Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-04084/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-04084-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLTON PAYNE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER C. SENUTA, 

et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________________/

No. C 09-4084 CW (PR) 

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Carlton Payne, a state prisoner incarcerated at

Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP), has filed a pro se civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging claims of retaliation

and deliberate indifference to safety. Plaintiff's motion for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. 

Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the claim

are alleged to have occurred PBSP, which is located in this

judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

In his complaint, Plaintiff names PBSP Correctional Officers

C. Senuta, R.J. Lesina and J.R. Bemrose. Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages.

On March 22, 2010, Plaintiff filed a request to add PBSP

Acting Warden Francisco Jacques as a Defendant in this action.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any

case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity

or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable

claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.

§ 1915A(b) (1), (2). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988). Moreover, pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988).

II. Legal Claims

A. Deliberate Indifference Claim

The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners. See

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular, prison

officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the

hands of other prisoners. See id. at 833; Hoptowit v. Ray, 682

F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d

637, 642 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1980). However, a prison official

violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met:

(1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious;

and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately

indifferent to inmate safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

Deliberate indifference occurs when an official knows of and

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disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id. at

837. The official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference. See id. Neither

negligence nor gross negligence are sufficient to constitute

deliberate indifference. Id. at 835-36, n.4; see also Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (establishing that deliberate

indifference requires more than negligence). 

Plaintiff alleges that on March 24, 2009, Defendant Senuta

acted with deliberate indifference to his physical safety by

releasing him into an exercise area along with another inmate who

subsequently assaulted Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that Defendants

Senuta and Bemrose acted with deliberate indifference by failing to

intervene while Plaintiff was being attacked. Furthermore,

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Lesina acted with deliberate

indifference by responding to the scene and shooting him in the eye

and face with a high-pressure chemical agent that caused him pain

and temporary blindness in both eyes. Plaintiff claims he suffered

from obstructed vision and physical pain. 

Liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff has stated a

cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Senuta, Lesina

and Bemrose stemming from the March 24, 2009 incident. 

B. Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff alleges that the inmate assault on March 24, 2009,

was permitted in retaliation for five complaints he previously

filed against PBSP officers including: Officers B.L. Benson and

Keys on November 9, 2008; Officer J. Peebles on December 25, 2008;

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Officer Silvera on January 19, 2009; Officer M. Hutchinson on

February 26, 2009; and Officer I. Parker on March 6, 2009. 

Retaliation by a state actor for the exercise of a

constitutional right is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if

the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been proper. 

See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84

(1977). "Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and

that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, a prisoner suing prison

officials under § 1983 for retaliation must allege he was

retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights and

that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological

goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline. See

Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). The prisoner

also must allege the defendants' actions caused him some injury. 

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000).

The plaintiff must show that the type of activity he was

engaged in was protected by the First Amendment and that the

protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the

alleged retaliatory acts. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. 

Retaliation is not established simply by showing adverse activity

by defendant after protected speech; rather, plaintiff must show a

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nexus between the two. See Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d

893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest on the

logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, i.e., "after this,

therefore because of this"). 

Here, Plaintiff's complaints were filed against other PBSP

officers. Plaintiff does not allege that prior to the March 24,

2009 incident, Defendants Senuta, Lesina and Bemrose were aware

that he filed these complaints. Defendants must have known about

the protected conduct for it to be the cause of the adverse

activity. See Huskey, 204 F.3d at 899. Therefore, Plaintiff's

retaliation claim against Defendants Senuta, Lesina and Bemrose is

DISMISSED with leave to amend. In his amendment to the complaint,

Plaintiff must allege that Defendants Senuta, Lesina and Bemrose

knew about the complaints he filed against the other PBSP officers,

and also that it was a substantial or motivating factor for

Defendants' alleged retaliatory actions on March 24, 2009. 

C. Supervisory Liability Claim

As mentioned above, Plaintiff filed a request to add Defendant

Jacquez as a Defendant in this action. The Court construes his

request as a motion to amend the complaint to add Defendant

Jacquez. Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiff is apparently suing Defendant Jacquez in his

supervisory capacity. Plaintiff does not allege facts

demonstrating that Defendant Jacquez violated his federal rights,

but seems to claim he is liable based on the conduct of his

subordinates. There is, however, no respondeat superior liability

under § 1983 solely because a defendant is responsible for the

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actions or omissions of another. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor generally "is only liable

for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor

participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the

violations and failed to act to prevent them." Id. A supervisor

may also be held liable if he or she implemented "a policy so

deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional

rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation." 

Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991)

(en banc).

Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Jacquez is therefore

dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amendment to

the complaint that alleges Defendant Jacquez's supervisory

liability under the standards explained above. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim

against Defendants Senuta, Lesina and Bemrose stemming from the

March 24, 2009 incident.

2. Plaintiff's retaliation claim against Defendants Senuta,

Lesina and Bemrose for allegedly retaliating against him for filing

previous complaints against the other PBSP officers is DISMISSED

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as indicated above. 

3. Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to add

Defendant Jacquez is GRANTED. 

4. Plaintiff's supervisory liability claim against Defendant

Jacquez is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as indicated above. 

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5. Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order

Plaintiff may file an amendment to the complaint with his amended

retaliation claim against Defendants Senuta, Lesina and Bemrose as

well as his supervisory liability claim against Defendant Jacquez

as set forth above in Sections II(B) and (C) of this Order. 

(Plaintiff shall resubmit only those claims and not the entire

complaint.) The failure to do so will result in the dismissal

without prejudice of the retaliation claim against Defendants

Senuta, Lesina and Bemrose as well as the supervisory liability

claim against Defendant Jacquez.

6. The Clerk shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for

Waiver of Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service

of Summons, a copy of the complaint and all attachments thereto and

a copy of this Order to: PBSP Correctional Officers C. Senuta, R.J.

Lesina and J.R. Bemrose. The Clerk shall also mail a copy of the

complaint and a copy of this Order to the State Attorney General's

Office in San Francisco. The Clerk shall mail a copy of this Order

to Plaintiff. 

7. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure requires Defendants to cooperate in saving

unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. 

Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this

action and asked by the Court, on behalf of Plaintiff, to waive

service of the summons, fails to do so, Defendants will be required

to bear the cost of such service unless good cause be shown for

their failure to sign and return the waiver form. If service is

waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served

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on the date that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule

12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be required to serve and file an

answer before sixty (60) days from the date on which the request

for waiver was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than

would be required if formal service of summons is necessary.) 

Defendants are asked to read the statement set forth at the foot of

the waiver form that more completely describes the duties of the

parties with regard to waiver of service of the summons. If

service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before

Defendants have been personally served, the Answer shall be due

sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for waiver was

sent or twenty (20) days from the date the waiver form is filed,

whichever is later. 

8. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The following briefing

schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than ninety (90) days from the date

Defendants' answer is due, Defendants shall file a motion for

summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be

supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in

all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. If Defendants

are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary

judgment, Defendants shall so inform the Court prior to the date

the summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the

Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion

shall be filed with the Court and served on Defendants no later

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than sixty (60) days after the date on which Defendants' motion is

filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should

be given to pro se plaintiffs facing a summary judgment motion:

The defendant has made a motion for summary 

judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. 

A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end

your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary

judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue

of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute

about any fact that would affect the result of your case,

the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or

other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific

facts in declarations, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided

in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the

defendant's declarations and documents and show that

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If

you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against

you. If summary judgment is granted [in favor of the

defendants], your case will be dismissed and there will

be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en

banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)

(party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence

showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element

of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that because he bears the

burden of proving his allegations in this case, he must be prepared

to produce evidence in support of those allegations when he files

his opposition to Defendants' dispositive motion. Such evidence

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may include sworn declarations from himself and other witnesses to

the incident, and copies of documents authenticated by sworn

declaration. Plaintiff will not be able to avoid summary judgment

simply by repeating the allegations of his complaint.

c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, Defendants

shall do so no later than thirty (30) days after the date

Plaintiff's opposition is filed.

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date

the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion

unless the Court so orders at a later date.

9. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant

to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to depose

Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

10. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be

served on Defendants, or Defendants' counsel once counsel has been

designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants or

Defendants' counsel.

11. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. 

Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address and

must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion.

12. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable

extensions will be granted. Any motion for an extension of time

must be filed no later than fifteen (15) days prior to the deadline

sought to be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 5/10/10 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLTON PAYNE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

C SENUTA et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV09-04084 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on May 10, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies)

in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in

the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's

office.

Carlton Payne J-88526

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500

C12-222

Crescent City, CA 95532

Dated: May 10, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk

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