Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02164/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02164-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Martha L. Woody, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-07-2164-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff brought this action to obtain judicial review of Defendant’s denial of social

security benefits. Dkt. #1. In an order dated June 23, 2008 (Dkt. #20), the Court denied

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #13) and granted Defendant’s motion to

remand for further proceedings (Dkt. #16). The Ninth Circuit reversed with instructions to

remand for an award of benefits. Dkt. #29.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”). Dkt. #32. Defendant has filed no response, and the time

for doing so has expired. See LRCiv 7.2(c), 54.2(b)(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).

Under the EAJA, the Court shall award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party unless the

United States shows that its position was “substantially justified or that special circumstances

make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d

1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001); Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The EAJA

creates a presumption that fees will be awarded to prevailing parties.”). Plaintiff is a

prevailing party because this matter was remanded pursuant to sentence four of the Social

Case 2:07-cv-02164-DGC Document 35 Filed 03/16/10 Page 1 of 2
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Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Dkt. ##1, 20; see Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257 (“An

applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA if the

denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits

ultimately are awarded.”). By not opposing Plaintiff’s motion, Defendant has not carried his

burden of showing that his position in this case was substantially justified or that special

circumstances make an award of fees unjust. Plaintiff is thus entitled to an award under the

EAJA. See 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A); Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257-58.

Plaintiff’s counsel, Mark Caldwell, has filed an affidavit and an itemized statement

of fees showing that he worked 61.7 hours on this case and that the fees total $15,259.05.

Dkt. #34. The Court finds the requested to be reasonable. See LRCiv 54.2(c)(3)(A)-(M)

(listing factors bearing on the reasonableness of a fee award); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 429-30 & n.3 (1983) (same). The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and award her

$15,259.05 in attorney’s fees.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees (Dkt. #32) is granted.

2. Plaintiff is awarded $15,259.05 in attorney’s fees pursuant to Equal Access to

Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.

DATED this 16th day of March, 2010.

Case 2:07-cv-02164-DGC Document 35 Filed 03/16/10 Page 2 of 2