Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02657/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02657-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 09CV2657

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELIJAH BEN PASCHELKE,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT HERNANDEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 09-CV-2657-W(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

[Doc. No. 22]

Plaintiff, a California state prisoner proceeding in propria

persona, brings this civil rights suit under 28 U.S.C. Section 1983

claiming Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. Defendants have moved the Court to dismiss the First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on the basis that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit pursuant to 42

U.S.C. Section 1997e(a) and fails to state any claim for which

relief can be granted. As explained below, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part.

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28 1/

 All references to documents on the Court’s docket are to the CM/ECF page

numbers, not the document’s original pagination.

2 09CV2657

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution, Victorville, in Adelanto, California. In late

2007, Plaintiff was incarcerated at California’s R. J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“Donovan”) as he served a 5-month term for a

state parole violation. (FAC, Doc. No. 9 at 9.)1/ Plaintiff arrived

at Donovan with a pre-existing back injury that necessitated he use

a cane to walk. (Id.) At Donovan, the medical screening staff

ordered that Plaintiff be assigned to a bottom-tier cell, be allowed

to use a cane, and be able to wear a cervical collar. (Id. at 10.)

Once Plaintiff arrived at his final housing unit, unnamed

Donovan “staff” told him that he would be housed in an upper-tier

cell because no bottom-tier cells were vacant. (Id. at 11.)

However, he was told that he would receive the next available

bottom-tier cell, as those were assigned on a first come, first

served basis. (Id.) Plaintiff continued to request a bottom-tier

cell for the next two weeks. (Id.)

On November 21, 2007, Plaintiff was walking escorted to his

cell, when his cane slipped in a puddle of water, and he fell down

a flight of stairs. (Id. at 9, 11.) This fall aggravated Plaintiff’s back injury, confining him to a wheelchair for the next eight

months. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff also believed he had suffered a

concussion because he began to suffer from debilitating headaches,

dizziness, nausea, and blurred and double vision. (Id.) Despite

being aware that he may have suffered from a concussion, medical

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28 2/ Plaintiff does not specify where he filed the appeal. Presumably he is

referring to the Director of the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”), who

is located in Sacramento.

3 09CV2657

staff “chose” not to treat Plaintiff for the same. On December 3,

2007, Plaintiff lost consciousness in his cell. (Id. at 12.)

Plaintiff alleges that he filed a prison administrative

complaint and appealed to Sacramento2/ concerning the denial of his

bottom-tier cell, the slip-and-fall incident, and lack of treatment

for a concussion. (Id. at 12-13.)

Plaintiff brings this suit against Warden Robert Hernandez,

Medical Staff Supervisor John Doe, and Corrections Officer John Doe.

He brings claims for violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment

right to equal protection. (Id. at 3.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in a

complaint. A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.

“[F]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Id.

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4 09CV2657

In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must

accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as

all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Pareto v.

F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). The complaint must be

read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sprewell

v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Parks

Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).

Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only where

there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence

of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1990).

A pro se complaint must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and can only be dismissed

for failure to state a claim if “it appears beyond a doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

While a court must look to the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, the court may look beyond the pleadings on nonenumerated

Rule 12(b) motions for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

where the defendant has the burden of proof. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2003). In such cases, the court

permits consideration of affidavits submitted by the parties in

support of or opposition to such a motion. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir.

1988).

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5 09CV2657

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss the FAC on the basis that (1)

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, (2)

Plaintiff failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted,

and (3) Plaintiff’s allegations fail to allege cognizable claims

against Warden Hernandez and Medical Staff Supervisor John Doe in

their supervisory capacities.

A. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Plaintiff generally alleges that he exhausted his administrative remedies by filing an appeal to Sacramento. (FAC, Doc. No 9 at

11-12). However, Defendants aver that they have searched their

records and none relating to any such appeal exists for any stage of

the appeal process. Defendants include several declarations from

persons who conducted the records search. (Motion, Doc. No. 22,

Exhs. 1-4.)

Under the Prison Reform Litigation Act, inmates may not bring

civil rights suits under Section 1983 “until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

There are multiple levels in the California prison system’s

grievance process: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written

appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to

the institution head or designee, and (4) a third, final appeal to

the Director of the CDC. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85-86, 103

(2006); Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that must be raised and proven, but does not have to be

specifically pled in the operative complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549

U.S. 199, 216-17 (2007).

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6 09CV2657

An affirmative defense for failure to exhaust can be raised

through a nonenumerated Rule 12(b) motion and may rely on evidence

outside the record. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 939 n.13

(9th Cir. 2005). Because prison officials are likely to have

superior access to prison administrative records, Defendants have

the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion defense.

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1124-25. Once Defendants meet their burden of

demonstrating the absence of evidence that exhaustion occurred, the

burden shifts to Plaintiff to produce evidence that demonstrates

either exhaustion or circumstance excusing exhaustion. See Sapp v.

Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2010); Nunez v. Duncan, 591

F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010). If the court finds that the

prisoner has failed to exhaust non-judicial remedies, the proper

remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice. Wyatt, 315 F.3d

at 1120.

In Wyatt, the Ninth Circuit cautioned that when a court looks

beyond the pleadings and decides disputed issues of fact, a pro se

prisoner litigant must be provided fair notice of the significance

of the procedure, the prisoner’s means of refuting any factual

contentions at issue, and the consequences of his failure to do so.

Id. at 1114, 1120 n.14.

Here, Plaintiff alleges he lodged an administrative complaint

and appeal concerning the November 21, 2007, slip-and-fall incident,

lack of medical care for a concussion, and Defendants’ failure to

provide a bottom-tier cell to accommodate his medical needs. He

claims he filed a complaint at the prison and mailed an appeal to

Sacramento.

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28 3/ See Doc. No. 22, Exh. 3 (Declaration of R. Cobb in Support of Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC); Id., Exh. 4 (Declaration of D. Foston in

Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC).

7 09CV2657

The Court provided Plaintiff notice by way of an order dated

March 16, 2011, informing him that Defendants filed a motion for

dismissal for failure to exhaust. In its order, the Court provided

instructions on what additional information Plaintiff must provide

to survive dismissal for want of exhaustion. (Doc. No. 23.)

However, Plaintiff’s response to the Motion to Dismiss offered

identical statements as contained in the FAC with no additional

support opposing the Motion to Dismiss.

Assuming Plaintiff had filed an appeal with the CDC Director,

the question remains whether each level of the appeal process had

been exhausted prior to filing this suit. Defendants have attached

to their Motion to Dismiss four sworn affidavits from various

officials with documentation3/ supporting that not one complaint or

appeal had been lodged by Plaintiff concerning the allegations

against Defendants. See Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs.

Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[N]o presumptive

truthfulness attaches, and the existence of disputed material facts

will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the

merits of jurisdictional claims.”). The Court may consider attached

affidavits on nonenumerated Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1120. Because Defendants have shown that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust all administrative remedies afforded prisoners in the

California penal system prior to filing a Section 1983 suit, the

appropriate remedy is to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.

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8 09CV2657

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

be granted in this regard.

B. Failure to State an Eighth Amendment Claim

In the event the FAC is not dismissed for failure to exhaust,

Plaintiff sufficiently pleads an Eighth Amendment violation against

Warden Hernandez to survive a Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff’s

assertion of an Eighth Amendment violation appears predicated on

alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s injury emanated from an accident

that did not result from deliberate indifference of a prison

official.

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v.

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.

1997) (en banc). A determination of “deliberate indifference”

involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of a

prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response

to that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. A “serious” medical

need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could

result in further significant injury or the “wanton infliction of

unnecessary pain.” Id. Examples of serious medical needs include

“the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient

would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the

presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an

individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and

substantial pain.” Id. at 1059-60.

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4/

 He specifically names prison “staff” and Warden Hernandez.

9 09CV2657

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows

that a prisoner faces a “substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate

it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). For example,

deliberate indifference may include a prison doctor’s inadequate

response to a prisoner’s medical needs, “prison doctors in their

response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally

interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 104-05. “The requirement of deliberate indifference is less

stringent in cases involving a prisoner’s medical need than in other

cases involving harm to incarcerated individuals because ‘[t]he

State’s responsibility to provide inmates with medical care

ordinarily does not conflict with competing administrative concerns.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Nonetheless, the indifference

to medical needs must be substantial; inadequate treatment due to

malpractice, or even negligence, does not amount to a constitutional

violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). Disagreements over “matters for medical

judgment,” such as whether additional tests or treatments are

required, are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107.

1. Delay in Assignment to Bottom-Tier Cell

Plaintiff alleges prison officials4/ delayed his placement in

a lower-tier cell despite direct orders from prison medical staff.

As a direct result, he alleges he suffered a possible concussion

from falling down a flight of stairs, which manifested itself in the

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5/

Plaintiff does not name which prison staff members denied his lower tier cell

accommodation issued by Donovan’s medical staff. However he states that he was

denied the cell accommodations while housed in both building 16 and building 20.

Plaintiff fell down the flight of stairs while housed in building 20. (FAC, Doc.

No. 9, ¶ 6-8.)

10 09CV2657

form of “debilitation headaches, dizzynes [sic], nausia

[sic], . . . and blurred vision.” (Doc. No. 9 at 11.)

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged he had a serious medical

need. His pre-existing back injuries and prior fall in a correctional facility were serious enough that the Donavan’s medical staff

ordered that he be assigned to a bottom-tier cell to accommodate his

medical condition. The very fact of this accommodation evidences

that he had a serious medical need that a reasonable medical

professional would see fit to address because medical staff actually

addressed it.

Plaintiff also sufficiently pleads deliberate indifference

because the prison staff5/ knew about his pre-existing injuries and

about the fact that he had previously fallen while on an upper-level

tier in another facility. He alleges his fall and possible

concussion resulted from the delay of accommodations ordered by

prison medical staff based on this information. The logical

inference from his allegations is that he would not have fallen down

the stairs had he been assigned a bottom-tier cell. He alleges that

prison “staff” delayed his placement in the proper cell and Warden

Hernandez’s first-come-first-served policy caused the delay.

Plaintiff’s allegations amount to much more than mere

negligence, malpractice, or inadvertence. He alleges he was housed

on an upper-tier cell despite medical orders that he be housed in a

bottom-tier cell, that those medical orders were based on needs that

medical professionals sought fit to address, that he had fallen in

a similar manner at another institution, that the risk that he would

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11 09CV2657

fall again was high and foreseeable as a result, and that he indeed

fell and seriously injured himself as a result of the delay in

receiving his medically-ordered accommodation. Plaintiff specifically faults this delay for his fall and injury, which suffices to

meet the “harmful delay” requirement. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974

F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[W]hen, as here, a claim alleges

‘mere delay of surgery,’ a prisoner can make ‘no claim for deliberate medical indifference unless the denial was harmful.’”) (quoting

Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th

Cir. 1985) (per curiam)).

Moreover, a partial basis for Plaintiff receiving the bottomtier assignment order in the first place was his fall down a flight

of stairs in another correctional facility a short time before he

entered Donovan. Plaintiff alleges he specifically explained this

to “staff”, but does not identify with specificity any individual

staff member. (Doc. No. 9 at 10, ¶ 8 [Plaintiff “presented his

lower bunk/lower tier chrono to staff and explained that the reason

[he] was in a cervical collar was because [he] had recently fallen

down a flight of stairs the previous month . . . .”)]. As a result,

“staff” was on notice that Plaintiff had a medical order for a

bottom-tier cell and had specific knowledge that Plaintiff had

recently fallen down stairs in another correctional facility.

Knowing this, “staff” could not assign Plaintiff to a bottom-tier

cell because of overcrowding and the resulting first-come-firstserved policy. These allegations are sufficient to make out an

Eighth Amendment claim.

Defendants argue that they did not have the sufficient

culpable state of mind because the inmates were locked down 23 hours

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28 6/ Warden Hernandez’s supervisory liability will be addressed below. The Court

recommends that Warden Hernandez not be dismissed on the basis that he was merely

a supervisor.

12 09CV2657

per day, Plaintiff was escorted, and the fall essentially amounted

to a freak accident. Nonetheless, based on Plaintiff’s medical

condition and prior fall, the risk that he would fall during the one

hour he was out of his cell was high. Moreover, the knowledge that

Plaintiff had fallen while in another institution placed them on

actual notice that he was acutely at risk of falling again, given

his then-current medical condition. As it came to be, he indeed did

fall.

The foregoing notwithstanding, although Plaintiff has

sufficiently pled an Eighth Amendment violation here, he only names

“staff.” While presumably “staff” refers to Correctional Officer

Doe, Plaintiff still has not named an actual person against whom

this claim is directed, despite two prior warnings that he needs to

do so. (See Doc. Nos. 3 at 7; 19 at 3.) As a result, the Court

RECOMMENDS that this claim be dismissed against Correctional Officer

Doe and any unnamed defendants. See Flowers v. Ahern, 650 F. Supp.

2d 988, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing claims against unnamed

defendants).6/

2. Failure to Treat Concussion

Plaintiff also bases his Eighth Amendment claim on the

failure to treat the purported concussion he suffered from his fall.

He alleges that unnamed prison staff “chose” not to treat him. As

a result, he alleges he lost consciousness while urinating and awoke

on the floor in his cell.

 Plaintiff has again alleged he had a serious medical need.

The possible concussion symptoms are serious enough that a reasonCase 3:09-cv-02657-W-WVG Document 29 Filed 10/28/11 Page 12 of 18
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13 09CV2657

able medical professional would have at least evaluated Plaintiff

after he complained.

 Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegation that medical staff “chose”

not to treat him, read liberally, sufficiently pleads deliberate

indifference because a reasonable medical professional would not

choose to ignore the symptoms Plaintiff described.

However, Plaintiff has not pled specifically who “chose” not

to treat his possible concussion. He merely states that unnamed

“medical staff” did so. (Doc. No. 9 at 11-12, ¶ 13.) As a result,

in the event the case is not dismissed for lack of exhaustion, this

portion of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed as

well. See Flowers v. Ahern, 650 F. Supp. 2d 988, 993 (N.D. Cal.

2009) (dismissing claims against unnamed defendants).

C. Plaintiff Fails to Make Out An Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

requires that all similarly situated persons be treated alike. City

of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

A plaintiff may establish an equal protection claim by showing that

he was intentionally discriminated against on the basis of his

membership in a protected class, Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425

F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005), or by showing that similarly

situated individuals were intentionally treated differently for no

rational basis, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564

(2000). 

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates or that he is a member

of a protected class. As a result, he fails to state a cognizable

equal protection claim. See Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s 

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Dep’t, 565 F.3d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 2009) (to pursue an equal

protection claim, a plaintiff must “allege facts that are at least

susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent) (citation

omitted). Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss in this regard be granted.

D. Supervisor Liability

It appears that Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on Warden

Hernandez and Medical Staff Supervisor John Doe based on their roles

as supervisors. However, because Plaintiff sufficiently pleads that

Warden Hernandez’s policies led to the delayed medical accommodations and the resulting injury, the Court RECOMMENDS that only

Medical Staff Supervisor John Doe be dismissed from this case.

Supervisors are only personally liable for damages under

Section 1983 if they participated in, directed, or knew of the

alleged constitutional violations, and failed to intervene to

prevent them. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

However, “direct, personal participation is not necessary to

establish liability for a constitutional violation.” Kwai Fun Wong

v. U.S. INS, 373 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). “Supervisors can be

held liable for the actions of their subordinates (1) for setting in

motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refusing to

terminate a series of acts by others, which they knew or reasonably

should have known would cause others to inflict constitutional

injury; (2) for culpable action or inaction in training, supervision, or control of subordinates; (3) for acquiescence in the

constitutional deprivation by subordinates; or (4) for conduct that

shows a ‘reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.’”

al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

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15 09CV2657

Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991)),

rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2074. “Any one of these bases

will suffice to establish the personal involvement of the defendant

in the constitutional violation.” Id.

To premise a supervisor’s alleged liability on a policy

promulgated by the supervisor, the plaintiff must identify a

specific policy and establish a “direct causal link” between that

policy and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., City

of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Oviatt v.

Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477-79 (9th Cir. 1992).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Warden Hernandez established

policies, wrote regulations, or gave orders that led to Plaintiff’s

injury. (Doc. No. 9 at 15-16, ¶¶ 29-30.) The FAC is certainly

inartfully pled. However, reading it liberally and in Plaintiff’s

favor, he essentially alleges that the Warden’s first-come-firstserved policy in response to overcrowding led to Plaintiff’s injury,

and that this injury could have been prevented had a policy existed

that required officers to find a bottom-tier cell for an inmate who

required one even if that inmate did not arrive first. This is a

reasonable interpretation of Plaintiff’s allegations and is

sufficient to impute personal participation to Warden Hernandez. In

this regard, Plaintiff’s theory of liability against Warden

Hernandez is that his policy set in motion a series of events that

led to Plaintiff’s eventual injury. See, e.g., Redman v. County of

San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)

(concluding that knowledge of a policy in response to overcrowding

that allegedly resulted in inmate’s rape could be sufficient to

establish liability).

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One tangential factor that the Court may consider is whether

necessity of the first-come-first-served policy to address overcrowding issues impacts Plaintiff’s claims. A policy response to

overcrowding that leads to a constitutional violation (e.g., a delay

in receiving ordered medical accommodations) does not excuse the

violation. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1933-34 (2011)

(discussing overcrowding in the context of, inter alia, delayed

medical care); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1447-48

(9th Cir. 1991); Thomas v. Schwarzenegger, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

110067, *5-*8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011) (discussing overcrowding;

rejecting qualified immunity argument and finding a triable issue of

fact exists); Dillingham v. Schofield, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93187,

*21-*22 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 2011) (“If overcrowded conditions cause

an inmate to be denied the minimal civilized measure of life’s basic

needs, such as food, warmth, or exercise, this would transgress the

Eighth Amendment.”)

In Redman, an inmate was raped because the jail was overcrowded and the offending inmate could not be confined or separated

from other inmates as a result. The Ninth Circuit held that Sheriff

Jim Duffy could be held liable:

[T]here is evidence in the record of both overcrowding and

Sheriff Duffy’s ultimate direction of operations at the

South Bay Detention Facility. If we draw all inferences

in favor of Redman, we find that a reasonable jury could

find Sheriff Duffy was deliberately indifferent to

Redman’s personal security rights by allowing overcrowding

of the South Bay Detention Facility. Moreover, a jury

could find that Sheriff Duffy knew or reasonably should

have known of the overcrowding at a facility under his

administration and that he acquiesced in a deficient

policy that was a moving force behind Redman’s rape and

that repudiated Redman’s constitutional right to personal

security. A jury could likewise infer, based on Captain

Beall’s testimony, that Sheriff Duffy approved the

classification policies in effect at the facility.

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Id. at 1447-48. As in Redman, overcrowding does not excuse Warden

Hernandez’s first-come-first-served policy when that policy led to

the delay of medical accommodations that the prison itself ordered.

In this instance, the policy led to the delay of Plaintiff’s medical

accommodations even despite the knowledge that Plaintiff had

recently fallen down a flight of stairs and was particularly prone

to falling again. At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has

made out sufficient allegations against Warden Hernandez to survive

dismissal.

However, unlike with Warden Hernandez, Plaintiff has not

alleged that Medical Supervisor John Doe set forth any policies that

led to the delay and the resulting injuries. Plaintiff has not

alleged any other facts against John Doe that could support his

liability as a supervisor. As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that

the FAC be dismissed against Medical Supervisor John Doe only.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss be granted on the basis that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies.

Alternatively, in the event the FAC is not dismissed on this

basis, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion be:

1. Denied in part as to the Eighth Amendment claim against Warden

Hernandez;

2. Granted in part as to the Eighth Amendment claim against

Correctional Officer John Doe;

3. Granted in part as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim in its

entirety;

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4. Granted in part as to Medical Supervisor John Doe’s supervisor

liability; and

5. Denied in part as to Warden Hernandez’s supervisory liability.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 28, 2011, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

December 16, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 28, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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