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Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT FEBO 9 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

BOBBY J. COWAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 92-6180 

) (D.C. No. CIV-91-639-A) 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 

Louis Sullivan, Secretary, 

) (W. D. Okla. ) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, 

District Court for the District 

designation. 

District Judge, United States 

of Wyoming, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-6180 Document: 010110170322 Date Filed: 02/09/1993 Page: 1 
Claimant Bobby J. Cowan appeals from a district court 

judgment affirming the Secretary of Health and Human Services' 

denial of claimant's application for social security disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 401-433. Claimant's application filed in May 1989 was 

denied on initial consideration and on reconsideration . Claimant 

then requested and was afforded a hearing before an administrative 

law judge. The ALJ concluded claimant was not disabled, and 

denied benefits. The Appeals Council denied review, making the 

ALJ's decision the final decision of the Secretary. ~g_,_, 

Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, 1520 (10th Cir. 1987). The 

district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and 

recommendation, and dismissed. 

u.s.c. § 1291. 

Our jurisdiction arises from 28 

On appeal claimant contends (1) the Secretary failed to 

establish that a significant number of jobs exist in the national 

economy, (2) claimant did not have transferable skills, (3) the 

ALJ improperly evaluated claimant's credibility, and (4) the 

Secretary's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We 

disagree and affirm. 

We review the Secretary's decision "to determine whether the 

findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the 

Secretary applied correct legal standards. " Pacheco v. Sullivan, 

931 F.2d 695, 696 (10th Cir. 1991). "We must determine whether 

the Secretary's decision of nondisability. . is supported by 

substantial evidence, i.e., '"such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

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Appellate Case: 92-6180 Document: 010110170322 Date Filed: 02/09/1993 Page: 2 
conclusion."'" Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 

1988) (quoting Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 414 (10th Cir. 

1983) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) )) . 

In reviewing the Secretary's decision, we cannot weigh the 

evidence or substitute our discretion for that of the Secretary, 

but we have the duty to carefully consider the entire record and 

make our determination on the record as a whole. Dollar v. Bowen, 

821 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1987). 

The Secretary has established a five-step sequential 

evaluation process to determine if a claimant is disabled. Reyes 

v. Bowen, 845 F . 2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1988) (listing five steps) ; 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If a claimant is determined to be disabled 

or not disabled at any step, the evaluation process ends there. 

Sorenson v . Bowen, 888 F.2d 706, 710 (10th Cir. 1989). The burden 

of proof is on the claimant through step four; then it shifts to 

the Secretary. See id. at 710 (citing Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 

224 (10th Cir. 1989)). 

Claimant, a fifty-two year old man with 

education, claims disability since May of 1983 due 

a fourth grade 

to back pain 

and numbness in his foot and leg. The medical evidence included 

notes on claimant's back surgeries in 1974 and 1983 . 

not seek medical treatment from September 1983 

Claimant did 

until the 

consultative medical examination in June of 1989, orde red for this 

case. A physician acting as a medical advisor and a vocational 

expert testified at the hearing. The ALJ determined at step four 

of the sequential evaluation process that claimant could not 

return to his past relevant work driving and unloading eighteen 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-6180 Document: 010110170322 Date Filed: 02/09/1993 Page: 3 
wheel trucks. The vocational expert classified claimant's past 

relevant work as very heavy because the work required frequent 

heavy lifting. 

The ALJ concluded at step five, although claimant's 

nonexertional impairments limited the range of light work he could 

perform, that claimant retained the functional capacity to perform 

certain light jobs which exist in significant numbers in the 

national economy. The vocational expert identified two light jobs 

claimant could perform: school bus driver and drip pumper . 

According to the vocational expert, the school bus driver job 

generally requires five hours of work per day, and involves 

starting and stopping the bus. The drip pumper job requires 

driving a tank truck from station to station, uncoiling a hose 

from a reel and hooking it up to a gas pipeline, then pumping and 

measuring the condensation. 

Claimant maintains the Secretary failed to meet his burden of 

establishing the existence of alternative work in the national 

economy that claimant can perform notwithstanding his exertional 

and nonexertional impairments. If a claimant cannot return to his 

past relevant work, the burden is on the Secretary to produce 

evidence that claimant can do alternative work, and that such work 

exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2) (A). 

"This Circuit has never drawn a bright line establishing the 

number of jobs necessary to constitute a 'significant 

number .... '" Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1330 (10th 

Cir. 1992). Rather, each case should be evaluated on its 

particular circumstances, acknowledging the ALJ's common sense in 

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Appellate Case: 92-6180 Document: 010110170322 Date Filed: 02/09/1993 Page: 4 
applying the statutory language to the individual claimant's 

situation. Id. Criteria which may be considered in evaluating 

whether work exists in significant numbers include: 

the level of claimant's disability; the reliability of 

the vocational expert's testimony; the distance claimant 

is capable of travelling to engage in the assigned work; 

the isolated nature of the jobs; the types and 

availability of such work, and so on. 

Id. (quoting Jenkins v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 

1988 ) (quoting Hall v . Bowen, 837 F . 2d 272, 275 (6th Cir. 1988))). 

In this case, the ALJ first considered claimant's impairments 

and acknowledged his limited ability to sit for prolonged periods. 

Next, the ALJ admitted a comprehensive resume from the vocational 

expert; therefore, we cannot challenge the reliability of the 

vocational expert's testimony. The ALJ also received testimony 

about the number of jobs available in Oklahoma. The vocational 

expert testified there were 112,000 school bus driver jobs in the 

national economy, and 1,400 such jobs in Oklahoma. The drip 

pumper jobs numbered 21,000 nationally, and 300 in Oklahoma. This 

level of job availability is significant . ~. id. at 1330 

(finding 650 to 900 jobs in state of Oklahoma a "significant 

number") . Finally, the ALJ considered the type and availability 

of the work, including the skill and exertional levels of the jobs 

and whether claimant's skills were transferable to the proposed 

alternative jobs. Consequently, we determine the record as a 

whole adequately sustains the ALJ's conclusion. 

We next consider claimant's argument that the ALJ erred in 

finding that claimant had transferable skills. 

A skill is knowledge of a work activity which requires 

the exercise of significant judgment that goes beyond 

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Appellate Case: 92-6180 Document: 010110170322 Date Filed: 02/09/1993 Page: 5 
the carrying out of simple job duties and is acquired 

through performance of an occupation which is above the 

unskilled level (requires more than 30 days to learn). 

It is practical and familiar knowledge of the principles 

and processes of an art, science or trade, combined with 

the ability to apply them in practice in a proper and 

approved manner. 

S.S.R. 82-41, Social Security Rulings, at 197-98 (Cum. Ed. 1982 ). 

A vocational expert may be called to determine whether claimant's 

skills acquired in past employment will transfer to a category of 

work at the exertional level the ALJ has concluded the claimant 

can perform. Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F . 2d 1482, 1492 (10th Cir. 

1991) . 

Claimant contends "driving" is not a transferable skill. But 

the skills identified by the vocational expert as transferable 

included driving and safely operating a commercial vehicle, and 

knowing and applying the regulations of highway driving . It is 

experience and the exercise of significant judgment that makes 

claimant's professional driving expertise a skill. 

Transferability of skills contemplates "applying work skills 

which a person has demonstrated in vocationally relevant past jobs 

to meet the requirements of other skilled or semiskilled jobs." 

S.S.R. 82-41 at 198. The jobs the vocational expert designated as 

suitable for claimant , school bus driver and drip pumper, utilized 

skills of 

Accordingly, 

handling large vehicles on public roadways . 

we conclude substantial evidence supports the 

Secretary's determination that claimant possessed transferable 

skills. 

Claimant also maintains the ALJ did not evaluate properly 

claimant's credibility. According to claimant, the ALJ's finding 

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Appellate Case: 92-6180 Document: 010110170322 Date Filed: 02/09/1993 Page: 6 
that claimant retained the residual functional capacity for a 

limited range of light work was flawed in view of claimant's 

testimony that "walking and bending [made] his pain worse . [,] 

he could stand for about thirty minutes and could not sit for 

fifteen to twenty minutes. " Aplt.'s Br. at 9-10 . 

Claimant's testimony that he is unable to sit for more than 

twenty minutes is not supported by medical evidence. To the 

contrary, Dr. Dougherty, the consulting physician, stated claimant 

can sit for two hours. Aplt.'s Supp . App. at 142 (claimant "can 

stand for unlimited time, can sit for 2 hours, cannot stoop, 

cannot lift and can walk~ mile") . 1 The only medical evidence in 

the record that claimant is in pain is the medical expert's 

testimony that claimant "had sufficient damage to the S-1 nerve, 

that he continues to have symptoms from that." Aplt.'s Supp . App . 

at 46. The medical expert did not testify claimant's pain is 

disabling. The record contains no medical evidence that claimant 

is disabled. Furthermore, claimant has not sought medical 

attention for his condition since 1983, and he takes no prescribed 

medication for his pain, but takes an unknown amount of aspirin. 

Luna v. Bowen, 834 F .2d 161, 165-66 (10th Cir. 

1987) (suggesting factors to consider when evaluating pain claim). 

The ALJ resolved the conflicting evidence by concluding that, 

although claimant's ability to sit for prolonged periods is 

limited, claimant's restrictions do not prevent him from 

1 

We do not perceive, nor does claimant argue, that the jobs 

recommended for him require appreciable walking, bending or 

lifting. 

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Appellate Case: 92-6180 Document: 010110170322 Date Filed: 02/09/1993 Page: 7 
performing the jobs of school bus driver and drip pumper. The ALJ 

did not ignore claimant's allegations of pain; the ALJ properly 

weighed them in light of the medical evidence. See Campbell, 822 

F.2d at 1522. "Credibility determinations are peculiarly the 

province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such 

determinations when supported by substantial evidence . " Diaz v . 

Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 

1990 ) . 

Because the ALJ's credibility findings are closely and 

affirmatively linked to substantial evidence, see Huston v. Bowen, 

838 F.2d 1125, 1133 (10th Cir. 1988 ) , we will defer to the ALJ's 

credibility findings . We conclude substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ's determination that claimant retains the ability to sit 

for sufficient periods to perform the jobs recommended for him. 

Finally, claimant alleges the ALJ's decision is not based on 

substantial evidence . We have carefully reviewed the record, and 

we have considered claimant's arguments in light of the record. 

We agree with the district court that substantial evidence 

supports the Secretary's decision that claimant is not disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 92-6180 Document: 010110170322 Date Filed: 02/09/1993 Page: 8