Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00008/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00008-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC RICHARD ELESON,

Petitioner,

v.

JOE A. LIZARRAGA, et. al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00008-LJO-SAB HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On December 29, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. 1 (Pet., ECF No. 1). On 

April 28, 1995, Petitioner was convicted of Lewd or Lascivious Acts, in violation of Cal. Penal 

Code § 288(a), in the Tuolumne County Superior Court. (Pet. at 2).2 Petitioner was sentenced to 

85 years to life. (Pet. at 2). 

Petitioner alleges the following grounds for relief in his federal petition: (1) Cal. Penal 

Code § 288 was not validly enacted, so the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence 

him; (2) Cal. Penal Code § 667 is illegal because California did not seek authorization from the 

 

1

Pursuant to the mailbox rule, the Court deems the petitions filed on the date they were signed and presumably 

handed to prison authorities for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 

1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001).

2

Page numbers refer to the ECF pagination.

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Appropriations Committee of the California Legislature for the greater amount of taxes 

necessary to pay for increased periods of incarceration, and it was not validly enacted; (3) 

Government officials’ failure to respond to Petitioner’s documents means that his allegations are 

true and he should be released; (4) The prosecutors and judges did not have the authority to act in 

his case, because the California Bar is not valid; (5) California has no jurisdiction over him; (6) 

The two sentence enhancements should be served after the indeterminate sentences are complete; 

and (7) His out-of-state conviction should not have been used to enhance the punishment of his 

California conviction involved in this petition. 

I.

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a 

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to 

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir. 2001). In Herbst v. Cook, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a district court may dismiss sua 

sponte a habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the 

petitioner adequate notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 

1041-42.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 

S.Ct. 586 (1997). As the instant petition was filed on October 13, 2014, it is subject to the 

provisions of the AEDPA. 

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The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a 

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, 

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward 

any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct 

review became final. In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme 

Court on January 15, 1997. Thus, direct review concluded on April 15, 1997, when the ninety 

(90) day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. See Barefoot v. 

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Brown v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner had one year from the conclusion of direct review, absent applicable tolling, in which 

to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, the statute of limitations expired 

on April 15, 1998, absent applicable tolling. However, Petitioner delayed filing the instant 

petition until December 29, 2014, over sixteen years beyond the expiration of the statute of 

limitations. Therefore, Petitioner’s federal petition is untimely absent any applicable tolling.

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C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 

The statute of limitations began to run on April 15, 1997, and expired on April 15, 1998.

Petitioner claims that he has filed two habeas petitions in the California state courts. (Pet. at 3-

4). Although Petitioner filed two post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim in state court, the petitions did not operate to toll the statute of 

limitations. Petitioner’s first state habeas petition was filed in the Tuolumne County Superior 

Court on September 11, 2013, over fifteen years after the limitations period expired. (Pet. at 3). 

Subsequently, on February 3, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court. (Pet. at 4). When the limitations period had already expired at the 

time the collateral challenge was filed, the collateral challenges had no tolling consequences. 

See Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to 

statutory tolling for his two state habeas petitions, because his first state habeas petition was filed 

after the expiration of the limitations period. Thus, it appears that Petitioner’s federal petition is 

untimely, absent equitable tolling. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) 

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 

stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department 

of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 

(9th Cir. 1998) (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997)). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give 

rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir.2002); Hinton v. 

Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). 

Petitioner claims that there is no statute of limitations when fraud is present. However, 

Petitioner’s fraud argument regarding the statute of limitations goes to the merits of his claims, 

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and does not address why he should be entitled to equitable tolling. Petitioner also claims that 

there is an ongoing impediment to filing his petition. However, Petitioner does not provide any 

specific reasons why he was unable to file his state habeas petition for over fifteen years after the 

expiration of the statute of limitations. Petitioner also doesn’t explain what impediments 

prevented him from filing his federal habeas petition for over sixteen years after the expiration of 

the statute of limitations. In addition, Petitioner does not explain how he was able to file the 

instant federal petition if there are still ongoing impediments that affect his ability to file 

documents with the Court. 

II.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner is ORDERED to SHOW 

CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this Order why the petition should not 

be dismissed for violating the limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order will result in dismissal of the 

petition pursuant to Fed. R. Civil Proc. § 41(b) (A petitioner’s failure to prosecute or to comply 

with a court order may result in a dismissal of the action, and the dismissal operates as an 

adjudication on the merits.).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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