Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00211/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00211-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN WESLEY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0211 DFL EFB P

vs.

S. KERNAN, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a prisoner, without counsel, prosecuting this civil rights action in forma

pauperis. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was removed from state court by defendants

and referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Franklin v. 

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Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir.1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as

frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual

contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a

constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See

Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

A claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that

would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81

L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80

(1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir.1981). In

reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the

complaint. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 48

L.Ed.2d 338 (1976). The court must also construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,

421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969). 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: Every

person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual

connection or link between the actions of each defendant and the deprivation alleged to have

been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct.

2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

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complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978). 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds

a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation

must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir.1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the

involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982).

Plaintiff alleges six claims in his complaint. His first claim is that his First Amendment

right to file administrative grievances was violated as a result of retaliation. He claims that

defendant Morgan, his Enhanced Outpatient Program (“EOP”) case manager, informed him that

defendants Vance, Vasquez, and Bailey joined to bar plaintiff from the EOP program due to

plaintiff’s filing “a lot [sic] of paperwork.” Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal regarding the

decision to bar him from the EOP program, and also wrote “personal notices” to defendants

Vasquez and Bailey, asking why he was “being made a target.” Plaintiff and defendant Morgan

subsequently attended interviews with defendants Vance, Vasquez, and Bailey, at which each of

the defendants denied seeking to bar plaintiff from the program. Defendant Vance, however,

stated “your paperwork is starting to cause controversy on my yard. If you can file lawsuits then

[sic] your [sic] high functional, my staff say your [sic] manipulative and we don’t want you

here.” 

In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plead facts which suggest that

retaliation for the exercise of protected conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor

behind the defendant’s conduct. See Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th

Cir. 1989). Plaintiff must also plead facts which suggest an absence of legitimate correctional

goals for the conduct he contends was retaliatory. Pratt at 806 (citing Rizzo at 532). Mere

conclusions of hypothetical retaliation will not suffice; a prisoner must “allege specific facts

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 It has been held that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two criteria

are met. First, a plaintiff’s alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious from an objective

standpoint. Put another way, a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114

S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct.

2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). Second, a prison official must have a state of mind of “deliberate

indifference” to a prisoner’s health and safety. Id. at 834. In the prison context, “only

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” implicates the Eighth Amendment. Id. (citing Wilson

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)). Thus, a court can hold a

prison official liable only if “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Id. at

837.

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showing retaliation because of the exercise of the prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Frazier v.

Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (n. 1) (10th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to show

that he was actually removed from the EOP program, and that the named defendants referenced

his filing of complaints as the motivating factor behind this change to plaintiff’s classification

status. Therefore, plaintiff has stated a retaliation claim against defendants Vance, Vasquez, and

Bailey. Plaintiff has failed, however, to plead facts sufficient to show that defendant Morgan

subjected him to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, by doing

an affirmative act, participating in another’s affirmative acts or omitting to perform an act which

defendant was legally required to do. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim against

defendant Morgan. 

Plaintiff’s second claim is that defendant Hernandez acted with deliberate indifference to

his safety in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from the threat

of harm presented by his cell mate. The Supreme Court has held that a prison official violates

the Eighth Amendment “only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”1 Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Under this standard, a prison official

must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” one of deliberate indifference to the inmate’s

health or safety. Id. at 834. To state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for failure to

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protect, plaintiff must allege specific facts that help demonstrate that defendant Hernandez knew

of and disregarded the substantial risk of serious harm that would result if he did not separate

plaintiff from his cell mate. Plaintiff alleges that he informed EOP Housing Officer Hernandez

that he and his cell mate “were not getting along.” Defendant Hernandez told plaintiff “I can’t

help you, there is no bed space.” Plaintiff again advised defendant Hernandez that he “needed to

be removed from housing with [his cell mate], but [d]efendant Hernandez again refused to assist

plaintiff.” Plaintiff’s cell mate then called out to defendant Hernandez saying that he, the cell

mate, would be “beating plaintiff’s ‘ass’ as soon as [plaintiff’s cell mate] got well.” Defendant

Hernandez departed, and an altercation between plaintiff and his cell mate ensued, wherein

plaintiff’s cell mate kicked plaintiff in the stomach. Defendant Hernandez returned, activated his

alarm, and escorted both plaintiff and his cell mate to holding cages. Plaintiff was later

examined by medical personnel.

An Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act

believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed

to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. See id. at 842; see also Robins

v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1439-40 (9th Cir.1995) (bystander-inmate injured when guards

allegedly used excessive force on another inmate need not show that guards intended to harm

bystander-inmate). This is a question of fact. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Allegations in a pro se

complaint sufficient to raise an inference that the named prison officials acted with deliberate

indifference--i.e, that they knew that plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it – states a “failure-toprotect” claim. Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1041-42. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official

is insufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Id.

at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. Plaintiff alleges that his cell mate called out to defendant

Hernandez that “as soon as he got well” he would beat plaintiff. The remoteness of this

statement (it was conditioned upon the cell mate getting better), and the fact that defendant

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immediately responded to the altercation and separated plaintiff and his cell mate, cuts against

any finding that defendant Hernandez wantonly failed to take measures to abate a significant risk

of serious harm to plaintiff even under the facts as alleged by plaintiff.

Plaintiff also asserts that he informed defendant Hernandez that he would be filing a

grievance against him for failing to protect him, and defendant Hernandez informed plaintiff that

he would then file a disciplinary report against plaintiff in order to “cover his ass.” On

November 11, 2006, plaintiff filed an inmate appeal against defendant Hernandez for the acts

described herein. On the same date, defendant Hernandez filed a disciplinary report against

plaintiff, charging “conduct that could lead to violence.” Plaintiff states that he was later found

not guilty and the disciplinary report was dismissed in the interest of justice. Plaintiff has failed

to state a claim based on deliberate indifferent against defendant Hernandez, but to the extent

that plaintiff alleges retaliation by defendant Hernandez, plaintiff has properly stated a claim. 

Plaintiff’s third claim is that defendant Compton obstructed the delivery of certain

personal property to plaintiff by an Officer Wheeler and also referred to plaintiff as a “peace

[sic] of shit.” Plaintiff also states that when he informed defendant Miner, defendant Compton’s

supervisor, of this incident, defendant Miner did nothing. Defendant Compton later “began

taunting plaintiff with sexual and derogatory remarks, boasting how he would continue to

deprive plaintiff of his property, even threatening to place plaintiff in segregation for filing an

inmate appeal” regarding the earlier incident. Further, when plaintiff filed an administrative

grievance regarding defendant Compton’s actions, defendant Moreno, Appeals Investigator, took

plaintiff’s statement but did not pursue other inmates for statements and in the end did nothing. 

Verbal harassment alone, however, is insufficient to state a claim. See Oltarzewski v.

Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). Even threats of bodily injury are insufficient to

state a claim, because a mere naked threat is not the equivalent of doing the act itself. See Gaut

v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, though defendant Compton may have

insulted plaintiff in a rather puerile manner, this action does not comprise a colorable claim. 

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Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that “an unauthorized intentional

deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural

requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful

postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). 

Thus, where the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy, only authorized,

intentional deprivations constitute actionable violations of the Due Process Clause. An

authorized deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established state procedures, regulations, or

statutes. Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Knudson v. City of

Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987). In the instant case, plaintiff has not alleged

any facts which suggest that the deprivation was authorized. The California Legislature has

provided a remedy for tort claims against public officials in the California Government Code,

§§ 900, et seq. Since plaintiff has not attempted to seek redress in the state system, he cannot

sue in federal court on the claim that the state deprived him of property without due process of

the law. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against defendants

Compton, Miner, and Moreno. 

Plaintiff’s fourth claim is that defendant Kelly acted with deliberate indifference and

“obstructed... every notice sent to her by plaintiff regarding the EOP inmate programs and

services, as well as the deprivations imposed upon plaintiff by defendant Vasquez.” As to

plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference, plaintiff alleges no facts whatsoever that defendant

Kelly knew that plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by

failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Regarding defendant

Kelly’s alleged failure to process plaintiff’s complaints, prisoners do not have a “separate

constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.2003), citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988). Even the

non-existence of, or the failure of prison officials to properly implement, an administrative

appeals process within the prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. Mann v. Adams,

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855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988). See also, Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th

Cir.1993); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir.1991); Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8, 10

(N.D.Ill.1982) (“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any

substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment.”). Specifically, a

failure to process a grievance does not state a constitutional violation. Buckley, supra.

Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against defendant Kelly.

Plaintiff’s fifth claim is a generalized claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, against defendants Kernan, Kelly, Vance, Vasquez, Bailey, and

Morgan. To the extent that plaintiff seeks to bring this action pursuant to Title II of the ADA, he

must name a state entity as to his claims for injunctive relief and damages. See Phiffer v.

Columbia River Correctional Institute, 384 F.3d 791 (9th Cir.2004); Lovell v. Chandler, 303

F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.2002). Plaintiff cannot seek damages pursuant to the ADA against

defendants in their individual capacities. Eason v. Clark County School Dist., 303 F.3d 1137,

1144 (9th Cir.2002), citing Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.2001). 

Accordingly, plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants under the ADA must be

dismissed because plaintiff has not named a proper defendant. The above defect, however, could

be overlooked because official capacity defendants represent the entity over which they have

cognizance. Nevertheless, Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from discriminating

against a qualified individual with a disability on the basis of a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132

(1994); Weinrich v. L.A. County Metro Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.1997). 

To state a claim under Title II, the plaintiff must allege four elements: 1) the plaintiff is

an individual with a disability; 2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive

the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities; 3) the plaintiff was either

excluded from participation in or denied the benefits by the public entity; and 4) such exclusion,

denial of benefits or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability. Weinrich, 114 F.3d

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at 978. Plaintiff improperly claims that a number of individual defendants seek to deny plaintiff

classification as an EOP inmate at California State Prison Sacramento (without properly naming

that entity as a defendant). In addition to failing to name a proper defendant, plaintiff does not

expressly allege the basis upon which he has been classified as an “EOP” inmate. Plaintiff’s

claim that he is being denied EOP status may be a colorable claim, but because plaintiff does not

name the appropriate defendant nor has he expressly set forth that he has a qualifying disability

under the ADA, his claims against the individual defendants based on the ADA will be

dismissed, but plaintiff will be granted one further opportunity to amend his complaint. 

In order to make out an ADA claim, plaintiff must show that he was “excluded from

participation in ... denied the benefits of ... , or ... subjected to discrimination” in his

classification change from EOP to Correctional Clinical Case Management System status

because of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. This he has not done. 

Plaintiff’s sixth claim is that defendants Kernan, Miner, Moreno, Vance, Vasquez, and

Bailey violated his state and federal constitutional rights “knowingly and intentionally, with a

sufficiently culpable intent” with customs, habits, and practices known as the “Code of Silence.” 

In support of this claim, plaintiff alleges that defendants “obstructed, ignored, and denied all

level of investigations with customs habbits [sic] and practices of the Code of Silence” regarding

plaintiff’s complaints. Specifically, plaintiff claims that defendant Scott Kernan, Warden,

“obstructed, ignored, and denied all level of investigations with customs habits and practices of

the code of silence” after plaintiff’s fiancée and mother filed citizens’ complaints regarding the

incidents alleged in the complaint. Documentation attached to plaintiff’s complaint

demonstrates that defendant Kernan responded to each of these complaints, stating that

investigations had been conducted resulting in findings that the allegations of staff misconduct

were not supported by the evidence. (Exhibit A, Part 2-J). Plaintiff does not allege any facts to

contradict that investigations were indeed conducted, and therefore fails to state a claim that

defendant Kernan acted in furtherance of a “Code of Silence.”

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 Also in support of this claim, plaintiff alleges that defendant Miner “refused to prevent

defendant Compton” from violating plaintiff’s rights. Because the court finds that defendant

Compton did not violate plaintiff’s rights, as discussed above, defendant Miner was not

obligated to prevent defendant Compton from acting in the manner alleged, however puerile and

distasteful it was. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against defendant Miner for

furthering the “Code of Silence.”

Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Moreno, as Appeals Investigator, obstructed,

ignored, and denied plaintiff’s inmate appeals regarding the actions of defendants Compton and

Miner, detailed above. However, the complaint, and documentation attached to the complaint,

indicate that defendant Moreno in fact investigated plaintiff’s claims against defendant Compton. 

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a cognizable claim against defendant Moreno for furthering a

“Code of Silence.” Furthermore, from the documentation that plaintiff submitted to the court, it

appears that this claim was not reviewed beyond the second level of review and is therefore

unexhausted.

As to defendants Vance, Vasquez, and Bailey, plaintiff alleges that defendants are “being

sued in [their] individual and official capacit[ies] for the ‘Code of Silence’ customs, habbits

[sic], and practices which violated Plaintiff’s State and Federal rights,” but alleges no facts in

support of this contention. Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of

official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982). Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim that

defendants acted in furtherance of a “Code of Silence.”

Plaintiff may proceed forthwith to serve defendants Vance, Vasquez, Bailey, and

Hernandez and pursue his retaliation claims against only those defendants or he may delay

serving any defendant and attempt to state a cognizable claim against defendants Morgan,

Compton, Miner, Moreno, Kernan, and Kelly. If plaintiff elects to attempt to amend his 

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complaint to state a cognizable claim against those defendants, he has 30 days so to do. He is

not obligated to amend his complaint.

If plaintiff elects to proceed forthwith against defendants Vance, Vasquez, Bailey, and

Hernandez, against whom he has stated a cognizable claim for relief, then within 20 days he

must return materials for service of process enclosed herewith. In this event the court will

construe plaintiff’s election as consent to dismissal of all claims against defendants Morgan,

Compton, Miner, Moreno, Kernan, and Kelly without prejudice. 

Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is

brought in the right place and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It

must contain a request for particular relief. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons

who personally participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional

right. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the

deprivation of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to

perform an act he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). 

In an amended complaint, the allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a single defendant. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim based upon separate transactions or

occurrences, the claims must be set forth in separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

The federal rules contemplate brevity. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d

1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved any

heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b)”); Fed. R. Civ. P.

84; cf. Rule 9(b) (setting forth rare exceptions to simplified pleading).

Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and

directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting

point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a

claim.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. The court (and defendant) should be able to read and understand

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plaintiff’s pleading within minutes. McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179-80. A long, rambling pleading

including many defendants with unexplained, tenuous or implausible connection to the alleged

constitutional injury, or joining a series of unrelated claims against many defendants, very likely

will result in delaying the review required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and an order dismissing

plaintiff’s action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 for violation of these instructions. 

If plaintiff’s pleading is deficient on account of an omission or technical defect, the court

will not dismiss it without first identifying the problem and giving plaintiff an opportunity to

cure it. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s pleading will be

construed “liberally” to determine if plaintiff has a claim but it will be dismissed if plaintiff

violates the federal rules, once explained, or the court’s plain orders.

An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. Local Rule 15-220; see Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff

files an amended complaint, the original pleading is superseded.

By signing a first amended complaint plaintiff certifies he has made reasonable inquiry

and has evidentiary support for his allegations and that for violation of this rule the court may

impose sanctions sufficient to deter repetition by plaintiff or others. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Plaintiff

is further admonished that by signing an amended complaint he certifies his claims are warranted

by existing law, including the law that he exhaust administrative remedies, and that for violation

of this rule plaintiff risks dismissal of his entire action. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Claims against defendants Morgan, Compton, Miner, Moreno, Kernan, and Kelly are

dismissed with leave to amend. Within 30 days of service of this order, plaintiff may amend his

complaint to attempt to state cognizable claims against these defendants. Plaintiff is not obliged

to amend his complaint.

2. The allegations in the pleading are sufficient at least to state cognizable claims against

defendants Vance, Vasquez, Bailey, and Hernandez. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. With this order

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the Clerk of the Court shall provide to plaintiff a blank summons, a copy of the complaint filed

with this court on January 31, 2007, 4 USM-285 forms and instructions for service of process on

defendants Vance, Vasquez, Bailey, and Hernandez. Within 20 days of service of this order

plaintiff may return the attached Notice of Submission of Documents with the completed

summons, the completed USM-285 forms, and 5 copies of the January 31, 2007 complaint. The

court will transmit them to the United States Marshal for service of process pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4. Defendants Vance, Vasquez, Bailey, and Hernandez will be required to respond to

plaintiff’s allegations within the deadlines stated in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1). In this event, the

court will construe plaintiff’s election to proceed forthwith as consent to an order dismissing his

defective claims against defendants Morgan, Compton, Miner, Moreno, Kernan, and Kelly

without prejudice.

Dated: May 23, 2007.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN WESLEY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0211 DFL EFB P

vs.

S. KERNAN, et al.,

Defendants. NOTICE OF SUBMISSION

 / OF DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff hereby submits the following documents in compliance with the court's

order filed .

One completed summons

 completed USM-285 forms

 copies of the 

 Complaint/Amended Complaint

DATED: 

 

Plaintiff

Case 2:07-cv-00211-JAM-EFB Document 5 Filed 05/24/07 Page 14 of 14