Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02246/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02246-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\H\10cv2246-dny-IFP-1915(g).wpd -1- 10cv2246 H (CAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC GRIFFIN, et al.,

BOP #44575-098,

Civil No. 10cv2246 H (CAB)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

[Doc. No. 3] 

AND 

(2) DISMISSING CASE FOR

FAILURE TO PAY FILING 

FEE REQUIRED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

vs.

U.S. MARSHALS; JOHN DOES,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, and currently incarcerated at the Medical

Center for Federal Prisoners located in Springfield, Missouri, has submitted a civil action.

Plaintiff’s Complaint refers to a school shooting in Carlsbad, California and contains several

delusional statements.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he

has submitted a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

[Doc. No. 3].

/ / /

/ / /

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1

 The Ninth Circuit has held that section 1915(g) does not violate a prisoner’s right to access

to the courts, due process or equal protection; nor does it violate separation of powers principles or

operate as an ex post facto law. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179-82 (9th Cir. 1999); see also

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1123 (noting constitutionality of § 1915(g), but recognizing that “serious

constitutional concerns would arise if § 1915(g) were applied to preclude those prisoners who had filed

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A. Motion to Proceed IFP

Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows certain litigants to pursue civil

litigation IFP, that is, without the full prepayment of fees or costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).

However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the

privilege to proceed IFP:

. . . if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds

that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.”

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter “Andrews”). “Pursuant to

§ 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews v.

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (under the PLRA,

“[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP

status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the

congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers,

128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“‘Strikes’ are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which

were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim.”

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (citation omitted). Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes,

he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless

he can show he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);

Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[]

a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the

time of filing.”).1

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actions who were not ‘frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim’ from proceeding IFP.”). 

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While the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar his

request to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “[i]n some instances, the district court docket

records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under

§ 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. When applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),

however, the court must “conduct a careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and

other relevant information,” before determining that the action “was dismissed because it was

frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim,” since “not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a

strike under § 1915(g).” Id. at 1121.

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the phrase ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,’ as used elsewhere in § 1915, ‘parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).’” Id. (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Andrews

further holds that a case is “frivolous” for purposes of § 1915(g) “if it is of little weight or

importance” or “ha[s] no basis in law or fact.” 398 F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted); see also

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual

allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous [under 28 U.S.C. § 1915] where it lacks an

arguable basis in either law or in fact .... [The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint,

embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”). “A

case is malicious if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews, 398 F.3d

at 1121 (quotation and citation omitted).

B. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

As an initial matter, the Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and has

ascertained that it makes no “plausible allegation” to suggest Plaintiff “faced ‘imminent danger

of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Therefore, Plaintiff is barred from proceeding IFP in this action because he

has on three prior occasions had civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious or

for failing to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

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A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias

v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d

801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens

Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Here, the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has had three prior prisoner civil

actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. 

They are:

1) Griffin, et al. v. Barack Obama, et al., Civil Case No. 10-1171-PMP-LRL (Nev.

Aug. 5, 2010 Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as delusional and factually

frivolous) (strike one);

2) Griffin et al. v. Harry Reid, et al., Civil Case No. 10-1204-KJD-PAL (Nev. Aug.

9, 2010 Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as delusional and factually

frivolous) (strike two); and

3) Griffin v. Las Vegas Review Journal, Civil Case No. 10-1253-GMN-LRL (Nev.

Aug. 9, 2010 Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as delusional and factually

frivolous) (strike three).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated three “strikes”

pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced imminent

danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed this Complaint, he is not entitled to the

privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez, 169

F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing

the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from

continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,

1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not

right.”).

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C. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

IFP [Doc. No. 3] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and DISMISSES this action for failure to pay

the $350 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).

The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 30, 2010

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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