Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02239/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02239-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Bounlom Khamsonphou, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-02239-PHX-SRB

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Bounlom Khamsonphou applied for, and was denied, a period of 

disability and disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). 

Plaintiff then filed a Complaint with this Court to challenge that denial. (Doc. 1). The 

Court now considers Plaintiff’s Opeing [sic] Brief (“Pl.’s Br.”) (Doc. 19) and 

Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (“Def.’s Br.”) (Doc. 20). Plaintiff 

did not file a reply. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits on December 22, 2010, alleging that her disability began on September 9, 2009. 

(R. at 15.)1

 Her claim was denied initially on June 13, 2011 and upon reconsideration on 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s alleged onset date was originally September 9, 2009, which Plaintiff 

later amended to August 31, 2010. (R. at 235.) However, Plaintiff’s counsel provided a different alleged onset date at the hearing—October 9, 2010—confirmed by Plaintiff in subsequent testimony. (R. at 52, 54.) Further confounding this issue is the ALJ’s decision, which cites both September 9, 2009 and September 9, 2010 as the alleged onset date, and records that indicate that Plaintiff was laid off in September 2010. (R. at 17-18; 

see R. at 305.) Nevertheless, because the ALJ’s opinion appears to primarily use 

Case 2:13-cv-02239-SRB Document 21 Filed 07/31/14 Page 1 of 12
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

September 8, 2011. (R. at 15.) Plaintiff then requested a hearing, which was held before 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Philip E. Moulaison on July 12, 2012. (R. at 15, 25.) 

Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Thomas M. Mitchell testified at the hearing. (R. 

at 15.) The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on August 10, 2012 in which he found 

that Plaintiff was not disabled from September 9, 2009 through the date of the decision. 

(R. at 25.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on September 3, 

2013, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. at 1.) 

Plaintiff now appeals. 

 A. Relevant Medical Evidence 

Plaintiff asserts that she is disabled due to pain in her right hand and right wrist. 

(Pl.’s Br. at 3, 13-14.)2

 Plaintiff does not appeal the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s 

psychological condition was not disabling, and the Court limits its summary of the record 

to those portions relevant to Plaintiff’s right wrist and hand. (See R. at 17-19.) 

 1. Treating Sources 

 a. Advanced Arthritis Care & Research 

 Plaintiff visited Advanced Arthritis Care & Research throughout 2010 for 

treatment of her right wrist, hand, and arm. (R. at 472-79.) On April 30, 2010, she 

reported pain, swelling, and redness in her right wrist for the previous two months, and 

rated her pain as a five out of ten. (R. at 478.) Examination by Nurse Practitioner Maria 

Nasta revealed positive erythema, swelling, and edema in her right wrist, but negative 

tenderness, erythema, and edema in the small joints of her hands. (R. at 479.) Plaintiff 

had good range of motion in all joints except her right wrist, which was limited by 

discomfort. (R. at 479.) She was assessed to have right de Quervain’s tenosynovitis and 

 Plaintiff’s original September 9, 2009 date and Plaintiff does not challenge this date on appeal, the Court will review Plaintiff’s arguments based on the alleged onset date of September 9, 2009. (See R. at 15-18, 25; Pl.’s Br. at 2.) 

2

 While Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she also suffered from pain in both arms, and various records indicate that Plaintiff visited treating sources for complaints of arm pain, Plaintiff limits her arguments to alleged disabilities in her right wrist and hand. (See R. at 56-57, 313, 478; Pl.’s Br. at 13-14.) 

Case 2:13-cv-02239-SRB Document 21 Filed 07/31/14 Page 2 of 12
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

right wrist pain. (R. at 479.) Ms. Nasta diagnosed Naprosyn and injected Plaintiff’s wrist 

with bupivacaine and Celestone to help relieve some of her pain. (R. at 479.) 

 Plaintiff returned on June 23, 2010, reporting that “she had some minimal relief 

with the injection” but still had difficulty working. (R. at 476.) Plaintiff was prescribed 

prednisone and Vicodin and recommended to undergo an MRI for her right wrist. (R. at 

476.)3

 On July 19, 2010, Plaintiff reported increased pain in her right wrist, but noted that 

the prednisone offered “mild relief.” (R. at 474.) She continued to have trouble at work 

and admitted that she was not resting or wearing a splint. (R. at 474.) Plaintiff received 

another injection in her wrist and given a prescription “for modified work duty with the 

right hand.” (R. at 474.) 

 On August 5, 2010, Plaintiff reported a “significant decrease in right hand pain” 

after her previous injection. (R. at 473.) She continued to wear a brace at work, but was 

afraid of losing her job if she moved to “light” duty. (R. at 473.) Ms. Nasta noted that she 

had a “significant language barrier” with Plaintiff, which caused some difficulty 

explaining the medications, or understanding which medications Plaintiff was taking. (R. 

at 473.) Plaintiff was continued on regular duty at work and she indicated that she would 

use a wrist brace. (R. at 473.) Ms. Nasta again diagnosed Plaintiff with right 

deQuervain’s tenosynovitis and right wrist pain, along with tendinosis and osteoarthritis 

of the first carpometacarpal joint. (R. at 473.) 

 b. Southeast Valley Medical Group 

Plaintiff was also treated at Southeast Valley Medical Group from 2001 to 2010 

for a variety of ailments. (See, e.g., R. at 305-424.) Plaintiff’s first visit relating to her 

right wrist or hand in the relevant time period was on February 2, 2010, when she 

complained of right arm and wrist pain radiating up her forearm, “which resulted while 

[at] work.” (R. at 313.) Plaintiff related to Physician Assistant Marti Neave that her 

 

3

 Plaintiff completed the MRI at evdi Medical Imaging on July 9, 2010. (R. at 450.) The MRI revealed mild to moderate deQuervain’s tenosynovitis with moderate 

tendinosis, accounting for the area of Plaintiff’s pain and swelling in the “radial aspect” of her right wrist, along with mild to moderate osteoarthritis of the first carpometacarpal joint. (R. at 450-51.) 

Case 2:13-cv-02239-SRB Document 21 Filed 07/31/14 Page 3 of 12
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

condition began several weeks before and that her arm and wrist pain was aggravated by 

walking and relieved by nothing. (R. at 313.) After an examination revealed swelling and 

pain in her right wrist, Ms. Neave ordered an x-ray of Plaintiff’s wrist and referred 

Plaintiff to a hand surgeon. (R. at 314.) Plaintiff returned on April 6, 2010 complaining of 

the same pain, but admitted that she did not visit the hand surgeon as recommended. (R. 

at 311.) Plaintiff was assessed to have pain, tendonitis, a “[s]prain-[s]train” in her right 

hand and wrist, and osteoporosis. (R. at 312.) She was prescribed vitamin D and calcium 

and referred again to a hand surgeon and rheumatologist. (R. at 312.) On a visit for an 

unrelated matter on August 2, 2010, she reported right wrist pain on a scale of six out of 

ten, but a subsequent examination did not indicate the status of her right wrist or hand. 

(R. at 308-09.) On September 17, 2010, Plaintiff returned for complaints of lower back 

pain and right wrist pain and indicated that she was recently laid off. (R. at 305.) Plaintiff 

reported that she had been going “off and on” her medication and that she was unsure that 

she would continue to use her medications. (R. at 305.) A physical examination revealed 

“good” range of motion in her hands. (R. at 306.) 

 2. Examining Physicians 

 a. Dr. Jeffrey Levison, M.D. 

Dr. Jeffrey Levison examined Plaintiff on May 11, 2011 and completed an 

accompanying “Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities 

(“Physical”)” (“MSS”). (R. at 486-91.) Dr. Levison noted that Plaintiff “ha[d] a very 

normal examination from head to toe,” and that he “closely examined both [of] her 

hands.” (R. at 487.) Dr. Levison observed “no soft tissue swelling, no joint effusions, and 

no ligamentous laxity whatsoever” in her hands and a “Finkelstein sign was negative 

bilaterally.” (R. at 487.) She had “no abnormalities about her wrists or hands,” full range 

of motion in her wrists, and five out of five grip strength. (R. at 487.) Dr. Levison 

concluded that while Plaintiff had a history of deQuervain’s tenosynovitis, it “appear[ed] 

to be resolved at this point in time,” and that there was “nothing limiting about her hands 

and wrists.” (R. at 487-88.) His MSS reflected this conclusion. (R. at 488.) 

Case 2:13-cv-02239-SRB Document 21 Filed 07/31/14 Page 4 of 12
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 b. Dr. Quirino B. Valeros, M.D. 

 Dr. Quirino B. Valeros examined Plaintiff and completed a Physical Residual 

Functional Capacity (“RFC”) Questionnaire one day before Plaintiff’s hearing—on July 

11, 2012. (R. at 504, 508.) He observed normal range of motion in Plaintiff’s left hand 

and wrist, except for “typical Heberden’s nodes present on the distal phalanges of the 

second and third fingers of the left hand.” (R. at 506.) Plaintiff’s right hand “exhibited 

edema and tenderness upon palpation of the small joints,” and had a limited range of 

motion. (R. at 506.) Plaintiff also had tenderness and swelling over the thumb side of her 

right wrist, up to her forearm. (R. at 506.) Dr. Valeros noted that a Finkelstein test was 

positive for tendonitis, and a Jammar dynamometer test revealed two pounds on the right 

hand and five pounds on the left hand. (R. at 506.) He concluded that Plaintiff was unable 

to continue working because “her field of work demands specific fine motor skills of her 

right hand.” (R. at 506.) 

 Dr. Valeros’s handwriting on the Questionnaire is mostly indecipherable. (See R. 

at 508-09.) However, he indicated that Plaintiff was could rarely lift and carry ten pounds 

with her right hand and could occasionally carry twenty pounds with her left hand. (R. at 

508.) Plaintiff could also rarely grasp, twist objects, turn, or use her fingers for fine 

manipulation with her right hand, while she could frequently do those activities with her 

left hand. (R. at 509.) Plaintiff could occasionally reach overhead with her right arm, and 

frequently reach overhead with her left arm. (R. at 509.) 

 3. Non-examining Physicians 

 a. Dr. Jean Goerss, M.D. 

Dr. Jean Goerss reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record and completed a Physical 

Residual Functional Capacity Assessment on May 18, 2011 (R. at 78-81.) She found 

Plaintiff to be partially credible, in part, because “no objective evidence estab[l]ishes a 

degree of limitation[] approaching what she claims.” (R. at 78-79.) According to Dr. 

Goerss’s assessment, Plaintiff could lift and/or carry twenty-five pounds occasionally and 

twenty pounds frequently. (R. at 79.) Plaintiff could also stand and/or walk about six 

Case 2:13-cv-02239-SRB Document 21 Filed 07/31/14 Page 5 of 12
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

hours per eight-hour workday, sit more than six hours per workday, and had unlimited 

ability to push and/or pull. (R. at 79.) She noted that Plaintiff could never climb ladders, 

ropes, or scaffolds and should avoid jumping from heights, but otherwise had no postural 

limitations. (R. at 80.) Plaintiff also had no manipulative, visual, communicative, or 

environmental limitations, except that Plaintiff should avoid concentrated exposure to 

vibration and all exposure to hazards. (R. at 80-81.) Dr. Goerss opined that Plaintiff’s de 

Quervain’s tenosynovitis “was not a repetitive motion injury but was inflammatory,” and 

that “[h]er work assembling should not have any effect on this condition.” (R. at 81.) In 

addition, there was no evidence of arthritis in any joint, except for the right wrist. (R. at 

81.) Dr. Goerss concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled and could perform her past 

relevant work as an electronic assembler. (R. at 81-82.)

 b. Dr. Melvin Roberts, M.D. 

 Dr. Melvin Roberts also reviewed Plaintiff’s record and completed a Physical 

Residual Functional Capacity Assessment on September 6, 2011, which largely echoed 

the conclusions of Dr. Goerss’s report. (R. at 91-95.) The only notable difference was Dr. 

Roberts’s assessment that Plaintiff was able to lift and/or carry twenty pounds 

occasionally and ten pounds frequently. (R. at 92.)

 B. Other Evidence 

 1. Plaintiff’s Function Reports 

Plaintiff’s first Function Report, completed on April 16, 2011 by her husband, 

Manisakone Nadenbousch, indicated that Plaintiff’s daily activities involved taking 

multiple medications to limit inflammation in her hands, legs, and knees, and limiting her 

work around the house. (R. at 203; see R. at 194, 201, 210.) Plaintiff had no problem with 

her personal care, but she did not prepare her own meals because she had trouble holding 

utensils. (R. at 204.) Plaintiff noted that she would shop for groceries one day a week for 

thirty minutes, but that she would not go out alone for fear of “sporadic inflammation.” 

(R. at 205.) In part, Plaintiff noted that her condition affected her ability to lift, complete 

tasks, and use her hands, each of which she could do for only “about five minutes” at a 

Case 2:13-cv-02239-SRB Document 21 Filed 07/31/14 Page 6 of 12
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

time. (R. at 207.) She revealed that she could lift only about five pounds. (R. at 207.) 

 Plaintiff submitted a second Function Report, also completed by her husband, on 

May 21, 2011. (R. at 211, 219.) While very similar to her first Function Report, Plaintiff 

indicated a few minor differences, including that she did light exercise during the day and 

that she could lift up to ten pounds. (R. at 212-13, 216.) 

 2. Third Party Function Report 

 Plaintiff’s husband completed his own Third Party Function Report on April 15, 

2011that did not differ substantially from Plaintiff’s Function Reports. (R. at 194-201.) 

 C. Hearing Testimony 

 1. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

Plaintiff testified at the hearing held on her application for benefits on July 12, 

2012. (R. at 51.)4

 She testified that she was fifty-eight years old, married, and righthanded. (R. at 53.) The highest grade completed by Plaintiff was fourth grade, in Laos. 

(R. at 53.) Plaintiff last worked on October 9, 2010, and testified that her current source 

of income was unemployment benefits that expired “about two or three weeks” prior to 

the hearing. (R. at 54.) Plaintiff’s husband also did not work, but received disability 

benefits. (R. at 54-56.) She testified that she previously worked as an assembler at 

Rockford Fosgate and Comtech EF Data. (R. at 56.) 

 Plaintiff reported that her “most severe” medical issue was with her right hand and 

right and left arms, and that she was currently taking only two medications: ibuprofen 

and hydrocodone. (R. at 56-58.) Plaintiff had problems at work using equipment as a 

result of her condition. (R. at 57.) When asked to describe her limitations, in relevant 

part, she explained could lift one pound with her arms, and that she had pain in her arms 

and right wrist, which Plaintiff opined was due to working with her hands. (R. at 59-60.)5

 

4

 During the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that Plaintiff was seeing a new treating physician, Dr. Cazares, but Plaintiff did not present those records to the ALJ. (R. 

at 57.) 

5

 Plaintiff also relayed a number of limitations that appear unrelated to her complaints of wrist and hand pain, including that she could climb a flight of stairs “but not very often,” walk about “one block” before needing to rest, stand up less than five 

Case 2:13-cv-02239-SRB Document 21 Filed 07/31/14 Page 7 of 12
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Plaintiff would take medicine and get massages to relieve her pain. (R. at 60.) 

 She testified that she started seeing a doctor for problems with her right hand and 

wrist that developed at work. (R. at 61.) She claimed that the pain would start to flare up 

after about ten to fifteen minutes at work, at which time she would use her other arm to 

complete her work and take breaks. (R. at 62.) Plaintiff testified that this problem caused 

her to slow down at work, and she believed that it ultimately led to her termination. (R. at 

62.) Plaintiff confirmed that she did constant precise work with her hands, and that this 

caused her radiating pain up her arms. (R. at 63-64.) She claimed that she could not clean, 

cook, or do laundry, understood only a “little bit” of English, and could write only her 

name. (R. at 64.) When asked if she looked for work after she was laid off, Plaintiff 

responded “[y]es, I look[ed], but nobody hire[d] me,” and that she received 

unemployment benefits during that time. (R. at 65.) 

 2. The VE’s Testimony 

 VE Thomas Mitchell also testified at the hearing. (R. at 65-69.) He classified 

Plaintiff’s past work as an assembler as semi-skilled and light. (R. at 67.) He opined that 

Plaintiff would not be able to perform her past work with the difficulties that she 

described in her hands, but would be able to perform assembly work at the sedentary, 

unskilled level. (R. at 67.) The VE testified that according to the limitations in Dr. 

Valeros’s RFC Questionnaire, she would not be able to perform her past relevant work 

because “her right hand would be too limited.” (R. at 68.) He opined that Dr. Valeros’s 

medical opinion would prevent all work, because “[s]he needs to be able to use her upper 

extremities, at least on a frequent basis . . . bilaterally.” (R. at 69.) 

 D. The ALJ’s Decision 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the 

Social Security Act through December 31, 2014, and had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (R. at 17.) Plaintiff was determined to have 

 minutes at a time, sit for about five minutes before needing to move around, and that she 

had trouble bending over and tying her shoes. (R. at 58-59.) 

Case 2:13-cv-02239-SRB Document 21 Filed 07/31/14 Page 8 of 12
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the following severe impairments: osteoporosis, osteoarthritis of the first carpometacarpal 

joint of the right hand, and de Quervain’s tenosynovitis in her right thumb. (R. at 18.) The 

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have any impairment that met or medically equaled a 

listed impairment in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 20.) According to 

the ALJ’s RFC, Plaintiff was able to lift and carry ten pounds frequently and twenty 

pounds occasionally, stand, walk, and sit for six hours (out of an eight-hour day), but 

could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, should not be required to jump from any 

height, and should avoid concentrated exposure to vibration and all hazards. (R. at 20.) 

 In making this finding, the ALJ found Plaintiff to lack credibility, listing several 

specific reasons for this determination. (R. at 22-23.) The ALJ also weighed the medical 

opinion evidence, assigning little weight to Dr. Valeros’s opinion, little weight to Dr. 

Levinson, and considerable weight to Drs. Goerss and Roberts. (R. at 23-24.) The ALJ 

concluded that Plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work as an electronic 

assembler and that she had not been under a disability from the alleged onset date 

through the date of his opinion. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS 

A. Judicial Review of Agency Decisions 

 The Social Security Act confines judicial review to evidence within the record to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence 

and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 

Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). Substantial 

evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995). “The ALJ 

is responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in medical testimony.” 

Id. If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s 

decision, the court must uphold the decision. Id. Reviewing courts cannot accept post hoc 

rationalizations for agency action and must limit their review to the grounds articulated in 

the agency’s opinion. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (9th 

Case 2:13-cv-02239-SRB Document 21 Filed 07/31/14 Page 9 of 12
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Cir. 2009) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)). 

 The Social Security Regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for 

evaluating disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). “If a claimant is found to be 

‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’ at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider 

subsequent steps.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four of 

the sequential process. Id.; Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). At step 

five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other 

substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; 

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 

 Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step four by making an adverse 

credibility finding, improperly weighing Dr. Valeros’s medical opinion, and by failing to 

question the VE on certain limitations. (Pl.’s Br. at 12-22.) 

 B. Analysis 

 1. Adverse Credibility Finding 

The ALJ found Plaintiff incredible for five specific reasons: (1) her allegations 

regarding limitations with walking, standing, sitting, or climbing were not supported by 

any impairment; (2) she responded well to conservative treatment; (3) Plaintiff did not 

give full effort during a July 2012 examination by Dr. Valeros; (4) Plaintiff continued to 

receive unemployment benefits after she was laid off; and (5) Plaintiff did not stop 

working because of her condition, but was laid off. (R. at 23.) Plaintiff challenges only 

reasons three and four. (See Pl.’s Br. at 14-17.) Plaintiff does not dispute the 

Commissioner’s argument that the remaining reasons are clear and convincing, and the 

Court agrees with the Commissioner. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (finding that a favorable “response to conservative treatment undermines 

[claimant’s] reports regarding the disabling nature of his pain”); Brackett v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 468 F. App’x 754, 755 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming adverse credibility 

determination based, in part, on the fact that the claimant “stopped working only when he 

Case 2:13-cv-02239-SRB Document 21 Filed 07/31/14 Page 10 of 12
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

was laid off due to a plant closure and told his physician that was the reason why he had 

stopped working”).6

 Even if the ALJ erred in using reasons three and four as a basis for 

rejecting Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ provided enough other clear and convincing 

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony to make such error harmless. See 

Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).

 2. Dr. Valeros’s Medical Opinion 

Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s assignment of little weight to Dr. Valeros’s 

medical opinion. (Pl.’s Br. at 17-19.) Because other medical opinions contradicted Dr. 

Valeros’s opinion, the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons for 

rejecting his opinion. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). In 

part, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Valeros’s opinion because it was inconsistent with 

other medical records. (R. at 23-24.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that Dr. Valeros’s 

diagnosis of edema in the small joints of Plaintiff’s right hand was inconsistent with the 

fact that Plaintiff had not been diagnosed with inflammatory arthritis and with Dr. 

Levison’s examination that revealed no swelling of her joints. (R. at 23-24.) The ALJ 

also noted that the severity of Dr. Valeros’s opinion was inconsistent with treating 

records that showed improvement with treatment. (R. at 24.)7

 The Court finds that these 

reasons are specific, legitimate, and supported by the record and the Court will not 

second-guess them on appeal. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 

2008) (upholding the rejection of a physician’s opinion because it was inconsistent with 

 

6

 The Commissioner argues that the clear and convincing standard does not apply in this situation because Ninth Circuit Panels that have articulated that standard did not 

have the power to overturn existing precedent in Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-

46 (9th Cir. 1991). (Def.’s Br. at 10 n.7.) This Court has repeatedly rejected this argument and does so again here. See, e.g., Nelson v. Colvin, No. CV-12-1514-PHXGMS, 2013 WL 4010860, at *8 (D. Ariz. Aug. 6, 2013); Stewart v. Astrue, 852 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1160 n.1 (D. Ariz. 2012). 

7

 Plaintiff does not contest these specific reasons, maintaining only that the ALJ’s conclusion that “[e]dema in the small joints of only one hand is inconsistent [with] the 

claimant’s known diagnoses of deQuervain’s and mild to moderate osteoarthritis of the 

first carpometacarpal joint,” was an improper medical conclusion. (R. at 24; Pl.’s Br. at 

18.) 

Case 2:13-cv-02239-SRB Document 21 Filed 07/31/14 Page 11 of 12
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the medical record).8

 3. VE Testimony 

 Plaintiff’s final argument is that the ALJ erred by failing to ask VE Mitchell about 

limitations (e.g., ladders, ropes, scaffolds, heights, or concentrated exposure to hazards 

(including machinery)) that would have precluded Plaintiff from performing her past 

work as an electronics assembler. (Pl.’s Br. at 21.) However, as the Commissioner 

argues, the ALJ was not required to use the VE at step four. See Ellis v. Astrue, No. 2:11-

CV-00922-KJN, 2012 WL 4207458, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012) (“Case law is in 

accord that at step four an ALJ’s determination that a claimant can perform past work 

need not be supported by the testimony of a vocational expert.”). 

III. CONCLUSION 

 The Court affirms the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The ALJ 

did not err in making an adverse credibility finding, weighing the medical evidence, and 

questioning the VE. The ALJ applied the correct legal standards and his decision is 

supported by substantial evidence.

 IT IS ORDERED affirming the decision of the Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 31st day of July, 2014. 

 

8

 Plaintiff also argues that because non-examining physicians Drs. Goerss and 

Roberts never examined Plaintiff, nor reviewed Dr. Valeros’s examination, “their 

opinions cannot be considered substantial evidence and were not sufficient to rebut the 

opinions of Dr. Valero[s] [n]or support the ALJ’s RFC.” (Pl.’s Br. at 20.) But Drs. Goerss 

and Roberts conducted their reviews almost one year before Dr. Valeros, and Plaintiff cites no authority that required the doctors to review Dr. Valeros’s findings. (See R. at 81, 

95, 504.) Moreover, non-examining physicians’ opinions may be considered substantial 

evidence even though they did not examine or treat the plaintiff. See Magallanes, 881 

F.2d at 752 (“[T]he reports of consultative physicians called in by the Secretary may serve as substantial evidence.”). 

Case 2:13-cv-02239-SRB Document 21 Filed 07/31/14 Page 12 of 12