Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_03-cv-00608/USCOURTS-almd-2_03-cv-00608-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2003 Job Discrimination

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

ALBERTA FLOYD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

) 2:03cv608-T

ELMORE COUNTY BOARD OF ) (WO)

EDUCATION, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This cause of action is before the court on the

plaintiff’s objections to the defendants’ bill of costs.

The defendants have submitted costs totaling $2,261.02. The

majority of those costs ($2,054.60) was for depositions.

The defendants took one deposition–-that of the plaintiff–-

and purchased copies of the nine depositions taken by the

plaintiff. Copies of these bills were provided to the

court. The remaining costs of $206.42 are for obtaining

copies of the plaintiff’s bankruptcy petitions from the

bankruptcy court and for reproducing copies of the motions

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for summary judgment, and these bills have also been

submitted to the court. 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1), “costs other than

attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the

prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.... Such

costs may be taxed by the clerk on one day’s notice. On

motion served within 5 days thereafter, the action of the

clerk may be reviewed by the court.” Costs in the amount of

$2,261.02 were taxed against the plaintiff on June 10,

2004, and the plaintiff filed, within five business days, an

objection. Each of her arguments will be addressed in turn.

The plaintiff first points out that “the discretion

given district judges to tax costs should be sparingly

exercised with reference to expenses not specifically

allowed by statute,” Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S.

227, 235, 85 S.Ct. 411, 416 (1964); however the defendants’

costs are specifically allowed by statute.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1920(2) provides that a “judge or clerk of

any court of the United States may tax as costs ... [f]ees

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of the court reporter for all or any part of the

stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the

case.” “Taxation of deposition costs is authorized by §

1920(2).” U.S. E.E.O.C. v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 620

(11th Cir. 2000). Yet “where the deposition costs were

merely incurred for convenience, to aid in thorough

preparation, or for purposes of investigation only, the

costs are not recoverable.” Id. (quoting Goodwall Const. Co.

v. Beers Const. Co., 824 F.Supp. 1044, 1066 (N.D. Ga.

1992)). The court must therefore determine whether the

costs were necessarily obtained for this case. Id. 

Each of the deposition transcripts copied by the

defendants was for an individual listed on the plaintiff’s

witness list. “Taxation of deposition costs of witnesses on

the losing party's witness list is reasonable because the

listing of those witnesses indicated both that the plaintiff

might need the deposition transcripts to cross-examine the

witnesses and that ‘the information those people had on the

subject matter of this suit was not so irrelevant or so

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unimportant that their depositions were outside the bound of

discovery.’” Id. at 621 (quoting Independence Tube Corp. v.

Copperweld Corp., 543 F.Supp. 706, 718 (N.D. Ill. 1982))

(citation omitted). In addition, it seems self-evident that

the defendants’ deposition of the plaintiff was not merely

“for convenience.”

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1920(3) and (4) provide that a “A judge

or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs

... (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;

(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers

necessarily obtained for use in the case.” “[I]n evaluating

copying costs, the court should consider whether the

prevailing party could have reasonably believed that it was

necessary to copy the papers at issue.” U.S. E.E.O.C., 213

F.3d at 623. 

The defendants argue that costs of $206.42 should be

taxed to the plaintiff. These costs were incurred in order

to obtain from the bankruptcy court copies of the

plaintiff’s bankruptcy petitions, which were included in the

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defendants’ motion for summary judgment and in order to

provide copies of the motion and exhibits to the court and

opposing counsel. It would have been reasonable for the

defendants to assume that costs related to producing

exhibits for their briefs as well as expenses related to

serving documents upon the court and opposing counsel were

necessary. 

Finally, the plaintiff argues that the disparity in

economic resources between herself and the defendants as

well as the good faith in which her civil-rights suit was

brought should persuade the court not to tax costs against

her. She asserts that “an award of costs to the defendant

will only serve to discourage persons of limited resources

from pursuing civil remedies in federal court for legitimate

and meritorious claims of civil rights deprivations.”

Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendants’ Bill of Costs (doc.

no. 54), at p. 3. The Eleventh Circuit, however, has

clearly stated that “when awarding costs a district court

should not consider the relative wealth of the parties.

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Comparing the financial resources of the parties would

unduly prejudice parties with assets and undermine ‘the

presumption that Rule 54(d)(1) creates in prevailing

parties’ favor, and ... the foundation of the legal system

that justice is administered to all equally, regardless of

wealth or status.’” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012,

1039 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cherry v. Champion Int'l

Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir. 1999)). Moreover, the

plaintiff offers no valid precedent for her assertion that

her sincere belief in her cause of action together with the

nature of the suit–-a civil rights action–-justifies the

defendants’ bearing of their own costs. Regardless of the

purity of the plaintiff’s motives, her claims were summarily

dismissed. While it is true that “civil rights litigation

is seen ‘as very undesirable because it stigmatizes an

attorney as a “civil rights lawyer” and thus tends to deter

fee-paying clients, particularly high-paying commercial

clients, from seeking assistance from that lawyer,’” Medders

v. Autauga County Bd. of Educ., 858 F.Supp. 1118, 1128 (M.D.

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Ala. 1994) (quoting Stokes v. City of Montgomery, 706

F.Supp. 811, 815 (M.D. Ala. 1988)), this court sees no valid

ground for carving out exceptions from cost-shifting

statutes for lawyers based on their chosen field of

practice. It is unconvincing to argue that a lawyer should

receive perquisites for bringing an action that is summarily

dismissed simply because he has invoked certain statutes. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) The plaintiff’s objections to defendants’ bill of

costs (doc. no. 54) are overruled.

(2) Costs in the amount of $2,261.02 are taxed against

plaintiff. 

DONE, this the 3rd day of May, 2005.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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