Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00126/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GARY WAYNE SEARCY, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 06-0126-BH-M

GRANTT CULLIVER, et al., :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This

action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is now before the

undersigned on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docs. 28,

34), and Plaintiff’s opposition thereto. (Doc. 36). For the

reasons stated below, it is recommended that Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment be granted and that Plaintiff’s action

against Defendants be dismissed with prejudice.

I. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

From its review of the record, the Court summarizes the

parties’ allegations material to the issues addressed in this

Report and Recommendation as follows. Plaintiff has been

incarcerated by the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”)

since 1998 under a sentence of life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole for capital murder. (Doc. 4 at 5). On

March 7, 1998, Plaintiff was admitted to W.E. Donaldson

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 1 of 25
1 Receiving and classification for male inmates in the ADOC

system takes place at the receiving and classification center at

Kilby. (Doc. 28, att. 4 at 2). Male inmates sentenced to life

without parole can be housed permanently in one of three

facilities: Donaldson, Holman, and St. Clair. (Id.). 

2

Correctional Facility (“Donaldson”), where he was housed in a

single cell unit until May 2, 2001, when he was transferred to a

single cell unit at St. Clair Correctional Facility (“St.

Clair”). (Doc. 28, att. 2 at 1). On June 18, 2001, Plaintiff

was sent to the receiving and classification center at Kilby

Correctional Facility (“Kilby”),1 where he was housed in

administrative segregation until July 24, 2001, when he was

transferred to administrative segregation at W.C. Holman

Correctional Facility (“Holman”). (Id. at 2).

On December 27, 2001, Defendant Penny Emmons, Holman

Classification Specialist, conducted a review of Plaintiff’s

status and continued his assignment in administrative

segregation. (Id.). Plaintiff requested a transfer at that time

to the State of Florida under the Interstate Corrections Compact

(“ICC”). His request was denied because his sentence of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole made him

ineligible for an ICC transfer. (Id.).

In February, 2002, seven months after being transferred to

Holman, Plaintiff received citations for violating Rule 44,

threats; Rule 29, assault on a DOC employee; Rule 52, possession

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 2 of 25
2

 DOC classification manual, page 44, ¶ D, items 1, 3, and

4(e), provides: “Disciplinary for/or assaultive behavior with a

weapon will result in placement into maximum custody for at least

twelve (12) months. . . . Possession of a weapon alone will

result in a return to close custody for twelve (12) months. . . . 

Possession of any escape device will result in return to close

custody for not less than twelve (12) months.” (Doc. 28, att. 2

at 3). 

3

 In November, 2003, Plaintiff submitted an “enemies list”

to Defendant Emmons containing the names of nineteen inmates

throughout the Alabama prison system with whom he could not

safely be confined. (Doc. 28, att. 3 at 32; Doc. 28, att. 2 at

3

of an escape device (a prison made handcuff key); and Rule 51,

possession of a weapon (an ice pick). (Id.). A reclassification

hearing followed resulting in an increase in Plaintiff’s custody

to “maximum” as per DOC classification guidelines.2 (Id.).

One year later, on June 10, 2003, the Institutional

Segregation Review Board (“ISRB”) reviewed Plaintiff’s custody

and granted him a reduction in custody to “close,” with continued

confinement in administrative segregation, but with weekly

reviews by the ISRB. (Id. at 3). On June 18, 2003, the ISRB

reviewed Plaintiff’s custody and made no changes. (Id.).

On May 22, 2004, Plaintiff was released from administrative

segregation to the general population on a six-month probationary

basis. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff’s annual review followed the next

month on June 30, 2004, with no changes. Plaintiff’s request to

be transferred at that time to St. Clair prison was denied

because he had four documented enemies at St. Clair.3 (Id.).

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 3 of 25
3). Previously, at Donaldson, Plaintiff had compiled an “enemies

list” with the names of seventeen inmates with whom he could not

be safely confined. (Doc. 28, att. 3 at 23-24).

4

The following year, on June 23, 2005, another annual review

of Plaintiff’s custody status found Plaintiff adjusting to the

general population “appropriately,” and he was assigned to the

“honor dorm” and the “metal fab.” (Id.). However, three months

later, on September 23, 2005, Plaintiff threw his food tray at a

DOC employee and was returned to segregation. (Id.; Doc. 28,

att. 3 at 11-12). On October 11, 2005, after a hearing,

Plaintiff was found guilty of violating Rule 29, assault on a

person associated with the ADOC. (Id.). The Hearing Officer

recommended thirty-five days in disciplinary segregation, but the

Warden reduced the time to ten days. (Id.).

The following month, on November 29, 2005, a correctional

officer confiscated a prison made “sticker” and handcuff key from

Plaintiff’s front pocket. (Doc. 28, att. 3 at 3-4, 9). On

December 2, 2005, Plaintiff was served with notice of a hearing

to be conducted on December 6, 2005. (Id.). Plaintiff was

charged with violating Rule 52, unauthorized possession of a

weapon, and Rule 51, unauthorized possession of an escape device. 

(Id. at 3, 9). Plaintiff was found guilty of both charges and

given forty-five days in disciplinary segregation. (Id. at 4,

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 4 of 25
4 On January 12, 2006, an enemy list was created between

Plaintiff and inmate Kenneth Lamar Wilson arising out of the

evidence presented at Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing. (Doc.

28, att. 2 at 5; Doc. 28, att. 3 at 4).

5 DOC Classification Manual, page 41, § C, item 3, provides:

“Possession of a weapon alone will result in a return to close

custody for twelve (12) months.” (Doc. 28, att. 2 at 5). 

5

10).4

On January 26, 2006, Plaintiff was served with twenty-four

hour advance written notice of a reclassification hearing to be

held on January 30, 2006. (Doc. 28, att. 2 at 4). Plaintiff

requested three witnesses, some of whom were not scheduled to

work on that date. When the hearing was rescheduled for February

9, 2006, Plaintiff refused to attend. (Id.). At the hearing,

Plaintiff’s custody was increased to “close” in accordance with

DOC Classification guidelines.5

 (Id. at 5).

Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action on March 1,

2006. (Doc. 1). He remained in administrative segregation at

Holman until April 12, 2006, when he was transferred to St. Clair

prison, where he is currently incarcerated. (Doc. 8).

II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE

On March 1, 2006, Plaintiff filed a § 1983 Complaint arising

out of his incarceration in administrative segregation at Holman

prison for an aggregate period of approximately three years and

five months. (Doc. 1). On March 9, 2006, the Court ordered

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 5 of 25
6 Defendant Holloway is now the Classification Specialist

Supervisor at Red Eagle Honor Farm. (Doc. 28, att. 4).

7 Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief are: (1) a

transfer to the “P.C. (protective custody) unit” at St. Clair,

which, according to Plaintiff, “is equivalent to general

population housing in terms of rehabilitative, educational,

vocational, and religious opportunities;” (2) a transfer to a

prison in his home state of Florida where he could enter the

general prison population; or (3) release back into society. 

(Doc. 4 at 11-12). As discussed above, subsequent to the filing

of this action, Plaintiff was transferred to St. Clair prison. 

(Doc. 8). Therefore, his claims for injunctive relief related to

his incarceration at Holman are moot. Boglin v. Weaver, 2001 WL

228172, *9 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (unreported) (“[A]n inmate’s request

for injunctive and declaratory relief in a section 1983 action

fails to present a case or controversy once an inmate has been

transferred.”) (citing Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1327, 1328

(11th Cir. 1989)).

6

Plaintiff to refile his Complaint on this Court’s form, which

Plaintiff did on March 20, 2006. (Docs. 3, 4). In his Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff alleged Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment

claims against Defendants Grantt Culliver, Warden at Holman

prison; Penny Emmons, Classification Specialist at Holman prison;

and Judy Holloway, Classification Specialist Supervisor at Kilby

prison,6

 arising out of his confinement in administrative

segregation while incarcerated at Holman. Plaintiff seeks

nominal and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief.7

(Doc. 4 at 12). 

On January 23, 2007, the Court directed the Clerk to serve

Defendants with the Complaint. (Doc. 15). On March 26, 2007, and

April 13, 2007, Defendants filed an Answer and Special Report

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 6 of 25
8 Plaintiff is suing Defendants in both their official and

individual capacities. As state officials, Defendants are

entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages in their

official capacities. See Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d

1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (state officials sued in their

official capacities are protected from suit for damages under the

Eleventh Amendment). Furthermore, “[q]ualified immunity protects

government officials performing discretionary functions from

suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct

violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Dalrymple v.

Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). In determining whether qualified

immunity is appropriate in a given case, “[t]he court must first

ask the threshold question whether the facts alleged, taken in

the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, show that the

government official’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” 

Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 995 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001)). Having found herein that Plaintiff’s allegations do

not establish a constitutional violation, “there is no necessity

for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier,

533 U.S. at 201.

7

denying that they violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and

asserting various defenses, including absolute and qualified

immunity.8

 (Docs. 28, 34). On February 1, 2008, the Court

ordered that Defendants’ Special Report and Answer be treated as

a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 35). On February 13, 2008,

Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 36). Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment and Plaintiff’s opposition thereto are now before the

Court.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

In analyzing the propriety of a motion for summary judgment,

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 7 of 25
8

the Court begins with these basic principles. The Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure grant this Court authority under Rule 56 to

render “judgment as a matter of law” to a party who moves for

summary judgment. “[S]ummary judgment is proper ‘if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . .’” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

The Court must view the evidence produced by “the nonmoving

party, and all factual inferences arising from it, in the light

most favorable to” that party. Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d

923, 934 (11th Cir. 1989). 

However, Rule 56(e) states that:

an adverse party [to a motion for summary

judgment] may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of the adverse party’s

pleading, but the adverse party’s response,

by affidavits or as otherwise provided in

this rule, must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial. If the adverse party does not so

respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,

shall be entered against the adverse party. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

325-27. 

“[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient

evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a

verdict for that party. . . . If the evidence is merely

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 8 of 25
9 The record shows that the vast majority of the time that

Plaintiff was confined in segregation at Holman prison was spent

in administrative segregation, with relatively short periods of

time in disciplinary segregation. (Doc. 28, att. 2 and att. 3). 

Plaintiff does not challenge his confinement in disciplinary

segregation separately; rather, he merely references his

“unending” confinement in administrative segregation. (Doc. 4 at

8).

9

colorable, . . . or is not significantly probative, . . . summary

judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (internal citations omitted). “Summary

judgment is mandated where a party ‘fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial.’” Custom Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Midway Servs.,

Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

In this action, Plaintiff seeks redress pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged constitutional deprivation arising

out of his prolonged incarceration in segregation at Holman

prison.9

 (Doc. 4 at 11). The crux of Plaintiff’s Complaint is

that, with the exception of a period of one year and four months

that he spent in the general population, the entire time that he

was incarcerated at Holman prison, he was housed in segregation. 

(Id.). The record shows that Plaintiff was incarcerated at

Holman prison from July, 2001, to April, 2006, and, during that

time, spent approximately three years and five months in

segregation. (Doc. 28, att. 2 and att. 3). 

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 9 of 25
10

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims against Defendant

Grantt Culliver, Warden of Holman prison, and Defendant Penny

Emmons, Holman Unit Classification Specialist, for violating his

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as his

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment, by housing him “indefinitely” in “administrative

segregation.” (Doc. 4 at 4, 7, 9, 11). Plaintiff further claims

that Defendant Judy Holloway, Classification Specialist

Supervisor at Kilby Correctional Facility (“Kilby”), violated his

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by arbitrarily placing

him in Holman prison in the first place. (Id. at 7). 

Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of

any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States

or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress. . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). For each of the reasons set forth

below, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims fail as a matter of law.

A. Statute of Limitations.

“In states where more than one statute of limitations

exists, the forum state’s general or residual personal injury

statute of limitations applies to all § 1983 actions filed in

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 10 of 25
10 Plaintiff has not alleged exceptional circumstances that

might warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period. See

Rutledge v. Tew, 2007 WL 1771385, *1 (M.D. Ala. 2007)

(plaintiff’s untimely § 1983 claim dismissed where plaintiff

“fail[ed] to assert any exceptional circumstances which would

warrant equitable tolling of the limitation period.”) (citing

Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999)

(federal limitations period may be equitably tolled when a

plaintiff untimely files because of “extraordinary circumstances

that are both beyond his control and unavoidable with

diligence.”); Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir.

2006) (Plaintiff bears the burden of showing extraordinary

circumstances.)).

11

federal court in that state.” Burt v. Martin, 193 Fed. Appx.

829, 830 (11th Cir. 2006). In Alabama, that period is two years. 

Id. “A cause of action accrues for purposes of determining when

the statute of limitations period began to run when the plaintiff

knew or should have known of his injury and its cause.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under

the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments by confining him in

segregation at Holman on two prolonged occasions: (1) from July,

2001, to May, 2004 (after which he was released into the general

population for one year and four months); and (2) from September,

2005, to April, 2006 (when he was placed back in administrative

segregation until he was transferred to St. Clair). (Doc. 4 at

11). Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action on March 1,

2006. (Doc. 1). Applying the two-year limitations period and

the applicable accrual rule, any claims related to Plaintiff’s

incarceration in segregation prior to March 1, 2004, are time

barred.10 In any event, even if Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 11 of 25
12

related to his incarceration prior to March 1, 2004, were not

time barred, they still fail inasmuch as he has not established a

violation of the Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment. 

B. Due Process.

1. Liberty Interest.

The Due Process Clause protects against deprivations of

“life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S.

Const. amend. XIV. Plaintiff does not claim to be deprived of

life or property. Therefore, he is only entitled to due process

if he was deprived of a liberty interest within the meaning of

the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The Supreme Court has stated that there are

two circumstances in which a prisoner can be

deprived of a liberty interest beyond the

deprivation associated with the prisoner’s

confinement. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L. Ed.

2d 418 (1995). First, a liberty interest may

arise from the “Due Process Clause of its own

face,” which extends procedural safeguards to

a prisoner when his liberty is restrained in

a way that exceeds the sentence imposed by

the court. Id. Secondly, states may create

liberty interests by conferring certain

benefits to prisoners, the deprivation of

which “impose[s] atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. 

Wallace v. Hamrick, 229 Fed. Appx. 827, 829-30 (11th Cir. 2007)

(unpublished). 

The Supreme Court has held that there is no right inherent

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 12 of 25
13

in the Constitution to be free from confinement in disciplinary

segregation. Sandin, 515 US. at 487, 478. Likewise, there is no

right inherent in the Constitution to be free from confinement in

administrative segregation. Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 Fed. Appx.

733, 738 (11th Cir. 2006). Therefore, Plaintiff possesses a

liberty interest related to his confinement in administrative or

disciplinary segregation at Holman prison only if the State has

created such a liberty interest. Id. at 478. “‘[T]he touchstone

of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created

liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of

confinement is not the language of the regulations regarding

those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves

‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” 

Wallace, 229 Fed. Appx. at 830 (quoting Wilkinson v. Austin, 545

U.S. 209, 223 (2005), quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 

In Sandin, the Supreme Court compared the conditions of

confinement in disciplinary segregation, administrative

segregation, and the general population and found that a

prisoner’s thirty-day confinement in disciplinary segregation did

not implicate a state-created liberty interest because it did not

present an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id., 515

U.S. at 484. The plaintiff in Sandin was a convicted murderer

and a kidnapper, sentenced to an indeterminate term of thirty

years to life in a maximum security prison. Id. at 474-75. 

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 13 of 25
14

Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that solitary confinement

automatically triggered due process protection, the court noted

that even inmates in the general population were confined to

their cells for twelve to sixteen hours a day, depending upon

their classification. Id., 515 U.S. at 486 and n.8. Therefore,

the deprivations endured by the plaintiff in disciplinary

segregation were not “atypical” or “significant” and “did not

work a major disruption in his environment.” Id., 515 U.S. at

486.

In the present action, Plaintiff’s considerably longer

confinement in administrative segregation presents an additional

consideration not present in Sandin. Addressing that issue in

Al-Amin, 165 Fed. Appx. at 739, the Eleventh Circuit held that a

prisoner who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole did not have a

state-created liberty interest in being free from confinement in

administrative segregation for three years, which represented the

entire amount of time that he had been incarcerated at the

facility. The evidence showed that the inmate was classified as

a “high maximum security” prisoner, who was considered an escape

risk and a threat to the security of the prison. Id. at 735. 

Finding no state-created liberty interest, the Eleventh Circuit

stated:

Al-Amin has a liberty interest only if his

confinement in GSP’s administrative

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 14 of 25
15

segregation for a period of approximately

three years constitutes an “atypical and

significant hardship” on him “in relation to

the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.

at 484, 115 S. Ct. at 2300. Based on the

substantial similarity between the privileges

and conditions of life in the general

population of GSP in comparison to conditions

in administrative segregation, the district

court concluded that confinement in

administrative segregation did not constitute

an atypical and significant hardship. We agree.

The briefs and the record establish that no

genuine issue of material fact exists

concerning the equivalence of the conditions

of Al-Amin’s administrative segregation

confinement in comparison to the conditions

experienced by the general population of GSP. 

Moreover, Al-Amin receives periodic reviews

of his classification status in accordance

with the Georgia Department of Corrections’

Standard Operating Procedures. Under these

circumstances, Al-Amin’s confinement in

administrative segregation does not

constitute an “atypical and significant

hardship ... in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” See id. at 484,

115 S. Ct. at 2300.

Al-Amin, 165 Fed. Appx. at 739. In Al-Amin, the plaintiff was

housed in administrative segregation for approximately three

years in a single cell and allowed to leave only for five hours

of exercise a week and for showering and shaving three times a

week. He could not go to the dining room with the general

population for meals. He was allowed to have personal

possessions in his cell; his furnishings were similar to those in

the general population; and he was allowed the same visitation

and correspondence privileges as those in the general population. 

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 15 of 25
11 Plaintiff in the present action does not allege any

deprivations related to his personal possessions, furnishings,

correspondence, or visitation. As discussed herein, Plaintiff

likewise received periodic reviews of his custody and

classification status. (Doc. 28, att. 2 at 2-5). 

12 Plaintiff spent approximately two years and ten months in

administrative segregation at Holman before being released to the

general population for one year and four months. He then

returned to administrative segregation for another seven months

before being transferred to St. Clair, where he is currently

incarcerated. (Doc. 28, att. 2; Doc. 8). As discussed, supra,

Plaintiff’s claims related to his confinement prior to March,

2004 (approximately two years and eight months of the total time

spent in administrative segregation), are time barred. However,

even considering the entire period of time that Plaintiff spent

in administrative segregation at Holman (three years and five

months), the result is the same. As discussed herein, Plaintiff

has failed to show that the conditions of his confinement in

segregation at Holman constituted an atypical and significant

hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 

16

He received periodic reviews of his classification status.11 Id.

Plaintiff alleges that the conditions of his confinement in

segregation at Holman were vastly different from the conditions

of confinement in the general population and, thus, implicate a

liberty interest. Plaintiff claims: (1) He was confined for

approximately three years and five months12 in a single cell,

with the exception of approximately four hours per week when he

was allowed to exercise and take showers; (2) his cell was hot in

the summer and noisy; and (3) he was denied access to vocational,

educational, and recreational activities (including television,

movies, interactive games), and group activities (including

religious services and sporting events). (Doc. 4 at 10-11).

Applying the holdings of Sandin and Al-Amin to the facts

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 16 of 25
13 Neither the State nor Plaintiff has provided the Court

with specific comparative information related to the restrictions

and benefits of confinement in the general population. 

Therefore, for purposes of this motion, the Court assumes that

the restrictions alleged by Plaintiff related to his conditions

of confinement in segregation do not exist in the general

population and that the benefits he was denied in segregation are

enjoyed by inmates in the general population.

14 The circumstances alleged in the present action are unlike

those alleged in Wallace, 229 Fed. Appx. at 830, in which the

Eleventh Circuit held that an inmate had sufficiently pled, for

purposes of avoiding dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a

Fourteenth Amendment state-created liberty interest and an Eighth

Amendment claim arising out of his incarceration in

administrative segregation for twenty-eight days where, in

addition to having no hot water and no ventilation, the inmate

alleged that he had no opportunity for exercise and did not

17

presented by Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court is convinced that

the restrictions and deprivations experienced by Plaintiff in

segregation at Holman prison did not impose an atypical and

significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. Assuming, for purposes of this motion, that inmates

in the general population enjoyed all of the benefits denied

Plaintiff in segregation,13 the Court finds that the deprivations

alleged by Plaintiff were still within the range of confinement

to be normally expected for one serving a sentence of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole for capital murder

in a maximum security prison. Plaintiff has not alleged that he

was denied adequate food, exercise, medical care, or sanitation,

nor has he alleged any other circumstance that, in the Court’s

view, would constitute an atypical and significant hardship in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.14 Therefore,

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 17 of 25
receive timely medical care.

18

Plaintiff did not possess a liberty interest in being free from

the alleged conditions of his segregated confinement.

2. No Violation.

The foregoing notwithstanding, even if the Court were to

assume that Plaintiff had a protected liberty interest related to

his segregated confinement at Holman prison, his claims would

still fail inasmuch as his due process rights have been

fulfilled. The record reflects that, while in segregated

confinement, Plaintiff received annual reviews of his custody

status and/or reclassification hearings in December 2001, June

2002, June 2003, June 2004, June 2005, and January 2006. (Doc.

28, att. 2). In addition, Plaintiff received hearings in

connection with each of the three disciplinary actions taken

against him while he was incarcerated at Holman. (Doc. 28, att.

2 and att. 3). Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied

advance notice of the hearings, the evidence relied upon, or the

reasons for the action taken, nor does he allege that he was

denied the opportunity to call witnesses, see Madison v. Ferrell,

2007 WL 3253659, *10 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (quoting Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974)), in connection with any

of the disciplinary proceedings. Because Plaintiff received due

process in connection with his segregated confinement at Holman

prison, his claims fail as a matter of law for this reason as

Case 1:06-cv-00126-BH-M Document 37 Filed 03/12/08 Page 18 of 25
19

well. 

C. Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and

unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. It proscribes

those conditions of confinement which “shock[] the conscience,”

involve the “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain,” or which

are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime

warranting imprisonment.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

(1981); Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1429 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Only conditions which deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities” are grave enough to violate the Eighth

Amendment.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337, 347. 

In the present action, Plaintiff alleges that: (1) he was

confined in segregation for a total of three years and five

months in a single cell and allowed to leave his cell for only

four hours per week to exercise and take showers; (2) his cell

was hot in the summer and noisy; and (3) he was denied access to

vocational, educational, recreational, and group activities. 

“It is clear that administrative segregation and solitary

confinement do not, in and of themselves, constitute cruel and

unusual punishment.” Sheley, 833 F.2d at 1429 (citing Hutto v.

Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978)). Because Plaintiff does not

allege that he was deprived of adequate food, medical care,

exercise, or sanitation, his conditions of confinement in

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administrative segregation at Holman do not, on their face,

violate the Eighth Amendment. 

However, in deciding whether Plaintiff’s confinement meets

constitutional standards, the Court must also consider the length

of Plaintiff’s confinement, whether it poses a threat of

“critical,” or “possibly irreversible” psychological illness to

Plaintiff, and whether there are feasible alternatives to his

custodial arrangement. Sheley, 833 F.2d 1429-30. In addition,

if Plaintiff’s confinement in segregation is punitive in nature,

the Court must consider “whether it shocks the conscience, is

grossly disproportionate to the offense, or is totally without

penological justification.” Sheley, 833 F.2d at 1429.

In Sheley, the Eleventh Circuit held that an inmate’s

twelve-year confinement in segregation with only two hours of

out-of-cell exercise per week raised “serious constitutional

questions” given the alleged mental and physical deterioration of

the inmate and the alleged punitive nature of the segregation. 

Id. The court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on

the reasons for the segregation, the conditions of segregation,

the effects of long-term confinement in those conditions, the

psychological evaluations (if any) that the inmate had received,

and the possibility of feasible alternatives. 

In the present action, the reason for Plaintiff’s

confinement in segregation was, at times, the result of prison

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management and, at other times, the result of disciplinary

action. (Doc. 28, att. 2 and att. 3). Plaintiff entered Holman

prison as an inmate who had been convicted of capital murder. 

Prior to entering Holman, while incarcerated at Donaldson,

Plaintiff had established a long list of enemies throughout the

Alabama prison system with whom he could not safely be confined

in the general population. In addition, while incarcerated at

St. Clair, Plaintiff had been disciplined for being in possession

of a prison made weapon. (Doc. 28, att. 2 at 1; Doc. 28, att. 3

at 23-24). Upon entering Holman, Plaintiff repeatedly proved to

be a threat to prison security by making threats, assaulting DOC

employees on two different occasions, possessing an escape device

on two separate occasions, and possessing a prison made weapon on

two separate occasions. (Doc. 28, att. 2 at 2-4; Doc. 28, att. 3

at 3, 9, 11). Therefore, his prolonged segregation from the

general population (off and on for a total of three years and

five months) was warranted and necessary to maintain order and

security in the prison.

With respect to the effect of Plaintiff’s long-term

confinement on his mental health, Plaintiff alleges that it

exacerbated his mental health problems to the point that he

frequently considered suicide. (Doc. 4 at 11). 

Although depression, hopelessness,

frustration, and other such psychological

states may well prove to be inevitable by

products of lifelong incarceration, the

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threat of substantial serious and possibly

irreversible if not critical psychological

illness together with prolonged or indefinite

segregated confinement would increase the

burden on prison authorities to explore

feasible alternative custodial arrangements.

Sheley, 833 F.2d at 1429 (quoting Jackson v. Meachum, 699 F.2d

578, 584-85 (1st Cir. 1983)). In the present action, there is no

medical evidence suggesting that Plaintiff suffered from the

threat of “substantial serious and possibly irreversible if not

critical psychological illness” as a result of his confinement in

administrative segregation. Id. Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated

allegations are simply insufficient to establish this factor. 

Cf., U.S. v. Adam, 2007 WL 4115960, *12 (S.D. Fla.

2007)(rejecting Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated claim that his mental

condition was deteriorating in administrative segregation).

With respect to feasible alternatives to Plaintiff’s

confinement in segregation, the record shows that, after

receiving regular reviews of his custody status, Plaintiff was

released from administrative segregation after two years and ten

months and placed in the general population for one year and four

months. (Doc. 28, att. 2 at 4). Plaintiff returned to

confinement in administrative segregation after assaulting a DOC

employee, and he remained there for seven months before being

transferred to St. Clair prison. (Id.; Doc. 28, att. 3 at 11;

Doc. 8). During those seven months, prison officials discovered

Plaintiff with an escape device and a prison made weapon. (Doc.

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28, att. 2 at 4). Therefore, Plaintiff forfeited his alternative

confinement in the general population and rendered that option

unfeasible.

Having considered all of the circumstances related to

Plaintiff’s confinement in administrative and disciplinary

segregation at Holman prison, in their entirety, Plaintiff’s

allegations fail to establish a deprivation rising to the level

of cruel and unusual punishment. “[T]he Constitution does not

mandate comfortable prisons.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349. To the

extent that the conditions endured by Plaintiff in segregation at

Holman prison were “restrictive and even harsh, they are part of

the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses

against society.” Id., 452 U.S. at 347. The circumstances of

Plaintiff’s segregated confinement do not shock the conscience,

offend society’s evolving notions of decency, nor are they

grossly disproportionate to the offenses which he has committed. 

Sheley, 833 F.2d at 1428 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,

685 (1978)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim

fails as a matter of law. 

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Defendants

Grantt Culliver, Penny Emmons, and Judy Holloway are entitled to

summary judgment in their favor on all claims asserted against

them by Plaintiff. Accordingly, it is recommended that

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Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, that this

action be DISMISSED with prejudice, and that judgment be entered

in favor of Defendants Culliver, Emmons, and Holloway and against

Plaintiff, Gary Wayne Searcy, on all claims. 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’ S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the

district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an

attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404

(5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging

the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set

out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which

provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter

excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a "Statement

of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation" within

ten days after being served with a copy of the

recommendation, unless a different time is established by

order. The statement of objection shall specify those

portions of the recommendation to which objection is made

and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall

submit to the district judge, at the time of filing the

objection, a brief setting forth the party’s arguments that

the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de

novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient

to submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the

magistrate judge, although a copy of the original brief may

be submitted or referred to and incorporated into the brief

in support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief in

support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

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25

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 12th day of March, 2008.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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