Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02117/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 

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*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 10, 2010*

  Decided March 11, 2010

Before

         WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

         TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

         DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐2117

ROY SUDDUTH,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CHRISTOPHER J. DONNELLY,

in his official capacity, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the

United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 08‐CV‐4227

Virginia M. Kendall,

Judge.

O R D E R

Roy Sudduth, an African‐American resident of Washington, D.C., who suffers from

diabetes and a visual impairment, claims to be the victim of a far‐reaching conspiracy

between Illinois prosecutors, Cook County judges, the city of Markham, Stephen Brudd,

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 09-2117 Document: 38-1 Filed: 03/11/2010 Pages: 3
No. 09‐2117 Page 2

eBay, and eBay’s corporate officers to discriminate against him and deny him access to the

courts.  These actions, according to Sudduth, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(A), (B), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.  Brudd alone answered Sudduth’s complaint; the others moved to

dismiss for failure to state a claim.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  The district court granted

their motion and sua sponte dismissed the claims against Brudd as well.

For our review we assume the truth of Sudduth’s allegations, but only to the extent

that they are plausible.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).  Sudduth won an online

auction for a phone card on eBay and paid Brudd, the seller.  But Brudd never sent him the

card.  Sudduth filed several written grievances with eBay and its officers, but they did

nothing.  He had more luck with police in Park Forest, Illinois, who arrested Brudd after

Sudduth filed a criminal complaint.  The Circuit Court of Cook County then scheduled

Bruddʹs hearing on unspecified charges for May 1, 2008, at a courthouse located in

Markham, Illinois.

At some point before the hearing, Sudduth told the Park Forest Police Department

and the Stateʹs Attorneyʹs Office that he was disabled and needed ʺample enough timeʺ to

make his way from Washington, D.C., to Illinois for Bruddʹs hearing.  Sudduth got no

response.  He alleges that his impaired vision prevented him not only from driving to

Illinois, but also from flying.  He bought a train ticket, however, and left the District of

Columbia for his cross‐country travel late in the day before the hearing.

Unfortunately, Sudduthʹs train fell behind schedule.  So during the morning of

Bruddʹs hearing, Sudduth called Assistant State’s Attorney Farah Brass and said he would

be late.  But the court held Bruddʹs hearing at the scheduled time and dismissed the charges.

Sudduth wrote letters to the Stateʹs Attorneyʹs Office and Chief Judge Timothy C. Evans of

the Circuit Court of Cook County regarding what he characterized as the wrongful

dismissal of Brudd’s charges.  The court held another hearing in July and confirmed that the

charges against Brudd would not be reinstated.

Sudduth then sued all the defendants for discrimination on the basis of race and

disability.  His theory, as we understand it, is that the defendants conspired to deprive him

of access to the courts and failed to reasonably accommodate him.

On appeal Sudduth argues that his allegations supported the relief he sought.  We

disagree, principally because of two fatal weaknesses in his complaint.  First, Sudduth never

alleged facts to support a plausible inference that any of the defendants knew his race or

maintained a policy that intentionally discriminated against any racial group.  Title VI of the

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Civil Rights Act protects only against intentional discrimination, so Sudduth’s claims under

that statute are meritless.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001); Brewer v. Bd. of

Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 921 (7th Cir. 2007).  And absent intentional discrimination or

a similarly situated person of another race who was treated differently, Sudduth could not

prevail on his equal‐protection theory either.

Second, according to Sudduth’s own allegations, his disabilities did not cause him to

miss Brudd’s hearing; rather, his choice in travel schedule did.  He alleges that his visual

impairment forced him to take a train, but he also tells us that he picked the last possible

train to travel across the country.  In so doing he created the risk of tardiness that

materialized when that train arrived late.  This dooms his discrimination claim because

Sudduth faced the same risk of lateness as any member of the public who is not disabled

but schedules travel close to a time‐sensitive event.  See Wisc. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of

Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 754 (7th Cir. 2006).  Likewise, his failure‐to‐accommodate claim

also fails because he seeks an accommodation, not for his impairment, but for the

uncertainties of long‐distance ground travel.

Finally, Sudduth argues that the district court erred by not allowing him to amend

his complaint.  Yet Sudduth’s automatic entitlement to amend ended when Brudd filed his

answer.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A).  And although the district court could have granted a

request to amend anyway, a court need not do so if amendment would be futile.  Johnson v.

Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 2008).  Sudduth never explained what he would add that

could entitle him to relief, so there would have been no point in letting him amend.

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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