Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01729/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01729-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE ALONZO PINA, Civil No. 09-1729 L (POR)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THAT PETITION FOR HABEAS

CORPUS BE DENIED

[Document No. 1]

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary,

Respondent.

I. Introduction

Petitioner Jose Alonzo Pina, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction in San Diego Superior

Court. (Doc 1.) Petitioner claims he is entitled to habeas relief because (1) the evidence was

insufficient to convict him of second-degree murder (Ground Two), and (2) because the trial judge

improperly instructed the jury on (i) aiding and abetting (Ground One), (ii) reasonable doubt

(Ground Three) , and (iii) evaluating circumstantial evidence (Ground Four). (Id.) 

Respondent filed an Answer, requesting the Court deny the Petition. (Doc. 11.) Respondent

contends the Court should deny the Petition because the California Court of Appeal rejected

Petitioner’s claims, and the appellate court’s decisions were consistent with federal law and

reasonable in light of the evidence. (Doc. 11 at 1.) 

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 In his Traverse, Petitioner asserts this statement is false. Petitioner contends at trial, Jose

testified he did not see Petitioner “make any phone calls and that to his knowledge, there were no

phones in [the] Pina home.” (Doc. 19 at 4.) 

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After a thorough review of the Petition, Answer, Traverse, and all supporting documents, the

Court finds Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested. Accordingly, the Court

RECOMMENDS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion in People v.

Pina, 2008 WL 755067, *1-3 (Cal. App. March 20, 2008). (Lodgment 6 at 2-6.) The Court

presumes these factual determinations are correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1). 

In 2003 Jose Cardona, Sr., and his 17-year-old son Jose Cardona, Jr. (Jose), moved in with

Cardona’s girlfriend Guadalupe Diane Pina (Diane). Appellant (Jose Pina) lived with his

mother Diane at her house in the Logan Heights section of San Diego with his two sisters

and a brother. Diane’s two older children, Alicia and Alfredo, lived elsewhere.

Cardona and Diane often had loud but not physically violent arguments about money. 

Eventually, Cardona and Jose moved into a trailer in Diane’s backyard but continued to eat

and shower in the house. Diane and Cardona continued to argue about money.

In the late morning of December 21, 2004, Jose left the trailer to go to the house. As he

walked up the backstairs, he and appellant [Pina] bumped shoulders. Jose apologized. 

Appellant asked Jose why he was being disrespectful. Appellant, looking angry, asked Jose

what he wanted to do. Jose responded with the same threatening question. 

Cardona came out of the house and asked why appellant was trying to fight Jose. Cardona

asked appellant if he wanted to fight him. Appellant and Cardona argued. Appellant told

Cardona to “pack his stuff.” Cardona replied he would pack his stuff when he wanted to. As

the two yelled at each other, appellant stated he was going to call his brother Alfredo.1

Diane came out of the house and began yelling at Cardona, telling him he was not wanted

there and for him to get his stuff and leave. After five or ten minutes, the yelling subsided. 

Diane and appellant, however, continued telling Cardona to get out. Cardona told Jose they

would leave. At some point, Diane said” “Oh, you’re gonna leave one way or another.” 

After a few minutes, a vehicle pulled up and Alfredo came out the back door of the house. 

He first talked with Diane and appellant. With Alfredo’s arrival, the yelling started again. 

Alfredo told Cardona to get his stuff and get out. Cardona replied he would get his stuff

when he wanted to. When it was clear Cardona was not leaving, Alfredo said: “All right,

then. All right.” Alfredo left the house, saying he would be back. 

Cardona and Jose walked to the trailer. Cardona told Jose to go to a friend’s house until

things calmed down. As Jose was leaving, appellant told him not to be surprised if he saw

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 In his Traverse, Petitioner asserts this statement is false. Petitioner contends at trial, Jose

testified he could not remember who made the comment referring to the 8 o’clock news. (Doc. 19 at

4.) 

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his father on the 8 o’clock news.2 As Jose left the house through the back gate, he saw

Alfredo get into a blue van he knew belonged to the mother of Alfredo’s girlfriend. Alfredo

drove away quickly. 

After Jose left, Cardona went to the home of a next-door neighbor, Joseph Leakes. Leakes

heard the yelling at Diane’s house. Cardona told Leakes that one of Diane’s sons was going

to get his “buddies.”

Cardona then went to the home of another neighbor, Annie Ridgell. Cardona arrived around

noon. He told Ridgell he had an argument with Diane and her sons and that they were giving

him a bad time. 

At approximately 1:45 p.m., Alma Eleuterio, who lived across the alley from the rear of 

Diane’s house, heard four gunshots. She then heard someone say, “You fucked me up,” and

then heard someone respond, “That is what you wanted.” 

Leakes also heard shots. When he went to the fence to investigate, he saw Cardona on the

ground in the alley moaning. Leakes called the police and stayed with Cardona until help

arrived. Through the gate to the Pinas’ backyard Leakes could see Jose Palacios, a friend of

appellant, sitting on Cardona’s trailer. 

On the afternoon of December 21, 2004, Jose Martinez was working on his truck several

houses down the alley from Diane’s house. Martinez saw a blue van drive up the alley. 

Some time later he heard a loud popping sound. Four or five houses down the alley he saw a

man standing near the blue van. The man was pointing a shotgun at another man. The van

was parked immediately behind Diane’s rear yard with its passenger side facing a gate

leading from the yard to the alley. The man pumped the gun to reload it. Martinez looked

away to tell his younger brother to get in the garage. As he did so, he heard a second shot. 

When he looked back, he saw a man on the ground. The shooter straddled him, pumped the

gun again and fired a third shot at the man. 

The shooter then went to the driver’s side of the van. The man on the ground tried to get up

and move to a gate to one of the houses. As he did so, a second assailant came from the

passenger side of the van and punched and kicked Cardona in the face, head and upper body. 

The shooter called to the second assailant to get in the van. He did so and the van drove off.

Martinez was unable to positively identify the assailants but was able to describe the shooter

as a Mexican man about five feet, eight inches to five feet, ten inches tall, 180 to 200 pounds

in weight with a stocky build, bald or with very short hair, “rough shaven,” and wearing

black pants and a brown flannel shirt. The second assailant was also a Mexican man, again

five feet, eight inches to five feet, ten inches tall but lighter in weight, 160 to 180 pounds,

clean shaven, with short hair, wearing a white shirt and dark pants with lighter skin and hair

a little longer than the shooter’s. 

When shown a picture of appellant taken at the time of his arrest in March 2005, Martinez

stated appellant looked similar to the second assailant with regard to his facial

characteristics, skin color, height, and weight. 

Cardona died at the scene from three shotgun wounds, one to the torso, one to the abdomen,

and one to the left leg. He also suffered two stab wounds to the back of the head. He had

abrasions on his face, abdomen and leg consistent with being struck by a hard object or from

falling to the ground. 

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About 9:30 p.m. on the evening of Cardona’s death, officers went to Alfredo’s apartment and

found a van fitting the description of the one used in the crime. The van was owned by the

mother of Alfredo’s girlfriend and Alfredo occasionally used it. 

The day after the murder, persons at Alfredo’s workplace were interviewed. They stated that

around 12:45 p.m. the day of the crime Alfredo received a call at work. He told his

supervisor he had to leave to take care of business but would return. Alfredo was gone about

an hour, returning around 2:00 p.m. 

Handwritten entries, however, on Alfredo’s time card represented he was working from

12:59 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. and took a break from 1:30 to 1:45 p.m. Alfredo’s supervisor, who

was familiar with Alfredo’s handwriting, testified the handwriting on the time card appeared

to be Alfredo’s. Generally, Alfredo punched in and out using a time clock. 

B. Procedural Background 

On April 24, 2006, a jury convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder. (Lodgment 6 at 1.) 

The court sentenced Petitioner to a prison term of 36 years to life. (Id.) Petitioner appealed to the

California Court of Appeal, alleging: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his second-degree

murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on aiding and abetting, the

evaluation of circumstantial evidence, and reasonable doubt; and (3) cumulative error. (Lodgment. 6

at 1-2.) On March 20, 2008, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. (Lodgment. 6

at 1.) Petitioner then appealed to the California Supreme Court on the same grounds by filing a

petition for review. (Lodgment 7.) On July 9, 2008, his petition was denied without comment. 

(Lodgment 8.) 

On August 7, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal

court. (Doc. 1.) On November 11, 2009, Respondent filed an Answer, requesting the Court deny

the Petitioner. (Doc. 11.) On January 26, 2010, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (Doc. 19.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). As amended, the AEDPA now reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the application of the claim–

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). 

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). With regard to § 2254(d)(1), the threshold

question is whether the rule of law was clearly established at the time petitioner’s state court

conviction became final. Id. at 406. Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 71 (2003). However, Ninth Circuit case law may be "persuasive authority for purposes of

determining whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme

Court law, and also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly established.’" Duhaime v.

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 2000). Only after the clearly established federal law is

identified can the court determine whether the state court’s application of that law "resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of" that clearly established

federal law. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72. 

A state court decision is "contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases" or "if the state court confronts

a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless

arrives at a result different from our precedent." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state-court

decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent if the state court identifies 

the correct governing legal rule from this Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the 

particular state prisoner’s case" or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle

from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that

principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 407. Under Williams, an application of

federal law is unreasonable only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409. 

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3

 For the sake of clarity, this Court will address the sufficiency of evidence ground first, and then the three jury

instruction grounds.

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Further, with regard to § 2254(d)(2), a state court’s decision results in a "decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in State court

proceeding" if it "is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists." 

 Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

The instant Petition raises four grounds for relief: (1) the trial court misinstructed the jury

when it instructed that an aider and abettor need not be present at the crime (Doc. 1 at 4, 8-11 ); (2)

the evidence was insufficient to sustain Petitioner’s conviction (Doc. 1 at 4, 12-14); (3) the trial

court misinstructed the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt (Doc. 1 at 5, 15-18); and (4) the

trial court’s modification of CALCRIM No. 225 misled the jury on the evaluation of circumstantial

evidence (Doc. 1 at 5, 19-21.)3

Respondent contends the Court should deny the Petition because the California Court of

Appeal’s rejection of each of Petitioner’s claims was consistent with federal law and based on a

reasonable interpretation of the facts. (Doc. 11 at 9.) 

In his Traverse, Petitioner contends the state court’s conclusions were unreasonable and

inconsistent with federal constitutional law. (Doc. 19.) 

A. Ground Two: Insufficiency of the Evidence

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction

for second degree murder. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Specifically, Petitioner contends there was “no physical

evidence, no weapons were recovered, no finger prints [sic], no DNA, and no positive identification

by the sole eye witness to tie Petitioner to the crime.” (Id.) Furthermore, Petitioner contends, “the

circumstantial evidence was so weak that it raised no more than a mere suspicion of his

involvement.” (Id.)

Respondent contends the California Court of Appeal reasonably determined the facts and

applied the relevant law in concluding the evidence was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction

for murder. (Doc. 11 at 19-21.)

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4

 The California Court of Appeal applied a legal standard equivalent to the constitutional standard enunciated in

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 324.

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When a challenge is brought alleging insufficient evidence, federal habeas corpus relief is

available only if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). Under Jackson, this standard must

be applied with reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. 

Id. at 324 n.16. Further, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction and prove

specific intent, and the reviewing court is required to uphold the conviction even if “[i]nferences to

the contrary would also be rational.” Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 341 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state's highest court, the Court "looks through"

to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). As

there was no reasoned decision from the California Supreme Court, the Court "looks through" to the

decision of the California Court of Appeal, which held the evidence was sufficient to convict

Petitioner of second degree murder. (Lodgment 6 at 7-9.)

In the last reasoned state court decision, the California Court of Appeal held that, in viewing

the record in a light favorable to the judgment, a reasonable trier of fact could find the elements of

second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Carter, 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1156 (2005).4

First, the appellate court found the evidence that Petitioner’s brother was the shooter was extremely

strong. (Lodgment 6 at 7.) Second, the appellate court noted the evidence was sufficient to prove

Petitioner aided and abetted the murder. (Id.) Specifically, the court discussed the following: (1)

Petitioner, his mother, and his brother had a heated argument with the victim the day of the murder;

(2) Petitioner was an active participant in the argument the day of the murder, telling the victim’s

son to not be surprised if he saw his father on the 8 o’clock news; (3) although an eye-witness could

not identify Petitioner as the second assailant, the eye-witness stated Petitioner looked similar to the

second assailant involved in the murder; (4) the jury could reasonably conclude that the “coup de

grace nature” of the stabbing and kicking was the anger driven reaction of Petitioner; and (5)

because the second assailant did not appear until after the shooting, the jury could conclude the

second man was Petitioner, who hearing the shots in the alley, walked through the gate from his

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 Although the Court of Appeal applied People v. Carter, 36 Cal.4th at 1156, the legal standard enunciated therein

is the equivalent to the constitutional standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 324.

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mother’s backyard around the front of the van and assaulted the victim. (Id. at 7-9.) Accordingly,

the Court of Appeal held the evidence was sufficient to convict Petitioner of second degree murder. 

(Id. at 9.) 

The Court of Appeal’s application of Jackson5

 was neither an unreasonable application of

federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. As required by Jackson, in reviewing the

record in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found proof of

Petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. At trial, the prosecution

presented circumstantial evidence to prove Petitioner was guilty of second degree murder. Jose

Cardona, Jr., the victim’s son, testified that the dispute on the day of the crime began with bumping

between himself and Petitioner. (Lodgment 2, Vol. 6 at 828-836.) Jose Cardona, Jr., testified that

Petitioner became angry and wanted to fight, first with him, and then with the victim. (Id.) 

Detective Kenneth William Brown further testified that just before the shooting, Petitioner told Jose,

Jr. something to the effect of “Don’t be surprised if your dad is on the 8 o’clock news.” (RT 1513-

15, 1530). 

Further, although eye-witness Martinez never made a positive identification of Petitioner as

the knife attacker, when shown a picture of Petitioner, Martinez stated the picture was similar to the

person he had seen in facial characteristics, skin color, and weight. (RT 773-75, 790-99, 1531-32). 

At trial, Martinez testified that Petitioner’s face, skin color, height and weight looked similar to the

knife attacker. (RT 799-800). Also, Martinez testified the knife attacker was wearing a white shirt

and dark pants on the day of the murder, which matched the description of what Petitioner had been

described as wearing that same day. (RT 730, 751-52, 786-87, 1518-20). Finally, Detective Brown

testified that the police searched for Petitioner for three months before arresting him, which could

have reasonably led the jury to infer Petitioner was hiding from the police, thereby demonstrating a

consciousness of guilt. (RT 1531-32, 1559-67.) 

Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, in presenting the foregoing evidence, the prosecution

showed Petitioner was the knife attacker. Furthermore, the absence of any evidence indicating

someone else had the motive or opportunity to assist Petitioner’s brother in the attack adds further

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support. Consequently, a rational trier of fact, considering Petitioner’s conduct and statements, as

well as other circumstantial evidence, in a light most favorable to the judgment, could find the

prosecution proved second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. 

Therefore, the state appellate court’s decision there was sufficient evidence to support a rational trier

of fact’s conclusion Petitioner committed second degree murder is neither an unreasonable

application of federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Id.) Accordingly, the

Court RECOMMENDS Ground Two of the Petition be DENIED.

B. Ground One, Three and Four: Improper Jury Instructions

In Grounds One, Three, and Four, Petitioner contends the trial court misinstructed the jury on

(I) aiding and abetting, (ii) reasonable doubt, and (iii) evaluating circumstantial evidence.

“In a criminal trial, the State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury instruction

violates due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement.” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S.

433, 437 (2004). “Nonetheless, not every ambiguity, inconsistency or deficiency in a jury

instruction rises to the level of a due process violation.” (Id.) Habeas relief can only be granted if

“‘the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,

147 (1973)). Moreover, a single jury instruction “may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must

be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” (Id.) 

When evaluating whether an ambiguous jury instruction rises to the level of constitutional

error, the Court must determine whether “‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied

the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990)). If so, the Court must consider “whether the instruction,

so understood, was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.” Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S.

141, 145 (1998). If a federal habeas court determines the trial court committed constitutional error

in instructing the jury, it must consider whether the error was harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619 (1993) (the standard for determining whether habeas relief must be granted is whether

the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict).

//

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6

 CALCRIM No. 401 holds: To prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that

crime, the People must prove that: 1 The perpetrator committed the crime; 2 The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended

to commit the crime; 3 Before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator

in committing the crime; AND 4 The defendant's words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator's commission of

the crime.

Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and he or she specifically

intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator's commission of that crime.

If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to actually have been present when the crime was

committed to be guilty as an aider and abettor.

[If you conclude that defendant was present at the scene of the crime or failed to prevent the crime, you may consider

that fact in determining whether the defendant was an aider and abettor. However, the fact that a person is present at the scene

of a crime or fails to prevent the crime does not, by itself, make him or her an aider and abettor.]

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1. Ground One: Aiding and Abetting Instruction

In Ground One, Petitioner contends the trial court’s instruction on aider-and-abettor liability,

CALCRIM No. 401,6

 was confusing and misleading, in that the instruction provides it is not

necessary that an aider be present at the crime. (Doc. 1 at 8-11.) Petitioner contends this portion of

the instruction was inconsistent with the prosecution’s theory of the case– that Petitioner was the

second assailant who stabbed the victim after he was fatally shot– and thereby should have been

redacted from the pattern instruction. (Id.)

Respondent contends the state court reasonably concluded the instruction on aiding and

abetting did not mislead or confuse the jury. (Doc. 11 at 21-25.) Although the Court of Appeal

criticized the trial court for not adopting the modification to the standard instruction proposed by

defense counsel, Respondent contends the Court correctly concluded the jury was properly

instructed on the law and was not likely to apply this law so as to convict Petitioner on an improper

factual theory. (Id.) 

The United States Supreme Court recently confirmed that when a jury is instructed on

multiple theories of guilt, one of which is improper, harmless error analysis still applies. Hedgpeth

v. Pulido, ---U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 129 S.Ct. 530, 531-32, 172 L.Ed.2d 388 (2008). Thus, in habeas

cases involving instructional error, a habeas petitioner is generally not entitled to habeas relief unless

such error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” See

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); see also

Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir.) (“A habeas petitioner must show that the alleged

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instructional error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's

verdict.’ ”) (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1027 (2006).

In the last reasoned state court decision, the Court of Appeal held the trial court erred in

refusing to accept Petitioner’s request to excise the portion of CALCRIM No. 401 which states

presence is not required to establish a defendant as an aider and abettor. (Lodgment 6 at 17.) 

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal held this error was harmless upon examining the entire record. 

(Id.) In conducting this examination, the Court of Appeal analyzed (1) defense counsel’s request at

the instructions conference to modify the aiding and abetting instruction, (2) counsels’ arguments in

closing argument and rebuttal, and (3) jury questions during deliberation. (Id. at 10-18.) 

Specifically, the Court held:

There is no doubt the prosecutor’s theory was that appellant was the second assailant

and, thus, aided and abetted the murder. However, whether intended or not–and his

insistence CALCRIM No. 401 not be modified suggests it was intended–, the prosecutor’s

argument offered a second theory, i.e., that appellant’s words and actions, even if he was not

the second assailant, were enough to convict him as an aider and abettor. 

The prosecutor reminded the jurors that pursuant to CALCRIM No. 373, while the

evidence showed other persons at the house besides the shooter and stabber were involved in

the murder, the jury was not to speculate about those other persons. Whatever the

prosecutor’s intent in so stating, the argument suggested the prosecutor’s position that

persons at appellant’s house, whether present at the crime or not, were involved in the

murder.

While making his case that appellant was the second assailant in discussing the

concept of aiding and abetting, the prosecutor also emphasized it was unnecessary appellant

be present at the commission of the crime in order to be found guilty as an aider and abettor. 

The prosecutor offered an example of a bank robbery in which two [of] the four persons

guilty of the crime were not present and in which one of the four took no physical part in the

crime whatsoever. 

The clear import of the prosecutor’s argument was that while he believed the

evidence established appellant was the second assailant, the evidence was sufficient to

convict him as aider and abettor even if he was not. The prosecutor had a reason for taking

this position, given that the sole eyewitness was unable to identify appellant as the second

assailant and because the victim, shortly before he was shot by Alfredo, told a neighbor that

one of Diane’s son[s] was going to get his buddies.

We agree with appellant the evidence was insufficient to support conviction of

appellant as an aider and abettor to murder if he was not the second assailant, he had

knowledge Alfredo was going to murder Cardona or that he intended, promoted, advised

encouraged, or instigated a murder. As we have noted, the trial court did not instruct

concerning the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

While the evidence showed appellant, his mother and Alfredo had a serious argument

with Cardona shortly before the shooting and while it might be inferred appellant knew or

guessed Alfredo was planning to take additional action against Cardona, it is mere

speculation appellant advised, promoted, instigated or encouraged Cardona’s murder.

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Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court should have accepted appellant’s

request the portion of CALCRIM No. 401 stating presence is not required to establish a

defendant as an aider and abettor excised from the instruction. The error in failing to do so

when combined with the prosecutor’s argument allowed the presentation of a theory of

culpability not sufficiently supported by the evidence.

The error, however, was harmless.

“Where the jury considers both a factually sufficient and a factually insufficient

ground for conviction, and it cannot be determined on which ground the jury relied, we

affirm the conviction unless there is an affirmative indication that the jury relied on the

invalid ground.” (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 233; People v. Guiton (1993) 4

Cal.4th 1116, 1127-1128, 1130.) In reviewing for an affirmative indication the jury relied on

the invalid ground, we examine the entire record including the facts, instructions, arguments

of counsel and any communications from or to the jury during deliberations. (People v.

Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1130.) 

It was clear that based on his presentation of evidence and argument to the jury, the

prosecutor’s core contention was appellant was the second assailant and, thus, given the

other evidence, an aider and abettor in Cardona’s murder. This was the sole theory to which

the defense responded. Nothing in the jury’s questions indicates it was not focusing on the

theory appellant was the second assailant or that they found he was not the person who

stabbed Cardona. There is no affirmative indication the jury relied on the invalid factual

theory offered by the instructions and the prosecutor’s argument. Any error in the manner

the jury was instructed on aiding and abetting, therefore, was harmless. 

(Lodgment 6 at 15-18.)

Here, Petitioner is unable to demonstrate the Court of Appeal’s determination–that the trial

court’s erroneous instruction on aiding and abetting was harmless– was either an unreasonable

application of federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. Specifically, Petitioner is

unable to demonstrate the instructional error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict,” as required under Brecht. 507 U.S. at 637-38; see also Hedgpeth,

---U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 129 S.Ct. at 531-32. First, a review of counsels’ closing arguments indicates

the principal theory espoused by the prosecution to convict Petitioner was that he was the second

assailant who stabbed the victim. In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated the evidence

showed Petitioner attacked the victim with a knife. (Lodgment 2, volume 10 at 1724.) Although the

prosecutor reminded the jury that the defendant did not need to be present when the crime was

committed to be liable as an aider and abettor, the prosecutor subsequently stated, “[Petitioner] was

there. He was a perpetrator. He was involved. He was one of the two, the person that stabbed Mr.

Cardona after he was shot.” (Id. at 1728-29.) In addition, in her closing argument, defense counsel

reiterated the prosecution’s theory that the only question in the case was whether Petitioner was the

person who stabbed the victim, stating, “the only aider and abettor to the shooting is the stabber.”

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(Id. at 1766, 1788.) Thus, despite instructing the jury that presence is not required to establish a

defendant as an aider and abettor, counsels’ arguments suggest Petitioner was the second assailant

and therefore present at the crime. 

Second, the jury’s requests and questions during deliberation do not suggest they considered

any theory of guilt other than Petitioner being the second assailant. The jurors asked to rehear the

testimony of Martinez concerning his description of the knife attacker and the testimony of Jose Jr.

and a police officer regarding who made the comment about watching the evening news. (Lodgment

1, volume 1 at 119.) Additionally, the jury asked the following questions: (1) whether aider liability

applied to both degrees of murder and manslaughter; (2) whether an aider’s knowledge of the

perpetrator’s intention was equivalent to premeditation; (3) whether the murder occurred at the time

of the shooting or the time of death; and (4) whether participation in the events of the crime

constituted aiding. (Id. at 121-127.) Thus, despite having been instructed that presence is not

required to establish a defendant as an aider and abettor, the jury’s requests and questions suggest

they relied on the valid factual ground–that Petitioner was the second assailant– to convict

Petitioner.

Therefore, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the record does not support the contention that

the jury relied on an invalid factual ground for conviction. Consequently, Petitioner is unable to

demonstrate the instructional error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury's verdict.” Brecht. 507 U.S. at 637-38. Thus, the Court of Appeal’s decision is neither an

unreasonable application of federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Id.) 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Ground One of the Petition be DENIED.

Ground Three: Reasonable Doubt Instruction

In Ground Three, Petitioner contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury on

reasonable doubt. (Doc. 1 at 15-18.) Petitioner contends California’s pattern jury instructions on

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7

 CALCRIM 220 states: 

“The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the defendant[s] is not evidence that the charge is true. You

must not be biased against the defendant[s] just because (he/she/they) (has/have) been arrested, charged with a crime, or

brought to trial.

A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires that the People prove a

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove

it beyond a reasonable doubt [unless I specifically tell you otherwise].

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The

evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.

In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider

all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the evidence proves the defendant[s] guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt, (he/she/they) (is/are) entitled to an acquittal and you must find (him/her/them) not guilty.”

8

 CALCRIM 222 states:

“You must decide what the facts are in this case. You must use only the evidence that was presented in this

courtroom [or during a jury view]. “Evidence” is the sworn testimony of witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and

anything else I told you to consider as evidence.

Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements and closing arguments, the attorneys discuss

the case, but their remarks are not evidence. Their questions are not evidence. Only the witnesses' answers are evidence. The

attorneys' questions are significant only if they helped you to understand the witnesses' answers. Do not assume that

something is true just because one of the attorneys asked a question that suggested it was true.

During the trial, the attorneys may have objected to questions or moved to strike answers given by the witnesses.

I ruled on the objections according to the law. If I sustained an objection, you must ignore the question. If the witness was

not permitted to answer, do not guess what the answer might have been or why I ruled as I did. If I ordered testimony stricken

from the record you must disregard it and must not consider that testimony for any purpose.

You must disregard anything you saw or heard when the court was not in session, even if it was done or said by one of the

parties or witnesses.

[During the trial, you were told that the People and the defense agreed, or stipulated, to certain facts. This means

that they both accept those facts as true. Because there is no dispute about those facts you must also accept them as true.]

The court reporter has made a record of everything that was said during the trial. If you decide that it is necessary, you may

ask that the court reporter's record be read to you. You must accept the court reporter's record as accurate.”

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reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence, CALCRIM Nos. 2207

 and 2228, are defective

because they prevent the jury from finding a reasonable doubt based on the lack of evidence. (Id.)

Respondent contends the Court of Appeal reasonably concluded the challenged instructions

were constitutionally adequate. (Doc. 11 at 25-26.)

In the last reasoned state court decision, the Court of Appeal held CALCRIM 220 properly

instructs the jury on the law regarding reasonable doubt. (Lodgment 6 at 23-26, citing Victor v.

Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994)). Specifically, the Court noted the plain language of the instruction

tells the jury that unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the

jury must acquit. (Id. at 26.) Therefore, the Court stated the “only reasonable understanding of this

language is that a lack of evidence could lead to reasonable doubt.” (Id.) (quoting People v. Flores,

153 Cal. App. 4t

h 1088, 1091-93) (2007). Accordingly, the Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s

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contention that CALCRIM 220 implies that lack of evidence does not suffice for acquittal. (Id. at

24-25.)

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused in a criminal

case against conviction “except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged.” See in re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In

reviewing a reasonable doubt instruction, the proper constitutional inquiry is “whether there is a

reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof

insufficient to meet the Winship standard.” Victor, 511 U.S. at 6. 

Here, Petitioner is unable to demonstrate the Court of Appeal’s determination that

CALCRIM 220 properly instructs the jury on reasonable doubt was either an unreasonable

application of federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. Specifically, Petitioner is

unable to demonstrate there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied CALCRIM 220 in a manner

that violates the constitution. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. As noted by the Court of Appeal, the jury was

instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 220 that “[u]nless the evidence proves the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal and you must find him not guilty” and

pursuant to CALCRIM No. 222 that evidence is the sworn testimony of witnesses and exhibits

admitted into evidence. (Lodgment 6 at 24). Based on the plain language of these instructions, and

in accordance with the requirements of in re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, if the evidence presented to

the jury was insufficient to prove an element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, this lack of

evidence would have required acquittal. Therefore, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, there is no

reasonable likelihood CALCRIM 220 and 222 improperly precluded the jury from considering lack

of evidence in its determination of reasonable doubt. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Accordingly, the

Court RECOMMENDS Ground Three of the Petition be DENIED.

Ground Four: Circumstantial Evidence Instruction

In Ground Four, Petitioner contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury on how to

evaluate the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. (Doc. 1 at 19-21.) Petitioner contends the trial

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9

 Modified CALCRIM 225 combined CALCRIM 224 and 225. CALCRIM 224 is the general instruction on

circumstantial evidence, which explains the concept that if circumstantial evidence supports conclusions of both guilty and

innocence, the jury must accept the conclusion of innocence. CALCRIM 225 conveys the same concept as CALCRIM 224

but does so only with regard to mental elements. The trial court, with the help and approval of defense counsel, modified

CALCRIM 225 in an attempt to make it applicable to the proof of both mental and nonmental elements. (Lodgment 6 at 18-

19.) Specifically, the trial court modified CALCRIM 225 by adding the term “conduct” wherever that instruction referred

to “intent or mental state.” (Lodgment 1, volume 1 at 87.)

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court’s modification of CALCRIM 2259

 was misleading because it did not instruct the jury that if the

circumstantial evidence supported a reasonable conclusion that Petitioner was not the second

assailant, then the jury was required to acquit. (Id.) 

Respondent contends the Court of Appeal properly concluded the instruction given was

adequate. (Doc. 11 at 27.) Further, Respondent contends the essence of the instruction was

reinforced by both counsels’ closing arguments. (Id.)

In the last reasoned state court decision, the Court of Appeal held the trial court should have

instructed the jury on circumstantial evidence using CALCRIM 224. (Lodgment 6 at 21-23.) 

However, the Court held the modified instruction sufficiently instructed the jury that if the

circumstantial evidence allowed a reasonable conclusion favorable to the defense, it was to be

accepted by the jury. (Id.) Specifically, the Court of Appeal held:

We are at a loss to understand how this problem arose. In all essential aspects, the

prosecution’s case was based on circumstantial evidence. CALCRIM No. 224 states the

concept that if the circumstantial evidence reasonably supported a conclusion favorable to

the defense, it must be accepted. CALCRIM No. 225 is inclusive and clearly applies to all

factual issues in a case. The Bench Note to CALCRIM No. 224 states the instruction must

be given sua sponte “if the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence to establish any

element of the case.” (Italics added.) The note adds that if the intent is the only element

proved by circumstantial evidence, then the court is not to give CALCRIM No. 224 but

instead give CALCRIM No. 225.

CALCRIM No. 225 instructs concerning the same concept as CALCRIM No. 224 but

confines it to the elements of intent and mental state. The Bench Note could not be more

clear. It states in part: “Give this instruction when the defendant’s intent or mental state is

the only element of the offense that rest substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence. 

If other elements of the offense also rest substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence,

do not give this instruction. Give CALCRIM No. 224.” (Italics added.)

The proper instruction on circumstantial evidence in this case was CALCRIM No.

224. The trial court, however, eschewed that instruction and instead rewrote the less

inclusive CALCRIM No. 225 to make it more inclusive. While this process was

unnecessary, the instruction crafted by defense counsel and the trial court sufficiently, if

ungrammatically, instructed that as to any fact if the circumstantial evidence allowed a

reasonable conclusion favorable to the defense, it was to be accepted by the jury. This

concept was repeated during both parties’ arguments and formed the argumentative context

in which the case was to be decided.

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In an instructional sense, the trial judge decided to walk down stairs on his hands. He

reached the bottom but could have arrived there easier, safer, and quicker by making the trip

on his feet.

(Lodgment 6 at 21-23.)

Here, Petitioner is unable to demonstrate the Court of Appeal’s determination– that the

modified version of CALCRIM 225 properly instructed the jury on the evaluation of circumstantial

evidence–was either an unreasonable application of federal law or an unreasonable determination of

the facts. Specifically, Petitioner is unable to demonstrate there is a reasonable likelihood the jury

applied the modified version of CALCRIM 225 in a manner that violates the constitution. Estelle,

502 U.S. at 72. As noted by the Court of Appeal, albeit with unnecessary revisions, the jury was

instructed pursuant to the modified version of CALCRIM No. 225 that if the circumstantial evidence

allowed a reasonable conclusion favorable to the defense, it was to be accepted by the jury. 

(Lodgment 6 at 22.) CALCRIM 224, the instruction Petitioner contends should have been given,

would have instructed the jury in precisely the same manner. Further, as discussed above, the court

instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM 220, which clearly instructed the jury on the prosecution’s 

burden of proof. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (a single jury instruction should not be judged in

artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole). Therefore,

contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, there is no reasonable likelihood modified CALCRIM 225 did not

instruct the jury that if the circumstantial evidence supported a reasonable conclusion that Petitioner

was not the second assailant, then the jury was required to acquit. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Ground Four of the Petition be DENIED.

//

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V. CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this case and based on the foregoing, the Court hereby

RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(1994). Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before October 25, 2010. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before November 8,

2010. The parties are advised that no extensions of time will be granted for purposes of filing

objections. The parties are further advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 23, 2010

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable M. James Lorenz

all parties

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