Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00303/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00303-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER CHAPPELL, # 137810, )

 )

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:15cv303-WKW 

 ) (WO)

LEEPOSEY DANIELS, et al., )

 )

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 filed byAlabama inmate Christopher Chappell (“Chappell”) on April 29, 2015. Doc. 1

No. 1. Chappell challenges his 1984 guilty plea convictions and resulting life sentence for

first-degree rape, first-degree burglary, and second-degree burglary. The respondents argue

that Chappell’s petition is time-barred by the one-year limitation period applicable to § 2254

petitions, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Doc. No. 8. After reviewing the pleadings,

evidentiary materials, and applicable law, the court finds that no evidentiary hearing is

required and that the § 2254 petition should be denied as untimely.

Although Chappell’s petition was date-stamped as received in this court on May 6, 2015, 1

it was signed by Chappell as delivered to prison authorities for mailing on April 29, 2015. Under

the “mailbox rule,” a pro se inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison

officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173

F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999).

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II. DISCUSSION

The AEDPA’s One-Year Limitation Period

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”) provides the statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions and states:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

On April 11, 1984, Chappell pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County

to first-degree rape, first-degree burglary, and second-degree burglary. See Doc. No. 1 at 1;

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Doc. No. 1-1 at 1-2. On that same date, the trial court imposed a sentence of life

imprisonment. Id. Chappell took no direct appeal.

Section 2244(d)(1)(A) of the AEDPA provides that the one-year limitation period for

filing a § 2254 petition begins to run on the date when the time for seeking direct review of

the challenged judgment expires. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Because Chappell took no

direct appeal, his conviction became final for federal habeas purposes on May 23, 1984, i.e.,

42 days after his sentencing. See Ala. R. App. P. 4(b)(1); Bridges v. Johnson, 284 F.3d 1201,

1202 (11th Cir. 2002)

The AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996. Thus, Chappell’s conviction –

which, as noted, became final on May 23, 1984 – became final before enactment of the

AEDPA. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “application of the one-year time bar in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d) to petitions of prisoners, like [Chappell], whose convictions became final

long prior to the effective date of the AEDPA . . . ‘would be unfair, and impermissibly

retroactive.’” Wilcox v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1211 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Goodman v. United States, 151 F.3d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998)). The court has further held

that prisoners in this position must be allowed a reasonable period of time after enactment

of § 2244(d)’s one-year period of limitation to file their § 2254 petitions, and determined that

“a reasonable time” is “one year from the AEDPA’s effective date.” Id. As such, the oneyear period for Chappell to file a § 2254 petition commenced on April 24, 1996. Absent a

showing of statutory or equitable tolling, the limitation period for a timely § 2254 petition

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expired on April 24, 1997. Chappell filed his § 2254 petition on April 29, 2015.

Statutory Tolling

Section 2244(d)(2) of the AEDPA provides that “[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this section.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Chappell filed a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.,

petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court on December 5, 2013. See Doc. No. 1-1

at 2. The trial court denied the Rule 32 petition on March 6, 2014. Id. Chappell appealed,

and on November 14, 2014, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Id. at 1-8. 

Chappell’s filing of the Rule 32 petition in December 2013 did not toll the limitation period

under 2244(d)(2), because the Rule 32 petition was filed well after the federal limitation

period had expired. See Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (where the

state court application for post-conviction relief is filed after the one-year statute of

limitations has expired, it does not toll the statute because no time remains to be tolled).

The statutory tolling provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) also do not provide

safe harbor for Chappell such that the federal limitation period commenced on some date

other than April 24, 1996. There is no evidence that any unconstitutional or illegal State

action impeded Chappell from filing a timely § 2254 petition. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(B). Chappell presents no claim that rests on an alleged “right [that] has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

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collateral review.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Finally, Chappell submits no grounds

for relief for which the factual predicate could not have been discovered at an earlier time

“through the exercise of due diligence.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

Equitable Tolling

The federal limitation period “may be equitably tolled” on grounds apart from those

specified in the habeas statute “when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary

circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable with diligence.” Sandvik v.

United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). See Holland v. Fla., 560 U.S. 631

(2010). “The burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests

with the petitioner.” Drew v. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Chappell appears to argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he is

uneducated, proceeding pro se, and lacked the mental ability to file a timely habeas petition. 

See Doc. No. 1 at 13; Doc. No. 10 at 1-3. A habeas petitioner must allege more than “the

mere existence of physical or mental ailments” to invoke the equitable tolling of the

limitation period. See Rhodes v. Senkowski, 82 F. Supp. 2d 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). A

petitioner’s mental incapacity may support a request for equitable tolling if the petitioner

establishes a causal connection between his alleged mental incapacity and his ability to

timely file his petition. Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Chappell alleges that, because of his limited mental ability and learning, he relied on help

from fellow inmates when filing his habeas petition. Doc. No. 1 at 13. He does not allege

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that his mental limitations prevented him from getting such help at a time when his petition

would have been timely. Nothing in the record supports a finding that Chappell’s alleged

mental limitations made it impossible for him to file his federal petition on time. Because

he shows no causal connection between his alleged mental limitations and his ability to file

a timely petition, Chappell is not entitled to equitable tolling on this basis.

Moreover, as to this claim, as well as his claims that he is uneducated and proceeding

pro se, Chappell does not establish that he acted diligently in trying to file a timely habeas

petition. In particular, Chappell did not file his first state post-conviction petition until

December 2013, and he does not allege that he took any steps, prior to that time, to try to

pursue his post-conviction remedies. Because he did not act diligently, he is not entitled to

equitable tolling. See Diaz v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 362 F.3d 698, 701-02 (11th Cir.

2004).

Furthermore, the law is settled that a petitioner’s pro se status and ignorance of the

law are insufficient grounds on which to toll the limitation period. See Felder v. Johnson,

204 F.3d 168, 171-73 (5th Cir. 2000) (ignorance of the law is insufficient rationale for

equitable tolling); Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1999) (neither “a plaintiff's

unfamiliaritywith the legal process nor his lack of representation during the applicable filing

period merits equitable tolling.”); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999)

(“ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse

prompt filing.”); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (equitable tolling not

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warranted to prisoner claiming he lacked access to federal statutes and case law); Henderson

v. Johnson, 1 F. Supp. 2d 650, 656 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (claims that petitioner “did not have

professional legal assistance [and] ‘did not know what to do’ . . . are far from the

extraordinary circumstances required to toll the statute”).

Under the circumstances set forth above, it is evident that the one-year limitation

period in § 2244(d) expired on April 24, 1997. Because Chappell did not file his § 2254

petition until April 29, 2015, his petition is time-barred and this court may not address the

merits.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION ofthe Magistrate Judge that the petition

for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED with prejudice and this case

dismissed because the petition is time-barred by the one-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d).

It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before July 2, 2015. Any objections filed must specifically identify

the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. 

Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The

parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore,

it is not appealable.

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Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5thCir. 1982); see Stein v.

Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206 (11thCir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30,

1981). 

Done this 18th day of June, 2015.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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