Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00331/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00331-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

---

1

18cv331-BEN-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STONE BREWING CO., LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

MILLERCOORS LLC,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18cv331-BEN-LL

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION RE DISCOVERY DISPUTE 

PURSUANT TO ECF NO. 348

[ECF No. 351]

MILLERCOORS LLC,

Counter Claimant,

v.

STONE BREWING CO., LLC,

Counter Defendant.

On March 9, 2020, the parties jointly contacted chambers regarding a discovery 

dispute in connection with a third-party subpoena Plaintiff served in January 2019. See

ECF No. 348. The Court subsequently issued a briefing schedule for the parties to set forth 

their respective positions on whether the dispute is timely in light of the fact that fact 

discovery closed on May 31, 2019. Id. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion 

[ECF No. 351 (“Mot.”) and SEALED ECF No. 354 (“Sealed Mot.”)] and Defendant’s 

Case 3:18-cv-00331-BEN-MDD Document 363 Filed 04/17/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 9
2

18cv331-BEN-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

opposition [ECF No. 355 (“Oppo.”)]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion. 

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On September 12, 2018, the Court issued a Scheduling Order which set May 3, 2019 

as the deadline for completing fact discovery. ECF No. 72 at 1–2.

On April 8, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the Scheduling Order. 

ECF No. 91. The parties stated that they needed additional time to complete document 

productions, discovery responses, and depositions; and they had “served third-party 

subpoenas for documents, and are still awaiting production of documents in response to 

several of those subpoenas.” Id. at 2. The Court granted the joint motion but for a shorter 

extension than requested. ECF No. 95. Fact discovery was extended to May 17, 2019. 

Id. at 2. 

On April 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order 

granting in part the joint motion to continue discovery deadlines [ECF No. 95]. 

ECF No. 104. Plaintiff stated that additional time for discovery was needed because 

(1) the scope of discovery had only been determined twenty days prior when the Court 

ruled on Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Counterclaims; (2) the parties would 

be unable to complete all noticed depositions before May 17, 2019; (3) Plaintiff’s lead trial 

counsel had another trial starting May 6, 2019; and (4) several discovery disputes remained 

to be resolved by the Court, with additional productions and responses to come. 

ECF No. 104 at 3–5. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. 

ECF No. 105.

On May 7 and 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to continue discovery deadlines 

because of additional time needed to review recently produced documents and complete 

thirteen depositions. See ECF Nos. 113, 116, 117. The Court granted the motion but for a 

shorter extension than requested. ECF No. 120. Fact discovery was extended to 

May 31, 2019. Id. at 3. Expert discovery deadlines were also extended, and the pretrial 

motions filing deadline was continued to August 12, 2019. Id.

Case 3:18-cv-00331-BEN-MDD Document 363 Filed 04/17/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 9
3

18cv331-BEN-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On June 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to extend expert discovery deadlines and 

the pretrial motions filing deadline by two weeks because it stated that (1) Defendant would 

not make certain witnesses available until two days prior to the deadline for disclosure of 

expert reports, and (2) evidence needed for experts to analyze and conduct market research 

and surveys was produced near the end of fact discovery. ECF No. 128 at 2–4. Defendant 

opposed the motion. ECF No. 130. The Court granted in part Plaintiff’s motion by 

extending only the deadline to file expert reports and the deadline to file rebuttal expert 

reports by one week. ECF No. 134.

Motions for summary judgment were filed August 12 and 13, 2019. ECF 

Nos. 170, 175. 

The final pretrial conference was held on February 24, 2020. ECF No. 340. 

On February 25, 2020, the district judge issued an order on six motions to 

preclude/exclude testimony of expert witnesses. ECF No. 339. 

On March 27, 2020, the district judge issued an order on the motions for summary 

judgment. ECF No. 360.

Trial is set for October 13, 2020. ECF No. 340.

II. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Plaintiff argues that a discovery motion it wishes to file regarding Rule 26 and 

Rule 37 discovery violations by Defendant is timely and should be heard.1 Mot. at 2. In 

support, Plaintiff states that it did not learn of the violations until February 11, 2020, when 

it completed an expedited conversion of “native, unprocessed, and basically unreviewable” 

documents produced by third-party Andrews Distributing (“Andrews”) on 

February 4, 2020 to comply with Plaintiff’s outstanding subpoena. Id. at 2–3. 

Plaintiff states that it diligently pursued production by Andrews. Id. at 2. Plaintiff

served a Rule 45 subpoena on Andrews on or about January 28, 2019 and requested 

 

1 The term “rule” refers to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless specified otherwise.

Case 3:18-cv-00331-BEN-MDD Document 363 Filed 04/17/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 9
4

18cv331-BEN-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

production by February 11, 2019. Id. at 5; ECF No. 351-3 at 3. Plaintiff states that on 

February 8, 2019, Andrews requested an extension to March 18, 2019, and Plaintiff did not 

object. Id.; ECF No. 351-2, Declaration of J. Noah Hagey (“Hagey Decl.”), ¶ 10. On 

May 17, 2019, Plaintiff emailed Andrews regarding the status of the production, but 

Andrews did not respond. Hagey Decl. ¶ 11. On June 6, 2019, Plaintiff sent a follow-up 

email, but Andrews again did not respond. Id. ¶ 12. 

On July 2, 2019, Plaintiff began enforcement proceedings against Andrews in the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where Andrews resides. 

Id. ¶ 14. On July 8, 2019, Plaintiff states that Andrews promised to produce documents by 

the following week, but on July 19, 2019, Andrews claimed it had technical issues and 

would produce by July 22, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 15–16. Plaintiff avers that between July 30, 2019 

and August 20, 2019, Andrews did not respond to follow-up emails and missed its deadline 

to oppose Plaintiff’s petition to compel production. Id. ¶ 17. On August 21, 2019, the 

federal court in Texas granted Plaintiff’s petition to compel production and ordered

Andrews to produce responsive documents, which Andrews produced on 

September 20, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. 

Plaintiff states that it found deficiencies in Andrews’ production and sought to meet 

and confer on at least seven separate occasions between September 20, 2019 and 

January 10, 2020. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff attests that Andrews had promised to supplement its 

production in November 2019, but then said it could not do so due to a medical issue with 

the responsible employee. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff states that on February 4, 2020, Andrews 

supplemented its production with 52,820 documents in native, unprocessed format. 

Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff avers that it took until February 11, 2020 to process the documents and 

upload them to Plaintiff’s e-discovery vendor platform. Id. Plaintiff states that it contacted 

Defendant on February 27, 2020 to meet and confer, and when those efforts failed, the 

parties contacted the Court. Mot. at 4. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s anticipated discovery motion is not timely. Oppo. 

In support, Defendant contends, inter alia, that fact discovery ended on May 31, 2019; that 

Case 3:18-cv-00331-BEN-MDD Document 363 Filed 04/17/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 9
5

18cv331-BEN-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff did not diligently seek to enforce the subpoena until after fact discovery ended; 

that Plaintiff violated the Court’s scheduling order by pursuing third-party discovery after 

the fact discovery cut-off and without Defendant’s knowledge; and that the 

August 12, 2019 pretrial motion filing deadline has also passed. Oppo. at 3, 5. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“The district court has wide discretion in controlling discovery.” Little v. City of 

Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988). Pursuant to Rule 16, the Court is required to 

issue a scheduling order that “must limit the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, 

complete discovery, and file motions.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A). “A schedule may 

be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). 

"Rule 16(b)'s 'good cause' standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking 

the amendment." Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609

(9th Cir. 1992). If the moving party fails to demonstrate diligence, "the inquiry should 

end." Id. “A scheduling order is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be 

cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.” Id. at 610 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “Disregard of the order would undermine the court's ability to control its 

docket, disrupt the agreed-upon course of the litigation, and reward the indolent and the 

cavalier.” Id.

Rule 6 provides that “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time, 

the court may, for good cause, extend the time . . . on motion made after the time has 

expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). To 

determine whether missing a deadline constitutes excusable neglect, the Ninth Circuit 

applies the factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment 

Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993). Id. at 395; 

Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997). The factors include: 

(1) the danger of prejudice to the non-moving party, (2) the length of delay and its potential 

impact on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within 

the reasonable control of the movant, and (4) whether the moving party acted in good faith. 

Case 3:18-cv-00331-BEN-MDD Document 363 Filed 04/17/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 9
6

18cv331-BEN-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. The weighing of Pioneer's equitable factors is left to the discretion 

of the court. Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 860 (9th Cir.2004).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to diligently seek Andrews’ compliance with the 

subpoena prior to the close of fact discovery. Although Plaintiff served the subpoena on 

Andrews about three months before fact discovery ended, Plaintiff did not diligently seek 

to obtain production by May 31, 2019. After the promised production date of March 18, 

2019 came and went, Plaintiff did not do anything until May 17, 2019 when it sent an email 

to Andrews asking about the status of production. Despite the quickly approaching fact 

discovery deadline, the next action by Plaintiff was a follow-up email on June 6, 2019, 

after discovery closed. Plaintiff then moved to enforce its subpoena in federal court in 

Texas, but this does not cure its lack of diligence before fact discovery ended. See Cornwell 

v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Attempting to secure 

discovery after a discovery cutoff date does not cure a party's failure to conduct diligent 

discovery beforehand.”).

The Court also finds that Plaintiff failed to seek an appropriate extension from the 

Court prior to the close of fact discovery. The September 12, 2018 scheduling order 

expressly states that “discovery subpoenas under Rule 45, must be initiated a sufficient 

period of time in advance of the cut-off date, so that it may be completed by the cut-off 

date, taking into account the times for service, notice and response as set forth in the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure.” ECF No. 72 at 1–2 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff was aware 

shortly before the end of fact discovery that Andrews had not yet produced anything but 

chose not to seek an extension from the Court to obtain its compliance. In April 2019, the 

parties had filed a joint motion seeking to amend the scheduling order and cited as one of 

the reasons subpoenas issued to third parties for documents that had not yet been produced, 

which the Court granted in part. However, in Plaintiff’s subsequent motion for 

reconsideration and a new motion by Plaintiff in May 2019 to extend discovery dates, no 

mention was made of the Andrews subpoena. Plaintiff could have reasonably filed a motion 

Case 3:18-cv-00331-BEN-MDD Document 363 Filed 04/17/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 9
7

18cv331-BEN-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for the appropriate extension while it sought Andrews’ compliance, but it did not. 

See Rosado v. Alameida, No. CV 03-1110-J (POR), 2006 WL 8455351, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 

Dec. 18, 2006) (“[C]ounsel should have requested leave from the Court to seek discovery 

beyond the discovery cut-off date.”). 

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff did not diligently seek Andrews’ compliance 

before the fact discovery deadline and failed to obtain the Court’s permission to pursue 

Andrews’ compliance after fact discovery ended, any discovery motion arising from 

Andrews’ production is untimely. See Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d at

1027 (“We decline to limit the district court's ability to control its docket by enforcing a 

discovery termination date, even in the face of requested supplemental discovery that might 

have revealed highly probative evidence, when the plaintiff's prior discovery efforts were 

not diligent.”); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d at 610 (“A scheduling 

order is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by 

counsel without peril.”). Additionally, the procedural posture of this action is far advanced 

and discovery motions at this stage would be inappropriate and frustrate the purpose of the 

scheduling order. See Lanier v. San Joaquin Valley Officials Ass'n, No. 1:14-CV-01938-

EPG, 2016 WL 4764678, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2016) (“The purpose of setting a time 

limit on discovery ‘is to assure both sides an opportunity immediately before trial to engage 

in orderly, final trial preparation, uninterrupted by a flurry of “midnight” discovery.’ 

(quoting King v. Georgia Power Co., 50 F.R.D. 134, 135-36 (N.D. Ga. 1970))); Gault v. 

Nabisco Biscuit Co., 184 F.R.D. 620, 622 (D. Nev. 1999) (“[T]o require additional 

discovery after the court's decision on Nabisco's motion for summary judgment, and on the 

eve of trial would cause a delay which the court finds inappropriate and unnecessary.”)

Having found the discovery motion to be untimely, that would be sufficient to end 

this inquiry because no motion has been made to amend the scheduling order. 

See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d at 608–09 (confirming that courts 

appropriately deny motions filed after a scheduling order cut-off date solely on the ground

of being untimely); U.S. Dominator, Inc. v. Factory Ship Robert E. Resoff,

Case 3:18-cv-00331-BEN-MDD Document 363 Filed 04/17/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 9
8

18cv331-BEN-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

768 F.2d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 1985), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized 

in MHC Fin. Ltd. P'ship v. City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013)

(affirming a district court’s denial of a late-filed motion for summary judgment as untimely 

because the moving party never requested a modification of the pretrial order to allow the 

filing of their motion). However, the Court finds that even if Plaintiff had requested a 

modification of the scheduling order now to allow the filing of an untimely discovery 

motion, the result would not change because Plaintiff has not demonstrated excusable 

neglect pursuant to the Pioneer factors. First, the Court finds that Defendant would suffer 

some prejudice by Plaintiffs’ untimely request for leave to file a discovery motion in that 

it would be required to pivot time from trial preparation and spend time and resources on 

opposing a discovery motion. This would potentially require the Court to re-open discovery 

at a late stage in the litigation. This factor weighs against a finding of excusable neglect. 

Second, the Court finds the length of delay and potential impact on judicial proceedings is 

substantial and weighs against a finding of excusable neglect because fact discovery ended 

over ten months ago; dispositive motions have been filed and ruled on; motions to exclude 

testimony have been filed and ruled on; and the final pretrial conference has been held. 

Third, the reason for the delay weighs against a finding of excusable neglect because 

Plaintiffs blame the delay on Andrews’ late production of documents in reply to Plaintiff’s 

subpoena, but this fails to acknowledge Plaintiff’s responsibility to ensure Andrews’ 

compliance before fact discovery ended or to seek assistance from this Court regarding 

Andrews’ late production in terms of the scheduling order. Fourth, whether Plaintiff acted 

in good faith is a neutral factor because the Court finds no indication that Plaintiff acted in 

bad faith. Weighing the factors together, the Court finds Plaintiff’s untimely discovery 

motion is not the result of excusable neglect. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:18-cv-00331-BEN-MDD Document 363 Filed 04/17/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 9
9

18cv331-BEN-LL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

V. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons cited above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 17, 2020

Case 3:18-cv-00331-BEN-MDD Document 363 Filed 04/17/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 9