Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-05143/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-05143-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 1 The claims against the private citizens, Robert Mays and Dorothy

Motschenbacher, have been severed, and the action stayed with respect to

them, by an order issued by this court on March 15, 2006. 

*E-filed 11/1/06* 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RICK M. REINHARDT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SANTA CLARA COUNTY, SANTA CLARA

COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE,

SANTA CLARA COUNTY DISTRICT

ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, CITY OF SAN

JOSE, WILL MANION, ENRIQUE GARCIA,

ROBERT MAYS, DOROTHY

MOTSCHENBACHER, and DOES 1-50,

INCLUSIVE,

Defendants. /

Case No. C05-05143

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO

DISMISS (FRCP 12(b)(6))

Re: Docket Nos. 30 and 33

I. INTRODUCTION

Rick Reinhardt brings claims for damages for “illegal and unconstitutional jailing”

against two public entities, two police officers, and two private citizens.1

 He bases his claims

on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, California’s Bane Act, and common law negligence. The damages stem

from the ten months he spent in jail, accused of murder, before authorities concluded he had

been framed and released him. Defendants County of Santa Clara (the District Attorney’s

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2 Plaintiff figured Mays was the culprit because he was the only person who

knew that Reinhardt had a Redwood City address and that the door was

always unlocked.

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Office and Public Defender’s Office), the City of San Jose, and San Jose police officers Will

Manion and Enrique Garcia move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

II. BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL HISTORY

All of the following “facts” derive from the allegations in the complaint, which the court

must accept as true for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes. On February 22, 2004, Pete Bianco was robbed

and shot to death. His body, which had been hidden in his garage in San Jose, was discovered

on February 26. San Jose police officers Manion and Garcia began an investigation to identify

the killer.

A few days later, Robert Mays, an apparent acquaintance of both the murder victim and

Rick Reinhardt, told police that he believed Reinhardt was involved in the crime. Later, Mays

said that Reinhardt was angry because his former girlfriend was then dating Bianco, and that

Reinhardt had told Mays two weeks before the murder that he was going to “cap” Bianco.

After the initial tip, San Jose police conducted surveillance of both of plaintiff’s

residences (Sunnyvale and Redwood City), obtained search warrants, and on March 1st

searched them. Plaintiff, who was at the Redwood City address at the time of the search, was

arrested at that time on an unrelated warrant.

 The Redwood City search uncovered under plaintiff’s mattress a gun (the murder

weapon), the keys to Bianco’s house, and a bag of white crystals. 

Reinhardt was “stunned” to learn about the items under his mattress. He insisted that

Bianco was a friend, that he did not own a gun, and that someone -- probably Mays -- was

trying to frame him.2

Reinhardt continued to profess his innocence even after police officers falsely told him

that DNA, video, and eyewitnesses all placed him at the crime scene. His story remained the

same even when the police said that he could help himself by acknowledging the killing but

explaining it was an accident or self defense.

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In February or March, the police interviewed plaintiff’s ex-girlfriend, Dorothy

Motschenbacher. She said her relationship with Bianco had provoked arguments between

Reinhardt and Bianco, and she thought it was possible that Reinhardt had killed Bianco.

At some unspecified point in time, evidence was developed which allegedly should have

cast doubt on Mays’ credibility sufficient to support the conclusion that Reinhardt had been

framed. For example, unnamed “acquaintances” of Mays told police that he owned guns, shot

guns in his garage, and made silencers for guns. Mays denied shooting in his garage or

constructing silencers, and “hesitated and stalled” when asked if he would take a lie-detector

test. Then, at another unspecified time, someone other than the police obtained Mays’ cell

phone records. Those records showed that on February 28, Mays called Reinhardt (and,

presumably, talked to him) while Reinhardt was out of town. The phone records also revealed

that Mays’ call was made from the Redwood City area (suggesting that Mays might have taken

this opportunity to plant the incriminating evidence in plaintiffs’ residence). However, Officer

Manion allegedly tried to discourage third parties from digging up evidence to show Reinhardt's

innocence, and even falsely told one of them that plaintiff had already killed someone else.

At some other point, plaintiff’s cell phone records were reviewed. They showed that

Reinhardt had called and paged Bianco "dozens of times" in the days after he was murdered and

before the body was discovered. These calls might suggest that plaintiff did not know Bianco

was dead, and, if so, then surely he had not killed him.

Although Motschenbacher initially told police that Reinhardt was violent, she later told

them she had never known him to have a gun, and that it was "possible" that he had been

framed.

In the meantime, the Public Defender assigned to Reinhardt’s case told him that the job

of the Public Defender’s Office was to plea bargain, and that she was afraid to go to trial in this

case. She said that even though he was innocent he would probably go to jail because the

District Attorney’s Office had more money and power than the Public Defender’s Office. She

pointed to the Lacy Peterson case and the Ricky Walker case to illustrate that innocent people

or people without much evidence against them sometimes go to jail anyway. She also said that

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she would wait for the District Attorney to perform forensic tests because they had more money

than the Public Defender, and that the District Attorney usually led the way on cases.

Reinhardt had a preliminary examination on July 22, 2004. Mays testified and lied

under oath, claiming that he was at home when he called Crimestoppers, while his cell phone

records revealed that he was actually in the area of Reinhardt’s residence.

When the police realized that Reinhardt was not responsible for the murder, they

nonetheless told him that he would remain in jail until Mays was arrested. They told Reinhardt

that he would have to do the prison time if they could not catch Mays.

Police eventually arrested Mays in December 2004 for killing Bianco and framing

Reinhardt. Reinhardt was released from custody, and ultimately obtained a judicial finding of

factual innocence.

Reinhardt now sues the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, the Santa Clara

County Public Defender’s Office, the City of San Jose (“the City”), and San Jose police officers

Will Manion and Enrique Garcia (“Officers;” collectively with the City, “City defendants”)

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights. He also

bases claims on California’s Bane Act, and on "negligence." 

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 15, 2006, this court granted, with leave to amend, certain portions of motions

by the City and County defendants to dismiss plaintiff's original complaint. In his subsequent

amended complaint, plaintiff named all the same defendants (substituting the City of San Jose

for the San Jose Police Department), added some factual allegations, and dropped claims based

directly on the California Constitution. 

The County defendants and City defendants moved, separately, for dismissal under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff did not file timely oppositions. At a hearing held on July 18,

2006, the court set an adjusted briefing schedule for plaintiff and defendants. In August, the

court issued an order modifying the briefing schedule and requiring further briefing on legal

issues. All parties submitted further briefing.

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III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the

claims stated in the complaint. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only where there is either a

“lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable

legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Where it is

clear that amendment would not save the complaint, dismissal with prejudice is warranted. See 

Polich v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 942 F.2d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1991). In resolving a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the court must (1) construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff; (2) accept all factual allegations as true; and (3) determine whether plaintiff can prove

any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80

F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). The court must accept as true not only all material allegations

in the complaint, but the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them as well. Pareto v.

F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the court "need not accept as true

conclusionary allegations or legal characterizations. Nor need it accept unreasonable inferences

or unwarranted deductions of fact." 9 Schwarzer, et al., California Practice Guide: Federal Civil

Procedure Before Trial § 221 (2006). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. FEDERAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff sues all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides in relevant part that

“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003). In the seminal case of Monell v. Department of

Social Services, the Supreme Court concluded that local governments, including cities and

counties, may be “persons” subject to § 1983 liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658 (1978). “A local government entity is liable under § 1983 when ‘action pursuant to official

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3 The court dismissed, as overly vague, this third "policy" allegation in its order

on the previous motion to dismiss. Plaintiff having alleged no new particulars

in the Amended Complaint, this time it is dismissed with prejudice. The first

two policy allegations are new, and are examined here.

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municipal policy of some nature cause[s] a constitutional tort.’” Oviatt v. Pierce, 954 F.2d

1470, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). 

1. Section 1983 Claim against the District Attorney’s Office

Plaintiff sues the District Attorney’s Office, invoking the Monell test for municipal

liability under § 1983. The County moves to dismiss on the grounds that the District Attorney’s

Office is not an official policymaker for the County with respect to the policies alleged by

plaintiff. Rather, says the County, the District Attorney's Office here acted as a policymaker for

the State of California.

Plaintiff alleges the following “policies” on behalf of the District Attorney’s Office: a

practice or custom of failing to investigate significant leads that point towards a defendant’s

innocence; a practice of not releasing a suspect until another was in custody; and a failure to

adequately provide its district attorneys with sufficient training regarding the district attorney’s

investigatory role.3

In examining the pleading for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes the question is whether the

District Attorney’s Office makes policy for the state of California or for Santa Clara County. If

the District Attorney’s Office’s actions are pursuant to County policy, then the County is

potentially liable for a constitutional tort caused by them. The distinction is functional and

turns on state law. One looks at particular functions, not general labels. McMillian v. Monroe

County, 520 U.S. 781, 785-86 (1997). The California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals draw a distinction between “prosecutorial” functions, where a district attorney

is considered a state actor, and “investigatory” or “administrative” functions, where a district

attorney is considered a county actor. In further defining these terms, the Ninth Circuit has

looked for guidance to another area of the law where this same distinction is made: the question

of absolute immunity in cases where a prosecutor is sued in his personal capacity under § 1983. 

The rule is that prosecutorial functions are those “intimately associated with the judicial phase

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of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). On the other hand,

where a prosecutor performs functions normally performed by a police officer, those acts are

“investigative.” See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). Where he makes

personnel decisions, his acts are “administrative.” Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 976 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

Although plaintiff has been careful to claim that the "policy" failures at the District

Attorney’s Office are investigatory or administrative, the court concludes that, at heart, they are

prosecutorial. That is, the labels that plaintiff chose to characterize them do not fit the policies

actually alleged. The prosecutor's actions (and the claimed policies behind them) are part and

parcel of the judicial process. Plaintiff does not assert that the district attorney, in the course of

police-like investigation, caused some affirmative harm. Rather, the alleged failure to

investigate significant leads caused harm only with respect to the decision to prosecute. In

other words, the proximate cause of plaintiff’s alleged injuries at the hands of the District

Attorney’s Office was the continued prosecution, rather than any investigative or administrative

policy or malfeasance. Meanwhile, the alleged practice of not releasing a suspect until another

is in custody is clearly a prosecutorial function. See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 55 F.3d

26, 31 (1st Cir. 1995) (decision not to dismiss a criminal case lies at the heart of the

prosecutorial function). Thus, even if plaintiff can ultimately prove all of his allegations about

the policies of the District Attorney's Office, these are policies regarding prosecution, a state

function. Therefore, the District Attorney's Office (i.e. the County of Santa Clara) is not a

"person" subject to § 1983 liability here. The § 1983 claim against the District Attorney’s

Office is dismissed with prejudice.

2. Section 1983 Claim against the Public Defender’s Office

Plaintiff asserts that the Public Defender’s Office had policies and practices that

deprived him of his rights under both the Sixth Amendment (right to counsel) and the

Fourteenth Amendment (due process). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege,

inter alia, that the defendant has acted “under color of state law.” The Supreme Court held in

Polk County v. Dodson that “a public defender does not act under color of state law when

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performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” 

Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). While the exercise of “independent

professional judgment in a criminal proceeding” does not provide the basis for § 1983 liability,

the Supreme Court left open the possibility that a Public Defender might act under color of state

law “while performing certain administrative and possibly investigative functions.” Id. at 324-

25. In Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit illustrated this

possibility by holding that the complaint stated a valid claim against a county public defender in

his official capacity, where it alleged (1) a policy of allocating resources based on polygraph

tests taken by defendants, and (2) a policy of assigning attorneys so inexperienced as to amount

to deliberate indifference to defendants’ constitutional rights. Both of these “policies” were

implemented by the public defender in his administrative role, and thus were under color of

state law for § 1983 purposes. The court finds that only one of plaintiff’s several allegations

against the Public Defender’s Office states a viable Miranda-like claim.

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that the Public Defender’s Office had the

following policies and practices: failing to adequately provide its attorneys with sufficient

training regarding the preservation of a defendant’s constitutional rights; relying on the District

Attorney’s Office to obtain forensic test results that could prove a defendant’s innocence;

discouraging defendants from going to trial despite their innocence; and discouraging

defendants from going to trial by threats of a powerful District Attorney’s Office and by telling

defendants that innocent people go to prison every day. 

The alleged failure to adequately train attorneys is again stated too vaguely for the court

to be able to ascertain whether it falls within the category of a lawyer’s traditional functions or

the category of administrative functions. The § 1983 claim is dismissed with prejudice as to

this alleged practice.

The allegation concerning a policy of waiting for the District Attorney’s Office to

perform forensic tests does pass muster for pleading purposes. This policy could potentially be

shown to be the kind of administrative decision regarding resource allocation that the Miranda

court concluded was under color of law. The County argues that insufficient facts are pled to

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support the inference that some sort of funding decision impacted plaintiff’s rights. However, it

would be inappropriate to decide a factual issue of causation now, because in this circuit the

causation element of a § 1983 claim is not a high hurdle at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Lee v.

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685 (9th Cir. 2001). The motion to dismiss is denied as to

this alleged practice, because the allegations describe potential violations of the rights

guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Finally, the various allegations about policies of discouraging defendants from going to

trial, even if shown to be true, do not allege action under color of law. Such legal strategies and

client communications fall within the realm of a lawyer’s traditional functions, and therefore the

motion to dismiss is granted, with prejudice, as to these policies. In any event, and merely as an

aside, the court fails to see any logical connection between the supposed policies about urging a

defendant to plead guilty and the harm about which plaintiff complains. The alleged harm here

is a delay in securing plaintiff's release, and the only alleged "policy" which could implicate that

is the one about funding considerations causing the Public Defender's Officer to dally about

securing what could have been exculpatory forensic tests.

3. Section 1983 Claim against the Officers

Here there is no question of municipal policy under Monell, because the Officers are

obviously “persons” subject to § 1983 liability. Rather, the issue is the extent of police liability

under § 1983 after a prosecutor files a criminal complaint based on an independent finding of

probable cause. 

Plaintiff alleges that Officers Manion and Garcia violated his Fourteenth Amendment

rights in the following ways: deliberately ignoring and failing to investigate significant leads

and exculpatory evidence that would have led to his freedom; discouraging third parties from

trying to prove his innocence; allowing him to remain in jail despite concluding that he was

innocent; and keeping him in the dark about when he would be released. 

The City, representing the Officers, argues that arresting officers are insulated from

liability under § 1983 for harm suffered after the prosecutor initiates formal prosecution because

there is a rebuttable presumption that a prosecutor exercises independent judgment regarding

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4 The original complaint did allege that the City failed to adequately provide

officers with sufficient training with respect to proper and thorough

investigation techniques. This is realleged in the amended complaint, but it

remains too vague, and is now dismissed with prejudice.

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the existence of probable cause in filing a complaint. Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469, 1471

(9th Cir. 1986). However, the court's research reveals that "the presumption of independent

prosecutorial judgment in the charging decision is an evidentiary presumption applicable at the

summary judgment stage to direct the order of proof; it is not a pleading requirement to be

applied to a motion to dismiss, before discovery has taken place." Galbraith v. County of Santa

Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff has alleged "malicious acts" and

"conscious disregard for his rights." This is more than enough to survive a motion to dismiss

under the Galbraith standard. Similarly, “a bad faith failure to collect potentially exculpatory

evidence would violate the due process clause.” Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th

Cir. 1989). Reading plaintiff’s allegations in the most favorable light, some of them might rise

to the level of “bad faith.” 

Furthermore, more is at stake here than plaintiff’s right to independent prosecutorial

judgment; plaintiff also has a due process right to be free from continued detention after it was

or should have been known that he was entitled to release. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001); Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993). It

remains to be seen whether Officers Manion and Garcia could conceivably be liable under this

theory. The City’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim against the Officers is denied. 

4. Section 1983 Claim against the City

In this court’s March 15, 2006 order dismissing, inter alia, the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

against the City with leave to amend, the court noted that Lee provides a viable legal theory that

the City defendants violated plaintiff’s due process rights. However, the original complaint did

not meet the Monell requirement for municipal liability, because it did not sufficiently point to a

particular City policy, custom or practice.4

 The amended complaint adds an allegation of “a

custom or practice of violating a suspect’s constitutional rights by keeping him in custody,

despite evidence pointing to someone else, until the true suspect is arrested.” This allegation

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meets the standard set in the March 15 order, because it alleges a specific municipal practice. 

The City argues that plaintiff has not shown the causal link between city policy and the alleged

constitutional violations, and that plaintiff has not sufficiently proven the existence of any

unconstitutional policies. However, these issues of causation and proof of an actual policy are

factual ones to be addressed at a later stage of this proceeding. Similarly, the City’s contention

that it was not plaintiff’s jailer also goes to causation, and therefore is properly addressed later. 

The City’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim against the City is denied to the extent that

liability is premised on an alleged custom or practice of keeping a former suspect incarcerated

until the real criminal is found.

B. STATE CLAIMS

1. California Civil Code Section 52.1

Plaintiff sues all defendants under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, known popularly as the Bane

Act. This statute creates a cause of action for “any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of

rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or ... of this state, has been

interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with" by any other person through “threats,

intimidation, or coercion.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2006). In short, § 52.1

requires “an attempted or completed act of interference with a legal right, accompanied by a

form of coercion.” Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329, 334 (1998). There is no requirement

of state action analogous to the requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Bane Act does not create

any new substantive rights, but instead establishes a new remedy for interference with existing

rights. See Harold E. Kahn & Robert D. Links, California Civil Practice Civil Rights Litigation

§ 3:16 (2006). Subsection (j) of § 52.1 states that “speech alone is not sufficient to support” a §

52.1 action, unless the “speech itself threatens violence” and the person against whom the threat

is directed “reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be committed” and that

“the person threatening violence had the apparent ability to carry out the threat.” Cal. Civ. Code

§ 52.1(j) (West Supp. 2006).

Thus there are three elements to pleading a Bane Act claim here: (1) a legal right; (2)

threats, intimidation, or coercion going beyond speech; and (3) interference. The court will

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discuss them in order.

a. Legal Rights 

Plaintiff alleges that all of the defendants violated (a) his “right to be free from the

deprivation of liberty without due process of law as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and

the California Constitution, Article 1, §7;” (b) his “right to effective assistance of counsel as

secured by the Sixth Amendment and the California Constitution, Article 1, §15;” and (c) his

“right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, acquire, possess and protect property, and pursue and

obtain safety, happiness and privacy, as secured by the California Constitution, Article 1, §1.” 

Unfortunately, plaintiff lumps all defendants together and does not articulate which

"facts" as to which defendant entitles him to relief under the Bane Act. As discussed above,

Lee potentially provides a viable theory with respect to the violation of plaintiff's due process

rights. With respect to the "right to counsel" allegation, that clearly can only apply to the Public

Defender's Office. And, since the Bane Act does not create substantive rights, it remains to be

seen whether plaintiff can actually establish an underlying violation of one or more existing

rights and then fit that violation into the Bane Act requirements. 

b. “Threats, Intimidation, or Coercion”

i. The District Attorney’s Office

This court’s earlier order dismissed the § 52.1 claim against the District Attorney’s

Office because it found that the original complaint’s allegations of threats, intimidation, and

coercion pertained only to the police officers, not the County actors. The amended complaint

adds an allegation that the “District Attorney’s Office ignored clear evidence of his innocence,

which demonstrated to Plaintiff that they were willing to send him to prison for a crime he did

not commit.” Drawing all favorable inferences, plaintiff has alleged that he was coerced and

intimidated into giving up his rights due to the message sent by his continued prosecution in the

face of evidence of innocence. See Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820, 850-51

(2004) (Baxter, J., concurring) (noting the broad scope of the “threat, intimidation, or coercion”

requirement). (Of course, plaintiff also has alleged that the ten month incarceration itself

constituted coercion that deprived him of rights.) 

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5 The City argues in its moving papers that § 52.1 is an antidiscrimination statute that doesn’t apply to all constitutional deprivations,

once “read in conjunction with surrounding provisions.” However, the case

cited for this proposition, Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach, 29 Cal.App.4th

1797 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), was expressly disavowed in the legislative finding

accompanying the 2000 amendment to the Bane Act. The legislature declared

that the decision in Boccato “misconstrued” the law and that the Bane Act

“does not require the individual” whose rights were violated “to be a member

of a protected class.” West’s Ann. Civ. Code § 52.1, Historical and Statutory

Notes to 2000 Legislation. See also Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32

Cal.4th 820 (2004).

At the July hearing on this motion, the court pointedly told counsel for

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ii. The Public Defender’s Office

Plaintiff alleges that the “Public Defender’s statements that he would likely go to prison

regardless of his innocence, and comments that the District Attorney’s Office was more

powerful and would therefore win at trial, were meant to coerce Plaintiff into plea bargaining. 

Plaintiff was both threatened and intimidated by the Public Defender’s statements that she was

afraid to go to trial and that her office did not have the proper resources to defend him.” These

allegations, limited as they are to “statements,” fail to state a claim, because speech alone is not

sufficient to support a § 52.1 action, unless the speech itself threatens that violence will be

committed by the speaker. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(j) (West Supp. 2006). The Bane Act claim

against the Public Defender's Office is dismissed with leave to amend to allege "threats,

intimidation, or coercion" going beyond speech alone.

iii. The City and the Officers 

With respect to the City defendants, plaintiff has alleged coercion going beyond “speech

alone,” because the Officers took many non-speech actions with respect to Reinhardt, including

the arrest and investigation. The City is potentially liable for the acts of the Officers pursuant to

Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2 (West 1995). 

The City cites cases, unconvincingly, that non-violent police action is not coercion. The

City cites one case in its supplemental briefing, Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Inds. of

California, Inc., 68 Cal.App.4th 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), which relies on Boccato v. City of

Hermosa Beach, 29 Cal.App.4th 1797 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). But, since Boccato was

subsequently legislatively overruled, Cabesuela adds nothing to the City's argument.5

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the City that Boccato had been overruled and that he should not have cited it

in support of his arguments. For counsel to then submit a supplemental brief

which once again -- indirectly -- relies on Boccato is, frankly, both

exasperating and deeply disturbing.

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Furthermore, the City is mistaken in its contention that non-violent police action does not

constitute coercion. “Use of law enforcement authority to effectuate a stop, detention

(including use of handcuffs), and search can constitute” threats, intimidation, or coercion. Cole

v. Doe 1 Thru 2 Officers of City of Emeryville Police Dept., 387 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1103 (N.D.

Cal. 2005). Cole also cites an unpublished California decision, Whitworth v. City of Sonoma,

where a California appellate court held that the act of a police officer physically barring the

plaintiff from entering a meeting can constitute “coercion” under § 52.1. Whitworth v. City of

Sonoma, No. A103342, 2004 WL 2106606 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2004).

c. Interference

At first blush the Bane Act’s use of the terms “interfer[ence] with" and "exercise or

enjoyment of rights,” as opposed to the more direct “deprivation of any rights” language in 42

U.S.C. § 1983, might suggest that in order to be liable a Bane Act defendant must somehow

induce the plaintiff to give up a positive right to do something. However, Jones v. Kmart Corp.,

17 Cal.4th 329, 334 (1998) suggests that “interference with” a right is the same as “violating” a

right, and commentators agree. See Harold E. Kahn & Robert D. Links, California Civil

Practice Civil Rights Litigation § 3:16 (2006). There is no requirement that a defendant must

manipulate a plaintiff into giving up rights of his own accord, so long as the defendant has

actually violated plaintiff’s legal rights. 

d. Summary of Bane Act Findings

The Bane Act is broadly worded. It has been amended to extend its reach beyond its

original purposes. There is a paucity of California cases interpreting it, and the courts in those

few cases have struggled with exactly what it means. Plaintiff's Bane Act allegations are

sweeping but do provide defendants with bare notice. The court will wait to see if they can be

fleshed out and supported by proof. In general, and for present purposes, they will suffice. The

amended complaint alleges "threats, intimidation, or coercion" on the part of the District

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Attorney's Office and the City defendants, so those allegations survive for now. However, the

Bane Act claims are dismissed (with prejudice) as to the District Attorney's Office, the City,

and the Officers with respect to deprivation of counsel. Since only speech is alleged, the Bane

Act claim is dismissed (without prejudice) as to the Public Defender's Office.

2. Negligence

Reinhardt alleges common law negligence against all defendants. While negligence is

directly attributed to the Officers, the claims against the Public Defender’s Office, the District

Attorney’s Office, and the City depend on Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2, which provides that a

public entity is liable for acts or omissions of employees committed within the scope of their

employment, and inversely that a public entity is not liable for any injury where the employee is

immune. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2 (West 1995). All allegations of direct liability on the part of

the entity defendants, such the failure-to-train allegations, fail as a matter of law, because

plaintiff has cited no statute imposing such liability. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815 (West 1995);

compare Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire Protection Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175 (2003). Thus each

negligence claim against an entity defendant is dismissed in part, with prejudice. Because there

is no question here that all the alleged acts were committed within the various employees’ scope

of employment, plaintiff’s claims will partially survive the motion to dismiss if he adequately

alleges a duty of care on the part of the individual prosecutors, public defenders, and police

officers. So long as a duty exists as a matter of law, and no immunity exists as a matter of law,

plaintiff’s claims should not be dismissed now. Issues of breach of duty, causation, and injury

are matters of fact to be examined later in this litigation. 

a. The District Attorney’s Office

Plaintiff alleges that the district attorneys assigned to Bianco’s murder owed plaintiff a

duty to act reasonably so as to not cause him undue harm and a duty to properly and adequately

investigate all reasonable leads and evidence. The court finds that, in addition to a duty not to

cause undue harm, the prosecutors had a duty to gather and present such evidence as will

convict the guilty or exonerate the innocent. See Tribulski v. County of Los Angeles, 83

Cal.App.3d 828, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); see also Hamilton v. City of San Diego, 217

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Cal.App.3d 838, 847, n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Tribulski and using the term “affirmative

duty”). 

The next issue is whether the prosecutors are legally immune from liability for their

alleged conduct. If so, the District Attorney’s Office is also immune. Cal Gov’t Code §

815.2(b) (West 1995). The County contends that the district attorneys are immune thanks to socalled “discretionary act” immunity (Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2) and to “malicious prosecution”

immunity (Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6). 

Discretionary act immunity protects acts or omissions that are “the result of the exercise

of ... discretion... whether or not such discretion be abused.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2 (West

1995). Cases interpreting § 820.2 have distinguished between basic policy decisions, which are

immune from liability, and ministerial acts that merely implement a policy already in place,

which are not. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782 (1968). The court is satisfied that

plaintiff’s allegations regarding the negligent behavior of the individual prosecutors assigned to

Bianco’s murder relate to the day-to-day implementation of previously established policies. 

Thus, at this point, the court declines to find that the prosecutors’ acts are immunized as basic

policy or planning decisions under § 820.2.

The malicious prosecution immunity statute provides: “A public employee is not liable

for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding

within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.”

Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6 (West 1995). Plaintiff argues that this immunity cannot apply here,

because he has brought a negligence claim, not a claim for malicious prosecution, which is a

separate tort under California law. The County correctly responds that courts have applied

malicious prosecution immunity beyond the strict confines of a malicious prosecution claim. 

The County is also correct that courts have applied the immunity to prosecutors and to

negligence claims. But that does not resolve the question whether or not these prosecutors are

necessarily immune from liability for the kind of negligence asserted in this case. Plaintiff does

not assert negligence in his arrest, or in instituting the process against him. Rather, he alleges a

failure to investigate that caused him to languish in jail longer than he should have. A case that

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this court cited in its prior order is instructive on the fine points of legal theory applicable here. 

Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d. 1373 (9th Cir. 1998) is based on California tort law

and clearly distinguishes between negligence in the initiation of a prosecution and negligence

that arises after a prolonged detention. The Martinez court found that the same immunity that

protected police officers from malicious prosecution liability protected them from liability for a

negligent investigation that led to an arrest. Id. at 1381. However, there was no such immunity

for an allegedly negligent failure to investigate the validity of an incarceration after sufficient

notice. Id. Because the plaintiff’s negligence claim against the District Attorney's Office may

fit into this space created by Martinez, the court declines to dismiss this claim at this time. 

b. The Public Defender’s Office

The potential negligence liability of the Public Defender’s Office turns on the existence

of a duty of care on the part of the individual public defender, because it seems clear that no

legal immunity applies. Plaintiff alleges that the public defender assigned to his case owed him

a duty to act reasonably not to cause him undue harm, as well as a duty to properly and

adequately investigate all reasonable leads and evidence. In addition to the duty not to cause

undue harm, the public defender had a “responsibility to adequately research the facts and the

law,” In re Hawley, 67 Cal.2d 824, 828 (1967), and a “duty to investigate carefully all defenses

of fact and of law that may be available to the defendant.” In re Williams, 1 Cal.3d 168, 175

(1969). See also Barner v. Leeds, 24 Cal.4th 676, 689 (2000). 

No immunity protects the public defender from liability here, and therefore no immunity

protects the Public Defender’s Office. Discretionary act immunity does not apply to a public

defender’s actions after making the decision to represent a defendant. Barner, 24 Cal.4th at

684-92. The County argues in its supplemental briefing that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the

“litigation privilege” codified at Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 47, but that privilege does not apply

here. Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 212-13 (1990) makes it clear that this privilege

affords freedom from worry about tort liability for litigants and witnesses making statements in

court proceedings. That is clearly inapplicable to statements made in private between attorney

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and client. The court therefore declines to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claim against the

Public Defender’s Office at this time.

c. City Defendants

In one respect, the court has changed its mind about a conclusion in its order on the first

motion to dismiss. The court there held, under the authority of Martinez v. City of Los Angeles,

141 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1998), that plaintiff had stated a negligence claim against the City

defendants based on the Officers' alleged failure to act on significant leads and exculpatory

evidence. The outcome in Martinez hinged on unique facts creating a special relationship

between American law enforcement officials and a suspect held in Mexico pursuant to their

request. Unique facts do not exist here, thus there is no "special relationship."

Next, California case law states that police officers owe no duty of further investigation

once probable cause has been established. Hamilton v. City of San Diego, 217 Cal.App.3d 838,

846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). After probable cause is established, any liability arising out of an

officer’s conduct “must be based upon more than mere nonfeasance.” Plaintiff's sole allegation

of affirmative malfeasance is that one or both of the Officers affirmatively discouraged third

parties from trying to prove plaintiff’s innocence. That single allegation describes a potential

violation of the standard duty not to cause others undue harm, and for that reason alone this

negligence claim will not be dismissed in its entirety.

The next issue is whether any statutory immunity prevents liability from attaching even

to that alleged negligent act. Clearly, discretionary act immunity does not protect the Officers

with respect to the implementation of their day-to-day duties. Malicious prosecution immunity

(Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6) and the immunity provided by Cal. Penal Code § 847 might not

apply, because these immunities focus on the arrest stage of a prosecution and plaintiff alleges

negligence arising after a prolonged detention. As discussed above, Martinez distinguishes

between negligence in the initiation of a prosecution and negligence that arises over time. It is

not out of the question that plaintiff’s allegations against the Officers will be shown to fit into

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6 "§ 847. Arrest by private person; duty to take prisoner before magistrate or

deliver him to peace officer; liability for false arrest.

(a) A private person who has arrested another for the commission of a public

offense must, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a

magistrate, or deliver him or her to a peace officer.

(b) There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall

arise against, any peace officer or federal criminal investigator or law

enforcement officer described in subdivision (a) or (d) of Section 830.8,

acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or false

imprisonment arising out of any arrest under any of the following

circumstances:

(1) The arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had

reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.

(2) The arrest was made pursuant to a charge made, upon reasonable cause, of

the commission of a felony by the person to be arrested.

(3) The arrest was made pursuant to the requirements of Section 142, 837,

838, or 839." 

Cal. Penal Code § 847 (West Supp. 2006).

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that same space created by Martinez. Similarly, when read as a whole, § 847 is clearly focused

on the immunity of police officers as to any injuries a person may suffer due to an arrest.6

 

In summary, the negligence claim against the City defendants is dismissed to the extent

that it alleges negligent investigation, but sustained to the extent that it alleges negligence in the

form of affirmative discouragement of third parties trying to prove plaintiff’s innocence.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part defendants’ motions

to dismiss as follows. The County's motion is GRANTED with prejudice as to the § 1983 claim

against the District Attorney’s Office. The County's motion is GRANTED with prejudice as to

the § 1983 claim against the Public Defender’s Office insofar as the claim is based on a failure

to adequately train attorneys, or on policies of discouraging defendants from going to trial; it is

DENIED insofar as the claim is based on a policy of waiting for the District Attorney’s Office

to perform forensic tests. The City's motion is DENIED as to the § 1983 claims against the

Officers. The City's motion is DENIED as to the § 1983 claim against the City insofar as the

claim is premised on a practice of keeping a suspect in custody, despite evidence pointing to

someone else, until the true suspect is arrested; it is GRANTED with prejudice insofar as the

claim is premised on a failure to adequately train officers regarding investigation techniques.

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 The motions are GRANTED with prejudice as to the Bane Act claims against the

District Attorney's Office, the City and the Officers insofar as the claims are premised on a state

or federal right to effective assistance of counsel. Otherwise, the motions are DENIED as to

those claims. The County's motion as to the Bane Act claim against the Public Defender’s

Office is GRANTED, but plaintiff has leave to amend. Any amended complaint shall be filed

by November 13, 2006.

The County's motion is GRANTED with prejudice as to the negligence claims against

the District Attorney’s Office and the Public Defender’s Office insofar as the claims are

premised on direct liability of the entities; the motion is DENIED insofar as the claims are

based on respondeat superior liability. The City's motion as to the negligence claims against

the Officers is GRANTED with prejudice insofar as the claims allege negligent investigation,

but DENIED insofar as they allege affirmative malfeasance. The City's motion as to the

negligence claim against the City is GRANTED with prejudice insofar as the claim is premised

on direct liability of the City or premised on respondeat superior liability for the Officers'

negligent investigation; it is DENIED insofar as the claim rests on respondeat superior liability

for the Officers' affirmative malfeasance.

Finally, the City defendants' motion for a more definite statement is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/1/06 /s/ Howard R. Lloyd 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS ORDER WILL BE ELECTRONICALLY

MAILED TO:

Robert Baker Burchfiel CAO.Main@ci.sj.ca.us 

David Michael Rollo david.rollo@cco.sccgov.org, anna.espiritu@cco.sccgov.org 

Loren Bryan Vaccarezza lorenbvaccarezza@yahoo.com, 

Counsel are responsible for transmitting this order to co-counsel who have not signed up

for e-filing.

Dated: 11/1/06 /s/ JMM 

 Chambers of Magistrate Judge Howard R. Lloyd

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