Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01711/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01711-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEVONTE B. HARRIS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

KEITH HIGGINS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:08-cv-01711-LDG

ORDER

Plaintiff Devonte B. Harris is a prisoner proceeding pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The defendants move for summary judgment (#31) as to Harris’ First, Second,

and Fifth claims.1 They argue that Harris failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as

to these claims. As relevant to this motion, Harris has alleged the following in his Second

Amended Complaint: First Claim - that defendants Larry Lesane, Corey Rasmussen and

1 The Court previously dismissed Harris’ Third Claim that his due process rights

were violated on January 4, 2006. The defendants have indicated they are not seeking

summary judgment as to Harris’ Fourth Claim, in which he alleges that Defendant Higgins

used excessive force against him on January 4, 2006. In addition, the defendants have not

sought summary judgment as to Harris’ Sixth Claim–that Brown and Chastain denied him

basic human needs on February 13, 2006–because the relevant defendants were not

served and have not appeared in this action.

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Joel Carlson used excessive force against him on March 29, 2005; Second Claim - that

Lesane and defendants G. Stratton, K.M. Chastain, and B. Forsterer retaliated against him

on April 6, 2005; and Fifth Claim - that defendants J. G. Watcher, Matt Gallagher and Jose

Villanueva used excessive force against him on February 13, 2006, and that Watcher and

Defendant T. Brown retaliated against him on that same date. Harris has filed an

opposition (#34) to the motion for summary judgment.

Motion for Summary Judgment

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court performs “the threshold

inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there

are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); United States v. Arango, 670 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir.

2012). To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show (1)

the lack of a genuine issue of any material fact, and (2) that the court may grant judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986); Arango, 670 F.3d at 992.

A material fact is one required to prove a basic element of a claim. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248. The failure to show a fact essential to one element, however, "necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Additionally, “[t]he mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient.” 

United States v. $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency, 672 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after

adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “Of

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course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.” Id., at 323. As such, when the non-moving party bears the initial burden of proving,

at trial, the claim or defense that the motion for summary judgment places in issue, the

moving party can meet its initial burden on summary judgment "by 'showing'–that is,

pointing out to the district court–that there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Id., at 325. Conversely, when the burden of proof at trial rests

on the party moving for summary judgment, then in moving for summary judgment the

party must establish each element of its case.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden on summary judgment, the nonmoving party must submit facts showing a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

56(e); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir.

2000). As summary judgment allows a court "to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses," Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, the court construes the

evidence before it "in the light most favorable to the opposing party." Adickes v. S. H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The allegations or denials of a pleading, however,

will not defeat a well-founded motion. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). That is, the opposing party cannot

“‘rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading’ but must instead produce

evidence that ‘sets forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”

Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)).

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Exhaustion

A prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section

1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. §1997e(a).

Compliance with §1997e(a) is mandatory:

Once within the discretion of the district court, exhausting in cases covered by

§1997e(a) is now mandatory. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001). 

All “available” remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need not

meet federal standards, nor must they be “plain, speedy, and effective.”

[W]e hold that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all

inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or

particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other

wrong.

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); see also Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098

(9th Cir. 2002); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).

As the Supreme Court explained in Booth, when Congress amended section

1997e(a) in 1995, “the amendments eliminated . . . the discretion to dispense with

administrative exhaustion.” Booth, 532 U.S. at 739. The Court also “stress[ed] the point

. . . that [it] will not read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements

where Congress has provided otherwise.” Id. at 741 n.6. “This inference is, to say the

least, also consistent with Congress’s elimination of the requirement that administrative

procedures must satisfy certain ‘minimum acceptable standards’ of fairness and

effectiveness before inmates can be required to exhaust them, and the elimination of the

courts’ discretion to excuse exhaustion when it would not be ‘appropriate and in the

interests of justice.’” Id . at 740 n.5. In enacting the PLRA, Congress sought “to curtail

frivolous prisoners’ suits and to minimize the costs–which are borne by

taxpayers–associated with those suits.” Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir.

1999).

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The United States Supreme Court clarified the exhaustion requirement under the

PLRA in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006). In Woodford, the Supreme Court reversed

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and held that an inmate must properly exhaust

administrative remedies, including complying with the administrative time requirements,

before the inmate can file suit. Simply put, Woodford holds that inmates who fail to timely

comply with the prison’s administrative grievance procedures and complete every step in

the administrative appeal process are barred from suing on their civil rights claims. Id . at

95-96. More recently, the Supreme Court clarified the exhaustion rule further, holding that

it is the prisoner’s observance of the state’s regulations and procedures concerning its

administrative appeals process, and not the PLRA itself, that determines whether a

prisoner has properly exhausted administrative remedies. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

218 (2007).

The California Prison Appeals System

The California Code of Regulations, Title 15, §3084.1(a), Right to Appeal, states:

“Any inmate or parolee under the department's jurisdiction may appeal any departmental

decision, action, condition, or policy, which they can demonstrate as having an adverse

effect upon their welfare.” The appeals office for each prison receives all inmate

grievances (known as appeals or CDCR Form 602) submitted by inmates at the

institutional level.

In 2005 and 2006, there were four levels of appeal review: one informal and three

formal levels. Cal. Code of Regs. tit.15, §3084.5 (2006). In order to be timely, the appeal

had to be submitted within fifteen working days of the action or decision being appealed. 

Cal. Code of Regs. tit.15, §3084.6(c) (2006). During the informal level of review the

appellant and staff involved in the action or decision attempt to resolve the grievance

informally. If the inmate was not satisfied with the informal level response, he could submit

the appeal for formal review. The first formal level of review was addressed at the Division

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Head level or his/her designee. Id. If the inmate was not satisfied with the first formal-level

response, he could submit it for a second level of review. Id. The second level of review

was conducted by the Institution Head or his/her designee. If the inmate was not satisfied

with the second-level response, he could elevate the appeal to the third level of review,

conducted by the Chief of the Inmate Appeals Branch in Sacramento, California. Id. This

constituted the CDCR Director’s decision on an appeal, and completed the exhaustion

process. Id. The inmate was required to file his appeal at the next level within 15 working

days of the decision at the lower level. Id.

Appeals that met the requirements under Title 15, including providing required

supporting documents and being submitted within certain time constraints, were assigned

for response at the appropriate level. If an appeal did not meet the requirements for

processing (which can include a failure to provide required supportive documents,

submitting duplicative appeals, or a failure to meet time constraints, the appeal would be

“screened out” and returned to the inmate with written instructions on how to correct the

deficiencies, if possible.

Analysis

First Claim. The defendants have shown that Harris filed a second-level

appeal and received a decision on that appeal on May 15, 2005. Harris did not file a thirdlevel appeal within fifteen days, but instead filed the appeal on August 11, 2005. The thirdlevel appeal was screened-out as untimely.

Harris asserts that his appeal was timely and the screen-out for being untimely was

improper. Harris states that, in the decision of his second-level appeal, the reviewer stated

the matter was being referred for a Use of Force Review “and if he wasn’t satisfied with

review, Harris could appeal to the third level.” Harris asserts that the Use of Force Review

(which determined Harris’ allegations were unfounded) was not issued until July 25, 2005. 

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As such, he argues that he complied with the second-level review decision by filing his

appeal within fifteen days of the Use of Force Review decision.

Harris’ argument, and declaration, are contrary to the text of the second-level

response, which (consistent with California’s regulations) provided that he could appeal the

second-level response “within fifteen days of receipt of this response.” Accordingly,

summary judgment is appropriate as to Harris’ First Claim.

Second Claim. The defendants have shown that Harris did not submit any

appeals asserting that either Lesane or Forester retaliated against him on April 6, 2005,

Harris asserts that he did file an appeal of his retaliation claim as part of his

excessive force claim against Lesane. Harris argues that, “on August 4, 2005, in his

excessive force appeal,” he explained the retaliation that was in response to his excessive

force claim.

As noted by the defendants, Harris’ own response concedes that he did not raise his

claim in an initial appeal, but included it as part of a second-level appeal of a different

matter. On this basis, alone, summary judgment is appropriate. The defendants have

further noted that Harris failed to file a timely third-level appeal of the other matter. 

Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate as to Harris’ Second Claim.

Fifth Claim. The defendants have shown that Harris did not submit any

appeals asserting that Villanueva used excessive force against him on February 13, 2006.

Harris asserts that he appealed his excessive force claim against Villanueva, but

that his third-level appeal was improperly screened-out as untimely without first determining

whether there was a credible explanation for the delay in filing the appeal. More

specifically, he asserts that he received a response to his second-level appeal after he was

transferred to another prison and placed in administrative segregation. He states that the

earliest he could have submitted an appeal to the third level was on November 4, 2006. As

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such, he argues that the third-level screen-out as untimely was inappropriate for failing to

consider whether he had a credible explanation for the delay in filing the appeal.

The defendants have shown that the second-level appeal was sent to Harris on

June 30, 2006. They further point out that Harris does not declare when he received the

second-level response, nor does he declare that he submitted his third-level appeal within

fifteen days. Harris’ vague assertion that the earliest he could have filed his third-level

appeal was on November 4, 2006, is insufficient to establish that he filed the third-level

appeal within fifteen days of receiving his second-level decision. Accordingly, summary

judgment is appropriate as to his Fifth Claim.

Therefore, for good cause shown,

THE COURT ORDERS that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (#31) as to

Devonte Harris’ First, Second, and Fifth Claims is GRANTED.

DATED this ______ day of December, 2015.

Lloyd D. George

United States District Judge

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