Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-02100/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-02100-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICKY BOONE,

Plaintiff,

v.

RUBY, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-2100 WBS DB P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, proceeds pro se with a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. This matter is before the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302 and 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). Plaintiff’s second amended complaint filed on April 25, 2022, is before the court for 

screening. (ECF No. 24.) For the reasons that follow, plaintiff may elect to either (1) proceed on 

the second amended complaint, as screened, with a claim under the Eighth Amendment claim 

against Officer Vargass; (2) or, in the alternative, plaintiff may elect to proceed on the first 

amended complaint, as previously screened, with claims under the Eighth Amendment against 

Officer Vargass, Sergeant Silva, Officer Ruby, Officer Armstead, and Officer Arbaca. Plaintiff 

shall respond to this order in writing, indicating plaintiff’s choice.

I. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

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court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 

1984). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal 

theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical 

inquiry is whether a constitutional claim has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. 

Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

In order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure requires a short and plain statement of the claim that shows the pleader 

is entitled to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In order to state a 

cognizable claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Id., 550 U.S. at 555. The facts alleged must “‘give the defendant fair notice of 

what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 

(2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 

court accepts as true the allegations of the complaint and construes the pleading in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. See id.; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

II. Allegations in the Second Amended Complaint

On July 12, 2020, plaintiff was assaulted by inmates while in the dayroom when Officer

Vargass left her post. (ECF No. 24 at 3.) Plaintiff was assaulted for more than 10 minutes and 

suffered significant injuries including head trauma and brain trauma. (Id.) After plaintiff was 

assaulted, Officer Vargass emptied an entire can of mace into plaintiff’s face while plaintiff was 

unconscious on the ground. (Id.) Plaintiff later found out from the assaulting inmates that 

correctional officers had paid inmates to assault plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. 

(Id. at 6.)

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III. Discussion

A. Eighth Amendment Standards

Excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment occurs when prison officials apply

force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or 

restore discipline. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 

F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). The relevant factors may include (1) the need for application of 

force, (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, (3) the threat 

reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity 

of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.

In a “failure-to-protect” Eighth Amendment violation claim, an inmate must show that a 

prison official’s act or omission (1) was objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official was 

deliberately indifferent to inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 

(1994); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005). The failure of prison officials to 

protect inmates from attacks by other inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment 

violation where prison officials know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to the 

plaintiff. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040. A prison official need not 

“believe to a moral certainty” that an inmate is at risk of harm “before [he] is obligated to take 

steps to prevent such an assault,” but “he must have more than a mere suspicion that an attack 

will occur.” Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).

“[S]peculative and generalized fears of harm at the hands of other prisoners do not rise to a 

sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm to [an inmate’s] future health.” Williams v. Wood, 

223 F. App’x 670, 671 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The obviousness of the risk, however, 

may be sufficient to establish knowledge. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 

F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). The prisoner may demonstrate that the risk was obvious due to 

the prisoner’s personal characteristics or conditions within the prison. See Lemire v. Cal. Dep't of 

Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013).

To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the 

inmate’s safety, the prisoner must show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an 

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excessive risk to inmate ... safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must also 

draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

B. Cognizable Eighth Amendment Claim in the Second Amended Complaint

The second amended complaint states a cognizable claim against C/O Vargass, whom 

plaintiff alleges emptied an entire can of mace into plaintiff’s face while plaintiff was 

unconscious on the ground. (ECF No. 24 at 3.) This is the only cognizable claim stated in the 

second amended complaint, which lacks specific factual allegations as to the conduct of C/O 

Ruby, C/O Armstead, C/O Arbaca, and Sgt. Silva. (See ECF No. 24.)

C. Plaintiff may Elect to Proceed on the First Amended Complaint, as Screened, or 

on the Second Amended Complaint, as Screened

By order dated January 20, 2022, the undersigned screened plaintiff’s first amended 

complaint and construed it liberally to find it stated claims under the Eighth Amendment against 

Officer Vargass, C/O Ruby, C/O Armstead, C/O Arbaca, and Sgt. Silva. (ECF No. 20.) In 

screening the first amended complaint, the undersigned considered an attachment to the first 

amended complaint purporting to be a statement by Inmate Cisneros, who stated he and two other 

inmates assaulted plaintiff on July 12, 2020 at approximately 3:45 p.m., and that the assault was 

orchestrated by correctional officers in that inmate Cisneros was approached by C/O Ruby, C/O 

Armstead, C/O Arbaca, C/O Vargass, and Sgt. Silva, and “promised several beneficial promises if 

myself, Inmate Todd, and Inmate Mendoza were to carry out with this assault [against plaintiff].” 

(ECF No. 16 at 5.)

In screening the first amended complaint, the undersigned noted the statement by inmate 

Cisneros was not signed under penalty of perjury, but also that plaintiff was not required to 

produce a statement signed under penalty of perjury in order to state a claim. (ECF No. 20 at 2-3.) 

The second amended complaint omits the purported statement by inmate Cisneros and does not 

contain factual allegations to support a claim against any defendant other than C/O Vargass. 

However, it is not clear whether this omission resulted from a deliberate choice by plaintiff, a 

misunderstanding of the screening order, or other difficulties pleading.

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Accordingly, the court will direct plaintiff to inform the court in writing whether plaintiff 

elects to proceed (1) on the second amended complaint, as screened, with a claim under the 

Eighth Amendment claim against Officer Vargass; or (2) on the first amended complaint, as 

previously screened by order dated January 20, 2022 (ECF No. 20), with claims under the Eighth 

Amendment against Officer Vargass, Sergeant Silva, Officer Ruby, Officer Armstead, and 

Officer Arbaca. Plaintiff shall inform the court of plaintiff’s choice, in writing and within 30 

days.

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

a. Notify the court in writing he wishes to stand on his first amended complaint 

as screened, with claims under the Eighth Amendment against Officer 

Vargass, Sergeant Silva, Officer Ruby, Officer Armstead, and Officer 

Arbaca; or

b. Notify the court in writing he wishes to stand on his second amended 

complaint, as screened, with a claim under the Eighth Amendment claim 

against Officer Vargass.

2. Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to respond to this order will result in a 

recommendation that this action be dismissed for failure to obey a court order and failure to 

prosecute.

Dated: July 26, 2022

DLB7

boon2100.screen2ac

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