Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00730/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00730-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS DEAN, SR. 

INDIVIDUALLY; AMY HUMPHRIES, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 

SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST FOR 

DECEDENT DENNIS EDWIN DEAN

JR.; SUSANNAH HARDESTY, 

INDIVIDUALLY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, A 

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; SCOTT 

JONES, INDIVIDUALLY; and DOES 

1-10,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-00730-JAM-KJN

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Sacramento 

County (“Defendant County”) and Sacramento County Sheriff Scott 

Jones’ (“Defendant Jones”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. #18) Plaintiffs Dennis Dean, Sr., Amy Humphries, 

and Susannah Hardesty’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) First Amended 

Complaint (Doc. #17) (“FAC”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiffs oppose the 

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motion (“Opposition”) (Doc. #19). Defendants have filed a reply 

(Doc. #20). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is 

GRANTED. 

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dennis Dean, Sr. is the father and successor-ininterest to Decedent Dennis Dean, Jr. (“Decedent”). FAC ¶ 2. 

Plaintiff Susannah Hardesty is the mother of Decedent. FAC ¶ 3. 

Plaintiff Amy Humphries is the wife of Decedent. FAC ¶ 4. On 

April 12, 2012, Decedent was at his home in Sacramento, 

California. FAC ¶ 10. While leaving his home, Decedent was 

confronted by narcotics officers employed by Defendant County. 

FAC ¶ 11. Decedent fled and was chased by the officers, who 

overtook Decedent, took him into custody, and placed him in a 

patrol vehicle. FAC ¶ 11. 

The officers then began executing a search warrant of 

Decedent’s home and found a small safe located in a bedroom 

closet on the floor. FAC ¶ 11. The safe was secured with a 

fingerprint security lock, and only Decedent could open the safe. 

FAC ¶ 11. The officers moved Decedent into the bedroom where the 

safe was located, and Decedent was “cooperative and understood 

what he was to do when opening the safe.” FAC ¶ 11. Plaintiffs 

are “unaware of the event which occurred in the bedroom” but 

allege that Decedent was “shot at close range in the back with 

his hands cuffed in front of him.” FAC ¶¶ 13, 17. Plaintiffs 

allege that an autopsy report shows over 62 bullet wounds to 

Decedent. FAC ¶ 15. Plaintiffs allege that, after the gunfire, 

the officers waited over two hours for a SWAT team’s robot to 

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determine that the room was safe, and that no medical assistance 

was provided to Decedent during this period. FAC ¶¶ 19, 20.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant County “has a history of 

using excessive force to carry out corrupt schemes and motives” 

as “evidenced by [the fact that Defendant County’s] Sheriff’s 

Deputies have been involved in 11 shootings in 2012, with several 

being fatal.” FAC ¶ 22. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant County 

had “policies implicitly ratifying and/or authorizing the use of 

excessive force by its deputies and the failure to reasonably 

train police officers . . . in the use of force.” FAC ¶ 10. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Jones was personally 

responsible for investigating the incident, and made a number of 

statements to the press, referring to the shooting as 

“justified.” FAC ¶ 31. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant 

Jones is responsible for training officers in Defendant County’s 

Sheriff Department in the use of deadly force. FAC ¶ 31.

On October 12, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the FAC in this Court. 

Plaintiffs’ FAC includes the following causes of action: 

(1) “Wrongful Death” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) “Violation of 

Plaintiffs’ civil rights to familial relationship” under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983; (3) “Monell” claim for violations of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983; and (4) “Survival Action: Violation of Decedent’s civil 

rights” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has original 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff has 

asserted a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

///

///

///

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II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 

of the FRCP. To survive a motion to dismiss a plaintiff must 

plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 556 U.S. 662, 570 

(2007). In considering a motion to dismiss, a district court 

must accept all the allegations in the complaint as true and draw 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 

319, 322 (1972). “First, to be entitled to the presumption of 

truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply 

recite the elements of a cause of action, but must sufficiently 

allege underlying facts to give fair notice and enable the 

opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 

F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101, 

182 L. Ed. 2d 882 (U.S. 2012). “Second, the factual allegations 

that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to 

relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party 

to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued 

litigation.” Id. Assertions that are mere “legal conclusions” 

are therefore not entitled to the presumption of truth. Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555). Dismissal is appropriate when a plaintiff fails to state a 

claim supportable by a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim, a court has discretion to allow leave to amend the 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 

“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not 

be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, 

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Discussion

1. First Cause of Action – Wrongful Death 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for 

wrongful death under § 1983 must be dismissed because Plaintiffs 

have failed to comply with the California Tort Claims Act. Mot. 

at 6. Defendants note that § 1983 civil rights actions which 

borrow authority from state law must comply with state law

requirements. Mot. at 6 (citing Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. 

Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1998)). Plaintiffs do not 

directly respond to this argument and do not contend that they 

have complied with the California Tort Claims Act. Opp. at 8-9.

There is no federal wrongful death statute. Salmon v. Kern 

Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 2013 WL 2318906 at *3, n.2 (E.D. Cal. May 

28, 2013). However, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that, in areas in 

which federal law does not provide an adequate remedy for civil 

rights violations, courts may look to “the common law, as 

modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the 

[forum] State.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). Accordingly, § 1988 

provides for the “borrowing” of a state statute for purposes of a 

§ 1983 federal civil rights claim, but only where the plaintiff 

lacks a suitable remedy under federal law. Robertson v. Wegmann, 

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436 U.S. 584, 588 (1978). Furthermore, any § 1983 civil rights 

claim brought under a state statute pursuant to § 1988 must fully 

comply with any applicable state law requirements. Moreland, 159 

F.3d at 369. 

The California Tort Claims Act requires, “as a condition 

precedent to suit against a public entity or public entity 

employee, the timely presentation of a written claim and the 

rejection of the claim in whole or part.” Mangold v. California 

Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Plaintiffs have failed to allege that any such tort claim was 

filed, and do not argue that they have complied with the Tort 

Claims Act. Opp. at 8-9. Without reaching the issue of whether 

federal law fails to provide an adequate remedy, necessitating 

the borrowing of the California wrongful death statute, the Court 

finds that Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the California Tort 

Claims Act precludes their federal wrongful death claim under 

§ 1988 and § 1983. See Salmon, 2013 WL 2318906 at *3, n.2

(noting that, to proceed on a § 1983 claim for wrongful death, a 

plaintiff “must allege compliance with the California Tort Claims 

Act”).

As the Court finds Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the 

Tort Claims Act dispositive, the Court need not reach Defendants’ 

additional arguments that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts 

showing that the shooting was wrongful, or that Plaintiffs have 

failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim against 

Defendant County. Plaintiffs’ first cause of action is DISMISSED 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

///

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2. Second Cause of Action – Right to Familial 

Relationship

a. Defendant Jones

Defendants argue that the second cause of action for 

violation of Plaintiffs’ rights to familial relationship under 

the Fourteenth Amendment must be dismissed, insofar as it is 

brought against Defendant Jones. Mot. at 11-12. Defendants note 

that Defendant Jones is sued in his individual capacity, and 

argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged adequate personal 

participation by Defendant Jones to support individual liability 

under § 1983. Mot. at 12. Plaintiffs respond, somewhat 

cryptically, that Defendant Jones is a “necessary party to this 

litigation.” Opp. at 14. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant 

Jones had “an outward and explicit involvement in the subject 

incident, by making appearances to the media and stating there 

was no wrong doing.” Opp. at 14.

Individual liability under § 1983 “arises only upon a 

showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Taylor v. 

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “A supervisor is only 

liable for constitutional violations if the supervisor 

participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 

violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. at 1045. The 

doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions 

and an individual is not normally liable for the actions of his 

or her subordinates. Id. at 1045.

In this case, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Jones was 

personally involved in the aftermath of the incident. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendant Scott Jones, 

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individually, was responsible for the investigation [of the 

shooting].” Compl. ¶ 31. Plaintiffs further allege that 

Defendant Jones made statements to the press regarding the 

incident. Compl. ¶ 31. Defendant Jones’ personal involvement 

after the shooting is insufficient to give rise to individual 

liability. Defendant Jones’ remarks to press and his personal 

involvement in the investigation are not causally related to the 

violation itself: the death of Decedent. Defendant Jones did not 

“participate[ ] in or direct” the shooting of Decedent, nor did 

he kn[o]w of the violation[ ] and fail[ ] to act to prevent 

[it].” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Accordingly, these allegations 

are insufficient to support individual liability for Defendant 

Jones.

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Jones was “responsible 

for the training of the use of deadly force in the Sacramento 

County’s Sheriff Department” and that it was “his decision to 

determine the specific policies and procedures regarding the 

number of trainings when a suspect is in custody.” Compl. ¶ 31. 

These conclusory allegations merely define the official 

responsibilities of Defendant Jones, and do not adequately 

describe any meaningful personal participation by Defendant 

Jones. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Accordingly, the second cause of action, insofar as it is brought 

against Defendant Jones, is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

b. Defendant County

Defendants also argue that the second cause of action must 

be dismissed, insofar as it is brought against Defendant County, 

because Plaintiffs have failed to allege the existence of an 

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official policy in sufficient detail. Mot. at 12. Defendants 

maintain that Plaintiffs’ references to a “policy, culture, 

pattern and/or practice” of “deliberate indifference” are merely 

“labels and conclusions,” which are not entitled to the 

presumption of truth under Iqbal. Mot. at 10 (quoting FAC ¶¶ 22, 

24). In opposition, Plaintiffs rely on a 2007 Ninth Circuit case 

for the proposition that “a claim of municipal liability under 

section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss even 

if the claim is based on nothing more than a bare allegation [of 

an] official policy, custom or practice.” Opp. at 13 (quoting 

Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

A municipality can be sued under § 1983, but “it cannot be 

held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused the 

constitutional injury.” Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics 

Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); see 

also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 

658 (1978). In the past, the Ninth Circuit required “nothing 

more than a bare allegation that the individual officers’ conduct 

conformed to an official policy, custom, or practice.” Whitaker, 

486 F.3d at 581. However, in AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of 

Tulare, 666 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit expressly 

overruled this lenient Whitaker standard, and held that the 

heightened pleading standard set by Twombly and Iqbal “applies to 

Monell claims and should govern future pleadings.” AE ex rel. 

Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637. Accordingly, bare allegations of the 

existence of an official policy or custom are insufficient to 

withstand a motion to dismiss, and the complaint “must contain 

sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice 

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and to enable the [municipality] to defend itself effectively.” 

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiffs make a number of references to an official 

“policy, culture, pattern and/or practice” of deliberate 

indifference to the rights of the Decedent. FAC ¶ 23. For 

example, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant County’s “failure to 

discipline or retrain any of the involved deputies [in a number 

of prior police shootings] is evidence of an official policy, 

entrenched culture and posture of deliberate indifference.” FAC 

¶ 22. Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant County had 

“policies implicitly ratifying and/or authorizing the use of 

excessive force by its deputies and the failure to reasonably 

train police officers . . . in the use of force.” FAC ¶ 33. 

However, despite the length and number of these allegations, the 

FAC does not “contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts 

to give fair notice” to Defendant County. Starr, 652 F.3d at 

1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs’ allegations boil down to a 

vague and undeveloped claim that Defendant County has a policy of 

deliberate indifference to widespread civil rights violations by 

its police force. Although these allegations may have met the 

lenient pleading standard under Whitaker, they do not contain 

sufficient detail to withstand the heightened standard set in AE 

ex. rel Hernandez. See, e.g., Canas v. City of Sunnyvale, 2011 

WL 1743910 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) (dismissing a similar claim 

for failure to sufficiently allege an official policy, despite 

the fact that the complaint included an extensive, but general, 

list of alleged policies). Accordingly, the second cause of 

action is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, insofar as it is brought 

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against Defendant County.

As the second cause of action is dismissed against both 

Defendant Jones and Defendant County, and there are no remaining 

Defendants, the Court need not reach Defendants’ argument that 

Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that officers 

acted with the purpose to harm Decedent that was unrelated to a 

legitimate law enforcement objective. 

3. Third Cause of Action – Monell Claim

a. Defendant Jones

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ third cause of action, a 

Monell civil rights claim under § 1983, must be dismissed, 

insofar as it is brought against Defendant Jones. Mot. at 12. 

Defendants note that Defendant Jones is sued in his individual 

capacity, rather than in his official capacity. Mot. at 12. 

Plaintiffs again respond that Defendant Jones is “a necessary 

party to this litigation.” Opp. at 14.

A Monell claim must be brought against a public entity, or a 

public official in his official capacity. Kentucky v. Graham, 

473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). A Monell claim cannot be brought 

against a public official in an individual capacity. Graham, 473 

U.S. at 167 (acknowledging the “basic distinction between 

personal- and official-capacity actions”). Accordingly, the 

third cause of action, insofar as it is brought against Defendant 

Jones, is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

b. Defendant County

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ third cause of action, 

insofar as it is brought against Defendant County, must be 

dismissed for failure to sufficiently allege an official policy. 

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Mot. at 13-14. The existence of an official policy is a 

necessary element in a Monell claim. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 

166. For the reasons discussed above with regard to Plaintiffs’ 

second cause of action, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not 

alleged an official policy in sufficient detail. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs’ third cause of action, insofar as it is brought 

against Defendant County, is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

4. Fourth Cause of Action – Survival Action

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, a 

survival action brought by Plaintiff Amy Humphries, must be 

dismissed because she did not comply with the California Tort 

Claims Act. Mot. at 15. Defendants note that Plaintiff 

Humphries cannot bring a survival action under § 1983 unless she 

has complied with California’s requirements for bringing a 

survival action against a public entity and its employees. Mot. 

at 15 (citing Moreland, 159 F.3d at 369). Plaintiff concedes 

that the fourth cause of action fails because “Ms. Humphries did 

not file any Tort Claim.” Opp. at 2. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ 

fourth cause of action is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The first and fourth causes of 

action are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The second cause of 

action is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The third cause of 

action is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, insofar as it is 

brought against Defendant Jones, and is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND, insofar as it is brought against Defendant County. 

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Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint must be filed within twenty (20) 

days from the date of this Order. Defendants’ responsive 

pleading is due within twenty (20) days thereafter. If 

Plaintiffs elect not to file an Amended Complaint, they should 

file a notice of dismissal within the next twenty (20) days.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2014

 

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