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Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-12769

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-00090-MP-CAS

DAVID A. BOYETTE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(February 18, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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David Boyette appeals the judgment of the District Court affirming the 

decision of the Acting Commissioner (“Commissioner”) of the Social Security 

Administration (“SSA”) denying his application for disability insurance benefits 

under Title II of the Social Security Act. The issue he presents is whether the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) “erred by not giving great weight to the 

decision of the Veterans Administration (“VA”) that [he] was . . . entitled to 

individual unemployable rating (100% disability rating) . . . as of November 21, 

2008.” Appellant’s Br. at 1. We conclude that the ALJ did not err in considering 

the VA’s disability finding and that substantial evidence supports the 

Commissioner’s decision. We therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment.1

 In determining whether the Commission’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, we are mindful that substantial evidence is “more than a 

scintilla.” Rather, it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion that a claimant is or is not entitled to benefits. 

 1

 Boyette’s applied for disability insurance benefits in February 2010, alleging that he 

became disabled on July 17, 2007, due to physical impairments. He worked after that, from 

April to November 2008, and from April to November 2009, as an assistant football coach for an 

average of two hours a day. He stopped working on both occasions not because of his disability 

but because the football season ended in November. The state agency responsible for disability 

determinations at the initial and reconsideration levels of review found Boyette not disabled. On 

June 13, 2011, the ALJ held a hearing on Boyette’s application for benefits. Boyette, who was 

represented by counsel, and a vocational expert testified at the hearing. 

Boyette testified that several conditions limited his ability to work: (1) degenerative disc 

disease; (2) degenerative joint disease/postthrombotic syndrome; (3) postphlebotic syndrome in 

his legs; (4) Factor V coagulation defect; (5) hypertension; (6) tinnitus; (7) tension headaches; 

(8) sleep apnea; and (9) chronic sinusitis. The ALJ found Boyette not disabled under the Social 

Security Act, concluding that he was still capable of performing his past relevant work as an 

administrative assistant and hearing officer. 

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Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per 

curiam). At the end of the day, if we conclude that the ALJ (whose decision 

became the Commissioner’s) ruled on the claimant’s application for benefits on the 

basis of such evidence, we will defer to the ALJ’s decision even if the evidence 

preponderates against it. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)

(per curiam). 

For Social Security purposes, “disability” is defined as the “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner uses a five-step, 

sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 

Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). This 

process includes an analysis of whether the claimant: (1) is unable to engage in 

substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe and medically determinable 

impairment; (3) has an impairment, or combination thereof, that meets or equals a 

Listing, and meets the duration requirement; (4) can perform his past relevant 

work, in light of his residual functional capacity (RFC); and (5) can make an 

adjustment to other work, in light of his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 

Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). The claimant’s RFC is an assessment, based upon 

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all the relevant evidence, of the claimant’s ability to do work despite his

impairments. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.945(a)(1). The claimant bears the “heavy burden” to demonstrate “both a 

qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore v. 

Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

The ALJ has a duty to make clear the weight accorded to each item of 

evidence and the reasons for those decisions, so as to enable a reviewing court to 

determine whether the ultimate decision is based on substantial evidence. Cowart 

v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981). “[T]here is no rigid requirement 

that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in [her] decision,” so long 

as the ALJ’s decision is not just “a broad rejection” that does not enable the 

reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant’s medical 

condition as a whole. Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211. The ALJ may make fact findings 

implicitly if the implication is sufficiently clear. See Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 

1177, 1178 nn. 1–2 (11th Cir. 1986) (discussing credibility findings).

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504, a decision by any other government 

agency, such as the VA, regarding a claimant’s disabled status “is based on [that 

agency’s] rules and is not [the commissioner’s] decision” as to disability. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1504. Instead, the Commissioner must “make a 

disability . . . determination based on social security law.” Id. VA disability 

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ratings are thus not binding on the ALJ, but such ratings should be considered and 

“given great weight.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 921 (11th Cir. 1984) 

(quotation omitted). In Rodriguez v. Schweiker, 640 F.2d 682, 686 (5th Cir. Unit 

A, March 25, 1981) (per curiam)2, the court stated that “[a] VA rating of 100% 

disability should have been more closely scrutinized by the ALJ,” because the ALJ 

mentioned the VA rating but “obviously refused to give it much weight.” The 

court noted that VA disability ratings are nonbinding but “should be considered” 

and are “entitled to great weight.” Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504.

In the instant case, the ALJ expressly acknowledged the VA’s determination 

that Boyette was entitled to total disability on the basis of individual 

unemployability (“TDIU”), and she also noted that this determination was not 

binding. Although the ALJ did not assign an express level of weight to the VA 

disability rating itself, except to say that it was not entitled to controlling weight, 

she scrutinized the VA’s decision and explained in detail why it was not entitled to 

controlling weight. The ALJ considered and assigned weight to the VA 

examiners’ opinions, VA primary care provider opinions, and VA treatment 

records. In fact, the ALJ appears to have given great weight to the VA examiners’ 

opinions that Boyette was capable of light or sedentary employment, which she 

concluded were consistent with the medical evidence and record evidence as a 

 2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981), this court adopted as 

binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.

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whole. However, the ALJ noted that other agencies determined disability under 

parameters other than those used by the SSA, and thus, while the clinical findings 

reported by the VA medical staff were given “appropriate weight,” the VA’s final 

opinion as to degree of disability was not entitled to controlling weight. Cf. 

Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that the ALJ

must give treating physician testimony substantial or controlling weight unless 

there is “good cause” not to do so, and explaining that good cause exists when the 

treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence, the evidence 

supported a contrary finding, or the opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with 

the physician’s own medical records). Thus, although the ALJ declined to give 

controlling weight to the VA disability determination and did not expressly state 

she gave “great” weight to it, there is no indication that she failed to give the VA’s 

determination great weight or consideration. See Brady, 724 F.2d at 921; see also

Parker, 793 F.2d at 1178 nn. 1–2. 

Boyette does not present any other objection to the ALJ’s decision. 

Although he contends that it is more difficult to obtain a TDIU rating than it is to

obtain SSA disability benefits, even the VA’s TDIU ratings are not binding on the 

ALJ and are not determinative as to whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence. See Brady, 724 F.2d at 921. Here, the ALJ correctly noted 

that the VA disability determination is guided by different factors than those for 

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SSA disability. Where, as here, the VA treatment notes, examining VA doctors’ 

opinions, treating doctors’ opinions, and state agency assessments all support the 

ALJ’s RFC assessment, the ALJ did not err in her treatment of the VA’s disability 

determination. Thus, the ALJ’s finding of no disability is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

AFFIRMED.

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