Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-03954/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-03954-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TIFFINI BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CRST MALONE, INC., 

Defendant.

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CV-12-BE-3954-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter—asserting retaliation and race and gender employment discrimination—is

before the court on “Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant CRST-Malone, Inc.” (Doc.

23). The Plaintiff filed a response (doc. 30), the Defendant replied (doc. 32), and the Plaintiff

filed supplemental authority (doc. 34-1); this motion has received thorough briefing. For the

reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion, the court FINDS that CRST’s motion for summary

judgment is due to be GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART. 

More specifically, the court DENIES the motion as to the claims in Count One for

discrimination based on race and/or gender, brought pursuant to Title VII; GRANTS the motion

as to the claims in Count One for hostile work environment based on race and/or gender;

DENIES the motion as to the claims in Count Two for discrimination based on race, brought

pursuant to § 1981; and GRANTS the motion as to the claims in Count Two for hostile work

environment based on race, brought pursuant to § 1981; GRANTS the motion as to the claim for

retaliation, brought pursuant to Title VII.

1

FILED

 2014 Sep-17 AM 09:30

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:12-cv-03954-KOB Document 35 Filed 09/17/14 Page 1 of 35
I. FACTS

The Defendant, CRST-Malone is a flat-bed trucking company with offices in Trussville,

Alabama. In January of 2011, CRST hired Plaintiff Tiffini Brown, an African American female,

as a Safety Processor. The month after hiring Brown, CRST hired Tobenna “TC” Chekwa, an

African American male, as a Recruiter to find drivers for hire or lease. 

In the position of Safety Processor, Brown was responsible for conducting driver safety

checks—including checks on a driver’s insurance, DOT citation and compliance history, and

background—to determine if a prospective driver satisfied the company’s qualification standards. 

During her first seven months at CRST, Brown worked under two different white supervisors,

received no disciplinary action, and was promoted to Team Leader for the Safety Processors. In

late August of 2011, Harry Kimball, a white male, took over the position of Director of Safety

from Chuck Haffenden, a white male, and Kimball became Brown’s direct supervisor. A twoweek overlap existed when both Haffenden and Kimball worked in the Trussville office, and

Brown does not recall having any specific conversation with Haffenden during that period about

Kimball’s maltreatment of her. 

Kimball began addressing Brown as “Trouble” in September of 2011, and their working

relationship was indeed troubled. Brown acknowledged that she did not take the moniker

“Trouble” as having any racial or gender connotations. A few weeks before the incident made

the basis of this suit, and after Haffenden left the Trussville office, the working relationship

between Brown and Kimball deteriorated when Brown told Kimball that a driver Kimball had

approved did not fall within the hiring guidelines. According to Brown, at this point, Kimball

began ignoring her and stopped communicating with Brown directly, using Rolinda Golden, a

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Safety Supervisor who was a white female, as an intermediary. Golden confirms that Kimball

communicated with Brown indirectly using Golden as a channel and that Brown would ask

Golden to accompany her to Kimball’s office when Brown needed to communicate with him. 

However, both Golden and a black female co-worker, Vershaune Roscoe, stated that they

did not recall Kimball treating Roscoe differently than other employees. Roscoe testified that

Kimball respected her in her position and treated black people the same as white people. Even

Brown, when asked whether Kimball treated Roscoe differently than he treated white employees, 

said, “I can’t speak for her on that. All I can speak on is what I experienced while I worked with

Mr. Kimball.” (Brown dep. 41). She acknowledged that she never saw Kimball interact with

Roscoe in his office.

On Friday, October 7, 2011, Chekwa complained to Kimball about an incident that

occurred about 10:15 AM on the company’s smoking dock involving Chekwa and Tiffini Brown. 

 The facts about the incident are largely undisputed. A group of CRST employees—Chekwa,

Brown, Michael Gibbons, Dustin Knowles and Sarah Lovell—were outside during a work break

when Chekwa tossed a rock in Gibbons’s direction. Gibbons picked up the rock and tossed it

either back at Chekwa or aside, but Brown, who had been standing two to three feet away from

Gibbons and talking to him at the time of the “toss,” saw nothing playful about the incident. 

Rather, Brown became mad and upset, insisting that Chekwa had nearly hit her knee with the

rock. Brown later acknowledged that she did not know whether Chekwa intended to hit her and

did not know whether he was throwing the rock toward her or toward Gibbons. 

After he threw the rock, Brown asked Chekwa, who by then was standing three- to fivefeet away from her, to back away, and she claimed that Chekwa failed to follow her instruction

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but instead “stood in front of me as if he were mocking me.” (Brown statement dated 10/7/11;

Doc. 24-1, at 50). Chekwa was 6'3" tall and weighed 200 pounds compared to Brown, who was

5'4' and weighed 118 pounds. The situation escalated as Brown began yelling for Erica Aaron, 

an African American female who was Recruiting Coordinator, to “get [Chekwa] out of my face.” 

Brown told Aaron in front of the co-workers: “you better get out here and get your boy T.C. or

I’m gonna put my foot up his ass.” (Doc. 23, at 9). Brown acknowledges cursing at Chekwa,

calling him a “mother-fucker,” and stating something to the effect that she would stick her foot

up his ass. (Invest. Form, doc. 24-1, at 53). In the meantime, no dispute exists that Chekwa

remained calm and tried to explain to Brown that he had never intended to throw the rock at her. 

On the day of the incident, Kimball heard about the incident and immediately notified

CRST’s HR department about it. Chekwa did not submit a formal complaint about the incident.

Determining that the incident required investigation, one of the HR leadership—either Lisa

Oetken, Employee Relations Manager, or Angela Stastny, HR director— promptly asked

Kimball to obtain statements from Chekwa, Brown, and witnesses to the incident on the smoking

dock.

Stastny testified, based on the dates of the statements received, that by the afternoon of

October 7, HR had received statements from Chekwa; Brown; Shafton Reese, the interim

Recruiting Supervisor; Michael Gibbons, a Recruiter who was one of the witnesses to the

incident on the smoking dock; Dustin Knowles, another witness; and Golden. Kimball did not

ask Brown directly for a statement or speak to Brown directly about the incident, but relayed the

request for her statement through Golden. Some of the employees provided their statements to

Kimball to forward to HR and some sent their statements directly to HR. The witness statements

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indicate that no real dispute exists about the general facts surrounding the rock incident; all

confirmed that the incident began when Chekwa tossed a rock in the area where Gibbons and

Brown were standing and that Brown became irate and began cursing Chekwa. Several

witnesses recall her making the statement that she would put her foot up/in his ass. 

On Monday, October 10, at the request of Golden, Lovell sent an email to Brown with a

copy to Golden, giving her version of the October 7 incident. This recounting supports Brown’s

statement that the rock Chekwa threw almost hit Brown and that Chekwa continued to stand

about four feet from Brown after she repeatedly asked him to back off. CRST did not provide

this statement to the EEOC when Brown later filed an EEOC complaint.

In addition to receiving the witness statements as part of the investigation into the rock

incident, Stastny and Oetken interviewed Chekwa and Brown in separate video conferences. On

Tuesday, October 11, 2011, Chekwa was interviewed.

On Monday, October 10, 2011, an accident occurred in the yard at CRST. Brown,

Kimball and two white employees, Brian Brown and Amanda Work, went outside to investigate

the accident. According to Tiffini Brown, Kimball conversed with Brian Brown and Work but

ignored Tiffini Brown’s statements and refused to speak with her. Following this incident, which

occurred the day before her own interview with HR, Brown sent an email to Stastny with a copy

to Golden raising her concerns about Kimball’s treatment of her. It states as follows:

Angie,

I have some concerns that I would like to discuss with you. I don’t know what

the issue Harry Kimball has with me but there is one. Since his third day here

and couple of time thereafter he called me “Trouble” don’t know why or where

it came from. Over the past two weeks he has not said one word to me. He

speaks and converses with everyone else in the department and others but has

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blatant disregard for me and my function in the department.

Last Monday there was an issue where he approved a driver that wasn’t in hiring

guidelines and I brought it to his attention he seemed to get upset by me

bringing it to him. After he instructed us to do so. In no way was I trying to

“call him to the carpet.” Afterwards I asked him if he wanted me to review

driver MVR’s for recruiting and he told me “no I will handle that.” That is one

of my job duties and I have been doing since Chuck was here. Since there is

some animosity from him to me and it is making this hard for me to do my job. 

Thursday I was standing in the recruiting department talking to a couple of

people and he walked by me not a word and turned his body in a direction as if

he was trying to avoid any contact with me.

Friday there was an incident with a recruiter and he made no attempts to hear

from me what happened or make sure that I was ok. To me he sided with the

recruiter and all fingers were pointed at me and I did nothing wrong. I don’t

understand it.

Today there was an accident on the yard involving two owner operators. Brian,

Amanda, and I were walking outside we meet [sic] Harry at the door. We were

walking out there and I was trying to talk to him about calling the police and he

completely ignored me. When we got around to the trucks he talked to Brian

and Amanda (continued to ignore me) and I was trying to speak to him as well. 

That really bothers me.

I feel as if he is out to terminate me for whatever reason he can seem necessary

to find. He doesn’t discuss anything with me concerning the department or my

team, he overlooks me or ignores my presence. I know for sure that I have not

wronged or disrespect [sic] him in any form or fashion. Others in the

department have noticed his attitude towards me. I feel like an odd ball and

don’t think its [sic] fair. 

I have contemplated long & hard about discussing this with him but I am not

comfortable speaking to him at all about my concerns.

I am not trying to stick my neck on the chopping block but I have been here

since January and no one has had an issue with working with me. I get along

with everyone and perform my job effectively. Chuck appointed me as a Team

Leader because of my performance. I am a professional and respect him the

same. I would like to resolve any issue if there is one because we do have to

work together and he is my direct supervisor.

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Have a wonderful day.

(Doc. 24-1, at 51, Ex. 6). 

On Tuesday afternoon, October 11, 2011, Stastny responded to Brown’s email and asked

if she were available the next morning for a conference. 

On Wednesday, October 12, 2011, Oetken and Stastny interviewed Brown by video-web

conference at approximately 8:30 AM, and Oetken took notes. According to those notes, 

Brown started the interview by focusing on Kimball’s treatment of her, explaining how Kimball,

who had brought the rock incident to HR’s attention, treated her differently than other

employees. She also reiterated matters discussed in her October 10 email, such as Kimball’s

recent refusal to communicate with her directly. Brown stated to Oetken and Stastny that she felt

Kimball and the recruiters discriminated against her and retaliated against her. Brown tied her

complaints of discrimination and retaliation to her actions of making recruiters stick to CRST

hiring guidelines. She explained that when the drivers recruited did not meet the standards, she

would disqualify driver candidates, and when “she tells [recruiters] why the driver doesn’t meet

standards [ ] [t]hey blame her for not getting drivers [ ] hired.” (Doc. 24-1, at 54). 

In her deposition testimony, Brown elaborated on the claims she made to Stastny and

Oetken on October 12 of discrimination and retaliation:

[Brown]: And I told [Stastny], I said, I feel discriminated against. I feel like I’m under

attack for something that I did not do or I felt the need to protect myself, and I then told

her, I said I feel like I’m being retaliated against because I do my job very well and they

have the – they have an issue with me because they can’t go against the guidelines. I

respect them; they don’t respect me.

[Q]: That’s referring to recruiting?

[Brown]: Yes.

(Doc. 24-1, at 84-85). Brown reiterated that the basis of her claims of discrimination were the

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issues with Harry Kimball that she had outlined in her October 10 email to Stastny. Brown

acknowledged that she personally had never heard Kimball use a racially or sexually derogatory

term. 

As far as any discussion regarding gender-based discrimination, in the investigation

interview, Brown stated that “she could allege sexual harassment. She gets compliments that she

looks nice.” (Doc. 24-1, at 54). However, when asked repeatedly in her deposition to state the

basis for her discrimination and retaliation claims, Brown did not mention those compliments

and also did not refer to them in her brief’s statement of facts and argument. 

When Brown and Oetken discussed the rock incident itself, Brown admitted using the “f”

word multiple times during the incident, including calling Chekwa a “mother-fucker,” and

Brown acknowledged making the comment about wanting “to stick my foot up his ass.” (Doc.

29-25). She also acknowledged that she could not say Chekwa intended to hit her with the rock

and could not say whether he threw the rock toward her or Gibbons; she simply knew that it

came close to hitting her. Stastny testified that Chekwa had complained in his statement that

Brown referred to him as a monkey or Chewbacca, a large ape-like character from Star Wars, and

that Brown also treated him differently than other employees based on his color and national

origin. The briefs’ Statements of Facts reflect that Chekwa is African American but do not

reveal his national origin. Although she admitted joking around with Chekwa in the past, Brown

denied ever referring to him as a monkey or Chewbacca.

Stastny solicited statements from employees in the recruiting department, either directly

or indirectly, about incidents in which Brown may have treated Chekwa unfairly or any

inappropriate comments that Brown made. However, the HR department took no further action

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regarding Brown’s complaint against Kimball.

Based on the statements and interviews, CRST concluded that Brown had violated

CRST’s employment policy prohibiting threatening and disruptive behavior. In her deposition

testimony, Stastny explained that “She was disruptive and boisterous, but the primary reason [for

the termination] was threatening, threatening behavior due to that comment she admitted to

[making:] ‘I’m going to shove my foot up your ass.’” (Stastny Dep. Doc. 24-2, at 41, p. 157). 

The spreadsheet compiled by HR to show employee discipline reflects that “[Chekwa] accused

[Brown] of racially discriminatory names.” Stastny acknowledged that the discipline Brown

received was for her threatening and boisterous behavior, not for calling Chekwa racially

discriminatory names, and Stastny has no explanation for this “error” on the spreadsheet. 

The identity of the decision maker in Brown’s termination is in dispute. Although

Stastny testified in her deposition that she made the decision alone, CRST advised the EEOC in

two different documents that Jim Schommer, Director of Operations, was part of the decision

making process, and CRST stated in an Interrogatory Answer that Schommer was the decision

maker. Schommer also testified that he was present when Brown received the news of her

termination, but that Stastny was the decision maker. (Doc. 29-5, at 17 p. 63). 

On October 13, 2013, Brown met with Schommer and Kimball and Stastny, with Stastny

participating by telephone. Stastny advised Brown that CRST was terminating her because of her

boisterous and threatening behavior. Her termination documents state that the reason for her

termination was “Misconduct Fighting and threatening violence on 10/7.” (Doc. 29-19, at 11). 

During the meeting, Brown disagreed with the reason given for the termination, stating that the

real reason the company was firing her was because she filed a complaint against Kimball. 

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Stastny replied that the complaint against Kimball was irrelevant. 

CRST did not discipline Chekwa for the rock incident; he did receive an email

prohibiting him from throwing rocks at work. 

Although Golden testified that Kimball treated Brown differently than other employees,

she also testified that Kimball did not treat Vershaune Roscoe, a black female, differently than

other employees. Roscoe confirmed that Kimball did not treat her differently than other

employees.

On October 15, 2011, after her termination, Brown called Haffenden, who had held the

position of Safety Director before Kimball, and left a voice message referencing her termination

and asking if he could help her get her job back. Haffenden called Schommer, who advised him

that HR had conducted an investigation, made a determination, and Schommer would not support

bringing Brown back. Haffenden did not contact Kimball about Brown’s termination.

Haffenden called Brown back on October 16, 2011, advising her that he was unaware that

she had been terminated until after the fact; and he had not participated in the decision to fire her. 

According to Brown, Haffenden told her he had talked with HR and Schommer about rehiring

her and “would try to get me my job back.” When Brown asked Haffenden what Kimball’s

problem was with her, Haffenden responded “it’s because you’re an independent black woman. 

Some may see it as an asset. Others may see it as a threat.” (Brown Dep. Doc. 24-1, at 99-100).

Haffenden denied making the “independent black woman” statement, does not recall discussing

Kimball at all in his October 16 phone conversation with Brown, and testified that he did not

know Kimball well enough to make a judgment about Kimball’s motives.

On October 17, 2011, CRST hired two safety specialists, a white female and a black

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female. 

Company policy

Stastny testified that if an employee is found guilty of fighting or threatening violence in

the workplace, the employee is automatically terminated. 

CRST’s Office Employee Handbook listing Employment Policies and Practice includes

an EEO Policy Statement that the company provides equal employment opportunities; expressly

prohibits unlawful employee harassment based on race and sex, among other protected

characteristics; and provides a complaint procedure. That procedure encourages employees and

supervisors who become aware of prohibited discrimination to immediately notify an HR

representative, and it also requests that each complaint be put in writing so that it can receive

thorough investigation. The handbook also includes the following provisions.

DISCIPLINARY ACTION

***

Failure to abide by the rules, regulations and policies of the company may

justify disciplinary action, up to and including termination.

Disciplinary actions are generally progressive. The severity of the infractions

may justify immediate suspension or termination. The company reserves the

right to immediately terminate an employee if deemed appropriate or necessary

under the circumstances.

The following violations of company policy shall subject an employee to

disciplinary action. Violations are not limited to the following list.

***

• Fighting or threatening violence in the workplace

• Boisterous or disruptive activity in the workplace

***

VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE

Nothing is more important to the company than the safety and security of its

employees. Threats, threatening behavior, or acts of violence against

employees, visitors, guests, or other individuals by any employee is prohibited.

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Any person or employee who threatens (directly or indirectly), exhibits

threatening behavior, or engages in violent behavior or that which is considered

by the company as inappropriate while on company property shall be removed

from company premises as quickly as safety permits, and shall remain off

company premises pending the outcome of an investigation. The company will

initiate a decisive and appropriate response should the investigation substantiate

that a violation of this policy (by letter or in spirit) has occurred. This response

may include, but is not limited to, suspension and/or termination of any business

relationship, reassignment of job duties, suspension or termination or

termination of employment and/or seeking arrest and prosecution of the person

or persons involved.

All employees are responsible for notifying the Human Resources Director of

any threat, perceived threats, act of violence or other inappropriate behavior that

they have witnessed, received or have told of by another person. All employees

are responsible for making this report regardless of the nature of the relationship

between the individual who initiated the threat or threatening behavior and the

person or persons who were threatened or were the focus of threatening

behavior.

***

(Doc. 24-3, at 9, 16, & 19). 

Although CRST has two separate employee handbooks, one for drivers and another for

office personnel, both handbooks have policies against fighting and threatening behavior. 

Stastny testified that fighting or threatening violence in the workplace is a terminable offense for

both drivers and office personnel, as stated in both handbooks. (Stastny Dep. 68, 72, & 374). 

EEOC Charge

On March 6, 2014, Brown filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC checking the

boxes for discrimination based on race and sex, and retaliation. In that charge, Brown refers to

Kimball’s treatment of her, calling her “Trouble” instead of her name, ignoring her when she

came into his office, refusing to address her directly or take anything from her hand, and forcing

her to enlist Golden to accompany her to talk to Kimball. She states in the Charge that she

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complained to Haffenden about how Kimball treated her, and complained to Golden that Kimball

had a problem with black women. She stated she also complained to Stastny and Oetken that she

felt discriminated against based on race and gender, but they never addressed the issue and

focused instead on the rock incident with Chekwa. When the company terminated her, claiming

the action was based on her behavior during the rock incident, she told Stastny that the real

reason for her termination was her complaints against Kimball, a claim Stastny denied.

Comparators

Brown proffers evidence of CRST white employees who were written up for boisterous

behavior involving profanity, fighting and/or threats but whom CRST did not terminate for that

behavior: Mary Cooper—white female loudly referring to her workload as “this damn shit” and

“this bullshit”; Roy Bowers—white male calling the fleet manager “a fucking idiot” and “fucking

stupid”; Michael Dickerson—a white male whom a co-driver accused of playing offensive music

and making threatening remarks; John Henderson—a white male accused of threatening the life

of another employee; Travis Pruter—a white male accused of threatening violence; Richard

Herob—a white male accused of fighting or threatening violence; Casey Crabtree—a white male

accused of participating in a physical altercation; Ted Sams—a white male accused of being

involved in a verbal altercation; Alan Kronjak—a white male accused of being involved in a

verbal altercation; Virginia Paris—a white female accused of threats and sexual harassment;

James Snead—a white male accused of getting in someone’s face and threatening him; Michael

Trapp—a white male who was accused of assault; Thomas Watkins—a white male accused of

assault; Jefferey Jacobs—a white male who was accused of making physical threats. 

As for the discipline that CRST meted out for precise behavior, CRST records provide a

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code for employees leaving the company, explaining the reason for leaving. The spreadsheet

lists the terminations of Dickerson and Henderson as Code 28, which means they were

terminated for failing to meet company standards, not misconduct. The spreadsheet lists Herob

and Pruter’s termination as Code 7, which means they were terminated for failing to show up for

work. The spreadsheet lists the termination of Sams, Paris, Trapp, Watkins, Jacobs and Crabtree

as voluntary. Snead’s termination was listed as Code 33, which means he abandoned his load. 

As the codes on the spreadsheets demonstrate, all of the white employees listed in the preceding

paragraph were written up for threatening conduct but the codes reflect that none was terminated

for that conduct.

Stastny testified that the company may or may not have an employee relations file on

employees who were disciplined. She also stated that she could not determine from the

spreadsheet whether an investigation was required and conducted nor could she tell from the

spreadsheets whether the drivers were independent contractors or employees.

CRST records do not reflect that any of these accusations were determined to be

unfounded and further do not reflect the race of the employee in question, or that the person

making the discipline decision knew their race. At the time the report about these employees was

generated, some of these employees still worked for CRST and some had been terminated or left

voluntarily.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is an integral part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary

judgment allows a trial court to decide cases when no genuine issues of material fact are present

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. When a

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district court reviews a motion for summary judgment it must determine two things: (1) whether

any genuine issues of material fact exist; and if not, (2) whether the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). The moving party can meet this burden by offering

evidence showing no dispute of material fact or by showing that the non-moving party’s evidence

fails to prove an essential element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Rule 56, however, does not require “that the moving party support

its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its burden of showing the district court that no genuine

issues of material fact exist, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party “to demonstrate that

there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.” Clark v. Coats &

Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Disagreement between the parties is not

significant unless the disagreement presents a “genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986) Substantive law determines which facts are

material and which are irrelevant. Id. at 248. In responding to a motion for summary judgment,

the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as

to the material fact.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586

(1986). The non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by

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the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e)); see also Advisory Committee Note to 1963 Amendment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), 28

U.S.C. app. (“The very mission of summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to

assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.”). “The non-moving

party need not present evidence in a form admissible at trial; however, he may not merely rest on

his pleadings.” Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999)

(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). If he does, or if the evidence is “merely colorable, or is not

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50

(citations omitted). 

In reviewing the evidence submitted, the court must “view the evidence presented

through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden,” to determine whether the nonmoving

party presented sufficient evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving

party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir.

1988). The court must refrain from weighing the evidence and making credibility

determinations, because these decisions fall to the province of the jury. See Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 255; Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins. Co., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2000); Graham v.

State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, all evidence and

inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Graham, 193 F.3d at 1282. The non-moving party “need not be given the

benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference.” Id. The evidence of the nonmoving party “is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” 

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. After both parties have addressed the motion for summary judgment,

the court must grant the motion if no genuine issues of material fact exist and if the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

Even if a district court “‘believes that the evidence presented by one side is of doubtful

veracity, it is not proper to grant summary judgment on the basis of credibility choices.’”

Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v.

Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006)). The court should not disregard self-serving

statements made in sworn testimony simply because they are self-serving at the summary

judgment stage, and if the self-serving statements create a genuine issue of material fact, the

court should deny summary judgment on that basis. Id. at 1253. 

IV. DISCUSSION

Brown’s Complaint presents the following claims: Count One - Discriminatory Discipline

based on Race and Gender, and Hostile Work Environment, all brought pursuant to Title VII;

Count Two - Race Discrimination, and possibly Hostile Work Environment, brought pursuant to

§ 1981; and Count Three - Retaliation based on race brought pursuant to Title VII and § 1981,

and Retaliation based on gender brought pursuant to Title VII. The court will address these

claims separately.

A. Race Discrimination

Brown asserts claims of race discrimination, or a combination of race and sex

discrimination, based upon a disparate application of disciplinary rules, brought pursuant to both

Title VII and § 1981. Because the standards of proof and analytical elements are the same under

both statutes, the court will analyze them concurrently under the same framework. See, e.g.,

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Jimenez v. Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Standard v. ABEL

Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998)). As Brown does not present direct evidence

of discrimination, she relies upon the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) to present a case based on circumstantial evidence. 

Under that framework, to establish a prima facie case for disparate treatment based on

race in a disciplinary matter, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she is a member of a protected class;

(2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) her employer treated similarly

situated employees outside of her protected class more favorably than she was treated; and (4)

she was qualified to do the job.” Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th

Cir. 2006). CRST challenges elements two and three.

Element Two: Adverse Employment Action

CRST argues that Brown cannot establish an adverse employment action, stating “[a]part

from her discharge, Ms. Brown only complains that Mr. Kimball ignored her or treated her

rudely.” (Doc. 23, at 22). That statement is akin to saying “apart from your husband’s

assassination, Mrs. Lincoln, did you enjoy the play?” Brown’s discharge is unquestionably an

adverse employment action and any attempt to argue otherwise is not appropriate advocacy; the

court FINDS that she has established element two of her prima facie case. 

Element Three: Similarly Situated Comparator

CRST also argues that Brown has failed to establish element three because she has not

provided evidence of a similarly situated comparator. When addressing the “similarly situated”

element in a discriminatory discipline case, the court must evaluate “‘whether the employees are

involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways.’” 

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Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir.

1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted)). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that the

proffered comparator must be “similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Holifield v. Reno, 115

F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). “The quantity and quality of the comparator’s misconduct

should be nearly identical.” Stone & Webster Const., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 684 F.3d 1127,

1135 (11th Cir. 2012) . The Court of Appeals also pointed to “[t]he most important factors in the 1

disciplinary context[:] the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments

imposed.” Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations and citations

omitted).

As to similarly situated white comparators, Defendants argue that Brown has only

presented one white comparator, Mary Cooper, and that Cooper is not similarly situated because

she cursed but did not direct her cursing at another employee. This argument perplexes the court

because it mischaracterizes the evidence. 

Brown has presented a number of potential white comparators, including white males and

white females, who, she claims, were similarly situated to Brown in that company records in

 The court acknowledges Brown’s argument that the “nearly identical” standard set forth 1

in Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 199) and Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., Fla.,

447 F.3d 1319, 1323 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2006) should not govern, and Brown cites as support for her

argument a district court opinion, Terpo v. RBC Bank, No. 12-2325-VEH, 2013 WL 5519704, *8

n. 17) N.D. Ala. Oct. 2, 2013). However, the court rejects that argument, noting that, in 2012,

the Eleventh Circuit addressed head-on in its Stone & Webster decision the argument against

applying the “nearly identical” standard. In that decision, the Court of Appeals stated that it had

resolved that conflict in favor of the “nearly identical” standard, and had expressly set aside the

case that did not rely on that standard. In Stone & Webster, the Eleventh Circuit applied once

again the “nearly identical” standard. 684 F.3d at 1135. Given that clear direction, unless and

until the Eleventh Circuit specifically advises this court to apply another standard, the court will

apply the “nearly identical” standard.

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CRST Employee Relations Spreadsheets reflect that they threatened other employees with

physical violence on at least one occasion. Stastny, whom CRST now identifies as the decision

maker, explained that the primary reason CRST terminated Brown was her threatening behavior

on one occasion—her threat that the Recruiting Supervisor better get Chekwa away from her “or

I’m gonna put my foot up his ass”—a statement Stastny interpreted as one for physical violence. 

Although profanity accompanied Brown’s behavior, Stastny’s testimony about the primary

reason for the termination is consistent with the Human Resources Change Notice documenting

Brown’s termination, which lists the reason for the termination as “Misconduct Fighting and

threatening violence on 10/7.” The termination notice does not mention the profanity. 

The CRST Employee Relations Spreadsheets reflect that the proffered comparators

threatened other employees with physical violence on at least one occasion. For example, the

spreadsheet entry on Henderson reflects that he “threatened Martinez’ [sic] life”; Pruter’s entry

reflects that he was written up for a “Threat of violence”; and the entry on Jacobs says he made

“physical threats.” The court finds these comparators who made physical threats to be “nearly

identical” within the meaning of the term. Because Brown is a 115-pound woman and Chekwa

is a much larger man, the threat—to “put her foot up his ass”—is not one where the person

threatened was reasonably in fear of bodily harm. Therefore, in analyzing similarly situated

comparators, the court focuses only on the fact of a threat of violence. 

The court finds disingenuous CRST’s argument that the information in the Employee

Relations spreadsheets listing employee disciplinary matters is not evidence that Brown can

appropriately rely upon for the purposes of summary judgment. Stastny testified that the primary

reason for the termination was Brown’s threats to Chekwa, a threat she interpreted as one for

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physical violence. CRST argues that the spreadsheet information is “informal” for internal use by

HR and that it does not give enough specific information about each disciplinary matter to

establish that the matters on the spreadsheet are nearly identical to the disciplinary matter in the

instant case. CRST further argues that the company may have determined, after investigation,

that some of the matters on the spreadsheet represented unfounded accusations of misconduct.

The court disagrees with CRST’s argument that the spreadsheet is not evidence

sufficiently establishing comparator misconduct at the summary judgment stage. CRST is the

entity doing the documenting. CRST provided enough documentation to present a list of

employees with nearly identical behavior (threats) with a dissimilar outcome (no resulting

termination). If CRST had further information about the results of the internal investigation of

the threats that would show the incidents were not nearly identical, then it should have provided

that information in discovery and presented that information at summary judgment. In addition,

if CRST had information to show that employees listed on the spreadsheet were African

American and were not terminated for misconduct similar to that of Brown, it had an opportunity

to present that evidence during discovery and to the court at summary judgment, but the briefs’

Statements of Fact do not include such information. Brown has presented to the court enough

evidence to establish her prima facie case based on a number of white employees and/or

employees who were not black females who were written up for threatening behavior but who

were not terminated.

That said, the court agrees with CRST that Mary Cooper is not a similarly situated

comparator. Stastny testified that the primary reason for the termination was Brown’s threats to

Chekwa, a threat she interpreted as one for physical violence. Accordingly, the white employees

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reported to HR as threatening physical violence at CRST but who were not terminated would

represent similarly situated comparators based on what is before the court at this summary

judgment stage. Cooper and Roy Bowers, another white comparator, cursed but did not threaten;

thus, they and the white employees who did not commit nearly identical behavior are not

appropriate comparators. However, Brown meets her prima facie case by presenting other

similarly situated comparators who were white and/or who were not black females, and who

threatened co-workers with physical violence but were not terminated.

As to male comparators, the court notes that a number of the comparators listed above

who exhibited threatening behavior were male, and it FINDS that Brown has met her prima facie

case by presenting similarly situated male comparators. 

Because Brown has established her prima facie case on the discriminatory discipline

claim, CRST must articulate a non-discriminatory reason for firing Brown. See St. Mary’s

Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). In its briefs, CRST argues that Brown has not

established her prima facie case, and does not provide an alternative argument regarding pretext;

therefore, CRST gives a non-discriminatory reason for the termination—Brown’s conduct of

threatening violence—but it does not give a non-discriminatory reason for disciplining her

differently than other employees who threatened violence. In other words, it gives a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her but that reason fails to explain why it terminated Brown

but not others who engaged in the same behavior. In any event, to the extent, if any, that CRST

has met its burden to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination, the

court FINDS that Brown has met that reason head on and shown pretext for the reasons discussed

below.

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To show pretext, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s “proffered reason was

not the true reason for the employment decision.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs. v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 256 (1981). She must “confront the employer’s seemingly legitimate reason for [the

adverse employment action ] ‘head on and rebut it.’” Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 

1206 (11th Cir. 2013). To do so, she must “cast sufficient doubt on the defendant’s proffered ...

reasons to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer’s proffered ‘legitimate

reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct.’” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d

1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Cooper-Houston v. Southern Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 605

(11th Cir. 1994)). She can do that by demonstrating “‘such weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons

for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.’” Combs, 106

F.3d at 1538 (quoting Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1072 (3rd. Cir.

1996)). However, a plaintiff “‘cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that

reason ....’” Kidd, 731 F.3d at 1206 (quoting Chapman v. AI Tranport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030

(11th Cir. 2000)); see Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1341 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t

is not the court’s role to second-guess the wisdom of an employer’s decisions as long as the

decisions are not [] motivated [by discrimination or retaliation]”).

In the instant case, Brown has presented evidence of inconsistencies in disciplining

Brown versus white employees, male employees, and employees who are not black females who

exhibited the same behavior. She also argues that the harsh discipline of termination makes no

sense when no one could reasonably characterize her words to Chekwa as a true threat of

violence. Rather, her words about sticking her “foot up [Chekwa’s] ass” represented an empty

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figure of speech instead of a serious threat, particularly given that she was a petite girl and

Chekwa was 200 pounds and over six feet tall. Thus, Brown has cast sufficient doubt on the

non-discriminatory reason to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the reason for her

termination was pretext for discrimination. The court notes that CRST has provided evidence

that Kimball and safety and recruiting department employees were frustrated at Brown for doing

her job well and strictly adhering to company hiring guidelines, as further discussed below. 

However, that evidence would not explain why the decision makers, Stastny and/or or

Schommer, treated Brown differently. Accordingly, the court FINDS that the motion for

summary judgment is due to be DENIED as to the claim for discriminatory discipline in Count

One.

Because the standards of proof and analytical elements are the same under Title VII and §

1981, the court also FINDS that the motion for summary judgment is due to be DENIED as to

the claim for discriminatory discipline in Count Two brought pursuant to § 1981.

B. Hostile Work Environment

Brown also alleges in Count One that she “has been discriminated and harassed because

of her gender and has further been subjected to unequal treatment, terms and pay thus subjecting

Plaintiff to a hostile work environment because of her gender.” (Compl. doc. 1, at 7). In her

brief, Brown characterizes the work environment as a hostile one based on race and gender. She

points to evidence of Kimball’s treatment as supporting a hostile work environment. As

discussed previously, Brown provides evidence that Kimball addressed Brown as “Trouble,”

instead of her name, but acknowledges that she saw no racial or gender connotations in that

moniker. In addition, Brown provides evidence that, after she questioned Kimball’s hiring a

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driver as outside the hiring guidelines, Kimball began ignoring her and stopped communicating

with Brown directly, using Golden, a white female, as an intermediary. Brown also provided

evidence that Kimball’s refusal to deal with her was so complete and disruptive to work

communication that Brown asked Golden to accompany her to Kimball’s office when Brown

needed to communicate with him. She provided further evidence that Kimball was the

employee who lodged the complaint about the incident between Brown and Chekwa that led to

her termination. 

To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment, brought pursuant to Title

VII, a plaintiff must show 

(1) that [s]he belongs to a protected group; (2) that [s]he has been subject to

unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment must have been based on a

protected characteristic of the employee . . .; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a

discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that the employer is

responsible for such environment under either a theory of vicarious or of direct

liability. 

Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). 

In the instant case, CRST challenges elements three and four, arguing that no evidence

ties the harassment to race and sex and that the harassment was not sufficiently severe or

pervasive. 

Element Three: Harassment Based on Race and Gender

As to element three, CRST argues that although the evidence reflects Kimball did treat

Brown differently than other employees, it also reflects that the difference in treatment was not

based on race or gender. In support of its argument, CRST points to evidence that (1) Kimball

treated another black female with whom he worked daily, Vershaune Roscoe, no differently than

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he treated the white employees; (2) Kimball treated Golden, a female, no differently than he

treated male employees; and (3) that the deterioration of Kimball’s relationship with Brown

occurred about the time she called him out on hiring a driver outside company hiring guidelines. 

Brown’s own email to HR complaining of Kimball’s treatment mentions and implies a link with

the hiring guideline incident but does not mention race or gender discrimination. In fact, that

email includes the statement that Kimball treated Brown differently than everyone else in the

department. Because the department included another black female, this statement that Brown is

the only one he treated differently is very significant.

Further, in her interview with Stastny, Brown does use the words “discrimination” and

“retaliation” but the context of those words is important: a careful reading shows that she is

complaining of unfair treatment not because of race or gender but because her co-workers are

mad at her for making them adhere to company hiring guidelines. As she explained to Stastny: “I

feel discriminated against. I feel like I’m under attack for something that I did not do or I felt the

need to protect myself, and I then told her, I said I feel like I’m being retaliated against because I

do my job very well and they have the – they have an issue with me because they can’t go against

the guidelines.” Thus, when placed in context, her complaints point to a reason for differential

treatment that has nothing to do with race and gender. 

Title VII and § 1981 do not protect against all differential treatment in the employment

context. They certainly do not protect against differential treatment based on co-worker

frustration at being held to strict hiring guidelines. Rather, they only protect against unlawful

differential treatment such as treatment based on race and/or gender. Brown’s use of the words

“discrimination” and “retaliation” does not automatically invoke protection under Title VII: she

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must provide some more information indicating that the discrimination and retaliation is

unlawful. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (stating “It shall be an unlawful employment practice

for an employer ... to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual ... because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....”)

(emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 2003-3(a) (providing that “It shall be an unlawful employment

practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because [the employee]

has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title. . . .”) (emphasis

added).

The only evidence that Brown offers as tying her different treatment to race and gender is

(1) Kimball’s favorable treatment of Golden, a white woman, and Kimball’s better treatment of

Brown when Golden accompanied her to Kimball’s office; and (2) Vice President Haffenden’s

response to Brown’s question, after her termination, about why Kimball had a problem with her: 

“it’s because you’re an independent black woman. Some may see it as an asset. Others may see

it as a threat.” 

As to the different treatment of Brown versus Golden, that treatment is consistent with

the non-discriminatory reason presented for Kimball’s treatment, because no evidence exists that

Golden made Kimball mad by advising him that he had hired a driver outside the company hiring

guidelines. Further, because no evidence exists that Kimball treated Roscoe, the other black

woman in his department, differently than white or male employees, any assumption that

Kimball’s differential treatment of Brown was based on race and gender is not a reasonable one. 

As to Haffenden’s “independent black woman” response, whether Haffenden made this

statement is a disputed fact. However, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, the

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court must assume for the purposes of summary judgment that Haffenden did make the

statement. Nevertheless, that assumption does not mean that the court must accept that statement

as admissible evidence of a link between Kimball’s treatment of Brown and discrimination based

on race and gender. The evidence reflects that Haffenden, the former safety director, and

Kimball, who took his place, only had a two-week overlap in the Trussville office before the

relationship between Brown and Kimball deteriorated. No evidence exists that Brown

communicated Kimball’s maltreatment of her during that period or that Haffenden personally

witnessed Kimball’s differential treatment of Brown, or indeed, differential treatment of any

black female employee, black employee, or female employee. No evidence exists that

Haffenden heard Kimball say any words indicating a bias against black women, blacks, or

females. Notably, Haffenden did not participate in the harassment of Brown, did not discuss the

harassment of Brown or her termination with Kimball, was not involved in the termination of

Brown, was not aware of the termination until after it had occurred, and did not discuss the

termination with Kimball after the fact. Further, no evidence exists that Haffenden and

Schommer discussed Kimball during their October phone conversation. 

On motions for summary judgment, the court may consider only evidence that “can be

reduced to an admissible form.” Rowell v. BellSouth Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 800 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Under these circumstances, any statement that Haffenden may have made about Kimball’s

motives for harassment and differential treatment of Brown would not be reducible to admissible

form; it was a mere inadmissible opinion of a person who did not participate in the harassment,

personally witness it, or discuss the harassment with the harasser. See Rowell, 433 F.3d at 800

(affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer in a discrimination suit when the

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alleged dispute of fact regarding the employment decision was the inadmissible personal opinion

of defendant’s employee about the decision and when that employee did not participate in the

decision or policy); Williams v. Hager Hinge Co., 916 F. Supp. 1163, 1168 (M.D. Ala. 1995)

(“[b]ald conclusions, opinions, and hearsay without supporting specific facts are not admissible

and do not create a genuine issue of material fact”) (citing Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d

984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985)); see also Kidd , 731 F.3d at 1209-1211 (remanding the case to the

district court that granted motion for summary judgment to make a ruling on the admissibility of

the declarant’s statement regarding the employer’s decision making process, but acknowledging

that if the declarant did not participate in the decision making process, his opinion of the

employment decision is inadmissible and summary judgment would be appropriate). 

 Because Haffenden’s response is the only link with race and gender and because that

response is inadmissible opinion, the court FINDS that Haffenden’s response does not create a

genuine issue of material fact that Kimball’s harassment of Brown was based on race and/or

gender. In light of this ruling, the court need not and does not address any other elements of

Brown’s prima facie case or the pretext argument. Accordingly, the motion for summary

judgment is due to be GRANTED as to the claim for hostile work environment based on race

and/or gender brought pursuant to Title VII in Count One, and as to the claim for hostile work

environment based on race brought pursuant to § 1981 in Count Two, to the extent that claim

exists.

C. Count Three: Retaliatory Termination Under Title VII and § 1981

In Count Three, Brown asserts that her termination was in retaliation for complaining

about Kimball’s harassment of her. 

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To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show “(1) that she engaged

in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) there

was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Kidd, 731 F.3d

at 1211. If the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the employer must articulate a

legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the challenged action, and, if it does so, then plaintiff has the

burden to establish that the employer’s proffered reason for that action was pretext for retaliation.

Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001). 

In the instant case, CRST challenges elements one and three.

Element One: Protected Activity

Brown argues that she engaged in two incidences of protected activity before her

termination: her October 10 email to Stastny; and her October 12 meeting with Stastny and

Oetken. As discussed previously, Brown’s October 10 email complained of differential

treatment but tied that treatment to Brown’s adherence to hiring guidelines instead of race and/or

gender discrimination. Further, Brown used the words “discrimination” and “retaliation” in her

October 12 meeting but, again, did not complain of unlawful discrimination and retaliation based

on race or gender. As discussed, she tied the differential treatment to her adherence to hiring

guidelines, not to her race and/or gender. 

Recent decisions of the Eleventh Circuit, although unpublished, have provided instruction

on the level of specificity needed in the alleged protected conduct to ensure that it qualifies

under Title VII’s opposition clause. In Brown v. City of Opelika, the Eleventh Circuit addressed

a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on a Title VII retaliation

claim. At the district court level, the employee had asserted that she engaged in protected

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conduct when she stated to a superior that she “wanted to make a complaint of ‘harassment.’” 

No. 05-CV-236-W, 2006 WL 1515836, *4 (M.D. Ala. May 30, 2006). In affirming, the Court of

Appeals explained that “the record contained no evidence that Brown engaged in a protected

activity by making a complaint about racial discrimination or harassment. . . . Brown admitted

that she never mentioned the word ‘race’ when she complained about Kirby’s behavior, that she

had no knowledge of Kirby making any racially derogatory comments, and that Kirby took out

her anger on everyone, including the white office assistant.” Further, the employee “never

voiced a complaint that the City was engaged in an unlawful employment practice.” 211 Fed.

Appx. 862, 863-4 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (emphasis added).

In Jeronimus v. Polk Cnty. Opportunity Council, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that the emails

plaintiff sent—one casually mentioning a “white boy” comment and another complaining that he

was being “‘singled out,’ was subjected to ‘a campaign of harassment,’ and was working in a

‘hostile environment’”—did not constitute protected activity. The Court of Appeals explained

that the “‘white boy’ comments were isolated, ephemeral, and ambiguous” and that in plaintiff’s

other complaints “he never suggested that this treatment was in any way related to his race or

sex.’” 145 Fed. Appx. 319, 326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

Applying these decisions and their instruction regarding protected conduct, the court

FINDS that Brown’s communications of October 10 and 12 do not constitute protected conduct

because she never suggested that Kimball’s treatment was in any way related to her race and/or

gender.

Because Brown has not established that she engaged in protected conduct before her

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termination, she has failed to meet element one of her prima facie case of retaliation, and the

motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED as to the retaliation claim brought

pursuant to Title VII and § 1981.

Element Three: Causal Connection

CRST also challenges Brown’s proof of a causal connection between the protected

conduct and her termination. Because of the court’s ruling on protected conduct element, the

court need not address other elements. However, in an abundance of caution, the court addresses

the causal connection element to provide the following ruling as an alternative means of granting

summary judgment on the retaliation claim. 

In the recent decision of Univ. of Tex. SW Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct.

2517 (2013), the Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff making a retaliation claim under § 2000e3(a) must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse

action by the employer.” Id. at 2534. Nassar was a Title VII case, and thus, the “but-for”

standard of causation would apply to the Title VII claim of retaliation. Brown also asserts a

claim for retaliation under § 1981, and, as noted previously, the Eleventh Circuit has explained

that the analysis for Title VII and § 1981 retaliation claims are the same. See Goldsmith v.

Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). Although the Goldsmith decision 

occurred before the Nassar decision, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Nassar would favor

application of the “but-for” standard to the § 1981retaliation claim as well. The Court explained

that “absent an indication to the contrary in the statute itself,” but-for causation is “the default

rule[ ]” that Congress is presumed to incorporate into a statute creating an intentional tort unless

Congress specifies another causation standard, as it did in Title VII’s § 2000e-2(m) but not in its

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anti-retaliation provision of § 2000e-3(a). 

With this guidance in mind, the court applies the “but-for” causation standard to Brown’s

retaliation claim under § 1981 as well as the Title VII retaliation claim. This application is

consistent with decisions of district courts in the Eleventh Circuit that have addressed § 1981

claims after Nassar. See, e.g., Shumate v. Selma City Bd. of Educ., No. 11-00078-CG, 2013 WL

5758699, at *2-3 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 2013); Parker v. Chilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 12-0650-

MEF, 2014 WL 116341 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 2014).

CRST argues that Brown’s misconduct of threatening and boisterous conduct occurred

before the protected conduct, and that CRST had already begun its investigation into her

misconduct when she engaged in the alleged protected conduct. CRST further points the court to

the unreported decision of Smith v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, No. 06-966-ID, 2008 WL

1698207 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 9, 2008) in which a sister district court granted the employer’s motion

for summary judgment under similar circumstances in a retaliation case; the employee’s

misconduct resulting in termination occurred before the protected conduct “but also the wheels

for Plaintiff’s termination already had been set in motion by the time Plaintiff made his internal

complaint. The court found that the company “was not expected to halt or forego its disciplinary

proceedings imply because, on the heels of [the company’s] contemplated termination of

Plaintiff, Plaintiff screamed retaliation.” Id. at 12.

In the instant case, the court FINDS, as an alternative ruling, that Brown cannot show her

statements about “discrimination” and “retaliation” in the period of October 10-12, 2011 were 

the “but-for” reason for her termination. Her complaints occurred after the investigation had

begun into her alleged misconduct on October 7 and after the company had obtained

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investigative statements from the other witnesses. Like the fact scenario in Smith, the wheels for

her discipline had already been set in motion by the time Brown made her ambiguous assertions

that she now characterizes as protected conduct. As the Supreme Court of the United States

explained in Clark County School District v. Breeden, “[e]mployers need not suspend previously

planned [discipline] upon discovering that a Title VII suit has been filed, and their proceeding

along lines previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence

whatever of causality.” 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001). Even assuming arguendo that Brown’s

statements during the period of October 10-12, 2011 constitute protected conduct—and the court

does not hold that they do—she has not established evidence of causality, and she most certainly

has not established the but-for causality required for a prima facie case of retaliation.

For all of these reasons, the court FINDS that the motion for summary judgment is due to

be GRANTED as to Brown’s claims for retaliation, brought pursuant to Title VII and § 1981.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated below, the court FINDS that CRST’s motion for summary

judgment is due to be GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART. More specifically, the court

FINDS

• the motion is due to be DENIED as to the claims in Count One for discrimination based

race and/or gender, brought pursuant to Title VII; 

• the motion is due to be GRANTED as to the claims in Count One for hostile work

environment based on race and/or gender, brought pursuant to Title VII;

• the motion is due to be DENIED as to the claims in Count Two for discrimination based

on race, brought pursuant to § 1981; 

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• the motion is due to be GRANTED as to the claims in Count Two for hostile work

environment based on race, brought pursuant to § 1981; 

• the motion is due to be GRANTED as to the claims for retaliation brought pursuant to

Title VII and § 1981.

The court will enter a separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated this 17th day of August, 2014.

 ____________________________________

 KARON OWEN BOWDRE

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

 

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