Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-01516/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-01516-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 03cv1516

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLOYD H. NELSON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 03cv1516 JM(RBB)

ORDER DENYING MOTION

 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND TO

FILE THIRD AMENDED

COMPLAINT

vs.

R. STANIFER,

Defendant.

Defendant R. Stanifer moves for summary judgment on all claims alleged in Plaintiff Floyd H.

Nelson’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Plaintiff Floyd H. Nelson (“Nelson”) opposes the

motion for summary judgment and separately moves for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint

(“TAC”) to remove the requests for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. Defendant opposes

the motion to amend the complaint and did not file a reply brief to Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion

for summary judgment. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), this matter is appropriate for decision

without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the motion for summary

judgment and denies Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. The SAC alleges that

Defendant, the Senior Hearing Officer at Centinela State Prison, denied him his due process rights to

call witnesses and present documentary evidence at the time of the September 11, 2002 disciplinary

/ / / 

Case 3:03-cv-01516-JLS-RBB Document 68 Filed 01/22/07 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 03cv1516

hearing in violation of his due process rights. He also alleges that Stanifer retaliated against him

because he had filed two previous inmate complaints against Stanifer. (SAC ¶2). 

Prior to the September 11, 2002 disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff filed two previous Form 602

appeals involving Stanifer. On June 9, 2002, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal challenging Defendant’s

opposition to Plaintiff’s release to the general inmate population. Plaintiff learned that Stanifer had

falsely accused him of being a member of the Black Guerrilla Family (“BGF”). (SAC ¶6). Ultimately,

on June 16, 2002 Plaintiff withdrew this inmate appeal when he was released into the general prison

population. (SAC ¶7). On June 17, 2002 Plaintiff filed another inmate appeal against Defendant

alleging that he displayed a 8" X 10" photograph of Plaintiff identifying him as a BGF gang member

on the wall of his office for viewing by other inmates. (SAC ¶8). On September 7, 2002 Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant made a statement to Plaintiff that the “filing of 602s (inmate appeals) against

me (R. Stanifer) will come back to haunt you (Plaintiff) and do more harm to you than good.” (SAC

¶9). 

By way of further background to the disciplinary hearing, on December 11, 2001 Plaintiff was

involved in an altercation with another inmate at the yard at Corcoran State Prison. (Stanifer Decl.

¶6). Plaintiff was found guilty of mutual combat at that hearing. The Investigative Report sets forth

the details of the altercation. (Stanifer Decl., Exh. B). Upon Plaintiff’s transfer to Centinela State

prison, Plaintiff was granted a new hearing, scheduled for September 11, 2002. (Stanifer Decl. ¶5).

Prior to the start of the September 11, 2002 hearing, Plaintiff alleges that Stanifer made further

comments of retaliation at the time of the disciplinary hearing. Defendant allegedly told Plaintiff

“Remember what I told you the other day about filing 602s against me?,” “you are now in my court,”

“you knew better than to file 602s against me, and “I will demonstrate to you the extent of my

authority and the consequences for filing 602s against me.” (SAC ¶12). Plaintiff allegedly informed

Stanifer that “he was not prepared to proceed with the hearing and attempted to provide defendant

Stanifer with a three page document outlining the inadequacies of the investigative employee (IE)

report submitted by L. Boos Emma and the evidence needed by Plaintiff to present in defense and/or

mitigation of the charge.” (SAC ¶12). Plaintiff alleges that he agreed to sign a waiver of the presence

of previously requested witnesses at the insistence of Stanifer. “Despite Plaintiff informing defendant

Case 3:03-cv-01516-JLS-RBB Document 68 Filed 01/22/07 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 03cv1516

R. Stanifer that he was not prepared to proceed, the disciplinary hearing was held.” Id. Stanifer would

not accept the three page document and Plaintiff alleges that such conduct was in retaliation for

Plaintiff’s previous filing of inmate complaints. (SAC ¶14). Plaintiff alleges that “the finding of

guilty [of mutual combat] came as a direct result of defendant R. Stanifer’s failure and refusal to

consider and review the three page document.” (SAC ¶15). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Stanifer’s

conduct in denying him the right to present evidence at the time of the evidentiary hearing violated

his due process rights. 

On July 28, 2003 Plaintiff filed the original complaint naming 47 Defendants. On October 7,

2003 the court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis but dismissed the complaint

without prejudice for failure to state a claim. On November 20, 2003 Plaintiff filed a First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”), adding six new Defendants. On February 10, 2004 the court dismissed the FAC

without prejudice. The SAC only names Stanifer and, on May14, 2004 the court concluded that the

SAC survived the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A with respect to the

retaliation claim against Defendant Stanifer. Defendant timely answered the complaint and now

moves for summary judgment on this claim.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where “there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.

56(c); British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.

981 (1979). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its

motion and identifying those portions of the file which it believes demonstrates the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). There is “no

express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or

other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Id. (emphasis in original). The opposing party

cannot rest on the mere allegations or denials of a pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and

by [the party’s] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct.

Case 3:03-cv-01516-JLS-RBB Document 68 Filed 01/22/07 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 03cv1516

At 2553 (citation omitted). The opposing party also may not rely solely on conclusory allegations

unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Any doubt as to the existence of any issue

of material fact requires denial of the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). On a motion for summary judgment, when “‘the moving party bears the burden of proof at

trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence

were uncontroverted at trial.’” Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis

in original) (quoting International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir.

1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059 (1992)).

The Due Process Claim

The basic requirements of due process are the right to notice and the opportunity to be heard

“at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,

437 (1982). The extent and manner of determining what process is due in any given situation depends

on “(1) the private interests at stake; (2) the risk that the procedure used will lead to erroneous results

and the probable value of the suggested procedural safeguard; (3) and the governmental interest

affected.” Little v. Streeter, 452 U.S. 1 (1981); see also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335

(1976). This “balancing test” determines what the due process clause requires, even if state law or

prison regulations call for something different. Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,

541 (1985); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980).

The Supreme Court has consistently held that prisoners “may not be deprived of life, liberty,

or property without due process of law,” and has identified certain minimum procedures required by

the Due Process Clause which “insure that a state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” Wolff

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1973) (citations omitted). Prisoners facing a disciplinary

hearing are entitled to: (1) written notice of the charges at least 24 hours in advance of the hearing;

(2) a written statement indicating upon what evidence the fact finders relied and the reasons for the

disciplinary action; (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when

doing so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (4) an impartial

Case 3:03-cv-01516-JLS-RBB Document 68 Filed 01/22/07 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 03cv1516

fact finder. Id. at 564-71. Once the court has decided that these minimal procedural due process

requirements have been met, its only remaining function is to determine whether there is “some

evidence” in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.

Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). 

Stanifer moves for summary judgment on grounds that (1) Plaintiff did not suffer any

punishment or adverse consequences as a result of the disciplinary proceeding; (2) Plaintiff failed to

exhaust available administrative remedies with regard to his retaliation claim; (3) there is no evidence

to support the retaliation claim; and (4) Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. 

Adverse Consequences

As set forth in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), “there can be no due process

violation where the inmate was not subject to any discipline or loss of credits.” Stanifer contends that

Plaintiff was not punished and therefore cannot state a due process claim “because the outcome had

no affect on the duration of his sentence.” (Motion at p.6:5). Stanifer submits evidence indicating that

Plaintiff was not assessed a loss of credits or otherwise punished as a result of the disciplinary

proceeding. (Stanifer Decl. ¶16-17; Exh. A-04). As Plaintiff did not suffer any adverse consequences,

Defendant concludes that he cannot establish a due process violation under any circumstance. 

In response to this evidentiary showing, Plaintiff comes forward to create a genuine issue of

material fact. Plaintiff’s evidence indicates that, at the time of the altercation, Plaintiff held the prison

job of Chairman of the Mens Advisory Committee which entitled him to have the credit earning status

of Work Group A-1 pursuant to CCR §3043.5(a). (Plaintiff’s Exh. C). Acting in this capacity,

Plaintiff received credit against his sentence. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff’s calculation of the

earliest possible release date was April 23, 2006. (Exh. B). After the disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff

was placed in work group A-2 and no longer earned credits towards his sentence and did not receive

any credit while Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation. Plaintiff’s earliest release date was

extended to October 17, 2007 as a result of the altercation with inmate Payne. (Exh. J). Viewing this

evidence in the best light for Plaintiff, he appears to have suffered an adverse consequence thus

creating a genuine issue of material fact.

/ / / 

Case 3:03-cv-01516-JLS-RBB Document 68 Filed 01/22/07 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 03cv1516

In sum, the court finds that genuine issue of material facts prevent entry of summary judgment

in favor of Stanifer on the issue of adverse consequences.

Exhaustion

Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the retaliation claim. The Prison Litigation

Reform Act of 1995 requires prisoners seeking to bring a §1983 action to first exhaust “such

administrative remedies as are available.” 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). Stanifer contends that Plaintiff did

not exhaust his retaliation claim and therefor summary judgment is appropriate.

In order to administratively exhaust available remedies, a prisoner must pursue several levels

of appeal: (1) informed resolution; (2) formal written appeal on a CDC Form 602 inmate appeal form;

(3) second level of appeal to the institution head of designee; and (4) third level appeal to the Director

of the California Department of Corrections. Barry v. Ratelle, 955 F.Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal.

1997). Stanifer argues that Plaintiff did not adequately allege in the Form 602s that he was alleging

retaliation by Stanifer as a substantial or motivating factor behind the decision to bar witnesses and

documentary evidence at the time of the disciplinary proceeding. (Motion at p.10:3-6). 

Plaintiff argues that he should be excused from completely exhausting the retaliation claim or,

alternatively, the other exhausted claims alleging the same due process violations adequately placed

Defendant on notice of this claim. Plaintiff comes forward with evidence to show that he filed an

inmate appeal Form 602 with respect to the retaliation claim on September 15, 2002. The Form 602

alleges that Stanifer retaliated against him because of the previous Form 602s filed by Plaintiff.

(Plaintiff’s Exh. A1). However, Plaintiff does not produce any evidence that he pursued that appeal

through the second or third levels of appeal. Plaintiff represents that he timely submitted the

retaliation Form 602 on September 15, 2002 but “it became lost while in the sole possession of CEN

prison officials.” (Oppo. at p. 15:9-10; Stanifer Decl. ¶53). In support of his claim that he submitted

a Form 602, Plaintiff submits a June 19, 2003 request for interview form indicating that he desired to

interview prison officials to determine the status of his Form 602. (Plaintiff’s Exhs. K1, L1.).

Plaintiff also represents that three inmates observed him submit the Form 602 into the prison drop box,

but that he has been unable to obtain declarations from these individuals to substantiate his claim.

/ / / 

Case 3:03-cv-01516-JLS-RBB Document 68 Filed 01/22/07 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 03cv1516

In light of the evidence presented by Plaintiff, the court concludes that there is a genuine issue

of material fact whether Plaintiff exhausted available remedies. 

The Merits

Plaintiff claims that his due process rights were violated when (1) he was denied the

opportunity to submit documentary evidence at the time of the hearing and (2) Stanifer retaliated

against him for having previously filed Form 602s by refusing to allow him to call witnesses and

present documentary evidence. In order to establish a claim for retaliation, “the inmate has the burden

of showing that retaliation was the substantial or motivating factor behind the conduct of the prison

official and that the alleged retaliatory acts did not advance the legitimate goals of the institution or

were not narrowly tailored to achieve such goals.” Torricellas v. Pool, 954 f. Supp. 1405, (C.D. Cal.

1997). Defendant contends that there is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that Plaintiff was

denied the opportunity to present witnesses or documentary evidence at the time of the hearing. In

support of this argument, Defendant submits a CDC 115 Form wherein Plaintiff signed the form

indicating that he waived the presence of the reporting employee and previously requested witnesses.

(Stanifer Decl., Exh. D). With respect to documentary evidence, Stanifer submits that Plaintiff never

attempted to present any documentary evidence. (Stanifer Decl. ¶12). Stanifer also highlights

inconsistencies with Plaintiff’s claim. Stanifer argues that the documentary evidence described by

Plaintiff is alternatively described as a four, three, and two page document when it is actually a two

page document. (Stanifer Decl. Exhs, A, B). Plaintiff further represents that he was denied the

opportunity to argue self-defense at the time of the disciplinary hearing. (Oppo. at p.10:19-21; Nelson

Decl. ¶¶45-47). The court notes that Plaintiff’s claim that he was prevented from arguing self defense

is undermined by CDC 115 Form which indicates that, at the time of the September 11, 2002 hearing,

Plaintiff pleaded “not guilty and gave the following testimony as his defense: ‘It was self defense.’”

(Plaintiff’s Exh. Z).

Plaintiff’s retaliation argument primarily consists of his testimony that Stanifer made several

threatening statements. The thrust of Plaintiff’s argument is that Stanifer said on several occasions

that “filing 602s against me will haunt you,” “you are now in my court,” “you knew better than to file

602 against me . . . now I will demonstrate to you the extent of my authority and the consequences for

Case 3:03-cv-01516-JLS-RBB Document 68 Filed 01/22/07 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 03cv1516

filing 602s against me,” and “you will not be allowed to present this document (Exhibit Y) as evidence

nor will you be allowed to argue its contents as a defense during the hearing.” (Plaintiff’s Decl. ¶¶40-

49). The documentary evidence sought to be introduced by Plaintiff consists of his statement that his

defense is one of self defense and documents that purport to show that prison officials received

information about a threat made against Plaintiff’s life, (Plaintiff’s Exh. Y). Thus, the parties dispute

whether Plaintiff even sought to introduce any documentary evidence. As Plaintiff has a due process

right to submit documentary evidence, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71, the court concludes that

disputed issues of fact prevent entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

In sum, the court denies summary judgment on the merits.

Qualified Immunity

 Qualified immunity “shields § 1983 defendants ‘[f]rom liability for civil damages insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001)

(en banc) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194 (2001), the first step in the qualified immunity analysis is “to consider the materials submitted on

support of, and in opposition to, summary judgment, in order to decide whether a constitutional right

would be violated if all facts are viewed in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Jeffers

v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 2001). “If no constitutional violation is shown, the inquiry

ends.” Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2003). On the other hand, if

“the parties’ submissions” create a triable issue of whether a constitutional violation occurred, the

second question is “whether the right was clearly established.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. A

constitutional right is clearly established when “it would be clear to a reasonable [government actor]

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202.

Here, for the above stated reasons, the court concludes that it is clearly established that a

prisoner has a due process right to submit documentary evidence and call witnesses at a rules violation

hearing. See Wolf, 418 U.S. at 564-71. The evidence submitted by the parties raises a genuine issue

of material fact whether Plaintiff was denied that right. Accordingly, the court denies Stanifer’s

motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Case 3:03-cv-01516-JLS-RBB Document 68 Filed 01/22/07 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 Defendant is instructed to cooperate with Plaintiff to timely prepare a proposed pretrial

conference order.

- 9 - 03cv1516

Motion to Amend the Complaint

Plaintiff moves for leave to amend the complaint to eliminate the request for preliminary and

permanent injunction seeking to rescind the finding of guilt. Stanifer opposes the motion. The court

denies the motion to amend because Plaintiff fails to establish good cause why he did not comply with

the scheduling order issued by Magistrate Judge Brooks on August 28, 2004. The scheduling order

required Plaintiff to file a motion to amend the pleading no later than November 22, 2004.

Accordingly, the motion to amend is denied without prejudice.

In sum, the court denies Stanifer’s motion for summary judgment and denies Plaintiff’s motion

to amend the complaint. The court sets a telephonic status conference before Magistrate Judge Brooks

on February 7, 2007 at 1:30 p.m. to discuss trial related matters, including the pretrial order, exhibits,

and witnesses. The court sets a final telephonic pretrial conference before this court on February 22,

2007 at 11:30 a.m. Defendant is instructed to arrange for the telephonic conferences with Plaintiff at

the scheduled times.1

 The court will schedule the trial date at the time of the pretrial conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 22, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All Parties 

Case 3:03-cv-01516-JLS-RBB Document 68 Filed 01/22/07 Page 9 of 9