Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02932/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02932-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD FITZGERALD,

Plaintiff,

v.

EL DORADO COUNTY, SHERIFF 

JOHN D’AGOSTINI, UNDERSHERIFF 

RICH WILLIAMS and Does 1 through 

20, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-02932-MCE-KJN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This action proceeds on Plaintiff Richard Fitzgerald’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”), which seeks to recover damages against Defendants Sheriff John 

D’Agostini (“D’Agostini”), Undersheriff Rich Williams (“Williams”), and El Dorado County 

(“County”) (collectively “Defendants”) on various legal theories. Plaintiff asserts three 

claims against all Defendants: (1) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; 

(2) violation of his due process rights; and (3) violation of his equal protection rights.

Plaintiff asserts additional claims against the County alone: (4) retaliation under state 

law; and (5) age discrimination under both state and federal law.

1

 Presently before the 

 1 In discovery, Plaintiff conceded that the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Claims for Relief are not 

asserted against individual Defendants D’Agostini and Williams. Pl.’s Resp. to Reqs. for Admiss. Ex. B, 

ECF No. 31-4, at ¶¶ 6-13.

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Court are Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, or alternatively partial summary 

judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (ECF No. 31-32), and 

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Errata Sheet (ECF No. 33), both of which Plaintiff timely 

opposed.

2

 ECF Nos. 31-32, 43. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions for 

summary judgment are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

3

BACKGROUND4

In 1991, Plaintiff was hired by the El Dorado County Sheriff’s Department

(“Sheriff’s Department”) to work in the patrol unit. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Joint Statement of 

Undisputed Facts (“SUF”), ECF No. 31-2, at ¶ 1. Subsequently, in 1994, Plaintiff 

became a detective. Id. at ¶ 2. He held that position until 2012, for a total of 18 years. 

Id. In 2010, D’Agostini was elected Sheriff of El Dorado County, and, shortly thereafter,

he appointed Williams as Undersheriff. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. This dispute arises out of oral and 

written statements made by Plaintiff in opposition to two changes Williams and/or 

D’Agostini proposed or instituted with respect to the investigations unit between 2011 

and 2012. 

First, D’Agostini proposed recruiting retired police officers to volunteer in the 

property crime investigation division. SUF ¶ 9. He made his proposal at a meeting 

attended by all of the detectives and several command staff personnel. Id. at ¶ 7. 

D’Agostini explained that he had met the retired officers during his campaign and 

 2 Because the Court did not rely on Plaintiff’s Deposition Errata Sheet in reaching its decision, 

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Errata Sheet is DENIED as moot. Similarly, the Court did not rely on 

Plaintiff’s Declaration or the other evidence Defendants challenge in their additional objections (ECF 

No. 54), which are also overruled as moot. 

3 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefing. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g). 

4 The Court notes that the bulk of Plaintiff’s recitation of the facts in his opposition briefs was 

single-spaced in violation of Eastern District of California Local Rule 130(c). The Court declines to strike 

any or all of Plaintiff’s current papers at this time, but admonishes the parties that failure to comply with the 

Local Rules in the future may result in sanctions. 

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thought that they could help with the heavy workload of the property crime detectives. 

Id. at ¶ 9. He then asked for the officers’ input regarding his plan. Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff

told D’Agostini that he did not think the plan would work because of issues affecting the

chain of custody for evidence, as well as the need to safeguard against leaked 

information. Id. Several other officers related their concerns with D’Agostini’s proposal

as well. Id. at ¶ 11. From Plaintiff’s account, D’Agostini then became upset and left the 

meeting. DF ¶ 97; Strasser Depo. Pl.’s Ex. I, ECF No. 40-2, at 72:14-74:3.

Second, D’Agostini and Williams proposed and later implemented a policy to 

rotate detectives out of the investigations unit and into other roles within the department. 

SUF ¶ 18. Williams assigned Lieutenant Dale Spear (“Spear”) to draft the rotation 

policy. Id. At Williams’ direction, Spear shared a copy of the rotation policy with the 

detectives at a meeting on November 16, 2011. Id. at ¶ 21. At that meeting, Spear 

asked for the detectives’ feedback before the policy was to go into effect on January 1, 

2012. Id.; Sheriff’s New Policy Directive Pl.’s Ex. L, ECF No. 31-8, at 35-36. All of the 

detectives at the meeting, including Plaintiff, expressed strong opposition to the rotation 

policy. Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff presents evidence that he was one of the most vocal 

opponents at the meeting, along with detectives Rich Strasser (“Strasser”) and John 

Yaws (“Yaws”). Strasser Depo. at 99:13-15. According to Strasser’s deposition, Plaintiff

argued at that meeting that implementing a rotation policy for detectives would hurt the 

department and that the majority of unsolved homicides in their jurisdiction were a direct 

result of inexperienced investigators. Id. at 101:3-9. In Plaintiff’s deposition, he states 

that he met privately with Spear after the meeting and voiced his concerns that the 

rotation policy would jeopardize the departments’ ability to solve crimes and could lead 

to age discrimination. Fitzgerald Depo. Pl.’s Ex. C, ECF No. 31-8, at 232:14-233:8. 

According to Plaintiff, he, Strasser, and the El Dorado County Deputy Sheriff’s 

Association (“DSA”) filed a grievance shortly after the meeting to oppose the rotation 

policy. Strasser Decl. Pl.’s Ex. H, ECF No. 40-2, at ¶ 5. Plaintiff presents further 

evidence that he attempted to obtain the signature of Sergeant Tom Hoagland 

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(“Hoagland”) on the grievance, but that Hoagland declined to endorse the grievance in 

front of a room filled with other detectives. Strasser Decl. Pl.’s Ex. H, ECF No. 40-2, at 

¶¶ 5-6; Hoagland Depo. Pl.’s Ex. E, ECF No. 40-1, at 176:4-24. Plaintiff also presents 

evidence that he took the lead in drafting proposed amendments to the policy, that he 

presented the proposal to Hoagland, Spear, and Sergeant Dreher, and that he was told 

the document would be presented to D’Agostini. Strasser Decl. at ¶ 8; Strasser Depo. at 

123:14-16; Proposed Changes and Justifications Pl.’s Ex. 18, ECF No. 38. 

On or about November 30, 2011, D’Agostini and Williams withdrew the rotation 

policy after receiving a “cease and desist” letter from the attorney for the DSA. SUF

¶¶ 24-25; DSA Letter Ex. M, ECF No. 31-8, at 39-41. Despite withdrawing the rotation 

policy, D’Agostini and Williams continued to discuss reassigning detectives out of the 

investigations unit. SUF ¶ 26. They eventually determined that either Plaintiff or 

Strasser should be one of the detectives reassigned. Id. at ¶ 31. Defendants allege that 

D’Agostini and Williams made this decision because Plaintiff and Strasser had been in 

the detective position for the longest period of time. Id.

On March 29, 2012, Plaintiff was informed that he was being reassigned to the 

patrol unit as of April 21, 2012. SUF ¶ 35. Plaintiff was 56 years old at that time. Id. at 

¶ 36. There were three other detectives reassigned to the patrol unit: two were 43 years 

old and one was 34 years old. Id.

On behalf of Plaintiff and the other reassigned detectives, the DSA initiated the 

employee grievance process outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) 

between the DSA and the County. SUF ¶¶ 48-49. Initially, on April 16, 2012, the DSA 

filed a grievance with Hoagland (Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor). Id. at ¶ 49. That

grievance was denied in a letter from Williams on April 25, 2012. Id. at ¶ 50. Then, on 

or about May 2, 2012, the DSA filed an appeal with D’Agostini, which was also ultimately 

denied. Id. at ¶ 51. Additionally, on May 22, 2012, the DSA filed an appeal with the 

County’s human resources director. Id. at ¶ 52. The director ruled that the Sheriff had

the managerial right to determine assignments and found insufficient evidence that 

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Plaintiff’s reassignment was retaliatory. Id. at ¶ 53. At the same time, however, the 

director also recognized the DSA’s right to negotiate the impact of any reassignments

prior to their implementation. On that basis, the director found that the sheriff needed to

restore Plaintiff and the other reassigned deputies back to their detective positions. Id.

at ¶ 53. D’Agostini and Williams believed that the director exceeded his authority in 

ordering the deputies be reinstated as detectives, and consequently refused to comply 

with his decision. SUF ¶ 54. Instead of filing an appeal with the Civil Service 

Commission or proceeding to arbitration (as outlined in the MOU), the DSA filed a writ of 

mandate in superior court challenging D’Agostini’s failure to implement the director’s 

remedy. D’Agostini and the County filed demurrers, which the court sustained without 

leave to amend. Id. at ¶ 55. 

After receiving notice of his reassignment, Defendants allege that Plaintiff went on 

medical leave and never returned to work. SUF ¶¶ 37, 44. On July 31, 2012, Plaintiff 

submitted written notice of his intent to retire from the Sheriff’s Department as of 

September 8, 2012. Id. at ¶ 47. 

In his operative FAC, Plaintiff alleges that D’Agostini and Williams violated his 

constitutional rights by reassigning him to the patrol unit and forcing him into retirement 

in retaliation for exercising his free speech rights. FAC at ¶ 4. Defendants bring the

instant motions seeking summary judgment, or, in the alternative, partial summary 

judgment. ECF No. 31; ECF No. 32. Those motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED 

in part.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when “the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex 

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Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is 

to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary judgment on part of a claim or 

defense, known as partial summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party may 

move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each 

claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. 

Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378–79 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The standard that applies to a 

motion for partial summary judgment is the same as that which applies to a motion for 

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); State of Cal. ex rel. Cal. Dep't of Toxic 

Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir.1998) (applying summary 

judgment standard to motion for summary adjudication).

In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the 

portions in the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial 

responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine 

issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 

253, 288–89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence or non-existence of a genuine factual 

dispute, the party must support its assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in 

the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits[,] or declarations ... or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do 

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (1). The 

opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251–52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of 

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W. Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party 

must also demonstrate that the dispute about a material fact “is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Id. at 248. In other words, the judge needs to answer the preliminary question before 

the evidence is left to the jury of “not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether 

there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party 

producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Id. at 251 (quoting Improvement 

Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 81 U.S. 442, 448, 20 L. Ed. 867 (1871)). As the Supreme 

Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule [56(a)], its 

opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 

the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Therefore, “[w]here the record taken 

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is

no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to 

be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed 

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's 

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. 

Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 

810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir.1987).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of age

and took retaliatory actions against him for opposing changes within the Sheriff’s 

Department. Defendants seek summary judgment on each of the claims for relief

alleged against them, arguing that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendants 

never engaged in the alleged discriminatory or retaliatory conduct. As explained below, 

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summary judgment is DENIED with respect to the following claims: First Amendment

retaliation; retaliation under California law; violation of Plaintiff’s equal protection rights; 

and age discrimination under both state and federal law. Also, summary judgment is 

DENIED for Plaintiff’s due process claim to the extent it relates to Plaintiff’s alleged 

constructive discharge, and GRANTED to the extent it concerns his reassignment from 

detective to the patrol unit. Finally, summary judgment is DENIED for Plaintiff’s § 1102.5 

retaliation claim insofar as it relates to Plaintiff’s alleged opposition to the rotation policy 

and GRANTED with regard to Plaintiff’s opposition concerning the retired police officer 

volunteers. 

A. First Claim for Relief: Violation of the First Amendment

Defendants first move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment 

retaliation claim. Under these circumstances, the Court evaluates five factors to 

determine whether a public employee’s speech rights have been violated: 

(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; 

(2) whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public 

employee; (3) whether the plaintiff’s protected speech was a 

substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment 

action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for 

treating the employee differently from other members of the 

general public; and (5) whether the state would have taken 

adverse employment action absent the protected speech. 

Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Eng v. Cooley, 

552 F. 3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009)). Each of the above elements must be met and are 

“independently necessary” to the First Amendment claim. Id. at n.4. Defendants argue 

that Plaintiff cannot establish any of the first three factors. For the following reasons, the 

Court disagrees.

1. Whether Plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern

First, whether speech addresses a matter of public concern is determined by

reviewing the content, form and context of the statement. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 

138, 147-148 (1983). Simple workplace grievances are not considered public concerns, 

but information that is of inherent “relevance to the public’s evaluation of the 

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performance of government agencies” falls within that realm. Johnson v. Multnomah 

County, Or., 48 F.3d 420, 425 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

Defendants claim that Plaintiff did not speak out on a matter of public concern 

because his statements reflected his own self-interest in his job security rather than 

broader societal concerns. ECF No. 32-1 at 13. However, it is undisputed that Plaintiff 

vocally opposed the use of volunteers in the property division and cited worries about

the chain of custody for evidence and controlling leaks of information. SUF ¶ 10. Based 

on these statements, Plaintiff’s concerns appear focused on the integrity of the police 

force and the ability to solve crimes unimpeded by potential media scrutiny, which are 

issues relevant to the public’s evaluation of the government’s performance. Plaintiff’s

own job security was not at issue here because he was assigned to the homicide 

division and not the property division. 

Similarly, with respect to the rotation policy, Plaintiff alleges in his deposition that 

when he spoke out against the policy, he expressed worries about potential age 

discrimination within the department and the competency of unmotivated and 

inexperienced rotational detectives. Fitzgerald Depo. Pl.’s Exh. C, ECF No. 40-1, at 

228:5-230:17. “[T]he competency of the police force is surely a matter of great public 

concern.” McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983). Likewise, 

potential discrimination within a county’s police force relates to public concerns. See

Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1979)

(concerning a teacher that had been fired after complaining about school policies she 

perceived as racially discriminatory). Thus, there are genuine issues of material fact

such that a jury could find for Plaintiff on this factor. 

2. Whether Plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or a public 

employee 

Second, First Amendment protections for public employees only apply when the

employee speaks as a private citizen as opposed to as a public employee. Eng., 

552 F.3d at 1070. A government employee acts as a private citizen if “the speaker had 

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no official duty to make the questioned statements, or if the speech was not the product 

of performing the tasks the employee was paid to perform.” Id. at 1071 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, statements do not lose First 

Amendment protection simply because they concern “the subject matter of [the plaintiff's] 

employment.” Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545 (9th Cir.2006); see Garcetti v. 

Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). On the other hand, a person is acting as a public 

employee when their actions and speech are made “pursuant . . . to official duties.” 

Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1068 (citation and internal quotations omitted); compare Ceballos, 

547 U.S. at 421 (a deputy district attorney’s memo to supervisors concerning a search 

warrant affidavit was written pursuant to his official duties); and Freitag, 468 F.3d at 546

(prison guard’s internal reports of inmate sexual misconduct were made pursuant to her 

official duties); with Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2007) (chief 

ferry engineer’s internal and external complaints of corrupt financial practices by 

managers in the ferry system were entirely outside his official duties as a ferry engineer). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not act as a private citizen because his 

supervisors elicited his statements regarding the volunteers and the rotation policy and

because his complaints remained within the internal chain of command. ECF 32-1 at 13; 

ECF 31-1 at 17. However, the fact that Plaintiff’s statements were confined to the chain 

of command is not dispositive. Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1074; see Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 420 

(“That Ceballos expressed his views inside his office, rather than publicly, is not 

dispositive.”). Also, Plaintiff presents evidence that he assisted in filing a grievance 

against the rotation policy and that he drafted and presented proposed changes to that

policy. Strasser Depo. at 109:20-110:13, 123:14-16; Strasser Decl. at ¶¶ 5-6; Proposed 

Changes and Justifications Pl.’s Ex. 18, ECF No. 38, at 143-45. Participation in a union 

grievance process may fall outside the official duties of a police detective because of the 

“inherent institutional conflict of interest between an employer and its employees’ union.” 

See Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a 

reasonable jury could find that an officer acted as a private citizen when he served as 

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representative and president of his police union). Although the MOU between the DSA 

and the County provided for a grievance process, there is no evidence that participating 

in this grievance process was a requirement of Plaintiff’s position. Therefore, there is 

sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether he acted 

within his official job duties, and, in turn, whether he acted as a private citizen or public 

employee.

3. Whether Plaintiff’s speech was a substantial or motivating 

factor in an adverse employment action

Finally, for Plaintiff to succeed, his protected speech must have been a 

substantial or motivating factor in an adverse employment action. Defendants argue 

both that Plaintiff cannot show either an adverse employment action or the requisite 

causation. 

a. Adverse Employment Action 

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff was not subject to an adverse employment 

action. ECF 32-1 at 14; ECF 31-1 at 18. The Court disagrees. There are facts before 

the Court on which a reasonable jury could rely to find an adverse employment action 

based on: (1) Plaintiff’s reassignment to patrol alone; or (2) Plaintiff’s constructive 

discharge generally.

5

Actions are adverse when they are “reasonably likely to deter” the exercise of 

protected First Amendment rights. Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 976 (9th 

Cir. 2003). Accordingly, a jury could find that Plaintiff’s reassignment to the patrol unit, in 

and of itself, would have deterred him from speaking out against the potential volunteers 

and the rotation policy. See Allen v. Scribner, 812 F. 2d 426, 428 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding 

 5 Defendants also argue that other conduct not discussed here did not by itself constitute adverse 

employment actions. Since Plaintiff does not argue to the contrary, the Court assumes Plaintiff agrees 

and does not address those arguments. In addition, D’Agostini and William assert that they were not 

involved in either: (1) a decision to repossess Plaintiff’s company car and keys; or (2) a decision to make 

late night calls to Plaintiff from dispatch. However, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that the 

majority of decisions within the department are made from the sheriff to the undersheriff and then to the 

officers below them. Hoagland Depo. Pl.’s Ex. E, ECF No. 38, at 105:1-6. In light of this evidence, there 

is a triable issue of fact as to whether D’Agostini and Williams were involved in these decisions.

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an allegation that plaintiff had been “reassigned to another position, and otherwise 

harassed in retaliation for . . . remarks he made to the press” sufficient to form basis of 

First Amendment claim) (emphasis added). 

Moreover, a jury could also find Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action 

through his constructive discharge. Constructive discharge occurs when, “looking at the 

totality of the circumstances, ‘a reasonable person in [the employee's] position would 

have felt that he was forced to quit because of intolerable and discriminatory working 

conditions.’” Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir.1987) (alteration 

in the original). “Whether working conditions were so intolerable and discriminatory as to 

justify a reasonable employee's decision to resign is normally a factual question for the 

jury.” Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting 

Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 915 F.2d 424, 431 (9th Cir. 1990)). “Demotion, even 

when accompanied by a reduction in pay, does not by itself trigger a constructive 

discharge.” King v. AC & R Advert., 65 F.3d 764, 768-69 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Turner 

v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1247 (1994)). There must be a showing of

“aggravating factors, such as a continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment.” Watson,

823 F.2d at 361 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff was reassigned from the investigations unit 

to the patrol unit and that this transfer reduced his pay by 5 percent. While the demotion 

and pay cut on their own would likely not be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find 

constructive discharge, King, 65 F.3d at 768-69, Plaintiff alleges several additional 

aggravating factors that raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a 

reasonable person in the same circumstances would have felt no other option but to 

retire. First, in Yaws’ Deposition, he claims that Hoagland made derogatory comments 

on several occasions about Plaintiff and his age because he was angry at Plaintiff for his 

opposition to the rotation policy. Among other things, Hoagland apparently said “that 

fucking guy” in reference to Plaintiff and commented that Plaintiff was a “crotchety old 

man.” DF ¶¶ 119, 137. Second, Plaintiff asserts that he was ordered to return his car 

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and keys on March 29, 2012, shortly after he went on medical leave, but before his 

reassignment to patrol was to go into effect. Finally, Plaintiff avers that Strasser asked 

Hoagland on his behalf if he could be assigned to an alternative position because he 

was concerned about his physical ability to perform the duties of a patrol officer. 

Hoagland never inquired if other positions were available, even though there was 

allegedly a vacancy. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, these additional 

factors provide a sufficient basis from which a jury could find an “intolerable and 

discriminatory” working environment and constructive discharge. See Watson, 823 F.2d 

at 361. 

b. Substantial or Motivating Factor

Plaintiff must nonetheless still show a causal link between his protected speech 

and the adverse action. This circuit has set forth three ways to show causation: (1) “the 

proximity in time between the protected speech and the retaliatory employment 

decision”; (2) “evidence that his employer expressed opposition to his speech, either to 

him or others”; and (3) “evidence that his employer’s proffered explanations for the 

adverse action were false and pre-textual.” Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977. 

As to the first factor, to be sufficient, the temporal proximity must be “very close.” 

Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001). Some courts have 

found that time lapses of three or more months, standing alone, are insufficient to 

establish causality. Id. (citing Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 

1997) (3 month period insufficient); Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (7th 

Cir. 1993) (4 month period insufficient)). However, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that 

there is no period of time that is “per se too long” and that causation is “a question of fact 

that must be decided in light of the timing and the surrounding circumstances.” 

Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977-78 (“Depending on the circumstances, three to eight months 

is easily within a time range that can support an inference of retaliation.”). Here, 

approximately four months passed between the time Plaintiff made his final opposition to 

the rotation policy in late November 2011 and the notification of his reassignment to the 

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patrol unit on March 29, 2012. Given the undisputed fact that D’Agostini and Williams 

had originally withdrawn the policy in late November, a reasonable jury could infer that 

Defendants waited a few months before finally implementing the rotation policy to let 

some of the initial disagreements over the policy die down and to distance the

reassignment decision from Plaintiff’s opposition thereto. 

Plaintiff also points to evidence supporting the second factor, namely that 

Defendants’ explanation for the reassignment was pre-textual. A plaintiff can 

demonstrate pretext by showing “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 

incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's . . . reasons for its action,” which “a 

reasonable fact finder could rationally find . . . unworthy of credence.” Hersant v. Dep’t 

of Social Serv., 57 Cal. App. 4th 997, 1005 (1997). According to Defendants, Williams 

told Hoagland that one of the four detectives reassigned to the patrol unit must be one of 

the two detectives who had been in the unit the longest. ECF No. 31-1 at 20. 

Defendants contend that it was mere coincidence that Plaintiff and Strasser were the two 

most senior detectives in the unit and that Hoagland, not D’Agostini or Williams, was the 

individual that ultimately chose Plaintiff for reassignment. Id. 

However, Plaintiff provides evidence casting doubt on Defendants’ explanations. 

First, Plaintiff alleges that he was one of the most vocal opponents of the rotation policy. 

In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he expressed his age discrimination concerns to 

Spears in a one-on-one meeting in his office. Plaintiff also presents evidence that he 

prepared amendments to the rotation policy and presented those amendments to 

Hoagland and Spear, and that, in his role as “patriarch” of the unit, he took the lead on 

opposing the rotation policy and filing the grievance against the policy. Based on this 

evidence, a reasonable fact finder could find that Defendants’ motivation for reassigning 

Plaintiff to the patrol unit was in retaliation for his protected speech regarding the rotation 

policy. As such, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. Defendants’ 

Motions for Summary Judgment as to the First Amendment retaliation claim are 

DENIED.

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4. Qualified Immunity 

Defendants D’Agostini and Williams also seek summary judgment with respect to 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim on the basis that they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

ECF 31-1 at 21. Defendants’ instant argument is rejected.

Public officials sued in their individual capacity, as here, are immune from suit if 

“their conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In deciding whether an official is 

entitled to qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has articulated a two-prong approach: 

first, whether the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right; and second, whether the 

right was clearly established. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 

As set forth above, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that, 

viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing violated 

his First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the question for the Court is whether Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights were clearly established such that “it would be clear to a reasonable 

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 

202. 

“[A] district court should decide the issue of qualified immunity as a matter of law 

when ‘the material, historical facts are not in dispute, and the only disputes involve what

inferences properly may be drawn from those historical facts.’” Conner v. Heiman, 

672 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Only 

where ‘historical facts material to the qualified immunity determination are in dispute’ 

should the district court submit the issue to a jury.” Id. (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). When analyzing a claim of qualified immunity, the court must view the facts in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 

2009).

Here, D’Agostini and Williams argue that it would not have been clear to a 

reasonable officer that Plaintiff’s comments were regarding a matter of public concern. 

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ECF No. 31-1 at 22. Yet, their position largely ignores a fairly significant dispute 

between the parties: whether Plaintiff’s complaints included public safety concerns, as 

Plaintiff alleges, or whether he only made self-serving inquiries about his own job, as 

Defendants contend. “Pre-trial dismissal on qualified immunity grounds is inappropriate 

if the plaintiff establishes that material issues of fact exist.” McSherry v. City of 

Long Beach, 423 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir.2005). Viewed in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff, his speech concerned public safety, age discrimination, and the integrity and 

effectiveness of the police force, which were clearly established matters of public 

concern at the time Plaintiff allegedly voiced his opposition. See McKinley, 705 F.2d at 

1114; see also Givhan, 439 U.S. at 412-13.

Additionally, D’Agostini and Williams argue that it would not have been clear to a 

reasonable officer that Plaintiff was acting as a private citizen when he made comments 

at staff meetings about volunteers in May 2011 and concerning the rotation policy in 

November 2011. Again, however, there is a dispute as to the content and extent of 

Plaintiff’s opposition to the volunteer proposal and the rotation policy, which precludes a 

finding that no reasonable officer would have known Plaintiff was acting as a private 

citizen. See McSherry 423 F.3d at 1022. Moreover, D’Agostini and Williams have not 

provided any evidence on the scope of Plaintiff’s job duties, and, as described above, 

Plaintiff’s statements and actions appear to fall outside the scope of his work 

responsibilities. As such, when Plaintiff “comment[ed] upon matters of public concern as 

a citizen and not pursuant to his job responsibilities, his speech was protected by the 

First Amendment—that rule had long been the law of the land.” See Eng, 552 F.3d at

1075-76 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, summary judgment on 

qualified immunity grounds would be premature.

B. Second Claim for Relief: Due Process Violation

Defendants next contend that a reasonable jury could not find a due process 

violation. They are partially correct. 

///

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The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process applies when 

a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. Board of Regents v. 

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). To survive summary judgment on a due process claim, 

a public employee has to allege facts from which a reasonable fact finder can conclude 

that: (1) the employer deprived the employee of a property interest; and (2) it did so 

without due process of law. Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 

2000). It is undisputed that Plaintiff was reassigned from the investigations unit to the 

patrol unit and that he subsequently retired. The parties’ dispute lies in whether Plaintiff 

was deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest. 

Plaintiff argues that he had a property interest in his position as a detective and 

that he was constructively discharged. ECF 43 at 19. More specifically, Plaintiff 

contends that he had a property interest in maintaining his detective assignment 

because he was orally told by all of the former sheriffs, including Hal Barker, Jeff Neves 

and Fred Kollar, that his assignment to investigations was a permanent lifetime position. 

DF ¶ 129. Plaintiff further claims that Hoagland told him that D’Agostini appreciated the 

value of experience and that Plaintiff would remain a detective. Id.

Defendants concede that Plaintiff had a property interest in his job with the 

Sheriff’s Department. ECF No. 32-1 at 14. However, they argue that Plaintiff had no 

property interest in his position as a detective. According to Defendants, because 

Plaintiff’s assignment was terminable at the discretion of the sheriff, Plaintiff had no 

legitimate entitlement to the position on an indefinite basis. Id. at 16. Defendants further 

assert that Plaintiff has only established that he voluntarily retired and has not provided 

sufficient evidence that he was constructively discharged. Id. at 12. 

Although one's actual job as a tenured civil servant is property, see, e.g., 

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985), the maintenance of 

a particular assignment, similar to a promotion, does not fit within that same category. 

Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1998). As the Supreme Court 

has explained, property interests are not created by the Constitution, but rather by 

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“existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state 

law.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. In California, the terms and conditions of public 

employment are generally “fixed by the statute, rules or regulations creating it, not by 

contract (even if one is involved).” Williams v. Los Angeles City Department of Water 

and Power, 130 Cal. App. 3d 677, 680 (1982). 

Plaintiff does not identify any California law that creates a property interest in a 

particular police assignment, and instead points only to the oral assurances or promises 

he received from former sheriffs and Hoagland that he had a permanent detective 

position. These oral statements do not suffice. Absent a state law on the matter, words 

or conduct are insufficient to form a property interest. See Nunez, 147 F.3d at 875 n.7 

(citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601–02 (1972)). “[T]here must be rules or 

mutually clear understandings securing the commitment.” Id. As such, Plaintiff has not 

met his burden to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he had a property 

interest in his detective position. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The Motions for Summary 

Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied due process in being reassigned 

from the investigations unit to the patrol unit are GRANTED.

Plaintiff also contends, however, that he was constructively discharged. 

Permanent state employees hold a property interest in their job which is protected by 

due process. Freitag, 468 F.3d at 548. This interest contains the right to continued 

employment free from disciplinary measures without cause. Skelly v. State Personnel 

Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 207-08 (1975). One type of disciplinary measure is a constructive 

discharge. As set forth above, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient evidence to survive 

summary judgment on his due process claim to the extent it turns on a constructive 

discharge theory. 

That said, Defendants claim that even if Plaintiff were constructively discharged, 

his claim still fails because he received all the process he was due. The Court 

disagrees. 

///

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Defendants offer evidence that under the rules of the El Dorado County 

Personnel Management, there is an appeal process for employees who feel they have 

been coerced into resignation. SUF ¶ 56. These rules, however, do not set forth any 

process to be afforded prior to a constructive discharge. Due process generally requires 

“‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any 

significant property interest.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542

(1985) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, (1971)). Given the lack of 

evidence of processes available pre-discharge, Defendants’ Motions for Summary 

Judgment on Plaintiff's due process claim is DENIED.

C. Second Claim for Relief: Equal Protection Violation

Defendants next seek judgment on Plaintiff’s equal protection claim. To establish 

a § 1983 equal protection violation, a plaintiff must show “that the defendants, acting 

under color of state law, discriminated against [him] as [a] member[] of an identifiable 

class and that the discrimination was intentional.” Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. 

Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.2003). That is, a plaintiff must show that the 

defendant acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him based upon his

membership in a protected class. Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir.

2003). 

Age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause. Kimel v. 

Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000). “States may discriminate on the basis of 

age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is 

rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. The rational basis test requires a 

showing that “the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the 

achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that 

the [government’s] actions were irrational.” Id. at 84 (citation and quotations omitted). 

In the present case, Plaintiff alleges that he was reassigned to the patrol unit, in 

part, based on his age, and he argues that there was no rational basis for this decision. 

ECF No. 43 at 20. Defendants argue that the rotation policy was rationally related to a 

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government interest because there were varying views on the rotation policy within the 

department, a survey showed some employees wanted more opportunities as 

detectives, and a Grand Jury report indicated there were limited investigation 

opportunities for female officers. ECF 32-1 at 18. Yet, Plaintiff presents evidence that 

the rotation policy served no legitimate purpose because there was already consistent 

movement in and out of the investigations unit. DF at ¶ 117. Based on this evidence, 

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the rationality of the rotation policy. 

Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's claim for violation of the equal 

protection clause are therefore DENIED.

D. Third Claim for Relief: Age Discrimination

Plaintiff asserts a claim of age discrimination under the Federal Employment 

Housing Act and the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. FAC at ¶ 47-54. To 

succeed under both laws, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he was: (1) a member of the 

protected class (at least age 40); (2) performing his job satisfactorily; (3) subject to an 

adverse employment action; and (4) replaced by a substantially younger employee. 

Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2000). If Plaintiff 

establishes these elements, then the burden shifts to Defendants to articulate a 

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for their employment decision. Id. Then, Plaintiff 

must show that Defendants’ reason is a pretext for a discriminatory motive. Id.

In Plaintiff’s case, it is undisputed that he was over 40 years old, and Defendants 

do not make an argument that he was not qualified for his position as detective or that 

he was not replaced by a significantly younger person. ECF 32-1 at 18. Defendants’ 

argument is that Plaintiff did not suffer a materially adverse action because he was 

merely involuntarily transferred. Id. It is undisputed that at all times he remained a 

Deputy Sheriff II. Yet, it is also undisputed that Plaintiff was reassigned to the patrol unit, 

and that he made 5 percent more as a detective. Whether or not Plaintiff’s reassignment 

to the patrol unit constitutes an adverse employment action is a question for the jury. 

Also, as discussed above, there is sufficient evidence of constructive discharge to create 

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a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, Defendant County’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment on Plaintiff's claim for age discrimination is DENIED.

E. Fourth Claim for Relief: California Labor Code section 1102.5 

Retaliation 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim for Relief arises under section 1102.5 of the California 

Labor Code. Section 1102.5 is a “whistleblower” statute that establishes liability for 

employers who retaliate against their employees for disclosing information to 

government or law enforcement agencies. Specifically, section 1102.5 provides, in 

relevant part:

(b) An employer may not retaliate against an employee for 

disclosing information to a government or law enforcement 

agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to 

believe that the information discloses a violation of state or 

federal statute, or a violation or noncompliance with a state or 

federal rule or regulation.

Accordingly, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under section 1102.5(b), 

a plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) his employer 

thereafter subjected him to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link 

between the two. Mokler v. County of Orange, 157 Cal. App. 4th 121, 138 (2007)

(quoting Patten v. Grant Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 134 Cal. App. 4th 1378, 1384 

(2005)). Defendant County argues that Plaintiff fails to show that he engaged in 

protected activity. ECF 32-1 at 23. For the following reasons, the Court agrees in part 

and disagrees in part. 

An employee engages in protected activity when he “discloses to a governmental 

agency reasonably based suspicions of illegal activity.” Id. at 138 (emphasis added) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5(b). The 

employee must “reasonably believe [ ]he was disclosing a violation of state or federal 

law.” Patten, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 1386. To have a reasonably based suspicion of 

illegal activity, the employee must be able to point to some legal foundation for his 

suspicion—some statute, rule or regulation which may have been violated by the 

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conduct he disclosed. Love v. Motion Indus., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1135 (N.D.

Cal. 2004) (concluding that without citing to “any statute, rule or regulation that may have 

been violated by the disclosed conduct,” plaintiff lacked “any foundation for the 

reasonableness of his belief”).

Here, Plaintiff does not argue that using retired police officers as volunteers is an 

illegal activity. Instead, Plaintiff contends that section 1102.5 prevents retaliation against 

employees who report working conditions they believe to be unsafe, even absent a 

reasonable belief of illegal activity. It follows, Plaintiff reasons, that he was opposing 

actions that would have compromised officer and victim safety through confidential 

leaks. However, the case law Plaintiff cites in support of this proposition is inapposite 

because it interprets an entirely different section of the Labor Code. See Freund v. 

Nycomed, 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003); Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 

290, 299-300 (1982). Accordingly, Defendant County’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

on section 1102.5 retaliation connected to Plaintiff’s opposition of the volunteer policy is

GRANTED.

The Court reaches a different conclusion in regard to the rotation policy. Although 

Plaintiff fails to raise the point in his Opposition, the Court recognizes that opposing an 

allegedly discriminatory rotation policy would qualify as raising a suspicion of illegal 

activity. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12941 (prohibiting employment discrimination against 

individuals over forty). Plaintiff argues that he opposed the rotation policy because he 

feared it would lead to age discrimination. Taken as true, his opposition to the policy 

constitutes protected activity. See id. He further contends that, because of this 

protected activity, he was reassigned from detective to the patrol unit and, thereafter, 

was constructively discharged. In support of his theory, Plaintiff puts forward evidence 

that he vocalized his opposition to Spear, assisted in filing a grievance against the 

policy, and provided a written alternative rotation proposal to Hoagland. According to 

Plaintiff, he was one of the most vociferous opponents of the rotation policy. Based on 

this evidence, there is sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to infer that D’Agostini and 

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Williams were aware that Plaintiff had engaged in protected activity and that his 

reassignment and alleged constructive discharge were connected to his protected 

activity. Thus, Defendant County’s Motion for Summary Judgment on section 1102.5 

retaliation connected to Plaintiff’s opposition of the rotation policy is DENIED.

F. Fifth Claim for Relief: FEHA Retaliation

Finally, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), it is 

unlawful for an employer “to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any 

person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or 

because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under 

this part.” Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(h). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation 

under this section, Plaintiff must show: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he was 

thereafter subject to adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link 

between the two. Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1042 (2005).

As explained in more detail above, Plaintiff presents sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to find that he opposed the rotation policy because he feared potential 

age discrimination. Because age discrimination is prohibited under FEHA, Plaintiff’s 

allegations, taken as true, provide sufficient evidence to show he was engaged in a 

protected activity. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12941. Plaintiff similarly provides enough 

evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was an adverse 

employment action and whether there was a causal connection between the protected 

activity and the alleged adverse action. Accordingly, Defendant County’s Motion for

Summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s FEHA retaliation claim is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

As set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 33) is DENIED, and 

Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31, ECF. No. 32) are GRANTED 

in part and DENIED in part as follows:

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1. Summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s First Claim for Relief for 

violation of his First Amendment rights and as to Defendants’ qualified immunity 

defense; 

2. Summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Second Claim for Relief 

alleging violations of his due process rights to the extent it relates to Plaintiff’s alleged 

constructive discharge and GRANTED to the extent it concerns his reassignment from 

detective to the patrol unit; 

3. Summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Second Claim for Relief 

alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause;

4. Summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Third Claim for Relief 

alleging age discrimination under both federal and state law;

5. Summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim for Relief 

arising under California Labor Code section 1102.5 to the extent it relates to Plaintiff’s 

alleged opposition to the rotation policy and GRANTED with regard to Plaintiff’s 

opposition of the retired police officer volunteers; and 

6. Summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim for Relief arising 

under California Government Code section 12940.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2015

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