Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04856/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04856-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 08:1329 Writ of Mandamus to Adjudicate Visa Petition

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABIODUN SODIPO,

Plaintiff,

v.

RON ROSENBERG, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-04856-JD 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 17

Plaintiff Abiodun Sodipo, a Nigerian citizen who resides in the United States, appeals from 

a decision by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denying his 

petition for an immigrant visa based on employment. A petitioner seeking an employment-based 

immigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A), as Sodipo does, typically must have a job offer in 

hand from an employer in the U.S., as well as a “labor certification” from the Department of Labor 

stating that workers already in the United States are not available to do the job and will not be 

adversely affected if the visa is granted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i); 8 

C.F.R. 204.5(k)(4)(i). Sodipo has neither a job offer nor a labor certification, but contends that he 

is entitled to a waiver from these requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i), which allows 

dispensing with these prerequisites when doing so would be in the national interest. The 

defendants -- USCIS and the chief of its Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”) -- move for 

summary judgment on all of the counts in Sodipo’s complaint. The Court grants the motion.

BACKGROUND

According to a 2005 application for labor certification submitted by his then-employer, 

Sodipo holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electronic and Electrical Engineering from Obatemi 

Awolowo University in Nigeria and a Master of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the 

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University of New South Wales in Australia. See Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 144, Dkt. 

No. 12. After earning his master’s degree in 1998, Sodipo came to the U.S. and worked as a 

Technical Support Engineer at VPNet Technologies from 2000 to 2002; then as a Network 

Support Engineer for AEKO Consulting from 2002 to 2004, and thereafter as a Software Support 

Engineer for Caymas Systems, providing support to customers and communicating customer 

feedback to the Engineering department. See A.R. at 142-43. Sodipo’s employment with Caymas 

was terminated on February 23, 2006 -- he claims in retaliation for making a complaint of 

discrimination -- and his employer-sponsored visa application was abandoned. See A.R. at 306.

After leaving Caymas, Sodipo says he refrained from working until June 28, 2010, when 

he filed a petition with USCIS seeking an immigrant visa based on employment under 8 U.S.C. § 

1153(b)(2)(A). A.R. at 80. That statutory provision governs so-called “second preference” 

employment-based immigrants, who qualify by virtue of either being “members of the professions 

holding advanced degrees or their equivalent” or “who because of their exceptional ability in the 

sciences, arts, or business, will substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural 

or educational interests, or welfare of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A).1 The 

statutory provision also usually requires the alien to have a job offer, but Sodipo, who was not 

employed at the time he filed his petition, argued that he qualified for a national interest waiver 

from this requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i).

On January 11, 2011, USCIS issued a decision concluding that Sodipo had not established 

that he qualified for a national interest waiver. It applied a test set forth by the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) -- the highest administrative appellate body charged with 

interpreting the immigration laws -- which requires that three factors be shown in order to obtain a 

national interest waiver: (1) the alien must seek employment in an area of substantial intrinsic 

merit; (2) the proposed benefit to be provided by the alien must be national in scope; and (3) the 

 

1

“Second preference” immigrants are distinguished from “first preference” immigrants (aliens 

with extraordinary ability, outstanding professors and researchers, and certain multinational 

executives and managers), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1), and “third preference” immigrants (skilled 

workers, professionals with baccalaureate degrees, and certain unskilled laborers), 8 U.S.C. § 

1153(b)(3).

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petitioner “must persuasively demonstrate that the national interest would be adversely affected if 

a labor certification were required.” In re New York State Dep’t of Trans., 22 I. & N. Dec. 215, 

217-18 (BIA Aug. 7, 1998) (“NYSDOT”). USCIS found that Sodipo had not shown that the 

proposed benefit he would bring would be “national in scope” (the second prong) and that 

requiring labor certification would adversely affect the national interest (the third prong). A.R. at 

190-93.

Sodipo appealed this denial to the AAO, which found in an April 2, 2012, decision that 

Sodipo (contrary to the decision below) would be able to provide a benefit that was “national in 

scope,” but concluded that denial of Sodipo’s petition was still proper because he had not shown 

the third prong -- that requiring labor certification would adversely affect the national interest. 

A.R. 26-31. It also dismissed Sodipo’s appeal on the alternative ground that he had failed to 

submit an ETA-750B form with his up-to-date employment history; instead, he had submitted a 

photocopy of his ETA-750B from his employer-sponsored application in 2005.

Sodipo then filed a first motion for reconsideration of the AAO’s decision. The motion 

was denied by the AAO on December 28, 2012. A.R. at 12-17. The AAO’s decision rejected 

Sodipo’s arguments that: (1) his prior work experience was sufficient to satisfy the third prong of 

the NYSDOT test; (2) NYSDOT impermissibly imposed requirements on aliens beyond those 

intended by the statute in violation of Kazarian v. INS, 596 F.3d 1115, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(holding that the AAO erred by imposing evidentiary requirements not found in statute); and (3) 

he was excused from submitting an up-to-date employment history with his ETA-750B form 

because of his lack of employment subsequent to his prior form. Id.

Sodipo filed a second motion for reconsideration, largely retreading the same ground he 

had in his previous submissions. A.R. at 22-23. The AAO denied the second motion on 

September 19, 2013. A.R. at 1-5. On October 18, 2013, Sodipo launched this case by filing a 

complaint asking the Court to set aside the agency’s determination. See Complaint, Dkt. No. 1. 

On June 16, 2014, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which is now fully briefed. 

See Dkt. Nos. 17, 18, 20, 21.

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LEGAL STANDARD

“Generally, judicial review of agency action is limited to review of the record on which the 

administrative decision was based.” Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“[T]he function of the district court is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence 

in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” City & County of 

San Francisco v. United States, 130 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Because the 

presence of the administrative record, which the parties have stipulated to, usually means there are 

no genuine disputes of material fact, it allows the Court to decide whether to set aside the agency 

determination on summary judgment without a trial. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) 

(per curiam); Hunter v. Leininger, 15 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The motion for summary 

judgment is simply the procedural vehicle for asking the judge to decide the case on the basis of 

the administrative record.”).

An “agency action may be set aside only if ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Family Inc. v. USCIS, 469 F.3d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 

2006) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). Our circuit has “held it an abuse of discretion for the 

Service to act if there is no evidence to support the decision or if the decision was based on an 

improper understanding of the law.” Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 

1305, 1308 (9th Cir.1984) (internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. JURISDICTION

The Court’s first task is to determine whether this action is properly before it. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the 

court must dismiss the action.”). The Court’s obligation to determine whether it has subjectmatter jurisdiction applies even when, as is the case here, the parties agree that it does. See

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986) (holding that lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be cured by the consent of the parties).

The parties suggest that the Court has jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act 

(“APA”), which gives district courts original jurisdiction to review agency actions. See 5 U.S.C. 

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§ 704. Jurisdiction under the APA does not extend, however, to agency actions that are 

“committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). This exception “is applicable in 

those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no 

law to apply.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). At first blush, this may seem to be 

one of those rare instances, for the operative statute gives the Attorney General broad and 

standards-free discretion in deciding whether to issue national security waivers:

Subject to clause (ii), the Attorney General may, when the Attorney 

General deems it to be in the national interest, waive the 

requirements of subparagraph (A) that an alien’s services in the 

sciences, arts, professions, or business be sought by an employer in 

the United States.

8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i). Were this the last word on granting national security waivers, it is 

likely the Court would lack jurisdiction over this case because of the lack of any meaningful 

standard against which to judge the agency’s decision, as at least two other courts have concluded. 

See Zhu v. INS, 300 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D.D.C. 2004); Talwar v. INS, No. 00 CIV. 1166 JSM, 

2001 WL 767018, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 9, 2001).

But as noted earlier, the BIA has in NYSDOT put some muscle on the skeletal statutory 

language, and that decision has been used as precedent by the agency with respect to national 

interest waiver applications, including in this case. See A.R. at 3, 26, 191. While USCIS’s 

discretion may have been unfettered prior to NYSDOT, once it “announces and follows ... a 

general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed,” an irrational departure from 

that policy can be reviewed by courts pursuant to the APA. See INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 

(1996); see also Spencer Enters. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even where 

statutory language grants an agency unfettered discretion, its decision may nonetheless be 

reviewed if regulations or agency practice provide a meaningful standard by which this court may 

review its exercise of discretion.”). As NYSDOT gives the Court standards to apply in evaluating 

the agency’s denial of a national security waiver, this case is not within the “agency discretion” 

exception to jurisdiction under the APA. See Repaka v. Beers, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216-17 

(S.D. Cal. 2014); Mikhailik v. Ashcroft, No. C 04-0904 FMS, 2004 WL 2217511, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Oct. 1, 2004). 

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II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Sodipo seeks to set aside USCIS’s denial of his visa petition on three grounds, each 

corresponding to a claim in his complaint: First, he claims that the fact that his educational 

attainment exceeds the minimum required in his field, as well as the fact that he has experience in 

cybersecurity -- a field he claims is important to the national interest -- entitles him to a waiver. 

Second, he argues that submitting a photocopy of his ETA-750B from 2005 with his application 

instead of attaching a new ETA-750B was sufficient under the statute, and that it was improper for 

USCIS to require a new ETA-750B. Third, and finally, he argues that labor certification should 

not be required because there is a shortage of workers in his field. Defendants move for summary 

judgment on all three counts.

A. Do Sodipo’s Qualifications Entitle Him to a National Interest Waiver?

The only factor in the three-part NYSDOT test that the parties dispute is the third one: 

whether Sodipo has “persuasively demonstrate that the national interest would be adversely 

affected if a labor certification were required.” NYSDOT, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 218. Sodipo argues 

that he qualifies because he seeks employment in the field of cybersecurity, see A.R. at 18, which 

he says has been identified by the president as being “critical to the national interest.” See Dkt. 

No. 18 at 6. He also argues that the fact that he worked at VPNet Technologies -- a developer of 

virtual private networks used in encrypting communications on the Internet -- and at Caymas 

Systems -- a developer of secure access gateways -- weighs in favor of his satisfying this prong, as 

does the fact that he has a master’s degree in a field in which the minimum qualification required 

is a bachelor’s degree.

The interpretation of the national interest waiver statutory provision embodied in the 

NYSDOT test is the one this Court must apply, because BIA’s interpretation of the statutes it 

enforces is entitled to deference from the courts under the doctrine associated with Chevron v. 

Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 

526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (holding that the BIA’s interpretation of “serious nonpolitical crime” in 

the immigration statute was entitled to deference); Arctic Ice Cream Novelties, L.P. v. Reno, 134 

F.3d 376, at *2 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (“Because ‘national interest’ is a general term of no 

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precise meaning and Congress has expressed no specific intent with respect to its meaning, we 

must defer to the INS’s interpretation so long as it is not arbitrary or capricious. We cannot say 

that it is.”) (citation omitted).

The principle underlying the NYSDOT decision is a sensible one: the requirements for a 

national interest waiver must exceed the ordinary requirements for a second preference 

employment-based immigrant visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A) -- namely advanced degrees or 

their equivalent or “exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business.” Otherwise everyone 

who qualified for a second preference immigrant visa would automatically satisfy the criteria for a 

national interest waiver, rendering the requirements of a job offer and labor certification 

superfluous. Thus, the BIA has held that to meet the third prong, the petitioner “must establish 

that the alien will serve the national interest to a substantially greater degree than would an 

available U.S. worker having the same minimum qualifications.” NYSDOT, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 

218. “Because, by statute, ‘exceptional ability’ is not by itself sufficient cause for a national 

interest waiver, the benefit which the alien presents to his or her field of endeavor must greatly 

exceed the ‘achievements and significant contributions’ contemplated in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 

§ 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(F).” Id.

In addition, the qualifications needed for a national interest waiver must be different from 

those needed to satisfy the normal requirement of obtaining a labor certification.2 Otherwise, there 

 

2

It is unclear from the statutory language whether labor certification is actually a requirement for 

second preference petitioners under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A). The neighboring provision, which 

applies to skilled workers and professionals, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(b)(3), contains an express 

requirement that labor certification is required, see 8 U.S.C. § 1152(b)(3)(C), but no such 

requirement appears in 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). And although the statutory provision describing the 

labor certification requirement -- 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(5)(A)(i) -- provides that “[a]ny alien who seeks 

to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible” 

without a labor certification, Sodipo does not seek to enter the United States; he is already here. 

Three courts of appeals, including our own in dictum, appear to have found that the labor 

certification requirement applies to petitions under 8 U.S.C. § 1152(b)(3), although none analyzed 

the statutory language in great depth. See Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 

2010) (“Unlike the ‘exceptional ability’ visa petition, the ‘extraordinary ability’ petition is not 

dependent on an actual offer for employment in the United States, and is exempt from the timeconsuming labor certification process ....”) (emphasis added); United States v. Ryan-Webster, 353 

F.3d 353, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2003); Kooritzky v. Reich, 17 F.3d 1509, 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

The regulations implementing the immigration statute clearly require labor certification for 

all applicants under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A) absent an applicable exception. See 8 C.F.R. 

204.5(k)(4)(i). Under Chevron, if Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise question at 

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would be no need for a national interest waiver from the labor certification requirement, since 

anyone who qualified for a national interest waiver could simply get a labor certification. See id.

at 217-218. Thus, “[i]t is not sufficient for the petitioner simply to enumerate the alien’s 

qualifications, since the labor certification process might reveal that an available U.S. worker has 

the qualifications as well.” Id. at 218. Nor is it sufficient simply for the alien to seek a job in an 

important field that suffers from a dearth of U.S. workers, because that problem can also be solved 

through the labor certification process. See id. 

Sodipo has not pointed to any qualifications he possesses that go above and beyond those 

that would be required by the normal, waiver-free process. It may be that the minimum 

educational requirement in his field is a bachelor’s degree, but a master’s degree cannot be 

sufficient to obtain a national interest waiver -- otherwise everyone who qualifies for a second 

preference employment-based visa through having an advanced degree would also qualify for a 

national interest waiver. Similarly, the importance of the field he seeks to work in and the 

groundbreaking work the companies he worked at did are beside the point. Sodipo must show that 

he himself “clearly present[s] a significant benefit to the field of endeavor.” Id. The mere fact 

that he worked as a support engineer at these countries and got at least one positive review, see

A.R. 314-19, is not enough. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to 

claim one.

B. Was Sodipo Entitled to Forgo Submitting an Updated Form ETA-750B?

Sodipo’s employer, when petitioning for an H-1B visa in March 2005, submitted a Form

ETA-750B containing Sodipo’s then-current work history. See A.R. 141-46. Sodipo included a 

photocopy of this same ETA-750B when he submitted the petition that gave rise to this case in 

2010, and argues that this is sufficient under the relevant regulation, which requires that the 

 

issue,” the Court must defer to the regulation unless it is “contrary to clear congressional intent or 

frustrates the policy Congress sought to implement.” See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; Providence 

Yakima Medical Center v. Sebelius, 611 F.3d 1181, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2010). In light of the fact 

that the agency’s requirement of a labor certification is not precluded by the statute and that there 

is no indication that it is contrary to Congress’s intent, the Court defers to the agency’s

interpretation that a labor certification is generally required for second preference immigrants 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A).

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petitioner “submit Form ETA-750B, Statement of Qualifications of Alien, in duplicate.” 8 C.F.R. 

204.5(k)(4)(ii). He also contends that a copy of the ETA-750B from 2005 was sufficient, as he 

had not worked from 2006 to 2010.

It was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion for the AAO to require an updated 

ETA-750B. Even if Sodipo’s employment history from 2005 to 2010 could be gleaned from the 

briefs that Sodipo submitted to USCIS and the AAO, USCIS is entitled to ask for and receive that 

information in a standardized form, rather than a legal brief. And it is hardly unreasonable to 

interpret 8 C.F.R. 204.5(k)(4)(ii) as requiring a current Form ETA-750B, rather than just any Form 

ETA-750B. The regulation does not specify that the Form ETA-750B has to be the alien’s, either, 

but that, like the requirement that the form be current, is so obvious that it would be absurd to 

insist that it be expressly included. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with 

respect to claim two.

C. Is the Alleged Shortage of Cybersecurity Professionals Sufficient Reason to Grant 

Sodipo a National Interest Waiver?

Sodipo argues that he is entitled to a national interest waiver because there is a national 

shortage of cybersecurity professionals. Whether that is true or not, it cannot be the basis for a 

national interest waiver, since it addresses a problem that is already covered by the usual labor 

certification requirement. In fact, the Department of Labor has determined that certain 

occupations are entitled to blanket labor certifications because they lack sufficient U.S. workers, 

and if cybersecurity were one of them, Sodipo could obtain a labor certification on that basis. See

20 C.F.R. § 656.5. To hold that the shortage of cybersecurity professionals warrants excepting 

Sodipo from the labor certification requirement would place the Court in the position of secondguessing the Department of Labor. The Court will not do so. Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment is granted with respect to claim three.

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CONCLUSION

The Court grants summary judgment in favor of defendants and directs the clerk to enter 

final judgment and close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 12, 2015

______________________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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