Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-00348/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-00348-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ARTHUR LEE GILES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 2:06-cv-0348-CLS-TMP

)

CARTER DAVENPORT,

[1] Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON RULE 59(e) MOTION TO

ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

This court entered a memorandum opinion and order on April 3, 2013, denying the

petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Arthur Lee Giles pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254, and seeking relief from his state court conviction for capital murder and death

sentence.

2 Giles subsequently filed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),

a timely motion to alter or amend that judgment.

3 The following day, he filed a second

motion, asserting additional grounds for the same relief.

4

Following consideration of the

1 Carter Davenport was substituted for Grant Culliver as defendant because Myers is the

current Warden of the State of Alabama’s HolmanCorrectionalFacility, at which petitioner is housed.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (providing that, when a public officialwho is named as a party in an official

capacity ceases to hold office while the action is pending, “the officer’s successor is automatically

substituted as a party”).

2 See doc. nos. 68 (Memorandum Opinion Denying Habeas Relief) and 69 (Order Denying

Habeas Relief).

3 See doc. no. 70 (Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment).

4 See doc. no. 71 (Second Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment).

1

FILED

 2016 Apr-14 PM 02:25

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:06-cv-00348-CLS-TMP Document 92 Filed 04/14/16 Page 1 of 22
motions and the parties’ briefs,

5

this court concludes that both motions are due to be

denied.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

No specific grounds for relief are stated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),

which addresses motions to alter or amend a judgment. Instead, the rule provides only

that such motions “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Consequently, the standards for ruling upon such motions are

found in case law, which generally holds that the decision of whether to alter or amend

a judgment is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See, e.g.,

American Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn Estess & Associates, Inc., 763 F.2d 1237,

1238-39 (11th Cir. 1985).

6 Even so, the Eleventh Circuit has said that “‘[t]he only

5 See doc. no. 82 (Petitioner’s Amended Brief Showing “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse

Procedural Defaults of Certain Claims); doc. no. 88 (Response to Giles’s Motion to Alter or Amend

the Judgment, Supplemental Authorities, and Allegations of Cause and Prejudice to Overcome

ProceduralDefault of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims); and doc. no. 91 (Petitioner’s Reply

Brief in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Reply Brief Regarding “Cause” and

“Prejudice” to Excuse ProceduralDefaults of Certain Claims). The court notes that petitioner filed a

brief on August 22, 2013, and a second brief on September 3, 2013, while simultaneously requesting an

extension of time to file his initial brief. See doc. nos. 77 (Brief of Petitioner Showing “Cause” Under

Martinez/Trevino andRequestingLimitedExtensionof Time toComplete Briefingon“Prejudice”) and

79 (Petitioner’s Brief Showing “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse Procedural Defaults of Certain

Claims). The motion for extensionof time was granted,andGiles’s counselwas allowed additionaltime

to file his initialbrief. See doc. no. 80 (Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time). Giles ultimately

filed his initialbrief in a timely manner, but exceeded the page limitation. See doc. no. 82. Even so, the

brief has been considered.

6 See also, e.g., Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11thCir. 1998) (holding that

a district court’s discretionary denialof a Rule 59(e) motion “is ‘especially soundly exercised when the

party has failed to articulate any reason for the failure to raise the issue at an earlier stage in the

2

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grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion are newly discovered evidence or manifest

errors of law or fact.’” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting

In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999)) (first alteration supplied, second

alteration in original); see also, e.g., United States v. Marion, 562 F.3d 1330, 1335

(11th Cir. 2009) (same). Rule 59(e) may not be used “to relitigate old matters, raise

argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”

Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343 (quoting Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Florida,

408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)); see also, e.g., Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc.,

555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) (same). Finally, a judgment should not be altered

or amended if doing so would serve no useful purpose. 11 Wright, Miller & Kane,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995).

7

II. DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RAISED IN GILES’S INITIAL

MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT

A. Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel Pursuant to Martinez and

Trevino8

As explained in the Memorandum Opinion previously entered in this case, a

litigation”) (quoting O’Neal v. Kennamer, 958 F.2d 1044, 1047 (11th Cir. 1992)).

7 Quod vanum et inutile est, lex non requirit (“The law does not require what is vain and

useless”), sometimes stated as lex neminem cogit ad vana seu inutilia peragenda (“The law does

not require anyone to do vain or useless things”).

8 See doc. no. 82 (Petitioner’s Amended Brief Showing “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse

ProceduralDefaults of CertainClaims); doc. no. 91 (Petitioner’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to

Alter or Amend Judgment andReplyBrief Regarding “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse Procedural

Defaults of Certain Claims).

3

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federal court cannot grant habeas relief to a state prisoner unless the petitioner has first

exhausted his state court remedies. “‘In other words, the state prisoner must give the

state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a

federal court in a habeas petition.’”

9

When a state prisoner fails to present a federal constitutional claim in the state

courts in a timely and proper manner, resulting in the state court’s refusal to address the

merits of the claim based on state procedural rules or principles, a federal habeas court

also is precluded from addressing the claim — unless: (1) the state prisoner shows both

(a) cause for failing to comply with the state’s procedural rules, and (b) actual prejudice

as a result of having failed to do so, or (2) the prisoner presents evidence showing that

the federal court’s failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., Coleman v . Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991);

9 Doc. no. 68 (Memorandum Opinion Denying Habeas Relief), ¶ IV.A., at 27 (quoting

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (in turn citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251

(1886), and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1))). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) reads as follows:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shallnot be granted unless it appears

that— 

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of

the State; or

(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or 

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect

the rights of the applicant.

4

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Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1989); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81-88

(1977).

This so-called “procedural default doctrine” bars habeas review of state court

rejections of a state prisoner’s federal constitutional claims when three circumstances

converge: i.e., (i) the last state court to review the claim (ii) states clearly and expressly

that its disposition of the claim rests on a state-law procedural rule; and (iii) the state-law

ground “is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729 (emphasis supplied); see also, e.g., Harris, 489 U.S. at 262-

63; Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1173 (11th Cir. 1991).

Constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel typically can serve as “cause”

to excuse a procedural default, unless the attorney’s errors occurred during postconviction collateral proceedings in state court. That exception is based upon the general

rule that “[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction

proceedings.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551

(1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (applying the rule to capital cases))

(alteration supplied); see also id. at 755 (“Finley and Giarratano established that there

is no right to counsel in state collateral proceedings.”); id. at 757 (“Because Coleman

had no right to counsel to pursue his appeal in state habeas [i.e., state post-conviction

collateral proceedings], any attorney error that led to the default of Coleman’s claims in

5

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state court cannot constitute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas.”) (alteration

supplied).

10

As is often the case in Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, there is an

exception to the exception. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Coleman v. Thompson left

open the question of whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in state postconviction collateral proceedings that provide the first occasion to raise a claim of

10 As the Supreme Court observed in Martinez v. Ryan, – U.S. –, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012):

Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner’s

conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court

judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of

legal proceedings within our systemof federalism. These rules include the doctrine of

procedural default, under which a federal court will not review the merits of claims,

including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner

failed to abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g.,Coleman,supra, at 747–748, 111

S. Ct. 2546; Sykes, supra, at 84-85, 97 S. Ct. 2497. A state court’s invocation of a

procedural rule to deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal review of the claims if,

among other requisites, the state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to

support the judgment and the rule is firmly established and consistently followed. See,

e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. –, –, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127–1128, 179 L. Ed. 2d 62

(2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. –, –, 130 S. Ct. 612, 617–618, 175 L. Ed. 2d 417

(2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not

without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by

showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law. See

Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546. . . .

Coleman held that “[n]egligence on the part of a prisoner’s postconviction

attorney does not qualify as ‘cause.’” Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. –, –, 132 S. Ct.

912, 922, 181 L. Ed. 2d 807 (2012). Coleman reasoned that “because the attorney is

the prisoner’s agent . . . under ‘well-settled principles of agency law,’ the principal

bears the risk of negligent conduct on the part of his agent.” Maples, supra, at 922,

132 S. Ct., at 922.

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1316 (alteration in original, first ellipses supplied, second ellipses in original).

6

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ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Such proceedings have been described as

“initial-review collateral proceedings.” Coleman suggested, but did not hold, that the

Constitution may require states to provide counsel in initial-review collateral

proceedings because those proceedings are “the first place a prisoner can present a

challenge to his conviction.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755.

11 Thus, an initial-review

collateral proceeding effectively constitutes a state prisoner’s “one and only appeal” of

a claim that his trial attorney was ineffective, id. at 756, thereby potentially justifying an

exception to the rule that there is no constitutional right to counsel in collateral

11 See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1316, where the Supreme Court observed that

Coleman, however, did not present the occasion to apply this principle to

determine whether attorney errors in initial-review collateralproceedings may qualify

as cause for a procedural default. The alleged failure of counsel in Coleman was on

appealfromaninitial-review collateralproceeding,andin that proceeding the prisoner’s

claims had been addressed by the state habeas trial court. See 501 U.S., at 755, 111

S. Ct. 2546.

As Coleman recognized, this marks a key difference between initial-review

collateralproceedings and other kinds of collateralproceedings. Whenan attorney errs

in initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that no state court at any level will

hear the prisoner’s claim. ThisCourt on direct review of the state proceeding could not

consider or adjudicate the claim. See, e.g.,Fox FilmCorp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207,

56 S. Ct. 183, 80 L. Ed. 158(1935); Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 22 L. Ed. 429

(1875); cf. Coleman,supra, at 730-731, 111 S. Ct. 2546. And if counsel’s errors in an

initial-review collateral proceeding do not establish cause to excuse the procedural

default in a federal habeas proceeding, no court will review the prisoner’s claims.

The same is not true when counsel errs in other kinds of postconviction

proceedings. While counsel’s errors in these proceedings preclude any further review

of the prisoner’s claim, the claimwillhave been addressed by one court, whether it be

the trial court, the appellate court on direct review, or the trial court in an initial-review

collateral proceeding. See, e.g., Coleman, supra, at 756, 111 S. Ct. 2546.

7

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proceedings. See id. at 755; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (holding

that states must appoint counsel on a prisoner’s first appeal oftrial errors).

12

The Supreme Court carved out such an exception in Martinez v. Ryan, – U.S. –,

132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), saying that:

To protect prisoners with a potentially legitimate claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel, it is necessary to modify the unqualified

statement in Coleman that an attorney’s ignorance or inadvertence in a

postconviction proceeding does not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural

default. This opinion qualifies Coleman by recognizing a narrow

exception: Inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral

proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of

a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.

Id. at 1315 (emphasis supplied); see also id. at 1320 (“Where, under state law, claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral

proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a

substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral

proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.”). The

12 As the Supreme Court observed in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. at 1317:

Where . . . the initial-review collateral proceeding is the first designated

proceeding for a prisoner to raise a claimof ineffective assistance at trial, the collateral

proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner's direct appeal as to the

ineffective-assistance claim. This is because the state habeas court“looks to the merits

of the clai[m]” of ineffective assistance, no other court has addressed the claim, and

“defendants pursuing first-tier review . . . are generally ill equipped to represent

themselves” because they do not have a brief from counsel or an opinion of the court

addressing their claim of error. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 617, 125 S. Ct.

2582, 162 L. Ed. 2d 552 (2005); see Douglas, 372 U.S., at 357–358, 83 S. Ct. 814 [

alteration in original].

8

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Martinez Court elaborated its rationale as follows:

Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel when an attorney’s errors (or the absence of an attorney)

caused a procedural default in an initial-review collateral proceeding

acknowledges, as an equitable matter, that the initial-review collateral

proceeding, if undertaken without counsel or with ineffective counsel, may

not have been sufficient to ensure that proper consideration was given to

a substantial claim. From this it follows that, when a State requires a

prisoner to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a

collateral proceeding, a prisoner may establish cause for a default of an

ineffective-assistance claim in two circumstances. The first is where the

state courts did not appoint counsel in the initial-review collateral

proceeding for a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. The second is

where appointed counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where

the claim should have been raised, was ineffective under the standards of

Strickland v . Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1984).

[13] To overcome the default, a prisoner must also demonstrate

that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a

substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the

claim has some merit. Cf. Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S. Ct.

1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003) (describing standards for certificates of

13 The Court’s opinion in Strickland established a two-pronged standard for judging, under the

SixthAmendment,the effectiveness of attorneys who represent criminaldefendants at trialor ondirect

appeal.

A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as

to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the

defendant mustshowthat counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing

that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteedthe defendantby the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant mustshow

that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that

counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trialwhose

result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the

conviction or death sentence resulted froma breakdown in the adversary process that

renders the result unreliable.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (emphasissupplied);see also, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390

(2000) (same); Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1215 (11th Cir. 2001) (same).

9

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appealability to issue).

Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19.

14

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Trevino v. Thaler, – U.S. –, 133 S. Ct. 1911

(2013), extended the Martinez exception to situations in which a state’s procedural

framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical

case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective

assistance oftrial counsel on direct appeal. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921.

Giles relies upon Martinez and Trevino to assert that he can overcome the

procedural default of several of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims due to

the following circumstances.

15

Giles filed an initial Rule 32 petition for collateral review in the state trial court,

and amended the petition twice.

16 The Rule 32 court subsequently held an evidentiary

hearing at which both testimonial and documentary evidence was presented.

17 During that

hearing, Giles’s

14 See also doc. no. 68 (Memorandum Opinion Denying Habeas Relief), at 35-38 (discussing

Martinez).

15 Doc. no. 82 (Petitioner’s Amended Brief Showing “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse

Procedural Defaults of Certain Claims), at 3-30; doc. no. 91 (Petitioner’s Reply Brief in Support of

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Reply Brief Regarding “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse

Procedural Defaults of Certain Claims), at 14-25.

16 Doc. no. 82 (Petitioner’s Amended Brief Showing “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse

Procedural Defaults of Certain Claims), at 2.

17

Id.

10

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state post-conviction counsel recognized that Petitioner had to amend his

Rule 32 petition to conform the petition to the evidence presented at the

evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Rule 32 R. Vol. 33, at 8, 36. The Rule 32

court agreed and directed the Petitioner to file an amended petition

conforming the pleadings to the evidence within 33 days after the mailing

of the hearing transcripts. Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, at 596. The transcripts

were mailed in November 1999, and state post-conviction counsel advised

the court that Petitioner would file his Third Amended Petition by

December 21, 1999. Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, at 599.

Doc. no. 82 (Petitioner’s Amended Brief Showing “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse

Procedural Defaults of Certain Claims), at 3. Despite that representation, Giles’s state

post-conviction counsel did not file his third amended Rule 32 petition until August 14,

2000, which also happened to be the same day on which the trial court entered its

judgment denying the claims asserted in Giles’s second amended Rule 32 petition.

Consequently, “the state courts did ‘not consider the allegations contained in [Giles’s

third amended Rule 32] petition because they were never properly before the circuit

court.’”

18

In other words, the claims asserted in the third amended petition were

procedurally defaulted.

According to Giles, there is “cause” to excuse the procedural default of each of

those claims because his post-conviction counsel “suffered a period of severe depression

beginning in 1999 and lasting into 2000 — the time during which she was working on the

18

Id. at 3 (quoting Giles v. State, 906 So. 2d 963, 973 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)) (alteration

supplied).

11

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Third Amended Petition.”

19 Giles also asserts that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s

failure to comply with the State’s procedural rules because of his inability to present the

following claims:

1. The claim that 1991 sentencing counsel labored under a conflict of

interest

20

Giles asserts that the court should consider his “Sixth Amendment actualineffectiveness claim based on the conflict of interest between [his own] interests and

his [trial] lawyers’ pecuniary interests created by a [state] statutory limit of 50 hours of

compensation for out-of-court work.”

21 Giles’s amended habeas petition, however, did

not contain an allegation of conflict of interest between him and his trial lawyers growing

out of Alabama’s statutory caps on attorney compensation. Instead, the claim reads in

its entirety as follows:

19

Id. at 4-5 (citing Exhibits A & B, the affidavits of post-conviction counsel Angela Phinney

and psychotherapist NanD. Stromberg). Mrs. Phinney attests she has suffered fromdepression since

college, and between1999and2000 the condition rendered her “unable to work or concentrate for long

periods of time,” although she admits she did not seek professional help until 2005. Doc. no 82-1

(Affidavit of Angela Phinney), at ¶¶ 4-9. Ms. Stromberg began treating Mrs. Phinney in 2005, and

attests Phinney suffers from“Major Depressive Disorder,Recurrent.” Doc. no. 82-2(Affidavitof Nan

Stromberg), at ¶¶ 4-5. Stromberg has “regularly and continually had sessions” with Phinney on a

weekly basis and Phinney “is on an aggressive treatment regime to treat her depression.” Id.

20 See doc. no. 82 (Petitioner’s Amended Brief Showing “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse

Procedural Defaults of Certain Claims), at 6-13; doc. no. 91 (Petitioner’s Reply Brief in Support of

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Reply Brief Regarding “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse

Procedural Defaults of Certain Claims), at 23-25.

21 Doc. no. 82 (Petitioner’s Amended Brief Showing “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse

Procedural Defaults of Certain Claims), at 6 (alterations and emphasis supplied) (citing doc. no. 45

(FirstAmendedUnifiedPetitionfor Writ of Habeas Corpus SeekingRelieffromUnconstitutionalTrial

and Conviction of Capital Murder and Sentence of Death), at 109-110).

12

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(37) Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Violated by Alabama Limits on

Court Appointed Compensation

APPLICATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 2254: This claim was raised in state

post-conviction at Vol 43 Tab #R-69 pp. 723-725; Vol 52 Tab #R-71 p.

110.

U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372

U.S. 335, 342 (1963).

364. At the time of Giles’ trial in 1991, the State of Alabama

severely limited compensation for attorneys appointed by the court to

represent criminal defendants charged in capital cases. Alabama Code §

15-12-21 (1975). Arthur Giles was represented by court-appointed

attorneys at his sentencing trial. The lead counsel in Giles’ 1991

sentencing trial, Herb Sparks, recalled he was appointed by Judge Holladay

when Sparks was sitting in the courtroom for criminal docket call. Vol 33

Tab #R-60 p. 49. Though he was lead counsel, this was Sparks’ first capital

murder case. Id. at pp. 114-115.

365. The attorneys did not conduct any investigation whatsoever.

Counsel’s timesheets indicated only 3 hours were spent on “investigation,”

and Herb Sparks testified that time was spent driving by the Nelson’s [sic]

old farm 11 years after the crime. Vol 54 Ex 6. These records indicate

counsel was paid a total of $3,064.05, $1860 for time in court and $1000

for out of court. [sic] Vol 54 Ex 6.

Doc. no. 45 (First Amended Unified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Seeking Relief

from Unconstitutional Trial and Conviction of Capital Murder and Sentence of Death),

at 109-110 (capitalization and other emphasis in original).

The text of those paragraphs cannot reasonably be construed to raise a claim for

ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon a theory of counsel’s pecuniary

conflict of interest. Nor can Giles’s citation to Gideon v. Wainwright, which only

13

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invokes the Supreme Court’s holding “that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Sixth

Amendment’s guarantee of right to counsel obligatory upon the States.” Pointer v.

Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 401 (1965) (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342). Because Giles did

not raise the pecuniary conflict of interest theory in his amended habeas petition, he

cannot now avail himself of Martinez in an effort to seek review ofthat claim.

Moreover, even if the court were to consider Giles’s argument as part of a more

general ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, it would not succeed. This court found

Giles’s ineffective assistance claim on these grounds to be procedurally defaulted

because “the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals would ‘not consider the allegations

contained in [the third amended] petition because they were never properly before the

circuit court.’”

22 This court also conducted a de novo review of this claim, and found it

to be meritless because Giles did “not attempt to show how the compensation limits

actually adversely impacted his defense. Strickland requires a showing of both a

professionally unreasonable error by counsel and prejudice to the defense caused by that

error. Under that theory, Giles has shown neither.”

23

In summary, Giles’s reliance on Martinez is a moot point, and his post-judgment

22 Doc. no. 68 (Memorandum Opinion Denying Habeas Relief), at 297-98 (quoting Giles v.

State, 906 So. 2d at 973) (alteration supplied).

23

Id. at 297 (emphasis in original).

14

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arguments and theories concerning the Strickland standard

24

either were or could have

been raised prior to judgment. There are no material errors of law or fact in connection

with the decision on this claim.

2. The claim that 1991 sentencing counsel failed to investigate Giles’s

background

25

Giles cannot rely upon Martinez for this claim either, because the claim was not

procedurally defaulted. Instead, this court found the claim to be without merit after

conducting a 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) review of the Rule 32 court’s dismissal of the claim

for lack of specificity pursuant to Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.3 and

32.6(b).

26 Additionally, and consistent with the pre-judgment position Giles himself

took,

27

this court conducted a 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) review of the Rule 32 court’s

24 As a matter of note, Giles’s post-judgment argument that his heretofore unarticulated

pecuniary “conflict of interest” theory should have been subjected to Cuyler v. Sullivan’s presumed

prejudice standard — as well as Strickland’s actual prejudice standard — is a non-starter for the

reasons set out in the Memorandum of Opinion. See doc. no. 68 (Memorandum Opinion Denying

Habeas Relief), at 297-98. Further, in Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1327-28 (11thCir. 2006),

the EleventhCircuit held that “there is no Supreme Court holding that any kind of presumed prejudice

rule applies outside the multiple representation context” addressed inCuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335

(1980)).

25 Doc. no. 82 (Petitioner’s Amended Brief Showing “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse

Procedural Defaults of Certain Claims), at 13-30; doc. no. 91 (Petitioner’s Reply Brief in Support of

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Reply Brief Regarding “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse

Procedural Defaults of Certain Claims), at 14-23.

26 Doc. no. 68 (Memorandum Opinion Denying Habeas Relief), at 249-62.

27 See doc. no. 44 (Brief in Support of First Amended Unified Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus SeekingRelief fromUnconstitutionalTrial andConviction of CapitalMurder and Sentence of

Death), at 90 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and asserting that “[t]his claimwas dismissed on grounds

that counsel was aware of this information and decided not to pursue it as a matter of strategy. This

is an utterly unreasonable determination of the facts.”) (alteration supplied); doc. no. 57 (Reply to

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adjudication of the claim based on the evidence presented to it at the Rule 32 hearing.

28

The court has examined Giles’s arguments and finds that he is attempting to relitigate old

matters or to present arguments or evidence that could have been raised prior to

judgment.

29 There are no manifest errors of law or fact in the court’s resolution30

of this

issue.

3. Remaining claims

Giles asserts that post-conviction counsel’s failure to timely file the third

amended petition “meant that the state courts did not hear the ineffective assistance of

trial counsel claims that were raised or adequately pleaded for the first time in the Third

Amended Petition.”

3 1 To support that argument, he cites to several pages of this court’s

Memorandum Opinion denying habeas relief to demonstrate that this court found his

State’s Answer to Unified Habeas Petition), at 76 (asserting that this claimwas “fully litigated at Rule

32 and decided on the[] merits”) (alteration supplied).

28 Doc. no. 68 (MemorandumOpinion Denying Habeas Relief), at 258-78. The Rule 32 court

expressly considered the evidence presented at the Rule 32 hearing in its judgment. See Rule 32C.R.

Vol. 56, Tab. 87 at 85-90, 103-07, 112-115. As admitted by Giles, the purpose of the third amended

complaint was to comport the evidence presented at the Rule 32 hearing. Doc. no. 82 (Petitioner’s

AmendedBrief Showing “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse ProceduralDefaults of CertainClaims),

at 3. In any event, as set out in the Memorandum Opinion, the factual findings made by the Rule 32

court are entitled to deference, and this court found the claim in Giles’s habeas petition to be without

merit. Doc. no. 68 (Memorandum Opinion Denying Habeas Relief), at 258-78.

29 Doc. no. 68 (Memorandum Opinion Denying Habeas Relief), at 258-78.

30

Id. at 249-78.

31 Doc. no. 82 (Petitioner’s Amended Brief Showing “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse

Procedural Defaults of Certain Claims), at 3.

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ineffective assistance claims to be procedurally barred.

32 He also makes a brief assertion

in a footnote that post-conviction counsel’s diagnosed depression supplies the cause to

overcome the default of the claims, and that certain pages of Giles’s pre-judgment

supporting briefsupply the requisite prejudice.

33

Giles’s blanket citations to pages of this court’s Memorandum Opinion and a prejudgment supporting brief are wholly inadequate to support a Rule 59 motion, or to

justify a Martinez exception to the procedural default rule. Moreover, with regard to the

singular claim for which this court actually has conducted a Martinez review, the court

found that Martinez did not apply.

34

Finally, as discussed in the following section, this

court conducted an alternative de novo review of each of the other claims identified by

Giles, and found each claimto be without merit.

In summary, none of the other claims identified by Giles warrant review under the

Martinez framework.

B. Giles’s Contention That the Court Failed to Apply Controlling Precedent

When Determining Whether Claims Raised for the First Time in His Third

Amended Rule 32 Petition Were Barred by Adequate and Independent State

32

Id. (citing doc. no. 68 (Memorandum Opinion Denying Habeas Relief) at 40-44, 101, 119,

157, 185, 271, 279-80, 282, 294, 296).

33

Id. at 4 n.1 (citing doc. no. 44 (Brief in Support of First Amended Unified Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus Seeking Relief from Unconstitutional Trial and Conviction of Capital Murder and

Sentence of Death), at 10, 19, 35, 90, 93, 94, 97).

34 See doc. no. 68 (Memorandum Opinion Denying Habeas Relief), at 101-05.

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Grounds

35

The court has examined Giles’s arguments and finds that he is attempting to

relitigate old matters or to present arguments or evidence that could have been raised

prior to judgment. There are no manifest errors of law or fact in the court’s resolution

of this issue. Moreover, although the court found the claims raised in the third amended

petition to be procedurally defaulted, it alternatively found all but three claims to be

without merit after conducting a de novo review.

36

As for the remaining three claims, this court examined the first to determine

whether cause and prejudice were present to overcome the procedural default under

Martinez. It examined the other two claims to determine whether a procedural default

would result in a miscarriage of justice. Neither exception to the procedural default rule

was found to apply.

3 7 Even if this court were to alternatively conduct a de novo review

of these three claims, the claims would be found to be meritless for the same reasons

that the exceptions to the procedural default rule did not apply.

C. Giles’s Contention That the Court Misapplied Controlling Precedent When

35 See doc. no. 70 (Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment), at 11-18; doc. no. 82 (Petitioner’s

AmendedBrief Showing “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse ProceduralDefaults of CertainClaims),

at 2-4; doc. no. 91 (Petitioner’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and

ReplyBrief Regarding “Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse ProceduralDefaults of CertainClaims), at

1-2, 14-30.

36 See doc. no. 68 (Memorandum Opinion Denying Habeas Relief) at 40-44, 97-100, 119-20,

157-58, 174-87, 236-38, 271-73, 279-80, 282-84, 292-99, 323-25.

37

Id. at 101-05, 163-66, 173-74.

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Determining Whether He Could Show Prejudice Relating to Trial Errors

Affecting the Jury, When the Jury Recommended Life Imprisonment

Without Parole

38

The court has examined Giles’s arguments and finds that he is attempting to

relitigate old matters or to present arguments or evidence that could have been raised

prior to judgment. There are no manifest errors of law or fact in the court’s resolution

ofthis issue.

D. Giles’s Contention That the Court Misapprehended Controlling Facts

When Determining that Juror Sharon Elliott Was Not Biased, and,

Missapplied Controlling Law When Concluding That Error Was Harmless

39

The court has examined Giles’s arguments and finds that he is attempting to

relitigate old matters or to present arguments or evidence that could have been raised

prior to judgment. There are no manifest errors of law or fact in the court’s resolution

ofthis issue.

E. Giles’s Contention That the Court Misapplied Controlling Precedent When

Determining That the Trial Court’s Reliance on the Presentence

Investigation Report Did Not Violate Petitioner’s Right to Due Process of

Law

40

The court has examined Giles’s arguments and finds that he is attempting to

relitigate old matters or to present arguments or evidence that could have been raised

38 Doc. no. 70 (Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment) at 18-35.

39

Id. at 35-46.

40

Id. at 46-57.

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prior to judgment. There are no manifest errors of law or fact in the court’s resolution

ofthis issue.

F. Giles’s Contention That the Court Failed to Recognize and Missapplied

Controlling Precedent When Determining That the Alabama Supreme

Court’s Decision in Ex parte Hays Did Not Violate the Constitution’s Ban

on Ex Post Facto Laws, Be cause the Court (1) Failed to Determine That the

Rule Announced in Ex parte Hays Was Foreseeable in Light of the Law

Expressed at the Time of Giles’s Alleged Criminal Conduct, and, (2) Failed

to Recognize That “Procedural” Changes to the Law Can Increase

Punishment

41

Giles devotes 103 of the 162 pages of his initial motion to alter or amend the

judgment to these arguments.

42 He also filed a “Notice of Supplemental Authorities,”

citing two Supreme Court decisions that were handed down after judgment was entered

in this case.

43 Despite the length of those arguments, and even after reviewing the

supplemental authorities identified by Giles, the court concludes that Giles is attempting

to relitigate old matters or to present arguments or evidence that could have been raised

prior to judgment.

44 There are no manifest errors of law or fact in the court’s resolution

41

Id. at 57-160; doc. no. 74 (Notice of Supplemental Authorities) at 1-50; doc. no. 91

(Petitioner’s ReplyBrief in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment andReplyBrief Regarding

“Cause” and “Prejudice” to Excuse Procedural Defaults of Certain Claims) at 2-13.

42 Doc. no. 70 (Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment), at 57-160.

4 3 See generally doc. no. 74 (Notice of Supplemental Authorities) (citing Metrish v.

Lancaster, – U.S.– , 133 S. Ct. 1781 (May 20, 2013), Peugh v. United States, – U.S.– , 133 S. Ct.

2072 (June 10, 2013)).

44 The court notes that Giles’s reliance on Peugh v. United States,133 S. Ct. 2072 (June 10,

2013) is misplaced, because that case “involved a direct appealof a sentence,” and “says nothing about

the authority to consider an . . . error on collateral review.” Spencer v. U.S., 773 F.3d 1132, 1144

(11th Cir. 2014) (citing Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915-916-19 (7th Cir. 2013) (denying

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ofthis issue.

III. DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RAISED IN GILES’S SECOND

MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT

Giles’s second motion to alter or amend the judgment alleges that the court made

a factual error in one sentence of the Memorandum Opinion.

45 Respondent agrees and

points out that a companion sentence also contains a factual error.

46 Accordingly, the

following sentences on pages 323-324 of the Memorandum Opinion are STRICKEN: “A

new trial occurred in 1982, resulting in conviction and jury recommendation of life

without parole. The trial court’s override of that recommendation and imposition of a

death sentence was reversed on appeal and remanded for a new sentencing trial before

a new jury.”

47

In place thereof, the Memorandum Opinion is AMENDED to reflect the

accurate procedural history, which is: “A new trial occurred in 1982, resulting in a

conviction for capital murder and a sentence of death by electrocution. The second

conviction was affirmed, but the Alabama Supreme Court set aside Giles’s sentence of

rehearing en banc because the intervening decision in Peugh did not affect collateral review of

sentencing errors)); see also Herrera-Gomez v. U.S., 755 F.3d 142, 145-47 (2ndCir. 2014) (holding

that the Peugh decision was neither a new substantive rule of constitutional law made retroactive to

cases on collateral review nor a watershed procedural rule to be applied retroactively to cases on

collateral review).

45 See doc. no. 71 (Second Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment), at 2-3.

46 Doc. no. 88 (Response to Giles’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, Supplemental

Authorities, and Allegations of Cause and Prejudice to Overcome Procedural Default of Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel Claims), at 19-20.

47 Doc. no. 68 (Memorandum Opinion Denying Habeas Relief), at 323-24.

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death and ordered a new sentencing hearing.”

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

After careful review of the arguments, the record, and this court’s Memorandum

Opinion Denying Habeas Relief, Giles’s first motion to alter or amend the judgment is

due to be, and it hereby is, DENIED. Giles’s second motion to alter or amend the

judgment is GRANTED, and the factual errors contained in the Opinion are AMENDED

as expressly set out above.

DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of April, 2016.

______________________________

United States District Judge

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