Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01008/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01008-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GOLDY RAYBON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

TOTTEN, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-1008-GEB-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. The remaining defendants in this action, Totten and Hardy, have filed a motion 

for summary judgment. ECF No. 34. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that 

defendants’ motion be granted as to plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim against Totten 

and Hardy but denied as to plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Hardy.1

 

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 1

 After plaintiff filed an opposition, defendants filed a reply brief. See ECF Nos. 36, 37, 

Plaintiff then filed an unauthorized “response to defendants reply.” See ECF No. 38. The letter 

filing must be disregarded. It is not authorized by either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or 

the court’s Local Rules. See E.D. Cal., Local Rule 230(l). 

Additionally, defendants have submitted a long list of objections to various 

representations in plaintiff’s opposition. See ECF No. 37-1. Those objections are moot, as none 

of the representations to which defendants’ object is material to the resolution of defendants’ 

motion. 

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BACKGROUND 

This action proceeds on plaintiff’s first amended complaint filed April 17, 2012, and 

signed under penalty of perjury. ECF No. 2 (“Pl.’s Compl.”). Plaintiff contends that defendants 

violated his Eighth Amendment rights when he was under contraband surveillance watch 

(“CSW”) from September 19, 2009, to October 5, 2009, at Folsom State Prison. Id. at 5, 72; see 

also ECF No. 34-7 (“Hardy Decl.”) at Ex. 1 (informational chrono, providing October 5, 2009, as 

the date plaintiff was released from CSW). 

CSW is reserved for inmates who prison officials suspect have ingested or otherwise 

concealed contraband in their body cavities. Hardy Decl. ¶ 3. Officials tape the legs and waists 

of CSW inmates’ boxer shorts and the arms and legs of their jumpsuits. ECF No. 34-8 (“Totten 

Decl.”) at ¶ 10. To further prevent inmates from accessing and disposing of contraband, officials 

employ waist restraints with handcuffs and leg restraints. Id. at ¶ 9. Officials place inmates on 

CSW in cells without showers or flushing toilets to prevent the disposal of contraband; when 

inmates notify prison staff that they need to urinate or defecate, staff provide a portable toilet or a 

plastic urinal device. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12. An inmate is normally required to complete three 

contraband-free bowel movements before his release from CSW. Id. at ¶ 5. 

Plaintiff’s first claim is an Eighth Amendment “conditions of confinement” claim. See 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that for the sixteen days 

he was on CSW, he was housed in a cell with a bright light that remained on for twenty-four 

hours per day and not provided a toothbrush, toothpaste, soap, the opportunity to shower, or 

sheets or covers for his plastic mattress. Pl.’s Compl. at 5, 7. Additionally, plaintiff alleges that 

on September 29, 2009, he notified Totten that he needed to urinate; however, plaintiff urinated 

on himself after waiting for a plastic urinal device for two hours. Id. at 6. Plaintiff contends that 

defendants tried to conceal or “cover this up” by changing plaintiff’s clothing and that Hardy 

instructed Totten to not log the incident. Id. Plaintiff further contends that he defecated on 

himself on October 1, 2009. Id. Originally, plaintiff claimed he was “placed back in his cell 

 2

 For ease of reference, all references to page numbers in plaintiff’s filings are to those 

assigned via the court’s electronic filing system. 

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without a shower or anything to properly clean himself with.” Id. However, plaintiff later 

clarified that following the incident, he was “provided with wet towelettes, such as wet-naps or 

baby wipes to sanitize himself.” See ECF No. 36 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 9, 13-14. 

Plaintiff’s second claim is that Hardy applied excessive force in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment when taping plaintiff’s boxers at the waist on September 21, 2009. Pl.’s Compl. at 5. 

When plaintiff complained that the tape was too tight, Hardy allegedly replied “[i]f you don’t shut 

up, I am going to make it tighter” and continued to wrap the tape “tighter and tighter.” Id. at 5-6. 

Hardy also allegedly placed waist chains around plaintiff’s waist tightly and handcuffs around his 

wrists before returning plaintiff to his cell. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that “he felt his circulation 

cutting off” and experienced “difficulty breathing.” Id. at 5-6. Hours later, a nurse allegedly 

requested that plaintiff be rushed to the Triage and Treatment Area (“TTA”) after noticing that 

plaintiff was incoherent. Id. at 6. Before plaintiff’s visit to the TTA—and thirty to forty minutes 

before plaintiff met with a doctor in the TTA—Hardy allegedly loosened the waist restraints and 

cut off some of the tape so that plaintiff could breathe. Id.; Pl.’s Opp’n at 5, 11, 16-17. 

Plaintiff was released from CSW on October 5, 2009, after his third contraband-free 

bowel movement. Hardy Decl., Ex. 1. 

STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary 

judgment avoids unnecessary trials in cases in which the parties do not dispute the facts relevant 

to the determination of the issues in the case, or in which there is insufficient evidence for a jury 

to determine those facts in favor of the nonmovant. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 

(1998); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986); Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1994). At bottom, a summary judgment 

motion asks whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a 

jury. 

The principal purpose of Rule 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims 

or defenses. Celotex Cop. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Thus, the rule functions to 

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“‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments). Procedurally, 

under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting 

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if 

any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 323; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). If the moving 

party meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A clear focus on where the burden of proof lies as to the factual issue in question is crucial 

to summary judgment procedures. Depending on which party bears that burden, the party seeking 

summary judgment does not necessarily need to submit any evidence of its own. When the 

opposing party would have the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the moving party 

need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See, e.g., Lujan v. National 

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Rather, the moving party need only point to matters 

which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-

24. (“[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a 

summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”). Indeed, summary judgment 

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. In such a 

circumstance, summary judgment must be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district 

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is 

satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

To defeat summary judgment the opposing party must establish a genuine dispute as to a 

material issue of fact. This entails two requirements. First, the dispute must be over a fact(s) that 

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is material, i.e., one that makes a difference in the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

248 (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”). Whether a factual dispute is material is 

determined by the substantive law applicable for the claim in question. Id. If the opposing party 

is unable to produce evidence sufficient to establish a required element of its claim that party fails 

in opposing summary judgment. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 

of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 322. 

Second, the dispute must be genuine. In determining whether a factual dispute is genuine 

the court must again focus on which party bears the burden of proof on the factual issue in 

question. Where the party opposing summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial on 

the factual issue in dispute, that party must produce evidence sufficient to support its factual 

claim. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by evidence are insufficient to defeat the motion. 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Rather, the opposing party must, by affidavit 

or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts that show there is a genuine issue 

for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. More significantly, to 

demonstrate a genuine factual dispute the evidence relied on by the opposing party must be such 

that a fair-minded jury “could return a verdict for [him] on the evidence presented.” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248, 252. Absent any such evidence there simply is no reason for trial. 

The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s 

evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See id. at 249, 255; 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the 

proponent must adduce evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American 

Int’l Group, Inc. v. American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir.1991) (Kozinski, J., 

dissenting) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at 

issue, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th 

Cir. 1995). On the other hand, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could 

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not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). In that case, the court must grant 

summary judgment. 

Concurrent with the instant motion, defendants advised plaintiff of the requirements for 

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 34-1; 

see Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 

1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

ANALYSIS 

I. Conditions of Confinement 

The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects prisoners from inhumane 

methods of punishment and inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 

F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of 

confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s 

necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). To succeed on an Eighth Amendment conditions of 

confinement claim, a prisoner must show that (1) the defendant prison official’s conduct deprived 

him or her of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities (the objective component), and 

(2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s health or safety (the 

subjective component). Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To show deliberate 

indifference, the prisoner must establish that the defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive 

risk to inmate health or safety; “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 

inference.” Id. at 837. 

Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff was in a cell with constant light and without a 

toothbrush, toothpaste, soap, showers, or bedding for sixteen days. Totten Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 11-12, 

21; Hardy Decl. at ¶¶ 5, 13-14, 17. Nor do they dispute the allegation that plaintiff urinated on 

himself after Totten failed to provide a portable toilet on September 29, 2009. See Totten Decl. at 

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¶ 20 (acknowledging that he was on duty and “had responsibility to observe [plaintiff] while he 

was on CSW,” but otherwise avoiding the alleged urination incident); Hardy Decl. at ¶ 19 (“Some 

inmates on CSW urinate on themselves . . . .”). Defendants contend that summary judgment is 

appropriate because plaintiff did not suffer an excessive risk to his health or safety while on CSW 

and because there is no indication that either defendant had knowledge of or disregarded such a 

risk. ECF No. 34-2 at 7. As explained below, defendants’ motion must be granted because there 

is simply no evidence of deliberate indifference. 

First, defendants note that they were in general attentive to plaintiff during this inherently 

but necessarily unpleasant contraband-watch confinement. Plaintiff received “regular meals and 

frequent snacks,” and that “medical staff checked [his] vital signs and examined him at his cell 

door at least once and often twice each day while he was on CSW . . . .” Totten Decl. at ¶¶ 21-22; 

Hardy Decl. at ¶¶ 10-11. Plaintiff does not contest that he received attentive and seemingly 

effective medical care while on CSW. While undoubtedly unpleasant, there is no indication that 

these conditions of confinement caused plaintiff to experience any negative health consequences. 

Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health or safety in light of the 

medical care that he received while on CSW. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (explaining that 

“humane conditions of confinement” includes “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical 

care”). Though plaintiff contends that defendants’ alleged attempt to cover up the September 29, 

2009 urination incident demonstrates deliberate indifference, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 5-6, he fails to 

show that those actions posed a “substantial risk of serious harm” to his health or safety, see 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Because there is no evidence that the conditions of confinement during 

plaintiff’s sixteen day stay on CSW posed an excessive risk to his health or safety, plaintiff has 

necessarily failed to establish that Hardy or Totten knew of and disregarded such a risk. 

Moreover, defendants’ evidence undermines plaintiff’s claims that they were responsible 

for the October 1, 2009 incident in which plaintiff defecated on himself, and that plaintiff was 

subsequently denied the ability to clean himself. Defendants point out that Totten was on duty for 

only two of the sixteen days that plaintiff was on CSW, and that neither of them was on duty on 

October 1, 2009. Totten Decl. ¶¶ 19, 20; Hardy Decl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that 

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neither defendant was on duty. Defendants’ evidence also shows that after the October 1, 2009 

incident, plaintiff was removed from his cell, that he cleaned the fecal matter off of his body, and 

that he was put in new clothing before being returned to his cell. Totten Decl., Ex. 1 at “Page 

28.” In his opposition, plaintiff admits to receiving clean underwear and “wet towelettes, such as 

wet-naps or baby wipes to sanitize himself” following the incident. Pl.’s Opp’n at 9, 13-14. 

Given that defendants were not responsible for the October 1, 2009 incident, coupled with the fact 

that plaintiff was allowed to clean up following the incident, there is also no genuine dispute for 

trial as to this aspect of plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim. 

In his opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiff contends that 

“defendants acted with ‘deliberate idifference’ [sic]” and that “defendants clearly knew of the 

condition’s [sic] plaintiff was enduring and did not respond to it in a reasonable manner.” Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 6. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation is insufficient to avoid summary judgment. See Leer 

v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Sweeping conclusory allegations will not suffice 

to prevent summary judgment. The prisoner must set forth specific facts as to each individual 

defendant’s deliberate indifference.” (citations omitted)). Deliberate indifference is an essential 

element of a conditions of confinement claim, and plaintiff has failed to make a showing 

sufficient to establish even the existence of an excessive risk to his health or safety—let alone that 

defendants knew of and disregarded such a risk. Accordingly, the court must grant defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim. 

II. Excessive Force 

Plaintiff contends that the manner of application of the tape and waist restraints resulted in 

cruel and unusual punishment. “When prison officials use excessive force against prisoners, they 

violate the inmates’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” 

Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). In order to establish a claim for the use of 

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that prison 

officials applied force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, rather than in a good-faith 

effort to maintain or restore discipline. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). In making 

this determination, the court may evaluate (1) the need for application of force, (2) the 

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relationship between that need and the amount of force used, (3) the threat reasonably perceived 

by the responsible officials, and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. 

Id. at 7; see also id. at 9-10 (“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 

punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical 

force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). “Unless it appears that the evidence, viewed in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the 

infliction of pain . . . the case should not go to the jury.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 

(1986). 

According to plaintiff, Hardy applied tape and waist restraints with such force that 

plaintiff felt his circulation cutting off and experienced difficulty breathing. Pl.’s Compl. at 5-6. 

Hardy’s alleged response to plaintiff’s complaints was to tell him “[i]f you don’t shut up, I am 

going to make it tighter” and to wrap the tape tighter. Id. Additionally, plaintiff contends that a 

nurse noticed plaintiff was incoherent and requested that he be rushed to the TTA. Id. at 6. 

Hardy, however, contends that he “applied the tape in a snug manner, but not so tight as to 

constrict the inmate.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 9. Hardy also argues that he applied the tape and waist 

restraints “in a good-faith effort to ensure [p]laintiff would not conceal or dispose of contraband.” 

ECF No. 34-2 at 11. Hardy further emphasizes that plaintiff did not complain about the tightness 

of the tape and waist chains to the nurse that allegedly found plaintiff incoherent or to the doctor 

that evaluated plaintiff at the TTA. Id. at 10. 

In his opposition, plaintiff maintains his version of the events as alleged in his sworn 

complaint,3

 but specifies that thirty to forty minutes elapsed between the time Hardy loosened the 

waist restraints and cut off some tape and the time plaintiff met with the doctor in the TTA. Pl.’s 

Opp’n at 5, 11, 16-17. 

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 The allegations of a verified complaint may serve as an affidavit for purposes of 

summary judgment if they are based on personal knowledge and set forth the requisite facts with 

specificity. See Human Life of Washington Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1022 (9th Cir. 

2010). 

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There is a significant discrepancy between plaintiff’s account—that he felt his circulation 

cutting off, had difficulty breathing, became incoherent, and had to be rushed to the TTA—and 

Hardy’s claim that he applied the tape “in a snug manner, but not so tight as to constrict” plaintiff. 

Consequently, the fact finder (in this case a jury) must determine whether this discrepancy in the 

amount of force Hardy applied is a genuine dispute as to a material fact. The fact is material 

because plaintiff’s excessive force claim, as a matter of substantive law, rests in large part on the 

amount of force that Hardy applied when taping plaintiff’s waist. Moreover, the dispute is 

genuine because a fair-minded jury could, based on the specific factual allegations in plaintiff’s 

verified complaint, return a verdict for plaintiff on his excessive force claim. Thus, the dispute as 

to the amount of force that Hardy applied is both genuine and material. Accordingly, Hardy’s 

representation that he merely applied the tape in a “snug manner” simply underscores one of the 

factual disputes which preclude summary judgment. 

Hardy defends his actions as a “good-faith effort to ensure [p]laintiff would not conceal or 

dispose of contraband.” ECF 34-2 at 11. Hardy, however, fails to recognize that plaintiff is not 

challenging the general practice of applying tape and waist restraints to prisoners on CSW. 

Rather, plaintiff is challenging Hardy’s specific application of force, which plaintiff suggests 

exceeded the amount necessary and was for the very purpose of causing harm. Furthermore, 

defendant’s claim that he acted in good faith when taping plaintiff’s waist conflicts in material 

ways with plaintiff’s account. Again, the issue is whether the inconsistency between the accounts 

is a genuine dispute as to a material fact. The fact is material because plaintiff’s excessive force 

claim necessarily fails if Hardy applied force in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline (and, conversely, is still viable if Hardy applied force maliciously and sadistically). 

The dispute is genuine because a fair-minded jury could, based on the specific factual allegations 

in plaintiff’s complaint (e.g., the physical effects and Hardy’s statement “[i]f you don’t shut up, I 

am going to make it tighter”), find that Hardy applied force maliciously and sadistically—and not 

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline—and return a verdict for plaintiff on his 

excessive force claim. Thus, the dispute as to whether Hardy applied force in a good-faith effort 

///// 

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to maintain or restore discipline is both genuine and material and precludes summary judgment in 

favor of Hardy on his asserted justification for the force he applied. 

Moreover, the fact that plaintiff failed to complain about the tightness of the tape and 

waist chains to the nurse and doctor does not warrant summary judgment. First, plaintiff 

contends that he did not complain about the tightness of the restraints to the doctor because Hardy 

had loosened the restraints and cut the tape thirty to forty minutes before plaintiff met with the 

doctor in the TTA. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5, 11, 16-17. Second, that plaintiff may not have sought 

medical treatment is relevant, at most, to plaintiff’s claim of residual injury and to the extent of 

that injury. Indeed, a jury may well accept Hardy’s rather than plaintiff’s version of what 

happened. However, at the summary judgment stage, the court cannot weigh plaintiff’s 

credibility and resolve genuine disputes over factual issues. Rather, the court must accept 

plaintiff’s version of what occurred and must draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. If a reasonable jury could credit 

plaintiff’s version over the defendant’s version, summary judgment must be denied. Warren, 58 

F.3d at 441. At trial, if plaintiff’s account as to what occurred and what force was used is 

credited, a jury could reasonably find for plaintiff on his claim of excessive force. 

Accordingly, defendant Hardy’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s excessive 

force claim must be denied. 

III. Qualified Immunity4

Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages where a 

reasonable person would not have known that their conduct violated a clearly established right. 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987). “In resolving questions of qualified 

immunity at summary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry.” Tolan v. Cotton, No. 

13-551, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 2014 WL 1757856, at *4 (May 5, 2014) (per curiam). “The first asks 

whether the facts, ‘taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . show 

 4

 Because the court finds defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of 

plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim, the court need not address the issue of qualified 

immunity as to that claim. 

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the officer’s conduct violated a federal right.’” Id. (internal bracketing omitted) (quoting Saucier 

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). “The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks 

whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” Tolan, 2014 

WL 1757856, at *4 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). A plaintiff invokes a 

“clearly established” right when “the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable 

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 

“The salient question is whether the state of the law at the time of an incident provided fair 

warning to the defendants that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.” Tolan, 2014 WL 

1757856, at *4 (internal bracketing and quotation marks omitted). 

As discussed above, the material facts as to whether Hardy violated plaintiff’s federally 

protected rights are disputed and cannot be resolved by summary judgment. Taking the version 

set out in plaintiff’s verified complaint--itself a sworn statement--as true, and viewed in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts indicate that Hardy’s alleged conduct violated plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Moreover, the law at the time of the 

incident provided fair warning to Hardy that his alleged conduct—taping and tightening 

plaintiff’s restraints so tight that plaintiff felt his circulation cutting off, had difficulty breathing, 

became incoherent, and had to be rushed to the TTA—was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Palmer v. 

Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the denial of qualified immunity on an 

excessive force claim where defendants unnecessarily fastened handcuffs so tightly around 

plaintiff’s wrists that they caused him pain and left bruises and refused to loosen the handcuffs 

after plaintiff’s complaints of pain); Alexander v. Perez, 124 F. App’x. 525, 526 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(“Since 1992, the legal standard articulated in Hudson has provided officers with ample notice 

that malicious or sadistic use of force is unlawful.”). Accordingly, Hardy’s defense of qualified 

immunity with respect to plaintiff’s excessive force claim cannot be resolved on summary 

judgment. 

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RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the motion for summary judgment filed 

by defendants on February 26, 2014 (ECF No. 34) be granted as to plaintiff’s conditions of 

confinement claim against Totten and Hardy but denied as to plaintiff’s excessive force claim 

against Hardy. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: August 5, 2014. 

Case 2:12-cv-01008-GEB-EFB Document 39 Filed 08/06/14 Page 13 of 13