Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05348/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05348-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 5, 1998 Decided January 8, 1999

No. 97-5348

Darlene Butler,

Appellant

v.

Togo D. West, Jr.,

Secretary, Department of the Army,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv02182)

James L. Kestell argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Michael J. Ryan, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. On the brief were Wilma A. Lewis,

United States Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United

States Attorney, and Paige E. Harrison, Special Assistant

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 1 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Attorney. Gregory W. Addington, Assistant

United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Wald, Randolph and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Wald, Circuit Judge: Darlene Butler ("Butler" or "appellant") brings this appeal challenging two rulings by the

district court that, taken together, dismissed the entirety of

her suit against Togo West, the Secretary of the Army

("appellee"). Prior to her December 11, 1992 removal for

insubordination and creating a disturbance, Butler had

worked for several years in the Civilian Personnel Office at

Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C.

("Walter Reed"). After Equal Employment Opportunity

("EEO") administrative proceedings proved ineffectual, appellant filed a mixed case appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB" or the "Board") alleging that her removal violated the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA" or

the "Act"), Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as

amended in sections of 5 U.S.C. (1996)), and was motivated by

discriminatory animus. The MSPB Administrative Judge's

Initial Decision upheld the Army's allegations of insubordination, but mitigated the punishment to a thirty-day suspension

and ordered appellant's reinstatement with back pay. The

Army petitioned the full Board for review, and Butler filed a

cross petition challenging the thirty-day suspension. Subsequently, Butler filed this complaint with the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia, suing Togo West

in his official capacity and broadly alleging unlawful discrimination in her removal. On defendant's motion, the district

court dismissed Butler's Title VII and retaliation claims for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Following defendant's motion to reconsider retention of her First Amendment

claim, the district court dismissed that as well. We find that

the district court improperly narrowed the window for filing

suit available under 5 U.S.C. s 7702(e)(1)(B), which explicitly

allows all of appellant's claims, and accordingly vacate the

dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 2 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

I.

The procedural history of this case is convoluted but the

controlling legal question is time-specific; consequently, we

discuss only those facts necessary to our decision.

On December 11, 1992, the Department of the Army removed Darlene Butler from her position as a GS-11 Position

Classification Specialist for insubordination and creating a

disturbance. Butler, an African-American woman, had begun

to have problems at work roughly two years earlier, following

her October 15, 1990 reassignment from the Position Management and Classification Division at Walter Reed to the Recruitment and Placement Division, Special Action Branch.

Prior to her termination, she had initiated EEO counseling on

four separate occasions--in December of 1991, April of 1992,

January of 1993, and either February or March of 1993.1

Following each episode she filed a formal EEO complaint

alleging both racial discrimination and retaliation in various

terms and conditions of her employment. In each instance,

an Army investigator and an Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission ("EEOC") Administrative Judge recommended a

finding of "no discrimination," and the Department of the

Army ("Army") adopted their recommendations on June 15,

1994.

Following her removal in December of 1992, which she

attributed to discriminatory animus and hostility towards her

recent election as an officer of a newly-formed chapter of

Blacks in Government ("BIG"), Butler again pursued the

necessary administrative procedures with the Army. She

timely sought EEO counseling, and then filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office at

__________

1 The record before us is unclear as to the exact dates that EEO

counseling initiated. The Bench Decision of the EEOC Administrative Judge lists December 6, 1991, April 13, 1992, January 13, 1993,

and February 10, 1993. See Butler v. West, Complaint Nos.

170-94-7116X, 170-94-8124X, 170-94-8239X, 170-94-8240X, at 3-6

(E.E.O.C. May 12, 1994). The district court, by contrast, cites

December 6, 1991, April 6, 1992, January 13, 1993, and April 22,

1993. See Butler v. West, No. 94-2182 at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1997).

Walter Reed in which she alleged that her termination was a

product of racial discrimination. The Department of Defense

Office of Complaint Investigations recommended a finding of

"no discrimination" on December 10, 1993. Butler then filed

a "mixed case appeal"2 with the MSPB on April 5, 1994,

challenging her removal as both procedurally improper3 and

discriminatorily motivated. On August 3, 1994, exactly 120

days after Butler lodged her appeal, an MSPB Administrative

Judge ("AJ") issued an Initial Decision which held that: (i)

the Army had carried its burden of showing that appellant

had been insubordinate and had created a disturbance; (ii)

the resulting disciplinary action promoted the efficiency of the

agency as required by 5 U.S.C. s 7513(a)4; (iii) the procedural errors made in removing the appellant were harmless; (iv)

Butler failed to make out her affirmative defenses of retaliaUSCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 3 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

tion and discrimination; and (v) that the removal penalty was

unreasonable. Accordingly, the AJ mitigated her removal to

a thirty-day suspension and ordered back pay with interest.

The Army petitioned the MSPB to review this penalty reduction within the thirty-five-day period provided for by the

MSPB's regulations, see 5 C.F.R. s 1201.114(d), and appellant

__________

2 "A mixed case appeal is an appeal filed with the MSPB that

alleges an appealable agency action was effected, in whole or in

part, because of discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, handicap or age." 29 C.F.R. s 1614.302(a)(2).

3 Butler alleged that the Army failed to follow the procedures

articulated in the Walter Reed Army Medical Center Supervisor's

Handbook for the recommendation and processing of adverse actions. The MSPB Administrative Judge found that the agency

failed to adhere to its normal procedures for initiating and investigating disciplinary matters, but that this departure neither harmed

nor prejudiced the appellant. See Butler v. Department of the

Army, USMSPB Initial Decision, No. DC-0752-94-0396-I-1, at 9

(August 3, 1994).

4 5 U.S.C. s 7513(a) provides that "[u]nder regulations prescribed

by the Office of Personnel Management, an agency may take an

action covered by this subchapter against an employee only for such

cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 4 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

filed a cross petition addressing only her nondiscrimination

claim of procedural irregularities.

On October 11, 1994, while the cross petitions were pending

before the MSPB, appellant filed this action in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, naming

Togo West, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the

Army, as defendant. Butler's complaint contained three

counts, alleging racial discrimination, retaliation, and a violation of her First Amendment rights to free speech and

association. Subsequently, on December 21, 1994, the MSPB

denied both petitions for review and the AJ's Initial Decision

became final. See 5 C.F.R. s 1201.113(b) ("If the Board

denies all petitions for review, the initial decision will become

final when the Board issues its last decision denying a petition for review."). In March of 1995, the appellee moved to

dismiss Butler's lawsuit under Rule 12(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, for summary

judgment, alleging that Butler filed her complaint prematurely as the MSPB had not yet issued a final decision. The

district court dismissed appellant's discrimination claims as

untimely in a February 14, 1997 Memorandum Opinion, reasoning that Butler had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies under the CSRA prior to filing suit. While the

court originally held that she had stated a timely First

Amendment claim independent from her Title VII action, a

November 12, 1997 Memorandum Opinion and Order granted

the defendant's motion for reconsideration and dismissed

Butler's First Amendment claim as equally untimely under

the CSRA.

Recognizing that it faced a question of first impression, the

district court found that appellant filed her suit at a time

when the court lacked jurisdiction to hear her complaint.

Although section 7702(e)(1)(B) states that an individual claiming discrimination shall be entitled to file a civil action if there

is no judicially reviewable action within 120 days following the

filing of an appeal with the MSPB, the court held that an

initial decision by the AJ within that period is sufficient to

foreclose immediate access to the federal courts. For purposes of section 7702(e)(1)(B), it ruled, "[a]n initial decision is

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 5 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

essentially the same as a final decision...." Butler v. West,

No. 94-2182 at 7 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1997) ("Butler I").

The court articulated three separate grounds for this conclusion: First, it reasoned that an initial decision and a final

decision are functionally indistinguishable, as the former automatically converts into the latter provided that neither party

(nor the MSPB on its own motion) seeks further Board

review. Second, it noted that 29 C.F.R. s 1614.310(h) authorizes an individual with a mixed case to file a civil action

"[a]fter 120 days from the date of filing an appeal with the

MSPB if the MSPB has not yet made a decision" (emphasis

added). Since the EEOC refers to a final decision in other

subsections of 29 C.F.R. s 1614.310, the court concluded that

the EEOC's use of the more general term decision in section

1614.310(h) signals an intent that any MSPB decision--initial

or final--should foreclose judicial review. Finally, the court

reasoned that any other reading of section 7702(e)(1)(B)

would lead to absurd results that defied the purpose of the

statute, since it necessarily takes more than 120 days for the

MSPB fully to process most claims before it. Were a prospective plaintiff allowed to proceed in district court whenever the Board failed to meet that deadline, the statutory

requirement of MSPB participation would be rendered meaningless.

According to the district court, appellant should have followed the alternative avenue into the federal courts provided

by 5 U.S.C. s 7703(b), which allows a civil suit to be filed

within thirty days of a final MSPB decision. Since Butler

neither refiled her suit nor moved to amend her complaint

within the thirty-day period following December 21, 1994, the

date on which the Initial Decision became final, her complaint

was untimely. In this appeal, Butler challenges the district

court's construction of the relevant statutory provisions, arguing that her suit was timely under 5 U.S.C. s 7702(e)(1) as

the MSPB had failed to issue a judicially reviewable decision

within 120 days after Butler lodged her appeal. We agree.5

__________

5 Appellant additionally asserts (i) that her complaint "ripened"

when the MSPB denied the cross petitions for review and the Initial

II.

The CSRA lays out a comprehensive statutory framework

for the processing of mixed case appeals, which has been

supplemented and elaborated by regulations issuing from

both the EEOC and the MSPB. See 5 U.S.C. s 7702; 5

C.F.R. ss 1201.151-1201.175; 29 C.F.R. ss 1613.401-

1613.421. As the procedural history of this case well illustrates, the provisions that structure both administrative and

judicial review of adverse personnel actions form a complicated tapestry. Where Congress has spoken authoritatively, the

time limits articulated by the Act have been strictly policed.

See King v. Dole, 782 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per

curiam) (given "the clear and emphatic language of the statuUSCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 6 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

tory provision" requiring civil action to be filed within thirty

days from notice of a judicially reviewable action, district

court lacks jurisdiction to hear case filed thirty-one days after

receipt of notice); Harrison v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1505, 1515

(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("reading between the lines [of the CSRA] to

interpolate remedies Congress did not provide can only lead

the Court into error"). To some extent, this case presents

the flip side of King, as it requires us to determine whether

the equally clear and emphatic language of section

7702(e)(1)(B), which facially permits a lawsuit when 120 days

pass without a judicially reviewable decision, merits an equally strict reading. We hold that it does.

A.The Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Mixed

Case Appeals

5 U.S.C. s 7702 contains the statutory provisions directly

addressing the procedural path of a mixed case--an adverse

personnel action subject to appeal to the MSPB coupled with

a claim that the action was motivated by discrimination. See,

e.g., McAdams v. Reno, 64 F.3d 1137, 1141 (8th Cir. 1995)

__________

Decision became final, such that her complaint then became timely

under 5 U.S.C. s 7703(b), and (ii) that she did not have to exhaust

administrative remedies with respect to her First Amendment

claims, as the MSPB was incapable of granting full relief. Since we

hold appellant's complaint timely under 5 U.S.C. s 7702(e)(1), we do

not reach these contentions.

(defining the mixed case in similar terms); Romain v. Shear,

799 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (same).

When the discrimination is alleged as a violation of Title VII,

the federal employee must negotiate and exhaust the complex

administrative regime that governs Title VII public employment cases in addition to the usual procedures for challenging

an adverse personnel action under the CSRA. See Brown v.

General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832-33 (1976) (requiring

exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to filing a Title

VII suit in federal district court).6 The MSPB and EEOC

regulations that structure the prosecution of mixed cases are

extremely complicated, but they can be reduced to a decision

tree, albeit a somewhat elaborate one. We briefly survey this

scheme so as to lay out the statutory and regulatory backdrop

for our inquiry into the proper meaning of section

7702(e)(1)(B).

An employee who intends to pursue a mixed case has

several paths available to her. At the outset, the aggrieved

party can choose between filing a "mixed case complaint"7

with her agency's EEO office and filing a "mixed case appeal"8 directly with the MSPB. See 29 C.F.R. s 1614.302(b).

By statute, the relevant agency EEO office and the MSPB

can and must address both the discrimination claim and the

appealable personnel action. See 5 U.S.C. s 7702(a). Should

she elect the agency EEO route, within thirty days of a final

decision she can file an appeal with the MSPB or a civil

__________

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 7 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

6 "However, when a federal employee claims he or she has been

affected by both an 'adverse employment action' and a related Title

VII violation, administrative remedies may be exhausted for Title

VII purposes by asserting both claims before the MSPB." Sloan v.

West, 140 F.3d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing McAdams, 64 F.3d

at 1141).

7 "A mixed case complaint is a complaint of employment discrimination filed with a federal agency ... related to or stemming from

an action that can be appealed to the [MSPB]." 29 C.F.R.

s 1614.302(a)(1).

8 See supra n.2.

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 8 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

discrimination action in federal district court.9 See 29 C.F.R.

ss 1614.302(d)(1)(ii), 1614.302(d)(3), 1614.310(a). If 120 days

pass without a final decision from the agency's EEO office,

the same avenues of appeal again become available: the

complainant can file either a mixed case appeal with the

MSPB or a civil action in district court. See 5 U.S.C.

ss 7702(e)(1)(A), 7702(e)(2); 29 C.F.R. ss 1614.302(d)(1)(i),

1614.310(g); 5 C.F.R. s 1201.154(b)(2).

When a complainant appeals to the MSPB, either directly

or after pursuing her claim with the agency EEO office, the

matter is assigned to an Administrative Judge who takes

evidence and eventually makes findings of fact and conclusions of law. See 5 C.F.R. ss 1201.41(b), 1201.111. The AJ's

initial decision becomes a final decision if neither party, nor

the MSPB on its own motion, seeks further review within

thirty-five days. See 5 C.F.R. s 1201.113. However, both

the complainant and the agency can petition the full Board to

review an initial decision. Should the Board deny the petition

for review, the initial decision becomes final, see 5 C.F.R.

s 1201.113(b); if the Board grants the petition, its decision is

final when issued. See 5 C.F.R. s 1201.113(c). At this point,

the complainant again has a choice: within thirty days of

receiving a final decision from the MSPB, she can either

appeal the discrimination claim to the EEOC, see 5 C.F.R.

s 1201.157, or appeal the entire claim (or any parts thereof)

to the appropriate district court.10 See 5 U.S.C. s 7703(b), 5

__________

9 The party can also appeal the decision to the EEOC, but in that

case she forfeits further consideration of all nondiscrimination

claims. See Sloan, 140 F.3d at 1260 (9th Cir. 1998).

10 On the discrimination claim, the complainant "shall have the

right to have the facts subject to trial de novo by the reviewing

court." 5 U.S.C. s 7703(c). The district court reviews nondiscrimination claims on the administrative record, and will set aside the

MSPB's determinations only when "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"; "obtained

without procedures required by law, rule or regulation having been

followed"; or "unsupported by substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C.

s 7703(c)(1)-(3). For applications of these standards, see Barnes v.

Small, 840 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Romain v. Shear, 799 F.2d

C.F.R. s 1201.175, 29 C.F.R. s 1614.310(b). Finally, if the

MSPB fails to render a judicially reviewable decision within

120 days from the filing of a mixed case appeal, the aggrieved

party can pursue her claim in federal district court. See 5

U.S.C. s 7702(e)(1)(B).

B.The Meaning of Section 7702

We review statutory interpretation by a district court de

novo.11 See Fawn Mining Corp. v. Hudson, 80 F.3d 519, 521

(D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Wishnefsky, 7 F.3d 254,

256 (D.C. Cir. 1993). As always, our inquiry starts from "the

fundamental canon that statutory interpretation begins with

the language of the statute itself." Pennsylvania Dep't of

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 9 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

__________

1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1986). If the complainant seeks only to pursue

her nondiscrimination claim, appeal properly lies with the Federal

Circuit. See 5 U.S.C. s 7703(b)(1); 5 C.F.R. s 1201.120; Powell v.

Department of Defense, 158 F.3d 597, 598-99 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

11 Appellee argues that this case requires a Chevron analysis of

MSPB and EEOC regulations. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 5 C.F.R.

s 1201.156(a), promulgated by the MSPB, provides that "[w]hen an

appellant alleges prohibited discrimination in the appeal, the judge

will decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable

action within 120 days after the appeal is filed." 29 C.F.R.

s 1614.310(h), promulgated by the EEOC, allows an individual with

a mixed case appeal before the MSPB "to file a civil action in an

appropriate United States District Court ... [a]fter 120 days from

the date of filing an appeal with the MSPB if the MSPB has not yet

made a decision." According to appellee, the MSPB and EEOC

regulations merely require an initial decision within 120 days:

section 1201.156(a) requires a "judge," rather than the full Board, to

issue a decision, while section 1614.310(h) requires a "decision,"

rather than a "final decision." We cannot agree. Neither the

MSPB nor the EEOC have construed their regulations in such a

manner, and neither advances this construction as a party to this

dispute. In any case, since we believe that the plain language of 5

U.S.C. s 7702(e)(1)(B) contains the "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress," Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, and our decision gives

effect to that intent, we need not go any further into a Chevron

step-two analysis.

Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990). See

also Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,

447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (same).

1.The Statutory Language

The text of 5 U.S.C. s 7702(e)(1)(B) provides that:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if at any time

after--

(B) the 120th day following the filing of an appeal with

the Board under subsection (a)(1) of this section [providing for mixed case appeals], there is no judicially reviewable action ...;

an employee shall be entitled to file a civil action to the

same extent and in the same manner as provided in section

717(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964....

The parties disagree as to the proper meaning of the term

"judicially reviewable action"--appellant limits its scope to

final decisions, while appellee asserts that it encompasses

both initial and final decisions. Since initial decisions are not

subject to judicial review, appellant argues, the statute expressly sanctioned her civil action; there was no judicially

reviewable action by the 120th day after she lodged her mixed

appeal with the MSPB.12 Appellee rejects this literal reading, embracing a functional approach analogous to that

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 10 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

adopted by the district court below. Because an initial

decision automatically converts into a final decision unless the

parties or the MSPB seeks further review, appellee argues

that initial decisions effectively constitute judicially reviewable actions. We think that appellant's reading of the statute

is clearly the right one.

The unambiguous and explicit language of section

7702(e)(1)(B), as well as the basic design of the statute in

which it reposes, limit our reading of "judicially reviewable

__________

12 At the time appellant filed her complaint in the district court,

179 days had elapsed since she lodged her mixed appeal with the

MSPB. Eighty-one days more would pass before a final decision

issued.

action" to one subject to judicial review as of the time the

plaintiff files suit. First, the phrase does not speak in

contingent terms to encompass actions that may or may not

be judicially reviewable at some point in the future. While an

initial decision can convert to a final decision with either the

passage of thirty-five days or the denial of all outstanding

petitions for review, it can also be overturned or modified by

the Board, in which case it will never be reviewable by the

courts in its initial form. Furthermore, throughout the

thirty-five-day period following the issuance of an initial

decision, the parties can each petition for another round of

review from the Board. Once a decision becomes final,

however, a losing party's only recourse lies in the courts.

These distinctions in the effect of the two kinds of decisions

have real-world implications, and defy any gloss that an initial

decision and a final decision are effectively synonymous.

Second, as sketched above, see supra pp. 7-10, section

7702(e)(1)(B) is situated within a larger statutory provision--

section 7702--that structures the path of all mixed cases. As

a whole, section 7702 provides a rigid time line for advancing

mixed cases through the various phases of administrative and

judicial review set forth therein. In looking to its parallel

structure, we "follow the cardinal rule that a statute is to be

read as a whole," King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215,

221 (1991) (citing Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115

(1989)), "since the meaning of statutory language, plain or

not, depends on context." Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,

515 (1993). As in Conroy and "the context of this statute

actually supports the conclusion that Congress meant what

[section 7702(e)(1)(B)] says." Id. For example, sections

7702(a)(1) and 7702(a)(2) respectively direct that the MSPB

and an employee's agency--depending on where the complainant chooses first to pursue his mixed case--"shall, within

120 days of the filing of the appeal, decide both the issue of

discrimination and the appealable action", 5 U.S.C.

s 7702(a)(1), and "shall resolve such matter within 120 days."

5 U.S.C. s 7702(a)(2). Moreover, sections 7702(e)(1)(A) and

7702(e)(1)(C) each allow aggrieved employees to pursue their

claims in federal court when either their employing agency or

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 11 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the EEOC has been temporally remiss in processing a case

before it.13 See 5 U.S.C. ss 7702(e)(1)(A) & 7702(e)(1)(C).

Read together, these provisions clearly express Congress'

desire that mixed cases should be processed expeditiously,

and that complainants should have access to a judicial forum

should their claims languish undecided in the administrative

machinery.

The legislative history lends further support to our reading

of section 7702(e)(1)(B). The Joint Explanatory Statement of

the Committee on Conference accompanying the CSRA ("Explanatory Statement") declares that

[t]he bill establishes mandatory time limits to govern the

maximum length of time the employing agency, the

MSPB, the EEOC, or the Panel may take to resolve the

matter at each step in the process. The act makes

compliance with these deadlines mandatory--not discretionary---in order to assure the employee the right to

have as expeditious a resolution of the matter as possible.

H. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1717, Joint Explanatory Statement of

the Committee on Conference, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted

in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2874 (emphasis added). Describing the procedural path for processing mixed cases, the

Explanatory Statement goes on to explain that

[t]he conference substitute fully protects the existing

rights of employees to trial de novo under title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 or other similar laws after a final

agency action on the matter. Under the act's provisions,

this final agency action must occur within 120 days after

the complaint is first filed. After these 120 days, the

employee may appeal to the Board or file a complaint in

district court in those cases where the agency in violation

of the law has not issued a final decision. If the employ-

__________

13 5 U.S.C. s 7702(e)(1)(A) entitles an employee to bring suit

when there is no judicially reviewable action on the 120th day

following the filing of a mixed case complaint with the employing

agency, while 5 U.S.C. s 7702(e)(1)(C) allows recourse to the federal courts when there is no "final agency action" on the 180th day

following the filing of a petition with the EEOC.

ee files an appeal of the agency action with the MSPB,

the employee may file a suit in district court any time

after 120 days if the Board has not completed action on

the matter by that time.

Id. at 2874-75. (emphasis added). We think this history

reinforces our reading of the text that Congress used "judicially reviewable action" to refer to final agency actions alone.

The Board has not "completed action" nor "resolve[d] the

matter" until it issues a final decision. The text and structure of section 7702, as well as the accompanying legislative

history, permit no other interpretation.

Appellee's principal support for his contrary reading lies in

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 12 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

a separate passage in the Explanatory Statement. After

discussing the mandatory nature of the time limits for agency

action, the Explanatory Statement continues: "[i]t is not

intended that the employing agencies, the Board, the Commission, or the special panel would automatically lose jurisdiction for failing to meet these time frames. Congress will

exercise its oversight responsibilities should there be a systematic pattern of any body failing to meet these time

frames." Id. at 2874. In appellee's view, this statement

signals a clear intention to prevent complainants from entering federal court until the administrative agency takes final

action, and section 7702(e)(1)(B) merely constitutes a type of

savings clause that applies on those rare occasions when the

agency refuses to act altogether.14 Appellee fails to explain,

however, why authorization of an agency's retention of jurisdiction after a deadline for action has passed should also

__________

14 In support of his reading, appellee also cites to sections

7701(i)(1) & (2), which direct the MSPB to announce time frames

for processing appeals and to submit yearly reports to Congress

discussing its adherence to these deadlines. 5 U.S.C. ss 7701(i)(1)

& (2). Neither the requirement of record-keeping nor the specter

of congressional oversight undercuts the alternative avenue for

relief that Congress made available to plaintiffs in section

7702(e)(1)(B). In fact, these provisions reinforce our reading; they

illustrate yet another mechanism for assuring the expeditious resolution of employee complaints that Congress so clearly contemplated.

divest the federal courts of the jurisdiction expressly granted

by section 7702(e)(1)(B) to consider the appeal of an appellant

in the same situation. The two are in no way mutually

exclusive. See Padilla v. Department of the Air Force, 58

M.S.P.R. 561, 566 (1993) ("The appellant's filing of a civil

action in a United States District Court does not automatically terminate the Board's jurisdiction over her appeal," as

Board law "permits simultaneous adjudication of a mixed case

appeal before the Board and a United States District

Court."); Connor v. United States Postal Serv., 52 M.S.P.R.

588, 591 (1992) (same); McGovern v. Equal Employment

Opportunity Comm'n, 28 M.S.P.R. 689, 691 n.1 (1985) ("The

fact that Section 7702(e)(1)(B) allows the appellant to go to

District Court if he does not have a decision within 120 days

of his appeal to the regional office does not lead us to

conclude that the presiding official's initial decision constitutes a final and reviewable Board order in this case. Rather, that section provides the appellant with an alternative and

additional route of appeal...."). The section allows the

appellant to ignore the time lapse by the Board or to move

the case to federal court. Accordingly, although the MSPB

does not lose its jurisdiction when 120 days elapse without a

final decision, the appropriate federal district court can take

jurisdiction as well.

2.Does Our Reading of Section 7702(e)(1)(B) Produce an

Absurd Result?

Appellee draws on the district court's opinion further to

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 13 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

argue that a literal reading of section 7702(e)(1)(B) would

produce absurd results. According to the court below, "[o]ne

hundred and twenty days is not enough time for the Board to

complete the entire cycle of initial decision and subsequent

review that is necessary to render a 'final' decision." Butler

I, at 7. Allowing a complainant to proceed to federal court

after the passage of 120 days would, in appellee's view,

undermine the MSPB's role as the preeminent authority on

federal personnel disputes and obviate the requirement for

the exhaustion of administrative remedies. We disagree.

First, the line of cases relied upon by appellee, dating back

to Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892),

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 14 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

and continuing up through United States v. X-Citement

Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), sanctions departure from a

statute's plain meaning only in that rare instance where a

literal reading would produce an application at odds with the

clearly expressed purpose of the statute. Where a " 'literal

application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at

odds with the intentions of its drafters' ... the intention of

the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls." United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242

(1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.

564, 571 (1982)) (emphasis added). We think it clear, however, for the reasons just discussed, that the plain language of

section 7702(e)(1)(B) does not lead to a particular application

that deviates from Congress' plain intent. To the contrary,

every application of our statutory reading will accord with

Congress' clearly expressed purpose. Accordingly, the principle of statutory construction expressed in Holy Trinity is

inapposite. To the extent that section 7702(e)(1)(B) permits a

complainant to proceed to federal district court without first

obtaining a final decision from the MSPB, and thereby to

avoid exhausting available administrative remedies, Congress

intended that result.15 See National Treasury Employees

Union v. King, 961 F.2d 240, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("Exhaustion is indeed a 'flexible doctrine,' in which congressional

intent is of 'paramount importance.' ") (quoting Patsy v.

Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982)).

We do not discount the special role that the MSPB has

been assigned in the adjudication of federal personnel dis-

__________

15 It is for this reason that cases cited by appellee like Tolbert v.

United States, 916 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1990) and Rivera v. United

States Postal Serv., 830 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1987), are distinguishable. In Tolbert and Rivera, the complainants appealed adverse

decisions from their employing agency to the EEOC, and then filed

suit before the 180 days allotted the EEOC for rendering a final

decision had passed. In other words, the plaintiffs brought suit

without first pursuing their claims at the administrative level to the

extent explicitly required by statute. In the present case, by

contrast, appellant pursued her claim before the MSPB and waited

the statutorily prescribed 120 days before bringing this lawsuit.

putes, nor do we impugn its expertise. The degree of deference that federal courts must accord MSPB resolutions of

nondiscrimination claims, see 5 U.S.C. s 7703(c) (limiting

review to actions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial

evidence), speaks directly to its preeminent role in this area.

We agree with our sister courts that "[a]dministrative law

judges and the MSPB [and] EEO counselors and the EEOC

... all have a measure of expertise and familiarity with

employment discrimination disputes that federal judges cannot readily match." Vinieratos v. United States Dep't of the

Air Force, 939 F.2d 762, 775 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Muller

Optical Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380, 395 (6th Cir. 1984) ("the

EEOC has developed considerable expertise in the field of

employment discrimination since Congress created it by the

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 15 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Civil Rights Act of 1964"); cf. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,

920 F.2d 967, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("In explaining Congress'

decision to grant the EEOC administrative enforcement powers, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare

observed that ... '[t]he Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission would be expected to develop an important reservoir of expertise in these matters, expertise which would

not readily be available to a widespread court system.' ")

(quoting S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1971)).

Nevertheless, where the complainant has neither deliberately

abandoned the administrative regime,16 see Vinieratos, 939

F.2d at 770 (plaintiff abandoned claim when he filed third

EEO complaint and asked MSPB to defer to EEO process);

McGinty v. United States Dep't of the Army, 900 F.2d 1114,

1117 (7th Cir. 1990) (plaintiff abandoned administrative system by filing claim in federal court rather than appealing

agency no age discrimination finding to the EEOC), nor

refused to cooperate in its processes, see Wilson v. Pena, 79

F.3d 154, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("If a complainant forces an

agency to dismiss or cancel the complaint by failing to provide

__________

16 As should be evident, we conclude that a federal employee who

files suit after 120 days have elapsed but before the MSPB issues a

final decision has not abandoned her administrative remedies.

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 16 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

sufficient information to enable the agency to investigate the

claim, he may not file a judicial suit."); Barnes v. Levitt, 118

F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 1997) (district court lacks jurisdiction

over employment discrimination suit where plaintiff refused

to cooperate with agency EEO investigation), and has herself

followed the rigorous time limitations prescribed by section

7702, section 7702(e)(1)(B) explicitly sanctions a civil action in

the federal district courts once 120 days have passed without

a final decision from the MSPB.17

While the district court has jurisdiction over such a claim,

and cannot dismiss it as untimely for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies, we see no reason why the district

court cannot stay the case, or hold it in abeyance, for a

reasonable period of time. See National Treasury Employees Union, 961 F.2d at 245 (reversing dismissal for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies but directing the district

court to hold claim in abeyance for three months to allow the

FLRA time to hear unfair labor practice claim). Such treatment would allow the court to benefit from the exercise of

MSPB expertise, preserving judicial resources while simultaneously protecting the right of appeal contained in section

7702(e)(1)(B). In this case, for example, the MSPB's final

decision was issued in December of 1994, a little more than

two months after appellant filed her complaint; the district

court did not rule on her complaint, however, until February

of 1997. While this delay may not be typical, it reveals that

the district courts can routinely benefit from MSPB expertise

without running afoul of the unambiguous language of section

7702(e)(1)(B), and without disadvantaging parties who follow

the letter of the statute's time line.

III.

For reasons discussed, we hold that the initial decision of

an administrative judge is not a "judicially reviewable deci-

__________

17 If the MSPB issues a final decision after more than 120 days

have elapsed but before the complainant has brought suit, 5 U.S.C.

s 7703 controls. Under section 7703(b)(2), once the party receives

notice of the MSPB's final action, she has thirty days in which to

file a claim in district court. See 5 U.S.C. s 7703(b)(2).

sion" for purposes of 5 U.S.C. s 7702(e)(1)(B) unless neither

party, nor the MSPB on its own motion, seeks further review

within thirty-five days. Accordingly, section 7702 allows a

complainant like Butler to appeal her claim to the appropriate

federal district court when, after filing a mixed case appeal

with the MSPB, 120 days elapse without final MSPB action.

Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of appellant's claim and

remand to the district court for further proceedings.

So ordered.

USCA Case #97-5348 Document #407833 Filed: 01/08/1999 Page 17 of 17