Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01643/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01643-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHESTER A. JOHNSON, No. CIV S-07-1643-MCE-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. ORDER

D.K. SISTO, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges the denial of parole.

On January 3, 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Hayward v.

Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2008). In Hayward, the petitioner had been twice

granted a parole date by the California Board of Prison Terms (“Board”). See id. at 538. The

governor, however, reversed the decision both times, concluding that the petitioner was not

suitable for parole. See id. In his federal habeas corpus petition challenging the most recent

denial of parole, the petitioner argued that the denial had violated his due process rights. See id.

at 541-42. The district court denied the petition. See id. at 541.

/ / /

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The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by restating its holding from Sass v.

California Board of Prison Terms, that California state prisoners have a constitutionally protected

liberty interest in parole. See id. at 542 (citing 461 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Specifically, under California Penal Code § 3041(b) and California Code of Regulations, Title

15, § 2402(a), once the inmate has served the minimum term required, the Board shall set a

release date unless release currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society. 

See Hayward, 512 F.3d at 542, 543. The court next observed that, under California law, in

deciding whether to reverse the Board’s grant of parole, the governor must consider the same

factors the Board is required to consider in the first instance. See id. (citing In re Rosenkrantz,

29 Cal.4th 616 (2002)). 

In determining whether the state has provided the necessary due process

safeguards with respect to parole decisions, the relevant consideration is whether the decision to

deny parole is supported by “some evidence” in the record, or is otherwise arbitrary. 

See Hayward, 512 F.3d at 542 (citing Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2007), and

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985)). The Ninth Circuit held that application of this

test in the context of California’s parole scheme requires that there be some evidence in the

record supporting the conclusion that the prisoner’s current release would pose an unreasonable

risk of danger to society. See Hayward, 512 F.3d at 543. The court noted that, even though there

may be some evidence that a particular unsuitability factor exists, this does not necessarily mean

that there is some evidence of the inmate’s current danger to the community if released. See id. 

Applying this standard to the facts of Hayward’s case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “no

evidence in the record supports a determination that Hayward’s release would unreasonably

endanger public safety.” See id. at 544. 

In particular, the court discussed the reliance on unchanging factors, such as the

facts of the petitioner’s commitment offense, in denying parole. See id. at 545 (citing Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003), and Irons, 505 F.3d at 854). The court stated: “It

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can hardly be doubted that time may attenuate the taint of certain prior misconduct, and this is

particularly true as applied to consideration of Hayward’s misconduct. . . ,” especially in light of

evidence of Hayward’s rehabilitation while in prison and plans upon release. Id. at 545. The

court reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief and concluded that the state had violated

Hayward’s due process rights in denying parole. See id. at 548. 

The court is aware that the Attorney General in other cases has argued that

Hayward is not binding in this § 2254 proceeding for one or both of the following reasons: (1) it

does not represent clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent; and/or (2) it is not final

because a petition for rehearing is pending in the Ninth Circuit. In submitting further briefing,

respondents are asked to assume that this court may rely on Hayward and discuss the facts of this

case as they relate to the “some evidence” standard as explained in Hayward. In doing so, the

court will not construe respondents’ submission as constituting any kind of waiver of arguments

that Hayward is not binding precedent. The court merely seeks respondents’ input on the merits

of this case in light of Hayward in the event it ultimately concludes that it is binding. 

The parties are hereby requested to address the applicability of Hayward to the 

instant petition. Within thirty days of the date of this order, each party may file a brief discussing

the effect, if any, Hayward should have on the disposition of petitioner’s case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 25, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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