Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-01269/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-01269-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

GREGORY ANDRE SMITH,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

L. TREXLER, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 13-cv-01052-SBA (PR) 

ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

SEVERING MISJOINED 

DEFENDANTS 

Plaintiff Gregory Andre Smith, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas 

Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), brings the instant pro se civil rights action, pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to 

health and safety, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and retaliation, against 

twenty-two SVSP prison officials. These claims are based on a number of separate events 

occurring between March 2011 and August 2012. 

The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment or dismissal based on misjoinder of party-defendants. Having read and 

considered the papers submitted in connection with this matter, the Court hereby GRANTS 

summary judgment as to the claims alleged against Chief Deputy Warden L. Trexler and 

severs the remaining party-defendants without prejudice, including: Physician Richard 

Mack; and Correctional Officers G. Bailey, H. Castillo, J. Ceja, J. Collier, R. Diaz, D. 

Dornan, V. Franco, G. Gudino, A. Machuca, M. Mejai, A. Miramontes, E. Montano, L. 

Ornealas, B. Powell, R. Reyes, M. Rodriguez, M. Roennman, J. Sanudo, J. Spaulding, and 

J. Vinson. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. FACTUAL SUMMARY

On February 21, 2011, Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation at SVSP 

for battery on another inmate with a weapon. Am. Compl. ¶ 29, Dkt. 10. On March 3, 

2011, Plaintiff appeared at an Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”) hearing 

chaired by Defendant Trexler. Trexler Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. C. The ICC is responsible for 

assigning inmates to a housing program when they are placed in administrative 

segregation. Trexler Decl. ¶ 3. At the hearing, Plaintiff informed the ICC that he suffers 

from certain mental health problems, including chronic depression and anti-social 

personality disorders, which prevent him from sharing a cell with another inmate. Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 30-32, Dkt. 10. Plaintiff indicated that if he is forced to “double cell,” “serious 

bodily injury or death would result.” Id. Defendant Trexler denied Plaintiff’s request for a 

single cell placement, in response to which he filed a grievance against Defendant Trexler. 

Id. 

On May 25, 2011, Plaintiff prepared an affidavit in support of his fellow inmate, 

Tomas Meneweather, for “wrondoings” he observed when “Defendants C/Os B. Powell 

and V. Franco” sprayed pepper spray in Meneweather’s cell.” Id. ¶ 38. In June 2011, 

Lieutenant G. R. Salazar interviewed Plaintiff regarding that incident. Id. ¶ 41. Shortly 

after cooperating with Lt. Salazar, Plaintiff and Meneweather allegedly began suffering 

stomach and chest discomfort, which they believed to be the result of “unknown 

substances” being placed in their food. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff alleges that from July 9, 2011 

through September 22, 2011, he was repeatedly served meals that made him ill by 

Defendants Spaulding, Vinson, Montona, Mejai, Gudino, Reyes, Ceja, Rodriguez, Diaz, 

Sanudo, Machuca, Castillo, Powell, Franco, Dornan, Miramontes, Bailey and Ornealas. 

Id. ¶¶ 59-75. 

In the meantime, on August 23, 2011, Plaintiff complained to Defendant Mack, a 

physician, about the contaminated food and related illness. Id. ¶ 48. Defendant Mack 

ordered blood and urine samples to be taken from Plaintiff “to determine if there was any 

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substance to Plaintiff’s claims and to determine if any additional treatment was necessary 

for [Plaintiff’s] stomach pains.” Mack Decl. ¶ 6. Defendant Roennman, however, 

allegedly refused to allow a lab technician to take the blood and urine samples from 

Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 49. 

A week later, on September 8, 2011, the blood and urine tests were performed on 

Plaintiff. Mack Decl. ¶ 6. On September 9, 2011, Defendant Mack reviewed the test 

results and determined that they were “within normal limits” and “did not indicate that 

[Plaintiff] needed any additional medical care.” Id. Defendant Mack determined that the 

test results “indicated that additional tests may be necessary” and thereafter ordered 

additional tests on October 12, 2011. Id. Again, Defendant Mack concluded that the 

October 12, 2011 test results were “within normal limits and did not indicate any 

additional tests were necessary.” Id. 

In October 2011, Defendant Collier approached Plaintiff about his “allegations of 

being poisoned by his colleagues,” and threatened him by saying that “if [Plaintiff] was 

smart [he] would ‘leave that poisoing [sic] shit alone or else [his] stay in [administrative 

segregation] could get unpleasant.’” Am. Compl. ¶ 48. 

On January 20, 2012, Plaintiff was treated with antibiotics for “h pylori” bacteria 

which later was detected in his blood test results. Id. ¶ 54. 

In April 2012, Defendants Collier and Roennman “informed Plaintiff that life is 

going to get rough for [him] for continuing to pursue an investigation into being 

poisoned.” Id. ¶ 80. On April 15, 2012, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Collier refused to 

provide him with his dinner tray. Id. ¶ 81. After Plaintiff filed a complaint to Defendant 

Collier’s superior, Defendants Collier and Roennman allegedly began to “harass, 

intimidate and threaten[] Plaintiff by kicking on Plaintiff’s cell door, taunting Plaintiff, 

[and] using foul disrespect[ful] language when speaking to Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 83. On April 

30, 2012 and August 3, 2012, Defendant Collier again denied Plaintiff his dinner tray, in 

retaliation for filing complaints against Defendant Collier. Id. ¶ 85. 

On August 6, 2012, Defendant Collier served Plaintiff a dinner tray with “chewing 

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tobacco spit in [his] food.” Id. ¶ 85. Defendant Collier’s alleged retaliatory actions of 

denying Plaintiff his dinner tray continued to take place in June and July 2013. Id. ¶ 93. 

Plaintiff claims he has lost between ten to fifteen pounds, due to lack of nutrients which 

has exacerbated [his] stomach medical conditions . . . .” Id. ¶ 93. 

B. PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

1. Claims 

Plaintiff filed the instant action in this Court on March 7, 2013. Dkt. 1. On August 

30, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against twenty-five Defendants, seeking 

injunctive relief and monetary damages. Dkt. 10. The Amended Complaint names the 

twenty-two party-defendants named above and Warden Anthony Hedgpeth, and 

Correctional Sergeants R. Machuca, Jr. and M. Zornes. 

In its Order of Service, the Court dismissed: (1) the supervisory liability claims 

against Defendants Hedgpeth, R. Machuca and Zornes; (2) the supervisory liability claim 

against Defendants Hedgpeth and Trexler based on “wrongdoings” of subordinates 

Defendants Franco and Powell; and (3) the claims of harassment and threats as to 

Defendant Collier. Dkt. 15 at 9-10. The Court served the remaining twenty-two 

Defendants as to the following claims: 

(1) Defendant Trexler was deliberately indifferent to his health and/or safety when 

he approved Plaintiff for double-cell housing in March 2011; 

(2) Defendants Spaulding, Vinson, Montona, Mejai, Gudino, Reyes, Ceja, 

Rodriguez, Diaz, Sanudo, A. Machuca, Castillo, Powell, Franco, Dornan, Miramontes, 

Bailey and Ornealas served him tainted meals from July to September 2011 in retaliation 

for providing information regarding an incident involving another inmate; 

(3) Defendant Mack provided inadequate medical care in August and September 

2011 in response to Plaintiff’s complaints of food poisoning; 

(4) Defendant Roennman interfered Plaintiff’s medical care on August 30, 2011; 

and 

(5) Defendant Collier was deliberately indifferent and retaliated against him by 

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denying him his meals in 2012 and 2013. 

2. Pending Motion 

Defendants’ motion presents the following arguments: (1) Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust available administrative remedies against Defendants Vinson, Collier, Ceja, 

Rodriguez, Powell, Mejai, Spaulding, Castillo, A. Machuca, Sanudo, Miramontes, Reyes, 

Montano, Diaz, Bailey, Dornan, Franco, Ornealas and Gudino1

; (2) Defendant Trexler was 

not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s health or safety; (3) Defendant Mack was not 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs; (4) Defendants Mack and 

Trexler are entitled to qualified immunity; and (5) the Defendants are misjoined because 

Plaintiff’s claims against them arise out of distinct, unrelated incidents. Plaintiff has filed 

an opposition to the motion in response to which Defendants have filed a reply. The 

motion is now fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. Because the matter of whether 

Defendants have been properly joined in this action is a threshold question, the Court 

addresses that issue first. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. MISJOINDER OF DEFENDANTS

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has improperly joined claims and partydefendants based on “separate incidents involving different defendants.” Dkt. 64 at 22. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2), a plaintiff may bring a claim against 

multiple defendants so long as (1) the claim against them arises out of the same transaction 

or occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences, and (2) there are commons 

questions of law or fact as to all defendants.2

 When there is a misjoinder of parties or 

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Defendant Roennman for interfering with Plaintiff’s August 30, 2011 blood test; however, 

in their reply, Defendants have withdrawn such argument. See Dkt. 77 at 5. 

2

 “Even once these requirements are met, a district court must examine whether 

permissive joinder would comport with the principles of fundamental fairness or would 

result in prejudice to either side.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th 

Cir. 2000). 

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claims, “the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; 

see Rush v. Sport Chalet, Inc. 779 F.3d 973, 975 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that a court may 

sever misjoined parties and dismiss them, provided that it evaluates the potential prejudice 

to the plaintiff). In other words, the improper joinder problem can be solved by merely 

dismissing or severing the improperly joined parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 

The claims alleged in the Amended Complaint do not satisfy the requirements of 

Rule 20(a) for permissive joinder. By its terms, the first prong of the test “requires factual 

similarity in the allegations supporting Plaintiffs’ claims.” Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 

733 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). That similarity is absent in this case. Plaintiff’s first 

claim is based on Defendant Trexler’s decision at a March 2011 administrative hearing 

where he declined Plaintiff’s request for a single cell and instead placed him in a double 

cell. In contrast, the next claim is based on incidents occurring several months later, from 

July to September 2011, during which time eighteen different Defendants allegedly served 

Plaintiff contaminated food in retaliation for his cooperation in a prison investigation 

regarding the treatment of another inmate (Meneweather). There is no indication that the 

alleged retaliation was connected to Defendant Trexler’s decision to place Plaintiff in a 

double-cell. As for Plaintiff’s remaining claims, they too are predicated on incidents 

involving different defendants that are unrelated to the claim against Defendant Trexler. 

Nor do Plaintiff’s claims present any “question of law or fact common to all 

defendants . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Trexler acted with deliberate indifference to his health and safety by refusing 

his request for a single cell placement. The other claims arise from separate, subsequent 

incidents involving the alleged contamination of food in retaliation for Plaintiff’s 

cooperation in an investigation regarding another inmate and inadequate medical care 

following Plaintiff’s consumption of that food. Because those claims involve the 

application of different legal standards to different parties and factual contexts, the second 

prong of the test for permissive joinder also is not satisfied. See Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 

F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that claims “involv[ing] different legal issues, 

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standards, and procedures” do not involve common factual or legal questions). 

In the event the test for permissive joinder is not satisfied, the Court may sever or 

dismiss the misjoined parties. Visendi, 733 F.3d at 870. In deciding whether to dismiss, 

as opposed to sever, the district court must evaluate the prejudice to the plaintiff. Rush v. 

Sport Chalet, Inc., 779 F.3d 973, 975 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “[m]any of our fellow 

circuits have held that district courts who dismiss rather than sever must conduct a 

prejudice analysis, including ‘loss of otherwise timely claims if new suits are blocked by 

statutes of limitations.’”) (citation omitted). Here, it is not entirely clear whether 

Plaintiff’s claims against the misjoined Defendants (i.e., all Defendants other than 

Defendant Trexler) would be timely in the event Plaintiff were to refile a separate action 

against them. Some of the incidents against the misjoined Defendants took place more 

than four years ago, which is beyond the limitations period.3

 Accordingly, the Court finds 

that severance, as opposed to dismissal, is the appropriate remedy to address the 

misjoinder of parties. 

 The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s remaining claim against Defendant Trexler. 

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT TREXLER

1. Legal Standard 

“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate where there ‘is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact” and the moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” 

Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 344 (2010) (quoting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c)) 

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 “For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of 

limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling, 

including equitable tolling, except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with 

federal law.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). As applied to prisoners, 

the limitation period for bringing an action under California law is four years. See Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 352.1(a) (providing a two-year statute of limitations for personal 

injury claims, which may be tolled for an additional two years for prisoners). The Ninth 

Circuit has held that prisoners are entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations 

while completing the mandatory exhaustion process. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 942-

43 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the parties dispute whether Plaintiff properly exhausted all 

of his claims. 

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(citing cases). “The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a ‘genuine issue’ is on the 

party moving for summary judgment.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). 

The movant must inform the district court “of the basis for its motion, . . . identifying those 

portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact.” Id. 

Where the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. Id. at 324. “This burden is not a light one. The non-moving party must 

show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” In re Oracle Corp. Secs. 

Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 252 (1986)). An issue is “genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 322-23 (1986). All reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of 

the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

2. Analysis 

The gist of Plaintiff’s first claim for relief, liberally construed, is that Defendant 

Trexler was deliberately indifferent to his mental condition and safety by declining his 

request for a single cell placement. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30-36, 96. The Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison officials take reasonable 

measures for the health and safety of inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 

(1994). Establishing a violation of the Eighth Amendment requires a two-part showing. 

First, the plaintiff “must objectively show that he was deprived of something ‘sufficiently 

serious.’” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. 

at 834). 

Second, the plaintiff “must then make a subjective showing that the deprivation 

occurred with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety.” Id. As will be 

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discussed below, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim fails, as a matter of law, with 

respect to both the objective and subjective prongs of the aforementioned test. 

a) Sufficiently Serious Deprivation 

Under the objective prong of the test for establishing an Eighth Amendment 

deliberate indifference claim, an inmate must show “extreme deprivations” of the 

“minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 

(1992). The court looks to whether “society considers the risk that the prisoner complains 

of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone 

unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993); see also Estelle 

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Here, Plaintiff has presented no evidence to establish 

that, because he suffers from certain mental health illnesses, he necessarily should have 

been assigned single cell status. Plaintiff’s subjective fears regarding sharing a cell do not 

rise to the level of demonstrating that a single cell assignment was mandated for mental 

health or safety reasons. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058; Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332. The 

Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact as to 

whether he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation within the meaning of the Eighth 

Amendment. 

b) Deliberate Indifference 

Even if Plaintiff had shown a sufficiently serious deprivation, he has failed to 

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the subjective component of a deliberate 

indifference claim. 

“To establish a prison official’s deliberate indifference, an inmate must show that 

the official was aware of a risk to the inmate’s health or safety and that the official 

deliberately disregarded the risk.” Foster, 554 F.3d at 814. In other words, the official 

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk 

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due care 

for the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 835. 

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The record does not support a finding of deliberate indifference on the part of 

Defendant Trexler. As an initial matter, the record demonstrates that Defendant Trexler 

evaluated Plaintiff’s request in accordance with California regulations. Those regulations 

specify that, as a general rule, all inmates are required to share a cell, and that “[i]nmates 

are not entitled to single cell assignment, housing location of choice, or to a cellmate of 

their choice.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3269(d). Single cell status may be appropriate for 

inmates who demonstrate a history of in-cell abuse, significant in-cell violence towards a 

cell partner, verification of predatory behavior towards a cell partner, or who have been 

victimized in-cell by another inmate. Id. In addition, single cell status may be approved if 

recommended by clinical staff due to mental health or medical concerns. Id. § 3269(f). 

SVSP is “designed for the majority of inmates to be double-celled.” Trexler Decl. 

¶ 8. SVSP Operational Procedure 42 provides a list of circumstances to consider before 

assigning an inmate to single-cell status, and requires the ICC to determine whether an 

inmate “has a history of in-cell assaultive, abusive, or predatory behavior” before granting 

an inmate single-cell status.” Id. ¶ 5. In order to determine if an inmate should be 

assigned single-cell status, the ICC is to consider documented reports of prior in-cell 

incidents and staff is instructed to consider the inmate’s pattern of behavior, not just an 

isolated incident. Id. Operational Procedure 42 does not allow an inmate to be placed on 

single-cell status simply because he has made unsubstantiated claims of mental illness or 

threats against potential future cellmates.” 

Here, the record shows that Plaintiff was “cleared for double-cell housing because 

he did not have a history of in-cell violence or sexual predatory behavior towards 

cellmates.” Trexler Decl. ¶ 9. Although Plaintiff stated he would “kill any cellmate he 

gets,” id., Ex. C, inmate threats are not sufficient under prison policy to assign an inmate to 

single cell status, id. ¶ 9. In addition, there is no evidence to substantiate the credibility of 

Plaintiff’s claim that he would apply deadly force upon a cellmate. The record shows that 

Defendant Trexler (as well as other committee members) considered appropriate factors 

when assigning Plaintiff to double-cell housing. There is no evidence that Defendant 

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Trexler was aware of any risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety by placing him in a double cell 

or that he deliberately disregarded the risk. 

c) Injury 

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim also fails for lack of injury. Under the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), “[n]o federal civil action may be brought 

by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or 

emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Plaintiff must plead an actual physical injury within the meaning of the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 in order to recover damages for mental or emotional 

damages. 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to show that he suffered any injury as a result of being 

double-celled. Plaintiff’s fear of double-celling is insufficient to satisfy the Eighth 

Amendment deliberate indifference standard. Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 270 (7th 

Cir. 1996). In Babcock, the Seventh Circuit assessed whether an inmate “who was not 

assaulted by, and who is no longer at risk from, fellow inmates may nevertheless maintain 

a Bivens claim for money damages based solely on prison officials’ past failure to take 

measure to protect the prisoner.” Id. The Court concluded that “it is the reasonably 

preventable assault itself, rather than any fear of assault, that gives rise to a compensable 

claim under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 272. In this case, Plaintiff has only shown a 

fear of injury to himself or a cellmate—not a reasonably preventable injury that he has, in 

fact, suffered. Plaintiff has not claimed any other specific injuries after he was placed in a 

double cell. His conclusory statements and fears of being assigned to double cell status 

fail to show that he suffered a cognizable injury as a result of Defendant Trexler’s double 

cell assignment.4

 4

 The Court’s finding that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as 

to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Trexler obviates the need to 

address Defendant Trexler’s alternative argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT 

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the misjoinder of Defendants is 

GRANTED. The Court SEVERS all Defendants other than Defendant Trexler from this 

action. The Clerk of the Court shall open a new action, and file a copy of the Amended 

Complaint (dkt. 10) and copies of the Court’s service order in this action (dkt. 15) as well 

as this Order in the new action. 

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to 

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Trexler. The motion is DENIED in all other respects 

without prejudice to reasserting the remaining arguments presented therein in a motion 

filed in the newly-opened action. 

3. The Clerk shall close the instant file, terminate all pending matters, and enter 

judgment in favor of Defendant Trexler. 

4. This Order terminates Docket No. 64. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 3/10/16 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

P:\PRO-SE\SBA\CR.13\Smith1052.grantIP&denyIP-MSJ_022916.docx 

Case 4:13-cv-01052-SBA Document 78 Filed 03/11/16 Page 12 of 12 Case 5:16-cv-01269-BLF Document 3 Filed 03/15/16 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

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add

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Da

GREGORY A

v. 

. TREXLER

I, the un

strict Court, 

That on

ARTIALLY G

EVERING M

dressed to th

acing said co

Gregory

Salinas 

P.O. Bo

Soledad

ated: 3/11/20

ANDRE SM

Plaintiff, 

R, et al., 

Defendants

ndersigned, 

Northern Di

n 3/11/2016, 

GRANTING

MISJOINED 

he person(s) 

opy(ies) into 

y Andre Sm

Valley State

ox 1050 

d, CA 93960

016 

UNITED

NORTHER

ITH,

s. 

hereby certi

istrict of Cal

I SERVED 

G DEFENDA

DEFENDAN

hereinafter l

an inter-offi

ith ID: P423

e Prison

0-1050 

D STATES D

RN DISTRIC

fy that I am 

lifornia. 

a true and c

ANTS’ MOT

NTS, by pla

listed, by dep

fice delivery 

354

Su

Cl

By

Je

H

DISTRICT C

CT OF CALI

Case No. 1

CERTIFIC

an employe

correct copy(

TION FOR S

acing said co

positing said

receptacle lo

usan Y. Soon

lerk, United

y:_________

ean Ballard, 

Honorable CL

COURT 

IFORNIA 

13-cv-01052

CATE OF S

ee in the Offi

(ies) of the a

SUMMARY

opy(ies) in a 

d envelope in

ocated in the

ng 

d States Distr

___________

Deputy Cler

LAUDIA WI

2-SBA (CW

SERVICE 

ice of the Cl

attached ORD

Y JUDGMEN

postage paid

n the U.S. M

e Clerk's off

rict Court 

_______ 

rk to the 

ILKEN 

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erk, U.S. 

DER 

NT AND 

d envelope 

Mail, or by 

fice. 

Case 4:13-cv-01052-SBA Document 78-1 Filed 03/11/16 Page 1 of 1 Case 5:16-cv-01269-BLF Document 3 Filed 03/15/16 Page 13 of 13