Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03953/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03953-27/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Racketeering (RICO) Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MONTEREY BAY MILITARY HOUSING, 

LLC, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PINNACLE MONTEREY LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03953-BLF 

ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

[Re: ECF 260-86, 288, 290-91, 294]

This Order addresses the motions in limine submitted by both sides in the above-captioned 

action. For the reasons explained below and on the record at the pretrial conference held from 

July 16 to 17, 2015, the motions are decided as follows:

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 1: GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 2: GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 3: GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 4: GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 5: GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 6: GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 7: DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 8: DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 9: DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 1: GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 2: DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 3: GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 4: DENIED IN PART and DEFERRED IN PART.

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Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 5: GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 6: DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 7: GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 8: GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 9: GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 10: DENIED as moot.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 11: GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 12: DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 13: GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 14: GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 15: DENIED as moot.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 16: DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 17: DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 18: DENIED as moot.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 19: GRANTED.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 20: DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 21: DENIED.

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 22: GRANTED.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

The parties’ motions in limine largely concern the admissibility of evidence under Federal 

Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 702. Rule 401 provides that evidence is relevant if “it has a 

tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact 

is of consequence in determining the action.” However, “[t]he court may exclude relevant 

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 

following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, 

or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. A district court has “wide 

discretion” in making Rule 403 decisions but must exclude evidence of slight probative value if 

there is a modest likelihood that the evidence would cause unfair prejudice or mislead the jury. 

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United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 424 (9th Cir. 1992).

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that a qualified expert may testify if “(a) the 

expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient 

facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert 

has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. In 

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993), the Supreme Court held 

that Rule 702 requires the district court to act as a gatekeeper to “ensure that any and all scientific 

testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. 

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999), the Supreme Court clarified that the “basic gatekeeping 

obligation” articulated in Daubert applies not only to scientific testimony but to all expert 

testimony. The Supreme Court also made clear that the reliability inquiry is a flexible one, and 

“whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a 

particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.” Id. at 

153. So long as an expert’s methodology is sound and his opinions satisfy the requirements of 

Rule 702, underlying factual disputes and how much weight to accord the expert’s opinion are 

questions for the jury. Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 2010).

II. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Plaintiffs bring nine motions in limine, which the Court addresses in turn.

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 1 to “Exclude Arguments and Evidence 

Concerning Irrelevant or Otherwise Inadmissible Insurance Issues.” GRANTED 

IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiffs seek to exclude reference to all other insurance matters that are not connected to 

the Master Insurance Program (“MIP”) administered by Defendants, through which Defendants 

procured property and general liability insurance for the parties’ military housing projects. While 

the MIP is at the heart of many of Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiffs seek to exclude reference to each of 

the following subjects on the ground that each is irrelevant to the MIP and would potentially 

confuse the jury: (1) construction-related insurance coverage at the military housing projects; (2) 

Plaintiffs’ consideration of a potential insurance captive of their own to take over insuring the 

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projects; and (3) argument or evidence that the projects’ asset managers approved the MIP. Pls.’ 

MIL #1, ECF 260. Defendants counter that evidence on each of these subjects is relevant to 

Plaintiffs’ knowledge of how such insurance programs work, their awareness of the alleged 

overcharges under the MIP, Plaintiffs’ unclean hands, and Defendants’ claims for breach of 

fiduciary duties. Defs.’ Opp. #1, ECF 331.

The challenged evidence is minimally relevant to the parties’ claims but is highly relevant 

to Defendants’ statute of limitations defense, which this Court has determined must be tried to a 

jury. Am. Order on Summ. J. (“SJ Order”) at 37-40, ECF 397. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs 

were aware of the operation of the MIP and the alleged overcharges thereunder long before they 

brought their claims. Plaintiffs disclaim such awareness. Defendants must therefore be afforded

an opportunity to cross-examine Plaintiffs’ witnesses concerning these issues. As such, and for 

the reasons stated on the record, Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 1 is GRANTED with respect to 

introduction of the challenged evidence in any party’s case in chief but DENIED with respect to 

Defendants’ use of the evidence to cross-examine Plaintiffs’ witnesses concerning notice and 

knowledge of the alleged MIP fraud.

2. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 2 to “Exclude Argument and Evidence Related to 

Irrelevant Conduct and Motives by Clark Realty Capital LLC.” GRANTED IN 

PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiffs seek to exclude evidence concerning Clark Realty Capital LLC’s (“Clark 

Realty”) internal audits of the Clark entities that performed construction and development services

at the parties’ Monterey and Irwin projects on the ground that such evidence is irrelevant to the 

claims and defenses in this action. Pls.’ MIL #2 at 2-3, ECF 261. Defendants contend that the 

audits reveal that Clark Realty overlooked billing and conduct irregularities committed by the 

Clark entities similar to the ones that Plaintiffs identify as the basis for terminating defendant 

American Management Services California Inc.’s (“AMSC”) property management agreements 

(“PMAs”) at Monterey and Irwin. Defs.’ Opp. #2 at 2-3, ECF 339. Such evidence thus has direct 

bearing on Defendants’ counterclaims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 2 is accordingly DENIED with respect to 

Clark Realty’s internal audits, but the evidence shall be limited to evidence of overlooked 

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irregularities.

Plaintiffs also seek to exclude reference to or suggestions that Plaintiffs, Clark Realty, or 

any of their affiliates intend to assume or take over property management duties at the Monterey 

and Irwin projects. Pls.’ MIL #2 at 3-4. The facts have changed since the filing of the motions in 

limine. As of July 13, 2015, a third party has taken over property management duties at the 

Monterey and Irwin projects. Although the parties disputed on the record whether the new 

property manager is affiliated with or controlled by Clark Realty, the Court finds such disputes 

inapposite to the issues in this action. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 2 to exclude reference to 

Plaintiffs, Clark Realty, or their affiliates taking over property management duties at the Monterey 

and Irwin projects is therefore GRANTED. 

3. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 3 to “Exclude Arguments and Evidence Related 

to Unrelated Military Projects and Pursuits with Pinnacle.” GRANTED IN 

PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiffs in their third motion in limine seek to exclude reference to the parties’ other 

agreements and pursuits that Plaintiffs contend are not relevant to the projects and contracts 

implicated in this action. Specifically, Plaintiffs move to preclude all reference to a 2001 Term 

Sheet between Clark Realty and American Management Services (“AMS”) and to Clark Pinnacle 

Family Communities LLC (“CPFC”), an entity formed by Clark and AMS in 2001 to pursue 

military housing contracts. Pls.’ MIL #3 at 2-4, ECF 262. As the Court previously found, the 

2001 Term Sheet is not binding, by its own terms. Corrected Order Denying Mot. to Dissolve 

Prelim. Inj. (“Inj. Order”) at 16-17, ECF 169. Furthermore, the Court denied Defendants’ belated 

motion to introduce a claim based upon the CPFC relationship. Order Denying Mot. for Leave to 

Conform Evidence to Pleadings, ECF 352. The challenged evidence is therefore of minimal 

relevance to the parties’ claims but is relevant to understanding their complex relationship. This 

portion of Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 3 is therefore DENIED, but the evidence of the Term 

Sheet and of CPFC is limited to general background information to explain the parties’ 

relationship.

Plaintiffs also seek to exclude reference to other project bids submitted by CPFC, 

particularly a successful bid at the Pacific Beacon naval project where Defendants’ affiliates were 

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subsequently terminated from the project. Plaintiffs assert that evidence relating to the Pacific 

Beacon project is irrelevant to any claim or defense in this action and that Defendants’ apparent 

assertion that the Pacific Beacon termination was part of a concerted effort to oust Defendants at 

the various Clark-Pinnacle projects is unproven. Pls.’ MIL # 4-5. Despite Defendants’ arguments 

to the contrary, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs. The probative value of the evidence regarding the 

Pacific Beacon project is miniscule and greatly outweighed by the undue consumption of time that 

presenting and distinguishing the features of this project would necessitate. Fed. R. Evid. 403. As 

such, the portion of Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 3 addressed to the Pacific Beacon project is 

GRANTED.

4. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 4 to “Exclude Specific Hearsay and Otherwise

Inadmissible Evidence.” GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiffs’ fourth motion in limine contains three parts. 

First, Plaintiffs seek to exclude reference to the “Executive Summary of Clark/Pinnacle 

Lockbox Review” prepared by third party consultant Jones Lang LaSalle (“JLL”) and the 

Memorandum prepared by Army officials Ivan Bolden and Rhonda Hayes, which summarizes the 

Clark/Pinnacle Lockbox Review. Plaintiffs assert that these documents are hearsay without 

sufficient indicia of reliability to allow admission into evidence. Pls.’ MIL #4 at 1-2, ECF 263. 

Defendants urge that these documents are reliable and that they are admissible public records 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) or business records under Rule 803(6). Defs.’ Opp. #4 at 

2-4, ECF 342. Plaintiffs have, however, provided the Court with evidence that the Executive 

Summary and Memorandum were preliminary, repudiated by the Army, and deemed 

untrustworthy by them. As such, Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 4 to exclude reference to these 

documents is GRANTED.

Second, Plaintiffs seek to exclude as hearsay emails and other out of court statements from 

Mr. Glenn Ferguson and Mrs. Gerri Ferguson to defendant Stanley Harrelson. Pls.’ MIL #4 at 2-

4. Defendants indicated at the pretrial conference that they do not intend to offer Mrs. Ferguson’s 

emails into evidence and Plaintiffs’ motion is therefore GRANTED on that ground. Mr. 

Ferguson’s out of court statements were made at a time when he was employed as senior manager 

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of Clark Realty and president of Clark Realty Builders. As such, they are admissible as partyopponent statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), and Plaintiffs’ motion as to these statements is 

accordingly DENIED.

Finally, Plaintiffs seek to exclude as hearsay a March 7, 2008 email from Deb Stratton to 

Chuck McDaniel, Tate McCoy, and Kay Lynn Keimig concerning an upcoming meeting with 

Plaintiffs to discuss the MIP. Pls.’ MIL #4 at 4-5. Defendants argue that the email and testimony 

related to the email is admissible as Ms. Stratton’s then-existing state of mind and relevant to her 

lack of intent to deceive Plaintiffs concerning the MIP. See Defs.’ Opp. #4 at 5. The Court agrees 

with Defendants and accordingly DENIES this aspect of Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 4.

5. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 5 to “Exclude Improper Attacks and Legal 

Arguments.” GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiffs seek to exclude (1) all attacks on counsel and auditors; (2) argument that actual 

wrongdoing by Defendants would have resulted in criminal charges; (3) reference to the 

availability of treble damages and attorneys’ fees under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. (“RICO”); and 

(4) any reference to privileged communications. Pls.’ MIL #5, ECF 264. 

Defendants agree that no party should be permitted to argue that wrongdoing would have 

resulted in criminal charges or to reference treble damages and attorneys’ fees available under 

RICO. Defs.’ Opp. #5 at 2-3, ECF 340. Plaintiffs’ motion on those issues is accordingly 

GRANTED.

As to attacks on counsel and auditors, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion with respect 

to attacks on counsel but DENIES the motion with respect to the forensic audits at Monterey and 

Irwin and the alleged improper motivation for those audits, which the Court finds relevant to 

Defendants’ claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Finally, Defendants acknowledge that they will not invade attorney-client privilege but 

assert that Plaintiffs’ privilege logs are relevant to Defendants’ statute of limitations defense and, 

in particular, to show when Plaintiffs became aware of the alleged MIP overcharges. Defs.’ Opp. 

#5 at 3-4. Defendants point to a May 15, 2009 entry on the log, which indicates that Mr. Jenkins 

and Mr. Caputo called counsel “seeking/giving legal advice regarding Pinnacle insurance 

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program.” Id. at 3. This entry, by itself, is of little probative value to Defendants’ statute of 

limitations defense, as Plaintiffs’ knowledge of the fraud alleged in this action can only be probed 

by knowing the substance of Mr. Jenkins’s and Mr. Caputo’s communication with counsel. As the 

Court noted on the record, it would be fundamentally unfair to allow the introduction of a 

document that would require Plaintiffs to waive their attorney-client privilege to defend 

themselves. As such, Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 5 is GRANTED with respect to attorneyclient communications and with respect to Defendants’ intended use of Plaintiffs’ privilege log.

6. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 6 to “Exclude the Report, Opinions, and 

Testimony of Defendants’ Expert Jeff George.” GRANTED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiffs seek to exclude the report, opinions, and testimony of defense expert witness Jeff 

George, an experienced fraud investigator, who has been designated to opine regarding: (1) the 

deficiencies in the analysis of AMS’s manipulation of work order data conducted by Plaintiffs’ 

expert Louis Dudney; (2) the manner in which AMS employees used the Yardi software system 

that was used to maintain work order data; and (3) that the PMAs at Monterey and Irwin did not 

require the submission of certain information. Pls.’ MIL #6, ECF 265. 

Plaintiffs assert that Mr. George’s criticism of Mr. Dudney’s analysis is unreliable because 

it is based upon “pure speculation” concerning “potential alternative explanations” for the work 

order data inconsistencies that Mr. Dudney uncovered. Id. at 2-3. Although it is undisputed that 

Mr. George did not test these potential alternative explanations for himself, Defendants have 

identified sufficient factual foundation for his opinion, which include his review of documents 

produced in discovery, technical descriptions of the Yardi system, and interviews with AMS 

employees. Defs.’ Opp. #6 at 3-5, ECF 320. Of course, at trial, Defendants must place this 

foundation into evidence and establish that each alternative is real and not speculative. Whether

these alternative explanations should have been considered by Mr. Dudney and whether they 

would have had any effect on Mr. Dudney’s analysis are issues that go to the weight of Mr. 

Dudney’s and Mr. George’s testimony and are better addressed on cross-examination. Plaintiffs’ 

Motion in Limine No. 6 is therefore DENIED with respect to Mr. George’s opinions criticizing 

Mr. Dudney’s analysis of the work order data.

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Similarly, although Mr. George is not himself a software engineer, he has spent 

considerable time learning the Yardi system and the jury may benefit from a description of the 

system’s functionality from a lay perspective. Mr. George may accordingly offer high level 

testimony concerning the operation of the Yardi system—i.e., how employees would use the 

system—but may not offer any technical explanation of the software. As addressed on the record, 

this high level explication includes testimony concerning a script change to the Yardi system in 

2010 that Mr. George opines should have been considered and factored into Mr. Dudney’s 

analysis. This aspect of Plaintiffs’ motion is thus DENIED.

Finally, some language in Mr. George’s report suggests that he is opining regarding the 

legal conclusion of what the PMAs require in terms of work order data. See Pls.’ MIL #6 Exh. 1 

(George Report) at 17, 18, 26. Defendants assert that his opinion was not intended to trespass on 

contract interpretation and that Mr. George will not offer any opinions on legal conclusions at 

trial. As such, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 6 with respect to Mr. 

George’s opinions concerning the interpretation of the PMAs.

7. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 7 to “Exclude the Report, Opinions, and 

Testimony of Defendants’ Expert Brian Potter.” DENIED.

Plaintiffs seek to exclude the opinions of Defendants’ expert witness Brian Potter 

pertaining to fraudulent transfer and the “investment value” of the PMAs at the Monterey and 

Irwin projects. Plaintiffs contend that the former is an unreliable legal opinion from an 

inexperienced expert and that the latter is irrelevant. Pls.’ MIL #7, ECF 268. Plaintiffs have 

alleged that a 2014 transaction between AMS and Hunt Companies, Inc. involved a transfer of 

substantially all of AMS’s assets, rendering it insolvent and judgment-proof. Defendants offer 

Mr. Potter to opine that AMS remains solvent and, indeed, he is qualified to offer such an opinion. 

Defs.’ Opp. #7 at 1-2. Defendants moreover clarify that Mr. Potter is only being offered to rebut 

the fraudulent transfer analysis of Plaintiffs’ expert, Louis Dudney, and that Mr. Potter will not 

testify concerning the legal standard for a fraudulent transfer or whether the Hunt transaction 

satisfies that standard. Id. at 2-4. With that understanding, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion 

in Limine No. 7 with respect to Mr. Potter’s opinion regarding AMS’s solvency.

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As to Mr. Potter’s opinion regarding the investment value of the PMAs, Defendants 

contend that this evidence is relevant to their claims that Plaintiffs breached their duty of good 

faith and fair dealing as well as to Plaintiffs claim for damages and any setoff that may be 

applicable to that claim. Id. at 4. Although the Court will not preclude Defendants from offering 

this evidence, Defendants are aware that placing the value of the PMAs at issue to suggest 

Plaintiffs’ bad faith, improper motive, and commercial unreasonableness may open the door to 

rebuttal evidence of Plaintiffs’ good faith that, as discussed below, the Court will exclude from 

Plaintiffs’ case in chief. With that proviso, Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 7 is DENIED with 

respect to Mr. Potter’s opinion concerning the value of the PMAs.

8. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 8 to “Exclude the Report, Opinions, and

Testimony of Defendants’ Expert David Stegall.” DENIED.

Plaintiffs move to exclude the opinions and testimony of defense expert David Stegall on 

the ground that his opinions concerning customary practices and use of a MIP and the duties and 

responsibilities of an insurance risk management administrator are either based upon cherry picked 

facts or lack factual foundation altogether. Pls.’ MIL #8, ECF 269. On review of Mr. Stegall’s 

report, the Court concludes that he has disclosed sufficient factual basis for his opinions. That he 

may not have considered evidence that Plaintiffs would deem “highly relevant” goes to the weight 

and credibility of his opinion. Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to depose Mr. Stegall and can 

readily point out the evidentiary flaws in his analysis on cross-examination. 

The Court does agree with Plaintiffs that Mr. Stegall has disclosed no authority to support 

his understanding of the “usual and customary practice” in the industry. Id. at 4-5. It is 

undisputed that Mr. Stegall has sufficient professional experience to testify regarding the 

customary practice in the insurance industry. See Defs.’ Opp. #8 at 4, ECF 323. As such, the 

Court will allow Mr. Stegall to testify on this subject but will expect Defendants to lay a proper 

foundation for this testimony at trial. 

Finally, Plaintiffs appear to have elicited testimony from Mr. Stegall during his deposition 

regarding individual parties’ intent and the proper interpretation of the PMAs. Defendants 

acknowledge that Mr. Stegall will not offer such improper testimony at trial. The Court therefore 

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need only reiterate that an expert witness may not testify concerning any party’s state of mind or 

the interpretation of the PMAs.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 8 is DENIED.

9. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 9 to “Exclude the Report, Opinions, and 

Testimony of Defendants’ Expert Roberta Garland.” DENIED.

Finally, Plaintiffs move to exclude the opinions and testimony of defense expert Roberta 

Garland, who is offered to rebut the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert, Nancy Watkins, regarding the 

allocation of MIP costs made by AMS and its insurance broker, Lockton. Plaintiffs contend that 

Ms. Garland, an experienced actuary in the insurance industry, offers unreliable opinions 

unsupported by evidence or by her own expertise. Pls.’ MIL #9, ECF 271. As discussed below, 

the parties’ experts dispute whether an actuarial approach was necessary or appropriate in 

determining the proper allocation of costs under the MIP. On that subject, the Court agrees with 

Defendants that Ms. Garland is qualified to opine that actuarial analysis is not necessary within the 

MIP context. Defs.’ Opp. #9 at 2-3, ECF 338. With respect to Ms. Garland’s failure to consider 

each allocation year or certain “relevant” data, these are challenges to the sufficiency of Ms. 

Garland’s sample size and go to the weight of her opinion and not its reliability. Plaintiffs’ 

Motion in Limine No. 9 is accordingly DENIED.

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Defendants bring twenty-two motions in limine, which the Court addresses in turn.

1. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 1 to “Exclude References to Other Civil and 

Criminal Legal Proceedings.” GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Defendants move to exclude reference to four other legal actions involving the parties: (1) 

the parties’ litigation in Georgia involving the Fort Benning and Fort Belvoir projects (“Georgia 

Action”), which was partially resolved on summary judgment and affirmed on appeal; (2) a recent

fraudulent transfer action that Plaintiffs filed in Gwinnett County, Georgia; (3) the guilty plea by 

former AMS maintenance director Eddie Hudspeth, who pled guilty to soliciting and accepting 

kickbacks from vendors at Fort Belvoir; and (4) ongoing grand jury investigation proceedings 

involving other current and former employees of Defendants. Defs.’ MIL #1, ECF 266.

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Plaintiffs indicated that they do not intend to introduce evidence of the Gwinnett County 

action or of the ongoing criminal investigation. Pls.’ Opp. #1 at 1 n.1, ECF 329. Defendants’ 

motion is therefore GRANTED as to these two subjects, and neither party may reference these 

matters at trial.

On the subject of the Georgia Action, two orders from that action are implicated: a 

summary judgment order by the court and a discovery and sanctions order compelling Defendants 

to produce insurance-related documents in that action. On balance, the Court finds that the 

Georgia court’s summary judgment order is highly relevant to RICO predicate acts, Plaintiffs’ 

good faith in rebuttal to Defendants’ claims of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing and breach of fiduciary duty, and of Defendants’ motive to engage in the allegedly 

fraudulent Hunt transaction. Furthermore, the probative value of the order to the aforementioned 

issues outweighs any prejudice to Defendants, particularly with appropriate limiting instructions to 

the jury. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 1 is accordingly DENIED with respect to the 

summary judgment order from the Georgia Action. Plaintiffs shall identify specific RICO 

predicate acts to which the order is relevant. Defendants shall prepare appropriate limiting 

instructions so that the jury understands that the order is not being used to prove liability in this 

case per se, but that it is only being used as a defense to the good faith and fair dealing claim and 

as evidence of motive for the Hunt transaction and other RICO predicate acts. 

At the pretrial conference, the parties further disputed the admissibility of a discovery 

sanctions order imposed against Defendants by the Georgia court; a subject that neither party 

briefed, nor did any party provide a copy of the disputed order. Based on the parties’ 

representations on the record, there appears to have been a December 12, 2012 consent order by 

which Defendants agreed to produce the insurance-related documents, followed by a later 

sanctions order. The Court finds the December 12, 2012 consent order relevant and probative of 

the timing of Plaintiffs’ knowledge of the alleged MIP fraud, which rebuts Defendants’ statute of 

limitations defense. The later order imposing monetary sanctions must be excluded because the 

unfair prejudice to Defendants outweighs its probative value. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 1 is DENIED with respect to the Georgia court’s December 12, 

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2012 consent order regarding production of documents. Defendants shall prepare an appropriate 

limiting instruction that the jury should consider the order only in connection with Defendants’ 

statute of limitations defense and Plaintiffs’ rebuttal to that defense. Counsel for individual 

defendants Stanley Harrelson and John Goodman may also prepare a limiting instruction that the 

order shall not be considered to implicate the individual defendants in any wrongful concealment.

Finally, Plaintiffs contend—and the Court agrees—that the Hudspeth plea is relevant to 

Plaintiffs’ RICO claim and is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(22). The Court 

finds that the plea is probative of Plaintiffs’ RICO claim and may be admitted with a limiting 

instruction that the jury may only consider it as evidence of a pattern of racketeering activity in 

connection with Plaintiffs’ RICO claim. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 1 is therefore 

DENIED with respect to the Hudspeth plea and Defendants shall draft an appropriate limiting 

instruction.

2. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 2 to “Exclude Evidence of Alleged Misconduct 

at Fort Benning or Fort Belvoir.” DENIED.

Defendants seek to exclude evidence relating to the alleged misconduct by Defendants’ 

East Coast affiliates at Fort Benning or Fort Belvoir, which is the basis of the parties’ lawsuit in 

Georgia. Defendants contend that the evidence of misconduct at those other projects is irrelevant, 

highly prejudicial, confusing, and invites the jury to infer that Defendants acted in conformity 

therewith at the Monterey and Irwin projects. Defs.’ MIL #2, ECF 267. Plaintiffs counter that 

this evidence is probative and relevant to the enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity 

elements of their RICO claims. Pls.’ Opp. #2, ECF 306. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs and 

further finds that the misconduct at Fort Benning and Fort Belvoir is not precluded by Federal 

Rule of Evidence 404(b). In any case, any undue prejudice to Defendants can be mitigated by 

limiting the purposes for which this evidence may be used and by requiring a limiting instruction. 

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 2 is therefore DENIED with the caveat that evidence of the 

misconduct at Fort Benning and Fort Belvoir may only be used to prove Plaintiffs’ RICO claim. 

Defendants shall prepare an appropriate limiting instruction to that effect. 

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3. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 3 to “Exclude Evidence that the Army 

Supports Plaintiffs’ Case.” GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Defendants in their third motion in limine seek to exclude any reference to the Army’s 

support of Plaintiffs’ case or the removal of AMSC from its position as property manager for the 

Monterey and Irwin projects. Defendants also request that no uniformed Army personnel be 

allowed to sit at counsel table or introduced to the jury. Defs.’ MIL #3, ECF 270. 

Plaintiffs indicate that they do not intend to have any uniformed officials seated at counsel 

table, nor do they presently intend to call any witnesses who will be wearing a uniform. Pls.’ Opp. 

#3 at 4 n.2, ECF 307. The Court accordingly GRANTS this portion of Defendants’ motion.

As to references to the Army’s support, Plaintiffs assert that such evidence is relevant to 

rebut Defendants’ assertions of bad faith and to provide context for Stanley Harrelson’s statement 

to the Army that “there would be ‘nothing left to collect’ at the end of the litigation” which, in 

turn, is relevant to Plaintiffs’ allegation of fraudulent transfer as a predicate RICO act. Id. at 2-4. 

The Court, however, finds that the imprimatur of Army “approval” or “support” on this litigation 

is not probative of any of Plaintiffs’ claims and is so highly prejudicial that it must be excluded 

from Plaintiffs’ case in chief. With that said, the requirement for Army consent to certain actions 

may be introduced to establish background context for certain evidence and is certainly relevant to 

rebut Defendants’ claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As such, 

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 3 is GRANTED with respect to reference to the Army’s 

support of this litigation in Plaintiffs’ case in chief but DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs’ use of 

this evidence in rebuttal to Defendants’ bad faith claim. To a very limited extent, Plaintiffs’ 

witness Joseph F. Calcara may describe the context in which Mr. Harrelson made the alleged 

“nothing left to collect” statement to him but may not testify to the Army’s approval of Plaintiffs’ 

actions in general in Plaintiffs’ case in chief. Plaintiffs shall moreover have leave to revisit this 

ruling on rebuttal should Defendants attempt to make an emotional appeal to the jury regarding the 

impact of the litigation on soldiers and residents at the projects.

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4. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 4 to “Exclude Argument of Purported 

Spoliation.” DENIED IN PART and DEFERRED IN PART.

Defendants move to exclude any reference or argument that they spoliated or destroyed 

hard copy work orders with fraudulent intent at the Monterey and Irwin projects on the ground 

that there has been no proof of spoliation and that references to such alleged spoliation would be 

unfairly prejudicial. Defs.’ MIL #4, ECF 272. Defendants’ motion, once unpacked, addresses 

three distinct but related issues: (1) whether Plaintiffs should be permitted to introduce evidence 

that there are missing hard copy work orders; (2) whether Plaintiffs may argue that the missing 

hard copies evince Defendants’ intent to defraud; and (3) whether the destruction of the hard copy 

work orders constitutes spoliation sufficient to warrant an adverse inference instruction. As to the 

first two issues, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that evidence that Defendants turned off controls 

in the Yardi system and destroyed hard copy work orders is relevant to Defendants’ intent to 

defraud and may be presented and argued to the jury. See Pls.’ Opp. #4 at 1-3, ECF 316. The 

Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion insofar as it seeks to exclude evidence of missing 

hard copy work orders. As to whether the term “spoliation” (and all of its connotations) can be 

attached to the work order destruction, the Court DEFERS ruling on the propriety of a spoliation 

or adverse inference instruction because there is no evidence before the Court on which to base 

such a determination. See id. at 4-5. In the meantime, the parties may not use the term 

“spoliation” in connection with the missing hard copy work orders.

5. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 5 to “Bar Argument that Residents’ Lives 

Were Put in Danger.” GRANTED.

Defendants seek to bar argument that the alleged work order manipulation at the Monterey 

and Irwin projects endangered resident lives. Defs.’ MIL #5, ECF 273. The Court finds that 

characterizations that the work order data manipulation at these projects created life-threatening 

conditions or anything similar are potentially misleading and likely to lack foundation and 

therefore lack any probative value in contrast to the high likelihood that such characterizations 

would enflame the passions of the jury and unfairly prejudice Defendants. Thus, on balance, such 

arguments must be excluded. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Plaintiffs may, however, provide factual 

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evidence allowing the jury to understand the nature of the affected work orders and the 

designations/categorizations attached to those work orders, such as whether they are urgent or 

emergencies. With that proviso, Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 5 is GRANTED.

6. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 6 to “Exclude Evidence of Alleged Work Order 

Misconduct Outside the Relevant Time Period.” DENIED.

Defendants seek in their sixth motion in limine to exclude evidence concerning alleged 

work order misconduct after 2008 at the Irwin project and after 2010 at the Monterey project on 

the ground that work order data manipulation is irrelevant past those dates because the Irwin and 

Monterey PMAs were respectively amended in 2008 and 2010 to remove work order data as a 

metric for AMSC’s incentive fees. Defs.’ MIL #6, ECF 274. Plaintiffs dispute the assertion that 

work order performance became completely irrelevant to AMSC’s incentive payments after the 

amendments to the PMAs and also contend that Defendants’ continued manipulation of work 

order data evinces intent to defraud and to conceal past fraud. Pls.’ Opp. #6, ECF 322. The Court 

agrees with Plaintiffs and accordingly DENIES Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 6.

7. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 7 to “Exclude Reference to Cash Deposits in 

Bank Accounts of AMS Employees and Vendor Donations to Extravaganza.” 

GRANTED.

Based on the Court’s ruling on summary judgment, Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 7 is 

GRANTED. See SJ Order 40-42, 43-44.

8. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 8 to “Exclude Improper Opinion Testimony 

From Lay Witnesses.” GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Defendants seek to exclude five categories of lay opinions that Plaintiffs have elicited from 

witnesses: (1) Jennifer Fraser’s opinion regarding overcharges by vendor Mainscape; (2) Jodi 

George’s opinion that the pricing of vendors Five Star and Mainscape “seemed high”; (3) Joanne 

Garrett’s opinion that the historical allocation model for the MIP was not fair; (4) Joanne Garrett’s 

opinion that Lockton (Defendants’ insurance broker) was being overcompensated; and (5) Melissa 

Meyer’s opinion that she was instructed by upper management to falsify work order data and that 

she knew the data was being falsified. Defs.’ MIL #8, ECF 276. Defendants withdrew their 

objections to Joanne Garrett’s two opinions and Melissa Meyer’s opinion on the record and 

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Defendants’ motion on those opinions is DENIED accordingly. In light of the Court’s ruling on 

summary judgment, the Court GRANTS the remainder of Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 8 

with respect to Jennifer Fraser’s and Jodi George’s opinions regarding vendor relationships. See

SJ Order 40-42, 43-44.

9. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 9 to “Exclude Any Reference, Evidence, or 

Testimony Concerning Prior Misconduct of David Krull.” GRANTED IN PART 

and DENIED IN PART.

Defendants seek to exclude reference to prior misconduct by former AMS employee David 

Krull, who was fired in 2008 for setting up a fictitious vendor account and diverting AMS vendor 

payments to himself. The specific instances of prior misconduct include this fictitious vendor 

account and a 2004 charge of sexual harassment. Defs.’ MIL #9, ECF 277. Plaintiffs indicated 

that they do not presently plan to introduce evidence of the sexual harassment allegation. Pls.’ 

Opp. #9 at 1 n.1, ECF 332. In any case, the Court finds that that incident lacks probative value 

and is unfairly prejudicial to Defendants. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 9 to exclude 

evidence of the 2004 sexual harassment allegation against Mr. Krull is therefore GRANTED. 

With regard to evidence of Mr. Krull’s embezzlement from AMS, Defendants 

acknowledge that such evidence has direct bearing on Mr. Krull’s character for truthfulness and 

modified their motion at the pretrial conference to seek exclusion only of extrinsic evidence of 

prior misconduct. This motion would therefore pertain only to an affidavit and confidential 

agreement that Mr. Krull signed in June 2008 admitting to his misconduct and agreeing to repay 

the funds to AMS. Plaintiffs aver that the confidential agreement also contains provisions that are 

relevant to Mr. Krull’s credibility as a witness, as well as to the alleged MIP fraud. See generally 

Pls.’ Opp. #9. On inspection of the agreement, the Court agrees. Defendants’ Motion in Limine

No. 9 is therefore DENIED with respect to evidence concerning Mr. Krull’s prior embezzlement, 

including the confidential agreement that he signed in 2008. 

10. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 10 to “Strike Improperly Added Breach of 

Contract Claim and to Exclude Any Evidence Related Thereto.” DENIED as 

moot.

All parties apparently agree that Plaintiffs have not alleged a breach of contract claim in 

connection with the PMAs. As such, this motion is DENIED as moot. As the Court stated on the 

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record, evidence of the Hunt transaction is to be introduced only in connection with Plaintiffs’ 

RICO claims and Defendants are free to object if the testimony elicited at trial appears to be going 

in another direction.

11. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 11 to “Exclude Reference to or Evidence of 

‘Ghost Letter’ and AMS October 2002 Response.” GRANTED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART.

All parties agreed on the record at the pretrial conference that the so-called “ghost letter,” 

an anonymous letter written in 2002 by a purported AMS employee, should be excluded as 

inadmissible hearsay. They likewise agreed that AMS’s October 2002 response to the ghost letter 

is relevant and admissible. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 11 is GRANTED 

with respect to the ghost letter and DENIED with respect to AMS’s response.

12. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 12 to “Exclude the 3/9/2005 Robert Trompeter 

Memo and His Testimony About the Memo.” DENIED.

In light of Defendants’ acknowledgment on the record that the subject of this motion is 

better handled on cross-examination, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 12.

13. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 13 to “Exclude Improper Character Evidence 

Attacking AMS’s Site Manager Rick Wimer.” GRANTED.

In light of the Court’s ruling on summary judgment, see SJ Order 40-42, 43-44, Plaintiffs 

have withdrawn their opposition to this motion. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 13 is 

accordingly GRANTED.

14. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 14 to “Exclude Evidence Attacking Character 

of AMS Managers at Monterey.” GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Defendants in their fourteenth motion in limine seek to exclude evidence and argument 

concerning (1) emails and related deposition testimony regarding banter that AMS Investment 

Manager Shawn Somerville engaged in with other employees including Community Director 

Stacia Schuster; and (2) an August 11, 2010 anonymous letter to Clark Realty alleging that the 

AMS management staff at Monterey engaged in “sex parties” and other improper behavior. Defs.’ 

MIL #14, ECF 282. Plaintiffs indicated both in their papers and on the record that they do not 

intend to introduce the 2010 letter or emails including Michelle Calloway into evidence. Pls.’ 

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Opp. #14 at 4 n.1, ECF 313. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the emails between Mr. Somerville 

and Ms. Schuster evidence a close personal relationship that is relevant to their credibility and 

possible motive to exonerate one another of wrongdoing. Id. at 2-3. The Court finds that Mr. 

Somerville’s and Ms. Schuster’s relationship is probative of their credibility and of the alleged 

conspiracy to defraud Plaintiffs, but that the emails documenting this relationship are highly likely 

to enflame the passions of the jury and unfairly prejudice Defendants. Plaintiffs may accordingly 

question Mr. Somerville and Ms. Schuster regarding their relationship and emails but may not 

introduce the emails into evidence unless they become necessary for impeachment purposes. 

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 14 is accordingly GRANTED as to all of the evidence that 

Defendants seek to exclude. To the extent the motion was intended to preclude any reference, 

argument, or questioning concerning Mr. Somerville’s and Ms. Schuster’s relationship, that aspect 

of the motion is DENIED.

15. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 15 to “Exclude Evidence of Personal Finances 

of Goodman and Harrelson.” DENIED as moot.

The parties have agreed that Plaintiffs may introduce evidence of the individual 

defendants’ net worth and relevant assets (namely, real estate assets). Plaintiffs have agreed that 

they will not refer to “lifestyle” or personal assets (such as cars, yachts, vacations, etc.) that might 

be owned by the individual defendants. With that agreement, the individual defendants have 

withdrawn their Motion in Limine No. 15, including the request to bifurcate, and the Court 

accordingly DENIES the motion as moot.

16. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 16 to “Exclude Evidence Pertaining to 

Pinnacle’s Interactions with Other Clients.” DENIED.

Defendants seek to exclude evidence that in 2010-2011, two of its other clients—

PERSI/CS Capital and Hunt—accused AMS of not disclosing the existence of a risk management 

fee paid to AMS in the course of administering the MIP. Defendants primarily object to the 

evidence on the ground that its probative value is outweighed by the risk of delay, confusion, and 

unfair prejudice, though Defendants also suggest that the evidence is also improper under Federal 

Rule of Evidence 404(b). Defs.’ MIL #16, ECF 284. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that this 

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evidence of other allegations of hidden fees in connection with the MIP is highly probative of a 

pattern of racketeering activity in connection with Plaintiffs’ RICO claim and is not precluded by 

Rule 404(b). Any prejudice to Defendants may be mitigated by a limiting instruction and does not 

overwhelm the probative value of the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Defendants’ Motion in Limine

No. 16 is therefore DENIED. Defendants may prepare an appropriate limiting instruction if they 

find it necessary.

17. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 17 to “Exclude Evidence of 2014 Hunt 

Transaction.” DENIED.

This motion is largely moot in light of the Court’s ruling on summary judgment. SJ Order 

at 47-50. As will be discussed in connection with Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 20, 

Plaintiffs’ expert Louis Dudney will testify to actual fraudulent intent—not constructive fraud—in 

connection with the Hunt transaction, which is alleged to be a predicate act fraudulent transfer in 

furtherance of Defendants’ racketeering enterprise. On the record, Plaintiffs confirmed that Mr. 

Dudney will not testify that the $30 million price of the Hunt transaction was not enough for the 

transferred assets, only that the manner in which the $30 million was paid did not amount to fair 

value. With that understanding, Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 17 is DENIED.

18. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 18 to “Exclude Portions of Plaintiffs’ Expert 

Louis Dudney’s Testimony on Work Orders.” DENIED as moot.

In light of Defendants’ acknowledgment that they withdraw this motion and will address 

their objections to Mr. Dudney’s testimony concerning work orders on cross examination, 

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 18 is DENIED as moot.

19. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 19 to “Exclude Plaintiffs’ Expert Louis 

Dudney’s Testimony on Vendors.” GRANTED.

In light of the Court’s ruling on summary judgment, see SJ Order 40-42, 43-44, 

Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 19 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall have leave, on rebuttal, to 

revisit this ruling with respect to Mr. Dudney’s opinion regarding vendor cost savings should 

Defendants open the door by introducing evidence of the investment value of the PMAs or the 

tremendous cost of this litigation to suggest Plaintiffs’ bad faith or motive.

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20. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 20 to “Exclude Plaintiffs’ Expert Louis 

Dudney’s Testimony on Fraudulent Transfer.” DENIED.

Defendants seek to exclude Mr. Dudney, Plaintiffs’ designated expert, from testifying 

concerning the 2014 Hunt transaction, which Plaintiffs allege to be fraudulent transfer. 

Defendants’ objection to Mr. Dudney’s testimony is twofold: first, that he offers opinions on 

theory of constructive fraud that is incongruous with Plaintiffs’ allegations and therefore 

substantively irrelevant and second, that his methodology in assessing AMS’s insolvency after the 

transaction is unsound. Defs.’ MIL #20, ECF 294. The first of these challenges is moot because 

Plaintiffs have clarified that Mr. Dudney will only opine regarding actual fraudulent intent and 

have assured the Court that they will not elicit testimony from him regarding constructive 

fraudulent transfer. See Pls.’ Opp. #20 at 2-3, ECF 325. To the extent insolvency is a badge of 

fraud probative of fraudulent intent, the Court will permit Mr. Dudney to testify concerning that 

subject. As to Defendants’ objections to Mr. Dudney’s methodology, the Court finds his cash 

flow and balance sheet analysis sufficiently reliable to reach the jury and that Defendants’ 

arguments go to the weight of the evidence and are better addressed on cross-examination. 

Finally, as already noted, Mr. Dudney will not offer an opinion that $30 million is not fair value 

for the assets involved in the Hunt transaction, only that the actual manner of payment was not fair 

value. As such, Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 20 is DENIED.

21. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 21 to “Exclude Expert Opinions and Testimony 

from Nancy P. Watkins.” DENIED.

Defendants seek to exclude the opinion and testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert witness Nancy 

P. Watkins, who has been designated to testify concerning the annual allocation of costs in 

Defendants’ MIP and to offer the opinion that the allocation was not fair and equitable. 

Defendants contend that Ms. Watkins’s testimony is not relevant because her analysis begins with 

the assumption that the MIP allocation is “like rate-making” and therefore warrants an actuarial 

model, which she then developed to approximate the actual allocation that took place. Defendant 

further challenges the reliability of Ms. Watkins’s model and the information and assumptions that 

she relied upon in her analysis. Defs.’ MIL #21, ECF 286. 

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Fundamentally, however, this comes down to a question of relevance. It is undisputed that 

Defendants and Lockton did not use an actuarial analysis in their allocation of the MIP costs. It is 

not apparent, however, that Ms. Watkins will testify that Lockton should have used an actuarial 

analysis. Rather, as Plaintiffs argue, she conducted an independent allocation analysis using wellknown standards (here, actuarial methods) to compare to the allocation that Lockton actually made

to offer her opinion regarding whether the actual allocation was fair. See Pls.’ Opp. #21 at 1-3, 

ECF 328. Such testimony is relevant and proper to the jury’s understanding of the alleged MIP 

fraud and Defendants’ alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Ms. Watkins is moreover an experienced 

insurance actuary with thirty years of relevant experience and is qualified to opine regarding the 

highly relevant issue of the fairness of Lockton’s allocation of MIP costs. To the extent 

Defendants differ with Ms. Watkins conclusion, that is a subject more appropriately left for crossexamination and rebuttal experts. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 21 is therefore DENIED.

22. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 22 to “Exclude Excerpts of Robertson Expert 

Reports and Preclude Testimony Regarding Same.” GRANTED.

Defendants seek to exclude portions of the report and testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert 

witness James A. Robertson, who is designated to opine regarding the custom and practices and 

standard of care in the insurance industry. Mr. Robertson is unquestionably qualified, but 

Defendants argue (and the Court agrees) that his report is rife with impermissible opinions 

wherein he vouches for Plaintiffs’ version of the facts, concludes the applicable law and the proper 

application of that law, infers the mental states of individual actors, and opines on ultimate issues 

reserved for the factfinder. See Defs.’ MIL #22, ECF 288. Plaintiffs acknowledge these 

shortcomings in Mr. Robertson’s report and have assured the Court that he will testify only to 

matters within the province of an expert witness and that they will not elicit testimony concerning 

individual actors’ mental states from Mr. Robertson. As such, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

Motion in Limine No. 22 with respect to the objectionable opinions in Mr. Robertson’s report in 

the form that they are written. Mr. Robertson will be allowed to testify concerning the custom and 

practice in the insurance industry and, upon a proper factual foundation and in the proper form, his 

opinion concerning Defendants’ observance of the standard of care in the industry. Mr. Robertson 

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may not testify to matters or offer opinions that are not in his report. 

IV. LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS

Where the Court has ordered a party to prepare a limiting instruction in connection with 

the rulings above, that party shall submit the proposed instruction to the Court no later than one 

trial day before the evidence to which the instruction pertains is to be offered at trial. The parties 

are encouraged to meet and confer ahead of time to arrive at an agreement on the wording of the

instruction. During trial, the party proposing the limiting instruction shall inform the Court when 

the instruction is to be read.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 30, 2015

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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