Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02151/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02151-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

BELINDA B. FULTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-2151 PHX MEA

)

JOANNE BARNHART, Commissioner )

of Social Security, ) MEMORANDUM & ORDER

)

Defendant. )

________________________________)

The parties have consented to have all proceedings in

this case conducted before a United States Magistrate Judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff, Ms. Belinda Fulton, brought this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the

final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration, Defendant Joanne Barnhart (the “Commissioner”),

denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits

pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, codified at 42

U.S.C. §§ 401-433. 

I Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance

benefits and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits on

June 28, 2002. Administrative Record on Appeal (“R.”) (Docket

No. 9A) at 69-70. Plaintiff’s application for benefits was

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1 In an unpublished opinion in a Social Security case arising in the

District of Arizona, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: “Although

the parties and the District Court refer to the District Court’s disposition

as ‘summary judgment,’ such terminology is most inaccurate.” Shafer v.

Barnhart, 120 Fed. App. 688, 691 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, the Court will

not recite the standard of review regarding a motion for summary judgment

pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although the motions

before the Court are styled as motions for summary judgment.

-2- 

denied initially and on appeal. Id. at 22. Plaintiff requested

a hearing regarding her eligibility for benefits, which was

conducted before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on April

14, 2004. Id. at 22 & 47. The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not

disabled as that term is defined by the federal Social Security

statutes and denied Plaintiff benefits. Id. at 30. The Social

Security Appeals Council denied review of this decision,

rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of Defendant,

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, for

purposes of judicial review. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (2005).

Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Judicial Review of

Administrative Determination of Claim for Social Security

Disability Benefits on July 21, 2005. Plaintiff alleges in her

Complaint that the ALJ erred in her findings of fact and

application of the law when concluding that Plaintiff is not

disabled as that term is defined by the Social Security

statutes.

II Standard of review

The Court’s jurisdiction extends to review the final

decision of Defendant denying Plaintiff’s application for Social

Security disability benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).

Plaintiff and Defendant have filed motions seeking judgment as

a matter of law. See Docket No. 13 & Docket No. 17.1

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Judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner is

based upon the pleadings and the record of the contested

decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2003 & Supp. 2005). The

scope of the Court’s review is limited to determining whether

the Commissioner, i.e., the ALJ, applied the correct legal

standards to Plaintiff’s claim and whether the record as a whole

contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings of

fact. See id. § 423; Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953

(9th Cir. 2001); Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir.

2001). If an ALJ’s error was harmless, the case need not be

remanded for further proceedings. See Batson v. Commissioner of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004); Curry v.

Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1990); Booz v. Secretary

of Health & Human Servs., 734 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1984) 

Satisfying the substantial evidence standard requires

more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of

evidence. See, e.g., Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953. Substantial

evidence has been defined as the amount of relevant evidence

that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. See, e.g., Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113

(9th Cir. 1999). Evidence is insubstantial if it is

overwhelmingly contradicted by other evidence in the

administrative record. See Threet v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 1185,

1189 (10th Cir. 2003); Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d

Cir. 1983); Robison v. Barnhart, 316 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163 (D.

Del. 2004); Rodriguez v. Barnhart, 252 F. Supp. 2d 329, 332

(N.D. Tex. 2003); Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F. Supp. 2d 496, 501

(M.D. Pa. 2000). 

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Because the ALJ is responsible for weighing the

evidence, resolving conflicts, and making independent findings

of fact, the Court may not decide the facts anew, re-weigh the

evidence, and decide whether a claimant is or is not disabled.

See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001); Powers v.

Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434-35 (7th Cir. 2000). If the evidence

can support either outcome, the reviewing court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Holohan v.

Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001); Casey v.

Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th

Cir. 1993). However, the Commissioner’s decision “cannot be

affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting

evidence.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th

Cir. 2001). 

III Statement of the Law

Title II of the Social Security Act provides for the

payment of benefits to individuals who suffer from a

“disability.” See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D) (2003 & Supp. 2005).

To establish eligibility for disability benefits under

the Social Security Act, the claimant must show that: (1) she

suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental

impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than twelve months, see id. § 423(d)(1)(A); and (2) the

impairment renders the claimant incapable of performing the work

that the claimant previously performed and incapable of

performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists

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-5- 

in the national economy. See id. § 423(d)(2)(A). If a claimant

meets both of these requirements, she is by definition

“disabled.” See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. 

The Social Security Administration regulations

prescribe a five-step sequential process for determining whether

a claimant is “disabled.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2005). The

burden of proof is on the claimant throughout steps one to four.

See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. If a claimant is found to be

“disabled” or “not disabled” at any step in the sequential

process, there is no need to proceed to the subsequent step(s).

See id.

First, the claimant must establish that she is not

gainfully employed at the time of her application. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) (2005). Next, the claimant must be

suffering from a “medically severe” impairment or “combination

of impairments.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The third step is

to determine whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals

one of the “listed” impairments included in Appendix 1 to this

section of the Code of Federal Regulations. See id. §

404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments meet or

equal one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, the claimant

is conclusively “disabled.” See id. The fourth step of the

process requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant can

perform work similar to work she has performed in the past. A

claimant whose “residual functional capacity” allows her to

perform “past relevant work” despite her impairments, will be

denied benefits. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant

cannot perform her past relevant work, at step five the burden

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shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant can

perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the

national economy. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Tackett, 180

F.3d at 1098.

IV Statement of Facts

Plaintiff was born in 1957 and was approximately 44

years old at the time she filed her application for disability

benefits in June of 2002. Record on Appeal (“R.”) (Docket No.

9A) at 28 & 420. Plaintiff did not complete high school and

previously worked as a grocery store cashier. Id. at 23 & 100.

Plaintiff’s application for benefits alleged she could not work,

due to asthma and back pain, as of May 8, 2001. Id. at 65 & 69

& 72. Plaintiff’s application was later amended to allege an

inability to work as of June 30, 2002, as Plaintiff had worked

after May 8, 2001, and before June 30, 2002. Id. at 137.

Plaintiff is insured for disability benefits through at least

December 31, 2007. Id. at 23.

In 2001 through at least October of 2002, Plaintiff

resided in Oregon. See id. at 70. Plaintiff was injured in an

automobile accident in May of 2001. Id. at 142-43. A

physician’s notes dated May 9, 2001, indicate Plaintiff had no

visible head trauma, but that she had diffuse neck discomfort.

Id. at 155. The doctor ordered a spinal CT scan. Id. The

doctor stated: “I did not see problems with her thoracic spine

CT or her cervical spine CT ... We reviewed the CAT scan that

she already had at [another hospital].” Id. at 156. The doctor

was concerned with the condition of Plaintiff’s heart. Id.

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-7- 

 Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Libby, a pulmonary

specialist and treating physician, by Dr. Dougherty, her primary

care physician and treating physician, in 2001, for testing

regarding her respiratory problems. Id. at 281. On May 16,

2001, Dr. Libby noted: 

Over the last 5-10 years she’s had recurrent

respiratory problems characterized by cough,

sputum production, wheezy breathing, and

difficulty breathing. These have gotten

progressively more frequent...

She was seen by Dr. Maunder in 1999, she had

a normal full PFT’s, normal CAT scan of the

chest, high resolution technique, and was

originally scheduled for methacholine

challenge, but apparently that never

occurred. Eventually, she was told by Dr.

Dougherty that Dr. Maunder thought a lot of

this was psychogenic and suggested she see a

psychiatrist. She was also told she might

have fibromyalgia. 

She reports that she stopping working in 1985

after working as a dental lab technologist.

She’s concerned about the fact that she began

getting these symptoms after being exposed to

asbestos and dental plaster dust.

Id. at 289. Dr. Libby noted Plaintiff’s recurrent respiratory

tract infections and cough responded “best” to “prolonged

courses of antibiotics and prednisone.... I am quite suspicious

that this represents an atypical presentation of asthma.” Id.

at 290.

In late May of 2001, Plaintiff reported to Dr.

Dougherty that she had been improving since the accident, that

she had a good range of motion in her hands, and that she

experienced limitations in the use of her left hand and weakness

in her left arm. Id. at 202-04. On June 15, 2001, Dr.

Dougherty reported Plaintiff’s left arm and hand were much

better, and she released Plaintiff to return to work on June 20,

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2001. Id. at 205.

 Plaintiff was seen by a neurological surgeon, Dr.

Adler, a consulting physician who also examined Plaintiff, on

August 10, 2001. Id. at 157. Plaintiff’s primary complaint to

Dr. Adler was pain in her shoulders since the automobile

accident. Id. at 158. Dr. Adler noted: “The patient was well

until she experienced a motor vehicle accident as a restrained

driver ... a diagnosis of myocardial contusion was made. The

patient complains at this point of sore, achy shoulders since

the accident ... pain has been substituted by soreness that

measures a 5 on a scale of 1 to 10.” Id. Plaintiff stated the

pain radiated, that her fingers became numb, and that she

dropped objects from her left hand. Id. Dr. Adler stated:

“[S]he is only able to lift 2.5 pounds. Pain is the limiting

factor rather than weakness. The patient has been working and

lifts forty pound bags. She feels that this activity may have

exacerbated her problem.... The patient feels this is a muscle

spasm related problem.” Id. At that time, Dr. Adler noted

Plaintiff suffered from asthma, and that she took Advil, Aleve,

and Hydrocodone. Id. Plaintiff reported no allergies. Id.

Dr. Adler noted Plaintiff was obese. Id. The doctor reported

Plaintiff’s recent and remote memory as intact, her attention

span as normal, and her language and speech as fluent. Id. at

159. Dr. Adler diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from muscle

spasm. Id.

In early September 2001, Plaintiff was seen by Dr.

Brett, a treating physician and spinal surgeon. See id. at 179-

185. The doctor noted Plaintiff’s complaints of shoulder and

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neck pain, and that she had a full range of movement in her

extremities. Id. at 179-80. Dr. Brett noted an MRI indicated

bulging at Plaintiff’s C5-C6 and C6-C7 vertebrae. Id. at 180.

On September 19, 2001, Plaintiff underwent a surgical cervical

discectomy, foraminotomy, decompression, and fusion of her C6

and C7 vertebrae, performed by Dr. Brett. Id. at 185-87. 

In October of 2001 Plaintiff’s treating family

physician, Dr. Dougherty, reported her progress after surgery as

“great.” Id. at 209. The notes state: “She has good [range of

motion]. She has much better progress. She has good motor

coordination of her fingers now and mobility which she had

almost completely lost.... She still has low-back pain ...” Id.

Dr. Dougherty scheduled Plaintiff for a lower back MRI. Id.

Plaintiff was prescribed Lipitor for her cholesterol level, and

reported that it was making her ill, i.e., causing nausea and

shaking and muscle aches. Id. On October 12, 2001, Dr.

Dougherty reported Plaintiff had “tweaked” her neck, and “now it

is painful on the [left side].” Id. at 210. The doctor noted

Plaintiff had full range of motion in her shoulders. Id.

On October 22, 2001, Plaintiff’s surgeon, Dr. Brett,

opined Plaintiff had “chronic lumbar strain with some referred

leg pain only as a result of her motor vehicle accident ... She

was given instructions regarding abdominal and back

strengthening exercises and the principles of back mechanics,

and weight loss was encouraged.” Id. at 260. On October 30,

2001, Dr. Dougherty, Plaintiff’s treating family physician

opined that Plaintiff’s back problems appeared to be “more

musculoskeletal. MRI was normal. She has exercises and

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stretching. I recommended weight loss.” Id. at 211.

Dr. Brett returned Plaintiff to “light work” on

November 26, 2001, with restrictions regarding lifting and

carrying, standing, and heavy exertion. Id. at 211, 258. In

December 2001, Plaintiff reported shoulder pain and mid-back

pain. Id. at 213. Doctor Brett released Plaintiff to part-time

work at her previous job without restrictions on February 6,

2002. Id. at 165, 255. The doctor noted Plaintiff’s “prognosis

is good, and she is very pleased with the results of the

surgery.” Id. at 255.

In February of 2002 Plaintiff’s treating physical

therapist reported she had continued pain in her shoulders and

continued tenderness and weakness in her upper extremities. Id.

at 163. Plaintiff reported her only medication as Aleve. Id.

Plaintiff’s therapist noted her surgeon had recommended

additional physical therapy, deep tissue massage, and ice and

heat. Id. at 164. After Plaintiff returned to work, her

treating physical therapist noted: “demonstrating pain

behavior–reports neck, upper back & [upper extremities] all sore

from return to work.” Id. at 165. By late February 2002,

Plaintiff was reporting “some days good, some bad.” Id. at 166.

On March 1, 2002, Plaintiff stated her condition had improved.

Id. at 166.

On March 27, 2002, Plaintiff was again seen by Dr.

Brett, the treating neurosurgeon who performed Plaintiff’s

spinal surgery. Id. at 246. Dr. Brett stated Plaintiff had low

back discomfort and “some uncharacteristic symptoms of pain and

dyesthesia in either leg. Her previous lumbar MRI is

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unremarkable, and she is felt to have a chronic lumbar strain

with referred leg complaints as a result of her motor vehicle

accident of 5-8-01 as per my chartnote of 10-22-01.” Id.

She has no objective neurologic deficit in

the arms or legs with preserved strength,

sensation and myotatic reflexes, no wasting

or fasciculations, and no nerve root

irritation signs. Cervical and lumbar range

of motion are quite good, although somewhat

slow, with mild paralumbar muscle spasm. 

She has done very nicely with regard to her

neck with resolution of her left arm

radicular pain, and repeat neck x-ray shows

excellent appearance. She has occasional

unrelated dyesthesia into either arm, and she

seems to be somewhat “introspective” with

regard to her symptoms.

She is released for all activities without

restrictions as far as her neck is concerned;

but she should not lift or carry more than 25

lbs., perform any repetitive lifting, bending

or stooping, or be required to sit or stand

in a stationary position for more than two

consecutive hours with regard to her low

back. There is little that I have to offer

for her chronic lumbar pain which will be

permanent and moderately disabling as noted

above.... I feel that she is medically

stationary with regard to both her cervical

and lumbar spine.

Id.

On March 29, 2002, Plaintiff reported “rather

disturbing symptoms” to her treating family physician, Dr.

Dougherty, including “dyesthesias either down an arm or a leg,”

and numbness without pain in her arms. Id. at 218. Dr.

Dougherty noted that Dr. Brett had previously opined that these

symptoms were unrelated to Plaintiff’s surgery on her cervical

vertebrae. Id. Dr. Dougherty noted in Plaintiff’s chart that

Plaintiff displayed numbness from her shoulder to her elbow, and

a full range of motion in her arms and neck. Id. Plaintiff

displayed numbness and muscle weakness on one side of her face.

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2 Apparently regarding Dr. Dougherty’s written opinion to Plaintiff’s

employer, the chartnote dated June 3, 2002, states: “Dictated letter dated

5-30-02 ready to pick up.” R. at 227.

-12- 

Id. 

Plaintiff experienced sinus problems throughout April

and May of 2002. Id. at 224-25. On May 30, 2002, Plaintiff

reported to her treating family physician, Dr. Dougherty, that

her sinus and infection problems were greatly alleviated while

she was at home and had been exacerbated by constant contact

with the public since Plaintiff’s return to work. Id. at 227.

Dr. Dougherty opined: “She needs to stop being exposed to public

contact. Her immune system is poor and this predisposes her to

recurrent infections. We will write a letter addressed to her

employer.” Id.2 On June 23, 2002, Dr. Dougherty’s associate

kept Plaintiff from work for two days due to exacerbation of

asthmatic symptoms, bronchitis and sinusitis. Id. at 228.

On June 1, 2002, Plaintiff was examined by a family

doctor, Dr. Blessing, also an associate of Dr. Dougherty. Id.

at 229-30. Dr. Blessing noted Plaintiff had “been seen

repeatedly for recurring reactive airway and bronchitis

symptomatologies. When asked how long she has been coughing,

she says 3 years.... She says the last 3 days she has had a temp

to 101-102 degrees but in the office it is afebrile.” Id. at

230. Dr. Blessing diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from viral

bronchitis which was not sensitive to antibiotics and noted:

“She does not have the notion of using her beta agonist on a

very frequent basis when she has this kind of coughing and so

forth. Additionally, during the entire interview on

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examination, patient does not cough once.” Id.

Plaintiff filed her application for disability benefits

on June 28, 2002, at which time she ceased working. Plaintiff

was divorced in June 2002 (she had been married for 29 years).

Id. at 62. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Sampson in November of

2002 that she was married. Id. at 299. 

On July 10, 2002, Dr. Brett, Plaintiff’s treating

neurosurgeon, noted Plaintiff was “really unchanged clinically,

without new neurologic deficit.” Id. at 253. Dr. Brett opined

that Plaintiff could “be working provide she not lift or carry

more than 10 lbs., perform any repetitive or heavy exertion with

the upper extremities, or maintain any awkward of stationary

neck positions.” Id. The doctor further stated: “Ms. Fulton

had difficulties with her neck several years ago, and her

current symptoms are unlikely to be directly related to her

motor vehicle accident of 5-8-01 which resulted in pathologic

worsening at her previously-treated C6-7 level.” Id.

On July 31, 2002, Dr. Dougherty stated Plaintiff was

“scheduled for surgery for discectomy [with Dr. Brett] on

08/09/02. She is not having any problems. Her breathing is

doing fairly well. She does need a PEAK FLOW meter and I have

given her one today.” Id. at 231. The doctor refilled

Plaintiff’s prescriptions for Advair, Maxair, Lipitor, Benadryl,

Vicodin, and Soma. Id. At that time, Dr. Dougherty,

Plaintiff’s treating physician, noted Plaintiff suffered from

her cervical problems, asthma and “allergic rhinitis.” Id. at

231. The doctor noted Plaintiff was “[o]ff work indefinitely at

this time pending post-surgical results.” Id. at 231.

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Plaintiff was also examined by her treating

neurosurgeon on July 31, 2002. At that time, Dr. Brett noted:

She has no true radicular pain or objective

neurologic deficit, and strength, sensation,

and mytatic reflexes are preserved. However,

cervical range of movement is reduced ...

with moderate paracervical muscle spasm, and

Spurling’s maneuver results in interscapular

pain in either direction ...

I feel the major contributing factor to her

current condition and need for treatment is

on-going degenerative change and her various

injuries, including her motor vehicle

accident of 5-8-01 and her work and

recreational activities.

Id at 252.

Plaintiff underwent a second spinal surgery by Dr.

Brett on August 7, 2002, i.e., a discectomy, foraminotomy,

decompression and fusion of her C5 and C6 vertebrae. Id. at

173, 245. At that time, Dr. Brett reported Plaintiff’s prior

spinal fusion was healing well. Id. at 172. He reported that,

other than the increasing disk protrusion, Plaintiff “[had]

enjoyed quite good health except” for “reactive airways

disease.” Id. Plaintiff reported her medications as Darvocet,

Flexeril, and Dalmane. Id. Dr. Brett noted Plaintiff’s

cervical movement was “moderately reduced with moderate

paracervical spasms.” Id.

Dr. Brett, Plaintiff’s treating neurosurgeon, released

her for “light work,” with a lifting restriction, a restriction

on heavy exertion, and a restriction against maintaining

“awkward or stationary neck positions,” on October 3, 2002. Id.

at 250. Dr. Brett stated Plaintiff “should not be working as a

grocery checker.” Id.

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Plaintiff moved from Portland, Oregon, to Arizona, in

October of 2002. See id. at 7.

On October 17, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Reconsideration

Disability Report with the Social Security Administration,

stating that she had increased pain and fatigue since her

original application for benefits, filed in June of 2002. Id.

at 89. At that time, Plaintiff stated that she suffered from an

additional illness, i.e., depression. Id. On the list of

physicians to provide medical records to the Social Security

Administration with regard to the additional illness stated in

her reconsideration report, Plaintiff did not list a

psychiatrist or psychologist. Id. at 90.

Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Sampson, a medical doctor

in the Phoenix area, from at least November 2002 through July

2003. Id. at 296-373. Dr. Sampson noted on November 20, 2002:

The patient ... has a history of asthma,

wheezing, allergy problems. ... She has a

history of fibromyalgia since 1989. She was

doing OK with this, doing yoga and doing fine

until 2001. She crushed one of her arms.

She had C7 cord compression because of the

accident. Since then, her hands have shaken.

She has a problem raising her hands. The

whole back hurts.... She has seen a

neurologist and had lots of tests. They even

considered possibility of whether or not she

had MS and that was looked into also. She

has had problems with slurring of her speech

and memory problems. This was there a little

bit before the accident.... On bad days, she

even has a hard time opening her eyes. She

continues with her yoga every day. She has

had physical therapy and it didn’t really

help. Problems sleeping at times but this

has gone on since childhood.

Id. at 297. 

Dr. Sampson assessed Plaintiff as suffering from

fibromyalgia, for which he recommended exercise, but he noted

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that he might potentially prescribe Oxycontin for this

condition. Id. Dr. Sampson also opined Plaintiff suffered from

irritable bowel syndrome, asthma (for which he intended to

prescribe “different” treatment), and allergic rhinitis, for

which he prescribed Breathe Right nasal spray. Id. at 297. Dr.

Sampson noted it was “unusual” for Plaintiff to still be

displaying whiplash-type symptoms from the automobile accident,

stating: “It is difficult to judge how much is her fibromyalgia

and how much is secondary to whiplash. In either case, there is

not much more that physical therapy or injections could do at

this time... Anti-inflammatories and possibly anti-depressants

in the future.” Id. at 298. Dr. Sampson did not, apparently,

see Plaintiff’s prior medical records prior to making this

assessment. Id. On November 22, 2002, Dr. Sampson opined

Plaintiff “will have chronic low back pain which will be

permanent and moderate disability.” Id. at 301.

In February of 2003, Plaintiff completed a Disability

Report, stating that her inability to work was caused by

fibromyalgia, musculoskeletal arthritis, memory loss, asthma,

constant sinus and bronchial infections, and poor lung function.

Plaintiff stated her ability to work was compromised because she

“can’t breath, spinal bone grafts & plates. Spine degenerative

disease [collapsing] do not sit, stand, or lay well or breath at

any time.” Id. at 94. Plaintiff alleged that these problems

caused her to be unable to work as of May 8, 2001, the date of

her car accident. Id. Plaintiff indicated that her job

attendance had “been poor for 10 years and unable to work from

further spine [injuries] on May 8, 2001.” Id. Plaintiff

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further asserted her previous job as a grocery cashier required

her to lift approximately 30 to 150 pounds every 30 seconds

bending from the floor to over her head. Id. at 95. 

Plaintiff also stated that, as of February of 2003, she

had never been seen by any physician for an emotional or mental

problem that limited her ability to work. Id. at 96. At that

time, the only physician Plaintiff was seeing was Dr. Sampson.

Plaintiff indicated she had not seen Dr. Dougherty since August

2002, and that she last saw her surgeon, Dr. Brett, in October

2002. At that time, Plaintiff listed her medications as Advair,

Allegra, Lipitor, Cyclobenzapine, Zoloft (prescribed by Dr.

Sampson), propoxyphene and morphine.

Plaintiff completed an activities of daily living

questionnaire on March 25, 2003. Id. at 107-110. Plaintiff

stated she did not sleep well. Id. at 107. Plaintiff reported

she was able to watch television and play computer games, go for

a short walk, and bathe, on a daily basis. Plaintiff stated she

was unable to clean because she could not reach her arms up or

backward and she could not lift more than 10 pounds. Plaintiff

stated she needed heavy drugs to control her pain from the

fibromyalgia and her neck and back conditions. 

Plaintiff stated her ex-husband lived with her “off and

on,” and that her adult daughter lived with her “off and on.”

Id. at 108. Plaintiff’s parents live close to Plaintiff. Id.

at 108-09. Plaintiff stated she could cook her own meals, i.e.,

hot dogs, sandwiches, macaroni and cheese, and raw vegetables,

by using a microwave. Id. at 108. Plaintiff stated she could

not do any household chores without assistance and could not

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shop without assistance. Id. Plaintiff maintains contact with

her family. Id. Plaintiff does not state anywhere in her

activities of daily living questionnaire that she is limited by

any mental inability or depression.

On March 28, 2003, Dr. Libby, a pulmonary specialist

and treating physician, to whom Plaintiff was referred by Dr.

Dougherty, completed a “Medical Source Statement of Ability to

do Work-Related Activities (Physical)” regarding Plaintiff’s

condition from May of 2001 through January of 2002. Id. at 279-

80. Dr. Libby stated he last saw Plaintiff on May 31, 2001.

Id. at 280. Dr. Libby diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from

asthma and musculoskeletal pain. Id. Dr. Libby stated

Plaintiff had no lifting and carrying restrictions, and that

Plaintiff could occasionally lift 20 pounds and frequently lift

10 pounds. Id. at 279. Dr. Libby opined Plaintiff could stand

or walk about six hours in an 8-hour workday, and that she could

sit six hours in an 8-hour workday. Id. Dr. Libby opined

Plaintiff did not need to alternate standing and sitting. Id.

at 280.

Dr. Sampson, a non-specialist treating physician,

completed a Medical Source Statement regarding Plaintiff’s

physical ability to do work-related activities on April 1, 2003,

regarding Plaintiff’s abilities after November of 2002. Dr.

Sampson stated Plaintiff could not lift 10 pounds or more. Id.

at 308. Dr. Sampson stated Plaintiff could stand or walk less

than two hours in an 8-hour workday. Id. Dr. Sampson stated

Plaintiff could sit 2-3 hours in an 8-hour workday, and that she

would need to alternate standing and sitting. Id. at 309. 

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The Arizona Department of Economic Security Disability

Determination Services Administration requested an independent

medical examination of Plaintiff, performed by Dr. Butterbaugh,

who examined Plaintiff on June 24, 2003, and reviewed her

medical records. Id. at 322-29. Dr. Butterbaugh diagnosed

Plaintiff as suffering from cervical disc disease, fibromyalgia,

asthma, and irritable bowel syndrome. Id. at 327. Dr.

Butterbaugh opined that Plaintiff could perform work at the

sedentary exertional level, i.e., that Plaintiff could

occasionally or frequently lift 10 pounds, that Plaintiff could

stand and walk at least two hours in an 8-hour workday, that

Plaintiff could sit six hours in an 8-hour workday, and that

Plaintiff would not need to alternate sitting and standing. Dr.

Butterbaugh opined that Plaintiff could only occasionally climb,

balance, stoop, kneel, crawl or crouch, and that Plaintiff was

limited with regard to heights and moving machinery. Id. at

328-29.

Plaintiff was examined by a psychologist, Dr. Young, on

June 26, 2003. Id. at 338-43. Plaintiff reported to the doctor

that she had applied for disability based on “having memory

problems, fibromyalgia, asthma, and possible multiple

sclerosis.” Id. at 338. Plaintiff told the doctor she had high

cholesterol, fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrom, and asthma.

Plaintiff told the doctor she had “‘no immune system,’” and a

“‘spinal cord injury.’” Id. at 341. Plaintiff told the doctor

that she had not previous been in counseling or sought

psychiatric help. Id.

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Dr. Young, an examining specialist, estimated

Plaintiff’s cognitive functioning ability as average. Id. at

339. The doctor reported Plaintiff had “excellent problemsolving strategies and approaches.” Id. Dr. Young concluded

that Plaintiff functioned 

in the low average range with regard to her

general memory functioning and immediate

memory function. It is slightly below her

expected level of performance as measured by

her WAIS-III. It does suggest that she may

have some weaknesses with regard to memory

function. Her attention and concentration

were in the average range.

Id. at 340. Plaintiff reported difficulty sleeping, feeling

fatigued, and no longer enjoying previously pleasurable

activities. Id. Plaintiff reported feeling worthless and

helpless, but not hopeless. Id. Plaintiff reported being

worried about her finances, and that she felt frustrated. Id.

Plaintiff told the doctor she spent her days watching

television. Id. at 341. The doctor stated:

Given her conditions of fibromyalgia, it is

possible that she has mood difficulties

related to her medical condition. She does

not have symptoms consistent with [] major

depression. She has no psychotic process

affecting her. Her cognitive development

seems to be within the average range. She

does have some minor weaknesses with regard

to memory [;] her overall memory function is

like that [of] a person with low average

ability. She may have some mood difficulties

related to her medical condition. She may be

very discouraged and her lethargy is

compounding her feelings of low self-esteem.

Id. at 342. This doctor concluded:

Given her current test results, she should be

able to understand simple directions

presented to her. She should be able to

follow through with instructions that she

understands what she was supposed to be

doing. At the present time, she is a person

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who may have difficulty with interacting with

supervisors and coworkers due to her selfesteem issues. Stress is likely to

exasperate her condition. Her judgment

appears to be within the normal limits.

Emotionally, she is relatively stable. She

may not be very reliable in a work setting.

Id. at 342.

A Department of Disability Services physician completed

a residual functional capacity assessment of Plaintiff in July

of 2003. Id. at 330-37. The assessment concluded Plaintiff

could perform work at the light exertional level. However, the

assessment does not indicate what evidence or medical records

were reviewed or provide the basis for the doctor’s opinion,

referring to “6E,” and the signature on the assessment is not

legible. This physician was a reviewing physician who did not

examine Plaintiff.

In July 2003, a psychologist, Dr. Enos, who did not

examine or treat Plaintiff, completed a Psychiatric Review

Technique form and Mental Residual Functional Capacity

Assessment form regarding Plaintiff’s mental condition. Id. at

344-61. Dr. Enos reviewed the clinical findings of Dr. Young,

who had examined Plaintiff. Dr. Enos concluded Plaintiff

suffered from a mood disorder secondary to medical conditions.

Id. at 347. Dr. Enos concluded Plaintiff had mild restrictions

of activities of daily living, difficulties maintaining social

functioning, difficulty maintaining concentration, persistence,

and pace. Id. at 354. Regarding Plaintiff’s residual mental

functional capacity, Dr. Enos concluded Plaintiff was not

significantly limited in any mental functioning category, and

that she could carry out simple instructions and complete a

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routine work week. Id. at 360.

In September of 2003, Dr. Sampson, Plaintiff’s treating

physician, completed a Medical Source Statement of Plaintiff’s

ability to do work-related activities. Id. at 375. Dr. Sampson

concluded Plaintiff could only occasionally lift more than ten

pounds, that she could not stand or walk more than two hours in

an 8-hour workday, that she could sit for 2-3 hours in an 8-

hour workday, and that she needed to alternate standing and

sitting. The doctor opined Plaintiff could only rarely stoop or

kneel, and that she could never crouch or crawl. Id. at 376.

The doctor stated that Plaintiff had job restrictions regarding

heights, moving machinery, temperature extremes, chemicals, and

dust. Id. Dr. Sampson stated Plaintiff suffered from

fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome, and asthma. Id.

A November 2003, MRI of Plaintiff’s left shoulder

produced findings “most consistent with tendinosis or

tendinitis. Id. at 406.

In January of 2004 Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Root, a

neurologist, for a consultation. Id. at 381. Dr. Root reviewed

Plaintiff’s neurological medical records. Id. at 382. Dr. Root

noted Plaintiff complained of “severe neck and left arm pain

with numbness, which has emerged in the past year.” Id. at 381.

The doctor stated she should be referred to a neurosurgeon for

an opinion and “to follow-up with her pain management specialist

for ongoing conservative and symptomatic care. There is no need

for any further neurological follow-up.” Id. at 382. The

doctor noted:

Motor tone and strength examination is normal

in the right upper and both lower

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extremeties. In the left upper extremity

there is variable collapsing or give way type

of weakness, depending upon the pain

experienced in the limb... Gait is mildly

antalgic moving slowly and gingerly because

of weight bearing discomfort in the low back

region. ... Lumbar spine range of motion is

normal in all directions. However, there is

guarding of movement initially because of

pain perceived. ...

Id. at 384.

Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Khayata, a neurosurgeon,

by her consulting neurologist, Dr. Root, and her neurosurgeon,

Dr. Brett. Id. at 402. Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Khayata

on March 10, 2004. Id. 

She has continued to experience neck pain and

numbness in both upper extremities. She does

not have any shooting pain, but she is

experiencing some numbness. She has a

history of fibromyalgia. NO weakness.

An MRI of the cervical spine was obtained by

Dr. Kenneth Root and this revealed evidence

of a previous fusion. There were no abnormal

findings at C5-6. There was a finding at the

C6-7 level, which may represent a small disc

protrusion versus osteophyte. She is now

referred for further evaluation.

Id. Dr. Khayata recommended physical therapy for Plaintiff’s

neck and back pain, and suggested Dr. Root order nerve

conduction studies. Id. at 403. Dr. Khayata advised against

heavy lifting. Id.

Approximately six months after he completed his

September 2003 assessment, Dr. Sampson completed a residual

functional capacity assessment specifically regarding the effect

of Plaintiff’s pain on her ability to work. Id. at 365. On

March 15, 2004, Dr. Sampson assessed Plaintiff’s pain level as

moderately severe and secondary to her fibromyalgia. Id. at

365. Dr. Sampson opined Plaintiff’s pain constantly interfered

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with her concentration and attention and that she could not

complete tasks in a timely manner. Id. at 366. The notes state

Plaintiff’s pain was moderate at times and severe at other

times. Id. at 365. Dr. Sampson stated Plaintiff’s pain was

“always severe if she pushes to do too much.” Id. Regarding

the basis for his findings, Dr. Sampson stated that

“potentially” some of Plaintiff’s degree of pain could

reasonably be expected to result from objective clinical or

diagnostic findings, “but some of it is secondary to

fibromyalgia.” Id. Dr. Sampson noted Plaintiff’s pain was

precipitated by a static position, changing weather, overuse,

stress, cold and heat. Id. at 366. Dr. Sampson also

concluded Plaintiff’s experience of pain was constantly

sufficiently severe to interfere with her attention and

concentration, and that she was constantly experiencing

deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace as a result

of her pain. Id. at 366.

Dr. Sampson also completed an additional medical

assessment of Plaintiff’s physical residual functional capacity

on March 30, 2004. Id. at 367. Dr. Sampson concluded Plaintiff

could not sit, stand or walk for one hour at a time in an 8-hour

workday, that she could sit for three hours and stand for three

hours in an 8-hour workday if she could frequently change

position, and that she could walk for two hours in an 8-hour

workday. Id. Dr. Sampson concluded Plaintiff could

occasionally lift 5 pounds but never more than that, and that

she could never carry any weight at all. Id. Dr. Sampson

concluded Plaintiff could never bend, squat, stoop, crawl or

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3 The record includes fifteen paycheck stubs dated from March 1,

2002, through July 26, 2002, indicating Plaintiff worked approximately

30 to 40 hours per week during this time period, although some weeks

she worked fewer than 30 hours. See R. at 74-88. Plaintiff testified

she worked about 25 hours per week. Id. at 423. 

-25- 

climb, but that she could occasionally reach. Id. at 368.

Without explanation, in contrast to his opinion six months

earlier, Dr. Sampson concluded Plaintiff had no restrictions

with regard to heights, machinery, exposure to changes in

temperature and humidity, or exposure to dust, fumes, and gases.

Id. at 368. 

In April of 2004, Plaintiff listed her medications as

Cephalexin for skin lesions, Maxair and Advair for asthma,

Tramadol, morphine, and methadone for pain, cyclobenzaprine for

muscle spasms, and Alllegra D for allergies. Id. at 136.

Plaintiff reported side effect of these medications as nausea,

shaking, drowsiness and dizziness, hives, dry skin and bleeding.

Id. 

At the hearing before the ALJ on April 14, 2004,

Plaintiff testified she attempted to work after the May 2001 car

accident and after her first cervical vertebrae surgery, but

that she discontinued work in July of 2002 because work became

too difficult. Id. at 422.3 Plaintiff testified she suffered

pain in her neck, down her back, and across her shoulders. Id.

at 424. She testified she could only sit, stand, or walk for

one-half hour at a time, and that she became numb if she

occupied one position for “too long.” Id. at 425. Plaintiff

testified that memory loss, pain, and incontinence prevented her

from keeping a steady job. Id. at 424. Plaintiff stated she

spent about three hours total lying down during a typical 8-hour

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4

 Dr. Butterbaugh’s residual functional capacity assessment of

Plaintiff states that Plaintiff could occasionally or frequently lift

10 pounds, that Plaintiff could stand and walk at least two hours in

an 8-hour workday, that Plaintiff could sit six hours in an 8-hour

workday, and that Plaintiff would not need to alternate sitting and

standing. Dr. Butterbaugh opined that Plaintiff could only

occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crawl or crouch, and that

Plaintiff was limited with regard to heights and moving machinery.

This residual functional capacity was the same as that assessed by the

Portland pulmonary specialist who treated Plaintiff’s asthma, Dr.

Libby. This is the same residual functional capacity also found by

the reviewing, non-examining, non-treating physician who completed the

residual functional capacity assessment at 15F in the record before the

ALJ.

Dr. Brett, Plaintiff’s treating neurosurgeon in Portland, had

previously released her for “light work,” with a lifting restriction, a

restriction on heavy exertion, and a restriction against maintaining

“awkward or stationary neck positions,” on October 3, 2002. R. at 250. Dr.

Brett stated Plaintiff “should not be working as a grocery checker.” Id.

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day. Id. at 432. Plaintiff testified she depended on relatives

for help with her housework and to prepare meals. Id. at 429-

30. Plaintiff testified she did not feel that her asthma was

“independently disabling.” Id. at 428.

A vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing.

The vocational expert testified that, assuming the limitations

as assessed by Dr. Butterbaugh, the physician who performed an

independent medical examination of Plaintiff at the behest of

the state disability services department, regarding Plaintiff’s

physical residual functional capacity,4 Plaintiff could perform

the sedentary unskilled jobs of cashier, assembler, and

addresser. Id. at 439. When asked if a need to alternate

sitting and standing were added to the previous restrictions

found by Dr. Butterbaugh, the VE testified that, assuming a need

to alternate sitting and standing, Plaintiff could perform the

jobs of cashier and assembler. Id. at 439-40. The VE also

testified Plaintiff could perform these jobs even with the

restriction imposed by Dr. Enos, the reviewing psychiatrist,

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5 The Court notes that evidence of disability occurring or increasing

in severity subsequent to the expiration of the claimant’s insured status

is relevant and properly evaluated to address the question of whether the

claimant was disabled during the period of their insured status. See

Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1996); Smith v. Bowen, 849

F.2d 1222, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1988).

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i.e., that Plaintiff could only perform work with simple

instructions. Id. at 440. When asked if an individual with the

limitations specified by Dr. Sampson, one of Plaintiff’s

treating physicians, could work, the expert stated that no work

would be available. Id. at 441.

At the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel requested an

amendment to the alleged onset date of disability to June 30,

2002, which amendment was granted. Id. at 22. Subsequent to

the hearing, additional exhibits were admitted into the record.

Id. at 22.5

In a written opinion issued October 29, 2004, the ALJ

concluded Plaintiff’s asthma, herniated nucleus puposus with

spondylosis requiring two different surgeries, history of

fibromyalgia syndrome, and irritable bowel syndrome were

“severe” impairments as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), but

that the impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the

listed impairments. Id. at 29. 

In the written opinion denying benefits, the ALJ

stated:

Based on the total record, the undersigned

finds the claimant’s subjective complaints,

including complaints of pain, are exaggerated

and less than totally credible.

The Administrative Law Judge finds the

claimant’s subjective complaints are

disproportionate to the objective medical

evidence. Her physical problems have

improved when she has received appropriate

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medical treatment, i.e. surgery on her

cervical spine. She returned to work after

her first cervical surgery. She worked until

June 2002. Since her second back surgery in

August 2002, the claimant has declined to

seek work of any kind, despite the fact that

her treating neurosurgeon, Dr. Brett,

determined she could lift/carry up to 25

pounds in October 2002, and the limitation

was considered temporary [].

Although the claimant complains of

paresthesias with minor hand and head

movement [], the claimant lives alone and she

is able to meet her personal needs. She is

able to cook her own meals and goes grocery

shopping. The claimant does some household

chores and plays computer games []. Her

mother reported that the claimant spends time

with her family and gets along with other

people as well []. The claimant took a trip

to Sedona during the adjudicatory period and

she flew from Portland, Oregon to Phoenix in

September 2002. she does use a significant

amount of pain medication, which is

apparently effective. Such daily activities

do not suggest the claimant is totally

disabled.

Id. at 26.

The ALJ further stated:

Several of the claimant’s treating physicians

have provided medical source statements on

the claimant’s physical condition. The

residual functional capacity assigned to the

claimant by Ronald Sampson, M.D. in exhibits

21F, 22F, and 24F is given very limited

weight, however. Dr. Sampson is not an

orthopedic specialist. Moreover, the doctor

indicated that some of the assigned

limitations were due to the claimant’s

fibromyalgia. Such limitations are clearly

difficult to quantify. Dr. Sampson reported

that the claimant’s level of pain is “severe”

if she “pushes” herself, but the doctor does

not define what work-related activities would

cause the claimant to push herself. He did

state exacerbating factors are movement and

overuse, which is consistent with assigned

residual functional capacity. Additionally,

Dr. Sampson’s medical opinions are not

consistent with the medical opinions of the

other doctors who have assessed the

claimant’s physical residual functional

capacity, including a pulmonary specialist,

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6

 The vocational expert testified that the job of grocery store cashier

is classified as light exertional and semi-skilled labor. R. at 438. The

vocational expert testified that, as described by Plaintiff, her job as a

grocer store cashier was at the medium exertional level. Id. The

-29- 

Dr. Libby, and her treating neurosurgeon, Dr.

Brett, and the consulting neurosurgeon, Dr.

Khayata.

Id. at 27.

The ALJ assigned “substantial weight” to the medical

opinion of Department of Disability Services physician, dated

July 9, 2003, at exhibit 15F in the record, and Dr. Enos, who

completed a psychiatric review technique form in July of 2003,

at exhibit 17F in the record, stating: “These assessments by the

State agency medical consultants are consistent with the great

weight of the evidence of record.” Id.

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff had the residual functional

capacity to sit for up to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. Id. at

27. The ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity for sedentary work, with a “sit/stand option

every 30 minutes” and a limitation to “simple work.” Id. at 27-

28. The ALJ stated: “She is restricted to simple work tasks due

to the effects of pain and inability to concentrate on more

complex tasks due to pain and drowsiness from pain medications.”

Id. at 28. The ALJ further concluded that, although Plaintiff

could not return to her past relevant work as a grocery store

checker, which required standing and lifting and was thus not

categorized as sedentary labor, she could perform other jobs

existing in the national economy, i.e., as an unskilled cashier

at the “sedentary” level of exertion, or as an assembler. Id.

at 29.6

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vocational expert testified that, essentially, the job of “sedentary

cashier,” was classified as sedentary exertional level and unskilled. Id.

at 439, 442-43.

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In his written opinion finding Plaintiff not disabled

and denying benefits, the ALJ stated:

The vocational expert testified that assuming

the hypothetical individual’s specific work

restrictions, she is capable of making a

vocational adjustment to unskilled, sedentary

work. [The expert] further testified that

given all of these factors the claimant could

work as a cashier and assembler, as these

positions are described in the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles []. The vocational

expert noted that these jobs are found ... in

the local and national economy...

Id.

V Analysis

1. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by finding

that her mental impairment was not severe.

At step two of the sequential analysis, the ALJ

assesses whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment

or combination of impairments which significantly limit her

ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (2005). A medically severe ailment may be a

mental ailment. See, e.g., Giese v. Barnhart, 55 Fed. App. 799,

801 (9th Cir. 2002). The “ability to do basic work activities”

is defined as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most

jobs.” Id. § 404.1521(b). An impairment or combination of

impairments is per se not severe if the record evidence

establishes the claimant suffers from only a slight abnormality

that has “no more than a minimal effect on [the claimant’s]

ability to work.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir.

2005) (internal quotations omitted). If the ALJ finds that the

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7

Social Security Regulations and Rulings, as well as case

law applying them, discuss the step two severity

determination in terms of what is “not severe.” According

to the Commissioner’s regulations, “an impairment is not

severe if it does not significantly limit [the claimant’s]

physical ability to do basic work activities,” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(c), 404.1521(a)(1991). Basic work activities are

“abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,

including, for example, walking, standing, sitting,

lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or handling.”

20 C.F.R. § 140.1521(b); [].

 Important here, at the step two inquiry, is the

requirement that the ALJ must consider the combined effect

of all of the claimant’s impairments on her ability to

function, without regard to whether each alone was

sufficiently severe. [] Also, he is required to consider

the claimant’s subjective symptoms, such as pain or

fatigue, in determining severity. [] Finally, the step-two

inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of

groundless claims.

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996).

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claimant lacks a medically severe impairment, the ALJ must find

the claimant to be not disabled; however, if the ALJ concludes

the claimant does have a medically severe impairment, the ALJ

proceeds to the next steps in the sequence. See id. 

Step two is considered “a de minimis screening device

[used] to dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at

1290; Webb, 433 F.3d at 687.7 An ALJ may find that a claimant

lacks a medically severe impairment or combination of

impairments only when his conclusion is “clearly established by

medical evidence.” Webb, 433 F.3d at 686-87.

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s physical ailments of

asthma, herniated nucleus puposus with spondylosis requiring two

different surgeries, fibromyalgia, and irritable bowel syndrome,

were “severe” impairments. R. at 29-30. The ALJ did not

conclude Plaintiff’s mood disorder or depression was a “severe”

impairment.

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To resolve Plaintiff’s claim regarding this finding,

the Court must first determine “whether the ALJ had substantial

evidence to find that the medical evidence clearly established

that [the plaintiff] did not have a medically severe impairment

or combination of impairments.” Webb, 433 F.3d at 687, citing

Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Despite

the deference usually accorded to the Secretary’s application of

regulations, numerous appellate courts have imposed a narrow

construction upon the severity regulation applied here.”).

There is substantial evidence (more than a scintilla of

evidence and enough evidence that a reasonable mind would accept

it as adequate) to support the ALJ’s finding that the medical

evidence established Plaintiff’s mental disorder was not a

“severe” impairment. See Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002,

1006 (9th Cir. 2005); Bowser v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 121

Fed. App. 231, 237-38 (9th Cir. 2005). Compare Webb, 433 F.3d

at 687-88. The evidence in the record supports the conclusion

Plaintiff’s mood disorder had no more than a minimal effect on

Plaintiff’s ability to work. An examining psychiatrist and

reviewing psychiatrist opined Plaintiff’s mood impairment was

secondary to her medical conditions, which the ALJ concluded

were “severe.” Neither psychologist concluded Plaintiff’s

mental condition would preclude her ability to work. No

psychiatrist or other physician concluded Plaintiff’s mental

condition would preclude her ability to work. Plaintiff did not

report being affected by a mood disorder or depression prior to

the alleged date that she became unable to work due to her

asthma and musculoskeletal ailments. Plaintiff did not seek any

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mental health assistance from counseling or a psychologist prior

to, or after, raising her mood disorder as a basis for

disability benefits. The only evidence in the record indicating

Plaintiff’s mood disorder might possibly affect her ability to

work was Dr. Young’s statement that Plaintiff might be

“unreliable” in a work setting. 

There is ample evidence in the record from which the

ALJ could properly conclude Plaintiff’s mood disorder did not

affect her ability to work, including her doctors’ repeated

comments that Plaintiff appeared alert and oriented, and her

failure to report mental problems to her physicians.

Additionally, the Court notes that the ALJ continued past step

two of the sequential process, and that the ALJ did consider

Plaintiff’s mood disorder limitations, including those

potentially caused or exacerbated by her medical conditions and

medications, when assessing her residual functional capacity at

step four of the sequential process. See Bowser, 121 Fed. App.

at 237.

2. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred at step four of the

sequential process by failing to properly credit the opinion of

Plaintiff’s treating and examining physicians.

At step four of the five-step sequential process used

to determine if a claimant is “disabled,” the ALJ must examine

the claimant’s “residual functional capacity and the physical

and mental demands” of the claimant’s past relevant work. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) & 416.920(e) (2005). To find that the

claimant is not disabled at step four, the claimant must be able

to perform: (1) the actual functional demands and job duties of

a particular past relevant job; or (2) the functional demands

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and job duties of an occupation as generally required by

employers throughout the national economy. Pinto, 249 F.3d at

844-45. In denying a claimant at step four of the five-step

sequential process used to determine if a claimant is disabled,

the ALJ has a duty to make the requisite factual findings to

support her conclusion. See id. at 844. 

Title II’s implementing regulations distinguish among

the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat

the claimant (the “treating” physicians); (2) those who examine

but do not treat the claimant (the “examining” physicians); and

(3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant, but who

review the claimant’s file (the “nonexamining” or “reviewing”

physicians). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (2005); Lester v.

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995).

Generally, in determining whether a claimant is

disabled, i.e., in assessing a claimant’s residual functional

capacity, a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight

than an examining physician’s, and an examining physician’s

opinion carries more weight than a reviewing physician’s. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (2005); Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.

Additionally, the Social Security Administration regulations

instruct adjudicators to give greater weight to opinions which

are explained than to those which are not explained, see 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3) (2005), and to the opinions of

specialists concerning matters relating to their specialty over

those of nonspecialists. See id. § 404.1527(d)(5). See also

Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001).

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An ALJ may reject the uncontradicted medical

opinion of a treating physician only for

“clear and convincing” reasons supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Reddick

v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998)

... If the treating physician’s medical

opinion is inconsistent with other

substantial evidence in the record,

“[t]reating source medical opinions are still

entitled to deference and must be weighted

using all the factors provided in 20 CFR §

404.1527.” SSR 96-2p.

Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1201-02.

When there is a conflict between the opinions of a

treating physician and examining physicians the ALJ may

disregard the opinion of the treating physician only if his

specific and legitimate reasons for doing so are supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.

The ALJ can meet this burden of substantial evidence by

“providing a detailed summary of the facts and conflicting

clinical evidence, along with a reasoned interpretation

thereof.” Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir.

1989). When the treating physician’s opinion conflicts with a

non-treating, non-examining physician’s opinion, the ALJ may

choose whom to credit in his analysis, but “cannot reject

evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Morales v.

Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2000). 

When other substantial evidence in the record

conflicts with the treating physician’s

opinion, however, that opinion will not be

deemed controlling. And the less consistent

that opinion is with the record as a whole,

the less weight it will be given. See id. §

404.1527(d)(4). ... the Social Security

Administration considers the data that

physicians provide but draws its own

conclusions as to whether those data indicate

disability. A treating physician’s statement

that the claimant is disabled cannot itself

be determinative.

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Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (7th Cir. 1999). 

“[A] treating source’s opinion on the

issue(s) of the nature and severity of your

impairment(s)” will be given “controlling

weight” if the opinion is “well supported by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent

with the other substantial evidence in your

case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).

Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003)

(emphasis added).

Additionally, it is the ALJ’s responsibility to

determine whether there are internal inconsistencies in a

physician’s report, whether those inconsistences are material,

and whether other relevant factors support discounting the

physician’s opinion. See Morgan v. Commissioner of the Soc. Sec.

Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 603 (9th Cir. 1999). An ALJ may reject

all or part of an examining physician’s report if it contains

inconsistencies, is conclusory, or is inadequately supported.

See id.; Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002).

When determining Plaintiff’s residual functional

capacity, the ALJ stated:

The residual functional capacity assigned to

the claimant by Ronald Sampson, M.D.[] is

given very limited weight, however. Dr.

Sampson is not an orthopedic specialist.

Moreover, the doctor indicated that some of

the assigned limitations were due to the

claimant’s fibromyalgia. Such limitations

are clearly difficult to quantify. Dr.

Sampson reported that the claimant’s level of

pain is “severe” if she “pushes” herself, but

the doctor does not define what work-related

activities would cause the claimant to push

herself. He did state exacerbating factors

are movement and overuse, which is consistent

with assigned residual functional capacity.

Additionally, Dr. Sampson’s medical opinions

are not consistent with the medical opinions

of the other doctors who have assessed the

claimant’s physical residual functional

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capacity, including a pulmonary specialist,

Dr. Libby, and her treating neurosurgeon, Dr.

Brett, and the consulting neurosurgeon, Dr.

Khayata.

Id. at 27.

The ALJ possibly erred in assigning “substantial

weight” to the medical opinion of the physician who completed a

peremptory Residual Functional Capacity assessment with no

notations as to what specific records he had consulted or on

what specific basis his opinion was formed. To the extent the

ALJ gave more weight to this opinion than to others in the

record, the ALJ did not commit reversible err in determining

that this assessment of Plaintiff’s physical residual functional

capacity was “consistent with the great weight of the evidence

of record.” See, e.g., Humphreys v. Barnhart, 127 Fed. App. 73,

76, 104 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 219 (3d Cir. 2005). Compare Wilson

v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547-48 (6th Cir.

2004). With the exception of Dr. Sampson, none of Plaintiff’s

other treating and examining physicians, including Dr. Brett

(treating), Dr. Libbey (treating), Dr. Dougherty (treating), and

Dr. Butterbaugh (examining), opined that Plaintiff was incapable

of at least sedentary labor. The Court notes that, on November

27, 2002, approximately six months after Plaintiff alleged her

medical problems were so severe she could not work, Dr. Sampson

did not prescribe for Plaintiff either pain medication for her

musculoskeletal pain or an anti-depressant for her depression.

It is not clear from Dr. Sampson’s assessments of Plaintiff’s

functional capacity the extent to which he concluded she could

not work because of her asthma. There is no evidence in the

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record that Plaintiff’s asthma precluded her ability to perform

sedentary labor. Additionally, at that time, Dr. Sampson opined

Plaintiff suffered from only “moderate” disability. The ALJ’s

opinion could arguably have been more thorough in discussing the

entirety of the medical evidence in the record. However, as a

matter of law, the ALJ gave sufficient specific and legitimate

reasons for discounting the opinion of a single treating

physician, Dr. Sampson, and giving greater weight to the

opinions of Plaintiff’s other treating physicians and the

reviewing and examining physicians. The specialist who treated

Plaintiff for her back pain, Dr. Brett, concluded Plaintiff

could perform work at the sedentary exertional level, i.e.,

“light work,” with a lifting restriction, a restriction on heavy

exertion, and a restriction against maintaining “awkward or

stationary neck positions.” R. at 250. The findings of these

physicians are supported by the medical evidence and clinical

findings in the record. There are no consistent clinical

findings in the record from which Dr. Sampson could

authoritatively conclude Plaintiff was completely disabled. See

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (holding that an ALJ may reject a

medical opinion if it is conclusory and inadequately supported

by clinical findings).

As mentioned supra, the ALJ could have given a more

detailed summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence

regarding Plaintiff’s limitations, along with the reasoned

interpretation of the differences in Doctor Sampson’s opinion

and the opinions of the other physicians. However, the ALJ’s

conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record,

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i.e., more than a scintilla of evidence and sufficient evidence

that a reasonable mind would accept it as supporting the

conclusion. The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons supported

by the entire record for rejecting Dr. Sampson’s opinion and,

therefore, he did not err as a matter of law by discounting Dr.

Sampson’s opinion. See Morgan, 169 F. 3d at 602 (“we have

consistently upheld the Commissioner's rejection of the opinion

of a treating or examining physician, based in part on the

testimony of a nontreating, nonexamining medical advisor.”). 

3. Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred by failing to

credit Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her disabling symptoms.

An ALJ must provide “specific, cogent reasons,”

supported by substantial evidence in the record, for her

disbelief of a claimant’s statements regarding the claimant’s

disability. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947

F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Jernigan v. Sullivan,

948 F.2d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 1991). Unless there is

affirmative evidence indicating the claimant is actually

malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s

testimony must be clear and convincing. See Lester, 81 F.3d at

834; Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989).

The ALJ must specifically identify what portion of the testimony

in the record is credible and what testimony undermines the

claimant’s complaints. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Dodrill v.

Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). “To find the

claimant not credible the ALJ must rely either on reasons

unrelated to the subjective testimony (e.g., reputation for

dishonesty), on conflicts between his testimony and his own

conduct, or on internal contradictions in that testimony.”

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Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997).

To determine whether the claimant’s testimony

regarding the severity of her symptoms is

credible, the ALJ may consider, for example:

(1) ordinary techniques of credibility

evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation

for lying, prior inconsistent statements

concerning the symptoms, and other testimony

by the claimant that appears less than

candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately

explained failure to seek treatment or to

follow a prescribed course of treatment; and

(3) the claimant’s daily activities. In

evaluating the credibility of the symptom

testimony, the ALJ must also consider the

factors set out in [Social Security Ruling]

88-13.

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal

citations omitted).

An ALJ may not discredit a claimant’s testimony

regarding her pain and resulting fatigue “solely because the

degree of pain alleged by the claimant is not supported by

objective medical evidence.” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748,

750 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346-47). See

also Social Security Ruling 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34483, 34485

(July 2, 1996) (“An individual’s statements about the intensity

and persistence of pain or other symptoms or about the effect

the symptoms have on his or her ability to work may not be

disregarded solely because they are not substantiated by

objective medical evidence.”). 

With regard to Plaintiff’s credibility concerning her

disabling symptoms, the ALJ stated:

Based on the total record, the undersigned

finds the claimant’s subjective complaints,

including complaints of pain, are exaggerated

and less than totally credible.

The Administrative Law Judge finds the

claimant’s subjective complaints are

disproportionate to the objective medical

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evidence. Her physical problems have

improved when she has received appropriate

medical treatment, i.e. surgery on her

cervical spine. She returned to work after

her first cervical surgery. She worked until

June 2002. Since her second back surgery in

August 2002, the claimant has declined to

seek work of any kind, despite the fact that

her treating neurosurgeon, Dr. Brett,

determined she could lift/carry up to 25

pounds in October 2002, and the limitation

was considered temporary [].

Although the claimant complains of

paresthesias with minor hand and head

movement [], the claimant lives alone and she

is able to meet her personal needs. She is

able to cook her own meals and goes grocery

shopping. The claimant does some household

chores and plays computer games []. Her

mother reported that the claimant spends time

with her family and gets along with other

people as well []. The claimant took a trip

to Sedona during the adjudicatory period and

she flew from Portland, Oregon to Phoenix in

September 2002. [S]he does use a significant

amount of pain medication, which is

apparently effective. Such daily activities

do not suggest the claimant is totally

disabled.

Id. at 26.

Because the ALJ did not expressly find affirmative

evidence indicating Plaintiff was actually malingering, the

ALJ’s reasons for rejecting her testimony must be clear and

convincing. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. However, an ALJ is not

required to accept every symptom of which a claimant complains

as rising to the level of a functional limitation. See

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating an ALJ is free to accept or reject a claimant’s

proposed restrictions as long as the decision is supported by

substantial evidence).

 The ALJ examined the record in this matter and was

able to observe Plaintiff during the hearing and during her

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8 The Court notes Plaintiff returned to work after her first surgery,

but that this caused her pain and suffering and she was ultimately forced

to have additional surgery. Plaintiff filed her application for disability

benefits after her return to work after her first surgery and before her

second surgery. Plaintiff did not attempt to work after her second surgery,

although Dr. Brett opined Plaintiff could return to “light” work.

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testimony. The record before the ALJ contains substantial

evidence of internal inconsistencies regarding Plaintiff’s

allegations about her ailments and limitations, including the

fact she returned to work after asserting that she was no longer

able to work.8 Although the record could support a conclusion

that Plaintiff’s reports of disabling pain and fatigue were

credible, the record also contains evidence that Plaintiff

repeatedly over-reported her ailments to her physicians and that

some of her physicians found Plaintiff not entirely credible in

reporting her symptoms and limitations.

The Court notes, again, the ALJ’s written opinion is

somewhat sparse in this regard, but not so sparse as to warrant

reversal. Even if the record permits a different assessment of

Plaintiff’s credibility, the Court may not reverse the ALJ’s

decision unless there is a lack of substantial evidence to

support the ALJ’s decision, and the Court concludes there is

sufficient evidence in the record to reach this standard. See

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. “Where ... the ALJ has made specific

findings justifying a decision to disbelieve an allegation ...

and those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the

record, our role is not to second-guess that decision.” Morgan,

169 F.3d at 600.

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4. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in accepting the

vocational experts testimony about whether there were jobs in

the national economy which Plaintiff could perform.

If it is determined at step four that the claimant

lacks the residual functional capacity to perform her former

job, at step five of the sequential evaluation the Social

Security Commissioner has the burden of showing the claimant can

perform other jobs which exist in substantial numbers within the

economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (2005); Johnson v.

Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995). In making this

determination, the ALJ must consider the claimant’s age,

education, work experience and residual functional capacity. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (2005). If the Commissioner identifies

appropriate work opportunities for the claimant, given their

established residual functional capacity, which exist in

significant numbers, then the claimant will not be deemed

disabled. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2005).

The Commissioner may carry her burden at step five by

eliciting the testimony of a vocational expert in response to a

hypothetical which sets out all the limitations and restrictions

of the claimant regarding her ability to perform work required

by employers. See, e.g., Cass v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 552, 556 (7th

Cir. 1993); Born v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 923 F.2d

1168, 1174 (6th Cir. 1990); Lewis v. Heckler, 808 F.2d 1293,

1298 (8th Cir. 1987). Although the ALJ’s hypothetical question

to the VE regarding the existence of suitable jobs may be based

on evidence which is disputed, the assumptions in the

hypothetical must be supported by the record. See Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Plaintiff does not contend there are not significant

numbers of jobs as assemblers in the national economy.

Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s decision may be reversed because the

ALJ did not adduce sufficient non-contradictory evidence in the

record, from the vocational expert, regarding the availability

of sedentary jobs to Plaintiff.

The record reveals the evidence taken at the hearing

with regard to the exact classification of the job of cashier

was in conflict. Nonetheless, the other job the vocational

expert testified Plaintiff is able to perform, that of

assembler, is undisputably sedentary unskilled labor and

available in the national economy and locally. Even if the ALJ

erred in regard to the exact classification of the sedentary

cashier job, any error was harmless and, therefore, does not

provide a basis for remanding this matter to the ALJ. See

Batson v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197

(9th Cir. 2003); Cabe v. Barnhart, 2006 WL 377242, at *1 (9th

Cir.); Jackson v. Barnhart, 120 Fed. App. 904, 905-06, 102 Soc.

Sec. Rep. Serv. 582 (3d Cir. 2005); Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d

618, 622 (5th Cir. 2003); Ischay v. Barnhart, 383 F. Supp. 2d

1199, 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2005). An ALJ may rely on a vocational

expert’s testimony that there are jobs in the economy the

claimant may perform when the vocational expert’s testimony is

based on a residual functional capacity supported by substantial

evidence in the record. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211,

1217 (9th Cir. 2005); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 757. Substantial

evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s determination

Plaintiff could do a limited range of sedentary work and could

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perform in jobs which are available in substantial numbers in

the national economy and, therefore, the ALJ’s decision was not

legal error. See Barker v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,

882 F.2d 1474, 1478-80 (9th Cir. 1989).

The ALJ could properly rely on the testimony of the

vocational expert regarding whether an individual of Plaintiff’s

age and abilities, with the residual functional capacity found

by the ALJ, to find that Plaintiff could perform jobs which were

available in the national economy and, therefore, the ALJ’s

determination at step five was not in error. See, e.g.,

Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435 (concluding that the ALJ did not err by

relying “solely on the vocational expert’s testimony,” which

constituted substantial evidence in the record to support the

ALJ’s conclusion that there were jobs available in the national

economy); Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 804-05 (8th Cir.

2005); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 & 507 (3d Cir.

2004); Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir.

2004). See also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 468 (1983)

(noting this inquiry requires the ALJ “to determine an issue

that is not unique to each claimant--the types and numbers of

jobs that exist in the national economy. This type of general

factual issue may be resolved as fairly through rulemaking as by

introducing the testimony of vocational experts at each

disability hearing.”); DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 851

(9th Cir. 1991) (“when vocational experts identify several job

categories and thousands of jobs performable in the state by the

claimant, we have repeatedly found substantial evidence of

performable jobs”).

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5. Plaintiff contends the proper remedy for the ALJ’s

errors is to order an immediate payment of benefits rather than

to remand this matter for further proceedings.

Remand for further administrative proceedings

is appropriate if enhancement of the record

would be useful. However where the record

has been developed fully and further

administrative proceedings would serve no

useful purpose, the district court should

remand for an immediate award of benefits.

More specifically, the district court should

credit evidence that was rejected during the

administrative process and remand for an

immediate award of benefits if (1) the ALJ

failed to provide legally sufficient reasons

for rejecting the evidence; (2) there are no

outstanding issues that must be resolved

before a determination of disability can be

made; and (3) it is clear from the record

that the ALJ would be required to find the

claimant disabled were such evidence

credited.

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). 

Because the Court has concluded the ALJ did not commit

any reversible error, this matter should not be remanded for

further proceedings. Cf. Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112,

1116 (9th Cir. 2003)

VI Conclusion

The ALJ did not commit non-harmless reversible error

when determining if Plaintiff was disabled as that term is

defined by federal statutes. Additionally, although the ALJ’s

recitation of the appropriate legal standard and supporting

facts in the record for her conclusions is arguably sparse, each

of the challenged decisions of the ALJ is supported by

substantial evidence in the record and, therefore, the ALJ’s

decision should not be reversed.

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The Court notes the issue before the ALJ was whether

Plaintiff was disabled as of the alleged onset date of

disability, i.e., June 30, 2002, and whether Plaintiff became

disabled between June 30, 2002, and the date of the hearing

before the ALJ, April 14, 2004. Cf. Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d

722, 725 (8th Cir. 2002); Barrett v. Apfel, 40 F. Supp. 2d 31,

38 (D. Mass. 1999) (“all requirements for entitlement must be

met before the administrative law judge’s decision”); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.620 (2005). Based on the record before the Court, the ALJ

could properly determine based on the substantial evidence in

the record, that Plaintiff was not “disabled” as that term is

defined as of April 14, 2004. However, it appears that

Plaintiff’s conditions deteriorated over time and Plaintiff’s

date last insured is December 31, 2007. The Court offers no

opinion as to whether Plaintiff might be found disabled with an

onset date subsequent to April 14, 2004.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for

“summary judgment” [Docket No. 13] is DENIED, and Defendant’s

cross-motion for “summary judgment” [Docket No. 17] is GRANTED.

Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant and against

Plaintiff with regard to the claims for relief stated in the

complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, as a result of the Court’s

determination that judgment in favor of Defendant is

appropriate, that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

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DATED this 8th day of May, 2006.

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