Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00376/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00376-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bruce Lee Scott, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 04-376 PHX MHM (VAM)

)

Deputy Warden Ryder, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Bruce Lee Scott ("petitioner"), currently confined at the

Arizona State Prison Complex in Yuma, Arizona, filed a pro se

Third Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner

raises four grounds for relief in the third amended petition. 

(Doc. 23 at pp. 5-8). Respondents filed an answer opposing the

granting of habeas relief. (Doc. 30).

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged with the first-degree murder of

Charlie Bremer. On April 13, 2000, petitioner was convicted of

the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. (Doc. 30,

Exhibit A at pp. 1-2; Exhibit C at p. 9). As a result of this

conviction, petitioner was sentenced to 18 years in prison. (Doc.

23 at p. 1; Doc. 30, Exhibit A at p. 2; Exhibit C at p. 9).

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Arizona Court of

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Appeals raising the following grounds for relief:

ARGUMENT I

THE FIRST DEGREE MURDER STATUTE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS BY

ELIMINATING ACTUAL REFLECTION AS A REQUIREMENT TO PROVE

PREMEDITATION.

ARGUMENT II

APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE COURT'S

REFUSAL TO ADMIT POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE.

ARGUMENT III

THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING BAD ACTS EVIDENCE AGAINST

[PETITIONER], VIOLATING [HIS] DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.

ARGUMENT IV

DEATH QUALIFYING JURORS IN A JUDGE SENTENCING STATE

VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND DEPRIVED [PETITIONER] OF A FAIR

TRIAL.

(Doc. 30, Exhibit C at pp. 12,18,28 and 33).

In a memorandum decision filed on June 28, 2001, the Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's convictions and sentences. 

(Doc. 30, Exhibit A at p. 12). The Arizona Supreme Court likewise

denied review and the Arizona Court of Appeals entered its order

and mandate on November 29, 2001. (Id. at Exhibit D). 

On November 29, 2001, petitioner initiated state postconviction relief proceedings when he filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 in the state

trial court. (Doc. 30 at Exhibit E). Petitioner filed a Rule 32

petition on January 26, 2003, raising the following claim:

In the aftermath of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

..., and Ring v. Arizona, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 2428,

2439, ..., the procedure by which the trial court alone

determined the aggravating circumstances at sentencing

deprived Petitioner of his right to a jury trial and to

a determination of their truth beyond a reasonable doubt

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An amended petition filed March 24, 2003, raised the same issue.

(Doc. 30, Exhibit F). The trial court dismissed the petition in a

minute entry entered on May 19, 2003, finding "no claim presents a

material issue of fact or law that would entitle [petitioner] to

relief ..." (Id. at Exhibit G). In addition, the trial court

concluded that petitioner's Apprendi/Ring claim is not "colorable"

and the claim was "precluded under Rule 32.2(A)(3), Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure, as having been waived at trial or upon

appeal." (Id.). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied a petition for review

without comment on June 29, 2004. (Doc. 30 at Exhibit H). The

Arizona Supreme Court also denied review without comment on April

20, 2005. (Id. at Exhibit I). Petitioner filed this Third

Amended Habeas petition on April 21, 2006, raising the following

grounds:

GROUND I

[Petitioner] was Denied Due Process [by] the Court's

Refusal to admit Polygraph Evidence, Violating Fifth &

Fourteenth Amendments

GROUND II

The Court Erred in Admitting Bad Acts Evidence Against

[petitioner] Violating [petitioner's] due process

rights. Also violating Fifth & Fourteenth Amendments

GROUND III

Death Qualifying Jurors in a Judge sentencing state

Violate[s] Due process and deprived [petitioner] of a

fair trial. Violates Sixth Amendment, Fifth & Fourteenth

Amendments

GROUND IV

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments

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[The trial courts summary dismissal of petitioner's

Apprendi/Ring claim in his Rule 32 petition on the

ground that it was not a "colorable" claim and was

waived because it was not presented at trial or on

appeal was error because "[a]t the time petitioner was

sentenced (May 17, 2000), Apprendi v. New Jersey ... had

not been decided, and he could not assert an as yet

unrecognized basis for a constitutional claim."].

II. DISCUSSION

Respondents first seek denial of Grounds I, II and IV of the

third amended petition on the basis that the claims presented in

these grounds have not been properly exhausted in state court and

are now procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 30 at pp. 4-9).

A. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the following standard for

granting a federal habeas petition originating from a state court

conviction applies:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

The Act also codifies a presumption of correctness of state

court findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) states that "a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof

to rebut the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." As

discussed more fully below, these provisions of the Act set the

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standard for the Court’s evaluation of the merits.

The Act limits the district court’s discretion to hold

evidentiary hearings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) states:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis

of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall

not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that

was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

A petition may be denied on the merits even though it

contains unexhausted claims, and the state does not waive

exhaustion except by an express waiver on the record. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(2) and (3).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

1. Law Generally

A federal court has authority to review a federal

constitutional claim presented by a state prisoner if available

state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454

U.S. 1, 3 (1981)(per curiam); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829,

833 (9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in

case law and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, now states:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

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of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that--

 (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available

in the courts of the State; or

 (B)(i) there is an absence of available state

corrective process; or

 (ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

.......

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted

the remedies available in the courts of the State,

within the meaning of this section, if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available

procedure, the question presented.

The exhaustion requirement can be satisfied in one of two

ways. First, a petitioner can fairly present his or her claims to

the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through

either the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Only one of these avenues of relief must be

exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. 

This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown

v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy,

827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059

(1989).

Claims presented in habeas petitions are considered exhausted

if they have been ruled upon by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

However, if the sentence received is life imprisonment, the claims

must be presented to the Arizona Supreme Court. Swoopes, 196 F.3d

at 1010. Although a federal habeas petitioner may reformulate

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somewhat the claims made in state court, Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796

F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d in part on other grounds by

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the substance of the federal

claim must have been "fairly presented" in state court. Anderson

v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam); Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971). While the petitioner need not recite

"book and verse on the federal constitution," Picard, 404 U.S. at

277-78 (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir.

1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support

the federal claim were before the state courts or that a "somewhat

similar state law claim was made." Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6.

As an alternative to presenting his claims to the highest

state court, a petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement

by demonstrating that no state remedies remained available at the

time the federal habeas petition was filed. Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 125 (n. 28)(1982); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602

(9th Cir. 1989). However, this path is fraught with danger:

If state remedies are not available because the

petitioner failed to comply with state procedures and

thereby prevented the highest state court from reaching

the merits of his claim, then a federal court may refuse

to reach the merits of that claim as a matter of comity.

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988); see also

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (determining that the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied if a petitioner presented a claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct review or via a petition

for post-conviction relief). This failure to comply with

reasonable state procedures is usually characterized as

"procedural default," "procedural bar," or a "waiver." As

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1

Appellate defaults are examined under the same standards that

apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim during trial.

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

8

discussed, exhausting state remedies by means of a procedural

default is risky. The burden is on the petitioner to show that he

or she has properly exhausted each claim. Dismissal of the

petition is proper when the record does not show that the

exhaustion requirement is met. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103,

1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023

(1982). If the unavailability of state remedies is in no way the

fault of the petitioner or his or her counsel, the exhaustion

requirement will likely be satisfied and a federal court may reach

the merits of the petitioner’s habeas claims.

In many cases, however, the lack of available state remedies

is a direct result of the petitioner’s failure to avail himself of

the state remedies in a timely or procedurally correct manner. In

such instances, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted, and may

not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of

"cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse the default.1 Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-

91 (1977); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989);

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). "Cause"

is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). "Prejudice" is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Id.

"Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a

procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court ‘has not given the

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term "cause" precise content.’" Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268,

1274 (11th Cir.)(quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that

cause should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to

petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a

claim was not reasonably available to counsel, (citation

omitted), or that "some interference by officials,"

(citation omitted), made compliance impracticable, would

constitute cause under this standard.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Harmon, 894

F.2d at 1275; Allen v. Risley, 817 F.2d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1987).

The standard is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). The

"cause and prejudice" standard is equally applicable to pro se

litigants, Harmon, 894 F.2d at 1274; Hughes, 800 F.2d at 908,

whether literate and assisted by "jailhouse lawyers," Tacho, 862

F.2d at 1381; illiterate and unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909, or

non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989).

Finally, if a claim has been found to be procedurally

defaulted, the failure to establish cause for the default may be

excused under exceptional circumstances. For instance:

... in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ even in the absence of showing cause for

the procedural default.

Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

327 (1995)(to meet the Murray standard, "the petitioner must show

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that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him in the light of the new evidence").

2. Application of Law to Grounds I, II and IV

a. Grounds I and II

Respondents first contend the claims presented in Grounds I

and II are procedurally defaulted because they were not raised in

state court as violations of federal law or petitioner's federal

constitutional rights. (Doc. 30 at p. 8). The Magistrate Judge

disagrees. Upon review, petitioner presented both of these claims

as violations of his federal constitutional rights. With respect

to Ground I (alleging a violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights when the court refused to admit polygraph

evidence of another man, Ramon Alvas), petitioner on direct appeal

alleged that the trial court's failure to admit this evidence

"denied [him] a fair trial in violation of the due process clause

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution as well as Art. II, §§ 4 and 24 of the Arizona

Constitution." (Doc. 30, Exhibit C at p. 18). In addition and of

considerable note, in disposing of this claim on appeal, the

Arizona Court of Appeals cited U.S. Supreme Court precedent as

well as Arizona cases which, in turn, specifically cited federal

precedent. (Doc. 30, Exhibit A at pp. 4-5 (n. 2)). Thus, in

addition to petitioner's assertion of a federal violation, the

state court's consideration of the federal aspects of this claim

leads to the conclusion that the federal nature of this claim was

squarely before the state courts. 

Similarly, with respect to Ground II (alleging the trial

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court violated his due process rights under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution when it admitted

"Bad Acts" evidence against him at trial), petitioner specifically

couched this claim in his appellate brief as a "violat[ion] [of]

[his] right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution ..." (Doc. 30,

Exhibit C at p. 28). 

Although, respondents quote Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098

(9th Cir. 1999), this case does not support their contention that

petitioner failed to exhaust the federal nature of Grounds I and

II in state court. In Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666 (9th Cir.

2000), modified on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001),

the Court noted that Hiivala predicated its determination that a

habeas petitioner had not "fairly presented" a federal claim to

the fact that the petitioner in that case "'did not refer to the

Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution' and 'cited

[neither] the Fourteenth Amendment nor any federal case law ..." 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. In this case, petitioner's specific

invocation of a violation of due process guaranteed by the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, clearly raised

the federal nature of his claim. 

b. Ground IV

Respondents also contend petitioner procedurally defaulted

Ground IV of the Third Amended Petition. In Ground IV, petitioner

asserts his sentences violate his federal constitutional rights

because the Arizona sentencing laws permitted the judge to impose

sentence based on aggravating factors determined by the judge

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instead of the jury. Petitioner contends this is in violation of

the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 

(See Doc. 23 at p. 8). 

Respondents contend that when petitioner raised this claim in

his Rule 32 proceeding, the state courts found the claim

procedurally deficient. Specifically, the trial court held that

the claim was barred from consideration pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2(a)(3) "as having been waived at trial or upon appeal." (Doc.

30, Exhibit G at p. 1). The trial court noted that "[t]rial

counsel raised the issue for Jury determination of aggravating

factors, the motion was denied, and was not appealed." (Id.). 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2 states, in pertinent part:

a. Preclusion. A defendant shall be precluded from

relief under this rule based upon any ground:

.....

(3) That has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any

previous collateral proceeding.

The state court's finding that petitioner's Apprendi claim was

precluded from consideration on the merits will prevent federal

habeas review if the state procedural bar is independent of

federal law and adequate to warrant withdrawal of federal relief,

that is, the bar is regularly applied by the state courts. 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) is an independent and adequate state

bar. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (finding

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) determination independent of federal

law); Ortiz v. Smith, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding

Rule 32.2(a)(3) regularly followed and adequate). 

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2

The issue involved in Cassett was a claim of violation of due

process by admission at trial of evidence of a prior guilty plea.

See Cassett, 406 F.3d at 619-20.

13

However, in analyzing the "waiver" bar of Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2(a)(3), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that

"[u]nder Arizona law, a claim that is of 'sufficient

constitutional magnitude' can only be waived 'knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently.'" Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d

614, 622 (9th Cir. 2005). The court went on to hold that "[i]f

the right asserted 'is of sufficient constitutional magnitude to

require personal waiver by the defendant and there has been no

personal waiver, the claim is not precluded." Id. 

The Cassett Court did not provide specific guidance on what

type of claim is of sufficient magnitude to require a personal

waiver, however, the court stated that making such a determination

is a "fact-intensive inquiry" that "Arizona state courts are

better suited to make ..."2 The court went on to conclude that

"[b]ecause it is not clear that the Arizona courts would hold

Cassett's federal due process claim barred under Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2(a)(3), we conclude that his claim is not procedurally

defaulted." Cassett, 406 F.2d at 623. 

In this case, unlike Cassett, the trial court specifically

determined that petitioner's Apprendi claim was precluded pursuant

to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). Thus, unlike Cassett, the state

court in this case expressly concluded petitioner waived his

Apprendi claim by failing to present it on direct appeal. (Doc.

30 at Exhibit G). Recently, one court held a habeas petitioner's

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claim procedurally defaulted, distinguishing Cassett because

"Cassett did not involve the actual finding of preclusion by the

state court. Here, the Court clearly found preclusion." Bailey

v. Schriro, 2006 WL 1663484 (D.Ariz., June 7, 2006 at *21 (n. 4)). 

The present case mirrors Bailey, in that the state courts clearly

found petitioner's Apprendi claim precluded pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). (Doc. 23, Exhibit G at p. 1). As a

result, this claim should be procedurally barred from federal

habeas review.

C. Merits

1. Habeas Standard of Review

 Under the AEDPA the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is

limited to circumstances in which the state court adjudication

"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved and

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States ... or

resulted in a decision that was an unreasonable determination of

the facts ..." 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) and (2). "[A] state court

decision applies 'clearly established' Supreme Court law under the

AEDPA when it 'applies a rule dictated by [Supreme Court]

precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became

final." Campbell v. Rice, 265 F.3d 878, 889 (9th Cir.

2001)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 376 (2001)). As

stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

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indistinguishable facts. Under the 'reasonable

application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court's decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner's case.

...

[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is

different from an incorrect application of federal law

...a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, the application must also be unreasonable.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring in

part, and concurring in the judgment). "In order for a state

court's application of federal law to be unreasonable, it must

have been clearly erroneous." Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143,

1152-54 (9th Cir. 2000). "Petitioner cannot meet his burden by

simply convincing the federal court that he has the better of two

reasonable legal arguments." Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832,

837 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1154)).

2. Petitioner's Properly Exhausted Claims

a. Ground I

In Ground I, petitioner contends that his due process rights

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the

trial court refused to admit the results of a polygraph test

administered to a prosecution witness, Ramon Alva. Petitioner

argues this evidence revealed Alva was not truthful when he denied

during a polygraph exam that he shot the victim, Charlie Bremer,

and when he responded affirmatively when asked if petitioner shot

the victim. (Doc. 23 at p. 5).

Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. (Doc. 30,

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Exhibit C at p. 18). The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected his

claim. (Id., Exhibit A at p. 4). This court must uphold this

determination if it was neither contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law as determined by

the U.S. Supreme Court, or an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1) and (2). 

In rejecting this claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals held

that the Arizona Supreme Court previously found that "as a matter

of law polygraph evidence is not reliable" and "is inadmissible

[under Arizona law] absent stipulation of the parties." (Doc. 23,

Exhibit A at p. 4 (Citing State v. Rodriguez, 186 Ariz. 240, 250,

921 P.2d 643, 653 (1996)). The court also cited the U.S. Supreme

Court in U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 317 (1998) for the

proposition that a per se rule against the admission of polygraph

evidence is constitutional. (Doc. 23, Exhibit A at p. 4 (n. 2)). 

This court must defer to the Arizona Court of Appeals

interpretation of state law on this point. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Moreover, the Arizona Court of

Appeals' determination that barring polygraph evidence comported

with federal law as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court is not

an unreasonable application of that court's holding in Scheffer. 

In Scheffer, the court noted that "[a] defendant's right to

present relevant evidence is not unlimited, ..." The court held

that "state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the

Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal

trials" and that such exclusions do not abridge a defendant's

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constitutional rights "so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or

'disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve." 

Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308. The court noted a "lack of scientific

consensus is reflected in the disagreement among state and federal

courts concerning both the admissibility and reliability of

polygraph evidence" and observed that "[m]ost states maintain per

se rules excluding polygraph evidence." Scheffer, 523 U.S. at

310-11. The court concluded by noting that "the degree of

reliability of polygraph evidence may depend upon a variety of

identifiable factors" and that "certain doubts and uncertainties

plague even the best polygraph exams." Id. at 312. For these

reasons, the court held that "a per se rule excluding all

polygraph evidence [does not violate the U.S. Constitution]." 

Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 312. 

As a result, the Arizona Court of Appeals' rejection (upheld

on review by the Arizona Supreme Court) of petitioner's claim

alleging his constitutional right to due process of law was denied

when the trial court refused to admit polygraph evidence was a

reasonable application of Scheffer and should be upheld.

b. Ground II

In this ground, petitioner alleges that the trial court erred

in "admitting" several examples of "bad act" evidence, violating

his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. 

(Doc. 23 at p. 6). Petitioner cites the following specific

examples:

(1) the prosecutor elicited from [witness] Leon Taylor

... a nonresponsive answer that [petitioner] got out of

his car with a shotgun.

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3

The Court notes the trial court did not admit the evidence

complained of in numbers (2) and (3) above and there was no

objection to items (4) and (5) above. Therefore, the only issue

preserved is item number (1) above.

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(2) ... Leon Taylor testified that when he came outside,

there was a shotgun in his vehicle and [petitioner] was

about to get into his vehicle ....

(3) While questioning witness Melinda Shaw, the

prosecutor approached and asked the court to be allowed

to elicit [from her] that [petitioner] threatened

someone with a shotgun.

(4) ... the prosecutor elicited from [witness] Crystal

Long that, at a block party [petitioner] was in

possession of a "sawed off" shotgun.

(5) Detective Steve Lewis testified that during a search

of [petitioner's] home he found some shotgun shells in

the bedroom of [petitioner's] grandmother.

(Id.). Petitioner notes that objections were sustained to some,

if not all of this "shotgun" testimony and that the Court even

ordered some testimony be stricken. (See Doc. 23 at p. 6). 

However, petitioner contends that in spite of this "the jury was

well aware that [he] had a 'sawed off shotgun,'" and argues this

prejudiced him because "there was no connection what so-ever

between [him] carrying a shotgun and the commission of the crime. 

The crime wasn't comitted [sic] with a shotgun." (Id.).

In rejecting these claims of error in admitting3 allegedly

"bad act" evidence, the Arizona Court of Appeals focused on state

law, namely Ariz.R.Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) states:

 Except as provided in Rule 404(c) evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible

for other purposes, such as proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

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The language of this rule tracks to a great extent the language of

Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). The court rejected each of these "five

instances cited by [petitioner]." Regarding the first instance of

alleged error the court stated:

 ... witness L.T. [Leon Taylor] testified that

[petitioner] "had told me that he had gone out and

killed (the victim) and that he was the triggerman."

L.T. further testified that approximately three weeks

later, he and several other people saw [petitioner] at a

McDonald's restaurant. L.T. stated, in a nonresponsive

answer, that [petitioner] "got out of the car with a

shotgun in his hand." Defense counsel objected pursuant

to Rule 404(b) and moved for a mistrial. After a

lengthy discussion held at the bench, the trial court

denied the motion. L.T. then testified that

[petitioner] appeared serious and "asked me if I told

anyone about what I knew [about the murder]." When L.T.

replied that he had not, [petitioner] "got back in the

car and left."

 [Petitioner's] actions (including his demeanor, his

use of the shotgun, his question, and his subsequent

departure after a negative response from L.T.) were

relevant to show his consciousness of guilt .... We

conclude that this testimony constitutes direct evidence

that [petitioner] committed the charged offense.

[Citation omitted]. Thus, we find that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence.

(Doc. 30, Exhibit A at pp. 6-7).

Concerning the second instance, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

stated:

 L.T. later described an occasion in which he gave

[petitioner] a ride and [petitioner] possessed a

shotgun. L.T. stated that he was about to deliver some

pizzas ... when [petitioner] appeared and requested a

ride. L.T. stepped inside to get some sodas, and when

he came back outside "there was a shotgun in my vehicle

and [petitioner] was about to get in the vehicle." L.T.

gave [petitioner] a ride and then [he] exited the

vehicle with a shotgun.

 Defense counsel objected to the testimony and

requested it be stricken and the jury be instructed to

disregard the whole matter as irrelevant. The court

granted defense counsel's request and advised the jury

that the proffered testimony was "ordered stricken ...

and you [the jury] are not to consider that as testimony

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..." The record also reveals that, both in its

preliminary and final jury instructions, the court

advised the jury to disregard questions and answers for

which an objection had been sustained and to not

consider any testimony stricken from the record.

 We presume that the jury followed the court's

instructions. [Citations omitted]. "Experience teaches

us that they possess both common sense and a strong

desire to properly perform their duties." [Citation

omitted]. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion

in the method used by the trial court to cure the error.

(Doc. 30, Exhibit A at p. 7).

The third instance cited by petitioner concerns testimony 

from Melinda Shaw. The Arizona Court of Appeals stated:

While questioning M.S. [Shaw] on redirect, the

prosecutor, at a side bar conference requested that the

court allow him to elicit testimony that [petitioner]

had a shotgun and had threatened people with it, because

on cross-examination defense counsel had asked questions

for the purpose of indicating that [petitioner] "isn't

tough, he just does things without anything to back it

up." Defense counsel objected, arguing that [Shaw's]

"knowledge comes from somebody else," and the court

sustained the objection. Because the court disallowed

the proffered evidence, and the jury did not hear it, no

error exists in this instance.

(Doc. 30, Exhibit A at p. 8).

In the fourth instance, regarding testimony from Crystal

Long (C.L.), the Arizona Court of Appeals stated:

 Witness C.L. testified that, at a teenage drinking

party, "some kid" threatened [petitioner], and

petitioner replied "I'm going to do you like I did that

kid (the victim) up on Happy Valley." C.L. asked

[petitioner] whether he actually killed the victim, and

petitioner replied, "[J]ust you don't worry about it." 

Petitioner also showed C.L. a sawed-off shotgun in the

back of his truck ....

 We find that [petitioner's] verbal and

demonstrative response to C.L.'s query was relevant both

as an admission, [citation omitted], and to show his

consciousness of guilt. [Citation omitted]. We conclude

that this testimony constitutes direct evidence that

[petitioner] committed the charged offense ....

(Doc. 23, Exhibit A at p. 8).

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In the final instance, concerning testimony from Phoenix 

Police Detective Steve Lewis, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated:

... Lewis testified that during a search of the

residence where [petitioner] lived, he found, among

other things, some shotgun shells in [petitioner's]

grandmother's bedroom .... Viewing the record as a

whole, [citation omitted], we cannot say that

introduction of the shotgun shell testimony reached the

foundation of [petitioner's] case, deprived him of any

right essential to his defense, or deprived him of a

fair trial.

(Doc. 30, Exhibit A at p. 9).

"A state court's procedural or evidentiary ruling is not

subject to federal habeas review unless the ruling violates

federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal

constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the

defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due

process." Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). 

As a result, petitioner cannot prevail on his contention that the

above-described testimony violated his constitutional right to due

process of law and denied him a fair trial in violation of the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments unless he shows that state court's

decision to admit the "prior bad acts evidence ... was arbitrary

or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally

unfair." Id.

Review of these claims shows the trial court's action did not

render his trial fundamentally unfair. Concerning the testimony

of Leon Taylor and Crystal Long, the Arizona Court of Appeals held

this testimony amounted to direct evidence of guilt. In addition,

the court's conclusion that Long's testimony that she heard

petitioner tell another person at a party "I'm going to do you

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like I did that kid (the victim) ..." was an admission showing

consciousness of guilt admissible under Ariz.R.Evid. 801(a)(2) and

(d)(2) is reasonable. In another instance, concerning the

prosecution's request to question witness Melinda Shaw, the

Arizona Court of Appeals correctly noted that the trial court

denied the motion and the jury never knew about the question the

prosecution sought to ask.

In each of these instances, the Arizona Court of Appeals'

determination was a reasonable application of state evidentiary

law and, as such, did not violate petitioner's due process right

to a fair trial. See Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357. 

Finally, with respect to Detective Lewis' testimony about

finding shotgun shells in petitioner's house (grandmother's

bedroom), in light of other admissible testimony heard by the jury

concerning petitioner's possession/ownership of a shotgun (the

testimony of Taylor and Long), testimony that ammunition for the

shotgun was found in petitioner's home was not prejudicial. In

sum, the Arizona Court of Appeals' conclusion that this testimony

by Lewis did not deprive petitioner of a fair trial is a

reasonable conclusion based on the law and facts and this claim

should be denied.

c. Ground III

In Ground III, petitioner contends that "[d]eath qualifying

jurors in a judge sentencing state violate[s] due process and

deprived [him] of a fair trial" in violation of his Fifth, Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 23 at p. 7). 

Specifically, petitioner asserts that since the jurors determined

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4

Petitioner was convicted in 2000, prior to the U.S. Supreme

Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) requiring

that a jury determine the factors warranting imposition of a death

sentence instead of the judge. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.

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only his guilty or innocence "questioning [them] regarding the[ir]

views on death penalty" was not appropriate and was

"unnecessary."4

 (Id.). Petitioner contends that"studies ... show

that death qualifying juries results in a 'conviction prone' jury"

and that a "considerable body of research has been conducted, and

it indicates that individuals who favor the death penalty have

correlated attitudes which may bias them towards the prosecution." 

(Id.). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim on appeal. 

The court stated:

 A court may question prospective jurors regarding

capital punishment where their attitude concerning the

death penalty might prevent them from performing their

duties and making an impartial decision. [Citation

omitted]. "The United States Supreme Court has held

that the Sixth Amendment is violated if the trial jury

in a capital case is chosen by excluding for cause

persons who have general objections to the death

penalty. State v. Anderson, 197 Ariz. 314, 318, para.

6, 4 P.3d 369, 373 (2000) (emphasis added) (citing

Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-23 (1968)). 

"However, this rule is not applicable to prospective

jurors who state unequivocally that they could never

impose the death penalty regardless of the facts in a

particular case." Id. at para. 7 (citing Witherspoon,

391 U.S. at 514).

 The Arizona Supreme Court has repeatedly approved

the death qualification process in Arizona, even though

juries do not sentence. [Citations omitted] .... 

Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has "rejected

the argument that the process produces conviction-prone

jurors." [State v.] Jones, 197 Ariz. at 309 ... [citing

Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168-73 & nn. 4-5

(1986)).

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "the Constitution does

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not prohibit the States from "death qualifying" juries in capital

cases." Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173. In upholding the

constitutionality of this practice, the court distinguished "death

qualifying" from exclusion of groups based on factors such as race

or gender, because "[d]eath qualification, unlike the wholesale

exclusion of blacks, women, or Mexican-Americans from jury

service, is carefully designed to serve the State's concededly

legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly

and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the

guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial." Lockhart, 476

U.S. at 175-76.

Petitioner does not allege that the trial court engaged in

improper conduct in "death qualifying" the jury. He merely

asserts that the act of "death qualifying" denied him a fair trial

because it created a likelihood of stacking the jury with members

predisposed to side with the prosecution. The U.S. Supreme Court

has held that "death qualifying" a jury does not violate the U.S.

Constitution. The Arizona Court of Appeals determination that

this claim was without merit was a reasonable interpretation of

the holding in Lockhart and this claim should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Third Amended Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s

order and judgment. The parties shall have ten (10) days from the

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date of service of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver

of a party's right to de novo consideration of the factual issues

and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate

review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. 

DATED this 18th day of September, 2006.

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