Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_10-cv-00204/USCOURTS-alsd-1_10-cv-00204-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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[1] 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ) 

etc., )

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 10-0204-WS-N 

 ) 

TURQUOISE PROPERTIES GULF, ) 

INC., et al., ) 

 ) 

Defendants. )

ORDER

 The plaintiff has filed an application for entry of default. (Doc. 92). According to 

the application, some 28 purchaser defendants have been served with process but have 

failed to respond to the complaint in the time allowed by the rules of civil procedure. 

 As a threshold matter, it is not clear why the plaintiff is seeking default. This is an 

interpleader action, in which the competing claims to the interpleaded funds are between 

defendant Turquoise Properties Gulf, Inc. (“Turquoise”) on the one hand and the 

purchasers of various condominium units on the other, and the plaintiff disclaims any 

interest in the funds. Nor, according to the plaintiff, is there any possibility that it could 

have liability to any defendant beyond the interpleaded amounts. While the plaintiff 

seeks affirmative relief in six counts, (Doc. 10 at 35-38), all such relief is sought from 

Turquoise, not from any of the purchasers. Nevertheless, the plaintiff seeks entry of 

default as to 28 purchaser defendants, relief that would benefit Turquoise at the expense 

of the defaulted defendants. The plaintiff has not explained why it should interject itself 

in support of one interpleader defendant and in opposition to others. Absent such 

explanation, the Court is reluctant to enter default on the plaintiff’s application. 

 At any rate, review of the record reflects that entry of default would be premature 

as to most of the 28 purchaser defendants. First, seven of the defendants as to whom 

Case 1:10-cv-00204-WS-N Document 115 Filed 08/05/10 Page 1 of 4
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default is sought filed answers shortly after the plaintiff’s application was filed. (Docs. 

94, 97, 98). Thus, entry of default cannot be obtained against defendants Daniel G. 

Blackburn, Debra H. Blackburn, Gordon Chalmers, Mary Chalmers, Mamturquoise, 

LLC, Reservation, LLC, or CKM, LLC. 

 “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed 

to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules,” it is subject to entry of default. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). But a defendant is under no obligation to plead or otherwise defend 

until and unless it is “served with the summons and complaint.” Id. Rule 12(a)(1)(A); 

accord Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wright, 261 Fed. Appx. 259, 261 (11th

Cir. 2008). Thus, “[b]efore a default can be entered, ... the party must have been 

effectively served with process.” 10 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure ' 2682 at 14 (3rd ed. 1998). Serious questions concerning the 

effectiveness of the plaintiff’s purported service of process remain unanswered by the 

plaintiff’s application. 

 Service of process on a corporation, partnership or association may be made in 

accordance with Rule 4(h) or by following Alabama law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1). The 

only recognized means of serving an artificial entity under federal law is “by delivering a 

copy of the summons and of the complaint to” specified individuals. Id. Rule 4(h)(1)(B). 

“The term ‘delivering’ appears to refer to personal service.” Dyer v. Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc., 318 Fed. Appx. 843, 844 (11th Cir. 2009). Other Circuits have routinely so 

concluded.1

 All the artificial entities as to which the plaintiff seeks entry of default were 

served by certified mail. They were thus not served in compliance with Rule 4(h)(1)(B). 

 1 E.g., Gilliam v. County of Tarrant, 94 Fed. Appx. 230, 230 (5th Cir. 2004) (municipal 

corporations); Larsen v. Mayo Medical Center, 218 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2000) (corporations); 

Husner v. City of Buffalo, 1999 WL 48776 (2nd Cir. 1999) (municipal corporations); Gabriel v. 

United States, 30 F.3d 75, 77 (7th Cir. 1994) (United States Attorney); Puet v. Blandford, 912 

F.2d 270, 275 (9th Cir. 1990) (United States Attorney); accord 1 James Wm. Moore, et al., 

Moore’s Federal Practice § 4.53[2] (3rd ed. 2007) (corporations). 

Case 1:10-cv-00204-WS-N Document 115 Filed 08/05/10 Page 2 of 4
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Dyer, 318 Fed. Appx. at 843-44 (service by certified mail on defendant’s registered agent 

did not satisfy Rule 4(h)(1)(B)). 

 Under Alabama law, an artificial entity may be served “by serving an officer, a 

partner (other than a limited partner), a managing or general agent, or any agent 

authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” Ala. R. Civ. P. 

4(c)(6). Service on an artificial entity may be made by certified mail, but “the addressee 

shall be a person described in the appropriate subdivision.” Id. Rule 4(i)(2)(i), (ii). That 

is, the mailing must be addressed, not simply to the artificial entity, but to a human being 

affiliated with the entity as an officer, partner or agent as described in Rule 4(c)(6). None 

of the certified mailings to an artificial entity on which the plaintiff relies includes a 

human addressee.2

 

 Service of process on an individual within the United States is governed by Rule 

4(e). Service of the summons and complaint must be made by “deliver[y]” to the 

defendant “personally,” or by “deliver[y]” to an agent authorized by appointment or by 

law to receive service of process, or “by leaving copies thereof at the individual=s 

dwelling or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion who 

resides there.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). As noted, delivery connotes personal service, and 

since certified mail is not delivered to a person’s home but is picked up at the post office, 

it does not appear that one may “leav[e] copies” within the contemplation of this rule by 

using certified mail. Accordingly, service on the individuals was not successful under 

Rule 4(e)(2). 

 Rule 4(e)(1) allows for service of process in accordance with Alabama law. The 

Alabama rule is substantively the same as the federal rule. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(e)(2) with Ala. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). Alabama, however, allows service on an individual 

 2

 (Doc. 26 at 8 (CSJ & Associates, LLC); id. at 12 (E&A Holdings, Inc.); id. at 14 (E&S 

Properties, LLC); id. at 16 (JMJ, LLC); id at 18 (Knobby-Lee Investments, LLC); id. at 26 

(Sandlot Development, LLC); id. at 28 (Walker Properties, LP); Doc. 27 at 2 (Beam Partners, 

LLC); id. at 6 (Schoonover Investments, LP)). 

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by certified mail. Id. Rule 4(i)(2). “Service by certified mail shall be deemed complete 

and the time for answering shall run from the date of delivery to the named addressee or 

the addressee’s agent as evidenced by signature on the return receipt.” Id. Rule 

4(c)(2)(C). 

 The majority of receipts as to individual purchaser defendants reflect that someone 

other than the defendant signed for the certified mail.3 As to these defendants, service is 

good only if the signatory constitutes the defendant’s “agent,” that is, “a person or entity 

specifically authorized by the addressee to receive the addressee’s mail and to deliver that 

mail to the addressee.” Ala. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2)(C). Some of the signatories share the same 

last name as the defendant, but others bear no obvious connection to the defendant. In 

neither case has the plaintiff attempted to show that the signatory is, or even probably is, 

the defendant’s “agent” as defined in Rule 4(i)(2)(C). 

 For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff’s application for entry of default, 

construed as a motion, is denied. The plaintiff and Turquoise are reminded that the clock 

is ticking under Rule 4(m), and by the end of this month dismissal for failure to serve 

process looms as a distinct possibility. 

 DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of August, 2010. 

 s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 3

 (Doc. 25 at 6 (Tim Bruni, signed for by Tracie Bruni); Doc. 26 at 24 (Timothy 

Quattlebaum, signed for by Janet DeJesus); Doc. 43 at 2 (Ronald Bruni, signed for by Mary Lee 

Bruni); Doc. 44 at 10 (Howard “Chip” Miskelly, signed for by Eloise Lide); Doc. 46 at 2 (Justin 

Duke, signed for by Todd Duke); Doc. 59 at 4 (Irwin Michael Weiner, signed for by Diane 

Weiner)). 

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