Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-02322/USCOURTS-alnd-5_13-cv-02322-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

ADAM KEITH WALDMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No.: 5:13-CV-2322-VEH-JEO

)

COMMISSIONER KIM THOMAS )

et. al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a pro se prisoner case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1-1).

The plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Limestone Correctional Facility in Harvest,

Alabama. (Id. at 6). The plaintiff names as defendants Alabama Department of

Corrections (“ADOC”) employees in their individual and official capacities: Prison

Commissioner Kim Thomas, employees as defendants in their individual and official

capacities: Prison Commissioner Kim Thomas, Director of Classification Cassandra

Conway,Assistant Director ofClassificationAmanda Baggett,ClassificationSpecialist

Mrs. Cooley and CaptainButler. (Id.). Forrelief, he seeks a jury trial, a declaration that

the defendants violated his federal and state constitutional rights, compensatory and

punitive damages, and an injunction ordering the defendants to “stop labeling and

branding [him] as a sex offender, and remove the “S” suffix fromhis [inmate] number.”

FILED

 2015 Dec-02 PM 04:43

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:13-cv-02322-VEH-JEO Document 20 Filed 12/02/15 Page 1 of 25
(Id. at 10).

In accordance with the usual practices of this court and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),

the amended complaint was referred to a magistrate judge for a preliminary report and

recommendation. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 (1991). In accordance with

the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 804, 110 Stat. 1321,

and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the magistrate judge screened the plaintiff’s amended

complaint and, on May 1, 2015, sua sponte recommended dismissal of the complaint

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 14, R&R). On June

10, 2015, the plaintiff filed objections to that Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 17)

(“Objections”). Also on that date, he filed a Motion for Leave To Amend Complaint

(Doc. 18) (the “Amend Motion”) and a proposed Amended Complaint (doc. 19).

The court will first address the plaintiff’s Objections. Then, it will address his

Amend Motion.

DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

After conducting a “careful and complete” review of the findings and

recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge’s

report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v. Wainwright, 681

F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 408 (5th

2

Case 5:13-cv-02322-VEH-JEO Document 20 Filed 12/02/15 Page 2 of 25
Cir.1982)).

1 The district judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the

matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report orspecified proposed findings orrecommendationsto which objection is made.”

Id.. This requires that the district judge “give fresh consideration to those issues to

which specific objection has been made by a party.” Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ.,

896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

In contrast, those portions of the R & R to which no objection is made need only

be reviewed for clear error. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed. App’x. 781, 784 (11th Cir.

2006).

2

“Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de

1 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued

before October 1, 1981, as well as all decisions issued after that date by a Unit B panel of the

former Fifth Circuit. Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir.1982); see also

United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1361 n. 4 (11th Cir.2009) (discussing the continuing

validity of Nettles).

2 Macort dealt only with the standard of review to be applied to a magistrate's factual

findings, but the Supreme Court has held that there is no reason for the district court to apply a

different standard to a magistrate's legal conclusions. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150, 106 S.

Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985). Thus, district courts in this circuit have routinely applied a

clear-error standard to both. See Tauber v. Barnhart, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1373–74 (N.D. Ga.

2006) (collecting cases). This is to be contrasted with the standard of review on appeal, which

distinguishes between the two. See Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 1991)

(when a magistrate's findings of fact are adopted by the district court without objection, they are

reviewed on appeal under a plain-error standard, but questions of law remain subject to de novo

review).

3

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novo, findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.”

United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). It

is incumbent upon the parties to timely raise any objections that they may have

regarding a magistrate judge’s findings contained in a report and recommendation, as

the failure to do so subsequently waives or abandons the issue, even ifsuch matter was

presented at the magistrate judge level. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pilati, 627 F.3d 1360 at 1365

(11th Cir. 2010) (“While Pilati raised the issue of not being convicted of a qualifying

offense before the magistrate judge, he did not raise this issue in his appeal to the

district court. Thus, this argument has been waived or abandoned by his failure to raise

it on appeal to the district court.”). However, the district judge has discretion to

consider or to decline to consider arguments that were not raised before the magistrate

judge. Stephens v. Tolbert, 471 F.3d 1173, 1176 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Williams

v. McNeil, 557 F. 3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009).

“Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings objected to.

Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district

court.” Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410 n. 8. “This rule facilitates the opportunity for district

judges to spend more time on matters actually contested and produces a result

compatible with the purposes of the Magistrates Act.” Id. at 410. Indeed, a contrary

rule “would effectively nullify the magistrate judge's consideration of the matter and

4

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would not help to relieve the workload of the district court.” Id. (quoting United States

v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 622 (9th Cir. 2000)).

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE R&R

I. Jurisdiction of Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff arguesthat the magistrate judge did not have subject-matterjurisdiction

to issue a report and recommendation in his case because:

1. No Article III Judge gave the plaintiff notice prior to designating

Magistrate Ott to serve as a special master in this case and afforded the

plaintiff the opportunity to object.

2. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) as applied and utilized by this Court

Constituted rights as guaranteed him by Article III of the United States

Constitution in that the Article III Judge, without any prior notice to the

plaintiff, desihnated [sic] a Magistrate to hear and determine his case.

Subsequently, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) and (1) the plaintiff is

served with a form to consent to the Magistrate who has already been

deligated [sic] which is essentially worthless because the Magistrate has

already been deligated [sic] to his case and the Article III Judge is not

about to remove him from the case, even absent the plaintiff's consent.

The plaintiff has never consented, and will never consent for his case to

be delegated or assigned to a Magistrate.

3. Article III confers upon the plaintiff a personal right to have his case

heard by an Article III Judge. ***

(Doc. 17 at 3).

The district court has statutory authority to delegate non-dispositive pretrial

5

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matters to a magistrate judge for determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

3 The

district court need not obtain the consent of the parties before assigning these matters

to a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(C). The undersigned is an Article III

judge and will issue the final determination in this case after a de novo review.

Therefore, plaintiff’s objection to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge to issue the

R&R is OVERRULED as frivolous.

II. Plaintiff’s Factual Objections

The plaintiff has objected to the magistrate judge’sstatement that “[t]he plaintiff

admits he was convicted of kidnapping.” (Doc. 17, p. 8 at ¶ 5). However, he then goes

on state that “he was found guilty, he did not admit to the offense in a guilty plea, but

wasfound [guilty] by a jury trial of [the offense] of kidnapping.” Being found guilty by

a jury trial is a conviction. Thus, the plaintiff has admitted and still admits that he was

“convicted of kidnapping.” This objection is OVERRULED as frivolous.

The plaintiff next “objects” (Doc. 17, p. 8 at ¶ 6) to the magistrate judge’s

3 Section 636(b)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part:

a judge may also designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including

evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and

recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in

subparagraph (A), of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of

criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2009) (footnote omitted).

6

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statement that “[t]he plaintiff admits he was convicted of‘[k]idnapping ... a minor, who

was under the age of twelve.” (Doc. 14, p.4)(alterations in original). Plaintiff states

that, “[o]n page 4 ... clearly shows that there is no mention of a child under the age of

12 years old.” (Doc. 17, p. 8 at ¶ 6). The undersigned agrees that the plaintiff did not

admit that he was convicted of kidnapping a minor who was under the age of 12.

Further, he did not necessarily admit that fact when he admitted that he was convicted

of “Kidnapping First Degree.”

4 However, he did state "The classification wants to

punish the plaintiff even more for the conviction of [k]idnapping of a minor, who was

under the age of twelve." (Doc. 1-1 at 8). Thus, it is the plaintiff who has informed this

court of the age of his kidnapping victim. Further, he has never denied that his victim

was a minor who was under the age of twelve. Nor has he alleged that he was the

child's parent or guardian.

5 Even in his objections, when he gives the details of his

4

§ 13A-6-43, Code of Alabama (1975) provides:

(a) A person commits the crime of kidnapping in the first degree if he abducts another

person with intent to

(1) Hold him for ransom or reward; or

(2) Use him as a shield or hostage; or

(3) Accomplish or aid the commission of any felony or flight therefrom; or

(4) Inflict physical injury upon him, or to violate or abuse him sexually; or

(5) Terrorize him or a third person; or

(6) Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function.

There is nothing in this statute that references the age of the victim.

5 The Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act

(“ASORCNA”) at Code 1975 §§ 15-20A-1 to 15-20A-48. Section 15-20A-5(18) states that

individuals who are convicted of "[k]idnapping of a minor, except by a parent, guardian or

custodian, as provided by section 13-6-43 or 13-6-44" are sex offenders.

7

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crime, he states:

3. The plaintiff was in the Navy and stationed in Pensacola Florida, when he

meet [sic] a woman that [sic] they started dating. Once dating she

introduced himto Meth and he spent all he had to keep her and him doing

this drug. Then he decided to go back to Virgina [sic] to visit his family,

when he left, he left her a lot of money. Upon his return to Florida, she

had left and taken all his money. At thistime the plaintiff went looking for

her and found her, she lied to him and said that she did not have his

money. He found out that she was married and had a kid. He approached

her again and demanded his money, she would not give his money to him.

Without rational thinking the plaintiff went to the day care where her son

was and retrived [sic] him and then called her and she said she would

come up with the money. Daycare called the cops, there was a pursuit and

the plaintiff recked [sic] his truck without injuring the kid. The plaintiff

left the kid in his stuck truck that was in a ditch, so that he would be safe

for the police to find him. The plaintiff never touched him in any sexual

manner, and did not threaten him in no [sic] sexual manner, this was all

proved at trial. The plaintiff was not found guilty of a sex offense of any

sort.

(Doc. 17 at 7)(emphasis by underlining supplied; emphasis in bold in original).

Thus, the undersigned agrees that the offense that the plaintiff was convicted of

did not include as an element any sexual contact between the plaintiff and his victim.

The magistrate judge’s R&R reflects only that it was the plaintiff who told this court

that he was convicted of kidnapping first degree and that his victim was a minor under

the age of twelve. (See Doc. 1-1 at 8)("The classification wants to punish the plaintiff

even more for the conviction of [k]idnapping of a minor, who was under the age of

twelve.") (Doc. 1-1 at 8). And, as explained above, he has never denied the age of the

8

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victim or claimed that he was the victim’s parent, guardian, or custodian. Thus, under

Section 15-20A-5(18) of ASORCNA, he is a “sex offender.”

The plaintiff’s objection to the magistrate judge’s finding that his own words

provide the necessary facts to show that he is a sex offender for purposes of

ASORCNA are OVERRULED. To the extent that the plaintiff objectsthat he was not

convicted of a sex offense, that objection is due to be SUSTAINED.

III. Magistrate Judge’s Finding that Plaintiff’s Claims Are Not Ripe

In the R&R, the magistrate judge recommended “that the plaintiff’s federal

constitutional claims be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and/or (2)

... and that jurisdiction over the plaintiff’sstate law claims be DECLINED.” (Doc. 14

at p. 14)(emphasis in original). Specifically, the magistrate judge considered that 

“[t]he plaintiff may be attempting to challenge § 15-20A-5 of the ASORCNA6

6 Effective July 1, 2011, Alabama replaced its prior sex offender registry law, the Alabama

Community Notification Act (CNA), Ala.Code § 15–20–20, et seq. (1975), with the Alabama Sex

Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (ASORCNA), Ala.Code § 15–20A–1, et

seq. (1975, as amended). A person subject to ASORCNA must register as a sex offender with the

Alabama Department of Public Safety (DPS), id. § 15–20A–7; must register with local law

enforcement, pay a registration fee, and abide by certain reporting requirements, id. § 15–20A–10

& § 15–20A–22; is subject to residency, travel, and employment restrictions, id. §§

15–20A–11,–13, & –15; and is subject to community notification requirements, id. § 15–20A–21.

In addition, ASORCNA requires that the offender carry identification. Id. § 15–20A–18. Further,

an adult sex offender cannot establish or maintain a residence or maintain employment within

2,000 feet of a school. Id. §§ 15–20A–aa(a) (residence) & 15–20A–13(b) (employment).

However, exceptions are possible in some instances. Id. § 15–20A–11(f) (residence) & §

15–20A–25(a) (employment). An “adult sex offender” (i.e. an adult who has been convicted of a

sex offense) is subject to ASORCNA's requirements for life. Ala.Code §§ 15–20A–3(b),

15–20A–4(1).

9

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as being unconsitutionally ‘vague’ and ‘a violation of [his] liberty interest’

because he is ‘being labeled and branded as a sex offender without being found

guilty of a sex offense or even charged for a sex offense.’ He also declares § 15-

20A-5 violated his right to due process and equal protection, constitutes cruel

and unusual punishment and violates ‘ex post facto laws.’” 

(Doc. 14 at p. 6) (internal citations omitted)(bracketed alteration in original).

The magistrate judge noted that “[t]he plaintiff’sthree convictions, including the

kidnapping conviction, occurred in 2005. He is serving two life sentences and a ten

yearsentence as a result of those convictions. There is no indication that a release date

has been set for the plaintiff.” (Doc. 14 at p. 7)(internal citations omitted). Relying on

U.S. v. Veal, 322 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), which in turn relied on Kirby v.

Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11thCir. 1999), the magistrate found that, “‘[I]nsofar

as [the plaintiff] seeks to challenge the constitutionality’ of the registration and

notification requirements of ASORCNA, his claims are not ripe for review.” (Doc. 14

at p. 7)(citing U.S. v. Veal, 322 F.3d at 1278). 

The undersigned has found no objection by the plaintiff to this characterization

of the facts or of his claims. Rather, he has objected to the magistrate judge’s

conclusion that, under controlling law, he faces no hardship fromdenying review of his

claim because “he was ‘not going anywhere and his prior arrest and conviction record

is not going to change,’ and (2) the claim was not fit for review because whether the

statute at issue would remain in effect and unamended until the plaintiff’s release from

10

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custody was a matter of speculation.” (Doc. 14 at 7, citing Veal, 322 F.3d at 1278,

quoting Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d at 1290.) The undersigned agrees with plaintiff

that the magistrate judge has misapplied the law in finding that plaintiff’s claims are not

ripe.

The magistrate judge relied on U.S. v. Veal, 322 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) and

Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285 (11thCir. 1999), in reaching his determination that

plaintiff’s claim was not ripe. However, the magistrate judge applied the holding of

Kirby in a manner that is the opposite of what Kirby stands for. Thus, an analysis of

Kirby is necessary here.

InKirby, the EleventhCircuit decided two consolidated appeals by two different

defendants: Kirby and Edmond. Kirby and Edmond each had sued (separately) under

42 USC § 1983, challenging Alabama's Community Notification Statute (“the Act”),

Ala. Code § 15–20–20. The relevant facts and procedural history ofthese consolidated

cases were explained by the Court as follows.

These cases, consolidated for appeal, involve challenges to Alabama's

Community Notification Statute (“the Act”), Ala.Code § 15–20–20. Appellant

Jeffery Powell Kirby appeals the district court's dismissal of his claims that the

Act violatesthe Ex Post Facto and Double JeopardyClauses ofthe United States

Constitution. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a

claimupon which relief may be granted because it determined that Kirby's claim

was not ripe. Appellant Edmond appeals the district court's grant of summary

judgment as to his claims that Defendant Alabama Department of Corrections

and its employees violated his constitutional rights by classifying him as a sex

11

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offender although he has never been convicted of a sex offense. The district

court granted summary judgment because it determined that Edmond did not

establish an equal protection claim or a due process violation. Further, the

district court determined that Edmond's challenge to the CommunityNotification

Statute was not ripe. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court

as to Kirby because his claim is not ripe. We reverse the district court as to

Edmond's due process claim because we find that Edmond's classification as a

sex offender implicates a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. We

remand the case to the district court because the record is inadequate for us to

determine whether he received adequate notice and hearing to satisfy due

process requirements. We affirm the district court as to Edmond's remaining

claims.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. KIRBY

Kirby is an inmate in custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections

(“ADOC”). He is serving a 15 yearsentence forfirst-degree sodomy. Kirby filed

the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the Act violates the Ex

Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution.

Additionally, Kirby alleged that he was denied parole due to the Act, and that

this violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Kirby's conviction

for first-degree sodomy constitutes a sex offense as defined by the Act.

Ala.Code § 15–20–20, et seq. (1975). As a convicted sex offender, the Act

applies to Kirby upon his release from prison. The Act provides for notification

of victims and neighbors of a criminal sex offender thirty days prior to his

release from custody. Because Kirby is not scheduled for release until 2005, the

district court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation and found that

Kirby has not yet suffered an injury from the Act. Accordingly, the court

dismissed Kirby's claim as not ripe for adjudication.

B. EDMOND

Edmond is an inmate incarcerated by the ADOC. He is serving a 20 year

sentence for attempted murder. He filed the present action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against ADOC Commissioner Joe Hopper, Deputy Commissioner John

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Shaver, and other ADOC officials claiming that he was unlawfully classified in

prison as a sex offender despite never having been convicted of a sex offense.

Edmond first claims this classification violates his equal protection rights

because sex offenders are treated differently in prison. Second, he claims the

classification violates his due process rights because he was labeled a sex

offender without being convicted of any sex crimes. Third, he alleges the

classification violates his right against self-incrimination because he is forced to

admit past behavior in sex offender classes. Finally, Edmond contends his

classification will improperly subject himto Alabama's Community Notification

Act after his release from prison.

ADOC classified Edmond as a sex offender based on two previous sex-related

charges listed in his PreSentence Investigative Report (“PSI”). In 1984, he was

charged with rape. The charge was no billed by the grand jury. In 1992, a charge

ofsexual abuse was nolle prossed in the trial court. According to ADOC Deputy

Commissioner John Shaver, these two sex charges, even without a conviction,

support Edmond's classification as a sex offender under ADOC guidelines.

Shaver also stated that prison classification officials received details from the

Russell County District Attorney's Office reflecting sexual abuse and kidnaping

in Edmond's prior history. Shaver contends this prior history denotes a pattern

of behavior further justifying the sex offender classification.

As a consequence of being classified as a sex offender, Edmond must participate

in group therapy sessions of Sexual Offenders Anonymous as a prerequisite for

parole eligibility. The sessions meet three times a week at the prison and involve

participants admitting past sexual offenses. Edmond contends this requirement

violates his right against self-incrimination. Additionally, being classified as a

sex offender makes Edmond ineligible for minimum custody classification.

Prisonersinminimumcustody are eligible for certainwork-release programs and

community custody programs. Moreover, Edmond contends his classification as

a sex offenderimposes a stigma that amountsto a significant hardship in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Edmond contends he received neither

notice nor opportunity to be heard prior to being classified as a sex offender.

Defendants contend that Edmond had an opportunity to be heard through his

annual classification review, and that he will be eligible for minimum custody.

On Defendants' motion, the district court adopted the recommendation of the 

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Magistrate Judge and granted summary judgment to Defendants on all claims.

The court determined that Edmond did not establish an equal protection violation

because he did not allege that the different treatment was based on race, religion,

or another constitutionally protected interest. Asto Edmond's due process claim,

the court granted summary judgment because ADOC regulations clearly provide

for sex offender classification for inmates with two or more arrests for sex

crimes regardless of the disposition of those claims. The court found that

Edmond's claim regarding his mandatory participation in the sex offender

treatment program was meritless because any admission of guilt required by the

program would be privileged communication not subject to disclosure in a

judicial proceeding. Finally, the court found that Edmond's challenge of

Alabama's notification statute was not ripe because Edmond has not been

released from custody.

Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1287-89 (11th Cir. 1999)(footnotes omitted;

emphasis supplied).

Like Edmond, the plaintiff in this case was not “convicted of” a sex crime.

Rather, he was convicted of a crime - Kidnapping first degree - that caused him to be

classified by the Alabama Department ofCorrections as a “sex offender.” InKirby, the

Eleventh Circuit held that “Edmond does have a liberty interest in not being branded

a sex offender. *** Even after Edmond's conviction for attempted murder, he retains

a ‘residuum of liberty’ that would be infringed by classification as a sex offender

without complying with minimum requirements of due process.” Kirby v. Siegelman,

195 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).

Here, plaintiff has complained of just such an infringement of due process.

Accordingly, unless Kirby v. Siegelman is no longer good law, the magistrate judge

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erred in recommending dismissal of plaintiff’s due process claim for lack of ripeness.

As stated above, the magistrate judge relied on U.S. v. Veal to support his

recommendation that plaintiff’s claims are due to be dismissed for lack of ripeness.

However, under the prior precedent rule,7 U.S. v. Veal could not abrogate Kirby v.

Siegelman. Further, as explained by the Eleventh Circuit, its holding in U.S. v. Veal is

consistent with Kirby v. Siegelman, because Veal was convicted of a sex offense,

whereas Kirby was not convicted of a sex offense. See U.S. v. Veal, 322 F.3d at 1278

(“Our holding in Kirby, that an inmate who was never convicted of a sex offense must

be afforded due process prior to being classified as a sex offender, is inapplicable here

because, unlike the inmate in Kirby, Veal was convicted of a sex offense.”)

The portion of Veal quoted by the magistrate judge in holding that plaintiff’s

claims, including his due process claim, are due to be dismissed as not ripe, discusses

the portion ofKirby that dealt with the claims ofthe defendant who had been convicted

of a sex offense — Kirby.

8 However, plaintiff here is not like Kirby, who was

7 Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1386 (11th Cir.1997) (“The law of this circuit is

‘emphatic’ that only the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc can judicially overrule a prior

panel decision.”), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1080, 118 S.Ct. 1529, 140 L.Ed.2d 680 (1998); United

States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir.1993) (“[I]t is the firmly established rule of this

Circuit that each succeeding panel is bound by the holding of the first panel to address an issue of

law, unless and until that holding is overruled en banc, or by the Supreme Court.”).” 

8

See Doc. 14 at 7, where the magistrate judge quoted Veal’s discussion at 1278 of Kirby

as follows:

In Kirby [v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d at 1290, the Eleventh Circuit] concluded that the plaintiff’s

15

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convicted of a sex offense – sodomy; rather, he is like Edmond, in that neither Edmond

nor plaintiff has been “convicted of” a sex offense.

Under binding Eleventh Circuit case law, plaintiff’s due process claim is ripe.

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s objection to the recommendation that it be dismissed as not

ripe is SUSTAINED.

IV. Magistrate Judge’s Findings on Federal Constitutional Challenges

A. Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Claim.

The magistrate judge again relied on the wrong portion of Kirby v. Siegelman–

the portion that applied to Kirby, who had been convicted of a sex offense, as opposed

to the portion that applied to Edmond, who is similarly situated to the plaintiff in that

Edmond had not been convicted of a sex offense — in finding that plaintiff had not

cognizably pled a liberty interest. Doc. 14 at 8-9. Because Kirby v. Siegelman held that

“an inmate who was never convicted of a sex offense must be afforded due process

prior to being classified as a sex offender”, U. S. v. Veal, 322 F.3d at 1278, the

magistrate judge erred in finding that plaintiff’s federal due process challenge to his

challenge to the constitutionality of Alabama’s Community Notification Act was not ripe for

review because the Act would not affect him until his release from custody. . . . See id.

(concluding that (1) the plaintiff faced no hardship from denying review of his claim because

he was “not going anywhere and his prior arrest and conviction record is not going to

change,” and (2) the claim was not fit for review because whether the statute at issue would

remain in effect and unamended until the plaintiff’s release from custody was a matter of

speculation).

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ADOC “S” suffix classification did not state a cognizable due process claim.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s challenge to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that

plaintiff’s procedural due process claim be dismissed is due to be SUSTAINED.

B. Plaintiff’s Substantive Due Process Claim.

The magistrate judge stated that “The plaintiff argues the ADOC’s sex offender

classification manual is unconstitutionally vague in its inclusion of the type of

kidnapping conviction he has as a sex offense. Such an assertion appears to be an

attempt to make a substantive due process claim.” (Doc. 14 at 9)(internal citation

omitted).

9 Plaintiffrespondsthat he “never argued the substantive due processissue....”

(Doc. 17 at 14). He then goes on to state, “But, since the Magistrate has asserted this

issue the plaintiff will argue it.” (Id.).

Ordinarily, the undersigned would decline to consider an objection to an R&R

on an issue that the objecting party admits he “never argued.” Williams v. McNeil, 557

F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 2747, 174

L.Ed.2d 249 (2009)(holding that the “district court did not abuse its discretion in

declining to consider [Section 2254 petitioner’s] timeliness argument that was not

9

In this subsection of the R&R, entitled “Substantive Due Process,” the magistrate judge

discusses substantive due process as it applies to ASORCNA and the ADOC Sex Offender

Classification Manual, finds them both to be “rationally related to legitimate government

interests” and “not unconstitutionally vague,” but then confusingly states that “plaintiff cannot

establish his right to procedural due process was violated.” (Doc.14 at 10-11).

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presented to the magistrate judge.). However, where, as here, the plaintiff has a

pending motion for leave to amend his complaint and a proposed amended complaint

asserting the very issue (albeit for the first time), the undersigned will consider

plaintiff’s objection as it will bear on the court’s decision whether to allow the

amended complaint.

The court agrees with the magistrate judge that no court has found ASORCNA

to violate substantive due process. Indeed, the most authoritative decision, that of the

Eleventh Circuit in the unpublished decision of Windwalker v. Governor of Alabama,

579 F. App'x 769, (11thCir. 2014), in which that court expressly rejected the plaintiff’s

substantive due process claim. Windwalker, 579 F. App'x at 773. Additionally, the

undersigned has found no case that has called Windwalker into question on this issue.

However, the court notes that, unlike plaintiff in this case, the plaintiff in Windwalker

was convicted of a sex offense. (Id. at 771)(“Windwalker was convicted in Florida in

1985 for having oral sex with a child under 12.”). See also Pittman v. Strange, No.

CIV.A. 12-00667-CB-M, 2014 WL 4685536, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 22, 2014)(finding

Windwalker persuasive on issue that ASORCNA is not punitive in Section 1983 action

brought by a convicted sex offender.).

A recent non-binding but persuasive opinion that is factually on point is Collins

v. Thomas, No. 212-CV-950-WHA, 2015 WL 5125750, at *6-7 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 31,

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2015). In that case, Collins, a prisoner incarcerated by the Alabama Department of

Corrections, brought a Section 1983 action alleging that correctional officials violated

his constitutional rights with respect to his internal classification “ ‘as a sex offender

even though he had never committed a sex offense and had never been convicted of a

sex offense....’ ” Id., 2015 WL 5125750, at *1. That is what Waldman has alleged in

this action. Like Waldman,Collinssought monetary damages, issuance of a declaratory

judgment and injunctive relief “restraining the defendants frombranding [him] with the

‘S'suffix and/orlabeling [him] as a criminalsex offender and ... ordering the defendants

to [immediately] expunge all of the same from [his] files....” Id. Also like Waldman,

Collins had been convicted, not of a “sex offense,” but of kidnapping children that he

was not the parent or guardian of the children and did not have legal custody of the

children. (See id. *4). And, like Waldman, “[u]nder these circumstances, Alabama law

identifie[d] Collins [as] a sex offender” (id.) and the Alabama Department of

Corrections affixed the “S” suffix to his file. (Id.).

Like the court in Collins, the court is persuaded by Windwalker, and by this

court’s own analysis of the law regarding substantive due process, that such a

classification action does not violate substantive due process. The EleventhCircuit has

stated that it “is very reluctant to expand substantive due process by recognizing new

fundamental rights[.] Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1342–1343 (11thCir.2005). And,

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as the Collins court stated:

“[T]he Supreme Court has not addressed whethersubstantive due process

invalidates sex offender registration statutes [or classification policies based

thereon], ... and [the Eleventh Circuit has found] no history or tradition that

would elevate the issue here to a fundamental right. In fact, the case law ... found

supportsthe contrary conclusion.” Id. at 1345 (citation omitted); Windwalker v.

Governor of Alabama, 579 Fed. Appx. 769, 773–774 (11th Cir.2014) (The

plaintiff's substantive due process claim provides no basis for relief because “in

the context of a regulation [specifically] designed to protect the public from sex

offender recidivism, none of [the plaintiff's] asserted rights are so ‘deeply

rooted’ in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of

ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were

sacrificed.' ”). This determination is equally applicable to the Classification

Manual adopted by the Alabama Department of Corrections, a manual which

utilizes the ASORCNA to define a sex offender. “When a statute [or regulation]

does not implicate fundamental rights, we must ask whether it is ‘rationally

related to legitimate government interests .’ Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728, 117

S.Ct. at 2271. The rational basis standard is ‘highly deferential’ “ and courts

deem statutes or regulations “unconstitutional under a rational basis standard in

only the most exceptional circumstances. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 948

(11th Cir.2001).” Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d at 1345.

*7 The purpose of the ASORCNA “is to assist law enforcement in

carrying out their duties and, most importantly, to protect the public, especially

children ” and “further[ ] the primary governmental interest of protecting

vulnerable populations, particularly children,” by “monitoring and tracking”

individuals convicted of sex offenses as defined by state law. Ala.Code §

15–20A–2(4) and (5) (emphasis added). “The ... intent in imposing certain

[restrictions] on sex offenders is not to punish sex offenders but to protect the

public and, most importantly, promote child safety.” Ala.Code § 15–20A–2(5)

(emphasis added). Alabama law provides that a sex offender is “[a]n adult

convicted of a sex offense.” Ala.Code § 15–20A–4(1). The ASORCNAincludes

in its list of qualifying sex offenses the kidnapping of a minor when the

perpetrator is not the minor's parent, guardian or legal custodian. See Ala.Code

§ 15–20A–4(14) and § 15–20A–5(18). The precise offense for which Collins

was convicted.

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In light of the foregoing, the court finds that the ASORCNA is not

violative of substantive due process. Consequently, the provision of the

Classification Manual which utilizes the ASORCNA's definition of a sex

offender for internal classification purposes does not deprive Collin[s] of

substantive due process violation.

Collins v. Thomas, 2015 WL 5125750, at *6-7.

Like the court in Collins, the undersigned finds Windwalker persuasive in its

analysis of ASORCNA in the face of a substantive due process challenge, such as the

one asserted in plaintiff’s Objections (doc. 17) and in his proposed Amended

Complaint (doc. 19). Accordingly, plaintiff’s objections to this portion of the R&R are

due to be OVERRULED.

C. Plaintiff’s Ex Post Facto Claim.

Turning again to Windwalker, which persuasively found ASORCNA to be

constitutional, even when applied retroactively, the court finds that plaintiff’s

objections to this portion of the R&R are due to be OVERRULED. See Windwalker,

579 F. App'x at 771-73 (holding that ASORCNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto

Clause and explicating its analysis).

D. Plaintiff’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment/Double Jeopardy Claim.

Windwalker expressly rejected plaintiff’s claim that ASORCNA is criminal

ratherthan civil. Although plaintiff clearly disagrees(doc. 17 at 23-24), the undersigned

finds Windwalker persuasive on this point as well. Accordingly, the court finds that

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plaintiff’s objections to this portion of the R&R are due to be OVERRULED. See

Windwalker, 579 F. App'x 769, 771-73 (holding that ASORCNA is civil rather than

criminal in nature and explicating its analysis).

E. Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim.

Windwalker expressly rejected plaintiff’s claim that ASORCNA violates the

equal protection clause. Although plaintiff clearly disagrees (doc. 17 at 24-25), the

undersigned finds Windwalker persuasive on this point as well. Accordingly, the court

finds that plaintiff’s objections to this portion of the R&R are due to be

OVERRULED. See Windwalker, 579 F. App'x at 774 (rejecting equal protection claim

and applying rational basis test).

V. Magistrate Judge’s Findings on Alabama Constitutional Challenges

As to plaintiff’s claims arising under the Alabama constitution, the magistrate

judge said only:

C. Claims grounded in the Alabama Constitution

The plaintiff declares his sex offender classification violates various

provisions of the Alabama constitution. However, this court should decline to

exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claims.

(Doc. 14 at 14.)

The “Recommendation” section of the R&R does not provide any additional

information, as it merely states, “The magistrate judge further RECOMMENDS

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that jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claims be DECLINED.” (Doc. 14 at

14)(emphasis in original).

Plaintiff has objected to this portion of the R&R by arguing that, because he

is proceeding pro se, his claims should have been construed more liberally than they

were (doc. 17 at 28), and he should be given “at least one chance to amend the

complaint.” (Id. at 29).

10 Specifically, because his complaint “mentioned the Article

I, §§ 9 and 10 of the [U]nited [S]tates [C]onstitution along with the Alabama

Constitution Article I, § 22[,] [it should have been] construed that [plaintiff was

arguing the United States Constitution but that the U.S.C. [sic] overrides the

Alabama Constitution.” (Id.). This statement, taken together with the omission of

any claims “grounded in the Alabama Constitution” from plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint (doc. 19), causes the undersigned to find that plaintiff’s objections to this

portion of the R&R are due to be OVERRULED as MOOT.

11

THE AMEND MOTION

The court has considered the Amend Motion and the proposed Amended

10 Because, as set out hereinafter, the undersigned will grant plaintiff’s Amend Motion,

this objection to the R&R is due to be OVERRULED as MOOT.

11 The Amended Complaint (doc. 19) fleshes out, at “Issue III. Bill of Attainder”, the

claim that plaintiff says the magistrate judge misunderstood or omitted. The undersigned will

address that claim as clarified in the portion of this Memorandum Opinion that addresses the

Amend Motion.

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Complaint. Because the Amended Complaint would be due to be dismissed under

the reasoning set out above, the Amend Motion is due to be DENIED. A district

court is not required to permit a pro se plaintiff to amend his complaint if, inter alia,

“amendment would be futile.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th

Cir.2001).

CONCLUSION

Having carefully reviewed and considered de novo all the materials in the

court file, including the report and recommendation, the court is of the opinion that

the magistrate judge’s report is due to be and is hereby ADOPTED in part and

REJECTED in part as set out herein. Specifically, although the undersigned agrees

with plaintiff that his due process claim is ripe, the undersigned finds that it is due to

be dismissed as stating neither a cognizable procedural due process claim nor a

cognizable substantive due process claim. The court further finds that plaintiff’s ex

post fact claim, his cruel and unusual punishment claim, and his equal protection

claim are due to be dismissed as not cognizable. Finally, the court finds that

plaintiff’s state law claims are due to be dismissed as moot. The Court further finds

that plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint is due to be denied because

the proposed Amended Complaint still fails to state any cognizable claim, and,

accordingly, any such amendment would be futile. The court EXPRESSLY FINDS

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that the complaint and the proposed Amended Complaint fail to state any claim for

which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the complaint is due to be DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim. A Final Judgment Order will

be entered.

DONE this the 2nd day of December, 2015.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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