Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01679/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01679-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISAAC KELLEY,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-09-1679 LKK DAD P

vs.

GRASS VALLEY POLICE

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

This proceeding was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule

302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

PLAINTIFF’S IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION

Plaintiff has submitted an in forma pauperis application that makes the showing

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) & 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has been without funds for six months and is

currently without funds. Accordingly, the court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of

the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments shall

be collected and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the

amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must

contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain

factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic,

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550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

In his complaint, plaintiff has named the following four defendants: (1) the Grass

Valley Police Department; (2) Officer Shoberg; (3) Officer Gamblegaurd; and (4) Officer

Clinklebread. Plaintiff alleges that on June 13, 2008, the defendant officers used their nightsticks

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to beat plaintiff while he was handcuffed. Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from liver damage and

night terrors as a result of the incident. In terms of relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages. 

DISCUSSION

The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are so vague and conclusory that the court

is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. 

Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice to

the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. 

Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which each defendant engaged in that support

his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an

amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how

each named defendant was involved in the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. Unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation, there

can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); see also

May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). For example, in his complaint plaintiff names the Grass Valley Police Department as

a defendant. While municipalities may be named as defendants in a civil rights action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, a municipality is not liable unless it had a “deliberate policy, custom, or practice

that was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation [plaintiff] suffered.” Galen v.

County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Therefore, if plaintiff wishes to pursue a claim

against the Grass Valley Police Department in his amended complaint, he must allege specific

facts demonstrating that his injuries occurred as a direct result of the police department’s official

policies, customs, or practices.

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In an amended complaint, plaintiff should also clarify where the alleged events

took place. If the alleged use of excessive force occurred during the course of plaintiff’s arrest,

his claim arises under the Fourth Amendment and is analyzed under a “reasonableness” standard. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1995); Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804,

806 (9th Cir. 1994). However, if the alleged use of excessive force was used by prison officials

to subdue plaintiff as a convicted prisoner, his claim would arise under the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986);

Jordan v. Garner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1524-25 (9th Cir. 1993). In the latter case, the core question is

“whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously

and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.

Plaintiff is finally informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order

to make his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule,

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57

(9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer

serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint plaintiff must sufficiently

allege each claim and the involvement of each defendant.

OTHER MATTERS

Also pending before the court is plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel. 

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel

to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S.

296, 298 (1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances, the district court may request

the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935

F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The test for exceptional circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s

likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in

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light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328,

1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances that

are common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do

not establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of

counsel. In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances for

appointment of counsel at this time. Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff’s request.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s April 27, 2010 application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No.

17) is granted;

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

The fee shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith;

3. Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. No . 1) is dismissed;

4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; failure to file an

amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action

be dismissed without prejudice; and

5. Plaintiff’s September 30, 2009 motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. No.

12) is denied.

DATED: April 29, 2010.

DAD:sj

kell1679.14a

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