Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04622/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04622-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Fraud

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

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DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID and LISA FAIGMAN, individually and on

behalf of others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AT&T MOBILITY LLC, formerly known as

CINGULAR WIRELESS, LCC; and DOES 1 through

100, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-04622 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs David and Lisa Faigman (“plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of a class of

others similarly situated, filed this action in California Superior Court for the County of San

Francisco against AT&T Mobility LLC, formerly known as Cingular Wireless, LLC (“Cingular” or

“defendant”) and Does 1 through 100, inclusive.1

 Defendant removed the action to this court. 

Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint (“FAC”) in April 2007 seeking damages for violations

of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), violations of the False Advertising Act, violations

of the Unfair Competition Law, and unjust enrichment. Now before the court is defendant’s motion

to dismiss plaintiffs’ FAC for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”). Having considered the parties’

arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court enters the following

memorandum and order.

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BACKGROUND2

Plaintiffs are California residents who claim that they were misled into purchasing mobile

phones and service contracts from Cingular as a result of a misleading rebate program. Defendant

Cingular is the nation’s largest mobile phone company in terms of subscribers and revenue,

operating nationwide with a substantial amount of business in California. Cingular has fifteen retail

stores in the city of San Francisco.

As part of its marketing efforts, Cingular advertises the availability of rebates in exchange

for the purchase of its products or services. According to plaintiffs, “[f]ollowing the custom of other

rebate offers it has offered in the past, Cingular’s advertising seeks to convey the impression that

once a customer mails in a completed rebate form, he or she will receive the value of the rebate in

cash or by check.” FAC ¶ 17. In 2005, Cingular discontinued its use of rebate checks and has since

issued “Cingular VISA Rewards Cards,” which function similarly to a debit card and carry a

maximum balance of $50 each.

Plaintiffs claim that Cingular’s practice of marketing its rebates as directly reducing the cost

of Cingular cell phones by the dollar amount of the rebate is misleading because the VISA Rewards

Cards do not reduce the cost of Cingular phones by the value of the rebate. Id. ¶¶ 13–15. The cards

are less valuable than cash or check, according to plaintiffs, due to the limitations and restrictions

placed upon the use of the cards. Id. Plaintiffs identify the following restrictions which are not

disclosed in Cingular’s advertisements: the cards must be activated, the cards are only accepted at

certain locations, the cards can incur service charges, the cards will be declined in transactions that

exceed the balance of the card, the cards expire, the cards are not redeemable for cash, the cards do

not earn interest, the cards are not divisible, the cards are not transferrable, the cards collect private

information, and the cards are issued in maximum increments of $50. Id. ¶16. Plaintiffs further

claim that these programs have led to numerous customer complaints. Id. ¶ 30.

Plaintiffs purchased three mobile phones and signed up for two-year service contracts with

Cingular in October 2005 via a Cingular retail store in San Rafael, California. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. While

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at the store, plaintiff Lisa Faigman noticed that rebates were offered on various phone models,

including models advertised as “buy one, get one free” after rebate, and “free” after rebate. Id. ¶ 33. 

Based on these advertisements, Lisa Faigman and her husband David, whom she called while in the

store, decided to purchase the phones and enter into a service contract with Cingular. Id. ¶ 34. Lisa

Faigman received her rebate forms after completing the purchase transaction, which David Faigman

thereafter completed and submitted.3 Id. ¶¶ 35–36. Plaintiffs claim that after the purchase

transaction and completion of the rebate forms, they did not realize that Cingular would tender the

rebates with VISA Rewards Cards, and that Lisa Faigman expected that Cingular would tender the

rebates via check. Id. ¶¶ 35–36. Plaintiffs were surprised when they received three VISA Rewards

Cards for $30 each (one for each phone purchased from Cingular) instead of cash or checks. Id. ¶

37. Plaintiffs assert that they have encountered difficulties and inconvenience when attempting to

use the cards, including activation and rejection. Id. ¶ 38. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that their

card was rejected at a Chevron gas station. Id.

Plaintiffs filed this action in California Superior Court on June 23, 2006. Plaintiffs asserted

causes of action for violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, violations of the False

Advertising Act, concealment, violations of the Unfair Competition Law, and unjust enrichment. 

On July 28, 2006 defendant removed the action to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1441,

alleging jurisdiction based upon the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. section 1332(d). 

On March 2, 2007 defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ original complaint pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) was granted with leave to amend. Docket Entry 64 (hereinafter “March Order”). Plaintiffs

timely filed their FAC on April 16, 2007 seeking damages for violations of the Consumer Legal

Remedies Act, violations of the False Advertising Act, violations of the Unfair Competition Law,

and unjust enrichment. Defendant now moves again to dismiss plaintiffs’ FAC for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss “tests the legal

sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In examining the

claim’s sufficiency, as opposed to its substantive merits, “a court may [typically] look only at the

face of the complaint to decide a motion to dismiss.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc.,

284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002).

A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___U.S.____, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 1960, (2007).4

 Dismissal can be based on lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th

Cir. 1996). The court need not, however, accept as true allegations that are conclusory, legal

conclusions, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden

State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752,

754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).

DISCUSSION

Defendant alleges that plaintiffs’ FAC is defective for the same two reasons articulated in

defendant’s first motion to dismiss. First, defendant claims that plaintiffs have again failed to allege,

with requisite specificity, misrepresentations on the part of Cingular with respect to the reward card

rebate program. This deficiency would be fatal to all four of plaintiffs’ claims. Second, defendant

claims that plaintiffs have again failed to allege that they were injured “as a result of” alleged

misrepresentations by Cingular, as they must to sustain a cause of action under the CLRA.

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I. Misrepresentations

Defendant claims that each of plaintiffs’ causes of action arises out of the same alleged

unified course of fraudulent conduct, and that where fraudulent conduct serves as the basis for a

cause of action the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) apply.5

Because plaintiffs have dropped their concealment cause of action in their amended complaint, fraud

is no longer a necessary element of any of the California statutory claims that plaintiffs have set

forth. See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the

requirements of Rule 9(b) may nonetheless apply to discrete allegations within each cause of action. 

Id. As the Ninth Circuit has explained:

In cases where fraud is not a necessary element of a claim, a plaintiff

may choose nonetheless to allege in the complaint that the defendant

has engaged in fraudulent conduct. In some cases, the plaintiff may

allege a unified course of fraudulent conduct and rely entirely on that

course of conduct as the basis of a claim. In that event, the claim is

said to be “grounded in fraud” or to “sound in fraud,” and the pleading

of that claim as a whole must satisfy the particularity requirement of

Rule 9(b).

[. . .]

In other cases, however, a plaintiff may choose not to allege a unified

course of fraudulent conduct in support of a claim, but rather to allege

some fraudulent and some non-fraudulent conduct. In such cases, only

the allegations of fraud are subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading

requirements. 

Id. at 1103–04. Where a complaint or claim is grounded in fraud and the averments of fraud are

insufficiently pled, “there is effectively nothing left of the complaint” and dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6) is warranted. Id. at 1107.

This court has held that each of plaintiffs’ causes of action rests upon an allegation of

fraudulent conduct in the form of misrepresentations made by Cingular regarding its rebate

programs. March Order at 5. Again, plaintiffs admit in their complaint that “[a]ll of the claims

asserted herein arise out of Cingular’s misleading and unfair advertisements and marketing

campaign regarding its rebate programs . . . .” FAC ¶ 3. Each of plaintiffs’ causes of action still

contains an explicit or implicit reference to fraud. FAC ¶¶ 55 (“defendants knowingly

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misrepresented the legal rights, obligations, or remedies involved in the purchase and sale of

Cingular service and products”), 60 (defendants’ conduct “constitutes unfair competition, unfair,

deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising . . .”), 65 (defendants’ conduct constitutes “a continuing

course of conduct of unfair competition because defendants are marketing and selling their phones

and services in a manner that is likely to deceive the public . . .”), 67 (defendants’ practices “were

likely to deceive consumers into purchasing services or products under . . . false pretense . . .”), & 72

(“As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ misleading and unfair business practices,

defendants have been unjustly enriched.”). Because each of plaintiffs’ claims is thus “grounded in

fraud,” each claim “as a whole” is subject to heightened pleading requirements. Vess, 317 F.3d at

1103–04.

Plaintiffs correctly observe, however, that this court addressed the applicability of Rule

9(b)’s heightened standard to claims brought under the CLRA in Nordberg v. Trilegiant Corp., 445

F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1097–98 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (Patel, J.). In Nordberg, the court held that while the

requirements of Rule 9(b) were not strictly applicable to a CLRA claim, plaintiffs were “still

required to provide some specificity in their pleadings to put defendants on notice of the charges

leveled against them.” Id. The question is whether plaintiffs have met the requirements of this

intermediate standard in their complaint.

Defendant claims that plaintiffs have failed to plead facts specific enough to satisfy this

requirement in their complaint. First, defendant argues that plaintiffs fail to identify “any

misleading advertisement or marketing by Cingular with respect to the VISA Reward Card

program.” Plaintiffs have, however, identified language that they claim to be misleading. 

Specifically, plaintiffs describe the promotional materials that Lisa Faigman saw inside the Cingular

store which advertised phones as “buy one, get one free” after rebate and “free” after rebate. FAC ¶

33. The legally relevant question is whether a reasonable consumer would believe Cingular’s

marketing to be misleading.6

 See Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 439 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1115

(S.D. Cal. 2006). The court finds that a reasonable consumer, upon seeing an advertisement that

promises a “rebate” of a certain amount, would generally understand that advertisement to mean that

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the amount will be returned to the consumer in cash, check or its equivalent. Other forms of tender,

such as the VISA Reward Cards at issue in the instant case, may satisfy this expectation. However,

the more terms, conditions and restrictions that are placed upon a form of tender, the less equivalent

it becomes to cash or check. In their complaint, plaintiffs list various restrictions on the VISA cards

that allegedly reduce their value. For example, the VISA cards must be activated, the cards are only

accepted at certain locations, the cards can incur service charges, the cards will be declined in

transactions that exceed the balance of the card, the cards expire, the cards are not redeemable for

cash, the cards do not earn interest, the cards are not divisible, the cards are not transferrable, the

cards collect private information, and the cards are issued in maximum increments of $50. FAC ¶

16. Still more terms and conditions are included in the documents that come with the phone upon

purchase. Pls.’ Exh. D. An additional two pages worth of terms and conditions arrive when

customers receive their VISA Rewards Cards. Pls.’ Exh. A. These numerous terms and conditions

raise an issue of fact about whether the VISA cards could reasonably be interpreted as equivalent to

cash or check. For purposes of this motion the court must assume that the cards are not equivalent. 

Assuming arguendo that the VISA cards are materially different from cash or check, advertising the

cards as a “rebate” would not be in line with the expectations of reasonable consumers. Plaintiffs

have identified language in Cingular’s advertising that promises “rebates” where consumers in fact

receive VISA Reward Cards, and therefore, defendant’s argument that plaintiffs’ complaint should

be dismissed for failure to identify “any misleading advertisement” is unavailing.7

Next, defendant argues that plaintiffs have not described Cingular’s advertisements with

sufficient particularity. Plaintiffs have described the specific advertisements that Lisa Faigman saw

at the Cingular store containing language such as “buy one, get one free” after rebate and “free”

after rebate, and have attached additional representative samples of advertisements containing

similar language to their complaint. FAC ¶ 33, Pls.’ Exhs. B & C. The United States District Court

for the Southern District of California has held that where alleged misrepresentations occur in

printed form, the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) may be satisfied by “identifying or

attaching representative samples of [misleading] materials.” Von Grabe v. Sprint PCS, 312 F. Supp.

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2d 1285, 1306 n.19 (S.D. Cal. 2003). Notably, plaintiffs’ complaint averring a cause of action under

the CLRA is not strictly required to rise to the level of specificity mandated by Rule 9(b). Nordberg,

445 F. Supp. 2d at 1097–98. Because attaching representative samples satisfies the heightened

particularity standard of Rule 9(b), plaintiffs’ complaint meets the intermediate particularity

standard at issue here.

Last, defendant argues that the samples plaintiffs attached to their complaint are not the

actual promotional materials that Lisa Faigman saw at the Cingular store at the time of purchase, and

therefore, plaintiffs have failed to plead a cause of action under the CLRA with sufficient

particularity to put defendants on notice of the charges leveled against them. This argument is

unpersuasive for three reasons. 

First, plaintiffs state in their complaint that they “believe that the ‘mail-in rebate card’

language appeared uniformly in Cingular’s newspaper ads, direct mail ads, and in-store displays.” 

FAC ¶ 18 (emphasis added). This would include the in-store displays Lisa Faigman saw in October

2005, described at paragraph 33 of plaintiffs’ complaint. Even if the representative samples are not

the actual advertisements Lisa Faigman saw, they are likely very similar considering plaintiffs’

allegations regarding Cingular’s uniformity in marketing.

Second, plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Cingular modified the language of its

advertisements after the Faigmans filed suit in June 2006. Requiring plaintiffs to attach a copy of

the actual in-store promotional material that Lisa Faigman saw in 2005 would be unduly difficult

without discovery since Cingular is likely the only entity with access to the actual, discontinued, instore advertisements Lisa Faigman saw in October 2005.

Lastly, Nordberg does not require, as defendants suggest, that a cause of action under the

CLRA be dismissed if plaintiffs cannot identify the unique advertisement which actually induced

plaintiffs to act. Nordberg, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1097–98. In Nordberg, plaintiffs’ claims under Cal.

Civ. Code sections 1770(a)(1), (3), (5) and (9) were dismissed not because plaintiffs failed to

identify advertisements which actually induced plaintiffs to act, but because the harm plaintiffs

suffered was not caused by defendants’ advertising at all. Plaintiff Nordberg had specifically

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declined defendants’ services on the phone and was nonetheless charged, and plaintiff Smith was

charged without ever having seen any of defendants’ advertising. Id. at 1098. Nordberg’s claim

under section 1770(a)(14)—the same section at issue in the instant case—was found to have been

pled with requisite specificity given that it described Nordberg’s personal experience with

defendants’ representatives: when the alleged misrepresentations were made to her, approximate

dates, the manner in which Nordberg discovered that defendants’ representations were inaccurate,

and the content of defendants’ alleged omissions. Id. Here plaintiffs have included the approximate

dates of their interactions with Cingular, the content of Cingular’s allegedly misleading

representations, the content of Cingular’s alleged omissions, and the manner in which plaintiffs

discovered the omissions. 

Because plaintiffs’ have identified allegedly misleading language in Cingular’s

advertisements, described the advertisements with particularity and attached representative samples

of Cingular’s advertisements to the complaint, plaintiffs’ complaint is sufficiently particular to put

Cingular on notice of the charges leveled against them.

II. Causation

As an alternative ground for dismissal, defendant claims that plaintiffs have failed to plead

that they were injured “as a result of” Cingular’s alleged misrepresentations, a purported defect fatal

to plaintiffs’ cause of action under the CLRA.8

The right to bring a private cause of action under the CLRA is limited to “[a]ny consumer

who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or

practice declared to be unlawful by [California Civil Code] Section 1770.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1780. 

Relief under the CLRA is therefore “specifically limited to those who suffer damage, making

causation a necessary element of proof.” Wilens v. TD Waterhouse Group, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 4th

746, 754 (2003); see also Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co., 18 Cal. App. 4th 644, 668 (holding that the

requirements of the CLRA were not met where the purported class representative did not believe the

alleged misrepresentation to be true). 

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Defendant claims that courts have construed the “as a result of” language in the CLRA to

require a plaintiff to allege causation and actual reliance as “a necessary element of proof.” While

both of the cases defendants cite in support of this claim do identify causation as a necessary

element of CLRA claims, neither require, or even mention, actual reliance. See Wilens 120 Cal.

App. 4th at 754; see also Caro, 18 Cal. App. 4th at 668. To prove causation via reliance, courts

require defendant’s representations to have been a “substantial factor” influencing plaintiffs’

decision. Whitely v. Philip Morris Inc., 117 Cal. App. 4th 635, 678 (2004). As the California Court

of Appeal explained, “[i]t is not necessary that a plaintiff’s reliance upon the truth of the fraudulent

misrepresentation be the sole or even the predominant . . . factor in influencing his conduct. It is

enough that the representation has played a substantial part, and so has been a substantial factor, in

influencing his decision.” Id. In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that “[i]n making the decision to

purchase the phones and enter into a new service contract, the Faigmans were predominantly

influenced by the advertised value of the rebates and their understanding that the rebates would be

the functional equivalent of cash.” FAC ¶ 39. This allegation of reliance clearly meets the standard

set forth in Whitely, and therefore, plaintiffs have successfully plead the causation requirement of

their claim under the CLRA.9

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 17, 2007 

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. Plaintiffs’ original complaint was filed against Cingular Wireless, LLC. Following plaintiffs’

original complaint, and prior to the filing of plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, defendant Cingular

Wireless, LLC changed its name to AT&T Mobility LLC. According to plaintiffs’ first amended

complaint, AT&T Mobility LLC continues to use the Cingular name, logo and website. Herein,

defendant AT&T Mobility LLC is referred to as “Cingular.”

2. Unless otherwise specified, background facts are taken from plaintiffs’ first amended complaint,

and are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion only.

3. Plaintiffs do not make clear in their complaint when David Faigman filled out and mailed the

rebate forms. The complaint merely states that he filled them out “after Lisa Faigman returned

home.” FAC ¶ 36. Although the question of whether David Faigman filled out the forms before the

three-day cooling off period expired may be legally significant to issues not considered in this

motion, the court need not address this ambiguity here where plaintiffs have pled reliance. 

4. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Twombly, defendant argues that plaintiff has

failed to allege facts that show plaintiff is “plausibly” entitled to relief. Although defendant has

correctly articulated the new standard for a motion to dismiss after Twombly, this change does not

affect the analysis in this case. 

5. Rule 9(b) provides: “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or

mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of

a person may be averred generally.”

6. Plaintiffs state throughout their complaint that they assumed that they would receive their rebate

in cash or by check. As the relevant standard is what a reasonable consumer would expect, the court

will take the plaintiffs’ discussion of their own assumptions to be a claim about what a reasonable

consumer would expect in their situation. See Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 439 F. Supp. 2d

1112, 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2006).

7. Cingular’s advertisements often show the price of a phone as the remainder calculated after the

subtraction of a savings from a “mail-in rebate card.” At the July 9, 2007 hearing defendant argued

that the term “mail-in rebate card” actually refers to the VISA Reward Card the consumer receives,

and therefore, Cingular’s advertisements explicitly disclose the fact that customers receive a VISA

card instead of cash or check. This argument is entirely without merit. No reasonable consumer

expects that the term “mail-in” refers to an item which the seller mails to the consumer; rather, a

reasonable consumer would expect the term to refer to the rebate form the consumer must mail-in to

the seller to obtain the rebate. Cingular’s own language makes this clear as well. Nowhere in

Cingular’s rebate forms or elsewhere does Cingular say they will be sending customers their “mailin VISA Reward Card.” Cingular is bound by the language they have created. The court therefore

ENDNOTES

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rejects the argument that “mail-in rebate card” refers to the VISA Reward Cards.

8. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs plead causes of action under California’s Unfair

Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code sections 17200 et seq., and California’s False

Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus & Prof. Code sections 17500 et seq.. The UCL and FAL were

amended via a ballot initiative passed in November 2004 such that standing to bring a private claim

under either statute is limited to “any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or

property “as a result of” such unfair competition or false advertising. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§

17204 & 17535. Defendants maintain that this language, while clearly limiting standing to

individuals who have suffered an injury in fact, further imposes a requirement that a private plaintiff

has suffered such injury as a result of relying upon the defendant’s statutory violation. The question

of whether this language implies a requirement of “actual reliance” was taken up by the California

Supreme Court on November 1, 2006, after plaintiffs filed their original complaint, but prior to the

filing of plaintiffs’ FAC in the following two cases: Pfizer, Inc. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d

840 (2006), and In re Tobacco II Cases, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 917 (2006). It is therefore unsettled, as a

matter of California law, whether actual reliance is required to plead a cause of action under UCL or

FAL. As the state’s highest court is in the process of deciding this question, it would be imprudent

for the court to reach the issue at this time. Accordingly, the court reserves judgment on plaintiffs’

UCL and FAL claims until after the California Supreme Court issues its decisions on these cases.

9. As alternative grounds for proving causation, plaintiffs argue that their allegations regarding the

inferiority of VISA Reward Cards to cash or check show that Cingular’s misrepresentation were

material, therefore giving rise to a presumption of reliance. A presumption of reliance arises where

there is a showing that a misrepresentation was material. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc.,

15 Cal.4th 951, 977 (1997). Defendant responds by arguing that plaintiffs have failed to identify

any misrepresentations at all, and that the marketing language Lisa Faigman saw at the Cingular

store does not support a finding of materiality. Since plaintiffs have successfully plead reliance

under Whitely, a finding that Cingular’s alleged misrepresentations were material, therefore giving

rise to a presumption of reliance, is unnecessary to support plaintiffs’ case. 

Case 3:06-cv-04622-MHP Document 81 Filed 07/18/07 Page 12 of 12