Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00625/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00625-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELIPE GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00625-LJO-SAB-PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 

EITHER FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT 

OR NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS 

TO PROCEED ONLY ON COGNIZABLE

CLAIMS

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff‟s complaint, filed March 

23, 2015.

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 

that “seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff‟s rights. Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.2002). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)(citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff‟s claims must be 

facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are „merely consistent with‟ a defendant‟s 

liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969. 

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) at CSP Corcoran, brings this civil rights action against Defendant 

correctional officials employed by the CDCR at CCI Tehachapi. Plaintiff names as defendants 

the following individuals: CCI Warden K. Holland; Correctional Officer (C/O) J. Hobmeier; C/O

Emerson; C/O G. Wildey; C/O Ganoa; C/O Rodriguez; CDCR Director Beard, Governor Brown. 

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Plaintiff alleges that the CDCR in general has engaged in discriminatory hiring practices. 

Plaintiff appears to allege that because the prisons are located primarily in rural areas of 

California, the employees hired by the CDCR to operate the prisons are from rural areas of 

California. Plaintiff appears to allege that CDCR employees are somehow ethnically distinct 

from the inmate population, which comes largely from the urban areas of the state. Plaintiff also 

sets forth a claim of excessive force.

As to the specific incident of excessive force, Plaintiff alleges that on March 11, 2013, at 

7:00 a.m., while incarcerated at CCI Tehachapi 4B Security Housing Unit (SHU), he was 

directed by Defendants Hobmeier and Emerson to get ready to be transported to court. Plaintiff 

told Emerson that “due to an institutional issue,” he had not shaved for a week and would like to 

shave. Emerson told Plaintiff that it was “not my problem.” Plaintiff told Emerson that “I‟m not 

going out without shaving.” (Comp. ¶ 17.) Emerson left, then returned with Defendants 

Hobmeier, Wildey and Ganoa.

At that point, Plaintiff placed his hands behind his back and placed them through the food 

port in order to be handcuffed. Plaintiff was removed from the cell and escorted by Defendant 

Emerson to the strip cage. Plaintiff‟s hands were cuffed behind his back, and he was holding his 

manila envelopes. Plaintiff alleges that he was not resisting, and that upon stepping into the strip 

cage, Defendant Emerson “grabbed Plaintiff by the back of the head and slammed him against 

right side back of cage, and held his head against the metal cage; placed his leg between 

Plaintiff‟s legs and proceeded to uncuff petitioner . . . before removing handcuffs through open 

door slot. Petitioner hit face first scraping front and right side of face and scratching right arm of 

prescription glasses.” (Compl. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff specifically alleges that he was not physically 

resisting.

Defendant Wildey then closed the door to the strip cage and conducted a strip search. 

While placing handcuffs on Plaintiff after the strip search, Wildey stated in a loud voice, “‟that‟s 

what happens when you play with lil‟boys.‟ (Insinuating that I was convicted of a sex crime – a 

blatant lie).” Plaintiff alleges that the search was conducted in C pod, “which houses the most 

violent prisoners and it is common knowledge that those convicted of sex crimes, informants, 

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rapists are subject to physical harm.” (Compl. ¶ 21.) 

Defendants Emerson and Wildey escorted Plaintiff to Receiving and Release. Plaintiff 

was transported to Kern County Superior Court and returned to the prison. Upon his return, 

Emerson and Wildey escorted Plaintiff back to his housing unit. Instead of returning Plaintiff to 

his regular cell, Defendants placed Plaintiff in a management cell. The management cell did not 

have a locker, table or bunk. Plaintiff requested a grievance form, which was denied by 

Defendant Emerson. Emerson specifically told Plaintiff “don‟t waste your time. 602s here make 

it to the trash can.” Plaintiff alleges that after walking away from Plaintiff‟s cell, Emerson

stopped in the vicinity of cells 109 and 110, “and commented . . .we have us a weirdo in cell 106 

. . (which in prison jargon translates to crazy, sex offender, snitch, P.C.) . . this comment was 

made to active prison gang members for the sole purpose to instigate.” (Compl. ¶ 24.) 

Plaintiff filed a written grievance on a sheet of paper due to the refusal of officers to 

provide a form. Plaintiff did not receive a response. On April 5, 2013, Plaintiff was moved out 

of the management cell. Plaintiff contends that he was held in a management cell for 26 days, 

despite the fact that he had not received a disciplinary charge or any kind of hearing. Plaintiff 

contends that Emerson put Plaintiff in a management cell in contravention of CDCR policy, 

which requires a sergeant to approve such a placement.

During the 26 days that Plaintiff was in the management cell, he was subjected to “threats 

and comments from prisoners about his charges.” (Compl. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant 

Rodriguez conducted a “harassment campaign” with active prison gang members. Plaintiff also 

alleges that while he was in the management cell, “no medical attention was given for laceration 

and bruise on petitioners face and severe headaches due to blow to side of petitioners head and 

was refused medical forms.” (Id.)

On February 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed a CDC Form 602, regarding the use of excessive for 

and “identical claims.” Plaintiff was interviewed regarding his appeal by Lt. Knowles. Plaintiff 

explained that the formal appeal was not timely because his original appeal (written on a piece of 

paper) was thrown in the trash. Plaintiff alleges that since the interview, Defendants Ganoa, 

Rodriguez and Wildey “escalated their comments and accusations, labeling Plaintiff as a snitch 

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because I filed the suit.” (Compl. ¶ 32.) 

On April 1, 2014, Plaintiff was informed that he would be moved to a different cell. That 

morning, Defendants Wildey and Rodriguez arrived to escort Plaintiff. While escorting Plaintiff 

out of the housing unit, Wildey, within hearing distance of all 20 cells, stated “that‟s what 

happens . . .when you file grievances . . . why don‟t you stop filing complaints against us . . . 

Defendant Rodriguez loudly commented, „yeah dude . . . stop snitching on us.‟” (Compl. p. 33.) 

Plaintiff also alleges generally that “there is a pattern and practice of retaliation, 

campaign harassment against jail house lawyers and those whom file grievances . . , use of 

excessive force, theft/loss of property; mail at CCI Tehachapi State Prison resulting in harmful 

injuries.” (Compl. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Warden Holland is aware of this 

pattern and practice because of the many grievances and lawsuits filed by inmates. 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force

The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment protects prisoners 

from the use of excessive physical force. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010)(per curiam); 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). What is necessary to show sufficient harm under 

the Eighth Amendment depends upon the claim at issue, with the objective component being 

contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). For excessive force claims, the core judicial inquiry is 

whether the force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or 

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37(quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 

7)(quotation marks omitted).

Here, the Court finds that, liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated an excessive force 

claim against Defendant Emerson. The allegations of the complaint indicated that Plaintiff was 

in the strip cage and was not offering resistance when Defendant Emerson grabbed Plaintiff by 

the back of the head and slammed him into the back of the cage. 

///

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B. Verbal Threats

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wildey insinuated Plaintiff was convicted of a sex crime 

by stating “that‟s what happens when you play with lil‟ boys.” Plaintiff also alleges that 

Defendant Emerson called Plaintiff a weirdo, “which in prison jargon translates to crazy, sex 

offender, snitch, P.C.” (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 24.) Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that he 

was in any way injured by the conduct of Defendants Wildey and Emerson. 

The Ninth Circuit has dismissed claims alleging prison guards were deliberately 

indifferent to a prisoner‟s safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the prisoner “did 

not allege that he had been assaulted or threatened by assault by other prisoners.” Williams v. 

Wood, 223 Fed.Appx. 670, 671, 2007 WL 654223, *1 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit has 

also rejected an Eighth Amendment claim where guards labeled an inmate a “snitch” but the 

inmate had not been retaliated against. Morgan v. McDonald, 41 F.3d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 

1994). In these cases the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “speculative and generalized fears of harm 

at the hands of other prisoners do not rise to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm.” 

Williams, 223 Fed.Appx. at 671. These cases do not stand for the proposition that injury is a 

necessary element of a failure to protect claim. Rather, in these cases, the plaintiffs failed to 

allege how a certain label resulted in a serious risk of harm and how that harm was known to the 

prison guard. Here, Plaintiff is relying on speculative and generalized fears of harm. Although 

Defendants reference “lil‟ boys,‟ and “weirdo,” There are no specific allegations that specific 

information was given to a particular inmate that posed a specific threat to Plaintiff. 

In some circumstances, a prison official may create a serious risk of irreparable harm, and 

thus violate the Eighth Amendment, by giving other inmates reason to believe that a particular 

inmate is a homosexual. Radillo v. Lunes, 2008 WL 4209824, *2 (E. D. Cal. Sep. 8, 2008); see

also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989)(deliberately spreading 

rumor that prisoner is snitch may state a claim for violation of right to be protected from violence 

while in state custody). The Court finds Radillo to be instructive. In that case, the defendant 

identified the plaintiff as a member of a prison gang that was engaging in homosexual activity, 

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and asked a known gang member if harm would come to a member of the gang that engaged in 

such activity. The defendant then informed the gang affiliate of the plaintiff‟s homosexual 

activity. Here, Defendants, at most, made comments that referred in general to “lil boys” and 

being a “weirdo,” but did not specifically identify Plaintiff as someone who was particularly 

vulnerable and communicate that information to an inmate that would pose a specific harm to 

Plaintiff. The Court finds these allegations to be insufficiently specific to state a claim for relief.

C. Management Cell

Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly placed in a management cell for 26 days. The 

Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. 

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). The Constitution itself does not confer on a 

prisoner a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.” See Id., 

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in party by Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); see also Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). 

However, state law has created a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a prisoner 

remaining free from arbitrary administrative segregation. Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 

672 (9th Cir. 2010)(as amended); Toussaint, 801 F.3d at 1097-98. When an inmate is placed in 

administrative segregation, due process requires notice of the charges or reason for segregation, 

an opportunity for the prisoner to present his views, and a non-adversary hearing of the 

information supporting placement within a reasonable time. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100. 

Further, the disciplinary decision must be supported by “some evidence.” See Id. at 1104-05.

“These healthy procedural protections, however, adhere only when the disciplinary action 

implicates a protected liberty interest in some „unexpected manner‟ or imposes an „atypical and 

significant hardship‟ on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Serrano, 

345 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). Determining whether a prison condition is 

“atypical and significant” requires consideration of the specific facts of each case. Keenan v. 

Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996) amended on denial of rehearing by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th 

Cir. 1998). The Court considers three factors in framing the inquiry: (1) “whether the challenged 

condition mirrored those imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective 

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custody, and thus comported with the prison‟s discretionary authority”; (2) “the duration of the 

condition, and the degree of restraint imposed”; and (3) whether the state‟s actions will 

invariably affect the duration of the prisoner‟s sentence.” Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1078 (9th Cir. 

2003)(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was placed on management cell status for 26 days. Courts 

have previously held that placement in segregation for period of time longer than 10 days did not 

constitute “atypical and significant hardship” in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 

See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (30 days of administrative segregation was permissible); 

Richardson, 594 F.3d at 672 (concluding that administrative segregation for 16 days did not 

constitute atypical and significant hardship). Plaintiff has not alleged that his placement on 

management cell status had any impact on the duration of his sentence. See Serrano, 345 F.3d at 

1078. As such, considering the Serrano factors, Plaintiff‟s allegations are insufficient to 

demonstrate that his placement on management cell status alone constituted “atypical and 

significant hardship” in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. There are no allegations 

in the complaint that Plaintiff was deprived of the “‟minimal civilized measure of life‟s 

necessities,‟” and (2) “the prison official „acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.‟” 

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 

732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation omitted)). Plaintiff‟s management cell claim should therefore 

be dismissed.

D. Medical Care

Regarding Plaintiff‟s allegations that he was denied medical care while he is in the 

management cell, The Court finds Plaintiff‟s allegations to be vague. A prisoner‟s claim of 

inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)(quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two part test for deliberate indifference requires Plaintiff 

to show (1) “a „serious medical need‟ by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner‟s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the „unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,‟” and 

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(2) “the defendant‟s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. A 

defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the defendant “knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 

(1994). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” Simmons v. Navajo County Ariz., 609 

F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is 

shown where there was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner‟s pain or possible 

medical need” and the indifference caused harm. Jett, 439 F.3d at 10986.

Here, Plaintiff alleges generally that staff failed to treat his medical condition while he 

was in the management cell. Although such an allegation indicates that he suffered from an 

objectively serious medical condition, he fails to allege any facts indicating how any of the 

named individual defendants knew of and disregarded his condition, resulting in injury to 

Plaintiff. In order to hold an individual defendant liable, Plaintiff must name the individual 

defendant, describe where that defendant is employed and in what capacity, and explain how that 

defendant acted under color of state law. Plaintiff should state clearly, in his own words, what 

happened. Plaintiff must describe what each defendant, by name, did to violate the particular 

right described by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not done so here.

E. Retaliation

A plaintiff may state a claim for a violation of his First Amendment rights due to 

retaliation under section 1983. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). A viable 

claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment consists of five elements:” “(1) an 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 

prisoner‟s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Cartier, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 169 (9th Cir. 2009).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that in retaliation for filing an inmate grievance, he was subjected 

to verbal threats. As noted above, the comments made by Defendants are not specific enough to 

state an Eighth Amendment claim. Further, allegations of threats and harassment do not state a 

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cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 

1996)(assaultive comments by prison guard not enough to implicate Eighth Amendment); Gaut 

v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987)(mere threat does not constitute constitutional wrong). 

Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that any First Amendment activity was 

chilled as a result of the filing of his inmate grievance. This claim should therefore be dismissed.

F. CDCR Policy

Plaintiff alleges generally that “there is a pattern and practice of retaliation, campaign 

harassment against jail house lawyers and those whom file grievances . . , use of excessive force, 

theft/loss of property; mail at CCI Tehachapi State Prison resulting in harmful injuries.” (Compl. 

¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Warden Holland is aware of this pattern and practice 

because of the many grievances and lawsuits filed by inmates. 

Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a 

theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 673 (2009). Since a government 

official cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability for section 1983 actions, 

Plaintiff must plead that the official has violated the Constitution through his own individual 

actions. Id. at 673. In other words, to state claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must 

link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation 

of Plaintiff‟s federal rights. Plaintiff must allege facts indicating that Warden Holland was 

personally involved in the deprivation at issue. He has not done so here.

Regarding Defendants Governor Brown and Secretary Beard, Plaintiff has similarly 

failed to plead any facts indicating that these individuals violated Plaintiff‟s constitutional rights 

through their own individual actions. In order to hold these Defendants liable, Plaintiff must 

allege facts indicating that they were personally involved in the deprivation of Plaintiff‟s right. 

Plaintiff has failed to do so. 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff‟s complaint states a cognizable claim against Defendant Emerson for excessive 

force. Plaintiff‟s remaining claims, however, fail. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the 

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opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987).

If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding 

only against Defendant Emerson on Plaintiff‟s excessive force claim, Plaintiff may so notify the 

Court in writing. The Court will recommend that the other defendants and claims then be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff will then be provided one summons and one

USM-285 form for completion and return. Upon receipt of the forms, the Court will direct the 

United States Marshal to initiate service of process on Defendant Emerson.

If Plaintiff elects to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 

but must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff‟s 

constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-679; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level . . . Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The mere 

possibility of misconduct is insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir. 2007)(no “buckshot” complaints).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. 

Humana,Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v.Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 

1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” 

Local Rule 220.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk‟s Office shall send to Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended complaint

and is willing to proceed only against Defendant Emerson on his claim of

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excessive force; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend that this 

action will be dismissed for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 1, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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