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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 14-7141 September Term, 2015

 FILED ON: JANUARY 19, 2016

EVAN EVANGELOU,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-531)

Before: ROGERS, GRIFFITH, and MILLETT, Circuit Judges.

J U D G M E N T

This appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia was 

considered on the record and the briefs of the parties. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. CIR. R.

34(j). The court has afforded the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not 

warrant a published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated below, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s judgment be AFFIRMED.

Evan Evangelou was hired as a Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officer in 

September 2008. The first eighteen months of his employment were probationary. During this 

period, Evangelou was accused of attempting to extort employees of a local bar. After an internal 

MPD investigation found that he had engaged in misconduct, Police Chief Cathy Lanier removed 

him from the force. MPD released no information to the public about the investigation or 

termination, and Evangelou’s personnel file specifies no reason for his removal. 

Evangelou sued the District of Columbia and Lanier under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 

that his termination was accompanied by official defamation and stigmatization and therefore 

deprived him of liberty without due process. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. We affirm.

An at-will government employee suffers a liberty deprivation under the Due Process 

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Clause if, when he is terminated, the government either (1) disseminates defamatory information 

about him (a “reputation-plus” claim), or (2) imposes a stigma or other disability that forecloses 

future employment opportunities (a “stigma or disability” claim). O’Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 

1126, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Under neither prong could a reasonable jury find that Evangelou 

has established a liberty deprivation.

Evangelou bases his reputation-plus argument on a D.C. regulation that provides that 

“an agency shall terminate an employee during the probationary period whenever his or her work 

performance or conduct fails to demonstrate his or her suitability and qualifications for continued 

employment.” D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 6-B, § 814.1. He argues that in light of the regulation, the 

very fact of his termination was defamatory because it necessarily suggested he was unsuited or 

unqualified for continued work. In his view, the regulation and termination together provided the 

public disclosure of defamatory information necessary to establish a reputation-plus claim. See 

Orange v. District of Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[I]njury to reputation 

cannot occur in the absence of public disclosure of the allegedly damaging statements.”).

This argument fails for two reasons. First, removal does not necessarily brand an officer 

unfit for the job. Although the D.C. regulation requires probationary officers to be fired if they 

are unsuited or unqualified, its plain terms do not bar the District from firing probationary 

officers for other reasons. Cf. Piroglu v. Coleman, 25 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 

(explaining that a structurally similar regulation merely “sets out certain circumstances in which 

a probationary employee may be terminated; it does not limit the District’s discretionary right to 

otherwise terminate him”). Second, even if termination did necessarily suggest that an officer 

was unqualified or unsuited for work, this implication would not deprive the officer of liberty

under our precedent. We have said that in a reputation-plus claim, the government-imposed 

“opprobrium” must be more than that created by a dismissal for poor performance. Harrison v. 

Bowen, 815 F.2d 1505, 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Hutchinson v. CIA, 393 F.3d 226, 231 

(D.C. Cir. 2005). Thus, Evangelou’s reputation-plus claim cannot succeed.

To the extent that Evangelou preserves a “stigma or disability” claim on appeal, it also 

fails. A plaintiff raising such a claim must show, as relevant here, that the challenged government 

action has had the “broad effect of largely precluding [him] from pursuing [his] chosen career.” 

Kartseva v. Dep’t of State, 37 F.3d 1524, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1994). This standard sets a “high” bar: 

an employee must show that the government has “seriously affected, if not destroyed, his ability 

to obtain employment in [his] field.” Taylor v. Resolution Trust Corp., 56 F.3d 1497, 1506 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959)). 

Evangelou has not met this burden. The record discloses that he applied to only two jobs 

after his termination: one in New Jersey and the other in New York. He abandoned the New 

Jersey application after he was asked to provide information on his employment history. See 

Orange, 59 F.3d at 1275 (concluding that employees who failed to pursue new job opportunities 

could not survive summary judgment on a claim that their employment prospects had been 

foreclosed). And Evangelou does not argue on appeal that he was ever denied the New York job, 

much less that any such denial was connected to his termination from MPD. See Corson & 

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Gruman Co. v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 47, 50 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“We require petitioners and 

appellants to raise all of their arguments in the opening brief[.]”). Rather, his brief repeats the 

district court’s statement that the record did not clearly indicate whether or why his application 

was rejected. Evangelou has not adduced evidence sufficient to put in dispute whether his 

employment opportunities have been broadly foreclosed. His claim therefore cannot survive 

summary judgment. See O’Donnell, 148 F.3d at 1141-42 (granting summary judgment where an 

employee presented no concrete evidence, and the circumstances did not demonstrate, that 

adverse government action actually harmed him in the job market).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is 

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any 

timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R.

41(a)(1).

 Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

 Ken Meadows

 Deputy Clerk

 

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