Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00684/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00684-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

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1

The Court uses this designation for convenience, though Alcatel-Lucent is not aligned as a

plaintiff, strictly speaking. 

2

Microsoft also filed a motion regarding Lucent’s defense of laches, but the parties

subsequently withdrew both the defense and the related motion. (See Doc. Nos. 198, 249, 278.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

and MULTIMEDIA PATENT TRUST

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 06-CV-0684-H

(CAB)

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Doc. Nos. 180, 182, 196, 197,

199, 200]

vs.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Defendant.

AND RELATED CLAIMS

This case involves claims and counterclaims for patent infringement between

Lucent Technologies, Inc. (“Lucent”), Multimedia Patent Trust (“MPT”), and AlcatelLucent (collectively with Lucent and MPT, “Plaintffs”1

) on one side and Microsoft

Corporation (“Microsoft”) on the other. On January 4, 2008, according to the schedule

set by the Court, the parties filed motions for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 180, 182,

197, 199-200.)2

 The parties filed their oppositions on January 18, 2008. (Doc. Nos.

225-26, 229, 232, 236.) The parties filed their reply briefs on January 25, 2008. (Doc.

Nos. 286-88, 291, 293.) The Court also permitted Microsoft to file a late amended

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version of one of its motions and granted Plaintiffs additional time to respond to this

motion. (See Doc. Nos. 196, 209, 222-23, 290.) The Court also authorized

supplemental briefing to address any material discovered after the parties’ last

opportunity to brief an issue. (See Doc. No. 326.)

On February 1, 2008, the Court held a hearing on this motion. The following

attorneys appeared on behalf of Lucent and MPT: Robert A. Appleby, Paul A. Bondor,

James E. Marina, Michel P. Stadnick, Todd Friedman, Avi Lele, Jonas McDavit,

Michael Bregenger, Carl Blickle, Karen Robinson, and Ephraim Starr. Scott Partridge

and Lisa Kelly appeared for Alcatel Lucent. The following attorneys appeared for

Microsoft: John E. Gartman, Christopher Scott Marchese, Alan Albright, Ross

Garsson, Richard Weinblatt, Irene Hudson, Andrew Kopsidas, and John Helms.

Background

On August 9, 2005, in Case No. 02-CV-2060, the Court granted summary

judgment of invalidity by indefiniteness of claims 13 and 15 of United States Patent

No. 5,227,878 (“Puri ‘878”) because a transcription error by the United States Patent

and Trademark Office (“PTO”) omitted language from claim 13, on which claim 15

depends. (See Order Granting Part Denying Part Microsoft’s Mot. Partial Summ. J.

Invalidity Puri ‘878, Case No. 02-CV-2060, Doc. No. 325.) Lucent obtained a

Certificate of Correction from the PTO, issued on October 25, 2005, and then brought

this action on March 28, 2006. 

While this case was pending, Lucent and Alcatel merged. Lucent is now a

subsidiary of Alcatel Lucent. Prior to the merger, Lucent created MPT and assigned

certain patents to it, including the Puri ‘878 patent.

In response to Lucent’s action, Microsoft asserted counterclaims for

infringement of ten of its patents against Lucent and Alcatel-Lucent: United States

Patent Nos. 6,412,004 (“Chen ‘004”); 6,438,217 (“Huna ‘217”); 5,438,433 (“Reifman

‘433”); 5,917,499 (“Jancke ‘499”); 6,339,794 (“Bolosky ‘794”); 5,764,913 (“Jancke

‘913”); 6,565,608 (“Fein ‘608”); 5,941,947 (“Brown ‘947”); 5,838,319 (“Guzak

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‘319”); and 5,977,971 (“Guzak ‘971” and collectively with Guzak ‘319, “the Guzak

patents”). The Court previously ruled on the construction of disputed terms for all

eleven patents at issue. (See Doc. No. 156, Claim Construction Order for U.S. Patent

Nos: 5,227,878; 6,412,004; 6,438,217; 5,438,433; 5,917,499; 6,339,794; 5,764,913;

6,565,608; 5,941,947; 5,838,319; and 5,977,971 (“Cl. Const. Order”).)

Discussion

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may grant

summary judgment upon a claim “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A party

moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986). The moving party’s burden “may be discharged by ‘showing’–that is,

pointing out to the district court–that there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.

Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56, the party opposing

the motion must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material

fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-56 (1986). The opposing

evidence must be sufficiently probative to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find in

favor of the opposing party. See id. at 249-250. Thus, the non-moving party cannot

oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by “rest[ing] upon mere

allegation or denials of his pleadings.” Id. at 256. If the non-moving party fails to

make a sufficient showing of an element of its case, the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

On a motion for summary judgment the court views the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962). However, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which

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is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a

court should not adopt that version of the facts” for summary judgment purposes. See

Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007).

II. Motions Related to the Puri ‘878 Patent

A. Background for the Puri ‘878 Patent

The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued the Puri ‘878 patent, entitled

“Adaptive Coding and Decoding of Frames and Fields of Video,” on July 13, 1993 to

inventors Atul Puri and Rangarajan Aravind. The application was filed on November

15, 1991. Puri ‘878 relates generally to the compression and decompression of video

signals, which allows transmission using less bandwidth.

Two apparatus claims are at issue here: claim 13 and related dependent claim 15.

Claim 13 states, in its corrected form:

An apparatus for decoding a compressed digital video signal, comprising:

a means for receiving a compressed digital video bit stream; and

a means responsive to a motion compensation type signal for selectively

and adaptively performing motion compensated decoding of frames of the

compressed digital video bit stream and fields of the compressed video bit

stream.

(Puri ‘878 90:31-38.) Claim 15 states:

 The apparatus of claim 13, in which the decoding means comprises:

a means responsive to a motion compensation type signal and selectively

responsive to frame motion vectors and field motion vectors for producing

an adaptive motion compensated estimate of a decoded video signal; and

a means responsive to the compressed digital video bit stream for

producing a decoded estimate error signal; and

a means responsive to the adaptive motion compensated estimate and the

estimate error signal for producing a decoded video signal.

(Puri ‘878 90:43-55.) The Court previously construed the terms of these claims,

including definitions of the structures related to the means-plus-function elements.

(See Cl. Constr. Order, Doc. No. 156, App. A.)

Claim 13 did not issue in its current form. The PTO, due to its own error,

initially issued claim 13 without the phrase “and fields of the compressed video bit

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stream” and without the word “digital” in the second means plus function limitation.

Lucent previously asserted the Puri ‘878 patent in a suit against Microsoft without first

seeking a correction. There, the Court declined to correct the patent and determined

that claims 13 and 15 were invalid for indefiniteness. (Order Granting Part Denying

Part Mot. Summ. J. Claims of Puri ‘878 Invalid Under § 112(2), Case No. 02-CV-2060,

Doc. No. 325.) After that ruling, Lucent obtained a certificate of correction from the

PTO, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 254, which permits the Director to issue a certificate

“[w]henever a mistake in a patent incurred through the fault of the Patent and

Trademark Office, is clearly disclosed by the records of the Office . . . .” The PTO

issued the certificate of correction on October 25, 2005.

MPT now asserts that certain Microsoft products infringe claims 13 and 15, as

corrected, in their implementation of MPEG-2 and VC-1 video compression standards.

MPEG-2 and VC-1 are both standards for video compression technology used in

common consumer video formats including DVD and HD DVD. More specifically,

MPT accuses Microsoft of infringing via software related to its Windows operating

systems and Xbox 360 game console. The accused software includes the MPEG-2 and

VC-1 decoders associated with these products.

B. Anticipation, Obviousness, and Structural Equivalence of Decoders

MPT moves for partial summary judgment that the asserted claims of the Puri

‘878 patent are neither anticipated nor obvious. Microsoft moves for summary

judgment that not all MPEG-2 and VC-1 decoders are structurally equivalent. 

Micrsoft also raises its argument regarding the equivalence of decoders in response

to MPT’s motions on anticipation and obviousness.

1. Microsoft’s Motion Regarding Equivalence of Decoders

Microsoft seeks summary adjudication that not all MPEG-2 and VC-1 decoders

are structurally equivalent. Specifically, it challenges the assertion of MPT’s expert,

Bernd Girod, that any decoder that complies with the MPEG-2 or VC-1 standard will

have structures that are at least equivalent to the corresponding structures of claims 13

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and 15. (See Decl. John E. Gartman Supp. Microsoft’s Mot. Summ. Adjudication Not

AnyandEveryMPEG-2 VC-1 Decoder Structurally Equivalent Ex. A (“Girod Decl.”).)

Microsoft also seeks exclusion of Girod’s testimony on this question of equivalence.

To determine infringement, the Court first construes the claim and then compares

the claim to the accused product or device. See, e.g., Freedman Seating Co. v. Am.

Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Terlep v. Brinkmann Corp., 418

F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For infringement, “the plaintiff must show the

presence of every element or its substantial equivalent in the accused device or

process.” Terlep, 418 F.3d at 1385 (quoting Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v. Nike, Inc.,

38 F.3d 1192, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). For means plus function elements under 35

U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, the patentee must prove that the accused product performs the

claimed function using a structure identical or equivalent to the structure identified by

the Court’s construction. See, e.g., Cytologix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., 424

F.3d 1168, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Microsoft argues that Girod’s declaration is legally insufficient because, to

conclude that the accused products have the same or equivalent functions and

structures as the patents, he relies on the products’ compliance with either the MPEG-2

or VC-1 standards. The Court disagrees. MPT has responded adequately with

evidence from Girod’s testimony that presents a material question of fact regarding

whether the accused products infringe the asserted claims. His declaration offers an

analysis of the structure and function of the accused products sufficient to survive

summary judgment. Girod bases his infringement analysis both on the implications of

compliance with the standard and on review of the product source code as applied to

the Court’s construction. (See, e.g., Girod Decl. at 50 (asserting, after review of both

the standard and the product’s source code, that “a computer with the MPEG-2

Decoder installed contains structure that performs the claimed function of “producing

an adaptive motion compensated estimate . . . .”).)

The Court recognizes that standards compliance is not necessarily equivalent to

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an infringement analysis for claims under section 112 ¶ 6. Nevertheless, analysis of

standards implemented by a product may be relevant to infringement and provide

support for the patentee’s position, provided thatstandards compliance does not replace

the ultimate legal standard for infringement. The parties do not dispute that the

accused software complies with these standards. Microsoft only concedes, however,

that the standards specify the syntax of a bit stream that a decoder must be able to

decode. Microsoft disputes whether compliance with the standards requires

implementation by a particular type of hardware or software. Nevertheless, MPT

presents a material question of fact regarding infringement of claims 13 and 15, based

on more than just compliance with the standards, and summary judgment of

noninfringement is therefore inappropriate.

Finally, the Court also notes that to the extent that Microsoft’s motion may be

construed as an objection to the admissibility of Girod’s expert testimony under Federal

Rule of Evidence 702, it has reviewed the motion and found no reason to exclude

Girod’s testimony at this time. As a result, the Court DENIES Microsoft’s motion for

summary adjudication that not any and every MPEG-2 or VC-1 decoder is structurally

equivalent.

2. Anticipation

An anticipation defense under 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires clear and convincing

evidence that a single prior-art reference discloses all limitations of a claim. See, e.g.,

Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Union

Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1188-89 (Fed.

Cir. 2002). Anticipation is typically established by one skilled in the art who must

“identify each claim element, state the witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element,

and explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference.”

Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Such

testimony cannot be merely conclusory. Id. at 1315-16. It is not the task of the district

court “to attempt to interpret confusing or general testimony to determine whether a

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case of invalidity has been made out, particularly at the summary judgment stage.” Id.

at 1316.

MPT meets its initial burden under Celetox to point out a lack of supporting

evidence from Microsoft, which bears the burden of persuasion on this affirmative

defense. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. In particular, MPT points out that

Microsoft’s expert report does not delineate how any single prior art reference

discloses all limitations of the claim. Under Celotex, Microsoft must come forward

with evidence sufficient to support a defense of anticipation, but it fails to do so.

Microsoft first attempts to apply its structural equivalence argument regarding

MPEG-2 and VC-1 decoders in this context, arguing that if any MPEG-2 or VC-1

decoder infringes the claims, as MPT argues, then certain prior art references render

the patents invalid. Jerry Gibson, Microsoft’s expert, opines that “if MPT is permitted

to disregard the specific structures identified by the Court in order to read claims 13

and 15 on the accused decoders, it is my opinion . . . that claims 13 and 15 are invalid.”

(Decl. John E. Gartman Supp. Microsoft’s Opp’n Plfs.’ Mots. Summ. J. (“Gartman

Opp’n Decl.”) Ex. I-1 (“Gibson Report”) at 48-49.) The premise of this argument is

inconsistent with the Court’s claim construction.

Gibson does not identify how a single prior art reference discloses all elements

of either claim. Gibson only cites to prior art setting forth some but not all elements,

or makes conclusory statements regarding anticipation. For example, he contends that:

(1) U.S. Patent No. 5,093,070 discloses the structure for adaptive motion compensated

decoding; (2) U.S. Patent No. 4,710,810 discloses the structure for differential

encoding and decoding of motion vectors; (3) two articles by inventor Puri disclose

the structure for variable block size decision making; (4) U.S. Patent No. 5,428,693

discloses the structure for motion compensated predictive coding; (5) U.S. Patent No.

5,539,466 describes adaptive motion compensation and a prediction mode signal.

(See Gibson Report 21, 33-34, 36, 38-39, 40-41 (analyzing prior art); Gartman Opp’n

Decl Exs. I-2 to I-6 (copies of alleged prior art).) Gibson also analyzes specific claim

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limitations and argues that they are disclosed by certain prior art references. (See, e.g.,

Gibson Report 49-50 (arguing that the limitation of “selectively and adaptively

performing motion compensated decoding . . .” is shown in prior art including

“DigiCipher Description,” “Columbia 91/131 Submission,” “Ericsson 1985 Article,”

U.S. Patent Nos. 5,428,693 and 5,539,466, and “numerous MPEG submissions”).

Nevertheless, Microsoft fails to indicate any analysis in which its expert lays out

precisely how any one of these references discloses all the limitations of either claim.

Microsoft argues that Gibson’s invocation of U.S. Patent No. 5,091,782 (“the

Krause patent”) is sufficient because that patent incorporates a 1985 Ericsson article

by reference which, Gibson argues, anticipate the claims in combination if viewed as

a single reference. Even assuming that the Krause patent and Ericsson article may be

considered a single reference, the cited portion of Gibson’s analysis makes only

generalized statements. He fails to set forth how the combined references would

disclose every claim element. (See Gibson Report 14-20.) 

Microsoft also attempts to rely on statements by Plaintiffs’ expert Girod, but the

Court concludes that Microsoft fails to present a question of fact based on Girod’s

testimony. Even if Girod’s testimony concedes that certain limitations are present in

the prior art, as Microsoft argues, it has not explained how Girod’s testimony

establishes that every limitation was present in a single reference.

Finally, Microsoft argues that it can make an anticipation defense through fact

witnesses in lieu of expert testimony, citing Lacks Indus. Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle

Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335, 1348-51 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This does not

change the fact, however, that it must put forward some specific evidence at this point

sufficient to establish its defense, not merely conclusory or generalized assertions about

the availability of evidence. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. Accordingly, the

Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment that the Puri ‘878 patent is

not invalid due to anticipation.

/ / /

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3. Obviousness

“The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination,” and summary

judgment may be appropriate if “the content of the prior art, the scope of the patent

claim, and the level of ordinary skill in the art are not in material dispute, and the

obviousness of the claim is apparent in light of these factors.” KSR Int’l Co. v.

Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1745-46 (2007) (citing Graham v. John

Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)). Courts also consider secondary

factors, including “‘commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,

etc.’” which may dislodge a determination of obviousness. Id. at 1734 (quoting

Graham, 353 U.S. at 17-18.) District courts weigh expert testimony to determine if

there is an open question of fact, though a merely conclusory affidavit will not preclude

summary judgment. See id. at 1745-46.

In KSR, the Supreme Court rejected a rigid application of the Federal Circuit’s

“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test. See KSR Int’l Co., 127 S.Ct. at 1734 (citing

Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 1999), as an

example of this test). Under this test, proof of obviousness required some teaching,

suggestion, or motivation “found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the

knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art.” Id. The Court determined that

while “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” had “captured a helpful insight” into

obviousness, it was incompatible with Supreme Court precedent when applied in a

rigid and mandatory fashion. Id. at 1741. The Supreme Court observed that other

more recent Federal Circuit decisions reflected a broader approach that may be

consistent with its opinions. Id. at 1743 (citing DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co.

Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Alza Corp.

v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

When determining obviousness, “neither the particular motivation nor the

avowed purpose of the patentee controls.” KSR Int’l Co., 127 S.Ct. at 1741-42.

Instead, courts should determine whether the “objective reach of the claim”

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encompasses obvious subject matter. Id. at 1742. This may include “noting that there

existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there was an obvious

solution encompassed by the patent’s claims.” Id. “[T]he results of ordinary

innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws.” Id. at 1746.

However, courts must avoid “falling prey to hindsight bias,” “ex post reasoning,” and

“[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense.” Id. at

1742-43. Furthermore, “when the prior art teaches away from combining certain

known elements, discovery of a successful means of combining them is more likely to

be nonobvious.” Id. at 1740.

“A patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by

demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.”

KSR Int’l Co., 127 S.Ct. at 1740. A combination is likely nonobvious if the elements

work together “in an unexpected and fruitful manner.” Id. at 1740. In contrast, a

patent is likely to be obvious if it merely yields a predictable result by substituting one

element for another known in the field. Id.

An issued patent is presumed valid, so the burden of persuasion for invalidity

defenses, including obviousness, is one of clear and convincing evidence See, e.g.,

Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.

2007); Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int’l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

Unlike anticipation, where a single reference must disclose all claim elements,

a party asserting obviousness may rely on the prior art as a whole. As with

anticipation, Microsoft’s expert offers numerous arguments that various elements of

the Puri ‘878 patent were present in the prior art. For example, he contends that:

(1) U.S. Patent No. 5,093,070 discloses the structure for adaptive motion compensated

decoding; (2) U.S. Patent No. 4,710,810 discloses the structure for differential

encoding and decoding of motion vectors; (3) two articles by inventor Puri disclose

the structure for variable block size decision making; (4) U.S. Patent No. 5,428,693

discloses the structure for motion compensated predictive coding; (5) U.S. Patent No.

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5,539,466 describes adaptive motion compensation and a prediction mode signal.

(See Gibson Report 21, 33-34, 36, 38-39, 40-41 (analyzing prior art); Gartman Opp’n

Decl Exs. I-2 to I-6 (copies of alleged prior art).) Gibson also analyzes specific claim

limitations and argues that they are disclosed by certain prior art references. (See, e.g.,

Gibson Report 49-50 (arguing that the limitation of “selectively and adaptively

performing motion compensated decoding . . .” is shown in prior art including

“DigiCipher Description,” “Columbia 91/131 Submission,” “Ericsson 1985 Article,”

U.S. Patent Nos. 5,428,693 and 5,539,466, and “numerous MPEG submissions”).

Gibson also asserts the Krause patent and Ericsson article. Unlike the

anticipation context, the Court concludes that these references present a material

question of fact on obviousness. The examiner initially rejected claims 13 and 15 as

anticipated in light of the Krause patent. (See Gibson Report 14–17.) The applicants

amended the second means plus function element of claim 13 as follows:

a means response to a motion compensation [coding] type signal for

selectively and adaptively performing motion compensated decoding of

frames of the compressed digital video bit stream and fields of the

compressed video bit stream.3

(Gartman Opp’n Decl. Ex. III-2 at CCMS_311949.) Microsoft argues that these

additions of “motion [compensation/compensated]” and “adaptively” would have been

obvious in light of other references. Gibson argues the Ericsson article describes a

method for using motion compensation in an adaptive prediction scheme, thus

rendering these modifications obvious. (See Gibson Report at 18.) The Court

concludes that this evidence presents triable issues of fact on obviousness and DENIES

Plaintiffs’ motion that the Puri ‘878 patent is not invalid for reasons of obviousness.

By providing these examples the Court does not limit Microsoft’s ability to raise other

prior art or other theories of obviousness.

/ / /

/ / /

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4The unpublished cases cited by Microsoft for shifting the burden of persuasion either predate

Mahurkur or make no reference to it.

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C. Conception Date of Puri ‘878

Microsoft moves the Court for summary adjudication that the inventors of the

Puri ‘878 patent conceived claims 13 and 15 no earlier than September 30, 1991.

Microsoft clearly seeks this adjudication in relation to invalidity arguments, such as

alleged anticipation under section 102(a). Microsoft retains the burden of persuasion

for invalidity. In Mahurkur v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the

Federal Circuit clarified the allocation of burdens where the alleged infringer

challenges the validity of a patent and the patentee seeks to avoid prior art by

establishing an invention date earlier than the patent filing date. The patentee has the

burden of producing evidence showing an earlier invention date. Id. at 1576-77. If the

patentee fails to meet this burden, the patent’s filing date is treated as the invention

date. Id. at 1577. If the patentee satisfies the burden of production, however, the

alleged infringer still has the usual burden of persuasion for invalidity, namely clear

and convincing evidence. Id. 1577-78.4

Conception is “the formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and

permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied

in practice.” Hybridtech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376

(Fed. Cir. 1986). Conception is complete once “only ordinary skill could reduce it to

practice, without extensive research or experimentation.” Burroughs Wellcome Co. v.

Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Proof of conception requires

corroborating evidence, to which Courts apply a “rule of reason” that examines “all

pertinent evidence so that a sound determination of the credibility of the inventor’s

story may be reached.” Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1985). “There

is no particular formula that an inventor must follow in providing corroboration of his

testimony of conception.” Singh v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This

may include consideration of circumstantial evidence. Sandt Tech., Ltd. v. Resco

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Metal and Plastics Corp., 264 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Applying these principles, the Court examines whether Plaintiffs have met their

burden of production for evidence of conception prior to the filing date of November

15, 1991, including adequate corroboration. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that they have produced evidence sufficient

to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether conception occurred prior to

Microsoft’s proposed cut-off date of September 30, 1991.

Plaintiffs submit Appendix A to Puri ‘878 as a sample segment of source code

implementing the invention, with “Sept 1991” entered in its initial comment field.

(Puri ‘878 cols. 31-88). Inventor Puri testified that this code represented a “snapshot”

of code, meaning that it was complete and functional. (Decl. Ephraim Starr Opp’n

Microsoft’s Mot. Partial Summ. J. Claims of Puri ‘878 Conceived No Earlier Than

Sept. 30, 1991 Ex. A (“Puri Depo. Tr.”) 309:4-310:14.) Puri further testified that

writing such code was the second phase in a two-step process consisting of a research

and development phase and an implementation phase. (Puri Depo. Tr. 310:16-311:11.)

Puri estimated the length of the implementation phase at six months. (Puri Depo. Tr.

311:13-23.) The complexity of the code used to implementing the patent corroborates

Puri’s testimony of the need for an implementation phase following research and

development. 

Other documents and testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,

also corroborate Puri’s version of events. Plaintiffs’ expert, Girod, also asserts that a

six month implementation period is reasonable in light of the complexity of the code.

(Decl. Bernd Girod Opp’n Microsoft’s Mot. Summ. J. Claims 13 and 15 Conceived No

Earlier Than Sept. 30, 1991 ¶ 7.) In November, 1991, Puri submitted, to an ISO

standardization working group, an MPEG-2 video coding proposal containing

elements, such as frame and field motion compensation, related to the invention. (Decl.

Atul Puri Opp’n Microsoft’s Mot. Summ. J. Claims 13 and 15 Conceived No Earlier

Than Sept. 30, 1991 (“Puri Decl.”) Ex. A.) Puri submitted another related proposal to

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ISO in May, 1991. (Puri Decl. Ex. E.) On February 11, 1991, Puri and co-inventor

Aravind produced research reports for the period of October, 1990, to January, 1991,

which describe working on coding research related to MPEG-2. (Puri Decl. Exs. B-C.)

Plaintiffs also submitted an internal AT&T document dated May 10, 1991, describing

“[a] subset of ideas that could be tested for MPEG-2.” This evidence, combined with

the complexity of the code itself, presents a sufficient question of fact for the jury to

considerwhether the inventors conceived the patented invention prior to September 30,

1991. For these reasons, the Court DENIES Microsoft’s motion for summary

adjudication that the inventors conceived claims 13 and 15 of the Puri ‘878 patent no

earlier than September 30, 1991, as there are triable issues of material fact. 

D. Microsoft’s Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims

1. Laches

Microsoft asserts two distinct theories of laches: (1) “prosecution laches,”

resulting from unreasonable delay in prosecuting a patent, and (2) “traditional laches,”

resulting from unreasonable delay in bringing suit. 

Prosecution laches is an equitable doctrine with origins in two Supreme Court

cases from the 1920s. See Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Elec. Co., 264 U.S. 463

(1924); Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50 (1923); see also Symbol Techs., Inc.

v. Lemelson Medical, Educ. & Research Found., 277 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

(“Symbol Techs., Inc. I”) (summarizing these cases). In both cases, the Supreme Court

concluded that patentees were barred from enforcing claims secured after an

unreasonable delay in prosecuting applications. Symbol Techs., Inc. I, 277 F.3d at

1364. Later, the Court expanded the prosecution laches defense to actions “involving

new claims issuing from divisional or continuing applications that prejudice

intervening adverse public rights.” Id. at 1364-65 (discussing Crown Cork & Seal Co.

v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159 (1938); Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W.

Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938)). A Court may apply prosecution laches even though

the applicant complied with pertinent statutes and rules, provided that the delay was

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unreasonable. See id. at 1363-66

Microsoft cites no case, however, in which the courts have applied prosecution

laches to an alleged delay in seeking a certificate of correction. It points to Southwest

Software, Inc. v. Harlequin, Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2000) where the

Federal Circuit observed that “it does not seem to us to be asking too much to expect

a patentee to check a patent when it is issued in order to determine whether it contains

any errors that require the issuance of a certificate of correction.” The Federal Circuit

made that observation, however, in holding that a certificate of correction does not

have retroactive effect to causes of action arising before its issuance. Id. at 1294-96.

The cases from which the prosecution laches defense originates all involved delays in

the application process, not delays in seeking corrections. See Symbol Techs., Inc. I,

277 F.3d at 1363-66. Prosecution laches is only for “egregious cases of misuse of the

statutory patent system.” See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Educ. &

Research Found., 422 F.3d 1378, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Delaying a certificate of

correction does not change the term of a patent, thus avoiding the concern identified

in Woodbridge that an inventor would “unduly . . . postpone the time when the public

could enjoy the free use of the invention.” Woodbridge, 263 U.S. at 60.

The Court declines to extend prosecution laches beyond the existing precedent.

In doing so, the Court does not completely foreclose Microsoft’s ability to assert the

delay in correcting the patent when defending MPT’s claims. As the Federal Circuit

explained Southwest Software, Inc., recipients of certificates of correction are limited

by their inability to apply the corrected patent to causes of action arising before the

certificate of correction. See Southwest Software, Inc., 226 F.3d at 1294-96. 

Furthermore, the Court concludes that other defenses premised at least in part

on the delay, including traditional laches, survive summary judgment. The Federal

Circuit has described the traditional laches defense as follows:

Laches may be defined generally as “slackness or carelessness toward

duty or opportunity.” In a legal context, laches may be defined as the

neglect or delay in bringing suit to remedy an alleged wrong, which taken

together with lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to

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the adverse party and operates as an equitable bar. “[Laches] exacts of the

plaintiff no more than fair dealing with his adversary.” In refusing to

enforce a patentee's claimofinfringement, the Supreme Court invoked the

maxim: “Courts of equity, it has often been said, will not assist one who

has slept upon his rights, and shows no excuse for his laches in asserting

them.”

A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (Fed. Cir.

1992) (citations omitted). The application of laches is within the discretion of the

district court, and it should be determined in a flexible manner without mechanical

rules. Id. at 1032. This discretion notwithstanding, the defendant must prove two

factors: (1) “the plaintiff delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length

of time from the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of its claim

against the defendant,” and (2) “the delay operated to the prejudice or injury of the

defendant.” Id.

In support of traditional laches Microsoft points to: (1) Plaintiffs’ 12-year delay

in seeking a certificate of correction, (2) Plaintiffs’ delay in bringing suit against

Microsoft, and (3) prejudice due to investment made during the period of time when

the asserted claims were invalid and due to the cost associated in converting its

products to avoid the corrected patent. Plaintiffs counter that the delay should be

measured from the date they knew or should have known of the infringement, not the

date the patent issued, and that the delay in seeking the certificate is irrelevant to this

determination. At least in this context, the parties did not dispute that Microsoft offers

sufficient evidence of prejudice.

Under A.C. Aukerman Co., Microsoft must establish a delay in filing suit, not

merely a delay in seeking the correction, that was unreasonable and inexcusable as

measured from when Plaintiffs knew or should have known of their claims. See id. at

1032. Nevertheless, given the equitable nature of laches, the Court may consider

Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking a certificate of correction as a factor relevant to applying

the laches defense.

The facts are sufficient for Microsoft’s traditional laches defense to survive

summary judgment. There is no dispute that Plaintiffs did not seek a certificate of

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correction from the PTO until approximately 12 years after the patent issued. There

is evidence that Lucent should have been aware of the error as early as 1996, and

perhaps as early as the issuance of the patent. Specifically, Microsoft offers evidence

that Lucent obtained an analysis of claim 13 as it relates to the MPEG-2 standard as

early as October 31, 1996. (See Gartman Opp’n Decl. Ex. III-6 (letter from attorney

Kenneth Rubenstein to Lucent’s Intellectual Property Division Manager).) Former

Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Gerald Mossinghoff opines that any such

analysis should have uncovered the missing words of claim 13. (Id. Ex. III-5 ¶ 33.)

He also observes that, in general, “sophisticated patent-acquiring entities proofread

granted U.S. patents against the prosecution history . . . .” (Id. ¶ 32.) Lucent attempted

to assert the patent in its uncorrected form, and those infringement claims were pending

for approximately two years before this Court.

Microsoft also offers evidence that Lucent actively asserted claim 13 in licensing

negotiations as early as 2002 and was informed of the error in the claim language

during the prior litigation. The evidence of licensing negotiations includes

presentations made for Apple Computer, eMachines, and Terayon Networks.

(See Gartman Opp’n Decl. Exs. III-7 to III-9.) Defense counsel informed Lucent of the

error both in correspondence from February, 2003, and statements in the Court’s record

from July, 2005. (See Gartman Opp’n Decl. Exs. III-10 to III-11.)

Lucent obtained its certificate of correction on October 25, 2005, and it cannot

seek damages for infringement before this date. It brought the present suit on March

28, 2006. The delay from the earliest possible cause of action is therefore

approximately five months. In light of the circumstances of this case, even this delay

might be considered unreasonable. Furthermore, any ultimate determination about

availability of traditional laches would be better founded on a more extensive record

as developed at trial. The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN

PART Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to the laches defense. Microsoft’s traditional

laches defense survives summary judgment, but its prosecution laches defense does

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not.

2. License

The Court previously rejected Microsoft’s license defense in a related case

involving the same facts surrounding to the creation of MPT and assignment of patents

from Lucent to MPT. (See Order Granting Part Denying Part Parties’ Mots. Summ. J.

Regarding Defs.’ Affirmative Defenses and Countercls., Case No. 02-CV-2060, Doc.

No. 2109 at 4-12; Order Denying Defs.’ Mots. Summ J. Granting Part Denying Part

Lucent’s Mot. Summ. J. Trust-Related Claims Defenses, Case No. 07-CV-2000, Doc.

No. 282 at 4-5.) Microsoft concedes that it only raises these arguments to preserve any

rights it may have for an appeal. Accordingly, the Court adopts the rationale of its

prior order and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Microsoft’s defense of

license.

3. Equitable Estoppel

To bar a patent infringement suit, the defense of equitable estoppel requires three

elements: “1) the patentee, through misleading conduct, leads the alleged infringer to

reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend to enforce its patent against the

alleged infringer, 2) the alleged infringer relies on that conduct, and 3) due to its

reliance, the alleged infringer will be materially prejudiced if the patentee is allowed

to proceed with its claim.” Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1371 (Fed.

Cir. 2001). Microsoft offers three theories of equitable estoppel, two of which the

Court previously rejected: (1) Lucent’s failure to license its patents to MPEG LA

despite an alleged commitment to do so, and (2) Lucent’s alleged attempt to defraud

Microsoft through the formation of MPT and assignment of patents to MPT.

(See Order Granting Part Denying Part Parties’ Mots. Summ. J. Regarding Defs.’

Affirmative Defenses and Countercls., Case No. 02-CV-2060, Doc. No. 2109 at 4-12;

Order Denying Defs.’ Mots. Summ J. Granting Part Denying PartLucent’s Mot. Summ.

J. Trust-Related Claims Defenses, Case No. 07-CV-2000, Doc. No. 282 at 4-5.) Based

on its prior orders, the Court rejects these theories.

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Microsoft also raises Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking a certificate of correction,

incorporating by reference the arguments it raised for its laches defense. The parties’

dispute focuses on whether Microsoft relied to its detriment on the delay in seeking a

certificate of correction, and at least for the present purposes, MPT does not challenge

the first element of whether the conduct was misleading. The Court concludes that

Microsoft has introduced evidence of reliance sufficient to create triable issues of

material fact. There is no dispute that Microsoft invested substantial amounts in its

development of the products at issue here, including the Windows Vista operating

system, and the Xbox 360 game console. Microsoft’s investment took place, at least

in part, during a period when the Puri ‘878 was invalid due to indefiniteness, as the

Court previously determined. Microsoft implemented MPEG-2 and VC-1 features in

these products based on its analysis of the market and the relevant patents as they

existed at that time. There is a triable issue of whether Microsoft relied to its detriment

by making these investments to implement features that allegedly fall within the scope

of the corrected patent. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion with

respect to Microsoft’s equitable estoppel defense.

4. Implied License

An implied license may arise “by equitable estoppel, acquiescence, conduct, or

legal estoppel.” Windbond Elecs. Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 262 F.3d 1363, 1374

(Fed. Cir. 2001). The parties’ briefs only address the theory of implied license by

equitable estoppel, and the Court understands that this is the only theory of implied

license offered. An implied license by equitable estoppel has three elements, which are

similar but not identical to the more general defense of equitable estoppel discussed

above: “(1) the patentee, through statements or conduct, gave an affirmative grant of

consent or permission to make, use, or sell to the alleged infringer; (2) the alleged

infringer relied on that statement or conduct; and (3) the alleged infringer would,

therefore, be materially prejudiced if the patentee is allowed to proceed with its claim.”

Id. 

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5Microsoft concedes that this order involved substantially the same facts and law, though it

involved a different patent. (See Microsoft’s Opp’n Plfs.’ Mots. Summ. J. at 21 n.14.)

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With respect to implied license, Microsoft merely incorporates its equitable

estoppel arguments by reference. These are not identical defenses, however. Implied

license by equitable estoppel requires some “affirmative grant of consent or permission

. . . .” Id. Equitable estoppel, in general, is broader and requires only some

“misleading conduct.” Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d at 1371. The only

Microsoft theory not precluded by the Court’s prior orders is its assertion of Plaintiffs’

conduct in failing to obtain a certificate of correction in a timely fashion. The failure

to obtain a timely certificate of correction does not constitute an affirmative grant of

consent. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion with respect to the defense

of implied license.

5. Waiver 

The Court previously rejected two of Microsoft’s grounds for its waiver defense:

(1) Lucent’s conduct in MPEG standardization activities, and (2) the formation of the

MPEG LA patent pool. (Order on Lucent’s Mot. Summ. Adjudications Regarding U.S.

Patent No. 4,701,954, Case No. 02-CV-2060, Doc. No. 844 at 8-9.)5 Microsoft

concedes that it only raises these arguments to preserve any rights it may have for an

appeal, and the Court need not entertain further litigation on these issues. 

Microsoft also raises a third theory of waiver unique to this case, namely, that

Lucent’s delay in seeking a certificate of correction represented a conscious decision

sufficient to support a waiver defense. The Court disagrees. To establish the defense

of waiver, a party must make a clear showing of intent to waive that right. See, e.g.,

Prieto v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 1005, 1013 n.12 (9th Cir. 2004). Delay

in seeking a certificate of correction, in these circumstances, does not clearly establish

an intent to waive rights in the patent. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’

motion with respect to the waiver defense.

/ / /

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6. Exhaustion

The Court previously rejected the premise of Microsoft’s exhaustion defense in

a related case involving the same facts surrounding to the creation of MPT and

assignment of patents from Lucent to MPT. (See Order Granting Part Denying Part

Parties’ Mots. Summ. J. Regarding Defs.’ Affirmative Defenses and Countercls., Case

No. 02-CV-2060, Doc. No. 2109 at 4-12; Order Denying Defs.’ Mots. Summ J.

Granting Part Denying Part Lucent’s Mot. Summ. J. Trust-Related Claims Defenses,

Case No. 07-CV-2000, Doc. No. 282 at 4-5) Microsoft concedes that it only raises

these arguments to preserve any rights it may have for an appeal. Accordingly, the

Court adopts the rationale of its prior order and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion with

respect to Microsoft’s exhaustion defense.

7. Unclean Hands

The equitable defense of unclean hands requires that “some unconscionable act

of one coming for relief has immediate and necessary relation to the equity that he

seeks in respect of the matter in litigation.” Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator

Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933). Because of the “far-reaching social and economic

consequences of a patent,” a court may consider both public and private standards of

equity in patent cases. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co.,

324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945). Conduct creating unclean hands includes a “willful act

concerning the cause of action” or “bad faith relative to the matter”. See id. 814-15

(1945) “Bad intent is the essence of unclean hands,” and a merely negligent action is

insufficient. See Dollar Sys. v. Avcar Leasing Sys., 890 F.2d 165, 173 (9th Cir. 1989).

The parties discuss four theories of unclean hands brought by Microsoft:

(1) Lucent fraudulently and intentionally withheld prior-art references during the

prosecution of the Puri ’878 patent, (2) Lucent attempted to defraud Microsoft through

the creation of Multimedia Patent Trust, (3) Lucent fraudulently created the impression

it would join MPEG LA, (4) MPT and its predecessors knew of the errors in claim 13

but failed to act to correct them in a reasonable period of time. 

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MPT’s motion does not address the first of these theories, based on alleged

withholding of prior art, so the Court does not reach it. The Court’s previous summary

judgment rulings exclude the next theory, based on circumstances surrounding the

creation of MPT, and the Court continues to apply its prior reasoning. (See Order

Granting Part Denying Part Parties’ Mots. Summ. J. Regarding Defs.’ Affirmative

Defenses and Countercls., Case No. 02-CV-2060, Doc. No. 2109 at 4-15; Order

Denying Defs.’ Mots. Summ J. Granting Part Denying Part Lucent’s Mot. Summ. J.

Trust-Related Claims Defenses, Case No. 07-CV-2000, Doc. No. 282 at 4-7.)

Furthermore, the third theory, relying on the alleged creation of a false impression that

Lucent would joint MPEG LA, essentially recasts other arguments regarding the

formation of MPT that the Court already rejected in its prior orders.

As to the final theory, regarding delay in correcting the patent, MPT argues that

Microsoft’s theory is at best one of negligence and therefore insufficient to establish

an unclean hands defense. In response, Microsoft asserts that Plaintiffs’ conduct was

more than merely negligent and thatLucent and MPT intentionally delayed seeking any

correction to the patent. Viewed in a light most favorable to Microsoft, the evidence

is enough to survive summary judgment. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’

motion regarding the unclean hands defense. The Court DENIES the motion with

respect to Microsoft’s theory regarding a knowing delay in seeking the certificate of

correction. The Court GRANTS the motion in all other respects.

8. Patent Misuse

In general, patent misuse requires that “the patentee has impermissibly

broadened the physical or temporal scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive

effect.” Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

To evaluate patent misuse, a Court looks to see whether the alleged conduct is either

patent misuse per se, based on prior precedent, or excluded from patent misuse under

35 U.S.C. § 271(d). Id. at 868-69. If neither of these categories applies, the Court next

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6Microsoft concedes that this order involved substantially the same facts and law, though it

involved a different patent. (See Microsoft’s Opp’n Plfs.’ Mots. Summ. J. at 23 n.17.)

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examines whether the practice is either: (1) “reasonably within the patent grant, i.e.,

that it relates to subject matter within the scope of the patent claims,” in which case it

cannot constitute patent misuse; or (2) whether the practice “has the effect of

extending the patentee’s statutory rights . . . with an anti-competitive effect,” in which

case it can. Id. at 869. In the later case, courts must still apply the “rule of reason” to

determine “whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on

competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific information

about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed,

and the restraint's history, nature, and effect.” Id. (quoting State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522

U.S. 3 (1997)). The Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s use of jury instructions

which permitted a finding of patent misuse based on merely “wrongful” enforcement

of the patent. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Microsoft offers four theories of patent misuse. The Court already rejected the

first, involving allegedly improper tying through package licenses. (Order on Lucent’s

Mot. Summ. Adjudications Regarding U.S. Patent No. 4,701,954, Case No.

02-CV-2060, Doc. No. 844 at 9-10.)6 The Court continues to apply the reasoning of

its prior order.

Microsoft next relies on Lucent’s attempts to “force” Microsoft to license the

patent for MPEG-2 applications even though, it argues, the Puri ‘878 is not essential

to the standard. Here, Microsoft focuses on Lucent’s actions to seek and obtain an

opinion from MPEG LA, which manages a pool of MPEG-2 patents, that the Puri ‘878

patent was essential to the MPEG-2 standard. (See Gartman Opp’n Decl. Ex. III-6.)

The opinion relied on the uncorrected version of the patent. (Id.) Microsoft offers two

other theories related to the certificate correction. First, that it was patent misuse to

delay requesting the certificate of correction, and second, that it was patent misuse to

continue asserting the Puri ‘878 patent after this Court ruled it invalid based on the

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uncorrected PTO error.

The Court concludes that these additional theories are insufficient to support

patent misuse. Other than the general characterization of the test from Virginia Panel

Corp., Microsoft cites no authority that these particular actions constitute patent

misuse. Furthermore, Microsoft makes largely conclusory allegations of

anticompetitive effect. The Court concludes that, at best, this is precisely the sort of

vague characterization of misuse rejected by the Federal Circuit in C.R. Bard. C.R.

Bard, 157 F.3d at 1373. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion with

respect to Microsoft’s defense of patent misuse.

E. Microsoft’s California Section 17200 Claim

The Court recently rejected Microsoft’s unfair competition law claim in a

related case involving the same alleged misconduct involving the creation of MPT

and assignment of patents to MPT. (See Order Denying Defs.’ Mots. Summ J.

Granting Part Denying Part Lucent’s Mot. Summ. J. Trust-Related Claims Defenses,

Case No. 07-CV-2000, Doc. No. 282 at 5-6.) There the Court held that Microsoft

lacks standing. The Court also noted that a number of the purportedly misleading

statements involved securities transaction or other regulatory matters outside the

proper scope of a section 17200 claim. Microsoft’s attempts to distinguish the

present circumstances are unpersuasive.

F. Effect of Certificate of Correction for Puri ‘878

The parties dispute whether, in these circumstances involving a certificate of

correction, Microsoft may assert intervening rights based on 35 U.S.C. § 252, which

involves reissues. Microsoft argues that, due to the certificate of correction, the

doctrines of absolute and equitable intervening rights preclude recovery by MPT. 35

U.S.C. § 252 defines these two doctrines. See generally BIC Leisure Pros., Inc. v.

Windsurfing Int’l Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1220-21 (explaining absolute and equitable

intervening rights). The absolute intervening rights provision provides that “[a]

reissued patent shall not abridge or affect the right” to continue activities covered by

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7The entire provision from 35 U.S.C. § 252 states: 

A reissued patent shall not abridge or affect the right of any person or that person's

successors in business who, prior to the grant of a reissue, made, purchased, offered to

sell, or used within the United States, or imported into the United States, anything

patented by the reissued patent, to continue the use of, to offer to sell, or to sell to

others to be used, offered for sale, or sold, the specific thing so made, purchased,

offered for sale, used, or imported unless the making, using, offering for sale, or selling

of such thing infringes a valid claim of the reissued patent which was in the original

patent. 

8The entire provision from 35 U.S.C. § 252 states:

The court before which such matter is in question may provide for the continued

manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale of the thing made, purchased, offered for sale,

used, or imported as specified, or for the manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale in the

United States of which substantial preparation was made before the grant of the reissue,

and the court may also provide for the continued practice of any process patented by

the reissue that is practiced, or for the practice of which substantial preparation was

made, before the grant of the reissue, to the extent and under such terms as the court

deems equitable for the protection of investments made or business commenced before

the grant of the reissue.

9Congress expressly provided for intervening rights in two other contexts—reexamination and

reinstatement after lapse for nonpayment of maintenance fees—thus supporting the argument that

Congress intended to only provide intervening rights in those contexts where they are specifically

authorized. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 41(c)(2), 307(b).

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the reissued patent unless such activities infringed a valid claim of the original patent.7

The equitable intervening rights provision provides that the Court “may provide” for

continued activity where “substantial preparation was made before the grant of the

reissue.”8 On its face, 35 U.S.C. § 252 only refers to the effect of reissued patents, not

certificates of correction.9 Microsoft nevertheless seeks to apply the intervening rights

doctrines here, due to a change in the patent’s scope.

The certificate added a limitation omitted from claim 13 by a PTO error, thus

narrowing the scope of the patent. The PTO issued the certificate pursuant to 35

U.S.C. § 254, which allows the Director to do so “[w]henever a mistake in a patent

incurred through the fault of the Patent and Trademark Office, is clearly disclosed by

the records of the Office . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 251 provides for the reissue of a patent

“[w]henever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, deemed

wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or

drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim

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10Section 255 provides for correction of “a mistake of a clerical or typographical nature, or of

minor character, which was not the fault of the Patent and Trademark Office,” when the patentee

shows that the mistake “occurred in good faith.”

11In Southwest Software, Inc., the Federal Circuit rejected an argument that Eagle Iron Works

should allow a certificate of correction under section 254 to be effective in a lawsuit brought before

the certificate of correction issued. Southwest Software, Inc., 226 F.3d at 1296-97 (noting that Eagle

Iron Works was not binding and declining to accept it as persuasive). The parties do not dispute that

the certificate of correction applies only to causes of action arising after it issued.

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. . . .” Microsoft argues, in essence, that although the intervening rights provisions of

35 U.S.C. § 252 do not expressly apply to certificates issued under 35 U.S.C. § 254, the

Court should apply them since, like a reissuance under 35 U.S.C. § 251, the certificate

changed the scope of a patent that was “through error . . . deemed wholly or partly

inoperative or invalid, by reasons of a defective specification.” 35 U.S.C. § 251.

The Federal Circuit does not appear to have addressed this question directly. A

similar question reached the Third Circuit before formation of the Federal Circuit. In

Eagle Iron Works v. McLanahan Corp., 429 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1970), the alleged

infringer argued that a certificate of correction pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 255 should be

treated as a reissuance since it allegedly altered the scope of the patent, thus making

intervening rights available.10 The court stated that 35 U.S.C. § 255 did not authorize

changes to a patent’s scope and that “[w]here there is a change altering the scope of a

patent, 35 U.S.C. § 252, regulating reissued patents, controls and under it intervening

rights may be achieved.” Id. at 1383. 

There are several problems applying Eagle Iron Works here. First, 35 U.S.C.

§ 254 does not expressly limit the types of mistakes to the “clerical,” “typographical,”

or “minor” variety, as in 35 U.S.C. § 255, which the court considered in Eagle Iron

Works. Instead, 35 U.S.C. § 254 requires that the error be clearly disclosed by the

PTO’s records. Second, the Third Circuit ultimately concluded that the certificate of

correction did not alter the scope of the patent, so this analysis was not essential to its

holding. Eagle Iron Works, 429 F.2d at 1387. Third, Eagle Iron Works, is at most

persuasive authority. See Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harelquin, Inc., 226 F.3d 1280,

1296-97 (Fed. Cir. 2000).11 Fourth, the Federal Circuit undermined Eagle Iron Works’

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premise that a certificate of correction cannot broaden a patent’s scope, indicating that

a certificate of correction under 35 U.S.C. § 255 may provide a broadening

construction under some circumstances. See Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods.

Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that “[w]e interpret 35 U.S.C. §

255 to require that a broadening correction of a clerical or typographical error be

allowed only where it is clearly evident from the specification, drawings, and

prosecution history how the error should appropriately be corrected” and concluding

that certificate of correction improperly broadened scope of patent). Finally, the

Federal Circuit eliminated the concern expressed in Eagle Iron Works that a certificate

of correction could have retroactive effect, by clarifying that certificates are only

effective for causes of action after their issuance. See Southwest Software, Inc., 226

F.3d at 1293-97.

Given the lack of any controlling authority clearly authorizing the application

of intervening rights to certificates of correction, and the plain language of the statute

which only applies these rights to reissued patents, the Court declines to extend the

intervening rights doctrines to this case. See, e.g., Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain,

503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (“We have have stated time and again that courts must presume

that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says

there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the

last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Microsoft’s

motion regarding the preclusive effect of the certificate of correction.

G. Alleged Failure to Provide Notice Prior to January 6, 2006

Microsoft moves for summary judgment that MPT cannot recover damages for

alleged infringement prior to January 6, 2006, based on a failure to mark or provide

notice of the patent. Here, Microsoft attempts to rely on a technical distinction that

ignores the realities of this litigation. It argues that Plaintiffs must provide actual

notice of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) because they did not mark products

covered by the Puri ‘878 patent. See Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Casings Co.,

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24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The patentee must communicate “a specific charge

of infringement by a specific accused product or device.” Id. Microsoft interprets this

as requiring a specific charge identifying the precise claims after the certificate of

correction issued. In their view, Plaintiffs provided no notice until January 6, 2006,

when Lucent’s counsel sent a letter to Microsoft’s counsel regarding infringement of

the patent as corrected. (See Decl. John E. Garman Supp. Mot. Summ. J. MPT Can

Recover No Damages Prior to Jan. 6, 2006 Ex. 4.) Microsoft does not point to

sufficient authority requiring that actual notice must communicate the precise claim

language at issue. Indeed, Amsted focused on the need to provide notice of

infringement by a specific accused product, but nowhere did it require notice to

precisely delineate every claim at issue. See id. at 187-88.

Viewing the overall circumstances of the litigation involving these parties, there

can be no doubt that Microsoft had actual notice of the charge of infringement raised

here. Microsoft and Lucent had already engaged in litigation over the Puri ‘878 patent

in which Lucent attempted to proceed with infringement claims by having the Court

order a correction of the patent. Therefore, even if specific notice of the corrected

claim language were required, the litigation between the parties provided Microsoft

with actual notice of the correction. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Microsoft’s

motion for summary judgment that MPT can recover no damages prior to January 6,

2006, due to a failure to mark or give notice.

H. Entire Market Value Rule and Accused Products

1. Legal Standard

The entire market value rule considers whether a patentee may recover damages

based on the value of an entire apparatus containing several features, not all covered

by the patent. It applies for purposes of both reasonable royalties and lost profits. See

Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Federal

Circuit has allowed recovery based on the value of an “entire apparatus containing

several features when the patent-related feature is the ‘basis for customer demand.’”

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Id. (quoting State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir.

1989)). The patented and unpatented components must “function together . . . in some

manner so as to produce a desired end product or result.” Id. at 1550. The components

“must be analogous to components of a single assembly or be parts of a complete

machine, or they must constitute a functional unit.” Id. 

The Federal Circuit has consistently upheld awards based on entire market value

where the two elements indicated above were present: (1) sufficient consumer demand

based on the patented feature, and (2) integration of the patented and unpatented

components into a single functioning unit. In Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354,

1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the court held that the was evidence supporting an award based

on the entire value of loudspeakers, although the patent related only to an elliptical port

tube that reduced noise and improved bass performance. The Court pointed to

evidence including the infringer’s decision to manufacturer and sell certain

loudspeakers based on bass performance and the patent owner’s efforts to market its

loudspeakers based on the benefits of the patented invention. Id. Similarly, in Tech

Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Michigan Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999), the Court

upheld an award based on the entire value of radiator and condenser assemblies, though

the patents involved only the manufacture of properly-balanced fans for use in the

assemblies. The patentee relied on evidence that the infringer had difficulty meeting

customer balance specifications without the patented technology. Id. The Federal

Circuit has also permitted application of the entire market value rule to a product where

a patent only covered an important method of using the product. Fonar Corp. v. Gen.

Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1552-53 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Where a patent covered a method

for improving the output of an MRI machine, the Federal Circuit concluded that

substantial evidence supported the jury’s use of the entire value of the machine,

particularly where brochures for the machine touted the value of the improved method.

Id; cf. Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH, 408 F.3d

1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that there was insufficient evidence to use value of

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entire laundry machine where invention merely differentiated different coins put into

the machine).

Microsoft contends that the Court should read the phrase “the basis for consumer

demand,” as “the [only] basis for consumer demand.” A review of the cases like Bose,

Tech Air, Inc., and Fonar Corp. indicates, however, that the Federal Circuit has not

strictly required that the feature be the “only” basis for consumer demand. For

example, in Tech Air, Inc., the fan technology provided proper balancing when used

in the radiator and condenser assemblies, as desired by customers, but customers no

doubt wanted these assemblies for their primary functions as well. Tech Air, Inc., 192

F.3d at 1362. This is also reflected in the Court’s own prior order from this litigation.

When concluding that the royalty base for infringing audio encoders could not be based

on an entire computer, the Court observed that “the evidence must show that these

features were the basis of the customer demand or substantially created the value of the

product.” (Order on Microsoft’s Mots. Judgment Matter Law Lucent’s Mot. New Trial

Lucent’s Mot. Alter Amend Judgment, Case No. 02-CV-2060, Doc. No. 1975 (“Group

2 Post-Trial Order”) at 32.) 

MPT also argues that, whether or not the entire market value rule applies, it

should be able to derive a royalty base using the entire product values using the factors

identified in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,

1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The Court disagrees. In Imonex Services, Inc., the Federal

Circuit cautioned against allowing this type of argument to circumvent the

requirements of the entire market value rule. “Any reliance on the so-called GeorgiaPacific factors, actually a Georgia-Pacific listing, had little or no relation to Imonex’s

entire-value calculation in different clothing.” Imonex Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d at 1380.

Since the Court ultimately concludes that MPT has put forward sufficient evidence

under the market value rule, however, this is not fatal to MPT’s damages theory.

/ / /

/ / /

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2. Windows Vista Operating System

MPT accuses Microsoft of infringing via MPEG-2 and VC-1 decoding software

included with various version of the Windows Vista computer operating system

(“Vista”). Microsoft sells Vista to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) who

install the operating system in personal computers intended for sale. The parties do not

appear to dispute that the decoding software permits playback of video files, including

video from DVDs and HD DVDs. MPT offers evidence of consumer demand for these

features. For example, MPT provides evidence that 58% of consumers have used

computers to playback DVDs, and approximately one third of computer users in one

study indicated that HD DVD playback was a “must have feature.” (Decl. Jennifer

Schmidt Supp. MPT’s Opp’n Microsoft’s Mot. Summ J. Entire Market Value Rule

Does Not Apply (“Schmidt Decl.”) Ex. 8 at CCMS_178364, CCMS_180304.)

Microsoft has used these features in its marketing, including promotions of the home

theater capabilities of Vista and the benefits of Vista’s media playback capabilities

compared to the competing Apple Macintosh OS X operating system. (See, e.g.,

Schmidt Decl. Ex. 8 at CCMS_156431, CCMS_156773, CCMS_157845.) Viewing

MPT’s evidence in a light most favorable to it, there are triable issues of fact regarding

both whether the decoder software operates as a single functioning unit with the

computer and whether the video playback features substantially create the value of the

product.

Microsoft counters that the patented feature only encompasses part of the

playback technology. As noted above with other pending motions, however, MPT has

presented a question of fact regarding whether the Puri ‘878 patent is essential to video

playback using the MPEG-2 or VC-1 standards.

3. Windows Media Player

Microsoft includes a VC-1 decoder in its Windows Media Player 10

(“WMP-10”) and Windows Media Player 11 (“WMP-11”) software applications.

These programs, usable on the Microsoft Windows Vista or Windows XP operating

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12Blu-ray and HD-DVD are competing technologies that aim to supersede DVD video with

improved features, such as better audio and video quality.

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systems, are available to consumers either for download or included with an operating

system. A VC-1 decoder provides playback of files from certain types of HD DVD

discs. Though WMP-10 and WMP-11 may be provided separately from the operating

system, the analysis at this stage is essentially the same as that for the Vista decoding

software already discussed. Like the Vista software, WMP-10 and WMP-11 may

operate in conjunction with the operating system to permit video playback on the

computer. As with Vista, there are triable questions of fact regarding whether these

programs operate as a functional unit with the computer and contribute substantially

to customer demand.

4. Xbox 360 Video Game Console

Microsoft manufactures and sells the Xbox 360 video game console. The

standard Xbox 360 ships with an MPEG-2 decoder capable of playing back files from

DVDs. Microsoft also manufacturers and sells an HD DVD player peripheral for use

with the Xbox 360. The HD DVD player includes both MPEG-2 and VC-1 decoders

that enable playback of video files from DVDs or HD DVDs. 

MPT offers evidence that, when viewed in a light most favorable to MPT,

indicates that DVD and HD DVD playback are important to customer demand for the

Xbox 360 products. For example, Microsoft has touted DVD playback to distinguish

the Xbox 360 from its competitor, the Nintendo Wii, which does not ship with DVD

playback capability. (Schmidt Decl. Ex. 8 at CCMS_159521.) Similarly Microsoft has

distinguished the Xbox 360 from another competitor, the Sony Playstation 3, based on

the Xbox 360's ability to playback HD DVDs, while Sony’s product supports the

competing Blu-ray format.12 (Id. at CCMS_128291.) Microsoft’s marketing materials

indicate that providing the potential for HD DVD playback on the Xbox 360 was

intended, at least in part, to help slow adoption of Sony’s competing Blu-ray format.

(Id.) Microsoft used various slogans marketing the Xbox 360 as more than just a

console for video games such as going “beyond gaming.” (Id. at CCMS_128636-38.)

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5. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Microsoft’s motion regarding application

of the entire market value rule. The Court notes, however, that these conclusions, made

with the favorable inferences appropriate to summary judgment, shall not prevent it

from considering whether the trial record ultimately presents enough evidence to rely

on the entire market value. The evidence may demonstrate an appropriate functional

unit for determining damages somewhere between the patented feature and an entire

computer or console, such as the operating system, or a video playback program. The

Court also notes that these questions appear intertwined, at least in part, with the extent

to which the asserted claims are or are not necessary to accomplish playback of video

formats in commercial demand. (Cf. Group 2 Post-Trial Order at 33-45 (concluding

that there was insufficient evidence to support damages based on whole computer value

where the evidence established that MP3 audio capabilities were commercially

important while the patents were “not required or critical to practice the MP3

standard”).)

III. Motions Related to the Patents Asserted by Microsoft

A. Alleged Anticipation of the Jancke ‘913 Patent

The anticipation defense under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) applies where the invention

was “in public use . . . more than one year prior to the date of the application . . . .” The

date one year before the application is also known as the critical date. The allegedly

anticipating public use must include every limitation of the patented invention.

Netscape Communications Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

This invalidity defense requires clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1320.

A court looks “to the totality of the circumstances when evaluating whether there

has been a public use within the meaning of section 102(b).” Id. at 1320. An

experimental use is not an anticipating use under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Id.

Circumstances relevant to determinating whether there was an anticipating public use

include: 

the nature of the activity that occurred in public; the public access to and

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13In its opposition, Microsoft attempted to raise a fact question by claiming that Lucent’s

anticipation argument ignored whether SQL EM includes the limitation on the generating step: “being

operational from any one of said plurality of nodes in said computer network.” Even if this were true,

it does not change the fact that Microsoft admitted that SQL EM embodies the patent.

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knowledge of the public use; whether there was any confidentiality

obligation imposed on persons who observed the use; whether persons

other than the inventor performed the testing; the number of tests; the

length of the test period in relation to tests of similar devices; and whether

the inventor received payment for the testing.

Id.

On June 9, 1998, the PTO issued the Jancke ‘913 patent, entitled “Computer

Network Status Monitoring System,” based on an application filed April 5, 1996. The

critical date for the patent is therefore April 5, 1995. Claim 6 is the only one currently

at issue. It states:

A method for monitoring and displaying status of a plurality of nodes in

a computer network, said method comprising:

monitoring an operational state of each of said plurality of nodes in said

computer network;

concurrently generating a display of a plurality of operational status icons

each indicative of a lowest detail view of said operational state of a

corresponding one of said plurality of nodes in said computer network,

said step of concurrently generating being operational from any one of

said plurality of nodes in said computer network;

superimposing at least one additional status indicator on said display of

any one of said plurality of operational status icons such that compound

operational status information for a single one of said plurality of nodes

is available in a single viewable one of said plurality of operational status

icons;

dynamically updating said display of said operational state for each of

said plurality of nodes; and

generating a hierarchical list of objects available from a user selected one

of said plurality of nodes.

(Jancke ‘913 5:16-38.)

Lucent argues that the asserted claims of the Jancke ‘913 patent are anticipated

by public use of the Enterprise Manager feature of Microsoft’s SQL Server 6.0 product

(“SQL EM”). Microsoft conceded that SQL EM embodies the ‘913 patent, at least in

its commercially released form.13 (See Decl. Jonas R. McDavit Supp. Plfs.’ Mots.

Summ. J. (“McDavit Decl.”) Ex. 20.) Other evidence also supports this admission.

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(See, e.g., Ex. 21¶ 235 (Microsoft’s damages expert using SQL EM as example of

product practicing the patent); McDavit Decl. Ex. 22 (testimony from Jancke regarding

claim 6 and SQL EM).) Nevertheless, Microsoft opposes the motion on two grounds.

First, it argues that there was no public use because SQL EM was only in beta form

prior to the critical date, and Microsoft took sufficient steps to protect the

confidentiality of the beta. Second, Microsoft argues that Lucent’s evidence

establishes at most that the final version of SQL EM embodied the patent, but it has not

established that the beta versions contained all of the claim limitations.

The Court concludes that Microsoft has identified triable issues of fact regarding

whether the beta test was public. For example, Microsoft introduces sample

nondisclosure agreements used with the beta test and testimony indicating that the beta

releases were not public and intended quality feedback rather than commercial

purposes. (See, e.g., Gartman Opp’n Decl. Exs. V-1 (excerpts from deposition of

Microsoft employee Voth); V-4 (sample non-disclosure agreements).) Having

concluded that there are triable questions of fact regarding the extent to which the beta

test was kept confidential, the Court declines to reach Microsoft’s argument regarding

differences between the beta and released versions. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment that the Jancke ‘913 patent is invalid by

anticipation.

B. Alleged Obviousness of the Guzak Patents

The Court provided the parties with an opportunity to file supplemental briefs

regarding a possible clarification of the claim construction for the Guzak patents. The

Court therefore declines to rule on this motion until such briefing is complete.

C. Motions for Noninfringement

1. Standard for Infringement

“Infringement, whether literal or under the doctrine of equivalents, is a question

of fact.” Terlep v. Brinkman Corp., 418 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Court

first construes the claim and then compares the claim to the accused product or device.

Id. at 1381. Every element of the claim must be present in the accused device or

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process, either literally or by a substantial equivalent. Id. at 1385. Under the doctrine

of equivalents, a “substantial equivalent” is one that “performs substantially the same

function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result.” See,

e.g., Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 38 F.3d 1192, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

For means plus function elements under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, the patentee must prove

that the accused product performs the claim limitation’s function using a structure

identical or equivalent to the structure identified by the Court’s construction. See, e.g.,

CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., 424 F.3d 1168, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

2. VitalSuite and Fein ‘608

The PTO issued the Fein ‘608 patent, entitled “Method and System for

Customized Alert Messages,” to inventors Ronald Fein, et al., on May 20, 2003. The

application was filed on December 16, 1998. The patent relates to the use of alert

messages in computer systems. Computer users may be familiar, for example, with

windows or dialog boxes appearing to convey information when a particular event or

problem occurs. (See Fein ‘608 1:14-25 (describing background of typical alert

messages).) The patent purports to improve on this process by providing for

customized messages, as compared to the typically static messages of prior systems.

(See generally Fein ‘608 1:26-2:60 (describing benefits of the invention over prior

systems).)

Microsoft asserts claims 7, 15, 21, and 25 against Lucent’s VitalSuite products.

Claim 7 depends on claims 1, 2, and 3, while claim 21 depends on claim 15. Claim 7

incorporates the limitation from claim 2 of “displaying an alert message in response to

detecting one of the predetermined conditions.” Claims 15, 21, and 25 include the

limitation “displaying the alert message in response to the detected predetermined

condition.” The Court has construed alert message as a “message to advise a user

about the occurrence of condition.” (Cl. Constr. Order, Doc No. 156, App. H.) The

Court concluded that no construction was necessary for “predetermined condition” or

“detecting one of the predetermined conditions.”

VitalSuite is a collection of software tools for network and application

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management. It includes VitalSuite NET, or “VitalNET;” VitalSuite Real-time Event

Analysis; VitalSuite Advanced Reporting Tool, or “VitalART;” and VitalSuite APPS,

or “VitalApps.” (See McDavit Decl. Ex. 28 (excerpt from VitalSuite user’s guide).)

VitalApps is further composed of VitalAnalysis and VitalHelp. VitalAnalysis tracks

the availability and historical performance of TCP/IP-based business applications.

VitalHelp assists in monitoring TCP/IP-based network applications. VitalSuite also

includes VitalAgent clients that run on computers in the network, detect problems, and

send alarms to the Help server. VitalSuite includes a Web Console graphical interface

to its components, accessible through a browser such as Internet Explorer. The Web

Console includes an Alarms/Applications page that lists alarms generated by the

VitalAgent clients. The page presents these alarms, or “events,” in a table format. A

user may also click on one of the events, and the software will generate an “Event

Details” window with further information. (See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Plfs.’ Mot.

Summ. J. at 32 (screenshots of the table alone and the table with an “Event Details”

window open).)

Lucent contends that there can be no infringement because the software does not

produce any messages “in response to” detecting a predetermined condition. Instead,

it argues that because the Alarms/Application page and related Event Details windows

require user intervention, they are produced in response to user input, not a

predetermined condition. 

The Court concludes that Lucent’s argument fails for two reasons. First, its

argument implicitly reads additional language into the claim construction. The claim

language only indicates that the message must be produced in response to detecting a

predetermined condition. It does not exclude the possibility that a message might also

be produced in response to user input. Since the claims use the traditional

“comprising” language, they do not exclude the possibility of other limitations. The

parties do not dispute that the software generates a table of alarms based on the status

of the system being monitored. They also do not dispute that the user may obtain

additional details about these alarms. Whether these are truly created “in response to”

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28 14At claim construction, the Court rejected an “automatically displayed” limitation that Lucent

sought for the definition of an “alert message.” The Court noted that the “in response to . . .” claim

language was sufficient. (Cl. Constr. Order, Doc. No. 156, App. H.)

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a predetermined condition remains a triable question of fact.14

Furthermore, even under Lucent’s suggestion that there cannot be user

intervention, the parties do not dispute that the software updates the table on the

Alarms/Application page without user intervention. This would present a triable issue

of fact, even under the approach sought by Lucent. 

The Court has also reviewed the parties’ arguments regarding Microsoft’s theory

of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and concluded that it survives

summary judgment. Lucent argues that Microsoft’s supplemental expert report must

be excluded as untimely. Given the totality of the circumstances in this litigation, the

Court declines to exclude the report at this time. Therefore, the Court DENIES

Lucent’s motion for summary judgment that its VitalSuite product does not infringe the

Fein ‘608 patent.

3. VitalSuite and Guzak ‘319 Claims 12 and 17

The Court provided the parties with an opportunity to file supplemental briefs

regarding a possible clarification of the claim construction for the Guzak patents. The

Court therefore declines to rule on this motion until such briefing is complete.

4. Accelerate Solution and Chen ‘004 Claim 2

The PTO issued the Chen ‘004 patent, entitled “Metaserver for a Multimedia

Distribution Network,” on June 25, 2002. The application was filed on March 27,

1997. The Chen ‘004 patent seeks to address traffic bottlenecks and related problems

that can arise on networks, like the Internet, when many users direct their client

computers to retrieve multimedia information, such as streaming audio or video, from

a single source. The patent aims to provide a system that eliminates bottlenecks,

provides fault tolerance, reduces network traffic, and allows integration of servers from

different organizations. (See Chen ‘004 1:5-37.) In broad terms, the patent provides

for a “metaserver” that organizes network traffic by routing client computers to

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individual multimedia servers with these aims in mind.

Microsoft accuses Lucent’s Accelerate Solution product of infringing claims 2,

25, 26, and 29, though only claim 2 is at issue on this motion. Claim 2 depends on

claim 1, though the precise limitations of claim 1 are not at issue here. Claim 1

describes a method for receiving requests for multimedia streams from a client

computer, monitoring the status of multimedia servers and the network, selecting at

least one of the multimedia servers that can deliver the multimedia stream, and

communicating the name of at least one eligible multimedia server to the client

computer. (See Chen ‘004 11:56-12:9.) Claim 2 further limits claim 1 as follows:

The method of claim 1, wherein selecting further includes:

using a minimum cost algorithm as said selection algorithm;

choosing a set of parameters including multimedia content, current load,

geographic location, and a network distance from said at least one

multimedia server to said client computer; and

applying said minimum cost algorithm to said set of parameters.

(Chen ‘004 12:10-19.)

The Court previously construed a “minimum cost algorithm” as “a sequence of

well defined mathematical operations for determining the cost to the system for a

particular multimedia server or servers to provide a data stream to a particular client

and for selecting the multimedia server that can provide the data stream at minimum

cost.” (Cl. Constr. Order, Doc. No. 156, App. B.) In accordance with the parties’

agreement, the Court construed “current load” as “a measure of the amount of

processing a computer system is currently performing in servicing client requests.” In

their claim construction briefs, the parties agreed that “geographic location” required

no construction, and their claim construction briefing did not address “network

distance.”

Lucent argues that its product does not consider three of the parameters

identified by the minimum cost algorithm: current load, multimedia content, and

network distance. Accelerate Solution comprises various hardware and software

elements that provide support for telephone services involving both traditional voice

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28 15The product description in question is entitled “BroadWorks Network Server Product

Description.” Since the parties do not appear to dispute its applicability, the Court understands that

this relates to the accused network server product. 

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telephone systems and Internet Protocol (“IP”) networks. (See McDavit Decl. Ex. 39.)

Lucent’s expert identifies the Lucent Feature Server 3000 as the allegedly infringing

metaserver in Lucent’s product. (See Decl. Karen Robinson Supp. Plfs.’ Reply Supp.

Mots. Summ. J. (“Robinson Decl.”) Ex. 20.)

a. Current Load

Lucent argues that Accelerate Solution does not consider “current load” because

it only considers predefined, static values that do not change during operation. Its

argument relies entirely on a citation in Microsoft’s expert report to a product

description which states: “Note that ‘static’ costs and weights assigned to the gateways

are used to load balance the traffic for gateways with similar location codes.”

(McDavit Decl. Ex. 41 (citing CCMS_031043).)15 This is not a sufficient basis for

summary judgment. Viewed in the light most favorable to Microsoft, this indicates at

most that the product considers some static factors, not that it fails to consider current

load. These propositions are not mutually exclusive. 

Furthermore, Microsoft offers evidence that the product considers current load.

First, the fact that “static” is placed in quotes in the cited description indicates possible

ambiguity about its meaning. Furthermore, the statement comes from a subsection of

the product description entitled “Dynamic Route Selection Based on Geographic

Location of a POP.” (See Gartman Opp’n Decl. Ex. VIII-1 at CCMS_031043.) At the

beginning of the parent to the same subsection, the product description states that “[t]he

Network Server has a built-in route selector mechanism that allows a route list to be

dynamically built upon a SIP and Media Server selection request.” (Id. at

CCMS_031042.) Microsoft also points to description indicating that the network

server provides a reporting tool that allows an operator “to view a node’s historical data

as well as the current load or system health.” (Id. at CCMS_031112) This description

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16Microsoft also pointed to a statements that the Feature Server 3000 could monitor resource

load when used in combination with the VitalSuite product, also discussed in this order. Lucent

disputes, however, whether VitalSuite was ever sold in combination with Feature Server 3000. The

Court does not rely on Microsoft’s representations regarding VitalSuite in reaching its conclusion

regarding the Accelerate Solution product and claim 2 of the Chen ‘004 patent.

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indicates that the Accelerate Solution product can monitor current load.16

b. Multimedia Content

For the next parameter, Lucent argues that its product only considers whether a

particular type of service is available on a server, not whether specific content is

available there. Lucent’s statements regarding multimedia content are conclusory. For

example, Lucent provides a “see generally” citation to more than 100 pages of product

description. The citations provided by Lucent support the fact that its product provides

streaming multimedia. The citations, however, do not support a services/content

distinction of the type Lucent advocates, at least when viewed in the light most

favorable to Microsoft. On this issue, the Court concludes that Lucent has failed to

meet its initial burden under Celotex to establish an absence of evidence for

Microsoft’s claims.

c. Network Distance

Here, Lucent admits that Microsoft comes forward with evidence that the

product considers “geographic location,” though it argues that Microsoft offers no

evidence that it considers “network distance.” There is no dispute that the product

description asserts, on several occasions, that the product seeks to locate the server

“closest” to the destination. (See, e.g., Gartman Opp’n Decl. Ex. VIII-1 at

CCMS_031015, VIII-3 at CCMS_031005). These references do not adequately

distinguish between geographic distance or some either type of distance calculation

based on a network’s configuration or status. Viewed in a light most favorable to

Microsoft, this evidence supports its position that the product considers both “network

distance” and “geographic location,” even accepting the distinction between these

terms that Lucent attempts to draw. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion

for summary judgment that Accelerate Solution does not infringe claim 2 of the Chen

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‘004 patent.

5. Open Media Suite and Chen ‘004

Microsoft also accuses Alcatel Lucent’s Open Media Suite product of infringing

the Chen ‘004 patent, also discussed in the previous subsection. As with Accelerate

Solution, Microsoft asserts claims 2, 25, 26, and 29. All of these claims involve three

similar steps, among other elements. Claim 1, on which claim 2 depends, requires the

following steps:

monitoring the status of each said multimedia server and the status of said

network;

selecting from the metaserver database at least one eligible multimedia

serverstoringthe requested mutimedia stream using a selection algorithm;

and

communicating a name of said at least one eligible multimedia server to

said client computer.

Claim 25 is also a method claim including “monitoring,” “selecting,” and

“communicating” steps. For the present purposes, these elements of claim 25 are

essentially the same, although there are differences in the claim language. Claim 26

is an apparatus capable of carrying out these steps, and claim 29 is a “computer

readable medium” having executable instructions comprising these steps.

Lucent argues that its Open Media Suite (“OMS”) product cannot infringe

because it is allegedly unable to perform these steps without significant alterations by

the user. OMS is a collection of components for providing video over data networks,

such as the Internet. OMS includes the 5959 Open Video Server (“OVS”) which

receives and responds to requests for video services in accordance with the Real Time

Stream Protocol (“RTSP”). OVS includes the capability to redirect clients requesting

servers according to an RTSP redirection procedure that may be specified by the

server’s user. The parties do not dispute that the RTSP redirector is disabled in OMS

by default. They do dispute, however, the extent of modifications required to practice

the asserted claims using the RTSP redirector and related components.

Software code may infringe if it permits the user to practice the invention

without first modifying the code. See Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. Sportsline.com,

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Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Accordingly, in order to infringe the

[asserted] patent, the code underlying [the accused product] must be written in such a

way as to enable a user of that software to utilize the [infringing function] without

having to modify that code.”) The parties dispute whether a user may practice the

asserted claims without modifying the source code of the RTSP redirector and related

products. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Microsoft, there is a

triable issue of fact.

Microsoft offers a Lucent product description indicating that OVS includes an

algorithm to perform redirection from one server to another, identified as

“rtsp_cm_redirect.” (Gartman Opp’n Decl. Ex. XIB-1 at CCMS_0049705-06.) This

capability addresses the “key issue” of “how to connect clients to the ‘right’ server.”

(Id. at CCMS_0049704.) The same document also indicates that the “[t]he scenarios

in which redirections are triggered are field customizable.” (Id atCCMS_0049705-06.)

Redirection may occur for reasons including “traffic congestion,” “when a given server

reaches a designated streaming threshold,” and when servers “are unhealthy or

unavailable.” (Id.) These rules are “defined in a customizable PL/SQL algorithm” that

“can be customized so that, in addition to the local Alcatel 5959 OVS database, any

number of call-outs to other databases, procedures or applications can be made in order

to calculate whether a redirection is required.” (Id.) A user may invoke the algorithm

using factors including “IP topology and geographical server location, location of

requested content, congestion level of an Alcatel 5959 OVS server, [and] load

balancing between Alcatel 5959 OVS servers.” (Id. at CCMS_0049709.)

Viewed in a light most favorable to Microsoft, this evidence indicates that a user

may implement a redirection algorithm including the disputed steps without modifying

the source code itself. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment that OMS does not infringe the Chen ‘004 patent.

6. APMS and Bolosky ‘794

The PTO issued the Bolosky ‘794 patent, entitled “Wire Protocol for a Media

Server System,” to inventors William J. Bolosky et al. The original application was

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filed December 8, 1995. The patent describes a protocol for establishing connections

between a media server and a client. 

Microsoft asserts claims 30 and 33 against Lucent’s AnyPath Messaging System

(“APMS”). Claim 30 is a method claim which states:

In a distributed system having a media server for storing files holding data

of multiple media, a client for requesting service from the media server,

a control connection between the media server and the client for passing

control information between the media server and the client and a data

connection for passing data between the media server and the client, a

method comprising the steps of:

sending a write request message from the client to the media server over

the control connection using a first transport protocol, said write request

message requesting that data from the client be written into a file at the

media server;

sending a write request acknowledgment message from the media server

to the client over the control connection to acknowledge the write request

message;

forwarding the data to be written from the client to the media server over

the data connection using a second transport protocol distinct from the

first transport protocol; and 

writing the forwarded data into the file at the media server.

(Bolosky ‘794 19:59-20:12.) Claim 33 states:

In a distributed system having a media server storing files holding data of

multiple media, a computer system comprising:

a control connection generator for creating a bidirectional control

connection between the media server and the computer system to enable

control information to be passed between the media server and the

computer system, the control connection utilizing a first transport

protocol; and 

a data connection generator for creating a bidirectional data connection

between the media server and the computer system to enable data to be

passed between the media server and the computer system, the data

connection using a second transport protocol distinct from the first

transport protocol.

(Bolosky ‘794 20:23-38.)

As agreed by the parties, the Court construed “transport protocol” as “any

standard protocol that is designed to operate in the fourth layer of the OSI reference

model (and the second highest layer in the four and five layer TCP/IP reference

models), for example, TCP, UDP, etc.” (Cl. Constr. Order., Doc. No. 156, App. F.)

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The parties also agreed that a “write request message” is “a request message that

requests that data from the client be written into a file on the media server,” and that

a “write request acknowledgment message” is a “message that acknowledges that the

write request was received.” The Court construed “client” as an “entity on a computer

that is capable of both requesting service from a media server and consuming data from

a media server.” (Id.) Under the Court’s construction, a “control connection” is a

“connection that facilitates exchange of control information,” and a “data connection”

is a “connection that facilitates the exchange of data between the media server and the

client.” (Id.)

The accused product, APMS, is a system for providing voice messages over both

traditional public switched telephone networks (“PSTN”) and IP networks, like the

Internet. APMS includes various servers, including a telephony server in two varieties,

depending on whether voice is being provided over an PSTN or IP network. APMS

may communicate voice messages to various end user devices including traditional

wireline phones, cell phones, pagers, FAXes, IP phones, and others. (See Gartman

Opp’n Decl. Ex. IX-1 at LUCENT0124371 (diagram of APMS from Lucent’s

Technical Product Description).)

a. Claim 30 – Whether APMS Uses a Control Connection

for the Required Messages

Lucent first argues that there can be no infringement of claim 30 because APMS

allegedly does not send the write request and write request acknowledgment messages

over a control connection, as required by the patent. The parties do not dispute that

APMS uses two separate connections. First, there is a signaling connection,

implemented using a standard known as Session Initiation Protocol (“SIP”), which is

the alleged control connection. Second, there is a connection for sending media data,

using a standard called Real Time Protocol (“RTP”), which is the alleged data

connection. Lucent argues that Microsoft failed to identify suitable write request and

write request acknowledgment messages over the control connection. The Court

concludes that Lucent meets its initial burden under Celotex, requiring Microsoft to

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come forward with evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment. See Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 325 (moving party’s initial burden “may be discharged by

‘showing’–that is, pointing out to the district court–that there is an absence of evidence

to support the nonmoving party’s case”).

In its opposition papers, Microsoft pointed to two messages identified in a figure

from Lucent’s technical documentation entitled “SIP-based Call Flow for AnyPath

Message Deposit.” (Gartman Opp’n Decl. Ex. IX-3 at LUCENT0124061.)

Specifically, Microsoft pointed to two messages labeled “INVITE” and “ACK” as

request and acknowledgment messages. Lucent replied that these cannot constitute the

two required messages because they both flow in the same direction, contrary to the

claim language. The Court agrees that messages flowing in the same direction could

not fulfill the claim language. The plain language of claim 30 requires that the write

request message travels from the client to the media server, while the write request

acknowledgment message travels from the media server to the client.

At oral argument, Microsoft attempted to patch this argument by pointing to two

different messages from the same diagram as exemplary of write requests and

acknowledgments in the implementation of APMS. Microsoft relied instead on the

messages labeled “INVITE” and “200 OK.” Even under this theory, the Court

concludes that Microsoft fails to raise a material question of fact that APMS uses both

required messages. In the diagram under dispute the “INVITE” message, offered by

Microsoft as an alleged write request message, passes between the “Originating SIP

User Agent” and the “Subscriber SIP User Agent.” The “200 OK” message, offered

as an alleged write request acknowledgment message, passes from the “AMS VOIP

Telephony Servers” to the “Originating SIP User Agent.” The language of claim 30

clearly states that the same two entities exchange these messages, namely the client and

the media server. Furthermore, the write request acknowledgment message must

“acknowledge the write request message.” The messages offered by Microsoft are not

exchanged between the same two entities. Furthermore, there is no indication that the

“200 OK” message is specifically acknowledging the “INVITE” message put forward

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28 17The same diagram also indicates a second “INVITE” message, but this would not save

Microsoft’s position here. That message originates with yet another system component described as

the “S-CSCF.”

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by Microsoft, especially given that the “200 OK” message does not originate from the

same entity that received the “INVITE” message.17

Microsoft has failed to present a triable issue of fact regarding whether APMS

uses both write request and write request acknowledgment messages over a control

connection. Therefore, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion to the extent

it seeks summary judgment that APMS does not infringe claim 30 of the Bolosky ‘794

patent. This conclusion includes both literal infringement and infringement under the

doctrine of equivalents.

b. Claim 30 – the “Client” Language

Lucent next argues that APMS does not infringe claim 30 because APMS does

not contain a “client.” This argument would add a requirement not present in the claim

language. Claim 30 is a method claim, and infringement requires only that the accused

infringer practices all of the steps, regardless of the apparatus used. See, e.g., Int’l

Glass Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 400 (Ct. Cl. 1969). Furthermore the method

of claim 30 is in the general context of a distributed system including a client, and the

documentation for APMS indicates that it is to be used to provide services to a variety

of types of clients, including traditional wireline phones and IP phones. (Gartman

Opp’n Decl. Ex. IX-1 at LUCENT0124371.) The Court therefore rejects this argument,

though the Court nevertheless concludes that APMS does not infringe claim 30.

c. Claim 33 – the “Computer System” Language

Lucent finally argues that APMS cannot infringe claim 33 because it does not

include a “computer system” within the meaning of this apparatus claim. Lucent

contends that the computer system of claim 33 must be construed analogously to claim

30. The claim language is clear enough on this point. Claim 30 is a method claim that

makes use of both control and data connections. Claim 33 is an apparatus claim that

includes a control connection generator and data connection generator. Microsoft

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provides undisputed evidence that APMS uses two separate connections, based on the

SIP and RTP standards. In light of this and other evidence offered by Microsoft, there

are triable issues of fact regarding whether APMS provides both control and data

connections and whether APMS includes an apparatus for generating these

connections. The Court therefore DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion to the extent

it seeks summary judgment that APMS does not infringe claim 33 of the Bolosky ‘794

patent.

7. 8788 Media Resource Platform and Bolosky ‘794

Alcatel Lucent also moves for summary judgment that its 8788 Media Resource

Platform (“8788 MRP”) does not infringe the Bolosky ‘794 patent, just discussed with

respect to the APMS product. 8788 MRP includes a media server, known as the 8688

Media Resource Function Module. Alcatel Lucent argues that there can be no

infringement because its product does not use control and data connections with

separate transport protocols, as required by the two claims at issue, 30 and 33. 

The parties do not dispute that the product uses two separate application layer

protocols, based on standards referred to as SIP and RTP. Much like the APMS

product, the SIP connection is the alleged control connection, and the RTP connection

is the alleged data connection. The transport protocols named in the Court’s

construction include the User Datagram Protocol (“UDP”) and Transmission Control

Protocol (“TCP”). There is no dispute that the product implements its RTP connection

using only the UDP transport protocol. The parties dispute, however, whether the SIP

connection uses only UDP, or both UDP and TCP, in the context of these claims. The

parties agree that, at least in the abstract, the SIP standard supports implementation

over both UDP and TCP. Nevertheless, if the 8788 MRP implements its SIP

connection only using UDP, as Alcatel Lucent contends, then the 8788 MRP would

only use one transport protocol for both connections, and it could not infringe the

asserted claims.

Microsoft offers evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of fact. The SIP

standard, which the 8788 MRP admittedly supports, mandates the use of TCP.

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(See Gartman Opp’n Decl. X-3 at CCMS_039408 (excerpt from standard stating that

“[a]ll SIP elements MUST implement UDP and TCP”).) Furthermore, Microsoft offers

a diagram from one of Alcatel Lucent’s product descriptions indicating that the product

communicates with other network devices using SIP, where “SIP” is accompanied by

the designation “UDP/TCP.” (Gartman Opp’n Decl. Ex X-5 at AL-C000107.) Alcatel

Lucent’s 30(b)(6) witness, Theirry Gouverneur, stated that the 8788 MRP only uses

SIP over UDP, but Microsoft points to other deposition statements by Gouverneur that,

when viewed most favorably to Microsoft, undermine this position. (See Gouverneur

Depo. Tr. at 72:8-24 (stating that the product “doesn’t support the SIP protocol” and

that “TCP is not in the SIP protocol”).)

Alcatel Lucent also concedes that 8788 MRP does use TCP for certain

communications, though it argues that these are “internal,” meaning not between the

server and a client, thus placing them outside the scope of the claims. The Court does

not rely on these statements with respect to claim 30, since that claim necessarily

involves communications between a client and a media server. These TCP

communications may be applicable to claim 33, however, which only involves

generators for connections between a “computer system” and a media server. Unlike

claim 30, claim 33’s language does not implicate communication only between the the

media server and the client. There is a triable issue of fact regarding whether these

“internal” communications, and the related components of 8788 MRP, might meet the

elements of claim 33. For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment that the 8788 MRP product does not infringe the Bolosky ‘794

patent.

8. OmniVista Air Control System and Jancke ‘913

Microsoft accuses AlcatelLucent’s OmniVistaAir Control System (“Air Control

System”) of infringing claim 6 of the Jancke ‘913 patent. The Air Control System is

a system for monitoring a network of wireless access points and providing wireless

service to clients using the wireless network. At issue are icons used by the Air

Control System to represent an access point’s status. The icons depict a circle along

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28 18Alcatel Lucent objected to introduction of evidence related to the AirControl System’ssource

code. (Doc. No. 284). The parties have resolved their dispute concerning access to the source code.

In any event, the Court denies the motion to exclude evidence.

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with a triangle covering part of the circle. (See Bowling Decl. Ex. J at

CCMS_048385.) Each access point contains two radios, and the colors of the upper

and lower halves of the circle correspond to the status of these two radios. The

triangle’s color corresponds to the status of the radio with the worse operating status.

Claim 6 is a method claim including the step:

superimposing at least one additional status indicator on said display of

any one of said plurality of operational status icons such that compound

operational status information for a single one of said plurality of nodes

is available in a single viewable one of said plurality of operational status

icons;

The Court previously concluded that the patent used “superimposing” in a manner

consistent with its ordinary meaning. (See Claim Constr. Order at 2 & App. G.)

Alcatel Lucent argues that Microsoft lacks any evidence that the Air Control

System performs an act of superimposing. Essentially, Alcatel Lucent argues that the

Air Control System includes only predefined icons, and its code performs no act of

superimposing. Under Alcatel Lucent’s theory, in order to superimpose status

indicators, the code would need to take separate images and manipulate them to create

a new icon. 

The Court concludes that the ordinary meaning of “superimposing” does not

necessarily exclude the display of a predefined compound icon in which one element

has already been placed so that it appears to be on top of another. This is also

consistent with the specification. The description of the preferred embodiment does

not state that the example status indicators must be created during the monitoring

process. (See Jancke ‘913 Figs. 4-5 and associated text.) It is consistent with the

specification that the preferred embodiment merely retrieves the predefined status

indicators from memory, thus “superimposing” the images by selecting and displaying

the appropriate combination. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion that the

Air Control System does not infringe the Jancke ‘913 patent.18

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D. Alleged Failure to Mark for Fein ‘608

For this issue, the parties do not dispute the essential facts, and the Court faces

a purely legal question. Microsoft concedes that it sells certain products that embody

the Fein ‘608 patent. The Fein ‘608 patent includes only method claims. The question

is whether, under these circumstances, Microsoft must mark its products or forego any

damages before giving actual notice.

35 U.S.C. § 287(a) provides that a patentee may give notice to the public of its

patent by marking its patented articles appropriately. Where the patentee fails to do so,

“no damages shall be recovered . . . except on proof that the infringer was notified of

the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be

recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.” 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).

Filing an infringement action constitutes actual notice. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).

Patents covering only a process or method, however, fall into an exception. “It

is ‘settled in the case law that the notice requirement of this statute does not apply

where the patent is directed to a process or method.’” State Contracting & Eng’g Corp.

v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1073 (quoting Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co.,

704 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed.Cir.1983)). The Federal Circuit has applied the notice

requirement where a patent contains both apparatus and method claims “to the extent

that there is a tangible item to mark.” See Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d

1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The parties direct the Court to no instance, however,

where the Federal Circuit applied the marking requirement to a patent with only

method claims or where the Federal Circuit created an exception when there is no

dispute that method claims have a tangible embodiment. See State Contracting &

Eng’g Corp., 346 F.3d at 1074 (“We have not previously held that a patent containing

only method claims is examined to see if something could have been marked in order

to assess whether the notice provision applies, and we decline to do so now.”)

Similarly, the Court declines to create a new exception to the Federal Circuit’s settled

case law.

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19The Court grants the motion as to prosecution laches, but denies as to traditional laches.

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Conclusion

In conclusion, the Court makes the following rulings on the parties’ motions

for summary judgment:

Motions Related to Puri ‘878

• Microsoft’s Motion that Not Any and Every MPEG-2 or VC-1 Decoder is

Structurally Equivalent — DENIED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Asserted Claims of Are Not Anticipated —

GRANTED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Asserted Claims of Are Not Obvious — DENIED

• Microsoft’s Motion that Claims 13 and 15 Were Conceived No Earlier Than

September 30, 1991 — DENIED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Microsoft Has No Defense of Laches — GRANTED

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART19

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Microsoft Has No Defense of License — GRANTED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Microsoft Has No Defense of Equitable Estoppel —

DENIED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Microsoft Has No Defense of Implied License —

GRANTED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Microsoft Has No Defense of Waiver — GRANTED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Microsoft Has No Defense of Exhaustion —

GRANTED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Microsoft Has No Defense of Unclean Hands —

DENIED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Microsoft Has No Defense of Patent Misuse —

GRANTED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion Regarding Microsoft’s Section 17200 Counterclaim —

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20The Court grants as to claim 30, but denies as to claim 33 and other arguments raised in the

motion.

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GRANTED

• Microsoft’s Motion Regarding the Effect of the Certificate of Correction —

DENIED

• Microsoft’s Motion that MPT Cannot Recover Damages Prior to January 6,

2006 — DENIED

• Microsoft’s Motion that the Entire Market Value Rule Does Not Apply to

Accused Products — DENIED

Motions Regarding Validity of Patents Asserted by Microsoft

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Jancke ‘913 is Invalid Due to Anticipation —

DENIED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Guzak Patents are Invalid Due to Obviousness — The

Court does not rule on this motion at this time. The Court’s tentative ruling is

to DENY the motion.

Motions Regarding Infringement of Patents Asserted by Microsoft

• Plaintiffs’ Motion for Noninfringement of Fein ‘608 — DENIED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that VitalSuite Does Not Infringe Guzak ‘319 Claims 12

and 17 — The Court does not rule on this motion at this time.

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Accelerate Solution Does Not Infringe Claim 2 of

Chen ‘004 — DENIED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Open Media Suite Does Not Infringe Chen ‘004 —

DENIED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that APMS Does Not Infringe Bolosky ‘794 —

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART20

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that 8788 Media Platform Does Not Infringe Bolosky ‘794

— DENIED

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• Plaintiffs’ Motion that OmniVista Air Control System Does Not Infringe

Jancke ‘913 — DENIED

• Plaintiffs’ Motion that Failure to Mark Precludes Pre-Notice Damages for

Fein ‘608 — DENIED

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 12, 2008

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

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