Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02674/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02674-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 376
Nature of Suit: other
Cause of Action: 31:3731 False Claims Act - Procedures

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel

Michael Durkin, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 15cv2674-MMA (WVG)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. No. 20] 

 

 Plaintiff Michael Durkin filed this action under the qui tam provisions of the False 

Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., on behalf of the United States of America 

and against Defendant County of San Diego. See Doc. Nos. 1, 17. The United States 

declined to intervene in this action. See Doc. No. 7. Defendant now moves to dismiss 

the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Doc. No. 20. 

The Court found the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral 

argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

GRANTS Defendant’s motion. 

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BACKGROUND1

By way of background, Plaintiff2 alleges that in 2014, he was involved in a lawsuit 

in which the owners of two properties located near the McClellan-Palomar Airport sued 

the County of San Diego for inverse condemnation. The FAC states that Plaintiff was the 

manager of the two entities that owned those properties. In the course of that litigation, 

Plaintiff alleges he uncovered the information underlying this action. In the instant case, 

Plaintiff asserts twelve claims against Defendant County of San Diego under the FCA, 

and requests damages and civil penalties. Plaintiff alleges Defendant made false 

statements to the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) in applying for grants for the 

maintenance and development of the Palomar-McClellan Airport located in Carlsbad, 

County of San Diego, California. 

Plaintiff alleges the FAA makes funding “available to improve American airports,” 

and provides funds to recipients in order to “among other things, ensure the safety of 

airports, the surrounding areas, and the people in or around the airports.” See Doc. No. 

17, FAC, ¶ 9. In order to obtain federal funds through the FAA, Plaintiff alleges 

applicants must “make statements and promises, and give assurances regarding, inter alia, 

how the land surrounding the airport is being controlled by the applicant so as to protect 

airport operations from hazards on the ground, and people and property on the ground 

from hazards inherent to airport operations.” See FAC, ¶ 9. Further, the FAC states that 

“[u]pon approving a grant, the FAA requires the applicant to include in the grant 

agreement [similar] statements . . . regarding how the airport and surrounding areas will 

be operated, maintained, improved, or acquired” for safety purposes. See FAC, ¶ 10. 

Then, Plaintiff alleges, “a grantee is required to file claims for payment to the FAA in the 

form of invoices,” which “impliedly or expressly recertify all the promises, assurances, 

                                                                

1

 Because this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the 

allegations set forth in the complaint. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 

(1976). 

2

 For convenience, “Plaintiff” hereinafter refers to Qui Tam Plaintiff Durkin, as opposed to the United 

States. 

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and statements previously made in the grant applications and agreements.” See FAC, ¶ 

11. 

In particular, Plaintiff alleges Defendant applied for, was approved for, and 

obtained funding for use in relation to the McClellan-Palomar Airport. Plaintiff contends 

that, in 1995, Defendant knew that certain undeveloped properties were in the Runway 

Protection Zone (“RPZ”), and obtained federal funds from the FAA in order to acquire 

those properties. Plaintiff alleges that instead of clearing the RPZ, Defendant “decided 

the properties were too expensive, gave other projects priority, and reallocated the 

funds.” See FAC, ¶ 14. The FAC asserts that the County knew that it was required under 

“federal regulations” to “acquire sufficient interest in the RPZ to prevent incompatible 

land uses.” See FAC, ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges Defendant never did so, “resulting in the 

development of an office building in the RPZ,” which “constitutes a place of public 

assembly in violation of FAA standards, circulars and requirements which the County 

promised it would comply with.” See FAC, ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges this safety hazard 

continues to the present time, despite Defendant’s assertions otherwise in its grant 

applications. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant, on multiple occasions between 2005 and 

2015, made misrepresentations to the FAA in applying for, entering into agreements for, 

or making claims for federal funds. Plaintiff alleges that, in each grant application, “the 

County certified, represented, and assured that it would be guided in the acquisition of 

real property by 49 CFR Part 24, subpart B, and that it had complied and would comply 

with Advisory Circular3

 150/5300-13, Changes 1 through 5.” See FAC, ¶¶ 19, 31, 53, 65, 

77, 89, 100, 111, 122, 134, 146, 158. Also, Plaintiff alleges that in some of the 

applications, Defendant stated that “it had taken the step of causing the adoption of the 

‘Palomar Airport Comprehensive Land Use Plan.’” See FAC, ¶¶ 19, 65, 77, 89, 134, 

                                                                

3

 According to the record, an “Advisory Circular” is a document issued by the United States Department 

of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, delineating guidelines and standards pertaining to 

aviation. See, e.g., Doc. No. 20, Exh. 31. 

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146, 158. Moreover, in some grant agreements, Plaintiff alleges Defendant promised “to 

acquire an interest in Runway Protection Zone Properties not then under it’s [sic] control, 

and to use interest acquired to prevent erection or creation of places of public assembly, 

meaning office and industrial buildings, and to clear or discontinue any such uses as 

already existed.” See FAC, ¶¶ 23, 35, 57, 126. In those same agreements, Plaintiff 

alleges Defendant promised to “abide by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real 

Property Acquisition Policies Act, 42 U.S.C. 4601, et seq.” See FAC, ¶¶ 23, 35, 57, 126. 

In all cases, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s assertions were false, and were made in 

order to induce the FAA to grant it funds, and that Defendant “never intended to 

perform” on its promises, and “took no steps whatsoever to perform its’ promises and 

assurances.” See FAC, ¶¶ 27, 39, 49, 60, 72, 84, 96, 107, 118, 129, 141, 153, 165. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). The plausibility standard thus demands more than “a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual 

enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). 

Instead, the complaint “must contain allegations of underlying facts sufficient to give fair 

notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 

F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 

 In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth 

of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form 

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of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Similarly, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to 

defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, courts generally may not 

look beyond the complaint for additional facts. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 

908 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents 

attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or 

matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Evid. 201; see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. Of 

Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Where dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant leave to amend unless the 

plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of 

Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009). 

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)4

Under Rule 9(b), when the complaint includes allegations of fraud, a party must 

“state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “In 

other words, the complaint must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, 

and why it is false.” Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd, 551 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff’s allegations of fraud must be “specific 

enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct . . . so that they can defend 

against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Vess v. CibaGeigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003). Further, the plaintiff must 

describe “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the fraudulent misconduct charged. 

Id. at 1106–07. In other words, the plaintiff must specify the time, place, and content of 

the alleged fraudulent or mistaken misconduct. See id. However, “malice, intent, 

                                                                

4

 Both parties acknowledge that Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard applies to Plaintiff’s claims. 

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knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 9(b). Failure to satisfy this heightened pleading requirement can result in 

dismissal of the claims. Vess, 317 F.3d at 1107. 

DISCUSSION

A. Requests for Judicial Notice and Incorporation by Reference 

As an initial matter, both parties request the Court incorporate by reference some 

documents into the FAC, as well as request judicial notice of certain documents or facts. 

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court is generally limited to the 

four corners of the complaint. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 

2003). However, a court may consider “documents attached to the complaint, documents 

incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice.” Id.; see also 

Lee, 250 F.3d at 688. The Court addresses the propriety of those requests below. 

i. Incorporation by Reference 

Defendant requests the Court consider multiple documents as incorporated by 

reference in the FAC. A document “may be incorporated by reference into a complaint if 

the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the 

plaintiff’s claim.” Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908 (internal citations omitted). In other words, 

“[a] court may consider a writing referenced in a complaint but not explicitly 

incorporated therein if the complaint necessarily relies on the document and its 

authenticity is unquestioned.” Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998), 

superseded by statute on other grounds in Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th 

Cir. 2006); Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007); Kneivel v. ESPN, 

393 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Here, Defendant specifically requests the Court incorporate by reference copies of 

multiple grant applications and grant agreements underlying Plaintiff’s claims, Airport 

Sponsor Assurances forms, the Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 

referenced in the FAC, as well as copies of “Outlay Reports and Requests for 

Reimbursement for Construction Programs” and “Echo Payment Drawdowns.” See Doc. 

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No. 20, Exhs. 1–39. Plaintiff does not oppose this request nor dispute the authenticity of 

the documents, and Defendant is correct that Plaintiff’s claims necessarily rely on these 

documents and some statements included therein. In fact, Plaintiff cites to and relies on 

Defendant’s submissions—particularly the grant applications and agreements which 

include the contested statements—in Plaintiff’s opposition brief. Thus, the Court 

GRANTS Defendant’s requests. 

Plaintiff also requests incorporation by reference of several documents. Plaintiff 

submits a copy of a grant application and grant agreement from 1995 “and attached 

documents,” as well as copies of a March 28, 1996 letter to the FAA from the County of 

San Diego “with attachments.” See Doc. No. 23, Exhs. 1, 2. However, unlike the 

documents that Defendant provides for incorporation, the FAC appears to merely 

mention the contents of those documents. The FAC does not refer “extensively to the 

document[s]” nor do the documents “form the basis” of any of Plaintiff’s claims. See 

Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request. Despite that the 

Court declines to incorporate Plaintiff’s documents, Plaintiff will have the opportunity to 

amend the FAC, as discussed below, and may add allegations relating to these 

documents, or incorporate these documents into an amended pleading if he so wishes. 

 ii. Judicial Notice 

Both parties also request judicial notice of several matters. A court may take 

judicial notice of matters submitted as part of a complaint, or those that are not but whose 

authenticity is not contested and where the plaintiff’s complaint relies on them. Lee, 250 

F.3d at 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “judicial notice is inappropriate where the facts to 

be noticed are not relevant to the disposition of the issues before the court.” Kuzmenko v. 

Lynch, 606 F. App’x 399 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 

543, 548 n.13 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

Defendant requests judicial notice of certain allegations that Plaintiff made in a 

previous case, as well as portions of the FAA Airport Compliance Manual. However, 

these allegations are not relevant to the issues pending before the Court. The Court 

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accordingly DENIES Defendant’s request. 

In addition, Defendant requests judicial notice of the following fact: “Relator 

Michael Durkin manages, is a member of, and has an ownership interest in, ‘Durkin 

CAC, Lot 24 LLC’ which is the plaintiff that sued County of San Diego for inverse 

condemnation of that limited liability company’s office building located within the 

runway protection zone of McClellan Palomar Airport.” See Doc. No. 22. However, 

again, Plaintiff’s prior litigation has no relevance to the Court’s disposition of 

Defendant’s current motion to dismiss. Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request. 

 Turning to Plaintiff’s requests, Plaintiff moves for judicial notice of Federal 

Aviation Advisory Circular 150/5300-13A, updated as of February 2014. However, it is 

unclear why Defendant’s copy of Circular 150/5300 is insufficient for the Court’s 

purposes, particularly where Plaintiff does not oppose its incorporation by reference or 

provide any reasoning in support of his request for judicial notice of this copy. Absent 

any reasoning as to why the Court should take judicial notice of this version, the Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s request. 

 Plaintiff also requests judicial notice of the following: an FAA publication entitled 

“What is AIP?,” a law review article regarding implied certification claims under the 

FCA, a congressional record, a document regarding fraud statistics, a document entitled 

Airport Layout Plan, the Merriam-Webster dictionary definition of “assure,” and FAA 

Advisory Circular 15/5100-17. However, it is unclear for what purposes Plaintiff wishes 

the Court to take judicial notice of these documents, which span more than 500 pages. 

Accordingly, because the Court need not take judicial notice of these matters for the 

purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s requests. 

B. Motion to Dismiss 

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on various grounds. First, 

Defendant argues Plaintiff does not allege a single objectively false statement that could 

serve as the basis for a FCA claim. Second, Defendant argues many of Plaintiff’s causes 

of action are barred by the statute of limitations. Third, Defendant argues none of 

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Plaintiff’s claims are pleaded with the specificity required by Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 8 and 9. Plaintiff opposes dismissal of any claims. Also, the United States has 

filed a statement of interest in response to the County’s motion to dismiss, despite that the 

United States has declined to intervene in this action. The United States requests only 

that if the Court decides to dismiss any claims in response to the County’s motion, the 

Court dismiss such claims without prejudice as to the United States. Otherwise, the 

United States asserts that it takes no position as to the merits of the pending motion to 

dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss. 

i. The False Claims Act 

“The False Claims Act makes liable anyone who ‘knowingly presents, or causes to 

be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for [government] payment or approval,’ or 

‘knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement 

material to a false or fraudulent claim’” for government payment. See United States ex 

rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., --- F.3d ----, No. 15-16380, 2017 WL 2884047, at *4 

(9th Cir. July 7, 2017) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B)). While, “[i]n an 

archetypal qui tam False Claims action, such as where a private company overcharges 

under a government contract, the claim for payment is itself literally false or fraudulent,” 

liability under the FCA “is not limited to such facially false or fraudulent claims for 

payment.” U.S. ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Rather, “the scope of false or fraudulent claims should be broadly construed.” Id. 

Relevant here, “[t]he principles embodied in this broad construction of a ‘false or 

fraudulent claim’ have given rise to two doctrines that attach potential False Claims Act 

liability to claims for payment that are not explicitly and/or independently false: (1) false 

certification (either express or implied); and (2) promissory fraud.” Id. at 1171. 

In false certification cases, “parties avail themselves of benefits of some type, such 

as loan guarantees or agricultural supports, through false statements which create 

eligibility that otherwise would not exist.” See U.S. ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 

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1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996) (John T. Boese, Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions 1–

29 to 1–30 (1995)). Mere regulatory violations do not create liability. Id. Rather, “[i]t is 

the false certification of compliance which creates liability when certification is a 

prerequisite to obtaining a government benefit.” Id. Similarly, under an implied false 

certification theory, “when a defendant submits a claim, it impliedly certifies compliance 

with all conditions of payment,” and “if the claim fails to disclose the defendant’s 

violation of a material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement . . . the defendant 

has made a misrepresentation that renders the claim ‘false or fraudulent’ under § 

3729(a)(1)(A).” Campie, 2017 WL 2884047, at *6. 

The theory of promissory fraud is closely related to false certification, and dictates 

“that liability will attach to each claim submitted to the government under a contract, 

when the contract or extension of government benefit was originally obtained through 

false statements or fraudulent conduct.” Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1173. Promissory fraud 

“sometimes differs from the false certification theory only in a temporal sense.” U.S. ex 

rel. New Mexico v. Deming Hosp. Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1154 (D.N.M. 2013). 

For example, “[w]hile the false certification theory alleges that a contractor certified that 

it did comply with a statute, regulation, or contractual term when it knew at the time that 

it did not do so, the promissory fraud theory may allege that a contractor originally 

certified that it would comply with a law, regulation, or term when it knew at the time 

that it would not do so.” Id. 

Under either a false certification or promissory fraud theory, “the essential 

elements of False Claims Act liability remain the same: (1) a false statement or fraudulent 

course of conduct, (2) made with scienter, (3) that was material, causing (4) the 

government to pay out money or forfeit moneys due.” Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1174. In 

considering a claim of false certification, there are “two major considerations: ‘(1) 

whether the false statement is the cause of the Government’s providing the benefit; and 

(2) whether any relation exists between the subject matter of the false statement and the 

event triggering Government’s [sic] loss.’” Id. at 1171 (quoting Hopper, 91 F.3d at 

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1266). Under either theory, a false claim or promise must be the “sine qua non of receipt 

of state funding.” See Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th 

Cir. 2010). Further, “for promissory fraud to be actionable under the False Claims Act, 

‘the promise must be false when made.’” Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1174. “Innocent 

mistakes, mere negligent misrepresentations and differences in interpretations are not 

false certifications under the Act.” Hopper, 91 F.3d at 1267. 

ii. Defendant’s Statements 

Although the FAC does not quote any statements from the grant applications or 

grant agreements that give rise to Plaintiff’s claims, Defendant provides copies of the 

grant applications and agreements, which are incorporated by reference into the FAC. 

Plaintiff does not oppose their incorporation, and relies on the quoted statements in 

opposing Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, in analyzing the propriety of 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court relies on the specific statements that the parties 

discuss in their briefing, as opposed to the broad summaries in the FAC. 

Here, Plaintiff’s claims arise out of multiple allegedly false statements. First, 

several grant agreements include the following assurance, or one essentially identical: 

RUNWAY PROTECTION ZONES: The Sponsor agrees to 

take the following actions to maintain and/or acquire a property 

interest satisfactory to the FAA, in the Runway Protection 

Zones: 

i. Existing Fee Title Interest in the Runway Protection 

Zone: The Sponsor agrees to prevent the erection or creation of 

any structure or place of public assembly in the Runway 

Protection Zone, except for NAVAIDS that are fixed by their 

functional purposes or any other structure approved by the 

FAA. Any existing structures or uses within the Runway 

Protection Zone will be cleared or discontinued unless 

approved by the FAA. 

ii. Existing Easement Interest in the Runway Protection 

Zone: The Sponsor agrees to take any and all steps necessary to 

ensure that the owner of the land within the designated Runway 

Protection Zone will not build any structure in the Runway 

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Protection Zone that is a hazard to air navigation or which 

might create glare or misleading lights or lead to the 

construction of residences, fuel handling and storage facilities, 

smoke generating activities, or places of public assembly, such

as churches, schools, office buildings, shopping centers, and 

stadiums. 

iii. Future Interest in the Runway Protection Zone: The 

Sponsor agrees that it will acquire fee title or less-than-fee 

interest in the Runway Protection Zones for runways that 

presently are not under its control within 105

 years of this Grant 

Agreement. Said interest shall provide the protection noted in 

above Subparagraphs a and b [sic]. 

See Doc. No. 23; see also, e.g., Doc. No. 20, Exh. 8, ¶ 11. 

 Second, the parties discuss how, in response to the portion of grant applications 

requiring applicants to state what actions have been taken to “assure compatible usage of 

land adjacent to or in the vicinity of the airport,” the County representative responded 

“Palomar Airport Comprehensive Land Use Plan.” See Doc. Nos. 20, 23; see also, e.g., 

Doc. No. 20, Exh. 1. 

 Third, Plaintiff alleges “every grant agreement” included, in pertinent part, 

statements identical or substantially identical to the following: 

21. Compatible Land Use. It will take appropriate action, to 

the extent reasonable, including the adoption of zoning laws, to 

restrict the use of land adjacent to or in the immediate vicinity 

of the airport to activities and purposes compatible with normal 

airport operations, including landing and takeoff of aircraft. 

34. Policies, Standards, and Specifications. It will carry out 

the project in accordance with policies, standards, and 

specifications approved by the Secretary including but not 

limited to the advisory circulars listed in the Current FAA 

Advisory Circulars for AIP6

 projects . . . and in accordance with 

applicable state policies, standards, and specifications approved 

                                                                

5

 Some grant agreements provide for twenty years, as opposed to ten. 

6

 AIP refers to “Airport Improvement Program.” See Doc. No. 20, Exh. 31. 

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by the Secretary. 

See Doc. No. 23; see also, e.g., Doc. No. 20, Exh. 8, ¶ 11. 

Fourth, in light of paragraph 34’s reference to advisory circulars, Plaintiff’s 

opposition also cites to paragraph 212 of FAA Circular 150/5300, which states, in 

pertinent part: 

212. RUNWAY PROTECTION ZONE (RPZ). The RPZ’s 

function is to enhance the protection of people and property on

the ground. This is achieved through airport owner control over

RPZs. Such control includes clearing RPZ areas (and 

maintaining them clear) of incompatible objects and activities.

Control is preferably exercised through the acquisition of 

sufficient property interest in the RPZ. 

 . . . 

(b) Land uses prohibited from the RPZ are residences and 

places of public assembly. (Churches, schools, hospitals, office 

buildings, shopping centers, and other uses with similar 

concentrations of persons typify places of public assembly.) 

Fuel storage facilities may not be located in the RPZ. 

. . . 

b. Recommendations. Where it is determined to be 

impracticable for the airport owner to acquire and plan the land 

uses within the entire RPZ, the RPZ land use standards have 

recommendation status for that portion of the RPZ not 

controlled by the airport owner. 

 

See Doc. No. 23; Doc. No. 20, Exh. 31, p. 331. 

Fifth, the FAC alleges “the County certified, represented, and assured that it would 

be guided in the acquisition of real property by 49 CFR Part 24, subpart B, and that it had 

complied and would comply with Advisory Circular 150/5300-13, Changes 1 through 5.” 

See FAC, ¶¶ 19, 31, 53, 65, 77, 89, 100, 111, 122, 134, 146, 158. Defendant interprets 

Plaintiff’s allegations as referring to paragraph 35 of several of the grant agreements, 

which states: 

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35. Relocation and Real Property Acquisition. (1) It will be 

guided in acquiring real property, to the greatest extent 

practicable under State law, by the land acquisition policies in 

Subpart B of 49 CFR Part 24 and will pay or reimburse 

property owners for necessary expenses as specified in Subpart 

B. 

Doc. No. 20, Exh. 27. 

Sixth, and finally,7

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant promised compliance with the 

Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real property Acquisition Policies Act. See FAC, ¶¶ 

23, 35, 57, 126. 

 Having laid out the particular statements underlying Plaintiff’s claims, the Court 

addresses Defendant’s arguments in support of its motion to dismiss in turn below. 

iii. Objective Falsity 

Defendant urges the Court that Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law because 

Defendant did not make any “objectively false” statements. See Doc. No. 20. Regarding 

the first statement, as quoted above, Defendant argues it cannot give rise to an FCA claim 

because it is qualified by a statement which is not objectively false—“satisfactory to the 

FAA.” See Doc. No. 20. However, Plaintiff argues Defendant “never intended to 

acquire any interest, or do anything whatsoever to comply with” those provisions. See

Doc. No. 23. Further, Defendant’s argument appears to be at odds with the structure and 

language of the assurance. Without deciding as a matter of law what was required under 

the provisions, it appears to the Court that the provisions required sponsors to comply 

with the subsections in order to “maintain and/or acquire a property interest satisfactory 

to the FAA.” See Doc. No. 20. Under Defendant’s interpretation, the subsections would 

                                                                

7

 In Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff also argues Defendant stated it would comply with FAA Circular 

150/5100-17 and thus the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, 

which Plaintiff states required Defendant to acquire an easement in order to restrict land use in the RPZ. 

However, the Court disregards this argument because the FAC does not mention Circular 150/5100 nor 

allege that any of Defendant’s statements were false based on Defendant’s failure to obtain an easement. 

Accordingly, the FAC did not provide Defendant notice, as required under basic pleading standards, of 

this basis for Plaintiff’s claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 

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be rendered either permissive, despite that the language indicates that they are mandatory 

requirements, or superfluous. Sponsors would be left guessing what actions would be 

“satisfactory to the FAA.” See Doc. No. 20. For those reasons, the Court is unconvinced 

that one could never falsely promise compliance with those provisions. 

With respect to the second statement delineated above, Defendant argues its 

response—“Palomar Airport Comprehensive Land Use Plan”—cannot give rise to FCA 

liability because that plan “is the controlling document addressing compatible land use in 

the vicinity of the airport.” See Doc. No. 20. Also, Defendant contends it has no 

authority over land use within the City of Carlsbad, which surrounds the airport. Thus, 

Defendant argues its response cannot be objectively false because the Plan does assure 

compatible land use “subject to the actions of the City of Carlsbad.” See Doc. No. 20. 

However, “at this stage, a court does not make factual findings,” and accordingly, the 

Court declines to determine as a matter of law the scope of Defendant’s authority over 

land use. See Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2009). In the 

opposition brief, Plaintiff argues that in providing the responses, Defendant assured or 

promised to make sure that land use surrounding the airport was free from incompatible 

land uses, i.e., office buildings. Plaintiff contends Defendant never intended to do so, 

though. See Doc. No. 23. Based on Plaintiff’s argument, the Court is unpersuaded that 

Defendant’s statement cannot, under any circumstances, be false.

8

Regarding the third allegedly false statement, listed as paragraph 21 above, 

Defendant argues that because it only agreed to take “appropriate action, to the extent 

reasonable . . . to restrict the use of land” in the RPZ, Defendant cannot be liable under 

the FCA. Defendant argues that, as an initial matter, that provision did not require 

Defendant to prevent or remove office buildings. Defendant points the Court to the FAA 

Airport Compliance Manual, arguing that pursuant to the manual, where an airport 

                                                                

8

 However, as discussed below, the FAC itself does not allege Defendant’s statement was false for this 

reason, and thus, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead falsity with the specificity required under Rule 9(b). 

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operator such as Defendant does not have zoning authority over adjacent property, the 

operator need only “demonstrate a reasonable attempt to inform surrounding 

municipalities on the need for land use compatibility zoning.” See Doc. No. 20. 

However, as discussed above, the Court declines to take judicial notice of the 

Compliance Manual, and it is premature to decide issues of fact at this stage in the 

proceedings. 

Further, Defendant argues one cannot objectively prove the falsity of a promise to 

take “appropriate actions to the extent reasonably possible.” See Doc. No. 20. Defendant 

argues it would be “impossible” for the County to “adopt zoning laws affecting properties 

in Carlsbad,” where the subject office building is located. See Doc. No. 20. However, 

again, the Court does not make factual findings in determining the propriety of a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and, accordingly, declines to rely on Defendant’s argument 

that it cannot adopt such zoning laws. 

Also, Plaintiff argues Defendant made a false statement in making the promise in 

paragraph 21 because Defendant never intended to do anything to fulfill that promise. In 

such circumstances, the assurance could be deemed false or fraudulent under a 

promissory fraud theory of liability, and the Court declines to categorically exclude the 

assurance from FCA liability. See Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1174 (stating that “failure to 

honor one’s promise is (just) breach of contract, but making a promise that one intends

not to keep is fraud”). 

Fourth, Defendant argues that in light of paragraph 212(b) of FAA Circular 

150/5300, Defendant was not required to prevent or eliminate the allegedly incompatible 

office building. In particular, paragraph 212(b) states that “[w]here it is determined to be 

impracticable for the airport owner to acquire and plan the land uses within the entire 

RPZ, the RPZ land use standards have recommendation status for that portion of the RPZ 

not controlled by the airport owner.” See Doc. No. 23; Doc. No. 20, Exh. 31, p. 331. 

Defendant contends, “[t]herefore, because the City of Carlsbad has land use jurisdiction 

over those RPZ properties, and because acquiring all properties has significant financial 

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requirements, it was and is impracticable for the County to acquire and plan all land uses 

in the RPZ.” See Doc. No. 20. Accordingly, Defendant concludes that its promise to 

comply with the Circular was not false or fraudulent. Plaintiff counters that Defendant 

could have acquired a property interest through eminent domain, and also that it is the 

false promise to comply, while having no intent to do so, that made Defendants’ 

statements fraudulent. As discussed, the Court declines to make findings of fact at this 

stage. Even were it appropriate for the Court to determine the scope of Defendant’s 

authority over land within the RPZ at this stage, or the impracticability of Defendant 

acquiring and planning land use, the record is insufficient for the Court to make such 

determinations. 

Additionally, Defendant argues impracticability is subject to many variables and 

different interpretations, and accordingly, a promise to comply with paragraph 212 

cannot be objectively false. However, the Court is unpersuaded that there are no 

circumstances under which an empty promise of compliance with the Circular could be 

deemed false or fraudulent under a promissory fraud theory of liability. For the above 

reasons, the Court is unpersuaded by Defendant’s proffered grounds for dismissal. 

Finally, regarding the fifth and sixth assurances, Plaintiff alleges Defendant 

promised “it would be guided in the acquisition of real property by 49 CFR Part 24, 

subpart B, and that it had complied and would comply with Advisory Circular 150/5300-

13, Changes 1 through 5,” and would comply with the Uniform Relocation Assistance 

and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act. See FAC, ¶¶ 19, 23, 31, 35, 53, 57, 65, 77, 

89, 100, 111, 122, 126, 134, 146, 158. Because the Court has already addressed 

Defendant’s promise to comply with Circular 150/5300, the Court focuses on 

Defendant’s promises to comply with 49 CFR Part 24 and the Uniform Relocation 

Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act. Defendant argues the FAC does 

not describe how Defendant failed to comply with those provisions, particularly where 

“no property was actually acquired” and no “persons were displaced as a result.” See

Doc. No. 20. The Court agrees, and relies on the same reasoning in concluding, below, 

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that Plaintiff has not satisfied the pleading requirements of 9(b) in alleging the falsity of 

Defendant’s statements. However, the argument does not support Defendant’s 

overarching contention that none of the statements alluded to in the FAC can ever be 

objectively false for the purposes of FCA liability. Thus, for those purposes, the Court 

disregards the argument, and declines to dismiss any claims on the basis that they cannot, 

under any circumstances, be objectively false, as Defendant contends. 

iv. Statute of Limitations 

In the Ninth Circuit, a qui tam plaintiff must initiate a civil action under the FCA 

“no more than (1) six years after the date on which the FCA violation is committed or (2) 

three years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or 

reasonably should have been known by the qui tam plaintiff, whichever occurs last.” 

U.S. ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrop Corp., 91 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996); see 31 U.S.C. § 

3731(b). “A suit under the Act must, in any event, be brought no more than ten years 

after the date on which the violation occurred.” Id.; see 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b). 

In Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Defendant argues several of Plaintiff’s causes of 

action are barred by the statute of limitations because they allege “violations that 

occurred more than 10 years ago.” See Doc. No. 20. Defendant relies on the dates of 

grant applications and grant agreements as the dates of accrual. Plaintiff counters that the 

limitations period begins to run at the time a claim is made, or, if the claim is paid, at the 

time of payment. Also, Plaintiff argues that even were accrual to begin at the time a 

claim is made, the limitations period began when the County submitted claims requesting 

payment, not upon submission of grant applications or grant agreements. In Defendant’s 

reply brief, Defendant admits that there is a split of authority regarding when the statute 

of limitations begins to run on FCA claims. Defendant urges the Court to follow cases 

that hold FCA claims accrue when a false or fraudulent claim is submitted—as opposed 

to the date of payment—which Defendant contends is the majority rule. 

Regarding accrual, case law on the issue is sparse, particularly within this Circuit. 

However, absent instruction from the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court, the Court sides 

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with the majority of courts, and the only court in California, that have addressed the 

issue, to the Court’s knowledge. See U.S. ex rel. Dugan v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 

CIV.A.DKC 20033485, 2009 WL 3232080, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2009) (“Courts in the 

majority of the federal circuits have concluded that the statute of limitations starts to run 

when a false claim is submitted to the government.”); U.S. ex rel. Condie v. Bd. of 

Regents of Univ. of California, No. C89-3550-FMS, 1993 WL 740185, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 7, 1993). Accordingly, the Court finds that the statute of limitations begins to run 

on an FCA claim upon submission of a false claim. 

However, the Court disagrees with Defendant regarding when submission of 

allegedly false claims occurred in the context of this case. As Plaintiff states, it is the 

submission of the claims for payment that trigger potential FCA liability here, not 

submission of the applications for funding or execution of the grant agreements, despite 

that those documents may have contained false or fraudulent statements and thus 

rendered subsequent claims for payment fraudulent under a promissory fraud theory of 

liability. See United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (“[T]he conception of 

a claim against the government normally connotes a demand for money or for some 

transfer of public property.”); U.S. ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 

1174 (9th Cir. 2006) (defining a claim as “a call on the government fisc” and as involving 

“some sort of request for the government to pay out money or forfeit moneys due”); 

United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 313 (6th Cir. 1962) (“[T]he causes of action sued 

upon did not come into being, nor was there an actual violation of [the FCA], until the 

first voucher seeking payment of the false claims was presented to the United States.”). 

Here, Plaintiff commenced this action on December 2, 2015.9

 Thus, Plaintiff may 

not rely on any claims for payment that Defendant filed prior to December 2, 2005 as 

grounds for his FCA claims. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to 

                                                                

9

 Plaintiff states that this action was commenced on November 25, 2015, which is the date the complaint 

was signed. However, “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 3. Plaintiff filed the complaint on December 2, 2015. See Doc. No. 1. 

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dismiss only to the extent that any of Plaintiff’s causes of action rely on claims for 

payment or reimbursement dated prior to December 2, 2005. Based on the FAC as well 

as relevant exhibits, the Court’s finding partially affects Plaintiff’s first and second 

causes of action only, based on how Plaintiff has organized his claims in the FAC. 

Specifically, it appears that Defendant submitted a claim for $58,652.00, and another 

claim for $310,802.00 on October 5, 2005. See Doc. No. 20, Exh. 32, p. 333, Exh. 33, p. 

340. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s causes of action with prejudice and without 

leave to amend as to Defendant County of San Diego, to the extent that those causes of 

action rely on the aforementioned October 2005 claims or any other claims submitted 

prior to December 2, 2005.10

On another note, Defendant also argues other claims are time-barred because they 

concern “violations that occurred more than six years ago, and no equitable tolling could 

have occurred.” See Doc. No. 20. The parties agree that qui tam Plaintiffs can take 

advantage of equitable tolling, but Defendant contends that whether Plaintiff could have 

known earlier of the facts underlying his claims is irrelevant because the United States 

should have known of an “open and notorious” office building. See Doc. Nos. 20, 26. 

However, it would be inappropriate and premature for the Court to dismiss any other 

claims on the basis that the United States knew or should have known of the allegedly 

incompatible land use. “A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground 

that it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations only when ‘the running of the 

statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.’” See Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 

465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006). “[A] complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears 

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the 

timeliness of the claim.” Id. (quoting Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 

(9th Cir. 1995)). Defendant’s argument is too speculative, and is unsupported by the 

FAC. It is not clear beyond doubt, on the face of the pleadings, that the United States 

                                                                

10 The Court DISMISSES those claims without prejudice as to the United States. 

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knew or should have known of the existence of the building, that it was in the RPZ, that it 

was being used for an incompatible use, and that it was continually noncompliant 

throughout the entire period of time during which Defendant submitted the claims at 

issue. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss any claims on those grounds. 

v. Pleading Standards Under Rules 8 and 9(b) 

“The FCA is an anti-fraud statute,” and as such, complaints containing FCA claims 

must be both plausible under Rule 8 and pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b). See 

Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001); Campie, 2017 WL 

2884047, at *4; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 9(b). As mentioned, to plead and prove a FCA claim, a 

plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) a false statement or fraudulent course of conduct, (2) 

made with scienter, (3) that was material, causing (4) the government to pay out money 

or forfeit moneys due.” See Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1174. “Under Rule 9(b), 

‘circumstances constituting fraud or mistake’ must be stated with particularity, but 

‘malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind,’ including scienter, 

can be alleged generally.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 996 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 

F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009)). While a complaint “need not ‘identify representative 

examples of false claims to support every allegation,’” the complaint must still allege the 

“particular details of a scheme to submit false claims.” See United States v. United 

Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1180 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). 

Defendant argues the FAC does not satisfy pleading requirements under Rules 8 

and 9(b). The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to plead falsity, 

scienter, and materiality under the applicable pleading standards. 

Regarding falsity, the FAC summarizes several statements allegedly made by 

Defendant, and then, lumping all of those statements together, urges that they were false. 

This does not suffice under the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b), which requires a 

plaintiff to describe “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the fraudulent 

misconduct, “including what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is 

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false.” See Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106–07; United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 

F.3d 1161, 1180 (9th Cir. 2016); U.S. ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 

1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a plaintiff must “assert particular details to 

support its allegations of fraud”). Here, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently state why or how 

Defendant’s statements were false or fraudulent. Plaintiff makes factual arguments in his 

opposition brief to support of his contention that the subject statements could be 

objectively false, but those facts are not present in the FAC. 

For example, as mentioned above, based on the FAC, it is unclear how 

Defendant’s alleged assurances “that it would be guided in the acquisition of real 

property by 49 CFR Part 24, subpart B,” or comply with the Uniform Relocation 

Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, were false. Further, as perhaps 

the most glaring example, the FAC fails to describe why Defendant’s response of 

“Palomar Airport Comprehensive Land Use Plan” was false. To illustrate, the FAC 

merely states that the County represented that “in order to assure compatible land use . . . 

it had taken the step of causing the adoption” of the Plan. See FAC, ¶¶ 19, 65, 77, 89, 

134, 146, 158. Without more, the FAC concludes that all of Defendant’s statements were 

false because Defendant never intended to fulfill any promises. Thus, the FAC indicates 

that Defendant’s statement regarding the Plan was false presumably because Defendant 

did not adopt, or perhaps abide by, that Plan. However, in Plaintiff’s opposition brief, 

Plaintiff does not argue that Defendant never adopted or complied with the Plan. Rather, 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s statements regarding the Plan were false because they 

constituted promises to make certain that land use surrounding the airport was free from 

incompatible land uses, i.e., office buildings, but the Plan did not actually prevent or 

eliminate the allegedly incompatible land use. Thus, the Plan did not “assure compatible 

usage of land.” See Doc. No. 23. That reason is absent from the FAC, however. 

As a final note regarding falsity, Plaintiff’s vague allegations are particularly 

problematic where Plaintiff’s claims are primarily promissory fraud claims. To 

elaborate, under a promissory fraud theory of liability, “the promise must be false when 

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made.” Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1174. Accordingly, Plaintiff must add some factual support 

for the proposition that Defendant did not intend to comply with its assurances or 

statements at the time those assurances or statements were made. This is particularly so 

in light of the fact that some of Defendant’s allegedly false assurances involved a promise 

to acquire an interest in land within ten or twenty years of the assurances, meaning 

Defendant may still have time to do so. In such circumstances, the alleged fact that 

Defendant has not yet acquired such an interest is not very probative of falsity or 

fraudulent intent. 

Regarding scienter, Plaintiff need only make general allegations pursuant to Rule 

9(b). But, Plaintiff must still plausibly allege Defendant “knew that its statements were 

false, or that it was deliberately indifferent to or acted with reckless disregard of the truth 

of the statements,” and knowingly presented those statements anyway. Corinthian 

Colleges, 655 F.3d at 996; Campie, 2017 WL 2884047, at *9 (stating scienter requires 

“knowledge of [] falsity and [] intent to deceive”); United States ex rel. Hagood v. 

Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991). The FAC is vague 

and conclusory regarding scienter. Again, the FAC lumps all statements together and 

concludes that Defendant never intended to comply with its various assurances. Further, 

the FAC states that testimony of Peter Drinkwater, the Director of Airports for the 

County of San Diego, in a prior case, illustrates that the County “had no intent of 

performing its grant assurance and promises made to the FAA.” See FAC, ¶ 15. 

However, it is unclear whether Mr. Drinkwater actually testified as to the County’s lack 

of intent, or if that is Plaintiff’s conclusion based on other, undisclosed, testimony. 

Regarding materiality and causation, Plaintiff’s allegations do not satisfy 9(b) for 

similar reasons. “The materiality standard is demanding.” Universal Health Servs., Inc., 

136 S. Ct. at 2002–03. “A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely because 

the Government designates compliance with a particular statutory, regulatory, or 

contractual requirement as a condition of payment.” Id. “Nor is it sufficient for a finding 

of materiality that the Government would have the option to decline to pay if it knew of 

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the defendant’s noncompliance.” Id. “Materiality, in addition, cannot be found where 

noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.” Id. Further, courts consider whether there is 

any relationship between the subject matter of the false statement and the provision of the 

benefit. See Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 998. 

Here, Plaintiff merely concludes, with respect to every cause of action: “The FAA 

would not have provided the federal funding for the project had it been aware the 

foregoing was false.” See FAC, ¶¶ 20, 32, 43, 54, 66, 78, 90, 101, 112, 123, 135, 147, 

159. This is insufficient, particularly where the materiality standard requires more than 

the government’s designation of “compliance with a particular statutory, regulatory, or 

contractual requirement as a condition of payment.” See Universal Health Servs., Inc., 

136 S. Ct. at 2002–03. In sum, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that Defendant’s 

assertions of compliance, or promises to remove the alleged office building in the RPZ, 

were the “sine qua non of receipt of” the government funding received. See Ebeid, 616 

F.3d at 998. 

Lastly, at the end of the FAC, Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for “other claims,” 

alleging that “between the years 2005 and 2015 the County applied for and received 

grants . . . and made the same false assertions and promises as hereinabove described . . . 

under the same or similar circumstances as those illustrated above.” See FAC, ¶ 167. 

Such allegations fall short of the specificity required by Rule 9(b). 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead causes of action 

under the FCA. While Defendant may have been put on notice of the grounds for 

Plaintiff’s claims, as illustrated by Defendant’s briefing and proffered exhibits, Rule 9(b) 

also “serves ‘to deter the filing of complaints as a pretext for the discovery of unknown 

wrongs, to protect defendants from the harm that comes from being subject to fraud 

charges, and to prohibit plaintiffs from unilaterally imposing upon the court, the parties 

and society enormous social and economic costs absent some factual basis.’” See United 

Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Bly–Magee, 236 F.3d at 1018). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and DISMISSES this 

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action in its entirety without prejudice, and with leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION

 As set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and 

DISMISSES all of Plaintiff’s causes of action. Within 21 days of this Order, Plaintiff 

may file a Second Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies described above. 

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 15.1(c), if Plaintiff wishes to file a Second Amended 

Complaint, Plaintiff must also include “a version of that pleading that shows—through 

redlining, underlining, strikeouts, or other similarly effective typographic methods—how 

that pleading differs from the previously dismissed pleading.” See Civ. LR 15.1(c). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 2, 2017

 _____________________________ 

 Hon. Michael M. Anello 

United States District Judge 

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