Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02585/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02585-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GREGORY ALLAN YOUNG, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-2585-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying his applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income under Titles II and XVI of the Social 

Security Act. The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are pending. For the reasons 

discussed below, plaintiff’s motion is granted, defendant’s motion is denied, and the matter is 

remanded for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB and SSI, alleging that he had 

been disabled since March 18, 2010.1 Administrative Record (“AR”) 294-302. Plaintiff’s 

 1

 Plaintiff subsequently amended his alleged onset date to March 10, 2010. 

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applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 181-185. On November 16, 

2012, a hearing was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Janice E. Barnes-Williams. Id.

at 64-94. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing, at which he and a vocational expert 

(“VE”) testified. Id.

On August 9, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled under 

sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act. Id. at 152-168. Plaintiff’s request for 

review by the Appeal Council was granted and on October 25, 2013, the Appeals Council vacated 

the ALJ’s August 9, 2013 decision and remanded the matter for consideration of additional 

evidence. Id. at 175-176. Specifically, the ALJ was directed to consider records from the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) rating plaintiff as 100 percent disabled as of March 6, 

2013. Id. at 175. 

On February 19, 2014, another hearing was held before the ALJ, at which plaintiff and a 

VE expert provided additional testimony. Id. at 95-120. On May 27, 2014, the ALJ issued a 

decision finding again that plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 

1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.2 Id. at 12-35. The ALJ made the following specific findings: 

 2

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

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1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

March 31, 2014. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 10, 2010, the 

amended, alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.). 

* * * 

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: obesity, mild degenerative disc 

disease of lumbar spine with bulging disc, meralgia parasthetica, bilateral plantar fasciitis, 

sleep apnea, type II diabetes mellitus, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and major 

depressive disorder (MDD) [20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). 

* * * 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 

416.926). I have specifically considered Sections 1.02, 1.04, 3.10, 9.00, 12.04, and 12.06. 

* * * 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the residual 

functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 

416.967(a), and SSR 83-10 in that he can lift and carry 10 pounds; stand and/or walk 2 

hours out of an 8-hour workday; and sit 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. However, he 

should not use foot control operations. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but 

never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and never balance. He can occasionally stoop, kneel, 

crouch, and crawl. He needs to use an assistive devise for uneven terrain and prolonged 

ambulation, and he should avoid extreme heat. Due to post-traumatic stress disorder 

symptoms, he may be exposed to no more than moderate noise. Additionally, he should 

avoid excessive vibration and exposure to operational control or moving machinery, 

unprotected heights, and hazardous machinery. Further, the claimant is restricted to the 

performance of simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a work environment free of fast-paced 

production requirements, and involving only simple work-related decisions with few, if 

any, workplace changes. Additionally, the claimant should have no public contact, and 

 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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can work around co-workers, but with only occasional interaction with co-workers. 

* * * 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 

416.965). 

* * * 

7. The claimant was born on January 28, 1968, and was 42 years old, which is defined as a 

younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date. (20 CFR 404.1563 and 

416.963). 

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English 

(20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964). 

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using 

the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not 

disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)). 

* * * 

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

March 10, 2010, the amended alleged onset date of disability, through the date of this 

decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)) and 416.920(g)). 

Id. at 22-38. 

Plaintiff again requested Appeals Council review which was denied on August 1, 2014, 

leaving the ALJ’s May 27, 2014 decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 8-13. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

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more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to adequately consider a 

VA disability determination finding that he is 100 percent disabled. ECF No. at 17 at 6-13. 

 Generally, an ALJ is required to consider a VA rating. McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). “While a VA disability decision does not necessarily compel the 

SSA to reach an identical result, the ALJ must consider the VA’s finding in reaching his decision, 

because of the similarities between the VA disability program and the Social Security disability 

program.” Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 2012). However, [b]ecause the 

standards for evaluating disability under the two programs is not identical, . . . the ALJ may give 

less weight to a VA disability rating if he gives persuasive, specific, valid reasons for doing so 

that are supported by the record.” McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1075; see also Valentine v. Comm’r 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 695 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 On June 24, 2013, the VA issued a decision finding that plaintiff was 100 percent disabled 

as of March 6, 2013 due to post-traumatic stress disorder with major depressive disorder. AR 

457-461. The ALJ’s decision provided the following discussion concerning the VA’ disability 

determination: 

Given the preponderance of the medical evidence in the file, 

including the 100 percent disabled rating of the Department of 

Veteran’s Affairs, I conclude that the record lacks sufficient 

objective medical support to warrant any further restrictions to the 

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claimant’s maximum remaining residual functional capacity during 

the relevant period beyond that indicated above. 

Id. at 36. This conclusory statement does not constitute a “persuasive, specific, valid” reason for 

giving less weight to the VA’s determination. Although the ALJ’s written decision provides a 

summary of the medical evidence, it fails to identify any specific medical findings or other 

evidence that contradicts the VA’s determination that plaintiff is completely disabled. The matter 

is simply unexplained. Accordingly, the ALJ did not adequately support the decision to discount 

the VA’s disability determination. 

 Although the ALJ is free to disagree with the VA disability determination where the 

record supports such a decision, it must nonetheless be explained. As the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Ninth Circuit has explained in the context of rejecting a treating physician’s opinion, the 

burden of providing valid reasons includes a properly explained decision that is supported by the 

record. Typically this includes “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (1988). Here, the context is rejecting a rating by the VA of 100% 

disability, not rejecting the opinion of a treating doctor. But the ALJ nonetheless was required to 

provide “persuasive, specific, valid” reasons for giving less weight to the VA’s determination, 

McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1075, and this standard requires at least some explanation in the context of 

the medical record. Accordingly, the ALJ’s conclusory dismissal of the VA’s determination did 

not constitute a persuasive, specific, valid reason for giving it less weight.3

 

///// 

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 The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment identifies evidence in the record 

that she contends supports the ALJ’s decision to give reduced weight to the VA’s determination. 

ECF No. 18 at 4-11. However, as the ALJ did not specifically rely on any of the evidence 

identified by the Commissioner, but instead provided only a conclusory dismissal of the VA 

determination, such evidence is not a proper basis for upholding the ALJ’s decision. See

Ceguerra v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A reviewing 

court can evaluate an agency’s decision only on the grounds articulated by the agency.”); Barbato 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 923 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 n. 2 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“[T]he 

Commissioner’s decision must stand or fall with the reasons set forth in the ALJ’s decision.”); 

Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e are wary of speculating about 

the basis of the ALJ’s conclusion”). 

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 The ALJ’s decision also observed that “[o]ther agencies may apply different rules and 

standards than we do for determining whether an individual is disabled. Therefore, because the 

ultimate responsibility for determining whether an individual is disabled under Social Security 

law rests with the Commissioner, we are not bound by disability decision by other governmental 

and nongovernmental agencies.” AR 36-37. While the assertion is an accurate statement, it does 

not provide the sort of explanation, grounded in an analysis of the medical evidence, which 

demonstrates “persuasive, specific, valid” reasons for giving reduced weight to a VA disability 

determination. Valentine, 574 F.3d at 695 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted and modification in 

original) (quoting McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1076). 

 As the ALJ failed to provide a sufficient justification for discounting the VA’s 

determination that plaintiff was 100 percent disabled, the matter must be remanded to the 

Commissioner for further proceedings. Barbato, 923 F. Supp. At 1276 n. 2 (“If the decision on 

its face does not adequately explain how a conclusion was reached, that alone is grounds for 

remand. And that is so even if [the Administration] can offer proper post hoc explanations for 

such unexplained conclusions.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 The ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standard. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED 

that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 3. The matter is remanded for further considerations consistent with this order; and 

 4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor. 

DATED: March 22, 2016. 

Case 2:14-cv-02585-EFB Document 20 Filed 03/22/16 Page 7 of 7