Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02931/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02931-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD ARMENTA,

CDCR #G-39318,

Plaintiff,

vs.

D. PARAMO, Warden, et al., 

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02931-BTM-KSC

ORDER:

1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE 

TO FILE AN AMENDED 

COMPLAINT 

[ECF No. 20]

AND

2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT 

TO Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

AS MOOT 

[ECF No. 16]

RICHARD ARMENTA (“Plaintiff”), is currently incarcerated at California State 

Prison, Los Angeles County (“CSP-LAC”) in Lancaster, California, and is proceeding 

pro se in this civil action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his original Complaint, 

Plaintiff claimed prison officials at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in 

San Diego, California, violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights while he 

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was incarcerated there in 2015 by charging him with, finding him guilty of, and 

punishing him for use of a controlled substance in violation of CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 

§ 3016(a). Plaintiff claimed Defendants did so with “deliberate indifference” to medical 

evidence showing he had been prescribed Tylenol with codeine, which he argued

accounted for the positive urinalysis results that initiated his disciplinary proceedings. 

(ECF No. 1 at 8-15.) 

I. Procedural Background

On April 4, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

(“IFP”), denied his Motion to Appoint Counsel, screened his Complaint pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, and directed the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon 

the Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3) (ECF No. 4).

See Puett v. Blandford, 895 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1990) (“An incarcerated pro se 

plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to rely on the U.S. Marshal for service 

of summons and complaint”). 

The U.S. Marshal successfully executed service upon Defendants Stratton, Salinas, 

Sanchez, Paramo, Frost, Covel, Zamora, Williams, and Lopez (ECF Nos. 7-15), but the 

summons was returned unexecuted as to Defendant G. Murphy on May 18, 2017 (ECF 

No. 6), with a note indicating that “per Litigation Coordinator, ... they are unable to 

confirm that there is now or ever has been a G. Murphy employed at R.J. Donovan and 

they are not authorized to accept service on his/her behalf.” (ECF No. 6). No proof of 

service, either executed or unexecuted has yet to be entered on behalf of the remaining 

Defendant, G. Wiley.

On June 19, 2017, the served Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Complaint pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 16). Defendants served Plaintiff 

with a copy of their Motion via U.S. Mail on the same day (ECF No. 16-1 at 25).

On June 22, 2017, the Court calendared Defendants’ Motion for disposition 

without oral argument on August 18, 2017, directed Plaintiff to file his Opposition, or 

Notice of Non-Opposition, by August 4, 2017, and granted Defendants until August 11, 

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2017 to file a Reply. (See ECF No. 18 at 2.)

On July 11, 2017, and in lieu of an Opposition, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave 

to File an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 20), signed, served upon Defendants’ counsel, 

and dated July 3, 2017. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff attaches to his Motion new “Supporting 

Facts” (id. at 5-9), and two new exhibits, but he also asks to “file an Amended Complaint 

to add new information,” and “new claims for relief” as to certain Defendants and other 

portions of his original pleading. Id. at 2-4. Plaintiff has also filed a copy of a letter he 

wrote to the U.S. Marshal regarding the status of service upon Defendants Murphy and 

Wiley. (Id. at 17.) 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend

Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a), a party “may amend its pleading once as a matter 

of course ... within 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b)...” FED. R. CIV. P.

15(a)(1)(B). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing 

party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). 

In this case, Plaintiff did not require the Court’s leave to amend because at the time 

he filed and served his Motion on July 3, 2017, the 21-day period for amending as a 

matter of course, after having been served with Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant 

to FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(B), had yet to expire. See ECF No. 20 at 1, 18; ECF No. 16-1 

at 25; Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-72 (1988) (notice of appeal filed by a pro se 

prisoner is deemed to be “filed” when it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding 

to the district court); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Houston 

mailbox rule applies to § 1983 suits filed by pro se prisoners.”).

However, the Court notes that the documents attached to Plaintiff’s Motion, while 

some pages are captioned as his “Proposed Amended Complaint,” see ECF No. 20 at 5-

10, do not constitute an Amended Complaint which is complete in itself. See S.D. Cal. 

CivLR 15.1 (requiring that “[e]very pleading to which amendment is permitted as a 

matter of right or has been allowed by court order, must be complete in itself without 

reference to the superseded pleading.”). It is well-established that an “amended complaint 

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supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.” Valadez-Lopez 

v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Once Plaintiff amends, 

his original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967).

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and 

the involvement of each defendant must be alleged; each pleading must include a “short 

and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” a “short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and “a demand for 

the relief sought.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1)-(3); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

677-78 (2009); Landers v. Quality Communications, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 640-41 (9th Cir. 

2014).

As currently submitted, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (ECF No. 20) does 

not, without more, qualify as an Amended Complaint pursuant to Local Rule 15.1; nor 

does it comply with FED. R. CIV. P. 8. For example, Plaintiff does not include the names 

of the Defendants he seeks to sue, nor does he indicate the capacity in which he seeks to 

sue them. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the 

parties.”); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that an earlier 

complaint “cannot have the effect of filling in the names of the defendants in [a] later ‘et

al.’ pleading.”). Moreover, while Plaintiff apparently seeks to add an additional statement 

of facts and two exhibits to his original complaint, and refers to a list of “paragraphs” he 

wishes to intersperse into that pleading involving “new information,” and “new claims 

for relief,” (ECF No. 20 at 2-4), he may not amend by interlineation, and instead may 

amend pursuant to Rule 15 only by filing and serving upon Defendants one single 

Amended Complaint, which is complete by itself, and without reference to any previous 

pleading. See Flood v. Nat’l Football League, No. CIV-S-08-0091 GEB-JFM-PS, 2008 

WL 942664, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2008) (rejecting Plaintiff’s attempts to “interlineate 

changes to the original complaint,” and instead advising him to submit an amended 

complaint that was “complete in and of [itsel[f].”). 

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However, Rule 15(a)(2) further provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave 

[to amend] when justice so requires,” and “this mandate is to be heeded.” Foman v. 

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sharkey v. O’Neal, 

778 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 2015). The intent of the rule is to “facilitate decision on the 

merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities,” Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Center of 

S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011), and this policy is “to be applied with 

extreme liberality.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 

When evaluating a motion to amend under Rule 15, the Court considers: (1) 

whether there has been undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the 

moving party; (2) whether there have been repeated failures to cure deficiencies by 

previous amendments; (3) whether there has been undue prejudice to the opposing party 

“by virtue of the allowance of the amendment”; and (4) whether amendment would be 

futile. Sharkey, 778 F.3d at 774 (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). Prejudice is the 

“touchstone of the inquiry under rule 15(a),” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 

F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), but “[a]bsent prejudice, or a strong 

showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 

15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id. (emphasis original).

Here, the Court finds no delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on Plaintiff’s part. In 

fact, he has not previously amended, and amendment would have been proper “as a 

matter of course” had he simply filed and served a complete Amended Complaint on July 

3, 2017, instead of filing the instant Motion seeking leave to do so. See FED. R. CIV. P.

15(a)(1)(B); Sharkey, 778 F.3d at 774. The Court further finds no previously named 

Defendant would be prejudiced at this stage of this proceeding, and amendment would 

not be futile, for it appears Plaintiff seeks leave to simply re-allege and/or supplement his 

previously alleged causes of action, which the Court has already found sufficiently

pleaded to survive initial screening, against the same RJD officials named in his original 

Complaint, two of whom have yet to be served. Id.; see also DCD Programs LTD v. 

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Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187-88 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding amendment proper when 

discovery has not closed, no pending trial date had yet to be set, and case as a whole 

remained in its early stages.). 

Thus, because all four Foman factors weigh in Plaintiff’s favor, his Motion for 

Leave to File an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 20) is GRANTED. Consequently, 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s original Complaint (ECF No. 16) pursuant to 

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) is DENIED without prejudice as moot in light of Plaintiff’s 

anticipated amendment. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 

F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”). 

III. Conclusion and Order

Accordingly, the Court hereby:

1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to file an Amend Complaint 

pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (ECF No. 20);

2) DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s original Complaint 

pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 16), and VACATES the hearing date 

previously set for Friday, August 18, 2017, as to that Motion (ECF No. 18) without 

prejudice as moot and in light of Plaintiff’s anticipated amendment; and instead,

3) DIRECTS Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint, and to serve it upon 

Defendants no later than Friday, August 18, 2017. Plaintiff is cautioned that his 

Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading

(ECF No. 1). See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1546; Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with 

leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered 

waived if not repled.”). Plaintiff is cautioned that if he fails to file and serve his Amended 

Complaint upon Defendants by August 18, 2017, the Court may dismiss his case based 

///

///

///

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on his failure to prosecute.1 See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If 

a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court 

may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 21, 2017

 

1 Plaintiff is further advised that he must correct the deficiencies of service already noted 

as to Defendants Murphy and Wiley, (see ECF No. 18 at 2 n. 2), and provide the U.S. 

Marshal with information sufficient to identify and serve those parties with his Amended 

Complaint within the time provided by FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). See Walker v. Sumner, 14 

F.3d 1415, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that while an incarcerated IFP plaintiff is 

entitled to rely on the U.S. Marshal for service of the summons and complaint, where he 

fails to provide the Marshal with accurate information sufficient to effect that service, 

dismissal for failure to prosecute pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) may be warranted).

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