Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00359/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00359-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES BERNARD DAVIS, Civil No. 10cv0359-W (CAB)

Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO GRANT RESPONDENTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS

[Doc. Nos. 7, 15] 

v.

G. MCDONALD, Warden, et al., 

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

Charles Bernard Davis (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner, filed a First Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“the First Amended Petition”). Respondents

move to dismiss the First Amended Petition as barred by the applicable statute of limitations and for

failure to exhaust state remedies. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned Magistrate Judge

recommends that Respondents’ motion be GRANTED and the First Amended Petition be dismissed

with prejudice. 

II. FACTS

A jury found Petitioner guilty of three counts of second degree murder with a knife use

enhancement. (Lodgment 1 at pp. 1-2.) Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal

arguing that: (1) the trial court reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof by instructing the jury with

Cal. Crim. No. 355 regarding a defendant’s right not to testify; and (2) Petitioner’s conviction for

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1

 Although the state habeas petition is stamped February 12, 2010, Petitioner signed it on

February 2, 2010. “Under the ‘prison mailbox rule’ . . . a prisoner’s . . . habeas petition is deemed filed

when he hands it over to prison authorities for mailing in the district court.” Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d

1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 2385

(1988). The “[mailbox] rule applies to prisoners filing habeas petitions in both federal and state courts.”

Huizar, 273 F.3d at 1223; Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533

U.S. 941 (2001).

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second degree murder should be reduced to voluntary manslaughter because the prosecutor did not

meet his burden of proving Petitioner was not acting in imperfect self-defense. (Lodgment 1 at pp.

6-11.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on August 28, 2008. (Lodgment 1.) 

Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court on the same grounds. 

(Lodgment 2.) The California Supreme Court denied review on October 22, 2008. (Lodgment 3.) 

On February 2, 2010, Petitioner constructively filed his federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus in this Court.1

 (Doc. No. 1.) The petition was dismissed for failure to name a proper

respondent, allege exhaustion of state judicial remedies, and use the proper form. (Doc. No. 3.) 

Petitioner constructively filed a First Amended Petition on March 24, 2010. (Doc. No. 4.) The

Court then entered an order reopening the case and setting a briefing schedule. (Doc. No. 5.) 

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Petition on June 3, 2010 (Doc. No. 7) and

Petitioner filed his response in opposition to the motion to dismiss on September 16, 2010 (Doc. 

No. 15). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

Respondents argue that Petitioner filed his federal petition 11 days after the one-year

limitations period expired. (Motion at p. 2.) Respondents contend that the statute of limitations

period commenced 90 days after the Supreme Court denied review, thus on January 20, 2009. 

Therefore, Respondents argue the statute of limitations expired on January 20, 2010 because

Petitioner is not entitled to any tolling. 

Petitioner agrees that the statute of limitations began to run “at the conclusion of all direct

criminal appeals in the state system follow[ed] by the expiration of the time allotted for filing a

petition for writ of certiorari . . . which is an additional 90 days.” (Opposition at pp. 2-3.) 

Petitioner, however, argues that his conviction became final on February 14, 2009 and the statute of

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limitations expired on February 14, 2010. Additionally, Petitioner argues that his petition is not

untimely as the Court “has already challenged Petitioner’s originally filed writ” and did not find

“that the petition was time barred.” (Opposition at p. 2.) He contends the Court “found that

summary dismissal [of his First Amended Petition] was not warranted” and ordered Respondents to

reply, thereby deeming “petitioner’s first amended petition [ ] timely and not time barred.” 

(Opposition at p. 2.) 

The Anti-Terrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) applies to all § 2254 habeas

corpus petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 268 (2000). Petitioner

filed his federal habeas petition on February 2, 2010. Therefore, the AEDPA statute of limitations

applies. The statute provides:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall

run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action

in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d). 

When a petitioner does not seek writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, the

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period begins to run 90 days from the date on which the

highest state court judgment becomes final. See Brown v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

On October 22, 2008, the California Supreme Court denied direct review of Petitioner’s conviction. 

(Lodgment 3; First Amended Petition at p. 2.) Petitioner did not seek writ of certiorari from the

United States Supreme Court. (First Amended Petition at p. 3.) Therefore, the one-year statute of

limitations began to run on January 20, 2009, not February 14, 2009, and expired one year later, on

January 20, 2010. Petitioner filed his initial petition on February 2, 2010, 13 days after the statute of

limitations period expired. 

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In arguing that the Court has deemed the petition timely, Petitioner mischaracterizes the

Court’s order and the docket in this case. On February 24, 2010, the Court initially dismissed the

Petition based on its facial deficiencies. In doing so, the Court cautioned Petitioner that the one-year

statute of limitations applied to his petition. (Doc. No. 3 at pp. 3-4.) Moreover, in the Court’s Order

reopening the case and setting a briefing schedule following Petitioner’s filing of a First Amended

Petition, the Court stated: 

“If Respondent contends the Petition can be decided without the Court’s reaching the

merits of Petitioner’s claims (e.g., because Respondent contends Petitioner has failed

to exhaust any state remedies as to any ground for relief alleged in the Petition, or

that the Petition is barred by the statute of limitations . . ., Respondent shall file a

motion to dismiss. . . .”

(Doc. No. 5 at p. 2.) (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the Court did not deem the Petition timely in any

prior order. Since Petitioner did not constructively file his petition until February 2, 2010, and

because Petitioner is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling as discussed below, the petition is

untimely. 

1. Statutory Tolling

The statute of limitations may be tolled for those periods of time during which a properly

filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review, with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim, is pending in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner has not shown

that he filed an application for state post-conviction or other collateral review. (First Amended

Petition at pp. 3-4.) Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. 

2. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner also has not shown that he is entitled to equitable tolling. AEDPA’s statute of

limitations period may be subject to equitable tolling. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds. However,

equitable tolling is only available where “extraordinary circumstances” beyond the prisoner’s

control made a timely filing impossible. Id. (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696,

701 (9th Cir. 1996)). Courts must “take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the federal habeas

process” and “only authorize extensions when this high hurdle is surmounted.” Id. at 1289. Thus,

equitable tolling will not be available in most cases. Id. at 1288.

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Here, Petitioner does not argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling but rather that he is

within the statute of limitations. As discussed above, Petitioner did not file his initial petition within

the statute of limitations. Therefore, the Petition is untimely. 

3. Prior Filing by Petitioner

Although not addressed by Petitioner, Respondents note Petitioner’s filing of a motion for

extension of time to file a habeas petition in Case No. 09cv2317. (Motion at p. 1; Lodgment 5 & 6.) 

As Respondents point out, Petitioner had not filed an actual habeas petition in that case and,

therefore, the statute of limitations did not stop running. The Court in Case No. 09cv2317 dismissed

the action stating: 

“[i]f petitioner wishes to proceed with a habeas action in this Court he must (as is the

case with all non-capital prisoners) file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which

will be given a separate civil case number. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED

without prejudice because Petitioner has not filed a Petition and has therefore failed

to initiate federal habeas proceedings in this action.”

 (Lodgment 4.) Thus, Petitioner did not initiate federal habeas proceedings until he filed a federal

habeas petition in this case on February 2, 2010. Accordingly, this Court recommends that the

motion to dismiss be granted because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition within the

statute of limitations and has not shown that he is entitled to any tolling. In the alternative, this

Court recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted for failure to exhaust state remedies as

discussed below.

B. Failure to Exhaust

Respondents contend that Petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies with regard to

the claims in his federal habeas petition because Petitioner has not presented any of these claims to

the California Supreme Court. (Motion at pp. 5-6.) Petitioner responds that he “alerted the

California Supreme Court to the fact that he was claim[ing] a violation of his due process the same

claim contained in claim number 1, 2, 3” and, therefore, the claims are exhausted. (Opposition at 

pp. 3-4.)

The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to a federal court’s review of claims

in a habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522

(1982); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). In order to properly exhaust state

judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must generally present the California Supreme Court

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with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her federal habeas petition. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). Thus, the petitioner

must have raised the same federal claims brought in the federal petition before the state supreme

court. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). 

Mere similarity of the state claims to the issues raised in the federal habeas petition is

insufficient to exhaust. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). A petitioner must present

the substance of the federal habeas corpus claim to the state courts first. Id. at 163. (citations

omitted.) A petitioner has not sufficiently presented the substance of a claim to the state courts by

making general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and

right to fair trial. Id. However, a Petitioner has fairly presented an omitted claim to the state

supreme court if it is sufficiently related to a claim in the petition for review. Wooten v. Kirkland,

540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). Claims are sufficiently related “when, by raising one claim,

the petition clearly implies another error.” Id. A federal court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus that contains unexhausted claims. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006). 

The state supreme court has not had a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of the issues

raised in Petitioner’s federal petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34. In

his petition for review before the California Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that (1) the trial court

lessened the prosecutions’s burden of proof by giving jury instruction Cal. Crim. No. 355 regarding

a defendant’s constitutional right not to testify in violation of Petitioner’s 5th and 14th Amendment

rights (Lodgment 2 at pp. 5-6); and (2) his due process rights were violated when he was convicted

of second degree murder because the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Petitioner did not act in imperfect self-defense (Lodgment 2 at p. 15). In his First Amended Petition

for federal habeas corpus relief, Petitioner argued that: (1) his counsel was ineffective because he

failed to investigate the medications Plaintiff was taking during trial that caused him to be drowsy

during trial and his counsel failed to present mitigating evidence; (2) his counsel was ineffective by

allowing admission of contaminated DNA evidence and the prosecutor asserted facts not in evidence

during the trial and in closing arguments; and (3) his counsel was ineffective because he allowed

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reference to a confession allegedly made in violation of Miranda rights and the trial court erred in

admitting the confession. (First Amended Petition at pp. 6-8.) 

While Petitioner did argue that his due process rights were violated in his petition for review

before the California Supreme Court, Petitioner’s federal habeas claims are not sufficiently related

to those exhausted claims. The substance of the claims raised in the state courts is different than the

substance of the claims presented in his federal habeas petition. In the state courts, Petitioner argued

the constitutionality of a jury instruction and whether the prosecution met its burden of proof

regarding imperfect self-defense. Petitioner did not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of

counsel, the admissibility of evidence, or prosecutorial misconduct in the California Supreme Court. 

A general appeal to due process violations is insufficient to establish exhaustion. See Gray, 518

U.S. at 162-63. Moreover, the issues raised in the California Supreme Court and Petitioner’s federal

habeas petition are different. Thus, this Court recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted for

failure to exhaust state remedies as well. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Having reviewed the matter, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that

Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and the First Amended Petition be dismissed with

prejudice. This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to

the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 12, 2011, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties within 10 days of being served with the objections. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 14, 2010

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States Magistrate Judge

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