Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35801/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35801-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHANE AARON ABBOTT,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; J.E.

THOMAS, Warden,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 12-35801

D.C. No.

3:11-cv-01047-

MO

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 26, 2014—Seattle, Washington

Filed October 27, 2014

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Ronald M. Gould,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould

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2 ABBOTT V. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel dismissed renewed claims, and, as to new

contentions raised after the district court’s decision on limited

remand, reversed the district court and remanded a case in

which Shane Abbott filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus seeking to compel the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to

allow him into the Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP).

The panel held that Abbott’s claims regarding the legality

of the BOP’s 2009 RDAP rule are rendered moot by the

BOP’s intervening decision to admit him to the RDAP.

 

Because Abbott made a categorical challenge to the

BOP’s interpretation of its own regulation, which is not

foreclosed from review, the panel held that the district court

erred when it held, on limited remand, that it lacked

jurisdiction to review Abbott’s challenge to his denial of

eligibility to receive RDAP’s early release incentive of a

sentence reduction.

The panel held that the BOP’s determination that a

Montana unlawful restraint conviction was equivalent to

“kidnaping” under 28 U.S.C. § 550.55(b)(4), barring

eligibility for early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B),

is invalid. The panel explained that the Montana unlawful

restraint elements are not equivalent to kidnaping, and that

the BOP’s conflation of the two was arbitrary and capricious.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ABBOTT V. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 3

The panel remanded for the district court to consider

whether modification of Abbott’s term of supervised release

is now appropriate in light of the BOP’s prior unlawful denial

of Abbott’s eligibility for sentence reduction.

COUNSEL

Stephen R. Sady (argued), Chief Deputy Federal Public

Defender, Portland Oregon, for Petitioner-Appellant.

S. Amanda Marshall, United States Attorney, Kelly A.

Zusman, Appellate Chief, Natalie K. Wight (argued),

Assistant United States Attorney, Portland, Oregon, for

Respondents-Appellees.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

In 2011, Petitioner Shane Abbott (“Abbott”) sought

acceptance into the Residential Drug Abuse Program

(“RDAP”) run by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and was

denied, based on a 2009 BOP rule that precluded prisoners

with outstanding warrants from RDAP eligibility. He filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to compel the

BOP to allow him into RDAP, which was denied by the

district court. He appealed that decision in 2012.

While Abbott’s 2012 appeal was pending, the BOP

changed its mind about proper procedure and changed its

course. The BOP discovered internal guidance that, along

with the quashing of one of Abbott’s warrants, resulted in a

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4 ABBOTT V. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS

new review pursuant to which the BOP determined that

Abbott was eligible to participate in RDAP. But the BOP

also concluded that Abbott was not eligible to receive

RDAP’s early release incentive of a sentence reduction,

because of his prior Montana conviction for unlawful

restraint. The BOP determined that the Montana unlawful

restraint conviction was equivalent to “kidnaping,” barring

his eligibility under 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(4).

We remanded this case to the district court for the limited

purpose of determining Abbott’s eligibility for RDAP’s

sentence reduction. Upon remand, the district court held that

it lacked jurisdiction to review Abbott’s challenge to his

denial of eligibility for sentence reduction on the ground that

the BOP’s decision was an individualized early release

determination, as opposed to a categorical challenge.

Abbott now appeals that decision, renewing the

arguments presented in his original habeas petition and

raising two additional contentions: 1) that the district court

erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction; and 2) that the

BOP’s interpretation of 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(4) to preclude

his eligibility for a sentence reduction was arbitrary and

capricious.

The claims presented in Abbott’s initial habeas petition

regarding the legality of the BOP’s 2009 RDAP eligibility

rule, renewed in this appeal, are rendered moot by the BOP’s

decision to admit him to the RDAP program. Abbott has

received all the relief sought in his original petition: RDAP

participation, eligibility for placement in a halfway house

program, and consideration for early release. Although he

was unsuccessful in getting a sentence reduction, he was

accepted as a participant in RDAP and was not precluded

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ABBOTT V. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 5

from consideration of such eligibility. Abbott retains no

“legally cognizable interest for which the courts can grant a

remedy.” Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

189 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, Abbott’s initial

and renewed appeal as to the BOP’s 2009 RDAP eligibility

rule is dismissed as moot.

Turning to Abbott’s appeal of the district court’s decision

on limited remand, the court erred when it held that it lacked

jurisdiction to review Abbott’s challenge. It is true that the

BOP has broad, unreviewable discretion over individualized

decisions regarding RDAP eligibility. See Reeb v. Thomas,

636 F.3d 1224, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2011). But here Abbott

makes a categorical challenge to the BOP’s interpretation of

its own regulation, which is not foreclosed from review. Cf.

Close v. Thomas, 653 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2011) (“These

petitions allege that the ‘BOP action is contrary to . . . its

statutory authority.’ Therefore, the petitions are within [our]

jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)).

We next and finally address whether Abbott’s prior

conviction for unlawful restraint, as codified in Montana

Code Annotated § 45-5-301, is equivalent to kidnaping under

28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(4). We conclude that the Montana

unlawful restraint elements are not equivalent to kidnaping. 

The BOP’s conflation of the two was arbitraryand capricious. 

We have previously explained that the offenses listed in

28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(4) (homicide, forcible rape, robbery,

aggravated assault, arson, kidnaping, and sexual abuse

offenses committed on minors) are an appropriate bar to early

release because their commission “rationallyreflects the view

that such inmates displayed readiness to endanger the public.” 

Peck v. Thomas, 697 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2012). Montana

law, however, does not view unlawful restraint similarly,

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6 ABBOTT V. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS

describing the offense as “the lowest form of interference

with the liberty of another.” Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-301

(Annotator’s Note to § 45-5-301). Further, unlawful restraint

is a lesser included offense of kidnapping under Montana

law. See State v. Brummer, 287 Mont. 168, 177 (1998). The

BOP has not shown a reasonable basis to extend a regulation

involving a set of serious and violent crimes, all of which

show “readiness to endanger the public,” Peck, 697 F.3d at

773, to unlawful restraint in violation of Montana law, which

we consider to be a crime less serious and less violent than

those listed. We hold that the BOP’s interpretive action is

invalid. See Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th

Cir. 2008).

We conclude that Abbott was eligible for early release

under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). Abbott has already been

released from prison and can no longer benefit from a

sentence reduction, but he still could benefit from a reduction

in his term of supervised release. See Reynolds v. Thomas,

603 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other

grounds by Sester v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012). 

We think it is legally permissible and serves the ends of

justice and fairness for us to remand to the district court for

it to consider in the first instance whether modification of

Abbott’s term of supervised release is now appropriate in

light of the BOP’s prior unlawful denial of Abbott’s

eligibility for sentence reduction.

DISMISSED, REVERSED AND REMANDED with

instructions.

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