Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-56158/USCOURTS-ca9-15-56158-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES REAL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF LONG BEACH, a California 

Municipal Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

No.15-56158

D.C. No.

2:13-cv-01631-

R-MAN

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 14, 2017

Pasadena, California

Filed March 29, 2017

Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and JOHN B. OWENS, 

Circuit Judges, and ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN,* District 

Judge.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

 * The Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein, United States Senior District 

Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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2 REAL V. CITY OF LONG BEACH

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment in favor 

of the City of Long Beach in an action brought pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the City’s zoning ordinances 

violate the First Amendment by unreasonably restricting 

plaintiff’s ability to open and operate a tattoo shop in Long 

Beach.

The panel held that plaintiff had standing to bring a facial 

First Amendment challenge to the zoning ordinances and 

that he was not required to apply for, and then be denied, a 

conditional use permit under a permitting system that 

allegedly gave City officials unfettered discretion over an 

expressive activity fully protected activity by the First 

Amendment. The panel also held that plaintiff had standing 

to bring an as-applied First Amendment challenge because it 

appeared likely that the City would take action against 

plaintiff if he opened a tattoo shop without a conditional use 

permit.

The panel held that plaintiff raised a cognizable claim 

that the City’s zoning ordinances constituted an unlawful

prior restraint on speech. The panel held that the Long 

Beach Code supported plaintiff’s allegations that the 

ordinances vested excessive permitting discretion with the 

City to issue or deny a conditional use permit, and did not 

contain adequate procedural safeguards. The panel further 

 ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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REAL V. CITY OF LONG BEACH 3

held that plaintiff raised a cognizable claim that the City’s 

zoning ordinances constituted an unlawful time, place, or 

manner restriction on speech. The panel remanded for the 

district court to try the City’s defense that the ordinances 

were reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions and not 

unlawful prior restraints on speech.

COUNSEL

Robert C. Moest (argued), Law Offices of Robert C. Moest, 

Santa Monica, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Monte H. Machit (argued), Assistant City Attorney; Charles 

Parkin, City Attorney; Office of the City Attorney, Long 

Beach, California; for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

James Real brought this civil rights action against the 

City of Long Beach (City), alleging that the City’s zoning 

ordinances violate the First Amendment by unreasonably 

restricting his ability to open and operate a tattoo shop in 

Long Beach. The district court held that Real did not have 

standing to bring his claims because he did not apply for a 

conditional use permit (CUP), which is required to operate a 

tattoo shop in Long Beach. On appeal, Real argues that he 

has standing to bring both facial and as-applied challenges 

to the City’s relevant zoning ordinances, and that the 

ordinances operate as both unlawful prior restraints on 

speech and unreasonable time, place, or manner restrictions 

on speech. We hold that Real has standing to bring both 

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4 REAL V. CITY OF LONG BEACH

facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges against 

the City, and remand for the district court to try the City’s 

defense that the ordinances are reasonable time, place, and 

manner restrictions and not unlawful prior restraints on 

speech.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Real is a tattoo artist and long-time resident of Long 

Beach. He owns a tattoo shop in Huntington Beach, 

California, but has desired to open a shop in Long Beach for 

over a decade. However, he has not opened a shop or applied 

for a CUP due to Long Beach’s restrictive zoning 

ordinances, which disallow tattoo shops in most of Long 

Beach and require a CUP to operate. Long Beach Code 

§ 21.32.110, Table 32-1. Additionally, a tattoo shop may not 

operate within 1,000 feet “of any existing adult 

entertainment, arcade, fortunetelling, tattoo parlor, or 

tavern,” and may only operate between 7 a.m. and 10 p.m. 

Id. § 21.52.273. Before issuing a CUP, the City must 

conclude, among other things, that “[t]he proposed use will 

not be detrimental to the surrounding community including 

public health, safety or general welfare, environmental 

quality or quality of life.” Id. § 21.25.206. Generally, only 

a property owner in an area zoned for tattooing may apply 

for a CUP; if the affected property is not in such an area, the 

property owner must submit a separate application for a 

variance. Id. § 21.25.203.

On August 1, 2011, Real’s attorney sent a letter to the 

City identifying three locations where Real desired to open 

a tattoo shop, and had obtained preliminary approval from 

landlords, but was unable to move forward because the 

locations were not zoned for tattooing. Real’s attorney 

argued that the zoning ordinances were invalid because 

(1) City officials have excessive discretion to issue or deny 

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REAL V. CITY OF LONG BEACH 5

a CUP, and (2) the areas in which tattoo shops may be 

located are unreasonably restricted. The City responded on 

August 8, 2011, stating that a number of properly permitted 

tattoo shops operate in Long Beach, and the City was 

considering expanding zoning for tattooing, possibly to the 

East Village Arts District, where Real was interested in 

operating.1

Real brought this action against the City, arguing that the 

City’s zoning ordinances unduly restricted his First 

Amendment right to engage in tattooing by (1) limiting the 

areas in which tattooing is permitted, including by requiring 

that there be at least 1,000 feet between tattoo shops and 

taverns or other tattoo shops, and (2) requiring permitting 

through a CUP process that vests excessive discretion in city 

officials and imposes excessive fees. The district court held 

a one-day bench trial where Real testified that if the CUP 

process were not in place, he would have the means to, and 

indeed would, pursue opening a shop in Long Beach. He 

 1 At some point after August 1, 2011, the City opened the East 

Village Arts District to CUP applications for tattoo shops, and at least 

one tattoo shop opened there. Real never applied for a CUP to open a 

shop in the East Village Arts District, although one of the three locations 

he identified in his 2011 letter to the City was in that area. At trial, he 

testified that he was no longer interested in operating there, at least in 

part because a prominent tattoo shop had already opened there, and he 

was concerned about professional courtesy. Contrary to the City’s 

arguments and the district court’s holding, the City’s decision to expand 

tattooing to the East Village Arts District and Real’s failure to apply for 

a CUP to operate there do not defeat his claims. The East Village Arts 

District was only one location that Real was considering, and he changed 

his mind due to subsequent events. Moreover, the City’s zoning 

expansion does not undermine Real’s claims that the CUP process vests 

unbridled discretion in the City, that most of Long Beach is not zoned 

for tattooing, and that the location proximity requirements are unduly 

restrictive.

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6 REAL V. CITY OF LONG BEACH

testified that he never applied for a CUP because the areas in 

which he was interested in opening a shop (particularly an 

area named Retro Row) were not zoned for tattooing, so he 

knew the application would be denied. Further, to obtain a 

CUP he would first have to rent a location, then pay a large, 

nonrefundable application fee, and then wait while the 

permit was reviewed, with no guarantee that it would be 

approved. Moreover, he was aware that there were bars 

centrally located in Retro Row, and so the 1,000 foot 

restriction would likely be prohibitive, even if the area were 

zoned for tattooing.

After cross-examining Real, and before presenting any 

evidence, the City made an oral Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 52(c) motion, claiming that Real had not met his 

burden. The court agreed, and entered judgment for the City, 

concluding that (1) the zoning ordinances constituted time, 

place, or manner regulations, not prior restraints, because 

they did not entirely forbid tattooing; (2) Real brought an asapplied challenge, rather than a facial challenge, because he 

did not present evidence of impact on third parties; and 

(3) Real did not have standing to bring his as-applied 

challenge because he did not apply for a CUP, and thus 

suffered no injury-in-fact. Real timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s Article III standing 

decision de novo. Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 

683 F.3d 1177, 1184 (9th Cir. 2012). We also review the 

district court’s determination that the City’s zoning 

ordinances do not constitute a prior restraint on speech de 

novo, including any underlying factual findings. Tucker v. 

State of Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1209 n.2 (9th Cir. 

1996).

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REAL V. CITY OF LONG BEACH 7

ANALYSIS

The district court inaccurately narrowed Real’s claims in 

its order granting judgment in favor of the City by 

(1) framing Real’s challenge as only to the CUP 

requirement, when Real also challenged the location 

restrictions on tattoo shops; (2) ignoring Real’s claim that 

the CUP process vests unbridled discretion in the City; and 

(3) stating that Real’s claim only concerned his desire to 

open a shop at 316 Elm Street in the East Village Arts 

District, when this was just one of three locations that Real 

initially identified in his letter to the City. By overlooking 

these aspects of Real’s claims, the district court incorrectly 

concluded that Real lacked standing and did not raise a prior 

restraint claim.

I. Real Has Standing to Bring a Facial First 

Amendment Challenge to the City’s Zoning 

Ordinances

The district court held that Real “plainly did not assert a 

facial challenge to the zoning ordinances” because Real 

presented “no evidence regarding any third party’s conduct 

or effect of the zoning ordinances on third parties.” 

However, there is no requirement that a plaintiff present 

evidence of harm to third parties in order to bring a facial 

challenge pursuant to the First Amendment. Rather, a 

plaintiff has standing to vindicate his First Amendment 

rights through a facial challenge when he “argue[s] that an 

ordinance . . . impermissibly restricts a protected activity,” 

and such facial challenges may be paired with as-applied 

challenges. Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa 

Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 2006).

As the Court explained in City of Lakewood v. Plain 

Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755–56 (1988), “when 

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8 REAL V. CITY OF LONG BEACH

a licensing statute allegedly vests unbridled discretion in a 

government official over whether to permit or deny 

expressive activity, one who is subject to the law may 

challenge it facially without the necessity of first applying 

for, and being denied, a license.” This is because “without 

standards to fetter the licensor’s discretion, the difficulties of 

proof and the case-by-case nature of ‘as applied’ challenges 

render the licensor’s action in large measure effectively 

unreviewable.” Id. at 758–59.

We have held that tattooing is “purely expressive activity 

fully protected by the First Amendment.” Anderson v. City 

of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2010). 

This includes “[t]he tattoo itself, the process of tattooing, and 

even the business of tattooing.” Id. Although Real did not 

clearly state to the district court whether his challenge was 

as-applied or facial, he plainly challenged the zoning 

ordinances on the grounds that they impermissibly restrict 

an activity protected by the First Amendment and vest 

excessive permitting discretion in the City. Thus, Real has 

standing to bring a facial challenge to the zoning ordinances. 

See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1033. He 

was not required to first apply for, and then be denied, a CUP 

to bring this claim under a permitting system that allegedly 

gives City officials unfettered discretion over protected 

activity. See City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 755–56.

II. Real Has Standing to Bring an As-Applied First 

Amendment Challenge to the City’s Zoning 

Ordinances

To establish Article III standing to challenge a law as 

applied to him, a plaintiff “must allege (1) a distinct and 

palpable injury-in-fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the 

challenged provision or interpretation and (3) would likely 

be redressed by a favorable decision.” Santa Monica Food 

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REAL V. CITY OF LONG BEACH 9

Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1033 (internal quotation marks and 

ellipsis omitted).2

The district court held that Real lacked standing to bring 

an as-applied challenge because he did not adequately allege 

an injury-in-fact. According to the district court, to suffer an 

injury in this case Real would have to apply for and be 

denied a CUP to operate at 316 Elm Street in the East Village 

Arts District, a location that Real identified in his 2011 letter 

to the City. The district court limited the claim to that 

location, even though it was only one of three locations that 

Real identified in 2011, and at trial in 2015 Real explained 

that subsequent events had made it an undesirable location, 

and he was looking to operate elsewhere in Long Beach. 

Moreover, Real was not required to apply for a CUP to 

operate anywhere in Long Beach to suffer an injury; “a 

plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he 

alleges an intention to engage in a course of conduct 

arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but 

proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of 

prosecution thereunder.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 

134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342 (2014) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In such a case, “an actual arrest, prosecution, or 

other enforcement action is not a prerequisite to challenging 

the law.” Id.

Real readily meets the first part of the Susan B. Anthony 

List standard because (1) he alleged an intention to open a 

 2 Real readily meets the second and third prongs of the standing 

analysis. His alleged inability to open a tattoo shop is fairly traceable to 

the zoning ordinances governing the locations and permitting of tattoo 

shops, and a decision finding those laws unconstitutional would likely 

redress his injury because he would be able to open a tattoo shop without 

the current restrictive requirements.

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10 REAL V. CITY OF LONG BEACH

tattoo shop without a CUP; (2) “tattooing is purely 

expressive activity fully protected by the First Amendment,” 

Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1055; and (3) the zoning ordinances 

proscribe his intended conduct. Real also sufficiently 

alleged a credible threat of prosecution. In his appellate 

brief, he argued that “the threat of enforcement against [him] 

is substantial,” because the City “has vigorously defended its 

zoning ordinances in this case, and [he] has been explicitly 

told that he will be subject to zoning enforcement processes 

if he opens except as permitted by the zoning scheme.” The 

City has not denied these allegations, and has continued to 

defend its zoning ordinances. It appears likely that the City 

would take action against Real if he opened a tattoo shop 

without a CUP; thus, he has standing to bring an as-applied 

challenge. See Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2342.

III. Real Raised a Cognizable Claim That the City’s 

Zoning Ordinances Constitute an Unlawful Prior 

Restraint on Speech

The district court erred by holding that the zoning 

ordinances could not constitute a prior restraint because they 

do not prohibit tattooing entirely. An outright prohibition is 

not required to bring a prior restraint claim; rather, “a 

[licensing] scheme that places unbridled discretion in the 

hands of a government official or agency constitutes a prior 

restraint and may result in censorship.” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City 

of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225–26 (2004) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also Long Beach Area Peace Network v. 

City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011, 1025 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(“Regulations must contain narrow, objective, and definite 

standards to guide the licensing authority and must require 

the official to provide [an] explanation for his decision.”) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Additionally, “a prior restraint that fails to place limits on the 

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REAL V. CITY OF LONG BEACH 11

time within which the decisionmaker must issue [a] license 

is impermissible,” because “a licensing scheme creates the 

possibility that constitutionally protected speech will be 

suppressed where there are inadequate procedural 

safeguards to ensure prompt issuance of the license.” 

FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 226.

Real alleged that the City’s zoning ordinances (1) vest 

excessive permitting discretion with the City to issue or deny 

a CUP, and (2) do not contain adequate procedural 

safeguards because no time limits are placed on CUP 

decisions. See id. at 225–26. The Long Beach Code 

supports these allegations. First, the criteria to issue a CUP 

includes the open-ended determination that the use “will not 

be detrimental to the surrounding community including 

public health, safety or general welfare, environmental 

quality or quality of life.” Long Beach Code § 21.25.206. 

Second, the Code does not include a deadline for City 

officials to grant or deny a CUP.3 Thus, Real raised a 

cognizable prior restraint claim.

Because the district court granted the City’s motion for 

nonsuit before the City presented its case, the City has not 

had the opportunity to present evidence on its permitting 

discretion or any procedural safeguards. Accordingly, we 

remand for the district court to try the City’s defense.

IV. Real Raised a Cognizable Claim That the City’s 

Zoning Ordinances Constitute Unlawful Time, 

 3 Although Long Beach Code § 21.25.207 requires that the Zoning 

Administrator set a conditional use application for public hearing within 

60 days of receiving a completed application, there is no deadline for a 

grant or denial of the CUP following the hearing.

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12 REAL V. CITY OF LONG BEACH

Place, or Manner Restrictions on Speech

Like the plaintiff in Anderson, Real does not argue that 

the City’s ordinances constitute a content-based restriction 

of protected expression subject to strict scrutiny. 621 F.3d 

at 1063–64. Instead, Real argues that the City 

unconstitutionally restricts a protected means of expression. 

See id. Thus, because “tattooing is a purely expressive 

activity fully protected by the First Amendment,” the City’s 

zoning ordinances are constitutional only if they are 

reasonable “time, place, or manner” restrictions on tattooing. 

Id. at 1055.

Time, place, or manner restrictions are reasonable if they 

are “(1) [] justified without reference to the content of the 

regulated speech; (2) [] narrowly tailored to serve a 

significant governmental interest; and (3) leave[] open 

ample alternative channels for communication of the 

information.” Id. at 1064 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

While a government “need not [use] the least restrictive or 

least intrusive means” of serving its legitimate interests, the 

means must not be “substantially broader than necessary” 

and must “promote[] a substantial government interest that 

would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” 

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–800 

(1989).

Because the City rested its case before it addressed 

whether its zoning ordinances constitute permissible time, 

place, or manner restrictions on tattooing, we remand for the 

district court to try the City’s defense.

CONCLUSION

We REVERSE the district court’s holdings that (1) Real 

did not adequately allege a facial challenge, (2) Real did not 

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REAL V. CITY OF LONG BEACH 13

have standing to raise an as-applied challenge, and (3) the 

City’s zoning ordinances cannot constitute prior restraints on 

speech. We REMAND for the district court to try Real’s 

facial and as-applied First Amendment claims, on the 

grounds that the City’s zoning ordinances operate as 

unlawful prior restraints on speech and are unreasonable 

time, place, or manner restrictions on speech.4

 4 Appellant James Real’s motion to take judicial notice, filed July 9, 

2016, is GRANTED.

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