Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_06-cv-00028/USCOURTS-almd-3_06-cv-00028-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

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Although Hughley’s self-styled Rule 60(b)(6) motion is date-stamped “received” on January 10, 1

2006 pursuant to the “mailbox rule,” the court deems it filed on the date he delivered it to prison

authoritiesfor mailing, presumptively the January 9, 2006, date of hissigning. See Houston v. Lack,

487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988); Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11 Cir. 2001). th

 See Criminal Case Nos. 3:98cr43-MHT & 3:98cr97-MHT. A jury found Hughley guilty of these 2

offenses on August 26, 1998. On December 18, 1998, the district court sentenced Hughley to a term

of 57 months’ imprisonment. On November 19, 1999, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

affirmed Hughley’s conviction and sentence. See United States v. Hughley, 202 F.3d 287 (11 Cir. th

1999) (unpublished table decision).

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

 )

v ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

) 3:06cv28-MHT-DRB 

JOHNNY HUGHLEY ) [WO]

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This action is before the court on a motion under FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b)(6) filed by

federal inmate Johnny Hughley (“Hughley”) on January 9, 2006 (Doc. No.1). Hughley 1

challenges his 1998 conviction and sentence for possession of counterfeit currency; passing,

uttering, and publishing counterfeit currency; and possessing a firearm after having been

convicted of a felony. For the reasons which follow, the court construes Hughley’s motion 2

as a successive motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and concludes that he is not entitled

to any relief.

I. DISCUSSION

Hughley asserts as “newly discovered evidence” a claim that the process of selecting

jurors in the Middle District of Alabama at the time of his trial violated (1) the Due Process

Case 3:06-cv-00028-MHT-TFM Document 2 Filed 10/03/06 Page 1 of 5
 This court decided adversely to Hughley all claims in his first § 2255 motion, filed on April 3, 3

2000. See Criminal Case Nos. 3:98cr43-MHT & 3:98cr97-MHT (Doc. No. 75); Recommendation

of Magistrate Judge, Aug. 13, 2002 (Doc. No. 150 ), adopted as a Final Judgment on Aug.18, 2002

(Doc. No. 154). On August 4, 2004, Hughley again challenged hissentence in a “Request for a Nunc

Pro Tunc Reconsideration and/or in the Alternative a Correction of Sentence.” Criminal Case Nos.

3:98cr43-MHT & 3:98cr97-MHT (Doc. No. 184). Because that motion attacked the fundamental

validity of Hughley’s sentence, this court characterized it properly as a motion to vacate, set aside,

or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because Hughley had not received appellate

certification for this court’s consideration of his successive § 2255 motion, the court summarily

dismissed his § 2255 motion. Id., Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Jul. 18, 2005 (Doc. No.

199 ), adopted as the court’s Final Judgment on Sep. 9, 2005 (Doc. Nos. 202 & 203).

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Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) the Sixth Amendment

guarantee of a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community; (3) the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (4) the Jury Selection and Service Act (“JSSA”),

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1861-71; and (5) the District’s Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and

Petit Jurors. He further argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise such a

claim at his trial.

On at least one prior occasion Hughley has attacked his conviction and sentence

through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. It is clear that the pending motion asserts a new claim 3

for relief from the same conviction and sentence and is not directed to the integrity of

judgments denying Hughley’s prior § 2255 motions. Accordingly, Hugley’s reliance on

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) as a vehicle for seeking relief in this case is unavailing.

 In Gonnzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 2646-47 (2005), the

Supreme Court held that, where a previous habeas petition has been denied, a nominal Rule

60(b) motion containing one or more “claims” for relief – i.e., “an asserted federal basis for

Case 3:06-cv-00028-MHT-TFM Document 2 Filed 10/03/06 Page 2 of 5
 See United States v. Terrell, No. 02-14997, 141 Fed.Appx. 849 (11 Cir. Jul. 19, 2005) 4 th

(unpublished) (stating that the holding and rationale of Gonzalez apply equally to § 2255 and § 2254

habeas proceedings). See also El-Amin v. United States, No. 05-1276, 2006 WL 771182 (11 Cir. th

Mar. 28, 2006) (unpublished).

 Hughley’s claim is, at bottom, an attack on the fundamental legality of his conviction and 5

sentence. “ Rule 60(b) simply does not provide for relief from judgment in a criminal case.” United

States v. Fair, 326 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11 Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted). th

 The Eleventh Circuit has held that Booker, Blakely, and Apprendi – the decisions upon which 6

Hughley premises her claims – are not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. See

Varela v. United States, 400 F.3d 864, 867-68 (11 Cir. 2005); In re Anderson, 396 F.3d 1336 (11 th th

Cir. Jan. 21, 2005); In re Dean, 375 F.3d 1287 (11 Cir. 2004). th

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relief from a ... judgment of conviction” – is in substance a successive petition for habeas

relief. 125 S.Ct. at 2647. Regardless of Hughley’s own labeling of his motion, this court 4 5

concludes necessarily that the motion is of the same legal effect as, and should be construed

as, a successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

A second or successive § 2255 motion in the district court requires the movant first

to secure from the appropriate court of appeals an order authorizing the district court to

consider the motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The appellate court, in turn, must

certify that the second or successive § 2255 motion contains “(1) newly discovered evidence

that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish

by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have found the movant

guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” See 28 U.S.C. 6

§ 2255 ¶8.

The pleadings and documents in this case reflect that Hughley has not received

Case 3:06-cv-00028-MHT-TFM Document 2 Filed 10/03/06 Page 3 of 5
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certification from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court’s

consideration of his successive § 2255 motion. Thus, this court lacks jurisdiction, and the

motion is due to be summarily dismissed. See, e.g., Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211,

1216 (11 Cir. 2003); Boone v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 377 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11 th th

Cir. 2004). 

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the motion

filed by Hughley on January 9, 2006, be denied and this case dismissed, as Hughley has

failed to obtain the requisite order from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing

this court to consider a successive § 2255 motion.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before October 17, 2006. A party must specifically identify the findings in the

Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections

will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings and recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on

appeal factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See th

Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of th

Case 3:06-cv-00028-MHT-TFM Document 2 Filed 10/03/06 Page 4 of 5
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Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en banc). th

Done this 3 day of October, 2006. rd

/s/ Delores R. Boyd

DELORES R. BOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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