Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00333/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00333-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN VOAGE, CDCR #AI-5010,

Plaintiff,

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; 

VIBRA HOSPITAL; and 

MASSOUD SOUMEKH,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-CV-333 JLS (BLM)

ORDER: (1) DISMISSING CIVIL 

ACTION FOR FAILING TO 

PREPAY FILING FEES REQUIRED 

BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), AND

2) DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

(ECF No. 2)

Plaintiff Kevin Voage, incarcerated at the California Health Care Facility in 

Stockton, California, proceeding pro se and with the assistance of a fellow inmate, has filed 

a Complaint pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF No. 1 

(“Compl.”).

Plaintiff contends Defendants denied reasonable accommodations for his disability 

in violation of Americans with Disabilities Act and acted with deliberate indifference to 

his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment while he was incarcerated at 

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, California, in October 2017. Id.

at 2–4, 6–10.

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the 

time he submitted his Complaint, nor has he filed a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

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(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). With the assistance of a fellow inmate, however, 

he has filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. See ECF No. 2 (“Mot.”).

I. Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP Status

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Section 

1915(a)(2) requires all persons seeking to proceed without full prepayment of fees to file 

an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets possessed and demonstrates an inability 

to pay. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015).

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), he is cautioned 

that, even if he files an IFP Motion and affidavit in compliance with § 1915(a)(2), he will 

nevertheless remain obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments,” see Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether his case is ultimately 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1), (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th 

Cir. 2002). He must also submit a “certified copy of [his] trust fund account statement (or 

institutional equivalent) . . . for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the 

complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). 

From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 

20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in Plaintiff’s account for the past six months, or 

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is 

greater, unless he has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1), (4); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850. 

The Court then directs the institution having custody of Plaintiff to collect subsequent 

 

1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

June. 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income in any month in which his

account exceeds $10, and to forward them to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“Although indigent prisoners are still accorded IFP status if they establish that they meet 

the prerequisites, § 1915(b) provides that prisoners proceeding IFP must pay the filing fee 

as funds become available in their prison accounts.”).

Because Plaintiff has neither paid the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to 

commence a civil action nor filed a properly supported Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his case cannot yet proceed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Rodriguez, 169 

F.3d at 1177.

II. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff’s fellow inmate, Dexter Brown, has also filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel 

on Plaintiff’s behalf. See generally Mot.

2 Mr. Brown claims that Plaintiff is paralyzed and 

that Mr. Brown has been “preparing various complaints/claims” on Plaintiff’s behalf

because Plaintiff has been “unable to obtain [other] assistance from . . . unit staff.” Id. at 

1. Mr. Brown contends that he has since been moved to another building, however, which 

“severely limit[s his] ability to communicate with Plaintiff.” Id. Therefore, Mr. Brown 

requests the appointment of counsel on Plaintiff’s behalf, arguing Plaintiff’s disabilities 

alone make his case “exceptional.” Id. at 2.

There is, however, no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep’t 

of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 

2009). And while 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) grants the district court limited discretion to 

 

2 Plaintiff is cautioned that “[a]ny person who is appearing propria persona (without an attorney) (i.e., pro 

se) must appear personally for such purpose and may not delegate that duty to another person.” S.D. Cal. 

CivLR 83.11(a). A litigant in federal court has a right to act as his or her own counsel. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1654; Johns v. Cnty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997). That right is personal to Plaintiff, 

however, and while nothing prevents Mr. Brown from helping Plaintiff prepare his pleadings or otherwise 

assisting Plaintiff, Mr. Brown may not “pursu[e] claims on behalf of [Plaintiff] in a representative 

capacity.” Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases).

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“request” that an attorney represent an indigent civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of 

Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), and Mr. Brown is correct to note that this 

discretion may be exercised under “exceptional circumstances,” id.; see also Terrell v. 

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991), it first and necessarily depends upon 

Plaintiff’s IFP status. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (“The court may request an attorney to 

represent any person unable to afford counsel.”). 

Because Plaintiff has neither requested nor has been granted leave to proceed IFP 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a) and (b) in this case, he is not eligible to request the 

appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) at this time.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court:

1. DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this civil action based on Plaintiff’s 

failure to pay the $400 civil filing and administrative fee or to submit a Motion to Proceed 

IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) and 1915(a);

2. DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel 

(ECF No. 2);

3. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date this Order is 

electronically docketed to: (a) prepay the entire $400 civil filing and administrative fee in 

full, or (b) complete and file a Motion to Proceed IFP which complies with 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2) and Civil Local Rule 3.2(b); and

4. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to provide Plaintiff with the Court’s 

approved form “Motion and Declaration in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis.”

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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If Plaintiff fails to either prepay the $400 civil filing fee or fully complete and submit 

the enclosed Motion to Proceed IFP within forty-five (45) days, this action WILL 

REMAIN dismissed without prejudice without further Order of the Court based on 

Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)’s fee requirement.3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2019

 

3 Plaintiff is cautioned that, if he chooses to proceed further by either prepaying the full $400 civil filing 

fee or submitting a properly supported Motion to Proceed IFP, his Complaint will be reviewed before 

service and may be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and/or 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), regardless of whether he pays the full $400 filing fee at once or is granted IFP status and 

is obligated to pay the full filing fee in installments. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua 

sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks 

damages from defendants who are immune); see also Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing similar screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A of all complaints filed by prisoners 

“seeking redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity”).

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