Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00078/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00078-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Joshua L. Hart, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-15-00078-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Joshua L. Hart seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, which denied him disability insurance 

benefits and supplemental security income under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social 

Security Act. Because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is not 

supported by substantial evidence and is based on legal error, the Commissioner’s 

decision will be vacated and the matter remanded for an award of benefits. 

I. Background. 

 Plaintiff, a 36-year-old male, has a high school diploma and previously worked as 

a paratrooper, a process technician, and a television repairman. On December 19, 2012, 

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning January 

13, 2010. On December 4, 2013, he appeared with his attorney and testified at a hearing 

before the ALJ. A vocational expert also testified. On January 15, 2014, the ALJ issued 

a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 

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The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the hearing decision, 

making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s 

decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 

(9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

III. The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation Process. 

 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner at 

step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

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of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 

be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is 

still capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant 

is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final 

step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id.

 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of 

the Social Security Act through December 31, 2017, and that he has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since January 13, 2010. At step two, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative disc disease, post 

laminectomy syndrome, obesity, and status-post spinal cord stimulator implant. At step 

three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to 

Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to 

perform: 

light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §] 404.1567(b) except he could 

frequently climb ramps or stairs and stoop, occasionally climb ladders, 

ropes and scaffolds, balance, crouch, kneel and crawl. He should avoid 

concentrated exposure to extreme cold, excessive noise, vibration, fumes, 

odors, dusts and gas, hazardous machinery and unprotected heights. 

The ALJ further found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of his past relevant work. 

At step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy that Plaintiff could perform. 

IV. Analysis. 

 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by: (1) improperly weighing medical opinion 

evidence, (2) improperly evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility, (3) failing to account for 

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Plaintiff’s obesity in the RFC determination, and (4) improperly evaluating third party 

witness evidence. 

 A. The ALJ Improperly Weighed Medical Source Evidence. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed medical opinions from Nicholas 

Ransom, M.D.; Marty Feldman, D.O.; and state agency reviewing physicians. Plaintiff 

also contends that the Appeals Council erred by reviewing the medical opinion of 

Michaela Tong, M.D., without comment in denying Plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s decision. 

 1. Legal Standard. 

 The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give greatest weight to a treating 

physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to 

one of a non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th 

Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when 

evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, 

frequency of examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective 

evidence). If it is not contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, the opinion of a treating 

or examining physician can be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 

81 F.3d at 830 (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). A 

contradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician “can only be rejected for 

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043). 

 An ALJ can meet the “specific and legitimate reasons” standard “by setting out a 

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th 

Cir. 1986). But “[t]he ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth 

his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.” 

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Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22. 

 2. Nicholas Ransom, M.D. 

 Dr. Nicholas Ransom is an orthopedic surgeon who performed two surgical 

procedures on Plaintiff’s back. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly afforded Dr. 

Ransom’s medical opinion no weight. 

 On April 16, 2010, Dr. Ransom performed an L4 laminectomy and an L5-S1 

fusion on Plaintiff’s back. A.R. 332-37. Dr. Ransom evaluated Plaintiff several times 

after the surgery. A.R. 349-54. On each occasion, Plaintiff admitted to “significant 

partial relief” from the procedures but also complained of new post-operative pain and 

numbness. Id. On July 12, 2010, Dr. Ransom opined that Plaintiff is “unable to work for 

a minimum of 6-12 months post operatively” because he “is unable to sit/walk/stand 

longer than 30 minutes due to an increase of pain.” A.R. 347. Dr. Ransom also opined 

that Plaintiff would be subject to “lifetime limitations” prohibiting: 

repetitive bending, stooping or lifting greater than 20 pounds on a frequent 

basis or 40 pounds on a rare basis. No prolonged sit/walk/standing 

activities for longer than one hour without allowance for position changes 

for 10 [to] 15 minute breaks. No crawling, kneeling or assuming cramped 

positions or repetitive push-pull activities. 

Id. 

 The ALJ afforded Dr. Ransom’s opinion no weight for four reasons. Because the 

“opinion was rendered shortly after the claimant underwent surgery,” the ALJ concluded 

that it was “reasonable only for a short period of time.” A.R. 40. The ALJ found “the 

opinion of ‘lifetime limitations’ less persuasive” because the treating relationship lasted 

only six months and Dr. Ransom did not evaluate Plaintiff after the initial 12-month 

recovery period. Id. The ALJ determined that Dr. Ransom’s recommended limitations 

were “contradicted by the medical evidence of record,” and that his opinion was 

contradicted by Plaintiff’s “reports of walking and swimming.” Id. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Dr. Ransom’s opinion was 

reasonable only for a short period of time. An ALJ is charged with resolving conflicting 

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medical evidence. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 956-57. “That role does not grant her a license 

to exercise her own, independent medical judgment in the absence of such conflict.” 

Schultz v. Colvin, 32 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 

1102; Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975)). In concluding that Dr. 

Ransom’s opinion is reasonable only for a short period of time, the ALJ does not cite any 

conflicting medical evidence. Nor is it evident that a surgeon who has performed two 

surgeries on a patient’s back, and who has held follow-up visits, is unable to opine 

reliably on the patient’s long-term prognosis. The ALJ appears to be exercising his own 

independent medical judgment, which is improper. Id. The Court concludes that the ALJ 

erred in concluding that Dr. Ransom’s opinion is reasonable only for a short time. 

 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Ransom’s lifetime 

limitations because the treatment relationship only lasted six months. A treatment 

relationship between a physician and patient exists when visits occur “with a frequency 

consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of treatment” required for the 

patient’s medical condition. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. A treatment relationship may be 

established even though the physician only treated or evaluated the patient a few times so 

long as “the nature and frequency of the treatment or evaluation is typical” for the 

patient’s condition. Id. Nor is it unusual for a surgeon to have a relationship with a 

patient only in connection with the surgery and post-operative follow-up. 

 A relationship established solely to bolster a disability claim, of course, is not a 

valid treatment relationship. Id. But there is no evidence that Dr. Ransom treated 

Plaintiff solely to bolster his disability claim. To the contrary, Dr. Ransom performed 

invasive surgery on Plaintiff and evaluated him on several occasions after the surgery. 

This is indicative of a legitimate treatment relationship. See id. Furthermore, the 

Commissioner has provided no authority for its position that a treating provider cannot 

opine about lifetime limitations several months into a 12-month recovery period from an 

invasive surgical procedure. The Court concludes that the ALJ erred in finding Dr. 

Ransom’s lifetime limitations unpersuasive on this ground. 

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 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding Dr. Ransom’s opinion inconsistent 

with the medical evidence in the record. An ALJ must provide “sufficiently specific 

reasons” for rejecting the opinion of a treating physician. Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22 

(finding ALJ’s approach inadequate where “he merely states that the objective factors 

point toward an adverse conclusion and makes no effort to relate any of these objective 

factors to any of the specific medical opinions and findings he rejects”). Here, the ALJ 

concluded that “the limitations given by Dr. Ransom are contradicted by the medical 

evidence of record” (A.R. 40), but the ALJ failed to identify both the specific findings of 

Dr. Ransom that are inconsistent and the specific contrary medical evidence. The ALJ’s 

general conclusion is not a sufficiently specific reason for rejecting Dr. Ransom’s 

limitations. Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22. The Court concludes that the ALJ erred in 

finding the limitations proposed by Dr. Ransom inconsistent with the medical record.1

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that Dr. Ransom’s opinion is 

contradicted by Plaintiff’s reports of walking and swimming. District courts “review the 

ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ – not post 

hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.” 

Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 2009). The 

parties agree that Plaintiff’s reports of walking and swimming are not inconsistent with 

Dr. Ransom’s opinion. See Docs. 16 at 19; 17 at 12. The Commissioner’s attempt to 

point to inconsistencies between Dr. Ransom’s opinion and Plaintiff’s statement to Dr. 

Eugene Ross – on which the ALJ’s finding did not rely – is an improper post hoc

rationalization. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1225-26. The ALJ erred in finding Dr. Ransom’s 

limitations inconsistent with Plaintiff’s statements on swimming and walking. 

 

1

 To show Dr. Ransom’s opinion’s consistency with the medical record, Plaintiff 

points to the VA’s disability determination. Doc. 16 at 18-19. Although the Commissioner is not bound by the determination of the VA, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504, the 

Ninth Circuit has ruled that the ALJ is required to consider the VA’s findings, McCartey 

v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ must ordinarily give great weight to a VA determination of disability, unless the ALJ provides persuasive, specific, valid reasons for disregarding the VA determination. Id. The ALJ found that the VA’s 

“finding is not supported by the evidence as a whole.” A.R. 40. This general conclusion is neither persuasive nor specific. McCartey, 298 F.3d at 1076. 

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 The Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons 

supported by substantial evidence for discounting Dr. Ransom’s opinion. Lester, 81 F.3d 

at 830. 

 3. Marty Feldman, D.O. 

 Dr. Marty Feldman is a primary care physician who treated Plaintiff for his back 

ailments. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly afforded Dr. Feldman’s medical 

opinion no weight. 

 Dr. Feldman is Plaintiff’s primary care physician. Dr. Feldman treated Plaintiff 

for back pain on a dozen occasions within a two-year period. A.R. 508-17, 521-24, 574. 

On May 16, 2012, Dr. Feldman opined that Plaintiff’s “chronic pain syndrome and post 

laminectomy syndrome . . . have caused and continue to cause him to experience 

incapacitating episodes which can last from one day, to many sequential days at a time,” 

for at least “7 weeks per calendar year.” A.R. 377. During these episodes, Dr. Feldman 

opined, Plaintiff cannot perform some activities of daily living, including “toileting, 

dressing, and bathing unassisted.” Id. Dr. Feldman noted that Plaintiff’s wife currently 

“acts as his non-medical attendant during these bouts of incapacitating episodes.” Id.

 The ALJ afforded Dr. Feldman’s opinion no weight for three reasons. The ALJ 

found that the treating relationship between Dr. Feldman and Plaintiff was sporadic. 

A.R. 39. The ALJ determined that Dr. Feldman’s opinion was “inconsistent with the 

doctor’s own objective findings and the other objective medical evidence.” Id. The ALJ 

also found that Dr. Feldman’s opinion was “inconsistent with the claimant’s self-reported 

activities of daily living, which include swimming, golfing and walking.” Id. Plaintiff 

challenges each of these findings. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that the treating relationship between 

Dr. Feldman and Plaintiff was “sporadic.” Id. The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ 

erred in reaching this conclusion, but maintains that “the ALJ provided valid reasons to 

discount Dr. Feldman’s opinion, and any error was harmless.” Doc. 17 at 13. The Court 

concludes that the ALJ erred in finding that the treatment relationship between Dr. 

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Feldman and Plaintiff was sporadic. 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that Dr. Feldman’s opinion was 

inconsistent with his own objective findings and the other objective medical evidence in 

the file. An ALJ may only reject a treating physician’s opinion “by setting out a detailed 

and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He 

must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are 

correct.” Id. (citing Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22). Here, the ALJ concluded that Dr. 

Feldman’s opinion was “inconsistent with the doctor’s own objective findings and the 

other objective medical evidence.” A.R. 39. The ALJ supported this conclusion by 

generally citing to nine voluminous exhibits spanning hundreds of pages. Id. The ALJ 

did not identify specific conflicting clinical evidence. Nor did he explain why his 

interpretations, rather than Dr. Feldman’s, were correct. The ALJ’s conclusory statement 

is insufficient.2

 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. The Court concludes that the ALJ erred in 

finding that Dr. Feldman’s opinion was inconsistent with his own objective findings and 

the other objective medical evidence in the record. 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in determining that Dr. Feldman’s opinion 

was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s self-reported activities of daily living, including 

swimming, golfing, and walking. The ALJ supported this conclusion by generally citing 

to five exhibits. A.R. 39. Again, the ALJ did not identify specific statements made by 

Plaintiff that were inconsistent with Dr. Feldman’s opinion. Nor did he explain why his 

interpretations, rather than Dr. Feldman’s, were correct. The ALJ’s conclusory statement 

 

2

 The Commissioner attempts to bolster the ALJ’s conclusory statement by identifying specific evidence within the nine exhibits cited by the ALJ that are allegedly inconsistent with Dr. Feldman’s opinion. Doc. 17 at 13-14. This Court’s mandate, 

however, is to review the ALJ’s decision and its reasoning without considering post hoc rationalizations. See Bray, 554 F.3d at 1225 (“Long-standing principles of administrative law require us to review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ – not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.”). The Court therefore has not considered the 

specific evidence identified in the Commissioner’s brief in reaching this conclusion. 

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is insufficient.3 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. The Court concludes that the ALJ erred in 

finding that Dr. Feldman’s opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s self-reported 

activities daily living. 

 The Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons 

supported by substantial evidence for discounting Dr. Feldman’s opinion. Lester, 81 F.3d 

at 830. 

 4. Michaela Tong, M.D. 

 Dr. Michaela Tong treated Plaintiff for his back problems. Plaintiff argues that the 

Appeals Council erred by receiving, but refusing to comment on, Dr. Tong’s opinion. 

 It is well settled that “when the Appeals Council considers new evidence in 

deciding whether to review a decision of the ALJ, that evidence becomes part of the 

administrative record, which the district court must consider when reviewing the 

Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence.” Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff submitted Dr. Tong’s opinion on 

March 21, 2014, two months after the ALJ’s decision. A.R. 589-90. On November 19, 

2014, the Appeals Council issued its decision denying Plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s decision. A.R. 1. In denying Plaintiff’s request, the Appeals Council considered 

additional evidence submitted by Plaintiff, including Dr. Tong’s opinion. A.R. 1, 4. 

Because the Appeals Council considered Dr. Tong’s opinion in denying Plaintiff’s 

request for review, it is part of the administrative record and must be considered by this 

Court. Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1163. 

 Plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council erred when it received Dr. Tong’s 

opinion without commenting on it. Doc. 16 at 22. The Appeals Council had no duty to 

comment on Dr. Tong’s opinion if it concluded that it would not change its conclusion 

that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. See Dover v. Colvin, No. 

 

3

 The Commissioner once again attempts to bolster the ALJ’s conclusory statement by identifying specific pieces of evidence not relied upon by the ALJ. Doc. 17 at 14. This post hoc rationalization is improper. See Bray, 554 F.3d at 1225. The Court 

therefore has not considered the specific evidence identified in the Commissioner’s brief 

in reaching this conclusion. 

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CV-13-00438-PHX-NVW, 2014 WL 2048079, at *8 (D. Ariz. May 19, 2014) (citing 

Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1162-63). Even if the Appeals Council had such a duty, Dr. Tong’s 

opinion would not lead to the conclusion that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by 

substantial evidence. Dr. Tong’s assessment stated that Plaintiff’s limitations were not in 

existence as of January 13, 2010. A.R. 590. Dr. Tong stated that Plaintiff “was on active 

military duty until injured 1 pm on Jan 13, 2010.” Id. Dr. Tong’s assessment provides 

no indication as to when the opined limitations were present. Dr. Tong’s opinion is 

therefore not inconsistent with the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not disabled as 

of January 13, 2010. 

 5. State Agency Reviewing Physicians. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when it gave great weight to the opinions of 

state agency reviewing physicians who neither treated nor examined Plaintiff. Generally, 

an ALJ should give greatest weight to a treating physician’s opinion and more weight to 

the opinion of an examining physician than to that of a non-examining physician. See 

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040-41. “The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself 

constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an 

examining physician or a treating physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 831 (citations omitted). 

State agency physicians reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records both at the initial level 

(A.R. 94) and at the reconsideration level (A.R. 110). The state agency physicians 

concluded that Plaintiff was capable of performing some range of light work and was 

therefore not disabled. A.R. 107, 126. 

 The ALJ gave these opinions great weight because they were not contradicted by 

anything in the record and the asserted RFC was reasonable and consistent with the 

objective medical evidence. A.R. 39. As discussed above, the ALJ erred in assigning no 

weight to the opinions of Dr. Ransom and Dr. Feldman. The opinions of the nontreating, non-examining state agency physicians cannot, standing alone, constitute 

substantial evidence to overcome the opinions of these treating physicians. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. The Court therefore concludes that the ALJ erred in affording great weight 

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to the opinions of non-treating and non-examining state agency physicians. 

 6. Conclusion. 

 The Court finds that the ALJ erred in weighing the opinions of Dr. Ransom, Dr. 

Feldman, and the state agency physicians. The Court concludes that the Appeals Council 

did not err in receiving Dr. Tong’s opinion without comment. Because the ALJ erred in 

affording the opinions of Dr. Ransom and Dr. Feldman no weight, the Court must vacate 

the ALJ’s decision. 

 B. Plaintiff’s Other Arguments. 

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by (1) improperly evaluating Plaintiff’s 

subjective testimony, (2) failing to account for Plaintiff’s obesity in its RFC assessment, 

and (3) affording Plaintiff’s wife’s opinion minimal weight. Having already decided that 

the ALJ’s decision must be vacated, the Court finds it is unnecessary resolve these issues. 

 C. Remand. 

 In the Ninth Circuit, when an ALJ fails to provide adequate reasons for rejecting 

evidence, a reviewing court must credit that evidence as true. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. An 

action should be remanded for an immediate award of benefits when the following three 

factors are satisfied: (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally 

sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence 

were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand. 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2008), Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1041 

(9th Cir. 2007), Orn, 495 F.3d at 640, Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 

2004), Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

 When the opinions of Dr. Ransom and Dr. Feldman are credited as true, the 

following facts are established: Plaintiff cannot stand or walk for more than one hour at a 

time, cannot sit for more than one hour without allowances for position changes every 

10-15 minutes, and cannot lift more than 20 pounds on a frequent basis or 40 pounds on a 

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rare basis. A.R. 347. Plaintiff cannot perform activities involving repetitive bending or 

stooping, crawling, kneeling, assuming cramped positions, or repetitive push-pull 

activities. Id. Plaintiff’s back ailments cause incapacitating episodes that span at least 

seven weeks per year, during which time he cannot perform activities of daily living 

without assistance. A.R. 377. Given these restrictions and the vocational expert’s 

testimony at Plaintiff’s hearing, Plaintiff does not have the ability to work. A.R. 89-90. 

Because it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff 

disabled if Dr. Ransom’s and Dr. Feldman’s opinions were credited as true, a remand for 

further proceedings is unnecessary. Orn, 495 F.3d at 640. 

 IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is vacated and this case is remanded for an award of benefits. The Clerk shall enter 

judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

 Dated this 9th day of December, 2015. 

Case 2:15-cv-00078-DGC Document 19 Filed 12/09/15 Page 13 of 13