Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07087/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 4, 1997 Decided January 6, 1998 

No. 97-7087

KAREN SHOOK, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 

AND MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(96cv2601)

Barbara S. Wahl argued the cause for appellants, with 

whom Evan S. Stolove and Ronald C. Jessamy were on the 

briefs.

Daniel A. Rezneck argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellee.

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 1 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for amici curiae

Missionary Baptist Ministers Conference for Washington 

D.C. and Vicinity, et al.

Before: SILBERMAN, WILLIAMS, and GARLAND, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: Appellants challenge an order 

issued by the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility 

and Management Assistance Authority (Control Board), divesting the District of Columbia Board of Education of control over the District's public schools and transferring the 

vast majority of the Board of Education's powers to an 

Emergency Transitional Education Board of Trustees. The 

district court dismissed appellants' claims that the order 

exceeded the scope of the Control Board's statutory authority 

and violated appellants' Fifth Amendment rights. We affirm 

in part and reverse in part.

I.

The District of Columbia Board of Education was created 

by Congress in 1906. At the time of its inception, its nine 

members were appointed by the judges of the Supreme Court 

of the District of Columbia (something of a forerunner to the 

present federal courts). Congress placed "control" of the 

District's public schools in the Board of Education, giving it a 

wide range of powers, including determination of general 

educational policy, appointment of teachers, and selection and 

supervision of the Superintendent. In 1968, Congress 

changed the method of selecting the Board of Education to 

election by District citizens. Five years later, Congress 

passed the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (Home Rule Act), which granted greater rights of self-determination to District citizens and 

set forth the structural framework of the District government 

in the District Charter. Similar in certain respects to a state 

constitution, the Charter established the Board of Education 

as one of five independent agencies existing outside the 

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 2 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

control of the executive or legislative branches of the District 

government. Home Rule Act ' 495, D.C. CODE ANN. 

' 31-101 (1981). Under the Charter, the Board of Education 

retained all authority that previously had been granted to it 

by Congress, including "control of the public schools." The 

Board of Education is required to appoint a Superintendent 

who "shall have the direction of and supervision in all matters 

pertaining to the instruction in all the schools under the 

Board of Education." D.C. CODE ANN. ' 31-107 (1981). The 

Superintendent may be removed at any time by the Board of 

Education "for adequate cause affecting his character and 

efficiency as Superintendent." D.C. CODE ANN. ' 31-110 

(1981).

In 1995, 22 years after the advent of home rule, Congress 

found that the District government was in the midst of a 

"fiscal emergency," plagued by "pervasive" mismanagement 

and "fail[ing] to deliver effective or efficient services" to 

residents. District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and 

Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-8, 

' 2(a)(1), (2) & (4), 109 Stat. 97, 98 (1995) (FRMAA). In 

response, it established what is popularly known as the 

Control Board. Composed of five members appointed by the 

President of the United States, the Control Board has been 

given wide-ranging powers to improve the District government's operations.

In 1996, Congress amended the FRMAA to strengthen the 

Control Board. Under section 207(d), it was given the ability 

to issue:

such orders, rules, or regulations as it considers appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act and the 

amendments made by this Act, to the extent that the 

issuance of such an order, rule, or regulation is within 

the authority of the Mayor or the head of any department or agency of the District government, and any such 

order, rule, or regulation shall be legally binding to the 

same extent as if issued by the Mayor or the head of any 

such department or agency. (Emphasis added).

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 3 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The Control Board, exercising power under that section, 

issued an order on November 15, 1996, reorganizing administration of the District's public schools. After finding what it 

perceived as the alarming condition of the school system, the 

November Order "established a 9-member Emergency Transitional Education Board of Trustees ... to assume immediate responsibility for the operation and management of the 

District of Columbia public school system." 1 November Order at & 2. The Board of Trustees was delegated "all the 

authority, powers, functions, duties, responsibilities, exemptions, and immunities of the Board of Education." Id. at & 6. 

The Order also discharged the Superintendent and redesignated his position as the CEO-Superintendent, an agent 

of the Control Board. The Control Board asserted the power 

to appoint the first CEO-Superintendent, but delegated the 

responsibility to appoint his successors to the Board of Trustees subject to the Control Board's approval. The Control 

Board or the Board of Trustees with the approval of the 

Control Board was empowered to remove the Superintendent 

from office at will. Id. at WW 7, 21. The Board of Education 

was left only with authority to license charter schools and to 

provide advice to the Board of Trustees, although its President was made a member of the Board of Trustees.

The Control Board's order relied on authority under section 207(d) to step into the shoes of the Board of Education, 

and with that power it in turn relied on D.C. Code section 

31-107, which reads in part, "[t]he Board of Education is 

authorized to delegate any of its authority to the Superintendent. The Superintendent is authorized to redelegate any of 

his or her authority subject to the approval of the Board." 

The order, however, provides for a direct delegation from the 

__________

1 The Board of Trustees is made up of five members appointed 

by the Control Board, a parent with at least one child in the District 

public schools (selected by the Control Board from a list of three 

parents provided by the Mayor), a teacher in the District public 

schools (selected by the Control Board from a list of three teachers 

provided by the Council), the CEO-Superintendent of the public 

school system, and the President of the Board of Education. November Order at & 2.

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 4 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Control Board to the Board of Trustees and a direct delegation from the Control Board to the Superintendent to perform 

all the duties theretofore performed by the old Superintendent as well as any other powers delegated by the Board of 

Trustees.

Appellants are 11 present and former members of the 

Board of Education who voted in the November 1996 Board 

of Education elections and sued in the district court seeking 

declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed for a number 

of reasons that the order exceeded the Control Board's 

authority and even violated the Constitution by abridging 

their Fifth Amendment right to vote for school board members. The district court rejected all of appellants' claims on a 

motion to dismiss. Addressing appellants' argument that 

even if the Control Board had the power to step into the 

shoes of the Board of Education it surely could not, in that 

capacity, delegate the Board of Education's responsibility to a 

Board of TrusteesCit could only delegate to the SuperintendentCthe court said,

In promulgating the November Order, the Control Board 

delegated nearly all of the Board of Education's authority to the Board of Trustees. Some of that power has 

been re-delegated by the Board of Trustees to the CEOSuperintendent. D.C. Code section 31-107 clearly contemplates that such a delegation would be lawful if 

undertaken by the Board of Education itself to the 

Superintendent, and by the Superintendent to a third 

party. Therefore, the delegation, when undertaken by 

the Control Board, standing in the Board of Education's 

shoes, must also be lawful under FRMAA section 207(d).

Shook v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility and Management Assistance Auth., 964 F. Supp. 416, 429 (D.D.C. 1997) (emphasis 

added).

II.

The Control Board contends, prompted by our own request 

that both parties discuss the issue, that we lack jurisdiction to 

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 5 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

review its action because section 207(d)(3) of the statute 

creating the Control Board provides that: "[t]he decision by 

the [Control Board] to issue an order, rule, or regulation 

pursuant to this subsection shall be final and shall not be 

subject to judicial review." We certainly respect congressional limitations of judicial review, see, e.g., Ayuda, Inc. v. 

Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1339-40 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated,

498 U.S. 1117 (1991), aff'd on remand, 948 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 

1991), vacated sub nom. Ayuda, Inc. v. Reno, 509 U.S. 916 

(1993), aff'd on remand, 7 F.3d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. 

denied, 513 U.S. 815 (1994), but we are bound to follow the 

Supreme Court's doctrine under which "[t]he presumption in 

favor of judicial review may be overcome only upon a showing 

of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative 

intent." Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 542 (1988) (citing

Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (citations 

omitted)).

With that in mind, we note that the preclusion of review 

language is rather peculiar. It does not say that an order 

issued by the Control Board is immune from judicial review, 

but rather that the decision to issue such an order is not 

reviewable. Turning to the legislative history for clarification, we find in the Conference Report accompanying the 

1996 Amendments an explanation that the language was 

designed to "waive[ ] all judicial review as to the authority of 

the control board to issue orders, rules, or regulations but 

does not waive judicial review as to the content of the orders, 

rules, and regulations." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-863, at 1182 

(1996). We confess that we are uncertain as to what line 

Congress was drawing. It appears most likely that Congress 

meant the Control Board could not be challenged as to its 

basic authority to issue orders, rules, or regulationsCit is an 

unpaid voluntary group that was to be recognized as exercising governmental powersCand that its internal decisionmaking process was not reviewable, but the actual content of 

individual orders could be challenged as exceeding its authority. The Control Board's counsel bravely asserted that no 

Control Board order, no matter how outrageous (including, 

hypothetically, taking control of the Prince George's County 

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 6 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

school system), could be challenged in federal court, but we 

simply do not believe that such an awesome delegation of 

unchecked authority can be drawn from Congress' unclear 

statutory wording (and an ambiguous Conference Report). If 

we had any doubt as to that conclusionCwhich we do notCwe 

would have to consider that preclusion of judicial review is 

particularly disfavored when applied to prevent a plaintiff 

from asserting a constitutional claim. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 

(1986).

III.

Turning to the merits, appellants present both broad and 

narrow challenges to the Control Board's order. The broad 

challengeCcontesting the Control Board's authority to encroach into the domain of the Board of EducationCis based 

primarily on the claim that the Control Board's power is 

limited vis-à-vis an independent agency of the District government. Section 207(d), upon which the Control Board 

relied, authorizes the Control Board to issue directives "to the 

extent that the issuance of such an order, rule, or regulation 

is within the authority of the Mayor or the head of any 

department or agency of the District government." It is 

clear that this section gives the Control Board enormous 

power vis-à-vis the Mayor, as well as all department and 

agency heads subordinate to the Mayor. It is also undisputed that section 207(d) does not grant the Control Board the 

same direct authority to act in the stead of the D.C. Council.2

__________

2 Other aspects of the FRMAA, however, greatly circumscribe 

the D.C. Council's power. Most notably, section 203(a) provides 

that all non-emergency acts passed by the Council and signed by 

the Mayor or passed by the Council over the Mayor's veto must be 

approved by the Control Board as consistent with both the District's financial plan and budget before they may be submitted to 

Congress in accordance with section 602(c)(3) of the Home Rule 

Act. Section 207(c)(1) also allows the Control Board, after consultation with Congress, to implement any of its own recommendations 

to ensure compliance with the District's financial plan or to improve 

the delivery of public services over the objection of the Council.

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 7 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

By not including in section 207(d) the term independent 

agency, by which the Board of Education sometimes is described in the same statute and other legislation dealing with 

the District, appellants argue Congress must not have intended the Board of Education and other independent agencies to 

be subject to this extraordinary Control Board power. They 

point to section 207(a)(3) of the FRMAA, which empowers the 

Control Board to make recommendations relating to "the 

structural relationship of departments, agencies, and independent agencies." (Emphasis added.) And, they refer us to 

section 305(5), which defines "District government" as "the 

government of the District of Columbia including any department, agency, or instrumentality of the government of the 

District of Columbia; [or] any independent agency of the 

District of Columbia established under part F of title IV of 

the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental 

Reorganization Act," which, as we noted, is the section of the 

District Charter designating the Board of Education and four 

other entities as independent agencies. (Emphasis added.) 

Because Congress has differentiated between agencies and 

independent agencies in these other provisions, appellants 

would have us read "any agency" as used in section 207(d) as 

limited to those departments and agencies under the Mayor's 

direct control.

The Control Board responds that "any agency," as a matter 

of simple English, includes "any independent agency," because the greater includes the lesser. See Acron Inv. v. 

Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 363 F.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 

1966) ("An 'independent agency' is no less an 'agency' in the 

ordinary sense of the word...."). It also points to at least 

two places in the original FRMAA where the single word 

"agency" has been understood to include the Board of Education. In section 301(a)(1)(C), the District's "budget" is 

defined to include "appropriations or loan or spending authority for all activities of all departments or agencies of the 

District of Columbia," (emphasis added), and in section 

302(c)(11), the Chief Financial Officer is assigned the duty of 

"[m]aintaining custody of all public funds ... of the District 

government (or any department or agency of the District 

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 8 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

government)" (emphasis added). Both of these provisions 

have been administered without protest under the assumption 

that the Board of Education was a covered "agency," and 

appellants do not claim that assumption is incorrect. Furthermore, section 5203(d)(5) of the 1996 FRMAA Amendments authorizes Control Board review of rulemaking of a 

"rule or regulation issued or proposed to be issued by the 

Mayor (or the head of any department or agency of the 

District government) in the same manner as such provisions 

apply to a contract or lease" (emphasis added). As the 

Control Board has the power to review an independent 

agency's contracts and leases pursuant to section 203(b)(2)(A) 

of the original FRMAA, the reference to "any department or 

agency" in the rulemaking review provision, the Control 

Board argues, similarly must encompass the Board of Education.

Although there is no definitive indication in the statute 

itself as to Congress' intent, the preamble to the FRMAA 

does include the finding that "the District of Columbia government fails to provide its citizens with effective and efficient services in areas such as education." FRMAA ' 2(a)(2). 

And turning again to the legislative history, we see no 

suggestion that Congress intended to exclude independent 

agencies, like the Board of Education, from the 207(d) power 

as one might expect to find if Congress had meant to draw 

the distinction. Indeed, the Conference Report accompanying the bill which includes section 207(d) expresses the conferees' concern about the "severe mismanagement of the 

District of Columbia Public School System" and states that 

"strong and immediate action must be taken to reverse this 

situation." H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-863, at 1180 (1996) 

(emphasis added). It was "anticipate[d] that the [Control 

Board] will take such action to improve the management of 

the District of Columbia Public Schools." Id. Appellants 

urge us to discount this language, pointing out that the 

conferees expressed their expectation in the section of the 

Conference Report dealing with the allocation of funds for 

"education facilities improvement," and not the section explaining the 207(d) power. We think the language is signifiUSCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 9 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

cant, however, because it refers to the management of the 

schools generally rather than to the management of school 

facility improvements, which is discussed later in the same 

section of the Conference Report.

The only provision in the FRMAA that could authorize the 

Control Board to take such immediate (and strong) action is 

section 207(d). Although the Control Board could implement 

recommendations for reorganizing administration of the 

schools under section 207(c), its action would not be immediate. The District government is given 90 days in which to 

respond to such recommendations, and if the Control Board's 

recommendations are rejected, they can only be implemented 

after consultation with the appropriate congressional committees. While we find it a bit mystifying that the conferees 

included this important indication of their purpose in the 

wrong section of the conference report, we nevertheless think 

it evidences Congress' understanding that the Control Board 

is able to use its 207(d) power to issue orders as if it were the 

Board of Education.

Even if the Control Board may use section 207(d) vis-à-vis

the Board of Education, appellants argue that it may not 

displace the Board of Education entirely because that would 

be inconsistent with the District Charter which specifically 

provides that "[t]he control of the public schools in the 

District of Columbia is vested in [the] Board of Education." 

D.C. CODE ANN. ' 31-101 (1981). The Charter, however, is 

simply an Act of Congress which can be modified either 

expressly or impliedly by Congress as it wishes. (Section 601 

of the Home Rule Act specifically reserves that power.) In 

that regard, the FRMAA is replete with modifications of the 

Charter. See, e.g., '' 106(a)(4), 108(b)(2), 201, 202, 203, 204, 

301, 302, 304. It seems rather obvious to us that once section 

207(d) is interpreted to permit the Control Board to step into 

the shoes of the Board of Education, it can no longer be said 

that the Board of Education has unchallengeable "control" of 

the District school system.

Still, appellants contend that even our reading of section 

207(d) merely gives the Control Board authority to issue

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 10 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

orders, rules, or regulations 3and does not prevent the Board 

of Education from issuing its own orders, rules, or regulations. But once the Control Board issues an order that could 

have been issued by the Board of Education, it is certainly 

not open to the Board of Education to take any act that would 

be inconsistent or in conflict with the Control Board's action. 

To be sure, section 207(d) does not explicitly restrict an 

agency's power to issue its own orders; but the effect is 

certainly implied. Congress, in a statute designed to ensure 

"efficient and effective" local government, FRMAA 

' 2(b)(4)(A), could not have possibly intended to create a 

system where neither the Control Board nor the Board of 

Education has the ultimate authority to implement policy. 

We think the Control Board can, by using section 207(d), 

assume any or all of the Board of Education's powers, and 

once it does so it surely "occupies the field." It is up to the 

Control Board, and only the Control Board, to determine 

what authority is left to the Board of Education.

Once we recognize that Congress has implicitly modified 

that section of the Charter vesting control of the schools in 

the Board of Education, it is apparent that appellants' constitutional arguments are based upon a false premise. It is 

claimed that appellants have a fundamental right to vote for a 

functioning Board of Education that has been taken away 

without due process. (What process they claim is due is 

__________

3

In a separate attack on the November Order, appellants 

assert that we should interpret "order, rule, or regulation" in a 

manner consistent with the D.C. APA. See D.C. CODE ANN. 

' 1-1502 (1981). But it is not apparent why the Control Board's 

order would not be considered an "order" as the term is defined in 

the D.C. APA. D.C. CODE ANN. ' 1-1502(11) ("the whole or any 

part of the final disposition ... in any matter other than rulemaking, but including licensing"). In any event, we reject appellants' 

premise. The plain language of the 1996 FRMAA Amendments 

does not suggest that "order, rule, or regulation" should be interpreted in a technical fashion. Section 5203(f) of the 1996 FRMAA 

Amendments, which includes section 207(d), is entitled "Granting 

[Control Board] Power to Issue General Orders." (Emphasis added.)

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 11 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

unclear.) They rely on several cases from our sister circuits 

holding that "once citizens are granted the right to vote on a 

matter, the exercise of that vote becomes protected by the 

Constitution even though the state was not obliged to allow 

any vote at all." Hussey v. City of Portland, 64 F.3d 1260, 

1263 (9th Cir. 1995); see Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 

(5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981).4 Appellants concede, howeverC

as they mustCthat their right to vote for a Board of Education, granted by Congress, can be taken away by Congress. 

See Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967) (threejudge court). Thus Congress' authorization to the Control 

Board to reduce, even drastically, the powers of the Board of 

Education does not raise an independent constitutional issue. 

Appellants are simply putting a constitutional gloss on their 

statutory claim.

IV.

Appellants' narrower challenge assumes, arguendo, that 

the Control Board can employ section 207(d) to put itself in 

the place of the Board of Education and assumes that it has 

done so by this order. According to appellants, the order is 

illegal, nevertheless, because it exceeds the Board of Education's powers. It will be recalled that section 207(d) permits the Control Board to issue only those rules, regulations, 

or orders that are "within the authority of the ... head ... of 

any agency." And under D.C. law, "[t]he Board of Education 

is authorized to delegate any of its authority to the Superintendent," who in turn "is authorized to redelegate any of his 

or her authority subject to the approval of the Board."

__________

4

In contrast to this case, both Duncan and Hussey involved 

abridgements of statutory rights to vote, which had never been 

repealed by state legislatures. In Duncan, the Fifth Circuit held 

that officials in the State of Georgia's executive branch had usurped 

the voters' statutory right to fill a seat on the Georgia Supreme 

Court. Duncan, 657 F.2d at 708. It seems to us, however, that the 

question there was strictly one of state law. Hussey, on the other 

hand, is not really on point as it involved an equal protection 

challenge to a Portland city ordinance that the Ninth Circuit held 

impermissibly burdened a statutory right to vote on annexation 

granted by the Oregon state legislature. Hussey, 64 F.3d at 1262.

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 12 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

It is perfectly clear that, notwithstanding the Control 

Board's citation of section 31-107 and the district court's 

conclusion that the Control Board adhered to that section, the 

Control Board did not follow section 31-107. For one thing, 

the Control Board, acting in the stead of the Board of 

Education, summarily fired the Superintendent without even 

mentioning a cause as required by section 31-110. See

November Order at & 21. The prior Superintendent has not 

sued, but since the Control Board's order purports to assert 

the same powerCto discharge the Superintendent at willCwe 

are obliged to conclude that the order's claim to that authority is contrary to law.

The Control Board's order delegates to the newly designated CEO-Superintendent (we do not think there is any legal 

significance to the new title) the same broad authority the 

Board of Education had given to the prior Superintendent, 

November Order at & 8. This seems unobjectionable. But 

the Control Board further delegates to the Board of Trustees, 

and not the Superintendent, "the immediate responsibility for 

operation and management of the District of Columbia public 

school system." Id. at & 2. In other words, the order 

recognizes the Superintendent as the chief executive but gives 

to the Board of Trustees the overall governing responsibility. 

Yet section 31-107 does not explicitly authorize the Board of 

Education to delegate to anyone but the Superintendent. 

The Control Board responds that section 31-107 does not 

expressly prohibit the Board of Education from delegating to 

another entity besides the Superintendent and therefore 

there is no reason to read into the statute an implied limitation. As expected, appellants rely on the ancient maxim of 

statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius,

"the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another." 

In Halverson v. Slater, No. 96-5151, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Cir. 

Nov. 12, 1997), we recently applied the maxim. There, Congress statutorily authorized the Secretary of Transportation 

to delegate certain powers to Coast Guard officials. The 

Secretary argued, however, that the statute did not prohibit 

him from delegating those powers to non-Coast Guard offiUSCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 13 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

cials as well. We held that the statute was intended to 

exclude delegations to non-Coast Guard officials. Id. at 18.

We have recognized, however, that this maxim is often 

misused. See Cheney R.R. Co. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 66, 68-69 

(D.C. Cir. 1990) (reviewing misapplications of the maxim); 

but cf. Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh,

868 F.2d 1285, 1293 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd by an equally divided 

Court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989) (explaining an appropriate use of 

the maxim). Sometimes Congress drafts statutory provisions 

that appear preclusive of other unmentioned possibilitiesC

just as it sometimes drafts provisions that appear duplicative 

of othersCsimply, in Macbeth's words, "to make assurance 

double sure." That is, Congress means to clarify what might 

be doubtfulCthat the mentioned item is coveredCwithout 

meaning to exclude the unmentioned ones. Cf. United States 

v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The 

maxim's force in particular situations depends entirely on 

context, whether or not the draftsmen's mention of one thing, 

like a grant of authority, does really necessarily, or at least 

reasonably, imply the preclusion of alternatives. That will 

turn on whether, looking at the structure of the statute and 

perhaps its legislative history, one can be confident that a 

normal draftsman when he expressed "the one thing" would 

have likely considered the alternatives that are arguably 

precluded. For that reason, we think the maxim should be 

used as a starting point in statutory constructionCnot as a 

close-out bid.

Bearing in mind the structure that Congress created to run 

the D.C. schools, we think, in this case, that the maxim points 

to a correct conclusion. It is unlikely that Congress drafted 

section 31-107 to reassure doubters that a Superintendent 

could indeed be the beneficiary of some general power of 

delegation possessed by the Board of Education, so that 

particular reason to mistrust the expressio canon is absent. 

Congress clearly expectedCprior to passage of the 

FRMAACthat the Board of Education itself, as we have 

previously discussed, would "control" the schools. It is generally understood in the American administrative experience, 

however, that a multi-member body is better suited to policyUSCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 14 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

making than to administration. In our system of government, broadly speaking, Congress sets policy to be executed 

by the President; in the private world, a corporate Board of 

Directors is expected to set policy that is executed by a CEO. 

Surely drawing on that tradition, Congress provided that the 

Board of Education could delegate to its subordinate executive, the Superintendent. Since the Superintendent was, in 

turn, authorized to subdelegate his functions, we think that 

necessarily implies that the Board of Education could not 

have bypassed the Superintendent and delegated executive 

functions to someone else. Moreover, it would be unusual, if 

not unprecedented, for Congress to authorize the Board of 

Education to delegate its own governing authority, its policymaking function, to another outside multi-member body. 

That sort of delegation is inconsistent with the grant of 

overall authority to the Board of Education wholly apart from 

any negative implication arising from the statute's express 

authority to delegate to the Superintendent. We therefore 

conclude that under section 31-107 the Board of Education

could not have delegated executive functions or policymaking 

authority to anyone but the Superintendent.

The Control Board contends that even though the order is 

not phrased in appropriate terms we should consider it as if it 

provided that the Control Board delegated to the Superintendent under section 31-107, and then he redelegated his 

authority to the Board of Trustees. But for reasons we have 

already suggested, we do not see how that scheme would 

work either. The Control Board's notion is inconsistent with 

the hierarchical framework Congress provided. We cannot 

read section 31-107 to permit the Superintendent to delegate 

the authority to supervise himself to another policymaking 

body. Surely it cannot be contemplated that the Board of 

Education could delegate to the Superintendent the power to 

hire and fire himself (a necessary predicate under the Control 

Board's theory if the Superintendent is to redelegate that 

power to the Board of Trustees). The Control Board's 

labored concept is thus at war with the statute's organizational structure. The Board of Education (or the Control Board 

standing in the Board of Education's shoes) is at the top of 

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 15 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the hierarchy. The Superintendent is second, and anyone 

receiving a subdelegation from the Superintendent is no 

higher than third. We therefore conclude that insofar as the 

Control Board exercised the Board of Education's authority, 

it could not have placed a third party in a position superior to 

the Superintendent.

There still remains the question, also raised by the Control 

Board, whether it can delegate its own section 207(d) authority to the Board of Trustees. This argument is premised on 

the notion that the Control Board has inherent delegation 

authority like other government agencies.5 Why could it not, 

therefore, delegate to the Board of Trustees its 207(d) power 

to step into the shoes of the Board of Education, thus 

investing the Board of Trustees in one fell swoop with the 

order-issuing and rulemaking powers of the Board of Education? Appellants answer that this approach is also inconsistent with congressional intent. Section 207(d) provides that 

when the Control Board exercises 207(d) powers vis-à-vis a 

department or agency head, it only has the power that the 

target official has, and, as we have seen, the Board of 

Education's powers to delegate are quite circumscribed. 

Therefore, to permit the Control Board to delegate the very 

207(d) power itself to another body to step into the shoes of 

the Board of Education would improperly circumvent that 

__________

5 Appellants point out that another provision of the Act, section 

103(b), does actually give the Control Board authority to delegate 

the powers granted "by [that] section." (Section 103 authorizes the 

Control Board to obtain information, issue subpoenas, dispose of 

gifts, and seek judicial enforcement of its orders.) Accordingly, 

again appellants brandish the expressio unius maxim. But here is 

a perfect example of a situation where the maxim by itself is 

unpersuasive because there is not much reason to think that the 

draftsmen were considering, when they drafted section 103(b), 

whether or not the Control Board should have or did have authority 

to delegate under other sections. They may well have been focusing only on ensuring that the Control Board did have delegation 

authority under section 103. Since we think the negative implication is weak, so is the maxim. It helps appellants but not very 

much.

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 16 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

limitation. We think there is a good deal of force to appellants' position, but we need not decide that question. Although the Control Board may have its own delegation powers 6

that could be used to subdelegate to one of its own 

members or staff prior to, during, or after stepping into the 

shoes of the Board of Education, and which differ in some 

ways from the delegation powers of the Board of Education, 

we still do not think that the Control Board can redelegate its 

207(d) power to an outside body.

It would be implausible to describe the Board of Trustees 

in this instance as the Control Board's subdelegee. (It should 

be noted that Congress did provide the Control Board with 

an Executive Director and staff, who are hired by the Executive Director with the approval of the Control Board's chair.) 

While the Trustees must "report to the [Control Board]," and 

their powers over the appointment and removal of the Superintendent are subject to the Control Board's approval, the 

Trustees are clearly neither part of the "small professional 

staff" of the Control Board, nor the "experts or consultants" 

contemplated in the legislative history of the FRMAA, see

H.R. REP. No. 104-96 (1995); most of their broad authority to 

set D.C. school policy is not even subject to the Control 

Board's approval.

The Control Board's power under section 207(d) to issue 

orders, rules, and regulations is, after all, quite extraordinary. 

The specific qualifications set forth in section 101(c) of the 

FRMAA for Control Board membership and the mechanism 

of Presidential appointment of the Control Board in section 

__________

6 The Supreme Court's cases are not one-sided as to whether 

an agency officer has the inherent ability to delegate his powers to 

subordinates. Compare Cudahy Packing Co. of La. v. Holland, 315 

U.S. 357, 366 (1942) (concluding Congress intended "that the subpoena power shall be delegable only when an authority to delegate 

is expressly granted"), with Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking &

Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947). We often have upheld an agency 

head's ability to delegate duties to subordinate officers, see, e.g., 

SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1027-28 (D.C. Cir. 

1978) (allowing delegation of subpoena power to SEC staff), but 

these cases do not involve delegations of agency authority to outside 

parties.

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 17 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

101(b) indicate that Congress wanted the Control Board itself 

to exercise the powers of governance over the District.7 We 

certainly recognize, however, that the Control Board might 

wish to be able to call upon others in the community to 

provide advice as to the Control Board's exercise of its 

authority over the D.C. schools. It may wish to use a body 

with the prestige and expertise of the Board of Trustees to 

fill that role, reconstituted perhaps, as an advisory board 

charged with recommending certain actions and policies to 

the Control Board.

* * * *

We reject appellants' broad challenge to the Control 

Board's authority over the Board of Education, but we hold 

that those portions of the order that created and delegated to 

the Board of Trustees are ultra vires, and the provision 

permitting the Control Board to discharge the Superintendent at will is also contrary to law. Employing our remedial 

discretion, however, past acts of the Board of Trustees are 

accorded de facto validity. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 

(1976); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 440 (1886). 

We see no benefit in plunging the District's school system 

into further chaos by invalidating all actions taken by the 

Board of Trustees over the past year. The judgment of the 

district court is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part.

__________

7

In this context there is no need to be concerned about 

administrative efficiency, cf. Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. at 123 (Jackson, J., concurring); SEC v. Arthur 

Young & Co., 584 F.2d at 1026, because of the Board of Education's 

and thus the Control Board's authority to delegate to the Superintendent, as well as the Control Board's ability to utilize its own 

Executive Director.

USCA Case #97-7087 Document #320655 Filed: 01/06/1998 Page 18 of 18