Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00069/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00069-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Respondent submits that on November 1, 2005, Petitioner was paroled to Region I. (Lodged Doc. 1.) 1

Gary Byrd is the District Administrator of the Region I Parole Office. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Gary Byrd is substituted as Respondent in this action. 

 As Respondent submits, Petitioner filed two additional state post-conviction collateral challenges, both 2

challenged the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations decision to not provide Petitioner with

gastric bypass surgery. This claim was dismissed on March 30, 2006 and, therefore, the petitions relating to that

claim are irrelevant and will not be addressed. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE T. MILLER,

Petitioner,

v.

GARY BYRD, District Administrator of

Region I Parole Office

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-0069 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 20]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

1

 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner pled guilty to possession of cocaine for sale and admitted a number of

sentencing enhancements. On August 16, 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate state

prison term of ten years. (Lodged Doc. 2.) 

Petitioner did not appeal the August 16, 2000, judgment. 

Petitioner did, however, file seven state habeas corpus petitions.2

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On February 26, 2003, Petitioner filed a first petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Lodged Doc. 3.) The petition was denied

on March 6, 2003. (Lodged Doc. 4.)

On March 20, 2003, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. 5.) The petition was denied on November 12, 2003. 

(Lodged Doc. 6.)

Petitioner filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus on April 29, 2004, in the

Stanislaus County Superior Court. (Lodged Doc. 7.) The petition was denied on May 5, 2004. 

(Lodged Doc. 8.)

Petitioner filed a fourth petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of

Appeal on June 23, 2004. (Lodged Doc. 9.) The petition was denied on July 23, 2004. (Lodged

Doc. 10.)

Petitioner filed a fifth petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Stanislaus County Superior

Court on August 11, 2004. (Lodged Doc. 11.) The petition was denied on August 12, 2004. 

(Lodged Doc. 12.)

Petitioner filed a sixth petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of

Appeal, on September 7, 2004. (Lodged Doc. 13.) The petition was denied on September 17,

2004. (Lodged Doc. 14.)

Petitioner filed a seventh petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court on October 28, 2004. (Lodged Doc. 15.) The petition was denied on February 2, 2005. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 31, 2005, in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. By

order of January 9, 2006, the action was transferred to this Court. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being filed outside the one year

limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it "plainly appears from the face

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of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the

district court . . . ." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of

the state’s procedural rules. See e.g. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) th

(using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White

v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a

response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F.

Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)'s one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in

procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state

procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review

Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on November 30, 2005, and thus, it is subject to

the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

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28 The limitations period may begin running later under certain specified circumstances, none of which are 3

applicable here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, Petitioner was sentenced on August 16, 2000, and he did not file an

appeal. Pursuant to Rule 31(a) of the California Rules of Court, Petitioner had sixty (60) days in

which to file a notice of appeal. Cal.R.Ct. 31(a); People v. Mendez, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d, 301, 19

Cal.4th 1084, 969 P.2d 146 (1999). Because Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal his direct

review concluded on October 15, 2000, sixty (60) days after the time for filing an appeal expired. 

Thus, the one-year statute of limitations period commenced running the following day - October

16, 2000. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9 Cir. 2001) (holding that Rule 6(a) of the th

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the calculation of statutory tolling applicable to the one

year limitations period.) Therefore, the statute of limitations expired on October 15, 2001. 3

Petitioner did not file the instant petition until March 31, 2005. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is

tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

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 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original 4

habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order

denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of

Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by

way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 4

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999);

Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the

limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate

level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent the

premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period, however,

will not toll for the time a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

As Respondent correctly argues, although Petitioner filed several state post-conviction

collateral challenges, he did not file any within the limitations period. Petitioner filed the earliest

of the seven state post-conviction challenges on February 26, 2003, over sixteen months after the

statute of limitations expired. (Lodged Doc. 3.) Because the limitations period had already

expired, the collateral challenge had no tolling consequence. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482

(9 Cir. 2001); Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to th

tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256

(11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). Accordingly, neither the

first nor the subsequent state post-conviction collateral challenges extend the statute of

limitations, and the instant petition is untimely. 

D. Equitable Tolling

 The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. 

Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. th

United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60, 139 th

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(1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1288 (9 Cir.), overruled th

in part on other grounds by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9 Cir. th

1998) (en banc) (noting that "[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions

of time will only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of

diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir.1999), citing th

Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541; Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-1289.

Petitioner did not file an opposition and has not presented any grounds for equitable

tolling. Thus, the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is barred by the statute of limitations

and must be dismissed, with prejudice.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition as untimely be GRANTED;

and

2. The instant petition be DISMISSED, with prejudice, and judgment be entered in

favor of Respondent. 

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with 

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the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 29, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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