Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01994/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01994-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS JACQUES,

2:05-cv-1994-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Thomas Jacques alleges

Defendant Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”) discriminated

against him, harassed him and retaliated against him in violation

of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal.

Gov’t Code sections 12920 and 12940, et seq. In addition,

Plaintiff alleges he was denied medical leave to which he was

entitled under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C.A.

§ 2612, as well as under the California Family Rights Act

(“CFRA”), Cal. Gov’t Code section 12945.2. Further, Plaintiff

alleges Allstate failed to reasonably accommodate his disability

in violation of FEHA, Cal. Gov’t Code section 12940 et seq.

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 1 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court notes Allstate has lodged a number of objections 1

to Plaintiff’s submissions. To the extent facts are stated

herein, they are deemed undisputed and Allstate’s objections are

overruled.

2

Plaintiff also alleges he was wrongfully terminated in violation

of public policy. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges Allstate is

responsible for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Plaintiff has conceded his second cause of action for

wrongful denial of medical leave under the FMLA, as well as under

the CFRA. Plaintiff has also conceded his fourth cause of action

for wrongful termination. Accordingly, Allstate’s Summary

Judgment Motion as it relates to those two causes of action is

GRANTED. For the reasons set forth below, Allstate’s Summary

Judgment Motion as it relates to Plaintiff’s claim for

discrimination is GRANTED. Allstate’s Summary Judgment Motion as

it relates to Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. Allstate’s Summary Judgment Motion as

it relates to Plaintiff’s claim for harassment is GRANTED. 

Allstate’s Summary Judgment Motion as it relates to Plaintiff’s

claim for failure to accommodate is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Thomas Jacques has been employed as an insurance

adjuster with Allstate Insurance Company since August 6, 1986. 

His obligations as a claims adjuster include investigating

claims, determining claims values, interpreting applicable

policies regarding policy coverage and limits, and negotiating

the resolution of covered claims.

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 2 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

During the relevant period, Plaintiff was under the supervision

of Linda Johnson-Jones. The Human Resources manager at the time

for Allstate was Lori Lauritzen.

On March 12, 2004, Plaintiff underwent quadruple bypass

surgery. On June 4, 2004, Plaintiff’s primary care physician,

Dr. Julie Baur, released him to return to work without

restrictions. On June 14, 2004, Plaintiff returned to work in

his capacity as a claims adjuster.

During Plaintiff’s first return to Allstate in June of 2004,

he experienced cognitive challenges eventually linked to his

heart surgery. Specifically, Plaintiff was diagnosed with postpump encephalopathy which generally results in mild to moderate

cognitive deficits. Prior to Plaintiff’s heart surgery, he

processed 12-15 insurance claims per day at an average value of

$8,000.00 to $10,000.00. Subsequently, Plaintiff was only able

to process 2-3 claims per day. Plaintiff sought assistance from

Johnson-Jones in processing a claim and was instructed to consult

his co-worker Jerry Roland for help. Roland provided Plaintiff

the support he sought with that claim. Otherwise, Allstate did

not specifically assist Plaintiff in handling his claims. 

Johnson-Jones also discussed online training courses aimed at

assisting Plaintiff with processing his claims. On another

occasion, Plaintiff advanced an email to Johnson-Jones requesting

guidance on handling two particular files. Johnson-Jones replied

by email clarifying the correct course for Plaintiff. Plaintiff

complained to Loritzen alleging that the email was critical in

tone and lacking in direction.

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 3 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Allstate concedes such an exchange, but alleges the email was

non-discriminatory and simply addressed Plaintiff’s question.

Plaintiff continued to work from June 14, 2004, until seven

months later, January 21, 2005, when he was again medically

excused from work. This second leave of absence was initially

due to stress and high blood pressure. Shortly after his leave

commenced, Dr. Baur referred Plaintiff to neurologist, Dr.

Gregory Fields, for further evaluation. Plaintiff complained to

Dr. Fields of memory loss and other cognitive difficulties. 

Plaintiff was diagnosed by Dr. Fields with “Cognitive Disorder,

Not Otherwise Specified.” 

Given that Plaintiff had exhausted his FMLA leave during his

first medical absence, he applied for and received short term

disability payments from Allstate’s disability insurer, Liberty

Life. In addition, Plaintiff received California State

Disability benefits. Those benefits were exhausted on June 10,

2005. It was at that point that Plaintiff alleges he began

requesting that Allstate reinstate him. Plaintiff alleges Dr.

Baur released him to return to work on March 1, 2005. Allstate

denies Dr. Baur ever issued such a release and contends instead

that Plaintiff was not cleared to return to work by any physician

or by Liberty Life until October 4, 2006, at which time Plaintiff

was permitted to return to work.

Upon the expiration of Plaintiff’s short term disability

benefits, Plaintiff applied for long term disability benefits

from Liberty Life. In addition, Plaintiff applied for long term

disability benefits from the Social Security Administration.

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 4 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Both applications were approved based on Plaintiff’s documented

medical disability.

Both before and after Plaintiff’s surgery, he received

“requires improvement” ratings in his checkpoint performance

evaluations regarding compliance with policies and accuracy of

work product. However, Plaintiff also received a “meets”

requirements rating on his yearly review.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Twp. of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 5 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987).

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 6 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Stated another way, “before the evidence is left to the jury,

there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there

is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a

jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party

producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442,

448, 20 L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained,

“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c),

its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 7 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

ANALYSIS

1. Discrimination, Harassment and Retaliation

Allstate correctly notes that, while Plaintiff frames his

first cause of action as encompassing discrimination, harassment

and retaliation, each claim arises independently under the

statute. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940(a) (prohibiting

discrimination), 12940(j) (prohibiting harassment), and 12940(h)

(prohibiting retaliation); see also Bagatti v. Dept. of Rehab.,

97 Cal. App. 4th 344, 357 (2002). Accordingly, the Court will

treat each claim severally. 

a. Discrimination

California’s FEHA prohibits discrimination based on a

person’s physical disability. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). 

Specifically, FEHA explains that it shall be an unlawful

employment practice for an employer, because of physical or

mental disability, to discriminate against a person in

compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment. See id. A prima facie case for discrimination under

FEHA requires a showing that: (1) plaintiff suffers from a

disability; (2) plaintiff is a qualified individual; and (3)

plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action because

of the disability. Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 85 Cal. App. 4th

245, 254, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55 (2000) (citing Brundage v. Hahn,

57 Cal. App. 4th 228, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830 (1997)). 

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 8 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

In seeking summary judgment, Allstate argues that

Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination must fail as he cannot

establish any adverse employment action nor is he a qualified

individual with a disability. More precisely, Plaintiff alleges

the following as instances of adverse employment action: 1) his

August 2004, performance review indicated a “needs improvement”

rating; 2) his settlement authority was not increased upon his

return from medical leave; and 3) his supervisor was overly

critical of his work files. Allstate contends none of the

foregoing can be deemed adverse employment action as a matter of

law. Allstate further avers that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his

claim that its failure to reinstate him in March 2005, was

unlawful discrimination because Plaintiff is not a qualified

individual with a disability. The Court will consider each of

these issues in turn.

i. Adverse Employment Action

As noted supra, Plaintiff claims he was subjected to

discrimination when he received a “needs improvement” rating on

his performance evaluation; when his settlement authority was not

raised; and when his supervisor was critical of his work files. 

Allstate avers that the foregoing do not rise to the level of

“adverse employment action” as that term is judicially construed.

The proper standard for defining an “adverse employment

action” under California law is the materiality test. Yanowitz

v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1036 (2005). 

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 9 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

This standard requires that an employer’s adverse action

“materially affect the terms and conditions of employment.” Id.

When discussing this standard, the California Supreme Court

explained that FEHA protects an employee against unlawful

discrimination with respect not only to ultimate employment

actions such as termination or demotion, but also to the entire

spectrum of employment actions that are reasonably likely to

materially affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity

for advancement in his or her career. See id. at 1053-1054 (fns.

omitted). The court went on to clarify that “[a]lthough a mere

offensive utterance or even a pattern of social slights by either

the employer or co-employees cannot properly be viewed as

materially affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment for purposes of Gov’t Code section 12940(a), the

phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of employment must be

interpreted liberally and with a reasonable appreciation of the

realities of the workplace... .” Id. at 1054; see also Taylor v.

City of L.A. Dept. of Water & Power, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216

(2006). Further, when considering whether an employee has been

subjected to adverse employment action, the Court must consider

the “totality of the circumstances” rather than each discreet act

in isolation. See Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at p. 1036.

Allstate claims the August, 2004, performance rating cannot

be considered adverse employment action because it was not

material in that it did not result in any change in the terms of

Plaintiff’s employment and it was based on Plaintiff’s admittedly

poor performance.

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 10 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

In addition, Allstate points to the fact that this performance

rating was essentially identical to those received by Plaintiff

prior to his heart surgery minimizing his argument that the

rating was motivated by discriminatory animus.

Plaintiff does not rebut these arguments by Allstate and, in

fact, the record supports Allstate’s position. Specifically,

none of the foregoing amount to a material change in Plaintiff’s

employment. The performance review did not result in any

consequence in Plaintiff’s employment. He retained not only his

position but also his pay rate. Further, with respect to his

settlement authority, Plaintiff concedes he was not singled out

but rather that his settlement authority was lowered as part of

an overall policy change in Allstate’s structure. Lastly,

Plaintiff stated in deposition that Johnson-Jones’ critical

review of his files began long before he became disabled when she

discovered an unacceptable level of errors in Plaintiff’s work. 

Even considering the totality of the circumstances, the foregoing

did not result in material changes in Plaintiff’s conditions of

employment. In fact, there is no evidence in the present record

of any change in the terms of his employment whatsoever. There

was no loss of pay, privileges or position. Instead, the record

shows Plaintiff received two pay raises during the period in

question. The Court finds no evidence of adverse employment

action with respect to the foregoing acts.

///

///

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 11 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

ii. Qualified Individual with A Disability

Allstate contends Plaintiff was not a qualified individual

with a disability when he sought reinstatement in March, 2005. 

Allstate points to Plaintiff’s representations to Liberty Life

and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) that he was

totally disabled and, therefore, eligible for benefits. Pursuant

to Section 423 of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), in order

to establish eligibility for benefits, the individual’s

impairment must be “of such severity that [he] is not only unable

to do [his] previous work but cannot, considering [his] age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy...” 

42 U.S.C.S. § 423(d)(2)(A).

Here, Plaintiff represented to the SSA that he was

“disabled,” as that term is defined in the foregoing statutory

provision, and thereby qualified for benefits. The SSA agreed

with Plaintiff’s representation and he was accorded Social

Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits. Through the

present action, however, he now claims his employer’s refusal to

reinstate him was discriminatory. Plaintiff makes this

allegation despite his representation to the SSA and Liberty Life

that he was entirely unable to do his work or any other kind of

gainful work that exists in the national economy. The Parties

vigorously dispute whether this inconsistency defeats Plaintiff’s

FEHA claim.

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 12 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

The Supreme Court had occasion to speak to a very similar

issue in Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795

(1999). There, the Court discussed the possibility of an SSDI

claim existing comfortably side by side with a discrimination

claim. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803. The Court first acknowledged

that, absent a sufficient explanation, the foregoing type of

inconsistency can be fatal to a Plaintiff’s claim. Id. In

striking a balance between a plaintiff’s claim of total

disability under the Act and a later claim he or she is a

qualified individual for purposes of disability discrimination

law, the Court held that a discrimination plaintiff cannot simply

ignore the apparent contradiction. Id. at 806. Rather, he must

proffer a sufficient explanation. Id. The Court further

explained that to defeat summary judgment, the explanation must

be “sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror’s concluding that,

assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff’s good faith belief in,

the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless perform

the essential functions of [his] job, with or without reasonable

accommodation.” Id. at 807 (internal quotations omitted).

Plaintiff’s sole contention in explaining the apparent

dissension between his earlier claim to the SSA and his current

claim in this action is that he was forced to apply for SSDI

benefits given Allstate’s steadfast refusal to reinstate him. 

The Court fails to appreciate how this explanation satisfies the

Supreme Court’s mandate that Plaintiff explain how he could

“nonetheless perform the essential functions of his job.”

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 13 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

While Plaintiff’s explanation clearly furnishes a motive for his

decision to seek SSDI benefits, it fails to create a triable

issue of fact as to his capability of performing the work. In

reaching this conclusion today, the Court recognizes the

difficulty of Plaintiff’s position that he either assert total

disability, as that word is defined under the Act, or suffer

extreme financial hardship. Still, the Court cannot deny summary

judgment when Plaintiff has failed to create a material issue of

fact with respect to an element of his claim.

Given the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s

discrimination claim under FEHA fails as a matter of law. Thus,

Allstate’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is granted. 

2. Retaliation

Generally, in order to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation under FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she

engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected the

employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link

existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action. 

Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1042 (internal citations and quotations

omitted). 

Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the

employer is required to offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory

reason for the adverse employment action. Id. (citing Morgan v.

Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 68 (2000)).

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 14 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse

employment action, the presumption of retaliation is removed, and

the burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional

retaliation. Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1042 (internal citations

and quotations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges Allstate retaliated against him when his

supervisor, Johnson-Jones, showed animus in replying to his email

seeking assistance. In addition, Plaintiff alleges Allstate’s

refusal to return him to work in 2005 was further retaliation

based on his disability. Allstate concedes the existence of

protected activity. See Def. Mem. of Pts., Docket # 27, p. 9. 

However, the Parties dispute whether the email and the refusal to

return Plaintiff to work were adverse employment action.

The standard for what constitutes adverse employment action

under a FEHA retaliation claim parallels the standard under a

FEHA discrimination claim. Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1053. 

Specifically, the actions alleged as retaliatory by Plaintiff

must materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment to be actionable. Id. To determine materiality, the

Court must take into account the unique circumstances of the

affected employee as well as the workplace context of the claim. 

Id.

Plaintiff first claims that the email from Johnson-Jones was

sufficiently adverse to materially alter his working conditions. 

Allstate rebuts that one isolated email, whether laden with

boorish overtones or not, can scarcely be said to have materially

altered Plaintiff’s employment. The Court agrees.

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 15 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

A single inarticulate email is not the type of offensive

utterance that can properly form the foundation for a retaliation

claim. See id. at 1054. 

Plaintiff’s allegation that he was not reinstated in

retaliation for protected speech is, however, another matter.

If, as Plaintiff alleges, he was not permitted to return to work

because of his protected speech, a material change in the

conditions of employment clearly would have occurred. If, in

fact, Plaintiff was released to return to work but Allstate

elected not to return him to work as a result of his protected

speech, there would be a profound alteration in Plaintiff’s

employment. That is true at least to the extent he was not

permitted to return to his occupation. The Court finds there is

an issue of material fact with respect to this claim. 

Accordingly, Allstate’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim

is denied.

3. Harassment

FEHA’s harassment provision provides as follows: “[i]t shall

be an unlawful employment practice ... [f]or an employer, ... or

any other person, because of ... [a] medical condition, ... to

harass an employee.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1). To prevail,

a Plaintiff must show the conduct at issue was “severe enough or

sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and

create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to

employees because of their [disability].” Miller v. Dept. of

Corr., 36 Cal. 4th 446, 462 (2005).

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 16 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

As is the case with discrimination under FEHA, the working

environment must be evaluated in light of all the circumstances. 

Id. These circumstances may include the frequency of the

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. Id.

In determining what constitutes “sufficiently pervasive”

harassment, courts have held that acts of harassment cannot be

occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial, rather the plaintiff

must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated,

routine or a generalized nature. Roby v. McKesson Corp., 2006

Cal. App. LEXIS 2052, *16 (2006) (citing Fisher v. San Pedro

Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 610 (1989)). The

harassment must satisfy an objective and a subjective standard. 

Roby, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS at *16. With respect to the objective

severity of harassment, Plaintiff must prove that Allstate’s

conduct would have interfered with a reasonable employee’s work

performance and would have seriously affected the psychological

well-being of a reasonable employee. Id. (citing Fisher, 214

Cal. App. 3d at 609-610, fn. omitted).

Plaintiff alleges the following to support his claim of

disability harassment: 1) his August 2004, performance review

indicated a “needs improvement” rating; 2) his settlement

authority was not increased upon his return from medical leave;

3) his supervisor was unnecessarily critical of his work files;

and 4) Allstate refused to reinstate him after he was released to

return to work in March, 2005.

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 17 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

In addition, Plaintiff alleges Johnson-Jones implied Plaintiff

did not hear well and once joked about Plaintiff being unable to

locate his vehicle in a parking lot.

The California Supreme Court has explained that harassment

consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job

performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal

gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other

personal motives. See Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 645

(1998). Harassment is not conduct of a type necessary for

management of the employer’s business or performance of the

supervisory employee’s job. Id. at 464. Indeed, the court went

on to conclude that commonly necessary personnel management

actions such as hiring and firing, job or project assignments,

office or work station assignments, promotion or demotion,

performance evaluations, and the like, do not come within the

meaning of harassment. Id. at 646-47.

Considering the foregoing instruction by the State’s high

court, it is readily apparent that the conduct of which Plaintiff

complains is largely, if not completely, within the sphere of

business and management duties. Specifically, his performance

review, settlement authority and Johnson-Jones’ examination of

his work cannot be used to support a claim of harassment. Id.

Excepting the foregoing protected activity, what remains is

general disrespect and a failure to show sympathy for Plaintiff. 

At best, the two isolated comments made by Johnson-Jones

regarding Plaintiff’s hearing and memory are trivial and fall far

short of the pervasive type of conduct the law is intended to

foreclose. See Roby, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 2052.

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 18 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Unlike the ADA, FEHA does not require that reasonable 2

accommodation for disability be made only where the person is “a

qualified individual” able to perform the essential functions of

the job as defined in 42 U.S.C. section 12111, nor is there any

requirement in Cal. Gov’t Code section 12940(m) that the employee

have a right to assert the duty of reasonable accommodation only

where some kind of adverse employment action is taken against the

employee. Bagatti, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 361. Consequently,

Plaintiff’s failure to establish his status as a qualified

individual with a disability is not fatal to this claim.

19

The Court finds Plaintiff’s claims insufficient as a matter of

law to create liability for harassment. Accordingly, Allstate’s

Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is granted.

4. Failure to Accommodate

Under section 12940(m), it is an unlawful employment

practice “[f]or an employer ... to fail to engage in a timely,

good faith, interactive process with the employee or applicant to

determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in

response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee

or applicant with a known physical ... disability.” The statute

provides an independent basis for liability. Gelfo v. Lockheed

Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App. 4th 34, 61 (2006) (internal citations

omitted). Indeed, an employer’s duty to accommodate is

inextricably linked to its obligation to engage in a timely, good

faith discussion with an applicant or employee whom it knows is

disabled, and who has requested an accommodation, to determine

the extent of the individual’s limitations, before an individual

may be deemed unable to work. Id.2

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 19 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

The Plaintiff has alleged that Allstate failed entirely in

its’ statutory duty to engage him in a timely, good faith

discussion to determine the extent of his limitations before

deeming him unable to work. The Court agrees.

Plaintiff has plainly put forth sufficient facts to create a

material issue regarding whether Allstate attempted to ascertain

the parameters of his disability before concluding that he could

not return to work in early 2005. There are ample issues of

material fact showing that Plaintiff sought return to his

position but that Allstate did not entertain his requests and,

instead, placed him on long term disability without an effort to

engage him in a dialogue. Consequently, Allstate’s Motion for

Summary Judgment on this claim is denied. 

5. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to damages for the

negligent conduct of Allstate that resulted in his severe

emotional distress. Allstate avers that its conduct was not

sufficiently “outrageous” as to make it actionable. This claim

fails for several reasons.

As an initial matter, the California Supreme Court has

clarified there is no independent tort of “negligent infliction

of emotional distress.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6

Cal. 4th 965, 984 (1993); see also Delfino v. Agilent Tech.,

Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 796 (2006). The tort is negligence. 

Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 984.

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 20 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

In addition, there is no duty to avoid negligently causing

emotional distress to another unless the defendant has assumed a

duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the

plaintiff is an object. Id. Recovery is available only if the

emotional distress arises out of the defendant’s breach of some

other legal duty and the emotional distress is proximately caused

by [breach of the independent duty]. Id. Even then, with rare

exceptions, a breach of the duty must threaten physical injury,

not simply damage to property or financial interests. Id.

Plaintiff’s allegation that Allstate breached its duty by

negligently and carelessly allowing the insensitive and unlawful

discrimination against Plaintiff is untenable for the following

reasons. First, even assuming the existence of a special

relationship as between employer and employee, Plaintiff cannot

show that this relationship gives rise to a duty. Specifically,

there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s emotional well being is, or

should be, an object of concern vis-a-vis Allstate. Rather, the

relationship between Plaintiff and Allstate has as its primary

object the payment of wages in exchange for the performance of

obligations. More importantly, recovery is not available to

Plaintiff in this instance as the alleged breach of duty did not

threaten physical injury to Plaintiff. Lastly, California courts

have held that an employer’s supervisory conduct is inherently

“intentional.” Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1105 (1990)

(quoting Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Prot. Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160

(1987). Such intentional conduct will not support a claim for

negligent infliction of emotional distress. Semore, 217 Cal.

App. 3d at 1105.

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 21 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

The Court finds that an employee should not be permitted to avoid

the stringent requirements of an intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim, including proof of “outrageous conduct”

that “‘exceed[s] all bounds usually tolerated by a decent

society’” by contending that the employer’s intentional

supervisory acts directed at the employee were negligent. See

Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 155, fn. 7. Consequently, summary judgment

as to this claim is proper and, hereby, granted. 

6. Punitive Damages

In California, a plaintiff can recover punitive damages only

if he proffers, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

defendant “has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). In addition, punitive damages against

a corporate employer are only permitted if the employee is

sufficiently high in the corporation’s decision making hierarchy

to be an “officer, director or managing agent.” Cal. Civ. Code,

§ 3294(a), (b); Gelfo, 140 Cal. App. 4th at 63. ‘Managing

agents’ are employees who ‘exercise[] substantial discretionary

authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate

policy.’ Id.

Allstate contends Plaintiff may not seek punitive damages on

two grounds. First, Allstate alleges there is no evidence in the

record of oppression or malice towards the Plaintiff. Second,

Allstate avers neither Johnson-Jones nor Loritzen were officers,

directors or managing agents of Allstate.

///

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 22 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

Whether Allstate’s conduct was oppressive or malicious is

not an issue of law, but rather an issue of fact inappropriate

for disposition on a Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly,

Allstate’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to punitive damages is

denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, Allstate’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims for

discrimination, harassment, and negligence. Allstate’s Motion

for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claims for

retaliation, failure to accommodate and punitive damages.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 12, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-01994-MCE -DAD Document 71 Filed 02/12/07 Page 23 of 23