Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-01911/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-01911-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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Case No.: 5:18-cv-01911-EJD

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

KAREN MOU, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SSC SAN JOSE OPERATING COMPANY 

LP, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:18-cv-01911-EJD 

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

TO REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 18

Presently before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, which Defendants oppose. 

Dkt. No. 18. Having reviewed the parties’ written submissions, the court finds this matter suitable 

for decision without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Accordingly, the hearing scheduled for July 

5, 2018, is VACATED, and the court finds, concludes and orders as follows:

1. Removal jurisdiction is a creation of statute. See Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy 

Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979) (“The removal jurisdiction of the federal courts is 

derived entirely from the statutory authorization of Congress.”). In general, only those state court 

actions that could have been originally filed in federal court may be removed. 28 U.S.C. § 

1441(a) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in 

a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 

removed by the defendant.”); see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) 

(“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to 

federal court by defendant.”). Accordingly, the removal statute provides two basic ways in which 

a state court action may be removed to federal court: (1) the case presents a federal question, or (2) 

the case is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), (b).

2. On a motion to remand, it is the removing defendant’s burden to establish federal 

jurisdiction, and the court must strictly construe removal statutes against removal jurisdiction. 

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Case No.: 5:18-cv-01911-EJD

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND

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Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The ‘strong presumption’ against removal 

jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is 

proper.”); Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). 

“Where doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.” 

Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003); accord 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).

3. Plaintiffs bring facial attack to the Notice of Removal. “A ‘facial’ attack accepts 

the truth of the [removing party’s] allegations but asserts that they ‘are insufficient on their face to 

invoke federal jurisdiction.’” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004)). Functionally, the court 

determines whether the jurisdictional allegations are sufficient as a legal matter by assuming the 

asserted facts are true and drawing all reasonable inference in the removing party’s favor. Id.

4. The Notice of Removal does not survive a facial attack. The allegations in support 

of diversity jurisdiction are plainly deficient. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 

857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Absent unusual circumstances, a party seeking to invoke diversity 

jurisdiction should be able to allege affirmatively the actual citizenship of the relevant parties.”); 

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006) (Because “federal courts lack 

jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record, the party asserting federal 

jurisdiction when it is challenged has the burden of establishing it.”). Missing is information 

identifying Defendants’ members and their principal places of business. See Johnson v. Columbia 

Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n LLC is a citizen of every state of 

which its owners/members are citizens.”). Without this information included in the Notice of 

Removal, the court cannot be assured that diversity jurisdiction exists in response to this motion. 

5. Nor have Defendants established federal question jurisdiction. None of Plaintiffs’

causes of action are created by federal law. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g 

& Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (explaining that federal question jurisdiction “is invoked by and 

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ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND

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large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law”). And neither fits within the 

“special and small category” of claims embraced by Grable. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. 

v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006). Indeed, determining whether or not Defendants violated

provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 or 42 C.F.R. § 483.10 does not “justify resort to the experience, 

solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313.

6. The Notice of Removal does not, on its face, satisfy Defendants’ burden to 

affirmatively show a basis for federal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the court believes a remand at this 

time is inefficient and could merely lead to another removal. This is so because diversity 

jurisdiction may exist in light of additional information not previously alleged but included in 

Defendants’ opposition. Thus, while not condoning the practice of removing civil cases on

obviously-deficient allegations and making up for them later, the court finds it appropriate to 

permit Defendants leave to amend the Notice of Removal to correct their jurisdictional statements. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1653; see also Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 831 (1989)

(holding that § 1653 addresses “incorrect statements about jurisdiction that actually exists”). 

Accordingly, Defendants shall file an amended Notice of Removal which conforms to the 

above discussion no later than July 6, 2018. The Motion to Remand (Dkt. No. 18) is DENIED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

Defendants are advised the court will remand this action, sua sponte, if an amended Notice 

of Removal is not filed by the established deadline. Any renewed Motion to Remand challenging

an amended Notice of Removal shall be filed no later than July 19, 2018, and noticed for hearing

at 9:00 a.m. on August 23, 2018. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 29, 2018

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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