Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00329/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00329-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Petitioner was one of 34 defendants charged in the 101-count indictment.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Curtis Graylin Simmons, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-13-329-PHX-NVW (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the “Petition”) in which Petitioner challenges criminal

convictions in Maricopa County, Arizona, Superior Court, Case No. CR2010-005426-029

DT. (Doc. 1) Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and

Petitioner has filed a Reply. (Docs. 10-11) As explained below, the undersigned Magistrate

Judge recommends the Petition be denied. 

I. Background

A. Indictment, Trial and Sentencing

On January 26, 2010, the State of Arizona indicted Petitioner on one count of

Conspiracy, a class two felony (Count 1), one count of Assisting in a Criminal Street Gang,

a class three felony (Count 2), one count of Money Laundering, a class three felony (Count

3), and one count of Sale or Transfer of Narcotic Drugs, a class two felony (Count 101).

(Doc. 10, Exhibit (“Exh.”) A)1

 Prior to trial and pursuant to the State’s motion, the trial court

Case 2:13-cv-00329-NVW Document 13 Filed 01/03/14 Page 1 of 8
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 The docket and page numbers cited were generated by the Court’s case management

and electronic filing system. They do not reflect the pre-printed numbers on the documents.

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 The Honorable Joseph C. Welty presided over Petitioner’s trial and sentencing.

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 Petitioner’s Notice of Appeal came after he filed a pro se Motion for New Trial on

January 24, 2011, five days after the jury found him guilty. (Doc. 10, Exh. D) The trial court

denied that motion the following day. (Id.)

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 The Court has confirmed that no petitions for post-conviction relief were filed on

Petitioner’s behalf by reviewing the docket at http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov.

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dismissed Counts 2 and 3. (Doc. 10-1 at 60)2

Following a jury trial in January 2011 on the remaining counts of Conspiracy and Sale

or Transfer of Narcotic Drugs, the jury found Petitioner guilty of both. (Doc. 10, Exh. C).3

On March 11, 2011, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of twenty years

in prison on each count. (Doc. 10, Exh. E) The severity of the sentences was due, in large

part, to the trial court’s determination that Petitioner had been convicted of eleven, mostly

drug-related, prior felonies. (See id.)

B. Direct Review

Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Appeal on March 14, 2011.4

 (Doc. 10, Exh. F)

Through counsel, Petitioner filed an Opening Brief on November 7, 2011. (Doc. 10, Exh. G)

The State then filed an Answering Brief on February 24, 2012. (Doc. 10, Exh. H) On May

17, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision in which it affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 10, Exh. I) On June 28, 2012, Petitioner filed

a Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 10, Exh. J) The Court denied

review on November 8, 2012. (Doc. 10, Exh. L) Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. (Doc. 1 at 3)

C. State Post-Conviction Proceedings

 Petitioner did not file a notice of, or petition for, post-conviction relief in state court.5

(Doc. 1 at 4)

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 The docket reflects the Petition was actually filed on February 14, 2013. (Doc. 1)

The January 15, 2013 filing date is the date Petitioner signed the Petition, doc. 1 at 31, and

reflects the application of the prison mailbox rule, i.e., a petition is deemed filed on the date

it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149

n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner fails to explain the delay between when the Petition was

placed in the prison mailing system and its actual filing date.

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 A minute entry regarding Petitioner’s pretrial Motion to Suppress Alleged

Incriminating Statements indicates the trial court denied the motion as moot because the State

advised that it did not intend to use the statements. (Doc. 10, Exh. B at 60)

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D. Federal Habeas Petition

On January 15, 2013, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

District Court.6

 (Doc. 1) Petitioner identifies one ground for relief in the Petition. (Doc. 1

at 6-26) Petitioner alleges his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments were violated when the trial court suppressed the statements of an “unknown

black female” who did not testify, but then allowed the prosecution to rely on evidence

derived from police officers’ contact with the unknown female to prosecute Petitioner.7

Petitioner claims the charges against him should have been dropped once the statements from

the unknown female were precluded. Petitioner claims the drug evidence obtained and used

against him at trial was “fruit of the poisonous tree” because it was obtained as a result of

information provided to law enforcement by the unknown female. On July 15, 2013,

Respondents filed their Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 10) Petitioner

filed his Reply on August 7, 2013. (Doc. 11)

II. Discussion

Respondents argue Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review

because it does not allege a violation of federal constitutional law. In addition, Respondents

argue Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted and Petitioner has not presented a valid

reason to excuse the default. The undersigned Magistrate Judge finds it unnecessary to reach

Respondent’s first argument because it is clear from the record that Petitioner’s claim is

procedurally defaulted and the Petition should be denied on that basis.

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A. Procedural Default

1. Legal Standards

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court

in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). A

petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues

by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Id. at

845. In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals

by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d

895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001); Bland v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th

Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly presented’ (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that

those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.

2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). “If a petitioner fails to alert

the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is

unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.” Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). “Moreover, general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient

to establish exhaustion.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)).

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

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court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may

dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991) (holding that a claim is procedurally defaulted “if

the petitioner failed to exhaust state court remedies and the court to which the petitioner

would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would

now find the claims procedurally barred”); Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir.

2002) (a defendant’s claim is procedurally defaulted when it is clear the state court would

hold the claim procedurally barred). Federal habeas review of these claims is barred unless

the petitioner can establish cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom, or

demonstrate that failure to consider the claim would result in a miscarriage of justice. See,

e.g., Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

“‘Cause’ must be something external to the petitioner, something that cannot be fairly

attributed to him: We think that the existence of cause for a procedural default must

ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the

defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Coleman, 501

U.S. at 753 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation mark omitted). To show prejudice, the

“habeas petitioner must show ‘not merely that the errors at . . . trial created a possibility of

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire

trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494 (quoting United

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (omission and emphasis in original). “Miscarriage

of justice” is a narrow exception to the cause requirement “in an extraordinary case, where

a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent” of the substantive offense. Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. Under such circumstances,

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Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(1) provides that a defendant is precluded

from post-conviction relief on any ground that could have been raised on direct appeal. In

addition, the time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in the State court under Rule

32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Petitioner has not raised, must less

shown, any of the exceptions to the time limits identified in Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) apply to him.

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“a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the

procedural default.” Id.

2. Analysis

Here, Petitioner failed to fairly present to an Arizona court the claim he asserts in his

habeas petition. In his direct appeal, Petitioner presented only one claim. Petitioner argued

the trial court erred in aggravating his sentence by considering factors that only the jury, as

the trier of fact, was allowed to consider. (Doc. 10, Exh. G) As noted above, Petitioner did

not file a State post-conviction relief petition. By failing to present to the Arizona Court of

Appeals the claim he raises here in his habeas petition, Petitioner has failed to exhaust his

State court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if he returned to

the Arizona courts.8

 As a result, his claim is procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner argues in the Petition and Reply that he failed to properly present his claim

in the State court because his appellate counsel refused to include it in the direct appeal.

(Docs. 1 at 8-10 and 11 at 5-8) Thus, he appears to be asserting ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel as cause for the default.

Ineffective assistance of counsel can establish sufficient cause only when it rises to

the level of an independent constitutional violation. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755. Thus, before

counsel’s ineffectiveness may be used to establish cause for a procedural default, it must be

presented to the state court as an independent claim. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S.

446, 451-53 (2000) (“ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim asserted as cause for the

procedural default of another claim can itself be procedurally defaulted”); Murray, 477 U.S.

at 489-90 (“the exhaustion doctrine . . . generally requires that a claim of ineffective

assistance be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to

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9

 In addition, because Petitioner failed to raise ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel in a post-conviction relief petition, this case falls outside the purview of Ha Van

Nuyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1295 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the modified “cause”

standard articulated in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), “applies to all Sixth

Amendment ineffective-assistance claims, both trial and appellate, that have been

procedurally defaulted by ineffective counsel in the initial-review state-court collateral

proceeding.”)

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establish cause for a procedural default.”); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.

1988) (exhaustion requires petitioner to first raise ineffective appellate counsel claim

separately in state court before alleging it as cause for default).

 Here, Petitioner had the opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel in a petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure. Because he failed to do so, however, Petitioner may not rely on his

appellate counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness to establish cause for the default of his habeas

claim.9

 

Petitioner argues no other basis to show cause for the default. Additionally, Petitioner

has not asserted an actual-innocence claim. Thus, he provides no basis for this Magistrate

Judge to conclude a miscarriage of justice would result if the merits of his claim are not

considered.

B. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds Petitioner failed

to exhaust his State court remedies and, because such remedies are no longer available, his

federal habeas claim is procedurally defaulted. Additionally, Petitioner has failed to show

cause to excuse the default, and he has not demonstrated a miscarriage of justice.

Accordingly, this Magistrate Judge will recommend the Petition be denied.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 1, be DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the Petition is

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justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, must not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P.

6(a), (b), and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate

review of the findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. 

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2014.

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