Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-92-05362/USCOURTS-caDC-92-05362-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 1994 Decided October 21, 1994

No. 92-5362

CROWLEY CARIBBEAN TRANSPORT, INC.;

CROWLEY MARITIME CORPORATION,

APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERICO F. PEÑA, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION;

LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP COMPANY, INC.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(92-cv00271)

Mark P. Schlefer argued the cause for appellant. With him on the

briefs was William H. Fort.

Douglas A. Wickham, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Eric H. Holder

Jr., United States Attorney and John D. Bates, R. Craig Lawrence,

and Jeffrey T. Sprung, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

On the brief for appellee Lykes Bros. Steamship Company, Inc., was

Timothy B. Shea.

Before: WILLIAMS, GINSBURG and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: Crowley Caribbean Transport carries

freight on U.S.-flag ships to the port of Las Minas on the Atlantic

coast of Panama. In 1990 Lykes Brothers Steamship Company proposed

to initiate cargo service on foreign-flag vessels to Balboa on the

Pacific coast, less than fifty miles (and ninety minutes by truck)

from Las Minas. Fearing that this proposed service might run afoul

of provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 designed to

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protect U.S.-flag carriers (such as Crowley) from competition from

foreign-flag vessels operated by subsidized domestic carriers,

Lykes applied to the Maritime Administrator for a waiver of the

rules. The Administrator denied Lykes's waiver application, and in

so doing explained that no waiver was necessary because the

proposed service did not compete with Crowley's existing service

within the meaning of the statute.

Crowley brought this suit challenging the Administrator's

determination and seeking to enjoin Lykes's Pacific-coast service

to Panama, which has since begun operation. The district court

granted summary judgment against Crowley, and we affirm. The

claims Crowley raises against the Administrator are ones for which

no judicial relief is available, and Crowley has asserted no

independent claims of error with respect to Lykes.

I.

Section 804(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 makes it

"unlawful" for any carrier that "receiv[es] an operating

differential subsidy ... directly or indirectly to own, charter,

... or operate any foreign-flag vessel which competes with any

American-flag service determined by the Secretary of Transportation

to be essential...." 46 U.S.C. App. § 1222(a). Section 804(b),

however, permits the Maritime Administrator to waive the

requirements of § 804(a) "[u]nder special circumstances and for

good cause shown." Id. § 1222(b). A carrier that violates §

804(a) is subject to fines. Id. § 1228.

Lykes receives operating differential subsidies for its

American-flag vessels and also operates foreign-flag vessels. It

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does not dispute that § 804(a) restricts its use of the

foreign-flag vessels. In late 1990, it applied for a § 804(b)

waiver to operate its foreign-flag vessels along several routes to

Central America, South America, and Africa. In the course of

denying most of the requested waivers for lack of specificity, the

Administrator noted that "to the extent Lykes requests authority to

operate foreign-flag vessel [sic ] in areas which would not compete

with any essential American-flag service, then no section 804

waiver is necessary."

Lykes then requested further guidance regarding the routes for

which a waiver was not required. Specifically, Lykes asked whether

it needed a waiver to operate foreign-flag ships to certain South

American and African ports, claiming that "[t]o [its] knowledge no

other U.S.-flag liner service is provided in this trade." The

Administrator replied that no waiver was required for any of these

services "since they are not directly competitive with other

U.S.-flag services within the meaning of section 804 of the

Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended."

By means that the record does not disclose, Crowley obtained

copies of this correspondence and, in a letter to the

Administrator, took issue with Lykes's assertion that its proposed

service would not compete with other U.S.-flag service. Crowley was

particularly concerned with Lykes's proposed service from the

United States to Balboa on the Pacific coast of Panama. Crowley

regularly carried freight by water directly to Las Minas on the

Atlantic coast; in addition, it accepted cargo for other

destinations in Panama (including Balboa), for which it issued an

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intermodal bill of lading and arranged for carriage by truck from

Las Minas. Crowley claimed that Lykes's service to Balboa would

compete with its intermodal service through Las Minas and that

without a § 804(b) waiver such competition would be unlawful. As

Crowley's Panamanian service was in a designated "essential trade

route"one of eight so defined by the Administrator, see Notice of

Final Determination of Essential Trade Routes, 24 SRR 177, 186

(1987)it was indisputably an "essential" service for purposes of

§ 804(a).

Despite the apparent rivalry between Lykes and Crowley for

some of the same cargo, the Administrator foundin further

correspondence precipitated by Crowley's objectionsthat Lykes did

not need a § 804(b) waiver because "[p]orts on Crowley's U.S.-flag

service on the Atlantic coast of Panama ... are not on the same

trade route as ports in Lykes's service on the Pacific coast of

Panama, and therefore vessels calling at these ports are not

directly competitive." In determining whether or not the services

were actually competitive within the meaning of § 804(a), the

Administrator focused only on ports directly served by ocean-going

vessels; he did not consider indirect intermodal competition, as

Crowley had hoped.

Crowley then sued Lykes and the Department of Transportation.

The district court held that although the term "competes" is

ambiguous in the context of § 804, the agency's interpretation of

the term was reasonable. The court therefore dismissed the suit,

and Crowley appealed.

II.

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1Although we cannot say for certain, it appears from the

United States Attorneys' Manual that Justice would act only on a

referral from some "client" agency. See United States Attorneys'

Manual § 4-6.200. Here, that would presumably be the Maritime

Administration, which (by delegation from the Secretary of

Transportation) is responsible for encouraging the development of

the merchant marine fleet by maintaining the operating

differential subsidy program andat issue hereenforcing its

rules. See 46 U.S.C. App. § 1101; 49 CFR §§ 1.66-.67. The

Department of Transportation does not possess independent

litigating authority in this field. 

After oral argument, we asked the parties for supplemental

briefs addressing the question of whether "the Administrator's

decision that Lykes did not require a § 804(b) waiver to operate

foreign-flagged vessels to Balboa constitutes a nonenforcement

decision under Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (198[5] )." Despite

this additional briefing, the exact nature of the Administrator's

action remains murky. None of the parties has explained with any

authority or precision the manner in which violations of § 804 are

prosecuted; in particular, no one has clarified exactly how

enforcement authority is shared between the Administrator and the

Department of Justice.1 As a result, we are left without a clear

picture of the effects of the Administrator's decision. If the

Administrator's statement that Lykes does not require a § 804

waiver for its Pacific-coast Panamanian service means as a

practical matter that neither the Department of Justice nor the

Department of Transportation will pursue the alleged violation,

then the Administrator has in effect declared that he will forego

enforcement of § 804(a) in the present case. On the other hand, if

the letters have no binding effect on Justice or Transportation and

do not guarantee Lykes protection from future government

enforcement, then they are simply advisory opinions accompanying

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what is in substance a denial of Lykes's requests for a waiver.

Even after the supplemental briefing, we cannot say which

characterization is more accurate.

Whichever characterization is more apt, however, we must

affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of

the Maritime Administrator. If we assume that his determination

was only a waiver denial plus an advisory opinion, Crowley has not

suffered the injury in fact required for it to have standing to

bring suit. If, on the other hand, the decision not to require a

waiver constituted a determination to forego enforcement, we would

be precluded from reviewing that decision under the principles

articulated in Heckler v. Chaney (assuming, arguendo, that on this

scenario Crowley satisfied standing requirements). We address each

of these possibilities in turn.

The Administrator's Letters as an Advisory Opinion

We first assume that government enforcement of § 804(a) is

completely entrusted to the Justice Department, which may proceed

against Lykes (absent a formal § 804(b) waiver) without any sort of

referral from or consent by the Maritime Administrator. Under

these assumptions, the Administrator's denial of a waiver and

assertion that none was needed would not preclude a future action

by Justice to enforce § 804(a); only the actual grant of the

waiver by the Administrator could offer such protection.

If this is the case, it is difficult to see how Crowley has

been injured by the Administrator's determination. What has

happened in concrete terms is that Crowley's rival has applied for

a waiver, i.e., a kind of immunity from future § 804(a)

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enforcement, and that immunity has been denied. In other words,

the Administrator's decision was substantively in Crowley's favor,

although it was accompanied by dicta (the interpretation of the

term "competes" in § 804(a)) to which Crowley objects. We have

made clear, however, that mere disagreement with an agency's

rationale for a substantively favorable decision does not

constitute the sort of injury necessary for purposes of Article III

standing: a litigant's "interest in [an agency's] legal reasoning

and its potential precedential effect does not by itself confer

standing where, as here, it is "uncoupled' from any injury in fact

caused by the substance of the [agency's] adjudicatory action."

Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC ("TRAC "), 917

F.2d 585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1990). And without a concrete injury in

fact, Crowley may not bring suit against the Administrator. See

Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218-

19 (1974). Except possibly in the sense that the Administrator's

reasoning may amount to a non-enforcement decision (the hypothesis

addressed below), its impact on Crowley is every bit as nebulous

and remote as the impact upon the TRAC plaintiffs of the FCC's use

of a broader rationale than they favored for finding certain

programming exempt from the equal-time rules. TRAC, 917 F.2d at

586-87.

The Administrator's Letters as a Non-Enforcement Decision

We now modify the first set of assumptions: we assume that

the Administrator's determination that Lykes's Panamanian service

does not require a § 804(b) waiver indeed telegraphs a definitive

judgment that the government will not enforce § 804(a) in this

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particular instance.

Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §

701(a)(2), makes judicial review inapplicable "to the extent that

... agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." In

Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court construed § 701(a)(2) to

create a presumption against reviewability for "an agency's

decision not to take enforcement action," 470 U.S. at 832. The

Food and Drug Administration in that case had declined to take

enforcement action against states that, in administering lethal

injections for capital punishment, had used drugs not approved by

the FDA for such use. In so deciding, the FDA had first asserted

that its jurisdiction over the unapproved use of approved drugs for

execution "was generally unclear but in any event should not be

exercised to interfere with this particular aspect of state

criminal justice systems." Id. at 824. It then said that even if

it clearly had jurisdiction, it would be "authorized to decline to

exercise it under [its] inherent discretion to decline to pursue

certain enforcement matters." Ibid. Thus the agency both

expressed a substantive view of the law on the unapproved use of

approved drugs (tentatively, to be sure) and invoked its inherent

enforcement discretion.

The Court offered several reasons for finding a presumption of

non-reviewability of agency non-enforcement decisions. First, it

noted the "complicated balancing of a number of factors which are

peculiarly within [an agency's] expertise," including the decisions

of "whether a violation has occurred" and how to allocate agency

resources. Id. at 831-32. Second, it stressed that a decision not

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to enforce "does not exercise [the agency's] coercive power over an

individual's liberty or property rights" and that it "shares to

some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in

the Executive Branch not to indicta decision which has long been

regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch." Id. at

832 (emphasis in original). Finally, non-enforcement decisions

differed from actions to enforce in that for the latter the "action

itself provides a focus for judicial review." Id. The Court

plainly did not regard these reasons as underminedor sufficiently

undermined, in any eventby the agency's having partially grounded

its inaction in an explicit analysis of its statutory power.

Crowley suggests that Chaney 's presumption of

non-reviewability is inapplicable when the agency bases its refusal

to enforce in an individual case solely on a legal interpretation

without explicitly relying on its enforcement discretion. This is

similar (if not identical) to an issue on which the Chaney Court

reserved judgment, saying that it expressed no opinion as to

whether an agency's refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings

would be reviewable if it were based solely on the agency's belief

that it lacked jurisdiction to take action. 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.

Our most recent pronouncement on the subject is contrary to

Crowley's view. In Safe Energy Coalition v. U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Comm'n, 866 F.2d 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the petitioner

had requested the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to enforce a subset

of NRC regulations ("Appendix B") against a specific risk-reporting

program at Detroit Edison's Fermi-2 nuclear reactor. Id. at 1475.

The NRC, though noting the petitioner's failure to produce evidence

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of violations, also explained that the regulatory requirements

imposed on Detroit Edison by Appendix B were "adequately

implemented" by a completely different program at Fermi-2. Id. at

1476. It nowhere invoked enforcement discretion. Petitioners

argued that the NRC's "legal determination" as to the limited scope

of Appendix B rendered Chaney inapplicable, id., but we declined

the gambit. Instead, we reasoned that the applicability of Chaney

depended on the relief sought by petitioners, which was enforcement

action. Id. at 1477. Even though a full answer to petitioners'

request might have required the NRC to settle the legal issue, we

said, Chaney could not be evaded by "artificially carving out this

antecedent legal issue" from the basic request for enforcement.

Id. at 1476.

It is true that three years before Safe Energy we gave a

different answer. In International Union, United Automobile,

Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Brock, 783

F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1986), we considered the Department of Labor's

refusal, based on its interpretation of the labor statutes, to take

enforcement action in response to a union complaint. We held that

an agency's statutory interpretation was presumptively reviewable

even if announced in the context of a non-enforcement decision.

Id. at 245-46. Thus International Union appears to have "carved

out" for review precisely what Safe Energy later said could not be

carved out. (The petitioner in Safe Energy did not cite

International Union to the court, and the court in turn did not

refer to that case.)

As a circuit, we seem to have no explicit rule on how to

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2Compare Dorse v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 798 F.2d

1372, 1376 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Where circuit authority is in

conflict, "we ordinarily reject the precedent that is

inconsistent with either Supreme Court cases or the weight of

authority within the circuit.' [citing cases] ... Where there is

no Supreme Court authority on the issue and no clear weight of

authority within the circuit, however, "we must resort to common

sense and reason' to determine the appropriate rule of law."),

with Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d

1160 (5th Cir. 1984) (presumption in favor of earlier case); 

McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 924-25 (3d Cir.

1985) (similar). 

proceed when we discover inconsistent precedents.2 Whatever the

general solution to that dilemma, the answer here is dictated by an

intervening decision of the Supreme Court which, though not in the

Chaney context, squarely rejects the notion of carving reviewable

legal rulings out from the middle of non-reviewable actions. In

ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers ("BLE "), 482 U.S. 270

(1987), the ICC had denied a petition to reconsider, filed after

the statutory time limit for appeal had expired. An agency's

denial of such a petition is normally entirely within its

discretion, but petitioner argued that in this case the denial

should be reviewable because it was explicitly based on substantive

legal grounds. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia flatly

rejected the principle that if an agency "gives a "reviewable'

reason for otherwise unreviewable action, the action becomes

reviewable":

To demonstrate the falsity of that proposition it is

enough to observe that a common reason for failure to

prosecute an alleged criminal violation is the

prosecutor's belief (sometimes publicly stated) that the

law will not sustain a conviction. That is surely an

eminently "reviewable" proposition, in the sense that

courts are well qualified to consider the point; yet it

is entirely clear that the refusal to prosecute cannot be

the subject of judicial review.

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3Furthermore, with respect to other areas of administrative

procedure, this court has extended the holding in BLE beyond the

specific context of the Hobbs Act. See John D. Copanos & Sons,

Inc. v. FDA, 854 F.2d 510, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also

Friends of Keeseville, Inc. v. FERC, 859 F.2d 230, 237 (D.C. Cir.

1988) (suggesting but not finding non-reviewability). 

482 U.S. at 283.

Although Justice Scalia was construing the Hobbs Act, he

invoked the Administrative Procedure Act, characterizing it as

"codif[ying] the nature and attributes of judicial review,

including the traditional principle of its unavailability "to the

extent that ... agency action is committed to agency discretion by

law'," id. at 282 (citing § 701(a)(2)). And he cited Chaney as an

application of the principle. Id.

3 Further, he responded to the

concurring justices' contention that the principles of SEC v.

Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), argued for reviewability by

noting that Chenery addressed only the character of review, not the

threshold issue of whether the agency action was reviewable. The

BLE Court's focus on "agency action" of course parallels both §

701(a)(2) itself and our decision in Safe Energy. It also

reaffirms the Court's statement in Chaney that the substantive

provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, far from supplying

"law to apply," were "simply irrelevant to the agency's discretion

to refuse to initiate proceedings." 470 U.S. at 835-36. See also

Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Reviewability in Administrative Law,

74 Minn. L. Rev. 689, 756 & n.335 (1990) (reading this passage from

Chaney as casting doubt on possibility of carving reviewable issues

out of non-reviewable actions); id. at 758 (noting that

International Union and similar cases are inconsistent with BLE );

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3 Kenneth C. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise

§ 17.7, at 150 (1994) (questioning whether International Union and

similar cases survive in light of BLE ).

The cases relied upon by Crowley provide no basis for review

of the Maritime Administrator's single-shot non-enforcement

decision (again, assuming that it is even as much as that). Both

Edison Electric Institute v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1993),

and National Wildlife Federation v. EPA, 980 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir.

1992), hold that an agency's statement of a general enforcement

policy may be reviewable for legal sufficiency where the agency has

expressed the policy as a formal regulation after the full

rulemaking process (NWF ) or has otherwise articulated it in some

form of universal policy statement (Edison ). The cases do not

involve an agency's decision to decline enforcement in the context

of an individual case.

There are ample reasons for distinguishing the two situations.

By definition, expressions of broad enforcement policies are

abstracted from the particular combinations of facts the agency

would encounter in individual enforcement proceedings. As general

statements, they are more likely to be direct interpretations of

the commands of the substantive statute rather than the sort of

mingled assessments of fact, policy, and law that drive an

individual enforcement decision and that are, as Chaney recognizes,

peculiarly within the agency's expertise and discretion. Second,

an agency's pronouncement of a broad policy against enforcement

poses special risks that it "has consciously and expressly adopted

a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication

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of its statutory responsibilities," Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4

(internal quotation marks omitted), a situation in which the normal

presumption of non-reviewability may be inappropriate. Finally, an

agency will generally present a clearer (and more easily

reviewable) statement of its reasons for acting when formally

articulating a broadly applicable enforcement policy, whereas such

statements in the context of individual decisions to forego

enforcement tend to be cursory, ad hoc, or post hoc. These latter

cases confront courts (as here) with the task of teasing meaning

out of agencies' side comments, form letters, litigation documents,

and informal communications. Cf. American Horse Protection Ass'n v.

Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding decision not to

initiate rulemaking reviewable, in large part because Chaney's

concern that non-enforcement decision would present insufficient

focus for review was inapplicable).

It is true that we regularly review agency statements that

arise in all manner of informal contexts such as letters, see,

e.g., National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443

F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971), but that fact, standing alone, does not

suggest a different result here. The Administrator's determination

is unreviewable because it is a decision to forego enforcement in

this one instance, not simply because it was articulated in the

context of a letter. It is conceivable that a document announcing

a particular non-enforcement decision would actually lay out a

general policy delineating the boundary between enforcement and

non-enforcement and purport to speak to a broad class of parties;

such a communication might qualify as the sort of general statement

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of policy reviewable under Edison and NWF. This will not be true

in the ordinary case, however, and the more reasonable inference

when faced with a context-bound non-enforcement pronouncement is

that the agency has addressed the issue in comparatively ad hoc

terms inherently implicating its non-reviewable enforcement

discretion.

Chaney turns the presumption of reviewability into a

presumption the other way, which may be rebutted by showing that

"the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to

follow in exercising its enforcement powers." Chaney, 470 U.S. at

833; see Safe Energy Coalition, 866 F.2d at 1477-78. We can look

for such standards in the statute itself, in "regulations

promulgated by an administrative agency in carrying out its

statutory mandate," Center for Auto Safety v. Dole, 846 F.2d 1532,

1534 (D.C. Cir. 1988), or in other binding expressions of agency

viewpoint, Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Crowley has not pointed to such standards in any form in this case.

III.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order granting

summary judgment in favor of the Maritime Administrator. Crowley

also named Lykes as a defendant and sought an injunction against

its provision of freight service to the west coast of Panama. But

Crowley has alleged no independent claims of error warranting

reversal of the summary judgment in favor of Lykes. We therefore

affirm that portion of the district court's judgment as well.

So ordered.

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