Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01934/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01934-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gila River Indian Community; John Doe

Allottee #1; Jane Doe Allottee #2, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Mark Winkleman, Commissioner, Arizona

State Land Department; Allen E. Clark, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-1934-PHX-EHC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Winkleman's Motion to Dismiss. [Dkt. 13].

The Motion is fully briefed.

Background

This case involves a disp ute "concerning rights to a 640-acre tract of land known

as Section 36, Township 4 South, Range 4 East, of the Gila and Salt River Base and

Meridian, Pinal County, Arizona." [Dkt. 1, p. 2]. The disputed property is allegedly part of

the reservation granted to the Gila River Indian Community (hereafter, the Community).

[Dkt. 1, pp. 4-5]. The Community also claims unextinguished aboriginal title in the disputed

property. [Dkt. 1, p. 10]. Arizona, through its Land Department, allegedly claims the

disputed property is school trust land Congress granted to Arizona. [Dkt. 1, pp. 6-9].

Case 2:05-cv-01934-EHC Document 20 Filed 05/22/06 Page 1 of 9
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The Commissioner of Arizona's Land Dep artment, Defendant Winkleman, allegedly

"granted Defendant Clark a sp ecial land use permit... for the purpose of establishing apiary

sites" on the disputed property. [Dkt. 1, p. 16]. Defendant Clark allegedly accesses the

apiaries via roads crossing the Community's reservation and land allotted to individual

members of the Community, including Plaintiffs John Doe Allottee #1 and Jane Doe

Allottee #2. [Dkt. 1, pp. 16-17]. 

The Community fears further encroachments should Arizona's Land Commissioner

designate the disputed property as "urban lands," pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-331 et

seq. [Dkt. 1, p. 12]. Designating the disputed property as urban lands allegedly would

impede t he implementation of the Community's Master Plan for Land and Water Use,

required by the Gila River Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act, 108 P.L. 451, §

204(e)(2) (1994). [Dkt. 1, p. 13-15]. The Settlement Act will only be effective if, inter alia, the

Community has implemented the Master Plan by December 31, 2007. 108 P.L. 451, §

207(c)(1)(C).

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants Winkleman and

Clark to end their alleged encroachments and prevent future encroachment s on the

disputed property.

Legal Standard

A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted

under any set of fact s t hat could be proved consistent with the allegations. Swierkiewicz

v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (citation omitted). All material allegations of the

complaint must be accepted as true and in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. In re

Broderbund/Learning Co. Securities Litigation, 294 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2002).

Discussion

Defendant Winkleman argues dismissal is required because Plaintiffs' claims against

him are barred by Arizona's sovereign immunity, Plaintiffs failed to join indispensable

parties, and Plaintiffs aboriginal title to the property has been extinguished.

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1

 Defendant Winkleman argues his issuance of a Special Land Use Permit allowing

Defendant Clark to operate an apiary cannot constitute a violation of § 177 (p rohibit ing a

"purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto" from

a t ribe unless made by a treaty) because the Permit is not a claim to land under the st at ut e.

Section 177's "overriding purpose is the protection of Indian lands. It acknowledges and

guarantees the Indian tribes' right of possession." Unit ed States ex rel. Santa Ana Indian

Pueblo v. University of New Mexico, 731 F.2d 703, 706 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing United States

v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 543 F.2d 676, 698 (9th Cir. 1976)). Op erat ion of an

apiary arguably interferes wit h t he Community's possession of the land. Such use without

a treaty, therefore, may be prohibited by § 177. 

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A. Sovereign Immunity

"The Eleventh Amendment grants to states a sovereign immunity from suit." Agua

Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). The United

Stat es Supreme Court's decision in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908),

"recognized an exception t o t he Eleventh Amendment bar for suits for prospective relief

against state officers, sued in their official cap acit ies, to enjoin an alleged ongoing

violation of federal law." Id. Here, the Young exception to the Elevent h Amendment would

normally apply because Plaintiffs are suing Defendant Winkleman, a state officer, to enjoin

an alleged ongoing violation of 25 U.S.C. § 177.1

 Defendant Winkleman, however, argues

that the Young exception cannot apply based on Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,

521 U.S. 261, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).

In Couer d'Alene, the Supreme Court p laced a narrow limitation on the applicability

of the Young exception. In that case, an Indian tribe sought declaratory and injunctive

relief against Idaho state officials to establish the t ribe's right to quiet enjoyment of

submerged lands. T he Supreme Court characterized the suit as "close to the functional

equivalent of quiet title in that substantially all benefits of ownership and control would

shift from the State to the Tribe" and as "seek[ing], in effect, a determination that the lands

in question are not even wit hin the regulatory jurisdiction of the State." Id., 521 U.S. at 282,

117 S. Ct. at 2040. The Supreme Court found that the relief sought by the tribe "would

divest the St ate of its sovereign control over submerged lands, lands with a unique status

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in t he law and infused with a public trust the State itself is bound to respect." Id., 521 U.S.

at 283, 117 S. Ct. at 2041. Based on the state's interest in the submerged lands, the Young

exception was inapplicable:

It is apparent, then, that if the Tribe were t o p revail, Idaho's sovereign

interest in its lands and wat ers would be affected in a degree fully as

intrusive as almost any conceivable retroact ive levy upon funds in its

Treasury. Under these particular and special circumst ances, we find the

Young exception inapplicable. The dignity and st atus of its statehood allows

Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Id., 521 U.S. at 287, 117 S. Ct. at 2043. Couer d'Alene, t herefore, stands for the proposition

that state sovereign immunity bars a suit against state officials for declarat ory or injunctive

relief t hat would quiet title to submerged lands in which the state has a sovereign interest.

The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Couer d'Alene in this fashion. Agua Calient e, 223

F.3d at 1045-48 (Couer d'Alene did not render the Young exception inapplicable to a suit

regarding state taxation of Indian tribes). In Agua Caliente, the Ninth Circuit recognized

that "[c]entral to the Court's decision [in Couer d'Alene] was the degree to which the tribe's

requested relief would have invaded Idaho's unique interest in t he submerged lands." Id.,

223 F.3d at 1047. The Ninth Circuit found that "interpret[ing] Couer d'Alene different ly

would be to op en a Pandora's Box as to the relative importance of various state powers or

areas of state regulatory authority." Id., 223 F.3d at 1048.

Other courts have found that Couer d'Alene only limits the application of the Young

exception when a state's cont rol of submerged lands is challenged. The Second Circuit

found "significant to the Court's reasoning was the fact that the Couer d'Alene Tribe's

claims implicated the authority of the State of Idaho over submerged lands." Western

M ohegan Tribe and Nation v. Orange County, 395 F.3d 18, 22 fn. 3 (2d Cir. 2004). In that

case, the Second Circuit held that Couer d'Alene gave the state immunity because "the

state parks listed as comprising portions of the Tribe's land claim contain 'submerged

lands.'" Id. Recognizing the importance of submerged lands to the Couer d'Alene decision,

the Tenth Circuit found that a state's interest in retaining profits under a recreat ional

property lease did not "present state sovereign interests" to the degree of the "State of

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Idaho's int erest in its submerged lands." Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. of New Mexico v.

Dept. of the Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 612 (10th Cir. 1998); but see ANR Pipeline Co. v.

LaFaver, 150 F.3d 1178, (10th Cir. 1998) (holding a suit challenging a state's property tax

system was barred by Couer d'Alene). 

Here, Plaintiffs challenge Arizona's issuance of a Special Land Use Permit allowing

the operation of an apiary on t he disp uted property. [Dkt. 1, p. 4]. Arizona allegedly claims

a school trust title in the disputed propert y . [Dkt . 1, p. 4]. Arizona's interest in school trust

title does not implicate the unique interest in submerged lands that was central to the

decision in Couer d'Alene. The Young exception to state sovereign immunity allows

Plaintiffs to bring this suit against Defendant Winkleman.

B. Failure to Join Indispensable Persons

A person's joinder is necessary to a case if complete relief cannot be afforded

among the parties in the person's absence and the person has a legally protected interest

in the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. Ass'n. v. United States, 30

F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 1994). The parties do not dispute that the United States and

Arizona are necessary persons whose joinder is not feasible due to their respective

sovereign immunities.

If a necessary person cannot be joined as a party, "the court shall determine

whether in equity and good conscience the action should p roceed among the parties

before it, or should be dismissed, the absent p erson being thus regarded as

indispensable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). In determining whether a person is indispensable,

Rule 19(b) directs the Court to consider to what extent a judgment would prejudice the

absent p erson or the parties, the likelihood of limiting any prejudice, the adequacy of a

judgment issued in the person's absence, and whether the plaintiff will have an adequate

remedy if the case is dismissed. Defendant Winkleman argues that the United St at es and

Arizona are indispensable persons whose absence from this suit requires dismissal.

//

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1. The United States

 As an initial matter, Defendant Winkleman asserts that Plaintiffs are judicially

estopped from arguing that the United States is not indispensable by t he Community's

argument in In re Schugg, CV 05-2045-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz.). That argument was

unsuccessful, In re Schugg [dkt. 37, p. 3], and thus cannot form the basis for an application

of judicial estoppel. See Hamilton Stat e Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir.

2001) ("This court has restricted the application of judicial estop p el t o cases where the

court relied on, or 'accepted,' the party's previous inconsistent position.").

Turning to the merits, the Ninth Circuit has held that the United States is not an

indispensable party to a case brought by a tribe to protect its tribal lands:

the rule is clear in t his Circuit and elsewhere that, in a suit by an Indian tribe

t o p rotect its interest in tribal lands, regardless of whether the United St at es

is a necessary party under Rule 19(a), it is not an indispensable party in

whose absence litigation cannot proceed under Rule 19(b). 

Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of T acoma, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983); Fort Mojave Tribe

v. LaFollette, 478 F.2d 1016, 1017 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Wit hout joining the United States, an

Indian tribe may sue in its own right to protect its interest in rest rict ed land."). Recent

cases from other circuits have explained that this rule should apply only when the interests

of the tribe are aligned with those of the United States. E.g., Spirit Lake Tribe v. North

Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 747 (8th Cir. 2001) ("when the government claims an interest in land

that squarely conflicts with the interest of a Tribe, the government's presence in litigation

is nearly always required"); Navajo T ribe of Indians v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455, 1473

(10t h Cir. 1987) ("In... Puyallup... the interest of the United States was aligned with that of

the Indians" and so the United States "was not found indispensable."). 

Here, the Community is seeking to protect the tribal lands from encroachments by

Arizona and Defendant Clark, thereby protect ing t he United States' trust title in those

lands. The relief sought by the Community would limit Arizona and Defendant Clark's use

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2

 Defendant Winkleman asserts that the United States is indispensable to the

resolution of Arizona's count erclaims. Arizona is not a party to this action. Nor has

Defendant Winkleman filed any counterclaims on its behalf.

3 Arizona could have selected other land in lieu of school trust land occupied by an

Indian reservation. 43 U.S.C. § 851 (where school trust land is occupied by an Indian

reservation,"other lands of equal acreage are also hereby appropriated and granted and

may be selected"). The Comp laint alleges that Arizona has not selected other land, but

"continues... to claim school trust title to Section 36." [Dkt. 1, p . 8]. Had Arizona selected

other land, it would have no claim to section 36 and thus no legal interest in this case. 

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of the disputed property, protecting- not clouding- the United States' trust title. The United

States is not indispensable to resolving Plaintiffs' claims.2

2. The State of Arizona

To determine whether Ariz ona is indispensable to the resolution of this case, the

Court will analyze first the effect of a judgment for Plaintiffs and second the effect if

Defendants prevail. The nature of the Communit y 's interest and Arizona's interest in the

disputed property is central to determining whether this case can proceed in the absence

of Arizona. T he Community claims the United States granted it the disputed property as

reservation land. Arizona claims it was grant ed t he property as school trust land. As

discussed below, the parties' right s in t he disputed property will be affected by which party

was granted the disputed property first.

If the Community had a reservation in the disputed property before Arizona was

granted and took the property, Arizona would not take t he disputed property until the

reservation is extinguished.3

 43 U.S.C. § 851 (state "await[s] the extinguishment of any

such military, Indian, or other reservation and the restorat ion of the lands therein embraced

to the public domain and then tak[es]" the school trust land); New M exico-Arizona

Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 61-219, § 24, 36 Stat. 557, 572-73 (1910) (applying § 851 to Arizona

school trust land). The United States Supreme Court has characterized a state's interest in

school trust land held awaiting the extinguishment of a reservation as "the fee of the land...

subject to a right of occupancy by the Indians." Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389

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(1902); see also Bennett County v. United States, 394 F.2d 8, 11 (8th Cir. 1968) ("The federal

government possesses the unquestioned power to convey the fee to lands occupied by

Indian tribes, although the grantee takes only the naked fee and cannot dist urb t he

occupancy of the Indians."). If, as alleged, the Community's reservation preceded Ariz ona's

taking of the school trust land, Arizona would hold fee title to the disputed property

subject to the Community's right to occupy the land.

Plaint iffs' requested relief, an injunction barring Defendant Clark from using the

apiary and barring Defendant Winkleman from authorizing future encroachments on the

disputed property, would leave Arizona's fee title undisturbed, remaining subject to the

Community's rights. Such a decision would not prejudice Arizona, who would not be

bound by a decision issued in its absence. See Fort Mojave, 478 F.2d at 1017 ("United

St at es will not be bound by any determination made in a suit to which it is not a party").

Such a decision would be adequate as to Plaintiffs because it would prevent further

encroachments authorized by Defendant Winkleman, who as Arizona's Land Commissioner

exercises the st at e's authority over the disputed property. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-132

(detailing Land Commissioner's powers, including issuing "permits for short-term use of

state land," (B)(6), and making "long-range plans for the future use of state lands," (A)(3));

see also Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458, 460 n.1 (1967) (Ariz ona's "Land Commissioner is

apparently a substantially independent state officer... with custody of the [school] trust

lands.").

By contrast, if the disputed property was granted first to the School as school trust

land, Ariz ona would arguably hold title free of the Community's rights accorded by the

reservat ion. In such a case, the Community may still retain a right of occupancy based on

aboriginal title or some other claim of right. No prejudice would result if it was found t hat

the Community did not have a right t o occupy the property. Such a result would be

pursuant to a judgment issued in a case filed by the Community. 

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Based on those possible resolutions, this case will not result in extinguishing

Arizona's title to the disputed prop ert y , at most Arizona's title would be subject to the

Community's right to occupy the property. Resolution of this case does not require

Arizona's presence because Defendant Winkleman, Arizona's Land Commissioner, can

p rop erly represent Arizona's interest in the state lands, as he is required to do by Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 37-132. In these circumstances, Arizona is not indispensable to this case. 

C. Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title

Defendant Winkleman argues that the Communit y 's claim that its aboriginal title

secures it the right to occupy the disputed land must be dismissed because the

Community 's aboriginal title to the disputed property has been extinguished. To

demonstrate that aboriginal title has been extinguished, Defendant Winkleman cit es Gila

River Pima-M aricopa Indian Community v. United States, 24 Ind. Cl. Comm. 301 (1970), and

Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 27 Ind. Cl. Comm. 11 (1972). Those

cases recognize the extinguishment of the Community's aboriginal title to the lands

described in the Indian Claims Commission's Finding 23. Pima-Maricopa Indian Community,

27 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 11. Finding 23 is a metes and bounds description of land taken from

the Community. Determining whether the disputed property is wit hin t he land described

in Finding 23 is a factual matter the Court cannot decide based on the present record.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Mark Winkleman's Motion to Dismiss [dkt. 13] is

DENIED.

DATED this 22nd day of May, 2006.

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