Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00550/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00550-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARMEN JOHN PALMIERI,

CDCR # V-19689 Civil

No. 13cv550-MMA (DHB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS; AND

(2) DISMISSING ACTION FOR

SEEKING MONETARY

DAMAGES AGAINST

DEFENDANTS WHO ARE

IMMUNE AND FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) &

1915A(b)

vs.

SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO

COUNTY, et al., 

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at California Men’s Colony in

San Luis Obispo, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.)

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of

the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing

fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure

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to pay only if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007);

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless

of whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(b)(1) & 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account

statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s

trust account statement shows that he has insufficient funds from which to pay an

initial partial filing fee.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, (ECF No.

2), and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the

Court further orders the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to garnish the entire $350 balance of the filing fees owed in

this case, collect and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the

installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. §

1915 also obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP

and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] 

accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or

the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,”

“as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any prisoner

civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous,

malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are

immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

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1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446

n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

First, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking money damages based on rulings

made by San Diego Superior Court Judges, these Defendants1

 are absolutely immune. 

“Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from

damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope,

793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, as Superior Court Judges for the

State of California, these Defendants have absolute immunity from civil proceedings

relating to these actions, which were performed within their judicial discretion. 

Second, to the extent that he is challenging the rulings made by the San Diego

Superior Court Judges in how the receivership of his companies were handled, he

cannot state a viable § 1983 claim. Throughout his Complaint, Plaintiff is claiming

constitutional violations arising from the rulings made by San Diego Superior Court

Judges. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “‘a losing party in state court is

barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state

judgment in a United States District Court, based on the losing party’s claim that the

state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’” Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038,

1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)),

cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 868 (1999); see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 & 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.

413, 416 (1923). 

Review of state court decisions may only be conducted in the United States

Supreme Court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476 & 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; see 28

U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar applies even if the complaint

raises federal constitutional issues. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16 & 486; Henrichs v.

Valley View Development, 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007). More specifically, the

1

 Plaintiff has named “Superior Court of San Diego County” as a Defendant. The Court has

construed this to be a claim against the various San Diego Superior Court Judges Plaintiff has identified

throughout the Complaint.

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bar applies if the challenge to the state court decision is brought as a § 1983 civil

rights action alleging violations of due process and equal protection. See Branson v.

Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995); Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805

F.2d 888, 893 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A complaint challenges a state court decision if the constitutional claims

presented to the district court are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s

decision in a judicial proceeding. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16. “[T]he federal

claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment if the federal claim

succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” 

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring); see also

Worldwide Church of God, 805 F.2d at 891-92.

Because Plaintiff appears to seek this Court’s assistance in overturning orders

made by San Diego Superior Court Judges, his claims are inextricably intertwined

with the state court proceedings, and are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Plaintiff also seeks to hold liable the Superior Court of San Diego County as a

whole for the actions claimed in his Complaint. However, an agency or department of

a municipal entity is not a proper defendant under § 1983. Vance v. County of Santa

Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Rather, the County itself is the proper

defendant. See id. “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs

a tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on

a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658, 691 (1978). 

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or

injunctive relief where a constitutional deprivation was caused by the implementation

or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially

adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board of

the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (“[A] plaintiff must

show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and

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must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the

deprivation of federal rights.”); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995).

Thus, to plead liability on behalf of the County, Plaintiff must allege: (1) he

was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the County had a policy; (3) the policy

amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the

policy was the “moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate

of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); Brown, 520 U.S. at 404; Trevino v.

Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Put another way, in order to state a § 1983

claim against the County of San Diego, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that his

injury was caused by individual county officers whose conduct both violated the

constitution and conformed to an official county policy, custom or practice. See

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). All

these things he has failed to do. 

Plaintiff’s claims for money damages also challenge the validity of his criminal

conviction. In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction,

Plaintiff must show that his criminal conviction has already been invalidated. Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such

a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no

cause of action under § 1983....’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489), cert. denied, 124

S. Ct. 2388 (2004). 

 Heck holds that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or

called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck,

512 U.S. at 486-87. A claim for damages challenging the legality of a conviction or

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable. Id. at 487; Edwards v.

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Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit,

the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if

the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even

if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any

outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the

action should be allowed to proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action that is barred by Heck should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new

action if he succeeds in invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

Here, Plaintiff’s claims “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his criminal

conviction. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Accordingly, because Plaintiff seeks damages for

an allegedly unconstitutional criminal conviction and because he has not alleged that

his conviction has already been invalidated, a claim for damages has not yet accrued.

See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90.

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking to bring claims under California

state law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these pendent

state claims at this time because Plaintiff cannot identify a violation of federal law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers of America v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, ...

the state claims should be dismissed as well.”); Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d

999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[O]nce judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention of

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.”)

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be

dismissed sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and

for seeking monetary damages against immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d

at 446 n.1.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF

No. 2) is GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the

$350 balance of the filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from

the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s

income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the

account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS

SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED

TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey

Beard, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S

Street, Suite 502, Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary damages

against an immune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A(b).

5. Plaintiff is GRANTED forty-five (45) days leave from the date this Order

is filed in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of

pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself

without reference to his original Complaint. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants

not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered

waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff fails to file

an Amended Complaint within 45 days, this action shall remain dismissed without

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further Order by the Court.

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a copy of a Court

approved § 1983 civil rights complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 21, 2013

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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