Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00364/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00364-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rodrick Wade High-Elk, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 11-364-TUC-FRZ (GEE)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on June 15, 2011,

by Rodrick Wade High-Elk, an inmate confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex in

Florence, Arizona. (Doc. 1) 

Also pending are the petitioner’s motions for discovery, disclosure, and leave to file an

amended reply. (Docs. 12, 15, 16)

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Edmonds for report and recommendation. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the

record, enter an order dismissing the petition. It is time-barred.

Summary of the Case

High-Elk was convicted after a jury trial of three counts of aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, two counts of aggravated driving under the influence

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of liquor, and fleeing from a law enforcement vehicle. (Doc. 11-1) The trial court sentenced

High-Elk to concurrent sentences, the longest of which was 15.75 years’ imprisonment. Id.

On direct appeal, High-Elk argued he was denied a fair trial because prosecution

witnesses improperly testified to prior bad acts and because the evidence was insufficient to

support the assault convictions. (Doc. 11-2) The court of appeals affirmed his convictions and

sentences on August 29, 2007. (Doc. 11-1) The Arizona Supreme Court denied his petition for

review without comment on January 28, 2008. (Doc. 11-2) High-Elk did not file a petition for

certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. (Doc. 1, p. 4)

On March 19, 2008, High-Elk filed notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11-7)

Counsel filed a petition in which he conceded he could find no colorable issues for review.

(Doc. 11-3, pp. 6-9) He nevertheless urged the court to hold a hearing on the issue of executive

clemency because the sentence required by law was excessive. Id. On August 6, 2008, the trial

court dismissed the petition without a hearing. (Doc. 11-3, p. 48) High-Elk subsequently filed

two motions to extend the time for filing a pro se petition for review of the trial court’s denial.

(Doc. 11-3, pp. 50-52) The trial court granted the motions, but High Elk did not file a petition

for review. (Doc. 11-3, p. 54)

On December 1, 2008, High-Elk filed a second notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc.

11-4) He argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly evaluate the state’s plea

agreement. Id. Trial counsel believed High-Elk would be eligible for a minimum sentence of

10.5 years should he lose at trial and therefore concluded the plea agreement of 10.5 years

offered no advantage. Id. After trial however, High-Elk was sentenced to 15.75 years’

imprisonment, which was in fact the minimum sentence available by law. Id. 

The trial court denied the petition on March 4, 2009. (Doc. 11-5, p. 2) The court of

appeals granted review but denied relief on July 30, 2009. (Doc. 11-5, p. 27) High-Elk’s

petition for review before the Arizona Supreme Court was denied on June 15, 2010. (Doc. 11-5,

p. 67)

On June 20, 2011, High-Elk filed in this court a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1) He argues (1) he was denied a fair trial when

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prosecution witnesses gave prior bad-act testimony violating the pre-trial order, (2) trial counsel

was ineffective for giving incorrect advice causing the defendant to reject the state’s plea

agreement, (3) counsel failed to request that the trial court give him special permission to

petition the Board of Executive Clemency pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-603(L), and (4) the evidence

presented at trial was insufficient to prove intent. (Doc. 1)

 On October 31, 2011, the respondents filed an answer arguing, among other things, that

the petition is time-barred. (Doc. 7) High-Elk filed a reply on December 2, 2011. (Doc. 13) 

High-Elk also filed a motion for discovery (Doc. 12), a motion for disclosure (Doc. 16),

and a motion for leave to file an amended reply (Doc. 15). 

Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A one-year limitation

period applies to persons in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The statute reads in pertinent part as follows:

 (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

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 The 90th day, April 27, 2008, is a Sunday. See Sup. Ct. R. 30.

2

 High-Elk put his petition in the prison mailing system on this day. (Doc. 1, p. 19); See Laws

v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the “prison mailbox rule”).

 

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judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

The limitation period for High-Elk’s claims was triggered on “the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The court of appeals affirmed his

convictions and sentences on August 29, 2007. (Doc. 11-1) The Arizona Supreme Court

denied his petition for review without comment on January 28, 2008. (Doc. 11-2) High-Elk

then had 90 days to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for review. Sup. Ct. R. 13. When he did

not do so, his judgment became final on April 28, 2008.1

 See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157,

1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The one-year limitation period did not begin to run immediately because High-Elk’s first

post-conviction relief petition was pending at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Tolling

pursuant to § 2244(d)(2) continued until August 6, 2008, when the trial court dismissed the

petition without a hearing. (Doc. 11-3, p. 48) The limitation period began to run the next day

and ran for 117 days until December 1, 2008, when High-Elk filed a second notice of postconviction relief and statutory tolling resumed. (Doc. 11-4)

Tolling pursuant to § 2244(d)(2) continued until his petition for review was denied by

the Arizona Supreme Court on June 15, 2010. (Doc. 11-5, p. 67) The limitation period resumed

the next day and expired 248 days later on February 18, 2011. High-Elk filed his petition in this

court on June 15, 2011.2

 It is time-barred.

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High-Elk argues his petition is timely because the limitation period did not begin until

his second petition for post-conviction relief was denied by the Arizona Supreme Court on June

15, 2010. (Doc. 13, p. 6) He is incorrect. 

The limitation period began to run when the trial court denied his first post-conviction

relief petition because, at that time, he had no petition for post-conviction relief “pending.” See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Banjo v. Acers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[P]eriods between

different rounds of collateral attack are not tolled.”), cert. Denied, 131 S.Ct. 3023 (2011);

Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2007) (The limitations period was not

tolled between the dismissal of the petitioner’s first PCR notice and the filing of his second PCR

notice.), cert. Denied, 555 U.S. 829 (2008). High-Elk’s limitation period ran for 117 days until

he filed his second notice of post-conviction relief. Tolling pursuant to § 2244(d)(2) resumed

and continued until June 15, 2010, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied his petition for

review. (Doc. 11-5, p. 67) The limitation period resumed the next day and expired 248 days

later on February 18, 2011. High-Elk filed his petition in this court on June 15, 2011. It is timebarred.

Outstanding Motions

On December 2, 2011, High-Elk filed a motion to conduct discovery. (Doc. 12) HighElk would like information about the current state of the law on the issue of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Id. He also requests access to certain trial exhibits, which would

establish that he suffered K-9 bites when he was arrested. Id. 

In light of this court’s conclusion that the petition is time-barred, High-Elk’s motion to

conduct discovery on the merits should be denied as moot. (Doc. 12)

On December 23, 2011, High-Elk filed a motion for disclosure. (Doc. 16) High-Elk

seeks access to certain trial exhibits and to the police files related to his arrest. Id.

In light of this court’s conclusion that the petition is time-barred, High-Elk’s motion for

disclosure on the merits should be denied as moot. (Doc. 16)

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Also on December 23, 2011, High-Elk filed a motion to file a supplement to his reply

brief. (Doc. 15) In his supplement, High-Elk offers additional argument related to his

evidentiary claim and his sufficiency of the evidence claim. In the interest of completeness, the

motion should be granted. (Doc. 15)

RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1)

It is time-barred.

High-Elk’s motion to conduct discovery should be denied as moot. (Doc. 12) 

High-Elk’s motion for disclosure should be denied as moot. (Doc. 16)

High-Elk’s motion to file a supplement to his reply brief should be granted in the interest

of completeness. (Doc. 15)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this report and recommendation to the petitioner

and the respondents.

DATED this 31st day of January, 2012.

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