Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01106/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01106-33/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CESAR URIBE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

PHILIP BABIENCO,

Defendant. /

No. C 13-01106 WHA

ORDER AWARDING REDUCED

COSTS

INTRODUCTION

On September 9, the clerk entered a bill of costs of $3,367.24 in favor of defendant as

the prevailing party in this case. Plaintiff timely objected pursuant to L.R. 54-2. For the

reasons that follow, plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED IN PART.

STATEMENT

On July 27, a jury reached a unanimous verdict for defendant Philip Babienco. 

Judgment was entered the next day. Defendant submitted a bill of costs on August 10 for

$4,327.52 (Dkt. No. 128), but amended the amount to $3,747.04 the following day (Dkt. No.

129). On September 9, the clerk taxed costs against plaintiff in the amount of $3,367.24 (Dkt.

No. 137). Plaintiff objects to this amount and asks this Court to exercise its discretion to deny

costs pursuant to FRCP 54. 

ANALYSIS

FRCP 54(d)(1) states, “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides

otherwise, costs – other than attorney’s fees – should be allowed to the prevailing party. Our

Case 3:13-cv-01106-WHA Document 143 Filed 10/12/16 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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court of appeals has interpreted the statute as creating “a presumption for awarding costs to

prevailing parties; the losing party must show why costs should not be awarded.” Save Our

Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2003). The district courts have

discretion to award, reduce, or deny costs. Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators v. State of

Cal., 231 F.3d 572, 593 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Guitron v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 619 F.

App’x 590, 592 (9th Cir. 2015); Carter v. Univ. Haw., 176 F. App’x 815, 816 (9th Cir. 2006). 

In determining whether to exercise that discretion, factors to consider include, but are not

limited to: (1) the substantial public importance of the case, (2) the closeness and difficulty of

the issues in the case, (3) the chilling effect on future similar actions, (4) the plaintiff's limited

financial resources, and (5) the economic disparity between the parties. Draper v. Rosario, No.

14-16340, 2016 WL 4651407, at *11 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2016). A losing party need not

demonstrate that all five factors weigh against imposing costs. Ibid.

In this case, all five factors weigh against imposing costs. First, the case has

“substantial public importance” because, as our court of appeals noted in Draper, “[i]ndividual

Eighth Amendment cases are important for safeguarding the rights and safety of prisoners.” Id.

at *12. Second, like Draper, this case was close enough to survive summary judgment and

ultimately “turned on which competing account of events the jurors believed.” Third, in

Draper, our court of appeals found “a large cost award” of $3,018.35 — less than the amount

billed here — “could chill similar lawsuits challenging Eighth Amendment violations in jails

and prisons,” particularly for cases that, like this one, “ultimately turn on the jury’s

determination of whose account of the event is more credible.” Ibid. Fourth, plaintiff, a

“prison inmate of . . . modest means,” has limited financial resources (Dkt. No. 131 at 3). And

fifth, as was the case in Draper, there is “no comparison between [plaintiff’s] limited resources

and those of the state of California, which bore the defense costs.” Draper, supra, at *13.

Defendant argues plaintiff “has money to pay costs associated with litigation” because

he “has money in his trust account,” and “received $4,500 as a monetary settlement” in a prior

case but gave it away (Dkt. No. 135 at 2). That plaintiff has $10.04 in his trust account (Dkt.

No. 134) — an amount defendant conveniently omitted — and received a one-time payment of

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$4,500 prior to this case does not disprove that plaintiff has limited financial resources,

especially compared to those of the state of California. Defendant also points out plaintiff “can

certainly afford to pay . . . over time,” with a “monthly payment plan of twenty percent of [his]

income” (Dkt. No. 135 at 3). But if the total amount of costs is unjust, then spreading it out

with a payment plan does little to mitigate its injustice — especially if, as plaintiff observes, it

would take a prisoner approximately 25 years of full-time work to pay according to the plan

(Dkt. No. 140 at 4).

Defendant also argues an award of costs here “will not have a chilling [effect] on civil

rights litigation” because “[p]laintiff is well acquainted with the judicial system” and is a

“seasoned litigant.” (Dkt. No. 135 at 4). Defendant’s argument is inapposite. As plaintiff

correctly notes, the “chilling effect” our court of appeals warned of in Draper was not on any

particular litigant, seasoned or otherwise, but on a general group of “would-be litigants” with

similarly meritorious Eighth Amendment claims who “may choose not to risk an unsuccessful

lawsuit that could add to the fees and costs associated with conviction and imprisonment” (Dkt.

No. 140 at 3). Draper, supra, at *12. The danger of such a chilling effect presents here

regardless of whether plaintiff, specifically, would be deterred from filing future lawsuits.

While the circumstances in this case indicate plaintiff cannot reasonably afford to pay

$3,367.24 in costs, he can afford a “relatively trivial and somewhat symbolic” amount to

“comport with the spirit of Rule 54(d).” Martinez v. Cui, No. 06–40029–FDS, 2009 WL

3298080, at *5 (D. Mass. Apr. 13, 2009) (Judge Frank Saylor). This order therefore REDUCES

DEFENDANT’S BILL OF COSTS TO $200.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s objections to defendant’s bill of costs are

OVERRULED IN PART. Costs are taxed against plaintiff in the amount of $200.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 2016. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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