Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05172/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05172-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 2002 Decided June 7, 2002

No. 01-5172

Gene C. McKinney,

Appellant

v.

Thomas A. White,

Secretary of the Army,

and

W. B. Huffman, Major General,

The Judge Advocate General,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv00728)

Charles W. Gittins argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

USCA Case #01-5172 Document #682119 Filed: 06/07/2002 Page 1 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Thomas M. Ray, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Roscoe C. Howard,

Jr., U.S. Attorney and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

Before: Sentelle, Rogers and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Gene C. McKinney, now retired,

was a Sergeant Major of the Army who was court martialed

in 1998 and found guilty of obstructing justice in violation of

Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

("UCMJ"), 10 U.S.C. s 934. After unsuccessful attempts to

have his conviction set aside under the UCMJ, he sought

review in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5

U.S.C. ss 701-706, of the Judge Advocate General's denial of

his request to set aside the court martial finding and sentence. The district court dismissed the complaint on the

ground that the Judge Advocate General is not an "agency"

for purposes of the APA. We hold that the statutory scheme

created by Congress for review of courts martial precludes

review of the Judge Advocate General's decision under the

APA. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint.

I.

The relevant facts are undisputed. Pursuant to UCMJ

Article 32, 10 U.S.C. s 832, an Army investigation of allegations of sexual harassment and assault by six female military

personnel resulted in McKinney's being court martialed. He

was charged in 18 counts with violations of military law

arising out of alleged sexual harassment and in a separate

count with obstruction of justice in violation of UCMJ Article

134, 10 U.S.C. s 934. In March 1998, a jury acquitted him of

the 18 sexual harassment counts and convicted him of the

obstruction count. He was sentenced to a reprimand and a

reduction in grade from Army Sergeant Major to Army

Master Sergeant.

USCA Case #01-5172 Document #682119 Filed: 06/07/2002 Page 2 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

McKinney sought a post-trial evidentiary hearing pursuant

to UCMJ Article 39(a), 10 U.S.C. s 839(b), to inquire into

allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in not disclosing and

destroying evidence and attempting to influence witnesses.

The Military Trial Judge denied the motion on the papers.

The Judge also denied McKinney's renewed Article 39(a)

request, to which he had attached the affidavit of his counsel

recounting a discussion with a prosecution witness. McKinney then filed a petition for mandamus in the United States

Army Court of Criminal Appeals in a further effort to obtain

a post-trial evidentiary hearing; the court denied the petition.

His writ of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Armed Forces was also denied, without prejudice to his

right of review under UCMJ Article 69, 10 U.S.C. s 869.

McKinney v. United States, 51 M.J. 270 (C.A.A.F. 1998).

Pursuant to UCMJ Article 69, 10 U.S.C. s 869(a), the

Commander for the Military District of Washington affirmed

the findings and sentence and forwarded the record of the

trial to the Judge Advocate General for review. Following

an investigation of McKinney's allegations of prosecutorial

misconduct that included interviews of several prosecution

witnesses, including the witness referred to in McKinney's

Article 39(a) affidavit, the Judge Advocate General stated

summarily: "The finding and sentence are supported in law

and the sentence is appropriate. No modification of the

finding or sentence is warranted." The Judge Advocate

General did not refer the case to a Court of Criminal Appeals

for review as to matters of law. Id. s 869(d) & (e).

Having failed to obtain relief from the military justice

system, McKinney filed a complaint in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia. He alleged that

the decision of the Judge Advocate General was arbitrary and

capricious and not based on substantial evidence within the

meaning of the APA, 5 U.S.C. s 706, because the Judge

Advocate General failed to provide an adequate explanation

for rejecting McKinney's claims of prosecutorial misconduct.

The Secretary of the Army and the other defendants ("the

Secretary") moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

USCA Case #01-5172 Document #682119 Filed: 06/07/2002 Page 3 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion to dismiss,

ruling that the Judge Advocate General is not an "agency" for

purposes of the APA.

II.

McKinney contends that the district court erred in ruling

that the Judge Advocate General's decision is not subject to

review under the APA. He maintains that because decisions

by the Judge Advocate General under UCMJ Article 69 are

reached independently and constitute final binding decisions

affecting the rights of individuals, the Judge Advocate General is an "authority" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. s 701(b)(1)

whose decisions are subject to judicial review under the APA

as final agency action. He relies on the broad definition of

the word "agency" in the APA, 5 U.S.C. s 701(b)(1), and the

presumption favoring review of final agency decisions that is

overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to restrict access to the courts. See Abbott

Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).

Although the district court addressed McKinney's complaint in terms of whether the Judge Advocate General was

an "agency" subject to APA review, we conclude that a

threshold jurisdictional issue must be addressed. The APA

provides for the non-reviewability of "courts martial and

military commissions," 5 U.S.C. s 701(b)(1)(F), but does not

expressly preclude review of Judge Advocate General decisions reviewing courts martial pursuant to UCMJ Article 69,

10 U.S.C. s 869. Congress' establishment, pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, of a separate judicial

system for courts martial review is, however, convincing

evidence that Congress could not have intended Judge Advocate General review of courts martial to fall within APA

review of agency decisions.

In Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746 (1975), the

Supreme Court stated that it "repeatedly has recognized that

of necessity '(m)ilitary law ... is a jurisprudence which exists

separate and apart from the law that governs in our federal

judicial establishment.' " 420 U.S. at 746 (quoting Burns v.

USCA Case #01-5172 Document #682119 Filed: 06/07/2002 Page 4 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)). The Court also reiterated

in Schlesinger both the general rule that "the acts of a court

martial, within the scope of its jurisdiction and duty, cannot

be controlled or reviewed in the civil courts, by writ of

prohibition or otherwise," 420 U.S. at 746 (citations omitted),

and the limited exception for collateral attack seeking a

declaration that a judgment is void, having no res judicata

effect, "because of lack of jurisdiction or some other equally

fundamental defect." Id. at 747. Observing that "[t]he military is 'a specialized society separate from civilian society'

with 'laws and traditions of its own (developed) during its

long history,' " id. at 757 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.

733, 743 (1974)), the Court noted that "Congress attempted to

balance ... military necessities against the equally significant

interest of ensuring fairness to servicemen charged with

military offenses." Id. The Court further observed that:

implicit in the congressional scheme embodied in the

[UCMJ] is the view that the military court system generally is adequate to and responsibly will perform its

assigned task. We think this congressional judgment

must be respected and that it must be assumed that the

military court system will vindicate servicemen's constitutional rights.

Id. at 758.

As the proceedings in McKinney's case illustrate, Congress

has established a complete and distinct procedure for members of the military who are charged with law violations

under the UCMJ. While direct parallels are imprecise, the

proceedings in his case suggest a process that begins with a

review that serves a function comparable to that of the grand

jury for Article III courts. This was followed by a jury trial,

imposition of a sentence, and post-trial motions proceedings.

Then, in a procedure unique to the military, the finding and

sentence were subject to the approval of the Commander of

the Military District. 10 U.S.C. s 860. Upon such approval,

the trial record was forwarded, in light of the length of

McKinney's sentence, to the Judge Advocate General for

review instead of a Court of Criminal Appeals. Id.

USCA Case #01-5172 Document #682119 Filed: 06/07/2002 Page 5 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ss 866(b)(1), 869(a). UCMJ Article 69 provides that a soldier

who is convicted during a general court martial and sentenced

to less than one year of confinement is entitled to an automatic review of the record of the trial by the Judge Advocate

General, unless the soldier affirmatively waives review. Id.

s 869. "If any part of the findings or sentence is found to be

unsupported in law or if reassessment of the sentence is

appropriate, the Judge Advocate General may modify or set

aside the findings or sentence or both." Id. s 869(a). Upon

referral by the Judge Advocate General, further review of

questions of law is available by a Court of Criminal Appeals

pursuant to UCMJ Article 69, 10 U.S.C. s 869. UCMJ

Article 76 provides that:

[t]he appellate review of records of trial provided by

[Chapter 47, UCMJ] ... are final and conclusive....

[and] are binding upon all departments, courts, agencies,

and officers of the United States, subject only to action

upon a petition for a new trial as provided in section 837

of this title (article 73) and to action by the Secretary

concerned as provided in section 847 of this title (article

74) [Remission and suspension], and the authority of the

President.

Id. s 876.

The proceedings under the UCMJ demonstrate that the

designated reviewing authorities have "heard [McKinney] out

on every significant allegation which [he] now urge[s]."

Burns, 346 U.S. at 144. The Military Trial Judge reviewed

McKinney's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct on two

occasions and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

denied his writ of appeal. The Judge Advocate General

reviewed the court martial finding and sentence and also

conducted his own investigation into the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. McKinney makes no claim that the

procedures established by Congress in the UCMJ were inadequate to the task, much less "fundamentally defect[ive]."

Schlesinger, 420 U.S. at 747.

This court has long acknowledged that it lacks jurisdiction

of a direct appeal of a court martial. Although McKinney

does not seek review of a decision of the Court of Appeals for

USCA Case #01-5172 Document #682119 Filed: 06/07/2002 Page 6 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the Armed Forces, he, like the petitioners in Shaw v. United

States, 209 F.2d 811, 813 (D.C. Cir., 1954), seeks review of a

decision by the military authority that Congress has designated to review his direct appeal and his collateral attack on his

general court martial conviction. The fact that he did not

receive a more severe sentence, whereby his appeal would

have gone to a Court of Criminal Appeals, is a distinction

without difference with regard to the jurisdiction of this

court. As in Shaw, then, "we are clear" that Congress has

not granted jurisdiction to this court to review direct appeals

from the highest military official of a general court martial.

209 F.2d at 812-13.

Furthermore, Congress has expressly provided that "courts

martial" are not subject to review under the APA. 5 U.S.C.

s 701(b)(1)(F). While McKinney contends that this prohibition does not extend to the final decision of the Judge

Advocate General, the logic of his position is illusive. Congress has provided a separate justice system in the UCMJ for

military personnel and it has expressly determined that

"courts martial" are not to be subject to APA review. Hence,

it is difficult to understand the reasoning that Congress would

have utilized in making the final UCMJ review of "courts

martial" subject to review by Article III courts under the

APA. To adopt that position would not only be contrary to

the long-established understanding that "[m]ilitary law, like

state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart

from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment," Burns, 346 U.S. at 140, "[i]t is well settled that 'by

habeas corpus the civil courts exercise no supervisory or

correcting power over the proceedings of a court martial' "

and that "[t]he correction of any errors it may have committed is for the military authorities which are alone authorized

to review its decision." Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 111

(1950) (citations omitted). In Shaw, this court rejected the

view that the Court of Military Appeals (now the Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces), was anything other than "a

court in every significant respect, rather than an administrative agency." 209 F.2d at 813. Although the Judge Advocate

General has independent fact-finding authority under UCMJ

USCA Case #01-5172 Document #682119 Filed: 06/07/2002 Page 7 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Article 69, unlike a Court of Criminal Appeals under UCMJ

Article 66 or an Article III appellate court, McKinney points

to nothing that would indicate that Congress viewed the

UCMJ Article 69 procedures for review of courts martial

involving sentences of less than one year to be so inferior as

to warrant review by Article III courts under the APA.

Although review by the Judge Advocate General is in the

nature of a collateral proceeding akin to coram nobis, Curci

v. United States, 577 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing inter

alia S. Rep. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in

1968 U.S.C.C.A.N 4501, 4515), for the military justice system

where "Congress has taken great care both to define the

rights of those subject to military law[ ] [and to] provide a

complete system of review within the military system to

secure those rights," Burns, 346 U.S. at 140, the Judge

Advocate General's decision is properly viewed as what Congress concluded should be the final decision under military

law in McKinney's court martial. So understood, Congress'

preclusion of APA review of "courts martial" reaches the

Judge Advocate General's decision in McKinney's case.

Although McKinney contends only that the Judge Advocate

General's summary statement of his decision is inadequate to

reveal the basis of his reasoning, and arguably is not seeking

review of the underlying court martial finding that he obstructed justice in violation of UCMJ Article 134, by assuming jurisdiction in his case the court would be unable to deny

review in later cases where it would be required to review

courts martial findings. As framed, moreover, McKinney's

allegations of prosecutorial misconduct would effectively require this court to determine whether the alleged misconduct

so affected his court martial that he was denied a fair trial.

Cf. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-79 (1985);

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987). Yet this is the type

of question that Congress has determined is to be conducted

by the Judge Advocate General when a court martial sentence imposes less than one year's confinement. See Schlesinger, 420 U.S. at 746-47. Moreover, as the Second Circuit

has suggested, the Judge Advocate General's decision to use a

short form of response in claims seeking discretionary review

is not unexpected where there are a large number of claims.

USCA Case #01-5172 Document #682119 Filed: 06/07/2002 Page 8 of 9
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

See Curci, 577 F.2d at 818. McKinney's attempt to invoke

the APA amounts, then, to an attempt to end run a military

justice system wherein Congress has afforded him the direct

review procedures it deemed appropriate.

Accordingly, we hold that this court has no jurisdiction

under the APA to review the decision of the Judge Advocate

General denying McKinney's request to set aside the court

martial finding and sentence, and we affirm the dismissal of

the complaint.

USCA Case #01-5172 Document #682119 Filed: 06/07/2002 Page 9 of 9