Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00739/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00739-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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While the Brand plaintiffs have requested oral argument on their motion

to strike, the Court concludes that oral argument would not aid the decisional

process.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ronald Ryan Brand, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

vs.

United States of America, et al.,

 Defendants.

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No. CV-15-00739-PHX-PGR 

 ORDER

 

 

Pending before the Court are the plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Amended

Counterclaim of United States Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 31), the

plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Third-Party Complaint of United States

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 32)), and the Brand plaintiffs’ Motion to

Strike Defendant’s Second Filing of Amended Answer and Counterclaim (Doc. 41),

all of which the United States has opposed. Having considered the parties’

memoranda in light of the relevant record, the Court finds that all three motions

should be denied.1

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While the plaintiffs are jointly prosecuting this action, Tashlik and Rinne

are represented by different counsel than the Brands.

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Relevant Background

The plaintiffs, Ronald Brand, Cheryl Brand, the Brands’ minor child M.B., and

Allison Tashlik and Adam Rinne2

, commenced this action on April 23, 2015. The

action arises from the collision on the Colorado River on July 5, 2013 between a

power boat driven by Ronald Brand, which contained the other plaintiffs as

passengers, and a power boat belonging to the United States Customs and Border

Patrol, which contained three Border Patrol agents. The original complaint, which

was solely brought pursuant to the Federal Torts Claims Act, named as defendants

the United States, the United States Customs and Border Protection agency, and the

three Border Patrol agents and their spouses. 

On June 26, 2015, the United States filed its original answer and counterclaim

against Ronald Brand, its original third-party complaint against Brand, as well as a

motion to dismiss the federal agency and the individual federal agents and their

spouses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In response thereto, the plaintiffs filed

a motion on July 1, 2015, wherein it sought leave to file a first amended complaint

adding claims under the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act. 

On July 10, 2015, the plaintiffs filed separate motions (Docs. 26 and 27) to

dismiss the United States’ third-party complaint and its counterclaim. In response to

those motions, the United States filed an amended answer and amended

counterclaim against Ronald Brand on July 15, 2015, as well as an amended thirdparty complaint (Doc. 30) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(c) against Ronald Brand. On

July 16, 2015, the plaintiffs filed their pending motions (Docs. 31 and 32) to dismiss

the United States’ amended counterclaim and amended third-party complaint, which

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the United States has opposed.

In light of the United States’ non-opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion to amend,

and the plaintiffs’ non-opposition to the United States’ motion to dismiss, the Court

entered an order (Doc. 36) on August 4, 2015, wherein it granted both motions and

permitted the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint that added the two new

statutory bases, with the proviso that the amended complaint had to delete all of the

United States-related defendants except the United States itself. The plaintiffs filed

their First Amended Complaint (Doc. 37) on August 4, 2015; the amended complaint

alleges claims for negligence and vicarious liability, gross negligence, and negligent

entrustment. On August 5, 2015, the United States filed its answer to the First

Amended Complaint and its [second] amended counterclaim against Ronald Brand

(Doc. 39).

On August 5, 2015, the Brand plaintiffs filed their pending motion to strike the

United States’ most recent filing of its amended answer and counterclaim, which the

United States has opposed. On September 8, 2015, the Court denied as moot the

plaintiffs’ original motions to dismiss the United States’ counterclaim and third-party

complaint in light of the plaintiffs’ subsequent motions to dismiss the [first] amended

counterclaim and [first] amended third-party complaint.

Motion to Strike

 The Brand plaintiffs have moved to strike the United States’ [second] amended

answer and [second] amended counterclaim on the ground that they were filed

without leave of Court or the permission of the plaintiffs after the plaintiffs’ motion to

dismiss the [first] amended counterclaim was fully briefed; the plaintiffs assert that

since the [second] amended counterclaim added some new factual allegations, the

United States filed it in order to get a “do-over” to counteract the pending motion to

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The Court further declines to strike the additional facts the Brand

plaintiffs assert the United States added to its [second] amended answer and

counterclaim. Because this is a pleading-related issue, the Court has not relied in

any manner on the evidentiary exhibits the parties have attached to their

memoranda related to the motion to strike, i.e., the drawings of the accident scene

by Ronald and Cheryl Brand submitted by the United States and the Yuma County

Sheriff Department’s report concerning the accident submitted by the Brand

plaintiffs.

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Since the Court is denying the motion to strike, the Court construes the

motions to dismiss as being applicable to the United States’ most recent amended

third-party complaint (Doc. 30) and its most recent amended counterclaim (Doc. 39).

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dismiss.

Why this issue may be a product of a procedural gray area between the

various deadlines of Fed.R.Civ.P., 15(a), the Court declines to strike the United

States’ latest amended answer and counterclaim because it was timely filed in

response to the plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and within 21 days after service

of the plaintiffs’ only pending motions to dismiss. Regardless of whether the

plaintiffs are correct that their amended complaint did not require an amended

answer and counterclaim because it did not contain any new facts, the United States

has the right to file a responsive pleading to an amended complaint.3

Motions to Dismiss Amended Third-Party Complaint and Amended Counterclaim

The plaintiffs have moved to dismiss the United States’ amended third-party

complaint and amended counterclaim against Ronald Brand with prejudice pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).4

 

The amended third-party complaint alleges that the collision was proximately

caused by Ronald Brand’s negligent operation of the plaintiffs’ boat. The amended

third-party complaint further alleges, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(c), that Ronald

Brand “is liable and tendered directly as a defendant to Passenger Plaintiffs Cheryl

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Rule 14(c)(1), which applies to third-party practice involving admiralty

or maritime claims, such as those brought in the plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint,

provides in relevant part:

If a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 9(h), the

defendant ... may, as a third-party plaintiff, bring in a third-party

defendant who may be wholly or partially liable - either to the plaintiff or

to the third-party plaintiff - for remedy over, contribution, or otherwise

on account of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of

transactions or occurrences.

6

Although the United States repeatedly cited to and referenced the KTech case in its response to the motions to dismiss as being a Ninth Circuit decision,

the case is clearly a decision by the Federal Circuit, which applied Ninth Circuit case

law as the governing regional law.

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Brand, Minor Child M.B., Allison Tashlik and Adam Rinne with respect to the matters

alleged in said Passenger Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Amended Complaint.”5

The plaintiffs initially argued as to both pleadings that they needed to be

dismissed because their threadbare recital of the elements of negligence were

insufficient to state a claim for relief against Ronald Brand. In response thereto, the

United States argued that its pleadings were sufficient because they complied with

the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. Appendix of Forms no. 11, which deals with

complaints for negligence; in so arguing, the United States cited to Fed.R.Civ.P. 84

(“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and

brevity that these rules contemplate.”), and K-Tech Telecommunications, Inc. v.

DirecTV, 714 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed.Cir.2013) (Court noted that “a proper use of a

form contained in the Appendix of Forms effectively immunizes a claimant from

attack regarding the sufficiency of a pleading.”)6

In their reply, the plaintiffs argue that the amended third-party complaint must

be dismissed because the United States cannot prove a plausible set of facts

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The Court does not reach the potential issue of whether plaintiff Cheryl

Brand has the legal right to waive any claims against Ronald Brand on behalf of their

minor child M.B.

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against Ronald Brand. The plaintiffs argue in part that Brand, as a plaintiff in the

initial complaint, does not meet the definition of a third-party defendant. The Court

disagrees to the extent that the United States argues that under Rule 14(c) Ronald

Brand may be liable as a third-party defendant to the other passenger plaintiffs. 

The plaintiffs further argue that Ronald Brand cannot be held liable as a thirdparty defendant in any case because the other passenger plaintiffs have submitted

affidavits stating that they will not pursue any claims against Ronald Brand related

to the collision, that they do not accept the tender of the third-party complaint on their

behalf, and that any allegation by the United States that Ronald Brand was at fault

for the collision is meritless because the United States was solely responsible for the

collision. The Court agrees with the United States that these affidavits are not

properly considered in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as they constitute extraneous

evidence outside of the amended third-party complaint that do not otherwise fall into

any exception permitting the Court to consider them at this time.7

The [second] amended counterclaim, which the United States brings in part

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 13, also alleges that the collision was due to Ronald

Brand’s negligent operation of the plaintiffs’ boat. In light of the United States’

response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs agree in their reply that Form 11

establishes the federal pleading standard but argue that the United States has not

met that standard because the amended counterclaim, as well as the amended thirdparty complaint, fails to properly allege that the United States suffered any damages

from Ronald Brand’s alleged negligence since the United States is only bringing an

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Paragraph 70 of the United States’ [second] amended counterclaim

alleges in part that any damages suffered by the passenger plaintiffs were solely

caused by Ronald Brand’s negligence, and that “the United States is entitled to

contribution and judgment over Ronald Brand for any monies the United States

may be obligated to pay the Passenger Plaintiffs, plus interest and costs.”

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unmatured claim for contribution.8

 The plaintiffs cite in support to Stahl v. Ohio River

Co., 424 F.2d 52, 55 (3rd Cir.1970) (“A claim for contribution is not a matured claim

as contemplated under Rule 13(e) because such a claim is contingent upon a verdict

and judgment establishing liability of a party as a joint tortfeasor. Since Rule 13(e)

has no provision which accelerates an unmatured claim, a claim for contribution may

not be elevated to the subject matter of a counterclaim.”) (footnoted omitted).

The United States argues, and the Court agrees, that a counterclaim that

seeks contribution is appropriate here. While the Court recognizes that there is a

conflict among the courts as to whether such a contribution counterclaim is

appropriate, the Court accepts the more recent, and more pragmatic, trend that

permits counterclaims for contribution in admiralty and maritime-related cases. See

e.g., In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz off Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 491

F.Supp. 161, 165 (N.D.Ill.1979) (Court, in holding that a counterclaim for contribution

could be asserted without waiting until after the counterclaimant’s liability was fixed,

stated: “[T]he movants argue that a claim for contribution is not mature and cannot

be asserted by counterclaim under Rule 13. While it is true that courts have held

that[] the right to contribution does not mature unless and until one has been

compelled damages in excess of his proportionate share under a comparative

negligence theory, ... the recent trend, and the more pragmatic approach, has been

to permit counterclaims for contribution.”); accord, In the Matter of the Petition of

Settoon Towing LLC, 2008 WL 1788542, at *2 (E.D.La. April 18, 2008) (Court, noting

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that “[c]ourts sitting in admiralty have long established and implemented the policy

of litigating all claims in a single forum[,]” denied a motion to dismiss a counterclaim

for indemnity and contribution, stating that it found “persuasive the pragmatic

approach applied in In re: Oil Spill by the by Amoco Cadiz off Coast of France on

March 16, 1978, wherein the district court held that movants were not entitled to

dismissal of limitation plaintiff’s counterclaim seeking indemnity and contribution for

oil spill cleanup costs.”); Dejana v. Marine Technology, Inc., 2013 WL 1282327, at

*2 (E.D.Mo. March 26, 2013) (In declining to dismiss a negligence-based

counterclaim for contribution stemming from a boating accident, court noted that

“[w]hile claims for contribution have been held by some courts to be outside the

purview of Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(a) because they are claims which are contingent on the

outcome of litigation and thus not mature claims, there is ample authority to the

contrary[.]”) (citing cases).

The Court concludes, for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), that the United States’

amended third-party complaint and its [second] amended counterclaim facially allege

sufficient factual content to support a plausible claim for negligence against Ronald

Brand. Whether the United States can prove that Brand acted negligently with

regard to the collision, and whether any party was damaged as a result of that

negligence, is not properly before the Court at this initial stage of the litigation.

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim

of United States Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 31), the plaintiffs’ Motion

to Dismiss Amended Third-Party Complaint of United States Pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 32)), and the Brand plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike

Defendant’s Second Filing of Amended Answer and Counterclaim (Doc. 41) are all

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denied.

DATED this 14th day of September, 2015.

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