Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00105/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00105-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANARD KITCHENS,

Plaintiff,

v.

TORDSEN, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:12-cv-0105-AWI-MJS (PC)

ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED 

COMPLAINT (ECF No. 63); AND (2) 

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

AMEND DISCOVERY AND SCHEDULING 

ORDER (ECF No. 69)

Discovery Deadline: January 1, 2015

Dispositive Motion Deadline: February 16, 2015

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 10.)

This matter proceeds on Plaintiff‟s first amended complaint regarding acts that 

occurred during Plaintiff‟s pretrial detention at Kings County Jail (“KCJ”). (ECF No. 26.) 

The Court screened Plaintiff‟s first amended complaint and found that it stated 

cognizable claims against Defendant Dwayne Tordsen for retaliation in violation of the 

First Amendment, and against Defendants Dwayne Tordsen, Coker, Leach and Day for 

subjecting Plaintiff to conditions of confinement that amounted to punishment in violation 

of the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 28.) The Court concluded that Plaintiff had 

failed to state (1) a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Coker, Leach, 

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and Day; (2) a claim under California Code of Regulations §§ 3370(c) and 3450, or 

California Department Operations Manual § 54046.8 against Defendants Marryanne 

Tordsen and Costa; or (3) a claim under California Code of Regulations §§ 3361(a) and

3354.2(c)(1), or California Civil Code § 56.10 against Marryanne Tordsen. (Id. at 7-9.) 

The Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint or notify the Court of his 

willingness to proceed only on his cognizable claims. (ECF No. 28 at 11.) Plaintiff 

notified the Court of his willingness to proceed only on the cognizable claims (ECF No. 

29), and, on May 31, 2013, the Court dismissed the non-cognizable claims and 

dismissed Defendants Marryanne Tordsen and Costa. (ECF Nos. 30 & 32.)

On May 1, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an “amended/

supplemental” complaint, and also lodged a proposed second amended complaint. (ECF 

Nos. 63 & 64.) Defendants opposed the motion (ECF No. 67), and Plaintiff filed a reply. 

(ECF No. 71).

On May 22, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to amend the Court‟s discovery and 

scheduling order in light of Plaintiff‟s motion to amend the complaint. (ECF No. 69.) 

Plaintiff did not oppose the motion.

These motions are deemed submitted pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).

II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

A. Legal Standard

The decision to grant or deny leave to amend pleadings is within the trial court's 

discretion. Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996); United States 

v. Cnty. of San Diego, 53 F.3d 965, 969 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995).

A party seeking leave to amend pleadings must demonstrate that amendment is 

proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 

Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992). Under Rule 15(a)(2), the court should freely 

give leave to amend a pleading “when justice so requires.” The Court should apply this 

policy “with extreme liberality.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 

712 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F. 2d 1074, 

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1079 (9th Cir. 1990)). “If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a [party] 

may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim 

on the merits.” Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

However, a district court may deny leave to amend where there is “‟any apparent 

or declared reason‟ for doing so, including undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing 

party or futility of the amendment.” Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 

F.2d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Forman, 371 U.S. at 182). These factors are not 

to be given equal weight. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 

(9th Cir. 2003). Prejudice to the opposing party must be given the greatest weight. Id.

“Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Forman factors, there 

exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. 

B. Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff seeks leave to file an “amended/supplemental complaint adding new 

claims, new defendants and new information.” (ECF No. 63 at 1.) Plaintiff explains that 

his lack of “legal knowledge” led him to misstate or omit some claims in his first amended 

complaint. Plaintiff believes he now is able to properly state additional claims. He also 

seeks leave to add new defendants. Plaintiff asserts that the statute of limitations as to 

these defendants would be tolled pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 

§ 352(a)(3).

Defendants oppose Plaintiff‟s motion on the following grounds: (1) the motion may 

have been filed for purposes of delaying the litigation, (2) Plaintiff has known the alleged 

facts in his proposed second amended complaint since the filing of his original complaint,

(3) the disputes regarding discovery and evidentiary issues that Plaintiff proposes to add 

do not constitute newly discovered evidence that would support amendment of the 

complaint; (3) existing and proposed defendants would be prejudiced by the extension of 

discovery and passage of time since the underlying events, (4) claims relating to 

Plaintiff‟s conditions of confinement are time barred, and (5) Plaintiff did not amend when 

given that option in the Court‟s screening order.

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C. Plaintiff’s Proposed Amended Complaint

Plaintiff‟s proposed second amended complaint would add the following 

defendants: (1) Kim Pedreiro, Commander at KCJ, (2) Frank, a registered nurse at KCJ; 

(3) Lavan H., head nurse at KCJ, and (4) Minetta Costa, medical program manager at 

KCJ. (ECF No. 64.)

Plaintiff‟s proposed complaint contains essentially the same allegations as the 

operative complaint regarding the alleged housing of Plaintiff in a dirty cell. It also 

contains new allegations concerning the proposed new defendants. His allegations may 

be summarized essentially as follows.

Plaintiff was housed in the Secure Housing Unit (“SHU”) of the KCJ on December 

29, 2010. Defendant Tordsen searched Plaintiff‟s cell, found damage to the cell, and had 

Plaintiff strip searched. Plaintiff was handcuffed and transferred to another holding cell 

where he was kept for six hours. Plaintiff complained to Defendant Tordsen about his 

handcuffs and the holding cell. Plaintiff asked for a grievance form, but Defendant 

Tordsen ignored the request. Defendant Tordsen escorted Plaintiff back to the SHU and

placed Plaintiff in a cell covered with feces. Defendant Tordsen provided Plaintiff with 

minimal cleaning materials. Cells are typically cleaned by inmate workers who have 

been convicted and sentenced and who are provided adequate cleaning supplies. 

Plaintiff had not been convicted or sentenced at the time he was placed in the dirty cell. 

Plaintiff asked Defendant Tordsen to place him in a different, vacant cell. Plaintiff 

again asked Defendant Tordsen for a grievance form but was refused. Plaintiff asked to 

be provided adequate cleaning supplies but was refused. 

While Defendant Tordsen was exiting the SHU at the end of his shift, Plaintiff 

pressed the emergency intercom button and threatened to kill himself if he was not 

removed from the cell. Plaintiff was not suicidal, but threatened suicide to get a response

from staff. Defendants Coker, Leach, and Day responded to Plaintiff‟s threat. Plaintiff 

informed them he did not want to kill himself but just wanted a clean cell. Defendant Day 

gave Plaintiff the option of either cleaning the cell or being placed on suicide watch. 

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Plaintiff asked for a grievance form but was told by Defendant Leach that there 

was no grievable offense. Plaintiff asked Defendant Coker if he was going to let the 

other defendants violate his right to file a grievance. Defendant Coker shrugged but did 

not respond.

Defendant Day again asked if Plaintiff wanted to be placed on suicide watch or 

clean the cell. Plaintiff chose to be placed on suicide watch. Defendants Day, Leach, and 

Coker placed Plaintiff on suicide watch for the night. Plaintiff‟s commissary purchase was 

withheld from him. California regulations require that a suicide watch order be given by a 

physician or psychologist. However, Defendants did not contact medical staff regarding 

Plaintiff‟s threat. California regulations also mandate that an inmate who threatens 

suicide be placed on suicide precaution, not suicide watch. 

Plaintiff was removed from suicide watch the next day and returned to Defendant 

Tordsen‟s custody and to the filthy cell. Plaintiff again asked to be housed in another, 

vacant cell but was refused. Plaintiff began to clean his cell with limited supplies. While 

cleaning, he slipped in a puddle of cleaning fluid, fell, and was knocked unconscious. No 

puddle would have formed had Plaintiff been provided adequate cleaning supplies. 

When Plaintiff awoke, Defendant Tordsen and several nurses were standing 

outside the cell door. A nurse determined that Plaintiff was not injured. After the 

responding officers left, Plaintiff started to experience numbness and drooping on the 

right side of his face and, because he was concerned about brain damage, he decided 

to slit his wrists. Plaintiff was diagnosed with facial paralysis, for which there is no cure.

Defendants did not write an incident report regarding Plaintiff‟s placement on 

suicide watch or his fall inside the cell. 

Defendant Tordsen wrote an incident report regarding damage to Plaintiff‟s prior 

cell, and falsely stated that Plaintiff was “rehoused to cell B86 without further incident.” 

This statement is contradicted by Daily Population Reports showing that cell B86 

remained vacant on December 29, 2010, and by safety logs showing Plaintiff was on 

suicide watch on December 29, 2010. 

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After Plaintiff was diagnosed, he attempted to file a lawsuit but staff members 

prevented him from doing so. Staff members intercepted his outgoing legal mail and 

withheld his incoming legal mail.

Defendant Costa conspired with Defendant Pedreiro to deny Plaintiff photocopies 

from his medical files in violation of the Department Operations Manual. Plaintiff intended 

to use the copies as evidence in the instant action.

Defendant Lavan conspired with Defendant Frank to fraudulently remove funds 

from Plaintiff‟s inmate trust account in violation of the regulations. This was done to 

intimidate Plaintiff so that he would cease requesting his medical records, and thereby

would be prevented from filing this action.

Defendant Frank intercepted medical request slips addressed to Defendant 

Lavan, and responded to the requests by forging Defendant Lavan‟s signature.

Defendant Frank retaliated against Plaintiff by giving Plaintiff internet printouts

containing false information regarding Plaintiff‟s pain medication and the cause and 

symptoms of facial paralysis. 

During discovery in the instant action, Defendants Coker, Leach, Tordsen, and 

Day provided falsified responses to Plaintiff‟s requests for production of documents and 

perjurious responses to Plaintiff‟s interrogatories. Specifically, Plaintiff requested the 

Inmate Housing List for the SHU for December 29 and 30, 2010, in order to show that 

cell B93 was vacant and Plaintiff could have been moved. However, the documents 

Defendants produced falsely showed that another inmate was housed in cell B93 on 

those dates. Plaintiff also submitted interrogatories to Defendants asking whether there 

were any vacant cells on those dates, and Defendants responded by stating that they 

had “no knowledge” of the issue. Finally, Defendant Tordsen responded falsely to 

interrogatories by stating (1) he didn‟t respond to Plaintiff‟s suicide threat, (2) he had no 

“first hand knowledge” of Plaintiff‟s suicide threat, and (3) Plaintiff did not say why he 

wanted a grievance form on December 29, 2010.

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D. Analysis

As set forth below, leave to amend Plaintiff‟s complaint would be futile because 

Plaintiff has failed to state any additional cognizable claims that can properly be brought 

in this action.

1. Unrelated Claims Against Unrelated Defendants

Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) states: “A party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, 

or third-party claim may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it 

has against an opposing party.” “Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but 

Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against 

Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not 

only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], 

but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees – for the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file 

without prepayment of the required fees.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 

2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (“Persons . . . may 

be joined in one action as defendants if . . . any right to relief is asserted against them 

jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same 

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences . . . .”)

The following conduct does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as 

Plaintiff‟s placement in a feces covered cell, which is the conduct on which this case 

proceeds: Defendant Costa‟s and Pedreiro‟s denial of copies of Plaintiff‟s medical 

records, Defendant Lavan‟s and Frank‟s removal of funds from Plaintiff‟s inmate trust 

account, Defendant Frank‟s interception of and response to Plaintiff‟s medical request 

slips, and Defendant Frank‟s provision of internet printouts regarding Plaintiff‟s medical 

concerns. Plaintiff may not bring these unrelated claims in this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

20(a)(2). Plaintiff has not raised any other claims against these defendants.

Leave to amend to add claims against Defendants Costa, Pedreiro, Lavan, and 

Frank would be futile and will be denied.

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2. Claims Against Existing Defendants

Plaintiff seeks to add additional claims against existing Defendants Tordsen, 

Leach, Coker, and Day. First, Plaintiff seeks to assert new legal claims for retaliation, 

discrimination, due process, access to courts, and regulation violations based on his 

being housed in a dirty cell. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks to assert claims based on new 

facts: Defendants‟ alleged failure to file or filing of false incident reports, and their alleged 

discovery misconduct during the course of this litigation.1 

a. First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff raises numerous new allegations of retaliation. 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner‟s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

The second element of a prisoner retaliation claim focuses on causation and 

motive. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must show 

that his protected conduct was a “„substantial‟ or „motivating‟ factor behind the 

defendant‟s conduct.” Id. (quoting Sorrano‟s Gasco. Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 

(9th Cir. 1989). Although it can be difficult to establish the motive or intent of the 

defendant, a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 

1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that a prisoner establishes a triable issue of fact 

regarding prison officials‟ retaliatory motives by raising issues of suspect timing, 

evidence, and statements); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997); Pratt 

v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (“timing can properly be considered as 

circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent”).

 

1

Plaintiff also asks that criminal charges be brought against these Defendants. Such relief is beyond the 

Court‟s authority.

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The third prong can be satisfied by various activities. Filing a grievance is a 

protected action under the First Amendment. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 

1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). Pursuing a civil rights legal action is similarly protected under 

the First Amendment. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985).

With respect to the fourth prong, “[it] would be unjust to allow a defendant to 

escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined 

plaintiff persists in his protected activity . . . .” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 

192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). The correct inquiry is to determine whether an 

official‟s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First 

Amendment activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (citing Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 

F.3d at 1300). 

With respect to the fifth prong, a prisoner must affirmatively show that “the prison 

authorities‟ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional 

institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 

532.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tordsen retaliated against him after Plaintiff asked 

for a grievance form. The Court considered this allegation in its prior screening order 

(ECF No. 28), and concluded that the operative complaint states a First Amendment 

retaliation claim on this ground. Plaintiff does not allege additional facts regarding this 

claim. Accordingly, no purpose would be served in granting Plaintiff leave to amend this 

claim. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tordsen retaliated against him for refusing to 

clean the dirty cell by reporting that Plaintiff was rehoused without incident. This 

allegation does not involve protected conduct, nor adverse action that would chill the 

exercise of his First Amendment rights. This allegation fails to state a retaliation claim.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Coker, Leach, Tordsen, and Day retaliated 

against him for filing this lawsuit by providing false responses to Plaintiff‟s interrogatories

and requests for production of documents. Filing a lawsuit is protected conduct under 

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the First Amendment. Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532. However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to 

show that his protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” behind 

Defendants‟ allegedly falsified discovery responses.

2 Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This allegation does not state a retaliation 

claim.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Coker, Leach, Tordsen, and Day retaliated 

against him for refusing to clean his cell by placing him on suicide watch, withholding his 

commissary purchase, and failing to file incident reports. Plaintiff‟s refusal to clean his 

cell does not constitute protected conduct. Plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim on this 

basis. Additionally, Plaintiff‟s factual allegations indicate Defendant Tordsen was not 

involved in the decision to place Plaintiff on suicide watch. Further, Plaintiff‟s allegations 

do not indicate he was harmed by the failure to file an incident report or that the lack of 

an incident report constituted adverse action. These allegations do not state a claim.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Coker, Leach, Tordsen, and Day retaliated 

against him for asking for a grievance form by failing to file an incident report. 

Requesting a grievance form constitutes protected conduct. See Valandingham, 866 

F.2d at 1138. Again, however, there is nothing in the facts to indicate the lack of an 

incident report constituted adverse action. This allegation fails to state a claim.

Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable retaliation claims, apart from those 

alleged in the operative complaint. Leave to amend to add these claims would be futile 

and will be denied.

b. Equal Protection

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Tordsen, Coker, Leach, and Day discriminated 

against him by denying his request to relocate to another cell even though other inmates 

were permitted to relocate.

 

2

Additionally, as discussed in the Court‟s order regarding Plaintiff‟s discovery requests (ECF No. 73), 

much of the discovery dispute appears to arise from Plaintiff‟s misinterpretation of the documents 

produced by Defendants. 

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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that persons 

who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 

Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal protection claim may be established in two 

ways. The first method requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant has intentionally 

discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of the plaintiff's membership in a protected 

class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). Under 

this theory of equal protection, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's actions were 

a result of the plaintiff's membership in a suspect class, such as race, religion, or 

alienage. Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001).

If the action in question does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may 

establish an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were 

intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state 

purpose. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San Antonio Sch. 

Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 

309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002). To state an equal protection claim under this theory, a 

plaintiff must allege that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class; (2) the 

plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated; and (3) there is 

no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564.

Plaintiff has not alleged a suspect classification. Nor has he alleged facts to 

indicate there was no rational basis for denying his request to move to a different cell. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s proposed amended complaint does not state a cognizable Equal 

Protection claim.

c. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process 

rights by housing him in a filthy cell, directing him to clean it without proper cleaning 

supplies, and requiring him to choose between cleaning the cell or being placed on 

suicide watch. The Court considered these allegations in its prior screening order (ECF 

No. 28), and concluded that the operative complaint states a Fourteenth Amendment 

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due process claim on these bases. Accordingly, leave to amend to allege these claims is 

unnecessary. 

d. Access to Courts

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants interfered with his ability to file this lawsuit by 

failing to write incident reports or writing false incident reports regarding his transfer to 

the dirty cell, his placement on suicide watch, and his fall in the cell while cleaning.3

Inmates have a fundamental right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, 

and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise 

from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forwardlooking access claim) or from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried 

(backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). A 

plaintiff must show that he suffered an “actual injury” by being shut out of court. Lewis, 

518 U.S. at 350-51. An “actual injury” is one that hinders the plaintiff‟s ability to pursue a 

legal claim. Id. at 351.

Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants have any affirmative constitutional 

obligation to file incident reports. Nor has he alleged how Defendants‟ failure to file 

incident reports hindered his ability to pursue his legal claims. The instant action 

evidences that Plaintiff was able to file this suit and is being afforded a meaningful 

opportunity to pursue his claims. See Ornelas v. Giurbino, 358 F. Supp. 2d 955, 972-72 

(S.D. Cal. 2005). Defendants were not required to enable him to “litigate effectively once 

in court” by documenting all of his action. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Defendant has not 

alleged an actual injury.

 

3

Plaintiff also alleges that unspecified jail staff intercepted his legal mail and unlawfully removed 

documents from his incoming legal mail in an attempt to interfere with his access to the Courts. However, 

Plaintiff has not linked this claim to any named defendant, nor has he named Doe defendants in this 

action. In any event, this allegation fails to state a cognizable claim for same reason as his other access to 

courts claims, discussed below.

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Allegations that defendants covered up or destroyed evidence may state a 

cognizable claim if the conduct deprives Plaintiff of meaningful access to the courts. See

Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998). However, Plaintiff has not 

alleged how or why Defendant Tordsen‟s allegedly false statement that Plaintiff was 

“rehoused to cell B86 without incident” has obstructed his ability to pursue his claims. 

Plaintiff agrees that he was rehoused to cell B86, even though that information may be 

contradicted by other documents in Plaintiff‟s possession. Additionally, the statement 

that he was rehoused “without incident” does not preclude Plaintiff from pursuing his 

legal arguments.

Plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable access to courts claim. Leave to amend 

to add such a claim would be futile and will be denied.

e. California Regulations

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated various provisions of Title 15 of the 

California Code of Regulations governing conduct of prison officials. As Plaintiff 

previously was advised (ECF No. 28), the existence of the Title 15 regulations does not 

necessarily entitle an inmate to sue civilly for their violation. The Court has found no 

authority to support a finding of an implied private right of action under Title 15, and 

Plaintiff has provided none. Several district court decisions hold that there is no such 

right. See e.g., Vasquez v. Tate, No. 1:10-cv-1876-JLT (PC), 2012 WL 6738167, at *9 

(E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012); Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1211 (S.D. Cal. 2012).

Plaintiff may not bring an independent claim solely for violation of prison 

regulations set out in Title 15. Leave to amend such a claim is futile and will be denied.

f. Refusal to Provide Grievance Forms

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to petition the government for 

redress of grievances when they refused to provide him with grievance forms. This claim 

fails as a matter of law. A prisoner has no substantive right to a prison grievance system 

and, therefore, due process claims based on the denial of or interference with a 

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prisoner‟s access to a prison grievance system are not cognizable. Ramirez v. Galaza, 

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 

g. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his procedural due process rights by 

failing to inspect cell B86 for safety hazards before rehousing Plaintiff. “The Fourteenth 

Amendment‟s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, 

or property.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). When one of these interests

is at stake, due process requires that the party be afforded an opportunity to be heard at 

a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 331

(1976).

Plaintiff does not argue that he was not provided a meaningful opportunity to be 

heard regarding his placement in cell B86. Rather, he argues that the cell should have 

been inspected and, presumably, had it been, he should not have been placed there. 

These allegations are subsumed in his conditions of confinement claim, discussed 

above. They do not state a procedural due process claim.

h. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff‟s proposed complaint makes a passing reference to injunctive relief, but 

does not specify what injunctive relief he requests. In any event, Plaintiff no longer is

detained at KCJ, and instead is housed at Pleasant Valley State Prison. There is no 

indication that Plaintiff will be transferred back to KCJ. Accordingly, any request for 

injunctive relief relating to Plaintiff‟s detention at KCJ would appear to be moot. See

Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402–03 (1975); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 

(9th Cir. 1991); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 n. 5 (9th Cir.

2007). Leave to amend to add claims for injunctive relief would be futile and will be 

denied.

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i. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant Coker and Leach are liable in their 

supervisory capacities because they witnessed the misconduct of others and failed to 

act.

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, as each defendant is only 

liable for his or her own misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009); 

Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisors may only be 

held liable if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and 

failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 

570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 

(9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

The Court has addressed above (and in its prior screening order) Plaintiff‟s 

allegations regarding Coker‟s and Leach‟s direct involvement in the alleged deprivation 

of his rights. These defendants are not subject to additional liability on a theory of 

respondeat superior. Leave to amend this claim will be denied.

j. Damages

Plaintiff‟s proposed complaint increases the amount of compensatory and punitive 

damages he seeks. Because he has failed to allege any additional cognizable claims or 

substantively alter the facts on which those claims are based, the Court will not grant 

Plaintiff leave to amend at this stage of the proceedings in order to increase the amount 

of damages sought.

E. Conclusion

Plaintiff‟s proposed amended complaint fails to state any new cognizable claims 

that may be brought in this action. Leave to amend would be futile and will be denied.

III. MOTION TO AMEND THE DISCOVERY AND SCHEDULING ORDER

Defendants argue that good cause exists to modify the current discovery and 

scheduling order (ECF No. 40), which set the discovery cut-off at July 4, 2014, and the 

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deadline for filing dispositive motions at September 15, 2014. Defendants seek the 

amendment on the ground that additional discovery would be likely if Plaintiff is allowed 

to proceed against new defendants and on new claims. (ECF No. 69.) Defendants also 

state that they canceled Plaintiff‟s deposition pending resolution of Plaintiff‟s motion for 

leave to amend, to avoid the potential expense of deposing Plaintiff again. 

Defendants have presented good cause for modifying the Court‟s discovery and 

scheduling order. The deadline for completion of all discovery, including filing motions to 

compel, shall be January 5, 2015. The deadline for filing pre-trial dispositive motions 

shall be February 16, 2015.

IV. ORDER

For the reasons stated, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff‟s motion for leave to file an amended complaint (ECF No. 63) is 

DENIED; 

2. Defendants‟ motion to amend the discovery and scheduling order (ECF No. 

69) is GRANTED;

3. The discovery and scheduling order (ECF No. 40) is amended as follows:

a. The deadline for the completion of all discovery, including filing motions 

to compel, shall be January 5, 2015; and

b. The deadline for filing pre-trial dispositive motions shall be February 16, 

2015. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 28, 2014 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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