Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01287/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01287-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE FRANK BARRON, Sr.,

CDCR #V-01476,

Plaintiff,

vs.

RAYMOND MADDEN, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS

ORDER

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 

EFFECT SERVICE PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

Jose Frank Barron, Sr. (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and while incarcerated at 

Centinela State Prison (“CEN”), in Imperial, California, has filed a civil rights Complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl. (ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff did not prepay the $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at 

the time of filing; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), followed by supplemental documentation in support. See ECF Nos. 

2, 4.

Case 3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 7
2

3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits 

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account 

for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

///

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

Case 3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 7
3

3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate

Statement Report as well as a Prison Certificate completed by an accounting officer at

CEN. See ECF No. 4 at 4, 6-9; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 

F.3d at 1119. These statements show that Plaintiff has carried an average monthly balance

of $73.70, had $60.34 in average monthly deposits to his account over the 6-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, and had a $5.27 available balance on 

the books at the time of filing. See ECF No. 4 at 4, 7. Based on this accounting, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and assesses his initial partial 

filing fee to be $14.74 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

However, because Plaintiff’s available balance was only $5.27 at the time of filing, 

see ECF No. 4 at 4, 7, the Court will direct the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to 

collect the initial $14.74 initial filing fee only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff’s 

account at the time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n 

no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil 

action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by 

which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 

850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a 

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to 

him when payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in this 

case must be collected by the agency having custody of the prisoner and forwarded to the 

Clerk of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

Case 3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 7
4

3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims CEN’s Warden and several California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Office of Appeals officials violated his Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights on May 29, 2018, by interpreting provisions of Title 15 of 

the California Code of Regulations in such a way as to exclude him from “immediate parole 

consideration” as a “non-violent offender” as provided by California’s Public Safety and 

Case 3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 7
5

3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Rehabilitation Act of 2016, “Proposition 57.” Id. at 3-5.2

Plaintiff claims he is “eligible for immediate parole consideration” pursuant to Cal. 

Const., Art 1, § 32(a)(1)(A), and that his “primary offense has been fulfilled.” Id. at 4-5. 

He contends Defendants’ refusal to conduct a “Non-Violent Parole Eligibility Analysis 

Process” (“NVPP”) in his case has resulted in the denial of a protected liberty interest in 

parole consideration created by Prop. 57 without due process and amounts to cruel and 

unusual punishment. Id. at 3, 5 & Ex. A. at 10-11. He seeks only injunctive relief. Id. at 7.

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint contains “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true,” to allege claims for relief that are “plausible on its face,” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and therefore, sufficient to survive the “low threshold” for 

proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 

 

2

 On November 8, 2016, the California voters approved The Public Safety and 

Rehabilitation Act of 2016—Proposition (“Prop”) 57—and it took effect the next day. 

People v. Marquez, 11 Cal. App. 5th 816, 821, 217 Cal.Rptr.3d 814 (Cal. App. 2017); Cal. 

Const., Art. II, § 10(a). Proposition 57 added Article 1, section 32 to the California 

Constitution. That section provides, in relevant part, “Parole consideration: Any person 

convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for 

parole consideration after completing the full term of his or her primary offense,” defined 

for these purposes as “the longest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any 

offense, excluding the imposition of an enhancement, consecutive sentence, or alternative 

sentence.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subds. (a)(1), (a)(1)(A).). Proposition 57 provides an 

inmate who has completed his base term with a hearing before the Board of Parole Hearings 

(Cal. Const. Art. I, Sec. 32(a)). See Herrera v. Sherman, No. 1:17-CV-386-AWI-BAM, 

2018 WL 3031547, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2018). As currently pleaded, it does not appear 

that success on the merits of Plaintiff’s alleged claims would “necessarily spell speedier 

release,” but rather only a parole consideration hearing under Prop. 57. Therefore, his 

claims may proceed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 

81, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005) (“§ 1983 remains available for procedural 

challenges where success in the action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier 

release for the prisoner ... habeas remedies do not displace § 1983 actions where success 

in the civil rights suit would not necessarily vitiate the legality of (not previously 

invalidated) state confinement.”).

Case 3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 7
6

3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1915A(b).3 See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123. 

Therefore, the Court will order the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon Defendants

on Plaintiff’s behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and 

serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he 

court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal ... if 

the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

III. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons discussed, the Court:

1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2).

2) ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $14.74 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available at 

the time this Order is executed, and to forward whatever balance remains of the full $350 

owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account 

exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY 

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4) DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 

1) and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each named

Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order, 

a certified copy of his Complaint, and the summons so that he may serve the Defendants.

Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the U.S. Marshal Form 285s

as completely and accurately as possible, include an address where each Defendant may 

 

3

 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative 

of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may 

choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 

Case 3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 7
7

3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

be served, see S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.1.c, and return them to the United States Marshal 

according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package.

5) ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon the Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to him. All 

costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).

6) ORDERS the Defendants, once served, to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint 

within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to 

“waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or 

other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte 

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a 

preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a 

“reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” defendant is required to respond); and

7) ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon the Defendants, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon 

Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document 

submitted for the Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must 

include with every original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a 

certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been 

was served on the Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. 

CivLR 5.2. Any document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with 

the Clerk, or which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants, may be 

disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2018

Case 3:18-cv-01287-GPC-NLS Document 5 Filed 08/31/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 7