Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_94-cv-01997/USCOURTS-cand-4_94-cv-01997-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

MARVIN PETE WALKER,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT L. AYERS, Acting Warden of

California State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

NO. C 94-1997 SBA

 ORDER RE SUMMARY 

 JUDGMENT

 DEATH PENALTY CASE

 

Introduction

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for murder, assault, robbery and other

crimes in August 1980. The California Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction and death

sentence on December 27, 1988. People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d 605 (1988). Petitioner’s state

petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied in September 1992; his petition for writ of certiorari

was denied in March 1993. Walker v. California, 507 U.S. 979 (1993). 

Petitioner filed his first federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on May 20, 1997. This

court found the petition to be unexhausted in part in April 1998, and petitioner filed a second state

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petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 5, 1998. The California Supreme Court denied the

petition on December 22, 2004, both on the merits and on various procedural grounds. 

Petitioner filed his Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court on

January 12, 2005. Per an order dated October 15, 2005, this court granted respondent’s motion to

dismiss Claims 9, 16, 19B(e), 19B(f), 19B(aa), 19B(cc) and 21 as procedurally defaulted. The

parties now bring cross-motions for summary judgment. Respondent has moved for summary

judgment on the majority of petitioner’s remaining claims. Petitioner opposes respondent’s motion

and has cross-moved for summary judgment on numerous claims. Pursuant to Civil Local Rules 7-

1(b) and 7-6, the court finds that the cross-motions are appropriate for submission on the papers

without oral argument. For the following reasons, summary judgment in favor of respondent is

GRANTED as to Claims 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19A, 19B(a), 19B(b), 19B(c),

19B(d), 19B(e), 19B(g), 19B(h), 19B(bb), 19B(dd) and 19B(ee). Petitioner’s motion for summary

judgment with respect to the same claims is DENIED. A decision as to Claims 2 and 22 is

DEFERRED. 

Factual Background

The following recitation of the factual background of this case is based, in relevant part, on

the Supreme Court of California’s opinion disposing of petitioner’s direct appeal, People v. Walker,

47 Cal. 3d 605 (1988). The state court’s factual findings are presumed to be correct pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254.

In 1980, a jury in the Superior Court of Santa Clara County sentenced petitioner to death

following a conviction of first degree murder and other crimes stemming from two separate

incidents joined for purposes of trial. Evidence at trial established that, in the first incident, which

occurred on August 7, 1979, petitioner and an accomplice robbed a liquor store called Dan’s Bottle

Shop and shot three people. One of the shooting victims, 15 year old Joseph Vasquez, died from the

gunshot wounds. In connection with this incident, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder,

two counts of assault with intent to commit murder, and robbery. The jury also found that petitioner

personally used a firearm in the commission of each crime, and found true the special circumstance

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that defendant committed the murder while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of

a robbery. 

Evidence at trial also established that, in the second incident, which occurred on September

5, 1979, petitioner entered a medical building, where he then proceeded to rob, sexually molest, beat

and shoot a young woman twice in the head. The woman, Rose Olveda, survived and identified

petitioner as her assailant. In connection with this incident, petitioner was convicted of assault with

intent to commit murder, robbery, and personal use of a firearm in the commission of each offense. 

He was also convicted of theft of Olveda’s vehicle. 

Petitioner’s defense at the guilt phase was primarily one of mistaken identity. Petitioner

testified on his own behalf. Petitioner’s testimony on the witness stand was impeached by earlier

statements he had made. 

At the penalty phase, the prosecution and defense stipulated that the evidence from the guilt

phase could be considered by the jury in the penalty phase. In addition, the prosecution presented

testimony from two police officers that petitioner had made threats against a police officer and a

deputy district attorney. The defense presented witnesses from petitioner’s family, including his

sisters, who testified that petitioner had helped them financially and emotionally and that they

wanted him to live. Petitioner’s mother testified that petitioner had grown up in a poor family with

seven brothers and sisters. Again, petitioner testified, claiming that he was innocent of the crimes

and testifying that he did not make threats to the officer and deputy district attorney. 

Discussion

I. Legal Framework

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates “that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c); see Anderson Liberty v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). 

The motion should not be granted, however, if a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, could resolve a material issue in the nonmoving party’s

favor. See id. at 248-49; Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1134-36 (9th Cir. 1991).

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 The parties agree that AEDPA applies to this matter. 

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Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), the court

should not grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d).1

 A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court’s

factual findings, and the presumption of correctness may only be rebutted by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d) have separate and

distinct meanings. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). A state court’s decision is

“contrary to” clearly established United States Supreme Court law if it fails to apply the correct

controlling authority or if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts materially

indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Id. at

413-14. A decision is an “unreasonable application” of United States Supreme Court law if “the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 414. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). “While the ‘objectively unreasonable’ standard is not selfexplanatory, at a minimum it denotes a great[] degree of deference to the state courts.” Clark v. 

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision are the only definitive

source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. While

circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision

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is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are

binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be reasonably applied. See Clark, 331 F.3d

at 1070.

When a federal court is presented with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a

rationale for its conclusions, the court has no basis other than the record “for knowing whether the

state court correctly identified the governing legal principle or was extending the principle into a

new context.” Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). In such situations, federal

courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. Id. While federal courts “‘are not required to defer to a state

court’s decision when that court gives [them] nothing to defer to, [they] must still focus primarily on

Supreme Court cases in deciding whether the state court’s resolution of the case constituted an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.’” Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081,

1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2001)). Furthermore,

independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather the only

way a federal court can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable. 

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, if the state court did not reach the

merits of a claim, federal review of the claim is de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th.

Cir 2003).

Even if a petitioner meets the requirements of § 2254(d), habeas relief is warranted only if

the constitutional error at issue had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). Under this standard, petitioners

“may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief

based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Brecht, 507 U.S.

at 637, citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 439 (1986).

II. Analysis

A. Claim 2

In Claim 2, which contains numerous subclaims, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to his counsel’s ineffective assistance

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during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The California Supreme Court dismissed all of these

claims in an unreasoned, summary opinion on the merits. Respondent moves for summary

judgment on Claim 2; petitioner cross-moves for summary adjudication on the issue of whether the

California Supreme Court was objectively unreasonable in its ruling that petitioner had not stated a

prima facie claim.

To establish a right to habeas relief due to a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel, the petitioner first must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). This requires showing that counsel made

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment. See id. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. The relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel

could have done, but rather whether the choices defense counsel made were reasonable. See Babbitt

v. Calderon, 151 F. 3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1159 (1999). Judicial

scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994).

Second, the petitioner must show that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The test for

prejudice is not outcome-determinative; thus, the petitioner need not show that the deficient conduct

more likely than not altered the outcome of the case. A simple showing that the defense was

impaired, however, is not sufficient. See id. at 693. The defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. See id. at 694.

Based on the record currently before the court, the court finds that a decision on the merits of

petitioner’s claim 2 is premature. Both the performance and the prejudice components of the

ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact, and therefore, generally require a

thorough review of a well-developed record. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; see also Earp v.

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Ornoski, 431 F. 3rd 1158 (9th Cir. 2005). This is particularly true where, as here, petitioner claims

that his defense counsel was deficient in investigating and presenting his case at the penalty phase. 

See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Boyde v. Brown, 404 F. 3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2005);

Correll v. Ryan, 465 F. 3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner has indicated his intention to move for

discovery and an evidentiary hearing on this claim; given the intense factual nature of ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, and recent decisions from the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court

regarding the factual development necessary to consider such claims, consideration of petitioner’s

Claim 2 is deferred. 

B. Claim 3

In Claim 3, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated by the government’s alleged use of perjured testimony in procuring petitioner’s

convictions and death sentence. Specifically, petitioner alleges that the prosecution presented

perjured testimony of prosecution witness William Sisco, and did not seek to correct said testimony. 

Petitioner also maintains that the perjured testimony was highly prejudicial. Petitioner raised this

claim in his 1990 and 1998 state habeas petitions; the California Supreme Court denied it on the

merits in summary, one-line denials. Respondent maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment

because an independent review of the record confirms that the state court’s decision was not an

objectively unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent;

petitioner opposes respondent’s motion and argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on this

claim.

At petitioner’s trial, William Sisco testified as follows. He stated that he saw petitioner at a

party in late September or October 1979 and heard petitioner state that “they had robbed somebody”

and that “[s]ome punk got in the way and he took him out of the game.” Ex. 24 at 2024-27, 2035-

40, 2048-49, 2051, 2056, 2064-66. Sisco heard these statements from about 10-15 feet away, and

testified that he understood the phrase “taking someone out of the game” to mean killing someone. 

Ex. 24 at 2026-27. Sisco also testified that petitioner was carrying what might have been a .45

caliber handgun in the waistband of his pants at the time of the party. Ex. 24 at 2027-29, 2043,

2046, 2054, 2063-64.

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Prior to testifying at petitioner’s trial, Sisco had been in custody at the Alameda County jail 

on a charge of felony auto theft. He also had a prior conviction for forgery in Santa Clara County. 

Ex. 24 at 2029-31, 2033, 2041, 2060-61. Sisco later pled guilty to a misdemeanor in the auto theft

case and, despite his prior forgery conviction, received probation. 

At petitioner’s trial, Sisco also testified that he had spoken to Sergeant Demkoski of the San

Jose Police Department prior to testifying at petitioner’s preliminary hearing. He denied that he had

received a deal from Demkowski or anyone else because of his testimony against petitioner. Ex. 24

at 2029-32, 2041-42, 2067-68. Demkowski also testified at petitioner’s trial. He denied making any

promises to Sisco or deals on his behalf; he further testified that he did not speak to any Alameda

County authorities before Sisco pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor, nor did he contact any other law

enforcement on Sisco’s behalf. Ex. 24 at 2077, 2080. 

According to petitioner, both Sisco and Demkowski perjured themselves at petitioner’s trial. 

Petitioner bases these allegations primarily on a 1997 declaration from Sisco, in which Sisco states

that while he heard the statement about “taking someone out of the game”, he is not sure whether

petitioner or someone else made the statement. Sisco Decl., (Ex. K to Amended Petition) at ¶ 4. 

Sisco also declares that he told the police officers that he did not know who made the statement, but

that they (the police officers) threatened to involve him in the crime if Sisco did not assist them. 

Sisco Decl. at ¶ 4. 

Sisco also maintains that the State promised Sisco favorable treatment on the pending felony

auto theft charge. Sisco Decl. at ¶¶ 5, 6, 8. Sisco claims that his sentence of probation, as opposed

to a jail sentence, was the favorable treatment he was promised as a result of testifying against

petitioner. Sisco Decl. at ¶¶ 7-8. 

Petitioner argues that the prosecution’s conduct regarding Sisco’s testimony constitutes both

a Brady violation (failure to disclose favorable evidence, in this case, evidence of an alleged

leniency deal) and a Napue violation (presentation of false evidence, in this case, Sisco’s statement

that he overheard petitioner make an inculpatory comment). His claim is based primarily on Sisco’s

declaration. 

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2 Sisco’s declaration, unlike his trial testimony, was not subject to cross-examination. 

Furthermore, as respondent correctly points out, recantations of this sort are to be viewed with

suspicion under California law. See, e.g., In re Weber, 11 Cal. 3d 703, 724 (1974); People v.

Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d 1210, 1274 (1991). 

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To prove a Brady violation, three elements must be shown. “The evidence at issue must be

favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence

must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have

ensued.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (citations omitted). 

A Napue violation is a type of Brady violation. Under Napue it is unconstitutional for the

State to knowingly use false or perjured testimony against a defendant to obtain a conviction. Napue

v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). “A conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is

fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false

testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103

(1976) (footnote omitted). To demonstrate a Napue violation, petitioner must show: 1) the evidence

in question was false; 2) the prosecution knew or should have known it was false; and 3) the false

evidence was material. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Respondent maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment because petitioner cannot

demonstrate that the prosecution either withheld material evidence from the defense or that the

prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony. Petitioner counters that Sisco’s declaration shows

violations of both Napue and Brady, and entitles him to summary judgment on this claim.

The court has conducted an independent review of the record and finds that the state court’s

summary dismissal of this claim was not objectively unreasonable. See Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

To begin with, even accepting Sisco’s declaration2

 as true, petitioner cannot show that the prosecutor

knew that Sisco testified falsely. The court notes that Sisco’s declaration does not clearly state that

Sisco even committed perjury, let alone that the prosecutor suborned it. Sisco’s declaration does not

refute his trial testimony that he saw petitioner at the party and that he heard the statements about

someone getting killed in a robbery. In fact, Sisco confirms that he heard someone in a group of

four men admit to shooting someone at Dan’s Bottle Shop during the robbery. Sisco Decl. at ¶ 4. 

He further states that petitioner was one of the men in the group. Id. Sisco also declares that he told

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 To the extent that petitioner is alleging that the prosecutor’s unknowing use of perjured

testimony entitles him to relief, that claim must also fail. Such a claim would be based on a new rule

in violation of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and petitioner has not established that any

exceptions to the Teague-bar would apply in this case. 

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“the police officers that I did not know who made the statement” but that does not demonstrate that

the prosecutor knew or should have known that Sisco was allegedly perjuring himself when he

testified that it was petitioner whom he overheard making the statement at the party in question. In

such a situation, petitioner is not entitled to relief. See, e.g., Murtishaw v, Woodford, 255 F. 3d 926,

955 (9th Cir. 2001) (petitioner not entitled to relief on claim where there is no evidence that the

prosecution knew the testimony in question was false).3 

Similarly, petitioner’s claim that the prosecution committed a Brady violation by failing to

reveal the alleged existence of a leniency deal between Sisco and the state must fail. Suppression of

a leniency deal may be grounds for a reversal on Brady grounds. See, e.g., Horton v. Mayle, 408

F.3d 570, 579-80 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding reversible error where evidence that a key prosecution

witness was promised immunity in exchange for his testimony had not been produced). In this case,

however, Sisco’s declaration, produced more than fifteen years after his trial testimony, does not

demonstrate that there was, in fact, a leniency deal in place. Sisco’s declaration, which relies

heavily on hearsay statements from the police and his public defender, claims he “believes” that his

testimony led to his probation in the auto theft case. That is not, however, sufficient evidence of a

leniency deal. See, e.g. Murtishaw, 255 F.3d at 958-59 (holding that an affidavit taken more than

ten years after trial and based largely on hearsay is not sufficient evidence to grant habeas relief

based on a Brady violation). Sisco’s declaration is the only evidence petitioner has proffered to

show that there was a suppressed leniency deal in place. As such, it was not objectively

unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to deny petitioner’s claim. 

Even assuming petitioner had shown either that the prosecutor knowingly presented false

evidence or that the prosecutor failed to produce Brady material, petitioner would not be entitled to

habeas relief on Claim 3. Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). In addition, to prove reversible Brady and Napue errors, a

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4A consists of background information in support of Claim 4 and is not a separate subclaim. 

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petitioner must show that any violations resulted in prejudice to his defense. As required by

AEDPA, the court has conducted an independent review of the record and concludes that it was not

objectively unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to determine that any error was not

prejudicial to petitioner. 

Sisco’s testimony, when reviewed in its entirety, was contradictory, not particularly

powerful, and subject to impeachment. Sisco did state that he overheard petitioner make inculpatory

statements at a party, but he also stated that petitioner had not confirmed that he (petitioner) was

involved in the robbery. Ex. 24 at 2050-53, 2059-60. Moreover, Sisco admitted that he was angry

at petitioner at the time of the party and that he had been telling the truth at the preliminary hearing

when he had testified that he could not remember petitioner saying anything at the party in question. 

Ex. 24 at 2040-2071. Sisco was also characterized as having a reputation as a liar by both petitioner

himself and by another witness (Ex. 27 at 2649-51; Ex. 25 at 2178-79), and part of his testimony,

where he denied intending to kill petitioner, was impeached by Sergeant Demkowski. Ex. 24. As

such, even if petitioner had been able to demonstrate that the state knowingly withheld evidence or

suborned perjury, he would not be entitled to habeas relief because he cannot show that any error

resulted in prejudice. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state court’s decision denying this claim was

objectively unreasonable. Thus, respondent is entitled to summary judgment on Claim 3. 

C. Claim 4

In Claim 4, petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated because the jury considered invalid and unreliable aggravating circumstances in

determining his sentence. There are three subclaims to this claim; each will be considered in turn. 

1. Claim 4B4

In this subclaim, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

to notice of the charges against him were violated because he was never informed of the statutory

basis of the criminal activity charged against him in the penalty phase, nor was he informed of the

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 Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 provides in relevant part: “. . . no evidence may be presented by

the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the

defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial.” 

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elements of the penal violations against which he had to defend. Respondent and petitioner both

contend they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

During petitioner’s penalty phase, two instances of aggravating criminal activity were

presented by the prosecution, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 190.3, factor (b). Under factor (b), the

prosecution at a penalty phase capital case may introduce as evidence in aggravation any “criminal

activity by the defendant which involved the use of force or violence or the express or implied threat

to use force or violence.” The evidence “must be limited to conduct that demonstrates the

commission of an actual crime, specifically, the violation of a penal statute.” People v. Phillips, 41

Cal. 3d 29, 72 (1985). 

The factor (b) criminal activity in petitioner’s case was two threatening statements made by

petitioner. One was an alleged threat against a deputy district attorney (the “D.A. threat”) and one

was an alleged threat against a police officer (the “Danny threat”). Petitioner maintains that he was

not provided with the required notice of the prosecution’s intent to offer the evidence of the “D.A.

threat” and the “Danny threat” in aggravation.5

 

The California Supreme Court addressed a variation of this claim in a reasoned opinion on

direct appeal. The state court stated:

We are satisfied that there was substantial compliance with section 190.3. 

The record discloses that the prosecutor told defense counsel even before the case

arrived in superior court that defendant had threatened a deputy district attorney and a

police officer. In addition, a written notice of the intention to introduce such

evidence in aggravation was filed a full week before commencement of the penalty

phase. The trial judge conducted a hearing in chambers on the evidence to be

admitted at the penalty phase. He personally recalled that from the time he was

assigned the case the matter of the prior threats had been discussed in connection with

courtroom security concerns. Moreover, defendant cannot be heard to complain that

the notice of the October 30, 1979, courtroom threat against the deputy district

attorney was lacking in specificity; the record reflects defense counsel was

representing defendant at the preliminary hearing and was himself present in the

courtroom when defendant uttered the threat. Finally, the record reveals counsel was

fully aware of his right to seek a continuance to investigate and respond to any

evidence of which he had not been afforded adequate notice. [citations omitted]. A

continuance was never sought. 

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The trial court was satisfied that defense counsel had been afforded adequate

notice of the prosecutor’s intent to introduce evidence of the threats. We see no

reason to reach a contrary conclusion. 

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 637. 

Petitioner first argues that, because the state court’s reasoned opinion was based on state law

and did not specifically discuss the federal constitution, it is not entitled to deference under AEDPA. 

Petitioner is mistaken. The Supreme Court has made clear that as long as the reasoning of the state

court does not contradict Supreme Court precedent, the AEDPA’s deferential standard applies. See

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (qualification for AEDPA deference requires neither citation

to United States Supreme Court cases nor awareness of them, as long as neither the reasoning nor

the result of the state court decision contradicts them). Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies to Claim

4B. 

Petitioner also maintains that, even if the state court’s reasoned opinion is entitled to

deference, the opinion is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United

States Supreme Court law. Petitioner maintains that the notice he received did not satisfy due

process requirements because he was not sufficiently informed of the nature of the elements of the

crime and because he did not receive notice of the factor(b) criminal activity prior to trial. 

Petitioner’s arguments are unpersuasive. The cases he cites in support of his arguments

contain general pronouncements regarding the notice requirements of the Due Process Clause, and in

no way establish either that the state was required to inform him in more detail of the elements of the

crime or that the state was required to give him more notice of the criminal activity to be entered

into evidence prior to the commencement of trial. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358

(1977) (holding that a capital trial’s sentencing phase must meet due process requirements); Presnell

v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14. Furthermore, petitioner can cite to no cases stating that the notice he was

given – six days before the commencement of the penalty phase trial – was constitutionally

inadequate. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court’s reasoned opinion was contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law or an

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unreasonable determination of the facts. Respondent is therefore entitled to summary judgment on

this claim. 

2. Claim 4C

In this subclaim, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated when the alleged “D.A. threat” and the “Danny threat” were admitted and

considered as criminal activity even though they did not constitute criminal activity under the state

penal code. According to petitioner, admission of these statements unconstitutionally expanded the

statutory list of aggravating factors. Respondent and petitioner both contend they are entitled to

summary judgment on this claim. 

a. The “Danny threat”

On direct appeal, petitioner argued that, at a minimum, admission of the threats violated

California’s Phillips/Boyd rule, which limits “other crimes” aggravation evidence to the violation of

a penal statute. People v. Phillips, 41 Cal. 3d 29, 72 (1985) (holding that section 190.3 evidence

must be limited to “conduct that demonstrates the commission of an actual crime, specifically, the

violation of a penal statute”); People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 776-78 (1985). As to the “Danny

threat” the California Supreme Court addressed petitioner’s contentions as follows:

[During the penalty phase trial], Officer Nichols testified for the prosecution

about a conversation he heard through electronic monitoring between defendant and

his cousin Lawrence Martin at the police station on September 26, 1979. During the

conversation, defendant told Martin that he would have to get the gun from “Danny”

(Officer MacIvor), and that “Danny” would have to be “offed.”

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

We agree with defendant that evidence of the “Danny” threat was

inadmissible under the rule of Phillips and Boyd. Respondent contends that

defendant’s statement constitutes solicitation of his cousin Lawrence Martin to assist

in a plan to murder Officer MacIvor, a violation of section 653f. But Officer

Nichols’s testimony concerning this threat does not bear out the claim; the words

used by defendant are at best ambiguous and equally supportive of an inference that

he was merely relating to Martin how he (defendant) would have to get the gun back

and “off” Danny. [footnote omitted]

We conclude, however that admission of evidence of the “Danny” threat was

nonprejudicial. [citations omitted]. This case was tried well before Phillips or Boyd

were decided. The properly admitted aggravating evidence in this case – in particular

the circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) – was simply overwhelming. 

From that evidence the jury found defendant guilty in one incident of murdering one

person and assaulting two others in execution-style shootings of unarmed and

unresisting victims, two of whom were teenagers. One month later defendant

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viciously pistol-whipped a young woman and shot her twice in the head in order to

facilitate his escape with her $11 and her car.

The evidence of defendant’s threats was dwarfed in comparison to the

seriousness and excessive violence of the charged offenses. Nor did the prosecutor

place heavy emphasis on the threats in his closing argument. He maintained that they

constituted examples of “other criminal activity” involving a threat of violence and

should thus be considered in aggravation, but he also cautioned the jury on three

separate occasions to ignore the evidence unless they first found beyond a reasonable

doubt that the alleged criminal activity had actually occurred. He suggested the

threats evidenced a callous and casual attitude toward the value of others’ lives, but

clearly communicated his belief that this attitude was established primarily by

defendant’s conduct in the charged offenses and his courtroom demeanor. Finally,

the jury knew from the guilt phase that defendant twice met with undercover Officer

MacIvor after communicating the “Danny” threat to his cousin and being released

from custody. There was no evidence defendant ever attempted to make good on his

threat. On these facts it would be sheer speculation for us to conclude that evidence

of the threat affected the penalty verdict. 

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 635, 639-40. 

Petitioner argues, once again, that because the state court’s reasoned opinion was based on

state law and did not specifically discuss the federal constitution, it is not entitled to deference under

AEDPA. As before, petitioner is mistaken. The Supreme Court has made clear that as long as the

reasoning of the state court does not contradict Supreme Court precedent, the AEDPA’s deferential

standard applies. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8 (qualification for AEDPA deference requires neither

citation to United States Supreme Court cases nor awareness of them, as long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradicts them). Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

applies to Claim 4C.

Petitioner also maintains that the state court’s decision that the erroneous admission of the

“Danny threat” was not prejudicial was contrary to or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established United States Supreme Court law. Specifically, petitioner argues that the Supreme

Court’s decision in Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 126 S.Ct. 884 (2006), entitles him to relief.

In Sanders, the Court considered a case where the capital defendant had been sentenced to

death after the jury found to be true four special circumstances. Two of those four special

circumstances were later invalidated by the California Supreme Court, but the death sentence was

upheld. Sanders, 126 S.Ct. at 888-89. The Court held that “[i]f the presence of the invalid

sentencing factor allowed the sentencer to consider evidence that would not otherwise have been

before it, due process would mandate reversal.” Id. at 892. Nonetheless, it reinstated the death

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sentence in the petitioner’s case, finding that the jury’s consideration of the invalid special

circumstances was not reversible error because “all of the facts and circumstances admissible to

establish the [invalidated special circumstances] were also properly adduced as aggravating facts

bearing upon the “circumstances of the crime” sentencing factor. They were properly considered

whether or not they bore upon the invalidated eligibility factor.” Id. at 894. 

According to petitioner, Sanders mandates reversal of his case because the inadmissible

“Danny threat” evidence is the equivalent of an invalid sentencing factor under Sanders. Petitioner

argues that, because the Sanders court held that reversal is mandated if an invalid sentencing factor

allowed the jury to consider evidence it would not have otherwise heard, reversal is mandated in his

case because the “Danny threat” was improperly admitted. 

Petitioner’s argument is specious. In petitioner’s case, the sentencing factor itself has not

been held to be invalid by any state or federal court. Rather, in petitioner’s case, evidence in support

of a valid sentencing factor was erroneously admitted. As such, Sanders is not applicable here. 

Thus, petitioner has not demonstrated that the state court’s reasoned opinion was contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As respondent points out, admission or exclusion of evidence in state court is

ordinarily not a matter for federal habeas review unless the admission or exclusion violates a

particular constitutional guarantee or is so prejudicial that it results in a denial of due process. See

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir.

1998). Petitioner cannot show that the state court’s decision that the error was not prejudicial was

erroneous, nor can he demonstrate that the state court’s factual findings were unreasonable. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Furthermore, petitioner has failed to establish that any purported state court

error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Brecht,

507 U.S. at 638. For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment on this subclaim is granted in favor

of respondent.

b. The “D.A. threat”

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Petitioner also argues that the state court’s admission of the alleged “D.A. threat” entitles

him to habeas relief. The state court, in its reasoned opinion, addressed petitioner’s contentions as

follows:

Officer MacIvor testified that at the conclusion of a preliminary hearing on

October 30, 1979, defendant walked by him and the deputy district attorney

conducting the hearing, turned toward the prosecutor and stated, “The hell with

getting a cop, I’ll get me a D.A.” The record further suggests that there may have

been some mention of the September 26 “Danny” threat in connection with a bail

motion made at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, perhaps thereby prompting

defendant’s “D.A.” threat. The deputy district attorney testified that when defendant

walked by, defendant glared at him and made a comment. All the district attorney

could make out was “D.A.”

........................................................................................................................................

Defendant and amicus curiae contend that the courtroom threat, “the hell with

getting a cop, I’ll get me a D.A.,” was not a crime in violation of a penal statute. 

Respondent asserts that it was a violation of sections 69 or 71 (threatening an

executive or public officer with intent to deter performance of his duties). We

conclude that evidence of the courtroom threat would support a finding of a violation

of section 69. Although defendant voiced the threat in a low voice, he turned to face

the deputy district attorney when he communicated it. The deputy had just completed

conducting a preliminary hearing in which defendant was held to answer, had argued

against his release on bail, and was able to hear at least a portion of the threat. Given

the murder and assault charges which defendant faced, it could reasonably be

perceived that he had the apparent ability to carry out the threat. The evidence thus

supports an inference that defendant intended to thwart or deter further prosecution of

his case by threatening the deputy district attorney, and each requisite element of a

violation of section 69 was shown on these facts. (See People v. Hopkins (1983) 149

Cal.App. 3d 36, 40-44 [196 Cal. Rptr. 609].) Furthermore, the jury was instructed

that the threats had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to qualify as

factors in aggravation. [citations omitted]. 

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 639. 

As with the "Danny threat", petitioner cannot show that the state court's opinion regarding

admission of the "D.A. threat" was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts. In fact, petitioner's claim here is even weaker

than his claim regarding the "Danny threat", since the state court found that evidence regarding the 

"D.A. threat" was properly admitted. While petitioner may argue for a different interpretation of the

facts, he fails to demonstrate that the state court's factual findings were unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2). Moreover, petitioner has failed to establish that any purported state court error had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at

638. 

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6

 Given the lack of precedent supporting his claim, petitioner is essentially asking this court

to establish a new rule entitling him to relief. For this court to do so would violate the dictates of

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-16 (1989), which prevents a federal court from granting habeas

relief to a state prisoner based on a constitutional rule of criminal procedure announced after his

conviction and sentence became final. As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) codifies and

amends the non-retroactivity principle announced in Teague. 

18

For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment on this subclaim is granted in favor of

respondent.

3. Claim 4D

In Claim 4D, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated because the trial court did not instruct the jury on the elements of the criminal

offenses that the "Danny threat" and the "D.A. threat" allegedly constituted. This claim was rejected

by the California Supreme Court on petitioner's state habeas claim, but was not addressed in a

reasoned opinion. Thus, this court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the state court opinion is objectively unreasonable, given clearly established United States

Supreme Court precedent. Delgado 223 F.3d at 982.

Petitioner does not and cannot cite to any state or federal case requiring that a trial court

instruct the jury as to the elements of criminal activity introduced into evidence during the penalty

phase. In fact, the California Supreme Court has held squarely to the contrary, stating that a “trial

court has no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury as to the elements of all of the other crimes that have

been introduced at the penalty phase.” People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 281-82 (1985). There

is no United States Supreme Court authority suggesting that such instruction is required at the

penalty phase, and in the absence of such authority, petitioner cannot demonstrate either that an error

occurred or that any alleged error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury's verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638.6

 

There is no support for the claim that the trial court was required to instruct the jury on the

elements of the criminal offenses that the "Danny threat" and the "D.A. threat" allegedly constituted

and the court’s independent review of the record confirms that the state court’s denial of relief on

this claim was not objectively unreasonable. As such, respondent is entitled to summary judgment

on this subclaim. 

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D. Claim 5

In Claim 5, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated by the state’s alleged destruction of evidence. The California Supreme Court denied

this claim on the merits in its reasoned opinion disposing of petitioner’s direct appeal. People v.

Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 621-23. Respondent and petitioner both contend that they are entitled to

summary judgment on this claim. 

Claim 5 is related to Claim 4 in that it concerns admission into evidence of the “Danny

threat” at petitioner’s penalty phase trial. The prosecution disclosed that a tape had been made of

the conversation containing the threat. Specifically, Officer Nichols testified that he had made a

copy of the tape and taken it to technicians to see if it could be enhanced, but enhancement was not

possible. RT 3183:12-26. Nichols also testified that when he turned it over to homicide detectives,

they informed him the tape was of no value because portions of the conversation were inaudible. RT

3184:1-2. Nichols stated that although he had kept the original tape for several months, he was

unable to find it at the time of trial, leading him to believe that he had reused it. RT 3184:5-17. 

Petitioner’s counsel never received or heard the tape. 

When addressing this claim on direct appeal, the California Supreme Court stated the

following:

Defendant contends that under People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 641, 652-

653 [117 Cal.Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361], the officers’ negligent destruction of the tape

should have precluded admission of evidence of the “Danny” threats at the penalty

phase. The United States Supreme Court has recently formulated its own duty-topreserve-evidence test in California v. Trombetta[,][] 467 U.S. 479 [(1984)]. . . .

Under Trombetta, the duty to preserve extends only to evidence which “both

possess[es] an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was

destroyed, and [is] of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain

comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (467 U.S. at p. 489 . . . .) 

Here it appears that neither prong of the Trombetta test was met; defendant made no

showing that the tape recording possessed any apparently exculpatory value, nor did

he show why his opportunity to cross-examine Officer Nichols, who directly

monitored the taped conversation, was inadequate to protect his rights. 

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 638 (footnote omitted). 

Upon review of the applicable record, the court finds that the California Supreme Court

reasonably considered and rejected this claim on the merits on direct appeal. The court considered

Trombetta, which petitioner now alleges entitles him to relief on this claim, and reasonably found

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that petitioner had not made a proper showing under either prong of the Trombetta test. In so doing,

the state court did not unreasonably apply the law, nor make an unreasonable determination of facts,

but rather properly analyzed the record. Petitioner has shown nothing to the contrary. 

This court thus concludes that the state court decision was correct, and was not contrary to,

and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as established by

the Supreme Court of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, respondent is

entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

E. Claim 6 

In Claim 6, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated due to the prosecutor’s allegedly improper peremptory strikes of the only three

African-Americans in the jury venire. Petitioner argues that the prosecutor’s conduct was in

violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The California Supreme Court denied this

claim on the merits in its reasoned opinion disposing of petitioner’s direct appeal. People v. Walker,

47 Cal. 3d at 625-26 & n. 5. Respondent and petitioner both argue they are entitled to summary

judgment on this claim. 

According to petitioner, the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges in a

discriminatory manner to strike all three prospective African-American jurors from the venire. The

Supreme Court “consistently and repeatedly has reaffirmed that racial discrimination by the State in

jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005)

(quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44 (1992)). In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98

(1986), the Court established a three-part test for evaluating claims that the prosecution’s

peremptory challenges were based on race.

The first step in a Batson challenge requires the defendant to make a prima facie showing of

discriminatory jury selection. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 96. A defendant may rely on “the totality of

the relevant facts” concerning the prosecutor’s conduct during the defendant’s trial. Id. If the

defendant successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecution to come

forward with a race-neutral explanation for each contested challenge. Id. at 97. This second step

requires the prosecutor to provide “a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate

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reasons for exercising the challeng[e].” Id. at 98. In the final step, the trial court has “the duty to

determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 98. 

When addressing this claim on direct appeal, the California Supreme Court held the

following:

On rehearing, amicus curiae assigns as error the trial court’s denial of

defendant’s motion for a mistrial pursuant to People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal. 3d

258. In Wheeler, we held that peremptory challenges may not be used to remove

prospective jurors solely on the basis of presumed group bias. (Accord, Batson v.

Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79) [parallel citations omitted]. We defined group bias as

the presumpton that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members of an

identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic or similar grounds. (22

Cal. 3d at p. 276).

Under Wheeler, a party who believes his opponent is improperly exercising

peremptory challenges for a discriminatory purpose must raise a timely challenge and

make a prima facie case of such discrimination. Once a prima facie case has been

shown, the burden shifts to the other party to come forward with an explanation that

demonstrates other, valid bases for the challenges – i.e., reasons relevant to the

particular case on trial (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal. 3d at ¶. 280-282), or as the

United States Supreme Court has put it, “a neutral explanation related to the

particular case to be tried.” (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98.)

It then becomes the duty of the trial court to make “a sincere and reasoned

attempt to evaluate the prosecution’s explanation in light of the circumstances of the

case as then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observations of the

manner in which the prosecutor has examined members of the venire and has

exercised challenges for cause or peremptorily, . . .” (People v. Hall (1983), 35 Cal.

3d 161, 167-168.) We have explained that we will “rely on the good judgment of the

trial courts to distinguish bona fide reasons for such peremptories from sham excuses,

belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination.” (People v.

Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal. 3d at p. 282.)

In the present case, the court concluded that defendant had presented a prima

facie case. The prosecutor in turn gave a number of reasons for challenging each of

the three Black prospective jurors. He recalled that prospective juror Michael George

had come to court in metal-studded leather motorcycle garb, and had related that he

had been repeatedly stopped and harassed by San Jose police officers while riding his

motorcycle because he fit what he called the “average black man syndrome.” Once

when George was stopped for speeding, the officer held a gun to his head; George felt

this was an excessive display of force, filed a complaint with the San Jose police

internal affairs division, and seemed unsatisfied with its resolution. The prosecutor

also recalled that George had volunteered, without being asked, “that he was not

comfortable at all with the fact that it was a death penalty situation.” 

Prospective juror Dorothy King had expressed strong scruples against the

death penalty. She also displayed a general antiprosecution bias. She related that the

San Jose police had “harassed” her husband by stopping him without sufficient cause. 

She had served on a jury in a prior homicide case which resulted in the defendant’s

acquittal. She related that she disliked sitting on a jury in a murder case. 

As for the third prospective Black juror, Dorothy Brown, the prosecutor

recalled that she was barely able to suppress her apparent amusement when asked

about her views on the credibility of police officers. She had founded a group “to

counterbalance the popular image of Black people in the media,” and showed

incredulity and disdain when the prosecutor asked follow-up questions about the

group’s functions. She believed the San Jose Police Department had followed her

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husband home every night for a protracted period of time. She stated she could not

imagine herself siding with the prosecutor’s side of the case. 

We are satisfied that the trial court fulfilled its obligation to critically evaluate

the prosecutor’s explanations. The record supports the court’s conclusion that the

prosecutor properly exercised his peremptory challenges on grounds of individual

bias. 

FN 5. Amicus curiae contends further that under People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal. 3d

667, the trial court erred in accepting the prosecutor’s explanations to the extent they

took into account the prospective jurors’ attire, facial expressions and sneers, audible

laughter, snickering and the like. We conclude that the record supports the court’s

finding of specific bias as to each prospective juror separate and apart from any such

factors. 

 People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 625-26 & n. 5. 

Respondent moves for summary judgment on Claim 6 on the grounds that the California

Supreme Court reasonably considered and rejected petitioner’s contentions on the merits, thus

foreclosing relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). He also asserts that the state court’s factual findings

are entitled to deference pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner responds that 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) does not prevent this court from granting relief on Claim 6 because the California Supreme

Court’s decision was contrary to Supreme Court precedent, specifically Batson v. Kentucky, 476

U.S. 79 (1986) and Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), and because its factual findings were

unreasonable. Petitioner argues that he was denied his equal protection rights during jury selection,

and maintains that clear and convincing evidence in the record establishes that the prosecutor’s

proffered reasons for his peremptory challenges were pretextual. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

At petitioner’s trial, the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges to strike all three

prospective African-American jurors in the venire. Petitioner is black and therefore is a member of

a cognizable racial group. During jury selection, the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to

strike potential jurors George, King and Brown, all of whom are black. Neither party disputes the

trial court’s ruling that petitioner made a prima facie showing of discrimination. 

As required by the second step of the Batson analysis, the prosecutor provided the trial

court with various race-neutral explanations for striking the three African-American venire persons. 

See People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 625-26. The Supreme Court has held that “[u]nless a

discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed

race neutral.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991). The second step of the Batson

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inquiry “does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v. Elem, 514

U.S. 765, 768 (1995). The prosecutor’s stated explanations for striking George, King and Brown

included the prospective jurors’ dress, past negative experiences with law enforcement, and

misgivings about imposing the death penalty. See People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 625-26. Once

again, neither party contests the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s proffered explanations

for striking all three prospective African-American jurors were facially race-neutral. 

Following the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking the three African-American venire

persons, the trial court adhered to the final step of a Batson challenge and “critically evaluated” the

prosecutor’s explanations. At this stage, “the trial court determines whether the opponent of the

strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. 

Although the trial court is not required to agree with the prosecutor’s stated race-neutral

explanations to accept them, the court must evaluate “the persuasiveness of the justification.” See

id. The California Supreme Court and the trial court accepted the prosecutor’s reasons and ruled

that he had not engaged in purposeful discrimination by striking George, King, and Brown. See

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 626 . 

Petitioner argues that this case is analogous to Miller-El in that the prosecutor’s proffered

explanations were little more than pretext for racial discrimination. “A Batson challenge does not

call for an exercise in thinking up any rational basis. If the stated reason does not hold up, its

pretextual significance does not fade because a trial judge, or an appeals court can imagine a reason

that might not have been shown up as false.” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252. Petitioner maintains that

the state court unreasonably accepted the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for challenging all

three African-Americans on the venire. 

In Miller-El, the Supreme Court held that the Texas state court’s conclusion that the

prosecution had not discriminatorily exercised peremptory challenges to strike African-American

jurors from the venire was unreasonable. Id. at 266. During jury selection in an African-American

defendant’s capital murder trial, the prosecution struck 10 of 11 qualified black venire persons. Id.

at 265. The Court ruled that “[t]he prosecutors’ chosen race-neutral reasons for the strikes do not

hold up and are so far at odds with the evidence that pretext is the fair conclusion indicating the very

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discrimination the explanations were meant to deny.” Id. The Court also underscored the

importance of other evidence of prosecutorial racial discrimination, which included two “jury

shuffles” intended to alter the racial composition of the panel, using disparate lines of questioning

depending on the race of prospective jurors, and a well-known policy by the Dallas County District

Attorney’s Office to exclude black venire members from juries at the time of Miller-El’s jury

selection. Id. at 265-66. Such overwhelming objective indicia buttressed Miller-El’s claims of

racial discrimination during jury selection and caused the Court to hold that the prosecutors’ raceneutral explanations were pretext for discrimination. Id. at 265.

Walker’s jury selection, however, is distinguishable from Miller-El. Although the prosecutor

in Walker’s trial exercised peremptory challenges to strike 100% of the African-American jurors as

compared to 91% in Miller-El’s trial, the statistical significance is far more profound in Miller-El

given the larger pool of eligible jurors. In the instant case, there were only three eligible AfricanAmerican jurors, which carries minimal statistical weight, especially when compared to the 11 of 12

black jurors excluded in Miller-El. Perhaps most importantly, the overwhelming objective indicia of

discriminatory purpose that existed in Miller-El – such as the “jury shuffle,” the different lines of

questioning based on race, and the stated prosecutorial policy to strike African-American jurors –

are not present in this case.

Petitioner asserts that, as in Miller-El, the prosecutor mischaracterized testimony of the

excluded black prospective jurors to explain his peremptory challenges. Petitioner argues that these

mischaracterizations further support an inference of pretext. While the record does raise questions

concerning the prosecutor’s characterization of the prospective African-American jurors’ testimony

during voir dire, AEDPA requires this court to presume that the state court’s factual findings are

correct. See 28 U.S.C § 2254(e)(1). Furthermore, the court has reviewed the applicable record and

petitioner is unable to demonstrate that the state court’s factual findings were unreasonable. 

Petitioner further argues that the California Supreme Court failed to engage in a comparative

analysis of the excluded African-American venire persons and other non-black venire members. “If

a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwisesimilar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful

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discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.” Miller-El, 545 U.S. 241. In this case, any

potential discrepancies are not comparable to the disparity demonstrated in Miller-El. The record

fails to provide clear and convincing evidence of disparate treatment of similarly-situated venire

persons based on their race. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Thus, AEDPA requires this court to defer

to the state court’s factual findings. 

Under AEDPA, this court must defer to the state court’s findings unless the state court

decision “contradicts the governing law set forth” in the Supreme Court’s cases “or confronts facts

that are materially indistinguishable from a Court decision and nevertheless arrives at a different

result.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406

(2000)). Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s reasoned decision was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme

Court law. Nor can he demonstrate that the state court’s factual findings were unreasonable. 

Accordingly, respondent is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

F. Claim 7

In Claim 7, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated due to alleged juror misconduct. Specifically, petitioner maintains that the jury

foreman improperly informed the other jurors that a sentence of life without parole could actually

mean that a defendant so sentenced might be released from prison. According to petitioner, the

jurors improperly factored this extraneous information into their deliberations, such that the penalty

determination was prejudicial. This claim was raised by petitioner in his 1990 state habeas petition

and rejected on the merits by the California Supreme Court. Both petitioner and respondent

maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

Respondent argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because petitioner’s claim is not

cognizable and that, therefore, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In support of his

argument, petitioner cites to Belmontes v. Woodford, 350 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2003). In Belmontes, the

capital defendant argued that the district court had improperly denied him an evidentiary hearing on

his juror misconduct claims. Like petitioner in this case, Belmontes argued that the jurors based

their death sentence in part on the belief that life without parole did not guarantee that he might not

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be released from prison in the future. The Ninth Circuit rejected Belmontes’ argument, holding that

he was not entitled to relief because his claim concerned “intrinsic jury processes.” Id. at 891. Such

processes “will not be examined on appeal and cannot support reversal.” Id. (citations and internal

quotations omitted). 

Despite the clear holding of Belmontes, petitioner argues that it should not be read as a

“broad holding that extrinsic information brought into the jury room cannot be the subject of a

constitutional claim.” Petitioner’s Motion at 118-19. Petitioner ignores the fact, however, that

Belmontes is squarely on point, and involves the exact same allegations as those made by petitioner,

specifically that the jurors’ death sentence was influenced by views that a LWOP sentence did not

necessarily mean that petitioner would spend the rest of his life in prison. The Ninth Circuit’s clear

holding is that such claims “will not be examined on appeal and cannot support reversal.” 

Belmontes, 350 F.3d at 891. Because petitioner’s claim is not cognizable on appeal and cannot be a

ground for reversal by this court, respondent is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

G. Claim 8

In Claim 8, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated by the prosecutor’s use of his peremptory challenges to strike jurors who

expressed reservations about the death penalty. The California Supreme Court denied this claim on

the merits in its reasoned opinion disposing of petitioner’s direct appeal. People v. Walker, 47 Cal.

3d at 624-25. Respondent and petitioner both contend that they are entitled to summary judgment

on this claim.

In considering this claim, the California Supreme Court held the following:

Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges

against death penalty skeptics, i.e., prospective jurors who, although not excusable for

cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, nevertheless expressed

reservations about the death penalty – violated People v. Wheeler[,][] 22 Cal. 3rd 258.

. . . We have repeatedly rejected this argument; there is “no constitutional infirmity in

permitting peremptory challenges by both sides on the bases of specific juror attitudes

on the death penalty.” (People v. Turner, [] 37 Cal. 3d [302], 315 [208 Cal. Rptr.

196, 690 P.2d 669] [(1984)].)

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 624-25. 

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Respondent moves for summary judgment on Claim 8 on the grounds that, as detailed above,

the California Supreme Court reasonably considered and rejected petitioner’s contentions on the

merits, thus foreclosing relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). He also asserts that the state court’s

findings of facts are entitled to deference pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner responds

that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not prevent this court from granting relief on these claims because the

California Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to Supreme Court precedent, specifically

Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 

In Witherspoon, as the California Supreme Court noted, the High Court held that jurors who

express reservations about the death penalty yet assure the court that they will follow the law may

not be excused for cause. 391 U.S. at 521-522. The Court re-confirmed and clarified this rule in

Witt, holding that a juror may be automatically disqualified only when his views about the death

penalty would “‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in

accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” 469 U.S. at 424-35 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448

U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). 

Neither Witherspoon nor Witt, however, deal with peremptory challenges, which are at issue

here. Similarly, Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), upon which petitioner also relies, does not

address peremptory challenges, but rather the exclusion of jurors who refused to take a statutory oath

that a mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment would not impact their deliberations on

issues of fact. In fact, none of the cases cited by petitioner deal with peremptory challenges, and the

court is unaware of any clearly established Supreme Court law holding that peremptory challenges –

as opposed to challenges for cause – may not be used to exclude jurors who express reservations

about capital punishment. See generally, Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (stating that

peremptory challenges are “often exercised upon the sudden impressions and unaccountable

prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another, upon a juror’s habits

and associations, or upon the feeling that the bare questioning [of a juror’s] indifference may

sometimes provoke resentment.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)). 

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As such, the court concludes that the state court decision was correct. The state court

decision was not contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as established by the Supreme Court of the United States. Furthermore, the state court’s

factual findings are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Accordingly, respondent is

entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

H. Claim 10

In Claim 10, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated by the trial court’s denial of his request to sever the Bottle Shop charges from the Olveda

charges. The California Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits in its reasoned opinion

disposing of petitioner’s direct appeal. People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 621-23. Respondent and

petitioner both contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

While misjoinder alone does not violate the Constitution, it may rise to the level of a

constitutional violation where “it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his . . . right to a

fair trial.” United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n. 8 (1986). The Ninth Circuit has held that

there are three possible ways prejudice may result from misjoinder:

First, the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence. Second, the defendant may be

prejudicially confounded in presenting his defenses. Third, the jury may erroneously

conclude that the defendant is guilty of one offense and, therefore, convict him on the

others because of his criminal disposition.

United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1323 n. 21 (9th Cir. 1976) (internal citations omitted). 

Petitioner maintains that he suffered undue prejudice of the first type, in that the jury was urged to

cumulate the evidence from the two charges, making a guilty verdict on both charges substantially

more likely than it would have been had they not been charged together. Specifically, petitioner

argues that, contrary to the finding of the California Supreme Court, the Bottle Shop and the Olveda

charges were not cross-admissible, i.e., the evidence of one charge would not have been

independently admissible in the other charge. According to petitioner, the cross-admission of the

evidence was unduly prejudicial. See Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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In addressing this claim on direct appeal, the California Supreme Court held that evidence of

petitioner’s robbery, assault, attempted murder and murder at Dan’s Bottle Shop would have been

admissible in a separate trial on the medical building crimes against Rose Olveda. Walker, 47 Cal.

3d at 622-23. Specifically, the court found that each set of crimes was similar enough to be

probative on the issue of identity, because:

both incidents were committed in San Jose one month apart; both were armed

robberies leading to unprovoked deadly assaults; and in both instances defendant

entered business premises shortly after 10 p.m., demanded that a safe be opened,

marched his victims to a back room, and began his attack with a vicious beating to the

victim’s head. Then, using the same gun in each instance, he shot the victim in the

head while he or she was lying on the floor.

Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 622.

Petitioner maintains that this court need not defer to the California Supreme Court’s decision

upholding the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to sever because it was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court law. Petitioner argues

that the commonalities described by the California Supreme Court are too “general” to show

commonality of circumstances such that the evidence of both crimes would be probative on the issue

of identity. 

Upon review of the applicable record, the court finds that the California Supreme Court

reasonably considered and rejected this claim on the merits on direct appeal. Petitioner has not

demonstrated that it was unreasonable for the court to conclude that the facts described above

constituted a distinctive enough modus operandi to be cross-admissible at separate trials. Although

the crimes at issue had some differences, as the California Supreme Court detailed, there were

significant similarities as well. This court thus concludes that the state court decision was correct,

and was not contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as established by the Supreme Court of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Furthermore, petitioner has not demonstrated that the joinder of the Bottle Shop charges and the

Olveda charges had a substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury’s verdict. See Brecht,

507 U.S. at 638. Accordingly, respondent is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

I. Claim 11

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In Claim 11, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated by the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony of Dr. Craig Haney, petitioner’s

proposed expert witness on the validity of eyewitness identifications. The California Supreme Court

denied this claim on the merits in its reasoned opinion disposing of petitioner’s direct appeal. 

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 628. The state court also rejected this claim on the merits in

petitioner’s first and second state habeas corpus petitions. Both respondent and petitioner argue they

are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

While recognizing that there is no law requiring that expert testimony be allowed, (see, e.g.,

Jordan v. DuCharme, 983 F.2d 933, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1993)), petitioner nonetheless maintains that

exclusion of his expert witness was so egregious that it violated his due process rights. Specifically,

petitioner argues that because his main defense was mistaken identity, expert testimony on the

validity of eyewitness identifications was of primary importance. 

Respondent moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the California Supreme Court

reasonably considered and rejected petitioner’s contentions on the merits, thus foreclosing relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). He asserts that the state court’s findings of facts are entitled to deference

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

 In its reasoned opinion, the California Supreme Court held that:

The present case is one in which the trial court had discretion to admit or exclude the

expert testimony. Although Dr. Haney offered to identify factors that might suggest

the witnesses misidentified the defendant, ample circumstantial evidence linked

defendant to the crimes and gave the identifications an independent source of

reliability. As we noted earlier, defendant admitted possession of the gun that was

used in both incidents; his car was identified as the possible getaway vehicle from the

liquor store; Olveda’s stolen vehicle was found parked less than a block from where

defendant’s sister lived; and defendant made numerous incriminating statements 

both to friends and police. Although the trial court, under these circumstances, had

discretion to admit Dr. Haney’s testimony, we find no abuse of discretion, and clearly

no prejudicial error, in its decision to exclude that evidence. 

 People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 628. 

Once more, petitioner maintains that, because the state court’s reasoned opinion was based

on state law and did not specifically discuss the federal constitution, it is not entitled to deference

under AEDPA. Petitioner is again mistaken. The Supreme Court has made clear that as long as the

reasoning of the state court does not contradict Supreme Court precedent, the AEDPA’s deferential

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standard applies. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8 (qualification for AEDPA deference requires neither

citation to United States Supreme Court cases nor awareness of them, as long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradicts them). Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

applies to Claim 11. 

The court concludes that the state court decision was correct. Petitioner has pointed to no

Supreme Court precedent tending to show that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. There is no indication that exclusion

of Dr. Haney’s testimony resulted in the denial of petitioner’s right to present his defense of

mistaken identify, specifically in light of the fact that, inter alia, the eyewitnesses were crossexamined regarding the reliability of their identifications and the fact that the jurors were read an

instruction requiring them to determine the credibility of any witness in part on “the extent of his

ability to perceive, to recollect or to communicate any matter about which he testifies.” Ex. 28 at

3027 (CALJIC No. 2.20). Furthermore, the state court’s factual findings are presumed to be correct,

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Finally, petitioner has failed to establish that any purported state court

error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. See Brecht,

507 U.S. at 638. Accordingly, respondent is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

J. Claim 12

In Claim 12, petitioner claims that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because it was

not proven at trial that he killed or intended to kill. Specifically, petitioner maintains that imposition

of the death penalty in his case would be unconstitutional because the jury may have convicted him

of the murder of Joe Vasquez on an accomplice or felony-murder theory, without a finding from the

jury that he intended to kill. The California Supreme Court denied this claim in its reasoned opinion

on direct appeal. People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 632-33. Respondent and petitioner both argue they

are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

In California, the felony murder statute provides that the unlawful killing of a human being

during the commission or attempted commission of an inherently dangerous felony like robbery, is

murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit the underlying

felony. Cal. Penal Code § 189; CALJIC No. 8.21. The felony murder rule has been upheld as valid

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7 Tison refined the holding of Enmund v. Florida, where the Court held that the Eighth

Amendment prevented the execution of a defendant convicted of first degree murder pursuant to a

felony murder theory unless there was a finding that the defendant did kill, attempted to kill or

intended to kill. 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). The Court further addressed this issue in Cabana v.

Bullock, where it found that the requisite finding under Enmund need not be made by a jury, but

rather could be made by a state court. 474 U.S. 376 (1986). 

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by the California Supreme Court. See, e.g., People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 472-76 (1983). 

Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held that a capital sentence may be appropriately

imposed for felony murder, even without a specific intent to kill, so long as there is a finding that 

there was major participation by the perpetrator in the underlying felony, coupled with reckless

indifference to human life. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).7 

In this case, the prosecution charged petitioner with the robbery-murder special circumstance

in Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (a)(17)(A), which states that: “[t]he murder was committed while the

defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of, attempted commission of, or

the immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit the following felonies: (A) Robbery

in violation of section 211.” While an intent to kill instruction is not required with respect to the

actual killer, an intent to kill instruction is required when the evidence is such that the jury could

find that the defendant was an accomplice as opposed to the actual killer. See People v. Anderson,

43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1138-39 (1987). Although the trial court in petitioner’s case gave the jury

accomplice liability instructions, it did not give instructions that under the accomplice liability

theory, the felony murder special circumstance would require proof of petitioner’s intent to kill. 

According to petitioner, this error on the part of the trial court entitles him to reversal of the special

circumstances finding and the death verdict.

The California Supreme Court addressed this error of the trial court in its reasoned opinion as

follows:

Defendant correctly argues that the court erred in failing to instruct that a

finding of intent to kill is required for a felony-murder special circumstance as to an

accomplice who is not the actual killer. Defendant handed the gun to his accomplice

before hitting Romero over the head with the bottles of wine; thereafter neither

Romero nor Zamora directly observed defendant shoot Vasquez. Notwithstanding

the overwhelming evidence that defendant was the gunman, because accomplice

liability instructions were given here, defendant was entitled to an instruction that,

under such theory of liability, the felony-murder special circumstance would require

proof of his intent to kill. 

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The error, however, was harmless . . . Absolutely no evidence was presented

suggesting defendant did not share the triggerman’s purpose to kill all the witnesses

to the robbery. 

Moreover, the guilty verdicts necessarily reflect that the jury found

defendant’s intent to kill Vasquez. Three persons were shot – Vasquez, Romero and

Zamora. Only Vasquez died. Defendant was charged with two counts of assault with

intent to commit murder for the shootings of Romero and Zamora. The jury was

instructed that this crime requires express malice. . . . Express malice, in this context,

necessarily includes an intent to kill. (See People v. Murtishaw, [] 29 Cal. 3d 733,

764-765 [175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 631 P. 2d 446 (1981)].) The jury verdicts finding

defendant guilty on both counts thus determined that he intended to kill Romero and

Zamora. The evidence manifestly shows a single intent as to all three victims in the

liquor store shootings; it is inconceivable the jury would find that defendant intended

to kill only the victims who survived, but not the one who died.

It is virtually impossible to conclude on this record that anyone other than

defendant was the actual killer. In any event, the record established beyond doubt

that defendant acted with intent to kill in this case. Hence, the finding required by

Enmund v. Florida, (1982) 458 U.S. 782 . . . , is satisfied. (Cabana v. Bullock (1986)

474 U.S. 376 [].)

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 633-34. 

In addition to its detailed analysis and finding that the error of the trial court was harmless,

the state court also rejected petitioner’s current claim that the jury might have found that he was an

accomplice to the murder of Joe Vasquez, as opposed to the actual killer. The California Supreme

Court stated: 

It is undisputed that defendant was armed with the handgun upon initiating the

robbery of the liquor store. After defendant personally removed the money from the

cash register his accomplice stated, “Come on. We got the money. Let’s get out.” 

Defendant replied, “No. We’re not going to leave any witnesses.” (Italics added.) 

Defendant marched the victims back into the rear of the store at gunpoint. He handed

the gun to his partner, then twice struck Romero across the head with two full bottles

of wine. When Romero pretended to be dead, defendant removed Romero’s wallet

from his back pocket, felt his back and said, “We don’t have to worry about this guy

any more.” (Italics added.) 

Neither of the surviving victims directly observed defendant regain possession

of the gun or fire the ensuing volley of shots. However, Romero testified that

defendant’s companion, who “had a very boyish look to his face,” remained passive

throughout the incident and at no time exhibited any threatening or violent behavior. 

Romero observed defendant walk over to Zamora and Vasquez and order the boys to

their knees. As the victims pleaded for their lives three shots were fired off in rapid

succession; Vasquez and Zamora were each shot through the front of the head. The

execution-style shooting clearly evinces an intent to kill. The nature and location of

the wounds, together with Romero’s testimony, strongly supports an inference that

defendant momentarily handed the gun to his companion so he could hit Romero over

the head with the wine bottles, then took his gun back, stood in front of his victims

and fired the shots. 

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Defendant used the same handgun several weeks later to rob and twice shoot

victim Rose Olveda in the head; the jury concluded from such evidence that he had

assaulted her with intent to commit murder. Subsequent to the commission of these

offenses defendant remained in possession of the handgun, admitted ownership of it

when he sold it to undercover Officer MacIvor, and told the officer it “had done a

murder.” The jury found that defendant had personally used the gun in connection

with the murder of Vasquez, the robbery of Olveda, and assaults with intent to

commit murder upon Romero, Zamora and Olveda. 

In short, the undisputed evidence overwhelmingly establishes that defendant

personally shot all of his victims and intended to murder each of them, succeeding in

one case. The verdicts and personal gun-use enhancements found true under each

count establish that the jury so found; no contrary evidence whatsoever was

presented. 

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 632-33. 

Despite the state court’s detailed analysis, petitioner maintains that he is entitled to summary

judgment on this claim. He argues that the state court decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court, see 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2), and maintains that, under the facts, the jury may have concluded that petitioner was an

accomplice to the Vasquez murder. Petitioner, however, has pointed to nothing in the record that

would tend to undermine the state court’s findings. Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the state

court decision is firmly supported by the record. Under AEDPA, this court must defer to the state

court findings; in addition, this court has independently reviewed the record and finds that the only

reasonable inference from the facts is that petitioner was the shooter and had the intent to kill all of

the victims. 

Petitioner also argues that the state court erred in finding that the trial court’s failure to read

the required instruction regarding intent and accomplice liability was harmless, and maintains that

such a finding was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established United States

Supreme Court law. Here, again, petitioner’s argument fails. The state court’s decision took note of

Enmund and Cabana, and correctly found that, under the applicable Supreme Court precedent, the

trial court’s instructional error was harmless. Based on the state court’s legal conclusions and its

reasonable factual findings, petitioner cannot demonstrate that any error had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (finding that

petitioners are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that any error

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resulted in actual prejudice). Accordingly, summary judgment on this claim is granted in favor of

respondent. 

K. Claim 13

In Claim 13, petitioner claims that his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights were violated by

the use of an unconstitutional presumption in applying Cal. Penal Code § 69. Specifically, petitioner

points to admission of the “D.A. threat” aggravation evidence as a violation of section 69 at the

penalty phase, and argues that violation of that statute includes proof of an intent to deter an

executive officer from performing a duty imposed by law. Petitioner argues that “no evidence was

offered at trial to show the intent with which this statement was made or whether, if made, it was

intended to influence the conduct of an executive officer, or what duty on the part of such officer it

was supposed to deter.” Amended Petition at ¶ 337. Thus, according to petitioner, admission of

this evidence was based on an unconstitutional presumption that relieved the prosecution of proving

all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., County Court of Ulster County v.

Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979). Respondent and petitioner both argue they are entitled to summary

judgment on this claim. 

Petitioner raised this particular claim, which is related to Claim 4, in his 1990 state habeas

petition, and the California Supreme Court rejected it in a summary opinion on the merits. Thus, in

order to prevail on this claim, petitioner must establish that an independent review of the record

demonstrates that the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable under clearly established

United States Supreme Court law. 

As discussed supra, the California Supreme Court held in its reasoned opinion on direct

appeal that admission of the “D.A. threat” did not constitute reversible error. People v. Walker, 47

Cal. 3d at 639. This court found, in its analysis of petitioner’s Claim 4 concerning the “D.A.

Threat”, that the state court’s opinion was neither contrary to, or an unreasonable application of

clearly established United States Supreme Court law, nor was it an unreasonable determination of

the facts. 

The gravamen of Claim 13 is that the California Supreme Court, in analyzing admission of

the “D.A. threat”, unconstitutionally presumed that petitioner had the required intent to deter a

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public officer from his duties. Essentially, petitioner is arguing that there was insufficient evidence

from which to find an intent to deter under Penal Code section 69, and thus that “the California

Supreme Court could only reach the conclusion it did by presuming that Walker had the required

intent.” Petitioner’s Motion at 160. 

Petitioner’s argument must fail. In its reasoned opinion concerning the “D.A. threat”, the

California Supreme Court specifically held that “[g]iven the murder and assault charges which

defendant faced, . . . [t]he evidence . . . supports an inference that defendant intended to thwart or

deter further prosecution of his case by threatening the deputy district attorney, and each requisite

element of a violation of section 69 was shown on these facts.” People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 639. 

Petitioner may disagree with the state court’s analysis of the facts but, as discussed in detail supra,

he has not shown that the state court’s factual determinations were unreasonable. 

Given the analysis of the California Supreme Court in its reasoned opinion regarding a

related claim on direct appeal, which this court has already found to be entitled to deference under

AEDPA, petitioner cannot show that the California Supreme Court’s summary decision denying this

particular claim in petitioner’s 1990 state habeas petition is objectively unreasonable. This court’s

independent review of the record confirms that it was reasonable for the California Supreme Court to

conclude that there was sufficient evidence of intent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1)(2). Moreover,

petitioner has not shown that any alleged constitutional error at issue had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638. Respondent is

therefore entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

L. Claim 14 

In Claim 14, petitioner claims that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated by California’s death penalty statutory scheme. Specifically, petitioner maintains that

the state’s death penalty law is unconstitutional because it does not require that the trial judge

instruct the jury that it must find both that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating

circumstances, and that death is the appropriate penalty, unanimously and beyond a reasonable

doubt. 

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The California Supreme Court has consistently held that the above feature of the state’s death

penalty law is constitutional. See, e.g., People v. Stanley, 10 Cal. 4th 764, 842 (1995), People v.

Webb, 6 Cal. 4th 494, 536 (1993). Petitioner’s argument to the contrary was raised and rejected on

direct appeal (People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 636), and in his 1998 state habeas corpus petition. 

Respondent maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment because the California

Supreme Court’s rejection of Claim 14 was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner counters that he is entitled to

summary judgment because the California statutory scheme is contrary to and an unreasonable

application of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and its progeny.

The Apprendi Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a

jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490. Following Apprendi, the Court

found in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), that Arizona's capital punishment scheme was

unconstitutional because it allowed the trial judge, as opposed to the jury, to determine the presence

or absence of aggravating factors required by Arizona law for imposition of the death penalty. 

Petitioner, however, cannot rely on either Apprendi or Ring in support of his claim because

both cases were decided well after his conviction became final in March 1993, and this court may

not apply them retroactively. As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) codifies and amends the

non-retroactivity principle announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379–80, 412 (2000). This principle prevents a federal court from granting

habeas relief to a state prisoner based on a constitutional rule of criminal procedure announced after

his conviction and sentence became final. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310–16; see also Penry v.

Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313–14 (1989) (the non-retroactivity principle is applicable in a capital

sentencing context). Furthermore, it prohibits federal courts from either creating or applying new

rules on collateral review. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990). 

In pertinent part, Section 2254(d) provides that no habeas relief may be granted as to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the prior decision was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United

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States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). Teague’s prohibition against reliance on new rules is

the functional equivalent of Section 2254(d)'s requirement of reliance on “clearly established law.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 379, 412. AEDPA has also added the requirement that the “clearly established

law” be limited to that “determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1). This extends the Teague principle “by limiting the source of doctrine on which a federal

court may rely in addressing the application for a writ.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 381–82. Thus,

AEDPA codifies Teague to the extent that Teague requires federal courts to deny relief contingent

upon a rule of law that was not clearly established at the time that the state conviction became final. 

Id. at 380.

Teague instructs that “[a] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by

precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.” 489 U.S. at 301. A decision

sets forth a new rule when it “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the

Federal Government.” Butler, 494 U.S. at 412. 

Here, petitioner’s conviction became final when the United States Supreme Court denied

certiorari in March 1993. Both Apprendi and Ring were decided well after that date. While there are

exceptions to the Teague bar, in the matter of Apprendi and Ring, controlling authority has

confirmed that neither case may be applied retroactively. Although the Ninth Circuit subsequently

held that the holding in Ring was retroactive and thus applicable to federal habeas review,

Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F. 3d 1082, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), the Supreme Court has since

reversed Summerlin and concluded that Ring established a new rule that was not retroactive. Shriro

v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352-54 (2004). In United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664,

668-671 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit held that Apprendi was not retroactive. 

Thus, as claim 14 is based on Apprendi and Ring, it is barred by Teague and no exceptions

apply. Furthermore, the court finds that the state court decision was correct and not contrary to

clearly established United States Supreme Court law. As such, respondent is entitled to summary

judgment on this claim. 

M. Claim 15

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 Pursuant to California law, these factors are not specifically labeled “aggravating” or

“mitigating.”

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In Claim 15, petitioner claims that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated by the alleged unconstitutional application of certain statutory sentencing factors. 

Specifically, petitioner addresses the application of Cal. Penal Code § 190.3, which provides in

pertinent part:

In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the

following factors if relevant:

(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in

the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be

true pursuant to Section 190.1

(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which

involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat

to use force or violence.

(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.

(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under

the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal

conduct or consented to the homicidal act.

(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the

defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his

conduct.

(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the

substantial domination of another person.

(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to

appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the

requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the

affects of intoxication.

(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.

(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his

participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor. 

 (k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even

though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.8

There are three subclaims concerning the above factors in Claim 15; the court will examine

each subclaim in turn. 

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1. Claim 15A

In Claim 15A, petitioner maintains that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial

court’s instructions to the jury regarding factors that he claims were irrelevant. Specifically,

petitioner alleges that it was reversible error for the court to instruct on factors d, e, f, g, h and j. 

According to petitioner, by instructing the jury on mitigating factors that were not at issue in his

case, the trial court permitted the jury to believe that all of the factors might be considered, and that

absence of such factors might be considered aggravating. Petitioner also maintains that the

prosecutor impermissibly did the same in his closing argument. Under state law, jurors are not

permitted to consider the absence of mitigating factors as aggravating factors. See People v.

Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247 (1985). The California Supreme Court denied this subclaim on the merits

in its reasoned opinion disposing of petitioner’s direct appeal. People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 649. 

Both respondent and petitioner argue they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

As to petitioner’s claim of instructional error, the state supreme court addressed petitioner’s

claim as follows:

Defendant and amicus curiae contend that the trial court erred in failing to

delete the nonapplicable or irrelevant statutory mitigating factors (§ 190.3). We have

previously rejected this argument. [citations omitted]. “[A]s is apparent from the

statutory language, it is for the jury to determine which of the listed factors are

applicable or ‘relevant’ to the particular case. (§ 190.3, par. 6.)” (Miranda, supra, 44

Cal. 3d at p. 105). 

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 649. 

As to petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct regarding the prosecutor’s closing

argument, the court notes that it has already held that this claim, which is stated in more detail as

Claim 19B(e) in the Amended Petition, is procedurally defaulted. As such, this court need not

address petitioner’s merits argument here. Nonetheless, in the interests of finality, the court will do

so. 

In its reasoned opinion, the state supreme court stated that petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial

misconduct regarding this issue was barred because of his failure to object at trial. Walker, 47 Cal.

3d at 644. The court also found that, because petitioner’s case was tried four years before

Davenport, petitioner could not rely on that case because “its rule is prospective only.” Id.

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The state supreme court also addressed this claim on the merits, stating:

The prosecutor’s argument constituted “Davenport error.” (People v.

Davenport (1985) 41 Cal. 3d 247 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) In Davenport

we held it improper for a prosecutor to argue that the mere absence of a statutory

factor was itself an aggravating circumstance. . . . Although we stated in Davenport

that such argument “should not in the future be permitted” (ibid.), we did not rely on

the point in reversing the penalty judgment therein.

Defendant and amicus curiae urge that the Davenport error requires reversal

of the penalty verdict. We do not agree. . . . 

Turning to the question of prejudice, our review of the evidence, instructions,

and arguments as a whole convinces us that the prosecutor’s reference to the absence

of mitigating evidence under factors (f), (g), (h), and (j) as “aggravating

circumstances” could not, in reasonable possibility, have affected the jury’s verdict. 

(See People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 432, 456 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d

1135].) In each instance the misnomer was directly preceded by argument in which

the prosecutor urged the jury to find each of the four factors inapplicable to this case. 

Stated otherwise, he argued that defendant could not possibly claim “moral

justification” for the shootings (factor (f)), did not act out of extreme duress or the

domination of another (factor (g)), did not commit the crimes due to intoxication or

mental illness (factor (h)), and had not played a “relatively minor role in the crimes”

(factor (j)). Given the guilt phase evidence and verdicts, it is not reasonably possible

that the “Davenport” error misled the jury in their task of weighing the applicable

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, we view the prosecutor’s

statement – “[t]he mitigating factors are a possibility of two. And the aggravating

factors are all the rest” – as an exhortation that the evidence supported the conclusion

that aggravating factors overwhelmingly outweighed the mitigating circumstances in

this case. 

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 644. 

Because the state supreme court disposed of these issues in a reasoned opinion, petitioner

must demonstrate that the conclusion was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established United States Supreme Court law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

In his attempt to do so, petitioner maintains that, while the California Supreme Court applied the

correct standard – whether there was a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s argument could

have affected the jury – it reached an objectively unreasonable conclusion in holding that it did not. 

Petitioner’s argument is unconvinving. He cannot cite to any opinion that demonstrates that

the state court’s decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established United States

Supreme Court law. Rather, petitioner cites to several federal cases that confirm generally that a

capital defendant has a right to an individualized sentencing determination (e.g. Woodson v. North

Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983); Johnson v.

Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584-85 (1988)) but cannot cite to any specific case that demonstrates that

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 Petitioner was 19 years old at the time these crimes were committed. 

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the California Supreme Court’s application of the relevant law was unreasonable. Petitioner

disagrees with the state court’s decision, but his disagreement is not enough under AEDPA. 

As detailed above, the California Supreme Court considered petitioner’s claims of

instructional error and prosecutorial misconduct in depth. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that

the state court decision with respect to this subclaim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established law as determined by the United Stats Supreme Court. See 28

U.S.C. 2254(d). Moreover, petitioner has failed to establish that any purported instructional or

prosecutorial error had a substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. 

See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638. Thus, summary judgment on Claims 15A and 19B(e) is granted in

favor of respondent. 

2. Claim 15B

In Claim 15B, petitioner maintains that his constitutional rights were violated because the

jury was not informed that certain factors could only be considered mitigating. Specifically,

petitioner argues that while factor (i), age of defendant,9

 may only be applied as a mitigating factor,

the prosecutor argued that the age factor “might be” mitigating. According to petitioner, the failure

to label violates California’s statutory scheme. Alternatively, petitioner argues that if the penalty

factors need not be labeled under California law, they are rendered too vague under the Eighth

Amendment. Petitioner raised this argument in his 1998 state habeas petition; the California 

Supreme Court rejected it on the merits in a summary opinion. Both petitioner and respondent

maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

In order to succeed on this claim, petitioner must establish that an independent review of the

record by this court reveals that the state court’s rejection of the claim was objectively unreasonable

in light of clearly established Unites States Supreme Court precedent. Under this standard,

petitioner’s second argument – that California’s penalty factors are unconstitutionally vague – must

fail. As respondent correctly points out, in Tuilaepa v. California, the Court examined factor (i), as

well and factors (a) and (b), and held that they were not unconstitutionally vague. 512 U.S. 967, 979

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(1994) (finding that “[a] capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in

the capital sentencing decision.”) Given the precedent of Tuilaepa, the state court’s rejection of

petitioner’s vagueness claim was clearly reasonable.

Petitioner’s first argument must also fail. The court has made an independent review of the

record, and there is nothing that reveals that the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. 

Petitioner does not – and cannot – cite to any statutory or caselaw establishing that his trial court

was required to read the jury an instruction that factor (i) was unequivocally mitigating. To the

contrary, California state law holds that the trial court is not required to address specific sentencing

factors because their aggravating or mitigating nature is evident. See, e.g., People v. Frye, 18 Cal.

4th 894, 1026 (1998); People v. Ray, 13 Cal. 4th 313, 359 (1996). And as this court has already

noted, the United States Supreme Court has found that factor (i) is not unconstitutionally vague. 

Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 979. 

For the foregoing reasons, respondent is entitled to summary judgment on subclaim 15B. 

3. Claim 15C

In Claim 15C, petitioner argues that his constitutional rights were violated due to the trial

court’s and the prosecutor’s approach to factor (k) of Cal. Penal Code § 190.3. Petitioner maintains

that the prosecutor improperly argued that: 1) factor (k) was limited to circumstances relating to the

crime; and 2) the absence of mitigating factors was aggravating. Petitioner also argues that it was

unconstitutional for the trial court to decline to offer any explanation beyond the statutory language

when the jury asked for further instruction on aggravating and mitigating factors. The California

Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits in its reasoned opinion disposing of petitioner’s

direct appeal. People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 641-42. Both petitioner and respondent maintain they

are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

In considering this claim on direct appeal, the California Supreme Court made a lengthy and

detailed analysis:

Defendant and amicus curiae argue that the jury was misinstructed on the

proper role of sympathy and general character and background evidence in the

penalty phase. In reviewing such claim, we examine the instructions and arguments

as a whole to determine whether the jury was adequately informed of the

proper scope of mitigating evidence for its consideration. (California

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v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 546 (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.); see

Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 113-115; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal. 3d at p. 777; People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 512,

536-537, 544, fn. 17; People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, &

fn. 10. [parallel citations omitted]. 

We have undertaken such a review here and conclude that the jury was not

misled regarding its responsibility to consider all of the mitigating evidence in the

case. 

First, the jury was not instructed at the penalty phase with the “no-sympathy”

language embodied in CALJIC No. 1.00. (Compare People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.

3d at 536-537, vacated sub nom, California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 [wherein the high

court held that the giving of the California standard anti-sympathy instruction

(CALJIC No. 1.00) at the penalty phase is not unconstitutional per se]). The jury was

specifically instructed that: “[Y]ou were previously instructed you must not be

influenced by pity for the defendant or swayed by sympathy for him. I instruct you

that in this phase of the case, the penalty phase, pity and sympathy for the defendant

would be proper considerations for you should you find them to be warranted in the

circumstances.” 

Next, although the jury did receive an instruction in the literal terms of factor

(k) in this pre-Easley case (People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal. 3d 858), our review of

the arguments as a whole reinforces our conclusion that, as instructed, the jury must

have understood its obligation to consider and weigh all of defendant’s mitigating

evidence. After arguing to the jury that “the law is neutral” on what happens at the

penalty phase, the prosecutor distinguished the penalty from the guilt phase of the

trial thusly: “There’s a difference, and that difference is that you previously have

been told that pity or passion for a defendant, sympathy, that sort of thing, cannot

enter into your deliberations . . . . This [the penalty phase] is the exception. . . . You

still cannot look at sympathy or passion or prejudice for the victims in terms of how it

would change facts. You can’t do that, but you can consider passion or prejudice

towards the defendant. [¶ ] [T]he instruction will say that . . . in this – the penalty

phase, pity and sympathy for the defendant would be proper considerations if you

should find them to be warranted in the circumstances. If the defense raises anything

in this case, which you may or may not have heard, any real evidence of so far, that

there is a reason for sympathy towards this particular defendant, then of course that’s

something for you to weigh and something that you use in looking at the instructions

on the case.” (Italics added.)

Defense counsel told the jury they could “consider Marvin’s family as well. 

They have indicated to you that they have loved Marvin. They wish him to live,

albeit in confinement, life imprisonment without possibility of parole. They have

indicated to you that Marvin has done some worthwhile acts while he has been on

this earth. That he is a human being, that he has done things to help others, that he

had been worthwhile in his activities, that he is a person of worth.” Defense counsel

explained: “The prosecutor indicated that the instruction provides as they do that you

can consider passion and pity for the defendant if you find that to be appropriate.” 

Finally, in his closing argument, the prosecutor again argued that defendant’s

proffered general character and background evidence was worthy of minimal

mitigating weight: “Marvin’s family felt that he should live. You heard the

testimony. . . I would expect a family to say that. The evidence you heard the other

day from the defense on Mr. Walker and his good deeds, the thing that stands out that

mostly I think about is that there was almost nothing to say. . . . [¶] You’re going to

have instructions. You’ll see how much value that is.”

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Defendant directs us to the prosecutor’s closing remarks in which he stated: “The mitigating factors are a possibility of two. And the aggravating factors are all

the rest.” (Italics added.) However, read in context, we believe the prosecutor was

simply arguing his view of the state of the evidence; namely that defendant’s relative

youth and his lack of prior convictions were the only two factors worthy of

assignment of any mitigating weight. Nor do we view the prosecutor’s argument

under factor (k) as improperly suggesting to the jury that evidence thereunder related

solely to the crimes – or that factor (k) evidence could be aggravating. (See People v.

Boyd (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 762, 776 [215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) In his closing

argument, the prosecutor discussed the testimony of defendant’s family members and

friends; including testimony that he had done some favors, loaned them money, done

odd jobs for some, and given others rides to work. He never suggested that any

evidence, or lack of evidence, regarding defendant’s general background and

character, was “aggravating.” Rather he simply urged the jury to accord little

mitigating weight to such evidence: “if that’s all you can say about somebody, that is

very, very thin.” 

Viewing the instructions and arguments as a whole, we conclude the jury here

was adequately informed of the full nature of its responsibility to consider

defendant’s mitigating general character and background evidence. 

Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 641-43. 

Because the state court issued a reasoned opinion, petitioner must demonstrate that the

decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States

Supreme Court law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts. The parties agree that the

controlling United States Supreme Court authority on this point is Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370

(1990). 

In Boyde, the Court upheld the version of factor (k) used in petitioner’s case, finding that it

was unlikely that jurors would interpret instructions on factor (k) “to prevent consideration of

mitigating evidence of background and character.” 494 U.S. at 381. Boyde also confirmed that the

proper standard for determining whether an allegedly ambiguous instruction is unconstitutional is for

a court to analyze “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged

instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Id. at

380. 

Despite the fact that Boyde confirms that the factor (k) instruction at issue here did not

compel jurors to not consider mitigating evidence of background and character, petitioner maintains

that the state court’s decision in this matter was unreasonable. Specifically, petitioner argues that in

his particular case, it was reasonably likely that the jury would have understood factor (k) as

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precluding non-crime related evidence, and that the state court was objectively unreasonable in

ruling to the contrary.

Petitioner is wrong. As the lengthy quotation from the state court’s opinion demonstrates,

the state court examined petitioner’s claim in great detail, and reasonably concluded that, viewing

the trial as a whole, “the jury here was adequately informed of the full nature of its responsibility to

consider defendant’s mitigating general character and background evidence.” Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at

643. Petitioner maintains that, nonetheless, his case is distinguishable from Boyde because the

amount of background and character evidence presented in his case was less than that presented in

Boyde. That may be so, but as respondent correctly points out, the amount of the mitigating

evidence does not bear on how the jury might have understood the factor (k) instruction. Moreover,

petitioner does not – and cannot – cite to any statutory or caselaw suggesting that evaluating the

amount of background and character evidence presented is the relevant standard for analyzing

claims such as these. 

Petitioner also argues that the prosecutor’s and the defense attorney’s arguments and the trial

court’s response to juror questioning would have led the jurors to believe that consideration of

background and character evidence was not proper. Again, petitioner cannot demonstrate that the

state court’s decision was unreasonable when it determined otherwise. The court has reviewed the

record, and the applicable law, and finds that the state court’s opinion was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law, nor was it an

unreasonable determination of the facts. As the state court pointed out, the trial court specifically

informed the jury that “pity and sympathy for the defendant would be proper considerations” during

penalty phase deliberations. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 641. The state court also addressed the

arguments of the prosecutor and of defense counsel, and nothing in the state court’s analysis is

unreasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment on subclaim 15(C) is granted in favor of

respondent. 

4. Claim 15D

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In Claim 15D, petitioner maintains that the allegedly misleading jury instructions and

prosecutorial argument on the statutory sentencing factors described in subclaims 15A-15C

constituted cumulative error. This court has already held that those subclaims must be denied and

that respondent is entitled to summary judgment on all of them. As such, petitioner cannot

demonstrate that there was cumulative error entitling him to relief. 

N. Claim 17

In Claim 17, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated because, at the prosecutor’s urging, the jury improperly considered his “nontestimonial demeanor” as an aggravating factor. The California Supreme Court rejected this claim

on the merits in a summary opinion when it denied his 1990 state habeas petition and also when it

denied his 1998 state habeas petition. Both respondent and petitioner maintain that they are entitled

to summary judgment on this claim.

Because the state court addressed this claim in a summary opinion, this court must undertake

an independent review of the relevant record and determine whether the state court’s decision was

objectively unreasonable. Petitioner challenges the following language of the prosecutor:

! You probably know there’s a lot of difference between one person who kills

and another person who kills. The things that you read generally are cases

where maybe there was a family fight or some family violence or people are

drinking, or they kill somebody possibly by accident. . . . killing people is a

lot less serious in some cases. But there are cases, and this is certainly one of

those cases, where it just becomes all that much more serious to take human

life. There are even cases, I suppose, where the attitude of the person who

kills changed over time. That afterwards, he feels some remorse, some sort of

sadness for what he has done. Then I suppose the next worst thing would be

someone who felt some sadness afterwards, or even neutral afterwards. Then

there’s the case of the smirking defendant who seems to be proud of what he’s

done. Ex. 29 at 3266-67.

! Counsel said one thing that I believe is very true for Counsel and for me and

for you and for most people. That is, that we all grieve about what happened

to the victim in the case. But unfortunately, one of the things that sticks most

in this case, and it’s most upsetting about it, is that it’s not true for everybody,

because I don’t think it’s true for the defendant from what you have seen here

in court. Ex. 29 at 3300-01.

! If it looked to you as if someone has cockily walked through the courtroom

here, has told numerous lies and not taken this all very seriously, not looked

very sad about what happened, then that’s your perception too. Ex. 29 at

3301.

! This case, I think through the facts of it, through all of the facts of it, the thing

that sticks out most in the case other that what happened here is the

defendant’s attitude towards the whole thing. . . . This stuff just over and over

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again without apparently either caring about it or being concerned with it or

being bothered by that. Ex. 29 at 3301.

! But anyway, a person locked up, he might do these things. You would think

that a person – and I don’t know what you have seen here in terms of attitudes

towards the witnesses, whether you have seen evil glares or whether you’ve

seen something else, a person who felt bad about what happened. I can’t

imagine, if you weren’t there, if you weren’t in the state when it happened,

that you would have a propensity as a normal person to glare at witnesses or

glare at attorneys or glare at people and give them that kind of look if you

weren’t involved, much less if you did it yourself. It shows something,

perhaps about what Mr. Walker is made of, and I don’t know why he is that

way. I haven’t the slightest idea. I don’t know. Ex. 29 at 3309-10. 

In moving for summary judgment on this claim, respondent maintains that the remarks

primarily concerned petitioner’s character, and that a penalty phase jury is entitled to consider

character during penalty phase deliberations. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)

(stating that penalty phase jurors must make an individualized determination of the appropriate

penalty based on “the character of the individual and circumstances of the crime.”) Respondent

also points out that petitioner testified during his trial, and that there is no constitutional prohibition

against referencing a defendant’s testimonial demeanor. Additionally, respondent argues that even if

the prosecutor was referencing petitioner’s non-testimonial demeanor, no United States Supreme

Court case holds that a capital defendant’s non-testimonial demeanor is not properly before the jury

during the penalty phase, and that under AEDPA, petitioner must show that an independent review

of the record reveals that the state court’s opinion was objectively unreasonable under clearly

established United States Supreme Court law. Finally, respondent maintains that petitioner cannot

show any prejudice from the remarks as required by Brecht. According to respondent, due to the

seriousness and violence of the charged offenses, petitioner would not have a received a sentence of

life without parole even absent the prosecutor’s remarks.

In cross-moving for summary judgment, and in opposing respondent’s motion, petitioner

maintains that the prosecutor’s remarks violate Taylor v. Kentucky’s admonition that “one accused

of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence

introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other

circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.” 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978). Petitioner also cites to

Ninth Circuit precedent holding that “in the absence of a curative instruction from the court, a

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10 In addition, petitioner did testify, and at least some of the prosecutor’s remarks can be

reasonably read as referring to petitioner’s testimonial demeanor. 

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prosecutor’s comment on a defendant’s off-the-stand behavior constitutes a violation of the due

process clause of the fifth amendment.” United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Additionally, petitioner maintains that the prosecutor was not referring to petitioner’s testimonial

demeanor as he was not examining petitioner’s demeanor as indicative of petitioner’s credibility on

the stand or lack thereof. Finally, in addition to arguing that the prosecutor’s remarks were

prejudicial, petitioner argues that the remarks violated California’s statutory death penalty scheme,

in that only certain factors are permitted to be considered in aggravation and a defendant’s character

or courtroom conduct is not among them. 

The court has conducted an independent review of the record and finds that the California

Supreme Court’s summary decision denying relief on this claim was not objectively unreasonable. 

As the Ninth Circuit has stated, this court must “focus primarily on Supreme Court cases in deciding

whether the state court’s resolution of the case constituted an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.” Greene, 288 F.3d at 1089 (citations omitted). Petitioner cannot cite to any

United States Supreme Court authority suggesting that reference to a capital defendant’s nontestimonial demeanor10 during the penalty phase is unconstitutional. Moreover, even the Ninth

Circuit case cited by petitioner is not squarely on point as Schuler is not a capital case and deals with

reference to non-testimonial behavior during a guilt/innocence trial as opposed to a penalty phase

trial. As such, it is not persuasive on this issue. 

Petitioner’s argument that the remarks violated California’s statutory death penalty scheme

must also fail. The California Supreme Court has held that, where the defendant places his own

character at issue as a mitigating factor, it is “proper for the jury to draw inferences on that issue

from their observations of defendant in the courtroom and therefore proper for the prosecutor to base

a closing argument on such observations.” People v. Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d 147, 197 (1988). Here,

the record reveals that petitioner’s case in mitigation consisted in part of character evidence from his

family and friends, and thus he put his character at issue during the penalty phase. As such, it was

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allowable under California law for the prosecutor to reference petitioner’s character and courtroom

behavior. 

Finally, petitioner has not demonstrated that, even if the prosecutor’s comments did rise to

the level of a constitutional error, that they had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638. The state court’s decision was not

objectively unreasonable, and respondent is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

O. Claim 18

In Claim 18, petitioner maintains that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated because petitioner’s death sentence allegedly resulted from improper mandatory

weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors. Specifically, petitioner alleges that Cal. Penal Code

§ 190.3, which was part of the jury instructions used at his penalty phase trial, is unconstitutional. 

The California Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits in its reasoned opinion disposing of

petitioner’s direct appeal. People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 645-49. Both respondent and petitioner

argue they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

The trial court instructed the jury with former CALJIC No. 8.84.2, which incorporates the

language of section 190.3. The court stated:

It is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties,

death or confinement in State Prison for life without possibility of

parole, shall be imposed on the defendant. After having heard all of

the evidence and after having heard and considered the arguments of

Counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the

applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon

which you have been instructed. If you conclude that the aggravating

circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall

impose a death sentence, or a sentence of death. 

However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh

the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of

confinement in State Prison for life without possibility of parole. 

Ex. 29 at 3332. Petitioner argues that the “shall impose a sentence of death” language is

unconstitutional because, inter alia, it allegedly limits the discretion of the jury to return a verdict of

less than death, limits the freedom of jurors to assign whatever weight to mitigating factors that they

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28 11 For further discussion on this issue, see the court’s analysis of Claim 19B(g), infra. 

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deem appropriate, and substitutes a statutory weighing process in lieu of the jurors’ individual

consciences. 

In its reasoned opinion, the California Supreme Court considered and rejected petitioner’s

argument in a lengthy analysis that the court will not repeat in full here. See People v. Walker, 47

Cal. 3d at 645-49. Briefly, the state court re-affirmed the constitutionality of section 190.3 (a

statutory scheme the California Supreme Court had held constitutional in People v. Brown, 40 Cal.

3d 512, 538-44 (1985) (vacated on other grounds), and found that there was nothing in the

prosecutor’s argument that would have confused the jury regarding the proper nature of the

weighing process.11 Furthermore, the state court found that the sentencing jury in petitioner’s trial

understood the full scope of its sentencing discretion, based on supplemental instructions from the

court and arguments from counsel. In sum, the California State Court concluded that “[v]iewing the

arguments and instructions as a whole, we are satisfied they did not mislead the jurors as to the full

nature of their sentencing discretion, and that the jurors realized the ultimate sentencing

responsibility rested with them, and them alone. (People v. Hendricks, supra, 44 Cal. 3d at p. 655.)”

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 649. 

Petitioner maintains that, notwithstanding the state court’s reasoned opinion, he is entitled to

summary judgment on this claim pursuant to Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) and

People v. Milner, 45 Cal. 3d 227 (1988). Caldwell prohibits arguments by prosecutors that lead a

sentencing jury to believe that “the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the

defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” 472 U.S. at 329. In Milner, the California Supreme Court found

Caldwell error based on the prosecutor’s arguments to the jury. 45 Cal. 3d at 257. 

The state court in petitioner’s case, however, squarely addressed Milner and found it

distinguishable. 

Defendant urges that the prosecutor's argument may have lessened the jurors’ sense

of responsibility to individually arrive at an appropriate penalty determination. (See,

e.g., People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 227, 255-256 [246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d

669].) Although such argument in isolation might raise a legitimate concern that the

jury was being misled, it could not have had such a misleading effect here. 

Throughout his argument the prosecutor sought to impart to the jury the gravity of

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12 In his pleadings, petitioner confirms he is making an as applied challenge, as opposed to a

facial challenge to section 190.3. Petitioner acknowledges that Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370,

376-77 (1990) and People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512 (1985) preclude facial Eighth Amendment

challenges to the constitutionality of section 190.3.

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their tasks and sentencing responsibilities: “I think the toughest thing that you will

ever do, if you vote for the death penalty in this case, is to follow that instruction and

do what the instruction says to do. To say that it’s easy to vote for that [the death

penalty] is a joke. Although there’s nothing funny about it, it’s extremely difficult. 

And we talked about that a great deal as this case started, and I don’t think there is a

person up there who thinks it’s something easy . . . . [¶] No one in this jury answered

the questions, led anyone to believe, counsel or myself, that you think it would be

easy to vote for the death penalty. It is tough. It might be the toughest thing you ever

do. But it’s called for here. It’s called for by the law.” (Italics added). 

. . . .

“This is not the type of case in which the jury was ‘left with the impression

that its responsibility was merely to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors without

regard to its view of the appropriateness of the alternative penalties, and that it was

“required” to return a sentence of death “if aggravation outweighed mitigation”

without, or even despite, each juror’s personal conclusion from the evidence, about

whether a sentence of death was appropriate under the circumstances for the offense

and the offender.” (Allen, supra, 42 Cal. 3d at p. 1278, italics in original.)” (People v.

Odle, supra, 45 Cal. 3d at p. 420.)

Viewing the arguments and instructions as a whole, we are satisfied they did

not mislead the jurors as to the full nature of their sentencing discretion, and that the

jurors realized the ultimate sentencing responsibility rested with them, and them

alone. (People v. Hendricks, supra, 44 Cal. 3d at p. 655.)

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 645-49 (original emphasis, footnote omitted). 

The court finds that nothing in the state court’s reasoned opinion was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established law. Furthermore, the state court’s opinion was not

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The state court considered the totality of the

circumstances in petitioner’s case, and concluded that there was no Milner (nor, by extension,

Caldwell) error. The instructions and argument, viewed in their entirety, did not mislead the jurors

as to the full nature of their responsibility, nor did they instruct the jurors that “the responsibility for

determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” Caldwell, 472 U.S. at

329. The state court correctly denied petitioner relief on this claim. Accordingly, respondent is

entitled to summary judgment on Claim 18.12 

P. Claim 19 

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In Claim 19, petitioner alleges that the trial prosecutor committed various acts of misconduct

which, either singly or cumulatively, violated petitioner’s Fifth, Sixth, Eight and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has held that when reviewing a habeas claim of

prosecutorial misconduct, the relevant inquiry is not whether “the prosecutor’s remarks were

undesirable or even universally condemned.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)

(citations omitted). Rather, the issue “is whether the prosecutors’ comments ‘so infected the trial

with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Id. (citing Donnellly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). “Moreover, the appropriate standard of review for such a

claim on writ of habeas corpus is the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of

supervisory power.” Id. (citations omitted). 

The court will consider each subclaim of prosecutorial misconduct in turn. 

1. Claim 19A

In Claim 19A, petitioner maintains that the prosecutor impermissibly informed the jury

numerous times during voir dire that a prison sentence of life without parole would not necessarily

mean that petitioner would remain behind bars because his sentence could be commuted by the state

governor. Amended Petition at 95 (citing Ex. 16 at 32, 38, 80, 123; Ex. 17 at 263; Ex. 19 at 789,

933; Ex. 20 at 1052-53, 1178). Petitioner also alleges that the prosecutor made “oblique references”

to the governor’s commutation power during penalty phase closing argument. Respondent and

petitioner both contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

The California Supreme Court reviewed and rejected petitioner’s voir dire claim in a

reasoned opinion on direct appeal as follows:

Defendant also assigns as misconduct the prosecutor’s questions put to several

prospective jurors about whether they knew what life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole “really meant.” We reject defendant’s claim that the questions

constituted reversible Ramos error (People v. Ramos[,], 37 Cal. 3d 136 . . . ); no

“Briggs Instruction” concerning the Governor’s commutation power was given in this

case, nor was the jury otherwise affirmatively informed of such gubernatorial powers. 

To the extent the questions invited improper speculation, any error was clearly

harmless. They arose at the earliest stages of trial, and the jury was thereafter

instructed not to assume the truth of any insinuations suggested by the attorneys’

questions.

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 627. 

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Petitioner cannot demonstrate that anything in the state court’s reasoned opinion is contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law. Nor can

he show that the opinion was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. As the state court

noted, and as this court’s review of the record has confirmed, the jury was never affirmatively told of

the governor’s commutation power. Moreover, any comments by the prosecutor during voir dire

were brief and did not “manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did [they] implicate other specific

rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent.” Darden, 477 U.S. at

182. In short, the comments did not come close to “so infect[ing] the trial with unfairness as to

make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id. at 181 (citations omitted)

The state court, although denying petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim in total, did not

directly address in a reasoned opinion petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor made “oblique

references” to the governor’s commutation power during closing argument. The reference in

question consists of the prosecutor asking the jury to “assume” that life without parole meant life

without the possibility of parole. RT 3308. Petitioner suggests that the prosecutor’s use of

“assume” suggested that the defendant might not actually be incarcerated for life.

Petitioner’s argument strains credibility. The court has conducted an independent review of

the record, and finds that the prosecutor’s statement does not even obliquely reference the

governor’s commutation power and does not come close to rising to a due process violation under

Darden. As such, respondent is entitled to summary judgment on Claim 19A. 

2. Claim 19B(a)

In this claim, petitioner alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct by excluding

qualified jurors by peremptory challenge because of their views about the death penalty and because

of their race. Both petitioner and respondent claim that they are entitled to summary judgment on

this claim. 

This claim was raised in petitioner’s 1990 state habeas corpus proceeding and was rejected

by the California Supreme Court on the merits in a one-line denial. It is related to Claims 6 and 8,

where petitioner claims Batson error, and Witherspoon-Witt error, respectively. 

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With regards to the claim regarding prosecutorial misconduct based on peremptory

challenges against jurors who were African-American, the court finds, after an independent review

of the record, that the state court ruling was not an unreasonable application of clearly established

United States Supreme Court law. As the court has already discussed in detail in its analysis of

Claim 6, supra, the trial court committed no constitutional error in excusing the three AfricanAmericans on the venire. Similarly, the prosecutor committed no misconduct in making his

peremptory challenges on this ground. The peremptory challenges did not rise to a violation of

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) nor did the prosecutor’s conduct amount to a due process

violation under Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. 

Similarly, with regards to the claim regarding prosecutorial misconduct based on peremptory

challenges against jurors who expressed reservations about the death penalty, the court finds, after

an independent review of the record, that the state court ruling was not an unreasonable application

of clearly established United States Supreme Court law. As the court has already discussed in detail

in its analysis of Claim 8, supra, the trial court committed no constitutional error in excusing

potential jurors who expressed reservations about the death penalty when the prosecutor challenged

them peremptorily. Similarly, the prosecutor committed no misconduct in making his peremptory

challenges on this ground. Such peremptory challenges (as opposed to challenges for cause) do not

amount to Witherspoon-Witt error nor does the prosecutor’s conduct come close to amounting to a

due process violation under Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. Thus, respondent is entitled to summary

judgment on this subclaim. 

3. Claim 19B(b)

Here, petitioner again alleges that the prosecutor improperly discussed the governor’s

commutation power with the jury. This subclaim is a repeat of Claim 19A, which this court has

already found is meritless. Summary judgment on this subclaim is thus granted to respondent. 

4. Claim 19B(c)

In Claim 19B(c), petitioner maintains the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by

presenting allegedly perjured testimony from William Sisco. This claim was presented to the

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California Supreme Court in petitioner’s 1990 state habeas petition and was rejected on the merits in

a summary denial. 

The court has already concluded, in its analysis of Claim 3 supra, that the California

Supreme Court’s decision that the prosecutor had not knowingly presented perjured testimony from

Sisco was not objectively unreasonable, and thus that respondent was entitled to summary judgment

on that claim. Because petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief on Claim 3, he is not entitled to

habeas relief on this related claim. The court has conducted an independent review of the record,

and concludes that petitioner has failed to demonstrate any constitutional violation arising from the

prosecutor’s actions regarding Sisco’s testimony. As such, pursuant to AEDPA, respondent is

entitled to summary judgment on this subclaim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

5. Claim 19B(d)

In Claim 19B(d), petitioner maintains that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct

by allegedly withholding the whereabouts of Rupert Harper, the alleged triggerman and second

perpetrator at Dan’s Bottle Shop. This claim was presented to the California Supreme Court in

petitioner’s 1998 state habeas petitioner and was rejected on the merits in a summary denial. 

Respondent and petitioner both contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

Because the state’s rejection of this claim was summary, this court must conduct an

independent review of the record and determine whether the state court’s decision was objectively

unreasonable under clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner can

prevail on this claim only by demonstrating that the prosecutors’ behavior “‘so infected the trial with

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181

(1986) (citing Donnellly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). 

Petitioner has not presented anything to this court, either in his Amended Petition or in his

pleadings, that suggests that the prosecution withheld the whereabouts of Rubert Harper, the alleged

second perpetrator at Dan’s Bottle Shop. The court has also conducted an independent review of the

relevant record, and finds that the California’s Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was not

objectively unreasonable under clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. As such,

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pursuant to AEDPA, respondent is entitled to summary judgment on this subclaim. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). 

6. Claim 19B(g)

In Claim 19B(g), petitioner maintains that the prosecutor impermissibly argued that the jury

should apply the weighing standard regarding mitigating and aggravating factors in a mechanical

and arithmetical manner. Amended Petition at 97. Respondent and petitioner both contend that they

are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

The California Supreme Court addressed this claim on the merits, when it analyzed

petitioner's related claims that Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 and former CALJIC No. 8.84.2 are

unconstitutional. The court stated, in relevant part:

Our review of counsel's arguments reveals nothing which would have

confused the jury regarding the proper nature of the weighing process, . . . The

prosecutor did not suggest that the weighing process was merely a "mechanical" or

"counting" process. In explaining to the jurors their responsibility to weigh the

evidence under the statutory factors, he argued: "[The] reason that [the law] gives the

jury the ultimate, or one of the ultimate steps in the job in this determination is

because all cases are different. If they weren't, you could do something else. You

wouldn't have to subject twelve people to this. You could add it up or figure it out,

compute it or something. It would be easy. But it's not. There are different facts." 

The prosecutor then argues: "If the defense raises anything in this case . . . any real

evidence . . . that there is a reason for sympathy towards this particular defendant,

then of course that's something for you to weigh. . ." (Italics added.) He explained

that the procedure set forth in former CALJIC No. 8.84.2 was a weighing process:

"The instruction says, look at the factors and see which outweighs the the other." 

(Italics added.)

As previously noted, at one point in his argument the prosecutor states, "[the]

mitigating factors are a possibility of two. And the aggravating factors are all the

rest." Read in the context of the prosecutor’s entire argument, we conclude this one

statement could not in and of itself have misled the jury into thinking the weighing

process was a mere mechanical counting of factors, with the death penalty to be

imposed if the aggravating circumstances numerically outnumbered the mitigating

ones. Again, the prosecutor was simply arguing his view of the case; i.e., that the

only evidence worthy of any mitigating weight fit under factor (c) (the absence of

prior felony convictions) and factor (i) (defendant's relatively youthful age). 

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 646.

 Although petitioner argues that the California Supreme Court misapplied California law,

petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating that the California Supreme Court's reasoned

opinion on this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established United

States Supreme Court law. Even the case petitioner primarily relies on, People v. Milner, 45 Cal.

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3d 227 (1988), does not assist him in this claim. The California Supreme Court squarely addressed

Milner, stating that:

 Defendant urges that the prosecutor's argument may have lessened the juror's

sense of responsibility to individually arrive at an appropriate penalty determination. 

(See, e.g., People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 227, 255-256 [246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 753

P.2d 669].) Although such argument in isolation might raise a legitimate concern that

the jury was being misled, it could not have had such a misleading effect here. 

Throughout his argument the prosecutor sought to impart to the jury the gravity of

their tasks and sentencing responsibilities: “I think the toughest thing that you will

ever do, if you vote for the death penalty in this case, is to follow that instruction and

do what the instruction says to do. To say that it’s easy to vote for that [the death

penalty] is a joke. Although there’s nothing funny about it, it’s extremely difficult. 

And we talked about that a great deal as this case started, and I don’t think there is a

person up there who thinks it’s something easy . . . . [¶] No one in this jury answered

the questions, led anyone to believe, counsel or myself, that you think it would be

easy to vote for the death penalty. It is tough. It might be the toughest thing you ever

do. But it’s called for here. It’s called for by the law.” (Italics added). 

. . . .

“This is not the type of case in which the jury was ‘left with the impression

that its responsibility was merely to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors without

regard to its view of the appropriateness of the alternative penalties, and that it was

“required” to return a sentence of death “if aggravation outweighed mitigation”

without, or even despite, each juror’s personal conclusion from the evidence, about

whether a sentence of death was appropriate under the circumstances for the offense

and the offender.” (Allen, supra, 42 Cal. 3d at p. 1278, italics in original.)” (People v.

Odle, supra, 45 Cal. 3d at p. 420.)

Viewing the arguments and instructions as a whole, we are satisfied they did

not mislead the jurors as to the full nature of their sentencing discretion, and that the

jurors realized the ultimate sentencing responsibility rested with them, and them

alone. (People v. Hendricks, supra, 44 Cal. 3d at p. 655.)

People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 645-49 (original emphasis, footnote omitted). 

As the foregoing demonstrates, the California Supreme Court found that, taken as a whole,

the prosecutor’s argument did not mislead the jurors regarding their discretion in sentencing

petitioner. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court decision with respect to this

subclaim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor has petitioner

demonstrated that the state court decision relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

For the reasons stated above, summary judgment on this subclaim is granted in favor of

respondent. 

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7. Claim 19B(h)

In subclaim 19B(h), petitioner maintains that the prosecutor committed misconduct during

his penalty phase trial by urging consideration of petitioner’s non-testimonial demeanor. Because

this is essentially a repeat of Claim 17, where the court ruled that respondent was entitled to

summary judgment, respondent is entitled to summary judgment on this subclaim as well. 

8. Claim 19B(bb)

In subclaim 19B(bb), petitioner alleges that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct

by allegedly arguing that character evidence and petitioner’s familial relationships had nothing to do

with the case. Amended Petition at ¶ 410. This claim was presented to the California Supreme

Court in petitioner’s 1990 state habeas petition and was rejected on the merits in a summary denial. 

Because the state court’s denial was not set forth in a reasoned opinion, this court must conduct an

independent review of the record and determine whether the state court’s decision was objectively

unreasonable under clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. 

The court has conducted an independent review of the record cited by petitioner (Ex. 29 at

3273-80, 3304) and finds that the prosecutor did not argue that petitioner’s character and familial

relationships had “nothing to do” with the case. The prosecutor did suggest that the character

evidence presented by the defense was not particularly strong. Id. at 3306-7. As respondent

correctly notes, however, there is no relevant precedent suggesting that a prosecutor may not argue

his or her view of the evidence in summation. Nothing in the portions of the prosecutor’s argument

cited by petitioner comes close to demonstrating that the prosecutor’s “comments ‘so infected the

trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden, 477 U.S.

at 181 (1986) (citing Donnellly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)). As such, petitioner cannot

meet his burden under AEDPA and respondent is entitled to summary judgment on this subclaim. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

9. Claim 19B(dd)

In this subclaim, petitioner maintains that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by

telling the jury during the penalty phase that if they failed to make a decision, another jury would be

required to do so. Amended Petition at ¶ 410. Petitioner raised this claim in his 1990 state habeas

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corpus proceeding, where it was rejected by the California Supreme Court on the merits in a

summary denial. Because the state court’s denial was not set forth in a reasoned opinion, this court

must conduct an independent review of the record and determine whether the state court’s decision

was objectively unreasonable under clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. 

Petitioner specifically challenges the following comments by the prosecutor:

Counsel said – he mentioned that killing Marvin Walker business in the

beginning because he meant to impress on you a sense of responsibility. I don’t think

I am convinced – you are more knowledgeable about this than I am, that this jury

certainly has a sense of responsibility. It’s not necessary for either one of us to put

this personal sort of blame on you. You will have to make a decision, or you won’t

make a decision – whatever the case may be. Of course, if you don’t reach a

decision, then some other jury must make a decision somewhere down the line; will

have to get it dumped on them, essentially. You’ve heard the evidence and no one

will ever have more knowledge of the evidence here than this jury. You’ve spent five

days going over – weeks going over here in court. You know the case as well as any

people could possibly know it. 

Ex. 29 at 3304-05. 

Petitioner cannot demonstrate the above comments “‘so infected the trial with unfairness as

to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (1986) (citing

Donnellly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)). Petitioner does not cite to any authority

suggesting that comments such as the above in penalty phase summation amount to a due process

violation and, as Donnelly cautions, “a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an

ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy

exhortation, will draw that meaning from a plethora of less damaging interpretations.” 416 U.S. at

647. 

The California Supreme Court’s decision denying petitioner relief on this claim was not

objectively unreasonable. As such, summary judgment is granted in favor of respondent. 

10. Claim 19B(ee)

In this subclaim, petitioner alleges that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct when

he made the following comments: “The next one, the presence or absence of any prior felony

convictions. You have not had presented to you proof of prior felonies, and of course, you must

assume that there is no prior felony for the defendant. That would, of course, be one in his favor.” 

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Ex. 29 at 3273. According to petitioner, these comments by the prosecutor “slyly” suggested that

petitioner had some prior felony convictions, when in fact he did not. 

Petitioner raised this claim in his 1990 state habeas petition, where it was denied on the

merits in a summary decision. It was again rejected by the California Supreme Court in a summary

denial when petitioner raised it in his 1998 state habeas petition. 

After an independent review of the record, the court finds that there is simply no support for

petitioner’s claim. There is no indication that the jury interpreted the prosecutor’s remarks to

suggest that petitioner had prior felonies, when the prosecutor in fact reminded the jury that no proof

of prior felonies had been presented. In addition, the prosecutor went on to tell the jury that

“[t]here’s possibility that there are a couple of factors in his favor . . . . lack of proof of prior felony

convictions is a factor.” Ex. 29 at 3281. Certainly, the prosecutor’s comments did not come close to

a due process violation under Darden or Donnelly; as such, the state court’s denial of petitioner’s

claim was not objectively unreasonable in light of the applicable United States Supreme Court

precedent. Summary judgment on this subclaim is granted in favor of respondent. 

Q. Claim 22

In this claim, petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all of the other

claims in his petition and contends that the cumulative effect of the constitutional violations alleged

in these claims deprived him of a fair trial and rendered his conviction and sentence inherently

unreliable. Because the resolution of this claim depends on the merit of the remaining claims in the

petition, the court defers ruling on it until those claims are resolved. 

///

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///

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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby DEFERS ruling on Claims 2 and 22. Summary

judgment on Claims 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19A, 19B(a), 19B(b), 19B(c),

19B(d), 19B(e), 19B(g),19B(h), 19B(bb), 19B(dd) and 19B(ee) is GRANTED in favor of

respondent. Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the same claims is DENIED. 

The court hereby directs the parties to meet and confer, and to submit to the court a joint

litigation schedule to address the remainder of petitioner’s claims. The litigation schedule should be

filed no later than November 14, 2007. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 28, 2007 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALKER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

VASQUEZ,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV94-01997 SBA 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on October 10, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

 California Appellate Project

California Appellate Project

Federal Court Docketing

101 Second Street

Suite 600

San Francisco, CA 94105

 Habeas Corpus Resource Center

Habeas Corpus Resource Center

50 Fremont Street, Suite 1800

San Francisco, CA 94105

Dated: October 10, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: LISA R CLARK, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:94-cv-01997-PJH Document 161 Filed 09/28/07 Page 63 of 63