Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01849/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01849-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 06cv1849

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLOYD EUGENE BARNES,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 06cv1849-BTM (PCL)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING IN PART AND

DECLINING TO ADOPT IN PART THE

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE; 

(2) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS; 

(3) DISMISSING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; AND

(4) ISSUING A CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

vs.

R. CAMPBELL, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a Petition

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Respondent Warden

R. Campbell moves to dismiss the Petition on the basis it was filed after expiration of the oneyear statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Doc. No. 13.) 

Presently before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) submitted by

United States Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis which recommends granting Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 18.) The Magistrate Judge found that statutory tolling applied

for the time Petitioner was pursuing one complete round of state post-conviction collateral

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review, and that 108 days remained on the one-year limitations period when statutory tolling

ended on June 22, 2005. (R&R at 4-5.) The Magistrate Judge also found that because Petitioner

had provided documentary evidence showing he had attempted to obtain access to his legal

materials while housed at Mule Creek State Prison, equitable tolling was likely available from

March 29, 2006, the date Petitioner was transferred to Mule Creek, until May 27, 2006, when

Petitioner states that he was given access to his legal materials. (R&R at 10-11.) The instant

Petition was constructively filed 101 days later, on September 5, 2006. (R&R at 7.) However,

the Magistrate Judge found that the Petition was untimely because equitable tolling was

unavailable from January 7, 2005 to March 29, 2006, the time Petitioner alleges he did not have

access to his legal materials while housed in the administrative segregation unit at Salinas Valley

State Prison, because Petitioner had failed to provide documentary evidence that he diligently

sought access to his legal documents while in administrative segregation, and did not allege facts

demonstrating that lack of access to the prison’s allegedly inadequate law library prevented him

from filing his federal Petition. (R&R at 6-10.) Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R,

which includes his declaration supporting the assertion that denial of access to his legal papers

and denial of access to an adequate law library while housed at Salinas Valley State Prison

prevented him from filing his federal Petition on time. (Doc. No. 25.) 

The Court has reviewed the R&R and the Objections thereto pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1), which provides that: “A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the

following reasons, the Court adopts in part and declines to adopt in part the findings and

conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as set forth below, grants Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss,

dismisses the Petition as untimely, and issues a Certificate of Appealability.

The Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s finding regarding commencement of the oneyear statute of limitations. Petitioner’s conviction became final by the conclusion of direct

review on April 15, 2003, the last day he could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the

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1

 Petitioner argued to the superior court that “Any delay is due to Appellate Counsel’s failure

to raise the instant claims on direct appeal.” (Lodgment No. 7 at 6.) He added the phrase “and the

continual facility lockdowns with no meaningful access to the facility law library” to that excuse when

presenting his subsequent habeas petitions in the state appellate and supreme courts. (Lodgment No.

9 at 6; Lodgment No. 11 at 6.) 

-3- 06cv1849

United States Supreme Court following the January 15, 2003 denial of his petition for review

by the state supreme court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The statute of limitations began to

run the next day, on April 16, 2003. (R&R at 5.) 

Petitioner allowed 257 days to elapse before filing his first post-conviction application

for collateral relief, a habeas petition filed in the state superior court on December 29, 2003.

(Lodgment No. 7.) The superior court denied the petition in a 21-page order filed March 16,

2004, in which the court reached the merits of the claims but only after noting that the petition

was untimely. (Lodgment No. 8.) Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state appellate court

51 days later, on May 6, 2004. (Lodgment No. 9.) The appellate court denied the petition in a

2-page order filed June 17, 2004, reaching the merits of some claims and denying other claims

on procedural grounds, but without reference to the timeliness of the petition.1

 (Lodgment No.

10.) Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state supreme court 34 days later, on July 21, 2004.

(Lodgment No. 11.) The state supreme court denied the petition in an order filed June 22, 2005,

which stated in full: “Petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.” (Lodgment No. 12.) 

Respondent conceded, and the Magistrate Judge found, that Petitioner was entitled to

statutory tolling of the limitations period for the entire time he was pursuing one complete round

of state habeas proceedings, beginning on December 29, 2003, and ending on June 22, 2005.

(R&R at 4-5.) The Court declines to adopt this finding. The superior court, although denying

the claims presented in the habeas petition on their merits, rejected Petitioner’s excuse for the

delay in filing the petition (that the delay was caused by his appellate counsel’s failure to raise

the claims on direct appeal), and stated: “Petitioner substantially delayed filing this petition even

after the resolution of his final appeal, i.e., 12 months. Petitioner did not timely file this petition

for writ of habeas corpus.” (Lodgment No. 8 at 5.)

The statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed” state habeas corpus petition

is “pending” in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214

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(2002), the Court held that the time between the denial of a petition in a lower California court

and the filing of a subsequent petition in the next higher state court does not toll the statute of

limitations (i.e., an application for post-conviction relief is not “pending” during the interstitial

periods while one is pursuing a full round of state collateral review) if the petition is ultimately

found to be untimely. Id. at 223-26. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005), the Court

held that statutory tolling is not available for the period a petition is under consideration (i.e., an

application for post-conviction relief is not “properly filed”) if it is untimely. Id. at 413-14. In

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006), the Court held that in the absence of a clear indication

by the state supreme court that a petition is untimely, the federal court “must itself examine the

delay in each case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness.”

Id., at 198. 

The state superior court specifically found that the habeas petition was untimely. After

discussing California law regarding timeliness and the procedural history of Petitioner’s appeal,

the court stated:

Petitioner states, “Any delay is due to Appellate Counsel’s failure to raise

the instant claims on direct appeal.” Petitioner fails to allege facts showing when

he learned the facts supporting his claim or that he was unaware of appellate

counsel’s failure to raise the instant claims on appeal. Therefore, petitioner should

have brought this petition soon after he filed his appeal. Petitioner substantially

delayed filing this petition even after the resolution of his final appeal, i.e., 12

months. Petitioner did not timely file this petition for writ of habeas corpus.

(Lodgment No. 8 at 5.) 

The superior court habeas petition does not provide a basis for statutory tolling

irrespective of the fact that the superior court also reached the merits of the claims. Pace, 544

U.S. at 413-14 (“What we intimated in Saffold we now hold: When a postconviction petition is

untimely under state law, ‘that is the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”); Bonner

v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that under Pace, “if the petition was

untimely under California law, it was never properly filed,” and rejecting the proposition that

statutory tolling is available when the state court denies a post-conviction petition both on the

merits and as untimely), as amended, 439 F.3d 993, cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 132 (2006), citing

Saffold, 536 U.S. at 225-26. As such, the earliest statutory tolling could possibly have begun

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was May 6, 2004, the day Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state appellate court. However,

the limitations period had already expired on April 16, 2004. Thus, statutory tolling is

unavailable and the instant federal Petition is untimely. The fact that Respondent incorrectly

conceded that statutory tolling was available does not prevent the Court from dismissing the

Petition on this basis. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006) (“[W]e hold that

district courts are permitted, but not obliged, to consider, sua sponte, the timeliness of a state

prisoner’s habeas petition.”)

The Magistrate Judge next found that equitable tolling was not appropriate because

Petitioner had failed to adequately substantiate his allegations. (R&R at 8-11.) The Court

declines to adopt this finding. See Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A

habeas petitioner . . . should receive an evidentiary hearing when he makes ‘a good faith

allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’”), quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351

F.3d 919, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). However, even assuming equitable tolling is available for the

entire time Petitioner contends he was denied access to his legal papers, from January 7, 2005,

when he was placed in administrative segregation, until May 27, 2006, the statute of limitations

expired on April 16, 2004, at a time when Petitioner had access to his legal files and was actively

litigating his untimely state habeas petitions. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court ADOPTS in part and DECLINES to adopt in part the findings and

conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as set forth in this Order, GRANTS Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss, and DISMISSES the Petition as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The

Court ISSUES a Certificate of Appealability. See Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1026-

27 (9th Cir. 2000).

The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 26, 2007

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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