Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00728/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00728-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TELECOM ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

FIBERLIGHT, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-00728-SI 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR, IN 

THE ALTERNATIVE, TO ALTER OR 

AMEND JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 149

After a three-day bench trial from August 1 to August 3, 2016, the Court issued its 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the “Verdict”) in this breach of contract case. Dkt. No. 

141. On August 19, 2016, the Court entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $16,964,055. 

Dkt. No. 142. Now before the Court is defendant’s motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, to 

alter or amend the judgment.

1 Mot. (Dkt. No. 149); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b), (e). Pursuant to Civil 

Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that this matter is appropriate for resolution without oral 

argument and VACATES the hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will DENY

defendant’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Telecom Asset Management, LLC (“TAM”) sued defendant FiberLight, LLC 

(“FiberLight”) for unpaid commissions from TAM’s involvement in brokering four deals between 

 

1

In addition, plaintiff has filed a Motion to Compel Assignment of Rights, seeking to 

enforce the judgment in this case. Dkt. No. 158. This Order does not address plaintiff’s motion to 

compel.

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FiberLight and non-party Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”).2 Although TAM’s brokerage services 

were completed, negotiations between FiberLight and TAM broke down before the parties could 

reach a final agreement on TAM’s commission structure. Both parties agreed that FiberLight 

owed TAM money; the trial focused on determining the amounts of TAM’s commissions for the 

four Verizon deals.

After trial, the Court found an implied contract between the parties under the equitable 

doctrine of quasi-contract. Verdict (Dkt. No. 141) at 9-10. The Court reviewed the evidence 

presented by the parties and heard live testimony to determine the appropriate amount of TAM’s 

agent commissions for the four Verizon deals. The Court found that two of the transactions were 

for “lit” services and awarded TAM 11% of total Monthly Recurring Revenue (“MRR”) under 

these transactions. Id. at 10. The Court found that the two larger transactions, the West Texas and 

Central Texas deals, were “dark fiber” transactions entailing a significant amount of construction, 

and awarded TAM 10% of MRR and 2.5% of Non-Recurring Revenue (“NRR”) for these 

projects.3 Id. at 11-13. Based on these commission percentages, after applying an undisputed 

discount rate for certain future cash flows, the Court awarded TAM $16,964,055 for its services.

Defendant now moves for a new trial or, in the alternative, for the Court to alter or amend 

the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. See Mot. (Dkt. No. 149). Out of “an 

abundance of caution,” defendant also invokes Rule 60(b).4 Mot. (Dkt. No. 149) at 7-11. Plaintiff 

suggests that this motion is properly brought under Rule 59. Opp’n (Dkt. No. 154) at 6-7. The 

Court agrees with plaintiff. A party may file a motion under Rule 59 “no later than 28 days after

the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b), (e); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 

 

2

The relevant details of these transactions and the parties’ interactions are set out in the 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Verdict. Dkt. No. 141.

3 Based on the evidence presented, the Court determined that 10% of MRR and 2.5% of 

NRR were industry standard agent commissions for deals of this nature, and thus represented the 

market value of the benefit to FiberLight for purposes of the Court’s restitution calculation. 

Verdict (Dkt. No. 141) at 11-13. Defendant’s motion takes issue only with the Court’s award of 

10% of MRR under the West Texas and Central Texas deals. See Mot. (Dkt. No. 149) at 6.

4

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 provides for relief from a judgment or order on 

motions made “within a reasonable time[.]” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.

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1111 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court entered judgment in this matter on August 19, 2016. Dkt. No. 

142. Defendant filed its motion 28 days later on September 16, 2016. Mot. (Dkt. No. 149). 

Defendant timely filed its motion under Rule 59 and the Court finds that this matter is properly 

framed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e).5

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits the filing of a motion to alter or amend a 

judgment. “There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: 1) the 

motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; 2) 

the moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; 3) the motion is 

necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or 4) there is an intervening change in controlling law.” 

Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis 

omitted) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah 

Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (listing similar grounds and stating 

“[t]here may also be other, highly unusual, circumstances warranting reconsideration”). 

Rule 59(e) “offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality 

and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 

1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (“A 

motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) should not be granted, absent highly unusual 

circumstances . . . .”). Rule 59(e) “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments 

or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping 

Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The 

trial court “enjoys considerable discretion in granting or denying [a rule 59(e)] motion.” 

 

5 Defendant’s motion requests relief under Rule 59(e) or, alternatively, under Rule 

59(a)(2). See Mot. (Dkt. No. 149) at 22. In its Reply, defendant appears to rely solely on Rule 

59(e). See Reply (Dkt. No. 157). Given the overlap between the standards for granting a motion 

under either rule, the Court will treat this as a Rule 59(e) motion. See HPS Mech., Inc. v. JMR 

Constr. Corp., No. 11-2600, 2014 WL 5451987, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2014), appeal 

docketed, No. 14-17261 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2014).

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McDowell, 197 F.3d at 1255 n.1 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

This matter was tried without a jury. On several central points, the witness testimony was 

in conflict, and the Court made credibility assessments after hearing the testimony presented and 

reviewing the reports admitted into evidence. In this motion, defendant’s allegations of error are 

purely factual. See Reply (Dkt. No. 157) at 3 (“FiberLight asserts that the judgment is based on 

manifest errors of fact . . . .”). Defendant does not present new or undiscovered evidence, 

reference an intervening change in, or manifest misinterpretation of, the law, or suggest any other 

form of injustice. In effect, defendant simply re-argues the same issues it argued about at trial.

FiberLight challenges two broad categories of factual findings. First, FiberLight argues 

that the Court erred in finding that the “on-net”/“off-net” distinction was not dispositive in this

dispute. Second, FiberLight argues that the Court did not properly weigh the evidence in 

determining the market value of the benefit FiberLight received. The Court has reviewed the 

submissions of the parties, and finds that nothing new has been presented. Both the principals of 

the parties, and the competing expert witnesses, testified at trial about each of these areas; their 

testimony was consistent in some respects but substantially divergent in others. The Court’s 

assessment of this evidence, and the credibility of the witnesses at trial, is incorporated in the 

Verdict’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 

Defendant disagrees with the Verdict, but mere disagreement does not mean that the Court 

committed a manifest error of fact. See Morales v. Tingey, No. 05-3498, 2010 WL 459046, at *1 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010) (citing McDowell, 197 F.3d at 1256) (“A district court does not commit 

clear error warranting reconsideration when the question before it is a debatable one.”). Defendant 

offers no new arguments, points to evidence already presented at trial, and merely uses this motion 

to “to relitigate old matters[.]” Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 485 n.5. None of the evidence 

defendant points to shows that the Court committed a manifest error of fact. As such, and for the 

reasons stated in the Verdict, defendant’s motion is DENIED.

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CONCLUSION

Defendant fails to demonstrate a manifest error of fact, rather than mere disagreement with 

the Court’s Verdict. Defendant does not allege an error of law, does not mention new or 

previously unavailable evidence, does not reference an intervening change in the law, and fails to 

describe how the Court’s Verdict might result in manifest injustice. Accordingly, and for all of 

the reasons stated in the Verdict, the Court hereby DENIES defendant’s motion.

This order resolves Dkt. No. 149.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 25, 2016

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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