Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02234/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02234-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:0227(b)(3) Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUCAS AMBEZEWICZ, et al,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GDFRIEND, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-02234-L-JMA

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION [Doc. 7] TO STAY

Pending before the Court is Defendant GDFriend, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) motion to 

stay. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court decides the matter on the papers 

submitted and without oral argument. For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES 

Defendant’s motion

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I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs in this action are three individuals1 who claim to have received 

multiple telemarketing calls to their cell phones from Defendant. Plaintiffs allege that 

Defendant placed these calls using an automated telephone dialing system and without 

prior express consent. Accordingly, on November 11, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a putative 

class action complaint alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 

(“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227. (Complaint [Doc. 1].) 

To trigger the TCPA, it suffices to show that (1) Defendant used an automated 

telephone dialing system (2) to call a cell phone for purposes of communicating an 

advertisement (3) without the express written permission of the call recipient. 47 U.S.C. § 

227 (b)(1)(A)(iii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a)(2). The TCPA defines an “automated 

telephone dialing system” as equipment which has the capacity to (A) to store or produce 

telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) 

to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)(emphasis added). In a 2015 order, the 

Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)2explained that “the capacity of an 

autodialer is not limited to its current configuration but also includes its potential 

functionalities.” 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7974 (July 10, 2015) (“FCC Order”). 

The FCC Order is currently under review by the District of Columbia Circuit Court 

of Appeals in ACA International v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Case No. 15-1211 (D.C. 

Cir.) (“ACA”). The D.C. Circuit heard oral argument in December of 2016, but a 

decision has yet to issue. Defendant seeks a stay of the present proceedings pending the 

forthcoming ACA decision, which Defendants argue could establish a new controlling 

definition for what constitutes an “automated telephone dialing system” for purposes of 

the TCPA. (Def.’s Mot. [Doc. 7].) Plaintiffs oppose a stay. (Opp’n [Doc. 8].)

 

1 Lucas Ambrezewicz, Edward Timmons, and Mark Haigler (collectively “Plaintiffs”). 

2 The FCC has the authority to prescribe regulations to implement the requirements of the TCPA. 47 

U.S.C. § 227 (b)(2). 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

The power to stay proceedings stems from the Court’s inherent power to control its 

docket in a manner aimed at the efficient disposition of cases. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 

U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Under this inherent power, the Court may issue a stay pending the 

outcome of an independent case whose resolution could establish applicable law. Leyva 

v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863–64 (9th Cir. 1979). That said, 

“[o]nly in rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside 

while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.” 

Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. 

To determine whether such a stay is appropriate, a court must consider 

the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the 

hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go 

forward, and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the 

simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which 

could be expected to result from a stay. 

CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). The moving party carries the 

burden of demonstrating that a stay is appropriate. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 

(2009). 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant complains that it might incur unnecessary litigation expenses if the 

Court does not issue a stay. More specifically, Defendant argues that “[i]t makes no 

sense to move forward with costly discovery while a decision pending an appeal is 

expected to clarify the proper definition of an ATDS–an essential element of Plaintiff’s 

entire lawsuit.” (Def’s Mot. 9:14–16.) 

While it is true that the forthcoming ACA decision may clarify the ATDS 

definition, it does not follow that allowing discovery in the interim would amount to 

waste. Indeed, whatever ATDS definition emerges from the ACA decision, resolution of 

this dispute will still require consideration of whether the specific equipment Defendant 

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used to place the calls at issue triggers that definition. Such an analysis will require 

consideration of a factual record, developed through discovery, showing what type 

equipment Defendant used to place the calls. 

Furthermore, granting a stay carries significant risk of prejudice to Plaintiff. It is 

unclear when the D.C. Circuit will issue a decision in ACA. During the indeterminate 

period of time between now and the decision in ACA, witnesses’ memories could fade 

and evidence could go stale. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama v. Unity Outpatient 

Surgery Center, Inc., 490 F.3d 718, 723-24 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that indeterminate 

stays of potentially lengthy duration carry substantial risk of prejudice to a plaintiff and 

are therefore disfavored.) The concern over loss of access to relevant evidence is 

especially pronounced in TCPA cases because “much of the relevant evidence Plaintiff 

will be interested in, such as call logs and dialer information, will be in the hands of third 

parties and subject to unknown data retention policies.” Montegna v. Ocwen Loan 

Servicing, LLC., Case no. 17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM (S.D. Cal. 2017). For the foregoing 

reasons, the Court finds that this case does not present the “rare circumstances” 

warranting a stay pending the resolution of a separate proceeding. 

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to stay is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2018

 

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