Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-08101/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-08101-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVAD ZOLFAGHARI,

Plaintiff,

v.

WALL&ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-08101-SVK

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 10

Before the Court are Plaintiff Javad Zolfaghari’s motion to remand (Dkt. 10) and 

Defendants Greg Thorson, P. Mark Yates, Wall & Associates, Inc., and Jennifer L. Cable’s 

(collectively, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss (Dkt. 8). All parties have consented to the 

jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge. See Dkts. 7, 13. The Court finds this matter 

suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 

The initial and fundamental issue in this case is whether the jurisdiction of this Court 

attached to Plaintiff’s state court complaint as drafted. This Court concludes that it did not. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand and DENIES AS MOOT

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for the reasons discussed below. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint

On November 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed his complaint, utilizing standard Judicial Council 

forms, alleging state-law claims of fraud and intentional tort against Defendants in the Superior 

Court of California for the County of Santa Clara. Dkt. 1-1 at 2. Plaintiff’s allegations arise out 

of alleged representations by Defendants that, in return for payment, they would represent Plaintiff

before the California Employment Development Bureau (“EDD”) regarding a tax lien. See 

generally Dkt. 1-1. 

Case 5:19-cv-08101-SVK Document 20 Filed 02/13/20 Page 1 of 11
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he paid Defendants $63,500.00 for their services in 

helping Plaintiff remedy a $21,000,000.00 tax lien that was placed on his corporation. Dkt. 1-1 at 

6. Plaintiff further alleges that despite his payments, Defendants did not take any action to remedy 

the tax lien. Id. Plaintiff mentions the $63,500.00 payment and the $21,000,000.00 tax lien in 

various places of the complaint. See id. at 6-8. Plaintiff further alleges: “Defendant would 

arrange for a hearing before the California Employment Development (EDD) bureau at which 

Plaintiff would have an opportunity to explain and set aside the tax liabilities which were 

improperly charged to Plaintiff by way of a tax lien placed on corporation in which he is an officer 

and shareholder.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff also alleges “Defendant failed to take effective action to 

resolve the tax obligations disclosed to them” and “Defendant did not arrange for a hearing before 

EDD and made no effort to set aside tax lien.” Id. In the complaint and under the pre-printed text 

“[b]ecause of plaintiff’s reliance upon defendant’s conduct, plaintiff has been damaged,” Plaintiff 

states: 

Plaintiff expended $60000 plus $3500 to obtain competent, effective and timely 

representation. Plaintiff did not retain competent representation to proceed against 

the EDD lien of approximately $21,000,000. Plaintiff’s business interests in Zolman 

Construction and Development, Inc. was severely jeopardized as a result of 

Defendant's lack of representation and incorrect tax advice.

Id. at 7. Plaintiff indicated that he intended to seek compensatory damages and punitive damages

but did not specify an amount. Id. at 5. The civil case cover sheet filed along with Plaintiff’s 

complaint indicated that Plaintiff sought monetary, nonmonetary (declaratory or injunctive relief), 

and punitive remedies. Id. at 11. 

B. Notice of Removal

Defendants removed Plaintiff’s action to this Court on December 11, 2019 (Dkt. 1) and 

filed their motion to dismiss on December 18, 2019 (Dkt. 8). In their notice of removal, 

Defendants contend that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over the instant action because (1) the 

amount in controversy exceeds $21,000,000.00; and (2) Plaintiff is a citizen of California and no 

Defendants are citizens of California. Dkt. 1 at 4-6. 

////

////

Case 5:19-cv-08101-SVK Document 20 Filed 02/13/20 Page 2 of 11
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

C. Motion to Remand

Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand on December 20, 2019, arguing that in the 

complaint he claims only $63,500.00 in damages. Dkt. 10; Dkt. 11 at 8. Plaintiff also avers by 

counsel that “he is willing to stipulate that he will not claim any more than $10,000 in punitive 

damages, and shall not exceed $74,900.00.” Dkt. 10-1 ¶ 6. 

In opposition, Defendants clarify that Plaintiff seeks: (1) $60,000.00 for an initial payment; 

(2) $3,500.00 for a subsequent payment; and (3) $21,000,000.00 for the tax lien Defendants were 

hired to challenge. Dkt. 15 at 6. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s argument that his complaint 

does not seek compensatory damages of over $21,000,000.00 is “absurd” and that “‘it is facially 

apparent from the allegations in the complaint that plaintiff’s claims’ include a claim for 

$21,000,000.” Id. at 8. 

In addition, Defendants argue that they were “eligible to assert the amount in controversy 

under 28 U.S.C § 1446(c)(2)(A)(ii) because California law ‘does not permit demand for a specific 

sum’ of exemplary damages and thus ‘does not permit’ Plaintiff to state the total ‘specific sum’ of 

damages that he is seeking” and “Defendants exercised this right by stating, in their Notice of 

Removal, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” Dkt. 15 at 10. Defendants also argue 

that “Plaintiff’s civil cover sheet, which is part of his Complaint, seeks ‘nonmonetary; declaratory 

or injunctive relief’” and “Defendants were thus eligible to assert the amount in controversy under 

28 U.S.C § 1446(c)(2)(A)(i)” and subsequently exercised that right. Id. 

Finally, Defendants take issue with Plaintiff’s post-removal statement that he will not seek 

more than $74,900.00 in damages. Dkt. 15 at 10-13. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s statement 

that he “shall not exceed $74,900” is “unclear” and “problematic.” Id. at 11. Defendants also 

contend that the Supreme Court barred post-removal stipulations in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity

Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938). Id. In particular, Defendants argue that “the initial 

complaint determines original jurisdiction and hence the propriety of remand, and nothing that the 

plaintiff says after filing the complaint can divest a court of jurisdiction that was conferred by the 

complaint.” Id. Defendants also argue that this Court has “applied this rule to block plaintiffs 

from obtaining remand through post-complaint attempts to reduce the amount in controversy.” Id. 

Case 5:19-cv-08101-SVK Document 20 Filed 02/13/20 Page 3 of 11
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(citing Bay Area Surgical Mgmt., LLC v. Principal Life Ins. Co., No. 12-cv-1140 EJD, 2012 WL 

3656451, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012)). 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Removal

The federal removal statute permits the removal of an action which could have been 

brought originally in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal jurisdiction is determined 

from the four corners of the complaint as it existed at the time of removal. Franchise Tax Bd. of 

the State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). Removal 

statutes are strictly construed against removal and place the burden on the party seeking removal 

to show removal is proper. Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). A case must be remanded to 

state court “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

B. Diversity Jurisdiction - Amount in Controversy

Federal courts have original jurisdiction on the basis of diversity where the opposing 

parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 

2003). Consistent with this framework, “[t]he party seeking to invoke the district court’s diversity 

jurisdiction always bears the burden of both pleading and proving diversity jurisdiction.” 

NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 613-14 (9th Cir. 2016). 

“[W]hen a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the defendant’s amount-incontroversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the 

court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87 (2014) (citations 

omitted). Thus, “a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the 

amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Id. at 89. But, “[i]f the plaintiff 

contests the defendant's allegation, § 1446(c)(2)(B) instructs [that] [r]emoval . . . is proper on the 

basis of an amount in controversy asserted by the defendant if the district court finds, by the 

preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional 

Case 5:19-cv-08101-SVK Document 20 Filed 02/13/20 Page 4 of 11
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

threshold.” Id. at 88 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In such a case, both sides submit proof 

and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy 

requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 88. 

The Ninth Circuit has also stated that “where . . . it is unclear from the face of the 

complaint whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the removing defendant bears the 

burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy 

exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th 

Cir. 2018) (quoting Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2013)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “[B]oth parties may submit proof of the amount in 

controversy through summary-judgment-type evidence including affidavits and declarations, and 

the defendant seeking removal bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Arakji v. Microchip Tech., Inc., 

2019 WL 5386239, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2019) (citing Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc, 775 F.3d 

1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[T]he amount in controversy is the amount at stake in the underlying litigation.” Fritsch 

v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Gonzales v. CarMax 

Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016)) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[T]his includes any result of the litigation, excluding interests and costs, that entails a 

payment by the defendant.” Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 793 (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “Among other items, the amount in controversy includes damages (compensatory, 

punitive, or otherwise) . . . and attorneys’ fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or contract.” Id. 

(citations omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Defendants Fail to Demonstrate the Amount in Controversy by a 

Preponderance of the Evidence 

Because Plaintiff contests Defendants’ allegations regarding the amount in controversy

(Dkt. 11 at 7-8), Defendants bear the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. Dart, 574 U.S. at 88; Arakji, 2019 WL 

Case 5:19-cv-08101-SVK Document 20 Filed 02/13/20 Page 5 of 11
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

5386239, at *3. Defendants argue that the complaint itself is evidence that the amount in 

controversy exceeds the $75,000.00 jurisdictional threshold. Dkt. 15 at 6-9. They point to the 

complaint’s allegations and argue that “Plaintiff specifically claimed he hired Defendants to 

provide competent tax representation in order to ‘resolve’ and ‘set aside’ the ‘improper’ ‘tax lien’

of $21,000,000.” Id. at 8 (quoting Dkt. 1-1 at 6). Defendants also point to the damages section of 

Plaintiff’s complaint, where they allege that “Plaintiff specifically states two items of damages 

beyond the $63,500 paid to Defendant Wall & Associates: (i) Defendants’ failure to provide 

‘competent representation ‘against’ the “tax lien’ of $21,000,000 and (ii) damage to ‘Plaintiff’s 

business interests’ which were ‘severely jeopardized’ by Defendants’ alleged fraud.” Dkt. 15 at 8

(quoting Dkt. 1-1 at 7). Defendants argue that “[a]ll of this is apparent on the face of the 

[c]omplaint.” Id.

Defendants further suggest that “[i]f Plaintiff’s sole request for damages was the return of 

the $63,500 paid to Defendant Wall & Associates . . . Plaintiff’s response to the prompt in the 

state form complaint requesting Plaintiff to specify the damages sought in the Complaint would 

have contained one sentence: ‘Plaintiff is seeking the return of the $63,500 paid to Defendant Wall 

& Associates.’” Dkt. 15 at 8. Instead, Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s complaint states “that 

Defendants’ failed to provide competent representation ‘to proceed’ against and ‘set aside’ the 

$21,000,000 tax lien and that Defendants’ failure to provide competent representation, including 

‘inaccurate tax advice,’ ‘severely jeopardized’ Plaintiff’s business interests.” Id. (quoting Dkt. 1-1 

at 7). Defendants argue that the “[c]omplaint’s allegations show that Plaintiff is seeking 

compensation in the amount of the tax lien that Defendants were allegedly supposed to resolve.” 

Dkt. 15 at 9. 

Defendants’ arguments, while not unreasonable, rest entirely on Plaintiff’s articulations in

the form complaint. However, the complaint, far from a model pleading, can be read to either 

include the $21,000,000.00 tax lien or to exclude it. See Dkt. 1-1 at 6-8. Consequently, the 

complaint, by itself, does not sustain Defendants’ substantial burden. Defendants provide no other 

Case 5:19-cv-08101-SVK Document 20 Filed 02/13/20 Page 6 of 11
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

evidentiary support that the amount in controversy includes the $21,000,000.00 tax lien.1 Because 

removal statutes are strictly construed against removal and the burden is squarely placed on the 

party seeking removal (see Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244 (citation omitted)), the Court finds 

that Defendants have not carried their burden. 

B. Plaintiff’s Clarification of the Amount in Controversy is Appropriate

Plaintiff avers that “he is willing to stipulate that he will not claim any more than $10,000 

in punitive damages, and shall not exceed $74,900.00.” Dkt. 10-1 ¶ 6. As argued by Defendants, 

it is well established that a plaintiff may not deprive a court of jurisdiction with a post-removal 

reduction of the amount in controversy. Dkt. 15 at 11 (citing St. Paul Mercury Indemnity, 303 

U.S. at 291-92). However, Defendants fail to acknowledge further direction from the Ninth 

Circuit, which provides, in critical part, that where it is unclear from the face of the complaint 

whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, the parties may submit proof of the 

amount in controversy through summary-judgment-type evidence. See Chavez, 888 F.3d at 416.

Where a post-removal stipulation simply “clarifies an ambiguity in the amount in 

controversy, a court may consider the stipulation as evidence of a failure to satisfy the amount in 

controversy.” Soules v. Farmersonly.com, No. CV 16-1289-R, 2016 WL 10966409, at *2 (C.D. 

Cal. Mar. 16, 2016) (citing Gillette v. Peerless Ins. Co., No. CV 13-03161 DDP (RZx), 2013 WL 

3983872, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2013)) (emphasis added). More specifically, “Courts consider 

stipulations that clarify the amount in controversy in situations where (1) state pleading rules leave 

plaintiffs with no other option but to specify an ambiguous amount in controversy in the 

complaint, or (2) where the stipulation indicates that the amount in controversy at the time of 

removal fell below the jurisdiction[al] limit.” Soules, 2016 WL 10966409, at *2 (citing Gillette, 

2013 WL 3983872, at *4).

As noted above, Plaintiff’s complaint is not well-drafted. Additionally, when Plaintiff 

filed his complaint in state court, he did not assert a dollar amount for damages. See generally

1 The only support provided for Defendants’ opposition are the declarations of Defendant Yates 

(Dkt. 15-1) and Defendant Thorson (Dkt. 15-2), neither of which pertain to the amount in 

controversy. 

Case 5:19-cv-08101-SVK Document 20 Filed 02/13/20 Page 7 of 11
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Dkt. 1-1. The California Civil Code bars Plaintiff from identifying a monetary amount sought 

because Plaintiff claimed punitive damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 3295(e) (“No claim for exemplary 

damages shall state an amount or amounts.”). In sum, the amount in controversy was ambiguous 

at the time the case was removed from state court. See Soules, 2016 WL 10966409, at *2. 

Plaintiff’s statement through his lawyer that he will not claim more than $10,000.00 in punitive 

damages and will not exceed $74,900.00 in damages was thus a statement of clarification rather 

than a statement of reduction and is therefore permissible to show that the amount in controversy 

does not exceed $75,000.00. 

C. Defendants Fail to Demonstrate Any Amount of Punitive/Exemplary 

Damages2

Defendants contend that Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in an unspecified amount and 

that California law prohibits Plaintiff from identifying a specific sum of punitive damages. Dkt. 1 

at 7; Dkt. 15 at 9-10. Defendants further contend that because California does not limit the 

amount of punitive damages that Plaintiff could receive, Plaintiff could obtain $63,500.00 in 

punitive damages in addition to the $63,500.00 in actual damages, thus exceeding the amount in 

controversy requirement. Dkt. 1 at 7-8. Plaintiff, in contrast, contends that Defendants have failed 

to meet their burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000.00 because Defendants have not offered evidence of the amount of possible 

punitive damages. Dkt. 17 at 5. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. 

Punitive damages are generally part of the amount in controversy in a civil action. See

Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001). But “simply pointing out that 

Plaintiff is seeking punitive damages without proffering any evidence regarding the amount is 

insufficient to establish that the potential punitive damage award will more likely than not increase 

the amount in controversy.” Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 994 F. Supp. 

1196, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 1998). “To properly include punitive damages in an amount in controversy 

calculation, the party with the burden must present evidence of a possible punitive damage award, 

2

“Punitive damages” and “exemplary damages” are the same under California law. 23 Cal. Jur. 

3d Damages § 181 (“[P]ersons may be subject to the imposition of exemplary or punitive damages

. . . .”) For consistency, the Court will refer to these types of damages as “punitive damages.” 

Case 5:19-cv-08101-SVK Document 20 Filed 02/13/20 Page 8 of 11
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

usually in the form of punitive damage awards in factually analogous cases.” Chavez v. Pratt 

(Robert Mann Packaging), LLC, No. 19-cv-00719-NC, 2019 WL 1501576, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr.

5, 2019) (citing Petkevicius v. NBTY, Inc., 3:14-cv-02616-CAB-(RBB), 2017 WL 1113295, *9 

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2017)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Defendants are correct that California pleading rules barred Plaintiff from demanding a 

dollar amount of punitive damages in his complaint. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3295(e). However, the 

Court does not find that Defendants have met their burden of showing, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that punitive damages would thrust the amount in controversy over $75,000.00. 

Defendants neither provided evidence of a possible punitive damage award nor provided factually 

analogous cases to support their contention. See Pratt, 2019 WL 1501576, at *5. Accordingly, 

the Court finds that punitive damages may not be used to calculate the amount in controversy 

because Defendants failed to establish that a potential punitive damage award would more likely 

than not increase the amount in controversy. 

D. Defendants Fail to Demonstrate That Plaintiff Seeks Nonmonetary Relief

Defendants also argue that even if the amount of compensatory damages is no more than 

$63,500.00, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00 in part because Plaintiff seeks 

nonmonetary relief. Dkt. 1 at 6; Dkt. 15 at 9-10. As support for this claim, they identify 

Plaintiff’s civil cover sheet, where the words “[r]emedies sought (check all that apply)” are stated 

and the box next to the words “nonmonetary; declaratory or injunctive relief” is “checked.” 

Dkt. 15 at 10 (citing Dkt. 1-1 at 11). “A civil cover sheet, however, is merely an administrative 

document designed to facilitate the court’s management of a trial.” Campbell v. Handlery Union 

Square Hotel, No. C 12–2466 MEJ, 2012 WL 3158840, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (quoting 

Wall v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 718 F.2d 906, 909 (9th. Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “A [c]ivil [c]over [s]heet does not supplant the complaint” (McKinney v. Law Office of 

James Duncan, No. CV 09–2605 NJV, 2010 WL 668027, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2010)) and 

“[c]hecking boxes on the civil cover sheet is not a substitute for alleging facts establishing 

jurisdiction in a complaint.” Campbell, 2012 WL 3158840, at *2 (citing Wall, 718 F.2d at 909). 

Defendants cannot use Plaintiff’s civil cover sheet as a basis for their argument that Plaintiff seeks 

Case 5:19-cv-08101-SVK Document 20 Filed 02/13/20 Page 9 of 11
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

declaratory or injunctive relief in an amount that would exceed the amount in controversy. As 

there is no mention of declaratory or injunctive relief in Plaintiff’s complaint (see Dkt. 1-1), the 

Court finds that Defendants have failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00 based on declaratory or injunctive relief. 

E. Complete Diversity of Citizenship is Present

In the notice of removal and again in the opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand, 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff is a citizen of California. Dkt. 1 at 4; Dkt. 15 at 3. Defendants 

also contend that Defendant Wall & Associates, Inc. is a citizen of Virginia (Dkt. 1 at 4; Dkt. 15 at 

3; Dkt. 15-1 ¶ 3); Defendant Cable is a citizen of Virginia (Dkt. 1 at 4; Dkt. 15 at 3); Defendant 

Yates is a citizen of Virginia (Dkt. 1 at 4; Dkt. 15 at 3; Dkt. 15-1 ¶ 2); and Defendant Thorson is a 

citizen of Washington (Dkt. 1 at 4; Dkt. 15 at 3; Dkt. 15-2 ¶ 2). Plaintiff has neither contested the 

truth of these allegations, nor has he argued that Defendants’ allegations are insufficient. 3 

Diversity jurisdiction dictates that “each plaintiff must be of a different citizenship from 

each defendant.” Grancare, LLC v. Mills ex rel. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018). The 

Court finds that Defendants’ allegations are sufficient to support that Plaintiff is diverse from all 

Defendants and that complete diversity of citizenship is present. However, as noted in Sections

III.A-D, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the instant case because the 

amount in controversy requirement has not been met. 

IV. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

Plaintiff requests $1,400.00 in attorney’s fees that were incurred in bringing the instant 

motion to remand. Dkt. 10-1 ¶ 7; Dkt. 11 at 9; Dkt. 17 at 9. Defendants do not provide any 

argument regarding this request. 

“An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, 

including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Absent 

unusual circumstances, courts may award attorneys’ fees under § 1447(c) only where the 

3 Plaintiff instead argues that “Remand is Required Because Diversity Jurisdiction is Inapplicable 

As Defendants’ Contacts With the State of California Establish Specific Personal Jurisdiction 

Over Each Defendant.” Dkt. 11 at 5. It appears that Plaintiff’s arguments inappropriately rest on 

personal jurisdiction rather than subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Case 5:19-cv-08101-SVK Document 20 Filed 02/13/20 Page 10 of 11
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal” and “[c]onversely, 

when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital 

Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). “In applying this rule, district courts retain discretion to 

consider whether unusual circumstances warrant a departure from the rule in a given case.” Id. 

“[R]emoval is not objectively unreasonable solely because the removing party’s arguments lack 

merit, or else attorney’s fees would always be awarded whenever remand is granted.” Lussier v. 

Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). Instead, the objective

reasonableness of removal depends on the clarity of the applicable law and whether such law 

“clearly foreclosed” the arguments in support of removal. Id. at 1066-67.

For the reasons discussed in this order, Defendants were not without an objectively 

reasonable basis to remove the action, notwithstanding this Court’s ultimate finding that diversity 

jurisdiction did not attach. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is DENIED. 

V. CONCLUSION

Though Defendants have plausibly alleged that there is complete diversity of citizenship,

they have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000.00 such that this Court may exert jurisdiction over this case. The Court concludes that it 

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the instant action. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion to remand and REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of California for 

the County of Santa Clara. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT and Plaintiff’s 

request for attorney’s fees incurred in bringing the instant motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2020

SUSAN VAN KEULEN

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:19-cv-08101-SVK Document 20 Filed 02/13/20 Page 11 of 11