Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03010/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-03010-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LORENA L. MEYER,

Petitioner,

 v.

KAREN LITZENBERG, et al.,

Respondents. /

No. C 16-03010 WHA

ORDER DENYING 

MOTION FOR RELIEF 

FROM JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, moves for relief from judgment against her following

dismissal of her petition for injunctive relief (Dkt. No. 54). Petitioner’s motion is DENIED.

STATEMENT

Petitioner Lorena Meyer initiated these proceedings by bringing a “Petition for Court to

Utilize Jurisdiction Pursuant to All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651” — which she insisted was

“not a lawsuit” (Dkt. No. 32) — to challenge deductions and levies on her retirement benefits

(Dkt. No. 1). After full briefing and oral argument, the Court granted respondents’ motions to

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the All Writs Act. And, in any case, the

Tax Injunction Act barred the petition insofar as it sought judicial intervention in the California

Franchise Tax Board’s levying activities (Dkt. No. 54). 

Case 3:16-cv-03010-WHA Document 73 Filed 12/30/16 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Petitioner explains she mailed the same motion twice “to ensure [it] is filed because it wasn’t the last

time she checked” (Dkt. No. 64). In light of this explanation, and since the two documents seem identical, this

order references only the more recent filing (ibid.).

2

 Petitioner explains that she again filed the same document twice after her initial attempt did not

appear quickly enough on the Court’s docket (Dkt. No. 69). Again, in light of this explanation and the identical

contents of the two filings, this order references only the more recent filing (ibid.).

2

Petitioner then (twice) filed a document titled (Dkt. Nos. 63–64):1

MOTION TO RELIEVE A PARTY FROM A FINAL

JUDGMENT, ORDER, OR PROCEEDING FOR ANY REASON,

INCLUDING EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES AND

ECONOMIC LOSSES SUFFERED BY PETITIONER THAT

JUSTIFY RELIEF FROM THE OPERATION OF THE

JUDGMENT, PURSUANT TO F.R.Civ.P., RULE 59(e) AND/OR

RULE 60(b), and any other appropriate Rules and Laws.

Two groups of respondents filed oppositions (Dkt. Nos. 65–66), and petitioner filed a

reply (Dkt. No. 67). Petitioner then (twice) filed another document titled (Dkt. Nos. 68–69):2

AMENDMENT OF PLEADING AS A MATTER OF COURSE,

OR WITH COURT’S LEAVE TO AMEND. (FRCivP, RULE 15)

Despite this title, the footer of the document identified it as “Petitioner’s Amendment to

Reply to Respondent’s [sic] Opposition.” Additionally, petitioner explained in the document

that “after [she] rushed to get her reply finished and in the mail to the Court, she realized she

made some errors in her reply that need to be corrected and/or amended and that is the purpose

of this current particular document [she] is currently writing” (Dkt. No. 69 at 2). 

Soon after, petitioner filed another document titled “REPLACEMENT,” which stated

(Dkt. No. 70) (emphasis added):

Petitioner found Document #67 unintelligible when she retrieved a

copy from PACER and it appears Document #67 was defaced

when it was electronically scanned, copied, or otherwise entered

into PACER by some other means. This has previously occurred

and the Court may need to examine a legible copy of “Petitioner’s

Reply to Respondent’s [sic] Oppositions,” even though Petitioner

since mailed an [sic] Rule 15 Amendment to the Court to correct

the described “PETITIONER’S REPLY TO THE RESPONDENTS’

OPPOSITIONS,” and other mistakes.

Defendants then protested petitioner’s multiple improper filings (Dkt. No. 71), and

petitioner responded by filing yet another document titled (Dkt. No. 72):

Case 3:16-cv-03010-WHA Document 73 Filed 12/30/16 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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REBUTTAL TO RESPONDENTS’ OBJECTION TO

PETITIONER’S AMENDMENT TO MOTION TO RELIEVE A

PARTY FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT.

Notwithstanding petitioner’s citation to Rule 15, and given the substantive contents of

her many post-judgment filings, this order liberally construes said filings as supporting

petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment against her following dismissal of her petition. 

And, since petitioner seems to indicate docket number 69 is her strongest reply in support of her

motion, this order construes docket numbers 64 and 69 as her operative motion and reply,

respectively. The Court has also reviewed petitioner’s other post-judgment filings, but nothing

therein alters the outcome of this order.

ANALYSIS

1. LEGAL STANDARDS.

Petitioner’s motion is based on FRCP 59(e) and 60(b). “Under Rule 59(e), it is

appropriate to alter or amend a judgment if (1) the district court is presented with newly

discovered evidence, (2) the district court committed clear error or made an initial decision that

was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in controlling law.” United Nat’l

Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). 

This is “an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron,

634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (same). Rule 59(e) “may not be used to relitigate old

matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry

of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (same). 

Under Rule 60(b), “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment” for certain

reasons, including “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” “newly discovered

evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a

new trial under Rule 59(b),” “fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing

party,” or “any other reason that justifies relief.” The last reason “is available only where

extraordinary circumstances prevented a litigant from seeking earlier, more timely relief.” 

Johnson v. CFS II, Inc., 628 F. App’x 505, 505 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Alpine

Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)).

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2. PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS.

Petitioner’s motion identifies no “newly discovered evidence” or “intervening change in

controlling law.” Her briefing mostly attempts to “relitigate old matters” by rehashing

previously rejected arguments. To the extent petitioner raises new arguments, they are

arguments “that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Petitioner identifies no

other basis under Rule 59(e) for altering or amending the judgment against her. Thus, Rule

59(e) does not support her motion. See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 485 n.5.

Petitioner’s alternative basis for this motion is Rule 60(b) — despite her repeated

complaints that respondents and the Court “inaccurately” construed her prior citations to Rule

60 in general as relying on Rule 60(b) instead of Rule 60(d) (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 64 at 6). Again,

the motion identifies no “newly discovered evidence.” Nor does it allege fraud,

misrepresentation, or misconduct by any respondent in this case, or any other circumstance

justifying relief from the judgment against her. Thus, Rule 60(b) does not support her motion.

It bears mentioning that petitioner seems to have abandoned her petition under the All

Writs Act and now attempts to cure its deficiencies by recasting it as based on Rule 60(d)

instead (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 64 at 4, 69 at 3 (petitioner claims she “cited the All Writs Act to

supplement the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to conduct a Rule 60(d) investigate [sic] the fraud

on the Court”)). Rule 60(d), however, provides no better basis for this action. To be clear, and

as stated in the previous order dismissing the petition, no part of Rule 60 confers subject-matter

jurisdiction (see Dkt. No. 54 at 3). See In re Hunter, 66 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Moreover, unlike Rule 60(b)(3), which permits the Court to “relieve a party . . . from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding” for “fraud . . . by an opposing party” (emphasis added), Rule

60(d)(3) only preserves the Court’s power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court”

(emphasis added) — a distinct species of fraud that must be shown by clear and convincing

evidence and typically does not arise from “[m]ere nondisclosure of evidence,” “perjury by a

party or witness,” or other mere fraud “connected with the presentation of a case to a court.” 

United States v. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 443–44 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Petitioner could perhaps have invoked Rule 60(d)(3) to challenge the judgment in her

previous lawsuit from 2012, based on “fraud on the court” that she claims a respondent

committed in that case (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 at 5–9). See Meyer v. Matteucci, No.

3:12-cv-00734-WHA. But she did not do so (and in no way does this order suggest that such a

motion would have any merit). Instead, she filed a new petition asking this Court to “restrain

the FTB from imposing any more levies on Petitioner’s bank account, prohibit CalPERS from

deducting any more money from Petitioner’s retirement benefits payments, . . . mandate

CalPERS to reimburse and refund all the money CalPERS deducted thus far from Petitioner’s

retirement, and mandate [Napa State Hospital] to verify [petitioner’s] W2 forms” (Dkt. No. 1 at

3–4, 12–13). Rule 60(d) has no application to such requests for relief. Petitioner asserted this

action — however she describes it (see Dkt. No. 32) — against respondents who were not

parties to the 2012 lawsuit, and the gravamen of the action is an attempt to thwart deductions

and levies imposed after the 2012 lawsuit ended. There is simply no way to salvage this

petition by reconstructing it under the auspices of Rule 60(d). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s motion is DENIED. Please, no further motions for

reconsideration will be entertained. Petitioner’s next recourse is to the Court of Appeals.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 30, 2016. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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