Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-mc-80233/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-mc-80233-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL A. BRUZZONE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

INTEL CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 16-80233 WHA

ORDER RE PRE-FILING

REVIEW OF COMPLAINT

For years, plaintiff Michael Bruzzone has tirelessly pursued a series of frivolous,

duplicative, and abusive lawsuits against defendant Intel Corporation (and others). The

undersigned, presiding over one such action in 2014, eventually declared plaintiff a vexatious

litigant and ordered pre-filing review of any further pro se complaints brought by plaintiff

against Intel in this district. Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., No. 3:14-cv-01279-WHA (Dkt. No. 88). 

On November 18, 2016, the undersigned reviewed and rejected yet another proposed

complaint from plaintiff that named as defendants 19 entities and individuals, including the

undersigned (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff then submitted a document titled “Declaratory Relief - Case

Reinstatement / Equity,” seeking to “reinstate” the proposed complaint and disqualify the

undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(a) & (b)(1) (Dkt. No. 4). Section 455(a) & (b)(1)

provides, “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself

in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” or “[w]here he has

a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” Section 455 is self-enforcing. Although a

party may “prompt the judge . . . to determine independently whether all the circumstances call

Case 3:16-mc-80233-WHA Document 5 Filed 12/09/16 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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for recusal under [Section 455(a) & (b)(1)],” the matter is one for the judge to decide within

their sound discretion. United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867–68 (9th Cir. 1980). 

The standard for disqualification based on personal bias and prejudice is “whether a

reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality

might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986)

(citations omitted). Section 455(a) & (b)(1) “require[s] recusal only if the bias or prejudice is

directed against a party and stems from an extrajudicial source.” Sibla, 624 F.2d at 869. 

Importantly, allegations of bias or prejudice involving a judge’s judicial acts, including

prior adverse rulings against a party, do not constitute the requisite bias or prejudice. Liteky v.

United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994); Studley, 783 F.2d at 939; Ronwin v. State Bar of

Ariz., 686 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S.

558 (1984). Under this framework, plaintiff’s rehashed complaints about the undersigned’s

adverse rulings against him in a prior action do not justify disqualification under Section 455.

Although plaintiff did not mention it, this order recognizes that Section 455(b)(5)(i)

requires a judge to disqualify himself from proceedings to which he is a party. Based on this,

the undersigned has already recused himself from five other lawsuits brought by plaintiff in

2016. Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., No. 3:16-mc-80042-VC (Dkt. No. 2); Bruzzone v. Intel Corp.,

No. 3:16-mc-80063-HSG (Dkt. No. 3); Bruzzone v. Alsup, No. 3:16-mc-80103-RS (Dkt. No. 4);

Bruzzone v. Intel Corp., No. 3:16-mc-80111-EMC (Dkt. No. 4); Bruzzone v. Intel Corp. Legal

Dept., No. 3:16-mc-80126-JST (Dkt. No. 5). Upon considering plaintiff’s litigation activities

up to this point, however, this order concludes recusal is unnecessary here because plaintiff’s

naming of judges as defendants in his lawsuits is clearly as frivolous as the lawsuits themselves.

Although Section 455(b)(5)(i) does not expressly provide for a judge’s exercise of

discretion, circuit courts have upheld district judges’ decisions not to disqualify themselves

“unless there is a legitimate basis for suing the judge.” E.g., Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505,

508 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Andersen v. Roszkowski, 681 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22,

1988)). Such decisions have recognized, “at least in principle, a potential exception to [Section

455(b)(5)(i)] when the naming of a judge as a defendant is frivolous.” Mina v. Chester Cty.,

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2015 WL 6550543, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2015). For example, in Gabor v. Seligmann, our

court of appeals upheld a district judge’s decision not to recuse himself even though he was

named as a defendant in an amended complaint. 222 F. App’x 577, 578 (9th Cir. 2007). And,

in Davis v. Kvalheim, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a district judge’s decision not to recuse

himself from a lawsuit that, like this one, frivolously accused a laundry list of defendants —

including the presiding judge — of conspiring to violate the plaintiff’s rights. 261 F. App’x

231, 232–34 (11th Cir. 2008).

Our court of appeals declined in Glick to decide whether Section 455(b)(5)(i) “excepts,

for example, a situation in which a plaintiff’s claims against the presiding judge are facially

improper or frivolous,” opting to affirm on other grounds two judges’ refusals to recuse

themselves in that case. Glick, 803 F.3d at 508. The Eleventh Circuit in Davis similarly

avoided deciding the issue but noted that, given the frivolousness of the underlying claims, the

district judge’s decision not to recuse himself was harmless error even if it was a “technical

violation” of Section 455(b)(5)(i). Davis, 261 F. App’x at 234. Decisions addressing this issue

have also invoked other legal principles to justify their departure from the literal reading of

Section 455(b)(5)(i). One such principle is that “‘[a] judge is not disqualified merely because a

litigant sues or threatens to sue him.’ . . . Such an easy method for obtaining disqualification

should not be encouraged or allowed.” Ronwin, 686 F.2d at 701 (citing United States v.

Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 954 (1978)); see Gabor,

222 F. App’x at 578. Relatedly, a non-literal interpretation of Section 455(b)(5)(i) prevents

plaintiffs from “judge-shopping” by simply naming judges as defendants. See Andersen, 681 F.

Supp. at 1289. Another principle relevant here is the ancient “rule of necessity” permitting

otherwise disqualified judges to hear cases that cannot otherwise be heard, e.g., where a litigant

alleging systematic conspiracy has sued or will eventually sue every judge available. See

Davis, 261 F. App’x at 234; Glick, 803 F.3d at 508–09. 

Each of these principles would support a non-literal reading of Section 455(b)(5)(i) here. 

In 2016 alone, plaintiff has named the undersigned as a defendant on five frivolous proposed

complaints (not counting the instant action), effectively circumventing the streamlining purpose

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of pre-filing review as his lawsuits were reassigned to five other judges in this district. 

Moreover, after Judge Richard Seeborg dismissed plaintiff’s third proposed complaint this year,

plaintiff named both the undersigned and Judge Seeborg as defendants in yet another proposed

complaint. Bruzzone v. Intel Corp. Legal Dept., No. 3:16-mc-80126-JST (Dkt. No. 2). Now, in

his sixth proposed complaint this year, plaintiff claims the fraudulent “scheme” against him — a

recurring theme in his lawsuits — has expanded to encompass at least nine judges in both

federal and state courts (Dkt. No. 1 at 63).

Plaintiff should not be permitted to circumvent pre-filing review, waste judicial

resources much needed in legitimate cases, and hinder the efficient administration of justice

with volleys of frivolous lawsuits. Nor should he be able to judge-shop by simply naming as

defendants judges who have ruled against him. Although plaintiff has not yet sued every judge

in this district, even the rule of necessity is implicated here because plaintiff has already

demonstrated his willingness to incorporate judges who rule against him into his everexpanding conspiracy theory. As the Mina decision aptly put it, “[w]ith respect to the potential

naming of other federal judges in this district as defendants, it takes no great guesswork to

figure out what the future holds should the plaintiff[] persist in filing lawsuits.” Mina, 2015

WL 6550543, at *7 (citing Glick, 803 F.3d at 509). To recuse in this case would invite “as

many problems as it solves,” and our court of appeals has stated it will not “require courts to

acquiesce to the extraordinary demands of vexatious litigants.” Glick, 803 F.3d at 509. Thus,

given the foregoing vexatious history, this order concludes the undersigned is not disqualified

under Section 455(b)(5)(i) — despite being named as a defendant in the proposed complaint at

issue. 

This order also addresses, although plaintiff did not, Local Rule 3-14, which provides,

“Whenever an affidavit of bias or prejudice directed at a Judge of this Court is filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 144, and the Judge has determined not to recuse him or herself and found that the

affidavit is neither legally insufficient nor interposed for delay, the Judge shall refer the request

for disqualification to the Clerk for random assignment to another Judge.” The commentary to

the rule added, “This rule does not preclude a Judge from referring matters arising under 28

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For the Northern District of California

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U.S.C. § 455 to the Clerk so that another Judge can determine disqualification,” indicating such

referral is permitted but not required. The rule does not require referral of plaintiff’s instant

request for disqualification, which relies on Section 455, not Section 144, and is legally

insufficient in any case. Insofar as the spirit of Rule 3-14 may be implicated here, moreover, it

does not compel referral under the circumstances of this case for the same reasons that Section

455(b)(5)(i) does not compel disqualification.

Plaintiff’s proposed complaint, like others he has filed this year, does not state a

potentially cognizable claim. Accordingly, the Clerk is instructed not to accept the proposed

complaint for filing, and this action is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 9, 2016. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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