Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06527/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06527-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Wrongful Death

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In resolving this motion, the court reviewed and considered 1

all of the evidence submitted by the parties with two exceptions.

The court did not consider the County’s evidence that the occupants

of the van had alcohol in their bloodstreams because the evidence

submitted did not establish that the driver of the van had alcohol

in his bloodstream, a fact the County conceded at oral argument.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROCIO ADAME ARAUJO DE AGUILAR,)

et al., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER )

CORPORATION, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-02-6527 REC/LJO

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT

COUNTY OF KERN'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 109) 

On October 11, 2005, the court heard defendant County of

Kern’s motion for summary judgment.

Upon due consideration of the record and the arguments of

the parties, the court grants the County’s motion for the reasons

set forth herein.1

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The court also did not consider evidence that the driver, Mario

Aguilar, had had his license suspended twice for drunk driving and

was driving on a suspended license at the time of the accident.

See California Vehicle Code § 40832; Shmatovich v. New Sonoma

Creamery, 187 Cal.App.2d 342 (1960).

2

This consolidated action involves complaints filed in five

separate cases by the heirs of seven persons killed by a

collision with an Amtrak train where the train tracks cross

Poplar Avenue near Shafter, California. The County of Kern is

named as a defendant by the plaintiffs in Rocio Adame Alfaro, et

al. v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, et al., No. CV-F03-5632 REC/LJO and in Ester Aguilar v. National Railroad

Passenger Corporation, et al., No. CV-F-03-5633 REC/LJO. 

The County is moving for summary judgment against those

plaintiffs who have sued it for damages on the ground that the

County maintained a dangerous condition of public property that

caused the deaths of plaintiffs’ decedents. The County contends

that it is entitled to summary judgment because the accident

occurred on property that was not owned or controlled by the

County; that the County’s property was not in a dangerous

condition; and/or that, if the property was in a dangerous

condition, the County did not receive notice of it in time to

correct the condition before the collision.

A. County’s Liability under California Government Code §

835.

1. Governing Standards.

California Government Code § 835 provides in pertinent part:

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Except as provided by statute, a public

entity is liable for injury caused by a

dangerous condition of its property if the

plaintiff establishes that the property was

in a dangerous condition at the time of the

injury, that the injury was proximately

caused by the dangerous condition, that the

dangerous condition created a reasonably

foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which

was incurred, and ...:

...

(b) The public entity had actual or

constructive notice of the dangerous

condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient

time prior to the injury to have taken

measures to protect against the dangerous

condition.

Government Code § 835.2(a) provides that a public entity has

actual notice of a dangerous condition “if it had actual

knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should

have known of its dangerous character.” Section 835.2(b)

provides in pertinent part that constructive notice exists

only if the plaintiff establishes that the

condition had existed for such a period of

time and was of such an obvious nature that

the public entity, in the exercise of due

care, should have discovered the condition

and its dangerous character.

a. Ownership or Control of Dangerous Condition of

Property.

The County moves for summary judgment on the ground that it

did not own or control the railroad crossing of Poplar Avenue 

where the accident occurred.

In their opposition brief, plaintiffs do not argue that the

County owned or controlled the railroad crossing. Rather,

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plaintiffs contend that there is a genuine issue of material fact

that the southbound approach of Poplar Avenue to the railroad

crossing is property owned and controlled by the County and that

this approach to the railroad crossing is the dangerous condition

of which plaintiffs complain. 

There can be no dispute that the County owned and controlled

Poplar Avenue to within two feet of the actual railroad crossing. 

Consequently, the issue is whether Poplar Avenue was a dangerous

condition. 

b. Dangerous Condition.

A “dangerous condition” of public property means a condition

of the property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from

a minor, trivial or insignificant risk of injury when such

property is used with due care in a manner in which it is

reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. Antenor v. City of

Los Angeles, 174 Cal.App.3d 477, 482-483 (1985). Whether a

given set of circumstances creates a dangerous condition is

primarily a question of fact and may be resolved as a question of

law only if reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion. 

Harland v. State of California, 75 Cal.App.3d 475, 484 (1977).

Plaintiffs argue that the configuration of southbound 

Poplar Avenue such that it intersects the railroad crossing at an

oblique 45-degree angle creates a dangerous condition for

motorists approaching the railroad crossing from the south. 

Plaintiffs refer to the declarations of their retained experts

that a motorist arriving at the limit line north of the railroad

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crossing has a limited view of the railroad tracks to the

motorist’s right and has to turn his or her head approximately

135 degrees to see an approaching southeast bound train. Relying

on this evidence, plaintiffs argue:

The placement of the stop/limit line on the

pavement to the north of the tracks puts the

motorist in a position where he is physically

prevented from having clear view of on-coming

southeast-bound train traffic. The angle of

the intersection works against safety, making

it difficult to locate traffic control

devices so that they can be effectively seen. 

As a result, the configuration of the

County’s roadway at the intersection

constituted a dangerous condition of public

property.

However, as the County argues, the record submitted to the

court, particularly the photographic evidence, establishes that

the view of the railroad tracks to the northwest from the limit

line for a southbound motorist is unobstructed to the horizon. 

In addition, the southbound motorist’s view of the railroad

crossing from Poplar Avenue is unobstructed. From 1,000 to 1,500

feet north of the railroad crossing, a southbound motorist

approaching the railroad crossing had an unobstructed view of the

train tracks to the northwest. Southbound Poplar Avenue is

clearly marked and signed for the approaching railroad crossing

and is marked and signed in compliance with law. A southbound

motorist had a unobstructed view of 480 feet of the train tracks

to the northwest from 340 feet south of the railroad crossing. 

The railroad crossing itself has a train-actuated flashing signal

device. Therefore, notwithstanding the opinions of plaintiff’s

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experts, the court concludes as a matter of law that the

configuration of Poplar Avenue was not a dangerous condition

within the meaning of the statute. The evidence before the court

establishes that a southbound motorist was adequately warned by

signage and pavement markings of the approaching railroad

crossing and that the view from the limitline of the tracks to

the northwest is unobstructed. The fact that the motorist has to

turn his head further to the right to see a train approaching

from the northwest than he would have to do at a 90-degree angle

crossing does not negate these facts. Requiring a driver to turn

his head to see if a train is approaching does not create a

dangerous condition. See Balding v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe

Railway, 225 Cal.App.2d 254, 259-260 (1964), quoting Will v.

Southern Pacific Co., 18 Cal.2d 468, 474-475 (1941). 

Furthermore, the evidence establishes that Mario Aguilar stopped

or came to a near stop before crossing the railroad tracks,

thereby establishing that he was aware of the railroad crossing

before he passed the limit line. 

c. Injury Proximately Caused by Dangerous

Condition.

Assuming for purposes of argument that the configuration of

Poplar Avenue is a dangerous condition, plaintiffs that summary

judgment should be denied because it is undisputed that the 

condition proximately caused the accident. In so contending,

plaintiffs that Mario Aguilar either stopped his vehicle or came

to a near stop as he approached the railroad crossing and then

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pulled into the path of the train. Plaintiffs contend: “A very

reasonable inference exists that the driver of the van had no

warning of the train and did not see the train as a result of the

configuration of the road.”

Because the court concludes that the configuration of Poplar

Avenue was not a dangerous condition, the court need not address

plaintiffs’ position. However, the record before the court is

disputed whether the train’s warning horn was sounding and

whether the train-actuated signal device was operating at the

time of the accident. These factual disputes do not raise a

genuine issue of material fact regarding the County’s liability

because the record establishes as a matter of law and fact that

the County has no ownership or control over these devices. 

However, if the court had concluded that the configuration of

Poplar Avenue raises a question of fact regarding whether it is a

dangerous condition, the court would further conclude that the

County is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of

proximate causation.

d. Reasonably Foreseeable Risk of Kind of Injury

That Occurred.

Assuming that the configuration of Poplar Avenue is a

dangerous condition, plaintiffs argue that the County is not

entitled to summary judgment with regard to this element of

liability. Plaintiffs contend that the configuration of

southbound Poplar Avenue as it crossed the railroad tracks

created a risk that a motorist would not see a train approaching

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from the northwest, would enter the railroad crossing in front of

the train, be struck by the train and suffer injuries or death. 

Plaintiffs argue that the fact that third party negligence is a

concurring proximate cause of the injury does not preclude

liability of the County for the dangerous condition of Poplar

Avenue, provided that the kind of injury that occurred was

reasonably foreseeable.

In making this latter argument, the court assumes that

plaintiffs are referring to the possible negligence of Mario

Aguilar and/or the railroad. In this regard, plaintiffs’

position is a correct statement of the law. Liability for a

dangerous condition of property cannot be premised upon third

party conduct alone. Peterson v. San Francisco Community College

Dist., 36 Cal.3d 799, 810 (1984). Such liability may arise only

where third party conduct is coupled with a dangerous condition

of the property. Id.

Because the court has concluded that the configuration of

Poplar Avenue is not a dangerous condition, the court need not

address plaintiffs’ position. However, if the court had

concluded that the configuration of Poplar Avenue raises a

question of fact regarding whether it is a dangerous condition,

the court would conclude that the County is not entitled to

summary judgment on the issue of reasonably foreseeable risk. 

e. County’s Actual or Constructive Knowledge of

Dangerous Condition.

Assuming that the configuration of Poplar Avenue is a

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dangerous condition, plaintiffs argue that the County is not

entitled to summary judgment with respect to this element because

the County had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous

condition.

Government Code § 835.2(a) provides that a public entity has

actual notice of a dangerous condition “if it had actual

knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should

have known of its dangerous character.” Section 835.2(b)

provides in pertinent part that constructive notice exists

only if the plaintiff establishes that the

condition had existed for such a period of

time and was of such an obvious nature that

the public entity, in the exercise of due

care, should have discovered the condition

and its dangerous character.

In so arguing, plaintiffs refer to the records of accidents

at the Poplar Avenue railroad crossing maintained by the County. 

Plaintiffs contend that the County had notice of eleven accidents

at the railroad crossing before the accident at issue.

Because the court concludes that the configuration of Poplar

Avenue is not a dangerous condition, the court need not address

plaintiffs’ position. However, if the court had concluded that

the configuration of Poplar Avenue is a dangerous condition, the

court would grant summary judgment for the County on this issue.

As the County argues, the evidence establishes that only

three accidents prior to the one at issue involved a vehicle

traveling southbound on Poplar Avenue. One of the three

accidents occurred in 1965 before the train-actuated signal

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It is noted that the accident report actually states that the 2

driver of the vehicle was traveling west on Poplar Avenue - which

is impossible. However, from the drawing of the accident on the

report, the driver was southbound on Poplar Avenue.

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device was installed. Furthermore, the CHP investigating officer

noted that visibility was good for the driver of the vehicle and

that the investigating officer discussed bringing criminal

charges against the driver because the driver was the cause of

the accident. The second accident involving a southbound vehicle

occurred in 1975. The driver in a commercial truck pulling a 2

trailer filled with cotton seed drove the truck and most of the

trailer over the railroad tracks. The report states that the

driver failed to notice the train and that the train signals were

working at the time of the investigation. The third accident

involving a vehicle southbound on Poplar Avenue occurred in 1997. 

According to the accident report, the driver of the vehicle was

slowing as he approached the railroad crossing. The driver of

the southbound vehicle drove into the side of the train which

already in the intersection at the time of the collision,

striking the second engine. The occupants of the vehicle fled

the scene prior to the investigation. None of the accident

reports prepared by the CHP attribute the cause of the accident

to the angle at which southbound Poplar Avenue crosses the

railroad tracks. As the County argues, these three accidents as

detailed in the CHP accident reports did not suffice to give the

County actual notice that the configuration of Poplar Avenue was

a dangerous condition. The first accident occurred 36 years

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before the accident at issue and occurred before the trainactuated signal device was installed. The second accident

occurred ten years later and was not caused by the configuration

of Poplar Avenue but because the driver failed to pull the

trailer off the tracks before the train arrived. In the third

accident, the driver actually drove into the side of the train

and then fled the scene, thereby negating any conclusion that the

driver failed to see the train because of the configuration of

Poplar Avenue. 

Plaintiffs further argue that the County had actual

knowledge of the dangerous condition caused by the configuration

of Poplar Avenue as it crossed the railroad tracks because the

County regularly inspected its roads every two weeks, which

inspections included line-of-sight dangers where roads crossed

railroad tracks.

However, in the absence of any indication that any of these

inspections caused the County to consider the Poplar Avenue

crossing dangerous because of the configuration of the road as it

approached and crossed the tracks in a southbound direction, the

fact of inspections is not probative that the County had actual

knowledge of a dangerous condition.

Plaintiffs further contend that the County had actual notice

because of the evidence from plaintiffs’ experts that accidents

at the location far exceeded the statistical norm for such an

intersection. Plaintiffs refer to the Federal Railroad

Administration Predicted Accident Formula as predicting that this

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railroad crossing would have an accident history of one crash

every 9.5 years. Because, plaintiffs argue, the evidence

establishes that there were 11 accidents at the railroad crossing

before the accident at issue, the County had actual knowledge of

the dangerous condition.

However, plaintiffs base the dangerous condition as the

configuration of Poplar Avenue as it approached the railroad

crossing from the south. Consequently, as the County argues, the

accidents that are relevant to plaintiffs’ case are those

accidents involving a collision by a southbound vehicle with a

southeast bound train. As noted, only three such collisions

occurred and the circumstances of all of those collisions differ

from that involving the accident before the court. In addition,

the County notes that plaintiffs’ experts assert that Poplar

Avenue had an average daily traffic of 510 vehicles in 1991,

meaning that approximately 186,150 cars crossed the railroad

tracks annually. As the County contends: 

If projected over the 35 years that the train

actuated warning devices were in place, this

means (after subtracting out the eight cars

involved in accidents) that 6,515,242 million

cars traveled over the railroad crossing

without incident. The suggestion that eight

accidents (even though six do not apply to

the current circumstances) out of more than

6.5 million vehicles traveling over the

railroad tracks, should have placed the

County on notice of a dangerous condition is

ludicrous.

See Callahan v. City and County of San Francisco, 15 Cal.App.3d

374, 379 (1971):

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We have concluded that the summary

proceedings have clearly eliminated the issue

of negligence of the City in either

permitting a dangerous condition to exist or

of any negligent maintenance. It has shown

that despite a heavy volume of daily

automobile traffic, no other such accident

had occurred over a period of four and onehalf years. ....

The statistics of vehicle traffic at the

intersection ... show that in excess of 19

million vehicles traversed the intersection

during a period of four and one-half years

prior to the accident. The paucity of

accidents occurring during this time clearly

indicates that the intersection was a safe

one except for drivers described by the

witness here, i.e., ‘maniacal’ or driving at

excessive and hazardous speed.

Plaintiffs further argue that summary judgment for the

County is not appropriate because of evidence from which it may

be inferred that the County had constructive notice of the

dangerous condition to southbound traffic on Poplar Avenue

crossing the railroad tracks.

In so contending, plaintiffs refer to the evidence that the

County applied to the PUC for a gate crossing at the intersection

in 1987 through 1997. 

Although the County concedes that it applied to the PUC for

the gate crossing, the County notes that it applied to the PUC

for such gate crossings at every railroad crossing in the County

which did not already have one. Consequently, as the County

contends, the fact of the PUC applications does not permit the

inference that the County applied for the gate crossing at the

subject intersection because it had notice of the dangerous

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configuration of southbound Poplar Avenue with respect to

southeast bound trains at the railroad crossing. Given the

annual volume of traffic crossing the railroad tracks on Poplar

Avenue, the low number of accidents occurring between trains and

motorists southbound on Poplar Avenue and the fact that the

circumstances of only one of those accidents is similar to that

before the court, which accident occurred prior to the

installation of the train-actuated signal device, and the

evidence that the County applied for crossing gates on all

railroad crossings in the County which did not have them, the

County is entitled to summary judgment that it did not have

actual or constructive knowledge that the configuration of

southbound Poplar Avenue as it crossed the railroad tracks was a

dangerous condition, assuming solely for purposes of resolution

of this aspect of the motion that it constituted a dangerous

condition.

f. Dangerous Railroad Crossing.

Plaintiffs’ further argue that summary judgment for the

County should be denied because “[t]he dangerous railroad

crossing immediately adjacent to the County’s roadway exposed

motorists using Poplar Avenue to a substantial risk of injury.”

Plaintiffs contend that “[p]ublic entity liability may also arise

under section 835 of the Government Code if a condition on

adjacent property exposes those using the public property to a

substantial risk of injury.” 

Plaintiffs’ position does not suffice to withstand summary

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judgment on this ground. 

In so contending, plaintiffs place primary reliance on Shea

v. City of San Bernardino, 7 Cal.2d 688 (1936). In Shea, the

plaintiff was injured when the car in which she was riding as a

passenger, traveling on a city street at normal speed, hit a bad

bump at the railroad crossing. Affirming judgment for the

plaintiff, the Supreme Court held:

... In giving consideration to appellant’s

contention that the city was powerless to

remedy the defect the above-mentioned

hypothesis will be assumed to be correct. 

Nevertheless, the contention is not

impressive. It must be remembered that the

improvement of streets within the boundaries

of a city is an affair in which the city is

vitally interested. The governing board and

officers of the municipality in dealing with

such an affair may not complacently declare

that they were powerless over a long period

of years to take any steps to remedy a

defective and dangerous condition that

existed in one of the principal streets of

the city. If the railroad commission had the

exclusive jurisdiction to order the north

track to be lowered it was the duty of the

city at some time during the six year period

to call upon the railroad commission to order

the rail to be lowered and thus to remove an

obviously dangerous condition in the street. 

Finally, if it be assumed that the city was

entirely powerless in the premises, had not

control over the right of way, and was

entitled, so far as the condition which

existed at the right of way was concerned, to

rely on the lack of power and control to

relieve it from liability, it was

nevertheless not relieved from the duty to

warn persons lawfully using the street that a

dangerous condition existed.

7 Cal.2d at 693.

Plaintiffs argue that, because the County had unsuccessfully

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applied to the PUC for a gate crossing at the Poplar Avenue

railroad crossing, the County could have closed Poplar Avenue at

the railroad crossing or re-aligned Poplar Avenue to cross the

railroad tracks at a 90-degree angle instead of sitting “idly by

as the motorist continued to traverse the dangerous railroad

crossing.” 

Here, however, the southbound motorist was warned of the

railroad crossing by lawful signage and road markings. Thus, the

court is not faced with a situation in which no warning of the

upcoming railroad crossing was given to the motorist. As the

County argues, the duty to warn arises only when the condition is

not reasonably apparent to those using the road. See Bunker v.

City of Glendale, 111 Calliope.3d 325, 328 (1980). Plaintiffs’

contention that the configuration of southbound Poplar Avenue

constituted a trap suggests that the angle of the road was not

reasonably apparent to a driver. However, as the County

contends, this argument “fails due to its own internal logic.” 

First, the fact that Aguilar stopped or nearly stopped before

crossing tracks establishes that he was aware of the railroad

crossing. Consequently, the County’s signs and pavement markings

warning of the railroad crossing were successful. Furthermore,

the angle at which southbound Poplar Avenue crossed the railroad

tracks would have been reasonably apparent to the southbound

motorist as demonstrated by photographs of the scene. And as

noted above, the view from the limit line of the tracks to the

northwest is unobstructed. Thus, the direction and location of

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the railroad tracks were apparent such that no further warning

was needed. Furthermore, as the County argues, its ability to

warn is limited to informing the driver of the existence of the

railroad crossing:

Signs and pavement markings are static and

are incapable of notifying a driver of the

changing situation of a train being present. 

Thus, the duty of warning of the presence of

a train is placed upon the railroad who has

the knowledge as to whether a train is

present. In turn, the railroad uses the

devices authorized for each unique crossing

by the Public Utilities Commission for that

purpose.

Finally, the County had no authority to close or realign

Poplar Avenue at the railroad crossing. The County’s authority

to close a road is limited by California Streets and Highway Code

§ 8324, which pertains to hearings in connection with

applications to vacate roadways and easements and provides in

pertinent part:

(b) If the legislative body finds, from all

the evidence submitted, that the street,

highway, or public service easement described

in the notice of hearing or petition is

unnecessary for present or prospective public

use, the legislative body may adopt a

resolution vacating the street, highway, or

public service easement. The resolution of

vacation may provide that the vacation occurs

only after the conditions required by the

legislative body have been satisfied and may

instruct the clerk that the resolution of

vacation not be recorded until the conditions

have been satisfied.

Therefore, the County could not have closed Poplar Avenue absent

a finding that Poplar Avenue is “unnecessary to present or

prospective public use.” The plaintiffs’ contention that Poplar

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Avenue could be closed without inconvenience to the public is

without evidentiary support. Furthermore, the PUC has the

exclusive power pursuant to California Public Utilities Code

Section 1202

(a) To determine and prescribe the manner,

including the particular point of crossing,

and the terms of installation, operation,

maintenance, use, and protection of each

crossing ... of a public or publicly used

road or highway by a railroad ... and of a

street by a railroad or of a railroad by a

street.

(b) To alter, relocate, or abolish by

physical closing any crossing set forth in

subdivision (a). 

See also California Streets and Highways Code § 120 (“With the

consent and approval of the Public Utilities Commission, the

department may abandon that portion of any state highway which

crosses the tracks or right of way of any railroad or street

railroad, and may close such crossing.”) Therefore, as the 

County argues, the suggestion that the County could vacate Poplar

Avenue and, with vacation, abolish the railroad crossing, is

contrary to law.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Defendant County of Kern’s motion for summary judgment

is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 29, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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