Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01921/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01921-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONI R. PENNEWELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01921-BAM

ORDER AFFIRMING AGENCY’S DENIAL OF 

BENEFITS AND ORDERING JUDGMENT FOR 

COMMISSIONER

Plaintiff Toni Pennewell (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for supplemental 

security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.1 The matter is before the Court on 

the parties’ briefs, which were submitted without oral argument to Magistrate Judge Barbara A. 

McAuliffe. Having carefully considered the parties’ briefs, as well as the entire record in this 

case, the Court finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole and based upon proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, this Court affirms the agency’s determination to deny benefits.

 

1

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to conduct all further proceedings in this case before the 

Honorable Barbara A. McAuliffe, United States Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 6, 9). 

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FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS2

In 2009, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income, alleging disability 

beginning July 17, 2007. AR 57. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on 

reconsideration AR 29, 37. Subsequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. AR 45. 

ALJ Laura Speck Havens held a hearing on February 10, 2011, and issued an order denying 

benefits on June 7, 2011. AR 18-26. The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review 

on September 28, 2012. AR 5-9. This appeal followed.

Plaintiff’s Testimony

ALJ Havens held a hearing on February 10, 2011 in Stockton, California. Plaintiff 

appeared and testified, she was represented by attorney Jeffrey Milam. 

Plaintiff was born on December 25, 1959 and was 51 years old at the time of the hearing. 

AR 467. Plaintiff lives with her husband; she has a high school diploma, and she can perform 

simple arithmetic including adding and subtracting. AR 468. Plaintiff claims that her disability 

began after a trip and fall that occurred at work. AR 468. She suffers from a herniated disk, carpal 

tunnel, and high blood pressure. AR 468. In the twelve months preceding the hearing, Plaintiff 

saw her primary care physician on two occasions. AR 471. Plaintiff’s treating physician currently 

prescribes Hydrocodone, Carisoprodol, Omeprazole, and Metroprolol for Plaintiff’s impairments. 

AR 471. She claims that the medications make her drowsy and the Norco causes constipation. 

AR 471. Although her medications do not relieve her symptoms, Plaintiff continues to take them 

to in order to comply with her physician’s instructions. AR 472.

As a result of her impairments, Plaintiff contends that she can only sit, walk, or stand for 

ten minutes at a time. AR 471. The most she can lift is five pounds. AR 472. Plaintiff 

experiences a burning sensation in her lower back that is constant; rating it a ten on a scale of one 

to ten with ten being the worst. AR 472. She reported that her doctor recommended surgery but 

that she does not have medical coverage. AR 473. Plaintiff also uses a heating pad approximately

 

2 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page 

number.

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eight hours a day while lying down. AR 474. She stated that she tried therapy and it did not work. 

AR 475. She also had surgery on her right hand, but claims it did not improve her symptoms only 

making them worse.

3

 AR 475.

When asked about her daily activities, Plaintiff said that she wakes at 7:00am every day. 

AR 469. Plaintiff cannot bathe herself or perform household chores such as cooking, mopping, 

sweeping, washing the dishes or doing the laundry. AR 469. Plaintiff, however, can make the 

bed, go grocery shopping, and drive up to ten miles. AR 469-470. Plaintiff reported that she 

watches television for ten hours a day while lying down. AR 470-471. Plaintiff also has trouble 

sleeping; she sleeps approximately four hours at night. AR 471. 

Medical Record

The entire medical record was reviewed by the Court. AR 120-447. The relevant sections 

of the reports are detailed below.

(a) Dr. Paul Rose, D.O., Treating Physician

Dr. Paul Rose, D.O., is Plaintiff’s treating physician. On May 19, 2008, Dr. Rose saw 

Plaintiff for a physical exam. AR 224. At that exam, Plaintiff was diagnosed with degenerative 

disk disease of her lower back and neck. AR 225. One year later, on June 25, 2009, Dr. Rose 

evaluated Plaintiff for pain in her back and legs. AR 187-189. She was advised to continue taking 

her medications and to return for a follow-up if her symptoms worsened or did not improve 

within 15 days. AR 189. On April 8, 2010, Dr. Rose completed a functional questionnaire for 

Plaintiff. AR 276-277. Dr. Rose reported that Plaintiff’s medical conditions would “probably” 

preclude her from performing any full-time work at any exertional level. AR 276. He opined that 

Plaintiff could only sit, stand, or walk for two hours in an eight hour work day and that she must 

lie down on and off for ten to twenty minutes at a time. AR 277. He also concluded that Plaintiff 

could frequently lift five to ten pounds and could only handle, feel, or grasp for ten minutes at a 

time. AR 277. Plaintiff was completely excluded from pushing or pulling. AR 277. He listed 

degenerative disk disease of the neck and back and carpal tunnel syndrome as his basis for these 

conclusions. AR 276.

 

3

Plaintiff also testified to issues relating to digestion and arthritis but these conditions are not listed as 

impairments.

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(b) Dr. Umer Malik, M.D., Consultative Examiner

On March 22, 2011, Dr. Umer Malik saw Plaintiff for a comprehensive internal medicine 

evaluation. AR 430. Dr. Malik noted that Plaintiff could walk to the exam table, though very 

slowly and gradually. AR 432. She was able to remove her shoes and get on the exam table. AR 

432. However, Plaintiff was non-compliant when Dr. Malik asked her to put her shoes back on 

without assistance and when he asked her to lie down on the exam table. AR 432. Dr. Malik 

reported that Plaintiff said she could not perform any of the coordination/station/gait maneuvers 

because she had not taken her medicine and it was going to be too painful. AR 433. Dr. Malik 

attempted all other range of motion maneuvers but Plaintiff was unable to comply because of her 

alleged pain. AR 434. 

Ultimately, Dr. Malik found that despite her complaints, there were no muscle spasms, 

crepitus, effusions, deformities, or trigger points identified on her back or her hands. AR 434. 

Motor strength and muscle bulk and tone maneuvers were also not fully completed due to 

Plaintiff’s non-compliance. AR 434. Dr. Malik opined that Plaintiff could sit, stand, or walk for 

up to six hours in an eight hour work day, carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 

frequently, she could also frequently engage in manipulative activities such as reaching and 

handling. AR 435. Plaintiff could occasionally climb and balance and frequently stoop, kneel, 

crouch, and crawl. AR 435. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Malik that she sometimes uses a cane even 

though she did not take it to the exam. He determined that if she did use one, it would only be 

necessary for long and uneven terrains. AR 435.

(c) Dr. M. Friedman, M.D., and Dr. I. Ocrant M.D., Non-Treating Sources

On July 15, 2009, Dr. Ocrant reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records. AR 271-272. He noted 

that the objective evidence showed minimal pathology and that Plaintiff’s “records show obvious 

symptom exaggeration.” AR 272. Dr. Friedman reviewed Plaintiff’s records on December 24, 

2009. AR 257-261, 273-374. He found Plaintiff to be capable of light work. AR 274. He also 

noted that Plaintiff’s complaints were not fully credible given the minimal objective findings. AR 

274. 

///

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The ALJ’s Decision

Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not meet the disability standard. AR 12-19. More particularly, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since June 12, 

2009. AR 20. Further, the ALJ identified degenerative disk disease, obesity, and carpal tunnel 

syndrome as severe impairments. AR 20. Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that the severity of the 

Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or exceed any of the listed impairments. AR 21.

Based on his review of the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work except she can climb and balance. 

AR 22. She can also stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl frequently, and she can engage in frequent 

handling, reaching, fingering, and feeling with bilateral upper extremities. AR 22. The ALJ found 

that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. AR 24. She noted that Plaintiff could perform a 

significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy, including cashier, fast food worker, 

and office helper. AR 25. As a result, Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. 

AR 25.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision 

to deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, 

this Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. 

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 

U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the evidence that 

supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commission’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 

F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commission 

must apply the proper legal standards. E.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 

1988). This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s determination that the claimant is not 

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disabled if the Secretary applied the proper legal standards, and if the Commission’s findings are 

supported by substantial evidence. Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 

510 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).

REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage 

in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 

42 U.S.C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental 

impairment of such severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but 

cannot, considering his or her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 

F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990). 

DISCUSSION

1. The ALJ Properly Discounted the Opinion of Dr. Paul Rose

In her first issue, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in failing to adopt the opinion of her

treating physician Dr. Paul Rose. (Doc. 18 at 10-17.) The Commissioner asserts, however, that 

the ALJ considered all of the medical evidence and properly rejected the treating physician’s 

opinion. (Doc. 25 at 6-8.) 

Cases in this circuit distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those 

who treat the claimant (treating physicians), (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant 

(examining physicians), and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (non-examining 

physicians). As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source 

than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant. Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 

(9th Cir. 1987). When the treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may 

be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th 

Cir. 1991). Even if the treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the 

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Commissioner may not reject this opinion without providing “specific and legitimate reasons” 

supported by substantial evidence in the record for so doing. Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 

502 (9th Cir. 1983).

The opinion of a non-examining physician cannot, by itself, constitute substantial 

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating 

physician. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1990); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 

1456 (9th Cir. 1984). In some cases, however, the ALJ can reject the opinion of a treating or 

examining physician, based in part on the testimony of a non-examining medical advisor. E.g.,

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989); Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043. For 

example, in Magallanes, the Ninth Circuit explained that in rejecting the opinion of a treating 

physician, “the ALJ did not rely on [the non-examining physician’s] testimony alone to reject the 

opinions of Magallanes’s treating physicians . . . .” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752. Rather, there 

was an abundance of evidence that supported the ALJ’s decision: the ALJ also relied on 

laboratory test results, contrary reports from examining physicians, and testimony from the 

claimant that conflicted with her treating physician’s opinion. Id. at 751-52.

If a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling weight because it is not well 

supported or because it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ is 

instructed to consider the factors listed in Section 404.1527(d)(2)-(6) in determining what weight 

to accord the opinion of the treating physician. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Those factors 

include the “[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination” by the 

treating physician and the “nature and extent of the treatment relationship” between the patient 

and the treating physician. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii). Other factors include the 

supportability of the opinion, consistency with the record as a whole, specialization of the 

physician, and extent to which the physician is familiar with disability programs and evidentiary 

requirements. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)-(6). 

In reviewing the medical evidence and rejecting Dr. Rose’s opinion, the ALJ stated the 

following:

The undersigned gives little weight to an assessment completed by the claimant’s 

treating physician to the effect that she is unable to perform even sedentary work. 

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The course of treatment pursued by the doctor has not been consistent with what 

one would expect if the claimant were truly disabled, as the doctor has reported. In 

fact, the conclusions in this assessment are so inconsistent with the treatment 

records, they are implausible. This assessment is also without substantial support 

from any other evidence of record.

AR 24.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting 

Dr. Rose’s opinion. The Court disagrees. In evaluating the medical evidence, the ALJ gave a 

detailed summary of the medical records and outlined the basis for her conclusions.

First, the ALJ noted that Dr. Rose prescribed only conservative treatment despite his 

report that Plaintiff was completely disabled and unable to perform any kind of work. AR 24, 

276. Plaintiff testified that in the last twelve months, she visited Dr. Rose on only two occasions. 

AR 471. During those visits, Dr. Rose prescribed routine medications with no change or alteration 

based on worsening symptoms. AR 145-146, 187, 197-198, 207-210, 222, 224-225, 228-231, 

238, 251-253. It is proper for the ALJ to rely on inconsistencies between a doctor’s notes and his 

opinions about his patient. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(holding that the ALJ properly found an “incongruity” between the doctor’s questionnaire 

responses and the doctor’s medical records and concluding that the doctor’s opinion “did not 

mesh with [Plaintiff’s] objective data or history”); see also, Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 

856 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ properly discounted treating doctor’s limitations for being “so extreme 

as to be implausible” and “not supported by any findings” where there was “no indication in the 

record what the basis for these restrictions might be”).

The ALJ also noted that the conclusions in Dr. Rose’s assessment were without 

substantial support from any other evidence in the record. AR 24. As mentioned by the ALJ,

absent from Plaintiff’s longitudinal treatment history is any evidence of acute distress; conversely 

Plaintiff’s treatment notes indicate that she is without any myalgias upon musculoskeletal 

examination, and she has negative straight leg testing. AR 20, 23. The ALJ also notes that 

radiographic findings document only mild, age-related degenerative disk disease. AR 23. In terms 

of Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome, no treatment has ever been documented. AR 23. It is 

proper for the ALJ to give such unsupported opinions little weight. See Young v. Heckler, 803 

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F.2d 963, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1986) (if instead an opinion is brief and conclusory and lacking in 

clinical detail, an ALJ may afford it little weight.); see also, Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (an ALJ may discredit treating physicians’ opinions 

that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole.). 

When evaluating the medical evidence, the ALJ gave greater weight to the consultative 

examining doctor’s opinion, Dr. Umer Malik, M.D. AR 23. The ALJ found this opinion to be 

“wholly consistent with the weight of the evidence.” AR 24. The ALJ’s reliance on the 

consultative examining physician’s opinion constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s 

RFC determination. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (examining 

physician’s opinion alone constitutes substantial evidence because it rests on independent 

examination); see Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The opinions of nontreating or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions 

are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record.”).

In conclusion, this Court finds that the treatment notes and reports from Dr. Rose are 

unsupported by the record. Therefore, ALJ Havens’ assessment of the medical evidence is 

supported by substantial evidence.

2. The ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Credibility

 In Plaintiff’s second issue, she asserts that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing 

evidence for discrediting her subjective symptom testimony. (Doc. 18 at 15-20). In reply, the 

Commissioner asserts that the ALJ adequately articulated reasons for discrediting Plaintiff. (Doc. 

25 at 8-10). A review of the record reveals the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s credibility.

 In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider 

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Other factors an ALJ may consider include: (1) the applicant’s 

reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent testimony; (2) 

unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course 

of treatment; and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Work records, physician and third party testimony about nature, severity, and effect of 

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symptoms, and inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant. Light v. Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). The ALJ may rely, in part, on his or her own 

observations which cannot substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 

177 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990). “Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, 

the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” 

Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

After a review of the record, the Court concludes that the ALJ did find and cite to clear 

and convincing reasons to detract from Plaintiff’s credibility as to her own assessment of her 

subjective symptoms. 

First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” but that Plaintiff’s statements concerning 

“the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent 

they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment” AR 23. This 

finding satisfied step one of the credibility analysis. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281-82. Because the 

record lacked evidence of malingering, the ALJ was required to provide clear and convincing 

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283-84; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended). When there is evidence of an underlying medical 

impairment, the ALJ may not discredit the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of his 

symptoms solely because they are unsupported by medical evidence. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 343. 

Moreover, it is not sufficient for the ALJ to make general findings; he must state which testimony 

is not credible and what evidence in the record leads to that conclusion. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 

F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993); Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46.

Here, the ALJ gave the following reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility:

Although the claimant received treatment for the allegedly disabling impairments, 

that treatment is routine and conservative in nature. She has not received the type 

of medical treatment one would expect for a totally disabled individual. 

Notably, after the injury that reportedly started her unremitting pain, the claimant 

was cleared to return to modified duty with limited stooping, bending and lifting 

and frequent position change. This was immediately post-injury and consistent, 

after over three years of recuperation, with the findings of the internal medicine 

evaluation conducted post-hearing. 

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With regard to her carpal tunnel syndrome, the longitudinal treatment records 

show a remote diagnosis but do not document significant complaints or treatment 

for that impairment. In light of the foregoing, the claimant’s description of the 

severity of the pain is so extreme as to appear implausible. 

Finally, although the claimant has described daily activities which are fairly 

limited, two factors weigh against considering these allegations to be strong 

evidence in favor of finding the claimant disabled. First, allegedly limited daily 

activities cannot be objectively verified with any reasonable degree of certainty. 

Secondly, even if claimant’s daily activities are truly as limited as alleged, it is 

difficult to attribute that degree of limitation to the claimant’s medical condition, 

as opposed to other reasons, in view of the relatively weak medical evidence and 

other factors discussed in this decision. 

AR 23.

Thus, the ALJ provided three clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s 

testimony including: 1) Plaintiff’s conservative treatment; 2) inconsistencies between the 

Plaintiff’s reported symptoms and the medical evidence; and 3) inconsistencies related to 

Plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living. These findings are supported by the record. 

With regard to Plaintiff’s conservative treatment, Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she 

visited her treating doctor only twice in the last year. AR 471. Although Plaintiff reports that her 

medications do not help, her physician prescribed the same medication regimen since 2009. AR 

226. An ALJ may determine that a claimant lacks credibility based on evidence of conservative 

treatment. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-51. Further, a claimant’s favorable response to 

conservative treatment can undermine the claimant’s testimony and reports of disabling pain. 

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008). An ALJ may also discredit a 

claimant’s testimony for “lack of consistent treatment” or because the claimant” did not seek any 

treatment or evaluation” for the condition. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The ALJ correctly found that Plaintiff’s course of treatment contradicts her complaints of 

disabling impairments and this was a clear and convincing reason for discounting plaintiff's 

credibility. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (claimant not credible 

where he “has not participated in any significant pain regimen or therapy program”).

Second, the objective medical evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s 

subjective symptom complaints were not entirely credible. Despite Plaintiff’s complaints about 

her constant burning back pain, she consistently appeared in no acute distress and had no 

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myalgias upon examination. AR 23, 188, 225, 253. It was proper for the ALJ to rely on this 

evidence. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While subjective pain 

testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective 

medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the 

claimant’s pain and its disabling effects”); see also Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (inconsistencies between the record and medical evidence supports a rejection of a 

claimant’s credibility). As discussed above, only mild, age-related degenerative disk disease was 

indicated from the radiographic findings. AR 120, 247. X-rays done in 2009 showed no 

compression deformity, fracture, or mal-alignment. AR 247. This coupled with the negative 

straight leg testing and the absence of any documentation concerning treatment or issues with her 

carpal tunnel demonstrates there is little evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s severe 

symptom complaints. See Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601-602 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding a mild 

or minor medical condition with all other tests reporting normal provides a basis for rejecting 

claimant's testimony of severity of symptoms). Accordingly, the Court determines that the ALJ’s 

finding that Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms are not supported by the objective medical evidence 

is supported by the record. 

Finally, the ALJ also relied on Plaintiff’s activities of daily living to support her

credibility determination. An ALJ may rely on a claimant’s daily activities to support an adverse 

credibility determination when those activities: (1) “contradict [claimant’s] other testimony”; or 

(2) “meet the threshold for transferable work skills.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 639. Here, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff’s limited daily activities could not be objectively verified in view of the relatively 

weak medical evidence. AR 23. The ALJ noted that the degree of limitation in Plaintiff’s 

activities of daily living could not be attributed to her medical condition. AR 23. The ALJ further

stated that “the reports do not support the claimant’s complaints of a disabling level of pain or 

illness and indicate that, at the least, she is exaggerating her limitations.” AR 24. Based on the 

foregoing, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s daily activities 

contradict her complaints of disabling impairments and this was a clear and convincing reason for 

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discounting Plaintiff’s credibility. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d at 681; see also Tonapetyan v. 

Halter, 242 F.3d at 1148 (claimant properly discredited because of “tendency to exaggerate”).

 Given the above, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial 

evidence for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. Here, the ALJ clearly identified 

what testimony she found not credible and what evidence undermined Plaintiff’s complaints. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 834. If the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, the 

court “may not engage in second-guessing.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 

2002). Accordingly, the ALJ’s credibility findings are free of legal error.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court 

DENIES Plaintiff's appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff, Toni 

Pennewell.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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