Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00755/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00755-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAREE BUTLER,

NO. CIV. S-07-755 LKK/DAD

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

CITY OF SACRAMENTO,

SACRAMENTO POLICE

DEPARTMENT and OFFICER

MICHELLE PEREZ,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, Sharee Butler, brings suit against the City of

Sacramento, the Sacramento Police Department and Detective Michelle

Perez under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging she was unlawfully detained

and arrested. Plaintiff brings additional state law claims for

false imprisonment, battery and violation of her civil rights.

Pending before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a claim. The court resolves the

matter upon the parties' papers and after oral argument. For the

reasons set forth below, the motion is denied in part and granted

in part.

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I. 

Factual Allegations

 Plaintiff’s allegations stem from two police searches executed

on June 28, 2006 pursuant to a search warrant issued by Sacramento

County Superior Court. The warrant authorized the search of, inter

alia, 3629 Merano Way, Antelope, California and a white 1998 Acura

vehicle registered to plaintiff at 3629 Merano Way, Antelope,

California. Compl. ¶ 11. The complaint is silent as to whether

the searches had to be executed simultaneously. 

The factual allegations are fairly straight forward. On June

28, 2006 at approximately 8:15 p.m., plaintiff parked her car in

the parking lot of the Wal-Mart located on Watt Avenue in

Sacramento. Plaintiff then observed a light-colored Ford Explorer

SUV pull behind her vehicle, blocking it in. Compl. ¶ 14.

Sacramento police officers allegedly rushed from the SUV and other

unmarked police vehicles with their guns drawn and pointed at

plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff was then handcuffed and placed in the

SUV. Compl. ¶ 14-15. At that point, the officers drove

plaintiff's vehicle and the police vehicles to the rear of the

Wal-Mart where officers searched the interior and exterior of

plaintiff's vehicle. Compl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that she was

detained in the SUV for more than one hour. Compl. ¶ 16. 

At the conclusion of the search of plaintiff’s car, Detective

Michelle Perez informed plaintiff that the officers had found no

contraband, but refused to release plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 16.

Detective Perez kept plaintiff handcuffed in the backseat and drove

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the SUV to plaintiff's residence at 3629 Merano Way. Id. A search

was then conducted of plaintiff’s residence. Id. When officers

entered the premises they pepper-sprayed plaintiff's dog despite

plaintiff’s offer to take control of the animal. Id. While the

search was proceeding, officers directed plaintiff to sit in the

living room of her residence. Compl. ¶ 17. At approximately 11:30

p.m., Detective Perez informed plaintiff that no contraband had

been discovered in the search, removed plaintiff's handcuffs and

exited the residence with the other law enforcement personnel.

Compl. ¶ 18. Plaintiff was neither charged or arrested for any

criminal offense in connection with the search of her vehicle or

her home. 

Plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the City of

Sacramento regarding her state law claims and it was rejected on

October 26, 2006. Compl. ¶ 9. In the present action, plaintiff

alleges that defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights by

"detaining her without reasonable suspicion or probable cause after

defendants failed to discover contraband in her vehicle." Compl.

¶ 19. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated her Fifth

Amendment rights by "unreasonably and without reasonable suspicion

or probable cause detaining plaintiff after completing the search

of her vehicle, which amounted to an illegal arrest." Compl. ¶ 20.

Plaintiff also brings state law claims for false imprisonment,

battery, and violation of civil rights pursuant state law. Compl.

¶¶ 21-23. 

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1 The holding in Twombly explicitly abrogates the well

established holding in Conley v. Gibson, that, "a complaint should

not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." 355 U.S.

41, 45-46 (1957); Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1968.

4

II. 

Standard for Motions to Dismiss

In order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim, plaintiffs must allege "enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). While a complaint need not plead

"detailed factual allegations," the factual allegations it does

include "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level." Id. at 1964-65. 

As the Supreme Court observed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a)(2) requires a "showing" that the plaintiff is entitled to

relief, “rather than a blanket assertion” of entitlement to relief.

Id. at 1965 n. 3. Though such assertions may provide a defendant

with the requisite "fair notice" of the nature of a plaintiff's

claim, only factual allegations can clarify the "grounds" on which

that claim rests. Id. "The pleading must contain something more.

. . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion

[of] a legally cognizable right of action." Id. at 1965 (quoting

5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at

235-36 (3d ed. 2004)).1

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must

be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

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The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every

reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the pleader.

See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other

grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). That said,

the court does not accept as true unreasonable inferences or

conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual

allegations. W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th

Cir. 1981).

III. 

Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that she was unlawfully detained and falsely

arrested when defendants, upon concluding the search of her vehicle

and discovering no contraband, continued to detain her and

transport her to her residence, which was also searched.

Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff cannot

state a claim because the detention was incident to the search of

her vehicle and residence, and was therefore reasonable. 

A. Plaintiff’s Claim under the Fourth Amendment 

1. Law Governing Detention Incident to Search 

The Fourth Amendment protects "the right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV.

Although the seizure of a person generally must be supported by

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probable cause to be reasonable, "some seizures admittedly covered

by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the

personal security of those detained and are justified by such

substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on less

than probable cause." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696

(1981) (citations omitted). Considering the temporary detention

of a person during a warrant-based search, the Supreme Court has

held, in Michigan v. Summers, that "a warrant to search for

contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the

limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a

proper search is conducted." Id. at 705. (footnotes omitted).

Nonetheless, a detention incident to a search must be reasonable.

Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).

"To determine whether a detention incident to a search is

constitutionally reasonable, [the court] balance[s] the law

enforcement interests served by the detention against the public's

privacy interests." Id. (citing Ganwich v. Knapp, 319 F.3d 1115,

1120 (9th Cir. 2003)). The law enforcement interests served by

such a detention are "preventing flight in the event that

incriminating evidence is found; minimizing the risk of harm to the

officers; and facilitating the orderly completion of the search,

as detainees' self interest may induce them to open locked doors

or locked containers to avoid the use of force." Muehler v. Mena,

544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03)

(internal cites omitted). 

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2

 In this respect the warrant is vague. According to the

allegations contained in the complaint, the search warrant provided

for the search of, inter alia, both the house and car but did not

specify if the searches had to be executed simultaneously. This

ambiguity, however, does not prevent the court from adjudicating

the pending motion. 

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2. Whether Plaintiff’s Detention was Reasonable 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants, acting under color of state

law, deprived her of her Fourth Amendment rights by "detaining her

without reasonable suspicion or probable cause after defendants

failed to discover contraband in her vehicle." Compl. ¶ 19. In

their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that since plaintiff "has

alleged she was only detained for approximately three (3) hours,

just long enough for the officers to complete the search of her

vehicle and residence, pursuant to a search warrant," her detention

was coextensive with the period of the search and was therefore

reasonable. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 3. 

Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that the two

searches, conducted at different locations and at different times,

may be considered one search for the purposes of evaluating

plaintiff’s detention under Summers.2 Moreover, it is clear that

the time plaintiff was detained between the execution of the

searches cannot be characterized as a detention incident to the

search of her car. Generally, a person may be detained only for

the period of the search and may not be detained once the search

is complete. See Dawson, 435 F.3d at 1066. Here, plaintiff

alleges that the police continued to detain her after her car was

searched and no contraband was discovered. Thus, plaintiff's

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continued detention after the conclusion of the search of her

vehicle may not be justified as detention incident to the search

of her car.

Second, even if plaintiff’s continued detention may be viewed

as detention incident to the search of her house, the court cannot

conclude, based on the facts alleged in the complaint, that the

detention was reasonable under Summers. 

Whether a detention is reasonable depends on “both the

character of the official intrusion and its justification.”

Summers, 452 U.S. at 700. A detention may be unlawful under the

Fourth Amendment “either because the detention itself is

[unreasonable] or because it is carried out in an unreasonable

manner.” Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994).

A seizure must be “carefully tailored” to the law enforcement

interests that, according to the Summers line of cases, justify

detention while a search warrant is being executed. Ganwich v.

Knapp, 319 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003). “[A] detention

conducted in connection with a search may be unreasonable if it is

unnecessarily painful, degrading, or prolonged[.]” Franklin, 31

F.3d at 876. 

When a person is detained away from the premises to be

searched, there is an increased intrusion on his privacy. See

United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 1994). Many

circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, have held that detentions

are unreasonable if the person is away from the premises to be

searched. For example, where the defendant had exited the premises

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to be searched and was stopped while driving away some distance

from the house, the Ninth Circuit found Summers inapplicable on the

grounds that the defendant was not detained in or adjoining the

place being searched and was obviously in no position to facilitate

the orderly completion of the search while lying handcuffed face

down in a ditch some distance from the house. United States v.

Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that the balance of

interests did not allow police to detain a defendant after stopping

him three blocks from the premises for which they had a search

warrant because "the police's legitimate law enforcement interest

in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence was

found was far more attenuated than in Summers." United States v.

Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 93-94 (10th Cir. 1996). The court reasoned

that the defendant "did not know prior to being stopped that any

warrant was being executed" and "thus had no reason to flee." Id.

See also United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 778 (8th Cir.

2001) (detention unreasonable when defendant was at work, at least

a twenty-five-minute drive from his residence, was unaware of the

warrant, and did not pose a flight risk).

Common to all these cases is a determination that the

detention in question did not advance the governmental purposes

articulated in Summers, for example, preventing flight in the event

that incriminating evidence is found or facilitating the orderly

completion of the search. 

In the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that the police had no

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reason to detain her once they completed the search of her car.

She alleges that she remained handcuffed and kept in the police car

despite the fact that nothing incriminating was found in her car.

Although defendants claim that the detention in between the

searches was reasonable, the court is adjudicating a motion to

dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment. The facts of the

allegation are taken as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). While it may be that the police had a legitimate reasons

to detain plaintiff, these facts are not contained in the

complaint. In determining whether a detention incident to a

search was reasonable, the court looks at the totality of the

circumstances. Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir.

2003). At this point, the court does not know all the

circumstances surrounding the searches and cannot determine if

plaintiff’s detention was “carefully tailored” and the law

enforcement interests outweighed the intrusion on plaintiff's

privacy. See Ganwich, 319 F.3d at 1122. 

For these reasons, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts so

as to state a claim that defendants violated her Fourth Amendment

right to be free from illegal seizure. Although the police found

no contraband in plaintiff’s car, they continued to detain her in

handcuffs. Once the car search was complete, plaintiff contends

that there was no reason to continue the detention. Moreover, she

was detained at some distance from her house, which is an increased

invasion of plaintiff's privacy interests. See Hogan, 25 F.3d at

693. These factual allegations are sufficient to state a claim and

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for this reason, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim

based on the Fourth Amendment is denied. 

B. Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Claim for False Arrest

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated her Fifth Amendment

rights by "unreasonably and without reasonable suspicion or

probable cause detaining plaintiff after completing the search of

her vehicle, which amounted to an illegal arrest." Compl. ¶ 20.

Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff has failed

to state a claim. 

It is not clear what specific Fifth Amendment right defendants

allegedly violated when they continued to detain plaintiff. Making

a “blanket assertion” of entitlement to relief is insufficient to

state a cause of action. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n. 3. While

plaintiff has clearly alleged a violation of her Fourth Amendment

rights, the complaint fails to specify how plaintiff’s Fifth

Amendment rights were violated. 

Moreover, plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim appears to

duplicate plaintiff’s claim under the Fourth Amendment, namely,

that she was illegally seized. Plaintiff’s opposition brief fails

to mention, much less discuss, her Fifth Amendment claim and how

it differs from her claim under the Fourth Amendment. 

In short, it is not clear how plaintiff’s claim under the

Fifth Amendment is a separate or alternative claim to her claim

under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim under

the Fifth Amendment is dismissed with prejudice.

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C. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

Given that plaintiff has stated a claim pursuant to Section

1983, the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Arbaugh v. Y

& H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, “federal

courts may exercise ‘supplemental’ jurisdiction over state-law

claims linked to a claim based on federal law.”). Accordingly, the

court addresses defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s state law

causes of action. 

1. False Imprisonment

Plaintiff alleges that defendants "falsely imprisoned

plaintiff by illegally restraining her by means of physical force,

threat of force and/or arrest, physical barriers, and other means

amounting to unreasonable duress, causing plaintiff to suffer

physical injury and emotional distress." Compl. ¶ 21. In order

to state a claim for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must allege

that she was intentionally confined without consent, without lawful

privilege, and for an appreciable period of time, however brief.

Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 496 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2000).

Here, the factual allegations are sufficient to state a cause

of action. Plaintiff alleges she was intentionally confined

without her consent and without lawful privilege when defendants

confined her and handcuffed in a police vehicle without reasonable

suspicion or probable cause. Plaintiff also alleges that she was

confined for an appreciable period of time, namely, the time

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between the search of her car and the search of her house. 

Defendants argue that the detention of plaintiff was

reasonable. As discussed in the context of plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claim, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to claim

that her detention was unreasonable. Accordingly, defendants’

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for false imprisonment is

denied.

2. Battery

Plaintiff alleges that defendants "intentionally, willfully

and without just cause battered plaintiff by forcefully and

violently handcuffing her, and refusing to remove the handcuffs

once defendants completed the search of plaintiff's vehicle in the

parking lot of Wal-Mart, causing plaintiff to suffer physical

injury and emotional distress." Compl. ¶ 22. 

In order to state a claim for battery, a plaintiff must allege

that (1) defendant intentionally did an act which resulted in a

harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff's person, (2)

plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and (3) the harmful or

offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to the

plaintiff. Piedra v. Dugan, 123 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1495 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2004); Fluharty v. Fluharty, 59 Cal. App. 4th 484, 497 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1997). Additionally, in a battery action against police

officers, a plaintiff must also allege that the police used

unreasonable force. Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th

1269, 1272 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 

In the case at bar, plaintiff has alleged that without her

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3

 Defendants’ sole argument on this point is that the

detention and use of handcuffs was reasonable. As discussed in the

context of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim, plaintiff has set

forth sufficient factual allegations to state a claim that she was

unreasonably detained. Accordingly, defendants’ argument is

without merit. 

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consent and "without just cause” defendants “battered plaintiff by

forcefully and violently handcuffing her." Compl. ¶ 22. Although

police may use force, including handcuffs, to effect a detention

incident to a search, the force must be reasonable under the

circumstances. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98-99. Plaintiff alleges the

force was unreasonable. Plaintiff also alleges that she suffered

physical injury and emotional distress as a result of defendants’

actions. Accordingly, the factual allegations are sufficient to

state a claim that the amount of force used was unreasonable and

constituted battery.3 For this reason, defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s battery claim is DENIED.

3. Violation of Civil Rights under the Bane Act

Plaintiff also brings suit under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (“The

Bane Act”). This statute creates a cause of action for “any

individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, or . . . of this state,

has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with” by

any other person through “threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Cal.

Civ. Code § 52.1(a)-(b). In short, § 52.1 requires “an attempted

or completed act of interference with a legal right, accompanied

by a form of coercion.” Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 334

(1998). There is no requirement of state action analogous to the

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requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that when she was detained and handcuffed,

defendants interfered with her federal and state constitutional

rights to be free from “illegal detention and false arrest.”

Compl. ¶ 23. It is well established that the “[u]se of law

enforcement authority to effectuate a stop, [and] detention

(including use of handcuffs) . . . can constitute” threats,

intimidation, or coercion under the Bane Act. Cole v. Doe 1 Thru

2 Officers of City of Emeryville Police Dept., 387 F. Supp. 2d

1084, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (relying on California cases

interpreting the Bane Act). Here, plaintiff alleged she was

handcuffed and detained, which interfered with her right to be free

from illegal seizures. For these reasons, and for the reasons

previously discussed, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

claim under the Bane Act is denied. 

IV.

Conclusion

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to

plaintiff’s first, third, fourth and fifth claims for

relief and GRANTED with respect to plaintiff’s second

claim for relief. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 6, 2007.

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