Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-6_14-cv-02257/USCOURTS-alnd-6_14-cv-02257-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

PERNELL JOHNSON,

Plaintiff;

vs.

WALKER COUNTY, ALABAMA,

et al.,

Defendant.

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6:14-cv-02257-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Before the Court are partial motions to dismiss filed by Defendant Walker

County, Alabama (Doc. 11) and Defendants Trent McCluskey (“McCluskey”), John

Mark Tirey (“Tirey”), and Jim Underwood (“Underwood”). (Doc. 13.) Also before

the Court is a motion to strike filed by the Plaintiff. (Doc. 19.) For the reasons stated

below, the motions to dismiss are due to be granted in part and denied in part, while

the motion to strike is due to be granted.

I. Background

1

Plaintiff Pernell Johnson (“Johnson”) brings this suit based on events that

The facts in this opinion are gleaned from the Plaintiff’s complaint, with all statements of 1 

fact therein accepted as true. See Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir.

2000).

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FILED

 2015 Mar-17 PM 02:02

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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occurred while he was a prisoner in the Walker County Jail (“the Jail”). Tirey and

Underwood each served assheriff of Walker County during timesrelevant to this suit,

while McCluskey was the jail administrator for the Jail.

Johnson entered the Jail in or about August 2014, having previously been

diagnosed with congestive heart failure and having beenprescribed medication for that

condition. Abond hearing was held prior to hisincarceration, where a nurse from the

Jail testified that the Jail could adequately continue Johnson’streatment.Based on this

testimony,the judge denied Johnson’srequest for a lower bond, and Johnson remained

in the Jail.

Johnson was not provided with any medical care for his congestive heart failure

during hisincarceration,nor washeprovided prescription medication to treat his other

medical conditions. As a result, he suffered a stroke and had to be transported to UAB

Hospital for treatment.Johnson remained in the ICU unit at UAB Hospital at the time

of his complaint.

Johnson filed his complaint on November 21, 2014, alleging claims under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, the U.S. Constitution, and state law. The only claims brought

before the Court by the instant motions are Counts II, III, and IV of his complaint.

Count II asserts that the Defendants failed to properly train and supervise correctional

officers to administer adequate medical treatment. Count III alleges that a civil

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conspiracy existed among Defendants to keep costs low, and that this conspiracy

resulted in Johnson’sinadequate medical treatment. Count IV complains of negligent

and wanton retention of incompetent staff. On January 5, 2015, Defendants filed

motions to dismiss these counts for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, and to dismissJohnson’srequested equitable relief for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. 

II. Standard of Review

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to contain

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from

the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the

doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-679 (2009). Instead, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted astrue, to state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678 (internal quotations omitted). This is a

notable departure from the “no set of facts” standard; the Supreme Court hasstated

that standard is “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted

pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by

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showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Bell Atl.

Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).

Iqbal establishes a two-step processfor evaluating a complaint. First, the Court

must “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. A complaint is not sufficient

“if ittenders‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether

they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. Factual allegations in a

complaint need not be detailed, but they “must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

B. Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) challenges the Court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction. When the attack is a facial—as opposed to

factual—challenge on the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court treats the Complaint’s

allegations astrue, as it does under a 12(b)(6) motion. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown &

Root Svcs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009).

With regard to Defendants’ challengeto Johnson’sstanding to request equitable

relief, standing is an Article III doctrine limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts

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to actual “cases” and “controversies.” SocialistWorkers Party v.Leahy, 145F.3d 1240,

1244 (11th Cir. 1998). In order to establish standing, a plaintiff “must demonstrate

injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” I.L. v.Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th

Cir. 2014). As Johnson is the party invoking this Court’s jurisdiction, he has the

burden of establishing standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561,

112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). 

“[E]ach element of standing must be supported ‘with the manner and degree

of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.’” Church v. City of

Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112

S.Ct. at 2136). When raised at the motion to dismissstage,“general factual allegations

of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may be sufficient to show standing.”

America’s Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens, 742 F.3d 1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2014). However,

a defendant may raise a facial attack upon a plaintiff’s standing, and the Court must

consider whether the allegationsin the complaint, taken astrue,support an inference

of standing. See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279

(11th Cir. 2009).

III. Analysis

A. Claims against Walker County

1. Failure to Train and Supervise

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Johnson alleges that Walker County had a duty to train the officers and staff of

the Jail in the proper medical treatment of inmates, that the County failed in this duty,

and that as a result of this failure Johnson wasinjured. (Doc. 1 at 7-8.) Johnson further

arguesthat this failure to train and supervise Jail staff to provide adequate medical care

constituted deliberate indifference which directly resulted in Johnson’sinjuries. (Doc.

1 at 8.) “Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’sserious medical needsis a violation of

the Eighth Amendment,” Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007),

and can therefore give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Walker County has a duty under Alabama law to provide funds for both the

medical care of inmates and for the upkeep of the Jail building. Ala. Code § 14-6-19

(1975). The County does not, however, participate in the daily operation of the Jail or

the creation of its policies; it merely providesthe funding. Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala.,

268 F.3d 1014, 1027 (11 Cir. 2001) (en banc)(abrogated on other grounds by Twombly,

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550 U.S. 544). Thus, while a county may be held liable for the conditions of the jail

building itself, see Marsh, 258 F.3d at 1027-28, it will generally not be held liable for

acts of jail personnel. See Turquitt v. JeffersonCnty, Ala., 137 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11 Cir.

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1998). Thisis for the simple reason that “authority over inmatesis expressly delegated

to Alabama sheriffs[, and] in operating the jails, sheriffs are subject to control by state

executive agencies, not by counties.” Id.

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Johnson correctly points out that the County has a non-delegable duty to

provide for indigent prisoners’ medical treatment, Ancata v. Prison Health Svcs., Inc.,

769 F.2d 700, 705 (11 Cir. 1985), and argues that a lack of adequate funding can th

support a deliberate indifference claim. While it is true that a lack of adequate medical

funding can support a deliberate indifference claim against a county, see Bell v. Shelby

Cnty., Ala., No. 2:12-CV-2991-LSC, 2013 WL 2248247, at *6 (N.D. Ala. May 21,

2013), it can only support a deliberate indifference claim based on that lack of funding,

not based on failure to properly train and supervise the Jail’s medical staff. The

County’s responsibility is to provide adequate funding for medical care, not to itself

undertake the direct training and supervision of the Jail’s medical staff. Count I of

Johnson’s complaint already alleges a violation based upon insufficient funding by the

County, and the County has not sought dismissal of that claim; Count II does not. For

these reasons, Plaintiff’s claim against Walker County alleging deliberate indifference

in failing to train and supervise medical staff is due to be dismissed.

2. Negligent and Wanton Retention

InCount IV,Johnson alleges that the County negligently and wantonly retained

the incompetent correctional officers and medical staff and that this retention led to

his injuries. (Doc. 1 at 9-10.) Johnson has stipulated to the dismissal of this claim

against Tirey, Underwood, and McCluskey, but has not done the same with regard to

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his claim against the County. (Cf. Doc. 21 at 5; Doc. 20.) Nevertheless this claim is

due to be dismissed for the same reasons given above. Unlike in Ancata, where the

prisoner alleged that the county itself had established policies relating to prisoners’

medical treatment or had provided insufficient funds, 769 F.2d at 704-05, Johnson

makes no such allegations here. Count IV only alleges that the County failed to

exercise care in retaining incompetent jail personnel. That duty belongs to the sheriff,

not the County, and thus Count IV of Johnson’s complaint against the County is due

to be dismissed. See Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1027.

3. Civil Conspiracy

Johnson alleges in Count III that “Defendants . . . have formed and carried out

an unwritten agreement to cut costs and in turn spend less on the care and treatment

of Walker County inmates.” (Doc. 1 at 9.) This conspiracy, in turn, led to the

inadequate medical care provided to Johnson and thus constitutes a violation of the

Constitution. (Id.)

These conclusory statements are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

Johnson points to the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion in Bendiburg v. Dempsey to argue

that he need not “produce a ‘smoking gun’ [to prove conspiracy] when nothing more

than an ‘understanding’ and ‘willful participation’ between private and state

defendants is necessary to show the kind of joint action that will subject . . . parties to

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§ 1983 liability.” (Doc. 20 at 10-11, quoting Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 469

(11th Cir. 1990).) While this is undoubtedly true, it does not absolve Johnson of his

duty to plead factsthat plausibly allege that a conspiracy actually existed. See Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678-79. In Bendiburg, the plaintiffs plead specific facts: that the defendants

intentionally exaggerated the seriousness of a minor’s medical condition for the

purpose ofsupplying state officialswith a pretextto remove the child from the custody

of his father. Bendiburg, 909 F.2d at 469. That court concluded that these facts, if

proven, could subject the parties to liability. Id. But here, Johnson has not provided

any factsthat, if proven, would show that a conspiracy existed among the Defendants;

he has simply made the conclusory claim that Defendants “have formed and carried

out an unwritten agreement to cut costs.” (Doc. 1 at 9.) This does not satisfy the

Twombly pleading standard. 

Though the pleading currently does not meet the standard laid out in Twombly

and Iqbal, were Johnson to plead his claims with sufficient particularity and using

actual facts, the pleading could survive a motion to dismiss. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(a)(2)suggest that this Court “should freely give leave [to amend] when

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). As such, Plaintiff’s request for leave to

amend this particular count with more particular facts is due to be granted.

4. Claim for Equitable Relief

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In his complaint, Johnson asks this Court to “[o]rder the Defendants, their

officers, agents and employees to adopt and implement policies and procedures to

remedy the pattern and practice of conduct” that is the subject of his complaint.(Doc.

1 at 12.) TheCounty hasraised a facial challenge to hisstanding to pursue this request

for declaratory and injunctive relief. (Doc. 12 at 8-10.) Unlike money damages, both

declaratory and injunctive relief are forms of prospective relief. See McGee v. Solicitor

Gen. of Richmond Cnty., Ga., 727 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Church, 30

F.3d at 1337. “For a plaintiff seeking prospective relief to have standing, he ‘must

show a sufficient likelihood that he will be affected by the allegedly unlawful conduct

in the future.’” Koziara v. City of Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001)).

In his response to the County’s motion to dismiss, Johnson argues that he has

standing to sue because the County is not due Eleventh Amendment immunity from

prospective relief. (Doc. 20 at 9-10.) But immunity is different from the standing

question, and Johnson must still show why this Court has jurisdiction to hear his

claims for equitable relief. To do that, even assuming that Johnson has suffered an

injury in fact and that the injury is traceable to the Defendants, Johnson must show

that the relief he requests will actually redress his own injury. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at

560.

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Although Johnson has plead facts that suggest he was harmed while at the

Walker County Jail, this only establishes a live controversy on a claim for money

damages and not a claim for injunctive relief. See Adler v. Duval County School Bd., 112

F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Equitable relief is a prospective remedy, intended

to prevent future injuries. In contrast, a claim for money damages looks back in time

and is intended to redress a past injury.” ). Johnson has not suggested that he will be

under the care of Defendants and that equitable relief is in any way necessary to

prevent the same harm from happening to him again. Though he alleges that the

County “isthe entity which has custody” over him, he also states that at the time he

filed the complaint, he remains at UAB Hospital “pending further ordersfrom UAB.”

(Doc. 1 at 2, 6.) It is not clear from the plead facts what will happen to Johnson next,

nor is it clear even if he returns (or has returned) to the Jail that “he will be affected

by the allegedly unlawful conduct in the future.” Koziara, 392 F.3d at 1305 (internal

quotations omitted). Therefore,Johnson hasfailed to plead sufficient factsto suggest

that he faces the future injury needed to establish standing to seek injunctive relief.

It is Johnson’s burden to prove that he has standing to request the relief he

seeks, and he has not met this burden. However, with more facts he may be able to do

so, and it is therefore not futile for the Court to allow him the opportunity to amend

his complaint to plead more factsin order to show standing. See Cockrell v. Sparks, 510

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F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that amendment is futile when a complaint

would still be appropriately dismissed as amended). As such, Johnson’s request to

amend his complaint to show standing is due to be granted.

B. Claims against Tirey, Underwood, and McCluskey

1. Failure to Train and Supervise

Johnson arguesthat Tirey, Underwood, and McCluskey had a duty to properly

train and supervise the Jail’s correctional officers to provide adequate medical care and

that because of a lack of training and supervision hewasinjured by the lack of adequate

medical care. (Doc. 1 at 7-8.) Thus, these Defendants “exhibited reckless disregard

for, and deliberate indifference to, the constitutional right of [Johnson] to receive

adequate medical care and treatment while in the custody of the Walker County Jail.”

(Doc. 1 at 8.)

These are conclusory statements that cannotsurvive a motion to dismiss under

the pleading standard of Twombly and Iqbal. But unlike with his failure to train and

supervise claim against the County, if Johnson were to plead this claim with more

particular facts, he may be able to state a survivable claim upon which relief could be

granted. Assuch,Johnson will be given leave to amend this Count to state a sufficient

claim.

2. Civil Conspiracy

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For the same reasons stated in Part III(A)(3), Johnson has not plead adequate

facts for the claim of civil conspiracy to survive the motion to dismiss. However, as

with the same complaint against the County,Johnson’srequest to amend his pleading

to provide more particular facts with regard to this count is due to be granted.

3. Negligent and Wanton Retention

Johnson has stipulated to the dismissal of Count IV of his complaint, alleging

negligent and wanton retention of incompetent staff, against Tirey, Underwood, and

McCluskey. (Doc. 21 at 5.) Accordingly, this claim is due to be dismissed.

4. Equitable Relief

For the same reasons stated above in Part III(A)(4), Johnson has failed to

establish that he has standing to pursue prospective equitable relief against

Defendants. However, Johnson will be given the opportunity to amend his complaint

to plead sufficient facts to carry his burden of proving appropriate subject-matter

jurisdiction.

C. Motion to Strike

Johnson has filed a motion to strike footnote 1 from the Defendants’ motions

to dismiss. (Doc. 19 at 1, referencing Doc. 14 at 2 fn. 1.) That footnote alleges that

“[d]iscovery will reveal that Plaintiff was receiving his medications (supplied by the

Defendants) for his heart and blood pressure issues but was non-compliant in taking

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his medications. The factswill show that hisstroke and medical issueswere caused by

his own hands and not by any of the Defendants.” (Doc. 14 at 2 fn. 1.)

Johnson’s motion to strike is due to be granted. Under the motion to dismiss

standard, the Court’s review is limited to “the four corners of the complaint.” St.

George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). Additionally, under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the

pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated

as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” The Court declines to consider the

outside material and thereby convert Defendants’ motionsinto premature motionsfor

summary judgment. Therefore, Johnsons’s motion to strike is due to be granted.

IV. Conclusion

Johnson’s claims against Walker County stand as follows: Count II (failure to

train and supervise) and Count IV (negligent and wanton retention of incompetent

officers) do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted and are due to be

dismissed. Plaintiff is given the opportunity to amend Count III (civil conspiracy) in

order to plead particular facts that demonstrate an entitlement to relief, as well as to

amend hisrequest for equitable relief in order to show standing. Counts I and VI, the

only two other claims against the County, remain in full.

Johnson’s claims against Tirey, Underwood, and McCluskey stand as follows:

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Count II(failure to train and supervise) and III (civil conspiracy) currently do not meet

the appropriate pleading standard, but Johnson is given the opportunity to amend

these claims and plead facts with particularity. He is also given leave to amend his

request for equitable relief to show standing. Count IV (negligent and wanton

retention) is due to be dismissed per Johnson’s stipulation. This leaves Counts I and

VI, the only other two claims against these defendants, remaining in full.

Finally,Johnson’s motion to strike footnote 1 from the Defendants’ motionsto

dismiss is due to be granted.

A separate order will be entered.

Done this 17 day of March 2015. th

L. SCOTT COOGLER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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