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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FREDDIE HUITT, JR., 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tench Circuit 

~ AY 2 9 1 91 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

) 

) 

No. 91-6010 

EDWARD EVANS, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-1286-R) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner-appellant Freddie Huitt appeals from the district 

court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because 

we conclude the petition constitutes an abuse of the writ, we 

affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-6010 Document: 010110118041 Date Filed: 05/29/1991 Page: 1 
Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in Oklahoma 

state court on February 20, 1976. He was sentenced to ten years' 

to life imprisonment pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.4. 

In his first petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner 

challenged his conviction on the basis there was newly discovered 

evidence establishing his innocence, the evidence was insufficient 

to establish the elements of second degree murder, he did not 

received adequate direct appellate review, and the Oklahoma Court 

of Criminal Appeals refused to address issues on appeal from 

denial of post-conviction relief. The district court dismissed 

this petition on June 17, 1985. The decision was affirmed by this 

court. 

Petitioner filed this second petition on August 10, 1990. He 

seeks relief on the basis his sentence violated the equal protection clause, the jury instructions on intent, premeditation, and 

reasonable doubt were erroneous, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. 

A petition for writ of habeas corpus will be dismissed as an 

abuse of the writ under 28 u.s.c. § 2244(b) and 28 u.s.c. foll. 

§ 2254, Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings, Rule 9(b) if it 

is a "second or successive petition ..• [that] •.• fails to 

allege new or different grounds for relief and ••• the judge 

finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds 

in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ." The 

Supreme Court recently clarified the standard for determining when 

a petitioner abuses the writ by raising a new claim in a 

subsequent habeas corpus petition. Mccleskey Y.!.. Zant, U.S. 

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,. 

__ , 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2218 (1991). In McCleskey, the Court held 

the Wainwright Y.!.. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), cause and prejudice 

test applicable to cases of procedural default applies also "to 

determine if there has been an abuse of the writ through 

inexcusable neglect." Id. at A claim raised for the first 

time in a second habeas petition will therefore be dismissed unless the petitioner shows cause for failure to raise the claim in 

the first petition and prejudice therefrom. 

Petitioner raises new claims in his second petition for writ 

of habeas corpus. He contends these claims should be considered, 

however, because they are based on new rules of law to be applied 

retroactively that directly affect his substantial rights. In 

such circumstances, a petitioner's failure to raise a claim in a 

prior petition is excusable. See Sanders Y.!.. United States, 373 

U.S. 1, 17 (1963); Coleman Y.!.. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 1380-81 (10th 

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 1835 (1990). 

An examination of the record in this case, however, reveals 

the decisions cited by petitioner do not directly affect his 

substantial rights. Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to the following statutory provision: 

Every person convicted of murder in the second 

degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the 

State Penitentiary for not less than 10 years nor 

more than life. The trial court shall set an 

indeterminate sentence in accordance with this section upon a finding of guilty by the jury of murder 

in the second decree. 

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.4 (repealed in 1976). In 1976, section 

701.4 was repealed and replaced by new section 701.9, which 

provides: 

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A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty or 

nolo contendre to murder in the second decree shall 

be punished by imprisonment in a state penal 

institution for not less than ten (10) years nor 

more than life. 

Id. tit. 21 § 701.9 (1983). Also pertinent to petitioner's 

contentions are the general indeterminate sentencing provisions: 

In all cases where a sentence of imprisonment in 

the penitentiary is imposed, the court in assessing 

the term of confinement may fix a minimum and a 

maximum term, both of which shall be within the 

limits now or hereafter provided by law as the 

penalty for conviction of the offense. The minimum 

term may be less than, but shall not be more than 

one-third of the maximum sentence imposed by the 

court .. 

Id. tit. 57, § 353 (1984). 

In White Y..!.. State, 774 P.2d 1072 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989), the 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that an indeterminate 

sentence of five years' to life imprisonment violated section 353: 

We find no statutory authority or case law 

instructing this Court as to how to calculate onethird of a life sentence. Since one-third of a 

life sentence cannot be calculated, we find that 

the trial court may not set an indeterminate 

sentence where a life sentence is the maximum 

imposed. Therefore, Appellant's conviction must be 

vacated. 

Id. at 1072. Following the White decision, prisoners who received 

indeterminate ten years' to life sentences under new section 701.9 

have had their sentences reduced to the statutory minimum in a 

series of unpublished opinions by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals. Petitioner contends the equal protection clause demands 

his sentence be reduced in a similar manner. 

Petitioner was sentenced under old section 701.4 and not sections 701.9 and 353, which are subject to the rule in White. This 

court noted in Murray Y..!.. Cowley, 913 F.2d 832, 833-34 (10th Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 991 (1991): 

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"[s]ection 701.4, unlike section 701.9, required an 

indeterminate sentence of ten years to life ... 

Under Oklahoma law, a specific penalty provision, 

such as section 701.4, controls the application of 

a general provision authorizing indefinite 

sentences, such as section 353 .... Accordingly, 

because section 701.4 mandates an indeterminate 

sentence of ten years to life, the Oklahoma trial 

court was required to impose that sentence. 

Based on this, this court concluded Murray had no basis for an 

equal protection claim. 1 Similarly, we now conclude petitioner 

has failed to demonstrate an intervening change in the law 

permitting him to pursue a successive petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 

Nor has petitioner demonstrated an intervening change in the 

law relating to his challenges to the jury instructions given at 

his state trial. The Supreme Court's decision in Francis Y...!.. 

Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) does not directly impact on 

petitioner's challenge to the jury instruction on intent and 

premeditation. In Francis, the Court found the challenged 

instruction violated the fourteenth amendment's requirement that 

the prosecution prove every essential element beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. at 314-17. The instructions on intent and premeditation given at petitioner's state trial, however, could not have 

lead reasonable jurors to believe the state did not have to prove 

each essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor do we 

believe the decision announced by the Supreme Court in Cage Y...!.. 

Louisiana, 111 S. Ct. 328 (1990) represents a change in the law 

1 This court has also recently upheld section 701.4 against 

challenges that it violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 

Baker Y...!.. Cowley, No. 90-6354, slip op. at 4-5 (10th Cir. Ap. 29, 

1991). 

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. .. 

supporting petitioner's arguments concerning the reasonable doubt 

instruction given by the state court. 

Petitioner offers no other explanation why his claims were 

not raised in his first petition. The district court properly 

concluded the petition should be dismissed as an abuse of the 

writ. Because we find petitioner has neither raised a reasoned 

argument on the law and facts, Coppedge Y...!.. United States, 369 U.S. 

438 (1962), nor demonstrated the issues raised are debatable among 

jurists, Barefoot Y...!.. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), we deny 

certificate of probable cause and the motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis. The appeal is DIS.MISSED. All pending motions are 

DENIED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

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