Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00662/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00662-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LARRY GIRALDES, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

K.M. PORTER, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-0662-KJM-EFB P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion to amend. 

ECF Nos. 30, 36. For the reasons explained below, the motions must be denied. 

I. Background 

 Plaintiff commenced this action on March 15, 2012. ECF No. 1. It proceeds on the 37-

page first amended complaint, filed on November 7, 2012. ECF No. 11. The crux of plaintiff’s 

complaint is that he has been retaliated against for pursuing lawsuits and administrative appeals. 

See id. at 14. Plaintiff details in the complaint dozens of purported acts of retaliation, including 

but not limited to the following: (1) defendants Till and Porter attempted to have plaintiff 

assaulted by another inmate; (2) defendant O’Brien confiscated plaintiff’s property; (3) defendant 

Perry vaguely threatened to issue a false rules violation report; (4) defendant Perry searched 

plaintiff’s cell and confiscated cable wires; (5) defendant O’Brien vaguely threatened to place 

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plaintiff in administrative segregation; (6) defendant Porter suspended plaintiff’s phone 

privileges; (7) defendant Porter required that plaintiff be strip searched before using the phone or 

entering the music building; (8) defendant O’Brien issued plaintiff a rules violation report for 

dangerous contraband and took away plaintiff’s privileges; (9) defendant Skogin told other 

inmates that they better make sure plaintiff stops filing appeals; (10) defendants Skogin and Till 

searched plaintiff’s cell and confiscated his guitar; (11) defendant Daley used his role as an 

appeals coordinator to block and/or delay plaintiff’s appeals; (12) defendant Porter prevented 

plaintiff’s “special purchase orders,” such as his typewriter; (13) defendant Porter, with help from 

defendants Till and O’Brien, issued a rules violation report claiming that plaintiff had another 

inmate’s headphones; (14) defendants Till, Porter, and O’Brien destroyed evidence in plaintiff’s 

cell; (15) defendant Virga denied there was any wrongdoing even though he knew retaliation was 

taking place; (16) defendant Skogin threatened to take away plaintiff’s music and yard time; (17) 

defendants Porter, Till, and O’Brien searched plaintiff’s cell and for a second time, confiscated 

plaintiff’s guitar and evidence; (18) defendant Porter searched plaintiff’s cell and confiscated 

batteries; (19) defendants Porter and O’Brien intercepted plaintiff’s letters requesting a new 

antenna; (20) defendant Hutchings conducted a series of cell searches, confiscated property and 

evidence, issued false rules violation reports, and threatened to continue retaliating against 

plaintiff; (21) defendants Hutchings and Porter confiscated plaintiff’s typewriter ribbons and then 

tried to cover it up; (22) defendant O’Brien intercepted plaintiff’s appeals, mail, and other 

outgoing legal correspondence; (23) defendant Todd falsely found plaintiff guilty of two different 

rules violation reports; (24) defendant Virga wrongly retained plaintiff in administrative 

segregation; and (25) defendants O’Brien and Porter prompted a transfer of plaintiff from 

California State Prison, Sacramento, to Mule Creek State Prison, then to High Desert State 

Prison, and then back to Sacramento. See ECF No. 11. This action proceeds on plaintiff’s First 

Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Daley, Hutchings, O’Brien, Perry, Porter, 

Scogin, Till, Todd, and Virga. See ECF No. 12 (Screening Order). 

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II. Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

 On August 29, 2013, plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to “prohibit[ ] 

defendants and their agents from violating the express terms in Giraldes v. Hicimbothem . . . by 

transferring plaintiff from California State Prison Sacramento, in retaliation for the filing of this 

suit, and for achieving settlement in that case.” ECF No. 30 at 1. Plaintiff explains that on 

August 12, 2010, he entered into a settlement agreement with the named defendants in Giraldes v. 

Hicimbothem, No. 1:09-cv-0154 SKO (E.D. Cal) (Hicimbothem), as well as with the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). See ECF No. 30, Ex. A1 (listing Cano, 

Jones, Hicimbothom, Chavez, Ortiz, Nelson, Trimble and Robicheaux as defendants). None of 

the defendants in this action were defendants in the Hicimbothem action. 

 One of the terms of the Hicimbothem agreement was that plaintiff would be transferred to 

and remained housed at California State Prison, Sacramento (CSP-Sac), where he is currently 

confined. ECF No. 30, Ex. A. In the pending motion for injunctive relief, plaintiff states that he 

has “been told” by his treating doctor that “he is on the list to be sent from [CSP-Sac].” Id. at 2. 

Plaintiff also claims that defendants O’Brien and Porter caused him to be transferred to Mule 

Creek State Prison in 2012. Though plaintiff was returned to CSP-Sac, he believes that he will be 

transferred again, given the information provided to him by his doctor. Plaintiff states that he 

needs to be housed at CSP-Sac because it is “close to his house and [fiancé] to ensure visits.” Id. 

He seeks preliminary injunctive relief to prohibit defendants from transferring him from CSP-Sac, 

in violation of the Hicimbothem agreement. ECF No. 30. 

A preliminary injunction will not issue unless necessary to prevent threatened injury that 

would impair the court’s ability to grant effective relief in a pending action. Sierra On-Line, Inc. 

v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984); Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 

F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1989). A preliminary injunction represents the exercise of a far reaching 

power not to be indulged except in a case clearly warranting it. Dymo Indus. v. Tapeprinter, Inc., 

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 Plaintiff appends to his motion a copy of the written settlement agreement entered into in 

Giraldes v. Hicimbothem, No. 1:09-cv-0154 SKO. The agreement stated that the court would 

retain jurisdiction over the settlement for one year. ECF No. 30, Ex. A. 

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326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964). A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must 

demonstrate “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm 

in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 

injunction is in the public interest.” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)). The Ninth Circuit has 

also held that the “sliding scale” approach it applies to preliminary injunctions—that is, balancing 

the elements of the preliminary injunction test, so that a stronger showing of one element may 

offset a weaker showing of another—survives Winter and continues to be valid. Alliance for Wild 

Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). “In other words, ‘serious questions 

going to the merits,’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support 

issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.” Id. 

In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any preliminary injunction 

“must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds 

requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 

 Here, the operative complaint does not seek enforcement of or relate to the terms of the 

Hicimbothem settlement agreement and none of the defendants in this action were defendants in 

the Hicimbothem action. Plaintiff has, however, filed a motion to amend his complaint to include 

a request for permanent injunctive relief for purposes of enforcing the term that he remain housed 

at CSP-Sac. See ECF No 36. Although he now seeks to insert into this First Amendment 

retaliation case a claim to enforce a term of the Hicimbothem settlement agreement, this action 

does not currently include a breach of contract claim, nor is it proceeding on any claim 

concerning plaintiff’s purported right to be housed at CSP-Sac. See ECF No. 11 (Am. Compl.); 

see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994) (explaining that 

an action regarding enforcement of a settlement agreement sounds in contract). Thus, the current 

motion for a preliminary injunction does not show serious questions going to the merits of this 

action. 

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 In his motion, plaintiff focuses on the fact that a transfer out of CSP-Sac would violate the 

terms of the Hicimbothem agreement. In doing so, plaintiff completely fails to demonstrate why 

or how such a violation would cause him to suffer irreparable harm. Though plaintiff does 

express a preference to remain housed near his home and his fiancé, these preferences do not 

demonstrate that plaintiff will suffer imminent irreparable harm in the absence of the requested 

injunctive relief. 

 Plaintiff also claims that his settlement mandating placement in CSP-Sac has been 

“resolved” and that “relitigating” the issue will “overburden” the court system. Id. at 4. That 

argument, however, fails to demonstrate that issuance of the requested injunctive relief is in the 

public’s interest or that the balance of the equities weighs in plaintiff’s favor. 

 In short, plaintiff’s motion must be denied, as it is not supported by facts that demonstrate 

he meets the standards for a preliminary injunction. 

III. Motion to Amend 

 Plaintiff seeks leave to amend his complaint to request a “permanent injunction that 

prohibits defendants from violating the express terms of the CDCR Settlement Agreement in 

Giraldes v. Hicimbothem, No. 1:09-cv-0154/SKO.” See ECF No. 36 at 1 (alleging that 

defendants continuously threaten to transfer plaintiff out of CSP-Sacramento). The requested 

amendment, if granted, would add a new claim alleging a breach of contract. 

Rule 15(a)(1) provides that “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course 

within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is 

required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under 

Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Here, defendants answered the complaint on July 12, 

2013. ECF No. 26. Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint more than 21 days thereafter. See 

ECF No. 36 (Oct. 7, 2013 Mot. to Amend). 

 Nonetheless, Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “[i]n all other cases, a party may amend its 

pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should 

freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The policy of freely 

granting leave to amend should be applied with “extreme liberality.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. 

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Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). When determining whether to grant leave to amend 

under Rule 15(a), a court should consider the following factors: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith; (3) 

futility of amendment; and (4) prejudice to the opposing party. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 

182 (1962). Granting or denying leave to amend rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, 

and will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 

(9th Cir. 1996). 

 Here, plaintiff’s proposed amendment to his request for relief is improper. The basis of 

his motion is that he anticipates a breach of the Hicimbothem agreement. Such an allegation 

would assert a claim unrelated to the already wide-ranging First Amendment retaliation claims at 

issue in this case. In addition, the proposed amendment would require that plaintiff also add as a 

defendant to this action one or more of the parties to the Hicimbothem agreement, such as CDCR. 

See Berglund v. Arthroscopic & Laser Surgery Center of San Diego, L.P., 44 Cal.4th 528, 536 

(2008) (a settlement is a contract and therefore not enforceable against non-parties). A breach of 

contract claim asserted against CDCR , however, could not be properly joined in this suit. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2) (joinder of defendants not permitted unless both commonality and 

same transaction requirements are satisfied); see also George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (“Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to 

prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to 

ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees-for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 

the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the 

required fees.”). Plaintiff may not add entirely new defendants based on an entirely new cause of 

action, which would not have been properly joined in the initial complaint. See George, 507 F.3d 

at 607 (7th. Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). For these reasons, plaintiff’s motion to 

amend the request for relief in the complaint would be futile.2

 2

 Although the Hicimbothem court’s retention of jurisdiction has now expired, plaintiff 

will not be without recourse in the event the terms of the settlement agreement are breached. The 

United States Supreme Court has made clear that absent a court’s “retained jurisdiction” over a 

settlement contract, “enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is 

some independent basis for federal jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994); see 

also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2)(B) (“Nothing in this section [of the Prison Litigation Reform Act] 

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IV. Summary of Order and Recommendation 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to amend (ECF No. 36) 

is denied. 

Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary 

injunction (ECF No. 30) be denied. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: February 6, 2014. 

 

shall preclude any party claiming that a private settlement agreement has been breached from 

seeking in State court any remedy available under State law”). 

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