Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01251/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01251-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW L. SMELTZER,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 14-cv-1251-WQH-WVG

ORDER

vs.

AUDREY KING,

Respondent.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the review of the Report and Recommendation

(ECF No. 17) issued by the United States Magistrate Judge . 

I. Background

In 2010, the San Diego District Attorney’s Office filed an Amended Petition for

Involuntary Treatment of a Sexually Violent Predator under California Welfare and

Institutions Code § 6600 et seq. against Petitioner Matthew L. Smeltzer. (ECF No. 15-1

at 20-23). A jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Smeltzer was a sexually violent

predator, and the trial court ordered that Smeltzer be committed to the Department of

Mental Health for an indeterminate term. See ECF No. 15-1 at 133-136; Cal. Welf. &

Inst. Code § 6604. Smeltzer filed a direct appeal of his commitment in the California

Court of Appeal in June 2012. (ECF No. 15-2 at 92). In August 2013, the California

Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s rulings in an unpublished opinion. (ECF No.

15-5).

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In May 2014, Smeltzer commenced this action by filing a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1). In June 2014, this Court issued an Order construing the

action as a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No.

2). In May 2015, Smeltzer filed the First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(the “Petition”). (ECF No. 8). Respondent Audrey King filed an Answer in July 2015. 

(ECF No. 15). In August 2015, Smeltzer filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 16). 

In February 2016, the United States Magistrate Judge issued the Report and

Recommendation, recommending that this court deny the Petition. (ECF No. 17). In

June 2016, the Court issued an Order appointing counsel to represent Smeltzer. (ECF

No. 19). In April 2017, Smeltzer filed an Objection to the Report and

Recommendation. (ECF No. 28). King filed a Reply in May 2017. (ECF No. 30). 

II. Legal Standard

The duties of the district court in connection with a report and recommendation

of a magistrate judge are set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28

U.S.C. § 636(b). The district judge must “make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b). 

III. Analysis

Smeltzer’s Petition asserts the following five grounds for relief: (1) the trial court

violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when it prevented his counsel

from asking expert witnesses certain questions; (2) the instructions given to his jury

violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; (3) his indeterminate

commitment violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection; (4) his

indeterminate commitment violated his rights under the Due Process Clause, the Ex

Post Facto Clause, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause; and (5) his

indeterminate commitment violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth

Amendment. The Court addresses each ground for relief below.

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A. Ground One: The Expert Witness Testimony 

1. Background

The California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6604 provides that, if “the court

or jury determines that [a] person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be

committed for an indeterminate term to the custody of the State Department of State

Hospitals for appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure facility . . . .” A 

“[s]exually violent predator” is “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent

offense . . . and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to

the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually

violent criminal behavior.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(1). A “‘[d]iagnosed

mental disorder’ includes a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or

volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts

in a degree constituting the person a menace to the health and safety of others.” Id. at

§ 6600(d).

At Smeltzer’s trial, the government called two expert witnesses (Dr. Robert Owen

and Dr. Eric Simon) and Smeltzer called one (Dr. Alan Abrams). (ECF No. 17 at 11-

12). All three experts testified about the standard that they used to determine whether

Smeltzer has a “volitional impairment,” id. at 10-17, i.e. a “condition affecting [his] .

. . volitional capacity that predisposes [him] to the commission of criminal sexual acts

in a degree constituting [him] a menace to the health and safety of others,” Cal. Welf.

& Inst. Code § 6600(a)(1). However, the trial court did not permit Smeltzer’s counsel

to ask certain specific questions about People v. Burris,126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2002). Id. Smeltzer contends that the trial court violated his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process when it prevented his counsel from asking those

questions. (ECF No. 8 at 6). On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal held that

the trial court’s decision not to allow Smeltzer’s counsel to ask those questions did not

violate Smeltzer’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 15-5 at 14). 

After noting that Smeltzer’s counsel’s examination of Dr. Abrams “includ[ed]

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a lengthy discussion of Dr. Abrams’ definition of volitional impairment,” the

Magistrate Judge concluded that “Petitioner’s counsel was not precluded from

presenting expert witness testimony on the issue of volitional impairment. Thus,

Petitioner has not established that the ‘evidentiary decision’ to preclude Dr. Abrams

from testifying about case law ‘created an absence of fundamental fairness that fatally

infected the trial.’” ECF No. 17 at 16-17 (citing Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891,

897 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Smeltzer objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that his counsel was not

precluded from presenting testimony on volitional impairment. (ECF No. 28 at 3). 

2. Discussion

The Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”) because it was filed after April 24, 1996 and Petitioner is in

custody pursuant to a state court judgment. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336

(1997). Under the AEDPA, a court may not grant a habeas petition “with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state

court’s judgment “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law” or “was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence

are generally not a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S.

447, 457 (1913). A habeas petitioner is only entitled to relief based on an evidentiary

decision “if the evidentiary decision created an absence of fundamental fairness that

‘fatally infected the trial.’” Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 897 (quoting Keaohapauole v.

Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Smeltzer does not contend that the trial court prevented his counsel from asking

any questions related to the volitional impairment issue other than those dealing with

the specifics of Burris. Trial courts establish the law of the case, and witnesses are

typically prohibited from testifying about the law. Summers v. A.L. Gilbert Co., 82 Cal.

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Rptr. 2d 162, 175-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). However, expert witnesses are sometimes

asked to opine on “the ultimate issue to be decided by a trier of fact,” such as whether

a person is insane. People v. Lowe, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 860, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 

One such “ultimate issue” is whether “a person meets or does not meet statutory criteria

for classification as a sexually violent predator.” Id. California’s Sexually Violent

Predator’s Act “specifically contemplates [that] the trier of fact will have the benefit of

expert opinion and analysis. (See § 6603, subds. (a) & (c)(1) [both parties may obtain

expert evaluations and present expert testimony]).” Id. at 863-64. Experts testifying on

this issue are permitted to articulate the standard they used to form their opinion;

otherwise, “the jury would not know[] whether the experts’ opinions were based on the

appropriate criteria.” Id. at 864. It does not follow that expert witnesses presenting

their opinion on whether someone qualifies as a sexually violent predator must be

permitted to discuss the specifics of every case involving a sexually violent predator

classification; such discussions are not required for the jury to “know[] whether the

experts’ opinions were based on the appropriate criteria.” Id. at 864. 

The trial judge’s decision not to allow certain questions about the details of

Burris did not prevent Smeltzer’s counsel from questioning the experts about the

volitional impairment standard they used to form their opinions. Nor did it “create[] an

absence of fairness that ‘fatally infected the trial.’” Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d

891, 897 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Keaohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th

Cir. 1986)).1 The California Court of Appeal correctly concluded that the trial court’s

decision not to allow the specific Burris questions did not violate Smeltzer’s Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Consequently, Smeltzer is not entitled to habeas relief based on that

decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

B. Ground Two: The Jury Instructions

1 Smeltzer also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Smeltzer’s counsel

primarily elicited the government’s experts’ testimony on Burris. (ECF No. 28 at 2). The

analysis in Part III.A.2 applies whether or not the government’s experts’ testimony on Burris

was primarily elicited by Smeltzer’s counsel.

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In Kansas v. Crane, the United States Supreme Court held that involuntarily

confining someone because of a disorder that makes the person dangerous violates due

process unless the person has serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior. 534

U.S. 407, 413 (2002). Smeltzer’s Petition contends that his right to due process was

violated because the instructions given to the jury at his trial did not state that his

disorder must “seriously” affect his ability to control his emotions and behavior. (ECF

No. 8 at 32). The California Court of Appeal held that any error in Smeltzer’s jury

instructions was harmless and therefore did not violate Smeltzer’s right to due process. 

(ECF No. 17 at 5). The Magistrate Judge agreed with the California Court of Appeal

on the grounds that “the seriousness required was conveyed to the jurors” by the

government’s case in chief, Smeltzer’s case in chief, the closing arguments, and “the

jury instructions as a whole.” Id. at 20. Smeltzer objects to the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion. (ECF No. 28 at 3-4).

Smeltzer’s argument is very similar to the argument rejected by the Supreme

Court of California in People v. Williams, 74 P.3d 779 (Cal. 2003). In that case, the 

“defendant was committed under the SVPA by a jury that received instructions in the

statutory language. However, the jury was not separately and specifically instructed on

the need to find serious difficulty in controlling behavior. [The d]efendant claim[ed]

a separate ‘control’ instruction was constitutionally necessary under Kansas v. Crane.” 

Id. at 780. The Supreme Court of California rejected the defendant’s argument, stating

By its express terms, the SVPA limits persons eligible for commitment to

those few who have already been convicted of violent sexual offenses

against multiple victims (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1)), and who have “diagnosed

mental disorder[s]” (ibid.) “affecting the emotional or volitional capacity”

(id., subd. (c)) that “predispose[ ] [them] to the commission of criminal

sexual acts in a degree constituting [them] menace[s] to the health and

safety of others” (ibid.), such that they are “likely [to] engage in sexually

violent criminal behavior” (id., subd. (a)(1)). This language inherently

encompasses and conveys to a fact finder the requirement of a mental

disorder that causes serious difficulty in controlling one’s criminal sexual

behavior. The SVPA’s plain words thus suffice “to distinguish the

dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or

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disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical

recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.” (Kansas v. Crane . . .

Id. (alterations in original).

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis in the Report and

Recommendation and the Supreme Court of California’s analysis in People v. Williams. 

The California Court of Appeal correctly concluded that the language of the jury

instructions did not violate Smeltzer’s right to due process. Consequently, Smeltzer is

not entitled to habeas relief based on the jury instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

C. Grounds Three, Four, and Five: The Indeterminate Commitment

Smeltzer’s Petition contends that his indeterminate commitment violates the Ex

Post Facto Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. (ECF No. 8 at 8-9). 

The Magistrate Judge concluded that Smeltzer’s involuntary commitment violated none

of those clauses. (ECF No. 20 at 20-24). Smeltzer objects to the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion, but provides no support for his objection. The Court agrees with the

Magistrate Judge that, under the current state of the law, Smeltzer is not entitled to relief

based on his claims brought under the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Double Jeopardy

Clause, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and

the Due Process Clause. 

/ / / 

IV. Conclusion

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 17)

is adopted in its entirety. Smeltzer’s First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

is DENIED without prejudice. 

DATED: November 16, 2017

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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