Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-05378/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-05378-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Except where otherwise noted, the facts are taken from the opinion of the Court of Appeal

affirming petitioner's conviction, People v. Narvios, A088545 (May 21, 2001) (unpublished), which

is included as Exhibit B to the petition, and will be cited elsewhere as "App. Op."

ORDER DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS & DEFERRING FINAL RULING—No. C-02-05378

RMW

E-FILED on 9-7-06

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

PAUL NARVIOS,

Petitioner,

v.

A.A. LAMARQUE, Warden,

Respondent.

No. C-02-05378 RMW

ORDER DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS &

DEFERRING FINAL RULING

[Re Docket Nos. 1, 11, 24]

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his

conviction for nineteen counts under California Penal Code §§ 288, 288a, 288.5, and 289. For the

reasons set forth below, the court denies the petition.

 I. BACKGROUND1

Petitioner moved in with his girlfriend Glorina in 1993. The two lived in South San

Francisco with petitioner's son and Glorina's daughter, Cassandra. Petitioner temporarily moved out

in 1996 when the couple broke up, but he soon returned to live with Glorina when he found himself

in financial hardship. In September 1997, petitioner was injured during an argument with Glorina,

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ORDER DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS & DEFERRING FINAL RULING—No. C-02-05378

RMW 2

and as a result of his injuries, petitioner lost his memory and quit his job. He recuperated in

Glorina's home. 

Cassandra, then aged nine, took care of petitioner as he recovered. During this period, the

two began to "cuddle" on petitioner's bed. The cuddling developed into a consensual sexual

relationship. The two had sex for the first time around November 1997. Over several months the

two had sexual intercourse approximately twelve times and engaged in oral sex approximately six

times; petitioner digitally penetrated Cassandra at least twice. Petitioner tried to use a condom once

but found it unexciting. They professed their love for one another.

After some time, petitioner began to suspect that Cassandra was pregnant. Home pregnancy

tests returned positive results. Glorina learned of the pregnancy and feared that Cassandra's father

would attempt to gain custody of Cassandra if he discovered her condition. Petitioner, Glorina, and

Cassandra decided to fly to the Philippines in May 1998 so that Cassandra's child could be delivered

without her father's knowledge. However, the day before their scheduled flight, petitioner called the

police from a hotel to turn himself in. 

When Officer Donald Olsen arrived at the hotel, petitioner told him that he was having a

relationship with his girlfriend's ten-year-old daughter. Olson drove petitioner to the police station

where he voluntarily confessed to his sexual relationship with Cassandra. The confession was

videotaped. During this time, Officer John Kallos went to Glorina's house to speak with Cassandra. 

Cassandra told the officer that she engaged in sexual intercourse approximately fifteen times with

petitioner. She also stated that they had mutual oral sex and that she was pregnant. Following

petitioner's videotaped confession, Kallos conducted a videotaped interview with Cassandra at the

police station. In the taped interview, she repeated that she and petitioner had intercourse

approximately fifteen times and that it was always consensual. She stated that petitioner used a

condom once or twice, that they had oral sex "[l]ike 10 [times] or something," and that petitioner

had digitally penetrated her on some occasions.

An examination of Cassandra several days after the interview revealed that Cassandra had

contracted venereal warts, a sexually-transmitted disease. On July 20, 1998, Cassandra gave birth to

a son. A paternity test indicated a 99.94% probability that petitioner was the father. At petitioner's

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2

 A copy of this order is attached to the petition as Exhibit A.

ORDER DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS & DEFERRING FINAL RULING—No. C-02-05378

RMW 3

trial, the parties stipulated to Cassandra's date of birth and that her pregnancy resulted from a sexual

relationship with petitioner. At the time of the baby's birth, Cassandra was ten years old and

petitioner was fifty.

Petitioner was charged with twenty offenses under California Penal Code §§ 288, 288a,

288.5, and 289. Court-appointed trial counsel represented petitioner. The prosecutor moved in

limine to admit Cassandra's out-of-court statements to Kallos while petitioner moved to compel

Cassandra's live testimony. The court held a hearing to determine whether Cassandra would testify. 

In response to the prosecutor's questions, Cassandra stated that she would not discuss her

relationship with petitioner and that it would be too embarrassing and painful for her to testify. The

court found that Cassandra was "unavailable as a witness" and admitted the statements. 

A jury trial was held in August 1999. During the trial, petitioner testified and admitted his

sexual relationship with Cassandra. The jury found petitioner guilty of the following offenses: six

counts under Penal Code § 288a(c) of oral copulation with a child under fourteen and more than ten

years younger than petitioner; two counts under Penal Code § 289(j) of digital penetration of a child

under fourteen and more than ten years younger than petitioner; ten counts under Penal Code

§ 288(a) of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under fourteen; and one count under Penal

Code § 288.5 of continuous sexual abuse of a child under fourteen. Petitioner was sentenced to a

total prison term of thirty-one years.

Petitioner was sentenced to the thirty-one year term on September 9, 1999. On May 2, 2001,

the state appellate court affirmed the judgment. The state supreme court denied review on August

15, 2001. People v. Narvios, S098229 (Cal.).2

 Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in this court

on November 12, 2002 claiming violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Petitioner contends that

he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment rights by (1) ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) the

trial court's admission of his victim's out-of-court statements. 

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ORDER DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS & DEFERRING FINAL RULING—No. C-02-05378

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

This court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus on "behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §2254(a). Petitioner bears the

burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his custody violates the Constitution, laws,

or treaties of the United States. See Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 2002). This

Court may not grant a petition with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the 'unreasonable application

clause,' a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner's case." Id. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable." Id. at 411. 

On a petition for habeas corpus, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state court

to determine whether the state court's decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir.

2000). It also looks to any lower court decision examined or adopted by the highest state court to

address the merits. See Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004) (because state

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ORDER DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS & DEFERRING FINAL RULING—No. C-02-05378

RMW 5

appellate court examined and adopted some of trial court's reasoning, trial court's ruling is also

relevant); Collins v. Rice, 348 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (where state appellate court adopted

reasons cited by trial court, federal review necessarily includes discussion of trial court decision).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

The right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the

Constitution has been clearly established by the Supreme Court. See Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984). In judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a court must ask whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the adversarial process that the result of the trial cannot be relied

upon as just. Id. at 686. The petitioner must establish (1) that counsel's performance was deficient

and (2) that petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. Id. at 687-94. In

establishing ineffective assistance, the relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have done,

but rather whether the choices he made were reasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524

(2003). Petitioner must show that counsel's performance fell below an "objective standard of

reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Id.

Petitioner argues that "a reasonably competent attorney would realize that, if Cassandra's

statements were not admissible, there was a lack of corroboration of petitioner's confession and that .

. . the confession would not be admissible." Pet. at 37. Petitioner contends that counsel's failure to

object to the admission of his confession on corpus delicti grounds constituted ineffective assistance

of counsel. Id. at 36-37. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected this contention. The court found that petitioner had

not established the first element of ineffective assistance under Strickland, namely that counsel's

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when measured against prevailing

professional norms. App. Op. at 14. The court found it "unreasonable to expect trial counsel to

make subsidiary objections based on the assumption that the trial court's underlying rulings were

incorrect." Id. Further, the court noted that, "even ignoring Cassandra's testimony, there was ample

evidence to satisfy the corpus delicti rule." App. Op. at 15. 

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ORDER DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS & DEFERRING FINAL RULING—No. C-02-05378

RMW 6

According to the California Supreme Court: 

The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to assure that the accused is not admitting to a crime

that never occurred. Hence, before a confession may be introduced slight corroborating facts

must show independently that a crime has been committed by someone. 

People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal. 4th 353, 357 (1998) (emphasis added). The parties had stipulated that

Cassandra had given birth to petitioner's son. The court thus concluded that "the admitted sexual

relationship provided the 'slight' corroboration that was necessary to support all of the sex offenses

that had been charged." App. Op. at 15. 

The Court of Appeal's determination that petitioner had no valid objection based on the

corpus delicti rule rendered the failure of petitioner's trial counsel harmless. The Court of Appeal's

finding was not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable application of Wiggins. Petitioner

is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

C. Admission of Cassandra's Out-of-Court Statements

Out-of-court statements constitute hearsay when the statements are offered into evidence to

prove the truth of the matter asserted. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219 (1974). 

Testimonial hearsay, such as prior testimony or a police interrogation, is barred under the

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment unless (1) the witness is unavailable and (2) the

statements have "adequate indicia of reliability." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). For purposes

of federal habeas corpus review, the standard applicable to violations of the Confrontation Clause is

whether the inadmissible evidence had an actual and prejudicial effect upon the jury. See

Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 637 (1993)). 

Petitioner argues that the admission of Cassandra's out-of-court statements deprived him of

his constitutional right of confrontation. Petitioner claims (1) that Cassandra was not "unavailable,"

as no attempt was made to compel her to testify and (2) that Cassandra's statements lacked "adequate

indicia of reliability" allowing for their admissibility. Pet. at 3-4. 

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ORDER DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS & DEFERRING FINAL RULING—No. C-02-05378

RMW 7

1. Availability of the victim

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in admitting Cassandra's out-of-court statements

after finding that she was "unavailable as a witness." Pet. at 18. Petitioner claims that because the

trial court "made no attempt" to compel Cassandra to testify, she was not "unavailable." Id. at 19-

20. 

The Court of Appeal found that the trial court took reasonable steps to induce Cassandra to

testify. App. Op. at 8. "She said repeatedly that she would not because 'it hurts too much.'" Id. 

Even if Cassandra were physically available, she was "unavailable" as a witness because she refused

to testify and because the court took reasonable steps to induce her to testify until it was "obvious

that such steps would be unavailing." See People v. Sul, 122 Cal. App. 3d 355, 365 (1981); App.

Op. at 10. Cassandra discussed with counsel and the trial court why she would not testify; according

to defense counsel, Cassandra appeared "adamant in her refusal to testify" and neither side thereafter

sought to compel her testimony. App. Op. at 9-11. 

Petitioner contends that the trial court could have done more to force Cassandra to testify,

such as order her to "forego some anticipated pleasurable activity or give up some valued object" or

pay a fine "proportionate, of course, to the child's allowance." Pet. at 21. In its analysis of

reasonableness, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court was not "obligated to further

traumatize an already fragile child who was making hopeful progress, by taking punitive measures

such as taking her teddy bear or garnishing her allowance." App. Op. at 11. The court's finding was

neither contrary to, nor involving an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

2. Adequate indicia of reliability

Petitioner next contends that the trial court erroneously admitted Cassandra's out-of-court

statements because the statements were unreliable. Pet. at 28. 

The Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and cross-examination are not offended by the

admission of hearsay evidence if the evidence contains "particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. However, "hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant

must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other

evidence at trial." Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990). The Supreme Court has set forth a

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ORDER DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS & DEFERRING FINAL RULING—No. C-02-05378

RMW 8

nonexclusive list of factors that courts may use to determine whether hearsay statements made by a

child witness in a sexual abuse case are reliable: (1) spontaneity and consistent repetition, (2) mental

state of the declarant, (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and (4) lack of

motive to fabricate. Id. at 821-822.

The Court of Appeal evaluated these four factors and concluded that Cassandra's statements

were "sufficiently reliable." App. Op. at 13-14. Cassandra's statements to the authorities were

consistent. She used terminology, such as "eat me," uncharacteristic of a child her age. Cassandra

repeatedly stated that she "loved" petitioner; she had no apparent motive to fabricate her testimony. 

The Court of Appeal's reasoning was not contrary to and did not involve an unreasonable application

of Wright. 

As respondent correctly notes, even if Cassandra's out-of-court statements were admitted in

error, the error was harmless. Petitioner's crimes were corroborated by Cassandra's pregnancy, her

venereal disease, and the planned flight to the Philippines. Ans. at 21.

In assessing harm in a habeas case, a court must ask whether "the error substantially

influenced the jury's decision." O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995) (internal quotation

marks omitted). A trial error is considered harmless under Brecht only if the actual jury in the case

would have reached the same verdict absent the error. Gray v. Klauser, 282 F.3d 633, 654-55 (9th

Cir. 2002), judgment vacated on other grounds, 537 U.S. 1041 (2002). A court must not go beyond

the record in deciding the likely effect if the error had not occurred. Id. at 655. If the court is

convinced that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the

judgment should stand. O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 437. 

This court finds that the evidence in the record, namely Cassandra's pregnancy and the

results of genetic testing which indicated petitioner as the father and Cassandra's contraction of

venereal warts, would have corroborated petitioner's own testimony absent admission of Cassandra's

out-of-court statements. Thus, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

3. Further briefing under Crawford

After this case was fully briefed, the United States Supreme Court held that the

Confrontation Clause forbids admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement by a witness who

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3

 The case is set for oral argument on November 1, 2006.

ORDER DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS & DEFERRING FINAL RULING—No. C-02-05378

RMW 9

did not testify, unless the witness is both unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to

cross-examine the witness. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). This abrogated the

"reliability" test set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). The Ninth Circuit has held that

Crawford applies retroactively to collateral attacks, and the Supreme Court is reviewing the

decision. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1020 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Whorton

v. Bockting, 126 S. Ct. 2017 (2006) (questions presented are whether Crawford applies retroactively

to cases on collateral review, and, if so, whether Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), applies).

After disposition of Worton v. Bockting,

3

 the parties are to meet and confer regarding

whether further briefing is appropriate in light of Crawford. The parties are then to file a joint

statement with the court setting forth their decision and suggesting a briefing schedule, if necessary. 

Alternatively, petitioner may at any time inform the court that he does not wish to pursue a claim

under Crawford, after which the court will enter a final judgment in this action.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court:

1. defers ruling on petitioner's Confrontation Clause claim to the extent Crawford 

 may be applicable, and

2. otherwise denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

DATED: 9/7/06

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS & DEFERRING FINAL RULING—No. C-02-05378

RMW 10

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Petitioner:

Richard Such jsuch@comcast.net 

Counsel for Respondent

Jeffrey Bryant

Gerald A. Engler

Catherine Rivlin 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 9-7-06 /s/ JH 

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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