Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01610/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01610-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAUNDRE CLEMON

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-1610 MCE EFB P

vs.

SCOTT KERNAN, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with an application for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a September 12, 2003

judgment of conviction entered against him in the Placer County Superior Court on charges of

two counts of grand theft, two counts of uttering fictitious checks, and two counts of second

degree burglary, with an allegation that petitioner committed the offenses while released on his

own recognizance in another pending case. He seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) jury

instruction error violated his right to due process; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to

support one of his convictions for grand theft. Upon careful consideration of the record and the

applicable law, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief

be denied.

////

Case 2:05-cv-01610-MCE -EFB Document 16 Filed 02/25/10 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 The following summary is drawn from the October 5, 2004 opinion by the California

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pp. 1-2, filed in this

court on October 4, 2005, as Lodged Doc. 1. This court presumes that the state court’s findings

of fact are correct unless petitioner rebuts that presumption with clear and convincing evidence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner has

not overcome the presumption with respect to the underlying events. The court will therefore

rely on the state court’s recitation of the facts. 

2

I. Procedural and Factual Background1

A jury convicted defendant Laundre Randell Clemon of two counts

of grand theft (Pen.Code, § 487, subd. (a); further section

references are to this code), two counts of uttering fictitious checks

(§ 476), and two counts of second degree burglary (§ 459), and

found that he committing the crimes while released on bail or his

own recognizance in another case (§ 12022.1). He was sentenced

to a state prison term of three years four months to run

consecutively to a term imposed in another case.

* * *

On September 25, 2002, defendant went into a jewelry store and

bought a man’s ring for $402.17. He paid for the ring with a check

written on his bank account that had been overdrawn and closed

for nearly five years. He initialed a sales slip with the name and

address on the check.

The next day, defendant brought a woman into the jewelry store

and bought two more rings, again paying by check drawn on his

closed account. Before defendant picked up the receipt, the owner

discovered the check was drawn on a long-closed account. 

Defendant left with the rings. The owner called the police and

followed defendant.

Roseville police recovered one ring and partial checkbooks from

defendant’s pockets.

Defendant’s mother testified she told him before the thefts that she

was going to deposit more than $1,000 into his account but forgot

to do so.

II. Analysis

A. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

Case 2:05-cv-01610-MCE -EFB Document 16 Filed 02/25/10 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established

United States Supreme Court precedents “if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in [Supreme Court] cases’, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (it is “not

enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a

‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court

judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court reaches a

decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

////

Case 2:05-cv-01610-MCE -EFB Document 16 Filed 02/25/10 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

B. Petitioner’s Claims

1. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner’s first claim is that one of the jury instructions given by the trial court lessened

the prosecutor’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner committed each

element of the charged crimes. 

This claim was rejected by the California Court of Appeal in a written decision on

petitioner’s direct appeal, and by the California Supreme Court without comment on petition for

review. Lodged Docs. 1, 2. The California Court of Appeal explained the background to the

claim and its reasoning thereon as follows:

Defendant contends the trial court “irremediably confused the

jurors” by modifying CALJIC No. 2.61 (the right of a defendant to

rely upon the evidence and not to testify) by inserting a sentence

from CALJIC No. 2.72 (the need for a corpus delicti to be proved

before a confession or admission is considered). As we will

explain, although the court’s combination of instructions was

erroneous, they did not lower the prosecution’s burden of proof as

defendant claims.

When reading the instructions, the trial court inexplicably

instructed the jury:

“In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may choose to

rely on the state of the evidence and upon the failure, if any, of the

People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element

of the charge or charges against him.

“No lack of testify [ sic ] on the defendant’s part will make up for a

failure of proof by the People so as to support a finding against

him on any such essential element. No person may be convicted of

a criminal offense unless there is some proof of each element of

the crime.

“And in just a moment, I’ll be telling you about the alleged crimes

and going through the elements one by one. The identity of the

person alleged to have ... committed a crime is not an element of

the crime.” (Italics added.)

////

////

////

Case 2:05-cv-01610-MCE -EFB Document 16 Filed 02/25/10 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

 Fidelity to the actual language of CALJIC instructions and the guidance provided by

the accompanying Use Notes is always the better approach. Deviation from the norm is quite

often confusing and invites trouble, in addition to unnecessary litigation.

5

Thus, the trial court began with CALJIC No. 2.61, properly

instructing the jury that a defendant need not testify and then, for

unknown reasons, jumped to CALJIC No. 2.72.2

We determine the correctness of jury instructions by examining the

entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an

instruction or from a particular instruction. (People v. Burgener

(1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538.) We also presume that the jury is

capable of following the instructions as given. (People v..

Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1337.) “[N]ot every ambiguity,

inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level

of a due process violation. The question is ‘”whether the ailing

instruction ... so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process.”’ [Citations.] ‘”[A] single

instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but

must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.”’ [Citations].

If the charge as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether

there is a ‘”reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the

challenged instruction in a way” that violates the Constitution.’ 

[Citations.]” (Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, ---- [158

L.Ed.2d 701, 707].)

We agree with defendant that no portion of CALJIC No. 2.72 was

applicable to this case because no confession or admission was in

evidence. We also agree the “some evidence” requirement for the

corpus delicti is different than the beyond a reasonable doubt

standard for conviction.

However, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s

instructional error. The jury was properly instructed with

definitions of reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and

the burden of proof, and it was told to disregard inapplicable

instructions. (CALJIC Nos. 1.01, 2.90, 17.31.) Considering the

entire charge of the court, the jury would not have understood the

incorrect instructions to allow a conviction without the prosecutor

having proved each element of the charges beyond a reasonable

doubt. In other words, the erroneous inclusion of parts of CALJIC

No. 2.72 was harmless.

Opinion at 2-5.

As explained by the California Court of Appeal, the trial judge read the entire text of

CALJIC No. 2.61 to petitioner’s jury, including the portion which described the People’s burden

Case 2:05-cv-01610-MCE -EFB Document 16 Filed 02/25/10 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

 CALJIC 2.61 provides as follows:

In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may choose to

rely on the state of the evidence and upon the failure, if any, of the

People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element

of the charge against [him] [her]. No lack of testimony on

defendant’s part will make up for a failure of proof by the People

so as to support a finding against [him] [her] on any essential

element.

4

 CALJIC 2.72 provides as follows:

No person may be convicted of a criminal offense unless there is

some proof of each element of the crime independent of any

[confession] [or] [admission] made by [him] [her] outside of this

trial.

The identity of the person who is alleged to have committed a

crime is not an element of the crime [nor is the degree of the

crime]. The identity [or degree of the crime] may be established by

[a] [an] [confession] [or] [admission].

6

“to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the charge against [petitioner].”3

Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 299-300. However, the court then instructed the jury

with a portion of CALJIC 2.72, to the effect that “no person may be convicted of a criminal

offense unless there is some proof of each element of the crime . . . .” Id. at 300 (emphasis

added).4 Petitioner is apparently arguing that this portion of CALJIC 2.72 may have led the jury

to believe that the prosecutor was only required to prove each element of the charges against

petitioner with “some proof,” and not with proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” He argues that

this constituted “structural error” because it lowered the prosecutor’s burden of proof beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (constitutionally deficient

reasonable-doubt instruction required reversal of conviction); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358

(1970) (due process clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the charged crime).

////

Case 2:05-cv-01610-MCE -EFB Document 16 Filed 02/25/10 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

In general, a challenge to jury instructions alone does not state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982));

Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to warrant federal habeas

relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even

“universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due process right guaranteed by the fourteenth

amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Cupp v.

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail on such a claim petitioner must demonstrate

“that an erroneous instruction ‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 317 (quoting Darnell v. Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir.

1987)). In making its determination, this court must evaluate the challenged jury instructions

“‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process.’” Id.

(quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1984)). Further, in reviewing an

allegedly ambiguous instruction, the court “must inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable

likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the

Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)).

The California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s jury instruction error was

harmless because the jury instructions as a whole correctly explained the prosecutor’s burden of

proof to the jury. Specifically, the state court concluded that because petitioner’s jury was

correctly instructed on the definition of “reasonable doubt,” the presumption of innocence, and

the burden of proof, the jury would “not have understood the incorrect instructions to allow a

conviction without the prosecutor having proved each element of the charges beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Opinion at 4-5.

In order to grant habeas relief where a state court has determined that a constitutional

error was harmless, a reviewing court must determine: (1) that the state court’s decision was

“contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court harmless error precedent, and

(2) that the petitioner suffered prejudice from the constitutional error, as that term is defined in

Case 2:05-cv-01610-MCE -EFB Document 16 Filed 02/25/10 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

Brecht. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18 (2003); Inthavong v. LaMarque, 420 F.3d 1055,

1059 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (“in § 2254

proceedings a federal court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a statecourt criminal trial under the ‘substantial and injurious effect’ standard set forth in Brecht, 507

U.S. 619, whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for

harmlessness under the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard set forth in Chapman [v.

California], 386 U.S. 18 ”). Both of these tests must be satisfied before relief can be granted and,

because both must be satisfied, a court need not address them in any particular order. Inthavong,

420 F.3d at 1061.

Harmless error determinations are highly fact-specific. They often

involve a review of the entire trial record. Under Brecht, we will

often make numerous independent evaluations about the weight

and sufficiency of the various items of evidence, the inferences to

be drawn, and the different theories of the case. Under AEDPA,

we simply concern ourselves with the reasonableness of the

evaluations and conclusions that the state court explicitly or

implicitly made, although requiring the state court to meet the

more stringent ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard.

Id. at 1060. Moreover, this court’s view of what is reasonable is not determinative; if the state

court’s evaluation is also reasonable, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief under the AEDPA. 

Kessee v. Mendoza-Powers, 574 F.3d 675, 676 (9th Cir. 2009). 

This court agrees with the California Court of Appeal that the trial court’s erroneous

instruction to the jury did not result in prejudice in this case. Petitioner’s jury was correctly

instructed on the definition of reasonable doubt and the burden of proof, and was also instructed

on the prosecutor’s burden to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the

charge or charges against him.” RT at 299-300. The jury was instructed to consider the

instructions as a whole and not to single out any particular instruction. Id. at 291. In addition, as

noted by respondents, the trial court gave the erroneous instruction in an attempt to clarify for

the jury that petitioner’s failure to testify could not fill any evidentiary gaps in the prosecution’s

case, and not to define the prosecutor’s burden of proof. Under these circumstances, the court’s

Case 2:05-cv-01610-MCE -EFB Document 16 Filed 02/25/10 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

erroneous but vague reference to “some proof of each element of the crime” could not have

caused the jury to disregard the other instructions on the correct burden of proof. See Weeks v.

Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000); (the jury is presumed to follow the jury instructions);

United States v. Reed, 147 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 1998) (same). There is no evidence the jury

misunderstood the instructions to require a lesser burden from the prosecutor than proof beyond

a reasonable doubt. The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that this jury instruction error

was harmless is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court

precedent. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

2. Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner claims that the evidence introduced at his trial was insufficient to support his

conviction on count one, grand theft of personal property. Pet. at 5. He argues, “a conviction for

larceny by false pretense requires a false representation beyond the passing of a false check.” Id.

This claim was rejected by the California Court of Appeal in a written decision on

petitioner’s direct appeal, and by the California Supreme Court without comment on petition for

review. Lodged Docs. 1, 2. The California Court of Appeal explained its reasoning as follows:

Defendant claims there was insufficient evidence that he

committed the theft in count one by false pretenses. Specifically,

he asserts that larceny by false pretenses “requires a false

representation beyond the passing of a false check” (caps.omitted)

and that there was no evidence he made either a note or

memorandum in writing, or orally, in addition to the check.

“‘To determine sufficiency of the evidence, we must inquire

whether a rational trier of fact could find defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. In this process we must view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the judgment and presume in favor of the

judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could

reasonably deduce from the evidence. To be sufficient, evidence

of each of the essential elements of the crime must be substantial

and we must resolve the question of sufficiency in light of the

record as a whole.’” (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312,

387, quoting People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 38; see Jackson

v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317-320 [61 L.Ed.2d 560,

572-574].)

////

Case 2:05-cv-01610-MCE -EFB Document 16 Filed 02/25/10 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

 The court struck, as inapplicable to the facts of this case, a third option set forth in

CALJIC No. 14.14, i.e., “The false pretense is proved by the testimony of two witnesses or that

of one witness and corroborating circumstances.”

10

Section 532, subdivision (b) provides certain requirements for the

elements of theft by false pretenses as reflected in CALJIC No.

14.14, given as follows:

“The defendant cannot be convicted of theft by false pretenses

unless:

“Number one, that false pretense or some note or memorandum

thereof is in [a] writing subscribed by the defendant or is in his

handwriting.

“Or, number two, on [ sic ] oral false pretense is accompanied by a

false token or writing.”5

Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence because the

check itself may not be considered as a writing subscribed by

defendant that accompanies the false representation, citing People

v. Mason (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 281, at page 288 (hereafter

Mason).

Assuming for purpose of discussion that Mason was decided

correctly, we conclude that the prosecution presented substantial

evidence of a writing subscribed by defendant which accompanied

defendant’s false pretense. The store manager testified that she put

defendant’s check address on the sales slip, not the address on his

identification card, because it was her practice to ask a customer

which address to use. Defendant initialed the sales slip at the time

he provided the false check and received the ring. This suffices as

a false writing, other than the check, subscribed by defendant that

accompanied his false representation and, thus, that supports his

conviction for the theft by false pretenses.

Opinion at 5-6.

The question before this court is whether the state court’s conclusion that sufficient

evidence supported petitioner’s conviction on count one is contrary to or an unreasonable

application of United States Supreme Court case law. There is sufficient evidence to support a

conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “[T]he dispositive question under

Case 2:05-cv-01610-MCE -EFB Document 16 Filed 02/25/10 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson, 443

U.S. at 318). A petitioner in a federal habeas corpus proceeding “faces a heavy burden when

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due

process grounds.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274, 1275 & n.13 (9th Cir. 2005). In order

to grant the writ, the habeas court must find that the decision of the state court reflected an

objectively unreasonable application of Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. Id.

The court must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is

challenged in habeas proceedings. Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441, 448 n.11 (9th Cir. 1985),

vacated on other grounds, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev’d, 483 U.S. 1 (1987). It is

the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw 

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. If the trier

of fact could draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the court in its review will assign

the inference that favors conviction. McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). The

relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether

the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict. United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th

Cir. 1991). “The question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt. It is whether rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” 

Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991). The federal habeas court determines the

sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as

defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Chein, 373 F.3d at 983.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and for the reasons

expressed by the state appellate court, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable

trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was guilty of grand theft,

as charged in count one. Accordingly, the conclusion of the state court that the jury’s finding as

true the burglary special circumstance allegation was supported by sufficient evidence is not

Case 2:05-cv-01610-MCE -EFB Document 16 Filed 02/25/10 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

contrary to United States Supreme Court authority and may not be set aside.

III. Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). In

his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the

event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: February 25, 2010.

Case 2:05-cv-01610-MCE -EFB Document 16 Filed 02/25/10 Page 12 of 12