Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00124/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00124-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anthony James Merrick, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-16-00124-PHX-SPL (BSB)

REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Anthony James Merrick has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and a supporting memorandum. (Docs. 1, 3.) Respondents 

have filed an answer in which they argue that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus 

relief because his claims are procedurally barred, are not cognizable on federal habeas 

corpus review, or lack merit. (Doc. 12.) Petitioner has filed a “”Statement of Related 

Cases” and a reply in support of his Petition. (Docs. 15, 19.) For the reasons below, the 

Court recommends that the Petition be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 On October 20, 2010, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner in Maricopa County 

Superior Court Case No. CR2010-007643 with three counts of conspiracy to commit 

tampering with a witness, class six felonies, conspiracy to commit perjury, a class four 

felony, and obstructing criminal investigations or prosecutions, a class five felony. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. A, Ex. Q at 3.) The State later dismissed one count of conspiracy to tamper 

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with a witness. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 3.) After a trial, during which Petitioner represented 

himself, a jury found Petitioner guilty of the remaining charges. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner 

filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied. (Id.) The trial court subsequently 

found that Petitioner had two prior felony convictions. (Id.) The court sentenced 

Petitioner to four-and-a-half years’ imprisonment for each conviction for conspiracy to 

tamper with witnesses, twelve years’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit perjury, and 

six years’ imprisonment for obstructing an investigation or prosecution. (Id.) The court 

ordered that Petitioner’s sentences to run concurrently, but consecutively to his sentences 

imposed in another case, Maricopa County Superior Court Case No.CR2010-005367. 

(Id.) 

 Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were based on the following events. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. Q.) While awaiting trial for fraudulent schemes and gift card fraud 

in CR2010-005367-001, Petitioner, with Vickie McFarland’s assistance, attempted to 

convince two people to fabricate testimony to help him avoid conviction. (Id. at 2; 

Doc. 12, Ex. N at 51.) Between April 2009 and October 2010, Petitioner called 

McFarland from jail. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 2, Ex. N at 53.) Petitioner also sent McFarland 

letters and post cards outlining the fictitious testimony he wanted her, Eve Ford, and 

David Harris to present at the underlying gift-card fraud trial. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 3, 20.) 

Petitioner was willing to compensate Ford and Harris, through McFarland, for their 

fictitious testimony. (Id. at 20-21.) 

 McFarland contacted the Perryville prison chaplain and requested a pastoral visit 

with Eve Ford. (Id. at 2.) When she learned that Ford would have to set up the pastoral 

visit, which would also require a background check, McFarland did not call back. (Id.) 

The police later obtained a warrant and searched McFarland’s home. (Id. at 3.) They 

discovered letters from Petitioner to McFarland describing how McFarland should testify, 

and discussing the Fundamental Christian Temple Church and pastoral visits. (Id.) The 

police also found letters about Eve Ford, Dominick Hurley, and David Harris and their 

alleged roles in the gift-card matter. (Id.) At Petitioner’s trial, Ford and Harris testified 

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that no one contacted them with an offer of compensation, and they did not know about 

the events of the underlying the gift-card fraud. (Id.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

 On November 23, 2011, Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. (Doc. 12, 

Ex. O.) On February 23, 2012, an attorney was appointed for Petitioner. (Merrick v. 

Inmate Legal Services, 13cv1094-PHX-SPL (BSB), Doc. 34-2 at 2.)1

 Petitioner’s 

counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

advising the court that he could not find any issues to raise on appeal. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 

2; Merrick, 13cv1094-PHX-SPL, Doc. 34-2 at 2.) The appellate court then entered an 

order allowing Petitioner to file a pro se supplemental brief. (Merrick, 13cv1094-PHXSPL (BSB) at Doc. 34-1 at 7.) Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental opening brief 

raising sixteen issues for review. (Doc. 12, Ex. P.) 

 On October 30, 2012, the appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claims and affirmed 

his convictions and sentences. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q.) In its order, the court of appeals 

informed Petitioner that he could file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review 

pursuant to the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 26.) Petitioner 

asserts that he did not file a motion for reconsideration because of the alleged interference 

of jail officials. (Doc. 1 at 8.) On November 20, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for 

review with the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 12, Exs. R, S.) The Arizona Supreme 

Court denied review on March 19, 2013. (Doc. 12, Ex. S.) Petitioner filed a motion for 

reconsideration, which the Arizona Supreme Court denied on April 17, 2013. (Doc. 12, 

Exs. T, U.) 

/ / / 

 

1

 The parties did not submit certain portions of the record in the criminal 

proceedings that pertain to the appointment of appellate counsel and related matters. 

However, those documents appear in the record of another case in this court and the 

Court takes judicial notice of the record in that case, Merrick v. Inmate Legal Services, 13cv1094-PHX-SPL (BSB). See Kruska v. Perverted Justice Found. Inc., 2010 WL 

1875514, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 7, 2010) (stating that courts may take judicial notice of court filings, as they are matters of public record, and “[i]t is also well established that a 

federal district court can take judicial notice of its own records.”). 

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C. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 On April 8, 2013, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 12, Ex. W.) The trial court 

appointed counsel. (Doc. 12, Ex. X.) Counsel filed a notice stating he had reviewed the 

record and found no claims to raise in a petition. (Doc. 12, Ex. Y.) Petitioner then filed a 

pro se petition raising five claims for relief. (Doc. 12, Ex. AA.) On November 19, 2015, 

the trial court dismissed the post-conviction proceeding finding that Petitioner had not 

presented a colorable claim. (Doc. 12, Ex. EE at 4.) 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 12, 

Ex. HH.) On November 19, 2015, the court of appeals granted review, but denied relief. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. LL.) The court found that “[m]ost” of Petitioner’s claims were “presented 

in a cursory fashion without a developed argument or citation to relevant authority,” and 

were accordingly waived. (Id. at 3.) Alternatively, the court found that Petitioner had 

not shown that he was entitled to relief. (Id.) On December 3, 2015, Petitioner filed a 

motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. (Doc. 12, Exs. MM, NN.) On 

January 4, 2016, the court issued its order and mandate, noting that Petitioner had not 

filed a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 12, Ex. OO.) 

D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On February 2, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

Court raising the following nineteen claims: 

 (1) the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case for 

lack of jurisdiction based on the State’s presentation of privileged religious 

communications to the grand jury, which violated clearly established federal law as 

determined by the United States Supreme Court (Ground One); 

 (2) the trial court violated clearly established federal law by denying 

Petitioner’s motion to preclude evidence of his communications with Reverend 

McFarland, including letters and telephone calls, which Petitioner claims were privileged 

religious communications (Ground Two); 

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 (3) the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for appointment of an 

expert witness/neuropsychologist to assist his defense (Ground Three); 

 (4) the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for constitutional 

seating in the courtroom as required by clearly established federal law (Ground Four); 

 (5) the trial court violated clearly established federal law by precluding 

Petitioner from presenting evidence of his religion and a defense under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 41-1493.01 (Ground Five); 

 (6) the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion in limine to preclude the 

introduction into evidence of phone calls (Ground Six); 

 (7) the trial court violated clearly established federal law by denying 

Petitioner’s motion for a new trial based on his assertion that insufficient evidence 

supported his convictions (Ground Seven); 

 (8) the trial court violated clearly established federal law by precluding a 

defense witness (Ground Eight); 

 (9) the trial court violated clearly established federal law by denying Petitioner 

the right to confront a witness (Ground Nine); 

 (10) the trial court violated Petitioner’s state and federal rights to due process 

and a fair trial by denying Petitioner’s motion for a new trial and by denying him “the 

opportunity to include evidence” (Ground Ten); 

 (11) the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for a new trial on the 

ground that the state presented privileged legal communications at trial in violation of 

Petitioner’s state and federal constitutional rights (Ground Eleven); 

 (12) the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for new trial on the 

ground that the trial court had failed to give a Willits instruction (Ground Twelve); 

 (13) the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for a new trial based on 

Petitioner’s assertion that the State introduced evidence at trial that it did not disclose to 

the defense (Ground Thirteen); 

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 (14) the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for a new trial based on 

his assertion that the prosecution misled the jury and committed misconduct in violation 

of Petitioner’s state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial 

(Ground Fourteen); 

 (15) the State’s use of privileged material prevented Petitioner from exercising 

his state and federal constitutional rights to testify and present evidence in his defense 

(Ground Fifteen); 

 (16) the trial court erred by denying Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial based on 

the prosecution informing the jury that Petitioner had been convicted of eleven felonies 

(Ground Sixteen); 

 (17) Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal (Ground 

Seventeen); 

 (18) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct and deprived Petitioner of his 

state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial (Ground Eighteen); 

and 

 (19) the trial court violated Petitioner’s state and federal rights to due process by 

not allowing Petitioner to include an illegal sentencing claim in his petition for postconviction relief. (Doc. 1 at 7-38.) 

 Respondents assert that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because 

(1) Ground Eighteen is procedurally barred from habeas corpus review, (2) Grounds One, 

Two, Four, Five, Six, Ten, Twelve, Thirteen, Sixteen and Nineteen are not cognizable on 

federal habeas corpus review, and (3) Petitioner’s remaining claims lack merit. 

(Doc. 12.) Petitioner has filed a reply and a statement of related cases in support of his 

Petition. (Docs. 15, 19.) The Court first considers the statement of related cases and then 

addresses Petitioner’s claims in the groups identified by Respondents. 

II. Petitioner’s Statement of Related Cases 

 On June 13, 2016, Petitioner filed a “Statement of Related Cases.” (Doc. 15.) In 

that statement, Petitioner asserts that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ May 16, 2016 

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decision in Merrick v. Inmate Legal Services, 2016 WL 2851149 (9th Cir. May 16, 

2016), “decides matters involved in this case,” but he does not identify those “matters.” 

(Id. at 1.) However, in his reply, Petitioner asserts that the Merrick decision is relevant to 

his claim of ineffective assistance appellate counsel asserted in Ground Seventeen. 

(Doc. 19 at 18.) The Court addresses the relationship between the Merrick decision and 

Ground Seventeen in its discussion of Ground Seventeen. See Section V.A, infra. As 

discussed below, the Merrick decision does not otherwise pertain to the substance of 

Petitioner’s claims or entitle him to habeas corpus relief. 

 The decision in Merrick v. Inmate Legal Services, CV 13-1094-PHX-SPL (BSB), 

involves civil litigation brought by Petitioner in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

In that case, Plaintiff alleges he was denied meaningfuly access to the state court because, 

after the Arizona Court of Appeals denied his direct appeal in the underlying criminal 

case at issue here, Maricopa County Jail officials impeded his ability to file a motion for 

reconsideration with the appellate court. (Id.) The district court granted summary 

judgment in defendant’s favor on this claim. (Id. at Doc. 42.) In its May 16, 2016 

decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court improperly 

granted summary judgment on Petitioner’s court access claim. Merrick, 2016 WL 

2851149, at *2. 

 Similar to the court access claim asserted in the § 1983 case, in this Petition, 

Petitioner repeatedly asserts that on November 8, 2012 “he attempted to file a motion for 

reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, but the county jail officials refused to copy, 

file or mail it.” (Doc. 1 at 8, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 24, 34; Doc. 3 at 5.) In his reply, 

Petitioner reiterates that the “[S]tate interfered with [his] constitutional right to file a 

motion for reconsideration.” (Doc. 19 at 20.) These allegations could be liberally 

construed as alleging a claim based on the denial of access to the courts. However, a 

denial of access to the courts is not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding 

because it does not concern the legality of confinement. See Johnson v. Schriro, 401 

F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020 (D. Ariz. 2005). Additionally, the filing of a motion for 

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reconsideration with the Arizona Court of Appeals was not a prerequisite to seeking or 

obtaining relief under § 2254, and Respondents do not assert any defenses to Petitioner’s 

claims based on the events surrounding the filing of a motion for reconsideration in the 

appellate court. (Doc. 12.) See Section III.A, infra (discussing the § 2254(b)’s exhaustion 

requirement). 

 Therefore, to the extent that Petitioner seeks relief in his Statement of Related 

Cases based on his allegations that jail employees interfered with his attempt to file a 

motion for reconsideration in the Arizona Court of Appeals, he does not state a claim for 

habeas corpus relief. 

III. Ground Eighteen 

 In Ground Eighteen, Petitioner argues that the State engaged in prosecutorial 

misconduct by presenting false evidence at trial. (Doc. 1 at 36.) Respondents argue that 

habeas corpus relief for the claims asserted in Ground Eighteen is procedurally barred. 

(Doc. 12 at 14.) As set forth below, the Court finds that habeas corpus review of Ground 

Eighteen is procedurally barred. 

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner.2

 Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 

2

 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. must present his claims to the state appellate court for review. Castillo v. McFadden, 399 

F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 

31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

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courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

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B. Ground Eighteen is Procedurally Barred 

As stated above, in Ground Eighteen, Petitioner argues that the State engaged in 

prosecutorial misconduct by presenting false evidence at trial. (Doc. 1 at 36.) He argues 

that the prosecution “submitted letters and jail calls (partial) and told the jury they 

contained lies.” (Id.) Petitioner asserts that he made “hundreds of calls that were” not 

presented at trial and that would show that the “contents of the letters were true and that 

the prosecutors and detectives were aware of this, since they listened to the calls.” (Id.) 

 Respondents argue that habeas corpus review of Ground Eighteen is procedurally 

barred because, although Petitioner presented this claim on post-conviction review, the 

trial and appellate courts denied review based on state procedural grounds. (Doc. 12 at 

14.) The record reflects that Petitioner presented this claim to the trial and appellate 

courts on post-conviction review. (Doc. 12, Exs. EE, LL.) The trial court found that this 

claim was precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(2) because Petitioner had presented it on direct 

appeal, and the court had denied relief.3

 (Doc. 12, Ex. EE.) 

 Petitioner subsequently presented the claim he now asserts in Ground Eighteen in 

a petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 12, Ex. LL.) The appellate 

court found review of Petitioner’s claim waived because it was presented in a cursory 

fashion. (Id. (citing State v. Stefanovic, 302 P.3d 679, 683 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).) The 

court alternatively found that Petitioner had “not demonstrated that he was entitled to 

relief.” (Doc. 12, Ex. LL.) 

 Therefore, federal habeas corpus review of Ground Eighteen is procedurally 

barred because Petitioner presented it to the appellate court on post-conviction review, 

 

3

 Apparently the post-conviction court liberally construed the petition for direct review as including the claims asserted in Ground Eighteen. This Court’s review of the 

petition for review and the Court of Appeals’ decision on direct review indicates that 

Petitioner presented a similar claim, that the introduction of telephone calls and letters prevented Petitioner from testifying, but that he did not raise a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on the introduction of the letters and telephone calls. (Doc. 12, Exs. P, Q.) Additionally, Petitioner states that he did not present the claims in Ground Eighteen on direct appeal. (Doc. 1 at 36.) Therefore, the Court does not rely on the trial court’s procedural ruling to determine whether review of Ground Eighteen is procedurally barred. 

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and the court found review barred based on an adequate and independent state procedural 

ground. See Beard, 558 U.S. 53; see also Simmons v. Schriro, 187 Fed. Appx. 753, 754 

(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that Arizona’s procedural rules are “clear” and “wellestablished”); Miloni v. Schriro, 2006 WL 1652578, *5 (D. Ariz. Jun. 7, 2006) 

(concluding that a procedural ruling based on Rule 32.9(c), which governs the form and 

content of a petition for review, is adequate). The appellate court’s alternative ruling that 

Petitioner’s claim lacked merit does not vitiate the procedural bar. See Comer v. Schriro, 

480 F.3d 960, 964 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Harris v Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 

(1989)). As discussed below, Petitioner has not established a basis to overcome the 

procedural bar. 

 1. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

 To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new 

reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 327. Petitioner does not argue that failure to consider his defaulted claim will result in 

a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Docs. 1, 3, 19.) Additionally, there is no 

indication in the record that failure to consider the procedurally defaulted claim will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the fundamental-miscarriageof-justice exception does not excuse the procedural bar. 

 

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 2. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 

(1982) (emphasis in original); see also Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 

1991). If petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need 

not consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 To show cause, Petitioner alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of 

counsel on post-conviction review.4

 Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute 

cause for failing to properly exhaust claims in state court and excuse procedural default. 

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998). However, ordinarily, to meet the 

“cause” requirement, the ineffective assistance of counsel must amount to an independent 

constitutional violation. Id. Accordingly, when no constitutional right to an attorney 

 

4

 Petitioner also argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on 

direct appeal. (Doc. 19 at 3.) Whether counsel was ineffective on direct appeal is not relevant to the determination of cause because the Court finds review of Ground Eighteen procedurally barred based on a ruling of the appellate court on post-conviction review. 

Additionally, to the extent Petitioner argues that appellate counsel should have raised the 

claims asserted in Ground Eighteen on direct appeal, that alleged ineffective assistance does not establish cause because Petitioner filed a supplemental brief on direct appeal raising numerous grounds for relief and does not explain why he did not present Ground Eighteen in his pro se petition. (Id.); (see Doc. 12, Ex. P.) 

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exists (such as in a post-conviction proceeding), ineffective assistance will not amount to 

cause excusing the state procedural default. Id. The Supreme Court has held that 

“[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. 

Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 

in such proceedings.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (citations 

omitted). Thus, in Coleman, the Court held that the ineffectiveness of post-conviction 

counsel also could not establish cause to excuse a failure to properly exhaust state 

remedies and procedural default on a claim. Id. 

 However, in Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), the 

Supreme Court established a limited exception to this general rule. The Court held that 

the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel “at initial-review collateral review 

proceedings” — while not stating a constitutional claim itself — may establish cause to 

excuse procedural default of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel when a postconviction proceeding represents the first opportunity under state law for a petitioner to 

litigate such claims. Id. at 1315. In Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1296 (9th Cir. 

2013), the Ninth Circuit held that the Martinez standard for cause applies to all Sixth 

Amendment ineffective-assistance claims that have been procedurally defaulted by 

ineffective counsel in the initial-review state-court collateral proceeding. Id. Because the 

Martinez cause standard applies only to defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims, it does not apply to Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim asserted in 

Ground Eighteen. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot rely on Martinez to show cause for his 

failure to properly present Ground Eighteen to the state courts. 

 Petitioner does not specifically assert any other basis to establish cause to 

overcome the procedural bar to federal habeas corpus review of Ground Eighteen. 

(Docs. 1, 3, 19.) Petitioner’s status as an inmate, lack of legal knowledge, and limited 

legal resources do not establish cause to excuse the procedural bar to review of his 

claims. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an 

illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a 

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procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s 

reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause). Accordingly, the Court does 

not consider whether Petitioner can establish prejudice. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 

527, 533 (1986) (stating that the court does not need to consider prejudice when the 

petitioner does not demonstrate cause). Thus, Petitioner has not established a basis to 

overcome the procedural bar to federal habeas corpus review of Ground Eighteen. 

IV. Grounds One, Two, Four, Five, Six, Ten, Twelve, Thirteen, Sixteen, and 

 Nineteen 

Respondents assert that Grounds One, Two, Four, Five, Six, Ten, Twelve, 

Thirteen, Sixteen, and Nineteen are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

Petitioner disputes this assertion. (Doc. 19 at 3-10.) A federal court may only consider a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner alleges that “he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“In conducting habeas 

review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”); Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 

26 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“A habeas petition must allege the petitioner’s detention 

violates the constitution, a federal statute, or a treaty.”) “[F]ederal habeas corpus does 

not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. A petitioner cannot “transform a 

state law issue into a federal one by merely asserting a violation of due process.” Poland 

v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 

1389 (9th Cir. 1996)). As discussed below, the Court concludes that Grounds One, Two, 

Four, Five, Six, Ten, Twelve, Thirteen, Sixteen and Nineteen either do not present 

cognizable claims or lack merit. 

A. Ground One 

 In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion 

to dismiss that was based on the trial court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at 7.) 

As discussed below, Ground One presents a state law claim that is not cognizable on 

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federal habeas corpus review. Petitioner’s assertion that the state court’s ruling violated 

“clearly established federal law” or the Due Process Clause does not transform Ground 

One into a federal claim. See Poland, 169 F.3d at 584; (Doc. 1 at 7; Doc. 19 at 5-6.) 

 Before trial, Petitioner moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q; 

Doc. 3-1 at 3.) He argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the grand jury 

proceedings were flawed when the prosecution introduced Petitioner’s “privileged 

religious communications” with McFarland during those proceedings. (Id. at 4.) 

Petitioner argued that his communications with McFarland could not be presented to the 

grand jury because they were “confessions, counseling and spiritual guidance, as well as 

other religious sacraments. The [] communications were made with the belief that they 

were confidential and privileged as set forth in the church creed.” (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 5.) 

The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion finding that Petitioner’s communications with 

McFarland were not protected by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4062. (Id. at 5.) On direct appeal, 

the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. (Id.) The appellate court further 

found that even if the communications were privileged, “the trial court still had subject 

matter jurisdiction over the felony charges.” (Id. at 5.) 

 Ground One challenges that the state courts’ determination that Petitioner’s 

communications with McFarland were not protected by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4062, and 

thus challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction.5

 These are matters of state law and, 

therefore, Ground One is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See Estelle, 

502 U.S. at 67-68 (1991). “Jurisdiction is no exception to the general rule that federal 

courts will not engage in collateral review of state court decisions based on state law.” 

Poe v. Caspari, 39 F.3d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that whether Missouri 

courts had jurisdiction to sentence petitioner was a state law issue and was not properly 

before the court on § 2254 review); see Reel v. Ryan, 2013 WL 2284988, at * 5 (D. Ariz. 

May 22, 2003) (concluding that the habeas court could not review “the state law issue of 

 

5

 The Arizona courts’ subject matter jurisdiction over criminal cases is “based on 

Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statute [§] 12-

120.24 . . . .” State v. Maldonado, 223 P.3d at 653, 654 (Ariz. 2010). 

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whether the state court had jurisdiction.”). Therefore, whether Petitioner’s 

communications with McFarland were protected by a state statute, and whether the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction because of flaws in the grand jury proceeding (based on the 

State’s presentation of allegedly privileged communications), are matters of state law that 

are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 

151, 157-58 (4th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases holding that whether a state court had 

jurisdiction under state law is a state-law question). 

 Additionally, “[b]ecause the right to a grand jury has not been applied to the states 

via the Fourteenth Amendment . . . , [Petitioner’s] challenge to the grand jury 

proceedings does not raise a question of federal law and is not cognizable on habeas 

review.” Stumpf v. Alaska, 78 Fed. Appx 19, 20 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that Fifth 

Amendment challenge to grand jury proceedings did not raise a federal question) 

(internal citation omitted); see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35, 538 

(1884) (indictment by grand jury is not included in the due process guarantees of the 

Fourteenth Amendment that apply to state criminal defendants). Accordingly, Petitioner 

is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on Ground One.

B. Ground Two 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that the state courts “violated clearly established 

federal law” by denying his motion to preclude letters and telephone calls that contained 

his communications with McFarland. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Petitioner asserts that the 

admission of the letters and recordings of telephone calls “substantially burden[ed his] 

religious exercise.” (Doc. 1 at 10; Doc. 19 at 7.) As discussed below, Ground Two 

presents a state law claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

Petitioner’s assertion that the state court’s ruling violated “clearly established federal 

law,” does not transform Ground Two into a federal claim. See Poland, 169 F.3d at 584. 

Additionally, whether the state courts’ rulings infringed on Petitioner’s free exercise of 

religion does not present a cognizable claim because it does not pertain to the fact or 

duration of Petitioner’s confinement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Lucas v. Hartley, 2009 WL 

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1930063, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing free exercise of religion claims under § 2254 

stating that “these grounds are clearly not candidates for habeas relief”). 

 Before trial, Petitioner moved to preclude evidence of his telephone calls and 

letters to McFarland because he argued that they contained “clergy-penitent” 

communications that were protected by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4062. (Doc. 12, Ex. E.) 

Section 13-4062 provides that a member of the clergy cannot “without consent of the 

person making the confession” testify about the substance of any confession. Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 13-4062. The trial court denied the motion. (Doc. 12, Ex. A.) 

 On direct review, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. (Doc. 12, 

Ex. Q at 7.) The appellate court concluded that § 13-4062 did not apply because, 

assuming McFarland was a member of the clergy, she did not testify. (Id.) Rather, the 

state relied on recorded telephone conversations that Petitioner made when jailed, which 

Petitioner knew were being recorded and were not private. (Id.) The appellate court 

further stated the record indicated that McFarland was not acting as a clergy member in 

her communications with Petitioner: 

Moreover, there is information in the record that supported the State’s argument to the trial court that, even if McFarland 

was a clergy member, she was not acting as such when 

talking to [Petitioner]. In the recorded telephone conversations and letters there was no mention that 

[Petitioner] was confessing and needed religious or spiritual assistance. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary. His April 17, 2010 letter to McFarland states: “I am going to want to claim The Fundamental Christian Temple as my church and religion. You should check the name availability with the corp[oration] comm[ission] as a non-profit church. Also, the 

I.R.S. I’m going to want to incorporate the non-profit church and get I.R.S. approval as a 501(c)(3).” The letter 

demonstrates that the church did not exist before April 2010, McFarland was not then an ordained member of the church 

and [Petitioner] only wanted to create it to attempt to hide behind religion. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 8.) The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err by 

admitting the telephone recordings and letters seized at McFarland’s residence. (Id. at 9.) 

 Ground Two challenges the trial court’s ruling that Petitioner’s communications 

with McFarland were not entitled to protection under Ariz. R. Stat. § 13-4062. 

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Therefore, Ground Two is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review because such 

review is unavailable for alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state law. 

See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief based upon 

alleged error of California’s evidentiary rules); see also Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d 

1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “[a]dmission of the testimony of the child victim, 

K.C., is an evidentiary issue that the Montana trial court addressed under Montana law. 

We do not review the admission for error.”). 

 Additionally, to the extent Ground Two can be construed as alleging a federal 

claim, Petitioner is not entitled to relief. A state court’s evidentiary ruling is not subject 

to federal habeas corpus review unless the ruling violates federal law, either by infringing 

upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory provision, or by depriving the defendant 

of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 

41 (1984). Petitioner generally argues that the trial court’s ruling violates “clearly 

established federal law.” (Doc. 1 at 10.) However, aside from claiming that the ruling 

burdened his right to the free exercise of religion — a claim that is not cognizable on 

habeas corpus review — he does not allege that the ruling violated any specific federal 

law or his right to due process. (Id.) Additionally, “[b]ecause this evidentiary issue was 

fully and competently aired in the state courts, no violation of fundamental fairness under 

the due process clause has been shown.” Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 1000 (5th Cir. 

1996). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground Two. 

C. Ground Four 

 In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion 

to sit at the counsel table that was located next to the jury box. (Doc. 1 at 15.) He asserts 

that the courtroom seating arrangement violated his right to a fair trial because it 

undermined the presumption of innocence. (Doc. 3 at 9-10.) Respondents argue that this 

claim is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review because there is no “clearly 

established federal constitutional, as determined by the United States Supreme Court,” 

requiring a particular seating arrangement in the courtroom. (Doc. 12 at 23.) 

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 The Court has not located any Supreme Court precedent requiring a particular 

seating arrangement in a courtroom. See McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 912 (9th Cir. 

2013) (no constitutional right to certain courtroom arrangement), reversed on other 

grounds by McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir. 2015). However, the 

Supreme Court has recognized that certain courtroom practices are so inherently 

prejudicial that they deprive the defendant of a fair trial. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 

U.S. 70 (2006). Petitioner asserts that the seating arrangement during his trial denied him 

a fair trial. (Doc. 1 at 15; Doc. 3 at 9.) Thus, the Court concludes that Ground Four 

presents a federal claim that is cognizable on federal habeas corpus review.6

 However, as 

discussed below, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

 “[T]he Constitution prohibits any courtroom arrangement or procedure that 

‘undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the fact-finding 

process.’” United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), adopting in 

part United States v. Larson, 460 F.3d 1200, 1214 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Deck v. 

Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630 (2005)). “The presumption is so undermined when the 

practice creates ‘an unacceptable risk . . . .of impermissible factors coming into play.’” 

Larson, 460 F.3d at 1214 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976)). 

 Petitioner asserts that the jury perceives the defendant as dangerous and a threat 

when the defendant is seated far away from them, which “has the effect of the court 

commenting on the weight of the evidence.” (Doc. 1 at 15.) The Court has not found 

any case law holding that a defendant’s constitutional rights are violated by a courtroom 

seating arrangement that places the defendant farther away from the jury than the 

 

6

 The lack of Supreme Court precedent on an issue does not render a claim noncognizable, or non-reviewable, under § 2254(a). That section only requires that a petitioner present a federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). However, when a state court has 

adjudicated a claim on the merits, § 2254(d)(1) provides that a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief unless the state court’s decision is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Therefore, when there is 

no clearly established federal law on an issue, a petitioner’s claim may be reviewable under § 2254, but the petitioner will be unable to establish that he is entitled to relief 

under § 2254(d)(1). 

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prosecutor is seated. However, the Ninth Circuit has rejected challenges to a variety of 

courtroom seating arrangements. 

 In United States v. Larson, 460 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2006), the court concluded that 

the district court did not violate two defendants’ constitutional rights when it denied a 

request that the court seat them at counsel table and instead seated them directly behind 

their two attorneys. Larson, 460 F.3d at 1215-16. The court concluded that the jury 

likely drew no impermissible inference from the arrangement and “may have just as 

easily inferred that that arrangement simply ameliorated overcrowding at the counsel 

table, or that it facilitated a more orderly and decorous courtroom.” Id. at 1215. 

 Similarly, in United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 2008), the court 

concluded that the seating arrangement during a jury trial, in which pro se defendants 

were seated at a table behind a table where represented defendants and their attorneys 

were seated, was not unconstitutional. Additionally, in McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 

802 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit “incorporate[d]” the district court’s decision that 

the petitioner was not deprived due process by a courtroom layout that resulted in the jury 

sitting in close proximity to and facing the defendants. 

 Petitioner argues that because he was seated farther away from the jury than the 

prosecutor, the jury likely perceived him as dangerous or a threat. (Doc. 1 at 15.) 

However, as the Ninth Circuit concluded in Larson, the jury “may have just as easily 

inferred” that the seating arrangement was based on courtroom logistics. 460 F.3d at 

1215. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus 

relief on Ground Four. 

D. Ground Five 

 In Ground Five, Petitioner asserts that the state courts violated “clearly established 

federal law” by precluding him from presenting evidence of his religion or a freedom of 

religion defense under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1493.01.7

 (Doc. 1 at 17; Doc. 3 at 8-9; 

 

7

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Doc. 19 at 8.) Petitioner asserts that the ruling deprived of him the opportunity to present 

a defense in violation of the Due Process Clause. (Doc. 3 at 8 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 

476 U.S. 683 (1986).) Respondents argue that this claim is not cognizable on federal 

habeas corpus review because it is based on the state court’s application of state law. 

(Doc. 12 at 24.) As discussed below, Ground Five asserts a violation of Petitioner’s 

federal rights, however, the resolution of that claim turns on the application of state law. 

Because this court is bound by a state court’s interpretation of its laws, Petitioner cannot 

establish that he is entitled to relief on Ground Five. 

 At Petitioner’s trial, the court granted the State’s motion in limine to preclude 

Petitioner from relying on § 41-1493.01 as a defense to the criminal charges against him. 

(Id.) Petitioner appealed that ruling. (Doc. 12, Ex. P.) The appellate court affirmed the 

trial court’s ruling and explained that § 41-1493.01 does not provide a defense for 

criminal conduct. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 9-10.) The appellate court stated that: 

Section 41–1493.01 is part of Title 41, article 9, entitled “free exercise of religion protected.” Section 41–1493.01 provides that one has a fundamental right to free exercise of religion, and applies while a person is employed by the state or other governmental entity. 

Although the statutory free exercise of religion provision protects employees of state government, it is not a defense to 

criminal conduct. The legislature did not make the free 

exercise of religion a defense in Title 13 of the Arizona 

Revised Statutes. And, Defendant has not cited to any case 

where § 41–1493.01 has been presented as a defense in a 

criminal case, and we have not discovered one. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 9-10.) 

 Petitioner asserts that the state courts’ rulings violated his constitutional right to 

present a complete defense. (Doc. 3 at 8.) In Crane, the Court stated “[w]hether rooted 

directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. 

Mississippi, [410 U.S. 284 (1973)], or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation 

clauses of the Sixth Amendment, . . . the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a 

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Crane, 476 U.S. at 690 (quoting 

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (internal citations omitted).) In 

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Crane, the Court held that state court erred in precluding the petitioner from introducing 

evidence about the circumstances of his confession because “reliable evidence bearing on 

the credibility of a confession is central to the defendant’s claim of innocence.” Crane, 

476 U.S. at 691. 

 As discussed below, unlike Crane, the evidence Petitioner sought to introduce 

about his religion was not central to his claim that he was innocent of the charges against 

him. Petitioner was charged with conspiracy to commit tampering with a witness, 

conspiracy to commit perjury, and obstructing criminal investigation or prosecutions, in 

violation of several Arizona statutes contained in Title 13 of the Arizona Revised 

Statutes. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 21-22.) Petitioner wanted to present a defense based on his 

religion under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 41-1493.01, and to present evidence of his religion to 

support that defense. (Doc. 3 at 8.) The trial court precluded that defense and the 

appellate court affirmed based on its conclusion that the Arizona legislature had not made 

§ 41-1493.01 a defense to charges under Title 13. (Doc. Q at 9-10.) 

 This Court is bound by the Arizona court’s interpretation of its state law. See 

Holgerson v. Knowles, 309 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the court was 

“bound by California’s interpretation of its state law.”); Mendez v. Small, 298 F.3d 1154, 

1158 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A state court has the last word on the interpretation of state law.”). 

Petitioner has not shown that he was denied his constitutional right to present a complete 

defense because, as interpreted by the appellate court, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1493.01 was 

not a defense to charges under Title 13. Therefore, evidence of his religion was not 

central to his claim of innocence to the charges. Additionally, to the extent Ground Five 

challenges the state court’s interpretation of state law it does not present a cognizable 

claim. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (Federal courts accept a 

state court’s interpretation of state law “and alleged errors in the application of state law 

are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.”). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to 

relief on Ground Five. 

 

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E. Ground Six 

 In Ground Six, Petitioner argues that the state courts “violated clearly established 

federal law” by denying his motion in limine to preclude evidence of his telephone calls 

to McFarland. (Doc. 1 at 20.) In his reply, Petitioner argues that the state courts’ rulings 

violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. (Doc. 19 at 8-9.) As discussed below, Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief on Ground Six. 

 At trial, Petitioner filed a motion to preclude evidence of his phone calls to 

McFarland on the ground that they were privileged religious communication under 

federal law.8

 (Doc. 12, Ex. F.) Petitioner argued, “[p]ursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000 cc–1, 

[t]he government shall not impose any substantial burdens on religious exercise unless 

they meet the 2 prong test. The State has not met their burden and a least restrictive 

option is available. [Ariz. Rev. Stat.] § 13-4062(3).” (Doc. 12, Ex. F at 2.) Petitioner 

further argued that the telephone calls were irrelevant and overly prejudicial and, 

therefore, inadmissible. (Id. at 1-6.) 

 The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion. (Doc. 12, Ex. N at 7-8.) The trial court 

found that the telephone calls were admissible under Arizona law as relevant and not 

overly prejudicial. (Id.) The court also rejected Petitioner’s contention that 42 

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 was applicable. (Id.) Petitioner challenged the trial court’s ruling on 

direct appeal. (Doc. 12, Ex. P.) The Arizona Court of Appeals stated that “[Petitioner] 

contends that the calls were irrelevant, confusing, prejudicial, misleading, hearsay . . . .” 

(Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 10.) The appellate court “found otherwise,” and concluded that the 

trial court did not err by denying the motion in limine. (Id.) Ground Six challenges the 

rulings related to the telephone calls. (Doc. 1 at 20.) 

 As Respondents argue (Doc. 12 at 25), to the extent that Ground Six challenges 

the trial court’s evidentiary rulings under state law, it presents a state law claim that is not 

cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (petitioner 

 

8

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was not entitled to habeas relief based upon alleged error of California’s evidentiary 

rules). Additionally, Petitioner’s claim that the introduction of the telephone calls at trial 

burdened his exercise of religion in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 does not present a 

claim that is cognizable on federal habeas corpus relief. Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, 

which is part of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, provides that 

“[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person 

residing in or confined to an institution . . . .” Whether this provision applies to the state 

courts’ rulings and whether those rulings infringed on Petitioner’s rights under this 

provision does not present a cognizable claim because those issues do not pertain to the 

fact or duration of Petitioner’s confinement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Lucas, 

2009 WL 1930063, at *1 (dismissing free exercise of religion claims under § 2254 stating 

that “these grounds are clearly not candidates for habeas relief”). 

F. Ground Ten

 In Ground Ten, Petitioner asserts that the trial “court erred by denying his motion 

for a new trial when the court denied [Petitioner] the opportunity to include evidence in 

violation of his state and federal and constitutional rights to [d]ue [p]rocess, a fair trial, 

and the right to present evidence and witnesses in this defense.” (Doc. 1 at 26.) 

Petitioner contends that the trial court excluded “whole statements that put other 

statements in context.” (Id.) He specifically argues that at trial, the State was permitted 

to present to the jury a portion of a telephone call during which Petitioner said, “I got 12 

gift cards in my name.” (Id.) Petitioner contends that he was not permitted to present the 

rest of that conversation during which he indicated that he did not have twelve gift cards. 

(Id.) Petitioner asserts that there are “dozens” of other instances of incomplete statements 

being introduced at trial. (Id.) 

 Petitioner challenged the exclusion of this evidence on direct appeal. (Doc. 12, 

Ex. P.) The appellate court noted that Petitioner argued that “portions of the transcripts 

of the telephone calls were redacted and he should have been allowed to present a 

complete transcript pursuant to Rule 106.” (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 17.) The appellate court 

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concluded that because the trial court conducted a hearing on the issue, reviewed the 

information, and determined that the redactions were appropriate, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by not directing the state to provide unredacted transcripts. (Id.) 

Ground Ten challenges this ruling. (Doc. 1 at 26.) 

 As Respondents argue (Doc. 12 at 27), to the extent that Ground Ten challenges 

the state courts’ rulings under Rule 106 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence or other 

Arizona law, it presents a state law claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus 

review.9

 Additionally, to the extent that Ground Ten relies on federal law, Petitioner’s 

conclusory allegations fail to state a claim. The petitioner must specify which federal 

constitutional right was violated and how it was violated as mere conclusions of 

constitutional violations will not suffice. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 

1995) (stating that a petitioner’s conclusory suggestion that a federal constitutional right 

had been violated fell “far short of stating a valid claim of constitutional violation.”). In 

Ground Ten, Petitioner asserts that the admission of partial transcripts violated his federal 

rights to “[d]ue [p]rocess, a fair trial, and the right to present evidence and witnesses in 

this defense.” (Doc. 1 at 26.) Petitioner, however, does not explain how the trial court’s 

evidentiary ruling violated those rights. Petitioner’s conclusory allegations do not state a 

constitutional claim. See Jones, 66 F.3d at 205. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to 

relief on Ground Ten. 

G. Ground Twelve 

 In Ground Twelve, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by failing to give a 

Willits instruction based on the alleged loss or destruction of a letter that police found 

during a search of McFarland’s residence. (Doc. 1 at 28); State v. Willits, 393 P.2d 274 

(Ariz. 1964). He asserts that the police took an incomplete picture of the letter, left the 

 

9

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letter “behind by ‘accident,’ and could not recover it.” (Id.) As discussed below, this 

claim is not cognizable on habeas corpus review. 

 The Willits jury instruction is based on state law. See State v. Glissendorf, 329 

P.3d 1049, 1053 (Ariz. 2014) (acknowledging that the Willits jury instruction “lacks a 

statutory or constitutional basis” and is appropriately characterized as “a court adopted 

rule of evidence” in Arizona). “To be entitled to a Willits instruction, a defendant must 

prove that (1) the state failed to preserve material and reasonably accessible evidence that 

could have had a tendency to exonerate the accused, and (2) there was resulting 

prejudice.” State v. Smith, 762 P.2d 509 (Ariz. 1988); see also State v. Speer, 212 P.3d 

787 (Ariz. 2009). Because the Willits instruction is based on state law, when the state 

court rules that a defendant is not entitled to a Willits instruction as a matter of state law, 

that decision is not reviewable in a federal habeas proceeding. Ballesteros v. Ryan, 2014 

WL 1911443, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 13, 2014) (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 

(1990)). 

 However, a habeas court can review the failure to give a jury instruction to 

determine whether the failure “so infected the entire trial that the defendant was deprived 

of his right to a fair trial.” Murray v. Schriro, 2008 WL 2278140, at *32 (D. Ariz. May 

30, 2008), aff’d, 746 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2014). “Because the omission of an instruction is 

less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law, a habeas petitioner whose 

claim involves a failure to give a particular instruction bears an ‘especially heavy’ 

burden.” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977)). 

 The Petition does not allege that the failure to give the Willits instruction resulted 

in a violation of his due process rights.10 (Doc. 1 at 28.) Moreover, the record does not 

establish such a claim. “To establish a due process violation when the State fails to 

preserve evidence that is only potentially exculpatory, [the petitioner] must demonstrate 

 

10 In his reply, Petitioner asserts a due process claim based on the court’s failure 

to give a Willits instruction. (Doc. 19 at 9.) The district court need not consider 

arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

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that the State acted in bad faith.” Ballesteros, 2014 WL 1911443, at *7 (citing Arizona v. 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988)). Assuming that the letter was potentially 

exculpatory and that the State lost or destroyed that letter, Petitioner does not establish a 

due process violation because he has not shown that the State acted in bad faith in losing 

or destroying the letter. See Ballesteros, 2014 WL 1911443, at *7. Therefore, the Court 

concludes that Ground Twelve alleges a state law violation that is not subject to federal 

habeas corpus review. See Ballesteros, 2014 WL 1911443, at *7. Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground Twelve. 

H. Ground Thirteen 

In Ground Thirteen, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by denying his 

motion for a new trial that was based on the State’s “introduc[tion of] evidence at trial 

that was never disclosed to the defense.” (Doc. 1 at 29.) Petitioner argues that the State 

did not disclose a “partial letter” to the defense until the third day of trial. (Id.) Petitioner 

states that he objected to the admission of that letter, but the trial court overruled his 

objection. (Id.) On direct appeal, Petitioner presented a state law claim based on the late 

disclosure of the letter. (Doc. 12, Ex. P.) 

 The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s claim stating that Petitioner had seen the 

full letter in an earlier trial: 

[Petitioner] also claims that the court erred by refusing to 

exclude one page of a letter that had not been previously disclosed to him. We disagree. 

The State wanted to use the exhibits from Defendant’s earlier 

trial, CR2010–005367, in this case, and provided Defendant with a copy of those exhibits the day after the third day of trial. One of the documents was a letter about Eve Ford. 

Defendant objected to the letter because the State had not 

given him a copy of both sides of the letter in his earlier case. 

He argued that if he had received both sides of the letter it 

would have changed the way he conducted his pretrial 

investigation and trial preparation. 

The court examined the letter. The court found that the full 

letter had been admitted as an exhibit in CR2010–005367, 

and that Defendant had seen the complete letter during that trial. The court also determined that having the complete letter would not have changed his pretrial investigation or trial preparation. As a result, the court allowed the State to 

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use the letter. Because the court determined that Defendant 

had previously seen the letter which was admitted at the 

earlier trial, the court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the letter to be used in this case. See Rule 106. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 18-19.) Petitioner asserts that the state courts’ rulings denied his rights 

to a “fair trial, due process, and the right to present evidence in his defense pursuant to 

the state and federal constitutions.” (Id.) 

 As Respondents argue (Doc. 12 at 28-29), although Petitioner cites to several 

federal rights, Ground Thirteen challenges the state court’s evidentiary rulings under state 

law and, thus, presents a state law claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus 

review. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Additionally, to the extent that Ground Thirteen 

relies on federal law, Petitioner’s conclusory allegations fail to state a claim. Petitioner 

does not dispute that the full letter was admitted as an exhibit in CR2010–005367, the 

underlying fraud case, and that he saw the complete letter during that trial. (Docs. 1, 3, 

19.) Additionally, Petitioner does not explain how his pretrial investigation or trial 

preparation would have been different if the letter had been produced sooner. Therefore, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on Ground Thirteen 

I. Ground Sixteen 

 In Ground Sixteen, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by denying his 

motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s statements to the jury. (Doc. 1 at 33.) 

Petitioner asserts that during opening statement the prosecutor told the jury that Petitioner 

was “in jail in this case,” and suggested that he had been convicted of eleven felonies. 

(Id.) Petitioner asserts that the mention of the prior offenses “violated a pretrial order to 

preclude any mention of these priors or jail.” (Id.) Aside from a general citation to his 

right to due process, Petitioner does not cite federal law to support his claim. (Id.) 

 As Respondents argue (Doc. 12 at 29-30), Petitioner’s allegation that the 

prosecution violated a pretrial order presents a state law issue that is not cognizable on 

federal habeas corpus review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 62, 67-68 

(recognizing that federal courts conducting habeas review are limited to “deciding 

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whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States”); see 

also Poland, 169 F.3d at 584 (holding that “[f]ederal habeas courts lack jurisdiction ... to 

review state court applications of state procedural rules.) Petitioner’s citation to the Due 

Process Clause does not transform Ground Sixteen into a federal claim. See Poland, 169 

F.3d at 584. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground Sixteen. 

J. Ground Nineteen 

 In Ground Nineteen, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by denying his 

request to amend his petition for post-conviction relief to include an “illegal sentencing 

claim.” (Doc. 1 at 38.) Petitioner presented this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. P; Ex. Q at 4.) The appellate court noted that Rule 32.6(d) of the Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the amendment of a petition for post-conviction 

relief, and concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to 

amend. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 4.) As the state court noted, Ground Nineteen challenges the 

trial court’s application of an Arizona statute to deny his motion to amend his state 

petition for post-conviction relief. As Respondents argue, Ground Nineteen does not 

present a cognizable claim. (Doc. 12 at 30.) 

 The Ninth Circuit has clarified that procedural errors arising during postconviction relief proceedings are not cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 because they do not challenge a petitioner’s detention. Franzen v. 

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam ); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 

F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the post-convictions court’s failure to appoint 

petitioner counsel in his second post-conviction proceedings did not constitute a basis for 

a federal habeas claim); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(stating that errors in the post-conviction proceeding were not cognizable in federal 

habeas corpus proceedings). Ground Nineteen turns on the interpretation and application 

of state law relevant to post-conviction proceedings, therefore, it is not cognizable on 

federal habeas corpus review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Accordingly, federal habeas 

corpus review is unavailable for Ground Nineteen. 

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V. Grounds Three, Seven, Eight, Nine, Eleven, Fourteen, Fifteen, and Seventeen

 Respondents state that Petitioner’s remaining grounds for relief were exhausted in 

state court, but that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on those claims. (Doc. 12 at 31.) In 

his reply, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief on these claims. (Doc. 19.) As set 

forth below, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on these claims 

because he has not established that the state courts’ decisions were based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts, or were contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. 

A. Review of Claims Adjudicated on the Merits 

 When a federal claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, the federal court 

reviews that claim under § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d), a federal court cannot grant habeas 

corpus relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state court’s decision “was contrary 

to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of 

the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that 

it “involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” based on the record before the state 

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This standard is “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). It is a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state 

court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). When evaluating state court decisions on habeas review, 

federal courts look through summary or unexplained higher state court opinion to the last 

reasoned decision on the claim. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2004). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

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contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v. 

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). A state court decision is an 

“unreasonable application of” federal law if the court identifies the correct legal rule, but 

unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 

133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal 

habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state 

court’s decision.’” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004)). 

 Federal courts may also grant habeas corpus relief when the state court decision 

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “Or, to put it 

conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process 

unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not 

merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th 

Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds, Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1000 (9th Cir. 

2014); see also Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002) (the 

statutory presumption of correctness applies to findings by both trial courts and appellate 

courts). Additionally, state court findings of fact are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with “clear and convincing 

evidence.” Id. 

 If the federal court determines, considering only the evidence before the state 

court, that the adjudication of a claim on the merits resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or 

that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, 

the court evaluates the claim de novo, and may consider evidence properly presented for 

the first time in federal court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 536 U.S. 170, 182-84 (2011). 

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 Additionally, when a state court decision is deemed to be contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief unless the 

erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n.6 

(9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 

507 U.S. at 631. 

B. Ground Three 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion 

for “the appointment of an Expert witness/ N[euro]psychologist for his defense to explain 

[his] ability to choose words and simple sentences due to his traumatic brain injuries.” 

(Doc. 1 at 13.) Petitioner argues that the trial court’s ruling, which was affirmed on 

direct appeal, “deprived him of the opportunity to present evidence.” (Id.) 

 Before trial, Petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of a neuropsychologist 

pursuant to Rule 15.9 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 12, Ex. G.) 

Petitioner claimed that he suffered “Traumatic Brain Injuries,” and an expert was 

“reasonably necessary to properly defend.” (Id.) Petitioner claimed his brain injury 

caused problems with “word selection, memory, confusion, planning and problem 

solving.” (Id. at 2.) Petitioner did not submit any documentation to support his motion. 

(Id.) The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion without prejudice finding that he “ha[d] 

not established the necessary grounds for appointment of such expert.” (Doc. H at 2; 

Doc. 12 at 36 n. 11.) 

 On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion 

because a “mental health professional was reasonably necessary in presenting a defense 

of innocence, no intent, or insanity. The mental health proffessional [sic] could have 

testified about appellant’s relevant behavioral tendencies and concerns with appellant’s 

actual capacity to form a certain mental state.” (Doc. 12, Ex. P at 6.) Petitioner cited 

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Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006), to support his claim. (Id.) The appellate court 

rejected Petitioner’s claim. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q.) 

 The court noted that Rule 15.9(a) provides that an indigent defendant may apply 

for the appointment of an expert witness if the defendant shows that “such assistance is 

reasonably necessary to present a defense adequately at trial or sentencing.” (Id. at 12.) 

The court also noted that “due process would require the appointment of an expert where 

there is a reasonable necessity for the testimony.” (Id.) The appellate court concluded 

that Petitioner had not shown “that a neuropsychologist was needed to examine him and 

testify as part of his defense.” (Id.) The court explained that Petitioner did not provide 

any medical records to support his allegations that he had suffered traumatic brain 

injuries. (Id.) The court concluded the trial court properly considered the “myriad 

pleadings [Petitioner] had filed to determine whether he had any problems with word 

selection, memory, confusion, planning, or problem solving.” (Id.) 

 As discussed below, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground Three. Petitioner 

does not cite federal law to support Ground Three, which appears to be based on state law 

and, therefore, is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). To the extent that Petitioner challenges the appellate court’s application of 

Rule 15.9, he presents a state law claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus 

review. See Estelle, 502 .U.S. at 67-68. 

 However, Respondents note that Ground Three could be construed as alleging a 

federal claim based on Petitioner’s citation to federal law, Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 

(2006), in his petition on direct appeal. (Doc. 12 at 36 (citing Doc. 12, Ex. P; Ex. Q at 

6).) The appellate court concluded that “due process” did not require the appointment of 

an expert because Petitioner had not made the requisite showing. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 12-

13.) To support that conclusion, the appellate court cited Jones v. Sterling, 110 P.3d 

1271, 1277 (Ariz. 2005), which cites Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), for the 

proposition that the denial of an expert witness to a criminal defendant can violate the 

Due Process Clause. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 12.) Therefore, the Court concludes that the 

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appellate court adjudicated Petitioner’s federal challenge to the trial court’s denial of his 

motion for the appointment on an expert on the merits and applies the standard of review 

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

 The guarantee of fundamental fairness of the Due Process Clause requires that 

states provide indigent defendants with the “‘basic tools of an adequate defense or 

appeal.’” Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 

(1971)). In some cases, a psychiatric expert may be a necessary tool. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83 

(holding that “when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time 

of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must at a minimum, assure the 

defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate 

examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of a defense.”). Under 

Ake, a defendant must make a preliminary showing about the need for an expert. See 

Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1995). The preliminary showing 

under Ake requires more than “undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance 

would be beneficial.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n. 1 (1985) (citations 

omitted). 

 Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that Petitioner made no showing that a 

neuropsychologist was necessary to his defense. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 12.) As the appellate 

stated, the record reflects that Petitioner did not provide any medical records or other 

documentation to support his allegations that he had suffered traumatic brain injuries or 

that he had mental problems. (Doc. 12, Ex. G.) Additionally, Petitioner did not provide 

information about the circumstances of the brain injuries, including where he was treated 

for those injuries, or provide medical releases to secure his relevant medical records. 

(Id.) Furthermore, the trial court denied Petitioner’s request for the appointment of an 

expert without prejudice, but Petitioner did not renew his request. (Doc. 12, Ex. H at 2; 

Doc. 12, Ex. A.) 

 Thus, the record reflects that Petitioner filed an unsupported request for the 

appointment of a neuropsychologist. Petitioner’s unsupported motion did not satisfy the 

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requirements for appointing a psychiatric expert under Ake, 470 U.S. 68. Accordingly, 

the appellate court’s rejection of Ground Three was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown 

that the appellate court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on Ground Three. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

C. Ground Seven 

 In Ground Seven, Petitioner asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish 

his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for his conviction for conspiracy to commit perjury. 

(Doc. 1 at 12.) Although Petitioner does not cite federal law to support this claim, 

Respondents concede that Petitioner “alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment 

Due Process Rights, as guaranteed under Jackson v. Virginia.” (Doc. 12 at 42.) Thus, 

the Court construes Ground Seven as alleging a federal claim. 

 “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 

which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, (1970). On review for 

sufficiency of the evidence “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 

U.S. 199 (1960) (a conviction completely lacking in evidentiary support violates the Due 

Process Clause). Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if the state court’s decision on 

this matter was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 As noted above, Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on his 

conviction for conspiracy to commit perjury. The State alleged that Petitioner conspired 

with McFarland to commit perjury. (Doc. 12, Ex. A; Doc. 12, Ex. N 22.) Arizona law 

provides that “a person commits conspiracy if, with the intent to promote or aid the 

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commission of an offense, such person agrees with one or more persons that at least one 

of them or another person will engage in conduct constituting the offense and one of the 

parties commits an overt act in furtherance of the offense.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1003. 

Arizona law provides that a person commits perjury by making “a false sworn statement 

in regard to a material issue, believing it to be false.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2702. 

 Petitioner presented this claim on direct review and the Arizona Court of Appeals 

determined that sufficient evidence supported Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to 

commit perjury because Petitioner “called and sent letters to McFarland detailing that she 

would testify at the underlying trial that she never saw [Petitioner] with any gift cards at 

any time.” (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 21.) Petitioner has not shown the appellate court’s 

conclusion was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 The appellate court’s decision indicates that that while awaiting trial for various 

fraud charges in another case (CR2010-005367-001), Petitioner, spoke to Vicki 

McFarland on the phone and sent her letters with detailed information about how to 

testify and what testimony she should give at his trial for gift card fraud. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q 

at 2-3.) The communications directed McFarland to testify that she never saw Petitioner 

with any gift cards. (Id. at 21.) This evidence was sufficient for “a rational trier of fact” 

to find Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit perjury. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

 Petitioner argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for 

conspiracy to commit perjury because the statement directing someone to testify that they 

never saw Petitioner with any gift cards was directed to Michael Canizales, not 

McFarland. (Doc. 1 at 21; Doc. 19 at 12.) Petitioner claims that “the evidence shows 

that this statement was made on a letter for Michael Canizales.” (Doc. 19 at 12.) The 

Petition, however, does not cite to that evidence. (Doc. 1 at 21.) In his reply, Petitioner 

cites to “Attachments to the Petition, Attachment 3, pages 12-15.” (Doc. 19 at 12.) That 

attachment is Petitioner’s supplemental brief that he filed on direct review, and review of 

the supplemental brief indicates that the letter to which Petitioner refers was trial exhibit 

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49. (Doc. 1-2 at 27-30; Doc. 12, Ex. P at 12.) Although Petitioner submitted numerous 

exhibits to support his Petition, he did not submit trial exhibit 49. (Docs. 1, 3.) 

Respondents also did not submit that exhibit. In the absence of that exhibit, the Court 

assumes that the letter to which Petitioner refers was directed to Canizales. However, 

assuming one of the letters submitted at trial appeared to be directed to Canizales, not 

McFarland, Petitioner not shown that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of 

conspiracy to commit perjury. 

 As previously stated, the appellate court found sufficient evidence to support 

Petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to commit perjury based on evidence that 

Petitioner “called and sent letters to McFarland detailing that she would testify at the 

underlying trial that she never saw [Petitioner] with any gift cards at any time.” (Doc. 12, 

Ex. Q at 21.) The appellate court’s decision indicates that the conviction was based on 

several pieces of evidence, not a single letter. Petitioner states that “his conviction for 

conspiracy to commit perjury was based on three letters and a jail call.” (Doc. 1 at 21.) 

With the exception of one of the letters, Petitioner does not explain why the other 

evidence was insufficient to convict him of conspiracy to commit perjury. (Doc. 1 at 21; 

Doc. 19 at 11-12.) Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that the appellate court’s rejection 

of Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Moreover, to the extent Petitioner challenges the reliability and credibility of the 

State’s witnesses and evidence, the determination of such issues is the function of the 

jury, not federal habeas court. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19 (explaining that the 

“familiar standard” of assessing whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt . . . gives full play to the 

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the 

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts”); Jones v. 

Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 564 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A key question for a jury, however, is the 

witnesses’ credibility, and the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence after a fair 

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trial is to be made by the jurors.”). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the 

appellate court’s rejection of his sufficiency of the evidence claim was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

D. Ground Eight 

 In Ground Eight, Petitioner alleges the trial court violated his due process right to 

present evidence in his defense by granting the State’s motion to preclude Petitioner from 

calling Dominick Hurley as a witness. (Doc. 1 at 22; Doc. 3 at 10; Doc. 19 at 12-13.) As 

set forth below, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on this claim. 

 Before trial, Petitioner filed a motion for an order to transport Dominick Hurley 

from prison to testify as a defense witness. (Doc. 12, Ex. I.) The trial court granted the 

motion, in part, and ordered Hurley transported from prison for a pretrial hearing to 

determine whether he was a proper defense witness. (Doc. 12, Exs. J, K.) The court 

described the issue as whether Hurley would support Petitioner’s “asserti[on] that the 

content of letters the State offers as proof of witness tampering are not [Petitioner’s] 

attempt to script testimony but the truth.” (Doc. 12, Ex. K.) Petitioner asserted that 

Hurley witnessed some of the events or conversations described in the letters and that the 

letters were not a script. (Id.) The court stated that it would preclude Hurley’s testimony 

at trial if it contradicted Petitioner’s assertions and, therefore, was not relevant to his 

defense. (Id.) 

 During the hearing, Petitioner questioned Hurley about the contents of the letters. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. L at 11-24, 32-38.) On cross-examination, Hurley testified that the only 

thing in the letters that was true was a statement about his drug use. (Id. at 24-32.) After 

hearing argument, the trial court took the matter under advisement. (Id. at 39-44.) The 

next day, the trial court issued an order precluding Petitioner from calling Hurley as a 

witness at trial. (Doc. 12, Ex. M.) The court concluded that Hurley was not a proper 

witness because his testimony contradicted Petitioner’s asserted defense that the contents 

of the letters was not a “script.” (Id.) 

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 On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged the trial court’s ruling and argued that it 

violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and to 

present evidence in his defense. (Doc. 12, Ex. P at 17.) The appellate court affirmed the 

trial court’s ruling that Hurley was not a proper witness. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 15-16.) 

Although the appellate court did not cite federal law, Petitioner presented a federal claim 

in his appellate brief, and “silent” denials are generally considered denials on the merits. 

See Lambert, 393 F.3d at 968-69; Hunter, 982 F.2d at 348. Therefore, the Court 

concludes that the appellate court adjudicated Petitioner’s federal challenge to the trial 

court’s preclusion of Hurley as a witness on the merits and applies the standard of review 

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary 

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). “While the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of defense 

evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the 

ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial 

judges to exclude evidence . . . .” Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 770 (2006). “A 

defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to 

reasonable restrictions[.]” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 303, 308 (2005). A 

defendant does not have an unlimited right to offer evidence “that is incompetent, 

privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Id. 

 Petitioner contends that Hurley would corroborate statements Petitioner made in 

letters to McFarland. (Doc. 1 at 22-23; Doc. 3 at 10.) However, Hurley testified under 

oath that he had no knowledge of any of the material statements in the letters. (Doc. 12, 

Exs. L, M.) The trial court observed Hurley testify, reviewed the evidence, and 

determined that Hurley was telling the truth. (Doc. 12, Exs. L, M, Q.) Therefore, Hurley 

could not offer any relevant, material evidence in Petitioner’s defense. (Doc. 12, Ex. M.) 

In support of Ground Eight, Petitioner argues that Hurley’s testimony was relevant 

because he confirmed that “fourteen events in the letters” were true. (Doc. 3 at 10.) 

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Petitioner, however, does not specifically identify those events or explain why the truth 

of those unidentified events rendered Hurley’s testimony relevant to his defense. 

 Additionally, to the extent Petitioner takes issue with the state court’s credibility 

determination concerning Hurley, federal courts have “no license to redetermine 

credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but 

not by them.” Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983). Therefore, Petitioner 

has not shown that the appellate court’s determination that Hurley’s testimony was 

properly precluded as irrelevant was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

E. Ground Nine 

 In Ground Nine, Petitioner asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right 

to confront McFarland because the State presented her statements in recorded telephone 

calls at trial, but did not call her as witness. (Doc. 1 at 24; Doc. 19 at 14.) Petitioner 

presented this claim on direct review, and the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief.11 

(Doc. 12, Ex. P at 18, Ex. Q at 16-17.) As set forth below, Petitioner has not shown that 

the state court’s determination was based an unreasonable determination of the facts, or 

that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, he is not entitled to relief on Ground Nine. 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claim that the admission of 

McFarland’s statements violated the Confrontation Clause. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 16-17.) 

The court found that the State presented the recorded telephone calls Petitioner made to 

 

11 Petitioner argues that the appellate court did not consider his federal claim. 

(Doc. 19 at 14.) The Court disagrees. In his appellate brief, Petitioner argued that he was denied his right to confront McFarland and cited Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 

(2004). (Doc. 12, Ex. P. at 18.) The appellate court stated that Petitioner contended that 

the court “violated his constitutional rights to confront witnesses against him.” (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 16.) Although the appellate court did not specifically cite federal law, Petitioner presented a federal claim in his appellate brief, and “silent” denials are generally considered denials on the merits. See Lambert, 393 F.3d at 968-69; Hunter, 982 F.2d at 

348. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the appellate court adjudicated Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim on the merits. 

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McFarland to attempt to prove its case, and not for the truth of anything McFarland stated 

in those calls. (Id.) The court determined that McFarland’s challenged statements were 

offered to give context to Petitioner’s statements, not for their truth, and therefore, the 

statements were not testimonial. (Id.) The appellate court also noted that Petitioner did 

not attempt to subpoena McFarland or to have her testify voluntarily. (Id.) 

 The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of out-ofcourt testimonial statements unless: “(1) the declarant is unavailable and (2) the 

defendant ‘had a prior opportunity to cross-examine’ the declarant.” Crawford, 541 U.S. 

at 59. Generally, a statement is testimonial when it is a “solemn declaration or 

affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. at 51. 

Testimonial statements include affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony, 

depositions, or confessions. Id. at 51-52. For example, “[a]n accuser who makes a 

formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who 

makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Id. at 51. 

 The appellate court concluded that McFarland’s statements in the telephone calls 

were not offered for their truth and, therefore, were not testimonial. Petitioner does not 

challenge the appellate court’s conclusion that McFarland’s statements were not offered 

for their truth, but to give context to Petitioner’s statements. (Doc. 1 at 24; Doc. 19 at 

14.) Testimony not admitted to prove its truth is not hearsay and does not violate the 

Confrontation Clause. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9. Thus, McFarland’s statements 

did not implicate the Confrontation Clause. Additionally, Petitioner could have 

subpoenaed McFarland and called her as a witness. 

 Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that the appellate court’s rejection of 

Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim was based on a unreasonable determination of 

the facts, or that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law. Crawford. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to relief on 

Ground Nine. 

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F. Ground Eleven 

 In Ground Eleven, Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his “state and 

federal constitutional rights” by denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that the 

State presented “privileged legal communications” at trial. (Doc. 1 at 16; Doc.19 at 14.) 

Petitioner contends that the State introduced portions of legal mail addressed “to and 

from Kamille Dean and Harla Davidson.” (Id.) Respondents argue that Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief on this claim because it is vague. (Doc. 12 at 53.) In his Petition, 

Petitioner does not cite to the record or to legal authority to support his claim. He does 

not describe the alleged privileged communications that were introduced at trial, identify 

a federal right that was allegedly violated by the introduction of those communications, 

or explain how he was prejudiced by the introduction of those communications. (Doc. 1 

at 27.) Therefore, Ground Eleven fails as conclusory. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 

(9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of 

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”). 

 However, in an abundance of caution, the Court alternatively further reviews 

Ground Eleven because Petitioner states that he raised Ground Eleven on direct appeal, 

and his petition for review and the appellate court’s order sufficiently describe 

Petitioner’s claim based on the introduction of allegedly privilege communications. 

(Doc. 12, Exs. P, Q.) In addition, Respondents discuss the merits of this claim. (Doc. 12 

at 53.) 

 On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that “Petitioner’s letters to McFarland that 

contained “work product,” and were “taken from sealed legal mail addressed to attorneys 

Kamille Dean and Harla Davidson.” (Doc. 12, Ex. P at 20.) He alleged that “[w]hen the 

[S]tate invades the attorney-client work product privilege a 6th Amendment violation 

occurs.” (Doc. 12, Ex. P at 20.) The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s assertion that 

the letters and recorded telephone conversations with McFarland were privileged as 

attorney client work product. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 17-18.) The court explained that 

Petitioner was allowed to act as his own lawyer, and McFarland was “not . . . appointed 

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to be his investigator.” (Id.) The appellate court further stated that “because [Petitioner] 

was both lawyer and client, once he communicated privileged information to a third 

person, like McFarland, he waived any privilege.” (Id. at 18.) 

 Petitioner does not dispute that the acted as his own attorney and that McFarland 

was not appointed to assist him. (Doc. 1 at 27.) Any voluntary disclosure of information 

to a third party waives the attorney client privilege. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 

600, 609 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, Ground Eleven lacks merit and fails under a de novo 

standard of review. Therefore, Petitioner cannot show that the appellate court’s rejection 

of Ground Eleven is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

G. Ground Fourteen 

 In Ground Fourteen, Petitioner asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion 

for a new trial based on the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct that led to his conviction. 

(Doc. 1 at 30-31; Doc. 3 at 11; Doc. 19 at 15.) Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor 

engaged in misconduct by telling the jury during rebuttal closing argument that the 

contents of Petitioner’s letters and his statements in telephone calls were “lies.” (Doc. 1 

at 30-31; Doc. 3 at 11.) On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the prosecution 

committed misconduct in violation of his rights to a fair trial and due process, and cited 

federal law to support his claim. (Doc. 12, Ex. P at 23, 25.) The appellate court rejected 

Petitioner’s claims, citing to federal law. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 24.) Thus, the Court 

concludes that the appellate court adjudicated Ground Fourteen on the merits. 

 In rejecting Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim, the appellate court 

explained that the trial court instructed the jury at the beginning of trial and in the final 

instructions that the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence, and the jury is presumed to 

have followed those instructions and “determined facts from the evidence produced in 

court.” (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 23.) As discussed below, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ 

decision is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law, and is not 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

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 In Parker v. Matthews, ___U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2153 (2012), the Supreme 

Court held that Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), is the “clearly established 

Federal law” applicable to a prosecutor’s alleged improper comments for purposes of 

review under the AEDPA. The appropriate standard for a claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct is “the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory 

power.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. Furthermore, to succeed on a claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct, a petitioner must prove that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper and that 

they so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 

due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974); see also Smith v. 

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of 

alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 

prosecutor.”). A petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief in the absence of a due 

process violation even if the prosecutor’s comments were “undesirable or even 

universally condemned.” Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642. 

 When evaluating a petitioner’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the court 

“must consider the probable effect of the prosecutor’s [comments] on the jury’s ability to 

judge the evidence fairly.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). To make such 

an assessment, the court must consider the prosecutor’s remarks in context. See Boyde v.

California, 494 U.S. 370, 385 (1990); Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir. 

1998). The Supreme Court has assessed the fairness of a petitioner’s trial by considering, 

among other circumstances, whether the prosecutor’s comments manipulated or misstated 

the evidence, whether the trial court gave a curative instruction, and “the weight of the 

evidence against the petitioner.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82. 

 Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals recognized the controlling legal principles and 

did not unreasonably apply Darden when concluding that the prosecutor’s rebuttal 

closing argument did not deny Petitioner a fair trial. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 24-25.) The 

prosecution has “reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments,” and “[i]nherent in this 

latitude is the freedom to argue reasonable inferences based on the evidence.” United 

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States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, the prosecutor did not 

engage in misconduct by urging the jury to make certain inferences from the evidence 

presented at trial. Further, the court of appeals appropriately considered the prosecutor’s 

argument in the context of the entire trial, which included the trial court’s instructions to 

the jury that counsel’s arguments were not evidence. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 

370, 385 (1990). 

 Even assuming the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument amounted to 

prosecutorial misconduct, Petitioner has not shown that the prosecutor’s misconduct “so 

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. Rather, it was an isolated incident during 

Petitioner’s seven-day trial. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 743 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(“Assuming it was improper the comment did not deprive Duckett of a fair trial. It was 

an ‘isolated moment’ in a lengthy trial, in which the jury was clearly instructed that 

statements made by attorneys during closing argument were not evidence to be 

considered in deciding the facts.”); Hall v. Whitley, 935 F.2d 164, 165-66 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(“Put in proper context, the comments were isolated moments in a three day trial.”). 

 For these reasons, Petitioner has not shown that the appellate court’s resolution of 

Ground Fourteen was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that is was 

contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, federal law and he is not entitled 

to habeas corpus relief on this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

H. Ground Fifteen 

 In Ground Fifteen, Petitioner argues that the “[S]tate’s use of privileged material 

prevented [him] from exercising his state and Federal Constitutional rights to testify and 

present witnesses in his defense.” (Doc. 1 at 32.) Petitioner asserts that the State 

presented letters and recorded phone calls between Petitioner and McFarland that 

included privileged religious communications and, therefore, Petitioner could not testify 

or call McFarland as a witness without waiving his “religious freedom.” (Id.) As 

Respondents note, Petitioner does not cite a particular federal law to support his claim. 

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(Doc. 12 at 61.) Respondents, however, do not argue that Ground Fifteen fails as 

conclusory or for failing to sufficiently state a federal claim. (Id.) Rather, they argue that 

Ground Fifteen lacks merit. (Id.) The Court, therefore, considers Ground Fifteen under 

the applicable standard of review.12 

 On appeal, Petitioner argued that he was forced to choose between exercising his 

right to testify or his “right to religious freedom” because the State used letters and phone 

calls between Petitioner and McFarland, which contained religious communications, to 

establish “conspiracy cases against [Petitioner].” (Doc. 12, Ex. P at 26.) The appellate 

court rejected this claim. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 10-12.) The court explained that Petitioner 

had the constitutional right to testify and the constitutional right not to testify, and he 

chose not to testify. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 11.) The court stated that Petitioner could have 

called McFarland to testify in an attempt to establish that their communications were in 

fact between “a member of the clergy and a penitent.” (Id.) If so, he could have 

established religious privilege and, if the “communication had been established, the 

recorded telephone calls and letters may have been precluded. But, even if the trial court 

disagreed with McFarland’s testimony about the privileged communication, the 

evidentiary issue would have been fully litigated for appeal.” (Id.) The court concluded 

that admission of the letters and phone calls did not prevent Petitioner from testifying, 

rather he made the choice not to testify. (Id. at 12.) Petitioner has not shown that the 

appellate court’s decision is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that 

it is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 “Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse 

to do so.” Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). As the appellate court noted, 

 

12 Respondents also assert that Petitioner waived review of Ground Fifteen by failing to testify. (Doc. 12 at 61.) However, they do not argue that Ground Fifteen is procedurally barred from habeas corpus review. Moreover, the appellate court considered Ground Fifteen and did not apply a state procedural rule to deny review of that claim. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q.) The Court, therefore, does not further consider 

Respondents’ waiver argument. 

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Petitioner could have called McFarland as a witness and testified on his own behalf to 

attempt to establish that there was some recognizable privilege for their communications. 

However, rather than trying to establish that privilege, Petitioner chose not to testify. The 

appellate court’s rejection of Ground Fifteen was reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

I. Ground Seventeen 

 In Ground Seventeen, Petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 

right to effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because appellate counsel filed a 

brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and did not help 

Petitioner file a petition for reconsideration after the appellate court denied his appeal. 

(Doc. 1 at 34-35; Doc. 3 at 11-15.) Petitioner presented these claims on post-conviction 

review, and the trial and appellate courts rejected them. (Doc. 12, Exs. AA, EE, HH, 

LL.) The trial court found that appellate counsel did not perform deficiently by 

reviewing the record, finding no arguable issues to raise, and filing a brief that complied 

with Anders. (Doc. 12, Ex. EE at 2.) The court further found that Petitioner was not 

prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance because he filed his own brief and the 

appellate court rejected all of his claims. (Id.) The appellate court affirmed this ruling. 

(Doc. 12, LL at 3.) The appellate court stated that, even if appellate counsel performed 

deficiently, Petitioner was not prejudiced because all of his claims were raised in his pro 

se brief and were rejected on appeal. Additionally, the court found that Petitioner had not 

established any reason why a motion for reconsideration would be granted. (Id.) As set 

forth below, Petitioner has not shown that the appellate court’s decision is based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it is contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 1. Establishing an Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient under prevailing professional 

standards, and that he suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 1984). 

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 To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must show “that counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 699. A 

petitioner’s allegations and supporting evidence must withstand the court’s “highly 

deferential” scrutiny of counsel’s performance, and overcome the “strong presumption” 

that counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 

exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 689-90. To establish prejudice, a 

petitioner must show a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. A “reasonable probability” is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. A petitioner must affirmatively prove actual prejudice, and the possibility 

that a petitioner suffered prejudice is insufficient to establish Strickland’s prejudice 

prong. Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001). The court need not 

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient if the court can reject the claim 

of ineffectiveness based on the lack of prejudice. See Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 

1148, 1155 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the court may proceed directly to the 

prejudice prong). 

 The Strickland test applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 

F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1986). Petitioner must show that appellate counsel’s performance 

was objectively unreasonable in failing to identify and bring the claims on appeal. See

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). “However, appellate counsel need not 

advance every possible argument, even those that are non-frivolous, and should instead 

concentrate his advocacy on winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on 

one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues.” Davis v. Singletary, 853 

F. Supp. 1492, 1549 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To 

succeed on a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a particular 

argument on appeal, the petitioner must establish that the omitted argument was likely to 

be successful and therefore that he was prejudiced by its omission. See Tanner v. 

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McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 

(9th Cir. 2006). 

 a. Filing an Anders Brief

 Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for filing an Anders brief 

and not presenting any specific claim for review. (Doc. 1 at 34; Doc. 3 at 11.) The 

record reflects that appellate counsel reviewed the record and found no claims to raise on 

direct review and, therefore, he filed a brief pursuant to Anders. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q) (citing 

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-752 (1983); Merrick, 13cv1094-PHX-SPL, Doc. 34-2 

at 2.) The Court need not resolve whether appellate counsel’s was deficient for filing an 

Anders brief because Petitioner has not established prejudice. See Jackson, 211 F.3d at 

1155 n.3. 

 After appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, Petitioner filed a supplemental pro se 

brief raising sixteen grounds for relief. (Doc. 12, Ex. P.) The appellate court considered 

those claims, and rejected them. (Doc. 12, Ex. Q.) Petitioner is unable to show that he 

was prejudiced by the filing of an Anders brief, because the record shows that he would 

not have prevailed on any of these issues on appeal. See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 

1428, 1434 n.9 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 

1992) (concluding that appellate counsel was not ineffective when the issue would have 

been unsuccessful on appeal). 

 b. Failing to Assist with Motion for Reconsideration 

 In Ground Seventeen, Petitioner also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to help him file a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision 

on direct appeal. (Doc. 1 at 34-35.) Petitioner asserts that after his direct appeal was 

denied, appellate counsel did not respond to his letters and phone calls and he was “left 

without counsel on appeal.” (Doc. 1 at 35.) Petitioner argues that prejudice is presumed 

because he was denied counsel at a critical stage of his criminal proceeding. (Doc. 3 at 

14-15.) Petitioner presented this claim of ineffective assistance to the appellate court on 

post-conviction review. (Doc. 12, Ex. AA.) The appellate court concluded that 

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Petitioner was required to show prejudice and rejected this claim. (Doc. 12, Ex. LL at 3-

4 and n.1.) Petitioner has not shown that the appellate court’s determination of this claim 

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 The Court first considers the appellate court’s conclusion that Petitioner was 

required to show prejudice to establish his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to help him file a motion for reconsideration on direct appeal. Prejudice is 

presumed when a defendant is actually or constructively denied the assistance of counsel 

at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 

659 (1984). Under such circumstances,“[n]o specific showing of prejudice [is] required” 

because “the adversary process itself [is] presumptively unreliable.” Id. at 659. A 

critical stage is any “stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal 

accused may be affected.” Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967); see also Bell v. 

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696, (2002) (defining a critical stage as “a step of a criminal 

proceeding, such as arraignment, that [holds] significant consequences for the accused”).

 The appellate concluded that Petitioner was required to show prejudice. It stated 

that “the law is clear [Petitioner] must show prejudice resulting from counsel’s 

unreasonable failure to file [an appellate] brief on the merits.” (Doc. 12, Ex. LL n.1 

(citing Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000).) In Smith, the petitioner alleged that 

appellate counsel failed to present his claims adequately by failing to file a merits brief. 

The Court held that the proper standard for “evaluating [the petitioner’s] claim that 

appellate counsel was ineffective in neglecting to file a merits brief is that enunciated in 

Strickland . . . .” Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. The Court concluded that Strickland’s

prejudice prong applied, and that prejudice is not presumed when a petitioner received 

appellate counsel who complied with a procedure that is constitutional under Anders and 

therefore, received all the procedural protection that the Constitution requires. Id. at 286-

87. 

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 In this case, appellate counsel complied with the procedure approved in Anders

and, therefore, satisfied the Constitution’s requirements for indigent criminal appeals. 

See id. at 264. As the appellate court noted, Petitioner does not cite any authority 

indicating that filing a motion for reconsideration is a critical stage of an appellate 

proceeding such that prejudice would be presumed if counsel or the State interfered with 

filing such a motion. As the appellate court noted, under Arizona law, the filing of a 

motion for reconsideration in the court of appeals is not a prerequisite to the filing of a 

petition for review. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.18(a). Thus, the failure to file a motion for 

reconsideration not deprive Petitioner of any substantial right. See Bell, 535 U.S. at 696. 

Accordingly, the appellate court reasonably concluded that the prejudice prong applied to 

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 The appellate court also reasonably rejected Petitioner’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel under the Strickland standard. The court found that 

assuming appellate counsel performed deficiently by failing to help Petitioner file a 

motion for reconsideration, Petitioner had not shown prejudice. (Doc. 12, Ex. LL at 3.) 

The appellate court noted that Petitioner had not shown any reason why his motion for 

reconsideration would have been granted. (Id.) As the appellate court noted, the petition 

for review did not identify the claims Petitioner would have presented in a motion for 

reconsideration and did not explain why the appellate court would have granted a motion 

for reconsideration. (Doc. 12, Ex. HH.) Therefore, the appellate court reasonably 

concluded that Petitioner had not shown prejudice and that his claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel failed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 In contrast, the memorandum in support of the pending habeas Petition identifies 

several claims that Petitioner would have presented in a motion for reconsideration. 

(Doc. 3 at 11-16.) In his reply, and in his “Statement of Related Cases,” Petitioner argues 

that because the Ninth Circuit in Merrick, 2016 WL 2851149, found that Petitioner’s 

motion for reconsideration was “nonfrivolous” for purposes of a denial of access to court 

claim, he is entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 19 at 

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18; Doc. 15 at 1, 5.) The Ninth Circuit’s determination that the motion for 

reconsideration was “nonfrivolous” does not resolve the ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim because the frivolousness standard is not the same as the standard for determining 

whether appellate counsel’s allegedly deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner. 

 The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits officials from actively 

interfering with inmates’ attempts to prepare or file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey, 

518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). When a plaintiff asserts a denial of access claim, he must 

show, among other things, the loss of a “nonfrivolous” or “arguable” underlying claim. 

Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 

U.S. 403, 416 (2002)), vacated on other grounds 555 U.S. 1150 (2009). To be establish 

that a claim is nonfrivolous, a plaintiff must show that the “‘arguable’ nature of the 

underlying claim is more than hope.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002). 

 In contrast to this standard, to show prejudice in the context of a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show a “reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is one “sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A petitioner must affirmatively prove actual 

prejudice, and the possibility that a petitioner suffered prejudice is insufficient to 

establish Strickland’s prejudice prong. Cooper, 255 F.3d at 1109. Comparing the 

standard for frivolousness and the Strickland standard for prejudice, the Court concludes 

that Strickland prejudice standard is more demanding and that the standards are different. 

Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s decision that Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was 

nonfrivolous does compel the conclusion that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 

to help Petitioner file that motion. See Merrick, 2016 WL 2851149, at *1. 

 Moreover, Petitioner has not established prejudice. Petitioner identifies several 

claims he would have presented in a motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 3 at 11-16.) 

Petitioner, however, does not explain why there is a reasonable probability that but for 

appellate counsel’s alleged deficient performance (failing to help him file a motion for 

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reconsideration raising these claims), there is a reasonable probability that the appellate 

court would have granted the motion for reconsideration and that the outcome of his 

direct appeal would have been different.13 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

 Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of his claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, he is not entitled 

to habeas corpus relief on this claim. 

VI. Conclusion 

 For the reasons discussed above, Ground Eighteen is procedurally barred from 

federal habeas corpus review and Petitioner has not established a basis to overcome that 

bar. Grounds Two, Four, Five, Six, Ten, Twelve, Thirteen, Sixteen, and Nineteen are not 

cognizable on federal habeas corpus review or lack merit. Additionally, Petitioner has 

not shown that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief on his remaining claims. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of many of 

Petitioner’s claims is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not 

find the ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

 

13 Additionally, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on counsel’s failure to help Petitioner file a motion for reconsideration fails 

because Petitioner filed a petition for review pro se and could have filed a motion for 

reconsideration pro se. (See Doc. 12, Ex. Q at 26; see also Merrick, 2016 WL at 

2851149, at *1 (noting that petitioner was proceeding pro se on direct appeal in his underlying criminal case). 

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Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties have fourteen days within which 

to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 12th day of August, 2016. 

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