Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02727/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02727-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Joseph Redmond and Linda Jean

Redmond,

Plaintiffs, 

v.

Frank Daniel “Chip” Shilosky, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-05-2727-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Frank Daniel Shilosky’s (“Shilosky”) Motion for

Summary Judgment Re: Liability (Dkt. 90), and Defendant Lake Havasu City’s Motion

for Summary Judgment Re: Liability (Dkt. 87).

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Plaintiffs Thomas Joseph Redmond and Linda Jean

Redmond’s (“Redmond” or “Redmonds”) indictment and prosecution for arson. The

Redmonds purchased the L & P Paper Company (“the Company”), located in Lake

Havasu City, in 1999. (Dkt. 88, Defs.’ Statement of Facts (“DSOF”) ¶ 1.) The parties

dispute the profitability of the Company prior to and following the Redmonds’ purchase. 

(Compare DSOF ¶¶ 5-7 with Dkt. 94, Pls.’ Statement of Facts (“PSOF”) ¶¶ 5-7.) In

August 2001, Linda Redmond sent a letter to the mayor of Lake Havasu City stating that

the Company needed $50,000 and requesting financial assistance from the city. (DSOF ¶

8 & Ex. H.) The mayor responded via letter dated September 14, 2001, stating that she

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 108 Filed 04/23/08 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

would forward Linda Redmond’s letter to the entity that handles business retention and

expansion, but that the city itself could not invest in a private business. (DSOF, Ex. J.) 

On September 28, 2001 at 4:48 p.m., a 911 call was received reporting a fire at the

Company. (DSOF ¶ 10.) Shilosky, a fire marshal for Lake Havasu City, was assigned to

lead the investigation for the Lake Havasu City Fire Department, and Detective Scott

Chesire was assigned to handle the investigation for the Lake Havasu City Police

Department. (DSOF ¶ 11.) Based on the evidence collected during the investigation of

the fire, Shilosky and Cheshire submitted the case for charging to the county attorney. 

(DSOF ¶ 17.) After sitting on the charging attorney’s desk for several months, the case

was assigned to Deputy County Attorney Kenneth Skousen, who reviewed the fire

investigation reports, police reports, and financial records submitted. (DSOF ¶ 19.) 

Based on his review of the file, Skousen determined that probable cause existed to take

the case to the grand jury. (DSOF ¶ 20.)

On November 14, 2002, Skousen presented the State’s case to the grand jury. 

(DSOF ¶ 21.) Shilosky and Cheshire testified to the grand jury regarding the results of

their investigation. (DSOF ¶ 22.) Shilosky testified, in pertinent part, that he believed the

fire was intentionally set and caused by a discarded cigarette flicked into the space above

the roof that ignited combustible materials. (DSOF, Ex. D, Tr. of Grand Jury Proceedings

27:21-28:16.) Shilosky further testified that three individuals were the last people to

leave the building on the day of the fire: the Redmonds and the shop general manager

Ken Lopez. (Id. at 28:17-21.) The grand jury voted to indict the Redmonds and charge

them with arson, criminal damage, and insurance fraud. (DSOF ¶ 27.) 

The State then commenced its prosecution of the Redmonds, and disclosed

hundreds of pages of documents to the Redmonds. (DSOF ¶ 28.) A one page statement

of Cory Rubenking was not disclosed by the State to the Redmonds. (DSOF ¶ 29.) That

nondisclosure gave rise to the instant civil litigation, for reasons discussed below.

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 108 Filed 04/23/08 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

While the criminal case against the Redmonds proceeded, several civil actions

were filed alleging that the Redmonds either intentionally or negligently caused the fire. 

(DSOF ¶ 30.) Shilosky was deposed during those civil proceedings. (DSOF ¶ 31.) The

attorney representing the Redmonds in those lawsuits confirmed in a letter to Shilosky

that Shilosky would bring his entire file to the deposition. (DSOF ¶ 32.) In his

deposition, Shilosky referenced a statement from Cory Rubenking. Apparently, none of

the lawyers at Shilosky’s deposition had seen Rubenking’s statement, and Deputy County

Attorney Skousen conceded that he had no record of its disclosure. (DSOF ¶ 35.)

Rubenking’s statement was taken by Shilosky on November 13, 2002, the evening

before the grand jury convened. (DSOF, Ex. R; DSOF ¶ 21.) Rubenking represented that

he was working next door to the Company on the day of the fire, and was pulling into the

yard at his employer between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. (Id.) Rubenking stated that he “noticed

a male and female coming out of [the Company]. They got into late model El Camino.” 

(Id.) Rubenking further stated that within twenty-five minutes from his arrival he noticed

the Company was on fire. (Id.) 

After Rubenking’s statement was revealed at Shilosky’s deposition, Tom

Redmond’s criminal defense counsel took Rubenking’s recorded statement on August 16,

2004. (DSOF ¶ 35.) Rubenking then stated that he was “[p]ositive” that the male and

female couple he saw on the day of the fire was not the Redmonds. (PSOF, Ex. 5,

Examination Under Oath of Cory Rubenking 12:13-15.) Rubenking’s recollection was

that the couple he saw were younger than the Redmonds, he was “pretty sure” the female

was blonde, and that the male was “darker haired.” (Id. at 21:17-22.) Rubenking agreed

that it “could have been as late as 4:30 that [he] saw that couple.” (Id. at 17:4-6.)

The Redmonds then filed a motion to dismiss the charges against them, based on

Shilosky’s failure to disclose the Rubenking statement. (PSOF, Ex. 8.) After an

evidentiary hearing, the court handling the criminal prosecution dismissed the case

against both Linda and Thomas Redmond with prejudice. (PSOF, Ex. 3 98:9-11.) The

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 108 Filed 04/23/08 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

court believed “that there does need to be this clear message that when state agents have

in their possession a document that may be exculpatory that it must be timely disclosed.” 

(Id. at 97:20-23.) The court stated that it could not “see how we can ever get back to

what may have been a finding of no probable cause in this matter.” (Id. at 98:6-8.) The

court therefore granted the Redmonds’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. (PSOF, Ex. 10,

Order dated Jan. 18, 2005.)

The Redmonds then initiated the instant civil litigation in Superior Court of

Arizona, Mohave County, which came before this Court by way of removal. (Dkt. 1,

Notice of Removal.) Redmonds assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of

due process and malicious prosecution, a separate claim for malicious prosecution, claims

for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a claim for fraudulent

concealment. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, Compl. 5-7.) Shilosky and Lake Havasu City seek summary

judgment as to liability on all claims. (Dkts. 90, 87.)

DISCUSSION

Shilosky seeks summary judgment as to liability on each of the Redmonds’ claims. 

For reasons described below, the Court will grant summary judgment and dismiss the

Redmonds’ § 1983 claims. As this ruling will dispose of the Redmonds’ federal claims,

and as the parties are not of diverse citizenship, the Court will remand the remaining state

claims to the Superior Court of Arizona, County of Mohave.

A. Violation of Redmonds’ Brady Rights

The Redmonds’ first claim for relief alleges a violation of their due process right

established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) to receive exculpatory evidence

from the prosecution in a criminal case. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 21-23.) The

Redmonds allege that Shilosky’s conduct regarding the Rubenking statement violated

their rights under Brady. (Id.) Shilosky seeks summary judgment on this claim, asserting

that Brady does not provide a cause of action for an officer’s withholding of evidence

from a prosecutor. (Dkt. 90, Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 12:10-14:27.)

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 108 Filed 04/23/08 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Section 1983 imposes liability on persons who, under color of law, deprive another

of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42

U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has commonly described § 1983 as “creating a

‘constitutional tort,’ since violations of constitutional rights have been the most frequently

litigated claims.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,

728 (1999)(Scalia, J., concurring in part)(citations omitted).

The Redmonds’ § 1983 claim for violation of Brady fails because due process

rights were not violated. The Court in Brady held that “the suppression by the

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or

bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. In so holding, the Court framed the

right to exculpatory evidence in terms of providing a fair trial. See id. at 86-88 (“This

ruling is an extension of Mooney v. Holohan, . . . . The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is

. . . avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.”). The Court’s subsequent development of

the Brady obligation confirms its intent to preserve the criminal trial as the forum for

ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432-

441 (1995). Thus, delayed disclosures only violate Brady if the lateness of the disclosure

prejudiced the defendant’s preparation or presentation of a defense such that the

defendant was prevented from receiving a constitutionally-guaranteed fair trial. United

States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d

1242, 1247 (9th Cir. 1978). This has led another court to state that a Brady violation that

resulted in the overturning of a § 1983 plaintiff’s conviction is a necessary, but not a

sufficient, condition for § 1983 liability on the part of the police. Jean v. Collins, 221

F.3d 656, 663 (4th Cir. 2000)(en banc).

In this case, the Redmonds’ criminal prosecution never went to trial. Rather, the

Superior Court dismissed the charges after the nondisclosure of the Rubenking statement

came to light. Section 1983 liability therefore does not attach because the Redmonds

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 108 Filed 04/23/08 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

were not deprived of their right to a fair trial. Additionally, it cannot be said that

Shilosky’s conduct deprived the Redmonds of their right to a fair grand jury proceeding. 

The government was not obligated to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. 

United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992); United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091,

1096 (9th Cir. 1992). As the Court in Williams “reject[ed] the attempt to convert a

nonexistent duty of the grand jury itself into an obligation of the prosecutor,” 504 U.S. at

53, so this Court refuses to extend a nonexistent obligation of the prosecutor into a

requirement of Shilosky. 

Accordingly, summary judgment shall be granted as to the Redmonds § 1983

claim against Shilosky for failure to disclose the Rubenking statement to the grand jury. 

That claim fails as a matter of law because Shilosky’s actions did not deprive the

Redmonds of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws. 

Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court therefore need not reach the Redmonds’ contention that

a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Shilosky’s intent and state of mind. (Pls.’

Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 11:1-13:14.)

B. Malicious Prosecution

The Redmonds’ second claim for relief alleges a violation of their constitutional

due process right not to be maliciously prosecuted in criminal proceedings. (Compl. ¶¶

24-27.) In order to succeed on a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the

Redmonds must show (1) tortious conduct under the elements of state law, and (2) intent

to deprive the individual of a constitutional right. Poppell v. City of San Diego, 149 F.3d

951, 961 (9th Cir. 1998); Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir.

1995) (“[Plaintiff] must show that the defendants prosecuted her with malice and without

probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying her equal protection or

another specific constitutional right.”). Under Arizona law, the essential elements of

malicious prosecution are (1) a criminal prosecution, (2) that terminates in favor of

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 108 Filed 04/23/08 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Non-prosecutors such as Defendant Shilosky can face § 1983 malicious prosecution

liability for maliciously or recklessly making false reports to the prosecutor. Blankenhorn

v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 482 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066

(“Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors but may be

brought, as here, against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed.”).

- 7 -

plaintiff, (3) with defendants as prosecutors,1

 (4) actuated by malice, (5) without probable

cause, and (6) causing damages. Slade v. City of Phoenix, 541 P.2d 550, 552 (Ariz.

1975).

A § 1983 malicious prosecution plaintiff must prove that the defendants acted for

the purpose of depriving him of a “specific constitutional right,” though that right is not

limited to one protected by the Fourth Amendment. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004). However, no substantive due process right exists under

the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from prosecution without probable cause. Id.,

citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268, 271 (1994)(plurality opinion). 

The Redmonds allege that Shilosky’s actions deprived them of “their right to Due

Process in criminal prosecutions not to be maliciously prosecuted.” (Compl. ¶ 27.) 

Shilosky seeks summary judgment on the grounds that probable cause existed to

prosecute the Redmonds, and that the Redmonds have no evidence of malice or that

Shilosky intended to deprive the Redmonds of their constitutional rights. (Def.’s Mot. for

Summ. J. 15:12-17:8.) The Redmonds contend that they have rebutted the presumption

of probable cause that arose from the grand jury indictment, that sufficient evidence exists

that Shilosky acted with malice, and that Shilosky’s conduct proves his intention to

deprive them of their Brady rights. (Pls.’ Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 15:4-19:16.)

Shilosky did not move to dismiss the Redmonds’ § 1983 malicious prosecution

claim on the grounds that it failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted, nor did

he raise the issue in his Motion for Summary Judgment. However, the Court has an

obligation to examine its own jurisdiction and ensure that it does not exceed its

constitutional authority. See In re Mooney, 841 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1988)

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 108 Filed 04/23/08 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Under Ninth Circuit case law, plaintiffs may pursue their claims by using a direct

approach based on the implicated constitutional provision instead of, or in addition to, a

malicious prosecution theory. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1070 n.4.

- 8 -

(“Nothing is to be more jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction.”), overruled on

other grounds by Partington v. Gedan, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Fleck &

Assocs. v. City of Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100, 1106 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006). The Court is

therefore empowered and required to dismiss an action if it determines at any time that it

lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)(“[T]he court is bound to ask and answer for itself

[the question of jurisdiction], even when not otherwise suggested . . . .”). Dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is proper when the claim is foreclosed by prior

decisions of the Supreme Court. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89.

No substantive due process right exists under the Fourteenth Amendment to be

free from prosecution without probable cause. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268

(1994)(plurality opinion); id. at 282-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and

joined by Thomas, J.); id. at 289 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). “Where a

particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection

against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, and not the more

generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these

claims.” Id. at 273 (plurality opinion)(internal quotations omitted). Post-Albright, the

Ninth Circuit has held that a § 1983 malicious prosecution plaintiff must allege that the

defendants acted for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of a “specific constitutional

right,” though that right is not limited to one protected by the Fourth Amendment. 

Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004); Freeman v. City of

Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995).2

In this case, the Redmonds allege that Shilosky’s actions deprived them of “their

right to Due Process in criminal prosecutions not to be maliciously prosecuted.” (Compl.

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 108 Filed 04/23/08 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

¶ 27.) Prior decisions of the Supreme Court make clear that the Fourth Amendment

addresses pretrial deprivations of liberty, rather than the “scarce and open-ended

guideposts” of substantive due process. Albright, 510 U.S. at 274-75 (plurality opinion). 

To the extent the Redmonds allege a violation of procedural due process, their claim is

foreclosed by the availability of a state tort remedy for malicious prosecution. See Parratt

v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-

26 (1990).

The Redmonds open-ended Due Process claim is foreclosed by previous decisions

of the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. As a result, this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over and must dismiss the Redmonds’ § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. 

Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89.

C. Defendant Lake Havasu City

The Redmonds assert § 1983 claims for Brady violations and malicious 

prosecution against Lake Havasu City under the theory that Shilosky’s actions were

pursuant to a municipal policy. (Compl. ¶¶ 22, 26.) Lake Havasu City cannot be held

liable under § 1983 if no injury or constitutional violation occurred. City of Los Angeles

v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). No constitutional violation having occurred as to the

Redmonds’ first claim for relief (§ 1983/Brady), the Court will also grant Lake Havasu

City’s Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Liability on that claim. (Dkt. 87, Def. Lake

Havasu City’s Mot. for Summ. J.) The Redmonds § 1983 malicious prosecution claim

must also be dismissed as against Lake Havasu City for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. Having dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

state law claims and remands them to Superior Court for Mohave County. 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3).

//

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 108 Filed 04/23/08 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

CONCLUSION

Defendant Shilosky’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted as to the

Redmonds first claim for relief alleging violation of their Brady rights. That claim fails

because Shilosky’s actions did not deprive the Redmonds of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws. Lake Havasu City’s Motion for

Summary Judgment will also be granted as to this claim, as a municipality cannot be held

liable under § 1983 if no injury or constitutional violation occurred. The Redmonds’

second claim for relief must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it

fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. The remaining claims shall be

remanded to Superior Court of Arizona, Mohave County. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendant Shilosky’s Motion for Summary

Judgment Re: Liability as to Plaintiffs Redmonds’ first claim for relief (Dkt. 90).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendant Lake Havasu City’s Motion

for Summary Judgment Re: Liability as to Plaintiffs Redmonds’ first claim for relief (Dkt.

87).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing without prejudice Plaintiffs Redmonds’

second claim for relief (Dkt. 1, Ex. A).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding the remaining claims to the Superior

Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Mohave.

DATED this 22nd day of April, 2008.

Case 3:05-cv-02727-SMM Document 108 Filed 04/23/08 Page 10 of 10