Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05262/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05262-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 3, 1994 Decided January 13, 1995

No. 93-5262

KICKAPOO TRIBE OF INDIANS OF THE KICKAPOO

RESERVATION IN KANSAS, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

BRUCE BABBITT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cv01187)

Glenn M. Feldman, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellants. Munford P. Hall entered an

appearance for appellants.

Jonathan F. Klein argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Lois J. Schiffer, Acting

Assistant Attorney General, Robert L. Klarquist and Edward J. Passarelli, Attorneys, United States

Department of Justice. John A. Bryson entered an appearance for appellees.

Before: WILLIAMS, GINSBURG, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of the Kickapoo Reservation in

Kansas appeals from the grant of summary judgment to the Secretary of Interior and the Assistant

Secretary of Interior for Indian Affairs ("the Secretary"). The Tribe contends that the district court

erred in ruling that, although a compact between the Tribe and the Governor of Kansas had been

approved by operation of law under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("Gaming Act"), 25 U.S.C.

§ 2710(d)(8)(C), the compact was nevertheless invalid because the Governor lacked the authority

under state law to sign the compact on behalf of the State of Kansas. We conclude, in agreement

with the Secretary, that the district court abused its discretion in denying the Secretary's motion to

dismiss the complaint because Kansas was an indispensable party under Rule 19(b) of the Federal

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 1 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1Class III gaming includes all gaming, other than social games for minor prizes and bingo, and

other comparable games, such as banking card games and "electronic or electromechanical

facsimiles of any game of chance or slot machines of any kind." 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(b) & (8). 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the

complaint.

I.

The Gaming Act authorizes Indian tribes and states to enter into "Tribal-State compacts"

setting forth the terms under which a tribe may conduct certain forms of gambling on itsreservation.

25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1988). A compact must be submitted to the Secretary of the Interior, who

shall approve or disapprove it within forty-five days; if the Secretary fails to act within that period,

the compact is deemed approved. Id. § 2710(d)(8)(C). Thereafter, the Secretary is required to

publish notice of the approved compact in the Federal Register. Id. § 2710(d)(8)(D).

In January 1992, the Chairman ofthe Kickapoo Tribe ofIndians ofthe Kickapoo Reservation

in Kansas and the Governor of Kansas entered into a compact authorizing Class III gambling on the

Kickapoo Reservation in Kansas.1 Shortly after the Tribe forwarded the compact to the Secretary

ofthe Interior, the AttorneyGeneralofKansas challenged the Governor's authority under Kansaslaw

to negotiate and enter into the compact, by filing a petition for mandamus in the Supreme Court of

Kansas. In the interim, in response to the Secretary's position that the compact did not comply with

the Gaming Act, the Tribe and the Governor revised the compact on grounds unrelated to the

Attorney General's lawsuit and resubmitted the compact to the Secretary. Because of the litigation

brought by the Kansas AttorneyGeneral, however, the Secretary notified the Governor and the Tribe

that the compact "had not been submitted as ... required by 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)," and that the

Gaming Act's forty-five-day review period would be tolled until the Supreme Court of Kansas

resolved the question of the Governor's authority.

The Tribe sued the Secretary seeking a declaratory judgment that the Secretary lacked

authority to defer approval of the compact and that his failure to disapprove it within forty-five days

resulted in approval of the compact as a matter of law. The Tribe also sought a writ of mandamus

directing the Secretary to publish notice of the compact in the Federal Register. After the Supreme

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 2 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

2An absent party is necessary to the litigation under FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a) if:

(1) in [the party's] absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those

already parties, or (2) [the party] claims an interest relating to the subject of the

action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in [the party's] absence

Court of Kansas interpreted state law as allowing the Governor to negotiate a compact under the

Gaming Act but precluding the Governor from signing the resulting compact and thereby binding the

State to its terms, State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1185 (Kan. 1992), the Secretary

moved to dismiss the Tribe's lawsuit on the ground that the State of Kansas was an indispensable

party under FED R. CIV. P. 19 not joined in the litigation. The Secretary also moved, in the

alternative, for summary judgment on the ground that the Governor's lack of authority to enter into

the compact rendered the compact a legal non-entity that could not constitute a valid submission to

the Secretary and thus that the forty-five-day period under the Gaming Act had not commenced to

run.

The district court denied the Secretary's motion to dismiss, ruling that the state legislature's

failure to enter into a compact with the Tribe and the assumption that the Governor negotiated and

signed the compact with "the best interests of the State in mind" meant that the State of Kansas was

not an indispensable party and the litigation could proceed in its absence. Kickapoo Tribe of Indians

v. Babbitt, 827 F. Supp. 37, 42-43 (D.D.C. 1993). The district court thereafter granted summary

judgment to the Secretary. While rejecting the Secretary's position that the Gaming Act permitted

him to toll the statutory forty-five-day review period, and ruling that the compact was approved by

operation of law, the district court concluded that the Governor's ultra vires action meant that the

State of Kansas never lawfully entered into the compact and thus the compact was void. Id. at 44,

46.

II.

Under FED. R. CIV. P. 19, whether a party is indispensable for a just adjudication requires a

determination regarding whether the absent party is necessary to the litigation; if so, whether the

absent party can be joined in the litigation; and if joinder is infeasible, whether the lawsuit can

nevertheless proceed "in equity and good conscience." FED.R.CIV. P. 19;2see Western Md. Ry. Co.

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 3 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede [the party's] ability to protect that

interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk

of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of

[the party's] claimed interest.

Where an absent party cannot be made a party, FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b) instructs the court to

determine:

whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the

parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent [party] being thus regarded as

indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what

extent a judgment rendered in the [party's] absence might be prejudicial to [that

party] or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective

provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the

prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the

[party's] absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an

adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 

3The Secretary did not file a cross appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss under Rule

19, but he argues in his brief that the denial was an abuse of discretion. The Tribe maintains that

the failure to cross appeal precludes the Secretary from arguing that the district court abused its

discretion in denying the Rule 19 motion. Even if that were so, see Massachusetts Mutual Life

Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479, 480-81 (1976) (while "appellee may not attack the decree with

a view either to enlarging his own rights ... or of lessening the rights of his adversary[,] ... it is

likewise settled that the appellee may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of a decree

any matter appearing in the record, although his argument may involve an attack upon the

reasoning of the lower court or an insistence upon matter overlooked or ignored by it") (quoting

United States v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924)), this court has a duty to raise

sua sponte the issue of whether the State of Kansas is an indispensable party. See Provident

Tradesman Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. at 106, 111; Wichita & Affiliated Tribes of

Okla. v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 772 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Weisberg v. United States Dep't of

Justice, 631 F.2d 824, 826-30 & n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 

v. HarborIns. Co, 910 F.2d 960, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The rule calls for a pragmatic decision based

on practical considerationsin the context of particular litigation. Provident Tradesman Bank &Trust

Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 116-17 n.12, 118 (1968); WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D, § 1601, at 10, 14 (1986). We review the district court's

determination that Kansas was not an indispensable party under Rule 19(b) for abuse of discretion.

Cloverleaf Standardbred Owners Ass'n. v. National Bank of Wash., 699 F.2d 1274, 1276 (D.C. Cir.

1983).3In that regard, the court has acknowledged that the district court has "substantial discretion

in considering which factorsto weigh and howheavilyto emphasize certain considerationsin deciding

whether the action should go forward." Id. at 1277 (citation omitted). We are, nevertheless,

constrained to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that Kansas was not an

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 4 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

4The court reviews determinations under Rule 19(a)(2)(ii) de novo. See Western Md. Ry., 910

F.2d at 963 n.6. 

indispensable party in the Tribe's lawsuit against the Secretary and that the trial could proceed in its

absence. We reach this conclusion based on the nature of the issue before the district court in light

of the immunity of the absent party and the district court's reliance on inappropriate factors.

A.

The Tribe seeks to obtain the validation of a compact with the State of Kansas that the

Supreme Court of Kansas has held was not approved by an official empowered to do so under state

law. State v. Finney, 836 P.2d at 1184-85. Clearly, as the district court assumed, the State of Kansas

has an interest in the validity of a compact to which it is a party, and this interest would be directly

affected by the relief that the Tribe seeks. Kickapoo Tribe, 827 F. Supp. at 41; Kansas v. Finney,

836 P.2d at 1176, 1183 (noting fiscal and other effects of the compact on the State). Thus, Kansas

is a necessary party under Rule 19(a).4See Wichita &Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d at 774; Enterprise

Management Consultants v. United States ex rel. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 893 (10th Cir. 1989). As a

necessary party, Kansasshould have been joined in the litigation ifsuch joinder wasfeasible. FED.R.

CIV. P. 19; see also Western Md. Ry., 910 F.2d at 962-63.

One reason joinder may be infeasible is that the absent party enjoyssovereign immunity. See

Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1460 (9thCir. 1994). Kansas enjoys immunity under

the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution that extends to suits commenced by

Indian tribes. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).

While Congress can abrogate this immunity, its intent to do so must be "unmistakably clear." See

Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989). Likewise, Kansas can waive its immunity but only by

explicit authorization in state law that is "express and unequivocal." See Ford Motor Co. v.

Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 467-68 (1945). Neither has occurred here. While

several courts have concluded that the Gaming Act's authorization of tribal suits against the states

for bad faith in compact negotiation provides a clear expression of congressional intent to abrogate

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 5 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

5

See Ponca Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1428 (10th Cir. 1994), petition for

cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-1029); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v.

South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 281 (8th Cir. 1993). 

6There is general agreement among several circuit courts that Congress intended to abrogate

the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting § 2710(d)(7) of the Gaming Act vesting

jurisdiction in the district court of lawsuits by Indian tribes alleging bad faith by states in compact

negotiations. But there is a split among the circuits on whether Congress has authority to

abrogate state immunity when it legislates pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. Compare

Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1432 (upholding congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment

immunity pursuant to Indian Commerce Clause), and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 3 F.3d at 281

(same), with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1023-24 (11th Cir.) petition for

cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. July 1, 1994) (No. 94-12) (legislation enacted pursuant to

Indian Commerce Clause cannot abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity because the

congressional abrogation power is limited to legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment and the Interstate Commerce Clause in Article I, § 8) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,

427 U.S. 445 (1976), and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)). 

7The district court did not consider, and neither party has addressed on appeal, whether Kansas

could have made a special appearance without waiving its immunity. Hence, we do not consider

the issue. See Miller v. Avirom, 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity,5nothing suggests that the Gaming Act provides an "unmistakably

clear" abrogation ofstate sovereign immunity when an Indian tribe seeks to compel the Secretary to

act under the statute.6 To the contrary, the fact that Congress expressly authorized particular causes

of action under the Gaming Act, see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A), and did not include the present suit

among those actions, indicatesthat Congress did not contemplate thistype ofsuit, and thus provided

no unmistakably clear intent to abrogate Kansas' immunity. See generally Guam v. American

President Lines, 28 F.3d 142, 145-49 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reviewing law on implied causes of action).

Further, nothing in the record suggests that Kansas has waived its immunity; its limited waiver for

tort actions within its own courts, see Kan. St. Ann. § 75-6103 (1993), does not encompass suits in

federal court. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 277 (1959). In the

absence of waiver or abrogation, Kansas cannot be joined in the instant litigation.7

Consequently, the issue faced by the district court was whether "in equity and good

conscience" the Tribe's lawsuit could proceed in the absence of the State of Kansas or whether the

lawsuit should be dismissed because Kansas was an indispensable party. While Rule 19(b) sets forth

four non-exclusive factors for the court to consider, see supra note 2, this court has observed that

"there is very little room for balancing of other factors" set out in Rule 19(b) where a necessary party

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 6 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

8Cf. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1499

(9th Cir. 1991) (applying the four factors in Rule 19(b) in determining whether an Indian tribe, a

necessary party immune from suit, is an indispensable party). 

under Rule 19(a) is immune from suit because immunity may be viewed as one of those interests

"compelling by themselves." Wichita & Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d at 777 n.13 (citation omitted);

see also Enterprise Management Consultants, 883 F.2d at 894; Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 171

n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984); WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, §

1617, at 257.8 Thus, notwithstanding the discretion generally accorded to the district court to

consider "which factors to weigh and how heavily to emphasize certain considerations," Cloverleaf,

699 F. 2d at 1277 (citation omitted), the district court was confronted with a more circumscribed

inquiry when it assessed whether the Tribe's lawsuit could proceed "in equity and good conscience"

in the absence of Kansas, which was both a necessary party and immune from the lawsuit.

B.

The exercise of discretion contemplatesreasoned decisionmaking on the basis ofrelevant and

appropriate considerations to the task at hand. See generally Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541

(1930); Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court: Viewed from Above, 22

SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 (1971). An appellate court, in reviewing for an abuse of discretion, must

consider "whether the decision maker failed to consider a relevant factor, whether he [or she] relied

on an improper factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support the conclusion." Johnson

v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365 (D.C. 1979) (citation omitted). See Sports Form, Inc. v. United

PressInt'l, 686 F.2d 750, 752 (9thCir. 1982) (citingCitizensto Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401

U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). The district court "abuses its discretion if it did not apply the correct legal

standard ... or if it misapprehended the underlying substantive law." Hunt v. National Broadcasting

Co., Inc., 872 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1989) (preliminary injunction). See Northern Alaska Envtl.

Ctr. v. Lujan, 961 F.2d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 1992) (same). If the exercise of discretion was in error

and the prejudicial impact of that error requires reversal, see Johnson, 398 A.2d at 366-67

(enumerating factors relevant to determining reversible error), the appellate court will hold that the

district court has abused its discretion.

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 7 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

9The inquiry as to prejudice under Rule 19(b) is the same as the inquiry under Rule 19(a)(2)(i)

regarding whether continuing the action will impair the absent party's ability to protect its interest.

See Confederated Tribes v. Lujan, 928 F.2d at 1499; Enterprise Management Consultants, 883

F.2d at 894 n.4. 

The district court found that the first two factors enumerated in Rule 19(b)prejudice to

Kansas from a judgment for the Tribe and inability to tailor a judgment to lessen or avoid the

prejudicefavored dismissal, but that the two remaining factorsthe adequacy of a judgment in

Kansas' absence and the lack of an adequate remedy for the Tribeplus two additional factors

dictated that the lawsuit could proceed notwithstanding Kansas' absence. Kickapoo Tribe, 827 F.

Supp. at 42-43. Specifically, the district court found no impediment to granting the relief sought by

the Tribe regardless of whether Kansas was a party and concluded that dismissal ofthe lawsuit would

leave the Tribe "without any remedy." Id. at 42. The court suggested that the latter consideration

"may well be the most important factor in this case." Id. In addition to the enumerated Rule 19(b)

factors, the district court also found significant that the Kansasstate legislature, the entity authorized

under state law to enter a tribal-state compact, had not engaged in substantial negotiations with the

Tribe despite ample time to do so and that thislack of receptivity to the negotiation processthwarted

the goals of the Gaming Act. Id. at 42-43. The district court also noted as significant that the

compact had been negotiated by the Governor, who "it is assumed ... has the best interests of the

State in mind" in approving the compact, thus diminishing the likelihood of prejudice to the State.

Id. at 43. Based on this assessment, the district court concluded that Kansas was not an indispensable

party.

While appropriately finding that Kansas would be prejudiced by a judgment rendered in its

absence,9the district court concluded that the prejudice was mitigated by two considerations. First,

the State of Kansas knew of the Tribe's lawsuit but it did not intervene. Id. at 41. Second, granting

relief to the Tribe would only subject the State to obligations to which the "popularly elected"

Governor, the State's highest executive official, had already agreed and obligations countenanced by

Congress under the Gaming Act. Id. at 41-42. Each consideration was flawed, however. Failure

to intervene is not a component of the prejudice analysis where intervention would require the absent

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 8 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

10Nor can the Tribe persuasively maintain that § 14 of the compact, authorizing the Tribe to

oversee law enforcement obligations should the State decline to exercise this authority, eliminates

"any possibility of prejudice" approval of the compact would cause to Kansas "in its ability to

oversee gaming conducted within its borders." Kickapoo Tribe, 827 F. Supp. at 42. As the

district court noted, approval of the compact not only forces Kansas to oversee gambling, but it

also ensures that Kansas "will be bound to a compact that was not approved in accordance with

Kansas law. Being forced to abide by an allegedly unlawful compact does serve to prejudice the

interests of the State." Id. at 41. Hence, the district court properly found that the first factor in

Rule 19(b)prejudice to the absent partyfavored dismissal. 

party to waive sovereign immunity. See Wichita & Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d at 776. Further,

assuming that the Governor could adequately represent the interests of the State in entering the

compact was contrary to the controlling state law; indeed, the district court acknowledged that this

same state law, having defined how Kansas' interests were to be protected under the Gaming Act,

precluded the Governor from signing the compact on her own initiative. Kickapoo Tribe, 827 F.

Supp. at 42-43. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Kansas explained the basis and importance of

the division of authority in the State. Kansas v. Finney, 836 P.2d at 1183. Hence, the district court

could not properly rely on either consideration for mitigation of the prejudice to the State of Kansas

as a result of its absence from the Tribe's lawsuit.10 While both considerations caused the district

court to view the first factor under Rule 19(b)prejudice to the State of Kansasas "the closest

issue," id. at 41, both considerationsinvolved "misapprehen[sion of] the underlying substantive law."

Hunt v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 872 F.2d at 293.

Because the district court concluded that Kansas would be prejudiced bya judgment rendered

in its absence, and that, in view of the reliefsought by the Tribe, "there is no way the court can avoid

the prejudice," Kickapoo Tribe, 827 F. Supp. at 42, the district court had grounds to dismiss the

complaint for failing to join an indispensable party without consideration of any additional factors.

See Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d at 171 n.42 ("Under the first and second prongs of [the Rule 19(b)

evaluation], when the relief requested must, to satisfy plaintiffs' claims, be in derogation of the rights

of a person not before the court, that person is an indispensable party."). See also Provident

Tradesman Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. at 124-25. The district court, however,

concluding that the prejudice was mitigated by two considerations, did consider additional factors,

all of which it concluded weighed against dismissing the Tribe'slawsuit. Assuming, notwithstanding

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 9 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

11The record before the district court indicated that the Tribe's lawsuit against Kansas was

pending on appeal by the State following the district court's denial of the State's motion to dismiss

on immunity grounds. Kickapoo Tribe, 827 F. Supp. at 42. In a consolidated appeal decided

September 2, 1994, the Tenth Circuit held that § 2710(d)(7)(A)-(B) of the Gaming Act abrogates

state immunity for purposes of a lawsuit by a tribe against a state. Ponca Tribe of Okla., 37 F.3d

at 1432. 

12The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in its Note on the 1966

Revision of Rule 19, stated that "[t]he fourth factor, looking to the practical effects of a dismissal,

indicates that the court should consider whether there is any assurance that the plaintiff, if

dismissed, could sue effectively in another forum where better joinder would be possible."

(emphasis added). See Provident Tradesman Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. at 112 (an

adequate remedy inquiry involves the question "whether the plaintiffs could have brought the

same action, against the same parties plus [the absent party] in a state court"); Harrell & Sumner

Contracting Co. v. Peabody Peterson Co., 415 F. Supp. 573, 576 n.3 (N.D. Fla. 1976) (alleged

prejudice against non-local parties by state juries did not constitute basis for claim that access to

state courts was an inadequate remedy under Rule 19(b)), aff'd on other grounds, 546 F.2d 1227

(5th Cir. 1976). 

Kansas' immunity, that the district court properly proceeded to consider additional factors, cf. id. at

119, the district court's assessment of them was flawed.

First, the district court found that the Tribe lacked "any other remedy" if the instant lawsuit

were to be dismissed. Kickapoo Tribe, 827 F. Supp. at 42. To the extent that the court found an

alternate remedy lacking because of the apparent reluctance by the state legislature to negotiate with

the Tribe, the district court gave insufficient consideration to the Gaming Act. That Act provides a

direct remedy whereby the Tribe can obtain ClassIII gaming rights, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)-(B),

and the record showed that the Tribe was pursuing its statutory interests in another forum.

11 To the

extent the court found that the Tribe lacked an adequate alternative remedy because it might not

negotiate as favorable a compact with the state legislature as it had with the Governor, the district

court misconceived Rule 19(b)'s fourth factor. The fourth factor requires consideration of whether

"the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed," FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b), which

is different from whether the plaintiff can obtain precisely the same relief elsewhere.12 Likewise, the

district court's concern that the instant lawsuit presented the only opportunity for the Tribe "to

challenge the alleged wrongful acts of the federal agents," Kickapoo Tribe, 827 F. Supp. at 43, was

misdirected; if the Secretary attempts to toll the forty-five-day period for his consideration of a

properly entered Tribal-State compact, then his action can be challenged anew. Finally, while the

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 10 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

absence of an alternative forum is properly weighed heavily against dismissal, the state's immunity

counters against proceeding; even if the Tribe lacked an adequate remedy by which to vindicate its

statutory rights, absence of an alternative remedy alone does not dictate retention of jurisdiction

under Rule 19. See Wichita & Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d at 777; 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

¶ 19.07-2[4], at 19-153 (1993).

Second, the district court reinvoked the assumption that the Governor entered the compact

with State's best interestsin mind as an independent ground underRule 19(b)supporting the retention

of jurisdiction. Kickapoo Tribe, 827 F. Supp. at 43. The Supreme Court of Kansas determined that

Kansas' interests under the Gaming Act were to be defined by the legislature, not the Governor. Its

decision was based on an analysis of the State constitutional provisions on separation of powers

between the Governor and the legislature as well as gambling. State v. Finney, 836 P.2d at 1176-77,

1181-82. Those vital State interests could not be reassessed by the court, notwithstanding the district

court's apparent good intentions to preclude Kansas from interposing delays undermining the

purposes of the Gaming Act. Kickapoo Tribe, 827 F. Supp. at 42-43.

Finally, the district court concluded that the apparent failure of the Kansas legislature to

negotiate in good faith with the Tribe supported the retention of jurisdiction. Id. While the court

might understandablyhave been concerned byindicationsthat Kansas wasstonewalling efforts by the

Tribe to reach agreement on a compact, reliance on this consideration as a basis to retain jurisdiction

wasinappropriate. Not being joined in the litigation, Kansas could not respond to the court's concern

about the State's conduct and the Secretary was not in a position to champion the State's position in

view of his trust obligations to the Tribe. See Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 444-45

(1912); Confederated Tribes v. Lujan, 928 F.2d at 1500. Cf. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d

at 775. Vigorous defense of its immunity in separate litigation cannot alone establish bad faith by the

State. See supra note 11; cf. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d at 776. Moreover, Congress,

anticipating such events, provided a mechanism in the Gaming Act by which Indian tribes can

challenge recalcitrant conduct on the part of states and obtain Class III gaming rights. 25 U.S.C. §

2710(d)(7)(B).

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 11 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

C.

While the 1966 amendment ofRule 19 was designed to emphasize the practical considerations

that underlie the determination of whether to proceed, see CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL

COURTS 498-99 (5th ed. 1994), Kansas' indispensability as a party in the Tribe's lawsuit is hardly a

formality; not only its contractual rights are at issue but its fiscal interests are also potentially at

stake. See State v. Finney, 836 P.2d at 1176. Moreover, it was both a necessary party under Rule

19(a) and immune from suit, thereby cabining the district court's discretion to consider factors under

Rule 19(b). See Wichita & Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d at 777 n.13 (citation omitted). The district

court could not properly rely on Kansas' failure to intervene in assessing mitigation of prejudice to

it, nor reassess the state law question of how Kansas' interests under the Gaming Act were to be

protected. Neither could the court appropriately factor into the balance, in Kansas' absence,

unproven allegations about its bad faith. Kansas' immunity from the Tribe's lawsuit coupled with the

district court's assessment of the first two Rule 19(b) factors indicate that the district court should

have dismissed the lawsuit. See Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d at 171 n.42. Absent that, the district court's

consideration ofinappropriate factorsin determining that "in equityand good conscience" the Tribe's

lawsuit could proceed because Kansas was not an indispensable partyunderRule 19(b), was an abuse

of its cabined discretion.

The situation cannot be salvaged, as the Tribe suggests, under the public interest exception

to Rule 19. Stated briefly, this exception provides that when litigation seeks vindication of a public

right, third persons who could be adversely affected by a decision favorable to the plaintiff are not

indispensable parties. See National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940). While the

"exact contours of the public interest exception have not been defined," the exception generally

applies where "what is at stake are essentially issues of public concern and the nature of the case

would require joinder of a large number of persons," Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324

(E.D. Cal. 1985); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 276 (D.D.C. 1985)

(applying exception in lawsuit addressing "a matter oftranscending importance"), aff'd, 835 F.2d 305

(D.C. Cir. 1987). Without the exception, public rights litigation would be severely curtailed because

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 12 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

it is often infeasible to join all the persons affected by such litigation. Id. at 325; see also National

Resources Defense Council v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553

(D.C. Cir. 1979). The instant case does not require the joining of an infeasibly large number of

parties. Nor does it appear to implicate a matter of transcending importance of the type that has

previously prompted courts to apply the exception. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n, 676 F. Supp

at 272, 276 (federal action affecting 170 million acres of public lands implicates public rights and

extends case "beyond the boundaries of a private dispute"). Furthermore, the Tribe has not pointed

to any analogous holding applying the public rights exception in the face of the absent party's

immunity. As a result, the public interest exception to Rule 19 is inapplicable.

Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case to the district

court with instructionsto vacate the entry ofjudgment for the Secretary and to dismissthe complaint

without prejudice.

USCA Case #93-5262 Document #95992 Filed: 01/13/1995 Page 13 of 13