Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08252/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08252-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.-Employee Benefits

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Peabody Holding Company, LLC, 

Administrator of the Peabody Western – 

UMWA 401(k) Plan, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Dianarose Black, an individual; and 

Raelene Brown, Administrator of the Estate 

of Roy Lee Black, 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-08252-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

 Peabody Holding Company, LLC (“PHC”) filed a complaint in interpleader 

seeking to have the Court adjudicate the competing claims of Defendants Dianarose 

Black and Raelene Brown to the benefits of decedent Roy Lee Black that PHC holds as 

the administrator and fiduciary of the Peabody Western – UMWA 401(k) Plan (“the 

Plan”). Doc. 1. The Plan is an “employee pension benefit plan” governed by the 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Id., ¶¶ 9-10. PHC asserts federal 

question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 pursuant to ERISA’s jurisdictional 

provision in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e). Id., ¶ 5. Defendants are members of the Navajo 

Nation, residing on Navajo land in Arizona, and the benefits were derived from the 

employment of Robert Lee Black, also a Navajo, on Navajo land. Per the Court’s request 

on April 3, 2013, the parties have filed briefs addressing whether the Court has subject 

matter jurisdiction over this action and, if so, whether it should nonetheless stay or 

dismiss the action in favor of tribal court jurisdiction. Docs. 16, 17. 

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I. Background. 

Decedent Roy Lee Black was employed by Peabody Western Coal Company 

(“Peabody”) on the Navajo Reservation. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 12-13. During his employment, Mr. 

Black participated in and maintained a 401(k) account as part of Peabody’s “employee 

pension benefit plan” (“the Peabody Western – UMWA 401(k) Plan” or “the Plan”). Id., 

¶¶ 8-9. Mr. Black died on February 11, 2011, and, as of September 14, 2012, his account 

contained a balance of $66,452.88. Id., ¶¶ 14-15. The governing provisions of the Plan 

(the “Plan Instrument”) provide that, unless otherwise designated, the balance of a 

decedent’s account will be paid out to his or her surviving spouse, and, if the decedent 

has no surviving spouse or designees, it will be paid out to the administrator of his or her 

estate. Id., ¶¶ 16-20 (citing Plan Instrument provisions). 

 Mr. Black did not have a surviving spouse, and he named his daughter Dianarose 

Black as his sole beneficiary on the Plan’s Designation Form. Id., ¶¶ 4, 22. The Plan 

Instrument allows for any persons who believe they are being denied a benefit to submit a 

written claim to the Plan administrator. Id., ¶ 25. Raelene Brown, the administrator of 

Mr. Black’s estate, submitted a claim to PHC, contesting the validity of the Designation 

Form and making a claim to the account balance on behalf of the estate. Id., 25-26. 

 PHC has a fiduciary duty under ERISA to distribute the balance according to the 

Plan Instrument. Id., ¶ 30 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D)). PHC has received no other 

claims to the account balance, and it has so far made no distributions pending resolution 

of whether Defendant Black or Mr. Black’s estate, represented by Defendant Brown, is 

the proper beneficiary. Id., ¶¶ 29-32. PHC filed this action in interpleader, seeking to 

pay the account balance into the Registry of the Court and to have the Court require 

Defendants to submit their respective claims to the Court for determination. Id., ¶¶ 38. 

II. Federal Court Jurisdiction. 

 ERISA’s jurisdictional statement provides that “[e]xcept for actions under section 

(a)(1)(B) [authorizing suits by participants or beneficiaries], the district courts of the 

United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter 

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brought by . . . [a] fiduciary, or any person referred to in section 1021(f)(1) of this title.” 

29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). PCH filed this action under §1132(a)(3), which authorizes a 

fiduciary to bring a civil action “to obtain . . . appropriate equitable relief [and] to enforce 

any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that an interpleader action brought by a plan 

administrator to ensure the proper disbursement of ERISA funds is as an equitable action 

properly brought under § 1132(a)(3)(B). See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bayona, 223 F.3d 

1030, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Estate of Strickland v. Strickland, No. CV-12-

433-TUC-JGZ, 2013 WL 673513, at *4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2013) (“An interpleader action 

is an equitable proceeding that permits a plan administrator to seek equitable relief to 

enforce terms of an ERISA plan.”). Because ERISA grants federal court jurisdiction for 

civil actions brought by a fiduciary, and PHC’s interpleader action is properly asserted 

under § 1132(a)(3)(B), the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. 

III. Tribal Court Jurisdiction. 

 A. Principles of Comity and Exhaustion. 

 Even where the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim involving 

Indians on Indian land, principles of comity generally require that examination of the 

existence and extent of a tribal court’s jurisdiction “be conducted in the first instance in 

the Tribal Court itself.” Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 

U.S. 845, 856 (1985). “[T]he federal policy supporting tribal self-government directs a 

federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a full opportunity to 

determine its own jurisdiction.” Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). National Farmers articulated three exceptions to 

this requirement: (1) “where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to 

harass or is conducted in bad faith,” (2) “where the action is patently violative of express 

jurisdictional prohibitions,” and (3) “where exhaustion would be futile because of the 

lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.” 471 U.S. at 857, 

n. 21 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

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 Defendant Black did not submit briefing on the jurisdictional issue. Defendant 

Brown contends that the Court should dismiss or stay this action to allow the Navajo 

tribal court to determine its own jurisdiction. Doc. 16 at 6, 10. She argues that this is 

appropriate because (1) the dispute is between Navajo family members arising from 

events on the Navajo Reservation, (2) proper distribution of the account balance 

implicates issues of Navajo law and custom, and (3) the Navajo probate court has 

jurisdiction over other matters related to Mr. Black’s estate. Id. at 2-9. PHC does not 

argue that Defendant’s assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is in bad faith, nor that 

exhaustion in tribal court would be futile. Rather, it argues that requiring exhaustion in 

tribal court would be “patently violative of [ERISA’s] express jurisdictional 

prohibitions,” and would “serve no purpose other than delay.” Doc. 17 at 2 (quoting 

National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857, n. 21; Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001)). 

B. Would Tribal Court Jurisdiction Violate Jurisdictional Prohibitions? 

 Section 1132(e)(1) of ERISA states: 

Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, 

the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive 

jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or 

any person referred to in section 1021(f)(1) of this title. State 

courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of the 

United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions under paragraphs (1)(B) and (7) of subsection (a) of this 

section. 

29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). This grant of “exclusive jurisdiction,” which applies to this 

interpleader action initiated by an ERISA fiduciary, would appear to preclude tribal court 

jurisdiction. It also appears to invoke National Farmers’ second exception to the 

exhaustion requirement – that tribal court jurisdiction would patently violate an express 

jurisdictional prohibition. Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. 

 Defendant Brown argues on the basis of United States v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724 

(9th Cir. 1992), that the principles underlying the exhaustion rule apply even where the 

statutory basis for an action contains “exclusive jurisdiction” language. Doc. 16 at 7, 7 

n. 1. In Plainbull, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) filed an action in federal court 

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seeking to recover grazing fees on behalf of the Crow Tribe from tribal members who 

had allowed their livestock to trespass on tribal lands. 957 F.2d at 725. The BIA asserted 

federal court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1355. Id. at 726. Section 1355 states that 

“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, 

of any action or proceeding for the recovery or enforcement of any fine, penalty, or 

forfeiture . . . incurred under any Act of Congress, except matters within the jurisdiction 

of the Court of International Trade under section 1582 of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 1355(a). 

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action in favor of tribal 

court exhaustion based on the district court’s finding that the alleged trespasses were 

essentially an internal tribal matter and that principles of comity required the BIA to seek 

resolution in tribal court. 957 F.2d at 725, 727. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth 

Circuit addressed whether § 1355 gave the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction, thus 

precluding tribal court jurisdiction. Id. at 726-27. The Court of Appeals reasoned that 

the plain language of § 1355 “only grants the district court original jurisdiction ‘exclusive 

of the courts of the States,’ not exclusive of all other courts that would otherwise have 

had jurisdiction.” Id. at 726. It went on to state that “[s]ince a tribal court is not a state 

court, we hold that it does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction provision of section 

1355.” Id. 

Plainbull does not support Defendant Brown’s position. Section 1132(e)(1) of 

ERISA does not state that the federal courts have original jurisdiction “exclusive of the 

courts of the States,” thus implicitly preserving the possibility of tribal court jurisdiction. 

Rather, § 1132(e)(1) unequivocally states that “the district courts of the United States 

shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by . . . [a] 

fiduciary.” 28 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (emphasis added). Importantly, the Ninth Circuit 

stated in Plainbull that if it were to find that the relevant statute “confers exclusive 

jurisdiction to the federal courts in the instant case,” it would be “compelled to reverse 

[the district court’s abstention] for abuse of discretion.” 957 F.2d at 726. 

 Defendant Brown cites Elliot v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 

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842, 848 (9th Cir. 2009), for the proposition that if tribal court jurisdiction is “colorable” 

or “plausible” the exception does not apply and exhaustion of tribal court remedies is 

required. Doc. 16 at 7, n. 1. The Court does not find Elliot helpful to Defendant Brown. 

Elliot addressed a fourth exception to the exhaustion requirement recognized in Hicks, 

533 U.S. at 369, – that the exhaustion rule does not apply “when it is ‘plain’ that tribal 

court jurisdiction is lacking, so that the exhaustion requirement ‘would serve no purpose 

other than delay.’” 566 F.3d at 847. The reasoning in Elliot is clear. If tribal court 

jurisdiction is “colorable” or “plausible,” it cannot be “plain” that the tribal court lacks 

jurisdiction. In this case, however, the relevant statutory provision confers “exclusive 

jurisdiction” on the federal courts, making “plain” that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction.1

 

 Defendant Brown emphasizes a Navajo Nation Supreme Court case that affirmed 

Navajo jurisdiction to oversee the disbursement of ERISA funds where the claimants 

were all Navajos and the life insurance policy belonged to a Navajo decedent pursuant to 

her work for a company on Navajo land. Doc. 16 at 3 (citing MacDonald v. Ellison, 7 

Nav. R. 429, 432 (1999)). But Defendant Brown acknowledges that the Navajo Supreme 

Court found that ERISA did not apply to that case. Id. The applicability of ERISA to the 

sole question of whether Mr. Black validly designated Defendant Black as his beneficiary 

in the current case is not meaningfully in dispute. Defendant Brown also argues that 

ERISA does not preempt tribal law. Doc. 16 at 4. Again, that is not the question before 

the Court. Jurisdiction is not being suggested in this Court because ERISA preempts 

tribal law, but because Congress has specifically declared that federal district courts have 

exclusive jurisdiction over ERISA actions such as this. 

 Defendant Brown’s citations to additional cases are also not persuasive. In United 

States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037, 1041 (10th Cir. 1996), the United States argued on the 

 

1

 The second and fourth exceptions to the exhaustion requirement appear to overlap. When the second exception applies – where the action in the tribal court would 

patently violate express jurisdictional prohibitions – the fourth exception will never apply because the lack of tribal court jurisdiction will be plain. That is the situation in this case. 

The fourth exception nonetheless remains relevant. Even if there is no express jurisdictional prohibition, courts must ask whether a lack of tribal court jurisdiction is plain for some other reason, so that exhaustion would serve no purpose other than delay. 

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basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1345, which gives the federal courts original jurisdiction over civil 

actions brought by the United States, that the exhaustion rule did not apply to a trespass 

and ejectment action the government initiated over tribal land. The court disagreed, 

citing a number of Supreme Court cases for the proposition that original jurisdiction in 

the federal courts does not preclude concurrent jurisdiction in other tribunals. Id. at 

1041-42 (citing cases). In affirming that comity required the United States to exhaust its 

remedies in tribal court, the Tenth Circuit found it significant that the relevant dispute 

was between Indians over rights in Indian country. Id. at 1043. Defendant argues that 

the same kind of dispute exists here. Doc. 16 at 8. But Tsosie was not an ERISA case, 

and it did not deal with an exclusive jurisdiction clause. The analysis in Tsosie simply 

does not apply where, as here, the applicable statutory provision precludes concurrent 

jurisdiction. 

 Defendant Brown’s citations to Prescott v. Little Six, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 1217 (D. 

Minn. 1995), and Prescott v. Little Six, Inc, 387 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2004), do not compel 

a different result. The district court opinion merely held that the “exclusive jurisdiction” 

provision in § 1132(e)(1) did not bar the tribal court from adjudicating the question of 

whether a valid ERISA plan existed, not that the federal courts do not have exclusive 

jurisdiction over ERISA actions otherwise subject to § 1132(e)(1). Prescott, 897 F.Supp. 

at 1222. The Eighth Circuit opinion is in accord. It found that where the tribal court had 

conclusively determined that no ERISA plan existed because the tribal corporation had 

not created one pursuant to relevant tribal laws, there could be no controversy to which 

ERISA could apply. Prescott, 387 F.3d at 758. Neither case held that where, as here, the 

existence of an ERISA plan is not in dispute, the exhaustion rule applies to an action 

brought by a fiduciary under § 1132(a)(3) despite the express language in § 1132(e)(1). 

Geroux v. Assurant, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00184, 2010 WL 1032648 (W.D. Mich. 

March 17, 2010), to which Defendant’s counsel cited at the scheduling conference, and 

Koopman v. Forest County Potawatomi Member Benefit Plan, No. 06-C-163, 2006 WL 

1785769 (E.D. Wis. June 26, 2006), are similar to the Prescott cases. Geroux remanded 

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a case to tribal court where the parties disagreed about whether the plaintiffs’ cause of 

action arose under ERISA. 2010 WL 1032648, at *18. Koopman, to which Geroux

cited, dismissed an action brought by tribal members where the plaintiffs had 

characterized the case as a dispute over ERISA benefits, but the court found that “it is 

clear from the filings [] it is anything but.” 2006 WL 1785769, at *2. The court found 

that preliminary issues such as a motion to disqualify the Tribe’s counsel and a motion to 

intervene from tribal members asserting claims under the Tribe’s own constitution 

presented it with “a paradigmatic opportunity to defer to the tribal court.” Id. 

 Defendant Brown attempts to show that disposition of the benefit in this case 

likewise implicates questions of tribal law and custom distinct from who is the proper 

beneficiary of Mr. Black’s account under ERISA. Doc. 16 at 4. The Court is not 

persuaded. As Plaintiff argues, ERISA requires the fiduciary to distribute Plan benefits 

according to the terms of the Plan Instrument. Doc. 17 at 7; see 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1104(a)(1)(D). Thus, the benefit must pass to Defendant Black if the Court finds that 

Mr. Black designated her as his beneficiary; otherwise it must pass to Mr. Black’s estate 

represented by Defendant Brown. Doc. 17 at 7. No questions of tribal law or concepts of 

“distributive justice” are implicated as Plaintiff argues (Doc. 16 at 5), and until the 

ERISA action is resolved, the account is a non-probate asset not properly before the tribal 

probate court. Id. at 6, 7. 

 In summary, the Court concludes that requiring tribal court exhaustion in this case, 

where the only question is one over which the federal courts have “exclusive 

jurisdiction,” would be “patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions.” Nat’l 

Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857, n. 21. As a result, exhaustion in tribal court is not required. 

 C. Alternative Grounds for Declining Abstention.

 Even absent a finding that the “exclusive jurisdiction” language in § 1132(e)(1) 

constitutes an express jurisdictional prohibition against tribal court jurisdiction, the Court 

finds further support on the basis of El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 

(1999), that the exhaustion rule does not apply. El Paso supports the proposition that 

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exhaustion does not apply, even without express language, where a federal statute evinces 

Congress’s intent that specific kinds of actions be addressed in a uniform manner in 

federal court. The plaintiffs in El Paso argued that principles of comity prevented the 

defendant of numerous tort claims stemming from uranium production on the Navajo 

reservation from removing cases from Navajo to federal court pursuant to the PriceAnderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act provides for original jurisdiction in federal court 

and removal from state court for claims relating to nuclear incidents. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 

at 484. It also contains a preemption provision, transforming all such claims into federal 

actions. Id. The Supreme Court found on the basis of these provisions that Congress had 

“expressed an unmistakable preference for a federal forum.” Id. at 484-85. Although the 

Act only provided for removal from state courts, not tribal courts, the Supreme Court 

explained: 

We are at a loss to think of any reason that Congress would have favored tribal exhaustion. Any generalized sense of comity toward nonfederal courts is obviously displaced by the provisions for preemption and removal from state courts, 

which are thus accorded neither jot nor tittle of deference. The apparent reasons for this congressional policy of immediate access to federal forums are as much applicable to tribal-court as to state-court litigation. 

Id. at 485-86. The Court concluded that the exhaustion rule did not apply to any putative 

Price-Anderson Act claims and that removal was warranted. Id. at 487-88. 

 At least one district court case, Vandever v. Osage Nation Enterprise, Inc., No. 06-

CV-380-GKF-TLW, 2009 WL 702776 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 16, 2009), has applied the 

rationale of Neztsosie to ERISA and concluded that exhaustion does not apply to ERISAbased claims. In Vandever, the plaintiffs filed an action in federal court against their 

tribal employer and the Osage Nation alleging ERISA violations. 2009 WL 702776, at 

*1. Defendants argued on the basis of National Farmers, et al., that plaintiffs must first 

pursue their claims in tribal court. Id. at *4. The court did not agree. Id. at *5. It cited 

to the fact that ERISA, like the Price-Anderson Act, preempts state law claims (see 29 

U.S.C. § 1144), and to the Supreme Court’s finding that 

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The purpose of ERISA is to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans. To this end, ERISA 

includes expansive preemption provisions, see ERISA § 514, 

29 U.S.C. § 1144, which are intended to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation would be “exclusively a federal 

concern.” 

Id. at *5 (quoting Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (internal citation 

omitted)). The court concluded that “[g]iven the preemptive nature of ERISA and the 

express purpose of Congress to provide a uniform regulatory scheme over employee 

benefit plans, . . . abstention would be inappropriate.” Id. Unlike here, Vandever 

pertained to claims brought by beneficiaries to recover benefits under the terms of a plan 

and thus fell under the second part of § 1132(e)(1), which gives the federal courts 

concurrent jurisdiction with the states, not the provision which gives federal courts 

“exclusive jurisdiction.” As Defendant points out, however, the fact that the court found 

abstention inappropriate even where federal jurisdiction was not exclusive further 

supports withholding abstention here. See Doc. 17 at 3, n. 1. 

Neztsosie and Vandever provide persuasive alternative grounds for finding that the 

principles of comity requiring tribal court exhaustion do not apply in this case. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. This action shall remain in federal court. 

 2. The Court will set a case management conference by separate order. 

 Dated this 29th day of May, 2013. 

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