Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00559/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00559-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEZANDER DELGADO,

Plaintiff, No. 2: 12-cv-0559 MCE KJN P

vs.

OFFICER WEEKS, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on the original complaint filed March 2,

2012, as to defendants Hubbard and Vegas. Defendant Hubbard has not yet been served.

Pending before the court is defendant Vegas’s motion to dismiss for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies. For the following reasons, defendant’s motion should be

granted.

II. Legal Standard for Administrative Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e

to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C.

§ 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

1

Case 2:12-cv-00559-MCE-KJN Document 31 Filed 06/27/13 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.

516, 524 (2002). Exhaustion is a prerequisite for all prisoner suits regarding conditions of

confinement, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether

they allege excessive force or some other wrong. Porter, 534 U.S. at 532.

Exhaustion of all “available” remedies is mandatory; those remedies need not

meet federal standards, nor must they be “plain, speedy and effective.” Id. at 524; Booth v.

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740 n.5 (2001). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in

grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Booth, 532

U.S. at 741. A prisoner “seeking only money damages must complete a prison administrative

process that could provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated, but no money.” Id. at 734. 

The fact that the administrative procedure cannot result in the particular form of relief requested

by the prisoner does not excuse exhaustion because some sort of relief or responsive action may

result from the grievance. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 737; see also Porter, 534 U.S. at 525 (purposes

of exhaustion requirement include allowing prison to take responsive action, filtering out

frivolous cases, and creating administrative records).

However, a prisoner need not exhaust further levels of review once he has either

received all the remedies that are “available” at an intermediate level of review, or has been

reliably informed by an administrator that no more remedies are available. Brown v. Valoff, 422

F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). Because there can be no absence of exhaustion unless some

relief remains available, a movant claiming lack of exhaustion must demonstrate that pertinent

relief remained available, whether at unexhausted levels or through awaiting the results of the

relief already granted as a result of that process. Brown, 422 F.3d at 936-37.

As noted above, the PLRA requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies. 

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an

agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can

2

Case 2:12-cv-00559-MCE-KJN Document 31 Filed 06/27/13 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” 

Id. at 90-91. Thus, compliance with prison grievance procedures is required by the PLRA to

properly exhaust. Id. The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an

untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Id. at 83-84.

The State of California provides its prisoners the right to appeal administratively

“any departmental decision, action, condition or policy which they can demonstrate as having an

adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a) (2010). It also provides

them the right to file appeals alleging misconduct by correctional officers and officials. Id. at

§ 3084.1(e). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner

must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal

on a 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and 

(4) third level appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation. Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F.Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal.Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5). A final decision from the Director’s level of review satisfies the

exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. at 1237-38. 

Non-exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense which should be

brought by defendants in an unenumerated motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b). Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the court

may look beyond the pleadings to determine whether a plaintiff exhausted his administrative

remedies. Id. at 1119-20. 

Although exhaustion is mandatory, an inmate must only exhaust administrative

remedies “as are available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under the Ninth Circuit law, exhaustion is

excused when improper screening of grievances occurs. Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010)). Sapp establishes

that “improper screening of an inmate’s administrative grievances renders administrative

remedies ‘effectively unavailable’ such that exhaustion is not required under [§ 1997e(a)].” Id. 

3

Case 2:12-cv-00559-MCE-KJN Document 31 Filed 06/27/13 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

at 823. If prison officials screen out an inmate’s grievances or appeals for improper reasons, the

inmate cannot pursue the necessary administrative process, and, consequently, his administrative

remedies become “unavailable.” Id.

III. Discussion

Plaintiff alleges that defendants forced him to perform oral sex on them on or

around June 8, 2011. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that later that day, he handed Sergeant

Weaver a 602 grievance addressing this claim, but Sergeant Weaver ripped it up stating, “this is

not the time for bull-shit.” (Id.) 

Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to his

claim that he was sexually assaulted. Defendant states that between June 8, 2011, and March 2,

2012, plaintiff submitted three non-medical appeals that were accepted for formal review. (ECF

No. 18-3 at 2.) None of those appeals alleged that defendants sexually assaulted plaintiff. (Id.,

exhibits A, B, and C.) One of these appeals, No. HDSP 11-0989, alleged that defendants

confiscated his electrical appliances. (ECF No. 18-8.) Plaintiff signed the first level appeal

regarding the alleged confiscation of his electrical appliances on June 12, 2011. (Id. at 2.) 

In his opposition, plaintiff reasserts the claim made in his complaint that Sergeant

Weaver ripped up his 602 alleging that defendants forced him to perform oral sex. (ECF No. 25

at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that he managed to send appeal no. 11-0989 to another housing unit for

processing. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that administrative appeals he filed on October 10, 2011,

and November 10, 2011, apparently unrelated to the claims raised in the instant action, were

improperly screened out. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges that on December 2, 2011, he submitted

several grievances related to the alleged sexual assault with negative results. (Id. at 10.) 

In the reply to plaintiff’s opposition, defendant states that plaintiff makes three

arguments in his opposition to defendant’s motion: 1) he actually exhausted his administrative

remedies; 2) he should be excused from exhaustion because one or more of his unrelated

grievances was improperly screened out; and 3) he should be excused from exhaustion because

4

Case 2:12-cv-00559-MCE-KJN Document 31 Filed 06/27/13 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Sergeant Weaver ripped up one of his inmate appeals. The undersigned addresses these

arguments herein.

To the extent plaintiff argues in his opposition that he exhausted his

administrative remedies regarding his sexual assault claim, the undersigned agrees with

defendant that plaintiff has presented no evidence of actual exhaustion to the third level of

review.

With regard to plaintiff’s argument that he should be excused from exhausting his

administrative remedies because one or more of his unrelated grievances was improperly

screened out, the undersigned agrees with defendant that such a circumstance would not excuse

exhaustion of the at-issue claim. In essence, plaintiff is arguing that he should be excused from

exhausting his administrative remedies because it would be futile to do so as his other grievances

were mishandled. As noted above, defendant has presented evidence that between June 8, 2011,

and March 2, 2011, plaintiff submitted three non-medical appeals that were accepted for formal

review. These circumstances undermine plaintiff’s claim that he should be excused from

administrative exhaustion because of alleged mishandling of other, unrelated grievances. 

Moreover, there is no futility exception to the exhaustion requirement. See Booth, 532 U.S. at

741 n. 6 (“[W]e stress the point ... that we will not read futility or other exceptions into statutory

exhaustion requirements where Congress has not otherwise provided.”)

In his opposition, plaintiff also alleges that on December 2, 2011, he submitted

several grievances related to the alleged assault with “negative results.” Other than this

conclusory assertion, this claim is not supported by evidence or specific detail. These bare

assertions of an inability to exhaust administrative remedies are insufficient. Buckley v. Ritola,

2013 WL 2150034, at *5 (E.D.Cal. 2013). 

Finally, plaintiff alleges that he could not exhaust administrative remedies because

Sergeant Weaver ripped up his grievance containing his claim that defendants forced him to

perform oral sex. In particular, in the complaint plaintiff alleges that during mealtime on or

5

Case 2:12-cv-00559-MCE-KJN Document 31 Filed 06/27/13 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

about June 8, 2011, he stepped out of line and handed Sergeant Weaver his grievance. (ECF No.

1 at 5.) This grievance alleged that defendants strip-searched plaintiff, deprived him of law

library access and forced plaintiff to perform oral sex. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant

Weaver ripped the grievance up and stated, “This is not the time for bull-shit.” (Id.) Plaintiff

then returned to his cell and prepared another grievance complaining that defendants had wrongly

taken five of his electrical appliances. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff managed to get this grievance to

another housing unit. (Id.) This grievance was exhausted to the Director’s Level of Review. (Id.

at 6-7.) 

In the reply to plaintiff’s opposition, defendant disputes plaintiff’s claim regarding

Sergeant Weaver. In a declaration attached to the reply, Sergeant Weaver denies plaintiff’s

claims. (ECF No. 26-1 at 1-2.) Sergeant Weaver states that he never ripped up, or otherwise

destroyed, any of plaintiff’s appeals or CDC 602 forms. (Id.)

On May 10, 2013, the court ordered plaintiff to file further briefing in connection

with his claim that he could not exhaust administrative remedies after Sergeant Weaver ripped up

his grievance. The court directed plaintiff to address why he did not include his claims regarding

defendants’ alleged sexual assault in the grievance he filed in the different housing unit

concerning defendants’ alleged confiscation of his electrical appliances. The court also directed

plaintiff to address why he did not file a new and separate grievance regarding his sexual assault

claim in a different housing unit after Sergeant Weaver allegedly ripped up his original

grievance.

On June 13, 2013, plaintiff filed a response to the May 10, 2013 order. This

response does not address the issues that plaintiff was directed to address in the May 10, 2013

order. In his response, plaintiff again alleges that Sergeant Weaver ripped up the grievance

concerning the alleged sexual assault. (ECF No. 30 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that he then returned

to his cell and wrote a letter to the Office of Internal Affairs, which he then passed to the inmate

in the next cell to mail for him. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that he tried to submit appeals to the

6

Case 2:12-cv-00559-MCE-KJN Document 31 Filed 06/27/13 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Appeals Office “but there were constant frustrations/rejections/loss of papers and appeals being

lost...” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that on July 21, 2011, he was placed in a holding cell by Sergeant

Weaver for 31⁄2 hours then taken to administrative segregation. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that

efforts to file grievances, apparently regarding his placement in administrative segregation, were

unsuccessful. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he continued to be harassed by prison staff. (Id. at 7.) 

Plaintiff claim in his further briefing that he tried to submit other appeals

regarding the sexual assault is vague and conclusory. While plaintiff alleges that there were

“constant frustrations/rejections/loss of paperwork,” he provides no specific allegations to

support this claim. These bare assertions are insufficient. Buckley v. Ritola, 2013 WL 2150034,

at *5 (E.D.Cal. 2013). Plaintiff’s suggestion that he felt too intimidated to pursue an

administrative grievance regarding the alleged sexual assault following his placement in

administrative segregation and the alleged harassment by prison staff is undermined by his ability

and willingness to pursue the administrative grievance against defendants regarding their alleged

confiscation of his property. 

As discussed above, exhaustion of all “available” administrative remedies is

mandatory. Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. As the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly reiterated, the PLRA

does not require exhaustion when circumstances render administrative remedies “effectively

unavailable.” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010). If employees of a facility

prevent the filing of a grievance, the exhaustion requirement may be “unavailable” and

defendants estopped from raising non-exhaustion as an affirmative defense. See Jernigan v.

Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002). 

The undersigned acknowledges that under different circumstances, the destruction

of a grievance by a prison official would render administrative remedies unavailable. However,

under the unique circumstances of the instant action, Sergeant Weaver’s alleged destruction of

plaintiff’s grievance did not render administrative remedies unavailable. Plaintiff’s willingness

and ability to pursue a grievance against defendants regarding another matter just days after

7

Case 2:12-cv-00559-MCE-KJN Document 31 Filed 06/27/13 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Sergeant Weaver allegedly destroyed the grievance regarding the alleged sexual assault indicates

that administrative remedies were still available. Despite having been granted an opportunity to

do so, plaintiff has failed to explain why he did not pursue another administrative grievance

regarding the alleged sexual assault when he filed the grievance regarding the confiscation of his

electrical appliances. The circumstances of this case demonstrate that plaintiff failed to exhaust

all available administrative remedies.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant’s motion to

dismiss (ECF No. 18) be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: June 26, 2013

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

del559.mtd

8

Case 2:12-cv-00559-MCE-KJN Document 31 Filed 06/27/13 Page 8 of 8