Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-05295/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-05295-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No.: 5:15-cv-05295-EJD

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

TOUFIC JISSER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF PALO ALTO,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:15-cv-05295-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 20

Plaintiffs Toufic and Eva Jisser and the Toufic and Eva Jisser Revocable Trust 

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the 

City of Palo Alto (“City”). Plaintiffs allege that the City’s Mobilehome Park Conversion 

Ordinance (“the Ordinance”) is unconstitutional as applied to them. Specifically, Plaintiffs 

contend that the Ordinance (1) imposes an unconstitutional condition on the their property rights; 

(2) violates the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and (3) violates California’s 

Mobilehome Residency Law. Pl. Opp. to Def. Mot. to Dismiss (“Opp.”) at 1, Docket Item No. 26. 

Presently before the Court is the City’s Motion to Dismiss under rules 12(b)(1) and 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Def. Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot”), Dkt. No. 20. 

After carefully considering the parties’ pleadings, the Court finds that Plaintiffs claims are not ripe 

for adjudication. Accordingly, the City’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Regulatory Overview 

i. California’s Mobilehome Residency Law 

California’s Mobilehome Residency Law limits the circumstances under which a 

mobilehome park owner may terminate tenancies. See Cal. Civ. Code § 798.56. If a park owner 

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seeks to close or convert the property for another use, he or she must meet certain conditions set 

forth under the Residency Law, including submitting a report that addresses the impact of the 

proposed closure on the displaced residents. Cal. Gov’t Code § 65863.7. A local legislative body,

or its delegated agency, may also require the park owner “to take steps to mitigate any adverse 

impact of the conversion” on the displaced residents. § 65863.7(e). Any mitigating steps imposed

by the local entity “shall not exceed the reasonable costs of relocation.” Id. 

ii. Palo Alto’s Mobilehome Park Conversion Ordinance

The City of Palo Alto adopted its Mobilehome Park Conversion Ordinance in 2001,

codified at Chapter 9.76 of the Palo Alto Municipal Code (“PAMC”).

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 In accordance with 

California’s Mobilehome Residency Law, the Ordinance sets forth the procedures through which a 

mobilehome park owner may seek approval to close the park. Specifically, the Ordinance requires 

a park owner to submit an application to convert the park, supported by a “Relocation Impact 

Report.” PAMC § 9.76.030. The Impact Report must include, inter alia, a proposal of measures 

to be taken by the park owner to mitigate adverse impacts of the park closure on residents. Id. 

Once the required application documents are submitted, the City holds a hearing to determine 

whether the proposed measures are sufficient. PAMC 9.76.040(g). “The hearing officer shall 

approve the application on the condition that the mitigation measures proposed by the park owner 

are adequate to mitigate the adverse impacts on the displaced residents and may condition the 

approval on additional conditions,” as set forth in the Ordinance, provided that the conditions do 

not exceed the reasonable costs of relocation. PAMC § 9.76.040(g).

If the City approves the closure of the park, the property owner is then required to return a 

“Certificate of Acceptance” form, finalizing the City’s decision. PAMC 9.76.050. Alternatively, 

if the property owner is dissatisfied with the City’s decision or otherwise disputes the outcome of 

the hearing, he or she may appeal the ruling to the city council. PAMC § 9.76.060. (“Any 

aggrieved person may appeal the hearing officer’s decision to the city council” pursuant to 

 

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Pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 201, the City’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) is 

GRANTED to the extent referenced in this Order. Dkt. Nos. 25-1, 25-2.

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procedures set forth in the PAMC). 

B. The Buena Vista Mobilehome Park and the Jisser Family

The Buena Vista Mobilehome Park (“Buena Vista”) has been in operation since the 1950s 

and is presently the only mobilehome park in the City of Palo Alto. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21. The Jisser 

Family has owned Buena Vista since 1986. Compl. ¶ 9. In November 2012, Plaintiffs applied to 

close Buena Vista, and submitted five Relocation Impact Reports between May 2013 and 

February 2014 pursuant to the Ordinance. Compl. ¶¶ 45, 46. The City accepted Plaintiffs’ final 

Impact Report on February 20, 2014. Compl. ¶ 47.

The City then held hearings on Plaintiffs’ application in May 2014 and issued a decision

provisionally approving the closure of Buena Vista on September 30, 2014. Compl. ¶¶ 49-50. The 

decision conditioned the closure on the Jissers’ paying “enhanced relocation assistance benefits,” 

which include: (a) the purchase of each mobilehome in the park for an amount equal to 100% of 

the on-site value of the mobilehome; (b) rent subsidies and start-up costs in the form of a lump 

sum payment equal to 100% of the difference between average rents for apartments in Palo Alto 

and surrounding cities and the average rents for spaces in Buena Vista, for a period of 12 months; 

and (c) reasonable moving costs, including first and last months’ rent plus a security deposit. 

Compl. ¶ 50. Plaintiffs estimate that compliance with these conditions will cost approximately $8 

million. Compl. ¶ 54.

Plaintiffs did not file an administrative appeal of the City’s decision with the city council. 

See Opp. at 8-11; Mot. at 7; Compl. ¶¶ 51-53. However, the Buena Vista residents did, arguing

that the compensation provided for by the decision was insufficient to mitigate the impact of the 

displacement. Compl. ¶ 51. The city council denied the residents’ administrative appeal and 

issued a final decision approving the closure of Buena Vista pursuant to aforementioned 

conditions on May 26, 2015. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 53. The Jissers then filed a duly-executed 

“Certificate of Acceptance” of the City’s decision on August 31, 2015. Opp. at 4; Def. RJN, 

Exh. D; Dkt. No. 25-4. 

Following the denial of their administrative appeal, the Buena Vista Residents Association

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filed a complaint in state court to invalidate the City’s approval of the park closure. Def. RJN, 

Exh. C. In contrast, Plaintiffs did not seek any form of judicial relief from the City’s decision in 

state court. See Opp. at 8-11; Mot. at 7; Compl. ¶¶ 51-53. 

Rather, Plaintiffs filed the instant action in federal court, alleging that the conditions 

imposed by the City’s decision - namely, the required payment of enhanced relocation assistance 

benefits - violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Compl. ¶¶ 65, 70-100. Plaintiffs’ 

alleged that the City applied its tenant relocation ordinance to Buena Vista in a manner that causes 

a taking. Compl. ¶¶ 3-5. However, Plaintiffs do not seek compensation for the taking, but instead 

ask this court to invalidate the City’s decision approving the closure. Compl. ¶¶ 87, 89, 105.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 

The burden of establishing ripeness and standing rests on the party asserting the claim. 

Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges subject matter 

jurisdiction and may be either facial or factual. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th 

Cir.2004). A facial 12(b)(1) motion involves an inquiry confined to the allegations in the 

complaint, whereas a factual 12(b)(1) motion permits the court to look beyond the complaint to 

extrinsic evidence. Id. When a defendant makes a facial challenge, all material allegations in the 

complaint are assumed true, and the court must determine whether lack of federal jurisdiction 

appears from the face of the complaint itself. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. General Tel. Elec., 594 F.2d 

730, 733 (9th Cir.1979). 

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient 

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). 

Although particular detail is not generally necessary, the factual allegations “must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level” such that the claim “is plausible on its face.” Id.

at 556-57. A complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to 

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state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal of a claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); see Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 

(9th Cir. 2008).

When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court generally “may not consider 

any material beyond the pleadings.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 

1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the court may consider material submitted as part of 

the complaint or relied upon in the complaint, and may also consider material subject to judicial 

notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). In the event that a 

motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless the court determines that 

the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the 

deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting 

Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

III. DISCUSSION

The City moves to dismiss this action on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ purported as-applied 

claims actually assert a facial challenge to the Palo Alto Ordinance, which it contends is time 

barred.

2

 Mot. at 9. However, the City also maintains that even if the claims are construed as “asapplied” claims, Plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action fail because Plaintiffs neglected to 

first seek any of the numerous state remedies available to them, rendering their claims unripe and 

depriving them of the opportunity to seek relief in this Court. Mot. at 13-14.

 

2 A facial takings claim accrues when the challenged legislation is adopted. See Guggenheim v. 

City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the Ordinance was adopted by the City 

in 2001. Compl. ¶ 10. Because Plaintiffs owned Buena Vista in 2001, that is when they became 

subject to the Ordinance and therefore when any potential facial claim accrued. See Compl. ¶¶ 9-

10. Plaintiffs filed this suit on November 19, 2015. Accordingly, the Court agrees that a facial 

challenge would be time barred pursuant to the statute of limitations. See Canatella v. Van De 

Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1). In any 

event, Plaintiffs’ pleadings, as well as their representations at the hearing held on May 26, 2016, 

maintain that they only assert as-applied claims. 

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Because ripeness is a dispositive issue, it must be addressed first. See Ventura 

Mobilehome Communities Owners Ass’n v. City of San Buenaventura, 371 F.3d 1046, 1051-52 

(9th Cir. 2004) (“In determining whether takings claims are properly before the court, we first 

determine whether the claim is ripe and then determine whether the claim is barred by a statute of 

limitations.”). Accordingly, as an initial matter, the Court will assume without deciding that 

Plaintiffs’ takings claims present an as-applied challenge to the City’s Ordinance. 

A. Plaintiffs’ As-Applied Takings Claims Are Not Ripe

In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,

the Supreme Court outlined a two-step inquiry to determine whether a takings claim is ripe for 

adjudication in federal court. 473 U.S. 172, 194-195 (1985). Under Williamson, a claim is not 

ripe until (1) the government entity charged with implementing the challenged regulation reaches

a final decision on the regulation’s application to the property at issue (the “finality” requirement);

and (2) the property owner seeks compensation through the available state procedures, unless they 

can show that doing so would be futile (the “exhaustion” requirement). Id. 

The City argues that Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment takings claims are barred under the 

Williamson exhaustion requirement because Plaintiffs failed to seek relief through readily 

available state procedures.3 Mot. at 14-15. Specifically, the City suggests that Plaintiffs had a

number of potential remedies available to them, including seeking a petition for a writ of mandate, 

filing a complaint for declaratory or injunctive relief, or bringing an inverse condemnation claim 

in state court. See Mot. at 7. In response, Plaintiffs argue that (1) the Williamson doctrine does 

not apply in money takings cases; and (2) exhaustion is only required in taking cases that seek

“just compensation.” Opp. at 10-11. Plaintiffs’ position is legally unpersuasive. 

 

3

The City also raises some dispute as to whether the first prong of the Williamson ripeness 

inquiry - the finality requirement - was satisfied in this case. See Mot. at 18. However, the City 

issued a final decision approving Plaintiffs’ conversion application, which contained express 

conditions regarding how the Ordinance was to be applied to the Buena Vista property. See

Compl. ¶¶49-54. Moreover, as the City points out, following the approval Plaintiffs were free to 

seek administrative or state judicial review of the decision, suggesting at least some degree of 

finality. See Mot. at 7. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that the finality requirement was met 

here and will focus the remainder of the ripeness discussion on the issue of exhaustion. 

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First, the suggestion that Williamson is inapplicable in a money takings case 

misunderstands the underlying purpose of the ripeness inquiry. Exhaustion in a takings case is 

premised on the notion that a state must be afforded the opportunity to address the harm allegedly 

caused by the state action before a federal court can determine if an unconstitutional taking has 

occurred. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 409 (9th Cir. 1996). This 

justification holds true regardless of whether the action burdens real property or imposes a 

condition requiring the transfer of money. If state procedures offer a potential remedy to 

landowners - either by paying just compensation for the taking or by modifying the burdensome 

condition - the state remedy must be pursued before a federal claim is ripe. 

Plaintiffs’ second argument is equally unconvincing. The fact that Plaintiffs do not seek 

monetary compensation does not mean that they are exempt from the Williamson requirements. 

In support of this argument, Plaintiffs rely on cases that address facial takings claims, despite 

purportedly alleging only as-applied takings claims. Levin v. City & County of San Francisco, 71 

F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (asserting a facial challenge to a San Francisco rent 

control ordinance); San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (bringing both facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of an amendment 

to a hotel conversion ordinance); Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 521 (1998) (seeking 

a declaratory judgment that the Coal Act was unconstitutional on its face). The rationale for 

excepting facial challenges from the Williamson exhaustion requirement cannot be co-opted, as 

Plaintiffs suggest, to support the same exception for as-applied challenges just because 

compensation is not the requested remedy. 

For example, in Levin, the district court explained that “facial takings claims were 

instantly ripe ‘by their nature’ because they ‘requested relief distinct from the provision of just 

compensation.’” 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1079 (quoting San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 

545 U.S. 323, 345–46 (2005)). But unlike facial claims, as-applied claims, by definition, 

challenge the specific application of an ordinance, allowing for the possibility that the ordinance 

could be constitutional under different circumstances. It follows that an as-applied claim is 

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therefore not “instantly ripe” at the time the ordinance is enacted, but rather may become ripe if 

the state denies the property owner relief to which he or she is entitled. In essence, “it is the scope 

of the constitutional challenge,” not the remedy sought, that is relevant for exhaustion purposes. 

Cedar Point Nursery v. Gould, No. 116-cv-00185-LJOBAM, 2016 WL 1559271, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 

Apr. 18, 2016) (rejecting a similar contention that Williamson only applies to claims for “just 

compensation,” calling that argument “a red herring.”). 

Accordingly, although exceptions to Williamson may be justified in the context of a facial

takings challenge, the same cannot be said for as-applied claims. See Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 

1117 (explaining that “as-applied challenges always require Williamson exhaustion,” while facial 

challenges “sometimes” do and sometimes do not); Sinclair Oil, 96 F.3d at 405 (same); Hacienda 

Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that asapplied challenges must meet both prongs of the Williamson ripeness analysis). Here, Plaintiffs 

allege only as-applied claims. Therefore, they are subject to both the finality and exhaustion 

requirement. Failure to exhaust an as-applied takings challenge in state court is grounds for 

dismissal in federal court. Ventura Mobilehome Communities, 371 F.3d at 1052 (affirming that 

because the only cognizable claim asserted was an as-applied challenge, the claim was properly 

dismissed as unripe). It is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not pursue any remedy through the state 

procedures. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action are not 

ripe for adjudication.

B. Prudential Considerations Do Not Warrant Exception to the Ripeness 

Requirement 

Plaintiffs also argue that even if the Court finds that exhaustion is required under 

Williamson, the Court should “use its prudential discretion to decline to apply the rule in this 

case.” Opp. at 10-11. The Ninth Circuit instructs that the Williamson ripeness requirement is 

“prudential rather than jurisdictional.” Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1118. However, in Guggenheim, 

the Ninth Circuit’s decision to exercise this prudential discretion over an otherwise unripe claim 

was based on case specific concerns of practicality and efficiency. Namely, because the court

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rejected the plaintiff’s claims on the merits, it reasoned that enforcing the exhaustion requirement 

“would be a waste of the parties’ and the courts’ resources.” Id. No such considerations are 

present here. Consequently, the Court will not exercise its discretion to waive the exhaustion 

requirement.

IV. ORDER

Finding Plaintiffs’ claims unripe for adjudication, the Court hereby GRANTS the City’s 

Motion to Dismiss as to the first and second cause of action. 

Having granted the City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ two federal question claims, the 

Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the third cause of action alleging 

violation of California’s Mobilehome Residency Law. See 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3); Sanford v. 

MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (concluding that where 

“all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the 

pendent jurisdiction doctrine ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the 

remaining state-law claims.” ). Accordingly, the third cause of action is also dismissed.

An unripe claim cannot become ripe if the statute of limitations for the state court action 

has expired. See Daniel v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 379, 182 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding 

that an unconstitutional exaction claim seeking injunctive relief was barred by the plaintiff’s 

failure to file a timely state court action). Here, Plaintiffs did not pursue any action through the 

available state procedures within the 90-day limitations period. PAMC § 9.76.140. Because there 

is no means by which Plaintiffs claims can become ripe, the Court finds that further amendment to 

the pleadings “could not possibly cure the deficiency.” See DeSoto, 957 F.2d at 658. 

The City’s Motion is therefore granted WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Judgment will 

be entered in favor of the City and the Clerk shall close this file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 24, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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