Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02085/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02085-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Unit.ed~tJ!~ft_Lc ~ lJ o.c.":I 0 urt of A I Tenth Circuit ppea s 

JAN c v 1993 

BARRY HOLLOWAY, } ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Petitioner 

vs. 

ROBERT J. TANSY, 

Respondent 

} 

- Appellant, } 

} 

} 

} 

} 

- Appellee. } 

No. 91-2085 

(D.C. No. CIV89-0297-JC) 

(D. New Mexico) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges, and ROGERs,** District 

Judge. 

Petitioner Barry Holloway, a state prisoner, appeals from an 

order of the district court denying his petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2254. Holloway seeks habeas 

relief following his conviction by a jury of criminal sexual 

contact of a minor in violation of N.M.Stat.Ann. 30-9-13(A} (1) and 

criminal sexual penetration of a minor in violation of 

N.M.Stat.Ann. 30-9-ll(A} (1). Finding no error of constitutional 

dimensions in his convictions, we affirm the denial of the writ. 

Prior to January 1986, petitioner was married to Anita 

Holloway. Anita Holloway had a daughter ("D"}, and a son from a 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 3.63. 

** The Honorable Richard D. Rogers, District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-2085 Document: 010110157266 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 1 
previous marriage. The couple had one child of their own. The 

couple was having marital difficulties in January 1986 . There were 

arguments in front of the children and discussions of divorce. 

On January 10, 1986, after there was an argument and talk 

about divorce in front of the children, D told her mother that 

petitioner had touched her "in my p;rivate parts." The police were 

contacted. D was interviewed by a police detective and examined at 

a hospital . At that time, D was nine years old. 

Ultimately, petitioner was charged with sexual contact and 

sexual penetration. The sexual penetration was alleged to have 

occurred some time between June 1, 1985 and November 1, 1985. The 

petitioner was convicted on both charges, but the convictions were 

reversed and remanded for a new trial. He was retried and again 

found guilty of both charges. His convictions were affirmed by the 

New Mexico Court of Appeals, and his petition for a writ of 

certiorari was denied by the New Mexico Supreme Court. He then 

sought habeas relief in federal court. The district court denied 

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus after adopting the 

proposed findings of a magistrate. 

The evidence against the petitioner at his state court trial 

came primarily from three sources: (1) the testimony of D; (2) the 

testimony of a psychologist, Dr. Ziemen, who interviewed D and 

thought she was credible; and (3) the testimony of a physician, Dr. 

Quinlin, who examined D and thought there was some physical 

evidence of penetration. 

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The petitioner raises three arguments in this appeal: ( 1) 

that his rights to a fair trial and confrontation were denied when 

D's uncle made hand signals to her while she was testifying; (2) 

that his rights to compulsory process and a fair trial were denied 

when the trial court excluded testimony regarding D's sexual 

knowledge at age four or five; and (3) that the evidence of his 

guilt was insufficient. 

In a collateral attack on a state conviction under§ 2254, the 

ultimate burden of establishing that the state proceeding violated 

the Constitution remains on the petitioner. Beachum v. Tansy, 903 

F.2d 1321, 1325 {10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s.ct. 269 (1990). 

Hand Signals 

During the trial, it was determined that D's uncle, Colt 

Anderson, had made hand signals from the back of the courtroom 

while D testified. He also went in and out of the courtroom during 

her testimony. Counsel for the petitioner brought these matters to 

the attention of the trial judge. Petitioner's counsel asked for 

a mistrial and argued primarily that he was concerned that Mr. 

Anderson, in leaving the courtroom during the trial, had talked to 

other persons who were going to testify. He also mentioned that he 

had been made aware that Mr. Anderson had made some hand signals to 

D while she testified. The trial judge allowed petitioner's 

counsel to present whatever he desired on these issues. 

Petitioner's counsel chose to call Mr. Anderson and the two 

witnesses who had been waiting outside the courtroom to testify. 

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Mr. Anderson testified that he did indeed make some hand 

signals to D while she testified. He stated that he was trying to 

calm her down; that he made a hand signal to try to get her to take 

a deep breath. There was also some indication, although not from 

the uncle's testimony, that he may have given D a "thumbs up" 

signal. Mr. Anderson also admitted that he had left the courtroom 

during D's testimony and entered the room where witnesses were 

waiting to testify. He testified that he went into the room only 

to get a pen and paper. The witnesses confirmed that Mr. Anderson 

had entered the room and that no conversations had taken place 

concerning any of the trial testimony. The trial judge denied 

petitioner's motion for a mistrial. 

Petitioner contends that his rights to confrontation and a 

fair trial were violated when Mr. Anderson made the hand signals to 

D while she testified in an effort to comfort her and calm her 

down. He asserts that the hand signals violated his rights even if 

they affected only D's demeanor, and not the content of her 

testimony. 

The confrontation clause guarantees criminal defendants the 

right to confront their accusers. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 

(1988). The purpose of the confrontation clause is to ensure the 

reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by 

subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary 

proceeding before the trier of fact. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 

836 (1990). 

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Under the circumstances of this case, we do not find that the 

petitioner's rights to confrontation or a fair trial were violated. 

We recognize the impropriety of a spectator providing signals to a 

witness and the cases cited by the petitioner in which courts found 

that such actions required a new trial. The problem, however, 

faced by the court in this instance is that we have no evidence 

that the hand signals in any way altered D's testimony or demeanor 

or the jury's perception of that testimony. There is no evidence 

in the record that D saw the hand signals or that she reacted to 

them if she did. Without such evidence, we would be forced to 

speculate that D saw the hand signals and that they somehow 

affected her demeanor or her testimony. We are unwilling to make 

such a leap. In sum, we do not find that the petitioner has 

sustained his burden in proving that his constitutional rights were 

violated. 

Exclusion of Certain Evidence 

During the trial, petitioner's counsel called a state juvenile 

probation officer named Samuel James to the stand. Mr. James had 

become closely acquainted with Anita Holloway in 1980, when D was 

three or four years old. The prosecution objected when 

petitioner's counsel asked Mr. James if he had discussed anything 

of a sexual nature with D. After a bench conference, the trial 

judge sustained the objection and no further questions of any kind 

were asked. 

Petitioner contends that the exclusion of Mr. James' testimony 

violated his rights to a fair trial and compulsory process. He 

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Appellate Case: 91-2085 Document: 010110157266 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 5 
contends that the testimony of Mr. James concerning prior 

conversations he had with D concerning sexual matters would have 

bolstered his contention that D had the capability to fabricate the 

charges. He further argues that this testimony would have refuted 

D's testimony and Dr. Ziemen's testimony relating to D's innocence 

about sexual matters. 

Unfortunately, the bench conference was not well taperecorded, and it is difficult to determine from the broken 

transcript what anyone is saying or on what basis the court decided 

to exclude the testimony. The trial judge appeared to base his 

ruling on the following points: (1) the substance of Mr. James' 

testimony was vaguely presented--we do not know what the substance 

of the conversation or observation was; (2) it was remote in time--

D was only three or four (or perhaps five) years old when it 

happened; and (3) counsel did not establish a foundation for the 

evidence by first asking Dor Dr. Ziemen if she had had prior 

conversations or observations with Mr. James concerning sexual 

matters. 

Having carefully reviewed the evidence presented at trial, the 

court does not find that the petitioner's right to a fair trial was 

violated by the trial judge's ruling on the prosecution's 

objection. "Any errors in the admissibility of evidence are not 

grounds for habeas relief absent fundamental unfairness so as to 

constitute a denial of due process of law." Martin v. Kaiser, 907 

F.2d 931, 934 (10th Cir. 1990). We find no error in the trial 

judge's decision. The evidence sought to be presented was indeed 

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Appellate Case: 91-2085 Document: 010110157266 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 6 
remote and vague. Moreover, we do not find that the petitioner's 

right to compulsory process was denied. In order to establish a 

violation of the compulsory process clause of the sixth Amendment, 

there must be a showing that the excluded evidence would have been 

material and favorable to the defense in ways not merely cumulative 

of other evidence. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 

858, 873 (1982). The court's ruling on Mr. James' testimony did 

not preclude the petitioner from presenting a defense. The 

evidence in question was not material to the petitioner's case. 

The evidence that petitioner sought to off er was cumulative of 

other evidence in the record. There was adequate evidence in the 

record that D had prior sexual knowledge from film strips she 

viewed at school and activity and conversations with friends. In 

sum, we find no violation of petitioner's rights. 

Insufficient Evidence 

Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence for his 

conviction of criminal sexual penetration of a minor. Petitioner 

contends that the prosecution failed to establish an incident of 

penetration within the time frame charged in the information: June 

1 to November 1, 1985. 

When testing the sufficiency of the evidence in the context of 

a habeas petition, the state conviction must stand unless no 

rational trier of fact, when viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, could have found the essential 

elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The evidence "must be 

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Appellate Case: 91-2085 Document: 010110157266 Date Filed: 01/20/1993 Page: 7 
substantial; that is, it must do more than raise a mere suspicion 

of guilt." Beachum, 903 F.2d at 1332. 

D testified that "something happened" between the petitioner 

and her after the family returned from a summer vacation in 

California but before the family went to the state fair that year. 

She also testified that during the time frame when this happened, 

her mother was wearing a blue work uniform. D' s subsequent 

testimony left no doubt that the "something" that had "happened" 

was an act of penetration. She testifi ed that she had fallen 

asleep in the living room of their house while wearing a pink 

nightgown. She related that she was awakened when the petitioner 

began touching her. She testified that he pulled up her nightgown, 

pulled down her panties, and then had intercourse with her. Anita 

Holloway testified that the family had gone to California in June 

1985, that she began wearing a blue work uniform on July 1, 1985 

while working at Long John Silver's restaurant, and that the family 

attended the state fair in late September. 

Petitioner suggests that the evidence was insufficient because 

(1) D's testimony concerning the time frame of the incident was 

vague; and (2) D's testimony related to an incident that was not 

charged by the prosecution. The latter argument relates to 

petitioner's assertion that D testified to an incident different 

from the one upon which the petitioner was arrested because the 

clothing she identified as wearing prior to the incident was 

different at trial (pink nightgown) than in her initial statement 

(sweatsuit). 

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We find no merit to either contention. The evidence was 

sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

petitioner committed the crime of sexual penetration of a minor 

under New Mexico law. The petitioner had been provided with the 

details of this charge in a statement of facts filed by the 

prosecution prior to the first trial. The testimony given by D at 

trial was in accord with this statement. Her testimony, along with 

her mother's testimony, established a sufficient time frame for the 

act of penetration. In sum, the evidence was adequate to support 

the jury's verdict. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court denying the 

petitioner's writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

9 

Entered for the Court 

Richard D. Rogers 

District Judge 

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