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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

---

ROBER.TL, HOECKER 

a.ERK 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 802D4 

August 23, 1990 

TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

Re: 88-2643, Key v. Liquid 'E11.!;1;9Y Corp. 

( Lower docket: CIV-8_5-l 7i>,[1iE, ) .. •~. . .·.{~ 

(303) 844-3167 

F'TS 664-3167 

Attached is an opinion filed today, whidh should be substituted for the .• :~·:- -.,; 

court's opinion filed June 21, 1990. 

Please call this office if you have. quest:l.¢,ns:. 

. ~~"'- ·'· , ,: 

RLH:oac 

Enclosure 

Sincerely, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appellate Case: 88-2643 Document: 01019871080 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 1 
FI .:L E·:D, - UfJited ·St~ Court ofA~peaJs T~ih Circuit 

PUBLISH AUGy2 3 1990 

'-. \~- - -:t'.;~~~. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAMES V. KEY; FRANCIS L. KEY; ) 

JOHN E. OUTHOUSE; GLENDA OUTHOUSE,) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

vs. 

LIQUID ENERGY CORPORATION, a 

Delaware Corporation; MITCHELL 

ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT, a Texas 

Corporation, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

No. 88-2643 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV 85-1761 E) 

Daniel J. Hoehner, Tom L. King and Jeff R. Beeler, King, 

Roberts & Beeler, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for DefendantsAppellants. 

Howard K. Berry, Jr., Berry and Berry, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for Plaintiff-Appellees. 

Before BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and CONWAY,* 

District Judge. 

CONWAY, District Judge. 

*The Honorable John E. Conway, United states District Judge for 

the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2643 Document: 01019871080 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 2 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. 

App. P., 34A; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is 

·ordered submitted without oral argument. 

This is an appeal from an order of the United states 

District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denying the 

Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the 

Alternative, Motion for a New Trial, filed by Liquid Energy 

Corporation and Mitchell Energy and Development, collectively 

referred to as "the defendants" or "the appellants." The final 

order was entered on September 19, 1988, and this appeal was 

timely filed on October 18, 1988. The following issues are 

raised on appeal. 

As to appellant Mitchell Energy and Development (Mitchell): 

whether the district court erred in failing to direct a verdict 

or grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of 

Mitchell. As to both appellants: whether the district court 

erred in failing to direct a verdict or grant a judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the appellants on the 

issue of proximate cause; whether the district court erred in 

failing to direct a verdict or grant a judgment notwithstanding 

the verdict in favor of the appellants on the issue of legal 

duty; whether the district court erred in giving a negligence per 

se instruction, and an instruction regarding future loss of 

earnings, and in not giving an instruction regarding proximate 

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Appellate Case: 88-2643 Document: 01019871080 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 3 
cause; and, whether the district court erred in awarding two 

rates of pre-judgment interest. 

we are persuaded by Mitchell's argument that the district 

court erred in failing to direct a verdict or grant judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict as to Mitchell, and we- will therefore 

reverse the district court on that basis. Having made this 

determination, we need not address the remaining issues as to 

appellant Mitchell. In addition, we find that the district court 

did not err in refusing to direct a verdict or grant a judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Liquid Energy on either 

the issue of proximate cause or legal duty. We also find that 

the district court properly instructed the jury and will 

therefore affirm on those issues related to the jury 

instructions. Finally, we find that the district court did not 

err in awarding two separate rates of pre-judgment interest, and 

instead acted within the scope of its discretion. The district 

court will therefore be affirmed on this final issue. 

Facts 

This is an action for damages resulting from an explosion 

which injured plaintiffs/appellees Key and Outhouse, who were 

employed as truck drivers by the Great Plains Transport Company 

on February 6, 1985, the date of the accident. In January of 

1985, approximately one month before the accident, the plaintiffs 

began hauling butane condensate from the appellant Liquid Energy 

Company's facility in Stinnett, Texas, to Velma, Oklahoma. 

Liquid Energy has three separate stations for loading condensate, 

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variously known as Canadian River, Barnhill and TP-1. on 

February 5, 1985, both Key and Outhouse loaded their tanks at the 

Canadian River plant pursuant to Liquid Energy's instructions. 

The appellees then drove to Clinton, Oklahoma where they stopped 

for the night. The following morning, samples were taken from 

their trailers, and the appellees drove on to Velma, Oklahoma. 

Upon arriving at the Lee Petroleum facility in Velma, the 

appellees were advised by a Mr. Kappel, a Lee Petroleum employee, 

that tests had to be made on the condensate they were 

transporting. The tests were made on the product contained in 

the trailer driven by Key, but Kappel was unable to perform the 

tests on the condensate in the trailer driven by outhouse due to 

pressure in the tank. After lunch, on February 6, Kappel and 

Outhouse decided to take a sample from the second trailer for 

testing. outhouse checked the rear vent, then both men got on 

top of the trailer and prepared to open the rear hatch. When 

outhouse released the rear hatch, the still pressurized 

condensate blew out in a 15-foot high column. While airborne, 

the condensate ignited, causing the explosion which resulted in 

the appellees' injuries. 

The appellees' theory at trial was that the product they 

received from Liquid Energy was a high pressure condensate and 

should not have been transported in the type of trailers 

provided. 

At the close of the evidence, the defendants moved for a 

directed verdict which was denied by the trial court. Defendant 

4 

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Mitchell specifically moved for a directed verdict on the theory 

that it could not be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary, 

Liquid Energy. The jury returned a verdict finding negligence on 

all parties and awarding damages to the plaintiffs. The 

defendants then filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 

Verdict ("JNOV"), or in the Alternative, for a New Trial, which 

was also denied by the trial court. The defendants -now request 

the trial court be reversed on these rulings and that judgment be 

entered in their favor, or in the alternative, that a new trial 

be ordered. 

In ruling on an appellant's request to overturn a trial 

court for failure to direct a verdict or grant a J~ov, the 

appeals court must determine whether the trial court's refusal to 

set aside the jury verdict constituted a manifest abuse of the 

trial court's discretion. Karnes v. Emerson Electriq co., 817 

F.2d 1452 at 1456 (10th Cir. 1987); Brown v. McGraw Edison co., 

736 F.2d 609, 616 (10th Cir. 1984). A verdict claimed to be 

against the weight of the evidence is normally not reversed 

absent an "unusual situation" or a "gross abuse of discretion." 

Brown, 736 F.2d at 616. We now turn to Mitchell's first argument 

regarding the trial court's denial of a directed verdict or a 

JNOV in favor of Mitchell. 

Mitchell urges that the sole basis for judgment against it 

is its status as a parent corporation of Liquid Energy. In 

support of its motion for directed verdict and/or JNOV, Mitchell 

argued that it was at all relevant times a distinct corporate 

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Appellate Case: 88-2643 Document: 01019871080 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 6 
entity, insufficiently related to Liquid Energy to warrant 

liability. Mitchell further argued that the plaintiff had failed 

to prove that it should be liable given the factors set forth in 

Rea v. An-Son Corp., 79 F.R.D. 25 {W.D. Okla. 1978). Mitchell 

states that at the trial the plaintiffs were only able to prove 

that the Liquid Energy facility at Stinnett, Texas had a sign 

which read "Liquid Energy Company, a Subsidiary of Mitchell 

Energy and Development Company." In its favor, Mitchell argues 

that there was no evidence that any of Mitchell's employees were 

in any way involved in the alleged acts of negligence, and 

further argues that Liquid Energy was owned entirely by Liquid 

Energy Corporation and not by Mitchell. Finally, Mitchell argues 

that it has no interest in any of the field liquids sold by 

Liquid Energy. 

By way of response, the appellees urge that Liquid Energy 

and Mitchell Energy are both energy-related businesses, that 

Liquid Energy is designated a subsidiary of Mitchell on the sign 

in front of the Canadian River plant, and that the post office 

box address in Woodlands, Texas is the same for both 

corporations. As a legal basis for imposing liability on 

Mitchell, the appellees contend that the relationship between 

Mitchell and Liquid Energy is analagous to that of an employer 

and an independent contractor and not necessarily that of a 

parent and its subsidiary corporation. Having thus characterized 

the relationship between Mitchell and Liquid Energy, the 

appellees argue that the employer, by analogy, Mitchell, cannot 

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Appellate Case: 88-2643 Document: 01019871080 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 7 
shed liability for the actions of the independent contractor, by 

( analogy, Liquid Energy, where the work involved has a peculiar 

risk of physical harm to others. This argument is founded on 

section 413 of the Restatement Second of Torts and is commonly 

known as the Peculiar Risk Doctrine. 

We will first address the validity of Mitchell's argument 

under traditional parent/subsidiary analysis and will then turn 

to the alleged applicability of the Peculiar Risk Doctrine. 

This Circuit's prior decisions on the law applicable to 

parent/subsidiary corporations are clear·, and consistent with 

Oklahoma law in setting forth the appropriate concerns when 

determining whether a parent may be.held liable for the acts of 

its subsidiary. In Fish v. East, 114 F.2d. 177 (10th Cir. 1940), 

this Court addressed the question of the liability of a parent 

corporation for the acts of its subsidiary in the context of a 

bankruptcy proceeding. The Court held that where the subsidiary 

is a mere instrumentality of the parent the corporate entity may 

be disregarded. In addition, the Court identified the following 

determinative circumstances for deciding whether a subsidiary is 

a mere instrumentality of the parent: 

whether the parent owns all of the stock of 

the subsidiary; whether the corporations have 

common directors and officers; whether the 

parent finances the subsidiary; whether the 

parent caused the subsidiary's incorporation; 

whether the parent pays salaries or expenses 

of the subsidiary; whether the subsidiary has 

business with anyone outside the parent, or 

assets which have ~ot been transferred to it 

by the parent; whether the directors and 

officers act independently in the interest of 

the subsidiary; whether the formal legal 

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requirements of the subsidiary, such as 

keeping minutes, are observed; whether there 

are distinctions between the parent and 

subsidiary that are routinely disregarded or 

confused; and, whether the subidiary has a 

full board of directors. 

114 F.2d. at 191. 

The ruling in Fish was adopted by the United States District 

court for the Western District of Oklahoma in Palmer v. Stokely, 

255 F. Supp. 674 {W.D. Okla. 1966), and Rea v. An-Son Corp., 79 

F.R.D. 25 (W.D. Okla. ·1978), which are consistent with c 9 ses from 

the Oklahoma Supreme Court. see, Frazier v. Byron Memorial 

Hospital Auth., 775 P.2d 281 {Okla. 1989) and Gulf Oil Corp. v. 

state, 360 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1961). In Palmer, the court 

elaborated on the Fish analysis by adding that the corporate veil 

should be pierced when a. failure to do .so would defeat public 

convenience, justify wrong and protect fraud. 255 F. Supp. at 

681. In Rea the district court added that the fact that a 

corporation owns all of the stock of another corporation does not 

destroy the identity of the latter as a distinct legal entity, 79 

F.R.D. at 29, and the fact that stockholders or officers of two 

corporations may be the same persons does not operate to destroy 

the legal identity of either corporation. Id. 

This Court reaffirmed the determinative considerations set 

out in Fish, Palmer and Rea in Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel, 618 

F.2d 1373 {10th Cir. 1980), a tort case which more closely 

parallels the instant case than those cited above. There the 

Court held that even though a parent corporation indirectly owned 

seventy percent of the stock of a foreign subsidiary, furnished 

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Appellate Case: 88-2643 Document: 01019871080 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 9 
ten of the managing officers of the latter, many of whom held 

( managerial posts in the parent, and had contracted to furnish the 

subsidiary with technical services and manufacturing equipment as 

well as locating business, it could not be said that the 

subsidiary was the mere alter ego instrumentality of the parent 

so as to hold the parent liable for any negligence of a 

subsidiary employee, especially absent any showing of fraud or 

inequitable conduct resulting from the use of separate corporate 

structures. 

In Luckett this Court cautioned that whether a separate 

corporate structure was adopted for the purpose of fraud or 

illegality is ordin~rily a fact question for the jury; however, 

this question should not be submitted to the jury if the evidence 

discloses no real issue of disputed fact. 618 F.2d. at 1379. 

Turning then to the present case, it is clear that in order 

for the plaintiffs to prevail against Mitchell for the acts of 

Liquid Energy, they must establish that Liquid Energy is a mere 

instrumentality or alter ego of Mitchell under the Rea test, 

and/or, show that the use of the separate corporate structures 

somehow results in fraud, illegality, or inequity. 1 The 

1

We need not decide whether under Oklahoma law proof that a 

subsidiary corporation is the mere instrumentality or alter ego 

of its parent corporation is enough to pierce the corporate veil 

of the subsidiary or whether the plaintiff must also establish 

fraud, illegality or inequity, because here we hold that the 

plaintiffs failed to prove either (1) mere instrumentality or 

alter ego, or (2) fraud, illegality or inequity. Compare Tara 

Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1275 (Okla. 1981) and 

Gulf Oil Corp. v. State, 360 P.2d 933, 936 (Okla. 1961). with 

Sautbine v. Keller, 423 P.2d 447, 451 (Okla. 1966) and Mainord v. 

Sharp. 569 P.2d 546, 548 (Okla. ct. App. 1977). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2643 Document: 01019871080 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 10 
plaintiffs cannot carry this burden by a simple showing that the 

( parent wholly owns the subsidiary, or that the corporations share 

some personnel. 

As noted above, the only facts the plaintiffs offered 

throughout the conduct of this case were that a sign in front of 

the Canadian River Plant designated Liquid Energy as a subsidiary 

of Mitchell, and that the mailing address for both corporations 

was the same. Even assuming that this is the case, such 

declarations simply do not meet the requirements outlined above. 

On the public policy issue of inherent injustice 

attributable to the maintenance of separate corporate structures, 

the plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence that the Mitchell/LEC 

relationship is detrimental to the public good, justifies wrong, 

or protects fraud. Even if we were inclined to rule in favor of 

the appellees on this issue, we would be forced to do so without 

an evidentiary basis. 

Therefore, having concluded that the plaintiffs did not meet 

their burden at trial, we find the appellant Mitchell's argument 

persuasive on the first issue. We conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion in failing to grant the motion for directed 

verdict and the Motion for JNOV on this issue. 

We now address the propriety of adopting the appellees' 

reasoning that this matter should be approached in the context of 

an employer/independent contractor relationship rather than a 

parent/subsidiary corporation relationship. 

10 

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( We must begin with the observation that the appellees have 

offered no authority for application of the employer/independent 

contractor analysis to a cause involving two distinct 

corporations. In fact, the·provision on which the appellees 

rely, section 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts has, so far 

as we are able to discern, never been applied in the 

parent/subsidiary context. Instead, the doctrine has been 

applied to general contractors who hire sub-contractors, 

El-Meswari v. Washington Gaslight co., 785 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 

1986); the owner of a ship who hired an independent contractor to 

make repairs, Futo v. Lykes Bros. s.s. co., Inc., 742 F.2d 209 

(5th cir. 1984); and the owner of an ice cream sales operation 

who hired independent contractors to do actual sales, Wilson v. 

Good Humor Corp°' 757 F.2d. 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The question 

thus presented is whether there is a sufficient reason to apply 

principles from the employment law regime to traditional 

corporate law. We conclude that no such rationale has been 

presented here. 

The Peculiar Risk Doctrine is a tool whose application 

assures that an employer may not escape liability for especially 

hazardous conduct simply by hiring someone else to do the 

dangerous work. Minnetonka Oil co. v. Haviland, 155 Pac. 217 

(Okla. 1916). As such, the doctrine provides a remedy for those 

who are injured by the conduct of one acting at the behest of an 

employer, or otherwise once removed party. In essence, the· 

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Appellate Case: 88-2643 Document: 01019871080 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 12 
Peculiar Risk Doctrine allows a plaintiff to reach beyond the 

actor and hold the one who directed the offensive conduct 

responsible. In determining whether to extend this remedy to 

putative plaintiffs in suits alleging a parent/subsidiary 

relationship, one consideration is whether such relief is already 

available. We find that the laws regulating corporations provide 

for adequate mechanisms to pierce the corporate veil, thereby 

providing plaintiffs an adequate remedy, and assuring that the 

corporate structure is not used to perpetrate inequity. see, Town 

of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1981); c.c.M.S. 

Publishing co., Inc. v. Dooley-Maloof, Inc., 645 F.2d 33 (10th 

cir. 1981); and Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel corp., supra. 

Based on the foregoing, we find no basis for extension of 

the Peculiar Risk Doctrine to the present case. In failing to 

direct a verdict or grant JNOV on the issue of the defendant 

Mitchell's liability, the trial court abused its discretion and 

is hereby reversed. 

The second and third issues on appeal now regard only the 

defendant Liquid Energy and are directed at the question of 

whether the trial court should have directed a verdict or granted 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issues of proximate 

cause and legal duty. We address the proximate cause issue 

first. 

Liquid Energy contends that the evidence presented by the 

plaintiffs failed to establish that the conduct of the defendants 

was the proximate cause of their injuries. On review of 

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Appellate Case: 88-2643 Document: 01019871080 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 13 
trial court's denial of a motion for judgment n.o.v., we view the 

evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party. Barnett v. Life Insurance co. of the 

southwest, 562 F.2d 15, 17 (10th Cir. 1977). We also note that 

it is for the trier of fact to choose from conflicting inferences 

those compatible with common sense and reasonable prudence. 

Moore v. Ledbetter, 383 P.2d 876, 879 (Okla. 1963). If there is 

competent evidence introduced, even though conflicting, the 

questions of negligence and proximate cause must be left to the 

jury. Martin v. Farmers Cooperative Exchange, 368 P.2d 1012, 

1015 (Okla. 1962). Only when the trial judge can conclude that 

all reasonable men would agree that the defendant's negligence 

was not the proximate cause of an injury should a motion for 

directed verdict, or judgment n.o.v., be sustained. 

Proximate cause is defined as an event which, in the natural 

and continuous sequence, unbroken by any independent cause, 

produces an event and without which that event would not have 

occurred. Mathers v. Younger, 58 P.2d 857, 862 (Okla. 1936). In 

order for a party to recover under a theory of negligence, there 

must be a causal connection between the actions of a wrongdoer 

and the injury. 

At trial, the plaintiffs' introduced evidence and 

corroborating expert testimony that the presence of butanes in 

the field liquids, combined with the transport of those liquids 

in an improper tanker, was the reason for the explosion. The 

field liquids loaded into outhouse's tanker by Liquid Energy were 

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rated at 45 PSI at 100 degrees F., while the tanker was rated 

only for materials of 16 PSI at 100 degrees F. These facts are 

supported by the load ticket, (which indicates that the more 

highly volatile material was in fact loaded), the difference in 

the color of the field liquids, and the chromatograph tests which 

indicated the presence of butane. The plaintiffs argued that but 

for the loading of the improper materials by Liquid Energy, the 

accident would never have occurred. 

The defendants' expert testified that the reason for the 

explosion was the improper venting of the tanker, and not the 

type of liquid loaded. The expert further testified that the 

fact that the improper liquid was loaded only created the 

conditions necessary for the accident to occur. 

This testimony created a conflict regarding proximate cause 

that the jury was entitled to evaluate. In conducting their 

evaluation, the jury is not bound by the testimony of the 

defendants' experts. See generally, Marathon Battery co. v. 

Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1965). Based on the evidence 

before it, the jury was entitled to conclude that the proximate 

cause of the explosion was in fact the negligent act of Liquid 

Energy in loading the trailer with a more highly combustible 

material than it was designed to carry. 

Having viewed the evidence and the inferences therefrom in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude 

that the evidence in the defendants' favor is not of such a 

conclusive nature as to require that the jury verdict be set 

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aside. We therefore find that the trial court did not err in 

refusing to grant the motion for directed verdict or judgment 

n.o.v. and will affirm the trial court on this issue. 

Turning now to the issue of whether Liquid Energy owed a 

legal duty to the plaintiffs, we note that the appeals court 

independently reviews the trial court's conclusions on legal 

issues and need not defer to a trial courts' decisions on the 

law. Pullman-standard v. Swint, 456 u.s. 273, 287 (1982). 

Liquid Energy argues that it did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs 

insofar as they are not members of the class intended to be 

protected under the Code of Federal Regulations' section 

applicable to the transportation of hazardous materials. 

The transportation of hazardous materials is regulated by 

40 p.F.R. § 171.1 (1984), et seq. Section 171.2(a) provides 

that: 

No person may offer or accept a hazardous 

material for transporation in commerce 

unless that material is properly classed, 

described, packaged, marked, labeled, and in 

condition for shipment as required or 

authorized by this subchapter. 

Section 171.2{b) provides that: 

No person may transport a hazardous material 

in commerce unless that material is handled 

and transported in accordance with this 

subchapter, or an exemption issued under 

Subchapter B of this chapter. 

Forty-nine C.F.R. § 172.1, et seq. sets forth the hazardous 

materials governed by the Regulations and§ 172.J(a) states 

that: 

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This part applies to - (1) Each person who 

offers a hazardous material for 

transportation, and (2) Each carrier by air, 

highway, rail, or water who transports a 

hazardous material. 

Liquid Energy would have this panel read the applicable 

regulations in such a fashion as to exclude the drivers of the 

transporting vehicle from that class of individuals who are 

protected by the regulations applicable to offerers of hazardous 

material for transportation under C.F.R. § 171.2{a). Such a 

reading would establish the rule that a hazardous materials' 

provider owes a duty to the general public, but not to the entity 

who will necessarily be in contact with the material being 

transported. 

The appellant argues that this reading makes sense in light 

of the fact that the transporter of the hazardous materials also 

has a duty to the public as defined in 49 C.F.R. 172.J{a) (2). We 

disagree. The more appropriate reading of this Code section is 

to hold, as we do now, that the duties outlined in 49 C.F.R. 

171.1, et seq., apply to the general public and to offerors and 

transporters of hazardous materials in their dealings with one 

another. Thus, just as the transporter has a duty to provide the 

appropriate equipment for the job of transportation, the offerer 

has a duty to conform to standards of due care in offering or 

transferring the material in question to the transporter. To 

hold otherwise would subvert the intent of this section of the 

Code which was enacted to regulate and protect individuals from 

the dangers of hazardous material transporation. 

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Having reached this conclusion, we find that the trial court 

properly denied Liquid Energy's Motion for Directed Verdict and 

Motion for Judgment n.o.v. We therefore affirm the trial court 

on this issue. 

The next issue on appeal is whether the trial court erringly 

gave a jury instruction on negligence per se and future loss of 

earnings, and wrongfully failed to give an instruction regarding 

proximate cause versus condition. 

We have reviewed the instructions of the trial court as a 

whole and find that they fairly embody the law applicable to the 

issues involved and result in no prejudice to the defendant. 

Thweatt v. Ontko, 814 F.2d 1466 (10th cir. 1987), Boyles v. 

Oklahoma Natural Gas co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980). 

The final issue before us is whether the trial court erred 

in awarding two separate rates of pre-judgment interest. The 

provisions of Title XII, Okla. Stat. Ann. § 727, in effect at the 

time this lawsuit was instituted, provided for the award of prejudgment interest at a rate of 15%. Title XII was amended 

effective November 1, 1986 in a manner that tied the applicable 

rate of pre-judgment interest to the United States Treasury Bill 

rate. For purposes of this case, the amendments effectively 

reduced the applicable interest rate to 10.03%. At the 

conclusion of the trial, the trial judge awarded the plaintiff 

pre-judgment interest at the rate of 15% for the time period 

before November 1, 1986 and 10.03% for the time period after 

November 1, 1986. on appeal, the defendants jointly urge that 

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Appellate Case: 88-2643 Document: 01019871080 Date Filed: 08/23/1990 Page: 18 
the pre-judgment interest rate should be uniform and should 

reflect the post-November 1986 amendments. 

We disagree. We find that the trial court clearly acted 

within its discretion in awarding the 15% interest rate, thereby 

recognizing that the plaintiff was entitled to the prevailing 

rate at the time the action was instituted. See, Nichols v. 

T.I.M.E. - D.C., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Okla. 1973). 

In accordance with the foregoing discussion, the trial 

court's judgment is hereby REVERSED for failure to direct a 

verdict or grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the 

appellant Mitchell and AFFIRMED on the remaining issues. 

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