Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01226/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01226-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK WILLIAM STANLEY,

CDCR #V-92538,

Civil No. 07-1226 H (BLM)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO

APPOINT COUNSEL [Doc. No. 3]

(2) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE AND GARNISHING

$350 BALANCE FROM

PRISONER’S TRUST ACCOUNT

[Doc. No. 2]; AND

(3) DISMISSING ACTION FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

AND FOR SEEKING MONETARY

DAMAGES AGAINST IMMUNE

DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) &

1915A(b)(1)

vs.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA;

UNION BANK OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Mark William Stanley, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State

Prison in Delano, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff did not prepay the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2], along with a Motion to Appoint Counsel [Doc. No. 3]. 

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I. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil action.

The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however, unless an

indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district courts are

granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may be exercised

only under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

“A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the ‘likelihood of success

on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be

viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d

1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice

nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley,

827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

II. Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2]

Effective April 9, 2006, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a

district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a

filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure

to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners

granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless

of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v.

Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

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1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. Plaintiff’s trust

account statement shows that he has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this time.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from

bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the

prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281

F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal

of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to

him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

IFP [Doc. No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However,

the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk

of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

III. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

A. Standard

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

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provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion

thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,

446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing

an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of

the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

A. Constitutional Claims

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on

other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

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B. Eleventh Amendment

In his Complaint, Plaintiff names the Superior Court of California as a Defendant because

he had difficulty obtaining court forms and filing documents. (See Compl. at 2-3.) The Superior

Court for the State of California, as an agency of the State of California, is not a “person”

subject to suit and is instead, entitled to absolute immunity from monetary damages actions

under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53-54

(1996); Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir.

1987). In order to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must identify a “person” who, acting

under color of state law, deprived him of a right guaranteed under the Constitution or a federal

statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the Superior Court for the State of California are

dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

C. Claims against private entity

In addition, Plaintiff fails to allege any act on the part of Union Bank of California which

was taken “under color of state law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Private parties do not generally act under color of state law; thus, “purely private conduct, no

matter how wrongful, is not within the protective orbit of section 1983.” Ouzts v. Maryland

Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08

(9th Cir. 1991). 

While a plaintiff may seek to hold a private actor liable under section 1983, he must

allege facts that show some “state involvement which directly or indirectly promoted the

challenged conduct.” Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 553; West v. Atkins, 457 U.S. 42, 49, 54 (1988);

Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1118-1120 (9th Cir. 1997). In other words, Plaintiff must

show that the private actor’s conduct is “fairly attributable” to the state. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,

457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); see also Vincent v. Trend Western Technical Corp., 828 F.2d 563, 567

(9th Cir. 1987). 

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Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show that the Union Bank of

California acted on behalf of, or in any way attributable to, the state. Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations

against the Union Bank of California fail to satisfy the first prong of a § 1983 claim. See

Haygood, 769 F.2d at 1354.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim

upon which relief may be granted and seeks damages against immune defendants, and is

therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). Because it

is not altogether certain that Plaintiff would be unable to allege any additional facts, however,

the Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend his pleading in light of the

standards set forth above. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

IV. Conclusion and Order

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED without prejudice [Doc. No.

3];

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2] is

GRANTED. 

3. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on James Tilton,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) and 1915A(b)(1) and (2). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty

five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D.

Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended

Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted

as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir.

1996). 

6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a Court approved form § 1983 complaint

to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 24, 2007

____________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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