Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01222/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01222-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Plaintiff was implanted with an Automatic Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator system

in 2002 prior to his incarceration.

WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allen E. Elmore, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-1222-PHX-MHM (LOA)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. # 39)

and his Inquiry on Pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. # 72). The Court will

deny Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief.

A. Background

Plaintiff filed a pro se Amended Complaint in the Maricopa County Superior Court

in April 2005. See Elmore v. Schriro, et al., CV2005-0023541. On April 22, 2005 the action

was removed to this Court (Dkt. # 1). In his Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant's failure to properly monitor his implanted heart defibrillator and his heart

medications resulted in permanent or prolonged numbness in his hands and arms.1

 Plaintiff

further alleges that, as a result of the denial of treatment, he has suffered headaches, blurred

vision, tremors, loss of coordination, and loss of sleep. Plaintiff claims that Defendant's

refusal to properly treat and monitor his medical condition amounts to deliberate indifference

Case 2:05-cv-01222-MHM Document 85 Filed 04/24/06 Page 1 of 5
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in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, which was signed on April 6, 2005,

contends that Defendants have denied Plaintiff the prescribed treatment plan for his

implanted heart defibrillator for more than three months. He states that the treatment plan

called for a check-up with a medical specialist in January 2005. The purpose of this January

follow-up examination was to retrieve information from Plaintiff's medical implant device

for review and possible adjustment of treatment. Plaintiff claims that he has yet to be

scheduled for the requisite examination. Further, Plaintiff alleges that it has been

approximately one year since he has received proper medical tests or eye exams despite his

suffering from side effects associated with his medications. Plaintiff asserts that he has

notified Defendants of these side effects. He seeks a preliminary injunction requiring

Defendants to: (1) perform medical and/or laboratory tests to monitor his condition; (2)

ensure that Plaintiff meets his cardiologist appointments, or in the alternative, ensure that a

physician has access to and the means available to download information stored in Plaintiff's

medical implant device and adjust treatment accordingly; (3) monitor Plaintiff's medication

intake in accordance with proper medical standards; (4) train staff on his medication

requirements; and (5) allow emergency medical services and hospital care to be provided

immediately and without delay in the event of a heart failure. Plaintiff claims that without

such relief he faces a substantial risk of organ damage and serious physical injury.

Pursuant to Court Order (Dkt. # 38), Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff's Motion

for Preliminary Injunction on October 17, 2005 (Dkt. # 40). Defendants argue that Plaintiff

has failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits, or that he will suffer

irreparable injury that cannot be remedied by damages. The Response claims that Plaintiff's

implant device has been checked and blood tests have been conducted since the filing of the

Plaintiff's Motion. Plaintiff then filed an "Inquiry on Pending Motion for Preliminary

Injunction" in which he renews his Motion for Preliminary Injunction and states that he

continues to be denied the level of health care he would receive outside of prison, and that

his health has deteriorated (Dkt. # 72). 

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B. Legal Standard

The purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo or to prevent

irreparable injury pending the resolution of the underlying claim. Sierra On-Line, Inc. v.

Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984). "A preliminary injunction is

not a preliminary adjudication on the merits, but a device for preserving the status quo and

preventing the irreparable loss of rights before judgment." Textile Unlimited, Inc. v.

A..BMH and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2001). A request for injunctive relief

requires that Plaintiff make a showing of “real or immediate threat” of injury. HodgersDurgin v. de la Vina 199 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting City of Los Angeles v.

Lyon, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)). Plaintiff is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief only if

he shows either: “‘(1) a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable

injury, or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits and the balance of

hardships tipping in [the movant’s] favor. These two formulations represent two points on

a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability

of success decreases.’” MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 516-517 (9th

Cir. 1993). Under either formulation of the test, the movant must demonstrate a significant

threat of irreparable injury. AGCC v. Coalition for Economic Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410

(9th Cir. 1991). 

“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).

“To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious . . .

health needs, the prisoner must show that ‘the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to inmate health.’” Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing to Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994)). Delay of, or interference with,

medical treatment can also amount to deliberate indifference. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). However, "[m]ere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.’” Id.

Where the prisoner is alleging that delay of medical treatment evidences deliberate

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indifference, however, the prisoner must show that the delay was harmful. See Shapley v.

Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Further, “a mere

‘difference of medical opinion . . . [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate

indifference.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

In Farmer, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a request for an injunction to prevent

a substantial risk of serious injury from rising to actual harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. 825.

Although Farmer concerned the safety of inmates and the duty to protect prisoners from

violence, as opposed to a medical claim, it is analogous because the Court applied the Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference standard in its analysis. The Court found that:

to establish eligibility for an injunction, the inmate must demonstrate the continuance

of that disregard during the remainder of the litigation and into the future. In so

doing, the inmate may rely, in the district court's discretion, on developments that

postdate the pleadings and pretrial motions, as the defendants may rely on such

developments to establish that the inmate is not entitled to an injunction.

Id. at 846. 

Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is based on the alleged denial and delay of

treatment for the three to four months immediately preceding the filing of the Motion for

Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff specifically seeks a check of his implant device, and

additional monitoring in the form of laboratory and medical tests. In its Response,

Defendants outline the treatment provided to Plaintiff subsequent to the filing of Plaintiff's

Motion. Plaintiff's implant devise was evaluated on April 6, 2005 and again on July 6, 2005.

Plaintiff also received another EKG in May 2005, and extensive blood tests in June 2005.

Defendants attached as an exhibit a copy of Plaintiff's deposition taken in September 2005

in which he admits that he is no longer suffering from tremors, and he started to see better.

As set forth in Farmer, Defendants may rely on these post-pleading developments to support

their contention that Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief. 

 In his "Inquiry on Pending Motion for Injunctive Relief," which the Court construes

as a Motion to Renew, Plaintiff does not dispute that he received the treatment described by

Defendants since April 2005. Although Plaintiff asserts that his "side effects and health, has

[sic] gone from bad to worse," he fails to allege any specific facts giving rise to the

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possibility of irreparable injury (Inquiry at 1). As discussed supra, allegations demonstrating

a significant threat of irreparable injury are a baseline requirement for a preliminary

injunction. 

The treatment requested in the Motion for Preliminary Injunction has now been

provided. Plaintiff's Motion is therefore moot. The denial of Plaintiff's request for injunctive

relief, however, is not an adjudication on the merits of the underlying claim, nor does it bar

Plaintiff from filing any such requests in the future.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

(Dkt. # 39), and Plaintiff's Inquiry on Pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Motion

to Renew) (Dkt. # 72) are denied.

DATED this 21th day of April, 2006.

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