Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00534/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00534-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL DORADOR-MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

CORECIVIC INC.; DO CARINI,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-CV-534-CAB-BGS

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [Doc. No. 45] AND 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

EXCLUDE EXPERT [Doc. No. 46]

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and 

motion to exclude expert. [Doc. Nos. 45, 46.] 

I. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

On March 13, 2018, Plaintiff Manuel Dorador-Martinez (“Plaintiff”) filed a 

complaint for battery, sexual battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 

violation of the (California) Bane Act. [Doc. No. 1.] Plaintiff is a citizen of Mexico 

who, in March 2016, was being held by the United States as an inmate at Defendant

CoreCivic Inc.’s Otay Mesa Detention Center (“OMDC”) in San Diego County. [Doc. 

No. 1 at ¶6.] Defendant D.O. Carini was employed as a detention officer at OMDC. [Doc. 

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No. 1 at ¶8.] Plaintiff alleges that on or about March 26, 2016, Carini conducted a “patdown” search of Plaintiff by clasping his hands together and delivering a violent upward 

strike to Plaintiff’s genitals. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶1.] According to Plaintiff, the strike was so 

powerful that Plaintiff’s left testicle retracted 2-3 inches above his scrotum pubic region 

and remains retracted to this day; Plaintiff will require surgery and will likely lose his left 

testicle. Id.

On March 29, 2019, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 

45] and a motion to exclude expert [Doc. No. 46]. Both motions are fully briefed. [Doc. 

Nos. 48, 49, 52 and 53.]

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). It is the moving party's burden to show there is no factual issue for 

trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets its 

burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show there is a genuine issue for 

trial. Id. at 331. 

The Court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 

212 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir.2000). The Court does not make credibility determinations or 

weigh conflicting evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 

Rather, the Court determines whether the record “presents a sufficient disagreement to 

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a 

matter of law.” Id. at 251–52.

B. Analysis.

Plaintiff has presented evidence that he was assaulted by Defendant Carini on or 

about March 24-26, 2019, including Plaintiff’s own testimony as well as the testimony of 

several eyewitnesses. [Doc. Nos. 48-1, Exhibits 1-3.] Plaintiff has also presented 

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CoreCivic medical records showing he received medical treatment after the alleged 

assault [Doc. No. 48-1, Ex. 5], as well as internal grievance documents he filed with 

CoreCivic about the alleged assault [Doc. No. 48-1, Ex. 6 and 7]. Finally, Plaintiff has 

presented corroborating notes/testimony by his criminal defense attorneys who visited 

him shortly after the alleged assault. [Doc. No. 48-1, Ex. 4, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24.] 

Defendants argue that the “irrefutable documentary evidence” is that Officer Carini 

was not working on March 28, 2016, and that was the only date that the alleged assault 

could have occurred. [Doc. No. 45-1 at 8.] Defendants’ argument rests upon their 

assumption that the records1they have submitted are “irrefutable.” However, while the 

records Defendants have submitted, if properly authenticated, may be admissible as 

business records, they are still subject to cross-examination, and a jury will ultimately 

determine their authenticity. 

It is textbook law that documents may be admitted as long as they are relevant and 

properly authenticated. The judge makes a preliminary determination as to whether there 

is sufficient evidence to sustain a jury finding of authenticity. FRE 104(b); Ricketts v. 

City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1410 (2nd Cir. 1996). As long as there is sufficient 

evidence to support a finding of authenticity, the documentary evidence may go to the 

jury. The fact conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding authenticity affects weight, 

not admissibility. Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Institute of London Underwriters, 267 

F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001). Once the judge finds sufficient evidence of 

authenticity and admits the documentary evidence, the jury, as trier of fact, makes the 

ultimate determination. Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 

1978).

Here, the CoreCivic records Defendants have submitted appear to be records that, 

at trial, could be admitted as business records if properly authenticated by a witness. 

 

1 The records in question are the OMDC kitchen staffing records. See Doc. No. 45-2, Ex. 5 and 6.

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However, Plaintiff has submitted evidence that presents conflicting inferences as to the 

reliability of those CoreCivic records. This conflicting evidence includes Plaintiff’s 

testimony2, the testimony of the eyewitnesses, the testimony of Plaintiff’s criminal 

defense attorneys3, and the Plaintiff’s medical records showing treatment for testicular 

pain. Ultimately, the jury will decide if the CoreCivic records are in fact reliable and 

admissible. Accordingly, there are triable issues of fact as to whether Defendant Carini 

was working at the time of the alleged assault and whether the alleged assault occurred.

C. Bane Act.

In the Fourth Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants interfered with 

Plaintiff’s right to be free from torture as a result of Defendant D.O. Carini violently 

striking Plaintiff in the groin causing excruciating pain and disfigurement” [Doc. No. 1 at 

¶44], and this is a violation of the Bane Act, California Civil Code §52.1. 

The Bane Act punishes any “person or persons, whether or not acting under color 

of law, [who] interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by 

threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or 

individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the 

 

2 Defendants argue that a triable issue cannot be created by Plaintiff’s “self-serving” testimony. 

However, the Ninth Circuit has long held that declarations are often self-serving and cannot be 

disregarded at the summary judgment stage merely because of their self-serving nature. Nigro v. Sears, 

Roebuck and Co., 784 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2015)(“[a]lthough the source of the evidence may have some 

bearing on its credibility and on the weight it may be given by a trier of fact, the district court may not 

disregard a piece of evidence at the summary judgment stage solely based on its self-serving nature. Id. 

at 497. Here, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony is based on his personal knowledge, legally relevant, and 

internally consistent. If Plaintiff has not been consistent on the exact date of the alleged assault, that is 

simply another factor for the jury to consider when it evaluates the credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s testimony is sufficient to create a triable issue as to whether and when the alleged 

assault occurred.

3 Defendants object to the handwritten notes of attorneys Trimble and Berstein as inadmissible hearsay 

and not properly authenticated. [Doc. No. 53 at 9.] These objections, while perhaps superficially valid, 

miss the mark. First, at the summary judgment stage, courts focus on admissibility of the evidence’s 

content, not its form. Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, while the 

handwritten notes may not be admissible as, for example, business records, it is possible the notes may 

be utilized at trial to refresh the memory of a witness or may even be admissible as recorded 

recollection. FRE 803(5). Thus, the objections are overruled without prejudice to being raised at trial.

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rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.” Cal Civ. Code § 52.1(a). The 

Bane Act also provides a cause of action for anyone whose rights are harmed in this way. 

Id. § 52.1(b). In order to state a claim under the Bane Act, a plaintiff must allege “(1) 

interference with or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal 

right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation, or 

coercion.” Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 67, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 654 

(2015).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not proffered any evidence that Defendants 

interfered with his constitutional rights, much less identified one. Contrary to 

Defendants’ assertions, Plaintiff has provided evidence which, if believed by a jury, 

would show that he was assaulted by a detention officer—a clear violation of his 

constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive force. “Where Fourth Amendment 

unreasonable seizure or excessive force claims are raised and intentional conduct is at 

issue, there is no need for a plaintiff to allege a showing of coercion independent from the 

coercion inherent in the seizure or use of force.” Dillman v. Tuolumne Cnty., No. 13–

00404, 2013 WL 1907379, at *21 (E.D.Cal. May 7, 2013). See also Rodriguez v. City of 

Modesto, No. 10–01370, 2013 WL 6415620, at *13 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 2013) (“A plaintiff 

bringing a Bane Act excessive force [claim] need not allege a showing of coercion 

independent from the coercion in the use of force.”) No further evidence is needed to 

create a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a Bane Act violation.

D. Punitive Damages.

Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to establish punitive damage liability against 

CoreCivic because Plaintiff fails to identify which of CoreCivic’s managing agents or 

officers continued to employ Officer Carini despite his alleged unfitness. [Doc. No. 45-1 

at 9-10.] By statute, where a plaintiff proves “by clear and convincing evidence that the 

defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the 

actual damages, may recover [punitive] damages.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). 

Nevertheless, a corporate entity cannot commit willful and malicious conduct; instead, 

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“the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of 

oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent 

of the corporation.” Id. § 3294(b); Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. v. Tela Innovations, 

Inc., No. 14-CV-00362-BLF, 2014 WL 3705350, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2014) (“[A] 

company simply cannot commit willful and malicious conduct—only an individual 

can.”). A corporate employer may not be held liable for punitive damages arising from 

the acts of an employee unless “an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation 

... had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her 

with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the 

wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of 

oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ.Code § 3294(b). Therefore, Plaintiff must present 

evidence that an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendants committed an act of 

oppression, fraud, or malice.

Here, while Plaintiff has presented some evidence that may constitute ratification

[e.g. failure to discipline Carini or terminate his employment], Plaintiff has not identified 

any individual officer, director or managing agent who allegedly engaged in such 

ratification. Simply arguing that “[Plaintiff] believes that Defendant CoreCivic knew 

what Carini did,” or that “CoreCivic knew about the assault and never disciplined 

Carini,” is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial. Therefore, the motion for 

summary adjudication of the claim for punitive damages against Defendant CoreCivic is 

granted.4

II. MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT

Defendants see to exclude certain opinions by Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Tung Hsieh,

on the grounds that they are unreliable and are based, in part, on inadmissible evidence. 

 

4 The punitive damage claim will remain as to Defendant Carini.

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[Doc. No. 46.] Dr. Hsieh, an experienced urologist at the University of California, San 

Diego Health System, has opined that Plaintiff’s pain is related to a blunt force trauma to 

his left testicle, and that such force could be generated by a “235 lb man who stays in 

shape.” [Doc. No. 46-2 at 5.] Defendants argue that Dr. Hsieh is not a biomechanical 

engineer and therefore cannot testify to causation of the injury. [Doc. No. 46-1 at 3-4.] 

In addition, Defendants argue that Dr. Hsieh’s opinions regarding the biomechanical 

forces he believes were involved are not grounded in reliable data that was applied to any 

valid scientific method or principle. [Doc. No. 46-1 at 4-5.] The Court is not persuaded. 

Defendants arguments go to the weight of Dr. Hsieh’s opinions, not their admissibility. 

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995); 

Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 564-565 (9th Cir. 2010).

Finally, Defendants argue that Dr. Hseih’s opinions should be excluded because 

they rely [in small part] on criminal records which are inadmissible. The records in 

question show that Def. Carini pled guilty to a felony assault charge on December 11, 

2017. [Doc. No. 48-2.] First, it is not clear at this point that the records are inadmissible, 

especially if Defendant Carini testifies. See FRE 609. However, even if the records are 

inadmissible, the Federal Rules of Evidence make clear that experts can rely on otherwise 

inadmissible facts if experts in the field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts. 

FRE 703. Finally, Defendants’ Rule 403 concerns regarding prejudice can be addressed 

at trial by limiting the expert’s disclosure to the jury of any inadmissible material. See 

U.S. v. Williams, 740 F.Supp.2d 4, 9-10 (D.C. 2010)(expert opinion based on 

inadmissible material not excluded where expert did not disclose any of the inadmissible 

material in his direct examination, and he had a sound basis for his opinion and 

conclusions). Therefore, the motion to exclude Dr. Hseih’s opinions is DENIED

without prejudice, subject to renewal at the time of trial.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED, 

except that the motion for summary adjudication of the punitive damages claim against 

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CoreCivic is GRANTED. In addition, the motion to exclude Dr. Hseih’s opinions is 

DENIED without prejudice, as stated above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 23, 2019

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