Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500/USCOURTS-caed-2_95-cv-01500-39/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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28 1 Regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

petitioner subpoenaed Neill to testify at the evidentiary hearing

(continued...)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GERALD F. STANLEY,

NO. CIV. S-95-1500 FCD GGH P

Petitioner,

DEATH PENALTY CASE

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EDDIE YLST, Acting Warden

of the California State

Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on petitioner Gerald

Stanley’s request for reconsideration (Docket #756) of the

magistrate judge’s order filed August 16, 2006 (Docket #751). In

said order, the magistrate judge denied petitioner’s motion to

expand the record to include the declaration of petitioner’s

trial attorney William Neill (“Neill”),1 who died in a house fire

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1(...continued)

held in April 2006, but could not locate or reach Neill until

April 27, 2006, the seventh day of the hearing. Neill informed

petitioner’s counsel that he was not in any condition to testify

as he had been suffering from the effects of alcoholism and had

been in a rehabilitation facility. The magistrate judge gave

petitioner until May 8, 2006 to inform the court of his desired

plan for how to proceed with Neill. Ultimately, the magistrate

judge gave petitioner the opportunity to present Neill’s direct

testimony by declaration and to seek respondent’s agreement to

the declaration serving as Neill’s complete testimony. 

Petitioner obtained the declaration but respondent would not

agree to stipulate to the completeness of his testimony. 

Thereafter, on June 22, 2006, petitioner’s counsel learned that

on June 3, 2006, Neill died when his home caught fire. On July

6, 2006, petitioner filed his motion seeking to expand the record

with Neill’s declaration. Respondent opposed the motion, and the

court heard oral argument on August 3, 2006.

2 In other respects, the magistrate judge granted

petitioner’s motion to expand the record. Those portions of the

August 16 order are not at issue herein.

2

a month after the last witnesses testified in the evidentiary

hearing held in this case.2

After full consideration of the issue, following a noticed

motion, briefing and a hearing on the same, the magistrate judge

found that in the absence of in-court cross-examination during

which Neill’s credibility could be assessed, Neill’s declaration

was too unreliable to be accepted as evidence in the case. The

magistrate judge based his decision on (1) Neill’s long term

alcoholism which made his memory suspect; (2) his disbarment

after a conviction for preparing false documentary evidence which

made his honesty suspect; and (3) his declaration conflicted in

many respects with co-trial counsel Peterson’s testimony, who had

been subjected to in-court examination and cross-examination.

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3 The August 16, 2006 order memorialized the magistrate

judge’s ultimate findings; however, the bases for those findings

were stated on the record at the August 3, 2006 hearing.

4 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

3

(RT, Aug. 3, 2006.)3 Petitioner now moves for reconsideration of

these findings arguing that under the circumstances, it would be

an “abuse of discretion” to exclude Neill’s declaration as the

grounds for impeachment (i.e., his alcoholism, disbarment, and

conflicting testimony) are “well-established and undisputed.” 

(Mtn. Recon., filed Aug. 30, 2006, at 2:17, 19.)4

As a non-dispositive pre-trial matter, the magistrate

judge’s instant order is governed by the “clearly erroneous or

contrary to law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 

As such, his order cannot be set aside or modified unless the

findings of fact are clearly erroneous or the conclusions are

contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Grimes v. San Francisco,

951 F.2d 236, 239-40 (9th Cir. 1991). The order should be

modified or set aside only if the reviewing court is left “‘with

the definite and firm conviction,’ that the [Magistrate Judge’s]

key findings are mistaken.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,

243 (2001) (citation omitted).

Petitioner argues under the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 590-91 (9th Cir. 2002) and

Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1016-18 (9th Cir. 2002), the

magistrate judge has the discretion to admit a declaration into

evidence even if the opposing party is thereby denied the right

to cross-examination. However, said authorities do not stand for

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4

the proposition that after finding a proffered declaration

unreliable, a court abuses its discretion in not admitting it

anyway. Indeed, Williams and Jennings are distinguishable from

the instant case.

In Williams, in deciding the issue of whether the petitioner

was shackled in a manner that prejudiced him before the jury, the

district court did not hold a full evidentiary hearing and

instead permitted the parties to present evidence through written

declarations. 384 F.3d at 590. One witness who refused to sign

a declaration, was allowed to orally testify. Id. On appeal,

the petitioner argued the district court, in resolving his claim

mostly on a written record, deprived him of a full evidentiary

hearing, of the opportunity to present facts, and of the

opportunity to cross-examine the state's witnesses. Id. The

Ninth Circuit held that in habeas corpus proceedings, the

district court “‘need not conduct full evidentiary hearings,’”

but may instead “‘expand the record . . . with discovery and

documentary evidence.’” Id. (quoting, Watts v. United States,

841 F.2d 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). Ultimately, the

district court must only “give the prisoner's claim ‘careful

consideration and plenary processing, including full opportunity

for presentation of the relevant facts.’” Id.

Unlike this case, in Williams, there was no dispute over the

reliability of the submitted declarations; the only issue was

whether the petitioner was entitled to a full evidentiary

hearing. Williams simply does not stand for the proposition that

a court errs in failing to admit a declaration deemed unreliable.

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5 In that regard, co-counsel Peterson testified that in

certain respects, only Neill was the appropriate source of

information (e.g., Neill handled all billing and financial work

with the county, Neill interviewed family members and had the

relationship with them, Neill primarily decided what evidence to

present at the penalty phase). (R.T., April 28, 2006, 8, 11, 14,

50, 56.) Moreover, Neill’s declaration conflicted with

Peterson’s testimony in some critical respects. For example,

(continued...)

5

Similarly, in Jennings, a mental health expert who had

examined the petitioner at the request of trial counsel, was

asked during the post-conviction proceedings to evaluate the

importance of information trial counsel had not presented to him. 

290 F.3d at 1016. The expert explained in a post-conviction

declaration how the newly investigated information would have

changed his opinion regarding available defenses and mitigation. 

Id. at 1017. Petitioner’s expert died before the evidentiary

hearing, but his declaration was made part of the record. Id.

Significantly, the state was allowed to present a rebuttal expert

who had reviewed all the relevant records. Id. at 1017-18. 

Again, however, unlike this case, there was no argument in

Jennings concerning the reliability of the deceased expert’s

testimony.

Additionally, also unlike Jennings, here, submission of

“answering affidavits,” by respondent is not a realistic option. 

Respondent cannot present counter-declarations on such matters as

Neill’s tactical decision-making; his decisions about, and memory

of, the questioning of witnesses; or his assessment of

petitioner’s competency at various times in the proceedings. 

Indeed, Neill’s declaration covers a multitude of issues about

which only Neill is knowledgeable.5 As such, his credibility,

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5(...continued)

Neill declared that Peterson was primarily responsible for the

penalty phase, yet Peterson testified that Neill was primarily

responsible for that phase of the trial. (Id. at 8, 13-14.)

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demeanor and ability to recollect under cross-examination would

have been crucial in the assessment of the facts asserted in the

declaration. Accordingly, the court cannot find the magistrate

judge’s decision excluding Neill’s declaration from the record as

“clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the magistrate 

judge’s August 16, 2006 order, denying petitioner’s motion to

expand the record with Neill’s declaration, is therefore DENIED.

DATED: September 28, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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