Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02167/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02167-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Darryl Lee White, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al. 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-09-2167-PHX-FJM (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. (docket # 1) Respondents have filed an Answer, docket # 11, to which Petitioner has

replied, docket # 12. On Petitioner’s motion, the Court granted Petitioner until February 20,

2010 to submit additional materials in support of his Reply. Petitioner has not submitted any

further materials and the February 20, 2010 deadline has passed. (docket # 13) Accordingly,

this matter is ready for review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be

denied.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges, Plea, and Sentencing 

On June 9, 2006, a thirteen-count indictment was filed in Maricopa County Superior

Court, CR 2006-030391-001 SE, charging Petitioner with the following offenses: Counts 1

& 6 - aggravated assault, class 6 felonies; Count 3 - sexual abuse, a class 3 felony and

dangerous crime against children; Count 4 - molestation of a child, a class 2 felony and

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 1 The indictment does not contain a Count 2. (Respondents’ Exh. B)

 2 Both Counts 4 and 5 involved victim A.D., a minor under fifteen years of age.

(Respondents’ Exh. B, C) 

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dangerous crime against children; Count 5 - sexual conduct with a minor, a class 2 felony

and dangerous crime against children; Counts 7 & 10 - sexual abuse, class 5 felonies; Count

8 - attempted sexual abuse, a class 6 felony; Count 9 - sexual conduct with a minor, a class 6

felony; Counts 11 & 12 - sexual assault, class 2 felonies; and Count 13 - aggravated assault,

a class 3 dangerous felony. (Respondents’ Exh. B1

) The offenses allegedly took place on

March 2, 2005. The victims were A.D., alleged to be under the age of fifteen (Counts 1, 3,

4, 5); D.B., alleged to be a minor fifteen years of age or over (Counts 6, 7, 8, 9), and B.K., a

person of fifteen or more years of age. (Counts 10, 11, 12, 13). (Respondents’ Exh. B) 

Petitioner allegedly engaged in the charged conduct at his town home on March 2, 2005,

where the victims were present to perform for Petitioner who purported to be auditioning

singers for his recording business. (Respondents’ Exh. A) 

On April 24, 2007, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement with the State, pleading

guilty to Count 4, as amended, attempted molestation of a child, a class 3 felony and

dangerous crime against children; and Count 5, as amended, attempted sexual conduct with a

minor, a class 3 felony and dangerous crime against children. (Respondents’ Exhs. B, C,

D2

) The plea agreement specified that the “crimes carry a presumptive sentence of 10

years, a minimum sentence of 5 years, and a maximum sentence of 15 years.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. C) (emphasis in original). In the plea agreement, the parties stipulated

that on Count 4, Petitioner would be sentenced to the Arizona Department of Corrections,

and that on Count 5, Petitioner would be placed on lifetime probation that would include all

sexual offender terms and conditions of probation. (Respondents’ Exh. C at ¶ 2) The plea

agreement specifically stated that the “parties hereto fully and completely understand and

agree that by entering into a plea agreement, the [Petitioner] consents to judicial fact-finding

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 3 The Honorable Wesley E. Peterson presided. 

 4 The Honorable David M. Talamante presided. 

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by a preponderance of the evidence as to any aspect or enhancement of sentence . . . .” 

(Respondents’ Exh. C at ¶ 7) (emphasis in original). 

During the change of plea hearing3

, Petitioner acknowledged that he initialed the

provisions contained in the plea agreement, signed the agreement, and that his initials and

signature indicated “that [he] read and that [he understood] the plea.” (Respondents’ Exh. N

at 6-7) Petitioner also acknowledged that defense counsel had “explain[ed] the plea” to him,

and that he understood the plea agreement. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 7) In response to the

court’s questions, Petitioner acknowledged that no force or threats were used to induce him

to plead guilty, and that he understood that on amended Count 4, he “would be sentenced to

the Department of Corrections.” (Respondents’ Exh. N at 7) The trial court also advised

Petitioner of the sentencing range related to Count 4 - the minimum sentence was five years,

the presumptive sentence was ten years, and the maximum sentence was fifteen years. 

(Respondents’ Exh. N at 7-8) Petitioner confirmed that he understood his sentencing

exposure. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 8) The court ensured that Petitioner understood the

rights he was foregoing by pleading guilty. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 8-10) Defense

counsel then articulated the factual bases for Petitioner’s guilty pleas to Counts 4 and 5. 

(Respondents’ Exh. N at 10-11) Petitioner agreed that counsel accurately described the facts

pertaining to both counts. (Respondents’ Exh. N at 11) The Court found that Petitioner’s

plea was “knowingly and intelligently and voluntarily made.” (Respondents’ Exh. N at 12) 

After hearing from the victims, the court accepted Petitioner’s guilty pleas. (Respondents’

Exh. N at 12-14) 

On June 18, 2007, the court4

 sentenced Petitioner on Count 4 to the presumptive

sentence of ten years’ imprisonment with 369 days of presentence incarceration credit. 

(Respondents’ Exh. E) The court sentenced Petitioner to lifetime probation on Count 5, “to

begin upon his absolute discharge from prison.” (Respondents’ Exh. E) The court further

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ordered that Term 1 of the Sexual Offender Terms of probation be modified to “reflect that

[Petitioner] not initiate, establish or maintain contact with any male or female child under

the age of 18, excluding relatives, or attempt to do so without the prior written approval” of

the probation department. (Respondents’ Exh. E at 3) (emphasis in original). 

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings/(Rule 32 of-right)

By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal, but retained the

right to seek review in a petition for post-conviction relief under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32, a socalled Rule 32 of-right proceeding. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. On September 14, 2007,

Petitioner filed a pro per notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. 

(Respondents’ Exh. F) On September 19, 2007, the Office of the Legal Advocate was

appointed to represent Petitioner. (Respondents’ Exh. G) On February 1, 2008, counsel

filed a notice of completion of post-conviction review, notifying the court that he was unable

to find any claims to raise, and requesting that Petitioner be given additional time to file a

pro per petition. (Respondents’ Exh. H) The court granted Petitioner additional time to file

a pro per petition. (Respondents’ Exh. I, attachment 1) On March 6, 2008, Petitioner filed a

pro per petition for post-conviction relief, raising the following claims:

1. The Arizona sentencing statute, A.R.S. § 13-604.01, is a “new code,”

and has no provision for any “Attempted Crime,” other than “Attempted 

Murder.” Therefore, Petitioner should have been sentenced under A.R.S.

§ 13-701, § 13-702. 

2. Petitioner’s sentence violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as

discussed in Blakely v. Washington, [542 U.S. 296 (2004)].

3. Rule 32 [of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure] is unconstitutional 

because it allows the Office of the Legal Advocate to “client shop” and 

overlook issues that Petitioner presented to the court as colorable claims. 

Counsel was ineffective for failing to raise colorable issues that Petitioner

requested be raised in the Rule 32 petition. 

(Respondents’ Exh. I) 

On May 30, 2008, the court denied relief and dismissed the petition for postconviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. K) The court first addressed Petitioner’s claim that

because Arizona’s sentencing provision A.R.S. § 13-604.01 does not include a provision for

“attempted crimes” other than attempted murder, Petitioner should have been sentenced

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under A.R.S. §§ 13-701, 13-702. The court rejected Petitioner’s claim and found that

Petitioner’s sentence was consistent with the stipulations in the plea agreement. 

(Respondents’ Exh. J) The court also noted that both the plea agreement and the sentencing

order incorporate the attempt statute, A.R. S. § 13-1001, and the sentencing provision,

A.R.S. § 13-604.01. (Respondents’ Exh. K at 1) The court further explained that: 

A.R.S. § 13-604.01 defines a “dangerous crime against children” as includ[ing]

molestation of a child and sexual conduct with a minor. The statute reads 

further that “a dangerous crime against children is in the 1st degree if it is a 

completed offense and is in the 2nd degree if it is a preparatory offense. . . .”

Again, the plea agreement and the sentencing order are consistent with these

statutory provisions. The sentencing provisions of 13-604.01 provide that 

notwithstanding 13-1001 (the attempt statute), “a person who is at least 18 

years of age . . . and who stands convicted of a dangerous crime against children 

in the 2nd degree . . . is guilty of a Class 3 felony and shall be sentenced to a

presumptive term of imprisonment of 10 years.” Again, this is consistent with 

the sentencing order of 6/18/07.

(Respondents’ Exh. K at 2) Regarding Petitioner’s Blakely challenge, the court stated, “the

provisions of the Defendant’s plea agreement state quite clearly that in exchange for the

sentencing stipulations the Defendant consented to judicial fact finding by a preponderance

of the evidence as to any aspect or enhancement of sentence. In any case the Defendant was

sentenced to a presumptive term, and not an aggravated sentence, to be followed by lifetime

probation.” (Respondents’ Exh. K at 2) Finally, the court rejected Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that there was “simply a disagreement over

counsel’s belief that after a review of the file there were no colorable claims for relief to

raise in the PCR proceedings. Defendant’s pro per petition itself does not raise any

arguments relating to representation at the trial court level.” (Respondents’ Exh. K at 2) 

On June 17, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro per petition for review in the Arizona Court

of Appeals, raising the following claims:

1. The Arizona sentencing statute, A.R.S. § 13-604.01, is a “new code,” and

has no provision for any “Attempted Crime,” other than “Attempted Murder.”

Therefore, Petitioner should have been sentenced under A.R.S. §§ 13-701, 13-702.

2. Rule 32 [of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure] is unconstitutional

because it allows the Office of the Legal Advocate to “client shop” and 

overlook issues that Petitioner presented to the court as colorable claims. Counsel

was ineffective for failing to raise colorable issues that Petitioner requested be 

raised in the Rule 32 petition. 

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 5 In his Reply, Petitioner asserts that he filed a Supplemental Petition for review on

November 18, 2008. (docket # 12, Exhibit A) However, the Court cannot determine whether

the Supplemental Petition was filed with the Court of Appeals. The copy of the Supplemental

Petition attached to Petitioner’s Reply does not contain any markings, such as a file stamp, to

indicate that it was filed with the Arizona Court of Appeals. Additionally, the Supplemental

Petition does not include the case number that was assigned to Petitioner’s appeal. (see

Respondents’ Exhs. L, M)

 6 Respondents concede that the Petition is timely filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

(docket # 11 at 8)

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(Respondents’ Exh. L5) The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review on September 18,

2009. (Respondents’ Exh. M)

C. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

On October 15, 2009, Petitioner filed a timely6

 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

this Court, raising the following claims: 

Ground One: Petitioner’s sentence violates the Supremacy Clause, the

Sixth Amendment, and Petitioner’s rights to due process and to be

free from double jeopardy; and

Ground Two: Petitioner’s counsel was ineffective in violation of the 

Supremacy Clause and the Sixth Amendment. 

(docket # 1) Respondents assert that Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted and procedurally

barred, or lack merit. (docket # 10) Petitioner disputes Respondents’ analysis of his claims. 

(docket # 12) The Court will address these arguments below. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedies on several of

his claims because he did not fairly present those claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Respondents further argue that those claims are now procedurally defaulted, and thus must

be dismissed. 

A. Relevant Legal Principles 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), before a federal court may consider a state

prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner must have exhausted

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available state-court remedies. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). When

seeking habeas corpus review, Petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has properly

exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). To exhaust

state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule upon the

merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989); Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the State with the necessary

‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate state court . . .

thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”). In Arizona, unless a prisoner

has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has

presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct review or in a

petition for post-conviction relief. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir.

2004); Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D.Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v.

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

To result in exhaustion, claims must be fairly presented. That is, the petitioner must

provide the state courts with a “fair opportunity” to apply controlling legal principles to the

facts bearing upon his federal claim. Picard v. Conor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-77 (1971). A

claim has been fairly presented if petitioner has described in state court both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (stating that “[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim

that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed

by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court.”); Galvan v. Alaska Department of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1205 (9th Cir. 2005)

(stating that “[t]o exhaust a federal constitutional claim in state court, a petitioner has to

have, at least, explicitly alerted the court that she was making a federal constitutional

claim.”). General appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial, do not establish fair presentation of a federal

constitutional claim. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1002 (observing that “[e]xhaustion requires more

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than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of an underlying federal legal

theory.”); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds,

247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)

(insufficient for prisoner to have made “a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such

as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a “constitutional error” or a “fair trial”).

Similarly, a mere reference to the “Constitution of the United States” does not preserve a

federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). Even if the basis of a

federal claim is “self-evident” or if the claim would be decided “on the same considerations”

under state or federal law, the petitioner must make the federal nature of the claim “explicit

either by citing federal law or the decision of the federal courts . . . .” Lyons, 232 F.3d at

668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a claim to the state court if the court must read

beyond the petition or brief filed in that court to discover the federal claim. Baldwin, 541

U.S. at 27. In summary, a “petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for

purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper

forum; (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis

for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations

omitted). 

 Where a prisoner fails to “fairly present” a claim to the state courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner, state court remedies may, nonetheless, be “exhausted.” This type of

exhaustion is often referred to as “procedural default” or “procedural bar.” Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. There are two

categories of procedural default. First, a state court may have applied a procedural bar when

the prisoner attempted to raise the claim in state court. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 802-05. 

Second, the state prisoner may not have presented the claim to the state courts, but pursuant

to the state courts’ procedural rules, a return to state court would be “futile.” Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989). 

 In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v.

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Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To

establish cause, a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The following objective

factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual

or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective

assistance of counsel. Id. To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate that the

alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,

170 (1982). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the court need not reach the prejudice

prong. 

To establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” resulting in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a state prisoner must establish that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B).

B. Application of Law to Petitioner’s Claims

1. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner claims that his sentence violates the Supremacy Clause,

Double Jeopardy Clause, Equal Protection, and Due Process. He also asserts that his

sentence violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as articulated in Blakely. (docket

# 1 at 6) Specifically, Petitioner argues that the “State of Arizona’s sentencing schemes are

in violation of the Supremacy Clause for the fact that the schemes are vague, complex, and

unconstitutional . . . .” (docket # 1 at 6) He also argues that his sentence was illegally

enhanced in violation of the Sixth Amendment because a judge, not a jury, found “all

elements” in support of sentence. (docket # 1 at 6) Petitioner further argues that Arizona’s

sentencing schemes “[s]imultaneously violate[] Double Jeopardy Clause & Due Process

Clause of the 5th and 14th Amend[ments] for multiple sentences on one document, i.e, docket

No. CR 2006-030391-001 SE, consolidated for trial court purposes then running those

counts consecutively of both greater & lesser included offenses constituting an illegal

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sentence in violation of the United States Constitution, Equal Protection of the Laws

Clause.” (docket # 1 at 6) Respondents assert that Petitioner did not properly exhaust state

remedies with respect to any of his claims raised in Ground One. 

In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner argued that Arizona’s sentencing

statute, A.R.S. § 13-604.01, did not contain any provisions for an attempted crime, other

than attempted murder. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 4) He further argued that under “the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [a]ll Arizona Defendants sentenced

under provisions of A.R.S. § 13-604.01 for any attempted crime, other than attempted

murder, must be resentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines of A.R.S. § 13-701 and § 13-

702.” (Respondents’ Exh. I at 7) Although Petitioner cited to the Equal Protection Clause,

he essentially raised a state-law claim arguing that the sentencing court erred by sentencing

under A.R.S. § 13-604.01, rather than under A.R.S. § 13-701, § 13-702. Likewise, the postconviction court rejected this claim on the basis of state law. (Respondents’ Exh. K) 

In his second issue raised on post-conviction review, Petitioner argued that his

sentence violated the Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington. (Respondents’

Exh. I at 9) The post-conviction court rejected Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment challenge to

his sentence because Petitioner received the presumptive, not an aggravated, sentence. 

Therefore, the Blakely Court’s Sixth Amendment analysis did not apply. (Respondents’

Exh. K) 

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief to the Arizona

Court of Appeals. (Respondents’ Exh. M, docket # 12, Exhibit A) Petitioner again

challenged his sentence by arguing that Arizona’s sentencing statute, A.R.S. § 13-604.01,

did not contain any provisions for attempted crimes, other than attempted murder. 

(Respondents’ Exh. L) Petitioner argued that under the “Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment . . . [a]ll Arizona defendants sentenced under the provisions of

A.R.S. 13-604.01 for any attempted crime, other than attempted murder, must be

resentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines of A.R.S. § 13-701 & 13-702. . . .” 

(Respondents’ Exh. L) Petitioner further argued that “A.R.S. § 13-604.01 . . . is in essence a

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double enhancement of sentence not found to be true either admitted by the defendant or

proven by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt as required within the Constitution for the

United States of America.” (Respondents’ Exh. L) The appellate court summarily denied

review. (Respondents’ Exh. M) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner did not fairly present his Blakely claim to the State

courts because, although he raised a Blakely claim to the trial court on post-conviction

review, he did not raise that claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. In his petition for

review, Petitioner did not specifically cite to Blakely. However, he used Blakely-type

language when he argued that “A.R.S. § 13-604.01 . . . is in essence a double enhancement

of sentence not found to be true either admitted by the defendant or proven by a jury beyond

a reasonable doubt as required within the Constitution for the United States of America.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. L) (emphasis added). In support of his Response to the State’s Answer,

Petitioner attached a Supplemental Petition for review, signed and dated November 18,

2008, which he claims to have submitted to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (docket # 12,

Exh. A) The Supplemental Petition includes a Blakely claim. Thus, if Petitioner indeed

filed the Supplemental Petition with the Arizona Court of Appeals, he likely exhausted his

Blakely claim by presenting it both to the trial and appellate courts on post-conviction

review. However, the Court cannot discern whether the Supplemental Petition was actually

filed with the Court of Appeals because it does not include any indicia of filing - such as a

file stamp. The Court need not resolve the exhaustion issue, however, because this Court

may deny the Blakely on the merits regardless of whether Petitioner failed to exhaust state

remedies on this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). As set forth in Section III, infra, the

Blakely claim lacks merit. 

As to Petitioner’s remaining claims asserted in Ground One, the record confirms

Respondents’ assertion that Petitioner did not fairly present a Supremacy Clause, Double

Jeopardy Clause, Equal Protection, or Due Process claim to the state courts. (Respondents’

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 7 In the Supplemental Petition which Petitioner purports to have filed in the Arizona Court

of Appeals (see docket # 12, Exhibit A), Petitioner cites to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Even

assuming Petitioner filed the Supplemental Petition in the Court of Appeals, presentation of a

claim for the first time in a petition for review does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement.

Petitioner did not present a Double Jeopardy claim in his petition for post-conviction relief to

the trial court. Under Arizona law, claims may not be raised for the first time in a petition for

review from the denial of a post-conviction review petition. See State v. Anderson, 177 Ariz.

381, 385, 868 P.2d 964, 968 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1993) (stating that “[o]nly those claims raised in the

petition for post-conviction relief and preserved in the motion for rehearing are subject to

appellate review); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a) (stating that “defendant shall be precluded from relief

under this rule based upon any ground . . . (3) that has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any

previous collateral proceeding.”). 

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Exhs. I, L; docket # 12, Exhibit A7) Although Petitioner cited the Equal Protection Clause

and several other constitutional provisions in support of his challenge to A.R.S. § 13-604.01

in his post-conviction petition, he essentially challenged the application of Arizona’s

sentencing statutes under state law. Likewise, the State court resolved Petitioner’s claim on

the basis of state law. Petitioner’s mere reference to a Constitutional provision did not

transform his state law sentencing claim into a federal claim. 

The Court finds that Petitioner’s Supremacy Clause, Double Jeopardy Clause, Equal

Protection, and Due Process claims asserted in Ground One are procedurally barred, because

Petitioner failed to present those claims to the State courts and a return to state court to

present those claims would be futile. Petitioner is time-barred from raising the foregoing

claims in a successive petition for post-conviction relief because the time for filing a notice

of post-conviction relief has long expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and 32.4 (a petition for

post-conviction relief must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of judgment and

sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct

appeal, whichever is later.”) Likewise, Petitioner is time-barred from seeking appellate

review because Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c) and 31.19(a) require petitions

for review from the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief, and petitions for review to

be filed within 30 days after the final decision of the trial court or the court of appeals. 

Thus, Petitioner is time-barred from seeking further review in the state court. 

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Additionally, under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, a

defendant is precluded from raising claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in

any previous collateral proceeding. See State v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. 112, 113, 912 P.2d 1341,

1342 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (“Defendants are precluded from seeking post-conviction relief

on grounds that were adjudicated, or could have been raised and adjudicated, in a prior

appeal or prior petition for post-conviction relief.”); State v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 624,

875 P.2d 850, 857 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant’s claim that his sentence had been

improperly enhanced by prior conviction was precluded by defendant’s failure to raise issue

on appeal).

2. Excusing Procedural Bar

Because Petitioner’s Supremacy Clause, Double Jeopardy Clause, Equal Protection,

and Due Process claims asserted in Ground One are procedurally defaulted, federal habeas

corpus review is only available if he can establish cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. To establish “cause”, a petitioner must establish that some objective

factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. 

Murray, 477 U.S. at 488-492. The following objective factors may constitute cause: (1)

interference by state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was

not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 

Prejudice is actual harm that results from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). Where petitioner fails to establish cause for

his procedural default, the court need not consider whether petitioner has shown actual

prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.

527, 533 (1986). Petitioner offers no argument sufficient to overcome the procedural bar. 

Petitioner’s status as an inmate and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute cause for his

failure to present his claims to the Arizona courts. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that an illiterate pro se petitioner’s

lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that petitioner’s arguments

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concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause.) 

Petitioner has not shown cause or prejudice to excuse the procedural default. 

Petitioner has also failed to show that failure to consider his defaulted claims will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A federal court will only review a

procedurally defaulted habeas claim on the merits if petitioner demonstrates that failure to

consider the merits of the claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298

(1995). The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies to a “narrow class of

cases” in which a petitioner makes an extraordinary showing that an innocent person was

probably convicted because of a constitutional violation. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 231

(1995). Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that a “constitutional violation has

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Id. at 327. To establish the

requisite probability, Petitioner must prove with new reliable evidence that “it is more likely

than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. at 324, 327. New evidence presented in support of a fundamental miscarriage

of justice claim may include “exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness

accounts, or critical physical evidence that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324, see also,

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (stating that a fundamental miscarriage of justice

contention must involve evidence that the trial jury did not have before it).

Petitioner has not offered any new evidence, or asserted that, in light of any newly

discovered evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327. 

Because Petitioner has not established any basis to excuse his procedural default,

Petitioner’s Supremacy Clause, Double Jeopardy Clause, Equal Protection, and Due Process

claims asserted in Ground One are barred from federal habeas corpus review. 

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3 . Ground Two

In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that: (a) counsel was ineffective for failing to

“defend Petitioner’s claims vigorously” and for failing to “file [a] detailed brief” for postconviction review; (b) counsel acted “as a friend of the court” and had a conflict of interest,

evidenced by the Legal Advocate using “the same format in not finding colorable claims” to

raise for review; (c) Petitioner’s plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made

because he was not aware of the “the true length of [his] sentence.” (docket # 1 at 7) 

Respondents concede that Petitioner properly presented his claim that counsel was

ineffective for failing to file a detailed brief on post-conviction review. (docket # 11 at 20) 

The Court, therefore, will consider the merits of that claim.

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s remaining claims asserted in Ground Two are

procedurally defaulted because Petitioner did not present them to the state trial court or to

the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Respondents’ Exh. I, Exh. L) In his petition for postconviction review, Petitioner argued that post-conviction counsel was ineffective because he

ignored Petitioner’s request to raise “colorable claims” on review. (Respondents’ Exh. I) In

his petition for post-conviction review filed with the trial court, Petitioner did not challenge

the voluntariness of his plea or argue that counsel was ineffective based on conflict of

interest. (Respondents’ Exh. I, L) The post-conviction court rejected Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. K)

In his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner again argued

that post-conviction counsel failed to raise colorable claims to the court despite Petitioner’s

request. (Respondents’ Exh. L) In his Supplemental Petition, Petitioner expanded on his

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and suggested that his plea was involuntary

because it was based on ineffective assistance. (docket # 12, exhibit A) As previously

discussed, it is not clear whether Petitioner indeed filed the Supplemental Petition with the

Arizona Court of Appeals. Even assuming Petitioner filed the Supplemental Petition,

presentation of a claim for the first time in a petition for review to the appellate court does

not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Under Arizona law, claims may not be raised for the

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first time in a petition for review from the denial of a post-conviction review petition. See

State v. Anderson, 177 Ariz. 381, 385, 868 P.2d 964, 968 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1993) (stating that

“[o]nly those claims raised in the petition for post-conviction relief and preserved in the

motion for rehearing are subject to appellate review); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a) (stating that

“defendant shall be precluded from relief under this rule based upon any ground . . . (3) that

has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.”). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims that counsel acted “as a friend of the court” and had

a conflict of interest, and that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

made because he was not aware of the “the true length of [his] sentence,” are procedurally

barred because Petitioner did not fairly present those claims to the state courts and a return

to state court to present those claims would be futile. Petitioner is time-barred from raising

the foregoing claims in a successive petition for post-conviction relief because the time for

filing a notice of post-conviction relief has long expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and 32.4

(a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of

judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in

the direct appeal, whichever is later.”) Likewise, Petitioner is time-barred from seeking

appellate review because Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c) and 31.19(a) require

petitions for review from the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief, and petitions for

review, to be filed within 30 days after the final decision of the trial court or the court of

appeals. Thus, Petitioner is time-barred from seeking further review in the state court. 

Additionally, under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, a

defendant is precluded from raising claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in

any previous collateral proceeding. See State v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. 112, 113, 912 P.2d 1341,

1342 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (“Defendants are precluded from seeking post-conviction relief

on grounds that were adjudicated, or could have been raised and adjudicated, in a prior

appeal or prior petition for post-conviction relief.”); State v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 624,

875 P.2d 850, 857 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant’s claim that his sentence had been

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improperly enhanced by prior conviction was precluded by defendant’s failure to raise issue

on appeal).

4. Excusing Procedural Bar

Because Petitioner’s claims that his plea was involuntary and that counsel was

ineffective based on conflict of interest were not properly presented to the state courts on

post-conviction review are procedurally defaulted, federal habeas corpus review is only

available if Petitioner can establish cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of

justice. To establish “cause”, a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external

to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Murray, 477

U.S. at 488-492. The following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by

state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably

available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Prejudice is actual

harm that results from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d

240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). Where petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default,

the court need not consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the

alleged constitutional violations. Smith, 477 U.S. at 533. Petitioner offers no argument

sufficient to overcome the procedural bar. Petitioner’s status as an inmate and lack of legal

knowledge do not constitute cause for his failure to present his claims to the Arizona courts. 

Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909 (finding that an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance

did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1381 (finding

that petitioner’s arguments concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers

did not constitute cause.). Petitioner has not shown cause or prejudice to excuse the

procedural default.

Petitioner has also failed to show that failure to consider his defaulted claims will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A federal court will only review a

procedurally defaulted habeas claim on the merits if petitioner demonstrates that failure to

consider the merits of the claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

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resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. 298. The

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies to a “narrow class of cases” in which a

petitioner makes an extraordinary showing that an innocent person was probably convicted

because of a constitutional violation. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. Petitioner has the burden of

demonstrating that a “constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent.” Id. at 327. To establish requisite probability, Petitioner must prove with

new reliable evidence that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 324, 327. New evidence

presented in support of a fundamental miscarriage of justice claim may include “exculpatory

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence that was

not presented at trial.” Id. at 324, see also, House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (stating that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice contention must involve evidence that the trial jury did

not have before it).

Petitioner has not offered any new evidence, or asserted that, in light of any newly

discovered evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327. 

Because Petitioner has not established any basis to excuse his procedural default, his

challenge to the voluntariness of his pleas and that counsel was ineffective based on conflict

of interest are barred from federal habeas corpus review.

C. Stay and Abey

On March 8, 2010, Petitioner filed a Motion to Stay and Abeyance. (docket # 14) 

Plaintiff requests that the Court stay this proceeding under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269,

278 (2005) to permit him time to obtain counsel. The stay and abeyance procedure

articulated in Rhines does not contemplate staying a case for such a purpose. Rather, Rhines

permits the district court to stay a mixed habeas corpus petition, and hold it in abeyance

pending the actual exhaustion of a petitioner’s claims. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. As

discussed below, the Rhines stay and abey procedure is not appropriate in this case. 

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 A federal court may not “adjudicate mixed petitions for writ of habeas corpus, that

is, petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 273

(citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-519 (1982)). However, the Supreme Court in

Rhines held that the AEDPA does not deprive district court of the authority to stay a petition

for writ of habeas corpus where it would be the proper exercise of discretion. Rhines, 544

U.S. at 277-78. The Court held that stay and abeyance of a mixed petition (a petition

containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims) to allow a petitioner to present the

unexhausted claims to state court in the first instance and then return to federal court for

review is only appropriate when the district court determines that there was good cause for

petitioner's failure to exhaust the claims first in the state court. 

As discussed above, the Petition contains either claims that were fairly presented to

the state courts and, thus, were actually exhausted, or claims for which no state remedies are

now available, and thus are technically exhausted. A petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion

requirement if: (1) he has fairly presented his federal claim to the highest state court with

jurisdiction to consider it; or (2) no state remedies remain available. Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Because the Petition in this case contains

claims that are either actually or technically exhausted, it is not a mixed Petition and Rhines

does not apply. Accordingly, the Court should deny Petitioner’s motion to Stay and Abey. 

III. Merits Review 

The Court will address the merits of Petitioner’s claims that are properly before this

Court after discussing the standard of review. 

A. Standard of Review

In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) which “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner

applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court

convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 693 (2002). 

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Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a habeas petition “with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court” unless the state court’s decision

was either (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006); Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003); Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). 

To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable

application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court

which existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14-

15 (2003); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has

acknowledged that it cannot reverse a state court decision merely because that decision

conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on a federal constitutional issue. Brewer v. Hall, 378

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Even if the state court neither explained its ruling nor cited United States Supreme Court

authority, the reviewing federal court must nevertheless examine Supreme Court precedent

to determine whether the state court reasonably applied federal law. Early v. Packer, 537

U.S. 3, 8 (2003). The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that citation to

federal law is not required and that compliance with the habeas statute “does not even

require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Id. 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell, 540 U.S

at 14 (citations omitted); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000).

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular

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case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An incorrect

application of federal law does not satisfy this standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.

652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state

court's decision is objectively unreasonable.”). “It is not enough that a federal habeas court,

in its independent review of the legal question,” is left with the “firm conviction” that the

state court ruling was “erroneous.” Id.; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. Rather, the petitioner must

establish that the state court decision is “objectively unreasonable.” Middleton v. McNeil,

541 U.S. 433 (2004); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76. 

B. Ground One - Blakely Claim

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that his sentence violates the Sixth Amendment as

construed in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), because a judge, not a jury,

determined “the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” (docket # 1 at 6) The postconviction court rejected this claim explaining that Blakely did not apply because Petitioner

received a presumptive, not an aggravated, sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. K) As an initial

matter, the Court will consider the effect of Petitioner’s plea agreement on this issue.

The terms of the plea agreement are controlled by the principles of contract law. See,

e.g., United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Plea bargains are

contractual in nature and subject to contract-law standards.”); United States v. Keller, 902

F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, courts apply contract principles to examine and

enforce the plain language of the contract, or plea agreement, and do not consider extrinsic

evidence to interpret the terms of a plea agreement if it is clear and unambiguous on its face. 

United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Wilson Arlington Co. v.

Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 912 F.2d 366, 370 (9th Cir. 1990)); United States v. Trapp,

257 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit regularly enforces “knowing and

voluntary” waivers of appellate rights in criminal cases, provided that the waivers are part of

negotiated guilty pleas, see United States v. Michlin, 34 F.3d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1994), and

do not violate public policy, see United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir.

1996) (cataloguing public policy exceptions). Likewise, the Supreme Court has held that a

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 8 Both counts involved the same victim, A.D., alleged to be under the age of fifteen.

(Respondents’ Exh. C).

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defendant’s right to a jury trial on aggravating factors may be waived. Blakely, 542 U.S. at

310. 

In this case, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which he pled guilty

to Count 4, attempted molestation of a child, a class 3 felony and dangerous crime against

children; and Count 5, attempted sexual conduct with a minor, a class 3 felony and

dangerous crime against children. (Respondents’ Exh. C8

) The plea agreement specifically

provided that, on Count 4, Petitioner “shall be sentenced to the Arizona Department of

Corrections.” (Respondents’ Exh. C) The plea agreement also stated that Petitioner’s

crimes carried a presumptive sentence of 10 years, a minimum sentence of 5 years, and a

maximum sentence of 15 years. (Respondents’ Exh. C) The plea agreement also provided

that Petitioner consented to judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence as to

any aspect or enhancement of sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. C at ¶ 7) Petitioner also

waived his right to “a trial by jury to determine guilt and to determine any fact used to

impose sentence within the range stated above in paragraph one.” (Respondents’ Exh. C at ¶

10) The plea agreement further provided that Petitioner waived “any and all motions,

defenses, objections, or requests which [he] has made or raised, or could assert hereafter, to

the Court’s entry of judgment against [him] and imposition of a sentence upon [him]

consistent with this agreement.” (Respondents’ Exh. C at ¶ 6) (emphasis added) 

The Court sentenced Petitioner to 10 years of imprisonment on Count 4 which

comported with the terms of the plea agreement. (Respondents’ Exh. E) Because Petitioner

was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement, his guilty plea effectively waived his

right to challenge to his sentence. See United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 303 (3rd Cir.

2007) (concluding that defendant’s “Blakely-based contention,” was argument that

defendant “waived as part of [his] plea agreement.”); United States v. Cortez-Arias, 403

F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by 425 F.3d 547, 548 n. 8 (2005) (joining other circuits

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in concluding that a claim under [United States v.] Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) was waived

when defendant waived the right to appeal his sentence, noting that in exchange for his

guilty plea and waiver, the defendant received a benefit).

Moreover, even if Petitioner had not waived his right to challenge his sentence, his

Sixth Amendment challenge to his sentence lacks merit. Petitioner argues that his 10-year

sentence on Count 4 violates the Sixth Amendment because factors used to impose his

sentence were not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Supreme Court case law

instructs that the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee proscribes the imposition of a

sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not

found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000);

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 

In this case, Petitioner pled guilty to Count 4, attempted molestation of a child, a class

3 felony and dangerous crime against children. (Respondents’ Exh. C, E) Under the

applicable Arizona law, at the time of Petitioner’s sentencing his conviction yielded a

presumptive term of 10 years’ imprisonment. A.R.S. § 13-604.01(J) (2007). The court could

impose a term as low as 5 years, or an aggravated term as high as 15 years. (Id.) The court

sentenced Petitioner to the presumptive term of 10 years’ imprisonment. Because Petitioner

received the presumptive sentence, the Blakely decision does not apply to Petitioner. 

Based on the foregoing, the State court’s finding that Petitioner’s sentence did not

violate the Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely is neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, the Supreme Court’s Apprendi/Blakely jurisprudence. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that his 10-year prison sentence violates the Sixth

Amendment fails. 

C. Ground Two - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that the “State of Arizona appoints [i]neffective

[a]ssistance of [c]ounsel which fail to defend Petitioner’s claims vigorously and file detailed

brief as to why no claims can be raised.” (docket # 1 at 7) Petitioner also argues that postconviction counsel acted as “an extra arm of the State in which [the] Legal Advocate

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appointed by the State uses the same format in not finding any colorable claims just to repeat

this process on other defendants under his office like a production line in which he receives

payments for services unconstitutionally unrendered by lining his pockets.” (docket # 1 at 7)

On post-conviction review, the trial court found that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim was “simply a disagreement over counsel’s belief that after a review of the

file there were no colorable claims for relief to raise in PCR proceedings. Defendant’s pro

per petition itself does not raise any arguments relating to representation at the trial court

level.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 2) The trial court concluded that Petitioner had not raised a

material issue of fact or law that entitled him to relief. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 2) As

discussed below, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner

must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d

1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. When

reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel

rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is “extremely limited.” 

Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S.

141 (1998). Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must also establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

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691-92; United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) (stating that “a violation

of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not ‘complete’ until the defendant

is prejudiced.”) To show prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Hart, 174 F.3d at 1069; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d

923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). The court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong. Jackson v.

Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). The

court, however, may not assume prejudice solely from counsel’s allegedly deficient

performance. Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155.

In this case, Petitioner essentially challenges post-conviction counsel’s conclusion that

there were no colorable claims to raise on post-conviction review. Petitioner argues that

counsel’s determination that there were no colorable issues to raise, establishes that counsel

acted as “an extra arm of the State in which [the] Legal Advocate appointed by the State uses

the same format in not finding any colorable claims just to repeat this process on other

defendants under his office like a production line . . . ..” (docket # 1 at 7) Even assuming

that counsel’s performance was deficient because he followed the alleged “format” of the

Legal Advocate’s office by finding no colorable claims, Petitioner must also show that he

was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance to prevail on his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000) (presuming prejudice

only when “counsel’s deficient performance actually cause[d] the forfeiture of the

defendant's appeal”). Petitioner has not sufficiently alleged prejudice from his postconviction counsel’s determination that there were no colorable claims to raise in his Rule 32

of-right proceeding. In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s

failure to raise a particular issue on appeal, Petitioner must show that the omitted argument

would have likely been successful. See Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n. 8 (9th Cir.

2000) (holding that appellate counsel’s failure to raise issues on direct appeal does not

constitute ineffective assistance when appeal would not have provided grounds for reversal);

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Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985) (failing to raise meritless argument on

appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). Petitioner has not met his

burden. Petitioner has not identified any issues that counsel should have raised for review,

let alone any issues that likely would have been successful. Moreover, the claims that

Petitioner raised in his pro per petition were unsuccessful and rejected by the post-conviction

court. (Respondents’ Exh. J) 

In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has not established that the state court’s rejection

of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on post-conviction review was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Petition should be denied and dismissed because

Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review or lack

merit. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (docket # 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey (docket #

14) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave to

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1);

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Rules 72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have seven

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 16th day of March, 2010.

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