Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04497/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04497-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY L. BROWN,

Petitioner,

v.

W. L. MUNIZ, Acting Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-04497-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; REINSTATING 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE; AND 

DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION 

FOR DISCOVERY AND EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state conviction. In an Order dated November 17, 

2104, the Court issued its Order to Show Cause. Dkt. 7.

Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition as successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 

Dkt. 13. Petitioner opposes the motion to dismiss, and Respondent has filed a reply to the 

opposition. 

Petitioner has also filed a motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Dkt. 3.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Respondent’s motion to dismiss

without prejudice to renewing the motion to address the issue below. The Court also DENIES 

without prejudice Petitioner’s motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing.

BACKGROUND

In 1995, Petitioner was sentenced to fifty-six years to life in state prison, following his 

conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and attempted first degree murder.

Thereafter, Petitioner unsuccessfully pursued direct and collateral review in state court. 

However, the Court need not detail his state post-conviction proceedings here as they are not 

relevant to the pending dispositive motion.

On October 7, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant petition. Dkt. 1.

DISCUSSION

I. RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

A claim presented in a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

Case 4:14-cv-04497-YGR Document 17 Filed 05/14/15 Page 1 of 8
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

28 U.S.C. § 2254 must be dismissed if presented in a prior petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1); 

Babbitt v. Woodford, 177 F.3d 744, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1999). Section 2244(b) applies when a court 

has disposed of a previous petition on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (emphasis supplied). 

As a consequence, a petitioner must obtain an order from the court of appeals which authorizes the 

district court to consider any second or successive petition before that petitioner can file such a 

petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Without such an order, a district court must dismiss the 

successive petition, including any new claims raised in that petition. See id. § 2244(b)(2). 

Here, Respondent contends that the instant petition is successive because Petitioner has 

filed a prior federal habeas petition, which challenged the same underlying state conviction. Dkt. 

13 at 3. In his previous federal habeas action, Case No. C 98-2013 MMC (PR), Judge Maxine M. 

Chesney denied the petition on the merits. Dkt. 28 in Case No. C 98-2013 MMC (PR). 

Respondent contends this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the instant renewed application for 

relief because Petitioner has made no showing that he obtained an order from the Ninth Circuit 

allowing him to file a successive petition. Dkt. 13 at 3. Thus, Respondent asserts the petition 

must be dismissed as successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Id.

In his opposition, Petitioner does not deny that he filed a previous federal habeas petition

which was denied on the merits, as shown by Respondent. However, Petitioner argues that the 

instant petition is not a second or successive petition because it is based on new Brady1claims. 

Dkt. 14 at 6-10.

A new claim presented in a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that was 

not presented in a prior petition must be dismissed unless it satisfies one of two sets of 

requirements. Under section 2244(b)(2)(A), the district court must dismiss a newly-presented 

claim in a second or successive petition unless the applicant “shows” that the “claim relies on a 

new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 

Court, that was previously unavailable.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Meanwhile, section 

2244(b)(2)(B) permits a newly presented claim where:

 

1

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

Case 4:14-cv-04497-YGR Document 17 Filed 05/14/15 Page 2 of 8
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in 

light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by 

clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no 

reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the 

underlying offense. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B). To survive dismissal as a second or successive petition under this 

exception, a petitioner must make a prima facie showing that “his claim (1) is based on newly 

discovered evidence and (2) establishes that he is actually innocent of the crimes alleged.” King v. 

Trujillo, 638 F.3d 726, 729-30 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). “A prima facie showing is a 

sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the district court, and we 

will grant an application for [a second or successive] petition if it appears reasonably likely that 

the application satisfies the stringent requirements for the filing of a second or successive 

petition.” Bible v. Schriro, 651 F.3d 1060, 1064 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

There is some uncertainty regarding how the second or successive restrictions apply with 

respect to Brady claims. Several circuits have ruled that second-in-time claims arising under 

Brady are not exempt from the second or successive restrictions. See Quezada v. Smith, 624 F.3d 

514, 520 (2nd Cir. 2010) (applying section 2244(b) to Brady claim); In re Siggers, 615 F.3d 477, 

479 (6th Cir. 2010) (same); Tompkins v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 557 F.3d 1257, 1259-60 (11th Cir.

2009); Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d 306, 323 (4th Cir. 2000) (same); see also Johnson v. Dretke, 442 

F.3d 901, 911 (5th Cir. 2006) (“a successive petitioner urging a Brady claim may not rely solely 

upon the ultimate merits of the Brady claim in order to demonstrate due diligence under 

[section] 2244(b)(2)(B) where the petitioner was noticed pretrial of the existence of the factual 

predicate and of the factual predicate’s ultimate potential exculpatory relevance”).

The Ninth Circuit in King, on the other hand, has “recognized that a Brady v. Maryland

violation claim in a habeas petition may not be subject to the ‘clear and convincing standard’

[under section 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)], provided the newly discovered evidence supporting the claim 

[i]s ‘material’ under Brady.” King, 638 F.3d at 729 (citing United States v. Lopez, 577 F.3d 1053, 

1066-68 (9th Cir. 2009) (leaving open the question of whether meritorious Brady claims that

Case 4:14-cv-04497-YGR Document 17 Filed 05/14/15 Page 3 of 8
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

would have been reviewable under the pre-AEDPA prejudice standard are subject to section

2244(b)(2)(B)(ii))).

In Lopez, the federal prisoner argued that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), holding that competency-to-be-executed claims 

based on Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), are exempt from AEDPA’s second or 

successive requirements, established that Brady claims are exempt from the second-or-successive 

restrictions as well. Lopez, 577 F.3d at 1066. The government, on the other hand, argued that all 

second-in-time Brady claims are subject to the second or successive restrictions because they are 

second or successive claims that rely on “newly discovered” evidence. Id. In considering both 

arguments, the Ninth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court has not always read “second or 

successive” literally. Id. at 1062. The Ninth Circuit also noted that in Panetti, the Supreme Court 

held “[t]he phrase ‘second or successive’ is not self-defining.” Id. (quoting Panetti, 551 U.S. at 

943). Responding to the government’s argument, the Lopez court stated that under a literal 

reading of “second or successive” in AEDPA,

federal courts would lack jurisdiction to consider any second-in-time 

Brady claims unless petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found petitioner 

guilty of the offense had the newly discovered evidence been 

available at trial. If [section 2244(b)]2applies literally to every 

second-in-time Brady claim, federal courts would be unable to 

resolve an entire subset of meritorious Brady claims: those where 

petitioner can show the suppressed evidence establishes a 

reasonable probability of a different result and is therefore material 

under Brady, but cannot, under [section 2244(b)(2)]’s more 

demanding prejudice standard, show that the evidence establishes by 

clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have 

voted to convict petitioner.

Lopez, 577 F.3d at 1064 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted and footnote added). The effect, 

the Ninth Circuit concluded, was the “perverse result” of foreclosing federal review of some 

meritorious claims and rewarding prosecutors for failing to meet their constitutional disclosure 

obligations under Brady. Id. at 1065.

 

2

Lopez was a section 2255 case, and the Ninth Circuit was applying section 2255(h)’s 

gateway in that case; however, the court of appeals treats the section 2244(b) gateway identically. 

See United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000).

Case 4:14-cv-04497-YGR Document 17 Filed 05/14/15 Page 4 of 8
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Ultimately, however, the Lopez court declined to resolve the issue regarding whether 

meritorious Brady claims were categorically exempt from AEDPA’s second or successive petition 

provisions, holding that “[e]ven if Panetti could be viewed as supporting an exemption from 

AEDPA’s gatekeeping provisions for meritorious Brady claims, such a rule would not benefit 

Lopez, because we conclude (1) that Brady claims that fail to establish materiality (and therefore 

lack merit) are subject to AEDPA’s gatekeeping provisions and (2) that Lopez has failed to 

establish materiality.” Id. 

As noted above, recently and subsequent to Lopez, the Ninth Circuit in King, again 

suggested that the section 2244(b)(2) second and successive restrictions do not necessarily apply 

to meritorious Brady claims. King, 638 F.3d at 729.

The Court finds that to the extent an exception to section 2244(b)(2) exists for Brady 

claims, as suggested by the Ninth Circuit, this may be a case that would fit that exception. See id. 

In his reply, Respondent claims that he “ha[s] found no case holding that Brady claims are 

excepted from [the] requirement[]” of first obtaining permission from the court of appeals before 

filing “second-in-time petitions raising claims that were not raised in a prior petition.” Dkt. 15 at 

2. Thus, Respondent has not considered whether this case fits into the aforementioned exception 

as recognized by the Ninth Circuit in King, 638 F.3d at 729. Therefore, the Court DENIES 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss without prejudice to renewing the motion so as to address 

whether this case fits the exception to section 2244(b)(2) as recognized by the Ninth Circuit in 

King. The parties shall abide by the briefing schedule outlined below.

II. PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY AND EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Petitioner requests discovery and an evidentiary hearing on his aforementioned Brady

claims. Dkt. 3 at 1. Respondent has not responded to Petitioner’s requests. 

Under the AEDPA express limitations are imposed on the power of a federal court to grant 

an evidentiary hearing. The habeas statute provides that a district court may not hold an 

evidentiary hearing on a claim for which the petitioner failed to develop a factual basis in state 

court unless petitioner shows that: (1) the claim relies either on (a) a new rule of constitutional law 

that the Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases on collateral review, or (b) a factual 

Case 4:14-cv-04497-YGR Document 17 Filed 05/14/15 Page 5 of 8
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence, 

and (2) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant 

guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

Even if an evidentiary hearing is permitted because a prisoner was able to clear the hurdle 

posed by section 2254(e)(2), one is not required. Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 

2000). The district court retains discretion whether to hold an evidentiary hearing or to expand the 

record with discovery and documentary evidence instead. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 

590 (9th Cir. 2004). This permissible intermediate step may avoid the necessity of an expensive 

and time consuming hearing in every habeas corpus case. Id. at 590-91.

Here, it is not clear to the Court that the facts which Petitioner seeks to develop could not 

be gathered other than by way of an evidentiary hearing, through the use of discovery and 

supplementation of the record. See Downs, 232 F.3d at 1041. In any event, the Court is allowing 

Respondent to file a renewed motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the request for an evidentiary 

hearing is DENIED without prejudice as premature.

The Court now turns to Petitioner’s discovery request relating to his Brady claims. Rule 6 

of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a habeas petitioner to invoke the 

processes of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the Court grants 

leave to do so. The Court may grant leave for discovery “in the exercise of [its] discretion and for 

good cause shown.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). Good cause is shown “where 

specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are 

fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.” Id. at 908-09, citing 

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 287, 300 (1969). 

At this point in the proceedings, the Court finds his discovery request premature. Again, 

the Court is allowing Respondent to file a renewed motion to dismiss. If Respondent chooses not 

to file a motion to dismiss and instead files an answer to the petition, then Petitioner might be able 

to again argue that he is entitled to discovery on this matter. Therefore, the Court DENIES 

Petitioner’s discovery request without prejudice to renewing it at that time.

Case 4:14-cv-04497-YGR Document 17 Filed 05/14/15 Page 6 of 8
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition as second or successive under 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) is DENIED. Dkt. 13. The denial is without prejudice to filing a renewed 

motion addressing whether this case fits the exception to section 2244(b)(2) as recognized by the 

Ninth Circuit in King v. Trujillo. 

2. In order to expedite these proceedings, the Court shall reinstate its November 17, 

2104 Order to Show Cause. Dkt. 7.

3. Respondent shall file with this Court and serve upon Petitioner, within sixty (60) 

days of the issuance of this Order of the issuance of this Order, an Answer conforming in all 

respects to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of 

habeas corpus should not be issued. Respondent shall file with the Answer a copy of all portions 

of the relevant state records that have been transcribed previously and that are relevant to a 

determination of the issues presented by the petition.

4. If Petitioner wishes to respond to the Answer, he shall do so by filing a Traverse 

with the Court and serving it on Respondent within sixty (60) days of his receipt of the Answer. 

Should Petitioner fail to do so, the petition will be deemed submitted and ready for decision sixty 

(60) days after the date Petitioner is served with Respondent’s Answer.

5. As mentioned above, Respondent may file a renewed motion to dismiss to address 

the issue above. The renewed motion shall be filed no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the 

date of this Order. 

If Respondent files a renewed motion, Petitioner shall file with the Court and serve on 

Respondent an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the renewed motion within twentyeight (28) days of receipt of the renewed motion.

Respondent shall file with the Court and serve on Petitioner a reply within fourteen (14) 

days of receipt of any opposition.

6. Petitioner’s motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing is DENIED without 

prejudice. Dkt. 3.

Case 4:14-cv-04497-YGR Document 17 Filed 05/14/15 Page 7 of 8
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

7. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 3 and 13.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

May 14, 2015

Case 4:14-cv-04497-YGR Document 17 Filed 05/14/15 Page 8 of 8