Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_05-cv-01785/USCOURTS-cand-1_05-cv-01785-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANDI HAYDEN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

REDWOODS COMMUNITY COLLEGE

DISTRICT, dba COLLEGE OF THE

REDWOODS, and DOES ONE to FIFTY,

inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C-05-01785 NJV

 AMENDED ORDER DENYING THE

 PARTIES MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

 JUDGMENT AND FOR INJUNCTIVE

 RELIEF

In this action for discrimination by denying meaningful access to a public accommodation in

violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), section 50 of the

Rehabilitation Act, and the Unruth Civil Rights Act [Cal. Civil Code sections 51, 51.5, 52(A), 52.1,

54, 54.1, 54.3, and 55], brought by Plaintiff Mandi Hayden against Defendants Redwoods

Community College District et al., both parties have filed motions for summary judgement in whole,

or in the alternative, in part. For the reasons set forth below, the parties motions are denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mandi Hayden attended the College of the Redwoods (“the College”) between Spring

of 2003 and Fall of 2005. (Joint Statement of Stipulated Facts in Support for Mot. for Summ. J. #5.) 

The College is part of the Redwoods Community College District, which is part of the California

Community College system, and is a state agency subject to Title II of the ADA. (Stipulated Facts

#1.) A violation of the ADA is, per se, a violation of the Unruth Act. (Lentini v. Cal. Center for the

Arts, 370 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2004).) The Redwoods Community College District is also a

recipient of federal funds and is therefore subject to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 

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(Stipulated Facts #1.) 

Plaintiff was born with the inability to hear and is completely deaf. (Stipulated Facts #3.) 

Plaintiff attended a deaf program from preschool through grade 6 at Magnalia Elementary School in

Carlsbad, California from teachers who signed, and then grades 7 through 12 at the School for the

Deaf in Riverside, California, also taught by teachers who signed. Thus, Plaintiff received her

early education in American Sign Language (ASL), which is also her first language. ASL is not a

visual representation of English or any other spoken language, but an entirely distinct visual

language. 

In the Spring of 2003, Plaintiff enrolled at College of the Redwoods. At the College, the

Disabled Student Programs and Services (DSPS) is responsible for the provision of auxiliary aids. 

(Stipulated Facts #7.) While Plaintiff was enrolled at the College, Tracey Thomas was the Director

of DSPS. (Stipulated Facts #8.) The State Chancellor’s Office oversees the College and has issued

guidelines that 5% of the College budget must be kept in reserve, leaving 95% to be allocated. 

(Stipulated Facts #74-75.) The annual budget of the College, from which DSPS’s budget comes, is

based on the number of students enrolled. (Stipulated Facts #73.) 

The annual budget of DSPS is determined by a set formula based on the number of students

who receive disabled student services from the College. (Stipulated Facts #71.) The annual budget

of DSPS in 2000-2001 was $1,213,662.57, $1,361,630.20 in 2001-2002, $1,288,247.45 in 2002-

2003, $1,314,464.45 in 2003-2004, and $1,367,093.95 in 2004-2005. (Stipulated Facts #72.) DSPS

served 1,316 students in 2000-2001, 1,227 in 2001-2002, 1,401 in 2002-2003, 1,247 in 2003-2004,

and 1,199 in 2004-2005. (Stipulated Facts #9.) In terms of students receiving interpreter services

from DSPS, 3 students in 2001-2002, 4 in 2002-2003, 6 in 2003-2004, 8 in 2004-2005, and 8 in

2005-2006. (Stipulated Facts #10.) 

On November 2, 2002, Plaintiff applied for DSPS services. (Stipulated Facts #11.) In order to

receive services, students must agree to abide by policies and procedures designed to “maximize

administrative efficiency when providing DSPS services.” (Stipulated Facts #15.) On November 6,

2002, Plaintiff applied specifically for Interpreter Services. (Stipulated Facts #13.) That

application process included signing a document entitled “DSPS Guidelines for Interpreter Services”

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that outlined the College’s policies for interpreter requests, absences, and the appeals process for

grievances. (Stipulated Facts #13.) Plaintiff signed this document. (Stipulated Facts #13.) 

Plaintiff never told anyone at DSPS if she understood the document. (Stipulated Facts #20, #4 of

D’s.) Nor does it appear if anyone from the College asked her if she understood it.

Among the provisions of the Interpreter Guidelines were those regarding absences. In relevant

part the guidelines stated that “if you plan to miss one or more classes, please notify DSPS at least

24 hours before the missed class(es). If the office is closed, please leave a message. This will allow

DSPS to promptly inform your interpreter and make any needed changes to the interpreting

schedule. If you are ill or if an emergency situations arises please contact DSPS within 24 hours. 

[sic] If you do not show up for a class and DSPS has not been notified, the absence will be

considered unexcused. If there are three or more unexcused absences, or other such situations occur

that are perceived by DSPS as abusing the interpreting services, DSPS will suspend your

interpreting services. In order to clear an unexcused absence, please bring a doctor’s note, etc., to

the DSPS office. If you would like your services reinstated, you will need to make an appointment

with DSPS.”

Also included in the guidelines is a section named “Appeals Process.” In that section, the

policy states that “if you have a concern about academic programs or college services, and feel you

have been denied services or access to a program, we encourage you to meet with the appropriate

program or department manager. If you cannot resolve the issue, please contact the Vice President

of Student Services.”

On November 15, 2002, Plaintiff submitted medical documentation that she is a deaf individual

with “severe-to-profound sensorineural hearing loss bilaterally” with “limited hearing even using

hearing aids” and lip reading skills that allow for “50% understanding.” (Stipulated Facts #14.) 

The form indicated a “possible benefit from interpreter (sign language) and notetaker.” (Stipulated

Facts #14.) Plaintiff received a copy of the DSPS Student Resource Guide, which outlined the

services available to disabled students, the procedure to obtain such services, and the procedure for

grievances. (Stipulated Facts #18.) All of the text in the Guide consists of a bold topic heading,

followed by single-spaced paragraphs of a few sentences each. None of the text in the Guide is in

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fine print.

The Student Resource Guide contains several sections relevant to the motions at hand. Under

‘Sign Language Interpreters,’ the Guide notes, “An Interpreter will be provided through the DSPS

office for students who are deaf or hard of hearing and who wish to use sign language as their

primary and preferred mode of communication.” When a student completes an application for such

services, “DSPS will then recruit qualified Interpreters for the classes the student will be attending.”

[emphasis added].

A later section of the Guide notes the ‘Grievance Process.’ There, the Guide states that “Every

effort will be made to resolve the matter through the informal process. This may include a meeting

with the Coordinator at DSPS, the faculty member and the student to determine a reasonable

accommodation or service for the student. In situations when an agreement can not be reached

informally, the Academic Accommodations panel will review the grievance. . . The student still has

the right of external appeal to the Office of Civil Rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973.” This final sentence regarding the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is its own paragraph.

Over the course of the next seven semesters, Plaintiff received Interpreter Services from DSPS

from seven different interpreters. Prior to the start of each semester, DSPS would send Plaintiff a

letter with the Interpreter assignments, and attach a copy of the Guidelines for Interpreter Services

that Plaintiff signed on November 6, 2002. Plaintiff consistently refused real-time captioning and

transcription services, though DSPS offered them to her several times. Instead, Plaintiff exclusively

prefered Interpreters as her auxiliary aids. Most classes only require a single Interpreter. For

particularly long classes, teams of two may be assigned so that one person is not signing for several

hours, which can become painful for the Interpreter’s hands. Instead, the Interpreters alternate,

giving the other a chance to rest.

In the Spring semester of 2003, starting on January 27 of that year, Plaintiff was assigned as

Interpreters Lyssa Elder for four classes (BUS11, CIS80, CIS81, BUS1505) and Julie Warren for

three classes (CIS1, CIS1L, and PE12). In addition, Julie and Lyssa interpreted on alternate days for

another class (ART10). DSPS assigned an interpreter for all of Plaintiff’s classes. After Plaintiff

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complained on April 2, 2003 about Julie’s interpreting skills to DSPS, DSPS assigned Lyssa to

Interpret Plaintiff’s CIS1 and CIS1L. Julie remained a part-time interpreter for Plaintiff’s ART10,

and the sole interpreter for Plaintiff’s PE12. Plaintiff earned a 3.586 g.p.a. in this semester and

believes that she would have done better in ART10 had she had a better interpreter than Julie. 

Plaintiff found Lyssa to be a qualified Interpreter and never complained about her. (Stipulated Facts

#21-22.)

For the Fall Semester of 2003, beginning August 25, 2003, DSPS assigned Lyssa to Plaintiff’s

entire schedule, eight classes in all (DM10, DM10L, SPCH1, ENGL150L, ART17, ENGL150,

GUID345, and GUID205). Originally, Plaintiff had signed up for DM15, but after the semester

started, she dropped DM15 and added GUID345, which she had not originally signed up for. 

Plaintiff also changed her scheduled lab times for ENG150L and DM10L. On September 17, 2003,

DSPS scheduled Lyssa to provide Interpreter services for GUID345, and the changed lab times. 

Plaintiff earned a 2.6 g.p.a. in this semester, largely because of a D in ENGL150: College Reading

and Writing. Plaintiff attributes this grade solely to her own scholastic abilities, not to Lyssa’s

Interpreting. Plaintiff has no complaints about DSPS services in Fall 2003.

Spring Semester 2004 began on January 26, 2004. The parties agree that Plaintiff was

provided with qualified Interpreters during this semester. (Stipulated Facts #26.) Plaintiff received

Interpreter services for all six of her classes. Lyssa provided Interpreting for JOURN5, ASTRO10,

DM11, DM11L, and MATH376, while Dallass Kenworthy (nee Downy) provided Interpreting for

PE17. Shortly after the semester began, DSPS assigned Dallass to team with Lyssa on JOURN5 and

MATH376, as the classes were too long for one interpreter. Plaintiff earned a 2.077 g.p.a. in Spring

2004. She received an F in ASTRO10 and a D in MATH376. Plaintiff attributes these grades to her

own scholastic abilities and health challenges, not to the Interpreting services that she received from

Lyssa and Dallass. Plaintiff never complained and has no complaints about Dallass’ Interpreting

skills. (Stipulated Facts #24-25.)

In Summer semester 2004, which began on June 7, 2004, Plaintiff enrolled in one class: DT24. 

DSPS assigned Dallass to Interpret this class for Plaintiff. Dallass’ hands hurt because of the long

duration of the class, but Plaintiff did not receive an additional interpreter. Instead, Dallass

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Plaintiff claims that Lyssa’s hours had been cut in Spring 2004 by the College in order to offer

sufficient hours to retain another Interpreter part-time. Plaintiff claims Lyssa was dissatisfied with her

reduced hours and moved to New Mexico, where she now interprets for college students in the area. 

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interpreted the entire class on her own. She took rest breaks periodically, and would then attempt to

summarize for Plaintiff what the Professor said during Dallass’ break. After class, Dallass and

Plaintiff would approach the Professor to discuss the class and ensure that Plaintiff did not miss

anything. Plaintiff earned a 3.3 g.p.a. in this semester. The parties agree that Dallass was qualified. 

(Stipulated Facts #30.)

For Fall semester 2004, beginning on August 23, 2004, DSPS assigned Interpreters for all

seven of Plaintiff’s classes. Plaintiff had indicated to DSPS that she may not be attending the

College in the Fall, but confirmed her attendance a few weeks before the semester started. Lyssa

was no longer available by this time, as she had moved away1. Instead, DSPS assigned Dallass to

five of Plaintiff’s classes (BUS63, DM22, DM22L, DM15, and BUS63L). Additionally, Dallass

interpreted MATH105 on two of the three days the class met each week, the other day was

interpreted by Melody Poff. Tina interpreted Plaintiff’s seventh class, CIS78. Plaintiff asked DSPS

why Tina was assigned to her class, as she found her Interpreting unsatisfactory since Tina did not

sign ASL. DSPS informed Plaintiff that no other interpreters were available, so Plaintiff dropped

the class. Plaintiff later dropped DM15 due to reasons outside DSPS. 

Plaintiff dropped BUS63L and BUS63 within the first two weeks because an Interpreter was

unavailable after the class was rescheduled. Plaintiff did not want Melody Poff to interpret any of

her classes, as Plaintiff did not believe Melody could sign ASL. On August 24, 2004, DSPS notified

Plaintiff that due to “unforeseen circumstances” (Melody was injured), MATH105 on Fridays would

have a substitute interpreter for Melody for “at least” the first six weeks of class. Dallass would

substitute for the first two weeks, and then Lydia New for the remaining two weeks. Plaintiff told

DSPS that she did not want Lydia interpreting any of her classes, but DSPS informed Plaintiff that

no other interpreters were available. Dallass interpreted for the first two weeks as planned, but then

Lydia was late to the third class. Plaintiff waited 5 minutes for Lydia, and then left. Plaintiff

withdrew from all her classes a short time later on September 26, 2004, within the fourth week of

classes, due to a work injury. Her decision to withdraw had nothing to do with DSPS. (Stipulated

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Facts #32.)

In Spring 2005, beginning January 24, 2006, Plaintiff enrolled in seven classes. Since Lyssa

had moved away, and Dallass was now on a reduced schedule because of pregnancy, Plaintiff was

concerned about Interpreter availability. Plaintiff introduced DSPS to Christopher Gardner, an

Interpreter Plaintiff met at Deaf Counseling, Advocacy, and Referral Agency (DCARA) who had

recently moved to the Eureka area. (Stipulated Fact #33.) Plaintiff states that she only introduced

DSPS to him and requested Christopher for some of her classes and Sandra for some, while

Defendants hold that Plaintiff requested Christopher for all of her Spring classes. Either way, it was

ultimately the decision of DSPS to assign Christopher to all seven of Plaintiff’s classes (DM15,

DT80, DM75A, DM75B, DM72, DM15, and DM77) in December of 2004. Later that month,

Plaintiff requested Sandra Factor for DM75A, DM75B, DM72, and DM77 instead of Christopher

because she did not feel Christopher could handle her engineering coursework. This caused Plaintiff

to rely on Sandra, even though Sandra used English signs and not ASL. DSPS made the assignment

changes as Plaintiff requested, leaving Christopher with DM15, DM80, and DM25. The parties agree

Sandra was a qualified Interpreter; Plaintiff never complained about her. (Stipulated Facts #35-36.)

On February 4, 2005, after the semester had started, Plaintiff complained to Tracey about

Christopher’s professionalism and technical abilities, and requested that he no longer Interpret for

her. (Stipulated Facts #38-39.) Plaintiff refused Tracey’s suggestion of discussing Plaintiff’s

concerns with Christopher. (Stipulated Facts #40.) DSPS removed Christopher from Plaintiff’s

classes. DSPS offered real time captioning and transcription services instead, but Plaintiff refused. 

(Stipulated Facts #44-45.) Though Plaintiff requested them, neither Sandra nor Dallass were

available at the time to pick up the classes that Christopher had been Interpreting for Plaintiff. DSPS

assigned notetakers for these three classes and said they would work on finding another interpreter. 

Tracey promised to try to find a replacement, but explained that since the semester had already

started, Interpreters had already been assigned to classes for other students. (Stipulated Facts #43.)

The following week in February, Plaintiff complained to DSPS that Christopher had sexually

harassed her. DSPS referred Plaintiff to the College’s Human Resources department to file a

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complaint. (Stipulated Facts #55.) DSPS also directed Plaintiff to the policies and procedures in the

Course Catalog. (Stipulated Facts #56.) Plaintiff had no Interpreter for 1-2 weeks for those classes. 

No replacement interpreters were ever assigned for DT25 or DM15. (Stipulated Facts #54.) On

February 28, 2005, DSPS assigned Dallass to Interpret for Plaintiff in her DM15 class. Plaintiff later

dropped DM15, because she had spent weeks without interpreters and was now too far behind.

 She also dropped DT80, and DT25 because she felt it was too far to drive without being sure of

having an interpreter.

 In mid-February 2005, DSPS attempted to find Interpreters for Plaintiff. Tracey contacted five

colleges and agencies for help in finding an interpreter for Plaintiff’s three uncovered classes. 

(Stipulated Facts #47-51.) On February 15, 2005, Cherry Hess of DCARA indicated to Tracey that

she had suggested a Video Interpreter (VI) to Plaintiff when Plaintiff had come into the Agency the

previous week, but Plaintiff was “not sure” about it. Cherry also indicated that Xenia, a certified

interpreter, would be moving to the Eureka area in the summer. Tracey contacted Xenia and

successfully recruited her as an Interpreter for the College, though Xenia would not be able to start

until the Fall sememster. Tracey also looked into the feasibility of VI, the costs of new equipment it

would require, and estimates from the College’s tech support team. (Stipulated Facts #52.) As VI

uses a very large amount of internet connection bandwidth, the tech support team estimated costs at

$50-60k to upgrade the entire networking infrastructure to handle VI, or $5-10k per classroom to get

a faster T1 connection, with an additional $300-$400 per month in fees.

Plaintiff received a letter from Tracey on April 1, 2006 indicating that Plaintiff was close to

violating the terms of her Guidelines for Interpreter Services. (Stipulated Facts #79.) DSPS stated

that Plaintiff had two unexcused absences for the DM15 class (interpreted by Dallass since February

28, 2005), as Plaintiff had not notified the DSPS office within 24 hours of missing the DM15 classes

with an excuse. According to DSPS, Plaintiff called at 12:30pm on March 2, 2005 to indicate that

she would not be attending the March 2, 2005 DM15 class that began at 12:30pm. She also did not

attend the March 30, 2005 class. Consequently, Tracey sent the letter “as notification that if you miss

one more class without notifying us in the appropriate amount of time (24 hours), your interpreting

services may be suspended for the DM15 course.” Plaintiff did not have a third unexcused absence,

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as she withdrew from DT25, DT80, and DM15. She earned a 4.0 in her remaining four classes, all

interpreted by Sandra, in Spring 2005. 

In the Fall of 2005, Plaintiff was assigned Xenia for all two of her classes (DT80 and ENGR23). 

Xenia needed a back up interpreter for each of these classes, as they were over three hours each, but

did not receive any help.. (Stipulated Facts #59.) Instead, Xenia would rest at times, and the

Professors would take a break. The parties agree that Plaintiff did not miss any instruction because of

these breaks. (Stipulated Facts #59.) Though her transcript reflects Fs in each of these classes,

Plaintiff states that she withdrew in October of 2005 from school due to personal reasons. (Stipulated

Facts #60.) She does not attribute her withdrawal to DSPS. (Stipulated Facts #61.)

Plaintiff feels that certified Interpreters are the only satisfactory auxiliary aid for her, though she

sees no difference between ‘certified’ and ‘qualified.’ (Stipulated Facts #69.) DSPS offered her tape

recording of a class in Spring of 2003, her first semester. Plaintiff used this service once, but it was

too difficult for the Interpreter (Lyssa) to sign the lecture to Plaintiff without the Interpreter also

seeing the lecture. Plaintiff was also unable to ask questions in class with this method. 

Transcriptions were also offered by DSPS, but Plaintiff declined, as she did not want to sit through a

lecture without being able to comprehend it and then have pages of lecture in English to read later. 

DSPS offered real time captioning beginning in the Spring of 2004, but that would require Plaintiff

to read English faster than she feels she is capable so she declined. As noted above, the College

found VI to be an expensive proposition. However, Plaintiff is wary of VI as well, since it is harder

to see the three-dimensional space that is important for expression in ASL on a two-dimensional

television screen.

On February 10, 2006, the College approved the installation of VI on all its campuses. 

(Stipulated Facts #67.) The College has also regularly advertised for Interpreters in local

newspapers both in and out of the Eureka area, as well as on its website since September 2003 and

nationwide through Higher Education Jobs at www.higheredjobs.com and the Registry of Interpreters

for the Deaf at www.rid.org. (Stipulated Facts #63-67.) The College also now offers classes in

Interpreter skills, taught by Xenia. (Stipulated Facts #68.)

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Plaintiff received Interpreting services for 91.5% of her classes (580/637) from Spring 2003

through Spring 2005, which does not include class meetings after Plaintiff dropped her classes in Fall

2004 and Spring 2005. (Stipulated Facts #77.) Between Spring 2003 and Summer 2004, Plaintiff

received an interpreter for 96.5% of her classes (491/509). (Stipulated Facts #76.) A full-time

permanent sign language interpreter is estimated to cost $85,244.01, with a base yearly salary of

$60,008.00 and benefits totaling $25,236.01.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment “shall be

rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are

those that may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable

jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. The court may not weigh the evidence. See

id. at 255. Rather, the nonmoving party’s evidence must be believed and “all justifiable inferences

must be drawn in [the nonmovant’s] favor.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865

F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255).

The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for

its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers,

admissions and affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the nonmoving party

will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party’s burden is discharged when it shows the court

that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. See id. at 325.

A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of [that] party’s pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250. The

opposing party, however, need not produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in

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order to avoid a summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Nor must the opposing party

show that the issue will be resolved conclusively in its favor. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248-49. 

All that is necessary is sufficient evidence supporting the asserted factual dispute and requiring a jury

or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial. See id.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion

I. Plaintiff claims Defendant has discriminated by requiring Plaintiff to sign away her “rights” in

order to receive services

II. Plaintiff claims Defendant is attempting to screen Plaintiff from services by use of its DSPS

agreement and its policy and procedures in violation of 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(f)

III. Plaintiff claims Defendant has failed to meet its burden regarding fundamental alteration or

undue financial or administrative burden

IV. Plaintiff claims Defendant should be prohibited from continuing its discriminatory behavior

C. Defendant’s Motion

I. Defendant claims no duty to provide a sign language interpreter

II. Defendant claims Plaintiff cannot show that the accommodations offered by the College were

unreasonable.

III. Defendant claims Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for an ADA violation

IV. Defendant claims Plaintiff should be estopped from asserting an ADA violation for the Spring

2005 semester

V. Defendant claims compensatory damages are not available because the College did not act with

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s requests

VI. Defendant claims Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief are moot and should be dismissed

D. Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c).

In ADA cases it is important to remember that “Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to remedy

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widespread discrimination against disabled individuals.” PGA Tour, Inc. V. Martin, 532 U.S. 661,

674, 149 L. Ed. 2d 904, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). The Act responds to what Congress described as a

“compelling need” for a “clear and comprehensive national mandate” to eliminate discrimination

against disabled individuals. “To effectuate its sweeping purpose, the ADA forbids discrimination

against disabled individuals in major areas of public life, among them employment (Title I of the

Act),public services (Title II) and public accommodations (Title III).”

In this case Defendant must provide Plaintiff with “meaningful access” to its programs. 

Hunsaker v. Contra Costa County, 149 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1998). To that end, it may be

required to make reasonable, but not fundamental or substantial, modifications to its programs See

Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300, 83 L. Ed 2d 661, 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985). Reasonableness

requires a “fact-specific, individualized analysis of the disabled individual’s circumstances and the

accommodations that might allow him to meet the program’s standards.” Vinson v. Thomas 288 F.3d

1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002). 

28 CFR § 160 requires public entities to “take appropriate steps to ensure that communications

with applicants, participants, and members of the public with disabilities are as effective as

communications with others.” 28 CFR § 160(a). These appropriate steps include furnishing

“appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an individual with a disability an

equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity

conducted by a public entity. In determining what type of auxiliary aid and service is necessary, a

public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of the individual with disabilities.” 28

CFR § 160(b)(1)-(2).

In relevant part, the Appendix to Title II of the ADA provides: “the public entity must provide

an opportunity for individuals with disabilities to request the auxiliary aids and services of their

choice. This expressed choice shall be given primary consideration by the public entity (§

35.160(b)(2)). The public entity shall honor the choice unless it can demonstrate that another

effective means of communication exists or that use of the means chosen would not be required under

§ 35.164 [the affirmative defenses]. Deference to the request of the individual with a disability is

desirable because of the range of disabilities, the variety of auxiliary aids and services, and different

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circumstances requiring effective communication.” 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A

Among the auxiliary aids listed by the statute for individuals with hearing disabilities are

“qualified interpreters, notetakers, transcription services, written materials, telephone handset

amplifiers, assistive listening devices, assistive listening systems, telephones compatible with hearing

aids, closed caption decoders, open and closed captioning, telecommunications devices for deaf

persons (TDD's), videotext displays, or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials

available to individuals with hearing impairments.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1).

Defendant correctly acknowledges its duty under the ADA to make reasonable modifications to

accommodate disabled individuals. However, Defendant argues that interpreter services– Plaintiff’s

preferred auxiliary aid– are not the only effective auxiliary aid, and that Defendant has the discretion

to offer other aids. It is true that Defendant is not necessarily required to provide Plaintiff with her

preferred auxiliary aid, but in giving her request primary consideration, Defendant may refuse her

request only in limited circumstances, i.e. if there are other equally effective means of

communication, or Defendant has an affirmative defense..

Defendant does not dispute it is a public entity subject to the ADA, and that it must “furnish

appropriate auxiliary aids” where necessary to afford Plaintiff an equal opportunity to participate in

the College. (Joint Stipulated Facts 1.) Nor does Defendant dispute that it must give “primary

consideration” to Plaintiff’s requested auxiliary aid, which Defendant acknowledges to be a ASL

interpreter.

Where the parties differ is whether “another equally effective means of communication exists”

as a form of auxiliary aid that affords Plaintiff an equal opportunity to participate in the College’s

programs besides an SLI. Defendant offered other auxiliary aids including transcription, real-time

captioning, and audiotaping services to Plaintiff, all of which are listed by the statute as auxiliary aids

for individuals with hearing disabilities. While it is true that Plaintiff rejected these options without

trying them, it is Defendant’s burden under the statute to demonstrate the proffered aid’s

effectiveness. 

Though Plaintiff’s application indicated her to have “50% lip reading ability” and possibly

benefit from notetakers as well as SLIs, that does not necessarily mean that auxiliary aids that

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complement these abilities are sufficient to satisfy the ADA’s “equally effective communication”

standard. It is not clear from the record sufficient to satisfy the summary judgment standard whether

the auxiliary aids offered by Defendant in alternative to an SLI are sufficiently “equally effective” to

satisfy the ADA. Not only does the efficacy of an auxiliary aid vary with the hearing abilities of each

individual, but an auxiliary aid that provides Plaintiff with an equal opportunity to participate in one

particular class may not be sufficient in another class. Such findings cannot be made here.

It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the auxiliary aids offered by Defendant to Plaintiff

meet the standards created in the ADA. 

The Supreme Court has noted that “the “undue hardship” inquiry requires not simply an

assessment of the cost of the accommodation in relation to the recipient's overall budget, but a

“case-by-case analysis weighing factors that include: (1) the overall size of the recipient's program

with respect to number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size of budget; (2) the type of

the recipient's operation, including the composition and structure of the recipient's workforce; and (3)

the nature and cost of the accommodation needed.”” (Olmstead v. L. C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,

606 (1999) citing 28 CFR § 42.511(c) (1998).) Further, “if applicable, the overall financial

resources of the parent corporation and the number of facilities; and if applicable, the type of

operation of the parent corporation” are to be considered. 28 C.F.R § 36.104.

DSPS has 36 staff who served 1,199 students across 3 campuses in the 2004-2005 school year

with a budget of $1,233,172. (#55, 19:9; Joint Stipulated Facts #3, 71, 72.) The staff include not

only employees who assist hearing impaired students, but those who assist students with mobility

disabilities, learning disabilities, and other challenges, as well as administrative staff. (#55, 19:10.) 

The budget comes from the California legislature and is dependent upon the number of disabled

students enrolled at the College, as well as the type(s) of disability (or disabilities) they have. (#55,

19:18-19.)

Defendant cites Roberts v. KinderCare Learning Ctrs., Inc., 86 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1996) an 8th

Circuit decision, to support its contention that the budget of the College should not be taken into

account, since financial operation of DSPS is separate. In KinderCare, the particular center was

responsible for being independently profitable and could not rely on the parent corporation’s

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resources. Here, however, DSPS is not intended to be a profitable operation, though it is responsible

for managing its budget. 

Defendant has provided the Court with financial information indicating that Plaintiff’s demand 

for a personal interpreter would constitute nearly 7% of the DSPS annual budget. Personal

interpreters for each of the 8 deaf students would constitute nearly 50% of the DSPS annual budget. 

With these figures, Defendant claims an undue financial hardship to accommodate Plaintiff’s demand

of a personal interpreter. 

Again, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether or not this constitutes an “undue hardship”

on the Defendant.

Regarding the remaining issues that the parties raise in their respective motions for summary

judgment, the court comes to a similar conclusion. That is without “weighing the evidence” there

remain genuine issues of material fact that must be decided by a jury. The core issue in this litigation

appears to the court to be whether the College complied with its obligations under the ADA to

provide adequate interpretation services to a hearing-impaired student that has been characterized by

the Defendant as difficult and demanding. Plaintiff submits a very different picture of what took

place over several semesters at the College. Plaintiff’s version of events paints a picture of

bureaucratic incompetence on the part of the Disabled Student Programs and Services Department of

the College of the Redwoods and an attempt on their part to supply her with substandard assistance

for her hearing disability. This analysis is by its nature fact driven.

III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The bases for injunctive relief are irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies. A party

seeking a preliminary injunction must show either:

(1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or 

(2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips in its favor. These two

formulations represent two pints on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable

harm increases as the probability of success decreases.

Roe v. Anderson 134 F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted.) “In each case, a court must

balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or

withholding of the requested relief . . .” Amoco Prod. Co. V. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542

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(1987). The standard for a permanent injunction is essentially the same, except that the plaintiff must

show actual success on the merits. Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546

n. 12 (1987). A “serious question” is one as to which the moving party has “a fair chance of success

on the merits.” Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984);

see also Martin v. Int’l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1984) (“fair chance of

success”on the merits is an “irreducible minimum”.)

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show either:

(1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury

without the injunction; or (2) that serious questions are raised and that the balance of hardships

tips sharply in the moving party’s favor. 

Stuhlberg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839-40 (9th cir. 2001); Dr.

Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997). These are

not two separate tests, but are “outer reaches of a single continuum.’” Stuhlberg, 240 F.3d at 840

(quoting International Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., 4 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1993)).

The court is in receipt of the Defendant’s supplemental letter brief dated 8/30/06. Plaintiff has

not responded to the contents of that letter brief. The letter states, in part, that Plaintiff did not enroll

for classes at the College of the Redwoods for the fall semester 2006. Based on these incontraverted

facts, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate “the possibility of irreparable” injury to her if a preliminary

injunction were not granted at this time. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction is

DENIED.

IV. DEFENDANT’S CLAIM OF UNDUE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN

Defendant asserts an undue administrative burden in allowing Plaintiff to choose her own

interpreter. (#55, 11:4-6.) Defendant states that Plaintiff cannot claim an ADA violation “by simply

asserting that the full-time interpreter could not communicate effectively for her.” (#55, 11:3-4.) If

she could, Defendant argues, the College would have to include Plaintiff in the interviewing process,

as the College would have to for all disabled students receiving interpreter services. (#55, 11:5-9.) 

Plaintiff demands a certified full-time interpreter, but “certification is not required in order for an

interpreter to be considered to have the skills necessary to facilitate communication.” (#55, 9:1-2.) 

Indeed, the ADA requires only a “qualified interpreter” as an auxiliary aid for effective

communication. Defendant claims that “qualified” does not necessarily demand that the student like

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the interpreter, only that the interpreter communicate “effectively, accurately, and impartially.” (#55

9:3-4, 12.) To require the College to include Plaintiff in assigning interpreters, claims Defendant,

would be an undue administrative burden.

As for Spring 2005, Defendant argues that it was unable to assign a new interpreter to Plaintiff’s two

uncovered classes, and to require it to do so would also be an undue administrative burden. (#55,

8:17-18.) Defendant claims that despite the efforts of DSPS Director Tracey Thomas, who contacted

multiple schools and agencies, no interpreters were available. (Joint Stipulated Facts 47-51.) 

Plaintiff declined alternate auxiliary aids such as transcription and captioning because she claimed

they could not provide the necessary level of communication skills required. Thomas also looked at

VRI, which turned out to require significant equipment installations and upgrades and was not

feasible as a solution for Spring 2005. (Joint Stipulated Facts 52.) Thus, the only way to assign an

interpreter for Plaintiff would be to reassign an interpreter from another student’s class to Plaintiff’s. 

(#55, 18:10.) Such a reassignment, Defendant states, is also an undue administrative burden.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s request to choose her own interpreter and include Plaintiff in

the process of assigning her an interpreter would constitute an undue administrative burden. 

Defendant cites two Ninth Circuit cases to support this contention, Zukla v. The Regents of the

University of California, 166 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) and Memmer v. Marin County Courts, 169

F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1999) In Zukla the Court held that:

Deference is also appropriately accorded an educational institution’s

determination that a reasonable accommodation is not available. 

Therefore, we agree with the First Circuit that “a court’s duty is to first find

the basic facts, giving due deference to the school, and then to evaluate

whether those facts add up to a professional, academic judgment that

reasonable accommodation is not available.” Wynne II, 932 F.2d at 27-28;

see also McGregor, 3 F.3d at 859 (the court must “accord deference to [the

school’s] decisions not to modify its programs [when] the proposed

modifications entail academic decisions”).

We recognize that extending deference to education institutions [**22] must not

impede our obligation to enforce the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, we

must be careful not to allow academic decisions to disguise truly discriminatory

requirements. The educational institution has a “real obligation . . . to seek

suitable means of reasonably accommodating a handicapped person and to submit

a factual record indicating that it conscientiously carried out this statutory

obligation. Wynne I, 932 F.2d at 25-26. Once the educational institution has

fulfilled this obligation, however, we will defer to its academic decisions. 

(Emphasis added)

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Zukla at 1046.

In Memmer the Court noted that being deaf is required a very special skill:

Memmer’s disability, however, differs from Duffy’s in a crucial respect. Duffy

was deaf; Memmer is visually impaired. Accommodating a deaf person requires a

special skill – the ability to converse in sign language [**11] – not possessed by

the ordinary person. Memmer’s evidence did not show that accommodating her

required more than a helper with the ability to observe, to read, and to

communicate verbally with her. These skills are possessed by the average person,

and more importantly, were possessed by Calderon, the Spanish-language

interpreter offered by MCC.

Memmer at 634.

Given the totality of the circumstances, the facts in this case and viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff. It cannot be held that as a matter of law Plaintiff’s requests

constitute an undue administrative burden on Defendant. In fact, as to one of those issues, the

College allowed Plaintiff to use Christopher Gardner, a person she found, as an interpreter when it

suited the College’s needs. Unlike other disabilities, interpreting for a deaf student requires not only

special skills but the ability to effectively communicate through ASL. This almost by definition

requires the input and, at times, the inclusion of the Plaintiff in the process of assigning a qualified

interpreter to assist her.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, and based on the entire record herein, the parties’ cross-motions

for summary judgment are DENIED. A case management and trial setting conference is scheduled

for January 23, 2007 at 1:00 p.m.

Dated: January 8, 2007. ____________________________________

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

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