Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01191/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Hilario Coberley Vasquez III,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondent.

No. CV-19-01191-PHX-DWL (MTM)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Petitioner Hilario Coberley Vasquez III has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1).

I. Summary of Conclusion.

Petitioner raises five grounds for relief in his Petition. The Court finds that the 

petition is untimely and is not subject to statutory or equitable tolling. Therefore, the Court 

will recommend that the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

II. Background.

A. Procedural Background.

Petitioner’s probation violation report provides the following facts:

On June 26, 2009, the defendant along with other codefendants was arrested after purchasing 300 pounds of 

marijuana from undercover detectives. The marijuana was 

transported at a residence located on 90th Avenue and Whitton 

in Phoenix. During the execution of a search warrant the 

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detectives discovered a surveillance system, fifteen weapons, 

including .45 caliber pistols equipped with silencers as well as 

shotguns and two cattle prods. Moreover, an additional 80 

pounds of marijuana, not part of the undercover operation, 

were discovered inside the residence. At the time of the arrest, 

the defendant was in the process of removing the marijuana 

from the vehicle and proceeded to split it into smaller amounts 

to be delivered around the state and other various locations. 

The defendant had approximately $3,000.00 cash on his 

person.

(Doc. 18-4, Ex. N, at 28). On July 6, 2009, a grand jury indicted Petitioner on five counts: 

conspiracy, illegally conducting an enterprise, possession of marijuana for sale over the 

statutory threshold, transportation of marijuana for sale over the statutory threshold, and 

money laundering. (Doc. 18-1, Ex. A, at 7-8).

Counsel was appointed for Petitioner; however, on September 29, 2009, during a 

trial setting conference, the Arizona Superior Court permitted Petitioner to represent 

himself after finding that Petitioner knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his 

right to counsel. (Doc. 18-1, Exs. C, D, at 20-22). Petitioner’s former defense counsel was 

retained as advisory counsel. (Doc. 18-1, Ex. C, at 20-22). During a subsequent status 

conference, on October 16, 2009, representing himself pro per, Petitioner rejected a plea 

offer. (Doc. 18-1, Ex. E, at 24-25). On November 13, 2009, a Rule 11 evaluation was 

ordered by the court. (Doc. 18-1, Ex. F, at 27). On January 7, 2010, after a hearing, 

Petitioner was ruled competent. Id. at 31. 

On April 23, 2010, Petitioner waived his right to a trial by jury and requested a 

bench trial. (Doc. 18-4, Exs. K-L, at 12-15). On April 26-27, 2010, the court held a bench 

trial, during which Petitioner represented himself with the assistance of advisory counsel. 

(Doc. 18-4, Ex. M). The court found Petitioner guilty of counts one and four: conspiracy 

and transportation of marijuana for sale in an amount over the statutory threshold. Id. at 

22. Petitioner was acquitted on the other three counts based on an oral motion for acquittal 

by advisory counsel. Id. at 21-22. 

On May 28, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of 15.75 years 

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imprisonment. (Doc. 18-4, Ex. P, at 48). At sentencing, the following exchange took place:

THE COURT: Now, because you had a trial you may appeal. 

In order to do that, you must file a notice of appeal within 20 

days of today’s date.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Who exactly do I file that with?

THE COURT: You file it with the clerk, and Mr. Rivera will 

give you that paperwork or make sure that – make sure you tell 

him that you want it done, and he’ll take care of it. All right? 

He has to do it within 20 days, and failure to file that notice 

within 20 days means you forever lose your right to appeal. If 

you can’t afford a lawyer, one would be appointed at no cost 

to you. 

(Doc. 18-4, Ex. Q, at 62-63). Petitioner also receive a Notice of Rights of Review After 

Conviction and Procedure, which he signed on May 28, 2010. (Doc. 18-4, Ex. R, at 66). 

B. Post-Trial Proceedings.

Petitioner never filed a notice of appeal of his conviction. However, Petitioner filed 

many other motions in the months after his May 28, 2010 conviction. On October 28, 

2010, he filed a request for notification and access. (Doc. 18-4, Ex. S, at 69-70). On July 

12, 2011, he filed a Judicial Notice of Appointment of Trustee. (Doc. 18-4, Ex. T, at 72-

77). On October 26, 2011, he filed an Acceptance of Contract. (Doc. 18-4, Ex. U, at 79-

82). On December 7, 2011, he filed a “Secured Party’s Motion for Hearing, Pursuant to 

Supplemental Rule E(4)(F) and Relief Pursuant to Rule 60C(4)(5)(6), Actual and 

Constructive Notice, Judicial Notice Required Pursuant to Rules of Evidence 201 and 44 

et seq.” (“December 7 Motion”) (Doc. 18-5, Ex. V, at 2-39). On December 19, 2011, he 

filed an Affidavit of Intent. (Doc. 18-5, Ex. W, at 41-45). 

On January 5, 2012, the Superior Court ruled that the December 7 Motion was a 

request for permission to file a delayed notice of appeal and ordered the state to file a 

response. (Doc. 18-5, Ex. X, at 47-48). After the state filed its response (doc. 18-5, Ex. Y, 

at 49-54), Petitioner filed a reply stating the court “took it upon its own” to treat his motion 

as a request for leave to file a delayed notice of appeal, and that in fact Petitioner wanted 

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“the relief sought pursuant to Rule 60.” (Doc. 18-5, Ex. Z, at 57). Petitioner stated that the 

court “errored in changing what was filed under Rule 60, Ariz. R. Civil P. to Rule 32.1(F) 

under Ariz. R. Crim. P. There is NO such rule or law that allows The Court to change a 

civil action to a criminal proceeding.” Id. at 59. 

On March 7, 2012, the Superior Court noted that the December 7 Motion “was 

mostly incomprehensible”; the court also noted that Petitioner “did make mention of the 

fact that he failed to file a timely notice of appeal after sentencing.” (Doc. 18-5, Ex. AA, 

at 65). The court noted that Petitioner did “not address the state’s response” but rather 

stated “the Court made an error in assuming that [Petitioner] wanted to pursue relief 

pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(f).” Id. The court explained that Petitioner insisted “that 

he is entitled to relief via the Civil Rules of Procedure. In [Petitioner’s] reply, he states that 

the Civil Rules of Procedure apply in criminal cases. [Petitioner] is mistaken.” Id. The court 

denied Petitioner’s request for a hearing under the Civil Rules of Procedure. Id. 

C. First Post-Conviction Review Proceeding.

On June 22, 2012, Petitioner filed his first notice for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). 

(Doc. 18-5, Ex. CC, at 72-74). In the notice, he acknowledged that he had represented 

himself at his sentencing hearing after his request to represent himself had been granted. 

Id. at 73. Petitioner also acknowledged that he had not filed a direct appeal. Id. Petitioner 

alleged one ground for relief: his failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief was 

without fault on his part. (Doc. 18-5, Ex. DD, at 79). In a contemporaneously filed affidavit, 

Petitioner stated that at trial, in representing himself he was “under the influence of 

person(s) that had taken money and confidence from” him, and he “now see[s] the error of 

[his] ways.” (Doc. 18-5, Ex. EE, at 92). Petitioner stated that he had been convinced by 

another man that “commercial law” was “viable to his defense” and could help him reduce 

his sentence. Id. at 93. Petitioner related that the court had granted his request for selfrepresentation after his appointed counsel refused to implement the strategy of relying upon 

commercial law. Id. Petitioner stated: “I admit, I was wrong.” Id. at 94. 

The Superior Court ruled on Petitioner’s PCR petition on July 20, 2012. (Doc. 18-

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5, Ex. FF, at 122-23). The court noted that the PCR request was untimely as it was not 

filed within the required 90 days of the entry of judgment or sentencing. Id. at 122. The 

court, however, found that Petitioner had “sufficiently raised a colorable claim to permit 

this Rule 32 proceeding to move forward” in light of Petitioner’s claim that he had been 

“extremely confused during the entire criminal justice process and that this was 

compounded by the fact that [Petitioner] represented himself at trial.” Id. at 123. The court 

appointed counsel to Petitioner and ordered counsel to file a petition for PCR or a notice 

of completion after investigation of Petitioner’s claims. Id.

On September 18, 2012, counsel for Petitioner filed a petition for PCR requesting 

permission to file a delayed notice of appeal. (Doc. 18-5, Ex. GG, at 125-29). The petition 

asserted that Petitioner’s advisory counsel at trial had not appropriately discussed

Petitioner’s rights with him, including his appeal rights, and faulted advisory counsel and 

the trial court: “[g]iven the fact that Petitioner’s actions caused enough concerns to place 

him in Rule 11 proceedings, neither his lawyer nor the court took any action to make sure 

that he understood his appeal rights.” Id. at 127. As a result, the petition asserted that “the

fault lies most plainly with Petitioner’s advisory counsel, who should have filed a Notice 

of Appeal on his behalf.” Id. at 128.

On March 29, 2013, the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s request for leave to file 

a delayed appeal. (Doc. 18-6, Ex. KK, at 17). On April 29, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition 

for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 18-6, Ex. LL, at 19-24). On October 

15, 2014, the Court of Appeals found that based on Petitioner’s claims and the trial court’s 

statements at sentencing, “some doubt exists as to whether or not [Petitioner] was without 

fault in relation to the filing of his notice of appeal.” (Doc. 18-8, Ex. TT, at 60). The Court 

of Appeals noted that it appeared that “conflicting information” was given to Petitioner 

regarding “what he and/or advisory counsel needed to do in order to assert his right.” Id. 

The court also stated it could not establish that Petitioner “affirmatively chose to file [other 

documents asserting various civil claims] as an alternative to appeal.” Id. Therefore, the 

court held the PCR court had abused its discretion in summarily denying the PCR petition. 

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Id. at 61. The court granted relief and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. Id. 

On June 8, 2015, the Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s 

claim. (Doc. 18-8, Ex. VV, at 67-70). Petitioner testified at the hearing. (Doc. 18-8, Ex. 

WW, at 72-143). After the hearing, the court ruled “that the failure of filing a timely appeal 

is the fault of the [Petitioner] and under Rule 32.1(f), the Court cannot make a finding to 

allow a delayed appeal.” (Doc. 18-8, Ex. VV, at 68). 

Petitioner filed a petition for review and a motion for sanctions with the Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 18-9, Ex. YY, at 6-15). On June 20, 2017, the Court of Appeals granted 

review but denied relief. (Doc. 18-12, Ex. CCC, at 14-17). The court held that “substantial 

evidence supports the superior court’s ruling” that Petitioner was at fault for failing to file 

a timely appeal. Id. at 17. The Court of Appeals pointed to Petitioner’s signature on the 

form outlining his right to appeal, his right to PCR, and associated deadlines; Petitioner’s 

testimony regarding his recollection that the court instructed him that “he had twenty days 

to file a notice of appeal”; and the lack of evidence that the court had ordered advisory 

counsel to file a notice of appeal. Id. 

Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court on July 18, 2017. (Doc. 18-13, 

Ex. DDD, at 2). The Supreme Court denied review on November 30, 2017. (Doc. 18-15, 

Ex. FFF, at 4). The mandate was issued by the Court of Appeals on January 3, 2018. (Doc. 

18-15, Ex. GGG, at 6). 

D. Second Post-Conviction Review Proceeding.

On November 20, 2015, Petitioner filed a second notice for PCR. (Doc. 18-15, Ex. 

HHH, at 12). In his second PCR petition, Petitioner raised numerous claims: prosecutorial 

misconduct by presenting illegally suppressed evidence; reinstatement of the plea; 

ineffective assistance of Rule 32 counsel for failing to present claims of ineffectiveness of 

trial counsel; ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress 

illegal evidence; improper and disproportionate sentencing; entitlement to treatment as a 

timely first Rule 32 petition; and improper consideration of a probation violation. (Doc. 

18-15, Ex. JJJ, at 98-100). 

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Court-appointed counsel completed a review and was unable to find a colorable 

issue to submit to the court. (Doc. 18-15, Ex. LLL, at 129). Petitioner continued with his 

petition pro per. (Docs. 18-16-18-17, Ex. MMM-OOO, at 1). On July 20, 2016, the 

Superior Court stayed the proceeding pending the outcome of Petitioner’s first PCR 

petition. On January 25, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the second PCR without 

prejudice. (Doc. 18-18, Ex. UUU, at 62-68). On January 31, 2017, the court granted 

Petitioner’s motion with leave to re-file upon the conclusion of his appeal. (Doc. 18-18, 

Ex. VVV, at 70). 

On February 16, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion to amend his PCR pleadings. (Doc. 

18-18, Ex. WWW, at 72-92). On February 21, 2017, the Superior Court filed an order for 

clarification asking if Petitioner wished to proceed although the mandate had not yet issued 

in his first proceeding from the Court of Appeals. (Doc. 18-18, Ex. XXX, at 158). In 

response, Petitioner filed a motion asking the court to proceed with the current PCR 

motion, even without the mandate from the Court of Appeals. (Doc. 18-18, Ex. YYY, at 

160). After briefing on Petitioner’s motion, on July 12, 2017, Petitioner filed another 

motion requesting a “delay in the decision” in order to “negotiate with the state for an 

acceptable resolution that would save state judicial time and resources.” (Doc. 18-20, Ex. 

FFFF, at 52). 

On July 13, 2017, the Superior Court found that Petitioner failed to provide a 

colorable claim for PCR and denied his second petition. (Doc. 18-20, Ex. GGGG, at 55).

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and request for nunc pro tunc with the Superior 

Court on August 25, 2017. (Doc. 18-20, Ex. HHHH, at 57). The Superior Court ordered no 

further action on Petitioner’s motion to request a delay in decision. (Doc. 18-20, Ex. IIII, 

at 72). On September 8, 2017, the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s motion for 

reconsideration. (Doc. 18-20, Ex. JJJJ, at 74). 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals on October 

2, 2017. (Doc. 18-21, Ex. KKKK, at 2). On March 6, 2018, the Court of Appeals issued a 

decision granting review but denying relief, holding that Petitioner had “not shown an 

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abuse of discretion” by the Superior Court in denying his PCR petition. (Doc. 18-22, Ex. 

NNNN, at 8). Petitioner petitioned for review to the Arizona Supreme Court on May 17, 

2018. (Doc. 18-22, Ex. OOOO, at 10). The Supreme Court denied review on October 31, 

2018. (Doc. 18-23, Ex. QQQQ, at 4). The Court of Appeals issued the mandate on 

December 4, 2018. (Doc. 18-23, Ex. RRRR, at 6). 

E. Petition for Special Action.

On May 17, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for Special Action with the Arizona 

Supreme Court. (Doc. 18-23, Ex. SSSS, at 8). In his statement of issues, Petitioner argued 

that “law enforcement relied on evidence observed in a protective sweep to support their 

affidavit of probable cause resulting in the seizure of evidence used to convict the 

petitioner,” and the prosecutor “failed to disclose and concealed relevant Brady material 

and information law enforcement relied on evidence observed in a protective sweep to 

support their affidavit of probable cause in violation of the rules of professional conduct.” 

(Doc. 18-23, Ex. SSSS, at 10). 

On September 24, 2018, the Supreme Court issued an order stating that Petitioner’s 

claims of unlawful search and seizure and prosecutorial misconduct were the same or 

related to claims in his petition for review of the denial of his successive PCR petition. 

(Doc. 18-23, Ex. TTTT, at 134). The Supreme Court denied his petition. Id. 

F. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition.

On February 19, 2019, Petitioner filed the habeas petition (“Petition”). (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner asserts five grounds for relief: (1) failure to timely appeal is not Petitioner’s fault; 

(2) prosecutorial misconduct for concealing Brady evidence; (3) ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress illegally seized evidence; (4) 

reinstatement of a plea agreement because of the suppressed evidence; and (5) ineffective 

assistance of Rule 32 counsel for failure to present ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

claims in the first PCR petition. (Doc. 1 at 7-10).

On July 3, 2019, Respondents filed a limited answer. (Doc. 18). On July 15, 2019, 

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Petitioner filed his reply. (Doc. 19).1

III. The Petition is Untimely.

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § § 2241 (c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations concerning Petitions for Habeas Corpus. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), (d)(2).

Here, Petitioner was sentenced on May 28, 2010, and his deadline to appeal was 

June 17, 2010. (Doc. 18-4, Exs. P, Q). After that date, his one-year statute of limitations 

began to run and expired on June 17, 2011. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)(stating the limitation 

period runs from the “date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review”).2 This Petition was not filed 

until February 19, 2019; therefore, it is untimely.

a. Statutory Tolling.

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. AEDPA provides for tolling of the 

limitations period when a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral relief with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction 

relief is filed. See Isley v. Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See 

also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“A proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of 

1 On February 21, 2020, this case was referred to Judge Michael T. Morrissey.

2 Although Petitioner asserts a separate claim for ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, for 

which the factual predicate would not have been known before June 2011, this is a noncognizable claim for federal habeas relief. “There is no constitutional right to an attorney 

in state post-conviction proceedings.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). 

Additionally, ineffective assistance of PCR counsel may only be used to invoke the 

Martinez v. Ryan exception to excuse procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claim; however, any such claim in this petition is untimely, and Petitioner chose 

to represent himself at trial. 566 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2012). 

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post-conviction relief with the court in which the conviction occurred.”). Petitioner’s initial 

motions, dating from October 2010 to December 2011, sought relief under civil law. In 

fact, Petitioner proactively asked the Superior Court not to treat his December 7 Motion as 

a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal under the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

(Doc. 18-5, Exs. Z, AA). Thus, none of Petitioner’s motions filed immediately after the 

conviction were properly filed applications for post-conviction relief. 

Petitioner did not file his first PCR notice until June 22, 2012, over two years after 

his conviction became final. (Doc. 18-5, Ex. CC). Under AEDPA, only a properly filed 

PCR proceeding can toll the one-year statute of limitations; the fact that Petitioner filed an 

untimely petition did not change the date of finality on his conviction. See Jimenez v. 

Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 120 n.4 (2009) (holding that “the possibility that a state court 

may reopen direct review ‘does not render convictions and sentences that are no longer 

subject to direct review nonfinal,’” but only “where a state court has in fact reopened direct 

review, the conviction is rendered nonfinal for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) during the 

pendency of the reopened appeal.”)(quoting Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 412 (2004)).

3

b. Equitable Tolling.

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. “A petitioner who seeks equitable 

tolling of AEDPA’s one-year filing deadline must show that (1) some ‘extraordinary 

circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and (2) he has diligently pursued his 

rights.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 

(9th Cir. 2015). Petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply.

Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling 

is only appropriate when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, 

account for the failure to file a timely habeas action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 

3 Although the PCR court acknowledged Petitioner’s first PCR petition as untimely, it 

allowed Petitioner’s first petition to move forward because he had raised a colorable claim 

for relief due to his “extreme confusion” throughout the criminal justice process. (Doc. 18-

5, Ex. FF). Ultimately, this PCR petition was denied after an evidentiary hearing, where 

the Superior Court found that Petitioner was at fault for failing to file a timely appeal. (Doc. 

18-8, Ex. VV, at 68). The denial of leave to file an untimely appeal was upheld by the 

Court of Appeals, which found that “substantial evidence support[ed] the superior court’s 

ruling.” (Doc. 18-12, Ex. CCC, at 14-17).

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1048 (9th Cir. 2010). Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were the 

cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to 

file a petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citation omitted).

Petitioner does not allege any “extraordinary circumstance” or “external force” that 

prevented him from filing his federal habeas petition within the one-year statute of 

limitations. Although Petitioner may have had “confusion” about the state criminal justice 

system and the application of civil procedure, this did not make it “impossible” for him to 

file a timely federal habeas petition; any such “confusion” only applied to his direct state 

appeal. “Confusion, time extensions, and requests for legal assistance do not rise to the 

level of the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ necessary for equitable tolling.” Williamson v. 

Hubbard, 27 F. App'x 733, 736 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 

1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding ignorance of law, delays caused by inmate law clerk, and 

inaccessibility of law library do not create “extraordinary” circumstances which merit 

equitable tolling). Petitioner does not point to anything in the record to justify waiting over 

nine years after the final judgment in his state case to file his federal habeas petition. 

Therefore, he is not entitled to equitable tolling.

IV. Conclusion.

The Court finds that Petitioner’s claim for federal habeas relief is untimely. The 

Petition is not subject to statutory tolling, and Petitioner fails to make any showing of 

extraordinary circumstances necessary for equitable tolling. The Court will therefore 

recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. 1) be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling

debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 8th day of April, 2020.

Honorable Michael T. Morrissey

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:19-cv-01191-DWL Document 21 Filed 04/08/20 Page 12 of 12