Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03097/USCOURTS-ca10-15-03097-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

MARCUS WASHINGTON, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

RAYMOND ROBERTS; DEREK 

SCHMIDT, Attorney General of the State 

of Kansas, 

 Respondents - Appellees. 

No. 15-3097 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 5:11-CV-03045-SAC)

_________________________________ 

Melody Brannon, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Topeka, Kansas, for PetitionerAppellant. 

Kristafer R. Ailslieger, Topeka, Kansas, for Respondents-Appellees. 

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, BACHARACH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

HARTZ, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

Marcus Washington seeks to set aside his state-court murder conviction. We 

granted a certificate of appealability (COA) so that he could appeal the denial of four 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 9, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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claims raised in his application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. 

2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring COA to appeal denial of relief under § 2254). These claims are: 

(1) the State exercised peremptory jury challenges against African Americans in 

violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) his rights under Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), were violated by the use of statements he made while in 

custody; (3) his trial attorney was ineffective in not calling him as a witness on the 

Miranda issue to show that he was in custody; and (4) the prosecutor’s closing argument 

improperly challenged his mental-disease defense. The United States District Court for 

the District of Kansas rejected Mr. Washington’s claims and dismissed his petition. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Washington was convicted by a Kansas jury on one count of first-degree 

premeditated murder and one count of criminal possession of a firearm arising out of the 

January 16, 2000 shooting of Stacey Quinn. He was sentenced on the murder conviction 

to life without the possibility of parole for 50 years and to a concurrent lesser term on the 

firearm conviction. 

On direct appeal the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but 

remanded to the trial court for resentencing. See State v. Washington, 68 P.3d 134 (Kan. 

2003). The trial court reimposed the original sentence. Mr. Washington unsuccessfully 

appealed, see State v. Washington, 123 P.3d 1265 (Kan. 2005), and the United States 

Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari, see 549 U.S. 1018 (2006). 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review § 2254 applications under the standards set forth in the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). A petitioner is entitled to relief if the 

state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). 

“Clearly established law is determined by the United States Supreme Court, and refers to 

the Court’s holdings, as opposed to the dicta.” Lockett v. Trammel, 711 F.3d 1218, 1231 

(10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only Supreme Court law announced 

by the time of the state-court decision on the merits qualifies as “clearly established law.” 

See Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 42, 44 (2011). A state court’s decision is “contrary 

to” clearly established law if the state court reaches a conclusion “opposite to that 

reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law” or “decides a case differently than 

the Court has . . . on materially indistinguishable facts.” Dodd v. Trammell, 753 F.3d 

971, 982 (10th Cir. 2013) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). A state 

court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court law if “the state court 

identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle 

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

III. BATSON CLAIM 

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986), the United States Supreme Court 

held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the 

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purposeful exclusion of a potential juror on account of race. It created a three-step 

framework to determine whether a peremptory strike was impermissible. First, the 

defendant must make a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting evidence 

supporting an inference that the prosecutor exercised the peremptory challenge to exclude 

a potential juror on the basis of race. See id. at 96–97. If the defendant makes this 

showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral justification for the 

strike. See id. at 97–98. If the prosecution does so, the court must determine whether 

purposeful discrimination occurred. See id. at 98. 

Our resolution of Mr. Washington’s claim is highly dependent on the standard of 

review required by AEDPA. If we were to review the same claim on direct appeal from a 

federal conviction, reversal would be likely because of the record evidence that at least

one peremptory challenge was substantially motivated by race. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 

552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008) (if “a peremptory strike [is] shown to have been motivated in 

substantial part by discriminatory intent,” then the strike can be sustained only by a 

showing that the factor was not determinative, and even such a showing may not suffice). 

But under AEDPA our role is quite limited. We proceed to describe the relevant 

proceedings at trial and on appeal, determine what standard was applied by the Kansas 

Supreme Court to resolve the Batson issue, analyze whether that standard was contrary to 

clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, and then determine whether 

the standard was unreasonably applied. We will conclude as follows: The test applied by 

the Kansas Supreme Court forbids only peremptory challenges that are solely on account 

of race. That test was not contrary to clearly established United States Supreme Court

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precedent when the Kansas court ruled. And we cannot say that this test was

unreasonably applied because the Kansas courts reasonably found that each peremptory 

strike was supported by a nonracial justification. 

A. The Voir Dire 

At Mr. Washington’s trial the prosecutor used 10 of her 12 peremptory strikes to 

exclude African American prospective jurors. The jury ultimately was comprised of two 

African Americans, one Asian American, one Native American, and eight whites. After 

jury selection Mr. Washington raised a Batson challenge. In this court he has questioned 

the striking of five African American members of the jury panel: Ms. Spratt, 

Ms. Hodges, Ms. Bullock, Mr. Brantley, and Ms. Powers. 

Ms. Spratt and Ms. Hodges both reported in their jury questionnaires that they had 

previously served as jurors in criminal cases. The prosecutor first questioned Ms. Spratt: 

Prosecutor: . . . You indicated you had been on a criminal case. 

Ms. Spratt: Yes. 

Prosecutor: What kind of case was that and when was that? 

Ms. Spratt: Goodness, it’s been about five or six years ago, maybe even longer. 

Prosecutor: Do you remember what the case was about? 

Ms. Spratt: Vaguely. It was—I don’t know what you would describe it as I guess a 

young man and lady got into an argument at a gas station and it ended up being 

criminal because she said he took jewelry from her. 

Prosecutor: Was that some kind of domestic where they knew each other or theft 

where he took stuff from her? 

Ms. Spratt: It was like they knew each other and like she hit his car and he took her 

necklace for the value for her getting his car or something like that. 

Tr. of Jury Voir Dire at 176–77. The prosecutor then turned to Ms. Hodges: 

Prosecutor: Ms. Hodges, what kind of criminal case were you on? 

Ms. Hodges: Let’s see. It’s been awhile. It was a shooting case. 

Prosecutor: It wasn’t a homicide then? 

Ms. Hodges: No, it was not. 

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Prosecutor: How long ago was that? 

Ms. Hodges: It’s been probably 15 or so. 

Id. at 177. 

After Mr. Washington raised his Batson objection at the conclusion of voir dire, 

the court asked the prosecutor to explain the strikes. She started with the same 

explanation for Ms. Spratt and Ms. Hodges: “[O]ne of the questions I asked was for them 

to describe the criminal case that they were previously on. And actually both [Ms. 

Spratt] and . . . Ms. Hodges . . . were quite evasive on what kind of case that was and the 

fact they seemed to have a hard time remembering or understanding the concept of what 

that case was about.” Id. at 224. She then continued with respect to Ms. Spratt: 

“Additionally, Judge, another reason I struck Ms. Spratt is because she lives in the 

projects and there is a lot of homicides that happen down in the projects. And so I struck 

her also for that reason.” Id. Defense counsel said, “ I object as—,” but the judge asked 

the prosecutor to proceed with her explanations for striking the other jurors. Id.

The prosecutor said that she struck Ms. Bullock because she incorrectly filled out 

her jury questionnaire, suggesting that she could not follow directions. She said that Ms. 

Bullock indicated on the questionnaire that she was single, but later provided her 

spouse’s employment information. See id. at 226. The prosecutor also noted that Ms. 

Bullock listed the names of her children and omitted their ages, whereas the form called 

for their ages only, not their names. See id. 

As for Mr. Brantley, he stated during jury selection that a close friend of his had 

been murdered. When defense counsel asked whether he had known anyone to carry a 

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gun for protection, he replied, “Yes. They hear that someone is after them or they feel 

there is a reason for them to carry a gun.” Id. at 214. Mr. Brantley also said that he had 

two daughters to take care of, but that they would be okay without him if he were to be 

empaneled. In explaining her strike of Mr. Brantley, the prosecutor expressed concern 

that he would sympathize with someone who said he needed to carry a gun for protection, 

which was part of the theory of Mr. Washington’s defense. The prosecutor also cited Mr. 

Brantley’s responsibility for his young children. 

Finally the prosecutor explained her strike of Ms. Powers, saying: “[S]he’s the 

high school student. I struck her primarily because of how young she is. She is just 18. 

She hasn’t gotten out of school. She obviously doesn’t have a lot of life experiences to 

draw upon.” Id. at 227–28. 

After the prosecutor completed her explanations, the proceeding concluded as 

follows: 

Court: All right. Obviously, in regard to . . . Mr. Brantley . . . and Ms. 

Powers, I’m not surprised by those strikes. As to [Ms. Spratt], [Ms. 

Hodges] . . . and [Ms. Bullock], those are individuals who didn’t—well, 

Ms. Spratt did answer some questions. The others were based on the jury 

questionnaires. Even though we are now to two African American jurors 

here, we started out, I think, after strikes for causes—as clear as I can tell, it 

was about 25 percent so we’re about half that in terms of down below that 

in terms of percentage remaining on this jury. But I can’t find that those 

are racially based strikes based upon the explanation given by the state. 

Defense Counsel: Your Honor, striking somebody because they live in the 

projects— 

Prosecutor: That was one reason, Judge. The other reason was her 

response— 

Court: She indicated two reasons. One was as to the prior jury duty. I 

agree with you, Mr. Coggs [defense counsel]. I don’t— 

Id. at 228. Defense counsel did not pursue the matter further but turned to another juror: 

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Defense counsel: Well, Ms. Powers was asked her age. She is 18. She is 

an eligible voter. She has life experiences. 

Court: I understand, but there was a request to have her struck for cause 

because of tests she was on. I don’t think she is struck because of her race. 

If she is 18, she is a young juror and it may be the state doesn’t want her on 

there. But I don’t think it’s race related. 

Defense counsel: It’s race related when you take it all into consideration 

that all ten of the twelve strikes are black. 

Court: I understand that. I’m going to deny your objection to the jury. 

Id. at 229. 

B. The Appeal 

On appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, Mr. Washington challenged the exercise 

of peremptory strikes under Batson and also under “the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Kansas Constitution [, which] affords greater rights [than] the federal Constitution,” Kan. 

Sup. Ct. Aplt. Br. at 29, a state-law claim not reviewable under § 2254. In his counsel’s 

view, “[T]he Batson bar [had] fallen so low that even a snake [could] easily slither over 

it,” but even so, “the reason given for a peremptory strike must still be facially valid.” Id. 

His Batson challenge focused only on the peremptory strike of Ms. Spratt and the strike 

of another juror not the subject of a challenge on this appeal. Regarding Ms. Spratt, he 

asserted: “[T]he prosecutor stated that Ms. Spratt was evasive about her prior jury 

service. The record, to the contrary, shows that Ms. Spratt was quite specific about that 

service.” Id. at 33. He then stated that the only remaining reason for the strike was that 

she lived in the projects, which, he argued, was a surrogate for racial stereotyping.1

 

 

1

 The ground for Mr. Washington’s perfunctory Batson challenge in the Kansas Supreme 

Court was a mere shadow of the arguments he now makes before this court. While his 

brief here argues that the state supreme court erred in permitting the strikes of five 

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The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed. After reviewing the peremptory strikes of 

six members of the jury venire, it concluded that “the trial court did not err in 

determining that the State provided facially valid race-neutral explanations for striking 

the six African–Americans.” Washington, 68 P.3d at 147. Regarding Spratt, it said that 

it did not need to consider “the prosecutor’s remarks concerning [her] residence,” 

because the prosecutor’s other explanation was “a facially valid, race-neutral reason.” Id. 

C. The Law Applied by the Kansas Supreme Court 

Mr. Washington contends that “[d]espite substantial evidence that the prosecutor’s 

explanations were pretext for racial discrimination, the Kansas Supreme Court rejected 

[his] appeal by ignoring salient evidence of pretext and by misapplying Batson.” Petr’s 

Suppl. Br. at 1. He says that the Kansas Supreme Court stopped its analysis at Batson’s 

second step (the prosecution presented a facially valid race-neutral explanation) and 

never addressed the third and final step (whether that explanation was pretextual). See id.

at 17. And he further contends that the state high court erred in thinking that the 

 

African American jurors because it misapplied step three of the Batson test, his statecourt brief raised a Batson challenge to only one of those five jurors and argued only that 

the prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking the juror did not satisfy step two of the 

Batson test. These omissions in Mr. Washington’s Kansas Supreme Court brief may well 

constitute a failure to exhaust much, if not all, of his § 2254 Batson claim. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1)(A) (relief cannot be granted unless state prisoner “has exhausted the 

remedies available in the courts of the State”). The State, however, has not raised failure 

to exhaust as a defense; and even though we doubt that it has waived the issue, see id. 

§ 2254(b)(3) (“A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or 

be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, 

expressly waives the requirement.”); United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 746 n.8 

(10th Cir. 2008) (“Sua sponte consideration of exhaustion of state remedies . . . is 

explicitly permitted by Supreme Court precedent.”), we choose not to address exhaustion 

because we can affirm on other grounds. 

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prosecutor needed only to give one acceptable explanation for each juror. Relying on a 

recent Ninth Circuit decision, he describes the Batson doctrine as follows: “It does not 

matter whether the prosecutor might have some valid race-neutral explanation; the 

‘defendant need not prove that all the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons were pretextual, 

or even that the racial motivation was determinative. Instead, to prove a Batson

violation, the defendant must demonstrate that race was a substantial motivating factor in 

the prosecutor’s use of the peremptory strike.’” Id. at 8 (quoting Currie v. McDowell, 

825 F.3d 603, 605–06 (9th Cir. 2016) (ellipsis omitted)). 

The argument has force. As we have already said, we would likely reverse if we 

were considering this matter on direct appeal from a federal conviction. But Mr. 

Washington inaccurately describes the analysis of the Kansas Supreme Court (and trial 

court) and ignores that we must assess the state court’s decision in light of preceding 

clear holdings by the United States Supreme Court. We first describe Batson doctrine in 

Kansas at the time of Mr. Washington’s appeal, then determine that it was not an 

unreasonable construction of Supreme Court precedent, and finally conclude that it was 

in fact reasonably applied in his appeal. 

To begin with, when the Kansas Supreme Court decided Washington’s appeal in 

May 2003, it had not adopted the Batson standard expressed by the Ninth Circuit in 

Currie. The Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he defendant need not prove that all the 

prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons were pretextual.” Currie, 825 F.3d at 605–06. But the 

Kansas Supreme Court had repeatedly stated that Batson was violated only when a racial 

ground was the sole reason for exercising a peremptory strike. See, e.g., State v. Betts, 33 

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P.3d 575, 595 (Kan. 2001) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the challenging of 

potential jurors solely on account of race or on the assumption that the jurors of that race 

as a group will be unable to impartially consider the case.” (emphasis added)), overruled 

on other grounds by State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317, 322 (Kan. 2006); State v. Lee, 948 P.2d 

641, 650 (Kan. 1997) (“After hearing the State’s explanations, and having observed the 

entire voir dire process, the trial court, under Batson, is to make a purely factual 

determination: Has the prosecution purposefully discriminated by exercising peremptory 

challenges against persons solely on account of their race?” (emphasis added to final 

phrase) (internal quotation marks omitted)), overruled on other grounds by State v. 

Gunby, 144 P.3d 647 (Kan. 2006)); State v. Walston, 886 P.2d 349, 353 (Kan. 1994) 

(same). Indeed, in raising his Batson objection at trial, defense counsel stated the test in 

the same terms: “Of the twelve strikes, I believe ten of them were black persons. I could 

see a couple of them for reasonable cause, but the others I believe were solely based on 

their race.” Tr. of Jury Voir Dire at 223. And nothing in counsel’s brief to the Kansas 

Supreme Court suggests a different view of what Batson requires. 

We agree with Mr. Washington that the Kansas standard at that time does not state 

current law. A prosecutor who provides a racial ground (or who provides a nonracial 

ground that is found to be pretextual) when exercising a peremptory strike cannot avoid 

Batson simply by providing an additional nonpretextual, nonracial ground. But that was 

not clear in 2003. We are persuaded by the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Akins v. 

Easterling, 648 F.3d 380, 389–92 (2011), which reviewed a Batson challenge resolved by 

the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in August 2000 under the same standard used 

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by the Kansas Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit said that courts “overwhelmingly reject 

a sole-motivation standard in favor of some level of dual-motivation analysis.” Id. at 

391. It noted that some courts apply a mixed-motive standard, which bars a 

discriminatory motivation that is a but-for cause for the peremptory strike, while others 

apply “a per se approach under which any improper discriminatory motivation violates 

Batson.” Id. at 389. Nevertheless, the circuit court could not “conclude that the state 

court’s application of a sole-motivation standard, rather than a per se approach or mixedmotive standard, is an unreasonable application of the relevant clearly established 

Supreme Court law.” Id. at 392. The court pointed out that “the Supreme Court used the 

word ‘solely’ in the Batson decision itself: ‘the Equal Protection Clause forbids the 

prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.’” Id. at 392 

(quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 89) (emphasis added). It then quoted from three subsequent 

Supreme Court opinions in 1991, 1994, and 2000 that repeated the “solely” phrasing, and 

it noted that lower federal courts had continued to use that language. See id. As Akins

reasoned, “The Supreme Court in Batson and its progeny, and the lower federal courts in 

applying Batson, may not have intended the inclusion of ‘solely’ to preclude dualmotivation analysis in appropriate cases, but it nonetheless informs our analysis of the 

reasonableness of the state court’s decision.” Id. (citation omitted). 

No Supreme Court decision from the time of the Tennessee Court of Appeals 

decision in Akins (August 2000) until the Kansas Supreme Court decision in Washington

(May 2003) would change the analysis. The Supreme Court cited Batson only once 

during that period—in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (Feb. 2003). But that opinion 

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did not say anything about mixed motives nor did it purport to expand, limit, modify, or 

even clarify Batson doctrine. The point of the opinion was that circuit courts should 

more readily grant certificates of appealability. It illustrated the point by showing the 

colorable merit of the Batson claim in that case. To be sure, the Court emphasized the 

centrality of determining the prosecutor’s credibility, but in doing so it was reiterating 

what it had said in prior opinions. Compare id. at 339 (“[T]he issue comes down to 

whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.”), 

with Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (“[T]he trial judge’s findings in the context under 

consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility.”). We conclude that the 

Kansas Supreme Court did not adopt an unreasonable view of United States Supreme 

Court precedent by using a sole-motivation standard to assess Batson claims in 2003. 

Mr. Washington has two remaining arguments that the Kansas courts misapplied even 

that standard. First, he argues that they ended their analysis at the second step of the Batson

framework—determining that the prosecutor provided a race-neutral justification for the 

peremptory strike—and did not proceed to the third step—determining whether purposeful 

discrimination occurred. Under the Kansas reading of Batson, this third step amounts to a 

determination that the justification stated by the prosecutor was a sincere one, not a pretext 

for racial discrimination. The argument has some merit but cannot carry the day. 

There is language in the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion that suggests it stopped 

at the second step. On several occasions the opinion concludes its rejection of a 

challenge to a strike by stating that the prosecutor gave a “facially valid, race-neutral 

reason.” Washington, 68 P.3d at 145, 146, 147. One could read this language as 

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indicating that the court was not concerned with whether the stated reason was pretextual, 

a concern required by Batson’s third step. 

But our Supreme Court has repeatedly counseled that on review under AEDPA we 

must construe reasonably what the state court decided. We cannot take language out of 

context to slap the hand of the state court. For example, in Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 

649 (2004) (per curiam), the circuit court had held that the state court acted contrary to 

clearly established federal law regarding ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims by 

requiring prejudice to be shown by a preponderance of the evidence rather than just a 

reasonable probability. See id. at 654. The lower court had focused on several 

statements by the state court, such as, “[i]n a post-conviction proceeding, the defendant 

has the burden of proving his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court explained, however, that even 

though the state court’s language could be read as the circuit court interpreted it, “[i]n 

context . . . this statement is reasonably read as addressing the general burden of proof in 

postconviction proceedings with regard to factual contentions.” Id. The Court’s guiding 

principle was that “state-court decisions [should] be given the benefit of the doubt” and 

“[r]eadiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know 

and follow the law.” Id. at 655 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 23–24 (2002) (state court’s use of word probable rather than the 

correct term reasonably probable did not justify circuit court in overturning state-court 

decision; state court was just using imprecise shorthand). As the Eleventh Circuit has 

nicely expressed the point, “[O]veremphasis on the language of a state court’s rationale 

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would lead to a grading papers approach that is outmoded in the post–AEDPA era.” 

Ferguson v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corrections, 716 F.3d 1315, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Perhaps the Kansas Supreme Court’s language would not earn a high grade. But 

when we carefully consider what it, and the trial court, did, we cannot say that they failed 

to consider the sincerity—the credibility—of the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for her 

peremptory strikes. If the state supreme court had accepted the prosecutor’s proffered 

reasons at face value, it could have disposed of the Batson challenge to each juror in one 

or two sentences. Instead, it devoted several paragraphs to each, determining whether 

there was a factual basis for the reason and whether the reason was sensible. The trial 

court took the same approach. For example, when defense counsel contested the striking 

of Ms. Powers (the 18-year-old member of the jury venire), arguing that she was an 

eligible voter and in fact had life experiences, the court responded: 

Court: I understand, but there was a request to have her struck for cause 

because of tests she was on. I don’t think she is struck because of her race. 

If she is 18, she is a young juror and it may be the state doesn’t want her on 

there. But I don’t think it’s race related. 

Defense counsel: It’s race related when you take it all into consideration 

that all ten of the twelve strikes are black. 

Court: I understand that. I’m going to deny your objection to the jury. 

Tr. of Jury Voir Dire at 229. 

There remains the final component of Mr. Washington’s Batson challenge. He 

argues that the Kansas Supreme Court unreasonably determined facts in upholding the 

peremptory strikes. In particular, he contends that the record cannot support striking Ms. 

Spratt and Ms. Hodges for the prosecutor’s stated reason that in discussing their prior 

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jury experience they were “‘quite evasive on what kind of case that was and the fact they 

seemed to have a hard time remembering or understanding the concept of what that case 

was about.’” Pet’rs Suppl. Br. at 12 (quoting voir dire transcript at 224). Mr. 

Washington asserts that “Ms. Spratt was immediately responsive” and that Ms. Hodges 

“answered the questions directly, without hesitation, and with no evidence of bad 

memory or confusion.” Id. That assertion reads too much into the transcript of the voir 

dire. Transcripts do not reveal facial expressions, tone of voice, or body language. Nor 

do they reflect how long it took a witness to respond or how often the witness paused 

during the response. Those who attend trials and then read the transcripts are commonly 

astonished by how much a perfect transcript can distort reality. We must defer to the 

judge who was present when the prospective jurors were questioned. As the Supreme 

Court has said: 

[T]he trial court must evaluate not only whether the prosecutor’s demeanor 

belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror’s demeanor can 

credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the 

juror by the prosecutor. We have recognized that these determinations of 

credibility and demeanor lie peculiarly within a trial judge’s province. 

Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 

2187, 2199 (2015) (“[A] trial court finding regarding the credibility of an attorney’s 

explanation of the ground for a peremptory challenge is entitled to great deference.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) 

(“Deference to trial court findings on the issue of discriminatory intent makes particular 

sense in this context because, as we noted in Batson, the finding ‘largely will turn on 

evaluation of credibility.’” (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21)). 

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In this case the judge credited the descriptions by the prosecutor of the jurors’ 

responses, and defense counsel apparently did as well. The judge was familiar with the 

questioning of the jurors stricken by the prosecutor, responding to the prosecutor’s 

explanations as follows: “Obviously, in regard to Ms. Blake and Mr. Collins, Mr. 

Brantley, Mr. Fielder and Ms. Powers, I’m not surprised by those strikes. As to 1, 13, 18 

and 19, those are individuals who didn’t—well, Ms. Spratt did answer some questions. 

The others were based on the jury questionnaires.” Transcript at 228. When defense 

counsel protested about the strike of Ms. Spratt, saying, “[S]triking somebody because 

they live in the projects—,” id., the prosecutor responded, “That was one reason, Judge. 

The other reason was her response—,” id. at 229. The judge interrupted to agree with the 

prosecutor that the other reason was valid and started to agree with defense counsel that 

the “projects” reason was not: “She indicated two reasons. One was as to the prior jury 

duty. I agree with you, Mr. Coggs [defense counsel]. I don’t—.” Id. But defense 

counsel, apparently conceding defeat (without challenging in any way the validity of the 

“other” reason), interrupted the judge to begin arguing about another juror: “Well, Ms. 

Powers was asked her age. She is 18. She is an eligible voter. She has life experiences.” 

Id. 

 In light of the trial judge’s rulings, based on an obvious familiarity with the jurors’ 

responses, and the absence of any challenge on that score by defense counsel at trial, we 

cannot agree that the Kansas Supreme Court unreasonably determined facts. 

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IV. MIRANDA CLAIMS 

Mr. Washington argues that his confession should have been suppressed under 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because he was not given Miranda warnings at 

the outset of his interview at the police station. Miranda warnings are required only 

when the person questioned “has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 

freedom of action in any significant way.” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494 

(1977) (internal quotation marks omitted) (warning not required before questioning in 

police office after suspect was told of police suspicions but voluntarily went to the 

office). Mr. Washington claims that he was under arrest and in custody when 

interviewed. But the Kansas Supreme Court reasonably rejected that argument on direct 

appeal. We summarize the relevant evidence from the Kansas court’s opinion, 68 P.3d at 

140–42, 148–51: 

About 1:30 a.m. on January 16, 2000, officers responding to a report of gunshots 

and a woman’s cry for help found Ms. Quinn’s body on a lawn. Soon thereafter they 

found a Chevrolet Cavalier with a warm engine parked nearby. The car was registered to 

Nina Betts. There was no indication that the car had been stolen. Two detectives went to 

her apartment shortly after 8:30 a.m. Mr. Washington answered the door when they 

knocked. Ms. Betts said that her car had still been parked outside at 11 p.m. the night 

before. She also said that Mr. Washington had been at her apartment the entire evening. 

Wanting to question Mr. Washington separately from Ms. Betts, the detectives 

asked him to go to the detective’s bureau. He said, “[S]ure, no problem.” After he left 

with a detective, Ms. Betts agreed to a search of her apartment. The search, which took 

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about two hours, uncovered bullets and a handgun. It is unclear when Ms. Betts was 

driven to the detective’s bureau but she was not interviewed until 11:10 a.m., after the 

search. During that interview Mr. Washington waited in a “victim’s room” with a 

television. 

Questioning of Mr. Washington began about 12:30 p.m. and continued to 1:20 

p.m. After the detectives told Mr. Washington about inconsistencies between the 

evidence and Ms. Betts’s statement, they told him that he did not have to talk with them 

but they would like to know what happened. Mr. Washington asked, “[A]re you guys 

going to listen to me?” and “began crying uncontrollably.” Id. at 150 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Once the detectives were able to calm Mr. Washington down, they read 

him his Miranda warnings and he waived his rights before confessing to the murder. 

In denying Mr. Washington’s Miranda claim, the Kansas Supreme Court pointed 

out that he agreed to go to the detective’s bureau, was not in an interrogation room but a 

victim’s room with a television set, was not advised of any outstanding warrants against 

him, was not formally arrested or handcuffed, was asked to come to the bureau before 

detectives knew who he was or suspected him of a crime, and would not have been 

forced to go to the station if he had declined the invitation. See id. at 150–51. Although 

Mr. Washington was at the bureau for four hours before being interviewed, the court said 

that “most of that time was accounted for based upon the delay faced by the detectives in 

searching Betts’ apartment.” Id. at 150. On this record the Kansas Supreme Court 

determined that the trial court’s decision that Mr. Washington was not under arrest or in 

custody before he was given Miranda warnings was supported by “substantial competent 

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evidence” and correctly applied the law. Id. at 151. Mr. Washington has not cited, nor 

are we aware of, any Supreme Court decision that would compel, or even suggest, a 

contrary ruling. He is not entitled to relief under § 2254 on this claim. 

V. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

Mr. Washington argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling him as 

a witness at the Miranda suppression hearing to testify to his version of the facts 

surrounding his questioning by the detectives. Under his version the question whether he 

was in custody when he was first interrogated is significantly more difficult to answer. 

There is a reasonable argument that if his attorney was aware of that version, the attorney 

should have called him as a witness to support a Miranda claim. But to establish a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show not only that counsel’s 

performance was deficient but that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Mr. Washington failed to show the 

requisite prejudice. 

After his conviction but before his appeal, Mr. Washington, through a new 

attorney, filed a motion for a new trial based on the alleged failure of original trial 

counsel to represent him adequately at the pretrial motion to suppress. At the evidentiary 

hearing on the motion, Mr. Washington testified to his version of what happened. But the 

trial judge found the testimony self-serving and not credible, so it would have denied the 

motion to suppress in any event. The Kansas Supreme Court reasonably affirmed the 

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denial of the ineffectiveness claim on that ground. See Washington, 68 P.3d at 152–53. 

We reject the claim. 

VI. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 

Mr. Washington’s final claim concerns the prosecutor’s closing argument at trial. 

Mr. Washington put on a defense based on his suffering from posttraumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD). He testified that at the time of the shooting he was deathly afraid of a 

man named Hill, who had made attempts on his life. He said that on the night in question 

he believed Ms. Quinn was involved with Hill in a plot on his life and that he shot Ms. 

Quinn in self-defense, not intending to kill her and not possessing the mental state 

necessary to commit premeditated murder. Psychiatric testimony supported this defense. 

A Kansas statute provided that a defendant was not accountable for his actions if, “‘as a 

result of mental disease or defect, [he] lacked the mental state required as an element of 

the offense charged.’” Id. at 155 (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3220). 

During her closing argument the prosecutor argued that PTSD “does not give 

someone a license to kill.” Id. at 154. The judge sustained Mr. Washington’s objection 

to the argument and admonished the jury to disregard it. When the prosecutor resumed 

her argument, she stated that Mr. Washington’s attorney “wants the jury to find that 

[PTSD] excuses [Mr. Washington’s] conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Mr. Washington objected again, but this time the judge overruled his objection. 

The Kansas high court held that any error in the prosecutor’s first statement was 

cured by the trial court’s admonition to the jury, and it said that the second comment was 

not prejudicial because the trial court clearly instructed the jury on the defense and the 

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comment was not so inflammatory as to prejudice the jury against Mr. Washington. 

Again, we are aware of no Supreme Court decision that requires a contrary conclusion. 

See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (“[I]t is not enough that the 

prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Mr. Washington’s claim has no merit. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Mr. Washington’s § 2254 application. 

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Washington v. Roberts, No. 15-3097 

BACHARACH, J., concurring. 

I join Parts IV, V, and VI of the majority=s well-crafted opinion. I also agree with 

the outcome in Part III, where the majority affirms the denial of habeas relief on Mr. 

Washington=s Batson claim. I agree with much of what is said in Part III. But I would 

approach step three of the Batson test somewhat differently for the peremptory challenges 

to Ms. Spratt and Ms. Hodges. 

In my view, the Kansas Supreme Court=s disposition of the step-three issue was 

reasonable based on the way that Mr. Washington briefed the issue in the Kansas 

Supreme Court. 

Mr. Washington acknowledges that habeas relief is governed under the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Pet=r=s Supp. Br. at 6. Under this Act, Mr. 

Washington must show that the Kansas Supreme Court unreasonably determined the facts 

in upholding the peremptory challenges. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d)(2). 

The reasonableness of the Kansas Supreme Court=s factual determination turns at 

least partly on what had been presented to the Kansas Supreme Court on the third Batson

step. Mr. Washington acknowledges that his brief in the Kansas Supreme Court gave the 

third step Ashort attention@ and did not explicitly label the argument as addressing the 

third step of Batson. Appellant=s Second Supp. Br. at 3, 7. 

For Ms. Spratt and Ms. Hodges, Mr. Washington=s briefing in the Kansas Supreme 

Court was particularly sketchy. For example, Mr. Washington=s step-three argument for 

Ms. Hodges consisted of a single sentence: AHow one ascertains this response is >quite 

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2 

evasive= is beyond understanding.@ Opening Brief for Appellant at 25, State v. 

Washington, 275 Kan. 644 (2003). Similarly, for Ms. Spratt, Mr. Washington stated only 

in a single sentence that the answer in voir dire had been specific about the prior jury 

service. Id. at 24, 33. 

In light of the sparsity of Mr. Washington=s step-three argument in the Kansas 

Supreme Court, the court=s disposition of the Batson issue for Ms. Spratt and Ms. Hodges 

was based on a reasonable determination of the facts. As a result, I too would reject Mr. 

Washington=s step-three challenge involving the peremptory challenges for Ms. Spratt 

and Ms. Hodges. 

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