Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02048/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02048-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Charlotte Eyvonne Wells, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02048-PHX-JJT (BSB)

ORDER AND REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Charlotte Eyvonne Wells has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, along with several exhibits. (Docs. 1, 8, 9.) Respondents 

assert that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely under the Anti-Terrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides the statute of limitations 

applicable to state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 15.) 

Alternatively, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and 

barred from federal habeas corpus review, except for her Fourth Amendment claim and 

her claim that trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations. (Id. at 9.) 

Specifically, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is not 

amenable to federal habeas corpus review and that her claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective during plea negotiations lacks merit. Petitioner opposes Respondents’ 

assertions. (Doc. 18.) For the reasons below, the Court recommends that the Petition be 

denied. 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 In 2009, drug enforcement detectives stopped Petitioner’s car after she made 

several illegal lane changes.1

 (Doc. 15, Ex. Y at 2.) A drug-sniffing dog alerted to the 

car’s trunk, and the detectives found several bales of marijuana inside. (Id. at 2.) On 

March 13, 2009, Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court on the 

following charges: (1) conspiracy to commit possession of marijuana for sale, a class two 

felony (Count One); (2) sale or transportation of marijuana, a class two felony (Count 

Two); and (3) possession of marijuana for sale, a class two felony (Count Three). 

(Doc. 15, Ex. A at 1-2.) Before trial, Petitioner moved to suppress the evidence gathered 

at the traffic stop arguing that the stop and search of her vehicle were unlawful. (Doc. 15, 

Exs. B.) After holding a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. (Doc. 15, Exs. L, P, 

Q.) Following a trial, a jury found Petitioner guilty of all three counts. (Doc. 15, Exs. CE, R-U.) The State then moved to dismiss Count Three, and the trial court granted the 

motion. (Doc. 15, Ex. M at 5.) On October 9, 2009, the trial court sentenced Petitioner 

to 9.25 years’ imprisonment on Count One and to a concurrent term of 9.25 years’ 

imprisonment on Count Two. (Doc. 15, Exs. H, O.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

 Petitioner appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, arguing that the stop of her 

vehicle was not based on reasonable suspicion and that the stop, search, and seizure 

violated the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 15, Ex. W.) On January 6, 2011, the appellate 

court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Doc. 15, Ex. Y.) Petitioner did 

not file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

 

1

 These facts are derived from the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. (Doc. 15, Ex. Y.) The appellate court’s determination of the facts is presumed correct. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Although Petitioner disagrees with this description of the facts, she has not rebutted the presumption of correctness with clear and convincing evidence. See 

Deere v. Cullen, 718 F.3d 1124, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013). 

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C. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 On August 22, 2011, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial 

court pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2

 (Doc. 15, Exs. Z, YY.) The 

state trial court appointed Petitioner counsel. (Doc. 15, Ex. AA.) Petitioner later filed a 

pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court declined to accept because 

Petitioner was represented by counsel. (Doc. 15, Exs. BB, CC.) After reviewing the 

record, Petitioner’s appointed counsel concluded that the notice of post-conviction relief 

was untimely and there was no “sufficient factual or legal basis upon which to ground a 

good faith” post-conviction petition. (Doc. 15, Ex. DD at 2.) Counsel obtained 

permission for Petitioner to file a pro se petition. (Id.) 

 On April 12, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.3

 

(Doc. 15, Ex. EE.) Petitioner raised the following claims: 

 (1) trial counsel was ineffective for the following reasons: (a) failing “to review 

[Petitioner’s] case and speak to [her] about the many relevant issues in [her] case”; 

(b) failing to notify the State that Petitioner wanted to accept its plea offer; 

(c) “obstructing the plea deal,” despite being told “on multiple occasions that [Petitioner] 

wanted to accept the original plea”; (d) being “unprepared for [Petitioner’s] trial and 

fail[ing] to interview the witnesses”; (e) refusing to allow Petitioner to testify on her own 

behalf; (f) failing to attend “presentence meetings”; (g) refusing to allow Petitioner’s 

family to testify on her behalf at sentencing; (h) failing to present “mitigating issues”; and 

(i) Petitioner “attempted to fire [counsel] but he refused to speak to the judge, and thereby 

had a conflict of interest at [Petitioner’s] sentencing” (Ground One); 

 

2

 Consistent with Respondents’ Answer and in accordance with Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-74 (1988), the Court considers Petitioner’s documents filed on the date 

she gave them to prison authorities for mailing. Id. (discussing the mailbox rule in federal proceedings). Respondents have provided prison mailing logs containing the dates on which Petitioner mailed her notice of post-conviction relief and her federal 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 15, Exs. YY, ZZ.) 

3

 For ease of reference, the Court assigns numbers and lettered subparts to the claims Petitioner presented in her state court filings. 

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 (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to notify Petitioner that her direct 

appeal had been denied until after the deadline to file a notice of post-conviction relief 

had passed (Ground Two); 

 (3) the police officers did not have probable cause to stop Petitioner’s car, “and 

then to search it with an untrained K-9 puppy and by [an] off-duty officer” (Ground 

Three); 

 (4) the police violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), by continuing to 

interrogate Petitioner after she asked to speak to an attorney (Ground Four); 

 (5) the State “altered evidence” because the “State’s tape recording was edited” 

and “[t]he beginning of [Petitioner’s] interview was deleted and not transcribed for the 

jury” (Ground Five); and, 

 (6) the State “provided perjured testimony from the officer[]s involved” because 

the officers’ police reports differed from their trial testimony (Ground Six). (Doc. 15, 

Ex. EE at 5-7.) 

 The State filed a response arguing that the Rule 32 proceeding was untimely. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. FF.) In her reply, Petitioner argued that the court should excuse the 

untimely filing because appellate counsel did not tell her when her direct appeal had 

concluded. (Doc. 15, Ex. GG at 5-6.) After considering additional briefing on the 

timeliness issue (Doc. 15, Exs. JJ, MM, NN), the trial court gave Petitioner “the benefit 

of the doubt” on that issue and stated that it would “address the issue of ineffective trial 

counsel on the merits.” (Doc. 15, Ex. OO at 3.) The trial court scheduled an evidentiary 

hearing and re-appointed counsel to represent Petitioner. (Doc. 15, Ex. OO at 3, Ex. PP.) 

The court clarified that it would only consider Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claims. (Doc. 15, Ex. OO at 3.) The trial court determined that all of Petitioner’s 

other claims were “either precluded or without merit and [did] not set forth colorable 

claims.” (Id.) 

 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on November 16 and 26, 2012. 

(Doc. 15, Exs. TT, UU.) Petitioner and trial counsel Robert Billar testified at the hearing 

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and several exhibits were admitted. (Id.) After taking the matter under advisement, the 

trial court found that trial counsel acted reasonably and competently: 

The court heard testimony from [Petitioner] as well as trial counsel Robert 

Billar. . . . The parties are in agreement that Mr. Billar sent a copy of the plea . . . providing for 3.5 years in prison, to [Petitioner] at the jail and she called him and asked to have him explain the plea. Mr. Billar visited [Petitioner] at her request and went over the plea with her. This is undisputed. The court accepts Mr. Billar’s testimony that he went to the jail to visit [Petitioner] more than two times. 

What is disputed is that [Petitioner] testified she thought the plea provided for probation. Mr. Billar advises that probation was not available (she 

acknowledged four prior felony convictions in the plea). The plea clearly shows that [Petitioner] “shall be sentenced to the Arizona Department of Corrections for the presumptive term of 3.5 years.” [Petitioner] is incorrect in her view the plea permitted probation and no reasonable person could assume otherwise. The court accepts Mr. Billar’s testimony that he went over the plea and advised probation was not available but only DOC for 3.5 

years. 

[Petitioner] contends that at [a hearing on June 10, 2009] she was supposed to enter into the offered plea and could not understand why she did not enter into a plea that day. In response to Commissioner Newell’s statement to the parties “You have had a chance to go over the plea agreement?” Mr. Billar answered “We are still working on it your Honor.” 

Mr. Billar explained this at the instant hearing by noting [Petitioner] did not want to take the plea and since defendants often change their minds, he wanted to keep open the offer and not reject it. Mr. Billar denies 

[Petitioner] wanted to take the offered plea that day or any day prior to the suppression hearing held [on August 21, 2009] where [Petitioner’s] motion 

to suppress was denied on the issue of the validity of the stop. 

Mr. Billar testified that [Petitioner] always claimed she was innocent and would not plead because of that and that while she was driving the vehicle in which the marijuana was found, it really was her daughter’s case who was riding in the vehicle with her. She told police that she should have known marijuana was in the car and was to be paid for transporting it at the end of her trip and her daughter, a passenger, knew nothing about it. 

When [Petitioner] made known to Mr. Billar after the suppression hearing that she now wanted to take a plea even though it would be more harsh, he tried to get the plea reinstated or a new plea offered and the state refused to do so at that stage. Trial was held a few days after the suppression hearing. The court accepts this testimony. 

No evidence was admitted concerning trial counsel’s alleged inadequacy at the jury trial or his alleged unpreparedness. These arguments the court considers abandoned by [Petitioner]. 

The court in its review of the transcript of the suppression hearing and all the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing now determines that Mr. Billar at all times acted reasonably and competently in all respects. The court specifically denies [Petitioner’s] contention that Mr. Billar tried 

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to stop her from being offered a plea at any time or stopped her from accepting a plea and that he told her to go to trial as he had a surprise for the state. 

* * * 

Mr. Billar followed the requirements set down in [relevant Supreme Court cases] and gave all information he had about the only one offered plea agreement. He did not fail to advise her of this plea and it was not accepted by [Petitioner] for her own reasons. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. VV at 1-3.) 

 After briefly discussing Petitioner’s sentencing, the trial court concluded that this 

“is a classic case of buyer’s remorse in [Petitioner’s] belated realization that she should 

have taken the one offered plea. The court denies all claims made by [Petitioner] and 

dismisses the instant petition.” (Id. at 3.) 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. WW.) The petition raised the following claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for 

the following reasons (a) failing to honor Petitioner’s instructions to accept a plea offer; 

(b) refusing to withdraw as counsel despite Petitioner’s requests; and (c) telling Petitioner 

and her family that he “had a big surprise for the prosecutor” (Ground One); and, (2) “the 

case was base[d] on [Petitioner] having several traffic violation[s] in the State of 

A[ri]zona which was not true” (Ground Two). (Id. at 2, 4-6.) 

 On March 13, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied 

relief. (Doc. 15, Ex. XX at 2.) The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims, which she had also presented to the trial court during the 

evidentiary hearing, stating that the “credibility of witnesses at an evidentiary hearing in a 

post-conviction relief proceeding rests solely with the superior court.” (Id. at 3.) The 

appellate court also affirmed the trial court’s determination that Petitioner had abandoned 

her other claims by failing to present evidence to support those claims at the evidentiary 

hearing. (Id.) Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review 

in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 1 at 5, 6-8.) The appellate court issued the 

mandate on April 29, 2014. (Doc. 15, Ex. XX at 1.) 

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D. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 Applying the mailbox rule (see Section I at n.2), Petitioner filed a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus in this Court on September 5, 2014.4

 (Doc. 1; Doc. 15, Ex. ZZ.) The 

Petition presents the following claims in three grounds for relief: 

 (1) trial counsel was ineffective in (a) failing to meet with Petitioner to discuss a 

plea offer and failing to honor her instructions to accept the plea offer before it expired, 

(b) promising Petitioner that she would receive no more than a five-year sentence, 

(c) telling Petitioner that the State had extended another plea offer including a longer 

term of imprisonment, when the State had not done so, (d) refusing to withdraw as 

counsel despite Petitioner’s requests, and (e) “not fight[ing]” for Petitioner and allowing 

“the courts and prosecutor to use [her] historical priors when San Diego California 

ask[ed] not to use[] them because they were 13 to 14 [years] old (sic)” (Ground One); 

 (2) trial counsel was ineffective by (a) failing to honor Petitioner’s instructions to 

accept a plea offer, (b) refusing to permit Petitioner or her family to testify, (c) failing to 

“address any question she wanted him to address all officers testifying at trial,” (d) not 

meeting with her until trial, (e) verbally abusing Petitioner, (f) failing to investigate 

“some issues” with the Phoenix Police Department or the county sheriff’s department, 

and (g) failing to attend a “meeting with presentencing on [Petitioner’s] behalf;” and 

(h) appellate counsel was ineffective because she “never filed an answer to [Petitioner’s] 

appeal, so [she] lost the appeal and [her] right to file a Rule 32 on a timely bas[is],” and 

(i) post-conviction counsel “tamper[ed] with court papers” (Ground Two); and, 

 (3) the traffic stop and the related search of Petitioner’s vehicle violated the Fourth 

Amendment (Ground Three). (Doc. 1 at 6-9.) 

 Respondents argue that the Petition is untimely. (Doc. 15.) They further argue 

that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus 

review, except for her Fourth Amendment claim and her claim that trial counsel was 

 

4

 For ease of reference, the Court assigns Petitioner’s claims numbers and lettered 

subparts. 

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ineffective during plea negotiations. Respondents argue that Petitioner’s Fourth 

Amendment claim is barred under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976), and that 

her claim that trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations lacks merit. 

Petitioner has filed a reply in support of her Petition. (Doc. 18.) As set forth below, the 

Court recommends that the Petition be denied. 

II. Statute of Limitations 

 The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The 

limitations period runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).5

 

A. Commencement of the Limitations Period 

 After her conviction and sentencing, Petitioner sought direct review in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on 

January 6, 2011. (Doc. 15, Ex. Y.) Petitioner then had thirty days in which to file a 

petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (stating 

that “[w]ithin 30 days after the Court of Appeals issues its decision, any party may file a 

petition for review with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.”). In their Answer, Respondents 

added five days to the thirty-day deadline citing Rule 1.3, which provides that “whenever 

a party has the right or is required to take some action within a prescribed period after 

service of a notice or other paper and such service is allowed and made by mail, 5 days 

shall be added to the prescribed period.” (Doc. 15 at 11 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3); see 

also State v. Zuniga, 786 F.2d 956, 957 (1990) (Rule 1.3 extends the time to file a notice 

of appeal by five days when the order appealed has been mailed to the interested party).) 

 5

 Under certain circumstances, the statute of limitations commences on a different 

date. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Petitioner does not make any allegations indicating that these sections should apply. Thus, the statute of limitations commenced 

on the date Petitioner’s judgment became final on direct review. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

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Respondents state that Petitioner had until February 10, 2011 to file a petition for review 

in the Arizona Supreme Court, but did not do so. (Doc. 15 at 11.) 

 Thus, Petitioner’s conviction became final on direct review on February 10, 2011, 

when the time for filing a petition for review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision to 

the Arizona Supreme Court expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Hemmerle v. 

Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2007) (a petitioner’s conviction was final on 

direct review upon the expiration of the time for seeking review of the court of appeals 

decision in the Arizona Supreme Court); Gonzalez v. Thaler, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 

641, 656 (2012) (for a state prisoner who does not seek review in the State’s highest 

court, the judgment becomes “final” under § 2244(d)(1)(A) on the date the time for 

seeking such review expires). 

 Accordingly, the one-year limitations period started to run the next day, February 

11, 2011 and, absent tolling, expired one-year later, on February 10, 2012. See Patterson 

v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-47 (9th Cir. 2001) (the limitations period begins to run 

on the day after the triggering event pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). Because the 

Petition was filed after February 10, 2012, the Court considers whether statutory or 

equitable tolling applies to extend the deadline for Petitioner to file a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in this Court. 

B. Statutory Tolling 

 Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time 

that a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino 

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an application for collateral 

review is pending in State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is 

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with 

regard to particular post-conviction proceedings.”). 

 The limitations period started to run on February 11, 2011, and ran for 192 days 

until Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial court on August 22, 

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2011.6 See Isley v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrs., 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The 

language and structure of the Arizona post-conviction rules demonstrate that the 

proceedings begin with the filing of the Notice.”); (Doc. 15, Exs. Z, YY.) The limitations 

period was tolled while the post-conviction proceeding was “pending.” See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(2). On March 13, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but 

denied relief. (Doc. 15, Ex. XX at 2.) Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme 

Court for review and the court of appeals issued its mandate on April 29, 2014. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. XX at 1.) 

 Respondents argue that the state post-conviction proceeding was no longer 

“pending,” as defined in § 2244(d)(2), and thus the limitations period began to run again 

when the appellate court denied relief on March 13, 2014, and not when the appellate 

court issued its mandate on April 29, 2014. (Doc. 15 at 12.) Thus, Respondents argue 

that the statute of limitations ran for 176 days from March 13, 2014 (when the state 

appellate court denied relief) to September 5, 2014 (when Petitioner filed her habeas 

petition in this Court).7

 Therefore, Respondents conclude that the pending habeas 

petition is untimely by four days under the one-year AEDPA limitations period (193 days 

+ 176 days = 369 days).8

 (Id. at 13.) 

 

6

 Respondents state that 193 days ran during this period. (Doc. 15 at 12.) However, according to the Court’s calculation, the period from and including February 11, 2011 (the day after Petitioner’s conviction became final on direct review) to but not 

including August 22, 2011 (the date Petitioner is deemed to have filed her notice of post- conviction relief) is 192 days. See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1245-46 (the limitations period begins to run on the day after the triggering event pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)); Isley, 383 F.3d at 1055-1056 (one-year limitations period under AEDPA was tolled once petitioner filed notice of post-conviction relief that was required under Arizona law to commence such proceedings). 

7

 Respondents state that Petitioner filed her petition in this Court on August 22, 2014. (Doc. 15 at 13.) This appears to be a typographical error. Respondents earlier stated that in accordance with the prison mailbox rule articulated in Houston, 487 U.S. at 

270-74, they considered the Petition filed on the date that Petitioner gave it to prison officials for mailing, September 5, 2014. (Doc. 15 at 3 n.2; Doc. 15, Ex. Z.) 

8 See supra note 6. Respondents incorrectly calculate that the statute of limitations 

ran for 193 days from the date Petitioner’s conviction became final to the date she filed 

her notice of post-conviction relief. The statute ran for 192 days during this period. 

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 Respondents rely on Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1074-76, and Welch v. Carey, 350 

F.3d 1079, 1080-83 (9th Cir. 2003), to support their argument that Petitioner’s postconviction proceedings were final when the court of appeals denied relief, and not when 

the court issued its mandate. (Doc. 15 at 12, citing Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1074-76; 

Welch, 350 F.3d at 1080-83.) However, these cases do not support Respondents’ 

argument. 

 In Hemmerle, the Ninth Circuit found that a state post-conviction proceeding was 

no longer pending for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) when the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

review “because there was nothing left for the court to do . . . .” Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 

1077. The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the post-conviction proceeding 

was pending until the clerk of the court of appeals issued a letter pursuant to Rule 32.9(h) 

returning the record. Id. (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(h).) The court noted that Rule 

32.9(h) provides for a “[ministerial] function . . . [that] is not equivalent to the issuance of 

a mandate.” Id. 

 Here, unlike Hemmerle, Petitioner sought appellate review of the trial court’s 

denial of post-conviction relief, the court of appeals granted review but denied relief, and 

Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. Thus, this Court is not 

considering when a post-conviction proceeding is final after the Arizona Supreme Court 

denies review, as in Hemmerle, but instead must decide when a post-conviction 

proceeding is final after the Arizona Court of Appeals denies relief and the petitioner 

does not seek further review. Therefore, Hemmerle does not resolve the issue before this 

court.9

 Respondents’ reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Welch is also misplaced. 

In Welch, the petitioner filed a post-conviction proceeding in California superior court, 

which was denied. In the portion of the Welch opinion that Respondents quote (Doc. 15 

 

9

 Notably, Respondents cite the portion of the Hemmerle decision discussing “gap tolling” for the period between the filing of post-conviction proceedings. (Doc. 15 at 12 (quoting Hemmerle, 495 F.3d. at 1074-76).) Respondents do not cite the portion of the decision discussing tolling under § 2244(d)(2). 

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at 12), the court stated that the petitioner “made no attempt to seek relief in a higher 

court.” Welch, 350 F.3d at 1080. Instead, the petitioner waited four-and-one-half years 

and filed a second post-conviction proceeding, raising different issues, in the California 

Supreme Court. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the petitioner’s post-conviction 

proceedings were not pending after he abandoned his first petition and waited years to 

file a second petition raising different issues. Therefore, his post-conviction proceedings 

were not pending during the period between the two petitions and the AEDPA statute of 

limitations was not tolled during this period. Id. at 1082. The circumstances addressed in 

Welch have no bearing on the issue before this Court.10 

 

10 Respondents also assert that “it is the decision of the state appellate court, rather than the ministerial act of entry of the mandate, that signals the conclusion of review.” (Doc. 15 at 12 n.6 (quoting White v. Klitzie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 n.4 (9th Cir. 

2002).) In White, the petitioner had filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus through Guam’s territorial procedures, and the Guam Supreme Court denied the petition. The court rejected the argument that the petition was not final until the mandate was entered. 

White, 281 F.3d at 923 n.4. However, the court was applying the rules of the Guam 

Supreme Court to determine when a matter was final and found that Guam did not extend 

that time beyond the filing of the decision at issue. (Id.) 

In White, the court cited Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 

2001), which is also inapposite because there the court considered the date on which a 

conviction becomes final under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), not the date on which state 

collateral review is no longer pending under § 2244(d)(2). In addition, the court found 

that under Washington law a mandate is not a decision terminating review. Wixom, 264 

F.3d at 897-98 (citing Wash. R. App. P. 12.5(a)). Respondents also cite Wetton v. 

Clarke, 258 Fed. App’x 134 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished), to support their argument that the entry of the mandate does not determine when state court proceedings are final. (Doc. 15 at 12 n.6.) In Wetton, the court again applied Washington law to conclude that a mandate is not a decision terminating review. Id. at 135-36. 

Respondents’ citation to Holeman v. Ryan, 2013 WL 3716603 (D. Ariz. Jul. 15, 

2013), is similarly misplaced. In Holeman, the petitioner did not seek further review 

after the trial court denied his post-conviction relief proceedings. Id. at *4. The 

petitioner argued that his post-conviction relief proceedings should be deemed pending for tolling under § 2244(d)(2) until the time to seek appellate review expired. The court rejected this argument and concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to tolling for the time he could have but did not seek review of the trial court’s denial of his post- conviction proceedings. Id. at *9. The court did not address the issue presented in this case. Furthermore, Respondents quote dicta from the Holeman decision in which the 

court misstated Hemmerle as concluding that under Arizona law the date of the issuance 

of the mandate is irrelevant to when a post-conviction petition is no longer pending. Id.

at *5. As set forth above, Hemmerle distinguish the ministerial task of transferring a file from the issuance of a mandate. The court concluded that the former had no significant 

in determining when the matter was final, but did not address the effect of the mandate. 

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 Here, after the trail court denied her petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner 

sought review in the court of appeals, which granted review but denied relief. Petitioner 

did not seek further review in the Arizona Supreme Court. As Respondents recognize, 

courts in this district have considered these circumstances and concluded that postconviction proceedings in Arizona are no longer “pending” under § 2244(d)(2), and thus 

no longer toll the AEDPA statute of limitations, when the court of appeals issues its 

mandate. See Celaya v. Stewart, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1055 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d 497 

Fed. App’x 744 (9th Cir. 2012) (under Arizona law, an appellate court decision is 

pending until the mandate issues); Baker v. Ryan, 2015 WL 997801, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 

6, 2015) (“In Arizona, when the court of appeals grants review of a petition, but denies 

the petition, direct review is not final until the mandate has issued.”) Washington v. Ryan, 

2015 WL 274151, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2015) (same); Elem v. Ryan, 2013 WL 

5434579, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2013) (same). 

 In Celaya, just as in this case, the trial court denied the petition for post-conviction 

relief, the court of appeals granted review but denied relief, and the petitioner did not 

seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. Ceyala, 691 F. Supp. 2d at 1053. The court 

distinguished Hemmerle and concluded that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision 

denying relief was final, and thus the post-conviction proceeding was no longer pending 

for purposes of § 2244(d)(2), on the date the appellate court issued the mandate. Id. at 

1054-55. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Arizona cases holding that “the 

appellate process is complete when the court of appeals issues its mandate.” Id. at 1054 

(citing Thompson v. Holder, 965 P.2d 82, 84-85 (Ariz. App. 1998)); see also id. at 1074 

(collecting Arizona cases). 

 Respondents agree that “[t]he tolling impact of a state court’s mandate depends on 

state law.” (Doc. 15 at 12 n.6.); Ceyala, 691 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (“For tolling purposes, 

however, state law determines finality.”) (citing Bunney v. Mitchell, 249 F.3d 1188, 1189 

(9th Cir. 2001)). A petition for post-conviction relief is “pending as long as the ordinary 

state collateral review process is ‘in continuance’ — i.e., ‘until the completion of’ that 

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process. In other words, until the [petition] has achieved final resolution through the 

State’s post-conviction procedures, by definition it remains ‘pending.’” Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002). 

 Respondents argue, however, that in Ceyala the court was “mistaken” in its 

conclusion that the state post-conviction proceeding was pending until the court of 

appeals issued its mandate. They argue that Rule 32 governs post-conviction proceedings 

and does not provide for the issuance of a mandate. (Doc. 15 at 13 n.6.) Therefore, they 

assert that “the date of the ‘mandate’ does not matter in post-conviction proceedings; 

after all, the rules do not even require a ‘mandate’ in the first place.” (Id.) 

 However, Rule 32.9(g) states that “[t]he provisions for filing motions for 

reconsideration and petitions for review in criminal appeals set forth in Rules 31.18 and 

31.19 shall apply to and govern motions for reconsideration and petitions for review of an 

appellate court decision entered pursuant to Rule 32.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(g). Rule 

31.23 in turn provides the procedures for the court of appeals to issue a mandate after the 

expiration of the time to file a motion to reconsider or a petition for review. Id. at 31.23. 

Although not explicitly incorporated in Rule 32(g), the Court finds that these provisions 

are part of the procedures that apply to motions for reconsideration and petitions for 

review and, thus, Rule 31.23 applies to post-conviction proceedings. 

 Additionally, Respondents’ argument that Rule 31.23 does not apply in postconviction proceedings is contrary to the practice of the Arizona Court of Appeals, which 

regularly issues a mandate at the conclusion of post-conviction proceedings. See Ceyala, 

691 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (noting date Arizona Court of Appeals issued mandate in postconviction proceeding); Baker, 2015 WL 997801, at *2 (same); Washington, 2015 WL 

274151, at *4 (same); Elem, 2013 WL 5434579, at *2 (same). In this case, the court of 

appeals issued a mandate pursuant to Rule 31.23. (Doc. 15, Ex. XX at 1.) 

 Therefore, the Court concludes that when the Arizona Court of Appeals grants 

review of the trial court’s decision on a petition for post-conviction relief but denies 

relief, and the petitioner does not seek further review, the post-conviction proceeding is 

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pending until the date the appellate court issues its mandate. Accordingly, the limitations 

period was tolled on the date Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (August 

22, 2011) and remained tolled until the date the appellate court issued its mandate 

concluding the state post-conviction proceeding (April 29, 2014). 

 Therefore, excluding the time the one-year limitations period was tolled, the 

Petition is timely. As previously stated, the limitations period began running on February 

11, 2011. It ran for 192 days until Petitioner commenced her Rule 32 proceeding and 

was tolled while that proceeding was pending. The limitations period started running 

again on April 29, 2014 and continued to run for 129 days until September 5, 2014, when 

Petitioner is deemed to have filed her petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. ZZ; Doc. 1.) Thus, the limitations period ran for a total of 321 days (192 

days + 129 days = 321 days) between the date Petitioner’s conviction became final on 

direct review and the date she filed her federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

Because the Petition is timely, the Court does not need to consider whether equitable 

tolling applies.11 

III. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

 11 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). 

However, the Court would find that equitable tolling does not apply. A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if she shows: “(1) that [she] has been pursuing [her] rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way.” Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Petitioner has not made either showing. 

 In her reply, Petitioner states that a prison paralegal directed her to “complete the package and mail it and [she] did as she was directed to do.” (Doc. 18-3 at 12.) She 

speculates that her Petition may have been untimely filed because of a delay in the mail delivery. (Id.) The record reflects that Petitioner gave her Petition to prison officials for 

mailing on September 5, 2014. (Doc. 15, Ex. ZZ.) The Court considers the Petition filed 

as of that date. See Houston, 487 U.S. at 270-74; see also supra at 2 n. 1. Therefore, any delay in mailing after that date is irrelevant, and Petitioner has not shown any reason why she did not mail the Petition before September 5, 2014. 

 Furthermore, if the Petition were untimely, equitable tolling would not apply because Petitioner does not provide any other explanation for the timing of filing in this Court. Petitioner has not articulated, and the record does not reveal, any extraordinary circumstance that prevented or delayed her in filing her federal habeas corpus petition. 

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exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner.12 Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 

31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

 

12 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

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returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

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not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

IV. Procedural Bar Applied to Petitioner’s Claims 

 Petitioner asserts three grounds for relief in her pending habeas petition. In 

Grounds One and Two, she asserts several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(Doc. 1 at 6-7.) In Ground Three, she asserts that her arrest and the related search of her 

car violated the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, the trial court should have suppressed 

evidence obtained during the search. (Id. at 8.) 

 Respondents agree that Petitioner properly exhausted her Fourth Amendment 

Claim asserted in Ground Three because she presented this claim to the state appellate 

court on direct review. (Doc. 15 at 9, 19; Doc. 15, Exs. B, W.) Accordingly, the Court 

considers this claim in Section V.A. Respondents argue that except for her claims that 

trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations, Petitioner’s claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, asserted in Grounds One and Two, are procedurally barred from 

federal habeas corpus review. As discussed below, the Court concludes that habeas 

corpus review of most of Petitioner’s claims is procedurally barred. 

A. Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 In Grounds One and Two, Petitioner asserts several claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 1 at 6-7.) She also argues that appellate and postconviction counsel were ineffective. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner must exhaust the factual basis 

of each claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 

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1068 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring exhaustion in state court of the factual basis of each 

distinct ineffective-assistance claim), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 

481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007); Gulbrandson v. Ryan, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 5779188, 

at *12 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2013) (“As a general matter, each ‘unrelated alleged instance [] 

of counsel’s ineffectiveness’ is a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion.”) (quoting 

Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

 Petitioner presented a variety of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in 

her petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court. (Doc. 15, Ex. EE at 1-2, 5-7.) 

She also raised several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals in her petition for review. (Doc. Ex. WW at 2, 4-6.) However, on 

review of the denial of post-conviction relief, the appellate court found that the petition 

for review presented only a claim that trial counsel was ineffective during plea 

negotiations for failing to inform the State that Petitioner wanted to accept a plea offer 

and for failing to advise her that the plea offer included probation. (Doc. 15, Ex. XX.) 

The appellate court also found that the petition for review included additional claims, but 

Petitioner had abandoned those claims by failing to develop a factual basis for those 

claims during the evidentiary hearing before the trial court. (Doc. 15, Ex. XX at 3.) 

 Thus, other than Petitioner’s claims that trial counsel was ineffective during plea 

negotiations, Petitioner either did not present her claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel to the Arizona Court of Appeals on post-conviction review, or she presented 

those claims to the appellate court, but that court found review barred pursuant to a state 

procedural rule. Therefore, as discussed below, federal habeas corpus review of 

Petitioner’s defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is barred. 

 First, to the extent that Petitioner presented her claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel (other than her plea-negotiation claims) to the appellate court, federal habeas 

corpus review of those claims is barred because the appellate court denied review based 

on an independent and adequate state grounds. See State v. Doody, 930 P.2d 440, 450–51 

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(Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting claim as waived because defendant failed to develop its 

factual basis in the trial court). 

 Second, to the extent that Petitioner did not present her claims to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals on post-conviction review, habeas corpus review is barred because it 

would be futile for Petitioner to return to the state courts to try to exhaust her claims 

because a successive petition for post-conviction relief would be untimely, and these 

claims would be precluded from Rule 32 review because they could have been raised in 

Petitioner’s prior post-conviction proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) and 

32.4(a); see also State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (Ariz. 2006) (“As a general rule, when 

[claims] are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding, 

subsequent claims [] will be deemed waived and precluded.”) (internal quotation 

omitted). Additionally, Petitioner’s defaulted claims do not implicate any of the 

exceptions to the timeliness or preclusion rules referred to in Rule 32.4(a) and Rule 

32.2(b), including being held in custody after the imposed sentence expired, the 

presentation of newly discovered material facts that probably would have changed the 

verdict or sentence, the failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief or a notice 

of appeal that was not the defendant’s fault, a change in the law, or the petitioner’s actual 

innocence. See Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). 

 Accordingly, with the exception of the Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective during plea negotiations and her Fourth Amendment claim, federal habeas 

corpus review of Petitioner’s claims is procedurally barred. As discussed in Section 

III.B, Petitioner has not established a basis to overcome the procedural bar to review of 

these claims. 

B. Petitioner has not Established a Basis to Overcome the Procedural Bar

 Because Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, other than her Fourth 

Amendment claim and her claim that trial counsel was ineffective during plea 

negotiations, federal habeas corpus review is unavailable unless Petitioner establishes 

“cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to overcome the 

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procedural bar. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749. For the reasons below, the Court finds 

that Petitioner has not established a basis to overcome the procedural bar. 

 1. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

 To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new 

reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 327. 

 Petitioner does not argue that failure to consider her defaulted claims will result in 

a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Docs. 1, 8, 9, 18.) Rather, Petitioner argues that 

she should have been allowed to plead guilty. (Doc. 1 at 6, 11.) Considering Petitioner’s 

assertion that she wanted to plead guilty, any claim of a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice would be unconvincing. See McCall v. Benson, 114 F.3d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 1997) 

(a petitioner’s claim of a fundamental miscarriage of justice was “unpersuasive” “in light 

of his guilty plea”). Moreover, Petitioner has not presented new evidence and has not 

shown that failure to consider her procedurally defaulted claims will result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Thus, she has not met Schlup’s high standard and 

this exception does not excuse the procedural bar. 

 2. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

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“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) 

(emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 Petitioner does not identify any “objective factor external to the defense,” that 

impeded her ability to present her defaulted claims to the state courts. (Docs. 1, 8, 9, 18); 

see Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. Petitioner’s status as an inmate, lack of legal knowledge, 

and limited legal resources do not establish cause to excuse the procedural bar to review 

of her claims. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse 

a procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(petitioner’s reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause). Because Petitioner 

has not shown cause for the procedural default of her claims, the Court does not consider 

whether Petitioner can show prejudice. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

Because Petitioner has not shown a basis to overcome the procedural bar to review of her 

defaulted claims, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on those claims. 

/ / / 

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V. Petitioner’s Claims that are Properly before the Court 

A. Fourth Amendment Claim 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that stop and search of her vehicle violated the 

Fourth Amendment and that the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence obtained 

during the search. (Doc. 1 at 8.) Respondents argue that Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment 

claim was fully litigated in state court and therefore is not subject to federal habeas 

corpus review. (Doc. 15 at 15-17.) In her reply, Petitioner discusses the merits of her 

Fourth Amendment claim, but does not specifically dispute Respondents’ argument. 

(Doc. 18.) 

 “If the state has provided a state prisoner an opportunity for full and fair litigation 

of his Fourth Amendment claim, [a federal court] cannot grant federal habeas relief on 

the Fourth Amendment issue.” Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 

2005) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, (1976)); see Newman v. Wengler, 2015 

WL 3700161, at *1, *3 (9th Cir. Jun. 16, 2015) (holding that the doctrine of Stone v. 

Powell, survives the passage of the AEPDA). In determining whether a state prisoner 

had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her Fourth Amendment claim, a court examines 

the extent to which the claim was considered by the state trial and appellate courts. See 

Abell v. Raines, 640 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that a lengthy evidentiary 

hearing transcript, a four-page appellate opinion, and substantial briefs demonstrated 

careful consideration of appellant’s Fourth Amendment claim). 

 The record of the state proceedings show that Petitioner received a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate her Fourth Amendment claim. Petitioner raised a Fourth 

Amendment claim in a pre-trial motion to suppress, and the trial court held an evidentiary 

hearing on the issue. (Doc. 15, Exs. B, L.) At the hearing, Petitioner was given an 

opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine the arresting officer. (Doc. 15, 

Exs. L, Q at 11-29.) After the hearing, the trial court determined that Petitioner’s Fourth 

Amendment rights had not been violated and denied the motion to suppress. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. Q at 30.) Petitioner challenged the trial court’s ruling on direct appeal. (Doc. 15, 

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Ex. W.) The court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s argument and affirmed the trial court. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. Y.) 

 Therefore, the record reflects that Petitioner raised her Fourth Amendment claim 

to the state trial and appellate courts, fully briefed that claim, and had an evidentiary 

hearing. Thus, Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her Fourth 

Amendment claim and, therefore, this Court cannot consider Petitioner’s Fourth 

Amendment claim. See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347 (1994) (quoting Stone, 428 

U.S. at 469) (federal courts cannot “consider a claim that evidence from an 

unconstitutional search was introduced at state prisoner’s trial if the prisoner had ‘an 

opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim in the state courts.’”)). Accordingly, 

the Court recommends that the court deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief 

based on her Fourth Amendment claim. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel during Plea Negotiations 

 In Grounds One and Two, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective 

during plea negotiations. As set forth below, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this 

claim because she has not shown that the state court’s resolution of this claim was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court precedent. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 1. Review of Claims Adjudicated on the Merits in State Court 

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review of that claim is limited by § 2254(d). Under 

§ 2254(d)(1), a federal court cannot grant habeas corpus relief unless the petitioner 

shows: (1) that the state court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly 

established in the holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the state 

court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it 

“involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” based on the record before the state 

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court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). This 

standard is “difficult to meet.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. It is also a “highly deferential 

standard for evaluating state court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be 

given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per 

curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 When evaluating state court decisions on habeas review, federal courts look 

through summary or unexplained higher state court opinions to the last reasoned decision 

on the claim. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the trial 

court issued a detailed written decision (Doc. 15, Ex. VV), and the Arizona Court of 

Appeals deferred to and largely adopted that decision. (Doc. Ex. XX at 3 (“The 

determination of the credibility of witnesses at an evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction 

relief proceeding rests solely with the superior court.”)). Consequently, the last reasoned 

decision is the decision of the trial court. However, the Court defers to both the trial 

court’s decision and the appellate court’s decision. See Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 

1119, 1130 (9th Cir. 2014) (“When the last reasoned decision is a state appellate court 

decision which adopts or substantially incorporates lower state court decisions, we may 

review those lower state court decisions as part of our review of the state appellate 

court’s decision.”) (internal quotation marks and modifications omitted). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

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particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s 

specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes 

in case-by-case determination.” Id. 

Federal courts may also grant habeas corpus relief when the state-court decision 

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “Or, to put it 

conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process 

unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not 

merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th 

Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds, Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1000 (9th 

Cir. 2014); see Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002) (the 

statutory presumption of correctness applies to findings by both trial courts and appellate 

courts). Additionally, state court’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with “clear and convincing 

evidence.” Id. 

 When a state court decision is deemed to be contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief unless the erroneous state 

court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue had a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. 

 Here, because the pending Petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel under 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Strickland prejudice standard applies 

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and the court does not engage in a separate analysis applying the Brecht standard. See 

Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. Calderon, 211 

F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the court “need not conduct harmless 

error review of Strickland violations under Brecht . . . because ‘[t]he; Strickland prejudice 

analysis is complete in itself; there is no place for additional harmless-error review.”)). 

 2. Standards to Establish Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner 

must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s 

deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s 

performance must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” 

Id. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong 

presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable 

professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is 

extremely limited. Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do 

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 

 To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a petitioner must also establish that she 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show 

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The court 

need not address both Strickland requirements if the petitioner makes an insufficient 

showing on one. See id. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should 

be followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[f]ailure to 

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satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider the other”) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

 The negotiation of a plea bargain is “‘a critical phase of litigation for purposes of 

the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.’” Missouri v. Frye, ___ 

U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 

(2010)). If counsel has misadvised a defendant about the law during a plea negotiation, 

or improperly coerced a defendant to accept a plea bargain, counsel’s performance may 

be found deficient. See Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) 

(counsel’s erroneous legal advice about possibility of conviction that led to rejection of 

plea offer constituted deficient performance). “If a plea bargain has been offered, a 

defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept 

it.” Id. at 1387. 

 When a petitioner has pleaded guilty, to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong he 

must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 

U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (citations omitted). To show that prejudice resulted from the 

ineffective assistance of counsel “where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because 

of counsel’s deficient performance, [a petitioner] must demonstrate a reasonable 

probability” that (1) he “would have accepted the earlier plea offer,” and (2) “the plea 

would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to 

accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under state law.” Frye, 132 

S. Ct. at 1409. The Court considers Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel in light of these standards. 

 3. The State Court’s Determination of Petitioner’s Claims

 Petitioner asserts that trial counsel Billar was ineffective during plea negotiations 

because he failed to meet with her to discuss a plea offer and failed to accept a plea offer 

before it expired. (Doc. 1 at 6, 7 (see Grounds One (a), Two (a).) The trial court rejected 

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these claims on post-conviction review, and the appellate court affirmed. (Doc. 15, 

Exs. VV, XX.) 

 Although a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law 

and fact, Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 2006), the resolution of 

Petitioner’s claim that Billar was ineffective during plea negotiations turns on factual 

issues that the trial court resolved against Petitioner. (See Doc. 15, Ex. VV at 1-3.) As 

discussed below, Petitioner has not presented clear and convincing evidence to rebut the 

presumption of correctness that applies to the court’s factual findings. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

 During post-conviction proceedings, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to 

consider Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.13 (Doc. 15, Exs. 

TT, UU.) As discussed in more detail below, after observing Billar and Petitioner testify, 

the trial court found that the parties agreed on some issues and otherwise credited Billar’s 

testimony. (Doc. 15, Ex. VV); see Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (concluding that the trial court, which observed counsel during trial, did not 

make an unreasonable determination of the facts and deferring to the trial court’s 

 

13 Pursuant to Rule 5(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, on May 15, 2015, the Court directed Respondents to file transcripts of the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 19.) Rule 5(c) provides that the district court “may order that the respondent furnish other parts of existing transcripts or that parts of untranscribed recordings be transcribed and furnished.” On June 12, 2015, Respondents requested an extension of time to file those transcripts because the evidentiary hearing was not transcribed and they were having difficulty obtaining the transcripts. (Doc. 21.) Respondents also argued that because the evidentiary hearing was not transcribed, transcripts of the hearing were not part of the state record at the time the appellate court affirmed that trial court’s decision and, therefore, the transcripts of evidentiary hearing are new evidence that are not properly considered on habeas corpus review. (Id. at 3-4.) 

To support their argument, Respondents cite Cullen v. Pinholster, __U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 

1388, 1398 (2011), in which the Supreme Court held that a petitioner cannot “overcome an adverse state-court decision with new evidence introduced in a federal habeas court, 

but not presented to the state court. Id. at 1399. Accordingly, Respondents argue that the transcripts are not necessary to resolve Petitioner’s claims. 

The Court need not resolve whether the transcripts are new evidence under Pinholster. Rather, because the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing was not transcribed during post-conviction review and Respondents have encountered difficulty obtaining those transcripts, the Court withdraws it May 15, 2015 Order and denies Respondents’ motion for extension of time as moot. The Court notes that Petitioner did not request the transcripts. 

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rejection of trial counsel’s assertion of inadequate performance). On habeas corpus 

review, this Court may not “re-determine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has 

been observed by the state trial court.” Aiken v. Blodgett, 921 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 

1990) (citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983). 

 On post-conviction review, the state court found that the parties agreed that Billar 

sent Petitioner, at the jail, a copy of a plea agreement that included a sentence of 3.5 

years’ imprisonment, Petitioner called and asked Billar to explain the plea agreement, and 

Billar met with Petitioner to discuss the plea agreement. (Doc. 15, Ex. VV at 1-3.) The 

trial court also noted that Billar testified that he met with Plaintiff at the jail two more 

times. (Id.) The trial court concluded that these facts were undisputed. (Id.) On appeal, 

the court affirmed the trial court’s findings. (Doc. 15, Ex. XX.) 

 In her Petition, Petitioner argues that Billar did not meet with her before trial and 

did not meet with her to discuss a plea offer. (Doc. 1 at 6, 7.) However, in her Reply, 

Petitioner states that Billar sent her a copy of a plea agreement, she called and requested 

that Billar meet with her to explain the plea agreement, and that Billar met with her on 

June 1, 2009. (Doc. 18-2 at 15.) To support her Petition, Petitioner filed a log from the 

jail which lists the dates that Billar visited Petitioner. (Doc. 8-1 at 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12; 

Doc. 18-2 at 31, 33, 35.) These logs reflect that Billar met with Petitioner several times, 

including on June 1, 2009. (Doc. 8-1 at 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12; Doc. 18-2 at 31, 33, 35.) 

Therefore, Petitioner has not presented clear and convincing evidence to rebut the 

presumption of correctness that applies to the state court’s determination of the facts 

regarding whether Billar met with Petitioner to discuss the plea offer. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (providing that a state court’s determination of a factual issue is 

“presumed to be correct” and a petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of 

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”). 

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 In her Petition, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective during plea 

negotiations because he failed to inform the State that she wanted to accept a plea offer.14 

(Doc. 1 at 6-7.) Petitioner made this same argument on post-conviction review. 

Specifically, Petitioner asserted that during a June 10, 2009 hearing in her criminal case, 

she was supposed to accept a plea offer and enter a guilty plea, and that she did not 

understand why she did not enter a guilty plea during that hearing. (Doc. VV at 1-3.) 

 The post-conviction court heard testimony regarding this issue during the 

evidentiary hearing. The court noted that evidence was presented that during the June 10, 

2009 hearing Commissioner Newell stated, “You have had a chance to go over the plea 

agreement?” (Id.) Billar answered, “We are still working on it your Honor.” (Id.) Billar 

testified before the post-conviction court that Petitioner did not want to accept the plea 

offer. (Id.) He also testified that defendants often change their minds and, therefore, he 

wanted to keep the plea offer open, rather than reject it. (Id.) Billar denied Petitioner’s 

assertion that she wanted to accept the plea offer. (Id.) Billar testified that Petitioner 

claimed she was innocent and would not plead guilty because, although “she was driving 

the vehicle in which the marijuana was found, it really was her daughter’s case” who was 

a passenger in the vehicle. (Id.) The trial court credited Billar’s testimony. (Id.) 

 

14 In her Reply, Petitioner asserts that the plea offer included probation. (Doc. 18-

2 at 13.) It appears that Petitioner makes this assertion to support her claim that she wanted to accept the plea offer. On post-conviction review, Petitioner also argued that the plea offer included probation, but the trial court concluded that the plea offer did not include probation. (Doc. 15, Ex. VV.) 

The record supports the trial court’s conclusion. The first paragraph of plea offer described the range of sentences generally available for the charge to which Petitioner would plead guilty under that offer. (Doc. 18-2 at 25.) It stated that the presumptive sentence was 3.5 years, the minimum was 2.5 years, and the maximum sentence was 7.0 years (8.75 if the court found exceptional circumstances). (Id.) The paragraph generally stated that probation was available. (Id.) 

However, the second paragraph of the plea offer included the proposed stipulated sentence. (Id.) It specifically stated that “[t]he Defendant shall be sentenced to the 

Arizona Department of Corrections for the presumptive term of 3.5 years. The Defendant shall be ordered to pay . . . a total fine of $1,380.” (Id.) Thus, as the state 

court found, the sentence to which the parties stipulated to in the plea agreement did not include probation. (Id.) 

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 Assuming that Petitioner testified and disputed Billar’s testimony during the 

evidentiary hearing, “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, a fact 

finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 

870, 919 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 226 (1988)). Petitioner 

has not presented clear and convincing evidence to rebut that presumption of correctness 

that applies to the state court’s factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

Additionally, the Court must defer to the state court’s credibility determinations. See 

Aiken, 921 F.2d at 217. 

 Petitioner also argues in her pending habeas petition that she did not want to go to 

trial. (Doc. 1 at 7.) She claims that she wanted to enter a guilty plea, and that Billar did 

not accept a plea offer despite her instructions that he do so.15 (Doc. 18-2 at 15.) 

Petitioner asserts that Billar did not testify truthfully during the Rule 32 evidentiary 

hearing. (Doc. 9-1 at 47.) Petitioner contends that she discussed the plea offer with 

Billar, and that they agreed that she would accept the plea offer. (Doc. 18-2 at 15.) 

Petitioner claims that she does not know why Billar told the trial court on June 10, 2009 

that they were still working on the plea. (Id.) She also claims that Billar told her that he 

only goes to trial. (Id. at 17.) 

 Petitioner, however, has not presented clear and convincing evidence to support 

her allegations and to overcome the presumption of correctness that applies to the state 

court’s factual determinations of this issue. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2). To support her 

claim that Billar’s credibility is questionable, Petitioner relies on several unsigned letters 

that were purportedly written by an inmate Billar represented. (Doc. 8-1 at 46, 53.) One 

of the letters, dated October 12, 2009, states that the author was present when Billar 

failed to show up for meetings with Petitioner. (Doc. 80-1 at 46.) However, that letter 

does not include the dates of those alleged missed meeting or any other details. (Id.) 

Another letter, dated October 18, 2009, states that several days after Petitioner’s criminal 

 

15 Petitioner asserts that the plea offer was for a sentence from three to five years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 15-5 at 23 (Grounds One (a) and (b).) The parties do not dispute the terms of the plea agreement. 

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trial concluded, Billar asked the author of the letter if Petitioner was mad at him. 

(Doc. 8-1 at 53.) 

 It is not clear whether these letters were presented to the state court on postconviction review. These letters, even if presented to the post-conviction court, shed 

little light on Billar’s representation of Petitioner during plea negotiations, and do not 

constitute clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness that 

applies to the trial court’s factual findings regarding Billar’s conduct during the plea 

negotiations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

 Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations 

because he told her that the State had extended a second plea offer for a longer term of 

imprisonment, but there was no such plea offer. (Doc. 1 at 7 (Ground Two (d).) In her 

Reply, Petitioner argues that she asked Billar to obtain a new plea offer, but she never 

had the opportunity to accept a new offer. (Doc. 18-2 at 17.) 

 On post-conviction review, the court noted that Billar testified that after the trial 

court denied the motion to suppress, Petitioner indicated that she was interested in 

accepting a plea offer, even though it would harsher than the 3.5 year offer. (Doc. 15, 

Ex. VV at 2.) Billar testified that he tried to get the State to reinstate the plea offer for 

3.5 years’ imprisonment or to extend another offer. However, the State refused to 

reinstate the prior offer or to extend a new plea offer. (Id.) The trial court accepted this 

testimony. (Doc. 15, Ex. VV at 1-3.) Petitioner has not presented “clear and convincing 

evidence” to rebut the presumption of correctness that applies to the state court’s 

determination of the facts regarding Billar’s attempt to secure a second plea offer from 

the State. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (providing that a state court’s determination of a 

factual issue is “presumed to be correct” and a petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the 

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”). 

 In conclusion, because this Court must defer to the state court’s factual findings, 

Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations fails because 

Petitioner has not offered clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of 

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correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 977, 978 

(9th Cir. 2004) (stating that presumption of correctness applies to “state court findings of 

fact made in the course of resolving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.”); see 

also Miller v. Thaler, 714 F.3d 897, 902 (5th Cir. 2013) (presuming correct the trial 

court’s finding that a defense attorney relayed the prosecutor’s rejection of a plea 

counteroffer to the petitioner because there was no clear and convincing evidence to the 

contrary). 

 Considering the state court’s presumably correct findings regarding the plea 

negotiations that are discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that Billar’s performance 

was deficient and, thus, cannot establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counel. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, Petitioner has not established that the state 

court’s determination that Billar was not ineffective is based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, or is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

VI. Conclusion 

 As discussed above, other than her Fourth Amendment claim and her claims that 

trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations, Petitioner’s claims are procedurally 

barred from federal habeas corpus review and she has not established a basis to overcome 

that bar. Additionally, Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was fully litigated in state 

court and therefore is not subject to federal habeas corpus review. Finally, Petitioner has 

not shown that the state court’s decision rejecting her claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective during plea negotiations is based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts, or is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Court’s May 15, 2015 Order (Doc. 19) is withdrawn 

and the Respondents’ Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 21) is DENIED as moot. 

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IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 13th day of August, 2015. 

Case 2:14-cv-02048-JJT Document 23 Filed 08/13/15 Page 35 of 35