Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-14-30925/USCOURTS-ca5-14-30925-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 368
Nature of Suit: Asbestos Personal Injury - Prod.liab.
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-30925

TINA DAVIDSON, Individually and on behalf of William Cleve Davidson; 

KATHRYN D. DAVIDSON, Individually and on behalf of William Cleve 

Davidson; KRISTEN M. DAVIDSON, Individually and on behalf of William 

Cleve Davidson, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

GEORGIA-PACIFIC, L.L.C.; UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION;

CERTAINTEED CORPORATION; BEAZER EAST, INCORPORATED; J 

GRAVES INSULATION COMPANY, INCORPORATED, formerly known as 

Graves-Aber Insulation Company, Incorporated; TAYLOR SEIDENBACH, 

INCORPORATED, formerly known as Taylor-Seidenbach, Incorporated, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

COSTA, Circuit Judge:

This asbestos case requires us to once again wade into the thicket of 

improper joinder law. 13F CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 

AND PROCEDURE § 3641.1 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that the Fifth Circuit “embraces 

a number of district courts that in particular have seen a considerable amount 

of removal activity that has raised issues of fraudulent joinder”). It also affords 

us an opportunity to decide a question about removal procedure that district 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 19, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

courts often face, but that we have not yet confronted: when a district court 

refers a motion to remand to a magistrate judge, is that matter a 

nondispositive one in which the magistrate has the authority to enter an order 

of remand? Or is it a dispositive matter in which the magistrate judge may 

only make a recommendation subject to the district court’s de novo review? 

I.

William Davidson was diagnosed with mesothelioma in March 2010. 

Two months later, he filed a lawsuit in Louisiana state court against numerous

manufacturer, supplier, and contractor defendants that he contended were 

responsible for his exposure to asbestos. Eventually, the case was removed to 

federal court. The parties conducted eleven months of discovery, including 

depositions of Davidson and his coworkers. Davidson died in October 2011. 

Davidson’s estate and family did not substitute as proper plaintiffs. Instead,

a motion to dismiss was filed and granted without prejudice in October 2012.

Meanwhile, in April 2012, Plaintiffs filed the instant survival and 

wrongful death action in Louisiana state court bringing similar claims to those 

in the first suit. The new suit did, however, add an allegation that Davidson 

was exposed to asbestos-containing insulation while working at Poulan 

Chainsaw in Shreveport from 1972 to 1978. All of the defendants in Davidson 

II were parties to Davidson I with the exception of the nondiverse Louisiana 

Defendants whose joinder is contested in this appeal: J. Graves Insulation 

Company, Inc. (Graves) and Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc. (Taylor). Graves and 

Taylor, according to Plaintiffs, are contractors that frequently installed 

asbestos insulation during the 1970s in northwest Louisiana. 

Defendant Georgia-Pacific timely removed this case on the ground that 

the Louisiana citizenship of Graves and Taylor should be ignored because these 

Defendants had been improperly joined. It pointed out that “substantial 

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3

discovery was completed” in the first case and that there had been no mention 

of either Graves or Taylor during that discovery.

Plaintiffs sought remand. In support of their motion, Plaintiffs attached

the affidavit of one of their attorneys, who stated, based on her experience that 

“to the extent Mr. Davidson was exposed to asbestos insulation at Poulan 

Chainsaw, this insulation was more likely than not supplied, installed[,] and 

repaired by Graves and Taylor.” Georgia-Pacific and a second defendant, 

CertainTeed, opposed the motion to remand, urging the court to pierce the 

pleadings and to consider summary-judgment type evidence. 

Both sides supported their positions by quoting Davidson’s testimony, 

from two depositions in the first lawsuit, about potential asbestos exposure 

while working at Poulan Chainsaw. In the first deposition he testified as 

follows:

Q: Okay. Do you have any reason to believe that you were exposed 

to any asbestos or asbestos-contain[ing] products when you worked 

for Poulan between that 19, you know, 72 or so to 1978 or ’79?

A: It’s a possibility because being out in the plant a lot and there 

were repairs being done to equipment all the time, some big 

machinery, and, you know, it’s very possible. 

In the second deposition, Davidson responded again to questions about

asbestos exposure at Poulan Chainsaw: 

Q: One of the things that you said was that you saw repairs being 

done to machinery out at [Poulan]. Can you describe what 

machinery that was?

A: Drills. You know, industrial-type drills, presses. I really can’t 

remember beyond that. 

Q: And do you remember any of this machinery being insulated out 

at [Poulan]?

A: I don’t recall.

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Q: Do you remember insulated pipe being out at [Poulan]?

A: I don’t recall.

Q: Do you ever remember seeing anybody doing any type of 

insulation work out at [Poulan]?

A: No. 

The district court referred the remand motion to a magistrate judge. The 

magistrate judge issued an order granting the motion to remand, concluding

that the allegations in the petition were sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)-

type analysis and that there was not a basis for piercing the pleadings.

Georgia-Pacific and CertainTeed filed “appeals” of the order. The district 

court disagreed with the magistrate’s analysis. After piercing the pleadings,

it concluded that Graves and Taylor had been improperly joined. Based on its 

improper joinder finding, the court dismissed Graves and Taylor with 

prejudice. After a period of discovery, the remaining Defendants filed a series 

of motions that resulted in the dismissal of all claims. 

II.

On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge only the denial of their motion to 

remand.1 Before we reach the merits of that question, we address a procedural 

question that a number of other circuits have decided but we have not: does a

 

1 Graves and Taylor argue that this court lacks appellate jurisdiction over them 

because the Plaintiffs did not appeal the district court’s order dismissing them with prejudice. 

In their amended notice of appeal, Plaintiffs specified that they were appealing the order 

denying their motion for remand, but failed to specifically mention the dismissals that were 

derivative of that ruling. Because Plaintiffs’ success on the remand issue that they have 

clearly preserved would mean the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter any dismissals, 

we reject this challenge to our appellate jurisdiction.

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magistrate judge have authority to enter an order remanding a case to state 

court?2 

In the trial court proceedings, the parties and both judges operated on 

the belief that the magistrate judge has that authority. The magistrate judge 

did not just recommend that the case be remanded, he entered an Order of 

Remand; Georgia-Pacific and CertainTeed filed “appeals” of that ruling; and 

the district court treated the magistrate judge’s ruling as one involving a

nondispositive matter that could be set aside only if “clearly erroneous or 

contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). In contrast, 

rulings by a magistrate judge on dispositive matters—motions to dismiss and 

for entry of summary judgment being the common examples—are mere 

recommendations subject to de novo review when properly challenged by the 

losing party. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). 

This dichotomy of a magistrate judge’s authority in civil cases referred 

by the district court is outlined in the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, 

and seeks to enforce the constitutional limits on non-Article III judges. See 12 

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3068.2 

(3d ed. 2014) (“Constitutional concerns explain the statutory distinction 

between types of pretrial matters. Motions thought ‘dispositive’ of the action 

warrant particularized objection procedures and a higher standard of review 

because of the possible constitutional objections that only an article III judge 

 

2 At least once, this circuit has reviewed a remand ruling from a magistrate judge that 

a district court treated as nondispositive. See In re 1994 Exxon Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d 378, 

383 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that the district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s denial of 

remand motions in fifteen cases under the “clear error” standard of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) 

that governs rulings by magistrate judges on nondispositive matters). But in that case 

neither the parties nor the court raised an issue about the magistrate judge’s authority. See 

id. at 381 (listing the sole issue on appeal as whether the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction). 

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may ultimately determine the litigation.” (quotation marks omitted)). The Act 

lists the following as dispositive pretrial matters in civil cases in which the 

magistrate judge may only issue a recommendation: motions for injunctive 

relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to certify or 

decertify a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and to

involuntarily dismiss a case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Although motions to 

remand are not included in this list, every court of appeals to consider the 

question has held that they should be treated as dispositive matters in which 

only the district court may enter an order. See Flam v. Flam, 788 F.3d 1043,

1046–47 (9th Cir. 2015); Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 527 F.3d 259, 266 (2d Cir. 

2008); Vogel v. U.S. Office Prods. Co., 258 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2001); First 

Union Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 995–96 (10th Cir. 2000); In re U.S. 

Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 145–46 (3d Cir. 1998).3 

We agree with the conclusion of our five sister circuits. The duty to avoid 

constitutional difficulties when interpreting a statute warrants a narrow 

reading of the matters in which a magistrate judge may enter orders without 

de novo Article III review. Williams, 527 F.3d at 264–65 (citing Gomez v. 

United States, 490 U.S. 858, 863–64 (1989)4). Allowing magistrate judges to 

 

3 A number of district courts have held that a motion to remand is a nondispositive 

matter. Indeed, “district courts in this circuit have generally adhered to the view that 

motions to remand are non[]dispositive pretrial matters and have applied the clearly 

erroneous standard of review.” Credeur v. York Claim Serv., 2013 WL 5935477 at *3 (W.D. 

La. 2013) (citing cases).

4 Gomez is useful for its general point that courts interpreting the Federal Magistrates

Act should do so in a manner that avoids constitutional concerns about the exercise of power 

by non-Article III judges. 490 U.S. at 864 (noting, in interpreting the Act, the “settled policy 

to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a 

reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question”). We do not, however, 

read it as two courts of appeals have as a holding that the list of dispositive matters in 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) is not exhaustive. See, e.g., Flam, 788 F.3d at 1046 (citing Gomez for 

the proposition that the “Supreme Court has identified some judicial functions as dispositive 

notwithstanding the fact that they do not appear in the list”); Williams, 527 F.3d at 265 (also 

characterizing Gomez as holding that jury selection in felony trials is dispositive despite not 

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enter remand orders at a minimum approaches the constitutional line because 

“a remand order is dispositive insofar as proceedings in the federal court are 

concerned” and thus is “the functional equivalent of an order of dismissal.” See 

U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 145 (noting that the question of subject matter 

jurisdiction is “at the core of the exercise of federal judicial power”). Treating 

motions to remand as nondispositive would create a situation in which an 

Article III judge might never exercise de novo review of a case during its entire 

federal lifespan. And although a remand order is a final disposition only of the 

jurisdictional question, a merits determination is not a necessary feature of a 

“dispositive” matter as the statute labels requests for preliminary injunctions 

and class certification as dispositive. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

We note an additional reason, one our sister circuits have not discussed,

for treating rulings on motions to remand as dispositive matters.5 An order of 

remand like the one the magistrate judge issued “is not reviewable on appeal 

or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Yet the statute and rule governing 

 

being in the statute’s list of dispositive matters). The question in Gomez was not dispositive 

versus nondispositive, but whether magistrates had any authority to conduct jury selection 

in felony cases. 490 U.S. at 860. The relevant statutory language provided that a “magistrate 

may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and 

laws of the United States.” Id. at 863 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3)). In finding that jury 

selection in felony cases did not fall within this catch-all provision, the Court noted that if it 

were within the scope of a magistrate’s duties, one would expect jury selection to be a 

dispositive one enumerated in the statute given that duty’s importance. The absence of the 

jury-selection duty from the enumerated list of dispositive matters thus counseled against 

including it within the catch-all provision. Id. at 873–74. If anything then, Gomez attaches 

significance to the statutory list of dispositive matters. We nonetheless come to the same 

conclusion in regard to a magistrate judge’s authority over motions to remand, for the reasons 

discussed above, as the courts of appeals that have read Gomez differently than we do. 5 U.S. Healthcare discussed some of these concerns after holding that the magistrate 

judge should not have entered an order of remand. 159 F.3d at 145–47. It did so in 

determining whether that order was appealable or the basis for a petition for mandamus on 

the ground that the magistrate judge exceeded his authority. See id. (concluding that the 

latter avenue offered relief). We conclude that these difficult issues surrounding appellate 

review of an order of remand issued by a magistrate judge also inform the initial classification 

decision.

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magistrate judge rulings on nondispositive matters provides for an appeal to 

the district court under the “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). Classifying motions to remand 

as dispositive matters on which magistrate judges may enter recommendations 

but not orders of remand avoids a potential collision between these review 

provisions. It also avoids a timing problem that would result even if the

magistrate-specific review provisions govern a magistrate judge’s entry of a 

remand order: absent a stay, a remand order sends the case back to state court 

and deprives the federal court of jurisdiction that would allow for district court 

review. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (noting that the clerk of court should mail order of 

remand to state court which “may thereupon proceed with such case”); Dahiya 

v. Talmidge Int’l, Ltd., 371 F.3d 207, 208 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding that 

district court’s remand order deprived the court of appeals of further federal 

jurisdiction).6

We therefore join the uniform view of the courts of appeals that have 

considered this question and hold that a motion to remand is a dispositive 

matter on which a magistrate judge should enter a recommendation to the 

district court subject to de novo review.

 

6 Escuadra v. Geovera Specialty Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 2d 967 (E.D. Tex. 2010), appears

to recognize both of these problems. It qualified its holding that a motion to remand is 

nondispositive by saying that is the case “at least when district-judge review is not 

foreclosed.” Id. at 972. It then addressed the practical difficulties of that review by noting 

that the local rules in that district require a 20-day waiting period after entry of a remand 

order before the clerk of court transmits a case back to state court. Id. at 972 n.3. Of course, 

not every district has that local rule. And even operating under such a rule, that 20 days 

would only allow the objecting party to file its appeal with the district judge. In most cases, 

the district judge would need more time to rule and thus would have to enter a stay. See also 

U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d at 144 (noting that even with a Local Rule’s 15-day grace period, 

the district court “treated the remand as effective immediately” because the case was closed 

the day the order of remand was entered, thus precluding district court review). Working 

around this problem is not impossible, but its existence informs how we classify a remand 

matter. 

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III.

That means we review the district court’s ruling as opposed to acting as 

the second layer of review for the magistrate judge’s decision. We review de 

novo the district court’s “determination that a party is improperly joined and 

[its] denial of a motion for remand.” Kling Realty Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 

575 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2009). The decision to pierce the pleadings and 

consider summary judgment-type evidence is reviewed only for abuse of 

discretion. La. ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 425 (5th Cir. 

2008).

“Improper joinder can be established in two ways: (1) actual fraud in the 

pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a 

cause of action against the non[]diverse party in state court.” Mumfrey v. CVS 

Pharmacy, Inc., 719 F.3d 392, 401 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and 

alteration omitted).7 Only the second situation is before us. The test “is 

whether the defendant has demonstrated that there is no possibility of 

recovery by the plaintiff against an in-state defendant, which stated differently 

means that there is no reasonable basis for the district court to predict that the 

plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state defendant.” Smallwood 

v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 

Our en banc opinion in Smallwood sets out the procedure for 

determining whether, in the absence of actual fraud, a nondiverse defendant 

was improperly joined. See Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 401. First, a court looks at

the allegations contained in the complaint. See id. If a plaintiff can survive a 

Rule 12(b)(6) challenge for failure to state a claim, there is ordinarily no 

 

7 “The Fifth Circuit adopted the terminology ‘improper joinder,’ . . . instead of the 

terminology ‘fraudulent joinder,’ which is ‘a term of art’ used in other circuits to describe the 

doctrine that ignores a lack of complete diversity where the plaintiff joins a nondiverse 

defendant to avoid federal jurisdiction.” Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 401 n.14 (internal citation

omitted).

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improper joinder. Id. (citing Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573). When “a complaint 

states a claim that satisfies 12(b)(6), but has ‘misstated or omitted discrete 

facts that would determine the propriety of joinder . . . the district court may, 

in its discretion, pierce the pleadings and conduct a summary inquiry.’” Id.

(quoting Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573). “[T]he decision regarding the procedure 

necessary in a given case must lie within the discretion of the trial court.” 

Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. 

“The burden of persuasion on those who claim [improper] joinder is a 

heavy one.” Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we

view “all unchallenged factual allegations, including those alleged in the 

complaint, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff” and resolve “[a]ny 

contested issues of fact and any ambiguities of state law” in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Id. Moreover, we must “take into account the ‘status of discovery’ and consider 

what opportunity the plaintiff has had to develop its claims against the 

non[]diverse defendant.” McKee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 358 F.3d 329, 334 (5th 

Cir. 2004) (quoting Travis, 326 F.3d at 649).

We do not agree with Plaintiffs that the district court abused its 

discretion in piercing the pleadings and looking to see if evidence had 

developed in the first case “that would preclude [P]laintiff[s’] recovery against 

the in-state defendant.” See Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573–74. In light of the 

district court’s discretion in deciding whether to pierce the pleadings, it was 

not error to do so here given the unusual procedural posture of this case that

meant there was already a lengthy record at the outset of this second lawsuit.

See Guillory v. PPG Indus., Inc., 434 F.3d 303, 309–11 (5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting 

plaintiff’s challenge to court’s decision to pierce the pleadings when neither the 

scope and amount of remand-related discovery nor the length of time court took 

to consider the evidence was excessive).

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We agree with Plaintiffs, however, that the district court erred in 

applying the improper joinder standard to that record. Although a court may 

pierce the pleadings and consider summary-judgment type evidence, the 

standard for finding improper joinder is not the summary judgment standard 

in which an absence in the plaintiff’s proof alone can be fatal. Travis, 326 F.3d 

at 650 n.3 (noting that “[o]n a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff’s 

lack of evidence in support of her claims, after a sufficient period of discovery, 

could have a different effect” than at the motion to remand stage, where such 

lack of evidence is not dispositive). It would make little sense to apply the noevidence summary judgment standard at the early stages of a case when 

improper joinder usually arises as the plaintiff typically will have had little 

opportunity to conduct discovery, hire experts, etc. Rather than a standard in 

which no evidence on the plaintiff’s part may be dispositive, “the test for 

fraudulent joinder is whether the defendant has demonstrated that there is no 

possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against an in-state defendant . . . .”8 

Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. The examples of improper joinder based on 

“discrete and undisputed facts” outside the pleadings that Smallwood provides 

are consistent with this language requiring a defendant to “preclude” the 

possibility of recovery:9 evidence showing that “the in-state doctor defendant 

 

8 In supplemental briefing, Defendants recognize that they must make an initial 

showing. They characterize the improper joinder standard as requiring that “once a 

defendant offers evidence of the in-state defendant’s non-liability, the plaintiff must respond 

with contrary evidence.” 

9 The improper joinder standard is thus similar to the summary judgment standard 

that many courts applied before the Supreme Court’s 1986 summary judgment trilogy. One 

of the 1986 cases was, like this one, an asbestos case. The D.C. Circuit denied summary

judgment based on its understanding that the summary judgment standard required “that 

the party moving for summary judgment must prove the absence of any genuine issue of 

material fact, and that only after the movant has done so must the nonmovant respond with 

‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See Patricia M. Wald, 

Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 1897, 1911 (1998) (explaining Catrett v. 

Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184–85 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and summary judgment 

practice generally prior to the 1986 trilogy). The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, 

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did not treat the plaintiff,” that “the in-state pharmacist defendant did not fill 

a prescription for the plaintiff patient,” that “a party’s residence was not as 

alleged, or any other fact that easily can be disproved if not true.” See 385 F.3d 

at 573–74 & n.12 (emphasis added) (citing Travis, 326 F.3d at 648–49).

Travis v. Irby, cited favorably by the en banc Smallwood court, see 385 

F.3d at 573, illustrates the difference between the summary judgment and 

improper joinder standards. The railroad defendant in Travis asked the 

district court to pierce the pleadings and consider interrogatory responses 

submitted by the plaintiff. 326 F.3d at 646, 648–50. The plaintiff’s responses 

acknowledged that she did not, at the time, possess facts supporting the 

petition’s allegations that the train engineer failed to keep a proper and 

reasonable lookout, to take proper precautions under the circumstances, and 

to brake in time. Id. at 649. Characterizing these statements “as admissions 

that she had no factual basis or evidence in support of her claims against [the 

engineer],” the district court found improper joinder. Id. at 649–50. We 

reversed, explaining that the “lack of substantive evidence as to the 

non[]diverse defendant does not support a conclusion that he was [improperly]

joined” even though that may support summary judgment. Id. at 650 & n3. 

Instead, “the defendant must put forward evidence that would negate a 

possibility of liability on the part of [the nondiverse defendant].” Id. at 650.

Much of the argument of the removing parties in this case amounts to 

what Travis rejected: “simply pointing to the plaintiff’s lack of evidence at this 

stage of the case.” Id. at 650 (finding such an argument insufficient). Aside 

from their arguments regarding Davidson’s deposition testimony which we will 

address shortly, Defendants cite the district court’s finding that “there was no 

 

holding that summary judgment is warranted when the movant identifies an absence of 

evidence supporting a claim and the nonmovant fails to identify facts in response. See id. at 

1911–12 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). 

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mention of either Graves or Taylor” in the Davidson I record. They have not, 

however, identified any evidence from that earlier lawsuit negating a 

possibility of liability on the part of Graves and Taylor, such as receipts or 

other business records showing that those businesses did not supply asbestos 

to Poulan Chainsaw from 1972–1978. Contrast, e.g., Vaillancourt v. PNC 

Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 771 F.3d 843, 847–48 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (finding 

improper joinder established, in case in which plaintiff alleged that defendant 

had not complied with statutory notice requirements before foreclosing, when 

defendant produced uncontroverted evidence including certified mail receipt 

and affidavit indicating notices were sent to plaintiff); Cuevas v. BAC Home 

Loans Servicing, LP, 648 F.3d 242, 250 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding improper 

joinder established, in case in which plaintiff alleged that defendant 

wrongfully refused to accept tendered payment for loan in default, when 

defendant produced uncontroverted evidence that it did not service or originate 

the loan). With the pleadings pierced, it also would not have been difficult for 

Defendants to submit affidavits from Graves and Taylor stating that they did 

not supply Poulan (if that was the case). Contrast Guillory, 434 F.3d at 313 

(finding improper joinder established, in case where plaintiff alleged 

defendants breached duty to protect, based on “the self-serving [deposition]

testimony of the nondiverse defendant[s] that [they] had no responsibility for 

safety measures relating to the particular plant explosion” because the 

plaintiffs did not identify evidence contradicting the defendants’ testimony). 

We do not believe that the existence of a developed record in the first 

lawsuit warrants expanding the improper joinder standard to allow the 

absence of evidence alone to satisfy it. The improper joinder ruling was made 

before discovery in this case, which had first named Graves and Taylor. See

McKee, 358 F.3d at 334 (“The district court must also take into account the 

‘status of discovery’ and consider what opportunity the plaintiff has had to 

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develop its claims against the non[]diverse defendant.” (quoting Travis, 326 

F.3d at 649)). The district court did not err in considering the record from the 

first trial, and that record might have revealed evidence of the sort we just

mentioned that would disprove Plaintiffs’ claims. But finding an absence of 

evidence to be controlling when Plaintiffs never had an interest in the first case 

to develop evidence against Graves and Taylor would be at odds with the 

limited scope of improper joinder and the defendant’s “heavy burden” to 

establish it. Travis, 326 F.3d at 649. The record in the first lawsuit did not 

include, nor would one expect it to, business records relating to Graves, Taylor,

or Poulan or testimony from people employed at those companies during the 

1970s. Defendants point out that the defendants in Davidson I might have 

had an incentive to develop such evidence against Graves and Taylor to 

support contribution claims. But we have always focused on the plaintiff’s 

opportunity to develop its claims, not other parties’ incentives. And if evidence 

developed by other parties is relevant, would that extend to earlier cases not 

even involving the plaintiff? We refuse the invitation to expand our improper 

joinder inquiry. 

That leaves Davidson’s deposition testimony. The district court found, 

without explanation, that this testimony supported its finding that Plaintiffs

have no reasonable possibility of recovery against Graves or Taylor. But his 

June 2010 statement that it was “very possible” that he had been exposed to 

asbestos at Poulan Chainsaw on its face more than satisfies a “some 

possibility” standard. Defendants counter that his testimony a year later, 

when Davidson said that he never saw anybody doing insulation work at 

Poulan Chainsaw, and did not recall specific machinery or industrial Poulan 

equipment being insulated with asbestos, shows that the possibility of any 

recovery from Graves or Taylor is “merely a theoretical” speculation. See Ross

v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that 

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speculation is insufficient). But accepting as inconsistent his “very possible” 

versus “I do not recall” answers, we have to resolve the tension in favor of the 

earlier, stronger statement. See African Methodist Episcopal Church v. 

Lucien, 756 F.3d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 2014) (“We repeat for emphasis that any 

contested issues of facts and any ambiguities of state law must be resolved in 

favor of remand.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if we could credit 

only Davidson’s later testimony—and, thus, limit his personal knowledge with 

respect to his exposure at Poulan Chainsaw to the “I don’t recall” answer—that 

only demonstrates an absence of evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claims. It does 

not “preclude [P]laintiffs’ recovery against the in-state [D]efendant[s].”10 

Guillory, 434 F.3d at 310 (quoting Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573–74). 

Finally, although Defendants make much of Plaintiffs’ apparent forum 

manipulation, we have noted that the “motive or purpose of the joinder of instate defendants is not relevant” when the basis for removal is not “actual 

fraud” in the pleadings but rather the inability of the plaintiff to recover 

against the in-state defendant. Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 574. 

* * *

We VACATE the judgment and REMAND to the district court for entry 

of an order remanding the case to state court.

 

10 We thus need not consider the admissibility of the affidavit submitted by Plaintiffs’

counsel. 

 Case: 14-30925 Document: 00513470939 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/19/2016