Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06818/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06818-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARCHIE CRIPPEN,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

CITY OF FRESNO, and DOES 1

through 40, inclusive

 Defendants.

1:03-CV-6818 OWW DLB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

CITY OF FRESNO’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

(Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P.) 

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant City of Fresno (“City”) moves for summary judgment

against Plaintiff Archie Crippen (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff

opposes the motion. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiff filed the complaint on December 11, 2003. Doc. 1,

Compl. Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint (“FAC”) on

June 17, 2004. Doc. 18, FAC. The City’s answer was filed on

August 3, 2004. Doc. 20, Answer. The City moved for summary

judgment on February 13, 2006. Doc. 58, Mot. for Summ. J.; Doc.

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 1 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

59, Mem. in Supp. Plaintiff filed opposition on March 3, 2006. 

Doc. 81, Mem. in Opp. City replied on March 6, 2006. Doc. 99,

Resp. in Supp. 

III. BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed. 1. On or about January

11, 2003, a debris pile on Plaintiff’s real property at 495 North

Marks Avenue, Fresno, California, caught fire. 2. Plaintiff

operated demolition and recycling businesses on the property, and

had allowed debris from these and other activities to accumulate

into a pile that covered approximately five acres, and ranged in

height from fifteen to thirty feet. 

3. Suppressing the fire took thirty days, and cost in excess

of two million dollars. 4. Due to the size and complexity of the

effort required, the City called on the resources of various

state and federal agencies, including the United States

Environmental Protection Agency. The City also declared a local

emergency as a result of the fire. 

6. After the fire, Plaintiff was cited for numerous

violations of state statutes and municipal codes. 7. Since

Plaintiff did not have the resources to remove the seventy-five

thousand tons of charred debris remaining on his property after

the fire, the City had to do so, at a cost to the City of more

than six million dollars. 

8. Subsequently, the conditional use permits by which

Plaintiff had been allowed to conduct his businesses on the

property were revoked; his low bid on a City demolition project

was rejected on the grounds that he was a “non-responsible

bidder”; and his applications for the demolition permits which he

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 2 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

had to seek from the City in order to perform demolition work

were subjected to a special procedure that resulted in delays in

their issuance. 

9. Plaintiff alleges that these actions by the City violate

his right to the equal protection of the laws, in violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 10.

He brings suit under the Civil Rights Act, Title 42, Section

1983, of the United States Code. 

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Cal.

v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, to

defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must

show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists and (2) that this

factual issue is material. Id. A genuine issue of fact exists

when the non-moving party produces evidence on which a reasonable

trier of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a

whole in light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that

party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216,

1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are “material” if they “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 

Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations without

any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 3 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Cir.2001). The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to the party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to

any material fact,” since a complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrell,

477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

The more implausible the claim or defense asserted by the

non-moving party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to

avoid summary judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N.

Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless,

the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court's role on

summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

Cir. 1996). 

V. ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

11. On or about January 11, 2003, a debris pile on

Plaintiff’s property caught fire. SUMF, #1. 12. As a result of

the fire, the City issued a declaration of local emergency. 

SUMF, #2. 13. Because of the magnitude and complexity of the

fire, the City utilized the assistance of federal, state and

other agencies. SUMF, #4. 14. In the last 15 years, the City

never had to go beyond Fresno County for resources to suppress a

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 4 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

fire. SUMF, #5. 15. Despite the infusion of outside resources,

it took approximately 30 days to suppress the fire. SUMF, #15. 

16. Plaintiff’s debris pile contained primarily wood products. 

SUMF, #17. 17. The pile covered approximately five acres, and

ranged from 15-30 feet in height. SUMF, #18. 18. The cost to

suppress the fire was in excess of two million dollars. SUMF,

#19. 19. Plaintiff told the City that he was financially unable

to properly dispose of the waste material that existed on his

property in violation of law. SUMF, #21. 20. As a result,

government agencies had to remove approximately 75,000 tons of

debris at a cost of over two million dollars. SUMF, #22. 21.

While the fire was still being suppressed, the City issued a

cease operations (“red tag”) order to Plaintiff. SUMF, #26. 22.

Plaintiff violated the cease operations order and continued

operations. SUMF, #27.

VI. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff claims that City violated his right to the equal

protection of the laws in four ways: (1) by revoking his

conditional-use permits (CUPs) after the fire; (2) by applying to

him alone a policy which resulted in delays in the issuance of

demolition permits; (3) by rejecting his bid for a City

demolition project on the grounds that he was a “non-responsible

bidder”; and (4) by “singling him out to bear the burden of the

City’s attempt to bring credibility to its Code Enforcement and

other departments.” Doc. 81, Mem. in Opp., 2. 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

commands that no State shall “deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” which is

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 5 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated

should be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); see also Honolulu Weekly, Inc.

v. Harris, 298 F.3d 1037, 1047(9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff brings his equal-protection claims as a “class of

one” under Title 42, Section 1983, of the United States Code. 

Doc. 81, Mem. in Opp., 12. The equal-protection guarantee

protects not only groups, but individuals who would constitute a

“class of one.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564

(2000); SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d

662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002). Where, as here, state action does not

implicate a fundamental right or a suspect classification, the

plaintiff can establish a “class of one” equal protection claim

by demonstrating that he has been intentionally treated

differently under the law from others similarly situated and that

there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. 

Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. Where an equal-protection claim is based

on “selective enforcement of valid laws,” a plaintiff can show

that the defendants’ rational basis for selectively enforcing the

law is a pretext for “an impermissible motive.” Squaw Valley

Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9 Cir. 2004). th

1. Revocation of Plaintiff’s CUPs

Plaintiff holds contractor’s licenses in earthwork and

paving and demolition. Doc. 81, Mem. in Opp., 6. Plaintiff also

owns and operates truck scales and a concrete-asphalt recycling

business; he conducts these operations on his property located at

495 North Marks Avenue. Id. On or about November 20, 1980, the

County of Fresno issued CUP No. C-1764 to Plaintiff, allowing him

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 6 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

to process concrete, asphalt, and other materials at the Marks

site. Pl.’s Resp. and Opp. to Def.’s Statement of Undisputed

Material Facts [hereinafter, “SUMF”], #83. Upon the annexation

of the Marks Avenue property by the City in or about 1983, this

CUP was grand-fathered to include the Marks Avenue site. SUMF,

#85. 

Beginning around 1988, Plaintiff’s business included the

storage, processing, and recycling of wood which resulted from

the demolition of structures. On December 9, 1994, the City

issued Plaintiff a revised CUP, No. C-94-120, allowing him to

expand his operation onto the property located at 3230 West

Nielsen Avenue in Fresno. Pet. for Writ of Admin. Mand., Sup.

Ct. Case No. 03 CE CG 01766, 2-3. (attached as Ex. A to Doc. 62,

Def.’s Request for Jud. Notice). 

After the fire, on March 7, 2003, Nick P. Yovino, Director

of the Planning and Development Department and the Building

Official of the City, sent Plaintiff a notice that his CUP had

been revoked. The letter cited violations of both the City and

County CUPs, the zoning ordinance, and the municipal code. SUMF,

#121. 

Plaintiff appealed to the City Planning Commission, which,

after a hearing conducted on April 30, 2003, upheld Director

Yovino’s decision. Pet. for Writ of Admin. Mand., 4-5; SUMF,

#25.

Plaintiff initially sought judicial review of the Planning

Commission’s ruling in Fresno County Superior Court, Case No. 03

CE CG 01766. Before the State Court considered Plaintiff’s

request for Administrative Mandamus, he dismissed it voluntarily

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 7 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

on December 8, 2003. SUMF, #142; Request for Dismissal and

Notice of Entry of Dismissal (attached as Ex. F to Doc. 62,

Def.’s Request for Jud. Notice). No ruling was issued by the

Superior Court.

Res Judicata Effect of the Planning Commission’s Decision

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his

judicial remedies bars the court from considering Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claim regarding the Planning Commission’s decision.

“‘Res judicata’ describes the preclusive effect of a final

judgment on the merits. Res judicata, or claim preclusion,

prevents re-litigation of the same cause of action in a second

suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. 

‘Collateral estoppel,’ or ‘issue preclusion,’ precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings. 

Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an

action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be

asserted in a subsequent lawsuit; a judgment for the defendant

serves as a bar to further litigation of the same cause of

action.” Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal.4th 888, 896-97

(2002). 

The Supreme Court has held that res judicata may be applied

to administrative agency actions when (1) an administrative

agency acts in a judicial capacity and (2) resolves disputed

issues of fact properly before it (3) which the parties have had

an adequate opportunity to litigate. See Public Utility Dist.

No. 1 of Snohomish County v. Federal Emergency Management Agency,

371 F.3d 701, 708 (9 Cir. 2004). If these requirements are th

satisfied, the federal courts are to give the state agency’s

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 8 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

decision the same preclusive effect the decision would have in

that state’s courts. Olson v. Morris, 188 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

Under California law, failure to challenge an agency’s

decision rendered in its judicial capacity entitles that decision

to preclusive effect in all subsequent actions. Johnson v. City

of Loma Linda, 24 Cal.4th 61, 69 (2000). 

An administrative agency decision has collateral estoppel

effect when the decision and the agency’s prior proceedings

possess a judicial character. Indicia of proceedings undertaken

in a judicial capacity include a hearing before an impartial

decision maker; testimony given under oath or affirmation; a

party’s ability to subpoena, call, examine, and cross-examine

witnesses, to introduce documentary evidence, and to make oral

and written argument; the taking of a record of the proceeding;

and a written statement of reasons for the decision. Pacific

Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 37 Cal.4th 921,

944 (2006) (citations omitted). 

The Planning Commission’s decision was made under

circumstances that satisfy the judicial capacity requirement. 

The Fresno City Municipal Code authorizes the Commission to hear

appeals from the Director’s decisions. City of Fresno Municipal

Code, Art. 4. At the hearing, Plaintiff was represented by

private counsel of his choice. SUMF, #129. The parties had an

opportunity to present argument, introduce witness testimony,

cross-examine witnesses, introduce documentary evidence and to

object to evidence. Id., #130. Plaintiff was not precluded from

introducing any witness or documentary evidence. Id., #131. 

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 9 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Witnesses were placed under oath and the proceeding was

transcribed by a court reporter. Id., #132. The City had the

burden of proof. Id., #133. The hearing lasted approximately

five hours. Id., #134. Plaintiff presented argument and

evidence that Plaintiff did not violate conditions of his CUPs,

did not create a health and safety problem or public nuisance for

other citizens, did not violate the law and that the City agreed

to his operations. Id., #135. The Planning Commission rejected

Plaintiff’s defenses, found him in violation of numerous CUP

requirements, and directed that its findings be reduced to

writing. Id., #136. The parties had an opportunity to be heard

with respect to the proposed findings and resolution. Id., #137. 

Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his suit for administrative

mandamus before the Superior Court had the opportunity to review

the Commission’s decision against Plaintiff. Request for

Dismissal and Notice of Entry of Dismissal (attached as Ex. F to

Doc. 62, Def.’s Request for Jud. Notice). The agency decision is

a final decision on the merits. The California courts afford the

Commission’s decision preclusive effect, Johnson, 24 Cal.4th at

69. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a federal court must

give the Planning Commission’s final decision the same effect. 

Olson, 188 F.3d at 1086; 28 U.S.C. § 1738.

Plaintiff claims that the Planning Commission did not afford

him an adequate and meaningful opportunity to contest the

revocation of his CUPs. See FEMA, 371 F.3d at 708. His sole

ground for this claim is that the City allegedly suppressed the

report of the State Fire Marshal, which Plaintiff characterizes

as “exculpatory evidence.” See, e.g., SUMF, ##130, 131, 135. 

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 10 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Plaintiff had the right to subpoena the Fire Marshal’s

report, to present it to the Planning Commission, and to seek

review in the judicial mandamus proceeding before the Superior

Court that the City’s alleged suppression of the report denied

him a fair opportunity to litigate before the Commission. In

fact, he did raise this issue in his Administrative Mandamus Writ

Petition, before voluntarily dismissing the Petition. See Pet.,

¶ 17(a). Res judicata bars the court from considering a

collateral attack on the Commission’s decision to revoke

Plaintiff’s CUPs in the absence of Plaintiff’s exhaustion of his

judicial remedies in state court. Misischia v. Pirie, 60 F.3d

626, 630 (9 Cir. 1995); Johnson, 24 Cal.4th at 69. th

Plaintiff argues that res judicata should not bar this cause

of action because the rights being litigated are not the same. 

Before the Planning Commission, Plaintiff defended his property

right to retain his CUPs. Here, he seeks a ruling that the

revocation of his CUPs violated his federal constitutional equalprotection rights. Doc. 81, Mem. in Opp., 28.

In Olson, a Section 1983 plaintiff sought a ruling in

federal court that the revocation of his psychologist’s license

by the State governing board violated his First Amendment

constitutional right to religious freedom. Olson, 188 F.3d at

1085. Like Plaintiff, Olson could have obtained judicial review

of the decision, but did not; instead, he filed suit in federal

court. Olson also argued that claim preclusion did not apply,

because the right at issue before the agency, his license and

right to practice a profession, was different from the right at

issue before the court, his First Amendment civil rights. The

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 11 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

court rejected this argument, stating:

Our examination of the record reveals that the state

administrative process here comported with the

requirements of [United States v.] Utah Construction [&

Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)]. If Olson had

constitutional defenses to the Board’s proceedings, he

had every right to raise them with the Board or on

appeal in state court. Olson’s only stated explanation

for not asserting his constitutional defenses more

vigorously before the Board is that he did not

anticipate losing. But lose he did, and the doctrine

of res judicata bars litigating it again.

Olson, 188 F.3d 1083, 1086-87; accord, Miller v. County of Santa

Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9 Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s claim th

is indistinguishable. His civil rights claim is barred by

failure to exhaust. 

No Similarly Situated Parties

Even if the civil rights claim was not precluded by

Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his state judicial remedies,

Plaintiff has not identified a class to which he is similarly

situated in ways “rationally related to the government’s

mission.” Purze v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455

(7 Cir. 2002). th

The test is whether a prudent person, looking

objectively at the incidents, would think them roughly

equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated. 

Much as in the lawyer’s art of distinguishing cases,

the ‘relevant aspects’ are those factual elements which

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 12 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

determine whether reasoned analogy supports, or

demands, a like result. Exact correlation is neither

likely nor necessary, but the cases must be fair

congeners. In other words, apples should be compared

to apples.

Barrington Cove Ltd. Partnership v. Rhode Island Housing and

Mortg. Finance Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 8 (1 Cir. 2001). st

Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, a class-of-one

equal-protection claim alleging disparate enforcement of

environmental regulations, addresses the “similarly situated”

requirement: 

Here, Squaw Valley contends it is being singled out

from all other dischargers. However, it presents no

evidence that any other discharger is of comparable

size, has a comparable history of non-compliance,

engages in a comparable level of activity on its land,

and has a comparable history of administrative action

being ineffective. As the district court repeatedly

stated, Squaw Valley is not comparing “apples to

apples.”

Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d 936, 945 (9 Cir. 2004). th

A comparison between Plaintiff and any other allegedly

similarly situated party subject to comparable conditions of a

CUP for a comparable land fill or recycling facility must be

made. The Commission found that the conflagration that broke out

on Plaintiff’s property resulted directly from Plaintiff’s

numerous violations of his CUPs – particularly, violation of the

requirements that a maximum of only ten percent of the material

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 13 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

on his property consist of combustibles, and that the use be

limited to “processing,” not storage. Fresno Planning Comm’n

Resol. No. 11850, at 2, 4. (attached as Ex. B to Decl. of Thomas

J. Riggs). Plaintiff has failed to identify any admissible

evidence of a class of, or any, other site operators to whom he

rationally.

Plaintiff argues that there are triable issues of fact

whether Plaintiff is situated similarly to, but treated

differently from, “the City and other holders of CUPs.” Doc. 81,

Mem. in Opp., 20. Plaintiff argues that “the evidence shows the

City itself believed it was similarly situated with [Plaintiff].” 

Id. What the City believed is not relevant to the issue of

whether it was situated similarly to any other party. 

Plaintiff’s evidence raises the issue whether the City has

violated its own CUPs. See Sep. Statement of Disputed Facts

[hereinafter “SSDF”] ##92, 93, 97, 100. (attached as Ex. 2 to

Doc. 81, Mem. in Opp.). Plaintiff’s evidence also raises the

issue whether a fire broke out on land for which a CUP had been

issued to the City. SSDF #96. However, Plaintiff’s evidence

does not show that any City CUP violation caused a local

emergency to be declared based on health and safety threats to

the public, required the help of state and federal agencies, took

thirty days to fully contain, or imposed comparable costs on the

public, or that the City was not financially responsible. 

Plaintiff’s evidence also does not show that the City defied a

red tag order to cease operations. Supra. Any rational

appraisal of these facts shows no similarity between Plaintiff

and any other party. Plaintiff’s inability to meet the

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 14 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

comparability requirement results from Plaintiff’s own conduct. 

Plaintiff presents no evidence that any other party shares any

relevant characteristics with him. 

Finally, based on the numerous CUP violations which the

Commission justifiably found, Plaintiff cannot establish that the

City’s revocation of Plaintiff’s CUPs is entirely irrational or

in any way unjustified. Under rational-basis review, Plaintiff

bears the burden of negating every conceivable basis on which the

government may have relied to revoke his CUPs. See, e.g., Rui

One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137, 1155 (9 Cir. th

2004). It was not irrational for the City to revoke Plaintiff’s

CUPs in view of his gross violation of their conditions, and the

substantial damage to the City and public safety that resulted

from Plaintiff’s violations. 

In its decision upholding Director Yovino’s March 7, 2003,

revocation of Plaintiff’s CUPs, the Planning Commission found

numerous violations both of the CUPs and of the Zoning Ordinance. 

These included:

• [Plaintiff] brought materials onto the Site other than

concrete, asphalt, and Group III [non-combustible]

materials. A large debris pile on the Site contained a wood

content estimated to range from 40 to 90 percent. The Site

also contained large amounts of metal and other trash and

debris. 

• The CUP limited the use on the Site to “processing.”

[Plaintiff] established a debris pile [covering] nearly five

acres [and] upon to 30 feet in height. 

• The accumulation existed for at least seven years and far

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 15 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

exceeded the 180-day transit storage permitted in a

“processing” use. 

• [Plaintiff] expanded the CUP operation and other operations

not permitted by the CUP or zoning onto a 5-acre vacant

parcel [ ] without a City entitlement or City approval. 

• [Plaintiff] operated a public scale without a City

entitlement or City approval. 

• [Plaintiff] expanded his operation to encroach upon a

neighbor’s property without a City entitlement or City

approval. 

• [Plaintiff] operated the Site as a landfill without a City

entitlement or City approval. The landfill consisted of

large amounts of trash, garbage, and debris intermixed with

large amounts of earth and dirt. 

• [Plaintiff] operated on the Site a motor vehicle wrecking

yard, and a junk, rag, and scrap iron storage yard without a

City entitlement or City approval. 

• Eighty disabled truck tractors, various car parts,

inoperable cars, pipes of iron and steel, industrial Ibeams, sheet metal, metal tanks, and metal drums were found

on the Site. 

• [Plaintiff] operated on the Site a dump without a City

entitlement or City approval.

• [Plaintiff] operated a wood waste recycling business on the

Site without a City entitlement or City approval. Wood

waste recycling is not a permitted use under the CUP, and is

not permitted in a M-2 zone district without a site plan

approval and environmental assessment. 

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 16 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

• [Plaintiff] did not obtain a site plan approval or

environmental assessment for wood waste recycling. 

Fresno Planning Comm’n Resol. No. 11850, at 2-3 (attached as Ex.

B to Decl. of Thomas J. Riggs). 

The Planning Commission found Plaintiff’s violations of the

Fresno Municipal Code, the Uniform Fire Code, and the California

Civil Code created a public nuisance: 

• [Plaintiff] created a public nuisance by the storage of

refuse, debris, garbage, scrap metal or lumber, concrete,

asphalt, and tires and without a City entitlement or City

approval.

• [Plaintiff] created a public nuisance by the storage of

combustible materials likely to become easily ignited, and

without a City entitlement or City approval.

• [Plaintiff] created a public nuisance by permitting the

existence of abandoned, wrecked, dismantled, or inoperative

vehicles, and without a City entitlement or City approval.

• [Plaintiff] created a public nuisance by parking or storing

vehicles on unpaved surfaces, and without a City entitlement

or City approval.

• [Plaintiff] created a public nuisance by violating multiple

provisions of the Fresno Zoning Ordinance, including

Sections 12-411-A-B, 12-227.1, 12-227.3, 12-228.3-B-18, 12-

228.3-B-9, 12-228.3-B-25, 12-302.A and B, and 12-408. 

Id., 3. 

The Planning Commission found Plaintiff’s violations of the

Uniform Fire Code created a public nuisance. 

• [Plaintiff] failed to provide adequate fire access roads to

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 17 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

the Site. 

• [Plaintiff] failed to provide an adequate water supply for

fire-fighting purposes on the Site. 

• [Plaintiff] failed to provide adequate fire safety lanes

separating portions of the debris pile. 

• [Plaintiff] created a debris pile in excess of 25 feet in

height, 150 feet in width, and 250 feet in length. The

debris pile was up to 30 feet in height, 300 feet in width,

and 600 feet in length covering nearly five acres.

• [Plaintiff] intentionally violated a lawful City “red tag”

[cease operations] order which prohibited entering or

occupying the Site or any buildings thereon. 

• [Plaintiff] violated Uniform Fire Code Sections 902.1,

903.1, 3008.1, 103.4.3.2, and 103.4.3.3, thereby creating a

public nuisance. 

Id., 3-4. 

Pretext for Discriminatory Enforcement

Plaintiff alleges that there is a disputed issue of fact

regarding whether City’s purported rational bases for revoking

his CUPs are merely pretextual. Plaintiff alleges that the true

motivation for the revocation was animus resulting from the

City’s embarrassment at the magnitude of the violations. Doc.

81, Mem. in Opp., 21. 

In this circuit it is clearly established that a plaintiff

may pursue an equal protection claim by raising a triable issue

of fact as to whether the defendants’ asserted rational basis is 

merely a pretext for differential treatment. Armendariz v.

Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1327 (9 Cir. 1996) (finding equal- th

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 18 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

protection case law clearly established that city officials could

not target plaintiffs for overzealous enforcement of housing

code); Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 700 n.2

(9th Cir. 1999) (“If Defendants’ justification for discriminating

against domestic-violence crimes is nothing more than pretextual,

then Defendants’ actions are arbitrary and violate the Equal

Protection Clause.”).

On summary judgment, an equal protection plaintiff may show

pretext by creating a triable issue of fact that either: (1) the

proffered rational basis was objectively false; or (2) the

defendant actually acted based on an improper motive. See Patel

v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 876 (recognizing that pretext might be

shown if the city was “using its code enforcement process not to

enforce compliance with the codes but rather to drive ...

downtown motels out of business”); Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1327

(finding “a triable issue of fact as to whether the [city's]

asserted rationale of directing efforts to enforce the housing

code in high-crime areas was merely a pretext” to reduce property

values for the city to purchase them at a reduced rate); Lockary

v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1155 (“Although a water moratorium may

be rationally related to a legitimate state interest in

controlling a water shortage” the plaintiffs raised a triable

issue of fact regarding the “very existence of a water

shortage”). Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d

936, 945-46 (9 Cir. 2004). th

In Armendariz, owners of low-income housing brought Section

1983 suits against officials of the City of San Bernardino,

alleging that conducting sweeps and over-enforcing the housing

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 19 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

code to re-locate criminals violated equal protection. The City

had begun vigorously enforcing its housing code several years

previously, resulting in the condemnation of many low-income

housing units, the eviction of suspected criminals, and the

revocation of property owners’ business licenses. The City did

not provide advance warning of the sweeps and did not tell the

owners why their buildings were being shut down until weeks

afterwards. “When the closure notices did arrive, they were

either worded so vaguely as to be unhelpful or cited seemingly

minor . . . violations.” Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1313. 

The City justified its actions by citing a provision of the

municipal code which authorized the building official to close 

buildings that he deemed immediately dangerous. Plaintiffs

argued that this was merely a pretext for one of two real

motives: (1) to force gang members to re-locate outside the City,

or (2) to allow a commercial developer to acquire the property at

a steep discount, raze the low-income housing units, and replace

them with a shopping center. Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1314-15. 

The court of appeals upheld the district court’s denial of

summary judgment on plaintiffs’ equal-protection claims. 

[P]laintiffs relied primarily on an affidavit submitted

by John Edwins, a commercial developer, to support

their claim that the defendants were motivated by a

desire to acquire the plaintiffs’ properties and

replace the low-income housing units with commercial

development. Edwins stated that he had met with [Mayor

William] Holcomb, [City Attorney James] Penman, and

other city officials to discuss and plan a proposed

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 20 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

commercial center on property then occupied by the

plaintiffs’ buildings. According to Edwins, Holcomb

wanted to demolish or relocate the plaintiffs’

buildings and replace them with commercial development

and asked Edwins to purchase the buildings as a third

party “strawman” so that the City’s Redevelopment

Agency could subsequently purchase them from him. In

an effort to mitigate the City’s costs of relocating

the buildings’ tenants and to suppress the value of the

plaintiffs’ properties, Edwins, Holcomb, and Penman

discussed methods of preventing the plaintiffs from

renting currently vacant apartments to tenants. Edwins

suggested the possibility of removing the utility

meters from unoccupied buildings; once the meters were

removed, the plaintiffs could not rent the apartments

without applying to the City for permits. On December

6, 1990, at the request of Holcomb, Edwins delivered to

Penman an inventory of buildings from which meters

could possibly be removed.

Only five days later, two investigators who worked

under Penman’s supervision accompanied two housing code

enforcement officers to the Arden-Guthrie area for a

“cursory inspection.” When the sweeps began about a

month later, the first 35 buildings swept were, with

two exceptions, the buildings included on Edwins’ list

provided to Penman.

Of course, a jury might reject the plaintiffs’ claim

that the defendants were motivated by a desire to

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 21 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

deflate the value of the plaintiffs’ buildings,

purchase them, and replace them with a shopping center. 

However, if proven at trial, the facts alleged by the

plaintiffs are sufficient to support a claim of a

violation of the equal protection clause. 

Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1327.

In Lockary, plaintiffs stated an equal-protection claim by

raising triable issues of fact as to whether the water shortage

asserted as the rationale for denying water hookups was

pretextual. Affidavits showed that, after the imposition of a

moratorium on new water hookups allegedly due to a water

shortage, local water consumption rose by seventy percent, water

storage capacity increased by a factor of twelve, and that

defendant utility had provided water for secondary units and

swimming pools, had voluntarily relinquished rights to certain

water sources, had a leakage rate double that of accepted norms,

and had sufficient water to permit population growth. Lockary,

917 F.2d at 1155-56. 

Here, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation of pretext, that the

City was “out to get him,” because the fire had embarrassed the

City, is unsupported by evidence of animus by word or act of

anyone associated with the City. That the City took precautions

and actions to protect the public against a recurrence of a

public nuisance and public liability and hazards created by

Plaintiff’s fire, having been “once burned,” does not constitute

improper or unjustified discrimination in revoking Plaintiff’s

CUPs. Revoking Plaintiff’s CUPs was not a completely irrational

response to Plaintiff’s consequential violations of his CUPs’

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 22 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

conditions. The magnitude of the costs and harm to the

environment those violations imposed upon the City fully

justified revocation of Plaintiff’s CUPs. Plaintiff proved

himself to be an unreliable operator, who lacked financial

resources, and intentionally defied a cease-and-desist order. 

All were valid non-pretextual reasons to revoke Plaintiff’s CUPs. 

2. Alleged Delays in the Issuance of Demolition Permits

Plaintiff claims that the City violated Plaintiff’s right to

equal protection by applying, only to him, a procedure for the

issuance of demolition permits that resulted in delays. Doc. 81,

Mem. in Opp., 9-10, 19. As a demolition contractor, Plaintiff

periodically needed to obtain demolition permits from the City,

which are issued by the Building and Safety Division. The City

concedes that on March 7, 2003, at the direction of City Manager

Hobbs, a notation was put into the Building and Safety Division’s

computer system which required staff to obtain Director Yovino’s

personal approval for each demolition permit issued to Plaintiff. 

Id., 10; Doc. 99, Resp. in Supp., 5. There is no dispute

Plaintiff’ was thereby singled out for special scrutiny. 

In the permitting process, a period of several days on one

occasion is the longest Plaintiff alleges any particular

demolition permit issuance was delayed. Doc. 81, Mem. in Opp,

10. Most of the “delays” amounted at most to hours. Id. 

Plaintiff obtained every demolition permit for which he applied

after the fire. Plaintiff admits he has never lost any work on

account of the alleged delays in demolition permit issuance. 

SUMF, ##78, 79.

The City defends its policy:

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 23 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

After the fire and all the problems associated

therewith, the upper levels of City management wanted

to be apprised of Plaintiff’s business activities with

the City. Given the recent history, Plaintiff’s

disrespect for public safety and welfare, his violation

of laws and ordinances, and the catastrophic events

that took place on his property, it was completely

rational for the City to undertake this action. 

Doc. 92, Resp. in Supp., 5. 

Plaintiff cites only Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v.

County of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 822 (9 Cir. 2003). See SUMF, th

#78. In Carpinteria, plaintiff landowner alleged in a Section

1983 action, inter alia, equal protection violations based on the

county’s delay in issuing a conditional use permit for his

projected building of a polo course on his property. Carpinteria, 344 F.3d at 830. The delay at in that case was nine

years. Id. Plaintiff alleges no such unreasonable delay in this

case. 

In SeaRiver Maritime Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662

(9 Cir. 2002), the owners and operator of the former Exxon th

Valdez challenged on class-of-one equal-protection grounds a

federal statute that singled out the tanker for exclusion from

the waters of Prince William Sound. SeaRiver “argue[d] that

burdening one ship by excluding it from Prince William Sound

results in treatment unequal to other ships that have in the past

spilled large amounts of oil,” and, like Plaintiff in this case,

alleged that the disparate treatment arose from political animus. 

SeaRiver, 309 F.3d at 679. 

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 24 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

The court upheld the statute, holding,

It is reasonable for Congress to single out the Exxon

Valdez due to the magnitude of the spill and the

sensitivity of the area where the spill occurred. It

is also rational for Congress to use this past disaster

as a measure of future performance to specifically bar

the Exxon Valdez from transporting oil through Prince

William Sound, an area that Congress has accorded

special statutory protection. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff claims that his son, Archie Lee Crippen, is

situated similarly to Plaintiff, but was treated differently

regarding the issuance of demolition permits. As set forth in

Archie Lee Crippen’s declaration: (1) he is an excavation and

demolition contractor holding Class A (general engineering) and

Class C21 (demolition) licenses from the California Contractors

State License Board; (2) he learned the demolition business from

Plaintiff; (3) he worked full-time for his father for twenty-two

years until 1993, when he left and formed his own business; (4)

he has performed many competitively bid demolition contracts for

the City; (5) he has hauled hundreds of truck loads of

construction debris to Plaintiff’s property; (6) he has two

criminal convictions; (7) he has an un-permitted structure on his

property; (8) he has violated a City red tag order; (9) he has

sued public entities, and in one case recently obtained a verdict

against the State. Doc. 81, Mem. in Opp., 19. 

These circumstances do not make Archie Lee Crippen’s

business and activities comparable to Plaintiff’s. Based on the

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 25 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

magnitude of environmental and liability problems, Plaintiff’s

threatening public health and safety at great public expense, his 

lack of financial responsibility and inability to remediate the

problems he was responsible for, Plaintiff was justifiably

singled out as a financially irresponsible and uncooperative

operator who needed to be particularly scrutinized. In view of

his undisputed failings as an operator of the dump site, the City

was fully justified in taking a close look at each demolition

permit Plaintiff sought, to determine his ability to perform

under each bid’s terms and conditions. It was rational for the

City to apply closer scrutiny and review before it issued

demolition permits to Plaintiff, given the past disaster for

which the Commission found him to be largely responsible, and the

likelihood that new demolition jobs would generate more debris

which would be deposited at Plaintiff’s recycling site. See

Order, supra at 11 (preclusive effect of this determination). 

3. The City’s Rejection of Plaintiff’s Bid on the Grounds that

He was a “Non-Responsible Bidder”

Section 1208 of the Fresno City Charter requires that every

contract subject to competitive bidding be let to the lowest

“responsive and responsible” bidder. The City Council may reject

any and all bids presented and re-advertise in its discretion. 

Fresno City Charter § 1208(a), (a)(4). 

In 2002, the City posted an invitation to bid for the

demolition of a building on 226 East Whites Bridge Avenue. SUMF,

#34. On March 25, 2003, Plaintiff was the low bidder for the

contract. Doc. 81, Mem. in Opp, 10; Decl. of Janet Smith, ¶ 3. 

The City then rejected all bids. SUMF, #35. In the

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 26 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

interim, the Council passed Resolution No. 2003-129, which

provides a definition for the term “non-responsible bidder,”

which Charter Section 1208 had not previously included:

A non-responsible bidder includes, but is not limited

to, one who does not possess the skill, judgment,

financial or functional ability, or integrity to

perform satisfactorily the proposed contract[.]

Resol. No. 2003-129. 

The City then re-bid the contract, and Plaintiff was again

the low bidder. SUMF, #36. The City subsequently determined

that Plaintiff was a non-responsible bidder and sent him a letter

advising him of the reasons for its determination. SUMF, #37. 

On Plaintiff’s appeal to a hearing officer, the determination was

upheld. SUMF, ##38-40. The contract was later awarded to

Plaintiff’s son, Archie Lee Crippen. SUMF, #41.

The letter the City sent to Plaintiff stated as one reason

for its determination that Plaintiff was a non-responsible bidder

and for its rejection of Plaintiff’s low bid, the fact that the

project required “the removal and legal disposal of all rubbish

and debris.” The letter also cited as grounds, the recent

revocation of Plaintiff’s CUPs for multiple violations, and his

defiance of a cease-operations order.

As the principal owner of Archie Crippen Excavation,

Archie C. Crippen has demonstrated that he does not

possess the judgment, functional ability, or integrity

to perform satisfactorily the proposed contract. 

Decl. of Janet Smith, Ex. B. 

Plaintiff has not submitted evidence that the City’s

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 27 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

determination was an irrational exercise of its discretion or

that it was based on false or contrived grounds. Plaintiff did

not seek judicial review of the City’s administrative nonresponsible bidder determination. These administrative decisions

are also claim-preclusive. Olson, 188 F.3d at 1086-87. The City

could rationally determine that Plaintiff lacked the financial

ability to successfully prosecute the demolition contract, since

he expressly represented to the City that he was financially

unable to dispose of the debris remaining on his property

(shifting the cost to the City). The City’s determination that

Plaintiff lacked the judgment and integrity to do so is likewise

not irrational, given Plaintiff’s numerous violations of his

CUPs, and his defiance of a City-issued cease-operations order. 

Plaintiff also claims that Archie Lee Crippen was situated

similarly to him for the purposes of the non-responsible bidder

determination. Doc. 81, Mem. in Opp., 20. This argument fails

for the same reasons it failed regarding the demolition permits

delay, supra. 

VI. CONCLUSION

Although this decision includes factual as well as legal

analysis, no material facts are in dispute on Plaintiff’s claims.

There is no question that Plaintiff was singled out based on his

performance failures, lack of financial responsibility, and

intentional violation of a justified stop order. Plaintiff’s

failure to pursue judicial review of the City’s actions against

him on CUPs, responsible bidder status, and demolition permits

bars litigation of these federal civil rights claims. 

For all the reasons stated above, the City’s motion for

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 28 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

summary judgment is GRANTED. 

SO ORDERED

DATED: May _4__, 2006.

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

____________________________

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

Case 1:03-cv-06818-OWW -DLB Document 105 Filed 05/04/06 Page 29 of 29