Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-19-01080/USCOURTS-ca6-19-01080-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 460
Nature of Suit: Deportation
Cause of Action: 

---

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 20a0003p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

USAMA JAMIL HAMAMA, et al.,

Petitioners-Appellees,

v.

REBECCA ADDUCCI, Director of the Detroit District of 

United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

et al.,

Respondents-Appellants.

┐

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

┘

No. 19-1080

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

No. 2:17-cv-11910—Mark A. Goldsmith, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: January 3, 2020

Before: BATCHELDER, SUTTON, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Michael A. Celone, William C. Silvis, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Miriam J. Aukerman, AMERICAN CIVIL 

LIBERTIES UNION FUND OF MICHIGAN, Grand Rapids, Judy Rabinovitz, Lee Gelernt, 

Anand Balakrishnan, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, New York, New York, Margo 

Schlanger, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Nadine Yousif, CODE LEGAL AID INC., Madison Heights, 

Michigan, Kimberly L. Scott, Wendolyn Wrosch Richards, MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK 

& STONE, PLC, Ann Arbor, Michigan, William W. Swor, WILLIAM W. SWOR 

& ASSOCIATES, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees.

SUTTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BATCHELDER, J., joined. 

WHITE, J. (pp. 9–13), delivered a separate opinion concurring only in the judgment.

>

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 1
No. 19-1080 Hamama, et al. v. Adducci, et al. Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Last time around, we held that Congress removed jurisdiction 

from the district courts to enter class-wide injunctions restraining the enforcement of the 

following immigration statutes: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), 

(g). Just before we decided that appeal, the district court issued another class-wide injunction. 

We vacate that injunction, too, and remand again for further proceedings.

I.

Usama Hamama is the named plaintiff in a class of over one thousand Iraqi nationals. 

The federal government entered final removal orders against Hamama and the class members 

between March 1 and June 24, 2017, and the government has detained them or will do so in the 

future. So far, most of them remain in the United States due to diplomatic difficulties preventing 

their return to Iraq.

The district court certified three subclasses: (1) all primary class members without 

individual habeas petitions who are or will be detained by Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, (2) those in the first subclass who are also subject to final removal orders, and 

(3) those in the first subclass whose motions to reopen their removal proceedings have been 

granted and who are being held under a statute mandating their detention. Today’s appeal 

concerns the first subclass.

The district court now has entered a trio of preliminary injunctions. We vacated two of 

them the last time we encountered this case. Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869, 871–72 (6th 

Cir. 2018). The first injunction prevented removal of certain Iraqi nationals located throughout 

the country. The district court, we explained, lacked jurisdiction to grant this relief under 8 

U.S.C. § 1252(g). Id. at 875–76. The second injunction required bond hearings for each class 

member who had been detained for at least six months. The district court, we explained, lacked 

jurisdiction to grant that injunction on a class-wide basis under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). Id. at 

877–79.

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 2
No. 19-1080 Hamama, et al. v. Adducci, et al. Page 3

In today’s appeal, the government challenges the third injunction, issued shortly before 

we decided the last appeal. The third injunction presumptively requires the government to 

release all primary subclass members, those in the first subclass, once the government has 

detained them for six months, no matter the statutory authority under which they were held.

In issuing this injunction, the district court offered three explanations. First, it relied on 

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001), which required release of certain immigration 

detainees after six months if the detainees could show that there was no “significant likelihood” 

that they would be removed in the “reasonably foreseeable future.” The government held the 

detainees in Zadvydas under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which applies to aliens with final removal 

orders. Id. at 682. Section 1231 requires their detention for up to 90 days, then grants 

discretionary authority to continue detaining certain criminal aliens after that period. The district 

court extended Zadvydas to impose the same six-month time limit on other immigration statutes 

that require or permit detention in other contexts: §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a), (c).

Second, the district court concluded that the class members showed that the government 

was unlikely to repatriate them to Iraq in the reasonably foreseeable future. Even though the 

government has sent some of the affected individuals back to Iraq since 2017, the evidence 

showed that diplomatic discussions had stalled and repatriation attempts had failed. The court 

concluded that this trouble likely would persist.

Third, the district court reasoned that the government “acted ignobly” throughout the 

litigation process and found no substantial likelihood of removal as a sanction for its conduct. 

R. 490 at 1, 53.

For the reasons offered in our last opinion and others elaborated below, the district court 

lacked jurisdiction to enter its class-wide preliminary injunction and at any rate had no license to 

extend Zadvydas to this setting.

II.

The district court had no jurisdiction to do what it did. Congress stripped all courts, save 

for the Supreme Court, of jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the operation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 3
No. 19-1080 Hamama, et al. v. Adducci, et al. Page 4

1232 on a class-wide basis. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). Thus, for many of the same reasons we 

reversed the district court before, we must do so again. See Hamama, 912 F.3d at 877.

In each case, the government detained the aliens under §§ 1225, 1226, or 1231. Yet those 

are the statutes covered by the jurisdictional bar, and the court’s injunction prevented those 

statutes from operating, whether with respect to mandatory or permissive detentions. What was 

true the first time around remains true today.

Hamama defends the district court’s most recent injunction on four grounds, each 

unavailing.

He starts by insisting that the district court in truth did not enjoin the statutes. It merely 

granted habeas corpus relief instead. As proof, he points out that the order required the release 

of detainees from confinement, a form of relief that resembles a grant of the writ of habeas 

corpus and that is consistent with the styling of the lawsuit as a habeas petition. 

That is a hard sell. As a matter of form, the district court entered a “preliminary 

injunction.” R. 490 at 1. That’s just what Hamama asked for in his motion, and that’s 

presumably why the court called it one. As a matter of substance, the district court considered 

the four-factor test for a preliminary injunction, never mentioning 28 U.S.C. § 2241, any other 

habeas statute, or any test for habeas relief. As a matter of process, the district court granted 

release from detention on a preliminary basis. Section 2241 does not permit preliminary grants 

of habeas. It prohibits the writ from issuing unless the prisoner “is” being held “in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” not merely because he 

likely could make that showing in the future. Id. § 2241(c)(3). Whether as a matter of form, 

substance, or procedure, this was a preliminary injunction, not a grant of the writ of habeas 

corpus.

Hamama could not succeed, moreover, even if this were a grant of habeas relief. One 

problem is that not all members of this subclass currently are in custody. The subclass includes 

individuals who will be detained in the future. Eligibility for habeas relief, as noted, covers only 

those individuals currently in custody, id. § 2241(c), while this order applies to the entire 

subclass. Another problem is that the order applies prospectively. It requires the release of

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 4
No. 19-1080 Hamama, et al. v. Adducci, et al. Page 5

detainees once they reach six months in detention. But § 2241(c) offers the writ only to 

prisoners whose confinement currently is unlawful, not to those whose confinement might 

become unlawful in the future.

No matter, Hamama responds: The court had authority to order the class members’ 

release as a sanction for the government’s misconduct during the litigation, either under its 

inherent powers or under Rule 37. Three problems there. One: A federal court does not have 

authority to ignore a directive of the legislature as punishment for conduct of the executive 

branch, least of all a directive that the court has no power to issue that kind of class-wide relief. 

Two: The plaintiffs’ description of what the court did is not exactly right. In truth, it never 

ordered the class members’ release as a sanction. It instead adopted a finding of fact—that there 

is no substantial likelihood of class members’ repatriation in the reasonably foreseeable future—

as an adverse inference against the government. R. 490 at 53. Three: What the court did still 

exceeds its authority. It used the sanction as part of its explanation for granting a class-wide 

preliminary injunction. But nesting a sanction within an order the district court lacked authority 

to issue does not solve the problem: that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) prohibits class-wide preliminary 

injunctions. Hamama, 912 F.3d at 877 (holding that § 1252(f)(1) “unambiguously strips federal 

courts of jurisdiction to enter class-wide injunctive relief” on these very claims).

Hamama’s third attempt to rehabilitate the district court’s injunction echoes an argument 

from the last appeal. He claims that the district court did not enjoin or restrain the immigration 

statutes; it just implemented them. But as we pointed out last time in responding to a similar 

argument, the district court ordered detainees released, created new time limits on detention, and 

adopted new standards that the government had to meet to continue detention. Hamama, 

912 F.3d at 879–80. “If these limitations on what the government can and cannot do under the 

. . . detention provisions are not ‘restraints,’ it is not at all clear what would qualify as a 

restraint.” Id. at 880.

Last of all, Hamama asks us to uphold the preliminary injunction on the ground that the 

court could have entered it as a declaratory judgment. Maybe; maybe not. Whatever we think 

about that issue in the abstract, however, the district court did not enter its preliminary order as a 

declaratory judgment. And Hamama at any rate did not seek that relief in the motion, making it 

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 5
No. 19-1080 Hamama, et al. v. Adducci, et al. Page 6

forfeited anyway. Nor should anyone assume Hamama could have obtained preliminary 

declaratory relief. The Supreme Court has suggested preliminary declaratory judgment does not 

exist. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).

The broader point, through all of Hamama’s attempts to reconceptualize this unlawful 

district court order, is that one does not lightly cleanse a prohibited action by identifying after the 

fact some other form of relief that might work sometimes in some circumstances. That is no way 

to run a railroad.

III.

The district court separately read too much into Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678, and 

overlooked the teachings of Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018), in granting relief.

In Zadvydas, aliens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) sought release. On its face, 

§ 1231(a)(6) authorizes indefinite detention of certain aliens with final removal orders—those 

who have committed certain sets of crimes enumerated elsewhere in the statute, who are likely to 

flee, or who will endanger the community. Concerned about the constitutional implications of 

indefinite detention susceptible to challenge only through administrative review, the Supreme 

Court construed the statute to avoid these problems. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. It concluded 

that, after six months of confinement under § 1231(a)(6), a detainee could try to show “good 

reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 

future.” Id. at 701. The government could then offer evidence to rebut that showing. Id. If the 

government failed to rebut the showing, it would have to release the detainee. Id.

Today’s case differs in material ways. The government has detained class members 

under four provisions: § 1231(a)(6), the statute the Zadvydas court considered; § 1225(b), which 

mandates detention of aliens during asylum proceedings; § 1226(c), which mandates detention of 

certain criminal aliens until entry of a final removal order; and § 1226(a), which permits 

detention of all other aliens until entry of a final removal order. Despite the differences between 

these provisions, the court grafted the Zadvydas standard onto the last three provisions.

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 6
No. 19-1080 Hamama, et al. v. Adducci, et al. Page 7

None of those three provisions implicates Zadvydas’s concern about indefinite detention. 

Zadvydas sprang from the observation that a “statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien 

would raise a serious constitutional problem.” 533 U.S. at 690. But, as Jennings noted, all three 

of these provisions, unlike the Zadvydas provision, have endpoints: conclusion of asylum 

proceedings or entry of a removal order. 138 S. Ct. at 844, 846. The Supreme Court, moreover, 

has separately upheld detention during deportation proceedings against constitutional challenge, 

allaying any constitutional concerns on that front. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).

More, Congress wrote two of the statutes—§§ 1225(b) and 1226(c)—too clearly to 

permit a constitutional-avoidance reading. Both statutes mandate detention, which forecloses an 

interpretation premised on the permissive nature of the detention authority in § 1231(a)(6). 

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697 (“[W]hile ‘may’ suggests discretion, it does not necessarily suggest 

unlimited discretion. In that respect the word ‘may’ is ambiguous.”).

Jennings indeed forbade this precise form of interpretation in construing § 1225(b). 

“Here, by contrast,” it reasoned, § 1225(b) “do[es] not use the word ‘may.’ Instead, [it] 

unequivocally mandate[s] that aliens falling within [its] scope ‘shall’ be detained.” 138 S. Ct. at 

843–44. And it said the same thing about § 1226(c), another mandatory detention statute, for the 

same reason. Id. at 846.

Ly v. Hansen does not require a different result. 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003). Yes, it 

extended Zadvydas and its reasoning to other detention statutes. But Ly did not survive 

Jennings.

Jennings restored the constitutional distinction between pre- and post-removal order 

detention that Ly collapsed. Ly held that pre-removal order detention for those who could not be 

deported at the close of removal proceedings implicated the same constitutional concerns as 

indefinite detention after entry of a final removal order. Id. at 268–69. But that difference is 

precisely where Jennings began its analysis. In the Supreme Court’s own words, “the Court of 

Appeals in this case . . . failed to address whether Zadvydas’s reasoning may fairly be applied in 

this case despite the many ways in which the provision in question in Zadvydas . . . differs 

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 7
No. 19-1080 Hamama, et al. v. Adducci, et al. Page 8

materially from those at issue here. . . . To start, [§ 1225(b)], unlike § 1231(a)(6), provide[s] for 

detention for a specified period of time.” Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 843–44.

Ly also turned on a constitutional avoidance reading of § 1226(c), one that Jennings

expressly foreclosed. Read Ly: “Since permanent detention . . . under [§ 1226(c)] would be 

unconstitutional, we construe the statute to avoid that result, as did the Court in Zadvydas.” 351 

F.3d at 267. Now read Jennings: Constitutional avoidance “permits a court to choose between 

competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text,” one of which implicates constitutional 

problems the other would avoid. 138 S. Ct. at 843 (quotation and emphasis omitted). But these 

texts are “quite clear”—so clear that application of that canon “falls far short of a plausible 

statutory construction.” Id. at 845–48 (quotation omitted). As between the approaches in 

Jennings and Ly, only one can survive. It is not Ly.

We vacate the district court’s injunction and remand for further proceedings.

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 8
No. 19-1080 Hamama, et al. v. Adducci, et al. Page 9

________________________________________

CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT

________________________________________

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment only. I recognize that 

the majority’s opinion in Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2018) (Hamama I) requires 

us to vacate the class-wide preliminary injunction. I therefore concur in the judgment. However, 

I adhere to my dissent in Hamama I and disagree with the conclusions the majority draws from 

Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent.

I.

The majority asserts that Hamama could not succeed even if the district court’s order is 

characterized as habeas relief because it “applies prospectively . . . to those whose confinement 

might become unlawful in the future.” Maj. Op. at 4-5. Under a Zadvydas analysis, however, it 

is necessary to examine the possibility of future indefinite and unconstitutional detention. 

Zadvydas did not neatly establish that detention shorter than six months is lawful while detention 

longer than six months is unlawful. Instead, in balancing the liberty interests of detainees with 

the executive branch’s need for leeway in accomplishing removals, Zadvydas established a 

presumption that six months of detention is reasonable. 533 U.S. 678, 700–01 (2001). After six 

months, Zadvydas provides process to detainees whose confinement might be unlawful—a 

review of the likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. Here, the district 

court conducted this review and found that “the record unquestionably demonstrates that there is 

no significant likelihood of repatriation in the reasonably foreseeable future.” R. 490, PID 

14171. This is not a case in which “confinement might become unlawful in the future,” but a 

case in which confinement will be unlawful once class members reach six months of detention. 

This court has acknowledged that the Supreme Court “has construed the ‘in custody’ 

requirement in a reasonably liberal fashion and held that the writ may be appropriate in situations 

beyond the traditional one in which petitioner’s claim would, if upheld, result in an immediate 

release from present custody.” Ward v. Knoblock, 738 F.2d 134, 138 (6th Cir. 1984). In Peyton 

v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), the Supreme Court “reexamined the so-called ‘prematurity 

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 9
No. 19-1080 Hamama, et al. v. Adducci, et al. Page 10

doctrine’ in the context of section 2241(c)(3) habeas corpus actions and rejected it as ‘an 

indefensible barrier to prompt adjudication of constitutional claims in the federal courts.’” 

Ward, 738 F.2d at 139 (quoting Peyton, 391 U.S. at 55). The Peyton prisoners sought to 

challenge the constitutionality of consecutive sentences they had not yet begun to serve. Peyton, 

391 U.S. at 55–57. The district courts dismissed their habeas petitions as premature but the 

Supreme Court held that the prisoners were “‘in custody in violation of the Constitution’ if any 

consecutive sentence they [were] scheduled to serve was imposed as the result of a deprivation 

of constitutional rights.” Id. at 64–65. The Court reasoned that this approach is “consistent with 

the canon of construction that remedial statutes should be liberally construed.” Id. at 65. And in 

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973), the Supreme Court observed “that habeas corpus 

relief is not limited to immediate release from illegal custody” but is also available “to attack 

future confinement and obtain future releases.” Of course, these cases are not on all fours with 

the instant case, but they demonstrate that the habeas remedy is not to be rejected simply because 

the confinement will become illegal in the near future. 

Here, the Zadvydas subclass members whose periods of detention will reach six months 

have already established that there is no reasonably foreseeable likelihood of repatriation. 

Therefore, upon the expiration of the six-month presumption “each day they are incarcerated . . . 

while their cases are in the courts will be time that they might properly have enjoyed as free 

men.” Peyton, 391 U.S. at 64. The district court’s order releasing any subclass member whose 

detention reaches six months, allowing the government to show special justification for 

continued detention of specific individuals, and allowing the government to remove individuals 

prior to the time required for release, would constitute permissible habeas relief under § 2241.

Even if we assume the district court could not grant habeas relief prospectively, Part 1 of 

the order, applying to subclass members who have been detained for more than six months, 

would remain a valid form of habeas relief. Part 2 of the order, applying to any subclass member 

whose detention reaches six months, could be reissued upon the actual expiration of six months 

of detention. 

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 10
No. 19-1080 Hamama, et al. v. Adducci, et al. Page 11

The majority also casts doubt on the possibility of declaratory relief. As I observed in 

Hamama I, “the request for such relief is part of the case and should be entertained by the district 

court on remand without prejudgment by this court.” 912 F.3d at 887 (White, J., dissenting). 

II.

I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) and 

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) foreclose all relief and that Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 

263 (6th Cir. 2003) does not survive Jennings.

Although the Court in Jennings observed that “§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2), unlike 

§ 1231(a)(6), provide for detention for a specified period of time,” the Court was nevertheless 

concerned about the possibility of prolonged or permanent detention without judicial review. 

138 S. Ct. at 844. Before “reaching the merits of the lower court’s interpretation,” the Court 

considered whether § 1252(b)(9) deprived the Court of jurisdiction. 138 S. Ct. at 839. The Court 

concluded that it retained jurisdiction, in part because an interpretation of the statute that would 

deprive the Court of jurisdiction would bar review of the very type of detention at issue here. 

Such an interpretation would

make claims of prolonged detention effectively unreviewable. By the time a final 

order of removal was eventually entered, the allegedly excessive detention would 

have already taken place. And of course, it is possible that no such order would 

ever be entered in a particular case, depriving that detainee of any meaningful 

chance for judicial review.

Id. at 840.

The Supreme Court has not allayed all constitutional concerns regarding detention during 

deportation proceedings. Although Demore considered detention under § 1226(c), one of the 

provisions at issue in the present case, and concluded that detention was constitutionally 

permissible, the Court also noted that “the detention at stake under § 1226(c) lasts roughly a 

month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five months in 

the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal,” and that the respondent himself “was 

detained for somewhat longer than the average—spending six months in INS custody.” Demore, 

538 U.S. at 530–31. The detention here lasted three times as long—some class members were 

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 11
No. 19-1080 Hamama, et al. v. Adducci, et al. Page 12

detained for a year and a half before the district court issued its injunction. See R. 490 

(explaining that DHS began arresting Iraqi nationals in June 2017, and the district court issued 

the preliminary injunction on November 20, 2018). The Court in Demore held that Congress 

“may require that persons such as respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their 

removal proceedings,” 538 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added), and noted its “longstanding view that 

the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period

necessary for their removal proceedings,” id. at 526 (emphasis added). The Court did not have 

the opportunity to consider the degree of prolonged detention at issue in the present case. The 

Court distinguished Zadvydas on that ground, explaining that “the period of detention at issue in 

Zadvydas was ‘indefinite’ and ‘potentially permanent,’” id. at 528 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 

at 690–91), while the detention considered in Demore was “of a much shorter duration,” id. The 

court also distinguished Zadvydas on the basis that in Zadvydas “the aliens challenging their 

detention following final orders of deportation were ones for whom removal was ‘no longer 

practically attainable.’” Id. at 527 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).

Thus, on the very grounds the Supreme Court distinguished Demore from Zadvydas, the 

situation here is closer to Zadvydas. The class members here were detained for a year and a half, 

not a “brief” or “limited period” by any measure, and the district court found that removal is not 

significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. It therefore remains possible, under the 

majority’s approach, that removal is never completed “in a particular case, depriving that 

detainee of any meaningful chance for judicial review.” Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 840. 

Further, as Hamama argues, Jennings did not disturb Ly’s discussion of constitutional 

principles. Neither should this court. See United States v. Adewani, 467 F.3d 1340, 1342 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006). Unlike the constitutional avoidance and statutory interpretation of § 1226(c) 

considered in Jennings, this court in Ly did not construe the statute to include a bright-line rule 

regarding a time limitation on pre-removal detention, 351 F.3d at 271, and did not require bond 

hearings, id. at 270. This court instead concluded that “although criminal aliens may be 

incarcerated pending removal, the time of incarceration is limited by constitutional 

considerations, and must bear a reasonable relation to removal,” id. at 269, and that the 

“reasonableness of the length of detention is subject to review by federal courts in habeas 

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 12
No. 19-1080 Hamama, et al. v. Adducci, et al. Page 13

proceedings,” id. at 273. The Jennings Court explicitly declined to reach these constitutional 

issues. 138 S. Ct. at 851. 

III.

In sum, I would vacate the preliminary injunction, and remand for reconsideration in light 

of Hamama I and for consideration of any remedies consistent with this opinion.

 Case: 19-1080 Document: 41-2 Filed: 01/03/2020 Page: 13