Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01302/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01302-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement (Insurance)

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ORDER – No. 19-cv-01302-LB

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

San Francisco Division 

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANSHUMAN S. NADKARNI, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 19-cv-01302-LB 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 

PLEADINGS 

Re: ECF No. 7 

INTRODUCTION 

The plaintiff Government Employees Insurance Company (“GEICO”) brought this 

declaratory-relief action to determine whether its insurance policy −− issued to the defendants 

Anshuman and Renuka Nadkarni, who are former landlords facing a state-court wrongful-eviction 

lawsuit brought by their former tenants −− requires it to defend and indemnify the Nadkarnis.1

 The 

defendants move for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) on 

the ground that GEICO has a duty to defend it as a matter of law, and GEICO counters that under 

the policy, it has no duty to defend or indemnify.2 The court denies the defendants’ motion for 

judgment on the pleadings. 

 

1

 First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) – ECF No. 7. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File 

(“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 

2

 Mot. − ECF No. 8 at 4; Opp. − ECF No. 18 at 23. 

Case 3:19-cv-01302-LB Document 26 Filed 07/11/19 Page 1 of 13
ORDER – No. 19-cv-01302-LB 2

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STATEMENT 

1. The Insurance Policy 

On May 9, 2018, GEICO issued Personal Umbrella Policy number P8345980 to the defendants 

for the policy period May 8, 2018 to May 8, 2019, “which was cancelled effective December 28, 

2018” (hereinafter the “GEICO policy” or “policy”).3 The policy limit was “$1 million above the 

minimum required underlying limit of primary liability insurance in the amount of $300,000, and 

also subject to a ‘retained limit’ of $500.”4

“Under the terms of the GEICO policy, GEICO promises to pay ‘damages’ on behalf of an 

‘insured’ arising out of an ‘occurrence,’5 subject to the terms and conditions of this policy.”6 The 

policy defines “damages” (in relevant part) as the “‘the total of: damages an “insured” must pay 

(1) legally; or (2) by agreement with “our” written consent; because of “personal injury” or 

“property” damage covered by this policy.’”7 Under the “Conditions” section of the policy, the 

policy “‘applies to “personal injury” or “property damage” which takes place anywhere during the 

time this policy is in force, provided that suit is brought in the United States, its territories and 

possessions, or Canada.’”8 The policy’s definition of “personal injury” includes “wrongful 

eviction.” The excerpt of the policy is as follows: 

10. Personal injury means: 

(a) mental or bodily injury, shock, sickness, disease or death including care and 

loss of services; or 

 

3

 FAC − ECF No. 7 at 2 (¶ 8) & Ex. A. 

4 Id. at 2 (¶ 9). Under the policy, the “[r]etained limit is the amount of any damages an insured must 

pay for any occurrence resulting in personal injury or property damage which is not covered by your 

primary insurance.” Policy, Ex. A to FAC – ECF No. 7 at 22 (¶ 9). 

5

 “Occurrence” is defined as “an accident or event, including a continuous or repeated exposure to 

conditions which results in personal injury or property damage neither expected or intended by an 

insured. For the purpose of determining the limit of liability, continuous or repeated exposure to 

substantially the same harmful conditions, during the policy period, which results in personal injury

and/or property damage shall be considered as arising out of one occurrence.” Id. at 21 (¶ 4). 

6

 FAC − ECF No. 7 at 2 (¶ 10). 

7 Id. (quoting the policy). 

8 Id. (quoting the policy). 

Case 3:19-cv-01302-LB Document 26 Filed 07/11/19 Page 2 of 13
ORDER – No. 19-cv-01302-LB 3

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(b) injury arising out of: 

(i) false arrest, false imprisonment, wrongful eviction, wrongful detention 

or malicious prosecution; or 

(ii) libel, slander, defamation of character or invasion of rights of privacy 

that does not arise out of any one or more of the following: 

(A) any business of an insured; or 

(B) oral, written or other publication of material by or at the direction of 

an insured with knowledge of its falsity; or 

(C) oral or written publication of material that was first published before 

the beginning of the policy period.9

Under the policy, “Property damage means physical injury or destruction of tangible property. 

This includes the loss of use caused by the injury or destruction. Property damage does not 

include the loss of money, notes, stock, bonds, or similar instruments, computer data or 

intellectual property.”10

In the section titled “Defense of Suits Not Covered by Other Insurance,” the policy states in 

relevant part, “[i]f the required ‘primary insurance’ [] is in force but does not cover ‘personal 

injury’ or ‘property damage’ due to the nature of the claim against ‘you’, and this policy does 

provide coverage, ‘we’ will provide defense of suits in excess of the ‘retained limit’.”11

2. The State Unlawful-Eviction Lawsuit 

In 2017, the defendants bought a residential property that was rented to tenants, who had lived 

there since 2008 and who had a written lease with the previous owner through April 21, 2018.12

On March 13, 2018, the defendants served the tenants with a “60 Day Notice of Termination of 

Tenancy,” which “‘provided that [the Nadkarni defendants] would be moving into the Subject 

 

9 Id. (¶ 11). 

10 Id. (¶ 12). 

11 FAC – ECF No. 7 at 3 (¶ 13); Policy, Ex. A to FAC – ECF No. 7 at 26 (¶ 1(a)). 

12 FAC – ECF No. at 4 (¶ 15); State Compl. – ECF No. 7 at 35–36 (¶¶ 1, 5). 

Case 3:19-cv-01302-LB Document 26 Filed 07/11/19 Page 3 of 13
ORDER – No. 19-cv-01302-LB 4

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Unit and that [the third-party claimants] must vacate.’”13 According to the state complaint, the 

former tenants vacated the unit on April 21, 2018.14 In November 2018, three former tenants sued 

the defendants for wrongful eviction on the ground that the defendants never moved into the 

property within three months (and did not thereafter stay for three years or offer it back to the 

tenants), which was the legal ground that allowed eviction.15 

The operative state complaint was filed on February 28, 2019, and has the following claims: 

(1) negligence (by demanding that the tenants vacate the property for an owner move-in and 

failing to move in) (resulting in serious emotional distress, property damage, property loss, loss of 

a rent-controlled apartment, and moving costs); (2) wrongful eviction in violation of the San 

Francisco Rent Ordinance (resulting in the same damages); (3) breach of the covenant of quiet 

enjoyment (resulting in the loss of a rent-controlled apartment, property damage, property loss, 

moving costs, and attorney’s fees and costs); (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress 

(resulting in severe emotional distress, mental injury, moving costs, and lose of use and enjoyment 

of the rental home); (5) a violation of section 37.11A of the San Francisco Rent ordinance by not 

filing required documents (such as a statement of occupancy within 90 days and updated 

statements every 90 days thereafter, the notice to vacate, and the notice of termination of tenancy) 

and by failing to move into the property (resulting in loss of enjoyment of a rent-controlled unit, 

property damage, property loss, mental injury, emotional distress, statutory damages and penalties, 

attorney’s fees, and litigation costs); (6) unfair business practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Code 

Prof. § 17200 by (essentially) the wrongful eviction and the failure to file the documents in 

violation of the Rent Ordinance, resulting in illegal profits; and (8) as to one former tenant, 

financial elder abuse warranting punitive damages.16

 

13 FAC – ECF No. at 4 (¶ 16); Notice, Ex. A to Nadkarni Decl. − ECF No. 8-2. The court considers the 

Notice under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076–77 (9th 

Cir. 2005). 

14 FAC – ECF No. at 4 (¶ 16). 

15 Id. (¶ 17) (move in within three months and live there for three years or offer the property back to 

the former tenants at the former rate, less any allowable increase). 

16 State First Amended Complaint – ECF No. 7 at 125−130 (¶¶ 24−74). 

Case 3:19-cv-01302-LB Document 26 Filed 07/11/19 Page 4 of 13
ORDER – No. 19-cv-01302-LB 5

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3. Tender by the Defendants; Coverage Investigation; Response to Tender 

On November 12, 2018, defendant Renuka Nadkarni (on behalf of all of the defendants), 

tendered the summons and complaint from the state unlawful-eviction action to GEICO for a 

defense and indemnity under the GEICO policy and advised (in an email) that “(1) ‘On 16th 

March [2018] a letter of Eviction was sent to the tenant with 60 days termination notice’; and (2) 

‘We took possession of the unit starting May [2018]’.”17

GEICO conducted a coverage investigation, which the complaint synopsizes as follows.18 

24. In connection with its coverage investigation, GEICO obtained a copy of 

three “Statement[s] of Occupancy filed on behalf of the Nadkarni defendants with 

the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board. . . . 

a. The “Statement of Occupancy” filed on June 11, 2018 on behalf of the 

Nadkarni defendants indicates that the notice to vacate the Subject Premises was 

served on the third-party claimants on “3/16/18” and that the Nadkarni defendants 

“recovered possession” of the Subject premises on “5/1/2018.” 

b. The “Statement of Occupancy” filed on November 8, 2018 [on behalf of] the 

Nadkarni defendants indicates that the notice to vacate the Subject Premises was 

served on the third-party claimants on “3/16/18” and that the Nadkarni defendants 

“recovered possession” of the Subject premises on “5/1/2018.” 

c. The “Statement of Occupancy” filed on November 16, 2018 [on behalf of] 

the Nadkarni defendants indicates that the notice to vacate the Subject Premises was 

served on the third-party claimants on “3/16/18” and that the Nadkarni defendants 

“recovered possession” of the Subject premises “on 30th April 2018. 

25. GEICO concluded from the allegations in the [state-court] Complaint . . . as 

confirmed by all information which was provided by the Nadkarni defendants and 

which was obtained from the San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board 

that the Nadkarni defendants’ exposure to liability in the [state-court] action does not 

present any potential liability for “personal injury” consisting of “wrongful eviction” 

covered by the GEICO policy which took place “during the time this policy is in 

force.” Rather, all undisputed information provided to GEICO indicates that any 

“personal injury”’ consisting of “wrongful eviction” allegedly suffered by the thirdparty claimants occurred prior to the May 8, 2018 inception of coverage under the 

GEICO policy either: (1) on March 16, 2018, when the third-party tenants were 

served a Notice of Termination of Tenancy by the Nadkarni defendants with respect 

to the Subject Property; (2) on April 28, 2018, when the third-party claimants vacated 

the Subject Property; or (3) on April 30, 2018 or May 1, 2018, when the Nadkarni 

defendants recovered possession of the Subject Property 

 

17 FAC – ECF No. 7 at 5 (¶¶ 22–23) (alterations in original). 

18 Id. at 5–6 (¶ 24). 

Case 3:19-cv-01302-LB Document 26 Filed 07/11/19 Page 5 of 13
ORDER – No. 19-cv-01302-LB 6

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26. GEICO also “concluded from the allegations of the Complaint in [the statecourt] action, as confirmed by all information provided by the Nadkarni defendants 

and obtained from the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration 

Board that the Nadkarni defendants’ exposure to liability in the [state-court] action 

did not present any potential liability for “property damage” claims covered by the 

GEICO policy. Rather, none [of]the allegations or claims raised any factual potential 

for “property damage” as that term is defined by the GEICO policy.19

On December 4, 2018, GEICO declined the defendants’ tender of the state complaint for a 

defense and indemnity.20 On December 8, 2018, the defendants disputed GEICO’s position and 

asserted that GEICO must accept the tender of defense because the “wrongful eviction” occurred 

in August 2019 (after the expiration of the 90-day period for either an owner move-in or an offer 

back to the tenants) and thus was during the policy period.21

On January 15, 2019, GEICO responded that it would provide a “defense . . . in the state action 

via independent counsel subject to a full reservation of rights under the terms of the GEICO 

[policy] and the law . . . . Among the specific rights reserved by GEICO . . . in the letter were: 

a. The “right to disclaim coverage” for the allegations and claims raised by the 

Venegas action on the grounds that no “personal injury” or “property damage” took 

place “during the time [the GEICO policy was] in force . . . .”; 

b. The “right to withdraw from th[e] defense [of the Nadkarni defendants] upon 

reasonable notice . . . .”; and 

c. The “right to seek recovery from [the Nadkarni defendants] for all defense 

costs incurred in defending [them] in the Venegas action.”22

On January 24, 2019, the defendants proposed that GEICO withdraw its reservation of rights 

regarding GEICO’s defense obligations in exchange for the defendants’ “waiver of any right to 

independent counsel under Civil Code section 2860.”23 GEICO declined the proposal.24 

 

19 Id. at 5–7 (¶¶ 24–26) & Statements of Occupancy, Ex. C to FAC – ECF No. 7 at 71–73, 75–80, 82–

90. 

20 Id. at 7 (¶ 27); Letter, Ex. D to FAC – ECF No. 7 at 91–96. 

21 FAC – ECF No. 7 at 7 (¶ 28); Letter, Ex. E. to FAC – ECF No. 7 at 97–100. 

22 FAC – ECF No. 7 at 7–8 (¶ 29); Letter, Ex. F to FAC – ECF No. 7 at 102–109. 

23 FAC – ECF No. 7 at 8 (¶ 30); Email, Ex. G to FAC – ECF No. 7 at 111–112. 

24 FAC – ECF No. 7 at 8 (¶ 30); Email, Ex. G to FAC – ECF No. 7 at 111. 

Case 3:19-cv-01302-LB Document 26 Filed 07/11/19 Page 6 of 13
ORDER – No. 19-cv-01302-LB 7

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On February 4, 2019, GEICO responded to the defendants’ contention that the eviction 

became unlawful only in August (after the 90-day period expired) and asserted that the “act or 

offense” covered by the “personal injury” policy provision was the defendants’ original 

“dispossession of the third-party claimants/[tenants] from the premises, which took place prior to 

the inception of coverage under the GEICO policy [on May 8, 2018].”25 On February 27, 2019, 

the defendants responded and “reiterated the same argument made in [their] December 8, 2018 

correspondence that the eviction only became ‘unlawful’ 90 days after the original notice of 

eviction [meaning, in August 2018, during the policy period].”26

4. Other Relevant Procedural History 

GEICO filed its initial complaint on March 11, 2019 and an amended complaint on April 5, 

2019.27 The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings on May 14, 2019 and answered the 

amended complaint on June 21, 2019.28 All parties consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction.29

GOVERNING LAW 

1. Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

“After the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for 

judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “[T]he same standard of review applicable to a 

Rule 12(b) motion applies to its Rule 12(c) analog,” because the motions are “functionally 

identical.” Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). A Rule 12(c) 

motion may thus be predicated on wither (1) the lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) 

 

25 FAC – ECF No. 7 at 8 (¶ 31); Letter, Ex. H to FAC – ECF No. 7 at 115–116. 

26 Id. (¶ 32) & Email, Ex. I to FAC – ECF No. 7 at 119–120. 

27 Compl. – ECF No. 1; FAC – ECF No. 7. 

28 Mot. – ECF No. 8; Answer – ECF No. 19. Geico pointed out that the motion for judgment on the 

pleadings was untimely because the defendants had not answered the complaint. Because the 

defendants have now answered, the pleadings are “closed,” and the court may consider the motion. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 

29 Consent Forms – ECF Nos. 5, 9. 

Case 3:19-cv-01302-LB Document 26 Filed 07/11/19 Page 7 of 13
ORDER – No. 19-cv-01302-LB 8

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insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(c), the court 

“must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). “A 

judgment on the pleadings is proper if, taking all of [plaintiff]’s allegations in its pleadings as true, 

[defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Compton Unified Sch. Dist. v. Addison, 

598 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Although a court generally is confined to the pleadings on a Rule 12(c) motion, “[a] court 

may, however, consider certain materials –– documents attached to the complaint, documents 

incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice –– without converting the 

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 

908 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). The 

Ninth Circuit has “extended the ‘incorporation by reference’ doctrine to situations in which the 

plaintiff’s claim depends on the contents of a document, the defendant attaches the document to its 

motion to dismiss, and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document, even though the 

plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint.” Knievel v. 

ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court properly considered documents attached to a motion to 

dismiss that described the terms of plaintiff's group-health insurance plan, where plaintiff alleged 

membership in the plan, his claims depended on the conditions described in the documents, and 

plaintiff never disputed their authenticity). 

2. The Interpretation of Insurance Agreements 

Because the defendants are California residents, and the parties’ dispute relates to an insurance 

policy covering property located in the state, California substantive law applies in this diversity 

action. Freeman v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 253 F.3d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 2001). In California, courts 

apply contract law to interpret insurance policies: 

Case 3:19-cv-01302-LB Document 26 Filed 07/11/19 Page 8 of 13
ORDER – No. 19-cv-01302-LB 9

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Interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law and follows the general 

rules of contract interpretation. (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal. 

4th 1, 18, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370, 900 P.3d 619 (Waller).) “The fundamental rules of 

contract interpretation are based on the premise that the interpretation of a contract 

must give effect to the ‘mutual intention’ of the parties. ‘Under statutory rules of 

contract interpretation, the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is 

formed governs interpretation. (Civ. Code, § 1636). Such intent is to be inferred, if 

possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract. (Id., § 1639). The “clear 

and explicit” meaning of these provisions, interpreted in their “ordinary and popular 

sense,” unless “used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given 

to them by usage” (id., § 1644), controls judicial interpretation. (Id., § 1638.)’ 

[Citations.] A policy provision will be considered ambiguous when it is capable of 

two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable. [Citation.] But language in 

a contract must be interpreted as a whole, and in the circumstances of the case, and 

cannot be found to be ambiguous in the abstract.” (Id. At p. 18, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370, 

900 P.2d 619.) 

Moreover, insurance coverage is “‘“interpreted broadly so as to afford the greatest 

possible protection to the insured, [whereas] . . . exclusionary clauses are interpreted 

narrowly against the insurer.”’” (White v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 

870, 881, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309.) . . . The burden is on the insured to 

establish that the claim is within the basic scope of coverage and on the insure to 

establish that the claim is specifically excluded. (Aydin Corp. v. First State Ins. 

Co.(1998) 18 Cal. 4th 1183, 1188, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 959 P.2d 1213.) 

MacKinnon v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 31 Cal. 4th 635, 647–48 (Cal. 2003). 

3. An Insurer’s Duty to Defend 

An insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify: 

An insurer must defend its insured against claims that create a potential for indemnity 

under the policy. (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 287, 

295, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 861 P.2d 1153 (Montrose); Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. 

(1966) 65 Cal. 2d 273, 275, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (Gray).) The duty to 

defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, and it may apply even in an action 

where no damages are ultimately awarded. (Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B.

(1993) 4 Cal. 4th 1076, 1081, 17 Cal. Rprt. 2d 210, 846 P.2d 792.) 

Determination of the duty to defend depends, in the first instance, on comparison 

between the allegations of the complaint and the terms of the policy. (Montrose, 

supra, 6 Cal. 4th 287, 295, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 861 P.2d 1153.) But the duty also 

exists where extrinsic facts known to the insurer suggest that the claim may be 

covered. (Ibid.) Moreover, that the precise causes of action pled by the third-party 

complaint may fall outside policy coverage does not excuse the duty to defend where, 

under the facts alleged, reasonably inferable, or otherwise known, the complaint 

could fairly be amended to state a covered liability. (Gray, supra, 65 Cal. 2d 263, 

Case 3:19-cv-01302-LB Document 26 Filed 07/11/19 Page 9 of 13
ORDER – No. 19-cv-01302-LB 10

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275–276, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168; CNA Casualty of California v. Seabord 

Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 598, 610–611, 222 Cal. Rptr. 276.) 

The defense duty arises upon tender of a potentially covered claim and lasts until the 

underlying lawsuit is concluded, or until it has been shown that there is no potential 

for coverage. (Montrose, supra, 6 Cal. 4th 287, 295, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 861 P.2d 

1153.) When the duty, having arisen, is extinguished by a showing that no claim can 

in fact be covered, “it is extinguished only prospectively and not retroactively.” (Buss 

v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 35, 46, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 939 P.2d 766 

(Buss); see also Aeroget-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1997) 17 Cal. 

4th 38, 59, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 118, 947 P.2d 909. 

From these premises, the following may be stated: If any facts stated or fairly 

inferable in the complaint, or otherwise known or discovered by the insurer, suggest 

a claim potentially covered by the policy, the insurer’s duty to defend arises and is 

not extinguished until the insurer negates all facts suggesting potential coverage. On 

the other hand, if, as a matter of law, neither the complaint or the known extrinsic 

facts indicate any basis for potential coverage, the duty to defend does not arise in 

the first instance. 

Scottsdale Insurance Company v. MV Transportation, 36 Cal. 4th 643, 654–55 (Cal. 2005). 

ANALYSIS 

The defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the “wrongful 

eviction” creates a duty to defend.30 The parties do not dispute that GEICO has a duty to defend a 

wrongful eviction that occurred during the policy period, which here began May 8, 2018. Instead, 

they dispute whether the wrongful eviction occurred in the policy period (meaning, on or after 

May 8, 2019). The defendants contend that the eviction became wrongful in July 2018 (after the 

expiration of the 90-day period for an owner move-in or, alternatively, a tender of the property 

back to the tenants) and that in any event, the tenants were not required to surrender the property 

until May 12, 2018 (within the policy period).31 GEICO contends that the “wrongful eviction” 

occurred when the defendants terminated the tenancy in March 2018, and certainly by the time the 

tenants vacated the property in April 2018, and the defendants regained possession of it on May 1, 

 

30 Mot. – ECF No. 8 at 5. 

31 Id. at 15; Reply – ECF No. 20 at 3. 

Case 3:19-cv-01302-LB Document 26 Filed 07/11/19 Page 10 of 13
ORDER – No. 19-cv-01302-LB 11

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2019.32 The court denies the defendants’ motion because the defendants terminated the tenancy 

before the policy’s effective date. 

The policy covers “occurrences” during the policy period.33 It is an offense-based coverage, 

and the event “triggering coverage” for covered “offenses” (such as the wrongful eviction here) “is 

the commission of the specified offense during the policy period.”34 Mez Indus., Inc. v. Pac. Nat. 

Ins. Co., 76 Cal. App. 4th 856, 865 (1999); Street Surfing, LLC v. Great Am. E & S Ins. Co., 776 

F.3d 603, 610 (9th Cir. 2014). The offense occurs on the date it commences, even if the offense is 

a continuing offense. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 188 Cal. App. 3d 438, 444–49 (1986); Harbor 

Ins. Co. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co., 165 Cal. App. 3d 1029, 1040 (1985). 

Here, as GEICO argues, at least three dates are relevant: March 13, 2018 (when the defendants 

served the notice of termination of tenancy); April 21, 2018 (when the plaintiffs vacated the 

property pursuant to the notice); and May 1, 2018 (when the defendants recovered possession of 

the property).35 All dates have legal significance, and all occurred before the policy’s effective 

date. For example, cases hold that wrongful eviction occurs when the landlord serves the eviction 

notice. Silve v. Riley, 15 Cal. App. 4th 23, 26 (1993); Menefee v. Ostawari, 228 Cal. App. 3d 239, 

246 (1991) (“Appellant was damaged at the time of service of the 30-day notice in that 

respondents interfered with his continued right of possession at that time”). In insurance-coverage 

cases, courts emphasize the actual departure of the tenant pursuant to an eviction notice. 

Cunningham v. Universal Underwriters, 98 Cal. App. 4th 1141, 1149 (2002) (physical 

dispossession is the sine qua non of eviction); see Swain v. California Casualty Insurance 

Company, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1, 10 (2002) (wrongful eviction is a discrete tort that consists in “the 

formal termination of a legal relationship). 

 

32 Opp. – ECF No. 18 at 18–19. 

33 Id. at 13. 

34 Id.

35 Id. at 18–19. 

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 The defendants nonetheless argue that the eviction was at least ongoing until the expiration of 

the 90-day period (to take possession or tender it back to the tenants).36 But that provision of the 

San Francisco Rent Ordinance is a “safe harbor” provision that does not render a previous eviction 

“wrongful” and instead is evidence about whether the landlord was acting in good faith at the time 

it served the eviction notice. See id. at 9 (landlords evicted tenants to allow a family move-in but 

later rented the property to another tenant; court rejected defendants’ argument that the eviction 

“only became illegal after the fact when the [defendants] failed to move into the premises 

themselves” and held that the insured’s conduct, whether lawful or not, inflict[ed] an obvious 

harm to an important interest –– the claimant’s interest in a leasehold, a place of shelter, [or] a 

home . . . .”). 

The defendants also suggest that the state complaint’s references to “personal injury” and other 

enumerated torts extend the eviction into the policy period.37 In their reply, they elaborate: 

The policy covers damages that arise out of property damage, mental or bodily 

injury, shock, sickness, disease or death, or injury that arises out of false arrest, false 

imprisonment, wrongful eviction, wrongful detention, malicious prosecution, libel, 

slander, defamation of character or invasion of the rights of privacy (so long as not 

thereafter excluded). By grouping all of these potential liability claims together, 

GEICO purposefully declined to separate them, and provide a separate trigger for 

each.38

They cite no authority to support the argument. Again, coverage is based on when the “offense is 

committed.” Here, at minimum, that is when the tenants departed or when the defendants regained 

possession of the property. Cunningham, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 1149. The same is true for the other 

enumerated torts. For example, for the tort of malicious prosecution, insurance-coverage cases 

hold that −− for purposes of insurance policies that measure coverage from the time when the 

 

36 Mot. – ECF No. 8 at 13. 

37 Id. at 15−16. GEICO points to other allegations in the state complaint about “property loss” and 

“property damage” and argues that they are conclusory, do not relate to the complaint’s core 

allegations about wrongful eviction, and do not trigger a duty to defend under the policy. Opp. – ECF 

No. 18 at 13 n.5. 

38 Reply – ECF No. 20 at 2. 

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“offense is committed” −− the tort of malicious prosecution occurs when the complaint is filed. 

Zurich, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 446–47. 

The defendants also argue that under the 60-day notice, the tenants were not required to vacate 

the premises until May 12, 2018, which was in the policy period.

39 That argument does not change 

the outcome for the same reason: the offense was committed before the policy period, meaning, 

when the tenants left and when the defendants regained possession. These events happened before 

May 8, 2018, the effective date of the GEICO policy. 

CONCLUSION 

The court denies the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Under the 

circumstances, and on this record, the court denies GEICO’s request that the court enter judgment 

in its favor. This order is without prejudice to GEICO’s raising the arguments in a motion for 

summary judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 11, 2019 

______________________________________ 

LAUREL BEELER 

United States Magistrate Judge 

 

39 See Reply – ECF No. 20 at 3. 

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