Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02334/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02334-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983bv Bivens Non-Prisoner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JESUS CASTELLANOS and RAQUEL 

CASTELLANO, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., 

Defendants. 

 Case No.: 18cv2334 JM(AGS) 

ORDER ON MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Presently before the court is Defendants the United States of America and Michael 

Hedlund’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 32). A hearing on the motion was 

held on January 13, 2020. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied. 

I. BACKGROUND 

This lawsuit stems from an incident that occurred at the Calexico Port of Entry 

(“POE”) on December 17, 2017. Upon applying for admission to the United States, 

Plaintiffs and their adult son, Marco, were referred to secondary inspection so that the 

vehicle they were traveling in could be inspected. (SAC at ¶ 17; Doc. No. 33-5, “Jesus 

Castellanos Dep.,” 131

; Doc. No. 33-7, “Marco Castellanos Dep.,” 5.) The Plaintiffs were 

sent to secondary inspection because a database had indicated to the primary inspector that 

1 Document numbers and page references are to those assigned by CM/ECF for the docket 

entry.

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Marco was on supervised release in connection with a drug smuggling conviction. (SAC 

at ¶ 17; Doc. No. 33-4, Miguel Salcedo Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 4; Marco Castellanos Dep. 5.) 

While Plaintiffs were being held in the secure secondary waiting area, California 

Border Patrol (“CBP”) Canine Program Officers were conducting a “sensitive border 

security operation” referred to as a “canine block blitz” which involved inspecting all 

southbound vehicles and targeting a vehicle that was stopped directly across from Marco 

and Jesus Castellanos. (Doc. No. 33-9, “Eugene Stewart Dep.,” 5, 8.) The entire incident 

within the secondary waiting area was videotaped, although an unobstructed and clear view 

of the encounters between Jesus Castellanos and all of the CBP Officers is not presented. 

Not surprisingly, the parties present differing accounts on certain aspects of the incident. 

Marco began using his mobile phone, and as he was approached by CBP Officer 

Martinez, put his phone back in his pocket. (Jesus Castellanos Dep. 152

; Marco Castellanos 

Dep. 6-7; Eugene Stewart Dep. 5.) Officer Martinez and Marco exchanged words 

regarding Marco’s use of the phone. (Jesus Castellanos Dep. 16; Marco Castellanos Dep. 

8, 9; see generally Doc. No. 47-2, Ex. 4, Report of Investigation (“R.I.”).) Officer Martinez 

believed Marco was recording what was occurring at secondary and told Marco that he 

needed Marco to hand over his phone. (Id.) Although Marco himself disputes that he ever 

stated he would not turn over his phone and simply requested a supervisor be called, others 

claim that Marco refused to give his cellphone to Officer Martinez. (See Jesus Castellanos 

Dep. 17; Marco Castellanos Dep. 9; Eugene Stewart Dep. 5-6; see generally R.I.) 

Officer Martinez entered the secure waiting area and attempted to arrest Marco. 

Marco did not acquiesce to being handcuffed, telling Officer Martinez not to touch him. 

(Jesus Castellanos Dep. 17; Marco Castellanos Dep. 10.) Officer Garneau arrived to assist 

2 Plaintiffs included excerpts of the deposition transcript of Jesus Castellanos in support of 

their opposition, Doc. No. 40-3. For ease of reference the court has simply referred to the 

full transcript supplied by the Defendants, Doc. No. 33-5, and has changed the citations to 

the appropriate CM/ECF page number. 

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Officer Martinez in restraining Marco. At this point, Plaintiffs Jesus and Raquel 

Castellanos approached Marco and Officers Martinez and Garneau. Jesus Castellanos 

placed his right hand into the general vicinity where Officer Garneau and his son were 

standing. (Doc. No. 33-1 at 2, screenshot of surveillance video, 21:04:08.471.) Jesus 

Castellano maintains he was reaching to touch his son’s arm while simultaneously telling 

him to calm down, and that all he was doing was trying to ease the tension. (Jesus 

Castellanos Dep. 18, 19.) Marco stated that he heard his father telling him “Calmate hijo,” 

(relax son), while putting his hand on his shoulder. (Marco Castellanos Dep. 11.) In 

contrast, CBP Officer Hedlund claims he saw Jesus Castellano place his hand on Officer 

Garneau’s left arm and interpreted this as an assault on his fellow officer, “[I]t’s an absolute 

no-no in my book, I mean you don’t touch an officer.” (R.I. at 29; see also id. at 21.) 

Officer Garneau would later recount that Marco screamed and hollered the entire time, 

which caused his father to respond to the area who then screamed and hollered. (R.I. at 8.) 

The video image is not clear as to who Jesus Castellano is reaching for. 

At this point, CBP Officer Pelayo reported that he moved over to the secondary 

inspection area and guided Jesus Castellanos back with his left hand, over the top of the 

fence that is securing the secondary waiting area. (R.I. at 7.) The video confirms this. Then 

Officer Hedlund entered the secondary area and moved directly toward Jesus Castellanos. 

He pushed Jesus Castellanos backward and away from the ruckus involving his son. (Doc. 

No. 33-1 at 3, screenshot of surveillance video, 21:04:16.545.) Officer Hedlund recounted 

that while pushing him backward, “Jesus Castellanos became physically assaultive toward 

him and began to grab and scratch CBPO Hedlund’s face.” (R.I. at 21.) Jesus Castellanos 

and Officer Hedlund disagree as to whether any verbal commands were issued by Officer 

Hedlund while he was pushing Jesus Castellanos backward. 

Officer Hedlund then turned Jesus Castellanos toward the bench and sat him down. 

Jesus Castellanos’ left hand/fist was up near the right side of Officer Hedlund’s face. (Doc. 

No. 33-1 at 3, screenshot of surveillance video, 21:04:19.748.) Officer Hedlund later 

reported that Jesus Castellano had him “by his throat and began to hit him.” (R.I. at 22.) 

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Officer Hedlund struck downward on Jesus Castellanos’ left arm with his right arm. Jesus 

Castellanos maintained his grip on Officer Hedlund’s uniform shirt. (Doc. No. 33-1 at 5, 

screenshot of surveillance video, 21:04:20.282; Doc. No. 33-1 at 6, screenshot of 

surveillance video, 21:04:20.416.) Officer Hedlund then punched Jesus Castellanos twice 

under the left arm in his upper left side, causing Jesus Castellanos to release his grasp of 

Officer Hedlund’s uniform. The internal investigation report states that “Jesus Castellanos’ 

right arm can be seen holding onto CBPO Hedlund’s left arm.” (R.I. at 3.) Jesus 

Castellanos claims that he may have touched Officer Hedlund when he was “moving my 

hand out of desperation that I am going to fall down” backward. (Jesus Castellanos Dep. 

21.) This initial interaction lasted approximately 9 seconds. 

Officer Hedlund then attempted to handcuff Jesus Castellanos by turning Jesus 

Castellanos to his right. CBP Officer Zaragoza arrived to help. The parties dispute whether 

Jesus Castellanos resisted being handcuffed. Plaintiff claims that he did not struggle or 

resist arrest. (Jesus Castellanos Dep. 22.) Defendant contends that the video shows “Jesus 

Castellano then positioned his left leg in an apparent attempt to stand up as the two CBP 

officers were trying to handcuff him in a seated position. The two CBP officers therefore 

turned Jesus Castellanos face down onto the bench to handcuff him.” Doc. No. 33 at 13. 

(See also Doc. No. 33-1 at 7, screenshot of surveillance video, 21:04:26.955; Doc. No. 33-

1 at 8, screenshot of surveillance video, 21:04:41.837.) Officers Garneau, Bustillo, 

Zaragoza and Guerrero reported that Jesus Castellanos was physically and verbally noncompliant. (R.I. at 8, 9, 10, 15.) The video illustrates that Jesus Castellanos ended up face 

down on the bench, with CBP Officer Guerrero also assisting in cuffing Jesus Castellanos. 

The image of Mr. Castellanos is obscured from view, but Plaintiff maintains that he was 

punched 6-7 times after the handcuffs were on him and his right arm was twisted. (Jesus 

Castellanos Dep. 23.) It takes approximately 32 seconds to place the handcuffs on Jesus 

Castellanos. 

Afterward, Jesus Castellanos complained of right elbow pain and was transported to 

El Centro Regional Medical Center. An x-ray was negative for fracture of the elbow and 

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neither rib fractures or fractures of the pneumothorax were found. (Doc. No. 33-1 at 15, 

22, 25, 26.) An X-ray of the elbow scan two days later showed no signs of fracture but 

were “suggestive of an occult fracture around the elbow joint” and a CT scan of the chest 

revealed “minimally displaced ribs.” (Id. at 43-46.) No injuries to Jesus Castellanos’ left 

arm were indicated. Jesus Castellanos suffers from diabetes and takes blood thinners. 

(Jesus Castellanos Dep. 3.) 

On October 10, 2018, Plaintiffs filed suit in district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331, 1346(B) and 1391(b) alleging that Defendants violated their civil rights and 

committed torts against them. (Doc. No. 1.) The Second Amended Complaint was filed 

on October 7, 2019, (Doc. No. 29), wherein Plaintiff Jesus Castellanos asserts two “Bivens 

claims” against Defendant Hedlund: (1) for Excessive Force in violation of his Fourth 

Amendment Right to be free from the use of excessive force and; (2) Unlawful 

Detention/False Arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment Right to be free from 

unreasonable seizure and unlawful arrest. In addition, Jesus Castellanos brings claims 

against the United States pursuant to pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 

28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., for Assault, Battery, and False Imprisonment and both Plaintiffs 

assert claims for Negligence and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress under the Act. 

Plaintiff Jesus Castellanos also brings a Bane Act claim for violation of California Civil 

Code § 52.1. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

 A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where “there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of 

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). But Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 contains “no express or 

implied requirement . . . that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other 

similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Id. (emphasis in original).

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 In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party cannot rest on 

the mere allegations or denials of a pleading but must “go beyond the pleadings and by 

[its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 

(internal citations omitted). In other words, the non-moving party may not rely solely on 

conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989). The court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962), and any doubt 

as to the existence of an issue of material fact requires denial of the motion, Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 

III. DISCUSSION 

 The individual Defendant, Officer Hedlund, seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff 

Jesus Castellanos’ Bivens claims.3

 First, Officer Hedlund argues that the Bivens Fourth 

Amendment claims should be dismissed as a matter of law because they would require an 

unwarranted extension of Bivens remedies. Second, Officer Hedlund seeks summary 

judgment under the qualified immunity doctrine asserting that Plaintiff has failed to prove 

a constitutional violation and, even if there is a constitutional violation, there is no existing 

precedent that squarely governs the specific facts at issue. Finally, the Government argues 

that the FTCA claims are precluded by the customs exception. 

 

3 Within the papers, the parties make references to “Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims,” but it is only 

Mr. Jesus Castellanos who has any Bivens claims currently before the court. (See SAC at 

¶¶ 36-60.) Within the SAC, Mr. Castellanos brought two separate causes of action that 

were identified as Bivens claims, one for excessive force and one for unlawful 

detention/false arrest. (See id.) Therefore, the court will treat these causes of action as two 

independent claims, and refer to them as being brought solely by Mr. Castellanos.

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A. “New Context” Under Bivens Cases

 Officer Hedlund argues that the case currently before the court, which involves a 

canine U.S. Border Patrol officer responding to defend other officers while a special 

operation was underway, constitutes a new context with meaningful differences between it 

and the other Bivens cases decided by the Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 33 at 16-17.) The 

crux of Defendant’s argument is that the court has to look at this case differently than a 

run-of-the-mill Bivens case because this happened at the international border. Plaintiff 

counters that “a claim that Border Patrol agents used excessive force against United States 

citizens on U.S. soil is a “garden variety” Bivens claim, notwithstanding the fact the 

incident took place at a customs inspection site. (See Doc. No. 40 at 18-27.) 

 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme 

Court “recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal 

officers alleged to have a violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal ̧556 U.S. 662, 675. The Court held that a plaintiff could bring a damages action in 

federal court against individual federal officers for violating the Fourth Amendment. 

Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). Bivens has since been expanded to allow suits for 

violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and for violations of the 

Eighth Amendment. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 

446 U.S. 1468 (1980). 4 

4 In Bivens ̧ the plaintiff whose apartment was entered by Federal Bureau of Narcotics 

Agents acting under claim of federal authority was arrested for alleged narcotics violations. 

Bivens, 403 U.S. 388. He then brought suit for damages for violation of his rights under 

the Fourth Amendment. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), an administrative 

assistant sued a Congressman for firing her, and the Court determined that the Fifth 

Amendment Due Process Clause provided her with a monetary remedy for gender 

discrimination. In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), a prisoner’s estate sued federal 

jailers for failure to treat the plaintiff’s asthma, with the Court ruling that the Eighth 

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause gave plaintiff a cause of action for 

damages for failure to provide medical treatment.

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 For only the fourth time, the Supreme Court recently considered the availability of 

a Bivens damages remedy in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017), noting that if 

the three Bivens cases were before the Court today they might be decided differently, and 

explaining that the Court has “consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context or 

new category of defendants.” The Abassi Court clarified (or perhaps established) the 

paradigmatic standard by with the validity of future Bivens claims should be considered 

“the proper test for determining whether a case presents a new Bivens context is as follows. 

If the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this 

Court, then the context is new.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. The Court then provided some 

examples of what would constitute a new context explaining: 

A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of the officers 

involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of the 

official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should 

respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other 

legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive 

intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the 

presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not 

consider. 

Id. at 1860. 

 If the court determines that a claim presents a new context, then a second step, a 

special factors analysis, is required to see if the claim may proceed. Thus, the Court 

explained “[t]he Court’s precedents now make clear that a Bivens remedy will not be 

available if there are “special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative 

action by Congress.’” Id. at 1857 (citations omitted). However, the Court acknowledged 

that although it had not defined what constitutes “special factors counseling hesitation” the 

inference can be made that the: 

Inquiry must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent 

congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and 

benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed. Thus, to be a “special factor 

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counseling hesitation,” a factor must cause a court to hesitate before 

answering the question in the affirmative....5

In sum, if there are sound reasons to think Congress may doubt the efficacy 

or necessity of a damages remedy as part of the system for enforcing the law 

and correcting a wrong, the courts must refrain from creating the remedy in 

order to respect the role of Congress in determining the nature and extent of 

federal-court jurisdiction under Article III. 

Id. at 1858. 

 Relatedly, the Court noted that if there was an alternative remedial structure present 

in a certain case, “that alone may limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens

cause of action. For if Congress had created ‘any alternative, existing process for 

protecting the injured party’s interest’ that itself may ‘amount to a convincing reason for 

the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.’” 

Id. (internal alterations and citations omitted.) 

 Within the opinion, the Abbasi Court emphasized that it was to be understood that it 

was not casting: 

doubt on the continued force, or even the necessity, of Bivens in the searchand-seizure context in which it arose. Bivens does vindicate the Constitution 

by allowing some redress for injuries, and it provides instruction and guidance 

to federal law enforcement officers going forward. The settled law of Bivens 

in this common and recurrent sphere of law enforcement, and the undoubted 

reliance upon it as a fixed principle in the law, are powerful reasons to retain 

it in that sphere. 

5 The Supreme Court also explained that the decision to recognize a damages remedy 

requires an assessment of its impact on government operations systemwide. Those matters 

include the burdens on Government employees who are sued personally, as well as the 

projected costs and consequences to the Government itself when the tort and monetary 

liability mechanism of the legal system are used to bring about the proper formulation and 

implementation of public policies. These and other considerations may make it less 

probable that Congress would want the Judiciary to entertain a damages suit in a given 

case. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858. 

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Id. at 1856-57. 

Neither party questions the unassailable proposition that “Congress intended to 

afford customs officers great latitude in conducting a search at an international border 

crossing.” Klein v. U.S., 472 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Thompson, 282 F.3d 

673, 678 (9th Cir. 2002) (the United States has a strong interest in protecting its borders...). 

They simply disagree as to whether, as Defendant suggests, the operations of U.S. Border 

Patrol officers constitute a new context that would discourage a court from authorizing a 

Bivens remedy. 

 The court must begin its inquiry by focusing on whether the claims presented are 

“different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases.” Here, the present case has 

parallels to the Supreme Court’s original Bivens case in that both are predicated on the 

Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff Jesus Castellanos seeks damages for the alleged use of 

excessive force and his unlawful detention/false arrest. But clearly, Border Patrol agents 

operate under different statutory and legal mandates than the FBI agents involved in the 

original Bivens case. There are also differences between immigration and customs 

enforcement issues at the border that are absent in traditional law enforcement contexts. 

And, importantly, the incident occurred at the secondary inspection site at the Calexico 

Port of Entry, on the international border where levels of force, detention and control are 

more readily employed, and reasonably so, than in a traditional law enforcement setting. 

 But the differences beg the question, however, as to whether they fundamentally

differ from the standard law enforcement contact in which an individual is subject to 

physical force, detained, or otherwise controlled. Both border enforcement and traditional 

law enforcement are cabined by existing Constitutional standards. See, e.g., U.S. v. 

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-882 (1975) (concluding that Border Patrol agents on 

roving patrols may perform reasonable Terry-stops and “question the driver and passengers 

about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious 

circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable 

cause.”) Whatever physical force to be employed must be reasonable under the 

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circumstances. Saucier v. Katz, 522 U.S 194, 207 (2001) (“Excessive force claims, like 

most other Fourth Amendment issues, are evaluated for objective reasonableness based 

upon the information officers had when the conduct occurred.”) Standard border detention 

in secondary at the international border will no more excuse or justify excessive force than 

a traditional arrest for drunk driving or any other criminal wrongdoing. Whereas the search 

of a vehicle may be performed at the border without reasonable suspicion, it may not be 

conducted in a destructive manner. If reasonable suspicion exists for an intrusive vehicle 

search then greater measures, even destructive in nature, may be utilized either at the border 

or in traditional law enforcement. But the consistent standard for all of these applications 

of force, whether at the international border or otherwise, is the fundamental Constitutional 

mandate: reasonable force at all times and in all relevant contexts. On balance, the context 

in which force and seizure were employed against Plaintiff tips in favor of the court 

concluding the circumstances of this case do not comprise a new Bivens context. However, 

there is more to assess. 

 The court now turns to whether this case involves any “special factors” that would 

preclude a Bivens remedy. Plaintiff Jesus Castellanos seeks damages for the alleged use 

of excessive force and unlawful detention/false arrest. Officer Hedlund argues that the 

Ninth Circuit has broadly identified “immigration issues as necessarily creating a special 

factor counseling hesitation.” (Doc. No. 33 at 18 quoting Mirmehdi v. U.S., 689 F.3d 975, 

982 (9th Cir. 2012)). Officer Hedlund also argues that officers like himself play a key role 

in preventing terrorism at our nation’s border, as well as detecting and seizing controlled 

substances and other contraband, often used to finance terrorist and/or criminal drug 

trafficking organizations and that he was performing a specialist operation at the time of 

the incident. (Doc. No. 33 at 20.) It is Officer Hedlund’s contention that case law supports 

his position that Bivens liability is not extended to contexts that involve defensive measures 

taken directly at the border nor to safety/security measures taken during inspections at ports 

of entry or airports. (Id. at 20-23.) 

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 But, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, the court does not view extending Bivens in 

this instance and the purported implications regarding national security concerns as a 

genuine special factor. As the Abbasi court cautioned, “national security concerns must 

not become a talisman used to ward off inconvenient claims.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861. 

This court does not think Border Patrol officers will be deterred from responding 

adequately and without hesitation if faced with Bivens liability any more so than any other 

federal officer. See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 745 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Agents sued 

under Bivens are liable only when they violate a clearly established constitutional right, 

and the rules governing the use of lethal force are clearly established.”)6

 There are 

numerous cases where Border Patrol officers have been sued for Fourth Amendment 

violations and the court sees no reason why this case, simply because it occurred at the 

border, implicates national security issues. See e.g., Rodriguez, 899 F.3d 719 (allowing a 

Bivens Fourth Amendment claim against a Border Patrol agent who shot and killed a 

teenage Mexican citizen walking down a street in Mexico); Chavez v. U.S., 683 F.3d 1102, 

1110 (9th Cir. 2012) ( a border patrol agent conducting a roving patrol near the border 

“violates the Fourth Amendment if she stops a vehicle in the absence of an objectively 

‘reasonable suspicion’...); Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015) (Bivens 

6

 Defendant’s reliance on Perez v. Diaz, 331 F.Supp.3d 1101 (2017) and Hernandez v. 

Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018) in support of his position is misplaced. (Doc. No. 33 

at 21.) Perez involved circumstances markedly different from those currently before the 

court and included the cross-border shooting of an illegal immigrant and challenged the 

policy of the U.S. Border Patrol. Hernandez is a case that included Bivens claims and 

involved a U.S. border patrol agent shooting a Mexican teenage boy on Mexican soil. The 

Hernandez court found that to allow a Bivens claim would interfere with the political 

branches’ oversight of national security and foreign affairs, because allowing it to proceed 

would flout Congress’ explicit refusal to provide a damages remedy for aliens injured 

abroad, and “create a remedy with uncertain limits. Hernandez, 885 F.3d at 822. In 

contrast, Plaintiff Jesus Castellanos is not challenging any policy, no illegal entry occurred, 

no cross-border shooting has taken place, no foreign citizens are involved, and Plaintiff has 

only sued the officer who allegedly assaulted him. 

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claim against ICE agent for wrongfully detaining a U.S. citizen); Martinez-Aguerro v. 

Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006) (recognizing Fourth Amendment Bivens claim 

against a border agent for excessive force and unreasonable arrest and detention). 

 Moreover, at the hearing, defense counsel acknowledged that Defendants were not 

arguing for a constitutional free zone at the border, and that if gratuitous force is used by 

an officer then national security cannot be considered as a factor because there is no nexus 

between gratuitous force and national security. Regardless of the nomenclature used, the 

issue of whether the force used by Officer Hedlund was gratuitous or excessive is a central 

issue in dispute. This provides yet another reason why national security is not a special 

factor here. 

As to the remaining special factors, Plaintiff Jesus Castellanos is not challenging any 

high-level executive branch policies or policymakers, he has only sued the officer who 

allegedly assaulted him. Extending Bivens here would also not implicate foreign policy 

because the incident involved American citizens on American soil. And, although both 

Plaintiffs are bringing claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Jesus Castellanos’ legal 

remedies against Officer Hedlund are limited to Bivens claims because “the Westfall Act 

is clear [] that the protection afforded federal employees for common law torts ‘does not 

extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the Government ... which is brought 

for a violation of the Constitution of the United States.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A).” 

Rodriguez, 899 at 740. 

 In light of the above, the court finds that this case is “therefore like the ones that 

Abbasi distinguished – those involving ‘standard law enforcement operations’ and 

individual instances of ...law enforcement overreach.” Rodriguez, 899 at 745 (citations 

omitted). Accordingly, the court concludes that Plaintiff may proceed with his Bivens 

claims. 

B. Qualified Immunity 

 The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for 

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

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constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Lane,

526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In 

determining the applicability of the qualified immunity doctrine, the court conducts a twopart test to decide: (1) if the alleged facts show a violation of a constitutional right; and 

(2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged 

misconduct. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 

violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 

 Officer Hedlund argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity for both of Jesus 

Castellanos’ Bivens claims under either step of the usual analysis performed by a court in 

cases of this type. (Doc. No.33 at 23-29.) 

(1) Excessive Force Claim

In relation to the excessive force claim, Officer Hedlund asserts that there is no 

evidence of a constitutional tort and that Plaintiff cannot show that his Fourth Amendment 

rights were violated under existing precedent. (Doc. No.33 at 23.) 

(i) Constitutional Violation

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. It “requires police officers making an arrest to use only an amount of force that 

is objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances facing them.” Blankenhorn v. City 

of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 

(1985)). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “it is sometimes difficult for an officer 

to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual 

situation the officer confronts.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. Notably, “[n]either tackling nor 

punching a suspect to make an arrest necessarily constitutes an excessive force claim.” 

Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 477. (citation omitted.) 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1986), established the framework under which 

excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment are to be analyzed. Thus, to 

determine whether a use of force was objectively reasonable, courts must balance “the 

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nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” against 

“the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. In doing 

so, the court pays careful attention to the facts and circumstances of the case, including 

(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to 

the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest 

or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Ames v. King County, Washington, 846 F.3d 340, 

348 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Next, the court balances “the gravity 

of the intrusion on the individual against the government’s need for that intrusion to 

determine whether it was constitutionally reasonable.” Miller v. Clark Cnty., 304. F.3d. 

959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). This determination of whether the steps taken 

by an officer were objectively reasonable must, however, be made “‘from the perspective 

of a reasonable officer on the scene’ and not ‘with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Ames, 

846 F.3d at 348 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 

 Generally, excessive force claims are questions of fact for the jury. Hervey v. Estes, 

65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (If the evidence, reviewed in the light more favorable to [plaintiff], could support 

a finding of excessive force, then the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment.”) 

The Ninth Circuit has made clear “because the excessive force inquiry nearly always 

requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences 

therefrom, we have held on many occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a 

matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 702. 

(internal citations and changes omitted). 

 Officer Hedlund does not dispute that he punched Jesus Castellanos two times in the 

left side before placing the handcuffs on him. (See Doc. No. 47; R.I. at 22, 29.) As a result 

of the blows, Jesus Castellanos alleges that he suffered multiple rib fractures. Plaintiff also 

claims that Officer Hedlund severely and violently twisted his arm during the altercation 

and that he suffered an occult fracture to his left elbow. Plaintiff also alleges that he 

sustained multiple blows to his torso after the handcuffs were secured. (Jesus Castellanos 

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Dep. 23.) Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Jesus Castellanos, the 

type of force used was intermediate as physical blows were delivered and constituted a 

sufficiently serious intrusion upon Castellanos’ liberty interests.7

 See Davis v. City of L.A., 

478 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (extreme force evidenced by slamming arrestee headfirst against a wall, face first into another wall, before throwing him face-down onto floor, 

placing knee on his back, and finally punching him in the face); Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 

480 (officer’s punches in response to individual resisting arrest not necessarily a reasonable 

response). Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (force employed was severe when two officers continued to press their weight 

on plaintiff’s neck and torso as he lay handcuffed on the ground and begged for air). But 

see Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1994) (in comparison to 

claims of deadly force or physical blows, physical pressure administered on demonstrator’s 

limbs in increasing degrees, resulting in pain, found to be reasonable). 

 When Defendant Hedlund first began pushing Plaintiff backward, Plaintiff was not 

being arrested. Rather the family was reentering the United States after a day trip to 

Mexico. The only reason the Castellanos family was detained in the secondary inspection 

waiting area was because Marco’s name appeared on the database at primary as someone 

who was on supervised release for a drug smuggling conviction. Marco had documentation 

to prove that he had obtained authorization for the visit. Although Jesus Castellanos was 

handcuffed and later released without any formal charges being brought against him, his 

refusal to comply with the officers' orders and resistance may have provided a compelling 

basis for the use of force. However, resistance to arrest does not rise to the level of a 

serious offense under the Graham analysis. See Young, 655 F.3d at 1164–65 (“[W]hile 

7 Cf. Young v. Cnty. of L.A., 655 F.3d 1156, 1162–63 (9th Cir.2011) (“Whatever such force 

[the use of pepper spray and two strikes with a baton] is ultimately labeled, there is no 

question that its use against an individual is a sufficiently serious intrusion upon liberty 

that it must be justified by a commensurately serious state interest.”). 

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disobeying a peace officer's order certainly provides more justification for force than does 

a minor traffic offense, such conduct still constitutes only a non-violent misdemeanor 

offense that will tend to justify force in far fewer circumstances than more serious offenses, 

such as violent felonies.”). Therefore, because Jesus Castellano was not involved in an 

underlying crime at the time of his arrest, the severity of the crime at issue is minimal at 

best. 

 Officer Hedlund contends that he pushed Jesus Castellanos backward in an attempt 

to remove him from the vicinity where Marco and the group of CBP Officers were engaged 

in an altercation. (R.I. at 21-22, 28.) Following the incident, Hedlund claimed he did this 

out of concern for the other officers’ safety and for Plaintiff’s safety after seeing Jesus 

Castellanos move toward his son and because he was physically grabbing officers and 

trying to pull them back off his son. (Id. at 22.) But such a statement standing alone is 

insufficient. See, e.g., Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation 

omitted). (“A simple statement by an officer that he fears for his safety or the safety [of] 

others” will not suffice.”). Officer Hedlund also claims he acted reasonably in responding 

with force against Jesus Castellanos when Plaintiff grabbed him by the collar of his 

uniform, and that the amount of force exercised was reasonable when Jesus Castellanos 

would not let go. (Doc. No. 33 at 24; R.I. at 22). The investigative report states that after 

explaining how he struck Jesus Castellano two or three times in the kidneys/rib area 

because Jesus’ hands were at his throat and Jesus had begun to hit him, Officer Hedlund 

“said this caused Jesus Castellanos’ role to change from dominator to a defensive role.” 

(R.I. at 22; see also id. at 24, 26.) In contrast, Plaintiff asserts that when he was holding 

on to the shirt of Defendant Hedlund, he was simply trying to stop himself from falling 

backward over the bench and that he did not make any attempt to hit or punch Officer 

Hedlund. (Jesus Castellanos Dep. 21-22.) The video of the incident does not categorically 

prove one party’s version of events or the other, and, it may be reasonably inferred, does 

not support Officer Hedlund’s contention that Plaintiff Jesus Castellanos was making 

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aggressive movements toward Officer Hedlund or other officers. Thus, whether Jesus 

Castellanos posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others is in question. 

 Additionally, there is contradictory evidence regarding whether Plaintiff Jesus 

Castellano was or was not resisting arrest. While the video shows three CBP Officers 

securing handcuffs on Plaintiff Jesus Castellanos, he maintains that he was not resisting 

arrest and a clear view of the entire handcuffing procedure is not shown from the video 

footage. (See Jesus Castellanos Dep. 20-23.) Similarly, amongst the CBP Officers there 

are inconsistencies as to whether proper warnings were given, if those warnings were given 

in English or in Spanish, and if any officer told Jesus Castellanos that he was being arrested. 

(See generally R.I.) It is also worth noting that Plaintiff was secured within a caged area, 

thus making it unlikely that he was going to escape. See. e.g., S.B v. Cnty. of San Diego, 

864 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Other relevant factors include the availability of less 

intrusive alternatives to the force employed, whether proper warnings were given and 

whether it should have been apparent to officers that the person they used force against was 

emotionally disturbed.”) Therefore, the court finds that whether or not Jesus Castellanos 

was resisting arrest at the time Officer Hedlund punched him is in question. 

 In sum, there are a number of material facts in dispute that call into question whether 

the actions of Officer Hedlund were reasonable. If a jury believes Jesus Castellanos’ 

evidence and rejects Defendant’s evidence and version of events, it could find that the 

events did not play out as Officer Hedlund suggests. In light of all of the evidence and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, a jury could find that Officer 

Hedlund’s use of force was not objectively reasonable, and, therefore, violated Jesus 

Castellanos’ Fourth Amendment right against excessive force. 

(ii) Clearly Established Right 

 A government official’s conduct violates a clearly established right when the 

“contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have 

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 

2083 (2011) (citation omitted); see also City and Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 

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1774 (2015). That “is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity 

unless the action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the 

light of the pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 

483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (internal citations omitted). “In other words, existing precedent 

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Reichle v. 

Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (citation omitted). 

 That means the court must decide if the alleged violation of Jesus Castellanos’ 

Fourth Amendment right against excessive force “was clearly established at the time of the 

officer’s alleged misconduct.” C.V. by and through Villegas v. City of Anaheim, 823 F.3d 

1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). In the Fourth Amendment context, the 

clearly established inquiry is especially important and “must be undertaken in light of the 

specific context of the case, not as a broad proposition because it is sometimes difficult for 

an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to 

the factual situation the officer confronts.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) 

(citations omitted). “General excessive force principles as set forth in Graham and Garner, 

are ‘not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warnings to officers,’ but they “do not 

by themselves create clearly established law outside an obvious case.’” S.B., 864 F.3d at 

1015. 

 Officer Hedlund argues that there was no evidence or case law providing clear 

warning to him that the force used was excessive because he believed he was acting in selfdefense. (Doc. No. 33 at 26-29.) In support, and as clarified at the hearing, Defendant 

relies on Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2001), Jimenez v. City of 

Costa Mesa, 174 Fed. App’x. 399, 403 (9th Cir. 2006) and Saetrum v. Vogt, 673 F. App’x 

688 (9th Cir. 2016). But the court is not persuaded that these cases support Officer 

Hedlund’s contention that his behavior was appropriate as the relevant facts are distinctly 

dissimilar. 

 In Jackson, the plaintiff was part of a group of individuals fighting with police in a 

public park. Plaintiff was sprayed with a chemical irritant, had a knee placed in her back 

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while handcuffs were being placed on her wrists, and was placed in a patrol car where the 

officer rolled up the windows and turned up the engine in the July heat. Jackson, 268 F.3d 

at 652. Subsequently, Jackson discovered she suffered a fractured finger. Id. at 650. 

Finding Jackson’s own testimony belied her assertion that neither she, nor her friends or 

family had verbally or physically threatened the police officers in question, the Ninth 

Circuit concluded that the use of force was not excessive. Id. at 653. In Jimenez, the Ninth 

Circuit came to differing conclusions about what kinds of contact are found to be 

objectively unreasonable on the part of police officers. 174 Fed. App’x. 399. The Court 

of Appeals found: (1) it constitutional for an officer to give a single push to an individual 

who was leaning over him when he was trying to arrest a suspect; (2) it unconstitutional 

for the same officer to push an unarmed bystander standing 3-4 ft away who suffered severe 

injuries as a result; and (3) that although the five punches the officer administered to the 

individual being arrested could be viewed as unreasonable, the officer was entitled to 

qualified immunity. Jimenez, 174 Fed. Appx. at 402-403.8

 Finally, in Saetrum, the Ninth 

Circuit succinctly held that a hands-on takedown executed by a police officer that resulted 

in a concussion did not “violate clearly established law, explaining: “even assuming that 

the takedown involved an unreasonable application of force, the contours of the law were 

not sufficiently clear to put any reasonable officer on notice that tackling Saetrum would 

violate the Constitution.” Saetrum, 673 Fed. App’x at 691. 

Plaintiff, in turn, relies on Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2000) and 

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 480 (9th Cir. 2007). In Blankenhorn, the 

8

 In doing so the Ninth Circuit explained “that because of plaintiff’s initial resistance, lack 

of serious injury, and the fact that he was not yet handcuffed when punched and thus posed 

at least a minimal threat, “we cannot conclude that a reasonable officer would have had 

‘fair notice’ under existing caselaw that ‘the force employed was unlawful, and that any 

mistakes to the contrary would have been unreasonable.” Jimenez, 174 Fed. Appx. at 403. 

(citation omitted). 

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court held that a jury could find the punching of plaintiff while he was on the ground 

unreasonable if plaintiff was not resisting arrest. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 480. Further, 

the Ninth Circuit explained that Graham’s holding had the effect of putting arresting 

officers on notice “that force is only justified when there is a need for force.” Id. at 481. 

In Fontana, the Ninth Circuit made clear that “some bodily intrusions may be provably 

accidental or de minimis and thus constitutionally reasonable” while “gratuitous and 

completely unnecessary acts of violence by the police during a seizure violate the Fourth 

Amendment.” Fontana, 262 F.3d at 880 (physical and sexual assault of an arrestee violates 

the Fourth Amendment). 

 Added to the cases cited by the parties, other Ninth Circuit case law reveals that 

passive or minor resistance to arrest alone does not constitute an immediate threat justifying 

the use of intermediate force. See Smith, 394 F.3d at 702 (finding an uncooperative arrestee 

who shouts expletives at officers and who refuses to follow officers’ commands but who 

is not actively threatening or attacking others is not an immediate threat justifying the use 

of intermediate force in the form of pepper spray and a police dog); Bryan, 630 F.3d at 

826–28 (finding an unarmed man engaging in erratic but nonviolent behavior and shouting 

expletives at officers from fifteen to twenty-five feet away does not constitute an immediate 

threat justifying the use of a stun gun during a traffic stop); Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 

433, 448, 451 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding an unarmed woman inside a car who “stiffened her 

body and clutched her steering wheel to frustrate the officers' efforts to remove her from 

the car” did not present an immediate threat of flight and was not evading arrest that 

warranted being tasered three times in one minute; and holding the use of a taser on a 

woman standing between an officer and her abusive husband who extends her arm and 

touches a police officer while attempting to intervene to discourage officers from arresting 

him constituted excessive force because there was “no threat that either spouse ha[d] a 

weapon”); Winterrowd v. Nelson, 480 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that no 

reasonable officer could justify slamming the suspect against the hood of a car just because 

the suspect had made verbal objections to being pulled over and had a “belligerent 

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attitude,” where the suspect claims he was neither threatening nor physically abusive, was 

not attempting to flee, posed no physical danger, and did not resist the officers). 

Given that facts necessary to decide the issue of qualified immunity are in dispute 

and finding the circumstances of this case more analogous to those of Blankenhorn and the 

body of cases that established that the use of intermediate force against an uncompliant 

arrestee can be excessive, the court finds Officer Hedlund is not entitled to qualified 

immunity at this time. Accordingly, the court DENIES Officer Hedlund’s motion for 

summary judgment on the excessive force claim. 

(2) The False Arrest Claim

As to the false arrest claim, Officer Hedlund disputes that an arrest ever took place 

“but in response to his false arrest claim, he contends that he had probable cause to arrest 

Jesus Castellanos, and probable cause is a complete defense to a false arrest claim under 

Bivens.” (Doc. No.33 at 23.) 

 “[A] warrantless arrest by a law [enforcement] officer is reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is 

being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). “If an officer has 

probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a minor criminal offense 

in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” 

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). To establish probable cause 

“[t]here must be some objective evidence which would allow a reasonable officer to deduce 

that a particular individual has committed or is in the process of committing a criminal 

offense.” McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1984). “Probable cause exists 

where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had 

reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person 

to be arrested.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 n.9 (1977). 

 Officer Hedlund argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to Jesus 

Castellanos’ false arrest claim because he had probable cause to arrest him under California 

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Penal Code section 148 for willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer. 

(Doc. No. 33 at 24.) In support of his position, he cites the videotape, claiming it is 

“conclusive evidence” of Jesus Castellanos’ criminal conduct, in that it demonstrates that 

Mr. Castellanos was interfering and resisting. (Id.) 

But, as set forth above, the facts do not indisputably show that Plaintiff willfully 

resisted, delayed or obstructed a public officer. Whether or not Jesus Castellanos assaulted 

Officer Garneau when Officer Hedlund became involved is in dispute and whether or not 

Officer Hedlund gave any verbal warnings to Jesus Castellanos before he began pushing 

him backward is also in dispute. Jesus Castellanos maintains that no commands where 

given, that Officer Hedlund said nothing while he was pushing him backward and that he 

was talking to his son and trying to diffuse the situation and settle down his son. (See Jesus 

Castellano Dep. 18, 19, 23; Marco Castellanos Dep. 11.) In contrast, Officer Hedlund 

reported that “he gave commands to Jesus Castellanos in English and told him in Spanish 

‘Tome asiento’ (Take a seat). CBPO Hedlund said Jesus Castellanos was listening but did 

not comply with commands given and kept flailing his arms,” and that he verbally 

commanded Jesus Castellanos to “back up.” (R.I. at 22, 28, Doc. No. 47.) Officer Hedlund 

also reported not recalling any other specific commands he gave Jesus Castellanos. (Id. at 

28.) The video does not capture what commands, if any, where given to Jesus Castellanos 

and there is no clear image of the precise interaction between him and Officer Garneau. 

In sum, the statements of Jesus Castellanos directly contradict those of Officer 

Hedlund. A reasonable jury could believe Jesus Castellanos’ version of the facts and 

conclude that probable cause did not exist for the arrest. Viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to Jesus Castellanos, the court concludes that there are there are triable 

issues of fact as to whether Officer Hedlund had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a 

violation of section 148(a). Summary judgment on this claim is therefore not warranted. 

Furthermore, the court cannot find that Officer Hedlund’s decision to arrest Jesus 

Castellanos was objectively reasonable or the result of a reasonable mistake. See 

Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (“An officer who makes 

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an arrest without probable cause, however, may still be entitled to qualified immunity if he 

reasonably believed there to have been probable cause.”) Thus, Officer Hedlund is not 

entitled to qualified immunity on Jesus Castellanos’ Fourth Amendment false arrest claim 

at this stage of the proceedings. See Demuth v. Cty. of L.A., 798 F.3d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 

2015) (“While the law must be unambiguous to overcome qualified immunity, that doesn’t 

mean that every official action is protected ... unless the very action in question has 

previously been held unlawful. [O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates 

established law even in novel factual circumstances. This is especially true in the Fourth 

Amendment context, where the constitutional standard—reasonableness—is always a very 

fact-specific inquiry.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Accordingly, 

Officer Hedlund’s motion for summary judgment on the false arrest claim is DENIED. 

C. FTCA Claims 

 The Government claims that the Customs exception set forth in U.S. Code § 2680(c) 

applies to Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims and, therefore, this court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 33 at 29-32.) Specifically, the Government asserts that the 

exception applies because Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the detention and inspection of their 

vehicle and Officer Martinez’s attempt to detain and inspect Marco’s phone. Plaintiffs 

counter that this exception does not apply because their claims do not arise out of the 

inspection, seizure, or detention of goods. (Doc. No. 40 at 27-30.) 

 Section 28 U.S.C. 2680(c) of the FTCA bars: 

any claim arising in respect to the assessment or collection of any tax or 

customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property 

by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer. 

28 U.S.C. 2680(c). 

 The Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory language of section 2680(c) to 

encompass “all injuries associated in any way with the ‘detention’ of goods,” including 

claims for negligence.” Kosak v. U.S., 465 U.S. 844, 854 (1984) (emphasis added). 

However, “after §2680(c) was enacted, Congress added an amendment to § 2680(h), 

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permitting recovery for various intentional torts when committed by an ‘investigative or 

law enforcement officer,’ including the intentional inflection of emotional distress.” Gasho 

v. U.S., 39 F.3d 1420, 1433 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)); Sheehan v. U.S., 

896 F.2d 1168, 1169, amended on other grounds ̧ 917 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

 Section 2680(h) provides that the FTCA’s waive of immunity does not apply to: 

Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 

malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, 

deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts 

or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States 

Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title 

[i.e., the waiver of immunity] shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the 

date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false 

imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For 

the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement officer” 

means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute 

searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 

 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “§§ 2680(c) and 2680(h) must be interpreted 

in a manner that reconciles them, without doing violence to either.” Gasho, 39 F.3d at 

1433. 

 For a claim to be barred the government make first demonstrate that the custom 

agent’s conduct falls within the scope of activities exempted in § 2680(c). Gasho, 39 F.3d 

at 1433. If the government successfully does this, then the claims are barred. “If the 

government fails to show that the tortious conduct is exempt, the plaintiff's claim is not 

barred, assuming the plaintiff demonstrates that an “investigative or law enforcement 

officer” committed the intentional tort.” Id. 

 At the time of the incident, Plaintiffs were away from their vehicle and the ensuing 

confrontation stemmed from Plaintiffs’ son’s use of a cell phone in the secondary 

inspection waiting area. When Marco did not immediately comply with Officer Martinez’s 

demand to turn over the cell phone the situation escalated. However, the alleged assault

on Jesus Castellano occurred while border patrol officers were in the process of detaining 

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him, a person, and had nothing to do with the inspection of the family’s vehicle. “The 

Customs exception in § 2680(c) does not bar an intentional tort claim arising out of arrests 

by Customs agents, as the exception applies only to the detention of goods and 

merchandise, not persons.” Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1434. See also Kosak, 465 U.S. at 856 (“the 

person who almost certainly drafted the language upon consideration clearly thought that 

it covered injury to detained property caused by the negligence of customs officials,” and 

the provision covered claims “arising out of” the designated conduct.) Thus, the 

government has not met its burden of demonstrating that at the time of alleged tortious 

conduct, Officer Hedlund’s actions were, in fact, related to the seizure and detention of 

goods by Customs.9

 Therefore, the Government’s motion for summary judgment on the 

FTCA claims is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 

No. 33) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 10, 2020 

9

 In so finding, the court has declined to broadly read the Customs exception to apply to all 

actions tangentially related to a customs agent’s official duties thereby insulating the 

Government from liability. See, e.g., Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions LLC, v. U.S., 859 F.3d 

1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that although Section 2680(c) has expansive reach it 

did not give the IRS absolute immunity, concluding: “Section 2680(c)’s exception to the 

waiver of sovereign immunity is broad, but it is not unlimited, and the government’s allencompassing view of it cannot be squared with the statutory text. By its terms, the 

exception shields only actions taken in connection with efforts to assess or to collect taxes, 

which were not involved in this case.”). 

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