Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05700/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05700-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVIER DIEGO URIBE,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL KNOWLES, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No. C 03-5700 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Javier Diego Uribe, a California prisoner incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison, has filed

this pro se action seeking awrit of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now

before the courtfor consideration ofthemerits ofthe habeas petition. For the reasons discussed

below, the petition will be denied.

BACKGROUND

A. The Crimes

Uribewas convicted ofsex offenses againstfourminors: committing lewd acts on Jane

Doe 1 (14 counts), Jane Doe 3 (1 count) and Jane Doe 4 (1 count), as well as one count of

committing a forcible lewd act on Jane Doe 2. At the trial, evidence also was presented of his sex

offense against an 11-year old (Katherine M.) that led to a sexual battery conviction several years

earlier. The evidence at trial included the following, which is largely taken from the California

Court of Appeal's opinion and the parties' briefs.
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Uribe knewJaneDoe 1 through hisfriendshipwith JaneDoe 1'smother and grandmother.

Jane Doe 1 was eight years old and in third grade atthe time ofthe firsttouching incident. The

touchingsstopped after the December 17, 1999 incident, when Jane Doe 1 was in fifth grade. The

touchings occurred at a variety oftimes and places and the behavior included touching Jane Doe

1'svagina over and under her clothing,touching her buttocks, putting his fingers inside her vagina,

and putting his mouth on her vagina and licking it.

Following the last molestation on December 17, 1999, Jane Doe 1 told several friends “that

therewas a guy touching on [her]” and she told themUribe’sfirst name. Jane Doe 1 also told her

younger brother, who then told his friend Andrew, and Andrew told his grandmother. The

grandmotherwas a friend ofJaneDoe 1'sfamily and onDecember 20, 1999 asked Jane Doe 1 if

Uribe had been touching her. Jane Doe 1 admitted Uribe had “messed with her” and pointed to her

vagina. The grandmother then called Jane Doe 1's mother, and Jane Doe 1 told her mother some

details about the molestations. 

Jane Doe 1's mother took Jane Doe 1 to the hospital. While there, Jane Doe 1 met with

a police officer. On December 22, 1999, Jane Doe 1 spoke with a social worker in the presence

of a different police officer, Officer Judy Stradan. On December 23, 1999 at the request of

Officer Stradan,Jane Doe 1 calledUribe on the telephone. The phone call was tape recorded.

Uribemade numerousincriminating statements. Uribe essentially admitted touching Jane Doe

1'svagina and putting his mouth on her vagina when, in response to Jane Doe 1's query about those

acts,Uribe asserted,“We were playing.” When Jane Doe 1 asked why he “put his fingers up [her]

vagina,” Uribemade a similar admission: “Because Ilike it.” Following this pretext phone call,

police arrested Uribe. 

Based on information provided by JaneDoe 1, an investigator from the district attorney’s

office went to an apartment complex at which Uribe had resided. The investigator discovered that

a number of complaints had been filed with the complex's security office in 1997, alleging Uribe

had molested or bothered other young girls. The investigation into these incidents led to the

charges involving Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, and Jane Doe 4. 
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Uribemolested JaneDoe 2,then 11 years old,in July 1996when he was at her apartment.

Uribe entered herroom,closed the door and put a chair underthe knob to prevent it from being

opened. He then got on top of Jane Doe 2 on the bed. He rubbed her breast with one hand and

covered her mouth with another hand. He tried to take off her jacket and he tried to kiss her. 

Uribe's’s encounters with Jane Doe 3, fourteen years old at the time of trial, included one

incident where he grabbed and pulled her onto his lap, another incident where he removed his shirt

and pants and stood in front of herin his underwear,and anotherincidentwhere he got on top of

her in his bedroom.

Uribe’s encounters with Jane Doe 4, fourteen years old at the time of trial, included

incidents where he rubbed her buttocks and tried to pull her into his apartment.

B. Case History

Following a jury trial in Monterey County Superior Court, Uribe was convicted of sixteen

counts of engaging in a lewd act upon a child and one count of engaging in a forcible lewd act upon

a child. As to each count, the jury found true the One Strike law allegation that Uribe committed

qualifying offenses against multiple victims. Uribe was sentenced on December 14, 2001 to a

total term of 100 years to life in prison. 

Uribe unsuccessfully appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of

convictionwith a sentencemodification and deniedUribe’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. 

Uribe then filed this action. His federal habeas petition raises seven claims: (1) his rights

to due process and a fair trial were violated when the court denied his motion to exclude his

coerced statement to the police, (2) his rights to due process, a fair trial and equal protection were

deniedwhen the trial court admitted evidence of his prior misconduct under California Evidence

Code section 1108, (3) hisrightsto due process and a fair trial were violated by the use of the

CALJIC2.50.01 jury instruction, (4) his rights to due process, a fair trial and a jury determination

on allissueswere violated by the court’s failure to correctly instruct on probation eligibility, (5)
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hisrightto counsel was violated when the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry about

his complaints against his attorney, (6) his rights to due process and to be free from double

jeopardy were violated by the sentence imposed for multiple victims, and (7) the cumulative effect

ofthe foregoing errors deprived him of his rights to due process and a fair trial. The court ordered

respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer and

petitioner filed a traverse. The matter is now ready for a decision on the merits. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court hassubjectmatter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged conviction

occurred inMontereyCounty,California,within thisjudicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings

eitherthe fact orlength oftheir confinement are required firstto exhaust state judicial remedies,

either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the higheststate court

available with a fair opportunity to rule on themerits of each and every claimthey seek to raise

in federal court. See 28U.S.C.§ 2254(b),(c). The parties do not dispute that state court remedies

were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he isin custody in

violation ofthe Constitution or laws or treaties of theUnitedStates." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petitionmay not be grantedwith respectto any claimthatwas adjudicated on themeritsin state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
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determined by theSupremeCourt oftheUnited States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination ofthe factsin light ofthe evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Underthe ‘contrary to’ clause,a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to thatreached by [theSupreme]Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state courtidentifiesthe correct governing legal principle from[the]Court’s decisions but

unreasonably appliesthat principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.at 413. “[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

orincorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id.at 411. A federal habeas

courtmaking the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application

of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.

DISCUSSION

A. Admission of Uribe's Confession To The Police

Uribe alleges hisrightsto due process and a fairtrialwere violated when the court denied

hismotion to exclude hisinvoluntary statementsto the police. He contends his statements were

based on repeated promises of both legal and medical help as well asreduced jail time -- all of

which were conditioned upon Uribe giving a statement confirming Jane Doe 1's accusations.

Uribe's statements were made to police officer Stradan during a 30-minute interview conducted

about an hour after his arrival at the police station following his arrest. Before the allegedly

coerced statementswere made, Uribe had made a phone call, had been advised of his Miranda

rights, and (during the interview) had already made some very damaging admissions.

TheCaliforniaCourt ofAppealrejected Uribe's claim that his confession was coerced.
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Cal.Ct.App.Opinion,pp.24-26. That court did not address whether the confession was coerced

butinstead concluded that any errorthatmight have occurredwas harmless. The court reasoned:

First,defendant had already admitted touching Jane Doe 1 on the buttocks and legs. Since

“any touching” can constitute a lewd act under section 288, subdivision (a), these

admissions were significant. Second, the evidence at trial was very strong. Jane Doe 1

recounted specific details ofmany touching incidents. She was able to pinpoint many dates

and the placeswhere the touchings occurred. She provided additional details regarding the

circumstances ofthe touchings. She made spontaneous disclosures to friends at school.

Although she did not provide details aboutthe varioustouchings atfirst,she did provide

such details a few days later, when she felt more comfortable talking to the female social

worker. Finally, the admissions defendant made during the pretextual call were very

damaging. He essentially admitted touching Jane Doe 1's vagina and putting his mouth on

her vagina when, in response to JaneDoe 1'squery aboutthose acts,defendant asserted,

“We were playing.” When Jane Doe 1 asked why he “put his fingers up [her] vagina,”

defendant made a similar admission: “Because I like it.” In light of these factors,we

conclude,beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was not prejudiced by any error with

regard to the admission of his police interview.

Cal.Ct.App.Opinion,p.26. The California Court of Appeal identified and applied the harmless

error standard from Chapman v.California,386U.S.18,24 (1967). Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, p. 25.

The erroneous admission of a coerced confession issubject to harmless error analysis.

Fulminate v.Arizona,499U.S.279,306-12 (1991). If, on direct review, the state court disposed

of a constitutional error as harmless under an appropriate standard of review, federal courts must,

for purposes of application ofthe “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), determine

whether the state court’s harmless error analysis was objectively unreasonable. Medina v.

Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2004).

The California Court of Appeal's harmless error analysis was not objectively unreasonable.

The state court correctly identified theChapman standard as the applicable standard of review on

direct appeal and reasonably applied it. This court agrees with the state court's conclusion that any

errorwas harmless. Before any of the allegedly coercive comments were made, Uribe had already

admitted some lewd conduct to officerStradan and had already admitted the mostserioussex

offenses during the recorded telephone call with Jane Doe 1. Both those statements were

admitted at trial and were not possibly tainted by any coercion that may have later occurred. Jane

Doe 1'sown detailed account ofUribe's conduct in her testimony at trial also provided persuasive

independent evidence of Uribe's criminal conduct. The believability of Jane Doe's complaints was
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strengthened by evidence that other girls had independently complained of Uribe'ssimilarsex

offenses againstthem. Uribe is not entitled to the writ on his claim that his constitutional rights

were violated by admission of evidence of an allegedly coerced confession.

B. Propensity Evidence

Uribe next assertsthatthe admission of evidence of his prior sex offense conviction under

CaliforniaEvidenceCode section 1108 violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal

protection. 

CaliforniaEvidenceCode section 1101 provides, in relevant part: “(a) Except as provided

in thissection and Section[] . . . 1108, . . . evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her

character...isinadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.”

California Evidence Code section 1108(a),states,in relevant part,that "[i]n a criminal

action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's

commission of anothersexual offense or offensesis notmade inadmissible bySection 1101,if

the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352." 

California Evidence Code section 352 permits the court to "exclude evidence if its

probative value issubstantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate

undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of under prejudice, of confusing the

issues, or of misleading the jury.”

The prosecution moved to introduce Uribe's prior sexual offense conviction for

misdemeanor sexual battery undersection 1108, arguing the evidence was admissible under

sections 1101 and 1108 and pointing out the similarities between the charged and uncharged

offenses. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court found the evidence admissible under

section 1108 and specifically found thatits high probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

On appeal the California Court of Appeal rejected Uribe's claims. Relying on the

CaliforniaSupremeCourt’s earlier opinion inPeople v.Falsetta,21Cal. 4th 903 (1999), which

rejected constitutional challenges to section 1108, the California Court of Appealsummarily
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rejectedUribe’s due process and equal protection arguments. The California Court of Appeal then

found thatthe trial court did not abuse its discretion undersection 352 by determining thatthe

probative value of the evidence of defendant’s uncharged offenses outweighed its prejudicial

effect.

1. Due Process

Astate's criminallaw(such as an evidence law pertaining to criminal trials) does not violate

the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause "'unless it offends some principle of justice so

rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Montana

v.Egelhoff,518U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (citation omitted). "It is not the State which bears the burden

of demonstrating that itsrule is deeply rooted, but rather respondent who must show that the

principle of procedure violated by the rule (and allegedly required by due process) isso rooted

in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Id.at 47 (citation

and internal quotations omitted; emphasisin original)(rule thatintoxication may be considered

on the question ofintentwas notso deeply rooted asto be a fundamental principle enshrined by

the Fourteenth Amendment). But simply finding a historical basisfor or against a rule is not

enough: "The Constitution does not encompass all traditional legal rules and customs, no matter

howlongstanding and widespread such practices may be. The Supreme Court has cautioned against

thewholesale importation of common lawand evidentiary rulesinto the Due Process Clause of

[the]Constitution" UnitedStates v.LeMay,260F.3d 1018, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.denied,

534 U.S. 1166 (2002).

No federal appellate court has yet reached the constitutionality ofCaliforniaEvidence

Code section 1108. However, section 1108 is analogous to Federal Rule of Evidence 414, which

governsthe admissibility of evidence of prior conduct in cases of childmolestation in federal

court. The Ninth Circuit has rejected due process and equal protection challenges to Rule 414,

and itsreasoning guidesthis court's consideration of the very similar California law. SeeLeMay,

260 F.3d at 1024, 1030. Rule 414 states that “evidence of the defendant’s commission of another
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offense or offenses of childmolestation is admissible,andmay be considered forits bearing on

anymattertowhich itisrelevant.” Rule 414 does not violate due process because Rule 403 (the

federal analog to California Evidence Code section 352) functions as a filter,resulting in the

exclusion of evidence that isso prejudicial asto deprive the defendant of hisrightto a fairtrial.

Id.at 1026. In other words, the “application of Rule 403 to Rule 414 evidence eliminates the due

process concerns posed by Rule 414.” LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1027 (quoting United States v.

Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881 (10th Cir. 1998)). 

CaliforniaEvidenceCode section 1108 functionsin a similarfashion toFederalRule of

Evidence 414. Section 1108 allows for the introduction of evidence of prior sex offenses by a

defendant accused of a sex offense and is subject to section 352 which excludes unduly prejudicial

evidence. Like Rule 414, section 1108 does not pose a due process concern because the section

352 filter (the state analog to the Rule 403 filter) does not allow the admission of section 1108

evidencewhich is so prejudicial as to preclude the right to fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process

Clause. Uribe has not shown "that the traditional ban on propensity evidence involves a

'fundamental conception of justice'" which is violated by section 1108. SeeLeMay,260F.3dat

1025. He thus has not shown that section 1108, which allows propensity evidence in the limited

area of sex offense cases, on its face violates due process. 

Section 1108 also did not violate due process as it was applied in Uribe's case. "The

evidence of defendant’ssexual offenses against Katherine M. had substantial probative value in

demonstrating defendant’s disposition to commit lewd acts upon young girls.” Cal. Ct. App.

Opinion, p. 28.

The offenses against Katherine M. were quite similar to the offenses against Jane Does 1-

4... [and] the evidence of defendant’s offenses against Katherine M. had an “independent

source,” as Katherine had reported the crimes well before defendant committed the crimes

againstJaneDoes 1-4....By contrast,the potential for prejudice, jury confusion, or undue

consumption oftime posed by this evidence was low. The jury knew that defendant’s acts

against Katherine M. resulted in a conviction and jail time. Thus, “the jury was not tempted

to convict defendant of the charged offenses, regardless of his guilt, in order to assure that

hewould be punished forthe uncharged offenses....” [Citation] Further, “the attention

of the jury was not diverted to a determination whether or not defendant had committed the

uncharged offenses,because thatfact had been determined conclusively by the resulting

. . . conviction.” [citation].
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Cal.Ct.App.Op.pp.28-29. Because the jury could draw from the evidence of Uribe's prior sex

offense the permissible inferencesthat he had the propensity to commit sex offenses against

minors and did commit the sex offenses charged in the present case, the admission of the evidence

that he had committed sexual battery on Katherine M. did not violate Uribe's right to due process.

See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991). 

A further reason Uribe is not entitled to the writ is because he has not shown that the

CaliforniaCourt ofAppeal'srejection of his due process claim was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of "clearly establishedFederallaw,as determined by theSupreme Court of the United

States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, there is not much in the way

of clearly established lawon the propensity evidence question. "[T]he Supreme Court has never

expressly held that it violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of

showing conductin conformity therewith, or that it violates due processto admit other crimes

evidence for other purposes without an instruction limiting the jury's consideration of the evidence

to such purposes. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly declined to answer these questions,

seeEstelle [v.McGuire,502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991)] ('Because we need not reach the issue,we

express no opinion on whether a state lawwould violate theDueProcessClause ifitpermitted

the use of "prior crimes" evidence to showpropensity to commit a charged crime')." Garceau v.

Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 774-75 (9th Cir. 2001),reversed on other grounds by 538 U.S. 202

(2003).

2. Equal Protection

The NinthCircuit's decision inLeMay also guidesthis court's analysis of Uribe's equal

protection claim. In LeMay,the court held thatFederal Rule of Evidence 414 did not violate the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the rule did not discriminate against

any group of individuals on the basis of a suspect or quasi-suspect class. LeMay, 260 F.3d at

1030. Second, Rule 414 did not infringe on a fundamental right, because defendants had "no

fundamental right to have a trial free from relevant propensity evidence that is not unduly
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prejudicial.” Id.at 1030. Because the Rule did not make distinctions based on a suspect class, or

infringe a fundamental right, the Rule needed only to bear a “reasonable relationship to a legitimate

government interest.” Id.at 1031. Prosecuting crime is a legitimate government interest, and

Rule 414 allowed prosecutorsto introduce relevant evidence in furtherance of that state interest.

Id. 

Just asthe class of childmolesters was considered not a suspect class in LeMay,the class

of accused sex offenders is not a suspect class here. Section 1108 does not infringe on a

fundamental right because there is no fundamental right to have a trial free from relevant

propensity evidence that is not unduly prejudicial. Section 1108 need only bear a reasonable

relationship to a legitimate government interest. It does so by aiding the effective prosecution of

a quintessentially secretive crime by allowing the introduction of relevant evidence in sex offense

cases. See People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 915 (Cal. 1999) ("the Legislature's principal

justification for adopting section 1108was a practical one:By their very nature,sex crimes are

usually committed in seclusion without third party witnesses or substantial corroborating

evidence"). Uribe has not shown that the application of § 1108 in his case violated his right to

equal protection of the laws. 

C. The Jury Instructions Regarding The Prior Sex Offenses

1. Background

Uribe contends that hisright to due process was violated because the jury instructions

could have been understood by a jury to permit his conviction based solely upon the fact of his

prior sex offense and without finding each fact necessary to support the conviction beyond a

reasonable doubt. 

The jury was given these instructions on the use of the prior sex offenses evidence:

Evidence has been introduced forthe purpose of showing that the defendant engaged in a

sexual offense on one ormore occasions otherthan those charged in the case. [¶] Sexual

offensemeans a crime underthe laws of a state or of the United Statesthat involves any

of the following: [¶] Any conduct made criminal by Penal Code Section 288(a) or

288(b)(1).The elements ofthese crimes are setforth elsewhere in these instructions.[¶]

If you find that the defendant committed other sexual offenses you may, but are not
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required to,infer that the defendant had a disposition to commitsexual offenses.If you

find thatthe defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not required to, infer that he

was likely to commit and did commit the crime or crimes of which he is accused.[¶]

However,ifyou find by a preponderance of the evidence thatthe defendant committed

othersexual offenses,thatis notsufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that he committed the charged crimes. The weight and significance of the evidence, if any,

are for you to decide. You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose.

Within the meaning of the preceding instructions, the prosecution has the burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed sexual offenses

other than those forwhich he is on trial.[¶]Youmust not consider this evidence for any

purpose unless you find by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed the

other sexual offenses.

CT1044-1045 (brackets omitted);CALJIC2.50.01(2001 revision),CALJIC2.50.1. The trial

judge then instructed: "I want to emphasize that the preponderance standard applies only to the

noncharged offenses. It does not lessen or change the People's burden to prove each and every

element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, not by a preponderance of the

evidence." RT 3400. The jury also was instructed on the preponderance of the evidence standard,

CT 1046, and was given the following standard reasonable doubt jury instruction:

A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and

in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guiltissatisfactorily shown,he is entitled to a

verdict of not guilty. This presumption places upon the People the burden of proving him

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a

mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible

or imaginary doubt. It isthatstate of the case which, after the entire comparison and

consideration of allthe evidence,leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they

cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.

CT 1056; CALJIC 2.90.

The California Court of Appeal rejected Uribe's claim of instructional error, following the

reasoning ofPeople v.Reliford,29Cal.4th 1007,1009 (Cal. 2003),which had determined that

the 1999 version ofCALJICNo.2.50.01correctly stated the law. Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 30-31.

TheReliford court had found no reasonable likelihood under the instructions given that the jury

would conclude it could convict appellant ofthe current offense solely because itfound that he

had committed a similar priorsexual offense. SeeReliford,29Cal.4th at 1015-16. In rejecting

Uribe's claim,theCalifornia Court of Appeal reasoned that, by giving the 2001 revised version of

CALJIC 2.50.01, the trial court ensured that the jury would understand and reconcile the

distinction between the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to proof of prior sex
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If the instruction describes the burden of proof incorrectly, rather than is merely

ambiguous, the Estelle approach does not apply. SeeGibson,387F.3dat 822 n.8. This is not a

case of misdescription of the burden of proof.

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crimes,and the burden to prove each element ofthe current offenses beyond a reasonable doubt

by giving the additional cautionary instruction emphasizing that “the preponderance standard

applies only to the noncharged offenses” and thatthePeople still had the burden “to prove each

and every element ofthe charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, not by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Cal. Ct. App. Opinion, pp. 30-31.

2. Analysis

To obtain federal collateralrelieffor errorsin the jury charge,a petitionermust show that

the ailing instruction by itselfso infected the entire trialthatthe resulting conviction violates due

process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72. It is beyond dispute that the Fourteenth

Amendment'sDue Process Clause requires that a defendant be presumed innocent until proven

guilty and that he may only be convicted upon a showing of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

and thatthe jury be properly instructed that a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 820 (9th Cir. 2004) "Any jury

instruction that'reduce[s]the level of proof necessary fortheGovernment to carry its burden ..

.is plainly inconsistent with the constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.'" Id.(quoting

Cool v.UnitedStates,409U.S.100,104 (1972)). So long as the trial court instructs jury on the

necessity that defendant’s guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not

require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden

of proof. See Gibson, 387 F.3d at 825.

In reviewing an ambiguousinstruction,the court must inquire whether there is a reasonable

likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the

Constitution. SeeEstelle,502U.S.at 72&n.4; Boyde v.California,494U.S.370,380 (1990).1

A determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged

instruction in a way that violatesthe Constitution establishes only that an error has occurred,
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however. SeeCalderon v.Coleman,525U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If an error is found, the court also

must determine thatthe error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury's verdict, see Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, before granting relief in habeas proceedings. See

Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146-47.

The jury instructions given at Uribe's trial did not incorrectly describe the burden of proof

or permit conviction upon a standard less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element

of the charged crimes. One of the challenged instructions given in this case is the 2001 revised

version ofCALJIC 2.50.01 which includes the language: “if you find by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant committed othersexual offenses, that is notsufficient by itself to

prove beyond a reasonable doubtthat he committed the charged crimes.” Additionally, Uribe's

jury received an additional admonition by the court emphasizing “that the preponderance standard

applies only to the noncharged offenses. It does not lessen or change the People’s burden to prove

each and every element ofthe charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, not by a preponderance

ofthe evidence.” RT3400.Whenviewed in light ofthe otherinstructions given by the court and

the specific reminder from the court, the revised CALJIC 2.50.01 given at Uribe's trial made clear

that even ifthe jury found thatUribe committed prior sexual offenses by a preponderance of the

evidence and drewthe inference that hewaslikely to commit and did commit the crimes of which

he was accused, that alone was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

committed the charged crimes. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the

challenged instructionsto convicttheUribe upon a preponderance ofthe evidence or anything

below proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The instructions used at Uribe's trial were not the same as those determined to be

constitutionally infirminGibson v.Ortiz,387 F.3d 812. InGibson,the jurywasinstructedwith

the pre-1999 version of CALJIC 2.50.01 which did not tell the jury that the inference it could

draw from the priorsex offense was not enough to prove guilt on the charged crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. The problem was compounded by the use of a modified version of CALJIC

2.50.1 thatstated the preponderance of the evidence standard asthe burden of proof for prior
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sexual offenses. The "interplay of the two instructions allowed the jury to find that Gibson

committed the uncharged sexual offenses by a preponderance of the evidence and thus to infer that

he had committed the charged acts based upon facts found not beyond a reasonable doubt, but by

a preponderance ofthe evidence." Id.at 822. The Gibson instructions,carefully followed by the

jury,would allowGibson's conviction based on a finding made on the unconstitutionally low

preponderance of the evidence standard. By contrast, Uribe's jury instructions, carefully followed

by the jury, would not permit Uribe's conviction based on anything lessthan proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of all elements of the crimes charged.

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Uribe's claim was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Uribe is not entitled to the writ on this

claim.

D. Sentencing Claims

Uribe contendsthatthe trial court’sfailure to instruct on proof of probation ineligibility

for the lewd conduct offenses violated hisright to have a jury determine all the elements of a

charge. SeeApprendi v.NewJersey,530U.S.466 (2000). Uribe further contends that he is not

subject to the provisions of the One Strike law, Cal. Penal Code § 667.61, if there is a

determination that he is eligible for probation,and,therefore,the jurymust determine probation

eligibility. He also contendsthe state court did not follow state law in deciding applying the

multiple victim special circumstance. And he contends that the use of the multiple victim

circumstance violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. 

1. The Probation Eligibility Issue

"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increasesthe penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt." Apprendi,530U.S.at 489. The statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is

the maximum sentence a judge could impose based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict
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or admitted by the defendant; that is, "the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not the maximum

sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose

without any additional findings." Blakely v.Washington,542U.S.296,---,124S.Ct.2531,2537

(2004). 

CaliforniaEvidenceCode section 667.61(b) provides that a “person who is convicted of

an offense specified in subdivision (c) under one of the circumstances specified in subdivision (e)

shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life and shall not be eligible for release

on parole for 15 years....” Subdivision (c) lists the specified offenses, including “(7) A violation

ofsubdivision (a) of Section 288, unless the defendant qualifies for probation under subdivision

(c) of Section 1203.066.” Cal. Penal Code § 667.61(c)(7). 

Uribe does not persuade with his argument that the jury had to decide whether he qualified

for probation. First, the text of the state law requires the probation eligibility determination to

be made based on the findings of “the court,” not the jury. Cal. Penal Code § 1203.066(c). 

Second,unlikeUribe's case,Apprendiinvolved an increase to the defendant’s maximum

possible sentence based on a factualfinding by the court. A finding of probation eligibility would

lessen rather than increase Uribe’s sentence. Even though probation would impact Uribe’s

sentence,that alone did notrequire thatthe jury make the necessary findings because it could not

increase the penalty authorized by the jury's verdict.

Lastly,any errorwas harmless. SeeDillard v.Roe,244F.3d758,773-74 (9thCir.),cert.

denied,534U.S.905 (2001)(factthat a jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant

used a firearm in the commission of the offense wassubject to the harmless error analysisset

forth in Brecht). Uribe was not eligible for probation under the terms of section 1203.066

because he did notmeetthe requirement that he be “the victim’s natural parent, adoptive parent,

stepparent, relative, or is a member of the victim’s household who has lived in the victim’s

household.” Cal. Penal Code § 1203.066(c)(1). 

2. Multiple Victim Circumstance
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2Uribe’sfourteen convictions and sentences under California Penal Code section 667.61

were based on a multiple victim special circumstance. Uribe contends that because there were

only four victims, the court erred in applying that circumstance more than four times.

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Uribe's other sentencing claim is that the state court violated his right to due process

because itdid not correctly interpretthe state lawin applying themultiple victim circumstance.2

His brief shows that he was raising a novel argument about the way the multiple victim

circumstance should work, and did not point to any California Court of Appeal or California

Supreme Court decision that was contrary to the approach taken by the California Court of Appeal

in this case. This court generally will not, in a habeas case, revisit a determination of state law by

the state appellate court. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988)(courtis notfree to

review state court's determination of state law); cf. id. at 630 n.3 (quoting West v. American

Telephone&TelegraphCo.,311U.S.223,237-38 (1940)(determination ofstate law made by

an intermediate appellate courtmust be followed and may not be "'disregarded by a federal court

unlessit is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide

otherwise'")). Once one accepts that California law is that the multiple victim circumstance could

apply to themanyOneStrike sentences imposed, the result for Uribe's habeas claim is inevitable.

The trial court's application ofthe multiple victim circumstance to the numerous offenseswas

correct under California law and therefore did not violate Uribe's right to due process.

Uribe also does not persuade with his claim that the multiple victim circumstance, as

applied here,violated his constitutional right to be free from being placed twice in jeopardy . The

use of prior convictions to enhance sentences for subsequent convictions, for example, does not

violate theDouble JeopardyClause. SeeSpencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967) (upholding

use of prior convictions to enhance sentences for subsequent convictions even if in a sense

defendant must relitigate in sentencing proceeding conduct for which he was already tried);

Jackson v.Nelson,435F.2d553,553 (9thCir.1971)(dismissing double jeopardy challenge to

recidiviststatute asmeritless). Consideration of relevant conduct in determining a defendant's

sentence within the legislatively authorized punishment range does not constitute punishment for

that conduct. SeeWittev.UnitedStates,515U.S.389,406 (1995). A court therefore may later
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convict and sentence a defendantfor a crime involving that conduct without violating the Double

Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against the imposition of multiple punishments for the same

offense. SeeUnited States v. Jernigan, 60 F.3d 562, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1995)(upholding defendant's

conviction forfailing to appear even though, in prior case, defendant’s sentence had been enhanced

for obstruction ofjustice based on the same failure to appear). The repeated use of the multiple

victimcircumstance to determine the appropriate sentences on the many counts of which Uribe

was convicted did not violate his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

E. Substitution of Counsel Request

1. Background

Uribe claims his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when the trial court

failed to conduct an adequate inquiry about his claims against his attorney. 

On November 8, 2000 (several months before trial began),defendant requested

substitution of appointed counsel pursuant to People v.Marsden,supra 2 Cal. 3d 118.

During an in camera hearing, defendanttold the trial court,"Ifeellikemy attorney's not

helping me.” 

Defendant submitted a written statement in support of his Marsden motion.

Defendant complained that he did notmeetwith a defense investigator until about nine

months after his arrest and thatthe investigator did not follow up when he told her he had

additionalinformation for her.Defendant also asserted that he requested that his appointed

counsel at the time, Deputy Public Defender Kleinkopf, ask for dismissal of the case

because "the District Attorney was not supposed to investigate this case personally."

Counsel had refused to request dismissal on that basis.Counsel had also failed to follow

up on defendant's allegation that the deputy District Attorney had "a conflict of interest with

this victim in a previous case."

During the hearing,the trial court noted that "thegist of your complaints is that your

case was not investigated in a timely fashion." The trial court asked defendant if he wished

to add anything.Defendant reiterated his complaint about the investigator failing to visit

him forsome time.He reiterated his belief that it wasimproper for the Deputy District

Attorney to perform personal investigation. He asserted that "the D.A. knows the mother

ofthe victim"and asked "that's conflict,right?" Defendant also added that he had asked the

investigator and counsel "to check the D.A.'sinvestigator because they changed some

statements." Defendant complained that counsel had not "foughtto remove some of the

charges" and had not given him"reports about what's going on." He complained that counsel

was pressuring him into accepting a plea bargain.

The trial court addressed defendant's complaints: "I'mnot aware of anything that

prevents the District Attorney from investigating the case. As far as the District Attorney

being acquaintedwith someonewho's a complainingwitnessin the case, in these cases I

think that probably inevitably happensthat atsome pointtheDistrictAttorney becomes
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acquaintedwith the people involved in the case. I don't know if you're suggesting that the

DistrictAttorney had a friendly relationshipwith one of thewitnessesin the case before

this case arose orsimply that a relationship ofsome sort has developed as the case has

progressed. If you know."

After defendantrequested the trial court "repeat that last part," the trial court stated:

"You indicated one of the things that you think is a problem, I'm not sure why it's a problem

involving your attorney, but that the District Attorney has a relationship or a friendship with

one ofthewitnessesin the case orthe victim in the case or something. I'm not sure exactly

what you mean, but again I'm not clear ifthat'ssome sort offriendship relationship that

arose before this case arose orifthisissomething that's developed after this case started."

Defendant stated, "They knew each other before." Defendant asserted that hisformer

retained counsel and his current attorney had both confirmed that fact.

The trial court next explained that defendant's former counsel had brought a motion

to dismisssome ofthe charges and that "[y]ou can't keep making the samemotions over

again if it was made and denied."

Counsel asserted that he tried to followup on everything defendant told him.He

stated that he had visited defendant "fairly regularly" and explained that his investigator had

been sick for overthreeweeks,butwasworking on the investigation. Counsel stated that

he was not going to make a motion to relieve the prosecutor because he did not believe she

had done anything improper by talking to witnesses.

Counsel opined that defendant's Marsden requestwas precipitated by counsel's

advice that defendant acceptthe prosecutor's offer. Counsel had explained to defendant the

weaknesses in the case, and defendant had become angry, claiming his innocence. Counsel

asserted,"Iwill do the bestI canwith what I have, and I will advise him based on what I see,

what the evidence isin the case,and I'm not going to justtell himwhat hewantsto hear."

Counsel noted that the case was set for trial the following week, and asserted that he would

probably be ready at that time.

Defendant asked the trial court,"If you're not going to [replace counsel], I ask if you

could give me more time so they can do a good investigation. . . ."

The trial court denied theMarsdenmotion,finding no "legal basis to remove your

attorney."The trial court found that counsel had made "a good faith effort to get this case

investigated,getit ready for trial" and indicated that it would grant the defense additional

time for investigation if necessary.

Ultimately,DeputyPublicDefenderKleinkopf withdrew fromthe case andwas

replaced byDeputyPublicDefenderHatcher,who represented defendant throughout trial.

Cal.Ct.App.Op. pp. 39-41. The trial date that had been set to start the week after the Marsden

hearingwas postponed for a fewmonths by agreement ofthe parties. SeeNov.18,2000RT18.

2. Analysis

The Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants who can afford to retain counsel a

qualified rightto hire counsel oftheir choice. SeeWheatv.United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 164
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(1988).Acriminal defendantwho cannot afford to retain counsel has no right to counsel of his

own choosing. See id. Nor is he entitled to an attorney who likes and feels comfortable with him.

TheSixthAmendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel, not a "meaningful relationship"

between an accused and his counsel. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).

In California, People v.Marsden, 2Cal.3d 118 (1970),requiresthe trial court to permit

a criminal defendant requesting substitution of counsel to specify the reasons for his request and

generally to hold a hearing. The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a defendant's

SixthAmendmentrightto counsel and is properly considered in federal habeas. See generally

Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2000). In reviewing the state courts' rejection

of a Uribe's Sixth Amendment claim, the "ultimate constitutional question" on federal habeas

review is whether the state trial court's denial of the Marsden motion "actually violated

[petitioner's] constitutionalrightsin thatthe conflict between [the defendant] and his attorney had

become so greatthatitresulted in a total lack of communication or other significant impediment

thatresulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship thatfellshort ofthatrequired by theSixth

Amendment." Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026. 

Uribe's claimissomewhat ambiguousin that one cannot determine whetheritis a claim

that hisrightto counselwas violated or that the counsel provided ineffective assistance. The claim

fails under either approach. 

TheCaliforniaCourt ofAppeal properly upheld the trial court's denial ofUribe’s request.

Uribemoved forsubstitution of counsel and,in accordwith the dictates of the Sixth Amendment,

the trial courtinquired intoUribe’s concerns. SeeHudson v.Rushen,686F.2d826, 831 (9th Cir.

1982)(state court conducted adequate hearing when it invited defendant to make a statement and

listened to defendant'sreasonsforwanting newcounsel). The record shows that the trial court

made a thorough inquiry into Uribe's complaints about counsel. During the hearing the court asked

Uribe to state his complaints about his attorney and the court listened and attempted to clarify

some ofUribe’s complaints. The court then allowed Uribe’s attorney to respond to each of the

complaints. Uribe spoke again after his attorney and then the court made its ruling. The record
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indicates the court contemplated the reasons supporting Uribe's motion before denying the

motion. 

The trial court's determination that counsel was performing adequately and that no

irreconcilable conflict existedwas not unreasonable. Counsel had explained that his investigation

ofthe casewas ongoing (although ithad been hampered by the illness of his investigator) and he

intended to continue the investigation. Nov. 8, 2000 RT 10. Counsel explained that he chose not

tomove to recuse the district attorney because the relationship between the district attorney and

the mother of one of the complaining victims did not appear a sound basis for such a motion.

See id. at 9. Counsel opined that a large part of Uribe's frustration with him resulted from

counsel's performance of his professional obligations, i.e., refusing to renew unsuccessful

motions,providing a legally accurate analysis ofthe case rather than just agreeing with everything

the clientsaid,being civiltoward the district attorney (whoUribe intensely disliked), and relaying

plea bargain offers from that district attorney to Uribe. See id. at 10-13. In light of the

information provided atthe hearing,itwas not unreasonable for the court to think that Uribe's

frustration with appointed counsel's exercise of his professional obligations would continue with

newcounsel and therefore did not warrant new counsel. That is, new counsel also would also have

to refuse to refile unsuccessful motions, would have to tell Uribe the harsh realities of his

defense,would have to dealwith the district attorney in a civil manner, and would have to relay plea

bargain offersthat Uribe did not want to hear. Appointment of new counsel wouldn't end the

frustration that was more a product of Uribe's predicament as a criminal defendantratherthan

counsel's behavior. And the fact that counsel had not completed his investigation also did not

showan irreparable breakdown ofthe attorney-clientrelationship as counsel indicated hewas

continuing to investigate the case. Finally, even if one assumed there had been an adequate

showing to require the appointment of a new attorney,Uribe received that relief when a new

attorneywaslater appointed to replace the defense attorney about whom Uribe had complained.

IfUribe's claimis viewed as one forineffective assistance of counsel by the attorney who
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wasthe subject ofthe Marsden motion, his claim also would fail. After the Marsden hearing,

another attorneywassubstituted in to represent him. The defense counsel against whom Uribe

filed theMarsden motion was not the attorney representing Uribe at trial and Uribe has provided

no evidence at allthatthe former attorney did anything that was irreparably harmful to his defense

attrial. He has shown no prejudice, as he must to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-94 (1984) (ineffective assistance of

counsel claimant mustshow deficient performance and resulting prejudice, i.e., that there is a

reasonable probability that,butfor counsel's errors,the result of the proceedings would have been

different). 

Bearing inmind thatthe "purpose of providing assistance of counsel'issimply to ensure

that criminal defendantsreceive a fairtrial,'"Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, this court sees no evidence

that that purpose went unfulfilled in this case or that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred. The

CaliforniaCourt ofAppeal's rejection of Uribe's claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. Accordingly, Uribe is not entitled to the writ on this

claim.

F. Cumulative Error

Uribe claimsthe cumulative effect of the errors set out in his petition deprived him of his

rightsto due process and a fair trial. In some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently

prejudicialtowarrant relief, the cumulative effect of several errors may still prejudice a defendant

somuch that his conviction must be overturned. SeeAlcala v.Woodford,334F.3d862,893 (9th

Cir. 2003). Here, there was at most a single error as both this court and the California Court of

Appeal decided thatthe admission ofthe confession was harmless error (if any error at all). The

cumulative doctrine does notwarrant any reliefwhen there is only one possible error and it has

been determined to have been harmless. 

CONCLUSION
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The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September _15__, 2005 ______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge