Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01742/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01742-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1331fr Fed. Question: Fraud

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Burk N. ASHFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

Eugene WOO, AKA Eugene WU, and 

JEAN SHIOMOTO, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR OF CALIFORNIA 

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR 

VEHICLES (DMV) AND DOES 1-20,

Defendant.

Case No.: 17-cv-1742-GPC-NLS

ORDER

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(2) DISMISSING SUA SPONTE FOR 

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION

On August 28, 2017 plaintiff Burk N. Ashford, proceeding pro se, commenced this 

action against Defendants Eugene Woo and Jean Shiomoto, Executive Director of 

California Department of Motor Vehicles. (Dkt. No. 1.) For the following reasons, the 

Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP, but sua sponte DISMISSES his suit 

for lack of federal jurisdiction. 

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Every party instituting a civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

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prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176,1177 (9th Cir. 1999). The court 

may authorize a lawsuit’s commencement without payment of the filing fee if the 

plaintiff submits an affidavit demonstrating his or her inability to pay the filing fee. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Such affidavit must include a complete statement of the plaintiff’s 

assets. Id. However, an IFP action is subject to dismissal if the court determines that the 

complaint is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). When a plaintiff moves to proceed IFP, the court first 

“grants or denies IFP status based on the plaintiff's financial resources alone and then 

independently determines whether to dismiss the complaint” pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Here plaintiff moves to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff has 

submitted an affidavit in support of his IFP motion indicating that he is unemployed, has 

$0 in a bank account, and owns no real or personal property. (Dkt No. 2-1.) Plaintiff is 

currently incarcerated in San Luis Obispo, CA as a prisoner of the State of California. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff meets the § 1915(a) requirements and 

GRANTS plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP.

II. Sua Sponte Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction

It is well-established that a federal court cannot reach the merits of any dispute 

until it confirms that it retains subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues 

presented. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). 

Accordingly, federal courts are under a continuing duty to confirm their jurisdictional 

power and are “obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to [its] existence 

. . . .” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977) 

(citations omitted). 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Unlike state courts, they have no 

“inherent” or “general” subject matter jurisdiction. They can adjudicate only those cases 

which the Constitution and Congress authorize them to adjudicate, i.e. those involving 

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diversity of citizenship, a federal question, or to which the United States is a party. See 

Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). Federal courts are presumptively without 

jurisdiction over civil actions and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the 

party asserting jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 

(1994).

Plaintiff appears to be asserting a state law tort claim of “replevin by detinue”

against Defendant. Based on the facts alleged in the Complaint, Defendant Eugene Woo 

appears to be a California citizen and Plaintiff also appears to be a California citizen.

Thus, Plaintiff has not adequately pled facts to indicate that there is diversity jurisdiction 

as to his tort claim. 

Further, Plaintiff has not adequately pled facts to indicate federal question 

jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that he was denied due process under the Fourteenth 

Amendment when the Superior Court of California denied him access to forms to file for 

relief in this case. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) However, Plaintiff has not sued the Superior Court 

of California and instead sues Defendant Woo and the DMV who are entirely unrelated to 

any potential denial of process. As such, the Court finds that the Complaint does not 

allege a colorable Section 1983 claim sufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction. 

See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006) (“A claim invoking federal 

question jurisdiction . . . may be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction if it is 

not colorable, i.e., if it is ‘immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining 

jurisdiction’ or is ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’”). Moreover, Ashford has not 

pled federal question jurisdiction in his “Statement of Jurisdiction” stating only that 

“[t]he Case is based upon a TORT act of the defendant upon the Plaintiff that was 

executed and committed in the City of Escondido, California. Therefore venue is proper.” 

(Dkt. No. 1.)

Plaintiff does not state a sufficient basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over 

his case. Accordingly, the Court sua sponte DISMISSES the complaint for lack of 

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subject matter jurisdiction. Further, the Court DISMISSES as moot Defendant’s Motion 

to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 3.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 13, 2017

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