Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02494/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02494-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125la Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HYLETE, INC., a Delaware 

corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

HYBRID ATHLETICS, LLC, a 

Connecticut limited liability 

company; and ROBERT 

ORLANDO, an individual,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-02494-WQH-AGS

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matters pending before the Court are the Motion to File Documents Under Seal 

filed by Defendants Hybrid Athletics, LLC and Robert Orlando (ECF No. 15); the Motion 

to Dismiss and the Motion to Strike filed by Defendants Hybrid Athletics, LLC and Robert 

Orlando (ECF No. 17); and the Motion to File Documents Under Seal filed by Plaintiff 

Hylete, Inc. (ECF No. 19).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 30, 2019, Plaintiff Hylete, Inc. commenced this action by filing a 

Complaint against Defendants Hybrid Athletics, LLC (“HA”) and Robert Orlando. (ECF 

No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “embarked on a plan to destroy and/or disrupt 

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[Plaintiff]’s business and maliciously disparage [Plaintiff] to drive it from the 

marketplace.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

unlawfully interfered with [Plaintiff]’s business by publishing false and 

misleading statements about [Plaintiff] and [Plaintiff]’s products, making 

false statements to [Plaintiff]’s customers and potential customers, interfering 

with [Plaintiff]’s business relationships and [Plaintiff]’s fundraising efforts, 

and fraudulently obtaining trademark registrations (including a registration 

for a mark [Defendant] Orlando admitted he copied from another entity and a 

mark that he admitted is descriptive and generic). 

Id.

Plaintiff brings the following six causes of action: (1) fraudulent procurement of 

U.S. Trademark Registration No. 4,609,469 (“‘469 Registration”) against Defendant HA; 

(2) cancellation of the ‘469 Registration (fraud) against Defendant HA; (3) violation of 

Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (false advertising) against Defendants HA and Orlando; 

(4) violation of California Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professional Code § 

17200 (unfair methods of competition and unfair/deceptive/unlawful acts or practices) 

against Defendants HA and Orlando; (5) violation of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices 

Act (unfair methods of competition and unfair/deceptive acts or practices) against 

Defendants HA and Orlando; and (6) tortious interference with prospective economic 

advantage against Defendants HA and Orlando. See id. at 18-27. Plaintiff seeks injunctive 

relief, declaratory relief, lost profits, disgorgement of Defendants’ profits, compensatory

damages, treble damages, punitive and exemplary damages, costs, attorney’s fees, and 

“other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.” See id. at 27-28.

On February 18, 2020, Defendants filed a Motion to File Documents Under Seal. 

(ECF No. 15). On the same day, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss all six of Plaintiff’s 

claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and a Motion to Strike 

Plaintiff’s fourth, fifth, and sixth claims pursuant to California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute, Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16. (ECF No. 17). On March 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion to 

File Documents Under Seal. (ECF No. 19). On the same day, Plaintiff filed a Response 

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in opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike. (ECF No. 21). On 

March 16, 2020, Defendants filed a Reply. (ECF No. 22).

II. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff “is a performance apparel company specializing in sales of apparel, 

footwear, gear, and accessories for individuals who are involved in active or ‘fitness’ 

lifestyles.” (ECF No. 1 at 3-4). Defendant “Orlando is the sole owner and member of 

[Defendant] HA” and is “responsible for all aspects of [Defendant] HA’s business and 

controls 100% of the business.” Id. at 2. 

Plaintiff “promotes, advertises, offers for sale and sells products to its consumers in 

the United States, including consumers who participate in functional fitness, cross-training 

and CrossFit” through “its HYLETE brand, and its registered trademarks” “as well as other 

marks which [Plaintiff] owns and uses (the ‘Hylete Marks’) ....” Id. at 4 (emphasis in 

original). Plaintiff “has expended significant time and resources in building a successful 

brand with an excellent reputation and goodwill in the industry.” Id. at 5. “As a result of 

[Plaintiff]’s efforts, [Plaintiff] and its product have become known in the industry for, 

among other things, high quality performance apparel and excellent customer service.” Id. 

After Plaintiff was formed in March 2012, Plaintiff “reached out to numerous 

microinfluencers to help build awareness for [Plaintiff]’s brand.” Id. “One such 

microinfluencer was [Defendant] Orlando.” Id. In April 2012, Plaintiff “sent [Defendant] 

Orlando mockups of the Hylete Logo Mark and Hylete Word Mark and asked [Defendant] 

Orlando if he would be interested in a co-promotion agreement.” Id. Defendant “Orlando 

declined [Plaintiff]’s offer ....” Id. 

Defendant “Orlando accused [Plaintiff] of copying [Defendants’] marks.” Id. 

Plaintiff “refuted [Defendant] Orlando’s accusations and specifically explained to 

[Defendant] Orlando why the Hylete Marks were not confusingly similar to [Defendant] 

Orlando’s or [Defendant] HA’s marks, and that [Plaintiff] did not steal any marks from 

[Defendant] HA or [Defendant] Orlando.” Id. “For years after this exchange, neither 

[Defendant] disputed [Plaintiff]’s representations.” Id. 

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“When [Defendants] declined [Plaintiff]’s offer in ... April 2012, [Defendant] 

Orlando’s popularity in the CrossFit community was rapidly declining.” Id. at 5-6. 

“Subsequent to [Defendants] declining [Plaintiff]’s offer ..., [Plaintiff] started to become 

very successful.” Id. at 6. “Upon realizing that he had missed out on a lucrative copromotion opportunity with [Plaintiff] ..., [Defendant] Orlando became angry.” Id. 

“So, [Defendants] embarked on a plan to destroy and/or disrupt [Plaintiff]’s business 

and maliciously disparage [Plaintiff] to drive it from the marketplace.” Id. Defendant 

“Orlando indicated he wanted to ‘crush those idiots,’ ‘kick[] the shit out of [Plaintiff],’ and 

was ‘happy’ to see [Plaintiff] suffer.” Id. (first alteration in original). Defendant “Orlando 

also indicated that he wanted to ‘bury’ [Plaintiff] and wanted to prevent [Plaintiff] from 

making ‘a single sale in the [CrossFit Community].’” Id. (third alteration in original). 

Defendants

unlawfully interfered with [Plaintiff]’s business by publishing false and 

misleading statements about [Plaintiff] and [Plaintiff]’s products, making 

false statements to [Plaintiff]’s customers and potential customers, interfering 

with [Plaintiff]’s business relationships and [Plaintiff]’s fundraising efforts, 

and fraudulently obtaining trademark registrations (including a registration 

for a mark [Defendant] Orlando admitted he copied from another entity and a 

mark that he admitted is descriptive and generic). 

Id. 

“For example, beginning in ... 2013 and continuing to the present time, [Defendants] 

have told (and directed [Defendant] HA’s employees to tell) [Plaintiff]’s customers and 

[Plaintiff]’s potential customers that [Plaintiff] stole and/or copied [Defendant] HA’s 

trademarks, to boycott [Plaintiff] and to not buy [Plaintiff]’s products.” Id. “Beginning in 

... 2013 and continuing for several years thereafter, [Defendants] posted statements on 

social media stating that [Plaintiff] stole and/or copied [Defendant] HA’s trademarks, and 

directing readers to boycott [Plaintiff] and not buy [Plaintiff]’s products.” Id. at 7. 

“Beginning in ... 2013 and continuing until at least 2018, [Defendants] told (and directed 

[Defendants] HA’s employees to tell) [Plaintiff]’s customers in Connecticut that [Plaintiff] 

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stole and/or copied [Defendant] HA’s trademarks, to boycott [Plaintiff] and to not buy 

[Plaintiff]’s products.” Id. 

“During a CrossFit event in 2013, [Defendants] told CrossFit that [Plaintiff] stole 

and/or copied [Defendant] HA’s trademarks and told CrossFit to ban [Plaintiff] from all 

CrossFit events.” Id. at 6-7. “CrossFit subsequently banned [Plaintiff] from all CrossFit 

events.” Id. at 7. Defendant “Orlando indicated that he was happy to see [Plaintiff] suffer 

as a result of [Plaintiff] being banned from CrossFit events and that it ‘felt good.’” Id. 

“On January 30, 2013, [Plaintiff] filed its application to register is [Hylete Logo] 

[M]ark ... for use on ... ‘[a]thletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, shorts, jackets, footwear, 

hats and caps.’” Id. at 5. “On October 16, 2013, [Defendant] HA filed a Notice of 

Opposition to [Plaintiff]’s application.” Id. Defendants “coordinated with CrossFit to 

oppose [Plaintiff]’s application to register [Plaintiff]’s Logo Mark based on [Defendant] 

HA’s fraudulent ‘H’ logo trademark application.” Id. at 7. 

“In 2015, [Defendants] coordinated with CrossFit to interfere with [Plaintiff]’s 

fundraising efforts by falsely telling a potential [Plaintiff] investor that [Plaintiff] engaged 

in ‘flagrant theft’ of [Defendant] HA’s trademarks.” Id. “The potential investor did not 

ultimately invest in [Plaintiff].” Id. Defendant “Orlando and CrossFit made similar 

statements to other potential investors in [Plaintiff].” Id. 

Defendants “have alleged that CrossFit is and was at all relevant times [Defendants’] 

attorneys.” Id. 

Defendants’ “statements that [Plaintiff] stole and/or copied [Defendant] HA’s 

trademarks were false, misleading and injurious.” Id. First, Defendant HA “had no valid 

protectable trademark rights in the purported HA trademarks.” Id. 

[Defendant] Orlando ... conceded in a recent deposition that he copied the 

‘Hybrid’ mark from someone else, that the purported HYBRID ATHLETICS 

mark merely described [Defendant] HA’s services, that the purported 

HYBRID ATHLETICS mark is generic for [Defendant] HA’s services, and 

that numerous third parties have used and are using the identical marks or 

similar marks and, that for over ten years, [Defendant] HA failed to police any 

such third party uses.

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Id. at 7-8 (emphasis in original).

“Second, even if [Defendant] HA had any protectable rights in the purported HA 

trademarks, the statement that [Plaintiff] stole and/or copied [Defendant] HA’s trademarks 

is false.” Id. at 8. “[Plaintiff]’s principal Ron Wilson independently created the Hylete 

Word Mark and Hylete Logo Mark in good faith and did not steal or copy them from 

[Defendant] HA or any other entity.” Id. “[B]efore adopting the Hylete Word Mark and 

the Hylete Logo Mark, ... Wilson conducted online searches and searches of the [U.S. 

Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)] trademark database to make sure no other 

entities were using any marks that could be confusingly similar to the Hylete Logo Mark 

or the Hylete Word Mark.” Id. “At the time ... Wilson created the Hylete Marks in March 

2012, he was not aware of any of [Defendant] HA’s purported trademarks and was not 

even aware of [Defendant] HA.” Id. 

Defendants’ “strategic plan to harm [Plaintiff] is further evidenced by the timing of 

[Defendants’] trademark applications.” Id. at 9. Defendants “only applied to register 

[Defendant] HA’s marks after [Plaintiff] applied to register the Hylete Word Mark and 

Logo Mark.” Id. “And, in doing so, [Defendants] committed fraud on the USPTO ....” 

Id.

“On July 28, 2010, [Defendant] Orlando filed a trademark application ... for a mark 

that is essentially identical to ... the mark reflected in the U.S. Trademark Registration No. 

4480850 and the much-later issued ... ‘469 Registration.” Id. at 9-10. Defendant “Orlando 

filed this application for the [essentially identical] mark ... for use on ... ‘[s]hirts, athletic 

equipment, athletic training, and [athletic] programming.’” Id. at 10 (fifth alteration in 

original). “On November 6, 2010, the USPTO issued an Office Action rejecting 

[Defendant] Orlando’s application ....” Id. “On May 16, 2011, the USPTO issued another 

Office Action maintaining its denial of [Defendant] Orlando’s application ....” Id. at 11. 

On December 19, 2011, after no “further action from [Defendant] Orlando, the USPTO 

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issued its Notice of Abandonment of the application ....” Id. Defendant “Orlando did not 

continue prosecuting the [r]ejected [a]pplication after the Notice of Abandonment.” Id. 

“On July 2, 2013, [Defendant] Orlando filed a trademark application ... for the mark 

HYBRID ATHLETICS ... for use on ... ‘[c]onducting fitness classes; [h]ealth club 

services, namely, providing instruction and equipment in the field of physical exercise; 

[p]ersonal fitness training services and consultancy; [and] [p]hysical fitness instruction.’” 

Id. at 13 (emphasis in original). “On October 25, 2013, the USPTO issued an Office Action 

rejecting the application for the HYBRID ATHLETICS ... mark for being merely 

descriptive of the services offered.” Id. at 14 (emphasis in original). On May 9, 2014, the 

USPTO again issued an Office Action rejecting [Defendant] HA’s claims that the HYBRID 

ATHLETICS mark had acquired distinctiveness.” Id. (emphasis in original). On April 21, 

2015, “the USPTO finally allowed the application to register ....” Id. at 15. 

“Throughout the application process [for the HYBRID ATHLETICS mark], 

[Defendant] Orlando (individually and on [Defendant] HA’s behalf) made false 

representations of material fact in a deliberate attempt to mislead the USPTO.” Id. at 14.

In his July 2, 2013 application, [Defendant] Orlando declared that “no other 

person, firm, corporation, or association has the right to use the [HYBRID 

ATHLETICS] mark in commerce, either in the identical form thereof or in 

such near resemblance thereto as to be likely, when used on or in connection 

with the goods/services of such other person, to cause confusion, or to cause 

mistake, or to deceive...”. 

Id. (second and third alteration and emphasis in original). 

In his November 10, 2014 declaration, [Defendant] Orlando declared that 

HYBRID ATHLETICS “is recognized in the trade and by consumers as 

[Assignee HA’s] trademark, and as exclusively indicating [Assignee HA’s] 

products and services.”

Id. at 14-15 (second and third alteration and emphasis in original). 

These were each false representations of fact and [Defendant] Orlando knew 

that the representations were false at least because [Defendant] Orlando has 

admitted that he copied the ‘Hybrid’ mark from another entity and 

[Defendant] Orlando was aware of other entities using the identical or similar 

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marks, at least based on the prior filed applications the USPTO notified him 

of ....

Id. at 15. “Moreover, [Defendant] Orlando testified that he believes that HYLETE is 

confusingly similar to HYBRID ATHLETICS, and [Defendant] Orlando was aware of 

[Plaintiff]’s substantial use of the HYLETE mark since 2012.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

“The misrepresentations were also material at least because the USPTO would not have 

allowed the application if the applicant could not prove acquired distinctiveness through 

substantially exclusive use.” Id. 

On February 21, 2014, Defendant “HA filed [a] trademark application ... for the 

[“H” logo] mark ... for use on ... ‘[b]ottoms; [h]eadwear; [and] [t]ops.’” Id. “[I]n reliance 

on the statements and representations of [Defendant] HA and/or [Defendant] HA’s 

attorney[,] [sic] the USPTO allowed [Defendant] HA’s application to register the [“H”

logo] mark (the ‘469 Registration) on September 23, 2014.” Id. at 17.

Defendant “HA claimed to have first used the [“H” logo] mark generally as of 

December 31, 2008 and to have first used the [“H” logo] mark in commerce as of December 

31, 2008.” Id. at 16. Defendant “HA also claimed that on the filing date, the [“H” logo] 

mark was ‘now in such use in commerce.’” Id. Defendant “HA knew that the [“H” logo] 

mark was not in use in commerce as of December 31, 2008” because, “in the July 28, 2010 

[r]ejected [a]pplication, [Defendant] Orlando declared that the [essentially identical] mark 

was first used in commerce on March 30, 2010 – not December 31, 2008.” Id. In an action 

brought by Defendant HA against Plaintiff for infringement of the ‘469 Registration1, 

Defendant “HA has not been able to provide any documentation to support its contention 

that it first used the [“H” logo] mark with bottoms, headwear or tops prior to December 31, 

2008.” Id. at 16-17. Defendant “HA has admitted that, about a year or two ago, it 

 

1 The Complaint alleges that Defendant HA filed suit against Plaintiff in the District of Connecticut on 

October 23, 2017 “alleging, among other things, infringement of ... the ‘469 Registration ... based on 

[Plaintiff]’s marketing and sales of apparel hearing the Hylete Marks.” (ECF No. 1 at 18). 

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intentionally deleted electronic documents dated prior to 2011 ....” Id. at 17. Defendant 

HA “has also stated that bottoms were sold ‘after December 31, 2008.’” Id. 

In Defendant HA’s February 21, 2014 application for the “H” logo mark, Defendant 

“Orlando declared, on [Defendant] HA’s behalf, that ‘no other person, firm, corporation, 

or association has the right to use the mark in commerce, either in the identical form thereof 

or in such near resemblance thereto as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the 

goods/services of such other person, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 

deceive...’.” Id. (second alteration in original). “This was a false representation of fact 

and [Defendant] Orlando knew that the representation was false at least because 

[Defendant] Orlando was informed by the USPTO, in relation to his [r]ejected [a]pplication 

filed on July 28, 2010, that the [essentially identical] mark was likely to be confused with 

Blocking Registration No. 3656042 ....” Id. Defendant “HA did not argue against the 

likelihood of confusion refusal, and instead attempted to amend the drawing of its mark to 

differentiate it from Blocking Registration No. 3656042 ... by adding HYBRID 

ATHLETICS.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

a. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a) provides that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ....” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a lack of a cognizable legal 

theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “All allegations of material fact are taken as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Thompson v. Davis, 295 

F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

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“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)) (alteration in original). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court 

must accept as true all “well-pleaded factual allegations ....” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 679 (2009). However, a court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell 

v. Golden St. Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “In sum, for 

a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and 

reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling 

the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

b. Statutes of Limitations (Claims 1-6)

Defendants contend that all six of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by statutes of 

limitations or laches. Defendants contend that the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s first 

claim (fraudulent procurement of the ‘469 Registration), second claim (cancellation of the 

‘469 Registration), and fifth claim (violation of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act) is 

three years. Defendants contend that the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s third claim 

(violation of Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)) is presumed to be three years. Defendants 

contend that the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s fourth claim (violation of California 

Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professional Code § 17200) is four years. 

Defendants contend that the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s sixth claim (tortious 

interference with prospective economic advantage) is two years. Defendants assert that all 

of the statements Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint were made over four years ago.

Plaintiff contends that its first and second claims do not have a statute of limitations. 

Plaintiff contends that the remaining four claims are not time barred. Plaintiff asserts that 

Defendants fail to identify an allegation in the Complaint that demonstrates that the claims 

are time barred. Plaintiff asserts that the Complaint alleges that the actionable statements 

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occurred recently. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have admitted to deleting potentially 

relevant documents. Plaintiff asserts that it was prevented from discovering some 

statements until recently because Defendants have improperly designated documents as 

confidential or for attorneys’ eyes only and withheld documents. 

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff seeks “remedies for the fraudulent procurement 

of ... the ‘469 Registration ... pursuant to Section 38 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1120” 

and “cancellation of the ‘469 Registration pursuant to section 37 of the Lanham Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 1119 ....” (ECF No. 1 at 2) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Complaint 

further alleges that Plaintiff seeks “remedies for false advertising under the Lanham Act,” 

“for violations of the California Unfair Competition Law,” “for violations of the 

Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act,” and “for intentional interference with [Plaintiff]’s 

prospective economic advantage.” Id.

“The Lanham Act contains no explicit statute of limitations.” Jarrow Formulas, Inc. 

v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “When a federal 

statute lacks a specific statute of limitations, we generally presume that Congress intended 

to ‘borrow’ the limitations period from the most closely analogous action under state law.” 

Id. (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals applies California’s three-year fraud statute 

of limitations to Lanham Act claims. See e.g., id. at 838 (“[T]he analogous limitations 

period is California's period for fraud, which is three years.”); Karl Storz Endoscopy Am., 

Inc. v. Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 857 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Lanham Act claims are 

subject to a three-year statute of limitations ....”). The Court of Appeals has stated that the 

three-year fraud statute begins to run upon the claimant’s “actual or constructive knowledge 

of the wrong.” Karl, 285 F.3d at 857 (citations omitted). 

The California Unfair Competition Law states that “[a]ny action to enforce any cause 

of action pursuant to this chapter shall be commenced within four years after the cause of 

action accrued.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208. The Court of Appeals has stated that 

“the four-year statute of limitations beg[i]n[s] to run on the date the cause of action accrued, 

not on the date of discovery.” Karl, 285 F.3d at 857 (citing id.). 

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The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act states that “[a]n action under this section 

may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter.” 

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(f). The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that the Act’s 

three-year limitation period is triggered upon the occurrence of the alleged violation, not 

the discovery of the alleged practice. See Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204, 212 

(1988) (“In construing our general tort statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-577, 

which allows an action to be brought within three years ‘from the date of the act or omission 

complained of,’ we have concluded that the history of that legislative choice of language 

precludes any construction thereof delaying the start of the limitation period until the cause 

of action has accrued or the injury has occurred.”). 

The Court of Appeals has stated that claims for “tortious interference with 

prospective economic advantage” pursuant to California law are subject to a “two-year 

statute of limitations ....” Jun-En Enter. v. Lin, 654 F. App’x 347, 347-48 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 339(1)). The accrual of the statute of limitations is 

“postpone[d] ... until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” 

Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal. 4th 383, 397 (1999) (citations omitted). “[W]e look to 

whether the plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured 

them.” Fox v. Ethicon Endo–Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 807 (2005). “So long as a 

suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot wait for the 

facts to find her.” Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1111 (1988).

The Complaint alleges that Defendant “HA filed [a] trademark application ... for the 

[“H” logo] mark ... for use on ... ‘[b]ottoms; [h]eadwear; [and] [t]ops’” on February 21, 

2014. (ECF No. 1 at 15). The Complaint alleges that Defendant “HA falsely declared 

and/or omitted material facts when it stated in [the] [t]rademark [a]pplication ... that the 

[“H” logo] mark in the ‘469 Registration had been used on bottoms, headwear, and/or tops 

by December 31, 2008.” Id. at 18, 20. The Complaint alleges that Defendant HA “knew 

that [it] had not used the mark in the ‘469 Registration on bottoms, headwear and tops by 

December 31, 2008” “[a]t the time of filing the ... trademark application ....” Id. at 18, 20. 

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The Complaint alleges that “the USPTO allowed [Defendant] HA’s application to register 

the [“H” logo] mark (the ‘469 Registration) on September 23, 2014.” Id. at 17. The 

Complaint alleges that “but for the misrepresentations and/or omissions of fact about the 

December 31, 2008 date of first use, the USPTO would not have issued the ‘469 

Registration ....” Id. at 19, 20. 

The Court applies California’s three-year fraud statute of limitations to Lanham Act

claims, which begins to run upon the claimant’s “actual or constructive knowledge of the 

wrong.” Karl, 285 F.3d at 857 (citations omitted). On February 21, 2014, Defendant HA 

filed the allegedly fraudulent trademark application with the false declaration and/or 

omission of material facts. See ECF No. 1 at 15, 18, 20. If the Court utilizes February 21, 

2014 as the date when Plaintiff attained “actual or constructive knowledge of” Defendant 

HA’s fraudulent application, then Plaintiff was required to file its first and second claims 

pursuant to the Lanham Act by February 21, 2017. Karl, 285 F.3d at 857 (citations omitted). 

On September 23, 2014, the USPTO accepted Defendant HA’s allegedly fraudulent 

trademark application and the ‘469 Registration was registered. See ECF No. 1 at 17. If 

the Court utilizes September 23, 2014 as the date when Plaintiff attained “actual or 

constructive knowledge of” Defendant HA’s fraudulent application, then Plaintiff was 

required to file its first and second claims pursuant to the Lanham Act by September 23, 

2017. Karl, 285 F.3d at 857 (citations omitted). Plaintiff fails to allege that it attained 

“actual or constructive knowledge of” Defendants’ allegedly fraudulent application at a 

later date. Id. (citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff filed the Complaint on December 

30, 2019. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s first and second claims are untimely.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants “have made false and misleading statements 

of fact regarding [Plaintiff] and [Plaintiff]’s products in interstate commerce in this District”

in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). (ECF No. 1 at 21). The Complaint 

alleges that “[t]hese statements actually deceive, or have a tendency to deceive, a substantial 

segment of [Plaintiff]’s customers or potential customers by causing them to believe that 

[Plaintiff] stole [Defendant] HA’s purported trademarks and applied them to [Plaintiff]’s 

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products.” Id. The Complaint alleges that Defendants’ “false and misleading advertising 

statements and omissions injured [Plaintiff] by damaging its business reputation among 

consumers and harming its commercial interests in sales.” Id. 

The Complaint alleges that Defendants “have engaged in unlawful, unfair and/or 

fraudulent business acts or practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising 

in the conduct of trade or commerce” in violation of California Unfair Competition Law, 

Business and Professional Code § 17200. Id. at 22. The Complaint alleges that Defendants 

“have engaged in unfair methods of competition and unfair acts or deceptive acts or 

practices in the conduct of trade or commerce” in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade 

Practices Act. Id. at 24. 

The Complaint alleges that Defendants “made false and misleading statements about 

[Plaintiff] and [Plaintiff]’s products in such manner as to imply business dishonesty and 

substandard product performance, including untrue statements that [Plaintiff] stole and/or 

copied [Defendant] HA’s purported trademarks and applied them to [Plaintiff]’s products 

and that [Plaintiff] engaged in unethical business practices.” Id. at 22-23, 24. The 

Complaint alleges that Defendants “coordinated with CrossFit to interfere with [Plaintiff]’s 

fundraising efforts by falsely telling a potential investor in [Plaintiff] that [Plaintiff] engaged 

in ‘flagrant theft’ of [Defendant] HA’s trademarks.” Id. at 23, 24. The Complaint alleges 

that Defendants and Defendant “HA’s employees/coaches intentionally, falsely and 

maliciously made disparaging comments about [Plaintiff] and [Plaintiff]’s products.” Id. at 

23, 24-25.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants “have made and published injurious and 

disparaging statements about [Plaintiff] and [Plaintiff]’s products in such a manner as to 

imply business dishonest and substandard business performance, including untrue 

statements that [Plaintiff] stole and/or copied [Defendant] HA’s purported trademarks and 

applied them to [Plaintiff]’s products and that [Plaintiff] engaged in unethical business 

practices.” Id. at 26. The Complaint alleges that Defendants “made these false and 

misleading statements to [Plaintiff]’s actual customers, [Plaintiff]’s potential customers, 

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[Plaintiff]’s actual and potential customers in the CrossFit community, on social media, 

including Facebook, and to [Plaintiff]’s potential investors, knowing that the statements 

were misleading and deceptive, for the improper purpose of disparaging [Plaintiff] and 

[Plaintiff]’s products and interfering with [Plaintiff]’s business relationship with these 

parties by encouraging them to discontinue their business with [Plaintiff].” Id.

The Complaint alleges that 

[B]eginning in or around 2013 and continuing to the present time, 

[Defendants] have told (and directed [Defendant] HA’s employees to tell) 

[Plaintiff]’s customers and [Plaintiff]’s potential customers that [Plaintiff] 

stole and/or copied [Defendant] HA’s trademarks, to boycott [Plaintiff] and 

to not buy [Plaintiff]’s products.... Beginning in or around 2013 and 

continuing for several years thereafter, [Defendants] posted statements on 

social media stating that [Plaintiff] stole and/or copied [Defendant] HA’s 

trademarks, and directing readers to boycott [Plaintiff] and not buy 

[Plaintiff]’s products. Beginning in in or around 2013 and continuing until at 

least 2018, [Defendants] told (and directed [Defendants] HA’s employees to 

tell) [Plaintiff]’s customers in Connecticut that [Plaintiff] stole and/or copied 

[Defendant] HA’s trademarks, to boycott [Plaintiff] and to not buy 

[Plaintiff]’s products.

Id. at 6-7. The Complaint further alleges that 

During a CrossFit event in 2013, [Defendants] told CrossFit that [Plaintiff] 

stole and/or copied [Defendant] HA’s trademarks and told CrossFit to ban 

[Plaintiff] from all CrossFit events. CrossFit subsequently banned [Plaintiff] 

from all CrossFit events. [Defendant] Orlando indicated that he was happy to 

see [Plaintiff] suffer as a result of [Plaintiff] being banned from CrossFit 

events and that it “felt good.” 

Id. at 6-7. The Complaint further alleges that

In 2015, [Defendants] coordinated with CrossFit to interfere with [Plaintiff]’s 

fundraising efforts by falsely telling a potential [Plaintiff] investor that 

[Plaintiff] engaged in ‘flagrant theft’ of [Defendant] HA’s trademarks. The 

potential investor did not ultimately invest in [Plaintiff]. On information and 

belief, [Defendants] made similar statements to other potential investors in 

[Plaintiff].

Id. at 7. 

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The Court applies California’s three-year fraud statute of limitations to Lanham Act 

claims, which begins to run upon the claimant’s “actual or constructive knowledge of the 

wrong.” Karl, 285 F.3d at 857 (citations omitted). If the Court utilizes 2013 as the year 

when Plaintiff attained “actual or constructive knowledge of” Defendants’ allegedly false 

and misleading statements, then Plaintiff was required to file its third claim pursuant to the 

Lanham Act by 2016. Karl, 285 F.3d at 857 (citations omitted). Plaintiff fails to allege that 

it attained “actual or constructive knowledge of” Defendants’ allegedly false and misleading 

statements at a later date. Id. (citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff filed the Complaint 

on December 30, 2019. Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants’ false and misleading 

statements “continu[e] to the present time,” “continu[ed] for several years” after 2013, and 

“continu[ed] until at least 2018” are conclusory and do not satisfy the three-year statute of 

limitations requirement. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7). The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s third 

claim is untimely. 

Claims pursuant to the California Unfair Competition Law are subject to a four-year 

statute of limitations, which “beg[i]n[s] to run on the date the cause of action accrued, not 

on the date of discovery.” Karl, 285 F.3d at 857 (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208). 

If the Court utilizes 2013 as the year when “the cause of action accrued,” then Plaintiff was 

required to file its fourth claim pursuant to the California Unfair Competition Law by 2017. 

Id. (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208). In this case, Plaintiff filed the Complaint on 

December 30, 2019. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s fourth claim is untimely.

Claims pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act are subject to a threeyear statute of limitations, which begins to run “from the date of the act or omission 

complained of ....” Fichera, 207 Conn. at 212. If the Court utilizes 2013 as the year for 

“the date of the act or omission complained of,” then Plaintiff was required to file its fifth

claim pursuant to the California Unfair Competition Law by 2016. Id. In this case, Plaintiff 

filed the Complaint on December 30, 2019. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s fifth claim 

is untimely.

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Claims for “tortious interference with prospective economic advantage” pursuant to 

California law are subject to a “two-year statute of limitations,” which begins when “the 

plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.” Jun-En, 654 F. App’x at 

347-48 (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 339(1)); Norgart, 21 Cal. 4th at 389 (citations 

omitted). If the Court utilizes 2013 as the year when Plaintiff “discover[ed], or ha[d] reason 

to discover, the cause of action,” then Plaintiff was required to file its sixth claim pursuant 

to the California Unfair Competition Law by 2015. Norgart, 21 Cal. 4th at 389 (citations 

omitted). Plaintiff fails to allege that it “discover[ed], or ha[d] reason to discover, the cause 

of action” at a later date. Id. (citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff filed the Complaint 

on December 30, 2019. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s sixth claim is untimely.

c. Laches (Claims 1-6)

A laches defense is premised on the maxim that “one who seeks the help of a court 

of equity must not sleep on his rights.” Jarrow, 304 F.3d at 835 (citation omitted). To 

prevail on a laches defense, the defendant must show “that (1) [the plaintiff]’s delay in filing 

suit was unreasonable, and (2) [the defendant] would suffer prejudice caused by the delay 

if the suit were to continue.” Id. at 838 (citation omitted). 

“Courts have recognized two chief forms of prejudice in the laches context—

evidentiary and expectations-based.” Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 955 (9th 

Cir. 2001). “Evidentiary prejudice includes such things as lost, stale, or degraded evidence, 

or witnesses whose memories have faded or who have died.” Id. (citations omitted). “A 

defendant may also demonstrate prejudice by showing that it took actions or suffered 

consequences that it would not have, had the plaintiff brought suit promptly.” Id. (citation 

omitted). “A defendant may establish prejudice by showing that during the delay, it 

invested money to expand its business or entered into business transactions based on his 

presumed rights.” Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 999 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(citations omitted). A defendant “may also prove prejudice if as a result of entering into 

such business transactions during the delay, it may incur liability for damages.” Id. at 1000 

(citation omitted). Other examples of such prejudice include the defendant “chang[ing] 

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their ... distribution activities in reliance on [the plaintiff’s] conduct” or the defendant 

“continuing investments and outlays ... in connection with the operation of its business.” 

Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 955 (citations omitted). Defendants have failed to show that they 

“would suffer prejudice ... if the suit were to continue.” Jarrow, 304 F.3d at 838 (citation 

omitted). The Court concludes that Defendants’ laches defense fails. 

IV. MOTION TO FILE DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL 

Defendants request to file under seal Defendants’ Memorandum of Points & 

Authorities in Support of their Motion to Dismiss Counts 1-6 per Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

and Motion to Strike Counts 4-6 per Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 425.16. See ECF No. 15 at 2. 

Defendants further request to file under seal Exhibits 1, 13, 17, 19-24, 35, 40, 41, and 53 to 

the Kosma Declaration filed in support of Defendants’ Motions. See id. Defendants assert 

that the documents contain information designated as confidential or for attorneys’ eyes 

only pursuant to a protective order (ECF Nos. 70, 90) issued in Hybrid Athletics v. Hylete, 

Inc. et al., No. 17-cv-01767-VAB (D. Conn.). See id. The docket reflects that Plaintiff has 

not filed a response to Defendants’ Motion to File Documents Under Seal. 

Plaintiff requests to file under seal Exhibits 1, 2, and 4 to the Deonarine Declaration 

filed in support of Plaintiff’s Response in opposition. See ECF No. 19 at 2. Plaintiff asserts 

that the documents contain information designated by Defendant HA and CrossFit, Inc. as 

confidential or for attorneys’ eyes only pursuant to a protective order (ECF Nos. 70, 90) 

issued in Hybrid Athletics v. Hylete, Inc. et al., No. 17-cv-01767-VAB (D. Conn.). See id. 

The docket reflects that Defendants have not filed a response to Plaintiff’s Motion to File 

Documents Under Seal. 

“A party seeking to seal a judicial record ... bears the burden of overcoming th[e] 

strong presumption [of access to court records] by meeting the ‘compelling reasons’ 

standard.” Kamakana v. Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). Under this 

stringent standard, a court may seal records only when it finds “a compelling reason and 

articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” 

Id. at 1182 (citation omitted). What constitutes a “compelling reason” is “best left to the 

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sound discretion of the trial court ....” Nixon v. Warner Commnc’ns Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 

599 (1978). Examples include when a court record might be used to “gratify private spite 

or promote public scandal,” to circulate “libelous” statements, or “as sources of business 

information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing ....” Id. at 598-99.

The parties have shown compelling reasons that outweigh the public’s interest in 

disclosure of these materials and justify filing the documents under seal at this stage in the 

proceedings. The Motion to File Documents Under Seal filed by Defendants (ECF No. 15) 

and the Motion to File Documents Under Seal filed by Plaintiff (ECF No. 19) are 

GRANTED.

V. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Hybrid 

Athletics, LLC and Robert Orlando (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint is 

DISMISSED without prejudice. Any motion for leave to file an amended pleading must 

be filed within 30 days of this Order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike filed by Defendants Hybrid 

Athletics, LLC and Robert Orlando (ECF No. 17) is DENIED as moot. The Court does 

not address the issue of commercial speech exemption in this Order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to File Documents Under Seal filed 

by Defendants Hybrid Athletics, LLC and Robert Orlando (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to File Documents Under Seal filed 

by Plaintiff Hylete, Inc (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED.

Dated: May 21, 2020

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