Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01311/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01311-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 In her Motion to Dismiss, Respondent preemptively proposes that “a certificate of appealability be

denied,” (Mot. Dismiss at 8); in his Objections to the R&R, Petitioner argues contrary to this proposition

(see Objs. to R&R at 7). Both requests are premature and, accordingly, are DISMISSED without

prejudice. The matter shall be addressed upon Petitioner’s timely filing of a request for certificate of

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANCY N. THOMPSON, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

K. MENDOZA-POWERS, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 05cv1311 J (AJB)

ORDER: 

1) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE

JUDGE BATTAGLIA’S REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION; AND

2) DISMISSING AS TIME-BARRED

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Anthony J. Battaglia’s Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) recommending that the Court dismiss as time-barred pro se Petitioner Mancy N.

Thompson, Jr.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Doc. No. 11.] On June 27, 2005,

Petitioner filed the instant Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 1.] On October 28,

2005, Respondent K. Mendoza-Powers, Warden of the Avenal State Prison, where Petitioner is

subject to confinement, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition [Doc. No. 7]; on November 15,

2005, Petitioner filed an Objection to the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 10].1

 The Magistrate

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appealability.

2 California Penal Code section 189 treats the subject of murder and degrees thereof; California Penal

Code section 190 discusses the punishments that attach to murder as committed under various

circumstances. See Cal. Penal Code § 189 (2002); Cal. Penal Code §190 (2000).

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Judge issued the R&R on April 25, 2006. [Doc. No. 11.] On May 12, 2006, Petitioner timely

filed Objections to the R&R. [Doc. No. 12.] For the reasons discussed below, the Court

ADOPTS in its entirety the R&R and DISMISSES as time-barred the Petition. 

Background

On November 22, 1988, based upon Petitioner’s October 7, 1988, jury conviction for

first-degree murder with personal use of a firearm, the San Diego Superior Court sentenced

Petitioner to twenty-seven years to life. (See R&R at 2.) Petitioner appealed to the California

Court of Appeal, which affirmed his conviction on July 5, 1990. (See id.) It was not until

December 29, 2003, that Petitioner first filed a request for habeas relief, first before the San

Diego Superior Court, subsequently before the California Court of Appeal on April 13, 2004,

and lastly before the California Supreme Court on May 28, 2004. (See id.) In each request,

Petitioner argued: 1) that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction by operating outside the

scope of California Penal Code sections 189 and 190; and 2) that the offense he had committed

did not constitute first-degree murder pursuant to California Penal Code section 189.2

 (See id.) 

Each court successively denied Petitioner’s requests for relief, with the Superior Court

finding that there were more than sufficient facts to support Petitioner’s conviction, and that

Petitioner’s filing of his first habeas petition approximately thirteen years after affirmation of the

conviction on appeal was not timely. (See id.) The Court of Appeal, in turn, found:1) that

habeas corpus could not serve as a substitute for appeal; 2) that Petitioner failed to establish

good cause for his fourteen-year delay in raising his claims; and 3) that Petitioner failed to

establish grounds for relief. (See id.) On April 13, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied

the state habeas petition without comment. (See id.)

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28 3 The Court CONSTRUES pro se motions and pleadings liberally. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Los Angeles

County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003).

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On June 27, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this

Court, claiming that his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution had been violated.3

 [Doc. No. 1.] On April 25, 2006, the Magistrate Judge issued

an R&R finding that Petitioner had failed to meet the “specific rules [under 28 U.S.C. § 2254]

governing the statute of limitations for federal habeas appeals,” and recommending, therefore,

that the Petition be denied as time-barred. (R&R at 8.)

Legal Standard 

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set forth

in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005). The district court must “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report ... to which objection is made,” and “may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005); see United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980).

Before a federal court may grant a petitioner habeas relief, the petitioner is required to

exhaust all available state court remedies with respect to all claims contained in the petition. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1996); Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore,

exhaustion requires that the petitioner give the highest state court a “fair opportunity” to address

each claim before presenting the claims in a federal habeas petition. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1066-69;

see also Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that to properly exhaust a

habeas claim, “a petitioner must present his claim to the state supreme court”). Moreover, the

petitioner “must describe in the state proceedings both the operative facts and the federal legal

theory on which his claim is based ‘so that the [court has] a “fair opportunity” to apply

controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.’ ” Kelly, 315 F.3d

at 1066 (quoting Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). 

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Once the state’s highest court considers the habeas petition, that court’s denial of the

petition without opinion or citation is sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See Harris

v. Superior Court, 500 F. 2d 1124, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d

344, 348 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the “California Supreme Court’s summary order denying

[the] petition was a denial on the merits”). Upon satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement, a

federal court may consider the merits of a petitioner’s habeas claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)

(1996). However, where a federal habeas petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted

claims, the court must dismiss the petition without prejudice. See id.; see Rose v. Lundy, 455

U.S. 509, 510 (1982). 

Discussion 

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge determines that there is substantial evidence to support

dismissal of the instant Petition. [Doc. No. 11.] Petitioner objects to the R&R on the following

grounds: 1) that the instant Petition is timely (see Objs. to R&R at 2); 2) that he has been

impermissibly denied the right to file an effective appeal (see id. at 2-3, 5-6); and 3) that if his

Petition is not timely, he is nonetheless entitled to equitable tolling under the “miscarriage of

justice”standard (id. at 3-4). For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its

entirety.

I. The Petition is Not Timely

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge determines that Petitioner has failed to file the instant

Petition within the applicable period of limitations as set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Petitioner objects to this determination, contending that

pursuant to the decisions of the California Supreme Court in In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391 (Cal.

1993) and In re Ward, 414 P.2d 400 (Cal. 1966), he is entitled to challenge “an illegally imposed

sentence ... at any time.” (Objs. to R&R at 2.) However, this Court FINDS that the Magistrate

Judge is correct to conclude that for failure to conform with the filing requirements as set forth

under the AEDPA, the instant Petition must be dismissed.

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Petitioner filed the instant Petition in this Court on June 27, 2005. [Doc. No. 1.] It is

therefore subject to review under the AEDPA standards, which govern habeas petitions filed

after April 24, 1996. A petitioner has a period of one year to file a motion under 28 U.S.C. §

2254. It is from the latest of four possible dates that the one-year period shall run:

A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; B) the date on which the

impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action; C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review;

or D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1996).

Petitioner is procedurally barred from bringing the instant Petition. Since

Petitioner’s state-court judgment became final in 1990, approximately six years prior to

the date the AEDPA took effect, Petitioner had a one-year grace period in which to file a

habeas petition in federal court. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246-47 (9th

Cir. 2001). Yet, Petitioner did not file this, his first federal Petition until approximately

eight years after his grace period had terminated. Petitioner has not shown cause for such

a delay.

Instead, Petitioner mistakenly contends that pursuant to the decisions of the

California Supreme Court in Harris and Ward, he in entitled to bring a federal habeas

petition at the time of his choosing. Harris and Ward, respectively, stand for the

following propositions: 1) that a habeas corpus claim that a court acted in excess of its

jurisdiction may be entertained by the state court under a narrow exception to the rule that

habeas corpus will not serve as a second appeal, Harris, 855 P.2d 391; and 2) whether a

defendant was subjected to excessive punishment is a proper matter for the state court to

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4 Petitioner also directs the Court’s attention to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) in further support of his claim

that his Petition is, in fact, timely filed. Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the statute of limitations shall run from

“the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); Petitioner argues that the factual

predicate for all of his claims was not discoverable until April 27, 2004, the date on which the California

Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s state habeas petition. However, as the Magistrate Judge aptly

observes in the R&R, “Petitioner’s claims arise from facts that occurred at the time of trial, thereby

undermining any basis Petitioner may have for asserting a delayed discovery date.” (R&R at 8 (citing

United States v. Battle, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004)).

5 It is worthy of note that the instant Petition is “mixed” for containing both exhausted and unexhausted

claims. (See R&R at 7.) The Court would present Petitioner with the option to exhaust the unexhausted

claims, staying the federal Petition and holding the exhausted claims in abeyance, or, in the alternative,

to pursue only the exhausted claims, dispensing altogether with the unexhausted claims, see, e.g., Rose

v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982), but for the fact that the instant Petition is time-barred.

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consider on habeas review, despite even a decades-long delay in the defendant’s decision

to bring the claim, Ward, 414 P.2d 400.

Notwithstanding the import of these cases in their proper context, their holdings do

not apply here, nor do they serve to suspend the federal statutory provisions pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 that guide the decisions of this federal district Court. Given the fact

that Petitioner has not complied with the applicable rules governing the statute of

limitations for federal habeas appeals, his argument that his Petition is indeed timely

fails4

; accordingly, the Court FINDS that Petitioner is procedurally barred from bringing

his habeas claims in this Court.5

II. Petitioner Fails to Present a Cognizable Claim with Regard to the Right to

File an Effective Appeal

In addition, Petitioner objects to the R&R for neglecting to reconcile the fact that

the trial court imposed a sentence on him that he “was never charged with, nor did the

jury ever find [him] guilty of” and that, subsequently, the California Court of Appeal,

both on direct and collateral appeal, “fail[ed] to specify what theory the jury used to

justify the verdict of 1st degree.” (Objs. to R&R at 2-3, 5-6.) He argues that this “failure

to specify ... has denied [him] his right to file an effective appeal, and created an

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impediment to filing, which has never been removed.” (Id.) This Court FINDS that

Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review.

As noted in the R&R with regard to the very question of whether Petitioner was

properly sentenced at trial, Petitioner here asks the Court to review the California state

courts’ application of California law. However, in this sparsely constituted objection,

Petitioner fails to make the requisite showing of fundamental unfairness or errors of

federal constitutional magnitude. See Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th

Cir. 1989) (stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state law unless

they rise to level of constitutional violation); see also Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461,

469 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir.1993)) (“Absent a

showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing

laws does not justify federal habeas relief.”). Moreover, Petitioner raised these claims on

habeas review to the state appellate courts, which ruled on the matter. [Lodgments 3, 4.] 

This Court thus defers to the state courts’ application of state law; it does not “sit as a

‘super’ state supreme court.” See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (indicating

that federal habeas court must “respect ... a state court’s findings of fact and application

of its own law”); see also Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Guzman v. Morris, 644 F.2d 1295, 1297-98 (9th Cir.1981)) (stating that federal habeas

court “ha[s] no authority to review a state’s application of its own laws”). The Court

FINDS that since Petitioner does not here proffer a claim cognizable on federal habeas

review, the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it.

III. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling

Lastly, Petitioner objects to the R&R on grounds that, notwithstanding the issue of

whether he timely brings the instant Petition in this Court, he is entitled to equitable

tolling pursuant to the “miscarriage of justice” standard. (Objs. to R&R at 3-4.) Petitioner

claims that since he was never charged with first-degree murder “within the meaning of

California Penal Code Section 189 ... the sentence imposed by the [trial] court is illegal

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and a miscarriage of justice.” (Id.) Petitioner fails to meet this standard and therefore

does not qualify for equitable tolling.

In order to prevail on a claim of miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must show that

“ ‘a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent,’ ” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. 478, 496 (1986)), with evidence so exonerating “that a court cannot have confidence

in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of

nonharmless constitutional error,” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. A credible claim of

innocence will be supported with new and reliable evidence that was not presented at trial

due to unavailability or exclusion. See Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 673 (9th Cir.

2002).

As the Magistrate Judge correctly determines in the R&R, Petitioner does not meet

the burden necessary to establish that a miscarriage of justice occurred. (See R&R at 10.) 

Petitioner does not bring to light any new and reliable evidence that was not presented at

his trial due to unavailability or exclusion, and there are simply no facts in the record to

sustain a claim that a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred. Accordingly, the

Court FINDS that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling under this standard.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, and

DISMISSES the instant Petition as time-barred. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 20, 2006

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Battaglia

 All Counsel of Record

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