Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_10-cv-00544/USCOURTS-almd-3_10-cv-00544-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

BOBBY AKLES HILL, #241257, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-CV-544-WHA

) [WO]

)

WILLIE THOMAS, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This cause of action is pending before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for

writ of habeas corpus relief filed by Bobby Akles Hill [“Hill”], a state inmate, on June 23,

2010. In this petition, Hill challenges a conviction for manslaughter imposed upon him

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in 2005 by the Circuit Court of Tallapoosa County, Alabama. The record establishes that

Hill’s manslaughter conviction became final on December 14, 2006.

In accordance with the orders of this court, the respondentsfiled an answer in which

they argue that Hill’s federal habeas petition is barred by the one-year period of limitation

The law is well settled that a pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to 1

prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173

F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11 Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11 Cir. 1993). Hill advised that

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he placed the petition in the prison mail system on June 23, 2010. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief

- Court Doc. No. 1 at 15. In light of the foregoing and for purposes of the proceedings herein, the court

considers June 23, 2010, as the date of filing. The parties do not dispute this date. 

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applicable to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitions. The respondents contend that because Hill’s 2

manslaughter conviction became final in 2006 -- after the effective date of the statute of

limitations -- Hill must have filed his § 2254 petition within a year of this conviction

becoming final, exclusive of the time that any properly filed state post-conviction petition

related to the conviction remained pending in the state courts. The respondents concede

that Hill filed a state post-conviction petition under Rule 32, Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure, on September 13, 2007 which tolled the limitation period. The respondents

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maintain that even allowing tolling of the federal limitation period during the pendency of

this Rule 32 petition, the limitation period expired prior to Hill filing his federal habeas

petition. Respondents’ Answer - Court Doc. No. 10 at 3; Moore v. Crosby, 321 F.3d 1377,

1381 (11 Cir. 2003) (“While a ‘properly filed’ application for post-conviction relief tolls

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the statute of limitations, it does not reset or restart the statute of limitations....”); Tinker

v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1335 n.4 (11 Cir. 2001) (“[A] properly filed petition in state

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Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)setsforth the one-year period oflimitation. Thissection is contained within

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the Anti-Terrorismand Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996 (the “AEDPA”) which became effective on April 24,

1996.

Hill certified he placed the Rule 32 petition in the prison mail system on September 13, 2007.

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Respondents’ Exhibit M - Court Doc. No. 13-1 at 6. A pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed in federal cases

the date the petition is delivered to prison officialsfor mailing. Houston, 487 U.S. at 271-272. “Alabama courts

have [adopted thisrule and] held that a pro se incarcerated petitioner/appellant is considered to have ‘filed’ aRule

32 petition, a notice of appeal, or a petition for a writ of certiorari when those documents are given to prison

officials for mailing.” Ex parte Allen, 825 So.2d 271, 272 (Ala. 2002); Holland v. State, 621 So.2d 373, 375

(Ala.Crim.App. 1993)(“[A] prose incarceratedpetitioner‘files’ aRule 32 petitionwhenhehandsthepetitionover

to prison authoritiesfor mailing.”). Consequently, the prison mailbox rule appliesto pro seRule 32 petitionsfiled

in the state courts of Alabama. Thus, September 13, 2007 is the appropriate date of filing for Hill’s Rule 32

petition.

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court only tolls the time remaining within the federal limitation period.”). Thus, the

respondents maintain that Hill filed the present federal habeas petition after expiration of

the one-year period of limitation. Respondents’ Answer - Court Doc. No. 10 at 3.

Based on the statute of limitation argument set forth by the respondents, the court

entered an order advising Hill that he had failed to file his § 2254 petition within the oneyear period of limitation established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Order of August 25, 2010

- Doc. No. 15. This order also allowed Hill an opportunity to show cause why his federal

habeas petition should not be barred from review by this court as untimely filed. Id. at 5.

In response to this order and in previously filed documents, Hill contends that this court

should ignore the untimeliness of his petition because failure to address the merits of his

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice as he is actually innocent of the

crime for which he was convicted. Hill, as he did in the state courts, bases his claim of

innocence on the evidence presented at trial, including his testimony and a statement he

provided to law enforcement officials that he acted in self-defense. In his statement, Hill

maintains that on the afternoon of August 19, 2002, the victim attacked him through the

window of a vehicle “when [Hill] grabbed a gun that [he] had just bought ... [and] shot one

time, and I do not know where I hit him.... I was being beat, and I could not do anything

else to get away. I shot him, but I did not mean to kill him. If he would not have come

over to the car and start beating me, none of this never would have happened....”

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Respondents’ Exhibit C - Doc. No. 103 (Appellate Memorandum Opinion) at 3. At trial,

“Hill testified that [the victim] attacked him while he was sitting in his vehicle, and that

during the struggle he and [the victim] were reaching for and fighting for possession of the

pistol which, according to Hill, discharged accidentally.” Id. at 4.

In addressing this argument, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that “the

State presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of manslaughter and to

refute Hill’s claim that he acted in self-defense. The State’s evidence indicated that Hill

called [the victim] over to him and shot [the victim] after a physical altercation on the

afternoon of August 19, 2002. Hill admitted that he shot and killed [the victim] in his

statement. Also, testimony indicated that Hill carried a pistol to the scene and loaded it

shortly before the shooting; that Hill had made numerous threats to kill [the victim]; that

Hill told his wife to ‘[g]et out of here,’ after the shooting; and that he left the scene at a

high rate ofspeed. The jurywas properly instructed on self-defense and obviously resolved

the conflicting evidence and credibility choices adversely to Hill.” Id. at 7-8 (internal

quotations and citation to the record omitted).

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Hill also argues that he is entitled to retroactive application of the amended definition of self-defense

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enacted by the Alabama legislature on June 1, 2006, Ala. Code, § 13A-3-23, and, maintains that upon such

application, he establishes actualinnocence asthisdefinitionprovidesgreatersupportfor his claimofself-defense.

However, this argument is foreclosed by White v. State, 992 So.2d 783, 785 (Ala.Cr.App. 2007). In White, the

court determined “that the amendment to § 13A-3-23 applies only to crimesthat occurred afterJune 1, 2006.” Id.

Since the amendment to the self-defense statute does not apply retroactively to the crime committed by Hill on

August 19, 2002, reliance on this amendment entitles him to no relief from application of the federal period of

limitation.

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In addition, Hill argues that equitable tolling of the limitation period should be

permitted during the time he resided at a mandatory residential treatment program from

March 30, 2009, until August of 2009 as “there was no law library and [he] was denied

access to legal council (sic), legal documentation, ... could only call immediate family, ...

[and was] denied communications with anyone except those in the program....”

Petitioner’s Response - Doc. No. 16 at 2. Hill further asserts that his limited legal

knowledge entitles him to equitable tolling of the limitation period.

Upon review of the pleadings filed by the parties, the undisputed state court record

and applicable federal law, the court determines that no evidentiary hearing is required,

Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, and

concludes that the present habeas petition is due to be denied as Hill failed to file the

petition within the applicable one-year period of limitation.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Actual Innocence - Independent Claim

To the extent that Hill argues he is entitled to federal habeas relief because he is

actually innocent of manslaughter, the law is well settled “that ‘[c]laims of actual

innocence based on [previously available or] newly discovered evidence have never been

held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional

violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.’ Herrera v. Collins, 506

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U.S. 390, 400, 113 S.Ct. 853, 860, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). It is not our role to make an

independent determination of a petitioner’s guilt or innocence based on evidence

[presented at trial or] that has emerged since the trial. ‘This rule is grounded in the

principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in

violation of the Constitution--not to correct errors of fact.’ Id.” Brownlee v. Haley, 306

F.3d 1043, 1065 (11 Cir. 2002); Jordan v. Secretary Dept. of Corrections, 485 F.3d 1351,

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1356 (11 Cir. 2007) (federal habeas relief not available for free-standing, non-capital

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claims of actual innocence). Thus, Hill is entitled to no relief from this court with respect

to any independent claim of actual innocence.

B. Actual Innocence - Gateway to Excuse Time Bar

Throughout his pleadings, Hill maintains he acted in self-defense, which he argues

establishes his actual innocence of manslaughter, which in turn serves as a “gateway”

through which this court may consider those claims that are otherwise barred by the

AEDPA’s one-year limitation period. In support of this claim, Hill relies on the same selfdefense argument as he set forth at trial and on direct appeal.

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This court must determine whether Hill has made a showing of actual innocence

before addressing whether the claims for federal habeas relief are barred by the statute of

As previously noted, infra at 4, n.4, the amended self-defense statute is not applicable to the offense for

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which Hill was convicted asthis offense occurred several years prior to enactment of the amendment. White, 992

So.2d at 785. Thus, any reliance on the amended definition ofself-defense is without merit and provides no basis

for federal habeas relief.

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limitations. Wyzykowski v. Department of Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11 Cir.

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2000). “To establish actual innocence, [a habeas petitioner] must demonstrate that ... ‘it

is more likely than not that no reasonable [trier of fact] would have convicted him.’ Schlup

v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-328, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867-868, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).”

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). “[T]he Schlup standard is demanding

and permits review only in the ‘“extraordinary’” case.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538,

126 S.Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006). Thus, “[i]n the usual case the presumed guilt of a prisoner

convicted in state court counsels against federal review of [untimely] claims.” Id. at 537.

“It is important to note in this regard that ‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence, not

mere legal insufficiency. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-

2519, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992).” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-624; Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d

147, 162 (2 Cir. 2004) (“As Schlup makes clear, the issue before [a federal district] court

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is not legal innocence but factual innocence.”). Schlup observes that “a substantial claim

that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely

rare.... To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence -- whether it be exculpatory scientific

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence -- that was not

presented at trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of

cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.” 513 U.S. at 324; Rozzelle v.

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Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 672 F.3d 1000, 1011 (11 Cir. 2012) (“[T]he

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alleged exception for AEDPA untimeliness would require the petitioner (1) to present‘new

reliable evidence ... that was not presented at trial,’ Arthur [v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1245

(11 Cir.), modified, 459 F.3d 1310 (2006)] (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct.

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at 865), and (2) to show ‘that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt’ in light of the new evidence. Johnson

[v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 513 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11 Cir. 2008)] (quoting Schlup,

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513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at 867); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538, 126 S.Ct.

2064, 2077, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006).”).

Hill’s assertion of self-defense isthe same argument he presented at trial and which

the jury rejected. Moreover, with respect to the allegations referenced by Hill regarding

the State’s failure to prove essential elements of the offense, these allegations merely go

to the sufficiency of and/or the weight afforded the evidence presented, issues decided

adversely to Hill by the jury, and clearly fail to establish Hill’s actual innocence of

manslaughter. Consequently, these assertions do not constitute “new reliable evidence”

of Hill’s actual innocence and Hill fails to demonstrate any such evidence exists to

establish his actual innocence so as to meet the standard set forth by Schlup. The instant

petition for federal habeas corpusrelief istherefore properly analyzed under the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

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C. The Federal Period of Limitation

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 amended the habeas

corpus statute to include a one-year period of limitation on petitions of state inmates filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This limitation period is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)

and provides that:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newlyrecognized bythe SupremeCourt andmade retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.

The statute clearly directs that the limitation period for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254

petition begins to run at the conclusion of direct review or upon expiration of the time for

seeking direct review, whichever is later. Where a petitioner preserves his right to file a

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petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, the statute of limitations

is tolled during the ninety-day period in which such action may be undertaken. Coates v.

Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11 Cir. 2000) (“A judgment does not become ‘final by the

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conclusion of direct review or by the expiration of the time for seeking such review,’ see

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), until the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to review the

case or the time for seeking review has expired.”); see also Rule 13.1, Rules of the United

States Supreme Court (a petition for writ of certiorari may only be filed to review a

judgment or order entered by a state court of last resort and must be filed within 90 days

of the action undertaken by such state court). Accordingly, a state court judgment of

conviction becomes final under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 when the United States Supreme Court

denies certiorari or the time to apply for certiorari expires. Id.

A duly empaneled jury before the Circuit Court of Tallapoosa County, Alabama,

convicted Hill of manslaughter on April 13, 2005, and the court thereafter imposed

sentence upon Hill for this conviction on June 1, 2005. Hill filed a direct appeal of his

manslaughter conviction and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the

conviction by memorandum opinion on May 19, 2006. Respondents’ Exhibit C - Doc. No.

10-3. The appellate court subsequently denied Hill’s application for rehearing.

Respondents’ Exhibit D - Doc. No. 10-4. On September 15, 2006, the Alabama Supreme

Court denied Hill’s petition for writ of certiorari. Respondents’ Exhibit E - Doc. No. 10-5.

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Hill did not further appeal his manslaughter conviction. By operation of law, the

petitioner’s manslaughter conviction became final on December 14, 2006 -- ninety days

after the Alabama Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari -- as this is the date on which the

time expired for the petitioner to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States

Supreme Court. Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11 Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.

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1166, 121 S.Ct. 1129 (2001) (“A judgment does not become ‘final by the conclusion of

direct review or by the expiration of the time for seeking such review,’ see 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A), until the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to review the case or the

time for seeking review has expired.”); see also Rule 13.1, Rules of the United States

Supreme Court (a petition for writ of certiorari may only be filed to review a judgment or

order entered by a state court of last resort and must be filed within 90 days of the action

undertaken by such state court). The federal limitation period therefore began to run on

December 15, 2006.

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1. Statutory Tolling of the Limitation Period. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

providesthat “[t]he time during which a properlyfiled application for State post-conviction

or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under thissection.” The court finds that the

limitation period ran for 272 days after Hill’s manslaughter conviction became final until

In computing the federal period of limitation, “exclude the day of the event that triggers the period[.]”

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Rule 6(a)(1)(A), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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the filing of a Rule 32 petition in the Circuit Court of Tallapoosa County on September 13,

2007. Respondents’ Exhibit M - Court Doc. No. 13-1 at 6. This state post-conviction

petition remained pending in the state courts until denial of Hill’s petition for writ of

certiorari by the Alabama Supreme Court and issuance of the certificate of judgment on

February 20, 2009. At this time, Hill had 93 days remaining within which to timely file a

federal habeas petition. The federal limitation period therefore began to run again on

February 21, 2009 and, absent equitable tolling, the time allowed Hill for filing a federal

habeas petition would expire on May 26, 2009.

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2. Equitable Tolling of the Limitation Period. Case law directsthat the limitation

period “may be equitably tolled” on grounds apart from those specified in the habeas

statute “when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstancesthat are both

beyond his control and unavoidable with diligence.” Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d

1269, 1271 (11 Cir. 1999); see also Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11 Cir. 2000);

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Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11 Cir. 2002). “Equitable tolling will not be

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available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Calderon v. United States District Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9 Cir.1997). Such tolling

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Under this calculation, the last day of the limitation period -- May 24, 2009 -- fell on a Sunday and the

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next day of the period constituted a federal holiday (Memorial Day). Hill therefore had until the end of the

following Tuesday, May 26, 2009, to timely file a federal habeas petition. Rule 6(a)(3), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

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applies only in truly extraordinary circumstances. Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035,

1039-1040 (11 Cir. 2002); Drew v. Department of Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11

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Cir. 2002). “The burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly

rests with the petitioner.” Drew, 297 F.3d at 1286; see Helton v. Secretary for the Dept.

of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1313-1314 (11 Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1080,

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122 S.Ct. 1965, 152 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2002) .

With respect to Hill’s argument that equitable tolling of the limitation period is

warranted due to his limited knowledge of the law and his pro se status, he is entitled to

no relief from this court. The law is well settled that an inmate’s lack of legal knowledge,

his failure to understand legal principles and/or the inability to recognize potential claims

for relief at an earlier juncture do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to

justify equitable tolling. United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4 Cir. 2004) (pro se

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status and ignorance of the law do not justify equitable tolling); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231

F.3d 460, 463 (8 Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 863, 122 S.Ct. 145, 151 L.Ed.2d 97

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(2001) (lack of legal knowledge or legal resources, even in a case involving a pro se

inmate, does not warrant equitable tolling); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10 Cir.

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2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1194, 121 S.Ct. 1195, 149 L.Ed.2d 110 (2001) (a petitioner’s

pro se status and ignorance of the law are insufficient to support equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations); Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5 Cir. 1999), cert. denied,

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531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 622, 148 L.Ed.2d 532 (2000) (ignorance of the law and pro se

status do not constitute “rare and exceptional” circumstances justifying equitable tolling);

Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104,

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148 L.Ed.2d 63 (2000) (petitioner’s pro se status throughout most of the period of

limitation does not merit equitable tolling); Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5 Cir.),

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cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1007, 120 S.Ct. 504, 145 L.Ed.2d 389 (1999) (unfamiliaritywith the

legal process during the applicable filing period did not merit equitable tolling); Wakefield

v. Railroad Retirement Board, 131 F.3d 967, 969 (11 Cir. 1997) (ignorance of the law “is

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not a factor that can warrant equitable tolling.”).

Hill also asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling from March 30, 2009, until

sometime in August of 2009 while he was participating in a state ordered residential

treatment program, as officials operating the program denied him access to legal materials

and prevented him from communicating with the court. For purposes of this

Recommendation, the court assumes arguendo that Hill is entitled to equitable tolling from

the time he entered the program on March 30, 2009, until his latest possible release date

in August of 2009 - August 31, 2009. Thus, the limitation period ran an additional 37 days

from February 21, 2009 – the date of final disposition of his Rule 32 petition, until March

29, 2009. At this time, the limitation period had run for a total of 309 days. Allowing

equitable tolling during the time Hill remained in the residential treatment program, Hill,

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upon his exit from the program, had 56 days of the limitation period remaining within

which to timely file a federal habeas petition. Hill has presented no allegations which

warrant equitable tolling of the limitation period upon his leaving the residential treatment

program in August of 2009 – the latest possible date being August 31, 2009.

Consequently, the limitation period again began to run on September 1, 2009, and ran

uninterrupted until its expiration on October 26, 2009.

3. Expiration of the Limitation Period. Under the circumstances of this case, the

one-year period of limitation contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) expired on October 26,

2009. Hill filed the instant federal habeas petition on June 23, 2010, over seven months

after expiration of the limitation period. Hill has failed to demonstrate that this petition

should not be dismissed as untimely filed.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpusrelief filed byBobby Akles Hill

be denied as Hill failed to file the petition within the one-year period of limitation set forth

in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

2. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before September 21, 2012, the parties may file objections

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to the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in

the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous,

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties

are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it

is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667

F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.

1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth

Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 7 day of September, 2012.

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/s/ Susan Russ Walker

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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