Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02437/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02437-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Section 1915(e)(2)(B) states:

. . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the

court determines that--

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERARD CHANG,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

GREATER BAY BANK, GREATER BAY

BANCORP, CHERYL E. HOWELL, KRYSTYNA

MARCINIAK, CATHLEEN COLGAN, ERIC

LEE and DOES 1 to 50,

 Defendants.

__________________________________/

No. C 07-2437 CW

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION

TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Gerard Chang requests leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (IFP) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Ninth Circuit

has indicated that leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) is properly granted only when the plaintiff has

demonstrated poverty and has presented a claim that is not

factually or legally frivolous within the definition of

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).1

 O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir.

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 1 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

1990); Tripati v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370

(9th Cir. 1987). Thus, the court "may deny leave to proceed in

forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the

proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit." 

Id. (quoting Reece v. Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 140 (9th Cir.

1962); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

382 U.S. 896 (1965)). An in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous

if it has "no arguable basis in fact or law." O'Loughlin, 920 F.2d

at 617; Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1379; Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d

1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984).

The Supreme Court holds that dismissal prior to service under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is appropriate where no legal interest is

implicated, i.e., the claim is premised on a meritless legal

theory, or clearly lacking any factual basis. Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) accords judges the

unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual

allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are

clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). 

Because a dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) is not a dismissal

on the merits, but rather an exercise of the court's discretion

under the in forma pauperis statute, the dismissal does not

prejudice the filing of a paid complaint making the same

allegations. Id.

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following. As of

April 16, 2001, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant Greater Bay Bank

(GBB) as a Vice President and Trust Officer of its trust company,

Greater Bay Trust Company (GBTC). Plaintiff was offered a base

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 2 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

salary of $85,000.00 plus a twenty percent bonus and stock options.

Plaintiff's previous experience is in the administration of

employee benefits retirement plans. GBB hired Plaintiff to be a

trust account administrator of employee benefits plans and some

individual retirement accounts. All the named individual

Defendants are employees of GBB and GBTC.

Defendant Cheryl E. Howell, an Executive Vice President and

Compliance Officer of GBTC, assigned to Plaintiff a large number of

personal trust accounts, and charitable and non-profit accounts. 

These types of accounts are ordinarily handled by a personal trust

administrator who typically has several years of relevant work

experience and often has a law degree. Plaintiff did not have the

relevant work experience nor a law degree when he was assigned

these accounts. 

On January 26, 2005, Plaintiff resigned from his job on the

ground that he could not perform work that he was unqualified to

do. Defendants wrongfully retaliated against Plaintiff by denying

him the right to collect unemployment insurance benefits. 

Defendants also "robbed" Plaintiff of his bonus payment and stock

options to which he was entitled. Defendants wrongfully did not

take any action to allow Plaintiff to return to work. 

On December 13, 2005, Plaintiff filed a federal complaint

titled Chang v. Greater Bancorp, Howell, Marciniak, Colman, Lee and

Does 1 to 50, Case No. C 05-5166 CW (2005 complaint). On May 12,

2006, the Court entered an order dismissing many of the causes of

action in the First Complaint. On March 19, 2007, the Court

entered an order granting summary judgment to Defendants on the

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 3 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

remaining causes of action and judgment was entered against

Plaintiff. On April 13, 2007, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. 

This appeal is still pending in the Ninth Circuit. On May 10,

2007, Plaintiff moved to relate the two cases and, on May 17, 2007,

the Court entered an order relating them.

In December, 2006, during the pendency of the appeal of the

judgment on the 2005 complaint, Plaintiff's doctor diagnosed him

with bipolar disorder. Plaintiff communicated this fact to

Defendants' attorneys. On May 1, 2007, Plaintiff filed a

discrimination charge under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The

EEOC informed Plaintiff that the charge was untimely and that it

would take no action on it. Plaintiff informed Defendants'

attorneys that he intended to file a discrimination action in

federal court. Defendants' attorneys told Plaintiff that they

would seek to have his complaint dismissed based on untimeliness. 

Plaintiff alleges that this claim cannot be dismissed because

Defendants had knowledge of Plaintiff's mental breakdown and mental

disability and Plaintiff suffered the mental breakdown as a result

of the hostile working conditions willfully created by Defendants. 

Plaintiff was a plaintiff or defendant in several state court

cases involving individuals who are not parties to this lawsuit. 

Two state court judgments have been entered against Plaintiff. 

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following

causes of action: (1) violation of the ADA for wrongful

termination; (2) age discrimination based on wrongful termination;

(3) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act because Defendants

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 4 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The eleventh cause of action appears to be a duplicate of the

tenth cause of action.

5

demanded that Plaintiff perform work he was unqualified to do; 

(4) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act based on the hostile

work environment created by Defendants; (5) violation of the Fair

Labor Standards Act based on non-payment of earnings; (6) violation

of civil rights based on wrongful termination; (7) violation of

civil rights based on Defendants' wrongfully withholding disability

benefits from Plaintiff; (8) violation of civil rights based upon

Defendants' denying health benefits to Plaintiff; (9) violation of

civil rights based upon Defendants' actions toward Plaintiff

arising out of his mental breakdown; (10) violation of civil rights

based upon constructive termination; (11) violation of civil rights

based upon constructive termination2; (12) fraud; (13) extortion,

coercion and duress; (14) negligence; (15) intentional infliction

of emotional distress; (16) negligent infliction of emotional

distress; (17) tortious interference with Plaintiff's life and

finances; and (18) negligent interference with Plaintiff's life and 

finances. Based upon these causes of action Plaintiff requests

compensatory damages based on his loss of compensation, general

damages for emotional distress and mental anguish and punitive

damages in the amount of $10,000,000. 

In its order granting Defendants' motion to dismiss in the

2005 case, the Court summarized Plaintiff's allegations as follows: 

On April 16, 2001, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant

Greater Bay Bancorp (GBB) as a Vice President and Trust

Officer of its Trust Company, Greater Bay Trust Company

(GBTC). Plaintiff was offered a base salary of

$85,000.00 plus a twenty percent bonus and stock options. 

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 5 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

Defendant GBB hired Plaintiff to be the trust account

administrator of its employee benefits plans and of some

individual retirement accounts. Plaintiff's professional

experience is in the administration of employee benefit

retirement plans. In connection with 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (the Patriot Act),

GBB and GBTC had to implement and comply with certain

stringent procedures. When Defendant Cathleen Colgan,

Vice President and Senior Trust Officer responsible for

the administration of Personal Trust accounts, resigned

from her job, Defendant Cheryl Howell, Executive Vice

President of GBB and head of GBTC, assigned Defendant

Colgan's trust accounts, charitable accounts and nonprofit accounts to Plaintiff. Under Patriot Act

regulations, Defendant Howell should have transferred

those accounts to people with relevant experience. 

Plaintiff did not have the experience to administer such

accounts, and Defendant Howell failed to provide to

Plaintiff any program or tools to handle those accounts. 

Defendant Eric Lee, Trust Administrative Assistant at

GBTC, failed to support Plaintiff in the administration

of client accounts as his job required. Defendant

Krystyna Marciniak, Vice President of Operations and

Compliance Officer of GBTC, failed to act in her capacity

as Compliance Officer to prevent this non-compliance with

regulations and sound business principles.

On January 26, 2005, Plaintiff resigned from his job with

GBTC on grounds that he was being asked to perform acts

that contravene banking regulations and the Patriot Act. 

Defendant GBB later refused Plaintiff's claims

for unemployment insurance benefits, and also refused to

pay Plaintiff's bonus. Plaintiff filed complaints with

the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board and

the California Labor Commissioner. Both agencies denied

Plaintiff's claims.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts sixteen

causes of action alleging breach of fiduciary duty,

violation of the Patriot Act, violation of fair labor

standards, and violation of civil rights. The first

eight counts claim that Defendants breached their

fiduciary duty under 12 U.S.C. § 92(a), in their

assignment of accounts to Plaintiff without properly

training him to handle the accounts. Counts nine and ten

claim that Defendant Howell failed to comply with the

Patriot Act by assigning Plaintiff to accounts he did not

know how to manage . . . 

Plaintiff seeks an injunction barring GBB from engaging

in actions that contravene the laws of the United States

and the public interest, reinstatement to his position

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 6 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

with seniority and benefits commensurate with his

experience, lost wages, punitive damages, legal fees, and

other relief the Court deems proper.

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss in First Complaint (Doc. # 31).

Therefore, except for the allegation that Plaintiff suffered

from bipolar disorder, the 2005 complaint and the instant complaint

contain the same allegations against the same Defendants. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Doctrine of Res Judicata

A. Legal Standard 

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits the re-litigation

of any claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior

action. Western Radio Servs. Co., Inc. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189,

1192 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v.

Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981)). The purpose of the doctrine is

to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple law suits,

conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent

decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” Marin v. HEW,

Health Care Financing Agency, 769 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1985)

(quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). Res judicata

operates where there is “1) an identity of claims, 2) a final

judgment on the merits, and 3) identity or privity between

parties.” Western Radio, 123 F.3d at 1192 (citing Blonder-Tongue

Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323-324 (1971)). 

The federal rule on the preclusive effect of a judgment from which

an appeal has been taken is that the pendency of an appeal does not

suspend the effect of a final judgment for res judicata purposes. 

Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 759 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1985),

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 7 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

superseded on other grounds, 880 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Two claims or causes of action are the same, for purposes of

the first prong of the res judicata test, if they arise from the

same transaction or series of transactions. Two events are part of

the same transaction or series of transactions where the claims

share a factual foundation such that they could have been tried

together. Western Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir.

1992). “Different theories supporting the same claim for relief

must be brought in the initial action.” Id. Likewise, all

evidence pertinent to a particular claim must be raised in the

initial action because “when a court of competent jurisdiction has

entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the

parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound not only

as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or

defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter

which might have been offered for that purpose.” Commissioner of

Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

B. Application

A review of the allegations in the 2005 complaint and the

instant complaint reveals that, except for the allegations that

Plaintiff suffers from a bipolar disorder, the two complaints have

identical allegations against Defendants. 

Here, the first two prongs for the application of res judicata

are easily met because there was a judgment on the merits in the

2005 complaint and the parties are the same in both actions. 

Plaintiff argues that the causes of action in the two complaints

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 8 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

are different. However, the causes of action in both complaints

arise from the same transactions or series of transactions. As

stated above, two events are part of the same transaction or series

of transactions where the claims share a factual foundation such

that they could have been tried together. Therefore, all

Plaintiff's causes of action are dismissed based upon the

application of the doctrine of res judicata. This is true of the

disability claims based on Plaintiff's bi-polar disorder even

though Plaintiff alleges that he was not aware of his mental

disorder until December, 2006 and he allegedly did not know about

it when he filed his complaint. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

knew about his mental disorder when he resigned and that, in

February, 2005, he was involuntarily placed in a hospital for two

days. Because the 2005 complaint was filed in December, 2005,

after he was hospitalized, Plaintiff should have known, just as he

alleges Defendants did, that he was suffering from a mental

disorder.

Even if the doctrine of res judicata did not apply to

Plaintiff's claims based on mental disability, they are deficient

for additional reasons, discussed below.

II. Claims Based Upon Bi-Polar Disorder

In the instant complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was not

diagnosed with bipolar disorder until December 11, 2006 (Comp. at 

¶ 40) but that Defendants knew that Plaintiff resigned on January

26, 2005 due to a mental breakdown because he resigned due to

unusual circumstances "that any reasonable person would consider to

be due to a mental breakdown." (Comp. at ¶ 59). Plaintiff brings

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 9 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

two claims premised on the theory that Defendants discriminated

against him on the basis of his bipolar disorder: the first cause

of action based upon wrongful termination in violation of the ADA

and the sixth cause of action based upon wrongful termination in

violation of Plaintiff's civil rights.

A. ADA Claim

Title I of the ADA prohibits a "covered entity" from

discriminating against a "qualified individual with a disability"

on the basis of that individual's disability. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(a). To establish that an employment termination

constituted discrimination under Title I, a plaintiff must prove

that (1) he or she is disabled; (2) he or she is qualified to

perform the essential functions of the job, either with or without

accommodation; and (3) he or she was terminated because of his or

her disability. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d

1080, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff's allegations giving rise to his ADA claim based on

his termination has several deficiencies. First, Plaintiff alleges

that he was not diagnosed with a mental illness until almost two

years after his resignation. Yet, he alleges that Defendants knew

he had a mental illness. He does not explain how Defendants could

have known of his diagnosis many months before his own doctor

diagnosed him. If Defendants did not know of Plaintiff's mental

illness, they could not have terminated him or taken any other

adverse employment action against Plaintiff because of his

disability. 

Second, Plaintiff alleges that, although he filed a disability

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 10 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

If the complainant initially institutes proceedings with a

state or local agency, the EEOC charge must be filed within 300

days. Santa Maria, 202 F.3d at 1176.

11

discrimination charge with the EEOC, this agency took no action on

the charge because it was untimely filed. To bring a claim under

Title I of the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative

remedies by filing a formal complaint with the EEOC and filing suit

within ninety days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter. Santa

Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Substantial compliance with this requirement is a jurisdictional

prerequisite. Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th

Cir. 2001). Therefore, it does not appear that this claim is

exhausted and thus, this Court does not have jurisdiction over it. 

Furthermore, under the ADA, there is a 180-day period for an

aggrieved party to file a charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12117.3 Because Plaintiff resigned on January 26, 2005 and filed

his ADA charge with the EEOC on May 1, 2007, his charge was

untimely. However, because this filing period is treated as a

statute of limitations, the same defenses that are available to a

statute of limitation violation, including equitable tolling, are

available when the claimant fails to file a timely charge with the

EEOC. Santa Maria, 202 F.3d at 1176. "[E]quitable tolling focuses

on the plaintiff's excusable ignorance of the limitations period

and on lack of prejudice to the defendant." Id. Plaintiff's

complaint is deficient because he has not alleged any facts which

would support equitable tolling of his ADA claim.

This claim is dismissed with leave to amend for Plaintiff to

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 11 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

correct the noted deficiencies, including the application of res

judicata, if he truthfully can do so.

B. Civil Rights Claim Based on Disability Discrimination

Plaintiff generally alleges that his civil rights have been

violated by Defendants' discrimination against him based on his

disability; he does not specify which constitutional right or

rights has been violated. Plaintiff must bring a claim for any

constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "provides a cause of action for the

'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v.

Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights

elsewhere conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

(1989). To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);

Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Because it appears from the complaint that all Defendants are

private actors who did not commit the alleged wrongful acts under

color of state law, Plaintiff may not bring against these

Defendants any claim that they violated his constitutional rights. 

Plaintiff also does not specify which of his civil rights have been

violated by which Defendant. In order to put Defendants on notice

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 12 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

of the causes of action against them, he must specify this

information. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim for violation of his

civil rights based upon his disability must be dismissed for these

reasons as well. If Plaintiff can add truthful allegations that

remedy these deficiencies, including the application of res

judicata, he has leave to amend this cause of action.

III. Application to Proceed IFP

Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP is deficient. On his

application, he indicates he is not employed and that he has no

income. He also indicates that he owns a home with an estimated

market value of over $1,000,000 and which has a monthly mortgage of

$4,459.78. He has assets of one bank account with a balance of

$2,200 and stocks with a value of $400. His monthly expenses are

$700 for rent and $250 for food. He has two money judgments

against him in the amounts of $119,874 and $40,831. 

Plaintiff does not adequately explain how he can pay his

mortgage and monthly expenses if he is not employed and has no

other source of income. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not provide

adequate reasons for not being able to pay the filing fee when he

has assets in the form of equity in his home and cash in his bank

account.

Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma

pauperis is DENIED. If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended

complaint, he must pay the full filing fee.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons noted above, Plaintiff's causes of action are

dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff's two causes of

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 13 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

action based on his disability are dismissed for other reasons as

well. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must

do so within thirty days of the date of this order. If Plaintiff

does not file an amended complaint within this time period, his

complaint will be dismissed for failure to prosecute. If Plaintiff

files an amended complaint, he must pay the full filing fee.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/7/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 14 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHANG et al,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GREATER BAY BANK et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV07-02437 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on June 7, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies)

in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in

the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's

office.

Gerard Chang

1247 Vicente Street

San Francisco, CA 94116

Dated: June 7, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:07-cv-02437-CW Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 15 of 15