Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_06-cv-00337/USCOURTS-almd-3_06-cv-00337-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

R.A., Jr., a minor child, by and through )

his father and next best friend, Richard )

Lemmel Arnold, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:06cv337-WHA

 ) 

DEPUTY SHERIFF WALTER LACEY, ) (WO)

in his official and individual capacity, )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This cause is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #17) filed by

Defendant Deputy Sheriff Walter Lacey on January 5, 2007, a Motion to Strike (Doc. #22) filed

by Plaintiff R.A., Jr. on January 26, 2007, and a Motion to Strike (Doc. #28) filed by Defendant

Deputy Sheriff Lacey on February 5, 2007. The Plaintiff, R.A., Jr., a minor child, by and

through his father and next best friend, Richard Lemmel Arnold, originally filed a Complaint in

this court on April 13, 2006, bringing claims for (1) a violation of rights guaranteed by the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, actionable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Count One), (2) assault

and battery (Count Two), (3) false imprisonment (Count Three), and (4) malicious prosecution

(Count Four). 

For reasons to be discussed, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be

GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, and both Motions to Strike are due to be DENIED, as

moot. 

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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56© of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986).

The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the

‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

Id. at 323. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute

of material fact, or by showing, or pointing out to, the district court that the nonmoving party has

failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate

burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party to

go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more

than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the other hand, the evidence of

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 It is important to point out that the conflicting versions of the pertinent facts are

distinctly different, leading the court to believe that only one party ultimately can substantiate his

version of the facts. At this time, however, it is not the court’s duty to weigh the evidence. 

Instead, the court views the submitted evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant

Plaintiff. Therefore, the facts noted in this opinion are stated under that specific framework.

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the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court

must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©.

III. FACTS

Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant have presented different versions of the facts

pertinent to this case. Nonetheless, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovants as the

court is required to do,1

 the submissions of the parties establish the following facts:

A fight occurring outside of the stadium at the Booker T. Washington High School

homecoming game in Tuskeegee, Alabama on October 7, 2005 serves as the catalyst for this

action. Acting within the scope of his employment as a Macon County Deputy Sheriff, Deputy

Sheriff Lacey provided security for the aforementioned football game. He was assigned to the

inside area of the football stadium. As Deputy Sheriff Lacey and Deputy Sheriff Whitlow left

the stadium area near the end of the football game, a young man named R.S. approached Lacey

and Whitlow and indicated that there was a person in the parking lot with a gun. Lacey and 

Whitlow proceeded quickly to the parking lot area. While in transit, Whitlow put in a radio call

notifying other law enforcement officers of the situation, and several other officers also

proceeded to the parking lot area.

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Before the officers arrived, a fight broke out between Q.J., a minor child, who allegedly

possessed a gun, and the Plaintiff’s brother, R.L., a minor child. Whitlow stopped the fighting

between Q.J. and R.L. by standing in between them, and he told R.S. to take R.L. away from the

area where the fight had occurred. R.S. escorted R.L. across the street from the fight area. R.A.,

Jr., who was twelve years old, was with them at that time.

During the time period when Whitlow broke up the fight between Q.J. and R.L., Lacey

attempted to break up a separate fight occurring in close proximity. Upon gaining control of that

situation and noticing that Whitlow still was attempting to control the other situation, Lacey

proceeded to help Deputy Sheriff Whitlow. According to the Plaintiff’s submitted evidence,

Lacey approached the Plaintiff from behind, grabbed him by the collar, slung him to the ground,

and hit him several times with his ASP baton, without provocation and even though R.A., Jr.,

R.L. and R.S. had crossed the street and were no longer involved in any altercation. As a result

of the blows from the baton, R.A., Jr. suffered various injuries. R.A., Jr. was not arrested at the

time of the incident. Lacey later swore out a warrant for his arrest on a charge of disorderly

conduct, but R.A., Jr. was acquitted of the charge.

IV. DISCUSSION

The Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges numerous counts against the Defendant (both

individually and in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff). To avoid any confusion, the court

will discuss the counts against the Defendant separately regarding both capacities, individual and

official. The court will then proceed to the matter regarding the Motions to Strike.

A. Claims Against Deputy Sheriff Lacey in his Official Capacity

1. Count One - Violation of Constitutional Rights, Actionable Under 42 U.S.C. §1983

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Regarding claims for monetary damages under Section 1983 against the Defendant in his

official capacity as a deputy sheriff, the Plaintiff cannot maintain any such claims due to the lack

of subject matter jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States. “[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public

funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.

651, 663 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58

(1989). Furthermore, “[i]n the absence of consent, a suit in which the State or one of its agencies

or departments is named as the defendants is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” Carr v.

City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.

v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). 

“To determine whether a state official is covered by Eleventh Amendment immunity,

[federal courts] consider the laws of the state.” Carr, 916 F.2d at 1525. Under Alabama law, it

is well-settled that sheriffs are executive officers of the state. As a result, Alabama courts

consider suits against a sheriff as suits against the state. Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442,

442-43 (Ala. 1987) (“A sheriff is an executive officer of the State of Alabama. . . .”); see also

McMillan v. Monroe County, Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 789 (1997) (holding that, based on an analysis

of Alabama law, sheriffs are state officers and suits against them in their official capacity are

suits against the state). Alabama law further recognizes that “[i]n general, the acts of the deputy

sheriff are the acts of the sheriff. The deputy sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff.” Hereford v.

Jefferson County, 586 So. 2d 209, 210 (Ala. 1991) (quoting Mosely v. Kennedy, 17 So. 2d 536,

537 (Ala. 1944)); see also Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that

a sheriff’s deputy is legally an extension of the sheriff); Carr, 916 F.2d at 1525 (recognizing that

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a deputy’s acts generally are considered acts of the sheriff). Accordingly, the court must

consider this suit against the Defendant in his official capacity as a suit against the state. 

The Plaintiff’s contention that, because he seeks equitable relief in his Complaint, this

case falls within an exception to the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity, citing Carr,

916 F.2d at 1525, is misplaced. The exceptions referred to there are for injunctive actions:

(1) to compel him to perform his duties, (2) to compel him to perform ministerial acts, (3)

to enjoin him from enforcing unconstitutional laws, (4) to enjoin him from acting in bad

faith, fraudulently, beyond his authority, or under mistaken interpretation of the law, or

(5) to seek construction of a statute under the Declaratory Judgment Act if he is a

necessary party for the construction of the statute.

Id. The Plaintiff seeks no such relief in his Complaint, nor would any such relief be appropriate

in an action such as this.

Because the Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against the state, in the absence of

consent, this court has no jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s federal law claims against the Defendant

in his official capacity. Therefore, with regard to the Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the

Defendant in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is due to be GRANTED.

2. Counts Two, Three and Four - State Law Actions

With regard to the state law tort claims alleged in Counts Two, Three and Four against

the Defendant in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff, the Defendant is absolutely immune

from such claims under the Alabama Constitution. As noted above, Alabama law considers

sheriffs as executive officers of the state. As a result, Section 14 of Article 1 of the Alabama

Constitution grants sovereign immunity to sheriffs as executive officers. Hereford, 586 So. 2d at

210 (citing Ala. Const., art. 1, § 14 (“[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in

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any court of law or equity.”)); see also McMillan, 520 U.S. at 789 (holding that, based on an

analysis of Alabama law, sheriffs are state officers and suits against them in their official

capacity are suits against the state). Alabama law also recognizes that “the acts of the deputy

sheriff are the acts of the sheriff[,]” and deputy sheriffs are considered the alter egos of the

sheriff. Hereford, 586 So.2d at 210. Thus, it follows logically that a deputy sheriff receives the

same privilege of sovereign immunity as a sheriff. See Wright v. Bailey, 611 So. 2d 300 (Ala.

1992) (holding that, because a sheriff would have immunity in a suit alleging negligent failure to

perform an arrest, two deputy sheriffs also would be entitled to such immunity). Accordingly,

under this premise, the Defendant receives absolute immunity from suits against him in his

official capacity under Section 14 of Article I of the Alabama Constitution.

As noted previously in regard to Eleventh Amendment immunity, exceptions to the state

law sovereign immunity enjoyed by a sheriff, or a deputy sheriff, under the Alabama

Constitution apply only in situations where plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief. See

Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 383 (11 th Cir. 1993) (“The Alabama Supreme Court explained

that under Article I, §14 [of the Alabama Constitution], the only exceptions to a sheriff’s

immunity from suit are actions brought to enjoin sheriff’s conduct.”). As noted above, the

Alabama Supreme Court has stated that, under Section 14 of Article I of the Alabama

Constitution, sheriffs are immune from suit except in actions

(1) to compel him to perform his duties, (2) to compel him to perform ministerial acts, (3)

to enjoin him from enforcing unconstitutional laws, (4) to enjoin him from acting in bad

faith, fraudulently, beyond his authority, or under mistaken interpretation of the law, or

(5) to seek construction of a statute under the Declaratory Judgment Act if he is a

necessary party for the construction of the statute.

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Carr, 916 F.2d at 1525; see also Parker, 519 So. 2d at 443. Just as was pointed out in regard to

Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, none of these exceptions fits the claims made in this

case.

So, just as the Plaintiff’s federal law official capacity claim is barred by Eleventh

Amendment immunity, the state law tort claims alleged in Counts Two, Three and Four against

the Defendant in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff are barred absolutely because of the

Defendant’s state immunity from such claims under the Alabama Constitution. Therefore, as to

these Counts, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED.

B. Claims Against Deputy Sheriff Lacey in his Individual Capacity

1. Count One - Violation of Constitutional Rights, Actionable Under 42 U.S.C. §1983

Determining whether summary judgment is appropriate regarding the Plaintiff’s Section

1983 claims against the Defendant in his individual capacity requires this court to address the

defense of qualified immunity. 

“The doctrine of qualified immunity insulates government agents from personal liability

for money damages for actions taken in good faith pursuant to their discretionary authority.” 

Calhoun v. Thomas, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1275 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800 (1982)). “The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry

out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation,

protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal

law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). The basic premise of the doctrine

is for immunity to harbor government officials from liability unless their conduct violated

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“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.

To determine whether a government agent is eligible for qualified immunity, a three-part

analysis, guided by Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, is appropriate. See Vinyard

v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 2002). “To receive qualified immunity, the public

official ‘must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when

the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.’” Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at

1194). Upon satisfying the discretionary authority threshold, a two-part inquiry remains. 

According to the Supreme Court, the initial inquiry then is whether the facts alleged, taken in a

light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the government official’s conduct violated

a constitutional right of the plaintiff. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the court

finds no constitutional violation, no further inquiry is necessary. Id. However, “if a violation

could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to

ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id. Accordingly, in order to determine whether

to grant the present Motion for Summary Judgment, the court will apply this three-part analysis

to the alleged facts of the case at bar.

a. Scope of Discretionary Authority

The parties agree in their pleadings and briefs that the Defendant was acting within the

scope of his discretionary authority, so this is not an issue.

b. Violation of a Constitutional Right 

The Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the Defendant used excessive force against him,

thereby violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Considering the circumstances

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of this case, however, the court finds that the alleged use of excessive force only implicates the

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Where an excessive force claim arises in the context of an

arrest, an investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free person, the claim invokes Fourth

Amendment protections - guaranteeing the citizen the right to be free from unreasonable seizures

of their person - not the more generalized protections of substantive due process afforded by the

Fourteenth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). “All claims that law

enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest,

investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth

Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’

approach.” Id. at 395. Therefore, this court will address the Plaintiff’s excessive force claim

applying a Fourth Amendment analysis.

“To assert a Fourth Amendment claim based on the use of excessive force, the plaintiffs

must allege (1) that a seizure occurred and (2) that the force used to effect the seizure was

unreasonable.” Troupe v. Sarasota County, Fla., 419 F.3d 1160, 1166 (11th Cir. 2005). In the

present case, it is clear that a seizure occurred. “A seizure occurs when an officer restrains the

freedom of a person to walk away.” Evans v. Hightower, 117 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1997)

(citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)). In the present case, the Defendant impaired

the Plaintiff’s freedom to walk away by administering blows with an ASP baton. This court

finds that such action constitutes a seizure of the person. Thus, the pertinent question becomes

whether the force used to effectuate the seizure - namely, the blows from the ASP baton - was

reasonable.

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In determining “reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has

noted that the test of reasonableness “is not capable of precise definition or mechanical

application.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). Instead, “its proper application requires

careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case. . . .” Graham, 490 U.S.

at 396. The Court further elaborated that “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force

must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the

20/20 vision of hindsight,” and that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance

for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances

that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a

particular situation.” Id. at 396-97. 

The Eleventh Circuit further has stated that “[a]n officer will be entitled to qualified

immunity if his actions were ‘objectively reasonable’-that is, if a reasonable officer in the same

situation would have believed that the force used was not excessive.” Thornton v. City of

Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1400 (11th Cir. 1998). It also must be noted that the Eleventh Circuit

applies a stringent standard regarding qualified immunity in excessive force cases. In fact, the

Eleventh Circuit has held that “when applied in excessive force cases, ‘qualified immunity

applies unless application of the standard would inevitably lead every reasonable officer . . . to

conclude the force was unlawful.’” Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1255 (quoting Post v. City of

Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993), modified 14 F.3d 583 (11th Cir. 1994)). 

The aforementioned statements play an important role in determining the reasonableness

of an officer’s actions by establishing an overall tenor for qualified immunity evaluations in the

realm of excessive force claims. To aid lower courts in actually making a determination

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 In determining reasonableness for the purposes of this Motion for Summary Judgment,

the pertinent standard requires the court to assess the alleged facts in a light most favorable to the

Plaintiff. Taken in such a light, the stated facts clearly are established. It is important to note

again, however, that the alleged facts submitted by the parties are extraordinarily contradictory. 

If the facts submitted by the Defendant were viewed in a favorable light, the stated facts upon

which the reasonableness determination is made would be remarkably different. For purposes of

the current Motion, the court is bound to the facts stated above. At trial, however, as the actual

facts are determined, the court potentially will revisit this reasonableness analysis under a

Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, if asked to do so.

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regarding whether the use of force was reasonable for purposes of a qualified immunity defense,

however, the Eleventh Circuit, guided by Supreme Court precedent, employs a standard threepart test. “‘[I]n determining if force was reasonable, courts must examine (1) the need for the

application of force, (2) the relationship between the need and amount of force used, and (3) the

extent of the injury inflicted.’” Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198); see also Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1347. Therefore, the court will

apply this test to the Plaintiff’s version of the facts to determine whether the Defendant’s use of

force was reasonable for purposes of a qualified immunity defense.

The Eleventh Circuit explains that the need for force is measured by the severity of the

crime, the potential danger to the officer, and the risk of flight. Lee, 284 F.3d 1198. Under the

present circumstances, the use of force was unnecessary. After the initial altercation between

Q.J. and R.L. had been broken up, the Defendant approached the Plaintiff from behind, threw

him to the ground and hit him several times with a baton.2 Deposition of R.A., Jr., Exh. 7, pp.

97-105. The Plaintiff was not involved in the initial altercation, other than trying to pull his

brother, R.L., away from the fight. Id. at pp. 92-94. Furthermore, the Plaintiff had crossed the

street from where the initial altercation had occurred at the point where the Defendant grabbed

him. Id. According to these facts, the Plaintiff committed no crime whatsoever. Even assuming

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 Although not occurring on the night in question, Plaintiff eventually was charged with

disorderly conducted. Ultimately, he was acquitted of those charges. 

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the potential argument that the Plaintiff’s involvement in the underlying altercation constituted a

breach of the peace or disorderly conduct,3

 such a crime lacks the severity commensurate to the

amount of force employed. Moreover, because the Plaintiff was turned away from the Defendant

at the time he was hit with the baton, there is no argument that either the Defendant or any other

person was in imminent danger from the Plaintiff. While the Defendant had been informed that

someone in the surrounding area potentially had a gun, there was nothing to compel a reasonable

officer to believe that the Plaintiff was armed and ready to use a weapon, especially considering

the fact that he was moving away from the altercation and had his back turned on the Defendant.

In addition to the foregoing rationale, there is Eleventh Circuit precedent which stands

for the proposition that, where there is an “absence of any justification for [the officer’s] use of

force, application of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard ‘would inevitably lead

every reasonable officer . . . to conclude that the force was unlawful.’” Sheth v. Webster, 145

F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Thornton, 132 F.3d at 1400. At one time, this

precedent appeared to present a hard and fast rule that the use of any force without probable

cause for arrest would support an excessive force claim. In recent opinions, however, the

Eleventh Circuit has retreated from that bright line determination. See Bashir v. Rockdale

County, Ga., 445 F.3d 1323, 1333 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Thornton does not stand for the proposition

that an independent excessive force claim may be predicated solely on the lack of power to make

the arrest.”); Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1170-71 (11th Cir. 2000) (questioning whether the

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Thornton result was based merely on the use of any force or, instead, the fact that the force used

was excessive). 

Despite the Circuit’s abandonment of the former rule, the Thornton decision nonetheless

is instructive on the application of the reasonableness standard. As the Bashir court indicated, it

appears that the decision in Thornton “was predicated on the unreasonableness of the quantum of

force used under the circumstances.” Bashir, 445 F.3d at 1333. In Thornton, the court found

that “neither [of the plaintiffs] was suspected of having committed a serious crime, neither posed

an immediate threat to anyone, and neither actively resisted arrest.” Thornton, 132 F.3d at 1400. 

The court, therefore, held that the use of force, wrestling one plaintiff to the ground and throwing

the other plaintiff onto the hood of a patrol car, was excessive. Id. The court accordingly

affirmed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Id. In the

present case, there was no basis for suspecting the Plaintiff of committing any serious crime, he

posed no immediate threat to the Defendant or others, and he was not resisting arrest actively. In

fact, as noted above, he had moved away from the scene of the initial altercation, of which he

was involved only nominally, and was attempting to leave the scene. At that point, the Plaintiff,

a 12-year-old at the time, was hit from behind by the Defendant several times with an ASP

baton. Whereas the Eleventh Circuit has held that, in the absence of a need for force, wrestling

an adult to the ground and throwing an adult against the hood of a car both constitute excessive

uses of force, this court is comfortable finding that the use of an ASP baton on a minor in a

comparable situation also is excessive, there being no need for any use of force.

Because the use of force was unnecessary, the second prong in the three-part analysis, the

relationship between the need for force and the amount used, is quite simple. Where no force is

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necessary, a significant use of force obviously is disproportionate. Simply, hitting a 12-year-old

child from behind with a baton crosses any demarcation line of proportionality, even when

applying the stringent standard set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in qualified immunity cases.

Finally, the three-part test instructs the court to look at the extent of the injuries. Here,

the Plaintiff suffered various bruises and a burst blood vessel in his leg, which required several

doctor/hospital visits, the use of crutches for a period of two weeks and the use of pain

medication. Deposition of R.A., Jr., Exh. 7, pp. 20-25 and 63-67. In addition, because of the

Plaintiff’s young age, this episode has caused him to suffer certain symptoms of anxiety,

including shaking and tremors in the presence of police officers. Id. at 190-92. Therefore, the

court must consider these significant injuries in the overall scheme of determining the

reasonableness of the Defendant’s actions.

Assessing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Defendant’s alleged

actions cannot withstand scrutiny under the reasonableness standard, primarily because the

quantum of force used was unnecessary. The Plaintiff was not committing any serious crime,

did not pose any threat to the Defendant or others, and was not resisting arrest. Simply, the

Plaintiff was attempting to leave the scene of a previous altercation when the Defendant hit him

from behind several times with a baton. In assessing the circumstances for purposes of a

qualified immunity defense, such an application of force is unreasonable. 

The Defendant attempts to analogize the present case to Garrett v. Athens-Clark County,

Ga., 378 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2004), a case in which the Eleventh Circuit held that officers did

not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a decedent to be free from excessive force when the

officers subdued the decedent with chemical spray and fettered him by tying his writs to his

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 Once again, it must be noted that the submitted evidence, when viewed in a light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, establishes these facts, despite the conflicting account submitted by the

Defendant.

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ankles. That analogy fails, however, because the facts of the present case markedly are different

from the facts of the Garrett case. In Garrett, the circumstances surrounding the decedent’s

proper arrest prompted the officers’ use of force. The decedent led the officers on a high speed

chase, at speeds ranging over 75 mph, for over 30 miles and through three separate counties. Id.

at 1276. The chase only ended after the officers used dangerous bumping techniques to disable

the decedent’s vehicle. Id. Further exacerbating the situation, the decedent resisted arrest upon

being pulled from his vehicle by screaming, grabbing for an officer’s gun and attempting to

overpower the officer. Id. at 1276-77. As a result of these actions, the officers used the

chemical spray and fettering techniques to subdue the decedent, which may have contributed to

his ultimate demise. Id. at 1277. In assessing whether the officers could rely on qualified

immunity from a suit claiming excessive force, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately held that “[a]fter

considering all of plaintiff's arguments, we conclude that, as a matter of law, [the officers] did

not violate [the decedent’s] Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force.” Id. at

1281. 

In contrast to the circumstances in Garrett, under the Plaintiff’s version of the facts in

this case, the Defendant did not face any similar threat from the Plaintiff that would justify his

use of force. As noted above, the Plaintiff, a 12-year-old, was not involved in the original

altercation. Furthermore, the Plaintiff had crossed the street from where the altercation had

occurred, and the Defendant grabbed the Plaintiff from behind and hit him with an ASP baton.4

Assessing these circumstances, the distinctions between the present case and Garrett are

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obvious. Primarily, there was no need in the present case for the Defendant to use the quantum

of force employed, whereas the circumstances in Garrett necessitated the officers’ use of force. 

As noted above, in Garrett, a serious crime was committed (leading officers on a three-county

high-speed car chase), the officers faced imminent danger as the suspect attempted to overpower

the officers, and the suspect actively and violently resisted arrest. In contrast, the Defendant in

the present case faced only a 12-year-old child with his back turned who was attempting to leave

the scene of a previous altercation. Clearly, the circumstances in the two cases prompt separate

and distinct evaluations. Therefore, because of the major differences between the circumstances

of the two cases, the Defendant’s reliance on Garrett as precedent is misguided. 

In sum, the Defendant’s unreasonable use of force amounts to a violation of the Fourth

Amendment right of the Plaintiff to be free from an excessive use of force, but not of the

Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process. Accordingly, if such right was clearly

established at the time of the violation, qualified immunity for the Defendant on the Fourth

Amendment claim is inappropriate.

c. Clearly Established Law

Having determined that the Plaintiff successfully has alleged a violation of his

constitutional rights, the court now turns to the question of whether the right to be free from the

use of excessive force was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

In Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-41 (2002), the Supreme Court clarified the standard

for whether a violation of rights is clearly established, determining that “[f]or a constitutional

right to be clearly established, its contours ‘must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. at 739 (quoting Anderson v.

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Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). The Court further stated that “‘[t]his is not to say that an

official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has

previously been held unlawful . . . but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the

unlawfulness must be apparent.’” Id. 

The Eleventh Circuit provides further guidance in regard to determining whether a right

is clearly established by setting forth three circumstances under which a court can make such a

determination. These three circumstances are: (1) when the words of the federal statute or

constitutional provision are specific enough to establish particular conduct as violating a specific

right, even in the total absence of case law; (2) when conduct is not so egregious as to violate a

federal statute or constitutional provision on its face, but the violation nonetheless is evident

through general principles set forth in case law; or (3) when the conduct does not clearly violate

a right based on either the plain language of the statute/constitutional provision or the application

of general principles set forth in case law, but the conduct closely resembles precedent tied

closely to particular factual circumstances. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350-52. 

In the Eleventh Circuit, “[i]t is clearly established that the use of excessive force in

carrying out an arrest constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Davis v. Williams, 451

F.3d 759, 767 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197 (“The Fourth Amendment's

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures encompasses the plain right to be free from the

use of excessive force in the course of an arrest.”); Magee v. City of Daphne, No. 05-0633-WSM, 2006 WL 3791971, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 20, 2006) (“The Fourth Amendment's right to

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures plainly encompasses a right to be free from

excessive force during an arrest.) This general principle is set forth in case law with such

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“obvious clarity” that, applying an objective standard, all law enforcement officers should know

that the use of excessive force results in a violation of constitutional rights. No specific fact

scenario is required to further elaborate this general principle.

Eleventh Circuit case law also clearly establishes the general principle that, if an officer

uses force, the officer must only employ force proportionate to the need for such force. As noted

above, both the Draper and Lee decisions set forth this proposition, in addition to the Supreme

Court precedent set forth in Graham v. Connor. Moreover, based on other recent Eleventh

Circuit decisions, the court finds that any reasonable officer would understand that, in the

absence of a need for any force at all, the use of significant force, including hitting a person

several times with an ASP baton, is excessive. Although there is no case law directly

comparable to the circumstances of the present case, other decisions set forth this basic premise

by analogy. See Thornton, 132 F.3d at 1400 (recognizing that, in the absence of a need to use

force, wrestling an adult plaintiff to the ground or throwing an adult plaintiff upon the hood of a

patrol car constituted an excessive use of force).

 Therefore, following the Eleventh Circuit’s guidance that broad statements of principle

not tied to particular sets of facts can establish general law in regard to different sets of facts, it is

clearly established law that use of significant force, in the absence of a need for force, is

excessive and that the use of excessive force results in a Fourth Amendment violation.

d. Qualified Immunity Summary

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the court finds that the actions

of the Defendant are objectively unreasonable for purposes of the qualified immunity defense

raised by the Defendant. Furthermore, the court finds that, for purposes of qualified immunity,

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 As previously noted, exceptions pointed to by the Plaintiff do not fit the claims made in

this case.

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pertinent case law has clearly established that, where no need for force exists, use of significant

force is excessive. Accordingly, the Defendant cannot rely on qualified immunity at this time. If

the jury believes the Plaintiff’s version of the facts, the Defendant will not be protected by

qualified immunity.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in

regard to the Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against him in his individual capacity is due to be

DENIED, insofar as the Plaintiff’s claim is based on the Fourth Amendment, but GRANTED to

the extent that it asserts any claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. Counts Two, Three and Four - State Law Actions

With regard to the Plaintiffs’ state law tort claims against the Defendant in his individual

capacity, the Defendant again relies on the immunity from suit provided by Section 14 of Article

I of the Alabama Constitution. The Alabama Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he wall of

immunity erected by §14 is nearly impregnable.” Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137,

142 (Ala. 2002); see also Hutchinson v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 256 So. 2d 281, 284 (Ala.

1971) (“The wall of ‘government immunity’ is almost invincible, made so by people through

their Constitution as interpreted by this Court.”). Moreover, Section 14 bars “claims against a

state official or employee sued in his individual capacity.” Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 500

(Ala. 2005); see also Milton v. Espey, 356 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (Ala. 1978) (“The prohibition of

Section 14 cannot be circumvented by suing the official or agent individually.”).5

 

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Despite these strong statements regarding the immunity afforded by Section 14, the

Alabama Supreme Court also has stated that “Section 14 does not necessarily immunize State

officers and agents from individual liability.” Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d at 500 (quoting Gill v.

Sewell, 356 So. 2d 1196, 1198 (Ala. 1978)). Essentially, the determination that a state official is

immune from suit in his individual capacity “depends on the degree to which the action involves

a state interest.” Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d at 500. The Alabama Supreme Court further has

indicated that the primary distinguishing factor triggering Section 14 immunity for a state

official is that the state official’s position exists by virtue of constitutional decree, as opposed to

legislative pronouncement. Id. Simply, if the state official is a constitutional officer acting in

the scope of his employment, then that official is immune from suit under Section 14. Id. at 500-

01 (“[T]his Court has consistently held that a claim for monetary damages made against a

constitutional officer in the officer’s individual capacity is barred by State immunity whenever

the acts that are the basis of the alleged liability were performed within the course and scope of

the officer’s employment.”).

In the present case, the Defendant was a deputy sheriff with the Macon County Sheriff’s

Department. Under the Alabama Constitution, sheriffs are executive officers of the state. ALA.

CONST. art. V, §112 (“The executive department shall consist of a governor, lieutenant governor

. . . and a sheriff for each county.”); see also Hereford, 586 So. 2d at 210 (finding that sheriffs

are executive officers of the state based on constitutional provision and, accordingly, are immune

from suit). Furthermore, as previously noted, Alabama law considers a deputy sheriff as a legal

extension of the sheriff. See Welch, 57 F.3d at 1008. Therefore, the court must consider the

Defendant as a constitutional official. 

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Accordingly, because constitutional officials are afforded immunity under Section 14,

even from suits against them in their individual capacity when acting within the course and

scope of their employment, the Defendant is a constitutional official, and the Plaintiff alleges in

the Complaint and in brief that the Defendant was acting within the scope of his authority as a

deputy sheriff, these claims against the Defendant cannot succeed. Therefore, with regard to

Counts Two, Three and Four against the Defendant in his individual capacity, the Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED.

C. Motions to Strike

In determining the Motion for Summary Judgment, the court found that the documents to

which the parties objected were unnecessary in the ultimate determination of the Motion. The

court has decided the Motion for Summary Judgment without regard to that evidence. The court

thus finds it unnecessary to grant either of the Motions to Strike. Therefore, both Motions to

Strike are due to be DENIED, as moot.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. With regard to Counts One, Two, Three and Four against Defendant Deputy Sheriff

Walter Lacey, in his official capacity, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

#17) is GRANTED.

2. With regard to Count One against Defendant Deputy Sheriff Walter Lacey, in his

individual capacity, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #17) is DENIED as

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to the Plaintiff’s claim based on the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States, and GRANTED as to any claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. With regard to Counts Two, Three and Four against Defendant Deputy Sheriff

Walter Lacey, in his individual capacity, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. #17) is GRANTED.

4. Plaintiff R.A., Jr.’s Motion to Strike (Doc. #22) is DENIED, as moot.

5. Defendant Deputy Sheriff Lacey’s Motion to Strike (Doc. #28) is DENIED, as

moot.

4. This case will proceed against Defendant Deputy Sheriff Walter Lacey only on the

claim in Count One against him in his individual capacity based on his right under the Fourth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to be free from the use of excessive force

in the course of a seizure.

Done this 27th day of March, 2007.

/s/ W. Harold Albritton 

W. HAROLD ALBRITTON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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