Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01827/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01827-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:626 Job Discrimination (Age)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The parties have requested oral argument on the motions for partial summary

judgment. The Court will deny t he requests because the parties’ memoranda thoroughly

discuss the law and evidence and t he Court concludes that additional argument will not

aid its decisional process. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197,

1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Lennar Homes of Arizona, Inc., 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-03-1827-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court are motions for partial summary judgment, motions to

supplement, and motions to amend filed by Defendant and motions to strike filed by both

parties. Docs. ##48, 68, 70, 90, 92, 101, 104, 115, 131, 133, 145, 148, 152.1

Background

Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission commenced this action on

September 18, 2003 by filing a complaint against Defendant that purports to state violations

of the Age Discriminat ion in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Doc. #1.

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 1 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Plaint iff alleges in the complaint that since at least May 1, 2000, Defendant has terminated

employees, including Jacque Judge, Carol Nikrant, and Gordon Cameron, because of their

ages. Doc. #1 ¶ 7. Pursuant to the Court’s case management order, Plaintiff filed a notice

on April 6, 2004 identifying Gregory Leach and Charlyne Sheehan as additional class

members on whose behalf Plaintiff will seek relief in this action. Docs. ##24, 33.

Discussion

I. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is approp riate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is ent it led t o judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Substantive law determines which

facts are material and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of t he suit

. . . will properly preclude the ent ry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Similarly, to preclude summary judgment the dispute must

be genuine, that is, t he evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The Ninth Circuit has “has set a high standard for the grant ing of summary

judgment in employment discrimination cases.” Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80

F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996). Very little evidence is required to survive summary

judgment in such cases “‘because t he ult imate question is one that can only be resolved

through a ‘searching inquiry’ – one that is most appropriately conducted by the factfinder,

upon a full record.’” Id. (citations omitted); see Chuang v. Univ . of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d

1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Schnidrig).

II. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Gregory Leach.

A. Is Plaintiff’s Claim Regarding Leach Time Barred?

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim regarding Leach is untimely under 29 U.S.C.

§ 626(d)(2) because Leach did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300

days of his termination. Doc. #48 at 7-14. Plaintiff argues that the claim is not t ime barred

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 2 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

because a privat e charge is not required for the EEOC to bring an action under the ADEA.

Doc. #105 at 5. The Court agrees with Plaintiff.

Section 626(d)(2) provides, in pertinent part: “No civil action may be commenced

by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful

discrimination has been filed with the [EEOC]. Such a charge shall be filed . . . within 300

days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (emphasis

added). On its face, § 626(d)(2) applies to actions brought by indiv iduals, not the EEOC.

Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that “the EEOC’s role in combating

age discrimination is not dependent on t he filing of a charge; the agency may receive

information concerning alleged violations of the ADEA ‘from any source,’ and it has

independent authority to investigate age discrimination.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson

Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting 29 C.F.R. §§ 1624.4, 1626.13 (1990)). The Court

thus concludes t hat t he 300-day limit set forth in § 626(d)(2) does not apply to Plaintiff’s

claims. See Massachusetts v. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 134, 144-45 (D. Mass.

2001) (holding that the 300-day limit in § 626(d)(2) does not ap p ly t o claims brought by the

EEOC); Glass v. IDS Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1029, 1051 (D. Minn. 1991) (“[T]he

EEOC’s ability to assert a direct action is not predicated on the filing of a timely charge[.]”)

(citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28); EEOC v. Sperry-Univac Corp., No. C 81-0276J, 1982 WL 649,

*4 (D. Utah Nov. 29, 1982) (“Nothing in the express language of the ADEA or the

incorporated provisions of the [Fair Labor Standards Act] conditions EEOC enforcement

actions upon the timely filing of private charges of discrimination under § 626(d).”). 

Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s claim regarding Leach is barred by

the statute of limitations contained in the Portal-to Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Doc. #129

at 10-13. The Court disagrees. Former § 626(e) of the ADEA incorporated by reference the

statute of limitations contained in § 255(a). 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1988); see Miller v.

Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the plaintiff’s ADEA

claims were not barred by the three-year limitations period contained in § 255 and

incorporated into former § 626(e)). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, amended §

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 3 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The current version of § 626(e) provides, in pertinent part:

If a charge filed with the Commission under t his chapter is dismissed or the

proceedings of the Commission are otherwise t erminated by the Commission,

the Commission shall notify the person aggrieved. A civil action may be

brought under this section by a person defined in [§] 630(a) of this title

against t he respondent named in the charge within 90 days after the date of

the receipt of such notice.

29 U.S.C. § 626(e).

- 4 -

626(e) in p art by deleting the reference to § 255(a). Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071

(1991) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)); see Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 24 F.3d 463,

464 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The Civil Rights Act of 1991 . . . amended section 626(e)(1) of the

ADEA. Under the current version of section 626(e), . . . section [255(a)] of t he Port al-to

Portal Act is no longer expressly incorporated[.]”); Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302,

307-08 n.14 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Civil Right s Act of 1991 . . . changed the applicable

statute of limitations in ADEA actions.”).2

The Court finds unpersuasive Defendant’s argument that, despit e Congress’s

elimination of the explicit reference to § 255 in § 626(e), the limitations period contained in

§ 255 still applies to ADEA claims because § 626(b) adop t s t he “procedures” set forth in

§ 216 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), which in turn adop t s t he limitations period

in § 255. See Littell v. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, 62 F.3d 257, 258-59 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting

the argument that § 626(e)’s former explicit reference t o § 255 was mere surplusage by

virtue of the indirect reference to § 255 in § 626(b)).

The cases Defendant relies on are also unpersuasive because they do not hold that

the limitations period cont ained in § 255 applies to ADEA actions. See Doc. #129 at 12.

In McConnell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1484 (E.D. Tex. 1992), the district

court concluded that the EEOC’s claims were untimely under § 626(e) because it did not

bring suit within 90 days of notifying the person aggrieved that the EEOC proceedings had

terminat ed. 802 F. Supp. at 1500. The court reached this conclusion by broadly construing

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 4 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

the EEOC as a “person” under § 630(a) on the ground that the EEOC constitutes a “legal

representative” when it files an ADEA act ion on behalf of individuals. Id. at 1499. This

Court does not agree with the reasoning in McConnell that the EEOC constitutes a

“person” as defined in § 630(a). See Wilkerson v. Martin Marietta Corp., 875 F. Supp.

1456, 1460 (D. Colo. 1995) (rejecting McConnell’s broad construction of the term “person”

based on the compelling legislative hist ory predating the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and “the

absurd results which application of . . . [a] statute of limitations would have” on ADEA

actions brought by the EEOC).

In EEOC v. North Gibson School Corp., 266 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2001), the Seventh

Circuit held that the EEOC’s action was untimely under § 626(d) because t he aggrieved

individuals had not filed timely charges of discrimination with t he EEOC. 266 F.3d at 616.

The court concluded that t he filing requirement in § 626(d) applied to the EEOC on the

ground that it was “in privity” with the aggrieved individuals and acted as t heir

“representative” with respect to their int erests in monetary relief. Id. Under controlling

Ninth Circuit law, however, employment discrimination actions brought by the EEOC are

not subject to a filing requirement or a limitations period because “[t]he EEOC vindicates

public p olicy by suing in federal court . . . regardless of the type of relief sought[.]” EEOC

v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 535 F.3d 533, 539 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added), aff’d,

432 U.S. 355 (1977). “[T]he fact that private parties may benefit from [an EEOC] action does

not detract from the public nature of those proceedings.” Id.

The district court in EEOC v. Oil Gear Co., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (D. Neb. 2003), also

relied on the filing requirement in § 626(d) in holding that one of the EEOC’s claim was

unt imely because the aggrieved individual did not file a timely charge of discrimination.

250 F. Supp. 2d at 1196. The court failed to explain, however, why the filing requirement

in § 626(d)(2) – which explicitly refers claims brought by “individuals” – applied to the

EEOC’s claim. Cf. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (holding that “the EEOC’s role in combat ing age

discrimination is not dependent on the filing of a charge”).

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claim regarding Leach is not time barred

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 5 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

because no statute of limit at ions applies to ADEA actions brought by the EEOC. See

Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359-72 (1977) (holding that no

statute of limitations applies to Title VII claims brought by t he EEOC because the EEOC

has the duty of investigating and attempting to conciliate claims and, “[u]nlike the typical

litigant against whom a statute of limitations might appropriately run, the EEOC is required

by law to refrain from commencing a civil action until it has discharged its administrative

duties”); EEOC v. AT&T Co., 36 F. Supp. 2d 994, 995-97 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (adopt ing t he

reasoning of the Supreme Court in Occidental Life Insurance and holding that “there is no

specific statute of limitations with respect t o claims brought by the EEOC under the

ADEA”); Wilkerson, 875 F. Supp. at 1459-60 (holding t hat “ t here is no applicable statute

of limitations in age discrimination claims brought by the EEOC”); cf. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d

1486, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Occidental Life Insurance and holding that no stat ut e

of limitations applies to civil enforcement actions brought by the Securities and Exchange

Commission).

Defendant states in its reply that the notion that the EEOC “may file litigation at any

time for any person . . . is ‘utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws.’” Doc. #129 at 10-11

(quoting Occidental Life Ins., 432 U.S. at 376 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). As the majority

opinion in Occidental Life Insurance explains, however, district courts have the power to

provide relief to a defendant t hat has been “significantly handicapped in making his

defense because of an inordinate EEOC delay in filing the action after exhausting its

conciliat ion efforts.” 432 U.S. at 373. This is essentially a laches issue, which is addressed

below.

B. Does the Single Fi l ing Rule or Similarly Situated Requirement Apply to

Plaintiff’s Claim Regarding Leach?

Defendant states that Plaintiff “is attempting to bootstrap relief for Leach into t he

Charging Parties’ suit, even though Leach did not file a timely administrative charge with

the EEOC.” Doc. #48 at 8. Defendant contends that Leach “should not be allowed to

‘piggyback’ onto the suit of the Charging Parties under the ‘single filing rule.’” Id. (citing

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 6 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Grayson v . K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1101 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the single filing

or “piggybacking” rule applies to ADEA cases)). Defendant further contends that to

satisfy the single filing rule and the “similarly sit uat ed” requirement in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),

Plaintiff “must establish that Leach’s claim consists of ‘similar discriminatory treatment’

and t hat it occurred ‘in the same time frame’ as the representative charge.” Id. at 9 (citing

Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that

plaintiffs must show that they are “similarly situated” t o bring a representative suit under

§ 216(b))). 

Plaintiff argues that that the “single filing rule” line of cases does not apply

because the EEOC has the authority to seek relief on Leach’s behalf regardless of the

timeliness of his claim and thus has no need to “piggyback” his claim onto the timely

claims of the charging parties. Doc. #105 at 6-7. Plaintiff further argues that it is not

subject to the “similarly situated” requirement in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because that section

governs act ions brought by “employees,” not actions brought by the EEOC, which are

governed by 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c) and 217. Id. at 7 (citing Donovan v. Univ. of Tex. at El

Paso, 643 F.2d 1201, 1204 (5th Cir. 1981); Flavel v. Svedala Indus., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 550,

553 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Glass v. IDS Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1029, 1081 (D. Minn. 1991)).

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. The ADEA enforcement section incorporates by

reference the enforcement provisions of the FLSA, including §§ 216 and 217. 29 U.S.C.

§ 626(b) (“The p rovisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers,

remedies, and procedures provided in sections . . . 216 . . . and 217 of this t it le[.]”). Section

216(b) provides t hat an employer may be sued “by any one or more employees for and in

behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 216(b) (emphasis added); see Flavel, 875 F. Supp. at 553 (“ T he ADEA incorporates by

reference the enforcement provisions of the [FLSA], including 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which

allows an employee to sue his or her employer ‘for and in behalf of himself or [herself] and

other employees similarly situated.’”) (alteration and emphasis in original). In cont rast,

ADEA suits brought by the EEOC are governed by §§ 216(c) and 217, neither of which

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 7 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Section 216(b) provides that an employee may obtain all appropriate relief,

including unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, lost wages, liquidated

damages, employment , reinstatement, and promotion. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Under § 216(c),

the EEOC may bring an action on behalf of an employ ee “to recover the amount of unpaid

minimum wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated damages.”

29 U.S.C. § 216(c). Once the EEOC files suit seeking such relief, the employee’s right to

bring an action under § 216(b) to obtain the same relief terminates. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)-(c).

Under § 217, the EEOC may bring an action to obtain injunctive relief with respect to the

payment of minimum wages or overtime compensat ion due employees. 29 U.S.C. § 217; see

Donovan, 643 F.2d at 1203-04, nn.5-7.

- 8 -

cont ain a “similarly situated” requirement. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 217; see Glass, 778 F. Supp.

at 1081 (“The EEOC’s power to bring a direct suit rest s on two sections of the ADEA, 29

U.S.C. §§ 216(c) & 217, which do not contain the ‘similarly situated’ standard applicable

to private suits brought [pursuant] to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).”).3

The Court concludes that the “similarly situated” requirement in § 216(b) does not

apply to Plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law because Plaintiff properly brought this action

pursuant to §§ 216(c) and 217, not § 216(b). Doc. #1 ¶ 7; see Flav el, 875 F. Supp. at 553

(“Unlike a private representative suit, the EEOC’s authority to bring such an action is not

limited t o circumstances where the plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated.’ . . . [T]he EEOC may

proceed in this matter on behalf of the plaintiffs whether or not they are ‘similarly

situated[.]’”); Donovan, 643 F.2d at 1204 (stating that the language of § 216(b) makes clear

that suits under § 217 “are to be brought by the Government, and that the Government has

the power t o seek class-wide relief for the victims without resorting to Rule 23”). The Court

further concludes that Plaintiff need not rely on the single filing rule with respect to

Leach’s claim because ADEA suits brought by the EEOC are not subject to a statute of

limitations. See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 359-72.

Defendant’s reliance on Grayson and Hipp is misplaced because both

cases involved private suits by employees under § 216(b), not actions by t he EEOC under

§§ 216(c) and 217. See Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1095-1102 (holding that the similarly situated

requirement in § 216(b) is not stringent and that an individual may piggyback onto the

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 8 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

timely charge filed by a named plaintiff in class suits brought under § 216(b)); Hipp, 252

F.3d at 1217 (discussing the similarly situated requirement and the piggybacking rule in

class suits brought by employees under § 216(b)) (citing Grayson). The only ADEA case

Defendant cites where the EEOC was a plaintiff is EEOC v. MCI International, Inc., 829 F.

Supp. 1438 (D.N.J. 1993). Doc. #48 at 10. In that case, however, it appears that the EEOC

sought to obtain damages under § 216(b). 829 F. Supp. at 1445 (discussing §§ 216(b),

216(c), and 217 and stating that the EEOC brought the action “pursuant to these

provisions”). The district court concluded that the similarly situated requirement of §

216(b) was not met, but did so without addressing whether the EEOC could properly bring

an ADEA action under § 216(b). Id. The Court finds the holding in MCI International

inapposite because Plaintiff has not brought this action under § 216(b). See Doc. #1 ¶ 7.

C. Is Plaintiff’s Claim Regarding Leach Barred by the Doctrine of Laches?

Leach was terminated on July 16, 1999 and filed his charge of discrimination nearly

four years later on June 30, 2003. Doc. #49 ¶ ¶ 22, 59. Plaintiff commenced this action on

September 18, 2003 and added Leach as a class member on April 6, 2004. Docs. ##1, 33.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim regarding Leach is barred by the equitable

doctrine of laches. Doc. #48 at 14-15 (citing EEOC v. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86 (9th Cir.

1980)). Defendant states that although most of the delay was caused by Leach himself,

Plaintiff has perpetrated the delay for at least another nine months by wait ing unt il April

2004 t o add Leach as a class member Id. at 14. Defendant further states that Plaintiff was

aware of Leach’s claim before it filed suit and “acted in a way that was inherently

prejudicial to [Defendant] by telling [Defendant] that Leach’s charge would not be

considered because it was untimely.” Id. at 15. Defendant states in its reply t hat it has

been prejudiced by the delay because Jon Jaffe, Defendant’s former Regional President,

could not specifically recall at his deposition in January 2005 whether Leach’s sales were

low. Doc. #129 at 14 (citing Doc. #106 ¶ 21).

Plaintiff argues that Defendant has waived the defense of laches by not affirmatively

alleging it in a pleading and that the defense does not apply to suits brought by the EEOC

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 9 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

as a mat t er of law. Doc. #105 at 10-11. Plaintiff further argues that Defendant has not met

its burden of establishing the elements of the defense. Id. at 11.

T he Court finds that Defendant has not waived the defense with respect to Leach

because Plaintiff identified Leach as a class member not in a pleading, but in a notice to the

Court to which no resp onsive pleading was required. See Docs. ##1, 33. The Court further

finds that laches may properly be raised as a defense in this case because the defense

applies to employment discrimination actions brought by the EEOC when such act ions are

not governed by a statute of limitations. See Occidental Life Ins., 432 U.S. at 373 (stating

that district courts have the power to provide relief to a defendant that has been

“significantly handicapped in making his defense because of an inordinate EEOC delay in

filing the action”); Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d at 88 (“Laches . . . may be used as a defense

t o a T itle VII action.”); Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1993)

(stating in an ADEA action that “laches is inapplicable when Congress has provided a

statute of limitations to govern the action”).

“The defense of laches ‘requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against

whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.’”

Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d 658, 666 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).

Prejudice should not lightly be assumed from delay in employment discriminat ion actions

because some delay in such actions “will be attributable to the EEOC’s time-consuming .

. . efforts at conciliation.” Id. at 667 (citing Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432

U.S. 355, 368-72 (1977)). Moreover, “[l]aches questions are seldom susceptible of

resolution by summary judgment, because ‘where laches is raised as a defense t he factual

issues involved can rarely be resolved without some preliminary evidentiary inquiry.’” Id.

at 666 (citations and alterations omitted).

Because the parties did not brief the issue, it is unclear to the Court whet her Leach’s

delay in filing his charge of discrimination may be imputed to Plaintiff under t he laches

doctrine. Moreover, the Court cannot determine from the record before it whether the

EEOC’s delay in adding Leach as a class member was unreasonable. Nor can the Court

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 10 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Defendant makes the same argument with respect to Plaintiff’s claim regarding

Charlyne Sheehan. See Doc. #68 at 12-13.

- 11 -

determine at the summary judgment stage whether Defendant has suffered prejudice from

the delay sufficient to sup p ort a laches defense. See Bratton, 649 F.2d at 666 (stating that

p rejudice should not lightly be presumed and that laches can rarely be resolved on

summary judgment); cf. Alioto Fish Company, 623 F.2d at 87-89 (affirming summary

judgment on the ground of laches where the undisputed facts showed that the defendant

was severely prejudiced when the EEOC brought suit more than five years after the charge

was filed and many of the key witnesses and records were unavailable).

If Defendant intends to raise the laches defense at trial, the parties shall identify it

as a contested issue in their proposed pretrial order and address whether Leach’s delay

may be imputed to the EEOC for purposes of the defense. T he p arties shall also address

how they propose to try the defense given that it is an equitable issue for t he Court to

decide and that t he Court does not intend to have a separate bench trial or evidentiary

hearing on the issue. 

D. Has Plaintiff Satisfied Its Conciliation Obligations?

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim regarding Leach should be dismissed

because Plaintiff failed to conciliate the claim. Doc. #48 at 15-16. 4 Plaintiff argues that it

has no legal obligation to conciliat e the claims of each and every potential class member.

Doc. #105 at 8-9. Plaintiff further argues that its conciliation efforts in this matter were

sufficient because it notified Defendant that it may file a class age discrimination suit and

afforded Defendant t he opportunity to resolve the class claim. Id. at 9; see Doc. #113 at

12-14.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit has held that in class suits,

t he EEOC is not required to conciliate on behalf of each potential class member. See EEOC

v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing EEOC v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.,

876 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1101-02 (6th

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 11 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

Cir. 1984) (holding t hat because the EEOC sufficiently conciliated a class claim that

reasonably grew out of the initial charge, no additional efforts at conciliation were

required); EEOC v. GM Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that the

EEOC’s conciliation efforts were sufficient and permissibly premised on the class claim);

EEOC v. Equicredit Corp. of Am., No. 02-CV-844, 2002 WL 31371968, *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8,

2002) (holding that the EEOC’s refusal t o identify a potential class member did not render

its conciliation efforts inadequate) (citing Keco Indus., 748 F.2d at 1102). In light of these

authorities, Plaintiff satisfied its conciliation obligation in this case by attempting to

conciliate the class claim. Moreover, case law teaches that substantial deference should

be given the EEOC in determining what level of conciliation effort is appropriate in a

particular case. See EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1091

(C.D. Ill. 1998) (stating that the conciliation requirement is an easy burden to satisfy and

that substantial discretion is vested in t he EEOC with respect to conciliation); EEOC v.

N. Cent. Airlines, 475 F. Supp . 667, 669 (D. Minn. 1979) (“[I]f some conciliation efforts have

occurred, substantial deference should be given t o t he EEOC’s determination that

conciliation efforts have failed[.]”). 

E. Is There a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Regarding Discrimination?

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not made a prima facie case of discrimination

because Leach was not qualified for his position or meeting Defendant’s expectations and

Plaintiff cannot show that similarly situated non-p rotected persons were treated more

favorably. Doc. #48 at 17 (citing Doc. #49 ¶ 26). To establish a prima facie case of age

discrimination, Plaintiff must show that Leach was (1) a member of the protected class

(at least age 40), (2) performing his job satisfact orily, (3) terminated, and (4) replaced by a

younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications. See Messick v. Horizon Indus.,

Inc., 62 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1995); Coleman v . Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281

(9th Cir. 2000). “The requisite degree of proof t o est ablish a prima facie case is minimal;

plaintiff need only offer evidence giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”

Messick, 62 F.3d at 1229; see Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1282 (stating that the prima facie case

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 12 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

standard is a “low threshold”); Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)

(“The amount of evidence that must be p roduced in order to create a prima facie case is

‘very little.’”) (citation and alterations omitted). 

Plaintiff has presented evidence of the following: Leach was more than 40 years old

when he was terminated and had more t han 30 years experience in real estate sales and

general contracting, eight of those years in supervisory duties. Doc. #106 ¶ 45. Defendant

hired Leach as a real estate sales manager in December 1996 and during his emp loy ment

Leach was a licensed real estate agent and associate broker. Id. ¶ 3. Leach received

“generally positive” performance evaluations and a bonus from Defendant shortly before

his termination in July 1999. Id. ¶¶ 32-35. Leach’s former duties as a sales manager were

assigned t o M ichael Dowell, who was less than 40 years old when he assumed the duties

and had less real estate and supervisory experience than Leach. Id. ¶¶ 43, 45-46. These

facts constitute sufficient prima facie evidence that Leach performed his job satisfactorily

and that his former duties were assigned to a younger employee with equal or inferior

qualifications. See Messick, 62 F.3d at 1229 (“[T]here was sufficient evidence for the trier

of fact to infer that Messick was performing satisfactorily.”); Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1281

(holding that when a discharge results from a reduction in workforce the plaintiff need not

show that he was actually replaced, but may show that the employer had a continuing need

for his skills and services and that his duties were still being performed).

Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to Defendant to

articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the termination. See Wallis, 26 F.3d

at 889. The EEOC must then produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether Defendant’s stated reason is pretextual. Id.

Defendant states that Leach was terminated because his productivity was not

acceptable. Doc. #48 at 17 (citing Doc. #49 ¶ 26; see Doc. #89 ¶ 26). Although this would

be a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for terminating an employee, the Court finds that

t he EEOC has presented sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent to raise a question of

fact as to whether Defendant’s stated reason is pretextual. Specifically, Leach has t estified

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 13 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

that David Kitnick, one of Defendant’s Division Presidents, bragged during a meeting that

he needed to “get rid of the st aff t hat he had” and “bring in younger people to fulfill his

mission.” Doc. #106 ¶ 7. Under Ninth Circuit law, this direct evidence of discriminatory

intent, standing alone, is sufficient to create a triable issue with respect t o p retext. See

Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing summary

judgment for the defendant and stating that whet her discriminatory remarks affected the

decision-making process was “a question appropriately answered by a trier of fact ”);

Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Godwin testified that the

president of the company . . . made derogat ory comments about women at meetings. . . .

Godwin’s direct evidence of discriminatory animus satisfies the required showing at the

pretext stage.”); Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“Because direct evidence is so probative, the plaintiff need offer ‘very little’ direct

evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”) (citing Godwin).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff “has mischaracterized the facts” because Kitnick’s

alleged statement was vague and referred to past conduct since “[p]eople do not normally

brag about something that they have not done yet.” Doc. #129 at 2. Defendant essentially

asks the Court to construe the evidence in its favor. At the summary judgment stage,

however, the Court must construe all evidence in favor of the nonmoving p arty – in this

case, t he EEOC. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Raad v.

Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing

summary judgment for the defendant because “the district court . . . failed to draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of Raad, the nonmoving party, and imp ermissibly

substituted its judgment concerning the weight of the evidence for the jury’s”).

Plaintiff has also presented sufficient circumstant ial evidence of pretext. Leach has

test ified that at the time of his termination his productivity was increasing. Doc. #106 Ex. C

¶ 6. Leach has further testified t hat he was never advised that his performance was

deficient or that improvement was necessary to retain his job even though Defendant had

a policy of advising employees of performance problems and attempting corrective action

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 14 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

before terminat ing t he employees. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Leach’s personnel forms do not indicate

that he was terminated for lack of productivity. Id. ¶ 17. Rather, the forms indicate that he

was simply laid off and that his termination was a “ cut back in staff.” Id. The forms do not

mention a productivity problem even though Defendant’s policy required the terminating

official to set fort h a specific reason for the termination and the Employment Separation

Form completed for Leach provided space for such reason coupled with the instruction to

“[b]e as specific as possible.” Id. ¶¶ 16-18. Such indirect evidence creates a question of

fact on p retext that must be resolved by the jury at trial. See Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1222

(stating that documents prepared cont emp oraneously with the challenged action that are

inconsistent with the defendant’s stated reason for the action are probative of pretext);

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (“Proof that the

defendant’s explanation is unwort hy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial

evidence that is p robative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.”).

Defendant has presented no evidence contemporaneous with Leach’s termination

showing that Leach was not productive. Rather, Defendant relies on the post-termination

t estimony of Leach’s supervisors. Doc. #48 at 17 (citing Doc. #49 ¶ 26; see Doc. #89 ¶ 26).

Whether such t est imony is to be believed is a matter of credibility for the jury to determine.

“Although ‘shifting explanations are acceptable when viewed in the context of other

surrounding events, such weighing of t he evidence is for a jury, not the [Court].’”

Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1222 (citation and alteration omitted); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and

the drawing of inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge[.]”); Harris

v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“ Issues of credibility, including questions of

int ent , should be left to the jury. When a plaintiff has provided direct and circumstantial

evidence of discriminatory intent, she . . . may be able to survive a motion for summary

judgment on that evidence alone.”) (citations omitted).

Defendant contends that Leach’s subjective beliefs regarding his qualifications and

performance are irrelevant and that the only issue is whether Defendant honestly believed

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 15 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

The Court will grant Defendant’s motion to exceed p age limits and motion to

supplement its statements of facts. Docs. ##101, 131. The Court will deny as moot

Plaintiff’s motion to strike facts and evidence submitted by Defendant. See Doc. #104.

- 16 -

that Leach was not qualified and lacked productivity. Doc. #129 at 4-7 (citing Palucki v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1571 (7t h Cir. 1989)). Defendant further contends

that Plaintiff cannot “show that the differences between Dowell’s qualifications and those

of Leach are significant enough to ‘jump off the page and slap you in the face.’” Id. at 6-7

(citing Deines v . Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Reg. Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1999)).

Under Ninth Circuit law, however, subjective evidence of an employees’s qualifications

and job performance may be relevant on the question of pretext. See Odima v. Westin

Tucson Hotel Co., 991 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the plaintiff’s superior

qualifications standing alone were enough to prove pretext). The Ninth Circuit has “never

followed the Fifth Circuit in holding that the disparity in [employees’] qualifications ‘must

be so apparent as to jump off the page and slap [you] in the face to sup p ort a finding of

pretext.’” Raad, 323 F.3d at 1194 (brackets added; emphasis in original). Moreover,

whether Defendant honestly believed that Leach was not qualified and lacked productivity

is an issue of fact for t he jury . See Harris, 183 F.3d at 1051; Braxton-Secret v. Robins Co.,

769 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Questions involving a person’s state of mind . . . are

generally factual issues inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment.”).

For these reasons, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion for partial summary

judgment regarding Leach.5

II. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Charlyne Sheehan.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case of discrimination

with respect to Sheehan because she voluntarily resigned when the new home community

to which she was assigned closed. Doc. #68 at 6-7. Plaintiff argues that it has made a

prima facie case because it has presented evidence that Defendant terminated Sheehan’s

employment. Doc. #113 at 7-11. The Court finds that questions of material fact preclude

summary judgment.

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 16 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Charging party Jacque Judge was laid off one week earlier on May 1, 2000. Id. ¶ 39.

7

Defendant does not address the notice in its reply, stating only that “there is

absolutely no evidence that [it] intended to or did terminate Sheehan.” Doc. #146 at 4.

- 17 -

Plaintiff has presented evidence of the following: Defendant hired Sheehan as a

new home sales consultant in February 1996. Doc. #114 ¶ 1. Michael Dowell, Sheehan’s

supervisor, assigned her to the Park Rowe community in February 2000. Id. ¶ 5. Park Rowe

was scheduled to close in March 2000. Id. When the advertising for Park Rowe had been

taken down, Sheehan discussed wit h Dowell the possibility of transferring to another

community. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. Dowell repeatedly told Sheehan that there were no open

communities to which she could be transferred. Id. ¶ 11. Sheehan t hus determined that her

services were no longer needed by Defendant. Id. ¶ 35.

Defendant’s notice to Sheehan regarding her change in employment shows both

that her departure was “voluntary” and “ involuntary.” Id. ¶ 36. The notice indicates that

her “involunt ary” departure and “[l]ayoff” were effective May 8, 2000, the same date

charging part ies Carol Nikrant and Gordon Cameron were laid off by Defendant. Id. ¶¶36-

39.6

 The notice further indicates that Sheehan was laid off because there was “no new

community” available. Id. ¶ 36. Sheehan wrote at the bot t om of the notice that she “was

laid off because there was no new community for [her] to go to” and that she “would have

stayed on with [Defendant] otherwise.” Id. ¶ 37. 

These circumstances, construed in Plaintiff’s favor, constitute evidence that

Sheehan was terminated and satisfy the low prima facie case standard. See Messick v.

Horizon Indus., Inc., 62 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The requisite degree of proof to

establish a prima facie case is minimal[.]”); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271,

1281 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating t hat t he p rima facie case standard is a “low threshold”); see

also Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing

summary judgment for the defendant on T it le VII and wrongful discharge claims in part

because there were issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff resigned or was terminated).7

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 17 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has presented no evidence of discrimination even

if Sheehan is determined to have been terminat ed. Doc. #68 at 7. As discussed above,

however, Leach testified that Kitnick said he had to get rid of the staff and “bring in some

younger peop le.” Doc. #114 ¶¶ 52-53. Nikrant has testified that Dowell asked her,

“Just how old of a person is Jacque Judge?” Id. ¶ 54. Dowell made the same inquiry to

former sales consultant Marilyn Harris. Id. Kit nick’s statement coupled with Dowell’s

inquiries constitute direct evidence of discrimination sufficient to survive summary

judgment. See Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1996)

(reversing summary judgment for t he defendant where the plaintiff was told that he would

not be considered for a promotion because the defendant want ed someone younger for the

job); Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 1145, 1149-50, n.5 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing

summary judgment for the defendant and stating that the fact that a manager’s

discriminatory comments were recounted by the plaintiff’s coworkers did not lessen the

probative value of the comments); EEOC v . Pape Lift, Inc., 115 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 1997)

(“[Defendant] would have this court hold that discriminatory remarks are tied to the

decision process only if a decision maker said something to the effect of ‘I’m firing you

because you are too old.’ Few employers who engage in illegal discrimination, however,

express their discriminatory tendencies in such a direct fashion[.]”); Coghlan v. Am.

Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen evidence establishes the

emp loyer’s animus toward the class to which the plaintiff belongs, the inference to the fact

of discrimination against the plaintiff is sufficiently small that we have treated the evidence

as direct.”) (citing Cordova).

 Plaintiff has also p resented sufficient circumstantial evidence of pretext. Construed

in it s favor, Plaintiff’s evidence shows the following: Sheehan could have been transferred

to a new community when the Park Rowe communit y closed. Doc. #114 ¶¶ 12, 14-16.

Defendant transferred sales consultants younger than Sheehan from Park Rowe to other

communities. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 30-31. Defendant was hiring sales consultants who were less than

40 y ears old and less experienced than Sheehan for new communities at the same time

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 18 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Defendant contends that any inference of discrimination is negated because

Sheehan had been promoted from a “rover” position to a full-time assignment shortly

before her departure. Doc. #68 at 7. This evidence must be weighed against the evidence

recounted above, a task for the jury. 

9

Defendant also argues that the charging parties were not qualified for their

p ositions or meeting Defendant’s expectations. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Doc. #49 ¶ 26). The evidence

Defendant relies on in support of it s argument , however, refers to Leach, not the charging

parties. See Doc. #49 ¶ 26 (“Leach was discharged because he was unable to achieve

adequate or consistent productivity[.]”). Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

presented sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case with respect to the charging

parties. See Docs. ##116 at 7-9; 117 ¶¶ 77, 79-81, 93, 96, 119, 121, 125-28, 146, 159, 182, 217-

18.

- 19 -

Dowell was t elling her that no new communities were available. Id. ¶¶ 17-29. Sheehan was

laid off on the same date as Cameron and Nikrant , both of whom were over 40 years old.

Id. ¶ 39. Sheehan and the charging parties were the only Arizona sales consultants who

were laid off instead of being transferred when their respective communities closed. Id. ¶

34.

A jury could reasonably conclude from this evidence that Defendant’s stated

reason for Sheehan’s departure – that there were no new communities to which she could

be transferred – is unworthy of credence. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (“Proof that the

defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial

evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.”).8

The Court will deny Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment regarding Sheehan.

III. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Carol Nikrant, Jacque

Judge, and Gordon Cameron.

Defendant states that the charging parties were laid off because of the closing

of their communities and p erformance issues. Doc. #70 at 5 (citing Doc. #49 ¶ 45).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no direct evidence of discrimination and cannot

otherwise show that Defendant’s stated reasons for terminating the charging parties were

pretextual. Id. at 7-10.9

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 19 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10See Docs. ##116 at 10; 117 ¶¶ 33-34, 39-41, 47-48, 68-77, 79-100.

11See Docs. ##116 at 10-13; 117 ¶¶ 35, 49, 51, 54-59, 65-66, 101-14, 117, 136-37, 147,

159-63, 168, 182, 185-86, 196, 210, 216-18.

12The Court will deny as moot Plaintiff’s motion to strike facts and evidence

submitted by Defendant. Doc. #115. The Court will grant Defendant’s motion to

supplement replies and deny its motion to strike evidence as moot because the Court did

not consider the challenged evidence. Docs. ##145, 148. 

- 20 -

As noted above, Kitnick’s comment regarding his desire to “bring in some younger

people” coupled with Dowell’s inquiries regarding Judge’s age constitute direct evidence

of discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment. Doc. #116 at 6-7 (citing Doc.

#117 ¶¶ 25-29). Plaintiff has also presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of pretext to

survive summary judgment . Id. at 9-21. The Court finds that there are genuine issues of

material fact as to (1) whether Defendant falsely told the charging parties that there were

no communities to which they could be transferred,10 and (2) whether t he charging parties

were terminated because of p erformance problems.11 The Court will deny Defendant’s

motion for partial summary judgment regarding Nikrant, Judge, and Cameron.12

IV. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgme nt Re: Limitation of Damages

for Gregory Leach.

Defendant argues that the potential damage p eriod for Leach is limited, as a matter

of law, to the time between his terminat ion on July 16, 1999 and Defendant’s sale of its

Vent ana Lakes community to Shea Homes on November 1, 2000. Doc. #90 at 1-2 (citing

Sivell v. Conwed Corp., 666 F. Supp. 23, 25-26 (D. Conn. 1987)). Plaint iff disagrees based

on the following undisputed evidence: Leach’s job duties as a sales manager at Ventana

Lakes included new home sales and he was hired as a salesman by Roy ce Homes after his

t erminat ion. Doc. #110 ¶¶ 7-8. When Ventana Lakes was sold, Dowell and Barry Grant,

Defendant’s President , told the employees that if they wanted to stay on with Defendant

positions would be found for them and that t hey were welcome to come back if they took

jobs with Shea and did not like them. Id. ¶ ¶ 2-3. One employee stayed on with Defendant

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 20 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13Defendant’s reliance on Sivell is misplaced because the plaintiff in that case

presented no evidence that he would have remained with t he defendant or been hired by

its successor. 666 F. Supp. at 25-26.

- 21 -

and two employees were hired by Shea. Id. ¶¶ 4-6.

Construing this evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that there are genuine

issues of material fact as to whether Leach would have remained wit h Defendant or been

hired by Shea if he had not been terminated prior to the sale of Ventana Lakes. See Bonura

v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 629 F. Supp. 353, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that the

defendant’s liability to ADEA plaint iffs did not end with the sale of the division in which

they worked prior to their termination because there was evidence that they would have

been retained by the defendant or its successor); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d

1093, 1098 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he jury reasonably could have found that Mohawk would

have retained Gibson after it closed its West Helena facility. Thus, the district court did

not err in refusing to limit Gibson’s recovery as a matter of law to the period prior to the

West Helena plant’s closure.”). 1 3 The Court will deny Defendant’s motion for partial

summary judgment regarding limitation of damages for Leach.

V. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Limitation of Damages

for Certain Claimants.

Defendant argues that Nikrant, Sheehan, Cameron, and Judge are entitled to no

backpay or limited backpay because they failed t o mitigate their damages. Doc. #92 at 1.

Defendant has the burden of proof on this issue. See Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel, 53

F.3d 1484, 1497 (9th Cir. 1995). Defendant must prove “‘that, based on the undisputed

facts in the record, during the time in question there were substantially equivalent jobs

available, which [the claimant s] could have obtained and that [the claimants] failed to use

reasonable diligence in seeking one.’” Id. (quoting EEOC v. Farmers Bros. Co., 31 F.3d

891, 906 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in Farmers)); see Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817

F.2d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The defendant bears the burden of showing that there were

suitable positions available and t hat the plaintiff failed to use reasonable care in seeking

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 21 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

them.”).

Plaintiff contends that Defendant has not proven t hat suitable jobs were available

to the claimants as a matter of law. Doc. #119 at 4-6. Defendant cont ends that it has met

its burden on this element because Nikrant, Sheehan, and Cameron obtained jobs selling

real estate shortly aft er t hey left Defendant’s employment. Doc. #92 at 2-3. The Court

need not resolve this issue because it finds t hat Defendant has not satisfied the second

requirement of its failure-to-mitigate defense – showing that the claimants failed to use

reasonable diligence in seeking new jobs.

A. Carol Nikrant.

Defendant acknowledges that Nikrant found a job at Jackson Properties within a

week of her termination and worked there until July 18, 2001. Doc. #92 at 5. Defendant

further acknowledges that Nikrant worked at Real Estate Temps from July 18, 2001 to

January 29, 2002. Id. at 6. Defendant st ates that Nikrant then retired to the PinetopLakeside area and cared for her mot her-in-law on a full-time basis. Id. at 6 (citing Doc. #93

¶¶ 25-26, Ex. E (Nikrant Dep. at 7, 19-26, 76)). Defendant contends in its motion that

Nikrant’s claim for damages should end on July 18, 2001 because Nikrant could have

obtained permanent employment with Real Estat e T emp s. Id. at 6, 12. Defendant contends

in its reply that damages should end no later than January 29, 2002, when Nikrant left Real

Estate Temps and moved to Pinetop-Lakeside. Doc. #147 at 3-4.

Plaintiff has presented an affidavit from Nikrant in which she testified that after

January 29, 2002 she sought “employment in the real estate field and applied to Torreon

Realty, Arizona Realty and Madico Realty” and “also applied at White Mountain Country

Club and Home Depot (three times).” Doc. #120 Ex. C ¶¶ 8-9. Nikrant furt her testified that

she was able to care for her mother-in-law and still work until her husband became ill in

December 2004, but that he fully recovered by April 2005. Id. ¶ 9.

Defendant contends that Nikrant’s affidavit directly contradicts her deposit ion

testimony that “she had done essentially not hing to become employed in the real estate

community subsequent to retiring to Pinetop-Lakeside.” Doc. #147 at 3 (citing Doc. #93

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 22 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14The Court has not read the entire Nikrant deposition. The Court is required to

review only those portions of the evidence cited by the parties. See Carmen v. S.F.

Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2001). 

- 23 -

¶ 26). Defendant further contends that the affidavit is offered solely to avoid summary

judgment and that “Nikrant is bound by her deposition testimony.” Id. (citing Burrell v.

Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff’s affidavit

sought to create “sham issues of fact” because her allegations of sexual harassment

appeared for t he first time in the affidavit and directly contradicted her prior deposition

testimony)).

The Court has reviewed the portions of the Nikrant deposition cited by Defendant

and cannot conclude that the affidavit is a sham.14 Nikrant explicitly testified at her

deposition that she sought employment at Torreon and Madico Realt y and that she

inquired with another realtor but could not recall the name. Doc. #93 Ex. E, Nikrant Dep.

at 20, 23, 25-26. Nikrant did not testify these were her only efforts to obtain employment

in the Pinetop-Lakeside area. Nor did she unequivocally testify that she was unable to

work due to the care she provided her mother-in-law. See id. at 20-21.

The “sham affidavit” rule “does not automatically dispose of every case in which

a contradictory affidavit is introduced to explain portions of earlier deposition testimony.”

Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1991). Rat her, the trial court

must find that the affidavit “flatly contradicts” earlier testimony and is in fact a sham. Id.

at 266. The Court cannot make that finding in this case.

Quest ions of fact preclude summary judgment on whether Nikrant failed to seek

employment with reasonable diligence after July 18, 2001 or January 29, 2002.

B. Charlyne Sheehan.

Defendant acknowledges that Sheehan found a new job within a week of her

departure and has been employed as an act ivities director for Cal-Am Properties since

November 2001. Doc. #92 at 6. Defendant nonetheless argues that Sheehan should be

denied damages from November 2001 because she “voluntarily left the real estate market”

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 23 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 Defendant notes that Cameron was fired from Centex for misconduct. Id. Plaintiff,

however, is not seeking damages for Cameron after March 1, 2004, the date he lost his job

with Centex. Doc. #119 at 12 (citing Doc. #120 ¶ 49). 

- 24 -

and “ allowed her license to sell real estate to expire[.]” Doc. #147 at 4. The Court agrees

with Plaintiff’s argument that Sheehan was not required to stay in the same profession in

order to mitigate her damages. Doc. #119 (citing Odima, 53 F.3d at 1497).

C. Gordon Cameron.

Defendant acknowledges that Cameron began working for Ryland Homes on

January 1, 2001 and for Centex Homes in Oct ober 2003. Doc. #92 at 7. Defendant asserts,

without analysis, that “Cameron should be barred from back-pay aft er January 1, 2000, the

date he was employed by Ryland, but not later than October 2003, when he was employed

by Centex.” Id. at 12.15

Defendant ap p ears to be taking the position that Cameron’s damages ceased after

he found employment with Ryland and Centex. As Plaintiff points out, however, t his is a

quest ion of t he amount of damages, not of mitigation. Doc. #119 at 12. Indeed, Cameron’s

employment with Ryland and Centex is evidence that he used reasonable diligence in

seeking employment after his termination. The amount of damages to be recovered by

Cameron, if any, will be decided by the jury.

D. Jacque Judge.

Defendant contends that Judge is entitled t o no backpay because although she

worked in “resale real estate from June 2001 until December 2003, she made only $6,000.00

during that period and did virtually nothing t o obt ain emp loy ment with a

homebuilder/develop er.” Doc. #92 at 5. As explained above, a claimant is not required to

stay in the exact same line of work in order t o mitigate her damages. See Odima, 53 F.3d

at 1497. Moreover, Judge has testified that she sought re-employment with Defendant and

sought employment with four other new home builders after her termination. Doc. #120 ¶¶

14-19. Judge has further testified that her termination was so shocking and traumatic that

it devastated her self-esteem and made it difficult for her to seek other employment. Id. ¶

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 24 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16Rule 16(b) provides that the district judge shall enter a scheduling order governing

the case and that the “schedule shall not be modified except upon a showing of good

cause[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b); see Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1062

(9th Cir. 2005) (“Courts set [pretrial] schedules to permit t he court and the parties to deal

with cases in a thorough and orderly manner, and they must be allowed to enforce them,

unless there are good reasons not to.”). 

- 25 -

7. 

Construing the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, t he Court finds that questions of fact

exist as to whether Nikrant failed to seek employment with reasonable diligence after her

termination. See EEOC v. Pape Lift, Inc., 115 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the

claimant’s efforts to seek emp loyment by reviewing the want ads was not unreasonable as

a matter of law where there was evidence that his lack of aggressiveness in pursuing new

employment was common among older workers: “[W]e think it . . . ap p ropriate to tailor the

reasonableness inquiry to the particular characteristics of the injured plaintiff. . . .

Accordingly, the evidence about [the claimant’s] mental condition following his discharge

was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that his mitigation efforts were

reasonable.”).

The Court will deny Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on damages

for certain claimants.

VI. Defendant’s Motion to Strike Any Claims Asserted on Be half of Gregory Leach

and Charlyne Sheehan and Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend Answer.

A. The Motion to Strike Claims.

In its motion to strike claims, Defendant seeks to have Plaintiff’s claims regarding

Leach and Sheehan stricken on the ground that Plaintiff has not amended the complaint

to include the claims. Doc. #133 at 2-3. Defendant filed the mot ion on April 19, 2005. Id.

The deadline for filing dispositive motions, however, was April 1, 2005. Docs. ##24 ¶ 7(a),

43 ¶ 1(F). Defendant does not mention the fact that the motion is untimely . Nor has

Defendant shown “good cause” under Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.16

The parties’ joint case management rep ort provides that, consistent with its

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 25 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17Defendant states in its reply that its motion to strike is not unt imely because it

“raises an issue of subject matter jurisdiction which cannot be waived by any party and

can be considered by the Court at any time.” Doc. #153 at 7. Defendant argues that the

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to conciliat e t he claims

regarding Leach and Sheehan. Id. As explained above, however, Plaintiff had no legal

obligation to conciliate each class member’s claim. See EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285,

289 (9th Cir. 1993).

- 26 -

complaint, Plaint iff “ may identify additional class members on whose behalf it will seek

relief.” Doc. #22 ¶ 6; see Doc. #1 at 1 (“ T his is an action under the [ADEA] to correct

unlawful employment practices on the basis of age and to provide relief to Jacque Judge,

Carol Nikrant, Gordon Cameron, and a class of protected age group persons whom

Defendant laid off because of their age.”) (emphasis added). In its case management

order, the Court set an April 6, 2004 deadline “for adding class members to this case[.]”

Doc. #24 ¶ 2. Plaintiff timely filed a notice adding Leach and Sheehan as “additional class

members on whose behalf [Plaintiff] will seek relief in this case[.]” Doc. #33.

Defendant did not object to the notice. Nor did Defendant argue in any one of its

five summary judgment motions that Plaintiff’s claims regarding Leach and Sheehan should

be barred because Plaintiff had not amended the complaint to include the claims. The

Court finds that Defendant has not shown good cause for filing its motion to strike after

the dispositive motion deadline. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 Advisory Comm.’s Notes (1983 Am.)

(stating that good cause exists when a deadline “cannot reasonably be met desp it e the

diligence of the party seeking the extension”); Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (holding that the

plaintiff “failed to demonst rate good cause for his belated motion to amend” and stating

that “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party

seeking the amendment”). The Court will deny Defendant’s motion to strike.17

B. The Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend Answer.

In it s alt ernative motion, Defendant seeks leave of Court to amend its answer to

include the defense of laches and other unspecified defenses purportedly applicable to

Leach and Sheehan. Doc. #33 at 3-5. Plaintiff argues that, except with regard to the laches

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 26 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 27 -

defense against Leach, Defendant has offered no explanation as to why it seeks leave to

amend its answer more than a year after Leach and Sheehan were added as class members

and months after it filed summary judgment motions regarding t heir claims. Doc. #142 at

3. Plaintiff further argues that the proposed amended answer is inappropriate because it

includes allegations learned during discovery regarding the charging parties and a new

allegation that the original complaint was untimely. Id. at 4 (citing Doc. #133 Ex. A).

Plaintiff concludes that Defendant has no need to supplement its answer with lengt hy

allegations already raised in its motions for summary judgment. Id. at 3.

As explained above, Defendant has not waived its laches defense wit h resp ect to

Leach by not having raised the defense in its answer. Nor has Plaintiff argued, or the

Court concluded, that Defendant has waived any other defenses with respect to Leach or

Sheehan. T he Court thus finds that Defendant’s proposed amended answer is

unnecessary. The Court will deny Defendant’s motion for leave to amend answer.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s request for oral argument (Doc. #54) is denied.

2. Defendant’s motions for partial summary judgment (Docs. ##48, 68, 70, 90, 92)

are denied.

3. Defendant’s motion for leave to exceed page limits (Doc. #101) is granted.

4. Plaintiff’s motions to strike facts and evidence submit t ed by Defendant

(Docs. ##104, 115) are denied as moot.

5. Defendant’s motions to supplement (Docs. ##131, 148) are granted.

6. Defendant’s motion to strike claims and alternative motion for leave to amend

answer (Doc. #133) are denied.

7. Defendant’s motion to strike evidence (Doc. #145) is denied as moot.

8. Defendant’s motion to correct the record (Doc. #152) is granted.

The Court will set a pretrial conference by separate order.

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 27 of 28
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 28 -

DATED this 30th day of September, 2005.

Case 2:03-cv-01827-DGC Document 161 Filed 10/03/05 Page 28 of 28