Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-01326/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-01326-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Tiana Brooke Blazer,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Desert Run Transportation LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV 24-01326-PHX-MTM

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. McNAMEE, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motions for Entry of Default Judgment. 

(Docs. 16, 26.) This Report and Recommendation is filed pursuant to General Order 21-

25.1 The Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s Motions be granted.

1 General Order 21-25 states in relevant part:

When a United States Magistrate Judge to whom a civil action has been 

assigned pursuant to Local Rule 3.7(a)(1) considers dismissal to be 

appropriate but lacks the jurisdiction to do so under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) 

due to incomplete status of election by the parties to consent or not consent 

to the full authority of the Magistrate Judge,

IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge will prepare a Report and 

Recommendation for the Chief United States District Judge or designee.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED designating the following District Court 

Judges to review and, if deemed suitable, to sign the order of dismissal on 

my behalf:

Phoenix/Prescott: Senior United States District Judge Stephen M. McNamee. 

. . .

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I. Background

On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff Tiana Brooke Blazer filed an Amended Complaint 

against Defendants Desert Run Transportation LLC, Crisse Jordan and John Doe Jordan, 

and Ryan R. Witte and Jane Doe Witte (“Defendants”), seeking unpaid minimum wages 

under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and unpaid minimum wages and unpaid 

wages under the Arizona Minimum Wage Act (“AMWA”) and the Arizona Wage Act 

(“AWA”). (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff alleges the following, in pertinent part:

• Defendant Desert Run Transportation, LLC, was a limited liability duly licensed to 

transact business in the State of Arizona. At all material times, Defendant Desert 

Run Transportation, LLC, does business, has offices, and/or maintains agents for 

the transaction of its customary business in Pima County, Arizona. Defendant 

Desert Run Transportation, LLC, owned and operated as “Desert Run 

Transportation,” a transportation company doing business in Pima County.

Defendants Crisse Jordan and Thomas Jordan are husband and wife, and owners of 

Desert Run Transportation. Defendants Ryan R. Witte and Jane Doe Witte are

husband and wife, and owners of Desert Run Transportation. Plaintiff was hired by 

and began working for Defendants on February 12, 2024, as a manager. Defendants

agreed to pay Plaintiff an hourly rate of approximately $15. In the sole workweek 

of her employment, Plaintiff worked approximately 30 total hours. Defendants 

never paid Plaintiff any wage whatsoever for the sole workweek of her employment. 

(Doc. 8, ¶¶ 11-13, 15, 17, 35-41.)

• As a result of Defendants’ failure to compensate Plaintiff any wage whatsoever for 

such hours worked, Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). As a result of 

Defendants’ failure to compensate Plaintiff any wage whatsoever for such hours 

worked, Defendants violated the AMWA, A.R.S. § 23-363. As a result of 

Defendants’ failure to compensate Plaintiff any wage whatsoever for such hours 

worked, Defendants violated the AWA, A.R.S., § 23-351. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 46-48.)

On June 28, 2024, the summons and copies of the Amended Complaint were 

personally served on Defendant Desert Run Transportation, LLC, and Defendant Crisse 

Jordan, owner of Defendant Desert Run Transportation, LLC.

2

(Docs. 11-12); see Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A)-(C), 4(h)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(d) and (i). The record also reflects that 

on October 17, 2024, the summons and copies of the Amended Complaint were served on 

2 The record reflects that service was returned unexecuted as to John Doe Jordan 

stating, “Crisse Jordan stated she did not have a spouse.” (Doc. 13.)

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Defendant Ryan Witte and Jane Doe Witte by leaving said documents at the Defendants’

individual residence or usual place of abode. (Docs. 21, 22); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A)-

(C); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(d) and (i). Accordingly, Defendants were properly served.

Defendants have not responded to the Amended Complaint.

On July 25, 2024, and again on November 8, 2024, Plaintiff requested entry of 

default against Defendants pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3

(Docs. 14, 23.) The Clerk of Court entered default on July 26, 2024 and November 13, 

2024. (Docs. 15, 24.) Plaintiff filed her Motions for Default Judgment on July 9, 2024 and 

December 18, 2024. (Docs. 16, 26.)

II. Motion for Default Judgment

A. Legal Standard

Under Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[w]hen a party against 

whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, 

and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Once a party’s default has been entered, the district court has 

discretion to grant default judgment against that party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Aldabe 

v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980).

In assessing a motion for default judgment, the district court first “has an affirmative 

duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” Tuli v. 

Republic of Iraq, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (“To avoid entering a default judgment 

that can later be successfully attacked as void, a court should determine whether it has the 

power, i.e., the jurisdiction, to enter judgment in the first place.”). Once jurisdiction is 

satisfied, the court must determine whether default judgment is proper under the Eitel

factors. See Eitel v.McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Specifically, a court 

should consider:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff[;]

3 The record reflects that both Applications for Entry of Default were served on 

Defendants by First Class Mail. (Docs. 14, 23.)

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(2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim[;]

(3) the sufficiency of the complaint[;]

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action;

(5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts;

(6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect[;] and

(7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

favoring decisions on the merits.

Id. at 1471-72. In applying the Eitel factors, “the factual allegations of the complaint, 

except those relating to damages, will be taken as true.” Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 

F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977).

B. Discussion

1. Jurisdiction

“When entry of default is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise 

defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the 

subject matter and the parties.” Tuli, 172 F.3d at 712. Plaintiff asserts claims arising under 

the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA. (Doc. 8.) The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over 

claims arising out of federal law, including the FLSA, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 

29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. The Court also has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367 because Plaintiff’s state law claims, under both the AMWA and AWA, are “so 

related” to her FLSA claim that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over them. Venue 

and personal jurisdiction requirements are also satisfied because Defendants were properly 

served and Defendants own and operate a transportation company, an enterprise located in 

Pima County, Arizona. (Id., ¶¶ 9-13.) Defendants regularly conduct business, have offices, 

and maintain business agents in Arizona, and Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Arizona.

(Id.) Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the parties.

2. Eitel Factors

Having determined that this Court has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction 

in this action, the Court will examine whether entry of default judgment is proper under 

the Eitel factors.

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a. The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Eitel Factors

When Defendants have not responded or participated in any litigation, the “first, 

fifth, sixth, and seventh [Eitel] factors are easily addressed.” Zekelman Industries Inc. v. 

Marker, No. CV-19-02109-PHX-DWL, 2020 WL 1495210, at *3 (D. Ariz. March 27, 

2020).

The first factor weighs in favor of default judgment because denying Plaintiff’s 

Motions will leave her “without other recourse for recovery,” PepsiCo, Inc. v. California 

Security Cans., 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002), and prejudice would exist if 

Plaintiff’s Motions were denied because she would lose the right to a “judicial resolution” 

of her claims. Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 392 (C.D. 

Cal. 2005). The fifth factor weighs in favor of default judgment because the well-pleaded 

factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are taken as true, and there is no “genuine 

dispute of material facts” that would preclude granting the Motions. PepsiCo, 238 

F.Supp.2d at 1177. The sixth factor considers whether the default was due to excusable 

neglect. Here, Defendants’ failure to participate after being personally served does not 

indicate that default was due to excusable neglect. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 

v. Streeter, 438 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1071-1072 (D. Ariz. 2006). The seventh factor -- favoring 

decisions on the merits -- generally weighs against default judgment; however, “the mere 

existence of Rule 55(b) indicates that ‘this preference, standing alone, is not dispositive,’” 

PepsiCo, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177, and is not sufficient to preclude the entry of default 

judgment in this case. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. Caridi, 346 F.Supp.2d 1068, 

1073 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (explaining that the seventh Eitel factor “standing alone, cannot 

suffice to prevent entry of default judgment for otherwise default judgment could never be 

entered” and courts have concluded that “this factor does not weigh very heavily”). Here, 

a decision on the merits is impossible, given that Defendants failed to appear.

In sum, the first, fifth, sixth, and seventh factors weigh in favor of default judgment.

b. The Second and Third Eitel Factors

The second and third Eitel factors -- the merits of the claim and the sufficiency of 

the complaint -- are “often analyzed together and require courts to consider whether a 

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plaintiff has state[d] a claim on which [she] may recover.” Vietnam Reform Party v. Viet 

Tan-Vietnam Reform Party, 416 F.Supp.3d 948, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Here, the Court 

must first examine Plaintiff’s employee status within the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA.

The FLSA defines an “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.” 

29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). It defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly 

in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” Id. § 203(d).

The Court finds that Plaintiff was classified as an employee of Defendants and 

Defendants were classified as employers pursuant to the FLSA. Defendants had the 

authority to hire and fire employees, supervised and controlled work schedules and the 

conditions of employment, determined the rate and method of payment, and maintained 

employment records in connection with Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants. 

Defendants also directed and exercised control over Plaintiff’s work and wages. (Doc. 1,

¶¶ 11, 14-18, 22-33.) These allegations, taken as true, support that Defendants are 

employers and Plaintiff was an employee of Defendants under the FLSA.

Like the FLSA, the AMWA defines an “employee” as “any person who is or was 

employed by an employer.” A.R.S. § 23-362(A). It defines an “employer” as “any 

corporation proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, limited liability company, trust, 

association, political subdivision of the state, individual or other entity acting directly or 

indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” A.R.S. § 23-362(B). 

Since the definition of employee is the same under both the FLSA and AMWA, the Court’s 

analysis as to Plaintiff’s employee status under the FLSA applies to the AMWA as well.

Lastly, similar to the FLSA and AMWA, the AWA defines an “employee” as “any 

person who performs services for an employer under a contract of employment either made 

in this state or to be performed wholly or partly within this state.” A.R.S. § 23-350(2). The 

AWA defines “employer” as “any individual, partnership, association, joint stock 

company, trust or corporation, the administrator or executor of the estate of a deceased 

individual or the receiver, trustee or successor of any of such persons employing any 

person.” A.R.S. § 23-350(3). Thus, the Court’s reasoning as to Plaintiff’s employee status 

under the FLSA also applies under the AWA.

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As noted above, in her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to 

unpaid wages, including minimum wages under the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA. Because 

the Court takes these allegations as true, Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560, and additionally has 

found that Defendants are employers and Plaintiff was an employee of Defendants, 

Plaintiff “has stated a claim on which [she] may recover.” Vietnam Reform Party, 416 

F.Supp.3d at 962.

Thus, the second and third Eitel factors support an entry of default judgment.

c. The Fourth Eitel Factor

The fourth Eitel factor considers “the amount of money at stake in relation to the 

seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. “If the sum of 

money at stake is completely disproportionate or inappropriate, default judgment is 

disfavored.” Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 438 F.Supp.2d at 1071.

Here, Plaintiff seeks unpaid wages, including minimum wages she is owed under 

the FLSA, AMWA, and AWA along with liquidated damages.4 Plaintiff is requesting 

$1,350.00 plus post-judgment interest, and to later request attorneys’ fees and costs 

following the entry of default judgment. Of that $1,350.00, Plaintiff is requesting that

$1,291.50 in trebled unpaid minimum wages be awarded against all Defendants jointly and 

severally. The remaining $58.50 in unpaid non-minimum wage damages be awarded 

against Defendant Desert Run Transportation, LLC.

Accordingly, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that the amount 

requested is reasonable and not disproportionate or inappropriate. Thus, the fourth Eitel

factor weighs in favor of default judgment.

Overall, the Court finds that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of entering default 

4 When an employer is found liable under the FLSA for failure to pay minimum and 

overtime wages, the employee is entitled to “unpaid minimum wages, [ ] unpaid overtime 

compensation ... and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 

216(b). Similarly, when an employer is found liable under the AMWA for failure to pay 

minimum wages, the employee is entitled to “the balance of the wages ... including interest 

thereon, and an additional amount equal to twice the underpaid wages ....” A.R.S. § 23-

364(G). Likewise, when an employer is found liable under the AWA for failure to pay 

wages, “the employee may recover ... an amount that is treble the amount of the unpaid 

wages.” Id. § 23-355(A).

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judgment against Defendants.

3. Damages

Having found that entry of default judgment is proper under the Eitel factors, the 

Court will turn to the issue of damages. Unlike the allegations in the Amended Complaint, 

the Court does not take allegations relating to damages as true. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560; 

see also TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). Indeed, 

plaintiffs have the burden of “proving up” damages, and “if the facts necessary to determine 

damages are not contained in the complaint, or are legally insufficient, they will not be 

established by default.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 

498 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Courts may rely on declarations submitted by the plaintiff in 

determining appropriate damages. Tolano v. El Rio Bakery, No. CV-18-00125-TUC-RM, 

2019 WL 6464748, at *6 (D. Ariz. Dec. 2, 2019) (citing Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 

F.R.D. at 498).

According to her Motions and accompanying Declarations, the total damages of 

$1,350.00 Plaintiff is seeking consists of $450 in trebled unpaid regular wage damages

under the AWA.

5

(Docs. 16, 16-1, 26, 26-1); see A.R.S. § 23-355.

Plaintiff is requesting that of this $1,350.00, $1,291.50 in trebled unpaid minimum 

wages be awarded against all Defendants – Defendants Desert Run Transportation, LLC, 

Crisse Jordan, Ryan R. Witte, and Jane Doe Witte, jointly and severally. The remaining 

$58.50 in unpaid non-minimum wage damages be awarded against Defendant Desert Run 

Transportation, LLC.6 Plaintiff further requests post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1961 and that the Court allow her to file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs 

5 This amount engulfs Plaintiff’s minimum wage damages under the FLSA and 

AMWA.

6 The Ninth Circuit has held employers individually liable under the FLSA. See, 

e.g., Walsh v. Wellfleet Commc’ns, 2021 WL 4796537, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 14, 2021). 

Likewise, the District of Arizona has held that employers may be individually liable under 

both the FLSA and the AMWA. See, e.g., Rosen v. Fasttrak Foods LLC, No. CV-19-

05292-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL 2981590, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2021). In contrast, the 

AWA states individual liability is not authorized “against the owners, officers, and 

directors of a corporate employer in a case where the claim is for the employer's wholesale 

failure to pay wages.” Id.

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should the Court grant default judgment.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s requested relief accurately calculates the damages 

she is statutorily entitled to and supported by Plaintiff’s Declarations. Therefore, the Court 

finds it appropriate to award Plaintiff $1,350.00 in liquidated damages. Additionally, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to her attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 

216(b).

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motions and the underlying documents in the record, 

the Court finds that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment in favor 

of Plaintiff for the requested amount.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motions for Entry of Default Judgment 

(Docs. 16, 26) be GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be awarded $1,350.00 plus 

post-judgment interest at the applicable statutory rate, and of that amount, $1,291.50 in 

trebled unpaid minimum wages be awarded against all Defendants – Defendants Desert 

Run Transportation, LLC, Crisse Jordan, Ryan R. Witte, and Jane Doe Witte, jointly and 

severally. The remaining $58.50 in unpaid non-minimum wage damages be awarded 

against Defendant Desert Run Transportation, LLC;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff have no later than 14 days

after entry of Judgment to file an application for attorneys’ fees and costs.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report 

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and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any 

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to 

the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 20th day of December, 2024.

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