Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01511/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01511-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 To the extent Ms. Woodford has been succeeded in her official position, her successor

shall be substituted in upon notice to the court of the successor’s name. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD PAUL CHAPMAN,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-05-1511 LKK KJM P 

vs.

JEANNE WOODFORD, ORDER AND

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Several matters are before the court.

1. Proper Respondent

Petitioner has filed a motion asking that “Jeanne Woodford” be identified as the

respondent in this action.1 Respondent has not objected to this request. Good cause appearing,

petitioner’s request will be granted.

II. Request For Appointment Of Counsel

Petitioner has requested the appointment of counsel. There currently exists no

absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d

Case 2:05-cv-01511-LKK -KJM Document 16 Filed 05/22/06 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). However, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A authorizes the appointment of counsel at

any stage of the case “if the interests of justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Governing

§ 2254 Cases. In the present case, the court does not find that the interests of justice would be

served by the appointment of counsel at the present time. 

III. Request For Judicial Notice

Respondent asks that the court take judicial notice of various documents

concerning petitioner’s challenge to his conviction and sentence in state court. Petitioner does

not oppose respondent’s request. Good cause appearing, respondent’s request for judicial notice

will be granted. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). 

III. Motion To Dismiss

Respondent has filed a motion asking that this case be dismissed as time-barred. 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides as follows:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

/////

Case 2:05-cv-01511-LKK -KJM Document 16 Filed 05/22/06 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

On October 10, 2003, petitioner filed in the California Supreme Court a petition

for review of the California Court of Appeal’s denial of petitioner’s appeal of his conviction and

sentence. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 1. The petition for review was denied November 12, 2003. 

Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 2. Id. Petitioner’s conviction became final for purposes of 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) on February 10, 2004, when time expired for petitioner to seek a writ of

certiorari with respect to the California Supreme Court’s denial of petitioner’s direct appeal

request for review. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999) ("We hold that

the period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a

petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court,

whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition."). The limitations period applicable

to this action began to run the next day, February 11, 2004.

It is not disputed that the limitations period ran until January 18, 2005 when

petitioner filed a petition for collateral relief in the Superior Court of Sacramento County. 

Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 5. That petition was denied on April 12, 2005. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc.

# 4. The AEDPA provides that “the time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2). However, respondent asserts that the limitations period was not tolled for the time

petitioner’s superior court petition was pending because it was not “properly filed.” Mot. at

3:18-26.

In his Superior Court petition, petitioner asserts two claims. The first is that his

counsel on direct appeal rendered ineffective assistance. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. # 5 at 5. The

second claim is that certain jury instruction errors deprived petitioner of due process. Id. at 36. 

The Superior Court denied the first claim as untimely and on the merits. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc.

#4. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814 (2005), the Supreme Court

held that a state court application deemed untimely will not provide a basis for tolling under 28

Case 2:05-cv-01511-LKK -KJM Document 16 Filed 05/22/06 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

 On February 9, 2005, two days before the limitations period applicable to this action

was set to expire, petitioner refiled the same petition he filed on January 18, 2005 in the

Sacramento County Superior Court. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. #3. On March 30, 2005, the second

petition was denied for being successive and untimely. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. #3. Under Pace,

the second petition was not properly filed for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner filed other applications for relief in California courts after his Superior Court

action was dismissed. Resp’t’s Lodged Docs. #s 7, 9 & 11. These actions are of no consequence

to a determination as to whether petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus is time-barred

because, by the time these actions were filed, the limitations period had run. See Jimenez v.

Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). 

4

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In this case, the Superior Court did not address petitioner’s second claim. 

In such cases, the Supreme Court has held that federal district courts in California must

determine whether California courts would have found that the delay in bringing unaddressed

claims was reasonable. Evans v. Chavis, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 846, 852 (2006). It is not

clear why the Superior Court did not address petitioner’s jury instruction claim. Most likely, the

court simply overlooked the claim. In any case, there is no reason evident in the record to

suggest the Superior Court would have found the ineffective assistance of counsel claim untimely

and the jury instruction claim timely, as both claims were apparent from the record when

petitioner’s direct appeal had become final eleven months prior to the filing of the Superior Court

petition. Additionally, it was not reasonable under California law for petitioner to wait more

than eleven months to bring his jury instruction claim before the Superior Court. See Evans, 126

S. Ct. at 854 (unexplained delay of six months not “reasonable” under California law). 

Because the Superior Court petition was not properly filed and because petitioner

fails to present any other basis for tolling the limitations period, the limitations period expired at

the end of the day on February 10, 2005.2 Accordingly, this action commenced on July 27, 2005

must be dismissed. 

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:05-cv-01511-LKK -KJM Document 16 Filed 05/22/06 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Jeanne Woodford is hereby designated as the respondent in this action;

2. Petitioner’s March 9, 2006 motion for appointment of counsel is denied; and

3. Respondent’s February 17, 2006 request for judicial notice is granted.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s February 17, 2006 motion to dismiss be granted; and 

2. This case be dismissed. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 19, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1

chap1511.157

Case 2:05-cv-01511-LKK -KJM Document 16 Filed 05/22/06 Page 5 of 5