Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02151/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02151-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision (regarding payment of benefits)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AARMAYL CRAWFORD, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 15cv02151 JAH-BLM 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND GRANTING 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[Doc. Nos. 16, 19] 

INTRODUCTION 

 Aarmyl Crawford (“Plaintiff”), filed this action seeking judicial review of a final 

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Defendant”) denying 

Plaintiff’s claim for Supplemental Security Income disability benefits pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. section 1383(c). 

 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment seeking reversal or remand of the 

Defendant’s decision. Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and 

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a reply in support 

of his motion for summary judgment. After a thorough review of the parties’ submissions, 

along with the entire record submitted in this matter, and for the reasons set forth below, 

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this Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reversal or remand of the Commissioner’s 

administrative decision, and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Factual Background 

 Plaintiff, who was born on October 20, 1967, is currently 49 years of age. AR1

 at 

213. He has past relevant work experience in construction and alleges he has been disabled 

since June 24, 2011. AR at 74-75, 213. 

II. Procedural Background 

 On December 22, 2008, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits 

and an application for supplemental security income alleging a disability beginning 

December 8, 2007. AR at 88. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 

issued an unfavorable decision on June 23, 2011. AR at 85. Plaintiff did not seek further 

review. 

 On January 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income 

asserting a disability beginning June 24, 2011. AR at 213. The Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration denied the claim on May 24, 2013, and again denied the claim 

upon reconsideration on November 5, 2013. AR at 136, 143. Plaintiff filed a request for 

a hearing, and appeared and testified at the hearing on February 26, 2015. AR at 71, 149. 

The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on April 3, 2015. AR at 39. Plaintiff filed a 

request for review of the ALJ’s decision and the Appeals Council denied the request. AR 

at 1-4. 

 Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on September 28, 2015. See Doc. No. 1. 

Defendant filed an answer on December 14, 2015. See Doc. No. 13. Thereafter, Plaintiff 

filed the pending motion seeking reversal or remand of the Commissioner’s administrative 

and Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition. See Doc. Nos. 

                                               

1 AR refers to the administrative record lodged with this Court. 

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16, 19. Plaintiff filed a reply brief in opposition to Defendant’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment. See Doc. No. 21. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Legal Standards 

A. Qualifying for Disability Benefits 

 To qualify for disability benefits under the Act, an applicant must show that: (1) he 

suffers from a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to result in death 

or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months; and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable of performing the work 

that he previously performed or any other substantially gainful employment that exists in 

the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), 2(A). An applicant must meet both 

requirements to be “disabled.” Id. 

 The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has established a five-step 

sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520, 416.920. Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial 

gainful activity.” If he is, disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 

416.920(b). If he is not, the decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines 

whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 

 If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, 

the disability claim is denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the impairment is 

severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which determines whether the impairment 

is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are 

so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404 Appendix 1 to Subpart P. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed 

impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If a condition “falls 

short of the [listing] criterion” a multiple factor analysis is appropriate. Celaya v. Halter, 

332 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2003). Of such analysis, “the Secretary shall consider the 

combined effect of all the individual’s impairments without regard to whether any such 

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impairment, if considered separately, would be of such severity.” Id. at 1182 (quoting 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B)). 

 If the impairment is not one that is conclusively presumed to be disabling, the 

evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment prevents 

the claimant from performing work she has performed in the past. If the claimant cannot 

perform her previous work, the fifth and final step of the process determines whether she 

is able to perform other work in the national economy considering her age, education, and 

work experience. The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if she is not able to 

perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). 

B. Judicial Review of an ALJ’s Decision 

 Section 405(g) of the Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of 

a final agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of judicial 

review is limited. The Commissioner’s denial of benefits “will be disturbed only if it is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Brawner v. Secretary of 

Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Green v. Heckler, 803 

F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Sandgathe v. Charter, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997)(citation omitted). 

“[I]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). The 

Court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and 

detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & 

Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)(citing Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 

995 (9th Cir. 1985)). If the evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the 

Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 

1984)(citing Allen v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 726 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 

1984). When the evidence is inconclusive, “questions of credibility and resolution of 

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conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 

F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). 

 However, even if the reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s conclusions, the Court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the 

proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and reaching a decision. See Benitez v. 

Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a 

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the Social Security 

Administrator for further proceedings. Id. “If additional proceedings can remedy defects 

in the original administrative proceeding, a social security case should be remanded.” 

Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 

F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

II. The ALJ’s Decision 

 In the present case, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since December 30, 2012, and has severe impairments, including a cognitive 

disorder and mood disorder with anxiety, that cause more than minimal limitations on 

Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities. AR at 44, 45. The ALJ determined 

Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or are 

medically equal in severity to one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404 Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. Id. In making this determination, the ALJ found Plaintiff has no restrictions 

in daily living, moderate difficulties in social functioning and moderate difficulties in 

concentration, persistence or pace. Id. Additionally, the ALJ found the evidence did not 

document any episodes of decompensation of extended duration within the period at issue, 

and there was no evidence to suggest a complete inability to function independently outside 

the area of one’s home. Id. 

 The ALJ found Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range 

of work at all exertional levels but with the non-exertional limitation of simple repetitive 

work tasks in a non-public work environment. Id. at 46. In making the finding, the ALJ 

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considered all symptoms and the extent the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as 

consistent with objective medical evidence, and opinion evidence. Id. The ALJ found the 

evidence failed to support Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations. 

AR at 47. The ALJ determined the record does not document changed circumstances 

sufficient to rebut the presumption of continuing non-disability. Id. The ALJ relied upon 

a consultative internal medicine evaluation in April 2013, performed by Dr. Dao. The ALJ 

rejected the opinion of Dr. Brolaski who, the ALJ found, assessed limitations unsupported 

by the medical evidence of record, and rejected the opinion of Plaintiff’s non-medical 

advocate which the ALJ described as having “inherent subjectivity/advocacy, 

vagueness/lack of functional specificity” and generally inconsistent with objective medical 

evidence of record. AR at 48. The ALJ also determined Plaintiff’s pain complaints were 

disproportionate to the objective evidence. Id. 

 The ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work but there 

were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy he could perform. AR 

at 49. Ultimately, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined 

by the Act from the date of his application. AR at 50. 

III. Analysis 

 Plaintiff seeks reversal or remand of the instant matter. He argues the ALJ violated 

20 CFR section 404.1527 by failing to evaluate and explain pertinent portions of the 

medical evidence of record. Plaintiff contends the ALJ ignored the neurological 

impairment evidence and physical impairment evidence. He further argues the ALJ 

committed reversible error in evaluating the severity of his depression and failing to find 

his depression is a severe impairment. Plaintiff maintains the unrebutted evidence of 

record from examining and treating medical providers documents his depression is 

moderately severe to severe. 

 Additionally, he argues the ALJ’s finding the Plaintiff is capable of “simple work 

tasks with no public contact” is not based on substantial evidence. He contends the reasons 

for rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating doctors is flawed. He further contends the 

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ALJ failed to do a comprehensive review of the current medical records and failed to 

provide a rational basis for disregarding new evidence in finding the record did not 

document changed circumstances sufficient to rebut the presumption of non-disability. 

 Defendant maintains the ALJ’s obligation was to determine whether to apply the 

presumption of continuing non-disability and give effects to the prior ALJ’s findings, 

which the ALJ did. Defendant argues the ALJ properly found Plaintiff failed to rebut the 

presumption of continuing non-disability because the only changed evidence in the new 

record is that Plaintiff’s polysubstance abuse is no longer active and Plaintiff remained able 

to perform simple repetitive tasks in a non-public work environment. Defendant contends 

the ALJ found the change failed to rebut the presumption of continuing non-disability and 

the ALJ was bound by the ALJ’s prior findings with respect to severe impairments, residual 

functional capacity or any other factors within Plaintiff’s vocational profile. 

 Defendant further contends Plaintiff may use medical opinions/records relating to 

that earlier period and/or considered by the prior ALJ in support of his claim that he became 

disabled after July 2011, but they are less persuasive than they might be otherwise, because 

they were already considered and did not show disability and such evidence does not get 

stronger with the passage of time. Defendant also maintains Plaintiff refers to the opinions 

of Drs. Pena, Naimark and Carroll which relate to the period the prior ALJ considered, and 

the current ALJ specifically referred to the opinions in his decision. Defendant also argues 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ ignored medical evidence relating to his neurological 

impairments, but he refers to recurring issues that the current and prior ALJ considered, 

and has not provided evidence of greater limitations. Defendant maintains Plaintiff 

presented no evidence of new or worsening physical impairments. Additionally, Defendant 

maintains there was no indication that Plaintiff’s depression was a new or worsened 

condition given Plaintiff’s prior mental diagnoses and limitations. Thus, Defendant argues, 

all that evidence fails to support a change sufficient to rebut the presumption of continuing 

non-disability arising from the prior ALJ’s decision. Defendant also argues, to the extent 

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the ALJ did not consider all of that evidence, Plaintiff fails to establish that any error was 

prejudicial. 

 Defendant further argues the ALJ properly assessed the new medical opinions and 

Plaintiff’s credibility. Specifically, Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to properly explain 

how these opinions conflict with the ALJ’s decision and, therefore, are conclusory or 

insufficiently developed, and may be waived. Nevertheless, Defendant contends the ALJ 

properly discredited Dr. Brolaski’s opinion that Plaintiff had extreme functional limitations 

and was unable to meet competitive standards because he had organic brain damage and 

was in a wheelchair, because there was a significant inconsistency in light of the lack of 

medical evidence for the need of a wheelchair which suggested that Plaintiff exaggerated 

his symptoms, and noted other inconsistencies between the opinion and the medical 

evidence of record. With respect to Dr. Arsenault’s opinion, Defendant contends Plaintiff 

does not explain what the ALJ failed to assess and argues, to the extent Plaintiff refers to a 

diagnosis of chronic pain, the issue was addressed. Defendant further contends the ALJ 

properly relied on the objective medical evidence in discounting Plaintiff’s allegations, 

including largely normal examination findings, indications that Plaintiff’s symptoms 

improved with medications, and the lack of referral to a specialist for more advanced care. 

Defendant argues Plaintiff did not present credible medical evidence or testimony rebutting 

the presumption, and thus, the ALJ properly adopted the prior ALJ’s findings. 

 In reply, Plaintiff argues The ALJ improperly found Plaintiff failed to rebut the 

presumption of continuing non-disability because Plaintiff provided evidence of clearly 

established changed circumstances. Plaintiff maintains he provided new evidence that he 

suffers from increased severity of impairments, included: 1) severe depression; 2) Benign 

Paroxysmal Positional Vertigo (“BPPV”); and 3) dementia and memory impairments. He 

further maintains his symptoms of dizziness and vertigo had increased, and the ALJ 

incorrectly noted his treatment did not include pain medication and, therefore his physical 

impairment were not significant. 

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 A final determination that a claimant is not disabled creates a presumption of 

continuing non-disability. Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985). A 

claimant must demonstrate changed circumstances indicating a greater disability to 

overcome the presumption. Chavez v. Brown, 844 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1988). The 

ALJ noted Plaintiff was no longer using illicit substances and is still capable of sustaining 

simple repetitive work tasks in a non-public work environment, in determining the record 

fails to demonstrate changed circumstances sufficient to rebut the presumption of nondisability. AR at 47. The ALJ specifically pointed to examinations in December 2011, 

April 2012, and August 2012 noting normal functioning in all areas including no 

psychological abnormalities. Id. The ALJ accorded little weight to medical sources 

statements from social service advocates which the ALJ deemed unsupported by 

contemporaneous objective findings from the mental health treatment records from 2013 

and 2014 noting some memory and mood problems but generally a cooperative demeanor 

with full orientation and improved symptoms on medication. Id. The ALJ relied upon the 

consultative psychological evaluation in March 2013, which found mild symptoms and no 

mental-related functional limitations relating to sustaining all levels of work tasks, 

interacting with others and dealing with normal work pressures. Id. The ALJ also 

discussed the medical records relied upon by Plaintiff and determined, while they reported 

“oscillating reports of anxiety and depression” and “intermittent complaints concentration 

and focus problems,” the findings noted stable and improved conditions when under 

medication and “intact memory, average intellect, and full orientation.” Id. at 48. 

 Additionally, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s allegations of symptoms and pain were 

not supported by any medical etiology and not credible. Id. at 47, 48. Specifically, the 

ALJ cited to an MRI of the brain in March 2013, which was unchanged from prior studies 

in October 2008, and a consultative evaluation in April 2013, in which the examiner noted 

no abnormalities and no functional restrictions. Id. 

 Ultimately, the ALJ determined the record does not provide a reasonable basis for 

finding any greater level of limitations than simple repetitive tasks in a non-public work 

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environment and, therefore, Plaintiff fails to rebut the presumption of continuing nondisability. Id. at 48. Plaintiff points to dizziness as a changed circumstance, however, he 

fails to demonstrate this symptom indicates a greater disability to overcome the 

presumption. The ALJ reviewed the record and determined Plaintiff’s symptoms did not 

support a finding of greater limitations than those found by the prior ALJ. Considering the 

record as a whole, the Court finds the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial 

evidence of record. 

 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Plaintiff’s motion for 

reversal or remand is DENIED and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

DATED: May 4, 2017 

 

 ____________________________________ 

 JOHN A. HOUSTON 

 United States District Judge 

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