Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00703/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00703-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SALVADOR ESPEJO ZAMUDIO,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 12-CV-703-IEG (MDD)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING IN PART AND

DECLINING TO ADOPT IN PART

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION [Doc. No.

18];

(2) DENYING MOTION TO STAY

AS MOOT [Doc. No. 5];

(3) DENYING MOTION FOR

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

WITHOUT PREJUDICE [Doc. No.

4]; and

(4) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY WITHOUT

PREJUDICE [Doc. No. 30]

v.

L.S. MCEWEN, Warden; MATHEW

CATE, Secretary,

Respondents.

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s motions to stay and for an

evidentiary hearing in connection with his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Petition”). [Doc. Nos. 4, 5.] Respondent opposes the motion to stay and argues

the Petition is untimely, and should therefore be dismissed. [Doc. No. 11.] 

Magistrate Judge Mitchell Dembin issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”)

recommending that the Court deny Petitioner’s motions to stay and for an

evidentiary hearing, and sua sponte dismiss the Petition as untimely. [Doc. No. 18.] 

Petitioner subsequently filed an Objection to the R & R (“Objection”). [Doc. No.

31.] 

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Upon de novo review, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and DECLINES TO

ADOPT IN PART the Magistrate Judge’s R & R. The Court adopts the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation as to statutory tolling, but declines to adopt the

recommendation to sua sponte dismiss the Petition. The Court also declines to adopt

the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation for the motion to stay as the California

Supreme Court has since ruled on the state habeas petition. The Court DENIES AS

MOOT the motion to stay. The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing. The Court also DENIES

WITHOUT PREJUDICE a certificate of appealability as it is premature.

BACKGROUND

The R & R contains a summary of the proceedings in this case. The Court

adopts the Magistrate Judge’s background, subject to a few exceptions. [Doc. No.

18, R & R at 1-2.] Petitioner was convicted on September 4, 2008 of rape with a

foreign object, forcible oral copulation, two counts of burglary and robbery, and

kidnaping.1

 [Doc. No. 1-1, Abstract of Judgment at 51.] On direct appeal, the

kidnaping charge, and several related enhancements, were overturned by the court of

appeal. [Doc. No. 1-1, Court of Appeal Decision at 20-34.] Petitioner’s appeal to

the California Supreme Court was denied on April 20, 2010.2

 On June 11, 2010,

Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-five years to life plus five years, four months. 

Petitioner argues that although he requested his appellate counsel to file a

notice of appeal, counsel failed to do so. [Doc. No. 1, Petition at 23-24.] Petitioner

states that he subsequently prepared a notice of appeal with the assistance of other

1

 The R & R states that Petitioner was convicted on June 11, 2009. [Doc. No. 18, R & R at 1.] 

However, other documents do not reflect that Petitioner was convicted on June 11, 2009. Rather, the

abstract of judgment, in addition to other parts of the Petition and the motion to stay, state that he was

convicted on September 4, 2008. [Doc. No. 1-1, Abstract of Judgment at 51; Doc. No. 1, Petition at

22; Doc. No. 5, Mot. to Stay at 2.]

2

 The R & R states that the California Supreme Court denied his appeal on April 16, 2010, but

does not provide a citation. Petitioner provides a copy of his appellate court docket which shows that

the denial of his petition for review by the Supreme Court was filed on April 20, 2010. [Doc. No. 1-1,

Appellate Court Case Information at 37.]

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inmates, and presented it to prison officials for mailing on August 2, 2010. He

believes that prison officials did not mail the notice of appeal to the court. [Doc. No.

5, Mot. to Stay at 3.] 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal court on March

21, 2012 [Doc. No. 1] concurrently with a Petition to the California Supreme Court,

and motions for a stay and for an evidentiary hearing. [Doc. Nos. 4, 5.] On May 23,

2012, Respondent filed an opposition to Petitioner’s motion to stay. [Doc. No. 11,

Resp.’s Opp.] Petitioner filed a reply on July 5, 2012. [Doc. No. 17, Pet’s Reply.] 

On September 12, 2012, the California Supreme Court denied the state habeas

petition. [Doc. No. 31, Objection at 20.]

LEGAL STANDARD

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R & R

are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The district court “must make a de novo review determination of those

portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.

667, 676 (1980); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Stay

Petitioner seeks a stay of the federal Petition in order to exhaust his state

remedies. [Doc. No. 5, Mot. to Stay.] On September 12, 2012, the California

Supreme Court denied the state habeas petition. Therefore, the Court DENIES AS

MOOT the motion to stay. The only issue before the Court is whether to accept the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to sua sponte dismiss the Petition as untimely.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / / 

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II. Statute of Limitations

Habeas petitions are governed by a one-year period of limitation, which

begins to run on the date on which judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The R & R concludes that Petitioner’s

conviction became final on August 10, 2010, after the expiration of the 60-day

period during which he could have filed a direct appeal following his sentencing on

June 11, 2010.3

 Therefore, the R & R concludes that Petitioner’s one-year statute of

limitations began to run on August 10, 2010. Because Petitioner did not file his

Petition until March 21, 2012, which was 589 days after August 10, 2010, the R & R

concludes that the Petition is untimely. However, the issue of when the conviction

became final may be complicated by California’s prison-delivery rule, which could

render Petitioner’s notice of appeal timely. This rule provides that a prisoner’s

notice of appeal is deemed timely if delivered to prison officials within the filing

period. In re Jordan, 4 Cal. 4th 116 (1992). 

Here, Petitioner states that he gave his notice of appeal to the prison

authorities on August 2, 2010, which is within the filing period. [Doc. No. 13,

Objection at 13.] Neither the parties nor the R & R explicitly addressed the

applicability of the prison-delivery rule to the question of when Petitioner’s

conviction became final. Further briefing on the issue of when Petitioner’s

conviction became final in light of California’s prison-delivery rule is necessary.

/ / /

3

 Petitioner in his Objection states that he was sentenced on June 10, 2010. [Doc. No. 31,

Objection at 12.] Petitioner also states that he had 90 days from that date to file a petition for review

with the California Supreme Court, which would have expired on September 10, 2010. [Id.] 

Petitioner contends that therefore, the one-year statute of limitations would have expired on September

10, 2011. [Id.] Petitioner cites no support for his contention that he had 90 days to file a petition for

review. 

A judgment becomes final after the time for direct appeal expires. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

The California Rules of Court provide that “a notice of appeal . . . must be filed within 60 days after

the rendition of judgment or the making of the order being appealed.” Cal. Rules of Court R. 8.308(a). 

Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s determination that the conviction became

final on August 10, 2010.

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Accordingly, the Court REMANDS to the Magistrate Judge for further briefing and

an R & R on the issue of when Petitioner’s conviction became final. 

A. Statutory Tolling

The one-year limitations period for habeas petitions is tolled when a properly

filed petition for habeas relief is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The

R & R correctly states that the state court petition was filed on the same day as the

federal Petition and concludes that therefore, statutory tolling is inapplicable. [Doc.

No. 18, R & R at 3.] Further, Petitioner concedes that “statutory tolling [is] not

appropriate” in his Objection. [Doc. No. 31, Objection at 6.] Accordingly, the

Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling, and ADOPTS the

R & R’s recommendation as to statutory tolling.

B. Equitable Tolling

A petitioner is only entitled to equitable tolling “if extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on

time.” Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). Generally, a party seeking equitable

tolling bears the burden of establishing that (1) he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs,

498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). The petitioner bears the burden of showing that

“extraordinary circumstances,” rather than his lack of diligence, were the cause of

any untimeliness. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner

must also show a causal connection between the grounds upon which he asserts a

right to equitable tolling and his inability to file a timely federal habeas petition. 

Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005). 

1. Counsel’s Failure to File Notice of Appeal

The Court agrees with the R & R that counsel’s failure to file a notice of

appeal “did not cause any undue delay or otherwise affect Petitioner’s petitions for

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habeas relief” as Petitioner was able to timely prepare a notice of appeal. [Doc. No.

18, R & R at 4.] 

2. Initial 6-month Period Following Petitioner Giving Notice of Appeal to Prison Officials

The Court also agrees with the R & R that equitable tolling should not be

granted for the initial 6-month period following when Petitioner gave his notice of

appeal to prison officials on August 2, 2010 due Petitioner’s lack of diligence. 

Although Petitioner believed that “he would not hear anything for about six months”

after the notice of appeal was given to prison officials [Doc. No. 31, Objection at 8],

ignorance of the law does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance. See

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that pro se

petitioner’s “lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary

circumstance warranting equitable tolling”). As Petitioner did not pursue his rights

diligently during this time period, the Court agrees that equitable tolling should not

be granted for the period between August 2010 and February 2011.

3. Period Following Initial 6 Months

Petitioner also raises his language limitations and his status as a sex offender

as contributing to his inability to timely file the Petition. Following the 6-month

period, Petitioner “start[ed] to be concerned” about his lack of response regarding

his notice of appeal, and began to seek advice from other inmates at Calipatria state

prison and help at the Calipatria law library.4

 [Doc. No. 31, Objection at 8-9; Doc.

No. 31, Zamudio Decl. at 35.] Plaintiff states that his attempts to seek help from

other inmates were unsuccessful due to his conviction for a sex offense. He stated

4

 However, Petitioner’s statements in a declaration attached to a letter to Judge Weber

regarding his notice of appeal seem to contradict his statements in the Objection. In the declaration,

he stated that from “August 2, 2010 to September 26, 2011, [he had] been patiently awaiting a letter

from an attorney” regarding his appeal. [Doc. No. 1-1, Zamudio Decl. at 65.] He said that on

September 26, he spoke with an inmate named “Cruz Ibarra” who “helped [him] understand the appeal

process.” [Id.] Petitioner does not mention any other attempts before September 26 to seek help for

his case. Petitioner is requested to clarify this issue, as he now argues that he began seeking assistance

around February 2011.

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that many inmates would not help sex offenders, and if other inmates discovered that

he was convicted of a sex offense, his life could be in danger. [Doc. No. 31,

Objection at 8; Doc. No. 31, Zamudio Decl. at 34.] Petitioner also stated that some

inmates requested money for their assistance. He was initially unable to pay the

$1500 that an inmate requested. [Doc. No. 31, Objection at 8; Doc. No. 31,

Zamudio Decl. at 35-36.] Petitioner stated that he was able to secure assistance from

a new inmate who arrived at Calipatria state prison on September 2011, who asked

to be paid $1200 to work on his case. Petitioner sought help from his sister to raise

the money, and she complied. The inmate filed the Petition and several motions,

including those presently before the Court, after Petitioner paid him. [Doc. No. 31,

Objection at 9; Doc. No. 31, Decl. of Zamudio at 36-37.]5

The R & R cites Mendoza v. Carey for the proposition that language

limitations, without more, do not justify equitable tolling. 449 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th

Cir. 2006). However, the Ninth Circuit in Mendoza also found that the combination

of a prison law library’s lack of Spanish-language legal materials in combination

with a petitioner’s inability to obtain translation assistance could constitute

extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 1069. The Ninth Circuit cited favorably the

decisions of other Circuits which “have recognized that equitable tolling may be

justified if language barriers actually prevent timely filing.” Id. The Ninth Circuit

“conclude[d] that a non-English-speaking petitioner seeking equitable tolling must,

at a minimum, demonstrate that during the running of the AEDPA time limitation,

he was unable, despite diligent efforts, to procure either legal materials in his own

5

 Petitioner also raises the issue of actual innocence, and argues that because he asserts actual

innocence on counts 1 and 2 of his conviction, he should be entitled “to overcome and pass through

any time bar . . . .” [Doc. No. 31, Objection at 6.] Although an actual innocence claim may remove

the timeliness bar, see United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 890 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003), “[t]o be

credible, [an actual innocence] claim requires petitioner to support his allegations . . . with new

reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial” and “show that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 324, 327 (1995); see also Williams v. Dexter, 649 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 

The Court cautions Petitioner that threadbare arguments without any identification of the new

evidence supporting actual innocence will not render the Petition timely. 

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language or translation assistance from an inmate, library personnel, or other

source.” Id. at 1070. Although Petitioner does not allege that he was unable to

procure legal materials in Spanish, he does argue that he was unable to find

translation assistance. [Doc. No. 31, Objection at 15-16.]

Petitioner in his Objection also raises the argument that his status as a sex

offender contributed to his inability to timely file his Petitioner. Numerous district

courts have found that the fact that a petitioner is a sex offender, standing alone, is

not sufficient to grant equitable tolling because it is neither an extraordinary

circumstance, see, e.g., Britt v. Runnels, 2008 WL 2561111, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June

24, 2008); Barberg v. Quinn, 2007 WL 641850, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2007),

nor a circumstance that is beyond Petitioner’s control, see, e.g., McCoy v. Sisto,

2010 WL 455464, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010); Britt, 2008 WL 2561111, at *4

(“The fact that [petitioner] was convicted of a sex crime, the predicate to the

circumstance in which [petitioner] finds himself, was not a circumstance beyond his

control.”); see also Smith v. Small, 2011 WL 5513227, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10,

2011). 

The Court declines to adopt the R & R to the extent it concludes that

“although Petitioner struggles with English, he has a demonstrated ability to

understand and file legal documents,” which the R & R states is evidenced by his

timely notice of appeal. [Doc. No. 18, R & R at 6.] Petitioner’s Objection makes

clear that he has always had to rely on others for assistance, including for the

drafting of the notice of appeal, and that he does not by himself have the ability to

understand and file legal documents. [Doc. No. 31, Objection at 10, 16.]

Petitioner has raised several factors that he argues affected his ability to timely

file the Petition, including his status as a sex offender and his inability to read and

write in either English or Spanish. Although standing alone, each factor may not

show extraordinary circumstances, Petitioner’s Objection has raised the question that

the factors in combination, in addition to his continuing efforts to obtain assistance,

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may warrant equitable tolling for the period of time following the 6-month period

after he gave his notice of appeal to prison officials. 

Because Petitioner has raised circumstances, which in combination, may

warrant equitable tolling, the Court REMANDS the action to the Magistrate Judge

for further briefing regarding this issue, and an R & R on equitable tolling. The

Court finds that it is inappropriate to resolve the issue of equitable tolling, which is

“highly fact-dependent,” see Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026

(9th Cir. 2005), without further briefing, as this issue was not squarely before the

parties and the Magistrate Judge on the motion to stay. 

III. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner complaining of detention arising from state court proceedings

must obtain a certificate of appealability to file an appeal of the final order in a

federal habeas proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2007). The district court

may issue a certificate of appealability if the petitioner “has made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). To make a

“substantial showing,” the petitioner must “demonstrat[e] that ‘reasonable jurists

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable[.]’” 

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Here, because the Court declines to dismiss the Petition, the

Court DENIES AS MOOT a certificate of appealability. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and DECLINES TO

ADOPT IN PART Magistrate Judge Dembin’s Report and Recommendation. The

Court DENIES the motion to stay as moot as the California Supreme Court denied

Petitioner’s state petition. The Court declines to sua sponte dismiss the Petition, and

REMANDS to the Magistrate Judge to order further briefing regarding the issues of

when Petitioner’s conviction became final and the applicability of equitable tolling,

and to be addressed by R & R. The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the

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motion for an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner may re-file this motion at a later time. 

The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 18, 2013 ______________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

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