Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00764/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-00764-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOEL ALLEN PRITCHETT,

Petitioner,

 vs.

MELVIN HUNTER, 

Respondent. /

No. C 05-0764 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

This is a habeas case filed pro se by a petitioner who is confined for treatment

pursuant to the California Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”), section 6600 et seq. of

the California Welfare and Institutions Code. In its initial review order, the court dismissed

two issues as presenting only state law claims and issued an order to show cause as to the

remaining two issues. Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and

authorities in support of it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded

to the answer with a traverse. Having reviewed the briefs and the underlying record, the

court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the claims presented and

will deny the petition.

BACKGROUND

I. Civil Commitment Proceedings

The California Court of Appeal summarized the factual and procedural background

of the civil commitment proceedings in its opinion affirming the judgment on direct appeal:

Pritchett was named in a petition for SVP commitment in March

2002. Finding probable cause to believe he was likely to engage in

sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his release from custody,

the trial court set the petition for trial. (See § 6602.) The parties waived

their right to a jury.

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A. PREDICATE OFFENSES

1. First Predicate Offense

On July 3, 1992, Pritchett and two other Navy men were visiting the

home of their superior officer for the holiday weekend. The next day, after

consuming alcohol with the other men, Pritchett went to the room of his

host’s two-year-old daughter (hereafter, victim one). Victim one’s mother

later found him lying on victim one’s bed, with victim one on her back and

her legs spread apart. Pritchett’s hand was under the girl’s diaper,

rubbing her vagina. When he noticed the mother had entered the room,

Pritchett removed his hand from the diaper and started pointing to and

naming the child’s body parts. The mother changed the diaper and

observed redness around victim one’s vagina. Later victim one

complained that “my peeper hurts” and that one of the Navy men “would

not leave my peeper alone.” On July 7, 1992, Pritchett admitted to

investigating officers that he had placed his fingers in victim one’s diaper

and fondled her vagina. He could not explain his actions.

The following August, Pritchett pled guilty to a felony charge of lewd

acts with a child less than 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). The

court suspended imposition of sentence and granted him three years of

formal probation, with the conditions that he participate in counseling or

therapy as directed, not associate with minors unless in the company of a

responsible adult who knew of his commitment offense, register as a sex

offender under Penal Code section 290, and totally abstain from the use of

alcohol.

2. Second Predicate Offense 

While still on probation in February 1992, Pritchett moved in with

his half-brother Michael, Michael’s girlfriend, and their two-year-old son

(hereafter, victim two). Pritchett moved out in November 1993. [Footnote

omitted.]

In 1996, victim two underwent counseling for exhibiting sexually

inappropriate behavior and advised a family member that “Uncle Noel” let

him watch videos of girls kissing and played with his “pee pee.” When

confronted by law enforcement, Pritchett admitted that while under the

influence of alcohol, he played an X-rated video in front of victim two. He

also admitted that he fondled the boy’s genitals on perhaps four to six

occasions and orally copulated him two or three times.

In October 1996, Pritchett pled guilty to two counts of felony lewd

acts with a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), with an enhancement for a

prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)). Pritchett was

sentenced to state prison for 11 years.

B. PEOPLE’S EXPERT TESTIMONY

1. Dr. Fricke

Alfred Fricke, a clinical psychologist, had worked as a SVP

evaluator for the DMH for two years and had completed 20 evaluations. 

Dr. Fricke had conducted a SVP evaluation of Pritchett by reviewing his

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Department of Corrections and DMH files, court records, and police

reports, as well as interviewing him for three hours.

Dr. Fricke testified that Pritchett’s predicate offenses were violent,

sexual, and predatory in nature. He opined that Pritchett suffers from the

mental disorder of pedophilia. He also concluded that Pritchett is likely to

commit predatory, sexual crimes in the future if released, and has a

substantial impairment in his ability to control himself. Despite having

been incarcerated, discharged from the Navy, placed on probation, and

participating in counseling, Pritchett was unable to control himself and

molested a two-year-old boy in a family setting. His potential victim pool

includes both boys and girls, both inside and outside the family, and with

children too young to avoid him.

In characterizing the nature of Pritchett’s predicate offenses, Fricke

distinguished between those who molest within the family unit, who could

do so for complicated reasons such as anger at the wife or turning to the

child for love, from those who molest relative strangers, who are more

likely to be suffering pedophilia. Because victim one was a stranger,

Pritchett’s lewd act with her was predatory and violent. His sexual acts

with victim two were also predatory, since Pritchett had not molested him

due to any apparent family reason, but because of his pedophilia.

In evaluating the likelihood Pritchett would reoffend, Fricke

performed a Static-99 sex offender recidivism risk assessment analysis

(Static-99 test) and considered Pritchett’s risk factors. Fricke found that

Pritchett represented a 40 percent risk for committing a new sexual

offense, although not necessarily a sexually violent predatory offense,

within 15 years. He concluded that Pritchett posed a “substantial risk” of

reoffending. When confronted with a February 2002 written evaluation, in

which Fricke had characterized the likelihood that Pritchett would reoffend

as a “borderline situation,” he explained that he had described Pritchett’s

situation as “borderline” based on a standard of “more likely than not,” that

is, more than a 50 percent likelihood. The risk of Pritchett’s reoffending

was nevertheless “substantial,” and based upon a substantial risk

standard, his likelihood of reoffending was not marginal.

Dr. Fricke acknowledged that participation in group therapy could

reduce the likelihood of Pritchett reoffending, and Pritchett appeared able

to cooperate with treatment and probation. Nevertheless, Fricke believed

Pritchett would likely reoffend. The counseling Pritchett received after his

1992 conviction had not stopped him from reoffending, and he violated the

probation conditions precluding him from associating with minors alone

and consuming alcohol. For a period of time he had also failed to register

as a sex offender as required by Penal Code section 290. Due to

Pritchett’s past conduct and mental disorder of pedophilia, Fricke

concluded, parole restrictions would not remove the risk Pritchett poses to

the community.

2. Dr. Jackson

Charles Jackson, a licensed psychologist, had completed over 400

SVP evaluations. Dr. Jackson performed a SVP evaluation of Pritchett,

reviewing his Department of Corrections and DMH files, court records, 

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and police reports, and conducting a clinical interview with Pritchett for

nearly two hours.

Like Fricke, Jackson opined that Pritchett met the statutory criteria

for a SVP. Pritchett had been convicted of violent, predatory, sexual

offenses on two offenses. The 1992 molestation of victim one involved

not only substantial sexual conduct, but also duress due to the difference

in their height, weight, and age. It had a predatory nature, because victim

one was a “stranger” as defined by the Static-99 test. In addition, the

subsequent molestation of victim two was sexually violent with an element

of duress as well. It was also predatory: among other things, in

babysitting victim two he was nurturing or promoting a relationship for the

purpose of victimizing him, and he “groomed” victim two by showing him

pornographic movies.

Jackson diagnosed Pritchett as suffering from pedophilia,

nonexclusive type, with an attraction to both males and females. 

Additional diagnoses were alcohol abuse in remission and borderline

personality disorder.

Jackson believed that Pritchett would reoffend in a sexually violent

and predatory manner. A Static-99 test disclosed a moderate high risk for

reoffending, and Jackson believed the risk was greater because Pritchett

had victimized both a male and a female. Other risk factors included

Pritchett’s deviant preference for two-year-olds, the early onset of his

behavior at the age of 20, his failure to complete sex offender treatment,

his reoffending after treatment, his borderline personality disorder, and his

manipulative behavior in telling evaluators different stories about his past. 

In addition, Jackson opined, Pritchett lacks insight into the nature of his

mental illness, suggesting he will not be able to change his behavior.

C. PRITCHETT’S TESTIMONY

Pritchett was called as a witness by the prosecution, and testified in

the defense case as well. 

When he moved into the home of his brother Michael, Pritchett

testified, he informed Michael of the probation condition prohibiting him

from being alone with children and advised that he should not babysit

victim two. Pritchett’s probation officer also informed Michael and his wife

about the San Diego offense, and instructed them not to leave Pritchett

alone with victim two. Within a couple of weeks, however, Pritchett was

left to babysit victim two by himself. Pritchett felt obligated to babysit,

because he was a family member living in Michael’s home.

Pritchett did not enjoy being on probation. He felt like somebody

was trying to control his life, and he did not like being watched. He

admitted violating two of his probation conditions, which precluded him

from being alone with minors and consuming alcohol. He claimed he

consumed alcohol only after Michael and Kathy offered it to him. The

pornographic movies he showed victim two, Pritchett claimed, belonged to

Michael. He complied with the counseling condition, knowing he would go

to prison if he did not stop molesting children.

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Pritchett’s first molestation of victim two occurred less than two

months before he left Michael’s house - and about a month after he had

completed his counseling for his molestation of victim one. He again

asked not to be left alone with victim two, because he wanted to stop

abusing victim two but was afraid he could not stop. He molested victim

two again. Despite his regrets about what he had done to victim one and

the prospect of going to prison if caught, Pritchett was unable to stop

himself from molesting victim two.

Pritchett agreed he has the mental disorder of pedophilia. He

claimed, however, that he did not molest victim one or victim two due to

any sexual attraction to children and obtained no sexual gratification from

the acts. Instead, Pritchett asserted, he acted out of a desire for love and

acceptance, because throughout his childhood he had been pushed aside

by adults. While adults do not want to listen to him, Pritchett explained,

children are less judgmental. Pritchett now realizes it is inappropriate to

seek love and acceptance from children to the exclusion of adults.

If released, Pritchett offered, he would not put himself in the

position of being alone with minor children, would comply [with] all the

terms of his parole, and would even pay for a treatment program himself. 

Pritchett believed that while in prison he had “come to terms” with his past

behavior and would be honest with himself and his family.

D. DEFENSE EVIDENCE

1. Pritchett’s Mother

Pritchett’s mother, Floy Colleen Williams, testified that Pritchett and

Michael were raised as brothers. She and Michael discussed Pritchett’s

San Diego conviction before Pritchett moved in. Victim two was a

“friendly, affectionate child” who “was just always all over” Pritchett, had a

“friendly relationship” with him, and related to “Uncle Noel” as a family

member. Williams did not suspect anything unusual had happened

between Pritchett and victim two.

2. Dr. Coleman

Dr. Lee Coleman, a psychiatrist for 30 years, had opined over 20

times on forensic psychology and the diagnosis of mental disorder and

risk prevention in SVP cases, including the accuracy or legitimacy of the

diagnostic methods by which such risk is assessed.

Coleman opined that “pedophilia” as a “diagnosis” is improper and

fraudulent use of psychology. Pedophilia is not an expert finding, he

explained, but merely a description of behavior, lending a false air of

expertise to the opinion. In addition, Coleman asserted that the resort of

mental health professionals to certain “tools” renders them worse than

laypersons at forming opinions. Tools such as the Static-99 test to predict

human behavior are faulty and of little value since they rely on sets of data

collected by several different groups whose research, methodology, and

criteria may vary. Thus, in Coleman’s opinion, the Static-99 test is

confusing, distracting, and intellectually dishonest.

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Coleman acknowledged that Pritchett’s history of sex crimes fit the

definition of pedophilia, although a diagnosis of mental disorder could not

be based simply upon criminal conduct. Coleman also agreed that one

who has recurrent fantasies or actually commits sex acts with two or

three-year-old children has something mentally wrong with them. In

obvious situations, lay people can predict future behavior and do not

require an expert to make such predictions.

3. Dr. Wornian

Larry Wornian, a licensed psychologist with a doctorate in

counseling psychology, testified as an expert in the assessment and

treatment of sex offenders. His experience included working as a staff

psychologist at San Quentin Prison for over two years, running a program

providing assessment and treatment for incest offenders, preparing Penal

Code section 288 evaluations, and serving as a principal at the sex

offender treatment program at the Crossroads Psychotherapy Institute

(Crossroads). He likened Crossroads to the treatment program for SVP’s

at Atascadero State Hospital.

Dr. Wornian reviewed the evaluation reports prepared by Fricke

and Jackson, as well as Pritchett’s DMH records. Although he did not

perform an assessment of Pritchett, Wornian believed Pritchett would

qualify for the Crossroads program. Men who molested two and threeyear-olds are being treated on an outpatient basis at Crossroads. Based

on polygraph tests, Wornian did not believe any of the men had

reoffended while on probation.

D. VERDICT AND SENTENCE

The court found that Pritchett was a SVP within the meaning of

section 6604 and ordered that he be committed for two years to DMH

custody at Atascadero State Hospital. 

Answer Ex. F at 2-9 (People v. Pritchett, No. A100115, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 18,

2003)). 

II. Direct Appeal

On September 13, 2002, petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal from the order of

civil commitment by the Contra Costa County Superior Court. Answer Ex. A (Clerk’s

Transcript) (“CT”) at 179-181. On November 18, 2003, the court of appeal affirmed the

judgment. Answer Ex. F at 14. On February 18, 2004, the state supreme court denied the

petition for review on direct appeal. Pet. 61 (People v. Pritchett, No. S121527, slip op. (Cal.

Feb. 18, 2004)).

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III. Habeas Proceedings

According to the records provided by petitioner, he submitted two petitions for

habeas relief in the Contra Costa Superior Court on January 13, 2003: one allegedly

challenging due process violations, and the other allegedly challenging evidentiary errors. 

Pet. 99-104, 109-112. It appears that only the first petition, named the “due process”

petition by petitioner, was filed by the superior court on January 16, 2003 (No. 030067-3). 

Id. at 105, 180. According to petitioner, the petition dubbed the “evidentiary error” petition

was filed on February 27, 2003 (No. 030310-7) and a duplicate copy of that petition was

filed as a separate petition on March 7, 2003 (No. 030362-8). Id. at 106-108, 113-116.

The superior court denied petitioner’s first habeas petition, i.e., the “due process”

petition, on the merits. Pet. 126-128 (In re Noel Pritchett on Habeas Corpus, No. 030067-

3, slip op. (Contra Costa Co. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2003)). The superior court subsequently

denied his second and third petitions, designated by petitioner as the “Evidence #1” and

“Evidence #2” petitions, as successive petitions. Pet. 122-124 (In re Noel Pritchett on

Habeas Corpus, Nos. 030310-7 and 030362-8, slip op. (Contra Costa Co. Super. Ct. March

20, 2003)). 

Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the court of appeal, which denied relief. Pet. 6,

66. Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state supreme court, which summarily denied

relief by order filed December 17, 2003. Pet. 59. The state supreme court denied review

on the direct appeal two months thereafter on February 18, 2004. Pet. 61.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 22, 2005. 

The court issued an order to show cause on October 7, 2005. Respondent filed an answer

on December 12, 2005. Petitioner filed a traverse on January 30, 2006. Respondent has

not sought to dismiss the claims as untimely or as barred by procedural default, and the

court will not consider, sua sponte, dismissal on those grounds. See Calderon v. United

States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (AEDPA statute of

limitations is not jurisdictional), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United

States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Francis v. Rison, 894

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F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir.1990) (absent extraordinary circumstances, procedural default

argument is waived by failure to raise it). The matter is submitted for decision on the

merits.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2001),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, it falls under

the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to

that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a

case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Pursuant to Section 2254(e)(1), factual determinations by state courts are presumed

correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. 

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This presumption is not altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of

appeals, rather than by a state trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981);

Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Pursuant to Section 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. 

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned state court opinion. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079,

n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). Where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its decision on

a petitioner's federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court decision on the claim, a

federal court conducts “an independent review of the record” to determine whether the

state court's decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

See Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006); Himes v. Thompson, 336

F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

DISCUSSION

As grounds for habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) the Sexually Violent

Predators Act violates due process on its face and as applied to him; and (2) the standard

of proof violated due process. Neither of these claims merits habeas relief.

I. Due Process Challenge to SVPA

In his first claim, petitioner raises facial and as applied due process challenges to the

SVPA, as well as claims alleging violations of the right to confront witnesses, right to

speedy trial and right to counsel secured under the Sixth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto

Clause and the Double Jeopardy Clause.

A. Facial Challenges

Petitioner argues that the SVPA, on its face, violates due process and other

constitutional rights on the following grounds:

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1) Failure to use the Fourteenth Amendment as the standard of judgment;

2) Allowing the state’s police power to protect the public to supercede

constitutional due process requirements;

3) Use of a prejudicial label of “Sexually Violent Predator” to prejudice the fact

finder into determining bad character;

4) Use of a “screening instrument” by the Department of Corrections, rather than

the Department of Mental Health, which is not capable of screening for all

elements required under the SVPA;

5) Failure by each administrative agency (CDC, BPT, DMH, DA) to give timely

notice of proceedings;

6) Failure to provide right to counsel from the inception of proceedings;

7) Failure to allow personal appearance at administrative hearings with counsel

and to confront accusers under the Sixth Amendment;

8) Failure to provide for record examination with counsel for accuracy prior to

review of these records by psychological evaluators;

9) Allowing BPT [former Board of Prison Terms, currently the Board of Parole

Hearings] to set regulations for “probable cause” hearing not authorized by

law;

10) Holding secret administrative proceeding to determine if a person is an SVP

in violation of Sixth Amendment right to face accusers or challenge evidence;

11) Failure to have independent psychological evaluators;

12) Allowing “good faith mistake of fact or law” to override constitutional rights;

13) Failure to provide for speedy trial or other time constraints, and the SVPA

provision that CDC initiate SVP proceedings at least six months prior to

release from incarceration, compared to other special proceedings which

require at least thirty days prior to the end of the previous commitment, gives

rise to equal protection violation; 

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14) Failure to establish requirements for obtaining jurisdiction.

Pet. 19-20 (the “facial” subclaims).

Petitioner presented these various due process, right to counsel, right to confront

witnesses, equal protection, and speedy trial arguments in support of the five claims

alleged in his state habeas petition. Pet. 180-215. The superior court denied these claims

on the following grounds: 

First Claim [facial subclaims 5, 6, 8, 11]: Petitioner claims that

because counsel has not been appointed when the state institutes its

evaluation process, an inmate is incapable of making an informed and

intelligent decision regarding consent to be evaluated. Petitioner

further claims that because the psychologists are paid by the state they

skew or even falsify statements made during the evaluation interview. 

Petitioner also claims that an inmate is not given notice of the

evaluations and the records reviewed for the evaluation contain

inaccurate information.

The court finds there to be no merit to this claim. An inmate

always retains the right to counsel if he so chooses. Second, there are

two practicing psychiatrists or psychologists who perform the

evaluation for the Director of Mental Health. Each has to protect his

license in order to continue to practice. Willful misconduct of the type

petitioner describes would put that license at risk. Given that there are

two evaluators, moreover, the possibility that such misconduct will

occur is negligible. Finally, no evidence supports the claim that an

inmate is not given notice of an impending evaluation; no evidence

supports the claim that records reviewed for the evaluation contain

inaccurate information.

Second Claim [facial subclaim 12]: Petitioner argues that the

state violates due process when it includes the language “a good faith

mistake of fact or law” in section 6601(a)(2) of the SVPA. The court

declines to interpret the instant claim as a declaratory relief request

where the claim is made ex parte and without notice to the attorney

general. In any event, petitioner, on this record, does not have

standing to raise the issue.

Third Claim [facial subclaim 3]: The court will not interpret this

claim [challenging use of the expression “sexually violent predator” as

prejudicial] as a declaratory relief request where the claim is made ex

parte and without notice to the attorney general.

Fourth Claim [facial subclaim 4]: In support of this claim

[challenging absence of “screening instrument” for CDC to initiate SVP

procedures] petitioner submits a copy of a letter from the Chief of the

California Department of Mental Health, George Bukowski, dated 2-5-

01, to Norman Hubbs, an inmate at Atascadero State Prison. This

“evidence” is stale and will not support the instant claim that the CDC

does not currently have a required screening instrument. Thus the

claim fails.

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[Fifth] Claim [facial subclaim 2]: No evidence supports this

claim [that police power to protect the public has been improperly used

to violate due process], i.e., that petitioner disagrees with the SVPA is

not a basis for finding governmental misconduct.

Pet. 127-128 (In re Pritchett, slip op. at 2-3).

Under California’s Sexually Violent Predators Act, a “sexually violent predator”

(“SVP”) is defined as “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense

against two or more victims for which he or she received a determinate sentence and who

has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety

of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a). The SVPA establishes procedures for the Department of

Corrections and the Board of Prison Terms to screen a prisoner who was previously

convicted of certain enumerated violent sex crimes six months before being released from

prison to determine whether the prisoner may be a potential SVP, followed by a full

evaluation by two practicing psychiatrists and/or psychologists designated by the Director

of Mental Health. Id. § 6601(a)-(d). Upon the recommendation of the Department of

Mental Health, the district attorney or county counsel for the county in which the alleged

SVP was convicted may file a petition for civil commitment in the superior court of that

county. Id. § 6601(h), (I). The superior court will hold a probable cause hearing to

determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the prisoner is likely to engage in

sexually violent, predatory criminal behavior after release. Id. § 6602(a). If the superior

court determines that probable cause exists, the court must order the prisoner to remain in

custody pending a civil commitment trial. Id. See Carty v. Nelson, 426 F.3d 1064, 1066-67

(9th Cir.), amended, 431 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1130 (2006). 

 Rejecting due process challenges to the SVPA, the Ninth Circuit has held that

California’s SVPA is similar to the Kansas civil commitment statute upheld in Kansas v.

Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004). In

Hendricks, the Supreme Court held that state civil commitment schemes must follow

“proper procedures and evidentiary standards” and require proof of dangerousness to one’s

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1 The version of section 6601 that was in effect at the time of petitioner’s SVPA

proceedings provided that an SVPA petition may be filed “if the individual was in custody

pursuant to his or her determinate prison term, parole revocation term, or a hold [on release

from custody for up to 45 days to conduct full evaluation] placed pursuant to Section 6601.3,

at the time the petition is filed.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(a)(2) (effective July 22, 1999

to Sept. 19, 2006).

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self or to others, coupled with proof of some additional factor such as a “mental illness” or

“mental abnormality.” 521 U.S. at 357-58. Procedural safeguards under the SVPA

“include requirements that accused sexually violent predators receive diagnoses from two

psychiatrists or psychologists, assistance of counsel, and trial by jury on proof beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Hubbart, 379 F.3d at 781. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the

SVPA falls short of these requirements or violates the right to due process, as alleged in

facial subclaims 1, 9 and 14. 

Petitioner’s other facial challenges to the SVPA also fail. Petitioner has not

demonstrated that the assistance of counsel provision under the SVPA denies the right to

counsel, as alleged in facial subclaim 6. See Hubbart, 379 F.3d at 781. Furthermore,

facial subclaims 7 and 10 fail because the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses

does not attach in civil commitment proceedings. See Carty, 426 F.3d at 1073-74. 

The speedy trial argument in facial subclaim 13 fails because there is no Supreme

Court authority establishing the right to speedy trial in civil commitment proceedings. See

Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 371-72 (1986) (full panoply of rights afforded criminal

defendants under the Constitution are not applicable to civil commitment proceedings). 

Even if the right to speedy trial attached to civil commitment proceedings, petitioner has not

demonstrated that the timing provisions under the SVPA1

 are so long as to be

presumptively prejudicial to support a facial challenge to the statute, nor has he

demonstrated that he himself was deprived of a speedy trial. See Doggett v. United States,

505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992). Furthermore, the equal protection argument of facial

subclaim 13 does not merit habeas relief because there is no clearly established federal

law recognizing an equal protection challenge to the timing provisions of the SVPA

compared to other involuntary commitment statutes. See Hubbart, 379 F.3d at 782

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2 Section 2032, which governed civil discovery by means of physical or mental

examination, was repealed and replaced by new provisions, effective July 1, 2005, to facilitate

the reorganization of the state rules governing civil discovery. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann.

§ 2016.010, Hist. and Stat. Notes (West) (California Civil Discovery Act reorganized by

Stats.2004, c. 182 (A.B. 3081), §§ 22, 23).

3 In Ghilotti, the state supreme court articulated that civil commitment under the

SVPA requires a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual “(1) previously was

convicted of qualifying violent sex crimes, (2) has a mental disorder which seriously impairs

volitional control of violent sexual impulses, and (3) as a result of the disorder, presents a

serious and well-founded risk of committing new acts of criminal sexual violence.” 27 Cal. 4th

at 924 n.15.

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(denying equal protection challenge to SVPA in absence of “‘a more lenient commitment

standard and a more stringent standard of release’” than other involuntary commitment

statute for mentally disordered offenders) (citation omitted); United States v. Sahhar, 917

F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1990) (“not every disparity between commitment procedures

applicable to individuals accused of crimes and those applicable to the general population

amounts to a denial of equal protection”). 

The state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. The claim is therefore denied. 

B. As-Applied Challenges

Petitioner raises the following challenges to the SVPA as applied to him:

1) Obtaining access to confidential records without following the procedures of

California Code of Civil Procedure section 2032;2

2) Not giving notice of the right to have psychological interviews (which are a

form of deposition by the opposition) tape recorded, thereby denying the right

to obtain a recording;

3) Failing to have the opposition’s psychological evaluators to abide by the three

criteria of special proceedings for commitment pursuant to People v. Superior

Court (Ghilotti), 27 Cal. 4th 888 (2002);3

4) Failing to require a different mental state for special proceeding commitment

than it did for penal commitment;

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4 This provision of the mentally disordered offender statutory scheme governs

treatment of prisoners who have a severe mental disorder as a condition of parole.

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5) Failing to establish a non-culpable mental state for special proceeding

commitment;

6) Failing to meet the standards for proper procedures and evidentiary

standards for civil commitment of dangerous sexual offenders set forth in

Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002);

7) Insisting that this or any respondent for SVP trial accept a mental disorder

defense that was denied to him at his penal trial for the same crimes;

8) Permitting a “personality disorder” contrary to Cal. Penal Code § 2962(a);4

9) Allowing a mental state of (a) diminished capacity, (b) diminished

responsibility, or (c) irresistible impulse, to qualify for commitment in violation

of California law;

10) Permitting circular logic, wherein the crime is the disorder and the disorder is

the crime;

11) Violating principles of estoppel by claiming a mental disorder exists based on

the same crimes for which respondent was held culpable, and sent to prison

for punishment, without a mental disorder, giving rise to estoppel of 

(a) silence, (b) res judicata, (c) judicial estoppel, and (d) issue preclusion;

12) Failing to require a non-culpable mental state that meets the legal

requirements of Cal. Penal Code §§ 20-29, wherein (a) the prospective

committee is incapable of forming intent, compare Penal Code §§ 26 [defining

exceptions to persons capable of committing crimes], 25(a) [abolishing

defense of diminished capacity], 28(b) [disallowing defense of diminished

capacity, diminished responsibility, or irresistible impulse] with Welfare &

Institutions Code § 6600 [defining SVPs]; and (b) the prospective committee

must meet the requirements of insanity, compare Welfare & Institutions Code

§ 6825 [procedures for handling mentally disordered persons charged with

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crime are provided in Penal Code § 1026] with Penal Code § 28(c) [limitations

on evidence of mental disorder not applicable to insanity hearing pursuant to

§ 1026];

13) Failing to harmonize the requirements of the SVPA with the requirements of

the Penal Code;

14) Allowing the State psychological evaluators to make findings of fact without

legal training or licensing contrary to Business & Professions Code § 2960(p)

[unprofessional conduct by psychologists includes functioning outside

particular field of competence];

15) Allowing the state’s psychological evaluators to usurp the fact finder in

determining that petitioner is an SVP;

16) Conducting the SVP trial as a penal trial, using scienter, and destroying the

nature of a special proceedings to make it penal in nature in violation of ex

post facto and double jeopardy clauses.

Pet. at 20-22 (the “in practice” subclaims).

Petitioner makes several arguments based on the premise that the civil commitment

proceedings under the SVPA are penal in nature, including his challenges on ex post facto

and double jeopardy grounds. California’s SVP civil commitment scheme, which is similar

to the Kansas statute upheld in Hendricks, is civil in nature and does not give rise to

habeas challenges based on allegations that the civil commitment scheme is punitive. See

Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 261-64 (2001) (rejecting as-applied ex post facto and

double jeopardy claims to Washington statute); Carty, 426 F.3d at 1073 (“the commitment

proceedings under the SVP Act are civil, not criminal”). Thus, petitioner’s arguments that

the SVPA permitted evidence of mental or personality disorders inconsistent with evidence

that was admissible in the criminal trials, or that his civil commitment is tantamount to

punishment for his mental disorder (“in practice” subclaims 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16)

do not state a claim for federal habeas relief.

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5 In Ghilotti, the state supreme court held that the SVPA requires two mental health

professionals to agree that petitioner “‘has a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is

likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody.’”

Ghilotti, 27 Cal.4th at 894 (quoting Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(d)). The state supreme

court held that the “likely to engage” standard is met “if, because of the person's diagnosed

mental disorder, he or she currently presents a substantial danger - that is, a serious and

well-founded risk - of criminal sexual violence unless maintained in an appropriate custodial

setting which offers mandatory treatment for the disorder,” and further held that the “likely”

standard does not require an evaluator to determine that there is a “better than even chance

of new criminal sexual violence.” Id. at 895.

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Petitioner also challenges the mental health evaluators’ findings as failing to apply

the correct legal standard for civil commitment set forth by the state supreme court in

Ghilotti5

 (“in practice” subclaim 3) in that the evaluators relied on his past history to

determine whether he currently had a mental disorder, and did not show that the mental

disorder existed separate from the crime. Pet. at 84-85. Petitioner further contends that

the mental health evaluators usurped the role of the judicial fact finder by determining that

petitioner is an SVP (“in practice” subclaim 15). 

Neither of these challenges establish a federal due process violation. Petitioner has

not demonstrated that his civil commitment trial was conducted beyond the scope of the

procedures and evidentiary standards set forth by the California SVPA. See Rose v.

Mayberg, 454 F.3d 958, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Crane, 534 U.S. at 409-10), cert.

denied, – U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 1271 (2007); Hubbart, 379 F.3d at 781. The record

demonstrates that the petition for civil commitment alleged that petitioner was convicted of

a sexually violent offense against two or more victims and that he had a diagnosed mental

disorder that made him a danger to others because it was likely that he will engage in

sexually violent criminal behavior, based on the evaluations of two mental health doctors. 

Ans. Ex. A (Clerk’s Transcript) at 1-45. The record also shows that petitioner was

represented by counsel at the probable cause hearing and at trial, the superior court found

probable cause to believe that petitioner was likely to engage in sexually violent predatory

criminal behavior upon his release, the parties waived a jury trial, and the superior court

held a court trial and made a finding that petitioner was an SVP as defined by the SVPA. 

Ans. Ex. A at 46, 87, 178; Ex. B (Reporter’s Transcript) at 337-38. Drs. Fricke and

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Jackson, who testified at the civil commitment trial, evaluated petitioner not only on the

basis of his criminal history, but also in-person clinical interviews, Static-99 analysis, and

review of petitioner’s medical history and central file. Ans. Ex. A at 4-26, 27-45; Ex. B at

101, 177. Petitioner’s SVP trial thus satisfied the due process requirements of proper

procedures and evidentiary standards, proof of dangerousness and proof of mental illness

set forth in Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 357-58. See Hubbart, 379 F.3d at 781.

Petitioner argues that it is inconsistent for him to be civilly committed for a complete

inability to form intent due to a mental disorder when he was held criminally liable for his

ability to form intent, despite his mental disorder. Pet. at 84-85. This argument is based on

the premise that civil commitment under the SVPA requires the mental disorder to render

petitioner completely unable to control his behavior or to form intent. The Ninth Circuit has

held, however, that due process does not require the factfinder to determine that petitioner

completely lacks control of his behavior, but only requires “‘some’ showing of an

abnormality that makes it ‘difficult, if not impossible for the dangerous person to control his

dangerous behavior.’” Rose, 454 F.3d at 963 (quoting Brock v. Seling, 390 F.3d 1088) (9th

Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 411)). Thus, petitioner has not

demonstrated that his civil commitment proceedings violated his right to due process. 

Petitioner’s “in practice” subclaim 6 mirrors his second claim for relief, which

contends that his civil commitment failed to meet the procedures and evidentiary standards

set forth in Crane. For the reasons discussed in Section II, below, this subclaim does not

merit habeas relief.

Furthermore, petitioner’s contentions that he was civilly committed in violation of

state laws and procedures (“in practice” subclaims 1, 2, 14) allege error in the interpretation

or application of state law and do not give rise to federal habeas corpus relief. Hubbart,

379 F.3d at 779-80 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)). 

The state courts’ denial of habeas relief was not an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. Petitioner’s due process claim is denied.

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II. Standard of Proof

In the second claim for relief, petitioner contends that the trial court applied a

standard of proof that violated due process under Kansas v. Crane, by using the standard

“likely” to engage in sexually violent predatory crimes if released from custody as stated by

the state supreme court in Ghilotti, rather than a higher standard of proof. Petitioner raised

this challenge to the standard of proof on direct appeal, and the Court of Appeal held that

there was no error:

Our Supreme Court has held that the defendant is “likely” to

engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if he is found to “present[ ]

a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk, of

committing [such crimes] if released from custody.” [People v.

Roberge, 29 Cal. 4th 979, 988 (2003).] Pritchett acknowledges that the

trial court applied this standard. For purposes of preserving the issue

for federal review and reconsideration by our Supreme Court, however,

Pritchett asserts that due process requires that “likely” be defined as

“highly likely” or, at a minimum, “more likely than not.”

We are obliged to follow the precedent of our Supreme Court. 

[Citation omitted.] In light of Roberge, Pritchett has not established

error on this ground.

Answer Ex. F (People v. Pritchett, slip op.) at 13-14.

The SVPA requires a preliminary assessment or screening by two psychologists or

psychiatrists to determine whether the offender “is likely to engage in acts of sexual

violence without appropriate treatment and custody.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(d). 

Ghilotti rejected the contention that due process limited civil commitment of SVPs to those

persons who are more likely than not to reoffend, and held that the SVPA was narrowly

tailored to confine and treat violent sex offenders who posed a substantial danger of

committing similar new crimes, even if that risk could not be assessed at more than fifty

percent. Ghilotti, 27 Cal. 4th at 924. The state supreme court applied the Ghilotti standard

in construing the standard for the trial phase of SVP civil commitment proceedings: “a

person is ‘likely [to] engage in sexually violent criminal behavior’ if at trial the person is

found to present a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk, of

committing such crimes if released from custody.” People v. Roberge, 29 Cal. 4th 979, 988

(2003) (quoting Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a) to define SVP). 

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In Kansas v. Crane, the Supreme Court further considered the constitutionality of the

evidentiary standard of the Kansas SVP statute reviewed in Hendricks, and held that due

process requires a lack of control determination for civil commitment, but did not require a

measure of the degree of lack of control. Crane, 534 U.S. at 410. The Supreme Court

made clear that “there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior,” but

recognized that “‘inability to control behavior’ will not be demonstrable with mathematical

precision.” Id. at 413. The requirement under the SVPA that the SVP have a mental

disorder and is “likely” to reoffend encompasses a lack of control determination: “an

evaluator applying this standard must conclude that the person is ‘likely’ to reoffend if,

because of a current mental disorder which makes it difficult or impossible to restrain

violent sexual behavior, the person presents a substantial danger, that is, a serious and

well-founded risk, that he or she will commit such crimes if free in the community.” Ghilotti,

27 Cal. 4th at 922 (emphasis added). This lack of control requirement under the SVPA

meets the Crane standard for due process in civil commitment proceedings. See id. at 920,

921 n.12, 924 n.15 (the SVPA requires for civil commitment “a current mental condition or

disorder that makes it difficult or impossible to control volitional behavior and predisposes

the person to inflict harm on himself or others”). See also Rose, 454 F.3d at 962-63 (civil

commitment under SVPA based on “mental disorder” that “affected his emotional or

volitional capacity” and predisposed him to commit further sex crimes was objectively

reasonable application of Crane and Hendricks).

Applying the “likely” to reoffend standard to the civil commitment trial in Roberge, the

state supreme court made clear that the burden of proof at trial was for the prosecution to

“show beyond a reasonable doubt that it is ‘likely that [the person] will engage in sexually

violent criminal behavior’ if released.” Roberge, 29 Cal. 4th at 986 (quoting Welf. & Inst.

Code § 6600(a)) (italics added in original). Under clearly established federal law, civil

commitment proceedings require only clear and convincing evidence, and do not require

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979). 

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Thus, the burden of proof required under the SVPA is more stringent than that required for

due process in civil commitment proceedings.

The state courts’ denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. The claim is therefore denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment for respondent, and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 9, 2008. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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