Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01376/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01376-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 08cv1376

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERTO CARLOS RUIZ, Civil No. 08cv1376 J (JMA)

Petitioner,

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING THE REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; and

(2) DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH

PREJUDICE

v.

KEN CLARK, Warden,

Respondent.

Before this Court is Magistrate Judge Jan M. Adler’s Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) recommending that the Court grant Respondent Ken Clark’s (“Respondent”) motion

to dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2244(d) with prejudice.

This court has considered the Petitioner Roberto Carlos Ruiz’s (“Petitioner” or “Ruiz”) Petition,

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, and all supporting documentation submitted by the parties.

Having considered these documents, this Court ADOPTS the R&R and DISMISSES Ruiz’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with prejudice.

Procedural Background

A jury convicted Petitioner of forcible rape, attempted forcible oral copulation, two

counts of forcible sodomy, two counts of first degree robbery, making a criminal threat,

dissuading a witness by force or threat, two counts of oral copulation in concert, two counts of

forcible oral copulation, and sodomy while acting in concert. The jury found that Petitioner used

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a knife in the commission of all counts. Further, in the convictions of forcible rape, attempted

forcible oral copulation, and sodomy of victim Betty R., the jury determined that Petitioner used

a deadly weapon, a knife, in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 12022.3(a). Petitioner appealed the

conviction to the California Court of Appeal. On June 28, 2004, the court unanimously upheld

the conviction (Lodgment No. 1). Petitioner did not appeal his conviction to the California

Supreme Court. (Pet. at 4). Thus, the judgment became final 40 days after the California Court

of Appeal’s decision on August 7, 2004.

On July 12, 2004, while his appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court. (See Attachment to Pet. at 2). The

superior court denied the petition on October 7, 2004. (Exhibit attached to Lodgment 2; see also

Attachment to Pet. at 2). On December 17, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 2). The appellate court denied the

petition on February 7, 2005. (Lodgment No. 3). On April 29, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition

for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, and the court denied the petition on

March 29, 2006, without citation or comment. (Lodgment No. 4). 

On June 20, 2007, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San

Diego County Superior Court. (See Attachment to Pet. at 3). The superior court denied the

petition in an order filed on July 5, 2007. (Attachment to Pet. at 4). On July 26, 2007, Petitioner

filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment

No. 5). The appellate court denied the petition on October 9, 2007. (Lodgment No. 6). On

December 19, 2007, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the petition on June 11, 2008. (Lodgment No. 7; see

Attachment to Pet.).

Petitioner filed the current federal habeas petition before this court on July 24, 2008.

[Doc. No. 1.] On February 4, 2009, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition, asserting

that the petition was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Petitioner requested [doc. nos. 9, 11, 13], and the Court granted, three time extensions to file his

Opposition [doc nos. 10, 12, 14]. On July 9, 2009, Petitioner filed a one-page Opposition.

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Magistrate Judge Jan Adler filed an R&R on August 11, 2009. Petitioner filed objections to the

R&R on September 8, 2009.

Legal Standard

I. Statute of Limitations for Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions

Unless tolled, the AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations to petitions seeking

habeas corpus relief. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 189 (2006). The one-year statute of

limitations shall run from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

A state post-conviction application tolls the statute of limitations only for “[t]he time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is

pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Under California’s collateral review system, a petitioner must

file an original petition for writ of habeas corpus with each court within a reasonable period of

time. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 221-22 (2002). If the time period between filings is

reasonable, then the state petition is “pending” between filings and the statute of limitations is

tolled for the entire time period that the petitioner is pursuing his state collateral review process.

Id. at 222-223.

II. Reviewing Magistrate Judge’s R&R

A district court may designate a magistrate judge to propose recommendations in

connection with the disposition of “applications for posttrial relief made by individuals

convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.”

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party may object within ten days after being served with a copy of the

magistrate judge’s proposed findings. Id. The district judge shall then “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made.” Id. The district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or

in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (2009); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)

(“[I]n providing for a ‘de novo determination’ . . . Congress intended to permit whatever reliance

a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate’s

proposed findings and recommendations.”).

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Discussion

I. Statute of Limitations

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), Petitioner must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

federal court within one year from the date his conviction became final. Here, Petitioner did not

seek further review from the California Supreme Court after the California Court of Appeal

upheld his conviction on June 28, 2004. Accordingly, under California law, Petitioner’s

conviction became final 40 days after the California Court of Appeal filed its opinion. Cal.R.Ct.

8.264(b)(1), 8.500(e)(1). Thus, the judgment became final, triggering the beginning of the

statute of limitations, on August 7, 2004. Absent tolling, the one-year statute of limitations

would have expired on August 7, 2005.

Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court on July 24, 2008,

almost four years after his conviction became final and three years after the expiration of the

statute of limitations. In his Objection to the R&R, he lists several reasons why he failed to meet

the one-year statute of limitations. [Doc. No. 18., p. 2] Nonetheless, consistent with 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d), his petition is barred unless the statute of limitations period was tolled on statutory

or equitable grounds. See, e.g., Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2002). 

II. Statutory Tolling

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation.” In California, absent a

prisoner’s undue delay, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is considered pending during the

time between a lower court’s decision on the petition and the filing of a new petition in a higher

court. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 224-25 (2002) (recognizing that “original writs in

California function like appeals”).

Petitioner originally filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2004, before his judgment

was final. He completed one full round of collateral petitions, ending on March 29, 2006, when

the California Supreme Court denied his first petition. Assuming that statutory tolling applied

to Petitioner’s claim until the California Supreme Court’s decision, the one-year statute of

limitations would have expired on March 29, 2007. 

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Petitioner did not take further action until more than a year after the California Supreme

Court denied his first petition. He filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San

Diego Superior Court on June 20, 2007. However, Petitioner’s additional claims cannot revive

statutory tolling once the statute of limitations has expired. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482

(9th Cir. 2001); Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, all of Petitioner’s

second round of collateral petitions are time-barred because they were filed after the statute of

limitations ran on March 29, 2007. 

Further, the three state courts found that Petitioner’s second round of habeas corpus

petitions were untimely under California state law. (Attachment to Pet.; Lodgments 6-7). If,

under state law, a postconviction petition is untimely, statutory tolling does not apply. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005).

III. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is permissible

“only if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a

petition on time.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted).

Such tolling is “unavailable in most cases.” Id. However, where “external forces, rather than

a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Id. 

The prisoner bears the burden of showing that such “extraordinary circumstances” exist and

that equitable tolling should apply. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). Here,

Petitioner has not shown that he pursued his claims diligently, nor has he shown that

extraordinary circumstances existed which prevented him from timely filing the petition. He

waited almost fifteen months from the time the California Supreme Court denied his first petition

for writ of habeas corpus on March 29, 2006, to the time he filed a second writ of habeas corpus

in the San Diego Superior Court on June 20, 2007. Additionally, even if Petitioner could show

that he diligently pursued his claims, he has not met the burden of showing any extraordinary

circumstance existed, a necessary prerequisite to trigger equitable tolling under the AEDPA.

Therefore, equitable tolling is not applicable to extend the AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations in this case.

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Conclusion

For the reasons above, this Court ADOPTS the R&R and, accordingly, DISMISSES

Ruiz’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 24, 2009

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

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