Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-01934/USCOURTS-ca7-13-01934-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13‐1934  

ELIZABETH CASTRO, et al.,

Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

DEVRY UNIVERSITY, INC.,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10 C 5869 — Sheila Finnegan, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2014 — DECIDED MAY 13, 2015

____________________

Before FLAUM, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Elizabeth Castro,

LaTonya Brooks, and Michael Florez sued their former em‐

ployer, defendant DeVry University, Inc., under Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiffs allege that DeVry re‐

taliated against them by terminating their employment for

complaining about their supervisor’s racially and ethnically

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
2 No. 13‐1934

derogatory remarks. DeVry transferred the supervisor about

three months after plaintiffs complained. After that time, he

neither supervised plaintiffs nor participated in any of the

termination decisions. Plaintiffs were discharged at different

times, from ten to thirty months after their complaint, and

the evidence concerning their individual circumstances and

job performance varies. The district court granted summary

judgment to DeVry on all three retaliation claims.

We affirm the district court’s decision on the claims by

Castro and Brooks, but we reverse its decision on the claim

by Florez. Castro was terminated thirty months after the

complaint because of poor performance over a sustained pe‐

riod. Brooks was terminated fifteen months after the com‐

plaint because of multiple instances of dishonesty and in‐

consistent performance. Neither Castro nor Brooks has

raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether these rea‐

sons were pretexts for retaliation.

Florez, however, has raised a genuine issue of material

fact about retaliatory motive. He was terminated ten months

after the complaint for two stated reasons: inconsistent per‐

formance and his “volatile behavior.” On appeal, DeVry has

conceded that Florez’s performance did not justify his termi‐

nation. Florez has also offered evidence that DeVry’s “vola‐

tile behavior” explanation was a pretext for retaliation. First,

he has presented evidence that his managers did not honest‐

ly believe he had behaved unprofessionally. Second, he has

offered evidence that DeVry falsely told the Equal Employ‐

ment Opportunity Commission that his manager—who

made the key recommendation for his firing—did not know

about the complaint when in fact she did know. Third, an

email recommending his termination referred specifically to

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No. 13‐1934 3

his complaint about the supervisor’s remarks. Although a

reasonable jury would not be compelled to find retaliation

on this record, such a finding would be permissible. DeVry

was not entitled to summary judgment on Florez’s claim.

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., asserting two claims: (1)

they were subjected to a racially and ethnically hostile work

environment, and (2) DeVry terminated their employment in

retaliation for complaining about their supervisor’s racially

and ethnically derogatory remarks. The parties consented to

the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c).

After more than a year of discovery, DeVry moved for

summary judgment on all claims. Plaintiffs conceded that

their hostile work environment claims should be dismissed

but argued that they had raised genuine issues of material

fact on their respective retaliation claims. The district court

disagreed, granting summary judgment to DeVry on all

three retaliation claims. Castro v. DeVry University, Inc., 941 F.

Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Ill. 2013).

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, ex‐

amining the record in the light most favorable to the non‐

moving parties and drawing all reasonable inferences in

their favor. E.g., Carter v. Chicago State University, 778 F.3d

651, 657 (7th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate

only where there are no genuine issues of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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4 No. 13‐1934

II. The Law of Retaliation & Summary Judgment

Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against

employees who engage in activity protected by the statute.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a). We have often said there are two ways

plaintiffs may prove their claims, which we have labeled the

“direct” and “indirect” methods of proof. E.g., Silverman v.

Board of Education of City of Chicago, 637 F.3d 729, 740 (7th Cir.

2011). But over the past several years, we have questioned

the utility of the distinctions between them, recognizing that

both methods of proof converge on the same fundamental

question: could a reasonable trier of fact infer retaliation or

discrimination, as the case may be? See, e.g., Bass v. Joliet

Public School District No. 86, 746 F.3d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 2014);

Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2013);

Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 2013);

Naficy v. Illinois Dep’t of Human Services, 697 F.3d 504, 514 (7th

Cir. 2012); Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 313–14

(7th Cir. 2012); Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 862–63 (7th

Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring).

Plaintiffs proceed under only the direct method of proof.

Under this method, plaintiffs must offer evidence of three

elements: (1) they engaged in protected activity, (2) they suf‐

fered adverse employment actions, and (3) there was a caus‐

al connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment actions. E.g., Greengrass v. Int’l Monetary Sys‐

tems Ltd., 776 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2015). Whether we apply

this method formally or just cut to the chase and ask the

fundamental question directly—could a reasonable trier of

fact infer retaliation?—makes no difference.

The first two elements are satisfied. Plaintiffs complained

to Human Resources manager Alana Hurt on April 16, 2007

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No. 13‐1934 5

that their supervisor, Phil Giambone, often used racially and

ethnically derogatory language in the workplace. Whether

Giambone’s comments went so far as to violate Title VII does

not matter. Plaintiffs sincerely and reasonably believed they

were complaining about conduct prohibited by Title VII,

which is all that is required to establish protected activity.

E.g., Magyar v. St. Joseph Regional Medical Center, 544 F.3d 766,

771 (7th Cir. 2008). The plaintiffs were all terminated at vari‐

ous times after the complaint. A termination is of course a

materially adverse employment action. E.g., Nichols v. South‐

ern Illinois University–Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir.

2007).

The question is whether plaintiffs have offered sufficient

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on wheth‐

er their complaint caused their terminations. To establish

this causal link, plaintiffs can rely on direct or circumstantial

evidence. E.g., Harper, 687 F.3d at 307. Plaintiffs do not claim

they have any direct evidence of DeVry’s retaliation—i.e.,

there is no admission from a DeVry agent that it discharged

the plaintiffs because they complained. Plaintiffs rely on cir‐

cumstantial evidence.

Circumstantial evidence suffices if “a convincing mosaic

of circumstantial evidence” would permit a reasonable trier

of fact to infer retaliation by the employer. Rhodes v. Illinois

Dep’t of Transportation, 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (in‐

ternal quotation marks omitted). In retaliation cases, we

have recognized three categories of circumstantial evidence

available to a plaintiff using the “convincing mosaic ap‐

proach.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 862. These categories include

(1) evidence of suspicious timing, (2) evidence that similarly

situated employees were treated differently, and (3) evidence

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
6 No. 13‐1934

that the employer’s proffered reason for the adverse em‐

ployment action was pretextual. Id. at 860, citing Silverman,

637 F.3d at 734 (suspicious timing); Volovsek v. Wisconsin

Dep’t of Agriculture, Trade & Consumer Protection, 344 F.3d 680,

689 (7th Cir. 2003) (disparate treatment); Dickerson v. Board of

Trustees of Community College District No. 522, 657 F.3d 595,

601 (7th Cir. 2011) (pretext). Each category of circumstantial

evidence can suffice by itself to preclude summary judg‐

ment, depending on its strength in relation to the other evi‐

dence, but plaintiffs may also use them together. Coleman,

667 F.3d at 862; Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736

(7th Cir. 1994). Here, plaintiffs rely on both suspicious tim‐

ing and pretext.

Suspicious timing can sometimes raise an inference of a

causal connection, but temporal proximity alone is “rarely

sufficient” to establish causation. O’Leary v. Accretive Health,

Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2011). We have rejected any

bright‐line rule about how close the events must be to estab‐

lish causation, but in cases where there is “corroborating ev‐

idence of retaliatory motive,” an “interval of a few weeks or

even months may provide probative evidence of the re‐

quired causal nexus.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 861. We have also

noted, though, that the mere passage of time “does not con‐

clusively bar an inference of retaliation.” Malin v. Hospira,

Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 560 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing summary

judgment for employer where evidence showed patient re‐

taliation over period of several years).

To show pretext, an employee “must present evidence

suggesting that the employer is dissembling.” O’Leary, 657

F.3d at 635; see also Naik v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuti‐

cals, Inc., 627 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2010). “The question is

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No. 13‐1934 7

not whether the employer’s stated reason was inaccurate or

unfair, but whether the employer honestly believed the rea‐

son it has offered to explain the discharge.” O’Leary, 657 F.3d

at 635. To meet this burden, the employee “must ‘identify

such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contra‐

dictions’” in the employer’s proffered reason “‘that a reason‐

able person could find [it] unworthy of credence.’” Coleman,

667 F.3d at 852 (alteration in original), quoting Boumehdi v.

Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007).

To survive summary judgment, plaintiffs’ mosaic of cir‐

cumstantial evidence must be strong enough to permit a rea‐

sonable trier of fact to find that DeVry terminated each plain‐

tiff because he or she complained about Giambone’s re‐

marks. See University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.

Nassar, 570 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).

Each plaintiff relies on a different assortment of evidence

to establish a causal link between the protected activity and

his or her firing. We begin by setting out the facts common

to all plaintiffs. Next we analyze the evidence of suspicious

timing upon which all three plaintiffs rely. We conclude that

this evidence does not by itself create a genuine issue of ma‐

terial fact on causation for any of the plaintiffs. We then ana‐

lyze the remaining evidence offered by each plaintiff to

show that DeVry’s stated reasons for each termination were

pretextual.

III. Facts Common to All Plaintiffs

Defendant DeVry University, Inc. is a for‐profit school

with several campuses in the Chicago area. Plaintiffs Eliza‐

beth Castro, LaTonya Brooks, and Michael Florez are former

admissions officers of DeVry. Castro and Florez are Mexican‐

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8 No. 13‐1934

American; Brooks is African‐American. In early 2007 Castro

was an assistant director of admissions for DeVry. Her im‐

mediate supervisor was Phil Giambone, then the director of

admissions for the Chicago campus. Florez and Brooks were

academic advisors who reported to Castro.

DeVry’s enrollment model is based on recruiting prospec‐

tive students for classes that begin every other month—in

January, March, May, July, September, and November. Ad‐

missions officers at DeVry are responsible for following up

on “leads” (potentially interested students), interviewing

applicants, and otherwise assisting prospective students

with the enrollment process. The goal for admissions officers

is to enroll new students.

On April 14, 2007, Florez approached Giambone and re‐

quested time off on May 5. Giambone responded by asking

if Florez was going to “get drunk with your people” on Cin‐

co de Mayo. Florez reported the remark to Castro. Castro,

along with Florez and Brooks, then decided to approach

Human Resources about Giambone’s behavior.1

                                                  1 Plaintiffs offer evidence that Giambone had a history of making of‐

fensive racial and ethnic remarks in the office. For example, he regularly

asked about the race or ethnicity of prospective students and connected

race or ethnicity to the ability to pay an application fee. On one occasion,

for instance, he commented that a Mexican‐American prospective stu‐

dent would be able to pay the fee because “Mexicans always have $100

in their mattresses because it’s communion money.” He also at times

remarked that an applicant who could not pay the fee was “probably

Puerto Rican or black” and that Puerto Rican and black people were

“always broke.” We accept this evidence as true for purposes of sum‐

mary judgment.

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
No. 13‐1934 9

A. Plaintiffs’ April 16, 2007 Complaint to Human Resources

Plaintiffs met with HR manager Alana Hurt on April 16,

2007. They discussed their concerns about Giambone’s racial‐

ly and ethnically derogatory remarks. Other academic advi‐

sors corroborated plaintiffs’ complaints about Giambone.

Shortly after the meeting, Hurt called HR director Deb Ma‐

her to tell her about the complaint. Maher relayed the com‐

plaint to Christine Hierl, the dean of enrollment manage‐

ment for the Chicago area.

B. Giambone’s Conduct After the April 16 Meeting

Ten minutes after Castro returned from the meeting with

HR, Giambone came to her office. He was “furious” and

asked Castro whether she had “anything to tell him.” He

then told Castro that she needed to do “phone work” with

him. Castro had not done this type of work since she had

been an academic advisor, eight years earlier.

Several days after the April 16 meeting, Giambone began

steering “leads” about prospective students away from Cas‐

tro’s team toward another team. Giambone also told Brooks

and Florez not to “hang out” or otherwise associate with

Castro. Then, in early June 2007, Giambone told Florez that

Castro was “stealing” his students, an accusation Castro de‐

nies.

C. The April 28, 2007 Sales Meeting

About two weeks after plaintiffs’ complaint to HR, DeVry

conducted a sales meeting in its Chicago office to address

concerns about low enrollment numbers for the July 2007

admissions class. At the meeting Castro complained about

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10 No. 13‐1934

how the “leads” were being distributed in the Chicago of‐

fice. Christine Hierl jumped in and “verbally attacked” Cas‐

tro. Hierl later sent Castro a memo stating that her negativity

was hurting morale in the office.

Immediately after the meeting, plaintiffs assert, Castro

entered a stairwell and heard Hierl say to Giambone:

“There’s no way we’re going to let a bunch of wetbacks run

this office.” Giambone responded with laughter.

After hearing the “wetbacks” comment, Castro filled out

a transfer request for any opening for a director or assistant

director of admissions at DeVry. Giambone approved the re‐

quest. Hierl told Castro that she could be transferred any‐

where she wanted if she waited until school started for the

July 2007 admissions class.

D. The July 2007 Reorganization

In July 2007 DeVry transferred Giambone from his posi‐

tion and made him a high school manager, where he would

supervise admissions presentations to high school students.

From that point forward, Giambone did not supervise Cas‐

tro, Brooks, or Florez. There is no evidence that he partici‐

pated in any of the termination decisions.

Kathaleen Berry, who had been the director of admis‐

sions for DeVry’s Addison and Tinley Park campuses in the

Chicago area, took over Giambone’s position. At Berry’s re‐

quest, Julie Strauss, an assistant director of admissions for

the Tinley Park campus, began supervising some of the Chi‐

cago‐based admissions officers, including Brooks and Florez.

As part of the reorganization, DeVry also demoted Castro

to senior academic advisor and transferred her to the Addi‐

son campus. At the Addison campus, Castro reported to as‐

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No. 13‐1934 11

sistant director of admissions Casey Tobin, who in turn re‐

ported to Berry in Chicago. Despite her demotion, Castro’s

compensation was not reduced.

When Berry replaced Giambone in the Chicago office,

she met with the admissions officers. She told them that if

they had a problem with another employee, they needed to

handle it “in‐house.” She warned her staff not to go “run‐

ning off to HR.” After the July 2007 meeting, Strauss rein‐

forced this message, telling Florez and Brooks: “Kathy Berry

is different. Don’t go to HR. If you go to HR, the people that

have went to HR no longer work here.” Sometime after the

meeting, Giambone told Florez: “You see what happens to

traitors like Liz [Castro]. ... I told you if you want to be

someone in this company, you need to be loyal.”

Many months passed before any of the plaintiffs were

terminated. Florez was discharged on February 21, 2008, ten

months after the April 2007 complaint; Brooks on July 8,

2008, fifteen months after the complaint; and Castro on No‐

vember 3, 2009, thirty months after the complaint.

IV. Plaintiffs’ Evidence of Suspicious Timing

Plaintiffs acknowledge that delays of these lengths can‐

not themselves establish causation. Cf. Clark County School

District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001) (per curiam)

(gap of twenty months between protected activity and ad‐

verse employment action “suggests, by itself, no causality at

all”); Everroad v. Scott Truck Systems, Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 481

(7th Cir. 2010) (one‐year delay too long to establish causation

in the absence of other evidence); Haywood v. Lucent Technol‐

ogies, Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (same); accord,

Oest v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrections, 240 F.3d 605, 616 (7th Cir.

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
12 No. 13‐1934

2001) (“The inference of causation weakens as the time be‐

tween the protected expression and the adverse action in‐

creases ... .”). Plaintiffs argue that although the periods be‐

tween their protected activity and their terminations were

relatively long, a reasonable trier of fact could still infer cau‐

sation based on suspicious timing because retaliatory acts

started almost immediately after the April 2007 complaint.

According to plaintiffs, the summary judgment record

would permit a reasonable finding that DeVry began retali‐

ating against plaintiffs within weeks of their protected activi‐

ty and that each termination was merely the culmination of a

long campaign to punish them for complaining about Giam‐

bone.2

Plaintiffs identify four types of retaliatory acts to support

this theory: (1) Giambone came to Castro’s office ten minutes

after the meeting with HR and assigned her phone work; (2)

Giambone began steering “leads” about prospective stu‐

dents away from Castro’s team toward another team; (3)

Giambone told Brooks and Florez not to associate with Cas‐

                                                  2 Cf. Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 2008) (re‐

versing summary judgment for employer; circumstantial evidence sug‐

gested discrimination in spite of year‐long period between discriminato‐

ry comment and termination); Lang v. Illinois Dep’t of Children & Family

Services, 361 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2004) (reversing summary judgment for

employer; convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence of retaliation

where employee began receiving reprimands shortly after filing griev‐

ance, culminating in his termination approximately one year later); Ve‐

prinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 891 n.6 (7th Cir. 1996) (recogniz‐

ing principle that summary judgment is inappropriate when record

would permit reasonable trier of fact to find that employer “waited in

the weeds” for years looking for an opportunity to fire employee).

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
No. 13‐1934 13

tro and told Florez that Castro was “stealing” students from

him; and (4) Hierl’s offensive “wetbacks” comment to Giam‐

bone.

None of this evidence establishes a genuine issue of ma‐

terial fact on the issue of causation. DeVry transferred Giam‐

bone from his position in July 2007. There is no evidence that

he had any authority over plaintiffs after that time or that he

had any input in the decisions to terminate them. Even if

Giambone wanted to retaliate against plaintiffs, a reasonable

trier of fact could not find that he influenced the termination

decisions.

Hierl, on the other hand, did have input in the decision to

terminate Brooks, but her offensive comment was no more

than an isolated “stray remark.” See, e.g., Overly v. KeyBank

Nat’l Ass’n, 662 F.3d 856, 865 (7th Cir. 2011). Hierl’s offensive

“wetbacks” epithet did not refer to Brooks (she is African‐

American, while the other plaintiffs are Mexican‐American),

was made approximately fourteenth months before Brooks

was terminated, and did not refer to either the protected ac‐

tivity or the termination decision. A reasonable trier of fact

could not find based on this single offensive comment that

Hierl intended to terminate Brooks because she had com‐

plained to HR about Giambone. See Sun v. Board of Trustees of

University of Illinois, 473 F.3d 799, 813 (7th Cir. 2007) (“stray

remarks that are neither proximate nor related to the em‐

ployment decision are insufficient to defeat summary judg‐

ment”); cf. Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 709–10 (7th

Cir. 2013) (contrasting tension between “stray remarks” cas‐

es and “common actor” cases involving racial, ethnic, or

gender bias).

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14 No. 13‐1934

Plaintiffs counter that Giambone’s retaliatory intent

should be imputed to Berry (the director of admissions),

who did have input in the termination decisions, based on

Berry’s comment that her staff should not go “running off to

HR” and Strauss’s comment that Florez and Brooks should

not go to HR because the people who “went to HR no longer

work here.” Plaintiffs argue that a reasonable trier of fact

could find based on these comments that Berry and Strauss

had picked up the mantle and intended to retaliate against

plaintiffs out of loyalty to Giambone. We disagree.

Construing the comments in the light most favorable to

plaintiffs, the statements suggest that Berry valued loyalty

among her subordinates and would have perceived a future

complaint to HR as an act of disloyalty, potentially worthy of

punishment. This type of comment could under some cir‐

cumstances give rise to an inference of retaliation. Employ‐

ers cannot retaliate against employees who complain about

violations of Title VII under the ruse that the employee was

being “disloyal” or “insubordinate” by opposing the unlaw‐

ful activity. But there are two problems with plaintiffs’ posi‐

tion on this record.

First, neither comment referred either explicitly or im‐

plicitly to the protected activity at issue: plaintiffs’ complaint

in April 2007 about Giambone. The statements looked for‐

ward, not backward. They warned about making hypothet‐

ical complaints in the future, not plaintiffs’ past complaint

about Giambone. After all, Brooks and Florez had gone to

HR and were still working in the same office when the

comments were made. Absent more context tying the com‐

ments to the protected activity, these generic, forward‐

looking remarks about loyalty would not permit a reason‐

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No. 13‐1934 15

able trier of fact to infer a causal connection between the

April 2007 complaint and the terminations.3

Second, both comments were made long before any of

the plaintiffs’ terminations. The shortest gap was approxi‐

mately seven months. (Florez was fired in February 2008.)

Ambiguous comments so far removed from the adverse em‐

ployment action are insufficient, without more, to defeat

summary judgment. See, e.g., Dass v. Chicago Board of Educa‐

tion, 675 F.3d 1060, 1072 (7th Cir. 2012) (ambiguous comment

made ten months before discharge was insufficient, without

more, to defeat summary judgment).

Accordingly, a reasonable trier of fact could not find

based on these ambiguous comments made at least seven

months before the earliest termination that Berry retaliated

against plaintiffs because of their complaint about Giam‐

bone. Thus, plaintiffs’ evidence of suspicious timing does

not, by itself, raise a genuine issue of material fact on causa‐

tion for any of plaintiffs’ claims. The timing does not conclu‐

sively bar inferences of retaliation, however, so we proceed

to the remaining evidence for each of the plaintiffs.

V. Florez’s Evidence of Retaliatory Intent

We begin with Florez, who was fired first, in February

2008. At that time DeVry offered two reasons for its decision:

                                                  3 We recognize that Strauss’s comment was backward‐looking in one

respect: a reasonable trier of fact could infer that Strauss was referring to

Castro, who had been transferred from the Chicago office to Addison

shortly before the comment was made. Because this interpretation of the

comment applies only to Castro, we address it below when analyzing

Castro’s remaining evidence of retaliation.

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16 No. 13‐1934

(1) inconsistent performance and (2) “volatile behavior.” On

appeal, however, DeVry concedes that Florez’s performance

was “adequate” and that his performance alone did not justi‐

fy his termination. We focus on the second explanation.

DeVry identifies two incidents of Florez’s “volatile behav‐

ior”: (1) a conversation he had with Strauss in October 2007

and (2) a conversation he had with Berry in January 2008.

Florez disputes the factual basis of both managers’ descrip‐

tions of these events.

The first incident occurred sometime in October 2007.

Florez acknowledged during his deposition that there was a

“blow‐up” between Strauss and him, but he testified that it

was Strauss who caused it. Strauss came by to observe

Florez’s “phone work,” but he was not in his office. When

Florez returned to his office, Strauss again tried to conduct

the observation, but there were technical difficulties with the

phone. According to Strauss, Florez grew impatient and

complained about being observed; he then yelled, slammed

doors, and eventually left his office.

Florez disputes Strauss’s version of the conversation in

ways that call into doubt the honesty of Strauss’s account. He

testified during his deposition—and we accept as true for

purposes of summary judgment—that he did not yell or

slam doors and that he behaved professionally throughout

the conversation.

Moreover, Mara Leal (another academic advisor) corrob‐

orated Florez’s account of his conversation with Strauss. Leal

testified during her deposition that it was Strauss, not

Florez, who slammed a door and yelled. Leal also testified

that after the incident between Strauss and Florez, she called

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No. 13‐1934 17

Berry to ask if she could move offices. Berry responded that

Leal needed to do her a “favor.” Berry asked Leal if she had

heard or seen the incident between Florez and Strauss. Leal

said yes. Then Berry told Leal that if HR manager Hurt

called her to ask whether she had observed the incident, Leal

needed to say that she did not see anything. Leal agreed, and

Berry told her that she could move offices later that night.

The second incident occurred on January 31, 2008, when

Berry herself tried to observe Florez’s phone work. Florez

complained to Berry about a poor performance evaluation

he had received from Strauss in October 2007, shortly after

the reported “blow‐up” with her. Berry found Florez’s be‐

havior inappropriate; she believed that if he had concerns

about his evaluation, he should have addressed them three

months earlier, not during the scheduled observation.

Following the phone session, Berry sent a memo to Hurt

in HR with a copy to Hierl (the dean of enrollment manage‐

ment). Berry’s memo said that Florez had been “strident and

yelling” and had made threats about lawyers and complaints

to the EEOC. She also criticized Florez for “continually re‐

hashing” the October incident with Strauss and noted that

HR had already investigated that earlier incident. She de‐

scribed the conversation as a “45 minute diatribe” and said:

“There were strong undertones of racism and lawsuits, and

he even asked if I would like to talk to his lawyer and that he

was recording all conversations in his office.”4

                                                  4 DeVry does not explain why it might have been justified in disci‐

plining Florez because he “made threats about lawyers and the EEOC.”

In fact, such a “threat” might well qualify as protected activity. E.g., Da‐

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18 No. 13‐1934

Florez disputes Berry’s version of the January 2008 con‐

frontation, again in ways that call into question the honesty

of her account. He admits that he complained about Strauss’s

evaluation from October 2007. But he testified during his

deposition—and again, we accept as true for purposes of

summary judgment—that he never yelled at Berry and never

made any threats about lawyers or the EEOC. He also testi‐

fied in a declaration opposing summary judgment that his

conversation with Berry lasted only five to ten minutes, that

he did not “continually rehash” the October 2007 incident,

and that he never claimed to be recording conversations in

his office.

DeVry argues we must disregard this evidence because

Florez’s declaration was dated only March 2012, with the

blank for the specific day left blank, and because it contra‐

dicted his deposition testimony. DeVry does not cite any au‐

thority for the proposition that a court must exclude a sworn

declaration because it does not specify the day it was sworn.

While including a specific date is the better practice, we are

not convinced that having left the specific date blank re‐

quired exclusion.

DeVry’s assertion that Florez’s declaration contradicted

his deposition testimony is the sort of assertion often made

                                                 

vis v. Time Warner Cable of Southeastern Wisconsin, L.P., 651 F.3d 664, 674

(7th Cir. 2011) (informal complaints can constitute protected activity for

purposes of Title VII retaliation claim); accord, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a)

(making it unlawful to retaliate against anyone “because he has opposed

any practice” prohibited by Title VII). Florez denies having made any

statement about lawyers or the EEOC, however, so we do not examine

this issue further.

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
No. 13‐1934 19

in summary judgment practice. In this case, the assertion is

not supported by the record. At his deposition, Florez was

shown Berry’s written description of the January 2008 inci‐

dent and was asked whether it was “an accurate account of

the interaction.” He answered that the written statement was

“inaccurate,” and he highlighted several specific statements

with which he disagreed. The questioning moved on to other

subjects.

The first problem for DeVry’s argument is that Florez was

not asked whether he had described all the inaccuracies with

the written statement. Without that question having been

asked and answered to ensure that his deposition testimony

exhausted his memory of the subject, his later declaration

identifying other inaccuracies simply did not contradict any

specific testimony in his deposition. Cf. Flannery v. Recording

Industry Ass’n of America, 354 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 2004)

(explaining that a “contradiction” exists only when the

statements are “inherently inconsistent,” not when the later

statement “merely clarifies an earlier statement which is am‐

biguous or confusing”).

At a more fundamental level, DeVry’s argument reads

too broadly the cases it invokes. DeVry cites Beckel v. Wal‐

Mart Associates, Inc., where we said that affidavits “when of‐

fered to contradict the affiant’s deposition are so lacking in

credibility as to be entitled to zero weight in summary

judgment proceedings unless the affiant gives a plausible

explanation for the discrepancy.” 301 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir.

2002). Beckel and cases like it involved contradictions so clear

that the only reasonable inference was that the affidavit was

a sham designed to thwart the purposes of summary judg‐

ment. See Bank of Illinois v. Allied Signal Safety Restraint Sys‐

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
20 No. 13‐1934

tems, 75 F.3d 1162, 1168–69 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If such contradic‐

tions were permitted ... ‘the very purpose of the summary

judgment motion—to weed out unfounded claims, specious

denials, and sham defenses—would be severely under‐

cut.’”), quoting Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 861

(7th Cir. 1985).

This principle must be applied with great care, though,

because summary judgment is not a tool for deciding ques‐

tions of credibility. See Bank of Illinois, 75 F.3d at 1169–70 (col‐

lecting cases). Few honest witnesses testify at any length

without at least occasional lapses of memory or needs for

correction or clarification. Disregarding as a sham every cor‐

rection of a memory failure or variation in a witness’s testi‐

mony requires “far too much from lay witnesses” and would

usurp the trier of fact’s role in determining which portion of

the testimony was most accurate and reliable. Tippens v. Ce‐

lotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953–54 (11th Cir. 1986). That’s why

we have said an affidavit can be excluded as a sham only

where the witness has given “clear answers to unambiguous

questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of

material fact.” Bank of Illinois, 75 F.3d at 1170, quoting Van T.

Junkins & Associates, Inc. v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 736 F.2d 656,

657 (11th Cir. 1984). The differences between Florez’s deposi‐

tion testimony and his declaration fall far short of this stand‐

ard.

The district court concluded that a reasonable trier of fact

could not find that DeVry’s “volatile behavior” explanation

was pretextual because Florez only “quarrels with ... the de‐

tails concerning the clashes” without undermining the hon‐

esty of DeVry’s stated belief. Castro, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 984.

We respectfully disagree.

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
No. 13‐1934 21

The differences between Florez’s testimony and Strauss’s

and Berry’s accounts of the October 2007 and January 2008

conversations are so basic that they are not obviously the

stuff of honest disagreement. And this is not a case where a

supervisor had to decide which of two conflicting stories to

believe; Berry herself made the decisive recommendation to

fire Florez, on advice from Strauss. They relied on their own

accounts—not reports from co‐workers or third‐parties—to

justify Florez’s termination. Cf. Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260

F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2001); Flores v. Preferred Technical Group,

182 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1999).

If, as Florez contends, Strauss and Berry are lying about

these events, then a reasonable trier of fact could find that

Strauss and Berry fabricated their reports to create a false

reason for terminating him. Under these circumstances,

summary judgment is not appropriate. See Testerman v. EDS

Technical Products Corp., 98 F.3d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1996) (“‘If

the only reason an employer offers for firing an employee is

a lie, the inference that the real reason was a forbidden one

... may rationally be drawn.’”), quoting Shager v. Upjohn Co.,

913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990).

Even if this evidence of pretext were not enough for

Florez, the inference of retaliation is strengthened further by

testimony from Leal that Berry bribed her to say she did not

see the October 2007 confrontation between Florez and

Strauss by offering her a new office. Evidence that Berry

asked Leal to lie about the incident goes directly to the hon‐

esty of Berry’s belief that Florez behaved unprofessionally.

Berry was one of the decision‐makers in DeVry’s decision to

terminate Florez, and she used this very incident as a basis

to recommend his termination. If Florez did not behave the

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22 No. 13‐1934

way Strauss and Berry have claimed, then a reasonable trier

of fact could find that DeVry’s “volatile behavior” explana‐

tion is unworthy of credence. See Coleman, 667 F.3d at 852.

The evidence of pretext is more than enough to require deni‐

al of summary judgment on Florez’s retaliation claim.

The district court held in the alternative that even if

Florez could prove that Berry and Strauss fabricated these

reports, a reasonable trier of fact would not be able to find

causation because Florez failed to produce evidence linking

DeVry’s decision to terminate him to his April 2007 com‐

plaint about Giambone. Castro, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 984. Again,

we respectfully disagree.

To establish this link, Florez supplemented his evidence

of pretext with an email from Hurt (the HR manager) to Ma‐

her (the HR director). Hurt sent the email on February 4,

2008, the week after the confrontation between Florez and

Berry. We quote the email in full because it is essential to our

analysis:

Mike Florez is an enrollment advisor. He’s been

here since October 2005. We are having a num‐

ber of problems with his performance.

1. His performance is not consistent (starts

goals vs. actual for the last three classes

were 9/11, 9/5, 3/5)

2. His behavior is volatile (I have several doc‐

umented incidences of ‘blow ups’ where he

has been, less than, cooperative with his

supervisors)

His last ‘blow up’ was with Kathy Berry last

week. To refresh your memory, he is the em‐

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
No. 13‐1934 23

ployee who was going to Daniel Hamburger

and Dave Pauldine, because he did not feel he

got resolution on the run‐in he had with Julie

Strauss a few months ago. He is also one of the

people who complained about a previous supervisor

(with Liz Castro).

He is constantly insubordinate and challenging

every decision his supervisor makes as racially

motivated. Supervisors/managers feel that

Mike’s negativity adversely impacts the team

and would like to separate him at this time. His

coming review will like[ly] be ‘Meets Standards’. I

agree with the supervisors. Let’s discuss when

you have a moment.

(Emphases added.)5

The February 4 email is striking for two reasons. First, it

specifically referred to the activity protected by Title VII as a

basis for recommending Florez’s termination. Second, the

email made clear that Hurt considered Florez’s performance

adequate (or at least probably adequate), which is in tension

with DeVry’s long defense of his firing based on poor per‐

formance.

                                                  5 The statement in the February 4 email that Florez “is constantly ...

challenging every decision his supervisor makes as racially motivated”

sounds like a reference to other complaints that might have qualified as

protected activity under Title VII. Florez does not make this argument,

however. He relies exclusively on the April 16, 2007 complaint about

Giambone as the protected activity in this case.

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24 No. 13‐1934

As it happens, Maher did not respond to Hurt’s February

4 email. Hurt waited until February 15, 2008 and then sent a

follow‐up email to Maher saying that she had reviewed

Florez’s semi‐annual performance evaluation. Although his

performance “met standards,” she wanted to move forward

with his termination. She explained in pertinent part:

The totality of his review is that his perfor‐

mance is inconsistent, his inability to effective‐

ly follow the direction of his supervisors is a

continuous problem and his refusal to accept

management decisions will continue to impede

his performance. While separating him is a

risk, I feel comfortable that it is the right deci‐

sion.

Maher still did not respond. Four days later Hurt emailed

Maher a third time: “Let’s discuss the email below when you

have a moment.” Florez was terminated the following week,

on February 21, 2008.

The district court concluded that the February 4 email

would not permit a reasonable trier of fact to find a causal

link between the protected activity and Florez’s termination

for two reasons. Neither reason justifies the conclusion, at

least for summary judgment.

First, the district court explained, Berry made the critical

recommendation to terminate Florez and because there is no

evidence that Berry knew about the protected activity, a rea‐

sonable trier of fact could not infer that Berry was motivated

by retaliation. Contrary to the district court’s assertion, how‐

ever, there is evidence in the record that Berry did in fact

know about the protected activity before Florez’s termina‐

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
No. 13‐1934 25

tion. Berry testified in her deposition that she learned of

plaintiffs’ complaint about Giambone “a couple months” af‐

ter it happened. Although Berry could not remember a spe‐

cific date, she said it “could have been as much as four or

five months” after she took over the Chicago office in July

2007. Berry Dep. at 28. Florez was terminated seven months

after Berry took over the Chicago office, so under any ver‐

sion of the timing, it is reasonable to infer that she knew of

plaintiffs’ protected activity before she recommended

Florez’s termination.

Even if this were not enough (and it is), there is evidence

not only that Berry knew of the protected activity but also

that DeVry lied to conceal this fact from the EEOC. In re‐

sponse to Florez’s EEOC charge, Hurt drafted a position

statement saying that Florez’s termination had been initiated

by Berry and that Berry “had no knowledge of” Florez’s

April 2007 complaint about Giambone. A reasonable trier of

fact could find that this statement to the EEOC was deliber‐

ately false and could infer further that DeVry was lying to

cover up a retaliatory motive. See, e.g., McInnis v. Alamo

Community College District, 207 F.3d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 2000)

(reversing summary judgment for employer where employ‐

ee produced evidence that employer made false statements

to EEOC in connection with termination). Neither DeVry in

its response brief nor the district court in its opinion ad‐

dressed this critical fact.6

                                                  6 Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1996), is not to the contrary.

In Rabinovitz, we held that an employer’s false statement to the EEOC

that it did not know the employee was Jewish did not create a genuine

issue of material fact on the employee’s religious discrimination claim.

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26 No. 13‐1934

The district court’s second reason was that the February 4

email did not suggest a retaliatory motive because Hurt tes‐

tified that she included the reference to the April 2007 com‐

plaint merely because it represented a risk of litigation if

DeVry went ahead with terminating Florez. DeVry argued in

the district court, as it does on appeal, that when read in con‐

text with Hurt’s later email from February 15, which men‐

tions that terminating Florez was a “risk,” the February 4

email does not suggest pretext. At most, DeVry contends, it

was just “practical advice” from the HR Department about

discharging Florez.

That’s one way to read the emails, but it’s also reasonable

to read them as signaling retaliatory intent. In accepting

DeVry’s argument, the district court drew an inference

against the non‐moving party, Florez, and in favor of the

moving party, which is of course not appropriate at the

summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Hutchens v. Chicago Board

of Education, 781 F.3d 366, 373–74 (7th Cir. 2015) (reversing

summary judgment for employer where reasonable trier of

fact could either accept employer’s stated reason as true or

find that it was pretext for discrimination); accord, e.g., Lewis

v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The dis‐

trict court erred by improperly weighing the parties’ evi‐

                                                 

Id. at 487–88. There, the employee had failed to offer any evidence link‐

ing the employer’s “(alleged) desire to lie to the EEOC investigator” with

the adverse employment decision. Id. at 488. Here, by contrast, Florez

has offered the February 4 email written by the same person who drafted

the false statement to the EEOC. That email, unlike the evidence in Rab‐

inovitz, explicitly linked the adverse employment action to the protected

activity.

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
No. 13‐1934 27

dence during summary judgment.”). Here, each side offers a

permissible interpretation of the February 4 email. Nothing

in the record makes Florez’s interpretation unreasonable.

In fact, the February 4 email did not mention “the risk of

litigation.” It did, however, list reasons to terminate Florez.

The statement that Florez was “one of the people who com‐

plained about a previous supervisor” appears in the same

paragraph as the statement that he had a “blow‐up” with

Berry—the disputed factual basis for terminating him. A rea‐

sonable jury could interpret the February 4 email as listing

the reasons to terminate Florez, with the protected conduct

among them. In light of both DeVry’s concession on appeal

that Florez’s performance did not justify his termination and

the evidence casting doubt on the honesty of the “volatile

behavior” explanation, a reasonable trier of fact could find

DeVry’s stated reasons unworthy of belief and conclude that

unlawful retaliation is the more likely explanation for its de‐

cision. See Forrester v. Rauland‐Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 418

(7th Cir. 2006) (“if the stated reason, even if actually present

to the mind of the employer, wasn’t what induced him to

take the challenged employment action, it was a pretext”). In

sum, Florez has produced evidence from which a reasonable

trier of fact could find that DeVry fired him because he had

complained to HR about Giambone.

VI. Brooks’s Evidence of Pretext

Like Florez, Brooks attempts to prove retaliation by

showing that DeVry’s stated reasons for firing her fifteen

months after the HR complaint were pretexts. According to

DeVry, Brooks was terminated for two reasons: (1) multiple

acts of dishonesty and (2) inconsistent performance. DeVry

contends that Brooks lied about her activities during several

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
28 No. 13‐1934

work days and failed to meet important performance

benchmarks during 2008.

DeVry cites two events to support its dishonesty explana‐

tion. First, in October 2007 Brooks told Strauss that she

needed to leave the office at 7:00 p.m. to pick up an applica‐

tion fee from a student. Strauss later conducted a routine

quality assurance call with the student. She was told that

Brooks had actually picked up the deposit earlier in the af‐

ternoon. When Strauss confronted Brooks about the discrep‐

ancy, she denied that she had been dishonest with Strauss

and explained that there had been an honest miscommunica‐

tion involving the student’s grandmother. Strauss told

Brooks that “honesty is the best policy” but did not repri‐

mand her further.

The second event occurred the following summer. On

June 17, 2008, Brooks told Strauss that she would be stop‐

ping on her way to work to visit a prospective student.

When Brooks still had not shown up at work two hours later,

Strauss called the student to see if Brooks had stopped by.

He said no. That same day Brooks had also told Strauss that

she spent the morning calling several prospective students

while working from home. Berry conducted quality assur‐

ance calls with these prospective students. They told her

they had not spoken with Brooks that day.

Based on the two incidents, Strauss believed that Brooks

had been dishonest with her. She wrote a report saying that

“LaTonya [Brooks] has repeatedly lied and is not on task.

LaTonya’s production is slipping tremendously. ... It is clear

LaTonya is not focused on her job and her responsibilities.”

Strauss also connected these incidents of dishonesty to

Brooks’s performance, noting that her enrollment numbers

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
No. 13‐1934 29

for the July 2008 admissions class were “decreasing ... by the

hand fulls.”

Strauss addressed other concerns with Brooks in two

other write‐ups, both dated June 24, 2008. She described sev‐

eral acts that were, in Strauss’s view, examples of insubordi‐

nation, disrespect, and a failure to cooperate with manage‐

ment. The next day, Strauss sent her write‐ups to Hierl and

Berry. Hierl then sent an email to Hurt with Strauss’s write‐

ups attached. Hierl told Hurt that she wanted either to ter‐

minate Brooks immediately or to put her on month‐to‐

month probation resulting in her termination at the end of

the July 2008 enrollment period. Thirty minutes later, Hurt

emailed back: “Can you send me a copy of her last review

and the improvement plan mentioned?” There is no evi‐

dence that Hierl responded to this email.

On July 1, 2008 Hurt emailed Maher (the HR director)

about Brooks’s “inconsistent” performance, summarizing her

“starts” for the admissions classes in January, March, May,

and July of 2008. DeVry’s “start” targets are like sales quotas:

“starts” refer to the number of students recruited by an ad‐

missions officer who enroll in a given class. After listing sev‐

eral enrollment periods for which Brooks failed to achieve

her start targets, Hurt’s email concluded: “We really need a

more solid performer, especially for a Level II advisor.

Would like to separate from the organization. We could live

with a month‐to‐month probation, but we would be proba‐

bly prolonging the inevitable.”

When the July 2008 enrollment period ended, Brooks had

missed her starts target for the class. This was the same en‐

rollment period Strauss had emphasized in her write‐up

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30 No. 13‐1934

about the June 17, 2008 incidents regarding Brooks’s dishon‐

esty. DeVry fired Brooks a few days later, on July 8, 2008.7

Brooks argues that both of DeVry’s justifications were

pretexts. She contests the dishonesty explanation in two

ways: (1) she denies that she was ever dishonest with

Strauss, and (2) she argues that because the July 1, 2008

email recommending her termination mentioned her per‐

formance but not her dishonesty, DeVry’s reasons for her

termination are “shifting” and “inconsistent.” The perfor‐

mance explanation was a pretext, she says, because Hurt

provided “false” numbers in the July 1 email to Maher when

describing her starts for two enrollment periods.

We begin with the dishonesty rationale. A reasonable

trier of fact could not find on this record that this explana‐

tion was pretextual. Brooks disputes that she was actually

dishonest with Strauss, suggesting that any discrepancies

discovered by Strauss should be chalked up to innocent mis‐

communications. Unlike Florez in his disputes with Strauss

and Berry, though, Brooks does not dispute that Strauss

honestly believed Brooks had been dishonest with her.

Brooks also does not dispute that Strauss reported these in‐

                                                  7 DeVry claims that Berry made the ultimate decision to terminate

Brooks. Appellee’s Br. 16–17. For this proposition, it cites Dkt. 49‐7 at

120:8–17 (Berry’s deposition); Dkt. 49‐13 at 135:9–136:4 & 136:24–137:5

(Hurt’s deposition); and Dkt. 49‐14 at 11:1–15 (Maher’s deposition). The

deposition excerpts do not support this proposition. In fact, the excerpt‐

ed transcript of Berry’s deposition that DeVry cites ends with page 113.

There is no page 120. Based on the summary judgment record, a reason‐

able trier of fact could find that Strauss, Berry, Hierl, and Hurt all partic‐

ipated in the decision to terminate Brooks.

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
No. 13‐1934 31

cidents to Berry and Hierl, who in turn relayed the reports to

Hurt and Maher. Brooks’s dispute about whether she was

actually dishonest with Strauss therefore does not bear on

the decisive question: Did Strauss, Berry, Hierl, Hurt, and

Maher honestly believe Brooks had been dishonest when

they made the decision to fire her? Cf. O’Leary, 657 F.3d at

635.

Brooks attempts to fill this gap in her theory by arguing

that DeVry has given “shifting” and “inconsistent” explana‐

tions for her termination because Hurt’s July 1 email did not

mention dishonesty. As a general rule, a reasonable trier of

fact can infer pretext from an employer’s shifting or incon‐

sistent explanations for the challenged employment deci‐

sion. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 738

(7th Cir. 2013). The record here would not permit such an

inference, though. Hurt’s decision to emphasize the perfor‐

mance rationale in her email to Maher did not create an in‐

consistency. She did not disavow or contradict the dishones‐

ty justification; she simply failed to mention it.

In fact, Strauss’s initial write‐ups about Brooks raised

both performance issues and concerns about dishonesty.

Strauss’s write‐up about the June 17, 2008 incidents involv‐

ing both a student and Brooks’s claim that she had been

working from home that morning explicitly linked the dis‐

honesty rationale to the declining number of students she

had enrolled for the July 2008 admissions class and noted

her “slipping” production. It is undisputed that Berry, Hierl,

Hurt, and Maher relied on this write‐up to justify terminat‐

ing Brooks. Thus, the summary judgment record establishes

beyond reasonable dispute that DeVry relied on both expla‐

nations to terminate Brooks.

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
32 No. 13‐1934

Where an employer relies on multiple reasons for the

termination, its failure to address all of the reasons in each

communication about the employee is not enough to show

contradictions or shifts in rationales that suggest pretext. See

Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 727, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2001)

(employer’s supplementation of reasons for adverse em‐

ployment decision not evidence of pretext so long as reasons

do not conflict and employer does not retract a reason);

O’Connor v. DePaul University, 123 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir.

1997) (employer’s “flux in terminology” not evidence of pre‐

text where three explanations “focused on different aspects

of [employee’s] behavior” but same underlying conduct).

Brooks next attacks DeVry’s performance rationale. Recall

that Hurt’s July 1 email to Maher summarized her starts tar‐

gets for the admissions classes in January, March, May, and

July of 2008. According to Hurt’s email, Brooks missed her

target for three of these classes: January (she enrolled one

student against a goal of three), May (zero students against a

goal of two), and July (sixteen students against a goal of

twenty).

Brooks concedes that she missed her starts target for the

July class. But she contends that she made her targets for the

January and May classes and that two of the numbers in

Hurt’s email are therefore false. She argues that this evidence

is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on

whether DeVry’s performance explanation was pretextual.

See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133,

147 (2000) (“In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact

can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that

the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory

purpose.”).

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
No. 13‐1934 33

Brooks’s argument runs into an evidentiary problem. The

only evidence she offers to support this theory are two doc‐

uments produced by DeVry in discovery. One document

suggests that Brooks enrolled six students for the January

class; the other suggests that she enrolled four students for

the May class. If these documents accurately reflect final

starts numbers, then Brooks achieved her targets for the Jan‐

uary and May classes, contrary to Hurt’s claim in the July 1

email.

The district court excluded this evidence, however, be‐

cause the documents were not properly authenticated. Cas‐

tro, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 987 & n.10. Plaintiffs argue that the

district court should have admitted the documents as busi‐

ness records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) for two

reasons: (1) the documents were properly authenticated by

Castro’s sworn declaration, and (2) DeVry’s production of the

documents in the litigation served as implicit authentication

under Thanongsinh v. Board of Education, 462 F.3d 762, 777–78

(7th Cir. 2006). We review only for abuse of discretion a dis‐

trict court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence on sum‐

mary judgment. Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d 704, 708–09 (7th

Cir. 1998); accord, e.g., Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, 662

F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2011).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in exclud‐

ing this evidence. We agree with the district court that Cas‐

tro’s declaration did not lay a sufficient foundation to au‐

thenticate the documents. Rule 803(6) requires authentica‐

tion by a “custodian or another qualified witness.” Castro’s

declaration did not establish that she was a custodian or oth‐

erwise qualified witness. It merely stated: “Attached as Ex. F

is a document generated by DeVry in the normal course of

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
34 No. 13‐1934

business reflecting registered students by advisor for Janu‐

ary of 2008. Ex. F is a document produced by DeVry in this

litigation on a disc.” Castro’s declaration includes an identi‐

cal statement about the second document, which was offered

to show Brooks’s starts for the May 2008 class.

Brooks contends that Castro could properly authenticate

these documents because she had been a “supervisor” who

was qualified to opine about DeVry’s performance evalua‐

tions. But that’s not enough. To lay a proper foundation for

admitting this evidence under Rule 803(6), Castro needed to

be familiar with DeVry’s record‐keeping practices. See, e.g.,

Joseph P. Caulfield & Associates, Inc. v. Litho Productions, Inc.,

155 F.3d 883, 888 (7th Cir. 1998) (no abuse of discretion

where district court excluded evidence because foundational

witness did not testify as to the business’s “regular record‐

keeping practices”). Her declaration was silent on this issue.

The fact of production in the litigation says nothing about

Castro’s familiarity with DeVry’s record‐keeping practices.

Plaintiffs’reliance on Thanongsinh is also unpersuasive. In

that case, we identified a narrow exception to the rule that

admission under Rule 803(6) at summary judgment requires

an affidavit from a custodian or other person familiar with

the type of record. The exception applies “when the party

challenging the document’s admissibility relied on that same

document ‘for its accuracy’ in earlier proceedings, or other‐

wise ‘conceded the accuracy of the documents that the [op‐

posing party] sought to introduce.’” Thanongsinh, 462 F.3d at

778 (alteration in original), quoting Woods v. City of Chicago,

234 F.3d 979, 988 (7th Cir. 2000). The exception does not ap‐

ply here. DeVry has not relied on these documents for their

accuracy. Nor has it conceded the accuracy of the starts

Case: 13-1934 Document: 42 Filed: 05/13/2015 Pages: 42
No. 13‐1934 35

numbers reflected in the documents. In Thanongsinh, by con‐

trast, the party opposing admission had “admitted in dis‐

covery that the [exhibit] is what the plaintiff purports it to

be.” Id.

No such admission exists here. The mere act of producing a

document in response to a discovery request based on the content

of the document does not amount to an admission of the docu‐

ment’s authenticity. A party’s duty to produce documents un‐

der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a) applies to respon‐

sive documents in its “possession, custody, or control.” They

must be produced regardless of their authenticity, accuracy,

or reliability, so the act of production does not say anything

about authenticity, accuracy, or reliability. Those are matters

for follow‐up requests for admissions or other discovery

tools.8

                                                  8 Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979 (7th Cir. 2000), provides a use‐

ful contrast. There, the plaintiff attached a police case report to his re‐

sponse to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The report

summarized the contents of an arrest record and a misdemeanor com‐

plaint. In opposing summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that the case

report accurately described those two underlying documents. Id. at 988.

The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, relying in

part on the underlying arrest record and misdemeanor complaint.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court abused its dis‐

cretion by considering this evidence because neither the arrest record nor

the misdemeanor complaint was admissible under Rule 803(6). We

agreed with the plaintiff that neither document had been properly au‐

thenticated, but we affirmed the district court’s decision anyway because

the plaintiff had conceded the accuracy of the underlying documents by

relying on the case report that summarized them. We explained that re‐

quiring authenticating affidavits under the specific circumstances of that

case “would be an empty formality” and concluded that the district

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36 No. 13‐1934

Without those two unauthenticated documents, no evi‐

dence in the summary judgment record casts doubt on

DeVry’s performance rationale. This is especially true in light

of Brooks’s concession that she missed her starts target for

the July 2008 class—the enrollment period immediately pre‐

ceding her termination and the only class mentioned in

Strauss’s decisive write‐up. A reasonable trier of fact could

not find pretext as to Brooks. Accordingly, Brooks has failed

to produce evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of

fact to find that DeVry fired her because she had complained

to HR about Giambone.

VII. Castro’s Evidence of Pretext

Castro also attempts to demonstrate that DeVry’s stated

reason for terminating her was a pretext for retaliation for

the HR complaint thirty months earlier. According to DeVry,

Castro was terminated because of poor performance over a

sustained period.

It is undisputed that Castro failed to achieve several

monthly performance goals in 2008 and 2009. She was ulti‐

mately fired on November 3, 2009. For the September 2009

enrollment period, she achieved only three starts against an

original target of twenty, which had been reduced to ten for

Castro’s benefit because she had taken a leave of absence.

Castro conceded during her deposition that three starts for

the September 2009 class “was not a good number.”

                                                 

court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it considered the doc‐

uments without such affidavits. Id. at 989.

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No. 13‐1934 37

Nevertheless, Castro argues that DeVry’s stated reason

was pretextual. Citing her success in achieving several

monthly performance goals in 2008 and 2009, Castro argues

that her failure to meet other performance goals during this

span was caused by her leaves of absence and not having her

targets adequately prorated. She also argues that she was

terminated prematurely, before she had a meaningful oppor‐

tunity to satisfy her starts target for the November 2009

class.

Castro has failed to establish a genuine issue of material

fact regarding pretext. Her ability to satisfy some of her

monthly performance goals does not raise a genuine issue.

DeVry has not claimed that Castro failed to satisfy all of her

performance targets. DeVry acknowledges that she achieved

some of her goals in 2008 and 2009, but it explains that Cas‐

tro’s performance was too inconsistent to justify keeping her

with the company. Inconsistent performance—though not

uniformly bad—is a legitimate, non‐retaliatory reason for

termination. See Roberts v. Separators, Inc., 172 F.3d 448, 451–

52 (7th Cir. 1999) (“poor performance” was legitimate, non‐

discriminatory reason where plaintiff’s “performance de‐

clined after an initial period of excellence”). And because

DeVry has not denied that Castro achieved some of her per‐

formance goals during the relevant span, a reasonable trier

of fact could not find based on this record that DeVry is dis‐

sembling.9

                                                  9 Castro cites evidence that Casey Tobin (her direct supervisor)

“whited out” two students’ names from her list of starts for the July 2009

enrollment period. Castro argues that this evidence would permit a rea‐

sonable trier of fact to find that DeVry falsified her performance num‐

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38 No. 13‐1934

Castro fares no better with her argument that she failed

to achieve certain monthly performance goals because her

targets were not adequately prorated. It is undisputed that

DeVry reduced several of her targets for her benefit. In fact,

the goal she missed just before she was fired had been re‐

duced from twenty to ten, and Castro still missed it.10 Cas‐

tro’s subjective belief that her targets should have been pro‐

rated more than they were does not undermine the honesty

of DeVry’s stated explanation for terminating her and thus

could not support a finding of pretext. See Ineichen v.

Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 2005) (“it is not ‘the

court’s concern that an employer may be ... too hard on its

employee’”), quoting Ransom v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 217 F.3d

467, 471 (7th Cir. 2000); accord, Silverman v. Board of Education

of City of Chicago, 637 F.3d 729, 738 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting

cases).11

                                                 

bers in an effort to terminate her. Even accepting this characterization of

the record as true, it does not establish a genuine issue on pretext be‐

cause DeVry did not justify her termination based on her performance in

July 2009. As Castro conceded in the district court, her mid‐year 2009

review said that she “made her starts goal” for that period. DeVry has

never claimed otherwise.

10 Castro asserts that “no one on Tobin’s team, except Tobin”

achieved their September 2009 starts goals. But these purported compar‐

ators all had at least seven starts for the period, and Castro does not at‐

tempt to demonstrate that they were situated similarly to her.

11 Castro could in theory establish pretext by producing evidence of

disparate treatment in the application of the company’s proration poli‐

cies. Suppose, for example, that Castro and a similarly situated employee

took leaves of absence of the same length and, upon returning to the of‐

fice, the comparator’s targets were reduced by 50 percent while Castro’s

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No. 13‐1934 39

Castro also argues that DeVry’s stated reason for firing

her was a pretext because she did not have a meaningful op‐

portunity to achieve her starts goal for the November 2009

admissions class. DeVry concedes that Berry recommended

Castro’s termination on October 26, 2009, before the sign‐up

period for the November 2009 class officially ended. DeVry

maintains, however, that the decision was reasonable be‐

cause, in light of Castro’s pace at enrolling students during

October, she could not possibly enroll nineteen students in

less than a week. Even assuming, as Castro contends, that

DeVry jumped the gun in concluding that she would not be

able to hit her target by the end of the sign‐up period, this

evidence does not establish pretext. It does not undermine

the honesty of DeVry’s belief. Even if that belief had been

unreasonable or overly harsh, there is no evidence that it

was dishonest. See, e.g., Ineichen, 410 F.3d at 961; Hartley v.

Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1997) (an em‐

ployer’s “foolish or trivial or even baseless” explanation suf‐

fices, so long as it is “honestly believed”).

                                                 

targets were reduced by only 10 percent. See, e.g., Coleman, 667 F.3d at

858 (explaining that selective enforcement of company policy can estab‐

lish pretext); Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 892 (7th Cir.

2001) (same). But the record here does not fit this pattern. There is no

evidence that employees at DeVry were entitled to proration under the

company’s policies. And Castro has not produced evidence that a simi‐

larly situated employee was treated better in this respect. In fact, she tes‐

tified during her deposition that whether DeVry would prorate an em‐

ployee’s targets was a matter of “discretion” and that there was “no

magic number” for determining by how much an employee’s targets

should be reduced.

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40 No. 13‐1934

Castro’s argument overlooks the fact that DeVry had al‐

ready placed her on probation because she had repeatedly

failed to hit performance targets over a sustained period. Af‐

ter Castro enrolled only three students for the September

2009 class against a prorated goal of ten, Berry placed her on

probation. In a memo dated August 27, 2009, Berry told Cas‐

tro: “During this probation period, failure to meet or make

substantial progress towards the target and weekly activity

levels outlined below may result in termination at any time

during this period.” The memo then outlined “weekly activi‐

ty minimums” of 6 appointments, 4 interviews, and 2.25 ap‐

plications. Castro does not dispute that she failed to achieve

these “weekly activity minimums.” Her focus on the total

starts goal for the entire enrollment period is therefore mis‐

placed.12 Ultimately then, Castro has failed to produce evi‐

dence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that

DeVry’s reason for firing her was pretextual.

We return finally to the evidence that shortly after the Ju‐

ly 2007 meeting Strauss told Florez and Brooks that “the

people that have went to HR no longer work here.” A rea‐

sonable trier of fact could infer based on this record that

Strauss was referring to Castro. Castro had been demoted

and transferred from Chicago to the Addison office shortly

before the comment was made and within three months of

                                                  12 Castro points out that when she was terminated on November 3,

no other advisor had more than one start for the November 2009 class.

She makes no attempt, however, to demonstrate that the other advisors

were situated similarly to her. For example, she does not present evi‐

dence that any of these employees had a comparable history of past per‐

formance problems or were already on probation as she was at the time.

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No. 13‐1934 41

the complaint to HR. A reasonable trier of fact could also in‐

terpret the comment as evidence of retaliatory intent—that it

was a signal to Florez and Brooks that Castro was demoted

and transferred because she complained to HR and that they

might suffer the same fate if they complained again.

This evidence takes Castro only so far. She has not based

her retaliation claim on her demotion and transfer. She has

complained only about her termination. The critical ques‐

tion, then, is whether Strauss’s comment to Florez and

Brooks would permit a reasonable finding that DeVry termi‐

nated Castro because of her complaint about Giambone.

Strauss’s comment would not permit such a finding. The

comment was made more than two years before Castro’s

termination. As we have explained, the record establishes

beyond reasonable dispute that Castro had a long history of

performance problems leading up to her termination. Absent

other evidence of retaliation, this comment does not create a

genuine issue for trial. See Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d

238, 242 (7th Cir. 1996) (“To be probative of discrimination,

isolated comments must be contemporaneous with the dis‐

charge or causally related to the discharge decision making

process.”).

Finally, plaintiffs argue that if any one of them has raised

a genuine issue as to retaliation, then summary judgment

should be reversed as to all of them. They all engaged in the

same protected activity, and all suffered the same penalty of

termination imposed by the same key decision‐makers.

While Florez has raised a genuine issue of material fact

about the reasons for his termination, we do not believe that

finding carries over to Brooks or Castro. Florez has offered

evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that

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42 No. 13‐1934

Strauss, Berry, and other DeVry managers retaliated against

him. That evidence allows a finding that those managers

were capable of retaliatory motive in response to the April

2007 HR complaint. But the three plaintiffs were treated in

different ways, at different times spanning nearly two years.

The undisputed evidence of performance problems for both

Brooks and Castro persuades us that a reasonable jury could

not find that the later and separate decisions to fire them

were motivated by retaliation for the 2007 HR complaint.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in

favor of DeVry on all of plaintiffs’ claims except Florez’s

claim of retaliation. On that claim, we REVERSE and

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opin‐

ion.

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