Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00726/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00726-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Victor O. Dema, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

State of Arizona, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-07-0726-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pro se Petitioner Victor O. Dema has filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus by Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. #4. United States

Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson prepared a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)

recommending that the petition be denied. Dkt. #105. The Court will adopt the R&R and

deny the petition. 

I. Background.

Petitioner was charged on November 6, 2003 with two misdemeanor domestic

violence offenses – assault and disorderly conduct. Dkt. #11, Ex. A; see A.R.S. §§ 13-

1203(A)(1), 2904(A)(1). Petitioner was convicted of both charges. Dkt. #11, Ex. C, Ex. T

at 2. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on June 24, 2004 with the Arizona Superior Court,

Maricopa County. Dkt. #11, Ex. D. The court affirmed his conviction on July 4, 2005

(Dkt. #11, Ex. G) and denied his motion for rehearing on August 24, 2005 (Dkt. #11, Ex. J).

Petitioner’s sentence was reimposed on October 31, 2005 (Dkt. #11, Ex. R at 2).

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Petitioner, in fact, asks the court to “construe this notice of objection as an alternative

motion for reconsideration and to review the Amended petition and reply brief to state’s

response in light of the facts alleged in the state court proceedings.” Dkt. #21 at 12. 

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Petitioner filed a petition for removal of his state criminal prosecution to this Court

(Dkt. #1 (No. 06-CR-00503-PHX-EHC)), which was denied as untimely on July 13, 2006

(Dkt. #11, Ex. M). He also filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985

against the City of Mesa and several police officers in this Court, an action the Court

dismissed on October 1, 2007. Dkt. #1 (No. 05-CV-3435-PHX-EHC).

Petitioner filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 9, 2007, raising 36

separate grounds for relief. Dkt. #4 at 22-68. Judge Anderson’s R&R recommends that the

petition be denied because Grounds 1-23 and 25-36 are untimely under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Ground 24 fails on the merits, and all grounds

alternatively are procedurally defaulted. Dkt. #20 at 24. Petitioner responded by filing a

notice of objections. Dkt. #21 at 1-2. 

II. Legal Standard.

Petitioner appears to ask that the Court review his entire petition de novo.1

 Rule 72(b)

provides that the district judge “shall make a de novo determination . . . of any portion of the

magistrate judge’s disposition to which specific written objection has been made.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b) (emphasis added). Congress likewise has required district courts to conduct

de novo review only of “those portions of the [magistrate’s] report . . . to which objection

is made.” 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). An obvious purpose of these provisions is judicial economy

– to permit magistrate judges to hear and resolve matters not objectionable to the parties.

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147-152 (1985). This efficiency would be lost if parties were

permitted to invoke wholesale de novo review merely by requesting it. Because complete

de novo review defeats the efficiencies intended by Congress, circuit courts rightly hold that

general objections to an R&R are tantamount to no objection at all. See Goney v. Clark, 749

F.2d 5, 7 (3rd Cir. 1984) (stating that word-for-word review of magistrate’s report due to

general objections would undermine judicial efficiency); Howard v. Secretary of Health and

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Human Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991) (“A general objection to the entirety of

the magistrate’s report has the same effect as would a failure to object.”). The Court

accordingly will undertake de novo review only of those portions of the R&R to which

specific objections have been made. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149. 

III. Analysis.

A. Pro Se Status.

Petitioner “strongly objects to this court construing His pleadings in all strictness of

standards and in ways more likely to have Him denied of relief through the writ of habeas

corpus in further violation of his constitutional rights.” Dkt. #21 at 12. Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519 (1972), requires that pro se complaints be held to a “less stringent standard than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. at 520-521. This more lenient standard, however,

applies only to the form of a motion and not to its merits. See, e.g., Tatum v. Christensen,

786 F.2d 959, 963 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986) (deciding pro se defendant’s writ of habeas corpus on

the merits, even though it was unclear whether the form should have been a writ of

mandamus) (overruled on other grounds by Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir.

1986)). The Court has no reason to believe that Judge Anderson did not properly follow this

standard, and Petitioner cites no specific examples to that effect. The Court also notes that

Petitioner is not an inexperienced pro se litigant. Petitioner has filed at least eight cases in

this court in the last three years. See CV05-2561, CV05-3435, CV06-2190, CV06-3034,

CV07-100, CV07-216, CV07-473, CV08-900. 

B. Statute of Limitations.

Petitioner claims that, contrary to the R&R, his habeas corpus petition was filed “well

within” the applicable statute of limitations. Dkt. #21 at 1. The AEDPA provides that “[a]

1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Although the AEDPA gives four potential dates for when the one year period begins to run,

the R&R concluded, and Petitioner does not contest, that only the first applies in this case:

“the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

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 Although Petitioner does not specifically state that this case tolls the statute of

limitations, the Court infers this argument from his objections. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-

521.

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expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)(A); Dkt. #20 at 9-10,

see Dkt. #21. For purposes of section 2254, “judgment” refers “to the judgment of

conviction and sentence,” and “direct review” is the “direct appellate review of that

judgment.” Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003). Judgments become final

when either the United States Supreme Court affirms a conviction on the merits, denies a

petition for certiorari, or when the time for certiorari expires. Hemmerle v. Schiro, 495 F.3d

1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 531 (2003)).

Petitioner does not dispute the R&R’s conclusion that the latest date on which his

conviction could have become final was October 31, 2005 (when his sentence was

reimposed), and that unless tolled, the statute of limitations would expire on November 1,

2006. Dkt. #20 at 9; Dkt. #21. Because his petition for habeas corpus was filed on April 9,

2007 (Dkt #4), it is time barred unless the one year period was somehow tolled. Petitioner

asserts that the statute of limitations was tolled for two reasons. 

Petitioner first claims that he has a pending case before this Court, and apparently

argues that the statute of limitations for his habeas corpus petition is therefore tolled.2

Dkt. #21 at 1-2. Petitioner filed a petition for removal of his state court criminal case on

May 18, 2006. Dkt. #1 (No. 06-CR-00503-PHX-EHC). On September 13, 2006, he filed

a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. #9 (No. 06-CR-00503-PHX-EHC)), and in his

September 29, 2006 reply he requested that the Court convert his removal petition into a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Dkt. #11 (No. 06-CR-00503-PHX-EHC). Petitioner

contends that the Court has not yet ruled on his motion or his request for conversion. 

 Petitioner’s assertion fails for three reasons. First, the case to which Petitioner refers

was dismissed on July 13, 2006, and all pending motions were denied. Dkt. #11, Ex. M.

Because his motion for appointment of counsel was filed after the case was dismissed and

closed, it is moot. Second, Petitioner fails to cite any authority suggesting that a court may

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 The Court also agrees with Judge Anderson’s conclusion that Ground 24 of the

Petition lacks merit. See Dkt. #20 at 10-11; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3).

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convert a criminal petition for removal into a civil writ of habeas corpus. Third, even if the

case were open and the Court could covert the petition for removal into one for habeas

corpus, federal cases do not toll the statute of limitations for habeas petitions under the

AEDPA. The one year period is tolled during the time that a “properly filed application for

State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (emphasis added); see Duncan v. Walker, 533

U.S. 167, 173 (2001) (holding that applications for federal review do not toll the limitations

period for habeas petitions under the AEDPA). Thus, Petitioner’s removal action does not

toll the statute of limitations for his petition for habeas corpus. 

Petitioner’s second argument for tolling is that his federal civil rights case, filed on

November 7, 2005, should have been converted into a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Dkt. #21 at 2-3. Although case law suggests that a district court may treat a section 1983

action as a habeas petition in certain circumstances, see Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49

F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995), this authority applies only when the civil rights claim reflects

a “clear intention to state a habeas claim.” Id. Petitioner has not explained how his section

1983 claim – which sought money damages not only for events related to his arrest for the

underlying state charge, but also for other events of alleged police harassment – was clearly

intended to seek habeas relief. Petitioner does not assert that he ever used the civil rights

claim to seek relief from his state criminal conviction. The Court therefore cannot conclude

that the civil rights case somehow tolled the statute of limitations. 

Because Petitioner filed his petition for habeas corpus over five months after the

statute of limitations had run, the Court agrees with Judge Andersen that the petition is time

barred under the AEDPA.3

 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The R & R (Dkt. #20) is adopted.

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2. Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Person in State

Custody (Dkt. #4) is denied.

3. The clerk is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 24th day of July, 2008.

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