Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-04624/USCOURTS-cand-1_15-cv-04624-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Wrongful Death

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

JULIAN MURPHY,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF MENDOCINO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04624-NJV

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 16, 22

Plaintiff Julian Murphy, a minor, by and through Steven Murphy, the duly appointed 

Guardian of the person and estate of Julian Murphy, (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against County 

of Mendocino, City of Fort Bragg, Officer McLaughlin, and Officer Brandon alleging nine causes 

of action for the custodial suicide of Plaintiff‟s father, Shane Allen Murphy (“Decedent”). 

Defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 16 & 22), to which Plaintiff has filed Responses 

(Docs. 21 & 27) in opposition. Defendants have also filed Replies (Docs. 26 & 28). For the 

reasons that follow the Motions to Dismiss are granted. Additionally, Plaintiff will be allowed an 

opportunity to file a first amended complaint.

FACTS AS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT

The Complaint alleges that on October 8, 2014, Shane Allen Murphy died while in custody 

at the Mendocino County Adult Detention Facility, after having been arrested on October 6, 2014. 

Although not stated in the “General Allegations” section of the Complaint, in the “Parties” section 

of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that it was Officers McLaughlin and Brandon who arrested the 

Decedent. According to the Complaint, at the time of arrest, it was apparent to Defendants that the 

Decedent was suicidal and in need of medical care. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Decedent was 

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not provided with adequate medical and psychiatric care upon arrest and while in jail. Finally, 

Plaintiff alleges that upon information and belief, the Decedent was found by other inmates 

hanging by his neck in a holding cell.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

is to test the legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the complaint. A motion to dismiss may be 

brought under Rule 12(b)(6) when the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While Rule 8 “does not require „detailed 

factual allegations,‟” a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 

1955 (2007)). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. Thus, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party must allege facts 

that are “enough to raise a right to above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the 

allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Dismissal of a complaint can be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 

lack of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a 

claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

DISCUSSION

Standing

County of Mendocino moves to dismiss the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and 

Ninth Causes of action, challenging Plaintiff‟s standing to bring these claims. More specifically, 

County of Mendocino argues that:

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[a]ll causes of action in Plaintiff‟s Complaint are Direct Claims in that all are 

brought by Plaintiff in his individual capacity. However, there are no allegations in 

the Complaint that County Defendant had any contact with Plaintiff whatsoever. 

All the factual allegations pled in these causes of action relate to allegations related 

to [Decedent], not Plaintiff.

Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 16) at 3. Plaintiff counters that the allegations contained in the “Complaint 

are sufficient to show that he has standing to assert a wrongful death claim . . . ,” that Plaintiff‟s 

claims under § 1983 are based on the wrongful death of Plaintiff‟s father, and that “Plaintiff [] is 

the son of [Decedent] and a proper plaintiff under [California Civil Procedure Code] § 377.60.” 

Resp. (Doc. 21) at 3-4.

It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to bring these claims through § 1983 as survival 

actions. To be clear, there is no “wrongful death” claim under § 1983. Estate of Lopez ex rel. 

Lopez v. Torres, 105 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“The confusion seems to be in that 

some courts (primarily in unpublished dispositions) have allowed claims for wrongful death under 

§ 1983 to proceed . . . What is clear from these cases is that even if the claim was described in the 

pleadings as a wrongful death claim under section 1983, the courts only allowed such claims to be 

maintained if they were construed as Fourth Amendment excessive force claims.”). However, a 

party may bring a claim on an “individual‟s behalf if the relevant state‟s law authorizes a survival 

action.” Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998), as 

amended (Nov. 24, 1998). “The party seeking to bring a survival action bears the burden of 

demonstrating that a particular state‟s law authorizes a survival action and that the plaintiff meets 

that state‟s requirements for bringing a survival action.” Id. Plaintiff has failed to establish that he 

is authorized to bring a survival claim on Decedent‟s behalf. Plaintiff‟s reliance on his status as 

Decedent‟s son and California Civil Procedure Code] § 377.60 is misplaced, because “section 

377.60 relates to wrongful death actions that are based on personal injuries resulting from the 

death of another, not survival actions that are based on injuries incurred by the decedent.” Hayes 

v. Cty. of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013). 1 The United States Court of Appeals 

 

1 Citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.60 (“A cause of action for the death of a person caused by the 

wrongful act or neglect of another may be asserted by any of the following persons . . .”); Schwarder v. 

United States, 974 F.2d 1118, 1123 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he cause of action granted by Section 377 to 

the heirs and personal representatives of a decedent is not derivative in character or a continuation or 

revival of a cause of action existing in the decedent before his death, but is an original and distinct cause of 

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for the Ninth Circuit specifically rejected a district court‟s reliance on § 377.60 to establish 

standing for a daughter to bring § 1983 claims as a result of her father‟s death. As the court 

explained:

California's statutory requirements for standing to bring a survival action are stated 

under California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.30: “A cause of action that 

survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding 

passes to the decedent's successor in interest ..., and an action may be commenced 

by the decedent's personal representative or, if none, by the decedent's successor in 

interest.” See also Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1093 n. 

2 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Where there is no personal representative for the estate, the 

decedent's „successor in interest‟ may prosecute the survival action if the person 

purporting to act as successor in interest satisfies the requirements of California 

law....”) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 377.30, 377.32). While claiming she is the 

decedent's “sole surviving heir,” Appellant fails to allege that she is her father's 

personal representative or successor in interest. Indeed, Appellant argues only that 

standing is appropriate under section 377.60, not section 377.30. There is no 

indication whether Appellant has filed the affidavit necessary under California law 

to commence a survival action as a decedent's successor in interest, see Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 377.32, . . . 

Hayes, 736 F.3d at 1229. As with the minor daughter in Hayes, Plaintiff has failed to meet his 

burden to establish standing to assert survival claims under California law and through § 1983. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Causes of action are 

DISMISSED.

Further, as “[i]t is axiomatic that standing is a threshold issue that precedes consideration 

of any claim on the merits,” Cotton v. City of Eureka, Cal., No. C 08-04386 SBA, 2010 WL 

5154945, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010), the court will not address Defendants other bases for 

dismissing these specific causes of action. Such arguments are only ripe for consideration if and 

when Plaintiff has established standing.

Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action

Defendants move for dismissal of the Sixth Cause of Action on the basis that Plaintiff has 

failed to properly allege a Monell cause of action. “In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 

 

action granted to the heirs and personal representatives of the decedent to recover damages sustained by 

them by reason of the wrongful death of the decedent.”) (quoting Van Sickel v. United States, 285 F.2d 87, 

90 (9th Cir. 1960)); see also Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 27 F.3d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(“In a survival action, a decedent‟s estate may recover damages on behalf of the decedent for injuries that 

the decedent has sustained. In a wrongful death action, by comparison, the decedent‟s dependents may 

only pursue claims for personal injuries they have suffered as a result of a wrongful death.”).

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Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), [the Supreme] Court held that civil 

rights plaintiffs suing a municipal entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show that their injury was 

caused by a municipal policy or custom.” Los Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 30-

31 (2010). This is because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Polk County v. 

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). 

Plaintiff‟s Sixth Cause of Action fails to identify or allege that his injury was caused by a 

municipal policy or custom, or even the lack of a policy or custom. Accordingly, the requests to 

dismiss the Sixth Cause of Action against County of Mendocino and City of Fort Bragg for failure 

to state a claim are granted.

As to the individual Officer Defendants, this cause of action alleges a loss of familial 

relations. “It is well established that a parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the 

companionship and society of his or her child and that the state‟s interference with that liberty 

interest without due process of law is remediable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Crowe v. Cnty. of San 

Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 441 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). “To amount to a violation 

of substantive due process, however, the harmful conduct must „shock the conscience‟ or „offend 

the community‟s sense of fair play and decency.‟” Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 

1079 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952)). “Mere 

negligence or lack of due care by state officials in the conduct of their duties does not trigger the 

substantive due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore does not state a 

claim under section 1983.” Woodrum v. Woodward Cty., Okl., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 

1989). As Officer Defendants point out, the only allegations made against them in the Complaint 

are that they arrested Decedent and that it was apparent to them at the time of the arrest that 

Decedent was suicidal. There are simply insufficient allegations against the individual Officer 

Defendants to sustain a claim that violated substantive due process through harmful conduct that 

shocked the conscience or offend the community‟s sense of fair play and decency. See e.g.

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998).

Accordingly, the requests to dismiss the Sixth Cause of Action against the individual Officer 

Defendants for failure to state a claim are granted.

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Finally, as to the Seventh Cause of Action, the state-law claim of wrongful death, because 

the court has dismissed all of Plaintiff‟s federal causes of action, the court will decline 

supplemental jurisdiction of this claim. A federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over state law claims “that are so related to claims in the action within [the court‟s] original 

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United 

States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A court may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction, however, where it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In considering whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, a court should 

consider factors such as “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., 

Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted); Roy v. 

Contra Costa Cnty., et al., No. 15-CV-02672-TEH, 2015 WL 5698743, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 

2015). “Comity and precedent in this circuit strongly disfavors exercising supplemental 

jurisdiction. „The Supreme Court has stated, and we have often repeated, that „in the usual case in 

which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point 

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.‟ ” Heatherly v. 

Malika, No. C-11-04125 DMR, 2013 WL 5754106, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2013) (quoting Acri, 

114 F.3d at 1001). Accordingly, the court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

the Seventh Cause of Action. Should Plaintiff, through amendment, establish federal claims, the 

court will address Defendants‟ arguments if Defendants re-raise them in a subsequent motion. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that the Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 16 & 22)

are GRANTED. Plaintiff shall have until on or before March 22, 2016 in which to file a first 

amended complaint. Failure to timely file an amended complaint will result in the court entering 

judgment in Defendants‟ favor.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2016

______________________________________

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

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