Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00414/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00414-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California RV 1

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOWARD ALLY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-00414 AWI JMD HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Doward Ally (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation pursuant to a judgment of the Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Pet. at 1; Answer

at 2.) Petitioner plead guilty to second degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187) with a firearm use

enhancement (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.5). (Pet. at 11). Petitioner is serving a sentence of

seventeen years-to-life. 

On June 16, 2004, Petitioner appeared before the California Board of Parole Hearings

(“BPH” or “Board”) for a parole consideration hearing. The Board denied Petitioner parole. 

(Answer at 2).

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles County Superior Court

challenging the BPH’s decision. (Answer at 3). The Superior Court denied the petition in a

reasoned opinion on March 7, 2005. (Id.)

On July 15, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the California

Court of Appeal. (Pet. at 5; Answer at 4). The appellate court summarily denied the petition on July

Case 1:06-cv-00414-AWI-JMD Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California RV 2

26, 2005. (Answer at 4). 

On October 21, 2005, Petitioner filed an application with the California Supreme Court to

review the Court of Appeal’s decision. (Answer at 2). The California Supreme Court summarily

denied Petitioner’s application on November 30, 2005. (Pet. at 2; Answer at 2.)

On March 22, 2006, Petitioner then filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus

with the Central District of California. (Pet. at 1). On April 11, 2006, the petition was transferred to

this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petition raises three grounds for relief: 1) the Board’s

conclusion, that Petitioner posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, was an abuse of

discretion as the decision was unsupported by any relevant or reliable evidence; 2) the Board’s

decision denies Petitioner due process of the law by continuing to rely on the commitment offense to

deny Petitioner parole; 3) the Board’s denial of parole effectively nullifies Petitioner’s original plea

agreement by recasting the plea of second degree murder to the higher first degree murder category.

On June 1, 2007, Respondent filed an answer to the petition.

On June 19, 2007, Petitioner filed a traverse to Respondent’s answer. 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court may petition a district court for

relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the U.S. Constitution. While Petitioner’s underlying conviction arose in the Los Angeles County

Superior Court, the case was properly transferred to the Eastern District of California pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241. Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the action.

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed after the statute’s

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499

(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97

F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by

Case 1:06-cv-00414-AWI-JMD Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California RV 3

Lindh, 521 U.S. 320 (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute’s enactment)). The

instant petition was filed on August 10, 2005 and is consequently governed by the provisions of the

AEDPA, which became effective April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003).

II. Standard of Review

A. AEDPA Standard of Review

 While Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state court conviction, Petitioner is in

custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation pursuant to a state court

judgment. Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for Petitioner’s habeas petition

since he satisfies the threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. 

Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Section 2254

‘is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court

judgment, even when the petitioner is not challenging his underlying state court conviction’”

(quoting White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

Since Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of AEDPA, his petition for habeas

corpus “may be granted only if he demonstrates that the state court decision denying relief was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”” Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71.

As a threshold matter, this Court must “first decide what constitutes ‘clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). In ascertaining what is “clearly established Federal law,” this

Court must look to the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of

the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. (quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412). “In other

words, ‘clearly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant

Case 1:06-cv-00414-AWI-JMD Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California RV 4

the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72.

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “[A] federal court may

not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable

application” inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law

was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the state court’s decision is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir.1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, Ninth

Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court decision

is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003); Duhaime v.

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 859, 123 S.Ct. 231 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149, 123 S.Ct. 955 (2003).

B. Standard Governing Parole Release Determinations

“We analyze a due process claim in two steps. ‘[T]he first asks whether there exist a liberty

or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the

procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.’” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127.

The United States Constitution does not, by itself, create a protected liberty interest in a parole date. 

Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981). However, where a state’s statutory scheme for parole

contains mandatory language, the presumption exist “that parole release will be granted’ when or

Case 1:06-cv-00414-AWI-JMD Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California RV 5

unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby give rise to a constitutional liberty

interest.’” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates

of Nebraska Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979)). California Penal Code section 3041 contains the

requisite mandatory language, thus vesting in California prisoners “whose sentence provide for the

possibility of parole with a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the receipt of a parole release

date, a liberty interest that is protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause.” 

Irons, 505 F.3d at 850; see McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 903; see also Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

914 (9th Cir. 2003). Even a prisoner who has not yet been granted a parole date has a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in a parole date. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1123.

Notwithstanding a prisoner’s liberty interest in a parole date, a parole release determination

is not subject to all of the due process protections of an adversarial proceeding. Pedro v. Oregon

Parole Board, 825 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12

(explaining that due process is flexible and calls for procedural protections as demanded by the

particular situations). “[S]ince the setting of a minimum term is not part of a criminal prosecution,

the full panoply of rights due a Petitioner in such a proceeding is not constitutionally mandated, even

when a protected liberty interest exists.” Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole,

833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir.1987). At a state parole board proceeding, an inmate is entitled to

receive advance written notice of a hearing. Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399. Additionally, the inmate must

be afforded an “opportunity to be heard” and told why “he falls short of qualifying for parole.” 

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16. 

 “In Superintendent, Mass. Correc. Inst. v. Hill, the Supreme Court held that ‘revocation of

good time does not comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due process’ unless the

findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.’” Sass, 461

F.3d at 1128 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that the same standard of “some

evidence” that applies to the revocation of good time also extends to parole determinations. Irons,

505 F.3d at 851. The “some evidence” standard as applied to parole determinations is clearly

established Federal law, pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Court. Id.; Sass, 461 F.3d at

1128-1129. This evidentiary standard prevents arbitrary deprivations of the prisoner’s liberty interest

Case 1:06-cv-00414-AWI-JMD Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California RV 6

without imposing undue administrative burdens or threatening institutional interests. Superintendent

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). In assessing “whether a state parole board's suitability

determination was supported by ‘some evidence’ in a habeas case, our analysis is framed by the

statutes and regulations governing parole suitability determinations in the relevant state.” Irons, 505

F.3d at 851. Consequently, the Court must look to California law and review the record. However,

in reviewing the record and determining whether the “some evidence” standard is met, the Court

need not examine the entire record, independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or re-weigh the

evidence. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-456). Rather, the relevant inquiry is

whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the BPH’s decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at

1128. 

California law provides that after an eligible life prisoner has served the minimum term of

confinement required by statute, the BPH “shall set a release date unless it determines that the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past

convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy

period of incarceration for” the prisoner. Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). “[I]f in the judgment of the

panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison,” the

prisoner must be found unsuitable and denied parole. Cal. Code Regs., § 2402(a); see In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1078, 1080 (Cal. 2005). The BPH decides whether a prisoner is too

dangerous to be suitable for parole by applying factors set forth in the California Code of

Regulations. See 15 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 2402; Irons, 505 F.3d at 851-852; Biggs, 334 F.3d at

915-916. The regulation’s criteria states that:

All relevant, reliable information available to the panel shall be considered in

determining suitability for parole. Such information shall include the circumstances

of the prisoner’s social history; past and present mental state; past criminal history,

including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented;

the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after

the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or

control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely

be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner’s suitability for release. Circumstance which taken alone may not firmly

establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding

of unsuitability.

15 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(b)

Case 1:06-cv-00414-AWI-JMD Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California RV 7

Factors supporting a finding of unsuitability for parole include (1) the underlying offense was

carried out in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner”; (2) a record, prior to incarceration

for the underlying offense, of violence; (3) a history of unstable relationships with others; (4) sadistic

sexual offenses; (5) a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the underlying offense; (6)

serious misconduct in jail. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402 (c)(1)-(6); also In re Shaputis, 82

Cal.Rptr.3d 213, 225 n. 14 (Cal. 2008) (holding that “some evidence” standard was met where

Petitioner failed to gain insight into his previous violent behavior and to take responsibility for the

commitment offense).

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ground One

Petitioner’s first contends that there was no relevant or material evidence to support the

BPH’s denial of parole or their conclusion that Petitioner currently posed an unreasonable risk of

danger to public safety. (Pet. at 6). Petitioner further argues that the BPH was obligated to use a

preponderance of the evidence standard and that the BPH failed to apply any standard of proof in

denying Petitioner parole. (Id). Petitioner additionally objects to this Court’s deference to the “some

evidence” standard, arguing for heightened judicial scrutiny. (Id.) 

Despite Petitioner’s contention that the BPH bore the burden of finding by a preponderance

of the evidence that the Petitioner was unsuitable for parole, Petitioner cites to no legal authority for

this specific proposition. Petitioner cites to the California Code of Regulations definition for “good

cause” yet this definition by itself does not require the Board to use such a standard for parole

determinations. More importantly, this Court’s sole inquiry is whether the state court’s decision was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). 

Clearly established Federal law requires that a reviewing court evaluate the BPH’s decision using

the “some evidence” standard. Irons, 505 F.3d at 851; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-1129. Thus, the

dispositive inquiry before this Court is whether there was some evidence to support the BPH’s

determination that Petitioner posed a current unreasonable risk to the public safety. 

The BPH conclusion rested on five factors: 1) the circumstances of the commitment offense;

2) Petitioner lacked insight into his motivations for the crime 3) insufficient participation in self-help

Case 1:06-cv-00414-AWI-JMD Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California RV 8

programs; 4) Petitioner ignored previous recommendations by the BPH that he participate in

additional vocational and self-help programs; 5) the opposition by the District Attorney and Los

Angeles Police Department to a finding of parole suitability. (Pet., Ex. B at 62-69). In the last

reasoned decision in this case, the Los Angeles Superior Court found that the record contained

“some evidence” to support the Board’s ultimate conclusion that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole. 

(Resp’t. Ex. 5). The Superior Court specifically discussed the Board’s finding that Petitioner lacked

insight and the circumstances of the commitment offense itself as “some evidence” that Petitioner

was still a danger to the public safety.

As the California Supreme Court recently stated, “the Board or Governor may base a denialof-parole decision upon the circumstances of the offense, or upon other immutable facts such as an

inmate’s criminal history, but some evidence will support such a reliance only if those facts support

the ultimate conclusion that an inmate continues to pose an unreasonable risk to public safety.” In re

Lawrence, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169, 198 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the relevant inquiry for a reviewing

court is whether some evidence supports the decision that the inmate constitutes a current danger to

the public safety, not merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of the BPH’s factual

findings). Here, the Board relied on the commitment offense as one of the circumstances

establishing Petitioner’s unsuitability for parole–specifically noting the inexplicable motive and

disregard for human suffering. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 2402 (c)(1)(E) and (D)). The Superior

Court also relied on the circumstances of the commitment offense in finding that there was “some

evidence” supporting the BPH’s conclusion. 

Consistent with Lawrence, though, this immutable factor does evidence that petitioner

continues to pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. It was the inexplicable motive for

the offense, combined with Petitioner’s lack of understanding, that lead the BPH to conclude that the

risk that Petitioner would commit a similar offense was still very present. The BPH specifically

stated that “the lack of insight into why he did it, for whatever reason he did it, causes us to believe

that until he deals with why he did this crime, why he would go and shoot a man he did not know

who had done nothing to him personally, in such a cold-blooded fashion, until he deals with why he

did that there’s a risk he could do it again.” (Pet., Ex. B at 65) (emphasis added). 

Case 1:06-cv-00414-AWI-JMD Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California RV 9

Petitioner attacks this facet of the BPH’s conclusion as lacking reliable or relevant evidence,

basing his argument on the findings of a 1999 psychiatric evaluation. (Pet. Ex. G). The evaluation

found that Petitioner had already delved into the causative factors of his crime and gained insight

into his commission of the underlying offense. (Id.). However, Petitioner’s own statements during

the hearing contradicts this assertion. When the BPH inquired about why he shot the victim,

Petitioner responded by stating, “to this day I still don’t understand why I pulled the gun. It was a

reaction. I was nervous.” (Pet., Ex. B at 15). Additionally, Petitioner when asked why he brought a

loaded gun to the location if did not intend to use the weapon responded by stating, “I can’t even

explain that part.” (Id. at 17)

The evidence taken as a whole is sufficient to show that it the BPH was presented with “some

evidence” that Petitioner posed a current unreasonable danger to public safety. Thus, the state

court’s conclusions, that “some evidence” existed to support the Board’s conclusion were

reasonable.

B. Ground Two

Petitioner’s second ground for relief is that the BPH’s continued reliance on the underlying

offense violates his right to due process of the law. Regulations governing parole determinations

permit the BPH to consider the underlying offense as one of the factors towards unsuitability for

parole. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402. The Ninth Circuit has expressed reservations about

using immutable factors, such as the circumstances of the commitment offense, as “some evidence”

to support a determination of current dangerousness to the public safety. Irons, 505 F.3d at 853-854

(holding that reliance on circumstances of the commitment offense by itself is permissible where the

denial of parole was prior to the prisoner serving their minimum sentence); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-

917; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1135 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Recently, the California Supreme Court has

held that immutable and unchangeable circumstances of the offense did not constitute “some

evidence” where it was the sole factor relied upon to deny parole. In re Lawrence, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d at

202-203. 

Here, the BPH relied on the commitment offense as one of several factors for its conclusion

that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole. The Superior Court relied on the circumstances of the

Case 1:06-cv-00414-AWI-JMD Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California RV 10

offense as one of two stated reasons for finding that “some evidence” supported the BPH’s

conclusion. Consequently, this instant case is distinguishable from Lawrence, in that the BPH’s

determination that Petitioner posed a current unreasonable danger to the public safety was not solely

based on immutable factors. Rather, as noted in the previous section, the BPH’s determination was

based on several additional considerations–including Petitioner’s insufficient participation in selfhelp programming, Petitioner’s lack of insight as to why he committed the underlying offense, and

the opposition by the District Attorney’s Office and Police Department. As it was not solely based

on immutable factors, the BPH’s decision to deny Petitioner parole did not violate his right to due

process. Therefore, the Superior Court’s determination, that Petitioner’s due process rights were not

violated by the BPH reliance on the circumstances of the commitment offense, was not unreasonable.

C. Ground Three: Nullification of Plea Agreement Claim

In his third ground for relief, Petitioner contends that BPH’s denial of parole nullified his

plea of second degree murder. Petitioner alleges that the parole board repeated denial of parole

based “primarily and interminably on the commitment offense” would alter Petitioner’s sentence to

the higher first degree murder category. 

The Los Angeles County Superior Court rejected Petitioner’s claim without explanation. 

(Resp’t. Ex. 5). As a result of the unexplained rejection, this Court conducts an independent review

of the record to decide whether the state court’s decision was objectively reasonable. Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (th Cir. 2003). Having done so, the Court concludes that there was no

breach of the plea agreement as there was no promise that Petitioner would be found suitable for

parole and paroled on a particular date. Cf. Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding

that prosecutor’s specifically stated concession, that defendant would be released after serving half

the minimum term if she had a clear disciplinary record in prison, in exchange for a plea of second

degree murder, created a contractual obligation that was violated when defendant was repeatedly

denied parole despite her clear disciplinary record).

“Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are measured by contract law standards.” 

Brown, 337 F.3d at 1159 (quoting United States v. De La Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

A criminal defendant’s right to due process entitles him/her to enforce the terms of a plea agreement. 

Case 1:06-cv-00414-AWI-JMD Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California RV 11

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-262 (1971). However, there is no evidence in this case,

and Petitioner does not allege, that the District Attorney’s Office promised that Petitioner would be

released on parole after a serving a certain amount of time or on a certain date. Rather, Petitioner’s

plea deal made him eligible for release after seventeen years but included a maximum term of life

imprisonment. Eligibility for parole does not mean suitability and under state law, Petitioner must be

found suitable for parole before his term and release date are set. Therefore, Petitioner has received

the parole considerations that he was entitled to under his plea agreement and sentence–namely

parole determinations hearing occurring less than seventeen years after Petitioner was sentenced. 

Furthermore, as noted above, the BPH’s denial of parole in Petitioner’s case was not based solely on

the immutable circumstances of the commitment offense. Consequently, Petitioner’s plea agreement

has not been violated or nullified by the BPH’s denial of parole on June 16, 2004.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Respondent. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©. The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 19, 2008 /s/ John M. Dixon 

hlked6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00414-AWI-JMD Document 16 Filed 09/19/08 Page 11 of 11