Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-07111/USCOURTS-caDC-93-07111-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 730
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Report &amp; Disclosure
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 20, 1996 Decided November 29, 1996

No. 93-7111

DANIEL A. GEORGE,

APPELLANT

v.

LOCAL UNION NO. 639, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD

OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN &

HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, ET AL.,

APPELLEES 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 89cv00916)

Daniel A. George, appearing pro se, filed the briefs for appellant.

Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp argued the cause for amicus curiae in support of appellant, with whom

Liam O'Grady, appointed by the court, was on the briefs.

Jonathan G. Axelrod argued the cause and filed the brief for appellees.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: At the time this suit arose, appellant Daniel George was a member

of Local 639 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("Local 639" or "Local"). On April 4,

1989, George sued the Local, alleging that the Local violated the Labor-Management Reporting and

Disclosure Act ("LMRDA") and the duty offair representation through various actions. The District

Court first noted that "substantial portions of George's complaint" were barred by the statute of

limitations. Citing DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 155

(1983), the District Court ruled that George's claims under LMRDA section 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §

411(a)(1) (1994), were barred by the six-month statute of limitations ofsection 10(b) of the National

Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), id. § 160(b). The District Court also concluded that the six-month

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1 A "hybrid" claim is one in which the employee has a claim both against the employer (for

breach of the collective bargaining agreement, under section 301 of the Labor Management

Relations Act) and the union (for breach of the duty of fair representation). See DelCostello, 462

U.S. at 163-65. In such a hybrid claim, "[t]o prevail against either the company or the Union, ...

[employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but

must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union." Id. at 165 (internal

quotations omitted). 

statute of limitations of section 10(b) applied to George's duty of fair representation claims. As to

George's other claims, the District Court considered the claims on the merits and granted summary

judgment in favor of the Local.

We hold that the District Court erred in applying the six-month statute of limitations of

section 10(b) to George's section 101(a)(1) claims. In Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488

U.S. 319 (1989), the Supreme Court considered the statute of limitations for a claim under LMRDA

section 101(a)(2). The Court distinguished DelCostello based on the fact that Title I of LMRDA,

which includessections 101(a)(1) and (a)(2), serves different policiesthan those embodied in section

10(b). Although Reed's holding was limited to section 101(a)(2) claims, we find no way to

distinguish section 101(a)(1) claims from the section 101(a)(2) claims considered in Reed. Indeed,

as the Reed Court noted, sections 101(a)(1) and (a)(2) both "serve the core function of enhancing

union democracy through enforcement of the rights of union members." Id. at 332 n.6. While it is

true that Title I actions might have some effect on the collective bargaining process, this effect is

legally irrelevant with respect to the issue before us. We therefore hold that section 101(a)(1) claims

are governed by the borrowed statute of limitations of state law, and not the six-month statute of

limitations of section 10(b). Thus, we remand the section 101(a)(1) claims that the District Court

held to be time barred.

Asfor George's duty offair representation claims, we hold that the District Court was correct

to apply the section 10(b) statute of limitations. This conclusion follows directly from DelCostello.

The DelCostello Court selected the section 10(b) statute of limitations for "hybrid" claims1based on

two rationales: the similarity of the rights asserted in unfair labor practice cases (to which section

10(b) applies) and in hybrid suits, and the similarity of the considerations relevant to the choice of a

limitations period in the two contexts. Because these similarities are also present in a straight duty

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2 The right of an employee to sue in federal court for a breach of the duty of fair representation

is an implied right under the NLRA. As the Supreme Court stated in DelCostello:

The duty of fair representation exists because it is the policy of the National Labor

Relations Act to allow a single labor organization to represent collectively the

interests of all employees within a unit, thereby depriving individuals in the unit of

the ability to bargain individually or to select a minority union as their

representative. In such a system, if individual employees are not to be deprived of

all effective means of protecting their own interests, it must be the duty of the

representative organization "to serve the interests of all members without hostility

or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith

and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct."

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164 n.14 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)).

There is another type of "straight" duty of fair representation claim: one raised before the

National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") alleging an unfair labor practice. The NLRB has

repeatedly held that a breach of the duty of fair representation constitutes an unfair labor practice. 

See id. at 170. Although a duty of fair representation claim brought before the NLRB is not

necessarily coterminous with one brought in federal court, see Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers

Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 86-87 (1989), they undeniably possess many

similarities. 

3 George's unit was known as the "Sears unit" because it provided service exclusively to Sears,

Roebuck & Company. 

4 Article XII of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Constitution states that "when, in

the judgment of the Local Union Executive Board, an employer has made a final offer of

settlement, such offer must be submitted to the involved membership for a secret ballot vote...." 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters Amendments to Article XII, Sections 1, 2, and 3

(adopted Oct. 17, 1988), reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 154; Constitution and Bylaws of

of fair representation case arising under the NLRA,2the District Court was correct to apply the

section 10(b) statute of limitations to the duty of fair representation claims. As to George's other

claims, we conclude, after a de novo review of the record, that summary judgment in favor of the

Local was appropriate.

I. BACKGROUND

At the time this suit arose, Daniel George was a truck driver in the "Sears unit" at Jacobs

Transfer, Inc. ("Jacobs") and a member of Local 639.3 On March 16, 1985, the collective bargaining

agreement covering the Sears unit expired. Soon after, on April 11, 1985, Jacobs made a "final offer"

to Local 639. The offer proposed to reduce employee wages and transfer employees from the Local

639 health and pension plans to the Jacobs health and pension plans. The Local never submitted this

offer to the membership for ratification.4 On April 24, 1985, Jacobs unilaterally implemented this

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the International Brotherhood of Teamsters art. XII, § 1(b) (1986), reprinted in J.A. 86. 

5 Section 101(a)(1) states:

Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges

within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or

referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to

participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings,

subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and

bylaws.

29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1). 

offer. See Affidavit of Ronald Warren at 3-4, reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 58-59.

A year later, on April 16, 1986, Jacobs made another "final offer" to the Local. This offer

included wage increases but did not include the return of employees to the Local 639 health and

pension plans. Jacobs stated that the offer would only stay open until May 4, 1986. Local 639 did

not submit this offer for membership ratification. See id. at 6-7, reprinted in J.A. 61-62. On

September 2, 1986,Jacobsinformed the Local that the April 16 offer was "back on the table." Jacobs

stated that this wasits "last and final offer," and that it intended to implement the offer on September

9, 1986. See Letter from H. Lindley Grubbs, President, Jacobs Transfer, Inc., to Ronald Warren,

Recording Secretary, Local 639 (Sept. 2, 1986), reprinted in J.A. 205. The Local did not submit this

offer for ratification. On September 14, Jacobs unilaterally implemented this offer. See Affidavit of

Ronald Warren at 7, reprinted in J.A. 62.

In January 1987, Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. ("Ryder") bought Jacobs. Sometime after

November 1987, members of the Sears unit informed the Local that they wanted George on the

negotiating committee. The Local refused to allow George to serve on the committee or attend

negotiations. On October 20, 1988, Ryder made a "final offer" that included a wage increase but that

did not return the employees to the Local 639 pension plan. The Local did not submit this offer for

a ratification vote by the membership. See id. at 7-9, reprinted in J.A. 62-64.

On April 4, 1989, appellant filed suit against Local 639, raising various claims. George

argued, inter alia, that the Local violated LMRDA section 101(a)(1)5and the duty of fair

representation by failing to submit the final offers to the Local's membership for ratification, and by

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6

In addition, George alleged that the Local violated LMRDA and the duty of fair

representation by: (1) insisting that the Sears unit employees be returned to the Local's health and

pension plans; (2) threatening to disclaim, and then disclaiming, representation of the Sears unit; 

(3) improperly excluding non-members from its meetings; and (4) failing to release documents to

George. 

not permitting George to serve on the negotiating committee or attend negotiation meetings. George

also argued that the Local violated LMRDA section 101(a)(2) by not permitting him to speak at

union meetings.6

On June 28, 1990, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Local. The

District Court first stated that "substantial portions of George's complaint" were barred by the statute

of limitations. Citing DelCostello, the District Court held that duty of fair representation claims are

governed by the six-month statute of limitations of section 10(b) of the NLRA. Next, the District

Court distinguished Reed and held that claims under section 101(a)(1) are also governed by the

section 10(b) statute of limitations. It therefore held that all duty of fair representation and section

101(a)(1) claimsthat arose before October 4, 1988 were time barred. See George &Cooper v. Local

Union No. 639, Civ. No. 89-0916-LFO, slip op. at 5-7 (D.D.C. June 28, 1990), reprinted in J.A.

243-45.

Although George's claim that the Local improperly excluded him from the negotiating

committee arose before the six-monthstatute oflimitations, the District Court nevertheless addressed

this claim on the merits, and granted summary judgment in favor of the Local. The District Court

found that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding George's claim that the Local

prohibited him from speaking at union meetings and, therefore, denied the Local's motion for

summary judgment on thisissue. Finally, the District Court granted summary judgment for the Local

on all other claims, including George's claim that the Local violated section 101(a)(1) and the duty

of fair representation by failing to submit the October 1988 offer for membership ratification. See id.

at 8-16, reprinted in J.A. 246-54.

George filed two additional amended complaints with the District Court, raising claims that

arose after he filed his original complaint. In particular, George alleged that the Local improperly

issued him a "withdrawal card" and that it manipulated the rules ofthe referral hall in order to prevent

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him from regaining active union status. After discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary

judgment. On June 8, 1993, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Local on

all remaining claims, including George's free speech claim, and dismissed the action. See George &

Cooper v. Local Union No. 639, Civ. No. 89-0916-LFO (D.D.C. June 8, 1993), reprinted in J.A.

635-53.

II. ANALYSIS

The District Court ruled that the six-month statute of limitations of section 10(b) of the

NLRA governs claims under LMRDA section 101(a)(1). This ruling was wrong as a matter of law;

therefore, we must remand those section 101(a)(1) claims that the District Court held to be time

barred. However, the District Court was correct to use the section 10(b) statute of limitations for

the duty of fair representation claims, so we reject George's arguments on this point. As to George's

other claims, we conclude that summary judgment was appropriate.

InDelCostello v.InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, the SupremeCourt considered the

appropriate statute of limitations in a "hybrid" suit against an employer (under section 301 of the

Labor Management Relations Act) and a union (a duty offair representation claim). See DelCostello,

462 U.S. at 165. The Court noted that, although the general rule is to "borrow" a statute of

limitations from state law, "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer

analogy than available state statutes," and when the federal rule is "a significantly more appropriate

vehicle for interstitial lawmaking," the federal rule will apply. See id. at 172.

Because no state statute of limitations was appropriate, the Court in DelCostello looked to

the six-month statute of limitations under section 10(b) of the NLRA. See id. at 163-69. The Court

noted thatsection 10(b) provided a suitable analogy for two reasons. First, the Court noted that there

is a "family resemblance" between unfair labor practice complaints arising under the NLRAand heard

by the NLRB and duty of fair representation and section 301 claims heard in federal court. See id.

at 170. Second, the Court noted the similarity of considerations relevant in an unfair labor practice

claim (to which 10(b) applies) and a hybrid section 301/duty of fair representation claim: both

involve a "balance between the national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of

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7 Section 101(a)(2) states:

Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and

assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or

opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon

candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly

before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules

pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be

construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce

reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization

as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its

performance of its legal or contractual obligations.

29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1994). 

private settlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside what he views as an unjust settlement

under the collective-bargaining system." Id. at 171 (internalquotation omitted). Thus, the Court held

that hybrid section 301/duty of fair representation claims are governed by a six-month statute of

limitations. See id. at 169-71.

InReed v. United TransportationUnion, theSupremeCourt considered the applicable statute

of limitationsfor LMRDA section 101(a)(2) claims in light of DelCostello.7 The Court stressed that

the generalrule isto borrow a state statute of limitations, and that the practice of borrowing a period

from federal law is a "closely circumscribed exception." See Reed, 488 U.S. at 324. State statutes

are to be used, the Court stated, "unlessthey frustrate or significantly interfere with federal policies."

Id. at 327.

The Court in Reed noted that the "core federal interest" furthered by section 101(a)(2)"the

interest in union democracypromoted byfree speech and assemblyrights of unionmembers"differs

from the considerations embodied in the six-month statute of limitations of section 10(b). See id. at

327-31. The Court acknowledged that there is a plausible argument that the concerns underlying

section 10(b)the interest in stable bargaining relationships and in private dispute resolution under

collective bargaining agreementsare implicated in section 101(a)(2) claims, but stated that the

relationship was too "tangential and remote" to borrow the 10(b) statute of limitations. See id. at

330-31.

The Court in Reed also addressed petitioner's argument that section 101(a)(2) claims should

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be governed by the section 10(b) statute of limitations because they bear a "family resemblance" to

unfair labor practice charges and claims that a union has breached its duty of representation, but

rejected this argument:

Even were it the case ... that Title I violations may constitute unfair labor practices

and breaches of the duty of fair representationquestions ... upon which we express

no opinionwe would stillhold thisresemblance inconclusive asregardsthe question

whether § 101 actions should be governed by a state statute of limitations or by

NLRA § 10(b). In contrast to the situation in DelCostello, an overlap between Title

I violations and unfair labor practices or breaches of the duty of fair representation

would not be attributable to similar federal policies underlying each of these areas of

protection, for the policies behind Title I, on the one hand, and NLRA § 8(b) and the

implied duty of fair representation on the other, are quite different.

Id. at 333-34 n.7. Thus, the Court held that the statute of limitations for a section 101(a)(2) claim

should be borrowed from state law. See id. at 334.

Although the Court's holding in Reed focused on the statute of limitations for section

101(a)(2) claims, the decision strongly suggeststhat the same reasoning would hold for claims under

section 101(a)(1):

One class of Title I actions may have a more direct effect on collective bargaining.

Union members may attempt to challenge a collective-bargaining agreement by

alleging that the union denied them the proper opportunity "to participate in the

deliberations and voting" to ratifythe agreement, in violation ofLMRDA§ 101(a)(1).

We have no occasion in this case, which involves a § 101(a)(2) free speech claim, to

decide what statute of limitations applies to other Title I actions. We note,

nevertheless, that however direct an effect some Title I claims may have on the

collective-bargaining agreement or on private dispute resolution, Title I claims all

serve the core function of enhancing union democracy through enforcement of the

rights of union members, not of protecting the integrity of collective bargaining or of

grievance-and-arbitration procedures.

Id. at 331 n.6 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court explicitly noted that the similarity of

considerations that led it to use the section 10(b) statute of limitations for a hybrid section 301/duty

of fair representation claimi.e., the interest in protecting the integrity of collective bargaining or

of grievance-and-arbitration procedureswas not the central concern in Title I cases.

We believe that Reed compelsthe conclusionthat claims undersection 101(a)(1) are governed

by the borrowed statute of limitations of state law, and not the six-month statute of limitations of

section 10(b). Although the holding in Reed was addressed to section 101(a)(2) claims, we can find

no reasonable way to distinguish section 101(a)(1) claims from the section 101(a)(2) claims

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considered in Reed. Indeed, as the Reed Court noted, sections 101(a)(1) and (a)(2) both "serve the

core function of enhancing union democracy through enforcement of the rights of union members."

Id. at 332 n.6; see also Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435-36 (1982) (stating that Title I "place[s]

emphasis on the rights of union members to freedom of expression without fear of sanctions by the

union," and that Title I was necessary "to further [LMRDA's] primary objective of ensuring that

unions would be democratically governed and responsive to the will of their memberships"). While

it is true that Title I actions might have some effect on the collective bargaining process, this effect

does not go to the "core function" of the statute. See Reed, 488 U.S. at 332 n.6.

We hold that section 101(a)(1) claims are governed by the borrowed statute of limitations of

state law, and not the six-month statute of limitations of section 10(b). It is noteworthy that all of

the circuits that have considered this question since Reed have come to the same conclusion. See

Allgood v. Elyria United Methodist Home, 904 F.2d 373, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1990); Clift v.

International Union, UAW, 881 F.2d 408, 410-12 (7thCir. 1989); see also Marshall v. Local Union

No. 6, 960 F.2d 1360, 1365-67 (8th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, we remand George's claims that the

Localviolated section 101(a)(1) byfailing to submit the April 1986 and September 1986 "finaloffers"

for ratification. Because both sides seem to agree that a three-year personal injury statute of

limitations would apply on remand, see Brief of Amicus Curiae at 25; Brief for the Appellees at 17

n.13, it appearsthat George's claim regarding the April 1985 offer istime barred. We do not remand

George's claim that his exclusion from the negotiation committee violated his rights under section

101(a)(1); although the claim arose before October 4, 1988, the District Court nonetheless decided

this claim on the merits.

The District Court also applied the section 10(b)statute oflimitationsto George's duty offair

representation claims. The trial court's judgment on this point was correct. This conclusion follows

from a consideration of the two bases on which DelCostello rested. First, duty of fair representation

claims clearly exhibit a "family resemblance" to unfair labor practice claims. As the Court stated in

DelCostello:

Even if not all breaches of the duty [of fair representation] are unfair labor practices

... the family resemblance is undeniable, and indeed there is a substantial overlap....

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[D]uty of fair representation claims are allegations of unfair, arbitrary, or

discriminatory treatment of workers by unionsas are virtually all unfair labor

practice charges made by workers against unions.

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 170. Second, duty of fair representation claims, like unfair labor practice

charges and the hybrid claims considered in DelCostello, involve the "balance between the national

interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements, and an employee's

interest in setting aside what he views as an unjustsettlement under the collective-bargaining system."

Id. at 171 (internal quotation omitted). This balance is implicated in every duty of fair representation

case, because a duty of fair representation claim focuses on an allegation that a union has not fairly

represented an employee in bargaining or grievance settlements. If the union is regulated in these

contexts, the employer-union bargaining relationship is necessarily affected.

Thus, the District Court was correct to apply the six-month statute of limitations of section

10(b) to George's duty offair representation claims. Other circuits that have considered this question

have reached the same conclusion. See Richardson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 864 F.2d 1162,

1167 (5th Cir. 1989); Eatz v. DME Unit of Local Union No. 3, 794 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1986);

Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1251 (9th Cir. 1985); Erkins v. United Steelworkers of Am.,

723 F.2d 837, 838-39 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Adkins v. International Union of Elec., Radio &

Mach. Workers, 769 F.2d 330, 335 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that section 10(b) applies "to all unfair

representation claims, regardless of the nature or presence of the section 301 claim" (citation

omitted)).

As to appellant's other claims, we conclude, after a de novo review of the record, see Tao v.

Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994), that summary judgment was appropriate. We affirm the

judgment in favor of the Local on these claims, substantially for the reasons given by the District

Court.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the District Court erred in applying the six-month statute of limitations of section

10(b) to George's LMRDA section 101(a)(1) claims, we remand those section 101(a)(1) claims that

the District Court held to be time barred. As to George's other claims, we conclude that summary

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judgment in favor of the Local was appropriate.

So ordered.

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