Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05168/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05168-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 23, 2004 Decided April 20, 2004

No. 02-5168

KEITH MAYDAK, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv02199)

Bruce V. Spiva, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for amicus curiae in support of appellants.

Keith Maydak, Gregory Smith, and Paul Lee, pro se, were

on the briefs for appellants.

Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Roscoe C.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-5168 Document #817238 Filed: 04/20/2004 Page 1 of 17
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Howard Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney. Michael C. Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

entered an appearance.

Before: RANDOLPH, ROGERS, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: In this case, three federal prisoners

allege that the Federal Bureau of Prisons maintained a secret

file of photographs of inmates and their visitors in violation of

several provisions of the Privacy Act, as well as the federal

statute that created the Inmate Trust Fund. The district

court granted summary judgment to the government on all

counts. We affirm with respect to one of the Privacy Act

claims. Because we find that genuine issues of material fact

preclude summary judgment on all remaining claims, we

reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

I.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) permits individual

institutions to operate the ‘‘Inmate Photography Program,’’

giving inmates the opportunity to have photographs taken

with their visitors. Inmates pay a one dollar fee for each

picture into the Inmate Trust Fund, which consists of money

spent by inmates nationwide at prison commissaries and on

other Trust Fund programs. The Fund pays for cameras,

film, processing, and administrative costs associated with the

Inmate Photography Program. BOP regulations allow prisons to offer inmates duplicate prints provided that doing so

does not increase processing costs. Because developing services often offer free ‘‘double prints,’’ most BOP institutions

gave inmates (at the time of the events leading to this case)

the second print.

Appellants, federal prison inmates Keith Maydak, Gregory

Smith, and Paul Lee, noticed that several prisons were giving

inmates only single photographs. An envelope obtained by

Lee from a photo developer revealed that although BOP

actually received double prints, inmates never received the

USCA Case #02-5168 Document #817238 Filed: 04/20/2004 Page 2 of 17
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second copy. At several of the institutions in which appellants were incarcerated, BOP officials acknowledged that they

did in fact develop and keep duplicate photographs. For

example, officials at the McKean and Ray Brook federal

correctional institutions (FCI) explained that duplicates of

inmate-purchased photographs were given to the Special Investigative Supervisor’s (SIS) office, which reviewed them for

‘‘investigative or informative value.’’ Roy Decl. ¶ ¶ 7, 9

(McKean); Cross Decl. ¶ ¶ 6, 8 (Ray Brook). Photos having

such value were ‘‘added to, and retained in, active investigation case files’’; remaining duplicates were ‘‘stored in a box

for approximately six (6) months and then destroyed.’’ Roy

Decl. ¶ 9; accord Cross Decl. ¶ ¶ 8–9. At the Beckley and

Cumberland federal correctional institutions, officials reviewed inmate-purchased photos for ‘‘gang-related activity.’’

Painter Decl. ¶ 3 (Beckley); Alvarado Decl. ¶ 6 (Cumberland).

At Beckley, ‘‘[i]f a photo showed gang-related activities, a

scanned copy was made and displayed in the SIS office for a

short period of time, then it was shredded.’’ Painter Decl.

¶ 3. At Cumberland, such photographs were ‘‘scanned into

the computer and maintained in the SIS Office.’’ Alvarado

Decl. ¶ 7. An official at the Lewisburg penitentiary declared

that the institution never developed duplicate photographs.

See Hoekman Decl. ¶ 4. Instead, SIS reviewed ‘‘the single

‘print’ to ensure that no one in the photograph made an

obscene gesture, and to ensure that nothing in the photograph pose[d] a threat to institution safety or security.’’ Id.

¶ 6. In addition, Beckley and McKean officials acknowledged

that on a few occasions, inmate trust funds had been used to

develop duplicate prints that, instead of being given to inmates, were used or retained by BOP. See Clifton Decl. ¶ 3

(Beckley); Fitch Decl. ¶ ¶ 4–5 (McKean).

Proceeding pro se, appellants filed suit in the U.S. District

Court for the District of Columbia alleging (among other

things) that BOP’s maintenance of what they call the ‘‘Secret

Squirrel Photo File’’ violated the Privacy Act of 1974. See

Pub. L. No. 93–579, § 3, 88 Stat. 1897 (1974) (codified at 5

U.S.C. § 552a (2000)). They also alleged that by using the

second print for investigative purposes, BOP violated 31

U.S.C. § 1321 (2000), the statute that created the Inmate

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Trust Fund (formally known as the Commissary Fund). The

district court initially dismissed the complaint for failure to

state a claim. See Maydak v. United States, No. 97–2199

(D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1999). On appeal, this court vacated the

dismissal of the Privacy Act and Inmate Trust Fund claims

and remanded for further proceedings. See Maydak v. United States, No. 99–5187, 1999 WL 1006593, at *1 (D.C. Cir.

Oct. 27, 1999). Acting on the basis of declarations submitted

by BOP officials at several of the institutions at issue in this

case—Beckley, Cumberland, Lewisburg, McKean, and Ray

Brook—the district court on remand granted summary judgment to the government. See Maydak v. United States, No.

97–2199, slip op. at 11–12 (D.D.C. May 4, 2001) (Maydak I);

Maydak v. United States, No. 97–2199, slip op. at 4–5 (D.D.C.

Mar. 22, 2002) (Maydak II).

Appellants filed a notice of appeal, and we appointed Bruce

V. Spiva as amicus curiae to present arguments on their

behalf. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo,

applying the same standards as the district court. Tao v.

Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Summary judgment

may be granted only ‘‘where there are no genuine issues of

material fact, and all inferences must be viewed in a light

most favorable to the non-moving party.’’ Id. (citing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 255

(1986)). We consider appellants’ Privacy Act claims in part

II, their Trust Fund claim in part III, and several unrelated

claims in an unpublished judgment issued herewith.

II.

‘‘[I]n order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in

information systems maintained by federal agencies,’’ the

Privacy Act regulates ‘‘the collection, maintenance, use, and

dissemination of information by such agencies.’’ Privacy Act,

§ 2(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896. ‘‘The Act gives agencies detailed

instructions for managing their records and provides for

various sorts of civil relief to individuals aggrieved by failures

on the Government’s part to comply with the requirements.’’

Doe v. Chao, 124 S. Ct. 1204, 1207 (2004).

USCA Case #02-5168 Document #817238 Filed: 04/20/2004 Page 4 of 17
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The Privacy Act imposes a series of substantive and procedural obligations on federal agencies that maintain what is

known as a ‘‘system of records.’’ A system of records is ‘‘a

group of any records under the control of any agency from

which information is retrieved by the name of the individual

or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying

particular assigned to the individual.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5).

A ‘‘record’’ is ‘‘any item, collection, or grouping of information

about an individual that is maintained by an agency TTT that

contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or

other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as

a finger or voice print or a photograph.’’ Id. § 552a(a)(4).

‘‘Maintain’’ means ‘‘maintain, collect, use, or disseminate.’’

Id. § 552a(a)(3).

Appellants claim that BOP’s maintenance of the so-called

Secret Squirrel Photo File violates Privacy Act subsections

552a(r), (e)(4), (e)(9), and (e)(11). These provisions require

agencies to establish rules of conduct for employees who

develop or maintain systems of records and to report certain

information regarding those systems. Appellants also allege

that the photo file violates subsections 552a(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3),

(e)(7), and (e)(10), which regulate the collection and maintenance of the records themselves.

The district court concluded that none of the cited Privacy

Act provisions applied to BOP’s photo file because the institutions at which appellants were incarcerated did not maintain

the photographs in a system of records. As we explain

below, however, under the law of this circuit, incorporation of

a record into a system of records is not required to trigger

subsection 552a(e)(7). With respect to the other alleged

Privacy Act violations, we believe that contested issues of

material fact as to whether BOP facilities actually maintained

photographs in a system of records precluded summary judgment.

Subsection 552a(e)(7)

Subsection 552a(e)(7) provides that any agency maintaining

a system of records shall ‘‘maintain no record describing how

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any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First

Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the

individual about whom the record is maintained or unless

pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7). In Albright v.

United States, 631 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1980), we held that an

agency that maintains any system of records is prohibited

from maintaining a record of an individual’s First Amendment activity ‘‘even if [that record] is not subsequently incorporated into the agency’s system of records.’’ Id. at 916–17.

‘‘[T]he Act clearly prohibits even the mere collection of such a

record, independent of the agency’s maintenance, use, or

dissemination’’ of the record thereafter. Id. at 918. To

interpret the statute otherwise, we explained, would be ‘‘inconsistent with the plain meaning of the language of the Act.’’

Id.

Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, then, whether

appellants have a viable subsection 552a(e)(7) claim turns not

on whether the photographs were maintained in a system of

records, but on whether they ‘‘describ[e] how [an] individual

exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.’’ 5

U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7). If they do, BOP should not have maintained the photographs ‘‘unless pertinent to and within the

scope of an authorized law enforcement activity,’’ as BOP

does not claim that maintaining the photographs was ‘‘authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is

maintained.’’ Id.

We think it obvious that photographs of prisoners visiting

with family, friends, and associates depict the exercise of

associational rights protected by the First Amendment—

provided, of course, that such rights survive incarceration.

Although the very fact of incarceration necessarily curtails

associational rights, see Overton v. Bazzetta, 123 S. Ct. 2162,

2167 (2003), the Supreme Court has never held that inmates

have no right to association. In Overton v. Bazzetta, the

Court stated, ‘‘[w]e do not hold, and we do not imply, that any

right to intimate association is altogether terminated by

incarceration or is always irrelevant to claims made by prisoners.’’ Id. Instead of ‘‘attempt[ing] to explore or define the

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asserted right of association TTT or determine the extent to

which it survives incarceration,’’ the Court implicitly assumed

that the right existed and upheld prison regulations limiting

that putative right as constitutionally justified under the

circumstances. See id.; see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.

817, 822 (1974). We too find it unnecessary to consider

whether the photographs at issue in this case depict inmates

exercising First Amendment rights because, at least in some

respects, BOP has shown that its maintenance of the photographs was ‘‘pertinent to TTT an authorized law enforcement

activity.’’

Although the Privacy Act does not define ‘‘law enforcement

activity,’’ we have interpreted the phrase broadly. See Nagel

v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 725 F.2d 1438, 1441

n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (indicating that the phrase includes an

authorized criminal, intelligence, or administrative investigation); J. Roderick MacArthur Found. & Lindblom v. FBI,

102 F.3d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that valid law

enforcement activities require neither an active investigation

nor a ‘‘current law enforcement necessity’’). Citing declarations of several prison officials, BOP argues that its actions

fall within subsection 552a(e)(7)’s law enforcement exception

because ‘‘the SIS office at the various institutions reviewed

the photos for threats to institution safety or security, for any

gang-related activity, for investigative or informative value, or

for other conduct.’’ Appellees’ Br. at 30. Because BOP has

responsibility for preserving prison security, we have no

doubt that examining photographs for conduct that may

threaten that security is pertinent to and within the scope of

an authorized law enforcement activity. Nor have we any

doubt that reviewing inmate photographs for gang-related

activity and obscene conduct also falls within that exception.

If BOP were reviewing the photographs for these purposes

only, we could easily affirm the grant of summary judgment

with respect to subsection 552a(e)(7). Based on BOP’s declarations, however, it appears that some prisons may have

reviewed and collected the photographs for other purposes as

well. According to officials from McKean and Ray Brook,

those institutions reviewed photographs for ‘‘investigative or

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informative value.’’ See Roy Decl. ¶ 9 (McKean); Cross Decl.

¶ 8 (Ray Brook). Neither official, however, explained what

these terms mean. Does investigative value relate to suspected criminal activity? What is the limit to informative

value? Although ‘‘authorized law enforcement activity’’ obviously has a broad meaning in the prison context, unless we

require greater specificity BOP could easily evade subsection

552a(e)(7) simply by invoking a need to maintain records for

generic investigative and informative purposes. We will

therefore remand this issue for the district court to determine, on the basis of a fuller record, whether McKean’s and

Ray Brook’s review of photographs was consistent with an

‘‘authorized law enforcement activity.’’

Other Privacy Act Subsections

Unlike subsections 552a(r), (e)(4), (e)(9), and (e)(11), which

impose obligations on the maintenance of systems of records,

subsections (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), and (e)(10) apply to the records themselves. These provisions state that:

Each agency that maintains a system of records

shall—

(1) maintain in its records only such information TTT

as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose

of the agency TTT;

(2) collect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject individual TTT;

(3) inform each individual whom it asks to supply

information TTT [of] the [agency’s] authority TTT;

the principal purpose TTT for which the information

is intended to be used; the routine uses which may

be made of the information TTT; [and] the effects

TTT of not providing TTT the requested information;

TTT [and]

(10) establish appropriate administrative, technical,

and physical safeguards to insure the security and

confidentiality of recordsTTTT

5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)–(3), (10).

Amicus urges us to extend Albright to these subsections,

arguing that like subsection 552a(e)(7), they apply to records

USCA Case #02-5168 Document #817238 Filed: 04/20/2004 Page 8 of 17
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not incorporated into a system of records. In considering

this argument, we do not write on a clean slate, for the Office

of Management and Budget has issued ‘‘Privacy Act Guidelines’’ to which we owe deference. See Henke v. U.S. Dep’t of

Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453, 1461 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (giving

the OMB Privacy Act Guidelines ‘‘the deference usually accorded interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with

its administration’’ (quoting Albright, 631 F.2d at 920 n.5));

see also Privacy Act, § 6 (‘‘The Office of Management and

Budget shall TTT develop guidelines and regulations for the

use of agencies in implementing the provisions of section

552aTTTT’’). According to those Guidelines, the requirements

contained in the interrelated subsections (e)(1), (2), and (3), as

well as (e)(10), are triggered only if the records are actually

incorporated into a system of records. See Office of Management and Budget Privacy Act Implementation: Guidelines

and Responsibilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,960–66 (July 9,

1975). With respect to subsection 552a(e)(1), for example, the

Guidelines instruct each agency to identify the specific legal

provision that authorizes an agency activity ‘‘with respect to

each system of records which it maintains or proposes to

maintain.’’ Id. at 28,960 (emphasis added). Agencies may

not maintain merely ‘‘useful’’ information, but must ‘‘review

the nature of the information which they maintain in their

systems of records to assure that it is, in fact, ‘relevant and

necessary.’ ’’ Id. (emphasis added). With respect to subsection 552a(e)(2), the Guidelines explain: ‘‘The practical effect

of this provision is to require that information collected for

inclusion in any system of records TTT should be obtained

directly from the individual whenever practicable.’’ Id. at

28,961 (emphasis added). The Guidelines’ discussion of subsection 552a(e)(3) also assumes a system of records, see id. at

28,962, as does their discussion regarding subsection

552a(e)(10): administrative, technical, and physical safeguards

must be ‘‘tailored to the requirements of each system of

records,’’ id. at 28,966 (emphasis added).

Reaching a different conclusion as to subsection 552a(e)(7),

Albright focused on ‘‘Congress’[s] own special concern for the

protection of First Amendment rights.’’ 631 F.2d at 919. As

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Albright explains, the Privacy Act’s legislative history reveals

the ‘‘preferred status which the Committee intends managers

of information technology to accord to information touching

areas protected by the First Amendment [to] the Constitution.’’ Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 93–1183, at 56 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6971) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Albright also discusses the virtual ‘‘flat prohibition’’

against collecting any record of an individual’s First Amendment activity, observing that the ‘‘mere inquiry of government into an individual’s exercise of First Amendment rights’’

can intrude on an individual’s privacy even if the record is not

incorporated in a system of records. Id. Albright’s recognition of congressional concern for the ‘‘unwarranted collection

of information as a distinct harm in and of itself’’ refers

specifically to the legislative history regarding subsection

552a(e)(7). Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 93–1183, at 57, reprinted in

1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6971–72). Finally, Albright points out

that the OMB Guidelines explain that subsection 552a(e)(7)

‘‘establishes an even more rigorous standard governing the

maintenance of records regarding the exercise of First

Amendment rights.’’ 631 F.2d at 919 n.5 (quoting 40 Fed.

Reg. at 28,965) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In contrast, none of the other subsections that appellants

invoke involves First Amendment concerns. Moreover, if

these other 552a(e) subsections trigger Privacy Act requirements even when the records at issue are not maintained in a

system of records, agencies may be liable for Privacy Act

violations simply by collecting records that they immediately

discard after finding the records neither relevant nor necessary. Cf. Henke, 83 F.3d at 1461 (expressing concern that if

retrieval capability creates a system of records, an agency

may be ‘‘found retrospectively to be maintaining a system of

records it did not even know existed, simply by dint of a

potential use it neither engaged in nor contemplated’’). So at

least in comparison to the other subsections at issue, subsection 552a(e)(7) proves the exception rather than the rule.

Contrary to the government’s argument, however, the fact

that these other subsections apply only when records are

maintained in a system of records does not end our task, for

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we believe that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to

whether BOP’s photo file in fact constitutes a system of

records. Recall that a system of records is ‘‘a group of any

records TTT from which information is retrieved by the name

of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or

other identifying particular assigned to the individual.’’ 5

U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (emphasis added). The term ‘‘record’’

includes ‘‘any item TTT about an individual TTT that contains

his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or

voice print or a photograph.’’ Id. § 552a(a)(4) (emphasis

added). Under the Act’s plain language, then, a ‘‘system of

records’’ may be a group of any records retrieved by an

identifying particular such as a photograph. In other words,

the personal identifier may be the photograph itself.

In asserting that the prisons at issue here maintained no

such system of records, BOP officials failed to appreciate this

point. They assumed that because the photographs were

organized neither by name nor individually assigned number,

they were not organized by personal identifier. For instance,

the McKean SIS declared that duplicate photos with ‘‘investigative or informative value’’ were retained in investigation

case files and other duplicates were ‘‘stored in a box for

approximately six (6) months and then destroyed.’’ Roy Decl.

¶ 9. Yet the SIS also claimed that ‘‘[n]one of the photographs

TTT reviewed by the SIS office TTT [were] retrievable by an

individual inmate as they [were] not filed by any personal

identifier.’’ Id. ¶ 10. As amicus quite properly asks, ‘‘What

purpose would it serve to keep photographs that BOP investigators have purportedly determined have some significant

importance to the security of the institution in a filing system

from which they could not be retrieved by individual?’’ Amicus Br. at 12 n.4. ‘‘Presumably,’’ amicus points out, ‘‘one of

the primary reasons for keeping such a system is to enable

the SIS to track and prevent unlawful activities by individuals

whose photographs provide valuable information to do that.’’

Id. Nor is it clear from the record why McKean officials

retained for six months duplicate photographs having no

investigative value. Although practices vary by prison, the

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Ray Brook declaration, which is very similar to the McKean

declaration, suggests one such purpose: ‘‘to identify possible

associates or accomplices of an inmate suspected of, or

charged with, committing prohibited acts at FCI Ray Brook.’’

Cross Decl. ¶ 9. This indicates that the duplicate photographs stored in a box were retrievable by personal identifier—the photograph itself—for how else could SIS staff have

identified a particular inmate’s associates or accomplices if

not by the photograph?

The government argues that even if the photographs were

retrievable by personal identifier, the photograph file would

not constitute a system of records if the photos were not

actually retrieved by personal identifier. The government is

correct. In Henke, we held that ‘‘retrieval capability is not

sufficient to create a system of records’’; the agency must in

practice retrieve information by personal identifier. 83 F.3d

at 1460–61. Although incidental or ad hoc retrieval by personal identifier does not convert a group of records into a

system of records, where an agency compiles information

about individuals for investigatory purposes, ‘‘Privacy Act

concerns are at their zenith, and if there is evidence of even a

few retrievals of information keyed to [personal identifiers], it

may well be the case that the agency is maintaining a system

of records.’’ Id. at 1461.

On the record before us, it seems clear that at least one

institution, Ray Brook, retrieved photographs by personal

identifier. With respect to the other institutions, because the

declarations rested on a flawed understanding of personal

identifier, they cannot support the grant of summary judgment. We will thus remand for the district court to determine whether the prisons’ compilation of photos constitutes a

system of records. In considering this issue, the district

court should take into account ‘‘the entirety of the situation,

including the agency’s function, the purpose for which the

information was gathered, and the agency’s actual retrieval

practices and policies.’’ Id.

In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the district

court did not consider the Ray Brook declaration. According

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to the district court, appellants lacked standing to challenge

alleged Privacy Act violations at Ray Brook because it was

‘‘undisputed that [ ] Ray Brook did not retain photographs of

any of the [appellants].’’ Maydak I, No. 97–2199, slip op. at 7

n.4. We think the record is not so clear. Ray Brook’s

Special Investigative Supervisor declared: ‘‘I am aware of no

inmate purchased photographs of [appellants] being maintained in any SIS file at FCI Ray Brook.’’ Cross Decl. ¶ 10

(emphasis added). As amicus points out, that declaration was

executed in February 2001, and the key statement is phrased

in the present tense. Under Ray Brook’s practice, any

photographs of appellants taken more than six months earlier

would not have been maintained at the time of the declaration. Moreover, because Ray Brook retained the ‘‘duplicate

copy of the inmate purchased photographs,’’ it would not have

maintained the actual ‘‘inmate purchased photographs’’ in any

SIS file. Thus, the declaration cannot support a finding that

Ray Brook never maintained, collected, or used photographs

of appellants. On remand, the district court will need to

consider the Privacy Act claims related to Ray Brook.

Other Privacy Act Considerations

We conclude with a few loose ends. First, the district

court disposed of appellants’ subsection 552a(b) claim on

grounds unrelated to whether BOP maintained a system of

records. Although that subsection prohibits agencies from

disclosing records to any person or to another agency ‘‘except

pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written

consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains,’’ 5

U.S.C. § 552a(b), it expressly permits disclosure of records to

agency employees ‘‘who have a need for the record in the

performance of their duties,’’ id. § 552a(b)(1). Because appellants offer no reason to think that there is anything

inappropriate about disclosing photographs to BOP officials

so that they can decide whether to release them to inmates,

we will affirm the grant of summary judgment on this issue.

Second, BOP argues that even if appellants have viable

Privacy Act claims, they may not obtain damages because

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they have failed to show that any violations were ‘‘intentional

or willful.’’ See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (establishing that in a

suit against an agency for failure to comply with specified

Privacy Act provisions, the court must determine that the

agency behaved intentionally or willfully before awarding

damages). Because this issue is a question of fact entirely

undeveloped in the record, however, it provides no basis for

summary judgment at this time. Moreover, should the question of damages arise on remand, that issue will be controlled

by Doe v. Chao, in which the Supreme Court held (following

oral argument in this case) that plaintiffs seeking monetary

relief under the Privacy Act must show actual damages. See

124 S. Ct. at 1212.

Finally, the record sheds little light on whether the district

court properly declined to consider asserted Privacy Act

violations at the Cumberland and Allenwood facilities. The

district court found that Maydak was the only appellant

confined at Cumberland and that because Cumberland officials claim that they never maintained photographs of Maydak, he had no standing to challenge the alleged Privacy Act

violations there. Maydak I, No. 97–2199, slip op. at 7 n.4.

In their opposition to the government’s motion for summary

judgment and in their brief to this court, however, appellants

allege that Lee also was incarcerated at Cumberland, see

Appellants’ Br. at 30 (citing Lee Decl. ¶ 17), though it is not

at all clear whether he was at Cumberland at times relevant

to this litigation. With respect to Allenwood, the district

court found that appellants lacked standing because ‘‘none

TTT appear[s] to have been confined [there] before the filing

of the lawsuit or the amended complaint.’’ Maydak I, No.

97–2199, slip op. at 7 n.4. Yet the amended complaint

appears to show an Allenwood address for Lee. We will

leave these two issues for the district court to sort out on

remand.

III.

This brings us to appellants’ trust fund claim. Section

1321(b)(1) requires BOP to operate the Inmate Trust Fund

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‘‘in compliance with the terms of the trust.’’ 31 U.S.C.

§ 1321(b)(1). As the Sixth Circuit has explained, trust funds

may be used ‘‘for any purpose accruing to the benefit of the

inmate body, as a whole, such as amusements, education,

library, or general welfare work.’’ Washington v. Reno, 35

F.3d 1093, 1096 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Department of Justice Circular 2244, Rules Governing the Control of Prisoners[’] Funds at the Several Penal and Correctional Institutions (1932)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Justice, Program Statement 4500.04: Trust Fund/Warehouse/Laundry

Manual, ch. 4504 (1999). BOP may not use trust fund

proceeds to fund security programs because doing so would

deplete funds intended for the benefit of inmates. Washington, 35 F.3d at 1102. But see 18 U.S.C. § 4043 note (2000)

(giving BOP permission to use the Inmate Trust Fund for

specified Inmate Telephone System expenditures, even if

security-related).

Appellants claim that BOP violated 31 U.S.C. § 1321 by

using trust fund monies to obtain second sets of prints for

investigative purposes. According to the district court, it was

undisputed that spending funds in this manner would violate

section 1321. Maydak I, No. 97–2199, slip. op. at 10; see also

Guynup Decl. ¶ 6 (‘‘Using Inmate Trust Fund[ ] mon[ies] to

pay for additional prints for security reasons is prohibited by

Federal Bureau of Prisons policy.’’). The Bureau admitted

misusing the Trust Fund in three instances at two prisons,

but claimed it subsequently reimbursed the Fund. According

to a Beckley official, although staff believed that duplicate

prints were free, they later discovered (in response to inmate

inquiries) that the photo developer charged one dollar per roll

for the second set of prints. The prison then reimbursed the

Fund one dollar for each such roll. Clifton Decl. ¶ 3. At

McKean, the Acting Controller admitted that money from the

Inmate Trust Fund was used to purchase duplicate prints on

two occasions, but explained that those precise amounts had

been reimbursed. Fitch Decl. ¶ ¶ 4–5. Satisfied that BOP

had fully reimbursed the Fund, the district court declined to

allow discovery on an ‘‘unsubstantiated claim of widespread

misuse,’’ and granted summary judgment to BOP. Maydak

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II, No. 97–2199, slip op. at 4. We cannot agree with the

district court’s resolution of this issue.

To begin with, having acknowledged that BOP misused the

Trust Fund in two of some six institutions in which appellants

were incarcerated, the district court appeared to draw—

improperly at the summary judgment stage—an inference in

the government’s favor by ‘‘assum[ing]’’ that all prisons were

complying with BOP policy prohibiting the use of trust funds

for duplicate prints. Maydak II, No. 97–2199, slip op. at 3.

The court also seems to have assumed that Beckley and

McKean had fully compensated the Fund by reimbursing one

dollar per roll for the duplicate photographs and that no trust

funds were implicated in those institutions where the Inmate

Trust Fund was not charged for the second set of prints.

But as appellants and amicus rightly point out, duplicate

prints can be obtained only by paying the full cost of purchasing and developing the film—costs wholly charged to the

Fund. Simply reimbursing extra amounts paid for second

sets of prints does not reflect their actual value. Likewise,

they argue, acquiring duplicate prints for investigative purposes, even for free, constitutes an improper use of the Fund

‘‘because the print is not in reality ‘free,’ but a promotional

offer which belongs to the inmates who have paid for the

print out of inmate trust funds.’’ Amicus Br. at 20. When

two people benefit from a ‘‘buy one, get one free’’ promotion,

neither may claim his item is the one free of charge. We will

thus remand for the district court to determine the proper

reimbursement amount and to consider appellants’ claim that

the Trust Fund was misused at other institutions.

IV.

We have considered appellants’ remaining claims relating

to the inmate photograph file and found them to be without

merit. The grant of summary judgment for the government

with respect to the Privacy Act § 552a(b) claim is affirmed.

In all other respects, the judgment of the district court is

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reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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