Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_07-cv-00071/USCOURTS-almd-3_07-cv-00071-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

 _____________________________

CHRISTOPHER MCCULLOUGH, *

#174 909

Petitioner, *

v. * 3:07-CV-71-WHA

 (WO) 

GARY HETZEL, WARDEN, et al., *

Respondents. *

 _____________________________

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This cause is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief

filed by Petitioner, Chris McCullough.1

 Petitioner challenges the November 14, 2003

conviction for attempted first degree burglary entered against him by the Circuit Court for

Chambers County, Alabama, following a jury trial. On January 15, 2004 the trial court

sentenced Petitioner, as a habitual offender, to 40 years imprisonment. The trial court denied

1

The present petition was stamped "filed" in this court on January 8, 2007. The petition was

accompanied by a brief in support of the petition and a request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis as well

as another habeas application challenging Petitioner’s 2002 convictions for first degree burglary and second

degree theft of property. Petitioner signed his habeas application on December 2, 2006, he signed his IFP

request on December 8, 2006, and he signed his brief in support of his habeas petition on December 28, 2006. 

Thus, although Petitioner executed his habeas petition and IFP request on December 2 and 8, 2006,

respectively, it is clear that Petitioner had all the aforementioned pleadings within his possession at the time

he filed said documents with the court and, therefore, he could not have submitted them to prison officials

for mailing prior to December 28, 2006. A pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to

prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173

F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1993). “Absent

evidence to the contrary in the form of prison logs or other records, [this court] must assume that [the instant

petition and accompanying pleadings] w[ere] delivered to prison authorities the day [McCullough] signed

[them] . . .” Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). In light of the foregoing,

the court considers December 28, 2006 as the date of filing. 

Case 3:07-cv-00071-WHA-SRW Document 36 Filed 09/24/09 Page 1 of 17
Petitioner’s November 17, 2004 request for a new trial on March 10, 2004. (See Doc. No.

10, Exh. A.)

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on

September 24, 2004. Petitioner did not file an application for rehearing or petition for

certiorari review. Accordingly, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals entered a certificate

of judgment on October 13, 2004. By operation of law, Petitioner’s first degree attempted

burglary conviction became final on October 27, 2004. (See Doc. No. 8, Exhs. 1B-1E.) 

Pursuant to the orders of this court, Respondents filed an answer in which they argue

that the instant habeas petition is barred by the one-year limitation period applicable to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).2

 Respondents contend that because

Petitioner’s conviction became final in 2004 – after the effective date of the statute of

limitations – he must have filed his § 2254 petition within a year of this conviction’s

becoming final, exclusive of the time that any properly filed state post-conviction petition

was pending in the state courts. Respondents concede that Petitioner filed a state postconviction petition in July 2005. They maintain, however, that even allowing a tolling of

the limitation period during the pendency of this Rule 32 petition, the limitation period

expired prior to Petitioner’s filing the present federal habeas petition. (Doc. No. 8, pgs. 8-13;

see also Doc. Nos. 18, 26.) See Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.); Tinker

v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333- 1335. n.4 (11th Cir. 2001). 

2

Subsection (d) was added by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(the “AEDPA”). This Act became effective on April 24, 1996.

2

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Based on Respondents’ argument, the court entered an order advising Petitioner that

he had failed to file the present federal habeas petition within the one-year limitation period

established by 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1). ( Doc. Nos. 11, 19.) The orders also gave Petitioner

an opportunity to show cause why his petition should not be barred from review by this court. 

(Id.) Petitioner took the opportunity granted to file his responses. (See Doc. Nos. 13, 24, 27,

29.) In his responses, Petitioner argues that he is actually innocent of the conviction he

challenges. Petitioner further argues that he failed to receive timely notice that his state postconviction petition had been denied. Upon review of the pleadings filed by the parties and

applicable federal law, the court concludes that Petitioner’s § 2254 petition for writ of habeas

corpus relief is due to be denied as it was not filed within the requisite one-year period of

limitations. 

I. DISCUSSION

A. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice - Actual Innocence

This court must determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated his actual innocence

before addressing Respondents’ assertion that the instant petition is barred by the statute of

limitations. See Wyzykowski v. Department of Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.

2000). “To establish actual innocence, [a habeas petitioner] must demonstrate that ... ‘it is

more likely than not that no reasonable [trier of fact] would have convicted him.’ Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-328, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867-868, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).” Bousley

v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). “[T]he Schlup standard is demanding and permits

review only in the ‘extraordinary’ case.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006). Thus, “[i]n

3

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the usual case the presumed guilt of a prisoner convicted in state court counsels against

federal review of [untimely] claims.” Id. at 537. “It is important to note in this regard that

‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. See Sawyer v.

Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-2519, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992).” Bousley,

523 U.S. at 623-624; Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 162 (2nd Cir. 2004) (“As Schlup makes

clear, the issue before [a federal district] court is not legal innocence but factual innocence.”).

 Schlup observes that “a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction

of an innocent person is extremely rare. . . To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner

to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence – whether it be

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence – that was not presented at trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable

in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.” Id. 513 U.S.

at 324.

Petitioner’s allegation of actual innocence is not based on new evidence. Rather,

Petitioner presents only self-serving and conclusory allegations that he is actually innocent 

of his conviction because the evidence against him was insufficient. Petitioner’s arguments,

at most, constitute claims of legal insufficiency rather than factual innocence. See Bousley,

523 U.S. at 622. Petitioner has submitted no “new reliable evidence” to support his claims

so as to meet the standard set forth by Schlup. His mere contention that he is actually

innocent of the crime of his conviction is not supported by the record or any credible

4

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evidence. Because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate his actual innocence, the court finds

that the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is properly analyzed under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A).

B. Statute of Limitations

i. Statutory Tolling

A one year statute of limitations is applicable to habeas corpus petitions filed in noncapital cases for persons convicted in a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).3

 28 U.S.C. §

 3This section provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) the time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection. 

5

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2244(d)(1)(A) directs that the limitation period for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition begins

to run on the date when the time for seeking direct review of the challenged judgment

expires. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) directs that the limitation period for filing a 28 U.S.C. §

2254 petition begins to run on the date when the time for seeking direct review of the

challenged judgment expires. Petitioner was convicted of attempted first degree burglary in

the Circuit Court for Chambers County, Alabama, on November 14, 2003. He filed a direct

appeal. The Alabama Court of Criminal appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on

September 24, 2004 and issued a certificate of judgment on October 13, 2004. Since

Petitioner did not seek further relief from the Alabama Supreme Court, he was not entitled

to file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court and the time for seeking

review of the 2003 attempted first degree burglary conviction lapsed upon expiration of the

time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court – that is,

fourteen days from the issuance of the certificate of judgment.4

 Rule 39(b), Alabama Rules

of Appellate Procedure; see Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Rule

13.1, Rules of the United States Supreme Court (a petition for writ of certiorari may only be

4

Respondents’ contention that Petitioner’s conviction became final on October 13, 2004 upon

issuance of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ certificate of judgment fails to take into account the

fourteen days within which Petitioner could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari. Upon expiration of

the fourteen days within which Petitioner could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari after the appellate

court’s issuance of a certificate of judgment, his conviction became final. 

6

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filed to review a judgment or order entered by a state court of last resort and must be filed

within ninety (90) days of the action undertaken by such state court). Thus, Petitioner's

attempted first degree burglary conviction became final on October 27, 2004 and the oneyear limitation period contained in section 2244(d)(1)(A) began to run on this date. (Doc.

No. 8, Exhs. 1B-1E.)

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

section.” The court finds that the limitation period ran for 267 days after Petitioner’s

conviction became final until he filed a Rule 32 petition in the trial court on July 21, 2005.5

On November 17, 2005 the trial court denied the Rule 32 petition. Petitioner did not appeal

the decision and, therefore, the limitation period began to run again on December 29, 2005,

forty-two days after the trial court entered its decision, as this is the last day Petitioner could

appeal that ruling. See Rule 4(b), Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. (Doc. No. 8, Exhs.

2A-2E.) Thus, as of the aforementioned date, Petitioner had 98 days of the applicable

limitation period remaining within which to file a federal habeas petition. The court,

5

Although the Clerk stamped the post-conviction petition as being filed on July 27, 2005, and

Petitioner indicated in the petition that it was mailed from the institution on July 20, 2005, it is clear that he

still had the petition in his possession on July 21, 2005, which is the date he signed his petition under oath

before a Notary Public. The court, therefore, considers July 21, 2005 as the date Petitioner filed his Rule 32

petition with the trial court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988). (See Doc. No. 8, Exhibit

2A at 7, 11.)

7

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therefore, concludes that the time allowed Petitioner for the filing of a federal habeas petition

expired on April 6, 2006. Petitioner filed his federal habeas application on December 28,

2006 – 266 days or eight months and 22 days after the limitation period had expired.

ii. Equitable Tolling

The limitation period “may be equitably tolled” on grounds apart from those specified

in the habeas statute “when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances

that are both beyond his control and unavoidable with diligence.” Sandvik v. United States,

177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). “Equitable tolling can be applied to prevent the

application of the AEDPA's statutory deadline when 'extraordinary circumstances' have

worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his petition.” Helton

v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir.2001); Jones v. United States, 304

F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (11th Cir. 2002); Drew v. Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278,

1286 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, the one-year limitations provision need not be equitably tolled

unless there is evidence that “extraordinary circumstances” beyond a petitioner’s control

made it impossible for him to file his petition on time. See Miller v. New Jersey State Dept.

Of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618-19 (3rd Cir. 1998) (“[E]quitable tolling is proper only

when the ‘principles of equity would make [the] rigid application [of a limitation period]

unfair.’ . . . Generally, this will occur when the petitioner has ‘in some extraordinary way .

. . been prevented from asserting his or her rights.’ . . . The petitioner must show that he or

she ‘exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims.’ . . . Mere

8

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excusable neglect is not sufficient.”) “The burden of establishing entitlement to this

extraordinary remedy plainly rests with the petitioner.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1286. 

Petitioner argues as grounds for equitable tolling that the trial court failed to make him

aware of its November 17, 2005 order dismissing his Rule 32 petition and that he only

received such information on December 1, 2006 after sending correspondence to the Circuit

Clerk’s Office for Chambers County inquiring about the status of his post-conviction

petitions.6

 Petitioner maintains that the state court’s failure to notify him that his Rule 32

petition challenging his attempted first degree burglary conviction had been denied impeded

his ability to appeal the trial court’s decision. Petitioner, however did not seek a belated

appeal with the trial court after receiving notice on December 1, 2006 that his Rule 32

petition had been denied but proceeded to file a federal habeas application with this court

almost one month later on December 28, 2006. Of course, Petitioner’s one-year limitation

period expired on April 6, 2006. Thus, Petitioner requests equitable tolling for the time

during which he had not received notice of the trial court’s November 17, 2005 order

denying his Rule 32 petition until December 1, 2006 when he received the Circuit Court

Clerk’s response to his inquiry regarding the status of that proceeding.7

6

Petitioner indicated that he was seeking information on all of his Rule 32 petitions, of which he

“should have a total of 4 or 5.” (Doc. No. 24 pg. 3.)

7

The evidence before the court reflects that the trial court’s November 17, 2005 order denying

Petitioner’s post-conviction petition contains a handwritten designation at the bottom of the order of “C.

McCullough, DA.” (See Doc. No. 24, Exh. 2E.) Such handwritten notations usually indicate to whom a copy

of an order is mailed. Parties would receive correspondence at their address of record.

9

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Petitioner also contends that he “repeatedly tried to not only get the results of [his]

post-conviction Rule 32s but also went to extreme measure to make them answer them and

get the results.” (Doc. No. 24 at pg. 7.) The “extreme measures” to which Petitioner refers

concern his filing of five mandamus petitions in either the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals or the Supreme Court of Alabama.8

 Of the five mandamus petitions filed by

Petitioner, one was filed approximately two weeks after he filed his Rule 32 petition

challenging his attempted first degree burglary conviction and one was filed more than one

year later, i.e., November 3, 2006. In neither of these two mandamus petitions, however,

did Petitioner request information regarding the status of his post-conviction petition

8

Petitioner filed his mandamus petitions in either the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals or the

Supreme Court for Alabama on April 11, 2005, April 14, 2005, April 29, 2005, August 8, 2005, and

November 3, 2006. With the exception of the petition filed in November 2006, Petitioner affixed to his

pleadings the criminal case number assigned in state court to his conviction for attempted first degree

burglary, i.e, CC-02-318. (See Doc. No. 24 at pgs. 8-11; Doc. No. 26, Exhs. A, C-E.) In the mandamus

petition filed in November 2006, Petitioner referenced the state court criminal number for his attempted first

degree burglary conviction in addition to other convictions previously entered against him by the Chambers

County Circuit Court. (Doc. No. 24 at pg. 14; Doc. No. 26, Exh. B.) The court notes, however, that Petitioner

did not file his post-conviction petition in CC-02-318 (the conviction for attempted first degree burglary)

until July 21, 2005. Thus, despite either Petitioner’s or the appellate’s and/or supreme court’s reference in

all five mandamus petitions to “CC-02-318" it is clear that only two of the five mandamus petitions could

possibly have been in reference to Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition challenging his attempted first degree burglary

conviction. 

Based on previous court filings submitted by Petitioner, the court takes judicial notice that dual

references to “CC-02-318" appear to have originated in the state trial court when a Rule 32 petition filed by

Petitioner on or about March 24, 2004, in which Petitioner sought to challenge the convictions for first degree

burglary and second degree theft of property entered against him by the Circuit Court for Chambers County,

was given the case number “CC-02-318.60” rather than the actual criminal case number for those

convictions, i.e., “CC-02-189.” See McCullough v. Hetzel, et al., Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-26-MEF (M.D.

Ala. 2009). Thus, when Petitioner filed his Rule 32 petition on July 21, 2005 in which he challenged his

attempted first degree burglary conviction, the Circuit Court for Chambers County gave that Rule 32 petition

the designation “CC-02-318.61” since “CC-02-318.60" was already being used, albeit incorrectly. (See Id.;

see Doc. No. 24 at pg. 4.) This erroneous designation by the state court, however, does not affect the court’s

disposition of the instant matter. 

10

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challenging his first degree attempted burglary conviction nor complain that the trial court

had failed to act on that Rule 32 petition. Rather, in one of the writs Petitioner essentially

challenged the validity of his conviction for attempted first degree burglary, (see Doc. No.

26, Exh. E), and in the other writ Petitioner requested mandamus relief due to “judicial

error” committed by the trial judge.9

 (Id. at Exh. B.) 

Petitioner has submitted a copy of the letter he sent to the Chambers County Circuit

Clerk, Charles Story, on November 24, 2006 requesting a status on his various postconviction petitions. Therein he advised the Clerk that he had not received any notification

that his four or five Rule 32 petitions had been either set for a hearing or been dismissed and

that he needed such information in order to proceed to federal court. Petitioner noted in his

letter that he had previously attempted to file a federal habeas corpus application but was

informed in 2005 through those proceedings that his Rule 32 petition remained pending.10

9

Petitioner listed several different criminal case numbers on this particular request for mandamus

relief, including the case number for his conviction for first degree attempted burglary.

10The court takes judicial notice of its own records which show that Petitioner filed a federal habeas

petition on June 28, 2004 seeking to challenge his convictions for first degree burglary and second degree

theft of property, convictions related to the same crime spree from which his attempted first degree burglary

conviction arose. On August 4, 2004 the undersigned entered a Recommendation that the petition be

dismissed without prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state remedies. Specifically, the pleadings and

documents before the court reflected that Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition challenging the first degree burglary

and second degree theft convictions entered against him by the Circuit Court for Chambers County was

pending in the state courts. Although Petitioner argued in his federal habeas petition that the he had not yet

received a response to that particular Rule 32 petition, the court found that that fact, without more, did not

make the filing of Petitioner’s federal habeas petition at that particular juncture appropriate. The court, in a

footnote, also advised Petitioner that he “may wish to file a request for a status report in the Circuit Court for

Chambers County concerning his Rule 32 petition.” By order entered August 18, 2004 the court adopted the

Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. See McCullough v. Bullard, 3:04-CV-631-WHA (M.D. Ala.

2004). Thus, Petitioner’s assertion in his letter to the Circuit Clerk that he learned in 2005 that one of his

11

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Thus, Petitioner requested that if any of his Rule 32 petitions were “inactive,” he be provided

written notification to that effect. (See Doc. No. 24 at 3.) Mr. Story’s response, postmarked

November 28, 2006, informed Petitioner that his post-conviction petition filed in CC-02-

318.60 and CC-02-318.61 had been denied on September 26, 2005.11 As noted, Petitioner

filed the instant habeas petition one month later on December 28, 2006. 

Here, the court finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he acted diligently

in pursuing his federal claims. The first inquiry he made with a court that could provide him

with notice of the status of his July 21, 2005 post-conviction petition challenging his first

degree attempted burglary conviction was filed more than sixteen months (491 days) after

he filed that action and more than a year after the trial court entered its decision on the

matter. Petitioner devotes considerable argument his claim that he filed writs of mandamus

with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court for the alleged

purpose of determining the status of his post-conviction pleadings. The only two pleadings,

however, which Petitioner filed with those courts and which could even have encompassed 

his July 21, 2005 post-conviction petition did not actually seek any action by those courts

Rule 32 petitions was pending, i.e., CC-02-189, was inaccurate, as he was informed of this information in

2004. 

11Although Mr. Story’s letter appears to have been incorrect with respect to the date on which

Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition challenging his attempted first degree burglary conviction was denied, he was

nonetheless correct at the time of his reply that the petition had been denied. As previously noted, the trial

court denied Petitioner’s post-conviction challenge to his attempted first degree burglary conviction on

November 17, 2005. (See Doc. No. 28 at pgs. 2, 4; Doc. No. 8, Exh. 2E.) 

. 

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with respect to the status of that proceeding in the trial court. (See Doc. No. 26, Exhs. B, E.)

Whether a habeas petitioner has exercised due diligence is context-specific and

requires an inquiry as to “whether the petitioner should be expected to take actions which

would lead him to the information.” Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 661-62 (3rd Cir. 2005). 

“Due diligence . . . does not require a prisoner to undertake repeated exercises in futility or

to exhaust every imaginable option.” Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 712 (11th Cir.

2002). It does, however, require reasonable diligence in the circumstances. Id. 

“A lengthy delay between the issuance of a necessary order and an inmate’s receipt

of it might provide a basis for equitable tolling if the petitioner has diligently attempted to

ascertain the status of that order and if the delay prevented the inmate from filing a timely

federal habeas petition.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1288. “[A] prisoner’s lack of knowledge that

the state courts have reached a final resolution of [his] case can provide grounds for equitable

tolling if the prisoner has acted diligently in the matter.” See Woodward v. Williams, 263

F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001). 

Under the circumstances of this case, the court finds that Petitioner has not established

that the instant habeas corpus petition was timely filed nor has he established that

extraordinary circumstances and due diligence require equitable tolling of the limitations

period. See Drew, 297 F.3d at 1286. Petitioner does not contend that he was ignorant of the

one-year limitation period. Rather, he claims he did not receive timely notice of the trial

court’s November 17, 2005 denial of his Rule 32 petition. Taking as true Petitioner’s

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assertion that he did not receive such notice, the court finds that nothing other than

Petitioner’s own lack of due diligence is responsible for the untimeliness of the filing of the

instant habeas petition. See Drew, 297 F.3d 1288 (Petitioner’s evidence in support of his

claim of diligent effort “actually cut[] against” such claim where evidence demonstrated that

Petitioner only sent one letter to the district court inquiring about his habeas petition and such

inquiry was sent sixteen months after the petition was filed.) 

This conclusion is further supported by the fact that in August of 2004 this court,

through previous court filings, informed Petitioner that he could send an inquiry to the trial

court if he wished to check the status of his state court post-conviction proceedings. See infra

at fn. 10. Nonetheless, the evidence before the court reflects that Petitioner waited more than

two years after that advisement before contacting the Circuit Court for Chambers County

requesting information on the status of the various post-conviction petitions he had filed with

that court. Further, assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner’s mandamus requests could support

his diligent effort argument, as noted, neither of the two mandamus petitions possibly

relevant to Petitioner’s July 20, 2005 Rule 32 petition sought information or action from

either the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals or the Alabama Supreme Court with respect

to any alleged inaction by the trial court with regard to that post-conviction proceeding. 

Requests for action or information on any state post-conviction petitions Petitioner filed in

the Circuit Court for Chambers County should have been directed to that court.

Here, the court “cannot say that [Petitioner] has acted with the conscience, good faith,

14

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and reasonable diligence necessary to call into action the powers of the court. This

conclusion is based on the longstanding, firmly rooted principle that a court cannot grant

equitable tolling unless it is satisfied that the party seeking such relief has acted with

diligence.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1291 n.5 (internal quotations omitted). The burden on

petitioner to ascertain the status of his post-conviction petition was “a burden necessary to

sustaining [Petitioner’s] claim of extraordinary circumstances.” Woodward, 263 F.3d at

1143. There is no evidence in the record tending to show that Petitioner’s delay in filing the

instant § 2254 petition was the result of extraordinary circumstances that were beyond his

control and unavoidable with the exercise of diligence. The extraordinary circumstances

standard applied in this Circuit looks at the circumstances surrounding the late filing of the

habeas petition, rather than the circumstances surrounding the underlying conviction. See

Helton, 259 F.3d at 1314-15. 

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court concludes that Petitioner has failed to assert

any credible basis for either equitable or statutory tolling of the limitation period until he

filed this cause of action. The reasons set forth by Petitioner for his untimeliness are

insufficient to establish the extraordinary circumstances required to toll the limitation period. 

The factual predicate of the claims were available to Petitioner at the time of his conviction

and sentence. Further, the claims presented in this petition are not based on a newly

recognized constitutional right. Because Petitioner has not shown extraordinary

circumstances that would prevent a timely filing and fails to establish a basis on which to

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conclude that he used due diligence in seeking federal habeas corpus relief, see Sandvik, 177

F.3d at 1271, he is not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitation period. Petitioner’s

petition for habeas corpus relief is, therefore, due to be dismissed as time-barred.

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the

petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Christopher McCullough be DENIED and

DISMISSED with prejudice as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

 It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before October 6 , 2009. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which a party objects. 

Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The

parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore,

it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

16

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Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

Done, this 24th day of September, 2009.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Case 3:07-cv-00071-WHA-SRW Document 36 Filed 09/24/09 Page 17 of 17