Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01972/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01972-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Leo Davis,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Paul Penzone, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV 19-01972 PHX SMB (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN M. BRNOVICH: 

I. Background

Plaintiff filed a complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on March 25, 

2019.1 Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint “as a matter of course” on July 24, 2019, 

and lodged a proposed First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 6; ECF No. 7). In an order 

(ECF No. 9) entered July 26, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis and dismissed his First Amended Complaint, docketed at ECF No. 8, for failure 

to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 

Plaintiff lodged a proposed Second Amended Complaint on August 12, 2019. (ECF 

No. 12). On November 26, 2019, the Court dismissed Counts One, Three, Four, Five, 

Seven, Eight, and Nine of the Second Amended Complaint, docketed at ECF No. 14, and 

also dismissed Defendants Penzone, Maxon, B2673, B1263, Knotts, Phillips, Kinslow, 

1 Plaintiff has fifteen pro se and in forma pauperis § 1983 suits from May of 2017 through 

October 24, 2019. Eight of the suits are still open and Plaintiff has two “strikes.” See 2:18 cv 1084

and 2:18 cv 2603.

.

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B0071, Carrasso, B2854, B1809, B6601, John Does 1-99, Wilson, Kirk, Mikels, A7936, 

B0084, Beckwith, A2833, Smith, Lieutenant Garcia, Burgett, McMannis, CS908, Nnah, 

Baptist, Reyes, Tudor, CS352, Zakasky, CS516, Johnson, Leticia Garcia, Coombs, Cline, 

Lucas, Ernster, RG744, HS869, Devera, Garmon, RT 024, 1654H, Richardson, Sepulveda, 

and 1401H, Baker, Collon, RG 587, 2039H, 1240H, CH427, NR998, RG926, 1651H, 

NR844, 1806H, 1047H, 1335H, 1784H, Spurgin, LeGer, and Leslie. (ECF No. 13). The 

Court ordered Defendant Jeans to answer Counts Two (excessive force) and Six (assault 

and battery) of the Second Amended Complaint. (Id.). Defendant Jeans waived service on 

December 16, 2019. (ECF No. 18).

On December 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed on a lodged

Third Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 17). On February 3, 2020, the Magistrate Judge 

recommended the motion at ECF No. 17 be denied. (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff filed objections 

to the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 20), and in an order entered April 2, 2020, 

the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and denied the motion at ECF No. 17. 

(ECF No. 24). In the interim, Defendant Jeans answered the Second Amended Complaint 

and a scheduling order was issued.

On April 2, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint, attaching what 

Plaintiff has labeled as his “Third Amended Complaint” (ECF No. 25 at 6), but which is 

actually his fourth amended complaint. Plaintiff alleges the proposed fourth amended 

complaint, which names 56 defendants, “cure[s] the deficiencies in Counts One, Three, 

Four, and Five of the Second Amended Complaint.” (ECF No. 25 at 2). The pleading at 

ECF No. 25 was placed in the prison mail on March 30, 2020, prior to the date the Court 

issued its order denying leave to docket and serve the Third Amended Complaint. (ECF 

No. 25 at 34). 

The proposed fourth amended complaint at ECF No. 25 differs from the “Third 

Amended Complaint” at ECF No. 17 in the following regards:

1. The proposed fourth amended complaint at ECF No. 25 names 56 defendants; the 

complaint at ECF No. 17 named 59 defendants;

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2. In Count One of the proposed fourth amended complaint Plaintiff reiterates the 

same claim alleged in Count One of his prior complaints, asserting that on November 30, 

2018, he complained of being placed in a cold, dirty cell with only a blanket and no 

drinking water. As with his prior complaints Plaintiff alleges he asked for the heat in his 

cell to be increased, he asked for cleaning supplies, and he asked one defendant for water, 

and his requests were refused, although he was given drinking water the following 

morning. In his proposed fourth amended complaint Plaintiff adds the specific language he 

used when requesting cleaning supplies and heat; he asserts he told specific Defendants 

that the conditions of his cell “violates my rights,” and he quotes the exact language the 

Defendants used in denying him cleaning supplies, denying his requests to “turn up” the 

temperature in his cell, and the refusal to provide him with drinking water. Plaintiff 

contends the various Defendants said they “could not help,” or that it was “out of their 

control.” According to Plaintiff, during a six-and-a-half hour time span he asked fourteen 

different prison officials, including two nurses, to give him cleaning supplies, turn-up the 

heat in his cell, and provide him with drinking water, without a positive response. In his 

initial Complaint and in his first, second, and third proposed amended complaints Plaintiff

did not quote the exact language of his requests or the Defendants’ responses.

Plaintiff was moved to a different cell on December 1, 2018. In his proposed fourth 

amended complaint Plaintiff adds the same additional “facts” he asserts with regard to 

November 30, 2018. He alleges that he complained about but was denied changes with 

regard to his cold and dirty cell on December 1 through December 18, 2018, noting each 

day he requested cleaning supplies and that he was informed he was not allowed cleaning 

supplies in the jail’s Psychiatric Unit and that various Defendants told him they were not 

authorized to grant Plaintiff’s requests. Plaintiff does not allege that he complained of a 

cold cell or being refused drinking water after November 30, 2018. 

3. In his proposed fourth amended complaint Plaintiff does not add allegations with 

regard to Count Two.

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4. In his proposed fourth amended complaint with regard to Count Three Plaintiff 

again asserts that he was placed on the “loaf” diet as punishment for fifteen days, rather 

than seven days.

5. Plaintiff’s proposed fourth amended complaint does not alter the factual 

allegations with regard to Count IV and Count V, but asserts the facts he adds in Count I 

and Count III of his proposed amended complaint support his allegation that his Eighth 

Amendment rights were violated.

II. Governing law

A. Standard for granting or denying a motion to amend

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff should 

be given leave to amend his complaint when justice so requires. Granting or denying leave 

to amend is a matter committed to the Court’s discretion. Hartmann v. California Dep’t of 

Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013). The Court’s discretion to deny leave 

to amend is particularly broad where the plaintiff was previously given leave to amend his 

complaint and repeatedly failed to cure the deficiencies noted by the Court. See SissetonWahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996); Turner v. County 

of Los Angeles, 18 F. App’x 592, 597 (9th Cir. 2001); Navajo Nation v. United States Dep’t 

of the Interior, 2019 WL 3997370, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 23, 2019); Skinner v. Ryan, 2013 

WL 3967619, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 2, 2013).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), requires the screening 

of prisoner complaints and the dismissal of allegations that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted prior to ordering service of a complaint on the defendants. See, e.g., 

O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Futility of amendment is sufficient

to justify denial of a motion for leave to amend. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 

1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). A proposed amended complaint is futile if, accepting all of the 

facts alleged as true, it would be immediately “subject to dismissal” for failure to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 

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Civil Procedure. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998); 

Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Medical Mutual of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010).

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), and the Court is 

obliged to liberally construe an incarcerated pro se plaintiff’s complaint. See, e.g., Hebbe 

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, although Rule 8 does not demand 

detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although 

pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id., quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible only “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint 

states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing 

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Therefore, although 

a plaintiff’s specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, the 

reviewing court must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a 

defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.

B. Elements of a § 1983 claim

To properly state a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must properly allege: (1) an act by the 

named defendant; (2) taken under color of state law; (3) which deprived the plaintiff of a 

federal right; and (4) caused him damage. See Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 

1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as 

a result of the conduct of a particular defendant, and he must allege facts showing an 

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that specific defendant. Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). To properly state a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff 

must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual 

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Notably, a plaintiff’s 

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speculation regarding a defendant’s motive is insufficient to state a claim. See Moss v. 

United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating the “sheer possibility” 

of unlawful conduct is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 

defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the plausibility standard).

“A claim has facial plausibility,” the [Iqbal] Court explained, “when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 129 S. Ct. 

at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ 

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 []). “Where a complaint 

pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” 

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 []).

Id.

“Under § 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates 

on any theory of vicarious liability.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 

2013). A supervisor may be found liable only if they are personally involved in the 

constitutional deprivation, or there is “a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Id. (internal quotations 

omitted). 

Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal 

participation by the defendant. [] A supervisor is only liable for constitutional 

violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the 

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citation omitted).

In the absence of a supervisor’s “overt personal participation in the act” which 

violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, they may be liable if they personally

implemented a policy “so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional 

rights and is the moving force of a constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 

642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted). See also Lolli v. County of Orange, 

351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, a supervisor is only liable under § 1983 

if the plaintiff establishes the supervisor’s “personal involvement in the constitutional 

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deprivation,” or a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct 

and the constitutional violation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(emphasis added and internal quotations omitted). The “causal connection” is established 

if the plaintiff shows the supervisor set in motion or refused to terminate an underling’s 

unconstitutional acts. See Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 

2018), citing Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011). “At the most basic 

level of formulation, our law requires an ‘affirmative link’ between the constitutional 

violation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, his exercise of control or 

direction, or his failure to supervise.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1211 (10th Cir. 

2010) (collecting cases and analyzing various bases for supervisory liability), cited in Starr, 

652 F.3d at 1207. Additionally, liability may be imposed “if the evidence showed that [a 

prison official] merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be 

true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842-43 n.8 (1994). And prison administrators and 

supervisors are not per se liable for an alleged violation of a plaintiff’s federal 

constitutional rights if they fail to grant “grievances or grievance appeals.” Davis v. 

Penzone, 2017 WL 8792541, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2017). Where a defendant’s only 

involvement in allegedly unconstitutional conduct is the denial of administrative 

grievances, the failure to intervene on a detainee’s behalf to remedy the alleged 

unconstitutional behavior does not amount to active unconstitutional behavior for purposes 

of § 1983. See Moreno v. Ryan, 2017 WL 2214703, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 19, 2017); 

Garcia v. Drake, 2012 WL 3776869, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 31, 2012), both citing Shehee v. 

Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).

III. Merits

A. Count One

Count One of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint was based on the following 

allegations:

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On November 30, 2018, Plaintiff was [brought to the psychiatric ward 

at the Lower Buckeye Jail and] placed in a “flat cell,” stripped of his clothing,

and forced to sleep “naked on the cold concrete floor with a moving pad to 

use as a blanket.” (Doc. 1 at 10.) There were feces and dried blood smeared 

throughout the cell, and the temperature was so cold that Plaintiff’s skin 

became numb and the muscles throughout his body hurt from shivering all 

night. (Id.) Plaintiff was not given access to drinking water until the 

following morning. (Id.) Plaintiff complained about the conditions in his cell 

to Defendants Knotts, Phillips, Kinslow, Carrasso, Wilson, Nnah, Leticia 

Garcia, Zakasky, Coombs, Garmon, 1654H, RG 587, Sepulveda, and CS516

between 5:30 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. on November 30, 2018, “requesting for 

cleaning supplies or for the cell to be cleaned, for the cell temperature to be 

turned up, and for water.” (Id.)

However, these Defendants “refused to give Plaintiff cleaning 

supplies, a clean cell, to turn up the cell temperature, and to give him drinking 

water.” (Id.) The following day, Plaintiff told Defendant Burgett that 

Defendants were violating his constitutional rights by forcing him to sleep 

on a cold concrete floor. (Id.) Plaintiff was subsequently moved to another

cell, which reeked of urine and had “vermin activity”; feces, blood, food, and 

vomit smeared throughout; an unclean toilet; standing water surrounding the 

toilet and shower and extending to the bunk; clogged ventilation registers; 

mildew on the walls; and peeling and chipping paint. (Id.) Plaintiff was 

forced to “walk around the bio-hazard cell barefooted, and to stand in feces 

and vomit while showering.” (Id.) The mattress he was provided was 

“unsanitary,” as Plaintiff had “watched the officer drag it across the dirty

floor.” (Id.)

Every day between December 1, 2018 and December 8, 2018, 

Plaintiff complained to multiple Defendants about the conditions in his new 

cell, “requesting that his cell either be cleaned or that he be given cleaning 

supplies.” (Id. at 11-12.) However, each Defendant refused Plaintiff’s 

requests, and some “just laughed at him.” (Id.) Each Defendant also denied 

Plaintiff the opportunity to shave or brush his teeth between November 30, 

2018 and December 8, 2018. (Id. at 12.)

On December 8, 2018, Plaintiff was moved to a different unit. (Id.) 

However, the cell he was transferred to “was in the same condition as the 

original cell.” (Id.) Every day between December 9, 2018 and December 17, 

2018, Plaintiff complained to multiple Defendants about the conditions in his 

new cell, “requesting . . . a clean cell or cleaning supplies.” (Id. at 12-13.) 

However, each Defendant refused his requests, and some “just laughed at 

him.” (Id.) Plaintiff was also forced to eat “non-finger food” without utensils.

(Id. at 13.)

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Plaintiff filed a grievance concerning the condition of his cell on 

December 18, 2018, “followed by all administrative appeals.” (Id.) However, 

Defendants Carrasso, Wilson, Beckwith, Kirk, A2833, Smith, and Penzone 

“made excuses” and refused to remedy the situation. (Id.) Plaintiff claims 

that all Defendants identified in Count One “were placed on notice, either 

directly from Plaintiff and/or through the grievance procedure, of the 

unconstitutional living conditions” to which Plaintiff was being subjected, 

but they failed to remedy the situation.

In Count One, Plaintiff contends that the foregoing Defendants, acting 

in both their individual and official capacities, violated his Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. 

(ECF No. 13 at 3-6).

In the screening order at ECF No. 13 the Court concluded, with regard to 

supervisory liability: “Plaintiff fails to adequately identify any policy, practice, or custom 

that gave rise to his injury or describe the way in which such policy caused his harm. 

Accordingly, the official capacity claims in Count One will be dismissed.” (ECF No. 13 

at 9). 

With regard to claims based on individual liability, the Court concluded:

. . . Whether the conditions and conduct rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation is an objective assessment that turns on the facts and 

circumstances of each particular case. Id.; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 

1042 (9th Cir. 2005). However, “a de minimis level of imposition” is 

insufficient. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.21. In addition, the “‘mere lack of due 

care by a state official’ does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or 

property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Castro v. County of Los 

Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 

474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986)). Thus, a plaintiff must “prove more than 

negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless 

disregard.” Id.

The allegations in Count One are too vague and conclusory to state a 

claim against the numerous Defendants identified therein. Plaintiff does not 

allege specific facts concerning how each particular Defendant learned of the 

conditions in Plaintiff’s cell and what, if anything, that particular Defendant 

did or said in response. Instead, he relies on conclusory assertions that he 

requested cleaning supplies or a clean cell from multiple Defendants and was 

refused.

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Plaintiff’s only assertion regarding a specific Defendant 

involves Defendant Burgett, whom Plaintiff allegedly told 

“that forcing [Plaintiff] to sleep naked on the concrete floor 

violated [Plaintiff’]s rights.” Even if this allegation were 

sufficiently specific, however, it appears that Plaintiff was 

moved to a new cell shortly after he talked to Burgett, and he 

does not allege that Burgett was aware of the conditions in his 

new cell. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege 

that Burgett disregarded a substantial risk to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff does not provide any specific details regarding the 

information discussed in his conversations or written requests, nor does he 

attempt to distinguish communications with one Defendant from 

communications with another Defendant. This is insufficient. See Marcilis v. 

Township of Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 596 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding dismissal 

of Bivens complaint that referred to all defendants “generally and 

categorically” because the plaintiff had failed to “‘allege, with particularity, 

facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted 

constitutional right.’”) (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th 

Cir. 2008)); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) 

(“Given the complaint’s use of either the collective term ‘Defendants’ or a 

list of the defendants named individually but with no distinction as to what 

acts are attributable to whom, it is impossible for any of these individuals to 

ascertain what particular unconstitutional acts they are alleged to have 

committed.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in Count One 

and this Count will be dismissed.

(ECF No. 13 at 10-11 & n.7).

In Count One of his proposed Third Amended Complaint Plaintiff added the 

allegation that on November 30, 2018:

. . . between 1730 and 2400 hours, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant’s 

Knotts (B3276); D.M. Phillips; C. Kinslow III; Carrasso (B2666); Wilson 

(A7120); Ubon Nnah; Leticia Garcia (1521H); Terry Zakosky; Mary 

Coombs (C5675); Marry Garmon (C3645); Nurse (1654H); CHT (RG587); 

Veronica Sepulveda; and Nurse (CS516), informing each of them 

individually that the cell conditions violated his rights. Plaintiff requested for 

cleaning supplies or for the cell to be cleaned, for the cell temperature to be 

turned up, and for water, however Knotts said that he couldn’t help him; 

Phillips said that he couldn’t help; Kinslow said to deal with it; Carrasso said 

no and laughed; Wilson said to sue him; Nnah said I can’t help you; Garcia 

said to tell the officer; Zakosky said that she could help; Coombs said it was 

out of her control; Garmon said she couldn’t help; Nurse (1654H) said the 

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she couldn’t help; CHT (RG587) said that she was only a tech; Sepulveda 

said sorry I can’t help; and Nurse (CS516) said that she can’t help.

(ECF No. 17 at 15). Plaintiff says he was refused water from 5:30 p.m. until midnight, but 

that he was given water the following morning. (Id.).

He further asserted that on December 1, 2018, between 630 and 2400 hours, he 

spoke with Defendants Burgett, Nnah, Baptist, Cline, Collon, CHR, Garcia, Nurse

(1654H), Coombs, and “John Does 1-99.,”

. . . informing each of them individually that the cell conditions 

violated his rights. Plaintiff requested for cleaning supplies or to have them 

clean the cell, however Burgett said that he has nothing to do with cell 

conditions, Nnah said that he only passes out medication; Baptist said that it 

sounds like a personal problem; Cline said that cleaning supplies are not 

allowed in the Physchiatric [sic] Unit; Collon said he couldn’t help; CHT 

(1240H) laughed and said that this wasn’t the Hilton; Garcia said that she 

cannot give out cleaning supplies; Nurse (1654H) said that she is only a nurse 

and cannot give cleaning supplies; Coombs said that she cannot help; and 

Does 1-99 said that they cannot give cleaning supplies in Phychiatric [sic] 

Ward.

(ECF No. 17 at 16).

Plaintiff repeated these comments with regard to December 2, 2018, and Defendants 

Garcia, Nurse (CS352), Nurse (HS869), Baker, CHT (NR844), MHA (1047H), Mary 

Coombs (CS675), Richardson, and John Does 1-99, stating these defendants responded 

“no,” or that they couldn’t help, couldn’t give out cleaning supplies, cleaning supplies were 

not allowed on the unit, and/or that they could not help. (Id.).

Plaintiff repeated these comments with regard to December 3, 2018, and Defendants 

B2854, B1809, Johnson, Lucas, CHT (NR844), Richardson, MHA (1335H), Burgett, and 

John Does 1-99, asserting he was told cleaning supplies are not allowed, Johnson said she 

had no control over cleaning supplies or cell placement, and that these Defendants said 

they “cannot help” or “there is nothing [they] could do.” (Id.).

Plaintiff repeated these comments regarding December 4, 2018, and Defendants 

Baptist (CH960), Tudor (1556H), CHT (NR844), Richardson, Lucas (CH068), Johnson

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(1306H), MHA (1335H), and “John Does 1-99,” who responded with the same statements 

he previously lists. (ECF No. 17 at 17).

Plaintiff repeated these allegations with regard to December 5, 2018, with regard to 

Defendants Burgett, Tudor, Garcia, Lucas, CHT (CH427), Collon, Baker, B6601, 

CHT (1561H), Richardson, MHLA (1806H), Nurse (1654H), and John Does 1-99, 

asserting these Defendants “laughed” said they could not help and/or give out cleaning 

supplies and/or that cleaning supplies were not allowed. (Id.). Plaintiff repeats these 

allegations with regard to December 6, 2018, and Defendants CHT (1645IH), Nnah, 

Baptist, MHLA (1806H), Ernster (1628H), and John Does 1-99. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges 

these defendants responded as previously asserted with regard to his prior requests for a 

different cell and/or to be provided with cleaning supplies. (Id.). Plaintiff repeats these 

allegations with regard to December 7, 2018, and Defendants Knotts, Carrasso, Nnah, 

Baptist, Ernster, CHT (1651H), MHLA (1806H), MHA (1784H), B2673, B1263, and John 

Does 1-99, and that he received the same responses. (ECF No. 17 at 17-18).

Plaintiff repeated these claims with regard to December 8, 2018, and various 

defendants, alleges he received the same responses, and that on December 8, 2018, he was 

“moved to another unit, however the cell that he was moved to was in the same condition 

as the original cell.” (ECF No. 17 at 18). He then made identical allegations with regard to 

complaining about his new cell on December 10, December 11, December 12, 

December 13, December 14, December 15, December 16, and December 17, 2018,

alleging he requested cleaning supplies from Nurse (CS908), CHT (RG926), Baptist, 

Nurse (RG744), CHT (NR998), Reyes, CHT (CH427), Nnah, Collon, Nurse (RT024), 

CHT (1240H), Burgett, Jeans, McMannis, Johnson (1306H), Devera (RG866), and “John 

Does 1-99,” and received identical responses. (ECF No. 17 at 18-20). 

As previously noted, the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation 

recommending Plaintiff’s motion to docket and serve his proposed Third Amended 

Complaint be denied. 

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In Count One of his proposed fourth amended complaint Plaintiff repeats the 

allegations of his Third Amended Complaint, but includes specific language with regard to 

the refusal to warm-up his cell and give him drinking water on November 30 and to give 

him cleaning supplies from November 30 through December 15, 2018. Plaintiff apparently 

believes he has now stated an adequate claim for relief by asserting that he told each and 

every defendant that his federal constitutional rights were being violated, and quoting the 

exact language each defendant used to refuse him cleaning supplies. 

A pretrial detainee’s claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement arises 

from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment while a convicted inmate’s 

claims for unconstitutional conditions arises from the Eighth Amendment prohibition 

against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979); Frost 

v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Hallstrom v. Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 

1485 (9th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, the same standards are applied in each circumstance. 

See Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement

a plaintiff must allege an objectively “sufficiently serious” deprivation that results in the 

denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; 

Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000), such as the deprivation of “adequate” 

shelter, food, medical care, or sanitation, or the presence of other conditions intolerable for 

prison confinement. Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731, citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 

(1991) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981).

The placement of pretrial detainees in safety cells is “punishment” in violation of 

the Fourteenth Amendment only if prison officials act with deliberate indifference to a 

substantial risk of serious harm. Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128; Anderson v. County of Kern, 

45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 75 F.3d 448 (9th 

Cir. 1995). The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective 

prong. First, the plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivation was “sufficiently serious” 

to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 & 837 

(holding the plaintiff must show “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 

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inmate health or safety . . .”); Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. Extreme deprivations are required 

to support an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim. Hudson v. McMillian, 

503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

To establish the subjective prong of the test, the plaintiff must make a showing that 

the prison official acted “with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Johnson, 217 F.3d at 

731. Conditions of confinement may be restrictive and harsh; however, they cannot involve 

the “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain” or be devoid of a legitimate penological 

purpose. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Mere negligence is insufficient to establish liability; the 

official’s conduct must have been wanton. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 

1128. The plaintiff must show that the prison officials had no “reasonable” justification for 

the deprivation to be entitled to relief. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 

2010).

“‘The circumstances, nature, and duration of a deprivation of [] necessities must be 

considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred.’” Hearns v. 

Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. 

Accordingly, whether conditions of confinement rise to the level of a constitutional 

violation may depend, in part, on the duration of an inmate’s exposure to those conditions. 

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996), citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 

678, 686-87 (1978) (holding conditions such as a filthy cell “may be tolerable for a few 

days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months”). Furthermore, the plaintiff must allege a

specific, actual injury arising from the alleged unconstitutional conditions. See, e.g., Lewis 

v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); Thomas v. CHS, 2009 WL 1034141, at *3 (D. Ariz. 

Apr. 14, 2009); Parra v. Arpaio, 2008 WL 340114, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 2008).

In Count One of his proposed fourth amended complaint Plaintiff alleges he was 

“forced to sleep naked on the cold concrete floor with a moving pad to use as a blanket,” 

that the temperature of the cell “was so cold that it caused Plaintiff severe discomfort” and 

“his muscles throughout his body hurt from shivering all night,” and that he was “forced 

to walk around the bio-hazard cell barefooted and to stand in feces and vomit while 

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showering.” (ECF No. 17 at 15-16). Plaintiff alleged he was subjected to these conditions 

for a period of 18 days (November 30 through December 8 in one cell, and December 9 

through December 17 in a different cell). 

Plaintiff fails to show how he was subjected to “serious” harm with regard to the 

conditions of his cell. The relevant case law requires more egregious circumstances than 

what Plaintiff has alleged to find an adequate claim for relief. See Johnson, 217 F.3d at 730 

(finding a constitutional violation where prisoners were left lying prone and handcuffed in 

the prison yard with no opportunity to get up to relieve themselves all night resulting in

prisoners urinating on other inmates); McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 848 (5th Cir. 

1991) (finding constitutional violation when inmate was forced to sleep on mattresses 

soaked in rainwater and sewage in absence of a bed); Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d 1005, 1006 

(10th Cir. 1987) (finding liability where the inmate suffered hypothermia seizures from 

being put naked in a cell with no blankets in below forty-degree temperatures; was denied 

food, served dirty food, or his food was thrown on the floor where he was told to eat it like 

a dog; was placed in a cell infested with lice; not allowed to shower for two weeks at a 

time; and left lying in excrement while having a seizure). Compare Smith v. Copeland, 87 

F.3d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding no constitutional violation where pretrial detainee

was subjected to an overflowed toilet for four days); Garcia v. Baldwin, 2019 WL 859210, 

at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2019) (holding the inmate’s confinement in segregation for sixty 

days in a cold, dirty cell did not deprive him of his Eighth Amendment rights). Many courts 

have concluded that temporary deprivations of bedding are not sufficiently serious to 

support an Eighth Amendment claim. See Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1060-

61 (9th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases); Centeno v. Wilson, 2011 WL 836747, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 

Mar. 4, 2011) (finding sleeping on cold floor without a mattress or blanket for seven days, 

resulting in the inmate’s “muscles ach[ing] from shivering,” did not violate the Eighth 

Amendment), aff’d, 479 F. App’x 101 (9th Cir. 2012).

Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege any specific, actual injury arising from the 

asserted deprivation of his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment by being 

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subjected to “unsanitary conditions of confinement and the denial of basic human 

necessities.” (ECF No. 17 at 20). Generally, a plaintiff must sustain more than de minimus 

physical harm to be entitled to relief on a conditions-of-confinement claim. See Whittington 

v. King Cty. Dep’t of Corr., 308 F. App’x 218, 218 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming a grant of 

summary judgment to defendant when the “[Plaintiff] failed to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether unsanitary conditions in the jail caused the staph infections he 

contracted.”).

Nor has Plaintiff adequately alleged that Defendants’ acts were wanton or devoid of 

a reasonable, legitimate penological purpose; Defendants’ refusal to provide Plaintiff with 

cleaning supplies were due to the jail’s policy prohibiting patients in the Psychiatric Unit 

from being provided with cleaning supplies for their own health and safety. Plaintiff fails 

to allege facts to support that any failure to provide cleaning materials rendered his 

conditions of confinement unconstitutional, because the jail policy of prohibiting detainees 

housed in the jail’s psychiatric ward would presumably be pursuant to a legitimate purpose, 

i.e., to prevent these detainees from committing suicide by ingesting cleaning products. See 

Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding prison conditions may 

be restrictive and harsh, but “most not be devoid of legitimate penological purpose”). And

apparently none of the prison guards or medical professionals to whom Plaintiff 

complained about the withholding of cleaning supplies had the authority to circumvent the 

policy. Accordingly, none of these named Defendants could be deemed to have the 

adequate mens rea to be liable on Plaintiff’s allegation that the Defendants’ refusal to allow 

him cleaning supplies violated his federal constitutional rights. Only the “unnecessary” and 

“wanton” infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Whitley v. Albers, 

475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “Among ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain are those 

that are totally without penological justification.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (citation 

omitted). 

Accordingly, despite four attempts to adequately state a claim for relief based on 

these events, in Count One of his proposed fourth amended complaint Plaintiff fails to 

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allege facts to support that Defendants wantonly subjected to him a substantial risk of harm, 

or that he sustained any injury. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Compare Anderson, 45 F.3d at 1314-15 

(finding temporary placement in a safety cell that was dirty and smelled bad did not 

constitute the wanton infliction of pain); Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1042-43 (allegations of 

serious health hazards in disciplinary segregation yard for a period of nine months, 

including toilets that did not work, sinks that were rusted, and stagnant pools of water 

infested with insects, and a lack of cold water when the temperature in the prison yard 

exceeded 100 degrees, were sufficient to state a claim of unconstitutional prison 

conditions); Preayer v. Ryan, 2016 WL 5341177, at *10-11 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2016) 

(finding, on summary judgment, a material issue of genuine fact on whether denial of basic 

hygiene items, denial of cleaning supplies and clean clothes, and exposure to an unsanitary 

cell for 17 weeks constitutes a deprivation of basic necessities under the Eighth 

Amendment).

In a different lawsuit before the Court Plaintiff alleged, inter alia:

On August 22, 2018, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Plaintiff was placed in a 

“flat cell,” and was forced by several Doe Defendants to lie “prone on the 

dirty floor” while they stripped him of his clothing and recorded their 

“humiliating and degrading act” with a camera. ([First Amended Complaint]. 

at 13.) Plaintiff was forced to remain in the “freezing” 60- to 70- degree cell, 

which lacked a mattress or bunk to sleep on, a blanket, a proper toilet, and 

access to drinking water for approximately twelve hours, causing his skin to 

become numb from cold, his muscles to become sore from shivering all 

night, and his legs to become swollen from lack of water. (Id.) Plaintiff asked 

Defendant Aguirre multiple times for water, but Aguirre refused. (Id.) In 

addition, Aguirre taunted Plaintiff throughout the night by kicking and 

banging on his cell door, making “smart aleck” comments to him, and 

laughing at him. (Id.) . . .

Davis v. Penzone, et al., 2:18-cv-04245 SMB CDB, ECF No. 10 at 7-8.

On June 25, 2019, the Court dismissed the complaint in 2:18 cv 04245 for failure to 

state a claim on which relief could be granted, without leave to amend, stating: “Plaintiff 

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has made two efforts at crafting a viable complaint and appears unable to do so despite 

specific instructions from the Court.” (Id., ECF No. 10 at 13). The Court further concluded:

In addition, the facts alleged in [Count Three of] the First Amended 

Complaint fail to demonstrate that Plaintiff was exposed to a substantial risk 

of suffering serious harm and that Defendants recklessly disregarded this 

risk. It appears from Plaintiff’s allegations that he was housed in an 

observation cell for a brief period of time because medical personnel had 

determined that he was a suicide risk. Under the circumstances alleged in the 

First Amended Complaint, such confinement did not offend the Constitution. 

Cf. Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1995) (Eighth 

Amendment was not violated by jails’ use of “safety cells” to house mentally 

disturbed or suicidal prisoners for short periods of time).

(Id., ECF No. 10 at 10-11).

However, on appeal the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found and concluded, with 

regard to this claim:

The district court dismissed Davis’s due process claim as to all 

defendants for failure to state a claim. However, Davis alleged that defendant 

Aguirre left Davis without clothing in a freezing cell for twelve hours, denied 

his requests for water, and verbally abused him. Davis further alleged that 

defendants Aguirre and Roberts took away Davis’s blanket. Liberally 

construed, these allegations were “sufficient to warrant ordering [defendants] 

to file an answer.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008) []. We 

reverse and remand for further proceedings as to this claim and these 

defendants only.

Davis v. Penzone, 796 F. App’x 466, 466 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2020) (emphasis added). The 

Ninth Circuit identified the behavior crossing the threshhold to warrant an answer as 

allegations demonstrating the defendants’ acts were wanton, i.e., verbally abusing Plaintiff 

and taking away Plaintiff’s blanket. In the proposed fourth amended complaint in this 

matter Plaintiff was provided a blanket and when Plaintiff complained about the conditions 

of his cell to a jail official with the power to move him, i.e., Defendant Burgess, Plaintiff 

was moved to a different cell. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge concludes the allegations 

in this matter are distinguishable and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the other matter does 

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not require the Court to allow Plaintiff to proceed on the claim for relief stated in Count 

One of his proposed fourth amended complaint.

With regard to the purported supervisory liability of Defendant Penzone and other 

Defendants, Plaintiff asserts in his proposed fourth amended complaint, as he did in his 

proposed Third Amended Complaint, that Defendant Penzone and all of the other fifty-five

named Defendants are liable in their individual and official capacity for the alleged 

violation of his constitutional rights, “because they were placed on notice, either directly 

from Plaintiff and/or through the grievance procedure, of their unconstitutional living 

conditions, in which they all having authority to take action to remedy the violation, acted 

with deliberate indifference, by their failure to take action in remedying the constitutional 

violation.” (ECF No. 25 at 23-24). With regard to supervisory liability, the instant 

allegations are insufficient to establish liability; Plaintiff makes only a conclusory 

allegation that Defendant Penzone was aware of, participated in, or was the moving force 

behind any alleged constitutional violation. Compare Starr, 652 F.3d at 1209-11 (finding 

adequate the plaintiff’s detailed allegations concerning the sheriff’s knowledge of his 

subordinates’ unlawful behavior because the sheriff was given written notice in a 

Department of Justice letter of a serious pattern and practice of constitutional violations; 

the sheriff received weekly reports from his subordinates who were responsible for 

reporting deaths and injuries in the jails; and the sheriff received ongoing reports from the 

Special Counsel and Office of Independent Review; and, under a threat of a lawsuit by the 

DOJ, the sheriff submitted to a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with the DOJ 

which required him to address and correct the continuous constitutional violations). 

B. Count Two

Count Two in the proposed Third Amended Complaint is identical to Count Two in 

the original complaint, which the Court previously found stated an adequate claim against 

Defendant Jeans.

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C. Count Three

In Count Three of his proposed Third Amended Complaint Plaintiff asserts the 

Court erred in the screening order by stating he had been placed on the “loaf” diet for seven 

days, when he stated in his Second Amended Complaint that he was placed on the loaf diet 

for 15 days. (ECF No. 25 at 30-31). Plaintiff further asserts the Court erred by concluding

that the punitive use of “Nutraloaf” did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.). 

Plaintiff argues he was placed on the diet for punitive reasons, for conduct unrelated to his 

misuse of food or utensils, and that the punitive measure extended “beyond the cessation 

of the offending inmate’s behavior.” (Id.).

In the screening order the Court stated the factual basis for Count Three as follows:

On December 18, 2018, Plaintiff was accused of making verbal 

threats against a detention officer and was issued a disciplinary action report 

(DAR). (Id. at 19.) Defendant Kirk found Plaintiff guilty, “based solely on 

how the DAR was written.” (Id.) Plaintiff received 30 days of restrictive 

housing, 30 days of full restriction, and “15 days on the food loaf.” The 

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office has a policy of imposing a food loaf diet 

on detainees like Plaintiff, whose disciplinary infractions did not involve the 

misuse of food, utensils, or human waste. (Id.)

(ECF No. 13 at 7-8). The Court did state later in the order: “Plaintiff alleges that he was 

placed on a loaf diet for seven days as punishment for a disciplinary violation.” (ECF 

No. 13 at 11). However, the Court dismissed the claim because: 

. . . As the Ninth Circuit stated in LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444 

(9th Cir. 1993), prisoners need only “receive food that is adequate to 

maintain health; it need not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing.” Id. at 1456 

(citations omitted). “The fact that the food occasionally contains foreign 

objects or sometimes is served cold, while unpleasant, does not amount to a 

constitutional deprivation.” Id. (quoting Hamm v. Dekalb County, 774 F.2d 

1567, 1575 (9th Cir. 1985)). An inmate may, however, state a claim where 

he alleges that he is served meals with insufficient calories for long periods 

of time. Id. In LeMaire, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 

temporary use of a loaf diet that meets an inmate’s nutritional requirements, 

concluding that such a diet is not “incompatible with ‘the evolving standards 

of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” 12 F.3d at 1456 

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)); cf. Jayne v. Bosenko, 2014 

WL 2801198, at *3-5 (finding triable issue of fact on Fourteenth Amendment 

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conditions-of-confinement claim where detainee alleged that he had been 

subjected to a loaf diet for 92 out of 120 days and had lost weight and fallen 

ill as a result).

. . . In the absence of any information to suggest that Plaintiff lost

weight or suffered some other physical harm as a result of this temporary 

diet, his allegation is insufficient to state a claim under the Fourteenth 

Amendment.

(ECF No. 13 at 11-12).

Plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies stated in the screening order at ECF No. 13 

with regard to Count Three of his Second Amended Complaint in his proposed fourth

amended complaint.

D. Count Four

Count Four of the proposed fourth amended complaint summarily restates the 

claims stated in the Second Amended Complaint.

E. Count Five

Count Five of the proposed fourth amended complaint summarily restates the claims 

stated in the Second Amended Complaint

F. Count Six

Count Five of the proposed fourth amended complaint summarily restates the claims 

stated in the Second Amended Complaint

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion at ECF No. 25, seeking leave to 

docket and proceed on his proposed fourth amended complaint, be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate 

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Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 29th day of April, 2020.

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