Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02703/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02703-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LIVE NATION MERCHANDISE, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN DOES 1-100, JANE DOES 1-100 

AND XYZ COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18cv2703-GPB(JLB)

ORDER SUA SPONTE DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF 

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EX 

PARTE APPLICATION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER

[Dkt. No. 5.]

On November 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint for trademark infringement and 

related causes of action along with an ex parte application for a temporary restraining 

order, a seizure order and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction and 

seizure order should not issue against unnamed Defendants John and Jane Does, and 

XYZ Company. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 5-2.) Based on the reasoning below, the Court sua sponte

DISMISSES the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and DENIES Plaintiff’s ex 

parte application for a temporary restraining order as moot. 

Background

Plaintiff Live Nation Merchandise, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) is engaged in the business of 

manufacturing, distributing and selling authorized merchandise, such as T-shirts, 

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sweatshirts and posters, bearing federally registered trademarks, service marks, 

likenesses, logos and other indicia owned by popular performers. (Dkt. No. 5-3, Weber 

Decl. ¶ 2.) Pursuant to an agreement between the Fleetwood Mac (“the Group”) and 

Plaintiff, Plaintiff possesses the exclusive right to distribute authorized tour merchandise

at all concerts in the United States and elsewhere bearing all trademarks, service marks, 

likenesses, logos and other indicia of the Group in connection with the tour. (Dkt. No. 1, 

Compl. ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 5-3, Weber Decl. ¶ 2.) On Saturday, December 8, 2018, the Group 

will perform at the Viejas Arena in San Diego, California. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 13.) 

Before and after the concerts on the tour, authorized tour merchandise bearing any or all 

of the Group’s Trademarks will be sold throughout the United States. (Id.) Defendants 

John Does, Jane Does, and XYZ Company are sued under fictitious names because their 

true names and capacities are unknown at this time. (Id. ¶ 3.) 

“FLEETWOOD MAC” is the trademark of the Group, a prominent and successful 

musical performing group that began in 1967. (Dkt. No. 5-3, Weber Decl. ¶ 4.) The 

Group is one of the top ten best-selling groups with over 100 million units sold 

worldwide, was inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 1998, and was 

nominated and won numerous awards including Album of the Year from the Academy of 

Recording Arts and Sciences in 1977. (Id.) 

The Group has obtained U.S. Federal Trademark Registration No. 3066017 for use 

in connection with International Class (“IC”) 025 clothing, 009 recordings; IC 020 plastic 

key chains; IC 021 mugs; and other service and goods; U.S. Federal Trademark 

Registration No. 1238825 for use in connection with IC 041 entertainment services, and 

U.S. Federal Trademark Registration No. 4908308 for use in connection with IC 016 

posters. (Id. ¶ 5.) Trademark Registration Nos. 3066017 and 1238825 are incontestable. 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff and the Group have spent a great deal of care, time and money in 

developing the authorized tour merchandise bearing the Group’s trademarks including 

making sure they are high quality and appropriate to their image. (Id. ¶ 7.) However, the 

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Group as well as other performers have recurring problems with individuals, also referred 

to as “Bootleggers”, who sell infringing tour merchandise near, at and at times, inside the 

concert venue. (Id. ¶ 8.) On every major prior tour by this Group, Defendant 

Bootleggers have appeared selling unlawful goods. (Id. ¶ 9.) According to Plaintiff, 

tours of other groups of this stature also have recurring problems with individuals who 

sell infringing tour merchandise near, at and sometimes inside a concert venue. (Id. ¶ 8.) 

According to Plaintiff’s counsel, who has been involved in two prior seizure orders 

for the Group’s prior tours, and in other bootlegging cases, typically, a “core” group of 

bootleggers follow a successful concert tour of a group and appear from venue to the 

next, selling identical, illegal merchandise bearing the names of the groups and logos of 

the tour. (Dkt. No. 5-5, Burns Decl. ¶ 10.) Absent relief, the loss of merchandising 

income at a single venue could range in the tens of thousands of dollars. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

Moreover, there is injury to the goodwill of Plaintiff and the Group, through distribution 

of inferior merchandise and is irreparable. (Id.) 

On information and belief, the Complaint claims Defendants will sell and 

distribute unauthorized, infringing T-shirts, jerseys, caps and/or other merchandise 

bearing any or all of the Group’s trademarks in the vicinity of the concert, before, during 

and after their performances, and at subsequent concerts during the tour. (Dkt. No. 1, 

Compl. ¶ 14.) The infringing merchandise is likely to cause confusion among 

prospective purchasers. (Id. ¶ 15.) Moreover, because the infringing merchandise sold 

and to be sold is generally of inferior quality, the sale of these merchandise is likely to 

injure the reputation of the Group which has developed the reputation for high quality

associated with Plaintiff and the authorized tour merchandise. (Id. ¶ 16.) 

The Complaint alleges four causes of action for infringement of registered 

trademark; violations of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) for false 

designation of origin and false descriptions and representations in commerce of 

Defendants’ infringing merchandise; violation of California Civil Code section 3344(a); 

and violation of common law right to privacy. (Id. ¶¶ 21-32.) The proposed TRO seeks 

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an order enjoining the “manufacturing, distributing, selling or holding for sale” any 

Infringing Merchandise and to seize the Infringing Merchandise “bearing the federally 

registered trademarks, service marks, likenesses, logos and other indicia of the musical 

group known as “FLEETWOOD MAC.” (Dkt. No. 5-1, Proposed TRO Order.) 

Discussion

The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo before a preliminary injunction 

hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed merely to prevent 

irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of 

Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). The legal standard that 

applies to a motion for a TRO is the same as a motion for a preliminary injunction. See

Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001). 

To obtain a TRO or preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood 

of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the 

absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the moving party’s 

favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 

Under the Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” approach, the first and third elements are 

to be balanced such that “serious questions” going to the merits and a balance of 

hardships that “tips sharply” in favor of the movant are sufficient for relief so long as the 

other two elements are also met. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 

1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy 

that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such 

relief,” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, and the moving party bears the burden of meeting all four 

Winter prongs. See Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1135; DISH Network Corp. v. FCC, 653 F.3d 

771, 776-77 (9th Cir. 2011). 

It is well-established that a federal court cannot reach the merits of any dispute 

until it confirms that it retains subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues 

presented. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1988). Federal 

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courts are under a continuing duty to confirm their jurisdictional power and are “obliged 

to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to [its] existence . . . .” Mt. Healthy City 

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977) (citations omitted); B.V. v. 

Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, (9th Cir. 1999) (“federal courts are required 

sua sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as standing.”). Thus, prior to addressing 

the ex parte request for a TRO, as a threshold issue, the Court must determine if it has the 

power to entertain this suit at all. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) 

(determining whether a case has a justiciable case or controversy is “the threshold 

question in every federal case.”) Article III of the United States Constitution restricts 

federal judicial power to the adjudication of “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. 

III, § 2. This is a “bedrock requirement.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 

United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). “No principle 

is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the 

constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” 

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 

Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)). 

“Two components of the Article III case or controversy requirement are standing 

and ripeness.” Bova v. City of Medford, 564 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). Both are 

evaluated at the time the action is commenced. Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 

309 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Standing is determined as of the commencement 

of litigation.”); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 446 F.3d 808, 814 (8th 

Cir.2006) (“Jurisdictional issues such as standing and ripeness are determined at the time 

the lawsuit was filed”). 

“’Standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy 

requirement’ and is therefore a prerequisite to our jurisdiction.” Washington v. Trump, 

847 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560 (1992)). To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate it (1) has “suffered 

an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 

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particularized, . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” (2) that 

the injury was caused by, or is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 

defendant;” and (3) that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will 

be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). If the plaintiff fails to satisfy the constitutional requirements to 

establish standing, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case and the complaint must be

dismissed. See Valley Forge Christian Col., 454 U.S. at 475-76 (“Those who do not 

possess Art. III standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the United States.”). 

“[F]or injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and 

individual way.” Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). On a TRO, Plaintiff

must make a “clear showing of each element of standing.” Washington v. Trump, 847 

F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to make a “clear showing” of each element of standing. It 

simply relies on numerous instances of bootlegging of other popular musical groups 

where courts have granted TRO applications with unknown defendants. However, those 

instances demonstrate a history of bootlegging in the music concert industry but does not 

satisfy the injury-in-fact for purposes of Plaintiff’s standing to sue. Merely relying on 

other district courts’ summary rulings based on facts distinct from the current case are not 

supportive. 

For this concert tour, Plaintiff has not demonstrated it has yet suffered any injury,

and consequently, has not demonstrated it has suffered an injury that affects it in a 

personal and individual way. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. By failing to identify or 

attempting to identify any bootleggers on this concert tour that have engaged in selling 

counterfeit merchandise, Plaintiff has not demonstrated it has suffered or will suffer any 

injury. See Live Nation Merchandise, Inc. v. John Does, Case No. CV 15-3762-

GHK(Ex), 2015 WL 12672733, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (denying ex parte TRO because 

plaintiff only presented generalized allegations of bootleggers in past tours and not with 

the current tour); see also SKS Merch, LLC v. Barry, 233 F. Supp. 2d 841, 843 (E.D. Ky. 

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2002) (granting preliminary injunction where affidavit “detail[ed] multiple instances of 

bootlegging at eleven” prior concert stops on the same tour, and “produced photographs 

depicting various persons allegedly engaged in selling bootleg merchandise at and around 

[ ] concerts.”). Similarly, Plaintiff does not provide any specific facts that any injury is 

“actual or imminent.” Plaintiff relies on prior instances of bootlegging from two prior 

concert tours of Fleetwood Mac in 2003 and 2014. (Dkt. No. 5-5, Burns Decl. ¶ 6; Dkt. 

No. 5-7, Burns Decl., Ex. B.) However, Plaintiff fails to presents any facts that connect 

those bootleggers from 2003 and 2014 to the Defendants in this case. See Live Nation 

Merchandise, Inc., 2015 WL 12672733, at *2 (generalized assertions about prevalence of 

bootleggers in past tours not sufficient). Moreover, the past instances of prior 

bootlegging on prior Group tours, four years ago and fifteen years ago, are too remote to 

show that the injury will necessarily occur. Instead, Plaintiff presents a hypothetical and 

speculative threat of injury that may or may not occur on December 6, 2018. Because 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact, the other two factors for standing 

necessarily fails as they also rely on the existence of an injury. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

560-61. The Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate it has standing to bring 

the complaint. See Vannatta v. Keisling, 899 F. Supp. 488, 492 (D. Or. 1995) (“A 

plaintiff lacks standing because it alleges no more than a hypothetical threat of injury 

which cannot satisfy the concrete injury in fact requirement of Article III of the 

Constitution.”) 

“While standing is primarily concerned with who is a proper party to litigate a 

particular matter, ripeness addresses when litigation may occur.” Lee v. Oregon, 107 

F.3d 1382, 1387 (9th Cir. 1997). “[I]n many cases, ripeness coincides squarely with 

standing’s injury in fact prong.” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 

1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In fact, the ripeness inquiry is often “characterized 

as standing on a timeline.” Id. “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon 

‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at 

all.’” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union 

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Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985)). “The ripeness doctrine 

demands that litigants state a claim on which relief can be granted and that litigants’

asserted harm is ‘direct and immediate’ rather than speculative or hypothetical.” 

Hillbloom v. United States, 896 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing to Abbott Labs. v. 

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967)). Here, Plaintiff has yet to demonstrate it has suffered

any type of injury and the claim is not yet ripe for judicial intervention. 

While the Court recognizes the difficulty in combatting bootleggers at high profile 

concerts, the Court has a duty mandated by the U.S. Constitution to determine whether it 

has jurisdiction over a case. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 471. Here, 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that it has standing and that the case is ripe for 

adjudication; therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and sua sponte

DISMISSES the complaint. 

Conclusion

Based on the reasoning above, the Court sua sponte DISMISSES the case for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction and DENIES Plaintiff’s ex parte application for temporary 

restraining order as MOOT. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 4, 2018

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