Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01017/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01017-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1017

___________

Herbert Carter, individually and *

on behalf of all others similarly *

situated, *

* 

Appellant, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * Eastern District of Arkansas

State of Arkansas; State and Public *

School Life and Health Insurance *

Board; Mike Huckabee, Honorable, *

individually and in his official *

capacity as Governor of the State *

of Arkansas; John Hartnedy, *

individually and in his official *

capacity as a member of the State and *

Public School Life and Health *

Insurance Board; Preston A. Means, *

individually and in his official *

capacity as a member of the *

State Public School Life and Health *

Insurance Board; Joseph *

Thompson, Dr., individually and *

in his official capacity as a member *

of the State and Public School Life *

and Health Insurance Board; *

Janie D. White, individually and *

in her official capacity as a member *

of the State and Public School Life *

and Health Insurance Board; *

Bobbie A. Davis, Dr., individually *

Appellate Case: 04-1017 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/17/2004 Entry ID: 1845832 
1

The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

-2-

and in her official capacity as a *

member of the State and Public *

School Life and Health Insurance *

Board; Darrell Montgomery, *

individually and in his official *

capacity as a member of the State *

and Public School Life and Health *

Insurance Board; Vance Strange, *

individually and in his official *

capacity as a member of the State *

and Public School Life and Health *

Insurance Board; Robert Watson, *

individually and in his official *

capacity as a member of the State *

and Public School Life and Health *

Insurance Board, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: November 18, 2004 

Filed: December 17, 2004 

___________

Before RILEY, McMILLIAN, and GRUENDER. Circuit Judges

___________

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Herbert Carter appeals from a final judgment entered in the District Court for

the Eastern District of Arkansas1

 dismissing his federal equal protection and due

process claims against state officials for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). We affirm. 

Appellate Case: 04-1017 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/17/2004 Entry ID: 1845832 
-3-

Carter, a former superintendent of the Marion, Arkansas, school district, is a

retired public school employee and a participant in the teacher retirement program

administered by the Arkansas State and Public School Life and Health Insurance

Board (the "Board"), which administers benefits plans for state employees and public

school employees. Carter filed the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against the

Governor of the State of Arkansas and eight members of the Board (collectively the

"state"), alleging equal protection and due process violations under the federal and

state constitutions. Carter first alleged that the state had violated his rights to equal

protection and due process because it contributed more for health insurance premiums

for state employees than for public school employees. He also alleged equal

protection and due process violations because retired public school employees who

received Medicare benefits paid the same premium as public school employees who

were not covered by Medicare.

The state filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that Carter had failed

to allege facts to support federal equal protection or due process claims. The district

court granted the state's motion and declined jurisdiction over the pendent state law

claims. Carter filed a timely appeal. 

DISCUSSION

We review the district court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de

novo, taking "all facts alleged in the complaint as true." Knapp v. Hanson, 183 F.3d

786, 788 (8th Cir. 1999) (Knapp). "A motion to dismiss should be granted only if it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle

him to relief." Id. (internal quotation omitted). 

Because Carter is not a member of a suspect class and his claims do not involve

a fundamental right, his federal equal protection claims are subject to rational basis

review. Under this review, a court must reject an equal protection challenge to a

Appellate Case: 04-1017 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/17/2004 Entry ID: 1845832 
-4-

statutory classification "'if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could

provide a rational basis for the classification.'" Id. at 789 (quoting FCC v. Beach

Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (Beach Communications)). Indeed,

"a legislative choice . . . may be based on rational speculation unsupported by

evidence or empirical data." Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315. Thus, because

"all that must be shown is 'any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could

provide a rational basis for the classification,' it is not necessary to wait for further

factual development." Knapp, 183 F.3d at 789 (quoting Beach Communications, 508

U.S. at 313). In other words, a district court may conduct a rational basis review on

a motion to dismiss. Id. 

In this case, the district court did not err in dismissing Carter's federal equal

protection claims. First, Carter did not state a claim regarding the difference between

the state's contributions for health insurance premiums of public school employees

and state employees. As a threshold matter, in order "[t]o state an equal protection

claim, appellant must have established that he was treated differently from others

similarly situated to him." Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 152 F.3d 859, 862 (8th

Cir. 1998). Carter argues that public school employees are similarly situated to state

employees because the state is ultimately responsible for public school education.

Although the state may be responsible for public school education, the two groups are

not similarly situated for purposes of an equal protection analysis, which requires that

plaintiffs must be "similarly situated to another group for purposes of the challenged

government action.'' Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298, 304 n.8 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal

quotation omitted). Moreover, the two groups must be similarly situated "in all

relevant respects." Bills v. Dahm, 32 F.3d 333, 335 (8th Cir. 1994). Here, public

school employees and state employees are not similarly situated for purposes of this

lawsuit challenging the amount of employer contributions to employee health

insurance premiums because, as the state notes, the two groups have different

employers. Public school employees are employees of local school districts, not the

state. Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-620(4)(A) ("Board of Directors of each school district

Appellate Case: 04-1017 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/17/2004 Entry ID: 1845832 
-5-

. . . shall . . . [e]mploy teachers and other employees . . . and make written contracts

with teachers and all other employees"). See Arnold v. City of Columbia, 197 F.3d

1217, 1220 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that although plaintiffs were in same job grade

classification as other employees, they were not similarly situated with respect to

wage and hour equal protection challenge); Post v. Harper, 980 F.2d 491, 495 (8th Cir.

1992) (rejecting equal protection challenge because county employee was "not

similarly situated, either in fact or in contemplation of law, to elected public officials

or to municipal employees").

Even assuming that the two groups were similarly situated, Carter failed to

state a claim. At the time Carter filed his complaint a local public school district was

required to contribute $114.00 a month for employees participating in "the public

school employee health insurance program," Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-1117(a), whereas

the state could contribute up to $350.00 for its employees' health benefits. Id. at § 21-

5-414(b)(1). As the district court held, it was rational for the state legislature to

require the employers of public school employees and state employees to bear

responsibility for health care contributions for their respective employees and that the

state could contribute more than a local public school district for employee health

insurance. 

Nor did the district court err in rejecting Carter's second equal protection

challenge. As the district court held, it was rational for the state to require Medicarecovered employees to pay the same health insurance premium as those not covered

by Medicare, because it could have reasonably concluded that those over 65 have

higher health care costs.

The district court also did not err in dismissing Carter's federal due process

claims. Because the challenged state actions survive rational basis scrutiny, Carter

has not stated a substantive due process claim. See Klein v. McGowan, 198 F.3d 705,

710 (8th Cir.1999) ("To meet his burden [of establishing a substantive due process

Appellate Case: 04-1017 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/17/2004 Entry ID: 1845832 
-6-

violation] a § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate that the government action complained

of is truly irrational, that is something more than . . . arbitrary, capricious, or in

violation of state law.") (internal quotation omitted). The state argues that Carter

failed to state a procedural due process claim because he does not have a property

interest in health insurance premiums. Even assuming Carter has a property interest,

he has not stated a procedural due process claim because he is not challenging the

manner of any deprivation, such as the lack of notice or opportunity to be heard. See

Parrish v. Mallinger, 133 F.3d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1998). 

The district court also correctly dismissed without prejudice Carter's claim that

the state had illegally used public school employees' health insurance premiums to

subsidize state employees' health insurance premiums . Carter characterized the claim

as an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation, in

violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, because he did not

allege that he had exhausted state court remedies, the district court did not err in

dismissing the claim. Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir.)

("Until [plaintiff] has exhausted his state court remedies, his [Fifth Amendment

takings] claim may not be brought in federal court."), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 825

(2003). We note that where, as here, a statute survives a substantive due process

challenge, "it would be surprising indeed to discover" that the statute constitutes an

unconstitutional taking. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223

(1986). 

 

Because the district court declined jurisdiction over Carter's pendent state law

claims, we do not address them.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

 

Appellate Case: 04-1017 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/17/2004 Entry ID: 1845832