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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 3, 2008 Decided November 14, 2008

No. 07-5255

DELARSE MONTGOMERY, JR.,

APPELLANT

v.

ELAINE L. CHAO, CHAIRWOMAN, PENSION BENEFIT

GUARANTY CORP. AND BRADLEY B. BELT, EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cv02157)

David H. Shapiro argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Alana M. Hecht.

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for

appellees. With her on the briefs were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S.

Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Karen L. Melnik, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH, and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

USCA Case #07-5255 Document #1149279 Filed: 11/14/2008 Page 1 of 10
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1

The PBGC is a U.S. government corporation within the

Department of Labor that insures private-sector defined-benefit

pension plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302; Boivin v. U.S. Airways, Inc.,

446 F.3d 148, 150 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: DeLarse Montgomery challenges

the district court’s grant of summary judgment against him on

his claims of employment discrimination and retaliation by the

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Because we

find that no reasonable jury could conclude that the PBGC’s

decisions not to promote and not to appoint Montgomery

resulted from discriminatory or retaliatory animus, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

I

Appellant Montgomery is an African-American male who

began working at the PBGC in 1986.1

 His first position was as

a secretary at the GS-5 grade level. In 1987, he became a

Management Analyst. By 1992, after a series of promotions, he

had become a Financial Specialist at the GS-11 level. After

receiving his promotion to GS-11, Montgomery filed a complaint

of race discrimination, which was settled in 1998. The

settlement gave him a promotion to a GS-12 Financial Specialist

position in the Investment Accounting Branch of the PBGC’s

Financial Operations Department.

Montgomery’s direct supervisor in the Investment

Accounting Branch was Cynthia Adams, an African-American

female. In March 2002, Adams assigned Montgomery to

perform Contracting Officer Technical Representative (COTR)

duties for the PBGC’s contract with Bert Smith Professional

Services, a firm that performed accounting work on pension

USCA Case #07-5255 Document #1149279 Filed: 11/14/2008 Page 2 of 10
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plans under contract with the PBGC. Soon thereafter,

Montgomery asked Adams to update his position description to

include the COTR duties, and in April 2003, he formally

requested a promotion to grade GS-13 based on accretion of

duties -- namely, the COTR duties that Adams had assigned to

him. On September 9, 2003, Adams notified Montgomery that

his requested accretion-of-duties promotion had been denied. On

October 1, 2003, Montgomery filed a formal Equal Employment

Opportunity (EEO) administrative complaint alleging that the

PBGC’s denial of his request for an accretion-of-duties

promotion to GS-13 resulted from race, gender, and age

discrimination. 

In response to the EEO complaint, the PBGC ordered a desk

audit of appellant’s position to determine its proper GS level.

Cynthia Kyle, a Human Resources contractor, conducted the

desk audit, which included interviews of both Montgomery and

Adams as well as review of documentation regarding

Montgomery’s responsibilities. The desk audit indicated that the

job was in fact a GS-11 position. The audit also found that

COTR duties are not usually “grade-controlling,” and that for

such duties to affect Montgomery’s grade, “he would have to

possess the qualifications to ‘oversee’ the work from a

completely ‘technical’ aspect or be an Accountant.” J.A. 379. 

While the EEO complaint was pending, Montgomery

applied for a GS-12/13 Accountant position. The PBGC instead

selected Lafaye Graham, an African-American female with a

bachelor’s degree in finance, a master’s degree in accounting,

and fifteen years of experience in accounting, including

investment accounting -- a qualification mentioned in the

vacancy announcement. In response to his failure to receive the

Accountant position, Montgomery filed a second EEO complaint

in late 2004, claiming both discrimination and retaliation.

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2

 “A status applicant is one who has ‘competitive status within the

government’ and does not have to ‘recompete’ for the position.”

Montgomery v. Chao, 495 F. Supp. 2d 2, 9 (D.D.C. 2007). 

After filing the second EEO charge, Montgomery applied

for a GS-13 Collections Analyst position, which was advertised

under both a status and a non-status vacancy announcement.2

Montgomery alleges that he applied under both vacancy

announcements, but the PBGC asserts that it only received the

non-status application. The PBGC hired a candidate from the

status list to fill the position and therefore cancelled the nonstatus vacancy announcement without considering applicants,

including Montgomery, who were on the non-status list. After

failing to obtain the Collections Analyst position, Montgomery

filed his third EEO complaint, again alleging both discrimination

and retaliation. 

On November 3, 2005, Montgomery filed suit in the U.S.

District Court for the District of Columbia. Montgomery

charged that, in denying him the promotion and positions just

described, the PBGC had discriminated and retaliated against

him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. On June 26, 2007, the district court

granted the PBGC’s motion for summary judgment on all of

Montgomery’s claims. This appeal followed. 

II

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Waterhouse v. Dist. of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 991

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only if

“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.R.CIV.

P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-

48 (1986). We must view the evidence in the light most

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favorable to the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable inferences

in his favor, and eschew making credibility determinations or

weighing the evidence. Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1088

(D.C. Cir. 2003); see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156

F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

Title VII prohibits the federal government from

discriminating in employment on grounds of race or sex, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-16, and from retaliating against employees for

engaging in activity protected by Title VII, see Forman v. Small,

271 F.3d 285, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Ethnic Employees of the

Library of Cong. v. Boorstin, 751 F.2d 1405, 1415 & n.13 (D.C.

Cir. 1985). See also Lathram, 336 F.3d at 1088. Where the

plaintiff’s evidence of discrimination (or retaliation) is

circumstantial, the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework

applies. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

802-05 (1973); Lathram, 336 F.3d at 1089 n.3. Under that

framework, a plaintiff “must [first] establish a prima facie case

of discrimination.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142. Once the plaintiff

establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant

to produce a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its

actions. Id. (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 254 (1981)); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

Where, as here, the defendant produces such a reason, “‘the

McDonnell Douglas framework -- with its presumptions and

burdens’ -- disappear[s], and the sole remaining issue [is]

‘discrimination vel non.’” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43 (internal

citations omitted); see also Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms,

520 F.3d 490, 493-94 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Thereafter, “to survive

summary judgment the plaintiff must show that a reasonable jury

could conclude from all of the evidence that the adverse

employment decision was made for a discriminatory [or

retaliatory] reason.” Lathram, 336 F.3d at 1088; see Czekalski

v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

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In the following paragraphs, we consider whether a

reasonable jury could so conclude with respect to each of

Montgomery’s three claims. 

1. Montgomery’s first claim is that the PBGC denied his

request for an accretion-of-duties promotion to grade level GS13, based on his new COTR duties, for discriminatory and/or

retaliatory reasons. In response, the PBGC states that it had a

nondiscriminatory (and nonretaliatory) reason for the denial: the

desk audit indicated the job was in fact a GS-11 position, and for

the COTR duties to affect Montgomery’s grade, “he would have

to possess the qualifications to ‘oversee’ the work from a

completely ‘technical’ aspect or be an Accountant,”

qualifications that he did not have. J.A. 379. 

As we have previously noted, “one way for a plaintiff to

show that an adverse employment decision was made for a

discriminatory reason is to ‘show[ ] that the nondiscriminatory

explanation the defendant proffered for its decision was false.’”

Czekalski, 475 F.3d at 366 (quoting Lathram, 336 F.3d at 1089);

see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47. Montgomery attempts to

demonstrate the falsity of the PBGC’s explanation by showing

that the agency, based on accretion of duties, had previously

promoted five other employees who were outside his protected

class. But Montgomery’s evidence did not establish that any of

those employees were similarly situated to him. None of them

had the same position he had, and none worked in the same

branch of the agency. J.A. 48-53 (Montgomery Dep.). Nor was

there evidence that any of those employees received accretionof-duties promotions due to COTR duties. Indeed, Montgomery

conceded at his deposition that three of the five employees did

not receive their promotions on the basis of COTR duties, J.A.

50-53, and that he had “no idea” whether the other two did or did

not. J.A. 48-49. “In the absence of evidence that the

comparators were actually similarly situated” to him, an

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inference of falsity or discrimination is not reasonable.

Waterhouse, 298 F.3d at 995-96; see, e.g., McGill v. Munoz, 203

F.3d 843, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff

provided no evidence of pretext where she “offered no evidence

that employees with similarly suspicious patterns of absenteeism

were treated any differently than she was”).

Montgomery also contends that a jury could infer

discriminatory animus from the fact that his supervisor, Cynthia

Adams, lied to the desk auditor about his job duties (and hence

his experience). It is true that “a plaintiff can attempt to show

that the employer’s explanation misstates the candidates’

qualifications,” and that “[a]dequate evidence of this type may

suffice to permit a jury to infer that the employer’s explanation

is incorrect or fabricated, and thus to infer discrimination.” Aka,

156 F.3d at 1295. But the evidence does not show that Adams

lied about Montgomery’s duties. To the contrary, the record

reveals the parties’ agreement that, although Montgomery

performed basic accounting work, he did not perform more

complex accounting duties, such as trust or investment

accounting. See J.A. 82-83 (Montgomery Dep.); J.A. 132-34

(Adams Dep.); J.A. 138-39 (Adams Dep.); cf. Holcomb v.

Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (suggesting that only

“a rather explicit misstatement” regarding an employee’s

experience “might permit an inference of discrimination” (citing

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1295)). Under these circumstances, an

inference of discriminatory animus is not reasonable.

2. Turning next to Montgomery’s claim that he was

unlawfully denied the GS-12/13 Accountant position, the PBGC

again offers a nondiscriminatory reason for failing to select

Montgomery: it simply chose a more qualified applicant. Even

“[i]n a close case, a reasonable juror would usually assume that

the employer is more capable of assessing the significance of

small differences in the qualifications of the candidates, or that

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the employer simply made a judgment call.” Aka, 156 F.3d at

1294. But this case is not even close. By his own admission,

Montgomery had only an associate’s degree in marketing, 24

credit hours of college-level accounting courses, and experience

limited to accounting for cash assets. J.A. 80-82 (Montgomery

Dep.); J.A. 100 (Montgomery Aff.). By contrast, the person

whom the PBGC hired -- Lafaye Graham -- had an

undergraduate degree in finance, a master’s degree in

accounting, and fifteen years of accounting experience, including

investment accounting. J.A. 140 (Adams Dep.). Under these

circumstances, a reasonable jury could not have inferred

discrimination. See Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 897-98.

Montgomery attempts to rebut the PBGC’s

nondiscriminatory explanation by insisting that the agency

refused to give him appropriate credit for his 24 hours of

accounting courses. Although he acknowledges that he failed to

submit a transcript showing that he had completed the courses,

as required by the vacancy announcement, he insists that the

agency had made allowances for other applicants in similar

circumstances. This argument, however, is simply irrelevant.

With or without the 24 hours, Montgomery’s qualifications do

not approach those of the applicant the agency hired. 

Of course, demonstrating that the employer’s proffered

explanation for its actions is untrue is not the only way to show

that it made an adverse employment decision for a

discriminatory reason. See, e.g., Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan

Mortgage Corp., 328 F.3d 647, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

“[E]vidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part

of the employer” is another way. Czekalski, 475 F.3d at 363

(quoting Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289). Although Montgomery offers

no evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part

of PBGC employees, he does contend that he has evidence of

retaliatory animus. 

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The strongest evidence that Montgomery proffers -- on this

or any of his other claims -- is an ambiguous statement that

Adams made at her deposition. In response to counsel’s question

as to why a Human Resources (H.R.) Specialist had asked her

about Montgomery’s qualifications, Adams answered that it may

have been “because of Mr. Montgomery’s past history.” J.A.

145. Montgomery speculates that this must have been a

reference to his 1998 EEO settlement, and that it shows agency

animus against such activity. Immediately before answering

that question, however, Adams had answered “no” to the direct

question of whether she and the H.R. Specialist had discussed

Montgomery’s “prior EEO activity.” J.A. 145. And the H.R.

Specialist himself testified that what he had discussed with

Adams was Montgomery’s accounting experience at the agency.

J.A. 180 (Lattimer Aff.). Against this, Montgomery has only a

form of compound speculation: his speculation about the

meaning of Adams’ speculation about why the H.R. Specialist

had contacted her. The possibility that a jury might speculate in

the plaintiff’s favor under such circumstances is simply

insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Haynes v.

Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 485 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Rogers Corp. v.

EPA, 275 F.3d 1096, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

3. Finally, we turn to Montgomery’s challenge to the

PBGC’s failure to select him for the GS-13 Collections Analyst

position, a position that was advertised under both a status and

a non-status vacancy announcement. Regarding his failure to

win appointment under the former, Montgomery offered no

evidence to rebut the PBGC’s nondiscriminatory reason for nonselection: that the agency’s decisionmakers had never received

a status application from him. Although there may have been a

genuine dispute (based on his own testimony) as to whether

Montgomery actually submitted such an application, there was

no genuine dispute that the decisionmakers never received it.

There was no computer (or other) record that the PBGC had

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received a status application from Montgomery, and no evidence

(or allegation) that the employee who logged in and disseminated

such applications (the receptionist) had any animus toward him.

See Def. Mot. Ex. 2 at 156-57 (Montgomery Dep.). Regarding

his non-status application, Montgomery likewise failed to rebut

the PBGC’s nondiscriminatory explanation for not choosing him:

that it filled the position with a candidate from the status list and

therefore, consistent with its selection procedures, did not

consider anyone on the non-status list. Nor did Montgomery

offer any other evidence that supported a claim of discrimination

or retaliation with respect to his failure to win the Collections

Analyst position under either announcement. 

III

Because no reasonable jury could conclude from all of the

evidence that the PBGC discriminated or retaliated against

Montgomery, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of the PBGC is 

Affirmed.

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