Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_91-cv-00002/USCOURTS-almd-1_91-cv-00002-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1. Unless otherwise indicated, references to

documents numbers (“Doc. No.”) are to those assigned by

the Clerk of Court in the instant case, Civil Action No.

2:91cv02-MHT. Page references to pleadings are to those

assigned by CM/ECF.

 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JACKIE McLEOD, # 116274-A, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No.

) 2:91cv02-MHT

E.L. HARRELSON, et al., ) (WO)

)

Respondents. )

OPINION

Before the court are two pro se motions filed on

April 4 and May 1, 2013, by petitioner Jackie McLeod, an

Alabama inmate, in which he purports to seek relief under

Rule 60(b)(4) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Doc. Nos. 72 and 74.1

 In both motions, he

contends that a 1994 judgment of this case dismissing a

28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief he

filed in 1991 is void. Id. In the second of these

motions, he also asserts claims attacking his state

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 1 of 13
2

convictions for four counts of cocaine distribution and

the resulting sentence of life imprisonment as a habitual

felony offender entered against him in 1989. Doc. No. 74

at 3-7.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 1991, McLeod filed a § 2254 habeas

petition in this court challenging the convictions and

sentence imposed by the state trial court in 1989. Doc.

No. 2. He raised a total of 25 claims in the habeas

petition. On December 1, 1992, the magistrate judge

entered a recommendation that McLeod’s habeas petition be

denied, reaching the merits of nine claims and dismissing

the remaining claims on procedural default grounds. Doc.

No. 50. The district court adopted the recommendation of

the magistrate judge and entered judgment against McLeod

on December 18, 1992. Doc. No. 52.

McLeod appealed, and, on June 17, 1994, the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 2 of 13
2. This court had concluded the claims, which McLeod

initially raised in several state post-conviction

petitions, were procedurally defaulted because McLeod

failed to appeal from the denial of his first state postconviction petition and his subsequent state postconviction petitions had been dismissed as successive.

The Eleventh Circuit found that, because McLeod’s direct

appeal was pending when his first state post-conviction

was denied, the trial court lacked jurisdiction, under

former Rule 20, Ala.R.Crim.P. Temp., to rule on the first

state post-conviction petition. Consequently, there had

been no actual ruling on the merits of the first state

post-conviction petition, and the subsequent state postconviction petitions were not successive.

3

this court’s holding that most of McLeod’s claims were

procedurally defaulted, and the appellate court remanded

the case to this court for further proceedings.2

 McLeod

v. Harrelson, No. 93-6039, 26 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 1994)

(Table). Following remand, the magistrate judge, on

October 5, 1994, entered a recommendation that McLeod’s

habeas petition should be dismissed without prejudice to

allow him to return to state court to exhaust his

unexhausted claims. Doc. No. 67. This district court

adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge and

entered a judgment dismissing the habeas petition without

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 3 of 13
4

prejudice on November 17, 1994. Doc. No. 71. McLeod

did not appeal that judgment.

Although McLeod purports in his instant motions to

challenge “the District Court Magistrate Judge (John L.

Carroll) court order ruling on or about September 20,

1994, dismissing petitioner[’s] 2254 habeas petition

without prejudice,” Doc. No. 72 at 1; Doc. No. 74 at 1,

no such order was entered by the magistrate judge or the

district court on that date. It appears that the correct

date of the ruling of this court under attack by McLeod

is November 17, 1994, the date on which this court

adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge and

entered an order dismissing McLeod’s habeas petition

without prejudice to allow him to return to state court

to exhaust his unexhausted claims.

II .DISCUSSION

As noted, McLeod purports to seek relief under Rule

60(b)(4) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 4 of 13
5

He asserts that this court’s 1994 judgment dismissing

without prejudice the § 2254 habeas petition he filed in

January 1991 is void because the court “lacked

jurisdiction and authority” to enter such a judgment

after the Eleventh Circuit remanded his petition to this

court for further proceedings in light of its holding

that this court had erred in finding that most of

McLeod’s claims were procedurally defaulted.

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides a basis,

but only a limited basis, for a party to seek relief from

a final judgment in a habeas case.” Williams v. Chatman,

510 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). Rule 60, like all

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applies only to civil

actions and proceedings in the United States District

Court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 1.

A party may seek relief from judgment under subpart

(b)(4) of Rule 60 if the judgment was “void,” that is,

the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter it.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4). Subpart (b)(6) of Rule 60

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 5 of 13
6

provides for relief from judgment for “any other reason

that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Motions

brought under subparts (b)(4) and (b)(6) “must be made

within a reasonable time ... after the entry of the

judgment or order or the date of the proceeding”

challenged. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1).

Here, McLeod attacks a judgment of this court that is

over 18 years old. He has given no reason for his

lengthy delay. Under the circumstances, the court finds

that his motions were not filed within a reasonable time

after entry of the judgment he challenges and are

therefore untimely. Consequently, his motions for relief

under Rule 60(b)(4) and (6) are due to be dismissed on

this ground. See, e.g., Soloman v. United States, 300

Fed. App’x 857, 858–59 (11th Cir. 2008) (Rule 60(b) motion

on denial of § 2255 motion denied because petitioner

“failed to file his motion for relief within a reasonable

time, and he did not provide any explanation for the

[nine-year] delay” in filing motion); BUC Int’l Corp. v.

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 6 of 13
7

International Yacht Council, Inc., 517 F.3d 1271, 1275

(11th Cir. 2008) (in deciding what is a “reasonable time”

to file a Rule 60(b) motion, the court “must consider the

circumstances of each case to determine ‘whether the

parties have been prejudiced by the delay and whether a

good reason has been presented for failing to take action

sooner’”).

Moreover, McLeod has not presented any evidence

supporting his assertion that this court’s 1994 judgment

is void. “Generally, a judgment is void under Rule

60(b)(4) if the court that rendered it lacked

jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or

if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of

law.” Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir.

2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). McLeod has

not raised any reasonable arguments suggesting that this

court lacked jurisdiction in this case or that it acted

in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. “A

judgment is not void ... simply because it is or may have

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 7 of 13
3. Any suggestion by McLeod that he was deprived of

(continued...)

8

been erroneous. Similarly, a motion under Rule 60(b)(4)

is not a substitute for a timely appeal. Instead, Rule

60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a

judgment is premised either on a certain type of

jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process

that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be

heard.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559

U.S. 260, __, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 1377 (2010) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

McLeod also fails to point out any error in this

court’s judgment. As indicated, the Eleventh Circuit

remanded McLeod’s habeas petition to this court for

further proceedings. In light of the Eleventh Circuit’s

opinion, this court concluded that his petition contained

claims that were unexhausted in the state courts, and

this court dismissed the petition without prejudice to

allow McLeod to pursue his state-court remedies. McLeod

does not show how this ruling was erroneous.3

 For the

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 8 of 13
3. (...continued)

an opportunity to have his claims heard would be

disingenuous. When he returned to state court, he filed

an amended state post-conviction petition raising 12

grounds for relief. Counsel was appointed to represent

him, and an evidentiary hearing was held. The state

trial court then considered all the issues McLeod had

raised in his January 1991 habeas petition and those in

his amended state post-conviction petition.

Subsequently, McLeod filed several more § 2254 habeas

petitions in this court challenging the same convictions

and sentence.

4. McLeod makes no attempt to set forth “any other

reason that justifies relief,” as provided in Rule

60(b)(6). Thus, he also fails to demonstrate a basis for

relief under Rule 60(b)(6).

9

reasons set forth, then, this court concludes that McLeod

fails to demonstrate a basis for relief under Rule

60(b)(4).4

In one of McLeod’s motions under consideration, Doc.

No. 74, he not only presents claims that challenge this

court’s 1994 judgment with regard to his January 1991

habeas petition, but he also attack his convictions for

four counts of cocaine distribution and the resulting

sentence of life imprisonment entered against him in

1989. Doc. No. 74 at 3-7. It is well settled, however,

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 9 of 13
10

that Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 does not provide a vehicle for

relief from a judgment in a criminal case. United States

v. Fair, 326 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v.

Mosavi, 138 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1998).

The court’s records reflect that, in September 1995,

McLeod filed a § 2254 habeas petition challenging these

same state-court convictions. See McLeod v. Sutton,

Civil Action Nos. 1:95cv1181-WHA, and 1:95cv1219-WHA

(M.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 1996). In that habeas action, this

court determined that his petition was due to be denied

because he had procedurally defaulted on each of his

claims for relief and had failed to show cause and

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice

excusing his procedural default. McLeod v. Sutton,

Civil Action Nos. 1:95cv1181-WHA (Doc. Nos. 31 and 33).

Where a previous habeas petition has been denied, a

nominal Rule 60(b) motion containing one or more “claims”

for relief--that is, “an asserted federal basis for

relief from a ... judgment of conviction”--is in

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 10 of 13
5. For purposes of the successive-petition rules,

McLeod’s 1991 habeas petition does not “count” as his

initial § 2254 petition because this court dismissed that

petition without prejudice. The habeas petition McLeod

filed in September 1995 is his initial § 2254 petition

for purposes of the successive-petition rules. In

addition to his previous § 2254 habeas petitions, McLeod

also attacked his convictions and sentence in a pleading

filed in July 2009 styled as a “2241 Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus,” McLeod v. Culliver, Civil Action No.

1:09cv634-ID (Doc. No. 1), and again in a pleading filed

in December 2010, where McLeod purported to seek relief

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) or, in the alternative, 28

U.S.C. § 2241, McLeod v. Patterson, Civil Action No.

1:10cv1074-ID (Doc. No. 1). As is the case with McLeod’s

instant pleading, this court deemed McLeod’s 2009 and

2010 challenges to be the functional equivalent of 28

U.S.C. § 2254 petitions. See Civ. Action No. 1:09cv634-

ID (Doc. Nos. 20, 23, and 24); Civ. Action No. 1:10c1074-

ID (Doc. Nos. 3-5).

11

substance a successive petition for habeas relief.

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529-34 (2005).

Consequently, to the extent McLeod presents claims

attacking his state convictions, his instant pleading,

Doc. No. 74, is due to be treated as a successive § 2254

petition, despite his having designated the motion as one

seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(4).5

 See id.. At 531-32.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(3)(A), “[b]efore a second or successive

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 11 of 13
12

application permitted by this section is filed in the

district court, the applicant shall move in the

appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the

district court to consider the application.” “A motion

in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the

district court to consider a second or successive

application shall be determined by a three-judge panel of

the court of appeals” and may be granted “only if [the

assigned panel of judges] determines that the application

makes a prima facie showing that the application

satisfies the requirements of [28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)].”

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B) and (C).

McLeod has not received an order from a three-judge

panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

authorizing this court to consider a successive

application for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. This court therefore lacks jurisdiction to grant

him relief to the extent he presents claims attacking his

state convictions. See Gilreath v. State Board of

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 12 of 13
Pardons and Paroles, 273 F.3d 932, 933 (11th Cir. 2001);

Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997).

***

An appropriate order denying relief will be entered.

DONE, this the 28th day of May, 2013.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:91-cv-00002-MHT-TFM Document 75 Filed 05/28/13 Page 13 of 13