Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03864/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03864-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Injunctive &amp; Declaratory Relief

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TITAN INDEMNITY COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v.

A PLUS TOWING, a general partnership,

JOSE HERMOSILLO, individually and

dba A PLUS TOWING, FERNANDO

HERMOSILLO, individually and dba A

PLUS TOWING,

Defendants. /

No. C 14-03864 WHA

ORDER RE MOTION FOR

DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND

VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this declaratory-judgment insurance action, plaintiff moves for default judgment

against defendants. To the extent stated below, plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. The relief

granted herein is a declaration that plaintiff insurance company had no duty to defend or

indemnify defendants in relation to the specific accident described below. The hearing set for

November 4 is VACATED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Titan Indemnity Company commenced this action in August 2014, seeking a

declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify defendants A Plus Towing, Jose

Hermosillo, Fernando Hermosillo, or Katrina Rapp under an insurance policy. The potential

insurance claim stemmed from an accident in which a trailer, attached to a truck towed off of A

Plus Towing’s lot by a third party, detached and struck defendant Rapp, causing injuries. 

Case 3:14-cv-03864-WHA Document 76 Filed 10/28/15 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff properly served all defendants, with defendant Rapp the only one to respond to the

complaint. In February of this year, the Clerk entered default against defendants Jose

Hermosillo, Fernando Hermosillo, and A Plus Towing (Dkt. No. 41). The case proceeded

against defendant Rapp. Despite never responding to the complaint, defendants Jose and

Fernando Hermosillo appeared for their depositions during the discovery phase of this case. In

September, an order granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against defendant Rapp,

finding that there was no material dispute as to the fact that none of the defendants ever owned

the trailer at issue (Dkt. No. 62).

Now, plaintiff moves for a default judgment against the remaining defendants — A Plus

Towing, Jose Hermosillo, and Fernando Hermosillo. After filing this motion, plaintiff attested

that it properly served these defendants with the present motion. No response or opposition has

been received. 

ANALYSIS 

Under FRCP 55(b)(2), a plaintiff can apply to the district court for a default

judgment against a defendant that has failed to otherwise plead or defend against the action. 

Default judgments are generally disfavored as “cases should be decided upon their merits

whenever reasonably possible.” In the Ninth Circuit, a district court must consider the

following factors when deciding whether or not to use its discretion in granting a motion for

default judgment: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s

substantive claims; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the

action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due

to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–1472 (9th Cir. 1986)

(citation omitted). Here, these factors favor entry of default judgment against defendants.

With respect to determining liability and entry of default judgment, the general rule is

that well-pleaded allegations in the complaint regarding liability are deemed true (except for

the amount of damages). Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Consequently, this order finds that Eitel factors two, three, four, five, and six weigh in favor of

Case 3:14-cv-03864-WHA Document 76 Filed 10/28/15 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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the entry of default judgment against defendants. As stated above, a previous order

acknowledged the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claims and the sufficiency of its complaint by

granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against defendant Rapp (Dkt. No. 62). As

there are no money damages at issue in our case (only declaratory relief) factor four is easily

satisfied.

Furthermore, there is no possibility of a material dispute of fact. During their depositions

in this case, defendants Jose and Fernando Hermosillo stated that they did not own the truck at

issue and thus had no interest in making any insurance claim based on ownership of that truck. 

Moreover, there is no evidence of excusable neglect, as defendants were properly served with all

pleadings, sat for depositions, and were thus fully aware of the existence of the present case. 

Although federal policy favors decisions on the merits, the circumstances surrounding this case

indicate that default judgment under FRCP 55(b) is proper.

CONCLUSION

To the extent stated herein, plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against defendants is

GRANTED. Specifically, this order declares that plaintiff Titan Indemnity Company had no duty

to defend or indemnify defendants A Plus Towing, Jose Hermosillo, or Fernando Hermosillo in

relation to the accident that occurred on August 24, 2012 under the insurance policy described

above. Based on the record presented, there is no need for a prove-up hearing. The case is at an

end and the CLERK SHALL PLEASE CLOSE THE FILE. Judgment will be entered separately. The

hearing set for November 4 is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 28, 2015. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:14-cv-03864-WHA Document 76 Filed 10/28/15 Page 3 of 3