Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02718/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02718-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMON SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16-cv-2718 WQH (JLB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF Nos. 16, 17]

This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 

16, 17.) Plaintiff Ramon Santiago Rodriguez moves under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)1 of the 

Social Security Act for judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security Nancy A. 

Berryhill’s final decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits under 

Title II of the Social Security Act. 

 

1 Section 405(g) states, “Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . 

. . brought in the district court of the United States . . . . The court shall have the power to enter, upon the 

pleadings and transcripts of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of 

the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be 

conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2015).

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This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge 

William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(c) of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

After careful review of the moving and opposing papers, the administrative record, the 

facts, and the applicable law, for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby 

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) be 

DENIED and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment affirming the 

Administrative Law Judge’s decision (ECF No. 17) be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits on September 24, 2012, alleging his disability commenced on June 6, 2011.

2

 (A.R. 

145–51.) Plaintiff alleges that he is unable to perform any work activity because he suffers 

from paranoia, suspiciousness of others, isolative behaviors, depression, anxiety, panic 

attacks, mood swings, racing thoughts, and auditory and visual hallucinations. (A.R. 20.) 

Plaintiff initially received some mental health treatment from physicians in Puerto Rico, 

then moved to the United States in 2013 and began receiving treatment from psychiatrist 

Rachel Ross, M.D. (A.R. 20–21.) Dr. Ross diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive 

disorder with psychotic features and a panic disorder. (A.R. 326.) 

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s claims by initial determination on April 2, 

2013. (A.R. 57–70, 84–87.) Plaintiff requested reconsideration of the initial determination 

on May 13, 2013. (A.R. 88.) The Commissioner denied reconsideration on October 28, 

2013. (A.R. 72–83, 91–94.) Plaintiff requested a de novo hearing before an Administrative 

Law Judge (“ALJ”) on November 21, 2013. (A.R. 97–98.) The Commissioner granted 

this request and appointed ALJ Jay E. Levine to preside over the matter. (A.R. 117–36.) 

On November 3, 2014, Plaintiff, his attorney, and a vocational expert appeared before ALJ 

 

2 See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (Disability insurance benefit payments); see also id. at §§ 416(i) (defining “period 

of disability”), 423(d)(1) (defining “disability” for purposes of entitlement to a period of disability or to 

disability insurance benefits).

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Levine. (A.R. 29–55.) In a decision dated February 19, 2015, the ALJ issued an 

unfavorable decision and found Plaintiff was not disabled from June 6, 2011, the alleged 

disability onset date, through December 31, 2014, the last date insured. (A.R. 13–28.)

On September 6, 2016, the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied 

Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s unfavorable decision (A.R. 1–4), making the 

ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.3 Plaintiff then commenced this

instant action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Determination of Disability

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must show 

two things: (1) that he suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of twelve 

months or more, or would result in death; and (2) the impairment renders the claimant 

incapable of performing the work he previously performed, or any other substantial gainful 

employment which exists in the national economy.4 A claimant must meet both 

requirements to be classified as disabled.5 

Under the authority of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner is required to 

perform a five-step sequential analysis for determining whether an individual is disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act.6 If the Commissioner can find that an 

applicant is “disabled” or “not disabled” at any step, there is no need to proceed further.7 

At step one, it is determined whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial 

gainful activity.8 At step two, it is determined whether the claimant has either a medically 

 

3 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).

4 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A). 

5

Id.

6

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). 

7 Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

8 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

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determinable impairment or combination of impairments that when combined is “severe.”9 

At step three, it is determined whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments is of a severity that meets or medically equals the criteria of one or more

specific impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.10 Before 

considering step four, the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)—his ability to 

do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite the limitations from his 

impairment(s)—is determined.11 At step four, it is determined whether the claimant has 

the residual functional capacity to do any work that he has done in the past.12 Lastly, at 

step five, it is determined whether the claimant is able to do some other work that exists in 

“significant numbers” in the national economy, taking into consideration the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.

13

 

Although the Commissioner must assist the claimant in developing a record at each 

step of the sequential process, the claimant bears the burden of proof during the first four 

steps while the Commissioner bears the burden of proof at the fifth step.14 

B. Scope of Review

The Social Security Act allows for unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review 

of the Commissioner’s final agency decision.15 The scope of judicial review, however, is 

limited. The Commissioner’s final decision should not be disturbed unless: (1) the ALJ’s 

findings are based on legal error; or (2) the ALJ’s determinations are not supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole.16 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere 

scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance.”17 Substantial evidence is “relevant 

 

9 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). 

10 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526. 

11 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). 

12 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). 

13 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). 

14 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098.

15 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). 

16 See Schneider v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000).

17 Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001).

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evidence that, considering the entire record, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.”18 

In making this determination, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s

conclusion.19 Where the evidence can reasonably be construed to support more than one 

rational interpretation, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision.20 This includes deferring 

to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts.21 The 

Court may not, however, affirm the ALJ’s decision “simply by isolating a specific quantum 

of supporting evidence.”

22

 

III. ALJ’S FINDINGS

Utilizing the five-step disability evaluation process,23 the ALJ rendered an 

unfavorable decision regarding Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits on February 

19, 2015. (A.R. 16–24.) At step one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff “did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from his 

alleged onset date of June 6, 2011 through his date last insured of December 31, 2014.”

(A.R. 18.) 

At step two, the ALJ determined that, through his date last insured, Plaintiff suffered

from the severe impairment of depression. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that the 

severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairment did not meet or medically equal the severity of a 

listed impairment. (A.R. 18–20.) 

 

18 Id.; Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003).

19 See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human 

Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). 

20 See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).

21 See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509.

22 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 

1035 (9th Cir. 2007)).

23 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

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Because the ALJ found Plaintiff’s mental impairments do not meet or equal a listed 

impairment, he assessed Plaintiff’s RFC before moving on to step four of the sequential 

evaluation process. The ALJ determined that, through his date last insured, Plaintiff 

had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all 

exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: the 

claimant is precluded from work on unprotected heights and dangerous 

moving machinery; is precluded from sustained, intense interaction with the 

public, coworkers and supervisors but brief conversations or intermittent 

conversations are not precluded; and is precluded from detailed or complex 

problem solving.

(A.R. 20.) 

In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements regarding 

the severity and persistence of his impairments were not entirely credible because Plaintiff 

reported daily activities that were not consistent with his alleged impairments; he received 

conservative medical treatment that was relatively effective in improving his symptoms; 

one doctor found that Plaintiff may be engaging in malingering or misrepresentation; there 

was evidence that Plaintiff stopped working for reasons unrelated to his impairments when 

he was having marital problems and in the process of obtaining a divorce; and objective 

medical evidence did not support his claims. (A.R. 20–22.) The ALJ considered the 

opinions of Dr. Rachel Ross, Plaintiff’s treating physician; Drs. L. Toro and Colette 

Valette, examining physicians; Drs. B. Hernandez and J. Soto, non-examining physicians; 

and Dr. H. Marrero.

24

 (A.R. 20–23.) The ALJ gave “little weight” to Drs. Ross’s and 

Marrero’s opinions, “some weight” to Dr. Valette’s opinion, and “some weight” to Drs. 

Hernandez’s and Soto’s opinions. (A.R. 22–23.) 

At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff, through his date last insured, “was 

capable of performing past relevant work as a delivery driver. This work did not require 

the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional 

 

24 The ALJ noted that although Dr. Marrero indicated that he saw the claimant for several office visits, the 

treatment notes were not provided. (A.R. 23.)

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capacity.” (A.R. 23.) 

Finally, at step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “was not under a disability, as 

defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from June 6, 2011, the alleged onset date, 

through December 31, 2014, the date last insured.” (A.R. 23.) 

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff challenges only the ALJ’s rejection of the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating

physician, Dr. Rachel Ross. (See ECF No. 16-1 at 4–11.) Although Plaintiff acknowledges 

that the record contains opinions that conflict with Dr. Ross’s opinion, Plaintiff argues that 

the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Ross’s opinion is improper for the following three reasons: (1)

the existence of one-time examining physician Dr. Valette’s contradicting opinion does not 

warrant rejecting Dr. Ross’s opinion (id. at 10); (2) the record does not contain significant 

evidence warranting giving the opinions of non-examining physicians Drs. Hernandez and 

Soto greater weight than Dr. Ross’s opinion (id.); and (3) the ALJ failed to articulate legally 

supported reasons for rejecting Dr. Ross’s opinion (id.). Based on these arguments, 

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the ground that the ALJ improperly rejected the 

opinion of Dr. Ross without articulating specific and legitimate reasons supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. (Id. at 11.)

The Commissioner opposes Plaintiff’s motion and cross-moves for summary 

judgment on the ground that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Ross’s opinion. (ECF Nos. 17, 

18.) For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that the ALJ provided a specific 

and legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence for affording Dr. Ross’s opinion 

little weight.

A. Applicable Law

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes among the opinions of three types of physicians: 

(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not 

treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither treat nor examine the 

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claimant (non-examining physicians).25 In the instant case, it is undisputed that Dr. Ross 

is a treating physician, Dr. Valette is an examining physician, and Drs. Hernandez and Soto 

are non-examining physicians. (ECF No. 16-1 at 9–10; ECF No. 17-1 at 4–7.) 

Generally, the opinions of treating physicians should be given more weight than the 

opinions of non-treating physicians.26 This is because treating physicians typically are 

employed to cure and they have a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as 

an individual.27 Although a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to deference, the ALJ 

is not bound by the medical opinion of a treating physician, and he may discount or reject 

the opinion regardless of whether that opinion is contradicted.28 If a treating physician’s 

opinion is not contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it for “clear 

and convincing reasons.”29 On the other hand, “[i]f a treating . . . doctor’s opinion is 

contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific 

and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.”30 This is because, even 

when contradicted, a treating physician’s opinion is still owed deference and will often be 

“entitled to the greatest weight even if it does not meet the test for controlling weight.”31 

An ALJ satisfies the “substantial evidence” requirement by “setting out a detailed and 

thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation 

thereof, and making findings.”32 “The ALJ must do more than state conclusions. He must 

set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are 

correct.”33 

 

25 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

26 Id. (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

27 McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 

28 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). 

29 Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (quoting Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

30 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

31 Id. (quoting Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

32 Id. (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

33 Id. (quoting Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725).

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Where an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical opinion or set forth specific, 

legitimate reasons for crediting one medical opinion over another, he errs.34 Put differently, 

an ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing 

more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is more 

persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis 

for his conclusion.35 

In the instant case, Plaintiff concedes that the opinion of his treating physician, Dr. 

Ross, is contradicted by the opinions of examining physician Dr. Valette and nonexamining physicians Drs. Hernandez and Soto. (ECF No. 16-1 at 9–10.) Thus, the ALJ 

was required to provide “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial 

evidence”

36 for rejecting Dr. Ross’ opinion. 

B. Analysis

Plaintiff raises a single issue in his motion for summary judgment: whether the ALJ 

properly rejected37 the opinion of Dr. Rachel Ross, Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. (ECF 

No. 16-1 at 6.) In support of his motion, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ “failed to articulate 

legally supported reasons for rejecting Dr. Ross’s opinion.” (Id. at 10.) In addition, 

Plaintiff contends that “Dr. Ross provided objective support for her opinion” and the record 

“does not contain significant evidence warranting giving the non-examining opinions 

greater weight” than that afforded to Dr. Ross’s opinion. (Id.) 

Respondent, in her cross-motion for summary judgment, argues that the ALJ 

provided good reasons supported by substantial evidence explaining why he rejected Dr. 

Ross’s opinion. (ECF No. 17-1 at 4.) Respondent argues that, as the ALJ repeatedly 

explained in his written decision, Dr. Ross’s objective mental status exam findings are “far 

 

34 Id. (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996)).

35 Id. at 1012–13 (citing Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1464).

36 Id. at 1012 (quoting Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198). 

37 The Court notes that the ALJ did not reject Dr. Ross’s opinion in its entirety but instead afforded it 

“little weight.” (A.R. 22.) 

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more modest” than her “extreme opinion that Plaintiff was unable to meet competitive 

standards in the overwhelming majority of mental aptitudes needed to perform work

activity.” (Id. at 5–6.) 

Dr. Ross treated Plaintiff on multiple occasions between November or December 

201338 and December 2014.39 The ALJ notes in his written decision that 

Dr. Ross’s mental status examinations frequently showed the claimant was 

alert and oriented, made good eye contact, had no psychomotor disturbance, 

normal speech, linear thought process, minimal hallucinations, some paranoid 

ideation and fair insight and judgment (Exhibits 6F/1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 13). While 

some notes show and [sic] anxious or depressed mood, others showed no 

mood deficits (Exhibits 6F/1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 13). The claimant was prescribed 

and took psychotropic medication and progress notes show that with some 

adjustments, the medication was relatively effective at improving the 

claimant’s symptoms (Exhibits 6F/1, 2, 5).

(A.R. 21.)

On October 27, 2014, Dr. Ross completed a Mental Impairment Questionnaire that 

specifically addressed Plaintiff’s RFC and ability to work. (A.R. 326.) As summarized by 

the ALJ, Dr. Ross

indicated the claimant had paranoid ideations, poor concentration and 

attention, low energy and distracting auditory hallucinations that make him 

unable to meet competitive standards for many of the mental abilities and 

aptitudes needed to do unskilled work, had moderate restriction of activities 

of daily living, marked difficulties maintaining social functioning, marked 

difficulties maintaining concentration, persistence or pace and 3 episodes of 

decompensation, has a residual disease process that had resulted in such 

marginal adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental demands or 

change in the environment would cause the claimant to decompensate, and 

that his impairments or treatment would cause the claimant to be absent from 

work more than 4 days per month (Exhibit 7F). 

 

38 Dr. Ross’s Mental Impairment Questionnaire states that her initial assessment of Plaintiff occurred on 

November 6, 2013 (A.R. 326), but her first treatment note is dated December 9, 2013 (A.R. 313).

39 Dr. Valette’s Adult Psychological Evaluation, dated December 17, 2014, notes that Plaintiff is currently 

being treated by Dr. Ross. (A.R. 334.) But, Dr. Ross’s last treatment note is dated July 24, 2014 (A.R. 

302), and her October 24, 2017 Mental Impairment Questionnaire states that Dr. Ross’s most recent 

appointment with Plaintiff was on October 14, 2017. (A.R. 326.) 

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(A.R. 22.) The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Ross’s medical opinion in reaching the 

conclusion that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels

that included brief or intermittent conversations, but was precluded from sustained, intense 

interaction with the public, coworkers and supervisors. Specifically, he rejected Dr. Ross’s 

opinion on the basis that 

Dr. Ross’s own objective mental status exam findings do not support her 

opinions. Specifically, as discussed above, Dr. Ross frequently found the 

claimant was alert and oriented, made good eye contact, had no psychomotor 

disturbance, normal speech and linear thought process, and that his 

medications were generally effective at improving his symptoms (Exhibits 

6F/1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 13). This evidence does not support any marked functional 

limitations, excessive absences and decompensations and is more consistent 

with the retained capacity to perform work activity with limited contact with 

others. 

(A.R. 22–23.) The ALJ relied more heavily on the opinions of other examining and nonexamining physicians and his determination that Plaintiff’s testimony was not entirely 

credible in reaching his conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s RFC. (See A.R. 21–23.)

The ALJ provided a specific and legitimate reason for affording Dr. Ross’s opinion 

little weight—Dr. Ross’s own mental status exam findings did not support her opinion that 

Plaintiff was unable to perform any work activity. (A.R. 22.)40 The ALJ’s reason for 

affording Dr. Ross’s opinion little weight is supported by substantial evidence. 

The ALJ set out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical 

evidence, stated his interpretation of the evidence, and made findings. (A.R. 22–23.)41 His 

decision summarized and analyzed Plaintiff’s testimony and all medical opinions. (A.R. 

20–24.) In addition to considering evidence supporting a finding of non-disability, the ALJ 

 

40 See Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a conflict between treating 

physician’s opinion and treatment notes could justify an ALJ’s decision to reject treating physician’s 

opinion, but only if supported by substantial evidence). 

41 See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (citing Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725) (stating that the substantial evidence 

requirement is satisfied when the ALJ sets out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 

conflicting clinical evidence, states his interpretation thereof, and makes findings). 

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also took note of evidence that Plaintiff occasionally felt people were laughing at him (A.R. 

19); had an anxious or depressed mood (A.R. 21); had a history of hallucinations (A.R. 

22); had a “longstanding” history of depressive and anxiety symptoms that require 

psychotropic medication management services and restrict Plaintiff to limited contact with 

the public, coworkers, and supervisors (A.R. 22); his medication was relatively, but not 

completely, effective with some adjustments (A.R. 21); and that multiple physicians 

diagnosed Plaintiff with major depression. (A.R. 21.) 

In rejecting Dr. Ross’s opinion, the ALJ considered the totality of Dr. Ross’s 

treatment notes. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ only cited to Dr. Ross’s treatment notes to 

discount Dr. Ross’s opinion. (ECF No. 16-1 at 9.) To the extent that Plaintiff argues that 

the ALJ only considered the portions of Dr. Ross’s treatment notes that conflicted with her 

opinion, this inaccurately characterizes the ALJ’s analysis—the ALJ specifically noted that 

Dr. Ross’s treatment notes indicated Plaintiff sometimes appeared with an anxious or 

depressed mood and that his treatment required some adjustments and was not completely 

effective. (A.R. 21.)42 After considering the entire picture that Dr. Ross’s treatment notes

painted, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Ross’s mental status exam findings did not support her 

opinion. 

As the ALJ specifically noted, Dr. Ross’s treatment notes frequently reflected that 

Plaintiff was alert, oriented, and made good eye contact. (A.R. 302, 304, 306.) During 

every visit, Dr. Ross found that Plaintiff had normal speech, linear thought processes, and 

no psychomotor disturbance. (A.R. 302, 304, 306, 308, 311.) Every treatment note also 

states that Plaintiff’s response to medication was “fair” and without side effects (A.R. 305, 

307, 308, 311), until the last treatment note, in which Dr. Ross stated that Plaintiff’s 

 

42 Plaintiff cites Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2001) to support his argument that the

ALJ impermissibly relied on selective portions of Dr. Ross’s treatment notes. In Holohan, the ALJ 

cherry-picked quotes from the treating physician’s treatment notes to exaggerate the physician’s 

description of plaintiff’s improvements and misattributed a statement about the infrequency of plaintiff’s 

panic attacks to the treating physician when this was stated by a different physician. Id. at 1205. In 

contrast, the ALJ in this case considered all of Dr. Ross’s treatment notes. 

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response to medication was “good.” (A.R. 303.) Dr. Ross indicated that Plaintiff’s audio 

and visual hallucinations were “minimal” or nonexistent during every visit. (A.R. 302, 

304, 306, 308, 311.) In two treatment notes, Dr. Ross indicated that Plaintiff’s mood and 

affect were “good.” (A.R. 302, 306.)

The opinions of other doctors corroborate these findings by Dr. Ross. Dr. Toro 

found that Plaintiff had an appropriate affect; spoke in a normal tone of voice; did not 

appear guarded, evasive, or suspicious; was oriented as to time, place, and person; was “in 

good contact with reality and cooperates during interview”; and showed no evidence of 

disorganization of thought processes. (A.R. 284.) Dr. Valette found that Plaintiff had 

normal mannerisms; displayed organized thought processes; had normal speech; tested for 

intact memory; and exhibited no symptoms of psychosis or mood disorder. (A.R. 334–35.) 

Additionally, Dr. Valette found it “highly likely that there are no mental restrictions with 

[Plaintiff]” and diagnosed him with rule out malingering. (A.R. 336.) 

These findings conflict with Dr. Ross’s sweeping opinion that Plaintiff cannot 

perform any work activity. In the Mental Impairment Questionnaire, Dr. Ross checked 

that Plaintiff was seriously limited or unable to meet competitive standards for nineteen 

out twenty possible abilities necessary to perform unskilled, semiskilled, or skilled work. 

(A.R. 328–29.) As a specific example, Dr. Ross stated that Plaintiff had experienced three 

episodes of decompensation lasting at least two weeks within a twelve month period. (A.R. 

330.) However, none of Dr. Ross’s treatment notes or her initial examination of Plaintiff 

indicate that Plaintiff experienced any episodes of decompensation lasting at least two 

weeks. (See A.R. 302–24.) In fact, nothing in the medical record supports this statement. 

The ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff had suffered no episodes of decompensation of 

extended duration (A.R. 19), a conclusion not challenged by Plaintiff. 

Accordingly, the ALJ provided a specific and legitimate reason supported by 

substantial evidence for affording Dr. Ross’s opinion little weight. 

/ / /

/ / /

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision to reject 

Dr. Ross’s opinion was not legal error. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) be DENIED and the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion to affirm the ALJ’s decision (ECF No. 17) be GRANTED.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report and 

Recommendation must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

January 25, 2018. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than February 5, 2018. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order.43

Dated: January 11, 2018

 

43 Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

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