Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00721/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00721-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1391 Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELSA MANULID,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10cv721 WQH (CAB)

ORDER

vs.

SYCUAN CASINO & RESORT, an

entity; SYCUAN BAND OF THE

KUMEYAAY NATION, an entity;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

DOES 1-30, Inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the Notice of Certification of Scope of Employment

for Defendant Dr. Donald Weiss and Notice of Substitution of United States of America as

Defendant in Place of Donald Weiss, M.D. (ECF No. 6), and the Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint filed by the United States. (ECF No. 7). 

BACKGROUND

On April 6, 2010, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Sycuan Casino & Resort, Sycuan

Band of they Kumeyaay Nation, and Dr. Donald Weiss. (ECF No. 1). 

On September 9, 2010, the United States filed a Notice of Certification of Scope of

Employment for Defendant Dr. Donald Weiss. (ECF No. 6-1). The United States concurrently

filed a Notice of Substitution of United States of America as Defendant in Place of Donald

Weiss, M.D. (ECF No. 6). On September 24, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Response to the Notice

Case 3:10-cv-00721-WQH-CAB Document 15 Filed 12/20/10 Page 1 of 5
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of Substitution of United States of America as Defendant in Place of Donald Weiss. (ECF No.

10). The United States filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Response. (ECF No. 13). 

The United States also filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 7). On

September 24, 2010, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. (ECF No. 9). The United States filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s

Opposition. (ECF No. 14). 

Plaintiff contends that the certification that Weiss was acting within the scope of his

employment at the time of the incident is not valid because the only claim against Weiss is

battery, an intentional tort. Plaintiff contends that substitution of the United States as a

Defendant was improper because Plaintiff’s battery claim seeks individual liability against

Weiss for his conduct outside the scope of his employment. 

The United States contends the certification that Weiss was acting within the scope of

his employment at the time of the incident is valid because the allegations in the Complaint

against Weiss arise solely from his examination of Plaintiff at the Sycuan Medical/Dental

Center while he was providing medical care.

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

The Complaint alleges that on April 6, 2008, Plaintiff injured her head while at work.

(ECF No. 1 at 3). The Complaint alleges that on April 8, 2008, Plaintiff visited Weiss at the

Sycuan Medical/Dental Center and told Weiss that she had injured her head and neck. Id. at

3-4. The Complaint alleges: “Much to her surprise, Weiss placed his finger in Plaintiff’s

rectum during her medical exam and then he immediately left the room.” Id. at 4. The

Complaint alleges that Plaintiff asked a medical assistant why she had been given a rectal

exam and , “the assistant claimed that Weiss was confused about the nature of [Plaintiff’s]

injury and that [Weiss] had left the office.” Id. The Complaint asserts a claim of battery

against Weiss stating that Weiss “touched Plaintiff with the intent to cause a harmful or

offensive contact[,]” “Plaintiff did not give her willing, voluntary, or informed consent to be

touched[,]” and “Plaintiff was injured, harmed and/or offended by Defendant Weiss’

touching.” Id. at 10. 

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//

DISCUSSION

I. Certification and Substitution

The Notice of Certification, which is signed by an Assistant United States

Attorney, states:

Pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 233(c), and 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), as

amended by Public Law 100-694, and pursuant to the authority vested in the

United States Attorney to make scope of employment certifications under 28

C.F.R. 15.3, ... I hereby find and certify that Donald Weiss, M.D., an

individual defendant named therein, at all relevant times, was acting within

the scope of his employment at the Sycuan Medical Clinic and was providing

medical services funded under the Indian Self Determination and Education

Assistance Act (ISDEAA), 25 U.S.C. § 405f(d). As such, claims for medical

malpractice against Sycuan Medical Clinic physicians, such as Dr. Weiss,

arising from medical services provided within the scope of employment at the

Clinic, are cognizable exclusively against the United States under the Federal

Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671, et seq. See 25 U.S.C. §

450f(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 233(a). Based on my certification that Dr. Weiss

was acting within the scope of his employment at the Sycuan Medical Clinic

at the time of the events out of which plaintiff’s claim arose, plaintiff’s claim

must henceforth ‘be deemed an action against the United States under the

provisions of the FTCA....’ 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). 

(ECF No. 6-1 at 1-2). 

A district court may review the certification of the United States that a federal

employee was acting within the scope of his employment. Gutierrez de Martinez v.

Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 436-37 (1995); see also Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 247

(2007) (“[A] complaint’s charge of conduct outside the scope of employment, when

contested, warrants immediate judicial investigation. Were it otherwise, a federal employee

would be stripped of suit immunity not by what the court finds, but by what the complaint

alleges.”) (citation omitted). “Certification by the Attorney General is prima facie evidence

that a federal employee was acting in the scope of [his] employment at the time of the

incident and is conclusive unless challenged.” Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 800

(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Green v. Hall, 8 F.3d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1993)). “The party seeking

review bears the burden of presenting evidence and disproving the Attorney General’s

certification by a preponderance of the evidence.” Billings, 57 F.3d at 800. 

The district court reviews a scope of employment determination under the principles

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of respondeat superior of the state in which the tort occurred. See McLachlan v. Bell, 261

F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Wilson v. Drake, 87 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir.

1996). Under California law “the principle is ‘well established’ that ‘an employee’s

willful, malicious and even criminal torts may fall within the scope of his or her

employment for purposes of respondeat superior, even though the employer has not

authorized the employee to commit crimes or intentional torts.’” Xue Lu v. Powell, 621

F.3d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital,

12 Cal. 4th 291, 296, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 512, 907 P.2d 358, 360 (Cal. 1995)). “A nexus

must exist between the employment and the tort if the employer is fairly to be held liable.” 

Xue Lu, 621 F.3d at 948. “[T]he tort must be ‘generally foreseeable’ or ‘engendered by’ or

‘arise from’ the employment.” Id. (quoting Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th at 298, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

514, 907 P.2d at 362)). 

In this case, Plaintiff relies on the allegations of the Complaint to dispute

certification and has not submitted any evidence to show that the certification by the

Assistant United States Attorney that Weiss was acting within the scope of his employment

at the time of the incident is invalid. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet her

burden “of presenting evidence and disproving the Attorney General’s certification by a

preponderance of the evidence.” Billings, 57 F.3d at 800; see also Osborn, 549 U.S. at 247

(2007)

II. Motion to Dismiss

The United States seeks to dismiss the Complaint against the United States because

Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirement of exhausting her administrative remedies

prior to filing suit pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The United States has

submitted the declaration of Daretia M. Hawkins (“Hawkins”), an attorney in the Claims

and Employment Branch, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Health and Human

Services. Hawkins states that there is no record of any Federal Tort Claims Act presented

by Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff contends that she was not required to engage in administrative procedures

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under the Federal Tort Claims Act because she alleged an intentional tort, but even if she

was, a constitutional tort claim could survive.

The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.,

provides a remedy for persons injured by the tortious activity of an employee of the United

States, where the employee was “acting within the scope of his . . . employment.” 28

U.S.C. § 1346(b). A FTCA action “shall not be instituted” against the United States unless

the claimant first presents the claim to the “appropriate Federal agency” and the claim is

denied or the agency fails to make a final disposition of the claim within six months. 28

U.S.C. § 2675(a) ; McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“The [Federal Tort

Claims Act] bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted

their administrative remedies.”) “The claim requirement of § 2675(a) is a jurisdictional

limitation.” Meridian Intern. Logistics, Inc. v. United States, 939 F.2d 740, 743 (1991)

(citing Blain v. United States, 552 F.2d 289, 291 (9th Cir. 1977)). 

On April 6, 2010, this action was initiated. (ECF No. 1). The United States has

been substituted as a Defendant in place of Weiss. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to present her claim to the “appropriate Federal agency” prior to initiating this suit. 28

U.S.C. § 2675(a). Additionally, Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional tort in the

Complaint. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant the Indian Self Determination and

Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 405f(d), 42 U.S.C. § 233(c), and 28 U.S.C. §

2679(d), that the United States of America shall be substituted as a defendant herein in

place of Defendant Donald Weiss.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as to the

United States (ECF No. 7) is granted.

DATED: December 20, 2010

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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