Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00442/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00442-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

HON. TOM PARKER, Associate )

Justice, Supreme Court of Alabama, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:16-CV-442-WKW

 ) [WO]

JUDICIAL INQUIRY COMMISSION )

OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on Defendants’ motions to dismiss under 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Docs. # 12, 13.)

Plaintiff Tom Parker, an Associate Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court 

(“Plaintiff” or “Justice Parker”), filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory 

Judgment and Injunctive Relief on June 15, 2016. (Doc. # 1.) Brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, this action challenges the constitutionality of Alabama Canons of 

Judicial Ethics (“Judicial Canons”) 1, 2A, and 3A(6), as well as Section 159 of the 

Alabama Constitution. Justice Parker argues that the Judicial Canons violate his 

First Amendment free speech rights and that Section 159 violates his Fourteenth 

Amendment due process rights. Consequently, he asks the court to declare each 

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 1 of 19
2

unconstitutional, to enjoin their enforcement, and to award him costs and attorney’s 

fees.

Defendants, the Judicial Inquiry Commission of the State of Alabama and its 

members named in their official capacities (collectively, the “JIC”), have moved for 

dismissal on the ground that Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), requires the

court to abstain from hearing the case. (Doc. # 12.) The JIC raises this argument 

under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), but submits that Rule 12(b)(1) is the proper 

vehicle by which to raise Younger. The Attorney General of Alabama, also a 

defendant, has incorporated this argument in a separate motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 

13.) For reasons to be discussed, both motions to dismiss are due to be granted, and 

this action is due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) based on Younger abstention.

1

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The complaint predicates subject-matter jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

																																																												 1 Whether Younger abstention should be raised under Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) is the 

subject of some dispute. Some courts have emphasized that Younger “reflects a court’s prudential 

decision not to exercise jurisdiction which it in fact possesses,” thus making 12(b)(1) seem an 

inappropriate vehicle. Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Benavidez 

v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1994)). See also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New 

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358–59 (1989). This insight notwithstanding, other courts often allow 

Younger abstention arguments to be “raised through a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.” 5B Charles Alan 

Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1350 at 96–100. This district is no 

exception. See, e.g., Moore v. JIC, No. 2:16-cv-388-WHA, 2016 WL 4157328, at *1 (M.D. Ala. 

Aug. 4, 2016) (“The court has considered the Defendants’ Younger abstention argument to be 

appropriately raised under Rule 12(b)(1).”). The court follows Moore but notes that the final result 

of this litigation in no way depends on whether this case is dismissed under 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6).

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 2 of 19
3

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may take 

the form of a facial or factual attack. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of AugustaRichmond City, 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007). A facial attack requires the 

court to determine whether the pleadings, on their face, allege a sufficient basis for 

subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. In analyzing a facial attack, the court assumes all 

well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are true. Id. A factual attack, 

by contrast, challenges “the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, 

irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony 

and affidavits, are considered.” Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 

1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). The motions at issue here attack the court’s jurisdiction both 

facially and factually. (Docs. # 12, 13.)

IV. BACKGROUND

On March 3, 2015, prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), the Alabama Supreme Court held that 

the Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment and the Alabama Marriage 

Protection Act, which defined marriage as the union of one man and one woman, 

did not run afoul of the federal Constitution. Ex parte State v. King, No. 1140460, 

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 3 of 19
4

––– So. 3d ––––, 2015 WL 892752 (Ala. 2015). Later that year, on June 26, 2015,

the U.S. Supreme Court decided Obergefell.

2

On October 6, 2015, Justice Parker, who is a candidate for reelection to the 

Alabama Supreme Court, appeared on a radio talk show during which he was asked, 

among other things, about his personal views on federalism, the U.S. Supreme Court, 

and the Obergefell decision. Specifically, Justice Parker expressed his opinion that 

Wisconsin’s response over 150 years ago to the U.S. Supreme Court’s pro-slavery 

decisions, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), provides precedent for 

states to ignore federal rulings they believe are in conflict with the U.S. 

Constitution.3 His comments are contextualized and laid out in detail below. 

																																																												 2 In Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599, the U.S. Supreme Court held that marriage laws in 

Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, which were similar to the Alabama law, were 

unconstitutional.

3 The Dred Scott case infamously held that a slave was an “article of property,” not a rightsbearing citizen, and thus could not sue for his freedom. 60 U.S. at 408. Relatedly, the Wisconsin 

Supreme Court famously refused to enforce a U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that the 

Fugitive Slave Act (which required northern states to return runaway slaves to their masters) was 

constitutional. The explanation provided on the Wisconsin Court System website is most helpful:

What has become known as the Booth case is actually a series of decisions from 

the Wisconsin Supreme Court beginning in 1854 and one from the U.S. Supreme 

Court, Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 514 (1859), leading to a final published decision 

by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ableman v. Booth, 11 Wis. 501 (1859). These 

decisions reflect Wisconsin’s attempted nullification of the federal fugitive slave 

law, the expansion of the state’s rights movement and Wisconsin’s defiance of 

federal judicial authority. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Booth unanimously 

declared the Fugitive Slave Act (which required northern states to return runaway 

slaves to their masters) unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned that 

decision but the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to file the U.S. Court’s mandate 

upholding the fugitive slave law. That mandate has never been filed.

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 4 of 19
5

When asked about Wisconsin, Justice Parker said: 

The Wisconsin situation in fact involved a double defiance of the 

Supreme Court. First they defied the Dred Scott decision, and then their 

decision in defiance was taken up to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 

reversed it, sent its mandate back to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 

which refused to accept that mandate, so the reversal was never acted 

on. 

I think it was a model of what we need to see in this [country]. Now, 

in the federalist papers, they said the states should be a restriction on 

the powers of the federal government to prevent it from overreaching.

. . . [I]t’s time for the state Supreme Courts to rise up and do their 

responsibility for this entire system we have nationally, otherwise it’s 

just going to continue to get worse and worse.

(Doc. # 1-1, at 11). Having raised Wisconsin as an example, the radio host began to 

get more specific. He asked, “What is the lay of the land right now in Alabama with 

regard to the subject of same sex marriage?” (Doc. # 1-1, at 12.) Justice Parker, in 

response, laid out the history of King and Obergefell, and noted that, because 

“nobody appealed [King] to the U.S. Supreme Court,” the Alabama Supreme Court 

must now determine whether King remains enforceable in Alabama. (Doc. # 1-1, at 

12.) He explained that, in his view, the Obergefell mandate extends only “to the one 

court of appeals that was the source of the original cases taken to the U.S. Supreme 

Court” because Article III of the U.S. Constitution “says that the [Court’s] 

																																																												

In Re: Booth, Famous cases of the Supreme Court, Wisconsin Court System, 

https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/supreme/docs/famouscases01.pdf. The same document 

can also be found in the record. (Doc. 26-1.)

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 5 of 19
6

jurisdiction is over cases or controvers[ies], and the practice from the very beginning 

was that a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court only affected the parties before that 

court.” (Doc. # 1-1, at 13.) 

Justice Parker made it very clear he does not agree with the reasoning of 

Obergefell. Far from it, he believes the decision runs “contrary to the constitution” 

and is out of step with popular opinion. (Doc. # 1-1, at 15.) Unpopular judicial 

decrees, he thinks, are due largely to the fact that federal judges are appointed for 

life rather than being elected by the people they represent. (Doc. #1-1, at 14–15.) 

Lifetime appointments make judges unaccountable to the people, while elections 

help to “keep judges in line.” (Doc. # 1-1, at 15.)

The subject of judicial accountability prompted a broader dialogue about

federalism, especially as it relates to Obergefell. Justice Parker explained to the 

audience that the Tenth Amendment “says that the state retains rights not delegated 

to the federal government” and “[t]here is nothing in the constitution that delegates 

any rights over marriage to the federal government.” (Doc. # 1-1, at 16.) He argued 

that the Obergefell decision was an example of the federal government “intruding 

into the state prerogative” in violation of the Tenth Amendment, and he voiced his 

belief that “states should be a check on the federal government.” (Doc. # 1-1, at 16, 

17.) Asked what would happen if a state Supreme Court refused to “accept the 

jurisdiction of the [U.S.] Supreme Court,” Justice Parker said:

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 6 of 19
7

I doubt that it would be a blanket defiance of all jurisdiction of the U.S. 

Supreme Court, but in regard to the Obergefell decision, where it’s clear 

that they jumped outside of all the precedents in order to impose their 

will on this country, that yes, resisting that decision could maybe state 

a revival of what we need in this country to return to our original 

founding principles.

(Doc. # 1-1, at 9.). 

In summary, Justice Parker—a candidate for political office, nearing election 

season, and speaking in a public forum—expressed his personal views on a number 

of highly contentious legal and political issues that his constituents, and the country 

at large, are currently facing. 

The Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”) took offense. On October 12, 

2015, the SPLC filed a complaint with the JIC—the body charged with investigating 

violations of Judicial Canons and the primary defendant in this lawsuit. The 

complaint alleged that Justice Parker’s comments “assault the authority and integrity 

of the federal judiciary” and “publicly endorse . . . [defiance of] Obergefell.” SPLC 

further complained that Justice Parker “offers ridicule and suggests defiance,” which 

in turn “foments the false impression in the public’s mind that the federal judiciary 

has tyrannically taken for itself unconstitutional power . . . .” Thus, said the SPLC, 

Justice Parker’s expression of criticism of the federal courts in general, and the U.S. 

Supreme Court in particular, is worthy of state-sanctioned disciplinary action

because it violated of a host of Judicial Canons promulgated by the state of Alabama. 

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 7 of 19
8

Specifically, the complaint alleges that Justice Parker’s comments were in 

violation of Canon 1, which requires a judge to observe “high standards of conduct 

so that the integrity . . . of the judiciary may be preserved”; Canon 2(A), which 

requires a judge to “conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public 

confidence in the integrity . . . of the judiciary”; and Canon 3(A)(6), which requires 

a judge to “abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding 

in any court.”

4 (Doc. # 1-1.) 

On November 5, 2015, the JIC notified Justice Parker that it intended to 

investigate all three purported violations, and informed him of his right to respond. 

(Doc. # 1-3.) Justice Parker responded on January 4, 2016. (Doc. # 26-1.) Since 

then, the JIC has kept its investigation open but has not filed a formal complaint with 

the Court of the Judiciary (“COJ”), which is the body responsible for trying ethics 

complaints after formal charges are filed. COJ decisions are appealable to the 

Alabama Supreme Court. Ala. Const., art. VI, § 157(b). Justice Parker filed this 

lawsuit in federal court on June 15, 2016. (Doc. # 1.)

V. DISCUSSION

While acknowledging the First Amendment issues that arise when the SPLC, 

in a political season, attempts to use an agency of state government to suppress

																																																												 4 The other statutory provision challenged by Justice Parker is Section 159 of the Alabama 

Constitution, which disqualifies him from acting as a judge while there is a pending JIC complaint. 

Ala. Const., art. VI, § 159.

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 8 of 19
9

speech with which the SPLC disagrees, the court also recognizes its duty to resolve 

legal questions in order of their priority. Thus, the threshold issue before the court 

today is whether the court must decline to exercise jurisdiction under the abstention 

doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the Supreme Court 

held that “the possible unconstitutionality of a [state] statute ‘on its face’ does not in 

itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it.” Id. at 54. This

“longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court 

proceedings” reflects “a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact 

that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a 

continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States 

and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate 

ways.” Id. at 43–44. The federal government, “anxious though it may be to 

vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so 

in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.” Id.

at 44. Therefore, if Younger compels abstention, the court will not reach the 

underlying First Amendment issue. 

Although Younger itself involved the state prosecution of a criminal 

defendant, the Supreme Court has since extended Younger to also apply to “civil 

enforcement proceedings” and civil proceedings “that are uniquely in furtherance of 

the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., 

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 9 of 19
10

Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989) (“NOPSI”). Younger 

abstention is thus appropriate in only three circumstances: (1) criminal prosecutions; 

(2) civil enforcement proceedings; and (3) civil proceedings that promote the state’s 

ability to perform its judicial functions. Id. When such cases arise, courts determine 

whether to abstain by considering the Middlesex factors: “first, do [the proceedings] 

constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate 

important state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the state 

proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. 

Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). However, satisfaction of the 

Middlesex factors, by itself, is not sufficient to justify Younger abstention. See Sprint 

Commc’ns v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 593 (2013) (clarifying that the “Middlesex

conditions . . . were not dispositive”). The factors are applied only after a 

determination that the case falls into one of the categories enunciated by the court in 

NOPSI. Id. at 594 (“Younger extends to the three ‘exceptional circumstances’ 

identified in NOPSI, but no further.”).

Because the regulation of judicial ethics is unquestionably in furtherance of 

Alabama’s ability to perform its judicial functions, it is appropriate to consider the 

three Middlesex factors. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368. The court will analyze each factor 

but will do so out of order, leaving the first (and, in this case, the most difficult) 

factor for last.

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 10 of 19
11

A. Important State Interest

Justice Parker does not dispute that Alabama has an important interest in 

regulating the conduct of state judges. Indeed, the Supreme Court “repeatedly has 

recognized that the States have important interests in administering certain aspects 

of their judicial systems.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1987). 

He does, however, contend that this court should decline to abstain because the state 

proceedings in which he finds himself are not “quasi-criminal” in nature, and thus 

not susceptible to Younger. 

This argument misses the mark. “[W]hether the proceeding is labeled civil, 

quasi-criminal, or criminal in nature, the salient fact is whether federal-court 

interference would unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the state.” 

Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 433 n.12 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The ethical 

conduct of state court judges being integral to the administration of any state judicial 

system, the court finds that enjoining the enforcement of state judicial ethics canons

would unduly interfere with legitimate state activities. Thus, the second prong is 

satisfied.

B. Adequate Opportunity to Raise Constitutional Challenges

“Minimal respect for the state processes, of course, precludes any 

presumption that the state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.” 

Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431. Accordingly, the burden of proof is placed on the party 

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 11 of 19
12

claiming the state proceeding is inadequate. Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 14. Here,

Justice Parker complains that the JIC cannot give him the remedies he desires, but 

he never denies his ability to raise his federal constitutional claims in the JIC forum. 

(Doc. # 34, at 14–18.) Indeed, the JIC provided a copy of the Justice’s response, 

complete with his signature, which raises the very same constitutional claims he has 

raised in this court. (Doc. # 26-1, at 6–23.) As the Supreme Court has made clear, 

the “pertinent inquiry is whether the state proceedings afford an adequate 

opportunity to raise the constitutional claims.” Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432 (quoting 

Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 426 (1979)). It appears Justice Parker has had such an 

opportunity here.5

If the court’s independent judgment were not enough, the Eleventh Circuit has 

suggested the same conclusion, albeit with some uncertainty. In Butler v. Alabama 

Judicial Inquiry Commission, 245 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Butler I”), this 

circuit certified several questions to the Alabama Supreme Court in an almost 

identical case involving charges against a justice of the Alabama Supreme Court in 

an election season. One of the questions asked whether a defendant may “raise and 

have decided a constitutional challenge to a judicial canon” in the same type of JIC 

																																																												 5 The argument that the JIC would not consider the federal Constitution in its decision, 

despite constitutional issues being raised, is likewise destined for failure. As the Supreme Court 

said in regard to a similar argument, “it would seem an unusual doctrine . . . to say that the 

Commission could not construe its own statutory mandate in the light of federal constitutional 

principles.” Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986).

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 12 of 19
13

and COJ proceedings at issue in this case. Id. at 1265. The only Justice to directly

answer the question indicated that constitutional objections could be raised and 

decided in such proceedings. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 261 F.3d 

1154, 1159 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Butler II”). Consequently, while recognizing the lack 

of “authoritative guidance,” the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “an adequate state 

forum likely exists.” Id. The facts of this case only serve to further corroborate that 

judgment. Thus, the third Middlesex prong is satisfied.

C. Ongoing State Judicial Proceeding

Justice Parker’s best argument against Younger abstention is that the 

investigation being conducted by the JIC is not an ongoing judicial proceeding. To 

support this contention, Justice Parker points out that no official complaint has been 

filed with the COJ and cites a number of authorities suggesting that investigatory

proceedings, in the absence of formal judicial proceedings, are insufficient to trigger 

Younger. (Doc. # 34, at 7.) However, upon closer examination, each of the 

authorities relied upon is either distinguishable or inapplicable to this case.

For example, Justice Parker relies on Sprint Communications v. Jacobs, 134 

S. Ct. 584, 592 (2013), for the proposition that “preliminary investigations without 

the commencement of formal judicial proceedings fail to constitute state judicial 

proceedings sufficient to invoke Younger abstention.” (Doc. # 34, at 7.) He is 

correct that Jacobs involved an investigation rather than a formal proceeding, and 

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 13 of 19
14

that the court declined to apply Younger. But he is wrong to suggest that the

proceeding’s investigatory nature is what made the court decide to hear the case. 

The court in Jacobs declined to apply Younger because the investigation at issue did

not fall into one of the three exceptions set forth in NOPSI. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. at 

593–94 (“Younger extends to the three ‘exceptional circumstances’ identified in 

NOPSI, but no further.”). Because this case involves state interests that are 

“uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial 

functions”—i.e., because it involves one of the “exceptional circumstances”

enunciated in NOPSI—the reasoning of Jacobs does not apply.

Nor can the JIC proceedings at issue here fairly be analogized to a criminal 

prosecution that “has been threatened, but is not pending.” See Steffel v. Thompson, 

415 U.S. 452, 454 (1974). In the criminal context, the Supreme Court has said that 

threatened criminal prosecutions are not sufficient to justify abstention under 

Younger. Id. Justice Parker argues that the JIC investigation, without the filing of a 

formal complaint with the COJ, is like a threatened prosecution. (Doc. # 34 at 8.) 

In the court’s view, the JIC investigation is more like a grand jury proceeding. 

The Alabama Appellate Courts website explains that the JIC, which is a body

created by the state constitution, see Ala. Const., art. VI, § 156, is “charged with 

investigating complaints of misconduct or professional wrongdoing on the part of 

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 14 of 19
15

judges.”6 The commission consists of nine members, three of whom are not lawyers, 

who are appointed by various state officials.7 If five or more members of the 

commission, after investigation, find “a reasonable basis exists to charge a judge 

with a violation,” then the JIC “is authorized to file a complaint with the Court of 

the Judiciary.” The website summarizes the role of the commission as one “similar 

to that of a grand jury.” Consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s practice in 

previous cases, this court is inclined to defer to the state’s own description of its 

proceedings and treat the JIC like a grand jury. See, e.g., Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 

432–34. 

However, likening the JIC procedure to that of a grand jury does not resolve 

the issue. On the question of whether a grand jury proceeding constitutes an ongoing 

state judicial proceeding of the kind required to invoke Younger, the circuits are split. 

Texas Ass’n of Business v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting the 

circuit split). The Eleventh Circuit has yet to decide the issue, but of the four circuits 

that have, three have held that a grand jury proceeding constitutes an ongoing 

judicial proceeding under Younger. Id. at 520–21; Craig v. Barney, 678 F.2d 1200 

																																																												 6 http://judicial.alabama.gov/appl_canons.cfm, last visited Sept. 12, 2016.

7 Of the commission’s membership, the website says the following: “The commission is 

composed of an appellate judge appointed by the supreme court (cannot be a supreme court 

justice); two circuit judges appointed by the Circuit Judges’ Association; one District Judge 

appointed by the Lt. Governor; three persons who are non-lawyers appointed by the governor with 

confirmation by the Senate; and two members of the State Bar appointed by the Board of Bar 

Commissioners.”

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 15 of 19
16

(4th Cir. 1982); Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir. 1981). But see Monaghan 

v. Deakins, 798 F.2d 632 (3rd Cir. 1986) (holding that a grand jury proceeding is not 

ongoing), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 484 U.S. 193 (1998).

8

Assuming without deciding that the JIC proceedings are analogous to grand 

jury proceedings, the court finds these authorities persuasive. However, this court 

need not rely on the majority view of the above circuit split. Indeed, the consensus 

view of a series of nonbinding cases that are analogous, but admittedly not identical, 

to this case would give the court more pause if it were not for several other factors 

weighing in favor of applying Younger here. There are at least three additional 

reasons that weigh in favor of abstaining rather than hearing this case. 

First, perhaps the most convincing of these reasons is the fact that the Supreme 

Court has held previously that the prerequisites for Younger were satisfied at an 

identical stage of a similar proceeding in New Jersey. In Middlesex, the U.S. 

Supreme Court held that a state disciplinary proceeding—which was administered 

by the New Jersey state bar and, much like the proceeding here, designed to 

discipline lawyers who had committed ethics violations—was “ongoing” as soon as 

the initial complaint was filed. 457 U.S. at 433. Middlesex was perhaps an easier 

																																																												 8 District courts facing the same question overwhelmingly have reached the consensus view 

that a grand jury proceeding is sufficient to satisfy Younger. See, e.g., Doe v. The Order Desk, 

Inc., No. CIV.A.3:97-CV-1479, 1997 WL 405141, at *7 (N.D. Tex. July 14, 1997); Law Firm of 

Daniel P. Foster, P.C., v. Dearie, 613 F. Supp. 278, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Notey v. Hynes, 418 F.

Supp. 1320, 1326 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 16 of 19
17

case than what the court faces today because the New Jersey Supreme Court had 

made very clear that the proceeding was “judicial in nature” from the outset.9 Id. 

However, as the U.S. Supreme Court clarified in a subsequent case, a key factor 

weighing into its decision in Middlesex was the fact that the adjudication of the ethics 

committee was ultimately appealable to the state supreme court. Ohio Civil Rights 

Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986) (“[W]e have held 

that federal courts should refrain from enjoining lawyer disciplinary proceedings 

initiated by state ethics committees if the proceedings are within the appellate 

jurisdiction of the appropriate State Supreme Court.”) (emphasis added). The same 

is true of the JIC proceeding at issue here. Ala. Const., art. VI, § 157(b). This 

holding weighs in favor of applying Younger.

Second, even supposing the JIC proceedings were administrative rather than

“judicial in nature,” application of the Younger doctrine is appropriate. The Supreme 

Court has readily applied Younger “to state administrative proceedings in which 

important state interests are vindicated, so long as in the course of those proceedings 

the federal plaintiff would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his 

constitutional claim.” Dayton, 477 U.S. at 627. As Parts V.A and V.B already have 

demonstrated, the JIC proceedings are designed to vindicate an important state 

																																																												 9 Because Youngerrequiresthat there be a proceeding that is both “ongoing” and “judicial,” 

the court in Middlesex faced a simpler task in that half the work was already done for it. 

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 17 of 19
18

interest and do in fact provide an adequate opportunity to litigate constitutional 

claims. This favors abstention. 

Third, as the JIC points out in its briefing (Doc. # 36, at 3–4), the circuits 

uniformly have treated state administrative proceedings as “unitary” in determining 

whether they are “ongoing” (or “pending”) for Younger purposes. See Hudson v. 

Campbell, 663 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir. 2011); Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 

519 F.3d 156, 167 (4th Cir. 2008); Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 364 F.3d 

27, 35 (1st Cir. 2004); Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 1998); 

O’Neill v. City of Phila., 32 F.3d 785, 791 (3rd Cir. 1994). See also M.R. v. Bd. of 

Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile Cty., No. 11-0245-WS-C, 2012 WL 3778283, at *3 (S.D. 

Ala. Aug. 30, 2012) (citing the above cases and discussing the “unitary proceeding” 

rationale in depth). All five circuits that have ruled on the issue have agreed that, to 

use the language employed by the First Circuit, “Younger now has to be read as 

treating the state process . . . as a continuum from start to finish,” which at any point 

precludes the “right to detour into federal court.” Maymo-Melendez, 364 F.3d at 35. 

Under this understanding, state proceedings, whether judicial or administrative, are 

considered “ongoing” from the very beginning of the process until the end, as long 

as the final decision is reviewable by the state court system. The state process has 

clearly begun here. Thus, even if the JIC proceeding is administrative, Younger

likely applies.

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 18 of 19
19

VI. CONCLUSION

In the absence of binding Eleventh Circuit or Supreme Court authority, this 

court heeds the reasoned opinions of its colleagues in other circuits. Whether the 

JIC proceeding is more appropriately characterized as a grand jury or administrative 

proceeding, the relevant authorities suggest that it is “ongoing” for purposes of 

Younger. Therefore, in accordance with the longstanding principle of comity and 

out of respect for federalism, the court concludes that Younger is applicable here and 

abstains from exercising jurisdiction.

Alternatively, if there be any doubt about the prudence of today’s decision, 

the Eleventh Circuit instructs courts to “err—if we err at all—on the side of 

abstaining.” Butler II, 261 F.3d at 1159. To the extent that the question today is 

unclear, abstention is appropriate.

It is ORDERED that Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. # 12, 13) are

GRANTED. A final judgment will be entered separately.

DONE this 29th day of September, 2016.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:16-cv-00442-WKW-SRW Document 39 Filed 09/29/16 Page 19 of 19