Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01217/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01217-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1217

___________

Robert Tupper, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Minesota.

Boise Cascade Corporation, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: November 15, 2004

Filed: January 7, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, HEANEY, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

___________

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

Robert Tupper worked for the Boise Cascade Corporation in a Minnesota paper

mill. During his employment, Tupper received several warnings about his chronic

absenteeism. In May 2001, Boise required Tupper to sign a last chance agreement,

which provided Tupper could not miss any part of a scheduled workday for the next

six months. Tupper understood that failure to comply with the agreement could result

in his immediate termination. In a Sunday in October 2001, Tupper broke a tooth

while eating a sandwich during his morning shift. Tupper spoke with his supervisor

and insisted that he needed medical attention. The supervisor expressed concern

about the consequences of Tupper’s departure under the agreement, and being

Appellate Case: 04-1217 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/07/2005 Entry ID: 1852734 
*

The Honorable Richard D. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

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uncertain of its duration, allowed Tupper to go home to check the agreement. Tupper

departed and did not return that day. Tupper’s dentist’s office was closed, and he did

not seek immediate medical care. Instead, Tupper went to his dentist the following

day over his lunch hour. 

After the incident, Tupper did not seek workers’ compensation benefits or

suggest to Boise he would do so. Tupper’s health insurance carrier paid his medical

bill. Two days after Tupper broke his tooth, Boise terminated his employment for

leaving work during his shift in violation of the agreement. After his union declined

to file a grievance, Tupper filed this diversity action for retaliatory discharge, alleging

Boise wrongfully terminated him in violation of Minn. Stat. § 176.82, which states

any person who discharges an employee for seeking workers’ compensation benefits

is liable in a civil action for the employee’s damages. Applying Minnesota law, the

district court*

 granted summary judgment to Boise, holding Tupper could not

establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge because he had not shown he

engaged in conduct protected by § 176.82. The district court noted Tupper admitted

he did not seek workers’ compensation benefits or suggest to anyone at Boise that he

would do so. 

Tupper appeals asserting he was protected by § 176.82. Having reviewed the

grant of summary judgment de novo, we conclude there was no genuine issue of

material fact and Boise is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We are satisfied

that the district court properly analyzed Minnesota law, and affirm on the basis of the

district court’s memorandum opinion and order. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

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HEANEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The district court based its grant of summary judgment

to the defendant on Tupper’s failure to file a claim seeking workers’ compensation

benefits. This is not fully consistent with Minnesota law. 

The Minnesota Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether a claim or

retaliatory discharge under Minn. Stat. § 176.82 requires an employee to file a

workers’ compensation claim. In Flaherty v. Lindsay, 467 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1991),

the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that two types of conduct were prohibited by the

statute: “retaliatory discharges (or threatened discharges) and obstructions of

workers’ compensation benefits.” Id. at 32. The court held that obstruction involved

“some actual denial or disruption in the receipt of benefits” but did not indicate

whether this applied to retaliatory discharge cases. Id.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals have issued inconsistent opinions on this

issue. Compare Randall v. Northern Milk Prod., Inc., 519 N.W.2d 456, 460 (Minn

Ct. App. 1994) (upholding a finding of retaliatory discharge where employee intended

to file a workers’ compensation claim, but did not actually file the claim until two

months after his discharge), with Furrer v. Campbell’s Soup Co., 403 N.W.2d 658,

660 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming summary judgment where employee only filed

claim after her discharge). The more recent case, Randall, shows that a retaliatory

discharge claim does not necessarily fail if the employee has not filed a claim at the

time of his discharge. In that case, the employee reported a back injury to his

employer, but initially stated that he was unsure whether the injury occurred at work.

Randall, 519 N.W.2d at 458. After further questioning, he stated that he was injured

at work, and was immediately fired. Id. The court held that this conversation

provided a sufficient basis for a fact-finder to infer that the employee was terminated

because he intended to file a workers’ compensation claim. Id. at 460. 

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The relevant question in this case is not whether Tupper actually filed a

workers’ compensation claim, but whether he has presented a prima facie case that

he was discharged because of his perceived intent to seek workers’ compensation

benefits. Tupper has shown that he was injured while at work, that his employer was

aware of his injury, and that his termination occurred shortly after he reported his

injury. While Tupper did not specifically raise the issue of workers’ compensation

and did not seek benefits after his termination, this does not foreclose his claim as a

matter of law. Breitenfeldt v. Long Beach Packing Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180

(D.Minn. 1999) (holding that an employee’s failure to seek benefits “go[es] to the

weight of the evidence” and did not preclude his claim). 

I would reverse the district court and remand this case for trial. 

______________________________

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