Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02093/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JOSE LUCENA VELEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-02093 PHX FJM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

On August 31, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging his criminal conviction by an Arizona state court.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus Limited to Affirmative Defenses (“Answer”) (Docket No.

17) on March 30, 2007. Respondents argue the action for habeas

relief was not timely filed and, therefore, that the petition

must be denied and dismissed with prejudice. On May 30, 2007,

Petitioner filed a reply to the answer to the petition. See

Docket No. 20.

I Procedural History

In 1999, Petitioner was charged with possession of

narcotic drugs for sale, i.e., heroin, a class 2 felony. See

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1

 Petitioner’s first trial on this charge, in late 1999 or

early 2000, resulted in a mistrial and Petitioner was released to the

custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service on March 21,

2000, because Petitioner was found to be in the United States

illegally. Answer, Exh. F. Because he was in federal custody,

Petitioner failed to appear for his scheduled state trial date of

April 5, 2000, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Answer, Exh.

E. The Court notes Petitioner was arrested on March 21, 2000, by the

federal authorities, on a charge of illegal re-entry into the United

States after a previous deportation. See United States v. Lucena

Velez, No. 00 CR 00437. On November 30, 2001, Petitioner was taken

into state custody from federal custody pursuant to the state bench

warrant issued April 5, 2000. Id., Exh. E. 

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Answer, Exh. A. Prior to his trial, Petitioner filed a motion

to suppress the evidence against him, which motion was denied.

See id., Exh. E. On March 5, 2002, a jury found Petitioner

guilty of the crime charged, and also found the weight of the

drugs involved in the crime exceeded the statutory threshold

amount of one gram. Id., Exh. C; Petition, Attach.1 On April

2, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 12 years

incarceration pursuant to this conviction, which term was

aggravated by a felony narcotics conviction in 1993. Answer,

Exh. D & Exh. F.

Petitioner timely filed a direct appeal of his

conviction and sentence. Id., Exh. E. The Arizona Court of

Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on

February 27, 2003. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner sought review of

this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review

on December 5, 2003. Id., Exh. G & Exh. H.

Petitioner filed an action for state post-conviction

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

on February 25, 2004, alleging a claim of ineffective assistance

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2

 In denying Petitioner’s allegation of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated:

Nothing indicates that counsel’s performance was

deficient. He counseled Defendant to accept a

plea bargain, seemingly because he could see how

solid the State’s evidence was going to be at

trial. They had a valid stop and a valid search.

... And the Defendant had three prior felonies

and was on release for another charge when this

case occurred. Counsel’s advice was clearly well

founded.

Answer, Exh. L. The Court of Appeals also concluded Petitioner was

not prejudiced by any alleged deficiency because “[i]n view of the

overwhelming evidence, it is inconceivable” a “different trial

strategy would have resulted in a different result.” Id., Exh. L.

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of counsel. Id., Exh. I & Exh. K. Petitioner was appointed

counsel to represent him in his Rule 32 proceedings. Id., Exh.

K & Exh. N. On September 1, 2004, the Arizona Superior Court

denied post-conviction relief, concluding Petitioner had not

raised a colorable claim he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel. Id., Exh. L.2 Petitioner was

allowed until October 25, 2004, to seek review of this decision.

Id., Exh. M. 

On November 8, 2004, Petitioner’s appointed counsel

submitted a pleading regarding review to the Arizona Court of

Appeals; however, Petitioner did not sign this pleading. Id.,

Exh. N. The Arizona Court of Appeals issued an opinion deciding

the pleading for review was not timely filed. Id., Exh. O.

Petitioner was advised by the Court of Appeals he could return

to the Superior Court to seek leave to file an untimely petition

for review. Id., Exh. O. Petitioner did not do so and, on

December 21, 2004, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed

Petitioner’s action for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. Q &

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Exh. R.

Petitioner filed an action seeking federal habeas

relief on April 4, 2005. See Velez v. Schriro, 05 CV 1014 PHX

JWS MEA. The petition was dismissed without prejudice with

leave to amend within thirty days on May 9, 2005. See id. at

Docket No. 3. Petitioner did not file an amended petition and

this action was dismissed by the Court on June 22, 2005. See

id. at Docket No. 4. Petitioner filed another action seeking

federal habeas relief on May 26, 2005. See Velez v. Schriro, 05

CV 1597 PXH FJM MEA. The petition was dismissed without

prejudice with leave to amend within thirty days on January 4,

2006. See id. at Docket No. 5. Petitioner did not file an

amended petition, but filed several motions seeking extension of

the time allowed to file an amended petition. Id. at Docket

Nos. 7, 8, 9. In an order filed May 12, 2006, the Court noted

Petitioner had returned to state court to attempt to exhaust his

federal habeas claims and that there were on-going state court

proceedings regarding Petitioner’s sentence. Id. at Docket No.

10. Because the claims stated in the petition filed May 26,

2005, had not been exhausted in the state courts, the 2005

habeas action was dismissed without prejudice on May 12, 2006.

Id. 

Petitioner filed the pending federal habeas petition on

August 31, 2006. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal

habeas relief from his conviction because the trial court erred

by denying his motion to suppress evidence, i.e., the 1.4 grams

of heroin found on Petitioner’s person when he was searched

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after a traffic stop revealed he was driving outside the scope

of permission to drive granted by the state. Petitioner also

contends he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court

erred by denying his motion to dismiss, in violation of his

right to due process.

II Analysis

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations as found in the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). However, the AEDPA provides that a petitioner is

entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(1994 &

Supp. 2006); Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361,

363-64 (2000).

Petitioner’s conviction became final on or about March

5, 2004, when the ninety-day time period for seeking certiorari

expired regarding his direct appeal, which concluded in the

state courts on December 5, 2003. See, e.g., Brambles v.

Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

485 (2005); Answer, Exh. G & Exh. H. Petitioner had one year

from that date, i.e., until March 5, 2005, to seek federal

habeas relief, absent any statutory tolling pursuant to a

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3

 See Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 803-04 (10th Cir.

2000) (“Thus, we hold today that, regardless of whether a petitioner

actually appeals a denial of a post-conviction application, the

limitations period is tolled during the period in which the petitioner

could have sought an appeal under state law.”); Swartz v. Meyers, 204

F.3d 417, 420-24 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that, because a judgment is

not final until the time for seeking review expires, the word

“pending” includes that time period, whether or not such review is

sought, and collecting cases so holding). See also Lookingbill v.

Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 266 (5th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases so

holding). 

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pending state action for post-conviction relief. See, e.g.,

Brambles, 412 F.3d at 1069. 

Petitioner filed an action seeking state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, on February 25, 2004. Accordingly, the statute of

limitations regarding Petitioner’s federal habeas action was

tolled until the conclusion of Petitioner’s proceedings

regarding his Rule 32 petition. See, e.g., Roy v. Lampert, 465

F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006). The action for post-conviction

relief was concluded on December 21, 2004, when the Arizona

Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s action for postconviction relief for Petitioner’s failure to properly prosecute

this action. See Answer, Exh. Q & Exh. R The one-year statute

of limitations then ran against Petitioner from January 21,

2005, when the time for appealing the Court of Appeals’

dismissal of the Rule 32 action to the Arizona Supreme Court

expired,3 until August 21, 2006, when Petitioner filed this

action for federal habeas relief, a period of approximately 19

months. 

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Neither of Petitioner’s 2005 actions seeking federal

habeas relief tolled the applicable statute of limitations

because they were not state actions for post-conviction relief.

See, e.g., Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 275, 125 S. Ct. 1528,

1533 (2005). Additionally, the instant habeas petition does not

“relate back” to the habeas petitions filed in 2005, rendering

the instant petition timely filed because the first habeas

petition was filed within the applicable statute of limitations.

See Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001); Green v.

White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). This conclusion is

not contradicted by the fact the first petition was dismissed

without prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust the claims

stated in that petition. See Dils, 260 F.3d at 986.

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only be considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has determined that equitable tolling of the

filing deadline for a federal habeas petition is available only

if extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. See Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003); Malcom v. Payne,

281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002). Equitable tolling is only

appropriate when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s

lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely

claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.

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1999). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

In reply to Respondents’ argument that his habeas

petition was not timely filed, Petitioner asserts he is entitled

to federal habeas relief because his arrest violated his Fourth

Amendment rights, there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction, his right to a speedy trial was violated, and his

counsel was ineffective, and because some of these claims were

properly exhausted in the state courts. See Docket No. 20.

Petitioner further contends he is entitled to equitable tolling

of the applicable statute of limitations because he has been

diligently attempting to exhaust his federal habeas claims. Id.

Petitioner also contends extraordinary circumstances prevented

his timely filing of the instant petition, i.e., that “when this

case [began he] was a Spanish speaker only,” that he is without

legal knowledge, that he is indigent, and that the state prisons

do not provide legal materials in the Spanish language. Id. 

 Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition, or that any state action was the “but for” cause for

his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2005)

(concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable

tolling because he was misled or confused about timing of

exhausting his state remedies and filing his federal habeas

petition); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir.

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2005) (“Each of the cases in which equitable tolling has been

applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by state

officials or, occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”).

Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006); Faught v. Butler,

135 Fed. App. 92, 93 (9th Cir. 2005); Corjasso v. Ayers, 278

F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, a petitioner’s

pro se status, ignorance of the law, or lack of representation

during the applicable filing period do not warrant equitable

tolling. See, e.g., Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–716

(5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir.

2004) (holding that petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s

“rules, statutes, and the time period set forth therein do not

justify equitable tolling”). 

Petitioner does not claim he was misled about the

statute of limitations or that Respondents acted to inhibit the

filing of his federal habeas petition. Petitioner asserts he is

entitled to equitable tolling based on a language barrier, i.e.,

he alleges legal materials in Spanish were not available to him

during his incarceration. An interpreter was present at

Petitioner’s sentencing on April 4, 2002. Answer, Exh. D. The

Court notes Petitioner filed a pro per motion to dismiss the

state criminal charge against him on August 8, 2001, however,

Petitioner avers he was only able to draft legal pleadings in

English due to the help of fellow inmates. See id., Exh. E &

Exh. G at 6 n.1.

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The United States Circuit Courts of Appeal “have

rejected a per se rule that a habeas petitioner’s language

limitations can justify equitable tolling, but have recognized

that equitable tolling may be justified if language barriers

actually prevent timely filing.” Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d

1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006).

Whether a habeas petitioner’s inability to

obtain Spanish-language materials or procure

translation assistance can be grounds for

equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s one-year

limitations period is a question of first

impression in this Circuit. In Whalem/Hunt, [], we held that the unavailability of a copy

of the AEDPA in a prison law library could,

but did not necessarily, constitute grounds

for equitable tolling. We remanded the case

to the district court for appropriate

development of the record. Id. So long as

there are some circumstances “consistent with

petitioner’s petition and declaration” that

would entitle the petitioner to equitable

tolling, remand is appropriate. Id.; see also

Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir.

2003)....

Id., 449 F.3d at 1069 (remanding the matter to the District

Court for further factual findings regarding equitable tolling).

In Mendoza, the petitioner alleged a lack of access to

Spanish-language legal materials prevented him from learning

about and complying with the AEDPA’s deadline for filing a

federal habeas petition challenging his state conviction.

However, the facts alleged in Mendoza are clearly

distinguishable form those alleged by Petitioner.

According to his declaration, when Mendoza

was first incarcerated, he requested

Spanish-language legal materials but was told

to “wait until [he] got to [his] regular

assigned prison.” After arriving at Solano

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State Prison, he made several trips to the

library but found only English-language books

and only English-speaking clerks and

librarians. Not until Mendoza found a

newly-arrived, bilingual inmate willing to

offer assistance was he able to file his

habeas petition; however, by this time, the

AEDPA deadline had already passed. We

conclude that this combination of (1) a

prison law library’s lack of Spanish-language

legal materials, and (2) a petitioner’s

inability to obtain translation assistance

before the one-year deadline, could

constitute extraordinary circumstances.

***

In Cobas v. Burgess, 306 F.3d 441, 444 (6th

Cir. 2002), the court held that a

petitioner’s “inability to speak, write

and/or understand English, in and of itself,

does not automatically” justify equitable

tolling. The court emphasized that the

“existence of a translator who can read and

write English and who assists a petitioner

during appellate proceedings” renders

equitable tolling inapplicable for that

petitioner. Id. Because Cobas had written a

detailed letter to his counsel in English and

had otherwise demonstrated his ability to

either communicate in English or communicate

with a translator, the record in Cobas’ case

“belie[d] any claim that language

difficulties prevented Cobas from filing his

petition in a timely manner...

Id., 449 F.3d at 1069-70 (concluding the Cobas “decision’s

rationale left open the possibility that a non-English speaker

who could not find a willing translator could qualify for

equitable tolling.”).

Petitioner presents no evidence that his language

skills were the “but for” cause of his inability to timely file

a federal habeas action. Petitioner had the assistance of other

inmates in preparing his legal pleadings in English. Notably,

Petitioner does not assert he was not aware of the AEDPA’s

statute of limitations. Additionally, Petitioner was,

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notwithstanding his language abilities, able to file two timely

habeas petitions in 2005, and to understand the Court’s orders

as to why these petitions were dismissed, initially with leave

to amend.

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

barred by the statute of limitations applicable to it pursuant

to the AEDPA. Petitioner has not shown that the circumstances

of his case warrant application of equitable tolling so that

this Court may address the merits of his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Lucena Velez’

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

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the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 1st day of June, 2007.

 

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