Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00064/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00064-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GELASIO SALAZAR and SAAD

SHAMMAS, et al.

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 07-CV-0064-IEG-WMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR CLASS

CERTIFICATION

(Doc. No. 58.)

vs.

AVIS BUDGET GROUP, INC., BUDGET

RENT A CAR SYSTEM, INC., AVIS

BUDGET CAR RENTAL, LLC, AB CAR

RENTAL SERVICES, INC., and AVIS

RENT A CAR SYSTEM, LLC,

Defendants.

Presently before the Court is a motion for class certification filed by plaintiffs Gelasio

Salazar and Saad Shammas. (Doc. No. 58.) For the following reasons, the Court denies the

motion. 

BACKGROUND

Factual Background

Plaintiffs bring this purported class action to recover wages allegedly owed to mechanics

and “mechanics’ helpers” (collectively “employees”) for work days they did not take a thirty

minute meal period. Defendants are companies involved in operating the Avis and Budget car

rental agencies. Plaintiff Gelasio Salazar worked for one of the Budget companies as a mechanic’s

helper beginning in 1999. Plaintiff Saad Shammas worked for a Budget company as a mechanic’s

Case 3:07-cv-00064-IEG-WMC Document 87 Filed 07/02/08 Page 1 of 8
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Plaintiffs and defendants have each filed objections to the exhibits cited in support of and in

opposition to the motion. The Court overrules defendants’ objections based on vagueness, ambiguity,

foundation and relevance. See Defendants’ Objections at 2-8. The Court overrules plaintiffs’

objections to the declarations in support of defendants’ opposition to the motion, as they are not

supported by law. See Plaintiffs’ Objections at 2-3. The Court denies as moot any other objections

and requests for judicial notice not discussed in this Order. 

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helper beginning in 2003. 

Plaintiffs allege they did not always take a meal period of at least thirty minutes after

working for five hours and are thus owed additional compensation under the California Labor

Code. The payroll records for the named plaintiffs and other mechanics show they did not always

stop working for a thirty minute meal period during each business day. Defendants argue there is

no evidence they ever required any employee to work through his or her meal period.

Procedural Background

 Plaintiffs filed the class complaint in Superior Court in San Diego, California, and

defendants removed the action to federal court on January 10, 2007. (Doc. No. 1.) On May 8,

2007, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand. (Doc. No. 25.) On May 12, 2008, plaintiffs

filed the instant motion. (Doc. No. 58.) On May 14, 2008, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion to

file an amended complaint. (Doc. No. 65.) Plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint on May

15, 2008. (Doc. No. 66.) On June 9, 2008, defendants filed an opposition to the motion for class

certification. (Doc. No. 72.) On June 16, 2008, plaintiffs filed a reply.1 The Court heard oral

argument on the motion on June 23, 2008 at 10:30 a.m. Sarah Warner and Tim Williams appeared

on behalf of plaintiffs. Jerrilyn Malana and Jody Landry appeared on behalf of defendants.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standard

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the certification of a class in

federal court. As a threshold matter, the moving party must establish that all four requirements of

Rule 23(a) have been met. These four requirements are often referred to as numerosity,

commonality, typicality, and adequacy. Hunt v. Check Recovery Sys., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 505 (N.D.

Cal. 2007). First, the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members individually is

“impracticable.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Second, there must be questions of law or fact

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common to the class. Id. (a)(2). Third, the claims or defenses of the class representative must be

typical of the claims or defenses of the class. Id. (a)(3). And fourth, the person representing the

class must be able to protect fairly and adequately the interests of all members of the class. Id.

(a)(4). 

If all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, the court then determines whether to

certify the class under one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). In this case, plaintiffs rely upon

subsection Rule 23(b)(3), which requires plaintiffs to establish that: (1) questions of law or fact

common to the class predominate; and (2) a class action is superior to other methods available for

adjudicating the controversy at issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

 In determining whether an action warrants class treatment under Rule 23, “the question is

not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but

rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.” Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,

177 (1974). “At this early stage of the litigation, the Court must only determine if the plaintiffs

have proffered enough evidence to meet the requirements of FRCP 23, not weigh competing

evidence.” Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 602, 605 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citation

omitted). The court exercises broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for class

certification. See Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 2003); Dukes v. Wal-Mart,

Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court’s decision to certify this class is

subject to very limited review and will be reversed only upon a strong showing that the district

court’s decision was a clear abuse of discretion.”) (citation omitted). 

Analysis

1. Proposed Class

Plaintiffs move for certification of a class comprised of:

All individuals who have worked as auto mechanics for one or more of the

Defendants in California performing maintenance on Avis and/or Budget rental cars

on or after November 27, 2002. 

2. Do Common Questions Predominate?

The central issue disputed by the parties is whether plaintiffs have shown common

questions of law or fact sufficient to meet their burden under Rule 23(a)(2) and shown that these

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Plaintiffs also claim defendants violated California Labor Code Section 226(a) by failing to

provide employees with accurate wage statements; violated California Labor Code Sections 200

through 202 by failing to pay employees all wages upon termination of employment; and violated

California Business & Professions Code Section 17200 because non-payment of wages is an unlawful

business practice. If defendants had no obligation to pay the additional wages, they did not violate

these other provisions. 

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common questions predominate over individual questions under Rule 23(b)(3). This dispute, in

turn, hinges on the interpretation of California Labor Code Sections 512(a) and 226.7 regarding

meal periods. Section 512 is the basis for plaintiffs’ wage claims and provides:

An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than five

hours per day without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than

30 minutes, except that if the total work period per day of the employee is no more

than six hours, the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of both the

employer and employee.

Cal. Labor Code § 512(a); see also id. § 226.7 (“No employer shall require any employee to work

during any meal or rest period mandated by an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare

Commission.”). The statute also provides for an additional thirty minute meal period if the

employee works ten hours. Id. § 512(a). If an employer fails to provide a meal period, it must pay

the employee for an additional hour of work at the regular rate. Cal. Labor Code § 226.7; Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11090, subd.11(D).2

 

The parties dispute the meaning of “provide” in Sections 512 and 226.7. Plaintiffs argue

defendants must ensure employees actually stop working for thirty minutes each day and if an

employee does not take a meal period for any reason, the extra hour of wages must be paid. 

Defendants argue the statute simply requires employers to make a meal period available, but that

employees may voluntarily work through the meal period or any portion thereof, and be paid for

that time. 

The California Supreme Court has not interpreted the meaning of “provide” in the Labor

Code. Accordingly, the Court “is Erie-bound to apply the law as it believes that court would

[apply] under the circumstances.” White v. Starbucks Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1088 (N.D.

Cal. 2007) (citing Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 663 (9th Cir.

1998)). Decisions of the California courts of appeal are not themselves binding on this Court.

 Brown v. Fed. Express Corp., ___ F.R.D. ___, 2008 WL 906517 at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2008)

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This decision is the subject of defendants’ additional request for judicial notice, which the

Court hereby grants. (Doc. No. 77.)

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(citing Guebara v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

Plaintiffs rely heavily on the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Cicairos v. Summit

Logistics, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 4th 949 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). In that decision, the court explained

“employers have an affirmative obligation to ensure that workers are actually relieved of all duty”

during a meal period. Id. at 962. But in White v. Starbucks, the district court for the Northern

District of California found Cicairos does not support the broad proposition that employers must

ensure breaks are taken. 497 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The court criticized plaintiffs’

reading of Cicairos:

[Plaintiff] harps on one sentence in the case stating that “employers have an

affirmative obligation to ensure that workers are actually relieved of all duty.” That

language is consistent, however, with a rule requiring an employer to offer or

provide or authorize and permit a meal break, i.e., the interpretation that

[defendant] endorses.

497 F. Supp. 2d at 1089 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Kenny v.

Supercuts, Inc., No. C 06-07521 CRB, 2008 WL 2265194 at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2008)

(“Cicairos is not persuasive authority for the proposition that employers must ensure that their

employees take meal breaks and this Court is not bound by the court of appeals’ decision.”).

In White, Chief Judge Walker concluded employers must “offer meal breaks, without

forcing employers actively to ensure that workers are taking these breaks.” 497 F. Supp. 2d at

1089. “[T]he employee must show that he was forced to forego his meal breaks as opposed to

merely showing that he did not take them regardless of the reason.” Id. This interpretation was

also adopted by Judge Fischer in Brown, 2008 WL 906517, and by Judge Breyer in a recent

unpublished decision in Kenny, 2008 WL 2265194.3

Plaintiffs argue their interpretation of the statute is supported by the statutory text, Ninth

Circuit caselaw, and the legislative history. First, plaintiffs point to the waiver provision of

Section 512: “if the total work period per day of the employee is no more than six hours, the meal

period may be waived by mutual consent of both the employer and employee.” Cal. Labor Code §

512(a). Plaintiffs argue this indicates an employee may only decline to take a meal period if he or

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See Plaintiffs’ Reply, Ex. 34.

5

The Court will not consider the unpublished decision in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior

Court of San Diego County (Adam Hohnbaum), No. D049331, 2007 WL 2965604 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.

12, 2007) (Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, Ex B). Brinker did not address the merits of

either interpretation of the statute. Moreover, the Court of Appeal is reconsidering its decision and

a new opinion is forthcoming. The Court also finds no merit to defendants’ argument that the

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she works less than six hours. As Judge Breyer explained in Kenny, the “waiver applies to the

employer’s obligation to ‘provide’ a meal break, not to the employee’s decision to take a meal

break.” 2008 WL 2265194 at *5. Similarly, plaintiffs’ reliance on Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410

F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2005), is misplaced. In Valles, the court held the right to receive meal periods

may not be waived in a collective bargaining agreement. In other words, employees may not

contract away their right to be free from work-related duties during a meal period. But Valles does

not obligate employers to force meal periods upon workers. The documents of the Industrial

Welfare Commission,4 which state employees “must receive” the meal period, also pertain to the

employers’ mandatory duty to provide the meal period. None of these sources indicates an

employer must ensure each employee uses the entire meal period every day. 

The Court agrees with the compelling reasons advanced by the White, Brown, and Kenny

decisions for interpreting “provide” to mean “make available” rather than “ensure taken.” As the

Brown court explained:

Requiring enforcement of meal breaks would place an undue burden on employers

whose employees are numerous or who, as with Plaintiffs, do not appear to remain

in contact with the employer during the day. It would also create perverse

incentives, encouraging employees to violate company meal break policy in order

to receive extra compensation under California wage and hour laws. 

2008 WL 906517 at *6 (internal citation omitted). 

This conclusion is also bolstered by dicta in the California Supreme Court decision in

Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 1094 (2007). Describing the meal period

provisions, the court explained “employees are entitled to an unpaid 30-minute, duty-free meal

period after working for five hours . . . . An employee forced to forgo his or her meal period . . .

loses a benefit to which the law entitles him or her.” Id. at 1104 (emphasis added); see also

Brown, 2008 WL 906517 at *5 (explaining Murphy supports view that meal period use is not

mandatory).5

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California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) adopted that decision by requesting its

publication. Accordingly, the Court denies judicial notice of Exhibits B and C to defendants’ request

for judicial notice. 

6

Plaintiffs attempted to distinguish these cases at oral argument. For example, counsel cited

the language in White v. Starbucks noting the absence of evidence that employees missed meal

periods. The decision, however, noted this factor as well as the absence of evidence the employer

“pressured” employees to miss breaks, which is also absent in this case. 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. The

White court held “the employee must show that he was forced to forego his meal breaks.” Id.

Evidence of missed meal periods does not meet this standard. 

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The White, Kenny, and Brown decisions are persuasive and well-reasoned.6 If this issue

were before it, the California Supreme Court would adopt defendants’ construction of the meal

period provisions. Accordingly, the Court holds plaintiffs must show defendants forced plaintiffs

to forego missed meal periods. 

This interpretation of the statute forecloses class-wide adjudication of claims in this case. 

As in Kenny, “individual issues predominate. Liability cannot be established without individual

trials for each class member to determine why each class member did not clock out for a full 30-

minute meal break on any particular day.” 2008 WL 2265194 at *6; see also Brown, 2008 WL

906517 at *6 (“Because FedEx was required only to make meal breaks . . . available to Plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs may prevail only if they demonstrate that FedEx’s policies deprived them of those

breaks. Any such showing will require substantial individualized fact finding.”); Blackwell v.

SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 453, 467 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (“First, to determine which

employees were not provided a timely 30-minute meal period requires a highly individualized

factual inquiry. This is because many stations did not require employees to clock in-and-out for

meal periods during the majority of the class period, and there are incomplete records to determine

whether meal periods were taken, and, if so, for how long.”).

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for class

certification.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 2, 2008

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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