Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-04589/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-04589-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE DANIEL CASTILLO-ANTONIO,

Plaintiff,

v.

GUADALUPE ANTONIO BUENO,

Defendant.

Case No.18-cv-04589-JSC 

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

Re: Dkt. No. 46

Plaintiff Jose Daniel Castillo-Antonio (“Plaintiff”), a physically disabled person, and 

Defendant Guadalupe Antonio Bueno (“Defendant Bueno”), the owner and operator of Tacos 

Sinaloa, reached a settlement agreement after Plaintiff sued Defendant for multiple Americans 

with Disabilities Act violations, claiming that Bueno’s business was inaccessible to Plaintiff and 

others. (Dkt. No. 43.)1, 2 Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees. (Dkt. 

No. 46). After careful consideration of the parties’ briefing, and having had the benefit of oral 

argument on August 29, 2019, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees

because the total hours sought are not reasonable.

BACKGROUND

I. Complaint Allegations & Procedural History

On July 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Guadalupe Antonio Bueno, Anh Chan, 

Don Chan, Judy Chan, Richard Chan, and Golden Valley & Associates, Inc. (Dkt. No. 1.) The 

complaint alleged that Tacos Sinaloa, a taco truck in Oakland, California, was subject to the 

“‘readily achievable’ barrier removal requirements of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities 

 

1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.

2 Plaintiff and Defendant Bueno have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 3, 19.) The claims against the other defendants were severed 

into a separate case. (Dkt. No. 25.) 

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Act of 1990.” (Id. at ¶ 1.) The complaint also alleged several other related state code violations, 

including violations of the California Civil Code and the California Health and Safety Code. 

Plaintiff, who requires use of a wheelchair, alleged barriers such as improper parking spaces, 

inaccessible routes from parking space to entry of the food service area, too high of a service 

counter, steep ramps, and too small of a bathroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 4–5.) These barriers interfered with 

Plaintiff’s access to the facilities at Tacos Sinaloa, depriving him of full and equal enjoyment of 

the services, facilities and privileges, and causing him embarrassment and humiliation. (Id. at ¶ 

5.) Defendants were parties that Plaintiff believed owned, operated, possessed, built, and kept 

Tacos Sinaloa. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff sought injunctive relief, damages, and litigation expenses. 

(Id. at Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1–8.) 

The Clerk of Court entered default as to Golden Valley & Associates, Inc., Don Chan, 

Judy Chan, Richard Chan, and Anh Chan on September 18, 2018 for failing to appear after 

service. (Dkt. No. 12.) The entry of default as to Golden Valley & Associates, Inc. was 

subsequently vacated following the parties’ stipulation, (see Dkt. No. 26), and the Court granted

the parties’ stipulated dismissal with prejudice as to Golden Valley & Associates, Inc. on July 29, 

2019, (see Dkt. No. 49).

As relevant to the instant motion, on September 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike 

Bueno’s answer and affirmative defenses. (See Dkt. No. 13.) The Court issued an Order 

addressing that motion on November 26, 2018, directing the parties to comply with General Order 

56 and ordering Bueno to file an amended answer. (Dkt. No. 32.) Bueno did so on December 11, 

2018. (Dkt. No. 35.) On June 4, 2019, the parties attended an ADR session where they partially 

settled the case and agreed that attorney’s fees would be decided by a separate motion. (Dkt. No. 

43.) Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorney’s fees on July 15, 2019. (Dkt. No. 46.) The 

motion is fully briefed, (Dkt. Nos. 50, 51, 54),3and the Court heard oral argument on August 29, 

2019. (Dkt. No. 55.) 

 

3 On August 9, 2019, Defendant filed a sur-reply, (Dkt. No. 54), to address Plaintiff’s allegations 

(see Docket No. 51 at ¶ 5) that Defendant had not removed two barriers named in a prior suit. 

According to Defendant, he was not aware of other barriers at the property as Defendant was not a 

party to the 2014 suit and Defendant completed all repairs requested by his landlord in 2016. 

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DISCUSSION

I. Attorney’s Fees Under the ADA

Plaintiff’s claim arose under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and 

related state laws. The ADA permits the “prevailing party” to seek attorneys’ fees and costs. 42 

U.S.C. § 12205. A plaintiff “prevails” when he or she enters into a legally enforceable settlement 

agreement against the defendant. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th 

Cir. 2002). 

To calculate an award of attorneys’ fees, district courts apply “the lodestar method, 

multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.” Ryan v. 

Editions Ltd. W., Inc., 786 F.3d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 

424, 433 (1983)). “A reasonable hourly rate is ordinarily the prevailing market rate in the relevant 

community.” Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in 

addition to the attorneys’ own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing 

in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and 

reputation.” Camancho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The party requesting fees also bears “the burden of submitting billing records to establish 

that the number of hours” requested are reasonable. Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 

1202 (9th Cir. 2013). The number of hours should not exceed the number of hours reasonably

competent counsel would bill for similar services. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Courts may reduce 

the hours expended “where documentation of the hours is inadequate; if the case was overstaffed 

and hours are duplicated; if the hours expended are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” 

Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 

433-34). 

 

(Dkt. No. 54 at ¶ 2.) Defendant’s sur-reply also clarifies that Defendant had not been sued by 

Plaintiff at this location before, but rather at a different property in 2016. (See id. at ¶ 5.) The 

issue is irrelevant to the Court’s determination of the instant motion. 

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The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors courts should consider in determining the 

reasonableness of the number of hours expended and the hourly rate charged, including: (1) the 

“experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney”; (2) “the outcome of the results of the 

proceedings”; (3) “the customary fees”; and (4) “the novelty or the difficulty of the question 

presented.” Id. (citing Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), 

abrogated on other grounds by City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992)). 

II. Amount Requested

Plaintiff requests $21,700.00 in attorney’s fees. (Dkt. No. 46 at ¶ 1.) In support of the 

requested amount, Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Mac Bride, submits a declaration with exhibits, 

including an itemized list of counsel’s activities and the corresponding hours for his work in this 

case. (Dkt. No. 46-2, Ex. 1.) The total amount requested constitutes 62 hours at $350 per hour; 

that total includes the time spent on the instant motion. (Id. at 3.) Defendant opposes the amount 

requested and asks the Court to reduce the requested fees to a “reasonable, noninflated amount.” 

(Dkt. No. 50 at 19). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is due a fee award. Accordingly, the 

Court addresses the reasonableness of the hours expended and the requested rate in turn, below, 

and concludes that a reduction in the hours expended is warranted.

a. Reasonableness of Hours Expended

Defendant challenges the hours expended as “inflated” and/or unreasonable based on the 

time spent on the following tasks: (1) drafting the complaint; (2) litigating with dismissed 

defendant Golden Valley; (3) researching and drafting the September 2018 motion to strike

affirmative defenses; (4) communicating with Plaintiff; (5) reviewing the site inspection reports; 

(6) reading emails; (7) reviewing Defendant’s amended answer; and (8) drafting the instant 

motion. (See Dkt. No. 50 at 12-18.) The Court address each item in turn. 

1. The Complaint

Mr. Mac Bride asserts that he spent 4.7 hours drafting the complaint. (See Dkt. No. 46-2, 

Ex. 1 at 1.) Defendant argues that it could not have taken Plaintiff 4.7 hours to draft because it is 

“basically a simple ‘cut and paste’ document” similar to “the 200 complaints that Plaintiff has 

filed in this court.” (Id. at 12.) Defendant includes as exhibits to its opposition the complaints in 

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four recent cases in this District involving Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel. (See Dkt. Nos. 50-1 –

50-4, Exs. 1-4.) Defendant also cites other district court cases in the Ninth Circuit where the court 

reduced the amount of time “frequent litigants” spent drafting “boilerplate complaint[s]” or 

“routine and duplicative work” and asks the Court to reduce the hours expended here, accordingly. 

(Id. at 12-13.)

A review of the complaint in this case in comparison to the those submitted by Defendant 

where Plaintiff was also a party and represented by Mr. Mac Bride shows that the complaints are 

similar and contain nearly-verbatim language in many respects, including in the discussion of 

barriers experienced at the subject properties. (Compare Dkt. No. 1 with Dkt. Nos. 50-1 – 50-4, 

Exs. 1-4.) Plaintiff’s reply “concede[s]” that Mr. Mac Bride does not “draft each new complaint 

from scratch” because “to do so would be duplicative.” (Dkt. No. 51 at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff asserts, 

however, that “counsel does dedicate significant time to investigating the barriers and to tailoring 

each complaint to those barriers.” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff argues that his “complaints are not just a 

mindless ‘cut and paste’ operation that merely changes the names.” (Id.) 

That may be true; however, 4.7 hours is excessive given that the complaints are not 

materially different except for the parties, addresses of the subject properties, and other minor 

differences. See Doran v. Corte Madera Inn Best W., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 

2005) (reducing hours from 4.3 to 0.5 for drafting of “form pleading that is identical in all 

substantive respects to complaints in other ADA lawsuits, including most of the 73 or so other 

ADA cases [the plaintiff’s counsel] has brought with [the plaintiff]”). Further, Plaintiff and Mr. 

Mac Bride are an experienced team that works together on ADA cases and drafting a complaint 

that is similar in most material respects to their complaints in other cases would not take nearly 5 

hours to complete. Finally, the billing records include separate time for evaluating the barriers, 

meeting with the client, and researching ownership. (Dkt. No. 46-2 at 1.) Thus, the Court reduces

the hours expended and awards 1.0 hour for drafting the complaint and summons. 

2. The Motion to Strike

Mr. Mac Bride’s billing summary lists 18.2 hours expended (totaling $6,370 in fees) 

related to the motion to strike—6 hours to draft the motion and the remaining time spent 

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researching, reviewing Defendant’s answer and proposed amendments, and corresponding with 

opposing counsel regarding the motion. (See Dkt. No. 46-2, Ex. 1.) Defendant challenges the 

hours expended because the motion was “completely useless and unnecessary” given the Court’s 

November 2018 Order that disposed of the motion, ordered Defendant to file an amended answer 

within 14 days, and stated, in pertinent part:

The parties should thereafter follow the procedures set forth in 

General Order 56. If at some point Plaintiff believes he needs a ruling 

on a motion to strike affirmative defenses in order to move the case 

forward, he shall file a written request with the Court that explains 

why a ruling is needed, that is, how it will move the case forward 

given its current posture. Unless and until the Court rules that such a 

motion may be filed, Plaintiffs shall not file a motion to strike any 

affirmative defenses.

(Dkt. No. 32.) In response to the Court’s Order, Defendant filed an amended answer on December 

11, 2018. (Dkt. No. 35.) 

As to fees related to Plaintiff’s motion to strike, Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant’s 

“eagerness” to amend its answer in response to that motion but rather argues that Plaintiff’s 

proffered amended answer “violated the basic pleading rules, and [P]laintiff” alerted Defendant to 

those defects “in detailed letters.” (Dkt. No. 51 at ¶ 12.) Further, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s 

amended answer filed in response to the Court’s November 2018 Order still included noncompliant defenses that Plaintiff previously sought to strike. (Id.) 

Plaintiff is correct that the amended answer contains some of the same affirmative defenses 

Defendant previously proffered to Plaintiff in its proposed amended answer. (Compare Dkt. No. 

16-1 at 68-84 with Dkt. No. 35 at 11-18.) However, the total amount of time on the motion to 

strike is excessive. Defendant proposed deleting 15 of the 34 affirmative defenses in her original 

answer while meeting and conferring with Plaintiff regarding the motion to strike, (see Dkt. Nos. 

16 at 3-4, 10 & 16-1 at ¶¶ 3-6), but Plaintiff refused Defendant’s proposed amendments and 

moved to strike all 34 defenses, (see Dkt. No. 13; see also Dkt. No. 16-1 at ¶ 7). Plaintiff spent 

time drafting a motion to strike all affirmative defenses when Defendant had already agreed to 

remove 44% of the challenged defenses. 

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It is reasonable to reduce the hours expended on the motion by an equal percentage. Thus, 

the Court reduces the hours expended by 8 hours, awarding a total of 10.2 hours for work related 

to the motion to strike. 

3. Tasks Related to Golden Valley

Defendant challenges the 6.1 hours Plaintiff spent litigating with Defendant Golden 

Valley. (Dkt. No. 50 at 15.) Defendant contends that Golden Valley’s “presence in the litigation 

was pointless” because Golden Valley merely “remodeled a food truck for Defendant Bueno,” and 

the truck “was not listed in either Plaintiff’s or Defendant’s inspection report as being noncompl[iant].” (Id.) Defendant asserts that Golden Valley should never have been named or 

should have been dismissed once Plaintiff received the inspection report. (Id.) Plaintiff’s reply 

counters that Plaintiff did have a “colorable claim” against Golden Valley because “[t]here are 

legal theories under which the seller of a taco truck,” such as Golden Valley, “can be liable in an 

ADA case.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff and Golden Valley entered into a settlement agreement and 

stipulated to dismissal of all claims with prejudice as to Golden Valley. (See Dkt. No. 48.) 

Regardless, any fees related to prosecuting Plaintiff’s action against Golden Valley should 

not be a cost borne by Bueno. Where multiple defendants are present in litigation, courts will 

either divide fees equally among principal defendants, apportion fees by degree of culpability, or 

apportion fees by relative time spent litigating against each defendant. Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. 

Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 956-57 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865, 871 (2d

Cir.1982); Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 657 F.2d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981); 

Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Engineering, 605 F.2d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 1979).

Here, apportionment by time spent litigating against each defendant is appropriate. In 

Cataphora Inc. v. Parker, 848 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2012), for example, the court 

reduced the plaintiff’s claimed hours for time spent on work associated with a different defendant. 

Similarly, in Cook Productions, LLC v. Szerlip, the court opined that “[i]t would be inequitable for 

Defendant Szerlip to bear the litigation fees expended by Plaintiff directed toward the other 

defendants.” 2017 WL 4883220, at *6 (D. Haw. Oct. 30, 2017) (emphasis added).

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Thus, the Court denies Plaintiff compensation for the 6.1 hours spent litigating with 

Golden Valley. For the same reason, the Court finds Bueno not responsible for the time Plaintiff 

spent drafting the motion for entry of default of property owners, and, accordingly, also denies the 

0.5 hours expended on this task. (Dkt. No. 46-2 Ex. 1 at 1.)

4. Communications with Plaintiff

The billing summary indicates that Mr. Mac Bride met initially with Plaintiff for less than 

two hours to discuss the case and “[e]valuate barriers as described by him and nature of probable 

claims.”4 Defendant argues that the amount of time “Plaintiff and Mr. Mac Bride spent in 

communication was unreasonable” because “Plaintiff has been represented in over one hundred 

cases by Mr. Mac Bride” and the “allegations in the complaint are the same allegations alleged in 

every other case Plaintiff has filed.” (Dkt. No. 50 at 17.) Defendant zeroes in on the initial 

meeting, arguing that Mr. Mac Bride and Plaintiff “spent almost two hours discussing barriers that 

were not present.” (Id.)

The billing entry in question is less than two hours and includes tasks unrelated to Mr. Mac 

Bride’s communications with Plaintiff, including research and travel to the subject property.5 

Although Plaintiff and Mr. Mac Bride are familiar with each other and experienced in ADA 

litigation, considerably less than two hours to discuss an entirely new case is not unreasonable or 

excessive. Thus, the Court does not reduce the hours expended for this task.

5. Conducting Site Inspection and Reviewing Site Inspection Reports

Defendant challenges the 5.5 hours Mr. Mac Bride expended in “conduct[ing] the site 

inspection, review[ing] the report and issu[ing] the letter” to defense counsel regarding the 

inspection report. (Dkt. No. 50 at 17.) Defendant argues that the time is “over inflated” and 

alleges that “a portion of this task could have been assigned to a legal assistant.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s 

reply asserts that a lawyer was required to complete the site inspection, not a legal assistant, and 

 

4 The entry of 1.9 hours in the billing summary is block-billed and includes other tasks; 

specifically, researching ownership and deed history and driving to the property “to verify prima 

facie case.” (Dkt. No. 46-2, Ex. 1 at 1.) 

5 A subsequent entry states includes “travel time of 30 minutes each way” for “[r]e-inspection of 

the subject business.” (Dkt. No. 46-2, Ex. 1 at 3.) 

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that the report and letter required a “lawyer’s analysis” that a legal assistant could not provide. 

(Dkt. No. 51 at ¶ 16.) 

Given the interrelationship of the tasks, two of which required substantive legal analysis, 

the Court finds the tasks not overstaffed. Thus, 5.5 hours is reasonable for all the tasks Mr. Mac 

Bride completed regarding the site inspection and the Court does not reduce the hours expended 

for these tasks.

6. Drafting the Rule 26 Disclosures

The billing summary indicates that Mr. Mac Bride spent 0.9 hours drafting the Rule 26 

disclosures in this case. (See Dkt. No. 46-2, Ex. 1 at 2.) Defendant argues that such time is 

unreasonable because “the[ ] disclosures consisted of one page and are likely the exact disclosures 

furnished in all 200 of Plaintiff’s ADA cases.” (Dkt. No. 50 at 17.) However, the Court is unable 

to determine whether the hours expended on this basis are unreasonable without having the 

disclosures before it. Thus, the Court does not reduce the hours expended on this task.

7. Reading Emails

Defendant further takes “issue with the fact that it takes Mr. Mac Bride around fifteen 

minutes to read every simple email communication[ ].” (Dkt. No. 50 at 18.) Defendant does not 

specify a billing entry he takes issue with, and it is not apparent from the face of the billing 

summary that the “email” entries are unreasonable. The Court does not reduce the hours expended 

on this basis. 

8. Reviewing Defendant’s Amended Answer 

The billing summary includes an entry of one hour on December 11, 2018 for reviewing 

Defendant’s amended answer. (See Dkt. No. 46-2, Ex. 1 at 3.) Defendant challenges that hour, 

arguing that the “first amended answer . . . was the same answer already submitted to [Mr. Mac 

Bride] on October 1, 2018, when [Defendant sought] stipulation to file it. (Dkt. No. 50 at 18.) 

Plaintiff counters that Defendant “exchanged several proposed amended answers, each one 

different, and each one in violation of the pleading standards.” (Dkt. No. 51 at ¶ 17.) Thus, 

Plaintiff asserts that it was reasonable for Mr. Mac Bride “to review the answer carefully to 

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ascertain what affirmative defenses were being pled, and whether they really constituted defenses 

under the law.” (Id.) 

A review of Defendant’s amended answer filed in December 2018, (see Dkt. No. 35), and 

the first and second proposed amended answers submitted in conjunction with Defendant’s 

opposition to Plaintiff’s September 2018 motion to strike, (see Dkt. No. 16-1 at 22-40, 58-85), 

shows that the amended answers are not identical although they do contain some overlapping 

affirmative defenses. Given that Plaintiff had previously rejected Defendant’s proposed amended 

answers as insufficiently pled, and because those answers were different in material respects, the 

Court does not find it unreasonable that Plaintiff would closely scrutinize the December 2018 

amended answer. Thus, the Court does not reduce the requested hours on this basis. 

9. The Instant Motion

Defendant also challenges the 8 hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent on the instant motion, 

saying that it would not have been necessary if Plaintiff’s hours were not already inflated. 

Defendant further asserts that the instant fee motion was “yet another cut and paste task.” (Id. at 

18.) While fees can be awarded for time spent on a fee motion, the time expended must be 

reasonable. As discussed above, some of Plaintiff’s time is inflated and unreasonable, which

forced Bueno into defending against the instant motion. Accordingly, the Court reduces the time 

spent on the fee motion by the same percentage of all unreasonably expended hours in relation to 

the total hours requested (29.5%) and awards 5.64 hours for the instant motion. 

***

In sum, the Court reduces the hours expended by 20.66 for a total of 41.34 hours. This 

total is reasonable given the complexity of the case, legal work completed, and Mr. Mac Bride’s 

experience with ADA litigation. 

b. Reasonableness of Rates

Plaintiff requests $350 per hour, citing Mr. Mac Bride’s experience, cases where attorneys 

have been awarded similar hourly rates in the district, and other ADA cases in this district where 

Mr. Mac Bride’s $350 rate was approved. (Dkt. No. 46 at ¶¶ 12–15.) The parties do not disagree 

over Mr. Mac Bride’s requested rate. Rather, Defendant argues that the case was overstaffed, as 

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Plaintiff’s counsel completed tasks at a high billing rate that could have been done by a legal 

assistant. (Dkt. No. 50 at 18-19.) Defendant asserts that “many of Mr. Mac Bride’s hours” could 

have been delegated to support staff. (Id. at 19.) However, Defendant does not specify which 

tasks were “secretarial in nature and should be billed as overhead.” (See id.) Defendant asks the 

Court to reduce the billing rates to a reasonable amount. (Id.) Plaintiff’s reply correctly observes 

that Defendant provides no specific examples of tasks that could have been delegated. (Dkt. No. 

51 at ¶ 21.) 

The parties do not dispute Mr. Mac Bride’s requested hourly rate of $350, and the Court 

finds the rate reasonable based on Mr. Mac Bride’s experience litigating “over one hundred ADA 

cases in the Northern District since 2012.” (See Dkt. No. 46 at ¶ 12.) A rate of $350 is in line 

with prevailing rates in the Bay Area for attorney services. See Superior Consulting Servs., Inc. v. 

Steeves-Kiss, No. 17-cv-06059-EMC, 2018 WL 2183295, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2018) 

(“[D]istrict courts in Northern California have found that rates of $475-$975 per hour for partners 

and $300-$490 per hour for associates are reasonable.”). Indeed, Mr. Mac Bride has been 

awarded that rate in previous ADA cases in this district. (See Dkt. No. 46 at ¶ 13 (citing several 

Northern District cases).) The issue is whether some of Mr. Mac Bride’s itemized tasks, (see Dkt. 

No. 46-2, Ex. 1), indicate “overstaffing” as argued by Defendant, that should have been “delegated 

to colleagues with appropriate levels of experience,” (see Dkt. No. 50 at 18). The Court does not 

find that a reduction in rate is warranted for several reasons. 

First, none of the tasks listed on Mr. Mac Bride’s billing summary appear “secretarial” in 

nature such that they would not require the attention of an attorney. (See generally Dkt. No. 46-2, 

Ex. 1.) The tasks are similar to those Mr. Mac Bride submitted in a previous ADA case, (see Dkt. 

No. 46-5, Ex. 4), for which Mr. Mac Bride was awarded his requested fees, see Castillo-Antonio v. 

Alvarez, No. 16-CV-00352-LHK, 2016 WL 4242241 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2016) (order adopting 

report and recommendation). Second, the Court cannot determine, on the briefing alone, that Mr. 

Mac Bride could have delegated the task to a junior attorney because it is unknown whether Mr. 

Mac Bride is a solo practitioner. Regardless, the Court does not find that this matters; the 

requested rate is on the lower end of rates found reasonable for even junior associates in the Bay 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Area. See Steeves-Kiss, 2018 WL 2183295, at *5 (“[D]istrict courts in Northern California have 

found that rates of $475-$975 per hour for partners and $300-$490 per hour for associates are 

reasonable.”) Given that all the itemized tasks require the attention of an attorney, the Court does 

not find the case overstaffed and does not find the requested rate unreasonable. 

In sum, the Court finds the requested rate of $350 per hour is reasonable for the itemized 

tasks and a reduction on that score is not warranted. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s 

fees, and orders Defendant to pay Plaintiff’s fees and costs in the total amount of $14,469.00,

reflecting 41.34 hours expended at $350 per hour. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

September 13, 2019

Case 3:18-cv-04589-JSC Document 56 Filed 09/13/19 Page 12 of 12