Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02337/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02337-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEREK TATE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-2337 MCE GGH P

vs.

ANTHONY LAMARQUE, ORDER AND

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a habeas corpus petition

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to dismiss filed

July 14, 2005. Respondent argues that not all of the claims in this action are exhausted. 

Respondent further argues that some of the claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

After carefully reviewing the record the court recommends that respondent’s

motion be granted in part and denied in part.

II. Failure to Exhaust State Court Remedies

A. Legal Standard

The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). If exhaustion is to be waived, it must

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be waived explicitly by respondent’s counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). A waiver of exhaustion,

thus, may not be implied or inferred. A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before

presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S. Ct. 509, 512

(1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 

The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal district court may not

entertain a petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted state remedies with

respect to each of the claims raised. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982). 

B. Discussion

In the petition for review filed May 20, 2002, with the California Supreme Court

petitioner raised two claims: 1) trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate and

challenge the prior bad acts evidence against petitioner; 2) the trial court abused its discretion by

refusing petitioner’s request to testify on his own behalf. See Exhibit B, respondent’s September

4, 2003, motion for summary dismissal. 

On October 23, 2002, petitioner filed this action. Rather than filing a petition, he

filed a letter with the court stating that he wanted to proceed with a habeas corpus petition but

was in the process of exhausting additional claims. On June 20, 2003, petitioner finally filed a

habeas corpus petition, labeled as an amended petition. Because the amended petition contained

both exhausted and unexhausted claims, on February 9, 2004, the court struck the unexhausted

claims and stayed this action so that petitioner could exhaust additional claims. Calderon v.

District Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 1998) (district court has authority to stay

exhausted petitions while petitioner returns to state court to exhaust unexhausted claims).

On December 9, 2003, petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition with the California

Supreme Court. Respondent’s Exhibit D. The December 9, 2003, petition raised two claims: 1)

the trial court improperly granted petitioner’s motion to represent himself; 2) the trial court

improperly denied petitioner’s request for a continuance after granting his motion to represent

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himself. In support of this petition, petitioner filed numerous pleadings which raised additional

claims. These pleadings are attached to respondent’s exhibit D. On September 22, 2004, the

California Supreme Court denied this petition. Id.

On January 4, 2005, the court lifted the stay in this action. On May 20, 2005,

petitioner filed an amended petition which contains ten claims. As will be discussed below, not

all of petitioner’s claims have been exhausted.

Claim 1

Petitioner alleges that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the

introduction of prior bad act evidence against petitioner. Petitioner raised this claim in both his

December 17, 2003, and February 20, 2004, pleadings filed with the California Supreme Court in

support of his habeas petition. Respondent’s Exhibit D. Petitioner’s February 20, 2004, pleading

is extremely lengthy and is located in the rear of respondent’s Exhibit D. The February 20, 2004,

pleading is divided into five sections by blue sheets of paper. Not all of these pages contain page

numbers. 

Petitioner’s claim alleging that the trial court abused its discretion when it

admitted evidence of petitioner’s prior bad acts is raised in the third section of petitioner’s

February 20, 2004, pleading at page 1. This claim is actually discussed at length throughout this

pleading. Accordingly, the court finds that this claim is exhausted.

Claim 2

Petitioner alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing his request to

testify on his own behalf. Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for review and his February

20, 2004, pleading filed in support of his habeas corpus petition. Respondent’s Exhibits B; D:

February 20, 2004, pleading, section 3. Accordingly, this claim is exhausted. 

Claims 3 

Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel

1) failed to investigate on petitioner’s behalf; 2) refused to file necessary motions; 3) failed to

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investigate and challenge the prior bad acts evidence against petitioner; 3) failed to investigate

the photo I.D. evidence; 4) failed to present evidence that would have impeached Officer

Klimplie; 5) failed to investigate police misconduct; 6) failed to investigate whether petitioner’s

prior convictions could be used to enhance his sentence; 7) failed to challenge three jurors even

though they had been victims of burglary.

The claims that counsel failed to investigate on petitioner’s behalf and refused to

file necessary motions are vague. Because petitioner does not identify the specific investigation

counsel failed to conduct and describe the motions counsel failed to file, the court cannot

determine whether these claims are exhausted.

Petitioner raised his claim that counsel failed to challenge the prior bad act

evidence in his petition for review. Accordingly, this claim is exhausted. Petitioner raised his

claim that counsel failed to investigate the photo I.D. evidence in his February 20, 2004,

pleading. Respondent’s Exhibit D: February 20, 2004, pleading, section 4, subsection “C

Supplemental Ground 3,” p. 22. Petitioner raised his claim that counsel failed to present

evidence to impeach Officer Klimpie in his February 20, 2004, pleading. Id., p. 62. Petitioner

raised his claim alleging that counsel failed to investigate police misconduct in his February 20,

2004, pleading. Id.,p. 37. Petitioner raised his claim that counsel failed to challenge the three

jurors in his February 20, 2004, pleading. Id., p. 42. Accordingly, these claims are exhausted.

Petitioner’s pleadings filed in the California Supreme Court did not raise his claim

that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether his prior convictions could be used

to enhance his sentence. Accordingly, this claim is not exhausted.

 Claim 4

Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based

on counsel’s failure to raise the following issues on appeal: 1) defective waiver of right to

counsel; 2) improper denial of continuance; 3) prosecutorial misconduct; 4) 1192.7 prohibits plea

agreement/priors are barred; 5) Marsden hearing violation. 

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 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).

5

Petitioner raised all of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his February

20, 2004, pleading. Id., section 5, subsection “Supplemental Ground D1,” pp. 13-14. 

Accordingly, these claims are exhausted.

Claim 5

Petitioner alleges that the trial court improperly granted his motion to represent

himself on the eve of trial. Petitioner raised his claim in the December 9, 2003, petition filed

with the California Supreme Court. Respondent’s Exhibit D. Accordingly, this claim is

exhausted.

Claim 6

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his right to due process when it

denied his motion for a continuance after it granted his Faretta motion. Petitioner raised this

claim in the December 9, 2003, petition filed with the California Supreme Court. Respondent’s

Exhibit D. Accordingly, this claim is exhausted.

Claim 7

Petitioner raises the following claims of prosecutorial misconduct: 1) the

prosecutor suborned perjury with his first witness; 2) the prosecutor lost or destroyed tapes which

were material evidence; 3) the prosecutor damaged the only direct evidence in the case in

violation of Brady v. Maryland,

1

 ; 4) the prosecutor read confidential attorney/client

communication even though he knew it was privileged information; 5) the prosecutor encouraged

Officer Klimpie to give false testimony.

In his February 20, 2004, pleading, petitioner argued that the prosecutor suborned

perjury with his first witness. Respondent’s Exhibit D, February 20, 2004, pleading, section 3, p.

12. Respondent argues that this claim is not exhausted because petitioner did not make clear

that he was raising a federal claim for prosecutorial misconduct. To exhaust state court remedies,

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a state prisoner must describe in the state proceedings both the operative facts and the federal

legal theory on which his claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s state habeas petition does not state that he is raising a federal constitutional claim for

prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecutor’s alleged suborning of perjury with respect to

the first witness. Accordingly, this claim is not exhausted.

In his February 20, 2004, pleading petitioner stated that the prosecutor was guilty

of misconduct when he damaged evidence. Respondent’s Exhibit D, February 20, 2004,

pleading, section 4, subsection “C Supplemental Ground Three Continued,” p. 58. With respect

to this claim, petitioner argued that the prosecutor was attempting to circumvent Brady by failing

to disclose that evidence had been altered. Although not the model of clarity, the court finds that

by citing Brady, petitioner alerted the California Supreme Court that he was raising a federal

constitutional claim with respect to this claim. Accordingly, this claim is exhausted.

In his February 20, 2004, pleading, petitioner stated that the prosecutor committed

misconduct by encouraging Officer Klimpie to give false testimony. Id., p. 66. With respect to

this claim, petitioner did not specifically state that he was raising a federal constitutional claim

for prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, this claim is not exhausted.

Petitioner’s pleadings filed with the California Supreme Court did not raise his

claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by losing or destroying tapes and reading

confidential attorney/client communication. Accordingly, these claims are not exhausted.

Claim 8

Petitioner contends that Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7 barred the prosecutor from

using several of his prior convictions to enhance his sentence. Petitioner did not raise this claim

in his pleadings filed with the California Supreme Court. Accordingly, this claim is not

exhausted.

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Claim 9

Petitioner alleges jury instruction error based on the reading of CALJIC Nos.

2.50.1 and 2.50.2. Petitioner did not specifically raise a jury instruction claim in his pleadings

filed with the California Supreme Court. Petitioner did argue that his appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise a claim challenging these instructions. Id., section 5. However,

petitioner did not raise a separate claim alleging jury instruction error in violation of the federal

constitution. Accordingly, this claim is not exhausted.

Claim 10

Petitioner alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to permit

petitioner to be present at his Marsden hearing. Id., section 4, subsection “C Supplemental

Ground Three Continued,” p. 53. Respondent correctly argues that petitioner did not raise a

claim alleging violation of a federal constitutional right in connection with this claim. 

Accordingly, this claim is not exhausted.

C. Conclusion

In the motion to dismiss, respondent argues that petitioner did not fairly present

several of his claims to the California Supreme Court because the claims were presented in a

confusing nature. The California Supreme Court cites In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949)

when it finds that a habeas petitioner has not plead his claims with sufficient particularity. Kim

v. Villalobos, 799 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986). A citation to Swain under those

circumstances means that the claims raised in the petition are not exhausted. Id. In the instant

case, the California Supreme Court did not cite Swain when it denied petitioner’s habeas

petition. Accordingly, the court cannot find that petitioner’s claims are not exhausted because

they were not plead with sufficient particularity.

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that the following claims are not

exhausted: 1) counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether petitioner’s prior

convictions could be used to enhance his sentence; 2) prosecutorial misconduct based on the

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prosecutor’s suborning of perjury; 3) prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecutor losing

tapes; 3) prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecutor reading confidential attorney/client

information; 4) prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecutor encouraging Officer Klimpie to

give false testimony; 5) Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7 barred the prosecutor from using several of

petitioner’s prior convictions to enhance his sentence; 6) jury instruction error; 7) the trial court

abused its discretion when it refused to permit petitioner to be present at his Marsden hearing. 

III. Statute of Limitations

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides,

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

The California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for review on June 27,

2002. Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit C. Petitioner’s conviction was final 90 days later on

September 24, 2002. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999). Unless excused by statutory

or equitable tolling, petitioner had until September 24, 2003, to file a timely federal habeas

petition. 

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Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation. Petitioner

filed his first state habeas petition in Shasta County Superior Court on June 27, 2003. Motion to

Dismiss, Exhibit D. On July 9, 2003, the Superior Court denied this petition. Id. Petitioner filed

another petition in Superior Court on December 15, 2003, which was denied on December 22,

2003. Id.

On August 29, 2003, petitioner filed a habeas petition with the California Court of

Appeal which was denied on September 25, 2003. Id. On December 9, 2003, petitioner filed his

habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court, which was denied on September 22,

2004. 

Petitioner’s state habeas petitions were pending for 453 days, i.e. June 27, 2003,

to September 22, 2004. Adding 453 days to September 24, 2003, would give petitioner until

December 20, 2004, to file a timely federal petition. 

As stated above, petitioner began this action by filing a letter on October 23, 2002. 

On June 20, 2003, petitioner filed a timely “amended petition” which contained the following

claims: 1) the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the introduction of prior bad acts

evidence against petition; 2) ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to

investigate and challenge the prior bad acts evidence against petitioner; 3) the trial court abused

its discretion when it denied petitioner’s request to testify on his own behalf; 4) ineffective

assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to move to disqualify the judge; 5) ineffective

assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to investigate the case; 6) the trial court abused

its discretion by granting petitioner’s motion to represent himself; 7) the trial court abused its

discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion for a continuance after granting his motion to

represent himself; 8) the prosecution withheld evidence in violation of Brady; 9) petitioner’s

prior convictions used to enhance his sentence were invalid; 10) ineffective assistance of counsel

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based on counsel’s failure to challenge the validity of the prior convictions; 11) jury instruction

error; and 12) petitioner was improperly excluded from his Marsden hearing.

On September 4, 2003, respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the

amended petition contained exhausted and unexhausted claims. On February 9, 2004, the court

denied respondent’s motion to dismiss and ordered this action stayed so that petitioner could

exhaust additional claims. 

On January 4, 2005, the court lifted the stay and ordered petitioner to file an

amended petition containing all of his exhausted claims. Petitioner filed the amended petition on

which this action is proceeding on May 20, 2005.

The May 20, 2005, petition was filed after the statute of limitations had run. 

However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) provides that an amendment of a pleading relates back to an

original pleading if the claims asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,

transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original pleading. In Felix v. Mayle, 125 S. Ct. 2562

(2005) the Supreme Court recently held that an amended claim in a habeas petition relates back

for statute of limitations purposes only if it shares a “common core of operative facts” with the

original claim. Therefore, the claims raised in the May 20, 2005, petition are timely if they share

a common core of operative facts with the claims raised in the June 200, 2003, petition. 

The court will now consider whether any of the claims found exhausted above

“relate back” to the claims raised in the June 20, 2003, amended petition. Claim 1 of the May

20, 2005, petition, i.e. the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the introduction of

prior bad acts evidence against petitioner, was raised in the June 20, 2003, petition. Accordingly,

this claim “relates back” and is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Claim 2 of the May 20, 2005, petition, i.e. that trial court abused its discretion by

denying petitioner’s request to testify, was raised in the June 20, 2003, petition. Accordingly,

this claim “relates back” and is not barred by the statute of limitations.

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In both the May 20, 2005, and June 20, 2003, petitions, petitioner argued that

counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and challenge the bad acts evidence against him. 

Accordingly, this claim “relates back” and is not barred by the statute of limitations.

The June 20, 2003, petition did not raise the other four ineffective assistance of

counsel claims the court found exhausted, i.e. 1) counsel failed to investigate photo I.D.

evidence; 2) counsel failed to present evidence to impeach Officer Klimpie; 3) counsel failed to

investigate police misconduct; and 4) counsel failed to challenge three jurors. These claims do

not share a common core of operative facts with the two other ineffective assistance of counsel

claims raised in the June 20, 2003, petition, i.e. counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate

and challenge the prior bad acts evidence and counsel failed to investigate whether petitioner’s

prior convictions could be used to enhance his sentence. Accordingly, these claims do not relate

back and are barred by the statute of limitations.

The June 20, 2003, petition did not raise any ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel claims. It is true that petitioner’s June 20, 2003, petition did raise some of the claims

underlying petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. For example,

petitioner argued that the trial court erred when it granted his motion to represent himself and

improperly denied petitioner’s motion for a continuance. However, the ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claims for failing to raise these issues on appeal do not share a common core of

operative facts with this claim. The ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims would

require the court to consider why appellate counsel failed to raise these claims, an operative fact

not shared by the underlying claims. Accordingly, petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

In both the May 20, 2005, and June 20, 2003, petitions, petitioner argued that the

trial court improperly granted his motion to represent himself and improperly denied his motion

for a continuance. Accordingly, these claims are not barred by the statute of limitations.

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Both the May 20, 2005, and June 20, 2003, petition raised the claim that the

prosecutor committed misconduct by withholding evidence in violation of Brady. Accordingly,

this claim is not barred by the statue of limitations. 

The court observes that several of petitioner’s claims found unexhausted above

would be barred by the statute of limitations were the court to find them exhausted. The four

prosecutorial misconduct claims the court found unexhausted above were not raised in the June

20, 2003, petition and do not share a common core of operative facts with the one prosecutorial

misconduct claim raised in that petition. The June 30, 2003, petition also did not raise the instant

claim 8, i.e. that Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7 barred the prosecutor from using petitioner’s prior

convictions to enhance his sentence. 

IV. Conclusion

In sum, the following claims are exhausted and not barred by the statute of

limitations: 1) the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted introduction of prior bad acts

evidence against petitioner; 2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied petitioner’s

motion to testify; 3) counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and challenge the prior bad

acts evidence; 4) the trial court improperly granted petitioner’s motion to represent himself; 5)

the trial court improperly denied petitioner’s motion for a continuance; 6) the prosecutor

committed misconduct by withholding evidence in violation of Brady. The motion to dismiss

these claims should be denied.

The following claims are exhausted but barred by the statute of limitations: 1)

counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate photo I.D. evidence; 2) counsel was ineffective

for failing to present evidence to impeach Officer Klimpie; 3) counsel was ineffective for failing

to investigate police misconduct; 4) counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge several

jurors; 5) all claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. These claims should be

dismissed. 

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The following claims are unexhausted and barred by the statute of limitations: 1)

the prosecutor committed misconduct by suborning perjury of the first witness; 2) the prosecutor

lost or destroyed tapes; 3) the prosecutor read confidential attorney/client information; 4) the

prosecutor encouraged Officer Klimpie to give false testimony; 5) Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7

barred the prosecutor from using several of petitioner’s prior convictions to enhance his sentence. 

These claims should be dismissed.

The following claims are unexhausted but not necessarily barred by the statute of 

limitations because they were raised in the June 20, 2003, petition: 1) counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate the validity of petitioner’s prior convictions; 2) jury instruction error; and 3)

the trial court abused its discretion when it would not permit petitioner to attend his Marsden

hearing.

In Rhines v. Weber, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005) the Supreme Court

recently held that a habeas petition may only be stayed for further exhaustion if the petitioner can

show good cause for his failure to first exhaust his claims in state court. As indicated above, the

court already granted petitioner one opportunity to return to state court and exhaust his claims. 

As to the three claims found unexhausted but not necessarily barred by the statute of limitations,

petitioner is ordered to show cause for his failure to raise these claims in his petition filed with

the California Supreme Court. If he did raise these claims and this court somehow overlooked

them in its review of the state petition, petitioner shall identify their location in his state petition. 

The court observes that petitioner’s opposition to the pending motion to dismiss is

extremely lengthy. Petitioner’s further briefing addressing his failure to exhaust the three claims

discussed above shall be no longer than ten pages. Following receipt of this briefing, the court

will consider whether the action should be dismissed as a mixed petition, or whether good cause

exists for a further stay. The court will, however, recommend dismissal for those claims barred

by the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(2).

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within ten days of the date of this

order, petitioner shall further briefing addressing his failure to exhaust the following three

claims: 1) counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the validity of petitioner’s prior

convictions; 2) jury instruction error; and 3) the trial court abused its discretion when it would

not permit petitioner to attend his Marsden hearing.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s July 14, 2005, motion to dismiss be denied as to the following

claims: 1) the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted introduction of prior bad acts

evidence against petitioner; 2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied petitioner’s

motion to testify; 3) counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and challenge the prior bad

acts evidence; 4) the trial court improperly granted petitioner’s motion to represent himself; 5)

the trial court improperly denied petitioner’s motion for a continuance; 6) the prosecutor

committed misconduct by withholding evidence in violation of Brady;

2. Respondent’s July 14, 2005, motion to dismiss should be granted as to the

following claims: 1) counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate photo I.D. evidence; 2)

counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence to impeach Officer Klimpie; 3) counsel

was ineffective for failing to investigate police misconduct; 4) counsel was ineffective for failing

to challenge several jurors; 5) all claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; 6) the

prosecutor committed misconduct by suborning perjury of the first witness; 7) the prosecutor lost

or destroyed tapes; 8) the prosecutor read confidential attorney/client information; 9) the

prosecutor encouraged Officer Klimpie to give false testimony; 10) Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

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shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 11/9/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

tat2337.157

Case 2:02-cv-02337-MCE -GGH Document 64 Filed 11/10/05 Page 15 of 15