Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02659/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02659-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 Letter briefs filed as docket entries #337 (plus declarations at ##339 and 340), and #341. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DERRICK SATCHELL, et al.

Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDEX CORPORATION,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 03-02659 SI

ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING AND

PARTIALLY DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO COMPEL DOCUMENTS

AND DEPOSITIONS

By letter briefs,1 the parties seek resolution oftwo discovery disputes. First, plaintiffs seek to compel

FedEx to produce documents related to “non-African-American and Latino employees’ return to work after

disability leave,” as required by this Court’s March 21, 2005 Order. Second, plaintiffs request that the Court

grant leave to reopen the depositions of three FedEx employees.

The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS and PARTIALLY DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for the reasons set

forth below.

1. Motion to Compel Production of Documents

On March 21, 2005, this Court partially granted and partially denied plaintiffs’ motion to compel

production of documents and responses to interrogatories. Among other things, the Court ordered defendant

to produce “documents relating to non-African-American and Latino employees’ return to work after disability

leave” on or before April 4, 2005. On April 1, 2005, FedEx informed plaintiffs that, due to the volume of

records and the short time the company had to comply with the Court’s Order, documents in the Foster City

Case 3:03-cv-02659-SI Document 348 Filed 09/07/05 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

and Irvine offices would be made available to plaintiffs for inspection as they were kept in the ususal course of

business. Defendant informed plaintiffs that the files were not maintained by race/national origin and that the

documents filled 290 filing cabinet drawers. 

On April 21, 2005, plaintiffs’ counsel and a paralegalinspected the documents in the Foster City office

for three and a half hours. Plaintiffs contend that defendants’ bulk in-house production of documents does not

satisfy Rule 34(b) or this Court’s March 21, 2005 Order because the files were not organized in any discernible

way by name or time period. Plaintiffs also assert, based on conversations with the document custodian in

Foster City, that 95-98% of the documents made available for inspection do not relate to long term disability

claims, but rather to “in and out” claims for employees on leave for short periods of time, and are therefore

irrelevant. Plaintiffs ask that the Court compel defendant to identify specific documents that are responsive to

the request and require defendant to organize and label them.

Defendant maintains that the production of documents as they are kept in the usual course of business

satisfies both Federal Rule 34(b) and this Court’s order, and that plaintiffs’ request for files organized by race

and length of leave is unreasonable. FedEx submits a declaration from Ramona McMaster, the document

manager for FedEx’s Foster City office, stating that the files in her office are kept alphabetically by employee

name and fiscal year. Def.’s brief #341, Ex. A. Defendant also asserts that plaintiffs did not review a large

enough sample of the filesto draw reasonable conclusions about the usefulness of the information contained in

the files. 

A. Organization of files

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b), “[a] party who produces documents for inspection shall

produce them as they are kept in the usual course of business or shall organize them and label them to

correspond with the categories in the request.” In general, if a responding party produces documents as they

are kept in the usual course of business, there is no obligation to organize them in correspondence with the

categories contained inthe documentrequests. W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Tetratec Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

14245 at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 1989). Some courts have ordered parties to organize documents to

correspond to each request, but generally only where the court had reason to believe that there was an effort

Case 3:03-cv-02659-SI Document 348 Filed 09/07/05 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

to obscure relevant documents or that the documents were not being produced as they are kept in the usual

course of business. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Evanston Township v. Admiral Heating & Ventilating, Inc.,

104 F.R.D. 23, 36 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“plaintiffs can legitimately fear defendants’ unwillingness to segregate the

documents masks a hope to obscure”); T.N. Taube Corp. v. Marine Midland Mortgage Corp., 136 F.R.D.

449, 456 (W.D.N.C. 1991) (“The Court doubts very much whether Defendant complied with the command

of Rule 34(b) that documents be produced as kept in the usual course of business.”). However, while parties

may produce records as they are kept in the ordinary course of business, “the producing party does have a

burden to select and produce the items requested rather than simply dumping large quantities of unrequested

materials onto the discovering party along with the items actually sought under Rule 34.” 8A Charles Alan

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2213 (2d ed. 1994). In addition, an unwieldy

record keeping system may not be used to prohibit a party from reviewing relevant documents. See Wagner

v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 208 F.D.R. 606, 611 (D. Neb. 2001) (holding that producing large numbers of documents

in no apparent order does not comply with a party’s discovery obligations); In re Brand Name Prescription

Drugs, 1995 WL 3603526 at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995). 

FedEx has submitted a declaration from the document manager for FedEx’s Foster City office stating

that the filesin question are kept alphabetically by employee name and fiscalyear. Document #341, McMaster

Decl. ¶ 5. This assertion directly contradicts plaintiffs’ claim that the documents were “not kept in any order at

all.” Pls.’ brief #337 at 3. The Court assumes that defendant has correctly presented the nature of the filing

system and ORDERS FedEx to produce all disability related documents from the Foster City office in the

manner described in the McMaster declaration. Specifically, all disability related files from the Foster City office

must be made available to plaintiffs in order by year and alphabetically within each year. Defendant must also

provide plaintiffs with affidavits signed both by the FedEx record custodians and by FedEx counselattesting to

the specific nature ofthe filing systems used in all other officeshousingrelevantdisability documents. If the Court

is not satisfied that there is a discernable organization of disability files in other offices, FedEx will be ordered

to produce all documents in the manner that documents are kept in Foster City. 

B. Race related information

Case 3:03-cv-02659-SI Document 348 Filed 09/07/05 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Plaintiffs seek an order compelling defendant to produce information organized by race and specifically

identifying all non-African-American and Latino employees who returned to work after disability leave.

Defendant maintains that this request is unreasonable because race is notrelevant to the administrationof a leave

of absence, and therefore FedEx has not identified employee race in the files as they are kept in the usualcourse

of business. 

The Court finds defendant’s explanation forthe absence of race related information in its disability files

to be reasonable. Defendant is not required to do the extra work of sorting files by race to meet plaintiffs’

discovery request and may produce the files as kept in the ordinary course of business. However, defendant

may not obscure information thatwould enable plaintiffs to identify individual employees’ files by race on their

own. Therefore, the Court orders defendant to produce information that will enable plaintiffs to determine the

race of employees on disability leave. Specifically, defendant is ORDERED to produce: (1) a list that identifies

each employee by name and number, if FedEx has not already done so; and (2) a list of the names of all

employees who have taken disability leave in the time period relevant to the litigation. Plaintiffs can then match

these lists with the information previously provided by FedEx identifying the race/nationality of all FedEx

employees.

C. Long-term versus short-term disability

Plaintiffs assert that 95-98% ofthe documents made available forinspectionwere irrelevant to plaintiffs’

claims because they did not relate to long-term disability claims, but rather to “in and out” claims for leave for

short periods of time. Defendant contends that, because FedEx does not separate long-term and short-term

disability files in the normal course of business, it is not required to do so to meet plaintiffs’ request.

In neither their original discovery request nor in papers submitted in support ofthis motion did plaintiffs

request that production of documents be limited to those employees on disability leave for a specific length of

time, distinguish between “in and out” and long-termfiles, or define “long-termdisability.” This Court’s March

21, 2005 Order compels defendant to produce only documents related to “non-African-American and Latino

employees’ return to work after disability leave.” 

The parties are ORDERED to confer with each other to define long-term disability leave. Once they

Case 3:03-cv-02659-SI Document 348 Filed 09/07/05 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

have agreed upon a definition, defendant is ORDERED to identify the employees who qualify under the agreedupon definitionoflong-termdisability leave and to then provide plaintiff with a list that includes: (1) the name of

all qualifying employees, (2) the date each employee began leave, and (3) the date the employee returned to

work. This will enable plaintiffs to reasonably access defendant’s filing system. Defendant must then make the

files available in accordance with the filing systems described by the record manager for each individual office

and as kept in the usual course of business. 

In summary, the Court hereby PARTIALLY GRANTS and PARTIALLY DENIES this motion to

compel and ORDERS discovery as follows:

• defendant must make available forinspection all disability related filesfromthe FosterCity office

in order by year and alphabetically within each year;

• defendant must provide affidavits signed both by the FedEx record custodians and by FedEx

counsel attesting in detail to the specific nature of the filing systems used in all other offices

housing relevant disability documents to be submitted the Court; 

• defendant must provide a list of employees by name and employee number, ifit has not already

done so;

• defendant must provide a list containing the name of all employees who have taken disability

leave in a time period relevant to the litigation; 

• the parties are ordered to confer with each other to define long-term disability;

• defendant must identify the names of employees who qualify under the definition of long-term

disability leave and provide plaintiff with a list that includes: (1) the name of all qualifying

employees, (2) the date each employee began leave, and (3) the date each employee returned

to work; after plaintiffs have determined which employees on this list are relevant to the

litigation, defendant must make all relevant files available to plaintiff.

Defendant must produce all responsive documents on or before September 30, 2005.

2. Motion to Compel Further Depositions

Plaintiffs ask to depose John Six forthree additional hours, Chris Matthews for an additionalfullsevenhour day, and Angela Suazo for four additional hours. Plaintiffs contend that the depositions of these three

witnesses did not last for a full seven-hour day as required by Federal Rule 30(d)(2). Plaintiffs also assert that

more time is necessary for full and fair depositions of these witnesses and that there is good cause to request

additional time to depose these witnesses because: (1) the range of subjects and claims is broad, (2) FedEx

produced additional documents relating to the witnesses after the deposition, and (3) two ofthe witnesses, Mr.

Case 3:03-cv-02659-SI Document 348 Filed 09/07/05 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 The parties do not calculate the exact time of the depositions. However, all parties took an

approximately one hour lunch break and occasional shorter breaks.

6

Matthews and Ms. Suazo, managed several of the named plaintiffs at issue in the pending summary judgment

motions. 

All three witnesses have previously been deposed by plaintiffs. John Six resides in Hawaii, and his

deposition commenced at 9:38 a.m. on December 6, 2004, and adjourned at 1:19 p.m., for approximately a

total of four hours and thirty minutes. During the deposition, the parties argued about documents that defendant

had failed to produce. Plaintiffs maintain that these documents were directly relevant to Mr. Six’s deposition.

These documents were ultimately produced in response to this Court’s March 21, 2004 Order. Defendant

asserts that plaintiffs’ counsel had other relevant information on hand which they failed to use to refresh the

witness’s memory, and thatSix’s depositionwas adjourned voluntarily by plaintiffs’ counsel. Chris Matthews’

deposition commenced at 9:39 a.m. on December 7, 2004, and adjourned at 5:32 p.m., for a total of

approximately eight hours. Angela Suazo’s deposition commenced at 9:42 a.m. on April 15, 2005, and

adjourned at 5:54 p.m., for a total of just over eight hours.2

Rule 30(d)(2) states that “unless otherwise authorized by the court or stipulated by the parties, a

deposition is limited to one day of seven hours.” However, the court must allow additionaltime “if needed for

a fair examination of the deponent or if the deponent or another person, or other circumstances, impedes or

delays the examination. ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2). Additional time may be awarded for good cause shown,

and the Court has discretion to determine how much time is reasonable and whether a deposition may extend

over more than one day. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2) Advisory Committee Notes (2000 amend.). Grounds

for granting an extensioninclude:whether a witnessrequires an interpreter, whether the deposition covers expert

testimony; whether the examination covers events occurring over a long period of time, extensive documents,

or multiple complex claims; or whether the witness did not read documents sent to him/her by the examining

party in advance of the deposition. See id. In addition, multi-party cases may warrant additional time. Id.

Because multiple plaintiffs and issues are at stake in this litigation and defendant failed to produce

documents related to interview notes, ASPIRE records, ASTRA SOPS, disciplinary records, and other

documents until the March 21, 2005 Order, the Court finds that plaintiffs have good cause to extend each of

Case 3:03-cv-02659-SI Document 348 Filed 09/07/05 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

these deposition beyond the seven-hour limit. The Court ORDERS defendant to produce Mr. Six in his offices

in Hawaii for three additional hours and Ms. Suazo and Mr. Matthews for four hours each.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby PARTIALLY GRANTS and

PARTIALLY DENIES plaintiffs’ motion to compel documents and depositions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:03-cv-02659-SI Document 348 Filed 09/07/05 Page 7 of 7