Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02824/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02824-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1961 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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STIPULATION AND ORDER TO SUPPLEMENT BRIEFING ON GREENPEACE FUND, INC.’S PENDING 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND STRIKE

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KARL OLSON (SBN 104760)

AARON R. FIELD (SBN 310648)

CANNATA, O’TOOLE, FICKES & ALMAZAN LLP

100 Pine Street, Suite 350

San Francisco, California 94111

Telephone: (415) 409-8900

Facsimile: (415) 409-8904

Email: kolson@cofalaw.com

afield@cofalaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant

GREENPEACE FUND, INC.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

RESOLUTE FOREST PRODUCTS, INC., 

RESOLUTE FP US, INC., RESOLUTE FP 

AUGUSTA, LLC, FIBREK GENERAL 

PARTNERSHIP, FIBREK U.S., INC., 

FIBREK INTERNATIONAL INC., and 

RESOLUTE FP CANADA, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL (aka 

“GREENPEACE STICHTING COUNCIL”),

GREENPEACE, INC., GREENPEACE 

FUND, INC., FORESTETHICS, DANIEL 

BRINDIS, AMY MOAS, MATTHEW 

DAGGETT, ROLF SKAR, TODD PAGLIA, 

and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-20,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:17-CV-02824-JST

STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] 

ORDER TO SUPPLEMENT BRIEFING 

ON GREENPEACE FUND, INC.’S 

PENDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND 

STRIKE

Date: October 10, 2017

Time: 2:00 p.m.

Department: Ctrm. 9, 19th Floor 

Case 3:17-cv-02824-JST Document 149 Filed 08/09/17 Page 1 of 18
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This stipulation is entered into by and among defendant Greenpeace Fund, Inc., on the 

one hand, and plaintiffs Resolute Forest Products, Inc., Resolute FP US, Inc., Resolute FP 

Augusta LLC, Fibrek General Partnership, Fibrek US, Inc., Fibrek International Inc., and 

Resolute FP Canada, Inc. (collectively, “plaintiffs”), on the other hand, by and through their 

respective counsel.

WHEREAS, on May 31, 2016, plaintiffs filed the instant action in the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of Georgia;

WHEREAS, on September 8, 2016, Greenpeace Fund, Inc. moved to dismiss 

plaintiffs’ complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 61) and to strike the plaintiffs’ complaint 

under the anti-SLAPP statute (ECF No. 60);

WHEREAS, on May 16, 2017, the Honorable Judge Randal Hall, Chief Judge of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, issued an Order granting the

Greenpeace Defendants’ motion to transfer for improper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1406(a), and transferred the instant action to the Northern District of California (ECF No. 

104). The Order did not address the substantive arguments set forth in Greenpeace Fund, 

Inc.’s pending motion to dismiss (ECF No. 61) or the motion of defendants, including 

Greenpeace Fund, Inc., to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (ECF No. 60) (collectively, the 

“Pending Motions”);

WHEREAS, on July 10, 2017, plaintiffs and defendants Greenpeace International, 

Greenpeace, Inc., Daniel Brindis, Amy Moas, Matthew Daggett, and Rolf Skar stipulated to a 

briefing schedule whereby they would supplement the briefing on their pending motions to 

provide the Court with guidance on how to resolve them under California and Ninth Circuit 

law (ECF No. 129);

WHEREAS, on July 12, 2017, the Court entered an Order pursuant to the stipulation of 

the parties authorizing plaintiffs and defendants Greenpeace International, Greenpeace, Inc., 

Daniel Brindis, Amy Moas, Matthew Daggett, and Rolf Skar to supplement the briefing 

pursuant to a schedule proposed by those parties (ECF No. 131);

Case 3:17-cv-02824-JST Document 149 Filed 08/09/17 Page 2 of 18
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WHEREAS, on July 21, 2017, present counsel for Greenpeace Fund, Inc. requested 

leave to appear as substitute counsel in this matter (ECF No. 135), and on July 25, 2017, the 

Court granted the request (ECF No. 137);

WHEREAS, plaintiffs and Greenpeace Fund, Inc. have met and conferred and agreed 

that Greenpeace Fund, Inc. should be allowed, in the interest of justice and fairness, to join in 

the supplemental brief of the other defendants and file its own supplemental brief, which is 

attached hereto as Exhibit 1, on the impact of California and Ninth Circuit precedent on 

plaintiffs’ claims against Greenpeace Fund, Inc.;

NOW, THEREFORE, plaintiffs and Greenpeace Fund, Inc. stipulate and agree as 

follows:

1. Greenpeace Fund, Inc. may file the supplemental brief in support of its pending 

motions to dismiss and to strike that is attached hereto as Exhibit 1;

2. The plaintiffs may respond to Greenpeace Fund, Inc.’s supplemental brief in a 

supplemental brief in further opposition to the Pending Motions on or before 

September 12, 2017;

3. Greenpeace Fund, Inc. may file a supplemental reply brief in further support of 

the Pending Motions on or before September 26, 2017; and

4. Oral argument on the Pending Motions will be held on October 10, 2017, at 

2:00 p.m.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

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DATED: August 7, 2017 CANNATA, O’TOOLE, FICKES & ALMAZAN LLP

By: /s/ Karl Olson 

KARL OLSON

Karl Olson

Aaron R. Field

Attorneys for Defendant

GREENPEACE FUND, INC.

DATED: August 7, 2017 KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP

By: /s/ Lauren Tabaksblat

LAUREN TABAKSBLAT

Lyn R. Agre

Michael J. Bowe

Lauren Tabaksblat

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

RESOLUTE FOREST PRODUCTS, INC., RESOLUTE 

FP US, INC., RESOLUTE FP AUGUSTA, LLC, FIBREK 

GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, FIBREK U.S., INC., 

FIBREK INTERNATIONAL INC., and RESOLUTE FP 

CANADA, INC.

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[PROPOSED] ORDER

Pursuant to stipulation and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Greenpeace Fund, Inc. may file the supplemental brief in support of its pending 

motions to dismiss and to strike that is attached to its stipulation with the 

plaintiffs as Exhibit 1;

2. The plaintiffs may respond to Greenpeace Fund, Inc.’s supplemental brief in a 

supplemental brief in further opposition to the Pending Motions on or before 

September 12, 2017;

3. Greenpeace Fund, Inc. may file a supplemental reply brief in further support of 

the Pending Motions on or before September 26, 2017; and

4. Oral argument on the Pending Motions will take place on October 10, 2017 at 

2:00 p.m.

Dated: _________________ ________________________________

 HON. JON S. TIGAR

August 9, 2017

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ATTESTATION PURSUANT TO CIVIL LOCAL RULE 5-1(i)(3)

I, Karl Olson, attest that concurrence in the filing of this document has been obtained 

from the other signatories. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United 

States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 7th day of August, 2017 at San Francisco, California.

 

/s/ Karl Olson 

KARL OLSON

Case 3:17-cv-02824-JST Document 149 Filed 08/09/17 Page 6 of 18
EXHIBIT 1

Case 3:17-cv-02824-JST Document 149 Filed 08/09/17 Page 7 of 18
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF GREENPEACE FUND, INC. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND SPECIAL 

MOTION TO STRIKE; JOINDER IN SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF OTHER GREENPEACE DEFENDANTS

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KARL OLSON (SBN 104760)

AARON R. FIELD (SBN 310648)

CANNATA, O’TOOLE, FICKES & ALMAZAN LLP

100 Pine Street, Suite 350

San Francisco, California 94111

Telephone: (415) 409-8900

Facsimile: (415) 409-8904

Email: kolson@cofalaw.com

afield@cofalaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant

GREENPEACE FUND, INC.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

RESOLUTE FOREST PRODUCTS, INC., 

RESOLUTE FP US, INC., RESOLUTE FP 

AUGUSTA, LLC, FIBREK GENERAL 

PARTNERSHIP, FIBREK U.S., INC., 

FIBREK INTERNATIONAL INC., and 

RESOLUTE FP CANADA, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL (aka 

“GREENPEACE STICHTING COUNCIL”),

GREENPEACE, INC., GREENPEACE 

FUND, INC., FORESTETHICS, DANIEL 

BRINDIS, AMY MOAS, MATTHEW 

DAGGETT, ROLF SKAR, TODD PAGLIA, 

and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-20,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:17-CV-02824-JST

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF 

GREENPEACE FUND, INC. IN SUPPORT 

OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND SPECIAL 

MOTION TO STRIKE; JOINDER IN 

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF OTHER 

GREENPEACE DEFENDANTS

Date: October 10, 2017

Time: 2:00 p.m.

Department: Ctrm. 9, 19th Floor 

Case 3:17-cv-02824-JST Document 149 Filed 08/09/17 Page 8 of 18
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SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF GREENPEACE FUND, INC. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND SPECIAL 

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Greenpeace Fund, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ECF No. 61, and made a special motion to strike the 

complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, ECF No. 60 at 1. Greenpeace Fund, Inc. hereby 

joins in the supplemental brief in support of both motions filed by Greenpeace International, 

Greenpeace, Inc., Daniel Brindis, Amy Moas, Matthew Daggett, and Rolf Skar, ECF No. 127-

1. Greenpeace Fund, Inc. also files this supplemental brief to elaborate on several reasons for 

granting both motions under California and Ninth Circuit law that apply to it with special 

force.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiffs’ litigation strategy in this case is a new spin on an old tactic that courts 

have long rejected as an impermissible end run around the First Amendment. The plaintiffs 

have recast their defamation claims as RICO claims and other state torts by supplementing 

them with conclusory and threadbare allegations. They now invite this Court to disregard the 

First Amendment limitations developed in defamation cases as a result. This Court should 

decline their invitation to embark on such a dangerous path. It should then hold that under

California and Ninth Circuit law, the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Greenpeace 

Fund, Inc., and put this SLAPP suit out of its misery sooner rather than later.

II. ARGUMENT

A. THE PLAINTIFFS MUST PLAUSIBLY PLEAD ACTUAL MALICE TO SUPPORT ALL 

OF THEIR CAUSES OF ACTION.

The actual malice standard is a critical component of the First Amendment protections 

for participation in politics and public discourse. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 

254, 268-80 (1964). It precludes a public figure plaintiff from recovering “for a defamatory 

falsehood” absent clear and convincing evidence that the statement was made with knowledge 

of its falsity or reckless disregard for whether it was false or not, id. at 279-80, and that the 

statement was materially false, Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 861 

(2014). To establish reckless disregard, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the publisher “in 

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fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication,” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 

U.S. 727, 731 (1968), or acted with a “high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity,”

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). To establish material falsity, the plaintiff must 

demonstrate that the statement “ ‘would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from 

that which the pleaded truth would have produced.’ ” Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,

501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (quoting Robert Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 138 

(1980)); see also Bustos v. A&E Television Networks, 646 F.3d 762, 763-69 (10th Cir. 2011) 

(Gorsuch, J.) (discussing the material falsity requirement and holding that referring to a 

prisoner as a “member” of a gang when he was really an “affiliate” was not a material 

falsehood). The plaintiff must establish actual malice as to each defendant. Cantrell v. Forest 

City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253 (1974); Murray v. Bailey, 613 F. Supp. 1276, 1281 (N.D. 

Cal. 1985).

The Supreme Court has long held that no cause of action can claim “talismanic 

immunity from constitutional limitations.” New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 269; see also id. 

at 279-80 (holding that a public official may not recover “for a defamatory falsehood” without 

proving actual malice). 

Accordingly, it has applied the actual malice standard to a broad spectrum of claims 

arising from alleged injurious falsehoods. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 

56 (1988) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 

U.S. 485, 513-14 (1985) (product disparagement); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386-87 

(1967) (false light invasion of privacy). 

This State and this Circuit follow these precedents, and hold that whether a plaintiff 

must satisfy First Amendment requirements like the actual malice standard depends on the 

substance of a cause of action, not its form or label. See, e.g., Blatty v. New York Times Co.,

42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1042-43, 1045 (1986) (holding that “the various limitations rooted in the 

First Amendment are applicable to all injurious falsehood claims and not solely to those 

labeled ‘defamation’ ” and plaintiffs cannot circumnavigate these limitations by “creative 

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pleading” that “affix[es] labels other than defamation to injurious falsehood claims”); Med. 

Lab Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, 306 F.3d 806, 821 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that tortious 

interference causes of action based on injurious falsehoods were subject to traditional First 

Amendment requirements); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183, 1187

(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that right of publicity, Unfair Competition Law, and Lanham Act

causes of action based on injurious falsehoods were subject to “the full First Amendment 

protections afforded noncommercial speech,” including the actual malice standard); Unelko 

Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that product disparagement

and tortious interference causes of action based on injurious falsehoods were “subject to the 

same First Amendment requirements that govern actions for defamation”). 

Thus, under California and Ninth Circuit law, where a cause of action is founded on 

allegations that an injurious falsehood published to a third party has caused the plaintiff 

reputational harm (i.e. “a defamatory falsehood,” New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80) 

and the plaintiff is a public figure, the actual malice standard applies.1

Applying this rule, the actual malice standard applies to all of the plaintiffs’ causes of 

action. As the defendants have explained before, the plaintiffs are public figures, see ECF 

Nos. 62 at 26-29, 98 at 19, 127-1 at 15-17, and the plaintiffs’ causes of action are all based on

a series of alleged statements about them to third parties concerning matters of public interest, 

see, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 84-99 & 88 n.1 (citing Appendix A, ECF No. 1-1 at 1-6), 100-04 &

n.2 (citing Appendix B, ECF No. 1-1 at 7-8), 105-14 & n.3 (citing Appendix C, ECF No. 1-1 

at 9-17), 115-24 & n.4 (citing Appendix D, ECF No. 1-1 at 18-23), 125-34 & n.5 (citing 

Appendix E, ECF No. 1-1 at 24-29), 135-42 & n.6 (citing Appendix F, ECF No. 1-1 at 30-36), 

218 (incorporating prior allegations into 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) cause of action), 226-27 (setting 

 

1

If the actual malice standard applied based on form rather than substance, plaintiffs could 

evade it by simply “affix[ing] labels other than defamation to injurious falsehood claims.” 

See Blatty, 42 Cal. 3d at 1042-45; see also Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food and 

Commercial Workers Union, Local 655, 39 F.3d 191, 196 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he malice 

standard required for actionable defamation claims during labor disputes must equally be met 

for a tortious interference claim based on the same conduct or statements. [Fn.] This is only 

logical as a plaintiff may not avoid the protection afforded by the Constitution and federal 

labor law merely by the use of creative pleading.”).

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forth alleged fraudulent communications in table format), 237 (incorporating paragraphs 1-

227 into 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) cause of action), 245 (incorporating paragraphs 1-227 into 18 

U.S.C. § 1962(d) cause of action), 254 (incorporating paragraphs 1-227 into O.C.G.A § 16-

14-4(b) cause of action), 271 (incorporating paragraphs 1-227 into O.C.G.A §16-14-4(c) cause 

of action), 279 (incorporating paragraphs 1-227 into defamation cause of action), 288 

(incorporating paragraphs 1-227 into tortious interference with prospective business relations 

cause of action), 297 (incorporating paragraphs 1-227 into tortious interference with 

contractual relations cause of action), 305 (incorporating paragraphs 1-227 into civil 

conspiracy cause of action), 310 (incorporating paragraphs 1-227 into trademark dilution 

cause of action). As a result, the actual malice standard applies to the plaintiffs’ entire 

complaint.

B. THE PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS OF ACTUAL MALICE AGAINST GREENPEACE 

FUND, INC. ARE CONCLUSORY AND THREADBARE, AND THUS LEGALLY 

INSUFFICIENT.

The plaintiffs’ complaint must allege actual malice in a non-conclusory, plausible 

fashion to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)2 motion to dismiss. In the wake of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662 (2009), the Ninth Circuit uses a two-step process to determine whether a plaintiff has 

stated a sufficiently plausible claim:

First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or 

counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must 

contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable 

the opposing party to defend itself effectively. Second, the factual allegations 

that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it 

is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of 

discovery and continued litigation.

Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Applying similar processes, every federal appellate court that has considered the question 

post-Iqbal has dismissed complaints subject to the actual malice standard for failing to allege

actual malice in a non-conclusory, plausible way. Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 

 

2 All references to Rules in this brief are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise specified.

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686, 701-02 (11th Cir. 2016); Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544-45 (2d Cir. 2015); 

McDonald v. Wise, 769 F.3d 1202, 1220 (10th Cir. 2014); Pippen v. NBC Universal Media, 

LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2013); Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, 

Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 377 (4th Cir. 2012); Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 

F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2012). 

This requirement is consistent with the Supreme Court’s explicit holding in Iqbal that 

the plaintiff must plead the defendant’s state of mind in a non-conclusory, plausible way even 

though Rule 9(b) permits a plaintiff to do so “generally” and despite the potential utility of 

discovery. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686-87. 

It is also consistent with a long line of cases from the Ninth Circuit and this Court that 

have carefully scrutinized actual malice allegations where the complaint clearly implicated 

First Amendment values. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. S.F. Local Joint Exec. Bd. 

of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082-84 (9th Cir. 1976) (applying heightened pleading 

standard to dismiss complaint because it clearly implicated the First Amendment) (citing, inter 

alia, Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 387-91; New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 267-83); Wynn v. 

Chanos, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1238-40 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing defamation complaint 

with leave to amend under Rule 12(b)(6) due in part to deficient allegations of actual malice); 

Wynn v. Chanos, Case No. 14-cv-04329-WHO, 2015 WL 971360, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 

2015) (dismissing defamation complaint without leave to amend under Rule 12(b)(6) and 

granting anti-SLAPP motion due in part to deficient allegations of actual malice); Nicosia v. 

De Rooy, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that “conclusory statements that 

[a defamation defendant] should have known the truth does not satisfy the heightened 

pleading standard” of actual malice); Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1121-22 (N.D. 

Cal. 1984) (recognizing that actual malice should be tested at the pleading stage and 

concluding that complaint insufficiently alleged actual malice); Barger v. Playboy 

Enterprises, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1151, 1156-57 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (recognizing that actual 

malice should be tested at the pleading stage and dismissing complaint without leave to amend

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due in part to deficient allegations of actual malice).

3

The plaintiffs have not pled and cannot plausibly plead that Greenpeace Fund, Inc. 

published any injurious falsehood with actual malice. As the defendants have stated 

elsewhere, the plaintiffs have alleged almost nothing that is specific to Greenpeace Fund, Inc. 

See ECF Nos. 61 at 2-12, 18, 97 at 2-5. They have not plausibly alleged that Greenpeace 

Fund, Inc. is responsible for defaming them in the first instance. See ECF No. 61 at 11-12, 97 

at 2-5; see also ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 33 (alleging in a conclusory fashion that Greenpeace Fund, Inc. 

was involved in planning “GP-Inc.’s forest campaign [sic]” in some unspecified way), 41(b) 

(conceding that Greenpeace Fund, Inc. is a “separate and distinct legal entit[y]” from the other 

Greenpeace entities, but nevertheless also alleging in a conclusory fashion that Greenpeace 

Fund, Inc. was somehow “intimately involved” in the other Greenpeace entities’ campaigns), 

42(l) and 45 (alleging in a conclusory fashion that Greenpeace Fund, Inc. published

unspecified “disinformation” and was somehow “actively involved” in a campaign through its 

Executive Director); ECF No. 1-1 (setting forth numerous allegedly false publications, but not 

attributing a single one of these publications to Greenpeace Fund, Inc.). A fortiori, they have 

not plausibly alleged that Greenpeace Fund, Inc. is responsible for publishing anything 

materially false with knowledge of its falsity or subjective awareness that it was probably 

false. See Wynn, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 1139 (dismissing defamation cause of action for, among 

other things, failure to allege actual malice where “[t]he complaint’s allegation that Chanos 

‘published [the statements] with reckless disregard for the truth’ . . . is conclusory, as it 

merely recites an element of slander and does not present any potential supporting facts”). 

 

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But cf. Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2002) (in a decision that 

predates Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686-87, affirming trial court’s decision not to decide actual malice 

issue on a motion to dismiss). In light of Iqbal, the unanimous chorus of appellate courts 

post-Iqbal that have applied the plausibility standard it endorsed to allegations of actual 

malice, and the fact that courts in this district have rigorously examined the plausibility of 

actual malice allegations on a motion to dismiss for years, including in a 2014 decision, Wynn, 

75 F. Supp. 3d at 1238-40, this portion of Flowers appears “out of line with the current state 

of the law.” See Michel, 816 F.3d at 702. Also, this portion of Flowers referred only to the 

fault element of the actual malice test, and said nothing of the falsity element, which is a 

“question of law for the court” on a motion to dismiss. See Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers 

Union, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1045-46 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

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In addition, even if the plaintiffs had alleged that Greenpeace Fund, Inc. was both 

responsible for publishing alleged statements and motivated by economic interests or an

animus toward the plaintiffs in a non-conclusory, plausible way (and they have not), that 

would not suffice to plead actual malice.

Economic interests of the defendant and animus toward the plaintiff cannot 

serve as a basis for actual malice. Harte–Hanks Comm. Inc. v. 

Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989) (“Motive in publishing a story . . .

cannot provide a sufficient basis for finding actual malice.”) “[T]he actual 

malice standard is not satisfied merely through a showing of ill will or ‘malice’ 

in the ordinary sense of the term.” Id. at 666. “Nor can the fact that the 

defendant published the defamatory material in order to increase its profits 

suffice to prove actual malice.” Id. at 667.

Nicosia, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1109.

The plaintiffs’ conclusory and threadbare allegations against Greenpeace Fund, Inc. 

would warrant granting its motions to dismiss and to strike in any context. Plaintiffs do not 

spell out any particular actions by Greenpeace Fund, Inc. in connection with the advocacy at 

issue. But granting Greenpeace Fund, Inc.’s motions to dismiss and to strike is particularly 

important here because the plaintiffs have alleged a vast and utterly implausible racketeering 

conspiracy that would require extensive discovery and be extremely expensive to litigate. 

Allowing this case to proceed against Greenpeace Fund, Inc. would leave intact the specter of 

ruinous liability for a defendant that has done little more than fund “a separate and distinct 

legal entit[y],” ECF No. 1 ¶ 41(b), that engaged in an advocacy campaign. If merely funding 

an entity made the funder liable for the entity’s speech about a public figure on a matter of 

public concern, Harry Belafonte, Sidney Poitier, and Nat King Cole could all have been held 

liable for the advertisement at issue in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 

since their names appeared on it, and arguably any advertiser in a publication (or even a 

shareholder in a publicly-held publisher) could be held liable.

In sum, under California and Ninth Circuit law, the actual malice standard applies to 

all of the plaintiffs’ causes of action, and this Court should grant Greenpeace Fund, Inc’s 

motions to dismiss and to strike because plaintiffs have failed to plead actual malice against 

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Greenpeace Fund, Inc. in a non-conclusory, plausible way.

C. THE PLAINTIFFS’ CIVIL RICO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST GREENPEACE FUND,

INC. ARE AS THREADBARE – AND THUS AS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT – AS THEIR 

ALLEGATIONS OF ACTUAL MALICE.

To state a legally sufficient civil RICO claim in the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs’ civil 

RICO allegations must all satisfy Rule 9(b). See Mostowfi v. i2 Telecom Intern., Inc., 269 

Fed. Appx. 621, 623-25 (9th Cir. 2008). Rule 9(b) “applies to civil RICO fraud claims.” 

Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, the Ninth 

Circuit has recognized that “Rule 9(b) may apply to claims – that although lacking fraud as an 

element – are ‘grounded’ or ‘sound’ in fraud.” See Mostowfi, 269 Fed. Appx. at 623-25

(quoting Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

 Where a plaintiff alleges a “unified course of fraudulent conduct” and “rel[ies] entirely 

on that course of conduct as the basis of a claim,” the claim is “ ‘grounded in fraud’ ” and “ 

‘sound[s] in fraud’ ” and “the pleading of that claim as a whole must satisfy the particularity 

requirement of Rule 9(b).” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1103-04. In this latter context, the Ninth Circuit 

has dismissed civil RICO claims predicated on extortion for failing to meet the strictures of 

Rule 9(b). Mostowfi, 269 Fed. Appx. at 624. The plaintiffs’ civil RICO causes of action are 

all based on an alleged unified course of fraudulent conduct, so all of them must be alleged in 

a manner that comports with Rule 9(b) to survive a motion to dismiss.

The plaintiffs’ civil RICO causes of action cannot satisfy this exacting standard. Rule 

9(b) provides, “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or 

mistake shall be stated with particularity.” It “requires a pleader of fraud to detail with 

particularity the time, place, and manner of each act of fraud, plus the role of each defendant 

in each scheme.” Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 405 

(9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). In Mostowfi, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had 

failed to satisfy these requirements where their civil RICO allegations were comprised largely 

of “general statements about actions committed by the defendants,” they alleged multiple 

predicate acts but did not specify who committed what violation, and they “lump[ed] together 

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the defendants without identifying the particular acts or omissions that each defendant 

committed.” 269 Fed. Appx. at 624.

These rules verify the insufficiency of the plaintiffs’ civil RICO allegations against 

Greenpeace Fund, Inc. The plaintiffs’ civil RICO allegations against Greenpeace Fund, Inc. 

consist of little more than conclusory generalities, see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 218-78, and do almost 

nothing but “lump” Greenpeace Fund, Inc. in with the other defendants. That is not sufficient

to give Greenpeace Fund, Inc. “ ‘notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to 

constitute the fraud charged so [it] can defend against the charge and not just deny [it has] 

done anything wrong,’ ” therefore it is not sufficient to state a claim against Greenpeace Fund, 

Inc. See Mostowfi, 269 Fed. Appx. at 625 (quoting Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 671 

(9th Cir. 1993)).

The parties have identified numerous other reasons why the plaintiffs’ civil RICO 

allegations fail to state a claim, and all of them remain sound under Ninth Circuit precedent. 

Greenpeace Fund, Inc. joins in the arguments for dismissing the plaintiffs’ civil RICO causes 

of action presented by the other parties in support of their separate motions to dismiss, ECF 

Nos. 55-1, 94, to the extent they support dismissing these causes of action against Greenpeace 

Fund, Inc.

D. IF THE COURT GRANTS GREENPEACE FUND, INC.’S RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION 

TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE, IT MUST GRANT GREENPEACE FUND, INC.’S 

ANTI-SLAPP MOTION AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Because the plaintiffs cannot state a claim against Greenpeace Fund, Inc., the Court 

should grant Greenpeace Fund Inc.’s special motion to strike. See Wynn, 2015 WL 971360, at 

*4. “The standard applied for an anti-SLAPP motion – probability of prevailing on the merits

– presents a higher burden than the plausibility standard applied for a motion to dismiss. If 

Plaintiffs cannot plead a plausible cause of action under the FRCP 12(b)(6) standard, then 

Plaintiffs as a matter of law cannot meet the probability of success on the merits standard.”

Xu v. Yamanaka, Case No. 13-CV-3240 YGR, 2014 WL 342271, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 

2014). Alternatively, if the Court grants Greenpeace Fund, Inc.’s motion to dismiss with

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leave to amend, it should permit Greenpeace Fund, Inc. to raise its anti-SLAPP motion again 

after the plaintiffs’ time to respond has expired or in response to the amended complaint. See 

Wynn, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 1231 n.1.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, under California and Ninth Circuit law, the plaintiffs have 

failed to state a single legally sufficient cause of action against Greenpeace Fund, Inc. in their 

124-page complaint. In addition to the many deficiencies in the complaint that the defendants 

have descibed elsewhere, all of the plaintiffs’ causes of action fail to state a claim against 

Greenpeace Fund, Inc. because they inadequately allege actual malice. The plaintiffs’ civil 

RICO causes of action also fail to state a claim against Greenpeace Fund, Inc. under Ninth 

Circuit law. 

Respectfully submitted,

DATED: August 7, 2017 CANNATA, O’TOOLE, FICKES & ALMAZAN LLP

By: /s/ Karl Olson 

KARL OLSON

Karl Olson

Aaron R. Field

Attorneys for Defendant

GREENPEACE FUND, INC.

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