Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01134/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01134-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY W. JONES; STEPHANNI 

JONES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AEGIS WHOLESALE CORPORATION; 

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE; MORTGAGE 

ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 

SYSTEMS INC.; U.S. BANK, 

N.A.; WACHOVIA BANK, N.A. 

a/k/a WELLS FARGO; BANK OF 

AMERICA, N.A.; and DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-01134-JAM-CKD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, U.S.BANK 

AND MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 

REGISTRATION SYSTEM INC.’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ 

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Timothy and Stephanni Jones (“Plaintiffs”) sued 

their mortgage servicer and several other financial institutions 

involved in foreclosing on their home, alleging defects in 

securitization and mishandling of their loan modification 

application. Three defendants, Nationstar Mortgage, U.S. Bank, 

and the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (“MERS”) 

(collectively, “Defendants”) now move to dismiss. For the 

reasons explained below, the Court grants in part and denies in 

part Defendants’ motion.1

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for November 18, 2015.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs took out a mortgage on their home at 5010 No Name 

Road in Loomis, California in May 2005. FAC ¶ 8. When the 

property went into foreclosure nearly ten years later, Plaintiffs 

applied for a loan modification through their mortgage servicer, 

Defendant Nationstar. See FAC ¶¶ 11-13. Plaintiffs allege that 

Nationstar failed to appropriately respond to their application. 

See FAC ¶¶ 15-18. Plaintiffs contend that the trustee for the 

foreclosure sale, Defendant U.S. Bank, and the “purported nominee 

for the beneficiary[,]” Defendant MERS, are liable for 

Nationstar’s wrongdoing. FAC ¶¶ 40-41. Plaintiffs also contest 

whether Defendants are “authorized” to conduct the foreclosure

sale due to defects in the chain of title. FAC ¶ 95. 

Within eight days of submitting their loan modification 

application, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court 

for the County of Placer against Defendants Nationstar, U.S. 

Bank, MERS, and several other financial institutions (Doc. #1). 

Plaintiffs alleged four causes of action for (1) Wrongful 

foreclosure; (2) Violation of California Civil Code section 

2924(a)(6); (3) Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing; and (4) Declaratory relief. Following removal, all 

defendants moved to dismiss (Docs. ##12, 14, 23). The Court 

granted the motions, but allowed leave to amend as to the claims 

against Defendants Nationstar, U.S. Bank, and MERS (Docs. ##44, 

45, 48, 53). 

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a first amended complaint 

(Doc. #47, “FAC”) asserting the same four causes of action, as 

well as claims for violations of 12 CFR section 1024.41, 

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California Civil Code sections 2923.4, 2923.7, and 2924.10, and 

violations of the Unfair Competition Law (California Business and 

Professions Code section 17200 et seq., “UCL”). Defendants have 

again moved to dismiss (Doc. #51), and Plaintiffs oppose the 

motion (Doc. #54).

II. OPINION

A. Judicial Notice

Defendants seek judicial notice of nine documents. The 

first five - a deed of trust, two assignments of the deed of 

trust, a substitution of trustee, and a notice of default – were 

each recorded in the Placer County Recorder’s Office. 

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (Doc. #52, “RJN”) at 2. 

Because these documents are in the public record and not subject 

to reasonable dispute, the Court takes judicial notice of them. 

Fed. R. Evid. 201; see Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of 

Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006); Lee v. 

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 662, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).

The final four documents purport to be “Denial Letter[s]” 

sent by Nationstar to Plaintiffs. Defendants offer no argument 

for why these documents are judicially noticeable, and Plaintiffs 

in fact dispute them. See Opp. at 8. Defendants’ request as to 

these four documents is therefore denied.

B. Analysis

1. First Cause of Action: Violation of 12 CFR

Section 1024.41

Defendants argue that this first cause of action should be 

dismissed because the regulation at issues does not apply to U.S. 

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Bank or MERS, and that Nationstar complied with the regulation. 

Mot. at 5-6. In particular according to Defendants, Nationstar 

need not comply with the duties the FAC identifies, because 

Plaintiffs submitted multiple loan modification applications. 

Mot. at 6. Plaintiffs do not address the first issue, but argue 

that they did not submit multiple applications. Opp. at 4-6.

As to the first issue, the Court agrees with Defendants. 

The regulation concerns actions that must be taken by a mortgage 

“servicer.” See generally 12 CFR § 1024.41. According to the 

FAC, Defendants U.S. Bank and MERS were not servicers, but rather 

the trustee and a “purported nominee for the beneficiary[,]” 

respectively. FAC ¶¶ 40-41. The only way the FAC attempts to 

link U.S. Bank and MERS to Nationstar’s actions is by stating 

that U.S. Bank “as Trustee of the Securitized Trust is liable for 

the actions of the servicer because its actions are within the 

scope of said agency relationship, Nationstar being an agent of 

U.S. Bank.” FAC ¶ 40. The FAC then states that MERS is also 

liable, based on the same agency relationship between U.S. Bank 

and Nationstar. FAC ¶ 41. Thus, according to Plaintiffs, the 

servicer (Nationstar) is the agent of the trustee (U.S. Bank) -

and somehow this also makes the “purported nominee for the 

beneficiary” (MERS) liable.

Plaintiffs point to no rule of California law that makes a 

servicer the agent of a trustee. Rather, in general “[t]he law 

indulges no presumption that an agency exists but instead 

presumes that a person is acting for himself and not as agent for 

another.” Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 725 F. Supp. 

2d 862, 882 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Walsh v. Am. Trust, 7 

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Cal.App.2d 654, 659 (1935)). Because of this presumption, a 

plaintiff “must allege facts demonstrating the principal’s 

control over its agent.” Imageline, Inc. v. CafePress.com, Inc.,

2011 WL 1322525, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2011). Because 

Plaintiffs have pled no facts demonstrating such control, the 

Court dismisses this cause of action as to Defendants U.S. Bank 

and MERS.

As to Nationstar, Defendants rely on documents provided in 

Defendants’ RJN to argue that that they complied with the 

regulation and that Plaintiffs submitted multiple requests for 

loan modifications. See Mot. at 6-7 (asserting that Plaintiffs’ 

version of events is incomplete and citing RJN exhibits 6-9). 

But, as discussed above, these documents purporting to be

communications between Nationstar and Plaintiffs are not

judicially noticeable, so the Court cannot rely on them in ruling 

on this motion to dismiss.

Instead, the Court must look to the facts contained in the 

FAC. The FAC alleges that Plaintiffs were engaged in a single 

attempt to receive a loan modification, and that Nationstar 

failed to comply with at least some aspects of section 1024.41 in 

handling that modification. For example, Plaintiffs allege – and

the Court must accept as true – that Nationstar did not 

“determine whether the [] submitted loan modification application 

represented a complete . . . application” or send notice to 

Plaintiffs within five days, see FAC ¶ 30, as required by section 

1024.41(b)(2)(i). 

Because the FAC adequately alleges a violation of this 

section, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss this

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first claim as it relates to Nationstar.

2. Second Cause of Action: Violation of California 

Civil Code Section 2923.4

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a cause of 

action under California Civil Code section 2923.4, because there 

is no private right of action under this section. Mot. at 7. 

Plaintiff does not address this argument, but rather enumerates 

the statutory language and repeats the factual allegations of the 

FAC. See Opp. at 6-7. 

The Court agrees with Defendants that section 2923.4 does 

not provide an independent cause of action; it “merely defines 

the [statutory] intent[.]” Weber v. PNC Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 

269473, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2015) (“The Court agrees that 

section 2923.4 alone cannot sustain Plaintiffs' cause of 

action.”). The Court therefore dismisses this cause of action 

without leave to amend. Resolving the issue on this basis, the 

Court does not reach Defendants’ further arguments that any 

violation has been “corrected and remedied” and that the statute 

only applies to servicers.

3. Third Cause of Action: Violation of California 

Civil Code Section 2923.7

Defendants next move to dismiss the claim for violation of

California Civil Code section 2923.7, which requires appointment 

of a single point of contact in connection with a loan 

modification application. Mot. at 9-10. They argue first that

the requirement to appoint a single point of contact was not 

triggered because Plaintiffs never requested one. Mot. at 9.

They further argue that Plaintiffs cannot sustain the claim 

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because they were neither “prejudiced” nor “damaged.” Mot. at 9-

10. Defendants cite almost no cases to support any of these 

arguments. And each argument fails.

As to the first argument, the statutory language does not 

support the idea that a plaintiff must specifically request a 

single point of contact. The section states, “Upon request from 

a borrower who requests a foreclosure prevention alternative, the 

mortgage servicer shall promptly establish a single point of 

contact[.]” Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.7(a). Defendants’ argument 

suggests that the “request[] [of] a foreclosure prevention 

alternative” is different from the prefatory language “[u]pon 

request.” Courts are split as to whether two separate requests 

are required. Jerviss v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 2015 

WL 7572130, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2015) (collecting cases). 

This Court agrees with those cases finding no requirement that 

the borrower specifically request a single point of contact. 

Indeed, a natural reading of the statute indicates that a single 

point of contact must be established when the borrower requests a 

foreclosure prevention alternative. See Penermon v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A., 47 F. Supp. 3d 982, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“A plain 

reading of the statute requires Wells Fargo to assign a [single 

point of contact] when a borrower requests a foreclosure 

prevention alternative.”). Moreover, Defendants’ interpretation

would effectively require borrowers to have knowledge of the 

intricacies of the Civil Code in order to invoke their right to a 

single point of contact. Such a result would contravene the 

statutory purpose of ensuring that “borrowers are considered for, 

and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss 

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mitigation options[.]” Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.4(a).

The Court also disagrees with Defendants’ other arguments 

that Plaintiffs must plead that they were “prejudiced” or 

“damaged.” Defendants state that “[f]or a violation of § 2923.7, 

Plaintiffs must allege both that a trustee’s deed upon sale has 

been recorded and that they suffered ‘actual economic 

damages[.]’” Mot. at 10:6-9 (emphasis in original). That 

position is wrong as a matter of law, where – as here – no 

foreclosure sale has yet occurred. See Hernandez v. Specialized 

Loan Servicing, LLC, 2015 WL 350223, at *4-*5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 

2015) (“[N]o trustee’s sale [has occurred]. [citations omitted] 

Thus, Hernandez need not have suffered an economic loss to bring 

her § 2923.7 claim . . . .”); cf. Chaghouri v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A., 2015 WL 65291, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015) (“[S]ection 

2924.12(a)’s enactment gives borrowers a right to obtain 

injunctive relief based upon violation of section 2924.17 

regardless of any showing of pecuniary harm.”); Rahbarian v. JP 

Morgan Chase, 2014 WL 5823103, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014)

(“The Court holds [] that Plaintiff need not plead harm to make a 

claim under section 2924.12(a) for a violation of section 

2924.17.”). 

Because Plaintiffs’ claim is not deficient on the bases

Defendants identified, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss this third cause of action.

4. Fourth Cause of Action: Violation of California 

Civil Code Section 2924.10

Defendants next assert that the section 2924.10 claim is 

deficient because it applies only to loan servicers (so not MERS 

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or U.S. Bank) and that Nationstar in fact complied with this 

section. Mot. at 10. Plaintiffs do not address the first 

argument, but state that whether Nationstar complied is a factual 

question that the Court should not resolve at this time. Opp. at 

8-9.

The Court agrees that the language of section 2924.10 places 

a duty only on a mortgage servicer. See Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 2924.10(a) (“[T]he mortgage servicer shall provide written 

acknowledgment of the receipt of the documentation within five 

business days of receipt . . . .”). As discussed above, MERS and 

U.S. Bank cannot be held liable for the alleged wrongdoing by the 

servicer under the facts alleged in the FAC. The Court therefore 

dismisses those defendants from this cause of action.

Concerning Nationstar’s conduct, Defendants contend that 

“Nationstar sent Plaintiffs written acknowledgement of the loan 

modification submission” three days after Plaintiffs submitted 

the application. Mot. at 10:26-27. To support this statement, 

Defendants rely on Exhibit 9 of its RJN, which purports to be the 

letter Nationstar sent to Plaintiffs. But as discussed above, 

the Court cannot take judicial notice of that document. 

Rather, the Court must take the allegations in the FAC as 

true. The FAC states that Plaintiffs “submitted a full and 

completed loan modification application to Defendant Nationstar” 

and that Nationstar “did not provide written acknowledgement 

within five business days of receipt of [the application.]” FAC 

¶¶ 13, 58. These allegations state a violation of section 

2924.10, and the Court therefore denies the motion to dismiss 

this claim as to Nationstar.

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5. Fifth Cause of Action: Wrongful Foreclosure

Plaintiffs base their wrongful foreclosure claim entirely on 

defects in securitization. See FAC ¶ 72. The allegations are 

almost identical to those made in the original complaint, which 

the Court found inadequate. The only new allegations are 

(1) that Defendant U.S. Bank is liable because of the “agency 

relationship” between U.S. Bank and Nationstar, (2) that MERS is 

liable based on the same agency relationship, and (3) that 

“Defendants’ unlawful conduct caused Plaintiffs damages in an 

amount to be proven at trial.” FAC ¶¶ 77-79. 

Plaintiffs’ allegations remain inadequate to support their 

wrongful foreclosure claim. Plaintiffs have not even attempted 

to argue otherwise; their opposition does not address the 

wrongful foreclosure cause of action. The Court agrees with 

Defendants that Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge 

defects in securitization by way of this cause of action. See

Flores v. EMC Mortg. Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1104 (E.D. Cal. 

2014). Plaintiffs’ new allegation that “Defendants’ unlawful 

conduct caused Plaintiffs damages” is a legal conclusion and does 

not provide any factual basis for standing. Lacking standing, 

Plaintiffs cannot maintain this claim. 

Because Plaintiffs have been unable to support this cause of 

action with any facts showing entitlement to relief, the Court 

concludes that amendment would be futile. The Court therefore 

dismisses this cause of action without leave to amend. Resolving 

the issue on the basis of standing, the Court does not reach 

Defendants’ further arguments about the propriety of the 

securitization method and the fact that foreclosure has yet to 

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occur.

6. Sixth Cause of Action: Violation of California 

Civil Code Section 2924(a)(6)

Defendants raise the same arguments to challenge Plaintiffs’ 

claim under California Civil Code section 2924(a)(6). Mot. at 

11-14. In response, Plaintiffs simply reiterate that the 

securitization was improper and then discuss Defendants’ alleged 

violations of other statutes, such as Defendants’ failure to 

properly assist and consider Plaintiffs’ loan modification

application. Mot. at 9-10.

Section 2924 may confer a private right of action for 

Plaintiffs to challenge securitization. Maomanivong v. Nat'l 

City Mortgage Co., 2014 WL 4623873, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 

2014). But even assuming that it does, Plaintiffs’ claim still 

fails. In particular, foreclosure has not yet occurred so the 

claim is premature. Rahbarian v. JP Morgan Chase, 2014 WL 

5823103, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014) (“[M]ost courts hold 

that [a claim] based on chain of title defects [is] premature if 

brought before sale.”) (collecting cases). The Court therefore 

dismisses this cause of action without leave to amend and does 

not reach Defendants’ remaining arguments attacking it.

7. Seventh Cause of Action: Breach of the Covenant 

of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Defendant urges the Court to dismiss the claim for breach of 

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because it does not 

identify a contract provision allegedly frustrated by Defendants. 

Mot. at 15. Plaintiff counters that “[o]verall, the actions of 

the Defendants breached the implied contractual obligations of 

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the Deed of Trust and the actual contractual provisions of the 

adjustable rate rider.” Opp. at 12:3-4. 

The Court agrees with Defendants, because Plaintiffs’ theory 

of this claim forecloses their argument about contractual 

obligations. The basis for this claim is the allegedly defective 

securitization. See FAC ¶ 96 (“[T]he named Defendants breached 

the implied covenant by recording documents with the county 

recorded [sic] indicating Defendants were a beneficiary of the 

loan . . . .”). That is, Defendants attempted to foreclose on 

Plaintiffs’ home, even though the chain of title had been broken 

and Defendants were not “authorized” to foreclose. FAC ¶ 95. 

The problem is that a “prerequisite for any action for breach of 

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is the 

existence of a contractual relationship between the parties[.]” 

Spencer v. DHI Mortg. Co., Ltd., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1165 (E.D. 

Cal. 2009) (quoting Smith v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 225 

Cal.App.3d 38, 49 (1990)). And Plaintiffs’ theory here is that 

no valid contract existed due to the alleged defects in the chain 

of title.

Because Plaintiffs cannot plead a valid contract under this 

theory, the Court dismisses this cause of action without leave to 

amend. Resolving the issue on that basis, the Court does not 

reach the parties’ arguments about the availability of tort 

versus contract remedies.

8. Causes of Action Addressed Beyond the Page 

Limitations of Defendants’ Motion

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ eighth and ninth 

causes of action for violations of the UCL and for declaratory 

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relief. See Mot. at 17-22. Defendants make these arguments 

beyond the page limit the Court permits for motions to dismiss. 

See Order re Filing Requirements (Doc. #3) at 1:19-23 (“Memoranda 

of law in support of and in opposition to [certain motions 

including motions to dismiss] are limited to fifteen (15) pages 

. . . . [T]he Court will not consider any arguments made past 

the page limit.”). However, Defendants’ reply repeats many of 

the same arguments within its page limit, see Reply at 5, and 

Plaintiff has had the opportunity to address the arguments, see

Opp. at 12-14. The Court will therefore consider the motion as 

to these final causes of action to the extent Defendants’ 

arguments are discussed within the page limitations of the reply. 

9. Eighth Cause of Action: Violation of the UCL

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ UCL claim on the 

basis that the FAC does not “demonstrate any conduct by 

Defendants that could be classified as unlawful, fraudulent, or 

unfair.” Reply at 5:10-12. The Court declines to dismiss this 

cause of action, because Plaintiffs have alleged viable claims 

under the first, third, and fourth causes of action, thereby 

satisfying the UCL’s unlawful prong. See Herron v. Best Buy Co. 

Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1177 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“Under the 

UCL’s ‘unlawful’ prong, violations of other laws are ‘borrowed’

and made independently actionable under the UCL.”) (citing Cel–

Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 

180 (1999)).

10. Ninth Cause of Action: Declaratory Relief

Finally, Defendants argue that the declaratory relief cause 

of action is deficient because the FAC demonstrates no “present 

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and actual controversy.” Reply at 5. Defendants are incorrect 

as to that point, in that Plaintiffs have alleged viable claims, 

discussed above. The Court therefore will not dismiss this cause 

of action.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART 

AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The first and 

fourth causes of action are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as 

to Defendants U.S. Bank and MERS. The motion is DENIED as to 

those same claims against Defendant Nationstar. The Court 

further GRANTS the motion WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the 

second, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action in their 

entirety. The Court DENIES the motion as to the third, eighth, 

and ninth claims in their entirety. 

Finally, as mentioned above, Defendants’ motion is seven 

pages beyond the page limit. In accordance with the Court’s 

standing order, sanctions are hereby imposed against Defendants’

counsel, Wright Finlay & Zak LLP, in the amount of $350.00. See

Order re Filing Requirements at 1:22-23 (cautioning that the 

Court will impose sanctions “against counsel in the amount of 

$50.00 per page” beyond the page limit of fifteen pages). This 

amount is to be paid by counsel within ten days of the date of 

this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 17, 2015

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