Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02001/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BERNICE RAULLERSON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07 CV 2001W (AJB)

ORDER: 1) GRANTING

MOTION FOR A MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT; 2)

DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM; AND 3)

GRANTING MOTION TO

STRIKE [DOC. 3]

vs.

CITY OF EL CAJON, GREG

JOHNSON, JOHN BENNETT and

DOES I Through XX, Inclusive,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Bernice Raullerson (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against

Defendants City of El Cajon (“the City”), Greg Johnson, John Bennett, and Does I-XX,

(collectively, “the Officers”) after the Officers allegedly used excessive force in executing

a search warrant. Defendants filed this motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on the

grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, fails to state a claim, and requests an improper

prayer for relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 12(e), 12(f). 

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral

argument. See Civ. Local R. 7.1(d.1). For the reasons stated below, the Court

Case 3:07-cv-02001-W-AJB Document 6 Filed 03/10/08 Page 1 of 6
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GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement, DENIES Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, on or about October 25, 2006, the Officers

attempted to execute a search warrant at Plaintiff’s address. (Compl. at 3:13-15.)

However, the search warrant was intended for the apartment next door. (Id. at 3:14-

16.) Plaintiff alleges that during the search, the Officers unnecessarily, unlawfully, and

carelessly used excessive force, causing her serious and permanent injuries. (Id. at 3:11-

13.) Plaintiff also alleges that she was arrested without a warrant and without

reasonable or probable cause. (Id. at 5:12-14.) Plaintiff further alleges that the City has

a practice and custom of negligently training and supervising its law enforcement

personnel with respect to observing and protecting citizens’ rights. (Id. at 6:28-7:1-2.)

Before filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff filed a claim, presumably under the

Government Tort Claims Act, against the City. (Compl. at 2:17-18.) After the City

denied the claim, Plaintiff filed this action against the City and the Officers. Plaintiff

asserts four causes of action: negligence, assault and battery, false arrest, and violation

of civil rights. (Id. at 1:13-15.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint filed in federal court requires only “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus,

a complaint is sufficient if it gives the defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, – – – U.S. –

– –, – – –, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957)). A plaintiff “is not required to state the statutory or constitutional basis for his

claim, only the facts underlying it.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (1996)

(quoting McCalden v. California Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1223 (1990)).

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Accordingly, in the face of the liberal notice pleading rule, a motion for a more definite

statement under Rule 12(e) will only be granted if a pleading is “so vague or ambiguous

that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s sufficiency. See

North Star Int’l. v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Dismissal of a claim under this rule is proper only in “extraordinary” cases. United

States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981). A complaint may be

dismissed as a matter of law for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or

(2) insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must

construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Gompper v.

VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). The complaint and all reasonable

inferences therefrom are construed in the plaintiff’s favor. Walleri v. Fed. Home

Loan Bank of Seattle, 83 F.3d 1575, 1580 (9th Cir. 1996).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff should be required to prepare a more

definite statement because her pleading is vague and ambiguous. More specifically,

Defendants assert that Plaintiff “fails to set forth which causes of action are being

brought against which defendant.” (Defs.’ P.&A. at 2:26-27.) The Court agrees.

In her Opposition, Plaintiff claims that the complaint “clearly alleges”

negligence, assault and battery, and false arrest against “all three defendants.” (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 2:5-6, 3:9-10, 4:19-20.) However, based on the allegations in the

complaint, the first three causes of action appear to only be asserted against the

Officers. For example, in the second cause of action for assault and battery, Plaintiff

alleges:

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1

The complaint does not have a paragraph number 17.

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15. On October 25, 2006, Defendants GREG JOHNSON, JOHN

BENNETT and DOES I through XX, and each of them, acting

pursuant to their authority as police officers for Defendant City of El

Cajon, did unlawfully and maliciously assault and batter Plaintiff. Said

actions caused serious and permanent injuries to said Plaintiff as herein

alleged.

16. By reason of the assault and battery above, Plaintiff suffered the

damages alleged in Paragraphs Twelve and Thirteen, above.

18. The conduct of Defendants GREG JOHNSON, JOHN

BENNETT and DOES I through XX, and each of them, was taken with

fraud, malic and oppression.... Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an

award of exemplary damages against these Defendants only in an

amount according to proof at trial.

(Compl. at 4:15–28.1

) Although the City is mentioned in this claim, the allegations

do not suggest that Plaintiff is suing the City for assault and battery. In contrast,

Plaintiff’s civil rights cause of action specifically alleges that “Defendants, CITY OF

EL CAJON, GREG JOHNSON, JOHN BENNETT and DOES I through XX ...

caused Plaintiff to be subjected to the deprivation of her rights of due process....” 

(Id. at 6:20–23.) Because the complaint is, at best, vague and ambiguous with

respect to whether the City is included in the negligence, assault and battery, and

false arrest causes of action, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for a More

Definite Statement. Plaintiff is, therefore, ordered to identify, under the heading for

each cause of action, which defendant is being sued.

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

 Defendants assert that, in California, a public entity’s liability is statutorily

driven. (Defs.’ P. & A. at 3:18-19.) Accordingly, Defendants argue that the City

cannot be held liable regarding Plaintiff’s state law causes of action because “[t]here

is no basis for negligence, assault and battery or false arrest against the City.” (Defs.’

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P. & A. at 3:15-17.) Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s false arrest claim

against the City must be dismissed because Plaintiff “failed to allege that the City

maintained unconstitutional policies or customs or inadequate training.” (Defs.’ P.

& A. at 4:20-23.) The Court disagrees.

Defendants assert that in the public entity context, “[i]mmunity is the rule

and liability the exception.” (Defs. P. & A. at 4:9.) However, the policy underlying

the Tort Claims Act is, in fact, contrary to Defendants’ assertion. Ultimately,

“[u]nless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, the important societal

goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by willful or negligent acts 

must prevail.” Baldwin v. State of California, 6 Cal. 3d 424, 436 (Cal. 1972)

(citation omitted). This rationale is further evidenced in the California Government

Code, namely sections 815.2 and 820.4, upon which Plaintiff relies. (Pl.’s Opp’n. at

2:15-22; 5:7.) Section 815.2 imposes upon pubic entities vicarious liability for the

tortious acts and omissions of their employees. (Cal. Gov’t Code §815.2.) Similarly,

section 820.4 explicitly states that “[n]othing in this section exonerates a public

employee from liability for false arrest or false imprisonment.” (Cal. Gov’t Code

§820.4.) Thus, statutory text dictates that both the Officers and the City may be

liable for the alleged negligence, assault and battery, and false arrest. 

Moreover, contrary to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to allege facts

sufficient to hold the City liable under section 1983, Plaintiff’s complaint specifically

asserts that the City has “a practice and custom of negligently training, retaining,

disciplining, and supervising its employees, officers and other law enforcement

personnel with respect to observing and protecting citizens’ rights.” (Compl. ¶29.) 

Thus, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a

Claim.

//

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C. Defendants’ Motion to Strike. 

Defendants assert that a public entity cannot be held liable for punitive

damages and therefore requests that Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages against

the City be stricken. (Defs.’ P. & A. at 5: 18-26.) Due to Plaintiff’s agreement that

the punitive damages claim should be limited to the Officers only, the Court need

not address this issue further. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the Court rules as follows regarding Defendants’

Motion (Doc. 3): the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite

Statement; the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike as it pertains to

limiting punitive damages to the Officers; and the Court DENIES Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Plaintiff is, therefore, ORDERED to

file a first amended complaint on or before March 24, 2008 that cures the defects

identified above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 10, 2008

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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