Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01668/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01668-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michelle Montgomery Flunder,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

People First Rehabilitation, subsidiary 

of Kindred Rehabilitation Services Inc., 

Defendant. 

No. 12-CV-01668-PHX-JAT 

ORDER

 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 13). Plaintiff has filed a Response to the motion to dismiss and a Motion 

for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 16). Defendant has filed a Reply 

opposing Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 17). The Court will deny Defendant’s motion and grant 

Plaintiff’s motion for the following reasons. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On August 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court as a pro se litigant 

alleging three counts of racial discrimination against her former employer—Defendant 

People First Rehabilitation (“People First”). (Doc. 1). On August 10, 2012, the Court 

entered an Order directing Plaintiff to complete and return the service packet to the Clerk 

of the Court by September 10th. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff failed to complete and return the 

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service packet within the requisite time period. On September 24, 2012, the Court entered 

an Order directing Plaintiff to appear in person before the Court on October 17, 2012, and 

show cause why this case should not be dismissed due to Plaintiff’s failure to return the 

service packet as required. (Doc. 7). On October 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed a first amended 

complaint (the “Amended Complaint”) alleging three counts of racial discrimination and 

one count of hostile work environment against People First. (Doc. 8). At the hearing on 

October 17, 2012, Plaintiff represented to the Court that she forwarded the service packet 

for the Amended Complaint on the day she filed the Amended Complaint, October 11th. 

(Doc. 10). Following the hearing, the Court granted an extension allowing an extension of 

service. (Id.). On November 11, 2012, Plaintiff gave notice to the Court that she had 

retained counsel to represent her. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff’s counsel did not draft the 

Amended Complaint. Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss the Amended 

Complaint on December 14, 2012. (Doc. 13). Plaintiff’s counsel filed the pending motion 

to file a Second Amended Complaint on January 14, 2013. (Doc. 16). 

 In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges four claims against People First. 

(Doc. 8). Counts One and Two are alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq. (“Title VII”), and Counts Three and Four 

are alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Id. at 17-20). 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed with 

prejudice because it does not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 

as it fails to give a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” (Doc. 13 at 3) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Defendant explains 

that the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint span 14 pages and close to 60 numbered 

paragraphs that are largely narratives of irrelevant background facts, which Plaintiff has 

not tied to the specific claims she made. (Id. at 4-7). Plaintiff has merely incorporated by 

reference all of the preceding paragraphs in each claim she made against Defendant. 

Defendant argues that it should not be required to scour the Amended Complaint to 

discern what facts relate to each claim. (Id. at 7). 

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 In the Response, Plaintiff has not addressed the merits of Defendant’s argument in 

the motion to dismiss. Instead, Plaintiff has merely requested that in order to resolve 

Defendant’s objections the Court grant leave to file a Second Amended Complaint 

because the preceding two complaints were filed pro se. Plaintiff argues that she is 

entitled to the request because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has said that motions to 

amend should be freely granted with “extreme liberality.” (Doc. 16 at 1-2) (citing Owens 

v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

II. ANALYSIS 

A district court’s denial of leave to amend is subject to an abuse of discretion 

standard of review. See Telesaursus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 

2010). The Court has “an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil 

rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of 

any doubt.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bretz v. 

Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). “A district court should not 

dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the 

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Id. (quoting Schucker 

v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). 

 Under Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent prior to the 2010 amendments to 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court would sua sponte grant leave to amend 

when granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), unless a pleading could not be 

cured by the allegation of other facts. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 

(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citing Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

However, this precedent has been called into question in light of the 2010 changes to the 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, which now allows parties twenty-one days from 

responsive pleadings and motions to dismiss to amend once as a matter of course. See id. 

The United States Supreme Court has established that motions to amend should be granted 

unless the district court determines that there has been a showing of: (1) undue delay; (2) 

bad faith or dilatory motives on the part of the movant; (3) repeated failure to cure 

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deficiencies by previous amendments; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (5) 

futility of the proposed amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see W. 

Shoshone Nat’l Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 204 (9th Cir. 1991). “Generally, this 

determination should be performed with all inferences in favor of granting the motion” to 

amend. Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing DCD 

Programs, LTD. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987)). Significantly, “[t]he 

party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice,” futility, or one of the 

other permissible reasons for denying a motion to amend. DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 

187; see Richardson v. United States, 841 F.2d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that leave 

to amend should be freely given unless opposing party makes “an affirmative showing of 

either prejudice or bad faith”). 

 Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1 provides that a “party who moves for leave to 

amend a pleading . . . must attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading as an exhibit 

to the motion . . . , which must indicate in what respect it differs from the pleading which 

it amends . . . .” LRCiv 15.1 (emphasis added). This requirement enables the Court to 

determine whether allowing amendment of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile. See Sheriff 

v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., CV-10-1328-PHX-JAT, 2011 WL 1496152, at *4 (D. 

Ariz. Apr. 20, 2011). 

 In this case, neither party has met their burden. Defendant has not shown how the 

deficiencies of the Amended Complaint could not be cured by amendment. Defendant 

merely argues that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not comply with Rule 8 and that 

Plaintiff’s counsel has failed to comply with Local Rule 15.1. (Doc. 17 at 2). Indeed, 

Plaintiff’s counsel did fail to abide by Local Rule 15.1 and attach a copy of the proposed 

amended pleading as an exhibit to Plaintiff’s motion to amend. Because Plaintiff did not 

attach a proposed Second Amended Complaint, Defendant cannot show and the Court 

cannot determine whether amendment of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile. 

 Defendant has not shown the four other factors as well. There has been no 

showing made that granting Plaintiff’s motion would cause undue delay, that Plaintiff has 

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acted in bad faith or with dilatory motives, or that Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to cure 

deficiencies by previous amendments. The Court also notes that Defendant will not be 

subjected to undue prejudice by granting Plaintiff’s motion because the first two 

complaints were filed pro se and the Amended Complaint was filed before any 

meaningful defense was raised to the original complaint. Further, while acting pro se, 

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint which forfeited Plaintiff’s counsel’s opportunity to 

file an amended complaint as a matter of course under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. 

Even though Plaintiff eventually retained counsel, Plaintiff has still essentially functioned 

as a pro se litigant up to this point and should not be treated more strictly at this juncture 

merely because she has retained counsel and before she receives substantive assistance 

from that representation. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has directed the Court to 

grant pro se litigants leave to amend with extreme liberality, especially in civil rights 

claims. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the Court 

grants Plaintiff’s motion to amend. 

 However, the Court reminds Plaintiff’s counsel that the Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure are to be followed. The Court has discretion to award attorney’s fees to a 

prevailing defendant in a Title VII case. E.E.O.C. v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 287 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (quoting Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) (“[A] 

district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title 

VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without 

foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”)). While the Ninth Circuit 

has indeed granted leave to amend with extreme liberality, the extremely liberal policy in 

favor of amendments is subject to limitations. As explained above, the district court will 

not grant further motions to amend if the Court determines that there has been a showing 

of: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith or dilatory motives on the part of the movant; (3) 

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments; (4) undue prejudice to the 

opposing party; or (5) futility of the proposed amendment. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. In 

addition, the Court’s discretion to deny further leave to amend is “particularly broad 

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where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil 

Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). In fact, leave to amend “need not be given 

if a complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., 

Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) is denied as 

moot without prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Second 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 16) is granted. Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint 

within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this order; if Plaintiff fails to file a second 

amended complaint within this deadline, then Defendant may re-file the Motion to 

Dismiss that the Court has denied without prejudice within twenty-five (25) days from the 

date of this order. 

 Dated this 27th day of August, 2013. 

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