Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01950/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01950-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

This Court may presume that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ factual recitation is

correct. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995).

Additionally, to resolve Petitioner’s claim, this Court may review the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision, as it constitutes the last reasoned state court decision. See Williams v.

Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

803-04 (1991)).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Corletha Davis, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

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CIV 14-1950-PHX-DJH (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Corletha Jones, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex,

Perryville, Goodyear, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(hereinafter “habeas petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an

Answer on December 2, 2014 (Doc. 7). On December 12, 2014, Petitioner filed a Reply

(Doc. 8). 

BACKGROUND

On November 29, 2010, Petitioner was charged by indictment in the Superior Court

of the State of Arizona with one count of Second Degree Murder, a class one dangerous

felony. (Doc. 7-1, at 2-3.) The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:1

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[I]n the early morning of November 19, 2010, Davis walked to the

QuikTrip (“QT”) near her home. She wore a red sweatshirt with the hood

pulled over her head. Despite QT policy to the contrary, the store clerk

permitted Davis to use the store telephone because Davis made him

“uncomfortable.” She called a cab company, gave a false name and waited for

the cab to arrive.

The cab driver brought Davis to the northernmost driveway of her

apartment complex, though Davis’s unit was not accessible form that entrance.

While still in the cab, Davis then allegedly shot the cab driver multiple times

in his head and face. A driver observed the cab roll out of the driveway and

stop in the middle of the road, and then saw a woman in a red sweatshirt exit

the passenger-side of the cab and walk toward the apartment complex. He

called the police when the cab driver slumped out the driver-side door,

“bleeding real badly.”

Police detained Davis in her boyfriend’s apartment next-door to her

own. When they executed a search warrant on the boyfriend’s apartment,

officers found two plastic bags in the dishwasher containing clothes that

matched the description of the clothing Davis was seen wearing at the QT, and

two guns, a .22-caliber Ruger semi-automatic pistol and a .22 caliber revolver.

Testing later matched blood stains on Davis’s clothing to the cab driver’s

DNA. An autopsy also determined that the cab driver died from a minimum

of five and maximum of seven bullet wounds from the .22 caliber Ruger pistol.

(Doc. 7-1, at 53-54.)

A jury found Petitioner guilty as charged, and also found the offense to be dangerous.

(Doc. 7-1, at 16.) The trial court had instructed the jury that an offense is a dangerous

offense “if it involved the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury or the

discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” (Id.,

at 3, 12, 19.) Petitioner was thereafter sentenced to an aggravated term of twenty-two years

in prison. (Id., at 24.) Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on April 2, 2012. (Id., at 28-

30.)

On appeal, as is relevant here, Petitioner’s counsel presented following issue for

review: “[a]ggravating factors must be determined by a unanimous verdict. The jury was

given an instruction on dangerousness such that the finding might have been based on serious

physical injury, an invalid aggravator, or, alternatively, on the use of a gun, a valid

aggravator. Did the trial court err when it used on the finding of dangerousness to aggravate

the sentence?” (Doc. 7-1, at 33.) In other words, counsel argued that, because the jury, in

finding dangerousness, did not distinguish whether its finding was based upon serious

physical injury or the use of a gun, there was no unanimous finding on a valid sentencing

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aggravator. On April 16, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision

affirming her conviction and sentence after finding that the erroneous dangerous-offense

instruction was harmless:

In Arizona, the “presumptive sentence is the ‘statutory maximum,’”

unless the facts necessary to support an aggravated sentence have been found.

State v. Anderson (Anderson II), 211 Ariz. 59, 60 ¶3, 116 P.3d 1219, 1220

(2005). Any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the presumptive

term must be submitted to the jury and proved by the State beyond a

reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).

Moreover, the jury must unanimously agree on such an aggravating factor.

State v. Anderson (Anderson I), 210 Ariz. 327, 355, ¶126, 111 P.3d 369, 397

(2005).

Here, Davis was convicted of second degree murder, a Class 1 felony

with a presumptive term of imprisonment of sixteen years and a maximum

term of twenty-two years. A.R.S. §13-710(A) (2010). The court used the

jury’s dangerous finding to impose the maximum term. The definition of

“dangerous offense” provided to the jury, however, included two distinct

prongs: the offense involved either (1) the intentional or knowing infliction of

serious physical injury, or (2) the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of

a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.

Davis argues and the State concedes that the court could not use the

first “legally deficient prong” to aggravate Davis’s sentence because serious

physical injury is an essential element of second degree murder. See A.R.S.

§13-701(D)(1) (infliction of serious physical injury constitutes an aggravating

circumstance “except if this circumstance is an essential element of the offense

of conviction . . .”). The State maintains that the inclusion of that prong in the

instruction to the jury was merely harmless error “because no reasonable jury

could have failed to find that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of

the offense.” We agree with the State. . . . “A violation of the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement with regard

to sentencing factors may constitute harmless error if no reasonable jury would

fail to find the factor’s existence beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.

Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, 227, ¶30, 99 P.3d 35, 42 (App. 2004); see

also State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 183 ¶¶71-72, 149 P.3d 950, 966 (2006)

(even absent a jury finding as to the existence of any aggravators, the court’s

imposition of an aggravated sentence is harmless error “if no reasonable jury,

on the basis of the evidence before it, could have failed to find the minimum

number of aggravators necessary to expose the defendant to the sentence

imposed”), State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 560 ¶79, 65 P.3d 941 (2003) (“In

those instances in which no reasonable jury could find that the [S]tate failed

to prove [the aggravating factor] beyond a reasonable doubt, we will find

harmless error affecting that factor.”). Here, the evidence recounted above

clearly demonstrated that Davis used a deadly weapon in committing the

murder. The medical examiner’s testimony also made clear that the victim

was killed by multiple gunshot wounds. No reasonable jury could find that

State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense involved the

use of a deadly weapon, the proper prong of the dangerous offense instruction

submitted to the jury. We therefore affirm the superior court’s application of

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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the jury’s dangerous finding to aggravate Davis’s sentence pursuant to A.R.S.

§701(D)(2).

(Doc. 7-1, at 57-60.)

Petitioner did not file a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 7-1,

at 51.) On June 24, 2013, Petitioner timely filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”),

and appointed counsel raised one claim, that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial

counsel when trial counsel failed to retain an expert to address the “cycle of domestic

violence,” and its impact on Petitioner and her “state of mind and defense.” (Docs. 7-1, at

63-68; 7-2, at 3.) On July 22, 2014, the trial court denied relief on the merits. (Doc. 7-2, at

31-33.)

Petitioner filed the instant, timely, habeas petition on September 5, 2014, in which she

asserts the same claim, discussed above, that she raised on direct appeal: that because the

trial court gave a duplicitous, dangerous-offense instruction in that it included two distinct

theories the jury could have used to find the offense was dangerous (serious physical injury

and use of a deadly weapon), there was no unanimous jury finding of dangerousness that

would support aggravating Petitioner’s sentence, as under the Arizona statutory sentencing

scheme “serious physical injury” could not be used as an aggravating factor. Petitioner

claims this error violated her Sixth Amendment right, as set forth in Blakely v. Washington,

542 U.S. 296 (2004), to have her sentencing aggravator found by a unanimous jury. (Doc.

1, at 11-12.) Respondents concede that Petitioner has exhausted her claim, but assert that her

claim fails on the merits.

DISCUSSION

Under the AEDPA2

, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the State court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

"When applying these standards, the federal court should review the 'last reasoned decision'

by a state court ...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation

omitted).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,"

or (2) "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent." Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an

'unreasonable application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation omitted).

In determining whether or not a faulty jury instruction supports habeas relief, “an

appellate court first considers whether the error in the challenged instruction, if any,

amounted to ‘constitutional error.’” Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 826, 833 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citing Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998)). If constitutional error is found, then

the harmless-error test set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), is applied to

determine whether the petitioner is entitled to habeas relief. Morris, 273 F.3d at 833. “Under

Brecht, an instructional error is prejudicial and habeas relief is appropriate only if, after

reviewing the record as a whole,[the appellate court] conclude[s] that there was a substantial

and injurious effect on the verdict, or if [the appellate court is] ‘left in grave doubt’ as to

whether there was such an effect.” Pulido v. Chrones, 629 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010)

(citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.750, 765 (1946). As a result, habeas relief may

only be granted if Petitioner affirmatively establishes that, as a result of the instructional

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error, she suffered “actual prejudice” – that is, the error caused her trial to be fundamentally

unfair. Brecht, 507 U.S. 637.

In the instant case, the jury instruction left it unclear whether or not the unanimous

jury, when finding that the offense was dangerous, determined that the offense involved the

intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury, or the discharge, use or

threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. The State conceded on

direct appeal that, because the first prong of the instruction - serious physical injury - was an

essential element of the offense, it could not be used to enhance Petitioner’s sentence. See

A.R.S. §13-701(D)(1) (infliction of serious physical injury constitutes an aggravating

circumstance “except if this circumstance is an essential element of the offense ...”). Thus,

even though the second prong of the instruction - the deadly weapon prong - is a valid

sentence aggravator, constitutional error occurred when the trial court relied on the

ambiguous dangerousness finding to impose an aggravated sentence. See Blakely, 542 U.S.

313-14 (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to unanimously find, beyond a

reasonable doubt, any aggravating circumstances that are used to increase a defendant’s

sentence).

Petitioner was not prejudiced, however, by the erroneous jury instruction, as it did not

have a substantial and injurious effect on her trial. As the appellate court noted, no

reasonable jury could have failed to find that Petitioner used a deadly weapon when she

killed the victim. The uncontroverted evidence proved that the victim died from “a minimum

of five and maximum of seen bullet wounds from the .22-caliber Ruger pistol,” which was

found hidden in the apartment where Petitioner was detained by police. Thus, in finding

Petitioner guilty of the murder, the jury necessarily found that Petitioner used a deadly

weapon. No reasonable jury could have failed to find that the victim was killed by multiple

shots from the .22-caliber Ruger pistol. The state court’s conclusion in this regard was based

on a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding.

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Furthermore, the state court’s determination of harmless error was not contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court. See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006) (holding that

Blakely error is subject to harmless error review); see also Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 773-

74 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a trial court’s failure to obtain a unanimous finding

concerning the defendant’s use of a firearm during an offense is subject to harmless error

review). Petitioner does not allege or establish that she was prejudiced by the erroneous jury

instruction, and thus Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. See, e.g., Butler v. Curry, 528

F.3d 624, 648 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that a Sixth Amendment violation is harmless, and a

habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief, if the jury “would have found the relevant

aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt”).

Thus, the state court’s decision on Petitioner’s erroneous jury instruction claim was

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court, or based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s habeas petition claim fails on its merits. Wherefore, this Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed

with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 31st day of March, 2015.

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