Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00377/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00377-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MARQUES PHILLIPS and CYNTHIA

PHILLIPS,

NO. CIV. S-04-0377 FCD PAN

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF FAIRFIELD, CHIEF OF

POLICE WILLIAM GRESHAM,

OFFICER MARK SCHRAER, OFFICER

CHAD TIGERT, OFFICER STEVE

TROJANOWSKI, JR., OFFICER MIKE

BEATTY, OFFICER MATTHEW

THOMAS, OFFICER STEPHEN RUIZ,

OFFICER TROY OVIATT, OFFICER

JEREMY NIPPER, OFFICER FRANCO

CESAR, OFFICER CADE BECKWITH,

and DOES 1 through 13,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on the City of Fairfield’s

(“city”), Chief William Gresham’s (“Gresham”), and named City of

Fairfield police officers’ (“officers”) motion for summary

judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of the

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Unless otherwise noted, the facts herein are 1

undisputed. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Am. Separate Stmt. of

Undisp. Facts (“UF”), filed Nov. 5, 2005). Where the facts are

in dispute, the court recounts plaintiffs’ version of the facts.

Defendants object to various pieces of evidence that

plaintiff presents in support of his motion. Much of the

evidence that defendants object to is immaterial to the court’s

analysis of the summary judgment motion. To the extent that the

evidence is relevant, the court finds that defendants’ objections

are without merit.

Due to the shared last names of the plaintiffs, the 2

court will refer to each plaintiff by his or her first name in

order to avoid confusion.

2

issues. Marques Phillips was arrested on February 1, 2003. 

Plaintiffs Marques Phillips and Cynthia Phillips filed this

action on February 2, 2004, alleging both federal and state law

claims arising out of the February 1, 2003 arrest. On December

2, 2005, the court heard oral argument on the matter. For the

reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part. 

BACKGROUND1

On January 31, 2003, Marques Phillips (“Marques”) was 2

stopped by Officer Steve Trojanowski, Jr. (“Trojanowski”) and

another officer in the 7-11 parking lot in Fairfield, California

for reckless driving. (UF ¶ 1; Dep. of Marques Phillips,

attached as Ex. F to Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.,

filed Nov. 5, 2005, at 42:10-13 (“M. Phillips Dep.”)). Marques

denies that he was driving recklessly or “bouncing” as the

officers alleged. (UF ¶¶ 1, 3; M. Phillips Dep. at 41:24-42:5). 

Marques had four other people in his car. (UF ¶ 2). The

officers made Marques and the passengers step out of the car. 

(UF ¶ 4). The officers searched the car and found a bag of

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marijuana. (UF ¶ 5). The officers arrested Marques and towed

his car. (UF ¶ 6). His parents retrieved his car for him from

the tow yard the next day. (UF ¶ 7).

On February 1, 2003, Marques and some friends were waiting

for a pizza he had ordered at Little Ceasar’s. (UF ¶ 8). While

waiting, Marques noticed some police in the area of North Texas

Street and went to check out what was going on. (UF ¶¶ 9-10). 

He approached the area where the police were. (UF ¶ 10). The

police asked Marques if he owned a Blazer. (UF ¶ 11). He

responded that he did not. (UF ¶ 11). The officers asked for

his car keys and appeared to use them to open a Blazer. (UF ¶

12). The officers found drugs in the Blazer. (UF ¶ 13). The

officers arrested Marques and confiscated his car keys. (UF ¶

13). 

Later that afternoon, Marques called a locksmith to have new

keys made for his car. (UF ¶ 14). Marques’ mother, Cynthia

Phillips (“Cynthia”), agreed to drive him to meet the locksmith. 

(UF ¶ 15). About 11⁄2 to 2 hours after Marques called the

locksmith, Cynthia drove him in her car to meet the locksmith. 

(UF ¶ 16). Cynthia parked at the Shell gas station, but Marques

told her it was not safe. (M. Phillips Dep. at 53:6-9). They

drove to the Jack-in-the-Box parking lot at 1972 North Texas

Street, which was near the parking lot where Marques’ car was

parked. (UF ¶ 17). Marques told Cynthia to park under a street

light because it was dark by that time. (UF ¶ 19). Cynthia

backed into a parking space. (UF ¶ 20). Marques could see his

car from that angle. (UF ¶ 21; M. Phillips Dep. at 53:13-15).

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The area of North Texas and East Tabor Streets, the same

area where Cynthia and Marques were, is known for high levels of

narcotics sales. (UF ¶ 23). This area is considered dangerous

by Fairfield Police and Fairfield citizens. (UF ¶ 23). On this

same night, members of the Crime Suppression and Narcotics Team

from the Fairfield Police Department were conducting undercover

narcotics purchases, called “buy/bust” operations, in areas known

for a high level of narcotics sales. (UF ¶¶ 22, 25). Police

consider these to be very dangerous operations for the police

officers involved. (UF ¶ 25). Prior to sending an undercover

officer into this area to purchase narcotics, Trojanowski drove

into the area to check out the site and look for suspected or

known drug dealers. (UF ¶ 26). Undercover officers would then

be sent in to attempt to purchase narcotics. (UF ¶ 26). Members

of the Crime Suppression Unit and Narcotics Team taking part in

the operation were Officers Mike Beatty, Cade Beckwith, Franco

Cesar, Mathew Thomas, Troy Oviatt, and Stephen Ruiz. (UF ¶ 26). 

Officer Jeremy Nipper was stationed in a surveillance van. (UF ¶

26). 

Defendants contend that the Fairfield Police Department had

just received a call regarding a male who was loitering in the

Jack-in-the-Box parking lot who was in possession of a firearm. 

(UF ¶ 27). Defendants also contend that the suspect fit the

general description of Marques and that Trojanowski heard this

warning dispatch. (UF ¶ 27). Plaintiffs present evidence that,

at the very least, demonstrate inconsistencies regarding whether

any of the officers, including Trojanowski, remembered hearing

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Plaintiffs also contend that evidence of this dispatch 3

was determined to be inadmissible at the Discovery Hearing on

October 13, 2005. Disc. Hr’g, attached as Ex. A to Pls.’ Opp’n

to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., filed Nov. 5, 2005, at 28:23-29:17

(“Disc. Hr’g”).

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this dispatch or the description of the suspect in the dispatch.3

 Approximately fifteen to twenty minutes after Marques and

Cynthia arrived, Marques got out of the car to go get a drink. 

(UF ¶ 28). He crossed the parking lot to go to the Liquor Tree

Store. (UF ¶ 29). He returned to the car where he and his

mother sat for another thirty to forty minutes. (UF ¶ 30). 

Marques saw a white van pull into the parking lot where his car

was parked. (UF ¶ 31). He assumed it was the locksmith. (UF ¶

31). Marques got out of the car to contact the driver of the

van. (UF ¶ 32). When he reached the van, however, it was not

the locksmith. (UF ¶ 33). He turned around and headed back to

his mother’s car, which was located on the other side of the

Jack-in-the-Box parking lot. (UF ¶¶ 33-34). 

At approximately 8:00 p.m. that evening, Trojanowski was

parked in the parking lot of 1972 North Texas Street near the

Shell Station and Jack-in-the-Box. (UF ¶ 35). This parking lot

is a high crime, high drug sales area. (UF ¶ 36). Trojanowski

saw Marques walking around the parking lot from the area of the

Shell Station to the Liquor Tree Store and back again to the

parked car. (UF ¶ 37). Trojanowski recognized Marques as

someone who was previously arrested for possession of marijuana

twice in the last twenty-four hour period. (UF ¶ 38). 

Defendants contend that Trojanowski knew from personal

experience that Marques had threatened violence against the

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police in prior arrests. (UF ¶ 39). Plaintiffs dispute this

contention. (M. Phillips Dep. at 50:12-16; Decl. of Marques

Phillips in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., filed Nov. 5,

2005, ¶ 3 (“M. Phillips Decl.”)). Defendants assert that

Trojanowski, upon seeing Marques walk back and forth across the

parking lot, believed Marques to be loitering in violation of

California Health and Safety Code § 11532. (UF ¶ 40). 

Defendants further assert that Trojanowski believed Marques could

be the armed suspect of the earlier dispatch. (UF ¶ 40). 

Plaintiffs dispute these assertions. (Disc. Hr’g at 28:23-

29:17). Defendants contend that in Trojanowski’s mind Marques’

actions seemed deliberately fashioned to undermine the officers’

buy/bust operation, (UF ¶ 40), and that because of the danger

presented to Trojanowski, the decision was made to arrest Marques

with a “high-risk stop” procedure. (UF ¶ 41). Plaintiffs also

dispute these contentions. (Disc. Hr’g at 28:23-29:17). A highrisk stop requires police to have their guns drawn as they order

a suspect to get down on the ground. (UF ¶ 42). This is done to

assure officer safety, safety of the community and safety of the

suspect. (UF ¶ 42).

When Marques entered the parking lot and approached the

passenger side of his mother’s car, he looked to his left and saw

Trojanowski. (UF ¶ 43). As he walked, he heard somebody say

“get on the ground.” (UF ¶ 43; M. Phillips Dep. at 58:7-9,

62:11-12, 63:3-5). Marques did not know who it was, but he

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Defendants assert that Marques first dropped to his 4

knees and that Trojanowski placed his foot on Marques’ upper back

to push him to the ground. (See Defs.’ Am. Sep. Stmt of Undisp.

Facts (“Defs.’ ASSUF”), filed Oct. 18, 2005, ¶¶ 44, 50).

Defendants contend that Marques started kicking his 5

(continued...)

7

obeyed the command and laid down face first. (Pl.’s Am. Stmt. 4

of Disp. Facts (“SDF”), filed Nov. 5, 2005, ¶ 1). Cynthia had

been watching Marques walk across the parking lot, but when

Marques laid down on the ground, she could no longer see him. 

(UF ¶ 47). Marques was about five feet from his mother’s car. 

(M. Phillips Dep. at 63:24-25-64:1). Marques turned his head and

saw Trojanowski training his gun on him. (SDF ¶ 2). Trojanowski

also trained his gun on Cynthia. (SDF ¶ 3). Trojanowski told

Cynthia to stay in her car and keep her hands up. (SDF ¶¶ 4, 5). 

Marques saw Trojanowski advance quickly toward him. (UF ¶ 48). 

Marques asked Trojanowski what he had done, but received no

answer. (UF ¶ 47). When Trojanowski reached Marques, he stomped

the back of his neck. (SDF ¶ 6). Marques screamed in pain. 

(SDF ¶ 7). Trojanowski continued to train his gun on both

Marques and Cynthia. (SDF ¶ 9). He then dropped down on top of

Marques and drove his knee into his back. (SDF ¶ 8). 

Trojanowski then picked Marques up and slammed him back into the

ground. (SDF ¶ 10). Marques continued to scream in pain, but

did not resist Trojanowski. (SDF ¶¶ 11, 12). Cynthia then saw

six to eight officers approach Marques. (UF ¶ 51). Trojanowski

and Officer Tigert placed handcuffs on Marques. (UF ¶ 57). 

Officer Ruiz and another officer helped put REPP restraints on

Marques’ ankles. (Decl. of Officer Stephen Ruiz in Supp. of 5

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(...continued) 5

legs which warranted the use of ankle restraints. (Defs.’ ASSUR

¶ 58). 

Defendants contend that Marques “was helped” to the 6

police car by Officer Beckwith and another officer. (Defs.’

ASSUR ¶ 58). Defendants also contend that in her deposition,

Cynthia said Marques was carried by his arms and legs, not his

restraints. (Defs.’ Opp. to PASDF 20). Plaintiffs assert that

Cynthia stated that the officers carried Marques by the top of

(continued...)

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Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., filed Oct. 18, 2005, at ¶ 9). The

officers tied Marques’ handcuffs to his ankle cuffs. (SDF ¶ 13). 

Marques did not resist the officers. (SDF ¶ 14). The officers

punched, clubbed, kicked, and slammed Marques into the ground

multiple times. (SDF ¶ 15). Marques continued to scream in pain

and passed out. (SDF ¶¶ 16-17). The officers continued to

punch, club, kick, and slam Marques onto the ground. (SDF ¶ 18). 

A young officer told Cynthia she could get out of the car. (UF ¶

52). Sergeant Schraer, who was standing at the front driver’s

side of Cynthia’s car, told the officers to keep Cynthia back and

out of the way. (UF ¶ 53). The officers “moved in toward [her]”

and she “moved back behind [her] car door.” (Decl. of Cynthia

Phillips in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., filed Nov. 5,

2005, ¶ 8 (“C. Phillips Decl.”); Dep. of Cynthia Phillips,

attached as Ex. E to PLS.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.,

filed Nov. 5, 2005, at 88:1-2; 143:7-10. (“C. Phillips Dep.”)). 

Cynthia then stepped onto the door jamb to see over her car. (C.

Phillips Dep. 88:4-7). Cynthia could see that the officers were

hitting Marques with their batons. (C. Phillips Dep. 88:7-12,

17-89:19, 91:19-92:18). The officers carried Marques to a police

car by his restraints. (SDF ¶ 20). 6

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(...continued) 6

his arms and legs. See UF ¶ 13. The court, however, does not

have that particular deposition page. The deposition testimony

does state that Marques was restrained by his hands and his

ankles, and the two sets of restraints were tied together. (C.

Phillips Dep. at 93:7-13). Cynthia also testified that Marques

was carried or lifted up. (Id. at 93:21-94:5).

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The officers “threw” Marques into the police car. (SDF ¶

21). An officer got into the police car and struck Marques while

he was handcuffed and anklecuffed. (SDF ¶ 22). Marques was

crying and screaming in pain. (SDF ¶ 23). In order to remove

him from the crowd that was gathering around the area of

Cynthia’s car, the officers then took Marques to the Food Max

parking lot in front of Hollywood Video. (UF ¶ 59). The

officers “snatched” him out of the police car by the “straps.” 

(M. Phillips Dep. 75:22-76:2). The officers patted him down,

lifted his shirt, and took off his shoes and socks. (UF ¶ 61). 

The officers did not find any contraband on Marques. (SDF ¶ 25). 

The officers then transported him to the County Jail. (UF ¶ 62). 

A booking photo of Marques was taken at the jail. (UF ¶ 63).

While the officers were carrying Marques to the car,

Sergeant Schraer came around to where Cynthia was, and the two

engaged in conversation. (UF ¶ 55). Her view was blocked by the

car and by Sergeant Schraer during the conversation. (UF ¶ 55). 

Cynthia asked Sergeant Schraer two times what Marques did wrong,

and both times he yelled back that Marques sells drugs. (SDF ¶¶

26-29). Cynthia asked him the same question a third time and

Sergeant Schraer responded that Marques was loitering. (SDF ¶¶

30-31). Cynthia told Sergeant Schraer that Marques was not

loitering because he was with her waiting for the locksmith. 

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(SDF ¶ 32). Sergeant Schraer then said that Marques identified

an undercover police officer. (SDF ¶ 33). He told her that she

should know how serious it was to identify an undercover police

officer because her husband was a police officer. (SDF ¶ 34). 

Cynthia told him that he was wrong. (SDF ¶ 35). Sergeant

Schraer shrugged his shoulders and said that he knew. (SDF ¶

36). Cynthia was crying. (SDF ¶ 37). She did not see Marques

again because he was gone by the time the conversation ended. 

(UF ¶ 55). Cynthia was never touched by any of the officers. 

(UF ¶ 56).

The officers’ actions caused Marques extreme physical and

mental pain. (SDF ¶¶ 43-44). Marques had to receive medical

attention for his physical pain. (M. Phillips Dep. at 80:13-

83:6, 85:3-10). The officers’ actions caused Cynthia extreme

mental pain and physical manifestations for which she had to

receive medical attention. (SDF ¶¶ 46-47).

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

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nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-289 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

/////

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a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee's note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation

to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224,

1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

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Plaintiffs failed to respond to many of these claims in 7

their opposition. Plaintiffs further clarified their nonopposition to the dismissal of these claims during the hearing

held December 2, 2005. 

13

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.

ANALYSIS

In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged violations of various

federal and state laws. In response to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, plaintiffs do not oppose defendants’ motion 7

with respect to the following claims: (1) plaintiffs’ claims

against Gresham, the officers, and the city brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for all constitutional violations except the Fourth

Amendment claims; (2) plaintiffs’ claims against Gresham and the

officers brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) plaintiffs’ claims

against the officers brought under Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7; (4)

plaintiffs’ claims against Gresham and the officers brought under

Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1; (5) plaintiffs’ claims against Gresham

based upon negligent infliction of emotional distress,

negligence, negligent selection, training, retention,

supervision, investigation, and discipline, and respondeat

superior liability for the actions of the officers; (6)

plaintiff’s claims against the officers based upon negligence;

and (7) plaintiff’s claims against the city based upon negligent

selection, training, retention, supervision, investigation, and

discipline.

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are (1) claims for relief under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations by the officers,

Gresham, and the city; (2) claims for relief under state law

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against the officers for intentional torts; and (3) a claim for

relief under state law against the city for respondeat superior

liability against the city for the conduct of the officers. 

Defendants do not address plaintiffs’ claims for intentional

infliction of emotional distress in their motion for summary

judgment. As such, plaintiffs’ claims survive this motion and

will not be addressed by the court. 

A. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiffs Marques Phillips and Cynthia Phillips bring

claims against the officers, Gresham, and the city pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs assert that the officers acted under

the color of law to deprive them of their Fourth Amendment

constitutionally protected rights to be free from unreasonable

search and seizure. Defendants move for summary judgment on the

ground that the claims fail as a matter of law and that the

officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

1. Marques Phillips’ Claims against Defendant Officers

Plaintiff Marques Phillips asserts that defendant officers

violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they did not have

probable cause to arrest him and because they used excessive

force. Defendants contend that there was probable cause to

arrest plaintiff and that the officers used a minimal amount of

force to overcome plaintiff’s resistance. Defendants also argue

that the officers are protected by qualified immunity.

a. Probable Cause

Plaintiffs assert that defendants had no probable cause to

arrest Marques Phillips. Plaintiffs’ theory is that defendant

Trojanowski created or fabricated reasons to arrest Marques

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Phillips. (Hr’g on Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“SJ Hr’g”), heard

Dec. 2, 2005). Trojanowski was involved in all three arrests of

Marques Phillips that occurred within an approximately 24 hour

period. (Id.) In the arrest at issue in this case, according to

defendants, Marques Phillips was walking through an area where

defendant officers had set up a dangerous buy/bust operation. 

(Id.) Defendants admit that part of the reason for the arrest of

Marques Phillips was the disruption or the potential disruption

of the buy/bust operation by the unknowing plaintiff as he walked

through the parking lot. (Id.) 

“Probable cause exists when the police know ‘reasonably

trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in

believing that the accused had committed or was committing an

offense.’” United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir.

1990) (quoting United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d

1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1988)). “In evaluating a custodial arrest

executed by state officials, federal courts must determine the

reasonableness of the arrest in reference to state law governing

the arrest.” Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1938 (9th

Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). California law

requires that the court look to the totality of the circumstances

known by the officer to decide whether the officer’s

determination of probable cause was reasonable. See People v.

Guajardo, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1738 (1994); Agar v. Superior Court,

21 Cal. App. 3d 24, 29 (1971). 

Defendants assert that defendant officers had probable cause

to arrest plaintiff Marques Phillips. Plaintiff was arrested

pursuant to California Health and Safety Code Section 11532,

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which sets forth the guidelines for unlawful loitering in a

public place with the intent to engage in narcotics related

activity. Specifically, defendants assert probable cause

pursuant to § 11532(b)(10) which provides that a factor “in

determining whether a person has the requisite intent to engage

in drug-related activity” is whether that person has engaged “in

any other behavior indicative of illegal drug-related activity”

in the past six months. Id. Defendants contend that because the

parking lot where plaintiff was arrested was known for high

levels of narcotics sales, and because Marques Phillips had been

arrested earlier in the same day for drug related activity by

Trojanowski, the initial arresting officer, defendants had

probable cause to arrest plaintiff.

Section 11532 is an anti-loitering statute. Before, the

officers may even consider factors relating to whether a person

is loitering in a manner and in circumstances that manifest an

intent to engage in drug-related activity, the officers must have

had probable cause to believe that the person was actually

loitering. See id. In this case, plaintiffs present evidence

that Marques was waiting for a locksmith with his mother in her

car. He approached a white van, which he thought belonged to the

locksmith. After determining that the van did not belong to the

locksmith, plaintiff was returning to his mother’s car when he

was stopped and arrested by the officers. Plaintiff’s actions in

walking to and from a white van is not enough for this court to

find that defendant officers had probable cause to arrest

plaintiff for loitering as a matter of law. 

/////

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Plaintiffs present evidence that all defendant officers 8

were involved in the incident or present that night. (UF ¶¶ 66-

67). Plaintiffs are amenable to dropping claims against

defendant officers who could not be identified by either

plaintiff as involved in the alleged arrest and beating of

Marques Phillips. (SJ Hr’g). However, defendants have refused

to turn over photographs of defendant officers for identification

by plaintiffs. As was previously indicated to the parties, the

court would entertain a motion to reopen discovery to allow

plaintiffs the opportunity to identify those officers involved in

the alleged wrongful conduct. 

17

Further, the circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s prior

arrests for “drug-related activity” are disputed. Plaintiffs

contend that the arrests of Marques Phillips were only

tangentially related to drugs. Plaintiffs present evidence that

in none of the prior arrests were drugs found upon Marques

Phillips’ person. Therefore, even if the officers had probable

cause to believe that plaintiff was loitering, defendants may not

have had an objectively reasonable basis for determining that

plaintiff had an intent to engage in drug-related activity under

§ 11532.

b. Excessive Force

Plaintiffs also assert that, in addition to lacking probable

cause, defendants used excessive force in the arrest of Marques

Phillips. Defendants argue that some of the defendant officers

were not at the scene and that others did not actually touch

plaintiff. Defendants also argue that the force applied to 8

plaintiff was reasonable because (1) plaintiff appeared to the

officers to be resisting a lawful detention; (2) the officers had

just received word from dispatch that there was an armed man in

the parking lot; and (3) Trojanowski believed that Marques

Phillips had threatened violence on prior occasions.

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Whether law enforcement officials used excessive force in

the course of making an arrest is properly analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 

Determining whether the force used to effect a

particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth

Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature

and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interests’ against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake.

Id. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). 

The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be evaluated

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. Id. 

A proper application of the reasonableness inquiry

requires careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers

or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest

or attempting to evade arrest by flight. 

Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotations omitted); see also McKenzie v. Lamb, 738

F.2d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 1984) (the determination requires the

analysis of factors such as “the requirements for the officers’

safety, the motivation for the arrest, and the extent of the

injury inflicted”).

In this case, plaintiffs present evidence that defendants

inflicted a significant amount of injury upon Marques Phillips. 

Plaintiff was ordered to get on the ground. Trojanowski trained

his gun on him and stomped the back of his neck. Trojanowski

then dropped down on top of plaintiff and drove his knee in his

back. Subsequently, plaintiff was handcuffed and his ankles were

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restrained. Defendant officers punched, clubbed, kicked, and

slammed plaintiff into the ground multiple times. Plaintiffs

allege that as a result of this interaction, Marques Phillips

suffered numerous injuries.

Further, while plaintiffs have presented a triable issue of

fact regarding the existence of probable cause to arrest, the

arrest at issue was for a violation of California Health and

Safety Code Section 11532, which is a non-violent misdemeanor. 

Therefore, the severity of the crime at issue weighs against the

use of force. While defendants contend that such force was

necessary to execute the arrest, plaintiffs present

countervailing evidence that Marques Phillips did not resist the

arrest and followed the officer’s command to get down. Viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,

the lack of resistance weighs against the use of such force. 

Finally, while defendants argue that Trojanowski believed

that Marques posed a threat to officer safety, plaintiffs present

evidence to the contrary. Defendants argue that Trojanowski and

officers heard a dispatch warning of an armed man in the vicinity

of the area where plaintiff was arrested. Plaintiffs dispute

whether any of the officers actually heard this dispatch. It is

also unclear whether a description of the “armed man” was given

and if so, whether the description matched the appearance of

plaintiff. (SJ Hr’g). Defendants also argue that Trojanowski

believed that Marques Phillips had threatened violence in the

past. Plaintiffs dispute that Marques Phillips previously

threatened violence against the police. Therefore, plaintiffs

have presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue

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regarding whether Trojanowski actually believed that plaintiff

posed a threat to officer safety or whether such belief was

reasonable. 

Based upon the foregoing analysis, plaintiffs have presented

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there is a triable issue

of fact regarding whether defendant officers had probable cause

to arrest Marques Phillips. Plaintiffs have also presented

evidence demonstrating a triable issue of fact regarding whether

excessive force was used in effectuating the arrest.

c. Qualified Immunity 

Defendants argue that, even if the officers made a mistake

regarding probable cause or the amount of force required, they

are immune from suit based upon the doctrine of qualified

immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects from suit

government officers who do not knowingly violate the law. Gasho

v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994). Qualified

immunity is a generous standard designed to protect “all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 

Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (citation omitted). A

law officer can establish qualified immunity by demonstrating (1)

that the law governing the officer’s conduct was not clearly

established at the time of the challenged actions, or (2) that

under the clearly established law, an officer could reasonably

have believed that the alleged conduct was lawful. See Katz v.

United States, 194 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999); Mendoza v.

Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (observing that police

officers “are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar

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as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known”).

The question of immunity generally is not one for the jury. 

Qualified immunity “‘is an immunity from suit rather than a mere

defense to liability’ . . . . [Therefore,] [i]mmunity ordinarily

should be decided by the court long before trial.” Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (citation omitted). However, if

a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the

circumstances under which the officer acted, then the court

should make the determination after the facts have been developed

at trial. Act Up!\Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th

Cir. 1993). 

The initial inquiry that the court must make to determine

whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity is whether,

“[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated

a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). 

Based upon the court’s above analysis of defendant officers’

potential liability, the court has found that plaintiffs have

presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that

a constitutional violation or violations did occur. 

If, as in this case, a violation could be made out on a

favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next inquiry is

whether the constitutional right was clearly established. Id. 

This inquiry must be taken in the light of the specific context

of the case. The contours of the right must be sufficiently

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clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right. Id. However, this does not mean that

an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the

very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but,

rather, in light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness must be

apparent. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (internal

citations omitted). The salient question is whether the law at

the time of the disputed conduct gave defendants “fair warning

that their alleged treatment of plaintiffs was unconstitutional.” 

See id. at 741. There must exist a clearly established rule so

that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct

was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 205-06.

The conduct in question surrounds the arrest of Marques

Phillips on February 1, 2003. At this time, the law regarding

the fundamental right to be protected from unlawful arrests and

the use of unreasonable force in the execution of arrests was

clear. Individuals have a right to be free from unreasonable

seizures unless there is probable cause to arrest. See People v.

Ellison, 68 Cal. App. 4th 203, 211 (1998) (police must have

probable cause to arrest an individual pursuant to Section

11532). In this case, because plaintiffs have provided evidence

that Marques was not loitering and did not appear to be

loitering, the officers arrest of plaintiff under a loitering

statute would not be reasonable. See Saucer, 533 U.S. at 205-06. 

Individuals also have a right to be free from the use of

excessive force in effectuating an arrest. See Mendoza v. Block,

27 F.3d 1357, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Officers have a

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considerable amount of guidance from the courts in the

permissible use of force while making an arrest.”). The use of

weapons, restraining individuals by force, handcuffing, and

throwing individuals against the ground is a violation of the

Fourth Amendment where the arrested individual did not resist

arrest and was not a risk to the safety of the arresting

officers. See McKenzie, 738 F.2d at 1010. Plaintiff presents

evidence that these were the circumstances of his arrest. 

In light of the established state of the law at the time in

question, defendant officers had “fair warning that their alleged

treatment of plaintiff was unconstitutional.” Hope, 536 U.S. at

741. Because there are triable issues of fact as to whether the

officers had probable cause to arrest Marques Phillips and

whether the force used to arrest Marques Phillips was

unreasonable, and because defendants had notice that their

alleged conduct was unconstitutional, the court cannot find that

defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity at this

stage of the litigation.

Therefore, defendants motion for summary judgment regarding

the claims of plaintiff Marques Phillips against defendant

officers based upon Fourth Amendment violations is DENIED.

2. Cynthia Phillips’ Claims against Defendant Officers

Plaintiff Cynthia Phillips asserts that defendant officers

violated her Fourth Amendment rights because they seized her

without reasonable suspicion and because Trojanowski used

excessive force when he trained a gun on her. Defendants contend

that Cynthia Phillips was never detained by the police, and

therefore, never seized. Defendants also contend that the use of

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the gun was reasonable. Defendants assert that even if the

officers were mistaken in the alleged seizures or use of force,

the officers are protected by qualified immunity.

Plaintiffs assert that defendants seized Cynthia Phillips on

two occasions during the arrest of Marques Phillips. “[F]or

there to be a seizure there must be a restraint of liberty such

that the person reasonably believes her is not free to leave.” 

Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1013 (internal quotation omitted).

Plaintiffs present evidence that during the arrest of

Marques Phillips, Trojanowski trained a gun on Cynthia Phillips

while she sat in her car. Plaintiffs rely primarily on the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Robinson v. Solano County to justify their

claim that Trojanowski’s training of his gun on plaintiff

constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 

However, in Robinson, the fact of a seizure was not disputed. 

Id. Further, in Robinson, the arresting officers pointed a gun

at plaintiff from a distance of 3-6 feet, and the officers

subsequently handcuffed plaintiff and placed him in the back of

the squad car. Id. 

In United States v. Del Vizo, the Ninth Circuit held that

the defendant was “seized” where the police ordered him to step

out of his vehicle and handcuffed him while the officers were

brandishing weapons. 918 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1990). In

United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, the Ninth Circuit ruled

that individuals were “seized” when police approached the

suspects with weapons drawn, ordered them to halt, and required

them to lie face down in the street while they were handcuffed. 

856 F.2d at 1295. However, there is no authority supporting the

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contention that pointing a gun at an individual, without more,

constitutes a seizure.

Plaintiffs also present evidence that Sergeant Schraer told

some of the officers to keep Cynthia Phillips back from Marques

Phillips, and the officers formed a half circle around her. 

Plaintiffs contend that Cynthia Phillips retreated until she was

trapped behind the car door and that she reasonably believed she

was not free to leave her car. 

The circumstances surrounding Trojanowski’s use of a gun and

the officers’ formation of a half circle around the plaintiff

demonstrate that Cynthia Phillips was not seized. Trojanowski

trained that gun at both Cynthia Phillips and Marques Phillips

during the arrest of Marques Phillips, which occurred within a

few feet of the car. An officer told Cynthia Phillips she could

get out of her car. When Sergeant Schraer ordered the officers

to keep plaintiff back, the officers did not keep her from

leaving, but prevented her from coming any closer to Marques

Phillips. Plaintiff was never ordered to get out of or stay in

the car, never physically touched by the officers, and never

physically restrained by the officers. A reasonable person would

have believed that she was free to stay in her car, leave her

car, or leave the vicinity. Defendant officers’ action in

preventing her from approaching or intervening in the arrest of

Marques Phillips does not constitute a “seizure” for purposes of

the Fourth Amendment.

Because plaintiffs have not presented evidence that Cynthia

Phillips was seized, plaintiffs do not have colorable claims for

violations of Cynthia Phillips’ Fourth Amendment rights. As

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such, defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding Cynthia

Phillips’ claims against defendant officers is GRANTED. 

3. Plaintiffs’ Claims against Gresham

Plaintiffs Marques Phillips and Cynthia Phillips contend

that Chief Gresham is liable under § 1983 in his individual

capacity for his actions and inaction. Specifically, plaintiffs

argue that Gresham failed to train the officers, failed to

supervise Trojanowski, and failed to discipline Trojanowski for

citizen complaints of excessive force.

In the case of a supervisor, “individual liability hinges

upon his participation in the deprivation of constitutional

rights.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th

Cir. 1991). This participation may involve the setting in motion

of acts which cause others to inflict constitutional injury. 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). For the

court to hold defendant liable in his individual capacity,

plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) that defendant’s “own culpable

action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of

his subordinates” caused the constitutional injury; (2) that the

defendant “acquiesce[d] in the constitutional deprivations of

which [the] complaint is made;” or (3) that his conduct showed a

“reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” See

Larez, 946 F.2d at 646 (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiffs rely on Larez to substantiate their arguments

that Gresham should be held liable in his individual capacity. 

The Larez court held that ratification by inaction in response to

a subordinate’s conduct that violate’s a plaintiff’s

constitutional right may be sufficient to hold a supervisor

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responsible for constitutional deprivations. Id. However, in

Larez, the police chief had significantly more involvement with

the constitutional violations than Gresham did. In Larez, there

was evidence that the chief created or maintained a policy by

which citizen complaints against officers were rarely sustained. 

The plaintiffs in that case presented expert testimony that a two

year comparative study demonstrated that claims brought by the

police department against officers were almost always sustained

while complaints by citizens rarely were. Id. at 635. The

plaintiffs’ expert witness, “armed with both many years practical

police experience and empirical data on police department

procedures and operations nationwide and in Los Angeles

specifically,” testified that he would have disciplined the

officers and would have established new procedures so that the

violations did not occur in the future. Id. The plaintiffs in

that case also presented evidence that the police chief signed a

letter, informing the plaintiff that none of his complaints would

be sustained. Id. 

Plaintiffs produce evidence that Trojanowski had six citizen

complaints against him for excessive force. Trojanowski was

investigated and exonerated for each claim. Further, plaintiffs’

civilian complaint was investigated and the officers involved

were exonerated. Plaintiffs contend that the investigation into

their complaint was “less than cursury.” PLS.’ Opp’n at 23. 

The evidence presented by plaintiffs does not demonstrate

the type of acquiescence and ratification as in Larez to

establish a triable issue of individual liability for defendant

Gresham. Plaintiffs do not present any expert testimony that

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Gresham created or maintained a policy whereby civilian

complaints of excessive force are meaningless. Plaintiffs have

not presented any evidence to demonstrate that the investigations

into the prior civilian complaints against Trojanowski or the

investigations into their own complaint against the officers was

cursory, inadequate, or meaningless. Plaintiffs have not

presented any evidence that Gresham acted in any way to condone

the use of excessive force against the plaintiffs or others. 

Because plaintiffs have failed to present evidence to raise a

triable issue of fact, defendants’ motion for summary judgment

regarding Gresham’s individual capacity liability under § 1983 is

GRANTED. 

4. Plaintiffs’ Claims against the City

Both Marques Phillips and Cynthia Phillips assert that

defendant City of Fairfield is liable under § 1983. Under Monell

and its progeny, a plaintiff may hold a municipality liable under

section 1983 if his injury was inflicted pursuant to city policy,

regulation, custom, or usage. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444

(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 694). The

existence of a city policy may be established in one of three

ways:

First, the plaintiff may prove that a city employee

committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant

to a formal governmental policy or a longstanding

practice or custom which constitutes the standard

operating procedure of the local governmental entity. 

Second, the plaintiff may establish that the individual

who committed the constitutional tort was an official

with final policy-making authority and that the

challenged action itself thus constituted an act of

official governmental policy. Whether a particular

official has final policy-making authority is a

question of state law. Third, the plaintiff may prove

that an official with final policy-making authority

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ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or

action and the basis for it.

Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992)

(citations and internal quotations omitted)). Assuming that a

plaintiff can establish one of these three circumstances, he must

then demonstrate that the municipal policy “caused” the

constitutional deprivation. Id. A municipal policy “causes”

injury where it is the “moving force” behind the violation. 

Chew, 27 F.3d at 1444 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 694).

Plaintiffs contend that city employees committed

constitutional violations pursuant to a formal governmental

policy or long standing practice of allowing excessive force by

officers. The sole evidence that plaintiffs present to

demonstrate this formal practice is a policy manual which

provides that officers “should never use unnecessary force.” 

Plaintiffs argue that the use of the word “should” in the policy

manual gives officers the discretion to use excessive force. The

court rejects plaintiffs’ interpretation of the policy manual. A

plain reading of this phrase provides that it is the policy of

the City of Fairfield to prohibit the use of excessive force. 

Therefore, plaintiffs’ claims based upon a formal policy allowing

the use of excessive force are without merit.

Plaintiffs also contend that the city is liable because

Chief Gresham, as a final policy-making authority ratified the

officers’ unconstitutional actions. Because, as discussed above,

plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Gresham ratified or 

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While the Edson court addressed only the state law 9

claim of battery, the court’s reasoning can be extended to apply

the same standard to the claim of assault. See Johnson v. County

of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787, 794 (9th Cir. 2003). 

30

condoned the officers’ action, the city cannot be liable on this

basis.

Because plaintiffs have failed to present evidence creating

a triable issue of fact regarding municipal liability under §

1983 for the City of Fairfield, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

B. State Law Claims

1. Assault and Battery

Plaintiff Marques Phillips alleges claims of assault and

battery against the defendant officers. California assault and

battery claims are the counterpart to plaintiff’s federal claims

brought under § 1983. See Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App.

4th 1269, 1274 (1988). To sustain a claim of assault and battery

against a police officer under state law, plaintiffs must provide

evidence that the officer used unreasonable force. Id. ; See 9

Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787, 794 (9th Cir.

2003). For the reasons provided in the court’s analysis of

Marques Phillips’ § 1983 claims against defendant officers,

plaintiffs have raised a triable issue of fact that the defendant

officers used unreasonable force. 

Defendants argue that defendant officers are immune from

plaintiff’s state law claims of assault and battery pursuant to

California Government Code § 821.6. Section 821.6 provides that

[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused by

his instituting or prosecuting any judicial

administrative proceeding within the scope of his

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employment, even if he acts maliciously and without

probable cause.

 

This immunity extends to actions taken in preparation for formal

proceedings, including investigations. Amylou R. v. County of

Riverside, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1205, 1209-10 (1994). The immunity

applies not only to injuries to the target of the judicial or

administrative proceeding, but also to injuries suffered by

others, such as witnesses or victims. Id.

Defendants argue that because Marques Phillips was arrested

during the officers’ execution of a buy/bust operation, the

officers are immune pursuant to § 821.6. Plaintiffs do not

dispute that defendant officers were public employees or that

they were acting within the scope of their employment; such

elements are prerequisites to their § 1983 claims. However, the

conduct in this case was not incident to an investigation. 

First, defendants assert that the officers were engaged in a buybust operation, not an investigation in preparation for judicial

proceedings. Second, defendants do not contend that Marques

Phillips was implicated or related to the buy/bust operation in

any way. Plaintiff’s only relation to the investigation was to

walk through the parking lot where defendant officers were. This

case does not present the type of factual circumstances in which

§ 821.6 has been held to apply. See Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2003); Baughman v. State of California,

38 Cal. App. 4th 182 (1995); Amylou R., 28 Cal. App. 4th 1205. 

Therefore, because plaintiffs have presented evidence that

defendant officers used unreasonable force against Marques

Phillips, and because § 821.6 immunity does not apply,

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Further, § 821.6 does not provide immunity for claims 10

of false imprisonment. Amylou R., 28 Cal. App. 4th at 1211 n.2

(citing Sullivan c. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710, 719-22

(1974).

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defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s

state law claims of assault and battery is DENIED. 

2. False Arrest and Imprisonment

Plaintiff Marques Phillips also claims that defendant

officers are liable under state law for false arrest false

imprisonment. “[T]he basis for the tort of false imprisonment is

the unlawful restraint of another’s liberty.” Scofield v.

Critical Air Medicine, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 4th 990, 1000 (1996). 

For the reasons provided in the court’s analysis of Marques

Phillips’ § 1983 claims against defendant officers, plaintiffs

have raised a triable issue of fact that the defendant officers

lacked probable cause to arrest Marques Phillips. Therefore,

California Civil Code § 43.55, which provides immunity to

officers who detains a suspect based upon probable cause that he

committed a crime, is inapplicable. Because the court has found

the § 821.6 immunity is also inapplicable to this case,10

defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding Marques

Phillips’ state law claims of false arrest and imprisonment is

DENIED.

3. Respondeat Superior Liability of the City

Plaintiffs claim that the city is liable under state law

pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. Plaintiffs

assert that the officers committed the alleged acts within the

course and scope of their employment as police officers for the

city. Therefore, the city is vicariously liable. Defendants

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move for summary judgment on the grounds that under Cal. Gov.

Code § 815.2(b), a public entity cannot be held liable for an

injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the

public entity where the employee is immune from liability. 

Defendants assert that defendant officers are immune under §

821.6.

Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a) provides that a city is liable for

acts and omissions of its employees under the doctrine of

respondeat superior to the same extent as a private employer. 

Unlike the rule against municipal liability under federal law set

out Monell, California imposes liability on municipalities under

the doctrine of respondeat superior. Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1016. 

Under California law, a city’s immunity depends upon whether the

police officers are immune. Id. 

For the reasons provided in the court’s analysis of Marques

Phillips’ § 1983 claims against defendant officers, plaintiffs

have raised a triable issue as to whether the police officers,

while operating in the course of their employment, used

unreasonable force in the seizure and arrest of Marques Phillips. 

Further, defendant officers are not immune under § 821.6. Thus,

under Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a), liability may flow to the city

for defendant officers’ actions toward Marques Phillips. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment for the

respondeat superior claim brought by Marques Phillips is DENIED. 

Because plaintiffs have failed to present evidence that creates a

triable issue of fact regarding an unreasonable search and

seizure of Cynthia Phillips, defendants’ motion for summary 

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judgment regarding the respondeat superior claim brought by

Cynthia Phillips is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court makes the

following orders:

A. As to the claims brought by plaintiff Marques Phillips:

1. Defendant officer’s motion for summary judgment is:

(a) DENIED as it applies to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims

based upon violations of his Fourth Amendment

rights;

(b) GRANTED as it applies to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims

brought under all other bases;

(c) GRANTED as it applies to plaintiff’s § 1981

claims;

(d) GRANTED as it applies to plaintiff’s state law

claims brought under Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7;

(e) GRANTED as it applies to plaintiff’s state law

claims brought under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1;

(f) GRANTED as it applies to plaintiff’s negligence

claims;

(g) DENIED as it applies to plaintiff’s assault and

battery claims;

(h) DENIED as it applies to plaintiff’s false arrest

and imprisonment claims 

2. Defendant Gresham’s motion for summary judgment is:

(a) GRANTED as it applies to all of plaintiff’s

claims;

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Defendants did not address plaintiffs’ claim for 11

intentional infliction of emotional distress in their motion for

summary judgment. Therefore, the court does not address this

claim.

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3. Defendant City of Fairfield’s motion for summary

judgment is:

(a) GRANTED as it applies to plaintiff’s § 1983

claims;

(b) GRANTED as it applies to plaintiff’s claims of

negligent selection, training, retention,

supervision, investigation, and discipline.

(c) DENIED as it applies to plaintiff’s respondeat

superior claims;

B. As to the claims brought by plaintiff Cynthia Phillips:

1. Defendant officer’s motion for summary judgment is:

(a) GRANTED as it applies to all of plaintiff’s claims

addressed in the motion for summary judgment;11

2. Defendant Gresham’s motion for summary judgment is:

(a) GRANTED as it applies to all of plaintiff’s

claims;

3. Defendant City of Fairfield’s motion for summary

judgment is:

(a) GRANTED as it applies to all of plaintiff’s

claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 21, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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