Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02674/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02674-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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 The Sullivan Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Adjudication of the

Motion to Dismiss on January 25, 2010 requesting that the Court rule on the Motion to

Dismiss because Plaintiff failed to file a timely response. Plaintiff subsequently filed his

Response to the Motion to Dismiss on January 25, 2010. Accordingly, the Court will now

consider the Motion to Dismiss on the merits and the Motion for Summary Adjudication is

denied as moot. 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ronald Addy, an individual,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State Farm Insurance Companies, an

Illinois Corporation; Dan and Virginia

Sullivan, husband and wife, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-02674-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Dan and Virginia Sullivan’s (the “Sullivan Defendants”)

Motion to Dismiss all claims asserted against them (Doc. # 12) and the Sullivan Defendants’

Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 15). Plaintiff Ronald

Addy (“Plaintiff”) filed a Response to the Sullivan Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #

16) and a Response to the Sullivan Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication (Doc. #

17).1

 The Sullivan Defendants filed a Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #

18). 

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I. BACKGROUND

On November 23, 2009, Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendant State

Farm Insurance Companies (“State Farm”) and the Sullivan Defendants. In the Complaint,

Plaintiff alleged (1) violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Arizona

Civil Rights Act and (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Sullivan Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss all

claims asserted against them. They argue that all four counts of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc.

# 1) should be dismissed as asserted against them because (1) Counts One and Two cannot

be asserted against the Sullivan Defendants because such claims cannot be made against

individuals; (2) Count Four is a punitive damage claim that can only be asserted as an

element of damages and cannot be treated as a separate cause of action; and (3) all four

counts are alleged against Defendant State Farm, not the Sullivan Defendants, and thus do

not satisfy the notice pleading requirement of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). 

In response, Plaintiff concedes that the allegations in Counts One and Two should be

dismissed because those Counts cannot be alleged against individuals, but contends that

Counts Three and Four satisfy the notice pleading requirement as asserted against the

Sullivan Defendants and, accordingly, the Court should not dismiss Counts Three and Four.

Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that if the Court finds that Counts Three and Four do not

satisfy the notice pleading requirement, Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his

Complaint.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is disfavored and rarely granted.

Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1997). This Court construes

the facts alleged in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d

428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff must nonetheless satisfy the pleading requirements of

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).

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Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “‘a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order

to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not

need detailed factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief

requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted); see 5

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

1216, at 235–36 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that “the pleading must contain something more . . .

than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of

action”). A claim must be stated clearly enough to provide each defendant fair opportunity

to frame a responsive pleading. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996).

“Something labeled a complaint . . . yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to

whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a

complaint.” Id. at 1180. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Dismissal of Counts One and Two

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Counts One and Two should be dismissed

with prejudice as to the Sullivan Defendants. Counts One and Two consist of allegations for

violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Arizona Civil Rights Act. The

Sullivan Defendants assert that these Counts against them should be dismissed because such

actions cannot be brought against individual defendants. Plaintiff concedes that Counts One

and Two should be dismissed as to the Sullivan Defendants. Neither Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 or the Arizona Civil Rights Act permit liability to run to individual

defendants. See Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating

that “individual defendants cannot be held liable for damages under Title VII”); De La Torre

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 The Sullivan Defendants also argue that Count Four of Plaintiff’s Complaint should

be dismissed because a claim for punitive damages should be asserted only as an element of

damages and should not be treated as a separate cause of action. The Court agrees that

punitive damages are a form a relief and not a separate cause of action. Quiroga v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 726 P.2d 224, 226 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that “[t]here is no such thing as a

cause of action simply for punitive damages. Rather, the right to an award of punitive

damages must be grounded upon a cause of action for actual damages.”). While Federal

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v. Merck Enters., Inc., 540 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1079 (D. Ariz. 2008) (stating that individual

Defendants cannot be held liable for damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

or the Arizona Civil Rights Act). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Counts One and Two

of Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice as to the Sullivan Defendants. 

B. Dismissal of Counts Three and Four

The Sullivan Defendants also argue that the Complaint should be dismissed as to them

because the Complaint does not sufficiently identify the parties to which each cause of action

is directed, and to the extent it does identify the parties, the allegations are directed only

against Defendant State Farm. In response, Plaintiff argues that the numerous factual

allegations in the Complaint that implicate the Sullivan Defendants provide fair notice to

them as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and that inadvertently omitting

the Sullivan Defendants from the individual counts should not constitute failure to adequately

state a claim against them. 

While the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the factual allegations leading up to the

counts in the Complaint implicate the Sullivan Defendants, the language in the individual

counts appears to limit the allegations to Defendant State Farm. A complaint must identify

“whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1180. The Court will

not require the Sullivan Defendants to assume that certain counts are asserted against them

merely because they are named as parties to the Complaint and the factual allegations

implicate them, especially when the Counts include no mention of them and do specifically

name Defendant State Farm. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Counts Three and Four2

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Rules of Civil Procedure 8 does not require any specific organization for claims for relief,

Plaintiff must clarify the underlying causes of action for which he is seeking punitive

damages in order to provide fair notice to Plaintiffs. See Silvas v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC,

No. CV-09-265-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 4573234, *14 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2010) (dismissing

separate causes of action for damages, but stating that the “remedy may be available for other

underlying legal theories”). 

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of Plaintiff’s Complaint as to the Sullivan Defendants. 

C. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint to correct the deficiencies therein. The

Sullivan Defendants do not oppose the request for leave to amend. Leave to amend should

be freely given “when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). “In exercising its

discretion with regard to the amendment of the pleadings, ‘a court must be guided by the

underlying purpose of Rule 15—to facilitate decision on the merits rather than on the

pleadings or technicalities.’” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987)

(quoting United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981)). This “policy of favoring

amendments to pleadings should be applied with extreme liberality.” Id. (quoting Webb, 655

F.2d at 979). 

A Court must consider the following factors in determining whether a motion to amend

should be granted: (1) whether the pleading at issue has been previously amended, (2) futility

of the amendment, (3) bad faith, (4) undue delay, and (5) prejudice to the opposing party.

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794,

798 (9th Cir. 1991). “Generally, this determination should be performed with all inferences

in favor of granting the motion.” Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir.

1999) (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987)).

“Significantly, ‘[t]he party opposing amendments bears the burden of showing prejudice,’

futility, or one of the other permissible reasons for denying a motion to amend.” Farina v.

Compuware Corp., 256 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1060 (D. Ariz. 2003) (quoting DCD Programs, 833

F.2d at 187). 

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 In this case, the Complaint has not been previously amended and there has been no

showing of bad faith or undue delay. Further, Defendants have not shown that granting leave

to amend would be futile or would prejudice them. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff

leave to amend his Complaint. 

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Dan and Virginia Sullivan (Doc. # 12)

is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts One and Two of Plaintiff’s Complaint

(Doc. # 1) are dismissed with prejudice as to Dan and Virginia Sullivan and the remaining

Counts are dismissed as to Dan and Virginia Sullivan for failure to state a claim, with leave

to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff shall file his Amended Complaint within twenty (20)

days of the date of this Order. The Amended Complaint shall not contain a separate Count

for punitive damages.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Adjudication of Dan and

Virginia Sullivan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 15) is DENIED as moot. 

DATED this 7th day of April, 2010.

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