Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01213/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-01213-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CHRISTOPHER LEONG, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

D. ASUNCION, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:16-cv-1213 MCE GGH P 

ORDER 

 On August 31, 2016, respondent filed a motion to dismiss based on failure to exhaust one 

of four claims. Petitioner shall file an opposition by September 30, 2016, and shall state in his 

opposition whether he intends to move for a stay and abeyance if indeed one of his claims is 

unexhausted. 

 The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal district court may not entertain a 

petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted state remedies with respect to each 

of the claims raised. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). The exhaustion of state court 

remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1). 

 A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with 

a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before presenting them to the federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.), 

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cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). A state court has had an opportunity to rule on the merits of a 

claim when the petitioner has fairly presented that claim to that court. The fair presentation 

requirement is met where the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theory on 

which his claim is based. Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78. Generally, it is “not enough that all the 

facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts . . . or that a somewhat 

similar state-law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). Instead, 

[i]f state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged 

violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to 

the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United 

States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an 

evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of 

law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not 

only in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). 

 If the petition is indeed a mixed petition, petitioner may proceed in one of two ways when 

he files his opposition. He may eliminate the fourth claim as unexhausted and proceed on the 

exhausted Claims One through Three only. Or, petitioner may file a motion to stay this action 

pending exhaustion of the unexhausted fourth claim.1 

 In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 125 S.Ct. 1528 (2005) the United States Supreme 

Court found that a stay and abeyance of a mixed federal petition should be available only in the 

limited circumstance that good cause is shown for a failure to have first exhausted the claims in 

state court, that the claim or claims at issue potentially have merit and that there has been no 

indication that petitioner has been intentionally dilatory in pursuing the litigation. Rhines, supra, 

at 277-78, 125 S.Ct at 1535. 

 If petitioner wishes to stay this action, he shall file a motion addressing the Rhines factors. 

In the alternative, petitioner may proceed with a stay request as outlined in King v. Ryan, 564 

F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) citing Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). In King, the 

 

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 Petitioner is cautioned that the habeas corpus statute imposes a one-year statute of limitations 

for filing non-capital habeas corpus petitions in federal court. In most cases, the one year period 

will start to run on the date on which the state court judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of time for seeking direct review, although the statute of 

limitations is tolled while a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral 

review is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

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Ninth Circuit held that in addition to the stay procedure authorized in Rhines, district courts also 

have discretion to permit petitioners to follow the three-step stay-and-abeyance procedure 

approved in Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1998) and Kelly v. 

Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 

1143 (2007). Pursuant to the King procedure, (1) a petitioner amends his petition to delete any 

unexhausted claims; (2) the court stays and holds in abeyance the amended, fully exhausted 

petition, allowing the petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust the deleted 

claims; and (3) the petitioner later amends his petition and re-attaches the newly-exhausted claims 

to the original petition. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070-71. The King stay-and-abeyance procedure has 

no requirement of a good cause showing or that the claims are potentially meritorious. However, 

no statute of limitations protection is imparted by such a stay, nor are exhausted claims 

adjudicated during the pendency of such a stay. 

 In the alternative, petitioner may file an amended petition in this court raising only 

exhausted claims. If petitioner chooses the second method, however, the court cautions that he 

will risk forfeiting consideration of the unexhausted claims in this or any other federal court. See 

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); see also Rose, 455 U.S. at 520-21; Rule 9(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: Petitioner shall file an opposition to 

respondent’s August 31, 2016 motion to dismiss by September 30, 2016. Petitioner is cautioned 

that failure to respond to the instant order, or to file an opposition to the pending motion to 

dismiss, may result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed. 

DATED: September 6, 2016 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

GGH:076/Leon1213.opp.sta 

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