Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_99-cv-05279/USCOURTS-caed-1_99-cv-05279-42/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL C. BOLIN,

Petitioner,

vs.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, as Acting Warden of San

Quentin State Prison,

Respondent.

_______________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 1:99-cv-05279 LJO

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE MOTION TO DEPOSE

PETITIONER AND GRANTING MOTION

FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

HEARING DATE OF JANUARY 7, 2013

VACATED

This matter is before the Court on the motion of Respondent Kevin Chappell, as Acting Warden

of San Quentin State Prison (the “Warden”) for leave to depose Petitioner Paul C. Bolin (“Bolin”) and

for production of specified documents in his possession or control. 

I. The Warden’s Argument

The Warden brings this motion pursuant to Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases

providing that discovery in habeas corpus actions may be granted only upon a showing of good cause. 

In his argument, he focuses on his need to ascertain the extent and content of Bolin’s input regarding

particular jurors and jury selection considerations discussed with his attorneys during voir dire. He

maintains revelation of this input will inform the determination of whether Bolin’s trial attorneys were

ineffective for not renewing the change of venue motion upon competition of voir dire. 

In support of the proposition that Bolin actually did provide such input, the Warden references

two handwritten notations indicating Bolin’s juror preferences, namely that he “liked” both James

Iseminger and Donald Newberry (both, alternate jurors). Because Bolin was present and participated

OReMo2DeposePetnr.Bol.wpd 1

Case 1:99-cv-05279-LJO-SAB Document 311 Filed 12/21/12 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in jury selection, the Warden maintains his deposition is essential for him to prepare for the March 18,

2013 evidentiaryhearing, Specifically, at the requested deposition the Warden will pose question to elicit

the following:

1. Whether Bolin can provide any insight into the reasons of trial counsel for

retaining or challenging particular jurors including, but not limited to, how

counsel considered and weighed a juror’s exposure to pretrial publicity;

2. What, if any, discussions Bolin had with counsel regarding jury selection of the

change of venue motion;

3. What, if any, additional information trial counsel had from Bolin in selecting a

jury and thereafter declining to renew a change of venue motion.

The good cause component of discovery is further informed by “need.” The Warden points out

that in the declarations of Bolin’s trial attorneys, both have averred they could not recall the jury

selection process. Accordingly, Bolin is the only trial player who might still have the foregoing

information. 

The Warden additionally requests documents in Bolin’s position relevant to jury selection. The

document production request includes the same class of documents potentially in the possession of

others and over which Bolin retains possession or control.

II. Controlling Legal Principles

Matters of strategy as to how to proceed at trial are solely within the sphere of decision making

by a trial attorneys after consultation with the defendant. This concept is explained in Standard 4-5.2

of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Prosecution and Defense Function, 3d ed. (1993). Standard 4-

5.2 provides in its entirety:

(a)Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and

others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be made by the

accused after full consultation with counsel include:

(i) what pleas to enter;

(ii) whether to accept a plea agreement;

(iii) whether to waive jury trial;

(iv) whether to testify in his or her own behalf; and

(v) whether to appeal.

(b) Strategic and tactical decisions should be made by defense counsel after consultation

with the client where feasible and appropriate. Such decisions include what witnesses to

OReMo2DeposePetnr.Bol.wpd 2

Case 1:99-cv-05279-LJO-SAB Document 311 Filed 12/21/12 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what

trial motions should be made, and what evidence should be introduced.

(c) If a disagreement on significant matters of tactics or strategy arises between defense

counsel and the client, defense counsel should make a record of the circumstances,

counsel's advice and reasons, and the conclusion reached. The record should be made in

a manner which protects the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship.

Although last updated in 1993, these ABA standards currently are cited as guides for reviewing attorney

performance by the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130

S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (citing standard 4-5.1(a) regarding defense counsel’s duty to advise about the

risk of deportation ); Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing standard 4-4.1(d)

regarding defense counsel’s duty to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case). 

In Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008), the high Court explains the rationale for relegating

tactical decisions to attorneys:

Giving the attorney control of trial management matters is a practical necessity. “The

adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical decision required client

approval.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1988).

The presentation of a criminal defense can be a mystifying process even for wellinformed laypersons. This is one of the reasons for the right to counsel. See Powell v.

Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932); ABA Standards for

Criminal Justice, Defense Function 4–5.2, Commentary, p. 202 (3d ed. 1993) (“Many of

the rights of an accused, including constitutional rights, are such that only trained experts

can comprehend their full significance, and an explanation to any but the most

sophisticated client would be futile”). Numerous choices affecting conduct of the trial,

including the objections to make, the witnesses to call, and the arguments to advance,

depend not only upon what is permissible under the rules of evidence and procedure but

also upon tactical considerations of the moment and the larger strategic plan for the trial.

These matters can be difficult to explain to a layperson; and to require in all instances

that they be approved by the client could risk compromising the efficiencies and fairness

that the trial process is designed to promote. In exercising professional judgment,

moreover, the attorney draws upon the expertise and experience that members of the bar

should bring to the trial process. In most instances the attorney will have a better

understanding of the procedural choices than the client; or at least the law should so

assume. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987

(1983); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267–268, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed.

2d 235 (1973); cf. ABA Standards, supra, at 202 (“Everyexperienced advocate can recall

the disconcerting experience of trying to conduct the examination of a witness or follow

opposing arguments or the judge's charge while the client ‘plucks at the attorney's sleeve’

offering gratuitous suggestions”). To hold that every instance of waiver requires the

personal consent of the client himself or herself would be impractical.

Id. at 249-50.

Subsection (b) of Standard 4-5.2 identifies “what jurors to accept or strike [and] what trial

motions should be made” as strategic decisions for the trail attorney to make. 

OReMo2DeposePetnr.Bol.wpd 3

Case 1:99-cv-05279-LJO-SAB Document 311 Filed 12/21/12 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. Discussion

The Court notes, with disappointment, that the Warden failed to mention or acknowledge the

foregoing principles.

While decisions about jury selection and change of venue motions are for the trial attorney to

make, client input is not irrelevant. Reasonable tactical decisions most certainly can and should be

informed by input from the client. The ultimate decision, however, is the responsibility of the attorney.

Should the Court grant leave to take Bolin’s deposition, the most the Warden can hope to gain

is that Bolin will say he told his attorneys which prospective jurors he liked or disliked and which he

wanted selected. This would add to the information cited by the Warden about Bolin’s favorable

impression of Alternate Jurors Iseminger and Newberry. Standing alone, however, this information

would not be helpful to the Court in assessing attorney performance regarding renewal of motion for the

change of venue. What is needed is an explanation about how the attorneys regarded Bolin’s input,

specificallyas to juryselection, and if that is beyond the attorneys’respective recollection, then generally

throughout the trial proceedings.

On November 29, 2012 the Court entered an order granting the Warden leave to conduct the

depositions of Bolin’s trial attorneys, Charles Soria and William Cater. (Doc. 303.) While the fact of

these depositions is mentioned in passing as a footnote in the Warden’s motion, the Warden reveals no

information about whether the depositions have occurred or even whether they have been noticed. The

Court has no way of knowing the attorneys’ respective positions on Bolin’s input in the jury selection

process, or how that input influenced the attorneys’ decision not to review the change of venue motion.

On the present showing, even without an opposition from Bolin’s attorneys, the Court finds the

“good cause” requirement of Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases to be lacking. The motion

for leave to conduct Bolin’s deposition is therefore denied without prejudice.

It may well be that the attorneys’ decision about the jury selection process may be refreshed by

the deposition process and reference to trial notes. The Warden also could ask the attorneys about

Bolin’s input generally throughout the trial, and specifically during the jury selection process.

In contrast, the Court finds the Rule 6(a) “good cause” requirement is satisfied as to the Warden’s

document production request. If Bolin has any of the materials requested, they should be produced. 

OReMo2DeposePetnr.Bol.wpd 4

Case 1:99-cv-05279-LJO-SAB Document 311 Filed 12/21/12 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

They very well may prove helpful to the Warden when conducting the depositions of Mr. Soria and Mr.

Cater (if they exist).

IV. Additional Related Matter

The Court takes this opportunity to clarify the effect of the Warden’s continued and renewed

objections to the declarations of Bolin’s trial attorneys. In the current motion the Warden cites to these

declarations as providing support for the proposition that Bolin is the only source of information about

his role in the jury selection process. The Warden then restates objections to the declarations because

they were not presented to the California Supreme Court and Bolin has not explained why the

declarations could not have been developed and presented in state court. See Motion (doc. 308) at p.

5, n. 1. The Court already has ruled on these issues.

The first objection relates to the application of Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).

Pinholster precludes a district court from considering evidence not presented in state court when making

the determination as to whetherthe state court decision was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Id. at 1398. The rationale for this holding is that “review under § 2254(d)(1) focuses on what the state

knew and did.” Id. 1399. The second objection relates to the diligence requirement under § 2254(e)(2),

which precludes a federal court from allowing further fact development (via evidentiary hearing or

record expansion) unless it first determines that the petitioner exercised diligence in trying to develop

the factual basis of the claim. Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 435 (2000) (holding that

subsection (e)(2) precludes an evidentiaryhearing when the failure to develop the factual basis of a claim

is due to a “lack of diligence or some greater fault attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel”).

Both of these legal concepts were outlined, in detail, in the order granting Bolin a limited

evidentiary hearing and record expansion as to Claim C2 of his petition. (Doc. 277.) With respect to

the trial attorneys’ respective declarations, specifically, the Court stated it was not considering that

evidence in determining the state court’s unreasonableness in denying Bolin further evidentiary

development in state habeas proceedings, explicitly because Pinholster proscribed it. The Court further

found that Bolin’s prior attorneys had exercised diligence under § 2254(e)(2). The Warden raised the

diligence argument again in his motion to exclude Bolin’s Strickland expert from testifying, and the

OReMo2DeposePetnr.Bol.wpd 5

Case 1:99-cv-05279-LJO-SAB Document 311 Filed 12/21/12 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court reiterated the text of the evidentiary hearing/ record expansion order in the order denying this

preclusion request. (Doc. 305.)

At this stage of the litigation, the Court has granted an evidentiary hearing and authorized record

expansion. The content of the trial attorneys’ declarations did not figure into this decision. Because the

Court already has determined that the state court was unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1) for not granting

Bolin the opportunity to develop additional evidence in state court, all relevant, reliable evidence the

parties offer to address the merits of Claim C2 now may be offered, including the trial attorneys’

declarations. Any objection the Warden may have to the Court’s consideration of those declarations,

from the entry the evidentiary hearing order forward, is ill-conceived and cumulative. Likewise the

diligence issue under § 2254(e)(2) is settled. It’s clear the Warden disagrees with the Court’s decision,

as he has argued the position two times since the decision was made. To the extent the Warden seeks

to preserve his objection to the Court’s rulings, he has fulfilled this goal. The matter need not and

should not be raised again. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 20, 2012 

 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

 Lawrence J. O’Neill

United States District Judge 

OReMo2DeposePetnr.Bol.wpd 6

Case 1:99-cv-05279-LJO-SAB Document 311 Filed 12/21/12 Page 6 of 6