Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01971/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01971-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

FRAY MARCELINO LOPEZ 

RODRIGUEZ, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

SGLC, INC. et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN 

MEMORANDA AND ORDER 

This action for unpaid wages, breach of contract, violation of California labor and 

housing laws, unfair competition, and fraud proceeds on Plaintiffs’ Second Amended 

Complaint filed against, among others, Defendants SGLC, Inc., Salvador Gonzalez, 

Julian Gonzalez, Salvador Gonzalez doing business as Salvador Gonzalez Farm Labor 

Contractor (collectively, “SGLC Defendants” or “SGLC”) and Vino Farms (“Vino”). 

Presently before the Court is Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1

 (ECF No. 168.) Plaintiffs filed a timely opposition. (ECF 

No. 206.) For the reasons set forth below, Vino’s Motion is GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part.2

 

1

 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise 

noted. 

2

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter submitted on the 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 1 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

BACKGROUND

Vino grows wine grapes in the San Joaquin Valley and other parts of California.

SGLC is a licensed farm labor contractor located in Galt, California. SGLC contracts 

with Vino and other agricultural growers to supply farm labor. Plaintiffs are Mexican 

farmworkers admitted to the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) 

and employed by the various Defendants under temporary “H-2A” visas. 

The H-2A Program3

The H-2A program was established as part of the Immigration Reform and Control 

Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in 

scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). See U.S.C. § 1188. Under the H-2A program, a 

category of nonimmigrant foreign workers can be used for temporary agricultural 

employment within the United States. See id. Agricultural employers are permitted to 

hire nonimmigrant aliens as workers under the H-2A program if the Department of Labor 

(“DOL”) first certifies that (1) there are insufficient domestic workers who are willing, 

able, and qualified to perform the work at the time and place needed; and (2) the 

employment of aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of 

domestic workers. See id. §§ 1184(c)(1), 1188(a)(1). 

The conditions under which an H-2A worker may be allowed into the United 

States for temporary agricultural employment are prescribed by the H-2A regulations. 

The H-2A regulations include provisions related to housing, meals, work-related 

equipment, and transportation. For example, an employer seeking the services of H-2A 

workers must compensate them at a rate not less than the federal minimum wage, the 

prevailing wage rate in the area, or the “adverse effect wage rate,” whichever is highest.

See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(9). The “adverse effect wage rate” is the minimum wage 

rate that the DOL determines is necessary to ensure that wages of similarly situated 

 briefing. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g). 

3

 The following synopsis of the H-2A program is taken from Arriaga v. Fl. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 

1232-33 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 2 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

domestic workers will not be adversely affected by the employment of H-2A workers. 

See id. §§ 655.100(b), 655.107. An employer must also pay an H-2A worker for inbound 

transportation and subsistence costs, if the worker completes fifty percent of the contract 

work period, unless the employer has previously done so. See id. § 655.102(b)(5)(i). 

Similarly, if the worker completes the contract work period, the employer is generally 

responsible for the payment of outbound transportation and subsistence costs. See id. 

§ 655.102(b)(5)(ii). 

Vino’s Version of the Facts4

On January 1, 2008, Vino Farms entered into a contract with SGLC entitled 

“Agreement for Farm Labor Contracting Services” (hereinafter “the services contract”).

Under the services contract, Vino engaged SGLC as an independent farm labor 

contractor “to perform pruning, tying, training, suckering, harvesting, and various other 

types of field work” on properties managed by Vino Farms. The service contract 

provided that SGLC is not an agent or employee of Vino. The contract also stated that 

“[p]ersons hired by [SGLC] shall be employees of [SGLC] alone and not employees of 

[Vino].” Finally, the contract provided that the “sole and exclusive control and 

supervision of [Plaintiffs] with respect to their employment” belonged to SGLC. 

On February 20, 2008, SGLC held a meeting with a number of the grower 

Defendants, including Vino, to discuss SGLC’s plan to apply for workers through the H2A program. Julie Ball, the executive assistant to Vino’s Executive Vice President and 

shareholder Kim Ledbetter-Bronson, attended the meeting. Vino contends that Ball did 

not have the authority to speak on behalf of Vino or to authorize SGLC to act on Vino’s 

behalf; she simply attended the meeting to take notes and to report to Vino what SGLC 

presented at the meeting. At the meeting, and again after the meeting, Salvador 

Gonzalez asked Vino to provide a letter of recommendation in support of SGLC’s 

application for H-2A workers. On February 25, 2008, Vino provided SGLC with the 

requested letter, which stated: “I am writing to give my full recommendation as it pertains 

 

4

 The following recitation of facts is taken from Vino’s Statement of Undisputed Facts. (ECF No. 168-2.) 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 3 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

to the H-2A certification request of Sal Gonzalez Labor Contractor. . . . Vino Farms, Inc. 

gives their highest recommendation without reservation and supports Sal Gonzalez 

Labor Contractor in their efforts to become H-2A certified.”

SGLC acquired part of its workforce for the 2008 growing season by applying for, 

recruiting, and hiring Plaintiffs from Colima, Mexico through the H-2A Program. SGLC 

hired approximately 178 workers through this program, including Plaintiffs. Vino did not 

apply for workers through the H-2A program, and did not assist SGLC with the 

preparation of the H-2A application. Vino did not give SGLC any input regarding how 

many workers SGLC applied for in the H-2A application. SGLC is the sole employer 

listed on the H-2A application.

Salvador Gonzalez and his father, Julian Gonzalez, made a trip to Mexico to 

inquire about recruiting workers for the H-2A program. Vino farms contends that it did 

not have a representative present on this trip. Julian and Salvador made a return trip to 

Mexico, to meet with the local governor and potential H-2A workers. The SGLC 

Defendants were accompanied by other grower Defendants on this trip, but no 

representative from Vino went on the trip. Plaintiffs were recruited and selected for 

SGLC through a Mexican government agency referred to as “the CNC.” 

SGLC entered into an individual employment contract with each Plaintiff. Vino 

contends it was not a party to these contracts, and was not involved in preparing the 

contracts or deciding the terms and conditions to be included. Plaintiffs’ wages, both 

hourly and piece, were determined in the employment contracts between Plaintiffs and 

SGLC. Vino did not determine the hourly or piece wage rates that SGLC listed in the 

contracts. Rather, SGLC told Vino that SGLC was required to pay Plaintiffs certain 

wages pursuant to H-2A regulations, and SGLC entered those wages into the contracts.

Similarly, the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs’ transportation to California, and 

reimbursement for transportation expenses, were part of the labor contracts between 

SGLC and Plaintiffs. SGLC alone provided Plaintiffs with transportation from Mexico to 

California, and sent Julian Gonzalez to keep track of Plaintiffs’ expenses incurred on the 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 4 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

trip.

Plaintiffs arrived in California on Thursday, July 17, 2008, and began working the 

next day. SGLC’s workweek runs from Monday through Sunday. None of Plaintiffs 

began working on Vino’s property until Tuesday, July 22, 2008, at the earliest. 

The employment contracts between SGLC and Plaintiffs provided that “free 

transportation will be provided from the housing location to the work site and return each 

day.” SGLC provided transportation on buses solely owned and operated by SGLC, at 

SGLC’s expense. Vino did not provide transportation. Vino contends that neither Vino 

nor SGLC required Plaintiffs to utilize the buses provided by SGLC to get to and from 

work, and neither Defendant attempted to prohibit Plaintiffs from using other methods of 

transportation. 

Vino did not participate in training Plaintiffs, and did not have disciplinary authority 

over Plaintiffs. Vino did not supervise Plaintiffs or control their work activities; rather, 

SGLC’s foremen exclusively supervised Plaintiffs. SGLC provided most, if not all, of 

Plaintiffs work equipment. Vino provided a tractor and equipment attached to the tractor, 

which most Plaintiffs would not have used. Vino did not determine what time Plaintiffs’ 

workday started or ended, and did not tell Plaintiffs when to take meal or rest breaks.

SGLC had the responsibility of telling Plaintiffs when to take meal and rest breaks when 

they worked at an hourly rate. When Plaintiffs worked at a piece rate, they individually 

determined when to take their breaks. 

Vino did not prepare Plaintiffs’ payroll. SGLC employees, not Vino, calculated 

how much to pay Plaintiffs and prepared their paychecks and pay stubs. Because 

Plaintiffs were never able to produce a sufficient quantity to qualify for payment on a 

piece rate basis, SGLC always paid Plaintiffs pursuant to the hourly rate specified in the 

labor contracts. SGLC tracked Plaintiffs’ hours with “Daily Labor Sheets.” Vino did not 

prepare any type of time sheet to keep track of Plaintiffs’ hours. The Daily Labor Sheets 

were presented to Vino’s Vineyard Manager who would briefly review the sheet, sign it, 

and return it to the SGLC foreman. This allowed the Vineyard Manager to verify that the 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 5 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Daily Labor Sheet contained an accurate representation of the farm labor services that 

SGLC had provided. 

SGLC had the sole authority to terminate Plaintiffs. Vino could not and did not 

terminate any of the Plaintiffs. Likewise, Vino did not recommend any of the Plaintiffs for 

termination.

SGLC was entirely responsible for Plaintiffs’ housing, pursuant to SGLC’s contract 

with Plaintiffs and the H-2A regulations. Vino did not own, construct, operate, or 

maintain any of the employee housing units where Plaintiffs were housed during the H2A period. Labor Camp 17, where many Plaintiffs stayed, is located on Ranch 17. 

Ranch 17 contained both vineyards and housing. In 2008, SGLC operated and 

maintained Camp 17, while Vino Farms managed the vineyards on Ranch 17. In 2008, 

Ranch 17 was owned by Silverado Premium Properties, an entity seperate from Vino. 

SGLC was solely responsible for obtaining permits and repairing Labor Camp 17 so it 

could pass inspection and meet H-2A housing standards. The camp was inspected 

several times by DOL representatives, at the request of SGLC. SGLC provided the 

mattresses, bed sheets, and bed covers for Camp 17. Vino did not participate in the 

process of readying housing for the H-2A workers, nor did Vino provide or pay for 

supplies that contributed to making Camp 17 suitable for employee living. SGLC 

determined which workers would live at Camp 17. Vino made no rules or regulations for 

the workers living at Camp 17. 

Vino did not provide food for Plaintiffs, and did not pay for or contribute to the 

purchase of food for Plaintiffs. SGLC provided the food for Plaintiffs. Vino did not 

charge Plaintiffs for meals they received. 

Plaintiffs’ Version of the Facts5

Vino and the other grower Defendants depended on the labor provided by SGLC.

 

5

 The following recital of facts is taken from Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts in Opposition to 

Defendant Vino Farms, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 206-4.) 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 6 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Vino had contracted with SGLC for approximately thirty years, and SGLC was Vino’s 

exclusive farm labor contractor. Vino, and other growers in the Galt and Clarksburg 

area, experienced difficulty finding sufficient labor in the 2007 growing season. Vino, 

along with three other grower Defendants, contracted with SGLC, Inc. for farm labor 

during the 2008 growing season. Recognizing the potential labor shortage that could 

occur again in the 2008 growing season, SGLC proposed to the grower Defendants the 

idea of applying for an H-2A permit, and recruiting temporary workers to come from 

Mexico under H-2A visas.

The grower Defendants, including Julie Ball as a representative of Vino, met with 

SGLC in late 2007 and/or early 2008. At that meeting, the grower Defendants and 

SGLC discussed the H-2A application, recruitment, transportation, housing, and hiring of 

H-2A workers. This meeting involved a discussion about the specific H-2A labor 

certification requirements and penalties for violating the program’s mandates. The 

meeting also included a discussion about the rates of pay for H-2A workers. The grower 

Defendants and SGLC agreed that SGLC would submit an application for temporary 

workers from Mexico. 

SGLC submitted its original H-2A application on April 9, 2008, seeking 200 

workers for the period of May 1, 2008, through December 31, 2008. On April 18, 2008, 

SGLC was notified that the application did not meet the H-2A program requirements and 

was not accepted for processing. The notice to SGLC stated that SGLC needed to 

“identify if they are the owners of the work locations or if they have contracts with the 

field location owners. If SGLC Inc. is acting as a [field labor contractor] they must 

provide a copy of their [field labor contractor] certificate and the contractual agreements 

between SGLC Inc. and the field owner . . . .” 

On April 23, 2008, SGLC submitted a modified certificate to the DOL. The 

modified application that SGLC submitted included the “Agreement for Farm Labor 

Contracting Services” between Vino and SGLC. That contract states that SGLC was to 

provide farm labor for work to be performed at various locations, including at least one 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 7 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

owned and operated by Vino, in the 2008 growing season. The total amount of the 

contract was estimated to be $3.47 million. Vino entered into the written contract with 

Salvador Gonzalez for the purpose of supporting SGLC’s H-2A application. Vino 

assumed that Salvador Gonzalez was going to use the contract between Vino and 

SGLC in its application for the H-2A permits. Vino’s Craig Ledbetter wrote a letter in 

support of SGLC’s application for H-2A permits, stating “We look forward to the services 

of the H-2A program.” Vino’s Craig Ledbetter also indicated that Vino would continue 

contracting with SGLC as long as SGLC could obtain H-2A workers. On June 10, 2008, 

the DOL granted SGLC’s certification for harvesting, pruning, general maintenance, and 

packing pears, grapes, apples, kiwis, and cherries. 

According to Plaintiffs, SGLC and the grower Defendants, including Vino, agreed 

to recruit H-2A workers in Mexico. Representatives of several other grower Defendants 

traveled with Salvador Gonzalez and Julian Gonzalez to Colima, Mexico, where they met 

with representatives of the government of Colima to ask for assistance in recruiting 

workers. SGLC could not have enlisted the Colima government’s help without first 

receiving authorization from the grower Defendants. The grower Defendants gave 

SGLC this authorization. SGLC and the grower Defendants recruited Plaintiffs by 

promising Plaintiffs work of forty hours per week for six months, earning at least one 

hundred dollars per day.

Although Vino did not send a representative to recruit workers in Mexico, it knew 

the trip occurred and that the trip was intended to recruit H-2A workers. SGLC had 

multiple discussions with Vino about the need to bring in workers from Mexico, and Vino 

requested 150 workers from the H-2A program. Defendants also agreed to allow 

Mexico’s government to help recruit workers. After the meeting with Mexican officials, 

Vino received an estimate as to when the workers would be available. Furthermore, the 

United States Consulate in Mexico contacted Vino regarding their employment of H-2A 

workers.

Plaintiffs contend that as a result of Defendants’ recruitment efforts, and the 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 8 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

approval of SGLC’s H-2A applications, Plaintiffs were granted temporary visas to work in 

the United States, exclusively under the terms of the SGLC contract. 

In early 2008, SGLC and the grower Defendants also discussed the need to have 

labor camps in order to abide by the H-2A program’s requirements. Upon arrival in the 

United States, some Plaintiffs were housed at Camp 17. According to Plaintiffs, Vino 

owns Camp 17 and assigned its foreman, Mike Harder, to manage the camp. Camp 17 

was uninhabitable. The toilets were backed up, the mattresses were soiled with blood 

and sweat, no laundry facilities existed, and there were exposed wires. SGLC did not 

pay Vino for the use of Camp 17.

During a meeting held in 2008, SGLC and Defendants also discussed the means 

by which the workers would get to and from the fields. This was an important 

consideration because the workers did not have their own transportation and did not 

know in advance where they would be working. SGLC also specifically discussed billing 

Vino for all transportation costs. Plaintiffs were not paid for the time that they waited for 

vans to pick them up in the morning and the travel time to the fields, altogether between 

55 minutes and 100 minutes. They were also not paid for the return trip after the shift, 

which could involve waiting up to two hours for the vans.

Often, Plaintiffs were either not given a rest period or received abbreviated 

breaks. The meals lacked nutrition and were of poor quality. Breakfast usually 

consisted of a bowl of beans and eggs with a cup of coffee. Lunch was two flour tortillas 

with beans. When it was provided, the evening meal contained meat and vegetables 

and a cup of coffee. Furthermore, the water at Camp 17 was foul-smelling.

Vino’s managers monitored the quality of all work and decided how much and 

which fruit would be picked each day. This involved supervising multiple aspects of the 

agricultural process, notifying SGLC of any issues or problems, and deciding where the 

workers would go. As a result, Vino determined when the work shifts would begin and 

end each day. The managers were also charged with approving timesheets, and Vino 

made decisions regarding the method and amount of actual compensation. Additionally, 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 9 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Vino could decide how many workers it actually wanted in its fields. Vino also provided 

equipment such as “tipsters” to Plaintiffs.

While in California, Plaintiffs experienced a lack of work and lower wages than 

Plaintiffs believed they would receive based on the representations Plaintiffs contend 

SGLC made to Plaintiffs in Mexico. Defendants failed to provide compensation for all 

hours worked. In deciding to come to the United States, Plaintiffs had relied on 

Defendants’ promises that they would be paid one hundred dollars per day, and work 

forty hours per week for six months. Plaintiffs therefore returned to Mexico before the 

six-month work period had ended. 

STANDARD

Rule 56 provides for summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually 

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. 

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on part of a claim or 

defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party may move for summary judgment, 

identifying . . . the part of each claim or defense . . . on which summary judgment is 

sought.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 

1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. 

Mich. 1992). 

The standard that applies to a motion for summary adjudication is the same as 

that which applies to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); 

Mora v. ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the 

initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, 

and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 10 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does 

exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986); 

First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968). 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party 

must tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible 

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a 

fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the 

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 

355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way, “before the evidence is left to the jury, there is 

a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but 

whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the 

party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 

(quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)). As the Supreme Court 

explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its 

opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 

the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier 

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 

475 U.S. at 586-87. 

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to 

be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed 

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 11 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s 

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn.

Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 

810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). 

ANALYSIS 

A. FLSA 

Joint Employment under the FLSA 

Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) intending to “correct and 

eliminate those ‘conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of 

living necessary for health, efficiency, and general wellbeing of workers.” Torres-Lopez 

v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)). The FLSA 

established a minimum wage; regulations concerning “maximum hours”; recordkeeping 

and reporting requirements; child labor provisions; and a system of civil and criminal 

penalties for violations. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. In 1966, Congress 

amended the FLSA to extend minimum wage protections to some agricultural workers.

See S. Rep. No. 89-1487 (1966).

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), employees may only seek redress from 

“employers.” “The FLSA broadly defines the ‘employer-employee relationship[s]’ subject 

to its reach.” Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 638. Under the FLSA, to “employ” is defined as 

“includ[ing] to suffer or permit to work.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). “The FLSA’s definition of 

employee has been called the ‘broadest definition that has ever been included in any 

one act.’” United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3 (1945); see also 

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting the “striking 

breadth” of the “suffer or permit” definition). The Ninth Circuit, among others, has held 

that “employees” include those workers “who as a matter of economic reality are 

dependent upon the business to which they render service.” Real v. Driscoll Strawberry 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 12 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 

1322, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that a business entity employs an individual when 

the economic reality is such that the individual depends on the entity); Sec’y of Labor v. 

Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1538 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the degree to which the 

alleged employee depends on the particular business determines employee status). 

Employees can have more than one employer under the FLSA, and “joint 

employers” are each individually liable for FLSA violations. Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 

638 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (“A single individual may stand in the relation of an 

employee to two or more employers at the same time . . . .”)). The question of joint 

employment is a question of law. Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 

1465 (9th Cir. 1983); Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 638. The Ninth Circuit “has recognized 

that the concept of joint employment should be defined expansively under the FLSA” in 

order to effectuate the FLSA’s broad remedial purposes. Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 639 

(citing Real, 603 F.2d at 754 (“Courts have adopted an expansive interpretation of the 

definitions of ‘employer’ and ‘employee’ under the FLSA, in order to effectuate the broad 

remedial purposes of the Act.”)). 

Courts also employ an “economic realities” test to determine whether a joint 

employment relationship existed. Real, 603 F.2d at 754; Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470; 

Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 639. The economic reality test seeks to ascertain whether the 

employee in question is economically dependent on the alleged employer. See TorresLopez, 111 F.3d at 641. Where the worker is “economically dependent” upon an alleged 

employer and the alleged employer “exercised control” over the workers, an employeremployee relationship will be found. Id. at 644. However, under this test, no single 

factor is determinative. Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, Inc., 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th 

Cir. 1981) (“Neither the presence nor absence of any individual factor is determinative.”). 

“Whether an employee-employer relationship exists depends on the circumstances of 

the whole activity.” Real, 603 F.2d at 754.

Courts have used various regulatory and non-regulatory factors to determine 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 13 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

whether a joint employment relationship exists. See Zhao v. Bebe Stores, Inc., 247 F. 

Supp. 2d 1154, 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“The Ninth Circuit has, at various times, identified 

different factors as relevant to the test of whether an employment relationship exists for 

purposes of the FLSA.”). Five regulatory factors, taken from the Migrant and Seasonal 

Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872, are: (1) the 

nature and degree of control of the workers; (2) the degree of supervision, direct or 

indirect, of the work; (3) the power to determine pay rates or methods of payment of the 

workers; (4) the right, directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or modify employment conditions 

of the workers, and (5) the preparation of payroll and the payment of wages. 29 C.F.R. 

§ 500.20(h)(5)(iv). The “regulatory factors relate to whether an alleged joint employer 

exerts control over workers and their wages.” Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 636. 

The eight non-regulatory factors used by the Ninth Circuit are: (1) whether the 

work was a “specialty job on the production line;” (2) whether responsibility under the 

contracts between a labor contractor and an employer pass from one labor contractor to 

another without “material changes;” (3) whether the “premises and equipment” of the 

employer are used for the work; (4) whether the employees had a “business organization 

that could or did shift as a unit from one [worksite] to another;” (5) whether the work was 

“piecework” and not work that required “initiative, judgment or foresight;” (6) whether the 

employee had an “opportunity for profit or loss depending upon [the alleged employee's] 

managerial skill;” (7) whether there was “permanence [in] the working relationship;” and 

(8) whether “the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business.”

Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 640 (internal citations omitted). These eight factors are 

derived from the AWPA. Maddock v. KB Homes, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1226, 1233 (C.D. 

Cal. 2007). The non-regulatory factors “relate to whether a farmworker is economically 

dependent on the alleged joint employer.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit has indicated that under its version of the test, a court is to 

consider those factors that are “relevant to the particular situation” when evaluating a 

potential joint employer relationship. Id. at 639 (quoting Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470).

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 14 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

Furthermore, a farm labor contractor and a grower may have a joint employment 

relationship where: 

(1) they have an agreement to share the worker's services, such as to 

interchange employees; (2) where the farm labor contractor acts “directly 

or indirectly in the interest of the other employer;” or (3) the grower and 

farm labor contractor “may be deemed to share control of the employee, 

directly, or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is 

controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer. 

Rosales v. El Rancho Farms, 1:09-CV-00707-AWI, 2011 WL 6153276 (E.D. Cal. 

Dec. 12, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 1:09-CV-00707-AWI, 2012 WL 

292977 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)). 

Vino generally contends that it did not jointly employ Plaintiffs. However, Vino has 

not met its burden of demonstrating to the Court that Plaintiffs have failed to put forward 

evidence in support of their claim of joint employment under the FLSA. When the 

nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party only needs to show 

“that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex 

Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. Vino has failed to show such an absence of evidence supporting 

Plaintiffs’ case for joint employment as to Plaintiffs who worked on Vino’s property. 

Vino also states that it is undisputed that three named Plaintiffs never worked on 

Vino’s property. (ECF No. 168-1.) While Plaintiffs contend that one of those Plaintiffs, 

Rogelio Lopez Llamas, did in fact work on Vino’s property (ECF No. 206-3 at 138), it is 

undisputed that named Plaintiffs Joel Gonzalez Avila and Francisco Ceja Sandoval did 

not work on Vino’s property.6

 The Court now finds that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs that 

performed no work for Vino were not “jointly employed” by Vino, as that term is used in 

the FLSA.

“[I]n any case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with ‘the language of 

the statute.’” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (quoting Estate 

of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992)). “And where the statutory 

 

6

 Vino also contends that two opt-in Plaintiffs never worked on Vino’s property. This issue is now moot, as 

the opt-in Plaintiffs are dismissed pursuant to the Court’s order issued this same day. (ECF No. 308.) 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 15 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.” Id. (citing Conn. Nat. Bank v. 

Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992)). The statute at issue here, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) states, in 

pertinent part: “Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 

shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid 

minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be . . . .”

(emphasis added). Congress chose to define “employee” as “any individual employed 

by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). An “employer includes any person acting 

directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” Id. 

§ 203(d). For an individual to be “employed” by an “employer,” that individual must be 

“suffer[ed] or permit[ted] to work.” Id. § 203(g). “Work,” the Supreme Court has held, “is 

physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the 

employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer.” Alvarez 

v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (citing Tenn. 

Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1940)). Furthermore, 

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “work” as “physical and mental exertion to attain an end, 

especially as controlled by and for the benefit of an employer; labor.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1742 (2009). 

 In this case, Plaintiffs that did not perform any work for Vino were simply never 

“suffered or permitted” to work for Vino. Cf. Dellinger v. Science Applications Intern. 

Corp., No. 1:10cv25(JCC), 2010 WL 1375263, at *3, aff’d, 649 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2011) 

(finding prospective employee’s FLSA claim failed because she was not suffered or 

permitted to work). While the provisions of the FLSA must be construed broadly, in light 

of the Act’s remedial purposes, Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 639, the Court is aware of no 

case holding that the FLSA’s definition of “employee” includes those individuals who 

have never performed work for the alleged employer. Quite simply, while “[t]he FLSA 

broadly defines the ‘employer-employee relationship[s]’ subject to its reach,” TorresLopez, 111 F.3d at 638, an employee must nonetheless be “suffer[ed] or permit[ted]” to 

work, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). That is, the employee must physically or mentally exert 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 16 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

himself, or labor in some way. See Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 902; Black’s Law Dictionary 

1742. Here, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs Joel Gonzalez Avila and Francisco Ceja 

Sandoval were ever “suffered or permitted” to “work” by Vino, as defined by the Supreme 

Court.

The Court’s holding is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s multi-factor test for 

determining whether a joint employment relationship exists. Under the first of the five 

regulatory factors, an alleged employer has no degree of control over a “worker” that 

does no work on his property. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(i). Second, the nature of an 

“employer’s” supervision is non-existent over an “employee” that performs no work for 

the employer. Id. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii). Third, the employer has no power to determine pay 

rates or methods of payment of a “worker” that performs no work for him, except to the 

extent that the employer determines that such a person will not be paid because that 

person has performed no work to be paid for. Id. § 500.20(h)(4)(iii). Fourth, the right to 

hire, fire, or modify employment conditions of such alleged “workers” exists only to the 

extent that an “employer” may choose to hire an “employee” who has not previously 

been “suffered or permitted to work” for him. Id. § 500.20(h)(4)(iv). However, it borders 

on nonsensical to say that an “employer” can modify the employment conditions of an 

“employee” when that employee is not being suffered or permitted to work in the first 

place. Fifth, the employer is not involved in the preparation of payroll and the payment 

of wages to a person that is not suffered or permitted to work, as that person receives no 

payment of wages. Id. § 500.20(h)(4)(v). Thus, none of the regulatory factors suggest 

that a joint employment relationship exists when the alleged employee is not “suffered or 

permitted to work.” This result is consistent with the question the regulatory factors are 

designed to examine: whether the alleged employer exerts control over the alleged 

employee. Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 636 (The “regulatory factors relate to whether an 

alleged joint employer exerts control over workers and their wages.”). An alleged 

employer clearly exerts no control over those individuals who perform no “work” for him. 

Analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s eight non-regulatory factors reaches a similar result.

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 17 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

See Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 640. First, when no “work” is performed, there certainly 

cannot be a “specialty” job. When there is no “work,” performed at all, there is no work 

for the alleged worker to specialize in. Second, if there is no employment contract, there 

is no employment contract to pass to another employer. Third, if no work is performed, 

no premises or equipment is used. Fourth, employees cannot organize a business 

organization to move to another worksite when they are not employed or organized at an 

already existing worksite. Fifth, work can be neither be characterized as “piecework” nor 

work that requires “initiative, judgment, or foresight” if there is no “work.” Sixth, an 

employee has no opportunity for profit or loss when the “employee” is not “suffered or 

permitted to work.” Seventh, there can be no permanence in a working relationship 

when no working relationship exists. Finally, a non-existent service cannot possibly be 

vital to the alleged employer’s business. Thus, the non-regulatory factors for an alleged 

“employee” who performs no “work” for the alleged “employer” necessitates finding that 

there is no joint employment relationship, as an individual cannot be economically 

dependent on an alleged joint employer when he performs no work for that employer.

See Maddock, 631 F. Supp. at 1233 (stating that the eight non-regulatory factors are 

designed to assess whether the alleged employee is economically dependent on the 

alleged joint employer). 

Indeed, the regulatory factors suggest that the “economic reality” for an alleged 

employee who performs no work for an employer is that the alleged employer exercises 

no control over the alleged employee, and the alleged employee has no economic 

dependence on the alleged joint employer. See Real, 603 F.2d at 754 (employing an 

“economic realities” test to determine whether a joint employment relationship existed); 

Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470 (same); Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 639 (same). The Court is 

bound by the joint employer analysis of the Ninth Circuit, and the plain language of the 

FLSA. As such, the Court holds that when a plaintiff is not “suffered or permitted to 

work” by the alleged employer-defendant, the plaintiff is not an “employee” and the 

defendant is not an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA. Accordingly, Vino’s 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 18 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

motion for summary judgment on the FLSA claim is granted as to Plaintiffs Joel 

Gonzalez Avila and Francisco Ceja Sandoval, who undisputedly performed no work for 

Vino.

De Facto Deduction Claim 

Plaintiffs allege that Vino, among other Defendants, “failed to reimburse 

transportation, visa, and recruitment fees” in the first week of work, which resulted in 

Plaintiffs being paid less than minimum wage during their first work week. (ECF No. 67 

at 10.) Vino moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ “de facto deduction” FLSA 

claim on the ground that no Plaintiffs worked on Vino’s property during the workweek in 

which Plaintiffs incurred their travel expenses. Vino further argues that even if it was a 

joint employer while Plaintiffs worked on Vino’s properties, it was not a joint employer 

during Plaintiffs’ first workweek. 

The FLSA’s minimum wage provisions apply to Plaintiffs. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 655.103(b) (“During the period for which the temporary alien agricultural labor 

certification is granted, the employer shall comply with applicable federal, state, and local 

employment-related laws and regulations . . . .”). Employers must provide workers 

weekly wages “free and clear” of improper deductions, at a rate no lower than the 

minimum wage rate. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.35, 776.4. In order to 

ensure that pre-employment expenses do not operate as de facto deductions, “[w]orkers 

must be reimbursed during the first workweek for pre-employment expenses which 

primarily benefit the employer, to the point that wages are at least equivalent to the 

minimum wage.” Arriaga v. Fl. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(citing Marshall v. Root’s Rest., 667 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1982)). “Compliance with 

the FLSA is measured by the workweek,” and the employer must reimburse inbound 

travel expenses “during the workweek in which the expense arose.” Id. One-time 

transportation costs for workers under the H-2A program are “an incident of and 

necessary to the employment of H-2A workers.” Id. at 1242. “Transportation costs are 

an inevitable and inescapable consequence of having foreign H-2A workers employed in 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 19 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

the United States; these are costs which arise out of the employment of H-2A workers.”

Id. Likewise, visa costs and visa application fees are expenses that primarily benefit the 

employer and are to be reimbursed in the first workweek “up to the point where the 

minimum wage is met.” Id. at 1244. 

Vino argues that Plaintiffs did not work for Vino in the “workweek” in which the 

transportation expenses arose—namely, Plaintiffs’ first workweek. Vino contends that it 

is undisputed that SGLC’s established workweek ran from Monday through Sunday, and 

Plaintiffs started working for SGLC on Friday, July 18, 2008. Thus, Vino argues, the 

workweek ended on Sunday, July 20, 2008.7 (ECF No. 241 at 7.) Plaintiffs did not begin 

working for Vino until on or after Tuesday, July 22, 2008. Plaintiffs argue that they 

worked for Vino five days after their arrival in the United States, and therefore within one 

week. Essentially, Plaintiffs argue that a workweek is any continuous seven day period.

Plaintiffs further argue that even if Plaintiffs did not work for Vino within the first 

“workweek,” Vino is nonetheless liable to Plaintiffs due to Vino’s concerted actions with 

other Defendants. (ECF No. 206 at 17.) 

“‘Workweek’ is defined under the FLSA . . . as ‘a fixed and regularly recurring 

period of 168 hours—seven consecutive 24–hour periods.’” Seymore v. Metson Marine, 

Inc., 194 Cal. App. 4th 361, 368 (2011) (citing 18 29 C.F.R. § 778.105). A workweek 

“need not coincide with the calendar week but may begin on any day and at any hour of 

the day.” 29 C.F.R. § 778.105. Vino offers evidence that SGLC’s workweek ran from 

Monday through Sunday. (ECF No. 173 at 5.) Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact. (ECF 

No. 206-3 at 57.) Vino also offers evidence that Plaintiffs arrived in California on 

Thursday, July 17, 2008, and began working the next day. (ECF No. 173 at 5.) Plaintiffs 

do not dispute this fact either. (ECF No. 206-3 at 57.) Finally, Vino offers evidence that 

Plaintiffs did not began working on Vino’s property until on or after Tuesday, July 22, 

2008, (ECF No. 173 at 5), which Plaintiffs do not dispute. 

 

7

 While Vino states that the date was Sunday, July 21, 2008, reference to a 2008 calendar reveals that the 

relevant dates are as follows: Friday, July 18, 2008; Sunday, July 20, 2008; Tuesday, July 22, 2008. 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 20 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ “workweek,” as the FLSA uses the term, 

was from Monday through Sunday. Given that this fact is undisputed, summary 

judgment is appropriate on this issue. Because Vino did not employ Plaintiffs during 

their first “workweek,” the Court grants Vino’s motion for summary judgment as to 

Plaintiffs’ claim for de facto deductions during the first workweek, as alleged in Plaintiffs’ 

first cause of action.

Moreover, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that due to Vino’s status as a joint 

employer, Vino is liable under the FLSA regardless of whether Plaintiffs worked on 

Vino’s property during the first workweek. While joint employers may be liable under the 

FLSA for the actions of their joint employer, Vino Farms was not a joint employer of 

Plaintiffs when Plaintiffs were not working on their property. See supra. As noted 

above, “[e]mploy” means “to suffer or to permit to work” under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 

203(g). Prior to July 22, 2008, no Plaintiffs had been suffered or permitted to work on 

Vino’s property. Accordingly, Vino was not a joint employer of Plaintiffs during the first 

workweek, and is not liable for the alleged de facto deductions that occurred during that 

time.

Travel Time under the Portal-to-Portal Act 

Plaintiffs also claim that Vino violated the FLSA by failing to compensate them for 

the time spent traveling to and from their work locations. Vino contends that Plaintiffs’ 

travel time claim fails under the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254, which generally 

provides that an employer cannot be held liable for time spent traveling to and from the 

work site. (ECF No. 168-1 at 4.) In response, Plaintiffs argue that they had no option 

but to use the buses provided by Defendants because they did not have alternative 

means of transportation to get to work, and Plaintiffs did not know where they would be 

working in advance. Thus, Plaintiffs claim their time is compensable under Morillion v. 

Royal Packing, 22 Cal. 4th 575 (2000). (ECF No. 206 at 18-19.) Plaintiffs also assert 

that “Vino’s argument that under the FLSA, ‘Portal to Portal’ bus transportation between 

the H-2A workers’ housing location and Vino work area is also equally trumped by the 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 21 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

California Supreme Court’s decision in Morillion.” (ECF No. 206 at 19.) 

 “The Portal-to-Portal Act was enacted in 1947 to make clear that the FLSA did 

not cover ordinary commuting time.” Wren v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, No. C-06-

05778 JCS, 2009 WL 2612307, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009) (citing Imada v. City of 

Hercules, 138 F.3d 1294, 1296) (9th Cir. 1998)). More specifically, employers do not 

need to compensate employees for “walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual 

place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is 

employed to perform” or for “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said 

principal activity or activities, which occur either prior to the time on any particular 

workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any 

particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 254(a). However, the Portal-to-Portal Act carves out exceptions, and provides that 

employers may be liable for compensation in two situations: (1) if there is an express 

provision in a written or verbal contract; or (2) there is a custom in effect at the time of 

the activity between the employee and the employer. 29 U.S.C. § 254(b). 

Federal regulations implementing the FLSA state that under the Portal-to-Portal 

Act, whether an employee works at a “fixed location” or “different job sites,” “[a]n 

employee who travels from home before his regular workday and returns to his home at 

the end of the workday is engaged in ordinary home to work travel which is a normal 

incident of employment.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.35. “Under this regulation, this time is not 

‘worktime’ and therefore, is not compensable.” Wren, 2009 WL 2612307, at *6 (citing 29 

C.F.R. § 785.35). “This rule applies even where employees travel together to a work site, 

either in an employee's vehicle or a company-owned vehicle, unless the employees are 

performing activities that are integral to their principal activities while en route to the work 

site.” Id. (citing Smith v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 462 F.3d 1274, 1288 (10th Cir. 

2006)).

On the other hand, “travel that is an indispensable part of performing one’s job is 

a principal activity and is compensable.” Vega v. Gasper, 26 F.3d 417, 424 (5th Cir. 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 22 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

1994). Likewise, “where an employee is required to report to a designated meeting 

place to receive instructions before he proceeds to another workplace (such as the 

jobsites), the start of the workday is triggered at the designated meeting place, and 

subsequent travel is part of the day’s work and must be counted as hours worked for 

purposes of the FLSA . . . .” Id. at 425 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Vino cites to Rutti v. Lojack Corp., Inc. in support of its argument that “use of an 

employers’ vehicle to commute is not compensable even if it is a condition of 

employment.” 596 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2010). In Rutti, the plaintiff sought to bring 

a class action on behalf of all technicians who installed alarms in customers’ cars. As a 

technician, Rutti was required to travel to job sites in a company-owned vehicle. Id. at 

1049. Rutti sought compensation for the time spent commuting to worksites on the 

ground that his use of the employer’s vehicle amounted to a condition of his 

employment. Id. at 1051. The Ninth Circuit rejected Rutti’s argument, stating that the 

plain language of 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2) mandated that where the use of an employer’s 

vehicle “‘is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer and the employee,’ it is 

not part of the employee’s principle activities and thus not compensable.” Id. at 1052. 

Under Rutti, it is clear that an employee’s use of the vehicle must be “subject to an 

agreement on the part of the employee and the employer” in order for the time spent 

commuting to be noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act. 596 F.3d at 1052 

(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)). However, under federal law, “there is no suggestion that 

the agreement cannot be a condition of employment.” Id.

 Plaintiffs cite to Morillion to support their argument that Plaintiffs are entitled to 

compensation for their travel time under the FLSA. (ECF No. 206 at 18.) Plaintiffs argue 

that the Portal-to-Portal Act’s application to the FLSA is “trumped” by Morillion. This 

argument fails. Morillion addressed “whether an employer was required to compensate 

field workers for time spent traveling to and from the fields on company buses, where the 

use of the buses was compulsory. Specifically, the [C]ourt addressed whether this time 

constituted ‘hours worked’ under the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 23 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

wage order.” Wren, 2009 WL 2612307, at *9 (citing Morillion, 22 Cal. 4th at 578).

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the Morillion Court merely found that federal authority, 

including cases interpreting the Portal-to-Portal Act, were not persuasive in interpreting 

California’s IWC. See Morillion, 22 Cal. 4th at 592. The Court thus found that California 

state law provided greater protections than federal law under the Portal-to-Portal Act. Id. 

In the present case, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there 

was an agreement between Plaintiffs and Vino and/or SGLC regarding Plaintiffs’ 

transportation on SGLC’s busses. Vino offers evidence that the Labor Contract provided 

by SGLC to Plaintiffs stated “Free transportation will be provided from the housing 

location to the work site and return each day,” (ECF No. 168-2 at 7), and Plaintiffs do not 

dispute this fact (ECF No. 206-3 at 61). However, Vino does not contend this 

contractual language is the requisite “agreement.” (See ECF No. 168 at 11.) Rather, 

Vino offers this language as evidence that Plaintiffs were not required to use the 

transportation that SGLC provided. (Id.) Without the undisputed fact of an agreement 

regarding Plaintiffs’ transportation on either Vino or SGLC’s vehicle, the Court cannot 

grant summary judgment for Vino. Accordingly, Vino’s motion for summary judgment is 

denied as to Plaintiffs’ claim for travel time under the FLSA. 

B. Breach of Contract 

Plaintiffs allege that Vino breached its work contracts with Plaintiffs in 2008 by 

violating numerous state and federal laws. (ECF No. 67 at 9-10.) Plaintiffs allege that 

as a result of Vino’s breach, Plaintiffs were forced to terminate their employment prior to 

the end of the contract period. (Id. at 10.) As a result, Plaintiffs claim, they suffered 

consequential damages including lost pay and the lost payment of unreimbursed 

expenses. (Id.) Although it is not clearly stated by Plaintiffs, the Court construes 

Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants “acted in concert” as asserting an agency theory to 

support their breach of contract action. (Cf. Pls.’ Opp’n to Def. Islands’ MSJ, ECF No. 

159 at 14 (arguing evidence of an agency relationship between Islands and SGLC).) 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 24 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

“To be entitled to damages for breach of contract, a plaintiff must plead and prove 

the following elements: (1) the existence of a contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or 

excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) resulting damage to the 

plaintiff.” Reinhardt v. Gemini Motor Transp., 1:11-CV-1944 AWI SMS, 2012 WL 

1435008 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2012) (quoting Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal. 

4th 811, 821 (2011)). Vino contends that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the 

existence of a contract between Islands and Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 168 at 13.) Vino 

contends that because Plaintiffs have put forth no facts establishing that such an 

agreement existed, Vino is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. (Id.)

The Court understands Plaintiffs to argue that Vino is bound by the employment 

contract between SGLC and Plaintiffs, pursuant to an agency or representative liability 

theory. “A representative is ‘[o]ne who stands for or acts on behalf of another.” Borders 

Online, LLC v. State Bd. of Equalization, 129 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1189 (2005) (quoting 

Black’s Law Dictionary 1304 (7th ed. 1999)). “An agent is one who represents another, 

called the principal, in dealings with third persons.” Id. (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 2295).

“The relation of agency need not depend upon express appointment and acceptance 

thereof, but it may be, and frequently is, implied from the words and conduct of the 

parties and the circumstances of the particular case.” Smith v. Schuttpelz, 1 Cal. 2d 

158, 161 (1934); see also Borders Online, LLC, 129 Cal. App. 4th at 1189 (“An agency 

relationship may be implied based on conduct and circumstances.”); Thayer v. Pac. 

Elec. Ry. Co., 55 Cal. 2d 430, 438 (1940) (“The existence of an agency is a question of 

fact which may be implied from the conduct of the parties.”) (internal citations omitted).

When an agent acts on behalf of an undisclosed principal, the unidentified principal 

becomes a party to the contract. Restatement (Third) of Agency: Agent for Undisclosed 

Principal §§ 6.02, 6.03 (2006). The agent who makes a contract on behalf of an 

undisclosed principal is also a party to the contract. Id. The principal and the third party 

have the same rights, liabilities, and defenses against each other as if the principal made 

the contract personally . . . .” Id. § 6.03. The existence of an agency relationship is a 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 25 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

question of fact. Thayer, 55 Cal. 2d at 438. 

In the present case, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, 

Plaintiffs have put forward facts that suggest an implied agency relationship between 

SGLC and Vino. For example, Vino exclusively used SGLC to fill its labor needs (ECF 

No. 212-1 at 4), and signed a contract with SGLC on January 1, 2008, for farm labor 

during the 2008 growing season (ECF No. 168-3 at 2). The grower Defendants had 

experienced a labor shortage and were having difficulty finding the necessary labor (ECF 

No. 211-4 at 7-9), and thus SGLC proposed—and the growers agreed—that H-2A 

workers should be recruited. (ECF No. 211-2 at 7). Plaintiffs offer evidence suggesting 

that the contract was needed for the H-2A application to be approved. (ECF No. 211-9 

at 23.) It is undisputed that Vino’s Craig Ledbetter wrote a letter to DOL in support of 

SGLC’s H-2A application, at the request of SGLC, recommending SGLC for the H-2A 

program. (ECF No. 212-1 at 17; ECF No. 173 at 4, Ex. B.) When Vino sent the letter in 

support of SGLC’s application, Vino was aware that the H-2A workers would be working 

on their property. (ECF No. 212-1 at 17.) Plaintiffs offer evidence that Vino met with the 

SGLC Defendants and other grower Defendants to discuss the details of applying for the 

H-2A program and recruiting H-2A workers. (ECF Nos. 211-4, 211-5.) Plaintiffs also 

offer evidence suggesting that the grower Defendants, including Vino, authorized 

Salvador Gonzalez to recruit workers to fill their labor needs. (ECF No. 211-2 at 51.) 

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a reasonable trier of 

fact could find that an agency relationship existed between Vino and SGLC, and that 

Vino was bound to the employment contracts entered into between SGLC and Plaintiffs.

As such, Vino has not shown as a matter of law that it is entitled to summary judgment 

on Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim. 

C. Failure to Pay Wages Due under California Law 

Plaintiffs’ third cause of action alleges that Vino violated California law by failing to 

pay Plaintiffs minimum wages and overtime for time spent waiting for transportation to 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 26 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

arrive at the beginning or end of the work day, and for time spent traveling to and from 

the work sites. The third cause of action also alleges that Vino failed to reimburse 

Plaintiffs’ inbound travel expenses during their first week of employment, causing their 

wages to fall below the state minimum in violation of California law.8

Travel Time Claim 

Plaintiffs allege that Vino failed to pay Plaintiffs for time spent waiting for their 

transportation to and from work to arrive at the beginning and end of the workday, for 

travel time to and from their job locations, and for the time traveling between work 

locations, in violation of California law. (ECF No. 67 at 11.) Vino moves for summary 

judgment on this claim on the grounds that the undisputed facts establish that Plaintiffs 

were not required to use SGLC’s buses to get to and from the worksites (ECF No. 168-1 

at 9), and that Plaintiffs have presented no evidence showing that Vino explicitly 

prohibited Plaintiffs from using their own transportation (id. n.5). In opposition, Plaintiffs 

argue that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Vino required Plaintiffs to 

travel to the work sites on SGLC’s buses, because Plaintiffs did not have any meaningful 

alternative modes of transportation. (ECF No. 206 at 18 n.6.) Plaintiffs also argue that 

there is a genuine issue of material fact whether they were required to use Defendant’s 

buses to go to and from the work site because they were not aware where they would be 

working in advance. (Id. at 18.) In short, Plaintiffs argue they were effectively required 

to use Defendant’s buses. 

Under California law, employees must be compensated for all time “during which 

an employee is subject to the control of an employer.” Morillion, 22 Cal. 4th at 578. In 

Morillion, the California Supreme Court addressed the issue whether an employer which 

requires its employees to travel to a work site on its buses must compensate the 

employees for travel time. Id. The facts in Morillion are similar to the present facts in 

 

8

 Vino contends that Plaintiffs’ third cause of action alleges that Vino and other Defendants are liable for 

the deduction of the cost of Plaintiffs meals. (ECF No. 168-1 at 14, 15.) However, the third cause of 

action contains no specific claim for deducting meal costs. While Plaintiffs’ fact section alleges that 

Defendants deducted these costs, Plaintiffs fail to include any allegations within the third cause of action 

that suggest a claim for this alleged activity. (ECF No. 67.) 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 27 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

that Defendant hired agricultural employees who were required to meet for work each 

day at specified assembly areas and were transported in buses provided by Defendant 

to work sites. Id. at 579. The decisive fact in Morillion was that the employees were 

explicitly prohibited by Defendant’s work rules from using their own transportation. Id. In 

reaching its holding, the Court discussed a Fifth Circuit case which addressed whether 

seasonal farm workers should be compensated for travel time on employer’s buses. Id. 

at 589 n.5 (discussing Vega, 36 F.3d 417). The Court found the “fact that the Vega 

employees were free to choose--rather than required--to ride their employer’s buses to 

and from work, [to be] a dispositive, distinguishing fact.” Id. Specifically, in Vega, not all 

of the employees rode on the employer-provided buses, thus demonstrating that using 

the employer-provided transportation was not required. Id. For the Morillion Court, the 

employees’ freedom of choice was a crucial factor in determining whether the employees 

had been subjected to the employer’s control such that compensation for travel time was 

required. Id. at 578. The Court ultimately held that employers who require employees to 

take certain transportation to a work site, subjecting them to its control by “determining 

when, where and how they are to travel,” must compensate employees for travel time.

Id. at 588. In addition, the Court found that the employer controlled the employees 

because they “were foreclosed from numerous activities in which they might otherwise 

engage if they were permitted to travel to the fields by their own transportation.” Id. at 

586.

Vino cites to Overton v. Walt Disney Co., 136 Cal. App. 4th 263 (2006), in support 

of its argument that employers are not required to compensate employees who use an 

employer-provided shuttle just because no alternative transportation is available or 

feasible. (ECF No. 168-1 at 9.) But Overton is easily distinguishable and does not 

support Vino’s argument that Plaintiffs were not required to use SGLC’s buses. In 

Overton, the Court held that employees who used employer-provided shuttles from the 

assigned parking lot to the park entrance were not entitled to compensation for travel 

time because the employer did not require its employees to take the shuttle. 136 Cal. 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 28 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

App. 4th at 274. In reaching its holding, the Court found the plaintiff’s concession that 

ten percent of Disney employees used alternative transportation to be dispositive, 

showing that employees were not required to use the employer-provided shuttles. Id. at 

271. The Court noted that the plaintiffs in Overton had available various modes of 

transportation including biking, walking, or taking the train or the bus as alternatives to 

the Disney shuttle. Id. Thus, the Court in Overton reached its holding precisely because 

there were alternative means of transportation available. The Overton plaintiffs chose to 

use the employer-provided transportation; they were not required to do so. Id. 

(emphasis added). 

Vino also argues that California Labor Code section 510(b) precludes Vino’s 

liability. Under section 510(b), “[t]ime spend commuting to and from the first place at 

which an employee’s presence is required by the employer shall not be considered to be 

part of a day’s work, when the employee commutes in a vehicle that is owned, eased, or 

subsidized by the employer and is used for the purpose of ridesharing, as defined in 

Section 522 of the Vehicle Code.” However, in Rutti, the Ninth Circuit found that 

“California Labor Code section 510(b) does not apply to compulsory travel time.” 596 

F.d at 1062 n.2 (citing Morillion, 22 Cal. 4th at 590 n.6). Thus, section 510(b) did not 

alter the Court’s finding that the employee was under the employer’s control while 

traveling using the employer-provided vehicle, and thus entitled to compensation for that 

time under California law. Id. at 1062.

Here, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Plaintiffs could use 

alternative transportation to get to the work sites. (ECF No. 216-7.) In contrast to 

Overton, there is no evidence that any Plaintiffs used alternative transportation to get to 

the work sites. Additionally, unlike the farmworkers in Vega, there is a genuine issue of 

material fact whether Plaintiffs were free to choose their mode of transportation to get to 

and from work. (Id.). Also distinguishing the present case from Vega is that Vino offers 

no evidence establishing, or even suggesting, that some Plaintiffs did not ride SGLC’s 

buses. Vega, 36 F.3d at 425. While Vino may not have explicitly prohibited employees 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 29 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

from using their own transportation as in Morillion, Plaintiffs have presented evidence 

suggesting that they were de facto required to use the employer-provided buses, as they 

did not know where they would be going ahead of time and had no other means of 

transportation. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Plaintiffs were 

“free to choose” to ride SGLC’s buses, Vino is not entitled to summary judgment on this 

claim.

Failure to Reimburse Pre-Employment Expenses During the First Workweek 

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint also alleges that “as a result of 

Defendants’ failure to reimburse transportation, visa and recruitment fees authorized by 

Defendants and benefitting Defendants, Plaintiffs . . . were paid less than $8.00 per 

hour during the first workweeks in 2008.” (ECF No. 67 at 11.) Vino contends that 

California law does not recognize a “de facto deduction” claim similar to that recognized 

under the FLSA. (ECF No. 168-1 at 16.) Indeed, Vino correctly points out that “the 

federal ‘de facto deduction’ claim recognized under the FLSA is based on specific 

federal statutes and regulations that do not have close state counterparts.” (Id. (citing 

Arriaga, 205 .3d at 1237)). Plaintiffs’ Opposition does not dispute Vino’s contention on 

this point.

The Court is aware of no case holding that the California Labor Code allows for 

recovery of amounts that were “de facto deductions” incurred in the first workweek due 

to pre-employment costs, as does the FLSA. California Labor Code section 2802 does, 

however, require that “an employer shall indemnify his or her employee for all necessary 

expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge 

of his or her duties.” Cal. Lab. Code § 2802; see Stuart v. Radio Shack Corp., 641 F. 

Supp. 901, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Section 2802 of the Labor Code “simply states that an 

employer shall reimburse; it says nothing about when the duty to reimburse is triggered.” 

Stuart, 641 F. Supp. at 902. Thus, Plaintiffs have not stated a viable claim. Accordingly, 

the portion of Plaintiffs’ third cause of action claiming violations of California law for 

failure to reimburse transportation, visa, and recruitment fees during the first workweek is 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 30 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

dismissed.

D. Failure to Provide Meal and Rest Periods Mandated by California Law 

Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action alleges that Vino “systematically failed to 

authorize or permit Plaintiffs and other employee to take rest and meal periods in 

accordance with IWC Order No. 14 and Cal[ifornia] Labor Code § 226.7 and suffered or 

permitted workers to continue working through their rest and meal periods in violation of 

law, regularly causing workers to work for [four] or more hours without a rest period or 

[five] or more hours without a fully relieved meal period.” (ECF No. 67 at 12.) 

“State law obligates employers to afford their non-exempt employees meal 

periods and rest periods during the workday.” Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 53 Cal. 

4th 1004, 1018 (2012). “Labor Code section 226.7(a) prohibits an employer from 

requiring an employee ‘to work during and meal or rest period mandated by an 

applicable order of the [IWC].’ In turn, Wage Order No. 5, subdivision 12 prescribes rest 

periods, while subdivision 11, as well as section 512 of the Labor Code, prescribes meal 

periods.” Id. (quoting Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7(b); Wage Order No. 5(11)(B), 12(B); 

Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1114 (2007)). In Brinker, 

the California Supreme Court held: 

An employer’s duty with respect to meal breaks under both section 512[(a)] 

and Wage Order No. 5 is an obligation to provide a meal period to its 

employees. The employer satisfies this obligation if it relieves its 

employees of all duty, relinquishes control over their activities and permits 

them a reasonable opportunity to take an uninterrupted 30-minute break, 

and does not impede or discourage them from doing so. . . . On the other 

hand, the employer is not obligated to police meal breaks and ensure no 

work thereafter is performed. Bona fide relief from duty and the 

relinquishing of control satisfies the employer’s obligations, and work by a 

relieved employee during a meal break does not thereby place the 

employer in violation of its obligations and create liability for premium pay 

under Wage Order No. 5[(b)] an Labor Code section 226.7[(b)].”

Id. at 1040-41. 

In this case, Vino contends that it is an undisputed fact that “[w]hen Plaintiffs 

worked towards an hourly wage rate SGLC directed Plaintiffs as to when to take their 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 31 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

meal and rest breaks.” (ECF No. 168-2 at 10.) Vino also contends it is undisputed that 

“when Plaintiffs worked towards a piece rate standard Plaintiffs made their own 

determination as to when to take their meal and rest breaks.” (Id.) Vino relies on the 

deposition testimony of Salvador Gonzalez. In his deposition, Salvador Gonzalez stated 

that when the Plaintiffs worked on a piece rate on Vino’s property, “the H-2A workers” 

would decide what time they would take a meal period. (ECF No. 170-1 at 44.) When 

they worked at an hourly rate, “SGLC’s foremen” decided when Plaintiffs would take 

meal periods and rest periods. (ECF No. 170-1 at 45.) When asked to explain “the 

policy in regards to lunch periods for H-2A workers,” Salvador Gonzalez explained that 

“they take a half hour lunch. . . . If they started at 7:00 a.m., they would take their break 

at, I believe, nine o’ clock – their first break of fifteen minutes. And at noon they would 

take their lunch for half an hour. And at two o’clock—1:30, two o’clock, they would take 

another fifteen minute break.” (ECF No. 170-1 at 47.) If the workers were working on a 

piece rate, Salvador Gonzalez explained that “they would stop and take their breaks 

whenever they wanted to take their breaks and take their lunch whenever they wanted to 

take it, as soon as they got hungry.” (Id.) Salvador Gonzalez testified that “their 

foreman” was responsible for ensuring that the lunch break was taken. (Id.) He also 

testified that lunch periods are a half hour long, and are not paid. (ECF No. 170-1 at 49.)

He testified that the H-2A workers were informed about their right to lunch periods “when 

[SGLC] gave them safety training . . . the first week they were here . . . before they 

started working.” (ECF No. 170-1 at 49.) Salvador Gonzalez testified that SGLC’s 

workman’s comp carrier provided the training. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs, however, argue that these facts are disputed, and offer the translated 

declaration of Plaintiff Librado Blas Martinez, which states “Salvador’s foremen didn’t 

respect the labor laws, the one about a lunch hour and breaks.” (ECF No. 219-2 at 11.) 

Plaintiffs also offer the declaration of Plaintiff Ramon Naranjo, in which he testifies that 

“during my work with SGLC I was never given any rest periods when I worked in the 

pear fields, even though I often worked more than eight hours per day. I and the other 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 32 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33

workers were provided food at both the grape and pear field worksites, but were almost 

never given a full thirty minute meal break.”9

 (ECF No. 216-7 at 18.) 

Plaintiffs’ evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact whether Vino, through 

its joint employer SGLC, of all duty, “relinquishe[d] control over [Plaintiffs’] activities and 

permit[ted] them a reasonable opportunity to take an uninterrupted 30-minute break.” As 

such, Vino’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is denied.

E. Failure to Pay Wages Due Upon Termination 

Vino argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to waiting time penalties because Vino 

was not Plaintiffs’ employer, and even if it was, any alleged failure by Vino to pay 

termination wages was not willful. (ECF No. 168-1 at 11.) Vino contends that there was 

a good faith dispute whether any wages were due to Plaintiffs, and whether Vino, rather 

than SGLC, owed Plaintiffs those wages. Vino claims that this good faith dispute 

regarding a legal defense entitles Vino to summary judgment. (Id. at 12.) In response, 

Plaintiffs contend they have satisfied their burden of showing Vino acted willfully 

because Vino jointly employed Plaintiffs, Vino failed to correctly pay Plaintiffs, and failed 

to honor the terms of the H-2A contract. (ECF No. 206 at 20.) 

 Under California law, “[i]f an employer discharges an employee, the wages 

earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately.” Cal. Lab. 

Code § 201(a). Under section 203, “[i]f an employer willfully fails to pay . . . any wages 

of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall 

continue as a penalty . . . but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days.” Id. 

§ 203(a). In the context of section 203, “willful” has been defined as an employer 

“intentionally fail[ing] or refus[ing] to perform an act which was required to be done.”

Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1201 (2008) (citing Barnhill v. 

 

9

 Vino’s objection that this evidence is irrelevant is overruled. (ECF No. 243 at 81.) While Naranjo is 

dismissed without prejudice for failure to file a consent to sue form, see infra, this does not preclude him 

from testifying as a witness. Vino has not made any objections that would preclude the Court from 

considering the evidence in this respect. 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 33 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

Robert Saunders & Co., 125 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7-8 (1981); Davis v. Morris, 37 Cal. App. 2d 

269, 274 (1940)). 

 However, “a good faith belief in a legal defense will preclude a finding of 

willfulness.” Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 314, 325 (2005) (citing Barnhill, 

125 Cal. App. 3d at 8-9.) A good faith dispute exists “when an employer presents a 

defense, based in law or fact, which if successful, would preclude any recover[y] on the 

part of the employee.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 13520(a) (2012). The Code of 

Regulations further provides that “[t]he fact that a defense is ultimately unsuccessful 

does not preclude a finding that a good faith dispute did exist. Defenses presented 

which, under all the circumstances, are unsupported by any evidence, are unreasonable, 

or are presented in bad faith, will preclude a finding of a ‘good faith dispute.’” Id. This 

regulation imposes an objective standard. FEI Enters., Inc. v. Kee Man Yoon, 194 Cal. 

App. 4th 790, 802 (2011). Thus, legal uncertainty may lead to a presumption of a good 

faith dispute. However, the presumption of good faith will be overcome when the plaintiff 

presents evidence that the employer was aware that its employees were not being fully 

compensated for their time. See Amaral, 164 Cal. App. 4th at 1202.

In Provine v. Office Depot, Inc., the defendant argued that it was entitled to 

summary judgment because there was a good faith dispute whether a discretionary 

award of fifty dollars should have been included as part of the plaintiff’s wages under 

section 203. No. C 11-00903 SI, 2012 WL 2711085, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2012). The 

Court rejected the defendant’s argument, stating that the “defendant has not 

demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment on this ground. Neither party has 

submitted any evidence regarding the reasonableness of [the defendant’s] decision not 

to factor Bravo awards into the regular rate of pay, and thus the Court cannot conclude 

on this record that a good faith dispute exists.” Id. at *7. 

As in Provine, Vino has failed to demonstrate that it is entitled to summary 

judgment for Plaintiffs’ section 203 claim. Vino argues that there is a good faith dispute 

that Vino did not employ Plaintiffs and therefore had no duty to pay termination wages.

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 34 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35

(ECF No. 168-1 at 12.) However, the parties have not submitted any evidence regarding 

the reasonableness of Vino’s failure to pay Plaintiffs the wages they contend they were 

owed upon termination. See Amaral, 163 Cal. App. 4th at 1202. Accordingly, the Court 

cannot conclude on the record before it that a good faith dispute exists, and Vino’s 

motion for summary judgment is denied for this claim.

F. Violation of Employee Housing Act 

Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action alleges violations of sections 17000 et seq. of the 

California Health and Safety Code (“the Employee Housing Act”). Plaintiffs’ Second 

Amended Complaint alleges that “at all times relevant to this action, the SGLC 

Defendants, Defendant Julian Gonzalez and Defendant Vino Farms, Inc. knowingly and 

willfully maintained Labor Camp 17 heretofore described in a manner that failed to 

comply with applicable health, safety, and building codes in violation of Health and 

Safety Code § 17001 et seq. and its implementing regulations.” (ECF No. 67 at 13.) 

Plaintiffs allege that Labor Camp 17 was owned by Defendant Vino Farms, and operated 

or managed by SGLC. (Id. at 8.)

Vino contends that it cannot be liable under the Employee Housing Act (“EHA”) 

because it “did not construct, operate, or maintain the housing at Camp 17.” (ECF No. 

168-1 at 18.) In fact, Vino claims that SGLC “was solely responsible for operating and 

maintaining Labor Camp 17.” (Id. at 19.) Plaintiffs respond both that Vino’s “foreman 

Mike Harder was assigned to oversee the housing at Labor Camp 17,” and, even though 

Vino “did not directly maintain the housing, it was nonetheless responsible to ensure it 

met the minimum state and federal habitability and housing code standards.” (ECF No. 

206 at 14.) Neither party disputes that Defendant Vino Farms owns Camp 17. (ECF 

Nos. 206 and 241.)

California law states that “[e]very person, or the agent or officer thereof, 

constructing, operating, or maintaining employee housing shall comply with the 

requirements of this part, with building standards published in the State Building 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 35 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36

Standards Code relating to employee housing, and with the other regulations adopted 

pursuant to this part.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 17037. Furthermore, “person” is 

defined as “any natural person, firm, association, organization, partnership, business 

trust, company, joint stock company, corporation, limited liability company, joint venture, 

or other organizations of persons.” Id. at § 17009.5(a). The Legislature enacted the 

EHA based on its “determin[ation] that those who provide employee housing should bear 

the burden of ensuring it meets minimum health and safety standards for the protection 

of its inhabitants and the community.” Reyes v. Kosha, 65 Cal. App. 4th 451, 461 

(1998). In Reyes, the Court found a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the 

defendant operated and maintained a labor camp when the defendant “strictly controlled 

who lived in the camp,” “provided workers with portable toilets and organized the 

workers to run a waterline to the camp,” “provided materials for them to install faucets 

and showers in the camp,” and “provided a mailbox so they could receive mail at the 

farm.” Id. at 465. Although there is not such evidence before the Court in this case, 

Plaintiffs’ burden requires only that they offer evidence of a genuine issue of material 

fact whether Vino operated and maintained Camp 17. The Court in Reyes stated that 

“from [the] evidence, a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that [the defendant] 

maintained or operated the employee housing on his property . . . .” Id. However, the 

Court did not hold that such evidence is required for the Court to find that a defendant 

“operated” or “maintained” employee housing within the meaning of the statute. 

Plaintiffs have offered evidence that Vino owned Camp 17 (ECF Nos. 211-2 at 65; 

211-3 at 23; 219-4 at 5) and that Vino allowed SGLC to use Camp 17 free of charge 

(ECF No. 211-3 at 23). Plaintiffs also offer evidence that Vino’s foreman, Mike Harder, 

was assigned to take care of “Ranch 17” (ECF No. 211-2 at 65) and that Mike Harder 

was there at “Ranch 17” when Plaintiffs arrived from Colima (ECF No. 211-2 at 65).10

 

10 While Julian Gonzalez testified about “Ranch 17,” not “Camp 17,” this testimony was provided during the 

course of questioning about Plaintiffs’ living accommodations. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiffs, a reasonable trier of fact could find that “Ranch 17” and “Camp 17” were used 

interchangeably during Julian Gonzalez’s testimony. (ECF No. 211-2 at 65.) 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 36 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

37

Given these facts, a disputed issue of material fact exists about whether, and to what 

extent, Vino “maintained” or “operated” Camp 17. Accordingly, Vino’s motion for 

summary judgment on this claim is denied. 

Vino also contends that fifteen Plaintiffs admit that they never stayed at Camp 17.

(ECF No. 168-1 at 19.) Thirteen Plaintiffs11 admitted in response to request for 

admission No. 14 that they never stayed at Camp 17. (Id. (citing ECF Nos. 170-6 

through 170-18).) Additionally, two Plaintiffs12 failed to respond to the requests for 

admission, and thus the request to admit that Plaintiffs never stayed at Camp 17 is 

deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 36(a)(2).

Courts have held that a request to admit, to which the served party did not 

respond, may provide the sole grounds for an award of summary judgment for the 

requesting party.” See, e.g., Donovan v. Carls Drug Co., 703 F.2d 650, 651 (2d 

Cir.1983); Cereghino v. Boeing Co., 873 F. Supp. 398, 403 (D. Or. 1994); Kyung Hee 

Park v. Kim, Dong Hyen, CV-08-0004-GA, 2007 WL 2122165 (N. Mar. I. July 17, 2007).

Because Plaintiffs have failed to respond to Vino’s request for admission that Plaintiffs 

never stayed at Camp 17, the Court deems this fact admitted as to these two Plaintiffs. 

While there is a triable issue whether Vino “maintained” or “operated” Camp 17, 

Vino cannot have violated these fifteen Plaintiffs’ rights under the EHA. There is no 

genuine issue of material fact regarding Vino’s liability to these Plaintiffs. Thus, the 

Court grants summary judgment to Vino on Plaintiffs’ EHA claim as to these fifteen 

Plaintiffs who never stayed at Camp 17.

G. Unfair Competition 

Vino further moves for summary adjudication of the seventh cause of action for 

violation of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 

 

11 Roberto Cruz Barragan, Gibran Rigoberto Diaz Campo, Obed Mares Contreras, Uriel Torres Contreras, 

Luis Manuel Torres Contreras, Marco Cesar Garcia Gutierrez, Benigno Martinez Marquez, Jesus Junior 

Robles Rodriguez, Leonel Esparza Ramirez, Rene Meza Sanchez, Oscar Manuel Carillo Torres, Christian 

Cruz Valverde, and Paul Salgado Villafan. (ECF No.170 at 2 (citing ECF Nos. 170-6 through 170-18).) 

12 Demetrio Montes Gaitan and Armando Zuniga Arias. (ECF No. 170 at 2.) 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 37 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

38

et seq. “In order to state a claim for a violation of the [UCL], a plaintiff must allege that 

the defendant committed a business act that is either fraudulent, unlawful, or unfair.” 

Levine v. Blue Shield of Cal., 189 Cal. App. 4th 1117, 1136 (2010). The UCL “protect[s] 

both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets 

for goods and services.” Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 949 (2002). “Because [the 

UCL] is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition—acts 

or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent. “In other words, a practice is 

prohibited as ‘unfair’ or ‘deceptive’ even if not ‘unlawful’ and vice versa.” Cel–Tech 

Comms., Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 (1999). Plaintiffs assert this 

claim under the UCL's unlawful prong. An unlawful business practice is one that “is 

forbidden by any law,” Olszewski v. Scripps Health, 30 Cal.4th 798, 827 (2003), and 

“[v]irtually any law—federal, state or local—can serve as a predicate for a section 17200 

action,” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1102–03 (1996), 

abrogated on other grounds by Cel–Tech Comms., Inc., 20 Cal.4th at 180.

Plaintiffs’ claim for unfair competition pursuant to California Business and 

Professions Code § 17200 is grounded in Plaintiffs’ allegations that Vino violated the 

California Labor Code and the FLSA. Vino contends that because Plaintiffs have failed 

to show that Islands is liable under any of the Labor Code statutes, Vino is entitled to 

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ UCL claim. Given that Vino has failed to meet their 

initial burden on summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim and California Labor 

Code claims, Vino is not entitled to summary judgment for this cause of action. 

H. Fraud and Misrepresentation 

Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action is for fraud and misrepresentation. Plaintiffs’ 

ninth cause of action alleges solicitation of employees by misrepresentation in violation 

of section 970 of the California Labor Code. Again, although not stated clearly by 

Plaintiffs, the Court construes Plaintiffs argument to allege an agency relationship 

between Vino and SGLC.

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 38 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

39

 The elements of an action for fraud are: (1) misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of 

falsity; (3) intent to defraud, i.e. to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) 

resulting damage. Lazar v. Sup. Ct., 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996) (internal citations 

omitted). Agency law imposes liability upon an innocent principal for the torts of his 

agent, including fraud, committed within the scope of the agency relationship. See

Garton v. Title Ins. & Trst Co., 165 Cal. App. 3d 365, 375 (1980). Likewise, section 970 

of the California Labor Code provides: 

No person, or agent or officer thereof, directly or indirectly, shall influence, 

persuade, or engage any person to change from one place to another in 

this State or from any place outside to any place within the State, or from 

any place within the State to any place outside, for the purpose of working 

in any branch of labor, through or by means of knowingly false 

representations, whether spoken, written, or advertised in printed form, 

concerning either: 

(a) The kind, character, or existence of work; 

(b) The length of time such work will last, or the compensation 

therefor; . . . . 

Plaintiffs have put forth evidence creating genuine issues of material fact about 

whether SGLC and Vino had an agency relationship. See supra. Because a principal 

may be liable for the fraud of its agent, and an agent may be liable under section 970, 

Vino is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ eighth and ninth causes of action.

In short, because a reasonable trier of fact could find that an agency relationship existed 

between the Defendants, see supra, and because Vino has not sufficiently demonstrated 

that SGLC did commit fraud and misrepresentation, the Court cannot conclude that, as a 

matter of law, Vino is not liable for fraudulent misrepresentation or violations of section 

970 of the California Labor Code. 

I. Consent to Sue Forms 

 Vino argues that the majority of the opt-in Plaintiffs filed their consent forms after 

the opt-in period had ended, and thus these Plaintiffs should be dismissed from the 

action. Additionally, Vino argues that the opt-in Plaintiffs never consented to sue Vino, 

and thus their claims against Vino must be dismissed. The Court declines to reach 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 39 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

40

these issues because all opt-in Plaintiffs were dismissed without prejudice from the case, 

pursuant to the Court’s order issued this same day. Accordingly, Vino’s motion is denied 

as moot as it applies to the opt-in Plaintiffs. 

 Vino also asserts that five named Plaintiffs failed to file consents at all in the 

action. These Plaintiffs are Armando Zunigas Arias, Daniel Becerra Aguilar, Oscar 

Manuel Carrillo Torres, Jorge Luis Rendon Silva, and Luis Ramon Naranjo Campos. 

(ECF No. 168-2 at 15.) Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact (ECF No. 206-3 at 139.) Vino 

contends that these Plaintiffs must be dismissed. Plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal of 

Plaintiff Arias, but argue that dismissal of the remaining four Plaintiffs is unwarranted. 

(ECF No. 206 at 15.) Plaintiffs state that “counsel has been unable to locate the consent 

to sue forms” for these Plaintiffs, but “will gather consent to sue forms for those Plaintiffs 

as soon as possible if they are not promptly located.” (ECF No. 206 at 15.) Plaintiffs 

made this representation to the Court on May 17, 2012, (id.) and now, nearly six months 

later, have failed to file consent to sue forms for these four Plaintiffs.

An FLSA collective action is deemed commenced for limitations purposes for the 

named plaintiff only when he or she has filed both a complaint and a consent to sue 

form. See Albritton v. Cagles, Inc., 508 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2007); see also 29 U.S.C. 

§ 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his 

consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which 

such action is brought.”). The Ninth Circuit has stated that “the FLSA claim of a plaintiff 

who has failed to file a written consent is subject to dismissal [w]ithout prejudice.” Real, 

603 F.2d at 756. Although Plaintiffs argue that “it would be against the interest of both 

judicial economy and the interest of all the parties” to dismiss these Plaintiffs, the Court 

is bound by the language of the statute. See Albritton, 508 F.3d at 1017 (“We are not 

empowered to rewrite statutes.”). Accordingly, the named Plaintiffs who have not yet 

filed consent to sue forms are dismissed without prejudice. 

To the extent that Vino argues that named Plaintiffs, rather than Opt-Ins, should 

be dismissed for failure to file their consent forms on time, the Court finds that Vino is not 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 40 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

41

prejudiced by the late filing of these consents. The majority of the consent forms were 

filed two weeks after the conclusion of the opt-in notice period, which ended on June 18, 

2009. Plaintiffs filed the opt-in forms on July 2, 2009. While Vino cites to conclusion of 

the opt-in notice period, which ended on June 18, 2009. Plaintiffs filed the opt-in forms 

on July 2, 2009. While Vino cites to Reyes v. Texas EZ Pawn, L.P., 459 F. Supp. 2d 

546, 566-67 (S.D. Tex. 2006), the Court there dismissed the opt-in Plaintiffs because the 

consent forms were postmarked after the expiration of the opt-in period. In the present 

case, the consent forms filed on July 2, 2009, were all signed prior to the end of the optin notice period. (ECF No. 36.) There is no evidence of when these consent forms were 

post-marked. In light of these circumstances, the Court finds that dismissal of these 

Plaintiffs, to the extent that they are ‘original named Plaintiffs’ and not ‘opt-in Plaintiffs’ is 

not appropriate.13

Finally, Vino contends that Plaintiffs cannot consent to sue Vino because the 

consent form did not name Vino as a defendant in the action. However, the plain 

language of the statute requires that Plaintiffs consent to participate in an “action.” 29 

U.S.C. § 216(b). The statute does not require that Plaintiffs file a consent form to 

participate in an action against each individual defendant. See Prickett v. Dekalb Cnty., 

349 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (Finding that the plain language of § 216(b) 

“indicates that plaintiffs do not opt-in or consent to join an action as to specific claims, 

but the action as a whole.”) While Prickett dealt with the addition of claims, the Court 

finds that the addition of defendants is no different, as Plaintiffs opted in to the action as 

a whole, which includes the action against the later-added defendants, including Vino.

Thus, Vino’s motion for summary judgment on this point is denied. 

 

13 However, the Court notes that all Opt-in Plaintiffs (not originally named Plaintiffs who signed consents) 

are dismissed pursuant to the Court’s order issued this same day. 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 41 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

42

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ordered that: 

1. Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of joint employment under 

the FLSA is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs Joel Gonzalez Avila and Francisco Ceja 

Sandoval, and DENIED as to all other Plaintiffs. 

2. Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiffs’ claim for de 

facto deductions during the first workweek. 

3. Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED for Plaintiffs’ claim for travel 

time under the FLSA. 

4. Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ breach of 

contract claim. 

5. Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ claim for 

travel time violations under California law. 

6. Plaintiffs’ claim for failure to reimburse pre-employment expenses during the 

first workweek under California law is DISMISSED. 

7. Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for failure to provide 

meal and rest periods under California law is DENIED. 

8. Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for failure to pay 

wages due upon termination is DENIED. 

9. Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for violations of the 

Employee Housing Act is DENIED as to the Plaintiffs who lived in Camp 17, and 

GRANTED as to the Plaintiffs who did not live in Camp 17. 

10. Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is DENIED. 

11. Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for fraud is DENIED. 

12. Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for violations of 

California Labor Code section 970 is DENIED. 

13. The four Plaintiffs who have not filed opt-in forms are DISMISSED WITHOUT 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 42 of 43
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

43

PREJUDICE. 

14. Vino’s Motion for Summary Judgment for late filing of Plaintiffs’ opt-in forms is 

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 15, 2012. 

Case 2:08-cv-01971-MCE-KJN Document 309 Filed 11/15/12 Page 43 of 43