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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

CLARA CARTER; JOANN SHOEBOOT, 

individually and in behalf of others 

similarly situated; RICARDO HUNT, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

and 

ROSLYN D. O'NEAL, as personal 

representative of the Estate of 

Michael V. O'Neal, 

Plaintiff, 

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FI LEO 

United Statfl (;{)1i1,c of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 13 1· Q 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 88-1239 

ROSE MEDICAL CENTER, a Colorado 

corporation; COLLYN DENIO, 

individually and as Vice President 

of Human Resources; AL MORRIS, 

individually and as Director of 

Environmental Services, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) (D.C. No. 85-Z-687) 

) (D. Colo.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36. 3. 

Appellate Case: 88-1239 Document: 01019963064 Date Filed: 02/13/1990 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Defendants-appellants appeal the district court's order of 

December 23, 1987, entered after a bench trial on 

plaintiffs-appellees' claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, 

42 u.s.c. § 1981. 1 

42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17, 

The district court awarded Clara 

and 

Carter 

damages against defendants Rose Medical Center and Al Morris for 

the embarrassment and humiliation she suffered as a result of a 

racially hostile work environment. The court awarded Ricardo Hunt 

damages against defendants Rose Medical Center and Al Morris as a 

result of his having been denied a promotion in November of 1982 

on the basis of his race. Finally, the court awarded JoAnn 

Shoeboot damages against Rose Medical Center, Al Morris, and 

Collyn DeNio as a result of her discharge from employment. 

We review the district court's findings of fact, including 

any finding of intentional discrimination, under a clearly 

erroneous standard. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 

290 (1982). We review the court's conclusions of law de novo. 

See In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 

1988). 

1 Roslyn D. O'Neal, as personal representative of the estate of 

Michael v. O'Neal, was a plaintiff below but is not a party to 

this appeal since defendants do not challenge the court's rulings 

on the estate's claims. 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-1239 Document: 01019963064 Date Filed: 02/13/1990 Page: 2 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides that "[i]n all actions tried 

upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 

shall find the facts specifically and state separately its 

conclusions of law thereon." "A trial court must include as many 

of the subsidiary facts as necessary to permit us to 'determine 

the steps by which [it] reached its ultimate conclusion on each 

factual issue. 111 Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1363 

(10th Cir. 1982)(quoting 9 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure§ 2579 at 710 (1971)). "Also, the findings 

should indicate the legal standards against which the evidence was 

measured. And the findings should be broad enough to cover all 

material issues." Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist. No. 

~, 568 F.2d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, the 

"[f]indings must be sufficient to allow a reviewing court to 

determine rather than speculate that the law has been correctly 

applied." Municipal Leasing Corp. v. Fulton County, Ga., 835 F.2d 

786, 791 (11th Cir. 1988). 

In ruling on Ms. Carter's claims, the district court did not 

articulate the legal standard applicable to claims based on a 

racially hostile work environment, which is as f o llows: 

"To establish a racially hostile work environment, ... 

plaintiffs must prove more than a few isolated incidents 

of racial enmity." "Casual comments, or accidental or 

sporadic conversation, will not trigger equitable relief 

pursuant to the statute." "Instead, there must be a 

steady barrage of opprobrious racial comment." Title 

VII is violated only where the work environment is so 

"heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy the 

emotional and psychological stability of the minority 

[employee]." 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-1239 Document: 01019963064 Date Filed: 02/13/1990 Page: 3 
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 

1987)(citations omitted). Whether harassment is "sufficiently 

pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create 

an abusive working environment ... [must] be determined with 

regard to the totality of the circumstances." Henson v. City of 

Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982). 

The district court's findings do not indicate clearly whether 

the court applied the correct legal standard. After noting some 

of the evidence presented, the court found that Ms. Carter was 

subjected to "very subtle, very irritating discrimination." (R. 

Vol. VIII at 5). 

Furthermore, the events the court discussed in connection 

with its finding of discrimination included Mr. Morris' 

over-supervision of Ms. Carter, his objecti o n to her beaded 

hairstyle, his suggestion that Ms. Carter watch a motivational 

tape involving black individuals, and his comment that Nigerians 

had more sense than blacks. The foregoing were the subject of an 

earlier charge Ms. Carter filed with the EEOC that was settled. 

The district court ruled that these events were barred by the 

settlement and the statute of limitations. 

The purpose of the district court's recitation of the 

time-barred events is unclear. "A discriminat o ry act which is not 

made the basis for a timely charge . may constitute relevant 

background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a 

current practice is at issue, but separately considered, it is 

merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal 

consequences." United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-1239 Document: 01019963064 Date Filed: 02/13/1990 Page: 4 
(1977). If the court based its ultimate finding on a subsidiary 

finding that the time-barred events themselves were part of the 

racially hostile environment for which Ms. Carter could recover, 

it erred. If, however, the court merely used the time-barred 

events as background in evaluating whether current events created 

a racially hostile environment, it did not err. For instance, the 

court could have considered the time-barred events in determining 

whether current events were racially motivated. 

Since we can neither discern from the district court's ruling 

whether it applied the correct legal standard regarding Ms. 

Carter's claim of racial harassment, nor discern whether it 

inappropriately relied on time-barred events, we cannot conduct a 

meaningful review of the district court's order with respect to 

Ms. Carter. Therefore, we must vacate the judgment and remand for 

further factual findings. 

On remand, the court also should clarify the statutory basis 

for its ruling, since racial harassment that affects the terms of 

employment but does not affect the employee's ability to make or 

enforce an employment contract is actionable under Title VII, but 

is not actionable under 42 u.s.c. § 1981. Patterson v. McLean 

Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2373-74 (1989). 

Mr. Hunt's claims against defendants were based on his 

failure to be promoted to a supervisory position on four separate 

occasions. The district court ruled that the first two occasions 

were time-barred, but the second two, in November of 1982 and 

January of 1984, were not. The court subsequently awarded damages 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-1239 Document: 01019963064 Date Filed: 02/13/1990 Page: 5 
to Mr. Hunt based on defendants' failure to promote him in 

November of 1982. 

The order of proof in a discriminatory failure to promote 

case is well-established. First, the plaintiff must establish a 

prima facie case, which requires proof of the following elements: 

(1) he is a member of a racial minority; (2) he was a qualified 

applicant for an existing vacancy; (3) despite his 

qualifications, he was rejected for the position ; and (4) after 

his rejection, the position either remained open or was filled by 

another under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 

unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 398 

(10th Cir. 1983). 

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the 

employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for the decision not to promote the plaintiff. McDonnell Douglas, 

411 U.S. at 802. The empl oyer need not prove the absence of 

discriminatory motive, Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 

25 (1978)(per curiam), or that "it was actually motivated by the 

proffered reasons." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 

450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). 

The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasi on throughout the 

trial. Therefore, once the employer articulates a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the decision, the plaintiff must have 

an opportunity to show that the articulated reason is a mere 

pretext for discrimination. "This burden now merges with the 

[plaintiff's] ultimate burden of persuading the court that [he) 

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has been the victim of intentional discrimination." Burdine, 450 

U.S. at 256. 

The district court, below, found that Mr. Hunt proved a prima 

facie case of discrimination regarding his failure to obtain an 

available supervisory position in November of 1982, but failed to 

discuss whether defendants articulated a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the decision not to promote Mr. Hunt. 

Defendants presented evidence that they contend showed that 

Mr. Hunt was not the best qualified candidate for the job. Both 

Mr. Hunt and Mr. Morris, the director of the environmental 

services department in which Mr. Hunt worked, testified that one 

of the criteria for supervisory positions in the department was 

three years' supervisory experience. Mr. Morris also testified 

that when selecting a supervisor he looked primarily at the 

applicants' education and experience, as well as their ability to 

get along with other people. With regard to the applicants' 

experience, Mr. Morris said he was looking for a person with 

experience in managing small groups of people, including 

interviewing, hiring, disciplining, and assigning work. 

The evidence showed that Mr. Morris considered three 

applicants for the supervisory position that was open in the fall 

of 1982. Among the three candidates were Mr. Hunt and Marge 

McCoy, a white woman who was selected for the position. Mr. 

Morris testified that he selected Ms. McCoy over Mr. Hunt because 

she was the better qualified candidate. Specifically, Ms. McCoy 

had attended college, whereas Mr. Hunt had not graduated from high 

school. Ms. McCoy also had eight years of management experience. 

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To Mr. Morris' knowledge, Mr. Hunt had no management experience. 

Mr. Hunt admitted that he did not have the three years of 

supervisory experience required. Furthermore, Ms. McCoy had 

excellent references and excellent interpersonal skills. Mr. 

Hunt, although friendly, had been suspended in August of 1981 for 

fighting with another employee and warned that due to the 

seriousness of his infraction, any further violations of the work 

rules could result in his discharge. 

The district court did not discuss or make specific findings 

with respect to any of the foregoing evidence. Furthermore, 

despite sharply conflicting evidence, the court did not make any 

findings with respect to the role of the panel of supervisors who 

interviewed Mr. Hunt in November of 1982. See Griffin v. City of 

Omaha, 785 F.2d 620, 628 (8th Cir. 1986)(district court must 

assure appellate court 

conflicting evidence 

"that it 

and 'come 

has 

to 

considered strongly 

grips with apparently 

irreconcilable conflicts"'). Instead, the court simply found that 

a majority of the panel members thought Mr. Hunt was the best 

qualified candidate for the position. 

The district court never addressed the reasons proffered by 

defendants for the decision not to promote Mr. Hunt, nor did it 

determine whether the same were merely a pretext for 

discrimination. "[B]efore the court can reject all the employer's 

explanations as pretextual, it must first address the specific 

proffered business reasons." Logue v. International 

Rehabilitation Assocs., Inc., 837 F.2d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 1988). 

The court effectively deprived defendants of "the full trial 

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.. 

process contemplated in Burdine" and "entered judgment in favor of 

[plaintiff] based on the strength of [his] prima facie case." Id. 

at 154-55. 

Since the district 

respect to defendants' 

court made 

proffered 

no specific findings with 

reasons for the employment 

decision in November of 1982, cannot determine whether the 

court's ultimate finding 

we 

that Mr. Hunt was the victim of 

intentional discrimination was correct. Therefore, we must vacate 

the lower court's judgment in favor of Mr. Hunt and remand for 

further findings of fact. On remand the district court also 

should make specific findings concerning Mr. Hunt's claim of 

discrimination in January of 1984, since the court's ruling does 

not contain any findings with respect to that claim. 

Ms. Shoeboot instituted the underlying action 

defendants for alleged discriminatory discharge. The 

against 

order of 

proof in a discriminatory discharge case is the same as that in a 

failure to promote action, which is outlined above. The prima 

facie case that a discharged employee must prove consists of the 

following elements: (1) she is a member of a racial minority; 

( 2) she was qualified for her job; ( 3) despite her 

qualifications, she was discharged; and (4) after her discharge, 

the position either remained open or was filled by another under 

circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful 

discrimination. Crawford v. Northeastern Okla. State Univ., 713 

F.2d 586, 588 (10th Cir. 1983). 

Unlike its ruling on Mr. Hunt's claim, the district court's 

ruling regarding Ms. Shoeboot did discuss some of the legitimate, 

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.. 

nondiscriminatory reasons advanced by defendants for firing her. 

Whether the court credited or discounted such reasons is unclear, 

however. 

The evidence showed that Ms. Shoeboot, who was receiving 

workmen's compensation as a result of a work-related injury, 

missed some physical therapy appointments. Thereafter, she was 

given a written memorandum that instructed her to attend scheduled 

appointments and informed her that if she failed to do so, she 

could be discharged for insubordination. The evidence further 

showed that Ms. Shoeboot subsequently was discharged for allegedly 

missing a scheduled physical therapy appointme nt o n March 5, 1984. 

In its ruling, the district court noted the grievance 

committee's conclusion that Ms. Shoeboot was not informed of the 

specific time for her appointment on March 5, 1984, which, the 

court said, corroborated Ms. Shoeboot's testimony that she was not 

told about the time for her appointment. (R. Vol . VIII at 14-15. ) 

The court then held that although there were numerous reasons to 

fire Ms. Shoeboot, the reason for which she actually was fired was 

not a proper one. 2 

2 The court stated in its ruling on Ms. Shoeboot's claim: 

She was not a terrific employee. She missed a lot 

of work. She was late. She wouldn't sit down when her 

employer told her to sit down. She questioned the 

directives. She questioned her supervisors, and there 

were lots of reasons -- proper reasons for firing her; 

but the reason that she was fired was not a proper 

reason .. 

R. Vol. VIII at 15. 

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In so ruling, the court may have applied an erroneous legal 

standard since Title VII does not require an employer to discharge 

an employee for good cause. "The employer may fire an employee 

for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous 

facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its a c tion is not for a 

discriminatory reason." Nix v. WLCY Radio/ Rahall Communications, 

738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984). See a lso Pollard v. Rea 

Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir.)(employer's mistake 

of fact is not necessarily a pretext for discrimination), cert. 

denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987). 

The district court found that there was a concerted effort to 

fire Ms. Shoeboot for one reason or another, but did not say 

whether it found such effort to be motivated by racial animus. 

Therefore, we cannot tell whether the court found Ms. Shoeboot's 

discharge improper because motivated by racial animus, or improper 

because based on an honest mistake of fact. The former is 

actionable under Title VII, the latter is not. 

Since we cannot review the district court's ruling in favor 

of Ms. Shoeboot without an understanding o f how the court reached 

its decision, we must vacate the judgment i n favor of Ms. Shoeboot 

and remand for further factual findings. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is VACATED and REMANDED with directions to 

make new findings of fact and conclusions of law in light of the 

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' . 

legal standards set forth herein, and then enter judgment in 

accordance with the new findings and conclusions. In view of our 

holding, we need not address the other issues raised on appeal. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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