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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Case No. 16-00696 BLF (PR) 

ORDER DEN. PET. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DEN. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES C. MCCURDY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

DAVE DAVEY, Warden, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 16-00696 BLF (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY; DIRECTIONS 

TO CLERK 

 Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254, challenging the revocation of his probation. Dkt. No. 1. After the Petition was 

dismissed in part, see Dkt. No. 23, Respondent filed an answer on the merits (“Answer”). 

Dkt. No. 35. Petitioner filed a traverse (“Traverse”). See Dkt. No. 47 (titled “Denial and 

Exception”). For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On July 11, 2011, Petitioner pleaded no contest to felony transportation of a 

controlled substance. See Dkt. No. 17-1, Ex. A at 153:23. A seven-year suspended 

sentence was imposed, and Petitioner was placed on five years’ probation. See Dkt. No. 

17-1, Ex. B at 165:21-25. On June 4, 2014, Petitioner’s probation was revoked and he was 

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committed to prison for seven years. See Dkt. No. 17-1, Ex. D at 3:15-18. 

Petitioner did not appeal the revocation of his probation. Instead, Petitioner filed a 

petition for resentencing in Sonoma County Superior Court, as well as habeas petitions in 

Sonoma County Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate 

District, and the California Supreme Court. See generally, Dkt. No. 17-1, Exs. E-I. Each 

of the state-court petitions was denied. See generally, id. The Sonoma County Superior 

Court summarily stated that Petitioner’s petition for resentencing was denied because the 

defendant was not eligible, and Petitioner’s habeas petition was denied because “no issues 

of merit [were] raised.” Dkt. No. 17-1, Ex. F. The California Court of Appeal and 

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s habeas petitions without comment. See Dkt. 

No. 17-1, Exs. G, I. 

When presented with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a rationale for 

its conclusions, a federal court must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court decision is objectively reasonable. See Delgado v. 

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). This “[i]ndependent review is not a de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which [a federal court] 

can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “[W]here a state court’s decision is 

unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by 

showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). Accordingly, this Court will conduct an independent, but 

still deferential, review of the record. 

Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on February 11, 2016. See Dkt. No. 1 

(“Original Petition”). The Original Petition stated four claims, which the Court found 

cognizable and served on Respondent. See Dkt. No. 9. Respondent moved to dismiss the 

Original Petition as untimely and unexhausted. See Dkt. No. 17. The Court found that 

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three of Petitioner’s claims were untimely, and dismissed those claims. See Dkt. No. 23. 

The Court ordered Petitioner to file an amended petition stating only the surviving claim: 

that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during probation revocation 

proceedings. See id. at 7. Petitioner timely amended, see Dkt. No. 28 (“Operative 

Petition”), and the Court stayed proceedings so that Petitioner could exhaust the ineffective 

assistance claim, see Dkt. No. 30. Following a motion from Petitioner, the Court reopened 

proceedings on January 25, 2019. See Dkt. No. 32. 

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

 In the absence of a reasoned state court opinion, the following facts are taken from 

the Operative Petition, the exhibits attached to the Original Petition, and the exhibits 

attached to Respondent’s motion to dismiss and Answer. Unless otherwise specified, the 

facts are given in chronological order. 

 On July 11, 2011, in Napa County, Petitioner pleaded no contest to felony 

transportation of a controlled substance. See Dkt. No. 17-1, Ex. A at 153:23. A sevenyear suspended sentence was imposed, and Petitioner was placed on five years’ probation. 

See Dkt. No. 17-1, Ex. B at 165:21-25. 

On October 31, 2013, Petitioner’s case was transferred to Sonoma County. See

Dkt. No. 17-1, Ex. C. The transfer appears to have been requested on the basis that 

petitioner had moved to Santa Rosa. See id. at 354:4-6. In the Operative Petition, 

Petitioner argues that this transfer “breached [his] plea agreement.” Operative Pet. at 6. 

However, Petitioner was present at the transfer hearing, and responded to the transfer by 

saying, “Awesome. Thank you.” Dkt. No. 17-1, Ex. C at 354:26. 

On January 15, 2014, after the transfer was completed, the Sonoma County 

Superior Court (“Sonoma Court”) summarily revoked Petitioner’s probation. See Dkt. No. 

36, Ex. L at 3, Ex. P at 2. Petitioner had been “convicted of a new crime in Napa County” 

and “had been charged with a new crime in Sonoma County.” Dkt. No. 36, Ex. P at 2. 

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Subsequently, the Sonoma Court held four hearings concerning the revocation of 

Petitioner’s probation. At the first, held April 8, 2014, Petitioner’s counsel requested 

additional time to conduct settlement discussions with the prosecution. See Dkt. No. 36, 

Ex. M. The Sonoma Court informed petitioner that he had a right to a “probation hearing 

in a reasonable time,” and asked if Petitioner agreed to waive that right in favor of a oneweek extension. Id. In the Traverse, Petitioner argues that the extension of time violated 

his rights. See Traverse at 3. However, during the April 8, 2014 hearing, the Sonoma 

Court directly asked Petitioner if he agreed to waive his rights and consented to an 

extension of time, and Petitioner directly informed the Sonoma Court that he did so agree. 

See Dkt. No. 36, Ex. M. 

At the second hearing, held April 15, 2014, the prosecution requested an extension 

of time to review Petitioner’s file and conduct settlement discussions. See Dkt. No. 36, Ex. 

N. Petitioner’s counsel stated that Petitioner was “prepared to give the People as much 

time as it takes to have a thoughtful discussion.” Id. at 3:26-27; see also id. at 5:3-5 (“I’m 

trying to find a way not to waste anyone’s time and have a thoughtful discussion, however 

that needs to happen.”). Petitioner was again asked directly by the Sonoma Court whether 

he agreed to waive his right to a speedy probation hearing, and again directly informed the 

Sonoma Court that he so agreed. See id. at 5:23-27. 

At the third hearing, held April 29, 2014, Petitioner’s counsel admitted that 

Petitioner had violated probation. See Dkt. No. 36, Ex. O. The Sonoma Court spoke to 

Petitioner directly, and informed Petitioner that he was entitled to a hearing in which the 

prosecution had “to prove by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that [Petitioner was] in 

violation of probation.” Id. at 2:22-25. The court informed Petitioner that he had a right to 

testify at such a hearing, and to test the evidence against him. See id. Petitioner informed 

the Sonoma Court that he understood and waived those rights. See id. at 3:3-5. The 

Sonoma Court found this waiver to be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,” and accepted 

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Petitioner’s admission that Petitioner had “failed to be of good conduct and obey all laws.” 

Id. at 3:2-15. The Sonoma Court observed that the violation was based on Petitioner’s 

conviction of a misdemeanor. Id. at 3:16-17 (The Court: “This misdemeanor, is that the 

basis of the violation?” Prosecution: “It is, Your Honor.”). The Sonoma Court then 

referred the matter to the Sonoma County probation department for a supplemental 

sentencing report. See id. 

The Sonoma County probation department provided its supplemental sentencing 

report on May 28, 2014. See Dkt. No. 36, Ex. P at 5. The report noted that, among other 

violations of the probation imposed in 2011, Petitioner had been “convicted of a 

misdemeanor violation of Section 69 PC in Napa County on 01/30/14.” Id. at 3. As 

punishment for this conviction, Petitioner “served 120 days in jail and was granted 

summary probation.” Id. at 3. The report concluded that Petitioner’s “compliance on 

probation has been dismal,” and recommended the Sonoma Court revoke probation. Id. at 

3, 5. 

The fourth hearing was held June 4, 2014, after the probation department provided 

its report. See Dkt. No. 17-1, Ex. D (noting that the court had “read and considered the 

probation report”). The transcript from that hearing shows that Petitioner’s counsel asked 

the Sonoma Court to impose “an alternative sentence besides state prison,” and suggested 

that Petitioner be released on his own recognizance. See id. at 2:12-22. The Sonoma 

Court denied both requests and revoked probation. Id. at 3. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standard 

 This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). The writ may not be granted with 

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respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state 

court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state 

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question 

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set 

of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is 

in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state 

court decision. Id. at 412; Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004). While 

circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining whether a state 

court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the 

Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be 

“reasonably” applied. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.), overruled on 

other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 

 “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme 

Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 

case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ 

clause, . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court 

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making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s 

application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

B. Analysis 

As explained above, Petitioner has only one claim in the Operative Petition: that 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance during probation revocation proceedings. See 

generally, Operative Pet. Specifically, Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective in 

advising Petitioner to admit to violating probation, see id. at 6, and in not “even 

attempt[ing] to compromise with the Sonoma County Court [at the] probation hearing” 

Traverse at 1. 

Petitioner must establish two things in order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment 

ineffectiveness of counsel claim. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was 

deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing 

professional norms. Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Second, he must 

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is defined as 

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id

“[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before 

examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the result of the alleged deficiencies.” 

Id. at 697; Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) (applauding 

district court’s refusal to consider whether counsel’s conduct was deficient after 

determining that petitioner could not establish prejudice), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1124 

(1996). 

1. Counsel was not ineffective in his attempts to negotiate. 

Petitioner’s argument that counsel “didn’t even attempt to compromise with the 

Sonoma County Court [at the] probation hearing,” Traverse at 1, is belied by the record. 

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The transcript of the first hearing before the Sonoma Court reveals that counsel requested, 

and was granted, a continuance “to have a settlement discussion about” Petitioner’s 

probation. Dkt. No. 36, Ex. M at 2:11-12. At the second hearing, counsel twice stated that 

he and the prosecution “need[ed] to continue our conversation” and to “continue our 

discussion.” Dkt. No. 36, Ex. N at 2:10-13. That the “discussion” or “conversation” with 

the prosecution needed to be “continue[d]” suggests that counsel had already begun 

settlement talks with the prosecution. Indeed, Petitioner’s own statements show that his 

counsel attempted to negotiate with the prosecution; Petitioner states that he agreed to a 

continuance at the second hearing because “we were trying to compromise.” Traverse at 2. 

The record and Petitioner’s own description of events thus show that counsel did attempt 

to negotiate with the prosecution, but in the end was unsuccessful. 

To the extent Petitioner intends to challenge the failure to secure a plea deal, 

Petitioner’s claim fails because the failure to secure a plea deal does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The United States Supreme Court has stated that, “[i]f no 

plea offer is made, or a plea deal is accepted by the defendant but rejected by the judge, the 

issue [of ineffective assistance of counsel] simply does not arise.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 

U.S. 156, 168 (2012); see also United States v. McCall, No. C 00-00505 WHA, 2014 WL 

2581353, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2014) (explaining that the requirement for effective 

advice from counsel only attaches to formal plea offers). This is because “defendants have 

‘no right to be offered a plea . . . nor a federal right that the judge accept it.’” McCall, 

2014 WL 2581353, at *3 (quoting Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148 (2012)). 

To the extent Petitioner intends to claim that counsel was ineffective because he did 

not accurately predict that the Sonoma Court would revoke probation, Petitioner’s claim 

fails. It is well-settled that an attorney’s incorrect prediction as to the likely sentence 

following a guilty plea does not amount to erroneous advice, or satisfy the deficiency 

prong of Strickland, simply because the trial court ultimately imposed a different sentence. 

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Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002-02 (9th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing Iaea v. Sunn, 

800 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Because the record is clear that counsel attempted to negotiate with the prosecution, 

Petitioner has not established that counsel was ineffective. 

2. Petitioner was not prejudiced by admitting he violated probation. 

Petitioner’s argument that counsel should not have advised Petitioner to admit the 

probation violation does not demonstrate prejudice, because as Petitioner concedes in the 

Operative Petition, he in fact violated probation. See Operative Pet. at 6 (“I violated 

probation . . . .”). 

First, it is apparent from public records that Petitioner violated probation. Court 

records show that Petitioner was convicted of at least one misdemeanor after Petitioner 

was granted probation, and before the Sonoma Court held the probation revocation 

proceedings at issue here. See Napa Cty. Super. Ct. Case Nos. CR-169183 (on January 30, 

2014, Petitioner pleaded guilty to a violation of the California Penal Code, for obstructing 

or resisting an officer), CR-163036 (on October 24, 2012, Petitioner pleaded guilty to a 

misdemeanor violation of the California Vehicle Code, for driving under the influence of 

alcohol and with a suspended license).1

 Petitioner’s conviction for obstructing or resisting 

an officer was noted in the probation report, see Dkt. No. 36, Ex. P at 2, and the 

prosecution expressly cited that conviction as a basis for revoking probation, see Dkt. No. 

17-1, Ex. D at 3:7-8. Because Petitioner was convicted of resisting or obstructing a police 

officer while Petitioner was on probation, and because the record of this conviction is 

publicly available, the only practical difference Petitioner’s admission made to the 

probation revocation proceedings is that it saved the prosecution the effort of introducing 

 

1

 The Court takes judicial notice of the Napa County court docket. Courts “may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States v. Black, 482 

F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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court records to prove up Petitioner’s probation violation. Accordingly, Petitioner has not 

established that he was prejudiced by this admission. 

Second, although Petitioner argues that he was inappropriately advised to admit to 

two probation violations, see Traverse at 1 (arguing that the failure to complete a drug 

treatment program did not constitute a second violation of probation), Petitioner does not 

explain how this would have made a difference to the probation revocation proceedings. 

Petitioner does not cite any case law that suggests he would have been entitled to remain 

on probation if he violated the conditions of probation only once, and the Court is unaware 

of any case law that allows a probationer one “free pass.” It therefore appears to the Court 

that any admission to two probation violations did not prejudice Petitioner. 

Moreover, Petitioner did not actually admit to two probation violations on the 

record. The Sonoma Court did not ask Petitioner whether Petitioner had violated probation 

more than once. Instead, Petitioner was asked: “do you admit that you violated your 

probation in that you failed to be of good conduct and obey all laws?” Dkt. No. 36, Ex. O 

at 3:10-12. Petitioner answered “Yes, sir.” Id. at 3:13. And as noted, supra, the Sonoma 

Court believed this admission was based on only one probation violation: Petitioner’s 

misdemeanor conviction. See id. at 3:16-17 (The Court: “This misdemeanor, is that the 

basis of the violation?” Prosecution: “It is, Your Honor.”). As Petitioner appears to 

concede that he violated probation at least once, see Operative Pet. at 6, and court records 

reveal that Petitioner was convicted of a crime while on probation, and the Sonoma Court 

believed Petitioner’s admission was based on this single conviction, see supra, Petitioner’s 

admission that he “failed to be of good conduct and obey all laws” is true even if the 

alleged second probation violation is disregarded. 

For these reasons, Petitioner has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability 

the Sonoma Court would have permitted him to remain on probation, but for counsel’s 

alleged errors. 

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Because counsel was not ineffective in negotiations with the prosecution, and 

because Petitioner has not shown he was prejudiced by admitting to two probation 

violations rather than to one, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to 

habeas relief. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the Court concludes that the 

Operative Petition must be DENIED. 

 Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has not made “a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated 

that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may 

not appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court but may seek a 

certificate from the Court of Appeals under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Clerk shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment in favor of 

Respondent, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 2, 2020 ________________________ 

BETH LABSON FREEMAN 

United States District Judge 

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