Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05199/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05199-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIE DARBELLAY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHN E. POTTER, in his official capacity as

Postmaster General,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-05199 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND

VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this employment-discrimination action, defendant John E. Potter, postmaster general,

moves for summary judgment on all plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff has failed to present a prima

facie case to support her discrimination claim. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to show that

she was fired for any unlawful reason. Thus, there remain no triable issues of fact in plaintiff’s

claim. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The hearing on

this motion scheduled for February 8, 2007, is hereby VACATED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff pro se Julie Darbellay, a Hispanic female, began work as a casual mail handler

for the United States Postal Service on February 28, 2004 (Kim Decl. Exh. 4, 14:16–22,

40:14–24, 101:7–8). She was 50 years old when she began work. Her job duties included

unloading mail from mail trucks at the Embarcadero Postal Center, bringing the mail to the

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 appropriate mail carriers, and straightening up her work area before leaving (id. at 33:9–34:24). 

Darbellay held a temporary position; her shifts and hours of work necessarily varied with the

Postal Service’s needs and the volume of mail received on any given day. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is directed at Glorvies Deguzman, her supervisor while working at

the Postal Service. Darbellay testified at her deposition that Deguzman was very stern and

demanding towards her in the workplace (id. at 45:8–19). Also Deguzman would not

acknowledge plaintiff’s presence in the morning when she arrived, and when she did speak to

plaintiff, she would sometimes yell at her or address her in a loud voice (id. at 47:7–49:3). 

Darbellay stated that Deguzman created “a hostile environment” because “she had a [sic] angry

way about her. She was not pleasant to be around” (id. at 49:8–9). Darbellay also testified that

Deguzman was angry and unpleasant toward both men and women and people of different ages

and races (id. at 69:14–71:2). Darbellay stated that she did not know if she was terminated

because of her age, race or gender (id. at 100:14–20, 102:6–10; 103:9–13). She did state that

Deguzman treated some other employees in a more friendly manner than Darbellay, including

“Judy,” a clerk, Larry Frost, the manager of the Embarcardero Postal Station, and Warren Lo, a

supervisor, one other unnamed person who worked nearby (id. at 97:21–99:10). Accordingly to

Darbellay, Deguzman was more friendly to Filipino postal employees, specifically another

unnamed supervisor (id. at 95:20–96:23). 

Plaintiff was terminated from the Postal Service on April 1, 2004. The reasons cited

were her poor job performance, her demeanor toward other employees, and her resistance to

changes in her work schedule (Deguzman Decl. ¶ 6). A varying work schedule was part of

plaintiff’s job as a casual mail handler. Deguzman reported that Darbellay would not follow

directions. Because plaintiff would sometimes walk away while Deguzman was speaking to

her, she often had to repeat instructions several times (ibid.). Plaintiff also argued with her

supervisors and fellow employees (ibid.). Deguzman recommended terminating plaintiff to

manager Larry Frost (ibid.). 

On July 2, 2004, plaintiff filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint alleging

discrimination based on national origin, gender, and age (Kim Decl. Exh. 4, Dep. Exh. G). It

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was dismissed on March 22, 2005, and the dismissal was affirmed by the EEOC on September

21, 2005. Darbellay filed this action on December 15, 2005 alleging that she was terminated

because of her race and age. Plaintiff stated in her deposition that she was also discriminated

against on the basis of her gender and national origin. 

Defendant’s counsel served requests for admission and interrogatories on plaintiff by

mail on September 21, 2006 (Kim Decl. Exhs. 1, 3). Her responses were originally due no later

than October 25, 2006. Defendant’s counsel agreed to extend the deadline to November 7, then

to November 28, and finally to December 8, 2006. Plaintiff never responded, nor did she

provide initial disclosures, notice any depositions, or serve any written discovery requests. 

Plaintiff did write a letter to the Court styled as a “request for necessary information and

contacts from people within the U.S.P.S.” on November 3, 2006. Defendant turned over the

requested information to plaintiff to the extent that it believed the information to be not

privileged. 

Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment on December 22, 2006, and noticed

it for a hearing on January 25, 2007. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion. Instead,

the parties stipulated to continue the hearing to February 8, 2007. The request was granted. 

Despite this, plaintiff protested that she was “not allowed” to contact people within the Postal

Service and that the hearing should be continued to March 2007, the month for which plaintiff

believed the hearing was originally scheduled. Discovery was closed on November 24, 2006,

and trial was set for April 2, 2007. 

ANALYSIS

Under FRCP 56(c), summary judgment should be granted where the pleadings, 

discovery, and affidavits show “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party has the initial

burden of production to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Playboy

Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “designate specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24

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(1986). “If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and ‘set forth specific facts’ that show a genuine

issue for trial.” Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted).

In the Ninth Circuit, “there is a high standard for the granting of summary judgment in 

employment discrimination cases.” Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th

Cir. 1996). “‘[W]e require very little evidence to survive summary judgment’ in a

discrimination case, because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a

‘searching inquiry’ – one that is most appropriately conducted by the factfinder, upon a full

record.’” Ibid. (quoting Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir. 1994)).

1. PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DISCRIMINATION. 

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff is required

to show that: 

(1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was performing according to her

employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action,

and (4) other employees with qualifications similar to her own were treated more

favorably.

Bergene v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. and Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff is a 50-year-old Hispanic female. Defendant does not dispute that as such, she

is a member of a protected class. As to the third prong, plaintiff was terminated from her

position as a casual mail handler which constitutes an adverse employment action.

For the second element, defendant presents evidence that Darbellay was not performing

her job up to legitimate expectations. When her supervisor would give her instructions,

Darbellay would walk away and the supervisor would have to repeat the instructions. She

resisted the fluctuations in her work schedule that accompanied her position as a casual mail

handler. She also would leave materials in her work area in an unsafe manner. Plaintiff has not

presented any evidence in response. At best, she has stated that she does not know why she was

fired. Even under the forgiving standard for summary judgment in employment-discrimination

cases, plaintiff has shown no evidence that she was performing up to her employer’s legitimate

expectations. 

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As to the fourth element of a prima facie case, plaintiff must identify employees who are

similarly-situated in all respects who were treated more favorably than she. See Moran v. Selig,

447 F.3d 748, 756 (9th Cir. 2006). In her deposition, plaintiff identified four people such

people. One of them, Judy, was a mail clerk, a different position than a casual mail handler. 

Larry Frost was the plant manager of the Embarcadero Postal Center. Warren Lo was a

supervisor, as was the unnamed person at the next station. None of these people held positions

similar to plaintiff’s. Accordingly, she has not shown other similarly-situated employees were

treated more favorably by Deguzman than she was. Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima

facie case, thus summary judgment for defendant is warranted. 

***

Plaintiff simply has not shown that she was terminated for any unlawful reason or that

her supervisor discriminated against her. Aside from her own allegations in the complaint,

Darbellay did not even testify that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race,

gender, age, or national origin. Additionally, the Postal Service has shown a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Darbellay’s employment. Darbellay argued with other

employees and her supervisor, resisted changes to her work schedule, and had difficulty

following directions. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to the contrary, nor has she

presented any evidence that she was terminated for an unlawful reason. 

In short, plaintiff has not shown that she suffered any discriminatory employment

action. She testified that she did not recall her race, gender, age, or national origin ever being

mentioned while she worked for the Postal Service. Even taking all of her statements as true,

she has not presented any evidence that action was taken against her because of her protected

status. She merely testified that Deguzman was more pleasant to Filipino workers than she was

to plaintiff. This is not actionable under the law. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED. 

2. PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY.

Failure to respond to a request for an admission is automatically deemed an admission. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a). Here, defendant propounded requests for admission asking Darbellay to

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admit that she was terminated because of her poor work performance and not for any unlawful

reason. She failed to respond, thus defendant argues that she is deemed to have admitted that

she was not terminated for any unlawful reason. This is true. In any event, plaintiff has failed

to make out her prima facie case of discrimination. 

CONCLUSION

For all the above-stated reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED. Seeing that no further argument on this matter is

necessary, the hearing is VACATED. Plaintiff is advised that she may appeal this matter to the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit if she properly dockets her appeal in accordance with

that court’s rules within 30 days of the entry of judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2007 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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