Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-03261/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-03261-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:227 Telephone Consumer Protection Act

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Case No.: 5:18-cv-03261-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE CLASS 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

BRYAN CANARY,

Plaintiff,

v.

YOUNGEVITY INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:18-cv-03261-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; CONTINUING 

CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Re: Dkt. No. 20

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Bryan Canary (“Canary”) initiated this putative class action suit seeking damages 

and injunctive relief pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 United 

States Code section 227. Defendant Youngevity International, Inc. (“Youngevity”) moves (1) to 

dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the allegations are insufficient 

to plead that the telephone call at issue was placed by Youngevity and (2) to strike the class 

allegations pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (f) because they are overbroad and not co-extensive with 

Canary’s own claims. The Court finds it appropriate to take the motion under submission for 

decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth 

below, Youngevity’s motion to dismiss and to strike will be granted with leave to amend. 

II. BACKGROUND1

Canary, a resident of Castroville, California, has a cell phone number that has been on the 

National Do Not Call (“DNC”) Registry since approximately 2006. Complaint ¶¶ 12, 41 (Dkt. 

 

1 The Background is a summary of the allegations in the Complaint. 

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No. 1). Youngevity is a “network marketing business” that is incorporated in Delaware and 

headquartered in Chula Vista, California. Id. ¶¶ 2, 13. David Allen Capital, Inc. (“DAC”) is a 

“division” of Youngevity through which Youngevity markets small business loans. Id. ¶ 2. 

On or about March 15, 2018, Canary received a telephone call from the number 1-800-

712-0830 (hereinafter referred to as “the call” or “March 15 call”). Id. ¶ 42. Canary did not 

answer the call and the caller left a prerecorded voicemail message. Id. ¶ 43. “The call appeared 

to have been made using an automated telephone dialing system.” Id. In the voicemail message, 

the caller referred to himself as “Renee” with DAC. Id. ¶ 44. “The purpose of the call was to 

advertise loans to small business owners in amounts of $10,000 to $500,000. Id. Canary alleges that

the voice of “Renee” is “Wade Cordell, who has been affiliated with Youngevity since his herbal 

supplement company, Restart Your Life, was acquired by Youngevity in 2014.” Id. ¶ 45. Wade 

Cordell (“Cordell”) is either an employee of Youngevity or served as a “high-level sales agent 

telemarketer” for Youngevity and DAC. Id. ¶ 34. Cordell allegedly made the telephone call “acting 

on behalf of Youngevity.” Id. ¶¶ 87-89. 

The voicemail message asked Canary to call 1-800-712-0830 and to leave contact 

information. Id. ¶ 49. “Calling 1-800-712-0830 directs the caller to the website 

myvipfunding.com, which then directs the viewer to complete an application form for David Allen 

Capital funding.” Id. Canary does not allege that he applied for any loan with DAC or 

Youngevity. Instead, Canary alleges that had he completed the application form and subsequent 

application forms sent to him, “he would have been directed to a DAC sales agent who would 

have attempted to sell him a small business loan or other service from Youngevity’s portfolio of 

personal and small business services.” Id. ¶ 51. 

Canary asserts causes of action against Youngevity for (1) statutory violations of the 

TCPA for which Canary seeks statutory damages for himself and the putative class ($500 for each 

and every call that violated the TCPA), and (2) knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA for 

which Canary seeks treble damages for himself and the putative class (up to $1,500 for each and 

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every call that violated the TCPA). Id. ¶¶ 128-137.

III. STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient 

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which 

it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). A 

complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 

appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support 

a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th 

Cir. 2008). Moreover, the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level” such that the claim “is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57.

When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court generally “may not consider 

any material beyond the pleadings.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 

1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). The court must accept as true all “well-pleaded factual 

allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court must also construe the 

alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1989). “[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be 

considered.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. But “courts are not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id.

Rule 12(f), Fed. R. Civ. P., permits a court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient 

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” When the court 

considers a motion to strike, it “must view the pleading in a light most favorable to the pleading 

party.” In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000). A 

motion to strike should be denied if there is any doubt whether the allegations in the pleadings 

might be relevant to the action. Id.

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IV. DISCUSSION

The TCPA makes it unlawful for any person in the United States to “make any call (other 

than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called 

party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any 

telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 

“The plain language of the statute assigns civil liability to the party who ‘makes’ a call.” Thomas 

v. Taco Bell Corp., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d, 582 F. App’x 678 (9th Cir. 

2014). “For a person to ‘make’ a call under the TCPA, the person must either (1) directly make 

the call, or (2) have an agency relationship with the person who made the call.” Abante Rooter & 

Plumbing v. Farmers Group, Inc., No. 17-3315 PJH, 2018 WL 288055, at * 4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 

2018) (citing Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 877-79 (9th Cir. 2014)).

Youngevity contends that Canary has sued the wrong party. Def.’s Motion 1 (Dkt. No. 

20). Youngevity argues that the case arises out of a single voicemail made on behalf of DAC, not 

Youngevity, and that this call does not mention or refer to Youngevity, does not originate from a 

phone number associated with Youngevity, does not refer to a Youngevity website or a 

Youngevity representative, and does not promote a loan issued by Youngevity. Youngevity also 

contends that Canary’s attempts to lump Youngevity and DAC together using principles of agency

and ratification are propped up by nothing more than recitations of legal standards, “upon 

information and belief” and “either-or” allegations that lack any factual support, and formulaic 

recitations of the elements of each claim.

A. Direct Liability

1. The Complaint Fails to Allege that Youngevity Directly Made The Call

Canary alleges that he “understands and believes” the March 15 call and voicemail message 

were “made by an authorized sales agent acting on behalf of Youngevity’s” DAC business loan 

servicing arm. Complaint ¶ 38. This understanding and belief are coupled with allegations that the 

voice of “Renee” on the call is Cordell (id. ¶ 45), who is “either an employee of Youngevity or 

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served as a high-level sales agent” for Youngevity and DAC (id. ¶ 34) and that Cordell “made” the 

telephone call “acting on behalf of Youngevity.” Id. ¶¶ 87-89. 

These allegations are insufficient to support a plausible inference that Youngevity made 

the call. At most, Canary’s allegations raise a possibility or suspicion that “Renee” was a 

pseudonym and that the speaker was actually Cordell. Even if the Complaint set forth sufficient 

facts from which to infer that the voice on the call was Cordell’s voice (which it does not), the 

Complaint lacks sufficient facts to support a plausible inference that Cordell or Youngevity dialed 

Canary’s telephone number. 

Canary counters that publicly available information leads to the conclusion that Cordell 

“was responsible for the call.” Pl.’s Resp. 4 (Dkt. No. 23). More specifically, Canary argues that 

it can be inferred that “Renee” is Cordell because Renee’s message asks Canary to call 1-800-712-

0830 and calling that number leads to the assignment of Cordell as the “client support specialist 

assigned to your account”; Cordell has many connections to Youngevity; and Cordell and DAC’s 

founder, David Rutz (“Rutz”), created a “voice to text” script to “move loans marketed by 

Youngevity through DAC. Id. (citing Complaint ¶¶ 45-48, 50). Although the allegations above 

suggest that it is possible “Renee” is Cordell, they are insufficient to support a plausible inference 

that Cordell or Youngevity made the call. Canary’s reliance on Lemieux v. Lender Processing 

Ctr., No. 16-1850 BAS, 2017 WL 1166430, at * 5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2017), is misplaced. In 

Lemieux, the plaintiff spoke to a person who said the call was from one named defendant and then 

transferred the call to a different representative who informed plaintiff that the call was from the 

second defendant. The Lemieux court held that plaintiff had pled sufficient facts to support a 

plausible inference that the second defendant was “responsible” for the telephone call that 

allegedly violated the TCPA. Id. The present case is distinguishable. Unlike Lemieux, Canary 

did not have any interaction with a representative during the March 15 call and the voicemail 

message that was left on Canary’s phone only identified “Renee” and DAC; there was no mention 

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of Youngevity.2 Moreover, calling 1-800-712-0830 led to Cordell who is described as a “DAC 

client support specialist,” not a Youngevity employee.

Canary next argues that direct liability for Youngevity exists because “Youngevity created 

and approved the call script used in the voicemail message [Canary] received.” Pl.’s Resp. 6 

(citing Complaint ¶ 32). This is a mischaracterization of the allegations in the Complaint. The

Complaint does not allege that the voicemail message Canary received followed any script that 

Youngevity created and approved. Instead, the Complaint alleges that Cordell and Rutz created a 

“voice to text” script (Complaint ¶ 32); the March 15 message Canary received was not a text 

message.

Canary also argues that direct liability exists because Youngevity’s Vice President

“admitted that had [Canary] filled out the loan pre-qualification form, Youngevity would have 

then taken over” (id. ¶ 50) and that Youngevity “directly pays commissions on every loan funded 

or service/product sold” (Pl.’s Resp. 7). These allegation, however, suggest that Youngevity’s 

alleged involvement is at least three steps removed from the March 15 call: a caller must then (1) 

call 1-800-712-0830, then (2) fill out and then (3) submit a pre-qualification form before 

Youngevity “takes over.” These allegations do not support a plausible inference that Youngevity 

“directly ma[d]e the call.” Abante Rooter & Plumbing v. Farmers Group, Inc., 2018 WL 288055, 

at * 4; see also Meeks v. Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc., No. 17-7129 YGR, 2018 WL 1524067, at *4

(N.D. Cal. March 28, 2018) (noting that direct liability does not extend to those who “might 

merely have some role in the causal chain that results in the making of a telephone call); In re Pet. 

by Dish Network, LLC et al, 28 F.C.C. Rcd. 6574, 6583, ¶ 26 (2013) (concluding that “a person or 

entity ‘initiates’ a telephone call when it takes the steps necessary to physically place a telephone 

call, and generally does not include persons or entities, such as third-party retailers, that might 

 

2 The lack of any mention of Youngevity during this process also distinguishes this case from 

Reichman v. Poshmark, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1281-1284 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (denying motion 

to dismiss complaint alleging that defendant Poshmark sent text message containing an invitation

“to view and buy the wares now being sold through Poshmark and giv[ing] a link to the Poshmark 

closet of the person whose Contacts list was used”).

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merely have some role, however minor, in the causal chain that results in the making of a 

telephone call”). 

2. The Complaint Lacks Sufficient Facts to Plead Direct Liability for DAC’s 

Actions

The Complaint identifies Youngevity and DAC as separate corporate entities. Complaint 

¶¶ 1-2. 3 Canary uses various terms and phrases in the Complaint to describe the relationship 

between DAC and Youngevity. Canary refers to DAC as a “Youngevity division” (id. ¶ 2), 

Youngevity’s “arm” (id. ¶ 5), “the commercial loan service [Youngevity] uses to connect 

consumers with small business loans” (id. ¶ 13), one of Youngevity’s “service arms” (id. ¶¶ 33,

78, 98), and a company “falling under the Youngevity umbrella” (id. ¶ 33). 

Liberally construed, Canary’s allegations may be sufficient to plead that DAC is a 

subsidiary or another affiliate of Youngevity. These allegations, however, are insufficient to hold 

Youngevity directly liable for the March 15 call because Canary does not adequately allege that 

DAC made the March 15 call, and as a general rule, a parent company is not liable for its

subsidiary’s actions. In re Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, Tel. Consumer Prot. Act Litig., No.

11-MD-2295 JAH, 2014 WL 223557, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (announcing the same rule in 

a TCPA case).

3. The Complaint Lacks Sufficient Facts to Plead that The Call Was Made by a 

Youngevity Employee

Even if the Complaint adequately alleges that Cordell made the call (which it does not for 

reasons already discussed above), the Complaint lacks sufficient facts to plead that Cordell is a 

Youngevity employee.4 Canary rests his claim on the allegation that Cordell is “either an 

 

3

 Youngevity’s request to take judicial notice of DAC’s Articles of Incorporation with the State of 

Michigan and DAC’s current standing with the State of Michigan is granted. A court may take 

judicial notice of public records. See MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F. 2d 500, 504 (9th 

Cir. 1986).

4 Youngevity represents that “Cordell is not an employee of Youngevity and had nothing to do 

with pre-recording or placing the call at issue.” Def.’s Reply 1, n.1. Although Youngevity’s 

representation is not relevant to the merits of Youngevity’s motion to dismiss, it may be relevant 

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employee of Youngevity or served as a high-level sales agent (effectively a telemarketer) for 

Youngevity and DAC.” Id. ¶ 34. Although a plaintiff may plead in the alternative, a plaintiff 

must allege facts that “nudge” his claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 556-57. Canary has not done so. Canary alleges that Cordell is “[t]he DAC client 

support specialist” (Complaint ¶ 50); that he participated in a training video to market loans “by 

Youngevity through DAC” and represented that he is “part of Youngevity” (id. ¶¶ 32, 47); that he 

“help[ed] to create the buzz” around “Youngevity services” (id. ¶ 46); that he sold his own 

company to Youngevity in 2014 (id. ¶ 45); that he created a “voice to text” script to “move loans 

marketed by Youngevity through DAC (id. ¶ 48); and that his wife is the “Vice Chairwoman” of 

Youngevity (id.). It is “conceivable” based on these allegations that Cordell is a Youngevity 

employee, which would create a potential basis for direct liability. But it is just as “conceivable” 

based upon these same allegations that Cordell is a DAC distributor for which there would be no 

direct liability for Youngevity.

5 Therefore, the allegations do not nudge Canary’s direct liability 

theory across the line from conceivable to plausible. Cf. Freidman v. Massage Envy Franchising, 

LCC, No. 12-2962 MJL, 2013 WL 3026641, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2013) (dismissing TCPA 

claim where plaintiffs alleged that each defendant was “an agent and/or employee” of the 

defendant). 

B. Vicarious Liability for Violation of the TCPA

In the Ninth Circuit, vicarious liability can provide a basis for liability for violation of the 

TCPA. Thomas v. Taco Bell Corp., 582 F. App’x at 679. Here, Canary advances three theories of 

vicarious liability: agency, apparent authority, and ratification. Youngevity contends that Canary 

does not allege sufficient facts—as opposed to conclusions—to satisfy any of these theories of 

vicarious liability.

 

to Canary’s obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

5 Whether Canary has adequately alleged vicarious liability for DAC’s action is addressed in 

Section B to this Order.

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1. Agency 

“Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests 

assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to 

the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” Mavrix 

Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 873 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2017) (as amended) 

(quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (Am. Law Inst. 2006)). For an agency relationship 

to exist, the agent must have authority to act on behalf of the principal and the principal must have 

the right to control the agent’s actions. Id. “Agency means more than mere passive permission; it 

involves request, instruction, or command.” Meeks v. Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc., 2018 WL 

1524067, at *6 (quoting Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir. 1931)); see also Thomas, 

879 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 (holding that defendant could not be held vicariously liable for alleged 

TCPA violations because the defendant did not exercise control over the “manner and means” by 

which a text message campaign was designed and executed); Linlor v. Five9, Inc., No. 17-218

MMA, 2017 WL 5885671, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2017). In order to establish agency liability 

for a TCPA violation, a plaintiff “must do more than establish an agency relationship.” Jones v. 

Royal Admin. Servs., Inc., 887 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2018). A plaintiff “must also establish 

actual authority to place the unlawful calls.” Id. 

a. Allegations re Actual Authorization to Make the March 15 Call

“Actual authority is limited to actions ‘specifically mentioned to be done in a written or 

oral communication’ or ‘consistent with’ a principal’s ‘general statement of what the agent is 

supposed to do.’” Id.; see also Knapp v. Sage Payment Solutions, Inc., No. 17-391 MMC, 2018 

WL 659016, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2018). In Canary’s Response to this motion, Canary argues 

that “Youngevity authorized Wade Cordell to make the call he did, using autodialing technology 

and leaving the prerecorded voicemail message, with a call script created, in part, by Youngevity’s 

own VP.” Pl.’s Resp. 8-9. Canary’s argument is based upon allegations in the Complaint that he 

received a call from Cordell that was made on behalf of Youngevity; that Youngevity 

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“encourages” sales agents to employ phone calls; that, upon information and belief, Youngevity 

reviews and vets all advertising and marketing materials distributed by its agents; that Youngevity 

“allows” employees and agents like Cordell to market loans through DAC by making autodialed 

and prerecorded calls to non-customers; that Cordell “had the actual authority of Youngevity to 

make the complained-of calls”; and that Cordell “was an authorized agent of Youngevity when he 

made the call.” Complaint ¶¶ 23, 29-32, 45, 74, 81, 92).

These allegations are too general and conclusory to plead that Youngevity authorized the 

March 15 call in a written or oral communication. For example, Canary does not allege facts to 

support the conclusion that Youngevity “allows” autodialed and prerecorded calls. The court need 

not accept such a conclusory allegation (Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), especially where 

Youngevity’s Policies expressly prohibit telemarketing methods that would violate state or federal 

law. 6 

b. Allegations re Control Over Manner and Means of Telemarketing

“In determining whether vicarious liability may be imposed, the ‘extent of control 

exercised by the [principal]’ is the ‘essential ingredient.’” Jones v. Royal Admin. Servs., Inc., 887 

F.3d at 450 (quoting United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 505 (9th Cir. 2010)). To establish 

vicarious liability for a TCPA violation, a plaintiff must allege facts to show that the defendant 

controlled the “manner and means” of the call. See Thomas, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. 

Here, Canary alleges that Youngevity controls by, for example, requiring pre-approval of 

any advertising materials. Complaint ¶¶ 70-73. Lacking, however, are sufficient factual 

allegations to plead that Youngevity exercised control over the specific contents of the March 15 

call advertising DAC. Even if Canary had alleged such facts, control over the content of an 

advertising call, without more, is insufficient to plead vicarious liability. See Jones v. Royal 

Administration Services, Inc., 887 F.3d at 451 (rejecting vicarious liability theory even though the

 

6

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and quotes from the Policies in the Complaint. U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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alleged principal required the scripts and advertising materials to be pre-approved in accordance 

with company guidelines).

7

Youngevity allegedly “takes over” only after a person receives a call, calls 1-800-712-

0830, completes a DAC loan application, and finally submits that application. Complaint ¶ 50.

This alleged control after the call is insufficient to plead agency liability. See Jones v. Royal 

Administration Services, Inc., 887 F.3d at 451 (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant 

where defendant exercised some amount of control over advertising materials but “did not have 

any control of a telemarketer’s call until the telemarketer decided to pitch” defendant’s vehicle 

service contracts to the consumer). 

Canary alleges on information and belief that Youngevity “provided its agents permission 

to perform the telemarketing that is the subject of this lawsuit” or “willfully looked the other 

way.” Complaint ¶ 82. The court need not accept such a vague allegation that is also unsupported 

by facts. Moreover, granting permission to perform telemarketing does not mean that Youngevity 

exercised control over the entity that made the March 15 call. See Thomas, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 

1085-86 (finding that defendant who knew of text message marketing campaign, approved it via 

its minority vote, and funded the campaign did not exercise control over the manner and means by 

which the campaign was designed and executed); see also Naiman v. TranzVia LLC, No. 17-4813 

 

7

 Canary cites to two out-of-circuit cases for the proposition that control over sales script and 

other advertising materials is enough to establish agency liability for a TCPA violation. See 

Gould v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 288 F. Supp. 3d 963, 969 (E.D. Mo. 2018); Aranda v. Caribbean 

Cruise Line, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 3d 817, 832 (N. D. Ill. 2016). The court is not bound to follow 

these out-of-circuit cases. In any event, in each case, the plaintiff alleged more than just control 

over sales script and advertising materials. In Gould, the court held that plaintiff had sufficiently 

alleged that defendant Farmers was directly and vicariously liable for violating the TCPA because 

Farmers used software to send the allegedly unlawful text message en masse; the texts stated they 

were from Farmers or agents “with Farmers”; and Farmers directed the content of its agents’ 

advertising, required approval of advertising, and approved the text messages sent to plaintiff. 

Gould, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 969-970. In Aranda, the plaintiffs had adduced evidence that the 

defendant had expressly or impliedly granted actual authority to a separate company, ESG, to 

make unlawful calls on behalf of defendant. Aranda, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 832. In particular, the 

Aranda court focused on evidence that the agreement between the defendant and ESG required 

ESG to provide defendant with “an exact telephone script with an exact audio file of each survey” 

and that defendant’s attorneys proposed edits to the survey script being used. Id. at 832. Canary’s 

Complaint does not contain comparable allegations. 

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PJH, 2017 WL 5992123, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2017) (granting motion to dismiss TCPA 

claim because defendant’s agreement with telemarketer on the volume of calling and the number 

of leads per day did not amount to control over the telemarketer). 

c. Allegations re Distributor DAC

Youngevity’s Policies make clear that its distributors are “independent contractors” and 

that Youngevity “does not dictate the selling methods, specific hours, or effort levels” of its 

distributors. Dkt. No. 20-2, Ex. 2 ¶¶ D1, D3. Although Youngevity’s characterization of its 

relationship with its distributors is not necessarily controlling, the Complaint does not allege facts 

to the contrary. Canary does not allege that Youngevity controlled the selling methods, specific 

hours or effort levels of Cordell, DAC, or any other the person or entity who may have made the 

March 15 call. Canary does not allege, for example, (a) that Youngevity supplied any of the tools 

or instrumentalities of work such as phone lines, computers, internet or office space to Cordell, 

DAC or any other distributor, (b) that the March 15 call came from a phone number associated 

with Youngevity; or (c) that the website referenced in the voicemail made any reference to 

Youngevity. 

Instead, Canary argues that the “exclusive, permanent, and interdependent nature of the 

relationship between Youngevity and Cordell/DAC support a finding of agency.” Pl.’s Resp. 11. 

Canary emphasizes that DAC is not an independent business with a distinct operation separate and 

apart from Youngevity and that Youngevity both benefits from and pays commissions to DAC for 

loan sales. Id. 12. These allegations, without more, are insufficient to support a plausible 

inference that DAC is Youngevity’s agent. In Dobkin v. Enter. Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 14-1989 

WHW, 2014 WL 4354070, at *4 (D. N.J. Sept. 3, 2014), the court held that plaintiff had pled a 

plausible agency theory in part because of allegations that the defendant’s telemarketing agent and 

defendant shared revenues. Significantly, the Dobkin court also relied on allegations that both the 

telemarketing agent and defendant had websites displaying the same product information, and that 

the telemarking agent offered to sell plaintiff the very product appearing on both websites. 

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Canary’s Complaint does not contain comparable allegations. Canary does not allege that DAC’s 

products appear on any Youngevity website or any other Youngevity marketing material seen by 

consumers. 

d. Allegations re Business Practices

The Complaint includes several allegations regarding Youngevity’s business practices. 

Canary alleges, among other things, that Youngevity holds weekly training, encourages 

distributors to employ phone calls and text messages as means of telemarketing, uses training 

videos and calls hosted by Cordell and Rutz to train sales agents, encourages cold calling, and 

awards bonuses to agents. Complaint ¶¶ 29, 32-33, 47-48, 62-63, 67. Canary also alleges that 

Cordell and Rutz “created a ‘voice to text’ script to ‘move’ loans marketed by Youngevity through 

DAC.” Id. ¶ 48. 

None of these allegations are sufficient to support a plausible inference that Youngevity 

controlled the specific person or entity that allegedly made the March 15 call to Canary. Nor are 

the allegations sufficient to support a plausible inference that Youngevity generally exercises 

control over the manner and means in which its distributors conduct marketing calls. The alleged 

business practices are insufficient to plausibly plead Youngevity’ vicarious liability. See Meyer v. 

Capital All. Grp., No. 15-2405 WVG, 2017 WL 5138316, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2017) 

(holding that evidence of defendant hiring third-party vendors to send faxes and make 

telemarketing calls was insufficient to establish the requisite control over the methods and means 

vendors employed).

e. Allegations re Whether Cordell is Youngevity’s Agent

As discussed previously, Canary has not plausibly alleged that Cordell made the call to 

Canary’s number on March 15. But even if Canary had adequately alleged that Cordell made the 

March 15 (which he has not), Canary has not plausibly alleged that Cordell is a Youngevity agent. 

Canary’s agency theory rests on the very same allegations Canary relies upon to try to plead that

Cordell is Youngevity employee, i.e. that Cordell is a high-level sales agent, a telemarketer and an 

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affiliate of Youngevity; Cordell’s wife is a “Vice Chairwoman” of Youngevity; Cordell created a 

“voice to text” script; Cordell worked as the “DAC client support specialist”; and Cordell helped 

create “buzz around Youngevity services.” Complaint ¶¶ 32, 34, 45, 46, 48, 50. None of these 

allegations are sufficient to support a plausible inference that Youngevity controlled the method 

and means of Cordell’s alleged March 15 call to Canary or the method and means of Cordell’s 

promotional activities in general. As Youngevity aptly points out, there are no allegations to 

suggest that “Youngevity set particular requirements for Cordell to follow as to the number of 

calls, hours of operation, type of equipment to use, the content of his conversations or prerecorded 

messages, or provided or dictated the tools or instrumentalities for Cordell’s alleged outreach.” 

Def.’s Motion 17. 

In summary, Canary fails to plausibly allege that Cordell acted as Youngevity’s agent 

when he allegedly made the March 15 call.

2. Apparent Authority

Apparent authority can only “be established by proof of something said or done by the 

[alleged principal], on which [the plaintiff] reasonably relied.” Thomas, 582 F. App’x at 679-80 

(quoting NLRB v. Dist. Council of Iron Workers of Cal. & Vicinity, 124 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir.

1997) and citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 265 cmt. a (1958)). “Apparent authority 

exists only as to those to whom the principal has manifested that an agent is authorized.” 

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 265 cmt. a (1958). “There is, therefore, tort liability only if 

such a manifestation and its execution by the apparent agent results in harm.” Id. Here, Canary 

does not allege that he reasonably relied upon something said or done by Youngevity to his 

detriment, and therefore the apparent authority theory fails. 

3. Ratification

Ratification is “the affirmance of a prior act done by another, whereby the act is given 

effect as if done by an agent acting with actual authority.” Kristensen v. Credit Payment Services 

Inc., 879 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting The Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.01(1)). 

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“A person may ratify an act if the actor acted or purported to act as an agent on the person’s 

behalf.” The Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.03. “Therefore, ‘[w]hen an actor is not an agent 

and does not purport to be one,’ the doctrine of ratification does not apply.” Id. (quoting The 

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.03 cmt. b.). As explained above, Canary’s Complaint lacks 

sufficient facts to plausibly allege that Cordell or DAC acted or purported to act as an agent of

Youngevity for the March 15 call. This deficiency is fatal to Canary’s ratification theory. 

C. Second Count: Knowing Or Willful Violation of TCPA

In the Second Count, Canary alleges that the March 15 call “was one of numerous and 

multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA by Defendant.” Complaint ¶ 134. The 

Second Count is subject to dismissal because Canary has failed to adequately plead a violation of 

the TCPA in the First Count and because it consists of nothing more than bare-bones legal 

conclusions unsupported by facts. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

D. Proposed Class Allegations

Canary proposes to represent a class defined as: “All persons within the United States who 

received a non-emergency telephone call from Youngevity, a Youngevity sales agent, or a 

Youngevity company/division to a cellular telephone through the use of an autodialer and/or voice 

message that had been recorded ahead of time, which was made for the purpose of soliciting the 

sale of products or services.” Complaint ¶ 107. Youngevity moves to strike the allegations as 

overbroad. Because Canary has not sufficiently alleged a violation of the TCPA, the motion to 

strike will be granted. 

//

//

//

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss and to strike is GRANTED 

with leave to amend. Canary may file and serve an amended complaint no later than April 8, 

2019. The case management conference scheduled for April 11, 2019 is continued to June 13, 

2019. The parties shall file a case management statement no later than June 3, 2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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