Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01216/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01216-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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 Plaintiff only refers to Duterte as “Director” in her 1

complaint. Compl. at 2:18. The court assumes that plaintiff

Duterte was the Director of CHSS.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TASHA SCOTT,

NO. CIV. 06-1216 LKK/EFB

Plaintiff,

v.

SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH AND SOCIAL O R D E R

SERVICES DEPARTMENT, SOLANO

COUNTY, PATRICK DUTERTE and

TRISH EDIE, et al,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, Tasha Scott (“Scott”), files suit against 

defendants Solano County, Solano County Health & Social Services

Department (“CHSS”), Patrick Duterte (Director of Solano CHSS) ,

1

and Trish Edie (plaintiff’s supervisor), alleging the following

claims against all defendants: 1) “Racial and Color Discrimination”

(Government Code § 12940, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 2)

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 Defendants make no claims concerning the § 1983 action. 2

Accordingly, it should not be dismissed. The claim, however,

assuming it is actually made, is intertwined with other causes of

action and must therefore be dismissed as badly pled. 

2

Harassment/Hostile Work Environment (Government Code § 12940, Title

VII); 3) Retaliation (Government Code § 12940); 4) Violation of the

Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 5) Intentional Infliction

of Emotional Distress; 6) Negligent Infliction of Emotional

Distress; 7) Employment Practices Discipline in Violation of Public

Policy; 8) Violation of Article 1, Section 7 of the California

Constitution; 9) Violation of Article 1, Section 8 of the

California Constitution; 10) Violation of Government Code § 12948;

11) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; 12)

Wrongful Termination; 13) Negligent Hiring, Supervising and/or

Training; 14) Defamation. 

Defendants move to dismiss all claims, except for claim five

(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress). I decide the

matter based on the pleadings, the parties’ papers and after oral

argument.2

I.

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, Tasha Scott, is an African-American woman who was

employed by defendant, CHSS, as an Employment Resource Specialist

from July 9, 2002 until her termination on October 14, 2004.

Compl. at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that she applied for supervisory

positions on or about January 2004 and May 2004, but that less

qualified Caucasian individuals were hired for such positions. Id.

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at 2. She contends that when she complained of race discrimination

because “she was more qualified than the person’s [sic] hired,” she

“became a target of retaliation.” Id.

Plaintiff maintains that during the course of her employment

she objected to violating the rights of her clients by “rushing

clients into signing documents stating they read and understood

their rights and responsibilities” when many of them could not read

or did not understand what they were signing. Compl. at 2. Scott

allegedly expressed concern to “lead worker” Dave Madden, who then

communicated plaintiff’s concerns on or about August 2004 to Trish

Edie (“Edie”), plaintiff’s supervisor. Plaintiff claims that

because of her complaints about rushing clients into signing

documents they did not understand, she was “singled out” and

“required to go through mandatory new employee training even though

she had already been employed more than two years and had exemplary

performance.” Id.

On September 22, 2004, plaintiff alleges that without any

warning or notice, she was removed from her position and “false

charges were levied against her,” accusing her of “dishonesty and

violation of company rules.” Compl. at 2. On October 14, 2004,

Scott’s union representative advised Director, Patrick Duterte, and

Human Resource [sic] Manager, Wayne Page, that there was no

evidence that plaintiff “exhibited any dishonesty or lack of

integrity or violated any policies.” Id. Nevertheless, Scott was

terminated by defendant on October 14, 2004. Id. 

 On December 16, 2005, plaintiff filed the instant suit in

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 Defendants explain that their notice of removal was filed 3

within thirty days of their receipt of the summons and complaint.

Notice of Removal at 2. 

4

Alameda County Superior Court. Plaintiff seeks general,

compensatory, special, and punitive damages, front pay and back

pay, and attorney’s fees. Compl. at 16. On June 5, 2006, defendants

removed the action from Alameda County Superior Court to this Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.3

II.

DISMISSAL STANDARDS UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must

be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every

reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).

Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact

if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged.

See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963)

(inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). So

construed, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle

him or her to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

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 The court is compelled to note that it has spent an 4

unreasonable amount of time adjudicating this matter because of

plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct. Although the court has sanctioned

plaintiff’s counsel $300 for twice failing to file an opposition

brief, and generously provided plaintiff’s counsel with a third

opportunity to file the brief, the opposition brief which was filed

on August 11, 2006 fails to adequately respond to defendants’

arguments. Of the ten pages submitted by plaintiff, a recitation

of the facts makes up six of those pages, and the standards make

up another page. In sum, it appears plaintiff’s counsel has filed

only three pages of argument that attempt to respond to

defendants’motion. Unfortunately, these three pages fail to

apprise the court of the relevant cases and issues. Plaintiff’s

counsel is admonished that her future failure to respond to the

court’s orders and to adequately represent her client will result

in severe sanctions, dismissal of the instant matter, and/or

referral to the California State Bar.

5

73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

In spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to the

plaintiff's allegations, however, it is not proper for the court

to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she]

has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . .

laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

III.

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss all but one of plaintiff’s fourteen

causes of action. The court turns to each cause of action and

explains why defendants’ motion must be GRANTED in part, and DENIED

in part.4

///

A. TITLE VII AND FEHA CLAIMS (CLAIMS 1,2,3)

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Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964 Act is codified as 5

Subchapter VI of Chapter 21 of Title 42 of the United States Code,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Title VII outlaws discrimination in

employment in any business on the basis of race, color, religion,

sex or national origin (see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). Title VII also

prohibits retaliation against employees who oppose such unlawful

discrimination. 

 FEHA, which is codified at § 12900 et seq. of the Government 6

Code, is a state antidiscrimination statute that confers on

employees a right against dismissal on certain grounds and creates

a remedy for its violation.

 To establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must 7

prove that defendants acted under color of state law, and deprived

Plaintiff of her constitutional rights. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48(1988). 

 Plaintiff’s allegations in claims one through three are 8

lodged at all defendants. Compl. at 4-7.

6

 Plaintiff’s first claim for relief alleges “Racial and Color

discrimination” pursuant to Title VII, the California Fair 5

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) , and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 6 7

Plaintiff’s second claim alleges “Harassment/Hostile work

environment” under Title VII and FEHA, while her third claim

alleges “Retaliation” under FEHA.8

Individual defendants Patrick Duterte, Director of CHSS, and

Trish Edie, plaintiff’s supervisor, move to dismiss the Title VII

and FEHA claims asserted against them, arguing that supervisors and

other individual employees are not an “employer” as defined under

Title VII and FEHA, and thus cannot be held personally liable.

Mot. at 4. Defendants maintain that only the county may properly

be considered plaintiff’s employer. 

Defendants are only partially correct. Under Title VII, there

is no personal liability for employees. FEHA, however, allows

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 In Miller, the Ninth Circuit held that a CEO and two general 9

managers of a restaurant were not individually liable under Title

VII. 991 F.2d at 587. 

The Ninth Circuit explained that based on the statutory 10

scheme of Title VII, “it is inconceivable that Congress intended

to allow civil liability to run against individual employees.”

Miller, 991 F.2d at 588. The court reiterated that its ruling in

Padway “that individual defendants cannot be held liable for

damages under Title VII is good law...” Id. at 587. 

7

liability to attach to individual employees for harassment and

retaliation. 

a. Title VII

Under Title VII, there is no personal liability for employees,

including supervisors. Miller v. Maxwell’s Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d

583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993)665, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109, 114

S.Ct. 1049 (1994)(“This circuit...protect[s] supervising employees

from liability in their individual capacities”). The Ninth 9

Circuit has also made clear that as to liability under Title VII,

“[t]here is no reason to stretch the liability of individual

employees beyond the respondeat superior principle intended by

Congress.” Id. at 588. See also Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 10

965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982)(“[I]ndividual defendants cannot be held

for back pay.”). This court is bound by Miller and Padway and must

dismiss the Title VII claims contained in causes of action one and

two against defendants Duterte and Edie. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588.

///

///

///

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b. FEHA

The court must dismiss the FEHA allegations against Edie and

Duterte contained in claim one (discrimination), but sustain the

FEHA claims against these individuals as to claims two and three

(harassment and retaliation, respectively). 

i. Discrimination Claim

In Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal.4th 640, 663 (1998), the California

Supreme Court held that supervisors could not be held liable under

FEHA’s general anti-discrimination provision. The court articulated

that it was concerned that “imposing liability on individual

supervisory employees would do little to enhance the ability of

victims of discrimination to recover monetary damages, while it can

reasonably be expected to severely impair the existence of

supervisory judgment.” Id. at 651-52. 

According to the court this concern was embodied in FEHA’s

statutory language and its varying approaches to harassment and

discrimination claims. FEHA prohibits “an employer... or any other

person” from harassing an employee, Cal. Gov. § 12940(j)(1), but

prohibits only “an employer” from engaging in improper

discrimination. Id. at § 12940(a). The court explained that

“harassment consists of conduct outside the scope of necessary job

performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal

gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other

personal motives...discrimination claims, by contrast, arise out

of the performance of necessary personnel management duties.” Reno,

18 Cal.4th at 645-46 (quotation omitted). To avoid creating

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supervisory conflicts of interest and a chilling of effective

management, the court concluded that the Legislature did not intend

to hold supervisors liable for unlawful discrimination. Id. at 654.

In her first claim, plaintiff avers that “[d]efendants and

each of them engaged in conduct or carried out affirmative policy

or condoned unlawful conduct” pursuant to FEHA. Specifically, she

contends that her “race was the motivating factor” in defendants’

decision to prevent her from being promoted, advancing, and in

their decision to terminate her. Compl. at 4-5. Based on the

unambiguous language in Reno, the court must dismiss plaintiff’s

FEHA discrimination claims against Duterte and Edie.

ii. Harassment Claim

In her second claim, plaintiff alleges that defendants,

including Duterte and Edie, “by their acts and/or omissions,”

failed to “end the harassment and hostile work environment.”

Compl. at 6. Although the court in Reno alluded to it, it did not

hold that employees could not be liable for harassment. In 2001,

however, the California Legislature amended FEHA’s harassment

provision expressly holding individual employees liable for their

harassment. See Cal. Gov.Code § 12940(j)(3); Page v. Superior

Court, 31 Cal.App.4th 1206 (1995)(“As to supervisors...the language

of FEHA is unambiguous in imposing personal liability for

harassment or retaliation in violation of FEHA.”); Winarto v.

Toshiba American Electronics Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1288

(9th Cir. 2001)(citing Page). Thus, although individual defendants

move for dismissal as to all FEHA claims, that motion must be

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DENIED as to the harassment claim contained in the second cause of

action. 

iii. Retaliation Claim

In her third claim, plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that she

has been “retaliated against by defendants as a result of having

made complaints of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.”

Defendants contend that all FEHA claims against Duterte and Edie

must be dismissed, citing Reno. I cannot agree. The Reno court

focused on FEHA’s antidiscrimination provision, which prohibits

only an “employer” from discriminating in hiring and employment

decisions. Cal Gov’t Code § 12940(a). Although it does not appear

that the California Supreme Court has directly addressed this

issue, the Ninth Circuit has held that “an individual-supervisor

may be held personally liable for retaliation under FEHA.” Winarto

v. Toshiba Am. Elec., 274 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing

Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal.App.3d 590 (1989) and

Page, 31 Cal.App.4th 1206, supra). The court explained that the

retaliation provision of FEHA applies to “any employer labor

organization, employment agency, or person.” Cal. Gov’t Code §

12940(h)(emphasis in original). Id. Giving “person” its ordinary

meaning, supervisors and individual employees can be held for

retaliation under § 12940(h). Id. Accordingly, Duterte’s and

Edies’ motion to dismiss the FEHA retaliation claims against them

contained in plaintiffs’ third cause of action must be DENIED.

///

///

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B. VIOLATION OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING(Claim

4)

Defendants contend that under California law, the terms and

conditions of public employment are controlled by statute rather

than contract. Mot. at 5. They argue that plaintiff may not state

a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing because “where there is no underlying contract,

there can be no duty arising from the implied contract”(citation

omitted). Id. Having examined the relevant authority, the court

concludes that defendants are correct.

 Every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing that "neither party will do anything that injures

the right of the other to receive the benefit of [their] bargain."

Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 358 (1958).

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises out of the

contract itself and protects the express contractual promises of

the contract, rather than to protect a general public policy

interest not directly tied to the contract's purposes. Foley v.

Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 690 (1988). Since the good

faith covenant is an implied term of a contract, the existence of

a contractual relationship is prerequisite for any action for

breach of the covenant. Smith v. City and County of San Francisco,

225 Cal.App.3d 38, 49 (1990).

Notably, plaintiff has not brought a breach of contract claim.

She has also not alleged - nor could she - that her employment is

governed by contract. In California, public employment is held not

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by contract, but by statute. Miller v. State of California, 18

Cal.3d 808, 813 (1977). Relying on Miller, the California Supreme

Court has made clear that civil service employees cannot state a

cause of action for breach of contract or breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Shoemaker v. Myers, 52

Cal.3d 1, 23-24 (1990). This same general principle of law applies

to civil service and noncivil service public employees alike. Hill

v. City of Long Beach, 33 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1690 (1995). Plaintiff

pleads that defendant CHHS and the County are “public entities and

municipalities.” Compl. at 3. She further avers that she is

employed by defendant as an “Employment Resource Specialist.”

Given that plaintiff was a public employee whose terms of

employment is governed by statute, she cannot state a cause of

action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. Shoemaker, supra. Defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s fourth cause of action must be GRANTED.

C. DISCIPLINE AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC

POLICY (CLAIMS 7, 11, 12)

The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation

of public policy are: 1) an employer-employee relationship, 2)

termination or other adverse employment action, 3) the termination

of the plaintiff's employment was in violation of public policy,

4) the termination was a legal cause of the plaintiff's damages,

and 5) the nature and extent of plaintiff's damage. Homes v.

General Dynamic Corp., 17 Cal.4th. 1418, 1426 (1993). Defendants

contend that plaintiff’s seventh (“Employment Practices -Discipline

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 Plaintiff brings a wrongful discipline claim in the seventh 11

cause of action. The tort of wrongful discipline in violation of

public policy has been recognized by California courts. See, e.g.,

Garcia v. Rockwell Internat. Corp., 187 Cal.App.3d 1556, 1561-1562

(1986). The claim is similar to a wrongful discharge claim. A

plaintiff's claim that the defendant's wrongful discipline claim

violated public policy must allege the policy is: “(1) delineated

in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) ‘public’ in

the sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the public’ rather than

serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well

established at the time of the discharge [or discipline]; and (4)

substantial and fundamental.” Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16

Cal.4th 880, 894 (1997). 

13

in Violation of Public Policy”), eleventh (“Wrongful Termination

in violation in violation of public policy”), and twelfth

(“Wrongful Termination”) claims must be dismissed for various

reasons. The court addresses their contentions below.11

First, defendants argue plaintiff’s twelfth claim, “wrongful

termination,” wherein plaintiff claims she was “terminated in

violation of the County’s and Department’s representation and

promise ‘that she would only be terminated for cause and benefit

of progressive discipline’” [sic], does not refer to any public

policy. In order to prevail on a wrongful termination claim under

California law, a plaintiff must plead and prove as one element of

that claim that a fundamental public policy exists that is

"delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions...A" Gantt v.

Sentry Ins., 1 Cal.4th 1083 (1992). In her twelfth claim, plaintiff

“realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 62 of the

complaint,” and those paragraphs include allegations that

defendants have violated various statutes and constitutional

provisions, including Title VII, FEHA, Art. I, §§ 7-8 of the

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 Tort liability of public entities in California is governed 12

by the Tort Claims Act, CA Gov’t Code §§ 815(a), et seq. 

14

California Constitution. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the twelfth

claim on this account must be denied.

Secondly, defendants argue that claims seven, eleven, and

twelve must be dismissed because they are immune under Cal. Gov’t

Code § 815. Section 815 states that “[e]xcept as otherwise

provided by statute: [¶] (a) A public entity is not liable for an

injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the

public entity or a public employee or any other person.”12

Defendants assert that plaintiff’s constructive discharge and

discipline claims in violation of public policy are common law

claims that come within the purview of § 815. Defendants’ argument

is unavailing. 

The court notes that all three claims make mention that

defendants have violated FEHA, and it is well-established that FEHA

applies to public entities. State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment

& Housing Com., 39 Cal.3d 422 (1985). The California Supreme

Court has allowed wrongful discharge claims to be brought against

public entities, particularly where FEHA violations have been

alleged. In City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.4th 1143,

1148 (1998), the California Supreme Court recognized that both FEHA

and common law wrongful discharge remedies were available to a city

employee who suffered discrimination based on work-related

disability. The wrongful discharge claim was not barred by §

815(a) or any other statutory immunity potentially available to the

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 The court in Palmer specifically stated that it would not 13

address whether § 815(a) bars a wrongful discharge claim. Id. at

910 (“Because this court previously concluded Palmer had stated a

common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of

public policy, we do not hold the Regents are immune from her

Tameny action under section 815"). Furthermore, even a cursory

examination of Palmer reveals that the court dismissed the wrongful

termination claim because plaintiff failed to exhaust internal

grievance procedures, not because of any statutory immunity

provided under § 815(a). Id. at 903. 

 There, a California appellate court dismissed a wrongful 14

discharge claim against defendant because plaintiff was never

employed by defendant and had no employment relationship

whatsoever with defendant. Id. at 53 (“Robert Del Pero had no

employment relationship with Khajavi”). The court never addressed

whether individual supervisors of an employer may be liable for

wrongful discharge claims. Defendants fail to direct the court to

any authority which supports its argument that a wrongful discharge

claim cannot be asserted against individual employees or

supervisors. 

 Defendants do not claim that plaintiff failed to exhaust an 15

established remedy. Thus, this is not a ground to dismiss. On the

15

city. In addition, although defendant cites to Palmer v. Regents

of Univ. of California, 107 Cal.App.4th 899, 909 (2003), for the

proposition that a wrongful discharge claim cannot be asserted

against a public employer, this case is inapposite to the instant

matter.13

Finally, defendants argue that these three claims must be

dismissed against individual defendants Duterte and Edie because

“only an employer can be liable for the tort of wrongful

discharge.” Mot. at 6. Defendants cite to Khajavi v. Feather

River Anesthesia Med. Group, 84 Cal.App.4th 32, 38-39 (2000).

Khajavi provides no support for defendants’ assertion.14

For the reasons set forth above, the court DENIES defendants’

motion to dismiss as to claims seven, eleven, and twelve.15

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other hand, it is difficult for the court to understand why a

separate cause of action is premised on FEHA, and why a separate

tort gains anything for plaintiff. Of course it is up to the

parties to sort through such questions.

 Section 7(a) states, in pertinent part: 16

A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law or denied equal protection of the

laws; provided, that nothing contained herein or elsewhere in

this Constitution imposes upon the State of California or any

public entity, board, or official any obligations or

responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal

Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States

Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school

assignment or pupil transportation. 

Although plaintiff does not make clear whether she brings her claim

under § 7(a) or § 7(b), it does not appear that § 7(b) would apply

given plaintiffs’ pleadings of “unequal treatment.” Section 7(b)

states that “[a] citizen or class of citizens may not be granted

privileges or immunities not granted on the same terms to all

citizens.” Plaintiff makes no mention of any privilege or

immunity, only that she was treated unfairly, which appears to fall

within the purview of the “liberty,” “due process,” and “equal

protection” rights guaranteed under § 7(a).

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D. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, §§ 7 AND 8 OF THE CALIFORNIA

CONSTITUTION (CLAIMS 8,9)

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for relief under

Art. §§ 7, 8 of the California Constitution. After reviewing the

relevant case law, the court GRANTS the motion as to § 7, but

DENIES the motion as to § 8.

a. Art. I, § 7 of the California Constitution (Eighth Claim)

Plaintiff asserts in her eighth claim that the “intentional

failure to remedy unequal treatment violates plaintiff’s rights to

equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art. I, Section 7. ”

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Compl. at 11-12. Defendants contend that plaintiff may not sue for

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damages based upon this Constitutional violation. Their argument

is well-taken. In Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29

Cal.4th 300(2002), the California Supreme Court barred plaintiff

from seeking damages for any violation of his state constitutional

right to due process under § 7(a). The court stated that “there

is no indication in the language of Article I, section 7(a), nor

any evidence in the history of that section, from which we may

find, within that provision, and implied right to seek damages...”

Id. at 325. The court also found “no basis upon which to recognize

a constitutional tort action for such damages” under Section 7(a).

Id. at 329. It is clear from plaintiff’s complaint that she seeks

only monetary damages in this suit (special damages, general and

compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, punitive damages, back

pay and front pay; reasonable attorneys’ fees). Because the court

may not grant the relief plaintiff seeks as to this claim, it must

be DISMISSED.

b. Art. I, § 8 of the California Constitution (Ninth Claim)

Article I, section 8 of the California Constitution states:

“A person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a

business, profession, vocation, or employment because of sex, race,

creed, color, or national or ethnic origin.” Defendant argues that

this claim must be dismissed because, like Art. I, § 7, this claim

“does not create a separate cause of action for damages.” Mot. at

7. Again, plaintiff fails to respond to this argument in her

opposition brief. Defendants’ motion to dismiss must be DENIED as

to this claim, however, because they cite no relevant authority for

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their argument that damages are not allowed under § 8. 

Defendants cite to Himaka v. Buddhist Churches of America, 919

F.Supp.332, 334-35 (N.D. Cal. 1995)(Jensen, J.). Nowhere in its

opinion did the district court conclude that monetary damages are

not allowed under Section 8. Further, it appears to the court that

Himaka actually undermines defendants’ argument. The district

court in Himaka stated that there may not be a “direct cause of

action arising under Section 8,” and that it must be “asserted

through a state tort law mechanism,” such as wrongful termination

in violation of public policy. Id. at 335. Plaintiff has done

just that. She has incorporated paragraphs 1 through 50 in her

ninth claim, which includes claims for wrongful termination in

violation of public policy. Thus, according to Himaka, plaintiff

has indeed asserted her § 8 claim through a state tort law

mechanism in order to bring a private cause of action. See

Phillips v. Saint Mary’s Regional Med. Center, 96 Cal.App.4th 219

(2002)(Art. I, Sec. 8 is an alternative source of public policy for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy claims).

Defendants’ arguments must be rejected and their motion to dismiss

must be DENIED as to this claim.

E. CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE § 12948 (Tenth Claim)

Plaintiff’s tenth claim for relief asserts a violation of

California Government Code § 12948. That section provides that it

“is an unlawful practice...for a person to deny or to aid, incite,

or conspire in the denial of the rights created by Section 51,

51.5, 51.7, 54, 54.1, or 54.2 of the Civil Code.” Again, defendants

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raise a number of arguments that are unavailing.

Defendants contend that this section prohibits discrimination

only by employers, and not individuals, and so the § 12948 claim

must be dismissed as to Edie and Duterte. I cannot agree.

Defendants cite to Reno, supra 18 Cal.4th at 644, for this

proposition, but this case offers no support for their position.

Reno stands for the proposition that the FEHA anti-discrimination

provision, § 12940(a), allows persons to sue and hold liable their

employers, but not individuals. Reno makes no mention of § 12948,

a different FEHA provision.

Defendants make several more arguments that the court must

reject. First, defendants direct the court once again to CA Gov’t

Code § 815(a), implying that this provision bars plaintiff’s §

12948 claim because it is being brought against public entities.

Specifically, defendants maintain that this provision does not

“abrogate the immunity provided a public entity from liability from

the act or omissions of the public entity or a public employee set

forth in Government Code § 815(a).” Mot. at 8 (internal quotations

omitted). Section 815(a) “eliminates common law governmental

liability,” Levine v. City of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.App.3d 481

(1977) (emphasis noted). Because a claim brought under Gov’t Code

§ 12948 is brought under a California statute, and not the common

law, § 815(a) has no application here. Defendants also assert that

§ 12948 is not cognizable against individual public employees, but

provide no authority whatsoever for this argument. Mot. at 8.

Given that the statute speaks of “a person,” it would appear by its

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terms to apply to the individual defendants.

For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion to dismiss

§ 12948 must be DENIED.

F. NEGLIGENT HIRING, SUPERVISION, TRAINING & NEGLIGENT INFLICTION

OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (CLAIMS 6, 13)

Defendants move to dismiss both negligence claims brought by

plaintiff in this suit. They argue that “[n]egligence by an

employer is expressly covered under the exclusively provisions of

the California Worker’s Compensation statutes.” Mot. at 9. This

argument cannot lie. The workers' compensation law does not bar

claims based on same acts or allegations of a negligent response

to harassment or discrimination claims because these claims are

based on accusations of discrimination, which “is not a normal risk

of the compensation bargain.” Fretland v. County of Humboldt, 69

Cal.App.4th 1478, 1492 (1999); See Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37

F.3d 1396, 1405 (9th Cir. 1994)(“Personal injury claims that

implicate fundamental public policy considerations are not

preempted by the Workers' Compensation Act”). Here, plaintiff’s

two negligence claims are premised upon allegations of

discriminatory conduct. Compl. at 10 and 14. Therefore,

plaintiff's sixth and thirteenth causes of action for negligence

are still at issue as to the entity defendants regardless of the

applicability of any exceptions to the workers' compensation

exclusivity provisions. See Fretland, supra (holding that the

workers' compensation exclusivity provisions do not bar emotional

distress claims founded on discrimination).

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Defendants additionally contend that the all defendants are

immune from these negligence claims under § 815.2(b) of the

California Tort Claims Act. Mot. at 10. I cannot agree. 

Section 815.2(b) merely states that where a public entity's tort

liability is derivative of employee liability, that public entity

is also liable. Defendants argue that an employee or former

employee “cannot sue individual employees based on their conduct,

including acts or words relating to personnel actions,” citing

Sheppard v. Freeman 67 Cal.App.4th 339, 347 (1988), and thus,

because the individual employees cannot be liable, the County and

CHHS cannot be liable. As I have previously explained, in

resolving questions of California law, this court “is bound by the

pronouncement of the California Supreme Court and the opinions of

the California Courts of Appeal are merely data for determining how

the highest California court would rule...in the absence of other

evidence, the opinions of California courts of appeal on questions

of California law cannot simply be ignored.” Brewster v. County

of Shasta, 112 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1188 n. 5 (E.D. Cal. 2000)(Karlton,

J.)(citations omitted). 

In the instant case other evidence exists. A district court

has already rejected Sheppard as overly broad. See Graw v. L.A.

County Metro. Transp. Auth., 52 F.Supp.2d 1152 (C.D. Cal.

1999)(Pregerson, J.). Moreover, Sheppard itself contains “other

evidence” - namely, the dissenting opinion of presiding Justice

Kremer. I conclude that other evidence justifies an independent

examination of the issue. 

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 The rule that an employer may be liable for both negligence 17

and intentional discrimination committed by an employee within the

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Upon individual examination, the court finds Judge Pregerson’s

opinion more persuasive and thus I must reject Sheppard.

Nonetheless, questions exist. It appears to the court that

plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. Plaintiff alleges negligence

on the part of these defendants resulting in discrimination. The

allegation is a non sequitur. Discrimination is an intentional act

and not the result of negligence.

Plaintiff brings negligence and discrimination claims against

all defendants, including Edie and Duterte, but her poorly pled

complaint fails to analyze the various claims as to the each

defendant. See Compl. at 4-5, 9-10, 14-15. An employer may be

liable for both negligence and intentional discrimination committed

by an employee within the scope of his or her employment under

vicarious liability principles. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756(1998)(“An employer may be liable for

both negligent and intentional torts committed by an employee

within the scope of his or her employment”); New Orleans, M., &

C.R. Co. v. Hanning, 15 Wall. 649, 657,(1873)(“The principal is

liable for the acts and negligence of the agent in the course of

his employment, although he did not authorize or did not know of

the acts complained of”); Rosenthal & Co. v. Commodity Futures

Trading Comm'n, 802 F.2d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 1986) (“‘respondeat

superior’ AAA is a doctrine about employers AAA and other

principals”); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(1) (1957).17

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scope of his or her employment also applies under California law.

See John Y. v. Chaparral Treatment Center, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 4th

565 (2002), review denied, (2002); Saks v. Charity Mission Baptist

Church, 90 Cal.App.4th 1116 (2001), as modified on denial of

reh'g,(Aug. 21, 2001); Depew v. Crocodile Enterprises, Inc., 63

Cal.App.4th 480 (1998). Bussard v. Minimed, Inc., 105 Cal.App.4th

798 (2003). Yamaguchi v. Harnsmut, 106 Cal.App.4th 472 (2003).

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Thus, plaintiff may allege both negligence and intentional

discrimination against the county and CHSS.

Plaintiffs’ allegations that individual defendants committed

both negligence and intentional discriminatory acts in this case,

however, cannot lie. In the employment context, a claim for

negligence requires the existence of a legal duty of care by an

employer to an employee, a breach of that claim, proximate

causation of plaintiff’s damages, and damages. Federico v. Superior

Court, 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1204 (1997). A negligence claim thus

rests on the breaching of a duty where the defendant knows or

should know of facts which would warn of wrongdoing, and fails to

do so. If plaintiff alleges that Edie and Duterte had such a duty

and that they breached that duty to warn of wrongdoing, they also

cannot allege that these two defendants committed the wrongdoing

which, in this case, are the discriminatory acts. It simply makes

no logical or factual sense.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the sixth and thirteenth causes

of action must GRANTED as to Edie and Duterte.

G. DEFAMATION (Claim 14)

Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to specify the

alleged defamatory statement at issue, and thus, her fourteenth

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claim must be dismissed. To state a claim for defamation (either

libel or slander), plaintiff must establish “the intentional

publication of a statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and

has a natural tendency to injure or which causes special damage.”

Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 397

(1999); Cal. Civ.Code §§ 45-46. Publication means “communication

to a third person who understands the defamatory meaning of the

statement and its application to the person to whom reference is

made.” Id. In addition, under California law to state a claim for

libel, a plaintiff must plead the alleged libelous words. Okun

v.Super. Ct., 29 Cal.3d 442, 458(1981). 

Under California law, the defamatory statement must be

specifically identified, and the plaintiff must plead the substance

of the statement. Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, 357 F.Supp.2d 1198,

1216 (C.D.Cal. 2004). Even under the liberal federal pleading

standards, "general allegations of the defamatory statements" that

do not identify the substance of what was said are insufficient.

See Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Crystal Dynamics, Inc., 983 F.Supp.

1303, 1314 (N.D.Cal.1997) (holding that "the words constituting a

libel or slander must be specifically identified, if not pleaded

verbatim”). 

Here, plaintiff alleges that defendants “published false 

information about plaintiff’s performance and falsely accused

plaintiff of dishonesty and lack of integrity.” Compl. at 15. It

is clear that plaintiff complains about statements allegedly made

about her performance at work and her character. Although terse,

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look kindly upon the addition of frivolous claims.

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her allegations are sufficient to provide defendants sufficient

notice of the issues to enable preparation of a defense. See Okun,

supra. The motion to dismiss the defamation claim must be DENIED.

V.

CONCLUSION

As consistent with the order, the court GRANTS in part, and

DENIES in part defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Given the fact that many of the causes of action are not

separately stated, the court will dismiss the complaint and grant

plaintiff thirty (30) days from the date of this order to file an

amended complaint, consistent with this order.18

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: September 1, 2006.

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