Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08172/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08172-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Poynor, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Scott Mascher, Yavapai County Sheriff;

Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office; Clyde

Bentley, a married man and Jane Doe

Bentley; and Yavapai County, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-11-8172-PCT-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 3). For the reasons

detailed below, the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, on October 9, 2010, Defendant Clyde Bentley, a deputy

in the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office (“YCSO”), responded to a “weapons offense” at 2733

North Kings Highway. When he arrived, he encountered Plaintiff Michael Poynor, who was

armed, but who was not threatening him. After telling Plaintiff to drop the weapon,

Defendant Bentley shot Plaintiff in the left side of his neck. (Doc. 1-2 at 3). Plaintiff filed suit

in Yavapai County Superior Court on October 7, 2011, making a number of state law claims

and making constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1-2). Defendants removed

to Federal Court on November 1, 2011. (Doc. 1). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on

November 8, 2011. (Doc. 3). In the motion, Defendants argue 1) that the state law claims

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must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to file a Notice of Claim within 180 days of the

claim’s accrual, as required by state law, 2) the claims against YCSO must be dismissed

because YCSO is a non-jural entity, and 3) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims must be dismissed

because the claims are improperly pled. (Doc. 3).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

When analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, all plausible “allegations of material fact are taken

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Smith v. Jackson,

84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal conclusions couched as factual

allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law

and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC,

139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The Arizona District Court requires parties to file a responsive memorandum within

fourteen days after a motion has been filed, unless otherwise ordered by the court. LRCiv

7.2(d). Failure do to so “may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and

the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.” LRCiv 7.2(i). “Failure to follow a district

court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal.” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th

Cir. 1995).

II. Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint contains five state law claims and one federal claim. The state

law claims—for Battery, Negligent/Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Violation

of a Criminal Statute, Negligence of Government Entities, and False Imprisonment—are

lodged against Defendant Bentley, Yavapai County, and YCSO. (Doc. 1-2, Ex. A at 3–4).

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is lodged against “Defendants” for “allowing [Defendant Bentley]

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under color of law” to use excessive force, for allowing him to assault Plaintiff, for allowing

him to abuse his power, for failing to train him, and for breaching a duty “in allowing or

disregarding the acts complained herein.” (Doc. 1-2, Ex. A, at 4). Defendant Bentley is not

named in his individual capacity in the § 1983 claim.

Arizona law requires that a plaintiff file a notice of claim “with the person or persons

authorized to accept service for the public entity . . . as set forth in the Arizona rules of civil

procedure.” Falcon ex. rel. Sandoval v. Maricopa Cty., 213 Ariz. 525, 526, 144 P.3d 1254,

1255 (2006). See also Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-821.01(A)(2003). If a public

entity is not properly noticed within 180 days of the accrual of the claim, a court must

dismiss the claim. See Falcon, 213 Ariz. at 528. Defendant attaches affidavits from

Defendant Mascher, Defendant Bentley, and Defendant Julie Ayers, the acting Clerk of the

Board of Supervisors of Yavapai County. (Doc. 3-1, Ex. A–C). All three affirm that neither

they nor the other proper entities received a notice of Plaintiff’s claim. Id. 

Generally, a court may not consider evidence or documents beyond the complaint in

the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990) (amended decision). Plaintiff alleges

in his complaint that “notice of Plaintiff’s claim was provided pursuant to A.R.S. 12-821-

821.01. [sic]” (Doc. 1-2, Ex. A at 3). He does not state to whom notice was provided, and did

not file a response to the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s state claims against the county,

Defendant Bentley, and Defendant Mascher are dismissed.

In his § 1983 claim, Plaintiff does not name Defendant Bentley in his individual

capacity. Instead, he alleges that “Defendants” are liable for allowing or supervising

Defendant Bentley’s actions. (Doc. 1-2, Ex. A, at 4). Supervisors are not liable in § 1983

suits under the doctrine of respondeat superior; instead a supervisor is only liable if he “set

in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts by

others, which he knew or reasonably should have known, would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.” Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)

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(internal quotation omitted). Municipalities may only be liable under § 1983 for failing to

train employees when the failure both can be traced to the injury suffered by a plaintiff and

“amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into

contact.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).

Plaintiff does not allege that any supervisor either set in motion or knowingly refused

to terminate the actions of Defendant Bentley. He states that some unnamed defendant

“fail[ed] to adequately train [Defendant Bentley]” but does not plead that whichever

Defendant was responsible for the training acted with deliberate indifference. Again, Plaintiff

did not respond to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, thereby waiving any argument that his

official capacity §1983 claim should proceed. This claim will also be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff, although represented by counsel, did not respond to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss. As such, his action “may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the

motion and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.” LRCiv 7.2(i). Defendant’s

motion is therefore granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 3) is granted.

2. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action.

DATED this 5th day of April, 2012.

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