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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

KENNETH E. HILL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FJLBO 

Uoited Stetes Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuif' 

NOV 5 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 89-3036 

GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER, INC., JERRY 

WOLF, JAMES MCCUNE, HARRY BROWNLEE, 

JESS~ WILLIAMS, GREGORY LONEY, DICK 

WEISER, THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY 

COMPANY, and DR. JOSEPH W. HUSTON, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 83-4161) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Pantaleon Florez, Jr., Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Mick Lerner and 

Overland Park, 

Rubber Co. 

Mark A. 

Kansas, 

Stites of Stinson, Mag, & Fizzell, 

for Defendant-Appellee Goodyear Tire & 

Before McKAY, McWILLIAMS, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 89-3036 Document: 01019945185 Date Filed: 11/05/1990 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict entered in favor of 

defendant Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., as well as from various 

rulings of the district court. Plaintiff instituted the 

underlying action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for discriminatory 

and retaliatory discharge. Plaintiff, an African American, began 

working for Goodyear in August of 1975 as a mechanic in the 

maintenance department at the plant in Topeka, Kansas. The Topeka 

plant produced tires for earthmovers, trucks, and passenger 

vehicles, though at the time of trial it no longer produced the 

latter. Plaintiff was a member of the United Rubber, Cork, 

Linoleum, and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC. 

During the course of his employment, plaintiff suffered 

several work-related injuries, including four injuries to his 

back. The last injury occurred on September 25, 1979. Plaintiff 

was treated and returned 

gradually worsened. On 

to work in late October, but his pain 

January 21, 1980, plaintiff stopped 

working and was 

injury), where he 

March 31, 1983. 

put on "hospital pass" (leave of absence due to 

remained until he was terminated effective 

Plaintiff contended that Goodyear discharged him in 

retaliation for his civil rights advocacy and because of his 

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Appellate Case: 89-3036 Document: 01019945185 Date Filed: 11/05/1990 Page: 2 
race.

1 Goodyear responded that it terminated plaintiff only 

because he was physically incapable of performing his job as 

maintenance mechanic and he was not qualified, either physically 

or otherwise, to perform any other job within the bargaining unit 

at the Topeka plant. 

Plaintiff also attempted to pursue a claim against Goodyear 

based on a hostile work environment, but the district court 

refused to permit him to do so on the grounds that plaintiff had 

not listed such a claim in the final pretrial order and that the 

claim would be barred by the statute of limitations in any event. 

The court did, however, permit plaintiff to present evidence of a 

hostile work environment and to argue to the jury that maintenance 

of such an environment was evidence of Goodyear's discriminatory 

intent in discharging plaintiff. Plaintiff does not appeal the 

district court's ruling that he could not pursue a hostile work 

environment claim at trial. 

Plaintiff does, however, appeal two other rulings relating to 

his hostile work environment claim. At the conclusion of the 

trial, plaintiff requested that the district court enter an 

injunction against Goodyear's continued maintenance of a hostile 

work environment. The court denied this request. Plaintiff also 

tendered three jury instructions to the district court concerning 

1 Plaintiff also alleged that several of Goodyear's employees 

conspired to discharge plaintiff because of his civil rights 

advocacy and his race, and that The Travelers Indemnity Co. and 

Dr. Huston conspired with Goodyear to terminate plaintiff's 

workmen's compensation benefits because of his race. All the 

defendants except Goodyear were removed from the action on motions 

for summary judgment prior to trial. Plaintiff does not appeal 

those summary judgment rulings. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3036 Document: 01019945185 Date Filed: 11/05/1990 Page: 3 
his claim for hostile working environment. The court refused to 

give plaintiff's requested instructions. Plaintiff appeals these 

two rulings. 

At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the district court 

directed a verdict on plaintiff's claim for retaliatory discharge, 

on the basis that retaliation for civil rights advocacy in general 

does not state a claim for relief under section 1981. Plaintiff 

appeals this ruling. Plaintiff also challenges the admission of 

certain evidence concerning his bad character, as well as the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict for 

Goodyear on the discriminatory discharge claim. 

While this case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Court 

decided Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), 

in which it limited the scope of claims actionable under section 

1981. 2 The Court held that the statute's protection of the right 

to make contracts "extends only to the formation of a contract, 

but not to problems that may arise later from the conditions of 

continuing employment." Id. at 2372. Specifically, section 1981 

"prohibits, when based on race, the refusal to enter into a 

contract with someone, as well as the offer to make a contract 

only on discriminatory terms." Id. Furthermore, the statute's 

2 Section 1981 provides: 

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 

States shall have the same right in every State and 

Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 

parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal 

benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 

persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, 

and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 

penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, 

and to no other. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3036 Document: 01019945185 Date Filed: 11/05/1990 Page: 4 
protection of the right to enforce contracts "embraces protection 

of a legal process, and of a right of access to legal process, 

that will address and resolve contract-law claims without regard 

to race." Id. at 2373. Only "conduct by an employer which 

impairs an employee's ability to enforce through legal process his 

or her established contract rights," is actionable under the 

"right to enforce contracts" language of the statute. Id. 

"Racial harassment in the course of employment," while actionable 

under Title VII, is not actionable under section 1981. Id. at 

2373-74 .. 

After Patterson was decided, Goodyear moved to dismiss this 

appeal on the basis that none of plaintiff's claims was still 

actionable in light of Patterson. Plaintiff responded by arguing 

that Patterson should not be applied retroactively, and that even 

if it were, his claims for retaliatory and discriminatory 

discharge should survive. 

Those circuits that have considered appeals that were pending 

when Patterson was decided have applied Patterson retroactively. 

See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 716, 723 (2d Cir. 

1990); Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair, 897 F.2d 

805, 807 (5th Cir. 1990); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 

F.2d 104, 110-11 (7th Cir. 1990); Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 

F.2d 630, 634-35 (8th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 

(Aug. 17, 1990); Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, 

Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1990); Sherman v. Burke 

Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1534-35 (11th Cir. 1990), 

petition for cert. filed, (July 30, 1990); Matthews v. Freedman, 

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Appellate Case: 89-3036 Document: 01019945185 Date Filed: 11/05/1990 Page: 5 
882 F.2d 83, 84 (3d Cir. 1989); Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration 

Supply Co., 882 F.2d 908, 910 (4th Cir. 1989); Risinger v. Ohio 

Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 883 F.2d 475, 479 (6th Cir. 

1989). Furthermore, the Supreme Court retroactively applied its 

limitation of the scope of section 1981 to the plaintiff in 

Patterson, 109 s. Ct. at 2377, 2379, and on at least one occasion, 

has directed a circuit court to consider the effect of Patterson 

on a plaintiff's section 1981 claims on remand. Lytle v. 

Household Mfg., Inc., 110 s. Ct. 1331, 1336 n.3 (1990). We see no 

reason to divide the circuits on this issue and, therefore, we 

hold that Patterson should be applied retroactively. 

We turn then to the first two issues on appeal. After 

Patterson, "racial harassment relating to conditions of employment 

is not actionable under § 1981 because that provision does not 

apply to conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract 

and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established 

contract obligations." 109 s. Ct. at 2369. Therefore, since 

plaintiff could not assert a hostile work environment claim under 

section 1981, the trial court properly refused 

injunction against Goodyear for maintaining a 

environment or to instruct the jury on plaintiff's 

environment claim. 

to issue an 

hostile work 

hostile work 

The next issue on appeal concerns the district court's 

refusal to submit plaintiff's claim for retaliatory discharge to 

the jury. We review a ruling on a motion for directed verdict de 

novo. Guilfoyle ex rel. Wild v. Missouri, Kan., & Tex. R.R. Co., 

812 F.2d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 1987). Viewing the evidence and 

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Appellate Case: 89-3036 Document: 01019945185 Date Filed: 11/05/1990 Page: 6 
all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 

to plaintiff, see id., the record shows that plaintiff was a 

leader in the local chapter of the NAACP and that at various times 

during the period of his employment, he complained to management 

at the Topeka plant about racial slurs and other incidents of 

racial harassment in an attempt to bring about a more harmonious 

relationship between the bargaining unit employees and management. 

Such advocacy, while commendable, is not protected by the 

provisions of section 1981 as it relates only to conduct affecting 

the terms and conditions of employment, which itself is not 

actionable under the statute. See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369. 

Since plaintiff's advocacy was not protected under section 1981, 

his discharge, even if in retaliation for such advocacy, was not 

actionable under section 1981. 3 Therefore, the district court 

properly refused to submit plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim 

to the jury. 

The final two issues on appeal concern plaintiff's claim for 

discriminatory discharge. Goodyear contends that in light of 

Patterson, discriminatory discharge claims are no longer 

actionable under section 1981 because they concern conduct that 

occurs after the formation of the employment contract and does not 

affect the employee's ability to enforce his contract rights 

through the legal process. 

3 We express no opinion as to whether an employee could state a 

claim under section 1981 if he were discharged in retaliation for 

advocating changes in conduct actionable under section 1981, ~, 

discriminatory hiring practices. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3036 Document: 01019945185 Date Filed: 11/05/1990 Page: 7 
The circuits are divided on the question whether discharge 

claims are actionable under section 1981 after Patterson. Compare 

Gonzalez v. Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d at 722 ("run-of-the-mine claim 

that the termination of plaintiffs' contracts was discriminatory" 

not actionable under section 1981); Lavender v. V & B 

Transmissions & Auto Repair, 897 F.2d at 808 (termination is 

postformation conduct and not actionable under section 1981); 

McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d at 108, 112 (claims for 

"termination on grounds of race and retaliation for filing 

antidiscrimination complaints" not actionable under section 1981); 

Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 899 F.2d 

at 849 ("Discharge is the type of postformation 'breach of 

contract' conduct not protected by section 1981. "); with Hicks v. 

Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d at 635 ("claim for discriminatory 

discharge continues to be cognizable under Section 1981"). 

We need not decide whether discriminatory discharge claims 

such as plaintiff's are still actionable under section 1981 after 

Patterson, however, because we can decide the issues regarding the 

admission of evidence of plaintiff's bad character and the jury's 

verdict for Goodyear without reference to Patterson. 

Plaintiff contends that the district court committed 

reversible error when it permitted defense counsel to question 

plaintiff about being a foul mouthed and vulgar employee. R. Vol. 

IV at 694-96. Although plaintiff objected to this questioning, he 

later permitted Mr. Jesse Williams, the personnel manager, to 

testify to similar matters without objection. See R. Vol. V at 

848-50. Therefore, unless the district court committed plain 

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Appellate Case: 89-3036 Document: 01019945185 Date Filed: 11/05/1990 Page: 8 
error when it admitted Mr. Williams' testimony without objection, 

the admission of evidence of plaintiff's bad character does not 

warrant reversal. See United States v. Lord, 907 F.2d 1028, 1029 

(10th Cir. 1990). We hold that the admission of such evidence was 

not plain error. 

Plaintiff also contends that the jury's verdict for Goodyear 

was against the weight of the evidence. We disagree. The record 

contains substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. See 

Kitchens v. Bryan County Nat'l Bank, 825 F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir. 

1987)("our review in relation to evidence [is] limited to the 

inquiry as to whether the record contains substantial evidence to 

support the jury's ... conclusion"). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Goodyear, 

see id., the record shows that plaintiff's job as a maintenance 

mechanic required heavy lifting, bending, stooping, twisting, and 

pulling. During the course of his employment, plaintiff suffered 

four back injuries. After his third back injury in June of 1978, 

plaintiff was unable to work for over six months. During this 

time, plaintiff was diagnosed as having degenerative disc disease 

complicated by repeated trauma, and was rated by one of his 

treating physicians, Dr. Redford, as being thirty to forty percent 

partially disabled. 

Plaintiff returned to work in February of 1979 and reinjured 

his back on September 25, 1979. Plaintiff was treated for this 

injury and returned to work in late October. On January 21, 1980, 

however, plaintiff stopped working due to his pain and was put on 

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Appellate Case: 89-3036 Document: 01019945185 Date Filed: 11/05/1990 Page: 9 
hospital pass. In late May of 1981, while still on hospital pass, 

plaintiff was examined by Dr. Redford, who reported: 

[Plaintiff's] back condition really makes it impossible 

for him to return to his previous work. Furthermore, I 

feel that in terms of returning to any kind of heavy 

lifting, he should be considered 100% disabled .... I 

do not think that there is any other therapy that we 

could recommend at this time that would restore his 

ability to return to his previous employment. 

Addendum to Brief of Appellee, Exhibit 401. 

Sometime after his last injury, plaintiff instituted 

administrative proceedings to obtain workmen's compensation 

benefits~ In January of 1983, the Administrative Law Judge 

rendered his opinion. He concluded that plaintiff was eighty 

percent permanently 

$72,500.91. 

partially disabled, and awarded him 

Upon receipt of the A.L.J.'s decision, members of Goodyear 

management at the Topeka plant evaluated all the jobs within the 

bargaining unit at the plant and determined, based on the medical 

evidence, that plaintiff could not perform any job with his 

physical disabilities. Numerous witnesses testified that 

essentially all the bargaining unit jobs in the Topeka plant, 

whether in production or maintenance, required some heavy lifting. 

Therefore, members of management at the Topeka plant recommended 

to corporate headquarters in Akron, Ohio, that plaintiff be 

retired from service on the ground that "he is no longer able to 

meet the requirements of his job and is unable to qualify for 

transfer to another job," pursuant to Article X of the Pension, 

Insurance and Service Award Agreement between Goodyear and the 

Union. R. Vol.Vat 843; Appendix to Brief of Appellant, Doc. 2. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3036 Document: 01019945185 Date Filed: 11/05/1990 Page: 10 
Corporate headquarters approved the recommendation, and plaintiff 

was retired, with a service award, effective March 31, 1983. 

The record amply supports Goodyear's position that it 

terminated plaintiff solely because he was incapable of performing 

any job within the bargaining unit in the Topeka plant, and not 

because of his race. Therefore, we affirm the jury's verdict for 

Goodyear. 

The judgment of the district court for the District of Kansas 

is'AF:'FIRMED. Appellees' motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

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