Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05995/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05995-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK SALDATE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

A. K. SCRIBNER, WARDEN, )

)

Respondent. )

)

___________________________________ )

CV F 04-5995 AWI WMW HC

FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS RE

PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A judgment of the State of California, County of Fresno, was imposed on Petitioner

on August 16, 2001, following his no contest plea to possession of a firearm by a felon

(Penal Code § 12021(a)(1), and his admission that he was out on bail or his own

recognizance during the time the alleged robberies occurred (Section 12022.1). Further, a

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jury found Petitioner guilty of two counts of robbery (Section 211), and found the personal

use of firearm enhancement true. As a result of his convictions, the court sentenced

Petitioner to serve a total prison term of twenty-one years.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal (“Court of

Appeal”) which affirmed his conviction in an unpublished decision issued April 29, 2003. 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, which denied the

petition on June 11, 2003. 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Fresno County Superior

Court, which denied the petition on October 15, 2003. He filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus with the Court of Appeal, which denied the petition on February 19, 2004. Petitioner

filed a second petition with Fresno County Superior Court, which the court denied on

December 17, 2003.

Respondent concedes that Petitioner has exhausted all of the claims in the present

petition by presenting those claims to the California Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The court finds the Court of Appeal correctly summarized the facts in its April 29,

2003 opinion. Thus, the court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the Court of Appeal. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A. JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or

laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams

v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of

his rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction

challenged arises out of the Fresno County Superior Court, which is located within the

jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the court has

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jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after

its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) th

(quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, th

117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117

S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed on July 22, 2004, after the enactment of the AEDPA, thus it is

governed by its provisions. 

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply

with respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court.

Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for

habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123

S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). th

“A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

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federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather, that

application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the

state court’s factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must

accept all factual findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,

116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Use of Prior Juvenile Adjudication as “Strike”

Petitioner contends that the trial court failed to make a finding as to truth in regard to

his juvenile adjudication, and that this failure invalidates the use of that adjudication as a

prior under the Three Strikes law. Petitioner’s claim is based on California Penal Code

Section 1158, which provides: 

 Whenever the fact of a previous conviction of another offense is charged in an

accusatory pleading, and the defendant is found guilty of the offense with which he is

charged, the jury, or the judge if a jury trial is waived, must unless the answer of the

defendant admits such previous conviction, find whether or not he has suffered such

previous conviction. The verdict or finding upon the charge of previous conviction

may be: "We (or I) find the charge of previous conviction true" or "We (or I) find the

charge of previous conviction not true," according as the jury or the judge find that

the defendant has or has not suffered such conviction. If more than one previous

conviction is charged a separate finding must be made as to each.

Habeas corpus relief is not available to correct alleged errors in the state court's

application or interpretation of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68(1991);

Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1084-85 (9th Cir.1985). Federal habeas review limited

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to a determination of whether the alleged error of state law "so infected the trial with

unfairness as to deny due process of law". Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. Thus, to the

extent that Petitioner’s contention is based on California law, it cannot provide a basis for

habeas corpus relief. 

 In his reply, Petitioner argues for the first time that the trial court’s use of his

juvenile adjudication as a prior under the Three Strikes law violated his right to due process. 

In addressing Petitioner’s contention regarding this prior adjudication, the Court of Appeal

held in part as follows:

In proving a prior strike conviction, the prosecution must prove that the

defendant is the person who suffered the prior conviction, and that the prior

conviction in fact qualified as a strike. [Citation omitted.] Here, the trial court was

present with evidence establishing that Frankie Saldate, Jr., had suffered a prior

adjudication for robbery as a juvenile and with evidence establishing that [Petitioner]

was the same Frankie Saldate, Jr., described in the records. [Petitioner] did not

contest that he was indeed the person who had suffered the prior adjudication. 

However, [Petitioner] did dispute whether his prior juvenile adjudication qualified as

a prior strike. While the trial court never explicitly stated that it had found the prior

strike allegation true, that ruling was implied from the fact that the trial court

sentenced [Petitioner] pursuant to the “Three Strikes” Law.

The trial court specifically denied [Petitioner’s] Romero motion stating that

the prior adjudication qualified as a strike. As to the identity issue, after the hearing

on the prior strike the trial court stated it wanted counsel to submit a declaration from

[Petitioner] regarding his prior offense. Specifically the court wanted

“to know whether he was represented by Counsel, I want to know whether the

Court and/or his attorney that represented him, what, if anything they advised

him about the consequences of that admission, I want to know whether he was

told that the admission would have any effect on him as an adult.

The court’s comments clearly indicate that the court had determined

[Petitioner] suffered the prior juvenile adjudication. At the initial sentencing hearing,

the trial court vacated its sentence because the probation report did not take into

account [Petitioner’s] prior strike. At the subsequent sentencing hearing the trial

court stated that it had read and considered the probation officer’s report. That report

noted that it had been prepared to reflect the fact that the trial court previously found

[Petitioner’s] robbery adjudication constituted a strike within the meaning of the

“Three Strikes” law. During the hearing, the trial court denied [Petitioner’s] motion

to strike his prior strike. In argument to the court, the prosecutor noted that

[Petitioner] had a prior strike for robbery. Based on the entire record, we conclude

the trial court implicitly found the prior strike to be true. Thus, we reject

[Petitioner’s] claim.

Unpublished Court of Appeal Opinion, 11 -12. The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the

trial court had implicitly found the prior strike to be true is a factual finding. As set forth

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above, the state court’s factual determinations must be presumed correct, and this court must

accept all factual findings made by the state court unless Petitioner can rebut “the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This

court finds that Petitioner has not carried that burden in regard to this contention. Petitioner

having demonstrated no error on the part of the Court of Appeal, this court must find that he

has not shown a violation of his right to due process. Accordingly, this contention provides

no basis for habeas corpus relief.

CALJIC No. 17.41.1

Petitioner argues that in instructing the jury with CALJIC 17.41.1, the trial court

deprived him of his Constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. Respondent disputes

this contention. 

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a

claim cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action. See, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

71-72 (1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner

must show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process. See, id. at 72. Additionally, the instruction may not be

judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a

whole and the trial record. Id. The court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the

overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. See, United States v.

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v, Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). 

Furthermore, even if it is determined that the instruction violated the petitioner’s right to due

process, a petitioner can only obtain relief if the unconstitutional instruction had a substantial

influence on the conviction and thereby resulted in actual prejudice under Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (1993) (whether the error had a substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.). See, Hanna v. Riveland,

87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9 Cir. 1996). The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous th

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instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional

validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish

plain error on direct appeal." Id. 

In the present case, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the

state courts’ resolution of his contention based on CALJIC No. 17.41.1 “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner’s contention that

his right to trial by jury was violated by the giving of the instruction is foreclosed by Brewer

v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.2004), in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed district court's

denial of relief because there is no clearly established federal law holding that CALJIC

17.41.1 violates an existing constitutional right. Accordingly, this claim presents no basis for

habeas corpus relief.

Sufficiency of Evidence

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of

robbery of Lori Miller, a bank employee. Specifically, Petitioner claims that Miller was not

in either actual or constructive possession of the cash which was taken from Pombo’s cash

drawer. Respondent disputes this contention.

The law on insufficiency of the evidence claim is clearly established. The United

States Supreme Court has held that when reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim on

habeas, a federal court must determine whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences to

be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. 

Id. at 324 n. 16. 

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In Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Court of Appeal explained Petitioner’s claim as

follows:

[Petitioner] does not dispute that cash was taken from Pombo’s cash drawer, and that

in the process force or fear was applied to both Pombo and Miller. Rather,

[Petitioner] argues that Miller was not in possession of the stolen money. This is

because she had no key to Pombo’s cash drawer and was not responsible for

accounting for the cash in Pombo’s drawer.

Unpublished Opinion, 12. The Court of Appeal defined the issue as “whether there was

sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that Miller was in constructive possession of the

cash in Pombo’s drawer.” Id. At 12 -13. The Court of Appeal found that Miller did have

constructive possession of the cash in Pombo’s drawer, after concluding that in this type of

case, the issue was whether the employee is in representative capacity to the owner of the

business. Id. at 13 -14. 

The Court of Appeal thus ruled on Petitioner’s contention based on the interpretation

of state law concerning constructive possession. As set forth above, habeas corpus relief is

not available to correct alleged errors in the state court's application or interpretation of state

law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68(1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1084-85 (9th Cir.1985). Further, even if this court were to find that Petitioner has stated a

federal claim, which he has not, Petitioner provides no discussion of any allegedly

unreasonable application of federal law or unreasonable determination of the facts by the

Court of Appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, this court must conclude that

Petitioner’s contention provides no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel,

because his trial counsel did not object to Pombo’s and Miller’s in-court identifications of

Petitioner. Petitioner claims that their in-court identifications were tainted by an

impermissibly suggestive one-person field showup procedure. Respondent disputes this

contention.

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The Court of Appeal found as follows in regard to the facts:

The testimony established Pombo and Miller were taken separately to a location

a short distance away from the scene of the robbery to view two suspects. The

identification took place approximately two hours after the robber occurred and each

witness viewed each suspect individually. Accordingly to Officer Torres, he

instructed both Pombo and Miller that they would be viewing two men who may or

may not have been responsible for the robbery and that they were under no obligation

to make an identification. In addition, they were informed that the men may be

handcuffed and in patrol cars and that was not to influence their decision in any way. 

When Pombo arrived, she first viewed Membreno. Pombo stated that he was the man

that had jumped over the counter and then upon reflection stated she was not sure of

her identification because the man she viewed appeared too large to be the jumper. 

Pombo later testified that the man she viewed was the man who stood next to the

counter. Pombo next viewed [Petitioner] and immediately identified him as the man

who wore the white sweatshirt. She was certain about her identification.

Miller also viewed Membreno and [Petitioner] in the field. She could not

positively identify the first man she saw (Membreno), although she stated that he

looked similar to the jumper or the man in the grey sweatshirt by the counter. When

she viewed [Petitioner], Miller identified him as the man by the door. She identified

him by his clothing and his build. According to Officer Torres, when Miller saw

[Petitioner] she stated “yeah, that’s him, damn right.”

Both Pombo and Miller were asked to make in-court identifications of their

assailants. Pombo pointed out [Petitioner] as the man who wore the white sweatshirt

and Membreno as the man who stood by the counter. Miller identified [Petitioner] as

the man who stood by the door during the robbery. [Petitioner] stood while she made

her identification allowing Miller to observe his height and build. Miller did not

identify Membreno.

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for

the purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v.

Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9 Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging th

ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344,

346 (9 Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, th

requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as

the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The

petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were not the result

of reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States

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v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9 Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's th

performance is highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that counsel's

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466

U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th

Cir.1994).

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different," 466 U.S., at

694. Petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive defendant of a

fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must evaluate

whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d

1356, 1461 (9 Cir. 1994). th

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since the defendant must

affirmatively prove prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must

necessarily fail. However, there are certain instances which are legally presumed to result in

prejudice, e.g., where there has been an actual or constructive denial of the assistance of

counsel or where the State has interfered with counsel’s assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 692; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S., at 659, and n. 25, 104 S.Ct., at 2046-2047, and n.

25 (1984). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable

application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215

F.3d 1058, 1062 (2000). 

Courts assess the constitutionality of field identifications, like other highly suggestive

lineup procedures, considering the totality of the circumstances. Carmona v. City of Costa

Mesa, 102 Fed.Appx. 74 (C.A. 9, 2004) (citing. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972)). 

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Applying the Strickland standard, the Court of Appeal defined Petitioner’s claim as

that the single person showup in this case was unnecessarily suggestive. It then reviewed the

totality of the circumstances as follows:

In the present case [Petitioner] has failed to point to anything which made the in-field

identification unnecessarily suggestive. His only complaint is that the identification

procedure allowed the witnesses to view the suspects’ faces unobstructed. However,

that would be true of any identification procedure. [Petitioner] has failed to

demonstrate how the identification procedure was suggestive in any way.

The witnesses were given an admonition prior to viewing the suspects and were

advised that the men they were about to view may or may not be the perpetrators. 

Upon viewing [Petitioner], both Miller and Pombo identified him as the man who

stood next to the door and wore the white sweatshirt. During her testimony, Miller

stated she could see the cheekbones and the area around the eyes of the man who

wore the white sweatshirt. Both witnesses described the height, build, and clothing

worn by each of the men in the robbery. Miller identified [Petitioner] as the man who

wore the white sweatshirt during the in-field showup and in court.

[Petitioner] contends that Miller and Pombo identified him by his facial features

in the courtroom, and thus argues that the in-court identification must have been

based upon her memory of viewing him during the showup and not upon her memory

of the men during the crime. [Petitioner’s] argument is nothing more than pure

speculation. Nothing in the record demonstrates that Miller or Pombo made their incourt identification of [Petitioner] based upon his facial features that were covered

during the robbery. Because [Petitioner] has failed to demonstrate that a challenge to

the in-field identification would have been successful, his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim fails.

Unpublished Opinion, 16 -18.

The court finds that Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that this

decision by the Court of Appeal “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The Court of Appeal correctly applied the controlling federal law as set forth in Strickland

and Neil, and Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the

facts was unreasonable. As the Court of Appeal found, Petitioner’s claim that the in-court

identifications were based on the showups is simply speculation. Accordingly, the court

finds that this claim provides no basis for habeas corpus relief.

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Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2) The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this

case. 

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the

objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by

mail) after service of the objections. The court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s

ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 28, 2006 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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