Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00212/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00212-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. SANTANA, Warden,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-CV-0212-JLS-WVG

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 29, 2018, Tony Jackson (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his criminal conviction of

robbery (Pen. Code § 211), attempted robbery (Pen. Code §§ 211/664), two counts of assault

(Pen. Code § 240), and failure to appear while on bail (Pen. Code § 1320.5). (Lod. 10, ECF

No. 7-23 at 55.) Petitioner asserts two grounds for relief, alleging: (1) that the prosecution

failed to establish his identity as to the strike priors; and (2) ineffective assistance of both

trial and appellate counsel. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) On April 2, 2018, Respondent filed a

Response, which asserts that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred and meritless.

(Resp., ECF No. 6.) Respondent contemporaneously lodged relevant state court records

with its Response. On May 17, 2018, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 8.)

The Court has considered the Petition, the Response, Petitioner’s Traverse and all

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supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence

presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS the

Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be

correct unless Petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 36-36 (1992)

(holding that findings of fact are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The

following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion on Petitioner’s

direct appeal, affirming the judgment of the trial court.

A. Robbery of Cash Plus Store (2013 Incident)

Gino Viskovic was the owner of a check-cashing business

called Cash Plus located in a shopping complex in San Diego. On

January 18, 2013, about 7:00 p.m., he began closing down for the

evening when he noticed a man in the lobby. Viskovic asked the

man if he needed anything, and the man immediately left without

answering. On January 22, 2013, about 7:00 p.m., Dante Lewis

and another man confronted Viskovic as he was closing his

business for the evening. Lewis was the man Viskovic had seen

four nights earlier. While Lewis held Viskovic at gunpoint in a

bathroom, the other man, later identified as [Petitioner],

plundered the store. The robbers took approximately $20,000 in

cash, various receipts and a purple cigarette lighter.

A woman shopping at a nearby grocery store saw Lewis

and [Petitioner] enter Cash Plus. She noticed them because one of

the men was loitering suspiciously and looked like he was

watching out for something. The woman called the police, who

arrived as the men were exiting the store. After the officers

ordered the men to stop, the men split up and ran. Two officers

captured Lewis as he tried to cross University Avenue. They

recovered his cellphone.

[Petitioner], who wore a blue hoodie, ran through a nearby

laundromat and out the back. After briefly losing sight of

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[Petitioner] after he entered the laundromat, two other officers

saw him climbing an embankment behind the laundromat. The

police followed [Petitioner], who scaled a barbed wire fence into

an apartment complex. Shortly thereafter, an apartment resident

yelled from his balcony that there was a man hiding on his patio.

Officers found [Petitioner] crouched behind a large glass table.

[Petitioner] was carrying $9,548 in cash, a purple cigarette

lighter, receipts from the Cash Plus store and a latex glove. Police

also found [Petitioner’s] van, which was missing license plates,

parked two rows away from the Cash Plus store. Inside the van

was [Petitioner’s] cellphone, empty license plate frames and

dealer plates. Police subsequently found incriminating text

messages between [Petitioner’s] and Lewis's cellphones.

After his arrest, [Petitioner] made—and then skipped out

on—bail. Although Viskovic identified Lewis as one of the

suspects, he was unable to identify [Petitioner], both on the day

of the robbery and at trial, as the other suspect.

At trial, [Petitioner’s] defense was that he was not Lewis's

accomplice. He testified that he had been panhandling in the area

near where he was apprehended in order to earn enough money to

buy some drugs and that, while he was urinating near the

apartment complex's dumpster, someone he knew ran by and

threw a blue jacket on the ground. [Petitioner] further testified that

he picked up the jacket and found a wad of money, which he put

in his pocket; that he subsequently threw the jacket down and hid

because the jacket's owner had previously assaulted him; and that

he worried the jacket's owner would be upset if he found

[Petitioner] with the jacket.

B. Attempted Robbery of Check Into Cash Store (2014

Incident)

On August 12, 2014, managers of a Kentucky Fried

Chicken (KFC) in Lemon Grove noticed a white car, which had

been on the lot for hours and which had been backed into a

parking spot facing the nearby Check Into Cash store. One of the

managers saw a man in the driver's seat exit the car, then get right

back in. The manager wrote down the car's license plate number.

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The following day, the same car was again parked in the

KFC lot, but it no longer had license plates. The manager saw the

same man from the day before—subsequently identified as

[Petitioner]—wearing a construction vest. The manager saw the

man pick up orange safety cones from the front of a neighboring

restaurant and put them in the car's trunk. The manager called the

police. After a patrol car arrived, the white car sped away.

On August 14, 2014, another KFC manager—who had

been informed of the white car and its driver's suspicious

activity—saw the car again parked in the lot. The manager called

police. The manager also saw what appeared to be orange safety

cones set up in front of the Check Into Cash store and a man

carrying a large black plastic trash bag.

The manager of the Check Into Cash store, Corazon

Hernandez, testified that when she arrived to open the store, she

noticed the cones and thought they were odd. As she walked to

the front door, she saw nearby a man later identified as

[Petitioner]. As soon as she opened the door, [Petitioner] grabbed

her by the neck and tried to push her inside. Hernandez fought

back and screamed. Alerted by the screams, the owner of a

neighboring business, David Nguyen, saw [Petitioner] trying to

push Hernandez into the store. Nguyen yelled at him to stop.

[Petitioner], still carrying the trash bag, ran towards the white car

in the parking lot with Nguyen in pursuit.

Another bystander, Marcus Pino, testified he heard the

commotion and joined Nguyen in his pursuit of [Petitioner]. As

[Petitioner] neared the white car, he turned and pointed a gun at

Pino and Nguyen. [Petitioner] got into the car and drove away.

The police ran the car's license plates and discovered it was

a rental car. The car was due back to the rental agency on the day

of the attempted robbery. Police staked out the rental agency lot.

[Petitioner] drove the car near the lot where he met an

acquaintance, Princess King. [Petitioner] turned the car over to

King, who had rented it, and King returned the car to the rental

agency.

After securing the car as evidence, inside detectives found

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a large black plastic trash bag and a pair of pliers. The police also

discovered that tamper-proof screws used to affix the license

plates had been replaced with regular screws. The detectives

removed the license plates and subsequent testing revealed

[Petitioner’s] thumbprints on the rear plate.

[Petitioner] was later arrested.

C. Motion for Consolidation

Before trial, the People moved to consolidate the charges

stemming from the 2013 and 2014 incidents on the ground the

evidence established [Petitioner’s] identity, intent and modus

operandi. The People argued that [Petitioner] could not show a

substantial danger of prejudice in joining the cases. [Petitioner]

countered that the two incidents were not sufficiently similar to

warrant consolidation and that, because the forensic evidence and

witness testimony of the 2014 incident was much stronger than

the evidence of the 2013 incident, the potential for unfair

prejudice was great. After briefing and oral argument, the trial

court granted the People's motion.

(Lod. 5, ECF No. 7-18 at 2-6.)

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. State Court Trial and Appeal

On March, 9 2015, a state jury found Petitioner guilty of robbery, attempted robbery,

and two counts of assault. (Lod. 4, ECF No. 7-16 at 7.) Following the conclusion of the

trial, the court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner had four prison priors and

three strike priors. (Pet. at 38.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a determinate term of

eight years and a consecutive indeterminate term of fifty years to life. (Lod. 1, ECF No. 7-

3 at 117-20.)

Petitioner filed a direct appeal of the conviction in the California Court of Appeal.

(Id. at 121.) First, Petitioner argued that the trial court “abused its discretion by granting the

prosecution’s motion to consolidate two cases arising from separate incidents.” (Lod. 5 at

2.) Second, Petitioner argued that even if it was within the court’s discretion to grant the

motion to consolidate, “reversal is required because the joinder resulted in ‘gross

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unfairness’ in violation of his due process rights.” (Id.) On July 21, 2016, the California

Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s assertions and affirmed the conviction in an

unpublished opinion, finding Petitioner did not meet his burden of showing prejudice from

the consolidation and the court found that there was no “gross unfairness” to Petitioner as a

result. (Id. at 12-13.)

On August 17, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court. (Lod. 6, ECF No. 7-19.) The petition for review was denied on October 12,

2016, without comment. (Lod. 7, ECF No. 7-20.)

B. Habeas Petition in State Court

On March 21, 2017, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California’s Superior Court for the county of San Diego. (Lod. 8, ECF No. 7-21 at 2.)

Petitionerstated two grounds for relief: (1) the “trial court imposed an illegal enhancement;”

and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 4-6.) On April 6, 2017, the superior court

denied the petition, finding that Petitioner failed to state a prima facie case for relief. (Lod.

9, ECF No. 7-22.) The Superior Court denied the petition on the merits after determining

that the documents used by the prosecution were sufficient to prove Petitioner’s identity and

that Petitioner stipulated that he was the subject of the priors before the court. (Id. at 2.) For

these reasons, the court found that trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing

to challenge the evidence. (Id.)

On April 27, 2017, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in

California Court of Appeal, alleging the same grounds for relief as he did in the lower court.

(See Lod. 10, ECF No. 7-23.) On July 13, 2017, the Court of Appeal denied the petition

because both claims were procedurally barred. (Lod. 11, ECF No. 7-24.)

On September 5, 2017, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus on

the same grounds in the Supreme Court of California. (Lod. 12, ECF No. 7-25.) The petition

was subsequently denied on November 15, 2017, without comment. (Lod. 13, ECF No. 7-

26.)

On January 8, 2018, Petitioner filed an additional petition in the Supreme Court of

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California asserting the same improper joinder claim that he raised on direct appeal. (Lod.

14, ECF No. 7-27.) Petitioner argued the trial court abused its discretion when it

consolidated Petitioner’s charges in a single trial, resulting in “gross unfairness” to

Petitioner. (Id.) This petition was similarly denied without comment, on April 11, 2018.1

C. Habeas Petition in Federal Court

On January 29, 2018, Petitioner filed the present Petition. Petitioner alleges the same

grounds for relief that he exhausted in state court; (1) that the “trial court imposed an illegal

enhancement,” and (2) that counsel was ineffective. (Pet.) On April 2, 2018, Respondent

filed a Response, contending that Petitioner’s claims are both procedurally barred and

meritless. (Resp.) On May 17, 2018, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 8.) After

reviewing the Petition, the Response, and all of the exhibits provided, the Court found

further briefing necessary regarding the timeliness of the Petition. (See ECF No. 9.)

Petitioner timely filed a response as did Respondent. (See ECF Nos. 10, 12.) Respondent

conceded the federal Petition was timely. (ECF No. 12 at 3:3-7.)

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”) because it was filed after April 24, 1996 and Petitioner is in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a state court. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).

Under AEDPA, a court may not grant a habeas petition “with respect to any claim that was 

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), unless the state 

court’s judgment “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States,” § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2). The Ninth 

 

1 California Courts, Appellate Courts Case Information, 

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/disposition.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=2241079&doc_no=S2

46388&request_token=NiIwLSIkXkg%2FWyBVSCM9WE1IMEw0UDxTJyM%2BSzJRMCAgCg%3D

%3D (last visited October 15, 2018).

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Circuit has further explained:

An adjudication is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable 

facts. It is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from 

the Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the 

facts of the prisoner's case. An unreasonable application of federal law is 

different from an incorrect application of federal law. The federal habeas court 

may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established 

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. A state court's adjudication is 

unreasonable only if the federal habeas court concludes that no fairminded 

jurist could conclude that the adjudication was consistent with established 

Supreme Court precedent.

Cain v. Chappell, 870 F.3d 1003, 1012 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the highest state court to which the claim 

was presented, the court “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision and 

presumes it provides the basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991); Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th

Cir. 2013), as amended on denial of rehearing, 733 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 

571 U.S. 1170 (2014). Where “the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a 

procedural default, [a court] will presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did not 

silently disregard that bar and consider the merits.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803.

A state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus 

claim. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the 

result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court 

decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

V. DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s two grounds for relief are as follows: (1) the prosecution failed to

adequately prove his identity as to the prior convictions that were used as strikes to enhance

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his current sentence; and (2) his constitutional right to affective assistance of counsel was

violated when his counsel did not object to the evidence used to prove identity for the priors.

(Pet. at 5-6.)

Respondent argues that Petitioner is procedurally barred from receiving relief on both

claims because the California Court of Appeal denied the habeas 

petition on adequate and independent state-law grounds, citing Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S.

307, 315-16 (2011) and Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). (Resp. at 4.)

Respondent further contends that, even if Petitioner’s claims were not procedurally barred,

they should be denied because they are meritless, asserting that the California Court of

Appeal correctly determined that Petitioner’s stipulation provided sufficient evidence of

identity, citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). (Resp. at 5.) Lastly, Respondent

argues that Petitioner’s counsel was not deficient because “sufficient biographical

information linked [Petitioner]” to the prior convictions. (Id. at 5.)

A. Petitioner’s Claims are Procedurally Barred

“In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court

pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the

claim is barred unlessthe prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice

as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that the failure to consider

the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750

(1991). Here, the California Court of Appeal clearly and expressly denied Petitioner’s state

petition for habeas corpus relief as procedurally barred because it was untimely.2(Lod. 11

at 1.) The state appellate court stated:

[Petitioner] is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. His petition, filed two years

after he was sentenced without any explanation for the delay, is barred as

 

2 Assuming “the petition were not procedurally barred,” the state court of appeal also stated 

Petitioner’s claims had no merit, but emphasized this was not the stated basis for the denial.

(Lod. 11 at 2.)

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untimely.3

(Id.)

It is well settled that California’s timeliness rule for state habeas petitions constitutes

an independent and adequate state procedural ground barring subsequent habeas relief in

federal court. See Walker v. Martin, 532 U.S. 307, 317 (2011); see also Ayala v. Chappell,

829 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Walker holds that California’s timeliness rule is an

independent and adequate state law ground sufficient to bar federal habeas relief on

untimely claims.” (emphasis in original)). Thus, the Petition may proceed only if Petitioner

can demonstrate cause for the default and show actual prejudice, or that failure to consider

the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

“Cause isthe legitimate excuse for default; prejudice isthe actual harm resulting from

the alleged constitutional violation.” Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir.

1984); see also Roybal v. Davis, 148 F.Supp.3d 958, 989 (S.D. Cal. 2015).

i. Petitioner Fails to Demonstrate Cause, Actual Prejudice, or that a

Miscarriage of Justice Would Occur

Petitioner claims the delay was caused by his counsel refusing to bring the claim, 

despite him taking “every avenue” to convince counsel to raise his claims.

4

(Traverse at 8-

4:1-6.) Attorney error can be cause only if an attorney’s performance is “constitutionally 

 

3

In California, a petitioner must “explain and justify any significant delay in seeking 

habeas corpus relief.” In re Reno, 283 P.3d 1181, 1207 (Cal. 2012). “Delay in seeking 

habeas corpus or other collateral relief has been measured from the time a petitioner 

becomes aware of the grounds on which he seeks relief” and that “time may be as early as 

the date of conviction.” In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 765 n.5 (Cal. 1993).

4 Petitioner seems to indicate he is referring to his state court petition. However, Petitioner 

refers to his counsel as appellate counsel. The Court assumes Petitioner is referring to 

counsel in regards to his state habeas petition. In any event, whether it was counsel for a 

direct appeal or his state habeas petition is inconsequential as the outcome is the same either 

way. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that an attorney’s inadvertence in failing to 

raise certain claims in a state appeal does not constitute cause. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 

U.S. 478, 486-87 (1986).

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ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington[.]”

5 Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 752 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). However, “[t]here is no 

constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Thus, an attorney “error that led to the late filing of [a] state habeas” petition 

“cannot be constitutionally ineffective” and Petitioner “must bear the risk of attorney error 

that results in a procedural default.” Id. at 752-53 (internal quotation omitted). 

Consequently, any argument that Petitioner’s counsel erred by not timely raising a habeas 

petition before the state court is unavailing as cause.

Although Petitioner has already failed to show the requisite cause, the Court notes 

that Petitioner offers no argument regarding prejudice. Regarding any miscarriage of 

justice, in conclusory fashion, Petitioner simply states it would be a miscarriage of justice 

to deny the Petition because there is “clear and convincing” evidence in support of his 

underlying claims. (Traverse at 5:7-13.) Such a superficial statement is insufficient.

Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner failed to meet his burden and federal habeas 

review of the claims is barred.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. This Report and Recommendation issubmitted to U.S.

District Judge Janis L. Sammartino, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. Section

636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 21, 2018 any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to objections shall be filed with the

 

5 The Court makes no determination as to whether there was attorney error by not timely 

filing a state habeas petition on behalf of Petitioner. The Court merely assumes error for 

sake of argument.

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Court and served on all parties no later than December 28, 2018. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 14, 2018

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