Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01279/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01279-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID RAY CABLE, No. CIV S-06-1279-LKK-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

HOREL, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondents’ motion to

dismiss (Doc. 12) filed September 8, 2006, and petitioner’s opposition (Doc. 19) filed November

13, 2006.

The court issued findings and recommendations on November 16, 2006,

recommending that respondents’ motion to dismiss be granted. The court concluded that the

instant petition was not filed within the one-year limitations period. Petitioner filed objections

(Doc. 23) on December 4, 2006. On August 17, 2007, the United States District Judge declined

to adopt the November 2006 findings and recommendations and referred the case to the

undersigned for consideration of timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

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I. BACKGROUND

On October 14, 1998, following a plea of no contest to second degree murder,

petitioner was convicted and sentenced to 15 years to life in state prison. Petitioner did not file

any direct appeal. Between October 28, 2004, and May 12, 2005, petitioner filed five postconvictions actions in the California state courts, all of which were denied. The instant federal

habeas petition was filed on June 12, 2006. 

II. DISCUSSION

Respondents argue that the instant petition is untimely. Specifically, respondents

assert that the limitations period began to run on December 14, 1998 – the day after the time to

seek direct review expired – and petitioner did not file his first state post-conviction challenge

until 2004 – after expiration of the one-year limitations period on December 13, 1999. Petitioner

argues that the limitations period did not begin to run in his case until some later date due to

claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in advising him to accept a plea agreement. Petitioner

cites 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), which provides that the limitations period shall run from “the

date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.” Petitioner does not, however state, either in his

opposition to respondents’ motion or in his December 2006 objections, when he first discovered

the factual predicate of his claims. 

Federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within one year from the later of:

(1) the date the state court judgment became final; (2) the date on which an impediment to filing

created by state action is removed; (3) the date on which a constitutional right is newlyrecognized and made retroactive on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Typically, the statute of limitations will begin to run when the state court

judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek direct

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review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitations period begins running the day

after expiration of the 90-day time within which to seek review by the U.S. Supreme Court. See

Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). The limitations period may also begin

to run, in certain cases, on the date the petitioner learned of the factual predicate of his claim

through the exercise of due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

The limitations period is tolled, however, for the time a properly filed application

for post-conviction relief is pending in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To be

“properly filed,” the application must be authorized by, and in compliance with, state law. See

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000). Imposition of a state procedural bar, however, does not

necessarily render the application improperly filed. See id. at 9. For example, California’s rule

governing the timeliness of bringing an application for post-conviction relief is subject to

numerous exceptions. See In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993). Because the state court would be

required to examine the merits of a petition before deciding whether an exception applies, it

should be considered by the federal court to have been properly filed, even if untimely. See

Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 2001). A state court application for postconviction relief is “pending”during all the time the petitioner is attempting, through proper use

of state court procedures, to present his claims. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th

Cir. 1999). Where the petitioner unreasonably delays between state court applications, however,

there is no tolling for that period of time. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). If the state

court does not explicitly deny a post-conviction application as untimely, the federal court must

independently determine whether there was undue delay. See id. at 226-27. 

There is no tolling for the interval of time between post-conviction applications

where the petitioner is not moving to the next higher appellate level of review. See Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006-07; see also Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). There is also no

tolling for the period between different sets of post-conviction applications. See Biggs v.

Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the period between the conclusion of direct

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review and the filing of a state post-conviction application does not toll the limitations period. 

See Nino, 1983 F.3d at 1006-07. 

In support of his argument concerning discovery of the factual predicate of his

claims, petitioner attaches two documents. The first is a May 26, 1998, supplemental report from

Butte County deputy sheriff R.E. Chandler which petitioner asserts supports his contention that

physical evidence overlooked by the police and his trial attorney was recovered. The second

document is the California Supreme Court’s November 16, 2005, denial of one of his state

habeas petitions. Petitioner nowhere states when he first learned of the May 26, 1998, document.

Nor does he offer any kind of explanation for the delay between the date his conviction became

final in December 1998 and the date he filed his first state habeas case in October 2004. 

Section 2244(d)(1)(D) applies to those who could not have discovered the factual

predicate for their claims, not to those who sleep on their rights. See Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d

770, 777 n.s (9th Cir. 2002). Beyond merely saying that he did not know the facts underlying his

claims, petitioner has not made any showing regarding due diligence in discovering the facts. 

Neither of the documents attached in support of his argument indicate when petitioner learned of

the facts underlying his claims. As mentioned above, petitioner has not said anything about what

he did to discover the facts of his claims between December 1998 and October 2004. The court,

therefore, concludes that petitioner has not established due diligence, a requirement for the

application of § 2244(d)(1)(D).

Moreover, the court finds that petitioner could have and should have known about

his claims by October1998 when he entered his plea. His claims are based on deficient

investigation, failure to follow Miranda procedures, and improper waiver of a preliminary

hearing. The facts underlying these claims should have been known to petitioner by the time he

entered his plea. To the extent petitioner is arguing that the clock started to run when he realized

the legal significance of the factual predicate to his claims, not when he first knew the important

facts, the Ninth Circuit has rejected this argument. See Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154

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n.3 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Even assuming that the petitioner did not actually know about the factual

predicate of his claims by the time he entered his plea, it appears that, based on his assertions,

that he did in fact know about the facts underlying his claims, and their legal significance,

sometime before January 31, 2004, at the latest. Petitioner states:

. . . During the time [petitioner] was waiting for his attorney to

prepare his “appeal,” he was moved from prison to prison. When he

arrived at Pelican Bay he was housed with an inmate familiar with the law. 

It was at that time [petitioner] was finally made aware of the “Miranda”

violation and his attorney’s failure. 

Attached to the petition as Exhibit 2 is petitioner’s declaration. In that declaration, petitioner

states that he was transferred to Pelican Bay State Prison “[s]ometime during November 2002.” 

Petitioner also states that, in November 2003, he was removed from administrative segregation at

Pelican Bay State Prison and assigned housing in the secured housing unit “. . . with a prisoner

who knows how to conduct legal research and understands the law. . . .” Finally, petitioner states

that his legal property was returned to him in January 2004. 

Giving petitioner the benefit of the time between November 2003 – when he was

housed with a knowledgeable inmate – and all of January 2004 – the month his legal property

was returned to him – the court will conclude that the latest petitioner learned of the factual (and

legal) predicates of his claim was January 31, 2004. The record reflects that petitioner filed his

first state court habeas petition on October 28, 2004, and that the last such petition was denied 

on May 12, 2005. Again, the court will give petitioner the benefit of statutory tolling for this

entire period. Thus, by the time he filed his first state petition, almost nine months of the oneyear limitations period had expired. The clocked stopped until May 12, 2005. Between May 12,

2005, and June 12, 2006 – the date the instant petition was filed – over 12 more months expired. 

Therefore, by the time petitioner filed the instant petition, and assuming that the clock did not

start to run until January 31, 2004, the clock had run for almost 21 months. 

In this case, petitioner’s conviction and sentence became final on December 13,

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1998 – the date on which the time to seek direct review expired. The limitations period began to

run under § 2244(d)(1)(A) the following day and ended one year later on December 13, 1999 –

before any of petitioner’s state court post-conviction cases were filed. Or, giving petitioner the

benefit of the doubt, the limitations period began to run under § 2244(d)(1)(D) on January 31,

2004, and was tolled between October 28, 2004, and May 12, 2005. Under this scenario, as

discussed above, the clock ran for 21 months before the instant petition was filed. Therefore, the

petition filed in this court on June 12, 2006, is untimely under both § 2244(d)(1)(A) and

2244(d)(1)(D). 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) be granted;

2. This petition be dismissed; 

3. All other pending motions (Docs. 17 & 18) be denied as moot; and

4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and close this file.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 6, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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