Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04497/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04497-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY L. BROWN,

Petitioner,

v.

DEBBIE ASUNCION, Acting Warden,1

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-04497-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS 

PETITION AS SUCCESSIVE; AND 

GRANTING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner Gregory L. Brown, a state prisoner, filed the instant pro se action for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Before the Court is Respondent’s renewed motion to dismiss the instant petition as

successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Dkt. 18. Petitioner filed an opposition to the renewed 

motion. Dkt. 19. Respondent filed a reply and two addendums to the reply. Dkts. 20, 21, 25.

Having read and considered the papers submitted and being fully informed, the Court 

GRANTS Respondent’s renewed motion and DISMISSES the petition as successive.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1995, Petitioner was sentenced to fifty-six years to life in state prison, following his 

conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and attempted first degree murder.

Thereafter, Petitioner unsuccessfully pursued direct and collateral review in state court. 

The Court does not detail Petitioner’s state post-conviction proceedings here as they are not 

relevant to the pending renewed dispositive motion.

On October 7, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant petition. Dkt. 1.

On November 17, 2014, the Court issued an order to show cause. Dkt. 7.

On February 6, 2015, in lieu of an answer, Respondent moved to dismiss the instant 

petition as successive because Petitioner filed a prior federal habeas petition, which challenged the 

 

1 Debbie Asuncion, the current warden of the prison where Petitioner is incarcerated, has 

been substituted as Respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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same underlying state conviction. Dkt. 13 at 3. In Petitioner’s previous federal habeas action, 

Case No. C 98-2013 MMC (PR), Judge Maxine M. Chesney denied the petition on the merits. 

Dkt. 28 in Case No. C 98-2013 MMC (PR). In his opposition to that motion to dismiss, Petitioner 

did not deny that he filed a previous federal habeas petition, but argued that the petition was not a 

second or successive petition because it is based on new Brady2claims. Dkt. 14 at 6-10.

In an Order dated May 14, 2015, the Court denied Respondent’s motion to dismiss without 

prejudice to renewing the motion to address “whether this case fits the exception to section 

2244(b)(2) as recognized by the Ninth Circuit in King v. Trujillo.

3

” Dkt. 17 at 7.

On June 11, 2015, Respondent filed the instant renewed motion to dismiss the petition as 

successive. Dkt. 18. On June 29, 2015, Petitioner filed his opposition to renewed motion. Dkt. 

19. Thereafter, Respondent filed a reply and two addendums to the reply.

4

 Dkts. 20, 21, 25.

II. DISCUSSION

A claim presented in a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 must be dismissed if presented in a prior petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1); 

Babbitt v. Woodford, 177 F.3d 744, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1999). Section 2244(b) applies when a court 

has disposed of a previous petition on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (emphasis supplied). 

Under that section, a petitioner must obtain an order from the court of appeals which authorizes 

the district court to consider any second or successive petition before that petitioner can file such a 

petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Without such an order, a district court must dismiss the 

successive petition. See id. § 2244(b)(2).

Further, a new claim presented in a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

that was not presented in a prior petition must also be dismissed unless it satisfies one of two sets 

 

2

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

3 King v. Trujillo, 638 F.3d 726, 729-30 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

4 On February 9, 2016, Petitioner informed the Court that he had not received a copy of the 

second addendum to the reply, which had been sent to Salinas Valley State Prison, where he was 

previously incarcerated. Dkt. 29. However, also on February 9, 2016, Respondent filed a notice 

entitled, “Re-Service of Second Addendum to Reply,” which indicates that another copy of the 

second addendum to the reply had been sent to Petitioner’s current address, CSP-Los Angeles 

County. Dkt. 28.

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of requirements. The first set requires dismissal unless the applicant “shows” that the “claim relies 

on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 

Court, that was previously unavailable.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). The second set allows a 

newly presented claim where:

(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in 

light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by 

clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no 

reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the 

underlying offense. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).

In its May 14, 2015 Order, the Court noted that there was “some uncertainty regarding how 

the second or successive restrictions apply with respect to Brady claims,” stating as follows: 

Several circuits have ruled that second-in-time claims arising under 

Brady are not exempt from the second or successive restrictions. 

See Quezada v. Smith, 624 F.3d 514, 520 (2nd Cir. 2010) (applying 

section 2244(b) to Brady claim); In re Siggers, 615 F.3d 477, 479 

(6th Cir. 2010) (same); Tompkins v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 557 F.3d 

1257, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2009); Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d 306, 323 

(4th Cir. 2000) (same); see also Johnson v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 901, 

911 (5th Cir. 2006) (“a successive petitioner urging a Brady claim 

may not rely solely upon the ultimate merits of the Brady claim in 

order to demonstrate due diligence under [section] 2244(b)(2)(B) 

where the petitioner was noticed pretrial of the existence of the 

factual predicate and of the factual predicate’s ultimate potential 

exculpatory relevance”).

The Ninth Circuit in King, on the other hand, has 

“recognized that a Brady v. Maryland violation claim in a habeas 

petition may not be subject to the ‘clear and convincing standard’ 

[under section 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)], provided the newly discovered 

evidence supporting the claim [i]s ‘material’ under Brady.” King, 

638 F.3d at 729 (citing United States v. Lopez, 577 F.3d 1053, 1066-

68 (9th Cir. 2009) (leaving open the question of whether meritorious 

Brady claims that would have been reviewable under the preAEDPA prejudice standard are subject to section 

2244(b)(2)(B)(ii))).

In Lopez, the federal prisoner argued that the United States 

Supreme Court’s decision in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 

(2007), holding that competency-to-be-executed claims based on 

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), are exempt from 

AEDPA’s second or successive requirements, established that Brady 

claims are exempt from the second-or-successive restrictions as 

well. Lopez, 577 F.3d at 1066. The government, on the other hand, 

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argued that all second-in-time Brady claims are subject to the 

second or successive restrictions because they are second or 

successive claims that rely on “newly discovered” evidence. Id. In 

considering both arguments, the Ninth Circuit observed that the 

Supreme Court has not always read “second or successive” literally. 

Id. at 1062. The Ninth Circuit also noted that in Panetti, the 

Supreme Court held “[t]he phrase ‘second or successive’ is not selfdefining.” Id. (quoting Panetti, 551 U.S. at 943). Responding to the 

government’s argument, the Lopez court stated that under a literal 

reading of “second or successive” in AEDPA,

federal courts would lack jurisdiction to consider 

any second-in-time Brady claims unless petitioner 

demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that 

no reasonable factfinder would have found 

petitioner guilty of the offense had the newly 

discovered evidence been available at trial. If 

[section 2244(b)]5applies literally to every secondin-time Brady claim, federal courts would be unable 

to resolve an entire subset of meritorious Brady 

claims: those where petitioner can show the 

suppressed evidence establishes a reasonable 

probability of a different result and is therefore 

material under Brady, but cannot, under [section 

2244(b)(2)]’s more demanding prejudice standard, 

show that the evidence establishes by clear and 

convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would 

have voted to convict petitioner.

Lopez, 577 F.3d at 1064 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted 

and footnote added). The effect, the Ninth Circuit concluded, was 

the “perverse result” of foreclosing federal review of some 

meritorious claims and rewarding prosecutors for failing to meet 

their constitutional disclosure obligations under Brady. Id. at 1065.

Ultimately, however, the Lopez court declined to resolve the 

issue regarding whether meritorious Brady claims were categorically 

exempt from AEDPA’s second or successive petition provisions, 

holding that “[e]ven if Panetti could be viewed as supporting an 

exemption from AEDPA’s gatekeeping provisions for meritorious 

Brady claims, such a rule would not benefit Lopez, because we 

conclude (1) that Brady claims that fail to establish materiality (and 

therefore lack merit) are subject to AEDPA’s gatekeeping 

provisions and (2) that Lopez has failed to establish materiality.” Id. 

As noted above, recently and subsequent to Lopez, the Ninth 

Circuit in King, again suggested that the section 2244(b)(2) second 

and successive restrictions do not necessarily apply to meritorious 

Brady claims. King, 638 F.3d at 729.

The Court finds that to the extent an exception to section 

 

5

Lopez was a section 2255 case, and the Ninth Circuit was applying section 2255(h)’s 

gateway in that case; however, the court of appeals treats the section 2244(b) gateway identically. 

See United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000).

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2244(b)(2) exists for Brady claims, as suggested by the Ninth 

Circuit, this may be a case that would fit that exception. See id. 

Dkt. 17 at 3-5 (footnotes renumbered). As explained above, the Court allowed Respondent to 

renew the motion to dismiss and directed him to “address[] whether this case fits the exception to 

section 2244(b)(2) as recognized by the Ninth Circuit in King v. Trujillo.” Id. at 7.

In the renewed motion to dismiss, Respondent continues to argue that the petition should 

be dismissed as successive because no such exception to section 2244(b)(2) exists, stating as 

follows:

As respondent noted in his original motion, no case has held that 

Brady claims of any sort are excepted from the requirements of 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b). United States v. Lopez, 577 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 

2009), is not to the contrary. There, the court held in the context of 

the analogous gatekeeping provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) that 

“Brady claims are not categorically exempt from AEDPA’s 

gatekeeping provisions and that second-in-time Brady claims that do 

not establish materiality of the suppressed evidence are subject to 

dismissal under § 2255(h)(1).” Lopez, 577 F.3d at 1066. In other 

words, under Lopez, second-in-time habeas petitions raising Brady 

claims not establishing materiality must be dismissed under 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b) if permission to file the petition has not been 

obtained from the court of appeals. See Lopez, 577 F.3d at 1066.

Dkt. 18 at 3. Respondent adds that “the Ninth Circuit has theorized that an exception to section

2244(b) might exist for Brady claims establishing materiality, but has not had occasion to decide 

the question.” Id. Therefore, Respondent argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide such 

an issue and consider the petition, stating:

Respectfully, a holding establishing for the first time in any 

circuit a new exception to § 2244(b) for Brady claims demonstrating 

materiality should come from the court of appeals in the first 

instance. This is particularly so where, as here, it is the court of 

appeals that serves as the gatekeeper for second-in-time habeas 

petitions. This Court currently lacks jurisdiction to address the 

petition, and should not create jurisdiction by creating new law not 

yet established by the court of appeals.

Even assuming, arguendo, an exception to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(b) exists for Brady claims, the court of appeals, not this 

Court, should determine whether the exception applies. Even under 

the exception theorized in Lopez, supra, there still remains a 

standard to be met—“materiality” of the withheld evidence—to 

establish whether an exception applies. See United States v. Lopez, 

577 F.3d at 1066-67. Hence, just as the court of appeals determines 

whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case of satisfying 

§ 2244(b), that court should be the one to determine whether a 

petitioner has established materiality of the allegedly withheld 

evidence, and thus whether § 2244(b) applies at all for a given case. 

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Absent such an order, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the 

petition.

Id. at 4. Finally, Respondent argues that “even if this Court were to establish an exception for 

Brady claims establishing materiality, it could only do so if petitioner can meet his burden of 

showing that the withheld evidence was material.” Id. Respondent stresses that if Petitioner 

cannot meet such a burden, then “this Court has no jurisdiction to address the petition.” Id. (citing

Lopez, 577 F.3d at 1066.)

In his opposition to the renewed motion, Petitioner bases his case for materiality on copies 

of letters from the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office to the San Francisco Public Defender’s 

Office stating, in essence, that there is evidence in three officers’ files that may constitute Brady 

material for some cases. Dkt. 19 at 6; see also Dkt. 14 at 2-3; Dkt. 1-2 at 9, 11, 13. Those officers

from the San Francisco Police Department are: Sergeants Michael Hutchings and Wallace Gin, 

and Police Officer Pamela Hockett. See id.

In the reply and addendums to the reply, Respondent argues that the letters to which 

Petitioner refers “do not concede or establish that Brady material exists, but rather that it may exist 

depending on, inter alia, each officer’s role in a given case.” Dkt. 20 at 2. Moreover, since the 

filing the renewed motion to dismiss, Respondent and the San Francisco County District 

Attorney’s Office have reviewed the material referenced in the letters pertaining to the three 

officers and have concluded there is no evidence that must be disclosed under Brady.

6

See Dkt. 20 

at 2; Dkt. 25 at 2. Therefore, Respondent argues that there is no Brady evidence concerning any 

of the three officers. Id. 

Upon reviewing the above-referenced arguments by the parties, this Court agrees that as a 

threshold matter uncertainty remains regarding how the Ninth Circuit would consider second or 

successive petitions based upon Brady claims. Therefore, the Court concludes that it does not 

have jurisdiction to decide the instant petition. 

The Court GRANTS Respondent’s renewed motion to dismiss. Dkt. 18. Given the 

 

6 A copy of the material concerning Sergeant Hutchings and Officer Hockett was sent to 

Victor Blumenkrantz, Petitioner’s appellate counsel. Dkt. 20 at 2 note 1. The record does not 

indicate whether the material concerning Sergeant Gin was similarly sent to Petitioner’s appellate 

counsel. See Dkt. 25.

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deference to the Ninth Circuit, the Court declines to make any determination as to the instant 

petition or to the alleged Brady evidence.

Accordingly, the instant petition is thus classified as a successive petition, and an 

authorization order from the court of appeals is necessary before this Court may consider the 

instant successive petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). As Petitioner has not presented an 

order from the Ninth Circuit authorizing this Court to consider any new claims, this Court 

DISMISSES the instant petition in its entirety under section 2244(b).

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY (“COA”)

“Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing 

required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable 

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Section 2253(c)(1) also applies to an appeal of a 

final order entered on a procedural question antecedent to the merits, for instance a dismissal of 

the petition as successive, as here. See id.

 “Determining whether a COA should issue where the petition was dismissed on procedural 

grounds has two components, one directed at the underlying constitutional claims and one directed 

at the district court’s procedural holding.” Id. “When the district court denies a habeas petition on 

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should 

issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the 

petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would 

find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. As each of 

these components is a “threshold inquiry,” the court “may find that it can dispose of the 

application in a fair and prompt manner if it proceeds first to resolve the issue whose answer is 

more apparent from the record and arguments.” Id. Supreme Court jurisprudence “allows and 

encourages” federal courts to resolve the procedural issue first, as was done here. See id.

Reasonable jurists could find debatable whether an exception to section 2244(b) might 

exist for Brady claims establishing materiality. Therefore, reasonable jurists could also find 

debatable whether Petitioner met his burden of showing that the withheld evidence relating to the 

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three officers was material. Moreover, because the Court found in its Order to Show Cause that it 

did not appear from the face of the petition that it was without merit, then it is reasonably 

debatable that the claims in the petition are valid. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is 

GRANTED as to the aforementioned issues.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent’s renewed motion to dismiss the petition as 

successive is GRANTED. Dkt. 18. The instant petition is DISMISSED as a successive petition 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate all 

pending motions and close the file.

As explained above, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability is warranted in this 

case. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (requiring 

district court to rule on certificate of appealability in same order that denies petition). The Clerk 

shall provide a copy of this Order to the Ninth Circuit. 

This Order terminates Docket No. 18.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

February 23, 2016

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