Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00464/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00464-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW BENNETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DARON FORBES; and WE ARE 

VOLLEYBALL ELITE,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17cv464-MMA (KSC)

ORDER:

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO STAY 

PROCEEDINGS; AND

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

[Doc. Nos. 16, 17]

On August 25, 2017, Plaintiff Andrew Bennett filed a motion for leave to file an 

amended complaint [Doc. No. 16-1 (“Mot. Leave”)] and a motion to stay the proceedings 

pending resolution of a partnership dissolution proceeding in state court [Doc. No. 17-1 

(“Mot. Stay”)]. Defendants Daron Forbes and We Are Volleyball Elite (“WAVE”), 

oppose the motions. Doc. Nos. 18 (“Oppo. Leave”), 19 (“Oppo. Stay”). Plaintiff filed 

timely replies. Doc. Nos. 20 (“Reply Stay”), 21 (“Reply Leave”). The Court, in its 

discretion, decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument, 

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pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to stay and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to amend.

BACKGROUND

On March 7, 2017, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants alleging causes of 

action for intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with 

prospective economic advantage, negligent interference with prospective economic 

advantage, defamation, trademark infringement, unfair competition and false designation 

under federal law, violation of California Business and Professions Code, intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and copyright 

infringement. See Doc. No. 1 (“Compl.”); see also Doc. No. 4 (“FAC”).

According to Plaintiff, he founded certain “organizations for the purpose of 

connecting intercollegiate beach volleyball programs with high school athletes.” See

Doc. Nos. 4, 7. Specifically, Plaintiff states he “is the founder of the brands and events” 

called: Get Noticed Beach Volleyball (“GNBV”), Endless Summer Beach Volleyball 

Tour (“Endless Summer” or “ESVT”), and Juniors Beach Volleyball League (“JBVL”). 

See FAC; Doc. No. 7. Plaintiff alleges he then “[brought] in [Forbes] and her 

organization, [WAVE] to help grow the brands for over two and a half years.” See Doc. 

No. 7. Plaintiff alleges he met Defendant Forbes in 2013 and at some point thereafter, 

they entered into a verbal agreement for a “joint venture to put on certain events.” See id. 

Plaintiff contends the Parties agreed that Plaintiff’s organization, the Tamarack Beach 

Volleyball Club, and Defendant Forbes’s organization, WAVE, would put on these 

events jointly, and would share “revenues, costs, and profits” equally. See id. 

According to Plaintiff, he recently decided it would be best for the Parties to cease 

working together, but alleges Defendants have attempted to assert control over and claim 

ownership of GNBV, Endless Summer, and JBVL. Specifically, the Parties began to 

feud regarding the management of events and on February 20, 2017, “discussions ensued 

between the parties about a separation and potentially having one party purchase and own 

certain brands outright,” but the Parties never came to an agreement. See Doc. No. 7. 

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Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have represented to members of the public that Plaintiff 

has no right to use the contested brands, and told the Association of Volleyball 

Professionals that WAVE “owns and operates JBVL, Endless Summer, and GNBV 

brands.” See Doc. No. 7 (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff states that Defendant 

Forbes “has continued to market and attempt to run events” under the disputed brand 

names, causing confusion to consumers. See Doc. No. 7. 

According to Defendants, “Plaintiff was simply an independent contractor hired to 

assist Defendants’ operations” in running “beach volleyball tournaments and showcases . 

. . to provide a platform for [] youth athletes to get recruited by colleges and universities.” 

See Doc. No. 8. Defendants contend that Defendant Forbes first met Plaintiff in 2013, 

and in 2014 Defendant Forbes asked Plaintiff if he would like to work “as an independent 

contractor to assist with Team WAVE’s beach volleyball events” despite having “been 

warned by others who had worked with Mr. Bennett that he was not to be trusted.” See

Doc. No. 8. Because of Defendant Forbes’s wariness about Plaintiff’s trustworthiness, 

Defendant Forbes claims she never allowed Plaintiff to hold “a position of title within 

Team WAVE’s organization” and Defendants “maintained all ownership of all aspects of 

the GNBV, ESVT, and JBVL brands and events.” See Doc. No. 8. Defendants contend 

Defendant WAVE “agreed to be financially responsible for all the events, including the 

permits, insurance coverage, costs, and any losses incurred with the beach volleyball 

events.” See Doc. No. 8. Defendants state that Defendant WAVE paid Plaintiff half of 

the net proceeds from each event, but asserts that this does not constitute sharing of 

profits because many expenses did not factor into his payments. Defendants assert that 

Plaintiff requested an ownership interest in, or control over, the brands, but Defendant 

WAVE denied his requests. 

On April 7, 2017, Defendants filed an Answer. Doc. No. 5 (“Answer”). On April 

24, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction requesting the Court order 

Defendants to, pending resolution of this action, refrain from: (1) “running any volleyball 

events using the GNBV, Endless Summer, and JBVL brands;” (2) “advertising, 

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promoting, and posting on any social media platforms under the names GNBV, Endless 

Summer, and JBVL;” (3) “advertising, promoting, and posting on any websites under the 

names GNBV, Endless Sumer, and JBVL;” and (4) “using the names GNBV, Endless 

Summer, and JBVL, in any form.” See Doc. No. 7. On June 12, 2017, the Court denied 

Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Doc. No. 14.

During briefing on Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff learned 

that Defendants were claiming there was never a partnership related to any of the events 

thrown together. Mot. Leave at 2. On June 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for 

partnership dissolution in state court as a direct result of Defendants’ claim there was no 

partnership. Id. The state action is based on the same set of facts that are at issue in the 

instant action. Oppo. Leave at 3. Plaintiff filed an ex parte request for a temporary 

restraining order in state court to enjoin Defendants from running any volleyball events 

under the names GNBV, Endless Summer, and JBVL. Mot. Leave at 2-3. Defendants 

filed an Answer on August 14, 2017 in the state court action, and then filed a Motion to 

Stay the state court action on August 16, 2017. Id. The Superior Court deferred its 

rulings until after the hearing in this Court regarding the motion to stay and motion to 

amend currently pending before this Court. Oppo. Leave at 3. 

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint filed in the Superior Court of California [Doc. Nos. 16-3, 17-4] and 

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of several state court documents, 

including the Superior Court’s docket, the Complaint and First Amended Complaint, the 

tentative ruling for Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and for Defendants’ 

motion to stay, and the minute order for Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction

[Doc. Nos. 19-2; 18-1 at 7-22]. Defendants also request the Court judicially notice 

documents filed by the United States Patent and Trademark Office, including Plaintiff’s 

trademark application for Endless Summer Volleyball Tour and GN BV Get Noticed 

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Beach Volleyball. Doc No. 18-1 at 1-6. Defendants obtained the trademark documents 

from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Electronic Search System. See Doc. No. 18-1 at 2.

The Court may take judicial notice of matters that are either “generally known 

within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. 

Evid. 201(b). Public records, including judgments and other publicly filed documents, 

are proper subjects of judicial notice. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (Courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within 

and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to 

matters at issue.”). Public records of administrative agencies are also appropriate matters 

of judicial notice. See Dahon N. Am., Inc. v. Hon, No. 2:11-CV-05835-ODW, 2012 WL 

1413681, at *8 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2012) (taking judicial notice of documents filed on 

the United States trademark website); see also Clearly Food & Beverage Co. v. Top Shelf 

Bevs., Inc., 102 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1161 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (taking judicial notice of 

trademark applications obtained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Electronic Search 

System). However, to the extent that any facts in documents subject to judicial notice are 

subject to reasonable dispute, the Court will not take judicial notice of those facts. See 

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds 

by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). Neither Plaintiff nor 

Defendants oppose the requests for judicial notice. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

both requests because the state court records are proper subjects of judicial notice.

MOTION TO STAY

Plaintiff moves the Court to stay the proceedings pending resolution of a 

partnership dissolution and accounting action currently pending in the San Diego 

Superior Court. Mot. Stay at 2. Defendants oppose the motion. Oppo. Stay.

1. Relevant Background

On June 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Bennett v. Forbes, et al., No. 37-

2017-00022703-CU-MC-NC, in the San Diego County Superior Court. Mot. Stay at 3; 

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Doc. No. 17-4. On July 5, 2017, Plaintiff appeared ex parte to request a temporary

restraining order. Mot. Stay at 3. Defendant answered Plaintiff’s state court Complaint 

on August 14, 2017 and filed a motion to stay the state court action on August 16, 2017. 

Oppo. Stay at 4. The San Diego County Superior Court published tentative rulings 

denying Plaintiff’s request and continued Defendants’ motion to stay to be heard after 

this Court’s ruling on the present motions. Id. On September 8, 2017, the San Diego 

County Superior Court deferred its rulings until after the hearing in this Court regarding 

the motion to stay. Id. 

2. Legal Standard

Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the 

jurisdiction given them.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 

U.S. 800, 817-18 (1976); see also Smith v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 418 

F.3d 1028, 1033 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that circumstances warranting a stay under the 

Colorado River doctrine are “exceedingly rare”); Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 867 

(9th Cir. 2002) (“the Colorado River doctrine is a narrow exception”). “Generally, as 

between state and federal courts, the rule is that ‘the pendency of an action in the state 

court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the [f]ederal court having 

jurisdiction . . . .” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 

U.S. 268, 282 (1910)); see also Seneca Ins. Co. v. Strange Land Inc., 862 F.3d 835, 841

(9th Cir. 2017).

Nonetheless, federal courts are authorized to dismiss or stay an action “due to the 

presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration.” 

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983) (quoting 

Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818). In considering whether to do so, the court is tasked 

with ascertaining “whether there exist ‘exceptional’ circumstances, the ‘clearest of 

justifications,’ . . . to justify the surrender of [federal] jurisdiction.” Id. at 25-26 

(emphasis in original); see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908, 

912 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Only exceptional circumstances justify such a stay, and whether 

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these circumstances exist is determined by weighing a complex of factors.”). 

Accordingly, the court considers the following factors in determining whether to grant 

such a stay:

(1) whether the state court first assumed jurisdiction over property; (2)

inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal 

litigation; (4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent 

forums; (5) whether federal law or state law provides the rule of decision on 

the merits; (6) whether the state court proceedings are inadequate to protect 

the federal litigant’s rights; and (7) whether exercising jurisdiction would 

promote forum shopping.

Holder, 305 F.3d at 870 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15-16, 23, 26; Colorado 

River, 424 U.S. at 818-19); see also Seneca Ins. Co., 862 F.3d at 842. Regardless, “the 

decision whether to [stay] a federal action because of a parallel state-court litigation does 

not rest on a mechanical checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important factors as 

they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of 

jurisdiction.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16; see also Seneca Ins. Co., 862 F.3d at 842;

Intel Corp., 12 F.3d at 912.

In the Ninth Circuit, “the narrow Colorado River doctrine requires that the pending 

state court proceeding resolve all issues in the federal suit.” Holder, 305 F.3d at 859; see 

also Seneca Ins. Co., 862 F.3d at 842. Indeed, if “there exists a substantial doubt as to 

whether the state court proceeding will resolve all of the disputed issues in [the federal] 

case, it is unnecessary for [the court] to weigh the other factors included in the Colorado 

River analysis.” Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d at 913 n.7. The 

Ninth Circuit explained that:

Under the rules governing the Colorado River doctrine, the existence of a 

substantial doubt as to whether the state proceeding will resolve the federal 

action precludes the granting of a stay . . . . “When a district court decides to 

. . . stay under Colorado River, it presumably concludes that the parallel statecourt litigation will be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt 

resolution of the issues between the parties. If there is any substantial doubt 

as to this, it would be a serious abuse of discretion to grant the stay or dismissal 

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at all . . . . Thus, the decision to invoke Colorado River necessarily 

contemplates that the federal court will have nothing further to do in resolving 

any substantive part of the case, whether it stays or dismisses.”

Id. at 913 (internal citations omitted); see also Smith, 418 F.3d at 1033 (9th Cir. 2005).

3. Analysis

Here, the Court finds there to be substantial doubt as to whether the state 

proceeding will resolve all the issues presented in this federal action. Plaintiff concedes 

that “the claims and causes of action are not the same.” Mot. Stay at 5. The instant 

action includes claims for copyright infringement, trademark infringement, intentional 

interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective 

economic advantage, negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, 

defamation, federal unfair competition and false designation, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See FAC. The San 

Diego Superior Court case includes causes of action for partnership dissolution and 

accounting. See Doc No. 17-4 at 4-8. Further, the San Diego Superior Court cannot 

decide all of Plaintiff’s federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (“No State court shall have 

jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to . . . 

copyrights.”). Accordingly, “there exists a substantial doubt as to whether the state court 

proceeding will resolve all of the disputed issues in [the federal] case, [and] it is 

unnecessary for [the court] to weigh the other factors included in the Colorado River

analysis.” Intel Corp., 12 F.3d at 913 n.7. 

Nonetheless, consideration of the other factors also does not weigh in favor of 

granting the requested stay. Neither this court nor the state court has assumed 

jurisdiction over property. Jurisdiction was first obtained in this Court, but state law 

provides the rule of decision on the merits of many—although not all—of Plaintiff’s 

claims. However, there has been no showing that this federal forum is inconvenient for 

the parties or that the exercise of jurisdiction by this court would promote forum 

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shopping.1 As previously discussed, not all the issues in the two actions are the same and 

there exists a legitimate concern whether the state court proceedings are adequate to 

protect the rights of the litigants in this action. Further, while avoiding piecemeal 

litigation is certainly a desirable goal, there has been no showing that it will not be 

achieved if this Court proceeds in this action. Indeed, the San Diego Superior Court has 

deferred deciding on whether to stay the state action pending in state court until after this 

Court rules on the motions pending here. Further, Plaintiff states that the state court’s 

finding of whether or not a general partnership and/or joint venture existed will only 

“likely” preclude Plaintiff’s infringement claims. Reply Stay at 7.

In short, after considering all of the relevant factors, this Court is not persuaded 

that exceptional circumstances and the clearest of justifications have been established 

justifying the granting of a stay. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to 

stay proceedings pending resolution of the partnership dissolution proceeding in the San 

Diego Superior Court. 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff moves the Court to permit Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint 

(“SAC”) removing without prejudice the following claims from Plaintiff’s FAC: (1) 

intentional interference with contractual relations; (2) intentional interference with 

prospective economic advantage; (3) negligent interference with prospective economic 

advantage; (4) defamation; (5) violation of California Business and Professions Code 

17200; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (7) negligent infliction of 

emotional distress. Doc. No. 16. This would leave Plaintiff with three claims for relief in 

the SAC: (1) trademark infringement; (2) unfair competition and false designation under 

 

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff decided to file the instant federal action in the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of California and to file the state action in the San Diego Superior Court 

in Vista, California. See Compl.; see also Doc No. 17-4 at 4-8. As a result, the Court find’s Plaintiff’s 

allegations of inconvenience with respect to traveling between Vista, CA and San Diego, CA to litigate 

both cases unpersuasive.

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federal law; and (3) copyright infringement. Id. at 4. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s 

motion. Oppo. Leave.

1. Relevant Background

On August 9, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel met and conferred 

regarding amendment of the FAC. Mot. Leave at 3. Plaintiff requested that Defendants 

permit Plaintiff to amend his FAC to remove the state claims because they depend on 

whether a partnership was formed. Id. Defendants offered to stipulate to Plaintiff 

amending the FAC to include a claim for dissolution of partnership. Oppo. Leave at 4. 

The parties could not agree, and so Plaintiff filed the instant motion.

2. Legal Standard

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may 

amend its complaint (i) within 21 days after serving it; (ii) within 21 days after a 

responsive pleading has been served; or (iii) with the opposing party’s written consent or 

leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The United States Supreme Court has stated:

If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a 

proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim 

on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason – such as 

undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated 

failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue 

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, 

futility of amendment, etc. – the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 

‘freely given.’

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Circle Click Media LLC v. Regus Mgmt. Grp. 

LLC, No. 12-04000 SC, 2013 WL 1739451, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013) (stating “the 

Ninth Circuit has stressed Rule 15’s policy of favoring amendments”).

3. Analysis

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend should be denied 

because they will be unduly prejudiced, Plaintiff’s motion is unduly delayed, Plaintiff is 

seeking leave to amend in bad faith, and Plaintiff has already amended his Complaint 

once. Oppo. Leave at 5-14. Plaintiff contends that “it is only natural and fair that [state 

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law] claims for relief be dismissed pending the Partnership Dissolution action in state 

court,” and that “[r]emoving these claims for relief will simplify this case for Plaintiff, 

Defendants, and this Court and limit it only to the Federal intellectual property issues.” 

Mot. Leave at 4. 

a. Prejudice

In the context of a motion to amend, prejudice means “undue difficulty in 

prosecuting a lawsuit as a result of a change of tactics or theories on the part of the other 

party.” Deakyne v. Commissioners of Lewes, 416 F.2d 290, 300 (3d Cir. 1969). The 

prejudice inquiry carries the “greatest weight” among the five factors. Eminence Capital, 

LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Defendants argue they will be substantially prejudiced by Plaintiff’s amendment 

because it will alter the nature of the litigation by allowing disputed claims before this 

Court to be decided in the San Diego County Superior Court, which will risk potentially 

conflicting rulings in the two different courts and cause twice the litigation expense. 

Oppo. Leave at 6-9. Specifically, Defendants note that this Court would have 

supplemental jurisdiction over the dissolution and accounting claims Plaintiff filed in 

State court, and eliminating the state law claims would significantly alter the nature of the 

litigation. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff counters Defendants will not be prejudiced because 

granting Plaintiff leave to amend will not require supplemental discovery or require 

Defendants to consider a new line of legal argument. Reply Leave at 4. Plaintiff 

explains that amending the complaint will not alter the nature of the litigation, but will 

“simplify the litigation into one intellectual property based dispute” and leave the state 

partnership issues to be decided by the San Diego Superior Court. Id. at 5. Further, 

Plaintiff asserts that splitting the claims between two different courts will not invite 

potentially conflicting rulings because the two actions involve different claims and 

remedies, and will not result in twice the litigation expenses because Plaintiff and 

Defendants could meet and confer to streamline discovery. Id.

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The Court finds that Defendants have not established undue prejudice. Defendants 

have not shown how withdrawing Plaintiff’s state law claims would create an undue 

difficulty in prosecuting this lawsuit. Should Plaintiff’s leave to amend be granted, the 

state law claims would be eliminated from the instant action, which would simplify the 

action. As a result, this factor weighs in favor of granting Plaintiff leave to amend.

b. Delay

Undue delay is delay that prejudices the nonmoving party or imposes unwarranted 

burdens on the court. See Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1212 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 

“Considerable delay with no reasonable explanation is relevant where a proposed 

amendment would cause prejudice to the other party or would significantly delay 

resolution of the case.” Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 

640, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th 

Cir. 1990)). The Ninth Circuit has noted “late amendments to assert new theories are not 

reviewed favorably when the facts and theory have been known to the party seeking 

amendment since the inception of the cause of action.” Acri v. International Ass’n of 

Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts have also 

found undue delay weighing against granting leave to amend where the motion “is filed 

near or after the close of discovery.” Ewing v. Megrdle, No. CV 12-01334 MWF (AJW),

2015 WL 1519088, at *4 (C.D. Cal. March 26, 2015) (summarizing Ninth Circuit cases 

affirming denials of motions to amend due to undue delay when the motions were filed 

near or after the close of discovery). 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is unduly delayed 

because he knew Defendants denied that a partnership existed over five months ago. 

Oppo. Leave at 9-12. Plaintiff counters that he did not learn of Defendants’ decision 

until briefing on the motion for preliminary injunction filed in this Court. Reply Leave at 

7. Plaintiff asserts that he waited to seek leave to amend the FAC until the Court’s ruling 

on the motion for preliminary injunction because the Court could have rendered an 

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opinion on the partnership issue. Id. Because the Court’s ruling came out on June 12, 

2017, Plaintiff’s motion “can hardly be considered a delay.” Id.

The fact that Plaintiff should have known that Defendants denied that a partnership 

existed over five months ago is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff should be granted leave to 

amend to withdraw state law claims. Further, discovery has not begun in this case. 

Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed withdrawal of state claims from the 

federal action would not cause prejudice to Defendants and would not significantly delay 

resolution of the case. Accordingly, the Court finds no undue delay. SAES Getters S.p.A. 

v. Aeronex, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1086 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (“[t]o show undue delay, 

the opposing party must at least show delay past the point of initiation of discovery”); see 

also DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987) (no evidence of 

undue delay when “suit is still in its early stages” and the moving party offers a 

“satisfactory explanation of their delay”). As a result, this factor weighs in favor of 

granting Plaintiff leave to amend.

c. Bad Faith

“In the context of a motion for leave to amend, ‘bad faith’ means acting with the 

intent to deceive, harass, mislead, delay, or disrupt.” Covert v. City of San Diego, No. 

15-cv-2097-AJB (WVG), 2016 WL 7117364, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2016). As defined 

in other contexts, bad faith “implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest 

purpose or moral obliquity . . . . [I]t contemplates a state of mind of affirmatively 

operating with furtive design or ill will.” United States v. Manchester Farming P’ship, 

315 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff filed this claim and the state court action to 

harass Defendants. Oppo. Leave at 12. Defendants assert that Plaintiff now seeks to 

move more claims to state court in an “attempt to evade the federal ruling by forum 

shopping and harassing Defendants with dueling state and federal claims on identical 

issues.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff counters that he “believes in good faith that at the bare 

minimum he was a partner” and is attempting to amend the complaint “to dismiss all of 

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the state claims so that the Superior Court can expedite this key issue for this Court.” 

Reply Leave at 7.

The Court disagrees with Defendants’ argument. The fact that Plaintiff has filed a 

complaint in state court and one in federal court arising out of the same facts does not, on 

its own, support a finding that Plaintiff is attempting to harass Defendants. As a result, 

this factor weighs in favor of granting Plaintiff leave to amend.

d. Futility

A court may deny leave to amend if the proposed amendment is futile or would be 

subject to dismissal. See Carrico v. City & Cnty of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 

(9th Cir. 2011). The test of futility “is identical to the one used when considering the 

sufficiency of a pleading challenged under Rule 12(b)(6).” Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 

845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants do not contend withdrawing state claims 

would be futile. Oppo. Leave at 13. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting 

Plaintiff leave to amend.

e. Prior Amendment

A district court’s discretion to deny amendment is especially broad when the court 

has already given a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend. Chodos v. West Publ’g 

Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002). “While not sufficient alone to deny leave to 

amend, a party’s prior opportunities to amend are relevant to whether the court abused its 

discretion in denying leave.” In re Circuit Breaker Litig., 175 F.R.D. 547, 552 (C.D. Cal. 

1997). While Plaintiff has amended his Complaint once, he did so as a matter of course 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1). This weighs in favor of granting a 

motion for leave to amend because Plaintiff’s previous amendment was not with leave of 

court and all the other factors weigh in favor of granting leave to amend.

4. Conclusion

On a final note, the Court emphasizes that it is within its discretion to grant 

Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend. See Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 

343 (9th Cir. 1996) (the decision to grant or deny leave to amend is within the district

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court’s discretion). While the Court appreciates Defendants’ arguments, Plaintiff is 

master of his Complaint, and the Court will not require Plaintiff to litigate claims he no 

longer wishes to litigate in this Court. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 

motion for leave to file an amended complaint [Doc. No. 16].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Court ORDERS as follows:

(1) Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED;

(2) Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED;

(3) Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay is DENIED; and

(4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint is GRANTED. 

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to file Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 

attached as Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s “Notice of Motion for Leave to File Amended 

Complaint, FRCP 15(a)(2)” [Doc. No. 16 at 18-25] as a separate docket entry.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 2017

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