Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01915/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01915-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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1 Originally JoAnne B. Barnhart was the named defendant in this action,

as she was the Commissioner when this action was commenced. On February 12,

2007, Michael J. Astrue became Commissioner. Therefore in accordance with Fed.

R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1) which allows, among other things, for substitution when a

“public officer is a party to an action in his official capacity and during its

pendency . . . ceases to hold office,” the court hereby substitutes Mr. Astrue

for Ms. Barnhart as the party defendant in this action. As expressly provided

for under section 405(g) of the Social Security Act, this action “survive[s]

notwithstanding” this change in Commissioners. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (West Supp.

2007). 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ernestina Martinez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner

of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. 06-1915-PHX-RCB

O R D E R

Currently pending before the court is a motion for summary

judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by plaintiff, Ernestina

Martinez (doc. 10); and a cross-motion for summary judgment by

defendant, Michael J. Astrue,1

 Commissioner of Social Security

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(“the Commissioner”) (doc. 16). For the reasons set forth

below, the court grants plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,

denies defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment and remands

this matter for further administrative action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence 4). 

Background

Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB)

on October 14, 1999, stating that she had “bec[o]me unable to

work because of her disabling condition on November 1, 1995.” 

Tr. at 75. On February 23, 2000, plaintiff’s 1999 application

for DIB was denied. Id. at 61. She did not appeal that denial. 

Id. at 19. 

Plaintiff reapplied for DIB on June 7, 2004, reciting again

that she had “bec[o]me unable to work because of her disabling

condition on November 1, 1995.” Id. at 66. On November 19,

2004, that application was denied, as was her subsequent request

for reconsideration. Id. at 39-42; and at 48-50. She therefore

timely filed a request for an administrative hearing, which was

held on November 4, 2005. Id. at 19. 

Stating that he had “careful[ly] consider[ed] the entire

record,” the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) expressly found

that plaintiff was “not disabled at Step Two of the sequential

evaluation process as set forth at 20 CFR 404.1520.” Id.

Although he found that the plaintiff had rheumatoid arthritis and

diabetes, the ALJ further found that her “allegations of

disability were not credible in light of the evidence.” Id. at

21. In that regard, the ALJ also found that plaintiff “did not

have any impairment that would have imposed more than minimal

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limitations upon her ability to perform basic work-related

activities prior to her date last insured.” Id.

Thereafter plaintiff requested review by the Social Security

Administration Appeals Council, and she submitted additional

evidence. Id. at 14, 35A-J; and 375-80. The ALJ’s decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner when, on July 11,

2006, the Council denied plaintiff’s request for review. Id. at

7. As 42 U.S.C. 405(g) allows, plaintiff then commenced the

present action seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.

Discussion

I. Standards of Review

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), a party is entitled to

summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” It is beyond dispute that “[t]he moving

party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any

genuine issue of material fact.” Horphag Research Ltd. v.

Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

“The criteria of ‘genuineness’ and ‘materiality’ are distinct

requirements.” Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912,

916 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “The requirement that an issue be

‘genuine’ relates to the quantum of evidence the plaintiff must

produce to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.” 

Id. “There must be sufficient evidence ‘that a reasonable jury

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could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “As to materiality, the substantive

law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248. 

“Once the moving party meets its initial burden, . . . , the

burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth, by affidavit

or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). This “[e]vidence must be concrete

and cannot rely on ‘mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.’”

Bates v. Clark County, 2006 WL 3308214, at * 2 (D.Nev. Nov. 13,

2006) (quoting O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 792 F.2d

1464, 1467 (9th Cir. 1986)). Similarly, “a mere ‘scintilla’ of

evidence” is not sufficient “to defeat a properly supported

motion for summary judgment; instead, the nonmoving party must

introduce some ‘significant probative evidence tending to support

the complaint.’” Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125

F.3d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249, 252). Thus, in opposing a summary judgment motion it is not

enough to “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as

to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations

omitted). 

By the same token though, when assessing the record to

determine whether there is a “genuine issue for trial,” the court

must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor.”

Horphag, 475 F.3d at 1035 (citation omitted). “This is true even

though[,]” as here, “the court is presented with cross-motions

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for summary judgment[.]” High Tech Gays v. Defense Ind. Sec.

Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation

omitted). 

On a summary judgment motion, the court may not make

credibility determinations; nor may it weigh conflicting

evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Thus, as framed by the

Supreme Court, the ultimate question on a summary judgment motion

is whether the evidence “presents a sufficient disagreement to

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that

one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52. The

fact that, as here, both parties are moving for summary judgment

does not alter these standards. “It is well settled that a

court’s duty to ascertain whether facts remain in contention is

not obviated by cross-motions for summary judgment.” Eby v. REB

Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 649 n.4 (9th Cir. 1974) (citations

omitted). 

B. Social Security Act

The Commissioner's denial of benefits is subject to judicial

review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The decision of the

Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial

evidence and the Commissioner applied the correct legal

standards. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th

Cir. 2005); Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.

2003); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d

715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). Factual determinations by the

Commissioner, acting through an ALJ, must be affirmed if

supported by substantial evidence. See Celaya v. Halter, 332

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F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520,

521 (9th Cir. 1996).

Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). 

It is more than a "mere scintilla," but less than a

preponderance. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (1971) (internal

quotations omitted); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th

Cir. 2003); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720;

Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975).

 In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the district

court must "consider the evidence as a whole, weighing both the

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the

Commissioner's conclusion." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279

(9th Cir. 1996). If the evidence can reasonably support either

affirming or reversing the Commissioner’s conclusion, the

district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner and must affirm. See McCartey v. Massanari, 298

F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098;

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720; Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Finally, "[a] decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for

errors that are harmless." Stout v. Comm'r, SSA, 454 F.3d 1050,

1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); accord Burch v.

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); Curry v. Sullivan,

925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, errors that are

inconsequential to the ALJ's ultimate determination as to

disability are not reversible. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1055. 

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As relief on her summary judgment motion, the plaintiff is

seeking to have this court “enter judgment reversing the

Commissioner’s final decision without a remand for rehearing,

i.e. for a finding of disability and an award of benefits.” Pl.

Mot. (doc. 10) at 1 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(sentence four)). 

Alternatively, she is seeking to have this court reverse “the

Commissioner’s final decision, with a remand for a rehearing[.]”

Id. Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that he is entitled to

summary judgment because his “final decision . . . is supported

by substantial evidence, making it conclusive upon this court.” 

Def. Mot. (doc. 16) at 2. 

II. Disability Determination

To be entitled to disability benefits, a plaintiff must

establish that her disability existed on or before the expiration

date of her insured status. See Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599,

601 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Here, the ALJ determined

that that expiration date is September 30, 2000; and the parties

do not dispute this. See Tr. at 21. “To medically qualify for

benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must establish

‘the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Stout v.

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). There is a five step

sequential evaluation process which the Commissioner, through an

ALJ, must employ for determining whether a claimant is disabled.

See id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920). 

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Here, plaintiff is challenging the ALJ’s determinations at

step two. She is arguing that there was not substantial

evidence, in the language of the applicable regulation, to

support the ALJ’s finding that she did not have an “impairment

sufficiently severe to limit . . . her ability to work[.]” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520. Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ

committed harmful error by (1) not “evaluating” the

“retrospective opinions” of one of her treating physicians, Dr.

Fosdick; (2) “erroneously evaluating” the opinions of another of

her treating physicians, Dr. Zara; (3) improperly rejecting the

testimony of lay witnesses; (4) improperly relying upon the

observations of a Social Security Field Office employee; and (5)

by failing to properly evaluate her credibility. The court will

address these contentions seriatim. 

A. Treating Physician’s Medical Opinions

1. Dr. Fosdick

Since at least June 2001, Dr. Fosdick has been one of

plaintiff’s treating physicians. Tr. at 351. At that time he

ordered laboratory testing for the rheumatoid factor. Id. at 247

and 250. On April 4, 2005, he completed a “Medical Work

Tolerance Recommendations” form outlining plaintiff’s functional

restrictions. On that form Dr. Fosdick indicated that she could

not perform sedentary work, either full-time or part-time. Id.

at 278. He further indicated that plaintiff had specific

limitations in terms of her abilities to sit, stand, walk, bend

and use her hands and arms. Id. at 278-79. She could stand for

no more than 15 minutes at a time, for a total of one hour per

workday. Id. at 278. During the workday, she could walk for no

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more than ten minutes “at one time without resting,” and for “no

more than” one hour total. Id. Plaintiff also could not bend,

according to Dr. Fosdick’s evaluation form, and she was only

occasionally able to perform fine movements with her hands. Id.

at 279. Significantly, Dr. Fosdick found that the “effective

dates” of those limitations were from December 10, 1999 “to

future.” Id.

There is no mention whatsoever of Dr. Fosdick’s opinions in

the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff asserts that this omission

“violat[es] . . . Ninth Circuit law and the regulations[;]” thus

the ALJ erred because he “neither acknowledged nor evaluated” Dr.

Fosdick’s April 2005 “retrospective opinions[.]” Pl. Mem. (doc.

10-3) at 4 (citations omitted). The Commissioner responds that

because Dr. Fosdick’s opinions were “admittedly retrospective[,]”

they were “not probative of Plaintiff’s condition prior to her

DLI [date of last insured].” Def. Mem. (doc. 18) at 3 (citation

omitted). Even if probative, the Commissioner further responds

that “at most” Dr. Fosdick’s opinion would have “create[d] a

conflict in the evidence which” the ALJ could “properly resolve.” 

Id. at 4. As a fallback position, the Commissioner resorts to the

well-settled general proposition that “[i]f evidence exists to

support more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must

defer to the Commissioner’s decision.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454

F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

Commissioner did not expand upon this argument, but presumably it

is his position that such evidence does exist to support the

ALJ’s decision. 

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The Commissioner’s argument that the ALJ, with no comment,

was free to disregard Dr. Fosdick’s retrospective opinions

because they were “not probative” is flawed for several reasons. 

First, “medical reports are inevitably rendered retrospectively

and should not be disregarded solely on that basis.” Smith v.

Bowen, 849 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Morgan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“[T]he circumstance of a retroactive diagnosis, standing alone,

may not be sufficient to discount the opinion of a treating

physician.”) This is in accordance with the Commissioner’s own

policy that “[i]n some cases, it may be possible, based on the

medical evidence to reasonably infer that the onset of a

disabling impairment(s) occurred some time prior to the date of

the first recorded medical examination, e.g., the date the

claimant stopped working.” SSR 83-20. 

What is more, the Commissioner’s suggestion that the ALJ

properly disregarded that opinion because it was not probative is

exactly the sort of post hoc rationalization which the Ninth

Circuit counsels against. See Stout, 454 F.3d at 1054 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) (reviewing court is

“constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts[,]” and may

not affirm an agency’s decision “on a ground that the agency did

not invoke in making its decision[]”). The ALJ did not state

that he was not considering Dr. Fosdick’s opinion because it was

not probative in that it was retrospective. As noted above, the

ALJ did not mention Dr. Fosdick’s opinions at all in his

decision. Thus, it is not within the province of this reviewing

court to (1) speculate as to why the ALJ did not consider this

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evidence; and (2) affirm on the unarticulated basis that Dr.

Fosdick’s opinion was not probative.

The ALJ’s failure to mention Dr. Fosdick is even more

troubling because he was one of plaintiff’s treating physicians. 

“By rule, the Social Security Administration favors the opinion

of a treating physician over non-treating physicians.” Orn v.

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527). Among other places, this preference is found in 20

C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(2), which provides in relevant part that if a

treating physician’s opinion is “well-supported by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is

not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the]

case record, [it will be given] controlling weight.” Deference

to the opinions of treating physicians explains the Ninth

Circuit’s well settled views as to how such opinions should

impact an ALJ’s findings:

Where the treating doctor’s opinion is not 

contradicted by another doctor, it may be 

rejected only for clear and convincing reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

. . . Even if the treating doctor’s 

opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the 

ALJ may not reject this opinion without providing

specific and legitimate reasons supported 

by substantial evidence in the record. This can 

be done by setting out a detailed and thorough 

summary of the facts and conflicting clinical

evidence, stating his interpretation thereof 

and making findings. . . . The ALJ must do more 

than offer his conclusions. He must set forth 

his own interpretations and explain why they, 

rather than the doctors’, are correct.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the present case, plaintiff provided the medical records

from several treating physicians, including approximately 75

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pages of records from Dr. Fosdick. As a licensed physician, Dr.

Fosdick is an “acceptable medical source” who can provide medical

opinion evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(1),

404.1527(a)(2). Based upon the case law set forth above and the

governing regulations, the court agrees with plaintiff that the

ALJ’s failure to even mention Dr. Fosdick’s opinions was error. 

As a licensed treating physician, Dr. Fosdick was “an acceptable

medical source” whose opinions should have been discussed by the

ALJ – and perhaps have been accorded controlling weight. Yet,

the ALJ disregarded Dr. Fosdick’s opinions without comment. 

Silently disregarding testimony as to how an impairment limits a

claimant’s ability to work has never been held harmless error. 

See Stout, 454 F.3d at 1055-56. Thus, it is difficult to

countenance a similar excuse for the error of silently

disregarding a treating physician’s opinion. 

The court notes that the ALJ’s failure to consider the

medical opinion of Dr. Fosdick is compounded by the fact that he

at least mentioned, and then discredited, the retrospective

opinion of another treating physician, Dr. Palmer. See Tr. at

20. The ALJ decided to give “no weight” to Dr. Palmer’s

assessment because that doctor did not see plaintiff until “more

than four years after her date last insured.” Id. Because the

ALJ did not even mention Dr. Fosdick’s opinions though, this

reviewing court has no way of knowing if the ALJ’s reasoning was

similar with respect to Dr. Fosdick. And, as already stated, it

would be impermissible for the court to speculate in this regard. 

2. Dr. Zara

Plaintiff is also challenging the ALJ’s decision in terms of

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the medical opinion of another of her treating physicians, Dr.

Zara. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “erroneously evaluated 

. . . physician Dr. Zara’s August and December 1999 opinions[]”

in two ways. Pl. Mem. (doc. 10-3) at 8. First, the ALJ did not

“mention that in December 1999" Dr. Zara confirmed his September

1999 opinions[]” that she had rheumatoid arthritis and was

“totally disabled.” Id. (citing Tr. at 299). This omission is

significant from plaintiff’s standpoint because the ALJ rejected

Dr. Zara’s September 23, 1999, conclusion that plaintiff was

“totally disabled” based upon the ALJ’s determination that the

doctor had known plaintiff “for less than a month” when he

rendered that opinion. See Tr. at 20. Dr. Zara treated

plaintiff several months later in December, 1999 and reached the

same conclusion; yet plaintiff contends the ALJ “did not grapple

with th[is] key fact.” Pl. Reply (doc. 19) at 6. 

Plaintiff also disputes the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Zara’s

opinions, contending that “the ALJ erroneously rejected Dr.

Zara’s opinions as unsupported by objective medical evidence.” 

Pl. Mem. (doc. 10-3) at 9. In this regard, plaintiff notes that

Dr. Zara’s physical examination where plaintiff “exhibited

decreased ranges of motion of both shoulders” was sufficient

“objective medical evidence[,]” notwithstanding the ALJ’s

contrary conclusion. See id.

Quoting the ALJ’s entire discussion of Dr. Zara’s medical

opinions, the Commissioner counters that the ALJ “gave specific

and legitimate reasons for rejecting” Dr. Zara’s opinions. Def.

Mem. (doc. 18) at 4. Although unstated, evidently it is the 

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2 That regulation defines “objective medical evidence” as, inter alia,

“evidence obtained from the application of medically acceptable clinical and

laboratory diagnostic techniques, such as evidence of reduced joint motion[.]”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)(2006).

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Commissioner’s view that any errors with respect to the ALJ’s

consideration of Dr. Zara’s opinions were harmless. 

The court disagrees. Rejecting Dr. Zara’s opinion that

plaintiff was totally disabled as of the date last insured is not

inconsequential, as that finding contributed significantly to the

ALJ’s ultimate finding of no disability. Further, because there

is “objective medical evidence” within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1529(c)(2)2 in Dr. Zara’s records that plaintiff had reduced

joint motion, the ALJ improperly rejected his opinions as not

being based upon objective medical evidence. In his notes from

plaintiff’s October 26, 1999, office visit, Dr. Zara wrote,

“{m]ultiple joint tenderness with passive range of motion,

especially the shoulders, elbows, wrists, knees, hips and ankle

joints[.]” Tr. at 152. That same notation is found in his

earlier notes from September 2, 1999. See id. at 301. And, on

September 23, 1999, Dr. Zara noted that plaintiff had

“[d]ecreased range of motion of the right shoulder, as well as

the small joints of both hands.” Id. at 300. On remand the ALJ

shall properly evaluate Dr. Zara’s opinion taking into account,

among other things, the relevant objective medical evidence. 

B. Lay Witnesses

As the ALJ noted, plaintiff’s “daughter, husband and church

friends submitted statement[s] attesting that [her] condition had

deteriorated over the past 10 years.” Tr. at 21. He then

conclusively stated, “These statements are given the weight

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accorded to the statements of laypersons.” Id. Finding those

statements were “not specific to the period under

consideration[,]” the ALJ gave them “little weight[.]” Id.

Plaintiff maintains that “substantial evidence” does not

support that finding because the ALJ did not, as the Ninth

Circuit requires, “provide reasons germane” to that testimony

before rejecting it. Pl. Memo. (doc. 10-3) at 10 (citation

omitted). Instead, the ALJ gave one reason for discrediting the

statements of all of the lay witnesses. As just noted, he

disregarded those statements based upon the time frame. 

Plaintiff concedes that that was a valid reason for

discrediting “some of the statements,” but not for the statement

by plaintiff’s husband, Victor Martinez, Sr. Id. Mr. Martinez,

in a letter apparently from December 2004, explained that “over

the past 10 years the disease has restricted [plaintiff] and [he]

watched [her] struggle to perform activities that most people

take for granted.” Tr. at 134. After explaining the scope of

those restrictions, Mr. Martinez opined that “[t]here is no

possible way that [plaintiff] could have held any employment over

the last 10 to 15 years of her life.” Id. Plaintiff contends

that “[b]ecause [this] statement corroborated [plaintiff’s]

statements with respect to her claim of disability, at her date

of last insured, the ALJ’s error was harmful.” Pl. Mem. (Doc.

10-3) at 10 (citing, inter alia, SSR 83-20 (“lay-witness

statements may be relevant to the determination of the onset of a

claimant’s disability”)). 

The Commissioner counters that the ALJ properly found the

lay witnesses’ statements were “not probative.” Def. Mem. (doc.

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3 Once again, the Commissioner is seeking to have this court engage in

improper post hoc rationalization, given that these were not reasons which the

ALJ proffered for discrediting the lay witnesses’ statements. 

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18) at 5. As to the statement of plaintiff’s husband in

particular, the Commissioner maintains that it “simply paralleled

or was cumulative; of what Plaintiff stated, and [she] was

properly found not credible.”3

 Id. at 6. As with the other

alleged errors, the Commissioner repeats that the ALJ’s

determination as to the lay witnesses’ statements was at most

harmless error because “it was inconsequential to the ultimate

nondisability determination.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff limits her Reply to her husband’s statements. She 

asserts that any error as to this statement was not harmless

because the ALJ discredited her husband’s statement because it

was “retrospective to her date of last insured[,]” when it was

not. Pl. Reply (doc. 19) at 6 (citing Tr. at 21 and 134). 

Plaintiff also urges the court to reject outright the

Commissioner’s “argument that corroborating evidence is not

probative because it is corroborative.” Id. at 7. 

At this juncture, it appears to the court that plaintiff’s

only disagreement with the ALJ in terms of the lay witness

statements pertains to her husband’s statement. The court will

limit its analysis accordingly. “[L]ay testimony as to a

claimant’s symptoms or how an impairment affects ability to work

is competent evidence . . . and therefore cannot be disregarded

without comment.” Stout, 454 F.3d at 1053 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added by Stout Court). 

“Consequently, [if] the ALJ wishes to discount the testimony of

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4 For example, the Commissioner correctly observes that the husband’s

statement is undated. See Def. Mem. (doc. 18) at 6 (citing Tr. at 134). 

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lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each

witness.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Here, the ALJ did not do that with respect to the statement by

plaintiff’s husband. The only reason given for discrediting his

testimony was, as with the other lay witnesses, the fact that it

was retrospective. Even a cursory reading of Mr. Martinez’

statement reveals that this is not an accurate reading of that

statement. Therefore, this reason is not “germane.” 

Moreover, this error was not inconsequential because the

husband’s statement goes to a critical issue here – the date of

the onset of disability. See Lesmeister v. Barnhart, 439

F.Supp.2d 1023, 1028 (C.D. Ca. 2006) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted) (“[T]he critical date is the date of onset

of disability, not the date of diagnosis.”) On remand the ALJ

may, if justified, discount the statement by plaintiff’s husband

for other reasons, including but not limited to those mentioned

by the Commissioner in his opposition.4 In accordance with the

applicable case law, the ALJ must, however, set forth those

reasons in his decision and those reasons must be “germane.”

C. Field Office Report

In finding the plaintiff not disabled, the ALJ relied upon a

June 7, 2004, Social Security Field Office Disability Report. 

See Tr. at 21. Plaintiff contends that this is “not even a

scintilla of evidence” for the ALJ’s step two decision because

even though the ALJ stated that the claims representative

“observe that the [plaintiff] had no difficulty . . . using her

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hands[,]” there is no evidence that she was asked to use her

hands. Pl. Mem. (Doc. 10-3) at 11. The Commissioner did not

respond to this argument. 

On remand the ALJ may give this Report such weight, if any,

as is appropriate under the applicable law, and taking into

account the record as a whole as developed on remand.

D. Adverse Credibility Finding

Finally, plaintiff contends that there is not substantial

evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that her allegations of

disability were not credible because the ALJ did not “acknowledge

or explain” the basis for his finding. Id. This is a valid

argument to which the Commissioner did not adequately respond. 

See Light v. Social Security Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792-93 (9th

Cir. 1997) (remanding to make “adequate findings[,]” because “the

ALJ failed to articulate an acceptable reason either for

disbelieving [plaintiff’s] testimony in general or for

discrediting his pain testimony specifically[]”). On remand, the

ALJ shall assess plaintiff’s credibility making the required

specific findings, including stating what testimony is not

credible and what facts in the record lead to that conclusion

To summarize, because the ALJ’s finding of no disability is

not supported by substantial evidence, for the reasons set forth

above, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment and this matter

is remanded. 

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

(doc. 10) is GRANTED; 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s cross-motion for

summary judgment (doc. 18) is DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is remanded to the

Commissioner for further administrative action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (sentence four);

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon remand the Social Security

Appeals Council shall remand this case to the ALJ to reevaluate

plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits in accordance

with this decision and the applicable Ninth Circuit case law.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to

enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and to terminate this case.

DATED this 30th day of September, 2007.

Copies to all counsel of record 

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