Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01443/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01443-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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 The undersigned uses “bar” and “default” interchangeably in this Findings, but 1

primarily refers to the doctrine applicable to denying habeas claims in federal court because of an

independent and adequate state law reason as “procedural bar.”

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH T. MUSSELWHITE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-01-1443 LKK GGH P

vs.

ROBERT WONG, Acting Warden, FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

San Quentin State Prison, and ORDER

Respondent. DEATH PENALTY CASE

 /

Introduction and Summary

Respondent appears to have defaulted on his procedural default (bar) motion. For

the reasons set forth below, respondent’s failure to respond to petitioner’s opposition to the

imposition of procedural bar, and respondent’s inaction with respect to the undersigned’s call for

further briefing on the Clark/Robbins (timeliness) bar, forfeits the opportunity to have the court

declare the Clark/Robbins bar and Dixon/Harris (failure to raise a claim on direct appeal) bar – 1

clear, well established and applied regularly by state courts so as to provide an independent state

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law ground for the denial of certain claims in the First Amended Petition.

Procedural Facts

Petitioner Musselwhite was convicted of murder in the course of a robbery and

burglary, and attempted murder committed in the course of a robbery. With respect to the

murder charge, the jury also found the special circumstances of robbery and burglary to be true. 

Petitioner was also convicted of personal use of a weapon charges and inflicting great bodily

injury. Ultimately, the jury imposed a sentence of death. His appeal to the Supreme Court was

resolved adversely to petitioner in People v. Musselwhite, 17 Cal. 4th 1216, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 212

(1998). 

Prior to the resolution of direct review, petitioner filed his first state habeas corpus

petition on August 18, 1997. This petition was denied by the state supreme court on July 18,

2001.

After resolution of the first state habeas petition, the initial federal petition was

filed on August 16, 2002. After petitioner’s counsel made it known that further issues required

exhaustion, this case was stayed pending exhaustion in state court. (Order of September 29,

2005). The second state petition was duly filed; it was denied on November 16, 2005. Prepared

for this eventuality, petitioner filed his First Amended Petition in federal court on the same day. 

A status conference was held in January 2006 in which respondent indicated that

he would like to file a motion to dismiss. Discussion ensued during the status conference

concerning whether it was beneficial to have an initial motion to dismiss on procedural issues, or

whether such procedural issues should be included in an omnibus motion or answer dealing with

all issues which could be resolved as a matter of law. At respondent’s request, the initial motion

was limited to procedural bar issues, and a briefing schedule was set. 

Much to the surprise of petitioner (and the court), respondent filed on April 10,

2006, an omnibus motion for summary judgment including both procedural bar and merits

issues. Petitioner asked for and received a status hearing on responding to this omnibus motion,

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 On remand, the state in Bennett abandoned any attempt to meet its burden. Bennett v. 2

Mueller, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1175 (n.15) C.D. Cal. 2005).

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as during the previous conference, the undersigned had scheduled the case based on a procedural

bar motion only. That status conference was held on May 30, 2006. During the course of that

conference, it was again decided that petitioner would first oppose only the procedural bar part of

the motion, and no response was required on the merits until resolution of the procedural motion. 

Respondent was given a date certain to reply to the opposition with the court noting respondent’s

burden of proof pursuant to Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F. 3d 573 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner filed an

opposition clearly placing in issue all aspects of the legitimacy of the Clark bar, and to a lesser

extent, the Dixon bar. Respondent did not file a reply.

Afterwards, the undersigned did not focus on the lack of a reply. At the status

conference, the undersigned had expressed his surprise that the precise parameters of

respondent’s regularity-of-application burden in the Clark or Dixon setting had not been spelled

out in a post-Bennett case. The undersigned expected that surely a case would soon percolate 2

through the Circuit defining more clearly this rather amorphous burden. Therefore, the

undersigned determined in his own mind to await, at least for the near future, any resolution of

the procedural bar motion pending this defining case. However, such a case did not percolate. 

What constitutes the specific “proof”of whether a procedural bar is regularly applied remains

unsettled at the Circuit level.

However, recently, in another case, the undersigned decided that the wait had

gone on long enough. On April 9, 2008, the undersigned issued his Findings and

Recommendations in Martin v. Hubbard, CIV-S-99-223 WBS GGH. In this case, the

undersigned determined that the California state courts, in explicated published and unpublished

opinions, had consistently applied the entire Clark rule, including its good cause requirements

and exceptions, such that the bar should be upheld. That determination was adopted by the

Honorable William Shubb. Martin is now on appeal.

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 Indeed, because both Clark and Dixon had been previously found wanting in terms of 3

adequacy of the bar, petitioner’s only burden was to oppose application of the bar. No further

specific showing was necessary. King v. Lamarque, 464 F.3d 963, 967-968 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Nevertheless, for the Clark bar, petitioner made a very specific showing, complete with graphs

and statistics.

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 Again, not focusing on the lack of respondent’s reply in this case, on April 9,

2008, the undersigned asked the parties to brief the court’s tentative conclusion to apply Martin

to the Clark issues in this case. Petitioner filed a brief opposing application; again, respondent

was silent. 

Discussion

Respondent asserted the Clark bar against claims L, M, N, P and Q. The Dixon

bar was asserted against claims J, M, N, and Q. There is no need to describe the claims

identified given the recommendations in this case.

Observing the lack of a reply for over two years, petitioner made the point in the

further briefing that whatever respondent’s burden to establish the adequacy of the bars asserted,

respondent had not met that burden with silence. The undersigned agrees. In the initial motion

raising the bars, respondent adequately asserted the bar by reference to the general rules set forth

by Clark and Dixon. However, respondent’s initial briefing was simply a general description of

the procedural rules and their parameters. It in no way constituted an analysis of the adequacy of

the bars in question. After all, petitioner had not yet opposed the bars, and petitioner’s specific

showing was unknown to respondent.3

Although petitioner’s analysis of unexplained assertions of the bar and nonassertions of the bar appears speculative and unpersuasive for the reasons set forth in Martin, the

undersigned will not recommend that Martin be applied here for the Clark bar. The lack of

showing setting forth any position on the consistency of application of the bars at issue, both

Clark and Dixon, as well as the lack of responsive briefing with respect to the other analytical

factors, i.e., clarity and well established, requires a finding that respondent has not met his

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In Martin, respondent put forward a statistical analysis of unexplained rulings with 4

which the undersigned disagreed, but the undersigned reached a determination favorable to

respondent on the merits using explicated cases. This is a far different situation from the court

picking up the ball and running with it when respondent has not even attempted to advance it. 

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burden – whatever that burden is. The undersigned will not become the advocate for the state.4

Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that all claims to which procedural bar has

been asserted should advance to an analysis on their merits. Insofar as procedural bar is

concerned, respondent’s summary judgment motion filed April 10, 2006 (docket #23) should be

denied.

IT IS ORDERED that the remainder of respondent’s motion for summary

judgment (docket #23) is vacated without prejudice to renewal after further status conference.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 05/15/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:gh:035

muss1443.f&r

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