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Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐2294

KATHLEEN A. WAGNER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 13‐CV‐497‐JDP — James D. Peterson, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 12, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, ROVNER, Circuit Judge, and

BLAKEY, District Judge.



BLAKEY, District Judge. Appellant Kathleen Wagner ap‐

peals the decision of the district court granting judgment on

the pleadings in favor of Appellees Teva Pharmaceuticals

                                                   Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

Case: 15-2294 Document: 47 Filed: 10/18/2016 Pages: 8
2 No. 15‐2294

USA, Barr Pharmaceuticals and Barr Laboratories. For the

reasons explained below, the decision of the district court is

affirmed.

I.   Background & Procedural History

Appellant Kathleen Wagner, who is a licensed attorney

proceeding pro se, took both brand‐name and generic hor‐

mone therapy drugs as prescribed by her gynecologist to

treat her post‐menopausal endometrial hyperplasia. After

taking the drugs, Wagner developed breast cancer. Wagner

sued multiple pharmaceutical companies that designed,

manufactured, promoted and distributed the drugs she took.

Appellees Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Barr Pharmaceuticals

and Barr Laboratories are the only pharmaceutical compa‐

nies that manufactured the generic form of the hormone

therapy drugs.

In her 12‐count First Amended Complaint, Wagner as‐

serted numerous Wisconsin state law tort claims, all based

upon allegations that Appellees sold dangerous products

and failed to adequately warn of their risks.

After answering the Amended Complaint, Appellees

moved for Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings, arguing

that federal law preempted Wagner’s claims. In response,

Wagner asserted, for the first time, that Appellees delayed

updating their generic brand labels to match the updated,

stricter labels on the brand‐name drug.  

The District Judge granted the motion for judgment on

the pleadings, finding that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics

Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., preempted Appellant’s

state law claims. Wagner appealed.  

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No. 15‐2294 3

II.   Discussion

We review de novo a district court’s Rule 12(c) decision.

Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2014).

To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a com‐

plaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A

claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factu‐

al content that allows the court to draw the reasonable infer‐

ence that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In assessing a mo‐

tion for judgment on the pleadings, we draw all reasonable

inferences and facts in favor of the nonmovant, but need not

accept as true any legal assertions. Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762

F.3d 661, 664–65 (7th Cir. 2014).

On appeal, Wagner raises two challenges. First, she ar‐

gues that, given the passage of the Food and Drug Admin‐

istration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), her claims are

not preempted. Wagner also argues that her claims are not

preempted to the extent they are based upon Appellees’

failure to update their generic drug labels to match the up‐

dated label on the brand name drug. We address both issues

in turn.

A. Preemption and the FDAAA

The district court found that the FDCA preempted Wag‐

ner’s state law claims. In support, the district court relied

upon two Supreme Court cases: PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564

U.S. 604 (2011), and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. Inc. v. Bartlett,

133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). These cases, as the district court cor‐

rectly explained, impose a “duty of sameness” on generic

drug manufacturers that requires “generic drug labels be the

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same at all times as the corresponding brand‐name labels.”

Mensing, 564 U.S. at 618. Flowing from that duty, federal law

preempts state tort laws when the generic drug manufactur‐

er could not have abided by this duty without: (1) changing

the drug’s formula; (2) changing the drug’s label; or (3)

withdrawing the generic drug from the market altogether.

By way of background, in Mensing, the Supreme Court

held that the FDCA preempts any state law that requires

companies to improve generic drug labels. Id. at 616−20. The

Court reasoned that it would be impossible for companies to

change both the generic drug label and maintain sameness

with the corresponding brand‐name drug label. Id. In Bart‐

lett, the Court extended the principles in Mensing to cover

state defective‐design laws. 133 S. Ct. at 2470. To comply

with the defective‐design tort law, the Court determined

that generic drug companies would have to either change

the drug’s formula or change its label. Id. at 2474. Alterna‐

tively, generic drug companies could choose to stop selling

the generic drug altogether. Id. at 2477. The first two options

were impossible because of the FDCA and the last option

(withdrawal of the product from the market) was unreason‐

able. Id. at 2470.

Although Mensing and Bartlett dealt with failure to warn

and design defect claims, respectively, federal courts have

extended their rationale to similar state law claims. E.g.,

Brinkley v. Pfizer, Inc., 772 F.3d 1133, 1139−40 (8th Cir. 2014)

(preempting breach of implied warranty cases); Johnson v.

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 605, 613−14 (5th Cir.

2014) (preempting express warranty claim); Lashley v. Pfizer,

Inc., 750 F.3d 470, 475−76 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)

(preempting strict liability and breach of warranty claims).

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No. 15‐2294 5

Such cases do not stand alone, and for good reason. As the

Fifth Circuit explained in Lashley, these types of claims still

rely upon the same essential grounds: “the generic manufac‐

turer’s failure to provide adequate information.” By exten‐

sion, federal law preempts Wagner’s claims, regardless of

how they are styled in her complaint.

Wagner claims that Mensing and Bartlett are outdated in

light of the FDAAA, which the Supreme Court did not con‐

sider. Other courts have rejected this argument. E.g., In re

Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II), No.

CIV. 08‐008 GEB‐LHG, 2011 WL 5903623, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov.

21, 2011); Whitener v. PLIVA, Inc., No. CIV.A. 10‐1552, 2011

WL 6056546, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2011) (citing In re Fosa‐

max). We reject it as well, as we did in Houston v. United

States, 638 Fed. App’x 508, 513−514 (7th Cir. 2016). The

FDAAA imposed certain obligations on generic drug manu‐

facturers when they propose labeling changes. But the

FDAAA did not remove the prohibition against doing so

unilaterally. As we noted in Houston, “the amendments still

forbid a generic‐drug maker from violating the duty of

sameness without FDA permission.” Id. at 514.  

B. Wagner’s Failure to Update Theory

Wagner, in the alternative, argues that she can still pro‐

ceed on her claims against Appellees to the extent they are

based upon Appellees’ failure to update the generic drug

label to match the updated label on the brand name drug.

The district court denied this claim for two reasons.  

First, Wagner failed to raise this theory in her complaint.

Having reviewed the First Amended Complaint, we agree

with the district court’s assessment. Wagner fails to effec‐

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tively respond to this fact on appeal, and instead makes an

untimely request of this Court for leave to file a Second

Amended Complaint. Wagner never sought leave to amend

her complaint in the proceedings below, and the factual as‐

sertions regarding her failure to update theory appeared for

the first time in her opposition to the Rule 12(c) motion. This

attempt comes far too late. Clearly, the district court did not

abuse its discretion by failing to order, sua sponte, an

amendment to the First Amended Complaint that Wagner

never requested.

Second, as an alternate basis for its ruling, the district

court found that, even if Wagner were given leave to amend,

any amendment would have been legally and factually fu‐

tile. While acknowledging a split in authority as to whether

federal law preempts state law failure‐to‐update claims, and

noting that the question remains open in this circuit, the dis‐

trict court found persuasive the Fifth Circuit’s decision in

Morris v. PLIVA, Inc., 713 F.3d 774, 777 (5th Cir. 2013) (find‐

ing federal law preempts failure‐to‐update claims) (per curi‐

am).1 Factually, the district court found Wagner’s theory of

                                                  1 The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, disagrees, finding that such claims

may be viable. Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 583−85 (6th Cir.

2013). In Brinkley v. Pfizer, Inc., 772 F.3d 1133, 1137−39 (8th Cir. 2014), the

Eighth Circuit noted the circuit split and proceeded to address a failure

to update theory on its merits. This ruling suggests, though not conclu‐

sively, that the Eighth Circuit would follow the Sixth Circuit. See also

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Superior Court, 217 Cal. App. 4th 96,

108−09, 110 n.3, 115 (2013) (after collecting and summarizing federal dis‐

trict court and state court cases reaching the same decision as the Sixth

Circuit, California Court of Appeals expressly stated its disagreement

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No. 15‐2294 7

causation insufficient because she asserted that both the ge‐

neric drug manufacturers’ labels and the updated brand la‐

bel were deficient.  

In light of the undeveloped record here, we need not an‐

swer the open question of preemption of state failure‐to‐

update claims; the factual deficiencies in Wagner’s com‐

plaint alone preclude reversal of the district court. At vari‐

ous times in the proceedings, Wagner has made conflicting

assertions undermining any causation of her failure‐to‐

update claim. Even in her reply brief to this Court, Wagner

characterizes both the brand‐name and generic labels as de‐

ficient. Yet, at oral argument, Wagner maintained that the

brand name label was adequate, and that her claim really

arose because Appellees failed to bring their labels in line

with the brand‐name drug in 2007. Putting aside whether

Wagner—who began taking the brand‐name drug in 1993

and the generic drug in 2000—could establish causation

based upon a failure to update in 2007, Wagner never al‐

leged such a claim in her complaint. As a result, she waived

the right to press the claim here. See, e.g., Darif v. Holder, 739

F.3d 329, 336−37 (7th Cir. 2014) (arguments raised for the

first time in a reply brief are waived); Central States, Southeast

and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 181 F.3d 799, 808 (7th Cir.

1999) (arguments not developed in any meaningful way are

waived).

                                                                                                             

with the Fifth Circuit). On January 20, 2015, the Supreme Court denied a

petition of certiorari in Teva Pharmaceuticals. 135 S. Ct. 1152, 1153 (2015).

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III.   Conclusion

Because Wagner’s complaint in the proceedings below

lacked the requisite factual allegations to support a failure to

update theory, any further consideration of the legal merits

of that issue is unnecessary. For the purposes of this appeal,

it is enough to note that federal law preempts Wagner’s Wis‐

consin state‐law claims, and that the operative complaint

lacks the factual allegations necessary to support any failure

to update theory.  

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.  

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