Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01603/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01603-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405wc Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAIME JOSE MENDOZA,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16-cv-1603-AJB-KSC

ORDER GRANTING JOINT 

MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF 

ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO 

THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE 

ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)

(Doc. No. 17)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Jaime Jose Mendoza (“Plaintiff”) and 

Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill’s (“Defendant”) joint motion for approval of attorney’s fees 

pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) filed on 

October 31, 2017. (Doc. No. 17.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the 

parties’ motion.

BACKGROUND 

On June 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint requesting judicial review of a final 

administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff disability 

insurance. (Doc. No. 1.) On October 31, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary 

judgment or motion for reversal and/or remand. (Doc. No. 10.) On December 21, 2016, 

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after a joint motion for extension of time to file was granted, Defendant filed her cross 

motion for summary judgment and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. Nos. 11, 12, 13.) 

On August 11, 2017, Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford filed a report and 

recommendation (“R&R”) that recommended that the district court grant Plaintiff’s motion 

for remand, deny Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and enter judgment in 

Plaintiff’s favor. (Doc. No. 15 at 32.) On September 11, 2017, finding that no party had 

filed objections to Magistrate Judge Crawford’s R&R, the district judge adopted the R&R 

in whole. (Doc. No. 16.) On October 31, 2017, the parties filed the present joint motion for 

attorney’s fees. (Doc. No. 17.)

DISCUSSION

Under the EAJA, prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys’ fees and 

costs unless the government’s position was substantially justified, special circumstances 

would make an award unjust, or the application for fees is not timely filed. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

2412(d)(1)(A), (1)(B); Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990). Thus, once 

a party establishes its status as a prevailing party under the EAJA, a rebuttable presumption 

arises that it is entitled to an award of fees. Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 123 F.3d 

1275, 1277–78, amended by, 131 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 1997). Once a court finds that a party 

is entitled to attorneys’ fees, it must then determine if the fee is reasonable. Sneede by 

Thompson v. Coye, 856 F. Supp. 526, 530 (N.D. Cal. 1994). This inquiry focuses on the 

reasonable number of hours expended and the appropriate hourly rate. Id. 

Here, Plaintiff is the prevailing party as his motion for remand was granted in his

favor. See Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 

782 (1989) (holding that a prevailing party is one that succeeds on “any significant issue 

in the litigation which achieves some benefit [they] sought in bringing the suit.”). Thus, in 

the present case, there is no dispute that Plaintiff has “prevailed.” 

Next, as this is a joint motion, Defendant has not tried to demonstrate that the fees 

should be denied because the “position” of the United States was “substantially justified.” 

Oregon Nat. Res. Council v. Madigan, 980 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court 

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notes that there are also no special circumstances whereby the Court may deny fees to a 

prevailing party. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 

The Court must now determine if the fee is “reasonable.” Here, Plaintiff requests he

be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $5,000.00, which represents the 

compensation for all legal services rendered on behalf of Plaintiff by counsel in connection 

with this civil action. (Doc. No. 17 at 2.) Though Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court 

with the number of hours expended in this litigation and their hourly rate, the Court finds 

that a fee of $5,000.00 is reasonable in general, and unopposed by defendant. See Keo 

Laosouvanh v. Astrue, No. CIV S-06-0589 DAD, 2009 WL 799122, at *2–5 (E.D. Cal. 

Mar. 24, 2009) (finding award of $9,740.00 in attorney’s fees under the EAJA reasonable,

based on the rational amount of time expended); see also Barber v. Astrue, No. CIV S-00-

1286 WBS DAD, 2008 WL 2705147, at *3–5 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2008) (finding a fee of 

$21,928.31 reasonable based on over 140 hours of attorney time spent at an hourly rate 

ranging from $142.00 to $167.00). 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) The joint motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) of the EAJA 

is GRANTED consistent with this order; and 

(2) Fees will be made payable to Jaime Mendoza, but if the Department of the 

Treasury determines that Jaime Mendoza does not owe a federal debt, then the 

government will cause the payment of fees to be made directly to Matty Sandoval, 

pursuant to the assignment executed by Jaime Mendoza. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2017

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