Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00211/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00211-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAY ALLEN COLES,

Petitioner,

v.

ELVIN VALENZUELA, Warden,

California Men’s Colony,

Respondent.

CASE NO. 13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF U.S.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

[Doc. No. 1]

I.

INTRODUCTION

Ray Allen Coles (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San

Diego Superior Court conviction in case No. SCD220436 for battery with the

infliction of great bodily injury, Cal. Penal Code § 243(d). (Lodgment 1 at 258.) The

court sentenced Petitioner to nine years in state prison. (Id.)

Petitioner alleges violations to his constitutional right to a jury trial under the

Sixth Amendment, and his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

[Doc. No. 1.] The Court has considered Petitioner’s Petition, Respondent’s Answer

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

1

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 1 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, Petitioner’s Traverse,

Petitioner’s Letter of Supplemental Authorities Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 28(j), and all supporting documents submitted by the parties. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition be DENIED. 

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to

be correct. Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear

and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The facts of the underlying

crime, as found by the state appellate court, are as follows:

 “On the night of the incident, Marcum, Kasprzak, the victim,

and other friends had been drinking. In the early morning hours the

group continued their activities at the victim’s home in Pacific

Beach, including using cocaine. At some point they decided to go get more cocaine. Defendant lived a few blocks away from the

victim and Marcum knew he was a drug dealer. Marcum testified that she had purchased cocaine from defendant about five times, and

about one month earlier he had furnished cocaine (at her request) during a trip to Miami. 

A short while before the incident, Marcum called defendant and

told him they wanted to buy some cocaine, and defendant told her

they could come over. At about 4:30 a.m., the victim drove

Kasprzak and Marcum to defendant’s home. Marcum got out of the car and stated she would be right back, while Kasprzak and the

victim (who did not know defendant) stayed in the car. Marcum

went upstairs to defendant’s apartment, knocked on the door, and

went inside the apartment. 

After about five or 10 minutes, the victim was concerned

because Marcum had not returned. The door to defendant’s

apartment was ajar, and the victim got out of the car and called out Marcum’s name a couple of times. There was no response, so he reentered the car and, along with Kasprzak, dozed off. About 10

minutes later when Marcum still had not returned, the victim woke

Kasprzak and told her he was going to go get Marcum. He went to the top of the stairs and called her name a couple of times. 

Marcum testified that she heard the victim calling for her while she was inside the apartment. Defendant asked who was out there

and opened the apartment door. The victim asked Marcum if she was

ready and told her they should go. Defendant said to the victim,

“Quiet down. I live here.” and Marcum told the victim she would be

out in a minute. Defendant or Marcum then closed the apartment door. A couple of minutes later, Marcum heard the victim call for

her again. According to the victim, at this point he was standing on

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

2

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 2 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the stairs about two steps from the top with his back toward the

apartment door, and he was leaning with his ‘butt’ or ‘right hip’ on

the stair handrail. Defendant came out of the apartment saying “[a]re

you trying to wake up my fucking neighbors?” and then ‘charged’

him and hit him. The victim explained he was “completely shocked” at defendant’s approach; when the door opened he turned around to

look; before he could react he “got a fist right across” the left side of

his face; and he “fell over the banister backwards.” The victim

testified he did not fall or roll down the steps but “just fell straight

back” to the concrete about 12 to 15 feet below. The last thing he

remembered before waking up in the hospital was “looking to the

sky” and thinking he was going to die. 

Marcum witnessed part of the incident from inside the apartment, and Kasprzak witnessed it from inside the car. According to Marcum, defendant was irate and he dashed out the door and

yelled at the victim to be quiet. Defendant made a fist and “put his

arm up in a threatening way.” The victim had a “shocked look on his

face” and started “backing down the stairs.” Defendant was “in [the

victim’s] face,” walking toward him. Marcum did not see what

occurred next because the apartment door “slamm[ed]” shut. She

heard voices yelling; a “punching” or “thump” noise; the sound of a

rail making a noise; and then an “impact” noise like something “fell

or hit into something and fell.” She opened the door, ran down the

stairs, and saw the victim lying on the ground on his back. Marcum

testified she did not actually see defendant punch the victim, but she

assumed he had done this because defendant “put his arm up and got in [the victim’s] face and was yelling at him,” and after the apartment door slammed shut she heard an “impact noise.”

Kasprzak was sitting in the back seat of the car with the

windows rolled up, and she was looking out at the victim through

the front windshield of the car. According to Kasprzak the victim was walking back down the stairs after looking for Marcum;

defendant then opened the apartment door; the victim turned around

towards defendant; and defendant “[came] after” the victim.

“[W]ithin an instant” of defendant coming out, defendant lunged forward and swung at the victim with his right arm; the victim “went

flying over the railing” and hit his head on the pavement; and there

was no time for the victim to respond. Kasprzak did not see the

“direct contact” of defendant’s hand connecting with the victim

because the victim’s back was blocking her view. However, she assumed that defendant either punched or pushed the victim and that the victim did not fall over on his own. She explained that she saw

defendant raise his arms and swing at the victim; the victim did not

fall down the stairs but “[i]nstantaneously” went flying over the

railing; and the victim went over the railing with “ a lot of force.”

She stated she did not know if defendant intended to cause the

victim to go over the railing, but she believed he did intend to punch or push him. 

The victim had fallen “straight on his head”; there was blood coming from his head; and his eyes were rolled back and wide open.

Kasprzak ran over to the victim. Kasprzak was trying to get her cell

phone to work and she told defendant they needed to call the police. Defendant grabbed both of Kasprzak’s arms, shook her, and “with a

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

3

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 3 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

lot of rage and panic” in his eyes told her she was not “going to call

the fucking police.” Kasprzak argued with defendant and said they had to. She then ran away from defendant around the corner of the

building, trying to get her cell phone to work. Kasprzak testified she was afraid of defendant because he had committed a violent act of

pushing the victim over and he had shaken her and told her not to

call the police. 

Marcum also came outside and tried to talk to the victim, but he

was unresponsive. Marcum told defendant they needed to call 911,

but defendant told her no. Defendant picked up the victim and put him in the front seat of the car so they could take him to the hospital. Kasprzak observed this and ran back to the car. When Marcum said

she was going to drive the victim to the hospital, Kasprzak argued with her and defendant because she knew that Marcum was in no

condition to drive and it “was just another accident waiting to

happen.” Kasprzak told them they needed to call the police, and defendant again grabbed her and shook her and said she was not

going to do this. After defendant shook her, Kasprzak ran off again and was able to alert the police by flagging down a patrol car. 

Meanwhile, Marcum was unable to manage the car’s clutch, and so defendant ended up driving. As defendant was backing the car into the street, he was stopped by the police in response to a 911 call

by a neighbor. Medical emergency personnel arrived and transported the victim by ambulance to the hospital. Based on the information

provided by Kasprzak, the police arrested defendant at the scene.

Officer Nicholas Minx spoke to defendant on the night of the incident. Defendant told Officer Minx that he had an argument with

the victim and during the argument he “chest-bumped” the victim.

Defendant explained to Minx that chest-bumping means you “get

real close” to the person and “puff out” your chest. Minx testified

that he did not remember specifically speaking with defendant about

whether he made contact with the victim, but when defendant stated

that “he chest-bumped him or got close to chest-bumping him,”

Minx assumed there had been contact. When defendant was at the

jail, Detective Gregory Olson told him what he was being charged

with. Defendant responded spontaneously by saying, “I should not have touched that guy. I don’t even know him.” Defendant told

Detective Olson that the victim was yelling “[Marcum, Marcum.] Where are you?”, and defendant opened the door and grabbed the victim’s shirt.

The victim was in the hospital for eight days. He suffered bleeding in his brain and a skull fracture, and he experienced

vomiting, memory loss, loss of concentration and severe headaches.

At the time of trial he had chronic upper-back pain. 

Testifying on his own behalf, defendant stated that Marcum

came to his home at about 5:00 a.m.; she was intoxicated; and she

asked him to get her some ecstasy. He told her he could not do

anything for her and she should not be coming over to his home at

this time of night. When he heard the victim at the top of the steps yelling for Marcum, he was upset at the noise and went outside.

Gesturing with his hands, defendant asked the victim what he was

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

4

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 4 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

doing yelling outside his home and told him to “shut the F up.” The

victim looked as if he was under the influence and appeared to be

shocked that defendant had come outside. Defendant walked

towards the victim, and the victim started walking backwards to

avoid defendant. The victim then “clipped over the rail, fell over backwards, arms in the air, not even trying to brace himself.” Defendant testified that he never got closer than two to three feet

from the victim; he never swung at, pushed, shoved or touched the victim; and he did not tell the police that he chest-bumped the victim

or that he should not have touched the victim. Defendant

acknowledged that he knew he should not have moved the victim

because the victim had a head injury and that the proper thing to do would have been to call the police, but denied that he told Kasprzak not to call the police. 

(Lodgment 5, at 2-8.)

III.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 23, 2010, a jury in San Diego County convicted Petitioner of

battery with the infliction of great bodily injury, Cal. Penal Code § 243(d) & Cal.

Penal Code § 1192.7(c)(8). (Lodgment 1 at 422.) Petitioner admitted he had one

prior serious felony conviction, Cal. Penal Code § 667(a), and one strike

conviction, Cal. Penal Code § 667.7(b). (Id. at 426.) On August 12, 2010, the

court sentenced Petitioner to a term of nine years. (Id. at 258.) 

On July 16, 2010, on a Motion for New Trial, the trial court considered new

testimonial evidence from three additional defense witnesses. (Lodgment 14 at

1401-1632.) The three additional witnesses were Jason Gregory Turner

(Petitioner’s original trial counsel), Melanie Patterson (an acquaintance of

Petitioner), and Alexandra Escajeda (an acquaintance of prosecution witness

Shantele Marcum). (Id.) Mr. Turner testified about his performance as Petitioner’s

trial counsel, and specifically, his decision not to investigate and interview a

potential witness, Melanie Patterson. Mr. Turner explained that Petitioner told him

that there was a women in his room on the night of the incident. (Id. at 1428.) He

further stated that Petitioner did not want this information to “see the light of day”

presumably because it would harm the relationship he had with his fiancee. (Id.)

Mr. Turner admitted that he should have investigated further but did not due in

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

5

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 5 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

part to honor Petitioner’s wishes. (Id.) Ms. Patterson testified that she was present

in the apartment with Petitioner on the night of the incident. She stated that she

had a good view of the Petitioner and victim, and from her vantage point,

Petitioner made no contact with the victim and that he fell on his own. (Id. at

1448.) Ms. Escajeda testified about a telephonic conversation she had with Ms.

Marcum on the night of the incident. (Id. at 1463.) She stated that Marcum called

her from the hospital and wanted her to falsely state that she was present at

Petitioner’s house on the night of the incident, should anyone ask. (Id. at 1462-

63.) She also testified that Marcum seemed more concerned about a dress she

borrowed from her rather than the victim’s condition. (Id. at 1464.)

After considering all testimony, the trial court found that Petitioner failed to

satisfy his burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 1621.)

The court concluded, given all the evidence, the decision not to call Melanie

Patterson was a tactical decision, and therefore, not ineffective assistance. (Id.)

The court also found that failing to call Melanie Patterson was not prejudicial to

Petitioner’s case since her account of the incident was not that powerful. The court

reasoned that Patterson was simply not as close to the scene as the other witnesses

in the case. The court also rejected Petitioner’s second basis for ineffective

assistance of counsel - that counsel did not, or forgot to impeach Shantele Marcum

with the prior statement she made to Escajeda. The court found that Marcum’s

statement “he went over the rail” serves little impeachment value since she didn’t

elaborate on her comment. (Id.) Furthermore, the court found that Marcum was

already thoroughly impeached during the course of the trial. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a timely appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One, in case D057933, claiming, (1) ineffective

assistance of trial counsel; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury

on accident or misfortune; (3) the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to

impeach him by questioning him about his prior drug procurement; (4) the trial

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

6

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 6 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court erred in failing to sustain his objection under California Evidence Code

section 352, as to the prosecutor’s questions about the prior drug procurement; (5)

the trial court erred in instructing the jury on proximate causation; (6) the trial

court’s errors cumulated to deny him due process; and (7) the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his motion for new trial. (Lodgment 2.) After considering

the parties’ briefs, (Lodgment 3, at 4) the appellate court issued an opinion

affirming the judgment. (Lodgment 5.) On April 6, 2012 Petitioner petitioned the

California Court of Appeal for a rehearing, (Lodgment 6.), which was denied on

April 17, 2012. (Lodgment 7.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court, case S202169, alleging the same claims raised in the

California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 8.) Petitioner also filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, case S202508, claiming

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Lodgment 9, 10, 11.) On June 20, 2012, the

Supreme Court of California denied the petition for review. (Lodgment 12.) On

August 29, 2012, the Supreme Court of California denied the petition for writ of

habeas corpus. (Lodgment 13.) 

Petitioner filed his current Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court

on January 25, 2013 claiming, (1) he received ineffective assistance of trial

counsel; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on accident or

misfortune; (3) the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to impeach him

by questioning him about his prior drug procurement; (4) the trial court erred in

instructing the jury on flight; (5) the trial court’s errors cumulated to deny him a

fair trial. [Doc. No. 1.] Respondent answered on March 26, 2013. [Doc. No. 5.]

Petitioner filed a traverse on August 3, 2013. [Doc. No. 10.] Petitioner also filed a

letter of supplemental authorities pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

28(j) on August 19, 2013. [Doc. No. 13.]

/ / /

/ / /

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

7

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 7 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

A federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas courts may not "reexamine

state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 68 (1991). "[A] state court’s interpretation of state law, including one

announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court

sitting in habeas corpus." Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); see Park v.

California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000) ("a violation of state law

standing alone is not cognizable in federal court on habeas").

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") governs

review of Petitioner’s claims because he filed his federal habeas petition after that

statute's 1996 effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997).

AEDPA imposes a “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court

rulings,’” requiring “that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333

n.7). Habeas corpus is a "'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal

justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal."

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)). "As a condition

for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that

the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended

in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." (Id. at 786-

87.) 

"AEDPA prevents defendants – and federal courts – from using federal

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

8

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 8 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of

state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1866 (2010). "By its

terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state

court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Richter, 131 S.

Ct. at 784. Habeas relief is available under the first exception if the state court

result "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-76

(2003); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (distinguishing

the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) "contrary to" test from its "unreasonable application"

test). To be found an "unreasonable application" of the precedent, the state court

decision must have been "more than incorrect or erroneous;" it "must have been

'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003)

(citations omitted). The lack of holdings from the Supreme Court on the issue

presented precludes relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Carey v. Musladin, 549

U.S. 70, 77 (2006). "[W]hen a Supreme Court decision does not 'squarely address'

the issue . . . it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is 'clearly established'

Supreme Court precedent addressing the issue," and the federal habeas court

"must defer to the state court's decision." Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th

Cir. 2009). "Circuit precedent may provide 'persuasive authority' for purposes of

determining whether a state court decision is an 'unreasonable application' of

Supreme Court precedent", but "only Supreme Court holdings are binding on state

courts, and 'only those holdings need be reasonably applied.'" Rodgers v.

Marshall, 678 F.3d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 

Under the second AEDPA exception, relief is available only if the state court

based its result "on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

"Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

9

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 9 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on

the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be

overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2)." Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473

(2007) (The question "is not whether a federal court believes the state court's

determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable – a

substantially higher threshold").

In applying these standards, the Court looks to the last reasoned state court

decision. See Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). To the extent no such reasoned

opinion exists, as where a state court rejected a claim in an unreasoned order, this

Court must conduct an independent review to determine whether the decisions

were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, “clearly established”

Supreme Court precedent. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

2000).

V.

ANALYSIS

Petitioner contends his federal constitutional right to a fair jury trial was

violated on five grounds: (1) trial counsel was ineffective because he - (a) failed to

investigate and interview Melanie Patterson, a potential percipient witness, (b)

failed to impeach Shantele Marcum, a prosecution witness, (c) failed to request a

limiting instruction on information revealed during Petitioner’s cross examination,

and (d) failed to move for a mistrial; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct

the jury on accident; (3) the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to

question him on cross-examination about his drug procurement for the Miami trip;

(4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight; and (5) cumulative error

resulted in a denial of due process. 

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

10

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 10 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1. Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The

United States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective

assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984). The

benchmark for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is “whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process

that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Nunes v.

Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003.) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

686). A petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances,

counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. After a petitioner identifies the

acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance. (Id. at 690); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,

521, (2003). 

Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's

deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Id. at 694.) A reasonable

probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

(Id.) See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderson, 224 F.3d 972,

981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel's

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the

defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . .if it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice. . . .that course

should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

11

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 11 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong

presumption that counsel's performance falls within the ‘wide range of

professional assistance.’ “Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There is in addition a strong presumption

that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in all significant

decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

In his habeas petition, Petitioner fashions his ineffective assistance claim from

a plethora of alleged misconduct. In particular, Petitioner claims that counsel: (a)

failed to investigate and interview Melanie Patterson, a potential percipient

witness, (b) failed to impeach Shantele Marcum, a prosecution witness, (c) failed

to request a limiting instruction, and (d) failed to move for a mistrial. Taking these

claims in turn, the Court will address each issue.

a. Failing to Investigate and Interview a Potential Percipient Witness

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel, Jason Gregory Turner, failed to

investigate and interview Melanie Patterson, a potential percipient witness, even

after Petitioner told him not to do so. When Petitioner was interviewed by his

counsel before trial, he mentioned there was another person in his apartment on

the night of the incident. (Lodgment 14 at 1417-18.) According to his counsel,

Petitioner passed over it “very quickly because this was at a time when he had

reconciled with his fiancee, [a]nd it was very important [to Petitioner] that this

information not see the light of day. So we just let it go.” (Id.) As a result, this

witness did not testify until Petitioner’s current counsel questioned her at the

Motion for New Trial. (Id. at 1442.) 

During direct examination at the motion for a new trial, Melayni Patterson

testified that after a domestic violence incident with her boyfriend in Palm

Springs, she drove to San Diego to clear her mind. (Id. at 1443.) While in San

Diego she ran into Petitioner at the Green Flash, a restaurant and bar. (Id.) She

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

12

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 12 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

stated that she knew Petitioner for three years and confided in him regarding her

situation with her boyfriend. (Id. 1444-45.) Patterson testified that she didn’t have

anything to drink, nor take any drugs that night, and accompanied Petitioner back

to his apartment. (Id.) During the early hours of Saturday morning, Patterson

awoke to voices both inside the apartment and outside. (Id. at 1445-46.) She

testified that she was in the Petitioner’s bedroom when she heard Petitioner open

the door and yell in a loud whisper for the victim to “shut the fuck up.” (Id. at 46.)

When Petitioner went outside to confront the victim, Patterson testified that she

“walked out of the bedroom and into the main area of the apartment where she

peeked out of the blinds that were right by the door.” (Id.) When asked about the

degree of darkness outside, Patterson stated it was pitch dark outside. (Id.)

Patterson then described that she saw the victim backpedal in response to the

Petitioner and toppled over the bannister. (Id.) She stated that although Petitioner

was gesticulating with his arms, there was no contact between him and the victim.

(Id.) Patterson also clarified that she was in a position to see the scene clearly and

that there was a light on the balcony. (Id.) 

However, on cross examination it was revealed that Patterson had a brief prior

romantic relationship with the Petitioner. (Id. at 1452.) Patterson explained that it

was a fleeting affair and that they were mostly good friends. (Id.) Patterson was

then questioned about the details of what she saw that evening, (Id. at 1455.)

specifically, where she was standing in reference to the victim and Petitioner. (Id.)

Patterson stated that Petitioner’s back was to her as he approached the victim

waiving his arms and saying “shut the fuck up.” (Id. at 1456.) She also explained

that the victim was on a slightly lower level because the Petitioner had to take a

few steps down to confront him. (Id.) Patterson then stated that after the victim

fell she remained in the apartment and did not go outside, call 911, or check up on

the situation. (Id. at 1457-58.) She left later that day and did not follow up on the

events from the morning. (Id.) Patterson explained that she has seen Petitioner

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

13

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 13 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

three or four times in public since the incident but never knew there was a pending

case against him. (Id.)

i. Prejudice under Strickland

As stated above, in assessing prejudice, the question is not whether it is

possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted

differently, but whether it is reasonably likely the result would be different.

Harrington v. Richter, ____ U.S. ____, 131 S.Ct. 770,791-92 (2011). “The

likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” (Id. at

792.) Additionally, as in this case, prejudice based on a failure to investigate

witnesses “must be considered in light of the strength of the government’s case.”

Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 808-09 (9th Cir. 2002.) 

In this instance, the government’s case relied upon testimony from two

witnesses who were present at the scene of the incident and whose statements

were made to law enforcement shortly after the incident. Marcum testified that

while she was in Petitioner’s apartment, Petitioner went up to the victim in

response to his shouting outside. (Id. at 158-59.) Marcum stated that although she

“never saw a punch, she assumed a punch because of the way Petitioner was upset

and yelling and because of the way he went up to [the victim].” (Id. at 192.) She

stated that while the door was open as Petitioner was approaching the victim, she

had a clear and unobstructed view of the well lit area where the Petitioner and

victim were. (Id. at 193.) Daria Kasprzak testified that she didn’t see the

Petitioner’s hand actually make contact with the victim, but that she “saw him

swing at the victim and the victim immediately fell.” (Id. at 467.) Kasprzak then

explained that she had a straight-on view but that the victim’s back had blocked

her vision of any actual punch. (Id.) She further explained during cross

examination that although she didn’t see the exact point of contact she had no

doubt contact was made between Petitioner and the victim due to the way

Petitioner’s hands went up and the way the victim’s body went over the rail. (Id.

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

14

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 14 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at 479.)

In addition to the testimonial evidence of those present at the scene, Detective

Olson and Officer Minx strengthened the government’s case by introducing

incriminating statements made by Petitioner. When Detective Olson told

Petitioner what he was being charged with in the holding cell hours after the

incident, Petitioner spontaneously told Detective Olson “I should not have

touched that guy. I don’t even know him.” (Id. at 768.) Officer Minx testified that

although he never took a “formalized statement” from Petitioner, according to his

report, Petitioner said something to the effect of chest bumping into the victim.

(Id. at 780.) Officer Minx stated that he didn’t remember specifically speaking

about whether or not they made contact, but “when he told me that he chestbumped him or got close to chest-bumping him, I had just assumed that they made

contact.” (Id. at 781.)

This Court is not convinced that it was an unreasonable application of

Strickland for the California courts to conclude that there was no reasonable

likelihood the jury would reach a different outcome. Although Patterson’s

testimony supports the conclusion that Petitioner didn’t make contact with the

victim, given her vantage point behind Petitioner, her testimony is not compelling

enough to create a substantial likelihood that the result of Petitioner’s trial would

be different. Patterson’s testimony is not exculpatory, nor does it shed any direct

and definitive light on Petitioner’s innocence. As stated in Respondent’s brief, the

issue at trial was whether Petitioner made contact with the victim, or whether the

victim fell over by himself. Patterson’s testimony would not have added any

definitive or conclusive evidence on the critical issue.

Since the addition of Patterson’s testimony isn’t compelling enough to create

a substantial likelihood of a different result, Petitioner has not satisfied the

prejudice prong of Strickland. Accordingly, this Court recommends that

Petitioner's claim regarding failure to investigate and interview be DENIED. 

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

15

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 15 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

b. Failing to Impeach a Prosecution Witness

The second argument Petitioner asserts to establish a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is counsel’s failure to impeach Shantele Marcum. Petitioner

claims there were two critical instances where trial counsel failed. 

The first instance involves an allegedly false statement made by Marcum to

the police on the night of the incident. There, Marcum told police that Escajeda

was at Petitioner’s residence, when in fact, Escajeda was not at Petitioner’s 

residence. Petitioner argues that had trial counsel impeached Marcum with this

false statement it would have had an impact on the jury. [Doc. No. 1 at 30.]

The second instance involves Marcum’s alleged statement to Escajeda several

hours after the incident that the victim “fell off the balcony.” (Lodgment 14 at

1463.) Petitioner emphasizes that Marcum’s statement to Escajeda describing the

incident as a “fall” rather than an assault and battery is extremely damaging to the

prosecution’s case and should have been presented to the jury. Petitioner also

claims that Marcum was primarily interested in discussing a white dress she

borrowed from Escajeda rather than the victim’s condition. 

 After reviewing the trial transcripts, this Court is not persuaded by

Petitioner’s argument that failing to impeach Marcum with her prior inconsistent

statement to the police, and her vague comments to Escajeda over the phone,

created prejudice within the meaning of Strickland.

 During cross examination, Petitioner’s trial counsel questioned Marcum

regarding her visit to Petitioner’s apartment. (Lodgment 14 at 154.) There,

Marcum stated that she chatted with Petitioner about Escajeda for several minutes

and never testified that Escajeda was present at Petitioner’s apartment. This

testimony conflicts with a police report that was given at the time of the incident.

However, even if Petitioner’s trial counsel brought this inconsistency to light, the

effect on the jury would have been minimal since this inconsistent statement had

nothing to do with her observations of Petitioner and the victim. Furthermore, the

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

16

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 16 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

jury did hear testimony evidence from Escajeda that in her opinion Marcum “was

not a trust worthy person.” (Lodgment 14 at 557.) Therefore, the lack of

impeachment with respect to Marcum’s statement to the police is seen by this

Court as harmless error. 

Secondly, Marcum’s statement that the victim “fell” could be reasonably

viewed as consistent with the prosecution’s case that Petitioner made contact with

the victim and he fell over the railing. There is nothing in the record that suggests

that Marcum and Escajeda had a detailed conversation regarding the facts of that

evening. As a result, the evidentiary value of Marcum’s comment for the

defense’s case is significantly diminished. This fact, coupled with testimony from

Marcum and Kasprzak describing their observations of Petitioner’s conduct and

description of how the victim went over the railing, strongly supports the

conclusion that there is no reasonable likelihood the result would be different.

Accordingly, this Court recommends that Petitioner's claim regarding failure to

impeach be DENIED. 

c. Failing to Request a Limiting Instruction

The third argument Petitioner asserts to establish a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel was his failure to ask for a limiting instruction after

Petitioner was cross examined on his having procured the cocaine he allegedly

was selling. (Lodgment 1 at 30.) 

At trial, Marcum testified that Petitioner was a drug dealer who sold cocaine

to her on several occasions, including on a recent trip to Miami. (Lodgment 14 at

52, 80.) She also explained that on the night of the incident, upon her request,

Petitioner told her that she could come over to get cocaine. (Lodgment 14 at 53,

58.) However, during Petitioner’s direct examination, he testified that he’s not a

drug dealer, never sold cocaine to Marcum, and never spoke to her on the phone

on the morning of the incident. (Lodgment 14 at 602-08.) Subsequently, on cross

examination, the prosecutor inquired into Petitioner’s prior procurement of

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

17

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 17 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

cocaine. The prosecutor asked Petitioner how he acquired the cocaine for the

Miami trip, and whether he sold any of the drugs. (Lodgment 14 at 720-27.)

Despite trial counsel’s objections on relevancy, cumulative, and prejudial grounds,

the trial court ruled that the prosecutor could make a “limited inquiry” into this

topic to establish Petitioner’s credibility. (Lodgment 5 at 30-31.) 

Petitioner now argues that trial counsel’s failure to move for a limiting

instruction to keep evidence of other crimes from the jury amounted to ineffective

assistance of counsel. (Lodgment 1 at 30.) He states that trial counsel should have

asked the trial judge to instruct with CALCRIM No. 3751/

, which orders the jury

not to conclude from the other crimes evidence that the defendant has a bad

character or is predisposed to commit a crime. (Lodgment 1 at 31.) In response,

Respondent argues that the prosecutor only initiated this line of questioning to

attack the defendant’s credibility and display his propensity to lie. [Doc. No. 5 at

22.] 

In considering Petitioner’s argument, federal courts may not interfere with a

state evidentiary ruling but only consider whether the evidence was so prejudicial

that its admission violated fundamental due process and the right to a fair trial.

Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1999). As such, this Court will focus on

whether trial counsel’s failure to ask for a limiting instruction amounted to

ineffective assistance of counsel.

 After reviewing transcripts of direct and cross examinations, this Court is not

persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that failing to ask the trial court for a limiting

instruction created prejudice within the meaning of Strickland. As the California

Court of Appeal noted, even if the trial court exercised its discretion under

California Evidence Code § 352 to narrow the scope and length of the

prosecutor’s cross-examination about Petitioner’s procurement of cocaine, the

1. CALCRIM 375 is designed to limit the jury consideration of uncharged acts to prove identity, intent,

motive, knowledge, credibility. 

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

18

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 18 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

jury was presented with other admissible evidence that Petitioner had provided

cocaine to Marcum on other occasions. (Lodgment 5 at 32.) Consequently, despite

trial counsel’s objections, the jury would have heard about Petitioner’s

involvement in procuring cocaine for the trip to Miami. Additionally, Petitioner’s

involvement in cocaine related activity was a relative minor issue compared to the

issue of whether or not Petitioner pushed the victim over the railing. The

prosecution mainly inquired into Petitioner’s cocaine related activity to attack his

credibility as a witness and establish foundation for Marcum visiting Petitioner’s

apartment. Accordingly, this Court recommends that Petitioner's claim regarding

failure to request a limiting instruction be DENIED. 

d. Failing to Move for a Mistrial

The fourth argument Petitioner asserts to establish a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, is that trial counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial based on

Petitioner’s cross examination on the cocaine procurement issue, was prejudicial.

Petitioner invokes the same argument and facts presented in his third argument of

failing to request a limiting instruction. As the Court stated above, trial counsel’s

failure to move for a mistrial based on the cross examination of Petitioner on his

prior drug procurement does not create prejudice within the context of Strickland.

Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice sufficient to show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different. Assuming arguendo, testimony

regarding Petitioner’s prior drug procurement was not presented to the jury, the

jury still had ample evidence including testimony from Marcum, Kasprzak,

Detective Olson and Officer Minx to convict Petitioner of battery. Accordingly,

this Court recommends that Petitioner's claim regarding failure to move for a

mistrial be DENIED. 

For the reasons stated above this Court recommends that ground one

regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim be DENIED in its entirety.

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

19

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 19 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Refusing to Instruct the Jury on Accident or Misfortune

In ground two, Petitioner contends that the trial court’s failure to instruct on

accident or misfortune prejudicially deprived Petitioner of his federal

constitutional right to present a defense. [Doc. No. 1 at 44.] Respondent argues

that Petitioner’s claim should be dismissed because: (1) this is not a federal

question for which relief may be granted; and (2) the California courts’ rejection

of the claim is entitled to deference and is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of United States Supreme Court precedent on the facts presented.

(Lodgment 5, at 28.)

The trial court, at the close of evidence, instructed the jury with CALCRIM

875, which as read to the jury, stated:

875. Assault with Deadly Weapon or Force Likely to Produce

Great Bodily Injury

The defendant is charged in Count 1 with assault with force likely

to produce great bodily injury. 

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must

prove that:

1A. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and

probably result in the application of force to a person, and

1B. The force used was likely to produce great bodily injury;

2. The defendant did that act willfully;

3. When the defendant acted, he was aware of facts that would lead

a reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature would

directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;

AND

4. When the defendant acted, he had the present ability to apply

force likely to produce great bodily injury to a person.

Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly

or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the

law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

The terms application of force and apply force mean to touch in a

harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough

if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The

touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

20

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 20 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object [or

someone else] to touch the other person.

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually

touched someone.

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually

intended to use force against someone when (he/she) acted.

No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant's act. But

if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all

the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an

assault, and if so, what kind of assault it was.

The following term great bodily injury is defined in another

instruction to which you should refer.”

925. Battery Causing Serious Bodily Injury

The defendant is charged in Count 2 with battery causing serious bodily injury.

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this charge, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant willfully touched Ajmal Wardak in a harmful or offensive manner;

AND

2. Ajmal Wardak suffered serious bodily injury as a result of the

force used.

Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly

or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the

law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.

Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough to commit a battery.

A serious bodily injury means a serious impairment of physical condition. Such an injury may include: loss of consciousness,

concussion, and bone fracture.

The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object to touch

the other person.”

(Lodgment 1 at 74-76.)

On direct review, the California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s

instructional error claim, as follow:

Defendant argues the trial court erred in refusing his request that the jury be instructed on the defense of accident. (See CALCRIM No.

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

21

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 21 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3404.) As we shall explain, the charged offenses in this case

(assault and battery with personal infliction of great bodily injury) do not require an intent to harm the victim. Further, to support an

accident defense, there must be accidental conduct by the defendant, not merely accidental conduct by the victim. Thus, to the extent

defendant’s contentions rest on claims that there was evidence to

support that he had no intent to hurt the victim and that the victim

(as opposed to defendant) engaged in accidental conduct, they are unavailing. Assault and battery are general intent crimes, requiring that the defendant commit the proscribed act willfully; i.e., on purpose.

(People v. Williams, supra, at p. 782; People v. Colantuono, supra, at pp. 213-214; People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal. App. 4th 102, 107; People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal. App.4th 1174, 1194.) Further, the defendant must have had knowledge of facts that would lead a

reasonable person to realize the application of force was likely to

result from the act. (People v. Williams, supra, at p. 788.) Thus, an accident defense can apply to charges of assault or battery when the defendant unwillingly or unknowingly (i.e., accidentally) directed

force towards, or touched, the victim. (See, e.g., People v. Lara, supra, at p. 106 [accident defense applicable based on evidence showing victim grabbed defendant, and defendant then

unintentionally hit victim while turning around to free himself];

People v. Gonzales (1999) 74 Cal. App. 4th 382, 385, 390 [accident instruction supported by evidence showing defendant accidentally struck victim with door when he entered room as victim was

leaving].) At trial, defendant argued an accident instruction was warranted based on evidence showing he had no intention to cause harm and the incident occurred because the victim recoiled in

response to his approach. The court concluded the accident defense

did not apply because there was no evidence that defendant engaged

in any involuntary conduct. Similar to his arguments to the trial

court, on appeal defendant asserts an accident defense was

supported by evidence showing that he went outside his apartment

with no wrongful intent but merely to tell the victim to stop yelling,

and the incident occurred because the inebriated victim accidentally fell over the railing when defendant approached him. To the extent

defendant is asserting an accident defense based on evidence

showing he did not intend to cause harm to the victim, this showing

would not refute the assault or battery charges in this case. Intent to harm is not an element of assault or battery; all that is required is

knowledge of the relevant facts and intent to do the act that is likely

to, or does, result in the application of the wrongful force. (See

People v. Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 782, 786, 790 [assaultive act, by its nature, subsumes intent to injure.]) It is apparent from the record that the jury understood that defendant was liable for assault or battery only if the prosecution proved that he acted purposefully instead of accidentally. The jury was instructed that the offenses of assault and battery required the prosecution to prove that defendant did the act or touching

“willfully” and that he was “aware of facts” reasonably showing the application of force was likely. The instructions provided to the jury

explained that defendant commits an act willfully when “he or she does it willingly or on purpose.” (See CALCRIM Nos. 915, 925.)

We assume the jurors understood and followed the court’s

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

22

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 22 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

instructions. (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 231.) Based on the instructions provided to the jury requiring that defendant act

willingly and on purpose, we have no doubt the jury understood

that it could not find defendant guilty unless it was convinced

beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct was purposeful, not

accidental. 

(Lodgment 5 at 16-20.)

Generally, a claim that a state trial judge gave erroneous jury instructions is

not cognizable in a federal habeas action unless the instruction “so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991), quoting Cupp v.

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). “[I]t must be

established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even

‘universally condemned’, but that it violated some [constitutional] right.”

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431

(1974). Further, “[i]t is well established that the instruction ‘may not be judged in

artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a

whole and the trial record.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (1991), quoting Cupp, 414 U.S.

at 147. 

When a petitioner challenges the admission of particular evidence, reviewing

federal courts will not find a due process violation as long as the challenged

evidence is relevant to an issue in the case and a permissible inference can be

drawn from that evidence. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 70; see Jammal v. Van de Kamp,

926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (Where several inferences arise from admitted

evidence, the jury is relied upon to “sort them out in light of the court's

instructions”); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86

L.Ed. 166 (1941) (“The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude

presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of

evidence whether true or false”). “Only if there are no permissible inferences the

jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due

process.”Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920; see also Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057,

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

23

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 23 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (For purposes of federal habeas review, it is “irrelevant”

whether the trial court's evidentiary ruling is correct or not under state law; the

only question “is whether the ruling rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as

to violate due process”) (citation omitted). Even when the state trial court's

erroneous evidentiary ruling is found to have violated the defendant's

constitutional rights, the error is still evaluated by federal habeas courts under

the Brecht “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury's verdict

standard. Baines, 204 F.3d at 977.

In this case, the jury was instructed that the offenses of assault and battery

required the prosecution to prove that Petitioner did the act or touching

“willfully.” The instructions provided to the jury explained that a defendant

commits an act willfully when “he or she does it willingly or on purpose.”

(Lodgment 5 at 74, 76.) The instructions did not alter or diminish the burden of

proof requiring the jury to find that Petitioner acted willingly and on purpose. 

Given these instructions, the California Court of Appeal’s reasoning is not

clearly contrary to any United States Supreme Court precedent. The court found

that, pursuant to California law, the trial court's refusal to instruct on accident was

without import because the trial court stated to the jury that if it did not find that

Petitioner acted purposely or willingly, it could not convict him of assault or

battery. As such, this instruction did not render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally

unfair since it required the jury to find all elements necessary to convict for the

crimes alleged. Accordingly, this Court recommends that ground two regarding

failure to instruct on accident or misfortune be DENIED.

3. Cross Examination of Prior Drug Procurement

In ground three, Petitioner contends that the court erred when it allowed the

prosecution to cross examine Petitioner on “irrelevant” and “highly prejudicial”

testimony relating to his drug procurement for an unrelated recent trip to Miami.

[Doc. No. 1 at 53.] In response, Respondent asserts that since Petitioner testified,

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

24

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 24 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

any evidence bearing on his credibility is relevant. [Doc. No. 5 at 33.]

Specifically, since Petitioner’s testimony contradicted the prosecution witness’s

testimony, it opened himself to scrutiny on this subject. (Id. at 33.)

When a petitioner asserts a due process violation based on admission of

evidence, a federal habeas court is limited to determining whether the challenged

evidence “rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate due

process.” Windham, 163 F.3d at 1103; accord Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057,

1065 (9th Cir.2008). But “[u]nder AEDPA, even clearly erroneous admissions of

evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit the grant of

federal habeas corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’

as laid out by the Supreme Court.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101

(9th Cir.2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)).

Here, although Petitioner cites the “fundamentally unfair” standard in Estelle,

he fails to cite any other applicable Supreme Court precedent or controlling

authority, and instead expressly relies on California rules of civil procedure. [Doc.

No. 1.] Since the state courts addressed and rejected Petitioner's evidentiary claims

(Lodgment 5 at 32), this Court will not second-guess the state court's conclusion

on an issue of state law. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67–68 (“[I]t is not the province of a

federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions.”) As a result, Petitioner's evidentiary claims are not cognizable and do

not present a federal question.

 Even if Petitioner's claims were cognizable on habeas review, they would not

warrant relief. As stated by the California Court of Appeals decision, any error in

this regard was not prejudicial. Considering the record as a whole, since the jury

was presented with other admissible evidence that Petitioner had provided cocaine

to Marcum on a separate occasion, this Court finds that the cross-examination

about Petitioner’s procurement of cocaine for the Miami trip was relatively

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

25

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 25 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

innocuous. Accordingly, this Court recommends that ground three regarding

improper cross examination be DENIED.

4. Jury Instruction on Flight

In ground four, Petitioner contends that the court erred by giving the jury a

flight instruction according to CALCRIM § 372. [Doc. No. 1 at 55.] Respondent

argues that Petitioner’s fourth claim should be dismissed because: (1) this is not a

federal question for which relief may be granted; and (2) the California courts’

rejection of the claim is entitled to deference and is not contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent on the facts

presented. (Lodgment 5, at 35-37.)

According to the California Court of Appeal decision, after the victim fell on

his head, the Defendant picked up the victim and put him in the front seat of a car

in order to take him to the hospital. (Lodgment 5 at 6.) The Defendant did this

despite several requests from Marcum and Kasprzak to call 911. (Id.) Kasprzak

also testified that the Defendant grabbed and shook her when she stated they

needed to call the police. (Id.) As the Defendant was backing the car into the

street, he was stopped by the police in response to a 911 call by a neighbor. (Id.)

The trial court, at the close of evidence, instructed the jury with CALCRIM §

372, which as read to the jury, stated:

“If the defendant fled or tried to flee immediately after the crime was

committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude

that the defendant fled or tried to flee, it is up to you to decide the meaning and

importance of that conduct. However, evidence that the defendant fled or tried to

flee cannot prove guilt by itself.”

(Lodgment 1 at 72.)

As stated above, jury instructions will not be subject to federal review unless

they, “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.” Estelle v. McGuire. 

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

26

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 26 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In this case, the flight instruction stated that if the jury found Petitioner tried

to flee, it could consider that as part of the evidence. The instruction also stated

that “evidence that the defendant fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself.”

Given the phrasing of the instruction, and the facts, the prosecution was entitled to

a flight instruction. Therefore, this Court recommends this claim be DENIED. 

5. Cumulative Error

In his final claim, Petitioner contends that the cumulative effect of the errors

asserted in grounds one, two, and three, and four violated his right to due process.

[Doc. No. 1.] On appeal, the California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner's

cumulative error claim, stating: 

the evidentiary items omitted by defense counsel (i.e., the testimony of

the women at defendant’s apartment and Marcum’s pretrial statement

to her friend) did not shed direct, definitive light on the key disputed

contention of whether defendant touched the victim, and there is no

reasonable probability that this evidence would have altered the jury’s

conclusions. Concerning the claims of instructional error, it is clear

from the record that the jury understood culpability could not be based

on accidental conduct by defendant; the jury was not told to apply a

proximate causation standard to the great bodily injury enhancement;

and the evidence warranted submitting the issue of flight to the jury.

Finally the prosecutor was entitled on cross-examination to challenge

the veracity of defendant’s testimony concerning his cocaine

procurement, and to the extent the court should have curtailed the

length of this cross-examination, it did not provide the jury with any

new evidence of misconduct that the jury did not know about from

other, admissible testimony.

“The Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined effect of multiple

trial court errors violates due process where it renders the resulting criminal trial

fundamentally unfair, even where each error considered individually would not

require reversal.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir.2007);see

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

27

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 27 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

also Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893 (9th Cir.2003); Mancuso v.

Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). “[T]he fundamental question in

determining whether the combined effect of trial errors violated a defendant's due

process rights is whether the errors rendered the criminal defense ‘far less

persuasive,’ ... and thereby had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence’ on

the jury's verdict.”  Parle, 505 F. 3d at 928 (internal citations omitted).

The California Court of Appeal addressed each of the alleged errors that

Petitioner contends together give rise to cumulative error and found no cumulative

error. Similarly, this Court reviewed all of Petitioner’s contentions and found no

resulting error. Therefore, this Court recommends Petitioners claim of cumulative

error be DENIED. 

VI.

CONCLUSION

This report and recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Janis L.

Sammartino, the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the Court and

serve a copy on all parties on or before November 21, 2013. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before December 19, 2013. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specific time may waive the

right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir.1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: October 24, 2013

Peter C. Lewis

United States Magistrate Judge

13-CV-211-JLS-(PCL)

28

Case 3:13-cv-00211-JLS-PCL Document 15 Filed 10/24/13 Page 28 of 28