Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-06330/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-06330-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SARAH PERTZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

HEARTLAND REALTY INVESTORS, 

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-06330-CRB 

ORDER STRIKING AFFIRMATIVE 

DEFENSES

The Court previously struck thirty-two affirmative defenses asserted in Heartland Realty 

Investors’ and Heartland Santa Rosa Limited Partnership’s (collectively, “Heartland”) Answer 

(dkt. 11) to Sarah Pertz’s Complaint (dkt. 1). The Court found that all thirty-two defenses lacked

factual support and many were not affirmative defenses at all. Order Striking Affirmative 

Defenses (dkt 23) at 2–3. Heartland’s Amended Answer (dkt. 26) asserts eleven affirmative 

defenses. Id. at 9–10. Once again, Heartland fails to support its affirmative defenses with 

sufficient factual allegations, and inappropriately attempts to cast allegations denying liability as 

affirmative defenses. Pertz’s Motion to Strike (dkt. 28) is therefore GRANTED, this time with 

prejudice.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A party must “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(c). “Affirmative defenses plead matters extraneous to the plaintiff’s prima facie 

case, which deny the plaintiff’s right to recover, even if the allegations of the complaint are 

true.” FDIC v. Main Hurdman, 655 F. Supp. 259, 262 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (citing Gomez v. 

Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640–41 (1980)). In contrast, allegations that plaintiff has not met its 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

burden of proof or which deny liability are not affirmative defenses. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. 

Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to “strike from a pleading an 

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” A 

ruling on a motion to strike affirmative defenses must be based on matters contained in the 

pleadings. See Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 516 (1959).

The Ninth Circuit has long held that an affirmative defense is adequately plead if it

“gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 

(9th Cir. 1979). While the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue, this Court 

and the majority of courts in this district have held that the heightened pleading standard of 

Twombly and Iqbal, which followed Wyshak, is now the correct standard to apply to 

affirmative defenses.1 See, e.g., Order Striking Affirmative Defenses at 2; Fishman v. 

Tiger Natural Gas Inc., No. C 17-05351 WHA, 2018 WL 4468680, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 

18, 2018); Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros. Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 

Accordingly, Heartland’s affirmative defenses must contain sufficient factual matter to

state a defense “that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

II. DISCUSSION

Once again, Heartland’s affirmative defenses fail to meet this standard. None of the 

eleven affirmative defenses pled in the Amended Answer is supported by sufficient factual 

allegations. See Amended Answer at 9–10. Indeed, Heartland’s third, seventh, and eighth 

affirmative defenses restate without substantive amendment the ninth, eighteenth, and 

twenty-first defenses the Court previously held insufficiently pled in Heartland’s initial 

Answer. Compare Amended Answer at 9–10, with Answer at 9–12; see also Order 

1

 Kohler v. Flava Enters., Inc., 779 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2015), is not to the contrary. That case 

confirmed the “fair notice” standard for affirmative defenses, without addressing the applicability 

of Twombly and Iqbal’s heightened pleading standard. See id. at 1019. The Court will therefore 

follow other decisions in this district that have continued to apply the heightened Twombly/Iqbal

standard to affirmative defenses after Kohler. See Fishman, 2018 WL 4468680, at *3.

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Striking Affirmative Defenses at 2. And as Pertz correctly notes, Heartland has amended 

its other defenses only by adding “vague, passing references to Cornell Holiday and the 

Heartland Defendants . . . or to Plaintiff.” Mot. at 8; see also Amended Answer at 9–10. 

All eleven affirmative defenses are stricken as insufficiently pled.

Heartland argues it “cannot plead further facts sufficient to demonstrate a 

negative—that it did not know or did not do something.” Opp’n (dkt. 33) at 5. Heartland 

is apparently attempting to salvage its fourth, fifth, and sixth affirmative defenses, which 

contest its vicarious liability for wrongs committed by defendant Cornell Holiday. See id.

at 4–6; Amended Answer at 9–10. But this argument simply proves Pertz’s point, that 

these allegations are not affirmative defenses at all, because they simply deny liability. 

See Zivkovic, 302 F.3d at 1088; see also Reply (dkt. 34) at 5–7.

Because the Court previously granted Heartland leave to amend, and Heartland 

failed to adequately allege any of its affirmative defenses on a second try, its amended 

affirmative defenses are stricken with prejudice. See ABC Distrib., Inc. v. Living 

Essentials LLC, No. 15-cv-02064 NC, 2016 WL 8114207, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2016). 

It is therefore unnecessary to address Pertz’s alternative arguments in favor of her motion 

to strike.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike Heartland’s affirmative defenses is 

GRANTED, with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2020

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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