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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 12, 1998 Decided August 28, 1998

No. 97-5121

Stephen S. Adams, et al.,

Appellants

v.

James F. Hinchman,

Acting Comptroller General of the United States General

Accounting Office, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(95cv02015)

Jules Bernstein argued the cause for appellants. With him

on the briefs were Linda Lipsett and Edgar N. James.

Wendy M. Keats, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were

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Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and Barbara C. Biddle, Assistant Director, U.S. Department of Justice.

Edgar N. James was on the brief for amicus curiae Federal

Law Enforcement Officers Association. Martha L. Walfoort

entered an appearance.

Before: Randolph, Rogers, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: This is an appeal from the district court's

judgment rejecting the claims of 14,122 current and former

federal criminal investigators or other law enforcement officers. The plaintiffs were employed between 1984 and 1995 in

federal agencies such as the Customs Service, the Secret

Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the Drug Enforcement

Agency and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.1

Between February 16, 1990, and December 13, 1995, they

filed civil actions in the Court of Federal Claims alleging that

they had been wrongfully classified as exempt from the

overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act

("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. s 201 et seq. During the same period,

each employee also filed an administrative claim at the Government Accounting Office. Of the 14,122 employees, 11,247

brought suit before June 30, 1994.

In a consolidated case, the Court of Federal Claims held

that certain grades of employees--namely, GS-9 and GS-11

investigators at BATF, DEA, IRS, and Secret Service, and

GS-9 investigators at Customs Service--were not exempt

from FLSA, and thus had been entitled to overtime pay.

Adams v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 5 (1992). On March 16,

1994, these plaintiffs entered into settlement agreements with

__________

1 The original defendants were then Comptroller General of the

General Accounting Office Charles A. Bowsher, and the heads of

the various federal agencies. On September 30, 1996, Mr. Bowsher

retired. The acting Comptroller General, James Hinchman, was

substituted as defendant.

the United States. The agreements gave the plaintiffs "back

pay and interest ... for the two-year period prior to the date

that each such plaintiff filed suit" but did not prejudice their

rights to pursue administrative remedies. Counsel then corresponded with the GAO regarding the pending administrative claims.

The authority of the GAO to settle claims against the

United States is found in the Barring Act, 31 U.S.C. s 3702.2

According to the GAO, "to settle a claim means to administratively determine the validity of that claim.... Settlement

includes the making of both factual and legal determinations.

The authority to settle and adjust claims does not, however,

include the authority to compromise claims." General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law

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11-6 (1982); see also Illinois Surety Co. v. United States ex

rel. Peeler, 240 U.S. 214, 219 (1916). Under 31 U.S.C.

s 3702(b)(1)(A), a claim against the government "must be

received ... within six years after the claim accrues except

... as provided in this chapter or another law."

Lawsuits for back pay under FLSA are subject to the

Portal-to-Portal Act's statute of limitations--two years for

non-willful violations and three years for willful ones.3 See 29

U.S.C. s 255(a). Shortly after FLSA coverage was extended

to federal employees, however, the GAO ruled that "the time

limitation for the filing of claims by federal employees under

the FLSA which may be considered by our office is six

years...." In re Transportation Sys. Ctr., 57 Comp. Gen.

441 (1978). The GAO relied in part on a letter from the Civil

Service Commission, reasoning that the language of 29 U.S.C.

s 255--which spoke exclusively in terms of a "cause of ac-

__________

2 The GAO's authority to settle federal employees' compensation claims has since been transferred to the Office of Personnel

Management. See 31 U.S.C.A. s 3702(a)(2) (West Supp. 1998).

3 One of the purposes of the Portal-to-Portal Act, enacted in

response to Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680

(1946), was to substitute a uniform federal limitations period for the

diverse periods provided under state law. See Carter v. Panama

Canal Co., 463 F.2d 1289, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

tion"--limited it to judicial proceedings and did not apply to

administrative claims. See also Principles 11-22 ("[T]he

time limit for filing a claim under the Fair Labor Standards

Act is the six years prescribed by [then-] 31 U.S.C. s 71a,

notwithstanding a two-year statute of limitations for commencing actions at law. Thus, a claim filed under the FLSA

more than two years but less than six years after it accrued

could still be considered administratively, although the claimant would have lost his recourse to the courts.").

In back pay and overtime cases, the statute of limitations

determines how many years of compensation each claimant

receives. Since these are continuing claims, a separate cause

of action accrues each payday. A six-year statute of limitations means that an employee could recover six years of back

pay or overtime compensation dating from the time he or she

first filed suit.

On May 23, 1994, the GAO overruled Transportation Systems Center.4 In In re Joseph M. Ford, 73 Comp. Gen. 157

(1994), the GAO held that the shorter statute of limitations

found in the Portal-to-Portal Act would henceforth be applied "in the settlement of pending and future FLSA claims

filed with GAO by federal employees." The GAO concluded

that 29 U.S.C. s 255 was "another law"--and thus an exception to the six-year limitation period in 31 U.S.C.

s 3701(b)(1)(A).

On July 1, 1994, Senator Sarbanes introduced legislation

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intended, he said, "to reverse a very destructive ruling by the

General Accounting Office to apply a retroactive change in

the statute of limitations from 6 years to 2 years for Federal

employees to file back pay claims under" FLSA. 140 Cong.

Rec. S8400 (July 1, 1994). As enacted on September 30,

1994, s 640 of the Treasury, Postal Service and General

Government Appropriations Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-329,

108 Stat. 2383, 2432, provided:

__________

4 In doing so, the GAO also overruled In re Henry G. Tomkowiak, 67 Comp. Gen. 247 (1988), and In re Federal Firefighters, 68

Comp. Gen. 681 (1989), which had applied the six-year statute of

limitations.

In the administration of Section 3702 of title 31, United

States Code, the Comptroller General of the United

States shall apply a 6-year statute of limitations to any

claim of a Federal Employee under the Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. s 201 et seq.) for claims

filed before June 30, 1994.

Senator Sarbanes added that while "the underlying question

regarding the appropriate length of the statute of limitation

for FLSA claims is one of continuing debate ... under no

circumstances should GAO apply the proposed change retroactively." 140 Cong. Rec. S8400.

In what was apparently its first decision after passage of

s 640, the GAO applied a six-year statute of limitations to

claims filed on May 22, 1989, and pending before it as of June

30, 1994. See In re Molly D. Kinsley, 1995 WL 9720 (Jan. 9,

1995). The GAO explained that s 640 "obviates the need for

us to discuss the effect, if any, of Joseph M. Ford. ... In light

of section 640, the Ford holding is applicable only to claims

filed on or after June 30, 1994." Id. at n.7.

Meanwhile, counsel for the employees again contacted the

GAO and requested a meeting to resolve pending claims in

light of s 640. The GAO acknowledged that "the Act of

Congress has modified our Ford decision" but pointed out

that "our regulations require that the agency from which the

claim originated shall initially adjudicate the claim. See 4

C.F.R. s 31.4 (1994)." 5 Counsel then brought their clients'

claims to the attention of the employing agencies, each of

which responded that s 640 gave specific authority to apply a

six-year statute of limitations only to the Comptroller Gener-

__________

5 4 C.F.R. s 31.4 provides in part:

A claimant should file his or her claim with the administrative

agency or department out of whose activities the claim arose.

The agency shall initially adjudicate the claim. If the claimant

is not satisfied with the agency's determination, he or she may

appeal that determination to the Claims Group, General Accounting Office. Claims which cannot be resolved by the

department or agency shall be transmitted to the Claims

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Group, General Accounting Office, for resolution.

al and that the agencies themselves were without statutory

authority to do so. Counsel appealed these denials to the

GAO, but the GAO did not respond. However, with regard to

an unrelated FLSA case, the GAO informed the Personnel

Director of the U.S. Customs Service that it did "not intend

to issue a decision in Marvin B. Atkinson ... until the

Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Bill, 1996 ... is enacted (because of the possible

retroactive repeal of s 640)."

In November 1995, Congress amended s 640 to state:

This section shall not apply to any claim where the

employee has received any compensation for overtime

hours worked during the period covered by the claim

under any other provision of law, including, but not

limited to, 5 U.S.C. 5545(c), or to any claim for compensation for time spent commuting between the employee's

residence and duty station.

Pub. L. No. 104-52, 109 Stat. 468. Introducing this amendment, Representative Lightfoot said that the GAO, in its 1978

decision, "made a mistake and established regulations stating

that Federal employees can get up to 6 years back pay for

overtime claims" under the FLSA. The GAO discovered and

corrected "its mistake," but then the 103d Congress "reversed GAO, and passed a law allowing Federal workers to

get up to 6 years back pay. The problem is that this act will

cost as much as $460 million.... The conferees were faced

with a choice--either pay hundreds of millions for work done

many years ago ... or give the Federal workers the same

rights as their private sector counterparts.... [W]e included language providing for the same treatment for public and

private workers ... not just because it costs a lot of money,

but because it is fair." 141 Cong. Rec. H12376 (Nov. 15,

1995).

After the amendment of s 640, the GAO decided Atkinson,

a case in which the plaintiffs here had been granted leave to

intervene. In re Marvin B. Atkinson, 1996 WL 31212 (Jan.

29, 1996). Atkinson's claim had been filed on January 1, 1994,

and sought compensation for the time he spent traveling

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between home and work travel while driving a government

vehicle. Atkinson's employing agency denied his claim after

the GAO decided Ford; he based his administrative appeal on

the original s 640. The GAO held that "the November 19,

1995 amendment to section 640 effectively reestablishes the

two-year statute of limitations for any claim where the employee has received overtime pay under any other law or any

claim for time spent commuting. We see no basis for the

assertion that this amendment does not apply to Mr. Atkinson's claim." Id.

On October 27, 1995--before passage of the amendment to

s 640 or the GAO's decision in Atkinson--plaintiffs brought

this action in district court seeking "mandamus and injunctive

and declaratory relief." The complaint challenged Ford's

adoption of a shortened, retroactive statute of limitation; the

GAO's insistence that plaintiffs bring their claims before their

respective agencies; the refusal of those agencies to grant the

claims; and the GAO's refusal to pass on their appeals. In

Supplemental Complaints dated December 13, 1995, and January 29, 1996, plaintiffs added the amendment to s 640 and

the GAO's decision in Atkinson to their list of requests for

declaratory relief.

Plaintiffs alleged that the GAO's decision in Ford and the

amendment to s 640 had offended due process. They asserted property interests in their back pay claims before the GAO

and in their earned but unpaid compensation.6 On October

10, 1996, the district court (Judge June L. Green) granted

defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court later

denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Our review of a

grant of summary judgment is de novo. With one exception,

we shall affirm the district court's judgment substantially for

__________

6 On appeal, plaintiffs also maintain that they have a property

interest in the statute of limitations itself. Brief for Appellants at

45. They cite no support for the assertion of such an interest and

we are aware of none. As explained earlier, the amount of overtime

that plaintiffs can claim is limited by the governing statute of

limitations. Thus the two are essentially the same and the same

analysis applies.

the reasons stated in the court's thorough and well-reasoned

opinion.7

The district court held that the GAO's prior application of a

six-year statute of limitations had been an error. Adams v.

Bowsher, 946 F. Supp. 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1996). It decided that

plaintiffs had no property interest in their pending administrative claims because "a cause of action ... affords no

definite or enforceable property right until reduced to a final

judgment." Id. at 41 (quoting Austin v. City of Bisbee,

Arizona, 855 F.2d 1429, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988)). See also

Sowell v. American Cyanamid Co., 888 F.2d 802, 805 (11th

Cir. 1989); Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8 (1st Cir.

1986). Without reaching the issue whether enactment of the

original s 640 gave certain plaintiffs property rights in their

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unpaid overtime, we agree with the district court that any

such property interest could be extinguished so long as the

retroactive economic legislation met the guarantees of due

process. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181,

191 (1992). Analyzing the legislative history of the amendment to s 640, the district court found that the statute had a

"legitimate legislative purpose which was furthered by rational means." 946 F. Supp. at 44 (relying on Pension Benefit

Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984)

and Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15

(1976)). The court emphasized that Representative Lightfoot's statement indicated a desire to promote fairness and to

equate "the rights enjoyed by federal employees to those of

private sector employees." 946 F. Supp. at 43.

__________

7 Appellees have moved to strike section III of plaintiffappellants' reply brief on the ground that it raised issues not

advanced in their opening brief. Plaintiffs there contended for the

first time that the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. s 5596, and the Civil

Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. s 7121(a), display congressional intent

to treat federal and private sector employees differently. See

Reply Brief for Appellants at 10-13. It is our practice not to

consider any issue "raised for the first time in a reply brief," a point

at which the opposing side has no opportunity to respond. See

Rollins Environmental Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 652 n.2

(D.C. Cir. 1991). We grant the motion to strike.

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As for plaintiffs' equal protection claim, the district court

determined that plaintiffs and the Kinsley claimants, whose

claims had been subject to a six-year statute of limitations,

were not similarly situated. Id. at 45. Unlike the claimants

in Kinsley, plaintiffs did not have a sufficiently developed

factual record for their claims to be processed by the GAO

prior to the enactment of the amendment. In addition,

plaintiffs charged that the GAO violated the Administrative

Procedure Act in deciding Ford and in failing to handle their

cases in a timely fashion--i.e., before s 640 was amended.

Such claims were moot, the district court concluded, because

Congress "had impliedly adopted the two or three-year limitation period" and the amendment "passe[d] constitutional

muster." 946 F. Supp. at 45. Thus the Ford and Atkinson

decisions were valid and it was beyond the power of the court

to compel the GAO to apply a longer statute of limitations.

While we therefore are in general agreement with the

district court, we cannot affirm the portion of the court's

decision holding that plaintiffs' "property" had not been taken

without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. See Adams, 946 F. Supp. at 44.

Applying the test for a compensable taking set forth in

Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211,

224-25 (1986), the district court concluded that any economic

impact on individual plaintiffs was slight, that the amended

s 640 did not "unduly interfere with a distinct investmentbacked expectation," and that "the nature of the action taken

by Congress is not inconsistent with the purpose behind the

takings clause." 946 F. Supp. at 44.

Repeating the argument they made below, plaintiffs argue

that "deprivation of [their] previously earned FLSA wages

constitutes an unlawful taking of [their] labor without just

compensation under the Fifth Amendment." Brief for Appellants at 19. We are without jurisdiction to decide this claim.

The usual remedy for unconstitutional takings is "a suit for

money damage (i.e., the 'just compensation' that the Constitution assures) under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal

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Claims, 28 U.S.C. s 1491...." 8 Student Loan Marketing

Ass'n v. Riley, 104 F.3d 397, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1997). "Except in

cases in which the amount in controversy is less than $10,000,

in which event jurisdiction is concurrent with the federal

district courts, see 29 U.S.C. s 1346(a)(2), the Federal Claims

Court's jurisdiction in such actions is exclusive." Railway

Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 987 F.2d 806, 816

(D.C. Cir. 1993). While there may be certain exceptions

"involv[ing] mandates of direct transfers of money to the

government," see Student Loan Marketing Ass'n, 104 F.3d at

401 (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 493 (2d

Cir. 1995)), they are not applicable here. At oral argument,

counsel for the plaintiffs represented that each of their individual claims amounted to more than $10,000. If that were

true, the district court would not have had jurisdiction to hear

the taking claim in the first place. Even if each back pay

claim were less than $10,000 and jurisdiction was based on

the "Little Tucker Act" (28 U.S.C. s 1346(a)(2)), the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit--not us--

would have exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal. See 28

U.S.C. s 1295(a)(2). Either way then, plaintiffs' taking claim

is not properly before us.9 We therefore remand the takings

__________

8 In relevant part 28 U.S.C. s 1491(a)(1) provides:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United

States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of

Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or

upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or

for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in

tort.

9 After oral argument, the parties called our attention to two

recently decided cases--National Treas. Employees Union & Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 53 F.L.R.A. No. 134 (Feb. 27, 1998); and

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (June 25, 1998)

(plurality opinion). Neither decision affects the outcome of this

case. National Treasury Employees Union appears to support the

reasoning of the district court. In Eastern Enterprises, four Justices concluded that it was within the district court's power to

award equitable relief for a claim arising under the Takings Clause.

See 118 S. Ct. at 2145 (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d at

issue to the district court for a determination of whether

jurisdiction was proper under the Little Tucker Act, 28

U.S.C. s 1346(a)(2).

For the reasons stated above, the district court's grant of

summary judgment is affirmed in part and reversed and

remanded in part.

So ordered.

__________

493). Unlike Eastern Enterprises, plaintiffs here are not threatened with a taking by a "challenged statute" that "requires a direct

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transfer of funds" from them to the government. See id. Rather,

they seek compensation from the government for unpaid overtime.

The only effect of a longer statute of limitations would be to grant

plaintiffs more money. Thus the circumstances found to support

district court jurisdiction in Eastern Enterprises do not exist in this

case.

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