Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02905/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02905-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD E. HODGES,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 16cv2905-GPC(RBB)

ORDER 

1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS; 

[Dkt. Nos. 2, 4]

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

v.

JUDGE RICHARD E.L. STRAUSS;

JUDGE JOEL M. PRESSMAN;

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ASSEMBLY; GOVERNOR OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Defendants.

On November 29, 2016, Plaintiff Richard E. Hodges, (“Plaintiff”), proceeding

pro se, filed a complaint against Defendants Judge Richard E.L. Strauss, Judge Joel M.

Pressman, State of California Assembly, and the Governor of the State of California.

(Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff also names as Defendants in Interest, Ace Parking Inc., Scott

Jones, Mike Wilson and Ian Pollard. Plaintiff concurrently filed a motion to proceed

in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which was amended on December 1, 2016. (Dkt. No. 4.)

Based on the reasoning below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP

and sua sponte DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which

relief may granted. 

/ / / /

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Discussion

A. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of

the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee

of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure 1

to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(a).

See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook,

169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff must submit an affidavit

demonstrating his inability to pay the filing fee, and the affidavit must include a

complete statement of the plaintiff’s assets. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). When a plaintiff

moves to proceed IFP, the court first “grants or denies IFP status based on the

plaintiff’s financial resources alone and then independently determines whether to

dismiss the complaint” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (“§ 1915(e)(2)”). Franklin

v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Here, Plaintiff submitted an amended affidavit reporting that he is currently

unemployed since he is retired. (Dkt. No. 4.) He receives retirements benefits of

$1073.00 per month plus $187.00 per month in food stamps for a total income of

$1,260.00 . (Id. at 2.) He has about $124 in his bank accounts. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff

reports no assets such as a home or a vehicle. (Id. at 3-4.) He has living expenses of

about $1108.00 per month. (Id. at 5.) Based on this information, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. 

B. Sua Sponte Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to § 1915(a) issubject

to mandatory sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court if it is “frivolous, or

malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee 1

of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee

Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014)). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons

granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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relief against a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000). § 1915(e)(2) mandates that a court reviewing a complaint filed

pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 make and rule on its own motion

to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 4(c)(2). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff

must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). To state a claim

upon which relief may be granted “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is

facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words,

“the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content,

must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S.

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 679.

Plaintiff’s complaint challengesthe unfavorable rulings of the state court judges

that presided over his complaint in state court for wrongful termination/racial

discrimination, harassment, retaliation and age discrimination against his former

employer.

“Anglo-American common law has long recognized judicial immunity, a

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‘sweeping form of immunity’ for acts performed by judges that relate to the ‘judicial

process.’” In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9 Cir. 2002) (quoting Forrester v. White,

484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988)). “A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his

judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave

procedural errors.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). “This absolute

immunity insulates judges from charges of erroneous acts or irregular action, even

when it is alleged that such action was driven by malicious or corrupt motives[.]”

Castillo, 297 F.3d at 947. Even if a judge acts in excess of judicial authority, he or she

is not deprived of immunity. Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The immunity promotesthe use of the appellate procedure to correct judicial error and

discourages collateral attacks on final judgments. Castillo, 297 F.3d at 947. 

Here, the complaint alleges a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action based on rights

violated under the United States Constitution and the State of California Constitution,

including Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). His claims are based on the

unfavorable rulings of Judges Strauss and Pressman in his state court case. Because

Judges Strauss and Pressman were engaged in acts of judicial decision making, they

are absolutely immune from liability. Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint must be

dismissed as to Defendants Strauss and Pressman. 

As to Defendants California State Assembly and Governor of California,

Plaintiffs allege that the California State Assembly is the body that promulgated and

is responsible for the laws that Judges Strauss and Pressman relied on to unlawfully

deprive Plaintiff of his rights and privileges under the U.S. and State Constitutions. 

(Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 9, 16.) He also alleges that the Governor isresponsible because

he signed into law what the California State Assembly promulgated. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 17.) 

Federal, state and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immunityfromcivil

liability for their legislative activities.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46 (1998). 

Plaintiff’s complaint against the California State Assembly is predicated on its role in

promulgating the laws that ultimately dismissed his state court complaint. Therefore,

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the California State Assembly is entitled to absolute immunity. 

Finally, “a governor is entitled to absolute immunity for the act of signing a bill

into law.” Nichols v. Brown, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citing

Torres–Rivera v. Calderon–Serra, 412 F.3d 205, 213 (1st Cir.2005) (“[A] governor

who signs into law or vetoes legislation passed by the legislature is also entitled to

absolute immunity for that act.”);Women's EmergencyNetwork v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937,

950 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Under the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity, a governor

cannot be sued for signing a bill into law.”)). Here, the Complaint seeks to hold the

Governor liable based on his signing into law the laws promulgated by the legislature

that were relied upon by Judges Strauss and Pressman. Therefore, the Governor of

California is absolutely immune. 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice for

failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because absolute

immunity bars claims against judges, legislators and governors in their official duties,

the deficiencies in the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting leave to amend should be granted when

a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the

plaintiff can correct the defect”). 

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and

sua sponte DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice for failing to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: December 14, 2016

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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