Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_05-cv-00104/USCOURTS-ared-5_05-cv-00104-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

JEREMY KENNEDY *

ADC # 93061 *

*

Plaintiff *

*

v. * Case No. 5:05CV00104 JLH/JFF

*

KIM LUCKETT *

*

Defendant *

PROPOSED RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

I. INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United States Chief District

Judge Leon Holmes. Any party may serve and file written objections to this recommendation.

Objections should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis for the objection.

If the objection is to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that

supports your objection. An original and one copy of your objections must be received in the

office of the United States District Court Clerk no later than eleven (11) days from the date

of the findings and recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party. 

Failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.

If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new, different,

or additional evidence, and to have a hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you

must, at the same time that you file your written objections, include the following:

1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is inadequate.

Case 5:05-cv-00104-JLH Document 36 Filed 01/30/06 Page 1 of 11
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2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing before the District 

Judge (if such a hearing is granted) was not offered at the 

hearing before the Magistrate Judge. 

 

3. The detail of any testimony desired to be introduced at the

hearing before the District Judge in the form of an offer of

proof, and a copy, or the original, of any documentary or

other non-testimonial evidence desired to be introduced at

the hearing before the District Judge.

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional

evidentiary hearing, either before the Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge.

Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to:

Clerk, United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite 402

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

II. RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

A. Defendant Luckett’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff, an inmate confined to the Arkansas Department of Correction filed the 

present action on April 11, 2005 (docket entry #2), and he has been granted leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (docket entry #3). Pending before the Court is a Motion to

Dismiss (docket entry #8) and Brief in Support (docket entry #9) filed by Defendant

Luckett. Plaintiff has filed his response (docket entry #19). Defendant Luckett contends

that Plaintiff has accumulated three-strikes under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g) and is not

entitled to in forma pauperis status in the present action. 

The three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), requires

a court to dismiss an inmate’s in forma pauperis action if it determines that the prisoner

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The Nerness decision followed several unpublished opinions in which the Eighth Circuit

held that a dismissal for an inmate’s actual failure to exhaust should not be counted as a strike.

Millsap v. Jefferson County, No. 03-1235, 85 Fed. Appx. 539 (8th Cir. Dec. 23, 2003); Boyles v.

Park, No. 04-2161, 111 Fed. Appx. 861 (8th Cir. Nov. 8, 2004) (dismissal of a complaint in

which an inmate alleges exhaustion and the procedural history of the case reveals an actual

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has “on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought

an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it

is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless

the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

The Eighth Circuit has explicitly upheld the constitutionality of the three-strikes provision.

Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2001). In addition, the Eighth Circuit has

recognized that civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to

state a claim before the effective date of the PLRA, are to be counted in determining

whether a prisoner has three “strikes.” See In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529 (8th Cir.1997)

(implicitly recognizing without discussion the dismissal of Plaintiff's pre-PLRA claims in

determining his number of strikes).

The Court has discovered that Plaintiff has filed 26 actions in this district.

Defendant Luckett correctly states that Plaintiff has had several actions dismissed for

failure to prosecute or failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Following the Eighth

Circuit’s recent decisions, the Court no longer treats as “strikes” dismissals where the

procedural history of the case reveals an actual failure to exhaust. Nerness v. Johnson, 401

F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 2005) (exhaustion is an affirmative defense that defendants must

plead and prove).1

Case 5:05-cv-00104-JLH Document 36 Filed 01/30/06 Page 3 of 11
failure to exhaust should not count as a strike); Anderson v. Langley, No. 03-2450, 84 Fed.

Appx. 710 (8th Cir. Dec. 23, 2003) (failure to prosecute and failure to exhaust should not be

counted as strikes).

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Notwithstanding, Defendant Luckett states that Kennedy v. Byers, 5:04CV0008;

Kennedy v. Minor, 5:04CV00046; Kennedy v. Byers, 5:94CV000682 and Kennedy v. Reed,

5:94CV00304 were all dismissed upon a finding that the Complaint lacked merit, and thus,

Plaintiff has at least three qualifying strikes. Both Kennedy v. Byers, 5:94CV000682 and

Kennedy v. Reed, 5:94CV00304 were dismissed upon Defendants’ Motions for Summary

Judgment. In several unpublished opinions, the Eighth Circuit has stated that when an

inmate civil rights case is dismissed by a district court upon a motion for summary

judgment, the dismissal does not constitute a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. Section

1915(g). Williams v. Lehman, No. 04-1879, 111 Fed Appx. 852 (8th Cir. Oct. 21, 2004);

Stallings v. Kemper, No. 04-1585, 109 Fed. Appx. 832 (8th Cir. Sept. 15, 2004);

Crutchfield v. Terry, No. 02-2130, 57 Fed. Appx. 271 (8th Cir. March 10, 2003); Cleaver v.

Kemna, No. 01-1639, 33 Fed. Appx. 834 (8th Cir. May 1, 2002). 

On February 24, 2004, Kennedy v. Byers, 5:04CV0008 was dismissed for failure to

state a claim for relief, and the dismissal counts as a “strike.” On February 27, 2004,

Kennedy v. Minor, 5:04CV00046 was dismissed upon the finding that Plaintiff could not

seek to overturn a prison disciplinary action through a Section 1983 action. In addition,

the Court reviewed the closed file in Kennedy v. Barker, PB-C93-489 that was dismissed

on October 13, 1995, upon the finding that Plaintiff could not seek to overturn a prison

disciplinary conviction through a Section 1983 action. Citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490

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Of the 26 actions, it appears 9 were dismissed for either failure to prosecute or failure to

exhaust; 2 remain pending in this consolidated action; 5 were dismissed under the “three-strikes”

provision prior to the court’s change in policy with regard to counting dismissals for failure to

prosecute and failure to exhaust as strikes; 2 settled; 3 were dismissed upon Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment; 3 count as strikes; 1 resulted in a verdict for the Defendants after an

appeal and 1 was dismissed after an evidentiary hearing before the magistrate.

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U.S. 319, 330 n. 9 (1989), the Court reasoned that the Complaint “lacks an arguable basis

in law or fact . . . and is so lacking in colorable merit that it must be dismissed as

frivolous.” This Court has followed Armentrout v. Tyra, No. 98-3161, 1999 WL 86355

(8th Cir. Feb. 9, 1999) which cited to Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 730-31 (11th Cir. 1998)

and Patton v. Jefferson Correctional Ctr., 136 F.3d 458, 462-64 (5th Cir. 1998)), in treating

dismissals on this basis as a “strike.” Reviewing the Eighth Circuit’s appellate docket, the

undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has not acquired any “strikes” on appeal.2

 However,

Plaintiff has acquired three qualifying “strikes” for his filings in this district. 

The PLRA provides an exception to the three-strikes provision if the inmate is in

imminent danger of serious physical injury. Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th

Cir.1998). The Court finds the Eighth Circuit decision in Ashley v. Dilworth to be

instructive. In the Complaint, Ashley, an Arkansas state inmate, alleged that he first

notified defendants in September 1993 that he was being placed near inmates on his enemy

alert list. See id. at 716. In June 1996, defendants threatened to transfer him so as to place

him near an enemy with the intent that he be harmed. See id. Thereafter, in July 1996, he

actually was placed near his enemy and was attacked with a sharpened, nine-inch

screwdriver. See id. Ashley again notified defendants in May 1997 of his placement near

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 Plaintiff’s later pleadings in the lead action reveal that prison administrators concluded

that while in population, Plaintiff falsely accused inmates Henderson and Strong of attacking

him in an effort to get placed in protective custody. Plaintiff asserts that Strong and Henderson

are members of the Disciple gang. 

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listed enemies, and on June 28, 1997, he was again attacked by the same enemy who was

then armed with a butcher knife. See id. Ashley filed his action shortly after the second

attack, in July 1997, and supported the allegations of his complaint with documentary

evidence. See id. In reversing the district court’s dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to the

three-strikes provision, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Ashley had “properly alleged an

ongoing danger, and because his complaint was filed very shortly after the last attack, we

conclude that Ashley meets the imminent danger exception in § 1915(g).” Ashley, 147 F.3d

at 717. The Court emphasized that an allegation that a plaintiff had faced imminent

danger in the past would be insufficient, but that a complaint is sufficient if it properly

alleges that the plaintiff is in imminent danger at the time of filing. See id. General

assertions are insufficient to invoke the exception to § 1915(g) absent specific fact

allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, or of a pattern of misconduct evidencing the

likelihood of imminent serious physical injury. Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir.

2003) (conclusory assertions that defendants were trying to kill Martin by forcing him to

work in extreme conditions despite his blood pressure condition were insufficient). 

In response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (docket entry #19), and in his

Amended Complaint (docket entry #6) in the lead action and the Complaint in the

consolidated action, Plaintiff states he was attacked in population on April 19, 2004.3

Thereafter, he requested protective custody, which was denied by Luckett, who responded

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 In the motion filed in the lead action, Plaintiff requests that the Court issue an order

directing that he be released from administrative segregation or that he be separated from other

administrative segregation inmates for housing and work assignments so long as he remains

confined to administrative segregation. In the motion filed in the consolidated action, he

requests that he not be assigned to hoe squad unless his hoe squad does not work in same area as

the hoe squad to which his enemy, Orion Armento, is assigned. 

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that he was “not suitable for P.C.” Instead, Plaintiff was “arbitrarily” confined to

administrative segregation. In administrative segregation, he was assigned to work and

cell with violent inmates like murderers and rapists, and is currently celled with a man who

is sentenced to life for beating another person to death. While he has been held in

administrative segregation, he was attacked by another inmate while at work. He contends

that he meets the imminent danger exception to the three strikes provision because he was

denied protective custody by Luckett, and was instead placed in administrative segregation

where he houses and works with “some of the most violent prisoners at the Cummins Unit”

and was attacked by one.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction in the lead action (docket entry #5)

and Complaint in the consolidated action reveals that the administrative segregation inmate

that Plaintiff asserts he was attacked by is named Orion Armento, and that the attack

occurred on March 11, 2005.4

 As a result of the altercation, both inmates were disciplined;

however, Plaintiff maintains that he was defending himself from Armento’s attack. Before

the altercation, Plaintiff had informed staff that he had problems with Armento, his cell

mate, and he requested to transfer cells. According to the Complaint filed in the

consolidated action, his initial requests were ignored by prison officials. After filing an

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emergency grievance, Plaintiff spoke with Hobbs, convinced him of the situation, and

obtained a cell reassignment. Despite the cell change, Armento was not placed on

Plaintiff’s enemy alert list and the two remained on the same hoe squad. The March

altercation between the two occurred while they were at work assigned to the same hoe

squad, #22, but no longer housed in the same cell. The Deputy Director’s response dated

June 6, 2005, to a grievance attached to the Complaint in the consolidated action states,

and Plaintiff’s grievance appeal confirms, that after the March 11, 2005 altercation, that

both Armento and Plaintiff were placed on each other’s enemy alert list. Plaintiff’s

declaration filed in the consolidated action (docket entry #5) states that Armento and

Plaintiff are assigned to different administrative segregation hoe squads, but that the hoe

squads often work in the same areas coming within 15 to 20 feet. Plaintiff states that he is

often 30 feet from Armento. He fears that the officers patrolling the hoe squads will not be

able to protect him from a potential attack because they are apparently on horseback rather

than on foot. The hoe squad inmates work with tools such as hoes and swing blades that

could be used as weapons.

Plaintiff states that he brings his action because he was “unconstitutionally

assigned to administrative segregation after being attacked in population.” (docket entry

#33, Motion for Appointment of Counsel). In another pleading, Plaintiff states, “the

question this suit seeks to answer is whether Defendants were correct in stating that

Plaintiff was not a suitable candidate for P.C. and whether he should’ve been segregated

from admin. seg. inmates.” (docket entry #26, Motion to Compel Discovery).

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The undersigned notes that contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, the fact that he was

initially granted in forma pauperis status in this action does not mean there has been an implicit

finding that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

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Unlike the Plaintiff in Ashley who was repeatedly placed near an individual on his

enemy alert list despite his protests to the defendants, (who intended that he be harmed,

and he was indeed attacked twice by that individual), Plaintiff makes a generalized

complaint that no effort is made in housing and work assignments to separate inmates held

in administrative segregation based upon their propensity for violence unless an inmate is

granted protective status. He contends that he is not a violent inmate, and he should be

placed in a single man cell or in protective custody while assigned to administrative

segregation so he is separated from violent inmates. In the Amended Complaint (docket

entry #6), Plaintiff also makes clear that he believes there is no basis for the Classification

Committee to continue to hold him in administrative segregation. Although Plaintiff fears

that he may be attacked in the future because he is housed with and assigned to work with

“violent prone” inmates like “murderers and rapists,” his fear is purely speculative and the

possibility of harm too remote. Even with regard to inmate Armento, Plaintiff is no longer

housed with Armento, they are assigned to different hoe squads, and have been placed on

each other’s enemy alert list. Plaintiff has not shown that the defendants are currently

disregarding his safety or that he faces a real threat of immediate danger. He has also

alleged that he has had cups of urine thrown on him and that he has been spit on by other

administrative segregation inmates while going to shower call. Although the actions of

these other inmates are barbaric, they do not support a finding of imminent danger.5 See

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also Elliott v. Byers, 975 F.2d 1375 (8th Cir. 1992) (inmates on hoe squad working

shoulder to shoulder did not face a pervasive risk of attack by other prisoners, armed guard

supervises each hoe squad, prisoners are separated at the first sign of trouble and prisoners

can avoid other prisoners through use of the enemy alert list).

B. Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Gay, Tate, McConnell, and

Hobbs

On September 20, 2005, the Court ordered case 5:05CV190 consolidated with this

action as the lead case. Defendants Lay, Tate, McConnell and Hobbs, who were named in

the consolidated action, were served with process and have moved to dismiss the

Complaint (docket entry #27) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5)

because they were served with a copy of the Complaint from the lead action rather than

from the consolidated action. Thus, they contend that they have had no formal notice of

any claims pending against them. Given the foregoing analysis, the undersigned

recommends that this Motion to Dismiss as well as all other pending motions in the lead

action and the consolidated action be DENIED as moot. 

IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant Luckett’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED (docket entry #8).

2. Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status be revoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

Section 1915(g) because he has three qualifying strikes and does not meet the imminent

danger exception.

3. All remaining pending motions in the lead action, 5:05CV00104, and in the 

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The pending motions in the lead action include: Motion to Appoint Counsel (docket

entry #4 and #33), Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (docket entry #5), Defendants’

Motion for Protective Order (docket entry #13), Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (docket entry #15),

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (docket entry #26), and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (docket

entry #27). The pending motions in the consolidated action include: Plaintiff’s Motion for

Appointment of Counsel (docket entry #3) and his Motion for Preliminary Injunction (docket

entry #4).

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consolidated action, 5:05CV00190, be DENIED as moot.6

4. This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

Section 1915(g) subject to the requirement that should Plaintiff wish to continue with this

action, he must submit the required $250.00 filing fee, along with a motion to reopen the

case, within 10 days of the entry date of this Order. 

5. The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma

pauperis appeal taken from a Judgment and the accompanying Order dismissing this action

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g) would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 30th day of January, 2006.

 

 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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