Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00098/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00098-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carl Ray Buske, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-15-00098-TUC-RCC (CRP)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, presently confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex Eyman, in

Florence, Arizona, and represented by counsel, has filed a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

For A Writ of Habeas Corpus By A Person In State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1,

Pet.), and a Memorandum in Support (Doc. 1-1, Mem.). Respondents have filed an Answer

to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 8, Answer). Petitioner has not filed a Reply.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the Magistrate

Judge for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 4, Order). LR Civ 72.1. After considering

the briefing, exhibits and relevant law, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court, after its independent review, dismiss the Petition.

I. Factual and Procedural History 

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Pima County, Arizona, Superior Court on

numerous counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under 15 years of age. See State v. Buske,

No. 2 CA-CR 2007-0171, at ¶¶ 1-3 (Mem. Decision) (Ariz. App. Oct. 9, 2008) (Pet., Ex. 3-5,

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1

 Relevant portions of the state court record are attached to the Petition as Exhibits 1-

27 but have been electronically filed as Exhibits 3-29. (Doc. 1, Pet. & Exhibits). The Court

has referred to these exhibits by citing to the filed exhibit number followed by the electronic

exhibit number, e.g., Petitioner’s filed Exhibit 1 electronically filed as Exhibit 3 would be

cited as Ex. 1-3. Other relevant portions of the state court record are attached as Exhibits A

through G to Respondents’ Answer. (Doc. 8, Answer & Exhibits). Unless otherwise noted,

the Court has cited to the state court record by exhibit number without the corresponding

docket number assigned to the Petition or Answer.

2

 Respondents cite March 10, 2015 as the date the federal habeas petition was filed

(Answer at 7), which is the date that counsel signed the petition. (Pet. at 8). Petitioner signed

the petition on March 6, 2015. (Id.). 

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Mem. Decision).1 The state trial court sentenced Petitioner to mitigated, consecutive terms

of imprisonment totaling 290 years. (Id. at ¶ 1). Petitioner appealed, and his convictions

and sentences were affirmed by the Arizona Court of Appeals in a Memorandum Decision

filed on October 9, 2008. (Id.). Petitioner did not seek review of this State appeals court

decision in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Pet., Ex. 3-5, Court of Appeals Mandate). 

Petitioner filed five applications (Notices or Notices and Petitions) for Post

Conviction Relief (“PCR”) in the state courts, all of which were either dismissed or denied.

Petitioner’s fifth and final PCR Petition was denied by the state trial court on March 6, 2014.

(Pet., Ex. 27-29). Petitioner did not seek review of the ruling denying his fifth PCR Petition

in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Mem. at 8). 

Petitioner filed the present habeas corpus petition through counsel on the federal court

docket on March 11, 2015. (Doc. 1, Pet.).2

 Petitioner asserts the following seven claims in

the Petition:

Claim One: “Petitioner’s right to the effective assistance of trial counsel was denied

when trial counsel failed to advise Petitioner of the mandatory sentencing range upon

conviction at trial and failed to engage in plea negotiations;”

Claim Two: “Petitioner was denied effective assistance of trial counsel during pretrial

discovery;”

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Claim Three: “Petitioner was denied effective assistance of trial counsel when counsel

failed to prepare Petitioner for testimony;”

Claim Four: “Petitioner was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel when

counsel failed to designate transcripts from CR2004-4881 on appeal which denied Petitioner

full appellate review;”

Claim Five: “Petitioner was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel when

counsel failed to argue facts asserted in [the] Motion for Reconsideration when arguing the

court erred in denying the Motion to Dismiss;”

Claim Six: “Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of PCR counsel when PCR

counsel failed to consult with Petitioner prior to filing a Notice in Lieu of Petition for PostConviction Relief;” and

Claim Seven: “Petitioner was denied right to transcripts.”

(Pet. at 6; Mem. at 8-9).

Respondents contend that the habeas petition is untimely filed and that Petitioner has

not asserted grounds to excuse the untimely filing. Respondents argue in the alternative that

the grounds Petitioner has asserted in his petition are procedurally defaulted and should be

dismissed. Respondents have not addressed the merits of Petitioner’s claims. 

II. Timeliness of the Federal Habeas Petition

A. The Petition Was Not Timely Filed 

A one-year period of limitations applies to an application for writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a state

prisoner must generally file a petition for writ of habeas corpus within one year from “the

date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of time for seeking such review[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Where a state prisoner does

not seek review in the State's highest court, the judgment becomes final on the date the time

for seeking such review expires. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 641, 656

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3

 Some courts have found that a petitioner has 35 days after the Arizona Court of

Appeals decision to seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. See, e.g., Coleman v. Ryan,

No. CV-14-02432-PHX-PGR (JZB), 2015 WL 10662702, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 2015)

(referring to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (“Within 30 days after the Court of Appeals issues

its decision, any party may file a petition for review with the clerk of the Supreme Court....”);

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3 (expanding time limits by five days after service by mail); State v.

Rabun, 162 Ariz. 261, 782 P.2d 737 (1989)). 

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(2012). Courts apply the anniversary method of Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) to calculate the expiration

of AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th

Cir. 2001).

The Arizona Court of Appeals filed its memorandum decision affirming Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences on October 9, 2008. (Pet., Ex. 3-5, Mem. Decision). Pursuant to

Rule 31.19(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Petitioner had 30 days to seek

review of that decision in the Arizona Supreme Court.3

 Petitioner did not seek such review

in the State Supreme Court and therefore his convictions became final 30 days later, but not

on November 8, 2008, which was a Saturday, but on Monday, November 10, 2008. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals mandate issued on December 10, 2008. (Pet., Ex. 3-5,

Mandate). Absent state law to the contrary, an appeal is deemed concluded upon the decision

of the state court, and not upon issuance of its mandate. Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d

1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir.2007) (petitioner's “direct appeal was final upon the expiration of the

time for seeking review of the Court of Appeals decision in the Arizona Supreme Court” and

did not continue until issuance of the mandate by the Arizona Court of Appeals). 

Petitioner’s conviction became final on November 10, 2008. Petitioner filed his

federal habeas petition on March 11, 2015, a date more than one year after his conviction

became final. The Magistrate Judge recommends that Petitioner’s federal habeas petition

was not timely filed.

//

//

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B. Application of Statutory Tolling

The Court next considers Respondents’ argument that application of statutory tolling

does not result in the timely filing of the federal habeas petition. (Answer at 5-7). “The time

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any

period of limitation.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). “The statute of limitations is tolled for ‘all of

the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court

procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction

application.’” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v.

Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.1999)). In Arizona, post-conviction review is

pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed even though the petition is not filed

until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th

Cir.2004); Rule 32.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Arizona, the filing of a

Notice of Post-Conviction Relief can toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. Hemmerle, 495

F.3d at 1074.

 “The tolling provision does not ... ‘revive’ the limitations period (i.e. restart the clock

at zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. Once the limitations

period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute of limitations.”

Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The statute of limitations is not tolled between the conviction’s finality date and the filing

of the first state collateral challenge because there is nothing pending during that interval.

Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010). The time between the completion of

a first round of state post-conviction proceedings and the beginning of a second round is not

tolled. See Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1075.

The state court record shows the filing dates and dispositions of Petitioner’s five PCR

Notices or Petitions filed in state court as follows. For purposes of clarity, these postCase 4:15-cv-00098-RCC Document 9 Filed 09/23/16 Page 5 of 14
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conviction applications are numerically referred to as the first through fifth applications or

proceedings. 

The parties agree that Petitioner filed his first PCR proceeding by filing through

counsel a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on December 30, 2008 (Pet., Ex. 4-6; Mem. at

5; Answer at 5). Appointed counsel subsequently filed a Notice in Lieu of a PCR Petition

citing no meritorious legal issues. (Pet., Ex. 6-8). On December 4, 2009, counsel filed

Petitioner’s pro se PCR Petition in the state trial court. (Id., Ex. 7-9). On February 25,

2010, the trial court filed a Ruling finding that all claims were precluded under Rule 32.2(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and which summarily dismissed the Petition.

(Id., Ex. 10-12). On March 25, 2010, Petitioner pro se sought review in the Arizona Court

of Appeals who granted review but denied relief on July 29, 2010. (Id., Ex. 11-13 & Ex. 12-

14). Petitioner’s request for review of that decision was denied by the Arizona Supreme

Court on February 17, 2011. (Id., Ex. 13-15). 

Petitioner commenced his second PCR proceeding by filing a pro se PCR Notice

which he signed on March 14, 2011 and filed on March 18, 2011. (Pet., Ex. 14-16). The

state trial court summarily dismissed the PCR Notice in a Ruling signed on March 25, 2011

and filed on March 28, 2011. (Id., Ex. 15-17).

Petitioner’s third PCR proceeding was commenced when he filed a pro se PCR Notice

that he signed on April 22, 2011 and filed on May 4, 2011 and which the state trial court

summarily dismissed by a Ruling signed on May 6, 2011. (Pet., Ex. 16-18 & Ex. 17-19).

The trial court found that Petitioner’s PCR Notice raised the same issues as in the preceding

PCR application. (Id., Ex. 17-19). Petitioner filed for reconsideration on May 27, 2011

which the state trial court considered as a motion for rehearing and denied in an Order signed

on June 1, 2011. (Id., Ex. 18-20 & Ex. 19-21).

Petitioner’s filed his fourth PCR proceeding by filing a pro se PCR Notice and

Petition which he signed on January 26, 2012 and filed on February 16, 2012. (Pet., Ex. 20-

22 & Ex. 21-23). The state trial court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s PCR Notice and

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 See State v. Goracke, 106 P.3d 1035, 1037 (Ariz. App. 2005) (applying prisoner

mail box rule to pro per petition for review filed in the Arizona Supreme Court on Rule 32

post-conviction proceedings, that is, a pro se petitioner is deemed to have filed a document

“at the time it is delivered, properly addressed, to the proper prison authorities to be

forwarded” to the clerk of court). 

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Petition in an Order signed on February 17, 2012 and filed on February 21, 2012, finding that

this application asserted the same arguments as in the second PCR proceeding (referring to

the March 18, 2011 PCR Notice). (Id., Ex. 21-23). Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in

the Arizona Court of Appeals which was dismissed on May 11, 2012 because Petitioner

failed to comply with a May 1, 2012 appellate court order. (Id., Ex. 22-24 & Ex. 23-25 (The

parties agree that the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review because

Petitioner failed to attach the trial court’s ruling to his petition for review. See Mem. at 6;

Answer at 6)). 

The parties agree that Petitioner represented by counsel filed his fifth and final PCR

proceeding by “filing” a PCR Petition on November 27, 2013. (Pet., Ex. 24-26; Mem. at 7;

Answer at 6 (this PCR Petition was stamped “Received” by the Clerk of the Superior Court

on November 27, 2013)). The state trial court denied the PCR Petition in a Ruling filed on

March 6, 2014. (Id., Ex. 27-29). Petitioner did not seek review of the dismissal of his PCR

Petition in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Mem. at 8).

Respondents contend that based on these filing and disposition dates, 1314 days of

untolled time passed between the date Petitioner’s conviction became final on November 8,

2008 and the filing of Petitioner’s federal habeas petition on March 10, 2015. (Answer at 6-

7). Respondents arrive at this untolled number of days by using the various dates Petitioner

filed his PCR Notice or Petition instead of the date Petitioner signed the document when

proceeding pro se.4

 Respondents calculate this alleged untolled time as follows: 

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52 untolled days between the finality of Petitioner’s conviction on November 8, 2008

(as opposed to November 10, 2008) and the filing of his first counseled PCR Notice on

December 30, 2008; 

29 untolled days between the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of review of

Petitioner’s first PCR Notice on February 17, 2011 and Petitioner’s filing of his second PCR

Notice pro se on March 18, 2011;

40 untolled days between the denial of Petitioner’s second PCR Notice on March 25,

2011 and the filing of his third PCR Notice pro se on May 4, 2011;

260 untolled days between June 1, 2011, the date the trial court denied Petitioner’s

Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of his third PCR Notice, and February 16, 2012,

the date Petitioner pro se filed his fourth PCR Notice; 

565 untolled days between May 11, 2012 when the State appellate court dismissed

Petitioner’s petition for review regarding his fourth PCR Notice and Petition and the filing

of Petitioner’s fifth PCR Petition through counsel on November 27, 2013. 

(Answer at 5-6).

These periods total 946 days of untolled time. (Answer at 6). Another 368 days

passed between the dismissal of Petitioner’s fifth PCR Petition on March 6, 2014 and the

filing of his federal habeas petition through counsel on March 10, 2015, the date counsel

signed the petition. Respondents’ sum equals 1314 “untolled” days. (Answer at 7).

Here, 565 days passed between May 11, 2012, the date the State appellate court

dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review regarding his fourth PCR application, and the filing

of Petitioner’s fifth PCR Petition through counsel on November 27, 2013. Petitioner’s time

to file his federal habeas petition thus expired before he filed his fifth and final PCR Petition

on November 27, 2013. More than a year passed between the dismissal of Petitioner’s fifth

PCR Petition on March 6, 2014 and the filing of Petitioner’s federal habeas petition on

March 11, 2015. 

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Petitioner contends that his federal habeas petition is timely because his fifth and final

PCR Petition was denied on March 6, 2014 and although Petitioner did not seek review of

that decision in the Arizona Court of Appeals, he is entitled to the 30 days for seeking such

review under Rule 32.9(c) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Mem. at 10).

Petitioner contends that his case became final on April 5, 2014, the date the time for filing

a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals expired. (Mem. at 10). Petitioner

appears to argue that this rationale applies because he “assert[ed] an exception to preclusion”

based on Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), in his fifth PCR Petition for “purposes

of the claims filed under Martinez v. Ryan.” (Mem. at 10). Petitioner contends that the

Martinez decision “permitt[ed] federal habeas review of ineffective assistance of counsel

claims that would otherwise be procedurally barred due to the ineffectiveness of counsel in

initial-review collateral proceedings.” (Id. at 10). 

In making this argument based on the filing of his fifth PCR Petition, Petitioner may

be relying in part on 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) which provides that the one-year habeas

limitations period runs from “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” In the Memorandum

filed with the fifth PCR Petition, Petitioner cited Rules 32.1(f) and (g), Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, as the authority on which the petition and claims were based. (Pet., Ex.

24-26, Mem.). Petitioner appears to have cited Rule 32.1(f) as a basis for contending that he

had not filed his post-conviction application on time through no fault of his own. Rule

32.1(g) provides as an appropriate ground for state post-conviction relief, “There has been

a significant change in the law that if determined to apply to defendant's case would probably

overturn the defendant's conviction or sentence.”

However, “Martinez did not announce a new rule of constitutional law.” Buenrostro

v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1139–40 (9th Cir.2012); McAuley v. Ryan, No. CV-14-

01756-PHX-SPL, 2015 WL 4594521, at *14 (D. Ariz. July 30, 2015) (“Martinez did not

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recognize a new constitutional right. To the contrary, Martinez was limited to creating an

exception to the bar on considering ineffective assistance of PCR counsel as cause to excuse

a procedural default.”). Martinez did not create a freestanding claim for challenging a

conviction or sentence based on the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel.

The Supreme Court has long held that there is no constitutional right to counsel in postconviction proceedings, even in capital cases, which necessarily means that a habeas

petitioner cannot assert a viable, freestanding claim for the denial of the effective assistance

of counsel in such proceedings. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991); see

also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (“The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal

or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding

arising under section 2254.”). 

Petitioner also cites May 18, 2011 as the date his conviction became final. (Mem. at

11). This date appears to be the result of adding 90 days to February 17, 2011, the date the

Arizona Supreme Court denied review regarding Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding.

Petitioner cites May 18, 2011 as the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the

United States Supreme Court expired. (Mem. at 11). 

A state court judgment becomes final “by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of time for seeking such review” under § 2244(d)(1)(A). This “period of ‘direct

review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the [90-day] period within which a petitioner

can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or

not the petitioner actually files such a petition.” Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

A petitioner is not entitled to the tolling of 90 days to seek certiorari in the United

States Supreme Court from when the state court denied his PCR petition. In Lawrence v.

Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 337 (2007), the Supreme Court held that AEDPA’s limitations period

is statutorily tolled “only while state courts review [a petitioner's] application [for

post-conviction relief].” Id. at 332, 337. Because “[a petition for certiorari before the

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Supreme Court] is not a part of a ‘State’s post-conviction procedures,’” § 2244(d)(2) does

not toll AEDPA's limitations period during the pendency of such a petition. Id. at 332

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). “The application for state post-conviction review is

therefore not ‘pending’ after the state court’s post-conviction review is complete, and §

2244(d)(2) does not toll the 1–year limitations period during the pendency of a petition for

certiorari.” Id. at 332. “When the state courts have issued a final judgment on a state

[post-conviction] application, it is no longer pending even if a prisoner has additional time

for seeking review of that judgment through a petition for certiorari.” Id. at 334. In

post-conviction proceedings, the statute of limitations is tolled only while state courts review

the application and not during the pendency of a certiorari petition or the time for filing one.

As previously discussed, Petitioner’s time to file his federal habeas petition expired

before he filed his fifth and final PCR Petition on November 27, 2013. The filing of the fifth

PCR Petition did not restart or pause the limitations clock. Once the AEDPA limitations

period expires, a subsequently filed notice of post-conviction relief cannot restart the statute

of limitations. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir.2001). See also Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.2003) (“section 2244(d) does not permit reinitiation

of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”). There can be no

tolling following the expiration of the limitations period because “there is no period

remaining to be tolled.” Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.2000). 

The Magistrate Judge recommends the finding that application of statutory tolling

does not render the federal habeas petition as timely filed under AEDPA’s limitations period.

C. Petitioner Has Not Asserted Cognizable Reasons for Equitable Tolling

The Court next considers whether Petitioner has asserted proper or sufficient grounds

to excuse the untimely filing based on equitable tolling, to the extent that Respondents

contend that Petitioner has not asserted grounds for equitable tolling. (See Answer at 7-8).

Petitioner contends that the Petition is “within the one-year statute of limitations due to

equitable tolling considerations.” (Mem. at 9). In support of this contention, Petitioner

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asserts that in his fifth PCR Petition filed in state court on November 27, 2013, he argued an

exception to preclusion based on Martinez v. Ryan, supra. (Mem. at 10). Petitioner’s

argument is that, “For purposes of the claims filed under Martinez v. Ryan, this case became

final on April 5, 2014, when the time to file a petition for review to the Arizona Court of

Appeals expired[,]”citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c). (Id.). Petitioner further argues as

grounds to excuse the untimely filing of his habeas petition that he “has cause and prejudice

to cure procedural default under Martinez v. Ryan.” (Id. at 11-13). 

In Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court held that, in certain circumstances,

“[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish

cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id., 132

S.Ct. at 1315. As Respondents point out (Answer at 7-8), the Martinez decision has no

application to the operation or tolling of the § 2244(d) statute of limitations period for filing

a § 2254 habeas petition. See Lambrix v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t Corr., 756 F.3d 1246, 1249

(11th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he equitable rule in Martinez applies only to the issue of cause to

excuse the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim that occurred

in a state collateral proceeding and has no application to the operation or tolling of the §

2244(d) statute of limitations for filing a § 2254 petition.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted); Madueno v. Ryan, Case No. CV-13-01382-PHX-SRB, 2014 WL 2094189, at *7

(D. Ariz. May 20, 2014) (“Martinez has no application to the statute of limitations in the

AEDPA which governs Petitioner’s filing in federal court.”). 

Similarly, principles of “cause and prejudice” do not apply to make an untimely

habeas petition timely. The “cause and prejudice” standard applies to excuse a petitioner’s

default of a claim in state court, that is, the failure to properly present a claim in the state

court. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (“In all cases in which a state

prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and

adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the

prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

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violation of federal law ...”). To the extent that Petitioner relies on procedural default case

law to excuse the untimely filing of his habeas petition, such authority is inapplicable to the

issue. See White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir.2010) (petitioner's reliance on

inapplicable procedural default case law in appealing statute of limitations dismissal was

misplaced); Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1018 n. 3 (9th Cir.2009) (Eleventh Circuit

authority was irrelevant because it concerned not statutory tolling under AEDPA, but rather,

the nature of procedural bars in federal habeas proceedings); Laurel v. Felker, No. CV

08–1676–MMM (PLA), 2009 WL 393013, at *4 n. 10 (C.D.Cal. Feb.12, 2009)

(“[P]etitioner's ‘cause and prejudice’ argument, which is asserted to overcome a procedural

default, is not relevant to the statute of limitations analysis.”). 

Application of the principles discussed in Martinez or of the “cause and prejudice”

standard to excuse a procedural default does not excuse Petitioner’s failure to timely file his

federal habeas petition within AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. 

For equitable tolling to apply to AEDPA’s limitations period, the petitioner must

demonstrate (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in the way and prevented timely filing. Holland v. Florida,

560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). The extraordinary circumstance must have made it impossible to

file the petition on time. Lakey v. Hickman, 633 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011). Equitable

tolling also is appropriate if the petitioner establishes his actual innocence under Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). “Actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which

a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar ... or expiration of the

[AEDPA] statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). To

invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a petitioner “ ‘must show that it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new

evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). The determination of whether

to apply equitable tolling is fact dependent and petitioner “bears the burden of showing that

equitable tolling is appropriate.” Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th

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Cir. 2005). Petitioner has raised no grounds for equitable tolling in either his Petition or his

Memorandum and he has not filed a Reply. No grounds justifying equitable tolling are

discernible from the record. The Magistrate Judge recommends the finding that, because

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he diligently pursued his rights and that

extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely federal habeas petition,

Petitioner's case is not subject to equitable tolling.

III. Conclusion

The Magistrate Judge recommends the finding that the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus was not timely filed and that the periods of statutory tolling do not render the petition

timely. It is further recommended that Petitioner has not asserted cognizable grounds on

which to find that principles of equitable tolling apply to excuse the untimely filing. 

IV. Recommendation 

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review, enter an Order finding that the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. 1) is dismissed with prejudice. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. A party

may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with

a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted

from the District Court to do so. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed

waived. The parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the

following case number: CV-15-00098-TUC-RCC.

DATED this 23rd day of September, 2016.

Case 4:15-cv-00098-RCC Document 9 Filed 09/23/16 Page 14 of 14