Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02335/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02335-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYM LAURA CANO, Civil No. 13-cv-2335 H (WVG)

Petitioner, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. No. 33]

(2) ADOPTING THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION 

[Doc. No. 35]

vs.

KIMBERLY HUGHES, Warden,

Respondent.

On September 26, 2013, Kym Laura Cano (“Petitioner”), a prisoner currently

incarcerated and proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) On August 18, 2014, Petitioner, through counsel, filed

a second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 25.) On January 26,

2015, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the second amended petition. (Doc. No. 33.) 

Petitioner’s deadline to respond to the motion to dismiss was February 24, 2015. (Doc.

No. 32.) Petitioner has not filed a response to the motion to dismiss. 

On April 2, 2015, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation

(“report”) to grant the motion to dismiss and dismiss the petition without prejudice. (Doc.

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No. 35.) The report ordered the parties to file objections by April 27, 2015. (Id. at 4.) To

date, neither party has filed an objection to the report.

Background

Petitioner was found guilty of second degree murder of her husband by a jury in

state court. (Lodg. No. 1 at 1.) Petitioner appealed, and the California Court of Appeal

affirmed her conviction. (Id. at 40.) Petitioner then appealed to the California Supreme

Court for review of particular jury instructions given at trial regarding whether a killing

committed without malice during the course of an inherently dangerous felony constitutes

voluntary manslaughter. (Lodg. No. 2 at 2.) The California Supreme Court denied review

of that issue without prejudice pending resolution of a related case. (Lodg. No. 3.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review in the California Supreme Court. 

On September 26, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) On November 13, 2013, the Court dismissed

the petition without prejudice. (Doc. No. 5.) The Court informed Petitioner that she must

raise her federal claims in state court before raising them in federal court. (Id. at 3.) On

January 16, 2014, Petitioner filed a first amended petition. (Doc. No. 6.) On March 10,

2014, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice. (Doc. No. 11.) The Court again

informed Petitioner of her obligation to exhaust her claims in state court before filing a

federal habeas petition. (Id. at 3-4.) On June 9, 2014, Petitioner retained counsel to assist

with preparing her second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 20-1 at

1.) On August 18, 2014, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a second amended petition. 

(Doc. No. 25.) 

On January 26, 2015, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the second amended

petition. (Doc. No. 33.) Petitioner has not responded to the motion; her response was due

February 24, 2015. (See Doc. No. 32.) On April 2, 2015, the magistrate judge issued a

report and recommendation to grant the motion and dismiss the petition. (Doc. No. 35.) 

Petitioner has not objected to the report. 

/ / /

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Discussion

I. Legal Standards

A. Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

A federal court may review a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). Habeas corpus is an

“extraordinary remedy” available only to those “persons whom society has grievously

wronged . . . .” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34 (1993)). Because Petitioner filed this petition after

April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

governs the petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Chein v. Shumsky,

373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). “When a federal claim has been presented

to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court

adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural

principles to the contrary.” Id. Federal habeas relief is available only if the result reached

by the state court on the merits is “contrary to,” or “an unreasonable application” of

Supreme Court precedent, or if the adjudication is “an unreasonable determination” based

on the facts and evidence. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(d)(2).

A federal court may grant habeas relief only if a state court either “applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases” or “confronts

a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.” Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06 (distinguishing the “contrary

to” and the “unreasonable application” standards). “[R]eview under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim

on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). “Although the Supreme

Court has declined to decide whether a district court ‘may ever choose to hold an

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evidentiary hearing before it determines that § 2254(d) has been satisfied,’ an evidentiary

hearing is pointless once the district court has determined that § 2254(d) precludes habeas

relief.” Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Pinholster, 131 S. Ct.

at 1411 n. 20).

A federal court may grant habeas relief under the “unreasonable application” clause

of § 2254(d)(1) if the state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state

prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. A federal court may also grant habeas relief

“if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court]

precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend

that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. The state court’s

“unreasonable application” of binding precedent must be objectively unreasonable to the

extent that the state court decision is more than merely incorrect or erroneous. Wiggins

v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (citation omitted); see also Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). Additionally, even if a state court decision is “contrary to”

Supreme Court precedent or rests on an “unreasonable determination” of facts in light of

the evidence, the petitioner must show that such error caused substantial or injurious

prejudice. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-

38); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964,

977 (9th Cir. 2000). AEDPA creates a highly deferential standard toward state court

rulings. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).

In determining whether a state court decision is contrary to clearly established

federal law, the court looks to the state’s last reasoned decision. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d

911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where there is an unexplained decision from the state’s highest

court, the court “looks through” to the last reasoned state judgment and presumes that the

unexplained opinion rests upon the same ground. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 891-

06 (1991).

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A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party objects to

any portion of the report, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report . . . to which objection is made.” Id.

B. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies 

Further, habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction

or the length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). To exhaust

state judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must present the California Supreme

Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her federal

habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34. Moreover, to

properly exhaust state court remedies a petitioner must allege, in state court, how one or

more of his or her federal rights have been violated. The Supreme Court in Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995), reasoned: “If state courts are to be given the opportunity to

correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the

fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution.” Id. at

365-66. For example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling

at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due process of law guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court.” Id. at 366.

A district court typically must dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus if it

contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522

(1982). A district court may stay a mixed federal habeas petition in limited cases where

the “petitioner had good cause for [her] failure to exhaust, [her] unexhausted claims are

potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines v. Winter, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005).

/ / /

/ / /

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II. Analysis 

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in state court of second degree murder and

related firearm violations. (Lodg. No. 1 at 1.) In her second amended habeas petition,

Petitioner claims her counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of intimate

partner battery to negate her intent to commit murder. (Doc. No. 25 at 50-51.) State

prisoners challenging their conviction based on constitutional violations, such as

ineffective assistance of counsel, must first raise their claims in state court. Granberry,

481 U.S. at 133-34. Petitioner affirmatively represents that she has not exhausted her

ineffective assistance claim in state court. In her second amended petition, Petitioner

states, through counsel, that her ineffective assistance claim is “unexhausted.” (Doc. No.

25 at 3.) Petitioner further states that that “[n]o petitions, applications or motions with

respect to the judgment in question have been filed in the California Superior Court,

California Court of Appeal, or California Supreme Court.” (Id. at 6.) Because Petitioner

did not exhaust her ineffective assistance claim in state court, the Court dismisses the

second amended petition. If Petitioner presented her ineffective assistance claim to the

state court between August 18, 2014 and the date of this order, Petitioner should file a

motion for reconsideration of this order alleging that she has exhausted her state court

remedies.

In light of the foregoing, the Court declines to consider whether the claims raised

in Petitioner’s second amended petition relate back to her original petition for purposes

of the statute of limitations.1

 

/ / /

1

 Petitioner also claims she suffered a violation of due process based on instructional error at trial. (Doc. No. 25 at 34-49.) Petitioner alleges that she raised her challenge to the allegedly errant jury instructions on direct appeal. (Id. at 5.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. (Lodg. No. 1 at 40.) The California Supreme Court denied review of the petition. (Lodg. No. 3.) 

Because Petitioner did not exhaust her claim for ineffective assistance, the Court

dismisses the petition in its entirety as a mixed petition. Rose, 455 U.S. at 522. 

Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that her case presents the “limited circumstances” in

which a stay and abeyance is appropriate. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. 

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Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts the magistrates judge’s report and

recommendation, grants Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas

corpus, and dismisses the petition without prejudice.2

 Additionally, the Court declines to

issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 18, 2015

_______________________________

Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

 The Court rejects the notion that Petitioner’s failure to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss constitutes consent to granting the motion to dismiss. The Court’s order is not based on Petitioner’s failure to respond to the motion to dismiss. 

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