Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-04745/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-04745-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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Case No. 5:13-cv-04745-EJD

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY 

COMPANY OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAUFMAN & BROAD MONTEREY BAY, 

INC.; K&B BAKEWELL SEASIDE 

VENTURE, LLC; AND KB SOUTH BAY, 

INC.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:13-cv-04745-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 52, 54

Presently before the court are Plaintiff Travelers Property Casualty Company of America’s 

(“Plaintiff”) and Defendants Kaufman & Broad Monterey Bay, Inc., K&B Bakewell Seaside 

Venture, LLC, and KB Home South Bay, Inc.’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motions for Partial 

Summary Judgment. The court found these matters suitable for decision without oral argument

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and previously vacated the hearing. Having fully reviewed the 

parties’ briefing, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 

DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff issued nine commercial general liability policies to Norcraft Companies, LLC 

(later Norcraft Companies, L.P.) (“Norcraft”) covering the policy periods between December 2002 

and November 2011. Dkt. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 8. Under the terms of the policies, Plaintiff 

committed to defend Norcraft or an additional insured against lawsuits for bodily injury or 

property damage. Id. at ¶¶ 10-12. The policies also reserved Plaintiff’s right to retain counsel of 

its choosing for the insured’s defense, and the insured was bound to cooperate with Plaintiff. Id.

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Case No. 5:13-cv-04745-EJD

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

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at ¶ 9. 

Defendants hired Norcraft as a subcontractor to perform cabinet work for a residential 

development project in Monterey County, California. Dkt. No. 8-3, Counterclaim at ¶¶ 9, 15. 

Norcraft provided Defendants with certificates of insurance, including two policies that named 

Defendants as an additional insured, to demonstrate that it had obtained comprehensive general 

liability insurance from Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 24. 

In February 2012, homeowners of the Monterey residential development project filed a 

lawsuit in Monterey County Superior Court against Defendants alleging strict product liability, 

breach of contract, and tort causes of action: Davis, et al. v. Kaufman & Broad Monterey Bay, 

Inc., et al., No. M116168 (the “Davis action”). Compl. at ¶ 15; Counterclaim at ¶ 10. In July 

2012, Defendants, through its legal representative Glaspy & Glaspy (the “Glaspy Firm”), tendered 

the Davis action to Plaintiff because it was an additional insured under the Norcraft policies. 

Compl. at ¶ 16; Counterclaim at ¶ 16. Plaintiff agreed to defend Defendants in the Davis action, 

and retained Jennifer Wilhelmi (“Counsel Wilhelmi”) of Clapp, Moroney, Bellagamba, Vucinich, 

Beeman & Scheley (the “Clapp Firm”). Compl. at ¶ 17; Counterclaim at ¶ 17. Defendants 

opposed the appointment of the Clapp Firm because the firm was ethically conflicted from 

representing Defendants since it had represented parties adverse to Defendants in other cases 

pertaining to similar issues as the Davis action. Id. at ¶ 20. 

Plaintiff commenced the instant action in October 2013, alleging that Defendants’ refusal 

of appointed counsel is a material breach of the Norcraft policies and of the implied covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing. Compl. at ¶ 18. Its claims include: (1) declaratory relief—right to 

independent counsel; (2) declaratory relief—duty to defend; (3) breach of contract; and (4) unjust 

enrichment. See Compl. Defendants filed a counterclaim in November 2013, alleging that 

Plaintiff did not intend to provide Defendants with an immediate, full, complete, and conflict-free 

defense because Plaintiff knew about the Clapp Firm’s ethical conflicts. Counterclaim at ¶¶ 20-

21. Its claims include: (1) declaratory relief; (2) breach of contract; and (3) breach of the implied 

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Case No. 5:13-cv-04745-EJD

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

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covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Counterclaim. In November 2014, the parties filed 

the instant cross-motions for partial summary judgment, which have been fully briefed. See Dkt. 

Nos. 52, 54, 86, 87, 102, 103.1 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment should be granted if “there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and 

identifying the portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or 

affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to 

the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate specific materials in the record to 

show that there is a genuinely disputed fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The 

court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment 

is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

However, the mere suggestion that facts are in controversy, as well as conclusory or 

speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers, is not sufficient to defeat summary 

judgment. See Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Instead, 

the non-moving party must come forward with admissible evidence to satisfy the burden. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c); see Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 

1990).

A genuine issue for trial exists if the non-moving party presents evidence from which a

reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that party, could resolve the 

material issue in his or her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986); 

 

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Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to Defendants’ declarations and exhibits in support of their 

motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 89) are DENIED because this opinion does not 

rely on those items of evidence. 

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Case No. 5:13-cv-04745-EJD

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

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Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 1991). Conversely, summary judgment must 

be granted where a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to that party’s case, on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 

III. DISCUSSION

Due to the parties exceeding the page limitation on the motion briefs, the court notified the 

parties that it would not review any material contained in the motions past the 25th page of text.2 

See Dkt. No. 77, Order. Consequently, only the following issues will be addressed: (1) whether 

Plaintiff breached its duty to defend for failing to provide an immediate defense; (2) whether 

Plaintiff breached its duty to defend for failing to provide a complete defense; and (3) whether 

Plaintiff had the right to appoint counsel of its choosing. See Dkt. No. 54, Defendants’ Motion 

(“Def. Mot.”) at 6; Dkt. No. 52, Plaintiff’s Motion (“Pl. Mot.”) at 2.3

A. Plaintiff’s Duty to Defend

An insurer has a duty to defend when an insured tenders its defense of any underlying 

litigation, and any of the claims are at least potentially covered by the insurance policy. Buss v. 

Super. Ct., 16 Cal. 4th 35, 58-59 (1997); Travelers Prop. v. Centex Homes, 2011 WL 1225982, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011) (Breyer, J.). This duty to defend requires that:

[T]he insurer must defend immediately. To defend immediately, it 

must defend entirely. It cannot parse the claims, dividing those that 

are at least potentially covered from those that are not. To do so 

would be time consuming. It might also be futile: The “plasticity of 

modern pleading” allows the transformation of claims that are at 

least potentially covered into claims that are not, and vice versa.

Buss, 16 Cal. 4th at 49 (internal citations omitted). An insurer breaches its duty to defend when it 

fails to provide and immediate and complete defense. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Civil 

 

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Plaintiff’s motion was reviewed through page 13, and Defendants’ motion was reviewed through 

page 18. See Order, Dkt. No. 84. 

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Page numbers refer to the page number in the heading of the PDF document. 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

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Serv. Emp. Ins. Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 26, 35 (1973); Travelers Prop., 2011 WL 1225982, at *3. 

Here, the parties agree that Plaintiff had a duty to defend Defendants in the Davis action. 

See Pl. Mot. at 21-22, Def. Mot. at 20. Thus, the issue is whether Plaintiff breached that duty for 

failing to provide an immediate and complete defense. 

1. Immediate Defense

Defendants move for partial summary judgment on the following issue: Plaintiff breached 

the insurance contract by breaching its duty to provide Defendants with an immediate defense of 

the Davis action. Def. Mot. at 6. The duty of providing an immediate defense “aris[es] on tender 

of defense and last[s] until the underlying lawsuit is concluded or until it has been shown that 

there is no potential for coverage.” Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 6 Cal. 4th 287, 295 

(1993); Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Centex Homes, 2012 WL 1657121, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

May 10, 2012) (Conti, J.). “The determination whether the insurer owes a duty to defend usually 

is made in the first instance by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the 

policy.” Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 4 Cal. 4th 1076, 1081 (1993). However, “an insurer 

must reasonably investigate to determine if a duty to defend exists.” Travelers Prop., 2011 WL 

1225982, at *4; see Cal. Shoppers Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 1, 38 (1985). 

“Thus, where an insured tenders an underlying action but fails to provide the insurer with 

necessary information relevant to a coverage determination, then the insurer need not defend the 

action upon tender.” Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Centex Homes, 2013 WL 1411135, at *2

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2013) (Conti, J.). 

Here, on July 6, 2012, the Glaspy Firm provided Plaintiff with a notice of tender and a 

copy of the Davis action complaint that was filed on February 8, 2012. See Dkt. No. 55-5, Exh. 

15. On July 20, Plaintiff’s senior technical specialist Pamela Colouris (“Colouris”) sent a letter to 

the Glaspy Firm acknowledging the tender, and informing the Glaspy Firm that in order to 

complete her investigation, she needed a copy of the subcontract between Norcraft and 

Defendants. See Dkt. No. 58, Declaration of Pamela Colouris (“Colouris Decl.”) at ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 

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Case No. 5:13-cv-04745-EJD

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

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71, Exh. D. The Glaspy Firm did not respond to this request, thus on October 29, Colouris again 

contacted the Glaspy Firm. See Colouris Decl. at ¶¶ 7-8; Dkt. No. 71, Exh. E. On the same day, 

the Glaspy Firm emailed the requested subcontract to Colouris. See Colouris Decl. at ¶ 9; Dkt. 

No. 71, Exh. E. On November 7, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Glaspy Firm stating that it would 

defend Defendants in the Davis action. See Colouris Decl. at ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 74, Exh. G. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff should have appointed counsel on July 6, when Plaintiff received 

the tender. Def. Mot. at 21. Since Plaintiff did not agree to appoint counsel until November 7, 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to provide an immediate defense. Id. 

When examined under the authorities cited above, the undisputed facts demonstrate that 

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of failure to provide an immediate 

defense. Although the parties agree that Plaintiff was ultimately obligated to defend Defendants 

against the Davis action, the facts show that Plaintiff’s duty did not arise until Plaintiff was 

provided with all of the information necessary to determine the existence of coverage. Indeed, 

without a copy of the subcontract between Norcraft and Defendants, Plaintiff could not confirm 

that Defendants were named as additional insureds on the policies Plaintiff issued to Norcraft. 

Since Defendants’ counsel, the Glaspy Firm, did not provide the subcontract to Plaintiff until 

October 29, 2012, the court finds that the duty to defend did not arise until that date and not on 

July 6, 2012, when the Glaspy Firm provided Plaintiff with a copy of the Davis action complaint. 

Furthermore, since Plaintiff notified the Glaspy Firm that it had accepted the tender approximately 

one week after receiving a copy of the subcontract, Defendants cannot demonstrate that Plaintiff 

failed to provide an immediate defense. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion on this issue is 

DENIED. 

2. Complete Defense

Defendants also move for partial summary judgment on the following issue: Plaintiff 

breached the insurance contract by breaching its duty to provide Defendants with a complete 

defense of the Davis action. Def. Mot. at 6. Defendants assert two arguments. 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

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First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to provide a complete defense because it 

included extensive limitations upon its duty to defend in its reservation of rights letter. Id. at 23. 

The reservation of rights letter provides that Plaintiff reserves its rights to: (1) amend or 

supplement the reservation of rights letter; (2) withdraw its defense if coverage does not apply to 

the claims; and (3) seek contribution from Defendant for uncovered claims in connection with 

settlements, or satisfaction of judgments obtained against Defendant. See Dkt. No. 56, Exh. 18. 

In its motion, however, Defendants do not explain in their one-sentence paragraph how these 

provisions violate Plaintiff’s duty to provide a complete defense, and the court does not find they 

violate the duty on their face. See Def. Mot. at 23. Thus, given the incompleteness of the 

argument on this issue, the court will not consider it further. 

Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff entered into a secretly negotiated settlement 

agreement with plaintiffs’ counsel in the Davis action, excluding Defendants and Defendants’ 

counsel, the Glaspy Firm, from those negotiations. Def. Mot. at 23; Dkt. No. 54-3, Declaration of 

Mary Kay Glaspy (“Glaspy Decl.”) at ¶ 11. On this issue, the parties agree that Plaintiff reached a 

settlement of the claims covered by the Norcraft subcontract and then withdrew from the Davis

action once those claims were settled. What they dispute is whether Plaintiff failed to provide a 

complete defense because it excluded Defendants from the settlement negotiations for the covered 

claims. 

“An insurer that owes a duty to defend an insured, arising because there exists a potential 

for liability under the policy, has the right to control defense and settlement of the third party 

action against its insured, and is a direct participant in the litigation.” Swanson v. State Farm Gen. 

Ins. Co., 219 Cal. App. 4th 1153, 1162 (internal quotations omitted). “‘In general, the insurer is 

entitled to control settlement negotiations without interference from the insured.’” Seltzer v. 

Barnes, 182 Cal. App. 4th 953, 966-67 (2010) (quoting W. Polymer Tech., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. 

Co., 32 Cal. App. 4th 14, 24 (1995)). “‘As a result, an insurer normally cannot be liable to the 

insured if the insurer does no more than settle a claim or suit within the policy’s limits.’” Id. In 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

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addition, an insurer may settle a claim without informing the insured of the settlement, or over an 

insured’s objection. See New Plumbing Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, Sooy & Byron, 99 Cal. 

App. 4th 799, 802 (2002). An insurer, however, cannot further its own interests by settling a 

claim without the insured’s consent, such as when the insurer’s settlement eliminates the insured’s 

chances for compensation for personal injuries or when the insurer’s claims adjustment practices 

results in an increase in premium revenue from the insured. W. Polymer Tech., Inc., 32 Cal. App. 

4th at 26. 

Here, the undisputed facts show that in October 2014, Plaintiff entered into a settlement 

agreement with the Davis action plaintiffs. See Dkt. No. 56-1, Exh. 22. Defendants did not learn 

of the agreement until after the settlement had been reached. See Glaspy Decl. at ¶ 11. After the 

settlement, Plaintiff withdrew the defense of the Davis action, which Defendants argue left them to 

absorb unpaid balances for defense fees and costs incurred by Defendants’ counsel. Def. Mot. at 

23-24. As a result, Defendants argue that Plaintiff provided an incomplete defense because it 

settled only a portion of the claims asserted against Defendants, and abandoned Defendants to 

defend itself against the remaining claims. Id. at 24. 

Defendants’ arguments, however, are unpersuasive based on this record. Since it is 

undisputed that Plaintiff had the duty to defend, Plaintiff had the right to control settlement 

negotiations of the covered claims without Defendants’ participation. That Plaintiff settled only 

the claims that arose out of the work of Norcraft does not make the settlement improper, nor does 

it indicate that Plaintiff furthered its own interests, and Defendants have not shown that it 

experienced increased defense fees and costs—outside of what it would have otherwise incurred—

due to Plaintiff’s withdrawal from the Davis action. 

Since Plaintiff fulfilled its contractual duty to defend Defendants against all claims arising 

out of the work of Norcraft, the court finds that Plaintiff did provide a complete defense. See W. 

Polymer Tech., Inc., 32 Cal. App. 4th at 27 (“A liability insurance policy’s purpose is to provide 

the insured with a defense and indemnification for third party claims within the scope of the 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

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coverage purchased, and not to insure the entire range of the insured’s well-being.”). Accordingly, 

Defendants’ motion on this issue is DENIED. 

B. Plaintiff’s Right to Appoint Counsel 

Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on the following issue: Plaintiff is entitled to 

a declaration that it has the right to appoint counsel of its choosing. Pl. Mot. at 2. Due to the 

restriction on the brief’s page limit, Plaintiff only had the opportunity to argue that the insurance 

policy provides Plaintiff with the right to control the defense, and that Plaintiff did not forfeit that 

right. Id. at 21-25. In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff forfeited its right to appoint 

counsel because it failed to provide an immediate and complete defense. Dkt. No. 85, Defendants’ 

Opposition at 19. 

When the insured tenders a defense, the insurer “will provide a defense and control the 

litigation with the full cooperation of the insured.” Truck Ins. Exch. v. Unigard Ins. Co., 79 Cal. 

App. 4th 966, 979 (2000); Travelers Prop., 2011 WL 1225982, at *6. “The right to control the 

defense generally includes the right to select defense counsel.” Id. Here, Defendants’ motion has 

been denied as to the issues of failure to provide an immediate or complete defense since the 

undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff satisfied both duties. With that result, Defendants 

cannot show that Plaintiff forfeited its right to control the defense. Accordingly, the court finds 

that Plaintiff had the right to appoint counsel of its choosing. Plaintiff’s motion as to this issue is,

therefore, GRANTED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing:

1. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiff 

breached the insurance contract by failing to provide Defendants with an immediate 

defense is DENIED. 

2. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiff

breached the insurance contract by failing to provide Defendants with a complete 

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

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defense is DENIED. 

3. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment for a declaration that it had the 

right to appoint counsel of its choosing is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 11, 2015 

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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