Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01064/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01064-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIUS D. HUMPHREY, SR.,

Petitioner,

v.

B. CURRY,

Respondent.

 /

1: 06 CV 01064 OWW WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 9]

Objections due in 20 days

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302. Pending before the court is Respondent’s

motion to dismiss.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was convicted of second degree burglary, receiving stolen property and petty theft

with a prior. A number of sentencing enhancements were found true. On April 29, 1999, the

Sacramento County Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate state prison term of

twenty-five years to life.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal and on July 26, 2001, the California Court of Appeal, Third

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28 The motion was based on Petitioner’s court appointed appellate counsel having been involuntarily placed on 1

inactive status during a portion of the time that Petitioner’s appeal was pending.

Appellate District (“Court of Appeal”), reversed the petty theft conviction and affirmed the judgment

in all of the respects. On January 28, 2003, after granting Petitioner’s motion to recall the earlier

opinion , the Court of Appeal again reversed the petty theft conviction and affirmed the judgment in

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all other respects. On April 9, 2003, the California Supreme Court denied review.

Petitioner subsequently filed three pro se post-conviction collateral challenges to his

conviction:

First Petition

July 12, 2004: Petition for post-conviction relief filed in the Court of Appeal

July 15, 2004: Petition denied

Second Petition

September 28, 2004: Petition for post-conviction relief filed in the California Supreme Court

August 10, 2005: Petition denied

Third Petition

August 1, 2005: Petition for post-conviction relief filed Superior Court

August 22, 2005: Petition denied.

Petitioner filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 14, 2006.

LEGAL STANDARD

 JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Sacramento 

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

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On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

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grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

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conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the grounds that it was filed beyond the oneyear statute of limitations and contains unexhausted claims. Petitioner opposes the motion. 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

Petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

Petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5

of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may be

raised by the Attorney General, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.” 

The Ninth Circuit has referred to a Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as a request for the Court to

dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 th

F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and

case law, the Court will review Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule

4.

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244, subdivision

(d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

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review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In this case, the California Supreme Court denied review on April 9, 2003. The state appeal

process became “final” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for filing a petition for

writ of certiorari expired ninety days later, on July 8, 2003. Supreme Court Rule 13; Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157 (9 Cir. 1999). The one-year statute of limitations period commenced running the th

following day: July 9, 2003. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9 Cir. 2001)(citing th

Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 6(a)). Thus, the court finds that absent any tolling, the last day to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus was July 8, 2004.

The court further finds that the statute of limitations began running on July 8, 2003, and

continued running until July 7, 2004, the date Petitioner’s first state post-conviction petition was

filed under the mailbox rule. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). As a result, 363 of the 365

day statute of limitations had expired by the time Petitioner filed the first state habeas corpus

petition.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 2

corpus jurisdiction. See, Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9 Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus th

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See, id. 

challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 2 th

(2000); see, also, Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321,

1323 (10 Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a th

petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all

claims to the state courts first and will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern

that the limitation period will end before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id.

at 1005. 

In this case, Respondent concedes that the statute of limitations was tolled during the time

that Petitioner’s first and second petitions were pending in state court. He also assumes, for the sake

of argument that Petitioner is entitled to “gap” tolling under Nino for the time between the first and

second petitions. Respondent does argue, however, that Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the

period in which his third petition was pending in state court. This court must agree. Petitioner’s

third petition was filed in Superior Court on August 1, 2005, before his second state petition was

denied. In denying the third petition, the court expressly found the petition to be untimely filed, and

cited to In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770 (1998) and In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993). Accordingly,

the third petition cannot be considered to be properly filed so as to provide for tolling within the

meaning of § 2244(d)(2). See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005)(a petition for writ of

habeas corpus rejected by a state court as untimely is not “properly filed” within the meaning of the

tolling provisions of the AEDPA); Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643 (9 Cir. 2007)(holding that th

California Supreme Court’s citation to Robbins was a clear ruling that Thorson’s petition was

untimely and therefore not properly filed). Therefore, the court finds that even with tolling during

the pendency of the first and second state post-conviction collateral challenges, the statute of

limitations expired on August 12, 2005, absent any equitable tolling.

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The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 th

F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60, 139 (1997); Calderon v. th

United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1288 (9 Cir.), overruled in part on other grounds th

by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9 Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that th

"[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if

'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir.1999), citing Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541; Beeler, 128 F.3d at th

1288-1289.

In this case, Petitioner claims in his opposition to the motion to dismiss that he mailed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Superior Court on November 24, 2003. Petitioner states

that he never received any indication from the court on the merits of his petition, and that he wrote

repeatedly to the court to inquire regarding the status of his petition. He provides a copy of a

response by the Superior Court, indicating that it had no record of receiving such a petition. He also

provides a copy of institutional mailroom records indicating that he mailed something to the superior

court on November 24, 2003. He also provides a copy of a petition for writ of mandate he filed in

the Court of Appeal, seeking to compel the Superior Court to respond to his petition filed November

26, 2003. This petition for writ of mandate is dated May 5, 2004. Respondent has not responded to

Petitioner’s contention that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

The court finds that such a factual scenario, whether it actually amounts to the loss of

Petitioner’s papers at the institution, in the mail, or at the Superior Court, is an example of external

forces beyond Petitioner’s control preventing him from filing a timely claim. Under these

extraordinary circumstances, the court finds that the statute of limitations ran from July 9, 2003, after

his state appeal process became final, until November 26, 2003, when he filed his original petition in

Superior Court under the mailbox rule. Petitioner is then entitled to equitable tolling from

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November 26, 2003, until he filed his petition for post-conviction relief in the Court of Appeal on

July 12, 2004. Had Petitioner’s original petition for post-conviction relief been received by the

Superior Court, there would have been no need for him to file the later petition on August 1, 2005. 

Thus the court finds that Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling from the denial of his petition filed

in the California Supreme Court to the date he filed the present petition in this court. Therefore, only

a total of approximately four and one half months of the statute of limitations ran before Petitioner

filed the present petition, and the present petition is timely.

Accordingly, to the extent that Respondent’s motion to dismiss is based on the claim that this

petition is barred by the statute of limitations, it must be denied.

EXHAUSTION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that it is a mixed petition,

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Specifically, Respondent contends that

Petitioner has not exhausted his state judicial remedies as to ground 1 (insufficient evidence); ground

4(b)(the trial court erred when it denied Petitioner’s motion for a new trial); and ground 7(b)(the trial

court violated the terms of his 1977 plea agreement in 1999 when it used the 1977 conviction to

impose a strike in the 1999 conviction).

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. th

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

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Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner

must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

In response to Respondent’s motion, Petitioner does not contend that all of his claims in his

petition are exhausted. Rather, he asks the court to allow him to amend his petition to raise only

grounds 5, 6 and 7(b). Petitioner does not claim that he has exhausted ground 7(b), but states that he

included the claim based on new relevant case law he discovered around the time he filed the present

petition. The court finds that based on Petitioner’s own description, ground 7(b) is clearly

unexhausted. Therefore, under the above legal authorities, the court cannot allow that ground to go

forward. It will, however, allow Petitioner’s petition to go forward on the two exhausted grounds

identified by Petitioner.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:

1) That Respondent’s motion to dismiss be DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART;

2) That this case be ordered to proceed on grounds 5 and 6 only; and 

3) Respondent be ordered to file a response on the merits to grounds 5 and 6.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

TWENTY (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 11, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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