Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05200/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05200-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 21, 2014 Decided August 8, 2014

No. 12-5200

AARON L. SCHNITZLER, ALSO KNOWN AS TYSON Q. BECHT,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-01318)

Megan L. Degeneffe, Student Counsel, argued the cause for

appellant. With her on the briefs were Steven H. Goldblatt,

appointed by the court, Rita K. Lomio and Lola A. Kingo,

Supervising Attorneys, and Harry P. Koulos, Student Counsel.

Aaron S. Goldsmith, Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S.

Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him

on the brief were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General,

and Colin A. Kisor, Acting Director.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, WILKINS, Circuit Judge,

and GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Chief Judge: For reasons we do not understand,

Aaron Schnitzler, a South Dakota state prisoner, wants to

renounce his United States citizenship. For reasons the

government has failed to explain -- or rather, for a host of everchanging reasons -- it has made it impossible for him to do so. 

To obtain relief, Schnitzler brought suit against the United

States. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of

jurisdiction, finding both that it was moot because Schnitzler

had obtained all the relief he sought, and that he lacked standing

because he had not been harmed.

Schnitzler’s complaint is not moot because the relief he

seeks -- an exception to the government’s in-person interview

requirement for renunciation, and official acknowledgment of

his renunciation -- has not been granted. Likewise, Schnitzler

has standing because he remains a citizen against his wishes and

allegedly in violation of his constitutional rights -- an allegation

that we must accept for purposes of ruling on his standing. We

therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that

a United States national can lose his nationality by voluntarily

performing one of several listed acts with the intention of

relinquishing Unites States nationality. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a). 

Schnitzler relies on two such acts:

(5) making a formal renunciation of nationality before

a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in

a foreign state, in such form as may be prescribed by

the Secretary of State; or

(6) making in the United States a formal written

renunciation of nationality in such form as may be

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prescribed by, and before such officer as may be

designated by, the Attorney General, whenever the

United States shall be in a state of war and the

Attorney General shall approve such renunciation as

not contrary to the interests of national defense.

Id. § 1481(a)(5), (6).

Schnitzler is an American citizen, currently serving a

sentence in a state facility in South Dakota. From there, he

began petitioning various United States agencies to recognize

his desire to renounce his citizenship. 

In a June 2010 request to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Services (USCIS), a component of the Department of Homeland

Security, Schnitzler sought “a letter stating that [he] is not a

citizen of the United States.” App. 100. In July 2010, USCIS

responded that the State Department -- not USCIS -- has

jurisdiction over “[t]he renunciation of United States

citizenship.” App. 98. USCIS said that § 1481(a)(5) “is the

section of law that provides for the ability of a U.S. citizen to

renounce his or her United States citizenship,” and “Americans

cannot effectively renounce their citizenship by mail, through an

agent, or while in the United States.” Id.

Schnitzler then turned to the Department of State for help. 

In an August 2010 letter, the State Department told him the

same thing USCIS had: “that one can only renounce one’s U.S.

citizenship before a U.S. diplomatic or consular officer at a U.S.

embassy or consulate abroad.” App. 97.

Having made no progress in these efforts, Schnitzler wrote

to the Department of Justice, citing § 1481(a)(6) as permitting

him to renounce his citizenship while in the United States. App.

96. But the Justice Department referred him back to USCIS, as

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did the State Department in another letter. See App. 79, 81, 82. 

So Schnitzler wrote twice more to USCIS, specifically citing

§ 1481(a)(6) each time, and complaining about his inability to

reach someone who would adjudicate his claim. App. 79-81. 

Once again, USCIS sent him back to the State Department. In

an August 2011 letter (sent soon after Schnitzler filed his

complaint), USCIS reiterated that all renunciations were

processed by the Department of State, and that § 1481(a)(5) was

the only available avenue. Renunciation under § 1481(a)(6), it

said, “can only be applied when there is a state of war in the

United States,” which it implied was not then the case. App. 75-

76.1

 And while § 1481(a)(5) was an available (and the only)

avenue, it came with a catch: the applicant must “[a]ppear in

person before a U.S. consular or diplomatic officer . . . in a

foreign country,” id., something that a South Dakota prisoner

could not do.

Tiring of the merry-go-round, Schnitzler filed this pro se

lawsuit on July 20, 2011, naming the Departments of Homeland

Security, State, Justice, and others as defendants. The form he

used to file the suit was provided by prison officials and was

marked as a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On

the form, Schnitzler stated: “I want the United States of

America to recognize that I am not a United States citizen.” 

App. 10. He asked the court to: “Compel the Attorney General

. . . to act on my request of Renunciation[;] and/or decla[re] [8

U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) and (6)] unconstitutional based on . . .

1

But see Turner v. Beers, No. 13-504, 2013 WL 6627983, at *3

(D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2013) (noting that “[t]he Government does not

contest that we are ‘in a state of war,’ which is a prerequisite for

[§ 1481(a)(6)] to be operative”); Kaufman v. Holder, 686 F. Supp. 2d

40, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that the United States was at war for

purposes of § 1481(a)(6) in 2008, when another prisoner sought

acknowledgment of his renunciation). 

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‘equal protection’ and/or the due process clause” because he had

no way of satisfying those sections’ requirements while

incarcerated. Id.; see id. at 11-13.

On December 14, 2011, the government filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Appended

to the government’s motion was a letter from USCIS to

Schnitzler, dated December 12, 2011, which stated:

U.S. citizens seeking renunciation under . . .

§ 1481(a)(6), must appear at a USCIS field office for

an in-person interview before a USCIS officer. . . . We

understand that you are currently incarcerated and thus

may not be able to appear for an in-person interview. 

Accordingly, your request will be held in abeyance

until such time as you are able to appear in person . . . .

App. 36. In its motion, the government stated that the Attorney

General’s authority under § 1481(a)(6) had been transferred to

the Secretary of Homeland Security, and asserted -- for the first

time -- that the in-person interview was necessary “to determine

whether an individual’s renunciation request will be ‘contrary to

the interests [of] national defense.’” App. 25 (quoting

§ 1481(a)(6)). Appended to a subsequent government filing was

the declaration of a USCIS official who confirmed that the

“interview is necessary in order to determine that renunciation

would not be ‘contrary to the interests of national defense.’” 

App. 48 (quoting § 1481(a)(6)). Arguing that the agency had

now “acted upon Plaintiff’s renunciation request,” that he had

“received the exact relief which he sought,” and that he was

entitled to nothing more, USCIS contended that Schnitzler’s

complaint was moot. App. 20, 22; see id. at 24.

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Schnitzler objected to the government’s use of the

December 2011 letter on two grounds. First, he said he had

never received it. That turned out to be true. USCIS admitted

that it had never mailed the letter, and thereafter it delivered a

copy to him. App. 49. Second, Schnitzler objected that the

letter did not provide the relief he had sought in filing the

lawsuit. “I want to renounce citizenship while in prison right

now!” he said. App. 53. “The claim is that the Defendants do

not give any way for me to renounce citizenship in the United

States, and while in prison.” App. 57.

The district court dismissed Schnitzler’s complaint for lack

of jurisdiction. Construing his request to compel agency action

as a request for a writ of mandamus, and taking into account

USCIS’s December 2011 letter, the court held: “To the extent

that defendant Homeland Security had a ministerial duty to act

on the plaintiff’s application to renounce his citizenship, which

is also the relief the plaintiff seeks from the complaint, it has

done so.” Schnitzler v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3

(D.D.C. 2012). Accordingly, the court said, that claim was

moot. The district court further found that Schnitzler lacked

standing to seek declaratory relief regarding his constitutional

claims because the fact that he is “still considered a United

States citizen . . . [does] not give rise to Article III standing.” Id.

at 4. The court also noted that “USCIS has represented that [he]

will not be prejudiced by its decision to hold his application in

abeyance until he is able to comply with § 1481(a)(6).” Id.

Schnitzler now appeals. On November 26, 2013, this court

appointed Georgetown University Law Center’s Appellate

Litigation Program as amicus curiae in support of the appellant. 

We review the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction de novo. See Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509

F.3d 572, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2007). We address the mootness issue

in Part II and the standing issue in Part III.

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II

A case is moot when “a party has already obtained all the

relief that it has sought.” Conservation Force, Inc. v. Jewell,

733 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Here, Schnitzler’s complaint included a demand that

the Attorney General “act on my request of Renunciation.” 

App. 10. The district court found that USCIS’s December 2011

letter, informing Schnitzler that it would hold his application in

abeyance pending an in-person interview, provided him all “the

relief plaintiff seeks from the complaint,” thus rendering the

complaint moot. Schnitzler, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 3.

But that is far too narrow a construction of what Schnitzler

sought. Schnitzler’s complaint demanded not just any response,

but an “ef[f]ective or practical way” to renounce his citizenship,

App. 12, as well as the government’s recognition of that

renunciation, id. at 10 (“Simply -- I want the United States of

America to recognize that I am not a United States citizen.”). 

His subsequent filings make that even clearer. In one filing, for

example, Schnitzler wrote:

There is still no avenue allowed me to renunciate

because I’m an Inmate. . . . They also give no reasons

why they cannot do an inperson interview with me by

coming to the prison, or doing it over the phone, or via

webcam.

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App. 105.2 And in another, he wrote: “The issue of this case

was never the lack of response from the government . . . but

specifical[l]y the lack of Action to recognize my renunciation of

citizenship right now.” App. 54.3 It is plain, then, that

Schnitzler has not yet received all the relief he sought in his

lawsuit. 

In what appears to have been an alternative holding, the

district court also found -- and the government now argues --

that “[t]o the extent that . . . Homeland Security had a ministerial

duty to act[,] . . . it has done so.” Schnitzler, 863 F. Supp. 2d at

3. That is, the court held that if Schnitzler’s complaint sought

something more than a mere response -- such as an exception to

the in-person interview requirement or official acknowledgment

of his renunciation -- then he was not entitled to it under the

court’s mandamus jurisdiction because “mandamus relief is

available ‘only where the duty to be performed is ministerial and

the obligation to act peremptory and plainly defined.’” Id.

(quoting Lozada Colon v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 170 F.3d 191, 191

(D.C. Cir. 1999)).4

2

See also App. 17 (stating that “[t]he main claim of this law suit

is that The United States of America gives no real way to . . .

relinquish United States citizenship”); App. 57 (“The main issue of

this claim is not that the Defendants needed to ‘act’ by sending me

another letter, but rather that the United States of America gives me no

real way to exercise relinquishment of citizenship.”).

3

See also App. 111 (“Getting another letter . . . is not changing or

resolving this case at all. ‘Acting’ is al[l]owing me to renounce

citizenship while in prison and while in the United States.”); App. 64

(stating that “I want the government to ‘act’ to pronounce me NOT a

citizen”). 

4

But cf. Ganem v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 844, 853-55 (D.C. Cir. 1984)

(granting mandamus to compel the Secretary of HHS to “alter her

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But while the government and the district court construed

Schnitzler’s complaint as a petition for mandamus, that word is

nowhere in his complaint.5

 Indeed, when faced with the

government’s contention that he had only filed for a writ of

mandamus, Schnitzler, a pro se litigant, responded:

This was not my intent . . . to file under the Mandamus

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. I, not an attorney, had no Idea

there was a diff[e]rence. When an inmate files any

lawsuit the court and the staff only give us one type of

form. Regardless of this I have a clear right to NOT be

a United States Citizen and the United States gives me

no available remedy because I am in prison . . . .

App. 63. Given the district court’s obligation to construe a pro

se plaintiff’s filings liberally, and to consider his filings as a

whole before dismissing a complaint, see Richardson v. United

States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999), Schnitzler’s

complaint was not properly construed as solely for mandamus. 

Rather, his arguments that the in-person interview requirement

constituted an arbitrary barrier to renunciation,6 and that USCIS

methods” of determining whether a social security claimant living in

Iran was eligible for benefits, because the Secretary’s policy of

requiring direct contact with the Iranian government “virtually

guarantee[s] that the determination will not be made in a reasonable

time”).

5

To the contrary, the face of the complaint -- on a form provided

by the prison -- states that it is “a Complaint by a Prisoner Under the

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” App. 6.

6

See, e.g., App. 66 (“Does the Head of Homeland Security have

authority to make a rule that arbitrarily takes the rights or freedoms

away from even one person, with no trial, no due process, and no

Justification?”).

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had failed to provide a reasonable explanation for that barrier,7

sound in administrative law. 

As court-appointed amicus notes, Schnitzler’s complaint

appears to state claims under the Administrative Procedure Act’s

cause of action for agency action unlawfully withheld or

unreasonably delayed, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), and for arbitrary and

capricious agency action, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). With respect to

§ 706(1), the district court did not undertake the kind of analysis

that this court suggested in a similar case in which a prisoner

had sought to renounce his citizenship. See Kaufman v.

Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1334, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 2008).8

Nor did the court consider whether the agency had acted

arbitrarily and capriciously, in contravention of 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2).9 During the course of Schnitzler’s letter writing and

7

See, e.g., App. 65 (“[T]hey do not give a reason why I have to

have an interview. They give no real reason why I cannot renounce

my citizenship while in prison.”).

8

The government states that, although this circuit “previously

suggested in dicta that the Government might have an obligation to act

on applications to renounce,” Gov’t Br. 13 n.9 (citing Kaufman, 524

F.3d at 1339), “this dicta is not persuasive,” id. This constitutes an

argument about the merits, upon which Schnitzler may or may not

ultimately prevail. But as we note below, his “prospects of success”

on such a claim are “not pertinent to the mootness inquiry.” Chafin v.

Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2013).

9

Cf. Fox v. Clinton, 684 F.3d 67, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding

that the State Department’s denial of the appellant’s request for a

certificate of loss of nationality that would acknowledge his surrender

of U.S. citizenship was “arbitrary and capricious,” because it was not

“logical,” “rational,” or “adequately explained”); Turner v. Beers, No.

13-504, 2013 WL 6627983 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2013) (rejecting as moot

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litigation, the government has offered a blizzard of constantly

changing explanations for why it could not process his request. 

At various times, the government has said that his request could

only be processed: by a different agency than the one to which

Schnitzler sent each letter; at an overseas embassy because the

United States was not at war; and at an in-person USCIS

interview in the United States because the agency had to

determine whether renunciation would be contrary to the

interests of national defense. In this court, the government

contends neither that the United States is not at war, nor that an

in-person domestic interview is required to assess the interests

of national defense. Instead, it offers a new explanation for the

in-person interview requirement: that it is necessary to ensure

that the request was made voluntarily and with a full

understanding of its consequences. Gov’t Br. 15-17. In

something of an understatement, the government acknowledged

at oral argument that it is “trying to develop a process . . .

against the context of litigation.” Oral Arg. Recording at 20:26-

20:30. 

In any event, whether or not the government’s policy and

explanations are reasonable under the Administrative Procedure

Act is a merits question, not a question of the court’s

jurisdiction. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 183-85 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). And Schnitzler’s “prospects of success” on such a

claim are “not pertinent to the mootness inquiry.” Chafin v.

Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2013). Because he has not

received all the relief he sought, and because we do not yet

know to what relief he may be entitled, Schnitzler’s claim is not

moot.

a prisoner’s mandamus claim relating to his request to renounce his

citizenship, but going on to assess the claim under § 706(2)(A)).

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III

The district court also construed Schnitzler’s complaint as

seeking a declaration that 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) and (6) violate

his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. 

Schnitzler challenged § 1481(a)(5)’s requirement that a citizen

seeking renunciation must be “in a foreign state,” and the

government’s construction of § 1481(a)(6) as requiring an inperson domestic interview at a USCIS office. Together, he

alleged, these requirements both prevent him from exercising a

right of renunciation and discriminate against those who cannot

travel to do so.

The district court did not reach the merits of Schnitzler’s

constitutional claims, finding instead that he lacked standing to

bring them. Schnitzler, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 4. The court held

that he lacked standing because being “still considered a United

States citizen” does “not state[] any other facts from which an

actual injury may be found or reasonably inferred.” Id. 

Moreover, the court said, “USCIS has represented that the

plaintiff will not be prejudiced by its decision to hold his

application in abeyance until he is able to comply with” the inperson interview requirement. Id. In concluding that Schnitzler

lacked standing, the court referenced one of the three necessary

elements of standing: that the plaintiff must have suffered an

“injury in fact.” Id.; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560 (1992).

But Schnitzler has sufficiently alleged an injury in fact: to

wit, being required to continue his association with the United

States against his wishes. The government contends that this

cannot constitute an injury, given the general recognition of the

benefits of U.S. citizenship. Gov’t Br. 21; Oral Arg. Recording

at 24:10-24:25. Indeed, it may well seem incongruous that, at

a time when many people are trying hard to obtain American

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citizenship, Schnitzler regards himself as “injured” by his

inability to renounce it. Nonetheless, the fact that we, or the

government’s attorneys, would not ourselves feel “prejudiced”

by being required to remain in citizenship status does not mean

that Schnitzler has not suffered an injury in fact. Nor is there

any dispute that Schnitzler genuinely believes he has. When

plaintiffs allege that they will suffer “aesthetic injury” from the

government’s interference with their ability to observe an animal

species, we do not resolve the matter by asking whether we -- or

the government, or most other people -- have the same aesthetic

sense. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-63. Nor can

we do the equivalent here.

In support of the district court’s holding, the government

also argues that “the Supreme Court has never recognized that

a citizen has a fundamental constitutional right to renounce

citizenship.” Gov’t Br. 12. In opposition to that holding,

amicus cites authority in support of Schnitzler’s position. See,

e.g., Reply Br. 23-24 (“‘In Afroyim [v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253

(1967)], the [Supreme] Court placed the right of voluntary

expatriation solidly on a constitutional footing.’” (quoting

Richards v. Sec’y of State, 752 F.2d 1413, 1422 (9th Cir.

1985))). The resolution of this dispute is a merits question, not

a question of standing. And the “Supreme Court has made clear

that when considering whether a plaintiff has Article III

standing, a federal court must assume arguendo the merits of his

or her legal claim.” Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d

370, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,

501-02 (1975)). “Indeed, in reviewing the standing question, the

court must . . . assume that on the merits the plaintiffs would be

successful in their claims.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted); see Holistic Candlers and Consumers Ass’n v. FDA,

664 F.3d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

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The government also maintains that Schnitzler’s equal

protection claim must fail because prisoners are not a suspect

class for purposes of such a claim. But this, too, is an argument

about the merits, not about standing. Schnitzler’s equal

protection claim is that the in-person interview requirement

erects a barrier that discriminates against those who cannot

travel to renounce their citizenship. Whether or not Schnitzler

will ultimately prevail on this claim, he “need only show that he

was part of a group that was denied equal treatment” in order to

establish his standing. Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d

1098, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

Finally, the government argues that Schnitzler cannot

establish the remaining two elements of standing: that there be

“a causal connection between the injury and the conduct

complained of,” and that it is likely that the injury can be

“redressed by a favorable decision” of the court. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. The government insists this is so

because, although the complaint Schnitzler filed sought a

declaration as to the unconstitutionality of the statute only, his

“real complaint is . . . with USCIS for making a determination

that an in-person interview in a USCIS field office is required to

adjudicate applications for renunciation.” Gov’t Br. 23. 

According to the government, the “cause” of Schnitzler’s

inability to renounce his citizenship is not the statute but

USCIS’s in-person interview policy, and a decision holding the

statute unconstitutional would not “redress” his injury.

This argument is a bit rich. The reason that Schnitzler’s

judicial complaint did not challenge USCIS’s interview policy

was that the government did not inform him that there was such

a policy until USCIS’s December 2011 letter. The government

did not provide that letter until well after Schnitzler filed suit --

and even then, only after the government noticed that it had

never mailed it to him. The government cannot now seek to bar

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standing on the basis of a policy that Schnitzler, a pro se litigant,

could not have known existed.

In any event, the government’s argument ignores

Schnitzler’s subsequent filings, which the court is bound to read

together with his complaint. See Richardson, 193 F.3d at 548. 

In his brief opposing the government’s motion to dismiss,

Schnitzler alleged that “[t]he United States government, by act,

policy, or law, will not al[l]ow me to relinquish my citizenship,”

and he asked the court to “decla[re] the laws, and polic[ie]s” of

USCIS unconstitutional. App. 64, 67 (emphasis added). That

constitutes a clear challenge not only to the statute, but to the

agency’s interview policy as well. And if it is the policy that is

the cause of Schnitzler’s inability to renounce his citizenship,

then a judicial determination that the policy is unconstitutional

can redress his injury. Accordingly, standing is not a barrier to

Schnitzler’s ability to pursue his constitutional claims.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the dismissal of

Schnitzler’s complaint and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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