Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05329/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05329-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 3, 2002 Decided May 31, 2002

No. 00-5329

Richard Drake,

Appellant

v.

Federal Aviation Administration,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv02790)

Andrew Dunlap, Student Counsel, argued the cause as

amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on the

briefs were Steven H. Goldblatt, Director of the Appellate

Litigation Program, Georgetown University Law Center, appointed by the court as amicus curiae, Wendy M. Marantz,

Supervising Attorney, and Kristina Marlow, Student Counsel.

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Richard Drake appearing pro se, was on the briefs for

appellant.

Madelyn E. Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Christy A. Slamowitz, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Edwards, Henderson, and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Circuit Judge: This appeal arises from the District Court's dismissal of appellant Richard Drake's action

against the Federal Aviation Agency ("FAA"). Drake believes that Delta Airlines infringed his legal rights when it

processed a random drug test that Drake was required to

take by virtue of his flight attendant position. Drake therefore contends that the FAA neglected its statutory responsibilities in finding that Delta did not violate agency regulations

and breached a regulatory obligation in refusing to disclose

information bearing on that determination. The District

Court dismissed all of Drake's claims, concluding that they

were barred by res judicata. This was error. Nevertheless,

we affirm the dismissal on other grounds. The efforts of

amicus curiae to convince us otherwise were ultimately unpersuasive.*

Drake's requests for information are moot, because he has

received all the documents to which he is entitled under the

Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). While Drake argues

that a since-amended FAA regulation, 49 C.F.R. s 40.37

(1993), guaranteed him more, we defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of that provision, under which it ap-

__________

* On August 15, 2001, the court appointed Georgetown University

Law Center's Appellate Litigation Program as amicus curiae on

Drake's behalf. A third-year law student, Andrew Dunlap, presented argument in support of the appellant. The court commends Mr.

Dunlap on the excellence of his oral advocacy, which greatly assisted our deliberations and judgment in this case.

plies neither to requests made upon the agency itself nor to

the broad class of information that Drake has sought here.

Next, we conclude that Drake cannot state a claim under

the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") against the FAA

based on its failure to find that Delta had violated the

agency's drug testing rules. Under the FAA's organic statute, the agency "may dismiss a complaint without a hearing

when the Secretary [of Transportation] or Administrator is of

the opinion that the complaint does not state facts that

warrant an investigation or action." 49 U.S.C. s 46101(a)(3)

(1994) (emphasis added). The FAA's decision to do just that

here is "committed to agency discretion by law," and may not

be reviewed under the APA. 5 U.S.C. s 701(a)(2).

The last two suggested bases for Drake's action are plainly

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meritless. First, Drake's complaint cannot be read to support an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents

of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). A

Bivens action cannot be maintained against a federal agency

such as the FAA, and Drake has neither named nor served

any individual defendants. Finally, Drake has asserted no

basis for a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act

("FTCA"). Just as the APA precludes review of the FAA's

discretionary decision not to hold a hearing on Drake's complaint against Delta, that decision cannot give rise to FTCA

liability either.

I. Background

FAA regulations require that air carriers administer periodic drug tests on employees who perform certain safetysensitive functions. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 40 (1993) ("Part 40").

In 1989, the Department of Transportation promulgated the

Part 40 rules that were in effect during the times relevant to

this case. See Procedures for Transportation Workplace

Drug Testing Programs, 54 Fed. Reg. 49,854 (Dec. 1, 1989).

These rules included a number of detailed requirements

relating to the scope of drug tests and the procedural protections afforded to employees subject to testing.

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Under the applicable version of Part 40, an employee's

positive test results had to be verified by the employer's

Medical Review Officer ("MRO"). Before doing so, however,

the MRO normally was required to give an employee a

chance to discuss his test result before reporting it to the

employer. See 49 C.F.R. s 40.33(c)(1), (5). Where there

were questions about the accuracy or validity of a positive

result, the MRO could order a retesting of the original

specimen. If this reanalysis was negative, the MRO was

required to cancel the test. 49 C.F.R. s 40.33(e). If the

result was "scientifically insufficient for further action," the

MRO could either declare the test negative or order a retest

under s 40.33(e). 49 C.F.R. s 40.33(g). Moreover, in a

provision entitled "Individual access to test and laboratory

certification results," the FAA regulations indicated that an

individual "shall, upon written request, have access to any

records relating to his drug test and any records relating to

the results of any relevant certification, review, or revocationof-certification proceedings." 49 C.F.R. s 40.37.

While Part 40 by its terms conferred no private right of

action against a carrier, employees may file a written complaint with the FAA if they believe a carrier has violated the

agency's rules or regulations. See 49 U.S.C. s 46101(a). In

turn, the Administrator "shall investigate the complaint if

reasonable ground appears to the ... Administrator for the

investigation." Id. s 46101(a)(1). However, the Administrator "may dismiss a complaint without a hearing when the ...

Administrator is of the opinion that the complaint does not

state facts that warrant an investigation or action." Id.

s 46101(a)(3). If there is a hearing, the Administrator "shall

issue an order to compel compliance" with the regulations "if

the Administrator finds in an investigation" that the regulations have been violated. Id. s 46101(a)(4).

In accordance with Part 40, Delta Airlines required its

flight attendants to undergo random drug tests as a condition

of their employment. In 1993, Drake was selected for testing

four times, the last on October 28. His urine sample was sent

to Delta's designated laboratory, CompuChem Laboratories,

Inc., which pronounced it "unsuitable for testing," indicating

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that it was somehow adulterated or abnormal. A subsequent

report suggested that this initial result was "indicative of

adulteration with glutaraldehyde," a substance often used to

mask the presence of drugs in the body. This finding was

transmitted to Dr. William Whaley, Delta's MRO, who decided to forward an aliquot of Drake's sample to another lab,

North West Toxicology Laboratory, for further testing. Dr.

Whaley allegedly did so without informing Drake or obtaining

his consent.

North West's test came back negative for glutaraldehyde,

although it revealed a pH of below 4, which the lab considered "inconsistent with human kidney function and highly

suggestive of adulteration." Dr. Whaley thus decided to send

the urine for yet another retest, this one to be conducted by

Dr. Malmoud ElSohly, who believed that he could adjust for

the abnormal pH and determine if the sample had been

tainted. However, Dr. ElSohly's test uncovered no positive

indication of either drugs or adulterants. Thus, while his

report did indicate that "the specimen might be adulterated,"

Dr. ElSohly recommended that Dr. Whaley take no action

against Drake "because of presumed adulteration." On November 24, 1993, Dr. Whaley contacted Delta directly, reporting the inconclusive results to the airline's drug program

managers. He recounted Drake's testing history, noting that

the Part 40 regulations forbade any additional testing on the

October 28 sample. Dr. Whaley therefore suggested that

Drake be contacted, at which point a new specimen could be

collected.

On November 29, North West performed a third retest on

Drake's original sample. This test came back positive for

glutaraldehyde. The next day, after Delta learned of this

result, Drake was removed from active flight status. One

month later, he was asked to resign, and was fired when he

refused.

On December 28, 1994, Drake filed a pro se complaint

against Delta in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York, arguing that the airline's

testing procedures had violated both the Part 40 regulations

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and the Fourth Amendment. The District Court in New

York dismissed the case on the ground that Part 40 provides

no private right of action against a carrier and that the

intrusion into Drake's privacy from the various retests of his

urine was minimal. See Drake v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 923

F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). On appeal, the Second Circuit

affirmed as to the regulations, but reversed on the constitutional issue. See Drake v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d 169

(2d Cir. 1998). That aspect of the case is still pending. In

rejecting Drake's bid to sue under Part 40, the court of

appeals noted that Drake "could have sought redress of the

alleged regulatory violations through administrative avenues,

such as by filing a complaint with the Secretary of Transportation." Id. at 171 n.2.

In September 1998, Drake formally requested that the

FAA investigate Delta for its allegedly unlawful actions in

processing his urine sample. Drake met with several agency

employees, who purportedly told him that he would be given

access to copies of all evidence and material collected during

the FAA's investigation. Compl. in Civ. Act. No. 99-2790, at

p 11. The FAA conducted a week-long investigation of Delta

between November 2 and November 6, 1998.

This inquiry was not yet completed when, on November 12,

1998, Drake filed a second pro se lawsuit, this one against the

FAA itself in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia. See Drake v. FAA, Civ. Act. No. 98-2758

(D.D.C.) ("FAA I"). In this action, Drake alleged that the

Part 40 regulations themselves violated the Fourth Amendment as well as "procedural due process." He contended that

Part 40 failed to provide adequate hearing opportunities for

tested employees and should have included a private right to

sue carriers who run afoul of the rules' requirements.

Compl. in Civ. Act. No. 98-2758, at p p 6, 9-10. This case was

assigned to Judge Lamberth.

On March 25, 1999, while this matter was proceeding, the

FAA informed Drake of the results of the agency's investigation. The FAA reported that it had found no evidence to

support Drake's allegations against Delta. The agency also

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informed Drake that any documents uncovered by the agency

during the course of its investigation could be released to him

only through FOIA. Thus, "as a courtesy," the FAA interpreted Drake's previous request for documents as a FOIA

request, and submitted it to the appropriate office on his

behalf.

Invoking s 40.37, Drake wrote to the FAA to argue that he

had a right to information gathered during the agency's

investigation. The FAA, however, continued to demur, insisting that only FOIA, and not the regulation, applied to Drake's

request. In April 1999, Drake was informed that although

the FAA had at least one responsive document, that document was exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption

7(a). This exemption applies to records complied for law

enforcement to the extent that production "could reasonably

be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings." 5

U.S.C. s 52(b)(7)(A). The agency noted, however, that the

protection of Exemption 7 would terminate when its investigation of Delta was complete.

The instant case commenced on October 20, 1999, when

Drake filed a second pro se action against the FAA in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

See Drake v. FAA, Civ. Act. No. 99-2790 (D.D.C.) ("FAA II").

In this complaint, Drake alleged that the FAA's determination that Delta had not violated Part 40 was unreasonable,

and the product of a conspiracy between the agency and the

airline. Compl. in Civ. Act. No. 99-2790, at p p 20-31. He

asked that the court compel the FAA to complete a proper,

fair investigation of Delta and also to "release all information

of that investigation to date and in the future." Id. at p 44.

This case was originally assigned to Judge Kessler, who

transferred it to Judge Lamberth on February 2, 2000 as a

related case to FAA I. Judge Lamberth had previously

dismissed FAA I for lack of jurisdiction; he reopened the

case following the transfer of FAA II in response to Drake's

motion to reconsider. On July 31, 2000, however, Judge

Lamberth granted the FAA's motion to dismiss both cases.

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As to FAA I, the District Court found that the Part 40

regulations attacked by Drake did not violate procedural due

process. Moreover, noting that those regulations had been

superseded by new ones, the court declined to pass judgment

on the constitutionality of the replacement regulations, which

Drake had not challenged. See FAA I, Civ. Act. No. 98-2758,

at 5-9 (D.D.C. July 31, 2000). Finally, the District Court

concluded that no private right of action existed under Part

40. Id. at 9.

The District Court then dismissed Drake's action in FAA

II, holding that the action was barred by res judicata,

because it grew out of the same factual nucleus as did FAA I.

See FAA II, No. 99-2790, at 3-5 (D.D.C. July 21, 2000).

However, the District Court elected to "comment" on the

merits, finding that Drake had failed to state a valid legal

claim. Id. at 5.

The District Court suggested that the federal government's

sovereign immunity precluded Drake from obtaining the relief that he sought from the FAA. As to Drake's information

request, the court agreed with the FAA that FOIA governed,

and that Drake was not entitled to judicial review of the

FAA's decision to invoke Exemption 7(a), because he had

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In support of

this conclusion, the District Court read s 40.37 to apply only

to the material referenced in its title: "test and laboratory

certification results." The regulation did not, in the court's

view, apply to the "body of information produced during the

agency investigation." Id. at 8-9.

Drake appealed both decisions. On March 16, 2001, this

court summarily affirmed the dismissal of FAA I. See Drake

v. FAA, No. 00-5328 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 16, 2001). However, we

denied the FAA's motion for summary affirmance of FAA II,

suggesting that it was not clear that the District Court's

judgment on res judicata was a proper application of that

doctrine. Moreover, we directed the parties to address two

merits issues in their briefs: (1) whether appellant's request

for information pursuant to s 40.37 is governed by FOIA;

and (2) what is the proper disposition of appellant's claims for

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all other relief (aside from the release of information). We

now turn to these questions.

II. Discussion

A. Res Judicata

The first issue presented in this appeal is whether the

District Court correctly dismissed FAA II on res judicata

grounds. Also known as "claim preclusion," this doctrine

holds that "a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a

second suit involving the same parties or their privies based

on the same cause of action." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,

439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). Whether two cases implicate the

same cause of action turns on whether they share the same

"nucleus of facts." Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 820

(D.C. Cir. 1984). Thus, under res judicata, "a final judgment

on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their

privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been

raised in that action." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94

(1980) (emphasis added).

In this case, the District Court misapplied the claim preclusion doctrine. It is clear that, for the most part, the causes of

action asserted in FAA II are different from those asserted in

FAA I. The first case was concerned with the Part 40

regulations as a whole, and the related allegation that the

laxity of these regulations may have allowed Delta to violate

Drake's rights when it processed his urine sample. In

marked contrast, the bulk of FAA II attacks the agency's

subsequent determination that Delta did not violate those

regulations and the FAA's refusal to disclose information

bearing on that determination. Compl. in Civ. Act. No.

99-2790, at p p 23-31. Plainly, then, the claims underlying

FAA II are based on a different nucleus of facts than were

those advanced in FAA I.

What is particularly noteworthy here is that many of the

central events underlying FAA II had not even taken place at

the time when Drake instigated FAA I. While it is not clear

from the record when exactly the FAA prepared the investigation report attacked in FAA II, it is undisputed that the

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agency did not tell Drake about its contents until March 25,

1999. FAA I, of course, had been filed months before, on

November 12, 1998. Moreover, Drake's claim in FAA II that

the agency improperly disregarded the terms of 49 C.F.R.

s 40.37 plainly arose after his first action began. It was not

until April 12, 1999 that the FAA informed Drake that it was

treating his request for information as one made under FOIA,

thus rejecting his assertion that he was entitled to the

information under s 40.37.

Accordingly, the District Court's conclusion that Drake

should, or could, have raised these claims in FAA I was

misguided. Res judicata does not preclude claims based on

facts not yet in existence at the time of the original action.

Page, 729 F.2d at 820 & n.12; see also Stanton v. District of

Columbia Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 78-79 (D.C. Cir.

1997). So it is here. The doctrine does not bar a litigant

from doing in the present what he had no opportunity to do in

the past. Therefore, insofar as FAA II challenges the nature

of the agency's investigation and its refusal to disclose the

fruits of that investigation, those claims were improperly

dismissed on res judicata grounds.

B. Drake's Request for the Release of Information

Drake contends that the FAA has provided no reasoned

basis for its refusal to apply 49 C.F.R. s 40.37 to his requests

for documents gathered or generated during the agency's

investigation of Delta. If this regulation does not apply, then

the issue is now moot. On May 9, 2000, the FAA informed

Drake that because its investigation of Delta was over, FOIA

no longer barred the release of the information gathered

during that inquiry. Thus, the bulk of what Drake had

requested, including the FAA's Enforcement Investigation

Report and documentation relating to his 1993 drug test, was

released to him.

In light of this disclosure, Drake's claim is moot, unless he

can show that s 40.37 entitles him to certain documents that

he has requested but not yet received. This he is unable to

do, because the FAA reasonably interpreted that regulation

as not applying to Drake's requests. The FAA asserts that

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Drake's demands for documents based on s 40.37 must fail,

because the regulation is addressed to laboratories, not the

agency, and, in any event, the regulation is limited to test and

laboratory certification results, not agency investigatory materials. Therefore, according to the FAA, Drake was obliged

to rely on FOIA, not s 40.37, in his quest for documents from

the FAA. We agree.

In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") issued to

amend Part 40, the FAA indicated that the existing regulations "require[ ] laboratories to provide certain information

about, among other things, their HHS certifications." Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs, 64 Fed. Reg. 69,076, 69,085 (Dec. 9, 1999)

(emphasis added). This suggested that any disclosure obligation imposed by s 40.37 was on the laboratories that conducted the actual drug testing, or on the employers for whom

the tests were conducted, not the FAA. Neither the NPRM

nor the rule itself states that an employee may rely on

s 40.37 to obtain information amassed by the FAA in the

course of its investigation of a carrier or laboratory. Moreover, since the NPRM was aimed at "laboratories," this

suggested that the regulation applied only to laboratory

results and not to documents relating to FAA investigations

of carriers.

This interpretation of the regulation was never expressly

advanced by the FAA when it rejected Drake's request for

documents. Agency officials merely advised Drake that he

was bound to use FOIA, not s 40.37, in his quest for documents. Drake also points out that s 40.37 does not expressly

foreclose his claim and, further, that the regulation can be

plausibly read to support his position. We agree with Drake

that the regulation, on its face, is ambiguous. However, this

is not fatal to FAA's position. Recent decisions of this court

make it clear that we owe deference to an agency's interpretation advanced during litigation regarding the meaning of an

ambiguous regulation, if the position is not inconsistent with

the agency's prior statements and actions regarding the

disputed regulation. See Bigelow v. Dep't of Defense, 217

F.3d 875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc. v. Fed.

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Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 212 F.3d 1301,

1304-05 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The FAA's interpretation here is

consistent with the position the agency took in its NPRM and

offers a perfectly reasonable interpretation of s 40.37, one to

which we defer.

In support of its interpretation, the FAA first points to

s 40.1. This provision provides that Part 40 "applies to

transportation employers (including self-employed individuals) conducting drug urine testing programs pursuant to

regulations issued by agencies of the Department of Transportation and to such transportation employers' officers, employees, agents and contractors." Thus, according to the

FAA, the mandate of s 40.37 - like the rest of Part 40 - was

directed to regulated carriers, such as Delta, and not to the

FAA itself. See Br. of Appellee 19. The agency finds further

support for this view in s 40.37's title, which refers only to

"test and laboratory certification results." The FAA claims

that information generated during an agency investigation of

the kind mounted by the FAA here does not fit within the

confines of this title. See id. at 18.

We accede to this interpretation of s 40.37. The Supreme

Court's seminal decision in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand

Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), established the basic principle that

an agency's interpretation of one of its own regulations

commands substantial judicial deference. That interpretation

"becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous

or inconsistent with the regulation." Id. at 414. More

recently, in Auer v. Robbins, the Court held that such deference is not to be withheld merely because the agency's

reading of the regulation comes in form of a legal brief. See

519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997); see also Nat'l Wildlife Federation v.

Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The mere

fact that an agency offers its interpretation in the course of

litigation does not automatically preclude deference to the

agency.").

There are at least three preconditions for applying this socalled Auer deference. First, the language of the regulation

in question must be ambiguous, lest a substantively new rule

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be promulgated under the guise of interpretation. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). Second,

there must be "no reason to suspect that the interpretation

does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on

the matter in question." Auer, 519 U.S. at 462; see also

Bigelow, 217 F.3d at 878. Finally, the agency's reading of its

regulation must be fairly supported by the text of the regulation itself, so as to ensure that adequate notice of that

interpretation is contained within the rule itself. See Auer,

519 U.S. at 461.

There is no doubt that s 40.37 is ambiguous in its reach.

And the interpretation advanced by the FAA, which applies

the rule only to test or laboratory certification results, and

not to requests presented to the agency itself, resolves that

underlying ambiguity quite sensibly. The phrase "relating to

his or her drug test" is plastic, and can plausibly be read

either narrowly, particularly in light of the provision's title, or

broadly, as referring to any records bearing on or connected

to a drug test. By focusing on the title to determine the

scope of the text, the FAA has adopted a reasonable construction.

The regulation is silent on the question of to whom the

employee may present a "written request" in order to gain

access to his or her testing records. It is not inconsistent

with the provision - and actually quite consistent with the

structure of the Part 40 regulations as a whole - to construe

this silence as the agency has now done. Part 40 imposes

obligations on regulated carriers and affiliated laboratories,

not on the FAA itself. These are the entities that actually

conduct the drug testing, and who therefore would generally

maintain records relating to such tests. It therefore makes

perfect sense to read s 40.37 to allow employees to seek such

information from private entities.

Accordingly, the interpretation of the regulation advanced

by the FAA during this litigation is controlling unless we

discern some reason to believe that it is not "fair and considered." In conducting this inquiry, we consider whether the

agency has "ever adopted a different interpretation of the

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regulation or contradicted its position on appeal." National

Wildlife, 127 F.3d at 1129. Where the agency's litigation

position is consistent with its past statements and actions,

there is good reason for the court to defer, for then the

position seems "simply to articulate an explanation of longstanding agency practice." Akzo Nobel, 212 F.3d at 1304; see

also Ass'n of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d

1246, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (distinguishing between explanations of a rationale implicitly adopted by the agency in its

prior actions and explanations that offer new explanations for

conduct previously defended on other grounds).

So it is here. The FAA's litigation position that s 40.37

applies neither to the FAA nor to documents relating to FAA

investigations of carriers is in accord with the agency's handling of Drake's information requests solely under FOIA and

treating the Part 40 rules as irrelevant. The FAA did not

vacillate or reverse itself on this point. See Akzo Nobel, 212

F.3d at 1304-05 (concluding that the "flip-flops here mark the

Secretary's position as the sort of 'post hoc rationalizations' to

which courts will not defer") (quoting Martin v. OSHRC, 499

U.S. 144, 156 (1991)). Furthermore, Drake can point to no

prior situations during which the FAA has followed a practice

different from the one it has invoked in this case. See

Bigelow, 217 F.3d at 878 (deferring where there were "no

past practices or pronouncements" inconsistent with agency's

"current interpretation"). And, finally, as noted above, the

FAA's litigation position finds support in the NPRM issued to

amend Part 40.

Accordingly, we have no reason to believe that the FAA's

reading of s 40.37 represents anything but its fair and considered understanding. Deferring to that reasonable interpretation, we find that s 40.37 does not apply to Drake's request

for documents, and that accordingly his claim is moot.

C. Drake's Remaining Claims

The District Court invoked sovereign immunity to support

its dismissal of the remainder of Drake's action. Drake

contends that this was error, arguing that the court instead

should have viewed his pro se allegations as three separate

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claims each of which survives the Government's 12(b)(6)

motion. We address each of these claims in turn.

1. APA Claim

Drake claims that the FAA's decision not to find Delta in

violation of the agency's Part 40 rules violated the APA. In

other words, according to Drake, Delta so manifestly disobeyed the FAA's regulations in processing Drake's urine sample

that the FAA abused its discretion in concluding otherwise.

The agency's actions in this context were governed by 49

U.S.C. s 46101. Under this provision, any person may file a

complaint with the FAA asserting a violation of one of the

agency's regulations. The agency is directed to look into the

matter "if a reasonable ground appears to the Secretary [of

Transportation] or Administrator [of the FAA] for the investigation." s 46101(a)(1). Here, Drake filed such a complaint

against Delta, and the FAA conducted an investigation.

What happened next falls within the ambit of s 46101(a)(3),

which provides that:

The Secretary of Transportation or Administrator may

dismiss a complaint without a hearing when the Secretary or Administrator is of the opinion that the complaint

does not state facts that warrant an investigation or

action.

(Emphasis added.) It is this dismissal that Drake now seeks

to challenge. We reject this challenge, because we find that

the FAA's decision to dismiss Drake's complaint without a

hearing is "committed to agency discretion by law," and thus

excluded from review under the APA. 5 U.S.C. s 701(a)(2).

While the APA embodies a "basic presumption of judicial

review," Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140

(1967), s 701(a)(2) bars judicial review of agency action when

the matter in dispute has been "committed to agency discretion by law." The Supreme Court's first significant discussion of s 701(a)(2) came in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,

Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). There, the Court indicated

that this is a "very narrow exception," which applies only "in

those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad

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terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' " Id. at

410 (quoting S. Rep. No. 79-752 (1945)).

Since the Court's decision in Overton Park, the "no law to

apply" formula has come to refer to the search for substantive legal criteria against which an agency's conduct can be

seriously evaluated. If no such "judicially manageable standards" are discernable, meaningful judicial review is impossible, and agency action is shielded from the scrutiny of the

courts. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985); Webster

v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600 (1988). In such circumstances,

the courts have no legal norms pursuant to which to evaluate

the challenged action, and thus no concrete limitations to

impose on the agency's exercise of discretion. In other

words, s 701(a)(2) encodes the principle that an agency cannot abuse its discretion, and thus violate s 706(2)(A), where

its governing statute confers such broad discretion as to

essentially rule out the possibility of abuse.

In determining whether a matter has been committed

solely to agency discretion, we consider both the nature of the

administrative action at issue and the language and structure

of the statute that supplies the applicable legal standards for

reviewing that action. See, e.g., Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep't of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 104 F.3d 1349, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The

Supreme Court has recognized that certain categories of

administrative decisions, including refusals to take enforcement actions, are presumptively outside the bounds of judicial

review. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-34; see also Lincoln v.

Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993).

In the present case, the FAA's decision to dismiss Drake's

complaint without a hearing was equivalent to a decision not

to commence an enforcement action. Such a hearing is a

prerequisite to an FAA finding that a carrier has committed a

statutory or regulatory violation. See 49 U.S.C.

s 46101(a)(4). Here, the agency determined that no hearing

was necessary because the facts stated in Drake's complaint

were insufficient to warrant further action. The FAA's action

in this case was thus analogous to an exercise of "prosecutoriUSCA Case #00-5329 Document #680880 Filed: 05/31/2002 Page 16 of 21
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al discretion" of the sort discussed in Chaney. And, as

Chaney makes clear, when prosecutorial discretion is at issue,

the matter is presumptively committed to agency discretion

by law. See Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d 1078, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(concluding that an agency's refusal to hold a hearing for the

purpose of establishing the factual basis for subsequent enforcement action is subject to Chaney's presumption against

judicial review).

In an effort to avoid Chaney's presumption against judicial

review, Drake argues that he is merely challenging the

specific findings of the FAA that led the agency not to

commence an enforcement action. In other words, Drake

contends that there is "law to apply" in the sense indicated by

the Supreme Court in Overton Park, because the agency

made specific findings to support its judgment and these

findings are subject to review under s 706(2)(A) of the APA.

This is a superficially appealing argument, but it ultimately

fails for two related reasons.

First, it is clear that the FAA's factual findings were

inextricably intertwined with its decision not to issue a compliance order against Delta. In other words, the FAA's

decision that the facts did not show a violation of Part 40 was

inseparable from its decision to take no further prosecutorial

action against the carrier. This is not to suggest that such

agency findings are never subject to judicial review. Instead,

our point is that when, as here, such determinations are a

prerequisite to an enforcement action, we would read Chaney

far too narrowly to conclude that a challenge to the adequacy

of agency findings is not in substance a challenge to the

agency's refusal to enforce. See Block, 50 F.3d at 1081

(suggesting that Chaney applies not merely to an agency's

decision not to commence enforcement action in the case of a

recognized violation, but also to "its antecedent judgment

upon the question of whether a violation has occurred")

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, whether this case is governed by Overton Park

("no law to apply" so the presumption of reviewability is lost)

or Chaney (agency action involved an exercise of prosecutoriUSCA Case #00-5329 Document #680880 Filed: 05/31/2002 Page 17 of 21
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al discretion and presumption of non-reviewability has not

been overcome), Drake cannot prevail. This is so because, in

the end analysis, the statute at issue gives virtually unfettered discretion to the FAA to act as it did in this case.

Chaney's presumption against judicial review may be rebutted where the relevant statute supplies meaningful standards to cabin the agency's otherwise plenary discretion. See

Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832-33; see also Vigil, 508 U.S. at 193

("Congress may always circumscribe agency discretion to

allocate resources by putting restrictions in the operative

statutes...."); Block, 50 F.3d at 1082 (noting that "an enforcement decision that would otherwise be unreviewable is

subject to judicial review if the Congress or the agency itself

has provided a meaningful standard for the agency to follow

in exercising its enforcement power"). Accordingly, we may

review the FAA decisions challenged by Drake only if the

operative statute provides clear guidelines by which to do so,

or otherwise evinces an intent to constrain the FAA's discretion.

In this case, however, the statute does just the opposite.

The language of s 46101(a)(3), which set the terms for the

FAA's decision to dismiss Drake's complaint without a hearing, is highly discretionary. Indeed, a provision that allows

the Administrator to act when she "is of the opinion that the

complaint does not state facts that warrant an investigation,"

gives the FAA virtually unbridled discretion over such decisions. The only statutory reference point is the Administrator's own beliefs. Therefore, a court has no meaningful

standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of

discretion, at least so long as the agency's action does not

otherwise infringe some constitutional right or protection.

See Webster, 486 U.S. at 603-04.

The Supreme Court has relied on an analogous distinction

between a subjective standard (whether the agency thinks

that a condition has been met) and an objective one (whether

the condition in fact has been met) in deciding that agency

action was unreviewable. In Webster, the Court held that a

provision allowing termination of a CIA employee whenever

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the agency's Director "shall deem such termination necessary

or advisable in the interests of the United States" precluded

judicial review of that decision. Id. at 600 (quoting 50 U.S.C.

s 403(c)). What may be thought necessary may not in fact be

necessary, but a court may pass judgment only on the latter,

not the former.

Thus, whether this case involves a presumption of nonreviewability under Chaney or, instead, a presumption of

reviewability under Overton Park, Drake's claim still fails

because there is "no law to apply." See, e.g., Claybrook v.

Slater, 111 F.3d 904, 908-09 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (decision of

agency representative to adjourn a meeting whenever "he

determines it to be in the public interest" was committed to

agency discretion by law) (emphasis added). In sum, then, it

is clear that the relevant statutory language "fairly exudes

deference" to the FAA, and "foreclose[s] the application of

any meaningful judicial standard of review." Webster, 486

U.S. at 600. We therefore have no basis upon which to

review the FAA's decision to dismiss Drake's complaint without a hearing. Appellant has therefore failed to state a claim

under the APA.

2. Bivens Claim

We need not linger long over Drake's argument that his

complaint states a colorable Bivens claim. The complaint

names only the FAA itself as defendant. Drake neither

named nor served any individual defendants. It is of course

well-settled that Bivens liability cannot be imposed on an

agency of the Federal Government. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510

U.S. 471 (1994). Drake's constitutional claim against the

FAA thus fails.

Aware of this problem, amicus asks us to allow Drake to

correct this pleading deficiency on remand. Because we have

rejected all of appellant's claims, however, there is nothing to

remand. Insofar as we are being asked to send the case back

merely so that Drake may amend his complaint, this request

comes too late. See Gov't of Guam v. Am. President Lines,

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28 F.3d 142, 149-51 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiffs

whose complaints are dismissed waive their right to amend

following appeal if they failed to seek leave to amend from the

District Court); United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier

Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 552-53 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (confirming that

this rule applies so long as the Court of Appeals affirms the

dismissal of the complaint).

3. FTCA Claim

Finally, we reject Drake's complaint resting on the Federal

Tort Claims Act. By its own terms, the FTCA does not

apply to any claim that is "based upon the exercise or

performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency ...

whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C.

s 2680(a). As our discussion of appellant's APA claim has

demonstrated, the FAA's decision to dismiss Drake's complaint without a hearing in light of its finding that Delta did

not violate Part 40 plainly represents an exercise of the

agency's discretion. Accordingly, the District Court's decision that Drake stated no claim under the FTCA was entirely

correct.

Drake argues that the FAA's governing statute contains

certain mandatory elements that, if disregarded, could serve

as the basis for an FTCA action. Specifically, he points to

the provision mandating that the Administrator "shall issue

an order to compel compliance with this part if the Secretary

or Administrator finds in an investigation under this subsection that a person is violating this part." 49 U.S.C.

s 46101(a)(4) (emphasis added). We have no occasion to

address whether disobeying such a statutory command could

give rise to FTCA liability, because there has been no such

disobedience in this case. The whole basis for Drake's complaint is that the FAA did not find a violation. Accordingly,

whatever obligations this statutory scheme may impose on

the FAA simply have not been triggered.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, the decision of the District

Court is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

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