Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08013/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08013-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Peter Michael Palmer, an individual, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Prescott, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-10-8013-PCT-DGC

ORDER

On August 6, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify the undersigned judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 on the ground that the undersigned is biased against Plaintiff

because of Plaintiff’s religious beliefs and activities. Doc. 31. The Court denied the motion

because “[t]he undersigned judge holds no bias against Plaintiff, and the facts set forth in

Plaintiff’s motion provide no basis upon which the undersigned’s impartiality might

reasonably be questioned.” Doc. 32 at 3. Plaintiff has filed a second motion to disqualify

the undersigned judge, this time pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. Doc. 34. Defendants have

stated that they will not respond to the motion. Doc. 35. For reasons that follow, the Court

will deny the motion.

I. Legal Standard.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, “[w]henever a party to any proceeding in a district court

makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is

pending has a personal bias or prejudice . . . against him . . . , such judge shall proceed no

further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.” Before another

Case 3:10-cv-08013-DGC Document 38 Filed 09/08/10 Page 1 of 4
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judge is to be assigned to hear the proceeding, however, the “judge against whom [the]

affidavit of bias is filed” may determine its legal sufficiency. United States v. Azhocar, 581

F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1978). “Only after the legal sufficiency of the affidavit is determined

does it become the duty of the judge to ‘proceed no further’ in the case.” Id. at 738; see Toth

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 862 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1988) (A district judge need only

assign the motion to another judge for a hearing “after the legal sufficiency of the affidavit

is determined[.]”).

“The standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 . . . is whether a reasonable person

with knowledge of all the facts would conclude the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993). “[M]ere

conclusory allegations . . . are insufficient to support a claim of bias or prejudice such that

recusal is required.” United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 566 (9th

Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868-69 (9th Cir. 1980)).

II. Analysis.

Plaintiff seeks disqualification of the undersigned judge for reasons unrelated to the

claims and issues in this case. Plaintiff alleges that disqualification is required because the

undersigned is a member of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormons),

Plaintiff is an Evangelical Christian to the Mormons (a fact unknown to the undersigned until

Plaintiff disclosed it in his previous motion to disqualify), and the undersigned’s religious

beliefs therefore will make him biased against Plaintiff. Doc. 34. Plaintiff has provided an

affidavit in which he makes various assertions about beliefs and commitments of practicing

Mormons, concludes (correctly) that the undersigned is a practicing Mormon, and therefore

asserts that the undersigned necessarily will be biased against him because he actively

opposes Mormon beliefs and practices. Doc. 334 at 19-22.

Plaintiff’s complaint in this case asserts claims against the City of Prescott and some

of its police officers and city attorneys for violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment

rights, negligent supervision, conspiracy, and conspiracy to obstruct justice. Doc. 30.

Plaintiff’s claims arise out of an encounter he had with police on January 23, 2009, and

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 Plaintiff asserts that police reports in this case “tangentially show that plaintiff is a

so-called ‘Anti-Mormon,’” Doc. 34 at 4, but any such reference in the reports will reveal

nothing more than Plaintiff already has disclosed in his motions to disqualify.

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subsequent events. Id. The claims do not relate to Plaintiff’s activities with respect to

Mormons; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is not a party to this litigation;

and, as the Court noted in its previous order, the undersigned is not biased against Plaintiff

individually or Evangelical Christians generally. Plaintiff’s activities with respect to

Mormons have nothing to do with this case and will have no effect on the Court’s rulings.1

As Plaintiff’s motion correctly acknowledges, federal courts and judges consistently

hold that membership in a church does not create a sufficient appearance of bias to require

disqualification. Doc. 34 at 5; see Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d

399, 400-401 (9th Cir. 1995); Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir.1984); Menora

v. Illinois High School Ass’n, 527 F.Supp. 632, 634 (N.D. Ill. 1981); State of Idaho v.

Freeman, 507 F.Supp. 706, 729 (D. Idaho 1981); see also Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, 388 F.Supp. 155

(E.D.Pa.1974).

As the Tenth Circuit has explained:

[M]erely because Judge Stewart belongs to and contributes to the

Mormon Church would never be enough to disqualify him. . . . Religious

freedom is one of the Constitution’s most closely guarded values. The First

Amendment prohibits congressional action respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting its free exercise. Article VI, clause 3, provides that all

governmental officers be bound by an oath to support the Constitution, and

that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office

or public Trust under the United States.” Should we require federal judges to

disclose the firmness of their beliefs in religious doctrine, it is a very fine line

before we enter the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing

religious claims.

In re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citations

omitted).

Given this well established law and the conclusory nature of Plaintiff’s affidavit

regarding the undersigned’s alleged bias, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s affidavit is

legally insufficient to require disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144. No reasonable person

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with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the undersigned’s impartiality might

reasonably be questioned. Taylor, 993 F.2d at 712. As Judge Higginbotham noted in

denying a similar motion to disqualify under § 144: “If the facts pleaded do not warrant my

disqualification, I am not only permitted to continue to preside over the case, I have an

affirmative duty not to withdraw.” Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 388 F.Supp. at 159

(citations omitted). 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify (Doc. 34) is denied.

DATED this 7th day of September, 2010.

Case 3:10-cv-08013-DGC Document 38 Filed 09/08/10 Page 4 of 4