Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00353/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00353-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO JWB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel Lee Baker,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-0353-PHX-SMM (JRI)

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Temporary

Restraining Order, and Request for a Three Judge Court (Doc. # 9). The Court will deny the

motion.

I. Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

The purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo or to prevent

irreparable injury pending the resolution of the underlying claim. Sierra On-Line, Inc. v.

Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984). When seeking injunctive relief

the moving party must show either: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits and the

possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) that serious questions going to the merits were raised

and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor.” Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 198

F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999). These two formulations both operate as a sliding scale,

whereby a stronger showing of irreparable harm can compensate for a weaker likelihood of

success. See id.; United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992).

Case 2:07-cv-00353-SMM Document 28 Filed 08/13/07 Page 1 of 4
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Under either test, the movant bears the burden of persuasion. Mattel, Inc. v. Greiner &

Hausser GmbH, 354 F.3d 857, 869 (9th Cir. 2003).

As a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff must do more than allege

imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; he must also demonstrate immediate

threatened injury. Caribbean Marine Servs. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

In other words, a plaintiff must show a real or immediate threat; a likelihood of substantial

and immediate irreparable injury. Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quotation and citation omitted). Speculative injury is not sufficient. Carribean Marine

Servs., 844 F.3d. at 674. 

In his motion, Plaintiff asserts that he is confined in overcrowded conditions that

result in increased violence and extreme hostility (Doc. # 9 at 1-2). As a result, Plaintiff

argues that the conditions of the prison violate the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff further avers

that there is a substantial threat of irreparable harm in that Plaintiff fears for his life. Plaintiff

seeks an order to (1) provide Plaintiff with 60 square feet of floor space; (2) prohibit doublebunking; (3) provide adequate medical and mental health services, clothing, outside exercise,

and food service; and (4) segregate dangerous gang members, predator inmates, and mentally

ill inmates from the population (id.).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(1), no preliminary injunction can be

issued without notice to the opposing party. Neither Plaintiff’s motion nor the accompanying

memorandum indicate that Plaintiff provided notice to Defendants of his request for

preliminary injunctive relief. Consequently, Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction

will be denied. 

II. Temporary Restraining Order

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) provides that a temporary restraining order may

not be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party unless:

1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit

or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable

injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before

the adverse party or that party’s attorney can be heard in

opposition, and

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2) the [applicant] certifies to the court in writing the

efforts, if any, which have been made to give the notice

and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not

be required.

Plaintiff has similarly not satisfied the requirements for a temporary restraining order.

Moreover, the Court finds that the harm Plaintiff alleges he is being threatened with is not

“immediate” enough to warrant the issuance of a temporary restraining order before

Defendants or their attorney can be heard in opposition. The standard for issuing a

temporary retraining order is the same as the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.

Whitman v. Hawaiian Tug & Barge Corp./Young Bros., Ltd. Salaried Pension Plan, 27

F.Supp.2d 1225, 1228 (D.Haw. 1998). Thus, Plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of

substantial and immediate irreparable injury. Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1129. 

Plaintiff has only alleged general and speculative injury. In his supporting

memorandum, Plaintiff relies on the decision in Helling v. McKinney to support the

argument that he does not have to wait for something tragic to happen to him before an

injunction is warranted. 509 U.S. 25 (1993). In Helling, the Supreme Court articulated that

the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm and supports an injunction if an inmate

proved that the conditions in the prison are unsafe and life threatening. Id. at 33-34.

Plaintiff’s allegations, however, fail to meet this standard and are too general to establish

immediate irreparable injury. The motion for a temporary restraining order will be denied.

III. Prisoner Release Order

In his motion, Plaintiff requests a hearing before a three-judge court, pursuant to18

U.S.C. § 3626, for consideration of a prisoner release order (Doc. # 9 at 1). A three-judge

court is required to enter a prisoner release order. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B). A party

seeking a prisoner release order must submit materials sufficient to demonstrate that (1) the

court has previously entered an order for less intrusive relief and that order has failed to

remedy the deprivation sought to be cured, and (2) the defendant has had a reasonable

amount of time to comply with the previous court order. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)3(A)(i-ii)

and (C).

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 Plaintiff argues that an “order for less intrusive relief” was issued in Harris, et al. v.

Cardwell, et al., and it failed to remedy the deprivation (Doc. # 10 at 7). Plaintiff is referring

to the 1982 Amended Judgment/Consent Decree in Harris, et al. v. Cardwell, et al., CV 75-

185-PHX-SRB (D.Ariz.). But Plaintiff only cites to this other case; he does not explain the

“order for less intrusive relief” or how it failed to remedy the deprivation, or even what the

deprivation at issue was in the prior action. As such, Plaintiff has failed to submit materials

that demonstrate the conditions required for a release order. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)3(A)(iii) and (C).

More importantly, a civil rights action is not the proper means by which to enforce a

remedial decree. Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 986-87 (11th Cir. 2003); Klein v.

Zavaras, 80 F.3d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1996); DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 534 (8th Cir.

1990); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (5th Cir. 1986). Jurisdiction to enforce

the judgment is retained by the court that entered it. Jeff D. v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844,

853 (9th Cir. 2004). A consent decree is negotiated by the parties in the case and may be

detailed or provide relief beyond constitutional requirements; therefore, individual prisoners

are not allowed to seek relief through a § 1983 action for violations of the decree. Cagle, 334

F.3d at 987; DeGidio, 920 F.2d at 534. Plaintiff’s request for a release order through this

action is improper and will be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order, and

Request for a Three Judge Court (Doc. # 9) is DENIED.

DATED this 9th day of August, 2007.

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