Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00368/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00368-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John v. Dommisse, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Janet Napolitano, in her individual

capacity only; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 06-368 TUC DCB (GEE)

ORDER

Pending before the court is a motion to strike filed by the plaintiff on September 21,

2006. [doc. # 25] The defendants, Janet Napolitano, Sydney Westphal, Mark Nanney,

Miriam Anand and P. Philip Scheerer, filed a response. Dommisse filed a reply. 

The plaintiff brings an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. He claims his due process

rights were violated when he was sanctioned by the Arizona Medical Board (the Board).

Janet Napolitano is the Governor of the State of Arizona and appoints the members of the

Board. Scheerer and Nanney acted at various times as Chief Medical Consultant to the

Board. Westphal and Anand are physicians who provided consulting services to the Board.

Dommisse moves that this court strike the defendants’ motion to dismiss because it

was filed by the Arizona Attorney General and that office is not permitted to represent these

defendants. 

Case 4:06-cv-00368-DCB Document 34 Filed 10/24/06 Page 1 of 3
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The case has been referred to Magistrate Judge Edmonds for all pretrial matters

pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2. Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District

of Arizona.

Discussion

Dommisse argues this court must strike the defendants’ motion to dismiss because it

was filed by the Arizona Attorney General and that office has no legal authority to represent

these individual defendants. He is incorrect. 

The Arizona Department of Administration has implemented a program of selfinsurance that provides liability coverage for 

[t]he state and its departments, agencies, boards and commissions and all

officers, agents and employees thereof and such others as may be necessary to

accomplish the functions or business of the state and its departments, agencies,

boards and commissions against liability for acts or omissions of any nature

while acting in authorized governmental or proprietary capacities and in the

course and scope of employment or authorization . . . .

A.R.S. § 41-621(A)(3), (E); (Defendants’ response, p. 2). The Arizona Attorney General is

authorized to defend those individuals covered by the statute. A.R.S. § 41-621(M). 

The defendants, Janet Napolitano, Sydney Westphal, Mark Nanney, Miriam Anand

and P. Philip Scheerer, are covered by the statute because they are either officers, agents or

employees of the state or its medical board. Accordingly, the Arizona Attorney General is

authorized to represent them in the instant action.

Dommisse argues representation is only proper if the defendants acted “in authorized

governmental or proprietary capacities and in the course and scope of employment or

authorization.” He asserts “[i]t is an undisputed fact” that the defendants did not so act.

Dommisse is incorrect. 

While Dommisse claims the defendants acted improperly, the defendants have not

conceded this point. The nature and substance of the defendants’ activities in connection

with the Arizona Medical Board is still in dispute. Accordingly, the statute must apply (at

least until it is determined that the defendants are not covered individuals). 

Case 4:06-cv-00368-DCB Document 34 Filed 10/24/06 Page 2 of 3
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Dommisse further argues the Arizona Attorney General may not represent the

defendants because they committed criminal acts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 242. The

instant action, however, is a civil action not a criminal action. Assuming arguendo the

attorney general may not represent an individual in a criminal action, this exception does not

apply here. Moreover, even if the defendants committed criminal acts, this fact alone does

not necessarily put them beyond the statute’s coverage. See, e.g., Arizona v. Schallock, 189

Ariz. 250, 259, 941 P.2d 1275, 1283 (1997) (An act may be forbidden by the employer, done

in a forbidden manner or even consciously criminal and still be within the course and scope

of employment.). Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the motion to strike filed by the plaintiff on September 21,

2006, is DENIED. [doc. # 25] 

DATED this 24th day of October, 2006.

Case 4:06-cv-00368-DCB Document 34 Filed 10/24/06 Page 3 of 3