Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01989/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01989-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Martial Ledvina, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Town of Marana, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-14-01989-TUC-CKJ (DTF)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 On June 9, 2014, Defendant Sheriff Clarence Dupnik filed a Motion to Dismiss all 

of Plaintiff Martial Ledvina’s claims against him based on failure to state a claim and 

statute of limitations. (Doc. 10.) Subsequently, Defendants Town of Marana, Terry and 

Jane Doe Rozema, and William and Jane Doe Dittiger (Marana Defendants) filed a 

Motion to Dismiss State Law Claims based on the statute of limitations. (Doc. 15.) Both 

of the motions are fully briefed. (Docs. 12, 13, 16, 17.) Pursuant to the Rules of Practice 

of the Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and 

Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its 

independent review of the record, dismiss Count 1 against Defendant Dupnik, with leave 

to amend, on the ground that it fails to satisfy Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and Counts 2-6 against all Defendants on the ground that they are time-barred. 

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On March 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Town of Marana, 

Marana police officers Terry Rozema (and Jane Doe Rozema) and William Dittiger (and 

Jane Doe Dittiger), and Pima County Sheriff Clarence Dupnik. (Doc. 1.) The Complaint 

alleges various civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C § 1983 (Count 1), battery (Count 2), 

false imprisonment (Count 3), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 4), 

negligence (Count 5), and gross negligence (Count 6) against the various defendants 

stemming from Plaintiff’s interactions with law enforcement on January 14, 2013.1

 (Id.) 

 The following facts are taken from the Complaint. On January 14, 2013, Plaintiff 

was an 83-year-old, 140-pound man with a heart condition. (Id. at 2.) Defendant Dittiger, 

a Marana Police Officer, responded to a 911 call alleging domestic violence at Plaintiff’s 

residence. (Id.) Without establishing probable cause, Dittiger forcibly detained Plaintiff, 

making him lie face down on the ground and threatening bodily harm. (Id. at 3.) Dittiger 

“dragged” Plaintiff to the squad car and made him bend over the back of the car for an 

excessive period. (Id.) Plaintiff’s wrists were red for days due to the tightness of the 

handcuffs. (Id.) Dittiger arrested Plaintiff and transported him to the Pima County Adult 

Detention Complex (P.C.A.D.C.). (Id.) 

 Plaintiff, 15 months removed from open heart surgery, immediately advised 

correctional officers at the facility of his heart condition and his need to “see the nurse.” 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s Complaint does little in the way of illuminating which claims are alleged against which defendant. From the parties’ briefing it can be surmised that the claims specific to Sheriff Dupnik are an Eighth Amendment Civil Rights violation under Count 1 and Counts 3-6. It appears, Marana Defendants are named in Count 1, which is 

not challenged in the pending motion, and Counts 2-6. 

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(Id.) Unheeded, Plaintiff called out to the nurse directly, but she too rebuffed his 

pleadings and he was subsequently removed to a cell. (Id.) On multiple occasions during 

the intervening hours of his detention, he reminded officers he needed to see the nurse 

and take his medication to no avail. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that the failure of officers 

to provide his morning medication when requested “caused him much anxiety.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff was released at noon, at which time his medication was returned. (Id.) 

 The criminal charge of domestic abuse, which served as the catalyst for Plaintiff’s 

arrest, was dismissed on April 3, 2013. (Id.) 

 On June 9, 2014, Sheriff Dupnik filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims against him, 

arguing that Count 1 fails to state a claim and Counts 3-6 violate the statute of 

limitations. (Doc. 10.) Subsequently, Marana Defendants filed to amend their answer to 

include a statute of limitations defense. (Doc. 14.) The Court granted that motion. (Doc. 

18.) Contemporaneous with their motion to amend, Marana Defendants filed a motion to 

dismiss Counts 2-6 against them based on the statute of limitations. A motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6) must be filed prior to a defendant submitting a responsive pleading. 

See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, 

Marana Defendants filed an answer prior to seeking dismissal. Therefore, the motion to 

dismiss will be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c). 

See id. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The standard governing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), is also used 

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for a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, 

Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that motions to dismiss and motions for 

judgment on the pleadings are functionally identical, delineated only by the time of 

filing). Thus, the Court considers Defendant Dupnik and Marana Defendants’ motions 

under the same standard. 

 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 

(2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Dismissal is only appropriate if the 

complaint’s factual allegations, together with all reasonable inferences drawn in the 

plaintiff’s favor, fail to state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678; see also Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (allegations in the complaint must be construed in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff). While a complaint need not plead “detailed factual 

allegations,” the factual allegations it does include “must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. The plausibility standard 

does not amount to a probability requirement, however, it demands “more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A mere 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is not sufficient to establish a 

claim, and legal conclusions are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Id. at 679. Further, 

specifically pertaining to § 1983 claims, “a plaintiff must plead that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution.” Id. 

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DISCUSSION 

 Defendant Dupnik contends that Plaintiff’s § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim 

(Count 1, in part) should be dismissed for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff did not sufficiently 

allege that anyone at the P.C.A.D.C. violated the Constitution by acting deliberately 

indifferent to his serious medical needs; and (2) Plaintiff did not adequately allege that 

Sheriff Dupnik was personally involved in or sufficiently causally connected to the 

constitutional violation. All Defendants argues that Plaintiff’s state-law claims (Counts 2-

6) are time-barred by Arizona’s statute of limitations.2

 

 Section 1983 Claim Against Sheriff Dupnik (Claim 1, in part) 

Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Dupnik is liable for the deprivation of his right to be 

provided with medical care while incarcerated. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Because Plaintiff only had 

been arrested, and not convicted of a crime, “his rights derive from the due process clause 

rather than the Eighth Amendment.” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 

1187 (9th Cir. 2002). However, as the Ninth Circuit notes, these due process rights, with 

regards to medical needs while in custody, impose the same duty the Eighth 

Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment necessitates. Id. (citing 

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 

1998); Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996)). Under this standard, a 

violation occurs when there is (1) a deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of 

 

2

 Marana Defendants also argue the state law claims are barred because Plaintiff 

failed to serve a timely notice of claim as required by A.R.S. § 12-821.01. (Doc. 15 at 2-

5.) The Court does not reach this argument because it finds the claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 

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a prisoner that (2) results in “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

 Defendant Dupnik argues that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged the existence of 

a serious medical need. A serious medical need exists when failure to treat a medical 

condition “could result in further significant injury or ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction 

of pain.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Taking the Complaint’s 

allegations as fact for the purpose of evaluating the pending motion, Plaintiff informed 

multiple personnel at P.C.A.D.C. of his heart condition and his need to take his 

medication. Therefore, drawing reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, it is certainly 

plausible to believe that an 83-year-old man deprived of his heart medication 15 months 

after open heart surgery presents a manifest case of serious medical need. Cf. Lolli v. 

Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 2003) (leaving a diabetic without proper 

food or insulin creates an “objectively, sufficiently serious” risk of harm). Accordingly, 

the first part of the Estelle test has been met. 

 Defendant Dupnik also argues that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a harm that 

satisfies the second part of the Estelle test. Here, the Court agrees. While Plaintiff does 

not have to prove substantial harm, the alleged indifference to the serious medical need 

must have resulted in a more than de minimis Eighth Amendment harm. Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 

F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (mere delay of surgery is insufficient to state a claim unless 

that delay was harmful); see also Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Here, the only harm alleged in 

the Complaint is temporary “anxiety” precipitated by P.C.A.D.C. staff’s refusal to 

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provide his heart medication in a timely fashion. Psychological pain can be more than de 

minimis, but “nonmeasurable pain is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment.” 

McMillian, 503 U.S. at 17 (Blackmun, J. concurring). Plaintiff has failed to allege any 

facts upon which a reasonable inference could be drawn that he did suffer non-de minimis

harm. He did not allege that he experienced any pain, or that he suffered further medical 

complications due to this anxiety. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege 

that anyone at P.C.A.D.C. violated the Constitution and that he is entitled to relief 

pursuant to § 1983. 

 Defendant Dupnik’s second theory as to why Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against him 

should be dismissed is that Plaintiff failed to allege that Sheriff Dupnik was personally 

involved or causally connected to a constitutional violation. Plaintiff is suing Sheriff 

Dupnik in both his individual and official capacity for his supervisory role at P.C.A.D.C. 

 The Court looks first at Plaintiff’s claim against Sheriff Dupnik as an individual 

under the theory of supervisory-liability. Vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 

suits, but a “plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference 

based upon the supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct 

by his or her subordinates.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011); Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 677. A defendant may be liable if: (1) he is personally involved in the 

constitutional violation; or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between his conduct 

and the violation. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint does not allege Sheriff Dupnik’s personal involvement with his alleged Due 

Process violation on January 14, 2013. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint must 

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adequately allege a sufficient causal connection between Sheriff Dupnik’s acts and the 

constitutional violation in order to survive dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Yet 

Plaintiff’s Complaint does no more than state conclusory allegations not entitled to a 

presumption of truth when considered during a motion to dismiss and it does not offer 

adequate (or any) factual foundation upon which these conclusions rest. The Complaint 

baldly alleges that: (1) Defendant maintained polices and/or long standing practices or 

customs that resulted in the violation of Plaintiff’s rights; (2) those polices, practices, and 

customs were inadequate; and (3) those polices, practices, and customs demonstrated 

deliberate indifference. (Doc. 1 at 5.) All three of these allegations are legal conclusions, 

and none of them are supported by any factual matter that could “allow the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678. 

 Plaintiff also argues his Complaint alleges an official-capacity claim against 

Sheriff Dupnik. Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff adequately alleged a constitutional 

violation, see Aguilera v. Baca, 510 F.3d 1161, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007) (the Court need not 

reach the § 1983 claims against a supervisor if it finds no violation of any constitutional 

right occurred), an official capacity claim is really a § 1983 claim against the 

municipality that the official serves. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). 

To sufficiently allege an official-capacity claim the plaintiff’s complaint must do more 

than “simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient 

allegations of underlying facts.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 

637 (9th Cir. 2012) (establishing that the Iqbal, Twombly, and Starr pleading standard 

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applies to official-capacity claims) (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216). Again, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint does no more than baldly assert the elements of such a claim without 

providing any factual support. (See Doc. 1 at 5.) 

 In lieu of denying factual deficiencies in the Complaint, Plaintiff argues that he 

believes discovery is needed to completely illuminate the extent of the policies and 

procedures at P.C.A.D.C. and this discovery will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to 

draft a “much more through and comprehensive complaint.” Plaintiff argues that Sheriff 

Dupnik’s Motion to Dismiss would be better suited as a Motion for Summary Judgment 

after discovery has been conducted. However, in light of the Supreme Court’s rulings in 

Iqbal and Twombly, the Court does not find this argument persuasive. See Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 559 (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to 

relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through careful 

case management given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in 

checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)). And this is particularly relevant in this case when the proposed 

discovery will impose a burden on government officials. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 

(“Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy 

costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might 

otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government.”). 

 In conclusion, Plaintiff has failed to allege that he suffered an actionable Eighth 

Amendment harm. Alternatively, even if he had, Plaintiff fails to provide any factual 

basis or support for the allegations in his Complaint that Sheriff Dupnik, through his own 

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individual actions or in his official capacity, violated the Constitution. The Complaint 

fails to meet the standard set out in Rule 8, and dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is 

proper. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686. However, because Plaintiff might be able to state a 

claim upon which he is entitled to relief with a more carefully drafted complaint, leave to 

amend is appropriate. See Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 State-law Claims Against All Defendants (Claims 2-6) 

 Defendants argue the state law claims are barred by the statute of limitations. In 

Arizona, all actions against public entities and public employees “shall be brought within 

one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that because all the defendants are public entities or employees, 

the one-year statute of limitations applies here. 

 The parties disagree over when the claims accrued. A cause of action accrues 

under this statute “when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and 

knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or 

condition which caused or contributed to the damage.” § 12–821.01(B); see also Glaze v. 

Larsen, 83 P.3d 26, 34, 207 Ariz. 26, 34 (2004). Defendants contend the claims accrued on 

January 14, the date of Plaintiff’s arrest and detention. Plaintiff argues the causes of 

action against Defendants did not accrue until the criminal charges against Plaintiff were 

dismissed on April 3, 2013, because it is then he realized that he had done nothing wrong 

and Defendants had acted without legal authority in arresting him. 

 Plaintiff argues that the question of accrual, which is based on Plaintiff’s 

knowledge of the damage and cause, should be left to the jury. A statute of limitations 

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defense can be raised and resolved on a motion to dismiss if it is evident from the face of 

the complaint that a claim is time barred. Anson v. Am. Motors Corp., 747 P.2d 581, 582, 

155 Ariz. 420, 421 (Ct. App. 1987). The cases cited by Plaintiff are not to the contrary; 

rather, they involved factual scenarios where the application of the limitations defense 

was a question of fact and was not evident from the face of the complaint. See Cervantez 

v. Graham Cnty, No. CV-10-0419-TUC-CKJ, 2011 WL 860329 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 

2011); Walk v. Ring, 44 P.3d 990, 202 Ariz. 310 (2002). To analyze accrual for purposes 

of a motion to dismiss, the Court will take the facts of the Complaint as true and evaluate 

each claim individually. 

 In Claim 2, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Dittiger committed battery by intentionally 

making a harmful or offensive contact with him on January 14, 2013, and causing 

Plaintiff physical injury and mental distress. At the time Defendant Dittiger allegedly 

forcibly detained Plaintiff, dragged him and tightly handcuffed him, Plaintiff knew he 

had been damaged and who had caused the damage. The dismissal of the criminal 

charges is irrelevant to the question of whether Dittiger’s contact was harmful or 

offensive. 

 In Arizona, false imprisonment accrues at the time of arrest. Hansen v. Stoll, 636 

P.2d 1236, 1242, 130 Ariz. 454, 460 (Ct. App. 1981); Rondelli v. Pima Cnty, 586 P.2d 

1295, 1297, 120 Ariz. 483, 485 (Ct. App. 1978). Thus, Claim 3 accrued on January 14, 

2013. 

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 In Claim 4, Plaintiff alleges that, on January 14, 2013,3 Defendants’ forcible 

detention and withholding of medical attention was extreme and outrageous, which 

caused him emotional distress and bodily harm. Because the conduct resulting in the 

alleged harm occurred on January 14, 2013, and Plaintiff was present and aware of the 

injury and by whom it was inflicted, his claim of intentional infliction of emotional 

distress accrued on that date. 

 Claims 5 and 6 allege negligence and gross negligence, respectively, arising out of 

the same actions alleged in Claims 2, 3 and 4. Because these claims are based on the 

same conduct as other claims that the Court has determined accrued on January 14, 2013, 

the same accrual date holds for Claims 5 and 6. 

 After review of each state law claim, it is evident that the dismissal of the criminal 

charges had no bearing on Plaintiff’s knowledge of the alleged damage and cause. All of 

the elements for claims of battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, negligence, and gross negligence were known on January 14, 2013. And Plaintiff 

does not dispute that he was aware of the named defendants’ identities as responsible 

parties.4

 The state causes of action, Claims 2-6, accrued on January 14, 2013, and the 

statute of limitations ran one year from that date, January 14, 2014. Because the 

 

3

 The Complaint actually states that these actions occurred on February 8, 2010. (Doc. 1 at 6.) The Court assumes this to be a typo based on the other information 

contained in the Complaint and the pending motions. 

4

 Plaintiff contends there are other doe defendants of whose identity he is still not 

aware. 

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Complaint was filed on March 27, 2014, after the limitations period had expired, the 

state-law claims against all Defendants are statutorily time-barred. 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

enter an order granting Defendant Dupnik’s Motion to Dismiss and Marana Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss (construed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings). The Magistrate 

recommends dismissing Claims 2-6 with prejudice. However, as to the Eighth 

Amendment allegation in Claim 1 against Sheriff Dupnik, the Court recommends 

dismissing it without prejudice and granting Plaintiff’s request to amend as to that claim. 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the District 

Court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

 Dated this 5th day of September, 2014. 

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