Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00691/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00691-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL MORENO, et. al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

ROSS ISLAND SAND & GRAVEL CO., 

et. al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-00691-KJM-KJN 

ORDER 

Defendant Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co. brings this motion to quash plaintiff 

Jared Mitchell’s writ of execution, which orders Ross Island to pay his $1.5 million damages 

judgment. ECF Nos. 256–259. Ross Island also seeks to clarify the judgment and for a 

protective order limiting post-judgment discovery. Id.; Mot. Protective Order, ECF No. 270. The 

plaintiffs oppose all three motions. ECF Nos. 260–61, 263, 272. The motions were submitted 

without oral argument. ECF No. 262. The motion to quash is denied, the motion to clarify is 

granted, and the motion for a protective order is denied as moot. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Michael Moreno and his stepson Jared Mitchell were injured in a boating accident 

after the boat Michael Moreno was driving hit Ross Island’s dredge pipeline. Deanna Moreno, 

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Michael Moreno’s wife and Jared Mitchell’s mother, suffered emotional distress. The plaintiffs’ 

negligence claim against Ross Island proceeded to trial. Contrary to the usual course in an 

admiralty suit, the case was tried to a jury in light of the unusual procedural circumstances 

presented. See Order on Summ. J. 20–30, ECF No. 136. On November 3, 2015, the jury found 

Michael Moreno had sustained $400,000.00 in damages; Jared Mitchell $1.5 million; and Deanna 

Moreno $25,000.00. ECF No. 238. The jury assigned ninety percent of the fault for the accident 

to Michael Moreno and ten percent to Ross Island. Id.

Following the jury’s verdict, the parties filed proposed forms of judgment and trial 

briefs in support of their proposals. ECF Nos. 245–248. The court did not specifically address 

the briefs and ordered “[t]hat judgment is hereby entered in accordance with the jury verdict 

rendered 11/3/2015.” ECF No. 250. After the entry of judgment, Jared Mitchell requested and 

was granted a writ of execution for $1.5 million in general damages. ECF No. 255. In response, 

Ross Island filed ex parte applications for an order to stay enforcement of the writ of execution 

pending its motions to quash and for clarification, ECF No. 256; see also ECF Nos. 257–259. 

The court stayed execution of the judgment and writ of execution pending resolution of Ross 

Island’s motions. ECF No. 262. The plaintiffs filed a combined brief, as the court ordered, in 

opposition to Ross Island’s motions. ECF No. 263. Ross Island replied. ECF No. 265. 

Ross Island also moves for a protective order limiting post-judgment discovery. 

ECF No. 270. It argues many of the plaintiffs’ discovery requests are irrelevant or meant not to 

collect useful information, but to harass. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. Writs of Execution 

“A money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution unless the court directs 

otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). No federal statute governs here, so state procedural law 

applies. See id.; see also Century 21 Real Estate, LLC v. All Prof’l Realty, Inc., No. 11-2497, 

2013 WL 3146805, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2013); Office Depot, Inc. v. Zuccarini, 621 F. Supp. 

2d 773, 775 (N.D. Cal. 2007). In California, a party enforces a money judgment by writ of 

execution. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 699.010, 699.510. A court can recall and quash a writ of 

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execution if it was improperly ordered. Evans v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty., 20 Cal. 2d 186, 188 

(1942); see also Dakota Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz, 192 Cal. App. 4th 493, 508 (2011) (void 

portion of judgment can be stricken and severed from valid judgment); Plaza Hollister Ltd. v. 

Cty. of San Benito, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1, 21 (1999) (court can declare void judgment null at any 

time); Jones v. World Life Research Inst., 60 Cal. App. 3d 836, 840 (1976) (writ of execution 

improper when issued to enforce a void judgment; writ of execution may be recalled if 

improvidently issued). Whether a motion to quash is granted is left to the district court’s 

discretion. United States v. Watson, 29 F. App’x 455, 456 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. 

Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1499 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

B. Clarifications of Judgment 

The court may interpret and explain a judgment to guide the parties without 

express reliance on any particular statute or rule. See Bordallo v. Reyes, 763 F.2d 1098, 1101–02 

(9th Cir. 1985). This type of relief is available as long as the clarification would not work a 

substantive change in the result. See id. (Governor’s request to clarify whether court’s judgment 

was declaratory or mandatory was not request to alter or amend judgment). 

In the alternative, the court can clarify the judgment here under Rule 60(a), which 

allows for the correction of “a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission,” 

including on the court’s own motion.1 The Ninth Circuit takes a broad approach to what 

constitutes a correctable mistake under Rule 60(a). Tattersalls, 745 F.3d at 1297–98 (9th Cir. 

2014) (explaining that a “clerical error” covers more than inadvertent omissions or 

miscalculations); see also Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 879 F.2d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 1989) (request 

for court to memorialize decision it inadvertently omitted not a request for altering or amending 

judgment and court’s clarification was not substantive change). Thus, a lower court can clarify a 

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 Rule 59(e) does not apply given the circumstances here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A 

motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the 

judgment”). The court entered judgment in this case on December 28, 2015. ECF No. 250. The 

writ of execution was issued February 8, 2016, and the defendants did not oppose the writ until 

February 11, 2016. The same time constraints do not apply to a Rule 60(a) motion. See 

Tattersalls, Ltd. v. DeHaven, 745 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 2014). 

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judgment as provided by Rule 60(a) to “reflect the necessary implications of the original order.” 

Id. at 1298 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The touchstone of Rule 60(a) . . . is fidelity 

to the intent behind the original judgment.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION 

The parties’ motions raise three questions: first, whether Ross Island is responsible 

for the entirety of Jared Mitchell’s $1.5 million award or just a 10 percent share, the value 

assigned by the jury; second, whether the judgment entitles Ross Island to contribution, 

indemnity, or apportionment from Michael Moreno; and third, whether a protective order is 

necessary. 

A. Whether Federal or State Law Applies 

The parties dispute whether federal or state law controls the question of Ross 

Island’s liability to Jared Mitchell. Ross Island claims California Civil Code section 1431.2(a) 

controls and limits recovery to its proportionate share of liability. Def.’s Resp. Br. at 2–5, ECF 

No. 247. The plaintiffs argue federal maritime law controls and allows them to recover fully 

from any person who caused the injury. Pls.; Resp. Br. at 2, ECF No. 248. 

General federal maritime law applies in this case. Order Oct. 29, 2015, at 2, ECF 

No. 217; see also Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953) (although plaintiff was 

injured within Pennsylvania “and ordinarily his rights would be determined by Pennsylvania 

law,” federal law governed both substantive and procedural aspects of action because basis of his 

injury was “a maritime tort”); Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1985) (general 

federal maritime law applies in personal injury cases). That law provides that two parties are 

concurrent tortfeasors or “jointly responsible wrongdoers” when they both are liable for causing 

the same injury to the same plaintiff. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 

443 U.S. 256, 260 (1976); Miller v. Christopher, 887 F.2d 902, 904 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff 

may recover her full damages from any one responsible person. Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 260; 

Miller, 887 F.2d at 904. 

Ross Island disagrees, and would have the court look to state law. Although 

federal courts may look to state law in admiralty cases, such an inquiry is “constrained by a soCase 2:13-cv-00691-KJM-KJN Document 275 Filed 06/30/16 Page 4 of 9
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called ‘reverse-Erie’ doctrine” that requires state substantive remedies to fit applicable federal 

maritime laws. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223 (1986); accord Pope & 

Talbot, 346 U.S. at 409–10 (“[A] state may not deprive a person of any substantial admiralty 

rights . . . .”). Here, federal law provides for joint and several liability and allows a plaintiff to 

recover full damages from any one tortfeasor. Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 260. This court may not 

adopt a California rule that would deprive the plaintiffs of this federal right. 

Ross Island reads Edmonds too narrowly when it argues that decision is limited to 

the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Reply Mot. Quash at 2–5, ECF 

No. 265. Although Edmonds was decided in the context of the Longshoremen’s Act, the Court’s 

decision called on general principles developed outside that context. See 443 U.S. at 263 (Court 

“unpersuaded” that Congress wanted to change “‘long-established and familiar principl[e]’ of 

maritime law by imposing a proportionate-fault rule” (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 

U.S. 779, 783 (1952))); id. at 269 (agreeing a ship would be liable for all of plaintiff’s damages 

even though “its negligence may have been only a minor cause of the injury”). After Edmonds, 

the Court has upheld its application of joint and several liability in the broader context of 

maritime torts. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220–21 (1994) (distinguishing 

Edmonds because it involved no settlement and reasoning “there is no tension between joint and 

several liability and a proportionate share approach to settlements”). While the McDermott Court 

did describe Edmonds as “primarily a statutory construction case,” 511 U.S. at 220, this statement 

cannot be read in isolation to contradict the McDermott Court’s broader conclusion that joint and 

several liability principles apply in cases of multiple wrongdoers. Id. The Ninth Circuit has also 

addressed and upheld application of the same rule. In Miller v. Christopher, the circuit allowed a 

plaintiff to recover a full judgment from one of two concurrent tortfeasors “regardless of the 

comparative degree of fault” and explained that contribution was the “appropriate device” to 

adjust damages based on fault. 887 F.2d at 904.2

 

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 In this context, contribution is “[o]ne tortfeasor’s right to collect from joint tortfeasors 

when—and to the extent that—the tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate share to 

the injured party, the shares being determined as the percentages of causal fault.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary 378 (9th ed. 2009). 

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Finally, the court cannot agree with Ross Island that Martin By and Through 

Martin v. United States, 984 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1993), applies here. Martin was a Federal Tort 

Claims Act case. See generally id. Federal courts apply state law in Federal Tort Claims Act 

cases, but again, state law is not controlling in admiralty cases. See Pope & Talbot, 346 U.S. 

at 409–10. 

The judgment was valid under maritime law. Jared Mitchell can recover the full 

amount of his damages from Ross Island. The same law applies to Deanna Moreno. 

B. Contribution, Indemnity, or Apportionment 

Having found no reason to quash the writ of execution, the court now addresses 

whether Ross Island’s request is appropriate in the context of a motion to clarify the judgment; 

whether the law supports Ross Island’s request; and whether the court may look to the jury’s 

verdict to reach a decision. 

1. Clarifying the Judgment 

As noted, the court can clarify a judgment as long as its clarification is clerical and 

not substantive. Tattersalls, 745 F.3d at 1297–98; Bordallo, 763 F.2d at 1101–02. A clerical 

change corrects a “blunder[] in execution,” Tattersalls, 745 F.3d at 1297 (quoting Blanton v. 

Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1577, n.2 (9th Cir. 1987)), whereas a substantive change reflects a 

change of mind, id. As an example of a clerical change, in Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 

709 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1983), the trial court had denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel a 

deposition witness’s answers. Id. at 526. Once judgment was entered, the defendant requested an 

amendment to include a ruling on its request for an award of deposition expenses as sanctions. 

Id. The trial court amended the judgment to include its denial of defendant’s motion for 

sanctions. Id. This was a “clerical” change. Id. at 527. By contrast, in Munden v. Ultra-Alaska 

Associations, 849 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit found a request to change the actual 

costs awarded in a trial court’s judgment was substantive, not clerical. Id. at 387. 

Here, Ross Island requests a clarification of its liability with respect to Jared 

Mitchell’s money judgment. ECF No. 259. As in Transamerican, the court here can clarify its 

ruling on Ross Island’s pre-judgment counterclaim. The order Ross Island seeks would not 

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represent a substantive change, because it would not represent a change in the amount of total 

damages or alter the jury’s assignment of fault. In other words, Ross Island does not ask the court 

to “change its mind,” or more precisely that of the jury. Instead, it is asking for a clarification of 

the law that applies. 

2. Whether Ross Island Can Seek Contribution, Indemnity, or Apportionment 

Ross Island seeks contribution, indemnity, or apportionment from Michael 

Moreno.3 Mot. Clarification at 6–9, ECF No. 259; Def.’s Reply at 6–7, ECF No. 265. The 

plaintiffs claim Ross Island waived its right to apportionment because it did not object to the 

verdict form, which did not distinguish between economic and non-economic damages. Pls.’ 

Opp’n at 7–8, ECF No. 260. Ross Island argues it preserved its right to apportionment by 

asserting its affirmative defenses and cross-claim, Mot. Clarification at 6–9, and because the jury 

was instructed on comparative fault, Def.’s Reply at 7. 

In federal maritime law, a tortfeasor who pays more than his apportioned share of 

damages can seek contribution from another person who is at fault but who has not paid his share. 

Miller, 887 F.2d at 904. The Supreme Court’s decision in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz 

Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974), addressed the circumstances under which one joint tortfeasor 

can seek contribution. There the Court upheld the “well-established maritime rule allowing 

contribution between joint tortfeasors.” Id. at 113. The Court wrote, “Contribution rests on a 

finding of concurrent fault.” Id. at 115. Here, the jury found Ross Island and Michael Moreno 

were both negligent, and it found Michael Moreno’s negligence was a “contributory factor” in 

causing the accident that injured Jared Mitchell. Verdict at 2, ECF No. 238. Ross Island may 

therefore seek contribution from Michael Moreno. 

The cases the plaintiffs cite to reach the contrary conclusion are not controlling 

because they were decided in the context of California law, which the plaintiffs have otherwise 

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 Ross Island has suggested plaintiffs’ counsel faces a conflict of interest. It points out 

that Jared Mitchell may advocate for payment of his attorney’s fees by his co-plaintiffs if Ross 

Island can hold Michael Moreno accountable for his proportionate share of fault. Mot. 

Clarification at 7. The plaintiffs have not responded to this suggestion. The court does not 

address this issue at this time. 

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argued correctly, is not applicable here. See, e.g., C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1031–32 

(9th Cir. 2014); Opp’n at 7–8. Ross Island may seek contribution from Michael Moreno. 

3. Counterclaim Against Michael Moreno 

Ross Island filed a counterclaim against Michael Moreno before the trial began. 

ECF No. 32. Ross Island claimed it would be entitled to indemnity, apportionment, or 

contribution from Michael Moreno if he were found responsible for the judgment. Id. at 5. Ross 

Island also requested a set-off for damages proximately caused by Michael Moreno’s negligence. 

Id. It specifically requested an order (1) declaring its rights to indemnity, apportionment, or 

contribution from Michael Moreno; (2) requiring Michael Moreno to pay the amount of the 

judgment; and, (3) awarding any other equitable and just relief. Id. at 5–6. The plaintiffs denied 

Ross Island’s claims. ECF No. 43. 

If a counterclaim is presented to a jury, including by assertion of an affirmative 

defense, the court may defer to the jury’s factual findings when ruling on that counterclaim. See

Yamashita-Shinnihon Kisen, K.K. Tokyo v. W. J. Jones & Son, Inc., 474 F.2d 847, 853 

(9th Cir. 1973). Here, Ross Island counterclaimed that Michael Moreno’s negligence caused the 

accident and that he should be held responsible for his part of any judgment. ECF No. 32. The 

jury was asked to determine whether Michael Moreno was negligent, whether his negligence was 

a “contributory factor in causing the accident” and, if so, what percentage of responsibility it 

would assign to him. ECF No. 238. The jury found Michael Moreno negligent and that his 

negligence was a contributory factor, and assigned him 90 percent of the responsibility for the 

harm suffered. Id. Thus, in response to Ross Island’s request for an order, and deferring to the 

jury’s determination, Yamashita, 474 F.2d at 853, the court agrees that Ross Island is entitled to 

contribution from Michael Moreno. 

IV. PROTECTIVE ORDER 

Ross Island’s motion for a protective order was filed without the benefit of the 

court’s decision here, as was the remainder of the parties’ briefing and the associated postjudgment discovery requests. In these circumstances, the prudent course is to deny Ross Island’s 

motion as moot. Any further post-judgment discovery disputes shall be adjudicated according to 

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the Local Rules of this district as they would normally apply if judgment had not yet been 

entered. 

V. CONCLUSION 

The motion to quash Jared Mitchell’s writ of execution is DENIED. The judgment 

is CLARIFIED to read that Jared Mitchell and Deanna Moreno may recover the full amount of 

their damages from Ross Island. However, Ross Island’s request for an order declaring its rights 

is also GRANTED: Ross Island is entitled to contribution from Michael Moreno for his ninety 

percent proportionate share of liability. Ross Island’s motion for a protective order is DENIED 

AS MOOT. Any further post-judgment discovery disputes shall be adjudicated according to the 

Local Rules of this district that would apply if judgment had not yet been entered. 

This order resolves ECF Nos. 258, 259, and 270. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 29, 2016. 

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