Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02499/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02499-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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1

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DIRECTV, INC., a California

corporation, 

NO. CIV. S-03-2499 WBS DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RE: MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

GURDEV ATWAL, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo---- 

Plaintiff moves to recover attorneys’ fees incurred to

obtain a judgment against defendant Brian Bruguier for violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)(unauthorized interception of electronic

communications) and 47 U.S.C. § 605(a)(unauthorized reception of

satellite signals).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On or about December 1, 2003, DirecTV filed this action

against, among others, Mr. Bruguier for violation of 18 U.S.C. §

2511(1)(a) and 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). Mr. Bruguier was properly

served with a summons and plaintiff’s complaint on or about April

5, 2004. (See Proof of Service of Summons & Compl. & Related

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1 The Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations

included an order directing plaintiff’s counsel to “set forth in

writing plaintiff’s full costs, including reasonable attorneys’

2

Docs. as to Def. Brian Bruguier). However, Mr. Bruguier failed

to appear in this action and did not respond to plaintiff’s

complaint within the time permitted by law. Consequently,

plaintiff sought entry of Bruguier’s default, which was entered

by the court on July 15, 2004. 

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for default

judgment against Mr. Bruguier on August 18, 2004. The magistrate

judge assigned to this case issued findings and recommendations

as to plaintiff’s motion for default judgment on February 8,

2005. This court adopted in part those findings and

recommendations and issued an order on March 22, 2005, granting

plaintiff’s motion in part and denying it in part.

Relevant to this motion, the court ordered that (1)

judgment be entered against Mr. Bruguier on plaintiff’s claims

under 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(a) and 47 U.S.C. § 605(a); (2) no

damages be awarded for Mr. Bruguier’s violation of 18 U.S.C.

§2511(1)(a); (3) that $1,000 in damages be awarded plaintiff for

Mr. Bruguier’s violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a); and (4) there be

no award for plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs at

the time of the order. (Order Adopting In Part Magistrate

Judge’s Findings & Recommendations, entered March 22, 2005

(“March 22, 2005 order”) at 2).

On April 21, 2005, plaintiff filed this motion for

attorneys’ fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54

and Local Rule 54-293.1 

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fees . . . by way of a declaration to be filed within ten (10)

days after being served with the[] findings and recommendations.” 

(See Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations dated

February 8, 2005 at 10 n1). The findings and recommendations

were issued on February 8, 2005. Had that part of the order been

adopted by this court, plaintiff would have been required to

submit the requisite declaration shortly after February 18, 2005,

depending on when plaintiff received service. 

However, this court’s March 22, 2005 order only adopted

the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in part. 

(March 22, 2005 order at 2). The order made clear that no award

for plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs was made at

the time because counsel had “fail[ed] to set forth in writing

plaintiff’s full expenses as directed by the magistrate judge.” 

(Id. at 1). The court did not, however, set a specific date for

plaintiff to submit a declaration setting forth his attorneys’

fees and costs. (Id.). Therefore, plaintiff was obligated to

look to the Local Rules for guidance about filing a motion for

attorneys’ fees. (See Local Rule 1-100(d)(noting general

applicability of Local Rules in civil cases in this district)). 

Plaintiff evidently did so. 

Local Rule 54-293 permits a prevailing party to file a

motion for attorneys’ fees up to 30 days after entry of final

judgment. Final judgment was entered against Mr. Bruguier on

March 22, 2005. Plaintiff submitted this motion along with an

accompanying declaration and billing statements to establish its

attorneys’ fees on April 21, 2005, exactly 30 days after entry of

final judgment. Therefore, this motion is timely. 

3

II. Discussion

Considering the history of this litigation, it is not

surprising that Mr. Bruguier has failed to oppose this motion. 

An unopposed motion may be granted where the movant’s papers are

sufficient to support the motion on their face. See Henry v.

Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993)(granting

unopposed motion for summary judgment). Plaintiff’s papers meet

this standard. However, in awarding attorneys’ fees, the court

is bound to evaluate the reasonableness of those fees. See

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983). 

Plaintiff obtained a default judgment as to its claims

against Mr. Bruguier under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) and 47 U.S.C. §

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2 The court may adjust the lodestar figure on the basis

of the Kerr factors:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and

difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4)

the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due

to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) 

time limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results

obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability

of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the

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605(a). Plaintiff has correctly cited 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(3) and

47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(iii) for the proposition that it is

entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees expended in

bringing its claims against Mr. Bruguier. See 18 U.S.C. §

2520(b)(3)(authorizing recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees

incurred to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511); 47 U.S.C.

§ 605(e)(B)(3)(iii)(mandating award of reasonable attorneys’ fees

to party establishing a violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) upon

proper motion). Therefore, the court will award plaintiff its

reasonable attorneys’ fees. 

A. Lodestar Calculation

 The court determines the amount of attorneys’ fees to 

award by using the lodestar calculation - the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable

hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. There is a strong

presumption that the lodestar amount is reasonable. Fischer v.

SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, the court may adjust the lodestar figure if various

factors overcome the presumption of reasonableness. Hensley, 461

U.S. at 433-34.2

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case, (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client, and (12) awards in

similar cases.

Morales, 96 F.3d at 363 n.8. (citing Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras,

Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975)). Many of the Kerr factors

have been subsumed in the lodestar approach. Id. (citing

Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir.

1988)). Moreover, the court should consider the factors

established by Kerr, but need not discuss each factor. Sapper v.

Lenco Blade, Inc., 704 F.2d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 1983). 

3 Attorneys’ fees incurred to prepare a bill of costs are

recoverable along with other attorneys’ fees. Carr v. Fort

Morgan Sch. Dist., 4 F.Supp.2d 998, 1004 (D. Colo. 1998). 

5

i. Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration and accompanying

billing statements itemizing the time its counsel spent on this

matter. Plaintiff seeks to recover $2,805.90 in attorneys’ fees

incurred to obtain a default judgment against Mr. Bruguier and an

additional $1,180 in fees incurred to prepare this motion and

plaintiff’s bill of costs.3 Plaintiff also anticipates incurring

another $645 in attorneys’ fees to have its counsel prepare for

and defend this motion. This brings the total fees sought to

$4,630.90.

Because Mr. Bruguier has failed to respond to

plaintiff’s motion, oral argument will not be necessary to decide

the motion. Therefore, the court will disallow the $645

plaintiff anticipated incurring to prepare for and defend the

motion. Having reviewed the declaration and billing sheets

submitted with plaintiff’s motion, the court determines that all

the other hours actually expended by plaintiff’s counsel were

reasonable. Therefore, the court will credit plaintiff for all

the other hours charged by its attorneys. 

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6

ii. Reasonable Hourly Rate

To determine the reasonableness of hourly rates

claimed, the court looks to the prevailing market rates in the

relevant community for similar work performed by attorneys of

comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Blum v. Stenson,

465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796

F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986). The relevant community is

generally the forum in which the district court sits as opposed

to where counsel is located. Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500

(9th Cir. 1997). Judges in this district have consistently found

$250 per hour to be a reasonable rate for an experienced attorney

working in this community. See, e.g., Hooper v. Calny, Inc.,

CIV. S-03-0167 DFL GGH (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2005); Hiram C. v.

Manteca Unified Sch. Dist., CIV. S-03-2568 WBS KJM (E.D. Cal.

Nov. 5, 2004). 

The rates charged by plaintiff’s counsel are, for the

most part, lower than the prevailing rate in this district. 

However, plaintiff seeks to recover fees for .8 hours of work

performed by Keli N. Osaki billed at a rate of $300 per hour and

another 2.4 hours of work performed by Suzanne M. Burke billed at

a rate of $325 per hour. (See Decl. of Brandon Q. Tran in Supp.

of Pl.’s Mot. for Attys’ Fees Against Def. Brian Bruguier, Ex. B

(billing statements)). Because these rates are significantly

higher than the prevailing rate in this district, the court will

award attorneys’ fees for these 3.2 hours of work at a rate of

only $250 per hour. This reduces plaintiff’s requested

attorneys’ fees award by another $220, for a total of $3,765.90. 

The court finds that no adjustment to the lodestar

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7

figure is necessary.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

attorneys’ fees be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in the amount

of $3,765.90. 

DATED: June 8, 2005

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