Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00540/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00540-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY D. THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. DIAZ, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-540-AWI-DLB (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT AND REQUIRING PLAINTIFF

TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Larry D. Thomas (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

April 6, 2007. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious;” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) &

(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under

Case 1:07-cv-00540-BLW-MHW Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.

A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on

the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’”

Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin,

262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to

a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were

not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff is an inmate currently housed at the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation State Prison in Delano. However, the events stated in his complaint took place at

Pleasant Valley State Prison. Plaintiff names as defendants: Correction Officers J. Diaz, A.

Rangel, J. Jordan and S. Deathridge; and P. Catalano, L.V.N. Plaintiff is seeking compensatory,

general and punitive damages, reasonable costs and attorney’s fees, injunctive, declaratory, and

other equitable relief. 

Plaintiff alleges that subsequent to his filing an “Employee Misconduct/Sexual

Misconduct Complaint” against Diaz, he was subjected to retaliation at the behest of Diaz, and

by direct action(s) on the part of Diaz, Rangel, Jordan and Deathridge. Plaintiff alleges that,

because of his use of the grievance system: Diaz kicked his cell door at 6:20 a.m. and ordered

that he take his window coverings down -- despite the fact that plaintiff had skipped breakfast to

sleep in and that window coverings were not required to be taken down until 8:00 a.m.; that

plaintiff was forced to make multiple cell moves; that Diaz instigated a new procedure for

morning medical procedures (just to irritate and vex plaintiff) such that all diabetic inmates were

to receive their insulin injections prior to inmates having their blood pressure taken and thereafter

Case 1:07-cv-00540-BLW-MHW Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

receiving their DOT hypertension medications (plaintiff was the only inmate requiring DOT

hypertension medication); and that on June 29, 2006, plaintiff was subjected to excessive force at

the hands of Diaz, Rangel, Jordan and Deathridge at Diaz’s behest in retaliation for plaintiff’s

use of the grievance system. Plaintiff further alleges that P. Catalano, L.V.N. was deliberately

indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs by failing to request an R.N. or M.D. to examine plaintiff

and for failing to clean and bandage his abrasions/wounds subsequent to the June 29, 2006

incident.

C. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

As plead plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. 

The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint that

complies with Rule 8(a) and sets forth for each defendant’s name, what action that defendant

took or failed to take, and why (e.g., to retaliate against plaintiff for filing inmate grievances). In

the subsections that follow, the court will provide plaintiff with the legal standards that, based on

plaintiff’s allegations, appear to be applicable. Plaintiff should utilize the legal standards

provided in this order for guidance when filing his amended complaint.. 

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

Case 1:07-cv-00540-BLW-MHW Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

In order to proceed under section 1983, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a

claim that each defendant named in the complaint either acted or failed to act in a manner that

was adverse to plaintiff and that the defendant(s) did so in retaliation against plaintiff for either

litigating in court or filing inmate grievances. Plaintiff is cautioned that in his amended

complaint, he must clearly identify what actions or omissions led to the violation of his rights and

which defendants were responsible for the acts or omissions.

2. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to

petition the government may support a § 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th

Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that

such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

68 (9th Cir. 2005). An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file

a prison grievance is sufficient to support a claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d

1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). Adverse action is action that “would chill a person of ordinary

firmness” from engaging in that activity. Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 770

(9th Cir. 2006); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lewis v. Jacks, 486

F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007); Bennett v.

Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2005); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George

Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005); Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir.

2004); Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Both litigation in court and filing

inmate grievances are protected activities and it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate

against inmates for engaging in these activities. However, not every allegedly adverse action will

Case 1:07-cv-00540-BLW-MHW Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

be sufficient to support a claim under section 1983 for retaliation. In the prison context, cases in

this Circuit addressing First Amendment retaliation claims involve situations where the action

taken by the defendant was clearly adverse to the plaintiff. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 (arbitrary

confiscation and destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault in retaliation

for filing grievances); Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171 (retaliatory placement in administrative

segregation for filing grievances); Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288 (retaliatory validation as a gang

member for filing grievances); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267(9th Cir. 1997) (retaliatory

issuance of false rules violation and subsequent finding of guilt); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (retaliatory

prison transfer and double-cell status); Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1138 (inmate labeled a snitch

and approached by other inmates and threatened with harm as a result); Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 530-

32 (retaliatory reassignment out of vocational class and transfer to a different prison). 

Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by the unjustified and

unnecessary retaliation, interference, and punishment of the plaintiff instigated by Diaz via: Diaz

kicking plaintiff’s cell door at 6:20 a.m. and ordering that he take his window coverings down --

despite the fact that plaintiff had skipped breakfast to sleep in and that window coverings were

not required to be taken down until 8:00 a.m.; multiple cell moves; a new procedure for morning

medical procedures (just to irritate and vex plaintiff) such that all diabetic inmates were to

receive their insulin injections prior to inmates having their blood pressure taken and thereafter

receiving their DOT hypertension medications (plaintiff was the only inmate requiring DOT

hypertension medication, and presumably was made to wait for dispensing thereof until the other

inmates were cared for); and on June 29, 2006, plaintiff was subjected to excessive force at the

hands of Diaz, Rangel, Jordan and Deathridge at Diaz’s behest in retaliation for plaintiff’s use of

the grievance system. 

Plaintiff has alleged the requisite elements for retaliation. However, as to being awoken

early on one morning, being moved from cell to cell, and the new morning medical procedures,

the court finds that these instances, even when viewed as a whole and in light of retaliation

claims, do not rise to the level of violating plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The June 29, 2006

instance of excessive force may very well support the retaliation claims plaintiff is making, but

Case 1:07-cv-00540-BLW-MHW Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

the court is unable to ascertain whether plaintiff intends that instance as a basis for his retaliation

claims, or solely as the basis for his claim of excessive force. Therefore, plaintiff is given

opportunity to file an amended complaint to address and perfect his claim(s) for violation of his

First Amendment right to Freedom from Retaliation. 

3. Interference with Plaintiff’s use of the Prison Grievance System

To the extent plaintiff attempts to state a claim relating to the processing of his use of the

grievance system within the prison, plaintiff is advised that, “[a prison] grievance procedure is a

procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v.

Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.

Ill. 1982)); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (Liberty interests created by state law are

generally limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850,

860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a

specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence

of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); see also Mann v. Adams, 855

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v.

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). The

failure to process a grievance does not state a constitutional violation, and a prison official’s

involvement and actions in reviewing a prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis

for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. There is no constitutionally

protected right to an appeals process and there is no constitutionally protected right to a particular

outcome. Even if interference with plaintiff’s use of the prison grievance occurred in retaliation

for his prior use of that system, defendants’ actions in interference with and/or reviewing and

issuing decisions on the appeals do not provide a basis upon which to impose liability under

section 1983. Therefore, any claims plaintiff is attempting to assert, regarding the interference

with his use of the prison grievance system do not rise to the level of a protected constitutional

right. 

Case 1:07-cv-00540-BLW-MHW Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

4. Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges that, on June 29, 2006, Diaz, Rangel, Jordan and Deathridge used

excessive force against him.

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim

is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is

evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth

Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis

injuries)). However, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause

of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided

that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal

quotations marks and citations omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation

of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it

may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that

need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,

and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth

Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” Id. 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution

or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). An officer

Case 1:07-cv-00540-BLW-MHW Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

can be held liable for failing to intercede only if he had a “realistic opportunity” to intercede. 

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff alleges that, on June 29, 2006, Diaz, Rangel, Jordan and Deathridge “wrestled”

plaintiff to the ground in a forceful manner, without giving the verbal order for plaintiff to “get

down” -- despite the fact that plaintiff was not resisting submission; that Diaz pushed plaintiff’s

face to the asphalt; that while plaintiff was handcuffed, Rangel, Jordan and Deathridge sat on

plaintiff’s back and legs, and Diaz gouged his fingers into plaintiff’s eyes; that the handcuffs

were tightened so as to restrict the blood flow; that these defendants thereafter walked plaintiff to

the clinic in a bent over crouch rather than being allowed to walk up-right – as a result, plaintiff

alleges he sustained abrasions and wounds to his face, scars from the handcuffs, nerve injury to

his left hand and fingers, and exacerbation of a prior lower back injury. 

Thus, it appears that plaintiff has stated a prima facie claim for use of excessive force

against him by Diaz, Rangel, Jordan, and Deathridge in violation of his Eighth Amendment

rights. 

5. Medical Needs

Plaintiff alleges that Catalano’s failure to cleanse, bandage and/or treat plaintiff’s injuries

(some of which were “bleeding profusely” during Catalano’s visual examination) and his failure

to refer plaintiff to someone qualified and licensed to diagnose plaintiff’s injuries, subsequent to

the June 29, 2006 altercation, constitutes deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical

needs in violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment constitutional rights. 

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference”

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than

conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Case 1:07-cv-00540-BLW-MHW Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the

Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v.

County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990). A prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim of

deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Deliberate indifference can be manifested by prison guards intentionally denying or

delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. However, where a prisoner alleges a delay in receiving

medical treatment, the prisoner must allege that the delay led to further injury. McGuckin v.

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs, Inc. v.

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997); Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs,

766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

The court finds that, as stated, plaintiff’s contentions that Catalano was deliberately

indifferent of plaintiff’s medical condition as he failed to cleanse, bandage and/or treat plaintiff’s

injuries (some of which were “bleeding profusely” during Catalano’s visual examination) and to

refer plaintiff to someone qualified and licensed to diagnose plaintiff’s injuries, subsequent to the

June 29, 2006 altercation, do not satisfy the requirements for showing deliberate indifference

Case 1:07-cv-00540-BLW-MHW Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

which caused a delay so as to lead to further injury. Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a claim

under the Eighth Amendment for violation of his constitutional rights for deliberate indifference

to his serious medical needs. 

5. State Law Claims

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original

jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the

action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under

Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce judicial power exists under §

1367(a), retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is

discretionary.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). “The district

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . .

the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before

trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

Plaintiff may be able to state a claims for relief under section 1983. Therefore, the court

reserves discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over and to address plaintiff’s state law

claims after plaintiff files his amended complaint so as to allow plaintiff opportunity to state

cognizable claims for relief under section 1983.

II. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to file an

amended complaint within thirty days. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained of have

resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227

(9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

Case 1:07-cv-00540-BLW-MHW Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended

complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). 

Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in

the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the

involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must

either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court

in this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only on the claims identified by the court

as viable/cognizable in this order; and

4. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 25, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00540-BLW-MHW Document 8 Filed 01/28/08 Page 11 of 11