Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-17272/USCOURTS-ca9-14-17272-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DR. RAHINAH IBRAHIM, an 

individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY; JEH JOHNSON,

* in his 

official capacity as the Secretary of 

the Department of Homeland 

Security; TERRORIST SCREENING 

CENTER; CHRISTOPHER M. PIEHOTA, 

in his official capacity as Director of 

the Terrorist Screening Center; 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION; JAMES COMEY, in 

his official capacity as Director of 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation; 

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney 

General, in her official capacity as 

Attorney General; ANDREW G.

MCCABE, in his official capacity as 

Executive Assistant Director of the 

FBI’s National Security Branch; 

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

Nos. 14-16161

14-17272

D.C. No.

3:06-cv-545-

WHA

OPINION

 * Current cabinet members and other federal officials have been 

substituted for their predecessors pursuant to Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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2 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

CENTER; NICHOLAS RASMUSSEN, in 

his official capacity as Director of 

the National Counterterrorism 

Center; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; 

JOHN KERRY, in his official capacity 

as Secretary of State; UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 14, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed August 30, 2016

Before: Richard R. Clifton and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit 

Judges, and Royce C. Lamberth,

** Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Lamberth

 ** The Honorable Royce C. Lamberth, Senior District Judge for the U.S. 

District Court for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 3

SUMMARY***

Equal Access to Justice Act

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district 

court’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to the 

Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) and the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 

(1983), and remanded for further proceedings.

Dr. Rahinah Ibrahim commenced the underlying action 

seeking monetary and equitable relief against various state 

and federal officials based on her inclusion in the 

government’s terrorist databases, including the No-Fly List. 

After two dismissals and subsequent reversals and remands 

by this court, the district court held a week-long bench trial 

and concluded that Ibrahim had been improperly placed 

within the government’s databases. Ibrahim sought 

$3,360,057 in market-rate attorney’s fees and $293,860 in 

expenses. 

The district court determined that Ibrahim was a 

prevailing party under EAJA, but further found that the 

government was substantially justified in some of its 

positions. The district court awarded Ibrahim $419,987.36 

in fees and $34,768.71 in costs and expenses. 

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990) (providing 

that courts are to make but one substantial justification 

determination on the case as a whole), the panel held that the 

 *** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

district court erred by making multiple substantial 

justification determinations and accordingly reversed. The 

panel also reversed the district court’s various reductions 

imposed on Ibrahim’s eligible fees arising from its incorrect 

substantial justification analysis. The panel affirmed the 

district court’s bad faith findings as well as its relatedness 

findings under Hensley . The panel also affirmed the district 

court’s striking of Ibrahim’s objections to the special 

master’s report on expenses.

COUNSEL

Marwa Elzankaly (argued), Jennifer Murakami, Ruby Kazi, 

Christine Peek, Elizabeth Pipkin, and James McManis, 

McManis Faulkner, San Jose, California, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Joshua Waldman (argued) and Sharon Swingle, Attorneys, 

Appellate Staff; Melinda Haag, United States Attorney; 

Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General; Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees.

Chet A. Kronenberg and JoAnne S. Jennings, Simpson 

Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amici 

Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of California, Asian 

Americans Advancing Justice-Asian Law Caucus, Asian 

Americans Advancing Justice-Los Angeles, Center for 

Constitutional Rights, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and 

National Immigration Law Center.

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 5

OPINION

LAMBERTH, Senior District Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Dr. Rahinah Ibrahim appeals the 

district court’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses 

pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 

28 U.S.C. § 2412 and the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). She contends the 

district court incorrectly found that the government had not 

acted in bad faith under EAJA section 2412(b) and therefore 

erred by declining to award market-rate fees. She further 

argues the district court erred by finding that the 

government’s conduct was substantially justified under 

EAJA section 2412(d)(1)(A) on discrete issues and at 

discrete stages of the litigation, rather than making a single 

determination on the case as a whole. Finally, she challenges 

the district court’s striking of her objections to a special 

master’s report on her claimed expenses. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990), we hold 

the district court erred by making multiple substantial 

justification determinations and accordingly reverse. We 

also reverse the district court’s various reductions imposed 

on Ibrahim’s eligible fees arising from its incorrect 

substantial justification analysis.

We however affirm the district court’s bad faith findings 

as well as its relatedness findings under Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). We also affirm the district 

court’s striking of Ibrahim’s objections to the special 

master’s report on expenses.

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6 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

I.

Fee disputes, the Supreme Court has warned, “should not 

result in a second major litigation.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. 

But, unsurprisingly, they sometimes do, and the instant case 

is one such example.

In January 2006, Ibrahim commenced this action seeking 

monetary and equitable relief against various state and 

federal officials alleging 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, state law 

tort claims, and constitutional claims based on her inclusion 

in the government’s terrorist databases, including the No-Fly 

List. After two dismissals and subsequent reversals and 

remands by this Court, Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

538 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Ibrahim I”), Ibrahim v. 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(“Ibrahim II”), the district court held a week-long bench 

trial.1

The district court concluded that Ibrahim had been 

improperly placed within the government’s databases.2

Specifically, it found the FBI agent who nominated Ibrahim 

to the government watchlists incorrectly filled out the 

nomination form. As a result, Ibrahim was placed on the NoFly List and another terrorist screening watchlist, rather than 

the lists on which the FBI agent had intended she be placed. 

Id. Accordingly, the court below ruled in favor of Ibrahim 

 1

 At the time of trial, the only remaining claims were those against the 

federal defendants arising from their placement of Ibrahim on the 

government’s terrorism watchlists, as well as their revocation and 

subsequent denial of Ibrahim’s entry visas.

 2

 The district court’s factual findings are not challenged on appeal; 

unless otherwise noted, factual assertions contained herein reflect those 

findings.

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 7

on her procedural due process claim, concluding the 

government’s nomination error involved a “conceded, 

proven, undeniable, and serious error by the government.” 

Although Ibrahim had been removed from the No-Fly List 

in early 2005, the government was ordered to remove any 

information contained in its databases associated with the 

2004 nomination form, including those databases the FBI 

agent had intended Ibrahim be placed on, because the 

nomination form had been incorrectly filled out. It also 

ordered the government to affirmatively inform Ibrahim she 

was no longer on the No-Fly List because the government’s 

Travel Redress Inquiry Plan—the only means by which an 

individual may challenge their suspected placement on the 

No-Fly List—failed to affirmatively disclose whether she 

had indeed been placed on the list incorrectly and whether 

she had been removed as a result.

The district court also granted unasked-for relief under 

our now-vacated precedent in Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 

863 (9th Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) by 

ordering the government to identify the specific subsection 

under section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act that rendered Ibrahim ineligible for a visa in 

2009 and 2013. Lastly, on additional independent grounds, 

the district court granted further relief by finding that the 

consular officer who denied Ibrahim her visa erred in 

indicating she could not apply for a discretionary waiver of 

her ineligibility. The district court ordered the government 

to permit such a waiver application.

The district court did not reach the remainder of 

Ibrahim’s other claims which included her First 

Amendment, substantive due process, equal protection, and 

Administrative Procedure Act claims because, in its view, 

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8 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

“even if successful, [they] would not lead to any greater 

relief than already ordered.”

Thereafter, the parties and the court engaged in a lengthy 

and contentious fee dispute. In total, Ibrahim sought 

$3,630,057.50 in market-rate attorney’s fees and 

$293,860.18 in expenses. Adopting the recommendations of 

a special master, the district court ultimately awarded 

Ibrahim $419,987.36 in fees and $34,768.71 in costs and 

expenses. Ibrahim challenges both the underlying legal 

framework the district court utilized to determine the fees 

she was eligible to recover, as well as the district court’s 

adoption of various reductions applied to those eligible fees 

by the special master.

II.

We begin with the district court’s application of the 

EAJA.

Congress passed the EAJA “to eliminate for the average 

person the financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable 

governmental actions.” Jean, 496 U.S. at 163. To that end, 

the EAJA permits a “prevailing party” to recover fees and 

other expenses from the government unless the government 

demonstrates that its position was “substantially justified.”3

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 

428 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gonzales v. Free 

Speech Coal., 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2005)). The EAJA 

limits attorney’s fees to “the prevailing market rates for the 

kind and quality of the services furnished” but, subject to 

 

 3 The EAJA also provides for an exception where “special 

circumstances” would make a fee award to the prevailing party unjust. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 9

exception, does not permit an award in excess of $125 per 

hour. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). One such exception to that 

cap applies where the court finds the government acted in 

bad faith. Rodriguez v. United States, 542 F.3d 704, 709 (9th 

Cir. 2008).

After determining Ibrahim was a prevailing party, the 

court below found that the government was substantially 

justified respecting its pre-Ibrahim II standing arguments, its 

defense against Ibrahim’s visa-related claims, and its various 

privilege assertions. It disallowed fees associated with those 

issues. It found the government’s conduct otherwise was not 

justified.

It further ruled that the government had not acted in bad 

faith, and with one exception not relevant here, imposed the 

EAJA’s hourly cap to Ibrahim’s fees.

Ibrahim contends these findings were erroneous. We 

address each in turn.

A.

We review a district court’s substantial justification 

determination for abuse of discretion. Gonzales, 408 F.3d at 

618. We review its interpretation of the EAJA de novo. 

Edwards v. McMahon, 834 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1987).

The government’s “position” when considered within 

the EAJA context includes both the government’s litigation 

position as well as the “action or failure to act by the agency 

upon which the civil action is based.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d)(1)(B). Hence, we have often articulated the 

substantial justification test as encompassing two lines of 

inquiry: one directed towards the government’s original 

action, and the other towards the government’s litigation 

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10 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

position defending that action. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. 

Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 2001). But it 

remains true that the test is an inclusive one; it is the 

government’s position “as a whole” that must have “a 

reasonable basis in fact and law.” Id. at 1261.4

Citing our decisions in Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 

1071 (9th Cir. 2008), and Li v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 913, 918 

(9th Cir. 2007), the court below concluded “[t]he 

government must show that its position was substantially 

justified at each stage of the proceedings in order to avoid an 

award of EAJA fees.” It went on to invoke our decision in 

Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 1998), for the 

proposition that in exceedingly complex cases, a court may 

appropriately determine whether the government was 

substantially justified at each “stage” of the litigation and 

make a fee award apportioned to those separate 

determinations. It accordingly disallowed fees for discrete 

positions5 taken by the government because, in its view, the 

government’s positions in each instance were substantially 

justified. It was error to do so.

In Jean, 496 U.S. at 161–62, the Supreme Court broadly 

pronounced that the EAJA “favors treating a case as an 

 

 4 And though we have held generally that “a reasonable litigation 

position does not establish substantial justification in the face of a clearly 

unjustified underlying action,” we have declined to adopt a per se rule 

foreclosing that possibility. United States v. Marolf, 277 F.3d 1156, 

1163–64 and n.5 (9th Cir. 2002). We have likewise left open the 

possibility that reasonable underlying conduct may not be sufficient 

grounds to preclude a fee award in the face of otherwise unreasonable 

litigation tactics. Id.

 5

 As noted, these include the government’s pre-Ibrahim II standing 

assertions, the government’s defense of its revocation of Ibrahim’s visa, 

as well as the government’s privilege assertions.

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 11

inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items.” Noting 

section 2412(d)(2)(D)’s use of the term “position” in the 

singular coupled with Congress’s “emphasis on the 

underlying Government action,” the Court concluded the 

EAJA substantial justification determination acted as a “onetime threshold for fee eligibility.” Id. at 159–60 and n.7. 

Accordingly, the Jean Court rejected petitioners’ argument 

that the court was required to make two substantial 

justification determinations: one as to respondents’ fees for 

time and expenses incurred in applying for fees, and another 

as to fees in the litigation itself. Id. at 157.

Jean, then, we think is clear: courts are to make but one 

substantial justification determination on the case as a 

whole. That is not to say a court may not consider the 

government’s success at various stages of the litigation when 

making that inquiry, but those separate points of focus must 

be made as individual inquiries collectively shedding light 

on the government’s conduct on the whole, rather than as 

distinct stages considered in isolation. Indeed in United 

States v. Rubin, 97 F.3d 373, 375–76 (9th Cir. 1996), we 

affirmed a district court’s treating the case as a whole in 

disallowing fees although there was some indication at least 

part of the government’s conduct was not substantially 

justified. In doing so, we cited favorably to Jean’s 

recognition that the EAJA favors treating the case as an 

“inclusive whole.” Id. at 375 (quoting Jean, 496 U.S. at 161–

62).

We are aware our sister courts have adopted contrary 

views in this regard. The D.C. Circuit, for instance, has 

rejected a reading of Jean that would preclude a claim-byclaim determination on the ground that such a rule would 

render the EAJA a “virtual nullity” because government 

conduct is nearly always grouped with or part of some 

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12 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

greater, and presumably justified, action. Air Trans. Ass’n v. 

F.A.A., 156 F.3d 1329, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In the same 

vein, the Seventh Circuit has cautioned against taking 

“judicial language out of context,” reasoning that Jean “does 

not address the question whether allocation is permissible 

under the [EAJA]” to allow fees for the part of the 

government’s case that was not substantially justified. 

Gatimi v. Holder, 606 F.3d 344, 350 (7th Cir. 2010).6

We do not share the fear, however, that a single-inquiry 

rule will render the EAJA “a virtual nullity.” Air Trans. 

Ass’n, 156 F.3d at 1332. The possibility that an evaluation 

of the government’s conduct can be so “‘holistic,’” id., so as 

to preclude a finding that the government was ever without 

substantial justification surely exists,7 but such an 

application would run afoul of the basic principle that courts 

interpret and apply statutes “in light of the overall purpose 

and structure of the whole statutory scheme.” United States 

v. Neal, 776 F.3d 645, 652 (9th Cir. 2015).

Nor are we concerned that a single-inquiry rule would 

disallow the recovery of fees even where the government 

may have been unjustified at certain stages or in discrete 

positions it took throughout the lifetime of the case. As the 

 

 6 Some circuits, like the Third Circuit, have required district courts to 

“evaluate every significant argument made by an agency” in order to 

permit an appellate court “to review a district court’s decision and 

determine whether, as a whole, the Government’s position was 

substantially justified.” Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 

123, 131 (3d Cir. 1993).

 7

 Because, on a general level, almost all government action is carried 

out through authorized avenues pursuant to some legitimate purpose. 

Analyzed at that bird’s-eye level, it is true that almost all government 

action is “usually substantially justified.” Air Trans. Ass’n, 156 F.3d at 

1332.

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 13

Supreme Court has noted, “substantially justified” in this 

context only requires justification “to a degree that could 

satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 

552, 565 (1988). That formulation implicitly permits the 

government some leeway, so long as its conduct on the 

whole remained justified. Whether those portions of the case 

on which the government was not substantially justified are 

sufficient to warrant fee shifting on the case as a whole is a 

question left to the evaluating court’s discretion. But that a 

situation may arise where a court may deny a prevailing

party fees even though the government was not substantially 

justified as to every position it took does not trouble us. Such 

a result seems expressly contemplated by the EAJA’s use of 

the qualifying term “substantial” rather than “total” or 

“complete.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

What’s more, “[a]voiding an interpretation that ensures 

that the fee application will spawn a second litigation of 

significant dimension is central to Supreme Court 

jurisprudence on fee-shifting statutes.” Hardisty v. Astrue, 

592 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal punctuation 

omitted) (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland 

Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791 (1989)). An approach 

permissive of separate substantial justification inquiries runs 

afoul of that interpretive paradigm.

Nor do we see any conflict with our decisions in Corbin, 

149 F.3d at 1053, or its progeny in which we have upheld 

EAJA fee awards in the social security context where the 

award was apportioned to each successive stage of the 

litigation. As we noted in Corbin, following the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 

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14 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

(1993),8 “it became possible for a [social security] claimant 

to be deemed a ‘prevailing party’ for EAJA purposes prior 

to the ultimate disposition of his disability claim.” Corbin, 

149 F.3d at 1053. As a result, we shifted focus from 

“considering only [whether the government was 

substantially justified as to] the ultimate issue of disability to 

considering the justification of the government’s position at 

the discrete stage in question.” Id. We have never applied 

Corbin outside of the social security context, nor do we see 

any reason to extend it to a case like this one where there was 

no possibility Ibrahim could be considered a prevailing party 

prior to the ultimate resolution of her claims.

In sum, courts assessing whether the government’s 

position under the EAJA was substantially justified should 

engage in a single inquiry focused on the government’s 

conduct in the case as a whole. We therefore hold the district

court erred in disallowing fees relating to discrete litigation 

positions taken by the government.

 8

 At issue in Schaefer was the point at which the EAJA’s 30-day clock 

for a fee application begins to run following a successful social security 

appeal after the district court makes a sentence-four remand under 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) but fails to enter a final judgment. 509 U.S. at 294–

95. The Supreme Court held that under such facts, the time for a fee 

application does not expire while the district court’s order remains 

appealable, and in light of the absence of a final judgment, such orders 

remain appealable even through the remanded proceedings, therefore 

making a post-remand EAJA application timely. Id. at 303. The Supreme 

Court noted, however, that it was error for the district court to fail to 

enter a final judgment upon the sentence-four remand. Id. at 300–01. 

Schaefer’s upshot, therefore, was that sentence-four remands were to be 

accompanied by final judgments, which in turn, would require EAJA fee 

applications to be filed before the proceedings on remand were 

concluded.

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 15

B.

We next address Ibrahim’s assertion that the district 

court erred in failing to find the government acted in bad 

faith and by consequently imposing the EAJA’s hourly rate 

cap on the majority of her recoverable hours.9

The EAJA mandates that the “United States . . . be liable 

for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other 

party would be liable under the common law.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(b). The common law permits a court to assess 

attorney’s fees against a losing party that has “acted in bad 

faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” 

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991). We 

hold the government to the same standard under the EAJA, 

Rodriguez, 542 F.3d at 709, and a finding that the 

government acted in bad faith permits a market-rate recovery 

of attorney’s fees, Brown v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 492, 495 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

“Under the common law, a finding of bad faith is 

warranted where an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises 

a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the 

purpose of harassing an opponent.” Rodriguez, 542 F.3d at 

709 (internal punctuation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 

115 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Mere recklessness does 

not alone constitute bad faith; rather, an award of attorney’s 

fees is justified when reckless conduct is combined with an 

additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an 

improper purpose.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 

 

 9 The district court permitted an upward departure for attorney James 

McManis due to his distinctive knowledge and skills.

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16 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

(quoting Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 993–94 (9th Cir. 

2001)).

Ibrahim raises several arguments in support of her 

contention that the government acted in bad faith both in the

conduct leading to and during this action. She first argues 

that the “Government’s refusal to acknowledge and 

permanently correct the injustice to Ibrahim, and its apparent 

lack of concern that others may have suffered harm from 

similar errors, show bad faith from the inception of this 

case.” Her next contention focuses on the government’s 

raising of its standing defense after our decision in Ibrahim 

II, in which we held Ibrahim had Article III standing to 

pursue her claims. 669 F.3d at 994. She also claims the 

government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege was 

made in bad faith and analogizes the government’s conduct 

here with that in Limone v. United States, 815 F. Supp. 2d 

393 (D. Mass. 2011). Ibrahim further alleges the government 

barred her and her daughter from entering the United States 

in an effort to prevent them from offering testimony at trial. 

And lastly, Ibrahim insists the district court clearly erred by 

failing to review the record in its entirety, and instead 

“examin[ed] examples of bad conduct in isolation and 

conclud[ed] each one individually did not show bad faith, 

rather than examining the totality of the circumstances.”

We review the district court’s bad faith findings for clear 

error. Rodriguez, 542 F.3d at 709. “A finding is clearly 

erroneous if it is ‘(1) ‘illogical’, (2) ‘implausible’, or 

(3) without ‘support in inferences that may be drawn from 

the facts in the record.’’” Crittenden v. Chappell, 804 F.3d 

998, 1012 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 

585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). “In applying 

the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district 

court sitting without a jury, [an] appellate court[] must 

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 17

constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide 

factual issues de novo,” even where it is “convinced that had 

it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the 

evidence differently.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 

470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985). “If the district court’s account 

of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in 

its entirety,” we must affirm. Id. We find that the district 

court’s account of the evidence is plausible in the light of the 

record, and therefore affirm.

Respecting Ibrahim’s first argument, it appears she is

making two distinct claims: first, that the government 

wrongly placed her on its watchlists and therefore acted in 

bad faith, and second, that its defense of such placement was 

bad faith because it knew its conduct was wrongful. Both 

contentions are unavailing.

The district court found that at the time the government 

placed Ibrahim on its watchlists, including the No-Fly List, 

there existed “no uniform standard for [watchlist] 

nominations.” It was not until after this suit was instituted 

that the government adopted the “reasonable suspicion” 

standard for placement on its watchlists. And although the 

government admits that Ibrahim did not meet that standard 

at the time of her placement, that fact alone is insufficient to 

reverse the district court here. The district court expressly 

declined to find that the government’s initial interest in 

Ibrahim was due to her race, religion or ethnicity.10 Absent 

evidence Ibrahim’s inclusion on the watchlists was 

otherwise improper, it was not clearly erroneous for the 

district court to find the government’s underlying placement 

of Ibrahim on its watchlists did not constitute bad faith.

 

 10 A finding Ibrahim does not challenge on appeal.

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18 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

Nor was the government’s defense of its partially 

mistaken placement bad faith. Prior to this suit no court had 

held a foreign national such as Ibrahim possessed any right 

to challenge their placement—mistaken or not—on the 

government’s terrorism watchlists. It accordingly could not 

have been bad faith to assert, as the government did, that 

Ibrahim possessed no such right. And more importantly, it is 

not true that the government defended, as Ibrahim claims, its 

placing her on the No-Fly List. At the time this action was 

instituted in early 2006, the government had already 

removed Ibrahim from the No-Fly List more than a year 

prior, and, with one exception, the lists on which she did 

appear at that time were the same lists on which the 

nominating agent had intended she be placed.

11 Therefore, 

to the extent the government defended Ibrahim’s placement 

on those lists, no colorable argument can be made such a 

defense was frivolous or made with improper purpose.12

 11 The district court found the nominating agent had intended to place 

Ibrahim within the Consular Lookout and Support System (“CLASS”) 

List, the TSA Selectee List, the TUSCAN List, and the TACTICS List, 

but instead placed Ibrahim on the No-Fly List and the Interagency Border 

Information System (“IBIS”) database. While the district court found the 

government removed Ibrahim from the No-Fly List in January 2005, it 

also found she remained on the Selectee List and CLASS Lists at that 

time. It found that in December 2005, she was removed from the Selectee 

List, but added to the TUSCAN List and TACTICS List. Thus, when this 

action was instituted, she was on the CLASS, TACTICS and TUSCAN 

Lists, which were, as the district court found, the same lists on which the 

nominating agent had intended she be placed. The district court made no 

finding, however, whether Ibrahim was ever removed from the IBIS 

database.

 12 That the government would later determine Ibrahim did not meet 

the reasonable suspicion standard, which was adopted subsequent to 

Ibrahim’s nomination to the lists, and remove her from its watchlists is 

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 19

The same can be said with respect to the government’s 

raising of the standing defense after our decision in Ibrahim 

II. Ibrahim fails to point to any evidence indicating the 

government reraised standing as a defense at summary 

judgment and trial with vexatious purpose. What’s more, the 

government correctly points out that there was at minimum 

a colorable argument that the different procedural phases of 

the case rendered their subsequent standing motions 

nonfrivolous.

Ibrahim’s claim that the government’s privilege 

assertions were made in bad faith is also unconvincing. As 

the district court noted, the government was successful on 

many of its privilege assertions, and on that basis it declined

to find the government’s invocation of privilege was 

frivolous. Ibrahim likens the government’s conduct in this 

case with that in Limone v. United States, where a 

Massachusetts district court found the government had acted 

in bad faith by “block[ing] access to the relevant 

documents,” and “hiding behind specious procedural 

arguments,” which “culminat[ed] in a frivolous interlocutory 

appeal.” 815 F. Supp. 2d at 398. The conduct in Limone 

included a refusal to disclose relevant information, even in 

camera, until ordered by the court to do so. Id. Ibrahim sees 

similar conduct in this case through the government’s refusal 

to produce basic information without a court order, its 

objections to questions at depositions, and its objections to 

discussing publicly available information.

 

of no relevance. Ibrahim did not possess—nor did the district court find 

her to possess—a right to challenge the substantive basis for her 

placement on the government’s watchlists. The district court’s relief was 

explicitly limited to the government’s post-deprivation procedural 

shortcomings and expressly disavowed “[a]ny other rule requiring 

reviewability before concrete adverse action.”

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20 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

But Ibrahim forgets that the government was ultimately 

successful on at least some of its privilege assertions, and 

absent evidence, of which Ibrahim has pointed to none, that 

the government’s assertions on those unsuccessful occasions

were frivolous or made with improper purpose, it could not 

have been clear error to decline to find the government acted 

in bad faith. Nor was the government’s action here 

analogous to that in Limone where it had refused to grant its 

own lawyers access to the allegedly privileged documents 

which resulted in counsel’s inability to respond to discovery 

motions and court orders for nearly two years. See id. at 398, 

408. There is nothing similar in this case.

Nor is there any evidence in the record demonstrating the 

government prevented Ibrahim from entering the United 

States to offer testimony in this suit, and with respect to her 

daughter, Ibrahim fails to explain why there was any error in 

the district court’s determination that the government’s 

initial refusal to allow her into the country was anything but 

a mistake, and a quickly corrected one at that. The district 

court’s findings here were not clearly erroneous.

Lastly, Ibrahim’s argument that the district court erred 

by making piecemeal bad faith determinations is 

unpersuasive. Her sole authority on point is our decision in 

McQuiston v. Marsh, 707 F.2d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1983), 

superseded by statute as recognized by Melkonyan v. 

Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 96 (1991), where we made the 

unremarkable observation that “[b]ad faith may be found 

either in the action that led to the lawsuit or in the conduct 

of the litigation.” She fails, however, to point to any case 

where we have elevated that observation to edict. Rather, we 

have consistently required fee awards based on bad faith to 

be “traceable” to the conduct in question. See, e.g., 

Rodriguez, 542 F.3d at 713. It was therefore proper for the 

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 21

district court to consider each claimed instance of bad faith 

in order to determine whether the associated fees should be 

subject to a market-rate increase.

III.

We turn to the district court’s fee reductions imposed in 

accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hensley, 

461 U.S. 424.

Though a prevailing party may be eligible for fees under 

the EAJA,13 “[i]t remains for the district court to determine 

what fee is ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 433. And as the Supreme 

Court noted, and we have often repeated, “the most useful 

starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee 

is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation 

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Schwarz v. Sec. of 

Health & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 

433). In the case of fees sought under the EAJA, the 

“reasonable hourly rate” is capped by the EAJA itself. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Thus, the equation for 

determining the reasonable amount of fees awardable in 

cases such as this is the number of hours reasonably 

expended multiplied by the applicable EAJA rates. The 

resulting figure—the lodestar figure—forms the basis for the 

remainder of the Hensley determination.

 

 13 Though Hensley addressed fees in the context of the Civil Rights 

Attorney’s Fees Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Court went on to 

hold in Jean that the assessment of reasonable fees under the EAJA is 

“essentially the same.” 496 U.S. at 160–61. We have since applied 

Hensley to EAJA fee awards. See, e.g., Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 

989–90 (9th Cir. 1998).

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But where a plaintiff has only achieved limited success, 

not all hours expended on the litigation are eligible for 

inclusion in the lodestar, and even those that are eligible may 

be subject to a discretionary reduction. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 

436; Schwarz, 73 F.3d at 901. Thus, under Hensley we have 

required district courts to follow a two-step process where a 

plaintiff’s success is limited: first, the court must determine 

whether the claims upon which the plaintiff prevailed are 

related to the unsuccessful claims. Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 

1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2003). That inquiry rests on whether the 

“related claims involve a common core of facts or are based 

on related legal theories.” Id. Time spent on unsuccessful 

claims the court deems related are to be included in the 

lodestar, while “[h]ours expended on unrelated, 

unsuccessful claims should not be included” to the extent 

those hours can be “isolated.” Id. at 1168, 1169. Thus, in 

addition to time reasonably spent on successful claims, 

potentially recoverable under Hensley are those hours 

expended on related but unsuccessful claims as well as those 

hours pertaining to unrelated, unsuccessful claims that 

cannot be severed cleanly from the whole.

Second, a court must consider “whether ‘the plaintiff 

achieved a level of success that makes the hours reasonably 

expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award.’” 

Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1147 (internal punctuation omitted) 

(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).14 Here, “a district court 

‘should focus on the significance of the overall relief 

 14 If the district court finds that a plaintiff was wholly successful, it 

must still evaluate whether the degree of success obtained justifies an 

award based on the number of hours reasonably expended, whereas a

“limited success” finding necessitates the intermediary step of 

determining which claims were related or unrelated before weighing the 

degree of success obtained against the total number of hours reasonably 

expended.

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 23

obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably 

expended on the litigation.’” Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. 

at 435).

If the court concludes the prevailing party achieved 

“excellent results,” it may permit a full fee award—that is, 

the entirety of those hours reasonably expended on both the 

prevailing and unsuccessful but related claims. Hensley, 

461 U.S. at 435; Schwarz, 73 F.3d at 905–06. On the other 

hand, where a plaintiff has not achieved results warranting a 

fully recoverable fee, the district court may apply a 

downward adjustment to the lodestar by “award[ing] only 

that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results 

obtained.”15 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.

Ibrahim was successful below on her procedural due 

process claim. The district court, however, expressly refused 

to reach her remaining claims—which included her 

substantive due process, equal protection, First Amendment, 

and Administrative Procedure Act claims because “those 

arguments, even if successful, would not lead to any greater 

relief than already ordered.” It accordingly treated those 

claims as having been unsuccessful.

It awarded full fees and expenses for those hours 

Ibrahim’s counsel incurred litigating her procedural due 

process claim. Because it found that her unsuccessful 

substantive due process and Administrative Procedure Act 

claims were related to her successful claim, it also awarded 

fees and expenses incurred prosecuting those claims. It 

declined to make any award for those fees and expenses 

 

 15 It is at this step for instance that district courts apply a reduction for 

the inclusion of hours associated with unrelated, unsuccessful claims that 

could not be easily segregated. Webb, 330 F.3d at 1169.

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24 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

associated with Ibrahim’s First Amendment and equal 

protection claims because they “were not related to the 

procedural due process claim (for which [Ibrahim] received 

relief) because they involve different evidence, different 

theories, and arose from a different alleged course of 

conduct.”

Ibrahim attacks the district court’s Hensley reductions on 

two grounds: first, she contends it was error to conclude her 

First Amendment and equal protection claims were 

unrelated to her successful procedural due process claim. 

Second, she argues the “excellent results” she obtained in 

this litigation support a fully compensable fee. We reject 

both assertions.

We review a district court’s award of fees under Hensley

for abuse of discretion, including its ruling that a party 

achieved only limited success, Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 

410 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 2005), as well as its finding that 

unsuccessful claims are unrelated to the claims upon which 

a plaintiff prevailed, Schwarz, 73 F.3d at 902. Unrelated 

claims are those that are both factually and legally distinct. 

Webb, 330 F.3d at 1168. In Schwarz, we observed “the test 

[for the factual relatedness of claims] is whether relief 

sought on the unsuccessful claim is intended to remedy a 

course of conduct entirely distinct and separate from the 

course of conduct that gave rise to the injury on which the 

relief [is] granted.” 73 F.3d at 903 (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 

1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 1986)). Thus, “the focus is to be on 

whether the unsuccessful and successful claims arose out of 

the same course of conduct,” or as the Supreme Court put it: 

the same “common core.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. “If they didn’t, they are 

unrelated.” Schwarz, 73 F.3d at 903.

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 25

The test does not require that the facts underlying the 

claims be identical. The concept of a “common core” or 

“common course of conduct” is permissive of the incidental 

factual differences underlying distinct legal theories. Were 

that not the case, rare would be the occasion where legally 

distinct claims would qualify as related under Hensley. But 

it remains true that the work done on the unsuccessful claims 

must have contributed to the ultimate result achieved. 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435; Schwarz, 73 F.3d at 904.

The court below disallowed fees for Ibrahim’s First 

Amendment and equal protection claims because they were 

based on different legal theories, evidence, and “alleged” 

courses of conduct. Ibrahim contends that reasoning was 

erroneous and in support cites Webb, 330 F.3d 1158, where 

we addressed an EAJA fee award arising out of a suit for 

false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. 

There we found that the “common course of conduct” was 

the plaintiff’s “arrest, detention, and prosecution.” Id. at 

1169. In light of that formulation, we noted that the 

plaintiff’s unsuccessful false arrest claim was 

“unquestionably” related to his successful false 

imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims because 

they each sprang from that same underlying conduct. Id. We 

therefore concluded that work done on the plaintiff’s 

unsuccessful false imprisonment claim “could have 

contributed to the final result achieved” and accordingly 

treated such work as being related for Hensley purposes. Id.

What Ibrahim misses—and what distinguishes this case 

from Webb—is the mutually exclusive nature of the claims 

presented here. As a predicate to the Webb plaintiff’s false 

imprisonment claim, the plaintiff had to be arrested. Work 

done investigating and developing the factual record on the 

false arrest claim would therefore necessarily further the 

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26 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

plaintiff’s successful false imprisonment claim. Likewise, 

the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim was inextricably 

tied to the prosecutor’s state of mind in bringing the spurious 

charges, which in turn was heavily reliant on what the 

prosecutor knew about the circumstances surrounding 

plaintiff’s arrest. Most work attributable to the plaintiff’s 

false arrest claim, therefore, likely also contributed to the

plaintiff’s successful claims.

The same cannot be said for Ibrahim’s claims. In light of 

the district court’s findings, Ibrahim’s First Amendment and 

equal protections claims were mutually exclusive with her 

procedural due process claims. That is, if the government 

negligently placed Ibrahim on its watchlists because it failed

to properly fill out a form, then it could not at the same time 

have intentionally placed Ibrahim on the list based on 

constitutionally protected attributes Ibrahim possesses, and 

vice versa.16 These mental states are mutually exclusive. 

Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to find that 

Ibrahim’s unsuccessful claims were unrelated, because 

although the work done on those claims could have 

contributed to her ultimately successful claim, the facts and 

legal theories underlying Ibrahim’s claims make that result 

unlikely.

We note our prior decisions in this sphere are somewhat 

opaque. In Schwarz, we detailed our previous decisions’ 

shifting focus on the degree to which the unsuccessful and 

successful claims arose out of the same common course of 

conduct and the degree to which the work done on 

unsuccessful claims contributed to the results achieved. 

 

 16 The district court expressly declined to find that the government’s 

initial interest in Ibrahim was due to her nationality or her religious 

beliefs. Ibrahim does not challenge that conclusion before this Court.

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 27

73 F.3d at 903 (citing Thorne, 802 F.2d at 1141; Outdoor 

Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 619 (9th Cir. 1993); 

Herrington v. Cty. of Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 747 (9th Cir. 

1989); Cabrales v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050, 1052 

(9th Cir. 1991); and O’Neal v. City of Seattle, 66 F.3d 1064, 

1068–69 (9th Cir. 1995)). Ultimately in Schwarz, we 

affirmed the district court’s decision to reduce the lodestar 

for work done on unsuccessful claims both because the sets 

of claims there were both factually and legally dissimilar and 

because the efforts spent on the unsuccessful claims did not 

contribute to the plaintiff’s success. Id. at 904. Nevertheless 

in Webb, we characterized our decision in Schwarz as 

“reaffirm[ing] that the focus is on whether the claims arose 

out of a common course of conduct.” 330 F.3d at 1169. Here, 

Ibrahim’s First Amendment and equal protection claims 

were based on her allegations that the government 

intentionally put her name on the lists based on 

constitutionally protected attributes, while her procedural 

due process claims were based on her allegations that the 

government failed to provide adequate procedures to remove 

her name from its lists. Accordingly, the district court did 

not err in concluding that these claims were based on both 

different alleged courses of conduct and different legal 

theories. Further, in light of our decisions on the matter, we 

likewise believe it cannot be error for a district court to also 

consider—as the court below did—that efforts on 

unsuccessful claims did not contribute to the success 

obtained.

In addition, even if it were the case that Ibrahim’s 

unsuccessful claims arose out of the same factual context as 

her successful claim, it is not true that the work expended on 

those claims necessarily contributed to her ultimate success. 

We therefore decline to find the district court abused its 

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28 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

discretion by concluding Ibrahim was ineligible to recover 

fees for work on those claims.

We also reject Ibrahim’s second contention that the 

“excellent results” she obtained should entitle her to a fully 

compensatory fee. The district court permitted Ibrahim to 

recover fully for her Administrative Procedure Act and 

substantive due process claims because, though 

unsuccessful, they were related to her procedural due

process claim. However, in doing so, it made no explicit 

mention of “excellent results,” though such a recovery by 

necessity implies an “excellent results” finding. See 

Schwarz, 73 F.3d at 905–06. And in light of our affirmance 

of the district court’s ruling with respect to Ibrahim’s First 

Amendment and equal protection claims, a ruling that 

Ibrahim also obtained excellent results on two of her four 

claims would have no effect on her potentially recoverable 

fee award.

We find unconvincing, however, the government’s 

contention that the district court’s overall fee reduction—

including its EAJA reductions—should be affirmed because 

the district court could have imposed such a reduction under 

Hensley’s second step. The government claims that any 

errors contained in the district court’s EAJA application and 

relatedness findings is harmless. The government, however, 

forgets that although the district court enjoys substantial 

discretion in fixing an appropriate fee under Hensley, we 

have imposed the modest requirement that it “explain how it 

came up with the amount.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 

534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008). “The explanation need 

not be elaborate, but it must be comprehensible . . . [T]he 

explanation must be concise but clear.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 

437). Where the difference between the fee award requested 

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 29

and the fee award granted is negligible, “a somewhat cursory 

explanation will suffice,” but where the disparity is greater, 

“a more specific articulation of the court’s reasoning is 

expected.” Id. Whatever the actual basis for the district 

court’s reductions here, there is certainly no room for 

argument that it clearly and concisely explained that its 

reductions to Ibrahim’s fee award were justified in light of 

the success she obtained. Absent such an explanation from 

the district court, we cannot take a rough justice approach 

and sua sponte decide that the district court’s mistaken fee 

reductions would be equivalent to the fee reductions it would 

have made at Hensley’s second step.

IV.

Following its fee entitlement determination, the district 

court appointed a special master to fix Ibrahim’s fee award.17

The special master went on to recommend a number of 

discretionary reductions to Ibrahim’s fee request due to 

block-billing, vagueness, and lack of billing judgment. The 

special master also made reductions for failure to 

demonstrate that the work claimed was associated with 

recoverable claims or issues. The district court adopted these 

reductions. It also struck Ibrahim’s objections to the special 

master’s report and recommendation on expenses for failure 

to follow page limits.

Because the reductions recommended by the special 

master and adopted by the district court were largely rooted 

in the district court’s EAJA determination, we agree with 

Ibrahim that those findings should be revisited if the district 

court once more determines Ibrahim is entitled to fees. 

 17 Though Ibrahim objected to the special master’s appointment, she 

does not press that issue on appeal.

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30 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

Ibrahim’s contention that the district court abused its 

discretion in striking her objections to the special master’s 

report and recommendation on expenses, however, is 

unavailing.

In its order appointing the special master, the district 

court also ordered the special master to file a report and 

recommendation regarding fees and expenses, and imposed 

a ten-page limit on the parties’ objections to that report and 

recommendation. It further required each party to file an 

appendix of all relevant communication with the special 

master.

The special master, however, filed two reports and 

recommendations, one focusing on fees and the other on 

expenses. In response, Ibrahim filed a ten-page set of 

objections to each, along with a one-page “statement.”

The district court struck Ibrahim’s objections to the 

special master’s report and recommendation on expenses for 

having filed “two ten-page briefs, a 234-page declaration 

with exhibits, and a one-page ‘statement,’” without also 

moving for a page extension. It found her filings were not 

good faith attempts to abide by its orders.

On appeal Ibrahim argues it was improper to strike her 

objections because the special master filed two reports and 

recommendations, and, therefore, it was reasonable to file a 

ten-page set of objections to each.18 She alternatively argues 

 18 Ibrahim also argues that the district court’s striking of her expenses 

resulted only in those objections being “overruled.” That assertion is 

patently contradicted by the record. In its order striking Ibrahim’s 

objections, the district court stated: “No objections to the special 

master’s report regarding expenses are preserved because counsel failed 

to abide by the rules.”

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 31

that the district court’s imposition of a ten-page limit on 

objections to reports and recommendations totaling 

hundreds of pages was also an abuse of discretion.

District courts have the inherent power to strike items 

from their docket for litigation conduct. Ready Transp., Inc. 

v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 

1998)). We review the exercise of that power for abuse of 

discretion and the factual determinations underpinning such 

exercise for clear error. Id. at 404; Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. 

Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 367 (9th Cir. 

1992).

Here, it was not clearly erroneous to conclude Ibrahim 

failed to abide by the district court’s page limits. While it is 

true that the special master filed two reports and 

recommendations and the district court’s order might have 

been misinterpreted or misunderstood by plaintiff’s counsel, 

it is also true that the order stated “all objections” should not 

exceed ten pages. Thus, whether the special master filed a 

single or several reports and recommendations, the district 

court’s order imposed a ten-page limit on objections. Indeed, 

the government restricted its objections to ten pages. We 

therefore cannot find that it was clearly erroneous to 

conclude Ibrahim failed to abide by the district court’s page 

restrictions.

Nor do we see the striking of Ibrahim’s objections in 

response to that failure as being an abuse of discretion. The 

order in question also required Ibrahim to resubmit her fee 

request and imposed requirements on that resubmission in 

order to facilitate the district court’s efforts to fix her award.

Ibrahim obstinately refused to abide by those 

requirements, and instead, filed multiple motions to 

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32 IBRAHIM V. USDHS

reconsider the district court’s fee entitlement 

determinations.19 In light of Ibrahim’s repeated failures to 

follow the very same order, we cannot conclude the district 

court abused its discretion by striking her objections to the 

special mater’s report on expenses.

Finally, we refuse to address Ibrahim’s contention that it 

was an abuse of discretion to limit her objections to ten 

pages. Where a party believes a district court has issued an 

improper order, their remedy is to raise that issue on appeal. 

United States v. Galin, 222 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 

In the meantime, however, they are to either abide by the 

order, file an interlocutory appeal, if available, or move for 

reconsideration. Id. Ibrahim did none of those things. Rather, 

she simply exceeded the district court’s page limits while 

“objecting” to those selfsame limits in a footnote. A party 

will not be heard to complain of an order on appeal by which 

it failed to abide. We therefore do not reach the merits of 

Ibrahim’s claim here.

V.

Any fee dispute is tedious, and this one is no exception. 

Though we are reluctant to require the district court to revisit 

its findings in this already protracted satellite litigation, we 

 

 19 Ibrahim offered multiple rationales for her refusal to follow the 

district court’s order that she resubmit her fee request. Initially, she 

argued that counsel had previously been awarded fees based on similar 

billing records. She also argued she would be unable to categorize 

projects in the manner directed by the district court because “that is not 

the way the time was recorded or billed.” At oral argument, however, she 

argued she could not comply with the district court’s order because it 

was predicated on legally erroneous conclusions. We find none of these 

rationales persuasive because Ibrahim, in the end, failed to comport with 

the order.

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IBRAHIM V. USDHS 33

see no other alternative. We pause to note, however, that we 

offer no view on the appropriateness of the amount already 

awarded by the district court in this case. It may well be 

Ibrahim is entitled to substantially more or substantially less 

than that amount. But until an amount is fixed in accordance 

with applicable law, we are unable to pass upon that 

question.

The present panel will retain responsibility for any 

appeals that may possibly emanate from an appealable order 

or judgment of the district court resulting from this remand. 

The fee and expense awards of the district court are 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 

REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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