Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-01737/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-01737-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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 NO. C 09‐01737 RS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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For the Northern District of California 

*E-Filed 02/05/2010* 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

TERESA BLOOMQUIST, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

WALGREENS CO., 

 

 Defendant. 

____________________________________/

No. C 09-01737 RS 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Plaintiff Teresa Bloomquist brought this action alleging that defendant Walgreens1

discriminated against her on the basis of a disability when it terminated her employment. 

Walgreens contends Bloomquist was terminated for violating company policy prohibiting 

employees from personally using or consuming store merchandise prior to paying for it, and more 

specifically for consuming a V8 juice drink she did not purchase. Because Bloomquist has shown a 

triable issue of fact as to whether Walgreens’ stated basis for her termination was pretextual, the 

 

1

 The corporation’s correct name is singular—Walgreen Co.—but it operates stores under the name 

“Walgreens.” 

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motion for summary judgment will be denied, except to the extent she is claiming a failure to 

engage in the interactive process or to accommodate separate and apart from her termination. 

II. BACKGROUND 

 Bloomquist worked for defendant Walgreens for nearly 26 years, the last two-and-a-half of 

which in the capacity of a store manager. In October of 2007, Bloomquist took medical leave for 

knee surgery and subsequent rehabilitation. She returned to work in February of 2008 under a 

doctor’s release that imposed no working condition restrictions, although she contends she was still 

limping and in some pain.2 Bloomquist asserts that upon her return from medical leave, she was 

treated negatively and unfairly by Dan Kidson, a new district manager who had become her 

supervisor shortly after the injury that led to her need for surgery. 

 In May of 2008, Bloomquist provided Walgreens with a doctor’s note indicating she was not 

to work more than eight hours a day, and was not to climb ladders. Within a few days, Bloomquist 

received an unannounced visit from Kidson in which he questioned her regarding her restrictions. 

According to handwritten notes Bloomquist prepared shortly after her termination, Kidson, “said it 

is hard to have a store manager with such restriction” and asked her if she “still wanted to be store 

manager.” When Bloomquist said she wanted to continue as store manager, Kidson told her he 

needed “a revised Dr. Note removing the restrictions.” 

 In opposition to this motion, Bloomquist characterizes that conversation in a similar manner, 

asserting that Kidson told her she “could not perform the job of Store Manager in 8 hours a day” and 

asked her if she was going to step down. Bloomquist asserts that the discussion left her feeling as 

though her job had been threatened.3

 

2

 Bloomquist’s declaration in opposition to the motion attests that she was under medical restrictions 

upon her return, citing doctor’s notes purportedly attached as Exhibit B to her declaration. As filed, 

however, Bloomquist’s declaration included no such exhibit. Her counsel’s declaration includes a 

doctor’s note indicating she was cleared to “return to full duties with no restrictions on 2/17/2008.” 

Waelty Decl. Exh. O. 

3

 Walgreens argues that Bloomquist’s current declaration should be disregarded because it 

“contradicts” her earlier handwritten notes memorializing the conversation. On this point, the minor 

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 In early June of 2008, shortly after the conversation between Kidson and Bloomquist 

regarding her restrictions took place, Walgreen employee Brenda Jenson sent two emails to Kidson 

reporting instances of possible violations of Walgreens policy by Bloomquist. Jenson had 

responsibility for assisting branch stores in conducting “re-maps”—reorganizations of the sales floor 

layout. She had recently been working at Bloomquist’s store. One email reported that Bloomquist 

had left the store unattended to go with two other employees to Starbucks. The other email reported 

that Bloomquist had taken a package of nail clippers from the shelf, opened it and used it, stating 

that she would pay for them later. Kidson advised Jenson to forward the information to Debbie 

Schenkhuizen, a Walgreens Loss Prevention Supervisor. 

 Schenkhuizen opened an investigation, focusing on allegations that Bloomquist had used 

band aids and nail clippers prior to paying for them, in contravention of a purported policy against 

what Walgreen calls “grazing.”4 In the ensuing inquiry, Bloomquist admitted using the band aids 

and nail clippers prior to paying for them, but was able to establish that she ultimately purchased 

those items. Bloomquist also admitted consuming a V8 juice drink, however, for which she was not 

able to produce a receipt, despite her claim that she had also paid for it. Schenkhuizen reviewed the 

electronic journal cash register transaction logs for a twelve day period, as well as Bloomquist’s 

debit card transaction history to attempt to verify her claim that she had paid for the V8 with her 

debit card. Schenkhuizen was unable to obtain any “objectively verifiable evidence” of payment. 

 Schenkhuizen forwarded her findings to Walgreens’ Employee Relations department and to 

Kidson. In consultation with counsel from Employee Relations and a Vice President of Operations, 

 

differences in the two descriptions of the conversation do not give rise to a conflict—the gist of the 

declaration and the notes is the same. Either one provides some evidence that Kidson appeared to 

believe Bloomquist’s medical condition rendered her less than fully capable of performing her job. 

4

 Bloomquist denies being aware at any time prior to the investigation that Walgreens considered 

“grazing” to include opening or using products prior to payment, as opposed to failing ever to pay 

for consumed items. While it is intuitive that Walgreens might wish to prohibit opening and 

consuming products prior to payment as a means of avoiding disputes regarding whether an 

employee intended to pay, Bloomquist correctly notes that certain Walgreens employee literature 

does not clearly advise that the timing of payment is as important as the fact of payment. See 

Waelty Decl. Exh. Q. 

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Kidson determined Bloomquist should be terminated for theft of the V8 and her admitting “grazing” 

(within Walgreens’ understanding of that term) as to the band aids, the nail clippers, and the V8. 

 In her deposition in this action, Bloomquist maintained that she in fact paid for the V8. Her 

complaint specifically alleges her possession of just such a receipt. In opposition to this motion, 

however, Bloomquist declares that she has now reviewed the security video footage from the day in 

question and has concluded that she was mistaken when she admitted to taking the V8 from 

Walgreens’ stock and consuming it prior to payment. Instead, Bloomquist contends, she brought the 

V8 into the store when she arrived that day. Bloomquist provides no information as to where or 

when she believes she acquired the V8, but the implication is that even if it came from her 

Walgreen’s store, the record of her payment was not located because she acquired and paid for the 

V8 at some earlier point in time. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The purpose of summary 

judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986). 

 The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of 

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Id. at 323. If it meets this burden, the moving party is then entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element 

of his case with respect to which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. 

 The non-moving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving party cannot defeat the moving party’s properly 

supported motion for summary judgment simply by alleging some factual dispute between the 

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parties. To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the non-moving party must bring forth 

material facts, i.e., “facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . . 

Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The opposing party “must do more than simply show that there 

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 

475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 

‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. However, “[w]here the record taken as a whole 

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case 

 Walgreens initially contends that Bloomquist has not made out even a prima facie case of 

discrimination because the undisputed facts do not show that she suffered from a disability at the 

time in question. Indeed, given the evidence that Bloomquist’s only medical restrictions were that 

she not work in excess of 40 hours a week or climb ladders, it is far from clear that she had any 

condition “that makes the achievement of a major life activity difficult.” Cal. Gov. Code 

§12926(k); see also DFEH v. Smurfit Corp., Dec. No. 98-01, 1997 WL 840033 (Cal. FEHC 1997) 

(forty hour work week limitation is not “in and of itself, is a limitation of a major life activity or 

makes achievement unusually difficult.”) 

 Nevertheless, although the question is close, there is some evidence that, if credited by a trier 

of fact, could support a conclusion that district manager Kidson viewed Bloomquist’s medical 

condition as interfering with her ability to perform her job functions adequately. While Walgreens 

insists that it accommodated Bloomquist by granting her leave, by never requiring her to work in 

excess of 40 hours a week, and by allowing her to delegate her responsibilities on the infrequent 

occasions she otherwise would have been required to climb a ladder, a rational trier of fact could 

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infer from Bloomquist’s account of her interactions with Kidson that he did not believe she was 

capable of performing as a store manager in light of her physical condition. The short interval 

between the time when Kidson allegedly either expressed his opinion that it would be “hard” for 

Bloomquist to perform or that she “could not perform,” and the time when the investigation leading 

to her termination commenced, is sufficient to support an inference that her perceived disability led 

to her termination.5

 B. Plaintiff’s termination

 Upon the showing of a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to 

the employer to present sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to conclude the employer had a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory basis to take the challenged employment action. McDonnell-Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973). Here, Walgreen’s has shown that its stated basis for 

terminating Bloomquist’s employment was her admission that she had engaged in conduct that it 

considers improper “grazing,” and its conclusion that in the case of the V8 drink, she had never paid 

for the item, despite her protestation to the contrary. Bloomquist takes no issue with the 

proposition that an employee’s failure to pay for even a single V8 could supply sufficient grounds 

for termination. Indeed, other than contending that Walgreens had not previously clearly explained, 

and she had not understood, that “grazing” included using or consuming items prior to paying for 

them, Bloomquist similarly does not dispute that a violation of the grazing policy could support a 

decision to terminate. Although it is certainly possible to imagine Walgreens electing to impose a 

lesser disciplinary measure under the circumstances, it had no obligation to do so in this at-will 

employment relationship. Accordingly, Walgreens has met its burden to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for terminating Bloomquist’s employment. 

 

5

 On reply, Walgreens argues that the Complaint alleges only discrimination based on actual 

disability and is insufficient to encompass a theory based on perceived disability. The complaint 

does not plainly limit itself to either theory, and given that California Government Code §12926(k) 

expressly defines “physical disability” to include actually having a disability or being perceived as 

having one, this argument is not persuasive. 

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 Under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, therefore, the burden shifts back to Bloomquist 

to show the existence of a triable issue of fact that Walgreens’ stated basis for the termination was 

pretextual. Bloomquist offers two basic arguments to show pretext. First, contrary to her prior 

admissions during the investigation and at deposition, Bloomquist contends that she brought the V8 

into the Walgreens on the day in question, rather than taking it from stock, and that Walgreens could 

and should have discovered that fact through a simple review of store security camera records, had it 

been interested in conducting a legitimate and fair investigation. 

 Even assuming that Walgreens could have made that determination from the security 

footage, and even assuming that under these particular circumstances it is appropriate to allow 

Bloomquist to recant her prior admissions, she has not shown any reason to suggest that Walgreens 

had an obligation to disregard the admission she made at the time. As Walgreens points out, the 

question is not whether it correctly determined that Bloomquist had committed theft. In fact, 

Walgreens did not even necessarily need to be reasonable in arriving at its belief that there was 

good cause to terminate Bloomquist. See Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 358 (2000) 

(“proffered reasons, if nondiscriminatory on their face and honestly believed by employer, will 

suffice even if foolish or trivial or baseless.” (citations omitted)).6

 Given the fact that Bloomquist, 

at no time prior to filing her opposition to the present motion, ever suggested that the V8 originated 

from anywhere other than the store’s shelves, Walgreens simply cannot be faulted for not analyzing 

the security video more closely. Any failure to do so, therefore, is not sufficient to create a triable 

issue of fact as to pretext. 

 Bloomquist, however, also disputes Walgreens’ contention that the investigation into her 

alleged misconduct was instigated and carried out independently of the discriminatory animus that 

she claims was exhibited by Kidson. Bloomquist cites Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 121 

Cal.App.4th 95 (Cal. App. 2004) for the proposition that a plaintiff need not show discriminatory 

animus on the part of all the corporate decision-makers involved in the matter, but only that “animus 

 

6

 The objective soundness of an employer’s proffered reasons, however, may be relevant to their 

credibility. Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 358. 

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on the part of one or more contributors to the decision was a substantial contributing factor in 

bringing about [plaintiff’s] dismissal.” 121 Cal. App. 4th at 113. Referring to an Aesop’s fable cited 

in Reeves, Bloomquist argues that liability arises if Kidson used others in the organization as his 

“cat’s paw” to carry out indirectly her termination. 

 Walgreens argues that Reeves is wholly inapplicable here, as there was no claim in Reeves 

that the persons who made the termination decision had any discriminatory animus, but only that the 

person who instigated the investigation into the plaintiffs’ conduct did.7 This case presents the 

opposite situation, Walgreens contends, because no animus has been ascribed to Brenda Jenson, 

whose complaints about Bloomquist gave rise to the investigation, or to Debbie Schenkhuizen, who 

carried it out. While that may be true, Walgreens is being too dismissive of the fact that Kidson 

undisputedly did participate in the final termination decision. 

 Even if Kidson had no part in instigating or conducting the investigation, he appears to have 

played an important role in deciding what the consequences to Bloomquist would be. Walgreens 

has not established, or even argued, that it always terminates employees when it concludes they 

have engaged in conduct like that for which Bloomquist was terminated. It is reasonable to infer that 

the decision-making group exercised some discretion in handling the situation, and it further appears 

that as a district manager and Bloomquist’s direct supervisor, Kidson was in position to exercise 

significant influence in how that discretion was exercised. Therefore, Bloomquist properly relies on 

Reeves for the proposition that Kidson’s purported animus may support liability if it was “a 

substantial contributing factor in bringing about [plaintiff’s] dismissal.” 

 The Court’s comments at the hearing on this motion reflect the fact that Bloomquist’s case 

appears to be resting on a series of very thin reeds. Nevertheless, upon review of the entire present 

record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court is not convinced that it would be irrational 

for a trier of fact to conclude Kidson held a discriminatory animus that substantially contributed to 

Bloomquist’s termination. 

 

7

 Or, more precisely, there was a triable issue of fact as to whether that person had discriminatory 

animus. 

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 C. Interactive process, accommodation

 Bloomquist’s complaint includes counts based on Walgreens’ alleged failure to 

accommodate her disability or to engage in the interactive process. To the extent these claims are 

based on the fact that she was terminated, they survive, but add nothing of substance to her primary 

claims of discrimination and wrongful termination. It appears from her opposition, however, that 

Bloomquist is claiming that Walgreens failed to engage in the interactive process or to 

accommodate her disability in the months prior to her termination. Her cursory and conclusory 

arguments in this regard are insufficient to create a triable issue of fact in light of the undisputed 

evidence that she returned to work under a doctor’s note stating she was cleared to return without 

restrictions and in the absence of any evidence of any requests by her or other circumstances that 

gave rise to a sua sponte duty on Walgreens’ part to initiate the interactive process or offer 

accommodation. Accordingly, partial summary judgment will issue as to the claim that Walgreens 

failed to accommodate or engage in the interactive process separately separate and apart from the 

termination itself.8

 

 

8

 For the same reasons set forth above regarding her discrimination claim, Bloomquist’s claim for 

wrongful termination is not subject to summary judgment. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

 Walgreen’s motion is granted with respect to Bloomquist’s claims that it failed to engage in 

the interactive process or to accommodate her disability other than in connection with the 

termination itself. The motion is otherwise denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 02/05/2010 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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