Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02259/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02259-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1 09cv2259 MMA (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN JOSEPH GUTTILLA,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE

Commissioner of Social

Security,

Defendant. 

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Civil No. 09cv2259 MMA(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR REVERSAL AND/OR REMAND

[DOC. NO. 10], DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT [DOC. NO. 11], AND

REMANDING THE CASE FOR AN

AWARD OF BENEFITS 

John Joseph Guttilla applied for disability insurance

benefits on April 30, 2007. (Admin. R. Attach. #5, 112.) His

claim was initially denied, and the denial was upheld by the

Social Security Administration after reconsideration. (Id.

Attach. #3, 48-49.) A hearing was held before Administrative Law

Judge Jerry F. Muskrat on April 7, 2009. (Id. Attach. #2, 18-

47.) He issued a written decision on June 3, 2009, finding

Guttilla was not disabled. (Id. at 6-17.) The denial of

benefits became final when the Appeals Council upheld the

decision on August 13, 2009. (Id. at 1-3.) Plaintiff seeks

judicial review of Social Security Commissioner Michael J.

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Astrue’s determination that he is not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. (Compl. 1; Mot. Reverse Remand 1.) On

October 13, 2009, Plaintiff filed his Complaint for Judicial

Review and Remedy on Administrative Decision Under the Social

Security Act [doc. no. 1]. Defendant filed an Answer [doc. no.

3] and filed the Administrative Record [doc. no. 4] on December

14, 2009. 

Guttilla filed a Motion for Reversal and/or Remand [doc. no.

10] on March 19, 2010, with a Memorandum in Support of Motion,

requesting that this Court reverse Judge Muskrat’s decision and

order payment of benefits or, alternatively, remand the case to

the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. 

(Mot. Reverse Remand 14.) On April 16, 2010, Defendant filed an

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and filed

essentially the same document as a Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment [doc. nos. 11-12]. Plaintiff did not file a reply. 

The Court finds this matter suitable for decision without

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). S.D. Cal.

Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court

recommends granting Plaintiff’s Motion [doc. no. 10] and denying

Defendant’s Cross-Motion [doc. no. 11]. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on December 19, 1944; he was sixty-four

years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. (Admin. R. Attach.

#2, 16.) He has more than a high school education and has past

relevant work experience as a gaming or cardroom supervisor, a

gambling dealer, a slot cashier, a retail cashier, and a door

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1

 Plaintiff originally claimed March 5, 2007, as his

disability onset date but agreed to change it to May 1, 2008, at

his administrative hearing. (Id. at 25; id. Attach. #5, 112.)

3 09cv2259 MMA (RBB)

keeper. (Id. at 15-16.) Guttilla last worked on May 1, 2008,

and claimed that as his disability onset date.1

 (Id. at 11.) 

Plaintiff initially claimed to be disabled due to several

impairments, including emphysema, prostate cancer, back injury

and pain, and shortness of breath. (Id. at 12; id. Attach. #6,

147.) In October of 2007, he began treatment with Dr. Jeremy

Flagel, a psychiatrist. (Id. Attach. #7, 340.) Guttilla

reported mental problems, including depression and panic

disorder. (Id. at 334-40.) At his hearing before the ALJ on

April 7, 2009, Plaintiff alleged he was disabled due to mental

impairments. (Id. Attach. #2, 23-24; id. Attach. #4, 110.) 

Plaintiff’s counsel withdrew all claims of physical impairments

due to emphysema, prostate cancer, back injury and pain, and

shortness of breath, stating that he did not “believe any of them

[to be] disabling.” (Id. Attach. #2, 23-24.) Thus, Plaintiff

relied only on the mental impairments of major depression,

anxiety, and panic disorder in attempting to establish his

alleged disability. (Id. at 23.) 

II. MEDICAL EVIDENCE

A. Plaintiff’s Treating Psychiatrist

Guttilla first visited his psychiatrist, Dr. Flagel, on

October 18, 2007, complaining of depression. (Id. Attach. #7,

340.) Dr. Flagel noted that Plaintiff was experiencing anxiety

and panic attacks, he had trouble concentrating, he had

difficulty sleeping as well as fatigue, and he often felt

lightheaded and lacked ambition. (Id. at 340.) The doctor also

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noted that Plaintiff was worried about getting back to work and

explained that when he was more active, he was in a better mood.

(Id.) 

Dr. Flagel completed a mental status evaluation checklist

and indicated that Guttilla’s concentration was intact, his

behavior was calm, his perception was normal, his judgment was

intact, and his attitude was cooperative with good insight and

impulse control. (Id. at 343.) Guttilla was oriented as to

name, place, date, and situation. (Id.) The psychiatrist also

noted that Plaintiff’s mood was depressed and anxious with

appropriate affect and fair eye contact. (Id.) The doctor

diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive and panic disorders. 

(Id. at 344.) Dr. Flagel also gave Guttilla a global assessment

of functioning (“GAF”) score of fifty. (Id.) Plaintiff was

prescribed Prozac and Ativan and put on a behavioral activation

treatment plan with the goal of reducing depression and anxiety. 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Flagel for a follow-up medication visit on

November 8, 2007. (Id. 339.) Plaintiff reported feeling “more

mellowed out” but still had difficulty sleeping and experienced

fatigue and dizziness. (Id.) He explained that he wanted to

return to work, but his employer, Home Depot, was not

accommodating him. (Id.) The doctor made no changes to

Guttilla’s diagnosis or medications and set a follow-up

appointment for four-to-five weeks later. (Id.) 

The next medication visit occurred on January 10, 2008, when

Guttilla was back at work and “doing a bit better.” (Id. at

338.) He explained that he was still upset about his job because

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2

 Although the physician’s progress note is dated January

5, 2008, the sequence of treatment indicates the correct date was

January 5, 2009. 

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he had a ninety-day assignment soliciting customers for credit

cards, which was better for his back but difficult for him due to

drowsiness. (Id.) Plaintiff also reported that he “still moped

around” and had difficulty sleeping. (Id.) He complained that a

side effect of the Ativan medication was slurring, and it was

not controlling his panic attacks, which occurred weekly for tento-twenty minutes at a time, so Dr. Flagel discontinued it. 

(Id.) Prozac was also discontinued, and Plaintiff was prescribed

Zoloft instead. (Id.) 

Guttilla’s alleged disability onset date is May 1, 2008. 

(Id. Attach. #2, 11.) As noted previously, he alleged an earlier

onset date but amended it because he had worked up to May 1,

2008. (Id.)

Dr. Flagel again saw Guttilla for a medication visit on

November 26, 2008, and noted that Zoloft had helped his anxiety.

(Id. at 337.) Guttilla still experienced anxiety and explained

that he was on a leave of absence from his job due to treatment

for prostate cancer. (Id.) He was unsure what type of work he

could do for Home Depot, and he was “unsure if he’ll go back to

[his] job.” (Id.) Plaintiff did not have panic attacks anymore,

but experienced increased heart rate on occasion. (Id.)

On January 5, 2009, Plaintiff returned to the doctor for a

medication visit and reported that worsening financial problems

were increasing his depression.2

 (Id. at 336.) Guttilla was

still on a leave of absence, but his state disability had run

out, and his employer “refused to pay long term disability.” 

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(Id.) He had applied for Social Security benefits but did not

feel as if he had control over a disability determination. (Id.) 

Guttilla explained that if he had no financial problems, he would

have no issues. (Id.) Plaintiff also reported continuing

anxiety and fatigue, back pain interfering with his sleep,

insomnia, and feeling more forgetful. (Id.) The doctor

considered increasing Plaintiff’s prescription for Zoloft but set

an appointment for a follow-up visit in six weeks. (Id.)

On February 6, 2009, Plaintiff reported that his financial

problems continued. (Id. at 135.) He had lost his disability

benefits and would lose his health insurance in May, although he

would be eligible for Medicare in December. (Id.) He reported

that he was sleeping a bit better, but he still had difficulty on

occasion. (Id.) He was worried about the follow-up visit for

his prostate cancer because he was “afraid nothing [would] help.” 

(Id.) At this meeting, the doctor increased Plaintiff’s

prescription for Zoloft to 100 milligrams and told Guttilla to

take naps. (Id.) 

Dr. Flagel next saw Plaintiff for a medication visit on

March 16, 2009, and noted that Guttilla had been diagnosed with

diabetes. (Id. at 334.) Plaintiff reported sleeping better but

was sluggish and started having crying spells. (Id.) He still

experienced periods of anxiety, had no desire to socialize, and

wanted to get out of his house more, but he felt helpless and

believed that his medication was not working. (Id.) Guttilla

also explained that when he was busy he “[didn’t] feel down,” but

with more time off work, he “gets more [depressed].” (Id.) The

doctor continued Plaintiff’s prescription for Zoloft. (Id.)

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A few weeks later, on March 28, 2009, Dr. Flagel completed a

mental residual functional capacity assessment of Guttilla. (Id.

at 330-32.) The psychiatrist indicated that Plaintiff was not

significantly limited in the following areas:

13. The ability to ask simple questions or

request assistance. 

. . . .

16. The ability to maintain socially appropriate

behavior and to adhere to basic standards of neatness

and cleanliness. 

. . . . 

18. The ability to set realistic goals or make

plans independently of others.

(Id. at 330-31.) 

Dr. Flagel indicated that Plaintiff was moderately limited

in the following areas:

1. The ability to remember locations and worklike procedures. 

2. The ability to understand and remember very short

and simple instructions.

3. The ability to understand and remember

detailed

instructions.

. . . . 7. The ability to perform activities within a

schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual

within customary tolerances. 8. The ability to sustain an ordinary routine

without special supervision.

. . . . 

12. The ability to interact appropriately with

the general public. 

. . . . 

14. The ability to accept instructions and

respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors.

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15. The ability to get along with coworkers or

peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral

extremes.

. . . . 

19. The ability to travel in unfamiliar places or

use public transportation [and] 

20. The ability to set realistic goals or make

plans independently of others.

(Id.) 

Finally, the doctor noted that Plaintiff was markedly

limited (the most severe gradation on the form) in the following

areas:

4. The ability to carry out very short and simple

instructions.

5. The ability to carry out detailed

instructions.

6. The ability to maintain attention and

concentration for extended periods.

. . . . 

9. The ability to work in coordination with or

proximity to others without being distracted by them.

10. The ability to make simple work related

decisions.

11. The ability to complete a normal workday and

workweek without interruptions from psychologically

based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace

without an unreasonable number and length of rest

periods.

. . . . 

17. The ability to respond appropriately to

changes in the work setting.

(Id.)

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING

A. The Plaintiff’s Testimony

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Guttilla testified at the hearing before Administrative Law

Judge Jerry Muskrat on April 7, 2009. (Id. Attach. #2, 18, 25-

37.) Plaintiff stated that he was a high school graduate and had

one year of college experience. (Id. at 26.) He explained that

he had attended school to be trained as a poker dealer, and in

the last fifteen years, he had worked as a poker dealer, slot

machine attendant, poker floor supervisor, cashier, greeter, and

credit card solicitor. (Id. at 27-35.) Plaintiff had not worked

since May 1, 2008. (Id. at 36.) He was not asked about, and did

not give any testimony regarding, mental limitations.

B. The Vocational Expert’s Testimony

Mary Jesco testified as a vocational expert. (Id. at 18,

38-47.) The ALJ presented her with a hypothetical residual

functional capacity assessment for a person limited to “nonpublic, simple repetitive tasks with minimal contact with peers

and supervisor[s].” (Id. at 39.) Jesco stated that such a

person could not perform any of Plaintiff’s past relevant work. 

(Id.) She also noted Guttilla had no work skills that would

transfer to the hypothetical residual functional capacity

assessment. (Id. at 40-41.) 

The ALJ then added the physical limitation of “medium range

of exertional limitation and an environmental limitation

requiring him to avoid even concentrated exposure to fumes[]” to

the hypothetical. (Id. at 41.) Jesco responded that the

individual could not perform any of Guttilla’s past relevant

work. (Id.) The vocational expert also explained that there

would be a significant erosion of the person’s occupational base. 

(Id. at 42-43.) But the person would be able to perform simple

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and repetitive jobs with a medium exertion level. (Id. at 43.) 

She identified three jobs meeting that criteria: floor waxer,

sweeper cleaner, and bander. (Id. at 43-44.)

Before examining Dr. Jesco, Plaintiff’s counsel asked the

ALJ, “Where in the record [he] drew the non-exertional

limitations from, what specific medical exhibit?” (Id. at 45.) 

ALJ Muskrat responded, “Mostly from 18F20 through 9 and 5 through

8 for the mental, and then the physical limitations, which

included non-exertional limitations, were from the DDS analysis.” 

(Id.) Counsel asked, “You synthesized the treating records at

18F and came up with your own . . . limitations regarding the

mental which is the non-exertional limitations?” (Id.) The ALJ

responded, “Yes.” (Id.)

Plaintiff’s counsel then asked the vocational expert if Dr.

Flagel’s mental residual functional capacity assessment was

applied, would Plaintiff be capable of performing the jobs that

she had identified. (Id. at 45-46.) Jesco responded that

Plaintiff could not perform any full-time work when applying the

psychiatrist’s functional analysis of the claimant. (Id. at 46-

47.) 

IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION

After considering the record, ALJ Muskrat made the following

relevant findings:

3. The claimant meets the insured status

requirements of the Social Security Act through

November 30, 2010. 

. . . .

4. The claimant has not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since May 1, 2008, the amended alleged

onset date.

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. . . .

5. The claimant has the following severe

impairments: emphysema; status post prostate cancer;

back injury and pain; shortness of breath; major

depressive disorder; single episode; and panic

disorder. 

. . . .

From a mental standpoint, the claimant has major

depressive disorder; single episode; and panic

disorder. His panic disorder has manifested in anxiety

and the tendency to avoid socialization. 

. . . .

With reference to the claimant’s alleged medically

determinable mental impairments, the court hereby

determines the following impairments are severe: major

depression, single episode; and a panic disorder. 

The claimant’s mental impairments results [sic] in

the claimant experiencing mild restrictions of the

activities of daily living; moderate difficulties in

maintaining social functioning; moderate difficulties

in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; but

in no episodes of decompensation. Furthermore, the

evidence does not establish the presence of the “C”

criteria of the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R.,

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A. 

. . . . 

6. The claimant does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically

equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A. 

. . . .

7. After careful consideration of the entire

record, the [ALJ] finds that the claimant has the

residual functional capacity to perform medium work as

defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(c) except he must avoid

concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, gases, poor

ventilation, etc. and he is mentally limited to: simple

and repetitive tasks with no public contact and minimal

interaction with peers and supervisors. 

. . . .

I have taken into consideration the documentation

in the record that the claimant tends not to socialize

due to his anxiety.

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. . . .

While claimant argues that he is unable to sustain

even simple and repetitive tasks [sic]. However, the

weight of the objective evidence does not support the

claims of the claimant’s disabling limitations to the

degree alleged. Mental status exams show that the

claimant was alert and oriented, and there was no

evidence of hallucinations, delusions, thought

broadcasting or withdrawal, or ideas of reference. 

Speech was unremarkable, and no psychomotor agitation

or slowing was noted. Digit span was # [sic] digits

forward and # [sic] digits backwards, and all three of

three objects were recalled after delay. Simple

calculations were intact, and the claimant was able to

perform serial #’s [sic] and spell “world” backwards. 

The claimant was able to recall the name of the current

president, and of # [sic] of the next most recent

presidents. Similarity and differences testing was

intact, as was interpretation of proverbs. Insight and

judgment were intact too. 

The claimant has not generally received the type

of medical treatment one would expect for a totally

disabled individual. 

. . . .

While the claimant has had difficulty sleeping,

there is no evidence of loss of weight due to loss of

appetite due to pain or depression. 

The claimant has alleged problems with

concentration due to his mental problems. However,

there is no objective evidence of cognitive defects due

to pain or depression with intact memory and

concentration. 

. . . .

As for the opinion evidence, I have considered the

opinion of Jeremy Flagel, M.D., in a mental functional

assessment signed on March 28, 2009. In assessing the

claimant’s mental limits, he indicated that the

claimant had between moderate to marked limitations in

most major mental functional domains. He concluded

that the degree of severity of the claimant’s

depression and anxiety precluded him from being able to

follow multi-step instructions to tolerate stresses

[sic]. To the extent that Dr. Flagel’s opinion does

not allow for the ability to do simple and repetitive

tasks with no public contact and limited co-worker and

supervisor interaction, I give it little weight. Dr.

Flagel specifically cited the claimant attention and

concentration difficulties as a basis for his

assessment. However, his own progress notes do not

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support the degree of impairment reflected in his

assessment. Mental status exam shows intact

concentration and memory. It appears that the

claimant’s symptoms are being appropriately managed

with a combination of psychotropic medications and

psychotherapy. There are no reported adverse side

effects from the medications. Finally, his assigned

GAF of 50 is inconsistent with his assessment.

8. The claimant is unable to perform any past

relevant work. 

. . . .

12. Used as a framework for decision making,

Medical-Vocational Guideline rule 203.09, 20 C.F.R.,

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, recommends a finding

that a hypothetical individual of the claimant’s age,

education, work experience, and residual functional

capacity is not disabled although the erosion effect of

the claimant’s nonexertional limitations on the

occupational base presumed to exist by rule 203.09 is

significant; yet nevertheless, a significant number of

jobs remain in the rule’s occupational base. Moreover,

the vocational expert was able to identify other jobs

existing in significant numbers in the national or

regional economy that the claimant could perform. 

. . . .

Examples of such jobs identified by the vocational

expert included: floor waxer, DOT No. 381.687-034,

unskilled, SVP-2, medium exertional level, 1,600 jobs

in regional economy. And 1.5 million jobs in national

economy; sweeper cleaner, DOT No. 389.683-010,

unskilled, SVP-2, medium exertional level, 1,520 jobs

in regional economy, and 1.6 million jobs in national

economy; and bander, DOT No. 762.687-010, unskilled,

SVP-2, medium exertional level, 890 jobs in regional

economy, and 111,000 in national economy.

. . . .

13. The claimant has not been under a disability,

as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 1,

2008, through the date of this decision. 

(Id. at 11-17 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).)

Based on all of the above, ALJ Muskrat concluded that

Guttilla was not entitled to a period of disability or disability

insurance benefits. (Id. at 17.) 

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V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security

Act, an applicant must show two things: (1) He or she suffers

from a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to

last for a continuous period of twelve months or more or result

in death, and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable

of performing the work that he or she previously performed or any

other substantially gainful employment that exists in the

national economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A) (West

2003). An applicant must meet both requirements to be classified

as “disabled.” Id.

Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act

allow applicants whose claims have been denied to seek judicial

review of the Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42 U.S.C.A.

§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (West 2003). The Court should affirm the

decision unless “it is based upon legal error or is not supported

by substantial evidence.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211,

1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599,

601 (9th Cir. 1999)).

"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the ALJ’s]

conclusion[,]” considering the record as a whole. Webb v.

Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It means “‘more than a mere

scintilla but less than a preponderance[]’” of the evidence. 

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1214 n.1 (quoting Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601). 

“‘[T]he court must consider the evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion . . . .’” Frost

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v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 359, 366-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jones

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Universal

Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951). 

To determine whether a claimant is “disabled,” the Social

Security regulations use a five-step process outlined in 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520 (West 2009). If an applicant is found to be

“disabled” or “not disabled” at any step, there is no need to

proceed further. Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2005) (quoting Schneider v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223

F.3d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 2000)). Although the ALJ must assist the

applicant in developing a record, the applicant bears the burden

of proof during the first four steps. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d

1094, 1098 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1999). If the fifth step is reached,

however, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id. at 1098. 

The steps for evaluating a claim are as follows:

Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a

substantially gainful activity? If so, then the

claimant is “not disabled” within the meaning of the

Social Security Act and is not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. If the claimant is not working in

a substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s

case cannot be resolved at step one and the evaluation

proceeds to step two.

Step 2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If

not, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not

entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the

claimant’s impairment is severe, then the claimant’s

case cannot be resolved at step two and the evaluation

proceeds to step three.

Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one

of a list of specific impairments described in the

regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled” and

therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. 

If the claimant’s impairment neither meets nor equals

one of the impairments listed in the regulations, then

the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three

and the evaluation proceeds to step four.

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Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that

he or she has done in the past? If so, then the

claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to

disability insurance benefits. If the claimant cannot

do any work he or she did in the past, then the

claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step four and the

evaluation proceeds to the fifth and final step.

Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other

work? If not, then the claimant is “disabled” and

therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. 

If the claimant is able to do other work, then the

Commissioner must establish that there are a

significant number of jobs in the national economy that

claimant can do. There are two ways for the

Commissioner to meet the burden of showing that there

is other work in “significant numbers” in the national

economy that claimant can do: (1) by the testimony of

a vocational expert, or (2) by reference to the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this

burden, the claimant is “not disabled” and therefore

not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the

Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then the claimant

is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability

benefits.

Id. at 1098-99 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also

Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001)

(giving an abbreviated version of the five steps).

Section 405(g) permits this Court to enter a judgment

affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 

42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West 2003). The matter may also be

remanded to the Social Security Administration for further

proceedings. Id.

“If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or

reversing the Secretary’s conclusion, the court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary.” Flaten v.

Sec’y Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Courts must uphold the denial of benefits if the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

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which supports the ALJ's decision. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d

676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).

VI. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Argument

Guttilla contends that the ALJ erred by substituting his

opinion for that of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. (Mot.

Reverse Remand 11.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ rejected the

opinion of treating psychiatrist, Dr. Flagel, without giving

clear and convincing reasons for doing so. (Id.) Plaintiff

notes that Dr. Flagel gave Guttilla a GAF of fifty on Guttilla’s

first visit, and Dr. Flagel’s evaluation of Guttilla seventeen

months later showed moderate and marked limitations in all

vocational categories. (Id. at 12.) Based on this, Dr. Jesco, a

vocational expert, testified that a person limited to the degree

indicated by Dr. Flagel could not perform even simple, repetitive

work. (Id.)

Guttilla notes that the ALJ accepted Dr. Flagel’s diagnosis

of major depressive disorder and panic disorder, but rejected the

psychiatrist’s opinion of Guttilla’s mental functioning, even

though there is no medical evidence contradicting the doctor’s

opinion. (Id. at 12.) 

Guttilla also claims that the ALJ did not specifically

address Dr. Flagel’s opinion but merely discusses the objective

evidence. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff argues that an uncontroverted

expert opinion cannot be rejected without providing clear and

convincing reasons for doing so. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff cites

Montijo v. Secretary, 729 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1984), for the

proposition that neither personal observations made by the ALJ

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nor the fact that physicians cannot support their opinions with

objective findings are “clear and convincing” reasons for

rejecting uncontroverted opinions. (Mot. Reverse Remand 13

(citing Montijo, 729 F.2d at 601).)

Finally, Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ’s conclusion

lacks evidentiary support, his rejection of the opinion of Dr.

Flagel and determination that Guttilla was not disabled is legal

error. (Id.)

B. Defendant’s Argument

Defendant maintains that ALJ Muskrat was not required to

accept Dr. Flagel’s opinion simply because it was uncontradicted,

noting that an ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion

whether or not it is contradicted. (Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 2.) 

Defendant cites Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 F.3d 1190 (9th

Cir. 2004), and Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.

1989), and argues that an uncontradicted, treating physician’s

opinion may be disregarded as long as the ALJ’s decision is based

on substantial evidence and clear and convincing reasoning. 

(Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 4 (citing Batson, 359 F.3d at 1191-95;

Megallanes, 881 F.2d at 751).) Defendant also contends that the

ALJ “provided numerous sufficient reasons for giving [Dr.

Flagel’s opinion] reduced weight.” (Id.)

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly evaluated the

doctor’s opinion and gave it little weight based on clear and

convincing reasons. (Id. at 3.) Defendant contends that the

first reason the ALJ provided was that Dr. Flagel’s progress

notes did not support a finding of complete disability because

his exam showed intact concentration and memory. Defendant cites

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Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2008), which held

that an ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion where that

opinion is inconsistent with medical records. (Mot. Summ. J. 4-5

(citing Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041).)

Second, Defendant asserts that the ALJ observed that Dr.

Flagel’s examination of Guttilla showed very little mental

impairment. (Id.) Defendant argues that the doctor noted

Guttilla was “well-groomed, cooperative, calm, with fair eye

contact, clear speech, relevant spontaneous conversation, with a

depressed anxious mood but appropriate affect, with normal

perception, intact memory, intact concentration, average

intelligence, good insight, intact judgment, and good impulse

control.” (Id. at 5.) The Commissioner asserts that Dr.

Flagel’s opinion that Guttilla was mentally disabled was not

supported by these findings; therefore, the ALJ properly

concluded that the opinion was entitled to little weight. (Id.)

Third, Defendant contends that the ALJ considered evidence

that Guttilla’s symptoms were controlled with medication. (Id.

(citing Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th

Cir. 2006).) In Warre, the court held that “[i]mpairments that

can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling

. . . .” Warre, 439 F.3d at 1006. Additionally, the

administrative law judge observed that Plaintiff had no side

effects from his medications. (Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 5.)

Next, Judge Muskrat found that the GAF score assigned to

Guttilla by Dr. Flagel was inconsistent with his treatment

records. (Id.) Finally, Defendant notes that the ALJ considered

the opinion of reviewing physician, psychiatrist K.J. Loomis, who

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found that disability benefits could not be conferred based on

the evidence in Guttilla’s file. (Id.) 

Defendant adds that Dr. Flagel saw Guttilla infrequently and

only for medication management and follow-up visits. (Id.) 

Appointments were five to six weeks apart. (Id. at 5-6 (citing

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433, (9th Cir. 1995).) In

Johnson, the court held that where a claimant only needs

conservative care, the ALJ properly rejected the treating

physician’s opinion as unsubstantiated by medical documentation. 

(Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 5-6.)

According to the Commissioner, because there were no truly

objective findings supporting Dr. Flagel’s opinion, a strong

inference was created that the opinion was based on Guttilla’s

subjective complaints. (Id. at 6.) Defendant argues that

Plaintiff does not challenge the finding that Guttilla’s

subjective allegations were not credible; the Commissioner

concludes that the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Flagel’s opinion

because it was based on Guttilla’s statements. (Id.)

Lastly, Defendant reiterates that Mary Jesco, the vocational

expert, testified that a person of Guttilla’s age, education, and

work experience, could perform work in the national economy, and

this supported the conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled. 

(Id.)

Defendant asserts that all the above constitute substantial

evidence and clear and convincing reasons for the ALJ to give Dr.

Flagel’s opinion reduced weight. (Id. at 7.) 

C. Treating Psychiatrist

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3

 Social Security Rulings clarify the Social Security Act’s

implementing regulations and the Social Security Agency’s 

policies; they are binding on the agency but do not have the

force of law. The rulings are given some deference as long as

they are consistent with statutes and regulations. Holohan, 246

F.3d at 1202 n.1 (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346

n.3 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).

21 09cv2259 MMA (RBB)

The opinions of physicians in Social Security disability

cases fall into three categories. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d

1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,

830 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). These are

“(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2)

those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining

physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the

claimant [but who review the claimant’s file] (nonexamining [or

reviewing] physicians).” Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1201-02

(alterations in original). 

Dr. Flagel’s status as a treating physician is not

contested. A treating physician’s opinion generally carries more

weight than other opinion evidence. Id. at 1202. “[I]f a

treating physician’s medical opinion is supported by medically

acceptable diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with

other substantial evidence in the record, the treating

physician’s opinion is given controlling weight.” Id. (citing 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)); see also Social Security Ruling (SSR)

96-2p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 9 (July 2, 1996).3

 “An ALJ may reject the

uncontradicted medical opinion of a treating physician only for

‘clear and convincing’ reasons supported by substantial evidence

in the record.” Id. (citing Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725

(9th Cir. 1998)). “Similarly, an ALJ may reject a treating

physician’s uncontradicted opinion on the ultimate issue of

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disability only with ‘clear and convincing’ reasons supported by

substantial evidence in the record.” Id. at 1202-03 (citing

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725). Even if the treating physician’s

opinion is contradicted by other evidence, it is still entitled

to deference. Id. 

ALJ Muskrat’s decision to give Dr. Flagel’s opinion little

weight is reversible legal error if the stated reasons for the

decision are not clear and convincing and supported by

substantial evidence. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support [the ALJ’s]

conclusion[,]” considering the record as a whole. Webb v.

Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It is “‘more than a mere

scintilla but less than a preponderance.’” Bayliss v. Barnhart,

427 F.3d at 1214 n.1 (quoting Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d at 601). 

“The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set

forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than

the doctors', are correct.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 (citing

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

As an initial observation, the ALJ cites “mental status

exams” as part of his analysis of Plaintiff’s credibility and

explains that they reveal Guttilla “was alert and oriented” with

“no evidence of hallucinations, thought broadcasting or

withdrawal, or ideas of reference.” (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 14.) 

The ALJ cites these exams as showing the following:

Digit span was # [sic] digits forward and # [sic]

digits backwards . . . . [C]laimant was able to

perform serial #’s [sic] and spell “world” backwards. 

The [C]laimant was also able to recall the name of the

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current president, and of # [sic] of the next most

recent presidents. Similarity and differences testing

was intact, as was interpretation of proverbs.

(Id.) 

The record contains no mental status exam noting any of these

facts. It appears that the ALJ utilized form language where “#”

is used as a placeholder, and mental exam results would be

obtained and added to replace the missing information, denoted by

“#.” The ALJ incompletely described facts that are not in the

record to support his assertion that “the weight of the objective

evidence does not support the claims of the claimant’s disabling

limitations to the degree alleged.” (Id. (citation omitted)

(emphasis added).) Judge Muskrat’s flawed method of evaluating

Plaintiff’s credibility does not impact the Court’s conclusion. 

Instead, this Court’s recommendation considers whether the

administrative law judge’s opinion was based on substantial

evidence and gave clear and convincing reasons for discrediting

Dr. Flagel’s opinion. 

D. Whether the ALJ’s Reasons Were Clear and Convincing

The primary reason the ALJ gave for discrediting Dr. Flagel’s

opinion was that the conclusions in the doctor’s March 28, 2009

mental functional assessment were not supported by Guttilla’s

treatment records. (Id. Attach. #2, 15.) Judge Muskrat held, “To

the extent that Dr. Flagel’s opinion does not allow for the

ability to do simple and repetitive tasks with no public contact

and limited co-worker and supervisor interaction, I give it little

weight.” (Id. Attach. #2, 15.) The Judge explained, “Dr. Flagel

specifically cited the claimant[’s] attention and concentration

difficulties as a basis for his assessment. However, his own

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progress notes do not support the degree of impairment reflected

in his assessment (Exhibit 18F [Dr. Flagel’s medical records from

October 18, 2007, through March 28, 2009]).” (Id.) Next, ALJ

Muskrat stated, “Mental status exam shows intact concentration and

memory. It appears that the claimant’s symptoms are being

appropriately managed with a combination of psychotropic

medications and psychotherapy. There are no reported adverse side

effects from the medications. Finally, his assigned GAF of 50 is

inconsistent with his assessment.” (Id. (citation omitted).)

The law does not “require the ALJ to evaluate in writing

every piece of testimony and evidence submitted.” Zalewski v.

Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 166 (7th Cir. 1985). Rather, the court

should only require a “minimal level of articulation by the ALJ as

to his assessment of the evidence . . . .” Id. For the reasons

discussed below, the administrative law judge’s opinion does not

meet these minimal standards. 

1. Mental Status Evaluation

Although the ALJ cites the October 18, 2007 mental status

evaluation, it is not clear that this exam contradicts the mental

residual functional assessment. The evaluation by Dr. Flagel took

place nearly seven months before Guttilla stopped working; at that

time, the doctor indicated that Plaintiff’s thought process,

concentration, and memory were intact. (Admin. R. Attach. #7,

343.) This evidence is not determinative for two main reasons: 

(1) the evaluation occurred before Plaintiff claims to be

disabled, May 1, 2008, and (2) there are mixed findings in Dr.

Flagel’s progress notes. This exam took place on Guttilla’s first

visit to Dr. Flagel. (Id. at 343-45.) On that date, Dr. Flagel

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noted, under the heading “current symptoms,” that Guttilla

reported that he “[c]an’t concentrate.” (Id. at 340.) The doctor

diagnosed Plaintiff with “MDD (major depressive disorder), single

(episode), [and] severe.” (Id. at 344.) He also gave Plaintiff a

GAF score of fifty. (Id. at 344.) Thus, the mental status

evaluation contains facts that support and contradict Judge

Muskrat’s decision. 

The Court cannot rewrite the administrative law judge’s

opinion. It is well established that the district court may not

resolve a social security case de novo and reach its own

conclusions from the evidence. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383,

387 (6th Cir. 1984); see also McKay v. Gardner, 245 F. Supp. 739,

742 (W.D. Pa. 1965). The Court limits its inquiry to the reasons

the ALJ stated in his decision. Judge Muskrat’s references to the

mental status exam performed before Guttilla claimed to be

disabled are not substantial evidence or clear and convincing

reasons for giving Dr. Flagel’s opinion little weight. 

2. The Management of Claimant’s Symptoms

The second reason the ALJ gave for giving the treating

physician’s opinion little weight was that Plaintiff’s “symptoms

are being appropriately managed with a combination of psychotropic

medications and psychotherapy.” (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 15.) 

Again, the ALJ does not point to any specific medication or

therapy that he considered effective. Although Guttilla was

prescribed antidepressant and antianxiety medications, there is no

substantial evidence that these courses of treatment were

effective in controlling his symptoms. (Id. Attach. #7, 332-44.)

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At their first meeting on October 18, 2007, Dr. Flagel

explicitly noted treatment goals of reducing Plaintiff’s anxiety

and depression. (Id. at 344.) Over the course of Guttilla’s

treatment, he continuously experienced depression and anxiety. 

(Id. at 332-44.) On January 10, 2008, Dr. Flagel changed

Guttilla’s antidepressant medication to Zoloft. (Id. at 338.) He

increased the dosage of the antidepressant medication on November

26, 2008, approximately six months after the disability onset

date, but Guttilla continued to be depressed. (Id. at 336-37.) 

Dr. Flagel again increased the Zoloft dosage on January 5, 2009. 

(Id. at 336.) The increasing dosages undermine the ALJ’s

statement. 

Plaintiff’s anxiety was also sustained over the course of his

treatment with Dr. Flagel; Guttilla perceived some lessening of

anxiety on November 26, 2008, but the anxiety was present both

before and after that visit. (Id. at 332, 336-38, 344.) In

Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d at 1205, the court held that the

treating physician’s “statements must be read in context of the

overall diagnostic picture he draws.” Id. (explaining that some

improvement from anxiety or depression does not mean that the

person's impairments no longer seriously affect his ability to

function in a workplace). There is no substantial evidence that

Plaintiff’s symptoms were being appropriately managed by his

medication. 

Additionally, there are no records that Plaintiff attended

psychotherapy sessions. During his first session with Guttilla,

Dr. Flagel noted that behavioral activation was a treatment goal. 

(Admin. R. Attach. #7, 344.) He referred Plaintiff to Dr.

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McGinnis for individual therapy. (Id. at 345.) There are no

medical records from Dr. McGinnis, and Dr. Flagel did not provide

individual therapy. Consequently, there is no evidence that

Plaintiff actually underwent this therapy. Each of the six

subsequent visits to Dr. Flagel was a “medication visit” that

lasted fifteen to twenty minutes. (Id. at 334-38.) Judge

Muskrat’s cursory statement that the Plaintiff’s therapy was

effective is not supported by any evidence, substantial or

otherwise. 

The ALJ’s conclusion that Guttilla’s symptoms were adequately

controlled by medication and therapy are not supported by evidence

that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the

conclusion” and, therefore, are not supported by substantial

evidence. See Webb 433 F.3d at 686 (citing Richardson, 402 U.S.

at 401). Likewise, the ALJ’s analysis and explanation is

insufficient. (See Admin. R. Attach. #2 at 15.) “The ALJ must do

more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the

doctor[’]s[], are correct.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 (citing

Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22). Because the ALJ’s determination that

Guttilla’s symptoms were controlled was not supported by

substantial evidence, it is not a clear and convincing reason to

discount Dr. Flagel’s opinion. 

3. Adverse Side Effects

The third reason Judge Muskrat gave for giving the doctor’s

opinion little weight was that “[t]here are no reported adverse

side effects from the medications.” (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 15.) 

This statement, however, is incorrect. The evidence in the record

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shows that Guttilla had at least one adverse side effect from a

medication. On January 10, 2008, Dr. Flagel noted, in the

“progress” section of his notes, that “Ativan caused slurring.” 

(Id. Attach. #7, 338.) The prescription for Ativan, an antianxiety medication, was discontinued. (Id.) Additionally, the

Court has already noted that the ALJ’s statement that Plaintiff’s

symptoms were being appropriately managed with a combination of

psychotropic medication and psychotherapy is not supported by the

record and is not clear and convincing. Thus, the conclusion that

Guttilla suffered no side effects is incorrect and is not a clear

and convincing reason to give Dr. Flagel’s opinion little weight. 

See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 (citing Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22). 

4. Guttilla’s Global Assessment of Functioning Score

The final reason given by ALJ Muskrat for discrediting Dr.

Flagel’s opinion was that he assigned Guttilla a global assessment

of functioning score of fifty which was inconsistent with the

psychiatrist’s assessment. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 15); id.

Attach. #7, 344.) “A GAF between 41 and 50 indicates serious

symptoms (e.g. suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals,

frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social,

occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to

keep a job).” Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595,

598 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999). But the GAF score alone does not

establish disability. See e.g., Howard v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 276

F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002).

Dr. Flagel assigned a GAF score to Plaintiff on October 18,

2007, during the initial consultation seven months before

Guttilla’s claim of disability. (Admin. R. Attach. #7, 340, 344.) 

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On the same date, the psychiatrist completed a mental status

evaluation form and checked boxes indicating that Guttilla’s

cognitive function was normal, except for depression and anxiety. 

(Id. at 343.) Also on that date, the doctor’s handwritten notes

indicate that Guttilla had trouble concentrating, experienced

panic attacks, had little ambition, wanted to be left alone,

suffered from anxiety, and had trouble sleeping. (Id. at 340.) 

Where the check-box form conflicts with the handwritten notes, the

ALJ must give specific and legitimate reasons for crediting one

assessment over the other. See e.g., Korenica v. Astrue, 346 Fed.

App’x 141, 142 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The ALJ reasonably determined

that the statements in the two documents [narrative versus checkthe-box statement] were contradictory, and determined that Dr.

Geary’s narrative report was more consistent with his clinical

findings and the findings of other medical sources.”)

Other than stating that the GAF score of fifty is

inconsistent with Dr. Flagel’s assessment, the ALJ does not give

any specific reason for that conclusion. (Admin. R. Attach. #2,

15.) He has not explained how the doctor’s assessment conflicts

with the GAF score. As noted previously, the court’s function is

not to create a new rationale to support the administrative law

judge’s decision. See Garner, 745 F.2d at 387. Because the GAF

score is consistent with some of the doctor’s assessment notes,

and the ALJ does not identify substantial evidence in the record

to discredit it, the determination that a GAF score of fifty was

inconsistent with Dr. Flagel’s assessment is not a clear and

convincing reason for giving his opinion little weight. See

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 (citing Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22). 

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E. Additional Arguments

In the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant argues, “It

also bears mention that Dr. Flagel provided Plaintiff with

conservative medical care, seeing him only for medication

management and scheduling follow-up appointments for 5 to 6 weeks

in the future.” (Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 5 (citation omitted).) 

Defendant states, “Moreover, in light of the absence of objective

evidence (such as test results) supporting Dr. Flagel’s opinion,

it is logical to infer that his opinion is based to a large extent

on Plaintiff’s subjective statements.” (Id. at 6 (citation

omitted).) Defendant concludes that “the ALJ properly gave less

weight to an opinion based to a large extent on those statements.” 

(Id. (citation omitted).)

Although Defendant’s arguments may be persuasive, and could

have been asserted by Judge Muskrat to support his decision, they

were not. As a result, the Court cannot rely on these additional

reasons, not included in the ALJ’s decision, to find clear and

convincing reasons to discredit Dr. Flagel’s opinion. Garner, 745

F.2d at 387. 

Defendant also asserts that “the ALJ noted the reviewing

physicians’ opinions, which include psychiatrist K. J. Loomis’

January 2009 opinion that benefits could not be granted based on

the evidence in Plaintiff’s file.” (Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 5

(citation omitted).) “[T]he findings of a nontreating,

nonexamining physician can amount to substantial evidence, so long

as other evidence in the record supports those findings.” Saelee

v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 

But Dr. Loomis’s statement is a review of Dr. Mauro’s conclusion. 

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Dr. Mauro wrote, “Based on overall evidence in [the] file[, it]

appears we cannot give this claim fully favorable decision from

AOD of 3/5/07.” (Admin. R. Attach. #7, 317.) Dr. Loomis

concurred, “Agree with above. Can not provide fully favorable

decision.” (Id.) There is no evidence in the record regarding

Guttilla’s mental condition other than Dr. Flagel’s opinion. 

Thus, the state agency consultants’ statements are not substantial

evidence. 

When looking only at the reasons given in ALJ Muskrat’s

decision, the Court should find that the ALJ did not give

specific, legitimate reasons for disregarding Dr. Flagel’s

opinions. See Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d at

1195. “[I]f the ALJ rejects significant probative evidence, he

must explain why.” Lusardi v. Astrue, 350 Fed. App’x 169, 173

(9th Cir. 2009). If the AlJ’s decision is not supported by

substantial evidence, remand or reversal is appropriate. See

generally Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984)

(reversing the judgment and concluding that a remand was not

necessary). 

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not specifically address

Dr. Flagel’s opinion. (Mot. Reverse Remand 15.) That is not the

case. As discussed above, Judge Muskrat dismissed Dr. Flagel’s

opinion; however, he failed to provide clear and convincing

reasons to afford the opinion little weight. 

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VII. CONCLUSION 

“[T]he decision of the Commissioner must be upheld if it is

supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied

the correct legal standards.” Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart,

341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Pagter v. Massanari,

250 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001)). If the ALJ’s decision is

not supported by substantial evidence, remand or reversal is

appropriate. See generally Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d at 1457

(reversing the judgment and concluding that remand was not

required). 

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reversal and/or Remand should be GRANTED; Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment should be DENIED; and the matter should be

REMANDED for an award of benefits. See Edler v. Astrue, 2010 U.S.

App. LEXIS 16284, at *7 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2010). 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the

United States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties

on or before September 3, 2010. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before September 17,

2010. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

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district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

DATED: August 13, 2010 _____________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Anello

All parties of record

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