Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-06328/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-06328-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 15:77 Securities Fraud

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

IRON WORKERS MID-SOUTH

PENSION FUND,

Plaintiff,

v.

TERRAFORM GLOBAL, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-6328-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO REMAND AND 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST 

FOR FEES

[Re: ECF No. 9]

In this putative securities fraud class action, Plaintiff Iron Workers Mid-South Pension 

Fund (“Iron Workers”) files suit pursuant to §§ 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 

(“Securities Act”). Before the Court is Iron Workers’ motion to remand and request for fees. 

Finding the matter suitable for submission without oral argument, and having considered the 

submissions of the parties and relevant law, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion to remand, and 

GRANTS Iron Workers’ request for fees. 

I. BACKGROUND

Iron Workers filed a securities fraud class action complaint on December 3, 2015 in 

California Superior Court, County of San Mateo, against Defendants, TerraForm Global, Inc. 

(“TerraForm”), TerraForm officers and directors, and underwriters of TerraForm’s initial public 

offering (“IPO”). See Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1, Exh. 1). The complaint alleges 

violations of §§ 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a)(2), and 77o, 

and asserts claims on behalf of Iron Workers both individually and as a representative of a class of 

persons who purchased or otherwise acquired TerraForm Class A common stock pursuant or 

traceable to the company’s Registration Statement and Prospectus issued in connection with 

TerraForm’s IPO. Id. ¶ 1. Iron Workers does not allege any state law causes of action. Id. ¶ 8. 

On December 30, 2015, Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1441(a). Notice of Removal from San Mateo Superior Court (ECF No. 1). On January 11, 

2016, Iron Workers filed a motion to remand the matter back to state court. Motion to Remand 

(“Mot.,” ECF No. 9). Defendants filed papers in opposition on February 3, 2016, and Iron 

Workers filed a reply on February 10, 2016. Response filed by Jeremy Avenier (“Opp.,” ECF No. 

20); Reply filed by Iron Workers (ECF No. 23). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove a civil suit from state court to 

federal court if the action could initially have been filed in federal court unless Congress expressly 

provides otherwise. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). However, 

all such “removal statutes are strictly construed against removal,” Luther v. Countrywide Home 

Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008), and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be 

rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance,” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 

980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Because of this “strong presumption against removal 

jurisdiction,” the party seeking removal “always has the burden of establishing that removal is 

proper.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But, “a plaintiff seeking remand has the burden to 

prove that an express exception to removal exists.” Luther, 533 F.3d at 1034.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Remand

The question before the Court is whether the Securities Act, as amended by the Securities 

Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”), explicitly bars removal of this action. Iron 

Workers argues that it does, thereby denying the Court of jurisdiction and requiring remand. Mot.

at 3–8, 13–14. Defendants counter that the SLUSA amendments granted federal courts exclusive 

jurisdiction over covered class actions brought under the Securities Act, thereby making this Court 

the correct forum for this case. Opp. at 5–8.

“As with any question of statutory interpretation,” the Court “begins with the plain 

language of the statute.” Jiminez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009). “In ascertaining the 

plain meaning of the statute, [a] court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as 

well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 

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291 (1988). To determine this motion, the Court turns to 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 77p(b), and 77p(c), 

the Securities Act’s jurisdiction and anti-removal provisions. 

Prior to the SLUSA amendments, § 77v(a) granted state and federal courts concurrent 

jurisdiction over Securities Act claims and barred removal of any case arising under the Securities 

Act. With the passage of SLUSA, the jurisdictional provision was amended to read:

The district courts of the United States and the United States courts 

of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations 

under this subchapter and under rules and regulations promulgated 

by the Commission in respect thereto, and, concurrent with State 

and Territorial courts, except as provided in section 77p of this title 

with respect to covered class actions, of all suits . . . brought to 

enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter. . . . Except 

as provided in section 77p(c) of this title, no case arising under this 

subchapter and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction 

shall be removed to any court of the United States. 

15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (emphasis added). SLUSA amended § 77v(a) by adding the language, 

“[e]xcept as provided in section 77p of this title with respect to covered class actions,” in the 

foregoing subsection. 

§ 77p(c), also added by SLUSA and entitled “Removal of covered class actions,” provides

as follows:

Any covered class action brought in any State court involving a 

covered security, as set forth in subsection (b), shall be removable to 

the Federal district court for the district in which the action is 

pending, and shall be subject to subsection (b).

Id. § 77p(c).

§ 77p(c) references subsection (b), which is entitled “Class action limitations” and 

precludes certain covered class actions:

No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of 

any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or 

Federal court by any private party alleging—

(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in 

connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or

(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or 

deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the 

purchase or sale of a covered security.

Id. § 77(b).

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Lastly, SLUSA added a definitions section, which defines “covered class action” to 

include: 

(i) any single lawsuit in which—

(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or 

prospective class members, and questions of law or fact 

common to those persons or members of the prospective 

class, without reference to issues of individualized reliance 

on an alleged misstatement or omission, predominate over 

any questions affecting only individual persons or members; 

or

(II) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a 

representative basis on behalf of themselves and other 

unnamed parties similarly situated, and questions of law or 

fact common to those persons or members of the prospective 

class predominate over any questions affecting only 

individual persons or members; or

Id. § 77p(f)(2)(A). 

Iron Workers argues that, taking these amendments as a whole, the anti-removal provision

amounts to the following interpretation: “‘no case arising under [the Securities Act] . . . shall be 

removed’ unless ‘based upon the statutory or common law of any State.’” Mot. at 5. Because this 

case concerns only Securities Act claims, it concludes, Defendants are barred from removing it to 

federal court. Id. 

Defendants instead focus on § 77v(a)’s jurisdictional provision and argue that the SLUSA 

amendments deprived state courts of jurisdiction over Securities Act claims in covered class 

actions. Opp. at 5–8. As noted above, the amended language in § 77v(a) exempts covered class 

actions “as provided in section 77p.” § 77p in turn contains four subsections that refer to covered 

class actions—(b), (c), and (f), all quoted above, as well as (d). Defendants’ argument relies on 

the definitions section contained within subsection (f) as the relevant section for jurisdiction, 

rather than the more limited subset of covered class actions in §§ 77p(b) and (c). Thus, 

Defendants argue, the state court where this case was initially filed is not a “court[] of competent 

jurisdiction” for this case, and § 77v(a)’s anti-removal language is therefore inapplicable here. 

Opp. at 6. 

Considering the statute as a whole, the Court finds Iron Workers’ reading of the statutory 

language correct. The most straightforward reading of the provisions is that only covered class 

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actions with state law claims can be removed to federal court, as provided in § 77p(c), and only for 

the purpose of dismissing the state law claims, as required by § 77p(b). See Cervantes v. 

Dickerson, No. 15-cv-3825-PJH, 2015 WL 6163573, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2015). 

This position is consistent with dicta from the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. In 

Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 636 (2006), the Court considered the question 

“whether an order remanding a case removed under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 

Act of 1998 [was] appealable, notwithstanding § 1447(d).” Holding that such orders were not 

appealable, the Court expressly endorsed Iron Workers’ reading of the statutes stating that “we 

read authorization for the removal in subsection (c), on which the District Court’s jurisdiction 

depends, as confined to cases ‘set forth in subsection (b),’ § 77p(c), namely, those with claims of 

untruth, manipulation, and so on.” Id. at 642. In other words, “removal and jurisdiction to deal 

with removed cases is limited to those precluded by the terms of subsection (b).” Id. at 643. 

Thus, if a Securities Act case is filed in state court and “the action is not precluded, [then] the 

federal court likewise has no jurisdiction to touch the case on the merits, and the proper course is 

to remand to the state court that can deal with it.” Id. at 644. The Court explicitly rejected a broad 

interpretation of SLUSA’s removal provision, which Defendants impliedly advance here. The 

Kircher Court explained that “if [it] read the removal power that broadly [to include any covered 

class actions] there would be no point to the phrase ‘as set forth in subsection (b),’ for subsection 

(b) cases would be removable anyway as a subset of covered class actions.” Id. at 643.

As other courts have found, “while the analysis in Kircher may be dicta, it is nevertheless 

highly persuasive.” Rajasekaran v. CytRx Corp., No. CV 14-3406-GHK (PJWx), 2014 WL 

4330787, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014); see also Cervantes, 2015 WL 6163573, at *5; Liu v. 

Xoom Corp., No. 15-CV-00602-LHK, 2015 WL 3920074, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2015); 

Plymouth Cty. Ret. Sys. v. Model N, Inc., No. 14-CV-04516-WHO, 2015 WL 65110, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. Jan. 5, 2015); Desmarais v. Johnson, No. C 13-03666 WHA, 2013 WL 5735154, at *3–5

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2013). The Ninth Circuit has adopted Kircher’s interpretation in Madden v. 

Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2009), which stated:

To prevent actions precluded by SLUSA from being litigated in 

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state court, SLUSA authorizes defendants to remove such actions to 

federal court, effectively ensuring that federal courts will have the 

opportunity to determine whether a state action is precluded. As the 

Supreme Court has explained, any suit removable under SLUSA’s 

removal provision, § 77p(c), is precluded under SLUSA’s 

preclusion provision, § 77p(b), and any suit not precluded is not 

removable.

(citing Kircher, 547 U.S. at 644) (footnotes omitted). Similarly in Luther, the Ninth Circuit 

addressed the anti-removal provision in § 77v(a), stating that it “strictly forbids the removal of 

cases brought in state court and asserting claims under the [Securities Act].” 533 F.3d at 1033. 

Therefore, “by virtue of § 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 [codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)],” the 

plaintiff’s “state court class action alleging only violations of the Securities Act of 1933 was not 

removable,” and the case was subsequently remanded to state court. Id. at 1034. 

In reaching this holding, the Court joins what “appears to be emerging as the dominant 

view around the country.” Plymouth Cty., 2015 WL 65110, at *3. Earlier courts considered 

orders that had “not harmonized the jurisdictional and removal provisions of §§ 77v and 77p with 

the same effect.” Young v. Pac. Biosciences of Cal., Inc., 5:11-cv-05668 EJD, 2012 WL 851509, 

at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012). The few cases Defendants cite in support of their position fall 

into this category of earlier cases, and the majority come from outside this district. See, e.g.,

Lapin v. Facebook, Inc., No. C-12-3195 MMC, 2012 WL 3647409, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 

2012); Hung v. iDreamSky Tech. Ltd., No. 15-CV-2514 (JPO), 2016 WL 29903, at **3–4 

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2016); Wunsch v. Am. Realty Capital Props., No. Civ. JFM-14-4007, 2015 WL

2183035 (D. Md Apr. 14, 2015); In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 7831(PAC), 2009 

WL 4067266, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2009); Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419, 425 

(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Rovner v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. Civ. A 07-178 (FLW), 2007 WL 446658, 

at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2007); Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 

2003). 

“Since 2013, however, every court in this district to address the issue has granted remand.” 

Plymouth Cty., 2015 WL 65110, at *3; see also Cervantes, 2015 WL 6163573, at *7; City of 

Warren Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Revance Therapeutics, Inc., No. 15-CV-02512-HSG, 2015 WL 

5117631, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015); Liu, 2015 WL 3920074, at *5; Desmarais, 2013 WL 

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5735154, at *5; Toth v. Envivo, Inc., No. C 12-5636 CW, 2013 WL 5596965, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

11, 2013); Reyes v. Zynga Inc, No. C 12-05065 JSW, 2013 WL 5529754, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 

2013); Harper v. Smart Techs., Inc., No. C 11-5232 SBA, 2012 WL 12505217, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 28, 2012). In other words, in this district, “Defendants’ position has been soundly rejected in 

recent years.” Liu, 2015 WL 3920074, at *3.

Defendants argue that Iron Workers’ motion relies on a misapplication of the burdens of 

proof under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), and contend that Iron Workers fails to meet his burden to show 

that an exception to removal exists such that remand would be proper. Opp. at 3–5. This 

argument, however, overlooks the fact that it is Defendants who bear the burden in the first 

instance to show that removal was proper. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (because of the “strong 

presumption against removal jurisdiction,” the party seeking removal “always has the burden of 

establishing that removal is proper”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But as discussed above, 

Defendants’ removal was improper because Iron Workers’ complaint asserted purely Securities 

Act claims, which could not be removed from state court under the Securities Act’s jurisdictional 

and anti-removal provisions.

For the same reasons, the Court rejects Defendants’ arguments that remand should be 

denied on the basis that two similar lawsuits had concurrently been filed in the Northern District 

of California, and that remanding Iron Workers’ lawsuit would bifurcate the litigation. Opp. at 8–

11; see also Beltran v. TerraForm Global, Inc. et al., No. 5:15-cv-04981-BLF (filed in the 

Northern District on October 29, 2015); Pyramid Holdings v. TerraForm Global, Inc. et al., No. 

5:15-cv-04068-BLF (filed in the Northern District on September 9, 2015). Under the Securities 

Act’s statutory framework, as set forth in § 77v(a) and modified by §§ 77p(b) and (c), state and 

federal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over Securities Act claims. For purely Securities 

Act claims filed in state court, such as Iron Workers’ here, the § 77v(a) anti-removal provision 

bars removal to federal courts. The Court therefore finds Defendants’ argument here unavailing: 

§ 77v(a) preserves a plaintiff’s choice of forum, and Defendants could not properly remove the 

matter in the first place. 

The legislative history cited by Defendants is also insufficient. While a court may consider 

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the legislative history of a statute where its plain language is ambiguous, see, e.g., Funbus Systems 

Inc. v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 801 F.2d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 1986), the legislative history cited 

by the parties fails to provide additional clarity. For example, Defendants cite to a House of 

Representatives Committee Report, which explained that “since passage of the [Private Securities 

Litigation Reform Act of 1995], plaintiffs’ lawyers have sought to circumvent the Act’s provisions 

by exploiting differences between Federal and State laws by filing frivolous and speculative 

lawsuits in State Court.” Opp. at 12 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-803, at 14–15 (1998)). 

However, the Court notes that other statements in relevant Senate Committee Reports define 

SLUSA’s purpose as “limit[ing] the conduct of securities class actions under State law,” and does 

not reference eliminating concurrent jurisdiction. See S. Rep. No. 105-182, at 1 (1998). As 

numerous courts in this district have noted, this legislative history is too “murky” to aid in 

interpreting the statute. See, e.g., Desmarais, 2013 WL 5735154, at *5; City of Warren Police, 

2015 WL 5117631, at *4; Liu, 2015 WL 3920074, at *5.

Because “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 

removal,” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the Court concludes that this action is not removable to federal 

court under 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 77p(c), and 77p(b). 

B. Fees and Costs

As a final matter, Iron Workers has requested attorneys’ fees and costs. Mot. at 14. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs 

and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” Awards are 

only proper under § 1447(c) if “the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for 

seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 131, 141 (2005). Here, the Court 

finds that an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is warranted. 

The Court notes that counsel for Defendants have litigated this exact issue in the Northern 

District of California three times over the past four years. In every case, the Court rejected 

Defendants’ jurisdictional argument—the same argument Defendants again raise here—and 

remanded the matter back to state court. In Harper v. Smart Technologies, Inc., Ms. Sara B. 

Brody served as co-counsel representing the defendants in a securities fraud class action that 

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alleged solely Securities Act claims. 2012 WL 12505217, at *1. Judge Armstrong expressly 

rejected the argument that federal courts held exclusive jurisdiction to hear those claims, and, 

finding the case improperly removed, remanded the matter back to state court. Id. at *4–5. 

Similarly in Toth v. Envivo, Inc., Mr. Norman J. Blears served as co-counsel for the defendants in 

a Securities Act class action suit. 2013 WL 5596965, at *1. Judge Wilken held that such actions, 

raising claims only under the Securities Act and not under state law, could not be removed to 

federal court. Id. at *2. The case was remanded back to state court. Id. Most recently, in 

Plymouth County, Mr. Blears again served as co-counsel representing the defendants in a class 

action alleging purely Securities Act claims. 2015 WL 65110, at *1. Judge Orrick rejected the 

defendants’ jurisdictional argument, found the removal improper, and remanded the matter back to 

state court. Id. at *2–4. 

As Judge Orrick observed in Plymouth County, and as this Court noted above, “[s]ince 

2013, . . . every court in this district to address the issue has granted remand.” Id. at *3 (citations 

omitted). “This appears to be the dominant view around the country.” Id. The Court agrees with 

Judge Orrick’s assessment. Defendants’ reliance on mostly out-of-district cases to support their 

position ignores the growing and uniform body of law in this district, including relevant Ninth 

Circuit case law, reaching the opposite conclusion. 

Moreover, Defendants’ argument that the existence of “identical federally filed actions . . . 

proceeding in parallel” to this case presents an unsettled legal question fares no better. The Court 

notes that Ms. Brody levied this same exact argument in Harper, claiming that the plaintiffs’ 

motion to remand should be denied on the basis that “substantively identical federal court actions”

had been filed in the Southern District of New York. Memorandum in Opposition re: Motion to 

Remand at 19, Harper v. Smart Techs, Inc., No. C 11-5232 SBA, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012), ECF 

No. 20 (contending that a remand “would result in concurrent, duplicative litigation”). That 

argument was unsuccessful there, and so too is it here. As this Court explained above, because the 

Securities Act preserves a plaintiff’s choice of forum, Defendants’ removal was improper to begin 

with. The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear to case, irrespective of related federal proceedings. 

In spite of the concordant body of case law in this district, and in spite of Defendants’ 

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previous litigation on this exact issue, Defendants have nonetheless persisted in removing not just 

this case, but also four other related cases, each time raising identical arguments that have been 

rejected before. Such tactics waste the time and resources of all parties and the courts in this 

district. Iron Workers should be compensated for the cost of this unnecessary round of litigation. 

The Court finds that Defendants lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal and 

therefore awards Iron Workers’ request for just costs and fees incurred in this motion. 

Under the Civil Local Rules and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for fees must 

ordinarily be filed within fourteen days, unless otherwise specified by court order. Civ. L.R. 54-

5(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i). The Court finds Iron Workers’ request for thirty days not 

unreasonable. Accordingly, any motion for fees shall be filed within thirty days of the date of this 

order. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED. This action is hereby remanded to San 

Mateo County Superior Court. 

2. Plaintiff’s request under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) for attorneys’ fees and expenses 

incurred as a result of the removal is GRANTED. Plaintiff is given leave to file a 

motion seeking fees and costs no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this 

order. The court shall retain jurisdiction over this collateral matter. Moore v. 

Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 981 F.2d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1992). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2016

 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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