Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00008/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00008-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

LESLIE RENEE CHILDERS, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Case No. 2:15-cv-8-MHT-WC 

 ) 

JOHN HOLLIS JACKSON, III, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF 

THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the court is Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1). On January 9, 2015, the 

District Judge entered an Order referring this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge 

“for consideration and disposition or recommendation on all pretrial proceedings as may 

be appropriate.” Order (Doc. 6). Plaintiff requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 

Mot. (Doc. 2), which the court granted. Order (Doc. 8). Thus, the court is obligated to 

undertake review of his complaint pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

That statute instructs the court to dismiss any action wherein it is determined that an in 

forma pauperis applicant’s suit is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 

immune from such relief.” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

Upon review of the Complaint and Plaintiff’s “motion to amend,” the court finds 

that this case is due to be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii) 

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because it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted and seeks monetary relief 

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

I. BACKGROUND

On January 7, 2015, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint alleging a 

violation of her civil rights and named John Hollis Jackson, III, as the defendant. Compl. 

(Doc. 1). The following allegations encompass the entirety of the factual basis provided 

in Plaintiff’s Complaint: 

I went to court 9/30/2014 I challenge Jurisdiction. No probation violation 

at all I was Free to go home. I went the court with my husband on 

10/14/2014 to support him. I was Illegally served papers and was made to 

sign and attend in one moment. Wasn’t prepared For court and was jail 

Illegally For 30 days without proof of Jurisdiction on 9/30/2014 

Constitutional rights violation of 14th amendment. Due process is a 

Fundamental right to citizen. 

Id. at 1. Plaintiff sought relief of $1,000,000.00. Id. at 2.

On January 23, 2015, the court entered an Order (Doc. 8) granting Plaintiff leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis and staying service of process pending review under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915. Concerned about Plaintiff’s ability to state a claim on these facts, the 

court explained as follows: 

The court is unable to discern the precise factual circumstances with 

which Plaintiff is aggrieved. Plaintiff fails to state any actions attributable 

to Defendant, or any individual for that matter, and how those actions 

somehow constitute “constitutional violations of [the] 14th amendment.” 

Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to satisfy the state action 

requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Order (Doc. 8) at 2. “Given the omission of relevant factual data and governing law, and 

the confusing presentation of the facts,” the court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended 

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complaint that complies with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 3. 

Additionally, Plaintiff was “warned that her failure to amend will result in this court’s 

recommendation that this case be dismissed.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

In response to the court’s order, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Amend (Change of 

Course),” (Doc. 10), wherein Plaintiff states as follows: 

I Leslie Childers request a motion to AMEND the course of this case. The 

title of Defendant be changed from John Hollis Jackson III Municpal [sic] 

Judge to (person) John Hollis Jackson III for The violations of U.S. 

Constitution 5th Amendment and (Equal Protection clause) Civil Rights 

Due process of Law. Mistake was made by myself (pro se) unintentionally 

and request the change of course to properly identify the Defendant in this 

case. Compensatory damages (pain and suffering, emotional distress 

monetary relief $1,000,000.00. 

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURES 

TITLE III 

PLEADING and Motions 

15(c)(1)(i) and (ii) 

 

Mot. (Doc. 10) at 1. Additionally, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Evidence,” which 

stated as follows: 

I Leslie Childers is submitting evidence on the case #2:15-cv-00008-MHTWC. I Leslie Childers has Filed the documents enclosed into Courts 

records to provide evidence most important in this matter. I request at this 

time that this court document[.] 

(Doc. 11) at 1. Plaintiff attached a three-page document titled “Demand for Violation of 

Subscribed Oath of Office,” that she filed in the Municipal Court of Clanton, Alabama. 

(Doc. 11-1) at 1. The state court motion provides this court no insight into what 

unconstitutional actions Defendant is alleged to have taken. Rather, Plaintiff simply 

asserts that Defendant has violated his oath of office and demands that he produce a copy 

of said oath. Id. at 1-2. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

Upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1), read in conjunction with Plaintiff’s 

other filings, as best the court can discern, Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000.00 from John Hollis 

Jackson, III, a municipal court judge in Clanton, Alabama, for an alleged violation of 

Plaintiff’s due process rights. Even upon a very liberal construction of Plaintiff’s 

pleadings,1

 the court finds that this case is due to be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted and because she seeks monetary relief 

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

Based on the confusing presentation of the minimal facts included in Plaintiff’s 

filings, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. As the court previously explained to Plaintiff, 

 Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a 

plaintiff file a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading 

standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ 

but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Although district courts 

must apply a “less stringent standard” to the pleadings submitted by a pro 

se plaintiff, a pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and 

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. With regard to any claim predicated 

upon some type of civil rights violation, Plaintiff has thus far simply failed 

to allege sufficient factual detail to support a plausible claim for relief. 

                                                            

1

 “In the case of a pro se action . . . the court should construe the complaint more liberally than it would 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990). “While a 

complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, ‘a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of 

his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a 

cause of action’s elements will not do.’” Simpson v. Zwinge, 2013 WL 5340509, at *1 (11th Cir. Sept. 

25, 2013) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

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Order (Doc. 8) at 2-3. Plaintiff’s “Motion to Amend” does not provide the court with any 

additional factual detail, other than clarifying that Defendant is a municipal judge. Mot. 

(Doc. 10) at 1. Based on the lack of available facts, the court cannot find that Plaintiff 

has stated a claim showing that she is entitled to relief. 

Additionally, despite Plaintiff’s request that Defendant be identified as a “person” 

rather than a judge, it appears to the court that Plaintiff seeks money damages from a 

judicial defendant for acts performed in his judicial capacity. The law is clear that 

judicial defendants are immune from such suits for money damages. Mireles v. Waco, 

502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991). Plaintiff seeks “$1,000,000.00 total damages” from Judge Hollis 

for, as best the court can discern, his actions or inactions that resulted in Plaintiff’s 

alleged unconstitutional detention. (Doc. 1) at 1. Thus, Defendant Hollis is absolutely 

immune from monetary damages, as claimed by Plaintiff, for his actions or inactions 

performed in his official capacity as judge. 

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant for some nonjudicial action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff still fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. 

To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, 

respondents must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation 

was committed under color of state law. Like the state-action requirement 

of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of § 

1983 excludes from its reach “‘merely private conduct, no matter how 

discriminatory or wrongful,’” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S. 

Ct. 2777, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1982) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 

13, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948)). 

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Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). Here, if Plaintiff were 

suing Defendant for behavior outside the scope of his judicial immunity, he would be a 

private, non-state actor who was not acting under color of state law. Accordingly, she 

would still fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s suit is due to be dismissed as it fails to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted and seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 

III. CONCLUSION

 For all of the reasons given above, it is 

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 10) is DENIED as frivolous; 

Plaintiff cannot bypass judicial immunity on the part of Defendant, a judge who appears 

to have been acting in his judicial capacity, by moving the court to change “the title of 

Defendant” “from John Hollis Jackson, III Municipal Judge to (person) John Hollis 

Jackson, III.” Mot. (Doc. 10) at 1. 

Further, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s 

complaint be DISMISSED prior to service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

Further, it is 

 ORDERED that Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before June 3, 2015. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is 

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

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District Court. Plaintiff is advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the 

court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

(5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

 Done this 20th day of May, 2015. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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