Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-00240/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-00240-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Rondel Delbert Gardner is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 

I.

RELEVANT HISTORY

Plaintiff filed the instant case on February 13, 2019, in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. 

On April 30, 2019, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, found that Plaintiff failed to state 

any cognizable claims for relief, and granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 

8.) 

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RONDEL DELBERT GARDNER,

 Plaintiff,

v.

GAVIN NEWSOM, et.al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:20-cv-00240-SAB (PC)

SCREENING ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO 

FILE A THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 

REFERRING MATTER TO SUJEAN PARK, ADR 

& PRO BONO COORDINATOR, TO LOCATE 

COUNSEL TO BE APPOINTED FOR THE 

LIMITED PURPOSE OF FILING A THIRD 

AMENDED COMPLAINT 

[ECF No. 21]

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Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on May 23, 2019. (ECF No. 11.) 

On October 2, 2019, Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman appointed counsel Bryan L. 

Hawkins and Sarah E. Kozal for the limited purpose of filing a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 

15.) 

A second amended complaint was filed on January 31, 2020. (ECF No. 21.) On this same 

date, counsel for Plaintiff was terminated. 

On February 8, 2020, the action was transferred to this Court because the allegations presented 

in the second amended complaint took place in the Kings County which is part of the Fresno Division 

of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. (ECF No. 22.) 

Thus, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed on January 31, 2020, is before the Court for 

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

II.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally 

construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 

(9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, 

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which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 

sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying 

the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

III.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the second amended complaint as true only for the 

purpose of the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

Plaintiff names M. Voong, correctional officer Lawrence, correctional officer Feairra, 

correctional lieutenant Ellen, J. Ceballos, and J. Lynch, as Defendants.

Plaintiff is a 60-year old Native American. Plaintiff has significant vision problems and 

requires use of a cane. 

On May 13, 2019, Plaintiff attended his scheduled Board of Parole Hearings Consultation and

was informed that he failed to appear for his job assignment, assigned as of April 25, 2019. Plaintiff 

was not notified of this assignment prior to the consultation and had been receiving Rules Violation 

Reports for failure to attend during that time period. Plaintiff was told by a housing unit officer that he 

had not been allowed to report to work because he is “ADA” and “not acceptable for the job.” 

On June 19, 2019, Plaintiff submitted an 1824 (reasonable accommodation) alleging 

discrimination and explained that although he had been assigned to the job, he was not allowed to 

attend because he is ADA elderly. Plaintiff reiterated these concerns in an inmate appeal, also 

submitted on June 19, 2019. Responses to both the 1824 request and inmate appeal failed to 

investigate the disability claims. 

On or about November 1, 2019, Plaintiff again appeared at work but was turned away due to 

his age and disability.

Plaintiff has been deemed eligible for the Substance Use Disorder Treatment program since at 

least November 2018. On May 10, 2019, Plaintiff was issued a Rules Violation Report for failure to 

meet program/work expectations for alleged failure to attend a Substance Use Disorder Treatment 

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program meeting, and was deemed a “program failure.” Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated 

Plaintiff’s due process rights by extending his Board of Parole Hearing from no later than December 

31, 2019 to 2032, depriving Plaintiff of the opportunity to provide his defense. Plaintiff understood 

himself to be a Priority Legal User and to have the day off from the meeting to access the law library, 

but was not given the opportunity to make this case before the Board of Parole Hearing date was 

extended. 

IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Linkage Requirement Under Section 1983

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other 

federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 

(9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, 

but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada 

ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 393-94 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts 

demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal connection, between each defendant’s actions or 

omissions and a violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 

F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to link each individual Defendant to any deprivation of his rights. Rather, 

Plaintiff simply refers to “Defendants” as a whole. However, Plaintiff must link each individually 

named Defendant to an alleged deprivation of his rights and state what he/she did or did not do. 

B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

Title VII prohibits employers from making employment decisions based on “race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. In addition, prior to filing a Title VII claim in 

federal court, a plaintiff must first obtain a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Opportunity Commission. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Baker v. McNeil Island Corr. Ctr., 859 F.2d 124, 125 (9th Cir. 

1988). First, because it appears that Plaintiff’s employment is mandatory due to his status as a 

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prisoner, he is not an “employee” for purposes of Title VII. See Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 984 

(9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the Equal Protection Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has held that 

inmates working directly for a prison pursuant to state law requiring prisoners to work at hard labor 

are not “employee” within 701(f) of Title VII); Oliver Thomas v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons et al., No. 

16-cv-012-SM, 2016 WL 3838033, at *3 (D.N.H. May 16, 2016) (explaining that a federal prisonerplaintiff is not an employee, so plaintiff could not pursue a claim under Title VII); Simon v. Fed. 

Prison Indus., Inc., No. 03-10792-JLT, 2003 WL 26128191, at *2 n.7 (D. Mass. July 15, 2003) 

(“Prisoners working in prison industries are not ‘employees’ under Title VII and thus it does not, [sic] 

apply to them.”) (citation omitted). Second, even assuming that Plaintiff is an “employee” for 

purposes of Title VII, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim under Title VII because the employment decision 

was based on his alleged disability, namely his age. Third, Plaintiff has not alleged that he obtained a 

letter to sue. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not and likely cannot state a claim under Title VII.

C. Americans with Disabilities Act

Title II of the ADA applies to the administration of state prisons. Pennsylvania Dep’t of 

Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1998) (claims against a “public entity” under Title II of 

ADA may be directed to state correctional systems). A prisoner may state a Title II claim based on 

“the alleged deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate [a prisoner’s] disability-related

needs in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other prison 

programs[.]” U.S. v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006). 

To state a cognizable failure-to-accommodate claim under Title II, an individual must allege 

the following four elements: (1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to 

participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) he was 

either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or 

activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial 

of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional 

Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations, punctuation and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010).

///

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The ADA authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public entities, 

United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153 (2006), and state prisons “fall squarely within the 

statutory definition of ‘public entity.’” Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 524 U.S. at 210. “To recover 

monetary damages under Title II of the ADA ..., a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on 

the part of the defendant.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). The 

standard for intentional discrimination is deliberate indifference, which “requires both knowledge that 

a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” 

Id. at 1139. 

“In suits under Title II of the ADA ... the proper defendant usually is an organization rather 

than a natural person.... Thus, as a rule, there is no personal liability under Title II.” Roundtree v. 

Adams, No. 1:01-cv-06502-OWW-LJO, 2005 WL 3284405 (E.D. Cal. 1, 2005) (quotations and 

citations omitted). Indeed, a plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State 

official in his individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA. Vinson v. 

Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, an ADA plaintiff may seek injunctive relief 

against an individual defendant only if the defendant is sued in his or her official capacity. Miranda B. 

v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff must name the appropriate entity or state officials in their official capacities, but he 

may not name individual prison employees in their personal capacities. Shaughnessy v. Hawaii, No. 

09-00569 JMS/BMK, 2010 WL 2573355, at *8 (D. Haw. Jun. 24, 2010); Anaya v. Campbell, No. CIV 

S-07-0029 GEB GGH P, 2009 WL 3763798, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2009); Roundtree v. Adams, 

No. 1:01-CV-06502 OWW LJO, 2005 WL 3284405, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2005). Individual 

liability is precluded under the ADA. Shaughnessy, 2010 WL 2573355, at *8; Anaya, 2009 WL 

3763798, at *5-6; Roundtree, 2005 WL 3284405, at *5. 

Here, Plaintiff contends that “Defendants” discriminated against him because he has an

impairment. However, assuming Plaintiff has a disability under the ADA, the proper Defendant to 

name in an ADA claim is the California Department of Corrections and/or the Warden at California 

State Prison, Corcoran in his official capacity only. Plaintiff has not named either of those 

Defendants, and has therefore not named a proper Defendant for purposes of ADA liability. 

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D. Due Process

“When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is 

paramount....” Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Board of Regents of 

State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972)). However, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings 

are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such 

proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). With respect to prison 

disciplinary proceedings, the minimum procedural requirements that must be met are: (1) written 

notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the prisoner receives written notice and 

the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the fact 

finders of the evidence they rely on and reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the 

prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous 

to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (5) assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is 

illiterate or the issues presented are legally complex. Id. at 563-71. As long as the five minimum 

Wolff requirements are met, due process has been satisfied. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 

(9th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). In addition, 

“some evidence” must support the decision of the hearing officer, Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 

445, 455 (1985), and the evidence must have some indicia of reliability, Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 

705 (9th Cir. 1987). The “some evidence” standard is not particularly stringent and the relevant 

inquiry is whether “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached. . . .” 

Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide any right “to be 

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no duty to 

offer parole to their prisoners.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011). When a state enacts a 

statutory scheme allowing parole, however, the state creates a liberty interest and “the Due Process 

Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication.” Id. The liberty interest at issue here is the interest 

in receiving parole consideration when the California standards for parole have been met, and the 

minimum procedures adequate for due process protection of that interest. Id. at 221. In the context of 

parole, the Supreme Court has held that the procedures required are minimal. Id. at 220; see also

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Miller v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 642 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The 

Supreme Court held in Cooke that in the context of parole eligibility decisions the due process right is 

procedural, and entitles a prisoner to nothing more than a fair hearing and a statement of reasons for a 

parole board’s decision....” (emphasis in original). Due process requires that the State furnish a parole 

applicant with an opportunity to be heard and a statement of reasons for the denial of parole. 

Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 220. 

Here, Plaintiff contends because he was issued a Rules Violation Report on or about May 10, 

2019, which deprived him of the ability to properly defend himself at the Board of Parole Hearing on 

December 31, 2019. However, as stated above in section A, Plaintiff fails to link each individual 

Defendant to any alleged deprivation of his rights. Accordingly, the Court cannot determine what 

named Defendants, if any, may be liable for the alleged due process violation. 

E. Appointment of Counsel

In light of the fact that counsel was previously appointed to draft the second amended 

complaint, the Court finds that appointment of counsel for Plaintiff is warranted again for the limited 

purpose of drafting a third amended complaint. Therefore, this matter will be referred to Sujean Park,

this Court’s ADR & Pro Bono Coordinator, to assist in locating and appointing counsel for the limited 

purpose of drafting a third amended complaint and any subsequent amended complaints.

V.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief and shall be granted 

leave to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in this order. See Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what each 

named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678-79. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Further, Plaintiff may 

not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George, 

507 F.3d at 607 (no “buckshot” complaints).

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Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey 

v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must 

be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This matter is referred to Sujean Park, this Court’s ADR& Pro Bono Coordinator to 

attempt to locate pro bono counsel to represent Plaintiff in these proceedings; 

2. If an attorney can be found to represent Plaintiff, that attorney shall be appointed as 

counsel for Plaintiff, if only for the limited purpose of drafting the third amended 

complaint; 

3. Within sixty (60) days from the date of an order appointing counsel, Plaintiff shall file a 

third amended complaint in compliance with this order; and

4. The Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this order on Sujean Par, this Court’s ADR & 

Pro Bono Coordinator.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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