Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-35051/USCOURTS-ca9-14-35051-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF

NATURAL RESOURCES; DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC

FACILITIES,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; AGNES

M. PURDY, Owner of Native

Allotment No. 50-2008-0437

certificate no.; that portion of Native

Allotment No. 50-2008-0437

currently occupied by Chicken Ridge

Alternate, Myers Fork Spur, Chicken

to Franklin and Chicken Ridge

Trails, containing 17.5 acres;

BARBARA A. REDMON, on behalf of

Anne L. Purdy, Owner of Native

Allotment No. 50-2013-0004,

certificate no.; that portion of Native

Allotment No. 50-2013-0004

currently occupied by Chicken to

Franklin and Chicken Ridge Trails,

containing approximately 6.4 acres

of land; DENA’ NENA’ HENASH,

Tanana Chiefs Conference, an

Alaska non-profit corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-35051

D.C. No.

4:13-cv-00008-

RRB

OPINION

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2 STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

Ralph R. Beistline, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 12, 2015—Anchorage, Alaska

Filed March 14, 2016

Before: William C. Canby, Jr., Jay S. Bybee,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Watford

SUMMARY*

Quiet Title / Declaratory Judgment / Condemnation

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of quiet

title and declaratory judgment claims for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, and vacated the dismissal of a

condemnation claim in a case involving a land dispute

between the State of Alaska and two Alaska Natives, Agnes

and Anne Purdy, concerning ownership of rights-of-way for

four public trails that cross the Purdys’ land.

The Purdys acquired ownership of the parcels in question

under the Alaska Native Allotment Act through allotments by

the federal government. The State of Alaska contended that

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES 3

the allotments were subject to rights-of-way for four trails. 

Federal statute R.S. 2477, repealed in 1976, granted rights of

way over public lands; it was self-executing; acceptance of a

grant was determined by state law; and under Alaska law an

R.S. 2477 grant could be accepted through public use.

Addressing the State of Alaska’s Quiet Title Act claim,

the panel held that the State of Alaska’s quiet title claim was

barred. The panel held that the United States was a necessary

party to the claim because it held an interest in the Purdys’

allotments (by virtue of the restraint on alienation), and

recognition of the R.S. 2477 rights-of-way would impair the

United States’ interest. The panel further held that the

United States had not waived its immunity from suit pursuant

to the Quiet Title Act’s Indian lands exception, which

preserves the United States’ immunity from suit when the

United States claims an interest based on that property’s

status as trust or restricted Indian lands. The panel concluded

that the district court properly dismissed the claim for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

The panel held that the district court correctly dismissed

the State of Alaska’s claim for declaratory relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2201, which sought essentially the same relief as the

quiet title claim.

Addressing the State of Alaska’s condemnation claim

against the Purdys and the United States under 25 U.S.C.

§ 357, the panel held that although the district court had

subject matter jurisdiction to hear the State’s condemnation

claim, the claim could not proceed as pleaded. The panel

held that the United States was an indispensable party to the

claim. The panel further held that the district court erred in

dismissing the claim on the ground that the United States had

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4 STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES

not waived its sovereign immunity because Congress waived

the government’s immunity with respect to such claims. The

panel also held that the United States’ express consent to the

condemnation claim was not required. The panel concluded

that the State improperly pleaded its condemnation claim, and

remanded so that the State may be given an opportunity to

amend the claim if it so chooses.

COUNSEL

Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, David A. Wilkinson

(argued), Assistant Attorney General, Mary Ann Lundquist,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Fairbanks, Alaska, for

Plaintiffs-Appellants State of Alaska Department of Natural

Resources and Department of Transportation and Public

Facilities.

Sam Hirsch, Acting Assistant Attorney General, David C.

Shilton and John Emad Arbab (argued), Attorneys,

Environment & Natural Resources Division, United States

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for DefendantAppellee United States of America.

Michael C. Kramer (argued) and Justin J. Andrews, Kramer

and Associates, Fairbanks, Alaska, for Defendants-Appellees

Agnes Purdy and Anne Purdy.

Richard D. Monkman, Harry R. Sachse, and Maile S.

Tavepholjalern, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Miller &

Munson, LLP, for Defendant-Appellee Dena’ Nena’ Henash

(Tanana Chiefs Conference).

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STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES 5

OPINION

WATFORD, Circuit Judge:

This case involves a land dispute between the State of

Alaska and two Alaska Natives, Agnes and Anne Purdy. 

Agnes Purdy owns a 160-acre parcel of land in eastern Alaska

near the town of Chicken; her sister Anne owns a neighboring

40-acre parcel. The State contends that it owns rights-of-way

for four public trails that cross the Purdys’ land, trails which

the State wants to keep open for public use. The Purdys

dispute the State’s claim of ownership and want to stop

members of the public from trespassing on their property by

using the trails.

The State sued the Purdys and the United States (as well

as other defendants not relevant here) in federal court. Three

of the State’s claims are at issue: (1) a claim seeking to quiet

title to the four rights-of-way; (2) a declaratory judgment

claim seeking essentially the same relief; and (3) a claim

seeking to condemn for public use whatever portions of the

rights-of-way the State does not already own. The district

court dismissed these claims for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and entered partial final judgment under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The remainder of the action

has been stayed pending resolution of this appeal.

We conclude that the district court properly dismissed the

quiet title and declaratory judgment claims for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. We vacate dismissal of the condemnation

claim because that claim may proceed if the State chooses to

amend it on remand.

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6 STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES

I

The Purdys acquired ownership of the parcels in question

under the Alaska Native Allotment Act, 43 U.S.C. § 270–1 et

seq. (1970). Congress repealed the Act in 1971 but included

a savings provision for applications pending on the repeal

date. 43 U.S.C. § 1617(a). As relevant here, the Act

authorized the Secretary of the Interior to allot up to 160

acres of land to Alaska Natives, subject to a restraint on

alienation. The relevant portion of the statute provides:

The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and

empowered, in his discretion and under such

rules as he may prescribe, to allot not to

exceed one hundred and sixty acres of vacant,

unappropriated, and unreserved nonmineral

land in Alaska . . . to any Indian, Aleut, or

Eskimo of full or mixed blood who resides in

and is a native of Alaska, and who is the head

of a family, or is twenty-one years of age; and

the land so allotted shall be deemed the

homestead of the allottee and his heirs in

perpetuity, and shall be inalienable and

nontaxable until otherwise provided by

Congress . . . .

§ 270–1. To qualify for an allotment, an applicant needed to

show “substantiallycontinuous use and occupancyof the land

for a period of five years.” § 270–3.

The Purdys applied for their respective allotments in 1971

before the Act was repealed. After a decades-long

administrative process, the Bureau of Land Management

(BLM) approved the Purdys’ allotment applications,

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STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES 7

concluding that Agnes had shown continuous use and

occupancy of her 160-acre parcel since 1931, and that Anne

had shown continuous use and occupancy of her 40-acre

parcel since 1955. In 2008 and 2012, the BLM issued

allotment certificates to the Purdys that transferred title to the

land. As mandated by the Act, the allotment certificates

contain a restraint on alienation stating that the land “shall be

inalienable and nontaxable until otherwise provided by

Congress or until the Secretary of the Interior . . . approves a

deed of conveyance vesting in the purchaser a complete title

to the land.”

The State contends that the Purdys’ allotments are subject

to rights-of-way for the following trails: the Chicken to

Franklin Trail, the Chicken Ridge Trail, the Chicken Ridge

Alternative Trail, and the Myers Fork Spur Trail. The State’s

complaint alleges that the public began using these trails in

the late 1800s, long before the Purdys’ use and occupancy of

their allotments began. The State further alleges that, by

virtue of this public use, it acquired ownership of the rightsof-way under an unusual federal statute known as R.S. 2477. 

That statute, first enacted in 1866, provides: “The right of

way for the construction of highways over public lands, not

reserved for public uses, is granted.” 43 U.S.C. § 932 (1970). 

Congress repealed the statute in 1976, but rights-of-way in

existence on the date of repeal were preserved. Lyon v. Gila

River Indian Community, 626 F.3d 1059, 1076 (9th Cir.

2010).

R.S. 2477 is unusual, as land-grant statutes go, because of

its self-executing nature. No formal document memorializing

the grant of a right-of-way needed to be executed by a federal

official. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM,

425 F.3d 735, 741 (10th Cir. 2005). Nor did a State, as the

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8 STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES

recipient of the grant, need to take any formal steps to accept

the federal government’s grant of a right-of-way. Acceptance

of a grant is determined by state law, and under Alaska law

an R.S. 2477 grant could be accepted through public use. 

Fitzgerald v. Puddicombe, 918 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Alaska

1996); Hamerly v. Denton, 359 P.2d 121, 123 (Alaska 1961). 

“The extent of public use necessary to establish acceptance of

the RS 2477 grant depends upon the character of the land and

the nature of the use.” Fitzgerald, 918 P.2d at 1020. While

“infrequent and sporadic” use is insufficient, Hamerly,

359 P.2d at 125, “continuous use is not required,” Fitzgerald,

918 P.2d at 1020. Beyond that, the Alaska cases provide little

guidance as to the quantum of public use that must be shown,

other than to note that the ultimate question is whether there

has been public use “for such a period of time and under such

conditions as to prove that the grant has been accepted.” 

Hamerly, 359 P.2d at 123.

The State’s complaint alleges facts that, in its view,

establish sufficient public use of the four trails to prove

acceptance of the grant. For example, the State alleges that

in 1926, some 517 people, 215 pack horses, 29 sleds, and 75

tons of freight traversed the Chicken to Franklin Trail, while

261 people, 86 pack horses, and 5 tons of freight traversed the

Chicken Ridge Trail. Whether the public’s use of the four

trails was sufficient to prove acceptance under Alaska law is

an issue that has not previously been resolved through

litigation. The State seeks to litigate that issue now. And it

seeks more particularly to show that, because the rights-ofway were accepted before the Purdys’ use and occupancy of

their allotments began, the Purdys took title subject to the

State’s pre-existing ownership interests.

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STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES 9

II

The first question raised by this appeal is whether the

district court had jurisdiction to hear the State’s quiet title

claim, by which it seeks to establish ownership of the four

contested rights-of-way. The second question is whether the

State may condemn for public use whatever portions of the

rights-of-way it does not already own.

A

The district court correctly held that the State’s quiet title

claim is barred. The United States is a necessary party to that

claim but has not waived its immunity from suit.

To establish ownership of the rights-of-way, the State

sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act (QTA),

28 U.S.C. § 2409a. The QTA states in relevant part:

The United States may be named as a party

defendant in a civil action under this section

to adjudicate a disputed title to real property

in which the United States claims an interest,

other than a security interest or water rights. 

This section does not apply to trust or

restricted Indian lands . . . .

§ 2409a(a). The State had to name the United States as a

defendant because it holds an interest in the Purdys’

allotments (by virtue of the restraint on alienation), and

recognition of the R.S. 2477 rights-of-way would impair the

United States’ interest. See Minnesota v. United States,

305 U.S. 382, 386 n.1 (1939); United States v. City of

McAlester, 604 F.2d 42, 46 (10th Cir. 1979). The State had

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10 STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES

to sue under the QTA because that statute provides “the

exclusive means bywhich adverse claimants [may] challenge

the United States’ title to real property.” Block v. North

Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983). The QTA governs even

when an adverse claimant, like the State here, asserts

ownership of less than a fee simple interest. Mills v. United

States, 742 F.3d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 2014); State of Alaska v.

Babbitt (Albert), 38 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 1994).

The United States may be sued only if a statute expressly

waives its sovereign immunity. Block, 461 U.S. at 280. The

QTA waives the United States’ immunity with respect to

claims covered by that statute, but the statute excludes from

its coverage claims involving “trust or restricted Indian

lands.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). This exclusion, known as the

Indian lands exception, preserves the United States’ immunity

from suit “when the United States claims an interest in real

property based on that property’s status as trust or restricted

Indian lands.” United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 843

(1986).

The Indian lands exception applies if the federal

government has a “colorable claim” that the lands in question

are trust or restricted Indian lands. Wildman v. United States,

827 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1987). That test is met so long

as the federal government’s position “was not undertaken in

either an arbitrary or frivolous manner.” Albert, 38 F.3d at

1076.

The federal government has a colorable claim that the

Purdys’ allotments are restricted Indian lands. The allotments

are Indian lands because the Purdys received the allotments

under the Alaska Native Allotment Act. See State of Alaska

v. Babbitt (Foster), 75 F.3d 449, 450–52 (9th Cir. 1996). And

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STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES 11

those lands are considered “restricted” by virtue of the

restraint on alienation contained in the allotment certificates. 

See 25 C.F.R. § 152.1(c); State of Alaska, 45 IBLA 318,

321–22 (1980). Thus, the allotment certificates alone give

rise to a colorable claim that the lands in question are

restricted Indian lands, see Foster, 75 F.3d at 452, unless the

State can show that the rights-of-way it asserts were validly

granted before the allotments were issued.

The State successfully made that showing in State of

Alaska v. Babbitt (Bryant), 182 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 1999). As

in this case, the land at issue in Bryant was allotted to an

Alaska Native (William Bryant), whose use and occupancyof

the land began in 1964. In 1961, however, the federal

government had earlier appropriated the same land to the

State for use as a material site right-of-way under a federal

highway statute. Id. at 673, 677 n.32. There was no dispute

that the 1961 grant to the State had in fact been made: The

statute authorizing the grant required then, as it does now,

that the Secretary of Transportation file “a map showing the

portion of such lands or interests in lands” that the federal

government wished to appropriate. 23 U.S.C. § 317(a). As

a legal matter, then, the land was simply not available for

allotment when Bryant began occupying it in 1964, and the

BLM therefore lacked the authority to allot the land to Bryant

in the first place. Given those facts, we held that the federal

government had no claim, much less a colorable one, that the

lands in question were trust or restricted Indian lands. 

Bryant, 182 F.3d at 676–77.

Our case is different. We do not have a clear and

undisputed grant from the federal government to the State of

an interest in the Purdys’ allotments. To be sure, we have a

potential grant of such an interest under R.S. 2477, but

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12 STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES

whether the rights-of-way were accepted (and when) is open

to dispute. Resolution of that issue would require a factintensive inquiry into the nature and character of the public’s

use of the four contested trails from the late 1800s through

the 1920s. The State may be right that it has the better of the

argument—that if given the chance to do so, it could

successfully show public use of the trails “for such a period

of time and under such conditions as to prove that the grant

has been accepted.” Hamerly, 359 P.2d at 123. But even

accepting as true all of the State’s factual allegations

concerning the nature and character of public use that

occurred, the question remains whether that use establishes,

as a legal matter, acceptance of the grants under Alaska law. 

We cannot say that the issue is so open and shut that arguing

against recognition of the R.S. 2477 rights-of-way amounts

to an arbitrary or frivolous position. The federal government

therefore has a colorable claim that the lands in question are

restricted Indian lands.

Because the Indian lands exception applies, the district

court correctly dismissed the State’s quiet title claim for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. (We decline to address the

State’s argument that its quiet title claim against the Purdys

may proceed in the United States’ absence, as the State failed

to assert that argument below in opposition to the Purdys’

motion to dismiss.) The district court also correctly

dismissed the State’s claim for declaratory relief under

28 U.S.C. § 2201, which sought essentially the same relief as

the quiet title claim. A claim under the DeclaratoryJudgment

Act may not be used as an end run around the QTA’s limited

waiver of sovereign immunity. McMaster v. United States,

731 F.3d 881, 900 (9th Cir. 2013).

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STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES 13

B

The State has also asserted a condemnation claim against

the Purdys and the United States under 25 U.S.C. § 357. That

statute provides: “Lands allotted in severalty to Indians may

be condemned for any public purpose under the laws of the

State or Territory where located in the same manner as land

owned in fee may be condemned, and the money awarded as

damages shall be paid to the allottee.” The United States is

an indispensable party to this claim, given the interest it holds

in the Purdys’ allotments. See Minnesota, 305 U.S. at 386. 

The State adequately named the United States as a defendant

to the condemnation claim when it incorporated by reference

the parties named in paragraphs 15–21 of the complaint,

which included the United States.

The district court dismissed the State’s condemnation

claim on the ground that the United States had not waived its

sovereign immunity. That ruling was in error. By

authorizing condemnation actions under § 357, Congress

waived the United States’ immunity with respect to such

claims. See Minnesota, 305 U.S. at 388; Jachetta v. United

States, 653 F.3d 898, 907 (9th Cir. 2011).

The Purdys contend that the State may not pursue

a condemnation claim—even though authorized under

§ 357—unless the United States expressly consents to the

suit. That contention is squarely foreclosed by our precedent,

which holds that such consent is not required. See Southern

California Edison Co. v. Rice, 685 F.2d 354, 356–57 & n.5

(9th Cir. 1982); Nicodemus v. Washington Water Power Co.,

264 F.2d 614, 617–18 (9th Cir. 1959). The Purdys rely on

United States v. Pend Oreille County Public Utility District

No. 1, 135 F.3d 602 (9th Cir. 1998), but that case is

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14 STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES

distinguishable. The condemning authority there sought to

condemn both tribal reservation land and individual Indian

allotments by flooding the lands through construction of a

dam. Id. at 606, 607. Because the reservation land could not

be condemned under § 357 (only the individual allotments

could), we held that the condemning authority needed the

consent of the United States to proceed. 135 F.3d at 613–14. 

This case, by contrast, like Rice and Nicodemus, involves an

attempt to condemn only individual allotments, so express

consent by the United States is not required. See Rice,

685 F.2d at 357; Nicodemus, 264 F.2d at 617–18.

Although the district court had subject matter jurisdiction

to hear the State’s condemnation claim, that claim may not

proceed as pleaded. The State has alleged a “confirm-andcondemn” claim that asks the district court first to “confirm”

the extent of the rights-of-way it already owns under R.S.

2477. The State then asserts that it will condemn only those

portions of the four trails it does not already own. The State

may not plead the claim in this manner. Because the State’s

claim under the QTA is barred, it may not litigate title to the

contested rights-of-way through the back door by asserting a

condemnation claim under § 357. See Match-E-Be-NashShe-Wish Band v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (2012). If

the State wishes to condemn the contested rights-of-way in

full and pay just compensation for their taking, it must make

that intention clear. We vacate the district court’s dismissal

of the State’s condemnation claim and remand the case so

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STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT. RES. V. UNITED STATES 15

that the State may be given an opportunity to amend that

claim, if it so chooses.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and

REMANDED.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

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