Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05082/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05082-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mulugeta Yemane Micael,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-05082-PHX-DJH (MTM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Petitioner Mulugeta Yemane Micael has filed pro se a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Petitioner has also filed a Motion for 

Production of Records (doc. 11) and a Motion to Expand the Record (doc. 12).

I. Summary of Conclusion.

Petitioner raises four claims for relief: 1) newly discovered evidence; 2) 

prosecutorial misconduct; 3) a juror conflict of interest; and 4) ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Petitioner also seeks an order compelling production of records from the state 

trial court and an order expanding the record. The Court recommends that Petitioner’s two 

supplemental motions be denied as Petitioner has not demonstrated that an evidentiary 

hearing should be granted. The Court recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus be denied as untimely filed and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.

//

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II. Background.

A. Facts and Direct Appeal.

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the essential facts1 of this case: 

“Mulugeta Yemane Micael appeals his conviction for armed robbery, a class two felony. 

The offense involved Micael taking a cell phone from the victim while implying he had a 

gun underneath his shirt.” State v. Micael, No. 1 CA-CR 14-0098, 2015 WL 5770580 *1 

(Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2015). Petitioner was convicted at a second trial after his first trial 

ended in a mistrial. Id. On January 29, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of fourteen 

(14) years in prison. (Doc. 15-1, Ex. B at 8).

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Arizona Court of Appeals on March 19, 

2015. (Doc. 15-1, Ex. C at 51). His appeal raised five issues: (1) structural error for not 

striking the entire voir dire panel; (2) a Confrontation Clause violation; (3) fundamental 

error for refusing to read five pages of jury instructions at the close of trial; (4) failure by 

the trial court to determine if Petitioner had voluntarily waived his right to attend trial 

wearing street clothes; and, (5) error in striking a potential juror during voir dire. (Id. at 14-

16).

On October 1, 2015, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. 

(Doc. 15-1, Ex. E at 91-97). After Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on 

December 1, 2015 (id. at 90), Petitioner did not seek further review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court. Petitioner’s conviction became final on January 1, 2016, upon expiration of the 

time period to seek review before the Arizona Supreme Court.

B. First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On December 1, 2015, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the 

Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 15-1, Ex. F at 99). Petitioner’s court-appointed 

counsel subsequently filed a notice advising that counsel could not identify any colorable 

issues warranting post-conviction relief. (Doc. 15-1, Ex. G at 102). Petitioner filed a pro 

se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) on July 5, 2016. (Doc. 15-1, Ex. H at 105).

1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254(e)(1), a state court’s determination of the facts is presumed 

to be correct.

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Petitioner raised six claims: (1) allegedly newly discovered evidence of a video recording 

that would purportedly show one of the arresting officers perjured himself; (2) a violation 

of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) for failure by the prosecution to disclose a 

number of documents; (3) a claim styled “actual innocence” stating an alleged 

Confrontation Clause violation; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to 

obtain the video recording described in Claim One and failure by appellate counsel to raise 

an alleged sexual relationship between Petitioner and a juror; (5) juror bias via empaneling 

a juror who Petitioner alleged had a previous sexual relationship with Petitioner; and (6) 

prosecutorial misconduct for presenting allegedly perjured testimony. (Doc. 15-1, Ex. H at 

105-116).

On August 9, 2016, Petitioner filed an Amended PCR Petition re-stating all six 

claims as in the original PCR Petition. (Doc. 15-2, Ex. I at 2-40). On December 3, 2016, 

the Maricopa County Superior Court denied the PCR Petition, finding that Petitioner did 

not present any colorable claim that warranted a hearing. (Doc. 15-2, Ex. K at 63). 

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 15-2, Ex. L at 65) was denied on March 1, 

2017. (Doc. 15-2, Ex. M at 68). On April 25, 2017, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed 

Petitioner’s appeal for failure to file a “compliant petition for review.” (Doc. 15-2, Ex. N 

at 70). Petitioner did not seek further review in the Arizona Supreme Court.

C. Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On February 27, 2018, Petitioner filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in 

Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 15-2, Ex. O at 72). On April 3, 2018, the Maricopa 

County Superior Court dismissed the PCR Notice as untimely and successive under Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). (Doc. 15-2, Ex. P at 76-78). Petitioner did not appeal the decision.

D. Third Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On April 9, 2018, Petitioner filed a third Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in 

Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 15-2, Ex. Q at 80). Petitioner again raised the 

issues of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and newly discovered 

evidence. On May 7, 2018, the Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed the PCR notice 

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as untimely and successive under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). (Doc. 15-2, Ex. R at 84-86). 

On May 31, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider. (Doc. 15-2, Ex. S at 88).

Petitioner’s Motion appears to suggest that the prosecutor staged crime scene photographs. 

(Id. at 92). On June 20, 2018, the Court denied the Motion to Reconsider. (Doc. 15-2, Ex. 

T at 94). After Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and a Petition for Review, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals on September 4, 2018 dismissed the Petition for Review as untimely 

under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(A). (Doc. 15-2, Ex. U at 96). Petitioner did not seek 

reconsideration.2 

III. The Petition.

Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. 1) with this Court on 

September 3, 2019. The Court’s October 7, 2019 Order described summarized Petitioner’s 

claims as follows:

Petitioner raises four grounds for relief. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges 

that he has discovered “new evidence.” In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges 

that certain evidence was withheld at his trial in violation of Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that one 

of the jurors in his trial committed misconduct. In Ground Four, Petitioner 

alleges that his attorney provided ineffective assistance.

(Doc. 5 at 1-2). On October 10, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion for Criminal Background 

from the State (doc. 8), which was denied by the Court on October 15, 2019. On October 

17, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion for Production of Records (doc. 11) and a Motion to 

Expand the Record (doc. 12). Respondents filed a Response to the Petition on November 

1, 2019 (doc. 15). Petitioner did not file a Reply.

IV. Timeliness.

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

2 Petitioner filed a fourth Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on August 2, 2019. (Doc. 15-2, 

Ex. W at 108). This PCR notice does not impact the timeliness of the Petition, and therefore 

is not discussed further herein.

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Whether a petition is barred by the statute of limitations is a threshold issue that must be 

resolved before considering other procedural issues or the merits of individual claims.

A. Statute of Limitations.

The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The 

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on October 1, 2015. Micael, 

2015 WL 5770580 at *1. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied on December 

1, 2015. (See Doc. 15-1, Ex. E at 90). Petitioner had thirty (30) days under Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 31.21(b)(2)(A) to seek review with the Arizona Supreme Court, which Petitioner did not 

do. Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction became final on January 1, 2016; under AEDPA, 

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus would have been timely if filed by January 1, 2017, 

absent statutory, gap, or equitable tolling.

B. Statutory Tolling.

AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction review 

is pending upon filing of a notice of post-conviction relief. See Isley v. Arizona Dep’t of 

Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“A 

proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the court 

in which the conviction occurred.”). 

Because Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief, he is entitled to 

statutory tolling of the first PCR proceeding. Petitioner filed the first PCR notice on 

December 7, 2015, before Petitioner’s conviction became final. The AEDPA statute of 

limitations did not begin to run until after the first post-conviction proceeding concluded. 

The Maricopa County Superior Court denied post-conviction relief on December 3, 2016 

(see doc. 15-2, Ex. K at 63). The Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s appeal 

on April 25, 2017 for failure to file a compliant petition for review. (Doc. 15-2, Ex. N at 

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70). Accordingly, the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on April 25, 2017. Absent 

further tolling, to be timely, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was required 

to be filed by April 25, 2018.

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the time his second or third postconviction relief proceedings were pending. A state petition that is not filed within the 

state’s required time limit is not “properly filed,” and therefore not entitled to statutory 

tolling. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction petition 

is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”). 

Petitioner filed a second PCR notice on February 27, 2018, well after the time to file a 

notice for post-conviction relief had passed, and without satisfying the conditions for filing 

an untimely notice under Arizona law. The Superior Court dismissed the PCR as untimely 

and successive. (Doc. 15-2, Ex. P at 76-78). The third PCR notice, filed on April 9, 2018 

was also dismissed as untimely and successive. (Doc. 15-2, Ex. R at 84-85). Therefore, 

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of either the second or third PCR proceedings.

Petitioner argues that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (filed on September 3, 

2019) was timely filed because “my judgement was given to me by the Arizona Supreme 

Court last month. I am including a copy of it.” (Doc. 1 at 14). In his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, Petitioner did not include a copy of this purported judgment by the Arizona 

Supreme Court; and the record does not show Petitioner ever appealed any of his postconviction proceedings to the Arizona Supreme Court. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled 

to statutory tolling for the properly filed first PCR, but not the second or third PCR 

proceedings. 

 Petitioner’s AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on April 25, 2017, after the 

Maricopa County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s first PCR petition. Therefore, to be 

timely, Petitioner was required to file his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by April 25, 

2018.3 Petitioner did not file his Petition with this Court until September 3, 2019 -- fifteen 

3 As the second and third PCR petitions were rejected as untimely (see doc. 15-2, Ex. K at 

63, Ex. P at 76-78), Petitioner is not entitled to any “gap tolling” of the time between PCR 

proceedings under King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

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(15) months after expiration of the AEDPA deadline. Therefore, the Petition should be 

dismissed as untimely.

V. Equitable Relief.

The merits of an untimely filed petition may still be considered in rare circumstances 

where a petitioner can demonstrate they are entitled to equitable relief. A petitioner may

establish that the statute of limitations should be tolled on equitable grounds, or that 

manifest injustice would result if a court did not reach the merits of the petition. 

A. Equitable Tolling.

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he has not shown extraordinary 

circumstances. “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one–year filing 

deadline must show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing 

on time, and (2) he has diligently pursued his rights.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

649 (2010). Petitioner has not identified any extraordinary circumstances to this Court that 

prevented Petitioner from timely filing the Petition. Petitioner has not established that the 

AEDPA limitations period should be equitably tolled.

B. Actual Innocence.

Petitioner has not proven actual innocence. “Actual innocence, if proved, serves as 

a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar

. . . [or] expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 

1928 (2013). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] petitioner is actually innocent when he 

was convicted for conduct not prohibited by law.” Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 

1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). Actual innocence is possible when a petitioner shows “in light 

of subsequent case law, that he cannot, as a legal matter, have committed the alleged 

crime.” Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014). 

In this case the record does not support a claim of actual innocence. The victim of 

the robbery testified at both trials; as the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the 

testimony “[t]he offense involved [Petitioner] taking a cell phone from the victim while 

implying he had a gun underneath his shirt.” Micael, 2015 WL 5770580 at *1. Petitioner 

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does not demonstrate that his alleged new evidence, an alleged eyewitness and video and 

phone records (see doc. 1 at 9-10), if presented to the Court, would have demonstrated that 

Petitioner could not have committed the crime.

4

 Therefore, the actual innocence exception 

to the limitations period does not apply.

VI. Petitioner’s Remaining Motions.

In addition to his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner has filed a Motion for Production 

of Records (doc. 11) and a Motion to Expand the Record (doc. 12). The Court recommends 

that both motions be denied.5 A court considering a habeas corpus petition is ordinarily 

limited to the state court record. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180 (2011). To 

determine whether a petitioner is entitled to discovery, a habeas corpus court must first 

identify the essential elements of the petitioner’s substantive claim and evaluate whether 

“specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the 

facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.” Bracy v. 

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09 (1997). Expansion of the record is unwarranted where the 

factual predicate could have been discovered during the state proceedings through the 

exercise of due diligence. Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 2010).

Petitioner is not entitled to expand the record. Petitioner’s motion identifies seven 

pieces of evidence without any subsequent elaboration as to why the evidence is relevant, 

or how it would prove that the Petition was timely filed or that Petitioner was entitled to 

habeas relief notwithstanding the untimely filing. “Just as bald assertions and conclusory 

allegations do not afford a sufficient ground for an evidentiary hearing, neither do they 

provide a basis for imposing upon the state the burden of responding in discovery to every 

4

In Petitioner’s direct appeal of his conviction to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner’s 

Statement of Facts noted that Petitioner’s trial testimony included that he “could not 

explain how the police found [victim’s] phone in his bag.” (Doc. 15-1, Ex. C at 21).

5 The Motion for Production of Records is not a request to expand the record, but rather a 

motion to compel the state to turn over a series of documents related to Petitioner’s state 

court proceedings. It appears that Petitioner erroneously attached documents related to this 

request to Petitioner’s Motion to Expand the Record. The Court recommends this motion 

be denied, because the supplemental documents attached to Petitioner’s Motion to Expand 

the Record indicate that correctional facility staff found and delivered the legal materials 

sought by Petitioner on August 7, 2019, and that Petitioner signed a form indicating 

Petitioner received them. (Doc. 12 at 18). 

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habeas petitioner who wishes to seek such discovery.” Earp v. Davis, 881 F.3d 1135, 1142-

43 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, the Court recommends that both 

motions be denied. 

VII. Conclusion.

The record is sufficiently developed, and the Court does not find that an evidentiary 

hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims 

are untimely. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Motion for Production of Records 

(doc. 11) and the Motion to Expand the Record (doc. 12) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a procedural bar and jurists would not find the procedural ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

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findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 27th day of May, 2020.

Honorable Michael T. Morrissey

United States Magistrate Judge

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