Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08153/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08153-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Vina Yazzie, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

County of Mohave, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-14-08153-PCT-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 7-11 of 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, (Doc. 83), filed by Defendants Mohave County, 

Steve Latoski, Ramon Osuna, Kevin Stockbridge, and Warren Twitchel1

 (“Defendants”) 

on January 25, 2016. On February 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed a letter addressed to the Court, 

ostensibly in response to Defendants’ motion. (Doc. 88). On March 11, 2016, Defendants 

filed a reply brief. (Doc. 89). Two months later, Plaintiff filed a second letter, this time 

requesting additional time to file another response to Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. (Doc. 91). On May 17, 2016, the Court deemed Plaintiff’s second letter a 

request for extension of time and permitted Plaintiff to file another response by June 6, 

 

1

 The motion identifies this individual as “Warren Twitchell,” see (Doc. 83 at 1, 6, 

14), and an accompanying affidavit states the same, see (Doc. 84-3 at 25–27). 

Defendants’ reply brief and Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), 

however, refer to this individual as “Warren Twitchel.” See (Docs. 14 at 1; 96 at 1). 

Because the docketing of this case lists this Defendant as “Warren Twitchel,” the Court 

will refer to him as such. 

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2016. (Doc. 92). On June 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed a third letter, apparently in response to 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 93).2

 Defendants filed a second reply 

brief on June 23, 2016. (Doc. 96). The Court now rules on Defendants’ motion. 

I. Background3

 

Plaintiff, a forty-nine year old Native American woman, was employed by 

Defendant Mohave County’s Public Works Department (“PWD”) for over seventeen 

years. (Doc. 84 at 1). As a term of her employment, Plaintiff was required to maintain a 

Commercial Driver’s License (“CDL”). (Id. at 2). Plaintiff began her tenure at PWD in 

1995 as a Road Maintenance Worker. (Id. at 1). Plaintiff applied for and was promoted to 

Senior Road Maintenance Worker in 2001 and to Road Maintenance Worker Specialist in 

2002. (Id.)

4

 The only promotion Plaintiff applied for but did not receive was for a 

 

2

 As Plaintiff is appearing pro se, her filings must be construed “liberally.” See 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1235 (9th Cir. 1984); Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police 

Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, although Plaintiff’s third letter 

does not indicate that it is a response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, see 

(Doc. 93), the Court will construe it as such. 

3

 Local Rule of Civil Procedure (“Local Rule”) 56.1(b) requires a party opposing 

a summary judgment motion to file a separate controverting statement of facts either 

agreeing with or disputing each of the moving party’s statements of fact. If the nonmovant disputes a statement of fact, she must point to admissible evidence in the record 

showing that a genuine dispute exists. LRCiv 56.1(b). If the non-movant does not 

properly address a statement of fact, the Court may consider that fact undisputed for 

purposes of the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). In this case, Plaintiff did not file a 

separate controverting statement of facts, nor did she otherwise respond to any of 

Defendants’ factual assertions. Although appearing pro se, Plaintiff is still required to 

follow the Local Rules and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., LRCiv 83.3(c)(1); 

Carter v. Comm’r, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986); Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 

1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, for purposes of this motion, the Court will 

deem Defendants’ statement of facts undisputed unless the record proves otherwise and 

will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants “if the motion and supporting 

materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled 

to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). 

4

 Other documents in the record indicate that Plaintiff was further promoted to the 

position of “Operator III” in 2003. See (Doc. 44-2 at 2–3). 

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“superintendent” position. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff earned an increase in salary for each 

promotion and was awarded multiple bonuses throughout her career. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff 

generally received satisfactory supervisor feedback on her annual reviews. (Id.) 

 The Mohave County Merit Rules (“Merit Rules”) govern discipline of PWD 

employees who test positive for drugs or alcohol while on duty. (Id.) Merit Rule 507 

begins by warning employees that “violations of this Rule may result in discipline for 

existing employees, up to and including dismissal.” (Doc. 84-1 at 11). Merit 

Rule 507(C)(5)(b)(ii) then expressly provides that if a PWD employee who occupies a 

safety sensitive position tests positive for drugs while on duty, “such employee may be 

immediately dismissed.” (Doc. 84 at 3). Merit Rule 701(A)(4)(g) also explicitly prohibits 

employees from being under the influence of marijuana while on duty or on county 

property. (Id.) PWD employees who carry CDLs and operate commercial vehicles, such 

as Plaintiff, are considered to be in safety sensitive positions and are subject to random 

drug testing. (Id. at 3–4). Employees subject to drug testing are randomly selected by and 

tested at the Kingman Regional Medical Center. (Id. at 4). 

 Plaintiff knew that the Merit Rules prohibited the consumption of marijuana, 

signed acknowledgements that she received Mohave County’s policies, and attended 

training sessions specifically addressing the prohibited consumption of illegal drugs, e.g., 

marijuana. (Id. at 12). Moreover, Plaintiff understood that employees were subject to 

termination pursuant to PWD’s standards for testing positive for drugs or alcohol while 

on duty. (Id. at 6). 

 As Director of PWD since 2009, Defendant Latoski is solely in charge of 

disciplining employees pursuant to the Merit Rules. (Id at 4; Doc. 84-1 at 2). According 

to Defendant Latoski, strict enforcement of the Merit Rules is necessary because “the use 

of tools and/or operation of equipment that if not operated in an alert manner and 

properly could harm both the operator and/or the public.” (Doc. 84 at 3). During 

Defendant Latoski’s tenure, if a PWD employee in a safety sensitive position tested 

positive for alcohol or drugs while on duty, the result was “uniform . . . dismissal.” (Id. at 

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4). Since January 2010, all ten PWD employees in safety sensitive positions who tested 

positive for alcohol or drugs while on duty were not offered substance abuse counseling 

but were terminated or resigned in lieu of termination. (Id. at 5).5

 Of those ten employees, 

eight were Caucasian, one was Hispanic, and one was Native American (Plaintiff). (Id. at 

5, 8). 

 On July 15, 2013, Plaintiff attended a drug and alcohol training session conducted 

by Defendant Twitchel. (Id. at 5). During the session, Defendant Twitchel discussed a 

draft “Zero Tolerance Policy” for drug use that had yet to be approved by the County 

Board of Supervisors. (Id.)

6

 Defendant Twitchel encouraged the employees in attendance 

to ask questions in order to fully understand the county’s policies. (Id. at 6). At the 

session, Plaintiff was reminded that discipline for a failed drug test would be carried out 

pursuant to the Merit Rules. (Id.) 

 After the July 15, 2013 meeting, Plaintiff was randomly selected for a drug 

screening and was tested at Kingman Regional Medical Center. (Id.) Plaintiff was not 

selected for every random drug screen. (Id. at 8). On July 24, 2013, Plaintiff was notified 

that she had tested positive for marijuana. (Id. at 6). Because she had recently consumed 

marijuana illegally, Plaintiff was “not surprised” at the result. (Id. at 7; Doc. 84-1 at 108). 

 On July 25, 2013, Plaintiff attended a meeting with Defendants Stockbridge, 

Twitchel, and Latoski to discuss her test results. (Doc. 84 at 6). Instead of admitting that 

the positive test was accurate because of her recent marijuana consumption, Plaintiff 

asserted that the result was a false positive due to Marinol, a prescription that she was 

purportedly taking. (Id. at 7; Doc. 84-3 at 79). Plaintiff admitted, however, that she never 

actually consumed Marinol prior to the drug test and knew that the positive result was 

 

5

 In fact, Defendant Latoski even terminated an employee who lost his CDL after 

pleading guilty to a DUI while off duty. (Doc. 84-1 at 5). 

6

 The Zero Tolerance Policy may have been developed due to an incident where a 

PWD supervisor knew that an employee was under the influence of drugs but did not do 

anything about it. (Id. at 4–5). The employee subsequently killed six people in a car 

accident. (Id.) 

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due to her recent marijuana use. (Doc. 84 at 6). During the meeting, Plaintiff was “afraid” 

and lied about her test result because she knew that employees were being terminated for 

testing positive for drugs or alcohol. (Id.; Doc. 84-1 at 112–13). Defendant Latoski 

advised Plaintiff that she was being placed on administrative leave and could re-test the 

sample pursuant to the Merit Rules. (Doc. 84 at 6).7

 On July 30, 2013, Defendant Latoski sent Plaintiff a letter notifying her of his 

intent to dismiss her from employment. (Doc. 84-1 at 78). On August 6, 2013, Defendant 

Latoski, as sole decision maker for Defendant Mohave County, informed Plaintiff that 

she was being terminated pursuant to the Merit Rules and advised her of her right to 

appeal. (Doc. 84 at 7). Defendant Latoski testified that the only reason he terminated 

Plaintiff was because she tested positive for marijuana in violation of the Merit Rules. 

(Id. at 8). Plaintiff filed for a hearing regarding her termination, and after a Merit 

Commission Appeal Hearing on December 20, 2013, her termination was upheld. (Id.) 

Plaintiff subsequently filed this lawsuit on August 20, 2014. (Doc. 1). 

II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be 

or is genuinely disputed must support that assertion by “citing to particular parts of 

materials in the record,” including depositions, affidavits, interrogatory answers or other 

materials, or by “showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of 

a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 

the fact.” Id. at 56(c)(1). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails 

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

 

7

 Rather than re-test the original sample as required by the Merit Rules, Plaintiff 

herself went to get retested more than a week after the initial test. (Doc. 84-3 at 16). 

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 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the 

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be 

unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to 

the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do 

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by 

“com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare 

assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a 

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247–48. Further, because “[c]redibility 

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 

from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, . . . [t]he evidence of the 

nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor” at 

the summary judgment stage. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 

144, 158–59 (1970)); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Issues of 

credibility, including questions of intent, should be left to the jury.” (citations omitted)). 

 At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge’s function is to determine whether 

there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient 

evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. 

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249–50. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not 

significantly probative, the judge may grant summary judgment. Id. Notably, “[i]t is well 

settled that only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court in ruling on a 

motion for summary judgment.” Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 

1181 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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III. Analysis 

 Five claims remain from Plaintiff’s FAC.8

 Count 7 alleges that Defendant Mohave 

County violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating against 

Plaintiff based on her race and/or ancestry. (Doc. 4 at 16–17). Counts 8 and 9 allege that 

Defendant Mohave County violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Family Medical Leave 

Act (“FMLA”). (Id. at 17–19). Count 10 alleges that the individual Defendants 

discriminated against Plaintiff based on her race and/or ancestry in violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981. (Id. at 19–21). Finally, Count 11 alleges that the individual Defendants violated 

Plaintiff’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 21–22). The Court will address each 

Count in turn. 

A. Counts 7 and 10: Violations of Title VII and § 19819

Plaintiff’s seventh and tenth Counts allege that Defendants violated Title VII and 

§ 1981 by discriminating against Plaintiff based on her race and/or ancestry. (Id. at 16–

17, 19–21). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that “other non-Native American employees 

hired by the Road Maintenance Department after her hire date received more frequent 

promotions and pay raises.” (Id. at 17, 20). Plaintiff also asserts that “the County did not 

terminate other similarly situated non-Native American employees who violated the 

County’s Drug and Alcohol Policies.” (Id.) 

 1. Legal Standard for Discrimination under Title VII and § 1981 

 Title VII forbids a covered employer to “discriminate against any individual with 

respect to . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual’s race, color, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 1981 

 

8

 The Court previously dismissed Counts 1-6 of the FAC in their entirety, (Doc. 82 

at 5), and Counts 10 and 11 against Defendant Mohave County, (Doc. 74). Counts 10 and 

11 remain pending against Defendants Latoski, Osuna, Stockbridge, and Twitchel (the 

“individual Defendants”). (Id.) 

9

 Because the same legal principles and standards apply to both Title VII and 

§ 1981 claims, see Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 797–98 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(citations omitted), the Court addresses both Counts together. 

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states that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right in every State and Territory . . . to 

the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 

property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to punishment, pains, 

penalties, taxes, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). 

 A plaintiff may prove a Title VII or § 1981 claim in one of two ways. First, she 

may produce “direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory 

reason more likely than not motivated the employer.” Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 

F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2008). Alternatively, the Court applies the burden-shifting 

framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the 

McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff “must first establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination or retaliation.” Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1105. This requires showing that “(1) 

[s]he belongs to a protected class; (2) [s]he was qualified for the position; (3) [s]he was 

subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside 

[her] protected class were treated more favorably.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 

F.3d 11125, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000). A plaintiff may alternatively satisfy the fourth element 

by showing that her position was filled by someone outside of her protected class. See 

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 “If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the 

defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly 

discriminatory or retaliatory conduct.” Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1106. The defendant’s burden 

is only of production, not persuasion. Id. If the defendant does so, then there is no 

presumption of discrimination and the plaintiff may defeat summary judgment by 

showing that the defendant’s “proffered nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for 

discrimination.” Id. (quoting Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Trans. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 

1037 (9th Cir. 2005)). To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “must show that the articulated 

reason is pretextual either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason 

more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s 

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Although a plaintiff may rely on 

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circumstantial evidence to show pretext, such evidence must be both specific and 

substantial.” Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062. 

 2. Analysis 

Because Plaintiff does not present any direct or circumstantial evidence indicating 

that Defendants were more likely than not motivated by discriminatory intent, see Surrell, 

518 F.3d at 1106, the Court will apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework. In this regard, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a 

protected class, was qualified for the employment position, and experienced an adverse 

employment action. (Doc. 83 at 8). Defendants do argue, however, that Plaintiff failed to 

show that non-Native American employees were treated more favorably than her. (Id.) 

Defendants alternatively contend that even if Plaintiff could set forth a prima facie case 

of discrimination, Plaintiff did not demonstrate that Defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff, i.e., testing positive for marijuana while 

on duty in violation of the Merit Rules, was pre-textual. (Id.) Plaintiff did not respond to 

either of these arguments. See (Docs. 88, 91, 93). Nonetheless, the Court has reviewed 

the entire record to determine whether a disputed issue of material fact exists as to either 

of these arguments. 

 To begin, nothing in the record supports Plaintiff’s “failure to promote” claims. 

After reviewing the record, the Court finds no document providing any indication as to 

the circumstances or specific dates that Plaintiff was allegedly denied promotions. 

Similarly, nothing in the record establishes that non-Native Americans were promoted 

faster or more frequently than Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s mere speculation and conjecture in her 

FAC is not enough to avert summary judgment. See Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE 

Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Conclusory, speculative testimony in 

affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat 

summary judgment.”). To the extent Plaintiff believes she was discriminated against for 

promotions between “1995-2002,” (Doc. 84-3 at 104), her claims are barred by the 

relevant statutes of limitation as Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until 2014. See Nat’l 

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R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110–14 (2002) (explaining that a failure 

to promote claim is a discrete act which triggers the running of the statute of limitations 

when it occurs); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (requiring that a discrimination claim under 

Title VII must be brought with the EEOC between 180 and 300 days of the alleged 

unlawful employment practice); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (finding that the statute of limitations for a § 1981 claim in Arizona is two 

years (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542)). 

 As to Plaintiff’s termination claim, no admissible evidence supports her assertion 

that similarly situated, non-Native American employees tested positive for drugs or 

alcohol while on duty but were not terminated. The undisputed facts demonstrate that all 

ten employees who failed drug or alcohol tests since January 2010 were terminated or 

resigned in lieu of termination. (Doc. 84 at 5). Based purely on “gossip” and “word 

around the county,” Plaintiff named several co-workers that she believed failed a drug 

test but were not terminated. See (Docs. 84 at 10; 84-1 at 115; 84-3 at 104). However, 

during the tenure of Defendant Latoski, these named employees either never tested 

positive for drugs or alcohol while on duty or were terminated after a positive test. (Doc. 

84 at 10–11). Beyond her own speculation, Plaintiff presents no admissible evidence to 

show that these employees failed a drug test and continued to work at PWD either before 

or during Defendant Latoski’s tenure. Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to set forth a prima 

facie case of discrimination and thus, summary judgment in favor of Defendants on 

Plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1981 claims is appropriate. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23 

(“The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving party fails 

to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the nonmoving 

party has the burden of proof.”).10 

 

10 To the extent Plaintiff believes that PWD disproportionately selected her for 

random drug testing, the facts belie that accusation. Namely, Kingman Regional Medical 

Center—not PWD—selected employees for random drug testing, and further, of the ten 

employees terminated for testing positive for drugs or alcohol since 2010, eight of them 

were Caucasian, one was Hispanic, and one was Native American (Plaintiff). (Id. at 5). 

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 Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Defendants 

set forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff. Specifically, 

Merit Rules 507 and 701 unequivocally state that an employee who occupies a safety 

sensitive position is subject to immediate termination for testing positive for marijuana. 

(Doc. 84 at 3). Here, Plaintiff was employed in a safety sensitive position and operated 

heavy machinery, such as backhoes, screening plants, scrapers, dozers and blades, 

tandem axle trucks, front end loaders, rollers, and sweepers. (Id. at 1). If Plaintiff was 

impaired by drugs or alcohol while on duty, the likelihood of harm to herself and the 

general public would be substantially increased. Plaintiff admitted to illegally consuming 

marijuana and tested positive for marijuana while on duty. (Id.) Thus, Defendants’ 

decision to terminate Plaintiff fell entirely within PWD’s policies thereby establishing a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. 

 Because Defendants provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 

terminating Plaintiff, Plaintiff must demonstrate the reason is pre-textual in order to avert 

summary judgment. See Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1106. Plaintiff made no argument in this 

regard, see (Docs. 88, 91, 93), and nothing in the record shows pre-text. Consequently, 

even assuming Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff did 

not establish that Defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was pre-textual 

thereby making summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s Title VII and 

§ 1981 claims appropriate. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 

1994) (“[W]hen evidence to refute the defendant’s legitimate explanation is totally 

lacking, summary judgment is appropriate even though plaintiff may have established a 

minimal prima facie case based on a McDonnell Douglas type presumption.”). 

 3. Conclusion for Counts 7 and 10 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff failed to set forth a prima facie case of 

discrimination and alternatively because Plaintiff did not show that Defendants’ 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff was pre-textual, 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Counts 7 and 10 of Plaintiff’s FAC. 

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B. Counts 8 and 9: Violations of FMLA 

In Counts 8 and 9 of her FAC, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Mohave County 

interfered with her rights under the FMLA. (Doc. 4 at 18–20).11 Plaintiff claims that she 

and her son suffered from qualifying “serious health conditions” under the FMLA and 

that she provided Defendant Mohave County with adequate notice of her need for leave. 

(Id. at 18). Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant Mohave County “knew or should have 

known that the medical conditions of Plaintiff Yazzie and her son during the relevant 

time period constituted serious health conditions within the meaning of the FLMA.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff avers that Defendant Mohave County did not provide her with notice of her 

FLMA rights but interfered with her FLMA rights by “criticizing her performance for 

requesting and receiving leave to care for herself and her son.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff 

asserts that Defendant Mohave County interfered with her FLMA rights by subjecting her 

to less favorable treatment than those around her via “heightened scrutiny, constant 

criticism, and subjecting her to more severe discipline compared to similarly situated 

coworkers who engaged in the same or similar conduct.” (Id. at 19). 

 1. Legal Standard for Interference under the FMLA 

 “The FMLA creates two interrelated, substantive employee rights: first, the 

 

11 Although Count 9 of Plaintiff’s FAC is entitled “FMLA-Retaliation,” (Doc. 4 at 

19), the claim is one for interference with FMLA rights. The United States Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has explained that “[b]y their plain meaning, the antiretaliation or anti-discrimination provisions do not cover visiting negative consequences 

on an employee simply because he has used FMLA leave.” Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, 

Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 (9th Cir. 2001). Rather, “the statutory and regulatory language 

of [the] FMLA makes clear that where an employee is subjected to ‘negative 

consequences . . . simply because he has used FMLA leave,’ the employer has interfered 

with the employee’s FMLA rights under 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(a)(1).” Xin Liu v. Amway 

Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124). The 

issue “becomes one of discrimination and retaliation” only when “an employee is 

punished for opposing unlawful practices by the employer.” Id. Here, Plaintiff does not 

claim that she was “punished for opposing unlawful practices” of Defendant Mohave 

County, and the Court has found no allegations in the FAC supporting a retaliation claim 

under the FMLA. Thus, the Court construes Plaintiff’s FAC as alleging a single claim for 

interference under the FMLA. 

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employee has a right to use a certain amount of leave for protected reasons, and second, 

the employee has a right to return to his or her job or an equivalent job after using 

protected leave.” Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1122 (citations omitted). The FMLA provides 

two ways to protect these substantive rights, one rooted in an employer’s interference 

with an employee’s FMLA rights, the other based on employer retaliation. Id. at 1124. 

 Under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), it is “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, 

restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise” the substantive rights 

guaranteed by FMLA. When a party alleges a violation of § 2615(a)(1), it is known as an 

“interference” or “entitlement” claim. Id. To prove a claim for interference, the employee 

must show that “(1) [s]he was eligible for the FMLA’s protections, (2) [her] employer 

was covered by the FMLA, (3) [s]he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) [s]he 

provided sufficient notice of [her] intent to take leave, and (5) [her] employer denied 

[her] FMLA benefits to which [s]he was entitled.” Sanders v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d 

772, 778 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). The employee “can prove this claim, as one 

might any ordinary statutory claim, by using either direct or circumstantial evidence, or 

both.” Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1125. 

 As explained above, the Court deems Plaintiff’s FMLA-related claims to be a 

singular claim for interference under the FMLA. 

 2. Analysis 

To begin, FMLA interference claims must be brought within two years of the date 

of the alleged violation for which the claim is brought. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1). Here, the 

only year in which Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mohave County denied her FMLA 

leave was 2008. (Doc. 84 at 9–10). There is no allegation—much less any evidence—that 

Plaintiff properly requested and was denied FMLA leave at any time thereafter. 

Consequently, because Plaintiff did not bring her interference claim until 2014, her claim 

is barred by the statute of limitations. 

Moreover, nothing in the record supports Plaintiff’s assertions. Counts 8 and 9 are 

predicated on Plaintiff’s belief that she suffered from a “serious health condition.” 

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(Doc. 4 at 18). In this regard, Plaintiff failed establish that she was treated by a health 

care provider as required by the FMLA, thereby failing to raise a material issue of fact 

that she suffered from a “serious health condition” that qualified her for FMLA leave in 

2008. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2611(11); 29 C.F.R. § 825.125(a); Sanders, 657 F.3d 

at 778 (holding that a viable FMLA claim requires a showing that the employee was 

entitled to leave). In addition, Plaintiff did not provide any evidence that she timely 

notified Defendant Mohave County of her FMLA leave requests, nor did she detail the 

specific dates she purportedly requested and was denied FMLA leave. Here, too, Plaintiff 

failed to raise a disputed issue of material fact. See Walls v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit 

Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In order to establish an FMLA violation, the 

employee must demonstrate that the employer received sufficient notice of an employee’s 

intent to take FMLA leave.” (citation omitted)). In fact, the only record evidence 

concerning the FMLA is in regards to Plaintiff’s granted FMLA leave requests in 2000 

and 2004. (Doc. 84 at 9–10). Nothing in the record—beyond Plaintiff’s accusations—

indicates that Plaintiff requested FMLA leave in 2008. 

 Consequently, even assuming the statute of limitations did not bar her claim, 

Plaintiff never properly requested FMLA leave that was denied or showed that she was 

entitled to FMLA leave. See Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1245 

(9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that because a plaintiff had taken FMLA leave in the past, she 

knew the process to request FMLA leave, and her failure to properly follow protocol for 

FMLA leave demonstrates that she did not intend to take FMLA leave). Thus, Plaintiff 

failed to establish a prima facie case of FMLA interference thereby making summary 

judgment in favor of Defendant Mohave County proper. See § 2615(a)(1); Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 322–23 (“The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the 

nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on 

which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof.”). 

 3. Conclusion for Counts 8 and 9 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of 

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Defendant Mohave County on Counts 8 and 9 of Plaintiff’s FAC. 

C. Count 11: Violation of § 1983 

Plaintiff’s last remaining Count alleges that the individual Defendants violated her 

civil rights pursuant to § 1983. (Doc. 4 at 21–22). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the 

individual Defendants violated her Equal Protection and Due Process rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by “implement[ing] a plan to . . 

. terminate” her, subjecting her to “increased scrutiny and more severe discipline 

compared to similarly situated coworkers,” not enforcing the Drug and Alcohol Testing 

Policies consistently, and terminating her. (Id.) 

 1. Legal Standard for § 1983 

 Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights on its own. Graham v. Connor, 

490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989). Rather, § 1983 “merely provides ‘a method for vindicating 

federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Id. at 394 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 

137, 144, n. 3 (1979)). “To make out a cause of action under section 1983, [a] plaintiff[] 

must [show] that (1) the defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived [the] 

plaintiff[] of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes.” Gibson v. United 

States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 

(9th Cir. 1962)). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning 

of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits 

to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

 2. Analysis 

 To begin, because Plaintiff seeks damages from the individual Defendants in their 

personal capacities, she must show that each individual Defendant caused her 

constitutional injuries. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1985). In this regard, 

there is no evidence that Defendants Osuna, Stockbridge, and Twitchel were involved in 

the decision to terminate Plaintiff or in the enforcement of the Merit Rules. There is also 

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no evidence that any of these Defendants “implemented a plan to . . . terminate” Plaintiff. 

Similarly, no evidence shows that these Defendants held any sort of racial animus 

towards Plaintiff. Plaintiff thus failed to show that these Defendants caused the alleged 

constitutional violations that Plaintiff asserts she incurred. Accordingly, Defendants 

Osuna, Stockbridge, and Twitchel are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 

claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“The moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law [if] the nonmoving party . . . fail[s] to make a sufficient showing on an 

essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.”). 

 Regarding Defendant Latoski, Plaintiff failed to raise a disputed issue of material 

fact as to whether he violated her constitutional rights. As described in detail above, 

nothing in the record indicates that Defendant Latoski terminated Plaintiff due to any 

racial animus in violation of her Equal Protection rights. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations 

in her FAC are not enough to withstand summary judgment. As to her Due Process 

rights, the record shows that Plaintiff understood Mohave County’s drug policies long 

before she was selected for the random drug test and knew that she could be terminated if 

she tested positive for an illegal substance. (Doc. 84 at 12). Defendant Latoski gave 

Plaintiff notice that she was being placed on administrative leave and informed her of her 

right to retest the split sample. (Id. at 7). Moreover, Defendant Latoski gave Plaintiff 

advance notice of his intent to terminate her employment. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff was 

given the opportunity to appeal her termination. (Id. at 7–8). These undisputed facts 

demonstrate that Plaintiff was afforded sufficient Due Process, and Plaintiff failed to 

raise a disputed issue of material fact such that a reasonable jury could find in her favor. 

 3. Conclusion for Count 11 

Accordingly, because no disputed issue of material fact exists such that a 

reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor 

of the individual Defendants on Count 11 of Plaintiff’s FAC. 

IV. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, 

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 7-

11 of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, (Doc. 83), is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in 

favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on all counts of the First Amended Complaint, 

(Doc. 4), see also (Docs. 74, 82), and shall terminate this case. 

 Dated this 19th day of July, 2016. 

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