Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_68-cv-02709/USCOURTS-almd-2_68-cv-02709-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

TIMOTHY D. POPE, )

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor, )

)

JOHNNY REYNOLDS, et al., )

)

Plaintiff-Intervenors, )

)

EUGENE CRUM, JR., et al., )

)

Plaintiff-Intervenors, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:68cv2709-MHT

) (WO)

TOMMY G. FLOWERS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

ALABAMA STATE CONFERENCE )

OF NAACP BRANCHES, )

)

Amicus Curiae. )

OPINION

Case 2:68-cv-02709-MHT-CSC Document 779 Filed 06/30/06 Page 1 of 7
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The issue before the court is whether, after

approximately a third of a century, the court-imposed nobypass rule should be terminated. In general, the rule

prohibits Alabama state officials from bypassing a higherranked African-American applicant in favor of a lowerranked white applicant on a certificate of eligibles.

Because there are no disputed issues of material fact, see

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, and for the reasons given below, the

court concludes that a summary judgment terminating the

rule should be entered.

On May 20, 2003, plaintiff United States of America

was joined by the defendants, who are officials of the

State of Alabama, in filing a motion to terminate the

no-bypass rule. This court granted permissive

intervention to representatives of two groups of

African-American employees of the State of Alabama, and to

Timothy Pope, a white employee of the Alabama Department

of Corrections who says he was denied a promotion because

of the no-bypass rule. On January 28, 2004, Pope joined

the United States and the state defendants in their

Case 2:68-cv-02709-MHT-CSC Document 779 Filed 06/30/06 Page 2 of 7
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termination motion. Previously, on May 20, 2005, the

court suspended, as opposed to terminated, the rule so as

to allow the African-Americans intervenors to complete

discovery on the issue. United States v. Flowers, 372

F.Supp.2d 1319 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (Thompson, J.). 

Now that all relevant evidence has been presented, the

court finds that the requirements of Rule 60(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rufo v. Inmates of

Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992), have been met,

that is, there has been a “significant change in [factual]

circumstances” and termination of the no-bypass rule is

“suitably tailored” to these changed circumstances. Id.

at 383. As this court has stated, the no-bypass rule was

“imposed in response to evidence that, up until 1970, the

State of Alabama was unabashedly refusing to hire and

promote African-Americans to almost any and all non-menial

positions in state government because of their race.”

Flowers, 372 F.Supp.2d at 1323. The rule was part of an

extensive remedial order to redress this discrimination.

Case 2:68-cv-02709-MHT-CSC Document 779 Filed 06/30/06 Page 3 of 7
1. African-Americans intervenors’ brief (Doc. No.

737), at 13 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

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In contrast, the current record reflects “that the

racial make-up of Alabama's government is dramatically

different from what it was in 1970, when the no-bypass

rule was imposed.” Id. at 1324. More specifically, and

for example, the percentage of African-Americans in 2003

in the state workforce rose to 39; while, at the same

time, between 1983 and 2003, the percentage of AfricanAmericans in the lowest pay-grade groups decreased from 48

(as opposed to 23 for whites) to 11 (as opposed to 8 for

whites), and, in general, there was a substantial

redistribution of African-Americans into jobs categories

with higher, and even the highest, earning potential.

Thus, all experts agree “that the percentage of African

American employees in the State of Alabama workforce has

increased from 1970 to 2003 and that the distribution of

these employees has changed from lower skilled positions

to higher skilled positions, and consequently, higher

paying, ... categories.”1

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To be sure, as the African-American intervenors

observe, the evidence also reflects that African-Americans

have still not achieved parity with whites in the overall

state workforce and in certain parts of that workforce.

However, the intent of the no-bypass rule was not to

achieve racial parity, see Ensley Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v.

Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The Constitution

does not guarantee racial parity in public employment”);

rather, it was to help in redressing the State’s acrossthe-board discrimination in employment, including

specifically the State’s intentional bypassing of higherranked African-American applicants in favor of a lowerranked white applicants so as to limit African-American to

menial jobs. The intent was to knock down the State’s

wall of racial discrimination.

The African-American intervenors also note that their

statistical evidence suggests that there may still be

discriminatory practices in other aspects of the State’s

selection process and even in some state agencies; this

evidence further suggests significant pay disparities

Case 2:68-cv-02709-MHT-CSC Document 779 Filed 06/30/06 Page 5 of 7
2. Indeed, it is arguable that the African-American

intervenors may have overstated their case. Their

evidence suggests that some of the alleged practices and

disparities they identify have remained and continued

unallayed at all by the no-bypass rule, thereby

suggesting the rule has been ineffective as to these

practices and disparities. Therefore, to the extent

these alleged practices and disparities need a remedy,

(continued...)

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between African-American and whites within some job

categories. “[T]he no-bypass rule is a race-conscious

provision and, as such, must meet ‘strict scrutiny’

standards and must be ‘narrowly tailored,’ Adarand

Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 115 S.Ct. 2097,

132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995).” Flowers, 372 F.Supp.2d at 1323.

The across-the-board rule, while narrowly tailored when

imposed to redress the State’s across-the-board

discrimination at that time, is no longer narrowly

tailored to redress the specific types of alleged racially

discriminatory practices identified by the AfricanAmerican intervenors today. Those alleged practices may

still need fixing, but the no-bypass rule is no longer one

of the appropriate tools; there is no longer a fit between

the alleged practices and the rule.2

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2. (...continued)

they need a new one more tailored to them than the nobypass rule.

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 30th day of June, 2006.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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