Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01971/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01971-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRAY MARCELINO LOPEZ No. 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN

RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SGLC, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs in the present action, a group of 44 Mexican

citizens admitted to the United States on temporary work visas

(“Plaintiffs”), seek damages for unpaid wages, breach of

contract, violation of California labor and housing laws, unfair

competition, and fraud. Plaintiffs filed their original

complaint in 2008, and now have joined in their Second Amended

Complaint (“SAC”) four new defendants: Greene and Hemley, Vino

Farms, Inc., Van Ruiten Brothers, and Islands, Inc.

(“Defendants”), agricultural growers and producers who allegedly

employed Plaintiffs. 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 111 Filed 07/23/10 Page 1 of 13
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 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to Rule or 1

Rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 230(g). 

 The factual assertions in this section are based on the 3

allegations in Plaintiffs’ SAC unless otherwise specified.

2

Defendants have each moved independently to dismiss Plaintiffs’

SAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and

9(b). Additionally, three of the Defendants have moved for a 1

more definite statement under Rule 12(e), and two have moved to

strike portions of the SAC under Rule 12(f) and to sever under

Rule 42. 

Because these four motions are substantially similar, this

Court will address them all in this Order. For the reasons set

forth below, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, to Strike, to Sever,

and for a More Definite Statement are denied.2

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiffs, citizens of Mexico, were allegedly recruited to

work in and around Galt and Clarksburg, California, in 2008 by

SGLC, Inc. (another defendant in the present action, but not a

party to the Motions to Dismiss). SGLC provided Plaintiffs and

other farm workers with visas through the federal H-2 visa

program, and promised them six months of work at one hundred

dollars per day. According to Plaintiffs, at all times

Defendants “acted in concert” with SGLC and were their joint

employers. 

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 Defendant Vino Farms has requested that the Court 4

judicially notice the H-2A contract attached by Plaintiffs as an

exhibit to their Motion for Conditional Certification. 

Additionally, Defendant Greene and Hemley has requested that the

Court judicially notice Plaintiffs’ SAC, filed in this Court. 

These requests are unopposed and will be granted, although the

Court notes that a Request for Judicial Notice is unnecessary for

pleadings in the same case.

3

Plaintiffs paid for their transportation and cost of living

while traveling from Mexico to their work sites in California, as

well as other administrative fees. Plaintiffs argue that

contrary to the terms of their work contract, they were not

reimbursed for these expenses. Plaintiffs were also charged for 4

the meals that Defendants provided. They argue that these

expenses were de facto deductions from Plaintiffs’ wages, and

that they reduced their earnings to below the state and federal

minimum wage. Plaintiffs also contend that living conditions at

the various work sites did not meet the minimum standards set by

state and federal laws, and that the meals provided were not

adequate or nutritious.

In light of these alleged violations of state and federal

law, Plaintiffs bring eight causes of action. First, for

violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”); second, for

breach of contract; third, for failure to pay wages under

California law; fourth, for failure to provide meal and rest

periods mandated by California law; fifth, for failure to pay

wages due upon termination; sixth, for violation of California’s

Employee Housing Act; seventh, for unlawful competition in

violation of California law; eighth, for fraud and

misrepresentation; and ninth, for solicitation of employees by

misrepresentation. 

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4

Each cause of action is brought against all defendants to

the present action. Defendants seek to dismiss the SAC for

failure to meet the pleading requirements established by

rule 8(a). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to

allege facts indicating that Defendants were joint employers of

Plaintiffs, that the SAC does not meet the heightened state and

federal pleading requirements for fraud, and that Plaintiffs have

failed to state a claim for breach of contract. Van Ruiten Bros

Defendants, Islands Defendants, and Vino Farms Defendants seek a

more definite statement as to which claims are being brought

against which defendants, and Islands Defendants and Vino Farms

Defendants seek both to strike certain allegations and to sever

Defendants from the present action.

STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what

the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 

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“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Id. at 555 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must contain

something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates

a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”). In

order to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face,” Aschroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570), plaintiff must plead “factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. 

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability

requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949 (internal citation

and quotation omitted). 

B. Motion for a More Definite Statement under Rule 21(e)

Before interposing a responsive pleading, a defendant may

move for a more definitive statement “[i]f a pleading...is so

vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to

frame a responsive pleading....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). 

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A Rule 12(e) motion is proper when the plaintiff’s complaint is

so indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain the nature of

the claim being asserted. Gay-Straight Alliance Network v.

Visalia Unified Sch. Dist., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1099 (E.D. Cal.

2001).

Due to the liberal pleading standards in the federal courts

embodied in Rule 8(e) and the availability of extensive

discovery, courts should not freely grant motions for more

definitive statements. Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores,

Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981). Indeed, a motion

for a more definitive statement should be denied unless the

information sought by the moving party is not available or is not

ascertainable through discovery. Id.

C. Motion to Strike under Rule 12(f)

The Court may strike “from any pleading any insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he function of a 12(f)

motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money

that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing

with those issues prior to trial....” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H.

Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Immaterial matter

is that which has no essential or important relationship to the

claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded. Fantasy, Inc. v.

Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (rev’d on other

grounds Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). 

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Impertinent matter consists of statements that do not pertain,

and are not necessary, to the issues in question. Id.

D. Leave to Amend

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should

“freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant,...undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of...the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is

only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight

Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

A. Pleading Standards under Rule 8(a)

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]o comply with Rule 8

each plaintiff must plead a short and plain statement of the

elements of his or her claim, identifying the transaction or

occurrence giving rise to the claim and the elements of the prima

facie case.” Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 840

(9th Cir. 2000). 

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8

In cases involving multiple plaintiffs and defendants, “[c]ourts

have required separate counts where multiple claims are asserted,

where they arise out of separate transactions or occurrences, and

where separate statements will facilitate a clear presentation.” 

Id. at 840-841 (internal citation omitted). The ultimate goals

are efficiency and fairness; “unless cases are pled clearly and

precisely, issues are not joined, discovery is not controlled,

the trial court’s docket becomes unmanageable, the litigants

suffer, and society loses confidence in the court’s ability to

administer justice.” Id. at 841. 

The present action is distinct from Bautista. In that case,

a large group of plaintiffs brought discrimination claims against

a mutual employer. Id. Plaintiffs sought to plead their

discrimination claims collectively, without specifying the acts

that gave rise to the dispute. Id. Plaintiffs to that action

had been hired and fired at different times and for different

reasons, but this information was not provided in the complaint. 

Id. In that case, a more specific pleading was necessary to

serve the intent of the Federal Rules to “secure the just,

speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and

proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 

In the present action, efficiency and fairness would not be

served by demanding a more specific pleading. A complaint that

alleged separate violations on behalf of each of the 44

Plaintiffs would be dense, overlong, and unwieldy and would not

“facilitate a clear presentation.” 

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9

Moreover, it would exceed the demands of Rule 8(a) for a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Contrary to Defendant Vino Farms’ argument, the SAC does not

fall into the category of “shotgun pleadings” referred to by

several District Court decisions. Destfino v. Kennedy, No. CV-F08-1269 LJO DLB (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2009); Cataulin v. Washington

Mutual Bank, No. 08 CV 2419 JM (NLS) (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009). A

shotgun complaint is “replete with allegations that ‘the

defendants’ engaged in certain conduct, making no distinction

among the [various] defendants charged.” Destfino at 6 (citing

Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)). 

Plaintiffs do not “allege all claims indiscriminately,” Cataulin

at 2, but plead specific facts against Defendant Vino Farms as to

housing conditions and the quality of the workers’ meals. 

Plaintiffs allege that they were all hired pursuant to the same

employment contract and that this employment contract was

violated by all Defendants; the similarity of the claims against

Defendants at this stage in the pleadings, then, is unavoidable. 

B. Claims of Joint Employer Relationship

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants employed them jointly

with SLGC, and are therefore liable for violations of federal

law. To determine whether a joint employer relationship exists

for the purposes of the FLSA, courts apply an “economic reality”

test. 

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10

Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1997); Bonnette

v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th

Cir. 1983). This test involves a consideration of “all factors

which are relevant to the particular situation in evaluating the

economic reality of an alleged joint employment relationship.” 

Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 639 (citations omitted). Rather than a

“mechanical determination,” the test should take into account the

“circumstances of the whole activity.” Bonnette, 704 F.2d at

1470 (citations omitted). The definition of “employer” for the

purposes of the FLSA is a broad one, and has been called “the

broadest definition that has ever been included in any one act.” 

Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 638 (citing United States v.

Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3 (1945)). The Ninth Circuit

has held that joint employment should also “be defined

expansively under the FLDA.” Id. at 639. 

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants were their employers,

as defined by the Industrial Welfare Commission’s (“IWC”)

Order 14, 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 11140, for the purposes of their

state law claims. The California Supreme Court recently held

that the IWC’s wage orders “do not incorporate the federal

definition of employment.” Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 52

(2010). It then articulated three alternate definitions of “to

employ”: “(a) to exercise control over the wages, hours or

working conditions, or (b) to suffer or permit to work, or (c) to

engage, thereby creating a common law employment relationship.” 

Id. at 64 (emphasis in original). 

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11

Under both state and federal standards, Plaintiffs’ SAC

alleges sufficient facts that, if taken as true, establish a

joint employer relationship between Defendants and SLGC. Under

the Martinez test, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants controlled

Plaintiffs’ work schedules, number of hours worked, and rates of

pay, and that Defendants participated in recruiting and hiring

Plaintiffs. Under the “economic reality” test, in addition to

the allegations above, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants

supervised their work while at the work sites and set their work

schedule and location. These allegations rise above conclusory

statements; Plaintiff’s SAC, therefore, states a plausible claim

for relief.

C. Fraud Claims 

Allegations of fraud must meet a higher pleading standard

than that provided by Rule 8(a). “In alleging fraud or mistake,

a party must state with particularity the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). This

heightened standard “requires a pleader of fraud to detail with

particularity the time, place, and manner of each act of fraud,

plus the role of each defendant in each scheme.” Lancaster Cmty.

Hosp. V. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir.

1991). The purpose of this requirement is “to give defendants

notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to

constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the

charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” 

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12

Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiffs allege in their SAC that Defendants promised to

provide six months of work at one hundred dollars per day, and

that this work was not provided. Plaintiffs allege that these

promises were made in Colima, Mexico, when Plaintiffs were

recruited, and that when the promises were made that Defendants

knew they did not have sufficient work for the number of workers

recruited. They further allege that on the basis of these

promises, Plaintiffs were induced to leave Mexico and travel to

work sites in Northern California, incurring expenses that they

now claim as damages. Plaintiffs have plead with enough

specificity to put Defendants on notice as to the charges against

them.

D. Motions to Strike, to Sever, and for a More Definite

Statement 

Rule 20(a) allows for joinder of defendants “if any right to

relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

alternative with respect to or arising out of the same

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or

occurrences, and any question of law or fact common to all

defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 

Plaintiffs’ SAC meets both these conditions. The same

transaction–the recruitment of workers in Mexico and the signing

of the employment contract–gives rise to the present action. 

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Questions of fact common to all Defendants include, but are not

limited to, whether Plaintiffs were promised certain hours and

wage rates and whether those promises were met. Defendant Vino

Farms argues that claims against Defendants should be severed in

the interest of fairness and efficiency, but this argument is

without merit. The claims brought by Plaintiffs are sufficiently

alike that efficiency demands that they be brought at the same

time. Furthermore, this Court does not find that Defendants will

be prejudiced if these claims are brought together. 

Because this Court finds that Plaintiffs have plead with

sufficient specificity to meet the pleading requirements of the

Federal Rules, Defendants’ Motions to Strike and for a More

Definite Statement are denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, to

Strike, to Sever, and for a More Definite Statement (Docket Nos.

82, 86, 87, 96) are DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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