Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00559/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00559-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT I. REESE, JR., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; Deputy 

ZACHARY ROSE (Badge #832), 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-00559-GEB-KJN 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART/DENYING 

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ RENEWED 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER 

OF LAW; DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR AMENDED 

JUDGMENT/AMENDING PAST MEDICAL 

DAMAGES JUDGMENT SUA SPONTE; AND 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

NEW TRIAL/AMENDING BANE ACT 

JUDGMENT SUA SPONTE

Defendants Zachary Rose (“Rose”) and County of 

Sacramento (collectively, “Defendants”) move under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 59 for an order amending judgment, 

arguing: (1) the jury’s damage award for “future non-economic 

loss” is not supported by evidence, (Defs.’ Cty. of Sacramento & 

Zachary Rose’s Mot. for Am. J. or Mot. for New Trial (“New Trial 

Mot.”) 3:14, ECF No. 206); and (2) the jury’s past medical 

damages award should be reduced by the amount of medical expenses 

the County of Sacramento already paid, (id. at 4:6-7). Defendants 

also move under Rule 59 for a new trial based on the following 

assertions: (1) the judge erred when he reduced the number of 

empaneled jurors from eight to seven, (id. at 4:21); (2) the 

judge erred when he sustained Plaintiff’s objection during a 

sidebar conference immediately prior to opening statements by 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 1 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2 

ruling Defendants were prevented from mentioning in their opening 

statement disputed evidence, which they argued in a conclusory 

manner was admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence, (id. at 5:5); (3) the judge erred when he included 

and/or excluded certain language in the jury instructions on 

Plaintiff Robert I. Reese Jr.’s (“Reese’s”) Fourth Amendment and 

Bane Act claims,1 (id. at 5:27-7:7, 10:3-11); (4) the jury’s 

verdict is contrary to the evidence, (id. at 8:8); (5) the judge 

erred when he did not grant Defendants’ motion in limine in which 

they sought to exclude Reese’s police practices expert, (id. at 

11:12); and (6) certain of the judge’s evidentiary rulings, 

individually and collectively, prejudiced Defendants, (id. at 

11:25). 

Defendants also move under Rule 50(b) for judgment in 

their favor, arguing: all claims are barred by the principle the 

United States Supreme Court enunciated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 

U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), which bars a lawsuit if the relief 

sought would invalidate a criminal conviction, (Defs.’ Cty. of 

Sacramento & Zachary Rose’s Renewed Mot. for J. as a Matter of 

Law (“JMOL Mot.”) 2:4-6, ECF No. 205); and Reese failed to 

satisfy the causation element of each claim, (id. at 12:1). 

Further, Rose moves under Rule 50(b) for judgment in his favor on 

Reese’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, arguing his 

qualified immunity defense shields him from being exposed to 

liability on this claim. (Id. at 8:18.) 

A general verdict was returned by the jury against Rose 

 

1

 Defendants also vaguely allude to the Court’s jury instruction on 

Reese’s battery claim in heading “F.” of their motion for new trial but 

present no argument on this issue; therefore, this issue is ignored. 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 2 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3 

on Reese’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and against 

Defendants on Reese’s California battery claim and California 

Bane Act claim. The jury awarded Reese $534,340.00 in damages, 

which consists of $34,340.00 for past medical expenses, 

$350,000.00 for past non-economic loss, and $150,000.00 for 

future non-economic loss. (Revised Verdict Form (“Verdict Form”) 

2, ECF No. 164.) Judgment was entered on January 15, 2016. (ECF 

No. 197.) 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 

The following standard applies to a Rule 50(b) motion 

for judgment as a matter of law: 

the court . . . may not make credibility 

determinations or weigh the evidence. Rather, 

[it] must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party . . . and 

draw all reasonable inferences in that 

party’s favor. The test applied is whether 

the evidence permits only one reasonable 

conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary 

to the jury’s verdict. 

E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 

2009) (first and third alterations in original) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. Motion to Amend Judgment 

“Amendment or alteration [of the judgment] is 

appropriate under Rule 59(e) if (1) the district court is 

presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court 

committed clear error or made an initial decision that was 

manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in 

controlling law.” Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 

(9th Cir. 2001). However, a motion to alter or amend the judgment 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 3 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4 

“may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments 

or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the 

entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 

485 n.5 (2008). 

C. Motion for New Trial 

The motion for a new trial may invoke the 

discretion of the court in so far as it is 

bottomed on the claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence, that the 

damages are excessive, or that, for other 

reasons, the trial was not fair to the party 

moving; and [the motion] may raise questions 

of law arising out of alleged substantial 

errors in admission or rejection of evidence 

or instructions to the jury. 

Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940). “A new 

trial is only warranted when an erroneous evidentiary ruling 

‘substantially prejudiced’ a party.” Ruvalcaba v. City of L.A., 

64 F.3d 1323, 1328 (9th Cir. 1995). 

II. RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 

A. Heck v. Humphrey 

Defendants argue under Rule 50(b) that judgment should 

be entered in their favor on all claims, contending that Reese’s 

no contest plea to a violation of California Penal Code section 

417(a)(1) renders all claims barred by the following principle 

enunciated in Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted): 

to recover damages for . . . unlawfulness 

[that] would render a conviction or sentence 

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that 

the conviction or sentence has been reversed 

on direct appeal, expunged by executive 

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal 

authorized to make such determination, or 

called into question by a federal court’s 

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . . 

The California Supreme Court applied the reasoning in Heck to 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 4 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5 

state claims in Yount v. City of Sacramento, 43 Cal. 4th 885 

(2008). Defendants argue since each claim contains a liability 

theory that necessarily implies the invalidity of Reese’s 

California Penal Code section 417(a)(1) conviction, which is 

proscribed by the Heck principle, all claims are barred by this 

principle. 

Reese counters, inter alia, that the Heck principle 

does not apply to this lawsuit because “Defendants never provided 

the [federal c]ourt with a factual basis for Plaintiff’s 

[referenced] no contest plea” and therefore have not shown that 

the Heck principle bars any claim. (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. 

(“JMOL Opp’n”) 3:10–20, ECF No. 208.) 

It is undisputed that Reese was convicted of violating 

California Penal Code section 417(a)(l), which states in 

pertinent part: 

Every person who, except in self-defense, in 

the presence of any other person, draws or 

exhibits any deadly weapon whatsoever . . . 

in a rude, angry, or threatening manner, or 

who in any manner, unlawfully uses a deadly 

weapon . . . in any fight or quarrel is 

guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . 

Cal. Penal Code § 417(a)(1). 

Defendants argue: “Plaintiff admitted [during the jury 

trial in this case] that he displayed . . . [a] knife when he 

opened the door [to his apartment in response to knocking on that 

door], but denied [that this display] was [done in an] angry or 

threatening [manner], and [he] could not say whether the manner 

of display was ‘not polite.’” (JMOL Mot. 6:8–10 (citing Trial Tr. 

vol. 2, 357:22–359:19, ECF No. 180).) Reese’s testimony 

concerning the “rude” term in California Penal Code section 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 5 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6 

417(a)(l) is the following: 

Q. You understand the term “rude”? 

A. Yes, I do. 

Q. How is it that you understand it? 

A. To not be polite. 

Q. Do you believe that you displayed the 

knife with the officers present in a manner 

that was not polite? . . . 

[Plaintiff]: I don’t know how to answer that. 

I know I answered the door with a knife in my 

hand. Rude, not polite, I cannot say. 

(Trial Tr. vol. 2, 358:17–359:2.) 

Defendants have not shown that Reese’s trial testimony 

invalidates his California Penal Code section 417(a)(l) 

conviction, since even if Reese’s conviction is dependent on a 

finding of “rudeness,” his trial testimony did not invalidate 

that conviction finding. Nor have Defendants shown that the 

victim or victims of the conviction were the deputy sheriff 

officers involved in this federal lawsuit. Therefore, the portion 

of Defendants’ Motion for Judgment premised on the Heck principle 

is DENIED. 

B. Verdict Is Contrary to the Evidence 

Each Defendant contends judgment should be entered in 

their favor on all claims, or in the alternative a new trial 

should be ordered, because the evidence presented was neither 

sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of excessive force nor 

the causation element of each claim. 

Defendants argue “no reasonable jury could have found 

the force [used] was unreasonable” in light of the “fast evolving 

situation” the deputy sheriff officers encountered. (JMOL Mot. at 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 6 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7 

13:13–14.) Specifically, Defendants contend force was applied in 

a situation where sheriff deputies were responding “to a 9-1-1 

call for shots fired [by a perpetrator] with an automatic gun[ 

and] wielding a steak knife in apartment 144.” (New Trial Mot. 

8:9-11.) Defendants also argue: 

[in s]eeking to further investigate and check 

on the occupant of apartment 144, and/or make 

contact in order to gather more information, 

Deputy Rose stood approximately arms-length 

away from the door [for apartment 144], and 

knocked. Deputy Brown positioned himself by 

some trees about 15 feet south of the front 

door of apartment 144. Deputies Steindorf, 

Gillock and Peyton took positions behind 

Deputy Rose. Other deputies went around the 

back of the building, or were in the parking 

lot. As found by the jury, Plaintiff opened 

the door with a knife in one hand in an 

elevated position, crossing the threshold. 

Believing Plaintiff posed an imminent danger 

to Deputy Rose, Deputy Brown fired one shot 

from his AR-15 rifle. Deputy Brown thought 

his round hit Plaintiff. Deputy Rose, who had 

been at the side of the door, saw Plaintiff 

move back from the threshold and out of his 

view. Deputy Rose immediately moved to the 

area in front of the threshold, and was 

surprised to see Plaintiff, standing 

approximately three feet in front of him. 

Deputy Rose believed Plaintiff still posed a 

threat, but did not see Plaintiff’s hands. 

Within seconds of Plaintiff opening the door[ 

and] hearing Deputy Brown fire a shot, Deputy 

Rose fired one 9mm round from his P-226 Sig 

Sauer handgun. The jury found that Plaintiff 

did not brandish the knife, and at the time 

Deputy Rose fired his shot, it did not appear 

Plaintiff “posed an immediate threat of death 

or serious physical injury.” The jury found 

Rose’s round struck Plaintiff, and not 

Brown’s. Defendant Rose submits this fast 

evolving situation means no reasonable jury 

could have found the force was unreasonable. 

(Id. at 8:11-27.) 

Reese counters the “jury’s determination that Plaintiff 

did not pose an immediate threat of death or serious physical 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 7 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8 

injury to Rose when Plaintiff was shot was . . . consistent with 

the trial evidence.” (Opp’n to New Trial Mot. (“New Trial Opp’n”) 

15:5-7, ECF No. 210.) Reese argues: 

Upon [Rose] seeing Plaintiff open the door 

with a knife in his hand, Deputy Rose’s 

immediate reaction was to back up. As Deputy 

Rose backed up, Plaintiff never advanced 

toward him. Deputy Rose never saw Plaintiff 

step out of his apartment. Plaintiff did not 

make any threats towards Deputy Rose. After 

he backed up some distance, Deputy Rose heard 

the first gunshot fired by Deputy Brown. 

Deputy Brown fired approximately one to two 

seconds before Deputy Rose fired and only 

fired once because he saw the knife drop, saw 

Plaintiff backing up inside his apartment, 

and understood that the threat was reduced or 

gone after his first shot. 

(Id. at 15:6-16.) 

Defendants also contend: “Plaintiff did not establish 

[the] causation [element of any claim by] . . . a preponderance 

of the evidence in terms of a touching or [a] constitutional 

violation, . . . [and this causation element] hinges on Rose’s 

round being the round that hit Plaintiff, a[nd] it is undisputed 

only one round did so.” (New Trial Mot. 8:28-9:2.) Specifically, 

Defendants argue Reese’s counsel asked the jury during closing 

argument to speculate as to causation by “arguing[,] ‘how could 

Rose miss at three feet away?’” (Id. at 9:26-27.) Defendants 

further contend Reese did not present forensic evidence, 

trajectory expert testimony, or an explanation of “the 

[following] physical impossibility”: Rose is taller than Reese, 

Reese stood inside his apartment on an elevated surface located 

at the entry point of the door threshold, “Rose was not situated 

above Plaintiff[,] and there was no evidence Plaintiff was 

bending over.” (JMOL Mot. 13:17–27.) 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 8 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9 

Reese rejoins: there “was strong circumstantial 

evidence that undermined the officers’ narrative and showed that 

Brown could not have fired the shot that struck Plaintiff.” (New 

Trial Opp’n 14:13-15.) Reese further argues: 

Brown is 5’9” and held the rifle at shoulder 

level or still below shoulder level as he had 

not fully brought the gun up to a level 

position when he fired whereas Plaintiff is 

5’7” (and sustained a bullet injury with an 

entry wound near his sternum/front of chest 

described by Dr. Owens and Dr. Humphries as 

having a downward path with an angle between 

10 and 45 degrees. There were two rounds 

recovered in the apartment and the bullet in 

the kitchen wall behind Plaintiff was 

approximately 5 to 6.5 feet off the ground. 

Brown admitted uncertainty as to whether or 

not his round struck Reese and acknowledged 

that his trial testimony was different for 

[sic] his deposition testimony so as to 

suggest (at trial) that i[t] was more likely 

that he had shot Plaintiff. Rose, in 

contrast, acknowledged seeing Plaintiff 

standing there, with no blood . . . and no 

indication of having been shot when Rose 

fired his round aimed at Plaintiff’s chest at 

approximately a 60 degree angle. After Rose 

fired, Plaintiff fell backwards, leaving Rose 

with the impression that his round had struck 

Plaintiff. Rose also saw blood on Reese after 

Rose fired. 

(Id. at 14:15-15:4 (citations omitted).) 

Reese also argues: 

The bullet fired from Brown’s rifle lodged in 

the wall of the kitchen six and a half feet 

off the ground. Given that the rifle bullet 

lodged in the wall at a height that was above 

Reese’s head, it is inconceivable that a 

bullet leaving his body at a downward angle 

could have lodge there. The bullet from 

Deputy Rose’s pistol, in contrast, lodged in 

a closet door three and a half feet off the 

ground. There was evidence (carpet fibers on 

the bullet) suggesting that the pistol 

bullet, after leaving Reese, had ricocheted 

off the floor before becoming lodged in the 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 9 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10 

closet door. In contrast, there were no 

carpet fibers on the rifle bullet and thus no 

indication that the rifle bullet had 

ricocheted. 

(JMOL Opp’n 14:24-15:4 (citations omitted).) 

Defendants have not sustained their burden of showing 

that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s liability 

findings. Therefore, these motions are DENIED. 

C. Qualified Immunity 

Rose moves for judgment on his qualified immunity 

defense, arguing this defense shields him from liability on 

Reese’s federal Fourth Amendment claim. Specifically, Rose relies 

on the clearly established law prong of this defense, contending 

there was no clearly established law evincing that Rose lacked 

probable cause to believe that Reese posed an immediate threat of 

death or serious physical injury to Rose when Rose applied the 

subject force. (JMOL Mot. 11:17–25.) 

Reese counters: “it is clearly established that the use 

of deadly force is not reasonable if the [the victim of the 

force] does not pose an immediate threat of death or serious 

bodily injury”; and here “[w]hether an immediate threat actually 

existed is a question of fact that was determined by the jury” 

when it answered “no” to the following written question: “At the 

time Deputy Rose fired his shot, did it appear that Plaintiff 

posed an immediate threat of death or serious physical injury to 

Deputy Rose?” (JMOL Opp’n 12:24–27; Verdict Form Question No. 14 

(emphasis added).) 

Decision on the clearly established law prong of Rose’s 

qualified immunity defense requires determining the factual 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 10 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11 

circumstances attendant to Rose’s use of deadly force, so that it 

can be ascertained whether “any reasonable” law enforcement 

officer would have understood that use of deadly force was then 

proscribed by clearly established Fourth Amendment excessive 

force law in the circumstances that could have been perceived to 

exist when Rose applied the subject force. The United States 

Supreme Court explains in City & County of San Francisco v. 

Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (emphasis added): “An 

officer ‘cannot be said to have violated a clearly established 

right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that 

any reasonable official in [his] shoes would have understood that 

he was violating it,’ meaning that ‘existing precedent . . . 

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” 

Close scrutiny of Question Number 14, submitted to the jury, 

reveals that the jury’s answer to that question does not aid in 

the analysis of what any objectively reasonable officer in Rose’s 

shoes would have perceived and done in Rose’s situation, because 

Question Number 14 does not specify from whose perspective it did 

appear that Reese posed an immediate threat of death or serious 

physical injury to Rose, and the word “appear” in Question Number 

14 is vague. The United States Supreme Court explains in Malley 

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986), that law enforcement 

officers “will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is 

obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded 

that . . . [the subject force at issue was within constitutional 

bounds]; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree 

on this issue, immunity should be recognized.” 

Examination of Question Number 14 reveals it sought a 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 11 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12 

response from the jury that was “purely speculative.” Vojdani v. 

Pharmsan Labs, Inc., 741 F.3d 777, 782 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding 

district court had discretion to reject plaintiff’s 

interpretation of a special jury instruction, even though 

plaintiff’s interpretation would have been consistent with the 

verdict, because to accept plaintiff’s interpretation would allow 

the jury to render a “purely speculative” finding). “‘The jury’s 

role as the finder of fact does not entitle it to return [an 

answer to a question] based only on confusion [or] speculation.’” 

Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Goldhirsh Grp., Inc. v. Alpert, 107 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 

1997)). 

The speculative nature of this finding is evinced by 

the common definition of the word “appear” in Question Number 14, 

which is “seem” or “give the impression of being.” Appear: 

Definition of Appear, Oxford Dictionary (May 16, 2016, 10:35 AM), 

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/

appear. “[T]he court may look to sources such as dictionaries for 

a definition [of a term].” United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 

1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Muscarello v. United States, 

524 U.S. 125, 128-130 (1998)); see also United States v. MacielAlcala, 612 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating: “dictionary 

definitions are cognizable” as tools for determining the ordinary 

meaning of words used in a statute); Terrell v. United States, 

564 F.3d 442, 451 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. 

Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994); Nat’l R.R. 

Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418 (1992)) 

(“A word’s ordinary meaning is often determined by reference to 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 12 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

13 

dictionaries.”). Applying this definition of the word “appear” 

reveals that Question Number 14 asks: “did it [seem or give the 

impression of being] that Plaintiff posed an immediate threat of 

death or serious physical injury.” This language is too vague for 

Question Number 14 to constitute a “fact” because it connotes 

“supposition” or a guess about what “might have happened.” See 

United States v. Jones, 856 F.2d 146, 150 (11th Cir. 1988) 

(citing 35 C.J.S., Fact § 490 (1960); Black’s Law Dictionary 531 

(rev. 5th ed. 1969) (defining a fact as that which has taken 

place)) (defining a “fact” as “a reality as distinguished from 

supposition or opinion; . . . a truth as distinguished from 

fiction or error; what took place, as distinguished from what 

might or might not have happened”). The phrasing also does not 

address whether law enforcement officers of reasonable competence 

in Rose’s position may have had the reasonable but mistaken 

belief that his life was in immediate danger when deadly force 

was used. See C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1027 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (“An officer who reasonably but mistakenly believes 

that his actions are warranted . . . may be entitled to qualified 

immunity.”). The jury’s ambiguous response to Question Number 14 

is not the jury’s fault because it was Rose’s obligation to 

prepare a non-ambiguous question on his qualified immunity 

defense. See Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 368 (2d Cir. 

2007) (“To the extent that a particular finding of fact is 

essential to a determination by the court that the defendant is 

entitled to qualified immunity, it is the responsibility of the 

defendant to request that the jury be asked the pertinent 

question.”) Reese insisted that the judge not be involved in 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 13 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

14 

formulating qualified immunity jury questions, and argued that it 

was solely the obligation of the proponent of the qualified 

immunity affirmative defense to satisfy his burden of presenting 

the jury with clear questions pertinent to that defense. 

The jury should not have been required to return an 

answer to Question Number 14 since the question sought a 

speculative response. Nevertheless, “[j]udgment as a matter of 

law is appropriate [on the qualified immunity issue] when the 

evidence presented at trial permits only one reasonable 

conclusion.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2002); 

Thompson v. Mahre, 110 F.3d 716, 721 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Findings 

of fact are ordinarily reviewed for clear error, but application 

of law to the facts to determine whether on those facts, 

qualified immunity is established, is reviewed de novo, because 

the determination of qualified immunity on facts not genuinely at 

issue is for the court.”). However, when deciding this issue “the 

jury’s view of the facts must govern [the court’s] 

analysis . . . .” A.D. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 712 F.3d 446, 457 

(9th Cir. 2013). 

The facts evince that Rose confronted Reese on 

March 25, 2011, sometime after Rose responded to a 9-1-1 call at 

5:00 AM concerning shots fired in Reese’s apartment complex. The 

9-1-1 caller gave Reese’s apartment number as the location of the 

person who fired a pistol described as an automatic firearm and 

said Reese also had a knife, was acting crazy, and was possibly 

high on drugs. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 97:12-21, ECF No. 179; Trial 

Tr. vol. 2, 230:17-21, 232:10-13.) Rose knocked on Reese’s door. 

(Trial. Tr. vol. 1, 103:11-12.) Rose was the closest officer to 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 14 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

15 

the door. (Id. at 108:12-15.) The jury found that Reese responded 

to the knock by opening the door with a knife in his hand held in 

an “elevated position,” and a “part” of Reese’s “body cross[ed] 

the threshold of the door prior to when Sherriff Deputy Brown” 

fired the “first shot” at Reese. (Verdict Form Question Nos. 6, 

7.) After Brown fired his weapon at Reese, Reese immediately 

moved back into the apartment, out of Rose’s sight. (Trial Tr. 

vol. 1, 186:13-15.) Rose then pursued Reese by entering the 

apartment, and upon entry he saw Reese facing him from only three 

to five feet away—within arm’s reach. (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 206:17-

18, 238:04-06.) At that moment—immediately before Rose fired his 

weapon at Reese—the jury found that Rose did not see Reese’s 

hands. (Verdict Form Question No. 13.) The evidence evinces that 

the entire episode, from the moment Reese opened the door to when 

Rose shot Reese, occurred “very quickly.” (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 

209:12-13.) Rose testified that “approximately two seconds” 

passed between Brown’s shot and Rose’s shot, (id. at 213:10-12); 

Brown testified that one and a half seconds to two seconds passed 

between his shot and Rose’s shot, (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 116:06-08); 

and Reese testified that he felt pain “a second or two” after he 

heard the first shot, (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 142:21-23). 

Further, the undisputed evidence evinces that after the 

first shot Rose pursued Reese to apprehend him, Reese was 

arrested, and Reese was subsequently taken to the hospital for 

treatment of his injury. (Trial Tr. vol. 3, 571:7-8, ECF No. 

181.) The probable cause justifying Reese’s arrest is undisputed. 

“[W]hen [a] police [officer] . . . [has] probable cause to . . . 

arrest [a criminal suspect for a crime reasonably perceived to 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 15 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

16 

have occurred in the officer’s presence, the suspect’s] act of 

retreating into [his apartment does not] thwart an otherwise 

proper arrest.” United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976). 

Further, “[w]henever an officer restrains the freedom of a person 

to walk away, he has seized that person,” and “there can be no 

question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a 

seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 

Amendment.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). However, 

“[w]here the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and 

no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend 

him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.” Id. at 

11. 

The issue is whether the extant of clearly established 

law in March 2011 would have put a reasonable officer in Rose’s 

position on notice that his use of deadly force would effect a 

Fourth Amendment violation. The Supreme Court discussed the 

factual similarity required by clearly established law doctrine 

in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011), explaining 

that the principle “do[es] not require a case directly on point, 

but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 

constitutional question beyond debate.” 

Qualified immunity shields an officer from 

suit when [he] makes a decision that, even if 

constitutionally deficient, reasonably 

misapprehends the law governing the 

circumstances []he confronted. Because the 

focus is on whether the officer had fair 

notice that [his] conduct was unlawful, 

reasonableness is judged against the backdrop 

of the law at the time of the conduct. If the 

law at that time did not clearly establish 

that the officer’s conduct would violate the 

Constitution, the officer should not be 

subject to liability . . . . 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 16 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

17 

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); see also Mattos v. 

Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that when 

deciding whether “actions constituted [an illegal measure] of 

‘deadly force,’ all that matters is whether [the defendant’s] 

actions were reasonable” (alterations in original)). 

“Reasonableness[] is always a very fact-specific inquiry.” C.B., 

769 F.3d at 1026. 

Reese “bears the burden to show that the contours of 

the right [not to be subjected to deadly force] were clearly 

established” under the circumstances involved in this case. 

Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 

2011); Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(stating “plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the right at 

issue was clearly established under this [clearly established 

right] prong” of the qualified immunity analysis). “Without that 

‘fair notice,’ an officer is entitled to qualified immunity.” 

Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1777. However, Reese has not cited 

authority containing facts closely analogous to this case that is 

sufficient to have placed Rose on notice that he could not use 

deadly force under the circumstances involved in this lawsuit. 

Further, even if Rose was mistaken in believing that 

Reese still held a knife when Rose shot him, the qualified 

immunity law gives officials “breathing room to make reasonable 

but mistaken judgments.” Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1774. (See, e.g., 

Trial Tr. vol. 2, 336:2–3 (Reese testifying: “I believe I dropped 

the knife sometime after the door and the bang.”).) “[T]he 

pivotal issue is whether [Rose], or an officer in [Rose’s] 

position, would reasonably fear that [Reese] was going to [stab] 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 17 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

18 

him.” Bowles v. City of Porterville, 571 F. App’x 538, 540 (9th 

Cir. 2014). This principle is illustrated in Bowles, where an 

officer shot and killed a suspect who pivoted and pointed a 

metallic object at the officer, which the officer believed to be 

a gun. Id. The metallic object was ultimately discovered to be 

the cylindrical top of a cologne bottle. Id. However, despite the 

officer’s mistake, the Ninth Circuit found the officer’s fear was 

reasonable because it was dark, the suspect had a cologne bottle 

with a metallic cylindrical top, the officer showed prior 

restraint, and it was a “‘tense, uncertain, and rapidly 

evolving’” situation. Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). 

Similarly, an officer in Rose’s situation could have 

had the “reasonable but mistaken belief” regarding his 

entitlement to use deadly force on Reese. Thomas v. Dillard, 

__F.3d__, 2016 WL 1319765, at *19 (9th Cir. 2016). Therefore, 

Rose’s motion for judgment on his affirmative qualified immunity 

defense from being liable for Reese’s Fourth Amendment excessive 

force claim is GRANTED. See Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 

800 (5th Cir. 1998) (“There is no inherent conflict between a 

finding of excessive force and a finding of qualified 

immunity.”). 

III. MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT/MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 

A. Reduction of Damages 

1. Pain and Suffering 

Defendants argue judgment should be amended because the 

jury’s award of $150,000 for “future non-economic loss” is not 

supported by evidence. (New Trial Mot. 3:14.) Specifically, 

Defendants contend: “[Reese] did not testify he continued to 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 18 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

19 

suffer any physical pain, ‘fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, 

worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, 

embarrassment, apprehension, terror or ordeal.’” (Id. at 3:24-27 

(quoting Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 892-93 

(1972)).) Reese counters that evidence of his permanent scars 

“throughout his upper body” was sufficient for the jury to infer 

“that the permanent scars will affect [him in the] future.” (Id. 

at 7:11-12.) 

“A jury’s verdict, including a damages award, must be 

upheld if supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Freitag v. Ayers, 

468 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2006). Damages may be reduced if they 

are “clearly unsupported by evidence”; and “an otherwise 

supportable verdict must be [upheld] unless it is grossly 

excessive or monstrous or shocking to the conscience.” Brady v. 

Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1557 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

The jury viewed Reese’s scars during the trial (Trial 

Tr. vol. 2, 337:12-24), and heard Reese’s following testimony 

concerning his scars: 

Q. Do you have any scars on your body from 

the surgeries? 

A. Yes, I do. 

Q. And where are the scars on your body? 

A. Right side, one scar comes from here all 

the way back around by my shoulder blade. 

(Id. at 336:24-337:3.) 

Awards for non-economic damages, which include pain and 

suffering, can be supported by a finding of permanent scarring. 

See, e.g., Hall v. N. Am. Indus. Servs., Inc., No. 1:06-cv-0123 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 19 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

20 

OWW SMS, 2008 WL 789895, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008) (noneconomic damages include both pain and disfigurement); Kennedy v. 

United States, No. CV08-02988 GAF(OPx), 2009 WL 3348404, at *12 

(C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2009) (stating that plaintiff was entitled to 

non-economic damages for “pain, suffering, scarring, . . . and 

other consequences of her injuries” (emphasis added)). 

In general, courts have not attempted to draw 

distinctions between the elements of “pain” 

on the one hand, and “suffering” on the 

other; rather, the unitary concept of “pain 

and suffering” has served as a convenient 

label under which a plaintiff may recover not 

only for physical pain but for fright, 

nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, 

mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, 

embarrassment, apprehension, terror or 

ordeal. 

Capelouto, 7 Cal. 3d at 892-93. 

In light of Reese’s scarring, an inference can 

reasonably be drawn that Reese will continue to endure suffering. 

Therefore, Defendants have not shown that this portion of the 

judgment should be amended. 

2. Past Medical Expenses 

Defendants argue Reese’s damages award for past medical 

expenses “should be reduced or offset” by $21,175.00, which is 

the amount the County of Sacramento has “already paid” under the 

County Indigent Program. (New Trial Mot. 4:8-9, 17-18.) 

Defendants argue California Government Code section 985(b) 

authorizes this post-jury verdict reduction. (Id. at 4:12-13.) 

Reese counters that Defendants’ reliance on this California 

procedural law is misplaced “because this case is before the 

Court on federal question jurisdiction.” (New Trial Opp’n 8:10-

11.) 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 20 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

21 

This procedural issue need not be decided since during 

trial the parties informed the jury that they stipulated as 

follows: 

[F]or the past hospital bills of Robert Reese 

related to this incident $21,175 has been 

paid. No further amounts are owed by Robert 

Reese except for an additional $165. The 

parties agree that these amounts do not 

include the amounts owed to the doctors who 

treated Mr. Reese. 

(Trial Tr. vol. 4, 642:1-7, ECF No. 182.) 

“Under federal law, stipulations . . . are generally 

binding on the parties and the Court.” Am. Title Ins. Co. v. 

Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988). Reese does not 

dispute that the County Indigent Program paid these expenses. 

Therefore, in light of this stipulation, and to prevent 

injustice, the judgment shall be amended by reducing $21,175.00, 

which is the amount the County Indigent Program paid for Reese’s 

medical expenses. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 

279, 297 (2002) (“[I]t goes without saying that the courts can 

and should preclude double recovery by an individual.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)); F.C. Wheat Mar. Corp. v. United 

States, 663 F.3d 714, 725 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding the district 

court’s amended judgment of the jury’s damages award to prevent 

double recovery); cf. Brady, 859 F.2d at 1557-58 (“[A] jury’s 

award . . . should not be overturned or decreased unless it is 

clearly unsupported by the evidence or ‘shocks the 

conscience.’”). Accordingly, Reese is awarded $13,165.00 in past 

medical expenses. 

B. Reducing the Jury to Seven (7) Jurors 

Defendants argue they are entitled to a new trial 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 21 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

22 

because the trial judge wrongfully reduced the number of jurors 

prescribed in the supplemental pretrial order from eight (8) to 

seven (7) jurors, which Defendants contend constitutes 

prejudicial error. (New Trial Mot. 4:21.) 

Initially, the trial judge issued a pretrial order 

stating eight (8) jurors would be empaneled. (Supplemental 

Pretrial Conference Order 3:16, ECF No. 81.) However, after 

Reese’s counsel indicated at a bench conference during voir dire 

and off the record that Reese preferred less than eight (8) 

jurors be impaneled, (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 39:23-40:2), the trial 

judge reduced the number of jurors to be impaneled from eight (8) 

to seven (7), (id. at 40:16-18). Defendants objected to this 

reduction, but ultimately stated: “in terms of the number moving 

from eight to seven, we certainly understand that the court sua 

sponte has the discretion . . . .” (Id. at 44:1-5.) The trial 

judge stated he exercised that discretion, and this decision was 

made before the parties were provided the opportunity to exercise 

preemptory challenges. (Compare Trial Tr. vol. 1, 39:23-40:18, 

with Trial Tr. vol. 1, 68:14.) Defendants have not shown this 

reduction is a basis for a new trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 48(a) 

(affording the trial judge the discretion to empanel between six 

and twelve jurors); Montiel v. City of L.A., 2 F.3d 335, 338 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (“[Rule 48] clearly states that a district court may 

empanel between six and twelve jurors. . . . Accordingly, the 

district court committed no error in seating a twelve-person 

jury.”). 

C. Reference to Rule 404(b) Evidence in Opening Statement 

Defendants argue they are entitled to a new trial 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 22 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

23 

because the trial judge erred in refusing to allow Defendants to 

reference evidence in their opening statement, concerning text 

messages about a dispute Reese allegedly had with his apartment 

complex neighbors before the deputy sheriff officers arrived at 

the apartment complex, to which Reese objected. (New Trial Mot. 

5:5-6.) However, the trial transcript evinces that Defendants 

referenced this disputed evidence in their opening statement by 

stating: “Now, in [P]laintiff’s opening argument, counsel said 

that [Plaintiff] believed [P]laintiff didn’t know who was at the 

door[; w]e believe there is evidence to the contrary.” (Trial Tr. 

vol. 1, 95:15-18.) Although the trial transcript reveals 

Defendants desired to include more factual information in their 

opening statement, Reese objected, arguing at sidebar that 

information concerning “a dispute between the plaintiff and a 

neighbor before the police ever got there” involves extrinsic 

details unknown to the deputies before they contacted Reese. 

(Trial Tr. vol. 1, 82:23-83:1.) Defendants responded: 

 [Defense Counsel]: . . . Our position 

would be this was a subject of [P]laintiff’s 

motion in limine that the [C]ourt denied, and 

because the evidence may be what it is, I 

think we’re entitled to at least argue what 

the evidence may show. 

 We believe that information related to 

what happened prior to the officer showing up 

goes to [P]laintiff’s state of mind, his 

motive, opportunity, essentially the way he 

opened the door. Because of that, we believe 

it is all relevant, at the very least, to the 

damages. 

 I think this is an effort to essentially 

re-argue the motion in limine that was 

denied. 

(Id. at 83:13-24.) 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 23 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

24 

This dispute concerned the admissibility of Rule 404(b) 

evidence; however, Defendants’ argument did not articulate 

clearly how the disputed Rule 404(b) evidence tended to establish 

Reese’s “state of mind,” what was meant by the “motive” and 

“opportunity” propositions, and how these propositions were 

probative on what Defendants argued was “essentially the way 

[Reese] opened the door.” These conclusory assertions failed to 

satisfy Defendants’ burden under Rule 404(b) of clearly 

articulating a purpose for which the evidence was admissible.2 

 

2

 Defendants had been previously alerted concerning their burden as the 

proponent of Rule 404(b) evidence in a motion in limine ruling filed 

October 26, 2015, as follows: 

 []Upon objection . . . , the proponent of 

the evidence . . . should be required to 

identify the specific purpose or purposes for 

which [the party] offers the evidence of ‘other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts.’ By so requiring, we do 

not mandate hypertechnicality. . . . 

Nevertheless, the [proponent’s] purpose in 

introducing the evidence must be to prove a fact 

that . . . [is] in issue . . . . 

 After requiring the proponent to identify 

the specific purpose for which the evidence is 

offered, the district court must determine 

whether the identified purpose . . . is 

“material”; that is, whether it is “in issue” in 

the case. If the court finds it is, the court 

must then determine, before admitting the other 

acts evidence, whether the probative value of 

the evidence is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice under [FRE] 403. If 

the evidence satisfies [FRE] 403, then, after 

receiving the evidence, the district court must 

“clearly, simply, and correctly” instruct the 

jury as to the specific purpose for which they 

may consider the evidence.[] 

United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 957 (9th Cir. 

2007) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 

Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1076-77 (6th Cir. 1996)). 

“Indeed, when a proponent of [FRE] 404(b) evidence 

contends that it is both relevant and admissible for a 

proper purpose, ‘the proponent must clearly articulate 

how that evidence fits into a chain of logical 

inferences, no link of which may be the inference that 

the defendant has the propensity to [act in a certain 

manner].’” Becker v. ARCO Chemical Co., 207 F.3d 176, 

191 (3rd Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Morely, 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 24 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

25 

Further, during trial Defendants elicited testimony, 

when cross-examining Reese, about the argument Reese had with his 

neighbors and the text messages Reese and his neighbors exchanged 

before the deputy officers’ arrival. (See Trial Tr. vol. 2, 

342:20-355:12 (“Q. Did you and Nathan, after Brittany left 

without the bottle, exchange heated words? A. We exchanged text 

messages.”).) 

This portion of Defendants’ motion reveals that 

Defendants misapprehended the purpose of an opening statement, 

and their burden of identifying the specific purpose for which 

Rule 404(b) evidence is offered so that it could be determined 

whether the identified purpose is material to an issue in the 

case, and also whether it should be admitted in light of Rule 403 

considerations. “The opening statement is not evidence in itself, 

but serves ‘to give the jury the broad outlines of the case to 

enable the jury to comprehend it.’” United States v. De Peri, 778 

F.2d 963, 978 (3rd Cir. 1985) (quoting Gov’t of Virgin Is. v. 

Turner, 409 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 1968)). Defendants have not 

 199 F.3d 129, 133 (3rd Cir. 1999)). 

 Here, Defendants have failed to satisfy their 

burden to admit the text messages under FRE 404(b). 

They have neither clearly identified a specific 

purpose permitted under FRE 404(b), nor shown that 

such purpose is material to this case. Cf. United 

States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 856, 860 (7th Cir. 

2014) (stating FRE 404(b) “allows the use of other-act 

evidence only when its admission is supported by some 

propensity-free chain of reasoning”; “caution[ing] 

against judicial freelancing in . . . [the FRE 404(b) 

limiting instruction] area”; and stating “the limiting 

instruction should be customized to the case rather 

than boilerplate.”). 

(Order on Pl.’s Mots. in Limine 5:21-7:1, ECF No. 145.) See generally Palmerin 

v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409, 1413 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Pretrial motions 

are useful tools to resolve issues which would otherwise ‘clutter up’ the 

trial[; and s]uch motions reduce the need for sidebar conferences and argument 

outside the hearing of the jury, thereby saving jurors’ time and eliminating 

distractions.”) 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 25 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

26 

shown that they were prejudiced by the trial judge’s refusal to 

permit Defendants to detail the disputed Rule 404(b) evidence in 

their opening statement. Therefore, the motion for a new trial on 

this ground is denied. 

D. Failure to Give Requested Bane Act Instruction 

Defendants argue they are entitled to a new trial on 

Reese’s state claim alleged under the Bane Act, contending that 

the Court erred in failing to give their proposed California 

Civil Jury Instruction (CACI) 3066, and the instruction given 

equates a factual and legal finding of Fourth amendment excessive 

force liability with liability under Reese’s Bane Act claim. (New 

Trial Mot. 10:4-5.) 

Consideration of the facts involved with Reese’s Bane 

Act claim reveals Defendants are correct in their argument that 

in this case their proposed instruction should have been given. 

Regarding the facts involved in the instant lawsuit California 

Appellate Court authority reveals3

: The Bane Act “requires a 

showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the 

[constitutional violation] itself.” Shoyoye v. Cty. of L.A., 203 

Cal. App. 4th 947, 959 (2012). The trial evidence in this case 

does not support this Bane Act element. Although no California 

 

3

 “[W]hen (1) a federal court is required to apply state law, and (2) 

there is no relevant precedent from the state’s highest court, but (3) there 

is relevant precedent from the state’s intermediate appellate court, the 

federal court must follow the state intermediate appellate court decision 

unless the federal court finds convincing evidence that the state’s supreme 

court likely would not follow it.” Ryman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 505 F.3d 

993, 994 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Hayes v. Cty. of San Diego, 658 F.3d 867, 

871–72 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (“[T]he task of the federal courts 

is to predict how the state high court would resolve it. In undertaking this 

analysis, a federal court . . . is not free to reject a state judicial rule of 

law merely because it has not received the sanction of the state’s highest 

court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 26 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

27 

Appellate Court decision addresses whether excessive force alone—

“the use of excessive force during an otherwise lawful arrest,” 

Bender v. County of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 4th 968, 978 

(2013)—is sufficient to sustain a Bane Act violation, several 

decisions indicate more is required. See Shoyoye, 203 Cal. App. 

4th at 955-56 (“The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the 

defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, 

intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff 

from doing something he . . . had the right to do under the law 

or to force the plaintiff to do something that he . . . was not 

required to do under the law.” (quoting Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 

Cal. App. 4th 329, 339 (1998))); Venegas v. Cty. of L.A., 32 Cal. 

App. 4th 820, 842-43 (2004) (stating that although the benefits 

of the Bane Act are not restricted to actual or perceived members 

of a protected class, “its provisions are limited to threats, 

intimidation, or coercion that interfere[] with a constitutional 

or statutory right”). 

Therefore, the jury instruction as given did not 

comport with the plain language in the Bane Act which requires 

that in this case Reese demonstrate “threat, intimidation, or 

coercion” beyond the shooting itself. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1; 

see also Lanier v. City of Fresno, No. CV F 10-1120 LJO SKO, 2011 

WL 149802, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“[A]llegations of excessive 

force do not equate to section 52.1 threats, intimidation or 

coercion.”); Justin v. City and Cty. of S.F., No. C05-4812 MEJ, 

2008 WL 1990819, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“Section 52.1 is only 

applicable when a defendant intends by his or her conduct to 

interfere with a separate affirmative right enjoyed by a 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 27 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

28 

plaintiff; it does not apply to plaintiff’s allegation of use of 

excessive force absent a showing that the act was done to 

interfere with a separate state or federal constitutional 

right.”). 

Since liability under the Bane Act has been fully 

briefed and the evidentiary record concerning this claim is 

complete, instead of granting a new trial an amended judgment 

will issue in favor of Defendants on this claim. See generally, 

Portsmouth Square, Inc. v. S’holders Prot. Comm., 770 F.2d 866, 

869-70 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Under certain limited circumstances a 

district court may issue summary judgment [sua sponte] . . . 

[such as when] it appears from all the evidence presented that 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and [a] party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); Nozzi v. Hous. Auth. 

of City of L.A., 806 F.3d 1178, 1199-200 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, granting summary judgment 

sua sponte is appropriate to “preserve[] judicial resources by 

preventing courts from having to preside over unnecessary trials 

where no genuine issues of fact are in dispute” (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted)). 

E. Court’s Denial of Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 

6: Testimony of Clark 

Further, Defendants contend the Court’s denial of their 

Motion in Limine (MIL) Number 6 entitles them to a new trial 

because the ruling constitutes prejudicial error. (New Trial Mot. 

11:12-24.) Reese counters “Defendants do not actually cite any 

evidence in making their argument about [MIL Number 6; m]oreover, 

after the [C]ourt conditionally denied the motion in limine for 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 28 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

insufficient factual content, Defendants never sought to re-raise 

the issue at a subsequent time.” (New Trial Opp’n 17:6-9.) Reese 

contends: “On [this] basis alone, the argument should be 

rejected.” (Id. at 17:9-10.) 

Defendants moved in MIL Number 6 to exclude Reese’s 

police practices “expert” Roger Clark from offering specific 

opinions at trial. (Defs.’ Mot. in Limine No. 6 2:2-6, ECF No. 

88.) Defendants contend, inter alia, that based upon his Rule 26 

report Clark’s testimony would constitute an impermissible 

opinion as to his legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an 

ultimate issue of law. (Id. at 4:1-5.) 

The challenged order denying MIL Number 6 states in 

pertinent part: “[s]ince it is unclear what questions Mr. Clark 

will be asked and whether any response could be challenged, a 

sufficient factual context is lacking to decide before trial the 

remaining portions of this motion.” (Order Addressing Defs.’ MIL 

11:7-10, ECF No. 144.) Since it is evident that the challenged in 

limine ruling does not constitute a definitive ruling, Defendants 

have not shown they have authority justifying their motion. 

“Absent a thorough examination of the objection raised in the 

motion in limine and an explicit and definitive ruling by the 

district court that the evidence is [or is not] admissible, a 

party” cannot challenge the in limine ruling and is required to 

make a “contemporaneous objection” during the trial concerning 

proffered evidence it deems inadmissible. United States v. 

Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000); cf. United States v. 

Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Palmerin, 794 F.2d 

at 1413) (finding a motion in limine preserves an evidentiary 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 29 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

30 

issue . . . if “the district court’s ruling permitting 

introduction of evidence was explicit and definitive”). 

Therefore, Defendants have not shown that the challenged ruling 

justifies granting them a new trial. 

F. Evidentiary Rulings 

Defendants also contend they are entitled to a new 

trial because “[t]here were a significant number of [evidentiary] 

ruling[s] that, individually and collectively, created prejudice 

to Defendants.” (New Trial Mot. 11:28.) Reese counters: “even 

assuming, arguendo, that any of [the challenged evidentiary 

rulings] were incorrect, it is clear that the rulings were 

neither individually nor collectively prejudicial such that the 

trial result was ‘inconsistent with substantial justice’ or a 

‘miscarriage of justice.’” (New Trial Opp’n 18:15-18.) 

Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

prescribes: 

Unless justice requires otherwise, no error 

in admitting or excluding evidence—or any 

other error by the court or a party—is ground 

for granting a new trial, for setting aside a 

verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or 

otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At 

every stage of the proceeding, the court must 

disregard all errors and defect that do not 

affect any party’s substantial rights. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. 

1. Questions on Phone Call to Reese Before Opening 

the Door 

Defendants contend that it was error to permit Reese’s 

attorney to ask Deputy Brown to speculate about the benefit of 

placing a phone call to Reese before appearing at Reese’s 

apartment. Specifically, Defendants object to the following 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 30 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

31 

testimony: 

Q. Okay. Based on your training and 

experience, if you placed a phone call, would 

you tell the person who you were, meaning the 

police? 

MR. WHITEFLEET: Objection. Incomplete 

hypothetical. Calls for speculation. 

THE COURT: Overruled. 

[OFFICER BROWN] I see no harm doing that. 

BY MR. GALIPO: 

Q. And what would be the benefit, in your 

mind, of doing that, letting them know that 

you were the police. 

MR. WHITEFLEET: Objection. The officer has 

not been identified as an expert witness and 

now we’re talking about a hypothetical 

benefit to a potential thing that didn’t 

occur? 

THE COURT: Overruled. 

THE WITNESS: I’m sorry. Reask the question. 

BY MR. GALIPO: 

Q. What, based on your training, would have 

been the benefit to letting the person in the 

apartment know if you called that you were 

the police? 

MR. WHITEFLEET: Same objections. 

THE COURT: I’ve already ruled. 

MR. WHITEFLEET: I’m sorry? 

THE COURT: I’ve ruled. 

THE WITNESS: To gain voluntary compliance to 

answer my questions and come out. 

(Trial Tr. vol. 1, 102:10-103:1.) 

Defendants contend: 

This ruling was an error. It was complete 

speculation whether there would be a benefit 

and/or such clearly calls for an expert 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 31 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

32 

opinion. The substantial prejudice is 

that . . . now the jury is left with the 

impression that Deputy Rose (or other 

officers) could have avoided the use of force 

by calling Plaintiff, when the testimony was 

[that] they tried to have dispatch locate a 

number without success. To have the witness 

speak to “what could happen” has no relevance 

because there was no number to call, no 

knowing if Plaintiff would answer, and no 

knowing whether he would have voluntarily 

answered questions. 

(New Trial Mot. 12:14-20.) 

Similarly, Defendants contend that the following 

question posed to Reese’s purported police expert, Clark, should 

not have been permitted: 

Q. Let’s assume that they did and were able 

to call in and tell them they were the police 

and they wanted to talk to him. You would say 

that would be appropriate? 

 MR. WHITEFLEET: Objection. Assumes facts 

not in evidence. Incomplete hypothetical. 

Irrelevant. 

 THE COURT: Overruled. 

(Trial Tr. vol. 3, 458:19-24.) Defendants contend: “This 

question, together with questions to Deputy Brown, are irrelevant 

to whether force used after [P]laintiff opened the door was 

reasonable[; t]his left improper impression that some preshooting decisions were at issue.” (New Trial Mot. 12:25-27.) 

Reese counters: 

The objections [to Deputy Brown’s testimony] 

were properly overruled and Deputy Brown gave 

an admissible lay opinion that was explicitly 

based on his own training and experience. In 

any event, there could be no prejudice 

because the jury learned that Deputy Brown 

did, in fact, try to obtain a phone number to 

make a phone call to [P]laintiff’s apartment, 

but no number was available. Thus, contrary 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 32 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

33 

to Defendants’ argument, the jury was not 

‘left with the impression that Deputy Rose 

(or other officers) could have avoided the 

use of force by calling Plaintiff” because 

the jury heard the deputies tried to have 

dispatch locate a number without success. 

(New Trial Opp’n 19:11-19 (citations omitted).) 

Defendants have not shown that this evidentiary ruling 

affected Defendants’ “substantial rights” justifying a new trial. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. 

2. Questions to Clark: Whether Police Should Have 

Announced Their Presence, and Whether It Was 

Appropriate for Rose to Shoot? 

Defendants further object to the Court’s allowance of 

questions to Clark about the feasibility of announcing police 

presence. Specifically, Defendants object to the following 

testimony: 

A. That he would clear out of the range of 

the door with the expectation because that 

was the purpose of the knock, that there 

would be an answer, and, therefore, he would 

remove himself out of the -- what we call the 

danger zone, because there is no safety in 

that immediate area of the door. 

MR. WHITEFLEET: Objection. Move to strike as 

speculative. Nonresponsive. 

THE COURT: Overruled. 

(Trial Tr. vol. 3, 460:13-20.) Reese counters: 

Evidence about the feasibility of warnings is 

relevant to the totality of circumstances. 

See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 397; Deorle 

v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir. 

2001) (“[T]he giving of a warning or the 

failure to do so is another factor to be 

considered in applying the Graham balancing 

test.”) In fact, Defendants likewise elicited 

testimony and argued about the feasibility of 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 33 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

34 

warnings/announcement. 

(New Trial Opp’n 19:22-27.) 

Defendants have not shown that the challenged 

evidentiary ruling justifies granting a new trial. 

Defendants also object to Reese’s hypothetical 

questions to Clark regarding Rose’s decision to shoot. 

Specifically, they object to the following line of questioning: 

Q. And so taking from Deputy Rose’s 

perspective, he sees a knife, he backs up, 

then he moves forward and sees an unarmed 

person standing in the doorway, is that a 

shoot or don’t shoot scenario? 

 MR. WHITEFLEET: Incomplete hypothetical. 

Vague. Overly broad. Seeks to invade the 

jury. 

 THE COURT: Overruled. 

 [CLARK]: It’s a don’t shoot scenario. 

(Trial Tr. vol. 3, 541:16-23.) Defendants contend: “This was 

tantamount to telling the jury it was unreasonable to shoot. This 

improperly invaded the jury’s purview.” (New Trial Mot. 13:10-

11.) 

Reese counters: 

The reasonableness of the decision to shoot 

was a proper subject for expert testimony. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) (“An opinion is not 

objectionable just because it embraces the 

ultimate issue.”) Defendants in fact asked 

the same or similar questions of their 

expert, Massad Ayoob. Moreover, the 

hypotheticals asked of Roger Clark were not 

“incomplete”; they were based on facts in 

evidence because there was evidence that 

Plaintiff’s hands were visible empty when 

Deputy Rose shot him. 

(New Trial Opp’n 20:2-9.) 

Defendants have not shown that the challenged 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 34 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

35 

evidentiary ruling justifies granting a new trial. 

3. Testimony of Tracy 

Defendants contend that Detective Robert Tracy, a 

Sacramento County Sherriff’s Department Homicide Detective, 

should have “been able to testify about the observations” he made 

of the shooting scene. (New Trial Mot. 13:23-24.) Specifically, 

Defendants point to the following testimony: 

BY MR. WHITEFLEET: 

Q. Did you make any observations in terms of 

this particular picture, Exhibit 31, in 

connection with any other defects that you 

noted at the apartment? 

 MR. GALIPO: Objection. Vague as phrased. 

May call for expert testimony. 

 THE COURT: Sustained. 

BY MR. WHITEFLEET: 

Q. In your mind did you associate this defect 

with any other defect inside this apartment? 

 MR. GALIPO: Objection. May call for 

expert testimony and vague as phrased. 

 THE COURT: Sustained. 

(Trial Tr. vol. 4, 631:7-19.) 

Q. And did you make any observations in terms 

of directionality in connection with the 

other defect as it’s shown on Exhibit 31? 

MR. GALIPO: Objection. Lacks foundation. May 

call for expert testimony. Also vague as 

phrased. 

THE COURT: Sustained. 

MR. WHITEFLEET: May we have a sidebar, Your 

Honor, in terms of the objections that are 

being raised for the expert versus 

observations? 

 THE COURT: No. 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 35 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

36 

(Id. at 632:7-16.) 

Defendants argue, concerning the above evidentiary 

rulings: “A witness who makes observations on the scene is a 

percipient witness[; h]e should have been able to testify about 

the observations.” (New Trial Mot. 13:23-24.) Reese counters: 

Defendants make a false claim that Detective 

Tracy was precluded from testifying about his 

observations regarding Exhibit 31, a close-up 

photograph of a portion of Reese’s carpet 

where a bullet struck after exiting Reese and 

before ricocheting and coming to rest in the 

closet door. Contrary to [D]efendants’ 

assertion, detective Tracy was permitted to 

testify fully about his observations within 

the apartment, including (1) that the carpet 

had been torn by a bullet, which appeared 

consistent with and similar to other 

roicocheted bullet strikes he had observed on 

other occasions, (2) the distance between the 

two tears in the carpet inferentially 

associated with the ricocheting bullet and 

(3) that there were carpet fibers on the 9 mm 

pistol round (fired by Deputy Rose) that was 

lodged in the door. Detective Tracy was not 

designated as an expert; he testified as a 

lay witness. Thus, the Court properly allowed 

him to testify about all of his observations 

and properly precluded him from giving 

expert-type testimony about bullet 

trajectories. 

(New Trial Opp’n 20:11-24 (citations omitted).) 

Defendants have not shown that the challenged 

evidentiary rulings justify granting a new trial. 

4. Objections to Testimony of Ayoob 

Defendants next object to Reese’s questioning of Massad 

Ayoob, Defendants’ “expert witness in police practices;” 

specifically Defendants object to the following portion of the 

evidentiary record: 

Q. And one of the benefits [of police 

announcing their presence is] that if [the 

suspect] had a weapon in their hand, they 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 36 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

37 

could drop it before opening the door if they 

knew it was the police? 

MR. WHITEFLEET: Objection. Calls for 

speculation. 

THE COURT: Overruled. 

[Ayoob]: Repeat the question, Mr. 

Galipo. 

BY MR. GALIPO: 

Q. Yes. One of the benefits to the citizen 

would be if they had a weapon in their hand, 

not knowing who it was, and they heard it was 

the police, that would give them an 

opportunity to drop the weapon before they 

opened the door to the police? 

A. It would. 

(Trial Tr. vol. 4, 710:2–14.) 

Defendants fail to explain why they opine the Court’s 

ruling was erroneous and how it prejudiced them. Accordingly, 

this argument fails to justify a new trial. 

Defendants also object to the following portion of the 

trial record concerning Ayoob’s testimony: 

Q. Would you agree, sir, under the facts of 

this case, Deputy Rose could see Mr. Reese’s 

hands and he had nothing in his hands; can 

you assume that for a moment? 

MR. WHITEFLEET: Objection. Compound. Vague as 

to time. 

BY MR. GALIPO: 

Q. Just before he shot. Do you have that in 

mind? 

A. That he could see or did see? 

Q. Did see. 

A. We’re assuming he does see empty hands? 

Q. Correct. Would you at least agree then it 

would be inappropriate to shoot? 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 37 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

38 

 MR. WHITEFLEET: I’ll object. There’s no 

testimony that Deputy Rose saw empty hands. 

It’s an incomplete hypothetical. 

 THE COURT: The jury decides whether 

there’s evidence in the record to support any 

question asked by either side. The objection 

is overruled. 

 [Ayoob]: If the individual is no longer 

assaulting the officer had seen that the 

hands are empty, the officer would have no 

grounds to shoot. 

(Id. at 718:9-719:5.) 

Q. Let’s say, under my hypothetical, he opens 

the door and sees the police and drops the 

knife immediately. Let’s say within half a 

second of opening the door, he drops the 

knife. Are you with me? 

A. I am. 

Q. Is it okay to shoot him? 

MR. WHITEFLEET: Incomplete hypothetical. 

Vague. 

THE COURT: Overruled. 

 THE WITNESS: If the officers have seen 

him drop the knife and he's standing in the 

position you describe which is essentially 

the surrender position with his hands 

shoulder high, no, it certainly would not be 

appropriate to shoot. That would be 

indication of surrender. 

(Id. at 724:16-725:3.) 

Defendants contend this questioning was premised on 

improper hypothetical questions and the rulings therein 

constitute reversible error because “[h]ypothetical [questions] 

must be based on facts in evidence[; n]o evidence shows that Rose 

could see Reese’s hands[; i]n fact [the] jury found he did not 

see his hands.” (New Trial Mot. 14:8-9.) Defendants further 

contend “there was no evidence Plaintiff opens the door and drops 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 38 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

39 

the knife immediately.” (Id. at 14:13-14.) 

The jury ultimately determined that “[a]t the time 

Deputy Rose fired his shot, he did [not] see Plaintiff’s hands.” 

(Verdict Form Question No. 13.) Defendants have not shown they 

were prejudiced by the challenged rulings; therefore, this 

argument does not justify granting a new trial. 

5. Admission of Photographs of Reese 

Counsel for Reese offered Exhibits 42, 43, 44, 45, and 

46, which are photographs of Reese taken at the hospital after he 

sustained his gunshot wound. Defense counsel objected to these 

exhibits as cumulative and unduly prejudicial. The Court 

overruled Defendants’ objection and admitted all of the photos. 

(Trial Tr. vol. 2, 256:2-5.) Counsel for Reese also offered 

Exhibit 30, which is a pile of Reese’s clothes post-shooting. 

(Id. at 265:4-10.) Defendants objected to this evidence as 

irrelevant but the Court admitted the exhibit. 

Reese counters: 

Plaintiff’s damages in this case are based on 

the fact that he was shot by Defendant Rose. 

At trial, Plaintiff used photographs showing 

his injuries to establish his damages. . . . 

The photographs were relevant because they 

bore on the question of damages. 

(New Trial Opp’n 20:27-30.) 

Defendants have not shown that the admission of the 

challenged evidence was so unduly prejudicial that it justifies a 

new trial. See, e.g., Robert v. Conti Carriers & Terminals, Inc., 

692 F.2d 22, 25 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming district court’s 

admission of photographs showing the medical condition of 

plaintiff’s hands, which were probative and not unfairly 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 39 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

40 

prejudicial with respect to damages on plaintiff’s negligence 

claim). 

6. Availability of Brittany Shurtleff 

Defendants argue they should be granted a new trial 

because they were not allowed to read portions of Brittany 

Shurtleff’s deposition testimony into evidence under Federal Rule 

of Evidence 804(a)(5), which concerns the unavailability of 

witnesses, despite having served a subpoena on Shurtleff and 

despite her failure to appear. 

To be “unavailable” under Federal Rule of Evidence 

804(a)(5), the party seeking to use the witness’s prior testimony 

must show efforts to secure the witness’s attendance “by process 

or other reasonable means.” Simply serving a subpoena is not 

enough. See Forbes v. Cty. of Orange, 633 F. App’x 417, 418 (9th 

Cir. 2016) (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in refusing to admit witness’s deposition testimony even though 

party seeking to introduce testimony had served a subpoena, as 

party did not make subsequent “reasonably diligent efforts” to 

secure witness’s attendance). 

When attempting to introduce the witness’s deposition 

testimony at trial, the following exchange between defense 

counsel and the Court ensued: 

MR. WHITEFLEET: I have proof of service of 

subpoena on Ms. Shurtleff, if the court would 

like to see it in order to determine 

unavailability. I can at least verbally 

indicate to you that when the processor 

server told us he handed the subpoena to Ms. 

Shurtleff, she indicated with some expletives 

that she did not intend to comply. 

 THE COURT: When did that occur? 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 40 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

41 

 MR. WHITEFLEET: At the time of service. 

 THE COURT: That’s helpful; however, what 

hour and day did that occur? 

MR. WHITEFLEET: October 22, 2015. If the 

court would like to see the proof of service, 

I can provide that. 

 THE COURT: I’m thinking that’s a couple 

weeks ago; is that about right? Isn’t this 

November 3rd? 

MR. WHITEFLEET: Yes, Your Honor. The start of 

the trial was supposed to be October 26. That 

was four days before the original date set. 

(Trial Tr. vol. 4, 732:2–18.) 

Defense counsel admitted he was aware that the witness 

had no intention of appearing in court, but failed to make 

additional reasonable efforts within the weeks before trial to 

ensure Shurtleff’s appearance in court. Therefore, Defendants did 

not make the required “reasonably diligent efforts” to secure 

Shurtleff’s attendance to justify finding her unavailable under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5). Thus, Defendants have not 

shown this ruling constitutes an error justifying a new trial. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the above stated reasons the renewed Motion for 

Judgment is GRANTED on Defendant Rose’s qualified immunity 

defense, and DENIED on the remaining issues. Reese’s past medical 

expenses and the damages award is reduced by $21,175.00; 

therefore, Reese’s total award for past medical expenses is 

$13,165.00. Further, judgment is amended to reflect that 

Defendants prevail on Reese’s Bane Act claim. The remaining 

portions of Defendants’ Motion for New Trial are DENIED. 

The Clerk of Court shall amend judgment as follows: 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 41 of 42
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

42 

Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Rose on 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim since Rose prevails on his 

qualified immunity defense. Judgment is entered in favor of 

Defendants on Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim. Judgment is entered 

against Defendant Rose and Defendant County of Sacramento on 

Plaintiff’s battery claim. Plaintiff is awarded $350,000.00 for 

past non-economic loss, $150,000.00 for future non-economic loss, 

and $13,165.00 for past medical expenses for a total of 

$513,165.00 in compensatory damages. 

Dated: June 2, 2016 

 

Case 2:13-cv-00559-WBS-DB Document 216 Filed 06/02/16 Page 42 of 42