISSi. First Am. Compl. ¶ 19. Further, Plaintiff alleges that “. . . defendant breached its

agreements with plaintiff by failing and refusing to comply with those provisions of the Teaming

Agreement, PAI Corporation Potential Conflict of Interest Disclosure, and Subcontract Agreement .

. . .” First Am. Compl. ¶ 24. Accordingly, the motion to strike the language from paragraph 24 is

denied. 

Motion to dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) may only be granted if

“it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Dismissal may be based

on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable

legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In analyzing a

motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, and

construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan,

792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The parties raise a threshold issue of whether the law of Tennessee or California applies as to

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some or all of Plaintiff’s claims. Both the Teaming Agreement and the Subcontractor Agreement

contain provisions designating Tennessee law as the choice of law. First Am. Compl. ¶ 4. Because

the choice of law issue is not dispositive of the Court’s decision on this motion to dismiss and was

not adequately briefed by the parties, the Court declines to decide the issue at this time. 

Inducement of breach of contract claim

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants induced a breach of Plaintiff’s

employment agreements with its employees. Under Tennessee law, inducement to breach a contract

requires seven elements: “(1) that a legal contract existed; (2) that the defendant was aware of the

contract; (3) that the defendant intended to induce a breach of that contract; (4) that the defendant

acted with malice; (5) that a breach of the contract occurred; (6) that the breach was a proximate

result of the defendant’s conduct; and (7) that the breach injured the plaintiff.” Givens v. Mullikin,

75 S.W.3d 383, 405 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 2002). Under California law, the tort is called interference with

contractual relations (see 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law, § 731), and requires the following

elements: “(1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of

this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the

contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5)

resulting damage.” Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 19 Cal.4th 26, 55 (1998). 

Plaintiff has sufficiently pled an inducement claim under either state law. Plaintiff alleges

that on or before August 30, 2004, it had verbal or written employment contracts with its employees

with respect to Plaintiff’s performance under the prime contract. First Am. Compl. ¶ 38. Plaintiff

alleges that all Defendants were aware of those employment contracts. First Am. Compl. ¶ 39. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants solicited key employees from Plaintiff to work for ISSi in

connection with the subsequent NASA contract, even though Plaintiff and Defendants had entered

into Agreements prohibiting solicitation of the employees and Defendants knew of the prohibition

against solicitation of Plaintiff’s employees. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40, 41. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants intended to induce breach of the employment contracts and that they acted with malice. 

First Am. Compl. ¶ 41. Plaintiff alleges that the breach of the contracts were a proximate result of

Defendants’ conduct and that the breach caused Plaintiff to be injured in that it lost its bid for the

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subsequent NASA contract. First Am. Compl. ¶ 41. Plaintiff claims that it has been injured in an

amount in excess of $3.5 million and in its reputation. First Am. Compl. ¶ 41. This is sufficient for

notice pleading. 

Defendants also argue that the inducement claim against Defendant McCloy should be

dismissed because she is immune as a corporate officer, director or employee of a corporation who

can only be liable if she acted outside the general range of her authority or acted in a manner not

substantially intended to further the corporation’s interests. Waste Conversion Sys. v. Greenstone

Indus., 33 S.W.3d 779, 782 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 2000) (addressing the question of whether a parent

corporation can be liable for inducement of breach of contract when it induces a wholly-owned

subsidiary to breach a contract and holding that the parent corporation cannot be liable); Forrester v.

Stockstill, 869 S.W.2d 328, 334-35 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1994) (addressing whether corporate officers can

be liable for inducement for breach of contract in a case where an at-will employee sued his former

employer where corporate officers made statements that eventually led to the termination, and

holding that they were not liable because the officers were acting in the best interests of the

company). These cases are inapposite. Here, Defendant McCloy was Plaintiff’s employee (First

Am. Compl. ¶ 18) who allegedly actively solicited Plaintiff’s employees to breach their employment

contracts. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the inducement claim against Defendant McCloy is

denied.

Unfair competition claim

In support of its unfair competition claim, Plaintiff alleges that when Defendant McCloy was

employed by Plaintiff, she “acquired knowledge of numerous trade secrets and practices and secret,

personnel and confidential information of plaintiff, utilized, among other things, by plaintiff in the

bidding proposals for or performance of its occupational safety, industrial hygiene, hazardous

materials and other environmental services contracts with NASA/ARC and other governmental

branches. In particular, McCloy was given all plaintiff’s employee names, addresses and salaries;

plaintiff’s cost strategies and information, and plaintiff’s internal documents.” First Am. Compl. ¶

46. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. McCloy used inside information that she obtained when she worked

for Plaintiff to wrongfully recruit Plaintiff’s employees, to unfairly compete against Plaintiff for

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contracts, to bill Plaintiff for project costs in excess of the contractual agreement, to legitimize a

greater expense to the government on the contract, to improperly make direct contact with Plaintiff’s

customers and to misrepresent ISSi’s prime customer as NASA. First Am. Compl. ¶ 47. Plaintiff

also alleges that Ms. McCloy did not work her required full time schedule when she was employed

by Plaintiff, and instead would take time off to work for Defendant ISSi in competition with

Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that when Ms. McCloy was working on Plaintiff’s project, she

displayed promotional materials with ISSi’s logo. Id. Plaintiff claims that the misappropriated

secret information was its main asset, that Defendants knew that it was confidential and that Plaintiff

has been harmed by the disclosure. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48-50. 

The sufficiency of Plaintiff’s unfair competition claim depends upon the statute or law under

which it intends to proceed: the TCPA, California’s unfair competition law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17200, et seq., or common law. It is not clear to the Court from the complaint or from the oral

argument which statute or tort is at issue. Moreover, Plaintiff’s ability to state a claim for unfair

competition depends upon the outcome of a choice of law analysis, which the Court has declined to

undertake at this early stage. 

At the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Plaintiff may want to pursue an unfair

competition claim under the TCPA. To state a claim under the TCPA, Plaintiff must allege: (1) that

the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared unlawful by the TCPA and

(2) that the defendant’s conduct caused an “ascertainable loss of money or property, real, personal,

or mixed, or any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated . . . .” Tucker v.

Sierra Builders, 180 S.W.3d 109, 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). It is questionable whether this

contractual transaction comes within the definition of “trade,” “commerce” or “consumer

transaction” contained in the TCPA. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-103(11) (1999) (“Trade,”

“commerce,” or “consumer transaction” means the advertising, offering for sale, lease or rental, or

distribution of any goods, services or property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, and

other articles, commodities, or things of value wherever situated.”); see also New Life Corp. v.

Nelson, 932 S.W.2d 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the TCPA was not applicable in a case

in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant willfully and maliciously damaged the plaintiff’s

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business when the defendant hired the plaintiff’s president to create a plan for the defendant to

compete with the plaintiff’s business). 

Also at the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Plaintiff may want to allege a claim under

California’ unfair competition statute. If California law applies, Plaintiff can probably state a claim

for unfair competition given the broad reach of California’s law. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants

took Plaintiff’s confidential and proprietary information and used it to compete against Plaintiff in

the marketplace. Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, 421 F.3d 981, 986

(9th Cir. 2005) (“‘Unfair competition,’ under California law, is conduct that threatens incipient

violation of antitrust law, or violates policy or spirit of one such laws because its effects are

comparable to or same as violation of law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms

competition.”). Of course, whether or not Plaintiff can pursue a claim under this California statute

may ultimately also depend on the choice of law issue. 

Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel also stated that it may want to allege a claim of common law

unfair competition. KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 104 Cal.App.3d 844, 850 (1980) (“the essence of the

tort of unfair competition is the inequitable pirating of the fruits of another’s labor and then either

‘palming off’ those fruits as one’s own (deception) or simply gaining from them an unearned

commercial benefit.”). 

Because it is unclear from the complaint and from the discussion at the hearing which law

Plaintiff intends to use to allege its unfair competition claim, Defendant’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s unfair competition claim is granted with leave to amend. 

Fraud

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s fraud claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

fraudulently entered into the Teaming Agreement and the Subcontractor Agreement to take

advantage of Plaintiff’s industry knowledge. Plaintiff has not pled this claim with sufficient

particularity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 671 (9th Cir. 1993)

(allegations must be “specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which

is alleged to constitute the fraud, so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that

they have done anything wrong.”). An allegation of breach of contract, without more, cannot be

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used as evidence that a defendant never intended to honor the contract for purposes of fraud; to

permit such use “contradicts the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) and would allow

‘every breach of contract [to] support a claim of fraud so long as the plaintiff adds to his complaint

that the defendant never intended to keep her promise.’” Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d

1150, 1153-54 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting Richardson v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Co., 2000 WL

284211, *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar 9, 2000)). 

The elements of fraud in Tennessee and California are essentially the same. Under

Tennessee law, “the elements of fraud are an intentional misrepresentation with regard to a material

fact; knowledge of the representation’s falsity, i.e., it was made “knowingly” or “without belief in its

truth” or “recklessly” without regard to its truth or falsity; the plaintiff reasonably relied on the

misrepresentation and suffered damages; and the misrepresentation relates to an existing or past

fact.” Oak Ridge Precision Ind. v. First Tennessee Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 835 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1992). In California, “a cause of action for fraud requires the plaintiff to prove (a) a knowingly

false misrepresentation by the defendant, (b) made with the intent to deceive or to induce reliance by

the plaintiff, (c) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff, and (d) resulting damages.” Glenn K. Jackson,

Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made certain representations by signing the Teaming

Agreement and the Subcontractor Agreement, e.g., that Defendants would not divulge Plaintiff’s

confidential information, would not recruit or hire Plaintiff’s employees identified as potential

workers on the NASA contract, would not make direct contact with Plaintiff’s customers without

authorization, would not make site visits to NASA facilities without prior approval, and would not

remove any proprietary information belonging to Plaintiff. First Am. Compl. ¶ 53. Plaintiff alleges

that these representations were false and that Defendants only entered into the Teaming and

Subcontractor Agreements for the purpose of “riding on PAI’s success and gaining inside

information about PAI’s trade secrets, processes, bidding strategies, confidential, personnel and

other proprietary information, . . . in order to enhance ISSi’s competitive edge in bidding

NASA/ARC and other governmental environmental science contracts.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 54. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants actively solicited Plaintiff’s employees and visited the site program

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office without prior notice. First Am. Compl. ¶ 55. Plaintiff says that it was justified in accepting

Defendants’ representations in the Teaming and Subcontractor Agreements because “McCloy, as

program manager, was entrusted with most of PAI’s proprietary information regarding NASA/ARC

contract because ISSi had agreed it would not misappropriate, divulge, confiscate or otherwise usurp

PAI’s proprietary assets contrary to its best interests.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 56. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants used proprietary information to compete against Plaintiff for the subsequent NASA bid. 

First Am. Compl. ¶ 57. Plaintiff alleges that as a proximate cause of the fraud, Defendants incurred

benefits and Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount in excess of 3.5 million and in its reputation. 

First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 58-59. 

Although Plaintiff has alleged some of the elements of fraud with sufficient particularity, it

has not done so with respect to all of them. For example, there is no allegation that the Defendants’

representations in the Teaming and Subcontractor Agreements were knowingly false at the time they

were made. Plaintiff also fails to allege that the representations were made with the intent to deceive

Plaintiff or to induce reliance by Plaintiff or that Plaintiff relied. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion

to dismiss the fraud claim is granted with leave to amend. 

Any amended complaint shall be filed no later than June 2, 2006. The Case Management

Conference currently scheduled for June 6, 2006 is continued to June 27, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. The

parties shall file a joint Case Management Conference statement no later than June 20, 2006. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 22, 2006 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

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