Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03435/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03435-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3435

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Troy K. Scheffler

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Messerli & Kramer P.A.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

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 Submitted: June 8, 2015

 Filed: June 29, 2015

[Published]

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Before LOKEN, BYE, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

In September 2009, law firm (and Appellee in this case) Messerli & Kramer,

P.A. (Messerli), obtained a default judgment for its client, Capital One Bank, against

Troy Scheffler, the Appellant in this case and a former debt collector himself. Having

learned that Scheffler, at that time, had a reputation as “the most litigious debtor” in

Minnesota, Messerli instructed its employees not to contact Scheffler about his file. 

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According to Scheffler, he nonetheless sent a cease-and-desist letter to Messerli in

March 2011. Messerli says it received no letter, Scheffler never produced one in the

district court, and there is no letter in the record on appeal.

Messerli attempted to enforce the judgment against Scheffler by serving him

with a garnishment summons in April 2014. The summons informed Scheffler that

it was “from a debt collector and is an attempt to collect a debt.” Scheffler returned

to Messerli a printed Exemption Form, which Messerli had included with the

garnishment summons. On that form he claimed that all of the money the bank had

frozen was protected, but he gave no reason why it was protected. Instead, he

asserted that the source of the money in his account was “[his] butt” and that he was

entitled to death benefits because he “died and payed [his] death with poop money.” 

He also wrote on the form, “I told you that you were wasting your time and money.”

Scheffler then enlisted an attorney who sent a letter to Messerli asking it to

honor the cease-and-desist request Scheffler purportedly had sent. The letter also

asserted that Scheffler is “judgment proof” and suggested Messerli redirect its “debt

collection energies in a different direction from Mr. Scheffler.”

Scheffler then, acting pro se, sued Messerli in federal court under various

sections ofthe Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),theFair CreditReporting

Act (FCRA), and state laws. Messerli moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Scheffler responded and then, through counsel, moved to amend his

complaint. The district court held a hearing on both motions. At the end of the

hearing, the district court denied Scheffler’s motion to amend and granted Messerli’s

motion to dismiss. We review de novo the court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). 

1

On appeal, Scheffler briefly mentions the denial of his motion to amend, but

1

he nowhere explains why he thinks that denial was improper. Thus, he has waived

this issue, see Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Dev., LLC, 526 F.3d 343, 355 n.12 (8th Cir.

2008), and we will not address it further. Because the district court denied the motion

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Appellate Case: 14-3435 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/29/2015 Entry ID: 4289480 
County of Ramsey v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 776 F.3d F.3d 947, 950 (8th Cir.

2014). 

On appeal, Scheffler first argues that Messerli improperly pulled his credit

report twice, only nine days apart, despite his letter requesting a cease. But there is

no evidence that Scheffler requested Messerli cease its communications with him. 

The letter fromhis attorneymerely asksthat Messerli honor the earlier letter Scheffler

allegedly had sent and of which, as we noted, there is no evidence. And even if there

were a cease letter, Messerli’s communications did not violate it. A creditor may

communicate with a debtor after receiving a cease letter “to notify the consumer that

the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily

invoked by such debt collector or creditor.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c)(2). That is exactly

what the garnishment letter was—a notification thatCapital One would be attempting

to collect the debt Scheffler owed.

Scheffler also argues that Messerli failed to send him notice of its use or

viewing of his credit reports. But under the FCRA, Messerli could request

Scheffler’s credit report for use “in connection with a credit transaction involving the

consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of

credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1681b(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). The consumer report that Messerli obtained

involved Scheffler, “the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished,” and

involved the “collection of an account of” Scheffler’s to pay the debt he owes to

Capital One. Messerli did not need to notify Scheffler before reviewing that

information.

to amend, and because Scheffler fails to contest that decision in this court, any

reference to the complaint is to the original document and not the proposed amended

complaint.

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Scheffler next argues that the garnishment summons constituted an “adverse

action” that requires notice to the debtor. But service of a garnishment summons is

not listed in the FRCA’s definition of an “adverse action” requiring notice to the

consumer. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m(a)(1)(requirement of notice), 1681a(k) (defining

“adverse action”). And Scheffler cites no authority for his assertion that the

garnishment summons qualifies under § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(iv)(II) as “an action taken or

determination that is . . . adverse to the interests of the consumer.”

Last, Scheffler loosely argues that the district court incorrectly dismissed his

state-law claim alleging invasion of privacy. Minnesota recognizes a claim for relief

for invasion of privacy based on a theory of “intrusion upon seclusion.” See Lake v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998). But to state a claimunder

that theory, the plaintiff must allege, among other things, that he had a legitimate

expectation of privacy in the secluded matter. Swarthout v. Mut. Serv. Life Ins. Co.,

632 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). The intrusion on the secluded

information also must be “highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable [person].” Id.

at 745 (quotation omitted).

The collection of the bank-account information here was not “highly

offensive”; in fact, it was authorized by law. Minnesota Statute § 550.011 advises

that if a judgment is left unsatisfied for 30 days, an attorney for the creditor on that

judgment may request information from the debtor regarding the debtor’s assets,

liabilities, and personal earnings. In other words, Messerli (the attorney for creditor

Capital One) could request from Scheffler, or request the Minnesota court to obtain,

his banking information. 

For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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