Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01180/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Johnny Gale Dickman, who is confined in the Central Arizona 

Correctional Facility in Florence, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). 

BACKGROUND

 Following a jury trial in the Yuma County Superior Court, Petitioner was 

convicted on April 25, 2002, of the offense of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child Under 

the Age of Fourteen. (Doc. 10-1, Exh, E.) On June 19, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to 

a term of 27-years of imprisonment. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. G.) 

 On July 1, 2002, Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Appeal. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. H.) 

In a memorandum decision filed on July 15, 2003, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed 

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. K.) Petitioner did not seek review 

of the decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. 

 On August 1, 2003, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and a 

Johnny Gail Dickman, 

 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-12-01180-PHX-NVW (SPL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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Request for Appointment of Counsel. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. L.) On August 8, 2003, the court 

appointed counsel. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. M.) After receiving a series of filing extensions 

(Doc. 10-1, Exh. B), on February 14, 2007, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition 

for Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 10-2, Exh. N.) On August 27, 2008, the trial court 

issued an order in which it dismissed all claims for relief and denied the petition. (Doc. 

10-2, Exh. Q.) 

 On March 17, 2009, Petitioner, through counsel, petitioned the Arizona Court of 

Appeals for review of the trial court’s ruling. (Doc. 10-1, Exh. B; Doc. 10-2, Exh. R.) On 

March 29, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review. (Doc. 10-2, 

Exh. T.) On May 5, 2010, Petitioner sought review, through counsel, to the Arizona 

Supreme Court. (Doc. 10-2, Exh. U.) The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied 

review on October 21, 2010. (Doc. 10-2, Exh. W.) 

 Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) on June 4, 

2012. Respondents filed a Limited Answer on October 11, 2012 (Doc. 10), and Petitioner 

filed a Reply on October 29, 2012 (Doc. 11). 

DISCUSSION

 In the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner alleges two grounds for 

relief. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting evidence of prior bad acts in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment based on counsel’s failure to 

request a hearing pursuant to State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Ariz. 1997), to 

present expert testimony as to the victim’s state of mind, and to argue at sentencing that 

the jury had to hear evidence before aggravating his sentence beyond the presumptive 

sentence. 

 Respondents contend that the habeas petition should be dismissed because the 

petition was filed beyond the statute of limitations period. Respondents further argue that 

Petitioner failed to exhaust his state-court remedies and some of his claims are 

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procedurally barred. Petitioner argues that his petition should be considered as though it 

were timely filed because the limitations period should be tolled. 

 For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the habeas petition is barred by the 

statute of limitations, and will therefore recommend that it be denied on that basis. 

I. Legal Standard 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Such petitions are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 1 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

The AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. The statute provides: 

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of– 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was 

prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). “[T]he period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) 

includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari 

from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a 

 1

 The AEDPA applies only to those cases that were filed after its effective date 

(April 24, 1996). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

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petition.” Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The one-year limitation period under AEDPA is statutorily tolled at “[t]he time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); see also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is 

filed even though the petition is not filed until later. Isley v. Arizona Department of 

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 In certain limited circumstances, AEDPA’s one-year filing deadline may be 

equitably tolled. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). A petitioner is entitled 

to equitable tolling if he can demonstrate that “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” to prevent 

him from timely filing a petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S, 

408, 418 (2005); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (generally, 

equitable tolling may be applied only when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a 

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”). For instance, equitable 

tolling is available “where an attorney’s misconduct is sufficiently egregious,” such as 

where an attorney refuses to file a petition at the client’s request or when the attorney 

abandons the client. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2003); Holland, 130 S. 

Ct. at 2568 (Alito, J., concurring). Equitable tolling is also available where a petitioner is 

denied access to his case file for an extended period of time. Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 

918, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable 

tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Spitsyn, 345 

F.3d at 799 (quoting Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

II. Application

 A. Statutory Tolling of the Limitations Period 

Petitioner was sentenced on June 19, 2002, and timely filed a direct appeal on July 

1, 2002. On July 15, 2003, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and 

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sentence. Petitioner had 30 days from that date to seek review. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

31.19(a). Because no petition for review was filed in the Arizona Supreme Court, 

Petitioner’s judgment became final on August 14, 2003 within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 656 (2012) (“with respect to a 

state prisoner who does not seek review in a State’s highest court, the judgment becomes 

‘final’ under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking such review expires). 

Accordingly, the one-year limitations period commenced August 15, 2003. 

 The limitations period, however, was statutorily tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2), when Petitioner properly filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on August 

1, 2003. The petition for post-conviction relief remained pending until the Arizona 

Supreme Court denied review.2

 After the denial by the Arizona Supreme Court on 

October 21, 2010, nothing remained “pending” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Therefore, the statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) began running on 

this date. See Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007) (under Arizona 

procedural rules, post-conviction petition is no longer pending after Arizona Supreme 

Court denies review). The statute of limitations continued to run uninterrupted for one 

year, until October 21, 2011. 

 Accordingly, the limitations period for Petitioner to file a federal habeas petition 

expired on October 21, 2011. Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition until June 

4, 2012, approximately seven months after the limitations period expired. The habeas 

petition is therefore untimely. 

B. Equitable Tolling of the Limitations Period

 In his reply, Petitioner contends that the limitations period should be equitably 

tolled. (Doc. 11.) Petitioner argues an absence of personal fault as to the delay in filing, 

because state post-conviction relief counsel did not respond to his request for case files 

 2

 The petition for review was filed with the Arizona Supreme Court 35 days after the issuance of the decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals. However, because the record does not indicate that the Arizona Supreme Court found the petition untimely, the Court construes the petition as pending until it was summarily denied on October 21, 2010. 

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until March of 2012. Petitioner has attached a letter from counsel, dated March 21, 2012, 

which states: 

I had to pull your file from storage and am sorry for the delay. It is coming in two boxes. Because I used the transcripts as exhibits, some of the transcripts are no longer bound. Given 

my delay, I felt it better to send it to you ASAP. 

I hope you are doing as well as can be expected, and hope you prevail in your habeas petition. 

Please let me know how you are doing, keep me updated, and let me know if I can assist you in any way. 

Due take care, and I remain, 

Very truly yours, 

Paul J. Mattern 

Attorney at Law 

(Doc. 11.) 

 Deprivation of legal materials is a type of external impediment which may merit 

equitable tolling. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(citing Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2002). However, Petitioner “bears 

the burden of showing his own diligence and that the hardship caused by lack of access to 

his materials was an extraordinary circumstance that caused him to file his petition 

almost a year late.” Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013. Here, Petitioner has not met that 

burden. 

 First, Petitioner has not established that he acted with reasonable diligence. 

Petitioner states in his reply that he contacted his state post-conviction relief counsel on 

October 29, 2010, following the Arizona Supreme Court’s order denying review, but 

counsel did not respond to his requests until March 21, 2012. Although Petitioner states 

that he “diligently and aggressively attempted to get his case file,” the certified mail 

receipt addressed to counsel, attached to Petitioner’s reply, is dated November 25, 2011, 

after the limitations period had already expired. Cf. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565 (“Holland 

not only wrote his attorney numerous letters seeking crucial information and providing 

direction, he also repeatedly contacted the state courts, their clerks, and the Florida State 

Bar Association... And, the very day that Holland discovered that his AEDPA clock had 

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expired due to Collins’ failings, Holland prepared his own habeas petition pro se and 

promptly filed it with the District Court.”). 

 Furthermore, if the Court were to find that counsel failed to timely provide 

Petitioner with his files despite his diligent repeated requests, Petitioner has nonetheless 

failed to adequately explain why he filed approximately seven months after the AEDPA 

deadline expired. Petitioner does not contend that he was unaware of the factual basis for 

the claims he raised, that he did not have possession of any of his legal files, nor does 

Petitioner point to any specific document which he required in order to present his 

claims. The underlying basis of his claims, e.g., the admission of evidence at trial and 

trial counsel’s performance, is not new information which was previously unavailable to 

the petitioner. See United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (even 

without access to his case file, petitioner must “at least consult his own memory of the 

trial proceedings.”). Even if Petitioner faced difficulty developing his claims without 

possession of all of his records, “[i]f diligent, he could have prepared a basic form habeas 

petition and filed it to satisfy the AEDPA deadline.” Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 

F.3d at 1014. He could have outlined “arguments and the facts underlying those 

arguments on the form habeas petition, and then sought to amend his petition when he got 

more information.” Id. 

 Petitioner has also not established that counsel’s delay constitutes extraordinary 

circumstances beyond his control which made it impossible to file a petition on time. 

Presupposing that Petitioner made a tactical decision to delay filing until review of all of 

his case files so that he could better bolster his claims, such tactical considerations did not 

prevent him from filing. Any alleged “lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an 

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Robinson v. Kramer, 588 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2000)); see also Fisher v. 

Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[I]gnorance of the law, even for an 

incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.”). 

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 Petitioner does not contend that he was unaware of the final denial of his petition 

for post-conviction relief. Cf. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556 (counsel failed to inform 

petitioner of the denial of his capital state appeal and AEDPA time limit expired). 

Instead, Petitioner concedes that he was informed of the denial in October 2010. 

Petitioner does not argue that he lacked access to the federal habeas statute of limitations 

or that he was even unaware of the limitations period. Petitioner also does not claim that 

his attorney was committed to filing a federal habeas petition on his behalf. Rather, in the 

letter, post-conviction relief counsel indicates a lack of commitment to pursue further 

relief on Petitioner’s behalf. Petitioner has neither articulated, nor does the record reveal, 

any extraordinary circumstance that would justify equitably tolling of the statute of 

limitations. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418 (equitable tolling available when petitioner is both 

diligent in pursuing rights and had extraordinary circumstances preventing earlier filing); 

Holland, supra (discussing potential for finding of extraordinary circumstances where 

counsel misinformed petitioner about filing deadline, failed to communicate conclusion 

of state appeals, and failed to communicate with petitioner at all over a period of years, 

despite repeated requests by petitioner regarding the filing of his federal habeas petition). 

Therefore, the Court will recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be 

denied as untimely. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus is barred by the statute of limitations. The Court will therefore 

recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

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Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within 

which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 19th day of December, 2012. 

 

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