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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 22, 2015*

Decided July 27, 2015

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐3417              

MICHAEL COLEMAN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

PARTHASARATHI GHOSH, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District   

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 3842

Edmond E. Chang,

Judge.

O R D E R

Michael Coleman, an Illinois prisoner, appeals the grant of summary judgment

for prison medical personnel in this deliberate‐indifference suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Coleman had experienced pain after knee surgery and a back injury, and he claimed that

the defendants did not effectively treat his pain or provide prescribed physical therapy.

But Coleman presented no evidence suggesting that the medical staff failed to exercise

their professional judgment in treating him, so we affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14‐3417    Page 2

Except as noted, we recount the facts in the light most favorable to Coleman, as

the party opposing summary judgment. See Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir.

2014). In December 2010 Coleman had surgery to repair torn cartilage in his right knee.

Upon returning to the prison after his surgery, Coleman saw Dr. Parthasarathi Ghosh,

who approved the surgeon’s recommendation for physical therapy and issued medical

permits for crutches and a knee brace, a low bunk, and the use of handcuffs in the front

instead of the back (as they usually are applied). Dr. Ghosh also prescribed

over‐the‐counter pain medications and told Coleman to begin applying weight to his

knee as tolerated. The next day Coleman was discharged from the health center with no

complaints and only minimal swelling. He followed up with doctors in the weeks after

his surgery, both at the hospital and the prison, and was observed to be healing well and

walking without assistance. In March Coleman wrote a formal complaint saying that his

knee was bothering him and that he had not yet received physical therapy, and medical

personnel scheduled him to be seen later that month. Coleman saw physician’s assistant

LaTanya Williams and Dr. Ghosh in March, and told them that he had not yet started

physical therapy. Dr. Ghosh wrote another referral for therapy. During this visit,

Coleman tells us, he complained about knee pain, though no complaint of knee pain is

documented in Dr. Ghosh’s progress note for this visit.

Then in May 2011 Coleman hurt his back when he fell in a stairwell, an incident

he attributes to his injured knee giving way. A few days later, and three more times over

the next two months, he visited a physical therapist. During his first visit, Coleman

complained that he was experiencing too much back pain to do the exercises. The

physical therapist did not detect a medical basis for Coleman’s reported pain and thus

told him that he needed to see a doctor before therapy sessions could go forward.

Coleman saw Dr. Ronald Schaefer in June 2011 and complained about his knee pain, and

the doctor prescribed a narcotic pain killer. The doctor did not restrict him from doing

physical therapy. But at each following therapy appointment, Coleman said his back

hurt too much to do the exercises, and in July 2011 the physical therapist discharged him

because he refused to participate.   

In response to Coleman’s continued complaints of knee pain, Dr. Imhotep Carter

ordered an X‐ray and prescribed steroid injections to help with inflammation and

encourage healing, and pain medication. Coleman made four more visits to Dr. Carter in

2011, during which the doctor, who suspected that Coleman was exaggerating his

symptoms, reviewed the X‐ray and examined Coleman’s knee and concluded that it was

normal and that the surgery site had healed and stabilized. At one of the visits, Coleman

told Dr. Carter that the steroid had helped but did not eliminate his knee pain, so

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Dr. Carter ordered an MRI of the knee, renewed Coleman’s medical permits, and

scheduled a follow‐up appointment. The doctor met with Coleman once more before the

end of 2011; he prescribed narcotic pain killers and also suggested a physical‐therapy

regimen that Coleman could do on his own. Meanwhile, Coleman says, he had been

sending letters to medical personnel complaining about unresolved pain in his knee and

back. Those letters were screened by prison administrators, but there is no evidence that

they were forwarded to the medical staff. Coleman started seeing a different doctor in

2012, and the new physician diagnosed an irregular kneecap, scarring from the surgery,

and mild swelling in his knee. The doctor did not observe any inflammation in his back,

however, and more X‐rays showed that his knee and back were normal.   

   

Coleman then sued physician’s assistant Williams; doctors Ghosh, Schaefer, and

Carter; and Wexford Health Sources, which employs all of them. Coleman claimed that

the defendants had been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing

to timely provide physical therapy and by failing to treat his knee and back pain. In

granting summary judgment for the defendants, the district judge concluded that

Coleman had not presented evidence that any defendant departed from accepted

professional norms by ordering X‐rays and MRIs and prescribing pain killers, injections,

crutches, and movement restrictions. And though Coleman alleged that doctors ignored

his complaints of pain, the district judge explained, he pointed to no evidence to show

that he saw doctors and complained of pain but was not treated. The judge also noted

that Coleman had never presented evidence that his written complaints about pain were

forwarded to the defendants. The district court finally concluded that Coleman lacked

evidence that Wexford had a policy or custom requiring doctors to limit their treatment

and therefore could not be liable under § 1983.   

   

Coleman’s appellate brief is the same document he submitted in opposition to the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment and does not comply with Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 28(a). Noncompliance with Rule 28, in particular its requirement

that an appellant make an argument, is ground for dismissal, see FED. R. APP. P. 28(a);

Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001), but the defendants have not

asserted that we should enforce this rule. At all events, our de novo review of the record

convinces us that the district court properly granted summary judgment for the

defendants.   

We can easily dispose of Coleman’s contention about physical therapy. He asserts

that he fell on the stairs and injured his back because the lack of prompt physical therapy

after surgery had weakened his knee, but he presented no evidence tying his fall to the

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delay in starting physical therapy. See Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013).

And Coleman’s refusal to participate in physical therapy contradicts his claim that the

defendants were deliberately indifferent to his needs. See Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494,

501 (7th Cir. 2000).

To survive summary judgment on his theory that the doctors denied

constitutionally adequate treatment for his knee and back pain, Coleman needed to

present evidence that “no minimally competent” doctor would have chosen that course

of treatment. See Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2008). Federal courts will not

second‐guess a prison physician’s treatment decision unless that choice was so

“significant a departure from accepted professional standards or practices” that it’s

questionable whether the physician actually exercised professional judgment.

See Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, Coleman stated during his

deposition that he was in pain and that he told doctors at various times that his back was

“killing” him. That would constitute evidence that he was in pain, though he did not

point to this testimony in any of his submissions at summary judgment. See Sterk v.

Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that district courts

are not required to sift record for evidence helpful to opponent of motion for summary

judgment).   

Still, his testimony changes nothing. Despite Coleman’s statements that he

complained to doctors about his pain, he also acknowledges that the defendants

provided a variety of treatments, including pain killers (both over‐the‐counter and

narcotic), exercise regimens, braces, movement restrictions, injections, X‐rays, and MRIs.

And he provided no evidence that he told the doctors the pain medication was not

working. While Coleman may think the medical attention he received was inadequate,

that disagreement with the defendants’ treatment plans is insufficient to overcome

summary judgment. See Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409; Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1012–13

(7th Cir. 2006).

Finally, because Coleman did not present evidence of an underlying

constitutional violation, the district court correctly concluded that Wexford cannot be

liable for deliberate indifference. See Pyles, 771 F.3d at 412.

AFFIRMED.

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