Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07218/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07218-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

K.S., a minor, by and through her parents, P.S.

and M.S.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

FREMONT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-07218 SI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AND

GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO HEAR ADDITIONAL

EVIDENCE 

On August 17, 2007, the Court heard argument on plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, and

plaintiff’s request to hear additional evidence. Having considered the arguments of the parties and the

papers submitted, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for leave

to amend, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART plaintiff’s motion to hear additional

evidence. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff K.S., a minor, by and through her parents, P.S. and M.S., filed this complaint against

defendant Fremont Unified School District on November 21, 2006.

Plaintiff is a child diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder who alleges that defendant refused

to provide her with a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) designed to meet her unique

needs. Compl. at 2-3. Plaintiff alleges that defendant denied her a FAPE for the 2002-03, 2003-04,

2004-05 and 2005-06 school years. Id. at 3. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the individualized

education program (“IEP”) designed for plaintiff failed to include appropriate speech therapy, one-toone support, and behavioral, academic, self-help, auditory processing and motor control services. Id.

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Plaintiff alleged four claims in her original complaint: (I) appeal from a decision in favor of

defendant by an administrative law judge at the Office of Administrative Hearings, issued August 24,

2006, (II) violation of Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“Section 504”), (III)

violation of Title II of The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12132 (“ADA”), and (IV)

violation of The Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (“Unruh Act”). 

On March 23, 2007, the Court issued an order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss Claims

II and III of the complaint, and granting defendant’s motion to dismiss Claim IV (Unruh Act) . The

Court dismissed Claim IV on the grounds that plaintiff failed to comply with the California Tort Claims

Act. The Court also indicated that if and when plaintiff successfully complied with the Tort Claims Act,

she could seek leave to amend her complaint. 

Plaintiff has now filed a motion to amend the complaint, and a motion to hear additional

evidence on her first claim.

I. MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amendment of the pleadings. It states that if a

responsive pleading has already been filed, the party seeking amendment “may amend the party's

pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely

given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). This rule reflects an underlying policy that

disputes should be determined on their merits, and not on the technicalities of pleading rules. See

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962). Accordingly, the Court must be very generous in

granting leave to amend. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.

1990) (leave to amend granted with “extreme liberality”); Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866

F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989).

However, there are several accepted reasons to deny leave to amend, including the presence of

bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, undue delay, prejudice to the defendant, futility of amendment, and

that the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. See Ascon Properties, 866 F.2d at 1160;

McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 1988). Courts do not ordinarily consider

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the validity of a proposed amended pleading in deciding whether to grant leave to amend, but leave may

be denied if the proposed amendment is futile or would be subject to dismissal. See Saul v. United

States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991).

DISCUSSION

In her motion for leave to amend the complaint, plaintiff titles her argument section as follows:

“Plaintiff requests leave to amend her complaint to demonstrate she has complied with the tort claims

act pursuant to this Court’s order.” Mot. at 3:24-25. The section starts: “This Court should allow

Plaintiff to amend her complaint to demonstrate Tort Claims Act compliance related to her Unruh

Claims.” Mot. at 3:26-27. She concludes the introductory section of her argument by stating: “Plaintiff

is seeking to simply clarify her pleadings to ensure that her complaint reflects the fact that she has

complied with the requirements of the Tort Claims Act.” Mot. at 4:21-22. In the next sub-section she

repeats the same argument, stating: “To reiterate, Plaintiff wishes to comply with this Court’s Order

by amending her complaint only to allege she has complied with the Tort Claims Act, that her

presentation of claims has been rejected by FUSD and to reallege the Unruh Claims dismissed by this

Court only for failure to comply with the above.” Mot. at 4:25-5:2; see also Mot. at 5:22-26 (“Plaintiff’s

amendment will merely clarify that the Tort Claims Act has been met and that Plaintiff now seeks to

allege only the Unruh Claims that were dismissed only for failure to meet the presentment requirements

under the Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff is not surprising the Defendant or ‘radically shifting’ or changing

the course of litigation in any way.”).

Despite these representations to the Court, plaintiff has attached to her motion a proposed

amended complaint that adds a new request for injunctive relief under the Unruh Act. See Amended

Complaint ¶ 93 (“Plaintiff suffered damages, and seeks an injunction . . . .”); p. 16 (“Prayer for Relief

. . . . (i) injunctive Relief”). In her motion for leave to amend, plaintiff makes absolutely no mention

of her desire to add an injunctive relief claim to the Unruh claim. As discussed above, her motion

focuses exclusively and explicitly on the desire to amend solely to plead compliance with the California

Tort Claims Act.

In her reply, rather than apologizing for omitting mention of the new injunctive relief claim,

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plaintiff argues that “Defendant has been aware that Plaintiff has always sought injunctive relief under

Unruh.” Reply at 2:10-11. Furthermore, she asserts, “Plaintiff filed her complaint on November 21,

2006 seeking in relevant part, money damages and injunctive relief. (Compl. at Pgs. 14-15 . . . ).”

Reply at 2:13-14. The Court has reviewed her initial complaint, however, and finds that injunctive relief

is nowhere requested. Under Claim IV of the original complaint, plaintiff explicitly requests only

money damages. See Complaint ¶ 91. Similarly, the prayer for relief in the original complaint makes

no mention of injunctive relief. See Complaint at 15:21-16:6. Plaintiff also states that at oral argument

on defendant’s motion to dismiss, she “made clear that she was seeking injunctive relief . . . .” Reply

at 2:20-21. The Court has reviewed the hearing transcript, and again finds plaintiff’s representation less

than accurate; nowhere in the cited portions of the transcript does plaintiff mention “injunction,” or any

synonym thereof. See Leigh Dec., Ex. A at 7-9. The closest plaintiff got to mentioning injunctive relief

was a her statement that “looking at the underlying remedies that we are seeking, you could say we are

asking on behalf of children to declare this policy, pattern and practice deemed violative . . .” Id. at

8:24-9:2. 

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure counsel have a duty to be fully candid with the

Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (“Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by

signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney

is certifying that . . . (2) the . . . legal contentions therein are warranted . . . [and] (3) the allegations and

other factual contentions have evidentiary support . . . .”); see also California Rules of Professional

Conduct 5-200 (“In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a member: . . . Shall not seek to mislead the judge,

judicial officer, or jury by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.”). Whether by design, or

inadvertence, counsel for plaintiff here has been less than fully accurate in her representations to the

Court. The Court urges plaintiff to be more prudent and candid in her future communications with

opposing counsel and the Court.

Despite the Court’s concerns with plaintiff’s motion, in light of the liberal standard for granting

leave to amend, the Court will allow plaintiff to file the proposed amended complaint. The Court also

agrees with defendants, however, that the new claim for injunctive relief significantly expands the scope

of plaintiff’s lawsuit. The claim adds new legal and factual issues, and expands the relevant temporal

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The parties’ proposed scheduling orders, discussed below, should incorporate these extensions

for defendant.

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scope. Consequently, to avoid prejudicing defendant, the Court will extend the discovery cut-offs for

defendant by one month. Plaintiff must complete her discovery by the current deadlines. Similarly, the

Court will extend defendant’s deadline for filing dispositive motions to two weeks after the deadline for

plaintiff.1

II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO HEAR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

Plaintiff has also filed a motion requesting that the Court hear additional evidence before ruling

on her first claim, which seeks review of the administrative decision rejecting her claims against

defendant. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion only in part.

LEGAL STANDARD

Congress created the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) to meet the unique

needs of disabled children with a free, appropriate public education. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson

Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982); Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467,

1469 (9th Cir. 1993). Congress amended the IDEA in 2004 with the Individuals with Disabilities

Improvement Act, or IDEIA. The IDEIA contains numerous procedural safeguards to assure that

schools meet the unique needs of disabled children. Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1469. Parents may file a complaint

with the school district regarding the services provided under their child's individual education plan, and

may pursue an administrative hearing if the complaint is unresolved. Id. If unhappy with the result of

the hearing, parents may appeal the results through a civil action in state or federal court. Rowley, 458

U.S. at 176.

When a party appeals the administrative hearing result, the provisions of the IDEIA place the

court in a unique position. The IDEIA provides, in pertinent part, that “the court shall receive the

records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and,

basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines

is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii). As a result, the court may give less than the usual

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The Ninth Circuit defines "due weight" as follows: "The court, in recognition of the expertise

of the administrative agency, must consider the findings carefully and endeavor to respond to the

hearing officer's resolution of each material issue. After such consideration, the court is free to accept

or reject the findings in part or in whole." Vashon, 337 F.3d at 1127.

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deference to the administrative hearing officer’s findings of fact. Ms. S. v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist., 337

F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2003), superseded by statute in non-relevant part, M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist.,

394 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2005). Complete de novo review, however, is inappropriate, because this would

negate the administrative hearing process. See id. Due weight must be accorded to the administrative

findings,2

 and the court determines how much weight to give to these findings and to any additional

evidence it deems appropriate to admit. See Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1473; see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206;

Vashon, 337 F.3d at 1127.

The Ninth Circuit has construed “additional” evidence to mean “supplemental” information.

Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1472. Therefore, witnesses before the district court may not “repeat or embellish their

prior administrative hearing testimony.” Id. at 1473 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206). The Ninth Circuit

further stated:

The determination of what is “additional” evidence must be left to the discretion of the

trial court which must be careful not to allow such evidence to change the character of

the hearing from one of review to a trial de novo. A practicable approach, we believe,

is that an administrative hearing witness is rebuttably presumed to be foreclosed from

testifying at trial. . . . In ruling on motions for witnesses to testify, a court should weigh

heavily the important concerns of not allowing a party to undercut the statutory role of

administrative expertise, the unfairness involved in one party's reserving its best

evidence for trial, the reason the witness did not testify at the administrative hearing, and

the conservation of judicial resources. 

Id. (quoting case). Acceptable “reasons for supplementation will vary; they might include gaps in the

administrative transcript owing to mechanical failure, unavailability of a witness, an improper exclusion

of evidence by the administrative agency, and evidence concerning relevant events occurring subsequent

to the administrative hearing.” Id. (quoting case). 

DISCUSSION

A. Dr. Howard Friedman

Plaintiff first wants to allow additional testimony from Dr. Howard Friedman, a psychologist

who observed and assessed plaintiff, and testified on her behalf at the administrative hearing. The

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additional testimony would “demonstrate how it is impossible to draw a conclusive determination as

to K.S.’s cognitive capacity from her scores on the Mullens Assessment upon which the ALJ relied []

based on Dr. Sue Clare’s testimony.” Mot. at 11:20-23. 

The Court will allow plaintiff to submit a declaration from Dr. Friedman, tailored to the issue

of whether Mullens Assessment scores would allow an expert, such as Dr. Clare, to determine or

estimate the I.Q. or cognitive capacity of a student such as K.S. Plaintiff was apparently not on notice

that Dr. Clare would testify as to plaintiff’s I.Q., and plaintiff contends she was not given the

opportunity to rebut Dr. Clare’s testimony at the administrative hearing. Defendant may submit an

expert declaration in rebuttal, should it wish to do so.

Along with additional testimony from Dr. Friedman, plaintiff also wishes to add to the record

the manual published by the Mullens Assessment manufacturer, and unidentified “articles related to the

development of a child’s IQ.” Mot. at 11:17-19. Plaintiff does not explain what the Mullens manual

is, nor what value it would add to these proceedings. Furthermore, plaintiff does not explain why she

could not have placed the Mullens manual or the unidentified articles in the record at the administrative

stage. The Court therefore DENIES plaintiff’s request to add the Mullens manual and articles to the

record.

B. Dr. Ronald Leaf 

Plaintiff next seeks to present the testimony of Dr. Ronald Leaf, who would testify as to the

ineffectiveness of the education program designed by defendant for plaintiff. Specifically, Dr. Leaf

would testify that a program built around the “Applied Behavior Analysis” (“ABA”) methodology

would have been superior to the “eclectic approach” provided by defendant. Plaintiff argues that she

learned at the hearing, for the first time, that defendant’s education program followed an “eclectic

approach.” Plaintiff does not provide a compelling reason to allow additional testimony. The

purpose of the administrative hearing was to explore the effectiveness of the IEP provided to plaintiff.

The administrative hearing was plaintiff’s opportunity to present her best evidence as to why the IEP

was ineffective. To allow Dr. Leaf to now testify as to why the IEP was not adequate would

impermissibly “change the character of the hearing from one of review to a trial de novo.” Ojai, 4 F.3d

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at 1473. The fact that defendant’s expert described her IEP in a way she had never heard before does

not justify additional evidence. Plaintiff was free to question any of the experts who testified at the

hearing about the effectiveness of an “eclectic approach” versus an ABA methodology. The Court

DENIES plaintiff’s request to present the testimony of Dr. Leaf.

C. Ms. Cheri Worcester

Plaintiff next seeks to admit an updated ABA report authored by Ms. Cheri Worcester, along

with video clips of Worcester working with K.S.’s father on certain goals and objectives. Worcester

is a behavior analyst who testified on plaintiff’s behalf at the administrative hearing. According to

plaintiff, the additional evidence from Worcester “will demonstrate that K.S. responds to, and therefore

would benefit from a structured, individualized, 1:1 therapy with a foundation in ABA . . .” Mot. at

16:9-11. Again, this is evidence that plaintiff could have presented at the evidentiary hearing.

The additional evidence from Worcester would also “demonstrate that K.S.’s 2006-2007

program is the same program . . . . [and] that this educational program is actually impeding K.S.’s

progress.” Mot. at 16:12-15. Plaintiff argues that evidence showing post-hearing improvement under

a different program would be relevant to whether previous programs were adequate; therefore, evidence

“that shows Plaintiff’s lack of progress and regression” under the same program should also be admitted

as relevant. Reply at 9:6-9. Plaintiff’s logic is not convincing. There is already ample evidence in the

record from at least four school years. Evidence regarding one more school year, involving a similar

IEP and similar results, would therefore be of limited, if any, probative value or relevance. 

The Court will not allow plaintiff to provide additional testimony or evidence from Worcester.

D. Evidence regarding the 2006-07 IEP

In addition to Worcester’s testimony, plaintiff seeks to add to the record several pieces of

evidence regarding the 2006-07 IEP. As discussed above, in the context of this appeal, post-hearing

IEPs are not particularly probative. According to plaintiff, the 2006-07 IEP is the same as the

challenged IEPs, and has had the same disappointing results. These facts, however, have little bearing

on whether the ALJ correctly determined that prior IEPs were reasonably calculated to enable the

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student to receive educational benefits. Such evidence would be cumulative, would increase the risks

associated with reviewing the ALJ’s decision with full hindsight, and would convert “the character of

the hearing from one of review to a trial de novo.” Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1473. 

E. Evidence related to the ALJ’s qualifications

Plaintiff next seeks to add evidence to the record regarding the qualifications of the ALJ who

heard their case. Plaintiff provides no authority that would allow review of the ALJ’s qualifications as

part of this Court’s review of the administrative decision. Absent any authority, the Court will not

engage in such an inquiry.

F. Updated assessment of Jennifer Murphy

Jennifer Murphy is a speech therapist who testified on plaintiff’s behalf at the administrative

hearing, and continues to work with plaintiff on a 1 on 1 basis. Plaintiff seeks to add to the record an

updated assessment report from Murphy. According to plaintiff, the report “evidences the meaningful

goals and objectives that Ms. Murphy has created in comparison to the repeated goals and objectives

that K.S. has been receiving from FUSD speech therapists.” Mot. at 19:26-20:2. 

Murphy testified at the administrative hearing regarding her work with plaintiff. Plaintiff fails

to explain how the updated report would add any relevant information that Murphy did not provide, or

could not have provided, at the hearing. The Court will not, therefore, allow plaintiff to embellish

Murphy’s testimony with additional assessment reports.

G. Transcripts of the testimony of Judith Paton 

Finally, plaintiff seeks to add to the record an independently-made transcript of the hearing

testimony of Judith Paton. As discussed in the recent Order Re: Discovery, portions of the

administrative record from the hearing before the ALJ are missing. In particular, the testimony of Judith

Paton (plaintiff’s expert), and Linda Martinez (defendant’s expert), are missing from the record.

Fortunately, plaintiff independently recorded much of the hearing, including portions of the Paton and

Martinez testimony. Consequently, and pursuant to Court order, the parties have now arranged for the

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transcription of the independent recordings of the Paton and Martinez testimony. Plaintiff requests that

the Court add the Paton transcript to the record. The Court GRANTS plaintiff’s request. See Ojai, 4

F.3d at 1472 (acceptable “reasons for supplementation . . . might include gaps in the administrative

transcript owing to mechanical failure . . . .”). Should either party request the addition of the Martinez

transcript, the Court will grant such request.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiff’s

motion for leave to file and amended complaint, and DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART

plaintiff’s motion to hear additional reference. In addition to the administrative record, the Court will

consider the transcript of Judith Paton’s testimony, and a declaration from Dr. Friedman regarding the

use of Mullens Assessment scores in determining I.Q. or cognitive capacity. 

As indicated at the August 17, 2007 Case Management Conference, the parties are hereby

ORDERED to submit proposed scheduling orders, and suggest how the Court should proceed with

plaintiff’s first cause of action. The parties shall submit their proposals on or before September 14,

2007.

[Docket Nos. 52, 63]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 4 , 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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