Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00249/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00249-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 The Court notes that the petitioner obtained counsel subsequent to the

filing of the Report and Recommendation.

2

 It is undisputed that all of the petitioner’s claims were timely filed and

properly exhausted.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dwayne Pitre,

 Petitioner,

vs.

Tara Diaz, et al.,

 Respondents.

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No. CV-12-00249-PHX-PGR (FJM)

 ORDER

 

 

Having reviewed de novo the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate

Judge Metcalf in light of Petitioner’s Objections to Report and Recommendation

(Doc. 23), which the petitioner filed through counsel1

, the Court finds that the

Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the petitioner’s habeas petition, filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, should be denied on the ground that none of the four

claims raised by the petitioner are meritorious, and the Court rejects all of the

petitioner’s objections to the contrary.2

Case 2:12-cv-00249-PGR Document 24 Filed 04/25/13 Page 1 of 4
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 The petitioner was convicted of 14 felonies stemming from the robbery of

a grocery store, which included five counts of armed robbery, five counts of

kidnaping, three counts of aggravated assault, and one count of vehicle theft; he was

sentenced to a total of 160 years in prison.

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In his Ground One, the petitioner alleges that he was given enhanced and

aggravated sentences in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

The trial court enhanced the petitioner’s sentences based on the petitioner having

two prior felony convictions and aggravated his sentences based on two other prior

felony convictions and other aggravating factors; the petitioner had admitted his four

prior felony convictions at a voluntariness hearing. The Court agrees with the

Magistrate Judge that the Arizona Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply

clearly established federal law in determining that the petitioner’s prior felony

convictions were properly used by the trial court as an aggravating circumstance

sufficient to permit sentencing within the statutory aggravated sentencing range for

each count.3

In his Ground Two, the petitioner alleges an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim based on his trial counsel’s failure to call an eyewitness, Ms. Felix, for the

purpose of challenging the identification of the petitioner as the perpetrator made by

one of the police officer witnesses. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that

the petitioner has not established that the state court’s determination that he had

failed to establish the prejudice required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984), was an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable

application of or contrary to federal law given that there is no reasonable possibility

that the outcome of the trial would have been changed by Ms. Felix’s proffered

testimony, which was in effect cumulative to that of a different police officer witness,

in light of the testimony of other non-police eyewitnesses/victims who identified the

Case 2:12-cv-00249-PGR Document 24 Filed 04/25/13 Page 2 of 4
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petitioner as the perpetrator.

In his Ground Three, the petitioner alleges another ineffective assistance of

counsel claim based on the failures of his trial and appellate counsel to challenge 

the discretionary decision made by the trial court to sentence him as a nondangerous repeat offender notwithstanding the jury’s finding of dangerousness; the

trial court’s election of this sentencing option resulted in a higher sentencing range

under an anomaly in state law, i.e. 28 years incarceration per count as opposed to

21 years per count. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the petitioner

has not established that the state courts improperly applied the Strickland standard

given that any objection by counsel would have been futile since state law clearly

permitted the trial court to sentence the petitioner in the manner that it did.

In his Fourth Ground, the petitioner alleges another ineffective assistance of

counsel claim based on his trial counsel’s failure to properly advise him of his

potential maximum sentencing exposure during plea discussions. The Arizona Court

of Appeals rejected this claim on the ground that the prejudice prong of the

Strickland test was not met because the petitioner had not shown that there was a

reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer, which would have

involved up to 21 years in prison, but for his counsel deficient performance. In so

ruling, the state appellate court noted that the trial court’s evidentiary hearing

established that the petitioner’s adamant position during plea negotiations was that

he was not interested in any plea agreement that required prison time, that the

petitioner never testified that he would have accepted the plea offer had he been

properly advised about the maximum sentence, and that his counsel had advised

him that he could be sentenced to somewhere over 100 years in prison and would

certainly spend the rest of his natural life in prison. The Court agrees with the

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Magistrate Judge that the state appellate court’s finding that the petitioner was not

prejudiced by his counsel’s performance during the plea negotiations stage involved

a reasonable application of Strickland based on a reasonable determination of the

facts. The petitioner’s contention in his objections that there is no reason why he

would not have taken a plea to a sentence capped at 21 years if he had been

properly informed about his maximum sentence exposure is simply speculative in

light of the evidence of record. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

(Doc. 15) is accepted and adopted by the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. §

2254 for a Writ of habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody is denied and that

this action is dismissed. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall be issued

and that the petitioner is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis because the

petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right

in that he has failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the Court’s

assessment of his constitutional claims to be debatable or wrong.

DATED this 24th day of April, 2013.

Case 2:12-cv-00249-PGR Document 24 Filed 04/25/13 Page 4 of 4