Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01344/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01344-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR RAY DEERE, SR.,

CDCR #F-94040,

Case No. 13cv1344 JLS (NLS)

Plaintiff, ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTIONS

TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS AS BARRED BY 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g); AND (2)

DISMISSING CASE FOR FAILURE

TO PAY FILING FEE REQUIRED

BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

(ECF Docs. No. 3, 6)

vs.

DR. E. ESTOCK,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Arthur R. Deere, Sr. (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the

California Institute for Men, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action. Plaintiff did

not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time he filed his complaint;

instead, he has since submitted two Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF Nos. 3, 6.) 

LEGAL STANDARD 

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s

Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, “face an additional

hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing fee” in

installments, as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison Litigation Reform Act

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(“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP

if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated

or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of

the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.” 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Andrews]. 

“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.;

see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Cervantes]

(holding that, under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may

entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule”). The objective of the PLRA is

to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” 

Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). “[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior

dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both before and after the statute’s effective date.” 

Id. at 1311.

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were

dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles

such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of

the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has

accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP

action in federal court unless he can show he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical

injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception

for IFP complaints that “make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger

of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing”).

ANALYSIS

A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v.

Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d

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801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens

Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). This Court takes judicial notice that

Plaintiff has had three prior prisoner civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were

frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted: 

1) Deere v. Cuomo, Civil Case No. 11-0542 JAH (WMc) (S.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2012)

(Order dismissing Third Amended Complaint for faiure to state a claim pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b));

2) Deere v. Brown, Civil Case No. 11-1579 WQH (JMA) (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2012)

(Order dismissing Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)); and 

3) Deere v. Altamirano, Civil Case No. 12-412-UA (CW) (C.D. Cal. April 4, 2012)

(Order denying Motion to Proceed IFP and dismissing case as frivolous, malicious

or failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted).

These prior civil actions are each “strikes” as defined by § 1915(g). Thus, Plaintiff has,

while incarcerated, accumulated three “strikes.” Moreover, after carefully reviewing Plaintiff’s

pleading, the Court finds that it contains no “plausible allegation” to suggest Plaintiff “faced

‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to the privilege of proceeding

IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes

prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying

IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt

permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby:

(1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed IFP (ECF Nos. 3, 6) as barred by 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g);

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(2) DISMISSES this action sua sponte without prejudice for failure to prepay the

$350 filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); and 

(3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would also be frivolous and,

therefore, not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United

States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent

appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 20, 2013

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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