Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02136/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02136-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1401 Education: Handicapped Child Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J.R., a minor, by and through

his parents W.R. and N.R.,

and W.R. and N.R., individually,

NO. CIV. S-06-2136 LKK/GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

SYLVAN UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT,

STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF EDUCATION in its supervisory

capacity, the CALIFORNIA OFFICE

OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, and

DR. JOHN HALVERSON, in his

official capacity as superintendent

for SYLVAN UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendants.

 /

Pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction. Plaintiff, J.R.,

a minor, brings suit under the Individuals with Disabilities in

Education Improvement Act (“IDEA”), the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”) and related state law grounds. Plaintiff names several

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The following facts are derived from plaintiff’s pleadings 1

and the evidence tendered by the parties. 

2

defendants, including the Sylvan Union School District

(“District”), the State of California Department of Education, the

California Office of Administrative Hearings and Dr. John

Halverson, in his official capacity as superintendent for the

Sylvan Union School District. 

Plaintiff is autistic and requires special education services

tailored to his needs. In June of 2006, an Administrative Law

Judge found that the Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) proposed

by the District was appropriate. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges

that the IEP approved of by the ALJ violates the IDEA, ADA and

related state laws. Plaintiff also maintains that the ALJ failed

to comply with procedural safeguards set forth in IDEA.

Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the District from implementing the

decision of the ALJ. Plaintiff seeks an order which would, in

essence, reinstate the IEP that was in place prior to the ALJ’s

decision. For the reasons discussed herein, the TRO is denied. 

I. 

JURISDICTION 

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 1331,

1367, and 20 U.S.C. § 1415. 

II. 

BACKGROUND 1

A. Plaintiff’s Education Plan Prior to June, 2006

During the 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 school years plaintiff was

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enrolled in a general education kindergarten class. Plaintiff

received speech and language therapy, occupational therapy,

resource support services, the support of a full time one-to-one

aide, and an in-home program. 

An IEP meeting was convened for plaintiff on January 31, 2006.

Plaintiff’s parents were present, as was their attorney, Richard

Ruderman and their special education advocate, Marilyn Maggio. At

the meeting, it was recommended that plaintiff be transitioned from

the general kindergarten class to a special day class for learning

handicapped students. In the new placement, plaintiff would receive

speech and language therapy, autism inclusion support, a full time

one-to-one aide and occupational therapy. Plaintiff’s parents

disputed the change. 

B. Events Surrounding The Due Process Hearing

The District filed for a due process hearing before an ALJ on

March 1, 2006. Plaintiff’s parents aver that prior to the hearing,

they had trouble finding counsel. In early June, plaintiff’s

parents contacted attorney Elizabeth Anderson. Ms. Anderson agreed

to represent the parents at the ALJ hearing contingent on the ALJ

granting a continuance of the hearing dates. 

Ms. Anderson requested a continuance of the hearing. The ALJ

denied Ms. Anderson’s request, stating that Ms. Anderson’s

unavailability did not establish good cause because she was aware

of the conflict when she took the case. 

The hearing before the ALJ began on June 12. Plaintiff’s

parents did not actively participate in the hearing. Plaintiff’s

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parents maintain that throughout the hearing they repeatedly

asserted that they did not know what was going on and that they

could not represent themselves. The District, however, states that

the ALJ encouraged plaintiff’s parents to participate in the

process. Plaintiff’s parents declined to present any evidence of

their own, or make any statement. 

On June 29, 2006, the ALJ issued an order allowing the

District to implement the IEP. The 18-page decision explained that

there was ample evidence that plaintiff was not making sufficient

progress in the general education class and that his needs would

be better met in the special education class. Among other things,

the ALJ found that plaintiff would receive more individualized

instruction and attention in the special education class. 

C. Events Occurring After The ALJ Decision

Plaintiff was scheduled to begin his new school placement in

early July of 2006. Not wanting plaintiff to attend the special

education class, plaintiff’s parents kept plaintiff home from

school. To date, plaintiff has not returned to school.

Defendants, meanwhile, fully phased out the program which was in

place prior to June 2006. 

Plaintiff’s parents requested a copy of the transcript of the

ALJ hearing. Upon receiving the request, the Office of

Administrative Hearings and the ALJ discovered that due to an

unknown recording failure, most of the third day of the hearing was

not recorded. On August 31, 2006, the ALJ issued a four page order

addressing the lack of a transcript for the last day of the

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hearing. The ALJ explained that neither party wanted to retry the

last day of the hearing, and that plaintiff’s parents did not want

to cooperate with the District to create an agreed statement of the

testimony. The ALJ determined that “in the absence of consent to

solve the problem...the Decision of June 29, 2006 remains binding

on the parties.” 

IV.

Analysis

A. Plaintiff Seeks Mandatory Relief 

Preliminary injunctions are not preliminary adjudications on

merits, but a “device for preserving [the] status quo and

preventing irreparable loss of rights before judgment.” Textile

Unlimited, Inc. v. A..BMH and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 781, 786 (9th

Cir. 2001).

The Ninth Circuit has explained that although “the basis for

injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable

injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies,” Weinberger v.

Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982), “where a party seeks

mandatory preliminary relief that goes well beyond maintaining the

status quo pendente lite, courts should be extremely cautious about

issuing a preliminary injunction.” Martin v. International Olympic

Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, under the law

of this Circuit, as a general rule, mandatory preliminary relief

is not to be granted unless both the facts and the law clearly

favor the moving party and extreme or very serious damage will

result. Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir.

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1979). “[I]n doubtful cases, or where the injury complained of is

capable of compensation in damages” a mandatory injunction will not

issue. Id.; see also Sullivan By and Through Sullivan v. Vallejo

City Unified Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947, 954 -955 (E.D. Cal.

1990) (J. Karlton) (same); Miami Beach Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n

v. Callander, 256 F.2d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1958) (“[M]andatory

injunction of this nature, especially at the preliminary stage of

proceedings, should not be granted except in rare instances in

which the facts and law are clearly in favor of the moving party.”)

The court’s first task, therefore, is to determine whether

plaintiff seeks a prohibitory injunction or a mandatory injunction.

Stanley v. Univ. of S. California, 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir.

1994). 

As noted, plaintiff seeks to have his former educational plan,

as outlined in his March 2005 IED, reinstated pending the outcome

of this litigation. The March 2005 IEP was discontinued in June

of 2006 when the ALJ approved the January 2006 EIP. 

To order that the March 2005 EIP be reinstated would require

affirmative action by the District and would require this court to

essentially invalidate the ALJ’s ruling pending appeal. Moreover,

if the court were to invalidate the ALJ’s decision pending appeal,

the court would essentially be reaching a preliminary adjudications

on the merits, which is not the function of a TRO or a preliminary

injunction. See Textile Unlimited, 240 F.3d at 786.

For this reason, the court finds that plaintiff is in fact

seeking mandatory relief and therefore, the court must proceed with

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extreme caution in its decision regarding the TRO and preliminary

injunction. As explained previously, mandatory preliminary relief

is not to be granted unless both the facts and the law clearly

favor the moving party and extreme or very serious damage will

result absent the relief. Anderson, 612 F.2d at 1115. 

B. Imminent Irreparable Harm

A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm

sufficient to establish the need for a TRO. He must also

demonstrate immediate threatened injury. Associated Gen.

Contractors of California, Inc. v. Coalition for Economic Equity,

950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991). Moreover, when mandatory

relief is sought, plaintiff must show that “extreme or very serious

damage” will result absent the TRO or preliminary injunction. See

Anderson, 612 F.2d at 1115.

 In the case at bar, plaintiff fails to set forth sufficient

allegations to suggest that he would suffer irreparable serious

damage if he was to participate in the programs outlined in the

January 2006 IEP. 

Plaintiff argues that missing school is causing him harm.

This argument is unavailing. Plaintiff is not attending school by

his parents’ own choosing. Thus, any harm is self-inflicted. It

is well-established that if the harm complained of is

self-inflicted, it does not qualify as irreparable. See 11A

Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal

Practice & Procedure, § 2948.1 pp. 152-53 (1995); see also, Caplan

v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 839 (3rd

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Cir. 1995) (if the harm complained of is self-inflicted, it does

not qualify as irreparable for purposes of preliminary injunction

inquiry); Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co., LLC v. AT & T Corp., 320 F.3d

1081, 1106 (10th Cir. 2003) (same); Fiba Leasing Co., Inc. v.

Airdyne Industries, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 38, 39 (D. Mass. 1993)

(same). 

Moreover, plaintiff fails to present facts or allegations that

participating in the educational program outlined in the January

2006 IEP would cause immediate irreparable harm. 

C. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

Given that the court finds that there is no threat of

immediate irreparable harm, the court need not address plaintiff’s

likelihood of success on the merits of his case. That said, the

court addresses the one claim which may have some merit.

Section 1415 of the IDEA sets forth a multitude of procedural

safeguards. One such safeguard is the provision of transcripts or

audio records of due process hearings. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415

(b)(3). As discussed previously, there is no transcript of the

third day of the due process hearing. The lack of a transcript is

troubling. 

The Supreme Court has stated specifically that “the elaborate

and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied in § 1415” -

safeguards which include the provision of transcripts or audio

recordings of due process hearings - are as important to the goals

of the IDEA as any of the substantive standards set forth in the

statute. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205-06 (1982).

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“Failure to comply with the procedural mandates of the IDEA ‘can

itself constitute the denial of a free appropriate education.’”

Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 2d 71, 79 (D.D.C.

2003).

Thus, a question in the case is whether plaintiff may succeed

in claiming that his procedural due process rights were violated

by not being provided with a complete transcript of the hearing.

I need not reach that issue to decide the instant motion.

D. Conclusion 

Put directly, plaintiff fails to set forth sufficient facts

which would give rise to a finding of imminent irreparable harm.

This is especially true in light of the heightened standard applied

to requests for mandatory injunctive relief. 

Therefore, plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: October 10, 2006.

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