Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-04029/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-04029-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 05:704 Labor Litigation

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCO DIMERCURIO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EQUILON ENTERPRISES LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-04029-JSC 

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 19

Marco Dimercurio, Charles Gaeth, John Langlitz, and Malcolm Synigal (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”) sue Equilon Enterprises LLC dba Shell Oil Products US (“Defendant” or “Shell”) 

alleging various wage and hour violations under California law. (Dkt. No. 18.)1 Now before the 

Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 (Dkt. No. 19.) After careful consideration of the parties’ 

briefing and having had the benefit of oral argument on January 15, 2020, the Court DENIES

Defendant’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

I. Complaint Allegations

Plaintiffs are current or former employees of Shell, which operates an oil refinery in 

Martinez, California. (Dkt. No. 18 at ¶ 1, 10-14.) Plaintiffs work or worked at the Martinez 

facility as refinery operators. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Shell requires its refinery operators “to work regular 12-

hour shifts.” (Id. at ¶ 2.) “In addition to their regular 12-hour shifts, operators at Shell’s Martinez 

 

1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 

2 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 

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refinery must regularly be available for designated 12-hour standby shifts twice a day.”3 (Id.) 

When assigned to cover standby shifts, operators must “be at the ready to receive calls 

during two 1.5-hour time periods” (“standby periods”) that “commence 30 minutes prior to the 

start of the scheduled shift and end an hour after the standby shift has started.” (Id. at ¶ 3.) If an 

operator is called during these standby periods but cannot be reached, “the operator is considered 

absent without leave and is subject to disciplinary action.” (Id.) If an operator is reached and 

asked to work the scheduled standby shift during one of these standby periods, the operator must 

report for duty at the refinery within 2 hours. (Id.) Operators are not compensated during these 

standby periods and are instead paid only “when actually required to work the standby shift.” (Id.

at ¶¶ 3, 9.) Further, Shell’s standby shift requirements “significantly limit employees’ ability to 

earn other income, take classes, care for dependent family members, and enjoy time for 

recreation.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) 

The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that Shell’s failure to compensate Plaintiffs for 

the standby periods violates reporting-time pay requirements under California law. Plaintiffs 

bring this action on behalf of themselves and “[a]ll operators working at the [Martinez] refinery . . 

. at any time from four years prior to the filing of [the] complaint” and final judgment. (Id. at ¶ 

25.) 

II. Procedural History

In June 2019, Plaintiffs filed their original class action complaint in California state court 

bringing a claim for “Failure to Pay Reporting Time Pay” in violation of Industrial Welfare 

Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order 1-2001 (“IWC Wage Order”), and derivative claims for 

“Failure to Pay All Wages Earned at Termination” in violation of California Labor Code §§ 200-

203; “Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements” in violation of Labor Code §§ 226, 226.3; 

 

3 The standby shift policy outlined in the CBA provides, in pertinent part: “Standby personnel 

must be available during the period extending 30 minutes prior to and one hour after the beginning

of the shift for which designated as standby.” (Dkt. No. 4, Ex. A at 92.) The policy then lists two 

separate periods: “Standby period on day shift – 5:30 am until 7:00 am”; and “Standby period on 

night shift – 5:30 pm until 7:00 pm.” (Id.) In other words, an individual employee is only 

responsible for the one shift (i.e., day or night) that he or she was “designated as the standby.” 

(See id.) 

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and “Unfair Business Practices” in violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL), 

California Business and Professions Code § 17200. (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A at 19.) Defendant timely 

removed the complaint pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction provisions of the Class Action 

Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), and purported federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

1331. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 3.) 

Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended complaint (“complaint”) in October 2019, 

asserting their previous claims and adding a claim under California’s Private Attorneys General 

Act (“PAGA”), Labor Code § 2698. (Dkt. No. 18.) Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss 

thereafter. (Dkt. No. 19.) The motion is fully briefed, (see Dkt. Nos. 20 & 21), and the Court 

heard oral argument on January 15, 2020. 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Generally, “district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when assessing 

the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 

F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). When such materials “‘are presented to and not excluded by the 

court,’ the 12(b)(6) motion converts into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 

56.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). There are, however, “two exceptions to this rule: the 

incorporation-by-reference doctrine, and judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” Id. 

As relevant here, courts may take judicial notice of an “adjudicative fact” pursuant to the Federal 

Rules of Evidence if that fact is one “that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is 

generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b)(1),(2). 

In conjunction with its motion to dismiss, Defendant requests judicial notice of: (1) 

collective bargaining agreements and related agreements (collectively, “CBA”) between Plaintiffs’ 

union and Defendant, which were previously filed with the Court in support of Defendant’s notice 

of removal, (see Dkt. No. 4, Exs. A-C); and (2) court documents filed in connection with the 

settlement in Berlanga, et al. v. Equilon Enterprises LLC dba Shell Oil Products US, et al., N.D. 

Cal. Case No. 3:17-cv-00282-MMC (“Berlanga”), (see Dkt. Nos. 19-2 – 19-6, Exs. A-E). 

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Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s request for judicial notice because the documents are not “relevant” 

to adjudicating the instant motion.4 The Court disagrees in part. 

The CBA is relevant in this wage-and-hour case because its terms govern the employment 

relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendant. It is also relevant to resolving the instant motion as

Defendant asserts that dismissal is warranted because section 301(a) of the Labor Management 

Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), preempts Plaintiffs’ claims. See Johnson v. Sky 

Chefs, Inc., No. 11-CV-05619-LHK, 2012 WL 4483225, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2012) 

(“Courts routinely take judicial notice of the governing collective bargaining agreement where 

necessary to resolve issues of [LMRA] preemption.”). Courts also routinely take judicial notice of 

CBAs at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Sarmiento v. Sealy, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 

1142-43 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Courts regularly take judicial notice of a CBA in evaluating a motion 

to dismiss.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Densmore v. Mission Linen Supply, 

164 F. Supp. 3d 1180, 1187 (E.D. Cal. 2016); Hernandez v. Sysco Corp., No. 16-cv-06723-JSC, 

2017 WL 1540652, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017); Jones v. AT&T, No. C 07-3888 JF (PR), 2008 

WL 902292, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2008). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s request 

for judicial notice of the CBA because it is a proper subject of judicial notice under Federal Rule 

of Evidence 201(b). 

The court documents filed in Berlanga would also ordinarily constitute proper subjects of 

judicial notice. See Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

judicial notice is appropriate for “undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file 

in federal or state courts”) (internal citation omitted); see also Bennet v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 

801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that courts “may take notice of proceedings in other 

courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct 

relation to matters at issue.”). Two of the named plaintiffs in Berlanga—Charles Gaeth and John 

Langlitz—are Plaintiffs in this action. Thus, their release in Berlanga of all wage-related claims 

 

4 Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendant’s request for judicial notice conflates judicial notice with the 

incorporation by reference doctrine. (See generally Dkt. No. 20-1.) Because Defendant does not 

assert that the documents are incorporated by reference in the complaint, the Court need not 

address Plaintiffs’ arguments on that score. 

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against Shell for a specified time period is directly related to this case and is indeed relevant. 

However, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Berlanga documents are not relevant to 

resolving the instant motion. 

Defendant’s motion cites the Berlanga documents in a footnote in the “Statement of Facts” 

and asserts that “[t]he Berlanga settlement bars Gaeth and Langlitz from pursuing claims for the 

period through September 2, 2018.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 11 n.2.) The motion does not otherwise cite 

the Berlanga documents in support of Defendant’s arguments regarding dismissal, nor does 

Defendant’s reply cite the documents. Because the Berlanga documents are not necessary to 

resolve Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court concludes that judicial notice of those 

documents is inappropriate. See CYBERSitter, LLC v. People’s Republic of China, 805 F. Supp. 

2d 958, 964 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (declining to take judicial notice of facts irrelevant to defendants’ 

motions to dismiss); see also Synopsys, Inc. v. InnoGrit, Corp., No. 19-CV-02082-LHK, 2019 WL 

4848387, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2019) (same); Hitachi Kokusai Elec. Inc. v. ASM Int’l, N.V., No. 

17-cv-06880-BLF, 2018 WL 6099953, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2018) (same). 

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s request for judicial notice of the CBAs and 

related agreements because they are proper subjects of judicial notice under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 201(b). The Court declines to take judicial notice of the Berlanga documents at this 

time because they are not relevant to the instant motion. 

DISCUSSION

The IWC Wage Order5at issue provides, in pertinent part:

Reporting Time Pay

(A) Each workday an employee is required to report for work and 

does report, but is not put to work or is furnished less than half said 

employee’s usual or scheduled day’s work, the employee shall be paid 

for half the usual or scheduled day's work, but in no event for less 

than two (2) hours nor more than four (4) hours, at the employee’s 

regular rate of pay, which shall not be less than the minimum wage.

 

5 The Supreme Court of California recognizes that “wage orders are issued pursuant to an express 

delegation of legislative power, and they have the force of law.” Alvarado v. Dart Container 

Corp. of California, 4 Cal. 5th 542, 552 (2018). 

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Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11010 subd. 5 (2001). There is no dispute that Plaintiffs’ claim for 

reporting-time pay consists of three elements: (1) the employee is required to report for work; (2) 

the employee does report; and (3) the employee is not put to work. Plaintiffs argue that they 

“report[ed] for work” under the meaning of the Wage Order by being available telephonically 

during the standby periods as required by Shell and that Shell violated the Wage Order by failing 

to compensate them for that time. (Dkt. No. 20 at 6.) Plaintiffs acknowledge that their other 

claims are derivative of the reporting-time pay claim. (Id.) 

Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that: 

(1) section 301(a) of the LMRA preempts Plaintiffs’ claims; and (2) the complaint otherwise fails

to state a claim for the wage and hour violations alleged. (Dkt. No. 19 at 7-8.) The Court 

addresses each argument in turn. 

I. Preemption under the LMRA

Section 301 of the LMRA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), states in relevant part that 

“[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing 

employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the 

United States having jurisdiction of the parties.” Preemption of state law claims under section 301 

applies to “claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements,” and 

“claims substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Caterpillar, 

Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987); see also McCray v. Marriot Hotel Servs., Inc., 902 

F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[Section] 301 generally preempts state law claims that implicate 

a collective-bargaining agreement, except for claims that (1) arise independently of a CBA, and 

(2) don’t substantially depend on analysis of a CBA.”).

Courts apply a two-part test for determining whether a claim is preempted by section

301. Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the court 

determines “whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by 

virtue of state law, not by a CBA. Id. at 1059. “If the right exists solely as a result of the CBA, 

then the claim is preempted, and [the] analysis ends there.” Id. If the right exists independent of 

the CBA, the court turns to the second prong: whether the claim is “substantially dependent on 

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analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). If the claim does not depend on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement, the claim 

is not preempted and may proceed under state law. The court’s decision in this regard is based on 

“whether the claim can be resolved by ‘look[ing] to’ versus interpreting the CBA.” Id. (quoting 

Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 121 (1994)). “[T]he bare fact that a collective-bargaining 

agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim 

to be extinguished.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124; see also Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 

F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If the claim is plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption is not 

mandated simply because the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense.”). 

Here, Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiffs’ claim for reporting-time pay concerns a 

right conferred by state law. (See Dkt. No. 21 at 6 (recognizing “the existence of a state law 

mandate to pay reporting time wages” when the Wage Order’s provisions are met), 9 (“The 

LMRA preemption issue is whether it is necessary to interpret the CBA to determine whether the 

employee possesses that right in the first instance”).) Because Plaintiffs’ claim for reporting-time 

pay arises under state law and would exist with or without the CBA, the first prong of the 

Burnside test is not met. Thus, the Court turns to the second prong to determine whether 

Plaintiffs’ reporting-time pay claim is “substantially dependent on analysis” of the CBA. See 

Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059. It is not. 

Defendant argues that whether Plaintiffs are owed reporting-time pay “depends on whether 

the mutually agreed standby system amounts to an employer-imposed requirement that operators 

on standby ‘report for work.’” (Dkt. No. 19 at 16.) Thus, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ 

reporting-time pay claim is preempted by the LMRA because resolution of the claim requires 

interpretation of the CBA’s terms. The Court agrees that whether Plaintiffs are entitled to 

reporting-time pay pursuant to the Wage Order hinges on whether Shell’s standby shift policy 

required Plaintiffs to “report for work” by being available telephonically during the standby 

periods. However, Defendant has not demonstrated that determining the answer to that question 

requires interpretation of the CBA; instead, it requires interpretation of the Wage Order and 

California case law. In other words, the dispositive issue—whether merely being on standby and 

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available telephonically constitutes “report[ing] for work” under the meaning of the Wage 

Order—is a question of law. The CBA offers no guidance on that score. Indeed, Defendant 

recognizes as much and fails to cite any specific provisions of the CBA that are in dispute and 

require interpretation. (See Dkt. No. 19 at 9-10 (“[T]he CBA does not expressly define ‘report.’ 

Rather, to glean a definition would require careful review and construction of the CBA’s several 

terms on shift scheduling, standby call-outs, and compensation.”)); see also Sarmiento, 367 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1146 (noting that prong two of the Burnside test is not satisfied where defendant’s 

motion “fails to identify any particular CBA provision that must be interpreted”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Simply put, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant is required to compensate them for reportingtime pay that Plaintiffs earn during the standby periods (i.e., the 1.5-hour time periods during 

which Shell requires its standby employees be available telephonically) and Defendant does not 

dispute that Shell does not pay its operators for that time. The Court need only “look to” the CBA 

to see that the standby shift policy exists as alleged by Plaintiffs. (See Dkt. No. 4, Ex. A at 92 

(providing, in pertinent part: “Standby personnel must be available during the period extending 30 

minutes prior to and one hour after the beginning of the shift for which designated as standby[,]” 

and “[s]tandby personnel must provide a telephone number at which they can be reached during 

the standby period and/or will be expected to carry a pager in the event they are not able to be 

reached directly by telephone.”).) The CBA further provides, in pertinent part: “Standby 

personnel must be able to assume the duties for which they are called within a reasonable time 

period of being contacted to report to work. This time period is not to exceed two hours.” (Id.) 

The cited provisions track Plaintiffs’ allegations. Thus, resolution of Plaintiffs’ reporting-time pay 

claim and derivative claims, which are premised on Shell’s failure to compensate Plaintiffs during 

the standby period, does not require substantial analysis or interpretation of the CBA. 

Defendant’s citation to the district court’s recent decision in Wood v. Marathon Refining 

Logistics Serv. LLC, No. 19-cv-04287-YGR, 2019 WL 6612252 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019) is 

unpersuasive. (See Dkt. No. 23.) The plaintiffs in Wood brought suit pursuant to the same Wage 

Order at issue here based on a standby shift policy that, as alleged, is nearly identical to the 

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challenged policy in this case. See 2019 WL 6612252, at *1. The Wood court determined that the 

plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by the LMRA because, as pleaded, the plaintiffs’ complaint 

would require the court “to wade into a maze of nuanced and ambiguous provisions in multiple, 

heavily-negotiated agreements.” Id. at *4. In making that determination, the Wood court cited

key ambiguities in the plaintiffs’ complaint that required CBA interpretation. See id. (“It is not at 

all clear based on plaintiffs’ complaint the extent to which this case involves a ‘mandatory’ 

standby obligation or a ‘voluntary’ one, and in any event, whether ‘crews’ created standby shift 

systems for their own convenience or used defendant’s default procedure.”). Such ambiguities are 

not present here. The court further cited specific terms and phrases in the challenged policy that 

the court would need to examine and interpret to adjudicate the case. Id. (“For example, to 

determine the extent of the alleged constraints on plaintiffs’ time during standby shifts, the [c]ourt 

would have to analyze terms pursuant to which standby employees may ‘trade or otherwise 

exchange standby assignments,’ may notify defendant if they are ‘otherwise unavailable when on 

standby,’ and must reach the refinery ‘within a reasonable time’ after receiving a call.’”). The 

court concluded that “[s]uch interpretation requires more than simply flipping through the CBAs 

and related guidelines.” (See id.)

Similar issues of interpretation are not present here. Indeed, and as previously discussed, 

Defendant’s motion fails to cite any specific provisions of the CBA that are in dispute and require 

interpretation. Defendant’s belated oral argument identification of the provision stating that 

“Standby Coverage and Requirements” are “set forth as a guide which should cover most 

circumstances that arise” and that “exceptions . . . should be carefully considered and kept to a 

minimum” does not persuade the Court otherwise. (See Dkt. No. 4 at 92-93.) What “guide” 

means will not have to be interpreted by the Court; instead, the question will be how Defendant 

actually implements the policy. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to the extent 

it asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the LMRA. 

II. Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as 

failing to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts must accept 

all well-pleaded “factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 

1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The same assumption of truth does not apply, however, to legal 

conclusions or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Defendant argues that dismissal is warranted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that 

Plaintiffs’ reporting-time pay claim “fail[s] to allege[ ] an employer-imposed duty that they were 

required to report for work, and further fail to allege that they did report for work without being 

paid the minimum amounts required by [the Wage Order].” (Dkt. No. 19 at 7.) Defendant asserts 

that Plaintiffs’ derivative claims fall with the reporting-time claim, and also fail for independent 

reasons. (See id. at 23-27.) The Court addresses each claim in turn. 

A. Reporting-Time Pay Claim

As previously discussed, to state a claim for reporting-time pay Plaintiffs must allege that: 

(1) Shell required Plaintiffs to “report for work”; (2) Plaintiffs did report; and (3) Plaintiffs were 

not put to work. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11010 subd. 5. Thus, the threshold inquiry is 

whether Plaintiffs adequately allege that complying with Shell’s standby policy required refinery 

operators to “report for work.” Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claim fails because they “allege 

no more than that they were passive standby with no affirmative duty to call in or to otherwise 

affirmatively report to [Shell].” (Dkt. No. 19 at 7.) 

1. Plaintiffs have alleged that they were required to “report for work”

Plaintiffs allege—and the CBA demonstrates—that Shell’s standby policy requires that 

refinery operators assigned as standby personnel be available to receive a telephone call from 

Shell during the standby period (i.e., 1.5 hours) on the day or night of their scheduled standby 

shift. In other words, refinery operators must be on call for 1.5-hour periods on the date they are 

assigned as standby personnel. If Shell is unable to contact an assigned standby employee, that 

employee is subject to disciplinary action. (See Dkt. No. 18 at ¶ 3.) The issue then is whether 

requiring an employee to be on call pursuant to Shell’s standby policy plausibly constitutes 

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requiring that employee to “report for work” within the meaning of the Wage Order. Plaintiffs 

assert that it does, relying on the recent California Court of Appeal decision in Ward v. Tilly’s, 

Inc., 31 Cal. App. 5th 1167 (2019). The Court agrees. 

The Ward court addressed the meaning of “report for work” in the context of a wage order 

that contains a “Reporting Time Pay” provision identical to the one in the Wage Order at issue in 

this case. See Ward, 31 Cal. App. 5th at 1176-77 (quoting Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070, subd. 5 

(2001) and noting that the phrase “report for work” is not defined therein). The plaintiff in Ward 

sought reporting-time pay based on the defendant-employer’s practice of “on-call scheduling,” 

whereby:

Employees are assigned on-call shifts, but are not told until they call 

in two hours before their shifts start whether they should actually 

come in to work. If they are told to come in, they are paid for the 

shifts; if not, they do not receive any compensation for having been 

“on call.” 

Id. at 1170. The defendant “required employees to call in exactly two hours before the start of oncall shifts, and it treat[ed] calling in late for an on-call shift or failing to call in for an on-call shift 

the same as missing a regularly scheduled shift.” Id. at 1189 (alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff argued “that when on-call employees contact Tilly’s two 

hours before on-call shifts, they are ‘report[ing] for work’ within the meaning of the wage order, 

and thus are owed reporting time pay.” Id. at 1171. (alteration in original). The defendant 

countered that “employees ‘report for work’ only by physically appearing at the work site at the 

start of a scheduled shift,” and therefore “employees who call in and are told not to come to work 

are not owed reporting time pay.” Id. The court rejected the defendant’s argument, concluding: 

[T]he on-call scheduling alleged in this case triggers [the wage 

order’s] reporting time pay requirements. As we explain, on-call 

shifts burden employees, who cannot take other jobs, go to school, or 

make social plans during on-call shifts—but who nonetheless receive 

no compensation from Tilly’s unless they ultimately are called in to 

work. This is precisely the kind of abuse that reporting time pay was 

designed to discourage.

Id. After detailed discussion of the “regulatory history and purpose” of the wage order’s 

reporting-time pay requirement, the court explained:

[A]n employee need not necessarily physically appear at the 

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workplace to “report for work.” Instead, “report[ing] for work within 

the meaning of the wage order is best understood as presenting 

oneself as ordered. “Report for work,” in other words, does not have 

a single meaning, but instead is defined by the party who directs the 

manner in which the employee is to present himself or herself for 

work—that is, by the employer. 

As thus interpreted, the reporting time pay requirement operates as 

follows. If an employer directs employees to present themselves for 

work by physically appearing at the workplace at the shift’s start, then 

the reporting time requirement is triggered by the employee’s 

appearance at the job site. But if the employer directs employees to 

present themselves for work by logging on to a computer remotely, 

or by appearing at a client’s job site, or by setting out on a trucking 

route, then the employee “reports for work” by doing those 

things. And if, as plaintiff alleges in this case, the employer directs 

employees to present themselves for work by telephoning the store 

two hours prior to the start of a shift, then the reporting time 

requirement is triggered by the telephonic contact.

Id. at 1185. The court noted that its holding that “employees may be owed reporting time pay for 

on-call shifts [was] consistent with” the California Supreme Court’s holding in Augustus v. ABM 

Sec. Servs., Inc., 2 Cal. 5th 257 (2016). Id. at 1186. The Augustus court held that requiring 

employees to remain on call during 10-minute rest periods violated California wage-and-hour law, 

which requires “that employers relinquish any control over how employees spend their break time, 

and relieve their employees of all duties—including the obligation that an employee remain on 

call.” 2 Cal. 5th at 273. The Ward court noted that although Augustus did not address reportingtime pay, its analysis was instructive in Ward because there the defendant’s on-call requirement 

similarly “limit[ed] how employees can user their off-duty time” and was thus “inconsistent with 

being off-duty, . . . trigger[ing] the reporting time pay requirement.” 31 Cal. App. 5th at 1187. 

Here, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Shell’s standby policy is 

similarly “inconsistent with being off-duty” in that it requires assigned employees to make

themselves available for 1.5 hours on a scheduled date to possibly receive a phone call to work a 

standby shift. During those 1.5-hour periods Plaintiffs were in limbo and could not engage in an 

activity that would interfere with receiving a phone call. As a result, Plaintiffs were not truly offduty during the standby period because Shell limited what they could do and when they could do 

it. Plaintiffs have thus sufficiently alleged that the Wage Order’s reporting-time pay mandate is 

triggered, as it was in Ward. 

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Defendant attempts to distinguish Ward primarily because the employees in that case were 

required to actively telephone their employer and were not, like Plaintiffs here, passively waiting 

for a call from their employer. (See Dkt. No. 19 at 21-22 (“There is no allegation that [Defendant] 

directs employees to present themselves in any manner—whether to physically go to the refinery, 

to call in, to log into [sic] a computer remotely, or to otherwise affirmatively contact the refinery 

in any manner.”) (emphasis omitted).) That is a distinction without a difference, however, and the 

Ward court’s reasoning applies with equal—and arguably greater—force on the facts alleged here. 

The employees in Ward at least knew definitively two hours prior to the start of their on-call shift 

whether or not they would be required to work, and they needed access to a phone only long 

enough to make the required call. Conversely, the standby employees in this case must wait for 

their phone to ring within the standby period. In other words, for the entire standby period the 

assigned employees must ensure that they are in a location where they can accept a telephone call. 

They must also ensure that they are within a two-hour commute from the Martinez refinery, in the 

event that Shell does call. Further, the standby period in this case produces the same constraints 

noted by the Ward court; specifically, “at the time employees are required [to be on-call] to find 

out whether they will be required to work on-call shifts, they cannot do things that are 

incompatible with making [or taking] a phone call, such as sleeping, watching a movie, taking a 

class, or being without cell phone service.” See Ward, 31 Cal. App. 5th at 1183. 

Construing the factual allegations as true, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that 

Shell’s standby policy requiring Plaintiffs to be on call for pre-scheduled 1.5-hour periods did not 

require Plaintiffs to “report for work” within the meaning of the Wage Order. 

2. Plaintiffs have alleged that they did report and were not put to work

Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs fail to plead a reporting-time pay claim because 

they “disregard” the second element (i.e., “and does report”), “as well as the CBA’s actual 

compensation provisions,” which demonstrate that Defendant pays standby employees who are 

actually called in to cover a shift. (See Dkt. No. 19 at 22-23.) Not so. First, the complaint alleges 

that all operators at the Martinez refinery are subject to the mandatory standby policy and that all 

named Plaintiffs are current or former operators who worked at the Martinez refinery and “were 

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scheduled to cover standby shifts.” (See Dkt. No. 18 at ¶¶ 3, 10-13, 23.) Thus, Plaintiffs have 

plausibly alleged that they reported to work as required under the policy by making themselves 

available to receive a telephone call during the 1.5-hour standby period. Second, whether 

Defendant pays reporting-time wages to standby employees who are actually called in to cover a 

shift but then sent home because the person they were called to replace showed up in time to not 

be considered AWOL does not defeat Plaintiffs’ claim that failing to compensate standby 

employees for the 1.5-hour standby period when they are not actually called in violates the Wage 

Order. (See Dkt. No. 18 at ¶¶ 9 (“Shell does not credit its operators at its Martinez, California 

refinery for ‘reporting to work’ when the employee is scheduled for a standby shift and is not told 

that they have work during the standby shift.”), 24 (“Unless Plaintiffs or other operators were 

asked to work a standby shift, Shell did not provide them with any compensation, including 

reporting time pay.”).) 

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ reporting-time pay 

claim. The Court next addresses the independent grounds Defendant asserts regarding dismissal 

of Plaintiffs’ derivative claims. 

B. Failure to Pay Wages Upon Termination 

Defendant’s asserted grounds for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for failure 

to pay all wages earned at termination concern only one named Plaintiff—Mr. Synigal. Defendant 

argues that dismissal is warranted because the complaint fails to plead that Mr. Synigal was 

“personally . . . subject to standby coverage at any time during the past four years.” (Dkt. No. 19 

at 23.) Defendant is wrong. 

The complaint alleges that Mr. Synigal “worked as an operator at Shell’s Martinez refinery 

and separated from Shell’s employment days prior to the filing of [the original] complaint in June 

2019.” (Dkt. No. 18 at ¶ 13.) The complaint further alleges that “[d]uring the course of their 

employment, Plaintiffs were asked to cover designated, 12-hour standby shifts twice a day.” (Id.

at ¶ 23; see also id. (“During their employment with Shell, Plaintiffs have frequently been 

scheduled to cover standby shifts, which always involved a scheduled start time[ ] and . . . ending 

time[ ].”).) Thus, the claim is plausible because the complaint sufficiently alleges that Mr. Synigal 

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was subject to the challenged standby policy during the relevant time period. See Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 570 (holding that a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face” to survive dismissal). 

Defendant asserts no other basis for dismissing this claim. Accordingly, the Court denies 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the second cause of action. 

C. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements

California Labor Code § 226 requires an employer to provide its employees “an accurate 

and itemized statement in writing showing:

(1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee, 

except as provided in subdivision (j), (3) the number of piece-rate 

units earned and any applicable piece rate if the employee is paid on 

a piece-rate basis, (4) all deductions, provided that all deductions 

made on written orders of the employee may be aggregated and 

shown as one item, (5) net wages earned, (6) the inclusive dates of the 

period for which the employee is paid, (7) the name of the employee 

and only the last four digits of his or her social security number or an 

employee identification number other than a social security number, 

(8) the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer and, 

if the employer is a farm labor contractor, as defined in subdivision 

(b) of Section 1682, the name and address of the legal entity that 

secured the services of the employer, and (9) all applicable hourly 

rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of 

hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee . . . . 

Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a). To state a claim for a wage statement violation under section 226, a 

plaintiff must allege: (1) a violation of Section 226(a); (2) that is knowing and intentional; and (3) 

“an injury resulted from the violation.” Achal v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 781, 810 

(N.D. Cal. 2015). 

Plaintiffs’ third cause of action alleges that Shell failed to provide them with accurate wage 

statements that “include correct numbers for total hours worked, gross wages earned, net wages 

earned, applicable hourly rates for the pay period at issue, and other information required by 

law[,]” in violation of Labor Code sections 226, 226.3. (Dkt. No. 18 at ¶ 46.) The gravamen of 

this claim is that Shell failed to accurately report and calculate reporting-time pay on the wage 

statements. (See id. at ¶¶ 46-47.) Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ wage statement claim on 

the grounds that “unpaid reporting time pay is not an earned wage, and it has no place on a 

statement of wages paid.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 25; see also Dkt. No. 21 at 13 (asserting that section 

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226 “has no mandate for inclusion of wages not paid the employee may later claim are due for 

hours not worked”) (emphasis omitted).) Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege an 

injury resulting from any alleged omission. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 

1. “Unpaid reporting time pay is not an earned wage”

California courts recognize that reporting-time pay constitutes a wage. See, e.g., Murphy 

v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1111-12 (2007) (noting that “reporting-time pay is 

compensation”); Shine v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 23 Cal. App. 5th 1070, 1077 (2018) 

(“[R]eporting-time pay is a form of wages.”) (citing Murphy, 40 Cal. 4th at 1111-12). 

Defendant’s argument that unpaid reporting time-pay need not be included on a wage statement 

because it is not an “earned wage” misses the point. (See Dkt. No. 19 at 24-25.) This claim is 

derivative of Plaintiffs’ reporting-time pay claim and, as previously discussed, Plaintiffs have 

adequately alleged that they are entitled to (i.e., that they earned) reporting-time pay during the 

standby period by making themselves available as required. It follows that if Plaintiffs earned

reporting-time pay during the relevant time period and were not properly compensated, then the 

wage statements furnished to them during that time were not accurate because they did not include 

all wages earned. 

Further, even if this were a standalone claim and not derivative claim of Plaintiffs’ 

reporting-time pay claim, Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient. The complaint alleges that 

“[r]eporting time pay was not accurately reported or calculated, such that no calculations could be 

performed to derive the accurate times, rates, and pay that should have been part of their 

compensation.” (Dkt. No. 18 at ¶ 47.) Plaintiffs do not allege, as Defendant seems to suggest,

that the wage statements were inaccurate because they did not include reference to unpaid

reporting-time wages. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that they “could not easily and promptly determine 

from their wage statements that they had been properly paid,” primarily because Shell failed to 

accurately report and calculate reporting-time pay. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-47.) Those allegations are 

sufficient at the pleading stage to state a section 226 wage statement claim. 

Defendant’s reliance on Ward for the proposition that reporting-time pay “is not an earned 

wage” is misplaced. (See Dkt. No. 19 at 24-25 (quoting Ward, 31 Cal. App. 5th at 1184).) Ward

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did not address whether employers must include reporting-time pay on wage statements. Further, 

the language Defendant cites discusses the general “goals” of the reporting-time pay mandate; it 

does not squarely address whether reporting-time pay is an “earned wage.” (See id.) Similarly, 

Defendant presents no authority for the proposition that an employer need not include reportingtime pay on wage statements because it does not reflect hours actually worked. (See id. at 24.) 

Indeed, that argument appears contrary to California law. See Murphy, 40 Cal. 4th at 1113 (noting 

that employers “must pay up to four hours of [reporting-time] wages even if the employee 

performed no work”). In the absence of any authority to the contrary, the Court cannot say on this 

record that Plaintiffs’ wage statement claim fails as a matter law because wage statements need 

not reflect reporting-time pay. 

2. Whether Plaintiffs have alleged an injury 

Labor Code § 226 provides that an employee suffers an injury for purposes of a wage 

statement claim when “the employer fails to provide accurate and complete information as 

required under subdivision (a) and: 

the employee cannot promptly and easily determine from the 

wage statement alone one or more of the following:

(i) The amount of the gross wages or net wages paid to the 

employee during the pay period or any of the other 

information required to be provided on the itemized wage 

statement pursuant to items (2) to (4), inclusive, (6), and (9) 

of subdivision (a).

Cal. Lab. Code § 226(e)(2)(B)(i). “[T]he injury requirement is minimal[,]” and “hinges on 

whether an employee can ‘promptly and easily determine’ from the wage statement, standing 

alone, the information need to know whether he or she is being underpaid.” Novoa v. Charter 

Commc’n, LLC, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1029 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 

Defendant argues that dismissal is warranted because “nothing in the Labor Code requires 

that the employer list amounts not being made for hours not worked,” and even if it did, such an 

“omission would not give rise to the presumption of injury.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 25.) Again, 

Defendant appears to misconstrue Plaintiffs’ wage statement claim to the extent Defendant 

suggests that the alleged violation is based on a failure to itemize reporting-time wages that 

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Plaintiffs did not earn. (See Dkt. No. 21 at 14 (arguing that the dispositive issue is “whether 

unearned wages not paid for hours not worked belong on a wage statement”) (emphasis omitted).) 

The complaint alleges that Plaintiffs did earn reporting-time pay and that the wage statements did 

not accurately reflect the amounts earned. (See Dkt. No. 18 at ¶¶ 46-47 (alleging that Plaintiffs

“could not easily and promptly determine from their wage statements that they had been properly 

paid” because reporting-time wages were “not accurately reported or calculated, such that no 

calculations could be performed to derive the accurate times, rates, and pay that should have been 

part of their compensation”).) Plaintiffs’ allegations as a whole give rise to a plausible inference 

that Shell omitted or did not accurately calculate compensable reporting-time wages from 

Plaintiffs’ wage statements. Those allegations are sufficient to allege an injury under Labor Code 

§ 226. See Novoa, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 1029-30 (finding injury for purposes of wage statement 

claim where wage statement at issue “omitted potentially compensable hours and the appropriate 

rate of pay for those hour[s]”). 

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss the third cause of action. 

D. Unfair Competition Law Claim

The UCL prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, “unfair competition,” defined as “any 

unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Each 

of these three adjectives captures a separate and distinct theory of liability.” Rubio v. Capital One 

Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Shell’s reporting-time pay practices constitute both an 

“unlawful” and “unfair” business practice. Defendant argues that dismissal is warranted because: 

(1) Plaintiffs’ underlying Labor Code claims fail; and (2) Plaintiffs “have no available UCL 

remedy in any event.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 26). The Court addresses each argument in turn. 

1. “Unlawful” conduct and underlying Labor Code claims

UCL claims under the unlawful prong “borrow[ ] violations of other laws . . . and make[ ] 

those unlawful practices actionable under the UCL.” Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 152 

Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1554 (2007). “Thus, a violation of another law is a predicate for stating a 

cause of action under the UCL’s unlawful prong.” Id. Accordingly, UCL claims under the 

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unlawful prong “stand or fall depending on the fate of the antecedent substantive causes of 

action.” Krantz v. BT Visual Images, LLC, 89 Cal. App. 4th 164, 178 (2001). 

Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ Labor Code claims survive dismissal. Thus, 

Plaintiffs’ UCL claim based on Defendant’s allegedly “unlawful” conduct survives as well. 

2. UCL remedy 

Restitution and injunctive relief are the only remedies available under the UCL. Korea 

Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Co., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1144 (2003). “[E]arned wages that are due 

and payable pursuant to [the Labor Code]” are “a restitutionary remedy authorized by the UCL.” 

Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 163, 177-78 (2000). Plaintiffs allege 

that Shell’s standby policy denied them “wages earned, due and payable,” and Plaintiffs seek 

restitution of those amounts. (See Dkt. No. 18 at ¶ 54.) Defendant asserts that dismissal is 

warranted because reporting-time wages “are not wages earned,” but are instead “remedies that 

arise out of the employers’ conduct, and not the employee’s efforts.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 26 (citing 

Pineda v. Bank of Am., N.A., 50 Cal. 4th 1389, 1401-02 (2010).) The Court disagrees. 

First, Pineda did not hold that unpaid reporting-time wages are not recoverable under the 

UCL. The court instead recognized that employees could seek restitution of unpaid wages under 

the UCL but held that penalties under Labor Code § 203 for failure to make timely payment of 

wages to an employee who is terminated or who quits are not recoverable. See Pineda, 50 Cal. 

4th at 1402 (“We thus hold section 203 penalties cannot be recovered as restitution under the 

UCL.”). In so holding the court reasoned that “it is the employers’ action (or inaction) that gives 

rise to section 203 penalties. The vested interest in unpaid wages, on the other hand, arises out of 

the employees’ action, i.e., their labor.” Id. at 1402. 

As previously discussed, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they earned reporting-time 

pay by complying with Shell’s standby policy and making themselves available during the standby 

period and that Shell failed to compensate them for that time. Further, California courts recognize 

that “reporting-time pay, like split shift and overtime pay, is a form of wages even though it serves 

the dual purpose of shaping employer behavior.” Shine, 23 Cal. App. 5th at 1077 (citing Murphy, 

40 Cal. 4th at 1111-12). Thus, absent authority that reporting-time pay cannot constitute an 

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“earned wage” recoverable as a restitutionary remedy under the UCL, the Court cannot say that 

Plaintiffs’ UCL claim fails as a matter of law. 

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ UCL claim. 

E. Private Attorney General Act Claim

Under the PAGA, “an aggrieved employee” may sue “on behalf of himself or herself and 

other current or former employees” to recover civil penalties under the Labor Code that could 

otherwise “be assessed and collected by the Labor and Workforce Development Agency. Cal. 

Lab. Code § 2699(a). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ PAGA claim fails because their underlying 

claims “under the Labor Code are ill-disguised LRMA claims.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 27.) As 

previously discussed, Defendant’s LRMA preemption argument is unavailing. Thus, the Court 

denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss the PAGA claim to the extent it is premised on grounds of 

preemption. 

Defendant further argues that “even if analyzed under state law, the [underlying] Labor 

Code claims” fail. For the reasons previously discussed, Plaintiffs’ Labor Code claims survive 

dismissal. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ PAGA claim. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

This Order disposes of Docket No. 19. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2020

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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