Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00703/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00703-29/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:1801 Farmworker Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Background

This case has a complex history but traces back to a suit filed by the Plaintiffs on behalf of 

themselves and a class of others similarly situated against Defendant Giumarra Vineyards 

Corporation on December 16, 2005. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has violated a number of 

federal and California laws governing employee wages and working conditions. Ultimately, class 

certification was granted for two classes of employees who were allegedly provided late meal 

breaks and required to purchase their own tools. 

Defendant has filed a motion for partial summary adjudication. Doc. 156. Plaintiffs 

oppose the motion. Doc. 164. The matter was taken under submission without oral argument. 

RAFAEL MUNOZ, LIDIA CRUZ, YANET 

HERNANDEZ, SANTOS R. 

VALENZUELA, TRINIDAD RUIZ, 

MARTA A. RINCON de DIAZ, RAMON 

CERVANTES PERALES, and HUGO 

PEREZ RIOS, on behalf of themselves, and 

all current and former employees, and on 

behalf of a class of similarly situated 

employees, 

Plaintiffs

v.

GIUMARRA VINEYARDS 

CORPORATION; and DOES 1-20

Defendant

CASE NO. 1:09-CV-0703 AWI JLT

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(Doc. 156)

Case 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT Document 184 Filed 09/11/15 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine 

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Fortyune v. 

American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). The party seeking summary 

judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of 

identifying the portions of the declarations (if any), pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate an 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); 

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). A fact is “material” if it 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986); Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Savings 

Assn, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002). A dispute is “genuine” as to a material fact if there is 

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must 

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the movant. 

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Where the non-moving 

party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant may prevail by presenting 

evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or by merely pointing 

out that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party’s 

claim. See James River Ins. Co. v. Schenk, P.C., 519 F.3d 917, 925 (9th Cir. 2008). If a moving 

party fails to carry its burden of production, then “the non-moving party has no obligation to 

produce anything, even if the non-moving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion.” 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). If the 

moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that 

a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party can not “‘rest upon the mere 

Case 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT Document 184 Filed 09/11/15 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

allegations or denials of [its] pleading’ but must instead produce evidence that ‘sets forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, 515 

F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that 

may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. 

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Stegall v. Citadel Broad, Inc., 350 

F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the 

opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. 

See Juell v. Forest Pharms., Inc., 456 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2006); UMG Recordings, 

Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F.Supp.2d 993, 997 (E.D. Cal. 2004). “A genuine issue of material fact does 

not spring into being simply because a litigant claims that one exists or promises to produce 

admissible evidence at trial.” Del Carmen Guadalupe v. Agosto, 299 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); 

see Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007); Bryant v. Adventist 

Health System/West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, a “motion for summary 

judgment may not be defeated ...by evidence that is ‘merely colorable’ or ‘is not significantly 

probative.’” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); Hardage v. CBS 

Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006). Additionally, the court has the discretion in 

appropriate circumstances to consider materials that are not properly brought to its attention, but 

the court is not required to examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of 

material fact where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references. 

See Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003). If the nonmoving party fails to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, the 

moving party is entitled to summary judgment. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz 

Companies, 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. Discussion

Defendant’s motion concerns the claim based on California’s Private Attorneys General 

Act (“PAGA”). California Labor Code Section 2699.3 states that a plaintiff may bring a civil 

Case 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT Document 184 Filed 09/11/15 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

action only after certain administrative requirements have been met. A plaintiff must first send 

written notice by certified mail to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 

the employer detailing the specific provisions which have allegedly been violated; a plaintiff may 

sue if the LWDA informs them that they do not intend to investigate the claim or if the plaintiff 

receives no word from the LWDA within 33 days of the initial written notice. Cal. Lab. Code § 

2699.3(a). PAGA claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations period under California 

Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a). Jayme v. Checksmart Financial, LLC, 2010 WL 2900333, *2 

(E.D.Cal. July 22, 2010). To satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirements of Section 2699.3 

a plaintiff must also send their written notice within one year of the violation. Soto v. Castlerock 

Farming & Transp. Inc., 2012 WL 1292519, *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012). 

In this case, the initial complaint was filed December 16, 2005, but did not contain any 

PAGA claims. Plaintiffs sent written notice (“PAGA Notice”) to Defendant and LWDA on 

December 20, 2005. Plaintiff did not make a PAGA claim until the amended complaint filed 

September 22, 2009. Doc. 28, 28:6-29:15. 

Defendant argues summary adjudication dismissing Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims is proper 

since, (1) Defendant did not receive written notice of Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims, (2) Defendant was 

not given an opportunity to cure the alleged labor violations, (3) Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims are timebarred, and (4) the written notice is not substantively sufficient. Plaintiffs claim Defendant is not 

entitled to summary adjudication because receipts prove they did receive written notice and 

Defendant was given an opportunity to cure the violations. Plaintiffs rely on the relation back 

doctrine to argue the PAGA claims are not time-barred. Plaintiffs also argue the notice is 

substantively sufficient because it contained specific allegations. 

A. Receipt of PAGA Notice

PAGA requires that “The aggrieved employee or representative shall give written notice by 

certified mail to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and the employer of the specific 

provisions of this code alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories to support 

the alleged violation.” Cal. Labor Code § 2699.3(a)(1). Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiffs 

Case 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT Document 184 Filed 09/11/15 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

did provide notice to the LWDA. Doc. 162, Defendant’s Undisputed Material Fact ¶ 2. However, 

Defendant argues it has no record of ever receiving such the PAGA Notice. Doc. 157, 8:19. Jeff 

Giumarra, Defendant’s Chief Financial Officer, states that “On the basis of my investigation and 

search for copies of these letters, I am informed and believe that Giumarra has no record that any 

such letters were ever delivered to Giumarra.” Doc. 155, Jeff Giumarra January 23, 2015 

Declaration, ¶ 15. In opposition, Plaintiffs state that they sent two copies to Defendant at two 

different addresses. Doc. 164, Eric Kingsley Declaration, ¶ 5. Plaintiffs also provide copies of the 

two certified mail receipts. Doc. 164-4, Ex. 3 and Doc. 164-5, Ex. 4. Defendant responds that the 

letters were sent to the Edison Post Office where they were signed for by Devin Bivens, who was 

a Postmaster Relief there in 2005; Devin Bivens has worked for Defendant since 2011 and stated 

“I knew Mr. Giumarra well, since he regularly stopped by the local Post Office to pick up the 

company’s mail, and I sometimes signed for letters or packages addressed to Giumarra Vineyards 

Corporation.” Doc. 168, Devin Bivens Declaration, ¶ 4. Review of the certified mail receipts does 

indicate that while the person signing for the letters wrote “George Giumarra” in the “B. Received 

by” box while signing “Devin Bivens” in the “A. Signature” box. Doc. 164-4, Ex. 3 and Doc. 164-

5, Ex. 4. Defendant thus argues that “Thus, the issue of delivery remains an open question.” Doc. 

166, 3:19-20. 

The statute only requires “written notice by certified mail” and does not make mention of 

actual receipt. Cal. Labor Code § 2699.3(a)(1). One case appears to hold that the key procedural 

necessity is certified mail and that even actual notice would not work to excuse that requirement. 

Pena v. Taylor Farms Pac., Inc., 2015 WL 471764, *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2015) (“TFP conceded at 

argument that it received timely notice by fax..... Because plaintiffs did not provide written notice 

by certified mail of the alleged violations as required by the statute, this claim may not proceed”). 

Thus, under the plain meaning of Section 2699.3 a plaintiff satisfies the administrative 

requirements when written notice is sent to the proper address of the employer and the LWDA by 

certified mail. A plaintiff need not prove that an authorized agent signed for the notice. This 

result is consistent with the interpretation of other statutes that require notice by certified mail. See 

e.g. Pagonis v. United States, 575 F.3d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[26 U.S.C.] § 6212 does not 

Case 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT Document 184 Filed 09/11/15 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

require actual receipt of the mailing, and that a notice sent by certified mail to a taxpayer’s last 

known address complies with the statutory requirements, even if it is returned unclaimed”); 

Cornhusker Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kachman, 514 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In further support of 

classifying notice sent by certified mail as ‘mailed’ for purposes of [Revised Code of Washington] 

§ 48.18.290, Washington state courts, in construing statutory schemes other than those governing 

insurance cancellation, have held that actual receipt of certified mail is not required to provide 

adequate notice”); Knapp v. Doherty, 123 Cal. App. 4th 76, 88 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2004) (“In 

order to be effective, a copy of the notice of trustee’s sale—at least 20 days prior to the sale—must 

be mailed by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, to the trustor, sent to his or her last 

known address if different from the address listed on the deed of trust. (§ 2924b, subd. (b)(2).) The 

trustor need not receive actual notice of the trustee’s sale so long as notice is provided to the 

trustor that is in compliance with the statute”). One California court, faced with a disagreement 

centered on lost correspondence in the course of a lease renewal, found that “when there is actual 

receipt of an item of certified mail by the mail carrier, who customarily picks up sacks outside a 

post office annex, the item has been ‘sent by certified mail.’” Jenkins v. Tuneup Masters, 190 Cal. 

App. 3d 1, 10 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1987). Plaintiffs utilized the proper means of sending the 

PAGA Notice.

Furthermore, when a person who is unauthorized to receive packages on another’s behalf 

regularly does so (with the recipient’s apparent acquiescence), courts are skeptical of the 

recipient’s representations concerning lack of authority. Sams v. Heritage Transp., Inc., 2013 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 45906, *15 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2013) (in the context of Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4, “This 

evidence contradicts Heritage’s position that Ms. Singh was unauthorized to sign for certified mail 

sent to Heritage at the 3855 Skofstad Street address. Instead, the evidence shows she does so 

regularly”). Devin Bivens has specifically stated “I knew Mr. Giumarra well, since he regularly 

stopped by the local Post Office to pick up the company’s mail, and I sometimes signed for letters 

or packages addressed to Giumarra Vineyards Corporation.” Doc. 168, Devin Bivens 

Declaration, ¶ 4, emphasis added. As Devin Bivens’s signing for Defendant’s mail was not an 

isolated occurrence and George Giumarra appears to have known this fact, the court would not be 

Case 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT Document 184 Filed 09/11/15 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

able to definitively determine that Devin Bivens was unauthorized as a matter of law. 

B. Opportunity to Cure

Part of the rationale behind this administrative exhaustion procedure is to “give employers 

an opportunity to cure less serious violations.” Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 134 

Cal. App. 4th 365, 375 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. 2005), quoting Cal. Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. 

Floor Analyses, analysis of Cal. Sen. Bill No. 1809 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 27, 

2004, p. 5. Defendant argues that sending the PAGA Notice after a complaint is filed does not 

give an employer an opportunity to cure alleged violations. Doc. 166, 4:4-24. This case was 

initiated on December, 16, 2005, before the PAGA Notice was sent on December 20, 2005. 

However, Plaintiffs did not make a PAGA claim until September 22, 2009. Doc. 28. 

Other courts faced with a similar factual pattern have not found this to be a sufficient 

reason to dismiss PAGA claims as employers . Hoang v. Vinh Phat Supermarket, Inc., 2013 WL 

4095042, *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013) (“Section 2966.3’s notice requirement serves the dual 

purpose of providing the LWDA with an initial opportunity to investigate Labor Code violations 

and cite employers, and giving employers, in certain instances, an opportunity to cure the alleged 

violations. Although this action was filed prematurely, allowing plaintiffs to bring their PAGA 

claims would not undermine these purposes.... the claim must simply be dismissed and cannot be 

realleged until thirty-three days or more after the plaintiff complies with 2699.3’s notice 

requirements”); Martinez v. Antique & Salvage Liquidators, Inc., 2011 WL 500029, *9 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 8, 2011). Plaintiffs filed their suit before the PAGA Notice. But Defendant had an 

opportunity to cure before the PAGA claims were brought. Since Defendant was given notice of 

the alleged violations, and an opportunity to cure before the PAGA claims were filed, Plaintiffs 

met their administrative exhaustion requirements.

C. Substantive Sufficiency of Notice

Defendant argues the written notice provided on December 20, 2005 is not substantively 

sufficient because it does not provide notice Plaintiffs’ claims, specifically that“(1) Giumarra 

Case 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT Document 184 Filed 09/11/15 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

workers were forced to endure ‘a late meal period’ in violation of Wage Order 14 whenever a 

meal period started more than five hours after the start time, or (2) despite company policy, some 

workers brought their own replacement tools without reimbursement.” Doc. 157, 10:5-10. 

Plaintiffs argue PAGA only requires minimal notice be provided and that their written notice 

meets that standard. Doc. 164, 7:12-26. Plaintiffs allege their written notice specifically informed 

Defendant of Giumarra’s failure to reimburse employees and provide timely meal periods. Doc.

164, 11:4-22. The PAGA Notice consisted of a letter and a copy of the December 16, 2005 

complaint. Doc. 164-1, Carroll Jan. 22, 2015 Declaration, ¶ 5; Doc. 164-3, Letter; Doc. 164-2, 

Dec. 16, 2005 Complaint. 

California Labor Code Section 2699.3 requires that the written notice sent to the LWDA 

and the employer contain “facts and theories to support the alleged violation.” Cal. Lab. Code § 

2699.3(a)(1). Simply restating the elements of California Labor Code provisions does not suffice. 

See Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., 2015 WL 5155449, *8 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s letter—a 

string of legal conclusions with no factual allegations or theories of liability to support them—is 

insufficient to allow the Labor and Workforce Development Agency to intelligently assess the 

seriousness of the alleged violations. Neither does it provide sufficient information to permit the 

employer to determine what policies or practices are being complained of so as to know whether 

to fold or fight”). 

1. First PAGA Claim - Meal Breaks

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs currently claim that “Giumarra workers were forced to 

endure a ‘late meal period’ in violation of Wage Order 14 whenever a meal period started more 

than five hours after the start time....The amended complaint (Doc 28) alleges as the meal period 

violation, only that Giumarra forced workers to ‘work through meal and rest period periods 

without paying legal compensation for failure to provide rest or meal periods.’” Doc. 157, 10:5-

18. Defendant objects to this change. However, a later shift in the theory of violation does not 

necessarily defeat the sufficiency of the PAGA Notice. See Cardenas v. McLane FoodServices, 

Inc., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1260 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“MFI offers no authority suggesting that 

Case 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT Document 184 Filed 09/11/15 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

PAGA’s requirement that employees provide in their notice ‘facts and theories to support [an] 

alleged violation’ necessitates inclusion of every potential fact or every future theory. To the 

contrary, the plain meaning of those words suggests that Plaintiffs were required to put forward 

sufficient facts to support their claims of labor violations by MFI. Indeed, MFI does not dispute 

that they did so. Instead, MFI seeks to bind Plaintiffs to those facts and theories exactly as laid 

out—even though, of course, no discovery has yet occurred, since Plaintiffs could not file suit 

until providing notice to NWLA and determining if the agency would investigate. Such a result is 

absurd and would undermine the principles of PAGA”).

On the substance, Plaintiffs’ PAGA Notice provides insufficient fact and theory to satisfy 

the Section 2699.3 requirements. Plaintiffs’ December 20, 2005 letter claims, “defendants 

violated the law...by failing to allow employees to take thirty (30) minute uninterrupted meal 

breaks when they worked over five (5) hours in a shift. No reimbursement for expenses and no 

additional pay/wages were paid for foregoing their breaks.” Doc. 164-3. Similarly, the attached 

complaint alleged, “During the relevant class period, defendants regularly allowed workers to 

work through their meal breaks, yet did not compensate them for the time spent 

working....Defendants failed to provide plaintiffs and others with timely meal breaks of not less 

than thirty (30) minutes as required by the Labor Code during the relevant class period.” Doc. 164-

2, 11:22-24 and 15:19-21. Plaintiff’s language in the PAGA Notice essentially restates California 

law without providing any factual detail. The Ninth Circuit found that a statement that the 

employer “failed to provide off-duty meal periods and to pay compensation for work without offduty meal periods to its California employees in violation of California Labor Code sections 226.7 

and 512, and applicable Industrial Welfare Commission orders” was insufficient as “The only 

facts or theories that could be read into this letter are those implied by the claimed violations of 

specific sections of the California Labor Code.” Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., 2015 WL 5155449, *7-8 

(9th Cir. Sept. 3, 2015). Similarly, a statement that alleged a “practice of denying rest periods and 

lunch periods to these workers in violation of IWC Wage Order 10” was not adequate. Soto v. 

Castlerock Farming & Transp. Inc., 2012 WL 1292519, *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012), citing 

Archila v. KFC U.S. Properties, Inc., 420 Fed. Appx. 667, 669 (9th Cir.2011). In finding the 

Case 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT Document 184 Filed 09/11/15 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

statement that “Payment has not been made for all work actually required and permitted to be 

performed, and for all rest and meal periods” to be insufficient, this court noted “the Ninth Circuit 

requires an exceedingly detailed level of specificity for Section 2699.3(a)(1) to be satisfied.” Soto 

v. Castlerock Farming & Transp. Inc., 2012 WL 1292519, *7-8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012). 

Plaintiffs have not exhausted this PAGA claim. 

2. Second PAGA Claim – Reimbursement for Tools 

Defendant also argues that there was insufficient detail in the PAGA Notice regarding the 

failure to reimburse for tool purchases claim. Doc. 157, 10:5-20. Plaintiffs’ argue the written 

notice did contain sufficient facts because it provided “specific details regarding the numerous 

supplies Plaintiffs and aggrieved employees were forced” to purchase. Doc. 164, 10:1-10. 

Plaintiffs’ December 20, 2005 letter only states that there was “No reimbursement for expenses.” 

Doc. 164-3. The attached complaint was much more detailed, stating “defendants failed to 

properly reimburse and/or deduct the cost of expenses incurred as a condition of their 

employment. These expenses include, but are not limited to: gloves, clippers, sharpeners, knives, 

umbrellas, tables, knee pads, pillows, trays, stools, and cleaning supplies.” Doc. 164-2, 6:14-17. 

This is a sufficient level of detail to satisfy the notice requirement. See Medlock v. Taco Bell 

Corp., 2014 WL 2154444, *4 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2014) (exhaustion satisfied by notice stating 

“Ms. Hardiman and other aggrieved employees incurred necessary business-related expenses and 

costs that were not fully reimbursed by TACO BELL FOUNDATION, INC. including and 

without limitation, required shoes, required clothing and related fees and deposits that resulted 

from their employment with Defendants”). 

D. Statute of Limitations

Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations because the 

claims were brought years after the one-year limitation period ran. Doc. 166, 5:5-13. Plaintiffs 

agree that PAGA claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations period but contend that 

under the relation back doctrine their PAGA claims can relate back to an earlier complaint if they 

Case 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT Document 184 Filed 09/11/15 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

provided timely notice. Doc. 164, 13:27-14:27. Defendant states that Plaintiffs can not use the 

relation back doctrine because the original complaint did not assert a PAGA claim. Doc. 166, 

5:14-22. Five of the named Plaintiffs worked for Defendant sometime during 2005. Doc. 164-1, 

Eric Kingsley Feb.23, 2015 Declaration, ¶¶ 14-18; Docs. 164-11, 164-12, 164-13, 164-14, and 

164-15. The PAGA Notice was sent on December 20, 2005. Since the notice was sent within a 

year of Plaintiffs’ employment with Defendant Plaintiffs satisfied the administrative requirements 

of Section 2699.3. See Soto v. Castlerock Farming & Transp. Inc., 2012 WL 1292519, *5 (E.D. 

Cal. Apr. 16, 2012). Plaintiffs brought their PAGA claims on September 22, 2009. The claims 

were brought after the statute of limitations expired in 2006. Plaintiffs can only bring PAGA

claims if they relate back to the original complaint filed on December 16, 2005. If the claims do 

not relate back to the original complaint they are barred by the statute of limitations. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) controls relation 

back for PAGA claims not California procedure. Milligan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 577 Fed. Appx 

718, 719 (9th Cir. 2014). Rule 15(c) states “an amendment to a pleading relates back to the date 

of the original pleading when...the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the 

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out – or attempted to be set out – in the original pleading.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). A defendant is not prejudiced if a claim arising from the same facts as 

the original complaint is added. Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 686 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Thus, whether the December 16, 2005 complaint contained a PAGA claim is not dispositive for 

relation back under Rule 15(c). The relation back doctrine should be applied liberally. E.W. 

French & Sons, Inc. v. Gen. Portland Inc., 885 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Here, Plaintiffs’ original December 16, 2005 complaint alleged that Defendant did not 

reimburse Plaintiffs for the cost of tools used in their employment. Doc. 164-2, 6:14-17. 

Plaintiffs’ amended claim states Plaintiffs are entitled to civil penalties under PAGA because 

Defendants did required Plaintiffs to purchase tools and did not reimburse them for that expense. 

Doc. 28, 11:12-23 and 22:7-24. The amended claim arises out of the “same conduct, transaction, 

or occurrence” as the original complaint. The original complaint and the new claim share a 

“common core of operative facts” because both are based on the same allegations and the evidence 

Case 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT Document 184 Filed 09/11/15 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

for both pleadings is the same. Relation back applies; Plaintiffs’ PAGA claim is not barred by the 

statute of limitations. 

IV. Order

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ first PAGA claim based on failure to provide timely 

meal periods is GRANTED in favor of Defendant.

Summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ second PAGA claim based on failure to reimburse 

workers for tools is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 11, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:09-cv-00703-AWI-JLT Document 184 Filed 09/11/15 Page 12 of 12