Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01259/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01259-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Silvia Peters, 

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 04cv1259-BEN (POR)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS 

[Dkt. Nos. 77, 83, 97, and 101]

vs.

Guajome Park Academy Charter School, et

al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court are Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 77, 83, 97, and 101]. 

The motions are presented by three groups of Defendants: (a) the Vista Unified School District

(“VUSD”), David Hubbard, Dave Cowles, and John Hannaman; (b) the Guajome Park Academy

Charter School (“GPACS”), Stephen Halfaker, Beverly Kanawi, and Mike Hadjiaghai; and (c) the

Board of Trustees of Guajome Park Academy and Guajome Park Academy Charter School.

Peters’ first Complaint was dismissed because she was seeking relief for her minor son as

next friend and guardian but without a licensed attorney to represent her son’s interests. See Order

dated October 29, 2004. In arguing against dismissal, Peters argued that apart from her son’s

rights to seek relief under the IDEA, a parent may urge her own IDEA rights pro se. The First

Amended Complaint, like the initial Complaint, told a complicated story about the special

education needs of Peters’ son, the alleged mal-treatment of Peters’ son from employees and

students in the Defendant Vista Unified School District and the Defendant charter school Guajome

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Park Academy, and Peters’ efforts to obtain a better educational experience for her son. There

were nine claims for relief: (1) a due process claim; (2) and equal protection claim; (3) a §504 of

the Rehabilitation Act claim; (4) an Americans with Disabilities Act claim; (5) a Title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 claim; (6) a Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 claim; (7) a

violation of California Government Code §1090 claim; (8) a First Amendment claim; and (9) a

civil Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act claim. At various points, Peters appeared

to be asserting her own rights, at other points, it appeared she was still asserting the rights of her

minor son (which she may not do pro se). 

The First Amended Complaint was dismissed and with leave of Court, Peters filed a

Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) was 27 pages and

94 paragraphs long. In her SAC, Plaintiff again set out the same nine separate claims for relief

each based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants again moved to dismiss and the school districts

and school officials sued in their official capacity were dismissed based upon the Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Plaintiff was again granted leave to amend her Complaint and has now

filed a Third Amended Complaint.

Peters’ Third Amended Complaint is 25 pages and 116 paragraphs long. In this iteration

she sues the Defendants in both their official and individual capacities and she asserts twelve

claims for relief. In some cases she seeks money damages and in others she seeks injunctive relief. 

The Defendants seek to dismiss either on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity, a failure to

exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA, the failure to state a claim for relief, or the

failure to properly serve certain Defendants with summons. The interplay between the various

claims and the different forms of relief, sought against Defendants in both official and individual

capacities, and the contours of Eleventh Amendment immunity, creates a complex matrix of

potential claims and immunities. Consequently, the claims are addressed one at a time.

II. MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Attacks on jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) can be either facial, confining the inquiry to

allegations in the Complaint, or factual, permitting a court to look beyond the Complaint. 

Polanski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 378 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1228 (S.D. Cal. 2005). For facial

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attacks, the allegations in the Complaint are taken as true. Id. When the motion challenges the

jurisdictional facts presented in the Complaint the court may consider evidence properly before it,

and the party opposing the motion has the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

A facial attack on jurisdiction under Rule 12 (b)(1) is similar to a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6). In both cases review is limited to the contents of the Complaint. Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W] hen the legal sufficiency of a complaint’s

allegations is tested by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), review is limited to the complaint.”). The

Court is required to presume all factual allegations of the Complaint to be true and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc.,

232 F.3d 979, 984 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6)

authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of dispositive issue of law.”). “A claim may be

dismissed only if ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Id. (citations omitted). At the same time, a court is

not to assume that a plaintiff can prove facts it has not alleged or that defendants have violated

laws in ways that have not been alleged. Associated General California, Inc. v. California State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

III. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

The VUSD Defendants and the GPACS Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s

claims brought under §1983 on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” The

decisions of the United States Supreme Court have extended the Amendment's applicability to

suits by citizens against their own States. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett,

531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). “The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that

nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.” Id. 

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This immunity from suit enjoyed by the States affects all of Plaintiff’s claims against the

two public school systems in her Third Amended Complaint. This is because public schools and

school officials sued in their official capacity are considered part of the State of California.

Berlanger v. Madera Unified School Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, VUSD and its

school officials are considered part of the State. Likewise, GPACS and its school officials, though

a charter school, is part of the California public school system and part of the State. Ridgecrest

Charter School v. Sierra Sands Unified, 130 Cal.App.4th 986, 998 (Cal.App. 2005) (“In 1998, the

Legislature, as part of AB 544, added section 47615 to the Act to find and declare that charter

schools are a part of the ‘Public School System, as defined in Article IX of the California

Constitution’; that they come under the system's jurisdiction; and that they are entitled to ‘full and

fair funding’ under the Act.”); Wilson v. State Board of Education, 75 Cal.App. 4th 1125, 1137

(Cal. App. 1999) (“[I]t is apparent that charter schools are part of California’s single, statewide

public school system.”).

All twelve of Plaintiff’s claims for relief are brought through 42 U.S.C. §1983. Eleventh

Amendment immunity has not been abrogated for §1983 claims. Carmen v. San Francisco

Unified School Dist., 982 F.Supp. 1396, 1403 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing §1983 claim against

California school district and district’s officials). As the court in Carmen recognized, while §1983

provides a federal forum to assert a deprivation of a civil liberty, it does not provide that forum for

a citizen who seeks a remedy against a State. Id. (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are

“persons” who can be sued in federal court under §1983. Id. However, there are two recognized

exceptions which could provide grounds for federal court jurisdiction. The two exceptions are for

suits seeking only prospective injunctive relief and individual capacity suits.

IV. EACH OF THE TWELVE CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

The first claim for relief is brought against the individual Defendants in their official

capacities. Because the individual Defendants are school officials being sued in their official

capacities, it is the same as a suit directly against the State of California and the Eleventh

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1

 A suit seeking declaratory relief, without more, does not provide a basis for federal court

jurisdiction and a court has discretion to decline consideration of a declaratory relief request. This

Court so declines.

2

 On her second claim for relief, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring, inter alia, Defendants

to adopt and implement training classes and adopt policies to ensure that Guajome Park Academy

complies with federal laws and complies with state laws regarding conflicts of interest.

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Amendment would ordinarily deprive this Court of jurisdiction to hear the claim. Berlanger v.

Madera Unified School Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1992). However, Peters seeks only

declaratory1

 and injunctive relief (in the form of an order to Defendants to take training courses on

disability discrimination and “violations of a FAPE”), not money damages. Therefore, the

Eleventh Amendment does not prevent the claim. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.

58, 66 (1989). 

However, while the Defendants are not immune from suit on this claim, the claim must be

dismissed because of a failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the IDEA. The

crux of the first claim for relief is that the Defendants have denied Plaintiff and her son a free and

appropriate education by failing to provide special education and related services. This type of

claim must first be pursued through the educational administrative process. Blanchard v. Morton

School District, 420 F.3d 918, 920-21 (9th Cir. 2005); Robb v. Bethel School District #403, 308

F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring dismissal of a complaint where the plaintiff has not exhausted

her administrative remedies under the IDEA). 

The first claim is dismissed without prejudice.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

The second claim for relief is also brought against the individual Defendants in their

official capacities. Because the individual Defendants are school officials being sued in their

official capacities, it is the same as a suit directly against the State of California and the Eleventh

Amendment would ordinarily deprive this Court of jurisdiction to hear the claim. Berlanger, 963

F.2d 248. However, Peters seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief,2

 not money damages. 

Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent the claim. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. at 66. 

However, while the Defendants are not immune from suit on this claim, the claim must be

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3

 For her third claim for relief, as for her second claim, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring,

inter alia, Defendants to adopt and implement training classes and adopt policies to ensure that

Guajome Park Academy complies with federal laws and complies with state laws regarding conflicts

of interest.

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dismissed because of a failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the IDEA. The

crux of the second claim for relief is that the Defendants have denied Plaintiff and her son a free

and appropriate education by failing to provide a safe learning environment. This type of claim

must first be pursued through the educational administrative process. Blanchard, 420 F.3d at 920-

21; Robb, 308 F.3d 1047 (requiring dismissal of a complaint where the plaintiff has not exhausted

her administrative remedies under the IDEA). 

The second claim is dismissed without prejudice.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

The third claim for relief is also brought against the individual Defendants in their official

capacities. Because the individual Defendants are school officials being sued in their official

capacities, it is the same as a suit directly against the State of California and the Eleventh

Amendment would ordinarily deprive this Court of jurisdiction to hear the claim. Berlanger, 963

F.2d 248. However, Peters seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief,3

 not money damages. 

Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent the claim. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58 at 66. 

However, while the Defendants are not immune from suit on this claim, the claim must be

dismissed because of a failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the IDEA. The

crux of the third claim for relief is that the Defendants have denied Plaintiff and her son a free and

appropriate education by “...failing to comply with the VRP [voluntary resolution plan] agreement

failing to establish a safe learning environment, by failing to adopt policies, procedures, practices,

staff, student, administration and teacher training.” This type of claim must first be pursued

through the educational administrative process. Blanchard, 420 F.3d at 920-21; Robb, 308 F.3d

1047 (requiring dismissal of a complaint where the plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative

remedies under the IDEA). 

The third claim is dismissed without prejudice.

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FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

The fourth claim for relief is brought against the individual Defendants in their individual

capacities and seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Because the individual Defendants are

school officials being sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in their individual capacities, the Eleventh

Amendment does not prevent the claim. Price v. Akaka,928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.

denied, 502 U.S. 967 (1991) (as amended on denial of r’hng and r’hng en banc). 

However, the claim for relief is too vague and fails to adequately allege a causal

connection between the conduct of each individual Defendant and an alleged violation of

Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Hubbard, Cowles,

Hannaman, Kanawi, Hadjiaghai, Halfaker, or any Does were personally involved in depriving

Peters of federal constitutional rights. That much is necessary to allege a § 1983 claim against

individuals acting in their individual capacity. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir. 2001);

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Instead, Peters alleges generally that “...the Individual Defendants (in their individual

capacity), and each of them, in refusing and failing to comply with the Direct Orders Relief from

CDE [California Department of Education], Plaintiff and her son were denied the benefits of

FAPE to which they were entitled under the IDEA.” The facts section of the Third Amended

Complaint does not supply the necessary allegations of causation. The only reference to an action

by the California Department of Education is found in paragraphs 37 to 40. There, Peters

describes a finding by the State Superintendent of Public Education. According to the Complaint,

Vista Unified School District and Guajome Park Academy was to provide some sort of

“assessment, placement, and an educational contract.” The Complaint alleges that Defendant

Hannaman appealed the decision and the appeal was denied. Finally, the Complaint then simply

alleges that the Vista Unified School District “did not provide the placement in compliance with

the direct orders of the state of California.” These allegations lack the necessary specificity to

state a §1983 claim for relief against state officials in their individual capacity. First, the denied

federal constitutional right is not identified. The Supreme Court has held that there is no federal

constitutional right to a free public education. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,

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411 U.S. 1 (1973). Second, the individual Defendant causing the denial of the federal

constitutional right is not identified. Third, the causal connection between the individual

Defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional violation is not described. Such

general allegations simply do not state a claim against any of the individual Defendants in the

individual capacities under §1983. E.g. Schwartz v. Snohomish County, Case No. C05-732P, slip

op., 2006 WL 692024 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2006) (general allegations which do not adequately

set forth causal connection between actions of individuals sued in their individual capacity and the

alleged constitutional violations are subject to dismissal). 

Moreover, this type of claim is at its core a claim that a statutory right to a free and

appropriate education has been denied and must first be pursued through the educational

administrative process. Blanchard, 420 F.3d at 920-21; Robb, 308 F.3d 1047 (requiring dismissal

of a complaint where the plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies under the IDEA). 

 The fourth claim is dismissed without prejudice.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

The fifth claim for relief is also brought against the individual Defendants in their

individual capacities and also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Because the individual

Defendants are school officials being sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in their individual capacities,

the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the claim. Price v. Akaka,928 F.2d at 828. 

However, this claim for relief is also vague and fails to specifically allege a causal

connection between the conduct of each individual Defendant and an alleged violation of

Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Hubbard, Cowles,

Hannaman, Kanawi, Hadjiaghai, Halfaker, or any Does were personally involved in depriving

Peters of federal constitutional rights. That much is necessary to allege a § 1983 claim against

individuals acting in their individual capacity. Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 915; Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. 

Peters alleges generally that “as a result of the action or inaction of the Individual

Defendants (in their individual capacity), and each of them, in refusing and failing to provide her

son a FAPE...by refusing and failing to provide a safe learning environment, by failing to adopt

policies, procedures, and practices, Plaintiff and her son were denied the benefits of FAPE to

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which he was entitled to under the IDEA.” The facts section of the Third Amended Complaint

however, suggests potential supervisory liability. Paragraph 19 alleges that the Defendants “knew

specifically that Plaintiff’s son was subjected to racial and disability discrimination, taunts, namecalling, physical assaults and even death threats.” The Complaint goes on to allege that “Plaintiff

and her son repeatedly reported incidents of verbal and physical harassment to all of the

Defendants, but their complaints fell on deaf ears.” Again in paragraph 21, Plaintiff alleges that

“harassment and physical assaults against Plaintiff’s son continued.” In paragraph 22, Plaintiff

alleges that “her son continued to experience retaliatory harassment by teachers that were

instructed by the administration of GPACS.” In paragraph 23, Plaintiff alleges that “her son

continued to receive...physical assaults, death threats, and rocks thrown at the back of his head,

mouth and the back of his body....Teachers were constantly humiliating and mocking Plaintiff’s

son in front of the other students and parents.” See also ¶¶ 35-36. 

Supervisory liability may be imposed through §1983 upon a supervisory official in his

individual capacity acting under color of law for his own culpable action or inaction in the

training, supervision, or control of his subordinates or for conduct that shows a callous or reckless

indifference to the rights of others. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991);

Harper v. Poway Unified School District, 445 F.3d 1166, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006), r’hng denied, 455

F.3d 1052 (2006) (vulgar, lewd, indecent, obscene, and plainly offensive speech as well as direct

physical confrontation may impinge upon the rights of public high school students while at

school). This type of claim which includes retrospective and non-educational injuries is not

subject to the exhaustion requirements of the IDEA. Blanchard, 420 F.3d at 921.

Nevertheless, the fifth claim for relief is deficient because these allegations lack the

necessary specificity to state a §1983 claim for relief against state officials in their individual

capacity. The Third Amended Complaint does not identify which individual Defendant or

Defendants may have been supervising the actors at the time or times when Plaintiff’s rights are

alleged to have been violated. Such general allegations simply do not state a claim against any of

the individual Defendants in the individual capacities under §1983. E.g. Snohomish County, 2006

WL 692024. 

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While it appears that Plaintiff may be able to articulate a valid claim for relief if given one

more opportunity, the pending fifth claim for relief is dismissed without prejudice.

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

The sixth claim for relief is also brought against the individual Defendants in their

individual capacities and also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Because the individual

Defendants are school officials being sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in their individual capacities,

the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this claim. Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d at 828. 

However, the claim for relief is too vague and fails to adequately allege a causal

connection between the conduct of each individual Defendant and an alleged violation of

Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged that either Defendants Hubbard,

Cowles, Hannaman, Kanawi, Hadjiaghai, Halfaker, or any Does were personally involved in

depriving Peters of federal constitutional rights. That much is necessary to allege a § 1983 claim

against individuals acting in their individual capacity. Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 915; Hansen, 885 F.2d

at 646. 

Instead, Peters alleges generally that “...the Individual Defendants (in their individual

capacity), and each of them, have acted with bad faith and with intentional disregard of Plaintiff’s

right to equal protection and substantive due process...by refusing and failing to comply with VRP

[voluntary resolution plan] agreements with the U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil

Rights....” and by “refusing and failing to comply with the CDE [California Department of

Education] direct order relief.” 

The facts section of the Third Amended Complaint does not supply the necessary

allegations of causation. The only reference to an action by the California Department of

Education is found in paragraphs 37 to 40. There, according to the Third Amended Complaint,

Vista Unified School District and Guajome Park Academy was to provide some sort of

“assessment, placement, and an educational contract.” The Complaint alleges that Defendant

Hannaman appealed the decision and the appeal was denied. Finally, the Complaint then simply

alleges that the Vista Unified School District “did not provide the placement in compliance with

the direct orders of the state of California.” The reference to a VRP indicates that a VRP is a

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voluntary resolution plan and a failure to comply does not give rise to rights in third parties such

as Plaintiff. These allegations lack the necessary specificity to state a §1983 claim for relief

against state officials in their individual capacity. The individual Defendant causing the denial of

the federal constitutional right is not identified and the causal connection between the individual

Defendant’s allegedly wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation is not described. Such

general allegations simply do not state a claim against any of the individual Defendants in the

individual capacities under §1983. E.g. Schwartz v. Snohomish County, Case No. C05-732P, slip

op., 2006 WL 692024 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2006) (general allegations which do not adequately

set forth causal connection between actions of individuals sued in their individual capacity and the

alleged constitutional violations are subject to dismissal). 

The sixth claim is dismissed without prejudice.

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

The seventh claim for relief is brought against the school district Defendants and the

individual Defendants in their official capacities and seeks an award of compensatory damages. It

alleges that Plaintiff’s son was denied “the benefits of school” in violation of Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act. The school district s and the individual Defendants are school officials being

sued in their official capacity, therefore, it is the same as a suit directly against the State of

California and the Eleventh Amendment would deprive this Court of jurisdiction to hear the claim. 

Berlanger, 963 F.2d 248. Yet, were this a §504 claim dealing with vocational training, the

Eleventh Amendment would not prevent the action. Clark v. State of California, 123 F.3d 1267

(1997) (California waives immunity when it accepts funds under the Rehabilitation Act).

However, the seventh claim for relief is simply her IDEA claim recast as a damages claim

under §504. The effect is to circumvent the remedies provided under the IDEA by resort to §504. 

This Plaintiff may not do. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1019 (1984) (handicapped child not

permitted to circumvent the EHA remedies by resort to §504); Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 372

F.Supp.2d 591 (D. Hawaii 2005) (consistent with Congressional intent, school student plaintiff

must pursue remedies available under IDEA rather than §504). 

The seventh claim is dismissed without prejudice.

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EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Like the seventh claim for relief, the eighth claim for relief is brought against the school

district Defendants and the individual Defendants in their official capacities and seeks an award of

compensatory damages. It alleges that Plaintiff’s son was denied the benefits of school in

violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 

However, the eighth claim for relief is simply her IDEA claim recast as a damages claim

under §504. The effect is to circumvent the remedies provided under the IDEA by resort to §504. 

This Plaintiff may not do. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. at 1019; Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 372

F.Supp.2d at 603. 

The eighth claim is dismissed without prejudice.

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

The ninth claim for relief, like the seventh and eight claims for relief, is brought against the

school district Defendants and the individual Defendants in their official capacities and seeks an

award of compensatory damages. In short, it alleges that Plaintiff has been a public critic of the

school district and the charter school. As a result, she alleges that she has “incurred the personal

animosity” of the Defendants and that in retaliation the Defendants have denied Plaintiff’s son “the

benefits of school” in violation of §504. 

Like the seventh and eighth claims, the ninth claim is an IDEA claim impermissibly recast

as a §504 claim seeking money damages unavailable under the IDEA and without exhausting

administrative remedies of the IDEA. The ninth claim is improper. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. at

1019; Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 372 F.Supp.2d at 603. 

The ninth claim is dismissed without prejudice.

TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

The tenth claim for relief is, again, brought against the individual Defendants in their

individual capacities and also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Because the individual

Defendants are school officials being sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in their individual capacities,

the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this claim. Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d at 828. 

However, the claim for relief is too vague and fails to adequately allege a causal

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connection between the conduct of any of the individual Defendants and a violation of Plaintiff’s

federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged that either Defendants Hubbard, Cowles,

Hannaman, Kanawi, Hadjiaghai, Halfaker, or any Does were personally involved in depriving

Peters of federal constitutional rights. That much is necessary to allege a § 1983 claim against

individuals acting in their individual capacity. Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 915; Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. 

Instead, Peters alleges that “...the Individual Defendants (in their individual capacity), and

each of them, have denied Plaintiff’s son a FAPE [free and appropriate education] by refusing and

failing to comply with the CDE [California Department of Education] direct order relief and by

failing to comply with VRP [voluntary resolution plan] in retaliation for Plaintiff’s activist role

and public criticism of VUSD and GPACS.” 

The facts section of the Third Amended Complaint does not supply the necessary

allegations of causation. The only reference to an action by the California Department of

Education is found in paragraphs 37 to 40. There, according to the Third Amended Complaint,

Vista Unified School District and Guajome Park Academy was to provide some sort of

“assessment, placement, and an educational contract.” The Complaint alleges that Defendant

Hannaman appealed the decision and the appeal was denied. Finally, the Complaint then simply

alleges that the Vista Unified School District “did not provide the placement in compliance with

the direct orders of the state of California.” The reference to a VRP indicates that a VRP is a

voluntary resolution plan and a failure to comply does not give rise to rights in third parties such

as Plaintiff. 

These allegations lack the necessary specificity to state a §1983 claim for relief against

state officials in their individual capacity. There is no recognized constitutional right identified. 

The right to a free education come from state statutes, not the federal Constitution. San Antonio

Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The individual Defendant causing the

denial of the rights alleged is not identified. The causal connection between the individual

Defendant’s allegedly wrongful conduct and any constitutional violation is not described. Such

general allegations simply do not state a claim against any of the individual Defendants in the

individual capacities under §1983. E.g. Schwartz v. Snohomish County, Case No. C05-732P, slip

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op., 2006 WL 692024 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2006) (general allegations which do not adequately

set forth causal connection between actions of individuals sued in their individual capacity and the

alleged constitutional violations are subject to dismissal). Moreover, Plaintiff seems to be urging

pro se the legal rights her son may have. For the reasons set forth in the Court’s Order dismissing

the First Complaint, a pro se plaintiff may not represent the rights of another in federal court.

The tenth claim is dismissed without prejudice.

ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

The eleventh claim for relief is, again, brought against the individual Defendants in their

individual capacities and also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Because the individual

Defendants are school officials being sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in their individual capacities,

the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this claim. Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d at 828. 

However, like the tenth claim for relief, the eleventh claim for relief is too vague and fails

to adequately allege a causal connection between the conduct of any of the individual Defendants

and a violation of Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged that either

Defendants Hubbard, Cowles, Hannaman, Kanawi, Hadjiaghai, Halfaker, or any Does were

personally involved in depriving Peters of federal constitutional rights. That much is necessary to

allege a § 1983 claim against individuals acting in their individual capacity. Jeffers, 267 F.3d at

915; Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. 

Instead, Peters again alleges that “...the Individual Defendants (in their individual

capacity), and each of them, have denied Plaintiff’s son a FAPE [free and appropriate education]

by refusing and failing to comply with the CDE [California Department of Education] direct order

relief and by failing to comply with VRP [voluntary resolution plan] in retaliation for Plaintiff’s

activist role and public criticism of VUSD and GPACS.” 

The facts section of the Third Amended Complaint does not supply the necessary

allegations of causation. As before, the only reference to an action by the California Department

of Education is found in paragraphs 37 to 40. There, according to the Third Amended Complaint,

Vista Unified School District and Guajome Park Academy was to provide some sort of

“assessment, placement, and an educational contract.” The Complaint alleges that Defendant

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Hannaman appealed the decision and the appeal was denied. Finally, the Complaint then simply

alleges that the Vista Unified School District “did not provide the placement in compliance with

the direct orders of the state of California.” The reference to a VRP indicates that a VRP is a

voluntary resolution plan and a failure to comply does not give rise to rights in third parties such

as Plaintiff. 

These allegations lack the necessary specificity to state a §1983 claim for relief against

state officials in their individual capacity. There is no recognized constitutional right identified. 

The right to a free education come from state statutes, not the federal Constitution. San Antonio

Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. The individual Defendant causing the denial

of the alleged rights is not identified. The causal connection between the individual Defendant’s

allegedly wrongful conduct and any constitutional violation is not described. Such general

allegations simply do not state a claim against any of the individual Defendants in the individual

capacities under §1983. E.g. Schwartz v. Snohomish County, Case No. C05-732P, slip op., 2006

WL 692024 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2006) (general allegations which do not adequately set forth

causal connection between actions of individuals sued in their individual capacity and the alleged

constitutional violations are subject to dismissal). Moreover, Plaintiff seems to be urging pro se

the legal rights her son may have. For the reasons set forth in the Court’s Order dismissing the

First Complaint, a pro se plaintiff may not represent the rights of another in federal court.

The eleventh claim is dismissed without prejudice.

TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

The twelfth claim for relief is, again, brought against the individual Defendants in their

individual capacities and also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Because the individual

Defendants are school officials being sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in their individual capacities,

the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this claim. Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d at 828. 

However, like the tenth and eleventh claims for relief, the twelfth claim for relief is too

vague and fails to adequately allege a causal connection between the conduct of any of the

individual Defendants and a violation of Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not

alleged that either Defendants Hubbard, Cowles, Hannaman, Kanawi, Hadjiaghai, Halfaker, or any

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Does were personally involved in depriving Peters of federal constitutional rights. That much is

necessary to allege a § 1983 claim against individuals acting in their individual capacity. Jeffers,

267 F.3d at 915; Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. 

Instead, Peters again alleges that “...the Individual Defendants (in their individual

capacity), and each of them, have denied Plaintiff’s son a FAPE [free and appropriate education]

by refusing and failing to comply with the direct Order Relief from CDE and by failing to comply

with the VRP [voluntary resolution plan] in retaliation for Plaintiff’s activist role and public

criticism of VUSD and GPACS in violation of the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution.” 

The facts section of the Third Amended Complaint does not supply the necessary

allegations of causation. As before, the only reference to an action by the California Department

of Education is found in paragraphs 37 to 40. There, according to the Third Amended Complaint,

Vista Unified School District and Guajome Park Academy was to provide some sort of

“assessment, placement, and an educational contract.” The Complaint alleges that Defendant

Hannaman appealed the decision and the appeal was denied. Finally, the Complaint then simply

alleges that the Vista Unified School District “did not provide the placement in compliance with

the direct orders of the state of California.” The reference to a VRP indicates that a VRP is a

voluntary resolution plan and a failure to comply does not give rise to rights in third parties such

as Plaintiff. 

These allegations lack the necessary specificity to state a §1983 claim for relief against

state officials in their individual capacity. The right to an education is not a recognized

constitutional right. Any right to a free education comes from state statutes, not the federal

Constitution. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. The individual

Defendant causing the denial of the alleged rights is not identified. The causal connection between

the individual Defendant’s allegedly wrongful conduct and any constitutional violation is not

described. Such general allegations simply do not state a claim against any of the individual

Defendants in the individual capacities under §1983. E.g. Schwartz v. Snohomish County, Case

No. C05-732P, slip op., 2006 WL 692024 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2006) (general allegations which

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 There appears to be no bad faith on the part of the Plaintiff. Consequently, the first of the

five factors weighs in her favor.

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do not adequately set forth causal connection between actions of individuals sued in their

individual capacity and the alleged constitutional violations are subject to dismissal). Moreover,

Plaintiff seems to be urging pro se the legal rights her son may have. For the reasons set forth in

the Court’s Order dismissing the First Complaint, a pro se plaintiff may not represent the rights of

another in federal court.

The twelfth claim is dismissed without prejudice.

V. LEAVE TO AMEND

A district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend a deficient claim or complaint is

particularly broad where a plaintiff has previously amended her complaint. Sisseton-Wahpeton

Sioux Tribe v. Unite States of America, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ascon Properties,

Inc. v. Mobile Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989)). Five factors are considered: (1) bad

faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to defendants; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) previous

opportunities to amend the complaint. Id. 

Here, the second, third, fourth, and fifth factors4

 weigh against granting leave to file a

fourth amended complaint. Considering the second factor, permitting further amendment will

cause undue delay. The original Complaint was filed in June of 2004. While Plaintiff has

amended her Complaint three times since her original filing, two and one-half years have passed. 

Further leave to amend will occasion further delay in getting to trial. The undue delay factor

weighs against granting leave for further amendment. 

Regarding the third factor, further amendment will also prejudice the Defendants. Further

amendment will force the Defendants to incur additional attorney’s fees and costs. Moreover, as

time passes, witness memories fade – prejudicing both sides in the quest for truth. The prejudice

factor also weighs against granting further leave to amend. 

The fourth factor is the futility of amendment. Of the twelve claims for relief contained in

the Third Amended Complaint, most address issues that must first be exhausted under the IDEA in

order for federal court jurisdiction to exist. Recasting an IDEA appeal as a civil rights claim is

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impermissible and amendment to that end would be futile. Moreover, all of her claims arise out of

the provision of a public school education to her minor son. It is not at all clear, that as a matter of

law, plaintiff may pursue the various rights and remedies she seeks on her own behalf. What is

clear, however, is that she may not represent pro se her child in asserting the child’s rights and

remedies in federal court. Only one claim out of the twelve (the fifth claim for relief) appears to

contain allegations that if correctly pled might state a valid claim for relief over which a federal

court might have jurisdiction. The futility factor weighs against granting leave to further amend. 

The fifth factor considers whether plaintiff has previously amended her complaint. Here,

plaintiff has previously amended her complaint on three occasions. The previous amendment

factor weighs heavily against granting leave to further amend. 

Four factors weigh against granting leave to further amend the Complaint. One factor (the

absence of Plaintiff’s bad faith) weighs in favor of granting leave. Having considered all of the

factors, the Court finds that in the interests of justice the Third Amended Complaint is dismissed

in its entirety without leave to amend.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are granted. The Third Amended Complaint is

dismissed in its entirety, without prejudice, and without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 25, 2006

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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