Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-19-15716/USCOURTS-ca9-19-15716-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

INNOVATION LAW LAB; CENTRAL

AMERICAN RESOURCE CENTER OF

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA; CENTRO

LEGAL DE LA RAZA; UNIVERSITY OF

SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL OF LAW

IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION

DEFENSE CLINIC; AL OTRO LADO;

TAHIRIH JUSTICE CENTER,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

CHAD WOLF, Acting Secretary of

Homeland Security, in his official

capacity; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY; KENNETH T.

CUCCINELLI, Acting Director, U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration

Services, in his official capacity;

ANDREW DAVIDSON, Acting Chief

of Asylum Division, U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration

Services, in his official capacity;

UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND

IMMIGRATION SERVICES; TODD C.

OWEN, Executive Assistant

Commissioner, Office of Field

Operations, U.S. Customs and

Border Protection, in his official

No. 19-15716

D.C. No.

3:19-cv-00807-

RS

OPINION

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2 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

capacity; U.S. CUSTOMS AND

BORDER PROTECTION; MATTHEW T.

ALBENCE, Acting Director, U.S.

Immigration and Customs

Enforcement, in his official capacity;

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS

ENFORCEMENT,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 1, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed February 28, 2020

Before: Ferdinand F. Fernandez, William A. Fletcher,

and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher;

Dissent by Judge Fernandez

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 3

SUMMARY*

Immigration /Preliminary Injunctions

The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of a

preliminary injunction setting aside the Migrant Protection

Protocols (“MPP”), under which non-Mexican asylum

seekers who present themselves at the southern border of the

United States are required to wait in Mexico while their

asylum applications are adjudicated.

After the MPP went into effect in January 2019,

individual and organizational plaintiffs sought an injunction,

arguing, inter alia, that the MPP is inconsistent with the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and that they have

a right to a remedy under the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”). The district court issued a preliminary injunction

setting aside the MPP.

The Government appealed and requested an emergency

stay in this court pending appeal. In three written opinions,

a motions panel unanimously granted the emergency stay. In

a per curiam opinion, the motions panel disagreed, by a vote

of two to one, with the district court’s holding that plaintiffs

were likely to succeed in their statutory argument that the

MPP is inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Judge Watford

concurred in that opinion, but wrote separately to express

concern that the MPP is arbitrary and capricious because it

lacks sufficient non-refoulement protections. Judge Fletcher

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

concurred only in the result, arguing that the MPP was

inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

The current panel first noted that the individual plaintiffs,

all of whom have been returned to Mexico under the MPP,

obviously have standing. The panel also concluded that the

organizational plaintiffs have standing, noting their decreased

ability to carry out their core missions as well as diversion of

their resources.

Addressing the question of whether a merits panel is

bound by the analysis of a motions panel on a question of

law, the panel followed East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v.

Trump, Nos. 18-17274 and 18-17436 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2020),

argued on the same day as this case, in which the court held

that a motions panel’s legal analysis, performed during the

course of deciding an emergency motion for a stay, is not

binding on later merits panels. The panel also concluded that,

even if a merits panel may be bound in some circumstances

by a motions panel, this panel would not be bound: two of the

three judges on the motions panel disagreed in part with the

Government’s legal arguments in support of the MPP, and the

panel’s per curiam opinion did not purport to decide

definitively the legal questions presented. In this respect, the

panel noted that Judge Fletcher specifically addressed the

effect of the legal analysis of the motions panel and expressed

the hope that the merits panel, with the benefit of full briefing

and argument, would decide the legal questions differently.

On the merits, the panel concluded that plaintiffs had

shown a likelihood of success on their claim that the returnto-Mexico requirement of the MPP is inconsistent with

§ 1225(b). The Government argued that the MPP is

authorized by § 1225(b)(2), which provides that, for certain

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 5

aliens arriving on land from a foreign territory contiguous to

the United States, the Attorney General may return the aliens

to that territory pending removal proceedings. Plaintiffs

argued, however, that they were arriving aliens under

§ 1225(b)(1), rather than under § 1225(b)(2), and pointed out

that there is a contiguous territory return provision in § (b)(2),

but no such provision in § (b)(1).

The panel agreed, explaining that there are two distinct

categories of “applicants for admission” under § 1225. First,

there are applicants described under § 1225(b)(1), who are

inadmissible based on either of two grounds, both of which

relate to their documents or lack thereof. Such applicants

may be placed in either expedited removal proceedings or

regular removal proceedings under § 1229a. Second, there

are applicants described under § 1225(b)(2), who are, in the

words of the statute, “other aliens,” “to whom paragraph

[(b)](1)” does not apply; that is, § (b)(2) applicants are those

who are inadmissible on grounds other than the two specified

in § (b)(1). Such applicants are placed in regular removal

proceedings. The panel noted that both § (b)(1) and § (b)(2)

applicants can be placed in regular removal proceedings

under § 1229a, though by different routes, but concluded that

a § (b)(1) applicant does not become a § (b)(2) applicant, or

vice versa, by virtue of being placed in a removal proceeding

under § 1229a.

Addressing the precise statutory question posed by the

MPP, the panel held that a plain-meaning reading of

§ 1225(b)—as well as the Government’s longstanding and

consistent practice—made clear that a § (b)(1) applicant may

not be “returned” to a contiguous territory under

§ 1225(b)(2)(C), which is a procedure specific to a § (b)(2)

applicant.

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6 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

The panel next concluded that plaintiffs had shown a

likelihood of success on their claim that the MPP does not

comply with the United States’ treaty-based non-refoulement

obligations codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b). The panel

explained that refoulement occurs when a government returns

aliens to a country where their lives or liberty will be

threatened on account of race, religion, nationality,

membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. 

Further, the United States is obliged by treaty—namely, the

1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of

Refugees and the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to

the Status of Refugees—and implementing statute—namely,

§ 1231(b)—to protect against refoulement of aliens arriving

at the country’s borders.

Plaintiffs argued that the MPP provides insufficient

protection against refoulement. First, under the MPP, to stay

in the United States during proceedings, an asylum seeker

must show that it is “more likely than not” that he or she will

be persecuted in Mexico, but that standard is higher than the

ordinary standing in screening interviews, in which aliens

need only establish a “credible fear,” which requires only a

“significant possibility” of persecution. Second, an asylum

seeker under the MPP is not entitled to advance notice of, and

time to prepare for, the hearing with the asylum officer; to

advance notice of the criteria the asylum officer will use; to

the assistance of a lawyer during the hearing; or to any review

of the asylum officer’s determination. Third, an asylum

officer acting under the MPP does not ask an asylum seeker

whether he or she fears returning to Mexico; instead, asylum

seekers must volunteer, without any prompting, that they fear

returning. The Government disagreed with plaintiffs on the

grounds that: 1) § 1231(b) does not encompass a general nonCase: 19-15716, 02/28/2020, ID: 11612187, DktEntry: 89-1, Page 6 of 57
INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 7

refoulement obligation; and 2) the MPP satisfies nonrefoulement obligations by providing sufficient procedures.

The panel rejected both arguments. With respect to the

second argument, the panel noted that the Government

pointed to no evidence supporting its speculations either that

aliens will volunteer that they fear returning to Mexico, or

that there is little danger to non-Mexican aliens in Mexico. 

The panel also noted that the Government provided no

evidence to support its claim that any violence that returned

aliens face in Mexico is unlikely to be violence on account of

a protected ground. Further, the panel quoted numerous

sworn declarations to the district court that directly

contradicted the unsupported speculations of the Government.

Addressing the other preliminary injunction factors, the

panel concluded that there is a significant likelihood that the

individual plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the MPP

is not enjoined; uncontested evidence in the record establishes

that non-Mexicans returned to Mexico under the MPP risk

substantial harm, even death, while theyawait adjudication of

their applications for asylum. Further, the panel concluded

that the balance of factors favored plaintiffs. While the

Government has an interest in continuing to follow the

directives of the MPP, the strength of that interest is

diminished by the likelihood that the MPP is inconsistent

with §§ 1225(b) and 1231(b). On the other side, the

individual plaintiffs risk substantial harm, and the

organizational plaintiffs are hindered in their ability to carry

out their missions. The panel concluded that public interest

similarly favored plaintiffs: while the public has a weighty

interest in efficient administration of the immigration laws,

the public also has an interest in ensuring that statutes enacted

by their representatives are not imperiled by executive fiat.

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8 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

Finally, considering the scope of the district court’s

injunction, the panel concluded that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in setting aside the MPP. The panel

recognized that nationwide injunctions have become

increasingly controversial, but noted that it was a misnomer

to call this order “nationwide,” as it operates only at the

southern border and directs the action of officials only in four

states. The panel explained that the district court did not

abuse its discretion for two mutually reinforcing reasons. 

First, the APA provides that a reviewing court shall “set

aside” action that is not in accordance with the law and that

there is a presumption that an offending agency action should

be set aside in its entirety. Second, cases implicating

immigration policy have a particularly strong claim for

uniform relief, and this court has consistently recognized the

authority of district courts to enjoin unlawful policies on a

universal basis. The panel also observed that the Fifth

Circuit, one of only two other federal circuits with states

along the southern border, has held that nationwide

injunctions are appropriate in immigration cases.

Dissenting, Judge Fernandez wrote that he believes that

this panel is bound by the motions panel’s published decision

in this case. Judge Fernandez wrote that the panel is bound

by the law of the circuit, which binds all courts within a

particular circuit, including the court of appeals itself, and

remains binding unless overruled by the court sitting en banc,

or by the Supreme Court. Further, Judge Fernandez wrote

that, insofar as factual differences might allow precedent to

be distinguished on a principled basis, in this case, the

situation before this panel is in every material way the same

as that before the motions panel. Judge Fernandez also stated

that, in Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2015), this

court held that a motions panel’s published opinion binds

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 9

future panels the same as does a merits panel’s published

opinion. Judge Fernandez also concluded that the law of the

case doctrine binds this panel, noting that he did not perceive

any of the exceptions to the doctrine to be involved here.

Applying those doctrines, Judge Fernandez concluded

that: 1) plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their claim that

the MPP was not authorized by § 1225(b)(2)(C); 2) plaintiffs

are not likely to succeed on their claim that the MPP’s

adoption violated the notice and comment provisions of the

APA; and 3) the preliminary injunction should be vacated. 

Judge Fernandez stated that he expressed no opinion on

whether the district court could issue a narrower injunction.

COUNSEL

Scott G. Stewart (argued), Deputy Assistant Attorney

General; Archith Ramkumar, Trial Attorney; Erez Reuveni,

Assistant Director; William C. Peachey, Director; Joseph H.

Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Office of Immigration

Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C., Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellants.

Judy Rabinovitz (argued), Michael Tan, Omar Jadwat, Lee

Gelernt, Anand Balakrishnan, and Daniel Galindo, American

Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Immigrants’ Rights

Project, New York, New York; Jennifer Chang Newell,

Katrina Eiland, Cody Wofsy, and Julie Veroff, American

Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Immigrants’ Rights

Project, San Francisco, California; Melissa Crow, Southern

Poverty Law Center, Washington, D.C.; Mary Bauer,

Southern Poverty Law Center, Charlottesville, Virginia;

Gracie Willis, Southern Poverty Law Center, Decatur,

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10 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

Georgia; Michelle P. Gonzalez, Southern Poverty Law

Center, Miami, Florida; Sean Riordan and Christine P. Sun,

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern

California Inc., San Francisco, California; Blaine Bookey,

Karen Musalo, Eunice Lee, Kathryn Jastram, and Sayoni

Maitra, Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, San

Francisco, California; Steven Watt, ACLU Foundation

Human Rights Program, New York, New York; for PlaintiffsAppellees.

Adeel A. Mangi, Muhammad U. Faridi, Elizabeth Riordan

Hurley, W. Robert Fair, and A. Robert Quirk, Patterson

Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, New York, New York, for

Amicus Curiae Local 1924.

Alan E. Schoenfeld and Olga Musayev, Wilmer Cutler

Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, New York; Julia

Prochazka, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP,

Boston, Massachusetts; Harold Hongju Koh, Rule of Law

Clinic, Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut; for Amici

Curiae Former U.S. Government Officials.

Xiao Wang,Rakesh Kilaru, Aleshadye Getachew, and Sophia

Cooper, Wilkinson Walsh & Eskovitz LLP, Washington,

D.C.; Chanakya A. Sethi, Wilkinson Walsh & Eskovitz LLP,

New York, New York; for Amici Curiae Amnesty

International USA, The WashingtonOffice on Latin America,

The Latin America Working Group, & Imumi.

Eleni Bakst, Human Rights First, New York, New York;

W. Hardy Callcott, Naomi A. Igra, and Tom Magaña, Sidley

Austin LLP, San Francisco, California; for Amicus Curiae

Human Rights First.

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 11

Ana C. Reyes, Williams & ConnollyLLP, Washington, D.C.;

Alice Farmer, United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae United

Nations High Commissioner.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs brought suit in district court seeking an

injunction against the Government’s recently promulgated

Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”), under which nonMexican asylum seekers who present themselves at our

southern border are required to wait in Mexico while their

asylum applications are adjudicated. The district court

entered a preliminary injunction setting aside the MPP, and

the Government appealed. We affirm.

I. Background

In January 2019, the Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”) promulgated the MPP without going through noticeand-comment rulemaking. The MPP provides that nonMexican asylum seekers arriving at our southern border be

“returned to Mexico for the duration of their immigration

proceedings, rather than either being detained for expedited

or regular removal proceedings orissued notices to appear for

regular removal proceedings.” Innovation Law Lab v.

Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

(quotation marks omitted). The MPP does not apply to

certain groups, including “unaccompanied alien children,”

“aliens processed for expedited removal,” “aliens with known

physical [or] mental health issues,” “returning [Legal

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12 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

Permanent Residents] seeking admission,” and “aliens with

an advance parole document or in parole status.”

DHS issued guidance documents to implement the MPP. 

Under this guidance, asylum seekers who cross the border

and are subject to the MPP are given a Notice to Appear in

immigration court and returned to Mexico to await their court

date. Asylum seekers may re-enter the United States to

appear for their court dates. The guidance instructs officials

not to return any alien who will more likely than not suffer

persecution if returned to Mexico. However, this instruction

applies only to an alien “who affirmatively states that he or

she has a fear of persecution or torture in Mexico, or a fear of

return to Mexico.” Officers are not instructed to ask aliens

whether they fear returning to Mexico. If an asylum officer

determines, based on an alien’s volunteered statement, that he

or she will more likely than not suffer persecution in Mexico,

the alien is not subject to return to Mexico under the MPP.

The MPP went into effect on January 28, 2019. It was

first implemented at the San Ysidro, California, port of entry

and was later expanded across the entire southern border.

The MPP has had serious adverse consequences for the

individual plaintiffs. Plaintiffs presented evidence in the

district court that they, as well as others returned to Mexico

under the MPP, face targeted discrimination, physical

violence, sexual assault, overwhelmed and corrupt law

enforcement, lack of food and shelter, and practical obstacles

to participation in court proceedings in the United States. 

The hardship and danger to individuals returned to Mexico

under the MPP have been repeatedly confirmed by reliable

news reports. See, e.g., Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Maya

Averbuch, Waiting for Asylum in the United States, Migrants

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 13

Live in Fear in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019),

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/us/politics/asylumunited-states-migrants-mexico.html; Alicia A. Caldwell,

Trump’s Return-to-Mexico Policy Overwhelms

Immigration Courts, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 5, 2019),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-return-to-mexicopolicy-overwhelms-immigration-courts-11567684800; Mica

Rosenberg, et al., Hasty Rollout of Trump Immigration Policy

Has ‘Broken’ Border Courts, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2019),

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-courtsinsight/hasty-rollout-of-trump-immigration-policy-hasbroken-border-courts-idUSKCN1VV115; Mireya Villareal,

An Inside Look at Trump’s “Remain in Mexico” Policy,

CBS NEWS (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/

remain-in-mexico-donald-trump-immigration-policy-nuevolaredo-mexico-streets-danger-migrants-2019-10-08/.

The organizational plaintiffs have also suffered serious

adverse consequences. The MPP has substantially hindered

the organizations’ “ability to carry out their core mission of

providing representation to aliens seeking admission,

including asylum seekers,” Innovation Law Lab, 366 F. Supp.

3d at 1129, and has forced them to divert resources because

of increased costs imposed by the MPP.

The Government has not argued in this court that either

the individual or organizational plaintiffs lack standing under

Article III, but we have an independent obligation to

determine our jurisdiction under Article III. The individual

plaintiffs, all of whom have been returned to Mexico under

the MPP, obviously have Article III standing. The

organizational plaintiffs also have Article III standing. The

Government conceded in the district court that the

organizational plaintiffs have Article III standing based on

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14 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742,

765–67 (9th Cir. 2018), given their decreased ability to carry

out their core missions as well as the diversion of their

resources, both caused by the MPP. See Innovation Law Lab,

366 F. Supp. at 1120–22. Because East Bay Sanctuary

Covenant was a decision by a motions panel on an emergency

stay motion, we are not obligated to follow it as binding

precedent. See discussion, infra, Part V.A. However, we are

persuaded by its reasoning and hold that the organizational

plaintiffs have Article III standing.

II. Proceedings in the District Court

Plaintiffs filed suit in district court seeking an injunction,

alleging, inter alia, that the MPP is inconsistent with the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), specifically

8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1231(b), and that they have a right

to a remedy under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Section 706(2)(A)

provides, “The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and

set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be

. . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

not in accordance with law.” (Internal numbering omitted.)

The district court held that plaintiffs had shown a

likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the

MPP is inconsistent with § 1225(b). Id. at 1123. The

Government contended that the MPP is authorized by

§ 1225(b)(2). Plaintiffs argued, however, that they are

arriving aliens under § 1225(b)(1) rather than under

§ 1225(b)(2). They pointed out that there is a contiguous

territory return provision in § (b)(2) but no such provision in

§ (b)(1). The district court agreed with plaintiffs:

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 15

On its face, . . . the contiguous territory return

provision may be applied to aliens described

in subparagraph (b)(2)(A). Pursuant to

subparagraph (b)(2)(B), however, that

expressly excludes any alien “to whom

paragraph [(b)](1) applies.”

Id. (emphasis in original). The court concluded, “Applying

the plain language of the statute, [the individual plaintiffs]

simply are not subject to the contiguous territory return

provision.” Id.

The district court also held that plaintiffs had shown a

likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the

MPP violates § 1231(b)(3), the statutory implementation of

the United States’ treaty-based non-refoulement obligations. 

The district court held that “plaintiffs have shown they are

more likely than not to prevail on the merits of their

contention that defendants adopted the MPP without

sufficient regard to refoulement issues.” Id. at 1127. In so

holding, the district court noted that the MPP does not

instruct asylum officers to ask asylum seekers whether they

fear returning to Mexico. Rather, “the MPP provides only for

review of potential refoulement concerns when an alien

‘affirmatively’ raises the point.” Id. The court further held

that it was more likely than not that the MPP should have

been adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking with

respect to the non-refoulement aspects of the MPP. Id.

at 1128.

With respect to the individual plaintiffs, the district court

found that “[w]hile the precise degree of risk and specific

harms that plaintiffs might suffer in this case may be

debatable, there is no real question that it includes the

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16 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

possibility of irreparable injury, sufficient to support interim

relief in light of the showing on the merits.” Id. at 1129. 

With respect to the organizational plaintiffs, the court found

that they had “shown a likelihood of harm in terms of

impairment of their ability to carry out their core mission of

providing representation to aliens seeking admission,

including asylum seekers.” Id. Finally, the court held that

the balance of equities and the public interest support the

issuance of a preliminary injunction. Id.

Relying on a decision of our court, the district court

issued a preliminary injunction setting aside the MPP. The

court noted:

[D]efendants have not shown the injunction in

this case can be limited geographically. This

is not a case implicating local concerns or

values. There is no apparent reason that any

of the places to which the MPP might

ultimately be extended have interests that

materially differ from those presented in San

Ysidro.

Id. at 1130.

III. Proceedings Before the Motions Panel

The district court issued its preliminary injunction on

April 8, 2019. The Government filed an appeal on April 10

and the next day requested an emergency stay pending

appeal. In accordance with our regular procedures, our April

motions panel heard the Government’s request for an

emergency stay. The motions panel held oral argument on

the stay on April 24. In three written opinions, the panel

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 17

unanimously granted the emergency stay on May 7. 

Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503 (9th Cir.

2019).

In a per curiam opinion, the motions panel disagreed, by

a vote of two to one, with the district court’s holding that

plaintiffs were likely to succeed in their statutory argument

that the MPP is inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Id.

at 508–09. The panel majority stated its legal conclusion in

tentative terms, writing that it was “doubtful that subsection

(b)(1) [of § 1225] ‘applies’ to [plaintiffs.]” Id. at 509

(emphasis added).

Judge Watford concurred in the per curiam opinion but

wrote separately to express concern that the MPP is arbitrary

and capricious because it lacks sufficient non-refoulement

protections. Id. at 511 (Watford, J., concurring). Judge

Watford expressed concern that asylum officers do not ask

asylum applicants whether they have a fear of returning to

Mexico: “One suspects the agency is not asking an important

question during the interview process simply because it

would prefer not to hear the answer.” Id. Judge Watford

concluded, “DHS’s policy is virtually guaranteed to result in

some number of applicants being returned to Mexico in

violation of the United States’ non-refoulement obligations.” 

Id.

Judge Fletcher concurred only in the result. He wrote

separately, arguing that the MPP was inconsistent with

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Id. at 512 (W. Fletcher, J., concurring in

the result). In his view, asylum seekers subject to the MPP

are properly characterized as applicants under § 1225(b)(1)

rather than § 1225(b)(2), and are thus protected against being

returned to Mexico pending adjudication of their applications. 

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18 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

Judge Fletcher emphasized the preliminary nature of the

emergency stay proceedings before the motions panel,

writing, “I am hopeful that the regular argument panel that

will ultimately hear the appeal, with the benefit of full

briefing and regularly scheduled argument, will be able to see

the Government’s arguments for what they are—baseless

arguments in support of an illegal policy[.]” Id. at 518.

IV. Standard of Review

When deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction,

a district court considers whether the requesting party has

shown “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Likelihood of success

on the merits is a threshold inquiry and the most important

factor. See, e.g., Edge v. City of Everett, 929 F.3d 657, 663

(9th Cir. 2019).

We review a grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse

of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. California, 921 F.3d

865, 877 (9th Cir. 2019). “The district court’s interpretation

of the underlying legal principles, however, is subject to de

novo review and a district court abuses its discretion when it

makes an error of law.” Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project

v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 19

V. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

A. Effect of the Motions Panel’s Decision

A preliminary question is whether a merits panel is bound

by the analysis of a motions panel on a question of law,

performed in the course of deciding an emergency request for

a stay pending appeal. On that question, we follow East Bay

Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, Nos. 18-17274 and 18-17436

(9th Cir. 2020), argued on the same day as this case, in which

we held that a motions panel’s legal analysis, performed

during the course of deciding an emergencymotion for a stay,

is not binding on later merits panels. Such a decision by a

motions panel is “a probabilistic endeavor,” “doctrinally

distinct” from the question considered by the later merits

panel, and “issued without oral argument, on limited

timelines, and in reliance on limited briefing.” Id. at 21–22,

20. “Such a predictive analysis should not, and does not,

forever bind the merits of the parties’ claims.” Id. at 22. At

oral argument in this case, the Government acknowledged 

“that law of the circuit treatment does not apply to [the

motion’s panel’s decision].” The Government later reiterated

that it was “not advocating for law of the circuit treatment.” 

The Government “agree[d] that that is inappropriate in the

context of a motions panel decision.”

Even if, acting as a merits panel, we may be bound in

some circumstances by a decision by a motions panel on a

legal question, we would in any event not be bound in the

case now before us. Two of the three judges on the motions

panel disagreed in part with the Government’s legal

arguments in support of the MPP. Further, the motions

panel’s per curiam opinion did not purport to decide

definitively the legal questions presented to it in the

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20 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

emergency stay motion. The per curiam spoke in terms of

doubt and likelihood, rather than in terms of definitive

holdings. Innovation Law Lab, 924 F.3d at 509; see also

supra Part III. Indeed, Judge Fletcher, who concurred in

granting the emergency stay, specifically addressed the effect

of the legal analysis of the motions panel and expressed the

hope that the merits panel, with the benefit of full briefing

and argument, would decide the legal questions differently.

B. Questions on the Merits

Plaintiffs challenge two aspects of the MPP. First, they

challenge the requirement that asylum seekers return to

Mexico and wait there while their applications for asylum are

adjudicated. They contend that this requirement is

inconsistent with the INA, as amended in 1996 by the Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsbility Act

(“IIRIRA”). Second, in the alternative, they challenge the

failure of asylum officers to ask asylum seekers whether they

fear being returned to Mexico. They contend that this failure

is inconsistent with our treaty-based non-refoulement

obligations. They contend, further, that with respect to nonrefoulement, the MPP should have been adopted only after

notice-and-comment rulemaking.

We address these challenges in turn. We conclude that

plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their claim

that the return-to-Mexico requirement of the MPP is

inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). We further conclude

that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their

claim that the MPP does not comply with our treaty-based

non-refoulement obligations codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b). 

We do not reach the question whether they have shown a

likelihood of success on their claim that the anti-refoulement

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 21

aspect of the MPP should have been adopted through noticeand-comment rulemaking.

1. Return to Mexico

The essential feature of the MPP is that non-Mexican

asylum seekers who arrive at a port of entry along the United

States’ southern border must be returned to Mexico to wait

while their asylum applications are adjudicated. Plaintiffs

contend that the requirement that they wait in Mexico is

inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). The government

contends, to the contrary, that the MPP is consistent with

§ 1225(b).

The relevant text of § 1225 is as follows:

(a) Inspection

(1) Aliens treated as applicants for

admission

An alien present in the United States

who has not been admitted . . . shall be

deemed for purposes of this chapter an

applicant for admission.

. . .

(b) Inspection of applicants for admission

(1) Inspection of aliens arriving in the

United States and certain other

aliens who have not been admitted

or paroled

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22 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

(A) Screening

(i) In general

If an immigration officer

determines that an alien . . . who is

arriving in the United States . . . is

inadmissible under section

1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this

title, the officer shall order the

alien removed from the United

States without further hearing or

review unless the alien indicates

either an intention to apply for

asylum under section 1158 of this

title or a fear of persecution.

(ii) Claims for asylum

If an immigration officer

determines that an alien . . . is

inadmissible under section

1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this

title and the alien indicates either

an intention to apply for asylum

under section 1158 of this title or

a fear of persecution, the officer

shall refer the alien for an

interview by an asylum officer

under subparagraph (B).

. . .

(B) Asylum interviews

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 23

. . .

(ii) Referral of certain aliens

If the [asylum] officer

determines at the time of the

interview that an alien has a

credible fear of persecution . . . ,

the alien shall be detained for

further consideration of the

application for asylum.

. . .

(2) Inspection of other aliens

(A) In general

Subject to subparagraphs (B) and

(C), in the case of an alien who is an

applicant for admission, if the

examining immigration officer

determines that an alien seeking

admission is not clearly and beyond a

doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien

shall be detained for a proceeding

under section 1229a of this title.

(B) Exception

Subparagraph (A) shall not apply

to an alien —

(i) who is a crewman

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24 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

(ii) to whom paragraph (1)

applies, or

(iii) who is a stowaway.

(C) Treatment of aliens arriving

from contiguous territory

In the case of an alien described in

subparagraph (A) who is arriving on

land (whether or not at a designated

port of arrival) from a foreign territory

contiguous to the United States, the

Attorney General may return the alien

to that territory pending a proceeding

under section 1229a of this title.

There are two categories of “applicants for admission”

under § 1225. § 1225(a). First, there are applicants described

in § 1225(b)(1). Second, there are applicants described in

§ 1225(b)(2).

Applicants described in § 1225(b)(1) are inadmissible

based on either of two grounds, both of which relate to their

documents or lack thereof. Applicants described in

§ 1225(b)(2) are in an entirely separate category. In the

words of the statute, they are “other aliens.” § 1225(b)(2)

(heading). Put differently, again in the words of the statute,

§ (b)(2) applicants are applicants “to whom paragraph

[(b)](1)” does not apply. § 1225(b)(2)(B)(ii). That is,

§ (b)(1) applicants are those who are inadmissible on either

of the two grounds specified in that subsection. Section

(b)(2) applicants are all other inadmissible applicants.

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 25

Section (b)(1) applicants are more numerous than § (b)(2)

applicants, but § (b)(2) is a broader category in the sense that

§ (b)(2) applicants are inadmissible on more grounds than

§ (b)(1) applicants. Inadmissable applicants under § (b)(1)

are aliens traveling with fraudulent documents

(§ 1182(a)(6)(C)) or no documents (§ 1182(a)(7)). By

contrast, inadmissable applicants under § (b)(2) include, inter

alia, aliens with “a communicable disease of public health

significance” or who are “drug abuser[s] or addict[s]”

(§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(i), (iv)); aliens who have “committed . . . a

crime involving moral turpitude” or who have “violat[ed] . . .

any law or regulation . . . relating to a controlled substance”

(§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)); aliens who “seek to enter the United

States . . . to violate any law of the United States relating to

espionage or sabotage,” or who have “engaged in a terrorist

activity” (§ 1182(a)(3)(A), (B)); aliens who are “likely . . . to

become a public charge” (§ 1182(a)(4)(A)); and aliens who

are alien “smugglers” (§ 1182(a)(6)(E)).

The Supreme Court recently distinguished § (b)(1) and

§ (b)(2) applicants, stating unambiguously that they fall into

two separate categories:

[A]pplicants for admission fall into one of two

categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and

those covered by § 1225(b)(2). Section

1225(b)(1) applies to aliens initially

determined to be inadmissible due to fraud,

misrepresentation, or lack of valid

documentation. . . . Section 1225(b)(2) is

broader. It serves as a catchall provision that

applies to all applicants for admission not

covered by § 1225(b)(1).

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26 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018) (emphasis

added) (citations omitted).

Even more recently, the Attorney General of the United

States, through the Board of Immigration Appeals, drew the

same distinction and briefly described the procedures

applicable to the two categories:

Under section 235 of the Act [8 U.S.C.

§ 1225], all aliens “arriv[ing] in the United

States” or “present in the United States

[without having] been admitted” are

considered “applicants for admission,” who

“shall be inspected by immigration officers.”

INA § 235(a)(1), (3). [8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1),

(3).] In most cases, those inspections yield

one of three outcomes. First, if an alien is

“clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be

admitted,” he will be permitted to enter, or

remain in, the country without further

proceedings. Id. § 235(b)(2)(A). [8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A).] Second, if the alien is not

clearly admissible, then, generally, he will be

placed in “proceeding[s] under section 240

[8 U.S.C. § 1229a]” of the Act—that is, full

removal proceedings. Id. Third, if the alien is

inadmissible on one of two specified grounds

and meets certain additional criteria, DHS

may place him in either expedited or full

proceedings. Id. § 235(b)(1)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)]; see Matter of E-R-M- &

L-R-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 520, 524 (BIA 2011).

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 27

Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 510 (BIA April 16,

2019).

The procedures specific to the two categories of

applicants are outlined in their respective subsections. To

some extent, the statutorily prescribed procedures are the

same for both categories. If a § (b)(1) applicant passes his or

her credible fear interview, he or she will be placed in regular

removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.30(f). A § (b)(1) applicant may also be placed directly

into regular removal proceedings under § 1229a at the

discretion of the Government. See Matter of E-R-M- & L-RM-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520, 522 (BIA 2011). A § (b)(2)

applicant who is “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to

be admitted” is automatically placed in regular removal

proceedings under § 1229a. See § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Both § (b)(1) and § (b)(2) applicants can thus be placed

in regular removal proceedings under § 1229a, though by

different routes. But the fact that an applicant is in removal

proceedings under § 1229a does not change his or her

underlying category. A § (b)(1) applicant does not become

a § (b)(2) applicant, or vice versa, by virtue of being placed

in a removal proceeding under § 1229a.

However, the statutory procedures for the two categories

are not identical. Some of the procedures are exclusive to one

category or the other. For example, if a § (b)(1) applicant

fails to pass his or her credible fear interview, he or she may

be removed in an expedited proceeding without a regular

removal proceeding under § 1229a. See § 1225(b)(1)(A), (B). 

There is no comparable procedure specified in § (b)(2) for

expedited removal of a § (b)(2) applicant. Further, in some

circumstances a § (b)(2) applicant may be “returned” to a

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28 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

“territory contiguous to the United States” pending his or her

regular removal proceeding under § 1229a. See

§ 1225(b)(2)(C). There is no comparable “return” procedure

specified in §1225(b)(1) for a § (b)(1) applicant.

The statutory question posed by the MPP is whether a

§ (b)(1) applicant may be “returned” to a contiguous territory

under § 1225(b)(2)(C). That is, may a § (b)(1) applicant be

subjected to a procedure specified for a § (b)(2) applicant? A

plain-meaning reading of § 1225(b)—as well as the

Government’s longstanding and consistent practice up until

now—tell us that the answer is “no.”

There is nothing in § 1225(b)(1) to indicate that a § (b)(1)

applicant may be “returned” under § 1225(b)(2)(C). Section

(b)(1)(A)(i) tells us with respect to § (b)(1) applicants that an

“officer shall order the alien removed . . . without further

hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention

to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution.” Section

(b)(1)(A)(ii) tells us that § (b)(1) applicants who indicate an

intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution “shall”

be referred by the immigration officer to an “asylum officer”

for an interview. The remainder of § 1225(b)(1) specifies

what happens to a § (b)(1) applicant depending on the

determination of the asylum officer—either expedited

removal or detention pending further consideration. 

§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii). There is nothing in § 1225(b)(1)

stating, or even suggesting, that a § (b)(1) applicant is subject

to the “return” procedure of § 1225(b)(2)(C).

Nor is there anything in § 1225(b)(2) to indicate that a

§ (b)(1) applicant may be “returned” under § 1225(b)(2)(C). 

Taking § 1225(b)(2) subparagraph by subparagraph, it

provides as follows. Subparagraph (A) tells us that unless a

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 29

§ (b)(2) applicant is “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to

be admitted,” she or he “shall be detained” for a removal

proceeding under § 1229a. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Subparagraph

(A) is “[s]ubject to subparagraphs (B) and (C).” Id.

Subparagraph (B) tells us that subparagraph (A) does not

apply to three categories of aliens—“crewm[e]n,” § (b)(1)

applicants, and “stowaway[s].” § 1225(b)(2)(B). Finally,

subparagraph (C) tells us that a § (b)(2) applicant who arrives

“on land . . . from a foreign territory contiguous to the United

States,” instead of being “detained” under subparagraph (A)

pending his or her removal proceeding under § 1229a, may be

“returned” to that contiguous territory pending that

proceeding. § 1225(b)(2)(C). Section (b)(1) applicants are

mentioned only once in § 1225(b)(2), in subparagraph (B)(ii). 

That subparagraph specifies that subparagraph (A)—which

automatically entitles § (b)(2) applicants to regular removal

proceedings under § 1229a—does not apply to § (b)(1)

applicants.

The “return-to-a-contiguous-territory” provision of

§ 1225(b)(2)(C) is thus available only for § (b)(2) applicants. 

There is no plausible way to read the statute otherwise. 

Under a plain-meaning reading of the text, as well as the

Government’s longstanding and consistent practice, the

statutory authority upon which the Government now relies

simply does not exist.

The Government nonetheless contends that § (b)(2)(C)

authorizes the return to Mexico not only of § (b)(2)

applicants, but also of § (b)(1) applicants. The Government

makes essentially three arguments in support of this

contention. None is persuasive.

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30 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

First, the Government argues that § (b)(1) applicants are

a subset of § (b)(2) applicants. Blue Brief at 35. Under the

Government’s argument, there are § (b)(1) applicants, defined

in § (b)(1), and there are § (b)(2) applicants, defined as all

applicants, including § (b)(2) and § (b)(1) applicants. The

Government argues that DHS, in its discretion, can therefore

apply the procedures specified in § (b)(2) to a § (b)(1)

applicant. That is, as stated in its brief, the Government has

“discretion to make the initial ‘determin[ation]’ whether to

apply section 1225(b)(1) or section 1225(b)(2) to a given

alien.” Blue Brief at 30.

The Government’s argument ignores the statutory text,

the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jennings, and the opinion of

its own Attorney General in Matter of M-S-. The text of

§ 1225(b) tells us that § (b)(1) and § (b)(2) are separate and

non-overlapping categories. In Jennings, the Supreme Court

told us explicitly that § (b)(1) and § (b)(2) applicants fall into

separate and non-overlapping categories. In Matter of M-S-,

the Attorney General wrote that applicants are subject to

different procedures depending on whether they are § (b)(1)

or § (b)(2) applicants.

Second, the Government argues that § (b)(2)(B)(ii) allows

DHS, in its discretion, to “apply” to a § (b)(1) applicant either

procedures described in § (b)(1) or those described in

§ (b)(2). The Government’s second argument is necessitated

by its first. To understand the Government’s second

argument, one must keep in mind that § (b)(2)(A)

automatically entitles a § (b)(2) applicant to a regular removal

hearing under § 1229a. But we know from § (b)(1) that not

all § (b)(1) applicants are entitled to a removal hearing under

§ 1229a. Having argued that § (b)(2) applicants include not

only § (b)(2) but also § (b)(1) applicants, the Government

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 31

needs some way to avoid giving regular removal proceedings

to all § (b)(1) applicants. The best the Government can do is

to rely on § (b)(2)(B)(ii), which provides: “Subparagraph (A)

shall not apply to an alien . . . to whom paragraph [(b)](1)

applies.” § 1225(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). The

Government thus argues that § (b)(2)(B)(ii) allows DHS, in

its discretion, to “apply,” or not apply, § (b)(2)(A) to a

§ (b)(1) applicant.

The Government misreads § (b)(2)(B)(ii). Subparagraph

(B) tells us, “Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an alien —

(i) who is a crewman, (ii) to whom paragraph [(b)](1) applies,

or (iii) who is a stowaway.” The function of § (b)(2)(B)(ii)

is to make sure that we understand that the automatic

entitlement to a regular removal hearing under § 1229a,

specified in § (b)(2)(A) for a § (b)(2) applicant, does not

apply to a § (b)(1) applicant. However, the Government

argues that § (b)(2)(B)(ii) authorizes the Government to

perform an act. That act is to “apply” the expedited removal

procedures of § (b)(1) to some of the aliens under § (b)(2), as

the Government defines § (b)(2) applicants.

There is a fatal syntactical problem with the

Government’s argument. “Apply” is used twice in the same

sentence in § (b)(2)(B)(ii). The first time the word is used, in

the lead-in to the section, it refers to the application of a

statutory section (“Subparagraph (A) shall not apply”). The

second time the word is used, it is used in the same manner,

again referring to the application of a statutory section (“to

whom paragraph [(b)](1) applies”). When the word is used

the first time, it tells us that subparagraph (A) shall not apply. 

When the word is used the second time, it tells us to whom

subparagraph (A) shall not apply: it does not apply to

applicants to whom § (b)(1) applies. The word is used in the

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32 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

same manner both times to refer to the application of

subparagraph (A). The word is not used the first time to refer

to the application of a subparagraph (A), and the second time

to an action by DHS.

The Government’s third argument is based on the

supposed culpability of § (b)(1) applicants. We know from

§ (b)(2)(A) that § (b)(2) applicants are automatically entitled

to full removal proceedings under § 1229a. However,

§ (b)(2) applicants may be returned to Mexico under

§ (b)(2)(C) to await the outcome of their removal hearing

under § 1229a. It makes sense for the Government, in its

discretion, to require some § (b)(2) applicants to remain in

Mexico while their asylum applications are adjudicated, for

some § (b)(2) applicants are extremely undesirable

applicants. As discussed above, § (b)(2) applicants include

spies, terrorists, alien smugglers, and drug traffickers.

When the Government was before the motions panel in

this case, it argued that § (b)(1) applicants are more culpable

than § (b)(2) applicants and therefore deserve to be forced to

wait in Mexico while their asylum applications are being

adjudicated. In its argument to the motions panel, the

Government compared § (b)(1) and § (b)(2) applicants,

characterizing § (b)(2) applicants as “less-culpable arriving

aliens.” The Government argued that returning § (b)(2), but

not § (b)(1), applicants to a contiguous territory would have

“the perverse effect of privileging aliens who attempt to

obtain entry to the United States by fraud . . . over aliens who

follow our laws.”

The Government had it exactly backwards. Section (b)(1)

applicants are those who are “inadmissible under section

1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7)” of Title 8. These two sections

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 33

describe applicants who are inadmissible because they lack

required documents rather than because they have a criminal

history or otherwise pose a danger to the United States. 

Section 1182(a)(6)(C), entitled “Misrepresentation,” covers,

inter alia, aliens using fraudulent documents. That is, it

covers aliens who travel under false documents and who,

once they arrive at the border or enter the country, apply for

asylum. Section 1182(a)(7), entitled “Documentation

requirements,” covers aliens traveling without documents. In

short, § (b)(1) applies to bona fide asylum applicants, who

commonly have fraudulent documents or no documents at all. 

Indeed, for many such applicants, fraudulent documents are

their only means of fleeing persecution, even death, in their

own countries. The structure of § (b)(1), which contains

detailed provisions for processing asylum seekers,

demonstrates that Congress recognized that § (b)(1)

applicants mayhave valid asylum claims and should therefore

receive the procedures specified in § (b)(1).

In its argument to our merits panel, the Government made

a version of the same argument it had made earlier to the

motions panel. After referring to (but not describing) § (b)(2)

applicants, the Government now argues in its opening brief:

Section 1225(b)(1), meanwhile, reaches,

among other classes of aliens, those who

engage in fraud or willful misrepresentations

in an attempt to deceive the United Statesinto

granting an immigration benefit. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(C). Plaintiffs have not explained

why Congress would have wanted that class

of aliens to be exempt from temporary return

to Mexico while their full removal

proceedings are ongoing.

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34 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

Blue Brief at 37–38 (emphasis in original).

We need not look far to discern Congress’s motivation in

authorizing return of § (b)(2) applicants but not § (b)(1)

applicants. Section (b)(2)(C) was added to IIRIRA late in the

drafting process, in the wake of Matter of Sanchez-Avila,

21 I. & N. Dec. 444 (BIA 1996). Sanchez-Avila was a

Mexican national who applied for entry as a “resident alien

commuter” but who was charged with being inadmissible due

to his “involvement with controlled substances.” Id. at 445;

see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (§ (b)(2) applicants include

aliens who have “violat[ed] . . . any law or regulation . . .

relating to a controlled substance”). In order to prevent aliens

like Sanchez-Avila from staying in the United States during

the pendency of their guaranteed regular removal proceeding

under § 1229a, as they would otherwise have a right to do

under § (b)(2)(A), Congress added § 1225(b)(2)(C). 

Congress had specifically in mind undesirable § (b)(2)

applicants like Sanchez-Avila. It did not have in mind bona

fide asylum seekers under § (b)(1).

We therefore conclude that plaintiffs have shown a

likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the

MPP is inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).

2. Refoulement

Plaintiffs claim that the MPP is invalid in part, either

because it violates the United States’ treaty-based antirefoulement obligations, codified at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A), or because, with respect to refoulement, the

MPP was improperly adopted without notice-and-comment

rulemaking. Our holding that plaintiffs are likely to succeed

on their claim that the MPP is invalid in its entirety because

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 35

it is inconsistent with § 1225(b) makes it unnecessary to

decide plaintiffs’ second claim. We nonetheless address it as

an alternative ground, under which we hold the MPP invalid

in part.

Refoulement occurs when a government returns aliens to

a country where their lives or liberty will be threatened on

account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a

particular social group, or political opinion. The United

States is obliged by treaty and implementing statute, as

described below, to protect against refoulement of aliens

arriving at our borders.

Paragraph one of Article 33 of the 1951 United Nations

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, entitled,

“Prohibition of expulsion or return (‘refoulement’),”

provides:

No Contracting State shall expel or return

(“refouler”) a refugee in any manner

whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where

his life or freedom would be threatened on

account of his race, religion, nationality,

membership of a particular social group or

political opinion.

The United States is not a party to the 1951 Convention, but

in 1968 we acceded to the United Nations Protocol Relating

to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967. INS v. Stevic,

467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984). “The Protocol bound parties to

comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2 through

34 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of

Refugees.” Id. Twelve years later, Congress passed the

Refugee Act of 1980, implementing our obligations under the

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1967 Protocol. “If one thing is clear from the legislative

history of the . . . entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’

primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into

conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating

to the Status of Refugees.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,

480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987). The 1980 Act included, among

other things, a provision designed to implement Article 33 of

the 1951 Convention. After recounting the history behind

8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1), part of the 1980 Act, the Supreme

Court characterized that section as “parallel[ing] Article 33,”

the anti-refoulement provision of the 1951 Convention. INS

v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999).

Section 1253(h)(1) provided, in relevant part, “The

Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . to

a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien’s

life or freedom would be threatened in such country on

account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a

particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. at 419

(emphasis added). The current version is § 1231(b)(3)(A): 

“[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a

country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or

freedom would be threatened in that country because of the

alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular

social group, or political opinion.” (Emphasis added.) The

words “deport or return” in the 1980 version of the section

were replaced in 1996 by “remove” as part of a general

statutory revision under IIRIRA. Throughout IIRIRA,

“removal” became the new all-purpose word, encompassing

“deportation,” “exclusion,” and “return” in the earlier statute. 

See, e.g., Salgado-Diaz v. Gonzales, 395 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“IIRIRA eliminated the distinction between

deportation and exclusion proceedings, replacing them with

a new, consolidated category—‘removal.’”).

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Plaintiffs point out several features of the MPP that, in

their view, provide insufficient protection against

refoulement.

First, under the MPP, to stay in the United States during

the pendency of removal proceedings under § 1229a, the

asylum seeker must show that it is “more likely than not” that

he or she will be persecuted in Mexico. More-likely-than-not

is a high standard, ordinarily applied only after an alien has

had a regular removal hearing under § 1229a. By contrast,

the standard ordinarily applied in screening interviews with

asylum officers at the border is much lower. Aliens subject

to expedited removal need only establish a “credible fear” in

order to remain in the United States pending a hearing under

§ 1229a. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Credible

fear requires only that the alien show a “significant

possibility” of persecution. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).

Second, under the MPP, an asylum seeker is not entitled

to advance notice of, and time to prepare for, the hearing with

the asylum officer; to advance notice of the criteria the

asylum officer will use; to the assistance of a lawyer during

the hearing; or to any review of the asylum officer’s

determination. By contrast, an asylum seeker in a removal

proceeding under § 1229a is entitled to advance notice of the

hearing with sufficient time to prepare; to advance notice of

the precise charge or charges on which removal is sought; to

the assistance of a lawyer; to an appeal to the Board of

Immigration Appeals; and to a subsequent petition for review

to the court of appeals.

Third, an asylum officer acting under the MPP does not

ask an asylum seeker whether he or she fears returning to

Mexico. Instead, asylum seekers must volunteer, without any

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prompting, that they fear returning. By contrast, under

existing regulations, an asylum officer conducting a credible

fear interview is directed “to elicit all relevant and useful

information bearing on whether the applicant has a credible

fear of persecution or torture.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d). The

asylum officer is specifically directed to “determine that the

alien has an understanding of the credible fear determination

process.” § 208.30(d)(2).

The Government disagrees with plaintiffs based on two

arguments. The Government first argues briefly that

§ 1231(b)(3)(A) does not encompass a general antirefoulement obligation. It argues that the protection provided

by § 1231(b)(3)(A) applies to aliens only after they have been

ordered removed to their home country at the conclusion of

a regular removal proceeding under § 1229a. It writes:

Section 1231(b)(3) codifies a form of

protection from removal that is available only

after an alien is adjudged removable. See

8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. 1208.16(a). 

Aliens subject to MPP do not receive a final

order of removal to their home country when

they are returned (temporarily) to Mexico, and

so there is no reason why the same procedures

would apply . . . .

Blue Brief at 41 (emphasis in original).

The Government reads § 1231(b)(3)(A) too narrowly. 

Section 1231(b)(3)(A) does indeed apply to regular removal

proceedings under § 1229a, as evidenced, for example, by

8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(a) (discussing, inter alia, the role of the

Immigration Judge). But its application is not limited to such

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proceedings. As described above, and as recognized by the

Supreme Court, Congress intended § 1253(h)(1), and

§ 1231(b)(3)(A) as its recodified successor, to “parallel”

Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. Aguirre-Aguirre,

526 U.S. at 427. Article 33 is a general anti-refoulement

provision, applicable whenever an alien might be returned to

a country where his or her life or freedom might be

threatened on account of a protected ground. It is not limited

to instances in which an alien has had a full removal hearing

with significant procedural protections, as would be the case

under § 1229a.

The Government’s second argument is that the MPP

satisfies our anti-refoulement obligations by providing a

sufficiently effective method of determining whether aliens

fear, or have reason to fear, returning to Mexico. In its brief,

the Government contends that asylum seekers who genuinely

fear returning to Mexico have “every incentive” affirmatively

to raise that fear during their interviews with asylum officers,

and that Mexico is not a dangerous place for non-Mexican

asylum seekers. The Government writes:

[N]one of the aliens subject to MPP are

Mexican nationals fleeing Mexico, and all of

them voluntarily chose to enter and spend

time in Mexico en route to the United States. 

Mexico, moreover, has committed to adhering

to its domestic and international obligations

regarding refugees. Those considerations

together strongly suggest that the great

majority of aliens subject to MPP are not

more likely than not to face persecution on a

protected ground or torture, in Mexico. In the

rare case where an MPP-eligible alien does

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have a substantial and well-grounded basis for

claiming that he is likely to be persecuted in

Mexico, that alien will have every incentive to

raise that fear at the moment he is told that he

will be returned.

Blue Brief at 45. However, the Government points to no

evidence supporting its speculations either that aliens,

unprompted and untutored in the law of refoulement, will

volunteer that they fear returning to Mexico, or that there is

little danger to non-Mexican aliens in Mexico.

The Government further asserts, again without supporting

evidence, that any violence that returned aliens face in

Mexico is unlikely to be violence on account of a protected

ground—that is, violence that constitutes persecution. The

Government writes:

[T]he basic logic of the contiguous-territoryreturn statute is that aliens generally do not

face persecution on account of a protected

status, or torture, in the country from which

they happen to arrive by land, as opposed to

the home country from which they may have

fled. (International law guards against torture

and persecution on account of a protected

ground, not random acts of crime or

generalized violence.)

Blue Brief at 40–41 (emphasis in original).

Plaintiffs, who are aliens returned to Mexico under the

MPP, presented sworn declarations to the district court

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 41

directly contradicting the unsupported speculations of the

Government.

Several declarants described violence and threats of

violence in Mexico. Much of the violence was directed at the

declarants because they were non-Mexican—that is, because

of their nationality, a protected ground under asylum law. 

Gregory Doe wrote in his declaration:

I did not feel safe at Benito Juarez [a

migrant shelter] because the neighbors kept

trying to attack the migrant community. The

people who lived near the shelter tried to hurt

us because they did not want us in their

country. . . .

At El Barretal [another migrant shelter], I

felt a little more secure because we had a high

wall surrounding us. Even so, one night

someone threw a tear gas bomb into the

shelter. When I tried to leave the shelter,

people in passing cars would often yell insults

at me like “get out of here, you pinches

Hondurans,” and other bad words that I do not

want to repeat.

Alex Doe wrote:

I know from personal experience and from the

news that migrants have a bad name here and

that manyMexicans are unhappy that so many

of us are here. I have frequently been insulted

by Mexicans on the street. . . . [O]ther asylum

seekers and I had to flee Playas [a

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neighborhood in Tijuana] in the middle of the

night because a group of Mexicans threw

stones at us and more people were gathering

with sticks and other weapons to try to hurt

us.

Christopher Doe wrote:

The Mexican police and many Mexican

citizens believe that Central Americans are all

criminals. They see my dark skin and hear

my Honduran accent, and they automatically

look down on me and label me as a criminal. 

I have been stopped and questioned by the

Mexican police around five or six times, just

for being a Honduran migrant. During my

most recent stop, the police threatened to

arrest me if they saw me on the street again.

. . .

I have also been robbed and assaulted by

Mexican citizens. On two occasions, a group

of Mexicans yelled insults, threw stones, and

tried to attack me and a group of other

Caravan members.

Howard Doe wrote:

I was afraid to leave the house [where I

was staying] because I had seen in the news

that migrants like myself had been targeted. 

While I was in Tijuana, two young Honduran

men were abducted, tortured and killed.

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 43

. . .

On Wednesday, January 30, 2019, I was

attacked and robbed by two young Mexican

men. They pulled a gun on me from behind

and told me not to turn around. They took my

phone and told me that they knew I was

Honduran and that if they saw me again, they

would kill me. Migrants in Tijuana are

always in danger[.]

Some of the violence in Mexico was threatened by

persecutors from the aliens’ home countries, and much of that

violence was on account of protected grounds—political

opinion, religion, and social group. Gregory Doe wrote:

I am also afraid the Honduran government

will find me in Mexico and harm me. Even

outside the country, theHonduran government

often works with gangs and criminal networks

to punish those who oppose their policies. I

am afraid that they might track me down.

Dennis Doe, who had fled the gang “MS-13” in Honduras,

wrote:

In Tijuana, I have seen people who I believe

are MS-13 gang members on the street and on

the beach. They have tattoos that look like

MS-13 tattoos . . . and they dress like MS-13

members with short sleeved button up shirts. 

I know that MS-13 were searching for people

who tried to escape them with at least one of

the caravans. This makes me afraid that the

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people who were trying to kill me in

Honduras will find me here.

Alex Doe, who had fled Honduras to escape the gang

“Mara 18” because of his work as a youth pastor and

organizer, wrote:

I am also afraid that the Mara 18 will find me

here in Mexico. I am afraid that the Mara 18

might send someone to find me or get

information from someone in the caravan. 

The Mara 18 has networks throughout Central

America, and I have heard that their power

and connections in Mexico are growing.

Kevin Doe, who fled MS-13 because of his work as an

Evangelical Christian minister, wrote:

[When I was returned to Mexico from the

United States], I was met by a large group of

reporters with cameras. I was afraid that my

face might show up in the news. . . . I was

afraid that the MS-13 might see my face in the

news. They are a powerful, ruthless gang and

have members in Tijuana too.

Ian Doe wrote:

I am not safe in Mexico. I am afraid that the

people who want to harm me in Honduras will

find me here. I have learned from the news

that there are members of Central American

gangs and narcotraffickers that are present

here in Mexico that could find and kill me. 

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 45

Honduran migrants like me are very visible

because of our accents and the way that we

look, and it would not be hard for them to find

me here.

Several declarants described interviews by asylum

officers in which they were not asked whether they feared

returning to Mexico. Gregory Doe wrote, “The officer never

asked me if I was afraid of being in Mexico or if anything bad

had happened to me here [in Mexico].” Christopher Doe

wrote:

I don’t remember [the officer] asking if I was

afraid to live in Mexico while waiting for my

asylum hearing. If she had asked, I would

have told her about being stopped by the

Mexican police and attacked by Mexican

citizens. I would also have told her I am

afraid that the people who threatened me in

Honduras could find me in Mexico . . . .

Kevin Doe wrote:

The officer who was doing the talking

couldn’t understand me, and I could not

understand him very well because he was

rushing me through the interview and I didn’t

fully understand his Spanish. The interview

lasted about 4 or 5 minutes. . . . He never

asked me if I was afraid of returning to

Mexico.

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Two declarants wrote that asylum officers actively

prevented them from stating that they feared returning to

Mexico. Alex Doe wrote:

When I tried to respond and explain [why I

had left Honduras] the officer told me

something like, “you are only going to

respond to the questions that I ask you,

nothing more.” This prevented me from

providing additional information in the

interview apart from the answers to the

questions posed by the officer.

Dennis Doe wrote:

I was not allowed to provide any information

other than the answers to the questions I was

asked. I expected to be asked more questions

and to have the opportunity to provide more

details. But the interview was fairly short,

and lasted only about 30 minutes. . . .

No one asked me if I was afraid to return to

Mexico, if I had received threats in Mexico, or

if I had felt safe in Mexico.

Two declarants did succeed in telling an asylum officer

that they feared returning to Mexico, but to no avail. Frank

Doe wrote:

He never asked me if I was afraid of returning

to Mexico. At one point, I had to interrupt

him to explain that I didn’t feel safe in

Mexico. He told me that it was too bad. He

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 47

said that Honduras wasn’t safe, Mexico

wasn’t safe, and the U.S. isn’t safe either.

Howard Doe wrote:

I told the asylum officer that I was afraid [of

returning to Mexico]. I explained that I’d

been kidnapped for fifteen days by Los Zetas

in Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas, [Mexico], and

that I’d managed to escape. . . . Migrants in

Tijuana are always in danger, and I am

especially afraid because the Zetas torture

people who escape them.

Despite having told their asylum officers that they feared

returning, Frank Doe and Howard Doe were returned to

Mexico.

This evidence in the record is enough—indeed, far more

than enough—to establish that the Government’sspeculations

have no factual basis. Amici in this case have filed briefs

bolstering this already more-than-sufficient evidence. For

example, AmnestyInternational USA, the Washington Office

on Latin America, the Latin America Working Group, and the

Institute for Women in Migration submitted an amicus brief

referencing many reliable news reports corroborating the

stories told by the declarants. We referenced several of those

reports earlier in our opinion.

Local 1924 of the American Federation of Government

Employees, a labor organization representing “men and

women who operate USCIS Asylum Pre-Screening

Operation, which has been responsible for a large part of

USCIS’s ‘credible fear’ and ‘reasonable fear’ screenings, and

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48 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

for implementing [the MPP],” also submitted an amicus brief. 

Local 1924 Amicus Brief at 1. Local 1924 writes in its brief:

Asylum officers are duty bound to protect

vulnerable asylum seekers from persecution. 

However, under the MPP, they face a conflict

between the directives of their departmental

leaders to follow the MPP and adherence to

our Nation’s legal commitment to not

returning the persecuted to a territory where

they will face persecution. They should not

be forced to honor departmental directives

that are fundamentally contrary to the moral

fabric of our Nation and our international and

domestic legal obligations.

Id. at 24.

Based on the Supreme Court’s conclusion that Congress

intended in § 1253(h)(1) (the predecessor to § 1231(b)(3)(B))

to “parallel” the anti-refoulement provision of Article 33 of

the 1951 Convention, and based on the record in the district

court, we conclude that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of

success on the merits of their claim that the MPP does not

comply with the United States’ anti-refoulement obligations

under § 1231(b). We need not, and do not, reach the question

whether the part of the MPP challenged as inconsistent with

our anti-refoulement obligations should have been adopted

through notice-and-comment rulemaking.

VI. Other Preliminary Injunction Factors

In addition to likelihood of success on the merits, a court

must consider the likelihood that the requesting party will

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 49

suffer irreparable harm, the balance of the equities, and the

public interest in determining whether a preliminary

injunction is justified. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “When the

government is a party, these last two factors merge.” Drakes

Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).

There is a significant likelihood that the individual

plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the MPP is not

enjoined. Uncontested evidence in the record establishes that

non-Mexicans returned to Mexico under the MPP risk

substantial harm, even death, while theyawait adjudication of

their applications for asylum.

The balance of equities favors plaintiffs. On one side is

the interest of the Government in continuing to follow the

directives of the MPP. However, the strength of that interest

is diminished by the likelihood, established above, that the

MPP is inconsistent with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1231(b). 

On the other side is the interest of the plaintiffs. The

individual plaintiffs risk substantial harm, even death, so long

as the directives of the MPP are followed, and the

organizational plaintiffs are hindered in their ability to carry

out their missions.

The public interest similarly favors the plaintiffs. We

agree with East Bay Sanctuary Covenant:

On the one hand, the public has a “weighty”

interest “in efficient administration of the

immigration laws at the border.” Landon v.

Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). But the

public also has an interest in ensuring that

“statutes enacted by [their] representatives”

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50 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

are not imperiled by executive fiat. Maryland

v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2012) (Roberts,

C.J., in chambers).

932 F.3d at 779 (alteration in original).

VII. Scope of the Injunction

The district court issued a preliminary injunction setting

aside the MPP—that is, enjoining the Government “from

continuing to implement or expand the ‘Migrant Protection

Protocols’ as announced in the January 25, 2018 DHS policy

memorandum and as explicated in further agency

memoranda.” Innovation Law Lab, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 1130. 

Accepting for purposes of argument that some injunction

should issue, the Government objects to its scope.

We recognize that nationwide injunctions have become

increasingly controversial, but we begin by noting that it is

something of a misnomer to call the district court’s order in

this case a “nationwide injunction.” The MPP operates only

at our southern border and directs the actions of government

officials only in the four States along that border. Two of

those states (California and Arizona) are in the Ninth Circuit. 

One of those states (New Mexico) is in the Tenth Circuit. 

One of those states (Texas) is in the Fifth Circuit. In practical

effect, the district court’s injunction, while setting aside the

MPP in its entirety, does not operate nationwide.

For two mutually reinforcing reasons, we conclude that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside

the MPP.

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 51

First, plaintiffs have challenged the MPP under the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Section 706(2)(A)

of the APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold

unlawful and set aside agency action . . . not in accordance

with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). We held, above, that the

MPP is “not in accordance with” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Section

706(2)(A) directs that in a case where, as here, a reviewing

court has found the agency action “unlawful,” the court “shall

. . . set aside [the] agency action.” That is, in a case where

§ 706(2)(A) applies, there is a statutory directive—above and

beyond the underlying statutory obligation asserted in the

litigation—telling a reviewing court that its obligation is to

“set aside” any unlawful agency action.

There is a presumption (often unstated) in APA cases that

the offending agency action should be set aside in its entirety

rather than only in limited geographical areas. “[W]hen a

reviewing court determines that agency regulations are

unlawful, the ordinary result is that rules are vacated—not

that their application to the individual petitioners is

proscribed.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 511 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “When a court determines that an

agency’s action failed to follow Congress’s clear mandate the

appropriate remedy is to vacate that action.” Cal. Wilderness

Coalition v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1095 (9th

Cir. 2011); see also United Steel v. Mine Safety & Health

Admin., 925 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“The ordinary

practice is to vacate unlawful agency action.”); Gen. Chem.

Corp. v. United States, 817 F.2d 844, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(“The APA requires us to vacate the agency’s decision if it is

‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law . . . .”).

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Second, cases implicating immigration policy have a

particularly strong claim for uniform relief. Federal law

contemplates a “comprehensive and unified” immigration

policy. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012). 

“In immigration matters, we have consistently recognized the

authority of district courts to enjoin unlawful policies on a

universal basis.” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d

at 779. We wrote in Regents of the University of California,

908 F.3d at 511, “A final principle is also relevant: the need

for uniformity in immigration policy. . . . Allowing uneven

application of nationwide immigration policy flies in the face

of these requirements.” We wrote to the same effect in

Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 701 (9th Cir. 2017),rev’d on

other grounds, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018): “Because this case

implicates immigration policy, a nationwide injunction was

necessary to give Plaintiffs a full expression of their rights.” 

The Fifth Circuit, one of only two other federal circuits with

states along our southern border, has held that nationwide

injunctions are appropriate in immigration cases. In

sustaining a nationwide injunction in an immigration case, the

Fifth Circuit wrote, “[T]he Constitution requires ‘an uniform

Rule of Naturalization’; Congress has instructed that ‘the

immigration laws of the United States should be enforced

vigorously and uniformly’; and the Supreme Court has

described immigration policy as ‘a comprehensive and

unified system.’” Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134,

187–88 (5th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original; citations

omitted). In Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir.

2017), we relied on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas to

sustain the nationwide scope of a temporary restraining order

in an immigration case. We wrote, “[W]e decline to limit the

geographic scope of the TRO. The Fifth Circuit has held that

such a fragmented immigration policy would run afoul of the

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INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF 53

constitutional and statutory requirement for uniform

immigration law and policy.” Id. at 1166–67.

Conclusion

We conclude that the MPP is inconsistent with 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b), and that it is inconsistent in part with 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b). Because the MPP is invalid in its entirety due to

its inconsistency with § 1225(b), it should be enjoined in its

entirety. Because plaintiffs have successfully challenged the

MPP under § 706(2)(A) of the APA, and because the MPP

directly affects immigration into this country along our

southern border, the issuance of a temporary injunction

setting aside the MPP was not an abuse of discretion.

We lift the emergency stay imposed by the motions panel,

and we affirm the decision of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because

I believe that we are bound by the published decision in

Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan (Innovation I), 924 F.3d

503 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

More specifically, we are bound by both the law of the

circuit and the law of the case. Of course, the rules that

animate the former doctrine are not the same as those that

animate the latter. See Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383,

389 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

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As we have said: “Circuit law . . . binds all courts within

a particular circuit, including the court of appeals itself. 

Thus, the first panel to consider an issue sets the law not only

for all the inferior courts in the circuit, but also future panels

of the court of appeals.” Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155,

1171 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover: “Once a panel resolves an

issue in a precedential opinion, the matter is deemed resolved,

unless overruled by the court itself sitting en banc, or by the

Supreme Court.” Id. (footnote omitted). Published opinions

are precedential. See id. at 1177; see also Gonzalez, 667 F.3d

at 389 n.4. That remains true, even if some later panel is

satisfied that “arguments have been characterized differently

or more persuasively by a new litigant,”1

or even if a later

panel is convinced that the earlier decision was “incorrectly

decided” and “needs reexamination.”2 And those rules are

not mere formalities to be nodded to and avoided. Rather,

“[i]nsofar as there may be factual differences between the

current case and the earlier one, the court must determine

whether those differences are material to the application of

the rule or allow the precedent to be distinguished on a

principled basis.” Hart, 266 F.3d at 1172. In this case, there

are no material differences — in fact, the situation before this

panel is in every material way the same as that before the

motions panel. Furthermore, there is no doubt that motions

panels can publish their opinions,3even though they do not

generally do so.4 Once published, there is no difference

1 United States v. Ramos-Medina, 706 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2013).

2 Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 425 n.7 (9th Cir. 2018).

3

See 9th Cir. Gen. Order 6.3(g)(3)(ii); see also id. at 6.4(b).

4

See Haggard v. Curry, 631 F.3d 931, 933 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (per

curiam).

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between motions panel opinions and other opinions; all are

entitled to be considered with the same principles of

deference by ensuing panels. Thus, any hesitation about

whether they should be precedential must necessarily come

before the panel decides to publish, not after. As we held in

Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2015):

Lair contended at oral argument that a

motions panel’s decision cannot bind a merits

panel, and as a result we are not bound by the

motions panel’s analysis in this case. Not so. 

We have held that motions panels can issue

published decisions. . . . [W]e are bound by a

prior three-judge panel’s published opinions,

and a motions panel’s published opinion binds

future panels the same as does a merits

panel’s published opinion.

Id. at 747 (citations omitted). Therefore, the legal

determinations in Innovation I are the law of the circuit.

We have explained the law of the case doctrine as “a

jurisprudential doctrine under which an appellate court does

not reconsider matters resolved on a prior appeal.” Jeffries v.

Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1488–89 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc),

overruled on other grounds by Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 389 n.4. 

While we do have discretion to decline application of the

doctrine, “[t]he prior decision should be followed unless:

(1) the decision is clearly erroneous and its enforcement

would work a manifest injustice, (2) intervening controlling

authority makes reconsideration appropriate, or

(3) substantially different evidence was adduced at a

subsequent trial.” Id. at 1489 (internal quotation marks and

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56 INNOVATION LAW LAB V. WOLF

footnote omitted).5 We have also indicated that, in general,

“our decisions at the preliminary injunction phase do not

constitute the law of the case,”6but that is principally because

the matter is at the preliminary injunction stage and a further

development of the factual record as the case progresses to its

conclusion may well require a change in the result.7 Even so,

decisions “on pure issues of law . . . are binding.” Ranchers

Cattlemen, 499 F.3d at 1114. Of course, the case at hand has

not progressed beyond the preliminary injunction stage. It is

still at that stage, and the factual record has not significantly

changed between the record at the time of the decision

regarding the stay motion and the current record. Therefore,

as I see it, absent one of the listed exceptions, which I do not

perceive to be involved here, the law of the case doctrine

would also direct that we are bound by much of the motions

panel’s decision in Innovation I.

Applying those doctrines:

(1) The individuals and the organizational plaintiffs are

not likely to succeed on the substantive claim that the

Migrant Protection Protocols directive (the MPP) was not

5 The majority seems to add a fourth exception, that is, motions panel

decisions never constitute the law of the case. That would be strange if

they can constitute the law of the circuit, which they can.

6Ranchers CattlemenAction Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am.

v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 499 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007); see also

Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1074, 1076 n.5 (9thCir. 2015);

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir.

2013).

7

See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1090.

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authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C). Innovation I,

924 F.3d at 506–09.

(2) The individuals and organizational plaintiffs are not

likely to succeed on their procedural claim that the MPP’s

adoption violated the notice and comment provisions of the

Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c); 

Innovation I, 924 F.3d at 509–10.

(3) As the motions panel determined, due to the errors in

deciding the issues set forth in (1) and (2), the preliminary

injunction lacks essential support and cannot stand. Thus, we

should vacate and remand.

(4) I express no opinion on whether the district court

could issue a narrower injunction targeting the problem

identified by Judge Watford, that is, the dearth of support for

the government’s unique rule8that an alien processed under

the MPP must spontaneously proclaim his fear of persecution

or torture in Mexico. See Innovation I, 924 F.3d at 511–12

(Watford, J., concurring)

Thus, I respectfully dissent.

8 Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i). That regulation describes information

which must be provided to an alien facing expedited removal, including

a Form I-867AB; the A portion of the pair of forms explains that the

United States provides protection for those who face persecution or torture

upon being sent home, and the B portion requires asking specific

questions about whether the alien fears that kind of harm. See U.S.

Immigration & Naturalization Serv., Forms I-867A & I-867B, reprinted

in 9 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law & Procedure app. B,

at 102–05 (2019).

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