Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01533/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01533-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Partial Service

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONNIE PHILLIPS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BRAMUCCI, et al., 

Defendants.

 

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No. C 15-01533 EJD (PR)

ORDER OF PARTIAL SERVICE;

DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

DIRECTING DEFENDANTS TO

FILE DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR

NOTICE REGARDING SUCH

MOTION; INSTRUCTIONS TO

CLERK

Plaintiff, a state prisoner at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), filed the

instant civil rights action in pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against prison

officials. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted in

a separate order. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must

identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious,

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For the Northern District of California

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According to the complaint, prison officials accused Plaintiff of previously

assaulting them. (Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff claims that four prison officers were

beating and pepper spraying him in full view of the entire prison yard and that some

prisoners chose to intervene and assaulted staff. (Ibid.) Plaintiff states that these

prisoners did not know him and that Plaintiff had lost consciousness at the time of

the assault on the prison guards. (Ibid.) 

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fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se

pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff’s primary claim is that his placement in, and continued retention in,

Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) violates his constitutional rights. According to the

complaint, on or about late 2005, Plaintiff was wrongly validated as a prison gang

member and assigned to isolation in the SHU in retaliation for his litigation against

prison officials; in retaliation for an altercation between Plaintiff and prison

officials,1

 and as part of prison officials’ attempt to isolate black inmates in SHU in

response to “overblown” fears of a race riot. (Compl. at 7, 9.) 

Plaintiff was wrongly housed in SHU facilities intended for members of the

four main prison gangs (Aryan Brotherhood, Black Guerilla Family, South Mexican

Mafia, Northern Familia). (Id. at 11.) These facilities have “specific atypical

hardships” distinct from and more onerous than those founds in other regular SHU

facilities. (Ibid.) These restrictions include: taunting, physical attacks, and hate

from all four main prison gangs; no real possibility for parole or release from SHU;

and prohibiting him from corresponding with his only child. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff was eligible for inactive review and release from SHU in 2012,

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pursuant to a 2012 Special Threats Group (“STG”) plan implemented by Defendant

Stainer, which requires that an inmate’s gang status be reviewed every four years;

previously, an inmate’s gang status was reviewed every six years. (Id. at 8–9.) 

However, Plaintiff has been wrongfully denied an inactive review, while other

similarly situated prisoners are both reviewed and released from SHU. (Id. at 8.) 

In January 2012, Defendant Barneburg falsely claimed that gang-related

materials had been discovered during a search of Plaintiff’s cell and submitted them

to the Office of Correctional Safety (“OCS”). (Compl. at 5, 8.) The OCS

“maliciously approved the items” as gang-related without taking into account

Plaintiff’s written objections. (Id. at 5, 8.) This false evidence of gang activity was

used to “misinform[] the decisions at plaintiff’s 2013 and 2014 annual committees

regarding eligibility.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff claims that the submission of false

evidence was initiated by Defendant Murphy. In support of this allegation, Plaintiff

states that at his initial validation, Murphy “promised” that Plaintiff would spend the

rest of his life in SHU if he did not “confess and separate from a statewide

conspiracy by black inmates to kill staff.” (Id. at 5.) 

Plaintiff appears to have been re-validated as a prison gang member in 2012. 

(Compl. at 15.) 

At Plaintiff’s annual hearing on October 30, 2013, Plaintiff requested inactive

review pursuant to the new regulations. (Compl. at 5.) PBSP Warden Barnes

informed Plaintiff that he was ineligible for inactive review due to the November 4,

2010 discovery of a “stale address book.” (Ibid.) On or around October 2014, in

preparing for his annual hearing, Plaintiff informed his correctional counselor

Defendant Walsh that his 128-B-2 listed two different inactive dates, only one of

which was correct. (Compl. at 6.) On October 1, 2014, Walsh “botched” the annual

hearing by using the incorrect inactive date. (Ibid.) Defendant Puget promised to

clear up the misunderstanding and that Plaintiff’s inactive review would take place

in 2015. (Ibid.) 

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Plaintiff attempted to file a complaint against Walsh for misconduct by a

peace officer pursuant to Section 148.6 of the California Penal Code. (Compl. at 6.) 

On December 19, 2014, Plaintiff was deterred from filing his complaint by

Defendants Ducart and Bramucci. (Ibid.) 

Plaintiff requested that Walsh postpone his parole hearing until Plaintiff was

released from SHU. (Compl. at 6.) Plaintiff believes that his status as an active

gang member and his housing in SHU — which would require that he appear before

the parole board in mechanical restraints — would prejudice him with the parole

board. (Id. at 6 and 16.) On January 7, 2015, Walsh claimed that he was unable to

process Plaintiff’s postponement request and directed Plaintiff to stipulate to the

Board of Parole that he was unsuitable for parole. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that

Walsh’s actions were taken in retaliation for Plaintiff’s attempt to file an action

against him pursuant to Section 148.6. (Ibid.) 

On January 9, 2015, Defendant Frisk authored a gang investigation report

concluding that there was insufficient evidence to validate Plaintiff as an active

associate of the Black Guerilla Family prison gang. (Compl. at 15.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that prison officials have further violated their own

regulations and policies in the following ways: (1) housing Plaintiff in PBSP SHU

despite his mental health issues; (2) refusing to allow Plaintiff to correspond with his

daughter; (3) maliciously disposing of Plaintiff’s personal family photos, 50 postage

stamps, and his television; (4) on February 14, 2012, prison officials intimidated

Plaintiff into relinquishing his personal prescription glasses (Compl. at 9–10.)

Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that prison officials have retaliated and

discriminated against black prisoners for participating in hunger strikes, by

cancelling PBSP’s black entertainment station, and by expanding the criteria for

prison gangs to encompass black street gangs that did not previously fall within the

four major groups. 

Plaintiff names the following prison officials as defendants: California

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Plaintiff incorrectly claims that his federal due process rights arise under the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against

governmental deprivations of “life, liberty or property,” as those words have been

interpreted and given meaning over the life of our republic, without due process of

law. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1972); U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. The Eighth Amendment, however, does not address due process rights. It

prohibits excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment. U.S.

Const. amend. VIII.

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Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Director D. Stainer; PBSP

Warden Ducart; PBSP Associate Warden Puget; OCS Officer Murphy; OCS Officer

Rogers; PBSP Assistant Governmental Prog. Analyst; PBSP Chief Deputy Warden

Bradbury; PBSP Institutional Gang Investigation (“IGI”) Officer Barneburg; PBSP

Correctional Counselor Walsh; Townsend; Hubbard; Swift; Tupy; and Frisk. 

(Compl. at 4, 11, 12, and 15.)

C. Analysis

1) Due Process2

Plaintiff claims that his indeterminate SHU term for gang association violates

his due process rights in the following ways: (1) Defendants Stainer, Hubbard,

Ducart, Puget, Murphy and Frisk placed and/or retained Plaintiff in SHU on the

basis on erroneous, unreliable, and untrue information that fails to satisfy the “some

evidence” standard; (2) Defendants Ducart, Puget, and Walsh failed to provide

meaningful classification reviews in 2013 and 2014; (3) Defendants Stainer,

Hubbard, Ducart, Puget, Murphy and Frisk’s incorrect labelling of Plaintiff as a

gang member prevents him from becoming an inactive gang member since that

process requires him to divulge information about his non-existent gang

membership; (4) Defendants Stainer, Hubbard, Ducart, Puget, Murphy and Frisk’s

gang validation and debriefing process is merely a pretext for retaining Plaintiff in

SHU; and (5) Defendants Stainer, Hubbard, Ducart, Puget, Murphy and Frisk failed

to assess the reliability of the items used to validate him and failed to show that

these items related to actual gang activity.

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Plaintiff challenges the regulations governing gang validation as void for

vagueness because the regulations grant unbridled discretion to CDCR Director

Stainer and senior staff to “pick and choose who to review for release;” fail to give

inmates adequate notice of what conduct is permissible under the new STG label

system; and cannot be enforced fairly because they lack clear standards. 

 When placement in administrative segregation impairs an inmate’s liberty

interest, the Due Process Clause requires prison officials to provide the inmate with

“some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to

the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative

segregation.” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Toussaint

v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1099 (9th Cir. 1986)). In addition to the notice and

opportunity for presentation requirements, due process requires that there be an

evidentiary basis for the prison officials’ decision to place an inmate in segregation

for administrative reasons. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985);

Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104–05. This standard is met if there is “some evidence”

from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. Hill,

472 U.S. at 455; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1105. The evidence relied upon must have

“some indicia of reliability.” See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146, 1273–74

(N.D. Cal. 1995). The “some evidence” standard applies to an inmate’s placement in

SHU for gang affiliation. See Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287–88. In addition, due process

requires that prison officials engage in some sort of periodic review of an inmate’s

confinement in administrative segregation. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477

n. 9 (1983) abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472

(1995); Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1101. Lower courts have found that those periodic

reviews must be more than “meaningless gestures” to satisfy due process. Toussaint

v. Rowland, 711 F.Supp. 536, 540 n.11 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (citing Toussaint, 801 F.2d

at 1102). Accordingly, liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations challenging his

placement and continued retention in administrative segregation in the SHU state

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Although Barneburg is not named in this cause of action, the body of the

complaint indicates that Barneburg submitted the false evidence that resulted in

Plaintiff’s erroneous re-validation as a gang member, which is the focus of

Plaintiff’s due process claims.

4

Although Bradbury is not named in this cause of action, the complaint

indicates that Bradbury knew that there no evidence supporting Plaintiff’s validation

yet continued to retain Plaintiff in SHU, which is the focus of Plaintiff’s due process

claims.

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cognizable due process claims against Defendants Stainer, Barneburg,3 Bradbury,4

Murphy, and Walsh. 

Plaintiff fails to state due process claims against Hubbard, Ducart, and Puget. 

To state a claim against a state official under section 1983, Plaintiff must allege

direct individual participation by each “person” named as a defendant. Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). There is no allegations that either

Hubbard, Ducart or Puget directly participated in the due process violations above. 

Outside of the conclusory allegations about Hubbard in the cause of action,

there are no allegations of direct acts taken by Hubbard that violated Plaintiff’s due

process rights. Accordingly, Hubbard is DISMISSED from this action. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”)

(citation omitted). However, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend this claim against

Hubbard if he can truthfully do so. See, e.g., McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369

F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Leave to amend should be granted unless the

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts, and should be

granted more liberally to pro se plaintiffs.”). 

According to the complaint, Puget promised Plaintiff that he would clear up

the misunderstanding regarding the correct inactive date, and Ducart deterred

Plaintiff from filing a complaint against Walsh. Neither Puget nor Ducart are

alleged to have been involved in the validation or re-validation process. These

allegations are unrelated to Plaintiff’s due process challenges to the gang validation

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process. Accordingly the due process claims against Puget and Ducart are

DISMISSED with leave to amend, if Plaintiff can truthfully do so. 

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants have adopted vague rules regarding gang

validation is also DISMISSED with leave to amend. Pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, a complaint must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .” Fed. R. Civ.

Pro. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.

A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). Plaintiff has not specified which rules and/or

regulations are vague. Defendants do not have fair notice as to what regulations

violate his due process. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his claim, he should identify

the regulations that he is challenging and specify how each regulation violates his

due process rights. 

2. First Amendment / Retaliation

Plaintiff claims that his First Amendment rights were violated in the

following ways: (1) Defendant Tupy arbitrarily prohibited Plaintiff from

communicating with his child by claiming that she was not his “natural” daughter

despite prison records approving her as a visitor since her infancy in retaliation for a

a history of conflict between Tupy and Plaintiff dating back to 1996; (2) Warden

Ducart arbitrarily approved Tupy’s actions based on gang activity; and (3)

Defendants Ducart, Puget, Barneburg, Swift and Murphy, in their personal and

professional capacities, reviewed two of Plaintiff’s 2008 outgoing letters wherein he

ridiculed the prison administration’s housing policy for Crips gang members and

deemed them “gang activity” without basis. (Compl. at 13.) It appears that these

letters were confiscated by prison officials. (Id. at 18.) 

Retaliation by a state actor for the exercise of a constitutional right is

actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if the act, when taken for different reasons,

would have been proper. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,

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429 U.S. 274, 283–84 (1977). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor

took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005)

(footnote omitted). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege four out of the five elements of a

viable First Amendment retaliation claim. Plaintiff has not alleged that the type of

activity he was engaged in was constitutionally protected — nor can he. Personal

correspondence is not constitutionally protected conduct, and therefore not protected

conduct for the purpose of a First Amendment retaliation claim. See, e.g., Barnett v.

Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815–16 (9th Cir. 1994) (prisoner suing prison officials for

retaliation must allege inter alia that he was retaliated against for exercising his

constitutional rights). Because Plaintiff was not engaged in protected conduct, he

cannot (and has not) alleged that the retaliatory action was caused by Plaintiff’s

protected conduct. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that the retaliatory action advanced no

legitimate penological interest. Finally, he has not alleged any chilling effect on the

exercise of his First Amendment right. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff

seeks to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim, this claim is DISMISSED for

failure to state a claim.

However, liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a violation of his First

Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265

(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). 

Censorship of outgoing mail is justified only if (1) the regulation or practice in

question furthers one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security,

order and rehabilitation, and (2) the limitation on First Amendment freedoms is no

greater than necessary to further the particular government interest involved. See

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled on other grounds,

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Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413–14. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegation that

Defendants Tupy, Ducart, Puget, Barneburg, Swift, and Murphy prevented him from

corresponding with his daughter, and from sending out correspondence ridiculing

the prison administration by falsely claiming that the correspondence was gangrelated states a cognizable First Amendment claim.

3. First Amendment, Equal Protection, Right to Associate

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated his “First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to associate with family and friends of his own racial group by

enforcing promulgating and implementing rules and/or regulations which effectively

forbid Plaintiff in total isolation from associating with his family, friends, and even

cancelling (after 23 years) the only black T.V. station democratically installed for

racial balance (1991). Said rules/regulations forbid innocent correspondences,

communications or contacts by or between black inmates in particular once it is

alleged that one is in any distant way associated with the defunct pro-black prison

gang.” (Compl. at 14.) 

Pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, a complaint

must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff has not specified which rules and/or

regulations he feels wrongfully forbids his association with his friends and family

and with inmates of other races. 

Further, to the extent that Plaintiff challenges restrictions on his right to

associate with his friends and family members, the Court notes that while the

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It is unclear whether the right to intimate association is rooted in the First

Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gardner v. Barry, No.

1:10-CV-0527, 2010 WL 4853885, at *5 n. 5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2010) (detailed

analysis of “right to intimate association” caselaw).

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Supreme Court has recognized a right to intimate association,5 e.g., the right to

maintain private relationships free of state intrusion, see Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity,

Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 2000), “[a]n inmate does not

retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration,” and “freedom of association is

among the rights least compatible with incarceration,” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S.

126, 131 (2003). Accordingly, “[s]ome curtailment of that freedom must be

expected in the prison context.” Id. 

With respect to Plaintiff’s challenges to restrictions on his right to associate

with members of his own racial group, the Court notes while there are claims that

can be stated for racial discrimination, this Court is unaware of legal basis for claim

under Section 1983 for infringing on an inmate right to associate with persons of the

same race. The Constitution protects the right to associate in two distinct senses: (1)

intimate association, as discussed above, and (2) expressive association, e.g., “the

right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the

First Amendment — speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the

exercise of religion.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). The

Constitution does not protect the right to associate with members of one’s racial

group. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that he has been denied his right to associate

with family, friends, and members of his own racial group is DISMISSED for failure

to state a claim. 

However, it appears that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim under the

Equal Protection Clause regarding the cancellation of the only black television

station. Plaintiff alleges that the prison is required to have racial balance in its

television programming and that the black television station was in retaliation for a

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successful hunger strike that resulted in negotiations and two proposed Senate bills. 

(Compl. at 19.) Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (“Prisoners are

protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from

invidious discrimination based on race.”) (citation omitted).

4. Cruel and Unusual Punishment — SHU Placement

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated his rights to be free from cruel

and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment when they

“maliciously and sadistically” placed and retained him in a SHU particularly

designed for prison gang members, knowing that Plaintiff was not a prison gang

members; and when they refused to release him even though he had met the prison’s

criteria of staying free of gang activity for a certain amount of time. 

However, the placement and retention of an inmate in segregated housing,

even for an indeterminate period of time, does not in and of itself implicate the

Eighth Amendment. Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1494 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1984). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “administrative segregation . . . is within the terms of

confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence.” See Anderson v. County of

Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 (1995) (holding that

conditions associated with administrative segregation, such as confinement in a

single cell for most of the day, did not violate the Eighth Amendment). The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is not violated by

classification programs which pursue “important and laudable goals” and are

instituted under the State’s authority to operate correctional facilities. See, e.g., Neal

v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 833 (9th Cir. 1997) (classification program designed to

treat and reduce recidivism of sex offenders is well within state’s authority to

operate correctional facilities and does not violate contemporary standards of

decency). Accordingly, misclassification does not inflict pain so as to be cruel and

unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Hoptowit v. Ray,

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682 F.2d 1237, 1255–56 (9th Cir. 1982). Nor is being retained in SHU despite

eligibility for inactive status a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Hewitt, 459

U.S. at 468 (“[T]he transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive

quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a prison sentence.” ). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claims related to his alleged erroneous classification as a gang associate; his

placement in SHU; and retention in SHU are DISMISSED without leave to amend

for failure to state a claim. 

5. Excessive Confinement and False Imprisonment

Plaintiff alleges that he is being wrongfully housed in SHU by the actions of

Ducart, Puget, Townsend, Bradbury, Barneburg, Frisk, and Murphy, in violation of

his rights under the Eighth and 14th Amendment. (Compl. at 15.) Specifically,

Plaintiff alleges that although Frisk determined that there is no evidence justifying

Plaintiff’s continued retention in SHU or justifying his validation as an active prison

gang associate, OCS has validated him as a gang member or associate and Ducart,

Puget, Townsend, Bradbury, and Barneburg have approved this validation via the

prison grievance procedure. (Ibid.) Plaintiff further alleges that Murphy, a senior

agent at the OCS, has been instrumental in Plaintiff’s validation. (Ibid.) Plaintiff

also alleges that Defendants’ actions have effectively denied him parole. (Id. at 16.)

Plaintiff’s excessive confinement claim is DISMISSED for failure to state a

claim because there is no indication that Plaintiff has been incarcerated past the

maximum length of his sentence. See, e.g., Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d

Cir. 1993) (“Subjecting a prisoner to detention beyond the termination of his

sentence has been held to violate the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel

and usual punishment.”). 

False imprisonment is a state law tort, not a constitutional challenge. Under

California law, false imprisonment is the “‘unlawful violation of the personal liberty

of another.’” Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir.1998)

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(quoting Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.4th 744, 757 (1997)). “There are

two bases for claiming false imprisonment: imprisonment pursuant to a false arrest

and unreasonable delay in bringing the arrested person before a judicial officer.” 

Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff

does not allege that the arrest that resulted in his imprisonment was false; nor does

he allege an unreasonable delay before he was brought before a judicial officer. 

Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim is therefore DENIED without leave to amend

for failure to state a claim.

6. Cruel and Unusual Punishment — Denial of Correspondence

Plaintiff alleges that Stainer, Ducart, and Tupy’s refusal to allow him to

correspond with his daughter constituted cruel and unusual punishment because

Plaintiff had no one of his race to talk to while housed in isolation and Plaintiff

suffered from obvious hostilities from other inmates due to his SHU placement. 

(Compl. at 16.) Plaintiff alleges that the denial was both arbitrary and in bad faith. 

(Id. at 16–17.) He alleges that Tupy and Ducart created false justifications for

denying his correspondence. (Ibid.) He further alleges that this denial was in

retaliation for criticisms of prison officials in two out-going letters mailed in 2008. 

(Id. at 17.) 

Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim with respect to the

denial of correspondence with his daughter. Although the Eighth Amendment

protects against cruel and unusual punishment, “only those deprivations denying the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the

basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9–10

(1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, this claim is

DISMISSED without leave to amend for failure to state a claim.

7. State Created Liberty Interest

In this “cause of action,” Plaintiff restates his prior claims and casts them as a

violation of his state created liberty interest under Sections 3310-3320 and 3335-

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3341.5 of the California Code of Regulations, title 15. (Compl. at 19.) Assuming

arguendo that the above-referenced sections created a liberty interest, the deprivation

of a liberty interest is unconstitutional only if the inmate did not receive due process

of the law prior to the deprivation. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 244

(2005). In short, this cause of action is duplicative of his earlier due process claim

and is therefore DISMISSED.

8. Racial Discrimination, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982

Plaintiff claims that Ducart’s removal of the black entertainment television

network shortly after a successful hunger strike indicates “a policy of racial

deliberate indifference to maintenance of blacks’ contract.” (Compl. at 20.) 

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination through both state and private

action. See Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1989). Because of §

1981’s historical roots in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

it covers only acts involving intentional discrimination, excluding from the statute’s

reach actions that merely have a disparate effect. Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, 470

F.3d 827, 836 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citing Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v.

Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390–91 (1982)). Liberally construed, Plaintiff has

stated a claim that Ducart’s removal of the black entertainment station, and

Bramucci’s rejection of the related appeals, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

However, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 governs property rights and bars all racial

discrimination in the inheritance, purchase, lease, sale, holding and conveyance of

real and personal property. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The cancellation of the black

entertainment station does not implicate 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

42 U.S.C. § 1982 is DISMISSED without leave to amend for failure to state a claim.

9. Remaining Defendant Rogers

Plaintiff has also named C. Rogers, of the Office of Correctional Safety as a

defendant. There are no allegations against Rogers. Accordingly, Rogers is

DISMISSED from this action.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff has stated the following cognizable claims: violation of his

due process rights by Defendants Stainer, Barneburg, Bradbury, Murphy, and

Walsh; violation of his First Amendment rights to send outgoing mail by Tupy,

Ducart, Puget, Barneburg, Swift, and Murphy; cancellation of the only black

television station violated the Equal Protection Clause; and the 42 U.S.C. § 1981

claim against Ducart and Bramucci for cancelling the only black television station.

The following claims have been dismissed with leave to amend: due process

claims against Hubbard, Ducart and Puget; and the due process claim regarding

vagueness of regulations governing gang validation.

The following claims have been dismissed for failure to state a claim: First

Amendment retaliation claim; right to associate claim; Eighth Amendment claims

for alleged erroneous classification as a gang associate and related SHU term;

Eighth Amendment claim for denial of correspondence; state created liberty interest

claim; excessive confinement claim; and false imprisonment claim.

Defendant Rogers is dismissed from this action.

2. If Plaintiff wishes to amend his due process claims against Hubbard,

Ducart, and Puget, and/or to amend his due process claim regarding the gang

validation regulations, he must file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days

from the date this order is filed. The amended complaint must include the caption

and civil case number used in this order (15-01533 EJD (PR)) and the words FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. An amended complaint completely

replaces the previous complaints. Plaintiff must therefore include in his amended

complaint all the claims he wishes to present and all of the defendants he wishes to

sue, including the Eighth Amendment claim which the Court has already found

cognizable. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff

may not incorporate material from the prior complaint by reference. Claims and

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defendants not included in the First Amended Complaint will not be considered by

the Court. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). The amended

complaint must be simple, concise and direct and must state clearly and succinctly

how each and every Defendant is alleged to have violated Plaintiff’s federallyprotected rights. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Failure to file an amended complaint within thirty days and in

accordance with this order will result in a finding that further leave to amend

would be futile. The action will therefore proceed only on the cognizable claims

identified above.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to send Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form with his copy of this Order.

3. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for 

Waiver of Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a

copy of the complaint, all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order upon

Defendants Stainer and Murphy at California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento CA 94283; and Defendants

Ducart, Puget, Walsh, Barneburg, Tupy, Swift, and Bramuccci at Pelican Bay

State Prison (P.O. Box 7000, Crescent City, CA 95531-7000. The Clerk shall also

mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff. 

4. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the

summons and the complaint. Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified

of this action and asked by the Court, on behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the

summons, fail to do so, they will be required to bear the cost of such service unless

good cause shown for their failure to sign and return the waiver form. If service is

waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date that

the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be

required to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days from the day on which

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the request for waiver was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be

required if formal service of summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked to read

the statement set forth at the foot of the waiver form that more completely describes

the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of service of the summons. If service

is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before Defendants have been

personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the date on which

the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days from the date the waiver form is

filed, whichever is later. 

5. No later than ninety (90) days from the date of this order, Defendants

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion with respect to

the claims in the complaint found to be cognizable above. 

a. If Defendants elect to file a motion to dismiss on the grounds

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a), Defendants shall do so in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion

pursuant to Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied

Alameida v. Terhune, 540 U.S. 810 (2003). The Ninth Circuit has held that

Plaintiff must be provided with the appropriate warning and notice under

Wyatt concurrently with Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Woods v. Carey,

684 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2012). 

b. Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by

adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants are advised that summary judgment

cannot be granted, nor qualified immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If

any Defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary

judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment

motion is due. 

6. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date

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Defendants’ motion is filed. 

a. In the event Defendants file a motion for summary

judgment, the Ninth Circuit has held that Plaintiff must be concurrently

provided the appropriate warnings under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir.

2012). 

Plaintiff is also advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (holding party

opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable

issues of material fact on every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned

that failure to file an opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment may

be deemed to be a consent by Plaintiff to the granting of the motion, and granting of

judgment against Plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53–54

(9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1994). 

7. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days

after Plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

8. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is

due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

9. All communications by the Plaintiff with the Court must be served on

Defendants, or Defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a

true copy of the document to Defendants or Defendants’ counsel.

10. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or

Local Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

11. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must

keep the court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s

orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action

for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

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12. Extensions of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to be

extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

DATED: 

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge 

7/16/2015

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