Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00113/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00113-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBIN LAWRENCE DUCKETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. RUIZ; L. SCHEMEHORN; A.

CHRITIONSON; W. BEAUCHEMIN, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 11-cv-0113 AJB (NLS)

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTIONS TO

DISMISS, (2) DENYING MOTION FOR

CONTINUANCE, AND (3) DENYING

AS MOOT MOTION FOR LEAVE TO

AMEND

[Doc. Nos. 33, 34, 47, 49]

Presently before the Court are Defendants’ two motions to dismiss (Doc. Nos. 33, 34), Plaintiff’s

motion for a sixty-day continuance (Doc. No. 47), and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the

Complaint (Doc. No. 49).1

 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS both motions to dismiss

with leave to amend, DENIES the motion for a continuance, and DENIES AS MOOT the motion for

leave to amend.

Background

On January 19, 2011, Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1.) On January 19, 2011, Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). (Doc. No. 2.) On March 21, 2011, the Court granted

1

 The Court is construing Plaintiff’s filing in Docket Number 49—which is titled “3rd Amended

Complaint Objections Or The Alternative Leave To Amend”—as a motion for leave to amend the

Complaint. 

1 11cv0113

Case 3:11-cv-00113-AJB-NLS Document 51 Filed 06/29/12 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s IFP motion and sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint with leave to amend for failure to

state a claim. (Doc. No. 7.) On May 5, 2011, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (Doc. No.12),

and on December 9, 2011, he filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. No. 32.) In the SAC,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights when Plaintiff allegedly did not

receive proper medical care relating to the surgical removal of a “suprapubic tube.” (Doc. No. 32 at 6.)

Plaintiff asks for relief in the form of (1) “[a]n injunction preventing defendants as well as other prison

officials from abusing the federally protected rights of inmates in the future”; (2) an injunction

preventing “retaliation by prison officials”; (3) general damages in the sum of $250,000; (4) punitive

damages in the sum of $500,000; and (5) special damages in the sum of $250,000. (Id. at 46.) On

January 20, 2012, Defendants L. Schemehorn, A. Chritionson, and W. Beauchemin filed a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 33.) On the same day, Defendant M. Ruiz filed a separate

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 34.) Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to either

motion with the Court, but he apparently served an opposition on Defendant Ruiz, which Ruiz attached

to his reply filed on March 20, 2012. (Doc. No. 40.) On March 21, 2012, Defendants Schemehorn,

Chritionson, and Beauchemin filed their reply (Doc. No. 41), and to the Court’s knowledge, Plaintiff has

not opposed their motion to dismiss. 

Legal Standard

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2009). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must accept all

factual allegations pled in the complaint as true, and must construe them and draw all reasonable

inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337–38 (9th Cir.1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual

allegations, rather, it must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has "facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

2 11cv0113

Case 3:11-cv-00113-AJB-NLS Document 51 Filed 06/29/12 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556).

Discussion

“The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon incarcerated individuals under color of law

constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Touguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.

2004) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992)). A prison official’s deliberate

indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “To establish

an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy both the objective and subjective components of

a two-part test.” Touguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Hallet v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir.

2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). First, it must be shown “that the prison official deprived the

prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. Second, the prisoner must show that

“the prison official acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.” Id. A prison official acts with

deliberate indifference only when the prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health and safety.” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th

Cir. 2002)). Under this standard, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “This subjective approach focuses only on what a

defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Touguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839

(1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). An accident is not on that basis alone to be characterized as

wanton infliction of unnecessary pain. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.

Similarly, in the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide medical care does not

constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Id. at 105-106. “Thus, a complaint that a

physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of

medical mistreatment under the eighth amendment.” Id. at 106. Medical malpractice is not a

constitutional violation simply because the victim is a prisoner. Id. at 106.

//

//

3 11cv0113

Case 3:11-cv-00113-AJB-NLS Document 51 Filed 06/29/12 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Count I

In count one of the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that by not removing his suprapubic catheter sooner,

Defendant Ruiz acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. (Doc. No. 32 at

6.) Plaintiff alleges that because of Defendant’s actions he developed an infection. (Id.) In his motion,

Defendant Ruiz argues that although Plaintiff’s Complaint is “styled as a section 1983 claim, the

allegations against her sound in professional negligence.” (Doc. No. 34 at 11.) Defendant also argues

that assuming Plaintiff “did not receive the exact treatment he believes he should have received from Dr.

Ruiz, that outcome does not amount to deliberate indifference.” (Id. at 12.) In his opposition, Plaintiff

argues that Defendant knew about his “serious medical need” to have the catheter removed but failed to

take action soon enough, resulting in an infection. (Doc. No. 40 at 5.) The Court does not find Plaintiff’s

argument persuasive. Plaintiff fails to provide facts that demonstrate that Ruiz acted with deliberate

indifference. At most Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are that of negligence or medical malpractice.

As discussed above, a claim of medical malpractice is not enough to state a valid claim of medical

mistreatment under the eighth amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Accordingly, the Court finds that

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Ruiz.2

II. Count Two

In count two of the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that when he returned from surgery he was placed in a

prison cell that was “a hazard to his health and safety.” (Doc. No. 32 at 13.) Plaintiff alleges that he

informed Defendant Schemehorn of his concerns, but Schamehorn refused to allow him to change

prison cells. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s refusal constituted a deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs. (Id.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff gives no facts “to show that Defendant

Schamehorn denied Plaintiff any medical care for a serious medical need.” (Doc. No. 33-1 at 5.)

2

 Defendant Ruiz requests judicial notice of Plaintiff’s SAC (Doc. No. 34-3, Exhs. 1) and the

Medical Board of California Physician and Surgeon License for Ruiz (Doc. No. 34-3, Exhs. 2). Pursuant

to Rule 201, a court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts “not subject to reasonable dispute.”

 Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Moreover, a district court may consider matters subject to judicial notice in ruling

on a motion to dismiss. Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). Facts are

indisputable, and thus subject to judicial notice, only if they are either “generally known” under Rule

201(b)(1) or “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

be reasonably questioned” under Rule 201(b)(2). The Court finds that these documents are judicially

noticeable and grants Defendant’s request.

4 11cv0113

Case 3:11-cv-00113-AJB-NLS Document 51 Filed 06/29/12 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to give any facts “that could support any inference that

Defendant Schamehorn acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs.” (Id.) 

The Court agrees. Plaintiff fails to provide facts that Schamehorn acted with deliberate

indifference. Plaintiff also fails to explain what serious medical need was shown indifference by

Schamehorn. Further, no facts in the SAC allege that Plaintiff suffered any injury as a result of

Schamehorn’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to change cells. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison

Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that a prisoner can make “no claim for deliberate

medical indifference unless the denial was harmful”). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which

the Court could find that Defendant Schemehorn acted with deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

III. Count Three

In count three of the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Chritionson placed him in administrative segregation, which prevented Plaintiff from receiving “his twice daily dressing changes and his

postsurgical medications.” (Doc. No. 32 at 25.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Chritionson’s actions

constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Id.) Here, once again, Plaintiff fails to

provide facts that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference when he placed Plaintiff in administrative segregation. Further, there are no facts in the SAC alleging that Plaintiff suffered any injury as a

result of his placement in administrative segregation. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which

the Court could find that Defendant Chritionson acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

IV. Count Four

In what the Court is construing as count four of the SAC, Plaintiff alleges he submitted a “602

appeal form” on staff misconduct that Defendant Beauchemin reviewed and denied. (Doc. No. 32 at 31.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Beauchemin suppressed “any facts, events, and circumstances relevant

to the appeal issue under investigation.” (Id.) In the SAC, Plaintiff fails to explain what rights were

violated by Defendant Beauchemin and how those rights were violated. Plaintiff simply comes to a

5 11cv0113

Case 3:11-cv-00113-AJB-NLS Document 51 Filed 06/29/12 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

vague conclusion that Defendant suppressed facts relevant to his appeal. Accordingly, the Court finds

that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.3

 The Court therefore GRANTS both of Defendants’ motions to dismiss

without prejudice. (Doc. Nos. 33, 34.) Plaintiff has thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to submit

an amended Complaint correcting the deficiencies noted herein. Failure to do so will result in the

Court’s dismissal of this case. 

Plaintiff recently filed two new documents with the Court. The first is a motion for a sixty-day

continuance. (Doc. No. 47.) Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for the continuance; further, the

motion is vague and unclear. It suggests that the continuance will “allow the court to appoint an

attorney,” but Magistrate Judge Stormes has since denied Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (Doc.

No. 50), so that is no longer an issue. The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for a continuance.

The Court construes the second document as a motion for leave to amend the Complaint. (Doc. No. 49.)

As noted above, the Court is permitting Plaintiff to amend his Complaint. Accordingly, the motion for

leave to amend is DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 29, 2012

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. District Judge

3

 The Court notes that Defendants make an additional argument regarding qualified immunity.

However, because the above grounds are determinative, the Court does not reach a finding on the

qualified immunity issue.

K:\COMMON\BATTAGLI\DJ CASES\2 Orders to be filed\11cv113 Order Granting MTDs.wpd 6 11cv0113

Case 3:11-cv-00113-AJB-NLS Document 51 Filed 06/29/12 Page 6 of 6