Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01659/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01659-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Matthew Lazzell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-10-1659-PHX-DGC 

ORDER 

 

 Plaintiff suffers from back and other injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident. 

He also has diabetes and is morbidly obese. He applied for disability benefits and 

supplemental security income in March 2007, claiming to be disabled since February 21, 

2007. Doc. 11, Tr. 109-22. The application was denied. Tr. 63-70, 78-84. A hearing 

before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was held on June 25, 2009. Tr. 35-58. The 

ALJ issued a written decision on September 11, 2009, finding Plaintiff not disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 23-34. This decision became 

Defendant’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1-3. 

 Plaintiff then commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). Doc. 1. For reasons that follow, the Court will reverse Defendant’s decision 

and remand for an award of benefits.1

 

1

 Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is denied because the issues have been fully briefed 

(Docs. 16, 22, 25) and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 

Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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I. Standard of Review.

 The Court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of record, a 

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits “should be upheld unless it is based on legal 

error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 

1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). In determining whether the decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, the Court “must consider the entire record as a whole and may not 

affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Id.

II. Discussion.

 Whether a claimant is disabled is determined using a five-step evaluation process. 

To establish disability, the claimant must show (1) he has not worked since the alleged 

disability onset date, (2) he has a severe impairment, and (3) his impairment meets or 

equals a listed impairment or (4) his residual functional capacity (RFC) precludes him 

from performing his past work. At step five, the Commissioner must show that the 

claimant is able to perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

 Plaintiff has met his burden. He has not worked since February 21, 2007. Tr. 25, 

¶ 2. He has multiple severe impairments: status post motorcycle accident, subdural 

hematoma, cervical disc bulging with possible fracture, lumbar and thoracic degenerative 

disc disease, diabetes mellitus, morbid obesity, sensorineural hearing loss, right knee 

degenerative joint disorder, and right shoulder dislocation. Tr. 25, ¶ 3. While those 

impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment (Tr. 27, ¶ 4), they do preclude 

Plaintiff from performing his past work as a truck driver (Tr. 32, ¶ 6). At step five, the 

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled because he has the RFC to perform light 

work with certain limitations. Tr. 27-34, ¶¶ 5, 9-11. 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in three respects: rejecting the opinions of 

treating physicians, adopting the assessment of the non-examining doctor, and finding 

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Plaintiff’s symptom testimony not credible. Docs. 16, 25. Defendant contends that the 

ALJ did not err and her decision is supported by substantial evidence. Doc. 22. The 

Court concludes that the ALJ committed reversible error in rejecting the opinions of 

Dr. Mathew Benjamin. 

 Dr. Benjamin has treated Plaintiff since before the motorcycle accident. See Tr. 

347-76, 541-90. On June 23, 2009, Dr. Benjamin completed a pain functional capacity 

questionnaire and a medical assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to do work-related activities. 

Tr. 899-903. He opined that Plaintiff experiences moderately severe pain, that the pain 

results from movement and being in a static position, and that the pain is severe enough 

to frequently interfere with Plaintiff’s attention, concentration, pace, and ability to 

complete tasks in a timely manner. Tr. 899-900. With respect to Plaintiff’s ability to do 

work-related activities, Dr. Benjamin opined, among other things, that Plaintiff can sit, 

stand, and walk less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday and must alternate positions every 

half hour. Tr. 901-02. Those opinions were based on Dr. Benjamin’s own diagnoses and 

objective clinical and diagnostic findings documented elsewhere in the medical records. 

Tr. 899, 901. 

 As Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Benjamin is “employed to cure and has a 

greater opportunity to know and observe [Plaintiff] as an individual.” McCallister v. 

Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). His opinions regarding the severity of 

Plaintiff’s pain and impairments are therefore entitled to “special weight,” and if the ALJ 

chooses to disregard them, she must, at a minimum, “‘set forth specific, legitimate 

reasons for doing so, and this decision itself must be supported by substantial evidence.’” 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988)) (quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 

1403, 1408 (1986)); see Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 The ALJ (Tr. 32) rejected Dr. Benjamin’s opinions on the ground that they are 

“inconsistent” with other records of the doctor indicating that Plaintiff is “totally 

disabled” (Tr. 543), “permanently disabled” (Tr. 878), and unable to perform “any 

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occupation” (Tr. 600). Plaintiff argues, correctly, that the opinions rendered by 

Dr. Benjamin on June 23, 2009 (Tr. 899-903) are entirely consistent with his other 

opinions that Plaintiff is disabled. The ALJ’s error in this regard is harmless, Defendant 

asserts, because she provided other legally valid reasons for rejecting Dr. Benjamin’s 

opinion. Doc. 22 at 11 n.8. The Court does not agree. 

 The only other reason the ALJ gave for rejecting Dr. Benjamin’s opinions is that 

they are “not consistent with the weight of the evidence of record.” Tr. 32. This Circuit 

has made clear that “conclusory reasons will not justify an ALJ’s rejection of a medical 

opinion[.]” Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294 F.3d 1294, 1299 

(9th Cir. 1999). To say that a medical opinion is against the weight of the evidence “does 

not achieve the level of specificity [Ninth Circuit] cases have required[.]” Embrey, 849 

F.2d at 421-22. 

 To properly reject Dr. Benjamin’s opinions about Plaintiff’s pain and work-related 

abilities, the ALJ must do more than offer her own conclusions. She must set forth her 

own “interpretations and explain why they, rather than [the treating physician’s], are 

correct.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ has failed to 

provide the requisite “detailed, reasoned, and legitimate rationales for disregarding 

[Dr. Benjamin’s] findings.” Embrey, 849 F.2d at 422. Her rejection of his opinions was 

clearly erroneous. 

 Defendant asserts that because the ALJ found Plaintiff’s symptom testimony to be 

not entirely credible, it was reasonable for the ALJ to also reject Dr. Benjamin’s 

opinions. Doc. 22 at 13. But the ALJ, not this Court, is required to provide specific 

reasons for rejecting medical opinions. See Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 

1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006). Indeed, the Court “cannot affirm the decision of [the ALJ] 

on a ground that the [ALJ] did not invoke in making [her] decision.” Pinto v. Massanari, 

249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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III. Remedy.

 The decision to remand for further development of the record or for an award 

benefits is within the discretion of the Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Harman v. Apfel, 

211 F.3d 1172, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2000). This Circuit has held that an action should be 

remanded for an award of benefits where the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient 

reasons for rejecting evidence, no outstanding issue remains that must be resolved before 

a determination of disability can be made, and it is clear from the record that the ALJ 

would be required to find the claimant disabled were the rejected evidence credited as 

true. See, e.g., Varney v. Sec’y of HHS, 859 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 After applying the credit-as-true rule to improperly discredited evidence, no 

outstanding issue remains to be resolved before determining that Plaintiff is entitled to 

benefits. The impartial vocational expert testified that the pain and functional limitations 

found by Dr. Benjamin, if adopted, would preclude sustained work. Tr. 57. Defendant 

does not disagree with this conclusion. See Doc. 22 at 11 n.8. Because it is clear that the 

ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled, see Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 

593-95 (9th Cir. 2004), the Court will remand the case for an award of benefits. See Orn 

v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 640 (9th Cir. 2007) (remanding for an award of benefits where it 

was “‘clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to determine the claimant 

disabled’”) (citation omitted). Given this ruling, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s 

arguments that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his credibility and erred in adopting 

the assessment of the non-examining doctor. 

 Defendant claims that a remand for further development of the record is in order. 

Doc. 22 at 19. Plaintiff applied for disability benefits more than four years ago. He has 

been denied at the initial, reconsideration, hearing, and appellate levels of the 

administration. Plaintiff specifically argued before the Appeals Council that that ALJ 

had erroneously rejected the opinions of Dr. Benjamin (Tr. 10-12), but his request for 

review was denied (Tr. 1-3). A remand for further proceedings is not warranted. See 

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D’Angelo v. Astrue, No. CV-06-3055-PHX-EHC, 2007 WL 4617186, at *9 (D. Ariz. 

Dec. 27, 2007). 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Defendant’s decision denying benefits is reversed. 

 2. The case is remanded to Defendant for an award of benefits. 

 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 30th day of June, 2011. 

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