Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00356/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00356-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2003 Job Discrimination

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1

The state law and Section 1981 claims appear clearly to be barred by the statute of

limitations. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l); Price v. M&H Valve Co., 177 Fed. Appx. 1, 6-7

(11th Cir. 2006). The Title VII claims may or may not be barred, depending on

application of Kerr v. McDonald’s Corporation, 427 F.3d 947 (11th Cir. 2005).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

PATRICIA BELL, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0356-WS-M

 )

INTEGRATED HEALTH SERVICES, )

INC., et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Integrated Health

Services, Inc. (“IHS”) to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) for

insufficiency of service of process. (Doc. 2). The parties have filed briefs and

evidentiary materials in support of their respective positions, (Docs. 3, 13, 14), and the

motion is ripe for resolution. After carefully considering the foregoing and other relevant

materials in the file, the Court concludes that the motion to dismiss is due to be granted.

BACKGROUND

The three plaintiffs filed suit in state court in July 2005, alleging that IHS, as their

employer at a health care facility in Greensboro, Alabama, violated Title VII, Section

1981 and state law by failing to promote them to either of two positions in June 2001. 

(Doc. 1, Exhibit A at 60-67).1

 The plaintiffs amended the complaint in November 2005 to

add IHS Management Group, Inc. (“Management”) and various fictitious parties as

defendants. (Id. at 45-52). The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint in December

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2005, (id. at 29-37), followed by an original and corrected application for entry of default

in May 2006. (Id. at 8-15). 

In July 2005, the plaintiffs attempted to serve the original complaint on IHS by

certified mail at the Greensboro street address of the facility at which they worked at the

time of the denied promotions. (Doc. 5, Exhibit E). The green card indicates that one

Kelly Thomas signed for the mailing. (Doc. 1, Exhibit 1 at 57). 

In November 2005, the plaintiffs attempted to serve the first amended complaint

on IHS by certified mail at 910 Ridgebrook Road, Sparks, Maryland. The mailing was

returned with the printed words, “Return to Sender/Refused/Unable to Forward” and the

handwritten notation, “Refused.” (Doc. 13, Exhibits J, K). 

In December 2005, the plaintiffs attempted to serve the second amended complaint

on IHS by certified mail at an address in Owings Mill, Maryland. (Doc. 5, Exhibit H). 

This mailing was returned as “undeliverable.” (Doc. 1, Exhibit A at 3, 22-23). 

In May 2006, the plaintiffs attempted to serve the corrected application for entry of

default and supporting declaration on IHS by certified mail at 910 Ridgebrook Road,

Sparks, Maryland. (Doc. 1, Exhibit 1 at 5). The mailing was signed for by one Erik

Cummings, a customer service representative for Pitney Bowes, whose office was located

at 920 Ridgebrook Road. (Doc. 8, Cummings Affidavit).

As a result of the May 2006 mailing, IHS learned of the action and removed it in

June 2006. (Doc. 1, ¶ 1). The plaintiffs moved to remand on the grounds of untimeliness,

arguing that IHS was properly served with process in November 2005. (Doc. 5, ¶¶ 6, 7,

9, 11, 13). The plaintiffs mentioned the July and December 2005 attempts at service but

did not argue that either effected good service. (Id., ¶¶ 5, 6 n.1 ). 

In response to the motion to remand, IHS presented affidavits reflecting that it had

not been served with process on any of these three occasions. (Doc. 8). With respect to

each, IHS presented evidence that it had no office at the addresses to which process was

directed at the time service was attempted. (Id., Bennett Affidavit, Zack Affidavit). 

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2 “There is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that

could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment.” Resolution

Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). The Court’s review on

this motion to dismiss is similarly limited to those arguments the parties have expressly

advanced.

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The Court extended the plaintiffs an opportunity to reply to IHS’s showing, (Doc.

7), but they elected not to do so. After the briefing period closed, the Court took the

motion to remand under submission and held that IHS had met its burden of demonstrating

that “every attempted service of process by the plaintiffs upon it was unsuccessful.” (Doc.

9). The Court thus denied the motion to remand.

The instant motion to dismiss was filed contemporaneously with the notice of

removal. The plaintiffs moved the Court to delay addressing the motion to dismiss until

after ruling on their motion to remand, (Doc. 6), and the Court granted their motion. (Doc.

7). Upon denying the motion to remand, the Court entered a briefing schedule on the

motion to dismiss. (Doc. 10).

IHS argues that the plaintiffs have not perfected service and that their claims

against IHS should thus be dismissed. The plaintiffs respond that they accomplished

service in November 2005 and/or in August 2006; that IHS cannot insist on proper service

because it has had knowledge of this lawsuit since May 2006 but is evading service; that it

should be allowed discovery before the Court rules on IHS’s motion; and that service by

publication should be ordered. (Doc. 13 at 7-9; Doc. 15).2

 

DISCUSSION

“[W]hen service of process is challenged, the party on whose behalf service is made

has the burden of establishing its validity.” Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A.,

629 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir. 1980). The ultimate burden is thus on the plaintiffs to prove

that they have perfected service on IHS.

The parties have failed to address the intermediate burdens and procedures

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3

An evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is

discretionary but not mandatory. E.g., Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir.

1990). Given the parties’ failure to request a hearing, the Court declines to hold one sua

sponte.

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applicable to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5). Accordingly, the Court utilizes the

standards governing motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal

jurisdiction, which presumably are analogous. In the personal jurisdiction context, the

defendant first bears the burden of producing affidavits that, in non-conclusory fashion,

demonstrate the absence of jurisdiction. Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun International Hotels,

Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff then bears the burden of

presenting “enough evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict.” Id. at 1268-69

(internal quotes omitted). If the plaintiff presents countering evidence, “the court must

construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. at 1269. Absent an

evidentiary hearing,3

 the plaintiff’s presentation of sufficient evidence to defeat a motion

for directed verdict ends the inquiry favorably to the plaintiff. Francosteel Corp. v. M/V

Charm, 19 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1994). 

A. Service in November 2005.

As noted, neither on motion to remand nor in opposition to the motion to dismiss

have the plaintiffs contended that service was perfected in July 2005, December 2005, or

May 2006. Thus, the only state court episode potentially at issue is the November 2005

attempted service of the first amended complaint. 

The threshold problem with the plaintiffs’ argument is that the Court has already

rejected it, by denying their motion to remand. While that ruling is interlocutory and thus

capable of being revised, the decision whether to do so is committed to the Court’s

discretion. E.g., Bodine v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 912 F.2d 1373, 1376 (11th

Cir. 1990). Here, acceptance of the plaintiffs’ argument on motion to dismiss would

require that the motion to remand be granted, so that their argument on motion to dismiss

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operates effectively as a motion to reconsider the Court’s order denying remand. Indeed,

in opposition to IHS’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs request the Court to order remand. 

(Doc. 13 at 9). 

The grant or denial of a motion to reconsider is left to the discretion of the trial

court. E.g., Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023-24 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Such a motion may not be used as a vehicle to inject new arguments into the underlying

motion, or to submit evidence previously available but not properly presented on the

underlying motion. E.g., Mays v. United States Postal Service, 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir.

1997). Instead, “[a] motion to reconsider is only available when a party presents the court

with evidence of an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new

evidence, or the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.” Summit Medical Center,

Inc. v. Riley, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1355 (M.D. Ala. 2003). The plaintiffs identify no

intervening change in controlling law, they present no evidence that was unavailable when

the motion to remand was decided, and they do not (and could not successfully) assert that

the Court’s ruling on the submissions before it was clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. 

Indeed, the Court’s conclusion was and remains patently correct. The plaintiffs rely

on two points to create a fact issue as to whether IHS maintained an office at 910

Ridgebrook Road in November 2005: (1) EEOC filings reflect that this was IHS’s

corporate address in 2001; and (2) the corrected application for entry of default was sent to

this address in May 2006 and was accepted. (Doc. 15 at 2, 4-5). As to the first point,

evidence of IHS’s presence in 2001 is not evidence of its presence in 2005, especially in

the face of uncontroverted evidence that IHS filed for bankruptcy in 2000 and has been

inactive since at least 2004. (Doc. 14, Zack Affidavit). As to the second, it is

uncontroverted that the application was signed for by an employee of Pitney Bowes, not

by anyone affiliated in any way with IHS. (Exhibit 8, Cummings Affidavit). 

Moreover, even were there evidence that IHS maintained an office at 910

Ridegebrook Road in November 2005, even were there evidence that someone affiliated

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4

Alabama law requires that service on a corporation be accomplished by service on

an individual holding one of certain enumerated positions in, or relationships to, the

organization. Ala. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(6). The November 2005 certified mailing, however,

identified no such individual, either by name or by position, but was addressed simply to

“Integrated Health Services, Inc.” (Doc. 13, Exhibit K). 

5

The plaintiffs complain that they should not be penalized for the clerk’s failure to

perform this function, but they identify no principle of Alabama law that would allow the

explicit requirements of effective service to be ignored simply because they were not

satisfied. The Court notes that, even when the state court ordered the plaintiffs to perfect

service within 21 days or face dismissal, (Doc. 1, Exhibit 1 at 16), the plaintiffs’ response

was not to ask the clerk to mail process to 910 Ridgebrook Road but rather to file an

application for entry of default. 

6

Service in federal court can be made pursuant to the law of the forum state. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), (h)(1).

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with IHS refused the certified mailing containing process, and even were such refusal

improper,4

 under Alabama law service was not thereby rendered complete. Instead,

service could be perfected only upon the clerk’s subsequent mailing of process by ordinary

mail to the same address. Ala. R. Civ. P. 4(e). As the plaintiffs admit, (Doc. 13 at 7), this

never occurred.5

 

B. Service in August 2006.

According to an affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs, in August 2006 one Vincent

Piazza personally delivered process to a business located at 930 Ridgebrook Road, Sparks,

Maryland. (Doc. 13, Exhibit M). Without explanation or analysis of applicable law, the

plaintiff posits that Piazza’s action perfected service under Alabama Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(c)(6). (Doc. 13 at 8).6

Piazza’s affidavit reflects that, when he arrived at 930 Ridgebrook Road, he was

advised: that IHS had no office there; that the office was occupied by a business called

Fundamental Health; that “the only person that can receive for IHS was Christine Zak [sic]

since she is the only person with any affiliation with the company and is Corporate

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Counsel”; and that Zack was traveling. Piazza left process on a counter, even after the

receptionist again warned him that only Zack could accept the documents and asserted that

she would simply throw the papers away.

The plaintiffs’ failure to offer discussion or authority in support of their raw

conclusion that this constituted good service is itself sufficient reason to reject the

argument. See, e.g., Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Institute of London Underwriters, 430

F.3d 1326, 1331 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A] passing reference to an issue in a brief [is]

insufficient to properly raise that issue.”). At any rate, the argument depends on at least

two fatally incorrect assumptions: (1) that service on Zack would constitute service on

IHS; and (2) that service on the receptionist constituted service on Zack.

Alabama law requires that service on a corporation be accomplished by service on

an officer, a partner, a managing agent, a general agent, an agent appointed to receive

service of process, or an agent authorized by law to accept service of process. Ala. R. Civ.

P. 4(c)(6). As a corporation, IHS has no partners, and it is uncontroverted that Zack is not

an officer of IHS (indeed, that IHS has had no officers since 2004). (Doc. 14, Zack

Affidavit). The Court thus turns to the various forms of agency that may support proper

service, noting first that Zack has denied under oath that she is such an agent. (Id.). 

“A managing agent is one authorized to transact all business of a particular kind at

a particular place and must be vested with powers of discretion rather than being under

direct superior control.” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Rhyme Syndicate Music, 376 F.3d 615,

624 (6th Cir. 2004); accord Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F.2d 1067, 1073 (2nd Cir. 1972); 1

James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice (“Moore’s”) § 4.53[2][b] (3d ed.

2006). A general agency requires at least as great a showing. Gottlieb v. Sandia American

Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 513 (3rd Cir. 1971). Such an agent must have “broad executive

responsibilities” and must have authority to act with continuity rather than sporadically. 

Id. 

Piazza’s affidavit states that unnamed employees of Fundamental Health identified

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7

According to Zack, she is not corporate counsel to IHS but to what were formerly

IHS’s subsidiaries. (Doc. 8, Zack Affidavit; Doc. 14, Zack Affidavit). While Piazza’s

affidavit is not free of ambiguity on this point, the Court generously reads it as evidence

that Zack is in fact corporate counsel to IHS. 

8

See, e.g., Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1273 (11th

Cir. 2004) (referring to “in-house corporate counsel”); Graham v. State Farm Mutual

Insurance Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999) (same). 

9

See, e.g., Sterling v. Stewart, 158 F.3d 1199, 1201, 1203 (11th Cir. 1998) (referring

to outside counsel as “corporate counsel”); Stepak v. Addison, 20 F.3d 398, 404-05 (11th

Cir. 1994) (same). 

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Zack as “corporate counsel.”7 While a corporate counsel may be an employee,8 the term

may also refer to outside counsel.9

 Here, it is uncontroverted that Zack was not employed

by IHS in August 2006. (Doc. 14, Zack Affidavit). It is also uncontroverted that, in

August 2006 and for several years preceding, IHS had no officers, employees or agents

and was inactive, awaiting dissolution. (Id.). The Court cannot conclude that the outside

counsel of an inactive corporation with no officers, employees or agents exercises broad

executive responsibilities on a continuing basis. 

Appointment to accept service can be express or implied, but such authority must

actually exist. Moore’s, § 4.53[2][c]. The mere fact that Zack is IHS’s corporate counsel

cannot serve the purpose, because “[s]ervice of process is not effective on an attorney

solely by virtue of his capacity as legal counsel for the defendant.” Shelley v. Bayou

Metals, 577 F.2d 1209, 1210 (5th Cir. 1977); accord United States v. Ziegler Bolts & Parts

Co., 111 F.3d 878, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Schultz v. Schultz, 436 F.2d 635, 639 (7th Cir.

1971). 

Nor can the statements concerning Zack by employees of Fundamental Health show

that she was authorized to receive process. First, the employees did not say that Zack was

authorized by IHS to accept service of process but only that she was “authorized to

accept” or “can receive for IHS,” without addressing process specifically. Second, there is

nothing in the record from which to draw a reasonable inference that employees of a

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10They may not have accomplished even this much, since Piazza did not deliver the

documents to the receptionist but left them on the counter.

11IHS points out that the summons that Piazza attempted to serve failed to comply

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a) because it was not signed by the clerk and did

not bear the seal of the Court. (Doc. 14 at 3). The Court agrees, but this appears to be an

attack on the sufficiency of process, and IHS has not moved for dismissal pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(4).

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separate entity had knowledge of Zack’s authority from IHS. 

The plaintiffs have identified no potential legal source for Zack’s appointment by

law to accept service of process, and the Court declines to conduct such a search on their

behalf. In short, the plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence or argument that could

create an issue as to whether service of process on Zack would constitute service on IHS.

Even could the plaintiffs surmount this hurdle, they did not in fact serve Zack. 

Instead, they served a receptionist with the independent company of Fundamental Health,10

and did so despite being warned that the receptionist had no authority to accept service and

that she would throw the papers away. The receptionist plainly was not authorized to

accept service on behalf of IHS, and there is no evidence from which to draw a reasonable

inference that, despite multiple warnings to the contrary, she delivered the process to Zack. 

Under these circumstances, delivery to the receptionist cannot constitute proper service.

See, e.g., O.J. Distributing, Inc. v. Hornell Brewing Co., 340 F.3d 345, 347, 354 (6th Cir.

2003) (process signed for by a receptionist did not constitute service on an authorized

agent); Woodbury v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 152 F.R.D. 229, 235 (M.D. Fla. 1993)

(assuming for purposes of argument the existence of a “re-delivery” doctrine, it cannot

apply when the recipient informs the server that she is unauthorized to accept service of

process and neither delivers the process to the proper person while the server waits nor

promises that she will do so).11 

C. Evasion of Service.

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The plaintiffs argue that IHS “has engaged in a pattern of evasiveness to thwart

service of process.” (Doc. 13 at 1). They identify the circumstances forming this pattern

as consisting of: (1) the failed attempt to perfect service in August 2006; (2) Zack’s

subsequent telephone call to Piazza, informing him that she had secured a restraining order

against him and that he would be arrested if he visited the Fundamental Health office

again; and (3) the refusal of IHS’s trial counsel to inform plaintiffs’ counsel of the identity

and address of the individual(s) who can accept service on behalf of IHS. (Id. at 5-6). 

These circumstances do not, individually or cumulatively, raise any inference that

IHS has improperly evaded service. The plaintiffs do not suggest, and certainly offer no

evidence, that Zack was not in fact traveling but was instead hiding in Fundamental

Health’s offices when Piazza attempted to serve her. Given the lack of evidence that Zack

was authorized to accept service of process, it is immaterial whether Zack was hiding or

that she obtained a restraining order. Counsel’s refusal to educate the plaintiffs on how to

effect proper service was perfectly appropriate, as a defendant has no responsibility to

volunteer such information. Cf. Moore’s, § 4.10[1][b] (discussing waiver of service under

Rule 4(d)) (“Corporations are not obligated to inform the plaintiff of the identity of the

person appointed to accept service on behalf of the corporation.”). 

D. Discovery.

The plaintiffs move for discovery into whether IHS is avoiding service; of the

identity of the individual(s) able to accept service for IHS; and to determine whether

another entity may have succeeded to IHS’s liability for the wrongs they allege. (Doc. 15

at 5). As discussed in Part C, the plaintiffs have no evidence even suggesting that IHS is

evading service and thus no basis for conducting discovery on this issue. As also

discussed in Part C, a defendant has no obligation to tell a plaintiff how to serve it, and a

necessary corollary is that a plaintiff cannot sue a defendant and then, without serving the

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defendant, compel it through discovery to identify its authorized agents for service of

process. The possibility that a different entity may be a potential defendant is irrelevant to

whether IHS is entitled to dismissal for failure to serve process.

E. Service by Publication.

Without amplification, the plaintiffs “move the Court to allow defendant to be

served via publication.” (Doc. 13 at 9). Alabama law provides for service by publication

in certain situations but, in order for it to be triggered, the plaintiff or counsel must submit

an affidavit setting forth facts demonstrating that the defendant is avoiding service, and the

process server must endorse the fact that service cannot be obtained and state the reason. 

Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.3(c), (d)(1). The plaintiff has not attempted to satisfy these requirements,

even after IHS pointed them out in its reply brief. (Doc. 14 at 10-11). They have thus

forfeited any opportunity to invoke Rule 4.3. 

F. Relief.

The complaint was filed in state court in July 2005 and removed to this Court in

June 2006. The action has thus languished over 18 months without service of process,

including almost 8 months in this Court. After three plainly ineffective attempts at service

in 2005, the plaintiffs have made only a single effort at service in the past year. The

plaintiffs have not completed service within the 120 days required by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(m). This failure exposes the complaint to dismissal without prejudice. Id. 

However, if the plaintiffs provide good cause for their failure, the Court must grant

additional time to perfect service. Id. Good cause exists “only when some outside factor

such as reliance on faulty advice, rather than inadvertence or negligence, prevented

service.” Prisco v. Frank, 929 F.2d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1991). IHS’s inactive status and its

dearth of officers and employees are outside factors that have complicated the plaintiffs’

task, but the plaintiffs’ failure to make more than desultory efforts at service or even

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investigation over such an extended period reflects that internal factors such as

inadvertence or negligence are responsible for the failure to effect service. 

“Rule 4(m) grants discretion to the district court to extend the time for service of

process even in the absence of a showing of good cause.” Horenkamp v. Van Winkle &

Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005). Factors to consider include whether the

defendant is evading service, whether it is concealing defects in service, and whether the

statute of limitations will bar the refiling of the lawsuit should it be dismissed. Id. Here,

there is no indication that IHS is evading service or concealing defects in service. While

dismissal will subject the lawsuit to a limitations defense, “the running of the statute of

limitations does not require that a district court extend the time for service of process

under” Rule 4(m). Id. at 1133. Given that the plaintiffs have had more than four times the

amount of time provided in Rule 4(m) in which to perfect service, given their sparse

efforts to accomplish service, and given that over 51⁄2 years have now elapsed since the

events made the subject of the complaint, the Court concludes that no extension of time to

perfect service should be granted.

G. IHS Management, Inc.

The plaintiffs have not served co-defendant Management, and their complaint

against this defendant is likewise subject to dismissal under Rule 4(m). Even after the

Court in August 2006 pointed out the plaintiffs’ failure to serve Management, (Doc. 9), the

plaintiffs offered no cause and thus no good cause for their failure. For the same reasons

provided with respect to IHS, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs should not be given

additional time to serve this defendant.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, IHS’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the

plaintiffs’ motions for leave to conduct discovery and to serve by publication are denied. 

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This action is dismissed without prejudice.

DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of January, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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