Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07213/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07213-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 1995 Decided December 15, 1995

No. 94-7213

SOON Y. PARK,

APPELLEE

v.

HOWARD UNIVERSITY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cv02662)

Amy F. Kett argued the cause for appellant, with whom Janet P. Holt and David G. Leitch were on

the briefs. William P. Flanagan entered an appearance.

St. John Barrett argued the cause and filed the brief for appellee.

Before: WALD, SILBERMAN and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: The District Court entered judgment for Soon Y. Park, a professor

of pharmacy, on her hostile work environment claimagainst her employer, Howard University, under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("Title VII"). Because Park failed to

exhaust her administrative remedies for this claim before the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission ("EEOC") prior to filing suit, we reverse the District Court's judgment.

I. Factual Background

Soon Y. Park is a naturalized United States citizen born in South Korea. She is a tenured

Associate Professor in the Department of Pharmacy Practice at Howard University's College of

Pharmacy and Pharmacal Sciences. She was awarded tenure in 1987, approximately six years after

joining the faculty. In her years on the faculty, she has taught courses, performed research, and been

involved in several academic committees. In 1991, Park sought the recently vacated position of

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Assistant Dean for Student Affairs in the College of Pharmacy, but Bertram Nicholas, a white

American, was chosen for the post. Park filed a charge with the District of Columbia Department

of Human Rights and the EEOC which claimed that Howard had discriminated against her based on

her sex and her national origin in selecting Nicholasfor the Assistant Dean position. After receiving

a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC, Park filed this lawsuit on November 25, 1992. The

complaint alleged sex and national origin discrimination in Howard's selection of Nicholas for the

Assistant Dean position. On December 11, 1992, Park filed an Amended Complaint, in which she

alleged an "atmosphere of sexual harassment" at Howard. Am. Compl. at 3. Howard moved for

partial summary judgment on the sexual harassment allegation, and the District Court granted this

motion "on the grounds that the Amended Complaint contains no discrete claim of sexual

harassment." Order of Oct. 28, 1993.

At trial, the District Court construed the remains of the Amended Complaint to allege two

separate charges: one for sex and national origin discrimination in the Assistant Dean selection

process, and one for "[a]n on-going pattern of discrimination against plaintiff based on her sex and

national origin which created a hostile work environment." Mem. Op. of Apr. 8, 1994 at 2 (emphasis

in original). The court also held that Park had fully exhausted her administrative remedies at the

EEOC as to both claims. Id. at 14. Park lost on the discrimination claim because the District Court

concluded that Howard "had a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason" for the selection of Nicholas

as Assistant DeanNicholas held a doctorate in higher education administration and had prior

assistant deanship experience, whereas Park met neither of these criteria. Id. at 10-11, 14-16, 15.

But the District Court did conclude that Park had been "subject to continuous discriminatory

conduct" that was "sufficiently pervasive to amount to harassment which created a hostile work

environment" based on Park's national origin (but not based on her sex). Id. at 19, 20-21. As

evidence ofthe hostile work environment, the court cited (1) two occasions where Park wasreplaced

by a black colleague on an administrative assignment, (2) mishandling of two other personnel

decisions, and (3) one derogatory comment about an applicant for a faculty position who had an

Asian name, and, incidentally, about Park herself. Id. at 17-20. Although some of this activity

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occurred before the 300-day limitations period, the court held that it constituted a "continuing

violation," eventually awarding Park $150,000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 21 n.5; Mem. and

Order of Sept. 23, 1994. Howard appeals from this judgment on multiple grounds.

II. Legal Analysis

Park prevailed in the District Court on her claim of a hostile work environment based on her

national origin. Discriminatory conduct results in a hostile work environment when it is "so severe

or pervasive that it create[s] a work environment abusive to employees because oftheir race, gender,

religion, or national origin," thus offending "Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality." Harris v.

Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993). Although there is no requirement of psychological

harm, id., it remainstrue that "casual or isolated manifestations of a discriminatoryenvironment,such

as a few ethnic or racialslurs, may not raise a cause of action." Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943

n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In this case, the District Court justified its finding of a hostile work

environment by pointing to Park's dismissal from committee assignments, a derogatory comment by

one of Park's colleagues about a job applicant with an Asian name and about Park herself, Howard's

failure to notify Park of her failure to win the Assistant Dean post, and Park's replacement as

coordinator of a student clerkship program. Howard maintains that these allegations, even if true,

do not constitute sufficient evidence to justify a finding of a hostile work environment. However, as

our analysis will show, Park loses on another threshold questionshe failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies at the EEOC for the hostile work environment claim. It is therefore

unnecessary to consider Howard's arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence.

Title VII requires that a person complaining of a violation file an administrative charge with

the EEOC and allow the agency time to act on the charge. Only after the EEOC has notified the

aggrieved person of its decision to dismiss or its inability to bring a civil action within the requisite

time period can that person bring a civil action herself. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) ("[W]ithin ninety

days after the giving of [a notice of right to sue] a civil action may be brought against the respondent

named in the charge."); see also Williams v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 721 F.2d 1412,

1413 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1976),

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1This is not to suggest that there will always be an administrative EEOC investigation after a

charge. Many cases are not investigated at all and the EEOC simply sends a right-to-sue letter to

the charging party. We, and the Fourth Circuit, only intend that claims within a Title VII suit

must be such as could reasonably be expected to be encompassed within an administrative

investigation if one did follow the charge. 

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1985)

(all construing the exhaustion of administrative remediesrequirement). A Title VII lawsuit following

the EEOC charge is limited in scope to claims that are "like or reasonably related to the allegations

of the charge and growing out of such allegations." Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co.,

31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). At a minimum,

the Title VII claims must arise from"the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected

to follow the charge of discrimination." Chisholm v. United States Postal Service, 665 F.2d 482, 491

(4th Cir. 1981).1 The administrative charge requirement serves the important purposes of giving the

charged party notice of the claim and "narrow[ing] the issuesfor prompt adjudication and decision."

Laffey, 567 F.2d at 472 n.325 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Although it is true that the

administrative charge requirement should not be construed to place a heavy technical burden on

"individuals untrained in negotiating procedural labyrinths," Loe v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 409, 417 (D.C.

Cir. 1985), it is also true that "the requirement of some specificity in a charge is not a "mere

technicality.' " Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1111 (7th Cir. 1992). A court cannot

allow liberal interpretation of an administrative charge to permit a litigant to bypass the Title VII

administrative process. Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).

Although Park filed an administrative charge, it did not express or even hint at a national

origin hostile work environment claim. The particulars of her charge read, in their entirety:

1. I was employed by the Respondent on August 15, 1981, as an Assistant Professor,

earning a salary of $27,500 pe[r] annum. I am still employed by the Respondent, as

an Associate Professor, earning a salary of approximately $56,300 per annum.

2. The Respondent has not articulated a valid reason for discriminating against me.

3. It is my belief that I was discriminated against on the bases of my sex (female) and

national origin (Korean) for the following reasons:

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A. In May or June 1991, Dr. Vincent G. Teling, (Associate Dean of Academic

Affairs-India), and Dr. Olusanya (Chairman-Nigeria) asked me if I was interested in

the position of Assistant Dean for Student Affairs when it became vacant. I said that

I would be interested. I was told I would be recommended for the position to Dr.

Wendell T. Hill, Dean (America).

B. The position became officially vacant in August or September 1991.

C. I applied for the position in writing to Dean Hill on October 19, 1991. I did not

receive a reply.

D. On March 25, 1992, I became aware that the position of Assistant Dean for

Student Affairs was held by Dr. Bertlam [sic] Nicholas (American male). I became

aware of this by [a] memorandum that was written by him on the above stated date.

An official announcement stating that Dr. Nicholas filled this position has not been

made as of 09/23/92.

E. On June 2, 1992, I wrote a memorandum to Dean Hill, asking him why I was not

interviewed or selected for the position in question, which I believe I was qualified

for.

F. On July 23, 1992, in a meeting this statement was said: Those faculty members

who hold administrative positions in the Dean's office, specifically Assistant Dean(s)

and Associate Dean(s) do not have to go through the college's Appointment,

Reappointment, Promotion andTenureCommittee. The Dean himself will "take care"

of the promotion and tenure process and award these administrative faculty members

the next higher rank and/or tenure.

G. Statements such as the above lead me to believe that Dean Hill can place anyone

in a position that he wants. There is not an administrative process in the Dean's office

that an employee can go through to apply for a vacant position.

H. It is my belief that I was denied the opportunity for advancement in my career

because of my sex (female) and my national origin (Korean).

District of Columbia Dep't of Human Rights and Minority Business Development Complaint in the

Matter of Soon Y. Park v. Howard University 1-2 (Sept. 23, 1992).

Park's charge not only lacksthe words "hostile work environment," but also lacks any factual

allegations supporting such a claim. Her challenge to the selection of Nicholas as Assistant Dean

does not incorporate the various other claims relied upon by the District Court in its finding of a

hostile work environment, and the charge does not contain any other challengesto Howard's actions.

The bald statement that "[i]t is my belief that I was denied the opportunity for advancement in my

career because of ... my national origin" cannot be read to encompass a hostile work environment

claim. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, "[s]ome detail, beyond a statement that "I believe I have

been discriminated against because of my race, Black' is necessary to allow the agency to perform its

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statutory duty" in regard to a harassment claim. Rush, 966 F.2d at 1111. "[T]he goals behind the

requirement of prior resort to administrative relief would be frustrated if the filing of a general charge

with the EEOC would open up the possibility of judicial challenges to any related conduct that took

place in connection with the employment relationship." Id. at 1110. Other courts have reached the

same result. See, e.g., Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co., 31 F.3d 668, 672-73 (8th Cir. 1994);

Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 882 F. Supp. 787, 791-92 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Riley v. Technical

and Management Servs. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (D. Md. 1995); Cabiness v. YKK (USA),

Inc., 859 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (M.D. Ga. 1994); Reese v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 859 F.

Supp. 1381, 1387 (D. Kan. 1994); Revis v. Slocomb Indus., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1209, 1219 (D. Del.

1993); Ghahramani v. BASF Corp., 755 F. Supp. 708, 710-11 (M.D. La. 1991); Baltzer v. City of

Sun Prairie/Police Dep't, 725 F. Supp. 1008, 1019 (W.D. Wis. 1989); Torriero v. Olin Corp., 684

F. Supp. 1165, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

Park's only other possible argument is that we should rely on the contents of her "Private

Sector Employment Pre-Complaint Questionnaire" which she completed for the District ofColumbia

Department of Human Rights several weeks before filing her charge with the EEOC. She attached

to her pre-complaint questionnaire a typed statement detailing Howard's allegedly discriminatory

actions against her. It would be possible to construe some of the wording in that statement to make

out a hostile work environment claim. However, the pre-complaint questionnaire is not the same as

an EEOC chargeit even states on its face that "[t]here is no guarantee that the information

submitted will constitute a basisfor filing a formal complaint." District of Columbia Dep't of Human

Rights Private Sector Employment Pre-Complaint Questionnaire at 1 (Aug. 13, 1992). Additionally,

Title VII requires chargesto be sworn, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), and the pre-complaint questionnaire

was not. See Hodges v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 990 F.2d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that

an unswornEEOCquestionnaire "did not constitute a valid charge under Title VII" untilit wassigned

under oath). Finally, there is no evidence that Howard or the EEOC ever had access to the

questionnaire, so it could not have fulfilled the purpose of the required administrative charge. "To

treat Intake Questionnaires willy-nilly as charges would be to dispense with the requirement of

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notification of the prospective defendant, since that is a requirement only ofthe charge and not of the

questionnaire." Early v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 959 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir. 1992).

III. Conclusion

Because Park'sEEOCcharge contained no claims or factual allegationsthat could reasonably

be expected upon investigation to lead to a hostile work environment claim, we hold that she failed

to exhaust her administrative remedies for such a claim at the EEOC. Her civil claim for a hostile

work environment istherefore barred. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court's judgment in favor

of Park. Howard raises additional arguments in opposition to the District Court's ruling which we

have not addressed, but because of our holding that Park failed to exhaust her administrative remedies

for the hostile work environment claim, we find it unnecessary to consider those other arguments.

Reversed.

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