Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02639/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02639-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PETER DYACHISHIN AND GALINA 

DYACHISHIN, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

AMERICA’S WHOLESALE LENDERS; 

COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL 

CORPORATION; RECONTRUST 

COMPANY; BANK OF AMERICA 

CORPORATION; WASHINGTON MUTUAL 

BANK; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. and 

DOES 1-50 inclusive, 

 Defendants. 

______________________________/

 

Case No. 2:09-CV-02639-JAM-GGH

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant JPMorgan 

Chase Bank, N.A., an acquirer of certain assets and liabilities 

of Washington Mutual Bank, (“Defendant’s”), Amended Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Peter and Galina Dyachishin’s 

(“Plaintiffs’”) Complaint (“Complaint”) for failure to state a 

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claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

(Doc. #18). Plaintiffs oppose the motion.1 (Doc. #27). 

Multiple defendants in this case filed motions to dismiss. 

(Doc. #11, #18). Plaintiffs filed one opposition. (Doc. #27). It 

is unclear to which defendants motion this opposition was 

intended to oppose. On the docket, Plaintiffs filed this as an 

opposition to Defendant’s amended motion to dismiss. (Doc. #27). 

Thus, the court will treat it as such. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 In February 2007, Plaintiffs obtained a mortgage loan to 

refinance their residential property located at 8280 Mariposa 

Avenue, Citrus Heights, CA 95610 (“subject property”). The terms 

of the loan were memorialized in the promissory Note which was 

secured by a Deed of Trust on the subject property. The lender 

was America’s Wholesale Lenders (“AWL”), not a party to this 

motion. 

In July 2007, Plaintiffs obtained a Home Equity Line of 

Credit on the subject property. The terms of the loan were 

memorialized in the promissory Note which was secured by a Deed 

of Trust on the subject property. Defendant was the lender. 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).

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Plaintiffs did not understand the terms of the loan and allege 

that Defendant mislead them. 

On or about February 21, 2008, Plaintiffs deeded their 

interest in the subject property to Andrey Dyachishin and 

Tatyana Dyachishin. Plaintiffs now bring the present lawsuit 

alleging violations of state and federal law. 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to 

dismiss, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint 

as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1975), 

overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 

(1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Assertions that 

are mere “legal conclusions,” however, are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 

(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007)). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to plead 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Dismissal is appropriate 

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where the plaintiff fails to state a claim supportable by a 

cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Upon granting a motion to dismiss, a court has discretion 

to allow leave to amend the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 15(a). “Dismissal with prejudice and without 

leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear . . . that 

the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Eminence 

Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F. 3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

Generally, the Court may not consider material beyond the 

pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state 

a claim. There are two exceptions to this rule: when material is 

attached to the complaint or relied on by the complaint, or when 

the court takes judicial notice of matters of public record, 

provided the facts are not subject to reasonable dispute. 

Sherman v. Stryker Corporation, 2009 WL 2241664 at *2 (C.D. Cal. 

Mar. 30, 2009) (internal citations omitted). Here, Defendant 

requests judicial notice of the loan documents in connection 

with the first mortgage and HELOC, and the Grant Deed (“Grant 

Deed”) to Andrey Dyachishin and Tatyana Dyachishin. Plaintiffs 

do not dispute the authenticity of these documents, all of which 

are either matters of public record or relied on by the 

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Complaint. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice as 

requested. 

B. Federal Law Claims

I. Violation of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)

In the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs 

raise the argument that Defendant violated the Truth in Lending 

Act, (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq., thereby seeking 

rescission and damages. “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal. . . is the complaint. This precludes the 

consideration of new allegations that may be raised in 

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6).” Cordell v. Tilton, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1128 

(S.D. Cal. 2007)(internal citations omitted). Because the TILA 

allegation was first raised in the Opposition, the Court will 

not consider this cause of action. 

II. Violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act

(“RESPA”)

Within the fourth and fifth causes of action, Plaintiffs 

allege that Defendant violated RESPA, 12 U.S.C. §§2601-17, by 

failing to comply with disclosure requirements and engaging in 

unlawful business acts. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failed 

to state a claim under RESPA because the Complaint does not 

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allege any facts to support this claim. In the Opposition, 

Plaintiffs merely restate that Defendant failed to comply with 

RESPA. 

Plaintiffs’ broad and conclusory allegation that Defendant 

failed to comply with RESPA is without merit. Without stating 

specific sections that Defendant violated or any facts to 

support the allegation, the Court cannot analyze this cause of 

action. Accordingly, the RESPA is dismissed, with prejudice. 

C. State Law Claims

I. Quiet Title 

To allege a cause of action to quiet title, the complaint 

must state (1) a legal description of the property; (2) the 

title of the plaintiff and the basis of the title; (3) the 

adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff; (4) the date as of 

which the determination is sought; and (5) a prayer for the 

determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse 

claims. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 761.020. 

Here, Plaintiffs’ claim fails because Plaintiffs do not 

have title to the subject property. Plaintiffs deeded their 

entire interest in the subject property to Andrey Dyachishin and 

Tatyana Dyachishin in February 2008. Therefore, Plaintiffs 

cannot allege title to the subject property. The claim for quiet 

title is dismissed, with prejudice. 

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II. Rescission Based on Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 1632

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant provided loan documents in 

the English language, in spite of the fact that Plaintiffs’ 

primary language is Slavic. Civil Code § 1632 requires that “any 

person engaged in a trade or business who negotiates primarily 

in Spanish, Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, or Korean, ... in the 

course of entering into any of the following, shall deliver to 

the other party to the contract ... a translation of the 

contract or agreement in the language in which the contract or 

agreement was negotiated ...” This includes “loan[s] ... secured 

other than by real property.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1632(b)(2). Thus, 

Section 1632 generally does not apply to loans secured by real 

property. 

Moreover, Section 1632 does not require Defendant to 

translate documents into Slavic. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to state 

a claim under Section 1632. Accordingly, the claim for 

rescission based on Section 1632 is dismissed, with prejudice. 

III. Rescission Based on Fraud (Non-Disclosure)

Plaintiffs allege that their loan should be rescinded due 

to fraud. A contract may be rescinded if the consent of the 

party rescinding was obtained through fraud or mistake. Cal. 

Civ. Code § 1689(b)(1). “In all averments of fraud or mistake, 

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the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated 

with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge and other 

condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.” Fed. 

R. Civ. Proc. 9(b). A claim of fraud must have the following 

elements: “(a) a misrepresentation (false representation, 

concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or 

‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; 

(d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” In re 

Estate of Young, 160 Cal. App. 4th 62, 79 (2008) (quoting Lazar 

v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has “interpreted 

Rule 9(b) to mean that the pleader must state the time, place 

and specific content of the false representations as well as the 

identities of the parties to the misrepresentation. Alan Neuman 

Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F. 2d 1388, 1393 (9th Cir. 

1988). 

Plaintiffs have not alleged fraud with the required 

particularity to state a plausible claim for relief. Nowhere in 

the Complaint do Plaintiffs describe the facts of the alleged 

fraud, other than making vague legal conclusions that they were 

mislead regarding the loan terms. Accordingly, the fraud claim 

is dismissed, with prejudice. 

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IV. Unfair Debt Collection Practices

 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violation the Rosenthal 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”). The RFDCPA limits 

debt collection agencies and creditors’ ability to collect 

debts. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788, et seq. Plaintiffs allege that 

Defendant, through its actions, violated the RFDCPA. These 

allegations are mere legal conclusions. Plaintiffs do not allege 

specific actions by Defendant that amount to threats to collect 

debt. 

Moreover, Plaintiffs have failed to provide support 

demonstrating that the RFDCPA applies to the Defendant in this 

case, as it is impossible to support a claim under the FDCPA 

based on foreclosure of a residential mortgage. See Fuentes v. 

Duetsche Bank, 2009 WL 1971610 (S.D. Cal. July 8, 2009) 

(granting defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 

“[s]ince a residential mortgage is not a debt and a home 

foreclosure is not debt collection within the meaning of the 

statute”); Gamboa v. Trustee Corps, 2009 WL 656285 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 12, 2009). Accordingly, the claim for unfair debt 

collection practices is dismissed, with prejudice. 

V. Unfair Business Practices

The California Business & Professions Code § 17200 

prohibits unfair competition including any “unlawful, unfair or 

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fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, 

untrue or misleading advertising.” This statute has a “broad 

scope that allows for ‘violations of other laws to be treated as 

unfair competition that is independently actionable’ while also 

‘sweep[ing] within its scope acts and practices not specifically 

proscribed by any other law.’” Hauk v. JP Morgan Chase Bank 

USA, 552 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kasky v. Nike, 

Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 949 (2002)). While the statute is broad 

in scope, Plaintiff must still plead his claim so as to 

establish a violation of the “other law” or unfair practice in 

question. See Constantini v. Wachovia Mortg. FSB, No. 09-406, 

2009 WL 1810122 at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2009) (citing Walker

v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1158, 1169-70 

(2002)). 

Here, Plaintiffs allege unfair competition based on failure 

to comply with disclosure requirements of California Civil Code 

§ 1632, RFDCPA, Federal Fair Debt Collections Act and RESPA. As 

mentioned above, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for any 

of these causes of action. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ cause of 

action for unfair business practices is dismissed, with 

prejudice. 

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VI. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

“The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary 

duty are: 1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; 2) a breach of 

the fiduciary duty; and 3) resulting damage.” Pellegrini v. 

Weiss, 165 Cal. App. 4th 515, 524 (2008). In the lending 

context, “financial institutions owe no duty of care to a 

borrower when the institution’s involvement in the loan 

transaction does not exceed the scope of its convention role as 

a mere lender of money.” Nymark v. Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan 

Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1096 (1991). Although California 

law imposes a fiduciary duty on a mortgage broker, no such duty 

is imposed on a lender. Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. 

App. 3d 465, 476 (1989). 

Plaintiffs do not state a claim for breach of fiduciary 

duty. Defendant is the “mere lender of money” in this case and 

holds no fiduciary duty towards Plaintiffs. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty is dismissed, 

with prejudice. 

VII. Declaratory Relief 

Plaintiffs’ tenth cause of action requests declaratory 

relief in order for Plaintiffs to ascertain their right under 

the contract and to determine Defendant’s right to proceed with 

the non-judicial foreclosure. 

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“Declaratory relief is only appropriate (1) when the 

judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling 

the legal relations in issue, and (2) when it will terminate and 

afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy 

giving rise to the proceeding.” Guerra v. Sutton, 783 F.2d 1371, 

1376 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim to meet these 

criteria. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ tenth cause of action for 

declaratory relief is dismissed, with prejudice. 

VIII. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs’ tenth cause of action also requests injunctive 

relief in the form of a preliminary injunction for the sale of 

the subject property and permanent injunction preventing 

Defendant from engaging in wrongful conduct in the future. 

“It is appropriate to deny an injunction where there is no 

showing of reasonable probability of success, even though the 

foreclosure will create irreparable harm, because there is no 

justification in delaying that harm where, although irreparable, 

it is also inevitable.” Jessen v. Keystone Savings & Loan 

Ass’n., 142 Cal. App. 3d 454, 459 (1983). Here, Plaintiffs have 

not paid the debt secured on the loan, nor have they shown a 

reasonable probability of success on the merits, as indicated 

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above. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ tenth cause of action for 

injunctive relief is dismissed, with prejudice. 

III. ORDER

 For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss is hereby GRANTED, WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 14, 2010 

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