Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01833/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01833-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Trademark Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United American Industries, Inc., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Cumberland Packing Corp., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-06-1833-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendant's motion to dismiss (doc. 7), plaintiff's response

(doc. 12), and defendant's reply (doc. 13). 

I

Since October 2001, plaintiff United American Industries, Inc. has been selling lowcalorie dietary food and natural sweetener products using the Sweet & Slender trademark,

registration number 1221390. In October 2003, the United States Patent and Trademark

Office (USPTO) cancelled Reg. No. 1221390 when plaintiff failed to renew the registration.

Plaintiff then filed new applications for registration of the Sweet & Slender mark on July 11

and 12, 2006. On June 14, 2006, defendant Cumberland Packing Corporation, which sells

a sugar substitute product under the brand name Sweet'n Low, filed an application to register

the mark "Sweet'n Slender" with the USPTO. Plaintiff then filed this action claiming that

defendant's threatened use of the Sweet'n Slender mark violated the Lanham Act and

Case 2:06-cv-01833-FJM Document 15 Filed 01/05/07 Page 1 of 5
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1

Although defendant moves to dismiss counts I and II pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.

R. Civ. P., both parties have submitted declarations in support of their positions. We decline

to consider either declaration or to convert the motion to one for summary judgment pursuant

to Rule 12(b). We note, however, that unlike a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider

declarations or other extra-pleading evidence when considering a motion under Rule

12(b)(1). United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 700 n.13 (9th Cir. 2004).

Therefore, we consider the parties' declarations regarding the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss

count III only.

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common law unfair competition and trademark infringement, and seeking a declaration of

its rights pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

Defendant moves to dismiss count I (Lanham Act) and count II (common law unfair

competition and trademark infringement) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., and to

dismiss count III (Declaratory Judgment Act) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P.1

Based on the following, we conclude that plaintiff's cause of action is premature, and

therefore we grant defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice (doc. 7).

II

We first consider plaintiff's claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §

2201(a), seeking judgment "declaring its rights in the Sweet & Slender trademark and its

rights with respect to [defendant's] threatened use of the Sweet'n Slender designation."

Complaint ¶ 48. Defendant moves to dismiss count III for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

asserting the absence of an actual controversy. 

Federal jurisdiction over declaratory judgment claims extends only to "actual

controversies" between interested parties. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). "[T]he question in each case

is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial

controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory

judgment." Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 62 S. Ct. 510

512 (1941). "The requirement of actual controversy encompasses concepts such as ripeness,

standing, and the prohibition against advisory rulings." BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide

Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1993). As applied to declarations of patent and trademark

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rights, a plaintiff must demonstrate, in part, the alleged infringer's "present activity which

could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such

activity." Id. at 978; see also Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764 (Fed.

Cir. 1990) (plaintiff must show infringer is "making, selling, or using" infringing product or

"making meaningful preparation for such activity"). 

Here, plaintiff fails to demonstrate defendant's present activity of infringement or

concrete steps taken with intent to conduct such activity. Instead, it relies on (1) defendant's

statements that it "was interested . . . in acquiring rights to the Sweet & Slender trademark,"

and "was preparing to bring to market a new sweetener and sugar substitute product under

the Sweet'n Slender" mark, Oney Declaration ¶ 3; (2) defendant's application to register the

Sweet'n Slender mark with the USPTO; and (3) defendant's refusal to abandon the Sweet'n

Slender mark. 

Defendant submits an declaration in which it states that it is only "considering the

possibility of introducing a new sugar substitute product under the name 'Sweet'n Slender,'"

Eisenstadt Declaration ¶4, but is also "considering using other trademarks for the same

product and the final decision as to which trademark will be used has not as yet been made."

Id. ¶ 5. Moreover, defendant states that it has not "begun to use the Sweet'n Slender and

Design mark in connection with any product . . . [nor] taken any steps to sell, transport,

distribute, market or advertise . . . any products or samples of products using the Sweet'n

Slender" mark. Id. ¶ 7. 

Without a showing of any present activity of infringement or concrete steps taken

toward such activity, plaintiff fails to establish an actual case or controversy. Neither

defendant's stated intention to use the Sweet'n Slender designation, nor its application for

registration of the mark is sufficient to support a declaratory judgment action. See Fila

Sport, S.p.A. v. Diadora Am., Inc., 141 F.R.D. 74, 75 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that "the mere

filing of an intent-to-use application . . . does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts"

where "there is no use of the marks in interstate commerce"). Accordingly, we grant

defendant's motion to dismiss count III without prejudice. 

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2

The parties treat the claims raised in counts I and II as identical, and accordingly our

discussion applies to both counts. 

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III

For the same reasons, we conclude that plaintiff's claims in counts I (Lanham Act) and

II (common law unfair competition and trademark infringement) are premature and

appropriately dismissed.2

 

In order to establish a claim under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must show that

defendant "used [plaintiff's] trademark in commerce and that the use was likely to confuse

customers as to the source of the product." Karl Storz Endoscopy America, Inc. v. Surgical

Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2002) (alterations omitted); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).

The Act defines "use in commerce" as occurring when the subject mark is "placed in any

manner on the goods . . . and . . . the goods are sold or transported in commerce." 15 U.S.C.

§ 1127. 

Plaintiff does not allege that defendant has actually used the Sweet'n Slender mark in

commerce. Instead, it argues that a Lanham Act claim can arise prior to defendant's actual

use of the trademark in commerce "if the threatened act of the defendant is imminent and

impending." Response at 5. However, plaintiff cites no case that supports this broad

proposition. Its reliance on Standard Oil Co. of N.M., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 56

F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1932), is unavailing because it predated the enactment of the Lanham Act

and does not examine "use in commerce" as defined by the Act. Nor does Maritz, Inc. v.

Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996), stand for the proposition that "threatend

use" alone is sufficient to satisfy the "use" prong of the Lanham Act. In contrast to the

present case, the alleged infringer in Maritz had "expended considerable effort in the

development of its internet service under the [infringing] mark, . . . made releases to the

national press using the [infringing] mark, . . . [and] numerous contacts and solicitations to

potential . . . customers." Id. at 1339. 

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Instead, courts have required more than an intent or threat to infringe in order to

demonstrate "use in commerce" under the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Bertolli USA, Inc. v.

Filippo Bertolli Fine Foods, Ltd., 662 F. Supp. 203, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that

transportation of infringing goods in commerce is sufficient "[t]o meet the definition of 'use

in commerce' "); Lang, 895 F.2d at 766 (holding that "until the [product] was completed,"

plaintiff could not "allege that the [product] had entered into commerce"); NTN

Communications v. Interactive Network, Inc., 1995 WL 569419, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17,

1995) (dismissing claim because there was no allegation that defendant had "already taken

steps to begin marketing its infringing product").

Plaintiff alleges that defendant "has taken steps to begin marketing the infringing

product," Response at 6, as evidenced by (1) its statements that it "was interested in acquiring

the rights to the Sweet & Slender mark," Complaint ¶ 18, and that it "was ready to launch a

new artificial sweetener and/or sugar substitute and wanted to use the designation Sweet'n

Slender as the trademark for the new product," id.; (2) its application to register Sweet'n

Slender with the USPTO, id. ¶ 20; and (3) its refusal to withdraw its application for

registration of the Sweet'n Slender mark, id. ¶ 34. Without more, these expressions of

intention are insufficient to constitute "use in commerce" as required by the Lanham Act.

We conclude that plaintiff's claim is premature and therefore we grant defendant's motion to

dismiss counts I and II without prejudice.

IV

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendant's motion to

dismiss this action without prejudice (doc. 7).

DATED this 4th day of January, 2007.

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