Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00705/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00705-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0402 Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GIAVANNA L., 

Plaintiff, 

v.

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security,1

Defendant. 

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00705-RNB 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 

ORDER REGARDING CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 16, 17) 

On April 16, 2019, plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking 

judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying her 

applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, and for 

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The operative complaint is the First Amended 

Complaint filed by plaintiff on July 8, 2019. (See ECF No. 7.) Now pending before the 

Court and ready for decision are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.2

 For 

 

1

 Andrew Saul is hereby substituted as the defendant in this case per Fed. R. Civ. P. 

25(d). 

2

 The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. 

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the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 9, 2015, plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability and disability 

insurance benefits and for SSI, alleging disability commencing December 31, 2012. 

(Certified Administrative Record [“AR”]) 224-25, 226-31.) Her applications were denied 

initially and upon reconsideration. (AR 169-73, 176-80.) 

On May 18, 2016, plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge 

(“ALJ”). (AR 381-82.) The hearing was held on March 1, 2018. Plaintiff appeared with 

counsel, and testimony was taken from her, a medical expert (“ME”), and a vocational 

expert (“VE”). (See AR 52-100.) The ALJ issued a decision on April 10, 2018, finding 

that plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of her benefits applications. (AR 15-26.) 

Thereafter, on April 28, 2018, plaintiff requested review of the decision by the 

Appeals Council. (AR 223.) The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner on February 13, 2019, when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request 

for review. (AR 1-6.) This timely civil action followed. 

SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ initially determined that plaintiff met the insured 

status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2016. (AR 18.) The 

ALJ proceeded to follow the Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation process. See

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.3

 

3

 Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to the Commissioner’s regulations 

are to the regulations in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision. Hereafter, the Court will 

only be citing the regulations applicable to disability insurance benefits applications 

because the parallel SSI regulations are virtually identical. 

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At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since December 31, 2012, the alleged onset date. (AR 18.) 

At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

“Crohn’s disease of the small bowel and colon; interstitial cystitis; obesity; anxiety NOS; 

and depression NOS.” (AR 18.) 

 At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 19.) 

Next, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

to perform light work as defined in the Commissioner’s regulations, subject to certain nonexertional limitations. (AR 20.) Specifically, the ALJ found: 

“[S]he can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; 

and can stand and/or walk for 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday, and sit for 6 

hours out of an 8-hour workday, with normal breaks; must avoid concentrated 

exposure to extreme cold and extreme heat; must avoid concentrated exposure 

to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation, and other pulmonary irritants; 

must have ready access to restroom facilities, meaning being able to get to a 

restroom from the work area in less than three minutes; can understand, 

remember, and carry out simple instructions for simple repetitive tasks; with 

no high stress work, but can tolerate simple decision making and few 

workplace changes.” (Id.) 

For purposes of his step four determination, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s 

testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC would not 

be able to perform and sustain any of plaintiff’s past relevant work. Accordingly, the ALJ 

found that plaintiff was unable to perform any of her past relevant work. (AR 24.) 

The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation process. Based on 

the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC 

could perform the requirements of representative occupations that existed in significant 

numbers in the national economy such as photo copy machine operator, sales attendant, 

housekeeping cleaner, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not been under a disability at any 

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time from December 31, 2012 (the alleged onset date) through the date of his decision. 

(AR 25-26.) 

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 26.) 

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS OF ERROR 

 1. The ALJ impermissibly rejected plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. 

 2. The ALJ failed to reject the lay witness testimonial evidence. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

(9th Cir. 1984). 

DISCUSSION 

A. Reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ’s alleged failure to make a proper 

adverse credibility determination. 

Plaintiff’s first claim of error is directed to the ALJ’s adverse credibility 

determination with respect to plaintiff’s administrative hearing testimony concerning her 

need for frequent bathroom breaks as a result of her severe Crohn’s disease and interstitial 

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cystitis. (See ECF No. 16-1 at 5-11.) Plaintiff testified that she stopped working back in 

2012 because the nature of her impairments would have her going to the bathroom for a 

long periods of time up to 45 minutes; that she would have to be in the bathroom for 15-45 

minutes each time; and that at best she goes to the bathroom 2-3 times a day and at worst 

5-6 times a day. (See AR 62, 76, 84-87.) 

 As a preliminary matter, the Court does not construe the ALJ’s RFC determination 

as a complete rejection of plaintiff’s testimony concerning her need for frequent bathroom 

breaks. In the Court’s view, the ALJ adequately accommodated plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding the frequency of the bathroom breaks she needed to take as a result of her Crohn’s 

disease and interstitial cystitis by specifying that (a) plaintiff be entitled to take normal 

breaks; and (b) plaintiff “must have ready access to restroom facilities, meaning being able 

to get to a restroom from the work area in less than three minutes.” In addition, inasmuch 

as plaintiff had testified that the frequency of the bathroom breaks she had to take was tied 

to how stressed out she was (see AR 97), the ALJ further accommodated plaintiff’s 

testimony regarding the frequency of the bathroom breaks she needed to take by specifying 

that (a) the work not be “high stress”; and (b) the work be limited to “simple repetitive 

tasks,” “simple decision making,” and “few workplace changes.” In his hypothetical to the 

VE, the ALJ posited an individual who was going to be off task from the job duties for 

bathroom breaks for 15 minutes twice a day in addition to the normal 15-minute morning 

and afternoon breaks and the typical half-lunch break. (See AR 93.) In other words, a total 

of five extended bathroom breaks each workday. The VE testified that the three jobs he 

had identified would still be available. (See AR 93-94.) 

However, in the Court’s view, the ALJ’s RFC determination and ultimate finding

that plaintiff’s impairments were not of disabling severity did constitute an implicit 

rejection of plaintiff testimony regarding the duration of the bathroom breaks she needed 

to take as a result of her Crohn’s disease. The VE testified that no employer would tolerate 

a hypothetical individual who had to go into the restroom for 15-45 minutes throughout the 

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workday and who was effectively off task or away from their station 25% of the time. (See

AR 94.) 

The law is well established in this Circuit that, where the claimant has produced 

objective medical evidence of an impairment or impairments which could reasonably be 

expected to produce some degree of pain and/or other symptoms, and the record is devoid 

of any affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony 

regarding the severity of the claimant’s pain and/or other symptoms only if the ALJ makes 

specific findings stating specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so. See, e.g., 

Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492-93 (9th Cir. 2015); Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 

1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014); Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 Here, one of the ALJ’s findings was that plaintiff’s medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, 

plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these 

symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in 

the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” (See AR 21.) 

 Since the Commissioner has not argued that the record here contains any evidence 

of malingering, the Court will apply the “clear and convincing” standard to the ALJ’s 

adverse credibility determination. 

Plaintiff would have the Court invoke the rule that “the Commissioner may not 

discredit the claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely because they are 

unsupported by objective medical evidence.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). 

However, it appears to the Court from the ALJ’s decision that the ALJ had two other 

reasons for not crediting plaintiff’s testimony regarding the disabling severity of her 

Crohn’s symptoms (which encompassed her testimony regarding the duration of her 

bathroom breaks). 

The ALJ’s primary reason was that plaintiff’s Crohn’s disease was being well 

managed with appropriate medical treatment. (See AR 21-22, 24.) By way of example, 

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the ALJ cited evidence that plaintiff’s treating gastroenterologist had noted on multiple 

occasions throughout the relevant time period that, when she was compliant with her 

prescribed medication, plaintiff’s Crohn’s disease had resolved or was stable or was in 

remission and/or that plaintiff was doing well overall and/or that her related symptoms had 

resolved or were in remission. (See AR 500, 504, 766, 786, 828, 832, 834, 856, 858.) 

Plaintiff herself had reported several times to her treating physicians that her Crohn’s 

disease was under control and/or that her related symptoms were minimal in nature. (See

AR 477, 651, 832, 858.) One time when plaintiff did report that her symptoms had flared 

up since her prior visit, she had been noncompliant with her medication and special diet. 

(See AR 669-70.) 

The Court finds that this reason for not crediting plaintiff’s testimony regarding the 

severity of her Crohn’s symptoms was supported by the substantial evidence of record. See

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (reiterating that substantial evidence 

“means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion’”). The Court further finds that this reason constituted a 

legally sufficient reason for not crediting plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of her 

Crohn’s symptoms under both the Commissioner’s regulations and Ninth Circuit case law. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v); Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 

1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that “[i]mpairments that can be controlled effectively 

with medication are not disabling for purposes of determining eligibility for [social 

security] benefits”); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599-600 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (ALJ may properly base adverse credibility determination on treating 

physician’s report that claimant’s symptoms had improved with the use of medication).

 The ALJ also cited another reason in support of his adverse credibility 

determination: 

“The claimant has not generally received the type of medical treatment one 

would expect for a totally disabled individual. The claimant’s course of 

treatment since her alleged disability onset date has generally reflected a 

conservative approach. She has not required emergency room or hospital 

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treatment for flare-ups or exacerbations of her symptoms. She has had no 

gastrointestinal surgeries.” (AR 22.)

While it appears from plaintiff’s medical records that plaintiff was hospitalized on 

one occasion with a small bowel obstruction, it further appears that plaintiff had 

discontinued her Crohn’s medication prior to that incident. (See AR 437.) In any event, 

the Court concurs with the ALJ’s characterization of plaintiff’s medical treatment for her 

Crohn’s disease as relatively conservative. See Lee v. Astrue, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039-

40 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (characterizing treatment of Crohn’s disease with medication as 

conservative). Moreover, the Court finds that this reason for not crediting plaintiff’s 

testimony regarding the severity of her Crohn’s symptoms also constituted a legally 

sufficient reason on which the ALJ could properly rely. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 

751 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We have previously indicated that evidence of ‘conservative 

treatment’ is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an 

impairment.”) (citing Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir.1995)); see also

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ may draw adverse 

inference against claimant’s credibility from fact claimant did not seek an aggressive 

treatment program).

 Finally, since the ALJ was not basing his adverse credibility determination solely on 

the lack of objective evidence to support plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of her 

Crohn’s symptoms, it was not improper for the ALJ to also rely on that reason. Plaintiff 

has not cited any objective findings in her medical records that her Crohn’s disease caused 

a need for bathroom breaks for 15-45 minutes throughout the day. See Nyman v. Heckler, 

779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that “a claimant’s self-serving statements may 

be disregarded to the extent they are unsupported by objective findings”). 

The Court therefore finds that reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ’s alleged 

failure to make a proper adverse credibility determination. 

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B. Reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ’s failure to properly consider the 

lay witness testimonial evidence.

Plaintiff second claim of error is directed to the ALJ’s apparent failure to even 

consider the written testimonial evidence provided by plaintiff’s mother. (AR 281-88.) As 

summarized by plaintiff, plaintiff’s mother averred in pertinent part that plaintiff lives with 

her; that plaintiff has to make frequent trips to the bathroom; that plaintiff’s sleep is 

interrupted by the frequent trips to the bathroom; that plaintiff has panic attacks and poor 

endurance for household tasks; and that plaintiff tires easily. (See ECF No. 16-1 at 12.) 

The law is well-established in this Circuit that lay witness testimony as to how a 

claimant’s symptoms affect the claimant’s ability to work is competent evidence and 

cannot be disregarded without providing specific reasons germane to the testimony 

rejected. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996); Dodrill v. 

Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 Here, the ALJ failed to mention the mother’s testimonial evidence, let alone provide 

any specific reasons germane to the mother’s testimonial evidence for rejecting it. The 

Commissioner does not dispute that the ALJ erred, but rather maintains that the error was 

harmless because plaintiff’s mother’s statements were duplicative of plaintiff’s own claims 

and because plaintiff’s mother did not assert that plaintiff had functional limitations beyond 

plaintiff’s RFC. (See ECF No. 17-1 at 9-10.) 

 The Court notes that, in her Reply Brief, plaintiff did not address either of the 

Commissioner’s contentions. The Court concurs with the Commissioner that plaintiff’s

mother’s statements were duplicative of plaintiff’s own claims of functional limitations, 

including frequent trips to the bathroom (see AR 84-85), panic attacks (see AR 81-82), 

sleep disturbance and fatigue (see AR 295), and limited ability to perform household chores 

(see AR 296-98). The ALJ addressed these claims of plaintiff in connection with his 

determination of plaintiff’s RFC. (See AR 21-24.) Indeed, as discussed above, the only 

part of the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination being challenged by plaintiff is the 

ALJ’s failure to credit plaintiff’s testimony concerning her need for frequent bathroom 

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breaks. The Court has found that the ALJ’s RFC determination adequately accommodated 

plaintiff’s testimony regarding the frequency of the bathroom breaks plaintiff needed to 

take. Plaintiff’s mother did not say anything about the duration of plaintiff’s bathroom 

breaks and the Court has found that the ALJ did not err in failing to credit plaintiff’s 

testimony concerning that issue. 

 In Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit held that 

the ALJ’s failure to provide specific reasons for rejecting lay testimony was harmless error 

where the lay witness testimony did not describe any more limitations than those the 

claimant herself had described, which the ALJ had validly rejected. See also, e.g., Vivian 

v. Saul, 780 F. App’x 526, 527 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that ALJ’s error in failing to provide 

germane reasons for discounting lay witness evidence was harmless for same reason); 

Shuey v. Astrue, 480 Fed. Appx. 439, 441 (9th Cir. 2012) (same). In accordance with this 

case law authority, the Court concurs with the Commissioner that the ALJ’s failure to 

properly consider the mother’s lay witness testimonial evidence was harmless error. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED, 

the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and it is hereby 

ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner and 

dismissing this action with prejudice. 

Dated: March 2, 2020 

 _________________________________ 

 ROBERT N. BLOCK 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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