Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01290/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01290-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Defendants are Sergeant Mitchell and Correctional Officers Rahman, Mims,

Thornton, Garcia, Jones, and Backes (Doc. 10).

WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Karen Marie Hansen, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 09-1290-PHX-GMS (ECV)

ORDER

Plaintiff Karen Marie Hansen brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against various Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) employees (Doc. 10).1

 Before

the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)(v) for failure to comply with a Court Order

(Doc. 52). 

The Court will deny Defendants’ motion. 

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claims arose during her confinement at the Arizona State Prison ComplexPerryville, in Goodyear, Arizona (Doc. 10 at 1). In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

set forth two counts of retaliation and two counts of denial of access to the courts (id.). She

alleged that Defendants returned to sender multiple pieces of legal mail and refused to mail

Case 2:09-cv-01290-GMS Document 66 Filed 08/17/11 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ recitation of the events at the deposition, which

is supported by an attached copy of the deposition transcript (see Doc. 62; Doc. 52, Ex. A,

Pl. Dep. 10:1-13:4, Jan. 5, 2011).

- 2 -

a legal document to the federal court (id. at 3-5). Plaintiff claimed that Defendants’ actions

resulted in court rulings against her (id. at 4-5). 

In February 2010, the Court issued a Scheduling and Discovery Order (Doc. 22).

Pursuant to that Order, Defendants noticed Plaintiff’s deposition to be taken on October 6,

2010 (Doc. 39). Plaintiff sought a protective order to prevent the deposition on the basis that

the deposition notice was untimely and Defendants had failed to make initial disclosures

required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 40). The Court denied her motion

and ordered her to participate in the deposition and answer questions (Doc. 47). The

Defendants therefore noticed Plaintiff’s deposition for January 5, 2011 (Doc. 48). 

During the deposition, Plaintiff invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to answer

a question about a state civil case filed against her, Titus Group, Inc. d/b/a Arizona

Earthmovers v. Kennedy, CV 2003-0617, No. 1 CA-CV 07-0560 (Doc. 52 at 3).2 When

defense counsel told Plaintiff that she was required to answer the question, Plaintiff

responded that an attorney, whom she refused to name, advised her not to answer such

questions (id.). Defendants’ counsel attempted to telephone the Magistrate Judge and the

District Judge, to no avail (id.). After Plaintiff stated that she would not answer any

questions about the state court case or about the instant action, defense counsel canceled the

deposition (id. at 3-4).

II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

A. Defendants’ Contentions

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on the ground that

she failed to comply with the Court’s Order directing her to participate in the deposition and

to answer questions (Doc. 52). They submit that under Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(v), dismissal is an

appropriate sanction because (1) Plaintiff had previously filed an unsuccessful motion for a

protective order to prevent the deposition, (2) she failed to file a motion for protective order

Case 2:09-cv-01290-GMS Document 66 Filed 08/17/11 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

regarding the reason she refused to answer questions at the January 5, 2011 deposition,

(3) she refused to answer questions about this suit or two other suits underlying her current

claims, and (4) she refused to identify the counsel who advised her not to answer questions

about the civil suits so that defense counsel could seek clarification from that attorney (id.).

Defendants conclude that without the ability to question Plaintiff in a deposition, they

are effectively prohibited from defending this suit (id. at 4-5). In addition to dismissal, they

seek expenses and attorneys’ fees caused by Plaintiff’s failure to participate in discovery (id.

at 5). 

B. Plaintiff’s Response

Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion (Doc. 62). She explains that her criminal

conviction is under post-conviction review, and that she is unable to answer deposition

questions without implicating her Fifth Amendment rights (id. at 1, 9). According to

Plaintiff, the Arizona Earthmovers civil action is directly related to, and an extension of, her

criminal case (id. at 9). She submits that deposition questions regarding that civil action

could relate to matters for which Plaintiff has not been, but could be, further prosecuted (id.).

 Plaintiff presents case law supporting that the right against self-incrimination applies

to civil matters and that the privilege survives during a direct appeal and pending postconviction relief (id. at 3-4). She also argues that the privilege against self-incrimination

further applies to testimony, such as that in a deposition, that may furnish a link to evidence

that could assist in prosecuting the individual testifying, and that mere attendance and

response to questions could constitute waiver of the privilege (id. at 5-6). 

Plaintiff contends that Defendants have an effective alternative to deposition

testimony; namely, requests for admissions (id. at 6-7). Plaintiff also suggests that she could

be offered complete immunity from criminal prosecution (id. at 7). Plaintiff states that she

has been unable to contact the chief Deputy County Attorney with regard to these

alternatives, but believes immunity may be acceptable for her deposition testimony (id. at

7-8). 

Case 2:09-cv-01290-GMS Document 66 Filed 08/17/11 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

C. Defendants’ Reply

In reply, Defendants note that Plaintiff’s direct appeal of her 2003 criminal conviction

was resolved three years ago (Doc. 63 at 1, citing to May 30, 2008 Mandate affirming Pl.’s

conviction). Thus, they argue that Plaintiff cannot establish that she is immunized from

providing her deposition testimony in this case (id.). Defendants renew their request for

dismissal and add requests for dismissal with prejudice and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988 based on Plaintiff’s frivolous position in opposition to their motion (id. at 2).

III. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, a district court has discretion to impose a

wide range of sanctions when a party fails to comply with the rules of discovery or with court

orders enforcing those rules. U.S. EEOC v. ABM Indus. Inc., 2009 WL 1287757, at *2 (E.D.

Cal. 2009) (citations omitted). When an adverse party fails to cooperate in discovery, the

party seeking discovery may move to compel disclosure or discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(a)(1). The party seeking discovery may move to compel a deponent to answer an

appropriate question in an oral deposition and request sanctions for a refusal to answer. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(I) and 37(a)(5)(A). Specifically, a party may file a motion to compel

a discovery response if a deponent fails to answer questions under Rules 30 and 31—the

rules governing depositions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(I).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 governs a person’s behavior during a deposition.

Generally, objections to a question during a deposition are noted on the record, “but the

examination still proceeds; the testimony is taken subject to any objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

30(c)(2). The only authorized exceptions for a deponent to not answer a question, or for a

lawyer to instruct a deponent not to answer a question, are “when necessary to preserve a

privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion under Rule

30(d)(3).” Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) specifically provides that a civil

litigant may not conduct discovery of a matter that is privileged. 

The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to evidence that

may directly support a criminal conviction, information that would furnish a link in the chain

Case 2:09-cv-01290-GMS Document 66 Filed 08/17/11 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

of evidence that could lead to prosecution, and evidence that a witness reasonably believes

could be used against her in a criminal prosecution. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461

(1975) (citation omitted). The privilege may be invoked in the course of any proceeding,

criminal or civil. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972); Campbell v. Gerrans,

592 F.2d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 1979). Its availability does not depend on the type of

proceeding; rather, it turns on the nature of the statement and the exposure it invites. Estelle

v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981). 

Here, Defendants did not file a motion to compel under Rule 37(a) in response to

Plaintiff’s failure to answer deposition questions. Instead, they move under Rule 37(b) for

dismissal based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a prior Order that denied Plaintiff’s

protective order and directed her to participate in a deposition (Doc. 47). But that Order did

not address Plaintiff’s asserted Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which,

as noted, is an authorized exception to answering questions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3).

Plaintiff asserts that the privilege applies because the civil cases that Defendants seek to

question her about are directly related to her criminal case, which she states is pending Rule

32 post-conviction review (Doc. 62). See State v. Hansen, Yavapai County Superior Court,

CR 20030191 (Rule 32 Post-Conviction Relief Extension of Time entered March 10, 2011).

Defendants do not address and, thus, do not controvert Plaintiff’s argument that the privilege

survives during post-conviction review proceedings (see Doc. 63, ref. only to Pl.’s direct

appeal). 

Further, contrary to Defendants’ contention, Plaintiff’s failure to raise her Fifth

Amendment privilege claim in a motion for protective order does not warrant dismissal.

Indeed, the Court cannot determine whether a deponent’s responsive answer to a question

might be incriminating except in the context of a propounded question. See Hoffman v.

United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951); Roach v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 804 F.2d

1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 1986) (to property assert the Fifth Amendment privilege, a witness

must normally “be sworn to testify, and assert the privilege in response to each allegedly

incriminating question as it is asked”).

Case 2:09-cv-01290-GMS Document 66 Filed 08/17/11 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

In light of the above, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is premature

and, at this stage, dismissal would be too harsh because the Court has not yet ruled on

whether the asserted privilege applies. See Campbell, 592 F.2d at 1057 (“[i]mposing the

harshest of the Rule 37 sanctions on a proper exercise of Fifth Amendment rights is not in

accord with Supreme Court decisions”). Defendants will therefore be granted leave of the

Court to take Plaintiff’s deposition within the time set forth below. In setting the date and

time of the deposition, Defendants must coordinate with the chambers of Magistrate Judge

Voss to ensure that he is available to resolve any issues that arise during the deposition.

Plaintiff is cautioned that the privilege against self-incrimination does not entitle her

to refuse, in a blanket manner, to answer all of Defendants’ questions. See Lyons v. Johnson,

415 F.2d 540, 542 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding Rule 37 sanctions proper where civil plaintiff

“block[ed] all discovery attempts against him by asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege to

any interrogation whatsoever upon his claim”). Even in the face of a party’s properly

asserted Fifth Amendment right, a court still has the power to dismiss an action if necessary

to prevent unfairness or prejudice to the other party. See id.; Wehling v. Columbia Broad.

Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1087 n. 6 & 1088 (5th Cir. 1979) (“a civil plaintiff has no absolute right

to both his silence and his lawsuit”).

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 52).

(2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 52) is denied.

(3) Leave of the Court is granted to Defendants to take Plaintiff’s deposition within

45 days from the date of this Order.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:09-cv-01290-GMS Document 66 Filed 08/17/11 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

(4) In scheduling Plaintiff’s deposition, Defendants must coordinate with the

chambers of Magistrate Judge Voss to ensure that Judge Voss is available to address any

issues that may arise.

DATED this 17th day of August, 2011.

Case 2:09-cv-01290-GMS Document 66 Filed 08/17/11 Page 7 of 7