Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01705/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01705-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JEREMY JAMISON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SAMBRAJYA PALAGUMMI, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-1705 AC P 

ORDER 

 Pending before the court are the following motions: (1) defendant moves for clarification 

of the court’s November 5, 2014 order on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment; 

(2) plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action, moves for the 

appointment of counsel; (3) plaintiff moves for an emergency injunction requiring “defendants 

CDC medical facilitators” to provide plaintiff with pain medication, and for an emergency 

injunction appointing a doctor to address his pain issues. Both parties have consented to the 

jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. ECF Nos. 6 & 21. For the reasons set forth below, the first 

two motions will be denied, and defendant will be required to respond to the third motion, to the 

degree it seeks emergency injunctive relief. 

1. Defendant’s motion for clarification 

In the court’s November 5, 2014 order, which resolved the parties’ cross-motions for 

summary judgment, the court held that plaintiff’s exhaustion of his “Appeal 1775” was excused 

Case 2:13-cv-01705-AC Document 65 Filed 12/02/14 Page 1 of 4
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because the erroneous instructions he was given on how to proceed with the appeal effectively 

blocked him from exhausting the appeal. The court further held that plaintiff could have 

exhausted this appeal had he been properly instructed. Defendant seeks “clarification” because, 

he asserts, the court’s order must have resulted from a clerical mistake or from oversight or 

omission. 

First, defendant argues that the court must have overlooked his “uncontested” evidence 

that plaintiff “could not have exhausted his 602 health care appeal 1775 within a period of only 

two months, which is how little time Plaintiff waited before filing his lawsuit after he was first 

seen by Dr. Palagummi.” ECF No. 60 at 2. Second, defendant seeks clarification of how the 

court concluded that plaintiff “‘could have exhausted his appeal’ . . . during this two month period 

despite the fact that neither side submitted any evidence to show that this appeal could have been 

processed through the Third or Director level in only two months.” ECF No. 60 at 2 (emphasis in 

text). 

There is no need for clarification of either matter. First, defendant’s “evidence” about the 

amount of time it would take for plaintiff to exhaust Appeal 1775 claim is not relevant, since the 

court held that exhaustion was excused, not that it had been completed in two months. Second, 

the court did not hold that plaintiff could have exhausted his appeal “during this two month 

period.” Rather, the court held that “plaintiff could have exhausted his appeal had he been 

properly instructed,” not that he could have done so within a two month time period.1

 The motion 

 

1

 Moreover, defendant’s “evidence” that the appeal could not have been exhausted in less than 

four months is not persuasive. Defendant, in his brief, argues that at least four months of 

“working days” are required for exhaustion, an apparent reference to Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, 

§ 3084.8, which sets forth the “Appeal Time Limits.” In order to reach this conclusion, defendant 

must be reading the regulation – incorrectly – to require that each appeal decision be completed 

no sooner than 30 working days from the date of each appeal. But that is not what the regulation 

says. It requires that the appeal be filed “within 30 calendar days” of the event complained of, 

and that each appeal decision be completed “within 30 working days.” Id., § 3084.8(b) & (c). If 

defendant means to say that the prison stretches out every appeal to the maximum time permitted 

by the regulation, even when it could decide the appeal more quickly, then he should say so. The 

Luyster Declaration also asserts that it would take 4 months to exhaust the appeal. The court does 

not read the declaration as asserting that every appeal decision, at every level, is needlessly 

stretched to the full 30 day limit, but rather, that Luyster is interpreting the regulation consistently 

(continued...) 

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for clarification will accordingly be denied. 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel 

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require 

counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 

U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the district court may request the 

voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 

1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). 

The test for exceptional circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s 

likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in 

light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 

1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances 

common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not 

establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of 

counsel. In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. 

Accordingly, the motion for appointment of counsel will be denied, without prejudice. 

3. Plaintiff’s emergency request for pain medication and a new doctor2

 This court has permitted this lawsuit to proceed on plaintiff’s claim of deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs in that, among other things, he has been denied proper 

pain management, including pain medication. On November 19 and 21, 2014, plaintiff filed 

motions, which the court construes as requests for a preliminary injunction, asking the court to 

order that his pain medications be restored, and that he be appointed a different doctor to manage 

his pain. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Palagummi, the last remaining named defendant, is deliberately 

indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, and specifically, that defendant has stopped 

plaintiff’s necessary pain and seizure medication for no medical reason. Defendant will be 

ordered to respond to this motion. 

 

with defendant’s brief. In that case, Luyster’s assertion is not “evidence,” but a legal conclusion. 

2

 Plaintiff’s emergency motion for appointment of a new doctor is included in his motion for 

appointment of counsel. 

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 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Within fourteen days of the date of this order, defendant Dr. Palagummi must file 

a response to the plaintiff’s emergency motions (ECF Nos. 63 & 64), other than the request for 

appointment of counsel. The court construes those motions as motions for preliminary injunctive 

relief for an order directing the renewal of plaintiff’s pain and seizure medication. There will be 

no extension of time granted for defendant’s response; 

 2. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 63) is DENIED without 

prejudice; 

 3. Defendant’s motion for clarification (ECF No. 60), construed as a motion for relief 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) & (b), is DENIED. 

DATED: December 1, 2014 

Case 2:13-cv-01705-AC Document 65 Filed 12/02/14 Page 4 of 4