Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02298/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02298-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARGARET NOYES WEBB, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:17-cv-2298-GPC (RNB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMMENDATION 

REGARDING CROSS-MOTIONS 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 16, 20) 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel, 

United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

On November 13, 2017, plaintiff Margaret Noyes Webb filed a Complaint pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying her application for supplemental security income (“SSI”). (See ECF No. 

1.) 

Now pending before the Court and ready for decision are the parties’ cross-motions 

for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court recommends that 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the 

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decision of the Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative 

proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 6, 2014, plaintiff filed an application for SSI under Title XVI of the Social 

Security Act, alleging disability beginning August 1, 2011. (Certified Administrative 

Record [“AR”] 221-26.) After her application was denied initially and upon 

reconsideration (AR 135-38, 140-45), plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before 

an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (AR 146.) An administrative hearing was held on 

June 20, 2016; plaintiff was represented by counsel and testimony was taken from her and 

a vocational expert (“VE”). (AR 34-80.) A supplemental administrative hearing was held 

on September 14, 2016; at this hearing, plaintiff was represented by different counsel and 

testimony was taken from her, a medical expert, and a different VE. (AR 81-108.) 

As reflected in his November 23, 2016 decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not 

been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since March 6, 2014, the date 

her application was filed. (AR 13-23.) The ALJ’s decision became final on September 15, 

2017, when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-6.) This 

timely civil action followed. 

SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 6, 2014, the application date.1

 (AR 

15.) 

                                               

1

 SSI is not payable prior to the month following the month in which the application 

is filed. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.335.

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At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe medically 

determinable impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine, and 

carpal tunnel syndrome. (AR 15.) 

At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 16-18.) 

Next, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

to perform light work with the following additional limitations: 

“[C]laimant can stand and walk for a total of two to four hours in an 

eight-hour day, and requires a five minute break for every hour of sitting. The 

claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The 

claimant cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolding. The claimant can 

occasionally perform gross handling and forceful grasping with her left (nondominant) upper extremity.” (AR 18.) 

For purposes of his step four determination, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s 

testimony at the June hearing that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile 

and RFC would be unable to perform the exertional demands of plaintiff’s past relevant 

work as a janitor or industrial cleaner. Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff was unable 

to perform any past relevant work. (AR 21-22.) 

The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation process. Based on 

the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC 

could perform the requirements of occupations that existed in significant numbers in the 

national economy (i.e., parking lot cashier and furniture rental consultant), the ALJ found 

that plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 22-23.) 

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS OF ERROR 

As reflected in plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, the two claims of error that 

plaintiff is raising as the grounds for reversal and remand are as follows: 

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 1. Assuming arguendo the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial 

evidence, the ALJ erred at step five of the Commissioner’s sequential evaluation process 

by improperly applying the Commissioner’s Medical-Vocational Guidelines, also known 

as the “grids.” (See ECF No. 16-1 at 5-9; see also ECF No. 23 at 1-4.) 

 2. In determining plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinions 

of plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Potwardowski. (See ECF No. 16-1 at 9-33.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

(9th Cir. 1984). 

DISCUSSION 

 1. The ALJ did not improperly apply the grids at step five. 

 The Court’s conclusion below that, in determining plaintiff’s physical RFC, the ALJ 

failed to follow the proper legal standard in evaluating the opinions of plaintiff’s treating 

physician would normally render it unnecessary to reach the other claim of error raised by 

plaintiff as a ground for reversal and remand. However, since plaintiff raised the ALJ’s 

alleged step five error as her first claim of error and since she only addressed that alleged 

error in her Reply Brief, the Court will address it. 

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 The gravamen of plaintiff’s claim appears to be that, even assuming arguendo the 

ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ erred by using the 

grid rule for light work as his framework for decision-making. According to plaintiff, the 

ALJ’s finding that she could only stand and/or walk two to four hours in an eight-hour day 

sufficiently eroded the light occupational base to warrant the application of the grid rule 

for sedentary work, which would have directed a finding of “disabled.” 

The Court concurs with the Commissioner that the ALJ did not err. To the extent 

that plaintiff’s exertional limitations placed her somewhere between two grid rules, the 

ALJ properly consulted the VE regarding whether plaintiff could perform substantial 

gainful work in the economy. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-12(2)(c) (“In 

situations where the rules would direct different conclusions, and the individual’s 

exertional limitations are somewhere ‘in the middle’ in terms of the regulatory criteria for 

exertional ranges of work, . . . [vocational specialist] assistance is advisable for these types 

of cases.”); Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2000) (“SSR 83-12 directs that 

when a claimant falls between two grids, consultation with a VE is appropriate.”); see also

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding substantial evidence 

supported ALJ’s non-disability finding where claimant fell between two grid rules and ALJ 

therefore obtained VE testimony in accordance with procedure articulated in Moore). 

 At the second administrative hearing, the ALJ posited to the VE a hypothetical 

individual with plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC. The VE testified 

that such an individual could still perform such representative occupations as parking lot 

cashier and furniture rental consultant, which respectively represented 15,000 and 52,000 

jobs in the national economy. (AR 104-05.) Consistent with SSR 00-4p, the expert further 

affirmed that her testimony was consistent with the information found within the 

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). (AR 105.) Consequently, the ALJ reasonably 

accepted the expert’s testimony in finding that plaintiff could still perform work that 

existed in significant numbers, and thus was not disabled. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 

F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A VE’s recognized expertise provides the necessary 

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foundation for his or her testimony” and, therefore, “no additional foundation is 

required.”). 

 

 2. The ALJ did not properly evaluate the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physician. 

 The medical evidence of record included three form assessments of plaintiff’s RFC 

provided by plaintiff’s longtime treating physician, Dr. Potwardowski. The assessments 

were dated, respectively, March 26, 2014, February 24, 2015, and June 13, 2016. (AR 

641-43, 756-58, 2391-93.) As succinctly summarized by the ALJ:

“The forms completed by Dr. Potwardowski limited the claimant to no more 

than two hours of standing or walking in an eight-hour day, no more than two 

hours of sitting in an eight hour day, and stated the claimant needed the ability 

to shift positions at will. . . . The doctor was of the opinion the claimant could 

‘rarely’ lift less than 10 pounds, had postural limitations, and had significant 

limitations with reaching, handling or fingering with either upper extremity. . 

. . Additionally, Dr. Potwardowski indicated the claimant had symptoms 

which frequently interfere with attention and concentration for even simple 

work tasks,2

 and if employed, she would likely miss more than 4 days per 

month due to her impairments.” (AR 20.) 

 The law is well established in this Circuit that a treating physician’s opinion is 

entitled to special weight because a treating physician is employed to cure and has a greater 

opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. See McAllister v. Sullivan, 

888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). “The treating physician’s opinion is not, however, 

necessarily conclusive as to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability.” 

                                               

2

 In a footnote, the ALJ noted that the record did not provide any objective support, 

such as mental status findings in connection with psychiatric or other care, to support the 

asserted concentration limits. Accordingly, the ALJ stated, he was not including any such 

limitations in his RFC determination. (See AR 20 n. 1.) The Court concurs with the ALJ’s 

reasoning in this regard and accordingly is confining its analysis of plaintiff’s second claim 

of error to the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions regarding plaintiff’s 

physical RFC.

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Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). If the treating physician’s 

opinion is uncontroverted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for “clear and 

convincing” reasons. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.3d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). Where a treating physician’s opinion is 

controverted, it may be rejected only if the ALJ makes findings setting forth specific and 

legitimate reasons that are based on the substantial evidence of record. See, e.g., Reddick 

v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A treating physician’s opinion on disability, 

even if controverted, can be rejected only with specific and legitimate reasons supported 

by substantial evidence in the record.”); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751; Winans v. Bowen, 

853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Here, Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions to the effect that plaintiff was incapable of even 

sedentary work were controverted by the opinions of the consultative examiner and the two 

State agency physicians, who opined that plaintiff was capable of a significant range of 

medium work activity. (See AR 115-17, 128-29, 648.) Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions 

regarding plaintiff’s physical RFC were also controverted by the opinion testimony of the 

medical advisor at the second administrative hearing regarding plaintiff’s RFC, which the 

ALJ generally accepted. (See AR 88-89.) In his decision, the ALJ stated that he was 

according “little weight” to the opinions of Dr. Potwardowski. (AR 20.) Under the 

authorities set forth above, the question thus becomes whether the ALJ set forth specific 

and legitimate reasons for his rejection of Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions regarding 

plaintiff’s physical RFC that are based on the substantial evidence of record. 

 In this regard, the Court notes that the ALJ’s stated rationale for rejecting Dr. 

Potwardowski’s opinions regarding plaintiff’s physical RFC was as follows: 

“Generally, the ‘medical opinion’ as defined in 20 CFR 416.927(a), (see also 

SSR 96-5p), from a treating source as defined in 20 CFR 416.902, is entitled 

to a considerable if not controlling amount of weight as compared to the 

opinions of other sources. However, the opinion of the treating source must 

further be ‘well supported’ by ‘medically acceptable’ clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques and must be ‘not inconsistent’ with the other 

‘substantial evidence’ in the case record. Here, the restrictions are greater 

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than what is supported by or consistent with the record as a whole, including 

the objective signs and findings discussed elsewhere in this opinion.” (AR 

20.) 

 Since the ALJ did not specifically identify the evidence of record that supposedly 

undermined Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions, the Court finds that this vague reason is not 

sufficiently specific to constitute a legally sufficient reason for according “little weight” to 

Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions. See Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(“To say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient objective findings or are 

contrary to the preponderant conclusions mandated by the objective findings does not 

achieve the level of specificity our prior cases have required.”); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 

F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 

2007) (“The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own 

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.”) (citing Embrey, 

849 F.2d at 421-22); Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1299 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“[C]onclusory reasons will not justify an ALJ’s rejection of a medical 

opinion.”).3

 Moreover, to the extent the ALJ was referring to the inconsistency between 

Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions and the opinions of the other physicians of record, the Court 

notes that any such inconsistency was merely determinative of the standard to be applied 

to the ALJ’s proffered reasons for not crediting Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions; it was not a 

legally sufficient reason in itself. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (in the event of conflict in the 

medical opinion evidence, an ALJ still must provide legally sufficient reasons to reject a 

                                               

3

 The Commissioner cites several examples of supposed inconsistencies between Dr. 

Potwardowski’s opinions and the medical evidence of record. (See ECF No. 20-1 at 9-10.) 

However, the Court is “constrained to review [only] the reasons the ALJ asserts.” Connett 

v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003); Orn, 495 F.3d at 630 (“We review only the 

reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on 

a ground upon which he did not rely.”). Since the ALJ did not cite those same examples, 

the Court is unable to consider them. 

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treating or examining physician’s opinion); see also Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 

1066-67 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (existence of a conflict among the medical opinions by itself 

cannot constitute substantial evidence for rejecting a treating physician’s opinion). 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

The law is well established that the decision whether to remand for further 

proceedings or simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the Court. See, e.g., 

Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 

603 (9th Cir. 1989); Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). Remand is 

warranted where additional administrative proceedings could remedy defects in the 

decision. See, e.g., Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984); Lewin, 654 F.2d 

at 635. Remand for the payment of benefits is appropriate where no useful purpose would 

be served by further administrative proceedings, Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th 

Cir. 1980); where the record has been fully developed, Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 

1425 (9th Cir. 1986); or where remand would unnecessarily delay the receipt of benefits to 

which the disabled plaintiff is entitled, Bilby v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 

1985). 

Here, the Court has concluded that this is not an instance where no useful purpose 

would be served by further administrative proceedings; rather, additional administrative 

proceedings still could remedy the defects in the ALJ’s decision. See Marsh v. Colvin, 792 

F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) (remanding for further administrative proceedings where 

ALJ failed to properly reject a treating physician’s opinion). 

The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment 

be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the Commissioner 

and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four 

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

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Any party having objections to the Court’s proposed findings and recommendations 

shall serve and file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objections 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to the other party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of the 

objections. See id. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 10, 2018 

 _________________________________ 

 ROBERT N. BLOCK 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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