Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00757/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00757-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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Robert Gaines is no longer the Warden of the Perry County

Correctional Center. Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of Rule

25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, David O. Streiff, as

Warden of that facility, is substituted for Gaines as a proper

Respondent in this action.

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Petitioner has been in the actual custody of David O. Streiff,

Warden of the Perry County Correctional Center in Uniontown, Alabama. 

“Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present

physical custody with the United States, he should name his warden as

respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement.” 

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

FRANK PIERRE, : 

Petitioner, : 

v. : 

CIVIL ACTION 06-0757-CG-M 

ALBERTO GONZALES, : 

MICHAEL CHERTOFF,

WARDEN DAVID O. STREIFF,1 : 

Respondents. : 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by Frank Pierre, a

citizen and native of Haiti, who has been detained by the U.S.

Department of Homeland Security (Doc. 1).2 This action has been

referred for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(c) and is now ready for

consideration. The record is adequate to determine Petitioner's

claims; no evidentiary hearing is required. It is recommended

that the instant petition be dismissed as premature.

In his petition, Pierre states that he entered this country

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in 1967, as a four-year-old, under his father’s citizenship (Doc.

1, p. 4). Petitioner asserts that he was taken into custody by

agents of the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(hereinafter ICE), on August 5, 2006, and has been in custody

ever since (Doc. 1, p. 3). Petitioner filed this action on

November 3, 2006 (Doc. 1). He maintains that he has been

detained for too long and that such detention is improper (id. at

pp. 4-5). Pierre seeks release from custody (id.). 

Respondents have provided information which demonstrates

that Pierre entered this country on October 21, 1967 as a lawful

permanent citizen(see Doc. 11, Exhibit A, p. 2). Further

evidence demonstrates that Petitioner was convicted of thirddegree criminal possession of a weapon on November 20, 1997 and

fourth-degree grand larceny on February 1, 2000, both in the

State of New York (see id.); for these convictions, Pierre was

sentenced to time served and five years probation for the

possession and one and one-half to three years in prison for the

larceny (see id. at p. 3). On January 20, 2004, an Immigration

Judge found that Petitioner was a removable alien under the

Immigration and Nationality Act and ordered that he be deported

to Haiti (see id.). Petitioner’s appeal to the Board of

Immigration Appeal (hereinafter BIA) was denied on June 15, 2004

(Doc. 11, Exhibit D); a week later, a warrant of removal/

deportation was issued for Pierre (Doc. 11, Exhibit E). 

On July 15, 2004 Pierre sought review of the BIA decision in

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The Court notes that 8 U.S.C. § 1231, entitled “Detention and

removal of aliens ordered removed,” states, in pertinent part, as

follows: 

(a) Detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered removed

(1) Removal period

(A) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section,

when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney

General shall remove the alien from the United

States within a period of 90 days (in this

section referred to as the "removal period").

(B) Beginning of period

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the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York (see

Doc. 11, Exhibit F); the action was stayed (Doc. 11, Exhibit G). 

Subsequently, Pierre’s action was transferred to the Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit with the stay of removal still in

place (Doc. 11, Exhibit H). The appellate court had oral

argument on November 27, 2006, but had not issued a ruling as of

February 7, 2007 (see Doc. 11, Exhibit I). 

Respondents have filed an Answer, stating that this action

is premature as Petitioner’s request for review in the Second

Circuit Court of Appeals is still pending before that Court (Doc.

11). Respondents further assert that no final order of removal

has been entered, so this action should be dismissed (id.). The

Court notes that Petitioner has filed no Reply to these

arguments.

The United States Supreme Court, in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001), held that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers

jurisdiction on federal courts to entertain actions such as this. 

In interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1231,3 the Zadvydas Court held that

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The removal period begins on the latest of the

following:

(i) The date the order of removal becomes

administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially

reviewed and if a court orders a stay

of the removal of the alien, the date

of the court's final order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined

(except under an immigration

process), the date the alien is

released from detention or

confinement.

(C) Suspension of period

The removal period shall be extended beyond a

period of 90 days and the alien may remain in

detention during such extended period if the

alien fails or refuses to make timely

application in good faith for travel or other

documents necessary to the alien's departure or

conspires or acts to prevent the alien's removal

subject to an order of removal.

8 U.S.C.A. § 1231. 

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the statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a

period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal

from the United States. It does not permit indefinite

detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. The Court went on to

hold that “six months [was] a presumptively reasonable period of

time to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation” pursuant

to § 1231. See Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1051 (11th

Cir. 2002). The Zadvydas Court further stated, however, that “an

alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 

In Akinwale, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that

the six-month-period “must have expired at the time [the

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Even though there have been no pleadings filed in this action

since Respondent’s Answer of February 9, 2007, this action was filed

prematurely. This is so in spite of what might have happened in the

Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the intervening period of time.

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Petitioner’s] petition was filed in order to state a claim under

Zadvydas.” Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052. The Akinwale Court also

noted that the six-month-period could be interrupted by a

petitioner’s motion for a stay of deportation or removal; this

interruption would necessarily include whatever time was needed

for the court, to which such motion had been made, to rule. 

Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052 n.4. 

The evidence of record shows that the Order of Removal

became administratively final on June 15, 2004 when the BIA

denied Petitioner’s appeal (Doc. 11, Exhibit D). So the sixmonth detention clock did not begin running until the next day. 

On July 19, 2004, a Stay was entered pursuant to Pierre’s filing

an action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of

New York (Doc. 11, Exhibit G). Barely more than a month had

passed since Petitioner’s Removal Order had become final when the

Stay was entered. Nothing in our records indicates that the Stay

has been lifted (see Doc. 11, Exhibit I). On this ground alone,

the Court finds that Pierre has not shown that he has been

detained for a period of six months prior to the filing of this

action as required in Akinwale. This action is premature.4

Therefore, it is recommended that this action be dismissed

as premature and that judgment be entered in favor of Respondents

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Alberto Gonzales, Michael Chertoff, and David O. Streiff and

against Petitioner Frank Pierre.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the

district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an

attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404

(5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging

the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set

out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which

provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing

a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time

is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to

which objection is made and the basis for the

objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a

brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the

magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de

novo and a different disposition made. It is

insufficient to submit only a copy of the original

brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a

copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred

to and incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the

objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 9th day of August, 2007.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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