Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00285/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00285-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KARLIS RUBEN AUGUSTUS 

HOWARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

AYLANA OLIVIA PARKS, et al.,

 Defendants.

No. 1:24-cv-00285-SAB (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 

TO THIS ACTION

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF 

CERTAIN CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS

(ECF No. 12)

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. 

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, filed June 20, 2024. 

(ECF No. 12.) 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 

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“seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 

facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d 

at 969. 

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint as true only for the purpose of 

the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

The incidents at issue in the third amended complaint took place at Wasco State Prison. 

Plaintiff names inmate Scott Stansell, City of Wasco, officer Rodriguez, officer J. Fernandez, 

officer C. Retamoza, sergeant B. Maddix, lieutenant R. Singleton, supervisor R. Nickell, 

lieutenant S. Sanchez, officer K. Carpenter, warden H. Shirley, the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, County of Kern, and Wasco State Prison, as Defendants. 

 Plaintiff’s third amended complaint is a verbatim copy of the second amended complaint, 

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with the addition of state law allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and 

battery, and Bane Act violation with respect to Defendant inmate Scott Stansell. 

Plaintiff arrived at Wasco State Prison on March 2, 2023, and placed in C-3 A-side on or 

about March 16, 2023. From March 16, to May 16, 2023, Plaintiff witnessed over 20 instances of 

violence in Dorm C-3, where no action was taken by staff, including all the named Defendants. 

On April 7, 2023, at approximately 6:30 a.m., Plaintiff was standing by his rack waiting 

for C-yard to open when he was threatened by inmate Scott Stansell. Scott Stansell threatened 

Plaintiff stating, “I’m going to beat your mother fucking ass” and “go get into the shower mother 

fucker” and “lets go fight...right now motherfucker, I’m going to kick your ass, I’m going to 

punch and kick your ass.” Inmate Stansell then proceeded to act on his threat by assaulting and 

battering Plaintiff resulting in physical injuries. Stansell continued to attack Plaintiff with no 

action taken by officer Rodriguez as a result of lack of training and supervision. 

Plaintiff was able to push inmate Stansell off him and then gestured to officer Rodriguez 

who took no action to prevent the attack. Plaintiff contends Rodriguez failed to use reasonable 

force to stop inmate Stansell from assaulting Plaintiff. Rodriguez failed to give any verbal orders, 

failed to use restraints on Stansell, failed to act to stop the fight, and failed to control and report 

the fight.

At approximately 6:45 a.m., Plaintiff saw Stansell approach him stating, I’m going to beat 

your ass on the yard home boy. Don’t get hit with the gun on the yard homie. We are going to 

fight to the death on the yard and I can’t wait to get my revenge on you motherfucker. Don’t 

even think about filing a 602 for this incident. My gang, the Fresnecks, are at every prisoner, if 

you file a 602 we will find you and beat your ass.” 

At approximately 7:15 a.m., C-3 yard opened and Plaintiff’s exited his cell. At 

approximately 7:25 a.m., Rodriguez allowed inmate Stansell out on the C-yard to assault Plaintiff. 

At approximately 7:42 a.m., Plaintiff was walking to the track on C-yard when he noticed inmate 

Stansell. At that point, Stansell yelled out “motherfucker” and took several steps toward Plaintiff 

then assaulted and battered him by punching him in the head, neck, torse, and chest. Rodriguez 

by allowing inmate Stansell out on the C-yard thereby condoned, authorized, created, and allowed 

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Stansell to assault Plaintiff causing injury. At approximately 7:45 a.m., officers Fernandez, 

Retamoza and Hasha gave orders to get down on the yard. Officers Retamoza and Hasha 

assaulted Plaintiff by lifting their block guns as if to shoot Plaintiff if he failed to comply. Inmate 

Stansell then proceeded to strike Plaintiff on the right side of his face knocking Plaintiff 

completely to the ground. Officers Retamoza and Hasha then falsely arrested, imprisoned, and 

assaulted Plaintiff by physically grabbing and placing him in handcuffs while pulling him to his 

feet. At approximately 7:45 a.m., Plaintiff and Stansell were escorted off the yard and placed in 

bird cages.

On or about April 12, 2023, Plaintiff was provided a copy of a Rules Violation Report for 

the incident and charged with fighting. 

Upon learning, hearing, and witnessing the attack by inmate Stansell on April 7, 2023, 

Rodriguez could and should have taken some action to stop the attack, but he took no action 

whatsoever from the time of the first assault to the end of the second assault. 

Plaintiff contends supervisors Shirley, Carpenter, Sanchez, and Maddux, failed to train 

and supervise officer Rodriguez. From March 2 to May 16, 2023, Dorm C-3 A-side at Wasco 

State Prison was a place where violent and terror reigned. 

Inmate Scott Stansell attacked, assaulted, battered, and threatened Plaintiff causing 

physical, mental, emotional and psychological injuries. On or about April 7, 2023, inmate 

Stansell assaulted and battered Plaintiff resulting in physical injuries. Stansell criminally 

threatened Plaintiff numerous times stating, “I’m going to beat your mother fucking ass!” 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 and Color of State Law

Section 1983 allows a private citizen to sue for the deprivation of a right secured by 

federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 916 (2017). “To 

establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the 

Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a 

person acting under color of state law.” Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 

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1149 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003)); Soo Park v. 

Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 2017). “The ‘under color of law’ requirement under § 

1983 is the same as the Fourteenth Amendment’s ‘state action’ requirement.” Chudacoff, 649 

F.3d at 1149 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982)).

Courts have consistently rejected attempts by prisoner plaintiffs to sue fellow inmates 

under § 1983. See, e.g., Jackson v. Foster, 372 F. App’x 770, 771 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that 

“the district court properly dismissed Jackson's excessive force claim because [fellow] inmate ... 

did not act under color of state law under any formulation of the governmental actor tests”); see 

also Gettimier v. Burse, 2015 WL 75224, at *5 n.3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 6, 2015) (“The fact that a 

fellow inmate is not a ‘state actor’ for purposes of § 1983 litigation is so fundamental as to not 

require citation.”); Rigano v. Cty. of Sullivan, 486 F. Supp. 2d 244, 256 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“It 

is well-established that a § 1983 claim is only cognizable against a state actor and not a fellow 

inmate.”); cf. Williams v. Calidonna, 2007 WL 432773, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2007) 

(dismissing § 1983 action against inmates despite allegation they were working as state 

informants). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot succeed in stating a section 1983 claim against fellow 

inmate Steven Stansell in this case as inmates are not state actors.

B. CDCR and Wasco State Prison as Defendants

CDCR and Wasco State Prison protected under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The 

Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits suits against a state and its 

agencies and departments for legal or equitable relief. See Federal Maritime Commission v. South 

Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002). “The Eleventh Amendment’s 

jurisdictional bar covers suits naming state agencies and departments as defendants and applies 

whether the relief sought is legal or equitable in nature.” Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. 

Co-op., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). 

Congress may validly abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity by statute, but the Supreme 

Court has repeatedly emphasized that “§ 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh 

Amendment immunity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n.17 (1985); accord Quern v. 

Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979); see also Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th 

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Cir. 1999). In the context of prisoner lawsuits specifically, the Ninth Circuit has expressly and 

repeatedly held that CDCR and prisons within CDCR are immune from suit under the Eleventh 

Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The 

district court correctly held that the California Department of Corrections and the California 

Board of Prison Terms were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Holley v. Cal. Dept. 

of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010). Because claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

CDCR and Wasco State Prison are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, they are not proper 

Defendants in this action.

C. Failure to Protect

Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners from 

violence at the hands of other prisoners because being violently assaulted in prison is simply not 

part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. Farmer, 511 U.S. 

at 833-34; Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2009); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 

1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). However, prison officials are liable under the Eighth Amendment 

only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious 

harm to an inmate; and it is well settled that deliberate indifference occurs when an official acted 

or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

834, 841; Clem, 566 F.3d at 1181; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040. Mere negligent failure to protect an 

inmate from harm is not actionable under § 1983. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (explaining “deliberate 

indifference entails something more than mere negligence”).

In this case, the alleged deprivation -- being subjected to physical assault – is no doubt 

sufficiently serious. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a 

cognizable failure to protect claim against Defendant Rodriguez only. 

D. Monell Liability

As local government units, the County of Kern and City of Wasco are proper defendants 

in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 

658, 691 (1978); Hammond v. County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1988). However, 

local government units may be held liable under section 1983 only where the plaintiff alleges 

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facts showing a constitutional deprivation was caused by a policy statement, ordinance, 

regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the local government unit or by the 

local government's final decision maker. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board of the County 

Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402-04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th 

Cir. 1995). In other words, a Monell claim exists only where the alleged constitutional 

deprivation was inflicted in “execution of a government’s policy or custom.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 

694. Here, the complaint contains no such allegations against the County of Kern and City of 

Wasco. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim against either local government unit. See

Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Iqbal’s pleading 

standards to Monell claims).

E. Supervisory Liability

A supervisory official is liable under section 1983 if (1) the official is personally involved 

in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a “sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 

1242–43 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). “The 

requisite causal connection can be established ... by setting in motion a series of acts by others or 

by knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or 

reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr, 652 

F.3d at 1207–08 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, a 

supervisor may “be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the 

training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional 

deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” 

Keates, 883 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208).

“Conclusory allegations that various prison officials knew or should have known about 

constitutional violations occurring against plaintiff simply because of their general supervisory 

role are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Sullivan v. Biter, No. 15-cv-00243, 

2017 WL 1540256, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 

U.S. 658, 691 (1978) and Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207). In other words, to state a claim against any 

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individual defendant based on supervisory liability, Plaintiff “must allege facts showing that the 

individual defendant participated in or directed the alleged violation, or knew of the violation and 

failed to act to prevent it.” Richard v. Holtrop, No. 15-cv-5632, 2016 WL 11520620, at *5 (C.D. 

Cal. May 12, 2016) (emphasis in original) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th 

Cir. 1998)) (“A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual 

was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”).

Plaintiff contends that because of all the instances of violence at Wasco State Prison C-3 

there is no way that supervisors Shirley, Carpenter, Sanchez, Maddux could not have known 

Rodriguez was violating the constitutional rights of inmates, such as Plaintiff. These supervisors 

took no action to remedy the cause of the violation. Plaintiff has failed to allege facts 

demonstrating that the supervisor Defendants were either personally involved in or causally 

connected to the constitutional deprivations that Plaintiff alleged to have experienced. Simply 

stating that supervisors could or should have known is insufficient to establish liability under 

section 1983. See, e.g., Krainskin v. Nev. Ex rel. Bd. Of Regents of Nev. Sys. Of Higher Educ., 

616 F.3d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissing complaint because plaintiff “merely alleged in a 

conclusory fashion that the officers ‘knew or should have known’ ” of the violation); Buckley v. 

Cty. of San Mateo, 2017 WL 3394747, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2017) (“Supervisor defendants 

are entitled to qualified immunity where the allegations against them are simply ‘bald’ or 

‘conclusory’ because such allegations do not ‘plausibly’ establish the supervisors’ personal 

involvement in their subordinates’ constitutional wrong.” (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-84)); 

Sullivan v. Biter, 2017 WL 1540256, at *1 (“Conclusory allegations that various prison officials 

knew or should have known about constitutional violations occurring against plaintiff simply 

because of their general supervisory role are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against any of the supervisor 

Defendants. 

F. Failure to Train

As to the allegation that supervisory Defendants failed to properly train Defendant 

Rodriguez, municipal liability arising from an alleged failure to train prison staff requires 

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allegations “that ‘the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so 

likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can 

reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.’ ” Rodriguez v. City of Los 

Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 2018), quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 

(1989). Individual liability based on a failure to train requires factual allegations of the 

individual’s participation in the alleged constitutional violation. “[A] plaintiff must plead that 

each Government official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated 

the constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77 (rejecting argument that “a supervisor’s mere 

knowledge of his subordinate’s [unconstitutional actions] amounts to the supervisor’s violating 

the Constitution.”) “A supervisory official may be held liable under § 1983 only if ‘there exists 

either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional violation, or (2) a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’ ” Keates 

v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 

(9th Cir. 2011)). “In a section 1983 claim, a supervisor is liable for the acts of his subordinates if 

the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations of subordinates 

and failed to act to prevent them.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Rodriguez’s supervisors failed to train and/or 

supervise him resulting in deliberate indifference. However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts 

demonstrating that supervisory Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a need for more or 

different training which would have resulted in Defendant Rodriguez separating inmate Stansell 

from Plaintiff on the yard. In addition, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his deprivation 

resulted from an official policy or custom established by a policymaker possessed with final 

authority to establish that policy. Indeed, Plaintiff “cannot prove the existence of a municipal 

policy or custom based solely on the occurrence of a single incident of unconstitutional action by 

a non-policymaking employee.” Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 

1989); see also Duenas v. Cty. of Riverside, No. EDCV 21-1645 (SPx), 2022 WL 2167601, at *4 

(C.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2022) (“Allegations of a single occurrence of an alleged constitutional 

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violation do[ ] not equate to a policy or custom.”); Naranjo v. City of Redwood City, No. 19-cv01549-YGR, 2019 WL 3842074, at *8 n.14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2019) (“With respect to customs 

and practices, liability may not be premised on an isolated incident.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails 

to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

G. State Law Claims

Plaintiff attempts to bring several state law claims, including negligence, false 

imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, criminal threats, assault and battery, 

unreasonable search and seizure, and Bane Act violation. 

1. Negligence

In California, a cause of action for negligence requires (1) a legal duty to use reasonable 

care; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) proximate cause between the breach and (4) the plaintiff's 

injury. Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 1339, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 (1998). 

“In California, prison officials owe detainees a duty to protect them from foreseeable harm.” 

Cotta v. County of Kings, 686 F. App’x 467, 469 (9th Cir. 2017); Edison v. United States, 822 

F.3d 510, 521 (9th Cir. 2016); Giraldo v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 4th 231, 

252–53, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 371 (2008). This standard requires a much lower level of culpability than 

deliberate indifference. See Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 

2016).

Here, for the same reasons the Court has found a sufficient Eighth Amendment failure to 

protect claim, the complaint adequately alleges separate state law claims for negligence; however, 

the remainder of Plaintiff’s state law claims are not cognizable. Mendoza, 66 Cal. App. 4th at 

1339 (elements of negligence are duty to use reasonable care, breach of duty, and breach is the 

proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury); Giraldo, 168 Cal. App. 4th 231, 252 (2008) (“jailers owe 

prisoners a duty of care to protect them from foreseeable harm”). 

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Under California law, the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) 

extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless 

disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or 

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extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by 

the defendant's outrageous conduct. Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d at 571. Conduct is outrageous if 

it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Id. In 

addition to the requirement that the conduct be intentional and outrageous, the conduct must have 

been directed at Plaintiff or occur in the presence of Plaintiff of whom Defendant was aware. 

Simo v. Union of Needletrades, Industrial & Textile Employees, 322 F.3d 602, 622 (9th Cir. 

2003).

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants acts, actions, conduct, and omissions were utterly 

intolerable, atrocious, in conscious disregard of the rights of the Plaintiff entitling the Plaintiff to 

an award for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (ECF No. 12 at 26.) Plaintiff’s 

allegations are insufficient to give rise to a cognizable claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress as Plaintiff’s allegations are nothing more than a legal conclusion. While legal 

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by well-pleaded 

factual allegations. There are no allegations suggesting that Plaintiff suffered “emotional distress 

of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society 

should be expected to endure it.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 1004 

(1993) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

In addition, as explained above, Plaintiff cannot seek liability by way of section 1983 

against inmate Scott Stansell. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

3. Assault and Battery

For an assault claim under California law, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant 

threatened to touch him in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) it reasonably appeared to the 

plaintiff that the defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the 

conduct; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in 

causing the harm. Tekle v. U.S., 511 F.3d 839, 855 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). For battery, 

a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant intentionally did an act that resulted in harmful or 

offensive contact with the plaintiff's person; (2) the plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and 

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(3) the contact caused injury, damage, loss, or harm to the plaintiff. Id. (citation omitted).

Here, although Plaintiff states a cognizable failure to protect claim, he fails to state any 

facts that Defendant Rodriguez submitted him to an use of force, let alone assault and battery. In 

addition, for the reasons above, Plaintiff cannot sue inmate Scott Stansell for assault and battery 

by way of section 1983. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

4. Bane Act Violation

The Bane Act punishes any “person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, 

[who] interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, 

intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of 

rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the 

Constitution or laws of this state.” Cal Civ. Code § 52.1(a). The Bane Act also provides a cause 

of action for anyone whose rights are harmed in this way. Id. § 52.1(b). In order to state a claim 

under the Bane Act, a plaintiff must allege “(1) interference with or attempted interference with a 

state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was 

by threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 67, 183 

Cal.Rptr.3d 654 (2015).

Here, there are no allegations that any action taken by a Defendant contained threats, 

coercion, or intimidation in violation of the Bane Act. In addition, Plaintiff cannot seek liability 

against inmate Scott Stansell for any alleged violation of the Bane Act. Accordingly, Plaintiff 

fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

H. Further Leave to Amend

In light of the fact that the Court informed Plaintiff previously of the relevant legal 

standards governing his claims and he has failed to cure the pleading deficiencies with respect to 

some claims, further leave to amend would be futile. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 

707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend when 

amendment would be futile.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

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IV.

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall randomly 

assign a District Judge to this action.

Further, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s failure to protect and negligence claims against 

Defendant Rodriguez; and

2. All other claims and Defendants be dismissed from the action for failure to state a 

cognizable claim for relief. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 

(14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 2, 2024 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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