Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00434/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00434-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CATHY A. MONAGHAN,

NO. 2:10-CV-0434 FCD GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EL DORADO COUNTY WATER AGENCY;

WILLIAM T. HETLAND; and DOES 1

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant El Dorado

County Water Agency’s (the “Agency” or “defendant”) motion to

dismiss plaintiff Cathy A. Monaghan’s (“Monaghan” or “plaintiff”)

first amended complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposes the motion. For

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).

2

the reasons set forth below,1

 defendant’s motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Monaghan was employed by defendant Agency from May

23, 2003, when she was hired as an Administrative Services

Officer. (FAC, filed June 2, 2010, ¶¶ 3, 22.) Her position was

re-classified to Administrative Manager-Clerk in July 2007. 

(Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor was defendant

William T. Hetland (“Hetland”), the General Manager of the

Agency. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 24.) 

Starting in April 2006, Hetland began making sexual advances

toward plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 25.) She ultimately surrendered to his

advances and became involved in a sexual relationship with

Hetland that occurred during both working and non-working hours. 

(Id. ¶¶ 3, 25, 26.) Plaintiff alleges that from the time the

sexual relationship began to the time that plaintiff was

terminated, Hetland employed tactics including encouragement,

manipulation, and intimidation in order to continue the

relationship. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff also alleges that Hetland

encouraged plaintiff’s use and abuse of alcohol, which he often

provided; plaintiff used and abused alcohol during regular

working hours at the Agency with Hetland’s knowledge and consent. 

(Id.)

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2 Prior to this time, plaintiff disclosed to her husband

that she was having a sexual relationship with Hetland. After

the disclosure, Hetland, plaintiff, and plaintiff’s husband

engaged in four sexual encounters. (Id. ¶ 27.) 

3

In October 2007, plaintiff decided to end the sexual

affair.2 (Id. ¶ 28.) Hetland pressured plaintiff to continue

the sexual relationship. (Id.) Plaintiff felt that she would

suffer adverse employment consequences if she refused. (Id.) As

a result, she continued the sexual relationship and did not

report Hetland’s conduct. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the stress of the situation caused

her use of alcohol to “spiral[] out of control.” (Id.) When

plaintiff complained to Hetland about the stress he was causing

her, he would yell and belittle her. (Id. ¶ 29.) Afterwards, he

would apologize and instruct her to “coast” on the job since she

“had a great staff and had pulled the office into a wellfunctioning team.” (Id.) 

Subsequently, plaintiff had discussions with the Agency’s

counsel, Fred Schaefer (“Schaefer”), concerning Hetland’s yelling

and belittling her. (Id. ¶ 30.) She also informed Schaefer that

Hetland “would share with her the marital and sexual issues he

was having with his wife.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that because

Schaefer supported Hetland’s treatment of her without question,

she did not inform Schaefer of her sexual relationship with

Hetland for fear that raising the issue would result in

retaliation. (Id.)

Plaintiff further alleges that Schaefer was aware of

plaintiff’s alcohol abuse. (Id. ¶ 31.) Specifically, on one

occasion, plaintiff left the office after consuming several

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drinks during her lunch hour; she hit the curb. (Id.) After

being notified by a staff member, Schaefer followed plaintiff to

her home and talked to her inside her residence. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was not counseled, reprimanded, suspended, or otherwise

disciplined by the Agency for this incident. (Id.) 

Further, in June 2009, plaintiff was convicted of

misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol. (Id. ¶ 32.) 

Hetland expressed concern that the abuse of alcohol and resulting

DUI conviction was his fault and drove plaintiff to her DUI

classes. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that during the first week of August 2009,

Hetland pressured her to have another sexual encounter in Lake

Tahoe to coincide with Agency meetings scheduled there later in

the month. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff refused. (Id.)

On August 24, 2009, plaintiff was found asleep at her desk

after drinking alcohol. (Id. ¶ 34.) Hetland took her home and

called plaintiff’s husband. (Id.) Hetland conceded that his

behavior both caused and enabled plaintiff’s alcohol abuse. 

(Id.)

On August 25, 2009, the Agency required plaintiff to attend

an inpatient alcohol rehabilitation program costing $11,000.00 at

her own expense. (Id. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff and the Agency entered

into a written agreement (the “Agreement”) that provided in part,

“On the basis of this conduct, Employer has decided to terminate

Employee’s employment, but will suspend the termination of

employment on the following terms.” (Id. ¶ 36 n.1.) The

Agreement also required that plaintiff enter an alcohol

rehabilitation treatment program and notify the Agency within

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three days of initial assessment, admission, or beginning

treatment. (Id.) The parties also agreed that “during and

following any period of initial or continuing treatment, Employee

agrees that she will, as a condition of continued employment by

the Employer, comply with the treatment recommendations of her

treatment practitioners.” (Id. ¶ 67.) On August 27, 2009,

Hetland signed an addendum letter to the Agreement (the

“Addendum”). (Id. ¶ 37-38.) The Addendum provided, in part, “By

your Agreement with the AGENCY you have agreed to follow the

course of counseling and treatment recommended . . . . The

Program is for 28 days, which is expected to be completed on

September 27, 2009. We would like to meet with you at your

convenience on either September 28 or 29, 2009 to receive your

evaluation of the Program and its effectiveness to you.” (Id. ¶

37.) Plaintiff completed the program and performed all

obligations under the Agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 40.) 

On September 29, 2009, plaintiff met with Hetland and was

presented with a written “Termination of Employment” effective

5:00 p.m. on September 29, 2009. (Id. ¶ 40.) The letter was

signed by Hetland, on behalf of the Agency. (Id.) Hetland and

Schaefer advised plaintiff that she was required to sign various

documents in connection with her termination, including a

Severance and Release Agreement. (Id.) However, plaintiff

refused to sign this agreement. (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that from October 2007 to the first week

of August 2009, Hetland subjected her to sexual harassment. (Id.

¶ 41.) Plaintiff further contends that Hetland retaliated

against her for resistance or refusal to engage in sexual

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conduct. (Id.) Finally, plaintiff contends that the Agency

employed Hetland with knowledge of his unfitness for the position

and in conscious disregard for plaintiff’s rights in the

workplace and both authorized and ratified Hetland’s wrongful

conduct. (Id. ¶ 43.) 

Plaintiff filed a timely charge of discrimination against

the Agency and Hetland with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) and with the California Department of Fair

Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) and received right to sue notices

in November and December 2009. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) On February 19,

2010, plaintiff filed a complaint in this court. Plaintiff filed

a first amended complaint on June 2, 2010. In her FAC, plaintiff

alleges claims against Hetland and the Agency for (1) sex

discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et

seq.; (2) sexual harassment in violation of California’s Fair

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Gov’t Code §

12900, et seq.; (3) failure to prevent sexual harassment in

violation of FEHA; (4) retaliation in violation of Title VII; (5)

retaliation in violation of FEHA; (6) breach of contract; and (7)

negligence. 

STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a pleading must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal

court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what

the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations

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omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on

liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define

disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious

claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the

complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,

322 (1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not

allege “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his

claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 

Nevertheless, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual

allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. A

pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

1950 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). 

Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can

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prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have

violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council

of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff has

failed to “nudge [his or her] claims across the line from

conceivable to plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. 

Id. at 1952. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a

probability requirement, it demands more than “a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949. 

This plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense.” Id. at 1950. 

ANALYSIS

1. Sexual Harassment

Defendant Agency moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for

sexual harassment under both Title VII and FEHA because it

contends that the sexual relationship was consensual.

Both Title VII and FEHA prohibit harassment based on sex. 

42 U.S.C. 2000e; Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j). “[A]lthough the

wording of the Fair Employment Housing Act and [T]itle VII of the

Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . differs in some

particulars, the antidiscriminatory objectives and the overriding

public policy purposes are identical,” and therefore, California

courts refer to applicable federal decisions where appropriate. 

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3 The court notes that when pleading employment

discrimination, a plaintiff need not allege a prima facie case

with particularity so long as the allegations give defendants

notice of and the basis for the charges against them. 

Swierkiewicz v. Soreman, 534 U.S. 506, 508, 512 (2002).

9

Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 1987)

(citing County of Alameda v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n, 153

Cal. App. 3d 499, 504 (1984); Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 36 Cal.

4th 446, 463 (2005); Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317,

354 (2000)). 

To sufficiently plead a prima facie case for a violation of

Title VII and FEHA based on a hostile work environment, plaintiff

must allege that the “workplace [was] permeated with

discriminatory intimidation . . . that [was] sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and

create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys.,

Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotations and citations

omitted); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d

590, 609 (1989).3 Sexual harassment includes “unwelcome sexual

advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or

physical conduct of a sexual nature that has the ‘purpose or

effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work

performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

working environment.’” Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 463 (quoting 29

C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)). Moreover, “the fact that sex-related

conduct was ‘voluntary,’ in the sense that the complainant was

not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a

sexual harassment suit.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477

U.S. 57, 68 (1986). Rather, “[t]he gravamen of any sexual

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harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were

‘unwelcome.’” Id. (citations omitted). The determination of

whether conduct was unwelcome “presents difficult problems of

proof and turns largely on credibility determinations committed

to the trier of fact.” Id.

Supervisors with the authority to control the environment

may be held personally liable for harassment in violation of FEHA

if they tacitly approved of the actions or if they were aware of

the harassment and failed to take action to prevent it. Matthews

v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. App. 4th 598, 604 (1995). 

Unlike discrimination in hiring, the ultimate

responsibility for which rests with the employer,

sexual or other harassment perpetrated by a supervisor

with the power to hire, fire and control the victimized

employee’s working conditions is a particularly

personal form of the type of discrimination which the

Legislature sought to proscribe when it enacted the

FEHA. Our holding that the responsibility for such acts

must be borne both by the offender as well as the

employer who tolerates the offense is consistent with

the Legislature’s intent to provide effective remedies

which will eliminate such discriminatory practices.

Id. at 605-06 (quotations omitted). Accordingly, where the

harassment is committed by a supervisor, the employer is strictly

liable. State Dep’t of Health Servs. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.

4th 1026, 1041 (2003).

In this case, plaintiff alleges that she “surrendered” to

Hetland’s advances and engaged in a sexual relationship with him. 

Plaintiff alleges that from the time her affair with Hetland

began, he used manipulation and intimidation to persuade her to

continue the relationship, including encouraging her use and

abuse of alcohol. In October 2007, plaintiff wished to end the

affair, but continued the relationship because Hetland pressured

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4 The Agency also contends that this claim fails for the

same reasons it argues that plaintiff’s harassment claims fail. 

However, for the reasons set forth above, plaintiff has alleged

sufficient facts to state a harassment claim. Accordingly, this

argument is without merit.

11

her and she believed that she would suffer adverse employment

consequences. As such, plaintiff has pled sufficient facts for

the court to plausibly infer that the conduct was unwelcome. 

Therefore, at this stage of the litigation, where

plaintiff’s allegations must be taken as true and reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, plaintiff has stated a plausible

claim against the Agency for sexual harassment under both Title

VII and FEHA. Thus, defendant’s motion to dismiss these claims

is DENIED. 

2. Failure to Prevent Sexual Harassment

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claim against the

Agency for failure to prevent harassment in violation of FEHA on

the basis that plaintiff failed to complain of the harassment

until after she was terminated.4

It is an unlawful employment practice under FEHA “for an

employer . . . to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to

prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring” in the

workplace. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(k). When a plaintiff seeks

to recover damages based on a claim of failure to prevent

harassment, she must show three essential elements: (1) plaintiff

was subjected to discrimination, harassment or retaliation; (2)

defendant failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent

discrimination, harassment or retaliation; and (3) this failure

caused plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm. Lelaind

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v. City and County of San Francisco, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1103

(N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing California Civil Jury Instructions

(BAJI) 12.11). 

In this case, plaintiff has alleged that she was the victim

of unwelcome sexual harassment perpetrated by her supervisor. 

Plaintiff further alleges that when she attempted to report

Hetland’s belittling and yelling behavior to Agency’s counsel,

counsel supported the conduct without question. As such,

plaintiff alleges that she did not report the allegedly unwelcome

sexual relationship because she feared that it would result in

retaliation by her supervisor and, possibly, Agency’s counsel. 

Moreover, plaintiff alleges that the Agency hired Hetland knowing

that he had a sexual relationship with a subordinate secretary at

his prior employment. Accordingly, plaintiff has pled sufficient

facts to support her claim that defendant did not take reasonable

steps necessary to prevent unlawful conduct.

Therefore, at this stage of the litigation, plaintiff has

stated a plausible claim against the Agency for failure to

prevent sexual harassment in violation of FEHA. As such,

defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim is DENIED. 

3. Retaliation

The Agency also moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for

retaliation under Title VII and FEHA, arguing that (1) plaintiff

did not engage in protected activity, and (2) she cannot

demonstrate a causal connection between any protected activity

and her termination because no Agency official was aware of the

relationship between plaintiff and Hetland.

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To state a prima facie retaliation claim under Title VII, a

plaintiff must demonstrate “that (1) she engaged in a protected

activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3)

there was a causal link between her activity and the employment

decision.” Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist.,

323 F.3d 1185, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003). Conduct constituting a

“protected activity” includes filing a charge or complaint,

testifying about an employer’s alleged unlawful practices, and

“engaging in other activity intended to oppose an employer’s

discriminatory practices.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a))(internal quotations omitted). The elements of a cause of

action for retaliation under FEHA are identical. Tarin v. County

of Los Angeles, 123 F.3d 1259, 1264 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997)

superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Leisek v.

Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 899 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002); see also

Flait v. North American Watch Corp., 3 Cal. App. 4th 467, 476

(1992). 

Causation “may be inferred from circumstantial evidence,

such as the employer’s knowledge that the plaintiff engaged in

protected activities and the proximity in time between the

protected action and the allegedly retaliatory employment

decision.” Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir.

1987); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“That an employer’s actions were caused by an employee’s

engagement in protected activities may be inferred from proximity

in time between the protected action and the allegedly

retaliatory employment decision.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

An employer’s awareness of the protected activity is required to

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supply evidence of a causal link between the protected activity

and the adverse action. See Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d

793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982).

In this case, plaintiff asserts that by rebuffing Hetland’s

overtures to engage in a sexual encounter at Lake Tahoe in August

2009, plaintiff opposed Hetland’s conduct of discrimination

prohibited under Title VII. Plaintiff alleges that while both

Hetland and Schaefer were previously aware of plaintiff’s

problems with alcohol, they took action against her only after

she refused to engage in sexual relations with Hetland and in the

same month that she declined Hetland’s advances. Specifically,

in August 2009, plaintiff was required to participate in an

inpatient alcohol rehabilitation program at her own expense as a

condition of “suspended termination.” The following month,

having complied with all required conditions and without having

returned to work, she was terminated by Hetland, the supervisor

she contends was engaging in the sexual harassment. As such,

plaintiff has pled sufficient facts that the agency official

responsible for her termination was aware of her refusal to

engage in sexual activity.

Therefore, viewing these allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences

therefrom, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she engaged in

protected activity and that she was retaliated against by the

Agency for such conduct in violation of Title VII and FEHA. 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss these claims is

DENIED. 

///// 

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4. Breach of Contract

Defendant also moves to dismiss plaintiff’s breach of

contract claim on the grounds that (1) she was an at-will

employee; and (2) even if she was not an at-will employee, there

was cause for termination.

California Labor Code § 2922 provides that “employment

having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either

party on notice to the other.” While § 2922 controls where an

employer and employee do not reach an alternative agreement, it

does not prevent the parties from settling on different terms,

such as “an agreement that the employee will be terminated only

for ‘good cause’ in the sense of a fair and honest cause or

reason, regulated by good faith, as opposed to one that is

trivial, capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or

pretextual.” Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 336 (internal quotations and

citations omitted). The “parties may define for themselves what

cause or causes will permit an employee’s termination and may

specify the procedures under which termination shall occur.” Id.

“Contract interpretation begins with the language of the

written agreement.” Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 323

F.3d 1035, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Foley Co. v. United

States, 11 F.3d 1032, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Contract terms are

to be given their ordinary meaning, and when the terms of the

contract are clear, the intent of the parties must be ascertained

from the contract itself. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1549 (9th Cir. 1990). 

However, a court may consider extrinsic evidence to construe an

ambiguous written contract. Winet v. Price, 4 Cal. App. 4th

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5 The court notes that plaintiff has not attached or

quoted verbatim the complete text of the Agreement. As such, the

court emphasizes that it makes no final determination as to the

validity or construction of the Agreement. Rather, as set forth

infra, the court merely concludes that under Rule 8(a)’s liberal

notice pleading standards, plaintiff has alleged a breach of

contract sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 

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1159, 1165 (1992). “‘A contract is ambiguous if reasonable

people could find its terms susceptible to more than one

interpretation.’” Tanadgusix Corp. v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1201, 1205

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United

States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1032 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff alleges that the Agreement constituted a contract

pursuant to which she ceased to be an at-will employee and the

Agency agreed “to suspend termination” of her employment.

The Agreement provides, in relevant part,5 “Employer has decided

to terminate Employee’s employment, but will suspend the

termination of employment on the following terms,” specifying the

requirement of alcohol rehabilitation treatment. Plaintiff

argues that the phrase “suspend the termination” manifested an

agreement between the parties that plaintiff’s termination would

be rescinded and that any cause the Agency might have had for

terminating her employment would be cured if she satisfied the

specified conditions. While defendant contends that it merely

agreed to hold plaintiff’s termination in abeyance for a period

of time while she completed rehabilitation treatment, the

language of the Agreement is not inconsistent with the

alternative interpretation proffered by plaintiff. As such, at

this stage of the litigation with the limited information before

it, the court cannot conclude that the terms are clear on the

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face of the Agreement. Further, plaintiff alleges that the

Agreement and Addendum required her to complete costly

rehabilitation at her own expense, to provide the Agency with

written documentation of her treatment, and to meet with the

Agency following completion of the program. She argues that by

undertaking these conditions and incurring substantial costs, she

fulfilled the conditions precedent to defendant’s agreement not

to terminate her.

On a motion to dismiss, where the court must view the

allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, the court concludes that plaintiff has sufficiently

stated a plausible claim for breach of contract. Accordingly,

defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim is DENIED.

5. Negligence

Finally, the Agency moves to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence

claim on the basis that (1) common law actions against public

entities for wrongful termination or retaliation are barred by

California Government Code § 815(a) and (2) any sexual harassment

was not within Hetland’s scope of employment. 

A. Statutory Basis for Public Entity Liability

Under California Government Code § 815(a), “[a] public

entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises

out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public

employee or any other person,” except as otherwise provided by

statute. However, § 815.2(a) provides that “[a] public entity is

liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an

employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment

if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given

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rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal

representative.” The statute thus “expressly makes the doctrine

of respondeat superior applicable to public employers.” Hoff v.

Vacaville Unified School Dist., 19 Cal. 4th 925, 932 (1998).

Consequently, plaintiff may bring her claim under § 815.2(a) if

she can establish that Hetland’s conduct was within the scope of

his employment and if she can otherwise establish that Hetland

would be liable to her. 

B. Scope of Employment

Under California law, “an employer is liable for risks

arising out of the employment.” Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons,

Inc., 41 Cal. 3d 962, 968 (1986) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). “A risk arises out of the employment when in

the context of the particular enterprise an employee’s conduct is

not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include

the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s

business.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

However, an employer “will not be held vicariously liable

for an employee’s malicious or tortious conduct if the employee

substantially deviates from the employment duties for personal

purposes.” Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 11 Cal.

4th 992, 1005 (1995) (emphasis in original). “If an employee’s

tort is personal in nature, mere presence at the place of

employment and attendance to occupational duties prior or

subsequent to the offense will not give rise to a cause of action

against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” 

Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 123 Cal. App. 3d 133,

140 (1981). 

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“The question whether an employee’s acts are within the

scope of employment is ordinarily a question of fact, but the

issue may be determined as a question of law when the material

facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible.” 

Jacobus v. Krambo Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 1096, 1103 (2000). In

the context of alleged sexual misconduct by employees against

third parties, courts have rejected vicarious liability “as a

matter of law because it could not be demonstrated that the

various acts of sexual misconduct arose from the conduct of the

respective enterprises.” Farmers Ins., 11 Cal. 4th at 1006-07

(citing cases). In addition, the California Supreme Court has

held as a matter of law that alleged sexual harassment by a

deputy sheriff directed toward other deputies working in a county

jail was outside the scope of the deputy’s employment. Id. at

1019-20. The court reasoned that the deputy’s conduct, including

requests for sexual favors, was “motivated for strictly personal

reasons” unrelated to the performance of his employment duties. 

Id. at 1007. The court concluded that “an employer will not be

held vicariously liable where, as here, it clearly appears that

neither directly nor indirectly could the employee have been

serving his employer.” Id. at 1008 (internal citations and

quotations omitted).

In this case, plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment

encompass conduct that substantially deviated from Hetland’s

employment duties. Plaintiff alleges no facts that could

plausibly suggest that Hetland was serving the Agency when he

engaged in the conduct at issue. Plaintiff thus fails to plead

sufficient facts to allege that Hetland was acting within the

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6 Furthermore, plaintiff fails to specify the conduct

that allegedly constituted negligence. Indeed, plaintiff’s

negligence claim appears inconsistent with the allegations in her

FAC, which describe intentional conduct on Hetland’s part. 

“Willfulness and negligence are contradictory terms.” Am.

Employer’s Ins. Co. v. Smith, 105 Cal. App. 3d 94, 99 (1980). 

“If conduct is negligent, it is not willful; if it is willful, it

is not negligent.” Id. Thus, plaintiff also fails to allege

negligence with sufficient clarity to put defendant on notice of

the basis of her claim.

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scope of his employment when he sexually harassed her.6 However,

plaintiff is granted leave to amend to the extent that she can

allege facts to support a plausible inference that Hetland was

acting within the scope of his employment.

Accordingly, the Agency’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

seventh claim for relief for negligence is GRANTED with leave to

amend. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 30, 2010

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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