Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01524/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01524-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Doneld Womack, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

The GEO Group, Inc., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-12-1524-PHX-SRB (LOA)

ORDER

This case comes before the Court on three motions filed by Plaintiff titled as follows:

1) Motion to Proceed on a Supplemental Complaint Adding New Defendant and Request for

Leave to Amend the First Amended Complaint, doc. 15; 2) Request for Entry of Default,

doc. 20; and 3) Motion for Contempt and Application for the Court to Enter Default

Judgment and Request for the Court to Order an Inquest be Taken Before a Jury to Assist

Plaintiff’s Damages, doc. 23. Defendant The GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO Group”), the only

defendant named in this action at this time, filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Answer to

Specifically Deny Count I, filed on February 1, 2013. (Doc. 26 ) 

I. Background

At the time he filed this action, pro se Plaintiff was an inmate confined in the Central

Arizona Correctional Facility (“CACF”), a private correctional facility, which is owned and

operated by the GEO Group, which has contracted with the State of Arizona to incarcerate

prisoners. Plaintiff initially filed this prisoner § 1983 civil rights action on July 16, 2012,

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1

 The Court raises this issue because in its November 15, 2012 Order, the Court

incorrectly stated that “[t]he Court granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status . . . .” (Doc. 14

at 1) The Court actually denied Plaintiff IFP status. (Doc. 7 at 6) This inadvertent, harmless

error will be corrected in this Order nunc pro tunc.

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and, upon his request to amend the original complaint, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to

file the lodged First Amended Complaint on August 23, 2012, after screening the First

Amended Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). (Docs. 1, 7) In the August 23,

2012 screening order, the Court dismissed without prejudice Counts Four through Six of the

First Amended Complaint because these counts were duplicative of Plaintiff’s allegations

in Counts One through Three. (Doc. 7 at 5) The Court also dismissed without prejudice

Counts Two and Three against Defendants Charles Ryan, Director of the Arizona

Department of Corrections (“ADOC”), and John Gay, Warden of CACF, respectively, for

failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. (Id.) In the same screening order,

the Court also denied Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis because Plaintiff

did not submit a certified six-month trust account statement required by 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(2).1 See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2007). (Id. at 2,

6) On the same day, the Clerk filed the lodged First Amended Complaint as limited by the

screening order to Count One only. (Doc. 8) 

In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, since approximately 2009, the

GEO Group has maintained the prison dorms in which Plaintiff was housed with “constant

illumination” by four large fluorescent lights which brightly illuminated his living area and

bed for “24 hours a day.” (Id.¶¶ 4-8 at 3-4) He also asserts that the GEO Group instituted

a practice of having its staff members awake inmates who attempt to block the light by

covering their heads at night. Plaintiff contends the constant, bright illumination in his cell

deprived him of normal sleep and rest; caused him to suffer headaches, sleep disorders,

placed “out of sync” his internal sleep clock; and renderd him too sleepy and fatigued to

participate in basic daily activities. In Count One, Plaintiff alleges the GEO Group has

violated, and continues to violate, his Eighth Amendment rights under the United States

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2

 Under federal law, if a defendant “has timely waived service” under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4(d), the defendant “must serve an answer . . . within 60 days after the

request for a waiver was sent . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(1)(A)(ii). 

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Constitution and are deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s “basic right to shelter” that does

not cause him harm or threaten his mental and physical well-being. (Id.¶ 1 at 3) See Keenan

v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (Because “[t]here is no legitimate

penological justification for . . . constant illumination[,]” a triable issue of fact existed on a

continuous lighting claim where prisoner was subjected to two large fluorescent lights that

were kept on 24 hours a day for six months, and the prisoner claimed that the lighting caused

him grave sleeping problems and other mental and psychological problems.”) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted), opinion amended on denial of rehearing by 135 F.3d 1318

(9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages.

On January 14, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Request for Entry of Default, attaching his

declaration thereto and claiming “[t]he GEO Group, Inc. has not filed or served an answer

as ordered by the Court on August 23, 2012, or taken other[] actions as may be permitted by

law although more than 60 days have passed since the date of service.” (Doc. 20, ¶ 3 at 2)

The docket reflects that on December 21, 2012, Defendant GEO Group filed a timely

answer.2

 (Doc. 17) In its Answer, Defendant GEO Group erroneously wrote “No answer

required of GEO[,]” to Count One, but it denied all allegations in Count Two, which had

been dismissed by the Court in the screening order. In its Motion for Leave to File to Amend

Answer to Specifically Deny Count I, doc. 26, the GEO Group requests leave to file an

amended answer to specifically deny Count I of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. At this

time, default has not been entered by the Clerk of Court on Count One against the GEO

Group.

On December 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed a document entitled Motion to Proceed on a

Supplemental Complaint Adding New Defendant and Request for Leave to Amend the First

Amended Complaint, which the Court construes, in part, as a motion to file a Second

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 15) Citing Rule 15(a)(2) and (d), Fed.R.Civ.P., Plaintiff seeks

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3

 Correctional Health Care Corporation may not be the healthcare provider to Plaintiff

at ADOC. Even if it were, CHC would not be liable to Plaintiff simply as the employer of

Plaintiff’s healthcare providers because “[t]here is no respondeat superior liability under §

1983 . . . .” Worley v. Correctional Medical Services, 2012 WL 1405866, at *2 (D. Ariz.

April 23, 2012) (citations omitted). 

4

 LRCiv 15.1 requires a proposed amended pleading, like an amended complaint, to

indicate how it differs from the prior complaint “[b]y bracketing or striking through the text

to be deleted and underlining the text to be added.” Because he failed to use brackets, strike

outs and underlines in his proposed 20-page handwritten Second Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff has significantly hindered the Court’s ability to compare the First Amended

Complaint and the proposed Second Amended Complaint and increased the time it takes to

do so. (Doc. 15 at 15-35)

5

 Elavil, a prescription drug with the generic name of amitriptyline, is an

antidepressant drug that “elevates mood by raising the level of neurotransmitters in nerves

of the brain.” “Amitriptyline is used to elevate the mood of patients with depression.” See

www.medicinenet.com/amitriptyline (last viewed on February 5, 2013).

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to file a Supplemental Complaint in this case, adding a new defendant in Count Two as well

as amending Count One of the First Amended Complaint. (Id. at 1) The prospective new

defendant is Correctional Health Care Corporation3

 (“CHC”), which, according to Plaintiff,

“is a newly contracted health care provider at GEO Group’s prison where the plaintiff was

housed.” (Id., ¶ 7 at 3) Plaintiff indicates that on November 5, 2012, ADOC moved him to

the south unit in Florence, Arizona and, although his proposed amendment is less than clear

and does not comply with LRCiv 15.1,4 he apparently seeks to file another amended

complaint to remove any potential Eighth Amendment liability to GEO Group after this date.

(Id., ¶ 10 at 3) 

As for his claim against CHC, Plaintiff indicates it “deals with medical treatment of

plaintiff’s sleeping problems . . . from July 1, 2012 to November 2012” and then after he was

transferred to ADOC’s south unit through the present time. (Id., ¶ 14 at 4) He claims Nurse

Practitioner Shaw initially prescribed him the drug Elavil5

 in pill form for Plaintiff’s

“reoccurring headaches caused by constant illumination shining on his face and or eyes” in

GEO Group’s dorms. (Id., ¶ 19b at 6) Beginning on and after July 1, 2012, “CHC started

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the practice of having its nursing staff to (sic) crush all of the plaintiff’s doctor prescribed

Elavil medication and give it to the plaintiff in water for no medical reason . . . .” (Id., ¶ 22

at 6) Plaintiff alleges the crushed Elavil in water, unlike when taken in pill form, “caused

the plaintiff to suffer from painful adverse side effects[,]” such as numb mouth, burning

throat when swallowing food, nauseated stomach, and vomiting. (Id., ¶¶ 23-24 at 7) Plaintiff

alleges “CHC was deliberate[ly] indifferent [to] plaintiff’s serious sleep disorders, medical

and medication needs in violation of his rights under the Eighth amendment of the U.S.

Constitution.” (Id., ¶ 8 at 3) Plaintiff accuses CHC of failing to inform him of the adverse

side effects of ingesting crushed Elavil in water and prohibiting his physician, Dr. Haleem,

and other prison healthcare providers from prescribing “uncrushed” Elavil in pill form as

CHC’s “statewide procedure.” (Id., ¶¶ 27, 29-30 at 7-8) Because of this prohibition to

dispense Elavil in whole pill form, Plaintiff claims he stopped taking crushed Elavil in water,

causing Plaintiff “to suffer for months from worse headaches and sleep disorders than he

ever had before.” (Id., ¶ 28 at 8)

Plaintiff’s amendment motion does not explain why he relies upon Rule 15(d),

Fed.R.Civ.P., rather than either filing a new complaint and lawsuit against CHC or seeking

to amend the First Amended Complaint, pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., except to

state the allegations against CHC “occurred since the plaintiff filed his original complaint[]”

against GEO Group and the drug Elavil is involved in both claims. (Id., ¶ 14 at 4) At the time

Plaintiff filed his amendment motion, Defendant GEO Group had been served with process,

but had not yet appeared in this action. Though its response to Plaintiff’s default motion

reflects knowledge of Plaintiff’s pending amendment motion, doc. 25 at 1, GEO Group has

not responded to Plaintiff’s amendment motion.

II. Defaults and Default Judgments

“Obtaining a default judgment is a two-step process governed by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 55.” Sierra Nevada Corp. v. Digibee Mobile Ltd., 2012 WL 1298545, at *1

(D. Nev. April 13, 2012) (citing Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986))

(“Eitel apparently fails to understand the two-step process required by Rule 55.”) (citation

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6

 Rule 15(d), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides:

Supplemental Pleadings. On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just

terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction,

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omitted). First, Rule 55(a) provides that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for

affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown

by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Second, after the clerk

enters default, a party must seek entry of default judgment under Rule 55(b). Id. Thus, a

default occurs when a defendant has failed to plead or otherwise respond to the complaint

within the time required by the Federal Rules. An entry of default is what a clerk enters when

the default is established by affidavit or otherwise. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). “Default is not to be

freely granted, however, as ‘a case should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits.’”

U.S. CommodityFutures Trading Com’n v. American Bullion Exchange, 2011 WL 4946810,

at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2011) (quoting TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d

691, 697 (9th Cir. 2001)).

After a defendant’s default has been entered by the clerk pursuant to Rule 55(a), a

plaintiff may apply for a default judgment, and, depending upon the nature of relief

requested in the complaint, judgment may be entered by the clerk or the court. See Rule

55(b)(1) and (2), Fed.R.Civ.P. Entry of default judgment, however, is not a matter of right.

Santa Fe Auto Ins. Co., Inc. v. Black, 2013 WL 310369, at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 25, 2013)

(citation omitted); Doe I v. Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1271 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Entry of a

default judgment “is entirely within the court’s discretion and may be refused where the

court determines no justifiable claim has been alleged or that a default judgment is

inappropriate for other reasons.” Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d at 1271 (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792

F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

III. Amended and Supplemental Complaints

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) provides the mechanism for supplemental

pleadings.6

 “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), the court may permit a party to

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occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.

The court may permit supplementation even though the original pleading is defective

in stating a claim or defense. The court may order that the opposing party plead to the

supplemental pleading within a specified time.

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supplement his complaint in order to set out ‘any transaction, occurrence, or event that

happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.’” Burnett v. Dugan, 2011 WL

1002145, at *2 (S.D. Cal. March 21, 2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d)) (emphasis in

original). “Rule 15(d) permits the filing of a supplemental pleading which introduces a cause

of action not alleged in the original complaint and not in existence when the original

complaint was filed.” Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 382 (9th Cir. 1998)

(citation omitted). In other words, Rule 15(d) provides a mechanism for parties to file

additional causes of action based on facts that did not exist when the original complaint was

initially filed. Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 874 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying claims

which arose from conduct which happened nearly a year before plaintiffs filed their first

complaint). “The purpose of Rule 15(d) is to promote as complete an adjudication of the

dispute between the parties as possible by allowing the addition of claims which arise after

the initial pleadings are filed.” William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking

Co., Inc., 668 F.2d 1014, 1057 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473

(9th Cir. 1988) (“[A] supplemental pleading is one designed to bring earlier pleadings up to

date.”) (citation omitted). The rule “permits the bringing of new claims in a supplemental

complaint to promote the economical and speedy disposition of the controversy.” Keith, 858

F.2d at 473; see also San Luis & Delta–Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,

236 F.R.D. 491, 499 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“The district court has developed extensive

knowledge of the relevant law, background, and scientific considerations . . . Retaining the

new claims as part of the existing case serves the interests of judicial economy.”).

“While Rule 15(a) and Rule 15(d) appear to offer similar relief, the rules differ in two

respects.” McGrotha v. Fed Ex Ground Package Sys., Inc., 2007 WL 640457, at *2 (M.D.

Ga. Feb. 24, 2007). “Rule 15(a) relates ‘to matters that occurred prior to the filing of the

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original pleading and entirely replace the earlier pleading.’” Id. (quoting Wright & Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1504 (1971) (“Parties and courts occasionally confuse

supplemental pleadings with amended pleadings and mislabeling is common. However,

these misnomers are not of any significance and do not prevent the court from considering

a motion to amend or supplement under the proper portion of Rule 15.”). “Rule 15(d),

however, deals ‘with events subsequent to the pleading to be altered and merely represent

additions to or continuations of the earlier pleadings.’” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that Rule 15(d) should “[n]ot be used to introduce

a separate, distinct and new cause of action.” Planned Parenthood of S. Arizona v. Neely,

130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing, inter alia, 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2D § 1509 (1990) (noting

that leave to file a supplemental pleading will be denied where “the supplemental pleading

could be the subject of a separate action”). The “only requirement is that ‘some relationship’

exist between the original claims and those being added.” Aten Int’l. Co., Ltd v. Emine Tech.

Co., Ltd., 2010 WL 1462110, at *3 (C.D. Cal. April 12, 2010) (quoting Keith, 858 F.2d at

474) (“While some relationship must exist between the newly alleged matters and the subject

of the original action, they need not all arise out of the same transaction.”). There is little

recent case law authorizing a supplemental complaint to add new parties, but the authority

that does exist requires the new parties be connected with the original action. See Griffin v.

County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 226-227 (1964).

Generally, the standard used by district courts in deciding whether to grant or deny

a motion for leave to supplement is the same standard used in deciding whether to grant or

deny a motion for leave to amend a complaint or answer. See Ibok v. Advanced Micro

Devices, Inc., 2003 WL 25686529, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2003) (citing Glatt v. Chicago

Park Dist., 87 F.3d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the standard under 15(a) and 15(d)

are the same); Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 198 n. 15 (4th Cir. 2002); Walker v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 240 F.3d 1268, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001). Thus, leave to file a supplemental

complaint should be freely granted unless there is undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive

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on the part of the movant, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or the supplement would

be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067,

1077 (9th Cir. 2004); Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). “The language of Rule 15(d) makes clear that a supplemental pleading

may only be filed with leave of the court.” Bittel Tech., Inc. v. Bittel USA, Inc., 2011 WL

940300, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2011).

IV. Discussion

Plaintiff’s request to enter default against Defendant GEO Group is plainly without

merit. Contrary to Plaintiff’s declaration, on December 21, 2012, Defendant GEO Group

filed a timely answer, indicating an intent to answer according to “the Court’s Order of

August 23, 2012[,]” which, of course, allowed only Count One to proceed after the Court’s

screening order. (Doc. 17) In its Answer, however, Defendant GEO Group erroneously

wrote “No answer required of GEO[,]” to Count One, but it denied all allegations in Count

Two, which had been dismissed. In its Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt and

Entry of Default, the GEO Group acknowledged its Answer “mistakenly denied only ‘Count

II,’” but the GEO Group points out its Answer denied all of Plaintiff’s claims in a catch-all

affirmative defense, to wit: “Defendant denies each and every material allegation not

admitted above.” (Doc. 25 at 1) (citing affirmative defense number one; see doc. 17 at 2).

The GEO Group requests leave to file an amended answer to specifically deny Count I of

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, complying with LRCiv 15.1(a). The Court will grant

the GEO Group’s leave to amend its answer because leave to amend “shall be freely given

when justice so requires,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); this amendment policy is to be applied with

“extreme liberality,” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th

Cir. 1990); there is no evidence of bad faith, undue delay, or prejudice to Plaintiff; and

Defendant GEO Group has not previously amended its answer. Johnson, 356 F.3d at 1077.

Regarding Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint, it does not allege a new claim against

current Defendant GEO Group, but instead raises an entirely new and different claim against

a new defendant, CHC, even though both claims are allegedly based upon violations of

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Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights and generally involve Elavil. Similar to the prisoner’s

request to file a supplemental complaint in Alverto v. Department of Corrections, 2012 WL

1344732 (W.D. Wash. April 18, 2012) to add new defendants due to events that occurred

since Plaintiff filed his original complaint, Plaintiff’s claim against CHC is separate and

distinct from that alleged in his original complaint, requires presentation of different

witnesses and evidence to establish a prima facie case, and should be set forth in a separate

complaint and lawsuit. See Neely, 130 F.3d at 402 (Rule 15(d) “[c]annot be used to introduce

a separate, distinct and new cause of action.”). CHC is neither a defendant in this lawsuit nor

is Plaintiff’s proposed supplemental complaint a “discrete and logical extension of the

original claim” against the GEO Group. In addition, allowing supplementation would not

serve the interests of judicial economy, would increase the cost, length, and complexity of

this litigation to the GEO Group and the Court by adding a new defendant with a different

factual basis for liability and damages, contrary to Rule 1, Fed.R.Civ.P. (“These rules . . .

should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive

determination of every action and proceeding.”). See Contreraz v. Stockbridge, 2012 WL

396503, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2012) (denying prisoner’s request to file supplemental

complaint on grounds that doing so “[w]ould not serve the interests of judicial economy and

convenience, and the proposed claims are simply not sufficiently related to the present claim

to support allowing leave to supplement.”). 

Like the district court noted in Alverto in denying plaintiff’s motion to file a

supplemental complaint, “[t]here are no ‘technical obstacles’ to the Plaintiff bringing a new,

separate action to challenge his new claims[,]” alleging his alleged different injuries related

to ingesting crushed Elavil in water. 2012 WL 1344732, *2 (citation omitted); see also

MacDonald v. Schriro, 2007 WL 4404880, *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 14, 2007) (denying prisoner’s

request to file supplemental complaint adding new parties because “the proposed supplement

is more properly the subject of a separate lawsuit.”).

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED as follows:

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1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed on a Supplemental Complaint Adding New

Defendant and Request for Leave to Amend the First Amended Complaint, doc. 15, is

DENIED. The denial of leave to amend the First Amended Complaint as to Defendant GEO

Group is without prejudice. Plaintiff may move to file a Second Amended Complaint;

provided, however, he timely moves to do so; fully complies with LRCiv 15.1(a); and the

amended pleading contains a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [Plaintiff]

is entitled to relief” as mandated by Rule 8(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., and fully explained in the

August 23, 2012 screening order, doc. 7 at 3. Thereafter, the Court will screen the proposed

amended complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s failure to comply with

this Order may result in the denial with prejudice an amendment motion.

2. Plaintiff’s Request for Entry of Default, doc. 20, and Motion for Contempt and

Application for the Court to Enter Default Judgment and Request for the Court to Order an

Inquest be Taken Before a Jury to Assist Plaintiff’s Damages, doc. 23, are DENIED.

3. Defendant GEO Group’s Motion for Leave to File to Amend Answer to

Specifically Deny Count I, doc. 26, is GRANTED. Defendant must file and serve its lodged

Amended Answer, as required by LRCiv 15.1(a), on or before Tuesday, February 19, 2013.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the November 15, 2012 Order, which incorrectly

states “[t]he Court granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status,” doc. 14 at 1, is hereby

corrected nunc pro tunc that the Court denied Plaintiff in forma pauperis status.

Dated this 8th day of February, 2013.

Case 2:12-cv-01524-SRB Document 28 Filed 02/08/13 Page 11 of 11