Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06365/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06365-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRELL VINCENT WHITE,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT AYERS, JR., warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-6365 SI (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

INTRODUCTION

Darrell Vincent White, currently in custody in San Quentin State Prison, filed this pro se

action seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before

the court for consideration of respondent’s motion to dismiss, petitioner’s motion for summary

judgment, and petitioner’s two motions for sanctions. Now that the record has been developed

more fully, it is evident that petitioner’s claim is plainly meritless and comes to this court too late

for relief. The action will be dismissed for both reasons.

BACKGROUND

White was convicted in the Madera County Superior Court of rape and kidnapping with

the intent to commit rape. Various sentence enhancement allegations were found true. He was

sentenced on June 4, 1993 to 43 years in prison. 

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal determined that White was properly sentenced

under California Penal Code § 667.6 to fully consecutive terms for the kidnapping and rape

charges. Petitioner’s Motion For Sanctions, Exh. B. The state court of appeal specifically

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The California Court of Appeal’s March 15, 1996 decision discussed White’s claim that

the sentences on kidnapping and rape violated California Penal Code § 654. The court stated:

“The sentence on appellant’s kidnapping conviction was selected as the principal term. The rape

conviction was run fully consecutive to the term imposed on the kidnap conviction. The court

therefore sentenced appellant on the rape pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (c), not section

1170.1.” Petitioner’s Motion For Sanctions, Exh. B. This sentencing decision is critical because

White’s current claim is based on an alleged entitlement to be sentenced under § 1170.1

California Penal Code § 1170.1 provided generally for a principal term and a subordinate

term, with the subordinate term being “one-third of the middle term,” while § 667.6(c) provided

a harsher sentencing scheme: “In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a full, separate,

and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of an offense specified in subdivision

(e) if the crimes involve the same victim on the same occasion.” Cal. Penal Code § 667.6(c). 

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This action was allowed to go forward in this district because White specifically alleged

he was challenging only the execution of a sentence. Had the petition challenged the sentence

imposed, it would have been transferred to the Eastern District, because that was the district in

which the conviction and sentence occurred. Had the petition challenged the sentence imposed,

it also would have run afoul of the rule against second and successive petitions because the

Eastern District already had denied his habeas petition challenging the conviction. See White

v. Galaza, E.D. Cal. No. CV-96-06171-OWW, affirmed, White v. Galaza, 9th Cir. No. 98-

17392. White would have had to obtain permission from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal

before he could file a second or successive petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).

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determined that the sentences could be fully consecutive and that they were imposed under

California Penal Code § 667.6 rather than § 1170.1. Petitioner’s Motion For Sanctions, Exh. B.1

For purposes of the current action, that determination is accepted as correct and unchallenged.2

The state court of appeal’s determination is fatal to White’s habeas claim.

White’s federal habeas petition did not challenge his conviction or the sentence imposed

but instead stated that it “challenges only the execution of his sentence.” Petition, p. 2. He

alleged that he was “deprived of liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because

prison officials refused to refer his case for correction after they detected error in his sentence.”

Id. at 8. The court found a cognizable due process claim and ordered respondent to show cause

why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition as time-barred. White has opposed that

motion and also has filed a motion for summary judgment as well as two motions for sanctions.

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That discrepancy message was not new in 2004. The “discrepant” error notation had

appeared on a Legal Status Summary prepared on January 8, 1997, as well as one prepared on

July 23, 2003. See Motion To Dismiss, Exh. B to Exh. 4; Petitioner’s Exhibits, Exh. E. White

had been complaining about the “discrepant” message since at least 2001. 

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DISCUSSION

A. The Petition Is Legally Meritless

1. Facts

When a prisoner arrives in the CDC system, as well as upon the happening of certain

events during his incarceration, a CDC case records specialist reviews his abstract of judgment

as well as other sentencing documents and enters the information into the CDC computer system.

A computer print-out called the Legal Status Summary is generated. If a mistake is discovered

or it appears that the abstract of judgment has a sentence not allowed under the Penal Code or

that contradicts the sentencing transcript, the CDC cannot change the abstract of judgment but

can suggest to the court that a correction be made. In re. Sandel, 64 Cal. 2d 412, 415-16 (Cal.

1966). If the error is discovered, the records specialist can refer the matter to the CDC’s legal

processing unit (“LPU”), the LPU reviews it, and sends a letter to the sentencing court to resolve

the discrepancy. See CDC Department Operations Manual (“DOM”) §§ 71020.7 et seq. 

The Legal Status Summary form for White had a computer-generated message on it that

his sentence was “discrepant.” “Discrepant cases are those cases in which errors in sentencing

are detected from the data entered into the OBIS or detected by case records staff.” CDC DOM

§ 71020.7.3. White asserted in his habeas petition that he learned that his sentence had a

problem when he reviewed the documents in his central file on February 24, 2004 and saw that

his Legal Status Summary had “discrepant” printed on it as well as a handwritten notation

regarding that discrepancy. Petition, p. 8. He further alleged that a new Legal Status Summary

was prepared on April 23, 2004 and “reflected that petitioner’s case remained flagged as being

a discrepant one, i.e., contained errors in sentencing.” Petition, p. 8(a). From the new legal

status summary dated April 23, 2004, White allegedly “was able to learn that his total term of

43 years was required to be approximately 14 years less.” Id.3

 

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 The discrepancy message on White’s Legal Status Summary stems from the consecutive

sentencing rule in California Penal Code § 1170.1. The implication of White’s allegations is

that, if § 1170.1 applied to his case, he would be entitled to a sentence approximately 14 years

shorter than the 43 years currently shown as his total term. 

White’s federal habeas claim is that the CDC personnel won’t refer his case to the CDC’s

LPU (and presumably the trial court) to fix the discrepancy. He attempts to capitalize on a CDC

operations rule to circumvent the state appellate court’s determination that he was not sentenced

under § 1170.1. White first contended in an inmate appeal in 2004 that the state appellate

court’s opinion had to be removed from his file under a CDC operations rule. Once the CDC

officials agreed to remove the opinion from his central file, he claimed that his sentence had to

be calculated under § 1170.1 – his thought apparently being that the removal from his file of the

court’s opinion would also remove the decision embodied in that document. He is wrong. 

White filed an inmate appeal on April 19, 2004, in which he initially complained that the

CDC had not destroyed the appellate opinion in his case, which (according to him) should have

been destroyed under department policy several years earlier. He initially requested that the

opinion be removed and destroyed. Motion For Expansion of Record, Exh. A, § A. The April

23, 2004 response at the informal level stated: “Granted, Opinion destroyed. However, the

appellate court returned a copy of the decision to affirm your sentence remains valid. The

removal of the central file copy does not invalidate the decision and issues regarding your

sentence will not be re-addressed.” Id., § C. In the formal level appeal dated April 27, 2004,

White wrote that he was dissatisfied with the response at the informal level.

P. v. White, 5 Crim. #F019953 was finalized on June 18, 1996. The opinion was to be

destroyed in 1996. Instead it was retained for 5 years and used as a basis to deny my req.

for an LPU referral in 2001. PC § 1263 says: “If a judgment against the defendant is

affirmed, the original judgment must be enforced.” Instead of complying w/ PC § 1263

CDC staff, “per Judy Debelle” changed the principal count “to accept fully CS & greater

term.” (Attachment-III hereto). Compliance w/ PC § 1263 will reveal that Count 2 was

the CS offense on which only 1/3 of the mid-term was to be imposed under § 1170.1(a).

This case was required to be referred to the LPU years ago and must now be reviewed,

based on the grant of this appeal.

Motion For Expansion Of Record, Exh. A, § D (emphasis added). This inmate appeal was

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At the initial review stage, this court wrote: “The petition, liberally construed, alleges

that prison officials refuse to take the steps necessary to correct an error in the sentence imposed.

Liberally construed, the allegation states a claim for a due process violation cognizable in a

federal habeas action. A person has a fundamental due process right not to be subjected to a

sentence that exceeds that allowed by state law. See generally Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,

358 (1977); Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926, and

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988).” Order To Show Cause, p. 2. White had not cited to the

Gardner or Walker case; rather, the court cited those cases based on its understanding that an

error had been made that subjected White to a sentence in excess of that allowed by state law.

In retrospect, the court now sees that it misunderstood the nature of White’s due process claim.

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rejected as duplicative of a 2001 inmate appeal.

White also filed a “citizen’s complaint” on June 3, 2004, in which he asserted that “prison

records staff changed a consecutive sentence designation made by a judge, withheld the case file

from the CDC mandatory audit schedules to conceal the unauthorized re-designation and failed

to refer a case identified as ‘discrepant.’” Petitioner’s Reply To Motion To Dismiss, Exh. B, p.

1. The warden’s July 29, 2005 response stated the discrepancy and warning errors on White’s

legal status summary were reviewed during an intake audit on February 26, 2001 and determined

to be a computer program problem rather than a problem that needed referral to the LPU for

correcting by the sentencing court. The response further stated, “This decision is supported by

both Appellate Court Opinions F019953 and F039047.” Id. The warden also wrote that White’s

case did not require further audit because it had been audited upon intake at San Quentin in 2001

and none of the other listed reasons for an audit had occurred since then. Id. at 1-2. The warden

noted that White’s arguments regarding his sentence had been rejected by the state superior court

and the state court of appeal.

2. The Due Process Theory On Which White Proceeds4

White’s habeas petition asserted that his right to due process had been violated by CDC

officials’ refusal to refer his case for correction after they detected an error in his sentence. He

cited to several authorities. He correctly cited Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975),

for the proposition that the “state supreme court’s construction of state’s own law is

authoritative.” Petition, p. 9. He cited to Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980) for the

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Hicks considered whether a state criminal law also could be considered as a matter of

federal due process. In Hicks, Oklahoma law provided that a convicted defendant was entitled

to have his punishment fixed by the jury. At the time the defendant was tried, the jury was

instructed, in accordance with a habitual offender statute then in effect that the jury had to assess

the punishment at 40 years imprisonment if it found defendant guilty. See Hicks, 447 U.S. at

344-45. The jury followed the instruction, imposing the mandatory 40-year term when it

returned a guilty verdict. Id. at 345. Later, the habitual offender statute was declared

unconstitutional in a separate case, and that led Hicks to try to set aside his sentence. The court

of appeal rejected Hicks’ effort to have his sentence set aside, reasoning that he was not

prejudiced by the impact of the unconstitutional habitual offender statute because his sentence

was within the range of punishment that could have been imposed. Id. The Supreme Court

determined that this analysis was erroneous. The Court explained that a convicted defendant

was entitled under Oklahoma law to have his punishment fixed by the jury and that, without the

unconstitutional statute, the jury could have imposed any sentence of not less than ten years, so

it was incorrect to say that the instruction that directed a 40-year sentence did not prejudice the

defendant. Id. at 345-46. The Court next rejected the argument that this was only a state law

error: “It is argued that all that is involved in this case is the denial of a procedural right of

exclusively state concern. Where, however, a State has provided for the imposition of criminal

punishment in the discretion of the trial jury, it is not correct to say that the defendant’s interest

in the exercise of that discretion is merely a matter of a state procedural law. The defendant in

such a case has a substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty

only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion, . . . and that

liberty interest is one that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary deprivation by

the State.” Id. at 347. 

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proposition that, “where the state provides for referral of cases flagged as being discrepant due

to errors in sentencing, ‘that liberty interest is one that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves

against arbitrary deprivation by the State.’” Petition, p. 9. The first half of the quote was pure

fabrication by White, as Hicks said no such thing. Hicks stands for a more limited proposition

that the deprivation of a state law entitlement may implicate the federal Due Process Clause.5

White also cited Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980), without an explanatory parenthetical.

Vitek stated that “state statutes may create liberty interests that are entitled to the procedural

protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 488. Vitek’s

holding, irrelevant to White’s case, was that the Due Process Clause conferred on a prisoner a

right to procedural protections before he was involuntarily transferred to a mental hospital.

White also cited to the CDC Operations Manual that allegedly required referral of “discrepant”

cases, and to a California Supreme Court case, In re. Sandel, 64 Cal. 2d 412 (Cal. 1966), that he

wrote stood for the proposition that “‘it is the People who are under a duty to bring the error to

the attention of the trial court as soon as possible.’” Petition, p. 9. Sandel is a bit more involved

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In Sandel, the trial court erroneously imposed a concurrent sentence for an escape

conviction instead of the required consecutive sentence. Sandel, 64 Cal. 2d at 414. The Adult

Authority and the People did not take steps to obtain a judicial modification; instead the Adult

Authority followed its practice of making the “correction” itself by making a handwritten

notation on the abstract of the judgment that the term was to run consecutive rather than

concurrent with another sentence. Id. at 414-15. The court held that the Adult Authority had no

power to correct an erroneous sentence of a trial court because that was a judicial function.

See id. at 415-17. 

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than White indicated: Sandel held that correcting an erroneous sentence was a judicial function

and had to be done by the court rather than the Adult Authority (i.e., the predecessor to the

CDC). See Sandel, 64 Cal. 2d at 415-16.6

 In the part of Sandel relevant to White’s case, the

court explained that it was not a defendant’s burden to initiate judicial action to correct a

sentencing error: “On the contrary, in such event it is the People who are under a duty to bring

the error to the attention of the trial court as soon as possible, by appropriate motion to vacate

the void portion of the judgment and impose a sentence authorized by law.” Id. at 418-19. 

Relying on these authorities, White contended he had a federally-protected due process right to

have his case referred to the LPU and the sentencing court because the CDC has determined that

there was a discrepancy in his sentence. Contrary to this court’s understanding in its order to

show cause, White did not actually contend that the sentence imposed exceeded that allowed by

state law.

3. The Claim Fails

As noted above, see footnotes 1-2, the California Court of Appeal determined that White

was sentenced under California Penal Code § 667.6(c) and not under § 1170.1. That

determination is accepted as correct for purposes of considering White’s habeas claim in this

action. 

Here, the alleged mistake by state prison officials does not affect the fact or duration of

White’s confinement. Accepting the state court of appeal’s determination that White’s sentences

are fully and properly consecutive, no relief is available to White. Both the CDC’s Legal Status

Summary and the state court’s opinion reflect a total term of 43 years. He has no legal right to

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force the CDC officials to refer his sentence to the state court for sentence correction under

California Penal Code § 1170.1 because the state court of appeal has determined that he was not

sentenced under § 1170.1. And he has no legal right to force the CDC to ignore the state court

of appeal’s determination that his sentences were fully consecutive and imposed under § 667.6.

The CDC’s refusal to refer White’s case for a determination of his sentence under a section that

the state appellate court already had determined did not apply does not violate any federallyprotected right White possessed. 

White also may be contending that he had a federally-protected right for referral

regardless of whether his sentence would be changed. The Fourteenth Amendment does not

require such a hollow act. The provision in the CDC’s operations manual that requires referral

to LPU of a case in which a sentencing error exists cannot be elevated to a federally-protected

right merely by White’s say-so. Whether his claim is analyzed under the cases concerning

prison conditions or those concerning criminal case procedures, he cannot force the CDC to

perform the hollow act of referring his case to the LPU and state court based on the “discrepant”

notation when the sentence reflected is correct. 

The first step in the due process analysis is determining whether any process was due.

Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources--

the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-

27 (1976). In the prison context, these interests are generally ones pertaining to liberty.

Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner

implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (examples of such severe conditions include

involuntary medication with psychotropic drugs or a transfer to a mental hospital). Deprivations

that are less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also

amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that state statutes

or regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation and that

the liberty in question is one of "real substance." See id. at 477-87. An interest of "real

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substance" generally will be limited to freedom from restraint that imposes "atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" or "will

inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence," id. at 484, 487. The refusal to refer White’s case

did not involve a change in conditions so severe as to implicate the Due Process Clause itself,

did not impose an atypical and significant hardship on White, and did not inevitably affect the

duration of his sentence. 

Under those cases that deal with due process pertaining to criminal case procedures, the

claim also would fail. A violation of a state law might implicate federal due process concerns,

but only if the state statute creates a protected "liberty interest." See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d

815, 841 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Bonin I"). A state law creates a "liberty interest" protected by the

Due Process Clause if the law: (1) contains "substantive predicates" governing official decision

making; (2) contains "explicitly mandatory language" specifying the outcome that must be

reached if the substantive predicates are met; and (3) protects "some substantive right protected

by the Constitution." Id. at 842; see, e.g., Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1161-62 (9th Cir.

1996) ("Bonin II") (even assuming violation of state law in setting execution date, no federal

habeas claim because there is no deprivation of federal substantive right); Bonin I, 59 F.3d at

842 (California statute which gives defendant in capital case right to have two defense attorneys

argue in his behalf does not create protected liberty interest cognizable in habeas because it

contains neither "substantive predicates" nor "explicitly mandatory language," and there is no

federal constitutional right to have two attorneys make closing arguments). Even if he could

satisfy the first two requirements, White’s claim fails on the third requirement, i.e., he has not

shown that the state law (i.e., the rule regarding referral of discrepant cases) protects a

substantive right protected by the Constitution. The constitutional red flag usually raised by a

sentencing error claim is that a sentence exceeds that allowed by state law, but there is no such

concern when the sentence conforms to state law. 

 In sum, because White’s sentence conforms to state law, he has no due process right to

have his case referred to the LPU or to the state sentencing court for sentence correction. White

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is not entitled to relief on his due process claim.

Lest there be any doubt in his mind, the foregoing analysis also requires the denial of

White’s motion for summary judgment. (Docket # 14.) There is absolutely no evidence to

support his assertion that his term of confinement or his term of confinement plus parole ended

on September 20, 2004. In light of the abstract of judgment showing that in 1993 he was

sentenced to a total of 43 years and the California Court of Appeal’s determination that he was

properly sentenced under California Penal Code § 667.6 (rather than under § 1170.1, as he

asserts in his motion for summary judgment), his argument that he is being held past a

September 20, 2004 release date is patently frivolous. 

Finally, the California Supreme Court case relied upon by White, In re. Sandel, 64 Cal.

2d 412, does not preclude a prisoner from asserting a challenge to the sentence. Sandel may

require prison authorities and the prosecutor to notify the court when a sentencing error is

spotted, but in no way does the imposition of that requirement mean that a prisoner cannot alert

a sentencing court to a suspected error. White has tried to assert his sentencing error claim in

state court, and has been told that his sentence is not incorrect. (The California Court of

Appeal’s website shows eighteen cases filed by Darrell White in Fifth District Court of Appeal,

at least nine of which were habeas petitions pertaining to his criminal case.) 

B. Respondent’s Motion To Dismiss

A habeas petition by a state prisoner challenging a decision of an administrative body,

such as prison officials’ rejection of his request for a reference of his case for sentencing

correction, is covered by the one-year habeas statute of limitations, and the limitations period

starts to run from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); Shelby

v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077,

1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003). In both Shelby and Redd, the limitations period was determined to run

from the date on which the prisoner received notice of the denial of his administrative appeal.

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The one-year limitations period will be tolled for the "time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The limitations period also can be

equitably tolled upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances beyond a petitioner's control

which prevented him from timely filing the petition. See Calderon v. United States District

Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (equitable tolling will not be available in

most cases because extensions of time should only be granted if extraordinary circumstances

beyond prisoner's control make it impossible for him to file petition on time), cert. denied, 523

U.S. 1061, 1099 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District

Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999).

White’s claim is based on the Legal Status Summary form prepared by the CDC. He

asserts that he learned that his sentence had a problem when he reviewed the documents in his

central file on February 24, 2004 and saw that his Legal Status Summary had “discrepant”

printed on it as well as a handwritten notation regarding that discrepancy. Petition, p. 8. He

further alleged that a new Legal Status Summary was prepared on April 23, 2004, that “reflected

that petitioner’s case remained flagged as being a discrepant one, i.e., contained errors in

sentencing.” Petition, p. 8(a). From the new legal status summary dated April 23, 2004, he “was

able to learn that his total term of 43 years was required to be approximately 14 years less.” Id.

Using April 2004 as the starting date for White’s one-year limitations period is erroneous

because White knew of and had been pursuing the claim years before then. 

White’s April 2004 inmate appeal shows that he knew of the problem on his Legal Status

Summary no later than 2001, as evidenced by the fact that he alleged that the state court of

appeal opinion had wrongly been “used as a basis to deny my req. for an LPU referral in 2001.”

Motion For Expansion Of Record, Exh. A, § D. He does not explain how he could have been

requesting an LPU referral in 2001 if he was unaware of the reported discrepancy on the Legal

Status Summary. The 2004 inmate appeal also was rejected as duplicative of his 2001 inmate

appeal. See Motion For Expansion of Record, Exhs. C; see generally Motion For Expansion of

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Record Exhs. B, D-F. His claim accrued in 2001, as he knew the factual predicate of the claim

(i.e., that there was a discrepancy notation on his Legal Status Summary). And he had filed a

state habeas petition long before he even saw the April 23, 2004 Legal Status Summary.

See Resp. Motion To Dismiss, Exh. 3, p. 1 (Madera County Superior Court Order Denying

Petition For Writ of Habeas On The Claimed Record Keeping Error, p. 1 (noting that the case

had been filed on March 24, 2004)); see also People v. White, 2003 WL 157525 (Cal. Ct. App.

2003) (denying White’s appeal from a petition for writ of error coram nobis and discussing the

history of White’s efforts to undo the sentence); People v. White, 2005 WL 1460634 (Cal Ct.

App. 2005) (rejecting appeal from denial of White’s “motion/application for correction of

clerical error in the court’s abstract of judgment” that had been filed in December 2003 in

Madera County Superior Court); see also id. at *1 (“Appellant’s motion requested in essence that

a consecutive term be reduced from a ‘full’ term of 11 years to one-third the middle term

pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.1"). 

The limitations period thus began no later than 2001, when White first asked for an LPU

referral based on the discrepant error notation on the Legal Status Summary. The Legal Status

Summaries prepared in 1997 and in 2003 also each showed a “discrepant” notation.

See footnote 3. The only new fact in 2004 was that the California Court of Appeal opinion had

been removed from his central file in prison. But the removal of that opinion from his file did

not mean that the decision it embodied – that his sentence was not under § 1170.1 – had been

vacated. Thus, there was no new relevant fact in 2004. 

White is not entitled to equitable tolling for the period of time during which his “citizen’s

complaint” was pending. His regular inmate appeal was rejected as duplicative on September

13, 2004 – duplicative of an inmate appeal filed in 2001. His decision to continue to pursue the

matter via a “citizen’s complaint” was not an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control that

prevented him from timely filing his federal petition. He also has not shown that his state habeas

petitions were filed before the expiration of the one-year limitations period – a limitations period

that expired no later than the end of 2002, one year after his LPU referral was denied in 2001.

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This federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was stamped “filed” on October 11, 2006,

had a signature date of October 5, 2006, and came in an envelope postmarked October 6, 2006.

Assuming that the petition was given to prison officials on the date it was signed, it is deemed

filed as of October 5, 2006 under the prisoner mailbox rule. See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d

1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001) (pro se prisoner's federal habeas petition is deemed filed when

prisoner delivers petition to prison authorities for mailing), vacated and remanded on other

grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). That was at least three years after the

limitations period expired. Respondent’s motion to dismiss will be granted because the habeas

petition was not filed by the deadline. 

C. White’s Sanctions Motions

White filed a motion for sanctions against respondent because respondent filed a motion

to dismiss instead of an answer to the order to show cause and “for making misrepresentations

to and concealing relevant facts from this and other Courts related to Petitioner’s case.” Motion

For Sanctions, p.1. This court does not police the conduct of counsel in other courts and

respondent has not engaged in sanctionable conduct in this court. Respondent's motion to

dismiss was permissible and therefore will not be stricken or subject him to sanctions. See

White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 600, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989). The court is receptive to a

respondent raising threshold problems (such as lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust, improper

venue, lack of custody, mootness, and untimeliness) by motion rather than in the answer. When

the court sees a procedural problem in its initial review of a habeas petition, it often invites a

motion to dismiss rather than an answer. However, as here, there often is not enough

information in the petition to alert the court to the existence of a potential procedural problem

and the court issues an order to show cause why the writ should not be granted. By doing so,

the court does not intend to preclude respondent to move to dismiss the petition for a threshold

procedural problem. Respondent did not err, let alone engage in sanctionable conduct, by filing

a motion to dismiss rather than an answer. White’s first motion for sanctions is DENIED.

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(Docket #9.)

White also filed a motion for sanctions against respondent because respondent did not

oppose White’s motion for summary judgment. Failing to file an opposition brief does not

warrant sanctions; the motion would simply be considered unopposed. Furthermore, in light of

the patently frivolous nature of White’s motion for summary judgment, it was reasonable for

respondent to not file an opposition. White’s motion for sanctions filed May 9, 2007 is

DENIED. (Docket # 17.) 

CONCLUSION 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely is GRANTED. (Docket # 7.)

The court dismisses the petition because it was not filed before the expiration of the statute of

limitations period. 

The court dismisses the petition for the additional and separate reason that petitioner is

not in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Now that

petitioner has elaborated on the factual details of his claim and presented his evidence, it is

plainly evident that there was no due process violation. 

Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. (Docket # 14.) Petitioner’s

motions for sanctions are DENIED. (Docket # 9 and # 17.) Petitioner’s motion to expand the

record is GRANTED in that the court has considered the materials submitted with that motion

in deciding the pending motions. (Docket # 12.)

The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 7, 2007 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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