Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-02206/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-02206-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TED ARTHUR KING, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

RUSSELL LEE TARVER, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-cv-02206-TLN-SCR 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter, which is referred to the undersigned pursuant 

to Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636. Now before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss 

(ECF No. 11) filed by the defendants who are judges and an Amended Motion to Dismiss (ECF 

No. 16) filed by Defendants Sacramento County and Santiago James Garcia. The Court will 

recommend that the motions be granted and the action dismissed. 

I. Background and Procedural History 

Plaintiff Ted Arthur King filed his Complaint on October 4, 2023 against Placer County 

Superior Court and five individuals. ECF No. 1. The exact nature of the claims in the original 

Complaint was unclear. It appeared to complain of the course of discovery in a state court matter 

and also mentioned landlord tenant issues. ECF No. 1 at 4-7. Plaintiff also filed a motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. On April 19, 2024, pursuant to screening under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e), Magistrate Judge Barnes dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend. ECF 

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No. 3. Thereafter, Plaintiff paid the filing fee and filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC). ECF 

No. 4. 

 On August 29, 2024, Defendants Michael W. Jones and Joginder S. Dhillon, both 

California Superior Court judges (the “Judicial Defendants”), filed a motion to dismiss because of 

judicial immunity, Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the Eleventh Amendment. ECF No. 11. On 

September 18, 2024, Defendants Sacramento County and Santiago James Garcia (the “County 

Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on 

Rooker-Feldman and failure to state a claim. ECF 16. On October 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed an 

opposition to the motions by both sets of defendants, though that opposition was untimely as to 

the Judicial Defendants’ motion.1 Both sets of defendants filed reply briefs and Plaintiff filed 

unauthorized sur-replies. The Court took these motions under submission without oral argument. 

II. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 

1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the 

court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). However, 

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 Pursuant to Local Rule 230(c) any opposition to a motion “shall be filed and served no later 

than fourteen (14) days after the motion was filed . . . A failure to file a timely opposition may 

also be construed by the Court as a non-opposition to the motion.” Even though Plaintiff is 

proceeding without an attorney, he is still obligated to comply with the rules. See Munoz v. 

United States, 28 F.4th 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[I]t is axiomatic that pro se litigants . . . are 

subject to the same procedural requirements as other litigants.”). 

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the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. 

Paulsen v. CNF, Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). While Rule 8(a) does not require 

detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere 

“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements 

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). A court cannot 

assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have 

violated the ... laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 

Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is permitted to 

consider material that is properly submitted as part of the complaint, documents that are not 

physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not contested and the plaintiffs’ 

complaint necessarily relies on them, and matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d. 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001). 

III. Analysis 

The FAC states it is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. ECF No. 4 at 1. Although 

Placer County and Sacramento County are listed as Defendants in the caption, they are not named 

as Defendants in the body of the FAC. The FAC lists as Defendants: 1) Judge Michael Jones of 

Placer County Superior Court; 2) Judge Joginder Dhillon of Sacramento County Superior Court; 

3) Russell Tarver, a “storage yard owner”; 4) Virginia Tarver, a “homemaker”; 5) Kurt Tarver as 

the son of Russell Tarver; 6) “LEANNE GARCIA? Sac Sheriff”; and 7) Santiago James Garcia, 

the “SAC SHERIFF.” ECF No. 4 at 2-4. 

 As to Judge Jones, Plaintiff complains of his judicial actions – the dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

state court action, his orders concerning discovery, and his “explanations.” ECF No. 4 at 6. As to 

Russell Tarver, the FAC makes allegations concerning his participation and testimony in the state 

court proceeding. Id. at 9-10. Much of the FAC appears to consist of excerpts from the minutes 

of the state court proceedings. See for example ECF No. 4 at 11 to 24. Plaintiff’s claim under § 

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1981 appears to be that he had some contractual rights with Russell Tarver, and the state court did 

not enforce them. ECF No. 4 at 25-26. Plaintiff alleges the jury in state court rendered a verdict 

in favor of Tarver and against Plaintiff and found him liable for $50,000 for negligence. Id. at 27. 

A. Judicial Immunity 

 Judicial Defendants move to dismiss the claims against them in the FAC arguing that they 

fail to state a claim and are barred by judicial immunity. ECF No. 11. As Judicial Defendants 

point out, there are no specific facts alleged against Judge Dhillon in the FAC, and the only 

mention is that Judge Jones took judicial notice of an order from Judge Dhillon. ECF No. 11 at 3-

4 (citing page 27 of the FAC). As to Judge Jones, the allegations against him concern judicial 

acts taken in his judicial capacity. Plaintiff failed to timely file an opposition to the motion to 

dismiss. The motion was filed August 29, 2024, and Plaintiff’s opposition was not filed until 

October 2, 2024. The Court has considered the untimely opposition (ECF No. 17) which does not 

directly respond to the argument concerning judicial immunity, and only indirectly responds to 

the failure to state a claim argument by claiming that his case is really about fraud. At one point 

Plaintiff argues his “only objective in this court is a trial against defendants for fraud, and/or 

fraudulent transfer of property, collaterally addressing the courts actions in Placer County, 

beaming light to the U.S. Supreme Court, from light shed from this court.”2 ECF No. 17 at 4. 

“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of 

authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 

349, 359 (1978). Judges are immune from damages actions for judicial acts taken within the 

jurisdictions of their courts. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). This 

immunity applies “however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its 

consequences it may have proved to plaintiff.” Id. 

Plaintiff states that he brings his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. However, the Ninth 

Circuit has held that § 1981 does not provide an express or implied cause of action. Yoshikawa v. 

Seguirant, 74 F.4th 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit stated that: “A 

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 If, as Plaintiff now seems to contend, his only cause of action is for fraud, then this Court would 

lack subject matter jurisdiction. 

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plaintiff seeking to enforce rights secured by § 1981 against a state actor must bring a cause of 

action under § 1983.” Id. at 1047. Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff’s claim is construed as 

being one under § 1983, he fails to state a claim. The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to state 

a claim against the Judicial Defendants because they are entitled to judicial immunity. 

The Court further concludes that leave to amend would be futile. Futility of amendment is 

a sufficient ground to deny leave to amend. U.S. ex rel. Insoon Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 

245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001). Amendment would be futile where a defendant is immune 

to a claim for damages raised in the complaint. See Valencia v. Juan, 2024 WL 1007234 at *2 

(E.D. Cal. 2024). 

B. Rooker-Feldman

 County Defendants move for dismissal on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman3 doctrine and 

failure to state a claim. ECF No. 16-1. Plaintiff filed a timely opposition to the motion (ECF No. 

18), and Defendants a reply (ECF No. 21).4 Under Rooker-Feldman, “a federal district court does 

not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state 

court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). Stated another way, the RookerFeldman doctrine prevents “a party losing in state court ... from seeking what in substance would 

be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court.” Henrich v. Valley 

View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Ignacio v. Judges of U.S. Court of 

Appeals, 453 F.3d 1160, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal “because the complaint is 

nothing more than another attack on the California superior court’s determination in [the 

plaintiff’s] domestic case”). 

 The FAC is largely focused on the alleged errors of the state court. Plaintiff complains 

that Judge Jones dismissal of his case “was an abuse of discretion.” ECF No. 4 at 6. He 

complains of an Order “to retrieve already addressed interrogatories.” Id. Plaintiff argues Judge 

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 The doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District 

of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 

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 Plaintiff has improperly filed sur-replies (ECF No. 22 & 23). Plaintiff is cautioned that he must 

comply with the Local Rules. See LR 230(m) (“After a reply is filed, no additional memoranda, 

papers, or other materials may be filed without prior Court approval [except as provided in 

subparts (m)(1) & (m)(2)]”). 

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Jones improperly denied an earlier motion to compel on October 2, 2020. Id. at 10-11. Plaintiff 

includes pages and pages of minute entries from state court in the FAC, apparently wishing for 

this Court to review the state court rulings and decide differently. Plaintiff also attaches to his 

FAC a minute order from October 2, 2020, that he disagrees with, and a memo in support of 

invalid lien judgment. ECF No. 4 at 30, 39. When a party relies on state court rulings and 

proceedings as “evidence” for their federal claims that is an indication the claims are likely 

precluded by Rooker-Feldman. See Eicherly v. O’Leary, 721 F.App’x 625, 627 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(“Plaintiffs’ contention that their federal claims assert legal injuries independent of any state court 

decision—and therefor not barred by Rooker-Feldman—is also belied by the fact that they rely on 

the allegedly erroneous state court orders and decisions as the primary ‘evidence’ of the 

underlying due process violations.”). 

It appears that Plaintiff seeks in this Court a de facto appeal of the state court proceedings. 

See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1156 (“Reduced to its essence, Rooker held that when a losing plaintiff in 

state court brings a suit in federal district court asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly erroneous 

legal rulings of the state court and seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of that court, the 

federal suit is a forbidden de facto appeal.”). Plaintiff’s action is based on the alleged legal 

wrongs of the state court. Plaintiff’s FAC does not have a clearly stated “relief requested” 

section, but the final sentence before the closing and signature states: “Plaintiff liable for damages 

award to defendant Russell Lee Tarver, of $50,000.00, is reversed.” ECF No. 4 at 27. This 

sentence is not a model of clarity, but other portions of the FAC refer to the damage award in 

state court as a “miscarriage of justice,” and again at least suggest that Plaintiff seeks to have that 

award reversed by this Court. 

 Plaintiff also appealed the judgment in state court, and Defendants have submitted the 

decision of the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District (ECF No. 16-2). The opinion 

states that the “trial court ordered plaintiff and cross-defendant Ted King, in propria persona, to 

produce documents and interrogatory responses, but he failed to do so.” ECF No. 16-2 at 4. 

Plaintiff was then given “several more opportunities to produce” the discovery as the case 

proceeded towards jury trial. Id. When he still did not do so, the trial court granted defendant 

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and cross-complainant Tarver’s motion for evidentiary sanctions and motion for non-suit. Id. at 

4-5. Thereafter: “Tarver proceeded to trial on the cross-complaint, where the jury 

found King liable for negligence, assault, and battery, and awarded Tarver $50,000 in 

damages.” ECF No. 16-2 at 6. The California Court of Appeal affirmed stating: “We find no 

error in the trial court’s issuance of sanctions.” Id. at 7. The Court of Appeal also rejected an 

argument that Plaintiff advances in this Court – that the state trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

impose sanctions. Id. at 8 (“We further dispose of King’s argument that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to issue sanctions because the motions were untimely.”). The Court of Appeal found 

the motions for sanctions were not untimely, found no error in the grant of nonsuit, and affirmed. 

Id. at 8-10. 

 The decision by the Court of Appeal was rendered May 31, 2023. Review was denied on 

August 23, 2023. King v. Tarver, 2023 WL 3732722 (Cal. Ct. App. May 31, 2023). Thereafter, 

on October 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action. The timing is further support for the conclusion 

that this is an improper de facto appeal which is precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As 

Rooker-Feldman is a jurisdictional doctrine, it is appropriate to dismiss this action without 

prejudice. See Eicherly v. O’Leary, 721 Fed. App’x 625, 627 (9th Cir. 2018). As with judicial 

immunity, leave to amend as would also be futile in light of the Rooker-Feldman issues. 

IV. Conclusion 

 The Court recommends that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) filed by Judge Jones and 

Judge Dhillon be granted on the basis of judicial immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and for 

failure to state a claim. The Court further recommends that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) 

filed by Defendants Santiago James Garcia and Sacramento County be granted on the basis of the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine and for failure to state a claim. The Court further recommends that the 

action be dismissed without further leave to amend.5

 Plaintiff has already once amended, and 

5

 The intended defendants are unclear as there are nine listed in the caption, seven in the list of 

defendants (ECF No. 4 at 2-4), and the allegations focus on only Defendants Judge Jones and 

Santiago James Garcia. Four have appeared and moved to dismiss. As Rooker-Feldman is 

jurisdictional, dismissal is appropriate even though perhaps not all defendants have been served 

or appeared. See Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (district 

court “may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not moved to 

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there a prior screening order (ECF No. 3) informed him of the deficiencies. The prior screening 

order explained at length the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. ECF No. 3 at 4-5. Under these 

circumstances, further leave to amend would be futile. Futility of amendment is a sufficient 

ground to deny leave to amend. See U.S. ex rel. Insoon Lee, 245 F.3d at 1052. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) as to 

Judge Jones and Judge Dhillon be GRANTED, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) as to 

Defendants Santiago James Garcia and Sacramento County be GRANTED, and this action be 

dismissed without prejudice and without further leave to amend. 

 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, either party may file written 

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's 

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in waiver of the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: November 4, 2024 

dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants”); see also 

Creech v. Tewalt, 84 F.4th 777, 787 (9th Cir. 2023) (“although sua sponte dismissals are unusual, 

they are permitted under our precedent”); Qin Zhang v. Google, Inc., 609 Fed. App’x. 459, 460 

(9th Cir. 2015) (“The district court properly dismissed Zhang’s federal claims sua sponte for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”). 

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