Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05261/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05261-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 23, 1995 Decided June 28, 1996

No. 94-5261

JOSE M. QUIÑON AND G. RICHARD STRAFER,

APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv00763)

Ronald R. Massumi, with whom G. Richard Strafer was on the briefs, argued the cause for

appellants.

Marina U. Braswell, Assistant United States Attorney, with whomEric H. Holder, Jr., United States

Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, were on the brief, argued the

cause for appellee. John D. Bates, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Sharon Kegerreis was on the brief for amicus curiae National Association of Criminal Defense

Lawyers, Inc.

William C. Walsh, James K. Green, and Arthur B. Spitzer were on the brief for amicus curiae

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc.

Elliot H. Scherker was on the brieffor amici curiae Florida Association ofCriminalDefense Lawyers

and Florida Association of Criminal Defense LawyersMiami Chapter.

Before BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS, and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge: Appellant Jose Quiñon, along with two other criminal defense

lawyers, were the subject of a brief obstruction of justice investigation by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation ("FBI" or "Bureau"). Quiñon and his law partner, G. Richard Strafer, seek the

production, under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), of documents acquired by the FBI

during the course of that investigation. The FBI withheld many of the documents requested by

Quiñon and Strafer pursuant to FOIA exemptions relating to records and information compiled for

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law enforcement purposes. The district court granted the FBI's motion for summary judgment on the

basis of affidavits filed by FBI special agents. We reverse and remand so that the district court may

conduct an in camera review of the withheld documents to verify that there was a legitimate law

enforcement basis to the investigation and that the FBI's sources provided information with an

expectation of confidentiality.

I. BACKGROUND

This case springsfroman FBI investigation into a possible obstruction ofjustice. Specifically,

in August-September 1991, the FBI investigated three criminaldefense lawyersJohnW. Thornton,

Jr., Stephen Bronis, and appellant Jose Quiñonto determine whether they had conspired to

disqualify the entire Eleventh Circuit from hearing the appeal of the former head of the Medellin

cocaine cartel, Carlos Lehder.

Lehder was convicted in 1988 of various drug trafficking chargesin the District Court for the

Middle District of Florida. After sentencing, Lehder's trial counsel, Quiñon and Edward Shohat,

informed the trial judge that Lehder did not have immediate access to funds with which he could

retain appellate counsel; they argued that because Lehder was "indigent, although ... not truly

indigent," he was entitled to court-appointed counsel. Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings, United

States v. Lehder-Rivas, No. 81-82-Cr-J-12 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 1988), at 208. The trial judge was

skeptical of this plea of quasi-indigence from a man who was purportedly a billionaire, see Mary

Thornton, Reputed Top Cocaine Trafficker Arrested in Colombia Faces U.S. Trial, Washington

Post, Feb. 5, 1987, at A18; and he instructed a magistrate judge to conduct a hearing on the matter.

The magistrate confronted counsel with published, though unconfirmed, reports, see Dave Von

Drehle, Ohhhhh Miami!, A.B.A. Journal, April 1, 1988, at 66, that Lehder had paid his lawyers

millions of dollars. Quiñon and Shohat responded that reports of their fees had been exaggerated,

and they have since filed affidavitsto that effect. The magistrate then appointed counsel to represent

Lehder on appeal.

Prompted by concerns about the quickly mounting costs of the Lehder appeal, in January

1989, the Circuit Executive for the Eleventh Circuit instructed Lehder's court-appointed counsel to

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"temporarily cease work" on the case. Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 211. On March 17, 1989, the

Eleventh Circuit designated Judge (now ChiefJudge) Tjoflat, who was not on the panel hearing the

Lehder appeal, to determine whether Shohat and Quiñon should be relieved of their responsibility to

represent Lehder in his appeal. Judge Tjoflat presided over a meeting of all the interested parties in

April 1989, in which Quiñon announced his willingness to re-enter the case. Quiñon was eventually

joined by Strafer as co-counsel.

The following year, on March 6, 1990, now-ChiefJudge Tjoflat wrote a letter to severalother

judges on the Eleventh Circuit questioning the propriety of having a court-appointed counsel

represent a defendant on appeal if that defendant had been represented by privately retained counsel

at trial. He noted that the problem "came to a head in the celebrated Carlos Lehder case," in which

he suggested that the trial attorneys may have been overpaid, held the excess funds in trust, and

re-entered the case only when it became clear that they would be required to inform the court how

much money they had received. J.A. at 237-38. In his letter, Chief Judge Tjoflat proposed that the

circuit rules be amended to prohibit criminal defense attorneys from declining representation after

trial. On April 1, 1991, the Eleventh Circuit promulgated Rule 46-1(d)(1) ("Rule 46"), which

providesthat retained counselfor a criminaldefendant cannot abandonrepresentationexcept byorder

of the court.

Rule 46 was not well received in the Florida legal community. See Mary Hiadky, A bitter

clash over criminal law fees, Miami Review, Aug. 9, 1991, at 10A (hereinafter "Miami Review").

On July 22, 1991, the Chief Judge sent a letter to John W. Thornton, Jr., a representative of the

Board of Governors of the Florida Bar, in which he explained the rationale underlying the rule. This

letter did not refer to the Lehder case; instead, it discussed a hypothetical that involved a low-level

drug courier whose lawyer was paid by a higher-up. A number of Florida criminal defense lawyers

were unpersuaded by the Chief Judge's defense of Rule 46. For example, at the Florida Bar's July

1991 Board of Governors meeting, Stephen Bronis, a spokesman for the Florida Association of

Criminal Defense Lawyers, harshly criticized the rule, reportedly terming it "judicial murder of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Miami Review, at 10A.

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Appellantslearned ofChiefJudge Tjoflat's March 6, 1990, letter and, onAugust 6, 1991, they

filed a motion to disqualify the Eleventh Circuit from hearing the Lehder appeal. They alleged that

the letter had falsely accused Lehder'strial counsel of being overpaid and of holding the excessfunds

in trust for himand that ChiefJudge Tjoflat had made similarly false statementsin his correspondence

with Thornton. Appellants asserted, finally, that the Eleventh Circuit had been tainted by Chief Judge

Tjoflat's ex parte statements and, as a consequence, the entire Circuit should be disqualified from

hearing the Lehder appeal.

Shortly thereafter, a complainant informed the FBI of an alleged violation of federal law; and

on or about August 9, 1991, at the instigation of the lead prosecutor in the Lehder case, Assistant

United States Attorney ("AUSA") Ernst Mueller, the FBI began investigating "possible obstruction

of justice by [Quiñon] and two others[apparently Thornton and Bronis, see J.A. at 429] for possibly

acting in concert in an attempt to cause the entire Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to recuse

themselves from the [Lehder] case." Declaration of FBI Special Agent James Felix dated Aug. 2,

1993, ¶ 36 ("Felix Declaration").

The investigation wasshort-lived. On September 11, 1991, barely a month after its inception,

Mueller advised the Bureau that he no longer needed its assistance in the matter and filed his answer

to the August 6 motion to disqualify the Eleventh Circuit. He contended that the motion was part

of an effort by Quiñon and others, including Thornton and Bronis, to discredit Rule 46. The motion

to disqualify the Eleventh Circuit was denied, and Lehder's sentence was ultimately affirmed. See

United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1992).

On November 21, 1991, appellants Quiñon and Strafer filed a FOIA request for the

documents compiled during the FBI's brief obstruction of justice investigation. The FBI located 77

pages, but ultimately released only sixteen, and those in redacted form. The documents were

withheld pursuant to Exemptions 7(C) and (D) of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) & (D), "and/or"

Exemption (j)(2) of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2). J.A. at 424. FOIA Exemptions 7(C) and

(D) apply to

records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent

that [their] production ... (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an

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unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, [or] (D) could reasonably be expected to

disclose the identity of a confidential source ... [and] information furnished by a

confidential source....

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), (D). Appellants filed suit in the district court to obtain the remaining pages.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated August 4, 1994, the district court granted the

FBI's motion for summary judgment and denied appellant's cross-motion. Quiñon v. FBI, Civ. No.

93-0763 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 1994) ("Mem. op."). Based on the information contained in the affidavits

of two FBI special agents, the court held that the Bureau had demonstrated that the records were

compiled for legitimate law enforcement purposes and it dismissed, as "mere speculation," allegations

that the investigation was retaliatory in design. Id. at 2-3. The district court further concluded that

Exemptions 7(C) and (D) of FOIA provided a sound basis for the FBI to withhold the information

at issue. The court held that Exemption 7(C) was properly invoked to withhold information

identifying informants as well as other individuals involved in the investigation because the public

interest in disclosure is minimal whereas the privacy interest of these individuals is great. Id. at 3-4.

The court also held that the FBI had properly invoked Exemption 7(D) of FOIA to withhold

information relating to the informants. Id. at 4-5. The district court reached these conclusions

without conducting an in camera review of the withheld documents.

Appellants challenge each of the court's holdings substantially because, in their view, the

affidavits are insufficiently detailed to support an award of summary judgment. Accordingly, they

maintain that the court erred when it declined to review the withheld documents in camera.

II. DISCUSSION

Because the central issue raised by this appeal is whether the district court should have

reviewed the withheld documents in camera to verify that they fell within the asserted FOIA

exemptions, we begin by reviewing the circumstances that will warrant an in camera inspection of

the information withheld by an agency in a FOIA case.

A. In Camera Review

1. Criteria

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FOIA directstrial courtsto review de novo the applicabilityofthe particular exemptions cited

by the agency to the withheld documents. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). In 1974, Congress amended

FOIA in order to provide district courts with the explicit authority to conduct in camera review of

agency files to determine the applicability of the claimed exemptions. See id. (courts "may examine

the contents of such agency records in camera"). The Conference Report on the authorizing

amendment states:

While in camera examination need not be automatic, in many situationsit will plainly

be necessary and appropriate. Before the court orders in camera inspection, the

Government should be given the opportunity to establish by means of testimony or

detailed affidavits that the documents are clearly exempt from disclosure.

S. Conf. Rep. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6287.

In keeping with this directive, agencies customarily submit affidavits to establish the applicability of

the asserted exemptions.

In some cases, the affidavits provide a sufficient basisfor granting summaryjudgment in favor

ofthe Government without an in camera review ofthe withheld documents. As we stated in Hayden

v. National Security Agency/Central Security Service, 608 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1979), however,

the affidavits must show, with reasonable specificity, why the documents fall within

the exemption. The affidavits will not suffice if the agency's claims are conclusory,

merely reciting statutory standards, or if they are too vague or sweeping. If the

affidavits provide specific information sufficient to place the documents within the

exemption category, if this information is not contradicted in the record, and if there

is no evidence in the record of agency bad faith, then summary judgment is

appropriate without in camera review of the documents.

Id. at 1387. The decision to conduct an in camera review is committed to the " "broad discretion of

the trial court judge.' " Lam Lek Chong v. DEA, 929 F.2d 729, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Carter

v. Department of Commerce, 830 F.2d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). See also NLRB v. Robbins Tire

& Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978) ("[t]he in camera review provision is discretionary by its

terms").

The principal benefit of an in camera inspection is that it enables the trial court to make a

case-specific determination; the costs include the possibly onerous burden imposed upon the trial

court and the fact that a decision based on an in camera review may have little precedential value

because it is unable to describe with specificity the basis for its decision. See generally Ronald M.

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Levin, Note, In Camera Inspections Underthe Freedom of Information Act, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 557,

558-61 (1974). In addition, in camera review deprives the FOIA requester of an opportunity to

present hisinterpretation ofthe withheld documents. See id. at 559; but see Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d

1187, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, C.J., concurring) (arguing that ex parte in camera inspections

actually increase the adversariness of a FOIA proceeding). Accordingly, an in camera review should

not be resorted to as a matter of course, simply on the theory that "it can't hurt." See Ray, 587 F.2d

at 1195.

While we do not intend to cramp the trial court's broad discretion in this area, we have

repeatedly noted that in camera review may be particularly appropriate when either the agency

affidavits are insufficiently detailed to permit meaningful review of exemption claims or there is

evidence of bad faith on the part of the agency. Lam Lek Chong, 929 F.2d at 735; Carter, 830 F.2d

at 392-93; Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Lesar v. Department of Justice,

636 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1980); cf. Allen v. Central Intelligence Agency, 636 F.2d 1287, 1298

(D.C. Cir. 1980),rev'd on other grounds, FoundingChurch of Scientology of Washington, D.C., Inc.

v. Smith, 721 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Another crude, albeit important, factor to be considered

is the number of the withheld documents. See Carter, 830 F.2d at 393 ("when the requested

documents "are few in number and of short length,' in camera review may save time and money")

(quoting Allen, 636 F.2d at 1298). Finally, when the dispute turns on the contents of the withheld

documents, and not the parties' interpretations of those documents, in camera review may be more

appropriate. See Carter, 830 F.2d at 393.

In this case, the FBI withheld 61 of the 77 pages compiled in the course of the obstruction

of justice investigation pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D) and Privacy Act Exemption

(j)(2). The FBI proffered affidavits from special agents that were intended to establish that the

withheld documents fell within these exemptions. While the FBI stated its willingness to have the

withheld documents reviewed in camera, the district court declined the invitation and awarded the

Government summary judgment on the basis of the affidavits.

2. Sufficiency of affidavitsto showinformation was compiled for lawenforcement purposes

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To withhold a document pursuant to Exemptions 7(C) and (D), an agency must make a

threshold showing that it was "compiled for law enforcement purposes." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). See

Mem. op. at 2. A record is deemed to have been compiled for such a purpose if it was created or

acquired in the course of an investigation "related to the enforcement offederal laws," and "the nexus

between the investigation and one of the agency's law enforcement duties [is] based on information

sufficient to support at least a colorable claimofitsrationality." Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420-

21 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[L]ess exacting proof " of a legitimate law

enforcement purpose will be required of law enforcement agencies such as the FBI. Id. at 418 &

n.25. Nevertheless, "the agency's basis for the claimed connection between the object of the

investigation and the asserted law enforcement duty cannot be pretextual or wholly unbelievable."

Id. at 421.

If the agency demonstrates that there was a legitimate basis for the investigation, the burden

shifts to the party requesting the documents to produce evidence that the asserted law enforcement

rationale was merely pretextual. Doe v. FBI, 936 F.2d 1346, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1991). "[T]he mere

existence of a plausible criminal investigatory reason to investigate would not protect the files of an

inquiry explicitly conducted, for example, for purposes of harassment." Shaw v. FBI, 749 F.2d 58,

63 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.).

The district court concluded that (1) the affidavitssubmitted by the special agents proved that

the investigation was rationally related to the FBI's law enforcement duties, and (2) appellants'

allegations that the investigation was intended to retaliate against them were "based upon mere

speculation." See Mem. op. at 2-3.

We begin by inquiring whether the FBI affidavits are sufficiently detailed to allow the district

court to determine that there was a rational basis for the investigation. We observe that the only

specific fact cited in the affidavits to justify the investigation is the filing of the August 6 motion to

disqualify the Eleventh Circuit. Appellants argue, and we agree, that the filing of a non-fraudulent

pleading cannot, taken alone, form the basisfor a legitimate obstruction of justice investigation. See

United States v. Hylton, 710 F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (5th Cir. 1983) (filing of a "factually accurate,

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non-fraudulent criminal complaint against federal agents" protected by the First Amendment's right

to petition for redress of grievances). At oral argument, counsel for the FBI essentially conceded that

the motion for dismissal could not provide the sole basis for an obstruction of justice investigation.

Nonetheless, the Bureau draws our attention to the declaration of Special Agent Lipkey which

provides, in relevant part:

This investigation into possible obstruction of justice was not initiated by the "mere

filing of a motion challenging the impartiality of a judge".... Rather, certain events

occurred which prompted the complainant to contact the FBI. The FBI cannot

further describe the basisfor itslaw enforcement investigation, and the nexus between

plaintiffs and a possible violation of federal law, without the danger of revealing the

identity of a confidential source or confidential information received from a

confidential source.

Declaration of FBI Special Agent Lloyd A. Lipkey dated Nov. 10, 1993 ("Lipkey Declaration"), ¶

5 (emphasis added). The FBI argues that the motion to disqualify, together with the "certain events"

referred to by Lipkey, provided a rational basis for the investigation of Quiñon and others.

Accordingly, it maintains, the Lipkey Declaration remedied the defect and obviated the need for an

in camera review.

We disagree. The affidavits filed by the FBI fail to supply facts that would justify an

obstruction of justice investigation; rather, they simply allude to "certain events," which they fail to

describe or characterize, that allegedly supplied the basisfor one. Compare Davin v. Department of

Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1056-57 (3d Cir. 1995) ("on the record before us, the government must allege

additional specific facts that demonstrate the agency was gathering information with the good faith

belief that the subject may violate or has violated federal law") (emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted) with Brinton v. Department of State, 636 F.2d 600, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("affidavits

made a detailed showing of the applicability" of the asserted FOIA exemption, and there was thus no

need for in camera review).

As noted above, where an agency's affidavits merely state in conclusory termsthat documents

are exempt from disclosure, an in camera review is necessary. See, e.g., Carter, 830 F.2d at 392-93.

To allow the FBI to satisfy the Pratt requirement with a vague reference to other "events" would

render that requirement a virtual nullity. Indeed, the FBI's cryptic allusion to "certain events" is

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especially problematic in this case. If AUSA Mueller's answer to the August 6 motion to disqualify

the EleventhCircuit is anyindication, the other "events"maybe nothing more sinister than Thornton's

and Bronis's criticisms ofRule 46. Taken together with the motion for dismissal, such "events" would

provide a highly dubious basis for an obstruction of justice investigation.

The FBI asserts it could not be more specific without revealing a confidential source. See

Lipkey Declaration ¶ 5 ("[t]he FBI cannot further describe the basis for its law enforcement

investigation"). This concession underscores the need for an in camera review of the documents to

evaluate the FBI's basis for the investigation. As we stated in Simon v. Department of Justice, 980

F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1992):

In [the] unusual circumstance, where the agency cannot describe the document fully

enough to show that it is exempt from disclosure without in the course of doing so

disclosing the very information that warrants exemption, the solution is for the court

to review the document in camera.

Id. at 784.

Because theFBI affidavits are insufficientlydetailed to demonstrate that therewas a legitimate

basis for the investigation, we need not inquire whether the affidavits also show that the claimed law

enforcement rationale was not merely pretextual. We do note, however, that other discretionary

factors also weigh in favor of in camera review. First of all, the FBI files contain only 77 pages of

documents that relate to the investigation; therefore, in camera review will not impose an onerous

burden upon the trial court. Moreover, the dispute over the applicability of the asserted FOIA

exemptions centers on the contents ofthe withheld documents; an in camera review will presumably

shed light on whether there truly was a legitimate purpose to the investigation. Finally, the FBI itself

had proposed an in camera inspection to the district court; accordingly, there need be no concern

"thatsuch inspectionwillinvolve judicialintrusion into the activities ofthe ExecutiveBranch." Allen,

636 F.2d at 1298-99.

B. The District Court's Exemption 7(C) and (D) Holdings

Although we are remanding the case to allow the district court to review the withheld

documents in camera to verify that they were "compiled for law enforcement purposes," 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(7), we comment briefly on the district court'srulingsthat the withheld documentsfallwithin

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the ambit of Exemptions 7(C) and (D).

1. Exemption 7(C)

An agency may withhold documents compiled for law enforcement purposes that "could

reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Id. §

552(b)(7)(C). Courts have construed this exemption to cover documents in which the privacy interest

at stake outweighs the public's interest in disclosure. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters

Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989) ("Reporters Committee"); Computer

Professionals for Social Responsibility v. United States Secret Service, 72 F.3d 897, 904-05 (D.C.

Cir. 1996) ("Computer Professionals"). In this case, because "the public interest in disclosure is

minimal, while the privacy interests of the informants are strong," the district court concluded that

the FBI was entitled to withhold documents identifying informants and other individuals involved in

the investigation. Mem. op. at 4.

Appellants argue on appeal that any documents identifying Chief Judge Tjoflat's role in the

investigation should not be protected under Exemption 7(C) because his privacy interest is

outweighed by the public's interest in disclosure. Appellants base their claim that the Chief Judge's

privacy interest is negligible on the fact that (1) if the alleged obstruction of justice were ever

prosecuted, he would be a "necessary witness"; and (2) he is a public figure. Brief for Appellants

at 38-39. Even assuming, arguendo, that a FOIA plaintiff may infer that a specific person is a source

and then make special arguments against confidentiality based on that hypothesis, we dismiss

appellants' first argument because it is sheer speculation that the Chief Judge would be a "necessary

witness." As regards their second argument, while it is true that Government officials may have a

somewhat diminished privacy interest, see Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National Archives and

Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1981), "[they] do not surrender all rights to personal

privacy when they accept a public appointment." Bast v. Department of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251,

1255 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Cf. Fitzgibbon v. Central Intelligence Agency, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C. Cir.

1990) ("[p]ersons involved in FBI investigationseven if they are not the subject of the

investigation"have a substantialinterest in seeing that their participation remainssecret' ") (quoting

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King, 830 F.2d at 233).

Appellants also argue that if the Chief Judge was involved in wrongdoing, the public has a

substantial interest in the disclosure of documents that would shed light on his role in the

investigation. We note, however, that the relevant question in determining whether there is a public

interest in disclosure is whether the FBI, not ChiefJudge Tjoflat, has engaged in wrongdoing. As the

Supreme Court stated in Reporters Committee, the public interest to be taken into the balance is that

in "[o]fficial information that sheds light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties." 489

U.S. at 773. Disclosure of information that "reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct"

does not further the public interest envisaged by FOIA. Id. We have recently observed, however,

that

[a]lthough Reporters Committee and the precedent of this circuit make clear that

FOIA extends only to those records which revealsomething about agency action, the

mere fact that records pertain to an individual's activities does not necessarily qualify

them for exemption. Such records may still be cloaked with the public interest if the

information would shed light on agency action.

Nation Magazine, Washington Bureau v. United States Customs Service, 71 F.3d 885, 894-95 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original).

As an initialmatter, we note that appellants have not produced a single speck of evidence that

the Chief Judge was involved in wrongdoing; and even if they had, there is no indication that such

misconduct would shed any light on the FBI's action. When

governmental misconduct is alleged as the justification for disclosure, the public

interest isinsubstantial unlessthe requester putsforward compelling evidence that the

agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity and shows that the

information sought is necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence.

Computer Professionals, 72 F.3d at 905 (quoting Davis v. Department of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276,

1282 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). In the absence of such evidence, we agree with the district court that the FBI

may invoke Exemption 7(C) to withhold the names of individuals identified in the withheld

documents, provided, of course, that those documents were compiled for a law enforcement purpose.

2. Exemption 7(D)

An agency may withhold documents compiled for a law enforcement purpose that were

"furnished by a confidential source." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). In this case, the district court

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concluded, on the basis of a declaration filed by Special Agent Felix, that "all the individuals

interviewed knew the subjects of the investigation." Mem. op. at 4. Because "[i]t is reasonable to

conclude that the persons interviewed would not have been inclined to risk the embarrassment or

socialantagonismthat could have resulted frompublic disclosure oftheirstatements," the courtfound

that the FBI had "demonstrated the existence of an implied assurance of confidentiality" and thus had

"satisfied the requirements of Exemption 7(D)." Id. at 4-5.

In United States Department of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993), the Supreme

Court held that "the Government is not entitled to a presumption that a source is confidential within

the meaning of Exemption 7(D) whenever the source provides information to the FBI in the course

of a criminal investigation." Id. at 2024. The Court rejected such a broad presumption of

confidentiality in favor of a "particularized approach" that looks to "factors such as the nature of the

crime that was investigated and the source's relation to it" in order to determine whether a promise

of confidentiality may be inferred. Id. at 2023-24.

The only case-specific factor apparentlyrelied upon bythe district court to justifyan inference

of confidentiality was Special Agent Felix's statement that many of the persons interviewed "were

acquainted and/or had contact on a business, professional, and/orsocial levelwith one or more ofthe

subjects of th[e] investigation." Felix Declaration ¶ 42. The mere fact that a source may have some

social or business association with the subject of a federal criminal investigation falls short of the

particularity mandated by Landano.

Whether the informantsin this case maybe presumed to have disclosed information to the FBI

under an expectation of confidentiality must surely depend on both the nature of the disclosure and

the nature of their relationships with the subjects of the investigation. It is simply not reasonable to

assume, for example, that anyone who provides the FBI with exculpatory information about a

professional associate will be "embarrassed" to have that fact disclosed. Therefore, on remand, the

FBI must satisfy the district court that their informants cooperated with an expectation of

confidentiality. To this end, the FBI may submit additional affidavits to establish that the informants'

particular social or professionalrelationships with the subjects of the investigation, and the nature of

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the information provided by them, allow for the inference of an assurance of confidentiality.

In its appellate brief, the FBI also contends that because the investigation in the instant case

was related to the "notoriously violent" crime of drug trafficking, one can infer that all information

was given under an implied promise of confidentiality. Brief for Appellee at 25. We are unpersuaded

by this argument. In this case, the Bureau was investigating an alleged attempt to disqualify the

Eleventh Circuit from hearing a criminal appeal. Ordinarily, there is little to fear, at least of a violent

nature, from a trio of criminal defense lawyers. At oral argument, however, counsel for the FBI

assured usthat Carlos Lehder'stentaclesspread far and wide, and that people would have legitimate

fears about crossing even his lawyers. Again, the FBI is free, on remand, to submit affidavits that

bolster this contention.

Whether or not the Bureau decidesto submit additional affidavitsin support ofitsinvocation

of Exemption 7(D), the district court must, on remand, examine the documents in camera not only

to determine whether the FBI was engaged in a bona fide law enforcement investigation, but also

whether they support the entitlement of each informant to confidentiality under the statute. If the

court decidesthat the exemptions were properly invoked, it should also determine whether, contrary

to its claim, the Bureau has withheld any reasonably segregable non-exempt portions of the

documents.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment granted the FBI is vacated; and the case

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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