Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04218/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04218-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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By order filed September 8, 2006, the Court vacated the hearing scheduled for

September 22, 2006.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEDAL SHAHWAN,

Petitioner,

 v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, et al.,

Respondents /

No. C-05-4218 MMC

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S

FEES AND COSTS

Before the Court is petitioner’s motion, filed July 28, 2006, for an award of attorney’s

fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Respondents have filed opposition, to

which petitioner has replied. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in

opposition to the motion, the Court rules as follows.1

“[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and

other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the

United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the

position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make

an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). “Substantially justified means justified in

substance or in the main – that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable

Case 3:05-cv-04218-MMC Document 32 Filed 02/26/07 Page 1 of 3
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Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B), an immigration judge “may not

redetermine conditions of custody imposed by [U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement]” as to “arriving aliens in removal proceedings.” See id. When an alien

travels on advance parole, the alien becomes an “arriving alien” upon return to the United

States. See Barney v. Rogers, 83 F. 3d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1996).

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person.” United States v. Marolf, 277 F. 3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation

and citation omitted).

By order filed December 12, 2005, the Court granted petitioner’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus and ordered respondents to provide petitioner with a bond hearing before

an immigration judge. Petitioner seeks fees on the ground the position taken by

respondents was not substantially justified. In particular, petitioner argues it was

unreasonable for respondents to assert that because petitioner had traveled on advance

parole, he was not entitled to a bond hearing.2

The central issues presented herein were (1) whether notices petitioner received

from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) when he traveled on advance

parole adequately advised him that in the event the INS later instituted removal

proceedings against him, he would not have the opportunity to have a bond hearing; and

(2) if such notices were deficient, whether in any such subsequently-instituted proceedings,

application of § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) would deprive petitioner of procedural due process.

Neither of the cases on which petitioner primarily relied, specifically, Martinez-De

Bojorquez v. Ashcroft, 365 F. 3d 800 (9th Cir. 2004) and Navarro-Aispura v. Immigration

and Naturalization Service, 53 F. 3d 233 (9th Cir. 1995), addressed the situation presented

herein. In Martinez-De Bojorquez, the Ninth Circuit characterized as a deprivation of

procedural due process the failure to inform the petitioner therein of the consequences of

traveling on advance parole. See Martinez-De Bojorquez, 365 F. 3d at 803 (noting “[i]t is

well-established that aliens facing deportation are entitled to due process”). There,

however, the deficient notice was provided in the course of an on-going deportation

proceeding, see id. at 804; here, by contrast, at the time he received the subject notices,

petitioner was not involved in a removal proceeding, and thus, arguably, no “procedures”

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were implicated. In Navarro-Aispura, although the notice in question therein was, as here,

provided prior to the institution of a removal proceeding, the issue presented was not denial

of procedural due process, but, rather, waiver. In that case, the INS unsuccessfully argued

that the petitioner, by accepting advance parole after receipt of the notice there in question,

had, in essence, acceded to the application of an otherwise inapplicable regulation

imposing exclusion proceedings. See Navarro-Aispura, 53 F. 3d at 236 (finding “this

thoroughly inequitable situation was not agreed to by the petitioner”) (internal quotation and

citation omitted).

Although this Court, in arriving at its decision, looked to the reasoning set forth in the

cases cited by petitioner, the cases on which petitioner primarily relied, as noted, do not

present the particular issues raised herein. Under such circumstances, the Court cannot

say that respondents’ position was so unreasonable as to lack substantial justification.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to an award of fees and costs under § 2412(d).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, petitioner’s motion is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 26, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-04218-MMC Document 32 Filed 02/26/07 Page 3 of 3