Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02632/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02632-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

15cv2632

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGINALD W. WHATLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. ARCINIEGA; DANIEL PARAMO; G. 

STRATTON; S. DAVIS,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:15-cv-02632-BAS-RBB

ORDER:

(1) DISMISSING CLAIMS AND 

DEFENDANTS FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM; AND

(2) DIRECTING UNITED STATES 

MARSHAL SERVICE TO EFFECT 

SERVICE OF FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

I. Procedural History 

On November 23, 2015, Reginald W. Whatley (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated 

at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and 

proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(ECF No. 1). Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 

when he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a certified copy of his inmate trust account 

statement which the Court construed as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2).

/ / /

Case 3:15-cv-02632-BAS-RBB Document 7 Filed 04/26/16 Page 1 of 9
2

15cv2632

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On February 5, 2016, the Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but 

simultaneously DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A (ECF No. 5). On March 31, 2016, Plaintiff filed his First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

As the Court stated in its previous Order, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or 

the payment of any filing fees, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires the 

Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like 

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced 

for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of 

parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after 

docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court 

must sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a complaint, which is frivolous, 

malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether 

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

/ / /

Case 3:15-cv-02632-BAS-RBB Document 7 Filed 04/26/16 Page 2 of 9
3

15cv2632

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n. 7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and 

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations” are simply not 

“sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Claims against Arciniega

As currently pleaded, the Court finds the Eighth Amendment claims against

Defendant Arciniega are sufficient to survive the “low threshold” for proceeding past the 

Case 3:15-cv-02632-BAS-RBB Document 7 Filed 04/26/16 Page 3 of 9
4

15cv2632

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm v. 

Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33, 

837 (1994) (Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of inmates, and has been interpreted to include the affirmative duty 

to protect prisoners from serious risks of harm).

Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Arciniega made statements in front of other 

inmates with the intent of provoking violence against Plaintiff. Arciniega allegedly said

to Plaintiff in front of other inmates “why don’t you tell your buddies what you in prison 

for[;] it’s some foul shit,” and later told inmates that Plaintiff was in prison for child 

molestation. Other inmates then began calling Plaintiff a “‘chester’ every day on the yard 

everywhere” causing Plaintiff to fear violence from other inmates. (See FAC at 14.) 

An Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim requires the plaintiff to show that 

an “official’s act or omission . . . cause[d] ‘a substantial risk of serious harm,’” and that 

the official was “subjectively aware of that risk,” yet acted with “‘deliberate indifference 

to inmate health or safety.’” Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). A defendant may have the requisite knowledge of an actual 

risk to an inmate’s safety “from the very fact the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

842. The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged, in the context of a due process claim, that 

“[w]e can hardly conceive of a state’s action bearing more ‘stigmatizing consequences’ 

than the labelling of a prison inmate as a sex offender.” Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 

829 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 

1989) (deliberately labeling a prisoner as a snitch in the presence of other inmates may 

state a claim for violation of right to be protected from violence while in state custody).

In this case, Plaintiff contends that Arciniega was aware of the risk that his statements 

presented for Plaintiff’s safety, and that Arciniega intended for his statements to provoke 

violence against Plaintiff. The Court finds this is sufficient to state a claim under the 

Eighth Amendment.

Accordingly, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service on Plaintiff’s 

Case 3:15-cv-02632-BAS-RBB Document 7 Filed 04/26/16 Page 4 of 9
5

15cv2632

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, 

and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order 

that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is 

authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

D. Claims against Defendants Paramo, Stratton and Davis

Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Stratton and Davis liable because they allegedly 

failed to interview one of Plaintiff’s witnesses and this resulted in an unfavorable 

response to Plaintiff’s grievance. (See FAC 12-13.) To the extent that Plaintiff is 

alleging that this violates his Eighth Amendment rights, he fails to state a claim. Merely

responding unfavorably to a grievance does not necessarily rise to the level of being 

“deliberately indifferent” to a serious risk of harm. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 

1085 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (Prison 

officials must be “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”)). There are 

no facts alleged that show that either Stratton or Davis were personally aware of any 

substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. 

To the extent that Plaintiff is alleging that the failure to interview a specific witness 

and adequately address the claims within his grievance violates his Fourteenth 

Amendment due process rights, he has failed to state a claim. While the Fourteenth 

Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 

property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, “[t]he requirements 

of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 

408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners 

liberty or property interests sufficient to invoke due process protection. Meachum v. 

Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, to state a procedural due process claim, 

Plaintiff must allege: “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a 

deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.” Wright v. 

Case 3:15-cv-02632-BAS-RBB Document 7 Filed 04/26/16 Page 5 of 9
6

15cv2632

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no protected property interest in an 

inmate grievance procedure arising directly from the Due Process Clause. See Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional 

entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure”) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 

639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment creates “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance 

procedure”)). Even the non-existence of, or the failure of prison officials to properly

implement, an administrative appeals process within the prison system does not raise 

constitutional concerns. Mann, 855 F.2d at 640. 

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that Defendants

Davis and Stratton deprived him of a protected liberty interest by allegedly failing to 

respond to his particular prison grievance in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty 

interest can arise from state law or prison regulations, Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-27, due 

process protections are implicated only if Plaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants: 

(1) restrained his freedom in a manner not expected from his sentence, and (2) 

“impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents 

of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Here, Plaintiff pleads no 

facts to suggest how Defendants’ allegedly inadequate review or failure to consider 

inmate grievances restrained his freedom in any way, or subjected him to any “atypical” 

and “significant hardship.” Id. at 483-84.

Moreover to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Paramo, Stratton and 

Davis liable in their supervisory capacities, the claims against these Defendants must be 

dismissed. “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must 

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual 

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Jones v. Cmty. 

Redev. Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se 

plaintiffs must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which 

Case 3:15-cv-02632-BAS-RBB Document 7 Filed 04/26/16 Page 6 of 9
7

15cv2632

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defendants engaged in” to state a claim).

Plaintiff’s FAC fails to allege sufficient factual allegations as to what these 

Defendants personally did, or failed to do, to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 “demands more than an unadorned, 

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and that “[t]o survive a motion to 

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570).

Plaintiff’s pleading must include sufficient “factual content which allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the [defendant is] liable for the misconduct 

alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and he must describe personal acts by each Defendant 

showing a direct causal connection to a violation of specific constitutional rights. 

Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Taylor v. 

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Causation is, of course, a required element of 

a § 1983 claim.” Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). 

A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of his subordinates if 

the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and 

with deliberate indifference failed to prevent them. Maxwell, 708 F.3d at 1086. For all 

these stated reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Paramo, Stratton and 

Davis are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim, and must be dismissed pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 

621 F.3d at 1004.

III. Conclusion and Order

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS the following:

1. The claims against Defendants Paramo, Stratton and Davis are DISMISSED

Case 3:15-cv-02632-BAS-RBB Document 7 Filed 04/26/16 Page 7 of 9
8

15cv2632

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Furthermore, this dismissal will be WITH PREJUDICE

as Plaintiff has already been given an opportunity to amend the complaint, and granting 

leave to amend would not cure the deficiencies noted. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home 

Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 

552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009). The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Defendants

Paramo, Stratton and Davis from the Court’s docket.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint (ECF No. 6) upon Defendant Arciniega and forward it to Plaintiff along with a 

blank U.S. Marshal (“USM”) Form 285. In addition, the Clerk is directed to provide 

Plaintiff with a certified copy of the Order granting Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP, a 

certified copy of his First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6), and the summons so that he 

may serve the named Defendant. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff is directed 

to complete the Form 285 as completely and accurately as possible, and to return it to the 

United States Marshal according to the instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter 

accompanying his IFP package. 

3. Upon receipt, the U.S. Marshal is ORDERED to serve a copy of the First 

Amended Complaint and summons upon the named Defendant as directed by Plaintiff on 

the USM Form 285. All costs of service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).

4. Defendant is thereafter ORDERED to reply to Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be 

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any 

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has 

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and 

thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that 

Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant is required 

Case 3:15-cv-02632-BAS-RBB Document 7 Filed 04/26/16 Page 8 of 9
9

15cv2632

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to respond).

5. Plaintiff must serve upon the Defendant or, if appearance has been entered by 

counsel, upon Defendant’s counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document 

submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff must include with the original paper to 

be filed with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the manner in which a true and 

correct copy of the document was served on the Defendant, or counsel for Defendant, and 

the date of that service. Any paper received by the Court which has not been properly filed 

with the Clerk, or which fails to include a Certificate of Service, may be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: April 26, 2016

Case 3:15-cv-02632-BAS-RBB Document 7 Filed 04/26/16 Page 9 of 9