Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_18-cv-01064/USCOURTS-alnd-1_18-cv-01064-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

RONALD G. SUGGS, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) Case No. 1:18-cv-01064-JEO

 )

SAM’S EAST, INC., )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this action, Plaintiff Ronald G. Suggs brings claims against his former 

employer, Sam’s East, Inc. (“Sam’s”), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”) and the Alabama 

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Ala. Code § 25-1-20 et seq. (“AADEA”). 

(Doc. 8).1

 Now before the court2 is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

(Doc. 25). The motion has been fully briefed, (docs. 26, 32, 34), and is ripe for 

 1 References herein to “Doc(s). __” are to the document numbers assigned by the Clerk of the 

Court to the pleadings, motions, and other materials in the court file, as reflected on the docket 

sheet in the court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) system. Unless 

otherwise noted, page citations to briefs, evidence, and other papers in the court file are to the page 

number of the electronically filed document, which may not coincide with pagination on the 

original “hard copy.” However, pinpoint citations to all depositions are to the page of the 

deposition transcript. 

2 The parties have consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 16). 

FILED

 2020 Apr-02 PM 01:27

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 1 of 42
2

decision. Also before the court is Defendant’s motion to strike. (Doc. 33). It too is 

fully briefed, (docs. 37, 38), and ripe for decision. For the reasons that follow, the 

motion for summary judgment is due to be granted in full. The motion to strike is 

due to be granted in part and mooted in part.

I. MOTION TO STRIKE

“A district court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of 

evidence” on a motion for summary judgment. Hetherington v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 511 

F. App’x 909, 911 (11th Cir. 2013).3 The nonmoving party is not required to 

“produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid 

summary judgment.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The 

Eleventh Circuit has “read this statement as simply allowing otherwise admissible 

evidence to be submitted in inadmissible form at the summary judgment stage, 

though at trial it must be submitted in admissible form.” McMillian v. Johnson, 88 

F.3d 1573, 1584 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 

831 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir. 1987)) (emphasis omitted). 

“The general rule is that inadmissible hearsay cannot be considered on a 

motion for summary judgment.” Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322-25 (11th 

Cir. 1999) (footnote, internal quotations, and citations omitted). However, as 

 3 Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals are not considered binding 

precedent; however, they may be cited as persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 2 of 42
3

explained above, a district court may consider a hearsay statement in deciding a 

motion for summary judgment if the statement could be “reduced to admissible 

evidence at trial”:

[T]he phrases “reduced to admissible evidence at trial” and “reduced to 

admissible form” [are used] to explain that the out-of-court statement 

made to the witness (the Rule 56(c) affiant or the deposition deponent) 

must be admissible at trial for some purpose. For example, the 

statement might be admissible because it falls within an exception to 

the hearsay rule, or does not constitute hearsay at all (because it is not 

offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted), or is used solely for 

impeachment purposes (and not as substantive evidence).

Id. at 1323–24 (footnotes omitted).

Defendant moves to exclude two4 statements from the court’s consideration 

on summary judgment. First, Defendant seeks to exclude portions5 of Plaintiff’s 

testimony regarding a telephone conversation between him and Christopher 

Simmons.6

 (Doc. 33 at 6; Doc. 38 at 2-4). Second, Defendant seeks to exclude a 

statement in Plaintiff’s brief that “Defendant’s Club Manager, Lisa Lewis, issued a 

 4 In its motion, Defendant also moved to exclude a third category, namely comments allegedly 

made by Simmons and Lewis and overheard by Rogers. (Doc. 33 at 1-6). In its reply, however, 

Defendant withdrew the motion with regard to these comments. (Doc. 38 at 1-2).

5 Defendant does not object to the inclusion of the fact of the telephone call or that Simmons 

apologized to Plaintiff during the call. (Doc. 33 at 6).

6 Plaintiff reported to Club Manager Lisa Lewis, an African American over the age of 40, and 

Overnight Assistant Manager Christopher Simmons, an African American under the age of 40. 

(Doc. 27-1 (“Suggs Dep.”) at 31-32, 55, 87).

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 3 of 42
4

vendetta to get rid of him after he called her out for racism.” (Doc. 33 at 6-7; Doc. 

38 at 4-5). The court discusses each statement in turn.

A. Telephone Conversation Between Plaintiff and Simmons

Defendant moves to strike the following testimony from Plaintiff’s deposition

regarding a telephone call between him and Simmons:

• Simmons told Plaintiff that “when he was hired he said my very first 

orders from Lisa was to do anything and everything to get you out of 

there. . . . [H]e said he was - he was under direct orders.” (Suggs Dep. 

at 113).

• “One of the things he said was he related a conversation that Lisa and I 

had had that I have – I have absolutely no recollection of. But in 

something we were saying, Lisa had made a remark, and I told her, you 

may want to be careful how you say that to the associates because it 

could be construed as racial discrimination. To be careful. And he said 

when he – when Lisa hired him, his exact words to me was [sic], get rid 

of him; ain’t no old white guy going to tell me what to do.” (Id. at 114).

• “I have no recollection of [the conversation with Lisa Lewis]. Like I 

said, the way I – he said you had – it was just one of those things she 

said you had just made a suggestion that she may want to rephrase –

you know, she may want to rephrase what she said because what she 

was saying, the way she was saying it, could be misconstrued as racial 

discrimination.” (Id.).

• “. . . I’m relying on what he told me. I do not remember the conversation 

[with Lewis].” (Id. at 115).

• “And if I said anything like that to her, it was with the best of intentions. 

I was trying to keep her from saying something that would get 

somebody else upset. It wasn’t – it wasn’t trying to say anything 

racially motivated or anything. But it couldn’t have been a major 

conversation because I have no memory of it.” (Id.).

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 4 of 42
5

• Q: “Do you know that it [the conversation] happened?”

A: “No, I don’t. Like I said, I don’t recall it at all. I just know that’s 

what CJ [Simmons] told me that he was instructed with Lisa when she 

hired him. That I was number one on the list. I was – his job was to 

get rid of me.” (Id.).

As background, this call took place after Simmons had been terminated from 

Defendant, and the only testimony regarding the conversation is Plaintiff’s 

testimony – there is no testimony from Simmons in the record. There is also no 

testimony from Lewis in the record. Defendant contends that this testimony is 

inadmissible double hearsay. (Doc. 33 at 6; Doc. 38 at 2-4). Plaintiff responds that 

the testimony is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) as an 

admission by a party opponent. (Doc. 37 at 1-3). 

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, “‘[h]earsay’ is a statement, other than 

one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence 

to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). As a general rule, 

“[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 

802. Hearsay within hearsay, or so-called “double-hearsay,” is admissible only if 

each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule. 

Fed. R. Evid. 805. Excepted from the definition of hearsay is “a statement by the 

party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or 

employment, made during the existence of the relationship,” which is deemed an 

admission by a party opponent. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). Thus, statements made 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 5 of 42
6

by a supervisory official who plays some role in the decision-making process are 

generally admissible. See, e.g., Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1208 

(11th Cir. 2013); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 873–75 (11th Cir. 1985).

As Defendant points out in its reply brief, Plaintiff’s statements present a 

classic “double hearsay” problem. Both Lewis’ alleged statements to Simmons and 

Simmons’ alleged statements to Plaintiff were made out of court. Additionally, 

Plaintiff is clearly offering them for the truth of the matter asserted – that is, that 

Lewis wanted Simmons to get rid of Plaintiff because of his race and age and that 

Plaintiff had a conversation with Lewis regarding rephrasing a discriminatory 

remark. As such, both statements must satisfy an exception to the hearsay rule. They 

cannot.

Plaintiff’s argument that the statements should be allowed under the 

exception for admissions of a party-opponent in Rule 801(d)(2) is incorrect. First, 

as to the statements between Lewis and Simmons, the conversation could arguably 

constitute an admission of a party opponent. But the problem here is that Plaintiff 

is the only person who testified regarding these statements. There is no evidence in 

the record from Simmons or from Lewis. So, to the extent that the first layer of 

hearsay could come under the Rule 801(d)(2) exception, there is no exception to 

cover the second layer. In other words, because it is the Plaintiff’s statement, and 

not Simmons’ statement, Plaintiff must identify an additional exception to the rule 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 6 of 42
7

against hearsay. See Kidd v. Mando, 731 F.3d 1196, 1208 n.15 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(even if plaintiff could demonstrate a statement was an admission by a party 

opponent, the statement would not automatically be admissible because someone 

else relayed the statement). Plaintiff does not, and cannot, identify such an exception.

Second, as to the statements regarding the alleged conversation between 

Plaintiff and Lewis, although Plaintiff could testify himself regarding the comment 

he allegedly made to Lewis regarding perceived racial discrimination, Plaintiff 

testified he did not remember making the comment. In fact, Plaintiff testified that 

he had to rely totally on Simmons’ recollection of the comment: “I’m relying on 

what [Simmons] told me. I do not remember the conversation [with Lewis].” (Id. 

at 115). As such, Plaintiff’s testimony regarding this alleged statement is 

inadmissible hearsay. For these reasons, the motion to strike as it relates to the above 

testimony is due to be granted.

B. Vendetta Statement

Defendant also seeks to exclude a statement in Plaintiff’s brief that 

“Defendant’s Club Manager, Lisa Lewis, issued a vendetta to get rid of him after he 

called her out for racism.” (Doc. 33 at 6-7; Doc. 38 at 4-5). Defendant argues that 

Plaintiff makes this statement without any citation to the record, “does not identify 

to whom Lewis allegedly issued such vendetta, there is no testimony that Lewis 

made such a statement to Plaintiff, and, as such, the statement is unsupported and 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 7 of 42
8

due to be stricken.” (Doc. 33 at 6-7). In response, Plaintiff argues that “[t]his 

statement was made in the Plaintiff’s concluding paragraph to its Response in 

Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and acts as a brief 

synopsis of Defendant’s actions.” (Doc. 37 at 3). Plaintiff maintains that the 

evidence supports his “synopsis.” (Id.).

It is axiomatic that statements by counsel in a brief, without support from the 

record, are not evidence. Skyline Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 613 F.2d 1328, 1337 (5th Cir. 

1980).7

 The court considers the evidence before it and not synopses or opinions by 

counsel as to what the evidence is or what conclusions should be drawn from it. In 

light of the standard the court employs in making its determination on a motion for 

summary judgment, the motion to strike, as it relates to this statement made by 

counsel for Plaintiff in his opposition brief, is due to be denied as moot.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if 

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary 

 7 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that decisions 

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, are 

binding in the Eleventh Circuit).

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 8 of 42
9

judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis 

for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it 

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. 

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party 

to go beyond the pleadings and by his own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers 

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a 

genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324.

The substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are 

irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All 

reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor 

of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 

1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the 

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment 

may be granted. See id. at 249.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff Suggs, a Caucasian, was hired by Defendant in its Oxford, Alabama,

location as a supervisor in the Receiving Department. (Suggs Dep. at 27, 106). 

Suggs was fifty-seven years old when he was hired. (Id. at 28; Doc. 8 ¶ 57). His 

job duties included the following: receiving early morning deliveries; receiving

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 9 of 42
10

FedEx and UPS deliveries; maintaining a chain of custody on valuable items; 

ensuring cleanliness and maintenance in the Receiving area; delivering items to the 

store floor; assisting night associates in the department; maintaining forklift 

equipment; and certifying forklift drivers. (Suggs Dep. at 35-36, 41). Several 

employees reported to him, including a Receiving Team Associate who assisted 

during the day and a Receiving Clerk who helped with paperwork to ensure 

everything was correctly processed. (Id. at 37). At all relevant times, Plaintiff 

reported to Club Manager Lisa Lewis, an African American over the age of 40, an 

Overnight Assistant Manager Christopher Simmons, an African American under the 

age of 40. (Id. at 31-32, 55, 87).

According to Plaintiff, Lewis maintained a clique of people who she liked and 

supported. (Doc. 27-5 (“Rogers Dep.”) at 15-16). This clique consisted of multiple 

employees of different races, both Caucasian and African-American, and ages, both 

over and under the age of 40. (Id. at 16-21). Plaintiff contends that Lewis was not 

a “by the book” employee, was unethical, and unprofessional. (Id. at 15-16). For 

instance, Lewis yelled at employees and reprimanded employees in front of others, 

instead of having a private conversation. (Id. at 60). Lewis also made racially 

insensitive or inappropriate comments to and about random associates such as, 

“white ass, her white ass, . . . black ass,” and “white trailer park trash.” (Id. at 25, 

52).

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 10 of 42
11

Although Plaintiff believed that he and Lewis had a good relationship, (Suggs 

Dep. at 115-16), Asset Protection Manager Tamala Rogers, a Caucasian over the age 

of 40, testified that Lewis wanted to find a way to terminate Plaintiff. (Rogers Dep. 

at 26-27, 52-53). Specifically, Rogers testified that she overheard a conversation 

between Rogers and Simmons:

8

She was out to get Ron, you know she had made comments about how, 

you know, we got – you need to coach him out. You need to find stuff 

to coach him to and coach him out. I even remember her making a 

comment one time about he was too old to be doing this job. He needed 

to find something else to do, or, you know, we need to do [sic] get rid 

of him.

(Id. at 26).

A. Coaching for Improvement and Plaintiff’s Disciplinary History 

Sam’s maintains a progressive discipline policy called Coaching for 

Improvement. (Def. Exh.9 2 to Doc. 27-2 (“Coaching for Improvement”) at 6-9;

Suggs Dep. at 48-49). The Coaching for Improvement program is used for both job 

performance, violations of company policies, or conduct that “interferes or creates a 

risk of interfering with the safe, orderly and efficient operation of [Sam’s] business.” 

(Coaching for Improvement at 50). The Coaching for Improvement program consists 

of a first written coaching, a second written coaching, a third written coaching, and 

 8 Defendant moved to strike this testimony as hearsay, but specifically withdrew the motion as it 

pertained to Rogers’ testimony. (Doc. 33 at 1-6; Doc. 38 at 1-2).

9 “Def. Ex.” is a reference to Defendant’s exhibits that are attached to Plaintiff’s deposition.

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 11 of 42
12

then termination of employment for a fourth written coaching within any 12-month 

period. (Id. at 50-51; Suggs Dep. at 48-49). Based on the severity of the conduct, 

however, steps in the Coaching for Improvement program can be skipped, up to and 

including immediate termination. (Coaching for Improvement at 50, 52). The 

program may also include investigations of reported or potential misconduct. (Id. at 

51). Employees are required to cooperate with the investigations and it allows for 

suspensions or transfers during such investigations. (Id.). If at any time during a 

12-month period an employee had a second or third written level of coaching, that

employee “may not be eligible for promotion or transfer.” (Id. at 50).

On April 10, 2017, Overnight Assistant Manager Simmons issued a First 

Written Coaching to Plaintiff for poor job performance.10 (Doc. 27-2 at 10-11). The 

coaching detailed incidents where work was not completed in a timely manner and 

warned that Plaintiff “must perform at a supervisor level and it has to improve 

immediately. Failure to not complete tasks and failure to not perform at a supervisor 

level will result in more disciplinary action.” (Id.). Plaintiff recalled Simmons 

telling him, “as a supervisor, I expect you to do everything I want done.” (Suggs 

Dep. at 56-57). Plaintiff described the coaching as follows:

 10 Before 2017, Plaintiff had only one other written coaching, which occurred on October 11, 2015, 

but expired before the relevant time period. (Suggs Dep. at 54).

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 12 of 42
13

I thought it maybe was because he was new11 at the job and trying to 

learn that area. He had never done overnight before. Because I found 

myself having to do more and more to help the overnight crew to try to 

get caught up and try to get the floor cleaned before 7:00 o’clock, which 

didn’t allow me to get my stuff put up in time for the 7:00 o’clock 

deadline.

(Id. at 57). Plaintiff disagreed with Simmons’ description of his performance as 

detailed in the First Written Coaching. (Id. at 60-66). Because of the way Simmons 

wanted everyone to work, the overnight employees struggled to keep up and were 

frustrated with Simmons. (Id. at 59-60). Plaintiff did not know if anyone else was 

disciplined for similar issues during this period. (Id. at 60). At the time he received 

the coaching, Plaintiff did not feel that he was being discriminated against; instead 

he felt it was unreasonable. (Id. at 70-71).

About two months later, on June 8, 2017, Simmons issued Plaintiff a Second 

Written Coaching for poor job performance. (Doc. 27-2 at 12-13). Much like the 

first coaching, this coaching detailed Simmons’ belief regarding Plaintiff’s failure to 

follow instructions in various situations over approximately a two-week period. 

(Id.). Plaintiff disagreed with the coaching and wrote in response, “I feel I am being 

targeted by my manager for some reason I don’t understand.” (Id. at 13). 

 11 Plaintiff testified that Simmons had been in this position for approximately two weeks when 

he received this First Written Coaching. (Suggs Dep. at 54-55).

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 13 of 42
14

After this coaching, Plaintiff spoke with Club Manager Lewis. (Suggs Dep. 

at 78-79). She told Plaintiff not to worry and that she “had [his] back.” (Id. at 79). 

Plaintiff asked Lewis “to remove one of the coachings because they were not –

especially the first one – because it was not – it was not a justified coaching. And 

she said, I will talk to [Simmons], and . . . I am watching out for you.” (Id.). Plaintiff 

does not know if Lewis ever spoke with Simmons. (Id.).

On August 14, 2017, Asset Protection Manager Tamala Rogers, a Caucasian 

over the age of 40, issued Plaintiff a Third Written Coaching.12 (Doc. 27-2 at 22-

23). This coaching related to Plaintiff’s failure to follow Lewis’s July 20, 2017 

directive to have her conduct a final safety check before certifying any forklift 

drivers.13 (Id.; see also Doc. 27-2 at 14). Despite these instructions, on July 31, 

2017, Plaintiff certified a forklift driver without Lewis conducting a final safety 

check. (Doc. 27-2 at 16-17). The unauthorized forklift driver caused an accident 

while driving the forklift, resulting in damage to a freezer. (Suggs Dep. at 84). 

Plaintiff testified that he “accepted full ownership of it. This was the one time when 

I said, yes, I was in the wrong in doing this. I made a mistake . . . the one, I accepted. 

This one was justified.” (Id. at 85).

 12 Rogers testified that she did not agree with this coaching, but that she “was made to do it

anyway.” (Rogers Dep. at 22).

13 Specifically, on July 20, 2017, Lewis sent an email to Plaintiff and others stating: “Going 

forward no one can be get [sic] certified on a lift until I personally approve it. I have to ensure that 

the associate is trained properly and that they are ready to be on the lift. . . .” (Doc. 27-2 at 14). 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 14 of 42
15

B. Events Leading to Plaintiff’s Termination

On September 5, 2017, Lewis called Plaintiff to her office. (Id. at 92). Lewis 

told Plaintiff that she “wanted everything done better, faster, and everything that was 

being expected of [Plaintiff], she wanted it all done before [the store] opened in the 

mornings. (Id.). Plaintiff told Lewis that the expectations were more than could be 

met, but she did not understand what he was saying. (Id. at 96). Plaintiff described 

the meeting as “a good old fashioned chewing out.” (Id.). 

Plaintiff left the meeting and stopped in the Personnel Office where Jennifer 

McCann, the Personnel Training Coordinator, and Bookina Caver, the Receiving 

Clerk, were having a conversation. (Id. at 99-100). When they asked if he was okay, 

Plaintiff told them he “had just gotten chewed out by Lisa [Lewis] for not getting 

[his] work done.” (Id. at 101). Plaintiff testified as follows when McCann and Caver 

asked Plaintiff if he was mad:

A. . . . And I said, no. I said, I’m upset. And then I told them, I related 

the situation. I said, you will never ever see me mad because of 

something that happened when I was 15. And it scared me enough that 

– from that point on, I knew I didn’t want to lose my temper in that 

way. 

***

Q. What specifically did you tell them about this incident when you 

were 15?

A. I shared with them the time where I saw – I was – we were going to 

band practice. And there was a young man who was physically picking 

on some younger girls. Pushing them around. Saying some very 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 15 of 42
16

violent things. And I told him to stop. And he continued on. And I 

grabbed him by the throat. And I had to have a couple of friends to pull 

me off him. And I was afraid I was going to hurt him. I was afraid I 

would have killed him. That was just me at that point as a 15 year old.

And that scared me enough from that point on, I have never – I 

have never gotten mad like that again. It has helped me become – that 

one situation helped me become more objective and more pragmatic, I 

guess.

I always – I always find myself now, if I’m in a situation, even if 

it means losing – you know, getting angry, I will ask myself, is that 

going to change the outcome? And if the answer is, no, which is usually 

is, I just don’t get angry about it. I just either accept it or see what I can 

change.

***

That is what I tried to share with them. They will not see me mad 

again. I may get upset, but you will not see me mad.

(Id. at 102-03).

Plaintiff’s statement alarmed McCann and Caver. (Doc. 27-3 (“McCann 

Dep.” at 28; Doc. 27-4 (“Caver Dep.”) at 35). McCann reported Plaintiff’s 

comments to Lewis, and Lewis submitted the concern to Sam’s Global Ethics Team 

through the Ethics Hotline. (McCann Dep. at 28-30; Doc. 25-5 (“Cizerle Decl.”) ¶ 

5). The report led to an investigation which was overseen by Ethics Manager Fashia 

Cizerle. (Cizerle Decl. ¶ 6). Cizerle oversees Ethics investigations and makes an 

“accountability recommendation” at the conclusion of an investigation as to the level 

of coaching an employee should receive under the Coaching for Improvement 

Policy. (Id. ¶ 4). When making a recommendation, Cizerle weighs several factors, 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 16 of 42
17

including an evidence that the involved individuals may have colluded to fabricate 

allegations, whether there are corroborating statements from multiple sources or if a 

single source is making an allegation, any previous Ethics investigations of a similar 

nature involving the same employee, extenuating circumstances such as evidence 

that the employee may have been joking, angry or upset, and, finally, whether the 

subject of the investigation is a supervisor or hourly employee. (Id.).

To begin the investigation, Cizerle directed Lewis to obtain statements from 

Plaintiff and every witness to the incident. (Id. ¶ 7). Plaintiff, McCann and Caver 

wrote statements regarding what had happened. Plaintiff’s statement was consistent 

with his testimony. In pertinent part, Plaintiff wrote:

On September 5th after a counseling conversation with Lisa [Lewis], I 

spoke with Jennifer [McCann] and Bookina [Carver] upstairs. I was 

upset after the conversation. Not mad, just upset. And shared an 

incident as a teenager that I should not have shared. And I didn’t share 

it in completion, so it sounded threatening. I shared that I didn’t ever 

want to get so upset that I would get made like I did many years ago.

(Doc. 27-2 at 24). McCann’s statement said:

Ron was standing at the door of the PTC office and said “[Bo]kina it is 

nothing personal but you are going to meet a different person tomorrow. 

Lisa said I have to be the biggest, baddest, son of a bitch. You’ve never 

seen me mad before. The last time I was mad was when I was in high 

school. And he still has the scars on his neck. It took three guys to pull 

me off. I was just watching his eyes fade away.

(Doc. 27-3 at 23). McCann testified that she thought the statement was threatening, 

but not directed at her personally. (McCann Dep. at 18). Instead, she believed that 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 17 of 42
18

maybe it was threatening “to whoever did whether it was Lisa of Christopher 

Simmons that – that wrote him up.” (Id.).

Caver’s statement mirrored McCann’s statement:

I was in the PTC office (Jennifer) on lunch. Ron the receiving lead 

state if he comes in tomorrow with a different attitude it wasn’t nothing 

against me, but he stated Lisa told him to be the biggest bad[d]est son 

of a bitch and take ownership of receiving. He also stated that I have 

never seen him angry before, the last time he was angry it took three 

men to get him off someone that he still ha[s] the scar[]s around his 

[]neck to this day. 

(Doc. 27-4 at 29). Caver testified that she “took it that he could have really hurt 

somebody in that moment.” (Caver Dep. at 35).

Cizerle reviewed the statements and found McCann and Caver’s statements 

to be consistent in their description of what occurred. (Cizerle Decl. ¶ 8). Cizerle 

also noted that Plaintiff admitted to the statements reported by McCann and Caver.

(Id.). Cizerle reasoned that although Plaintiff did not direct his comments at anyone 

specifically, McCann and Caver perceived the comments as threatening and Plaintiff 

admitted that they “sounded threatening.” (Id. ¶ 8, 11). Cizerle considered the fact 

that Plaintiff was the Receiving Team Lead and supervised at least two other 

employees, including Caver who was a witness to the comments. (Id. ¶ 9). Cizerle

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 18 of 42
19

concluded that Plaintiff’s statements violated the Inappropriate Conduct portion of 

the Statement of Ethics14 and the Violence Free Workplace policy.15 (Id. ¶¶ 11). 

Because of this conclusion, Cizerle was required to make an “accountability 

recommendation.” (Id. ¶ 12). Cizerle recommended a Third Written Coaching for 

Plaintiff. (Id.). The recommendation was based on the following: (1) the specific 

statements made by Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff’s admission that he made the statements; 

(3) his position as a supervisor and that the comments were made to one of his 

subordinates; (4) his admission that he was upset when he made the statement; and 

(5) written coachings issue to other employees in supervisor positions who 

committed similar violations.16 (Id. ¶ 13). Cizerle made this recommendation 

 14 The Inappropriate Conduct portion of the Statement of Ethics states: “We believe in maintaining 

a working environment free of inappropriate conduct such as obscene, profane, gross, violent, 

discriminatory, bullying or similarly offensive language, gestures or conduct.” (Doc. 27-7 at 23). 

15 In relevant part, the Violence Free Workplace policy states:

We prohibit any form of violence or threat of violence in or affecting the workplace, 

other associates or our customers/member. This includes, but is not limited to, any 

conduct or communication (whether direct or indirect) which: 1) harms, damages, 

injures, harasses, intimidates, bullies, threatens, stalks, taunts, forces, coerces, 

restrains or confines another person; 2) reasonably causes another person to fear for 

his/her health or safety; or 3) intentionally harms or damages property.

(Doc. 27-7 at 55).

16 Plaintiff “disputes” this last fact stating that “there is no evidence showing what other associates 

and what other ‘similar’ acts were used as a basis for comparison to the Plaintiff.” (Doc. 32 at 5). 

While the court generally agrees with Plaintiff’s statement, Plaintiff does not cite to any evidence 

that contradicts Cizerle’s testimony that she used such evidence as part of her reasoning for issuing 

Plaintiff a Third Written Coaching. (Id.). Statements and arguments made by counsel in brief, 

without citation to evidence to support them, are not evidence. Skyline Corp., 613 F.2d at 1337.

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 19 of 42
20

without reviewing Plaintiff’s previous coaching history. (Id. ¶ 12). She also did not 

know the race or age of any of the individuals involved in the incident or whether 

any of them had ever made a complaint of discrimination. (Id. ¶ 15).

Cizerle emailed Lewis and informed her of the recommendation of a Third 

Written Coaching for Plaintiff based on her investigation. (Id. ¶ 14). At that point, 

Cizerle asked for Plaintiff’s then-current coaching level and Lewis responded that 

he was “on a 3rd written.” (Id.). Cizerle replied, “[u]nfortunately this will mean 

termination for him.” (Id.). Based on this recommendation, Lewis terminated 

Plaintiff’s employment. (Suggs Dep. at 130-31). Plaintiff did not complain to 

anyone at Defendant or appeal the termination decision. (Id. at 132-33).

C. Aftermath of Plaintiff’s Termination 

As discussed above in the section regarding the Motion to Strike, Plaintiff 

received a telephone call from Simmons at some point after Plaintiff’s termination. 

(Suggs Dep. at 113-14). Simmons himself had been terminated and asked Rogers 

for Plaintiff’s phone number. (Rogers Dep. at 51). Among the other statements 

struck by the court, Simmons apologized to Plaintiff for what happened between 

them while they were employed by Defendant. (Suggs Dep. at 113).

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on December 6, 2017, alleging race and age 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 20 of 42
21

discrimination.17 (Doc. 27-2 at 58-59). The EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice 

of Rights on April 9, 2018. (Id. at 67). Plaintiff timely filed his complaint on July 

10, 2018. (Doc. 1).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends he was discriminated against because of his race and his 

age, in violation of Title VII, the ADEA and the AADEA.

18 (Doc. 8 ¶¶ 13-46, 54-

73, 74-83). He also contends that he was retaliated against in violation of Title VII. 

(Id. ¶¶ 47-53). The court first addresses his discrimination claims and then moves 

on to his retaliation claims.

A. Discrimination Claims

Discrimination claims can be categorized as either single-motive or mixedmotive claims. Quigg v. Thomas Cnty Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 

 17 The EEOC Charge does not allege retaliation. (Doc. 27-2 at 58-59).

18 It is not clear in the Eleventh Circuit whether a plaintiff may simultaneously pursue claims under 

the AADEA and ADEA. Compare Collins v. Compass Group, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1331-

32 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (plaintiff's AADEA claims were duplicative of claims under the ADEA and 

due to be dismissed on summary judgment); Henry v. Jefferson County Personnel Bd., 519 F. 

Supp. 2d 1171, 1185, 1185-86 (N.D. Ala. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 252 F. App’x 308 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (“As a threshold matter, the court notes that Plaintiff cannot pursue both of her claims 

under the Alabama Age Act and the ADEA in this case. . . . Because the plain language of the 

Alabama Age Act forces a plaintiff to choose either suit under the ADEA or, in the alternative, 

suit under the Alabama Age Act, and because Plaintiff in this case has filed suit under the ADEA, 

the court finds that Plaintiff’s claim under the Alabama Age Act is duplicative.”) (emphasis 

omitted), with Wallace v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1304 (M.D. Ala. 1999) 

(The AADEA does not preclude “simultaneous pursuit” of AADEA and ADEA claims “in a single 

forum.”). Defendant does not argue, however, that these claims are duplicative. As such, the court 

will not decide whether Plaintiff may pursue his age discrimination claims under both the ADEA 

and AADEA. Regardless, under either theory, his claim of age discrimination fails.

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 21 of 42
22

2016). A single-motive, or pretext, case is one where an illegitimate reason, such as 

race or gender, was the sole motivation for the adverse employment decision. Id. A 

mixed-motive case is one where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated 

the employer’s adverse employment decision. Id. Mixed-motive and single-motive 

discrimination are not “distinct causes of action” but rather “serve as alternative 

causation standards for proving discrimination.” Id. at 1235 n.4. Here, Plaintiff 

argues both theories of discrimination. (Doc. 32 at 9-12).

A plaintiff can establish single-motive and mixed-motive discrimination 

through direct or circumstantial evidence. Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1235. It is undisputed 

there is no direct evidence of discrimination. The court analyzes single-motive 

claims based on circumstantial evidence under the familiar McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework.19 Id. at 1237 (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792 (1973)). The court’s analysis for mixed-motive claims based on 

circumstantial evidence is different. In Quigg, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the 

 19 The court recognizes that in Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1332–1333 (11th Cir. 2013), the 

Eleventh Circuit clarified that the McDonnell Douglasframework is not the only way for a plaintiff 

to survive summary judgment in a discrimination case. See Smith v. Lockheed–Martin Corp., 644 

F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). Rather, “[t]he plaintiff will always survive summary judgment 

if he presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s 

discriminatory intent.” Id. A triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, presents a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that would 

allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decision maker. Id.; see generally Hamilton 

v. Southland Christian School, Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has not 

presented his discrimination claims using the “convincing mosaic.” Regardless, even if the court 

looks at the evidence through that lens, the court finds that none exists.

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 22 of 42
23

mixed-motive framework set forth by the Sixth Circuit in White v. Baxter Healthcare 

Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008). Id. at 1239. Under this framework, the court 

asks, “whether a plaintiff has offered ‘evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) 

the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) [a 

protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for the defendant’s adverse 

employment action.’” Id. (quoting White, 533 F.3d at 400). The court first addresses 

Plaintiff’s discrimination claims under the mixed-motive framework and then moves 

to the McDonnell Douglas framework.

1. Mixed Motive Discrimination

Plaintiff purports to bring both his race and age discrimination claims under 

the mixed motive theory of discrimination. (See Doc. 32 at 9-11). While his race 

discrimination claim can clearly be brought as a mixed-motive claim, see Quigg, 814 

F.3d at 1237, his age discrimination claim cannot. The mixed motive theory is 

inapplicable to ADEA claims because a plaintiff must prove that age was the “butfor” cause for the adverse employment action to prevail on a disparate-treatment 

claim under the ADEA. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009); 

see also Mora v. Jackson Mem’l Found., Inc., 597 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(recognizing that after Gross, there is no such thing as a “mixed-motive” ADEA case 

because an ADEA plaintiff must establish that he suffered an adverse employment 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 23 of 42
24

action “because of” his age). As such, the court will address the mixed motive theory 

only as it relates to Plaintiff’s race discrimination claims.

As stated above, to survive summary judgment on a mixed motive claim, a 

plaintiff must show “(1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against 

the plaintiff; and (2) [a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor for the 

defendant’s adverse employment action.” Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1232-33 (alteration in 

original). To prove race was a motivating factor, a plaintiff must show that the 

employer’s decision would have been different if he belonged to a different race. 

Lewis v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 343 F. App’x 450, 455 (11th Cir. 2009).

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to establish a mixed motive race 

discrimination claim. (Doc. 34 at 3-4). Defendant first argues that the only adverse 

employment action is Plaintiff’s termination. Second, Defendant contends that 

Plaintiff cannot prove race was a motivating factor in his termination. Specifically, 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s reliance on evidence of an alleged plot to pile up 

coachings against him, as well as inadmissible hearsay “falls flat.” (Id. at 3). 

Defendant also highlights the fact that Cizerle, the person whose recommended 

coaching ultimately led to Plaintiff’s termination, did not know Plaintiff’s race or 

age, or any alleged protected activity. (Id. at 4). The court begins with the alleged 

adverse employment actions and then moves on to whether Plaintiff created a 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 24 of 42
25

genuine issue of material fact as to whether race was a motivating factor with regard 

to the alleged adverse employment actions.

i. Adverse Employment Action

“[N]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy” is actionable under

federal civil rights statutes prohibiting discrimination in employment. Higdon v. 

Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1219 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Doe v. Dekalb County Sch. 

Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1449 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotations omitted)). 

Rather, while a challenged action need not necessarily have economic consequences, 

it will be cognizable as unlawful discrimination only if it works “a serious and 

material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” judged 

objectively from the perspective of a reasonable employee. Davis v. Town of Lake 

Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1238-40 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis original); see also 

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2006) 

(discussing “material adversity” in the context of Title VII’s anti-retaliation 

provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).

Here, Plaintiff contends that each coaching constitutes an adverse 

employment action because “[e]mployees . . . are on a ladder of automatic 

termination with four rungs. When coachings accumulated against Plaintiff, . . . the 

guaranteed result was the tangible, adverse effect of termination.” (Doc. 32 at 14). 

In other words, Plaintiff contends that the Coaching for Improvement policy was 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 25 of 42
26

cumulative, thus necessarily making each step an adverse employment action. The 

court disagrees.

“Negative performance evaluations, standing alone, do not constitute adverse 

employment action,” Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1261 (11th Cir. 

2001), and “courts are wisely reluctant to treat job performance memoranda as 

actionable . . .where they do not trigger any more tangible form of adverse action 

such as a loss in benefits, ineligibility for promotional opportunities, or more formal 

discipline,” Davis, 245 F.3d at 1241; see also Brown v. Snow, 440 F.3d 1259, 1265 

(11th Cir. 2006). Likewise, “memoranda of reprimand or counseling that amount to 

no more than a mere scolding, without any following disciplinary action, do not rise 

to the level of adverse employment actions” either. Davis, 245 F.3d at 1236.

Accordingly, “[t]he reprimand of an employee does not constitute an adverse

employment action when the employee suffers no tangible harm as a result.” 

Summerlin v. M & H Valve Co., 167 F. App’x 93, 97 (11th Cir. 2006); accord Perry 

v. Rogers, 627 F. App’x 823, 832-33 (11th Cir. 2015); Barnett v. Athens Reg’l Med. 

Ctr. Inc., 550 F. App’x 711, 713 (11th Cir. 2013); Wallace v. Georgia Dep’t of 

Transp., 212 F. App’x 799, 801 (11th Cir. 2006). However, once a negative 

performance evaluation is used to justify the denial of a raise or some other form of 

compensation, the evaluation may be deemed an adverse employment action. See

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 26 of 42
27

Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 971-72 (11th Cir. 2008); Gillis v. Georgia Dep’t 

of Corr., 400 F.3d 883, 888 (11th Cir. 2005).

Here, there is no evidence that any of the three coachings, prior to the one that 

resulted in Plaintiff’s termination, amounted to “a serious and material change in the 

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis, 245 F.3d at 1240. The mere 

fact that the coachings were part of a progressive discipline plan does not necessarily 

equate with the conclusion that they were adverse employment actions, as argued by 

Plaintiff. While it is true with the benefit of hindsight that, in this case, each written 

coaching brought Plaintiff closer to termination, such a conclusion was not an 

inevitable consequence of every coaching. Job-related criticism, warnings, 

instructions, evaluations, and/or coachings, such as the ones used here, are meant to

prompt an employee to improve his or her performance and lead to a better working 

environment. In fact, Rogers testified that coaching were used “to help an associate 

get better, to build themselves on things that they might not be proficient at or maybe

doing inaccurately.” (Rogers Dep. at 34). Additionally, Plaintiff has not introduced 

any evidence to show any tangible harm from any of the individual coachings, other 

than the one that resulted in his termination. For instance, there is no evidence that 

these coachings had any effect on his pay, benefits, or ability to receive a 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 27 of 42
28

promotion.20 Nor is there any evidence these coachings resulted in any sort of 

demotion or were perceived as such. Notwithstanding all of the above, the court will 

assume, without deciding, that the coachings were adverse employment actions. 

ii. Motivating Factor

In an effort to establish that race was a motivating factor with regarding to the 

coachings and his ultimate termination, Plaintiff points to Lewis’ alleged plan to get 

rid of Plaintiff by giving him enough coachings to result in his termination. (Doc. 

32 at 11-12). The problem for Plaintiff is that there is no admissible evidence that 

this plan was because of Plaintiff’s race. While there is evidence that Lewis used 

language such as “white ass,” and “white trailer trash” to refer to Caucasian 

employees, there is also evidence that she used language such as “black ass” to refer 

to African American employees. (Rogers Dep. at 25, 52). And there is no evidence 

that she used such language in reference to Plaintiff. Simply put, Plaintiff has failed 

to present a genuine issue of material fact that race was a motivating factor in any of 

the coachings or in Plaintiff’s termination. The evidence does not support a finding 

that Defendant’s decisions would have been different if Plaintiff belonged to a 

 20 The court notes that the Coaching for Improvement program provides that if at any time during 

a 12-month period an employee had a second or third written level of coaching, that employee 

“may not be eligible for promotion or transfer.” (Coaching for Improvement at 50). There is no 

evidence, however, that Plaintiff’s coachings resulted in such revocation of eligibility or that he 

sought a promotion or transfer.

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 28 of 42
29

different race. See Lewis, 343 F. App’x at 455. Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim 

fails under the mixed-motive framework.

2. Single Motive Discrimination

Title VII, the ADEA, and the AADEA21 make it unlawful for employers to 

discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because of race and age. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), Ala. Code § 25-1-22. Absent direct 

evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff may prove his case through circumstantial 

evidence using the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th 

Cir. 2004). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case 

of discrimination. Id. After a prima facie case is established, the employer has the 

burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment 

decision. Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087. This burden involves no credibility 

determination, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, (1993), and 

has been characterized as “exceedingly light.” Perryman v. Johnson Prod. Co., 698 

F.2d 1138, 1141 (11th Cir. 1993). As long as the employer articulates “a clear and 

reasonably specific” non-discriminatory basis for its actions, it has discharged its 

burden of production. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 

 21 The Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act employs the same analytical framework 

that applies to federal age discrimination claims. Robinson v. Ala. Cent. Credit Union, 964 So. 2d 

1225, 1228 (Ala. 2007).

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 29 of 42
30

254-55 (1981). After an employer articulates one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action, the plaintiff must show the 

proffered reason was a pretext for illegal discrimination. Id. If the proffered reason 

is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, a plaintiff cannot recast the reason 

but must “meet that reason head on and rebut it.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 

1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000). Although the burden of production shifts back and 

forth, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s 

Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002).

a. Prima Facie Case

Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race 

or age discrimination for two main reasons.22 First, while Sam’s concedes the 

Plaintiff’s termination is an adverse employment action, it argues that any pretermination coaching is not an adverse employment action. (Doc. 26 at 14-15; Doc. 

34 at 5-6). Second, Sam’s contends that Plaintiff cannot identify a similarly situated 

comparator that was treated more favorably than he was treated. (Doc. 26 at 16-17; 

Doc. 34 at 6-9). The court has already addressed the adverse employment action 

 22 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff was not qualified for the position of supervisor in the 

Receiving Department. (Doc. 26 at 17). Defendant contends that “as a result of his violation of 

Sam’s Standard of Ethics (Inappropriate Conduct) and its Violence Free Workplace, Plaintiff 

rendered himself unqualified for the position of supervisor in the Receiving Department.” (Id.). 

The court rejects this argument (and notes that Defendant does not revisit it in its reply brief).

Cizerle did not recommend termination on the basis of Plaintiff’s violation, and if he had no other 

coachings, Plaintiff would have remained as supervisor in the Receiving Department. 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 30 of 42
31

element, and again, assumes without deciding that each coaching, as well as 

Plaintiff’s termination, constitutes an adverse employment action. Therefore, the 

court moves on to the similarly-situated prong of the prima facie case.

In the en banc decision of Lewis v. City of Union City, the Eleventh Circuit 

acknowledged that its prior decisions attempting to define how similarly situated a 

plaintiff and her comparator must be had “only sown confusion.” 918 F.3d 1213,

1217 (11th Cir. 2019). The Court sought to clarify the proper standard for evaluating 

the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s proffered comparator. Id. at 1218-29. In doing so, 

the court rejected prior language requiring a plaintiff to show that his circumstances 

and those of another employee were “nearly identical.” Id. Instead, “a plaintiff 

proceeding under McDonnell Douglas must show that []he and h[is] comparators 

were ‘similarly situated in all material respects.’” Id. at 1226. As explained by the 

Court, the “materially similar” standard provides plaintiffs the opportunity to 

establish “an inference of unlawful discrimination” but still allows employers the 

“necessary breathing space to make appropriate business judgments.” Id. at 1228.

In announcing this standard, the Eleventh Circuit also identified some 

“guideposts.” Id. at 1227-28. The court “envision[ed] the sorts of similarities that 

will, in the main, underlie a valid comparison.” Id. Typically, a similarly situated 

comparator will have: (1) engaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct) as 

plaintiff; (2) been subject to the same employment policy, rule or guideline as 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 31 of 42
32

plaintiff; (3) “ordinarily (although not invariably) have been under the jurisdiction 

of the same supervisor as the plaintiff;” and (4) share plaintiff’s employment or 

disciplinary history. Id. The court reasoned that “a valid comparison will not turn 

on formal labels, but rather on substantive likenesses.” Id. “[A] plaintiff and h[is]

comparators must be sufficiently similar, in an objective sense, that they cannot 

reasonably be distinguished.” Id. at 1227 (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

Plaintiff points to Jimmy Mitchell a comparator. This comparator only relates 

to one of the coachings at issue - the one regarding the forklift incident. Plaintiff 

did not identify any other comparators with the coachings regarding his alleged poor 

work performance or with the coaching regarding his alleged threatening comment

that led to his termination. As such, the court concludes that Plaintiff failed to 

establish a prima facie case with regard to these three coachings. 

Plaintiff also failed to establish that Mitchell is a proper comparator. Plaintiff 

contends that Mitchell, an African-American supervisor in his thirties, was not 

issued a written coaching after certifying a forklift driver without Lewis’s 

permission. (Doc. 32 at 15). Plaintiff points to the testimony of Tamla Rogers who 

stated Mitchell certified people on the forklift without Lewis’ approval after she sent 

the email and that Mitchell was not coached. (Rogers Dep. at 22, 46). The problem 

with this testimony, however, is that Rogers also testified that she does not have 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 32 of 42
33

access to whether or not an employee is coached and does not have access to an 

employee’s coaching history. (Id. at 46, 62). As such, Rogers admitted that she 

“can’t say 100 percent” as to whether Mitchell was coached regarding the forklift 

incident. (Id. at 46). There is no other evidence in the record regarding whether or 

not Mitchell ever certified a forklift driver without Lewis’ approval and, if so, 

whether he was coached. Because of her admission that she did not have access to 

employee coachings, Rogers’ testimony alone is not enough to establish Mitchell as 

a comparator under the standard set forth in Lewis.

Even if the evidence was more solid that Mitchell was not coached for 

certifying a forklift driver without first gaining the approval of Lewis, there is still 

not enough information to provide an adequate comparison under Lewis. For 

example, the individual certified by Plaintiff was involved in an accident while 

driving the forklift. There is no information about the identity of the employee 

Mitchell allegedly certified or whether or not that individual was involved in a 

forklift accident. Additionally, there is no evidence that Lewis was aware that 

Mitchell certified a forklift operator without her approval. Simply put, Plaintiff did 

not introduce enough evidence to establish Mitchell as a comparator under the 

standards articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Lewis. Therefore, Plaintiff failed to 

establish a prima facie case as it relates to the forklift coaching as well.

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 33 of 42
34

All that being said, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that even “[i]f a plaintiff 

fails to show the existence of a similarly situated employee, summary judgment is 

appropriate where no other evidence of discrimination is present.” Holifield, 115 

F.3d at 1562 (citing Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 182 (1st Cir. 

1989)). As such, the court must move on to the pretext analysis. 

b. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons and Pretext 

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant has articulated a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for each alleged adverse employment action. (Doc. 32 at 

18). The first two coachings were due to Plaintiff’s poor performance, the third was

for certifying a forklift driver without prior approval, and the final coaching, which 

led to Plaintiff’s termination, was for violating the Statement of Ethics and the 

Violence Free Workplace policy. 

Because Defendant satisfied its burden of production of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s termination, Plaintiff must come forward with 

evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude the reasons 

Defendant gave were pretextual. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Plaintiff may do so by 

demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or 

contradictions in [Defendant’s] proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a 

reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Springer v. Convergys 

Customer Mgmt. Group, Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348-50 (11th Cir. 2007). Conclusory 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 34 of 42
35

allegations of discrimination, without more, are insufficient to show pretext. 

Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996). “A reason 

is not pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and 

that discrimination was the real reason.” Brooks v. County Comm’n of Jefferson 

County, 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006).

 To show pretext, a plaintiff may not merely quarrel with the wisdom of the 

employer’s reason but must meet the reason head on and rebut it. See Alvarez v. 

Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010); Chapman, 229

F.3d at 1034. The inquiry into pretext is based on “the employer’s beliefs, and not 

the employee’s own perceptions of his performance.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 

1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1997). As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “to be blunt about 

it,” the inquiry does not center “on reality as it exists outside of the decision maker’s 

head.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266 (explaining the question is not whether the 

employee actually had performance problems but “whether her employers were 

dissatisfied with her for these or other non-discriminatory reasons, even if 

mistakenly or unfairly so, or instead merely used those complaints . . . as cover for” 

discrimination).

As evidence of pretext, Plaintiff points to the same evidence as he did with his 

mixed motive theory of discrimination. (Doc. 32 at 19). Notably, Plaintiff does not 

specifically address any of the coachings that led to his termination or the reasons 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 35 of 42
36

articulated by Defendant for each coaching and for good reason. In his deposition, 

Plaintiff essentially admitted that the reasons behind each coaching were legitimate. 

As to the first two coachings, while Plaintiff may not have believed that the 

coachings were “fair,” Plaintiff admitted that he was not meeting all of Simmons’ 

expectations. (Suggs Dep. at 57-60, 72). Similarly, with regard to the third 

coaching, it is undisputed that Plaintiff certified a forklift driver without first gaining 

the approval of Lewis, in direct contravention of Lewis’ instructions. (Id. at 80-85). 

In fact, Plaintiff testified that he “was in the wrong in doing this. I made a mistake 

. . . the one, I accepted. This one was justified.” (Id. at 85). Finally, with regard to 

the coaching that resulted in his termination, Plaintiff admitted in his written 

statement regarding the situation that his comments “sounded threatening.” (Doc. 

27-2 at 24). 

Instead of meeting the reasons for the adverse employment actions head on 

and rebutting them, Plaintiff maintains Lewis wanted him terminated and used 

coachings as a way to accomplish this goal. However, glaringly missing from 

Plaintiff’s argument and theory of a plot to terminate him is evidence that he was 

coached and/or terminated because of his race or his age. A court does not judge 

whether an employer’s decisions are “prudent or fair”; the sole concern is whether 

unlawful discriminatory animus motivated an employment decision. Damon v. 

Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 36 of 42
37

There is simply no evidence to link this alleged plot with illegal race or age 

discrimination. While there are isolated racial comments from Lewis, the evidence 

shows that those comments were about both Caucasian and African Americans. Her 

clique of favorite employees contained people of both races and a variety of ages. 

Plaintiff’s pretext argument also ignores the fact that Cizerle oversaw the 

investigation and made the recommendation of a “Third Written Coaching”23 with 

regard to the comments Plaintiff made to McCann and Caver. It is undisputed that 

Cizerle did not know Plaintiff’s race or age at the time she made this 

recommendation. (Cizerle Decl. ¶ 15).

As to the one comment that Rogers overheard Lewis tell Simmons that

Plaintiff “was too old to be doing this job,” (Rogers Dep. at 26), there is not enough 

evidence surrounding the circumstances of this alleged comment to raise an 

inference of age discrimination with any of the alleged adverse employment actions. 

For example, there is no evidence as to when this comment was allegedly said. 

Without any context, the comment is too remote and isolated to establish a material 

fact on pretext. See Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002) (isolated 

comments unrelated to the termination decision are “insufficient to establish a 

material fact on pretext”).

 23 Use of the term “Third Written Coaching” is confusing in this context because it is actually 

Plaintiff’s fourth incident that led to a coaching. However, it is the appropriate term in view of 

Defendant’s Coaching for Improvement plan. (See. Doc. 27-7 at ¶ 12 (italics added)).

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 37 of 42
38

In summary, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish that the 

reasons for the adverse employment actions were false and that discrimination was 

the real reason. Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163. His race and age discrimination claims, 

therefore, fail as a matter of law and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on 

these claims.

B. Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against in violation of Title VII. (Doc. 

8 ¶¶ 47-53). As in the discrimination context, where proof of retaliatory intent is 

offered by way of circumstantial evidence, as here, courts apply a burden-shifting 

scheme analogous to the McDonnell Douglas framework outlined above. Holifield, 

115 F.3d at 1566; Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1162-3 (11th Cir. 

1994). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts 

to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse

employment action. Id. Once the employer proffers a legitimate reason for the 

adverse employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show the 

legitimate reason was pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct. Id.

Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee because 

(1) “he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by the 

statute, or because (2) “he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 

any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under the statute. 42 U.S.C. 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 38 of 42
39

§ 2000e–3(a). To establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation claim based on 

circumstantial evidence, Plaintiff must show: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected 

expression; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) there is 

a causal connection between the two events. See Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970; see

also Dixon v. The Hallmark Cos., Inc., 627 F.3d 849, 854 (11th Cir. 2010); 

Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot show that he engaged in statutorily 

protected activity, and, even if he did, he cannot show a causal connection between 

that activity and any adverse employment action. (Doc. 26 at 17-22). The court 

agrees.

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that he engaged in any 

sort of protected activity. “A plaintiff engages in statutorily protected activity when 

he complains about an action that he reasonably believed was unlawful under Title 

VII.” Banks v. iGov Techs., Inc., 661 F. App’x 638, 645 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing 

Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997)). 

“This standard has both a subjective and an objective component.” Id. (citing Little, 

103 F.3d at 960). Plaintiff is required to show that he “‘subjectively (that is, in good 

faith) believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices’ 

and that ‘his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record 

presented.” Id. (quoting Little, 103 F.3d at 960) (emphasis omitted).

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 39 of 42
40

Here, there is no admissible evidence that Plaintiff made any sort of complaint

of race discrimination that could qualify as statutorily protected activity. For the 

reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his telephone conversation 

with Simmons is inadmissible hearsay. And, even if the court were incorrect in 

striking Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his alleged “words of caution to Lisa Lewis 

as to her inappropriate and racist comments made to employees,” (doc. 32 at 16),

this evidence fails to establish that Plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected activity. 

There is no evidence regarding the context of this conversation. Additionally, 

Plaintiff’s alleged statement that Lewis’ comment needed to be rephrased because 

some employees could construe it as racial discrimination does not establish the 

objective or even subjective components of statutorily protected activity. Plaintiff’s 

testimony regarding the statement seems to imply that he did not perceive the 

statement as racially discriminatory. But, again, because Plaintiff does not remember 

the conversation, the court is left to guess at what was said – something it refuses to 

do.

Defendant also challenges Plaintiff’s retaliation claim on causal connection

grounds. To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that the decision

makers were aware of the protected conduct, and that the protected activity and the

adverse action were not wholly unrelated. Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 

571, 590 (11th Cir. 2000). To show a causal connection mere temporal proximity 

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 40 of 42
41

between knowledge of protected activity and an adverse action must be very close.

See Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004); Clark County Sch. 

Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001). In addition to showing temporal 

proximity between the protected act and the allegedly adverse employment action, a 

plaintiff must show that his employer actually knew about the protected activity. See 

Clark County, 532 U.S. at 272.

Even if the court assumes that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity when he 

allegedly made the statement to Lewis, cautioning her to be careful in how she 

conveyed a message to other employees, there is absolutely no evidence when this 

alleged conversation occurred. There is also no evidence regarding the context of 

this alleged conversation. In fact, Plaintiff does not remember the conversation at 

all. Without any evidence of the timing or context of the conversation, it is virtually 

impossible to show that it was in any way related to any adverse employment action. 

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law. 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation in 

violation of Title VII.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 

25) is due to be granted in full. Defendant’s motion to strike (doc. 33) is due to be 

granted in part and is moot in part. A separate order will be entered.

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 41 of 42
42

DATED this 2nd day of April, 2020.

_________________________________

JOHN E. OTT

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Case 1:18-cv-01064-JEO Document 39 Filed 04/02/20 Page 42 of 42