Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-03039/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-03039-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES BOYD,

Booking No. 201144610,

Civil No. 11cv3039 LAB (WMc)

Plaintiff, ORDER SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

AND FOR SEEKING MONETARY

DAMAGES AGAINST IMMUNE

DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

vs.

CITY OF OCEANSIDE POLICE

DEPARTMENT; CITY OF OCEANSIDE;

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; MALINDA’S

PROFESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE

SERVICES; BENJAMIN CURTIS

CONWAY; MALINDA KAY CLICK;

MALINDA KAY CURTIS; ABSOLUTE

BONDING CORP.; SAN LUIS REY

TOWING; FRANK McCOY; OCEANSIDE

POLICE OFFICERS 1-100; TOM

AGUIGUI; SUMMER STEPHAN; BONNIE

DUMANIS; DREW BEDELL; OCEANSIDE

SWAT TEAM 10, 

Defendants.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Charles Boyd (“Plaintiff”), formerly detained at the Robert Presley Detention Center in

Riverside, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 on December 29, 2011, along with a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). Plaintiff also filed an identical action in

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San Diego Superior Court which was removed to this Court by Defendants on March 15, 2012. 

See Boyd v. Oceanside Police Dep’t., S.D. Civil Case No. 12cv0652 LAB (WMc). That action

has since been dismissed and Plaintiff has been informed to proceed with his claims in this

action. 

The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and simultaneously dismissed his

Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an

Amended Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. (Id.

at 8-9.) Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 11.) Once again, the

Court conducted a sua sponte screening of his FAC and found that the FAC also failed to state

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (ECF No. 13.) The Court permitted Plaintiff leave

to file a Second Amended Complaint which he filed on January 3, 2013. (ECF No. 17.) In the

Court’s previous Orders, Plaintiff was cautioned that any claims not re-alleged and Defendants

not renamed in the Amended Complaints would be deemed waived. (ECF Nos, 4, 13 citing King

v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987)). In Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, he no

longer names Defendants City of Oceanside Police Department, City of Oceanside, San Diego

District Attorney’s Office, City of Vista, City of Vista District Attorney’s Office, San Luis Rey

Towing, County of San Diego, Malinda’s Professional Investigative Services, Benjamin Curtis

Conway, Malinda KayClick, Malinda KayCurtis, or Absolute Bonding Corp. (See SAC at 1-2.) 

Accordingly, the claims against these Defendants have been waived and they are DISMISSED

from this action. King, 814 F.2d at 567. 

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Standard of Review

As the Court informed Plaintiff in the previous Orders, the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced

for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” 

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See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under these provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte

dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim,

or which seek damages fromdefendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, courts “have an obligation where the petitioner

is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010)

(citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court may not, however,

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of

the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations 

of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to

dismiss.” Id.

A. Eighth Amendment claims

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that during the time period

referenced in his pleading he was a “pre-trial” defendant. (SAC at 2.) However, Plaintiff seeks

money damages for alleged Eighth Amendment violations. (See Id. at 15-16). Because Plaintiff

was not a prisoner at the time, the Eighth Amendment does not apply to him. Bell v Wolfish, 441

U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (“Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has

complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.

. . . [and] the State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is

concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process

of law.”); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Because

[petitioner] had not been convicted of a crime, but had only been arrested, his rights derive from

the due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual

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punishment.”). Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims for

failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

B. Conspiracy claims

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted in a conspiracy

to violate his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). (See SAC at 16.) “To state

a cause of action under § 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any

person or a class of persons the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and

immunities under the laws, (3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy,

and (4) a personal injury, property damage or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen

of the United States.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Griffin

v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536

(9th Cir. 1992). “[T]he language requiring intent to deprive equal protection . . . means that

there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus

behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536.

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege membership in a protected class and fails to allege that any

Defendant acted with class-based animus, both of which are essential elements of a cause of

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02; Schultz v. Sundberg, 759

F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that conspiracy plaintiff must show membership in a

judicially-designated suspect or quasi-suspect class); Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995

F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) are

DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

C. Prosecutorial Immunity

Plaintiff seeks to hold District Attorney Bonnie Dumanis and Deputy District Attorney

Summer Stephan liable for the alleged constitutional violations. (See SAC at 7-8.) Criminal

prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil damages suits premised upon acts committed

within the scope of their official duties which are “intimately associated with the judicial phase

of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Buckley v.

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Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487-93 (1991). A

prosecutor is immune even when the prosecutor’s malicious or dishonest action deprived the

defendant of his or her liberty. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendants Dumanis and Stephan are DISMISSED for seeking monetary relief against

defendants who are immune from such relief.

D. Respondeat Superior

Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Frank McCoy and Bonnie Dumanis liable in their

supervisory capacity. However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into

causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer

v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71

(1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each

individual Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at

issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional

violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what

extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting

or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded,

however, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally

construed to support an individualized constitutional claim against either Defendant McCoy or

Defendant Defendants. Thus, these Defendants are DISMISSED from this action for failing to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

For all these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to state

a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted and seeks monetary damages against immune

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defendants, and that it must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Lopez, 203

F.3d at 1126-27.

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from

the date this Order is filed in which to file a Third Amended Complaint which addresses all the

deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself

without reference to his superseded pleading. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not named

and any claim not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King

v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, however, this case shall

remain dismissed for failing to state a claim and for seeking monetary damages against immune

defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) without further Order of the Court.

DATED: March 25, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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