Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Jones v. State of California, 1:04-cv-6566, was

voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff on February 28, 2005; Jones v.

Strangio, 1:04-cv-6567, was dismissed with prejudice on March 16,

2005; Jones v. Strangio, 1:05-cv-00410, was also dismissed with

prejudice on April 20, 2005. Neither of the latter two cases

stated claims cognizable in federal court.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN JONES, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL A. TOZZI et al., 

Defendants.

______________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

1:05-CV-0148 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE RE DISMISSAL (DOC. 18);

GRANTING DEFENDANTS TOZZI and

HOLLENBACK’S MOTION TO

DISMISS (DOC. 8); DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

DEFAULT JUDGMENT (DOC. 14);

AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

(DOC. 16)

I. INTRODUCTION

This case, one of four filed in this court by Plaintiff

Melvin Jones regarding his family law case in state court,1 was

transferred to this court on March 16, 2005, as a related case. 

See Doc. 15, filed March 21, 2005. On March 29, 2005, Plaintiff

was ordered to show cause why this case should not be dismissed. 

Also before the court are Defendants Tozzi and Silveria’s motion

to dismiss the complaint (Doc. 8, filed Mar. 9, 2005);

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 1 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment as to Defendants

Hollenback and Jensen (Doc. 14, filed Mar. 14, 2005); and

Plaintiff’s motion file a second amended complaint (Docs. 16 & 19

and Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint lodged Apr. 20,

2005).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on February 3, 2005. 

Doc. 1. Then, prior to the filing of any responsive pleading by

Defendant, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on March 3,

2005. Doc. 7. The first amended complaint names as defendants: 

Michael A. Tozzi, the Executive Officer of Stanislaus County

Superior Court; Superior Court Judge Marie Sovey-Silveria; and

attorneys Leslie Jensen and John Holenback. The amended

complaint generally alleges that (1) Defendants’ conduct in

connection with his family law dispute in state court violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory rights in violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) Defendants conspired together to violate

Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory rights, in violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986. Id. To summarize, the complaint

makes the following allegations:

(1) There existed potential conflicts of interest between

several of the Defendants. The failure of Defendants to

disclose these conflicts violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment Rights. Id. at ¶15. 

(2) Defendants’ conduct throughout the family law proceedings

violated various provisions of the California Rules of

Court, State Bar Ethical Standards, and provisions of the

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 2 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 On April 20, 2005, Defendants Jensen and Hollenback

filed a motion to join the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants

Tozzi and Sovey-Silveria. Docs. 25, 26 & 27. Their motion was

not set for hearing, however, because it was improperly noticed. 

See Doc. 30, filed April 20, 2005.

3

California Code of Civil Procedure. As a result,

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Rights were violated. Id.

at ¶¶ 16-33. 

(3) Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Silveria

interrupted a proceeding in the family matter before Judge

Jack Jacobsen and used non-verbal gestures and conduct that

were “sensed and observed by Plaintiff to be harassment,

reprisal [and] retaliatory in furtherance of conspiracy.” 

Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that Michael Tozzi’s issuance

of a declaration in support of Mediator Don Strangio

[presumably one of the declarations submitted to this court

in a related lawsuit] was also in “furtherance of the

conspiracy.” Id. at ¶¶ 33-34.

(4) Plaintiff demands judgment in the amount of $1,600,000 in

damages and $4,100,000 in punitive damages. 

Defendants Tozzi and Silveria moved to dismiss this

complaint on March 9, 2005.2 Doc. 8. Plaintiff opposed this

motion, Doc. 13, filed Mar. 14, 2005, and moved for default

judgment against defendants Jensen and Hollenback. Doc. 14,

filed Mar. 14, 2005. Plaintiff then (improperly) filed an

additional “counter motion” in opposition to Defendants Tozzi and

Silveria’s motion to dismiss, along with a motion to amend the

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 3 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

complaint a second time. Doc. 16, filed Mar. 24, 2005. This

motion to amend is still pending. Four days later, on March 28,

2005, Plaintiff lodged yet another “second amended complaint” to

“supercede” the second amended complaint that was attached to his

motion for leave to amend. Doc. 19, filed Mar. 28, 2005. 

On March 18, 2005, the district court issued an order

dismissing Plaintiffs related case, Jones v. Strangio. See Doc.

72, 1:04-cv-06567. In light of that dismissal, the district

court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be

dismissed as well. Doc. 18, filed Mar. 29, 2005. Plaintiff

responded to the order to show cause on April 20, 2005. Doc. 29. 

At the same time, Plaintiff filed yet another proposed amended

complaint intended to supercede the complaint lodged on March 24,

2005. See Proposed Second Amended Complaint lodged Apr. 20,

2005. This complaint contains numerous new allegations that

Defendants made racially derogatory remarks to plaintiff as part

of a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights in 

contravention of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986. 

Plaintiff bases his response to the order to show cause

almost entirely on the new factual and legal allegations

contained within this proposed second amended complaint. See

Doc. 29, at 1. Plaintiff asserts that:

Dismissal of [this] case at the pleading stage would

give rise to further violation(s) of Plaintiff’s Civil

and Constitutional rights, would foreclose justice to

Plaintiff; and in the case of defaulted defendants’

Jensen, and Hollenback, this Court would be acting as

their de facto attorney, and would give defendants who

have lost their voice a de facto new opportunity to

speak - as such Plaintiff objects. Both said

defendants have failed to answer, and plead their

innocence. 

Id. Plaintiff’s veiled threats against the court will not be

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 4 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

countenanced. He has shown a pattern of suing every attorney,

judge, and quasi-judicial officer who has had any contact with

his case. 

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Child Custody Dispute

This case arises out of a child custody dispute between

Plaintiff and Kea Chhay, the mother of Plaintiff’s minor child. 

Although the record contains limited information about the

underlying family law case, it appears to have first been filed

in Santa Clara Superior Court. During a hearing held on November

15, 2001, the presiding judge in Santa Clara warned Plaintiff

that he would be declared a vexatious litigant if he filed

additional motions in that case. The case was subsequently

transferred to Stanislaus County

Don Strangio, formerly a defendant in Jones v. Strangio,

1:04-CV-06567, and Jones v. Strangio, 1:05-CV-00410, is a

licensed psychologist and marriage and family therapist in the

state of California. Strangio was appointed, as required by law,

by the court to mediate the dispute between Plaintiff and Chhay. 

During the initial mediation session, held July 9, 2002, 

Plaintiff requested a private child custody evaluation. Three

potential evaluators, including Steven Carmichael, also formerly

a defendant in the Jones v. Strangio cases, were identified to

the parties. Of the three, only Carmichael was agreeable to both

parties at the initial mediation. The state court then issued an

order referring the parties to Carmichael, who was appointed to

conduct for a private custody evaluation.

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 5 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

B. The Alleged Conflict of Interest

It is not disputed that Carmichael rents office space, along

with a number of other mental health professionals, in a building

in which Dr. Strangio has a partial ownership interest. 

Carmichael and Strangio, with several other professionals, share

this office space, a common telephone number, and support staff. 

Outside the common office is a sign that reads “Psychological

Associates.” Their practices are independent; there is no comingling of any business-related accounts; they do not file joint

tax returns; Carmichael has no ownership interest in the

building; and the income Strangio realizes from his private

practice is in no way affected by the income Carmichael earns

from his own practice. 

Leslie Jensen served as Ms. Chhay’s attorney in the family

law case. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Strangio counseled Jensen

on at least one occasion regarding personal matters. 

Plaintiff apparently raised some or all of his conflict of

interest objections with the state court. In response to a

letter sent by Plaintiff on May 12, 2003, Defendant Michael A.

Tozzi, the Executive Officer of the Stanislaus Superior Court,

wrote:

It is common for mental health professionals in this

community to rent communal office space and share

overhead expenses/ phone numbers/ and addresses. 

Psychological Associates [is] in an office with ten

professionals including Dr. Carmichael and Dr.

Strangio. However, their practices are independent

from each other. They do not benefit from the work

that the other does. The Court has no concern about a

potential conflict of interest in the situation you

question, nor any other referral by Dr. Strangio. 

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 6 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

When the Court refers a case for private child custody

evaluation, the list of qualified evaluators is limited

to those licensed mental health professionals who have

the specific training required by law.... That list

currently consists of approximately five psychologists,

Licensed Clinical Social Workers, and Marriage and

Family Therapists in addition to the ten independent

contract mediators. Dr. Carmichael is one of those

five who are not associated with the court. 

Dr. Strangio and Dr. Carmichael are publicly listed in

the phone book and had you accepted the referral for

Dr. Carmichael to perform the child custody evaluation

as ordered on October 8, 2002, you would have likely

observed both in the office. There is no attempt to

hide this relationship. 

I trust that this resolves the questions you had. 

Doc. 1, Ex. C. 

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Defendants Tozzi and Silveria’s Motion to Dismiss 

1. Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a court

must “take all of the allegations of material fact stated in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party.” Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979,

983 (9th Cir. 2002). In general, “a pro se complaint will be

liberally construed and will be dismissed only if it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). However, “a liberal

interpretation of a [pro se] complaint may not supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Id. 

2. Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Claims Fail as

a Matter of Law

At the outset, it appears that Plaintiff has attempted to

set forth procedural due process claims that are strikingly

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 7 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

similar to those alleged and dismissed in his previous lawsuits. 

For example, Plaintiff again alleges that a conflict of interest

existed between Don Strangio and Steven Carmichael, the mediator

and custody evaluator, respectively, in Plaintiff’s family law

case. Plaintiff also re-alleges the existence of a conflict

between Defendant Jensen and Strangio. As the district court

explained in Jones v. Strangio:

In the context of Plaintiff’s factual allegations, it

appears that he is essentially arguing that Defendants’

alleged conflict of interest (and Defendants’ failure

to disclose these alleged conflicts) amounts to a

violation of his procedural due process rights under

the United States Constitution. 

***

To state such a claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that

no “meaningful postdeprivation remedy” is available

under state law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

531 (1984) (holding a claim under § 1983 for

deprivation of property without due process invalid

absent a showing that no meaningful postdeprivation

remedy was available). In California, appellate and

post-judgment tort remedies can provide a meaningful

remedy for the violations alleged in Plaintiff’s

complaint. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 900. Plaintiff’s

complaint contains no allegation he has pursued any

state judicial review of those claims or why such

remedies would be inadequate. 

Jones v. Strangio, 1:04-CV-6567, Doc. 72 at 28-29. Plaintiff has

again failed to state a procedural due process claim. He has

utterly failed to plead any facts that suggest he exhausted his

state remedies. As such, his procedural due process claims, if

any are stated, are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

//

//

//

//

//

//

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 8 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Defendants in this action also argue that the RookerFeldman doctrine precludes jurisdiction in this case. As

explained in orders issued in Plaintiff’s related cases, RookerFeldman bars a district court from hearing “challenges to state

court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial

proceedings” or deciding questions “inextricably intertwined”

with state court proceedings. Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). Whether, under the

specific facts alleged in this case, Rooker-Feldman operates as a

bar to this court’s jurisdiction is a close question. As the

claims against Defendants Tozzi and Silveria are easily dismissed

on other grounds, Rooker-Feldman will not be discussed herein.

9

B. Domestic Relations Exception3

The domestic relations exception is a judicially created

doctrine that “divests the federal courts of power to issue

divorce, alimony and child custody decrees.” Ankenbrandt v.

Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). In the Ninth Circuit,

district courts must refuse jurisdiction if the primary issue

concerns child custody issues or the status of parent and child

or husband and wife. See Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.

1987); Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136-37 (9th Cir. 1982). 

The Coats case is most directly on point. In a series of

complaints filed in federal court, the plaintiff in Coats named

as defendants her former husband, his new wife, their attorney,

the court-appointed attorney for their two children, a

court-appointed psychologist, two court commissioners, two

Superior Court judges, the Orange County Superior Court, the

County of Orange Costa Mesa Police Department, the Newport-Mesa

School District, and an organization called United Fathers. 819

F.2d at 236-37. Coates sued these individuals under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, alleging that defendants wrongfully deprived her of the

custody of her two children. The district court abstained from

hearing the cases on the ground that “the actions, involving

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 9 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

child custody, implicated domestic relations issues,

traditionally an area of state concern.” Id. The Ninth Circuit

affirmed, approving the district court’s reliance “on the

abstention doctrine under which federal courts traditionally

decline to exercise jurisdiction in domestic relations cases when

the core issue involves the status of parent and child or husband

and wife.” The Ninth Circuit went on to reason that: 

This case, while raising constitutional issues, is at

its core a child custody dispute....If the

constitutional claims in the case have independent

merit, the state courts are competent to hear them.

Given the state courts' strong interest in domestic

relations, we do not consider that the district court

abused its discretion when it invoked the doctrine of

abstention.

Id. at 237. 

The issue presented is whether plaitniff’s new allegations,

all arising from his child custody dispute in state court, change

the nature of the case to one that is not at its core a child

custody dispute. Reading Plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally,

Plaintiff arguably alleges that Defendants violated his

substantive due process rights: “The Supreme Court has long

protected, under substantive due process principles, the

integrity of the family unit and the right of parents to raise

their children.” Abebe v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir.

2004)(citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 

However, if any such claim is contained in any of the filed or

lodged versions of Plaintiff’s complaints, a district court would

be barred from hearing such a claim by the domestic relations

exception because, in Plaintiff’s case, it directly concerns

child custody issues. Plaintiff’s substantive due process

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 10 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 Defendants Tozzi and Silveria also argue that the

Eleventh Amendment shields them from liability in official

capacity claims brought under § 1983. Plaintiff appears to

concede this and emphasizes that his claims are also brought

against Tozzi and Silveria in their individual capacities.

11

claims, if any are stated, are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction

under the domestic relations exception.

The only possible remaining § 1983 claim is an equal

protection claim that Defendants impeded Plaintiff’s access to

the judicial system because of Plaintiff’s race. Plaintiff also

attempts to allege that Defendants conspired to violate his equal

protection rights in contravention of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. 

Such claims would not be barred by the domestic relations

exception, as they concern Plaintiff’s access to the judicial

system, rather than the subject matter of the underlying family

law dispute. As explained below, however, Plaintiff’s § 1983

claims based on equal protection and his claims under §§ 1985 and

1986 against Defendants Tozzi and Silveria must be dismissed on

other grounds. 

C. Absolute Immunity4

1. Absolute Judicial Immunity of Judge Silveria

The federal courts have long recognized the doctrine of

judicial immunity, a "comparatively sweeping form of immunity”

for acts performed by judges related to the "judicial process.” 

Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988). This immunity is

“absolute” and operates to protect judges against civil claims,

even if it is alleged that such action was “driven by malicious

or corrupt motives.” In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir.

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 11 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

2002); see also Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227-28. Plaintiffs

complaint alleges that Judge Silveria was motivated by such a

“malicious or corrupt motive” -- racial bias. Even assuming all

of Plaintiff’s sweeping, conclusory (and somewhat implausible)

allegations to be true, Judge Silveria is still immune because

she was acting in connection with the judicial process. 

2. Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity of Defendant

Tozzi. 

As established in parallel proceedings, “[a]bsolute judicial

immunity is not reserved solely for judges, but extends to

nonjudicial officers for all claims relating to the exercise of

judicial functions.” Castillo, 297 F.3d at 947 (citing Burns v.

Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part)). The United States Supreme Court is

"quite sparing in [its] recognition of absolute immunity, and

[has] refused to extend it any further than its justification

would warrant." Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429, 433

n.4 (1993). Nevertheless, the "traditional common-law

protections extended to the judicial process,” remain protected. 

Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225. For example, quasi-judicial immunity

has been extended to: 

military and naval officers in exercising their

authority to order courts-martial .... to grand and

petit jurors in the discharge of their duties as such;

to assessors upon whom is imposed the duty of valuing

property for the purpose of a levy of taxes; to

commissioners appointed to appraise damages when

property is taken under the right of eminent domain; to

officers empowered to lay out, alter, and discontinue

highways; to highway officers in deciding that a person

claiming exemption from a road tax is not in fact

exempt, or that one arrested is in default for not

having worked out the assessment; to members of a

township board in deciding upon the allowance of

claims; to arbitrators, and to the collector of customs

in exercising his authority to sell perishable

property, and in fixing upon the time for notice of

sale. 

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 12 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Burns, 500 U.S. at 499-500 (emphasis added). Quasi-judicial

immunity has been extended to “non jurists who perform functions

closely associated with the judicial process.” Castillo, 297

F.3d at 948 (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200

(1985)). 

To determine whether a particular non-judicial officer is

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, a court must “look to the

nature of the function performed and not just the identity of the

actor performing it.” Castillo, 297 F.3d at 949. Specifically,

a court must first “inquire as to the immunity historically

accorded [that official] at common law, during the development of

the common-law doctrine of judicial immunity.” Id. (citing

Antoine, 508 U.S. at 437). The court must then “consider whether

the particular functions of the [official] at issue in the case

were functions involving the exercise of discretionary judgment.” 

Id. The Supreme Court has granted this form of immunity to

certain individuals who have a sufficiently close nexus to the

adjudicative process, including:

(1) prosecutors, when initiating a prosecution and

presenting the state's case, (2) prosecutors, when

taking acts and making decisions in preparation for the

initiation of a prosecution or trial, (3)

administrative law judges and agency hearing officers,

when performing adjudicative functions within a federal

agency, (4) agency officials, when performing functions

analogous to those of a prosecutor, (5) agency

attorneys, in arranging for the presentation of

evidence in the course of an administrative

adjudication, and (6) individuals, when acting within

the scope of their duties, who participate in the

judicial process, such as grand jurors, petit jurors,

advocates, and witnesses.

Castillo, 297 F.3d at 948 (internal citations omitted). 

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 13 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Here, Tozzi, as court executive officer, allegedly sent a

letter to Plaintiff addressing Plaintiffs concern that a conflict

of interest might exist between Don Strangio and Steven

Carmichael. Tozzi determined that no such conflict existed and

informed Plaintiff of this determination. See Doc. 1, Ex. C. 

Tozzi was participating in the judicial process when he made the

determination and sent Plaintiff correspondence on the subject. 

He is entitled to absolute immunity for the acts alleged.

D. Motion for Default Judgment

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on February 3, 2005. 

According to the Proof of service, Defendant Hollenback was

personally served on February 15, 2005, making his answer due

March 7, 2005, while Defendant Jensen was personally served on

February 17, 2005, with her answer due on March 9, 2005. See

Docs. 10 and 11, filed Mar. 14, 2005. Having received no

responsive pleading, Plaintiff moved for default judgment on

March 14, 2005 and set a hearing on the motion for April 11,

2005. Plaintiff did not, however, request that the clerk enter

default against Defendants. On April 5, 2005, Defendants Jensen

and Hollenback filed a joint motion to dismiss the complaint. 

Doc. 20. On April 28, 2005, Jensen and Hollenback filed an

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. Doc. 38. 

Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment must be denied. 

Prior to moving for default judgment, a plaintiff must first

request that the clerk enter default against a defendant. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Only after the entry of default by the

clerk may the court issue default judgment. No default was

entered. 

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 14 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

E. Motion to Amend the Complaint

Plaintiff has established a pattern of filing multiple

complaints without leave to amend and without providing

justification for the amendment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(a) provides:

A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter

of course at any time before a responsive pleading is

served or, if the pleading is one to which no

responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not

been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so

amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.

Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only

by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse

party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so

requires.

Under Rule 15(a), Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is

properly part of the record because it was filed prior to the

filing of a responsive document by any Defendant. However,

Plaintiffs’ proposed second amended complaint lodged on March 24,

2005, and the several proposed second amended complaints lodged

thereafter are not yet part of the record. Plaintiff moved for

leave to amend on March 24, 2005. Doc. 16. Thereafter,

Plaintiff lodged several superceding complaints, the most recent

of which was lodged on April 20, 2005.

A district court shall grant leave to amend freely "when

justice so requires.” However, the Ninth Circuit has outlined

four reasons why a Court may refuse to grant leave to amend: (1)

undue delay; (2) bad faith; (3) futility of amendment; and (4)

prejudice to the opposing party. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114

F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1997).

//

//

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 15 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

1. Standard of Review When Determining Futility

A complaint may be deemed futile if it would fail to state a

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6). 

Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988).

As with a motion to dismiss, a court determining the futility of

the proposed amendment must construe all pleaded facts in the

complaint as true and must draw all inferences in favor of the

plaintiff. 

2. Claims Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint does not mention 

§ 1983, but to the extent that such a claim can be implied from

the facts as alleged, such claims would be futile with respect to

Defendants Jensen and Hollenback. Section 1983 applies only to

individuals acting under color of state law. Jensen and

Hollenback are private individuals, not state actors, and

therefore cannot be liable under § 1983. 

3. Claims Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986

Section 1985 prohibits several forms of conspiracies to

deprive individuals of the rights and privileges held by a

citizen of the United States. Sub-sections 1985(1) and 1985(2),

which deal with conspiracies to impede federal officials in the

performance of their duties and conspiracies to obstruct justice,

do not appear to be applicable on the facts presented. Section

1985(3), entitled “depriving persons of rights or privileges,”

may be applicable to the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s proposed

second amended complaint. Section 1985(3) is divided into three

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 16 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 The first clause of § 1985(3) provides: 

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or

go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another,

for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,

any person or class of persons of the equal protection of

the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the

laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the

constituted authorities of any State or Territory from

giving or securing to all persons within such State or

Territory the equal protection of the laws....

17

parts. The first part prohibits conspiracies to deprive “any

person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or

of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1985(3).5 The second part prohibits conspiracies to interfere

with federal elections, generally Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,

1028 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985), and is not implicated in this case. 

The third clause provides a cause of action in federal court for

the victim of conspiracies prohibited by § 1985(3). 

To state a claim under the first part of §1985(3)

(conspiracies to deprive an individual of equal protection of the

laws or equal privileges and immunities), plaintiff must show

“discriminatory animus.” In other words, Plaintiff must allege

that the conspiracy was motivated by racial discrimination. 

Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1971); see also

Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725 (1983). In addition,

Plaintiff must allege “(1) a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any

person (or class of persons) of the equal protection of the laws,

or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an act

performed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the

conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury, property damage, or a

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 17 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United

States.” Griffen, 403 U.S. at 102-103. 

In the Ninth Circuit, conspiracy claims are subject to a

heightened pleading standard. To survive a motion to dismiss a

conspiracy allegation requires more than a conclusory accusations

that Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his civil

rights. In other words, bare allegations that one defendant

"conspired" with another are insufficient. See Harris v.

Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Buckey v. County

of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Woodrum v.

Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather,

"[t]o state a claim for a conspiracy to violate one's

constitutional rights under section 1983, the plaintiff must

state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed

conspiracy." Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th

Cir.1989); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679

n. 6 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that plaintiffs must allege facts

which are "specific and concrete enough to enable the defendants

to prepare a response, and where appropriate, a motion for

summary judgment based on qualified immunity." Plaintiff may

meet the heightened pleading standard by alleging "which

defendants conspired, how they conspired and now the conspiracy

led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights...." Harris,

126 F.3d at 1196.

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. 

First, Plaintiff appears to allege that defendants violated a

number of state rules of procedure, ethics rules, and rules of

court. Plaintiff asserts that these violations were in

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 18 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

furtherance of the conspiracy. But these violations do not

demonstrate a conspiracy motivated by race discrimination as is

required under § 1985. Plaintiff does allude to race

discrimination in a few factual allegations. For example,

Plaintiff alleges that: 

On 10/08/2002 – Court was not in session, nor was

mediation in session. Plaintiff observed Defendant

Strangio, and co-conspirator Jensen out-side of dept.

13 engaged in conversation. Strangio and Jensen

confirmed to Plaintiff that they were not discussing

Plaintiff’s family law case, and that there [sic]

conversation was non-court related. Defendant

Strangio, and co-conspirator Jensen made comments of

which indicate personal animus, and class-based animus,

and were furtherance of the out of court conspiracy. 

Proposed Second Amended Complaint, at ¶19. In addition,

plaintiff alleges that: 

...Jensen threatened Plaintiff that he would get his

black-ass kicked if he continued to make trouble for

the Court and if Plaintiff continued to [sic] with the

contempt proceedings; said threat, intimidation, was

furtherance of the conspiracy.

Id. at ¶29. Although these accusations mention race

discrimination, Plaintiff fails to allege "which defendants

conspired, how they conspired and how the conspiracy led to a

deprivation of his constitutional rights." Harris, 126 F.3d at

1196. He simply alleges that several of the defendants did or

said things that were, in Plaintiff’s opinion, racially

derogatory. Without more, such comments do not amount to a

conspiracy actionable under § 1985(3). 

Plaintiff also attempts to state claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1986, which provides for recovery of damages against persons

who, having the knowledge and power to do so, fail to prevent the

commission of a conspiracy pursuant to § 1985. But, Plaintiff

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 19 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

cannot maintain a claim under § 1986 unless there is also a valid

claim under § 1985. Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 632 (9th

Cir. 1983); see also Martinez v. Nygaard, 644 F. Supp. 715, 730

(D. Or. 1986). 

Accordingly, the § 1985 and § 1986 claims stated in

plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint are futile as currently

stated because they fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted. 

 

4. Claims Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981

Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint also asserts claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 provides: 

(a) Statement of equal rights. 

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United

States shall have the same right in every State and

Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be

parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal

benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of

persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,

and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,

penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every

kind, and to no other.

(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined

For purposes of this section, the term "make and

enforce contracts" includes the making, performance,

modification, and termination of contracts, and the

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and

conditions of the contractual relationship.

(c) Protection against impairment

The rights protected by this section are protected

against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination

and impairment under color of State law.

42 U.S.C. § 1981. This provision prohibits private individuals

as well as state actors from discriminating against an individual

on the basis of his or her race with respect to that individual’s

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 20 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

right “to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and

equal benefit of all laws...” See General Bldg. Contractors

Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). As with

claims brought under sections 1985 and 1985, section 1981 claims

require proof of intentional race discrimination. 

Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that Defendants

deprived him of his right to sue, his right to be party to a

proceeding, and his right to make and enforce contracts. As

previously discussed few of Plaintiff’s allegations do mention

race as a motivation. Unless a specific exception applies (such

as the heightened pleading standards applicable to a conspiracy

claim), the pleading requirements for a civil rights claim are

not difficult to meet. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506,

510-511 (2002). There is no general requirement that the

plaintiff plead facts establishing a prima facie case of

discrimination. Id. Plaintiff’s proposed second amended

complaint arguably states a claim under § 1981 sufficient to

survive a motion to dismiss. However, because Plaintiff’s § 1985

claim is futile, Plaintiff will not be permitted to file his

lodged proposed second amended complaint. Plaintiff’s motion to

amend the complaint is DENIED.

F. Defendants Hollenback and Jensen’s Pending Motion to

Dismiss

Also pending before the court is Defendants Hollenback’s and

Jensen’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, currently

set for hearing on June 6, 2005. Doc. 32. This motion will

remain on calendar. Plaintiff may not file any amended complaint

until the motion to dismiss has been heard and decided. 

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 21 of 22
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

(1) The order to show cause (Doc. 18) is DISCHARGED.

(2) Defendants Tozzi and Silveria’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED

and Defendants Tozzi and Silveria are DISMISSED AS

DEFENDANTS from this case (Doc. 8). 

(3) Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is DENIED (Doc. 14).

(4) Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint is DENIED (Doc.

16).

(5) Plaintiff may not file any amended complaint until the

pending motion to dismiss (Doc. 32) has been heard and

decided.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 11, 2005 

 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00148-OWW -DLB Document 47 Filed 05/11/05 Page 22 of 22