Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04135/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04135-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Rule 26 authorizes the court to alter the limits on the number of interrogatories and

to issue protective orders to protect a party from undue burden or expense in the discovery

process. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) and 26(c).

*E-filed 10/02/07*

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

21X CAPITAL LTD. and DAVID A. BREWER, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

ROBERT WERRA and JOHN WERRA, 

Defendants.

 /

Case No. C06-04135 JW (HRL)

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION

FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Re: Docket No. 27

In this diversity action, Plaintiffs sue to collect a state court judgment against RJW

Acquisitions, LC ("RJW") from individuals alleged to be alter egos of RJW. Plaintiff 21X

Capital served 25 interrogatories on each Defendant. Defendants move for a protective order on

these interrogatories and suggest that each side be limited to 30 interrogatories. This court has

broad authority to issue protective orders regarding discovery. Gray v. Winthrop Corp., 133

F.R.D. 39, 39 (N.D. Cal. 1990).

DISCUSSION

The Werras admit that a literal reading of FED. R. CIV. P. 33 permits any party to serve

25 interrogatories on any other party, and it is undisputed that Plaintiffs have acted within these

literal terms. In spite of this, Defendants argue that the limiting principles of FED. R. CIV. P. 261

and the facts of this case make a further limitation on Rule 33 appropriate. 

Case 5:06-cv-04135-JW Document 34 Filed 10/02/07 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1) Parties are "nominally separate"

The Werras first argue that a per side limit (as opposed to Rule 33's per party limit) is

appropriate because the parties are nominally separate. Defendants point to commentary and

caselaw which has noted that permitting the maximum number of allowable interrogatories on

each named defendant does not always accord with the purpose of Rule 33's limitation. Citing,

Vinton v. Adam Aircraft Industries, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 650, 664 (D.Colo. 2005); 8A CHARLES

ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 2168.1 (2d ed. 1994). The 25 interrogatory limit per side rule is often applied

when parties to an action are nominally separate. WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, § 2168.1. 

Parties may be considered nominally separate when represented by a single attorney, when

there is unity of action, or when there is a legal relationship between parties. Id. Defendants

contend that a per side limit should be applied here because this is an alter ego case, because

Defendants are nominally separate, or because Plaintiffs are nominally separate. 

Defendants cite caselaw which indicates that the nominally separate doctrine is

particularly appropriate in alter ego cases. Vinton, 232 F.R.D. 650, 664. Defendants reason

that, since Plaintiffs are attempting to collect a judgment under an alter ego theory, the limit

should apply. However, Vinton found the parties to be nominally separate where the individual

defendant and the corporate defendant were the alleged alter egos. Id. That is not the case here. 

The company alleged to be the alter ego of these individuals - RJW - is not a party to this

action. There is no claim that Robert Werra and John Werra are alter egos of one another. 

Defendants next claim that the Werras are nominally separate parties. They note that the

Robert and John Werra are father and son, that they have the same counsel, and both are alleged

to be alter egos. Further, they claim that Plaintiffs intend for each Defendant's interrogatory

response to be binding on both Defendants. Plaintiffs deny claiming that one Defendant's

response would necessarily bind the other. Review of the interrogatories finds little support for

Defendants' claim, as there are some interrogatories related to the presentation of a defense

which were identical and directed to each Defendant. Plaintiffs also note that John Werra and

Robert Werra served different roles in the company and are, by any account, actually separate

Case 5:06-cv-04135-JW Document 34 Filed 10/02/07 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs are nominally separate because the parties are a

corporation and its principle. Since only 21X Capital has served interrogatories at this time,

this argument is irrelevant to the current motion. 

3

 Plaintiffs show that RJW appears to have been limited to only a few transactions.

(Carlson Decl., Exs. A-D). Defendants present no evidence that RJW was so complex that

answering these interrogatories presents a real burden on the Werras. 

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individuals. As noted at the hearing, it is conceivable that one defendant could be found an

alter ego, but not the other. The limited evidence indicating these parties are similarly situated

is insufficient to find these parties nominally separate.2

The court declines to apply a per side limit based on a finding of nominal separateness.

 

2) Scope of Interrogatories Overbroad

Defendants next argue that the interrogatories are burdensome because their content is

overly broad. The Werras do not quantify or describe in any detail how responding to these

questions would be burdensome. Rather, Defendants generally "object" to Plaintiffs' use of

phrases like "any and all details" from "each and every person or entity." 

Plaintiffs counter that these overbreadth claims are not specific, individualized

arguments tailored to the allegedly objectionable interrogatories. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452

U.S. 89, 102, n. 16 (1981). Nor do Defendants present the required formal objections. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 33(b)(4). Furthermore, Plaintiffs demonstrate that although the interrogatories may

initially seem broad, they really are not under the facts presented.3

 Accordingly, this second

argument fails. 

3) 50 to 100 interrogatories are too numerous and presumptively burdensome

Defendants finally argue that "50 interrogatories are presumptively unduly burdensome"

because they exceed the 25 interrogatory limitation of FED. R. CIV. P. 33. Essentially,

Defendants claim that because the limit set forth by Federal Rules is 25 per party, when a side

serves more than 25 a question of undue burden is presented. When considered with the

Case 5:06-cv-04135-JW Document 34 Filed 10/02/07 Page 3 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 4 Although unknown whether Plaintiff Brewer will do so, Rule 33 would permit him

to serve 25 interrogatories on each Defendant.

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potential for Plaintiffs to serve 50 more,4 the Werras claim that a reasonable limit should be

imposed to protect them from the burden of responding to 50 to 100 interrogatories. 

Defendants do not describe a particular hardship or burden in answering that volume of

interrogatories, and this court is not willing to rule in a vacuum that 50 (or 100) is too many as a

matter of law. Maybe it is; maybe not. 

The party resisting relevant, non-privileged discovery has the burden of showing why

discovery should not go forward. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir.

1975). Defendants have not met this burden and so their arguments with respect to numerosity

also fail. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion is DENIED. Responses to the

interrogatories served by Plaintiffs are due within 7 days of the date of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/2/07 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 5:06-cv-04135-JW Document 34 Filed 10/02/07 Page 4 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS NOTICE WILL BE SENT TO:

Thomas H. Carlson tcarlson@rjop.com, smarcus@rjop.com 

Aaron Paul Silberman aps@rjop.com, fyh@rjop.com 

Jon Burgess Streeter jstreeter@kvn.com, efiling@kvn.com, mcanales@kvn.com,

sharmison@kvn.com 

Courtney Towle ctowle@kvn.com, sgiminez@kvn.com 

Counsel are responsible for transmitting this order to co-counsel who have not signed

up for e-filing.

Dated: 10/2/07

 /s/ KRO 

Chambers of Magistrate Judge Howard R. Lloyd

Case 5:06-cv-04135-JW Document 34 Filed 10/02/07 Page 5 of 5