Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-03424/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-03424-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

D. L. TAYLOR, C-05467, 

Plaintiff(s),

 v.

M. J. JOHNSON, Correctional Officer,

Defendant(s). 

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No. C 12-3424 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

DISMISSAL AND/OR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND

REFERRING MATTER FOR

SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS 

(Dkt. #52 & 74)

I.

Plaintiff D. L. Taylor is currently incarcerated at California State Prison,

Corcoran (CSP – COR). But on June 29, 2012, while he was incarcerated at

Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP), plaintiff filed a pro se prisoner complaint under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging various conditions of his confinement at PBSP. 

After several rounds of dismissals with leave to amend and amended complaints,

plaintiff filed a verified Fifth Amended Complaint (FAC) for damages under 

§ 1983 alleging that on February 29, 2012, while he was at PBSP, Correctional

Officer M. J. Johnson used excessive force against him. Plaintiff specifically

alleges that, while he was on the floor of his cell talking to a female correctional

officer thru the gap at the bottom of the closed cell door, Johnson “began to

repeatedly kick plaintiff’s cell door with all of his might,” causing the cell door to

hit plaintiff in the mouth and “knocking out a tooth” and chipping one on his

“partial.” Docket #29 at 4.

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Per order filed on April 25, 2014, the court screened the FAC under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A and found that, liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations that

“Johnson kicked plaintiff’s cell door so hard that it caused the cell door to hit

plaintiff in the mouth and knock out a tooth and chip one on his partial appear to

state an arguably cognizable claim for damages under § 1983 for use of excessive

force” and ordered the claim served on Johnson. Dkt. #31 at 2. 

Defendant Johnson now moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the operative FAC fails to allege facts

sufficient to state a claim for use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth

Amendment and instead shows that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

Defendant also moves for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56 on the ground that plaintiff failed to properly exhaust available

administrative remedies before filing suit, as required by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (PLRA). After being advised of what is required of him to oppose

defendant’s motion, plaintiff filed an opposition and defendant filed a reply.

II.

Dismissal is proper where the complaint fails to “state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “While a complaint attacked by

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A motion to dismiss

should be granted if the complaint does not proffer “enough facts to state a claim

for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. 

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The court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, but

it need not accept as true “legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations

if those conclusions cannot be reasonably drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg

v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). Review is

limited to the contents of the complaint, including documents physically attached

to the complaint or documents the complaint necessarily relies on and whose

authenticity is not contested. Lee v. County of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688

(9th Cir. 2001). The court also may take judicial notice of facts that are not

subject to reasonable dispute. Id. 

It is well established that prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if

they apply force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, rather than in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-

7 (1992). In determining whether the use of force was for the purpose of

maintaining or restoring discipline, or for the malicious and sadistic purpose of

causing harm, a court may evaluate the need for application of force, the

relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of any

injury inflicted, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and

any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id. at 7. 

Defendant moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the

operative FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for use of excessive

force in violation of the Eighth Amendment and instead shows that defendant is

entitled to qualified immunity. According to defendant, plaintiff has not alleged

facts showing that defendant knew that, when he kicked plaintiff’s closed cell

door, plaintiff was on the other side of the door with his face close to the gap at

the bottom of the closed cell door. He argues that plaintiff’s allegations therefore

state no more than a claim for negligence not actionable under § 1983.

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Defendant reads the operative FAC too narrowly and selectively. In the

FAC, plaintiff alleges, under penalty of perjury, that when correctional officer

Bryson stopped by his cell to give him his medication, plaintiff commented that

he had not seen her in years and started talking and trying to catch up, telling her

that he was engaged and trying to show her a photograph of his fiancee. But

defendant yelled at him from two cells down to “shut the fuck up” and quickly

came over to “slam my food slot shut.” Dkt. #29 at 4. Plaintiff then got down on

the floor and tried to pass the photograph to Bryson thru the gap at the bottom of

the cell door. But defendant intercepted it and “kicked my photograph back

under the door.” Id. Plaintiff proceeded to put his “mouth close to the gap at the

bottom of the cell door” and complain out loud how “sexist” and “racist”

defendant was behaving. Id. Defendant immediately responded by “repeatedly

kick[ing] the cell door with all of his might” and “causing the cell door to hit me

in my mouth knocking out a tooth and to chip one on my partial.” Id.

Taken as true, plaintiff’s factual allegations are enough “to state a claim

for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A trier of fact

reasonably could find that defendant knew that plaintiff’s face was close to the 

gap at the bottom of the cell door when defendant started repeatedly kicking the

door with all his might because a trier of fact reasonably could find that

defendant heard plaintiff yell out complaints thru the gap at the bottom of the cell

door just before defendant started kicking the cell door. A trier of fact therefore 

reasonably could find that defendant used excessive force in violation of

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights because defendant applied force maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm, rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. It matters not that defendant’s

only physical contact with plaintiff was via a closed door, see Robins v.

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Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1439-41 (9th Cir. 1995) (standard for determining

whether excessive force was used in violation of 8th Amendment “is whether the

defendants applied force ‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of

causing harm,’ – that is any harm;” this means, for example, that prison officials

violate the 8th Amendment when they exert excessive force against one inmate

which results in injury to another inmate as well), or that plaintiff’s injuries – a

knocked out tooth and a chip to one on his partial – were not significant, see

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10 (use of force that caused “bruises, swelling, loosened

teeth, and a cracked dental plate” not de minimis for 8th Amendment purposes).

Nor can it be said that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. The

defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). But at this point in the

proceedings, when plaintiff’s allegations must be taken in the light most

favorable to him, qualified immunity is not in order because it cannot be said that

the facts alleged show that defendant’s conduct did not violate a constitutional

right, or that defendant had a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or

about what the law required under the circumstances. See Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 192, 201-02 (2001). Put simply, it cannot be said that defendant could

reasonably believe that it was lawful to repeatedly kick plaintiff’s cell door with

all of his might while knowing that plaintiff’s face was close to the gap at the

bottom of the cell door. Accord Watts v. McKinney, 394 F.3d 710, 712-13 (9th

Cir. 2005) (finding that prison guard could not reasonably believe that he could

lawfully kick the genitals of a prisoner who was on the ground and in handcuffs).

/

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III.

“The PLRA mandates that inmates exhaust all available administrative

remedies before filing ‘any suit challenging prison conditions,’ including, but not

limited to, suits under § 1983.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir.

2014) (en banc) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006)). To the extent

that the evidence in the record permits, the appropriate procedural device for

pretrial determination of whether administrative remedies have been exhausted

under the PLRA is a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. at 1168. 

The burden is on the defendant to prove that there was an available

administrative remedy that the plaintiff failed to exhaust. Id. at 1172. If the

defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the prisoner to present evidence

showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and

generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. Id.

The ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant, however. Id.

If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner

shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under

Rule 56. Id. at 1166. But if material facts are disputed, summary judgment

should be denied and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the

facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id.

The PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall

be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Although once within the discretion of the district court,

exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory. Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). All available remedies must now be

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exhausted; those remedies “need not meet federal standards, nor must they be

‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Id. (citation omitted). Even when the prisoner

seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages,

exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Id.; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741

(2001). Similarly, exhaustion is a prerequisite to all prisoner suits about prison

life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and

whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. Porter, 534 U.S. at

532. PLRA’s exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion” of available

administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). Proper

exhaustion requires using all steps of an administrative process and complying

with “deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Id. at 90.

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

provides any inmate or parolee under its jurisdiction the right to appeal “any

policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or its staff that

the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon

his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). 

CDCR’s appeal process consists of three formal levels of appeals: (1) first formal

level appeal filed with one of the institution’s appeal coordinators, (2) second

formal level appeal filed with the institution head or designee, and (3) third

formal level appeal filed with the CDCR director or designee. Id. §§ 3084.7,

3084.8. A prisoner exhausts the appeal process when he completes the third level

of review. Id. § 3084.1(b); Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010). 

A “cancellation or rejection” of an appeal “does not exhaust administrative

remedies.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b). 

Defendant properly raises failure to exhaust in a Rule 56 motion for

summary judgment and argues that plaintiff failed to properly exhaust available

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administrative remedies as to his excessive force claim before filing suit. 

Defendant specifically argues that despite knowing how to use CDCR’s inmate

appeal process, plaintiff did not submit an appeal in connection with his

excessive force claim. In support, defendant submits declarations and

documentary evidence showing that although plaintiff filed thirty-four inmate

appeals while he was at PBSP, and exhausted the vast majority of them thru the

third level of review, none of the appeals concerned plaintiff’s claim that

defendant used excessive force against him on February 29, 2012. This is

enough for defendant to meet his burden of showing that there was an available

administrative remedy that plaintiff failed to exhaust in connection with his

excessive force claim against defendant. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The

burden now shifts to plaintiff to present evidence showing that there is something

in his particular case that made the existing and generally available

administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. See id.

In opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment for failure to

exhaust available administrative remedies, plaintiff submits a declaration stating,

under penalty of perjury, that on “February 29, 2012, I gave my third-watch unit

staff my 602 staff complaint-appeal [concerning the excessive force claim at

issue] for delivery to the inmate appeals office.” Dkt. #68-2 at 2. Plaintiff sent

written inquiries about the status of his complaint-appeal to the inmate appeals

office on “March 15, 2012, April 5, 2012, April 26, 2012 and May 13, 2012,” but

never received a response. Id. Plaintiff consequently “authored a new 602 staff

complaint-appeal and sent it to my brother” asking him to mail it to PBSP’s

inmate appeal office. Id. Plaintiff’s brother did, but there is no indication that

the complaint-appeal was filed, “screened out and/or returned to me.” Id. at 2-3. 

Plaintiff argues that prison officials’ failure to process his “602 staff complaintCase 3:12-cv-03424-CRB Document 75 Filed 04/29/15 Page 8 of 10
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appeal” left him “with no available administrative remedies.” Id. at 3.

Under the law of the circuit, plaintiff’s sworn statements that he was

thwarted from filing a 602 staff complaint-appeal concerning the excessive force

claim at issue meets his burden of production in showing that administrative

remedies were not available to him. See Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182,

1191-92 (9th Cir. 2015) (plaintiff alleged under penalty of perjury that she first

tried to inform correctional officer about safety concern, but that he did not help

her and told her, “So what! That is not my problem! That is your problem!”; she

then tried to file a grievance and an appeal with another correctional officer, who

rejected the grievance and refused to file the appeal). Defendant may not simply

rely on the existence of an administrative review process (or claim that plaintiff’s

sworn allegations are false) to overcome such showing as he carries the ultimate

burden of proof of failure to exhaust. See id. at 1192. The motion for summary

judgment for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies must be denied. 

See id. (reversing summary judgment to defendants on issue of exhaustion where

defendants evidence did not rebut prisoner’s evidence that administrative

remedies were not available to her because her filings were rejected by prison

officials, nor show that prisoner failed to follow prison procedures).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for dismissal and/or

summary judgment for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies (dkt.

#52) is DENIED.

The court finds that referral of this matter to the Pro Se Prisoner

Settlement Program with Magistrate Judge Vadas is in order and hereby REFERS

this matter to Magistrate Judge Vadas for settlement proceedings. All other

proceedings are stayed. 

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A settlement conference shall take place within 120 days of the date of

this order, or as soon thereafter as is convenient to Magistrate Judge Vadas’

calendar. Magistrate Judge Vadas shall coordinate a time and date for the

conference with all interested parties and/or their representatives and, within ten

(10) days after the conclusion of the conference, file with the court a report

regarding the conference. 

Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (dkt. #74) is DENIED

without prejudice to renewing after settlement proceedings have concluded and

the court’s stay is lifted.

The clerk shall provide a copy of this order to Magistrate Judge Vadas. 

SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 28, 2015 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\CRB\CR.12\Taylor, D.12-3424.mtd-msj.wpd

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