Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08046/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08046-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Teresa Watkins, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-08046-PCT-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Teresa Watkins’s appeal of the Social 

Security Administration’s (the “Administration”) decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 1). 

For the reasons set forth below, the Administration’s decision is affirmed. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Procedural Background 

 Plaintiff applied for disability benefits on October 24, 2008, alleging disability 

from June 2, 2005 based on fibromyalgia, diabetes mellitus with mild left extremity 

peripheral neuropathy,1

 obesity, carpal tunnel syndrome, and headaches. (Administrative 

Record “R.” 114-17). After her claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, a 

hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Teresa L. Hoskins Hart on 

March 31, 2011. (R. 62-96). On June 22, 2011, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not 

 

1

 Neuropathy is any disorder affecting any segment of the nervous system. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, at 1211 (27th ed. 2000). 

Case 3:12-cv-08046-GMS Document 20 Filed 03/13/13 Page 1 of 12
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

disabled (R. 43-56), and the Appeals Council denied her request for review (R. 1-6), 

which was a final decision. The matter is now fully briefed. (Docs. 12, 18, 19). 

II. Factual Background 

 Plaintiff was 42 years old on her alleged onset date. (R. 114). She has a 

Bachelor’s degree and past relevant work as an office assistant manager, secretary, 

accounting manager, case aid and bookkeeper. (R. 85, 152, 159). Plaintiff last worked 

on July 20, 2006. (R. 267). 

 At her hearing on March 11, 2011, Plaintiff testified that her pain on an average 

day was moderately severe. (R. 78). On a typical day she woke at 8:00 or 9:00 a.m., 

took her medicine and fed her three dogs and two cats. (R. 73-74). She drove an 

automobile, shopped for groceries, cared for her fifteen year old son who went to school 

online, read novels and watched television. (R. 74-75). Plaintiff testified that she had 

carpal tunnel in both hands, that wearing hand braces caused her pain and, as a result, she 

did not have full control of her fingers and had difficulty using the computer, typing and 

writing. During the day, she laid down two or three times to help with the pain and 

became drowsy because of her medications. (R. 79). She stated that she could stand and 

walk for ten minutes without pain and lift a gallon of milk. (R. 81). She had daily body 

aches due to fibromyalgia and moderate to moderately severe headaches. (R. 81-82). 

Plaintiff felt she could not work because of the pain associated with her back, neck, 

fibromyalgia, diabetes, carpal tunnel syndrome and nerve damage. (R. 76-77, 81-83). 

 Mark Kelman, the Vocational Expert (“VE”), also testified at the hearing. (R. 83-

95). The ALJ asked the VE to consider four hypothetical workers assuming the same 

age, education, prior work experience and vocational profile as Plaintiff. (R. 86-93). The 

ALJ’s first two hypotheticals involved a person who had the capacity for light and 

medium work but could not stand or walk for more than four hours in an eight-hour 

workday, was limited to occasional fingering and had some environmental limitations. 

The VE testified that Plaintiff’s past work required more than occasional fingering and 

Case 3:12-cv-08046-GMS Document 20 Filed 03/13/13 Page 2 of 12
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that light and medium work typically required standing for more than four hours each 

day; thus Plaintiff would be precluded from all light to medium work. (R. 86-89). 

 In the ALJ’s third hypothetical, the worker had the same limitations except she 

was capable of sedentary work. The VE stated that person could work as an unarmed 

security guard and telemarketing representative. (R. 89-90). In the fourth hypothetical, 

the ALJ applied the above limitations to the functional capacity assessed by the physical 

therapist at Dr. Tadlock’s direction, in which the therapist recommended Plaintiff needed 

an additional thirty minute continuous break. (R. 92). The VE opined no employer 

would tolerate that type of break and thus work would be precluded. (R. 93). 

 Plaintiff’s counsel added to the ALJ’s third hypothetical the need for Plaintiff to 

keep her legs elevated at heart level while seated due to neuropathic problems and 

circulation. The VE stated the leg elevation requirement would eliminate the above 

positions. (R. 93). 

 Plaintiff’s counsel presented two more hypothetical questions to the VE. 

Plaintiff’s first hypothetical added moderately severe pain causing restrictions in 

persistence, pace, concentration for one-third of the day. The VE testified all 

employment would be eliminated. (R. 93-94). Plaintiff’s counsel then asked whether a 

person who could occasionally sit, stand and walk, occasionally lift ten pounds, with no 

usage of the upper extremities for fine control, assembly or grasping, was capable of 

work. The VE stated that person could not be employed. (R. 94). 

 In evaluating whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step 

sequential evaluation for determining disability.2

 At step one, the ALJ determined that 

 2

 The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (governing 

supplemental security income). Under the test: 

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she is 

not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) that 

her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets or 

equals one of the specific impairments described in the 

Case 3:12-cv-08046-GMS Document 20 Filed 03/13/13 Page 3 of 12
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (R. 

45). At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments 

of fibromyalgia, diabetes mellitus with mild left extremity peripheral neuropathy, obesity, 

carpal tunnel with 2006 right release with residual mild tingling and intermittent 

numbness, and headaches. (Id.). At step three, the ALJ determined that none of these 

impairments, either alone or in combination, met or equaled any of the Administration’s 

listed impairments. (R. at 50). The ALJ made a determination of Plaintiff’s RFC,3

concluding that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work, except that Plaintiff was limited 

to occasional fingering and had to avoid concentrated exposure to vibrations or hazards, 

such as unprotected heights or dangerous machinery. (R. at 50-51). The ALJ then 

determined at step four that Plaintiff did not retain the RFC to perform her past relevant 

work as an office manager or secretary. (R. at 54). The ALJ therefore reached step five, 

where she determined that Plaintiff could perform two jobs in the national economy, 

unarmed security guard and telemarketing representative, that met her RFC limitations. 

Given this analysis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 54-56). 

 

 

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of the 

specific impairments described in the regulations, the claimant 

can still establish a prima facie case of disability by proving at 

step four that in addition to the first two requirements, she is not 

able to perform any work that she has done in the past. Once the 

claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts 

to the agency at step five to demonstrate that the claimant can 

perform a significant number of other jobs in the national 

economy. This step-five determination is made on the basis of 

four factors: the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), 

age, work experience and education. 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

3

 An RFC documents what work-related task a claimant can perform despite 

the limitations caused by her impairments. See S.S.R. 96-8p (July 2, 1996). 

Case 3:12-cv-08046-GMS Document 20 Filed 03/13/13 Page 4 of 12
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of Review 

 A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the 

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is 

either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less 

than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant 

evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

II. Analysis 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by either misinterpreting or disregarding evidence, 

by rejecting treating physician opinion, by failing to properly consider a Social Security 

Ruling, and by improperly rejecting Plaintiff’s credibility. (Doc. 12 at 2). 

1. Misinterpreting or ignoring evidence 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ, in evaluating Plaintiff’s RFC either misinterpreted 

or ignored evidence of Plaintiff’s need to frequently elevate her legs. According to the 

testimony of the vocational rehabilitation expert, if Plaintiff needs to elevate her legs as a 

condition of employment, that requirement would eliminate all possible employment for 

her. (Doc. 12 at 5; R. 233). Without explaining why, Plaintiff asserts that the 

recommendation that she frequently raise her legs relates somehow to Plaintiff’s 

neuropathy. (Doc. 19 at 1). The record, and discussion of the ALJ demonstrates 

otherwise. 

 The ALJ fully discusses in her decision the reasons for her determination that the 

Plaintiff does not have a permanent requirement to elevate her legs. In the decision the 

ALJ tracks the development, treatment history and resolution of the claimant’s swelling 

in the lower extremities that resulted in the temporary need for her to elevate her legs. 

As the decision notes, in October 2009 “the claimant exhibited pitting edema of the lower 

Case 3:12-cv-08046-GMS Document 20 Filed 03/13/13 Page 5 of 12
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

extremities.” In a follow-up visit that occurred in November 2009, Plaintiff reported that 

her feet continued to swell, but “it was considered improved from the last visit.” The 

ALJ did note that as a result ‘she was recommended to elevate her legs frequently,” but 

also noted that a contemporaneous lower extremity Doppler was negative of evidence “of 

right or left leg deep venous thrombosis.” It was suggested to Plaintiff that she use a 

Jobst stocking. 

 When in January 2010 Plaintiff again sought treatment for her lower limb edema, 

she was “diagnosed with chronic kidney disease and acute renal failure secondary to the 

use of a diuretic and an ace inhibitor.” Her doctor noted that “there was no need for 

dialysis and that her lower limb edema would improve once she stopped the Celebrex.” 

As the ALJ notes in her decision, treatment notes for the claimant’s June 2010 care note 

that Plaintiff’s acute renal failure resolved. (R. 49). Not surprisingly, those notes further 

indicate that her edema had improved since her last visit. Thus, the ALJ reasoned 

Plaintiff’s renal insufficiency did not meet the twelve-month durational requirement to 

qualify as a severe and chronic impairment. Claimant, thus, apparently ceased to take the 

Celebrex which according to her treatment note would result in the alleviation of the 

swelling in her lower extremities. Thus the ALJ gave a full explanation of why she did 

not consider the advice given to Claimant in November 2009 to frequently elevate her 

legs, to be a permanent treatment requirement. (R. 49, 233). 

 Plaintiff’s argument regarding her need for leg elevation is without merit. 

Plaintiff points to no objective medical evidence that links Plaintiff’s neuropathy to 

Plaintiff’s need to elevate her legs. The ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s EMG and NCV 

tests and MRI consistently suggested mild symptomatology. (R. 52, 265, 421, 750). The 

ALJ noted that the EMG results identified some peripheral neuropathy with sensory loss 

and explained how that was most likely due to diabetes, which was better managed. (R. 

52). Reports from Dr. Tadlock indeed indicate Plaintiff’s diabetes was under control 

from February 2010 through November 2010. (R. 803, 764, 768, 792, 797, 799, 801, 

Case 3:12-cv-08046-GMS Document 20 Filed 03/13/13 Page 6 of 12
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

757). There also was no objective medical evidence that Plaintiff was referred for 

surgery regarding her neuropathy. (R. 52, 750). 

2. Rejecting opinions of treating physician, Dr. Tadlock, and a physical 

therapist 

 

Plaintiff next argues the ALJ erred by rejecting treating physician Dr. Tadlock’s 

opinion in April 2007 that Plaintiff could not work. (Doc. 12 at 6; R. 448). Plaintiff also 

contends the ALJ mischaracterized the opinion of Ms. Deering, a physical therapist who 

Plaintiff asserts became part of the interdisciplinary team and should be given the same 

weight as a treating physician.4

 Defendant argues the ALJ’s opinion is free from error as 

the physical therapist was not an acceptable medical source entitled to controlling weight. 

(Doc. 18 at 12-13). 

 An ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician in favor of a non-treating 

physician only “by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 

conflicting clinical evidence,” stating an interpretation of the evidence, and making 

findings. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Magallenes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In this process, an ALJ “may 

reject a treating physician’s opinion if it is based ‘to a large extent’ on a claimant’s selfreports that have been properly discounted as incredible.” Tommasetti, 533 at 1041 

(quoting Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

 However, only “acceptable medical sources” can “establish the existence of a 

medically determinable impairment.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 06–03p, 2006 WL 

2329939, at *2 (Aug. 9, 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)). Physical therapists, like 

Ms. Deering, are not “acceptable medical sources,” but instead are only “other sources” 

of information, a category of information that also includes, inter alia, spouses, siblings, 

 

4

 At the conclusion of the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel presented the same argument to the ALJ. (R. 93). 

Case 3:12-cv-08046-GMS Document 20 Filed 03/13/13 Page 7 of 12
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

and friends. Id . Although these “other sources” can show the severity of a claimant's 

symptoms, they cannot establish a medically determinable impairment. Id.

 The ALJ reasonably evaluated the substantial evidence in the record in 

determining Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work with occasional fingering. 

(R. 51, 574-75). In so finding, the ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Dr. Tadlock, 

who in April 2007 completed Plaintiff’s state disability claim. (R. 53, 448). The ALJ 

explained that Dr. Tadlock diagnosed multiple impairments with seemingly very little 

objective evidence. (R. 53). For example, Dr. Tadlock noted Plaintiff was unable to 

work due to occipital neuralgia5

 and brachial neuritis,6 which Dr. Tadlock thought was 

confirmed by MRI and EMG/NCV evidence. But the ALJ explained the EMG evidence 

showed only mild carpal tunnel syndrome of the left hand and only residual axonal loss 

of the right. (R. 53, 448-50, 570-77). The ALJ noted how in January 2007, Dr. Tadlock 

diagnosed cervical radiculopathy with disc protrusion at the C5 area as well as cervical 

degenerative disc disease while there were no x-rays or MRIs to support those findings. 

(R. 53, 521). Moreover, in March 2007 Dr. Tadlock diagnosed severe degenerative disc 

disease without examining Plaintiff’s range of motion, evidence of muscle spasms, or xrays. (R. 53, 511). Given this lack of objective evidence, the ALJ reasoned that Dr. 

Tadlock appeared to rely heavily on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

 Further, the ALJ addressed the many reasons for giving physical therapist Ms. 

Deering’s May 2007 opinion little weight.7 (R. 53-54, 271). For example, the ALJ noted 

 

5

 Occipital neuralgia refers to pain in the back of the head or neck. 

Stedman’s, at 1206, 1250, 1764. 

6

 Brachial neuritis refers to a neurological disorder, of unknown cause, 

characterized by the sudden onset of severe pain. Stedman’s, at 66, 1207. 

7

 Citing Gomez v. Chater, 74 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1996), Plaintiff 

contends the physical therapist should be given the same weight as a treating physician 

because the therapist became a part of “the interdisciplinary team” by working under the 

direction of Dr. Tadlock. (Doc. 12 at 6). In Gomez, a nurse practitioner’s opinion was 

considered to be a part of a physician’s opinion where she worked closely under the 

supervision of the physician, consulted with the physician numerous times, and was 

Case 3:12-cv-08046-GMS Document 20 Filed 03/13/13 Page 8 of 12
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

MRIs and x-rays did not show limited range of motion and that treating physicians, Dr. 

Ronald Bennett in June 2008 and Dr. Nimfa Aguila in February 2010, found Plaintiff did 

not need carpal tunnel surgery. (R. 419-21, 746-48). The ALJ did not err in giving little 

weight to the opinions of Dr. Tadlock and Ms. Deering. 

 3. Improperly rejecting Plaintiff’s credibility 

 Plaintiff argues next that the ALJ erred in “essentially” rejecting the credibility of 

Plaintiff regarding her moderately severe pain without any articulated reasons. (Doc. 12 

at 8; R. 94). 

In conducting the two-step process required when evaluating subjective pain 

testimony, the ALJ found that although “the claimant's medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms” her statements 

“concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms” were not 

credible. (R. at 24). See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 If the medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause 

the alleged symptoms “and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the 

claimant’s testimony about the severity of [his] symptoms only by offering specific, 

clear, and convincing reasons for doing so.” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. “The ALJ 

may consider many factors in weighing a claimant's credibility, including (1) ordinary 

techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation for lying, prior 

inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant 

that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek 

 

acting as an agent of the physician. 74 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1996). Despite 

concluding, that Ms. Deering’s opinions should be given the weight of a physician under 

Gomez, Plaintiff makes no attempt to argue the basis for this conclusion other than Dr. 

Tadlock referred Plaintiff for an RFC assessment. Plaintiff points to no facts in the 

record which support findings that, during her treatment of Plaintiff, Nurse Deering 

worked under the supervision of a physician or consulted with a physician. Plaintiff 

points to no record where Dr. Tadlock refers to Nurse Deering’s report. Therefore, the 

Court declines to conclude that the ALJ erred by not affording treating physician weight 

to Nurse Deering’s opinion. 

Case 3:12-cv-08046-GMS Document 20 Filed 03/13/13 Page 9 of 12
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the claimant's daily 

activities.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 The ALJ adequately “identif[ied] what testimony [wa]s not credible and what 

evidence undermine[d] the claimant's complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 

(9th Cir.1995). The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for finding the 

substantial evidence in the record did not support Plaintiff’s subjective complaints 

regarding pain and for finding Plaintiff’s pain adequately accounted for with her RFC 

limits. (R. 52-53). At her hearing, Plaintiff testified her pain on an average day was 

moderately severe. (R. 78). However, the record shows Plaintiff did not always take her 

prescribed pain medication. (R. 53, 416-18). Further, Dr. Tadlock noted on many 

occasions that Plaintiff responded well to various pain medications. (R. 472, 475, 499, 

503, 801, 829, 833, 836, 846, 849, 852). 

 Regarding Plaintiff’s allegations of very limited functional limitations, the ALJ 

discussed Plaintiff’s daily activities, noting that she took care of herself during the day, 

including driving, cooking and eating. The ALJ stated in February 2007 she could button 

her shirts and comb her hair; in March 2007, she did six loads of laundry; in December 

2009, she could walk without difficulty; and in January 2010, although she had back and 

joint pain, she had no restriction of motion. (R. 53, 308, 571, 737). The ALJ noted while 

Plaintiff reported difficulty concentrating, she could read novels and watch television. 

(R. 53). In addition, Plaintiff had no problems with any side effects of her medication in 

November 2010. (R. 764). 

 The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the 

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either 

Case 3:12-cv-08046-GMS Document 20 Filed 03/13/13 Page 10 of 12
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. 

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 

 4. Failing to properly consider a Social Security Ruling 

 Plaintiff argues cursorily that the ALJ erred in not considering Social Security 

Ruling 96-9p, which states any significant manipulative limitation of one’s ability to 

hand and work with small objects with both hands significantly erodes the capacity for 

sedentary work. (Doc. 12 at 7). Defendant asserts SSR 96-9p goes on to state that the 

ALJ can call an expert and must weigh the expert’s testimony with other evidence. (Doc. 

18 at 21). 

 In this case, in answering the ALJ’s third hypothetical question,8

 the VE testified 

that the sedentary jobs of security guard and telemarketing representative could be 

performed with occasional fingering. (R. 86-90). See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 

747, 756 (9th Cir.1989) (finding a vocational expert’s response to a hypothetical question 

constitutes substantial evidence only if the question accurately portrays the claimant's 

individual physical and mental impairments). The ALJ’s hypothetical question, however, 

need not state limitations that are unsupported by the record. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006). The ALJ’s third hypothetical question 

accurately portrayed Plaintiff’s physical impairments and is supported by the record. The 

June 2008 EMG/nerve conduction study showed left carpal tunnel syndrome with mild 

denervation, but no sign of right carpal tunnel syndrome and no evidence of cervical 

radiculopathy or polyneuropathy. (R. 421). Further, Plaintiff received no more than 

steroid injections and was not referred for carpal tunnel surgery after 2006. As discussed 

 8

 The ALJ’s third hypothetical proposed the following: 

“let’s assume an individual has the same age, education and prior 

work experience, the same vocational profile as [Plaintiff] . . . . if you had 

the sedentary capacity and you had the manipulative limitations . . . for 

fingering occasionally . . . [a]nd the environmental limitations [of not 

working with concentrated exposure to either vibrations or hazards such as 

unprotected heights or dangerous machinery] . . . . Would there be jobs you 

could identify for this hypothetical person?” 

Case 3:12-cv-08046-GMS Document 20 Filed 03/13/13 Page 11 of 12
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

above, substantial evidence in the record and the VE’s testimony support the ALJ's 

finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment 

and TERMINATE this matter. 

 Dated this 13th day of March, 2013. 

Case 3:12-cv-08046-GMS Document 20 Filed 03/13/13 Page 12 of 12