Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00314/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00314-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Erik Scott Maloney, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-0314-PHX-RCB (BSB) 

 O R D E R 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s 

Order entered March 25, 2014, granting qualified immunity to Defendants on Plaintiff’s 

claim under the First Amendment regarding breakfast time for Ramadan in 2012. (Doc. 

45; ref. Doc. 42.) 

 The Court will deny the motion. 

I. Background 

 As noted in its Order entered March 25, Counts One and Three of Plaintiff’s 

Second Amended Complaint (SAC) raised claims that Defendants failed to accommodate 

Plaintiff’s religious beliefs during Ramadan when they allegedly set the time for 

breakfast after the time for religiously mandated fasting had begun. This forced Plaintiff 

to either forgo breakfast during Ramadan or violate the tenets of his Muslim faith. 

Specifically, Defendants set breakfast for 5:00 a.m., prior to sunrise, rather than prior to 

dawn. (Doc. 42 at 1-2, 5.) Count One asserted a violation of the First Amendment, and 

Case 2:13-cv-00314-JJT-JZB Document 53 Filed 04/29/14 Page 1 of 4
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Count Three alleged a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 

Act (RLUIPA). (SAC, Doc. 17.) 

 On Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the Court held that 

monetary damages are not available under RLUIPA. (Doc. 42 at 7, n. 3.) The Court also 

held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim for 

damages. (Id. at 6-7.) The Court determined that a general duty to satisfy an inmate’s 

religious dietary requirements defines the right in question too broadly and further 

determined that the issue for these Counts is whether it was clearly established that 

during Ramadan Muslims must eat breakfast before dawn rather than before sunrise. (Id.

at 6, citing Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010).) The Court also held 

that it was not persuaded that the authority cited by Plaintiff demonstrates that there was 

such a clearly established right. (Id. at 6-7.) 

II. Governing Standard and Analysis 

 A. Legal Standard 

Motions for reconsideration should be granted only in rare circumstances. 

Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). A motion for 

reconsideration is appropriate where the district court “(1) is presented with newly 

discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly 

unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, 

Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Mere 

disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration. See Leong 

v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 689 F. Supp. 1572, 1573 (D. Haw. 1988). A motion for 

reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time 

when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona Enters., Inc. 

v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Nor may a motion for 

reconsideration repeat any argument previously made in support of or in opposition to a 

motion. Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. 

Ariz. 2003). 

Case 2:13-cv-00314-JJT-JZB Document 53 Filed 04/29/14 Page 2 of 4
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 B. Analysis 

Plaintiff objects to the Court’s definition of the right at issue, arguing that a more 

general right applies—the right to accommodations to meet religious dietary needs. 

(Doc. 45 at 2, citing McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987).) He also disagrees 

with the Court’s analysis of Washington v. Garcia, 977 F. Supp. 1067 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 

1997) and other cases he cited. (Doc. 45 at 3-4, 6.) He objects to the Court not 

construing the allegations in his SAC as true; specifically the allegation that Defendants 

had knowledge that the 5:00 a.m. feeding was later than the pre-dawn time required by 

his religion. (Id. at 5.) He also takes issue with the Court’s reliance on a recent 

determination in Bomar v. Richardson, CV-13-0253-PHX-ROS (LOA) (Doc. 30), that 

there was no clearly established right to pre-dawn breakfast. 

 As to the claim that the Court did not construe as true Plaintiff’s allegation that 

Defendants had knowledge of that the 5:00 a.m. feeding was later than the pre-dawn time 

required by his religion, Plaintiff is essentially arguing that Defendants were on notice of 

a clearly established right. But for purposes of qualified immunity, the right must be 

clearly established by case law; the doctrine of qualified immunity provides that even if 

there was a constitutional violation, Defendants may not be liable for damages. The 

remaining arguments mentioned above are merely disagreements with the Court’s 

decision and are not grounds for reconsideration. 

 Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the Court did not address the congregational-prayer 

aspect of the religious exercise of Sahur raised in Count Three and so dismissed half of 

the religious exercise claim in that Count. (Doc. 45 at 7-8.) A review of Count Three in 

the SAC shows that Plaintiff’s allegations include an assertion that Sahur ends with group 

prayer at the first light of dawn. (Doc. 17 at 11.) But as to a burden on his religious 

exercise, Plaintiff alleged only the 5:00 a.m. feeding time. (Id. at 12.) He did not claim a 

separate policy or practice that burdened the group prayer. Thus, to the extent the group 

prayer was somehow burdened, which is not clearly alleged in the SAC, it is related to 

Case 2:13-cv-00314-JJT-JZB Document 53 Filed 04/29/14 Page 3 of 4
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the feeding time. In other words, Plaintiff has not alleged a separate claim in Count 

Three regarding group prayer. 

 The Court finds no reason to reconsider its Order granting qualified immunity. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) The reference to the Magistrate is withdrawn as to the Motion for 

Reconsideration (Doc. 45). 

 (2) The Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 45) is denied. 

 (3) All other matters must remain with the Magistrate for disposition as 

appropriate. 

 DATED this 28th day of April, 2014. 

Case 2:13-cv-00314-JJT-JZB Document 53 Filed 04/29/14 Page 4 of 4