Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00276/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00276-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

AZ Holding, L.L.C., a North Dakota

limited liability company, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Thomas C. Frederick and Christine J.

Cobb, husband and wife; RBW

Consultants, Inc., an Arizona corporation;

and Bumaro, L.L.C., an Arizona limited

liability company,

Defendants. _________________________________

Thomas C. Frederick and Christine J.

Cobb, husband and wife; RBW

Consultants, Inc., an Arizona corporation;

Bumaro, L.L.C., an Arizona limited

liability company,

Counterclaimants,

vs.

AZ Holding, L.L.C., a North Dakota

limited liability company,

Counterdefendant.

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No. CV-08-0276-PHX-LOA

ORDER

Pending for ruling is Plaintiff AZ Holding, L.L.C.’s (“Plaintiff”) June 19, 2009

Motion for Telephonic Conference, docket # 88, which the Court deemed a motion for an

order precluding Defendants Thomas C. Frederick and Christine J. Cobb, RBW Consultants,

Inc., and Bumaro, L.L.C.s’ (collectively “Defendants”) expert witness, Linda Decker, from

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1

 Under the CJRA mandate, “[f]ederal trial courts are now required, by statute, to

implement techniques and strategies designed to dispose of cases in an efficient and

inexpensive manner.” Schwarzkopf Technologies Corp. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 142

F.R.D. 420, 423 (D.Del. 1992). For example, section 473(a)(2) directs that federal judges

provide “early and ongoing control of the pretrial process . . . such that the trial is scheduled

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testifying at trial or in response to a dispositive motion due to her and her report’s untimely

disclosure. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that Defendants violated the

March 17, 2009 scheduling order, Defendants’ untimely expert disclosure was not

substantially justified, and Plaintiff has been sufficiently prejudiced by Defendants’ violation

that sanctions will be imposed.

BACKGROUND

This hotly-contested commercial dispute was initially filed on February 12,

2008. (docket # 1) Between February and November, 2008, the parties stipulated to a

Temporary Restraining Order on Plaintiff’s Application, to several continuances of the

preliminary injunction hearing, to a limited discovery schedule related to the requested

injunctive relief, and to a stay of this lawsuit to participate in a private mediation. (docket ##

12, 24, 28, 36 at 1-2) Private mediation was unsuccessful. After Plaintiff filed its Amended

Complaint on November 17, 2008, Defendants answered and counterclaimed. (docket ##

52, 73) Nearly a year after this lawsuit began, the parties expressly consented to magistratejudge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c) with the approval of the then-assigned

District Judge. (docket ## 63, 70) At the time the case was reassigned, the Rule 16

scheduling conference had not yet been held.

Shortly after denying Plaintiff’s second Application for Preliminary Injunctive

Relief, docket ## 61-62, on February 26, 2009, the Court set the Rule 16 scheduling

conference for the following month. (docket ## 77-78) At the March 17, 2009 scheduling

conference, the Court stressed to all counsel that due to the 13-month delay since the filing

of this lawsuit, the deadlines in the Scheduling Order were real, firm, and, consistent with

the undersigned’s responsibilities mandated by Congress in the Civil Justice Reform Act of

1990, 28 U.S.C. §471 et seq.,1

 would not be altered except “ upon a showing of good cause

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to occur within eighteen months after the filing of the complaint . . . .” 28 U.S.C. §473(a)(2)

(emphasis added) Because of the delay in this case before its reassignment, this goal can not

be achieved.

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and by leave of the assigned trial judge.” (docket # 81 at 2)

At the scheduling conference with the active, direct involvement of all counsel

to fashion an order for the fair disclosure of all experts and their anticipated opinions on the

various claims and counterclaims, the Court set three staggered deadlines for disclosure of

expert testimony and reports:

[P]laintiff’s and Counterclaimants’ disclosure of expert

testimony and reports required under Rule 26(a)(2)(B),

Fed.R.Civ.P., on their affirmative claims shall be made by

Wednesday, April 15, 2009. Defendants’ and

Counterdefendant’s disclosures of expert testimony and reports

required under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), Fed.R.Civ.P., on their

respective defenses shall be made by Friday, May 15, 2009.

Plaintiff’s and Counterclaimants’ disclosure of true rebuttal

expert testimony and reports solely to contradict or rebut

evidence as required under Rule 26(a)(2)(C), Fed.R.Civ.P., shall

be made by Monday, June 15, 2009. 

(docket # 81 at 2-3) The scheduling order also mandates supplementation of all discovery

pursuant to Rule 26(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., by Friday, September 11, 2009, completion of all

discovery by Wednesday, October 14, 2009, and filing of dispositive motion(s) on or before

Friday, November 20, 2009. (Id. at 3-4) The scheduling order makes clear that the deadlines

are “to be taken seriously,” citing Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir.

1994). (Id. at 2) At the scheduling conference, defense counsel expressed neither objection

nor confusion that any defense expert to counter Plaintiff’s expert testimony must be

disclosed on or before Friday, May 15, 2009.

 Plaintiff contends it timely disclosed its expert witness, Patricia J. Baldwin

(“Baldwin”), and her report containing her anticipated trial testimony on April 21, 2009, six

days after the April 15, 2009 deadline by prior agreement with opposing counsel. (docket #

88, n. 1) In the subject Motion, Plaintiff claims Defendants did not disclose an expert on

Defendants’ counterclaims by the April 15 deadline or by the May 15 deadline to contradict

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2

 Defendants acknowledge that they “did not disclose any expert testimony on [April

15, 2009] because they are not planning to offer any affirmative expert testimony on any of

their counterclaims.” (docket # 92 at 10)

3

 On July 21, 2009, the Court granted the parties’ written stipulation extending the

deadline for Defendants’ Reply to July 21, 2009. (docket # 97)

4

 The Court has preliminary concerns whether either expert witness may properly

offer their opinions in evidence at the trial of this matter. This issue, however, will be

addressed prior to trial. Nationwide Transport Finance v. Cass Information Systems, Inc. 523

F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n expert witness cannot give an opinion as to her legal

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Plaintiff’s expert disclosure of April 21, 2009. Rather, on June 15, 2009, Defendants

disclosed their so-called “rebuttal” expert witness, thirty days after the deadline for

responding to Plaintiff’s expert disclosure. (docket # 87) Plaintiff contends that the June 15,

2009 deadline pertained only to “true rebuttal expert testimony and reports” for Plaintiff and

Counterclaimants to contradict or rebut evidence disclosed on or before the May 15

deadline. (docket # 81 at 2-3) Because Defendants failed to disclose an expert on their

counterclaims by the April 15, 2009 deadline, Plaintiff contends it did not disclose an expert

witness in response by the May 15, 2009 rebuttal deadline.2

 Further, Plaintiff argues it has

been prejudiced by Defendants’ untimely disclosure because it cannot offer rebuttal

testimony to Defendants’ disclosed and anticipated expert testimony.

On June 22, 2009, the Court ordered Defendants to show cause in writing why

the Court should not preclude Defendants’ expert witness from testifying at trial due to

Defendants’ failure to comply with the Rule 16 scheduling order. (docket # 90) Defendants

and Plaintiff filed timely Responses, docket ## 92, 94, on July 1 and July 10, 2009,

respectively. On July 21, 2009, Defendants filed their timely Reply to Plaintiff’s Response.3

Defendants argue that their “expert disclosure did not contravene the Court’s

Rule 16 Scheduling Order” and “was both proper and timely” because their disclosure of

Linda Decker (“Decker”), a Senior Branch Manager and Commercial Escrow Officer, was

“true rebuttal expert testimony . . . offered solely to contradict or rebut evidence offered by”

Plaintiff’s expert, Baldwin, a Senior Escrow Officer.4

 (docket # 92 at 1, 6-7) Defendants

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conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law. Similarly, instructing the jury as to

the applicable law is the distinct and exclusive province of the court.”) (quoting Hangarter

v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004))

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contend that Decker’s report is a “classic example of a rebuttal report. The sole issues

addressed in Decker’s report are the ones that Baldwin addressed in her report, and all that

Decker has done is disagree with Baldwin and explain why. There are no new, or affirmative, issues of any type raised in Decker’s rebuttal report.” (Id. at 8) Assuming their expert

disclosure was untimely, Defendants claim they “had substantial justification for making the

disclosure on the date that they did[]” because their reading of the scheduling order was “a

reasonable reading of the Order[]” and “Defendants’ June 15, 2009 disclosure of Decker’s

report can also be fairly characterized as ‘harmless.’” (Id. at 13) 

Plaintiff responds that “Defendants’ position defies common sense[,]”

“distort[s] the plain language of this Court’s Scheduling Order[,] and “fails to demonstrate

substantial justification for their failure to comply with the Court’s Scheduling Order.”

(docket # 94 at 1-2) To demonstrate the disingenuousness of Defendants’ argument,

Plaintiff points to the parties’ proposed case management plan wherein the parties agreed to

disclose experts on any claims or counterclaims on one date, and then 30 days later disclose

experts opposing those claims and counterclaims. (docket # 79 at 14) Plaintiff correctly notes

“[t]he Court adopted the parties’ requested approach for disclosure of an expert and a

responding expert 30 days apart, but added a third subsequent date to allow for disclosure 30

days thereafter for any rebuttal expert – but only by Plaintiff (on its claims) and

Counterclaimants (on their counterclaims).” (Id. at 5) (“Plaintiff’s and Counterclaimants’

disclosure of true rebuttal expert testimony and reports solely to contradict or rebut evidence

as required under Rule 26(a)(2)(C), Fed.R.Civ.P., . . . .”) (emphasis in Plaintiff’s original).

Plaintiff acknowledges the Court specifically discussed this third disclosure date with

counsel for the parties in chambers. 

Plaintiff suggests that Defendants’ untimely expert disclosure was not a simple

mistaken interpretation of the scheduling order, but rather intentional legal strategy designed

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to prevent Plaintiff from offering rebuttal opinions to Defendants’ expert’s opinions. Plaintiff

urges the Court to enter an order precluding Defendants’ expert witness from testifying at

trial. (Id. at 2) 

RULE 16 SCHEDULING ORDER

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 vests the district court with early

control over cases ‘toward a process of judicial management that embraces the entire

pretrial phase, especially motions and discovery.’” In re Arizona, 528 F.3d 652, 657 (9th

Cir. 2009), cert. denied, S.Ct. , 2009 WL 1738654 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

16 advisory committee’s note, 1983 Amendment). “Rule 16 further recognizes the

inherent power of the district court to enforce its pretrial orders through sanctions, Fed. R.

Civ. P. 16(f), and the discretion of the [trial] judge to apply an appropriate level of supervision as dictated by the issues raised by each individual case.” Id. (citing, e.g., Fed. R.

Civ. P. 16(c)(2)). “Failure to comply with the scheduling order exposes a party to ‘any

just orders,’ as determined by the [trial] judge, including dismissal, entry of default or

contempt of court.” Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f), 37(b)(2)).

Because this Court directed the sequencing and dates of expert witness

disclosures, including the dates for exchange of expert reports, the alternative procedure

set forth by Rule 26(a)(C)(i) is inapplicable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) and (C)(i);

Mendez v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 2005 WL 1865426, * 3 (N.D.Cal. 2005) (“Due

to Defendants’ untimely disclosure of their non-retained experts and their failure to

petition this Court for relief from the Scheduling Order, this Court holds that Defendants

may not present their non-retained experts in support of their claims or defenses.”) (citing

Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Fasco Indus., 1995 WL 115421, at *2 (N.D.Cal. 1995) (“When

the court crafted its own schedule for expert disclosures, the mechanism set forth in Rule

26 was nullified, including the provision for supplemental disclosures”).

As authorized by Rule 26(a)(2)(C), the scheduling order herein set the

timing and dates for expert disclosures and incorporated what Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires

to be disclosed. Rule 26(a)(2)(C) (“A party must make these disclosures at the times and

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in the sequence that the court orders. . . .”). Rule 26(a)(2)(B) mandates, inter alia, that an

expert witness’ disclosure “be accompanied by a written report - prepared and signed by

the witness . . . [and] must contain (i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness

will express and the basis and reasons for them; (ii) the data or other information

considered by the witness in forming them; . . . (v) a list of all other cases in which,

during the previous four years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition;

and (vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the

case.” Rule 26(a)(2)(B), FED.R.CIV.P.

Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(C)(ii) defines

rebuttal experts as those experts presenting “evidence [that] is intended solely to

contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under

Rule 26(a)(2)(B), within 30 days after the other party’s disclosure.” See, Lindner v.

Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 625, 635-636 (D.Haw. 2008) (sanctions requested for untimely disclosure of expert report that was allegedly not proper rebuttal which

defendant claimed plaintiff should have produced by an earier expert disclosure deadline)

(citing Johnson v. Grays Harbor Cmty. Hosp., 2007 WL 4510313, at *1 (W.D.Wash.

2007) (“the Court will not exclude Plaintiff’s rebuttal experts from testifying solely

because Plaintiff designated only rebuttal experts”)).

“In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts . . . set schedules and

establish deadlines to foster the efficient treatment and resolution of cases.” Wong v.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005). “As the torrent of civil

and criminal cases unleashed in recent years has threatened to inundate the federal courts,

deliverance has been sought in the use of calendar management techniques. Rule 16 is an

important component of those techniques.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975

F.2d 604, 611 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, “federal courts strictly enforce the expert witness

disclosure requirements in Rule 26(a)(2)(B), and have the discretion to impose sanctions

for an untimely or inadequate expert disclosure including the exclusion of expert witness

testimony.” Wilderness Development, LLC v. Hash, 2009 WL 564224, * 3 (D.Mont.

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5 Brooks v. Eclipse Recreational Vehicles, Inc., 2009 WL 1616017 (D.Ariz. 2009)

(good cause not shown to modify scheduling order, untimely request for leave to file

amended complaint denied).

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2009) (citing Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.

2001)). “Exclusion of expert testimony ‘is an appropriate remedy for failing to fulfill the

required disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a).’” Id. 

Untimely expert disclosure implicates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

37(c)(1). This Rule provides “[i]f a party fails to provide information or identify a witness

as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or

witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was

substantially justified or is harmless. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). Thus, a party may still

use that party’s expert witness evidence if the failure to timely disclose that evidence was

either “substantially justified” or “harmless.” Yeti By Molly, Ltd, 259 F.3d at 1106. 

District courts are given “particularly wide latitude . . . to issue sanctions under Rule

37(c)(1).” Id. at 1106.

The Ninth Circuit, other judges from this District Court, including the

undersigned,5

 and other district courts within the Ninth Circuit have consistently demonstrated in writing and orally at scheduling conferences that Rule 16’s deadlines are firm,

real and are to be taken seriously by the parties and their counsel. See, e.g., Janicki, 42

F.3d at 566; Hostnut.Com, Inc.v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 2006 WL 2573201 * 3 (D.

Ariz. 2006) (evidence not disclosed until more than two months after the discovery deadline precluded at trial); Schwartz v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., CV-06-2168-PHX-FJM

(party’s first request to extend expert witness disclosure deadline denied; defense expert

precluded) (docket # 83 at 2 in CV-06-2168-PHX-FJM); Hazelwood v. United States,

2006 WL 1599344, * 7 (D.Ariz. 2006) (“Plaintiff has presented no evidence she was

diligent in seeking to amend her complaint. Finding no good cause to modify the

Scheduling Order, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is untimely and will be denied.”); U.S. ex

rel. O’Connell v. Chapman University, 245 F.R.D. 652 (C.D.Cal.2007) (sanction of an

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award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,805.00 imposed under Rule 37(c) for

plaintiff’s untimely expert disclosure and noncompliance with Rule 26(a)(2)(B)).

If, however, a district court is inclined to strike a party’s expert witness as a

sanction due to the untimely disclosure of the expert or expert’s report, the Ninth Circuit

instructs that district courts consider the following factors: “1) the public’s interest in

expeditious resolution of litigation; 2) the court's need to manage its docket; 3) the risk of

prejudice to the defendants; 4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

merits; 5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Lindner, 249 F.R.D. at 642 (quoting

Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 1997)).

DISCUSSION

Here, Defendants’ arguments for the timing of their expert’s disclosure and

her report flies in the face of the purpose of the mandatory expert disclosure requirements

delineated in Rule 26(a)(2) and the plain, ordinary language of the March 17, 2009

scheduling order. Whether intentional strategy or not, Defendants’ disclosure of their

expert on the last of the three dates ensured Plaintiff could not offer rebuttal opinions to

Defendants’ expert at trial. Perhaps citing both Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and Rule 26(a)(2)(C)(ii)

with the May 15 expert deadline may have improved the order’s clarity by stating the

obvious that Defendants’ expert rebuttal must be disclosed by this date. Nevertheless, the

scheduling order makes plain that the word “Defendants” is only used in that portion of

the scheduling order addressing expert disclosures required by Friday, May 15, 2009.

(docket # 81 at 3) Considering that Defendants concede they do not intend to use expert

testimony to help prove their counterclaims, Defendants’ requested proposal for the

disclosure of expert witnesses 30 days apart in their First Amended Joint Proposed Case

Management Plan, docket # 79, and the detailed discussions with both counsel about the

sequencing of expert disclosures at the Rule 16 scheduling conference, the Court

concludes Defendants violated the Court’s scheduling order by disclosing Decker and her

report on June 15, 2009, instead of May 15, 2009. There is no substantial justification for

this violation and it certainly was not harmless to Plaintiff because, unless remedied,

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Plaintiff cannot offer rebuttal opinions to Defendants’ expert opinion testimony at trial.

Having found a violation of both the letter and spirit of the scheduling

order, the Court turns to the question of the appropriate remedy. After reviewing each of

the five Wendt factors: 1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; 2)

the court’s need to manage its docket; 3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; 4) the

public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; 5) the availability of less

drastic sanctions, the Court finds that total preclusion of Defendant’s expert witness is

unduly harsh and unwarranted. Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir.

1997) Although the first two factors favor preclusion, the last three factors favor a lesser

sanction. Specifically, the prejudice to Plaintiff due to Defendants’ untimely disclosure

can be ameliorated by the Court’s orders entered herein without extending the remaining

deadlines in the scheduling order. Additionally, sanctions other than preclusion are

available and would be more just considering the gravity of the violation. Due to

Defendants’ claim that expert witness Decker is solely a rebuttal witness, and following

the lead of the Magistrate Judge in U.S. ex rel. O'Connell, 245 F.R.D. at 656, the Court

will preclude Defendants’ use of expert witness Decker in any capacity other than as a

rebuttal witness.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for an order precluding

Defendants’ use of Linda Decker as an expert witness is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ expert witness Linda

Decker may only testify as a rebuttal expert, i.e., she cannot testify in Defendants’

case-in-chief if Plaintiff’s expert does not testify in Plaintiff’s case-in-chief. If Linda

Decker testifies at trial for Defendants, she may only offer testimony to contradict or

rebut the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert on the same subject matter and may not offer

expert testimony on any other subject. In other words, Defendants’ expert witness is not

permitted to offer any opinions independent of rebuttal testimony.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1)(A), FED.R.CIV.P.,

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awarding to Plaintiff its reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in urging the subject motion.

Plaintiff shall timely file with the Clerk of the Court an Attorney’s Fees Affidavit,

consistent with LRCiv 54.2(d)(4) and (e), by Friday, September 18, 2009. Defendants

may file Objections to Plaintiff’s Affidavit by Friday, October 9, 2009. Plaintiff may

file a Reply by Monday, October 19, 2009. Absent good cause shown, the failure to

timely file the subject Affidavit or Objections may result in the summary denial or award

of the requested attorneys’ fees.

Dated this 7th day of August, 2009.

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