Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02178/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02178-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOREN MORGAN,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTHONY KANE, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-2178 MHP (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

Loren Morgan filed this pro se action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has moved to dismiss the action as time-barred. Morgan has

opposed the motion. The court finds that the petition was not timely filed and therefore will 

grant the motion and dismiss the action.

BACKGROUND

Morgan states in his amended petition that he was convicted on a plea agreement in

the San Diego County Superior Court of aiding and abetting second degree murder. He

states that the offer of a plea agreement “was accepted by the Petitioner because he was told

he would be out in Ten (10) years, leaving Petitioner to believe he was serving a total of a 15

year term.” Amended Petition, p. 2, n.1. In this habeas action, Morgan challenges the

execution of his sentence rather than his conviction. Specifically, he alleges that the 2005

denial of parole by the Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”) violated his plea agreement.

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DISCUSSION

Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences

must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became

final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an

impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if

such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The one-year limitations period will be tolled for the "time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The limitations period also

can be equitably tolled upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances beyond a petitioner's

control which prevented him from timely filing the petition. See Calderon v. United States

District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (equitable tolling will not be

available in most cases because extensions of time should only be granted if extraordinary

circumstances beyond prisoner's control make it impossible for him to file petition on time),

cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061, 1099 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v.

United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 526

U.S. 1060 (1999).

A habeas petition by a state prisoner challenging a decision of an administrative body,

such as the BPH, is covered by the statute and the limitations period starts to run from “the

date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); Shelby v.

Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077,

1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Here, the factual predicate or basis of Morgan’s claim that his plea agreement was

breached was known to him no later than 1994. He was sentenced in 1984 and claims that he

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accepted the plea agreement because he was told that he would “be out in Ten (10) years.” 

Amended Petition, p. 2, n.1. If the promise was made and became part of the agreement as

Morgan asserts, it would have been breached in 1994, when the tenth year ended and he

remained in prison. Further, if there was any doubt in Morgan’s mind that prison officials

were not living up to his parole expectations, it was removed when he was denied parole

each time he went for parole after 1994, including at his 2002 hearing. (The 2005 denial by

the BPH was the sixth denial of parole and the fifth denial of parole occurred in 2002,

according to Morgan. Amended Petition, p. 2.) Morgan’s claim accrued in October 1994

and he did not file his federal habeas petition until twelve years later, clearly after the

expiration of the one-year limitations period. Even if the claim did not accrue until parole

was denied, that occurred five times before the 2005 hearing, including in 2002. He could

not revive the time-barred claim by asserting that the agreement – which by his account was

irrevocably breached in 1994 – was breached again in 2005, no more than one can revive a

time-barred claim on a contract by alleging a new breach years after the contract was

irrevocably breached.

Morgan’s state habeas petitions were not filed within the one-year limitations period

and therefore did not toll the limitations period regarding the breach of plea agreement claim. 

He also has shown no basis for equitable tolling of the limitations period. This action was

filed after the one-year limitations period expired and is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

CONCLUSION 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition is GRANTED. (Docket # 7.) The

petition is dismissed because it was not filed by the deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The

clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 16, 2007 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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