Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00801/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00801-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Anthony Tyrone Campbell Sr. is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed September 11, 2014. 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

ANTHONY TYRONE CAMPBELL, SR.

 Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.:1:14-cv-00801-LJO-SAB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

RECOMMENDING ACTION PROCEED ON 

EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM ONLY AND ALL 

OTHER CLAIMS BE DISMISSED FROM THE 

ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF

[ECF No. 12] 

Case 1:14-cv-00801-DAD-SAB Document 13 Filed 09/19/14 Page 1 of 6
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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now 

higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive 

screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow 

the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely 

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names D. Aguinaga, D. Cardenas, T. Ramos, M. Barajas, J. Mendez, and C. Nevarez, 

as Defendants in this action. 

On July 3, 2013, while imprisoned at Pleasant Valley State Prison (PVSP), Plaintiff refused an 

incompatible housing assignment with an inmate returned to the facility from administrative 

segregation. Upon refusal of the direct order by correctional officers D. Cardenas and M. Barajas, D. 

Cardenas stated: “I don’t have time for this shit...” M. Barajas subsequently stated: “Campbell, if you 

don’t accept that individual to be your cellie I’m going to take all your personal property and make 

matters even wors[e] for you...” Plaintiff remained persistent in refusing the unreasonably suggested 

housing assignment, and requested to be placed in administrative segregation where he could discuss 

the housing assignment issue with a classification committee. Moments later Defendant D. Cardenas 

returned to the building, accompanied with Defendants T. Ramos, D. Aguinaga, and Sergeant J. 

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Mendez. These officers met with Defendant M. Barajas at the officer’s podium for approximately two 

minutes.

Upon conclusion of their discussion, the Defendants impulsively broke huddle and each of 

them headed up the stairs toward the shower where Plaintiff was confined. Their approach was 

aggressive and intimidating but Plaintiff remained humble and requested again to be placed in 

administrative segregation. 

Sergeant Mendez unlocked the shower and ordered Plaintiff to step out backward. Plaintiff 

complied and Defendant T. Ramos and D. Aguinaga moved forward and proceeded to escort Plaintiff 

along the tier as D. Cardenas and M. Barajas trailed behind.

As they approached the stairs which were adjacent to cells 202 and 203, where Plaintiff had 

been housed in cell 202 and eyewitness Matthews housed in 203, Plaintiff veered to the left toward the 

stairs anticipating to be escorted down but Defendants T. Ramos and D. Aguinaga grabbed Plaintiff 

and without warning pushed Plaintiff toward cell 202 attempting to physically force the housing 

assignment on him. 

However, Plaintiff was able to plant his feet firm enough to keep from being forced inside the 

cell, and simultaneously managed to prone out on the tier in response to the defendants’ aggressive 

action. Suddenly Sergeant J. Mendez became enraged and maliciously commenced pressing 

Plaintiff’s face to the floor.

In an instant D. Aguinaga impulsively began punching his fist repeatedly into the back of 

Plaintiff’s head and T. Ramos reserved no mercy as he began thrusting his knee into the left side of 

Plaintiff’s ribs. The use of force in terms of a good faith effort to restore or maintain discipline was 

not necessary because Plaintiff was not hostile and had requested on his own to be placed into 

administrative segregation until the issue regarding the incompatible housing assignment could be 

pleaded to a classification committee.

D. Cardenas also acted with malicious intent to hurt Plaintiff as she aggressively plunged her 

baton several times into the back of Plaintiff’s thigh and M. Barajas intentionally and with the purpose 

of causing harm stomped on Plaintiff’s lower right left with her boot. 

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When the assault came to an end, Plaintiff spoke with Sergeant Mendez and stated, “Now can 

we go to the ‘hole,’ (administrative segregation) and shortly thereafter an alarm was activated. 

Suddenly, D. Cardenas stated, “He kicked me,” and in sequence D. Aguinaga stated, “He hit me too.” 

Luckily for Plaintiff, eyewitness Matthews observed the entire incident and attested Plaintiff’s actual 

innocence in an eyewitness statement to the investigative employee. Inmate Harden is also a viable 

eyewitness, who can attest to the actual innocence. 

The false allegation by D. Aguinaga and T. Ramos alleging Plaintiff lunged backwards and 

struck D. Aguinaga on the left side of face involves the presence of inmate Harden, as indicated in the 

defendants’ incident reports, as inmate Harden is the person defendants’ claim they were escorting at 

time of incident. 

On July 26, 2013, Plaintiff pleaded an ineffective investigation claim to the senior hearing 

officer, C. Nevarez, at the time of hearing and requested the hearing be postponed until defense 

witnesses were present for testimony. However, defendant denied Plaintiff his procedural right to 

have requested viable eyewitnesses testify to his actual innocence at the hearing, defendant also denied 

Plaintiff’s additional request for proof of sufficient evidence necessary to substantiate the alleged 

charged offense. 

Plaintiff contends no significant evidence exists such as, photos of injuries, video of injuries, xray of injuries, and/or medical reports of the injuries. Plaintiff contends ultimately the finding of guilt 

was rendered by defendants based on a “preponderance of mere allegations,” upon which the liberty 

interest is violated. 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 

Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992) 

(citations omitted). For claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the issue is “whether 

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (per 

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curiam) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 

F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013). The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is 

contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency, Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted), and although de minimis uses of force do not violate the Constitution, the 

malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency, 

regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident, Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-8, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 

(citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10) (quotation marks omitted); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th 

Cir. 2002). 

Assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations, as this Court must at the pleading stage of the 

action, Plaintiff contends he was not resisting and was in a prone position on the floor when 

Defendants J. Mendez, D. Aguinaga, T. Ramos, D. Cardenas, and M. Barajas allegedly used 

unreasonable force on him. Assuming the truth of the circumstances as alleged, Plaintiff allegations 

state a cognizable claim against Defendants J. Mendez, D. Aguinaga, T. Ramos, D. Cardenas, and M. 

Barajas. 

B. Due Process

The exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s amended complaint clearly indicate that Plaintiff lost time 

credits as a result of being found guilty in the prison disciplinary proceeding against him, and that 

credit loss affects the length of his sentence. Where, as here, “success in a . . . [section] 1983 damages 

action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must 

first achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge 

the underlying conviction or sentence.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004) (citing to 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994)); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 

(1997) (applying Heck to a prison disciplinary hearing where good-time credits were affected). 

Because the punishment imposed at the disciplinary hearing affects the duration of Plaintiff’s 

sentence, Plaintiff’s due process claim is barred until such time as Plaintiff invalidates the result of the 

disciplinary hearing. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable due process violation, and the 

Court previously provided Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend and based on the nature of the 

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deficiencies at issue, further leave to amend would be futile. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 

(9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 

IV.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. This action shall proceed on Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force against Defendants J. 

Mendez, D. Aguinaga, T. Ramos, and D. Cardenas; and

2. Plaintiff’s due process claim against C. Nevarez be dismissed for failure to state a 

cognizable claim for relief.

This Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(l). Within twenty (20) 

days after being served with this Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the Court. The document should be captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and 

Recommendation.@ Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court=s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 18, 2014 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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