Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02061/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:0271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRESIDIO COMPONENTS, INC., 

Plaintiff,

v. 

AMERICAN TECHNICAL CERAMICS 

CORP., 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 14-cv-02061-H-BGS 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A 

MATTER OF LAW AND FOR A 

NEW TRIAL; 

[Doc. Nos. 399, 400, 402.] 

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR A PERMANENT 

INJUNCTION; 

[Doc. No. 373.] 

(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR ENHANCED 

DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S 

FEES; AND 

[Doc. No. 377.] 

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(4) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL 

DAMAGES AND INTEREST 

[Doc. No. 372.] 

 On June 22, 2016, Plaintiff Presidio Components, Inc. filed (1) a motion for a 

permanent injunction; (2) a motion for enhanced damages and attorney’s fees; and (3) a 

motion for supplemental damages and interest. (Doc. Nos. 372, 373, 377.) On July 13, 

2016, Defendant American Technical Ceramics Corp. filed its responses in opposition to 

Presidio’s three motions. (Doc. Nos. 391, 393, 394.) On July 20, 2016, Presidio filed its 

replies in support of its motions. (Doc. Nos. 412, 414, 415.) 

 On July 15, 2016, ATC filed (1) a motion for judgment as a matter of law and new 

trial of no infringement; (2) a motion for judgment as a matter of law and new trial of no 

willfulness and no induced infringement; and (3) a motion for judgment as a matter of law 

and new trial of no lost profits. (Doc. Nos. 399, 400, 402.) On July 29, 2016, Presidio 

filed its responses in opposition to ATC’s three motions. (Doc. Nos. 423, 424, 426.) On 

August 5, 2016, ATC filed its replies in support of its motions. (Doc. Nos. 432, 433, 434.) 

The Court held a hearing on the matters on August 17, 2016. Gregory Ahrens and 

Brett Schatz appeared for Presidio. Peter Snell and Ronald Cahill appeared for ATC. For 

the reasons below, the Court: (1) denies ATC’s motions for judgment as a matter of law 

and new trial; (2) grants Presidio’s motion for a permanent injunction; (3) denies Presidio’s 

motion for enhanced damages and attorney’s fees; and (4) grants Presidio’s motion for 

supplemental damages and interest. 

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/// 

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Background

 On September 2, 2014, Presidio filed a complaint for patent infringement against 

ATC, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,816,356 (“the ’356 patent”). (Doc. No. 

1, Compl.) The ’356 patent is entitled “Integrated Broadband Ceramic Capacitor Array.” 

U.S. Patent No. 6,816,356 B2, at 1:1-2 (filed Apr. 14, 2003). The patent issued on 

November 9, 2004 and claimed priority to an application filed on May 17, 2002. See id. 

(See Doc. No. 276-3 ¶ 4; Doc. No. 356-1 at 5.) 

A capacitor is a passive electrical component that stores and releases energy and is 

used in a variety of electrical devices. Presidio Components, Inc. v. American Technical 

Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Generally, a capacitor comprises 

two parallel metal plates separated by a non-conductive material such as ceramic or air, 

known as a dielectric. Id. When a capacitor is connected to a power source, electricity 

passes through the metal plates, but not the dielectric, causing a positive charge to 

accumulate on one plate and a negative charge on the other. Id. “The capacitor may release 

this stored energy by connecting the two plates through a conductive path that closes the 

circuit.” Id. “The amount of energy a capacitor can store is its ‘capacitance.’” Id. 

 Multiple capacitors may be combined to create a “multilayer capacitor.” Id. A 

multilayer capacitor is made of several layers of conductive and non-conductive materials 

stacked together. Id. Each layer in the multilayer capacitor has its own electrical properties 

affecting the overall performance of the capacitor. Id. 

 The ’356 patent claims a multilayer capacitor design and teaches a multilayer 

integrated network of capacitors electrically connected in series and in parallel. Id.; 

Presidio Components, Inc. v. American Technical Ceramics Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 

1289 (S.D. Cal. 2010), vacated on other grounds, 702 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This 

network of capacitors is disposed within a “substantially monolithic dielectric body,” as 

shown below in Figure 10A. Presidio, 702 F.3d at 1355. The claimed multilayer capacitor 

creates capacitance between internal parallel plate combinations 10 and 11 while 

simultaneously creating fringe-effect capacitance between external contacts 72 and 74. Id. 

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 On December 8, 2015, the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued a 

reexamination certificate for the ’356 patent, amending certain claims of the patent.1

 (Doc. 

No. 170-2, FAC Ex. 2.) Amended claim 1 of the ’356 patent, the only independent claim 

asserted by Presidio in this action, is as follows: 

1. A capacitor comprising: 

a substantially monolithic dielectric body; 

a conductive first plate disposed within the dielectric body; 

a conductive second plate disposed within the dielectric body and forming a 

capacitor with the first plate; 

a conductive first contact disposed externally on the dielectric body and 

electrically connected to the first plate; and 

a conductive second contact disposed externally on the dielectric body and 

electrically connected to the second plate, and the second contact being 

located sufficiently close to the first contact in an edge to edge relationship in 

such proximity as to form a first fringe-effect capacitance with the first contact 

that is capable of being determined by measurement in terms of a standard 

unit. 

                                                                

1 The PTO previously issued a reexamination certificate for the ’356 patent on September 

13, 2011. (Doc. No. 170-1, FAC Ex. 1.) This reexamination certificate did not alter any of the 

claims at issue in the present action. (Id.)

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U.S. Patent No. 6,816,356 C2, at 1:23-36 (Reexamination Certificate filed Dec. 8, 2015) 

(emphasis removed from original). The claims in the reexamination certificate were 

amended in order to overcome a final rejection by the PTO examiner, rejecting the claims 

at issue as anticipated by the AVX MLC Catalog reference, and in the alternative, as 

obvious over the AVX MLC Catalog reference in view of the Ceramic Capacitor 

Technology reference. (See Doc. No. 212-2, Slonim Decl. Exs. 1, 2, 8, 11.) 

 On December 22, 2015, Presidio filed a first amended complaint, alleging 

infringement of the ’356 patent as amended by the reexamination certificate. (Doc. No. 

170, FAC.) Specifically, Presidio alleged that ATC’s 550 line of capacitors infringes 

claims 1, 3, 5, 16, 18, and 19 of the ’356 patent. (Id. ¶ 26.) On December 22, 2015, ATC 

filed a second amended answer and counterclaims to the first amended complaint, adding 

an affirmative defense of absolute and equitable intervening rights and an affirmative 

defense and counterclaim of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct. (Doc. No. 171.) 

On January 12, 2016, the Court denied Presidio’s motions for: (1) summary 

judgment of definiteness; (2) summary judgment of infringement; (3) summary judgment 

of ATC’s equitable affirmative defenses; and (4) summary judgment of no acceptable noninfringing alternatives. (Doc. No. 210.) In the order, the Court also denied ATC’s motions 

for: (1) partial summary judgment of non-infringement; (2) summary judgment of 

indefiniteness; and (3) summary judgment of no willful infringement. (Id.) On February 

10, 2016, the Court granted ATC’s motion for summary judgment of its affirmative defense 

of absolute intervening rights and held that Presidio is entitled to infringement damages 

only for the time period following the issuance of the reexamination certificate on 

December 8, 2015. (Doc. No. 234 at 28.) In that order, the Court also dismissed with 

prejudice ATC’s affirmative defense and counterclaim that the ’356 patent is unenforceable 

due to inequitable conduct. (Id. at 33.) 

 The Court held a jury trial beginning on April 5, 2016. (Doc. No. 297.) During the 

trial, on April 8, 2016, ATC filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). (Doc. No. 307.) On April 18, 2016, the jury 

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returned a verdict finding direct infringement and induced infringement of claims 1, 3, 5, 

16, 18, and 19 of the ’356 patent by ATC as to all of the accused products in the action: the 

550L, the 550S, the 550U, and the 550Z capacitors. (Doc. No. 328 at 2-3.) In addition, 

the jury found that Presidio had proven by clear and convincing evidence that ATC’s 

infringement of the asserted claims was willful. (Id. at 4.) The jury awarded Presidio 

$2,166,654 in lost profit damages. (Id.) The jury also issued an advisory verdict as to 

indefiniteness and found that ATC had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that claim 1 of the ’356 patent is indefinite.2

 (Id. at 5.) 

 On June 17, 2016, the Court issued a memorandum decision finding in favor of 

Presidio and against ATC on all issues submitted to the Court, including indefiniteness, 

equitable intervening rights, equitable estoppel, and laches. (Doc. No. 368.) On June 17, 

2016, the Court entered judgment in favor of Presidio on all causes of action and awarded 

Plaintiff $2,166,654 in damages. (Doc. No. 369.) 

By the present motions, ATC moves for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) or, in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to Rule 

59 on the following issues: (1) infringement; (2) induced infringement; (3) willful 

infringement; and (4) lost profits. (Doc. Nos. 399, 400, 402.) Presidio moves for: (1) a 

permanent injunction; (2) enhanced damages; (3) attorney’s fees; (4) supplemental 

damages; and (5) prejudgment and postjudgment interest. (Doc. Nos. 372, 373, 377.) 

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2

 The verdict form initially had the “Yes” box marked in response to question No. 6 “Has ATC 

proved by clear and convincing evidence that claim 1 of the ’356 patent is indefinite?” (Doc. No. 328 at 

5.) During the reading of the verdict in open court, the jurors agreed that checking the “Yes” box in 

response to question No. 6 was a clerical error and then amended the verdict form to reflect that the 

“No” box should be checked. (See id.; Doc. No. 333 at 8-11.) 

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Discussion 

I. ATC’s Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law and for a New Trial 

 A. Legal Standard for a Rule 50 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 

In a patent case, a motion for judgment as a matter of law is governed by the regional 

circuit, here the Ninth Circuit. InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 

1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, a court should 

render judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) only when “a party has been fully heard on 

an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a 

legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

50(a)(1); see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000). In other 

words, judgment as a matter of law is proper when “the evidence, construed in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that 

conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 

2002); accord InTouch Techs., 751 F.3d at 1338; see also Hangarter v. Provident Life & 

Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004) (“JMOL should be granted only if 

the verdict is ‘against the great weight of the evidence, or it is quite clear that the jury has 

reached a seriously erroneous result.’”). In contrast, “[a] jury’s verdict must be upheld if 

it is supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence adequate to support the jury’s 

conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion.” Pavao, 307 F.3d at 

918. 

In deciding a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court “must view all evidence 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable inferences in the 

favor of the non-mover, and disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the 

jury is not required to believe.” Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1021 (9th 

Cir. 2008); see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150-51. A district court “may not make credibility 

determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150. “‘[T]he court must accept 

the jury’s credibility findings consistent with the verdict’ . . . [and] ‘may not substitute its 

view of the evidence for that of the jury.’” Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, 

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Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 B. Legal Standard for a Rule 59 Motion for New Trial 

In a patent case, a motion for a new trial is also governed by the law of the regional 

circuit. InTouch Techs., 751 F.3d at 1338. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), 

a district court “may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues–and to any 

party– . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted 

in an action at law in federal court.” “Rule 59 does not specify the grounds on which a 

motion for a new trial may be granted. Rather, the court is bound by those grounds that 

have been historically recognized.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 

2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, “‘[t]he trial 

court may grant a new trial only if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, 

is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice.’” Id.; see 

also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A] 

district court in the Ninth Circuit ‘may grant a new trial only if the verdict is against the 

clear weight of the evidence.’”). “Unlike with a Rule 50 determination, [a] district court, 

in considering a Rule 59 motion for new trial, is not required to view the trial evidence in 

the light most favorable to the verdict. Instead, the district court can weigh the evidence 

and assess the credibility of the witnesses.” Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. 

Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd, 762 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 2014). “‘[A] district court may not 

grant a new trial simply because it would have arrived at a different verdict.’” Wallace v. 

City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 “The grant of a new trial is ‘confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on 

the part of the trial court.’” Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 

1990) (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980)). On appeal, 

the Ninth Circuit “afford[s] considerable deference to the district court’s new trial decision 

and will not overturn the district court’s decision to grant a new trial absent an abuse of 

discretion.” Experience Hendrix, 762 F.3d at 842. A district court’s “denial of a motion 

for a new trial is reversible ‘only if the record contains no evidence in support of the 

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verdict’ or if the district court ‘made a mistake of law.’” E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, 

Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 C. Infringement 

 ATC moves for judgment as a matter of law that its 550 capacitors do not infringe 

claims 1, 3, 5, 16, 18, and 19 of the ’356 patent, or in the alternative, for a new trial on the 

issue of infringement. (Doc. No. 399-1 at 25.) Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), “whoever 

without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the 

United States . . . infringes the patent.” A patent infringement analysis proceeds in two 

steps. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d 

517 U.S. 370. In the first step, the court construes the asserted claims as a matter of law. 

See id. In the second step, the factfinder compares the claimed invention to the accused 

device. Id.; see also Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1340 

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A determination of infringement is a question of fact . . . .”). 

“[A] patentee who files a complaint or counterclaim alleging patent infringement 

bears the burden of proving that infringement.” Medtronic Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 695 

F.3d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “To prove literal infringement, the patentee must show 

that the accused device contains every limitation in the asserted claims. If even one 

limitation is missing or not met as claimed, there is no literal infringement.” Riles v. Shell 

Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2002); accord Uniloc USA, Inc. 

v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

 ATC argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law of no infringement 

because Presidio, through its infringement expert, failed to prove that the high frequency 

performance of the accused products is derived from the fringe-effect capacitance between 

the capacitors’ external contacts rather than from the capacitors’ internal electrodes. (Doc. 

No. 399-1 at 1-21.) In response, Presidio argues ATC’s contention is based on an improper 

attempt to redefine the scope of the asserted claims of the ’356 patent. (Doc. No. 424 at 5-

9.) The Court agrees with Presidio. 

 In its motion, ATC argues that the asserted claims of the ’356 patent, as amended by 

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the December 8, 2015 reexamination certificate, require that the capacitor’s high frequency 

performance derive solely from the fringe-effect capacitance between the capacitor’s 

external contacts; “[h]igh frequency capacitors that derive their high-frequency 

performance from internal structures of the capacitor do not infringe Presidio’s ’356 

patent.” (Doc. No. 399-1 at 1.) But the asserted claims have never been construed to 

contain a limitation requiring that the fringe-effect capacitance between the external 

contacts of the capacitor, and not the internal structures of the capacitor, affect the 

capacitor’s high frequency performance. Such a limitation is not contained in the plain 

language of the asserted claims of the ’356 patent as amended by the December 8, 2015 

reexamination certificate. See ’356 Patent at 13:26-28, 14:1-2, 14:9-16; ’356 Patent Dec. 

8, 2015 Reexamination Certificate at 1:23-2:9 (“the second contact being located 

sufficiently close to the first contact in an edge to edge relationship in such proximity as to 

form a first fringe-effect capacitance with the first contact that is capable of being 

determined by measurement in terms of a standard unit”). Such a limitation is also not 

contained in the Court’s claim construction order. (See Doc. No. 103.) Such a limitation 

was also not contained in ATC’s proposed jury instruction regarding the Court’s claim 

constructions, (Doc. No. 296 at 19), or in the actual instructions that were provided to the 

jury regarding the Court’s claim constructions. (See Doc. No.327 (Court’s Instruction No. 

17).) 

Further, in determining the scope of the amended claims when ruling on the parties’ 

cross-motions for summary judgment of ATC’s absolute intervening rights defense, the 

Court never found that such a limitation was present in the amended claims. (See Doc. No. 

234.) Cf. R+L Carriers, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 801 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 

(explaining that the determination of claim scope for an intervening rights analysis is “a 

matter of claim construction”). In determining that that the amendments in the December 

8, 2015 reexamination certificate narrowed the scope of the asserted claims, the Court 

determined “that the scope of the asserted claims as amended by the December 8, 2015 

reexamination certificate requires a fringe-effect capacitance that is actually measurable 

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such as in the manner shown in Figs. 21A and 21B of the ’356 patent.” (Id. at 20.) A 

fringe-effect capacitance that is negligible or merely theoretically present, i.e., a 

capacitance that is merely derivable by using theoretical calculations or simulations, is 

outside the scope of the amended claims. (Id.) Figures 21A and 21B of the ’356 patent 

are graphs representing the insertion loss of a capacitor. ’356 Patent at 6:10-16. 

Accordingly, the Court’s absolute intervening rights summary judgment order only holds 

that the amended claims contain the limitation that the fringe-effect capacitance between 

the external contacts be capable of being determined by measurement such as through 

insertion loss measurements, and not merely by using theoretical calculations. The order 

does not hold that the amended claims contain a limitation specifically requiring that the 

fringe-effect capacitance between the external contacts of the capacitors, and not its 

internal structures, affect the capacitor’s high frequency performance.3

 ATC cannot seek a new claim construction post-trial. ATC did not request a 

construction of the asserted claims containing the limitation that the fringe-effect 

capacitance between the external contacts, not internal structures, affect the capacitor’s 

high frequency performance in its claim construction briefing; at the claim construction 

hearing; following the issuance of the December 8, 2015 reexamination certification; in its 

motion for summary judgment on its defense of absolute intervening rights; through a 

                                                                

3

 ATC notes that the prior court held that Presidio admitted that “‘insertion loss’ is ‘a property 

critical to and very specific to high frequency performance.’” (Doc. No. 399-1 at 9 (citing Doc. No. 234 

at 5 n.3); see also Doc. No. 432 at 8-9 (citing Doc. No. 235 at 26).) But ATC fails to further explain 

how this admission necessitates its proposed construction. It does not follow that because insertion loss 

is critical to high frequency performance and the claims require that the fringe-effect capacitance be 

actually measurable such as through insertion loss testing, that the claims then must require that the 

fringe-effect capacitance between the capacitor’s external contacts, and not internal structures, affect the 

capacitor’s high frequency performance. At best, this means that if the fringe-effect capacitance is to be 

measured through insertion loss testing, then it must have some effect on the capacitor’s high frequency 

performance; not that the capacitor’s high frequency performance must only be derived from the fringeeffect capacitance between the external contacts and not from any internal structures. Further, Presidio’s 

infringement expert, Dr. Huebner, testified that although the accused products contain some internal 

capacitances that help with high frequency performance, the highest frequency performance of the 

capacitors is achieved by the fringe-effect capacitance. (Doc. No. 306, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 162-63; see 

also id. at 27-29, 38-53, 57-63; Doc. No. 331, Trial Tr. Vol. V at 222.) 

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motion for clarification; in its proposed jury instructions; or its Rule 50(a) motion for 

judgment as a matter of law. (See Doc. No. 93, 98, 104, 189, 212-1, 227, 296, 307.) 

Therefore, ATC waived its argument that the claims should be construed to contain this 

limitation, and ATC cannot raise this argument through post-trial motions. See Cordis 

Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[L]itigants waive their 

right to present new claim construction disputes if they are raised for the first time after 

trial.”); GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 839, 850 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 

(“[Plaintiff’s] two claim construction arguments were not raised at the Markman stage or 

in briefing regarding the jury instructions. [Plaintiff] provides no citation to prior efforts 

to raise the latter two arguments, and does not otherwise argue that it properly preserved 

those arguments for post-trial consideration. The Court therefore concludes [plaintiff]’s 

arguments with respect to the purpose of the invention and claim differentiation are waived. 

A party may not raise new claim construction arguments for the first time in post-trial 

briefing.” (citations omitted)). In sum, because the Court did not construe the asserted 

claims to contain the specific limitation requiring that the fringe-effect capacitance between 

the external contacts of the capacitor, not its internal structures, affect the capacitor’s high 

frequency performance, the Court rejects ATC’s argument that it is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law on this issue. 

ATC also argues that it is entitled to a new trial on the issue of infringement because 

the Court admitted Dr. Huebner’s computer simulation evidence at trial over its objection. 

(Doc. No. 399-1 at 21-25.) The Court rejects ATC’s request for a new trial on this issue. 

The simulation testing evidence Dr. Huebner presented at trial was relevant to provide 

background and context for his opinions and measurements. The evidence was admitted 

to demonstrate that fringe-effect capacitance exists between the external contacts of the 

550 capacitors. That the evidence was used for this purpose could not have confused the 

jury because both Presidio’s and ATC’s experts agreed that fringe-effect capacitance is 

well known and always exists between the external contacts of a capacitor. (Doc. No. 305, 

Trial Tr. Vol. II at 261; Doc. No. 306, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 151; Doc. No. 331, Trial Tr. Vol. 

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V at 78.) 

ATC also erroneously argues that it sought to introduce into evidence its own 

computer simulations. (Doc. No. 399-1 at 24.) ATC was permitted to present its 

simulation evidence to the jury at trial. At trial, ATC initially only sought to have the 

exhibits at issue admitted as demonstratives, and the Court received them as demonstratives 

over Presidio’s objections. (Doc. No. 331, Trial Tr. Vol. V at 50-52.) ATC later sought to 

have the exhibits admitted as evidence, and Presidio objected to the exhibits pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 on the grounds that they also contained inadmissible editorial 

comments. (Id. at 69-70.) The Court sustained the objection. (Id.) Presidio stated that it 

would be fine to admit the exhibits if the editorial comments were removed, but ATC never 

sought to introduce the exhibits into evidence without the editorial comments. (Id. at 70.) 

Further, ATC has failed to show that it was prejudiced by the Court’s refusal to admit the 

exhibits into evidence. ATC states that the purpose of these exhibits was to show that noninfringing capacitors have fringing field lines between their external contacts. (Doc. No. 

399-1 at 24.) But this evidence then was cumulative of other evidence in the record because 

both sides’ experts agreed that fringe-effect capacitance is well known and always exists 

between the external contacts of a capacitor. (Doc. No. 305, Trial Tr. Vol. II at 261; Doc. 

No. 306, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 151; Doc. No. 331, Trial Tr. Vol. V at 78.) Accordingly, the 

Court rejects ATC’s argument that it is entitled to a new trial based on the computer 

simulation evidence that was admitted at trial.4

The jury’s infringement verdict was supported by substantial evidence and not 

against the clear weight of evidence. Presidio’s infringement expert provided testimony, 

                                                                

4

 ATC also argues that it is entitled to a new trial because the Court allowed Presidio’s witnesses 

to testify that the December 8, 2015 reexamination certificate did not change the scope of the asserted 

claims. (Doc. No. 399-1 at 25 n.12; Doc. No. 432 at 14.) ATC has failed to explain how it was 

prejudiced by this testimony. The Court instructed the jury as to the proper scope of the asserted claims 

under the Court’s claim construction orders. (Doc. No. 327 (Court’s Instruction No. 17).) “A jury is 

presumed to follow its instructions.” Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). 

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supported by analysis and testing, explaining how the accused products satisfied all the 

limitations in the asserted claims. (See Doc. No. 305, Trial Tr. Vol. II at 243-44, 249-65; 

Doc. No. 306, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 1-80.) This testimony was more than adequate to allow 

the jury to reach its finding of infringement. See, e.g., Martek Biosciences Corp. v. 

Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Because the jury’s infringement 

verdict was supported by substantial evidence, it must be upheld. See Pavao, 307 F.3d at 

918. Accordingly, the Court denies ATC’s motion for judgment as a matter of law of no 

infringement, or in the alternative, for a new trial on the issue of infringement. 

 D. Induced Infringement 

 ATC moves for judgment as a matter of law of no induced infringement, or in the 

alternative, for a new trial on the issue of induced infringement. (Doc. No. 400-1 at 22-

24.) ATC argues that the jury’s finding of active inducement was not supported by 

substantial evidence. (Id.) 

 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) provides: “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent 

shall be liable as an infringer.” To prove inducement, the patentee must establish that “the 

defendant knew of the patent and that ‘the induced acts constitute patent infringement.’”5

 

Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (2015). Intent can be shown 

through circumstantial evidence. Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 

1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009). For example, evidence of active steps taken to encourage direct 

infringement can be found in “‘advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage 

in an infringing use.’” Takeda Pharm. U.S.A., Inc. v. W.-Ward Pharm. Corp., 785 F.3d 

625, 630-31 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 

                                                                

5

 To prove inducement, the patentee must also establish direct infringement. See Lucent Techs., 

Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“‘[A] finding of inducement requires a 

threshold finding of direct infringement—either a finding of specific instances of direct infringement or 

a finding that the accused products necessarily infringe.’”). As explained in the prior section, substantial 

evidence supports the jury’s finding that the accused products directly infringe the asserted claims of the 

’356 patent. See supra. 

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Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005)). 

 At trial, Presidio presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find that ATC 

knew about of the ’356 patent. One of ATC’s engineers, who was involved in the design 

of the accused products, testified that he was aware of the application that later issued as 

the ’356 patent and the ’356 patent itself. (Doc. No. 305, Trial Tr. Vol. II at 48-49, 56-57, 

81-83.) 

Presidio also presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find that ATC knew 

that the induced acts constituted patent infringement. ATC’s design engineer testified that 

he not only knew about the ’356 patent, but also the results of the prior litigation. (Id. at 

57.) Further, Presidio presented evidence showing that ATC actively promoted and sold 

the 550 capacitors to its customers for use, and provided information related to the accused 

products to its customers, such as data sheets. (Id. at 3, 112-13.) Presidio also presented 

evidence showing that ATC promoted the 550 capacitors to its customers as a replacement 

for the 545L capacitor – the capacitor that was found to infringe the ’356 patent in the prior 

action. (Id. at 56-57, 137-38, 153-54, 167-68.) This evidence was sufficient to support the 

jury’s finding of inducement.6 See Takeda, 785 F.3d at 630-31; see, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. 

Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 851-52 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming the jury’s finding of 

inducement as supported by substantial evidence where the evidence in the record showed 

that the defendant provided instructions that taught users to practice the accused product in 

a manner the defendant knew would result in an infringing use). 

ATC argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish its intent to induce 

infringement of the ’356 patent because by December 8, 2015 – the time when the relevant 

                                                                

6

 ATC argues that this evidence is insufficient to establish inducement because these actions 

occurred prior to the claims being amended through the December 8, 2015 reexamination certificate and 

during the period when ATC’s sales were determined to be lawful under the Court’s intervening rights 

ruling. (Doc. No. 434 at 16.) ATC argues that until December 8, 2015, it knew that the ’356 patent was 

invalid and, thus, knew there could be no infringement and there was no corresponding intent to induce. 

(Id.) This argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commil. In Commil, the 

Supreme Court held that “a belief as to invalidity cannot negate the scienter required for induced 

infringement.” 135 S. Ct. at 1929. 

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period of infringement began – ATC had an objectively reasonable non-infringement 

defense. (Doc. No. 400-1 at 23-24.) To the extent ATC is arguing that an objectively 

reasonable non-infringement defense negates a finding of inducement, the Federal Circuit 

has recently rejected this contention. See Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2015-

1725, 2016 WL 3947839, at *8 (Fed. Cir. July 22, 2016) (The Supreme Court’s cases on 

inducement “require a showing of the accused infringer’s subjective knowledge as to the 

underlying direct infringement. The district court’s reliance on the objective strength of 

Apple’s non-infringement arguments as precluding a finding of induced or contributory 

infringement was erroneous.”). Further, to the extent ATC is arguing that the noninfringement defense it presented at trial was sufficient to allow the jury to find that it 

lacked the requisite intent to induce infringement, this argument also fails as the jury was 

not required to accept ATC’s evidence on this issue and was free to reject it. Cf. Harper, 

533 F.3d at 1021 (explaining that in reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, 

the court must “disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not 

required to believe”). Accordingly, the Court denies ATC’s motion for judgment as a 

matter of law of no induced infringement, or in the alternative, for a new trial on the issue 

of induced infringement. 

 E. Willful Infringement 

ATC moves for judgment as a matter of law of no willful infringement, or in the 

alternative, for a new trial on the issue of willful infringement. (Doc. No. 400-1 at 3-22.) 

At the time the jury rendered its verdict, the Federal Circuit had held “that an award of 

enhanced damages [under section 284] requires a showing of willful infringement.” In re 

Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 

To establish willful infringement, the patentee has the burden of showing “by 

clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively 

high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.” 

“The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective 

inquiry.” Only if the patentee establishes this “threshold objective standard” 

does the inquiry then move on to whether “this objectively-defined risk 

(determined by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was 

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either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused 

infringer.” 

 

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., 776 F.3d 837, 844 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015) (quoting Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371). The Federal Circuit further held that the 

objective prong of the willfulness test is to be decided by the Court as a matter of law; 

while the subjective prong of the test is a question of fact. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, 

Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006-08 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

 On June 13, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse 

Elecs., Inc., No. 14-1513, 579 U.S. __ (June 13, 2016). In Halo, the Supreme Court 

rejected the Federal Circuit’s two-part test from Seagate for determining when a district 

court may award enhanced damages as inconsistent with § 284. Id., slip op. at 1-2. The 

Supreme Court explained that § 284 commits the award of enhanced damages to the 

discretion of the district court. See id. at 8, 12-13, 15. The Supreme Court further 

explained that the Seagate test is “‘unduly rigid’” and “‘impermissibly encumbers’” a 

district court’s discretion, particularly its requirement that there must be a finding of 

objective recklessness in every case before a district court may award enhanced damages. 

Id. at 9. “The subjective willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or knowing, may 

warrant enhanced damages, without regard to whether his infringement was objectively 

reckless.” Id. at 10. “Section 284 permits district courts to exercise their discretion in a 

manner free from the inelastic constraints of the Seagate test.” Id. at 11. 

ATC first argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of 

willfulness because Halo commits the entire issue of enhanced damages to the district 

court’s discretion and a separate factual finding of willfulness by a jury no longer exists 

under the standard. (Doc. No. 400-1 at 3-8.) The Court has previously rejected this 

argument, (Doc. No. 368 at 27), and this argument has also recently been rejected by the 

Federal Circuit. In WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., the Federal Circuit held that Halo does not 

change “the established law that the factual components of the willfulness question should 

be resolved by the jury.” No. 2015-1038, 2016 WL 3902668, at *15 (Fed. Cir. July 19, 

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2016); see also id. at *15 n.13 (Halo “leaves in place our prior precedent that there is a 

right to a jury trial on the willfulness question.”). ATC may disagree with the Federal 

Circuit’s decision in WBIP. (Doc. No. 421at 2; Doc. No. 434 at 4-5.) Nevertheless, WBIP 

represents binding circuit law, and this Court must follow it. 7 See Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 

1116, 1119 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[O]nce a federal circuit court issues a decision, the district 

courts within that circuit are bound to follow it.”). Accordingly, the Court rejects ATC’s 

contention that it was an error for the Court to submit the issue of subjective willfulness to 

the jury. 

ATC also argues that the jury’s willfulness finding is invalid because there has been 

no finding as to the objective reasonableness of ATC’s defenses. (Doc. No. 400-1 at 8-9; 

Doc. No. 434 at 8-10.) ATC argues that objective reasonableness remains a factor in any 

willfulness determination post-Halo. (Doc. No. 400-1 at 8.) This argument is also 

foreclosed by the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in WBIP. In WBIP, the Federal Circuit 

held that “[p]roof of an objectively reasonable litigation-inspired defense to infringement 

is no longer a defense to willful infringement.” 2016 WL 3902668, at *15 (Fed. Cir. July 

19, 2016); see also Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (“The subjective willfulness of a patent 

infringer, intentional or knowing, may warrant enhanced damages, without regard to 

whether his infringement was objectively reckless.”). Accordingly, the Court rejects 

ATC’s contention that a jury must consider objective reasonableness when making a 

willfulness determination. 

ATC next argues that the jury’s willfulness finding should be vacated because the 

court’s instructions on willfulness failed to properly reflect the standard set forth in Halo. 

                                                                

7

 ATC characterizes the above statement from WBIP as dicta. (Doc. No. 421 at 2; Doc. No. 434 at 

4.) The Court disagrees. The statement is not dicta because the panel’s determination that the factual 

components of the willfulness question should still be decided by a jury was necessary to the panel’s 

ultimate decision to affirm the district court’s enhanced damages award. See N.L.R.B. v. Int’l Bhd. of 

Elec. Workers, Local 340, 481 U.S. 573, 592 n.15 (1987) (describing a statement in a prior case as dicta 

because it “was unnecessary to the disposition” of the case); Exp. Grp. v. Reef Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 

1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing dicta as statements that are not “necessary to the decision”). 

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(Doc. No. 400-1 at 9-10; Doc. No. 434 at 5-7.) In support of this argument, ATC relies on 

the following language from Halo: “Awards of enhanced damages . . . are not to be meted 

out in a typical infringement case, but are instead designed as a ‘punitive’ or ‘vindictive’ 

sanction for egregious infringement behavior. The sort of conduct warranting enhanced 

damages has been variously described in our cases as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, 

deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate.” Halo, 

136 S. Ct. at 1932. But here, the Supreme Court is discussing the standard that a district 

court should use when ultimately determining whether to exercise its discretion and award 

enhanced damages, not the standard that should be used by the factfinder when making a 

finding as to subjective willfulness. Accordingly, the Court rejects this argument.8

 

Finally, ATC argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to willfulness 

because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of willfulness even under the 

standard applied by the jury. 9 (Doc. No. 400-1 at 10-22.) The Court disagrees. The jury’s 

                                                                

8

 In its reply brief, ATC argues for the first time that jury’s willfulness finding was insufficient 

because the jury was not asked to make specific factual findings by answering special interrogatories in 

the verdict. (Doc. No. 434 at 7-8.) This argument is waived because ATC did not object to the verdict 

form on this ground at trial. (See Doc. No. 331, Trial Tr. Vol. V at 245-57; Doc. No. 332, Trial Tr. Vol. 

VI at 3-4.) This argument is also waived because ATC raised this argument for the first time in a reply 

brief. See Bazuaye v. I.N.S., 79 F.3d 118, 120 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in the 

reply brief are waived.”); accord Novosteel SA v. U.S., Bethlehem Steel Corp., 284 F.3d 1261, 1274 

(Fed. Cir. 2002). 

9

 The Court provided the following jury instruction as to willful infringement: 

In this case, Presidio also argues that ATC willfully infringed Presidio the ’356 

patent. 

To prove willful infringement against ATC, Presidio must first persuade you that 

ATC infringed a valid and enforceable claim of Presidio’s asserted patent. The 

requirements for proving such infringement were discussed in my prior instructions. In 

addition, to prove willful infringement, Presidio must persuade you by clear and 

convincing evidence that on or after December 8, 2015, ATC acted with reckless 

disregard of the claims of the patent holder’s patent. When a party has the burden of 

proving something by clear and convincing evidence, it means you must be persuaded by 

the evidence that the claim or defense is highly probable. This is a higher standard of 

proof than proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 

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willfulness finding was supported by substantial evidence. One of ATC’s engineers who 

was involved in the design of the accused products, testified that he was aware of the 

application that later issued as the ’356 patent and the ’356 patent itself. (Doc. No. 305, 

Trial Tr. Vol. II at 48-49, 56-57, 81-83; see also Doc. No. 426-6, Ex. F (Trial Ex. 44); Doc. 

No. 426-7, Ex. G (Trial Ex. 46); Doc. No. 426-9, Ex. I (Trial Ex. 189).) The engineer 

testified that he not only knew about the ’356 patent, but also the results of the prior 

litigation. (Doc. No. 305, Trial Tr. Vol. II at 57.) Further, Presidio presented evidence 

showing that ATC promoted the 550 capacitors to its customers as a replacement for the 

545L capacitor – the capacitor that was found to infringe the ’356 patent in the prior 

lawsuit. (Id. at 56-57, 137-38, 153-54, 167-68.)10 Presidio also presented evidence 

                                                                

To demonstrate such “reckless disregard,” Presidio must persuade you that ATC 

actually knew, or it was so obvious that ATC should have known, that its actions 

constituted infringement of a valid patent. In deciding whether ATC acted with reckless 

disregard for Presidio’s asserted patents, you should consider all of the facts surrounding 

the alleged infringement including, but not limited to, the following factors: 

1. Whether ATC acted in a manner consistent with the standards of commerce for 

its industry; 

2. Whether ATC intentionally copied a product of Presidio covered by the 

patents; 

3. Whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that ATC did not infringe or had 

a reasonable defense to infringement, including a belief that the patent-in-suit is invalid; 

4. Whether ATC made a good-faith effort to avoid infringing the patent, for 

example, whether ATC attempted to design around the patent; 

5. Whether ATC tried to cover up its alleged infringement. 

(Doc. No. 327 at 35-36.) 

10 ATC argues that this evidence is irrelevant because it predates December 8, 2015 – the date on 

which the relevant period of infringement began under the Court’s intervening rights ruling. (Doc. No. 

400-1 at 10-11.) ATC argues that this evidence can only establish ATC’s knowledge during the noninfringement period. (Id.) The Court disagrees. Evidence of what ATC knew prior to December 8, 

2015 is relevant to what ATC knew after December 8, 2015. (Doc. No. 275 at 12-13.) Indeed, it is 

generally reasonable to infer that if a person knows about something prior to a certain date, that person 

retains that knowledge after that certain date. 

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showing that ATC was aware that the claims as amended had survived three PTO 

reexamination proceedings that ATC itself had instituted. (Doc. No. 304, Trial Tr. Vol. I 

at 143; Doc. No. 305, Trial Tr. Vol. II at 192.) This evidence was sufficient for the jury to 

find that ATC acted with reckless disregard of the claims of the ’356 patent. 

ATC notes that its corporate secretary, Mr. Evan Slavitt, testified that as of 

December 8, 2015 – the date infringement began – he had reason to believe, based on the 

expert reports and pleadings in the case, that ATC was not infringing the ’356 patent. (Doc. 

No. 400-1 (citing Doc. No. 330, Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 216-17; Doc. No. 331, Trial Tr. Vol. 

V at 1-2).) But the jury was not required to credit this testimony. Cf. Harper, 533 F.3d at 

1021 (explaining that in reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court must 

“disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to 

believe”). In addition, the Court notes that the jury found willful infringement by clear and 

convincing evidence – a higher burden of proof than is required after Halo. See 136 S. Ct. 

at 1934. Accordingly, the jury’s willfulness finding was supported by substantial evidence 

and was also not against the clear weight of evidence. 

 Moreover, the Court notes that ATC’s motion on this issue is essentially moot 

because the Court, exercising its sound discretion, ultimately declines to award Presidio 

enhanced damages despite the jury’s finding of willful infringement. See infra. 

Accordingly, the Court denies ATC’s motion for judgment as a matter of law of no willful 

infringement, or in the alternative, for a new trial on the issue of willful infringement. 

 F. Lost Profits 

Presidio moves for judgment as a matter of law of no lost profits, or in the alternative, 

for a new trial on lost profit damages on two grounds. First, ATC argues that Presidio 

failed to establish that it was entitled to lost profit damages because it failed to prove the 

absence of non-infringing alternatives. (Doc. No. 402-1 at 4-13.) Second, ATC argues 

that Presidio failed to establish that it was entitled to lost profit damages because it failed 

to properly apportion between the patented and unpatented features of the accused 

products. (Id. at 13-19.) ATC further argues that because Presidio failed to prove that it 

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is entitled to lost profit damages, Presidio is only entitled to damages in the form of a 

reasonable royalty of $0.25 per capacitor. (Id. at 1, 4.) 

35 U.S.C. § 284 provides: “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the 

claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 

reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 284. 

“The phrase ‘damages adequate to compensate’ means full compensation for any damages 

the patent owner suffered as a result of the infringement. Full compensation includes any 

foreseeable lost profits the patent owner can prove.” Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. MaizeProducts Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

“To recover lost profits damages, the patentee must show a reasonable probability 

that, ‘but for’ the infringement, it would have made the sales that were made by the 

infringer.” Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc); 

accord Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1349 (“To recover lost profits, the patent owner must 

show ‘causation in fact.’”). “A showing under the four-factor Panduit test establishes the 

required causation.” Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013) (citing Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 

(6th Cir. 1978)). The four-factor Panduit test requires the patentee to show: “(1) demand 

for the patented product; (2) absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes; (3) 

manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand; and (4) the amount of profit 

that would have been made.” Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 

702 F.3d 1351, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “Causation of lost profits ‘is a classical jury 

question.’” Versata, 717 F.3d at 1264. 

 i. Available Non-Infringing Alternatives 

ATC argues that the jury’s finding as to the second prong of the Panduit test – that 

there is an absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes – was not supported by 

substantial evidence. (Doc. No. 402-1 at 4.) Specifically, ATC argues that Presidio failed 

to bear its burden of demonstrating that ATC’s 560L capacitor was not an available and 

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acceptable noninfringing product during the relevant infringement period. (Id. at 6.) 

“[T]o be an acceptable non-infringing substitute, the product or process must have 

been available or on the market at the time of infringement.” Grain Processing, 185 F.3d 

at 1349 (emphasis removed). “[M]arket sales of an acceptable noninfringing substitute 

often suffice alone to defeat a case for lost profits.” Id. at 1352. “[A]n available technology 

not on the market during the infringement can constitute a noninfringing alternative.” Id. 

at 1351. But, when the alleged alternative is not on the market during the accounting 

period, a factfinder may reasonably infer that it was not available as a noninfringing 

substitute, and the accused infringer bears the burden of overcoming this inference by 

showing that the substitute was actually available during the accounting period. Id. at 

1353; DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1331 (Fed. 

Cir. 2009). Further, “the ‘[m]ere existence of a competing device does not make that device 

an acceptable substitute.’” Presidio, 702 F.3d at 1361. 

ATC argues that Presidio bears the burden of demonstrating that the 560L capacitor 

is not an available noninfringing product because the 560L capacitor was on the market 

during the relevant infringement period. (Doc. No. 402-1 at 6.) The evidence presented at 

trial showed that ATC sold 88,000 560L capacitors during the relevant infringement 

period. (Doc. No. 330, Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 25, 213; Doc. No. 331, Trial Tr. Vol. V at 152, 

174.) But the evidence in the record showed that all of these sales were to a single 

customer, (id.), and the product is not listed on ATC’s website. (Doc. No. 331, Trial Tr. 

Vol. V at 167.) Presidio’s damages expert, Mr. Thomas, testified that these sales were 

made on an as needed basis, and that the 560L capacitor was not widely advertised or 

touted as a competitive product as to Presidio’s BB capacitor.11 (Id. at 25-27, 29; Doc. No. 

                                                                

11 ATC renews its contention that the Court should have excluded Mr. Thomas from testifying that 

the 560L capacitor does not constitute an available noninfringing alternative. (Doc. No. 402-1 at 22-23; 

see also Doc. No. 251 at 5-11.) The Court again rejects ATC’s contention that the Court should have 

excluded this testimony. Mr. Thomas’s testimony was relevant to Presidio’s assertion of lost profit 

damages, specifically Panduit factor two: “absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes.” See 

Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269, 1288 (Fed. 

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306, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 202-03.) ATC did not present any evidence disputing these 

assertions. In addition, Mr. Lambert Devoe, Presidio’s product manager and CFO, testified 

that he was unaware of the 560L capacitor and that no Presidio customer or sales 

representative has ever mentioned the 560L capacitor to him. (Doc. No. Trial Tr. Vol. II 

at 10-11.) ATC’s own witness testified that the 560 capacitors are not as good as the 550 

capacitors. (Doc. No. 330, Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 211.) Further, in contrast to the 88,000 

560L capacitors sold during the relevant period, ATC sold over a million 550 capacitors 

during the relevant period. (See Doc. No. 330, Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 6.) This evidence in 

the record was sufficient to allow the jury to find that the 560L was not an acceptable noninfringing alternative. 

 ii. Apportionment 

ATC argues that Presidio is not entitled to lost profit damages because it failed to 

separate or apportion its damages between the patented and unpatented features of the 

accused products in its lost profits calculation. (Doc. No. 402-1 at 17.) But ATC has failed 

to show that an apportionment of the jury’s damages award is necessary or appropriate in 

the present circumstances. 

Here, the jury was instructed on apportionment12 and lost profit damages, including 

                                                                

Cir. 2011) (“To be ‘available,’ an acceptable noninfringing substitute must have been ‘available or on 

the market’ at the time of infringement.”). Further, ATC’s challenges to Mr. Thomas’ testimony went to 

the weight of the testimony and its credibility rather than the admissibility of his opinions. See Alaska 

Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., 738 F.3d 960, 970 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming the denial of a 

motion to exclude where the movant’s challenges went to “the weight of the testimony and its 

credibility, not its admissibility”). 

12 The Court’s instruction on apportionment is as follows: 

A damages award-either in the form of lost profits or a reasonable royalty should 

compensate a patentee only for the inventive aspects of its patent. Therefore, if you find 

that ATC infringed the ’356 patent, your damages award must reflect the value you find 

attributable to that patent. 

Where the accused products have patented and non-patented features, you may 

consider an apportionment of the damages between the patented features and the 

unpatented features, so that your award is based only on the value of the patented 

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the Panduit test. (Doc. No. 327 (Court’s Instructions Nos. 30-36, 40).) The jury found that 

Presidio established that it should be awarded lost profit damages. (Doc. No. 328 at 4.) 

Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding as to the second prong of the Panduit test. 

ATC does not challenge the jury’s findings as to the other prongs of the Panduit test. (See 

also Doc. No. 306, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 190-208; Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 1-15 (Mr. Thomas’s 

testimony regarding the four Panduit factors).) Under Federal Circuit law, “[a] showing 

under the four-factor Panduit test establishes the required causation” for lost profit 

damages. Versata, 717 F.3d at 1264; accord Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545 (“When the 

patentee establishes the reasonableness of this inference, e.g., by satisfying the Panduit test, 

it has sustained the burden of proving entitlement to lost profits due to the infringing 

sales.”). Thus, by satisfying the Panduit test, Presidio met its burden of proving causation 

and its entitlement to lost profits. See id. ATC fails to cite to any case holding that, after 

a party has satisfied Panduit’s four-factor test and established entitlement to lost profits, a 

further apportionment of those profits is required.13 Cf. Brocade Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. 

A10 Networks, Inc., No. C 10-3428 PSG, 2013 WL 10601009, at *2 n.12 (N.D. Cal. May 

15, 2013) (noting that the Federal Circuit has suggested “that apportionment—at least as 

consumer demand stands as a way of showing apportionment—is unnecessary under 

                                                                

technology in the Accused Products. On the other hand, if Presidio proves that the patent 

covers the infringing product as a whole and that the lost profits it seeks are tied to the 

intrinsic value of the patented features, you may award damages for lost profits 

attributable to the value of the invention consistent with the Court’s instructions. Presidio 

has the burden of proving damages by a preponderance of the evidence. If Presidio 

proves infringement of a valid patent, you must award damages in no event less than a 

reasonable royalty. Presidio bears the burden to establish a reasonable royalty 

attributable to the patented features. 

(Doc. No.327 (Court’s Instruction No. 40).) “A jury is presumed to follow its instructions.” Weeks, 

528 U.S. at 234. 

13 ATC cites to a Federal Circuit case generally holding that “‘apportionment is required even for 

non-royalty forms of damages.’” (Doc. No. 402-1 at 15 (quoting Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 

F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). But Ericsson did not involve lost profit damages, and, importantly, 

never holds, to extent there is an apportionment requirement for all forms of damages, satisfaction of the 

Panduit test does not satisfy that requirement. 

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Panduit” (citing Versata, 717 F.3d at 1265 (“[T]he Panduit factors place no qualitative 

requirement on the level of demand necessary to show lost profits.”))). 

Further, the Federal Circuit has explained that apportionment principles do not apply 

where the patentee shows that “‘the patented feature creates the basis for customer demand 

or substantially creates the value of the component parts.’” Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 

Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014). ATC itself contends that customers for 

broadband capacitors seek bulk capacitance and low insertion loss at high frequencies and 

those requirements are what drives customers to buy the accused products. (Doc. No. 433 

at 11.) Dr. Huebner, testified that although the accused products contain some internal 

capacitances that help with high frequency performance, the highest frequency 

performance of the capacitors is achieved by the claimed fringe-effect capacitance. (Doc. 

No. 306, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 162-63; see also id. at 27-29, 38-53, 57-63; Doc. No. 331, 

Trial Tr. Vol. V at 222; Doc. No. 330, Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 32-33, 35-37.) Accordingly, 

there was sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to find that the patented feature 

creates the basis for customer demand or substantially creates the value of the accused 

products. 

Moreover, the Federal Circuit has held that apportionment principles do not apply 

when the accused product is the smallest saleable unit, and the asserted claims “cover[] the 

infringing product as a whole, not a single component of a multi-component product.” 

AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 782 F.3d 1324, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see Virnetx, Inc. 

v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2014). ATC does not dispute 

Presidio’s assertion that the 550 capacitors are the smallest saleable units, (see Doc. No. 

433 at 9), and there was substantial evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the asserted 

claims of the ’356 patent cover the accused products as a whole. The asserted claims cover 

an entire multilayer capacitor, and the accused products are multilayers capacitors.14 See 

                                                                

14 ATC argues that Presidio did not invent the multilayer capacitor. (Doc. No. 433 at 8.) This may 

be true, but this fact is of no consequence. In AstraZeneca, the Federal Circuit found that apportionment 

of the damages base at issue was not necessary because the claims covered the product as a whole – “the 

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’356 Patent at 13:26-28, 14:1-2, 14:9-16; ’356 Patent Dec. 8, 2015 Reexamination 

Certificate at 1:23-2:9. Presidio’s infringement expert Dr. Huebner explained how the 

components in the accused products satisfy the various limitations contained in the asserted 

claims. (See Doc. No. 305, Trial Tr. Vol. II. at 243-44, 249-65; Doc. No. 306, Trial Tr. 

Vol. III at 1-80.) ATC argues that the asserted claims do not cover all of the features of 

the accused products because the accused products contain internal electrodes that have a 

unique shape and follow the teachings in U.S. Patent No. 8,446,705. (Doc. No. 402-1 at 

18-19.) But Dr. Huebner testified that the accused products’ internal electrodes satisfy the 

’356 patent’s claim limitations of a “conductive first plate disposed within the dielectric 

body” and a “conductive second plate disposed within the dielectric body and forming a 

capacitor with the first plate.” (Doc. No. 306, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 7-8, 13-14, 16, 18.) 

Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to determine that the 

asserted claims cover the accused products as a whole. 

In sum, the Court rejects ATC’s arguments that the jury’s damages award cannot 

stand because Presidio failed to properly apportion its requested damages. Cf. Virnetx, 

767 F.3d at 1328 (“[W]e have never required absolute precision in [assigning value to the 

patented feature]; on the contrary, it is well-understood that this process may involve some 

degree of approximation and uncertainty.”). Accordingly, the Court denies ATC’s motion 

for judgment as a matter of law of no lost profits, or in the alternative, for a new trial on 

the issue of lost profit damages. 

II. Presidio’s Motion for a Permanent Injunction 

 Presidio moves for the entry of a permanent injunction, enjoining ATC from 

marketing, selling, or offering to sell its 550 capacitors. (Doc. No. 373-1.) The Patent Act 

provides a patentee with the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, 

or selling the [patented] invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). “In furtherance of this right to 

                                                                

drug core, the enteric coating, and the subcoating.” 782 F.3d at 1338. The Federal Circuit reached this 

determination without also finding that AstraZeneca invented a drug core, enteric coating, or subcoating. 

See id. 

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exclude, district courts ‘may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity 

to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems 

reasonable.’” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 638 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 

(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283). 

For a permanent injunction to issue, the party requesting an injunction must 

demonstrate that: (1) it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) legal remedies, such as money 

damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) the balance of hardships 

warrants an injunction; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by an injunction. 

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The Federal Circuit has 

explained that “[t]his analysis proceeds with an eye to the ‘long tradition of equity practice’ 

granting ‘injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent 

cases.’” Presidio, 702 F.3d at 1362; see also Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 

F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Although eBay abolishes our general rule that an 

injunction normally will issue when a patent is found to have been valid and infringed, . . 

. it does not follow that courts should entirely ignore the fundamental nature of patents as 

property rights granting the owner the right to exclude.”). “The decision to grant or deny 

permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable 

on appeal for abuse of discretion.” eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 

 A. Irreparable Harm 

“To satisfy the first eBay factor, the patentee must show that it is irreparably harmed 

by the infringement.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 639 (Fed. Cir. 

2015). “[F]acts relating to the nature of the competition between the parties undoubtedly 

are relevant to the irreparable harm inquiry.” Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1150. ATC and 

Presidio are direct competitors. ATC’s 550 capacitors directly compete with Presidio’s 

BB capacitors.15 (Doc. No. 304, Trial Tr. Vol. I at 143-44; Doc. No. 305, Trial Tr. Vol. II 

                                                                

15 The Court notes that in finding that Presidio established entitlement to lost profit damages 

through the Panduit test, the jury necessarily found that ATC’s 550 capacitors directly compete with 

Presidio’s BB capacitors. See Presidio, 702 F.3d at 1360. 

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at 1-2, 119; Doc. No. 306, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 194, 196.) They are sold in the same market 

and to the same customers and potential customers. (See id.) “Direct competition in the 

same market is certainly one factor suggesting strongly the potential for irreparable harm 

without enforcement of the right to exclude.” Presidio, 702 F.3d at 1363. This is because 

“[w]here two companies are in competition against one another, the patentee suffers the 

harm—often irreparable—of being forced to compete against products that incorporate and 

infringe its own patented inventions.” Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Products Co., 

717 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

Further, Presidio has never licensed the ’356 patent to anyone. (Doc. No. 305, Trial 

Tr. Vol. II at 21-22.) “Presidio’s unwillingness to license favor[s] finding irreparable 

injury.”16 Presidio, 702 F.3d at 1363. 

The jury’s lost profits award also supports a finding of irreparable injury. In finding 

that Presidio established that it is entitled to lost profit damages, “the jury necessarily found 

ATC’s [550] capacitor sales caused Presidio to lose BB capacitor sales. This squarely 

supports a finding of irreparable harm.” Presidio, 702 F.3d at 1363; see Douglas 

Dynamics, 717 F.3d at 1344 (“Irreparable injury encompasses different types of losses that 

are often difficult to quantify, including lost sales . . . .”). In sum, this evidence is sufficient 

to demonstrate irreparable injury. See Presidio, 702 F.3d at 1363-64; Douglas Dynamics, 

717 F.3d at 1344-45. 

To satisfy the first eBay factor, the patentee must not only demonstrate irreparable 

injury, but also prove that the harm is caused by the infringement. Apple, 809 F.3d at 639. 

“This requires proof that a ‘causal nexus relates the alleged harm to the alleged 

                                                                

16 ATC argues that Presidio’s failure to license the ’356 patent should be given no weight because 

the amended claims at issue only came into existence on December 8, 2015 when the reexamination 

certificate for the ’356 patent issued. (Doc. No. 409-1.) But even if the Court only considers the period 

from December 8, 2015 to the present, the evidence in the record shows that Presidio consciously 

decided not to license the ’356 patent during that period. (Doc. No. 305, Trial Tr. Vol. II at 21-22.) 

This decision favors a finding of irreparable injury. See Presidio, 702 F.3d at 1363. 

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infringement.’” Id. “[P]roving a causal nexus requires the patentee to show ‘some 

connection’ between the patented features and the demand for the infringing products.” Id. 

at 641 (“The district court should have determined whether the record established that [the 

infringing] feature impacts customers’ purchasing decisions.”). ATC itself contends that 

customers for broadband capacitors seek bulk capacitance and low insertion loss at high 

frequencies and those requirements are what drives customers to buy the accused products. 

(Doc. No. 409-1 at 11; Doc. No. 433 at 11.) Dr. Huebner, testified that although the 

accused products contain some internal capacitances that help with high frequency 

performance, the highest frequency performance of the capacitors is achieved by the 

claimed fringe-effect capacitance.17 (Doc. No. 306, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 162-63; see also 

id. at 27-29, 38-53, 57-63; Doc. No. 331, Trial Tr. Vol. V at 222.) This evidence is 

sufficient to satisfy the nexus requirement. Cf. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 

1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (characterizing broadband capacitors as “relatively simple 

products” and noting that the causal nexus requirement is more easily satisfied for “simple” 

products); see also Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 

(“As direct competitors in a limited market, [plaintiff]’s harm was clearly linked to 

[defendant]’s infringement of [plaintiff]’s patent property rights.”). 

ATC argues that Presidio cannot establish a causal nexus because Presidio’s BB 

capacitor, which does not practice the invention claimed in the ’356 patent, competes in 

the same market as ATC’s 550 capacitors. (Doc. No. 409-1 at 14-15.) But the Federal 

Circuit explained in the prior litigation that “[e]ven without practicing the claimed 

invention, the patentee can suffer irreparable injury.” Presidio, 702 F.3d at 1363. 

                                                                

17 The Court rejects ATC’s contention that it established at trial that the high frequency 

performance of the accused products is derived solely from their internal electrodes. (Doc. No. 409-1 at 

11-14.) Presidio’s expert, Dr. Huebner, never conceded at trial that the 550 capacitors achieve their high 

frequency performance solely from their internal electrodes. (See Doc. No. 306, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 

127, 162-63; Doc. No. 331, Trial Tr. Vol. V at 220-23.) To the contrary, he specifically testified that 

although the accused products contain some internal capacitances that help with high frequency 

performance, the highest frequency performance of the capacitors is achieved by the claimed fringeeffect capacitance. (Doc. No. 306, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 162-63.) 

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ATC also argues that Presidio has failed to establish irreparable injury because any 

harm Presidio has suffered was caused by lawful “design wins” that occurred prior to 

December 8, 2015. (Doc. No. 409-1 at 15-18.) ATC contends that an injunction cannot 

be entered on account of otherwise lawful competition. (Id. at 15.) The Court recognizes 

that under its intervening rights ruling, ATC is not liable for damages for any sales of 550 

capacitors prior to December 8, 2015. (Doc. No. 234 at 28.) But those sales and the 

resulting harm caused by the sales became infringing and unlawful on December 8, 2015 

once the reexamination certificate with the amended claims issued. ATC’s ongoing sales 

of infringing products, whether resulting from new or historical design wins, result in 

irreparable harm to Presidio. Further, the Federal Circuit has explained that “[t]he causal 

nexus requirement ensures that an injunction is only entered against a defendant on account 

of a harm resulting from the defendant’s wrongful conduct, [and] that an injunction is not 

entered on account of ‘irreparable harm caused by otherwise lawful competition.’” Apple, 

809 F.3d at 640. Here, Presidio has satisfied the causal nexus requirement. 

ATC next argues that Presidio’s nearly five-year delay in filing suit against ATC’s 

550 capacitors weighs against a finding of irreparable injury. A period of delay is one 

circumstance that a district court may consider in the context of the totality of the 

circumstances when evaluating irreparable harm. See Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 

F.2d 1446, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1325 

(Fed. Cir. 2012).18 But “a showing of delay does not preclude, as a matter of law, a 

determination of irreparable harm.” Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1457. Further, the Court in the 

prior litigation entered an amended judgment following the parties’ appeals on September 

19, 2013, and denied Presidio’s motion for relief from judgment on January 27, 2014. 

Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 08-cv-335-GPC (Doc. Nos. 

                                                                

18 The Court notes that these two cases involved a motion for a preliminary injunction, not a 

motion for a permanent injunction. Cf. Lermer Ger. GmbH v. Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed. 

Cir. 1996) (“[Preliminary and permanent injunctions] are distinct forms of equitable relief that have 

different prerequisites and serve entirely different purposes.”). 

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480, 490). Presidio filed the present action on September 2, 2014. (Doc. No. 1.) The 

Court finds that Presidio acted reasonably in waiting for the prior litigation to be fully 

resolved prior to filing the present lawsuit. See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. 

Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (listing “other litigation” as a 

permissible excuse for a delay in filing suit). Accordingly, any delay in filing the present 

action was reasonable and permissible and does not weigh against a finding of irreparable 

injury. 

Finally, ATC argues that Presidio’s inability or refusal to make certain capacitors or 

sell its capacitors to certain customers also shows a lack of irreparable harm. (Doc. No. 

409-1 at 19-22.) First, ATC argues that Presidio is not suffering irreparable harm from 

ATC’s sales of its 550U (100 nF) and 550S (50 volts rating) capacitors because Presidio 

has no competing product for those specific capacitors and thus could not have made those 

sales. (Id. at 19-20.) But this argument is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict. In awarding 

Presidio lost profits damages, the jury necessarily found that Presidio would have made the 

sales that were made by ATC for all of the accused products. See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 

1545 (“To recover lost profits damages, the patentee must show a reasonable probability 

that, ‘but for’ the infringement, it would have made the sales that were made by the 

infringer.”). The jury’s verdict was not limited to any specific types of accused products. 

(See Doc. No. 328 at 4.) Second, ATC argues that Presidio is not suffering harm from 

ATC’s sales of 550 capacitors to certain customers because either Presidio has decided not 

to do business with those customers or those customers will not buy from Presidio. ATC’s 

contention that Presidio will not do business with these customers is not supported by the 

record. The evidence presented at trial shows that Presidio is willing to do business with 

and sell its capacitors to those specific customers. (Doc. No. 305, Trial Tr. Vol. II at 15-

20; Doc. No. 415-3, Devoe Decl. ¶¶ 7-9.) Indeed, the evidence showed that Presidio 

actively sells its BB capacitors to two of the identified customers. (Doc. No. 305, Trial Tr. 

Vol. II at 15; Doc. No. 415-3, Devoe Decl. ¶ 9.) Further, the evidence presented by ATC 

only shows that those two customers have currently decided not to buy Presidio capacitors 

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and are instead buying ATC’s 550 capacitors. (Doc. No. 409-11, Ex. 32; Doc. No. 409-

14, Ex. 35; Doc. No. 409-2, Tessaro Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) The evidence does not show that these 

customers would still refuse to buy Presidio’s capacitors if the 550 capacitors were 

removed from the market. Accordingly, ATC has failed to show that Presidio is unable to 

make sales to those companies. 

In sum, Presidio has shown that it has suffered irreparable harm that is caused by 

ATC’s infringement. The Court rejects ATC’s arguments to the contrary. Accordingly, 

Presidio has satisfied the first eBay factor. 

 B. Inadequate Remedy at Law 

“The second eBay factor is whether ‘remedies available at law, such as monetary 

damages, are inadequate to compensate’ for the irreparable harm suffered by the patentee.” 

Apple, 809 F.3d at 644–45. ATC itself asserts that the accused products operate within a 

“design win” market. (Doc. No. 409-1 at 6-10.) The Federal Circuit has explained that 

“the structural nature of a design win market favors a finding that monetary damages are 

inadequate.” Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 703 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Broadcom, 732 F.3d at 1336, 1338 

(affirming district court’s finding that “money damages were inadequate to compensate 

[plaintiff] largely due to incumbency effects from the design-win market conditions”). 

Presidio’s decision not to license the ’356 patent also supports a finding that 

monetary damages are inadequate. See Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 

1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding whether the patentee has licensed the invention relevant to 

the determination of whether money damages are adequate). Further, this factor favors an 

injunction where “[t]here is no reason to believe that [the defendant] will stop infringing, 

or that the irreparable harms resulting from its infringement will otherwise cease, absent 

an injunction.” Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1155. Presidio has presented the Court with 

evidence showing that ATC continues to offer the accused products for sale even after the 

jury’s verdict. (Doc. No. 372-2, Ex. A.) Further, ATC has represented to the Court that it 

does not intend to discontinue the accused products until an injunction is entered. (Doc. 

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No. 409-1 at 30.) Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that ATC will stop infringing 

absent an injunction, and Presidio has established that money damages are insufficient to 

compensate for the irreparable harm it has suffered. 

 C. Balance of Hardships 

 “To satisfy the third eBay factor, the patentee must show that the balance of 

hardships weighs in its favor.” Apple, 809 F.3d at 645. The balance to be “considered is 

only between a plaintiff and a defendant.” Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 

1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

ATC’s infringement harmed Presidio by causing lost sales and by forcing Presidio 

to compete against its own patented invention, which places a substantial hardship on 

Presidio. See Apple, 809 F.3d at 646 (“Samsung’s infringement harmed Apple by causing 

lost market share and lost downstream sales and by forcing Apple to compete against its 

own patented invention, which ‘places a substantial hardship’ on a patentee, especially here 

where it is undisputed that it is essentially a two-horse race.”); Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 

1156. ATC argues that it will suffer hardships from a permanent injunction because it has 

made substantial investments in the development of it 550 series of capacitors, and an 

abrupt termination of sales would cause it to suffer customer alienation and loss of 

reputation. (Doc. No. 409-1 at 26-27.) But the Federal Circuit has explained that the 

consequences of a defendant’s infringement, such as sunk development costs or loss of 

business, is irrelevant to this factor.19 See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 

863 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 704 (“‘[O]ne who elects to build a 

business on a product found to infringe cannot be heard to complain if an injunction against 

continuing infringement destroys the business so elected.’”). In addition, the Court further 

notes that any potential hardship on ATC would be mitigated by the Court’s inclusion of a 

                                                                

19 The Court also rejects ATC’s argument that it will suffer hardship because it is difficult for ATC 

to know how to modify its capacitors to make them non-infringing. (Doc. No. 409-1 at 28-29.) It has 

been ATC’s contention throughout this litigation that the 560L capacitor that it already manufactures 

and sells does not infringe the ’356 patent. (Doc. No. 202 at 66; Doc. No. 402-1.) 

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90-day sunset provision into the requested injunction. See Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 704 

(finding that inclusion of a sunset provision can ameliorate the potential hardships of an 

injunction). 

“[T]he parties’ sizes, products, and revenue sources” are also relevant factors for 

balancing the hardships. i4i, 598 F.3d at 862. Presidio asserts that ATC and its parent 

company AVX have tens of millions of dollars in cash and a total market cap exceeding 

two billion, while Presidio is a small, family-owned company. (Doc. No. 373-1 at 20 

(citing Doc. No. 373-15, Ex. N); Doc. No. 415 at 11; see also Doc. No. 414 at 7-8.) ATC 

does not contest these assertions. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of issuing an 

injunction. 

D. Public Interest 

“The fourth eBay factor requires the patentee to show that ‘the public interest would 

not be disserved by a permanent injunction.’” Apple, 809 F.3d at 646. “[T]he public is 

best served by enforcing patents that are likely valid and infringed.” Abbott Labs. v. Andrx 

Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “As a result, the public interest nearly 

always weighs in favor of protecting property rights in the absence of countervailing 

factors.” Apple, 809 F.3d at 647. 

ATC argues that the public interest would be disserved by an injunction because the 

accused products provide unusual societal benefits to critical government, military, space, 

and infrastructure applications. (Doc. No. 409-1 at 29-30.) ATC argues that enjoining the 

550 capacitors would cause important government, military, space, and infrastructure 

projects to suffer. (Id.) The Court rejects ATC’s contention that its products provide 

unusual societal benefits. Cf. Apple, 809 F.3d at 647 (“[The patentee] does not seek to 

enjoin the sale of lifesaving drugs.”). The evidence ATC presented in support of this 

contention only shows that ATC has certain government and infrastructure clients that have 

purchased 550 capacitors and would prefer to be able to continue to purchase them in the 

future. (Doc. No. 409-3, Rabe Decl. ¶¶ 10-14; Doc. No. 409-2, Tessaro Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) 

ATC and its evidence fails to specifically identify any government, military, space or 

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infrastructure projects that would actually suffer if the 550 capacitors were removed from 

the market. ATC has not established that these unnamed projects could not continue with 

the use of other products.20 Further, the Court notes that any potential harm to the public 

would be mitigated by the inclusion of a 90-day sunset provision into the requested 

injunction. See Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 704 (“[T]he sunset provisions mitigate the harm to 

the public.”). Accordingly, this factor favors entry of a permanent injunction. 

E. Conclusion 

Weighing the above factors and the equities in this case, the Court, exercising its 

sound discretion, concludes that a permanent injunction is appropriate. Accordingly, the 

Court grants Presidio’s motion for a permanent injunction. The Court will enter the 

permanent injunction in a separate order. 

i. Presidio’s Proposed Injunction 

Presidio has submitted a proposed permanent injunction. (Doc. No. 373-16, Ex. O.) 

In paragraph three of its proposed permanent injunction, Presidio proposes the following 

language: 

It is hereby Ordered that ATC and its successors, assigns, officers, 

agents, servants, employees, and persons in active concert or participation 

with them, including any parent and subsidiary entities during the period 

commencing on the date hereof and through the date of expiration of the ‘356 

patent are hereby enjoined and restrained from infringing Claims 1-5, 16, and 

18-19 of the ‘356 patent and are further hereby enjoined and restrained from 

making, using, selling, or offering to sell in the United States, or importing 

into the United States: the 550L, 550Z, 550S, and 550U capacitors; any other 

product that is only colorably different from the 550L, 550Z, 550S, and 550U 

capacitors. 

                                                                

20 The Court finds ATC’s inability to specifically identify any concrete harm that would occur 

significant in light of the fact that ATC previously discontinued its 545L capacitor after that capacitor 

was found to infringe the ’356 patent in the prior litigation. Yet ATC cannot identify any concrete harm 

that resulted from the discontinuance of that product, particularly in light of counsel’s prior 

representations to the Court that the 545L capacitors performed better than the 550 capacitors. (Doc. 

No. 211 at 29-30.) 

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(Id.) 

The Court adopts the majority of the language contained in Presidio’s proposed 

permanent injunction. The Court rejects Presidio’s inclusion of ATC’s “successors, 

assigns,” and “parent and subsidiary entities” into the language of the injunction. The 

Federal Circuit has explained that “Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

specifies the proper form and scope of an injunction issued by a district court.” Int’l 

Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 383 F.3d 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Rule 65(d)(2) 

provides: Every order granting an injunction “binds only the following . . . : (A) the parties; 

(B) the parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons 

who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or 

(B).” Rule 65(d) does not list successors, assigns, parents, and subsidiaries as those among 

whom an injunction may be made binding upon. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharm. 

Labs., Inc., 843 F.2d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Rule 65(d) . . . does not include 

successors and assigns as among those whom an injunction is ‘binding only upon.’”). 

The Court also excludes from the injunction the language stating that ATC is 

“enjoined and restrained from infringing Claims 1-5, 16, and 18-19 of the ’356 patent.” 

“In the patent infringement context, [the Federal Circuit] has rejected as overly broad a 

permanent injunction that simply prohibits future infringement of a patent.” Int’l Rectifier, 

383 F.3d at 1316. The Federal Circuit has explained that “the only acts the injunction may 

prohibit are infringement of the patent by the adjudicated devices and infringement by 

devices not more than colorably different from the adjudicated devices.” Id.; see also, e.g., 

Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 479–80 (Fed. 

Cir. 1993) (rejecting permanent injunction where the order did “not state which acts of 

[defendant] constitute infringement of the . . . patent” and the order did “not limit its 

prohibition to the manufacture, use, or sale of the specific infringing device, or to infringing 

devices no more than colorably different from the infringing device”). In addition, the 

Court notes that similar modifications were made to Presidio’s proposed permanent 

injunction in the prior litigation on these same grounds. See Presidio Components, Inc. v. 

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Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 08-cv-335-GPC (Doc. No. 473 at 17-19). 

 ii. ATC’s Request for a Stay Pending Appeal and a Sunset Provision 

ATC argues that in the event the Court grants Presidio’s motion for a permanent 

injunction, the Court should stay the injunction pending an appeal and provide a one-year 

sunset provision in the injunction. (Doc. No. 409-1 at 31.) In deciding whether to grant a 

stay pending appeal, the Court “assesses the movant’s chances of success on the merits and 

weighs the equities as they affect the parties and the public.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & 

Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 835 F.2d 277, 278 (Fed. Cir. 1987); accord Standard Havens 

Prods. v. Gencor Indus., 897 F.2d 511 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Exercising its sound discretion, 

the Court declines to stay the injunction pending appeal. Based on the Court’s review of 

the record and the totality of the circumstances in this case, the Court concludes that ATC 

has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on appeal. Indeed, in its request, ATC 

fails to even address this factor. Further, the Court concludes that the equities do not weigh 

in favor of granting a stay. 

Exercising its sound discretion, the Court declines to include the requested one-year 

sunset provision into the permanent injunction, but will include a 90-day sunset provision. 

ATC has had ample time and notice to prepare for the possibility that this Court would 

enter a permanent injunction in this action. A permanent injunction was entered in the 

prior litigation. Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., No. 08-cv-335-

GPC (Doc. No. 473 at 19); see also Presidio, 702 F.3d at 1362-63. The jury rendered its 

infringement verdict and awarded Presidio lost profit damages on April 18, 2016 – several 

months ago. (Doc. No. 328.) The Court issued its memorandum decision rejecting ATC’s 

invalidity and equitable defenses on June 17, 2016 – two months ago. (Doc. No. 368.) The 

Court concludes that under the totality of the circumstances a one-year sunset provision is 

unnecessary and, instead, a 90-day sunset provision is appropriate.21 Accordingly, the 

                                                                

21 At the hearing, Presidio stated that it would not object to the inclusion of a 90-day sunset 

provision into the permanent injunction. 

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Court includes a 90-day sunset provision into its permanent injunction. 

IV. Presidio’s Motion for Enhanced Damages 

 Presidio moves for an award of enhanced damages pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 284. 

(Doc. No. 377-1 at 3-24.) Section 284 provides that a court “may increase the damages up 

to three times the amount found or assessed.” 35 U.S.C. § 284. In Halo Elecs., Inc. v. 

Pulse Elecs., Inc., the Supreme Court held that “[s]ection 284 gives district courts the 

discretion to award enhanced damages against those guilty of patent infringement.”22 136 

S. Ct. at 1935. But the Supreme Court further explained that although “[d]istrict courts 

enjoy discretion in deciding whether to award enhanced damages, and in what amount”, 

that discretion is not without limits. Id. at 1932. 

Enhanced damages are generally appropriate under § 284 only in “egregious cases” 

of misconduct beyond typical infringement and should not be awarded in “garden-variety 

cases.” Id. at 1932, 1934-35. “The sort of conduct warranting enhanced damages has been 

variously described . . . as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously 

wrongful, flagrant, or – indeed – characteristic of a pirate.” Id. at 1932. The culpability of 

the infringer should be “measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the 

challenged conduct.” Id. at 1933. In determining whether enhanced damages are 

appropriate, “courts should . . . take into account the particular circumstances of each case.” 

Id.; see also id. at 1935 (“In applying this discretion, district courts are ‘to be guided by 

[the] sound legal principles’ developed over nearly two centuries of application and 

interpretation of the Patent Act.”). 

 In Halo, the Supreme Court also explained that entitlement to enhanced damages 

need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1934. And a district court’s 

determination of whether to award enhanced damages is reviewed for abuse of discretion 

                                                                

22 In Halo, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s Seagate test for determining whether 

enhanced damages are appropriate as “‘unduly rigid,’” as “‘it impermissibly encumbers [section 284’s] 

grant of discretion to district courts.’” 136 S. Ct. at 1932; see also id. at 1933-34 (“Section 284 permits 

district courts to exercise their discretion in a manner free from the inelastic constraints of the Seagate 

test.”). 

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on appeal. Id. 

 After reviewing the particular circumstances in this case, including the record and 

the parties’ arguments, the Court, exercising its sound discretion, declines to award 

Presidio enhanced damages. The Court begins by noting that the jury found that ATC 

willfully infringed the ’356 patent, (Doc. No. 328 at 4), and the Court has denied ATC’s 

post-trial motion challenging the jury’s willfulness finding. See supra. But both the 

Supreme Court in Halo and the Federal Circuit in WBIP have held an award of enhanced 

damages need not follow a finding of willful infringement. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 

(“[N]one of this is to say that enhanced damages must follow a finding of egregious 

misconduct.”); WBIP, 2016 WL 3902668, at *15 n.13 (“[T]his is not to say that a jury 

verdict of willful infringement ought to result in enhanced damages.”). Thus, the Court 

may still exercise its discretion and decline to award enhanced damages based on the 

particular circumstances in this case even though there has been a finding of willful 

infringement.23 See id.; see, e.g., Trustees of Boston Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., No. 12-

11935-PBS, 2016 WL 3976617, at *3 (D. Mass. July 22, 2016) (finding, in its discretion, 

that the case did not warrant an award of enhanced damages even though the jury found 

willful infringement). 

 Here, the unique circumstances of this case do not warrant an award of enhanced 

damages. At the summary judgment stage, the Court granted ATC’s motion for summary 

judgment in its favor on its defense of absolute intervening rights. (Doc. No. 234.) In that 

                                                                

23 Presidio argues that a jury’s finding of willful infringement creates a presumption in favor of an 

award of enhanced damages. The Court rejects Presidio’s contention. First, Halo itself contains no 

mention of a presumption in favor of enhanced damages upon a finding of willful infringement. Second, 

and more importantly, the case Presidio cites in support of its argument does not mention a presumption 

in favor of enhanced damages upon a finding of willful infringement. (See Doc. No. 377-1 at 5 (citing 

Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).) The Federal Circuit’s decision in Jurgens 

never refers to a presumption in favor of an award of enhanced damages. The Jurgens court only held 

that “[u]pon a finding of willful infringement, a trial court should provide reasons for not increasing a 

damages award or for not finding a case exceptional for the purpose of awarding attorneys fees.” 80 

F.3d at 1572. Thus, even assuming the Jurgens standard still applies post-Halo, this Court’s decision 

complies with Jurgens as the Court provides its reasoning for not awarding enhanced damages. 

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order, the Court held that due to Presidio narrowing the asserted claims during 

reexamination proceedings, Presidio is only entitled to infringement damages for the time 

period following the issuance of the December 8, 2015 reexamination certificate. (Id. at 

28.) Thus, the period of infringement in the present case began on December 8, 2015. 

This fact is important to the Court’s analysis because, in Halo, the Supreme Court 

explained that an infringer’s culpability should be measured at the time of the challenged 

conduct. 136 S. Ct. at 1933; see also WBIP, 2016 WL 3902668, at *15 (“[A]s the Supreme 

Court explained in Halo, timing does matter.”). ATC began selling the accused products 

in January 2010. Under the Court’s intervening rights ruling, ATC is not liable for any 

sales of 550 capacitors that occurred prior to December 8, 2015. Therefore, at the time 

infringement of the asserted claims began on December 8, 2015, ATC had already been 

permissibly selling the accused products without being subject to damages liability for 

almost six years. Moreover, at the time infringement began, Presidio and ATC were well 

into the present litigation. Specifically, by December 8, 2015, ATC had received the 

Court’s claim construction order, developed noninfringement and invalidity theories that 

were supported by expert reports, and filed motions for summary judgment on several 

issues. (Doc. No. 149.) By December 8, 2015, ATC had also just succeeded in causing 

Presidio to substantively narrow the scope of the asserted claims in reexamination 

proceedings that ATC instituted. Thus, under the unique circumstances of the present case, 

the Court declines to find that the willful infringement that occurred in the case after 

December 8, 2015 constitutes an “egregious” case of misconduct warranting an award of 

enhanced damages. Rather, the present action was a “garden-variety” hard-fought patent 

infringement action between two competitors. 

Moreover, the Court notes that Presidio’s invalidity defense at trial, although 

ultimately rejected by the Court, was not meritless. The Court also notes that there was no 

evidence of bad faith or litigation misconduct by ATC in this action. Accordingly, the 

Court, exercising its sound discretion, declines to award enhanced damages. The Court 

denies Presidio’s motion for enhanced damages. 

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V. Presidio’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees 

 Presidio also moves for attorney’s fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285. (Doc. No.377-

1 at 25-30.) “Section 285 of the Patent Act authorizes a district court to award attorney’s 

fees in patent litigation.” Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 

1749, 1752 (2014). Section 285 provides: “The court in exceptional cases may award 

reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. “When deciding 

whether to award attorney fees under § 285, a district court engages in a two-step inquiry.” 

MarcTec, LLC v. Johnson & Johnson, 664 F.3d 907, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The court first 

determines whether the prevailing party has proven that the case is “exceptional,” and, if 

so, the court then determines whether an award of attorney’s fees is justified. Id. at 1915-

16. 

The Supreme Court has held that “an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out 

from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position 

(considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner 

in which the case was litigated.” Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (stating that 

“exceptional” means “‘uncommon,’ ‘rare,’ or ‘not ordinary’”). “District courts may 

determine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, 

considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id. In determining whether to award fees, 

district courts may consider a nonexclusive list of factors, including “‘frivolousness, 

motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the 

case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation 

and deterrence.’” Id. at 1756 n.6. “[A] case presenting either subjective bad faith or 

exceptionally meritless claims may sufficiently set itself apart from mine-run cases to 

warrant a fee award.” Id. at 1757. There is no precise rule or formula for determining 

whether to award attorney’s fees, but instead equitable discretion should be exercised in 

light of the above considerations. Id. at 1756. 

Entitlement to fees under § 285 must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. 

See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1758. A district court’s determination of whether to award 

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attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Highmark Inc. 

v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749 (2014) (“[T]he determination of 

whether a case is ‘exceptional’ under § 285 is a matter of discretion.”). 

After reviewing the totality of the circumstances including the record in this action 

and the parties’ arguments, the Court declines to find that the present case is “exceptional” 

and declines to award Presidio attorney’s fees. In the present action, Presidio accused 

ATC’s 550 capacitors of infringing the ’356 patent, asserting a period of infringement 

beginning in January 2010 when Presidio began selling the accused products. (Doc. No. 

285-1, Thomas Expert Report at 14, 28-31.) Based on this asserted period of infringement, 

Presidio initially sought over $16 million in lost profit damages for the period of first 

quarter of 2010 through September 13, 2015. (Id.) At the summary judgment stage, ATC 

successfully obtained summary judgment in its favor on its affirmative defense of absolute 

intervening rights based on Presidio’s narrowing of the scope of the asserted claims during 

ex parte reexamination proceedings that were instituted by ATC. (Doc. No. 234.) Because 

of this substantive change to the scope the asserted claims, the Court held that Presidio is 

only entitled to infringement damages in this case for the time period following the 

issuance of the December 8, 2015 reexamination certificate. (Id. at 28.) Thus, although 

Presidio ultimately prevailed at trial on the issues of infringement, willful infringement, 

and validity of the ’356 patent and was awarded over $2 million in lost profits damages, 

prior to the trial, ATC prevailed on its absolute intervening rights defense, thereby 

substantially limiting the period of infringement at issue in the case and the damages 

Presidio could seek. Thus, the present case was not a one-sided victory by Presidio. 

Moreover, the Court notes that Presidio’s invalidity defense at trial, although 

ultimately rejected by the Court, was not meritless. The Court also notes that there was no 

evidence of bad faith or litigation misconduct by ATC in this action. The present action 

was a garden-variety hard-fought patent infringement action between two competitors. 

Accordingly, the Court, exercising its sound discretion, declines to find the present case 

“exceptional” and declines to award Presidio attorney’s fees. The Court denies Presidio’s 

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motion for attorney’s fees. 

VI. Presidio’s Motion for Supplemental Damages 

 Presidio moves for an award of supplemental damages for any sales of accused 

products occurring on and after February 21, 2016 – the date on which ATC last provided 

sales information for the accused products. (Doc. No. 372-1 at 1-3.) Specifically, Presidio 

requests (1) that the Court order ATC to account for all 550 capacitor sales made 

subsequent to the latest sales data ATC provided and that was utilized at trial, and (2) that 

the Court award it supplement damages on those as yet unaccounted for sales at the lost 

profits rate adopted by the jury – $1.58 per unit.24 (Id. at 2.) 

 28 U.S.C. § 284 provides: “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the 

claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 

reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest 

and costs as fixed by the court. When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall 

assess them.” The Federal Circuit has explained that a patentee is not fully compensated 

if the damages award does not include future lost sales. Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing 

Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, 

Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A damages award for pre-verdict sales of the 

infringing product does not fully compensate the patentee because it fails to account for 

post-verdict sales of repair parts.”). Therefore, a district court should award compensation 

for any infringing sales not assessed by the jury. See Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1213; Apple, Inc. 

v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 67 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1117-18 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 816 F.3d 

788 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In addition, “[c]ourts routinely grant motions for a further accounting 

where the jury did not consider certain periods of infringing activity post-verdict.” Metso 

Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen Int’l Distribution Ltd., 833 F. Supp. 2d 333, 347 (E.D.N.Y. 

2011); accord Apple, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. “Courts have [also] applied this reasoning 

                                                                

24 Presidio asserts that the jury awarded Presidio lost profits damages in the amount of $2,166,654 

based on ATC’s sale of 1,371,300 units. (Doc. No. 372-1 at 2 (citing Doc. No. 328 at 4).) $2,166,654 

divided by 1,371,300 units equals $1.58 per unit. 

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to the situation in which an infringer provides sales data that does not cover all sales made 

prior to trial.” Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. TEK Glob. S.R.L., No. 5:11-CV-00774-PSG, 2014 

WL 1008183, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2014). An award of supplemental damages should 

be calculated consistent with the damages awarded in the jury’s verdict. ActiveVideo 

Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 2:10CV248, 2011 WL 4899922, at *2 

(E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2011); see, e.g., Sealant Sys., 2014 WL 1008183, at *5; Mondis Tech. 

Ltd. v. Chimei InnoLux Corp., 822 F. Supp. 2d 639, 643 (E.D. Tex. 2011). 

 Presidio has presented the Court with evidence showing that ATC continues to offer 

the accused products for sale even after the jury’s verdict. (Doc. No. 372-2, Ex. A.) 

Further, ATC has represented to the Court that it does not intend to discontinue the accused 

products until an injunction is entered. (Doc. No. 409-1 at 30.) Accordingly, Presidio is 

entitled to an accounting of and supplemental damages on any sales of infringing products 

not assessed by the jury. See Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1213; Apple, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 1117-18; 

Sealant Sys., 2014 WL 1008183, at *5. 

 In response, ATC does not dispute Presidio’s contention that it is entitled to 

supplemental damages for sales of accused products made on or after February 21, 2016 at 

a rate of $1.58 per unit. Rather, ATC only argues that Presidio’s motion is premature 

because ATC’s motions for judgment as a matter of law are still pending. (Doc. No. 409-

24 at 11.) The Court rejects this argument. ATC fails to explain why the Court cannot 

concurrently rule on both ATC’s post-trial motions and Presidio’s motion for supplemental 

damages. Moreover, the Court has ruled on and denied ATC’s post-trial motions, and, 

therefore, the motions are no longer pending. See supra. Accordingly, the Court grants 

Presidio’s motion for supplemental damages. The Court orders ATC to account for all 550 

capacitor sales made subsequent to the latest sales data it provided to Presidio and that was 

utilized at trial and prior to the entry of the Court’s permanent injunction. Further, the 

Court awards Presidio supplemental damages on those as yet unaccounted for sales at the 

rate of $1.58 per unit. 

/// 

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VII. Presidio’s Motion for Interest 

 A. Prejudgment Interest 

 Presidio moves for an award of prejudgment interest on its damages award. (Doc. 

No. 372-1 at 3-6.) Specifically, Presidio requests a prejudgment interest rate of 7 percent. 

(Id. at 4.) 28 U.S.C. § 284 provides: “the court shall award the claimant damages adequate 

to compensate for the infringement . . . together with interest and costs as fixed by the 

court.” The Supreme Court has interpreted section 284 to require that “prejudgment 

interest should ordinarily be awarded absent some justification for withholding such an 

award[.]” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657 (1983); see also 

Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[P]rejudgment 

interest is the rule, not the exception.”). The purpose of prejudgment interest is to 

“compensate[] the patent owner for the use of its money between the date of injury and the 

date of judgment.” Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

“Generally, prejudgment interest should be awarded from the date of infringement to the 

date of judgment.” Nickson Indus., Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795, 800 (Fed. Cir. 

1988). 

 In response, ATC argues that the Court should deny Presidio’s request for 

prejudgment interest based on Presidio’s undue delay in filing the present action. (Doc. 

No. 409-24 at 2-7.) The Court rejects ATC’s contention. “District courts have discretion 

to limit prejudgment interest where, for example, the patent owner has caused undue delay 

in the lawsuit, but there must be justification bearing a relationship to the award.” Nickson, 

847 F.2d at 800 (citations omitted); see Gen. Motors Corp., 461 U.S. at 657 (“[I]t may be 

appropriate to limit prejudgment interest, or perhaps even deny it altogether, where the 

patent owner has been responsible for undue delay in prosecuting the lawsuit.”). But here 

there was no undue delay in filing the action. Presidio filed the present action on September 

2, 2014. (Doc. No. 1.) In granting ATC’s motion for summary judgment of its affirmative 

defense of absolute intervening rights, the Court held that Presidio is entitled to 

infringement damages only for the time period following the issuance of the December 8, 

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2015 reexamination certificate. (Doc. No. 234 at 28.) Thus, Presidio initiated the present 

action prior to the entire period of infringement at issue in this case. Indeed, Presidio is 

only seeking prejudgment interest from December 8, 2015 through June 17, 2016. (Doc. 

No. 412 at 3.) Moreover, even if the Court were to consider the relevant period to have 

begun in 2010 when ATC began selling the accused products, the Court finds that Presidio 

acted reasonably in waiting for the prior litigation to be fully resolved prior to filing the 

present lawsuit. See A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1033 (listing “other litigation” as a 

permissible excuse for a delay in filing suit). 

 ATC also argues that if the Court awards prejudgment interest, it should be at the 

three-month U.S. Treasury Bill rate. The Court agrees with ATC on this point. “A trial 

court is afforded wide latitude in the selection of interest rates” for prejudgment interest. 

Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1991); accord BioRad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 807 F.2d 964, 969 (Fed. Cir. 1986). “Courts 

may use the prime rate, the prime rate plus a percentage, the U.S. Treasury Bill rate, state 

statutory rate, corporate bond rate, or whatever rate the court deems appropriate.” Apple, 

67 F. Supp. 3d at 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon 

Commc’ns, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-248, 2011 WL 4899922, at *3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2011) 

(“[W]hile courts have selected different rates, courts most often award either the prime rate 

or the U.S. Treasury rate.”). In patent cases, courts typically only award prejudgment 

interest at the prime rate or higher where there is evidence that the patent owner would 

have been spared from borrowing money at the prime rate during the infringement period 

had the infringer been paying royalties. See Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., No. 13-

CV-03999-BLF, 2016 WL 3880774, at *18 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016); Apple, 67 F. Supp. 

3d at 1121-22; Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 128, 133 (D. N.J. May 

22, 2007). Here, Presidio has not put forth any evidence showing that it borrowed any 

money during the infringement period at the prime rate or higher. Accordingly, the Court 

concludes that the appropriate rate is the U.S. Treasury Bill rate. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. 

v. NEC Corp., 115 F.3d 947, 955 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding no abuse of discretion where 

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“the district court, in exercises of its discretion, awarded prejudgment interest and set the 

rate at the U.S. Treasury bill rate, compounded annually”); see also Apple, 67 F. Supp. 3d 

at 1122 (“The Treasury Bill rate has been accepted and employed by many courts in patent 

cases as a reasonable method of placing a patent owner in a position equivalent to where it 

would have been had there been no infringement.”). Accordingly, the Court grants 

Presidio’s motion and awards Presidio prejudgment interest at the 3-month U.S. Treasury 

Bill rate, compounded monthly.25

 B. Postjudgment Interest 

 Presidio also moves for an award of postjudgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1961. (Doc. No. 372-1 at 6-7.) An “award of postjudgment interest is governed by 28 

U.S.C. § 1961.” Tinsley v. Sea-Land Corp., 979 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1992). Section 

1961 provides “[i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered 

in a district court” and “shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment.” 

“Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1961, postjudgment interest on a district court 

judgment is mandatory.” Air Separation, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 45 

F.3d 288, 290 (9th Cir. 1995). 

ATC concedes that Presidio is entitled to postjudgment interest at the rate provided 

in 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) from the date of the entry of judgment, June 17, 2016. (Doc. No. 

409-24 at 11.) Accordingly, the Court grants Presidio’s motion and awards Presidio 

postjudgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 at the statutory rate from the date of 

the entry of judgment, June 17, 2016. 

/// 

                                                                

25 Whether the prejudgment interest “should be compounded or uncompounded [is] left largely to 

the discretion of the district court.” Bio-Rad Labs., 807 F.2d at 969. “Courts ‘have recognized that 

compounding is necessary to fully compensate the patentee.’” Apple, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 1122; see also 

Finjan, 2016 WL 3880774, at *18 (“‘[M]ost [courts] apply some form of compounding.’”). The Court, 

exercising its discretion, agrees with Presidio that the prejudgment interest should be compounded 

monthly. See, e.g., Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1223, 2013 WL 6231533, at *30 (W.D. 

Mich. Aug. 7, 2013). 

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Conclusion 

 For the reasons above, the Court: 

1. Denies ATC’s Rule 50(b) motions for judgment as matter of law and Rule 59(e) 

motions for new trial; 

2. Grants Presidio’s motion for a permanent injunction; 

3. Denies Presidio’s motion for enhanced damages and attorney’s fees; and 

4. Grants Presidio’s motion for an award of supplemental damages and interest. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 17, 2016 

 

 MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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