Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-04742/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-04742-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2003 Job Discrimination

---

1

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

PAULINE K. PARTTI,

 

Plaintiff,

v.

PALO ALTO MEDICAL FOUNDATION FOR 

HEALTH CARE, RESEARCH AND 

EDUCATION, INC., ET AL.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

(Re: Docket No. 32)

While working at Defendant Palo Alto Medical Foundation for Health Care, Research and 

Education, Inc., Plaintiff Pauline K. Partti filed a complaint against an abusive supervisor. A few 

years later, she was transferred to Defendant Sutter Health Mills-Peninsula Health Services, where 

she worked briefly before going on leave, never to return. Even after construing all evidence of 

what happened between the complaint, transfer, and leave in the plaintiff’s favor, no reasonable 

juror could find for Partti. Defendants MPHS and PAMF’s motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 1 of 21
2

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

I.

In October 2006, PAMF offered Partti a job.1 After Partti accepted, she worked under the 

supervision of John Hoebeke. Hoebeke insulted, threatened, and verbally abused the people 

working below him, including Partti.

2

 It is unclear if Hoebeke ever singled Partti out for abuse on 

the basis of her sex, race, age, or national origin.3Partti herself stated that “[t]hreats, yelling, name 

calling, insults etc are equal opportunity for everyone who works for John . . . . I am NOT singled 

out. John is very fair in dishing this treatment out equally.”4 In any case, fed up with this behavior, 

Partti reported Hoebeke to the human resources department in 2009,5and they investigated and 

agreed with her allegations.6 

The aftermath of Partti’s report is murky. Partti initially testified that Hoebeke never 

singled her out for filing a complaint against him, but later changed her testimony.7 According to 

Partti’s friend and immediate supervisor Martin Alsip,8 Hoebeke instructed him to “withhold all 

career advancement” for Partti for “unspecified reasons though the inference was understood” that 

it was because of her HR complaint.9 Alsip also testified, however, that he had simply never had 

the opportunity to recommend Partti for promotion.”10 

 

1

See Docket No. 33-1 at Partti Confirmation Letter 1-2.

2

See id. at 89:1-17, 90:7-11.

3 Compare id. at 90:15-92:23 with Docket No. 34-2 at Deposition Errata 1-2. 

4 Docket No. 33-1 at DEFENDANTS002066.

5

See id. at Page54-55.

6

See id. at 101:3-105:24.

7 Compare id. at 90:15-92:23 with Docket No. 34-2 at Deposition Errata 1-2.

8

See Docket No. 33-1 at 33:20-34:25.

9

See Docket No. 46-2 at ¶ 4.

10 See Docket No. 48-3 at 163:7-23.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 2 of 21
3

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Regardless, in 2011, Partti received a raise and Hoebeke approved a performance review 

that stated that she consistently met performance requirements.11 In January 2012, due to 

organizational restructuring, Partti was transferred from PAMF to MPHS and left Hoebeke’s chain 

of command.

12

 Although Partti believed that Hoebeke “was a player” in her move, she was 

“pleased” and “look[ed] forward to it.”13 After the transfer, Partti had limited contact with 

Hoebeke: he called her about four times to discuss work questions and each conversation was two 

to three minutes and professional.14 Partti also saw Hoebeke at two work events, but they did not 

interact beyond saying hello to each other.15

Not long after Partti transferred to MPHS, on February 28, 2012, she attended a department 

lunch meeting.

16

 Many of the allegations underlying Partti’s claims arise out of this meeting. 

During the course of the meeting, Partti said that she and her son occasionally slept outdoors, 

which Partti believed caused coworker Raquel Saquel to act like she was put off by the comment.17 

Partti also sprayed herself with a can of compressed air to cool herself off.

18

The following day, February 29, 2012, Partti had a meeting with her MPHS supervisors, 

Nelson Yee and Iftikhar Hussain.

19

 The parties’ accounts of the meeting differ significantly: Partti 

testified that Hussain yelled at her to “shut the fuck up” and “listen” and called her “disgusting” 

and “inappropriate” with her son.20 She also testified that Hussain said “nobody gives a shit about” 

 

11 See Docket No. 33-1 at DEFENDANTS001699-1702.

12 See id. at 149:21-150:22.

13 Id. at 151:13-152:4.

14 See id. at 139:4-143:21.

15 Id. at 143:24-144:13.

16 See Docket No. 34-1 at 278:24-279:2.

17 See id. at 283:8-19.

18 See id. at 284:12-23.

19 See Docket No. 35-2 at 175:6-176:21.

20 Docket No. 34-1 at 295:2-297:25.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 3 of 21
4

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

her.21 Partti testified that amidst these insults, Hussain did not say anything about her complaint 

against Hoebeke or her age, gender, race, or national origin.22 But she later changed her deposition 

testimony to state that he did.23 She also testified that she believed Yee’s conduct in February 2012 

was “absolutely not” related to her complaint against Hoebeke.24 

Yee’s account of the meeting differs as to the style of Hussain’s conduct. Yee testified that 

Hussain discussed Partti’s office demeanor, asked her to “back off” and not “overtake the entire 

staff” when talking, and discussed Partti’s comments about her son at the February 28 department 

meeting.

25

 

Shortly after the meeting with Yee and Hussain, Partti contacted the human resources 

department. On March 7, 2012, she met with Claudia Christensen, MPHS’s Human Resources 

Executive.26 At this meeting, Partti requested a leave of absence and attempted to file complaints 

about Hussain and Yee’s behavior.27 Human Resources approved Partti’s request for leave.

28 A

few days later, Partti emailed Christensen to file more complaints. She alleged that assorted MPHS 

coworkers, specifically Hussain, Yee, Celia Leung, Ginny Marquart, and Saquel had conspired 

against her and mobbed her.29 As evidence of the conspiracy, she wrote that she “believe[d] 

something ‘unethical’ may be connecting Raquel to Nelson,” because Yee had allegedly repeated 

 

21 Id. at 299:5-301:14.

22 See id. at 298:1-23.

23 See Docket No. 34-2 at Deposition Errata 3.

24 See id. at 315:7-12.

25 See Docket No. 35-2 at 178:11-182:22.

26 See Docket No. 36 at ¶ 1.

27 See Docket No. 34-2 at 380:2-19.

28 See Docket No. 36-2 at Plaintif00000436.

29 See Docket No. 34-1 at DEFENDANTS000251-52.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 4 of 21
5

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

something Saquel had said.30 Partti also wrote that she feared for her life, suggesting that she 

feared MPHS personnel.31

Christensen was confused by Partti’s emails and sent Partti an email asking if Partti wanted 

an HR investigation, and if so, for more information about the complaints, so that she could 

investigate Partti’s claims.32 Partti responded that she wanted an HR investigation, but did not 

provide any facts or information for Christensen to follow up on.33 Partti then began to believe that 

Christensen also was against her, and accordingly never provided Christensen with information 

regarding her HR complaints.34

Partti remained on leave from March 2012 to June 2013.35 During this period, she saw 

medical professionals and remained in contact with MPHS HR regarding her ability to return to 

work and extensions of her leave.36 In June 2013, MPHS terminated Partti’s employment, because 

she had exhausted all her leave and was effectively on indefinite leave.37 

 

30 Id.

31 Id.

32 See Docket No. 34-2 at 436:11-437:14, DEFENDANTS000165.

33 See id. at DEFENDANTS000175.

34 See id. at 432:19-435:14.

35 See Docket No. 36-2 at Plaintif00000436-37.

36 See Docket Nos. 36, 37, 40. The issue of whether Partti was ever cleared to return to work is 

relevant only to whether Defendants had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for ending Partti’s 

employment. The legitimate, non-retaliatory reason only becomes relevant if Partti establishes a 

prima facie case for retaliation under her seventh and eighth causes of action. Because the court 

finds that those claims are either time-barred or that Partti has not established a prima facie case for 

those claims, Partti’s medical and leave history, including whether she was ever cleared to return to 

work, are not relevant to summary judgment. The details of Partti’s leave extensions, Dr. Mollah 

and Dr. Kimmel’s assessments of her ability to return to work, and what accommodations, if any, 

were necessary for her to return to work, are exhaustively documented in the Declarations of 

Christensen, Annette Barraza, and Lilian Guzman and their accompanying exhibits. See Docket 

Nos. 36, 36-1, 36-2, 37, 37-1, 37-2, 37-3, 37-4, 37-5, 37-6, 37-7, 37-8, 38-1, 38-2, 38-3, 38-4, 38-5, 

38-6, 38-7, 38-8, 38-9, 40, 40-1, 40-2, 40-3, 40-4, 40-5, 40-6, 40-7, 40-8, 41-1, 41-2, 41-3, 41-4, 

41-5, 41-6, 41-7. 

37 See id.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 5 of 21
6

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

On July 8, 2013, Partti filed a complaint with California’s Department of Fair Employment 

and Housing alleging harassment, retaliation, and that she had been terminated for 

whistleblowing.38 She then withdrew her complaint39 and sued Defendants for wrongful 

termination, breach of employment contract with specific term, breach of employment contract 

with no specified term, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent 

infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, whistleblower 

retaliation in violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(h) and Cal. Labor Code §§ 98.6, 1102.5, and 

hostile work environment and retaliation in violation of Title VII.40 Defendants move for summary 

judgment as to all eight causes of action.

II.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. The parties further consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned 

magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).41

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case.42 A dispute as to a material 

fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the 

non-moving party.43 All evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party. At this stage, a court “does not assess credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply 

 

38 See Docket No. 34-2 at EEOC000008.

39 See id. at EEOC000007.

40 See Docket No. 8.

41 See Docket Nos. 7, 10. 

42 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts that 

may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of 

summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”).

43 See id.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 6 of 21
7

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

determines whether there is a genuine factual issue for trial.”44 Initially, the moving party bears the 

burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists.45 If this burden is met, the burden 

shifts to the non-moving party.46 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 establishes an administrative framework for 

employment discrimination and retaliation claims, under which a plaintiff must file a claim with 

either the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or a state or local agency before suing in 

court.

47

 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) requires employees to file an EEOC claim within 180 days, or a 

state or local agency claim within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurs. 

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan established that “[a] discrete retaliatory or discriminatory 

act ‘occurred’ on the day that it ‘happened.’ A party, therefore, must file a charge within either 

180 or 300 days of the date of the act or lose the ability to recover for it.”

48 For a claim of hostile 

work environment, however, the 180- or 300- day filing window does not entirely apply. With 

hostile work environment claims, the court may consider “the entire time period of the hostile 

environment,” including conduct falling outside of the 180- or 300- day window, “for the purposes 

of determining liability” if “an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period.”49

Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(h) makes it illegal for an employer to “discharge, expel, or 

otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden 

under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding 

under this part.” To bring a claim under Section 12940(h), a plaintiff must first file a complaint 

with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing within one year after the alleged 

 

44 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 559-60 (2006). 

45 See Celotex Corp. v. Caltrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

46 See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 630, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

47 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). 

48 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002).

49 Id.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 7 of 21
8

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

unlawful practice occurred.50 The filing period may be extended by 90 days if the plaintiff does 

not learn of the facts of the alleged unlawful practice within one year of its occurrence,51 and the 

continuing violation doctrine allows a court to consider actions “outside the limitations period” if it 

is “sufficiently linked to unlawful conduct that occurred within the limitations period.”52 If the 

administrative prerequisites are satisfied, the plaintiff must then establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation by showing that (1) she engaged in a “protected activity,” (2) the employer subjected her 

to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and 

the employer’s action.53

Cal. Labor Code § 98.6 provides in relevant part that an employer may not “discharge . . . 

discriminate, retaliate, or take any adverse action” against an employee “because the employee . . . 

engaged in any conduct delineated in” Division Two, Part Three, Chapter Five of the California 

Labor Code, including Section 1102.5. As pertinent to Partti’s claim, Section 1102.5 prohibits an 

employer from retaliating against an employer for disclosing a violation of state or federal law to a 

governmental or law enforcement agency.54 As with a Section 12940(h) claim, the plaintiff must 

show a causal link between the adverse employment action and her disclosure.55

California’s common law of tort provides a cause of action for wrongful termination against 

public policy.56 “Under California law, an employer cannot terminate an employee for a purpose 

that contravenes public policy.”57 To establish a claim of wrongful termination against public 

 

50 See Cal. Gov. Code § 12960(d).

51 Cal. Gov. Code § 12960(d)(1).

52 Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1056 (2005).

53 Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1042.

54 See Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5(b).

55 See Morgan v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69-70 (2001).

56 See McCullough v. Xerox Corp., Case No. 13-CV-04596-HSG, 2015 WL 5769620, at *9 (N.D. 

Cal. Oct. 2, 2015).

57 Id. (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 667 (1988)).

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 8 of 21
9

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

policy, the plaintiff must show that the allegedly violated policy is “(1) delineated in either 

constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) ‘public’ in the sense that it ‘inures to the benefit of the 

public’ rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of 

the discharge; and (4) substantial and fundamental.”58 For a wrongful termination against public 

policy claim based on a violation of Section 12940(h), the administrative exhaustion requirement 

does not apply.59 However, the plaintiff must show that she meets the substantive requirements of 

the constitutionally or statutorily delineated policy.60 

Cal. Labor Code § 2922 provides that “[a]n employment, having no specified term, may be 

terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other.” “An at-will employment may be 

ended by either party ‘at any time without cause,’ for any or no reason, and subject to no procedure 

except the statutory requirement of notice.”61 However, parties are free to contract to “any 

limitation, otherwise lawful, on the employer’s termination rights,”62 because “the employment 

relationship is fundamentally contractual.”63 A contractual modification of the at-will relationship 

may be express or implied in fact.64 “Where there is no express agreement, the issue is whether 

other evidence of the parties’ conduct has a ‘tendency in reason’ to demonstrate the existence of an 

actual mutual understanding on particular terms and conditions of employment.”65

 

58 Stevenson v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 880, 897 (1997).

59 See Stevenson, 16 Cal. 4th at 890.

60 See McCullough, 2015 WL 5769620, at *9.

61 Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 335 (2000) (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 

47 Cal. 3d 654, 680 (1988)).

62 Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 336.

63 Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 696.

64 Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 336.

65 Id. at 337 (quoting Cal. Evid. Code § 210).

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 9 of 21
10

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 

performance and its enforcement.”66 A breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing must involve “something beyond breach of the contractual duty itself. . . . If the allegations 

do not go beyond the statement of a mere contract breach and, relying on the same alleged acts, 

simply seek the same damages or other relief already claimed in a companion contract cause of 

action, they may be disregarded as superfluous as no additional claim is actually stated.”67

The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are “‘(1) 

outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability 

of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and (4) actual and proximate 

causation of the emotional distress.’”68 “Severe emotional distress means ‘emotional distress of 

such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should 

be expected to endure it.’”69 Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress “does not 

extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”70

“It is for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it 

is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed.”71

“A claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort but the tort 

of negligence to which the traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages 

apply.”72 “[T]o recover damages for emotional distress on a claim of negligence where there is no 

 

66 Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 683.

67 Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1394-95, as modified on 

denial of reh’g (Oct. 31, 2001).

68 Wong v. Tai Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1376 (2010) (quoting Agarwal v. Johnson 25 Cal. 3d 

932, 946 (1979)).

69 Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1004 (1993).

70 Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1051 (2009) (internal quotation omitted).

71 Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 397 (1970).

72 Wong v. Tai Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1377 (2010).

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 10 of 21
11

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

accompanying personal, physical injury, the plaintiff must show that the emotional distress was 

‘serious.’”73 “‘[S]evere emotional distress’ is functionally the same as the articulation of ‘severe 

emotional distress’” required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.74 The 

statute of limitations for a negligence tort claim is two years.75

III.

Applying the standards as set forth above, none of Partti’s claims survive.

First, Partti’s eighth cause of action for a hostile work environment and retaliation in 

violation of Title VII is untimely as to most of the alleged unlawful conduct, and there is no 

genuine issue of material fact as to the rest of the conduct. Partti filed an administrative complaint 

with DFEH on July 8, 2013.76 Under Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day deadline, Partti can sue only 

for Title VII retaliation violations that occurred between September 11, 2012, and July 8, 2013. As 

for the hostile work environment part of the Title VII claim, Partti can only sue if at least some of 

the conduct causing the hostile work environment occurred after September 11, 2012.

Partti argues that the continuing violation doctrine saves her hostile work environment 

claim from being untimely and allows the court to consider pre-September 11, 2012 conduct.

77

 

However, Morgan says otherwise, by mandating that at least some part of the conduct occur during 

the window of timeliness. In other words, some part of the offensive hostile work environment 

conduct must have occurred on or after September 11, 2012. Partti’s leave began on March 6, 

2012, and she never returned to work at MPHS.78 The last day that conduct relating to a hostile 

work environment could have occurred was March 6, 2012, and so none of the hostile work 

 

73 Id. (quoting Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 927-30 (1980)).

74 Wong, 189 Cal. App. 4th at 1378 (2010).

75 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1. 

76 See Docket No. 32 at 12.

77 See Docket No. 46 at 5.

78 See Docket No. 36-2 at Plaintiff00000436.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 11 of 21
12

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

environment conduct occurred within the 300-day window. The hostile work environment part of 

the Title VII claim is untimely.

Most of the conduct supporting Partti’s Title VII retaliation claim also is untimely, and the 

rest of it lacks any evidence by which a reasonable jury could find for Partti. After reviewing 

every scrap of evidence presented by the parties and taking all of it in the light most favorable to 

Partti, the court has identified the following instances of alleged retaliatory conduct that could be 

construed as relating to a Title VII retaliation claim and disposes of them as follows:

79

 Hoebeke’s alleged harassment of Partti while she was at PAMF:

80 all of this conduct 

happened, if at all,81 before Partti’s transfer to MPHS in January 2012. Partti testified that 

she had minimal contact with Hoebeke after her transfer, none of which a reasonable jury 

could find was discriminatory or retaliatory.

82

 Any Title VII claim based on Hoebeke’s 

conduct at PAMF is untimely.

 Hoebeke’s alleged order that Alsip not promote Partti:

83 Partti left Hoebeke and Alsip’s 

chain of command, and their authority over her promotions, when she transferred to MPHS 

 

79 Because the court finds that Partti’s Title VII claim is untimely and lacks sufficient evidence for 

a reasonable jury to find that the alleged conduct occurred, the court does not reach the issue of 

whether the alleged conduct establishes a prima facie case for retaliation, with the exception of 

Guzman’s alleged refusal of accommodations, discussed below. 

80 See Docket No. 33-1 at 89:1-17, 90:7-11. 

81 While the record is undisputed that Hoebeke insulted and verbally abused Partti and other staff 

working beneath him, there is some dispute as to whether Hoebeke singled Partti out for verbal 

abuse on the basis of her sex, race, age, or national origin, or her HR complaint about him. 

Compare Docket No. 33-1 at 90:15-92:23 with Docket No. 34-2 at Deposition Errata 1-2. The 

court notes that Partti submitted her deposition errata much later than the 30 days after deposition 

that Rule 30(e)(1) permits. The court does not reach the issue of whether the errata are admissible, 

however, because it finds that the claims related to the errata are time-barred as a matter of law.

82 See Docket No. 33-1 at 143:24-144:13, 139:4-143:21 (describing Partti’s post-transfer contact 

with Hoebeke as approximately four brief phone calls on work issues or where Yee was, and two 

encounters in person where they said hello to each other and nothing else).

83 There is mixed evidence as to whether Hoebeke ordered Alsip not to promote Partti. Partti 

testified that after she complained against Hoebeke, other PAMF accountants were promoted but 

she was not, and when she asked Alsip why, he said, “You know why.” Docket No. 34-1 at 

174:14-23. Alsip himself testified that he never had the opportunity to recommend Partti for 

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 12 of 21
13

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

in January 2012, well before September 11, 2012. Any Title VII claim based on Hoebeke’s 

alleged order not to promote Partti is untimely.

 Partti’s transfer to MPHS in 2012: Partti was transferred in January 2012. The court does 

not address whether the transfer was an adverse employment action because there is no 

dispute that it is outside the 300-day window and any Title VII claim based on the transfer 

is untimely.

 Partti’s MPHS colleagues’ alleged conduct at the February 28, 2012 department 

lunch: it is unclear whether Partti’s colleagues’ conduct at the February 28 meeting could 

even remotely be characterized as discriminatory or retaliatory, but it occurred before 

September 11, 2012, and so any Title VII claim based on this conduct is untimely.

 Yee and Hussain’s alleged conduct at the February 29, 2012 meeting: it is unclear 

whether Yee and Hussain’s alleged conduct at their private meeting with Partti was 

discriminatory or retaliatory,

84 but it occurred before September 11, 2012, and so any Title 

VII claim based on this conduct is untimely.

 Hussain, Yee, Leung, Marquart, and Saquel’s alleged mobbing of Partti: Partti does 

not provide any evidence to support her allegations that these individuals “mobbed” her, let 

alone sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for her on this claim. However, any 

 

promotion and never picked someone else over her to fill an opening, because she was simply 

never in consideration for the next slot when promotions became available. See Docket No. 48-3 at 

163:7-23. Alsip later stated in a declaration that Hoebeke told him to “withhold all career 

advancement” for Partti and that “the inference was understood” that it was because she had 

complained. See Docket No. 46-2 at ¶ 4. While such evidence might normally create a genuine 

dispute of material fact, the claim is untimely.

84 Partti affirmatively testified at deposition that while Hussain yelled at her to “shut up and listen,” 

called her “disgusting” and “inappropriate”, and said that “nobody [gave] a shit about” her, he did 

not say anything about her age, gender, race, national origin, or complaint against Hoebeke. 

Docket No. 34-1 at 295:2-298:23. The deposition errata said that he did. See Docket No. 34-2 at 

Deposition Errata 3. The court notes that Partti submitted her deposition errata much later than the 

30 days after deposition that Rule 30(e)(1) permits. The court does not reach the issue of whether 

the errata are admissible, however, because it finds that the claims related to the errata are timebarred as a matter of law.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 13 of 21
14

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

mobbing would have ended when Partti went on leave in March 2012,85 and so any Title 

VII claim based on this conduct is untimely.

 Leung, Hoebeke, Hussain, and Yee’s alleged collaborative fabrication of misconduct 

by Partti: Partti alleges—without any facts or evidence to support her allegations—that 

Yee and Hussain’s actions at the February 28 and 29 meetings were part of a collaboration 

with Hoebeke and Leung to fabricate claims of misconduct against Partti.86 Not only is a 

speculative, unsupported allegation insufficient to survive summary judgment, any Title VII 

claim based on conduct occurring in February 2012 is untimely.

 Leung’s alleged fabrication of complaints against Partti: Partti’s personal notes on the 

timeline of events state that in April 2012, she learned that Leung had made up complaints 

that Partti had exposed her breasts at work and made a comment about oral sex.

87

 If Leung 

made these complaints at all—and there is no evidence that she did—she did so before 

September 11, making any Title VII claim based on her conduct untimely. 

 Guzman’s alleged refusal to grant Partti accommodations: Partti states in her 

declaration that Guzman refused to provide the reasonable accommodations that Partti 

needed to return to work.88 Leaving aside the questions of whether the accommodation was 

reasonable,89 there is no evidence remotely hinting that this refusal was connected to Partti

engaging in a protected activity,90 and so there is no Title VII claim.

 

85 Partti made this allegation by email on March 9, 2012. See Docket No. 34-1 at 

DEFENDANTS000251-52. Any mobbing conduct raised in that allegation therefore is untimely. 

There is no evidence that the alleged mobbing continued after Partti went on leave (or occurred at 

all), and so there is no Title VII claim, timely or otherwise.

86 See Docket No. 46-1 at ¶ 2.

87 See Docket No. 34-1 at MOLLAH 000012; see also Docket No. 46-1 at ¶ 8.

88 See Docket No. 46-1 at ¶ 6.

89 See Docket No. 45-1 at DEFENDANTS000976-77, 000986 (fitness for duty evaluation finding 

no “accommodations or restrictions required for [Partti’s] return to work”).

90 The court has closely scrutinized the record and Partti does not identify any nexus between the 

alleged refusal of accommodation and any protected activity, as she must do to establish a prima 

facie case of Title VII retaliation. See Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1988).

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 14 of 21
15

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 Leung, Christensen, Guzman, and Barraza’s alleged collaboration to not investigate 

Partti’s complaints at MPHS (“MPHS HR conspiracy”): no evidence exists in the 

record that even suggests that these individuals collaborated to avoid investigating Partti’s 

complaints, fabricate allegations to prevent her return to work, or otherwise participate in 

the alleged retaliatory mobbing campaign, other than Partti’s statement in her declaration 

that she is “informed and believe[s]” that it is so.91 Partti’s speculative allegation is 

insufficient for any reasonable jury to find that this conduct occurred, let alone that it was in 

retaliation for a protected activity.

92

 Partti must “do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . [She] must come forward with 

‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”

93

 

Furthermore, Christensen’s undisputed testimony states that she had no detailed 

knowledge of Partti’s employment at PAMF, let alone her complaint against Hoebeke, 

further undermining the possibility of retaliation based on that complaint.

94

 There is 

undisputed evidence that Christensen did not investigate Partti’s complaints, but it is 

equally undisputed that she did so not to retaliate but because she could not understand 

what Partti’s complaints were.95 Christensen asked Partti for more information about her 

complaints and told Partti that she needed the information in order to conduct an 

investigation.96 Partti refused to reply, however, believing that Christensen was part of the 

 

91 Docket No. 46-1 at ¶ 9.

92 See Gordon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., __ F.Supp.3d __, Case No. 5:10-CV-05399-EJD, 2015 WL 

1940209, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2015) (“[T]he mere suggestion that facts are in controversy, as 

well as conclusory or speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers, is not sufficient to 

defeat summary judgment.”).

93 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e)).

94 See Docket No. 34-2 at DEFENDANTS000165.

95 See Docket No. 35-3 at 96:7-12, 194:16-195:24.

96 See Docket No. 34-2 at 436:11-437:14, DEFENDANTS000165, DEFENDANTS000175.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 15 of 21
16

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

campaign against her,97 and so Christensen did not investigate. The evidence presented by 

Partti would not allow any reasonable jury to find for her on this issue.

 Hoebeke’s alleged conspiracy with MPHS staff to retaliate against Partti for 

complaining against him: no evidence exists that suggests that Hoebeke conspired with 

MPHS staff. Alsip’s declaration states that PAMF and MPHS “are closely interrelated” and 

that Hoebeke “worked with senior members with influence over the operations of 

MPHS.”98 This bare, unsupported allegation provides insufficient facts for a reasonable 

jury to find that Hoebeke ever conspired with MPHS staff against Partti.99

Second, Partti’s seventh cause of action for retaliation in violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 

12940(h), Cal. Labor Code § 98.6, and Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 also fail. Turning first to the 

Section 12940(h) claim, it fails due to untimeliness and a complete lack of any evidence supporting 

her allegations of unlawful conduct. Partti filed an administrative complaint with DFEH on July 8, 

2013.100 Under Section 12960(d)’s one-year deadline, Partti can only sue under Section 12940(h) 

for retaliatory conduct that occurred between July 8, 2012 and July 8, 2013. The continuing 

violation doctrine does not salvage Partti’s Section 12940(h) claim because there is no evidence 

showing that unlawful conduct occurred within the limitations period, let alone that unlawful 

conduct outside the limitations period was “sufficient linked” to unlawful conduct within the 

limitations period.

101

 All the conduct that the court identified above as untimely under Title VII 

also is untimely under Section 12960(d)(1), because none of it occurred during the one-year filing 

window. There is no evidence suggesting that the remaining alleged conduct102 occurred, much 

 

97 See Docket No. 34-2 at 432:19-435:14, 437:6-14, 440:12-16.

98 Docket No. 46-2 at ¶ 5.

99 See Gordon, 2015 WL 1940209, at *2; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586-87.

100 See Docket No. 32 at 12.

101 Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1056.

102 Namely, Guzman’s alleged refusal to grant Partti accommodations; the MPHS HR conspiracy; 

and Hoebeke’s alleged conspiracy with MPHS staff.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 16 of 21
17

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

less that it was tied to Partti engaging in protected activity, as is required for a claim under Section 

12940(h).

As for the Cal. Labor Code §§ 98.6 and 1102.5 claim, it fails due to a lack of nexus 

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. To survive summary judgment 

on this claim, Partti must show facts sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that she disclosed a 

violation of state or federal law to a governmental or law enforcement agency, that she suffered an 

adverse employment action, and that the two events were connected. Partti filed a complaint with 

the DFEH in July 2013, which is a disclosure to a government agency. However, MPHS 

terminated her employment in June 2013, before Partti made her DFEH complaint. There is no 

evidence showing that the July complaint caused MPHS to fire Partti in June, a month before she 

made the complaint, and no reasonable jury could find for Partti on this issue.

Third, Partti’s first cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy 

fails as a matter of law. This claim is premised on a violation of Section 12940(h),103 so Partti 

must show that she can satisfy the elements of a Section 12940(h) retaliation claim: engagement in 

a protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal link connecting the two. 

However, Partti has not established a prima facie case. Partti argues that she engaged in protected 

activity when she complained against Hoebeke at PAMF and when she complained against 

assorted MPHS staff in March 2012. In the context of the wrongful termination claim, she argues 

that MPHS subjected her to an adverse employment action by wrongfully terminating her in 2013. 

However, Partti presents no evidence supporting a connection between her termination and her 

complaints at PAMF and MPHS. The only evidence supporting a connection between the Hoebeke 

complaint and Partti’s termination is her unsupported belief that Leung, Hoebeke, Hussain, and 

Yee collaborated against her,104 and Alsip’s statements that PAMF and MPHS are related and that 

 

103 See Docket No. 8 at ¶¶ 38-43.

104 See Docket No. 46-1 at ¶ 2.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 17 of 21
18

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Hoebeke worked with senior MPHS staff.105 Such speculative evidence is too flimsy to create a 

genuine dispute of material fact.106

Partti also fails to connect her attempted complaints against various MPHS staff with her 

termination. She provides no evidence based on which a reasonable jury could find that the 

termination was connected with her March 2012 complaints to Christensen. The undisputed 

evidence shows that Christensen did not understand what Partti’s complaints were, requested more 

information from Partti, and never received it.107 Based on the evidence, even if Partti’s March 

2012 complaints qualify as protected activity,108 there is no evidence connecting Partti’s 

termination to her complaints.

Fourth, no reasonable juror could find for Partti on her second and third causes of action 

for breach of employment contract. While the second cause of action is styled as breach of 

employment contract with specific term109 and the third as breach of employment contract with no 

specified term,110 both causes of action rest on the same theory of contractual modification and fail 

accordingly. 

The evidence is clear that Partti’s employment contract was at-will: her PAMF and MPHS 

offer letters clearly stated that111 and Partti testified that she understood that her employment at 

PAMF and MPHS was at-will, that she knew she could be fired without cause, and that she 

 

105 Docket No. 46-2 at ¶ 5.

106 See Gordon, 2015 WL 1940209, at *2; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586-87.

107 See Docket No. 35-3 at 96:7-12, 194:16-195:24; Docket No. 34-2 at 432:19-435:14, 436:11-

437:14, 440:12-16, DEFENDANTS000165, DEFENDANTS000175. 

108 Yanowitz, 36 Cal. 4th at 1047 (“Although an employee need not formally file a charge in order 

to qualify as being engaged in protected opposing activity . . . complaints about personal 

grievances or vague or conclusory remarks that fail to put an employer on notice as to what 

conduct it should investigate will not suffice to establish protected conduct.”)

109 See Docket No. 8 at 8.

110 See id. at 9.

111 See Docket No. 33-1 at Partti Confirmation Letter 2, DEFENDANTS001169.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 18 of 21
19

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

understood her employment would be at-will before she signed the PAMF and MPHS offer 

letters.112 Partti also testified that no one at PAMF or MPHS represented to her that her 

employment was not at-will.

113

Partti argues MPHS and PAMF modified the at-will nature of her employment by creating 

an implied-in-fact contract that her employment would only be terminated for cause.114 She makes 

this argument based on the MPHS and PAMF handbooks and various workplace memoranda.115 

However, Partti signed a form acknowledging that the PAMF handbook “does not, in any way, 

constitute an employment contract or an assurance of continued employment.”116 She signed a 

similar acknowledgment regarding the MPHS handbook.117 She testified that she understood both 

forms before signing them.118 Under Guz and Foley, the court must look at the “‘totality of 

circumstances’ . . . to determine whether the parties’ conduct, considered in the context of 

surrounding circumstances, gave rise to an implied-in-fact contract limiting the employer's 

termination rights.”119 Defendants’ uncontroverted evidence shows that there was no “meeting of 

the minds”120 that the at-will employment contracts were expressly or impliedly modified to be forcause employment contracts, and Partti presents no evidence to support her theory of contract 

modification.

 

112 See id. at 61:15-63:17, 152:12-153:19.

113 See id. at 64:23-65:8, 152:12-154:20.

114 See Docket No. 8 at ¶¶ 44-69; Docket No. 46 at 8-9.

115 See Docket No. 8 at ¶¶ 44-69; Docket No. 46 at 8-9.

116 See Docket No. 33-1 at Page53; 

117 See Docket No. 48-1 at DEFENDANTS001180.

118 See Docket No. 33-1 at 63:23-66:3, 152:12-154:20.

119 Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 337 (quoting Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 681).

120 Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 337.

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 19 of 21
20

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Fifth, no reasonable jury could find for Partti on her fourth cause of action for a breach of 

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In order for Defendants to have breached the 

implied covenant, there must be a contract to breach. As discussed above, there is no support for 

Partti’s allegation that PAMF and MPHS’s handbooks and memoranda created a modified 

employment contract. Furthermore, this cause of action relies on the same allegations as the 

breach of contract claims, and Careau is clear that in such circumstances, “no additional claim is 

actually stated.”121

Sixth, no reasonable jury could find for Partti on her fifth cause of action for negligent 

infliction of emotional distress or her sixth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. Both causes of action require evidence that Partti experienced severe emotional distress of 

“such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should 

be expected to endure it,” and there is no such evidence.122 

Partti bases her emotional distress claims on the following conduct: Hoebeke’s verbal 

threats and alleged conspiracy with MPHS staff to destroy her career; Leung’s alleged complaints 

against Partti; the alleged MPHS HR conspiracy to not investigate Partti’s complaints; and Hussain 

and Yee’s alleged insults, shouting, pedophilia accusation, and false imprisonment of her. As 

discussed above, there is no evidence showing that the Hoebeke-MPHS conspiracy, Leung’s 

complaints, or the MPHS HR conspiracy ever occurred, let alone sufficient evidence such that a 

reasonable jury could find that these actions caused Partti severe emotional distress. As for 

Hoebeke’s verbal abuse and threats at PAMF, threats and insults do not create liability for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress.123 The same goes for Hussain and Yee’s alleged verbal 

 

121 Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1394-95, as modified on 

denial of reh’g (Oct. 31, 2001).

122 Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1004; Wong, 189 Cal. App. 4th at 1378 (2010).

123 Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1051 (2009) (internal quotation omitted); see also Schneider 

v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 992–93 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming summary judgment against 

plaintiff's IIED claim where her supervisor “screamed and yelled in the process of criticizing her 

performance, threatened to throw her out of the department and made gestures she interpreted as 

threatening”).

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 20 of 21
21

Case No. 5:13-cv-04742-PSG

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

insults and shouts. As for the allegation of false imprisonment, there is no claim for false 

imprisonment and Partti has not pleaded facts or proffered evidence showing that Hussain and Yee 

falsely imprisoned her.

IV.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to all claims. A separate 

order shall issue entering judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 2, 2015 

_________________________________

PAUL S. GREWAL

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:13-cv-04742-PSG Document 72 Filed 11/02/15 Page 21 of 21