Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-01339/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-01339-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

STEPHANIE GAYTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

ATLAS COPCO NORTH

AMERICA, LLC; ATLAS COPCO

TOOLS & ASSEMBLY SYSTEMS,

LLC; ATLAS COCPCO USA

HOLDINGS, INC.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:15-CV-1339-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

PlaintiffStephanieGayton (“Ms.Gayton”) initiated this personal injury lawsuit

(Doc. 1) on August 7, 2015, and filed an amended complaint (Doc. 7) on August 24,

2015. Ms. Gayton seeks to hold Defendantsliable for injuriesshe received fromusing

a power tool at work. Pending before the court is Defendants’ Motion for More

Definite Statement (Doc. 11) (the “Motion”) filed on October 26, 2015. The deadline

for Ms. Gayton to respond to the Motion ran on November 9, 2015 (Doc. 3 at 23), but

Ms. Gayton neither has filed any opposition nor sought additional time in which to

do so. For the reasons explained below, the Motion is GRANTED. 

FILED

 2015 Nov-18 AM 09:18

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:15-cv-01339-VEH Document 15 Filed 11/18/15 Page 1 of 8
II. Standards

A. Rule 12(e)

Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement. A party may move for a

more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is

allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot

reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing

a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and

the details desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the

order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the

time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other

appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

As the former Fifth Circuit has explained the standard on motions for a more

definite statement:

The motion for more definite statement, on the other hand, involves,

within the applicable standards of that rule, the exercise of that sound

and considered discretion committed unavoidably and properly to the

Trial Judge as he presides over the continuous process of adjudication

from commencement of the litigation through pleadings, pretrial

discovery, trial, submission and decision.

Under 12(e) the Court must determine whether the complaint is

such that ‘a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive

pleading.’But the fact that a careful Judge, in the exercise of that wise

discretion controlled by the prescribed principles of that rule, might so

conclude does not permit him to dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim. ‘It may well be that petitioner’s complaint as now drawn

is too vague, but that is no ground for dismissing his action. * * *.’ Glus

v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 1959, 359 U.S. 231, 79 S. Ct.

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Case 1:15-cv-01339-VEH Document 15 Filed 11/18/15 Page 2 of 8
760, 763, 3 L. Ed. 2d 770, 774.

Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 130 (5th Cir. 1959).1

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

While Defendants do not expressly reference Rule 12(b)(6) in their Motion,

they do complain about Ms. Gayton’s “conclusory” and “vague” allegationsthat lack

any “factual basis.” (Doc. 11 at 2 ¶¶ 2, 3). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“[A] party may assert the

following defenses by motion: (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted[.]”). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint

provide “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair

notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a) (setting forth general pleading requirements for a complaint including

providing “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief”). 

1

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the

Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to October 1, 1981.

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While a plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, Rule 8

does not mandate the inclusion of “detailed factual allegations” within a complaint.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.

Ct. at 103). However, at the same time, “it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). “[O]nce a claim has been

stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the

allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. 

“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. “While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to

an entitlement to relief.” Id. (emphasis added). “Under Twombly’s construction of

Rule 8 . . . [a plaintiff’s] complaint [must] ‘nudge[] [any] claims’ . . . ‘across the line

from conceivable to plausible.’ Ibid.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S. Ct. at 1950-51. 

A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). 

C. Ms. Gayton’s Failure To Oppose

Ms. Gayton’s failure to file any opposition does not automatically mean that

the Motion is due to be granted. As explained by Judge Steele in Branch Banking

and Trust Co. v. Howard, No. 12–0175–WS–N, 2013 WL 172903, at *1 (S.D. Ala.

Jan. 16, 2013):

As noted, Churchill and Howard elected not to be heard in

response to BB & T’s Amended Motion to Dismiss. Notwithstanding

that omission, BB & T (as Rule 12(b)(6) movant) bears the initial

burden of demonstrating that it is entitled to dismissal of the

counterclaims. Churchill’s and Howard’s lack of response to the Rule

12(b)(6) Motion does not trigger the kneejerk granting of such Motion

on an abandonment theory. See Gailes v. Marengo County Sheriff’s

Dep’t, 2013 WL 81227, *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 4, 2013) (“the Court will not

treat a claim as abandoned merely because the plaintiff has not defended

it in opposition to a motion to dismiss”). Rather, it remains BB & T’s

burden as movant to establish its entitlement to relief under Rule

12(b)(6). In light of these circumstances, the Court scrutinizes BB &

T’s Motion to Dismiss in accordance with the following legal standard:

“the Court will review the merits of the [movant]’s position and, if it is

clearly incorrect or inadequate to satisfy the [movant]’s initial burden,

will deny the motion despite the [nonmovant]’s failure to respond. If,

however, the [movant]’s presentation is adequate to satisfy its initial

burden, the Court will not deny the motion based on arguments the

[nonmovant] could have made but by silence elected not to raise.” Id.

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Branch Banking, 2013 WL 172903, at *1 (footnotes omitted).

III. Analysis

The court has studied the allegations of Ms. Gayton’s amended complaint and

agrees with Defendants that she should be required to provide a more definite

statement of her claims. In particular, the court points out that Ms. Gayton

impermissibly has lumped all of her claims (i.e., negligent design, failure to warn,

breach of an express/implied warranty) against all defendants into one solitary count

(Doc. 7 at 5) instead of dividing her complaint into separately numbered counts

asserted against each specific defendant. 

The Eleventh Circuit frowns upon such shotgun shenanigans. See, e.g., Davis

v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 979 & n.54 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The

complaint is a model ‘shotgun’ pleading of the sort this court has been roundly,

repeatedly, and consistently condemning for years, long before this lawsuit was

filed.”);2id. at 980 (“The steps counsel took in litigating their respective clients’

2

 Davis footnote 54 gives numerous examples of Eleventh Circuit anti-shotgun references

and states in full:

See, e.g., United States ex el. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1354 n.6

(11th Cir. 2006); M.T.V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1156 n.1 (11th

Cir. 2006); Ambrosia Coal and Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1330 n.22

(11th Cir. 2004); Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp.,

305 F.3d 1293, 1296 nn.9-10 (11th Cir. 2002); Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075,

1128–34 (11th Cir. 2001); Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2001);

BMC Indus., Inc. v. Barth Indus., Inc., 160 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998);

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interests–the pleading strategiesthey employed–were not taken out of ignorance; they

were deliberate, calculated.”).

Indeed, theEleventh Circuit hasinstructed district courtsto require the plaintiff

to replead even if the defendant does not requestsuch relief. See Davis, 516 F.3d 984

(“In light of defense counsel’s failure to request a repleader, ‘the court, acting sua

sponte, should have struck the plaintiff's complaint, and the defendants’ answer, and

instructed plaintiff’s counsel to file a more definite statement.’” (quoting Anderson

v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 367 (11th Cir. 1996))).

The amended complaint also is completely lacking in the type of factual detail

that is needed to satisfy Twombly’s plausibility standard. Under Rule 8, Ms. Gayton

cannot simply state in a factually undeveloped fashion that Defendants are liable to

her. Instead, in repleading, Ms. Gayton mustseparately state the factsthatsupport the

prima facie elements of each claim she is able to plausibly assert against each

GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 1998);

Cramer v. Florida, 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997); Ibrahimi v. City of

Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162 passim (11th Cir. 1997); Anderson v. Dist. Bd.

of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366-67 (11th Cir. 1996); Beckwith

v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1567 (11th Cir. 1995); Cesnik v.

Edgewood Baptist Church, 88 F.3d 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1996); Oladeinde v. City of

Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (11th Cir. 1992); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d

1465, 1518 (11th Cir. 1991); T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520,

1543-44 n.14 (11th Cir. 1986) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). This list is just a teaser—since

1985 we have explicitly condemned shotgun pleadings upward of fifty times.

Davis, 516 F.3d at 979 n.54.

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defendant. Ms. Gayton also must not confusingly place her prayer for relief at the end

of her complaint (Doc. 7 at 6-7 ¶ 20) without a specific reference to the claims upon

which the requested remedies are plausibly based. 

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED, and Ms. Gayton is HEREBY

ORDERED to adequately and plausibly replead her allegations and claims in a

manner that conforms with this order, no later than Monday, December 14, 2015.

DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of November, 2015.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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