Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01590/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01590-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 130
Nature of Suit: Miller Act
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Miller Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRONTIER CONTRACTING, INC., CASE NO. CV F 11-1590 LJO SAB 

Plaintiffs, ORDER TO DENY EXTENSION OF DATES

vs. (Doc. 69.)

ALLEN ENGINEERING CONTRACTOR,

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

 /

The parties request a six-week extension of all discovery and motion dates set by the November

16, 2012 order on the parties’ stipulation to extend originally-set dates. The parties point to retention

of new counsel for defendants Safeco Insurance Company of America and Liberty Mutual Insurance

Company and potential to “facilitate settlement.” The parties mindlessly propose a dispositive motion

hearing date on October 17, 2013, six days prior to the October 23, 2013 pretrial conference and after

the deadline to file a pretrial conference statement.

Pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(3)(A), district courts must enter scheduling orders to establish

deadlines for, among other things, to “complete discovery, and file motions.” Scheduling orders may

also “set dates for pretrial conferences and for trial.” F.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(3)(B)(v). “A schedule may be

modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” F.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4). The scheduling order

“controls the course of the action unless the court modifies it.” F.R.Civ.P. 16(d).

Scheduling orders “are the heart of case management,” Koplve v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15,

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18 (3rd Cir. 1986), and are intended to alleviate case management problems. Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992). A “scheduling conference order is not a frivolous

piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded without peril.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at

610. In Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

. . . Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily concerns the diligence of the party

seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial schedule “if it cannot

reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

16 advisory committee’s notes (1983 amendment) . . . Moreover, carelessness is not

compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief. . . . [T]he

focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. . . . If

that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.

Parties must “diligently attempt to adhere to that schedule throughout the subsequent course of

the litigation.” Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 607 (E.D. Cal. 1999); see Marcum v. Zimmer,

163 F.R.D. 250, 254 (S.D. W.Va. 1995). In addressing the diligence requirement, this Court has noted:

Accordingly, to demonstrate diligence under Rule 16's “good cause” standard, the 

movant may be required to show the following: (1) that she was diligent in assisting the

Court in creating a workable Rule 16 order, see In re San Juan Dupont, 111 F.3d at 228;

(2) that her noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur,

notwithstanding her diligent efforts to comply, because of the development of matters

which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16

scheduling conference, see Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609; and (3) that she was diligent in 

seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that she could not 

comply with the order, see Eckert Cold Storage, 943 F.Supp. at 1233.

Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 608.

Moreover, this Court’s Local Rule 144(d) provides:

Counsel shall seek to obtain a necessary extension from the Court or from other counsel

or parties in an action as soon as the need for an extension becomes apparent. Requests

for Court-approved extensions brought on the required filing date for the pleading or 

other documents are looked upon with disfavor.

The parties demonstrate neither good cause nor diligence to extend dates. Substitution of counsel

for limited defendants fails to substantiate good cause to continue dates. This action has been pending

for 20 months. The current schedule has been in place for nearly seven months and it extended dates

originally set more than a year ago and during which the parties have known of looming deadlines. The

parties fail to explain how extending dates will facilitate settlement and why they are unable to prepare

the case subject to the current dates.

Moreover, this action’s schedule was crafted to maximize limited judicial resources and to best

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manageU.S.District Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill’s burdensome caseload approaching 2,000 cases. Judge

O’Neill is unable to reset dates to suit the parties’ whim. Resetting dates as requested by the parties

would jeopardize Judge O’Neill’s casemanagement and would devote inordinate resources to this action

at the expense of other actions and litigants. The parties proposed dispositive motion schedule compels

resetting no less than the pretrial conference and potentially trial to disrupt this Court’s delicate case

management. 

Resetting dates in this action can be accomplished only if the parties consent to the conduct of

all further proceedings by a U.S. Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judges' availability is far more

realistic and accommodating to parties than that of Judge O’Neill, who must prioritize criminal and older

civil cases over more recently filed civil cases. If the parties consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction,

the reassigned magistrate judge can reset dates. 

Moreover, civil trials set before Judge O'Neill trail until he becomes available and are subject

to suspension mid-trial to accommodate criminal matters. Civil trials are no longer reset to a later date

if Judge O'Neill is unavailable on the original date set for trial. If a trial trails, it may proceed with little

advance notice, and the parties and counsel may be expected to proceed to trial with less than 24 hours

notice. Also, this Court's Fresno Division randomly and without advance notice reassigns civil actions

to U.S. District Judges throughout the nation to serve as visiting judges. In the absence of Magistrate

Judge consent, this action is subject to reassignment to a U.S. District Judge from outside the Eastern

District of California.

On the basis of good cause, this Court:

1. DENIES the parties’ requested extension of discovery and motion dates:

2. ORDERS the parties to consider, and if necessary, to reconsider, consent to Magistrate

Judge jurisdiction; and

3. ORDERS the parties' counsel, no later than May 20, 2013, to file and serve papers to

indicate whether each party consents to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. Magistrate Judge

consent forms are available on this Court's website. 

The parties and counsel are encouraged to contact United States Senators Diane Feinstein and

Barbara Boxer to address inability to accommodate the parties and this action. For further information

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regarding handling of this action, the parties may contact staff attorney Gary Green at (559) 499-5683

or email him at ggreen@caed.uscourts.gov.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2013 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 66h44d

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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