Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05221/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05221-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 10, 2010 Decided January 4, 2011

No. 10-5221

GERALD WALPIN,

APPELLANT

v.

CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES ET

AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-01343)

Sanford M. Saunders Jr. argued the cause for the appellant.

Helen L. Gilbert, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the appellees. Ronald C. Machen

Jr., United States Attorney, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney, were

on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Gerald

Walpin, former Inspector General of the Corporation for

National and Community Services (CNCS), appeals the district

USCA Case #10-5221 Document #1286007 Filed: 01/04/2011 Page 1 of 7
2

court’s dismissal of his mandamus action against the CNCS and

three of its officers. Walpin v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Serv.,

718 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2010). Walpin asks that CNCS be

directed to restore him as the CNCS Inspector General on the

ground that the President did not comply with the requirement

of the Inspector General Act (IGA), as amended by the Inspector

General Reform Act of 2008 (IGRA), that the President give the

Congress thirty days’ notice of his intent to remove an Inspector

General and of the reasons therefor. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3(b). We

conclude the district court correctly dismissed the action because

Walpin does not have a “clear and indisputable right to relief”

as required for mandamus. 

I.

 Walpin assumed the post of CNCS Inspector General on

January 6, 2007 after Senate confirmation. On June 10, 2009,

Walpin received a telephone call from Norman Eisen, the

President’s special counsel, who issued Walpin an “ultimatum

that he either tender his resignation as Inspector General, or be

terminated from his post,” giving him one hour to decide.

Compl. ¶ 29. When asked why, Eisen told Walpin it was “time

to move on.” Id. Walpin “declined to make a decision,”

whereupon “Eisen informed him that he was being removed

from his post as Inspector General.” Id. The same day, “the

White House ordered that [Walpin] be immediately denied all

attributes of his post, including access to his office, continued

access to his staff, and access to email communications,” and

“be transferred . . . to the status of administrative leave.” Id.

¶ 41.

The following day, June 11, 2009, the President sent

virtually identical letters to the Vice President (as Senate

President) and to the House Speaker, stating in relevant part:

“This is to advise that I am exercising my power as President to

remove from office the Inspector General of [CNCS], effective

30 days from today. . . . [I]t is vital that I have the fullest

USCA Case #10-5221 Document #1286007 Filed: 01/04/2011 Page 2 of 7
3

confidence in the appointees serving as Inspectors General. 

That is no longer the case with regard to this Inspector General.” 

Mot. to Dismiss, Exs. A, B, Walpin v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty.

Serv., No. 09-1343 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2009) (Mot. to Dismiss);

see Compl. ¶ 31. The same day, Senator Charles Grassley

advised the President he was “deeply troubled to learn of the

ultimatum given [Walpin] absent Congressional notification.” 

Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C at 2. In response, the White House

Counsel wrote a letter to Grassley stating that the President

“intend[ed] to remove [Walpin] because the President d[id] not

have full confidence in him” and that this action was “fully

supported by the Chair of [CNCS] (a Democrat) and the ViceChair (a Republican).” Id., Ex. D at 1. The letter further

asserted Walpin had “been suspended, with pay,” which was

“fully consistent with the Inspector General Act,” and advised

that the Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern District of

California had “referred [Walpin’s] conduct for review by the

Integrity Committee of the Council of Inspectors General on

Integrity and Efficiency” and that the administration was “aware

of the circumstances leading to that referral and of [Walpin’s]

conduct throughout his tenure.” Id. On June 16, 2009, Senator

Claire McCaskill called on the White House to provide a “more

substantive rationale” and Senators Joseph Lieberman and Susan

Collins inquired about Walpin’s removal. Compl. ¶¶ 34-35. In

response, Eisen sent a letter to the three senators stating that

Walpin “was removed after a review was unanimously requested

by the bi-partisan Board of [CNCS]” and that the Board’s action

“was precipitated by a May 20, 2009 Board meeting at which

Mr. Walpin was confused, disoriented, unable to answer

questions and exhibited other behavior that led the Board to

question his capacity to serve.” Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. E., at 1. 

As additional justification for Walpin’s removal, Eisen recited

other examples of inappropriate activity and concluded that

Walpin “had become unduly disruptive to agency operations,

USCA Case #10-5221 Document #1286007 Filed: 01/04/2011 Page 3 of 7
4

impairing his effectiveness and . . . losing the confidence of the

Board and the agency.” Id.

1

Walpin filed this action against the CNCS, its Acting Chief

Executive Officer, Chief Human Capital Officer and General

Counsel. The amended complaint alleges Walpin was

“effectively removed from his post as Inspector General on June

10, 2009, prior to any colorable claim of a start of the required

thirty (30) day notice-to-Congress period, rather than following

a thirty (30) day notice period, as required by statute.” Compl.

¶ 41. It seeks (1) declarations that the June 11, 2009 and June

16, 2009 letters failed to comply with the statutory notice

requirements and that Walpin was “unlawfully transferred, and

or constructively terminated in violation of the notice

requirements of the [IGRA]” and (2) a “Writ of Mandamus

directing Defendants to restore Mr. Walpin to his duly appointed

position as Inspector General.” Compl. at 19-20. 

On June 17, the district court granted the defendants’

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6), concluding that Walpin failed to establish a clear

right to relief as required for mandamus. Walpin filed a timely

notice of appeal.

II.

Section 3(b) of the IGA, as amended by section 3 of the

IGRA, Pub. L. No. 110-409, 122 Stat. 4302, 4302 (2008),

provides: 

1

Eisen cited the Acting United States Attorney’s referral of

Walpin’s conduct for review and asserted Walpin had been absent

from the CNCS’s headquarters over the objection of the Board,

“exhibited a lack of candor in providing material information to

decision makers” and “engaged in other troubling and inappropriate

conduct.” Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. E.

USCA Case #10-5221 Document #1286007 Filed: 01/04/2011 Page 4 of 7
5

(b) An Inspector General may be removed from

office by the President. If an Inspector General is

removed from office or is transferred to another

position or location within an establishment, the

President shall communicate in writing the reasons for

any such removal or transfer to both Houses of

Congress, not later than 30 days before the removal or

transfer. Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a

personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other

than transfer or removal.

5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3(b). Walpin contends the President violated

this section’s notice requirements in two respects and seeks

relief therefor under the Mandamus Act, which “grants district

courts original jurisdiction over ‘any action in the nature of

mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United

States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the

plaintiff.’ ” Baptist Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 603 F.3d 57, 62

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1361). To secure

mandamus relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he has a

“clear right to relief”; (2) the defendant has “a clear duty to

act”; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy available to

plaintiff. Id. Reviewing de novo the district court’s dismissal of

Walpin’s mandamus action, see id., we conclude that Walpin

has not demonstrated a “clear and indisputable right to relief”

based on a “clear and compelling duty” to act, as required to

support mandamus relief. In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted).

 Walpin first asserts a right to relief based on the

President’s alleged violation of the statutory duty to provide

congressional notice thirty days before removing an inspector

general. Walpin maintains he was prematurely “removed”

without the statutory notice on June 10, 2009, when he was

placed on “administrative leave.” His placement on

administrative leave, however, did not constitute removal from

USCA Case #10-5221 Document #1286007 Filed: 01/04/2011 Page 5 of 7
6

office and therefore did not give rise to a clear right to relief for

violating section 3(b). Walpin remained on administrative

leave, with pay, until July 18, 2009, more than thirty days after

the President’s letters to the Congress, when he was in fact

removed from the payroll. See Aff. of Gerald Walpin ¶ 11 n.1,

Walpin v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Serv., No. 09-1343 (D.D.C.

Sept. 17, 2009). His status while on leave was much like the

U.S. Postal Service employee’s in Oliver v. U.S. Postal Service,

696 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1983). 

The employee in Oliver was given a “Notice of Proposed

Removal” and placed on paid leave for 30 days. He contended

the suspension of his duties violated a provision of the Civil

Service Reform Act of 1978, which requires “at least 30 days’

advance written notice” before taking certain adverse actions,

including “a removal.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 7513(b)(1), 7512(1). The

Fifth Circuit disagreed, declining to “[i]nfer[] a right to remain

on duty during the notice period,” “where none is expressly

provided or need be inferred to effect a protection granted.” 

696 F.3d at 1131. So here, IGA section 3(b) provides no right

to continued duty performance but only to deferral of “removal”

until thirty days after notice is given. Accordingly, we cannot

conclude that the statutory language gives rise to the clear duty

or right to relief necessary for mandamus relief. Cf. Swan v.

Clinton, 100 F.3d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (denying mandamus

relief to removed holdover board member not granted statutory

removal protection). 

Walpin next contends the President violated his duty under

section 3(b) to communicate “the reasons for . . . removal” in

the thirty-day notice. The President did, however, provide in

the letters to the Congress his reason for removing

Walpin—that the President “no longer” had “the fullest

confidence” in him. This explanation satisfies the minimal

statutory mandate that the President communicate to the

Congress his “reasons” for removal. Section 3(b) imposes no

USCA Case #10-5221 Document #1286007 Filed: 01/04/2011 Page 6 of 7
7

“clear duty” to explain the reasons in any greater detail Cf.

Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 317-19 (D.C.

Cir. 1988) (declining to review adequacy of detail in agency’s

report to Congress pursuant to statutory reporting requirement

that “by its nature seems singularly committed to congressional

discretion in measuring the fidelity of the Executive Branch

actor to legislatively mandated requirements”). In fact, the

Congress intended that the thirty-day notice requirement

provide an opportunity for a more expansive discussion of the

President’s reasons for removing an inspector general. See

S. Rep. No. 110-262, at 4 (2008) (notice provision added to

“allow for an appropriate dialogue with Congress in the event

that the planned transfer or removal is viewed as an

inappropriate or politically motivated attempt to terminate an

effective Inspector General”). And this is precisely what

occurred here.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Walpin lacks

the clear right to relief based on a clear duty to act that is

necessary to obtain mandamus relief.2

 Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

So ordered.

2

Walpin did not argue below that he is entitled to a declaratory

judgment in the absence of a right to mandamus relief, see 718 F.

Supp. 2d at 24, and has therefore waived the argument. See Murthy

v. Vilsack, 609 F.3d 460, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

USCA Case #10-5221 Document #1286007 Filed: 01/04/2011 Page 7 of 7