Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00175/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00175-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert B. Stanford III,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-14-00175-PHX-JAT (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES SENIOR 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Robert B. Stanford III’s (“Petitioner”) amended 

Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) that was 

filed on April 14, 2014 (Doc. 15). On May 27, 2014, Respondents filed their Answer 

(Doc. 16). Petitioner did not file a reply. The matter is deemed ripe for consideration.1

 

The Petition contains one ground for relief, which alleges the ineffective 

assistance of Petitioner’s trial counsel. Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was 

deficient in failing to present alleged eye-witness testimony at Petitioner’s trial and that 

such failure prejudiced Petitioner. The Petition is timely, and Petitioner’s claim is not 

procedurally barred. The undersigned, however, finds that the claim is meritless. The 

1 The case was reassigned to U.S. Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett on November 14, 2014.

 

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undersigned further finds that Petitioner is not entitled to the evidentiary hearing 

requested by Petitioner.2

 It is therefore recommended that the Court deny Petitioner’s 

request for an evidentiary hearing and deny the Petition. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison Complex in 

Florence, Arizona. Petitioner is serving 18 years for a second degree murder conviction. 

A. Facts Underlying Petitioner’s Convictions

Petitioner’s convictions arise out of an altercation that occurred outside the 

Redfish Grill and Bar in Chandler, Arizona. The Arizona Court of Appeals recounted the 

events as follows:

On August 6, 2007, [Petitioner] was asked to leave the 

Redfish Grill and Bar (“Redfish”) because he was arguing 

with a bar patron. As the head bouncer escorted [Petitioner] 

to his car, they crossed paths with Victim in the parking lot. 

[Petitioner] and Victim made eye contact, and then 

[Petitioner] asked him “what the f*** he was looking at.” 

Victim reacted to [Petitioner] by yelling that [Petitioner] did 

not know who he was. [Petitioner] and Victim continued 

yelling and tried to fight one another but were separated by 

other bouncers. The yelling continued across the parking lot 

as the head bouncer escorted [Petitioner] away from Victim 

and to his car. Once at the car, [Petitioner] told the head 

bouncer that ‘he’s got something for [Victim] in the car, that 

he’ll take care of it.’ [Petitioner] then got into the car, 

apologized to the bouncer for the situation, said he was 

leaving for the night, and drove off.

A few minutes after [Petitioner] drove off, the bouncer 

monitoring the patio saw [Petitioner’s] car return to the 

parking lot. [Petitioner] was driving and began circling the 

parking lot in the same direction about five or six times. 

About ten to fifteen minutes after [Petitioner] left, the head 

2 In the Petition, Petitioner also requests the State of Arizona to transfer its files regarding Petitioner’s criminal case (Doc. 15 at 19). On May 27, 2014, Respondents 

attached the relevant State of Arizona records to its Response (Doc. 16). Petitioner did 

not file a reply or notice with the Court objecting to the completeness of the records attached. The undersigned finds that the records attached to the Response (Doc. 16) are 

sufficient for evaluating the merits of Petitioner’s IAC claim. The undersigned therefore

deems Petitioner’s request moot.

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bouncer saw Victim inside the restaurant. Although Victim 

was acting fine, was not arguing with anyone, and was not as 

upset as he had been in the parking lot, the head bouncer 

escorted him out of the restaurant because it was standard 

procedure for anyone involved in a confrontation to be 

escorted out of the restaurant. Victim was initially upset that 

he was asked to leave but was calm as another bouncer 

escorted him to his car. That bouncer then returned to the 

front of the restaurant with the head bouncer. Less than a 

minute later, they heard gunshots, and then Victim came 

around the corner of the restaurant and collapsed in front of 

them. Victim had been shot . . . . Victim died from internal 

bleeding because the bullet hit his lungs.

Officers from the Chandler Police Department quickly 

arrived at the crime scene. Officers could not find anyone 

who witnessed the shooting but found two .45 caliber shell 

casings, a bullet hole in a nearby restaurant, and a bullet hole 

in Victim’s car. Police determined the shooter used a .45 

caliber gun.

The investigation led police to [Petitioner]. Police 

searched [Petitioner’s] apartment and found a receipt for a .45 

caliber gun and .45 caliber ammunition. During a police 

interview with the case agent, [Petitioner] initially lied and 

said he was not involved with the shooting at the Redfish. 

Later in the interview, however, [Petitioner] confessed to 

shooting Victim with a .45 caliber gun but claimed it was 

self-defense. According to [Petitioner], the following 

occurred. First, Victim hit him while the head bouncer was 

escorting him to his car. When [Petitioner] was in his car, 

Victim then jumped on the hood, hit him in the head through 

the window, leaned into the car, and tried to grab 

[Petitioner’s] gun, which was on his lap. [Petitioner] was 

scared that the Victim was going to kill him, so he pulled the 

trigger three times and drove away, not knowing whether or 

not he shot Victim. [Petitioner] then disposed of the gun and 

went home.

(Ex. M at 2-5; Doc. 16-1 at 56-59).3

3 Citations to pages within exhibits to Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 16) are referred to by exhibit number and also by the page numbers assigned by the Clerk of Court when 

filed on July 14, 2014. For example, Exhibit A to Respondents’ Answer is filed as Document 16-1. A citation to a page within Exhibit A would appear as (Ex. A at __;

Doc. 16-1 at __). 

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B. Direct Appeal, State Post-Conviction Relief, and Petitions for Review

On August 17, 2007, the Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner for one 

count of second degree murder. (Ex. A at 1-2; Doc. 16-1 at 2-3). Petitioner’s six-day 

trial began on December 1, 2008. (Ex. B; Doc. 16-1 at 6). On December 9, 2008, the 

jury found Petitioner guilty as charged. (Ex. B; Doc. 16-1 at 30). The trial court 

thereafter sentenced Petitioner to 18 years in prison. (Ex. J; Doc. 16-1 at 36). 

Following his 2009 conviction, Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Ex. K; Doc. 16-1 at 40). In its May 25, 2010 decision, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Ex M; Doc. 16-1 at 55). 

Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court.

On March 19, 2010, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). 

(Ex N; Doc. 16-1 at 66). In his May 6, 2011 PCR petition, Petitioner raised three claims, 

which alleged that Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (i) call alleged 

eye-witness Shiekh Ajamu (“Ajamu”) at trial; (ii) raise the issue of the victim’s 

aggressive nature and criminal background; and (iii) test Petitioner’s driver side window 

frame for the victim’s DNA. (Ex. O; Doc. 16-1 at 73-84). Attached to the PCR petition 

is an affidavit from Ajamu, which states that the victim jumped onto Petitioner’s vehicle 

in an aggressive manner, then leaned into the vehicle and began fighting with Petitioner. 

(Ex. O, Attachment A; Doc. 16-1 at 97-98). Ajamu further states that after Petitioner and 

the victim tugged back and forth on Petitioner’s gun, the gun discharged several times. 

In addition, Ajamu asserts that he contacted Petitioner’s trial counsel at least two times to 

explain what Ajamu witnessed, but trial counsel did not take Ajamu’s statement or 

interview him. Finally, Ajamu averred that if he had been called as a trial witness, he 

would have testified to the statements made in his affidavit. (Id.). 

On September 8, 2011, the trial court dismissed the PCR petition. (Ex. R; Doc. 

16-1 at 182). The court found that Petitioner had failed to state a colorable claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). (Ex. R; Doc. 16-1 at 179).

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals on October 6, 

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2011. (Ex. S; Doc. 16-2 at 2). On August 17, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied 

relief after finding that Petitioner had failed to establish his IAC claim. (Ex. T; Doc. 16-2 

at 87). Petitioner filed a petition for further review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which 

the Arizona Supreme Court denied on February 15, 2013. (Ex. V; Doc. 16-2 at 121). 

On January 30, 2014, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1). On April 14, 2014, with the Court’s permission, an amended Petition was filed 

(Doc. 15). 

II. FEDERAL HABEAS LAW

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims, the Anti-Terrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) requires federal courts to defer to the last 

reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state 

prisoner must show that the state court’s adjudication of his or her claims either:

1. [R]esulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or 

2. [R]esulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 

As to the first entitlement to relief explained above, “clearly established federal 

law” refers to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applicable at the time 

of the relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. 

Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly 

established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and 

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nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. 

Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 

(2000)). 

As to the second entitlement to relief explained above, factual determinations by 

state courts are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing 

evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 

852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). That is, 

a state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so 

long as “fair-minded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of the state court’s 

decision. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101; Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). 

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PETITION

A. Petitioner’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing 

AEDPA imposes “an express limitation on the power of a federal court to grant an 

evidentiary hearing and [has] reduced considerably the degree of the district court’s 

discretion.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) provides that if a habeas petitioner 

“has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” no 

evidentiary hearing on the claim will be held in federal court unless the petitioner shows 

that:

(A) the claim relies on:

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that 

was previously unavailable; or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been 

previously discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 

constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have 

found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (bold in original).

Case law has clarified that review under Section 2254(d) is limited to the record 

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that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, --- U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (holding that “review under § 

2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the 

claim on the merits”); Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 994 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(stating that Pinholster and the statutory text make clear that limitation on evidentiary 

hearings applies to Section 2254(d)(2) claims as well). In Gulbrandson, the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals held that a U.S. District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a 

habeas petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing regarding the petitioner’s IAC 

claims. The Court explained that “the state court’s rejections of these claims were neither 

contrary to, nor involved unreasonable applications, of Strickland. Thus, Pinholster bars 

a habeas court from any further factual development on these claims.” Gulbrandson, 738 

F.3d at 994; see also Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that a 

habeas petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as the petitioner failed to 

present a colorable IAC claim).

As explained below, the Arizona state court’s denial of Petitioner’s IAC claim was 

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Under 

Pinholster, Gulbrandson, and Stokley, Petitioner is therefore not entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing. 

B. Proving IAC Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

Respondents do not argue, and the undersigned does not find, that Petitioner’s 

claims are untimely or procedurally barred. The undersigned will thus evaluate the 

merits of Petitioner’s claims. The “clearly established federal law” for an IAC claim is 

the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

Under Strickland, a petitioner arguing an IAC claim must establish that his or her 

counsel’s performance was (i) objectively deficient and (ii) prejudiced the petitioner. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This is a deferential standard, and “[s]urmounting 

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 725 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)). In the habeas context, 

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the issue is whether there is a “reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist 

could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In assessing the performance factor of Strickland’s two-part test, judicial review 

“must be highly deferential” and the court must try not “to second-guess counsel’s 

assistance after conviction.” Clark, 769 F.3d at 725 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). To be constitutionally deficient, counsel’s representation must fall 

below an objective standard of reasonableness such that it was outside the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. A reviewing court considers

“whether there is any reasonable argument” that counsel was effective. Rogovich v. 

Ryan, 694 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012). 

To establish the prejudice factor of Strickland’s two-part test, a petitioner must 

demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. In other words, it must be shown that the “likelihood of a different result [is] 

substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112.

Although the performance factor is listed first in Strickland’s two-part test, a court 

may consider the prejudice factor first. In addition, a court need not consider both factors 

if the court determines that a petitioner has failed to meet one factor. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”); 

LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998) (a court need not look at both 

deficiency and prejudice if the habeas petitioner cannot establish one or the other).

C. Alleged IAC for Failure to Call Sheikh Ajamu as a Trial Witness

In his alleged ground for habeas relief, Petitioner asserts that:

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Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by 

failing to find, interview, and call as a witness at trial the only 

eye-witness to the shooting which the State of Arizona 

charged Petitioner with second-degree murder when that eyewitness’s testimony would have supported Petitioner’s claim 

of self-defense.

 (Doc. 15 at 12). 

The last state court decision reviewing the above claim is the August 17, 2012 

Arizona Court of Appeals ruling that affirmed the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s PCR 

petition. Citing to Strickland, the Court of Appeals explained that “we agree with the 

[trial] court that [Petitioner] has failed to overcome the presumption ‘that counsel’s 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ that ‘might be 

considered sound trial strategy.’” (Ex. S, Attachment A; Doc. 16-2 at 116-17). As the 

Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s reasoning, the U.S. District Court may 

review the trial court’s decision as part of the review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ 

decision. Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1130 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that when 

the last reasoned decision is a state appellate court decision which adopts or substantially 

incorporates lower state court decisions, the lower state court decisions may be reviewed 

as part of the review of the state appellate court’s decision). For the following reasons, 

Petitioner’s IAC claim is meritless as the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s IAC claim 

was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

1. Trial Counsel’s Performance was Not Deficient

The record indicates that Petitioner’s trial counsel did speak with alleged eyewitness Ajamu. In a July 7, 2010 email to Petitioner’s current counsel, Petitioner’s trial 

counsel stated that:

Mr. Sheikh Ajamu . . . made contact with me on at least three 

occasions. He called my office and appeared at court at 

[Petitioner’s] hearings on a couple of occasions. He asked me 

what [Petitioner] was facing in terms of years in prison. I 

remember him asking me what he could face and I told him 

he needed to talk to a lawyer because I couldn’t give him 

legal advice. I notified the prosecutor and the state’s case 

agent detective [Ajamu] was a possible witness in the case 

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and had made phone contact with me . . . . He at first 

indicated he wanted to be a witness for [Petitioner] if he could 

just give a statement to me. I told him he would be subject to 

interview by the prosecutor. [Ajamu] eventually just faded 

away. In my contacts with [Ajamu] he did not give me 

information that was exculpatory for [Petitioner]. I lost 

interest in having [Petitioner] as a witness as he figured out if 

he put himself in the car at the time of the shooting he could 

implicate himself. In our conversations [Ajamu’s] account 

of what happened did not match [Petitioner’s] story. 

(Ex. O, Attachment B; Doc. 16-1 at 100-01) (emphasis added).

While Petitioner does not dispute trial counsel’s statements regarding trial 

counsel’s conversations with Ajamu, Petitioner contends that “[a]t a minimum, defense 

counsel should have conducted a thorough interview of Ajamu. Had he done so, then he 

would have discovered that Ajamu’s recollection of the shooting actually matched 

Petitioner’s version of the shooting that he testified to at trial.” Yet as correctly noted by 

the trial court, the “relevant inquiry is not what trial counsel may have chosen to do based 

on Mr. Ajamu’s present testimony, but on what he reasonably believed that testimony 

would be in 2008 when this matter was being prepared for trial.” (Ex. R at 2; Doc. 16-1 

at 179). A reviewing court “must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

If the conversations trial counsel had with Ajamu did not indicate that Ajamu’s 

testimony would benefit Petitioner’s defense, then it was reasonable for trial counsel to 

choose not to pursue a formal interview. Gulbrandson, 738 F.3d at 988 (the 

“presumption of reasonableness means that not only do we ‘give the attorneys the benefit 

of the doubt,’ we must also ‘affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons 

[defense] counsel may have had for proceeding as they did.’” (quoting Pinholster, 131 

S.Ct. at 1407) (alteration in original)). An attorney “need not pursue an investigation that 

would be fruitless, much less one that might be harmful to the defense.” Richter, 131 

S.Ct. at 787. Another email from Petitioner’s trial counsel to Petitioner’s current counsel 

confirms that the decision not to pursue Ajamu as a defense witness was strategic:

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I didn’t think [Ajamu’s] testimony would help, in fact I 

thought it would hurt . . . . Please keep in mind 

[Petitioner’s] story to me about how the shooting took 

place changed frequently. That was our main problem at 

trial, the police had several different versions of how this 

happened from [Petitioner] and they just played each different 

version at trial. 

(Ex. O, Attachment B; Doc. 16-1 at 100) (emphasis added). 

Although Petitioner disagrees with trial counsel’s strategy, that disagreement does 

not constitute deficient performance on the part of Petitioner’s trial counsel. See Murray,

746 F.3d at 457 (a “defendant’s disagreement with trial counsel’s strategy does not 

constitute deficient performance on the part of trial counsel”). Petitioner has failed to 

show how trial counsel’s performance fell below a standard of reasonableness under 

prevailing professional norms. Clark, 769 F.3d at 725. Petitioner therefore does not 

meet the performance prong of the Strickland test. Even if Petitioner did meet the 

performance prong, Petitioner has failed to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland

test, as discussed below.

2. Petitioner has Failed to Establish Prejudice 

In an effort to establish that the failure to call Ajamu as a trial witness prejudiced 

Petitioner, Petitioner relies on questions posed by the jurors, such as “Why have we not 

heard testimony from [Ajamu]?” Petitioner asserts that the jury’s questions “eradicate 

any doubt as to Mr. Ajamu’s significance in their determination of guilt in this case.” 

(Doc. 15 at 17-18). Yet the jury’s curiosity about why Ajamu did not testify does not 

mean that the jury would have believed Ajamu’s testimony or given it significant weight. 

In light of Petitioner’s own conflicting stories to the police about what happened and 

other evidence presented by the State, a reasonable juror may have likely doubted the 

testimony of Ajamu. 

For example, a police detective testified that Petitioner told “so many different 

stories about the gun, that he can’t own one, and then he did, and that he gave it away, 

and that he threw it away . . . .” (Ex. Y at 63; Doc. 16-3 at 173). The detective further 

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testified that the physical evidence did not corroborate Petitioner’s version of the events. 

After conducting a reenactment, the detective concluded that if the events happened as 

Petitioner alleged, shell casings from the gun would have landed inside the vehicle. (Ex. 

Y at 66; Doc. 16-3 at 176). Yet the shell casings were found in Redfish’s parking lot, not 

inside Petitioner’s vehicle. (Ex. Y at 65; Doc. 16-3 at 175). Petitioner’s vehicle did not 

have visible damage and there was no blood or firearms evidence inside the car. (Ex. Y 

at 62; Doc. 16-3 at 172). 

In addition, a forensic pathologist testified at Petitioner’s trial that powder burns 

were not found on the victim’s hands, which would be reasonably expected if the victim 

had been holding onto the barrel of the gun as Petitioner alleged. (Ex. Z at 34; Doc. 16-4 

at 35). In addition, gun powder particles were not found on the victim’s shirt and the 

shirt was not torn or singed, which could occur if the victim had been touching the gun 

barrel or had been within a few inches of the barrel when it was fired. (Ex. Z at 49-51; 

Doc. 16-4 at 50-52). Given all of the evidence presented by the State, Petitioner has 

failed to establish that there is a “substantial, not just conceivable” likelihood of a 

different result if the jury had heard the testimony of Ajamu. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 

112. Petitioner has thus failed to establish the prejudice prong of Strickland. 

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that it was not contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, Strickland for the Arizona state court to reject Petitioner’s 

IAC claim contained in the Petition. The undersigned therefore recommends that the 

Court deny the claim on the merits.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny 

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. The undersigned further recommends that 

the Court deny and dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1) with prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing be 

DENIED.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in his claim for relief. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated this 24th day of March, 2015. 

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