Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00373/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00373-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Declaratory Judgement

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

K.W. MICHAEL CHAMBERS, et al., )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0373-WS-B

 )

MICHAEL J. COONEY, M.D., )

Defendant/ Counterclaim Plaintiff, )

 )

v. )

 )

DR. EUGENE de JUAN, et al., )

Counterclaim Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on defendant SurModics, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss

(doc. 40). The Motion has been briefed and is ripe for disposition at this time.

I. Relevant Background.

A detailed review of the factual underpinnings and procedural posture of this

consolidated action is unnecessary to resolve the discrete issues raised in the Rule 12 Motion. In

the Amended Complaint (doc. 38, Exh. 6), Michael J. Cooney, M.D. (“Dr. Cooney”) brought

certain claims against SurModics, Inc. (“SurModics”) and others based on SurModics’

acquisition of a company called InnoRx, Inc. In particular, the Amended Complaint alleges a

scheme by SurModics, InnoRx and others to deprive Dr. Cooney of proceeds from that

transaction and to rob him of inventorship rights for certain technologies that he had helped to

innovate while working for and with InnoRx by eliminating his name from patent applications

pertaining to those inventions.

The specific claims that Dr. Cooney asserts against SurModics include the following: (1)

a claim for unjust enrichment on the theory that InnoRx was unjustly enriched by the value of

Dr. Cooney’s intellectual property and his subsequent exclusion from licensing rights for that

intellectual property; (2) a claim for fraud based on InnoRx’s failure to inform Dr. Cooney that

his name was being removed from the ‘750 Patent application and that he was being deliberately

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excluded from other patent applications despite his status as an inventor; and (3) a claim for

breach of fiduciary duty on the ground that InnoRx owed Dr. Cooney a fiduciary duty which it

breached to Dr. Cooney’s detriment. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 48-58.) With respect to each of

these causes of action, Dr. Cooney predicates liability for SurModics on its status as successor to

InnoRx.

The Amended Complaint also includes two other causes of action that are of particular

significance to the pending Motion to Dismiss. In particular, Count IV, captioned “Correction of

Inventorship,” states that Dr. Cooney is a co-inventor of the ‘750 Patent and asks this Court

pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 256 to correct that patent to reflect his co-inventor status. Count IV also

sets forth a laundry list of 15 other pending patent applications and states that “[i]n the event that

patents are issued on [those] applications and Dr. Cooney is not named as an inventor [f]or each

such patent, Dr. Cooney reserves the right to amend the Complaint to add such patents to seek a

correction of inventorship.” (Amended Complaint, ¶ 59.) The relief requested by Dr. Cooney in

Count IV is that he “should be declared the owner of all rights arising from his status as coinventor of the ‘750 patent and the [15 other enumerated] applications (once they issue).” (Id., ¶

62.) Further, Count V of the Amended Complaint is captioned “Tortious Interference with

Prospective Economic Advantage.” A fair reading of Count V is that Dr. Cooney alleges that

SurModics had determined based on its own analysis that Dr. Cooney was entitled to inventor

status on the pending patent applications, but failed either to notify the Patent and Trademark

Office of that determination or to file appropriate petitions to correct ownership. (Id., ¶¶ 64-67.) 

As a result of these allegedly wrongful omissions, Dr. Cooney claims, he “has been deprived the

right to independently license the pending applications on which he is an inventor.” (Id., ¶ 68.)

In its Motion to Dismiss, SurModics asks this Court to dismiss Count IV to the extent it

seeks relief concerning pending patent applications, to dismiss Count V for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, and to strike certain paragraphs of the Amended

Complaint that it contends improperly recount statements made during settlement negotiations.

II. Legal Standard.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the

Court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hill v. White, 321

F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, “when ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a

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1 It is an uncontroversial and well-established proposition that federal courts have

jurisdiction only to correct inventorship on issued patents, not on pending patent applications. 

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judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v.

Pardus, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). The rules of pleading

require only that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. While a complaint attacked by a Rule

12(b)(6) motion need not be buttressed by detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff’s pleading

obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 1955,

1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The rules of pleading do “not require heightened fact

pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id. at 1974; see also Financial Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir.

2007) (explaining that “factual allegations in a complaint must possess enough heft to set forth a

plausible entitlement to relief”) (citation omitted). The Court’s inquiry at this stage focuses on

whether the challenged pleadings “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 127 S.Ct. at 2200 (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964). 

Thus, the proper test is whether the complaint “contain[s] either direct or inferential allegations

respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal

theory.” Financial Sec., 500 F.3d at 1282-83 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

III. Analysis.

A. Count IV: Correction of Inventorship.

SurModics devotes nearly half of its lengthy memorandum of law in support of the

Motion to Dismiss to Count IV, the claim for correction of inventorship pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §

256. In so doing, SurModics does not allege that this cause of action fails to state an actionable

claim to the extent that Dr. Cooney seeks correction of the ‘750 Patent to designate him as a coinventor. Rather, SurModics’s position is that Count IV should be dismissed “to the extent it

seeks an order correcting inventorship of pending patent applications.” (SurModics Brief (doc.

41), at 7.)

This is a phantom issue. While the legal premise of SurModics’ argument is correct,1

 it is

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See, e.g., Eli Lilly and Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining

that 35 U.S.C. § 256 allows an alleged co-inventor to bring a cause of action to correct

inventorship on an issued patent, but that 35 U.S.C. § 116 “plainly does not create a cause of

action in the district courts to modify inventorship on pending patent applications”); 35 U.S.C. §

116 (“Whenever through error ... an inventor is not named in an application, and such error arose

without any deceptive intention on his part, the Director [of the Patent and Trademark Office]

may permit the application to be amended accordingly, under such terms as he prescribes.”). Dr.

Cooney does not maintain otherwise in these proceedings.

2 It appears that SurModics based this aspect of the Motion to Dismiss on language

in the ad damnum clause of the Amended Complaint, wherein Dr. Cooney requests “[a]n order

correcting the inventorship of the ‘750 patent and the [15 pending] applications.” (Amended

Complaint, at 23.) While this inconsistency reflects poor draftsmanship, a simple telephone call

between counsel would likely have resolved the discrepancy to the satisfaction of all concerned. 

Indeed, it might have saved the parties (and this Court) substantial time and resources had

SurModics called Dr. Cooney’s counsel to request clarification before firing off a 29-page Rule

12(b)(6) Motion and brief directed in considerable part at claims that the Amended Complaint

did not appear to be pursuing and that Dr. Cooney now unequivocally disavows.

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combating claims that simply are not alleged. Dr. Cooney emphatically states in his response

brief that he “is not requesting this Court to declare him an inventor on pending patent

applications” and that he “stipulates that he will not seek a correction of inventorship on any

patent application until it issues.” (Cooney Response (doc. 46), at 1-2.) Such a stipulation is

fully supported by the plain text of Count IV itself, in which Dr. Cooney states that “[i]n the

event that patents are issued” with respect to those 15 pending applications, “Dr. Cooney

reserves the right to amend the Complaint to add such patents to seek a correction of

inventorship.” (Amended Complaint, ¶ 59 (emphasis added).) As Dr. Cooney is not presently

requesting correction of inventorship by this Court as to any of the 15 pending patent

applications, SurModics’ Motion to Dismiss Count IV “to the extent” that he is so requesting is

denied as moot.

2

 For the sake of clarity, the Court observes that Count IV does not read, and is

not to be construed for purposes of this action, as requesting correction of inventorship as to any

of the 15 pending patent applications at this time. Rather, Count IV is confined to the ‘750

Patent. If Dr. Cooney later seeks to petition the Court in this action for correction of

inventorship or a declaration of ownership rights as to any patent other than the ‘750 Patent, it

will be necessary for him to seek leave of court to amend his pleadings to do so, pursuant to Rule

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3 The foregoing also disposes of Surmodics’ second argument, to-wit, that “Count

IV should be dismissed to the extent it seeks a declaration that Dr. Cooney will be a co-owner of

any patents that may issue from pending patent applications.” (SurModics Brief (doc. 41), at

17.) As stated, Dr. Cooney has disavowed any intent to utilize Count IV as a platform for

litigating patent applications other than the ’750 Patent, so once again SurModics is asking the

Court to slay an imaginary dragon.

4 This makes sense, given the fragmentary information available to the Court. 

Federal courts sitting in diversity generally apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which

they sit. See Grupo Televisa, S.A. v. Telemundo Communications Group, Inc., 485 F.3d 1233,

1240 (11th Cir. 2007) (“A federal court sitting in diversity will apply the conflict-of-laws rules of

the forum state.”). “Lex loci delicti has been the rule in Alabama for almost 100 years. Under

this principle, an Alabama court will determine the substantive rights of an injured party

according to the law of the state where the injury occurred.” Fitts v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.

Co., 581 So.2d 819, 820 (Ala. 1991). “Where as here, the injury in question is financial, the

location where the financial injury was felt is determinative under lex loci delicti.” Chambers v.

Cooney, 2007 WL 2493682, *11 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 29, 2007). The Amended Complaint reflects

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15, Fed.R.Civ.P., and in conformity with the deadlines specified in the applicable Rule 16(b)

Scheduling Order.3

B. Count V: Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage.

1. Pleading Requirements.

Next, SurModics contends that Dr. Cooney’s tortious interference claim (Count V) is

fatally infirm as presented in the Amended Complaint because it fails to plead the elements of

that cause of action. SurModics’ position is that Count V should be dismissed because it “does

not identify a single potential business relationship involving any alleged efforts by Dr. Cooney

to license the 15 listed pending patent applications.” (SurModics Brief, at 24.) SurModics

further maintains that Count V fails because it does not identify “any business relation that

supposedly would have proceeded to some sort of binding, if not contractual, relationship but for

the undisclosed ‘interference’ that Dr. Cooney attributes to SurModics.” (Id.)

To evaluate this argument, the Court must first examine the appropriate pleading

standard for a claim of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. Although

there is some question as to which state’s law applies to Count V, both parties’ briefs rely

primarily on New York law on this question; therefore, the Court will assume (without deciding)

that New York law applies.4

 Under New York law, the tort of tortious interference with

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that Dr. Cooney is a resident of New York. (Doc. 38, Exh. 6, ¶ 5.) Therefore, it appears that the

injury from the alleged tortious interference would have been felt by Dr. Cooney in New York,

such that New York law would apply under the lex loci delicti doctrine. No party has argued

otherwise, at least for purposes of the pending Motion to Dismiss, so the Court will not explore

that question further at this time.

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prospective economic advantage “has a limited scope,” imposes “demanding” requirements on

plaintiffs, and is “very difficult to sustain.” Henneberry v. Sumitomo Corp. of America, 415 F.

Supp.2d 423, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citations omitted). Indeed, New York law provides that

“[a]llegations of tortious interference must be more than just mere suspicions, and, therefore, the

complaint must allege interference with a specific identified business relationship with a third

party.” American Bldg. Maintenance Co. of New York v. Acme Property Services, Inc., 515 F.

Supp.2d 298, 316 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Henneberry, 415 F. Supp.2d at

469 (granting motion to dismiss tortious interference with prospective advantage claim where

plaintiff “failed to plead adequately the first element of this claim - i.e., that he had a continuing

or existing business relationship with a third party with which defendant interfered”). More

generally, to state a viable claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations

under New York law a plaintiff “must allege the following four elements: (1) a business

relationship between plaintiff and a third party; (2) that defendants, having knowledge of such

relationship, intentionally interfered with it; (3) that defendants acted with the sole purpose of

harming the plaintiff or, failing that level of malice, used dishonest, unfair or improper means;

and (4) injury to the business relationship.” Zedenek Marek v. Old Navy (Apparel) Inc., 348 F.

Supp.2d 275, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). “Furthermore, plaintiff must allege that defendants directly

interfered with the business relationship by directing some activities towards the third party and

convinc[ing] the third party not to enter into a business relationship with the plaintiff.” Id.

(citation omitted); see also Piccoli A/S v. Calvin Klein Jeanswear Co., 19 F. Supp.2d 157, 167-

68 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that plaintiff failed to state claim for tortious interference where

there was no allegation that defendants’ conduct was directed towards any third party with whom

plaintiff had existing or prospective business relationship).

Count V of the Amended Complaint does not comport with these bedrock requirements

under New York law. As pleaded, Count V does not identify any specific continuing or existing

Case 1:07-cv-00373-WS-B Document 69 Filed 01/23/08 Page 6 of 11
5 In so concluding, the Court rejects Dr. Cooney’s arguments to the contrary. Dr.

Cooney relies heavily on the unpublished decision of SLM, Inc. v. Shelbud Products Corp., 1993

WL 127969 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1993), wherein the district court found that a complaint need not

“identify by name the prospective business relationships that it alleges have been interfered

with,” as long as the complaint “sufficiently identifies the prospective business relationships as

being with inventors, SLM employees, and others in the toy industry.” Id. at *5. But SLM is

distinguishable. The concern here is not that Dr. Cooney has failed to name prospective

licensees by name, but that he has offered no description or characterization of them at all such

that it is impossible for SurModics to discern anything about the relationships that it is accused

of interfering with. That was simply not the case in SLM. Shred-It USA, Inc. v. Mobile Data

Shred, Inc., 202 F. Supp.2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) is distinguishable for precisely the same

reason, inasmuch as Dr. Cooney’s Amended Complaint says nothing about the relationships

allegedly interfered with. More generally, the Court finds that the Henneberry, American Bldg.,

and Zedenek Marek line of authority discussed above accurately reflects New York law

concerning pleading requirements for a claim of tortious interference with prospective economic

advantage, and Dr. Cooney has unambiguously failed to satisfy the requirements identified in

those authorities.

6 The law of this Circuit is clear that a court need not sua sponte afford a

represented party an opportunity to amend his complaint to correct deficiencies where, as here,

the plaintiff has not requested leave to do so. See, e.g., Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Industries

America Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A district court is not required to grant a

plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by

counsel, never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.”).

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business relationships with third parties with which SurModics is alleged to have interfered;

rather, Dr. Cooney merely states that his right to license the pending patent applications has been

infringed by SurModics’ alleged wrongdoing. He does not identify specific licensees, either by

name or other description. He does not state that he has a continuing or existing relationship

with such licensees, or even that he has ever been in contact with any of them; rather, it appears

that the relationships that have allegedly been interfered with are purely speculative and

hypothetical. And he does not allege that SurModics directed any activities toward those

amorphous putative licensees to convince them not to do business with Dr. Cooney. In all of

these respects, Count V is inadequately pleaded under New York law.5

2. Necessity of Proving Patent Inventorship Rights.

Under the circumstances, any attempt by Dr. Cooney to amend Count V to correct these

pleading flaws would be futile.6

 Even if Dr. Cooney were to amend his pleading to recite the

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7 In Stevens v. Broad Reach Companies, L.L.C., 2006 WL 1556313 (W.D. Mo.

May 31, 2006), the district court determined that these principles forbid not only direct claims to

decide inventorship issues of pending patent applications, but also “state law claims that are

premised on [plaintiff’s] assertion that he is either the sole or joint inventor of the [technology]

which the Defendants seek to patent. These claims require the Court to resolve questions of

inventorship in a pending patent application before granting the relief sought ... [which] gives

rise to the risk of an inconsistent determination of inventorship. As the Court has determined

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technical elements of the tortious interference claim in a manner that satisfied pleading

requirements imposed by New York law, this cause of action would remain subject to an

insuperable defect. Count V is entirely predicated on Dr. Cooney’s contention that he should

have been named as co-inventor on the 15 pending patent applications. He reasons that

SurModics knew he was a co-inventor for those applications, but failed to correct inventorship

on those applications, resulting in a deprivation of Dr. Cooney’s right to license those patent

applications and constituting the tort of tortious interference with prospective economic

advantage. It is abundantly clear, however, that a necessary prerequisite to an award for Dr.

Cooney on Count V would be a determination by this Court that he is in fact a co-inventor for

the patent applications at issue. As already discussed, supra, however, it is undisputed by the

parties that federal courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate inventorship rights for pending patent

applications. Dr. Cooney cannot use a tortious interference claim to accomplish indirectly that

which he cannot accomplish directly in a correction of inventorship claim. Therefore, even if

Dr. Cooney were able to amend his tortious interference cause of action to comport with the

pleading standards of New York law, Count V would still fail to state a claim on which relief can

be granted because Dr. Cooney’s theory of relief presupposes co-inventorship status on pending

patent applications, a determination that this Court lacks jurisdiction to make. See, e.g., 35

U.S.C. § 116; Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc., 510 F. Supp.2d 1299, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2007)

(construing statutory scheme as one “in which Congress intended for courts to become involved

in inventorship only after the patent has issued”); Sagoma Plastics, Inc. v. Gelardi, 366 F.

Supp.2d 185, 187-88 (D. Me. 2005) (holding that “the courts may not interfere with the patent

process until after the PTO has rendered a final decision on the precise nature of the patent, if it

chooses to issue a patent at all” and that district courts are not empowered to determine questions

of inventorship prior to patent’s issuance).7

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that the PTO is the proper forum for resolving questions of inventorship in pending patent

applications, these claims will also be dismissed.” Id. at *8. The Court finds the Stevens

reasoning persuasive, and expressly adopts it here.

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In response, Dr. Cooney does not suggest that this Court can or should become involved

in inventorship determinations of pending patent applications. Instead, he argues that “no

judicial determination of inventorship on the pending applications is necessary” (doc. 46, at 7)

for Count V because SurModics had already determined Dr. Cooney to be a named inventor, yet

failed to list him in that capacity on the patent applications. This argument misses the point. 

Whatever it may have said or done at some other time, SurModics has plainly taken the position

in this litigation that Dr. Cooney is not a co-inventor of the pending patent applications and that

his name should not be listed on those applications. If Count V were to proceed, the finder of

fact would necessarily be tasked with determining whether Dr. Cooney’s name should have been

listed on those applications, so as to trigger his licensing rights and enable him to secure

economic advantage from the business relationships that SurModics allegedly interfered with. 

After all, unless Dr. Cooney is listed as a co-inventor, he has no licensing rights as to those

pending patent applications. But the decision of whether or not Dr. Cooney is a co-inventor (and

thus one whose name should be listed on the applications) is for the Patent and Trademark Office

to make as to those pending applications, not for this Court or a federal jury. The Court will not

overstep its jurisdictional authority and invade the province of the Patent and Trademark Office

to make inventorship determinations for pending patent applications in the guise of deciding a

common-law cause of action for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.

3. Conclusion.

For all of these reasons, the undersigned finds that Dr. Cooney’s claim against

SurModics for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted because it does not comply with state-law pleading

requirements for such claims. Even if it did, the tortious interference claim would still fail a

Rule 12(b)(6) analysis because implicit in any relief that might be granted Dr. Cooney on that

cause of action would be a determination by the fact-finder that he is a co-inventor or otherwise

has inventorship rights in pending patent applications, and federal courts are not empowered to

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make such determinations.

C. Request to Strike Allegations Concerning Settlement Negotiations.

Lastly, the Court turns to SurModics’ request pursuant to Rule 12(f), Fed.R.Civ.P., that

Paragraphs 46, 47, and 64-67 of the Amended Complaint be stricken as containing inadmissible

evidence of settlement negotiations, pursuant to Rule 408, Fed.R.Evid. In this very action, the

Court has previously rejected the parties’ improper attempts to extract anticipatory evidentiary

rulings concerning statements in the pleadings. Specifically, Dr. Cooney previously asked the

Court to dismiss the former stockholders of InnoRx’s tortious interference claim against him

“because the evidence on which it is predicated consists of statements made by Dr. Cooney in

settlement negotiations, which are inadmissible under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence. This kind of evidentiary objection is inappropriate at the Rule 12(b) stage.” 

Chambers v. Cooney, 2007 WL 2493682, *12 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 29, 2007) (footnote omitted). The

parties now argue whether the statements identified in SurModics’ motion to strike constitute

settlement negotiations or not, with SurModics proffering extrinsic evidence in support of its

position. Again, the Court declines to make anticipatory evidentiary rulings at the Rule 12(b)

stage of the proceedings based on an undeveloped factual record.

SurModics’ request is governed by Rule 12(f), Fed.R.Civ.P., which authorizes district

courts to “order stricken from any pleading ... any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” Id. However, “[s]triking matter on Rule 12(f) grounds is a drastic,

disfavored remedy.” English v. CSA Equipment Co., 2006 WL 2456030, *2 n. 5 (S.D. Ala. Aug.

22, 2006); see also Stephens v. Trust for Public Land, 479 F. Supp.2d 1341, 1346 (N.D. Ga.

2007) (noting that a motion to strike is a “drastic remedy” and that such motions “are rarely

granted absent a showing of prejudice”); BB In Technology Co. v. JAF, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 632,

641 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (opining that Rule 12(f) motions “will usually be denied unless the

allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the

parties”); Carlson Corporation/Southeast v. School Bd. of Seminole County, Fla., 778 F. Supp.

518, 519 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (characterizing motions to strike as “time wasters” and observing that

such motions “will usually be denied”).

SurModics’ justifies its request that certain paragraphs of the Amended Complaint be

stricken by arguing that the statements set forth therein constitute settlement negotiations that

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would be inadmissible under Rule 408, Fed.R.Civ.P. As noted supra, however, the question of

admissibility is not properly before the Court; rather, the question presented by SurModics is

whether those statements should be stricken from the court file in its entirety. SurModics has

made no showing to warrant such a remedy in this case. Significantly, movant makes no

showing that it would sustain any prejudice by virtue of the inclusion of those statements in the

court file or that any harm will befall it unless those allegations are stricken. Absent any

evidence of prejudice, the Court declines to impose the drastic, disfavored remedy of striking the

challenged allegations pursuant to Rule 12(f). See Evonik Degussa Corp. v. Quality Carriers,

Inc., 2007 WL 4358260 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 13, 2007) (denying motion to strike exhibits to notice of

removal where movant alleged that exhibits constituted settlement negotiations that were

inadmissible under Rule 408). The Motion to Strike is denied, subject to SurModics’ right to

challenge admissibility of these statements at an appropriate juncture.

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that SurModics’ Motion to Dismiss and to

Strike (doc. 40) is granted in part, and denied in part. The Motion to Dismiss is granted with

respect to Dr. Cooney’s claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage,

and Count V of his Amended Complaint is dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to

state a claim on which relief can be granted. The Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot with

respect to Count IV of the Amended Complaint because the Motion hypothesizes that Dr.

Cooney is bringing claims that he is unequivocally not bringing in these proceedings. The

Motion to Strike is denied, with the proviso that SurModics may litigate the admissibility of the

challenged statements at an appropriate time. SurModics is ordered to file an answer to Dr.

Cooney’s Amended Complaint on or before February 4, 2008.

DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of January, 2008.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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