Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01882/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01882-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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3 17 OCT 11 AM 9j 03

eiERK. U.S. DISTRICT COURT 4 SWTtMH DISTRICT OF CAUrOHNO

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JESSE GONZALEZ, JR., Case No.: 15cvl882-H-KSC

12 Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE: DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

13 v.

14 SCOTT KERNAN, Secretary,

Respondent. 15

16

17 Jesse Gonzalez, Jr. (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis with a First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 28.) Petitioner was convicted ofwillful, deliberate

and premeditated attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great

bodily injury causing permanent paralysis, and assault with a deadly weapon with infliction

of great bodily injury causing permanent paralysis, for which he was sentenced to life in

prison with the possibility of parole plus six years. (Id. at 1-2.) He claims his federal

constitutional rights were violated because there is insufficient evidence of deliberation

and premeditation (claim one), he received ineffective assistance of counsel (claims two

and four through eight), the jury was not allowed to view video exhibits in the jury room

during deliberations (claim three), and he was denied access to the courts because his state

habeas petitions were erroneously denied as untimely (claim nine). (IdL at 9-56.)

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1 Respondent has filed an Answer and lodged portions ofthe state court record. (ECF

Nos. 16, 37-38.) Respondent argues that the adjudication by the state court of claims one

through three, which were raised by appointed counsel on direct appeal, is neither contrary

to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (EFC No.

37-1 at 11-17.) Respondent contends that claims four through eight, which were raised on

state habeas by Petitioner proceeding pro se, are procedurally defaulted because the state

court found them to be untimely, and that claim nine is meritless. (Id. at 17-19.)

Respondent also argues that an evidentiary hearing is unwarranted. (ECF No. 37 at 3.)

Petitioner has filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 50.) He argues that claims four through

eight are not procedurally defaulted because, although the state trial and appellate courts

found them to be untimely, they were not found to be untimely by the state supreme court.

(Id. at 3.) He contends the state court adjudication of his claims is contrary to, and an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and that an evidentiary hearing

is warranted. (IdL at 3-26.) He has also filed several motions, which the Court denied as

premature and without prejudice to consideration ofthe arguments in this Report, in which

he argues that any default can be excused and the record should be expanded to include

additional portions ofthe state court record. (ECF Nos. 54, 56, 57, 60, 61.)

Forthe following reasons, the Court finds claims four through eight are procedurally

defaulted, but thatjudicial economy counsels in favor of addressing the merits ofthe claims

without determining whether Petitioner could overcome the default because they clearly

fail on their merits. The Court finds that the state court adjudication of all claims presented

in this action is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

The Court also finds an evidentiary hearing is neither necessary nor warranted, and

recommends the Petition be denied.

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26 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

27 In a two-count Third Amended Information filed in the Imperial County Superior

28 Court on July 24, 2012, Petitioner was charged with attempted willful, deliberate and

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1 premeditated murder in violation of California Penal Code §§ 187(a) and 664 (count one),

and assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code § 245(a)(1) (count two).

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Transcript [“CT”] at 269-72.) As to count one it was alleged

that Petitioner personally used a deadly weapon (a knife) and personally inflicted great

bodily injury which resulted in paralysis within the meaning ofPenal Code §§ 12022(b)(1)

& 12022.7(a)-(b). (Id.) As to count two it was alleged that Petitioner personally inflicted

great bodily injury which caused the victim to become comatose and suffer paralysis within

the meaning of Penal Code §§ 12022.7(a)-(b). (Id.)

On July 27, 2012, a jury found Petitioner guilty on both counts and returned true

findings on all the allegations. (CT 331-34.) On March 7, 2013, he was sentenced to life

in prison with the possibility of parole on count one, plus consecutive terms of five years

for the great bodily injury finding and one year for the deadly weapon finding, and had his

sentence on count two stayed. (Lodgment No. 1-A, Clerk’s Augmented Tr. at 5-8.)

Petitioner appealed, raising claims one through three presented here. (Lodgment

No. 3.) The appellate court affirmed. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Gonzalez. No. D063129,

slip op. (Cal.App.Ct. Feb. 26, 2014).) On March 24, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for

review in the state supreme court raising claims one through three here. (Lodgment No.

6.) That petition was denied with an order which stated: “The petition for review is

denied.” (Lodgment No. 7, People v, Gonzalez. No. S217429 (Cal. May 14, 2014).)

On August 3, 2015, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state superior court in

which he raised claims four through eight presented here. (Lodgment No. 8.) On August

10, 2015, he constructively filed his original habeas petition in this Court which contained

claims one through three, accompanied by a motion to stay this action while he exhausted

state court remedies as to the remaining claims. (ECF Nos. 1-2.) On September 8, 2015,

the state superior court denied Petitioner’s habeas petition on the basis that he had failed to

use the proper form, failed to explain why his petition was over a year late, and failed to

explain why his claims were not raised at trial or on appeal. (Lodgment No. 9, In re

Gonzalez. No. EHC01959, order (Cal.Sup.Ct. Sept. 8, 2015).)

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1 On February 18, 2016, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state appellate court

in which he raised the same claims presented in the trial court habeas petition, plus claim

nine raised here. (Lodgment No. 10.) The appellate court denied the petition on the basis

that it was untimely because it was filed over three years after sentencing without any

explanation for the delay, and, alternately, on the merits ofthe claims. (Lodgment No. 11,

In re Gonzalez. No. D069783, order (Cal.App.Ct. Feb. 26, 2016).)

On March 21, 2016, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state supreme court in

which he raised claims fourthrough nine presented here. (Lodgment No. 12.) That petition

was denied on June 8,2016, with an order which stated: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus

denied.” (Lodgment No. 13, In re Gonzalez. No. S233162, order (Cal. June 8, 2016).)

On June 13, 2016, this Court denied as moot Petitioner’s motion for stay and

abeyance because he had completed exhaustion ofhis state court remedies while the motion

was pending. (ECF No. 27.) Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition, the operative

pleading in this action, on June 20, 2016. (ECF No. 28.) He thereafter filed a motion for

opposition to any default, and motions to expand the record and lodge additional portions

of the state court record. (ECF Nos. 54, 56, 57, 60.) On July 27, 2017, the Court denied

the motions as premature, indicating that the arguments and requests made in those motions

would be addressed in this Report, which the Court does below. (ECF No. 61.)

II. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Lance Hicks testified that he is the owner of the Hard Luck Tavern in El Centro,

California. (Lodgment No. 2, Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 153-54.) He was working there on

Christmas day, 2010, when, around closing time, about 2:00 a.m., three men, one of whom

he identified in court as Petitioner, entered the tavern, briefly spoke to Hicks’ wife, and left

without incident. (RT 154-56,160-61.) A few minutes later the back door blew open and

a concrete boulder used to hold the door open tumbled in. (RT 156.) Hicks picked up the

boulder, walked outside and encountered the three men who had just left through the front

door. (RT 156-57.) He asked them: “Why Christmas? Why throw the boulder?” (RT

157.) Hicks said Petitioner then ran at him very fast, crouched down running low, and

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Hicks “felt very threatened, very scared,” and felt the need to defend himself. (RT 158.)

Hicks said that Petitioner hugged him and in the process must have stabbed him in the

back, as Hicks said he felt dead and felt his legs disappear. (RT 158-59.) He said his head

slammed to the ground, and he remembered being unable to defend himself, holding his

hand up, and pleading for Petitioner to stop the attack. (RT 160.) The only other thing he

remembered was his wife slapping his face and telling him to be strong and stay awake

while several people were standing over him, and passing out just before he told her he

was dying. (RT 161.) He thought he had died, but woke up several days later in a hospital

with fifteen stab wounds, including one in his back, two in his neck, two in his chest, one

in his heart, three in his lungs, and several defensive wounds to his arms. (RT 161-62.)

Dorian Gray testified that he was working as a bartender at the Hard Luck Tavern

on Christmas day 2010. (RT 176.) A few minutes after the bar closed at 2:00 a.m., Gray

was cleaning up and counting the receipts when his neighbor, Louis Murillo, entered with

Petitioner and another man. (RT 177,183.) Murillo waived to Gray and said: “That’s my

neighbor.” (RT 178.) Ana Hicks, the owner’s wife, met them at the door, told them they

were closed, asked them to leave, and the men left. (Id.) About two minutes later, Gray

heard a loud noise at the back door, went to see what it was, and saw the owner, Lance

Hicks, by the door, who told Gray to go back to washing the dishes. (RT 179.) Gray went

back to the dishes, and “maybe a minute” later heard a commotion outside. (RT 180.) He

grabbed a stun gun from behind the bar and ran out the back door. (Id) Gray saw Hicks

laying on the ground on his back holding a hand out with Petitioner kneeling on his

midsection. (RT 181.) Petitioner appeared to be punching Hicks with numerous fast

punches. (Id.) As Gray approached, Petitioner looked straight at him, while Murillo stood

about twenty feet away, and the third man who had been refused service stood about fifteen

feet away. (RT 182.) Murillo said: “Let’s go,” as Gray ran toward Hicks and Petitioner

while firing the stun gun into the air twice, which made a loud popping noise. (RT 182-

83, 208.) At that point Gray saw a knife in Petitioner’s hand, saw that Petitioner was

stabbing Hicks not punching him, and saw blood on Petitioner’s hand and all over Hicks.

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1 (RT 184.) Gray touched Petitioner with the stun gun and activated it, but it did not seem

to have any effect. (RT 184-85.) The third man grabbed Petitioner by the back of his shirt

and pulled Petitioner off Hicks, away from Gray, and the three men ran away. (RT 185.)

Gray began to run after them, but Hicks asked for help, so Gray returned and tried but could

not help him up. (RT 185-86.) Hicks asked Gray to get his wife, so Gray ran to the back

door and yelled for help, and a man named Bostic arrived and rendered first aid. (RT 186-

87.) Gray said he saw Petitioner stab Hicks at least nine to ten times, and that Petitioner

was already stabbing Hicks when Gray first came outside. (RT 188.)

Justin Bostic testified that he is a Senior Deputy Sheriff with the Imperial County

Sheriff’s office. (RT 211.) He was off duty standing in front of the Hard Luck Tavern

about 2:00 a.m. on December 26,2010, when he was approached in an aggressive manner

by three men who “were walking as ifthey owned the sidewalk,” and “told me to give them

a cigarette instead of asking for one.” (RT 212-13.) Bostic told them he did not have a

cigarette, pointed at a passing car and told them he had just gotten one from that car, which

was untme but he thought the car would be gone before they could contact it and it would

get the men away from him. (RT 213-14.) The three men then ran into the street and

started banging on the car windows requesting a cigarette. (RT 214.) They appeared to

know the people in the car, and after the two groups spoke briefly, the three men entered

the Hard Luck Tavern. (Id.) They came back out almost immediately, walked over to the

opening of an alley between the tavern and the next building which was blocked by a chain

link fence, and pulled down the fence. (Id.) Bostic stayed in front ofthe tavern talking to

his family and friends as the three men walked into the alley. (RT 216.) About three to

five minutes later, Bostic heard screaming from behind the tavern and ran in the direction

the three men had gone. (Id.) Behind the tavern he saw a man lying on the ground moaning

and groaning with one or two women next to him, and he put pressure on the man’s wounds

and attempted to keep him awake. (RT 217-20.)

Steven Gonzalez, an emergency medical technician, testified that he and his

paramedic partner responded to the rear of the Hard Luck Tavern about 2:30 a.m. on the

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1 night of December 25, 2010. (RT 247.) He treated a victim for multiple stab wounds,

placed him in a cervical collar and on a spinal board, and administered fluids intravenously

due to the blood loss. (RT 248-49.) He drove the victim to the hospital where air was

pumped into his chest due to a collapsed lung. (RT 249-50.) The parties stipulated that if

called, Dr. Veerinder Anand, an orthopedic surgeon, would testify that he treated the

injuries sustained by Hicks, which included a stab wound to the thoracic spine which

caused Hicks to become a paraplegic for the rest of his life. (RT 251-52.)

Richard Ramos, an El Centro Police Detective, testified that Petitioner was arrested

on December 30, 2010, after he drove by his residence while a search warrant was being

executed. (RT 253-54.) A video taken by a surveillance camera from a restaurant next

door to the Hard Luck Tavern was played for the jury, and the People rested. (RT 299-

302.) The appellate court described the video:

That video shows a paved area in the foreground and walls and parked

cars in the background. Three people are seen running in the background,

from left to right, one after the other. Almost immediately, a fourth person

follows at a slower pace. A person comes into view on the right and moves

toward the fourth person. The fourth person moves back slightly, stretches an

arm toward the other person and moves his foot in a kicking motion, but does

not touch the other person. The other person moves toward the fourth person,

the fourth person reciprocates, and they make contact. Standing close

together, they move toward the left and out of view, as the other person hits

the fourth person repeatedly. More people appear. There is a flash.

Emergency vehicles arrive.

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21 (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Gonzalez. No. D063129, slip op. at 8.)

The defense called Ramon Bonesi, who testified that on December 25,2010, he was

in El Centro visiting his family. (RT 318.) He decided to visit Petitioner, a friend he had

known since the second grade, and walked to Petitioner’s house carrying an 18-pack of

beer, arriving about 5:30 p.m. (RT 319-20, 341.) Bonesi said he eventually went out for

more beer and brought Luis Murillo back to Petitioner’s house where the three of them

continued drinking beer. (RT 320-21.) They decided to go to a bar about 10:00 p.m., and

took some beer with them as they walked to the Owl bar. (RT 321-22.) At the Owl bar

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1 they drank about six pitchers of beer between them, along with three shots each of hard

liquor. (RT 330, 333.) Bonesi started feeling unwell about 12:30 p.m. due to the large

amount of alcohol he had consumed. (RT 323.) He took a taxi home, where he showered

and ate, and returned to the Owl bar about an hour later, where Petitioner and Murillo were

still drinking. (RT 324-25.) He said Petitioner and Murillo had not noticed he had been

gone, and the three ofthem continued drinking until the bar closed. (RT 325.)

Bonesi said he was “pretty drunk” when the three of them left the Owl bar about

2:00 a.m. and walked to the Hard Luck Tavern. (RT 326.) He did not recall meeting

anyone outside the tavern, did not recall asking for a cigarette, said he did not smoke

cigarettes although Murillo did, and did not recall stopping a vehicle in front ofthe tavern.

(RT 326-27.) Immediately after they entered the tavern a woman told them it was closed,

so they left and started to walk home. (RT 328.) They stepped into an alley over a fence

that had been knocked down, but he did not remember ifthey knocked it down. (RT 329.)

The next thing he remembered the three ofthem had turned around and were running. (RT

330.) When he noticed that Petitioner was not with them, he went back and saw Petitioner

in a scuffle with another man. (RT 331.) Bonesi testified that he went to pull Petitioner

off the man, and tapped Petitioner on the shoulder, but just as he was about to grab

Petitioner, and while Gray was coming at them making a noise with a taser, Petitioner

disengaged from the fight by himself. (RT 337-38.)

On cross-examination, Bonesi admitted he lied when he gave several versions of his

story to the police, saying at first he did not remember anything and then changing his story

to running away right after Petitioner threw a rock through the back door. (RT 334-35.)

Bonesi agreed that the surveillance video from the restaurant next door showed Petitioner

and Hicks fighting just before they disappeared from view as they fell to the ground behind

a car. (RT 338-39.) He identified himself as the man on the video who, about ten seconds

later, runs into the scene, gets down behind the car, and then stands up and throws Petitioner

ahead of him just before they run away. (Id.) He said the three of them then ran back to

Petitioner’s house, where he asked Petitioner how he got a cut on his arm, and Petitioner

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admitted he had stabbed someone during the fight. (RT 339-40.) Bonesi said that when

he and Petitioner were in a jail cell together later, they asked each other what had happened,

and Petitioner said he had blacked out and could not remember the incident, although

Petitioner remembered meeting up at his house afterwards. (RT 347-48.)

Petitioner testified that he lived with his family in El Centro in 2010, and that he

spent Christmas Eve at home where he drank beer, smoked marijuana, and took the drug

Ecstasy. (RT 455-56.) He awoke about 10:00 a.m. the next day with a hangover, and

drank beer and smoked marijuana with his breakfast. (RT 457.) His friend Ramon Bonesi

came to his house between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. that day, and they drank the 18-pack ofbeer

Bonesi brought with him, along with some leftover beer from the night before, and smoked

marijuana. (RT 458-60.) At some point Petitioner’s father drove them to pick up their

friend Luis Murillo, and they brought himback to Petitioner’s house. (RT 460.) Petitioner

said it was possible they went to get Murillo because they ran out of beer, but he could not

remember. (RT 460-61.)

The three of them continued drinking beer and smoking marijuana at Petitioner’s

house until they walked to the Owl bar. (RT 461-63.) Petitioner was carrying a nonfolding knife with a blade four or five inches long in a sheath in his pocket. (RT 464.) He

had been carrying the knife for a couple of years, which he used at work and around the

house, and “had become used to carrying it around.” (RT 464-65.) He said he drank about

20 beers before walking to the Owl, and did not remember walking there or arriving. (RT

465.) He remembered being at the Owl and drinking at least two pitchers of beer and two

or three shots oftequila. (RT 467-68.) He did not remember Bonesi leaving for an hour,

but remembered leaving the Owl and not being allowed back in, and remembered then

going to the Conga bar down the street and drinking beer. (RT 468-70.)

The next thing he could remember was the three of them passing the Hard Luck

Tavern on their way home, and being denied entrance. (RT 470.) He did not remember

encountering anyone in front ofthe tavern or stopping a vehicle, and said neither he, Bonesi

nor Murillo smoke cigarettes. (RT 471-72.) As they cut through a gap between buildings,

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1 he saw a big rock and thought it would be funny to throw it at the door. (RT 471-74.) He

threw the rock and they ran. (RT 474.) Petitioner could not remember why he walked

back, and the next thing he remembered was a man, who he found out later had come from

the Hard Luck Tavern and was named Hicks, was standing in front of him. (RT 475-76.)

Hicks was very angry, was yelling, and called Petitioner a motherfucker. (RT 476.) Before

Petitioner had thrown any punches or taken out his knife, he was hit and kicked a couple

of times in the head by Hicks. (RT 477.) As Hicks began to hit Petitioner, he noticed a

large man, who he later found out was Gray, standing behind Hicks with a weapon in his

hand. (RT 476.) Gray was coming closer with the weapon, so Petitioner took out his knife

and stabbed Hicks once in the abdomen. (RT 477-78.) Petitioner thought Hicks must have

continued to hit him, but he could only remember being on top of Hicks, who was holding

Petitioner by his shirt collar. (RT 479.) He did not remember stabbing Hicks fourteen

times, but remembered being scared that he “was going to get seriously hurt by these two

bigger men, one who I thought had a weapon.” (RT 480.) When he “came back to [his]

senses,” he pushed himself off Hicks and ran. (Id.) He ran home where he met Bonesi and

Murillo, and told them he had stabbed a man. (RT 481-82.) He threw the knife away as

he ran home, and threw his bloody clothes away the next day. (RT 482-83.)

On cross-examination Petitioner admitted he told a defense psychiatrist named Dr.

Greene that he had a lot of problems with anger for many years, that he had a really bad

temper, got mad easily, and had gotten into quite a few fights in his life. (RT 486-88.) He

also told Dr. Greene that he smoked about half a gram of methamphetamine each day in

the month leading up to Christmas. (RT 490-91.) He testified that he “can’t really explain”

why he was able to remember things that show he “did nothing wrong,” such as what,

where and how much he drank, being physically and verbally attacked by Hicks, feeling

threatened by Gray, feeling scared and thinking he was going to get seriously hurt by the

two bigger men, and running away, but could not remember things “which would go to the

intent to kill,” such as why he turned back to confront Hicks, running at Hicks, stabbing

him fifteen times, and how he got up or got off Hicks. (RT 518-19.)

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1 Doctor John Greene, a psychiatrist, testified that he interviewed Petitioner for about

four hours on June 13, 2012, and administered three different tests to determine if he was

being truthful. (RT 548-51.) Petitioner’s answers were consistent with people who do not

fake mental illness, and Dr. Greene opined that he was most likely telling the truth. (RT

551.) Petitioner reported past use of methamphetamine, alcohol and marijuana, and said

he was intoxicated on alcohol during the crime, as he and his two friends drank

approximately 90 beers that day along with several shots of hard liquor, which Dr. Greene

opined would have caused memory loss and impaired judgment. (RT 555-61.) Petitioner

also reported anger problems as a child, that he had been expelled from school, taken to

juvenile hall, and placed on probation, but told Dr. Greene that his anger issues had

lessened as an adult. (RT 562.) Dr. Greene said Petitioner’s records indicate he was

diagnosed with adjustment disorder in 2001, when he was thirteen years old, perhaps

related to his parents’ divorce, but by the time he was age seventeen there were no longer

any reported behavioral issues. (RT 562-64.)

The defense played a surveillance video taken inside the Hard Luck Tavern about

2:10 a.m., and rested. (RT 618-20.) The appellate court described that video:

A video taken inside the Hard Luck Tavern depicts three men entering

through the front door. A blond woman moves toward them, gesturing and

pushing one ofthem in the direction ofthe door. One ofthe men also gestures.

The three men leave. A man, apparently Hicks, approaches the door after the

men are outside. Within a minute, he looks toward the back door ofthe tavern,

moves toward the back door and disappears from view. Within seconds,

another man, apparently Gray, follows him quickly, holding an object,

apparently the stun gun, and also disappears from view. Approximately one

minute later, the blond woman, a brunette woman and a man mn toward the

back of the tavern and disappear from view. Within seconds, the brunette

woman comes into view, running from the back door area toward the front of

the tavern.

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26 (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Gonzalez. No. D063129, slip op. at 7-8.)

The prosecutor argued in closing that the video taken from the restaurant next door,

although of poor quality, showed Petitioner and his two friends running away, then Hicks

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coming into the picture and stopping, and Petitioner running back at Hicks. (RT 681-82.)

Petitioner is seen pausing briefly when he reaches Hicks, Hicks throws a kick and a punch

at Petitioner, they separate for a fraction of a second and then come together. (RT 682.)

For a second and a half, four punches and a kick are seen and Hicks goes to the ground

with Petitioner on top of him as they both disappear behind a parked car for about 10 or 11

seconds. (Id.) Bonesi is then seen walking up to where Hicks and Petitioner disappeared,

reaching down and picking up Petitioner, and they both run away. (Id.) Gray then steps

into the picture holding a flashing stun gun. (Id.)

Defense counsel argued in closing that the video from inside the tavern showed Gray

following Hicks out the back door with the taser in his hand just seconds after Hicks went

outside, not about a minute later as Gray testified. (RT 709-10.) Defense counsel argued

that the video taken from the restaurant next door did not show Petitioner crouching and

running at Hicks as Hicks testified, and did not show a knife in Petitioner’s hand. (RT

711.) Rather, he argued it shows Hicks kick Petitioner in the groin, and then kick Petitioner

once and hit him twice while Petitioner is hitting back before they fall out of sight, and

shows nothing after that. (RT 712-13.) Defense counsel argued that Petitioner was too

intoxicated to form the intent to kill, or to premeditate or deliberate the attack, that he acted

in self-defense because he reasonably believed he was in imminent danger and reasonably

believed the use of force was necessary to defend himself, or acted in imperfect selfdefense if those beliefs were unreasonable, and that at most he was guilty of attempted

voluntary manslaughter because he acted under the heat of passion after being provoked

by what Hicks said and by Hicks starting the fight. (RT 706-21.)

Immediately after deliberations began, the jury sent a note requesting to have the

videos brought to the jury room to view “privately (without audience) to discuss among

ourselves.” (CT 321.) They were only allowed to view the videos in open court because

they were on the prosecutor’s laptop computer which contained other material. (RT 738-

43.) The videos were played three times in open court, and the jurors were admonished

not to discuss what they were seeing or make any comments while they were viewing them.

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1 (Id.) The jury thereafter requested the video from the restaurant next door be played frame

by frame, but were told it could not be viewed in that manner, so it was played twice at

one-quarter speed and twice at halfspeed. (RT 743-45.) The jury then submitted a request

that it be played three times at half speed and one-quarter speed, and later another request

that it be played three times at full speed, twice at halfspeed, and once at one-quarter speed.

(CT 321-26.) After deliberating about ten hours over two days, the jury found Petitioner

guilty of willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder, guilty of assault with a

deadly weapon, and found that he had personally used a deadly weapon and had inflicted

great bodily injury resulting in permanent paralysis. (CT 280-81, 321-28.) Petitioner was

sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole plus six years on the attempted

murder count, and to three years on the assault with a deadly weapon count which was

stayed. (Lodgment No. 1-A, Clerk’s Augmented Tr. at 5-8.)

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims his federal constitutional rights were violated because: (1) there is

insufficient evidence to support the jury finding that the attempted murder was committed

with premeditation and deliberation, as the evidence showed he stabbed the victim in a rash

and impulsive act while severely intoxicated (claim one); (2) he received ineffective

assistance of trial counsel in failing to request the jury be instructed that provocation can

negate premeditation and deliberation (claim two); (3) he was denied his right to ajury trial

and a fair trial by refusing to allow the jury to view the videos in the jury room, which

prevented meaningful deliberations (claim three); (4) his statements to Dr. Greene were

inadmissible because they were obtained without Miranda warnings (claim four); (5) he

received ineffective assistance oftrial counsel due to counsel’s failure to seek exclusion of

his statements to Dr. Greene on the basis they were obtained without Miranda warnings

(claim five); (6) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to counsel’s failure

to object to the prosecutor’s repeated statements that Bonesi pulled Petitioner offthe victim

(claim six); (7) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure

to request the jury be instructed on voluntary intoxication causing unconsciousness (claim

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1 seven); (8) he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise claims

four through seven on appeal (claim eight); and (9) he was denied access to the courts when

the state trial and appellate courts erroneously denied his habeas petitions as untimely.

(ECF No. 28 at 9-56.)

Respondent answers that the state court adjudication of claims one through three is

neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law, and claim three does not present a federal issue. (ECF No. 37-1 at 11-17.) Respondent

contends claims four through eight are procedurally defaulted because the state court

denied them as untimely, and claim nine lacks merit. (Id at 17-19.)

Petitioner replies that claims four through eight are not procedurally defaulted

because the state supreme court did not find them untimely, and argues that in any case he

can excuse any default. (ECF No. 50 at 3; ECF No. 56 at 4-21.) He argues that the state

court adjudication of all of his claims is contrary to, and an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, and that an evidentiary hearing is warranted. (ECF No. 50

at 3-26.) He also requests expansion ofthe record to include the videos introduced at trial,

as well as portions of the Reporter’s Transcript not lodged by Respondent involving

argument on pre-trial motions: (a) to preclude Bonesi from testifying that the reason he

pulled Petitioner off Hicks during the fight was to prevent him from being tased by Gray,

and (b) ruling inadmissible Dr. Greene’s opinion that Petitioner did not form the intent to

kill and did not premeditate or deliberate because he was intoxicated. (ECF No. 54 at 1-2;

ECF No. 57-1 at 1-12; ECF No. 59 at 1-3.)

Standard of Review

In order to obtain federal habeas relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the

merits in state court, a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the state court

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination ofthe facts in light ofthe evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

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1 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). Even if § 2254(d) is satisfied, a petitioner must show

a federal constitutional violation occurred in order to obtain relief. Fry v. Pliler. 551 U.S.

112,119-22 (2007); Frantz v. Hazev. 533 F.3d 724,735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court

precedent (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth

in [the Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor. 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state

court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal

law, “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407.

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and only

if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there

could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall. 572 U.S.,

134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-07 (2014), quoting Harrington v. Richter. 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

In order to satisfy § 2254(d)(2), the petitioner must show that the factual findings upon

which the state court’s adjudication of his claims rest are objectively unreasonable. MillerEl v. Cockrell. 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

Claim One

Petitioner alleges in claim one that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process

was violated because there is insufficient evidence to support the finding of premeditation

and deliberation by the jury. (ECF No. 28 at 9.) He argues that the evidence showed he

threw a rock at the tavern door and was running away when Hicks drew himback by yelling

obscenities, and that Hicks started the fight. (Id. at 9-10.) Thus, he argues, the evidence

at best shows that, while extremely intoxicated, he stabbed Hicks in a rash and impulsive

act without careful consideration of that choice or its consequences, and only after Hicks

had insulted, punched and kicked Petitioner while Gray was standing behind Hicks with a

weapon. (Id.) Respondent answers that the state court denial of this claim, on the basis

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that sufficient evidence was presented to allow the jury to draw a reasonable inference that

Petitioner considered the circumstances and, after reflection, decided to kill Hicks, is

neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law. (ECFNo. 37-1 at 11-12.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in his petition for review.

(Lodgment No. 6.) That petition was denied with an order which stated: “The petition for

review is denied.” (Lodgment No. 7.) The same claim was presented to the state appellate

court on direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 3.) The appellate court denied the claim in a written

opinion. (Lodgment No. 5.)

There is a presumption that “[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding thatjudgment or rejecting the

same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501U.S.797, 803-06(1991).

The Court will look through the silent denial of this claim by the state supreme court on

direct appeal to the last reasoned state court opinion addressing the claim, the appellate

court opinion on direct appeal, which stated:

Gonzalez contends his intoxication and Hicks’s provocation (cursing at

him after he had begun running away, then kicking and punching him)

precluded a finding of attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation.

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Attempted “willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder . . . shall be

punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of

parole.... The additional term provided in this section for attempted willful,

deliberate, and premeditated murder shall not be imposed unless the fact that

the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated is charged in

the accusatory pleading and admitted or found to be true by the trier of fact.”

(§ 664, subd. (a).) Willfulness refers to an intent to kill. (See People v.

Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 666.) “‘Deliberation’ refers to careful

weighing of considerations in forming a course of action; ‘premeditation’

means thought over in advance. (Citations.) ‘The process of premeditation

and deliberation does not require any extended period oftime. “The tme test

is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection.

Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated

judgment may be arrived at quickly,...” (Citations.)’ (Citation.)” {People v.

Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041,1080.)

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“In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court’s

role is a limited one. ‘“The propertest for determining a claim ofinsufficiency

of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier

offact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Citations.)

On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People

and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the

trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (Citation.)’” (Citations.) ((j[)

‘“Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid

value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to

determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on

which that determination depends. (Citation.) Thus, ifthe verdict is supported

by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and

not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact

finder. (Citations.)” (Citation.)’ (Citation.)” {People v. Smith (2005) 37

Cal.4th 733, 738-739.)

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A rational jury could have accepted Hicks’s version of events and

rejected Gonzalez’s version. The evidence set forth above, including Hicks’s

and Gray’s testimony, would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that in a

short period of time, before he attacked Hicks, Gonzalez considered the

circumstances and, after reflection, decided to kill Hicks. Substantial

evidence supports the finding of deliberation and premeditation and the

conviction of attempted murder.

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17 (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Gonzalez. No. D063129, slip op. at 8-11.)

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which

he is charged.” In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause is violated, and an applicant is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief,

“if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact

could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S.

307, 324 (1979). The Court must apply an additional layer of deference in applying the

Jackson standard, and “must ask whether the decision of the California Court of Appeal

reflected an ‘unreasonable application of’ Jackson and Winship to the facts of this case.”

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Federal habeas relief functions as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state

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criminal justice systems,” not as a means of error correction. Richter, 562 U.S. at 103,

quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 332 n.5.

Petitioner’s jury was instructed that:

The defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill when he acted. A

defendant deliberated if he carefully weighed the considerations for and

against his choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The

defendant premeditated if he decided to kill before acting.

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The length of time the person spends considering whether to kill does

not alone determine whether the attempted killing is deliberate and

premeditated. The amount oftime required for deliberation and premeditation

may vary from person to person and in accordance to the circumstances. A

decision to kill made irrationally, impulsively, or without careful

consideration of the choice and its consequences is not deliberate and

premeditated.

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13 On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision to kill can be reached

quickly. The test is the extent ofthe reflection, not the length oftime.

(RT 657-58.)

Hicks testified that when he walked out the back door of the tavern: “There were

three gentlemen, three kids,” about fifteen or twenty feet away, and that he said to them:

“Why Christmas? Why throw the boulder?,” although he admitted: “I don’t exactly

remember to this day exactly what I said.” (RT 157-58.) He testified that Petitioner turned

around and then ... came running at me,” and “ran at me very fast, kind of crouched down

and low like he was coming at me. I’m old enough to know when somebody is coming at

you.” (RT 158.) Hicks said: “I felt very threatened, very scared. And it felt like I needed

to defend myself.” (Id.) He described what he felt when Petitioner made contact:

I’ll never forget it. You feel like you are dead because he kind of

hugged me and then he stabbed me in my back apparently. I didn’t know it

then. You feel your legs kind ofjust disappear. At that moment I forgot about

what I was doing, where I was, the scene I was at. I felt more like I was dead.

I didn’t feel like I was there anymore.

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1 The video from the restaurant next door, as described by the appellate court, shows

Petitioner initially running away from the back ofthe tavern but then moving back towards

Hicks when Hicks enters the picture. (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Gonzalez. No. D063129,

slip op. at 8.) Hicks is seen retreating slightly as Petitioner approaches, and stretches his

arm towards Petitioner and tries but fails to kick him. (Id.) Petitioner is then seen moving

forward and making contact with Hicks, and, while standing close together, they move

toward the left and out of view as Petitioner hits Hicks repeatedly. (Id.)

The jury could draw a reasonable inference from that evidence that Petitioner ran

away after throwing the rock, came back when Hicks said something to his group, and,

while Hicks was backing off and trying to defend himself, Petitioner stabbed Hicks almost

immediately. The jury could draw a reasonable inference under their instructions that as

Petitioner approached Hicks he armed himself with his knife, “carefully weighed the

considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the consequences,” made a quick

“cold, calculated decision to kill.” (RT 657-58.)

Petitioner argues the evidence showed his decision to kill was made irrationally,

impulsively, or without careful consideration of the choice and its consequences, and

therefore was not deliberate and premeditated. He argues the jury could have drawn such

an inference if they believed: (a) he was severely intoxicated, that is, if they believed his

testimony regarding the amount of alcohol he consumed (which was supported only by the

testimony of Bonesi, his close friend who admitted he repeatedly lied to the police about

the incident), (b) his testimony that Gray was standing behind Hicks with a weapon in his

hand as Hicks initiated an attack on Petitioner (which the parties disputed was supported

by the video evidence), and (c) his testimony that only then did he take out his knife because

he was afraid the two large men could seriously hurt him, and could only remember

stabbing Hicks once in the stomach. Even assuming such an inference is reasonable, the

jury obviously did not draw that inference. The jury was instructed to consider the veracity

of the witnesses, which, with respect to Petitioner, included his testimony that he “can’t

really explain” why he was able to remember things that show he “did nothing wrong,”

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1 such as what, where and how much he had to drink, being physically and verbally attacked

by Hicks, feeling threatened by Gray, thinking he was going to get seriously hurt by the

two bigger men, stabbing Hicks only once, and feeling scared and running away, but could

not remember things “which would go to the intent to kill,” such as why he turned back to

confront Hicks, running at Hicks, stabbing him an additional fourteen times, and how he

got up or got off Hicks. (RT 518-19.) The jury could have drawn a reasonable inference

that the testimony regarding the enormous quantity of alcohol Petitioner consumed was not

entirely consistent with his selective memory or his actions. Any contention that the jury

should have believed his testimony and the testimony of his good friend Bonesi rather than

Hicks and Gray does not support federal habeas relief. See Schlup v. Delo. 513 U.S. 298,

330 (1995) (“under Jackson, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally

beyond the scope ofreview.”); see also Coleman v. Johnson. 566 U.S. 650,

2060, 2065 (2012) (“The jury in this case was convinced, and the only question under

Jackson is whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare

rationality.”)

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16 Petitioner requests the Court expand the record to include the videos because he

“believes they are important so that this court can have a full concept for the case and

claims currently under revision.” (ECF No. 57 at 2.) However, the Court need not view

the videos because a federal habeas court will not reweigh the evidence or resolve any

evidentiary conflicts. See Cavazos v. Smith. 565 U.S. 1, 7 (2011) (holding that Jackson

“unambiguously instructs that a reviewing court ‘faced with a record of historical facts that

supports conflicting inferences must presume - even if it does not affirmatively appear in

the record - that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution,

and must defer to that resolution.’”)? quoting Jackson. 443 U.S. at 326.

Petitioner also requests the record be expanded to include the transcript of a pre-trial

hearing where the parties agreed that Dr. Greene would not be permitted to testify as to the

ultimate issue of whether Petitioner actually formed the intent to kill, or premeditated or

deliberated the attempt to kill. (ECF No. 57 at 11-12.) Expansion is unnecessary because

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Petitioner has attached the relevant transcript pages to his motion to expand.1 (Id.) Any

contention that the trial court erred in ruling that Dr. Greene would not be allowed to testify

as to the ultimate issue of Petitioner’s actual intent is without merit. See People v. Cortes.

192 Cal.App.4th 873, 908 (2011) (holding that defendant is not prevented under the state

penal code “from presenting expert testimony about any psychiatric or psychological

diagnosis or mental condition he may have, or how that diagnosis or condition affected him

at the time ofthe offense, as long as the expert does not cross the line and state an opinion

that the defendant did or did not have the intent, or malice aforethought, or any other legal

mental state required for conviction ofthe specific intent crime with which he is charged.”);

Taylor v. Illinois. 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered

right to offer testimony that is ... inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”); Aponte

v. Gomez. 993 F.2d 705,707 (9th Cir. 1993) (Federal habeas courts “are bound by a state

court’s construction of its own penal statutes.”); Estelle v. McGuire. 502 U.S. 62, 67-68

(1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions.”)

The Court finds that the evidence established premeditation and deliberation as those

elements are defined by state law. See Jackson. 443 U.S. at 324 n.16 (holding that federal

habeas courts must analyze Jackson claims “with explicit reference to the substantive

elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.”) It was objectively reasonable

for the appellate court to find that if the jury believed Hicks’ version and disbelieved

Petitioner’s version, they could draw a reasonable inference that Petitioner acted with

deliberation and premeditation because he armed himself as he approached Hicks and

“carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the

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25 The transcript at issue reflects the trial judge ruled that Dr. Greene would not be allowed to testify that

Petitioner actually formed a particular intent or was in a particular state of mind, and defense counsel

confirmed that such an ultimate opinion would not be introduced. (ECF No. 57-1 at 11-12.) Dr. Greene

states in his report: “It is my opinion, within a reasonable medical certainty, that due to Mr. Gonzalez’s

intoxication, memory impairment, and resulting judgment impairment, he was unable to form the mental

state of premeditation and deliberation, and that these factors prevented him from having an intent to kill

Mr. Hicks.” (Lodgment No. 12 [ECF No. 38-5 at 49].)

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consequences,” made a quick “cold, calculated decision to kill.” See Koontz. 27 Cal.4th

at 1080 (“The process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended

period of time. The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the

reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated

judgment may be arrived at quickly.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Federal habeas

courts must respect the “factfinder’s province to determine witness credibility.” Jackson.

443 U.S. at 319.

In light of the additional layer of deference this Court must give in applying the

Jackson standard, see Juan H.. 408 F.3d at 1274, and the Supreme Court’s admonition that

federal habeas relief functions as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state

criminal justice systems,” and not simply as a means of error correction, Richter. 562 U.S.

at 103, quoting Jackson. 443 U.S. at 332 n.5, it is clear that sufficient evidence was

presented at trial to support Petitioner’s conviction for attempted willful, deliberate and

premeditated murder. The state court adjudication of this claim does not reflect “an

‘unreasonable application of’ Jackson and Winship to the facts ofthis case.” Juan H. 408

F.3d at 1274. In addition, there is no basis to find that the factual findings upon which the

state court’s adjudication of this claim rest are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El. 537

U.S. at 340.

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19 Accordingly, the Court finds that the state court adjudication of claim one is neither

contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court recommends

habeas relief be denied as to claim one.

Claim Two

Petitioner alleges in claim two that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because his trial counsel failed to request the jury be instructed that provocation, even if

insufficient to reduce attempted murder to attempted manslaughter, may negate the mental

state required to show deliberation and premeditation. (ECF No. 28 at 16-22.) Respondent

answers that the rejection of this claim by the appellate court, on the basis that Petitioner

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was not prejudiced as a result of the failure to instruct because there was no substantial

evidence of provocation, is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. (ECF No. 37-1 at 13-15.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in a petition for review

which was summarily denied without a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment Nos. 6-7.) It

was presented to the appellate court on direct appeal and denied in a written opinion.

(Lodgment Nos. 3, 5.) The Court will look through the silent denial by the state supreme

court to the last reasoned state court opinion addressing the claim, the appellate court

opinion on direct appeal, which states:

Defense counsel argued that Hicks provoked Gonzalez by yelling,

cursing and landing the first blow; Gonzalez acted because of a sudden quarrel

and in the heat of passion; he was so intoxicated he acted rashly and without

thinking; and this was a case of imperfect self-defense. At counsel’s request,

the court instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted

voluntary manslaughter if “(t)he defendant attempted to kill someone because

of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion” and “because he was provoked”

(CALCRIM No. 603) and on complete and imperfect self-defense

(CALCRIM Nos. 505, 604). The court also instmcted the jury could

“consider evidence of voluntary intoxication in deciding if the People (had)

proved . . . deliberation and premeditation” (CALCRIM No. 3426) and that

“(a) decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration

of the choice and its consequences is not deliberate and premeditated”

(CALCRIM No. 601). Gonzalez contends counsel was ineffective because he

did not request a modified version of CALCRIM No. 522, instructing that

provocation insufficient to reduce attempted murder to attempted voluntary

manslaughter may nevertheless support a finding that the attempted murder

was not premeditated and deliberate.

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The defendant has the burden of showing he received ineffective

assistance of counsel, that is, that counsel did not act in a manner expected of

a reasonably competent attorney and counsel’s acts or omissions prejudiced

the defendant. {Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,687-688,691—

692.) To establish prejudice, “(t)he defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” {Id. at p. 694.)

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1 Here, there was no substantial evidence of provocation; the evidence

was, at most, minimal and insubstantial. (People v. Middleton (1997)

52 Cal.App.4th 19, 33.) The record does not demonstrate the lack of a request

for a modified version ofCALCRIM No. 522 caused Gonzalez any prejudice.

(See People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1085-1086.) This defeats his

contention of ineffective assistance of counsel.

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6 (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Gonzalez. No. D063129, slip op. at 8-11.)

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law governing ineffective

assistance of counsel claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

For ineffective assistance of counsel to provide for relief, Petitioner must show that

counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687. “This requires showing

that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id He must also show that counsel’s

deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires showing that “counsel’s

errors were so serious as to deprive [Petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable.” Id To show prejudice, Petitioner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability

that the result ofthe proceeding would have been different absent the error. Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. Petitioner must establish both deficient performance and prejudice in order

to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Id at 687. “Surmounting Strickland’s high

bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky. 559 U.S. 356,371 (2010). “The standards

created by Strickland and section 2254(d) are both highly deferential and when the two

apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter. 562 U.S. at 105. These standards are

“difficult to meet” and “demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the

doubt.” Cullen v.Pinholster. 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).

To the extent the evidence of provocation was merely Hicks yelling at a group of

men who were running away after one of them threw a boulder through the door of his

place of business, it is objectively reasonable for the appellate court to find it was minimal

and insubstantial. See e.g. Schurz v. Ryan. 730 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding no

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1 prejudice under Strickland where trial counsel failed to argue as mitigating evidence that

petitioner was provoked “in response to a minimal provocation occasioned by a few words

of bravado that were not even directed at him.”) However, Petitioner argues the evidence

of provocation consisted of his testimony that Hicks, who is a large man, called him a

motherfucker as he was running away, and, when he returned to confront Hicks, Hicks

kicked him in the groin and hit him in the head while Gray, who is also a large man, was

backing Hicks up by standing behind him holding a weapon, and only then did Petitioner

arm himself and fight back. (ECF No. 28 at 17-22.) That evidence was supplied only by

Petitioner, as Hicks said he merely asked Petitioner why he had thrown the boulder on

Christmas (RT 157), and Bonesi did not testify as to provocation because he said he was

running away when he realized Petitioner had turned back and was fighting Hicks. (RT

330-31.) The video did not have an audio component, and the jury was left to decide

whether to believe Hicks or Petitioner regarding what Hicks said to Petitioner. In rejecting

his claim of self-defense the jury apparently found Petitioner to be an unreliable or

untruthful witness, although in making the determination whether substantial evidence of

provocation exists, “courts should not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, a task for the

jury.” People v. Breverman. 19 Cal.4th 142,162 (1998). Nevertheless, Petitioner testified

that he did not remember why he came back to confront Hicks. (RT 475-76.) He therefore

did not testify that he initiated contact with Hicks as a result of provocation. Rather, he

testified that he did not pull his knife until after Hicks hit him, and said that: “Mr. Gray

moved closer, or we moved closer to him, and I reacted. I pulled out my knife and struck

him.” (RT 477.) Although Hicks testified that he was not sure exactly what he said when

he came out the back of the tavern, the video from the restaurant next door, as described

by the appellate court, does not support Petitioner’s contention that Hicks initiated the fight

or provoked Petitioner in any manner other than the initial verbal taunts described only by

Petitioner. Rather, it shows that as Petitioner approaches Hicks, Hicks “moves back

slightly, stretches an arm toward [Petitioner] and moves his foot in a kicking motion, but

does not touch [Petitioner, who] moves toward [Hicks, who] reciprocates, and they make

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contact. Standing close together, they move toward the left and out of view, as [Petitioner]

hits [Hicks] repeatedly.” (Lodgment No. 5, People v. Gonzalez. No. D063129, slip op. at

8.) Thus, even assuming the truth of Petitioner’s testimony regarding what Hicks said, the

evidence did not support a finding of substantial provocation. Rather, Petitioner testified

that he stabbed Hicks in self-defense, not as a result of provocation.

In any case, the jury obviously rejected Petitioner’s claim of provocation when they

rejected his heat of passion defense. They were instructed that Petitioner acted in the heat

of passion if he “attempted the killing because he was provoked.... [and] the provocation

would have caused an ordinary person to average disposition to act irrationally and without

due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment.” (RT 661.) They were

also instructed that:

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12 While no specific type of provocation is required, slight or remote

provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short

or long period of time. It is not enough that the defendant simply was

provoked. The defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard of conduct.

You must decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the

provocation was sufficient.

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In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether

an ordinary person of average disposition in the same situation and knowing

the same facts would have reacted from passion rather than judgment. If

enough time passed between the provocation and the attempted killing for an

ordinary person of average disposition to cool off and regain his or her clear

reasoning and judgment, then the attempted murder is not reduced to

attempted voluntary manslaughter on this basis.

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22 (RT 661-62.)

Thus, the jury, in finding Petitioner guilty of attempted murder, rejected reducing

attempted murder to attempted voluntary manslaughter based on provocation. In light of

that, and in light of the lack of substantial evidence of provocation, the state court’s

determination that Petitioner was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to request the

jury be instructed that the provocation can support a finding that the attempted murder was

not premeditated or deliberate, is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable

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application of, Strickland. See Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694 (holding that in order to show

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome.”); see also Richter. 562 U.S. at 110 (“Representation is constitutionally

ineffective only if it ‘so undermined the proper functioning ofthe adversarial process’ that

the defendant was denied a fair trial.”), quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 686. Neither is

there any basis to find that the factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication of

this claim rests are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El. 537 U.S. at 340.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the state court adjudication of claim two is neither

contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court recommends

habeas relief be denied as to claim two.

Claim Three

Petitioner alleges in claim three that he was denied his right to a fair trial and a jury

trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when the trial court refused the jury’s

request to have the videos brought to the jury room to view “privately (without audience)

to discuss among ourselves.” (ECF No. 28 at 24-30; CT 321.) He contends the error

prevented the jurors from deliberating and evaluating the evidence in a meaningful manner

because they were precluded from discussing the videos while they were playing, and

precluded from independently stopping and rewinding them as they needed or saw fit,

which was necessary because the entire incident took less than 30 seconds, the figures in

the videos are hard to see, and the videos are key pieces of evidence. (Id.)

Respondent answers that this claim does not present a federal issue because it

challenges only the trial court’s discretion under state law as to how to allow the jury to

view the videos. (ECF No. 37-1 at 15.) Respondent alternately argues that to the extent it

does raise a federal claim, the denial of the claim by the state appellate court on the basis

that the trial judge did everything within technological limits to accommodate the jury’s

request, is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, and that any error is harmless. (IdL at 15-17.)

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1 Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in a petition for review

which was summarily denied. (Lodgment Nos. 6-7.) It was presented to the appellate

court on direct appeal and denied in a written opinion. (Lodgment Nos. 3, 5.) The Court

will look through the silent denial by the state supreme court to the last reasoned state court

decision addressing the claim, the appellate court opinion on direct appeal, which states:

During trial, the videos introduced into evidence were played in open

court. The court instructed the jury that ifit wished to see the videos again, it

should send a note through the bailiff, and the videos would then be played in

open court. Soon after the jury began deliberating, the court received a note

asking to view the videos “privately (without audience) to discuss among

ourselves.” The court discussed the note with counsel, who agreed on the

following procedure. Because the videos were playable only via a program

on the prosecutor’s laptop computer, which also contained files the jury was

not entitled to see, the jury would watch the videos in open court. The court

would suggest to the jurors that each video be played three times, would

admonish them not to speak while viewing the videos and would tell them to

write another note ifthey wished to view the videos again. The court informed

the jurors ofthe procedure, and before the videos were played, received a note

from the jury asking whether the videos would be played in real time, or if

they could be played in slow motion. The court responded the videos would

be played in real time, and if the jurors wished to see the videos in slow

motion, they should send another note.

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18 At defense counsel’s request, the court allowed the jury to gather

around the screen to obtain a better view. The videos were played three times.

The jury returned to the deliberation room, and a short time later sent the court

a note asking to view the video taken outside the Hard Luck Tavern three

times frame by frame and once in real time. The court responded that for

technological reasons, the video could not be played frame by frame, so it

would be played a couple oftimes at quarter speed and then a couple oftimes

at halfspeed. The court told the jurors to make a note of any point they would

like the video stopped, and the court would try to accommodate any request.

The court admonished the jury not to hold any discussions in open court, then

had the video played twice at quarter speed and twice at halfspeed. The court

asked the jurors ifthey wished the video played again at quarter or halfspeed.

The jurors did not ask to see the video again. The court told the jurors to send

another note if they had further requests. After the jury left the courtroom,

the court stated its beliefthat the video could not be played more slowly than

quarter speed. The prosecutor agreed. Defense counsel did not comment.

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1 The next morning, the jury sent the court a note asking to see the video

“at (quarter) speed and (half) speed, three times.” Defense counsel told the

court that he and the prosecutor “would like to have the jurors review the

videos as if they were in a private deliberative area.” The court closed the

courtroom and directed the jurors not to talk while the video was playing. The

court told the jurors they were free to position themselves for the best view.

The prosecutor played the video three times each at half speed and quarter

speed. The court excused the jurors for further deliberations and asked them

to send another note ifthey had another request.

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A little more than one hour later, the court received a note from the jury

asking to view the video after the lunch break, three times in real time, two

times at halfspeed and once at quarter speed. After the lunch break, the court

told the jurors to position themselves for the best view and admonished them

to refrain from discussion. The video was played at the three speeds

requested. The jury returned to the deliberation room. After deliberating for

a period lasting between one and one-quarter hour and two hours 40 minutes,

the jury notified the court it had reached a verdict.

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Gonzalez contends that requiring the jurors to view the videos in open

court, without simultaneously discussing what they saw, and without

“independently starting, stopping and rewinding the video clips as much as

they wanted,” “prevented the jurors from deliberating and evaluating the

evidence in a meaningful manner.”

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“(S)ection 1137 . . . provides that the jurors, upon retiring for

deliberation, may take with them all papers which have been received into

evidence (except depositions). Moreover, there is judicial authority that

transcripts of tape-recorded testimony may be taken into the jury room.”

CPeople v. Fujita (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 454, 473.) Nevertheless, “what may

be taken by the jury into the jury room is left to the sound discretion of the

trial court.” (People v. Walker (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 594, 603.)

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23 Here, the court did everything possible to accommodate the jury’s

requests to view the videos. The court allowed the jurors to position

themselves so as to have a clear view, and to view the videos at various speeds,

as many times as they wished. The only limits the court imposed were those

required by technology and the extraneous material on the prosecutor’s laptop

that the jury was not entitled to see. There was no error.

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Petitioner alleges here, as he did in state court, that his rights to a jury trial and to a

fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the procedures used

to respond to the jury’s request to view the videos. (ECF No. 28 at 24-30; ECF No. 16-11

at 29-35, citing Remmer v. United States. 350 U.S. 377 (1956) and United States v.

Evanston. 651 F.3d 1080,1084 (9th Cir. 2011).) The court in Evanston stated:

District courts are accorded substantial discretion in the control ofjury

deliberations. Nevertheless, because the right to a trial by jury as fact-finder

in serious criminal cases is “fundamental to the American scheme ofjustice,”

it is a “cardinal principle that the deliberation of the jury shall remain private

and secret” in order to protect the jury from improper outside influence. The

judge’s traditional role in a jury trial is thus limited to arbiter of the law and

manager of the trial process; the jury remains the primary finder of fact and

essential check on arbitrary government. For these reasons, “(t)he trial judge

is . . . barred from attempting to override or interfere with the jurors’

independent judgment in a manner contrary to the interests of the accused,”

and “it is the law’s objective to guard jealously the sanctity ofthe jury’s right

to operate as freely as possible from outside unauthorized intrusions

purposefully made,” Remmer v. United States. 350 U.S. 377, 382 (1956).

Evanston. 651 F.3d at 1083-84 (citations omitted). In Remmer. quoted in Evanston, the

Supreme Court ordered a new trial after finding the trial judge had made an inadequate

inquiry into whether a juror’s “untrammeled exercise of his judgment” was affected when

he was contacted by an outside party. Remmer. 350 U.S. at 382.

Even assuming the Ninth Circuit in Evanston cited Remmer for the proposition that

a trial judge may not, in managing a trial, interfere with the jury’s deliberative process to

the point it infringes upon the jury’s role as “the primary finder of fact and essential check

on arbitrary government,” that did not occur here. Each request by the jury to view the

videos was granted, the trial judge encouraged them to ask for additional viewings at

whatever speed they thought necessary, and their requests were accommodated as the

available technology permitted.

Petitioner has not identified any clearly established federal law supporting his

contention that the jury’s ability to deliberate was curtailed to the point of a violation of a

fair trial or his right to a jury trial. Rather, “if a habeas court must extend a rationale before

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it can apply to the facts at hand,” then by definition the rationale was not ‘clearly

established at the time of the state-court decision.’” Woodall 134 S.Ct. at 1706, quoting

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004). The Supreme Court has stated that

§ 2254(d)(1) does not require an “identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be

applied.” Woodall 134 S.Ct. at 1706, quoting Panetti v. Ouarterman. 551 U.S. 930, 953

(2007). Rather, “relief is available under § 2254(d)(l)’s unreasonable-application clause

if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts

that there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” Woodall 134 S.Ct. at

1706-07, quoting Richter. 131 S.Ct. at 787.

The Court finds that the state appellate court’s determination that Petitioner’s rights

to a fair trial and to a jury trial were not violated as a result of the jury being required to

view the videos in the courtroom rather than the jury room, is neither contrary to, nor

involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Woodall 134

S.Ct. at 1706; Evanston. 651 F.3d at 1084. In addition, there is no basis to find that the

factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication ofthis claim rests are objectively

unreasonable. Miller-El. 537 U.S. at 340.

Furthermore, even assuming there was an error, it is clearly harmless. In applying

harmless error review, a federal habeas court must examine whether the error “had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v.

Abrahamson. 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). “Under this standard, an error is harmless unless

the ‘record review leaves the conscientious judge in grave doubt about the likely effect of

an error . . . (i.e.,) that, in the judge’s mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels

himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.’” Padilla v. Terhune. 309

F.3d 614, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting O’Neal v. McAninch. 513 U.S. 432,435 (1995)

and citing Kotteakos v. United States. 328 U.S. 750,765 (1946) (“[I]f one cannot say, with

fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action

from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is

impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected.”)

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1 Although the jury was not allowed to discuss what they were seeing amongst

themselves while they were viewing the videos, each time they viewed the videos they

immediately retired to the jury room where they were able to discuss what they had just

seen. They repeated that process several times, and were invited by the trial judge to do so

as often they felt necessary. Although that process was not as efficient as allowing the jury

to deliberate while watching the videos, there is nothing to suggest they were precluded

from examining and evaluating the evidence completely. Thus, there is no basis to find

the procedure “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence” on their verdict. Brecht.

507 U.S. at 623.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the state court adjudication of claim three is neither

contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, is

not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, and that any error is harmless.

The Court recommends habeas relief be denied as to claim three.

Claims Four and Five

Petitioner alleges in claim four that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his

statements to Dr. Greene because they were taken without Miranda warnings. (ECF No.

28 at 32-39.) His interview with Dr. Greene took place while he was in custody handcuffed

to an interrogation table, and he contends he was coerced into making the statements and

forced to testify at trial as a result. (Id.) He alleges in claim five that his trial counsel was

deficient in failing to object to the admission of the statements on Miranda grounds. (Id.

at 41.) He claims he was prejudiced by the admission of his incriminating statements

regarding the circumstances of the fight, and by the highly prejudicial factors from his

personal history, including his issues with anger and frequent fighting. (Id.)

Respondent answers that these claims, and claims six through eight, are procedurally

defaulted because they were denied as untimely by the state court. (ECF No. 37-1 at 17-

19.) Petitioner replies that they are not defaulted because although the trial and appellate

court found them untimely, the state supreme court did not, and argues that he can excuse

any default. (ECF No. 50 at 3; ECF No. 56 at 4-21.)

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1 Petitioner first presented these claims to the state court in a habeas petition filed in

the superior court. (Lodgment No. 8.) That court denied the petition, stating:

In this case, though he included Judicial Council Form MC-275 in his

paperwork, Petitioner has utterly failed to make proper use of it, which is

mandatory for self-represented inmates in the absence of a showing of good

cause. (California Rules of Court rule 4.551, subd. (a)(1), (a)(2).) Petitioner

offers no explanation for this omission, and the court declines to overlook it.

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7 More importantly, Petitioner offers no explanation for his delay of over

one year in bringing his petition, and also offers no explanation as to why the

matters of which he now complains, if they had merit, were not raised in the

trial court and/or in the Court of Appeal, where he was represented by new

counsel.

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11 (Lodgment No. 9, In re Gonzalez. No. EHC01959, order at 1-2.)

Petitioner then presented the claims to the state appellate court in a habeas petition.

(Lodgment No. 10.) The appellate court denied the petition, stating as relevant to claims

four and five here:

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15 Gonzalez is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. The petition, filed more

than three years after sentencing without any explanation for the delay, is

barred as untimely. (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 459; In re Swain

(1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 302.) The Miranda-based claims are further barred

because Gonzalez could have raised them on direct appeal, but did not. (In re

Reno, supra, at p.490; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759.) “In this state

a defendant is not permitted to try out his contentions piecemeal by successive

proceedings attacking the validity of the judgment against him.” (In re

Connor (1940) 16 Cal.2d 701, 705.)

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Even if Gonzalez’s claims were not procedurally barred, they would be

rejected on the merits. The claims based on alleged failure to provide Miranda

warnings are frivolous. Such warnings are required only in the context of

“custodial interrogation,” which means “questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” (Miranda, supra,

384 U.S. at p. 444, italics added.) Dr. Greene was retained by defense counsel

to examine Gonzalez to determine whether any psychiatric problems,

including intoxication, contributed to the crimes with which he was charged.

Gonzalez presents no evidence Dr. Greene was working for law enforcement.

“Absent evidence of complicity on the part of law enforcement officials, the

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1 admissions or statements of a defendant to a private citizen infringed no

constitutional guarantees.” (People v. Mangiefico (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d

1041, 1049.) In any event, once Gonzalez introduced testimony from Dr.

Greene on the intoxication defense, the prosecutor was permitted to introduce

evidence of statements Gonzalez made about the crimes during his

examination by Dr. Greene. {Kansas v. Cheever (2013) 571 U.S.__,__(134

S.Ct. 596, 602).) Because a Miranda objection to introduction of the

statements in Dr. Greene’s psychiatric report would properly have been

overruled, Gonzalez’s trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by

failing to make the objection. (See, e.g., People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324,

387 (“Counsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to make

motions or objections that counsel reasonably determines would be futile.”).)

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10 (Lodgment No. 11, In re Gonzalez. D069783, slip op. at 2.)

Finally, Petitioner presented the claims to the state supreme court in a habeas

petition. (Lodgment No. 12.) The court denied that petition with an order which stated:

“Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.” (Lodgment No. 13, In re Gonzalez. No.

S233162, order at 1.)

Petitioner contends that although the trial and appellate courts found his claims

untimely, they are not procedurally defaulted because the state supreme court did not

expressly do so in its silent denial. (ECF No. 50 at 19, citing Harris v. Reed. 489 U.S. 255,

263 (1989) (“[A] procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either

direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly

and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.”) (internal quotation

marks omitted)). However, as Petitioner recognizes (ECF No. 50 at 19), this Court must

apply a presumption that “[wjhere there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a

federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding thatjudgment orrejecting the same claim

rest upon the same ground.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-06; see also Bonner v. Carev. 425 F.3d

1145, 1148 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Ylst presumption to look through silent denial

of habeas petition by California Supreme Court to the lower state court habeas decision).

Petitioner argues the Court should look through the silent denial by the state supreme

court to the merits determination rather than to the untimeliness finding. (ECF No. 50 at

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1 19.) However, the fact that the state court alternately reached the merits ofthe claims does

not preclude the application of a procedural default in this Court. See Harris. 489 U.S. at

264 n.10 (“[A] state court need not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in the

alternative holding. ... as long as the state court explicitly invokes a state procedural bar

as a separate basis for decision. In this way, a state court may reach a federal question

without sacrificing its interests in finality, federalism, and comity.”) Thus, the Court

presumes that the state supreme court’s silent denial is based on the finding of untimeliness

by the appellate court as well as on the merits, and finds that a procedural default is not

precluded by the state court reaching the merits in the alternative.

In order to preclude federal review based on a procedural default, a state procedural

bar must rest on a state ground which is “independent” of federal law and “adequate” to

forever bar federal review. Coleman v. Thompson. 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991). To be

“independent” the state law basis for the decision must not be interwoven with federal law.

Michigan v. Long. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). In order to be “adequate,” the state

procedural bar must be “clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time ofthe

petitioner’s purported default.” Calderon v. Bean. 96 F.3d 1126,1129 (9th Cir. 1996). A

procedural default does not arise where a state court erroneously applies a state procedural

rule. Sivak v. Hardison. 658 F.3d 898, 907 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Lee v. Kemna. 534

U.S. 362, 375 (2002) (holding there are “exceptional cases in which exorbitant application

of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a

federal question.”)

Respondent has the initial burden of pleading as an affirmative defense that a failure

to satisfy a state procedural mle forecloses federal review. Bennett v. Mueller. 322 F.3d

573,586 (9th Cir. 2003). The burden then shifts to Petitionerto challenge the independence

or adequacy of the procedural bar. Id If Petitioner makes a sufficient showing, then the

ultimate burden of prooffalls on Respondent. Id.

Respondent has carried the Bennett burden with respect to the timeliness bar. See

Walker v. Martin. 562 U.S. 307, 312-21 (2011) (holding that California’s timeliness rule

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1 requiring that a petitioner must seek relief without “substantial delay” as “measured from

the time the petitioner or counsel knew, or should reasonably have known, of the

information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim,” is clearly

established and consistently applied); Bennett. 322 F.3d at 581 (“We conclude that because

the California untimeliness rule is not interwoven with federal law, it is an independent

state procedural ground.”) Accordingly, the burden has shifted to Petitioner to challenge

the independence or adequacy ofthe timeliness bar. Bennett. 322 F.3d at 586.

Petitioner can carry his burden by showing that the timeliness rule was erroneously

applied in his case. Sivak, 658 F.3d at 907; Kemna. 534 U.S. at 375. He attempts to do so

by arguing that he “essentially complied” with the state timeliness rule, and made a good

faith effort to do so, by writing to his appellate counsel and notifying her of his Miranda

concerns while briefing on his direct appeal was still in progress. (ECF No. 28 at 105; ECF

No. 50 at 19-20; ECF No. 56 at 5-7.) Although he did not present that evidence in his

superior court habeas petition filed on August 3, 2015, he included it in both subsequent

state habeas petitions. (Lodgment No. 10, Ex. E [ECF No. 38-3 at 61]; Lodgment No. 12,

Ex. E [ECF No. 38-5 at 64].) In addition, he told the trial judge at sentencing that he had

informed his trial counsel that he had never been read his Miranda rights and that he

intended to raise that issue on appeal. (RT 874.) The trial judge on September 10, 2012,

and appellate counsel in a letter dated August 30,2013, explained to Petitioner that because

no statement of his to law enforcement was introduced at trial, there was no basis for a

Miranda-based claim. (Id; Lodgment No. 12, Ex. E [ECF No. 38-5 at 64].)

Because Petitioner was aware ofhis Miranda-based claims (four and five) at the time

of sentencing, and aware his appellate counsel would not raise them on appeal, yet waited

almost two years after being informed they would not be raised on appeal to present them

to the state court, he has not carried his burden under Bennett as to claims four and five.

His contention that he had to wait for his direct appeal to end to present his claims all at

once (ECF No. 56 at 19), is also insufficient to carry his Bennett burden. The Court finds

claims four through eight are procedurally defaulted.

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1 The Court can still address the merits of the procedurally defaulted claims if

Petitioner can demonstrate cause for his failure to satisfy the state procedural rule and

prejudice arising from the default, or show that a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice would

result from the Court not reaching the merits ofthe defaulted claim. Coleman. 501 U.S. at

750. Petitioner attempts to do so by arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective

because she was aware of but failed to raise the Miranda claim (claim four), and that the

claims he raised in his state habeas petitions could not have been discovered earlier, despite

his exercise of reasonable diligence, because they were due to ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel which did not become apparent to him until after his direct appeal ended.

(ECF No. 56 at 11-19.) He also argues that a default of his claims in this Court would

amount to a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice because he is actually innocent of attempted

premeditated murder, as he should have been found guilty of a lesser offense such as simple

attempted murder which carries a maximum sentence of nine years rather than life in

prison. (Id. at 20-21.)

In order to determine ifPetitioner can show cause and prejudice to excuse the default

as to claim four alleging a Miranda violation, the Court would have to examine the merits

of claim five alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object on Miranda

grounds, and claim eight alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to

raise claims four through eight. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,488 (1986) (“[I]f the

procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment

itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the State.”) In addition,

because Petitioner proceeded pro se during his state habeas proceedings, he can establish

cause and prejudice with respect to his defaulted ineffective assistance of trial counsel

claims (claims five through seven), if he can establish that they are “substantial” claims.

See Martinez v. Rvan. 566 U.S. 1,17 (2012) (“Where, understate law, claims ofineffective

assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a

procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of

ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial review collateral proceeding, there was no

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1 counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.”) The Court must also assay the

merits of claims five through seven, alleging ineffective assistance oftrial counsel, in order

to determine ifthey present “substantial” claims sufficient to excuse their defaults. See id

at 14 (holding that a claim is “substantial” if the petitioner can show that “the claim has

some merit.”) In making that determination, the AEDPA limitation on expanding the

record does not apply. See Dickens v. Ryan. 740 F.3d 1302,1321 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)

(holding that a petitioner is “entitled to present evidence to demonstrate that there is

‘prejudice,’ that is that petitioner’s claim is ‘substantial’ under Martinez. Therefore, a

district court may take evidence to extent necessary to determine whether the petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance oftrial counsel is substantial under Martinez’")

The Ninth Circuit has indicated that: “Procedural bar issues are not infrequently

more complex than the merits issues presented by the appeal, so it may well make sense in

some instances to proceed to the merits ifthe result will be the same.” Franklin v. Johnson.

290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002), citing Lambrix v. Singletary. 520 U.S. 518, 525

(1997) (“We do not mean to suggest that the procedural-bar issue must invariably be

resolved first; only that it ordinarily should be.”) The Court must examine the merits of

claim five in order to determine if the default can be excused as to claims four and five,

must examine the merits of claim eight in order to determine ifthe default can be excused

as to claims four through seven, and can avoid addressing whether expansion ofthe record

under Martinez is necessary if it finds the procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of

counsel claims (claims five though seven) can be denied on the merits. Because these

claims clearly fail on the merits, the Court finds that the interests ofjudicial economy will

be better served by denying the procedurally defaulted claims on the merits without

determining whether Petitioner can excuse the default. Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1232.

Merits-claim four

Petitioner alleges in claim four that his statements to Dr. Greene were taken without

Miranda warnings while he was in custody handcuffed to an interrogation table, that he

was coerced into making the statements, and that he was forced to testify at trial as a result.

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1 (ECF No. 28 at 32-39.) He contends his defense counsel pressured him into talking to Dr.

Greene, and that Dr. Greene never told him his statements could be admitted into evidence.

(ECF No. 50 at 21.) He contends that because his statements were admitted against him at

trial, and “still being under psychological pressure for the sentence he was facing,

circumstances of the case and counsel telling petitioner it was the only way to go home,

petitioner testified at trial.” (Id.)

The Fifth Amendment provides that “no person . . . shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const, amend. V. It has been clearly

established for over 50 years that the “Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of

criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their

freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate

themselves.” Miranda. 384 U.S. at 467; Malloy v. Hogan. 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding

that “the Fifth Amendment’s exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.”)

Actions by private parties do not generally invoke constitutional protections. See

Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (“The most outrageous behavior by a

private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence

inadmissible under the Due Process Clause.”), citing Walter v. United States. 447 U.S. 649,

656 (1980) (“It has, of course, been settled since Burdeau v. McDowell. 256 U.S. 465

[1921] that a wrongful search or seizure by a private party does not violate the Fourth

Amendment and that such private wrongdoing does not deprive the government ofthe right

to use evidence that it has acquired lawfully.”) However, the Ninth Circuit has held that

Miranda may apply when the private person with whom the suspect is speaking is “acting

on behalf of the state.” Jones v. Cardwell. 686 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1982); Estelle v.

Smith. 451 U.S. 454, 464-68 (1981) (holding that a court appointed psychiatrist must

provide warnings and secure a waiver before examining a suspect if information is to be

used against him). To determine if Miranda warnings are appropriate in that situation, the

Court considers factors such whether there was a pre-existing agreement between the

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1 private individual and the police, whether the private individual was acting on his or her

own initiative, and whether there is a quid pro quo underlying the private individual’s

relationship with the state. United States v. Pace. 833 F.2d 1307,1313 (9th Cir. 1987).

The state appellate court’s determination that Miranda warnings were not required

because Petitioner was questioned by an expert witness retained by defense counsel rather

than law enforcement officials, is consistent with clearly established federal law. See

Smith, 451 U.S. at 468 (“A criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric

evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to

respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him.”) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the Court recommends denying claim four on the merits because the state

court adjudication of the claim is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. Id. Nor is there any basis to find that the

factual findings upon which the state court adjudication of this claim rests are objectively

unreasonable. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.

Merits-claim five

Petitioner alleges in claim five that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

in failing to object to the admission of his statements to Dr. Greene on the basis they were

obtained without Miranda warnings. (ECF No. 28 at 41.) He contends he was prejudiced

by his incriminating statements to Dr. Greene regarding the circumstances ofthe fight and

the highly prejudicial factors from his personal history, including his issues with anger and

his frequent fighting. (Id.)

As quoted above, the state appellate court determined that because any objection on

Miranda grounds would have been overruled, defense counsel did not render deficient

representation due to a failure to object. That determination is consistent with the clearly

established federal law discussed above precluding the need for Miranda warnings absent

a relationship between Dr. Greene and law enforcement. Petitioner has failed to show his

trial counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

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1 Petitioner has also failed to show that counsel’s alleged deficient performance

prejudiced the defense because he has failed to demonstrate “a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694; Richter. 562 U.S. at

110 (“Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if it ‘so undermined the proper

functioning ofthe adversarial process’ that the defendant was denied a fair trial.”), quoting

Strickland. 466 U.S. at 686. There is no such probability here because, as the state court

correctly observed, an objection based on Miranda would have been overruled.

Petitioner requests expansion of the record to include the transcript of a pre-trial

hearing where the trial judge asked defense counsel for an offer of proof regarding Dr.

Greene’s testimony, and defense counsel replied:

He is going to offer opinions that are based upon his understanding of

the amount of alcohol consumed by Mr. Gonzalez; that he had impairment on

the day of the incident; that the alcohol impaired his ability to perceive, his

ability to judge, et cetera. That is basically it. He is not going to say that he

didn’t have the mental intent at the time of the incident. But with the

impairment and the alcohol, that his ability to deliberate and so forth is

impacted, [f] He is not going to testify to the ultimate fact as to whether or

not he had - at the time of the incident, he did not have the mental intent to

kill or to premeditate, deliberate, et cetera.

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Petitioner appears to claim that if he had been advised of his right to remain silent,

he would not have made the incriminating statements to Dr. Greene which the prosecutor

elicited from Petitioner on cross-examination, and defense counsel still could have

introduced Dr. Greene’s opinion regarding the effect alcohol has on a person’s judgment

and perception. However, Dr. Greene’s testimony went beyond a general opinion on the

effects of alcohol. He opined that Petitioner was likely being truthful about the amount of

alcohol he consumed that night, and that such an amount would cause a person to act

irrationally and impulsively, and impairtheirjudgment, memory and mental capacity. (RT

559-61,565-69,605,613-14.) He also opined that Petitioner was being truthful with regard

to his selective memory loss, which was a very important issue with regard to intent. (RT

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1 551, 606-07, 617.) Because Dr. Greene could not have provided those opinions without

interviewing Petitioner, there is no support for Petitioner’s claim that defense counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by allowing Dr. Greene to interview Petitioner without

Miranda warnings. See Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689 (“There are countless ways to provide

effective assistance of counsel in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys

would not defend a particular client the same way.”)

In light ofthe admonishment by the Supreme Court that “[t]he standards created by

Strickland and section 2254(d) are both highly deferential and when the two apply in

tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so,” Richter. 562 U.S. at 105, and that the standards are

“difficult to meet” and “demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the

doubt,” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181, it is clear that the state court determination that

Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance by trial counsel’s failure to object to the

admission of his statements to Dr. Greene on Miranda grounds is neither contrary to, nor

involves an unreasonable application of, Strickland. There is no basis to find that the

factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication ofthis claim rests are objectively

unreasonable. Miller-El. 537 U.S. at 340.

Conclusion-claims four and five

In sum, the Court finds that claims four and five are procedurally defaulted, and that

judicial economy counsels in favor ofreaching the merits ofthe claims without determining

whether Petitioner can overcome the default because, even assuming he could make such

a showing, he is not entitled to habeas relief as the state court adjudication ofthese claims

is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court

recommends habeas relief be denied as to claims four and five.

Claim Six

Petitioner alleges in claim six that he received ineffective assistance oftrial counsel

due to counsel’s failure to object when the prosecutor said in his opening statement and

closing argument that Bonesi lifted Petitioner offthe victim, and when the prosecutor asked

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Petitioner on cross-examination if Bonesi had lifted him off the victim. (ECF No. 28 at

43-47.) Respondent answers that this claim is procedurally defaulted due to the state court

denial of the claim as untimely. (ECF No. 37-1 at 17-19.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in a habeas petition which

was summarily denied. (Lodgment Nos. 12-13.) He previously presented the claim to the

appellate court in a habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 10.) That court denied the petition as

untimely, and then reached the merits in an alternate ruling. (Lodgment No. 11.)

For the same reasons set forth above with respect to claims four and five, the Court

finds that this claim is procedurally defaulted because it was denied by the state court as

untimely. Also as discussed above with respect to claim five, the Court finds that judicial

economy counsels in favor ofreaching the merits ofthe claim without determining whether

Petitioner can overcome the default because it clearly fails on its merits.

The Court will look through the silent denial by the state supreme court to the

appellate court order, which stated:

As forthe failure to object to statements ofthe prosecutor and witnesses

that Gonzalez was pulled offthe victim, Gonzalez neither identifies any basis

for a meritorious objection nor explains how the exclusion ofthose statements

would have led to a better outcome.

(Lodgment No. 11, In re Gonzalez. D069783, slip op. at 3.)

Petitioner has not demonstrated deficient performance by his trial counsel’s failure

to object to the prosecutor’s comment because prosecutors are free to argue “reasonable

inferences from the evidence.” United States v. Gray. 876 F.2d 1411,1417 (9th Cir. 1989).

Bonesi testified that he approached Petitioner and tapped him on the shoulder just before

Petitioner got up by himself. (RT 337.) Bonesi identified himself on the video from the

restaurant next door as the man who is seen running into the scene, getting down behind

the car Petitioner and Hicks had fallen behind, and then standing up and throwing Petitioner

ahead of him just before he and Petitioner are seen running away. (RT 338-39.) Gray

testified that he witnessed Bonesi grab Petitioner by the back ofthe shirt and pull Petitioner

off Hicks. (RT 185.)

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1 Petitioner requests the record be expanded to include the transcript of a pre-trial

hearing where the prosecutor argued that Bonesi should not be allowed to testify as to why

he pulled Petitioner off Hicks during the fight, which defense counsel indicated was in

order to save Petitioner from being tased by Gray, on the basis that it was improper opinion

evidence, speculative, lacked foundation, and could trigger an accomplice instruction.

(ECF No. 54 at 4-7; see Lodgment No. 12 [ECF No. 38-5 at 87-90] for complete transcript.)

The prosecutor stated that Bonesi had agreed to testify pursuant to a cooperation agreement

(although he was ultimately called as a defense witness), having already pleaded guilty to

a misdemeanor charge of accessory after the fact. (Id.) The trial judge deferred ruling on

any objections until Bonesi testified. (Id.) Petitioner attached the transcript pages here and

to his state habeas petitions. (Id.; Lodgment No. 8 [ECF No. 38-1 at 109-16]; Lodgment

No. 10 [ECF No. 38-3 at 87-92]; Lodgment No. 12 [ECF No. 38-5 at 87-90].)

Expansion of the record is unnecessary to the resolution ofthis claim because Gray

testified that he witnessed Bonesi grab Petitioner and pull him off Hicks. (RT 185.) Thus,

irrespective of Bonesi’s actual or proffered testimony, there was no basis for an objection

to the prosecutor’s statements that Bonesi picked Petitioner up off Hicks to end the fight

because Gray testified he saw that happen. Although Bonesi denied pulling Petitioner off

Hicks at trial, he testified that he gave Petitioner “sort of a little push” ahead of him before

they ran offtogether. (RT 338.) Accordingly, the prosecutor did not make an objectionable

statement when he told the jury in opening statements that the evidence would show that

Bonesi picked Petitioner up off of Hicks, argued to the jury in closing that the evidence

had shown just that, and when he asked Petitioner on cross-examination if that is what

happened. Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to

make a frivolous objection to those statements and that question, particularly in light ofthe

fact that an overruled objection might have brought unwanted attention to whether

Petitioner had to be pulled off Hicks. See Matvlinskv v. Budge. 577 F.3d 1083,1091 (9th

Cir. 2009) (holding that a petitioner must overcome a “heavy burden of proving that

counsel’s assistance was neither reasonable nor the result of sound trial strategy.”)

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Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate prejudice arising from the failure to make such a

baseless objection because he has failed to demonstrate “a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Richter, 562 U.S. at

110 (“Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if it ‘so undermined the proper

functioning ofthe adversarial process’ that the defendant was denied a fair trial.”), quoting

Strickland. 466 U.S. at 686. Accordingly, the state court adjudication of this claim is

neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, Strickland. Neither is

there any basis to show that the factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication

ofthis claim rests are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.

The Court finds that claim six is procedurally defaulted, and that judicial economy

counsels in favor of denying the claim on the merits without making a determination

whether Petitioner can overcome the default because, assuming Petitioner could make such

a showing, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief since the state court adjudication of

this claim is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

The Court finds that expansion ofthe record is unnecessary because the requested transcript

is in the record. The Court recommends habeas relief be denied as to claim six.

Claim Seven

Petitioner alleges in claim seven that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

due to trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication causing

unconsciousness. (ECF No. 28 at 49-52.) Petitioner argues counsel should have requested

a modified version of California Jury Instmction 626, which states: “When a person

voluntarily causes his or her own intoxication to the point of unconsciousness, the person

assumes the risk that while unconscious he or she will commit acts inherently dangerous

to human life. Ifsomeone dies as a result ofthe actions of a person who was unconscious

due to voluntary intoxication, then the killing is involuntary manslaughter.” (Id. at 102-

04.) He contends that if the jury found that he blacked out during the killing, they would

not have found premeditation and deliberation had they been so instmcted. (Id. at 51.)

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1 Respondent answers that review of this claim is precluded as procedurally defaulted

because the state court found the claim untimely. (ECF No. 37-1 at 17-19.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in a habeas petition which

was summarily denied. (Lodgment Nos. 12-13.) He previously presented the claim to the

appellate court in a habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 10.) That court denied the petition as

untimely, and then reached the merits in an alternate ruling. (Lodgment No. 11.)

For the same reasons set forth above, the Court finds that this claim is procedurally

defaulted, and, because the claim clearly fails on its merits, thatjudicial economy counsels

in favor of denying the claim on the merits instead of making a determination whether

Petitioner can overcome the default. The Court will look through the silent denial by the

state supreme court to the appellate court order, which stated:

As for the failure of trial counsel to request a jury instruction on

unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication (CALCRIM No. 626),

Gonzalez identifies no substantial evidence he was unconscious when he

repeatedly stabbed the victim. (See People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353,

424 (no duty to instruct on unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication

when there “was no quantum satis of evidence to warrant an instruction”).) It

also does not appearthe failure to request the instruction caused any prejudice,

for the jury found Gonzalez guilty of willful, deliberate, and premeditated

attempted murder even though other instructions (CALCRIM Nos. 601 &

3426) advised the jury his voluntary intoxication could have prevented the

deliberation and premeditation required to find him guilty.

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The appellate court correctly observed that there was no evidence Petitioner was

unconscious at any point during the events due to his voluntary intoxication. In fact, the

only evidence of intoxication was his testimony and the testimony of his friend Bonesi.

Even assuming the jury believed their testimony regarding how much alcohol they had

consumed, and credited Dr. Greene’s testimony that it was enough to impair Petitioner’s

memory and judgment, Petitioner did not testify that he was ever unconscious, and there

was no evidence of unconsciousness. Although he testified he could not remember certain

events, eyewitness testimony and the video evidence does not support a finding he ever

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lost consciousness. The fight was brief, and other than when Petitioner was out ofsight of

the video on the ground repeatedly stabbing Hicks, it is obvious from the video as described

by the appellate court that Petitioner was conscious the entire time. Gray testified as to

Petitioner’s behavior while he was not visible on the video, and said that Petitioner was on

top of Hicks stabbing him repeatedly. (RT 181-85.) Bonesi testified that Petitioner and

Hicks were on the ground fighting up until Bonesi tapped Petitioner on the shoulder and

Petitioner disengaged. (RT 336-37.) There was insufficient evidence of unconsciousness

to support the instruction. People v. Rogers. 39 Cal.4th 826, 888 (2006) (“Defendant’s

professed inability to recall the event, without more, was insufficient to warrant an

unconsciousness instruction.”) Petitioner has provided no basis for the Court to expand

the record to include the videos, which were described by the appellate court, by the

attorneys in argument, and during examination of the witnesses, because he has made no

showing as to how they support this or any other claim presented in the Petition.

Because there is insufficient evidence that Petitioner was unconscious, he has not

shown his trial counsel was deficient in failing to request an instruction regarding voluntary

intoxication causing unconsciousness. See Matvlinskv. 577 F.3d at 1091 (holding that a

petitioner must overcome a “heavy burden of proving that counsel’s assistance was neither

reasonable nor the result of sound trial strategy.”); see also Knowles v. Mizavance. 556

U.S. Ill, 122 (2009) (holding that defense counsel was not deficient in abandoning a

defense with “almost no chance of success” even though there was “nothing to lose” by

raising the defense). Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate “a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome” arising from his trial counsel’s failure to request an

instruction for which there was no evidentiary support, and therefore cannot satisfy the

prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694; see also

Richter, 562 U.S. at 110 (“Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if it ‘so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process’ that the defendant was

denied a fair trial.”), quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 686. The state court adjudication of

this claim is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, Strickland.

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Neither is there any basis to show that the factual findings upon which the state court

adjudication of this claim rests are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.

The Court finds that claim seven is procedurally defaulted, and thatjudicial economy

counsels in favor of denying the claim on the merits without determining whether Petitioner

can overcome the default because the state court adjudication of the claim is neither

contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court recommends

relief be denied as to claim seven.

H. Claim Eight

Petitioner alleges in claim eight that he received ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel in failing to raise claims four through seven on appeal. (ECF No. 28 at 54.)

Respondent answers that this claim is procedurally defaulted because it was denied as

untimely in the state court. (ECF No. 37-1 at 17-19.)

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in a habeas petition which

was summarily denied. (Lodgment Nos. 12-13.) He previously presented the claim to the

appellate court in a habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 10.) That court denied the petition as

untimely, and then reached the merits in an alternate ruling. (Lodgment No. 11.)

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds this claim is procedurally defaulted,

and, because it clearly fails on the merits, judicial economy counsels in favor ofreaching

the merits rather than determining whether Petitioner can overcome the default. The Court

will look through the state supreme court order to the appellate court order, which stated:

Since these claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the

Miranda-based claims raised by Gonzalez have no merit, appellate counsel

did not provide ineffective assistance by notraising the claims on appeal. (See

In re Smith (1970) 3 Cal.3d 192, 202 (appellate counsel must “raise crucial

assignments of error, which arguably might have resulted in a reversal”); In

re Richardson (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 647, 660 (no ineffective assistance

when appellate counsel’s “decision not to raise the argument . . . was

reasonable”).)

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1 It is an objectively reasonable application of Strickland for the state court to find that

Petitioner’s appellate counsel was entitled to make a tactical decision not to raise weak and

unsupported claims. See Turner v. Calderon. 281 F.3d 851,872 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining

that the Strickland standard applies to claims ofineffective assistance of appellate counsel);

Miller v. Keeney. 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that appellate counsel has

no constitutional obligation to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal because “[i]n many

instances, appellate counsel will fail to raise an issue because she foresees little or no

likelihood of success on that issue; indeed, the weeding out of weaker issues is widely

recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.”) It is clear from the

discussion of claims four through seven above that it was objectively reasonable for the

state court to find that appellate counsel was not deficient in failing to raise those claims

on appeal. See Gustave v. United States. 627 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1980) (“There is no

requirement that an attorney appeal issues that are clearly untenable.”); Woods v. Etherton,

576 U.S.,, 136 S.Ct. 1146,1152-53 (2016) (finding no Strickland prejudice arising

from appellate counsel’s failure to raise claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

where there was no Strickland prejudice arising from trial counsel’s alleged error).

The Court finds that claim eight is procedurally defaulted, and thatjudicial economy

counsels in favor ofdenying the claim on the merits without determining whether Petitioner

can overcome the default because the state court adjudication is neither contrary to, nor

involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and is not based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court recommends habeas relief be

denied as to claim eight.

E. Claim Nine

Petitioner contends in his final claim he was denied access to the courts by the denial

of his state habeas petitions as untimely because they were in fact timely. (ECF No. 28 at

56.) Respondent answers that this claim is without merit because the timeliness finding is

correct, and Petitioner was not denied access to the courts because his state habeas petitions

were filed, and his claims considered and denied on the merits. (ECF No. 37-1 at 19.)

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1 Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in a habeas petition which

was summarily denied. (Lodgment Nos. 12-13.) He previously presented the claim to the

state appellate court in a habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 10.) That court denied the

petition as untimely, and then reached the merits in an alternate ruling, stating:

Finally, this court does not address Gonzalez’s challenge to the superior

court’s order denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus he filed in that

court. That order is not appealable or otherwise reviewable by this court. (In

re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767, fn. 7; In re Crow (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613,

621, fn. 8.)

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The United States Supreme Court has found that California’s timeliness rule, which

requires that a petitionerseek reliefwithout “substantial delay” as “measured fromthe time

the petitioner or counsel knew, or should reasonably have known, of the information

offered in support ofthe claim and the legal basis for the claim,” is clearly established and

consistently applied. Walker. 562 U.S. at 312-21. As the state appellate court observed,

Petitioner waited over three years after he was sentenced to raise his trial error claims in

his appellate court habeas petition. He has not identified an error in the appellate court’s

application of its timeliness mle, but even if he could, there is no federal due process

violation because his claims were addressed on the merits despite the state procedural bar.

See e.g. Estelle. 502 U.S. at 72 (holding that to merit federal habeas relief based on an error

ofstate law, the petitioner must show that the error, considered in the context ofthe record

as a whole, so infected the entire proceedings that the conviction violated due process).

The Court finds that the state court adjudication of claim nine is neither contrary to,

nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and is not

based on an unreasonable determination ofthe facts. Accordingly, the Court recommends

denying habeas relief as to claim nine.

Evidentiary Hearing/Expansion of the Record

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 50 at 3-4.) He also requests

expansion of the record to include the videos which were introduced at trial, and the

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1 transcripts of the pre-trial motions involving the admissibility of Bonesi’s testimony and

the offer of proofregarding Dr. Greene’s opinion testimony, both discussed above, which

Petitioner contends will help with an evidentiary hearing, and because he “believes they

are important so that this court can have a full concept for the case and claims.” (ECF No.

57 at 1-3; ECF No. 54 at 4-6; ECF No. 59 at 1-3.) As discussed above, Petitioner has not

shown how the additional transcripts (which Petitioner has placed before this Court in any

case), or the video exhibits, would assist in the resolution of any claim. The Court

recommends denying Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing and expansion of the

record because, even assuming the allegations in the Petition are true, the state court record

presently before the Court provides an adequate basis to adjudicate his claims. See

Campbell v. Wood. 18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that an evidentiary hearing

is not necessary where the federal claim can be denied on the basis ofthe state court record,

and where the allegations, even iftrue, do not provide a basis for relief).

IV. CONCLUSION

For all ofthe foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and

(2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 10. 2017. any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than December 1,2017. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan. 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst. 951 F.2d 1153, 1156mCir. 1991).

Dated: Octobe^^., 2017 //, //TV )

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Hon. Kiren S. Crawford

United States Magistrate Judge 8

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