Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00054/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00054-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DURRELL ANTHONY PUCKETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

BARAONA, T. CAMPBELL, 

HERNANDEZ and WHITE,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-00054-HBK (PC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S THIRD

MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT1

(Doc. No. 92)

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s third Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, filed 

on October 21, 2024, and his proposed Fourth Amended Complaint. (Doc. Nos. 92, 93). 

Defendants filed an Opposition on November 22, 2024. (Doc. No. 106). For the reasons stated 

below, the Court denies the Motion to Amend. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this 

action by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff’s initial 

Complaint named 14 defendants, including “Jane Doe employed as Register[ed] Nurse at CSP 

1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 

No. 104).

Case 1:23-cv-00054-HBK Document 108 Filed 12/03/24 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Corcoran.” (Id. at 2). Prior to screening, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, which 

named four defendants: (1) Lt. J. Barrios; (2) Correctional Officer White; (3) Sgt. Hernandez; and 

(4) Correctional Officer Gutierrez. (Doc. No. 12, “FAC”). On February 17, 2023, the Court

screened Plaintiff’s FAC, finding it stated an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement 

claim, and directed service on Defendants White, Barrios, Gutierrez, and Hernandez. (Doc. Nos. 

17, 18). On October 4, 2023, the Court issued a Discovery and Scheduling Order (“DSO”), 

which included an April 4, 2024 deadline to amend the pleadings. (Doc. No. 43).

On December 19, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s first Motion to Amend, ordered 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) served on Defendants Barrios, Hernandez, and 

White, and directed Defendants Barrios, Hernandez, and White to respond to Plaintiff’s SAC. 

(Doc. Nos. 58, 62). On February 14, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s second Motion to 

Amend, permitting him to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), substituting J. Gaxiola for 

the previously named Defendant Gutierrez, and adding Warden T. Campbell as a Defendant. 

(Doc. Nos. 67, 72). On February 28, 2024, Defendants Baraona, Barrios, Campbell, Hernandez, 

and White filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s TAC. (Doc. No. 78). The Parties have engaged in 

discovery since that time and on April 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 

which remains stayed. (Doc. Nos. 82, 87).

On October 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Amend, seeking to add K. 

Allison as a Defendant and dismiss Defendant Barrios.2 (Doc. No. 92). Plaintiff lodges a

proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, which asserts new First Amendment retaliation and Eighth 

Amendment conditions of confinement claims against Defendant Allison. (See Doc. No. 93). 

Because Plaintiff’s Motion was filed after the Court entered a discovery and scheduling order 

issued pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court construes Plaintiff’s 

Motion as brought pursuant to Rule 16(b).

////

////

2 Defendant Barrios was previously dismissed pursuant to the Court’s November 20, 2024 granting 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. (Doc. No. 105).

Case 1:23-cv-00054-HBK Document 108 Filed 12/03/24 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Under Rule 15, a party “may amend its filing once as a matter of course . . . .” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(1). For subsequent amendments, “a party may amend its pleading only with the 

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when 

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, because Plaintiff’s Motion was filed

after the Court issued a discovery and scheduling order, Rule 16’s standards now control. See

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992) (evaluating under

Rule 16 motion for leave to amend filed after issuance of pretrial scheduling order). In pertinent

part, Rule 16 provides:

(b) [The district court] ... shall, after consulting with the attorneys

for the parties and any unrepresented parties, by a scheduling

conference, ... enter a scheduling order that limits the time

(1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings;

(2) to file and hear motions; and

(3) to complete discovery.

....

The order shall issue as soon as practicable but in no event more

than 120 days after filing of the complaint. A schedule shall not be

modified except by leave of . . . [the district court] upon a showing

of good cause.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). Thus, Plaintiff’s ability to amend his complaint is governed by Rule 16(b),

not Rule 15(a). See Forstmann v. Culp, 114 F.R.D. 83, 85 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (party seeking to

amend pleading after date specified in scheduling order must first show “good cause” for

amendment under Rule 16(b), then, if “good cause” be shown, the party must demonstrate that

amendment was proper under Rule 15); see also Financial Holding Corp. v. Garnac Grain Co.,

127 F.R.D. 165, 166 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (same).

“A court’s evaluation of good cause is not coextensive with an inquiry into the propriety

of the amendment under . . . Rule 15.” Forstmann, 114 F.R.D. at 85. Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal

amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith of the party seeking to interpose an amendment

Case 1:23-cv-00054-HBK Document 108 Filed 12/03/24 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily considers

the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial

schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee” notes (1983 amendment); Harrison Beverage Co. v.

Dribeck Importers, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 463, 469 (D.N.J. 1990); Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex

Corp., 132 F.R.D. 213, 217 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Forstmann, 114 F.R.D. at 85; 6A Wright, Miller &

Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 at 231 (2d ed. 1990) (“good cause” means

scheduling deadlines cannot be met despite party's diligence).

Moreover, carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason

for a grant of relief. Cf. Engleson v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.

1992) (carelessness not a ground for relief under Rule 60(b)); Martella v. Marine Cooks &

Stewards Union, 448 F.2d 729, 730 (9th Cir. 1971) (same), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972);

Smith v. Stone, 308 F.2d 15, 18 (9th Cir. 1962) (same). Although the existence or degree of

prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a

motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. See

Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co., 108 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Me. 1985). If that party was not

diligent, the inquiry should end. See Kamal v. Eden Creamery, LLC, 88 F.4th 1268, 1279 (9th

Cir. 2023) (finding no abuse of discretion by district court in denying plaintiff motion to amend

finding plaintiff no diligent).

B. Analysis

Here, Plaintiff provides no explanation as to why he failed to join Defendant Allison by

the April 4, 2024 deadline provided in the DSO. Indeed, this case was filed more than three years

ago, Plaintiff has amended his complaint two times already, and the parties have been engaged in

discovery for more than a year. Indeed, discovery is closed. (See Doc. No. 72, directing all

discovery to be completed no later than October 8, 2024). If the Court were to permit Plaintiff to

pursue his new claims against the additional proposed defendant, this case would essentially

begin anew. Defendant Allison would need to be served, the Court would need to reopen

discovery from inception, and all new case management deadlines would need to be set in this

Case 1:23-cv-00054-HBK Document 108 Filed 12/03/24 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

already three-year-old case. In fact, the dispotive deadline is imminent. (Id., setting dispositive

deadline to Janaury 10, 2025). 

Plaintiff’s Motion does not address the critical question in evaluating a motion to amend

under Rule 16: why he was unable to file his motion within the deadlines prescribed by the

Court’s October 4, 2023 Discovery and Scheduling Order. Plaintiff provides no information as to

when he learned of the alleged wrongdoing by Defendant Allison or when he ascertained her

identity. Plaintiff’s Motion was filed six months beyond the deadline set to join parties or amend

the pleadings. Plaintiffs’ barebone Motion states only that his “request [is made in] good faith.”

(Doc. No. 92 at 1). Plaintiff has failed to explain the lengthy delay and therefore failed to

demonstrate diligence and good cause to amend his complaint.

A scheduling order “is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly

disregarded by counsel without peril.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610 (quoting Gestetner Corp., 108

F.R.D. at 141). Plaintiff’s disregard of the Court’s scheduling orders “undermine[s] the court’s

ability to control its docket, disrupt[s] the agreed-upon course of the litigation, and reward[s] the

indolent and the cavalier.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610. The Court finds no reason to set aside the

important principles underpinning Rule 16 and permit Plaintiff’s proposed amendment at this late

date. Forstmann, 114 F.R.D. at 85; Financial Holding Corp., 127 F.R.D. at 166; see also Riofrio

Anda v. Ralston Purina Co., 959 F.2d 1149, 1155 (1st Cir. 1992) (permitting amendment under

Rule 15(a) in violation of district court scheduling order “would have nullified the purpose of

Rule 16(b)(1)”).

Furthermore, even if Plaintiff could demonstrate diligence and good cause under Rule 16,

he nonetheless cannot overcome Rule 15’s hurdles. While Rule 15 is more lenient, a court may 

decline to grant leave to amend “if there is strong evidence of ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 

motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] 

futility of amendment, etc.’” Sonoma County Ass’n of Retired Employees v. Sonoma County, 708 

F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 US 178, 182 (1962)). While 

prejudice to the opposing party “carries the greatest weight[,] ... a strong showing of any of the 

Case 1:23-cv-00054-HBK Document 108 Filed 12/03/24 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

remaining Foman factors” can justify the denial of leave to amend. Eminence Cap., LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). As noted, discovery is closed,

Plaintiff has already been deposed concerning the claims in his TAC, and adding a new defendnat

and new claims would require reopening discovery. Here, Defendants undeniably would be

prejudiced at this late stage of the proceedings. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. No. 92) is DENIED with prejudice.

Dated: December 3, 2024 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:23-cv-00054-HBK Document 108 Filed 12/03/24 Page 6 of 6