Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01434/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01434-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY L. PEAVY,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv1434-LAB (WVG)

ORDER IN RESPONSE TO

COURT OF APPEALS’

REFERRAL

vs.

DOCTOR CAIN, et al.,

Defendant.

On June 29, Plaintiff Gary Peavy, a former prisoner who was held in state custody,

filed his civil rights complaint along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The

Court granted him leave to proceed IFP, screened his complaint, and dismissed it. The order

discussed the deficiencies in the complaint and gave Peavy leave to amend. When Peavy

filed his amended complaint, the Court again screened and dismissed it, this time without

leave to amend. Peavy then filed a notice of appeal. On January 31, the Ninth Circuit

referred to this Court the issue of whether the appeal was taken in good faith. For reasons

discussed below, the Court determines it was not.

Peavy’s amended complaint brought two principal but related claims. First, Peavy

argues his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when prison officials refused to treat his

serious medical condition. As pointed out in the first screening order, Peavy never alleged

what his condition was, never alleged whether it was serious, never alleged whether any

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 Peavy alleged that he had made an appointment to interview (while still in prison) 1

to be interviewed for release to a substance abuse treatment house. (Am. Compl., ¶ 16.)

Peavy thought that if his scheduled release date were pushed back because of the

conviction, he would be ineligible for this program. (Id.) As the interview date (but not his new

release date) approached and his appeal had not yet been decided, Peavy decided to

abandon his appeal. (Id.) Peavy also alleges that an officer suggested he continued to

appeal. (Id.) It is therefore clear that, although he was still in custody and still had appeals

procedures open to him, he voluntarily abandoned his appeals.

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officer knew it was serious (or any facts that would support such an inference), and never

alleged any harm resulting from it. The only alleged indicator of his needing medical care

was that he told officers he wanted to go to sick call The officers all either sent him to ask

a different officer, or denied permission because they believed he was malingering to get out

of attending a substance abuse class. Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) and its

progeny, this claim must be dismissed. Although Peavy was warned about these defects,

his amended complaint did not allege any additional facts.

The second claim is an attempted appeal of a conviction for a rules violation. Peavy

was accused of showing an expired medical card to an officer, in order to get out of a work

assignment. (Peavy attached the card to his amended complaint, and it had been expired

for over a month on the date he was accused of showing it to the officer.) Peavy now claims

some of his proffered evidence was improperly excluded, a state procedural rule requiring

witnesses to be held in a soundproof room was violated, a few other state procedural rules

also weren’t followed, the principal witness against him fabricated the charges, and everyone

knew that the witness's testimony was a lie. He says this prevented him from getting an

earlier release date. Peavy admits he never exhausted this claims, and abandoned his

appeal before it reached the final level of review, i.e., the Director's level, because he

thought it would take too long. After the failure to exhaust was pointed out to him in the first 1

screening order, Peavy says he filed a late appeal, and in his latest filing says the appeal is

now pending.

At his prison disciplinary hearing, Peavy's proffered evidence was excluded as

irrelevant. As the second screening order pointed out, the evidence Peavy was tangential.

It pertained to whether the principal witness saw Peavy's name on a list to pick up medicine,

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 None of the pleadings show any connection between the medical list and the use 2

of the expired card, or Peavy's attempt to avoid a work assignment. Peavy's theory of

admissibility, as detailed in one of his appeals, is that the officer who testified Peavy showed

him the expired card also testified he saw a list of inmates scheduled to pick up medication

at 12:30 p.m. (Am. Compl., Ex. A, ¶ 3 ("Officer Garza allege to have seen this expir[ed]

medical card and list of inmate[s] that pick-u[p] medication at 12:30 pm.").) Peavy's theory

is that, if the officer lied about the medical list, he also lied about Peavy presenting him with

the card. (Id., ¶4 ("Because Officer Mark Garza isn't a good lier.[ ] The[re] is no medical list

for afternoon pick-up.").) Beyond this, he hasn’t developed this claim.

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or lied about seeing it on the list. It didn't directly bear on the charged conduct, i.e., whether

Peavy did or didn't show the officer the expired card. If the evidence was relevant or

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material for some reason, Peavy never explained what. Impeachment on a collateral matter,

which is all Peavy has alleged, is routinely excluded in federal courts, and the exclusion

doesn't violate due process. See, e.g., United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763, 770 (9th Cir.

1977). Peavy's other arguments about whether state law procedures were properly followed

don't give rise to a federal claim. Except for the charge of the knowing use of perjured

testimony, none of Peavy's grievances about how the proceedings were handled, either

individually or in aggregate, would render the proceeding so fundamentally unfair as to

violate due process. 

The order also found Peavy’s claim was barred by the "favorable termination rule" of

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1977). Peavy's claim that he was convicted based on

testimony everyone knew was perjured, if successful, would imply the invalidity of his

conviction. The rule would apply to the prison disciplinary proceeding at issue here, because

Peavy claims the conviction caused him to be confined longer than he would have been

otherwise. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643–44 (1997) (plaintiff's § 1983 claim

based on prison disciplinary conviction allegedly in violation of due process was subject to

Heck bar); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (prison disciplinary

sanctions that affect the fact or length of a prisoner's confinement may be subject to Heck

bar). Because Peavy has already been released, any equitable claims have become moot

and he can only seek damages. But Heck still bars his claims, regardless of the type of relief

sought. See Edwards at 648 (holding claim for declaratory relief and money damages that,

/ / /

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if successful would imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, was not cognizable under

§ 1983).

There are some exceptions to this rule, where despite a plaintiff's diligence, relief that

would invalidate the conviction is unavailable to him. See Nonnette, 316 F.3d at 877. But

these exceptions don't apply here. Accepting Peavy's representations as true, he is either

too early, or too late. If his “late appeal” is denied as untimely, he cannot show that denial

occurred in spite of his diligence. His admission that he abandoned his appeals prevents

that. See Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148, 11543 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (§ 1983 claim

brought by plaintiff whose remedies became unavailable because he failed to timely pursue

them was Heck-barred). On the other hand, if his "late appeal" is not time-barred, his claim

is unripe. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (Heck-barred

action does not accrue until favorable termination).

Although the second screening order cited non-exhaustion of administrative remedies

as a basis for dismissal, the Court now reconsiders that analysis. Because Peavy filed suit

after being released from prison, the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e is

inapplicable. See Talamantes v. Leyva, 575 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2009). He would,

however, be required to exhaust any claims subject to the California Tort Claims Act's

exhaustion requirement.

The amended complaint added a new claim for retaliation, alleging a prison counselor

threatened to put Peavy in segregated confinement for filing his appeal. But such an

incident does not give rise to a retaliation claim. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813,

815–16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (explaining standard). Peavy also attempted to raise a

worker's compensation claim against the state, but even if that claim were not already

pending before a state court, both this Court and the court of appeals would lack jurisdiction

over it.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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The Court therefore concludes that this appeal would not be taken in good faith.

Pursuant to the order of referral, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and the holding of Hooker v.

American Airlines, 302 F.3d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002), Peavy’s IFP status is REVOKED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 2, 2012

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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