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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

LARRY D. FRAZIER, 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant,) 

v. 

L.F. DUBOIS, WAYNE SMITH, 

R.I. MATHEWS, LEE CONNORS, 

SAM CLABONE, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Appellees.) 

No. 90-3096 

FIIJED 

United States .Court of Appeals T~ath ch·uit 

CE: 1 2 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D. Kan. No. 90-3020-R) 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34{a}; lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. We nevertheless grant Frazier's 

request to proceed in forma pauperis. 

This case involves an appeal pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1331. 

Plaintiff, currently confined at the United States Penitentiary, 

Lompoc, California, claims that the defendants violated his 

constitutional rights by transferring him from the United States 

Appellate Case: 90-3096 Document: 01019625488 Date Filed: 12/12/1990 Page: 1 
Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas to Lompoc. Plaintiff alleges 

that he was transferred in retaliation for his activities as 

chairman of the "Afrikan Cultural Society" and brings this action 

under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) for violation of his First 

Amendment rights. Plaintiff further contends that he was 

segregated from the general prison population for four days 

without a hearing and that the judge's signature on the April 10, 

1990 order denying his motion to appeal in forma pauperis is a 

forgery. Plaintiff seeks both damages and equitable relief in the 

form of a transfer to a federal prison near his home in North 

Carolina. 

The district court dismissed the pro se complaint as 

frivolous under 28 u.s.c. S l915(d). Citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 

u.s. 215 (1976) and Robinson v. Benson, 570 F.2d 902, 923 (lOth 

Cir. 1978}, the court concluded that the plaintiff could not state 

a claim because 11 the Attorney General has the discretion to 

transfer federal prisoners from one place of confinement to 

another at any time, for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at 

all." Order at 1. We disagree with the all-encompassing breadth 

of that conclusion. The Supreme Court in Meachum v. Fano held 

that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 

entitle a prisoner to a hearing whenever he is transferred from 

one prison to another because a prisoner does not have a "liberty 

interest" in assignment to any particular prison. However, 

Meachum addressed only the due process clause, and it did not 

preclude the possibility that a transfer might violate other 

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Appellate Case: 90-3096 Document: 01019625488 Date Filed: 12/12/1990 Page: 2 
constitutional provisions. Most circuits have since recogni zed 

this distinction and have held that Meachum did not confe r on 

prison officials unbridled discretion to transfe r inmates in 

retaliation for exercising their constitutional rights . The 

Eighth Circuit stated as much in Murphy v . Missouri Dept. of 

Correction, 769 F.2d 502 (1985), holding that a prisoner's 

complaint alleging a transfer from a medium security prison to a 

maximum security prison solely to punish him for his rel igious 

views amounted to a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . See 

also Meriwether v. Coughlin , 879 F . 2d 1037, 1045 (2d Ci r . 1989); 

Bridges v. Russell, 757 F . 2d 1155 (11th Cir. 1985); and Buise v . 

Hudk ins, 584 F .2d 223 , 229-30 (7th Cir . 1978), cert. denied , 440 

u.s. 916 (1979}. Cf. Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235 , 1248 (5th 

Cir . 1989); Mat zker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1150 ( 7th Cir. 1984); 

Milhouse v. Carlson , 652 F.2d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir . 1981); and 

Furtado v . Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 , 87 {lst Cir. 1979) , cert. denied, 

444 u.s. 1035 (1980). 

Although the Tenth Circuit has yet to rule on such a prisone r 

transfer case, we think the other circuits have correctly 

interpreted Meachum . Thus, we agree that "[w ]hile a prisoner 

enjoys no constitutional right to remain in a particul ar institution and generally is not entitled to due process protections 

prior to such a transfer, prison officials do not have the discretion to punish an inmate for exercising his first amendment rights 

by transferring him to a diffe rent institution." Murphy v . Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 769 F.2d at 503. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3096 Document: 01019625488 Date Filed: 12/12/1990 Page: 3 
Given this holding of law, we find that the district court 

here erred in dismissing the compl aint as frivolous. It is by now 

well established that an action may not be dismissed as frivolous 

unless it is beyond doubt that the petitioner can pr ove no facts 

in support of his claim which would entitl e him to rel i ef . 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Owens v. Maschner, 811 

F.2d 1365 (lOth Cir. 1987}; Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 211 

(8th Cir. 1984). Because Frazier may be able to prove that his 

transfer was the result of improper retaliation by prison 

officials to punish plaintiff for constitutionally protected 

activity, we reverse and remand for further consi deration·. 1 

We are, however, mindful of the fact that '' courts are ill 

equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison 

administration ••• ,» and thereby direct the lower court on 

remand to the principles set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 

78, 84 (1987) . In Turner , the Supreme Court indicated that "a 

lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate in determi ning the 

constitutionality of prison rules" and that great defe rence must 

be accorded to the administrative determinations of prison 

officials. Id. at 81, 85. The Court thus concluded that "when a 

prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional righ t s, the 

regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate 

penological interests." Id. at 89. Although Turner addresses 

prison rules and regulations, we see no reason why the Turner 

1 Of course, it is imperative t hat plaintiff's pleading be 

factual and not conclusory. Mere all egations of constitutional 

retaliation will not suffice; plaintiffs must rather allege 

specific facts showing retaliation because of the exercise of the 

prisoner's constitutional rights. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3096 Document: 01019625488 Date Filed: 12/12/1990 Page: 4 
principle should not apply to other prison act ions, such as the 

transfer here. Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235 , 1248 (5 t h Cir. 

1989) . 

To determine whether the prison action is "reasona bly related 

to legitimate penologica l interests," Turner erects a balancing 

test, and it directs lower courts to weigh t he fol lowing factors . 

First, the lower court should inquire into whether there is a 

"valid, rational connection" between the prison action and the 

"legitimate government interest put forward to justify it ." 

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 . Second, the lower court should determine 

whether "there are alternative means of exer cising the righ t that 

remain open to prison inmates." Id. at 90. Third, the court 

should evaluate "the impact [that] accommodation of the asserted 

constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on 

the allocation of prison resources generally." Id. And finally, 

the court should look for the pr esence of "obvious, easy 

alternatives" to the disputed prison activity . 2 Id. Of course, 

in conducting this analysis, the Supreme Court advises repeatedly 

that substantial deference is to be accorded to the prison 

authorities. 

The lower court here did not engage in the analysis set forth 

in Turner. Moreover, the prison officials have, as of yet, 

articulated no reasons for the transfer of Frazier. Therefore, 

2 We note that the Supreme Court emphaticall y rejected a "least 

restrictive alternative test," observing that "prison officials do 

not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable 

alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional 

complaint." Id. at 91. We therefore disapprove of Benjamin v. 

Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1990) to the extent that it is 

inconsistent with this admonition. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3096 Document: 01019625488 Date Filed: 12/12/1990 Page: 5 
since it is by no means apparent that Fraz ier 's claim i s 

frivolous, we think it appropriate to remand this case for further 

consideration consistent with this opinion. 

Frazier additionally claims that he was arbitrarily placed in 

segregation without a hearing by the officials at Lea venworth. 

This is a serious a llegation. The Supreme Court has noted tha t 

"[s]egregation of a prisoner without a prior hearing may violate 

due process if the postponement of procedural protections is not 

justified by apprehended emergency conditions." Hughes v. Rowe, 

449 U.S. 5, 11 (1980). Specifically, an inmate must receive "some 

notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present 

his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to 

transfer him to administrative segregation." Hewitt v. Helms , 459 

u.s. 460, 476 (1983). Frazier claims that he was denied these 

procedures. Because the record is unclear as to facts and the 

extent to which Frazier exhausted his admin istrative remedies, we 

remand to the lower court and order the government t o respond to 

Frazier's allegations. 

Finally, Frazier contends that the judge's signa t ure on the 

April 10, 1990 order denying his motion to appeal in forma 

pauperis was a forgery. From this assertion he concludes that the 

order denying him such status is void. Petitioner's allegation on 

this issue is so confusing and devoid of facts that we can not 

clearly understand it. However, because we conclude t hat the 

district court erred in dismissing Frazier's complaint, and 

because we are remanding for furthe r proceedings, this claim is 

moot. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3096 Document: 01019625488 Date Filed: 12/12/1990 Page: 6 
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

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