Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01998/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01998-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 STEPHEN DRAGASITS,

CDCR #AX-5810,

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01998-BEN-JLB

12 ORDER: Plaintiff,

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(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[Docket No. 3]

vs. 14

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA; RJDCF;

CLARK KELSO; DR. JIN YU; DR. R.

WALKER; DR. S. ROBERTS; M.

GLYNN; DR. DAVID GULDOETH; J.

LEWIS; D. VAN BUREN; DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

16 (2) DISMISSING CLAIMS AND

DEFENDANTS FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM AND FOR

SEEKING MONETARY DAMAGES

AGAINST IMMUNE DEFENDANTS

[Docket No. 1];

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3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO

EFFECT SERVICE OF SUMMONS

AND COMPLAINT ON REMAINING

DEFENDANTS

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Stephen Dragasits (“Plaintiff’), a prisoner incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a

Civil Rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiff claims

the State ofCalifornia, several RJD health care officials, and a Deputy Director ofthe

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CDCR’s Health Care Services Appeals Branch, denied his Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to medical treatment and due process while he has been incarcerated

at RJD. Additionally, Plaintiffhas filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”).

(Docket No. 3.)

I. Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court ofthe

United States, except an application for writ ofhabeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiffs failure to

prepay the entire fee only ifhe is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes. 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v.

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Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,”

Bruce v. Samuels,

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U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless ofwhether his action is ultimately dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore. 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir.

2002).

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Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a

“certified copy ofthe trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the

6-month period immediately preceding the filing ofthe complaint.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of(a) the average

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution

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i In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule ofFees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff.

Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed

IFP. Id.

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having custody ofthe prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% ofthe

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(2); Bruce. 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support ofhis IFP motion, Plaintiffhas submitted a certified copy of his prison

trust account statements, as well as a prison certificate, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(2) and S.D. Cal. CrvLR 3.2. Andrews. 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements

shows that Plaintiffhad an available balance of zero at the time offiling. Therefore, the

Court assesses no initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However,

the Court directs the Secretary ofthe California Department ofCorrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or his designee, to instead collect the entire $350 balance of

the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk ofthe Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding Plaintiffs IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the PLRA

also requires the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions ofparole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a complaint,

which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants

who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith. 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson. 621

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiffhas failed to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard

applied in the context offailure to state a claim under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to reliefthat is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal.

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm. 680 F.3d at 1121.

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals ofthe elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on itsjudicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility ofmisconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed

me accusation^]” fall short ofmeeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v.

U.S. Secret Service. 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations ofmaterial fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language ofFederal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretzv. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.l (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not

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“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. ofRegents

ofthe University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiffs Allegations

Plaintiff has filed a forty-one (41) page Complaint in which he names ten (10)

defendants and attaches over 300 pages of exhibits. (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that

he suffers from several arthritic ailments as well as “syncope.” (Id at 26.) In his

Complaint, plaintiff alleges that he filed a grievance on May 12, 2015 against his primary

RJD physician, Dr. Yu, claiming that Yu failed to reissue a “lower bunk/extra mattress”

chrono that plaintiffhad received at a prison where he was previously housed. (Id. at 13-

14.) Yu denied plaintiffs grievance. (Id at 14.) On June 9, 2015, Defendant Robert

Walker, denied plaintiffs grievance at the first level ofmedical review. (Id.) On August

14, 2015, Defendants Roberts and Glynn denied plaintiffs grievance at the second level

ofreview and J. Lewis, deputy director ofthe CDCR’s Health Care Services Appeals

Branch denied plaintiffs grievance at the final level ofreview on October 12, 2015. On

August 21, 2015, plaintiff claims that he fell off his top bunk and injured his knee and

hip. (Id. at 16.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiffmust allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws ofthe United States was

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the

color ofstate law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030,

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

D. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

As an initial matter, the Court finds that to the extent Plaintiffnames the State of

California or RJD as Defendants in this action, his claims must be dismissed sua sponte

pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim and

for seeking damages against defendants who are immune. The State ofCalifornia’s

Department ofCorrections and Rehabilitation and any state prison, correctional agency,

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sub-division, or department under its jurisdiction, are not “persons” subject to suit under

§ 1983. Groten v. California. 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hale v. State of

Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387,1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department of

corrections is an arm ofthe state, and thus, not a “person” within the meaning of

§ 1983)). In addition, to the extent that plaintiffseeks to sue the State ofCalifornia itself

for monetary damages, his claims are clearly barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See

Alabama v. Pugh. 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (“There can be no doubt...

that [a] suit against the State and its Board ofCorrections is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment, unless [the State] has consented to the filing ofsuch a suit.”).

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiffseeks monetary damages against the State of

California or RJD, these claims are dismissed without leave to amend.

E. Individual Liability

Plaintiffnames Clark Kelso, the medical receiver for the CDCR, on the first page

of his Complaint. However, nowhere in the body ofhis pleading does he include “further

factual enhancement” which describes when, how, or to what extent, Defendant Kelso

actually caused him constitutional injury. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twomblv. 550

U.S. at 557). Plaintiffprovides each party’s general job description and title, but

“[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, [he] must plead that each

government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated

the Constitution.” Id- at 676; see also Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency of

City ofLos Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (even pro se plaintiffmust “allege

with at least me degree ofparticularity overt acts which defendants engaged in” in order

to state a claim).

Plaintiff has offered no detail from which the Court might reasonably infer a

plausible claim for reliefbased on a violation of any constitutional right as to Defendant

Kelso. See Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 678 (noting that Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 “demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and that “[t]o survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

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‘state a claim for reliefthat is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555, 570).

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Thus, for this reason alone, the Court finds Plaintiffs Complaint sets forth no facts

which might be liberally construed to support any sort ofindividualized constitutional

claim Defendant Kelso. Accordingly, the claims against Kelso must be dismissed on this

basis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez. 203 F.3d at 1126-

27; Rhodes. 621 F.3d at 1004.

Eighth Amendment Medical Claims

Plaintiff claims that his primary physicians, along with the doctors who responded

to his administrative grievances, failed to provide him with adequate medical care. “The

government has an ‘obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by

incarceration,’ and failure to meet that obligation can constitute an Eighth Amendment

violation cognizable under § 1983.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir.

2014) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble. 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976)). “In order to prevail on

an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care, a plaintiffmust show

‘deliberate indifference’ to his ‘serious medical needs.’” Id.

“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner ‘must satisfy both the

objective and subjective components of a two-part test.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d

1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). “To meet the objective element ofthe standard, a plaintiff

must demonstrate the existence of a serious medical need.” Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066.

“Such a need exists iffailure to treat the injury or condition ‘could result in further

significant injury’ or cause ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction ofpain.’” Id. To meet

the subjective element ofthe standard, a plaintiffmust demonstrate “(a) a purposeful act

or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by

the indifference.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “A prison official

is deliberately indifferent under the subjective element ofthe test only ifthe official

‘knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’” Colwell. 763

F.3d at 1066.

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First, “[b]ecause society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access

to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment

violation only ifthose needs are ‘serious.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992),

citing Estelle. 429 U.S. at 103-04. At this stage ofthe proceedings, the Court will

presume plaintiffs claims regarding his health care needs are sufficient to plead an

objectively serious medical need. The Court also finds that plaintiffhas stated claims as

to Defendants Yu, Walker, Roberts, Glynn and Lewis sufficient to survive the “low

threshold” for proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm v. Rotman. 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir.

2012).

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Complaint still fails to include any further “factual content” to show that Defendants

Guldoeth or Gines2, acted with “deliberate indifference” to his needs. Jett v. Penner, 439

F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678.

With respect to Dr. Guldoeth, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Guldoeth “confirmed his

disability” and on December 28, 2015 wrote a “permanent chrono” for plaintiffproviding

him with a lower bunk. (Docket No. 1 at 19.) He further alleges that Dr. Guldoeth

requested an “orthopedic consult” for plaintiff on January 6, 2016. As for Defendant

Gines, plaintiff claims he “spoke to [Defendant Gines” on several occasions in August of

2015 informing Defendant Gines of his various ailments. There are no allegations that

Defendant Gines refused to treat plaintiff or provide him with medical care.

Plaintiffs Complaint lacks the “further factual enhancement” which demonstrates

that Defendants Guldoeth or Gines made any “purposeful act or failure to respond” to his

pain or possible medical need. Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678, citing Twomblv, 550 U.S. at 557;

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following in which he identifies individual defendants. However, Plaintiffrefers to a Defendant “Gines”

in the body ofthe Complaint itself. (See Docket No. 1 at 24-25.) 28

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Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012), citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

This is because to be deliberately indifferent, a defendant’s acts or omissions must

involve more than an ordinary lack of due care. Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs claim against Defendants Gines or

Guldoeth fails to state an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim and is

subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

§ 1915A(b)(l).

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8 Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Finally, plaintiff also seeks to bring a due process claim based on the manner in

which Defendants responded to his administrative grievances. The Ninth Circuit has held

that inmates have no protected property interest in an inmate grievance procedure arising

directly from the Due Process Clause. See Ramirez v. Galaza. 334 F.3d 850, 869 (9th

Cir. 2003) (“[Ijnmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison

grievance procedure”) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding

that the due process clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment creates “no legitimate claim of

entitlement to a [prison] grievance procedure”)). Even the non-existence of, or the failure

ofprison officials to properly implement, an administrative appeals process within the

prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. Mann, 855 F.2d at 640.

Moreover, Plaintiffpleads no facts to suggest how Defendants’ allegedly

inadequate review or failure to consider inmate grievances restrained his freedom in any

way, or subjected him to any “atypical” and “significant hardship.” Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Therefore, Plaintiffs due process allegations arising from the

filing of his administrative grievances are dismissed for failing to state a claim. Because

Plaintiff is seeking to hold Defendant Van Buren liable for the rejection ofhis

administrative grievance and does not allege that Van Buren was responsible for any

medical decisions arising from his grievances, Defendant Van Buren is also dismissed

from this action for failing to state a claim upon which reliefmay be granted.

G.

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1 III. Conclusion and Orders

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 3);

2. DIRECTS the Secretary ofthe CDCR, or his designee, to collect from

Plaintiffs prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) ofthe

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk ofthe Court each

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk ofthe Court to serve a copy ofthis Order on Scott

Keman, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4. DISMISSES Defendants State ofCalifornia and “RJDCF” for failure to

state a claim against them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) and

because these Defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment;

5. DISMISSES Defendants Kelso, Guldoeth, Gines, and Van Buren for failure

to state a claim against them 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b);

6. DISMISSES Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment due process claims for

failing to state a claim upon which reliefmay be granted;

7. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to the remaining Defendants in

Plaintiffs Complaint (Docket No. 1) and to send it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S.

Marshal Form 285 for each Defendant. In addition, the Court directs the Clerk to provide

Plaintiffwith a certified copy ofthis Order, and a certified copy of his Complaint so that

he may serve each Defendant. Upon receipt ofthis “IFP Package,” Plaintiffmust

complete the Form 285s as completely and accurately as possible, and return them to the

United States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter

accompanying his IFP package;

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8. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy ofthe Complaint and summons

upon each Defendant as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s. All costs ofservice

will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Crv. P. 4(c)(3);

9. ORDERS the remaining and served Defendants to reply to Plaintiffs

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions ofFederal Rule ofCivil

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b),

and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone

that plaintiffhas a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant is

required to respond); and

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ORDERS after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to serve upon

the named Defendants, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’

counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the

Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiffmust include with every

original document he seeks to file with the Clerk ofthe Court, a certificate stating the

manner in which a true and correct copy ofthat document has been was served on

Defendants or their counsel, and the date ofthat service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any

document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk or

which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon Defendants may be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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24 Dated: November , 2016

HonJRoge^T. Benitez

UnifeaSfates District Judge

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