Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02948/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02948-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Solomon Sovero,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn,

1

et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-2948-PHX-JGZ (BGM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner David Solomon Sovero’s Petition 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody 

(Non-Death Penalty) (“Amended Petition”) (Doc. 10). Respondents have filed a Limited

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 20), and Petitioner did 

not reply. The Amended Petition (Doc. 10) is ripe for adjudication.

Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure,2this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. The 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Amended Petition (Doc. 

10).

. . .

1 The Court takes judicial notice, that Charles Ryan is no longer the Director of the Arizona 

Department of Corrections (“AZDOC”). As such, the Court will substitute the Director of the 

AZDOC, David Shinn, as a Respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure.

2 Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 1 of 36
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Initial Charge and Sentencing

Petitioner’s presentence investigation report summarized the information from 

Phoenix Police Department Report #2009-90199243 as follows:

On February 4, 2009, police responded to a call of shots fired in an 

apartment complex located in the area of North 28th Street and Greenway. 

Upon arrival, police observed blood on the sidewalk and, upon entering 

apartment #4, victim [R.M.], age fifty-one, was found lying face down. 

Paramedics arrived and pronounced him deceased. Police learned an 

additional gunshot victim, [D.L.], age forty-three was transported from the 

area to the hospital where he later died of his injuries.

Police contacted [C.M.] who advised having arrived at the apartment 

complex to pick up his step-son, [D.L.], when he heard shots fired. Shortly 

after, [D.L.] ran from the apartment and entered the passenger side of the 

truck saying that Tony had shot him. As [C.M.] backed up to pull away, a 

subject exited the apartment holding a handgun and fired four rounds at his 

truck. [C.M.], who was not injured, then drove his step-son to the hospital.

[J.L.] contacted police to advise a man named Tony, later identified 

as the defendant and also known as Jesse Salazar, kidnapped her on February 

4, 2009. She said while she was with him, he held a pistol in his lap and 

threatened to kill her if she ran or stalled him in any way. He told her he was 

going to kill subjects he had on a “hit list,” and he threatened to kill her if she 

warned the victims. On February 4, 2009, the defendant shot the victims in 

her presence. She also watched as he fired upon the truck. [J.L.] was 

eventually able to get away from the defendant and then contacted the police.

On February 5, 2009, the defendant was located and followed by 

police, during which time he pointed a pistol at Detective Miller #6014. He 

was eventually taken into custody after entering the apartment of [K.W.], and 

he was found to be in possession of a pistol and a loaded magazine. He 

declined to answer any questions.

Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-109769-001-

DT, Presentence Investigation 1/18/2011 (Exh. “A”) (Doc. 21) at 3.

3

On February 9, 2012, Petitioner was charged with two (2) counts of first-degree

murder, one (1) count of burglary in the first degree, two (2) counts of kidnapping, two (2) 

3 Page citations refer to the CM/ECF page number for ease of reference.

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 2 of 36
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

counts of aggravated assault, and one (1) count of burglary in the second degree. See

Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-109769-001-

DT, Indictment 2/9/2012 (Exh. “B”) (Doc. 21). On November 23, 2010, pursuant to a plea 

agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to two (2) counts of first-degree murder and one (1) count 

of aggravated assault, and the remaining charges, including the possibility of the death 

penalty, were dismissed. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, 

Case No. CR2009-109769-001-DT, Plea Agreement (Exh. “C”) (Doc. 21). On January 18, 

2011, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for natural life on Count One; a 

second term of imprisonment for natural life on Count Two to be served consecutively with 

Count One; and a term of twenty-one (21) years of imprisonment on Count Six, for 

aggravated assault, to be served consecutively with the first two counts. See Answer (Doc. 

20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-109769-001-DT, Sentence of 

Imprisonment 1/18/2011 (Exh. “D”) (Doc. 21).

B. Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

On October 13, 2011, Petitioner filed his Delayed Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

(“PCR”).

4

 See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-

109769-001, Def.’s Delayed Not. of PCR (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 21). On October 28, 2011, the 

trial court observed that Petitioner’s Notice of PCR was untimely; however, because the 

notice “sufficiently raised a colorable claim[,]” the court allowed the Rule 32 proceeding 

4

In Arizona, “[b]y pleading guilty or no contest in a noncapital case, a defendant waives 

the right to have the appellate courts review the proceedings by way of direct appeal, and may seek 

review only by filing a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 and, if denied, a 

petition for review.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.1(e); see also A.R.S. § 13-4033(B) (“In noncapital cases 

a defendant may not appeal from a judgment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea 

agreement or an admission to a probation violation.”). “Any person who pled guilty . . . shall have 

the right to file a post-conviction relief proceeding, and this proceeding shall be known as a Rule 

32 of-right proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1. “Arizona courts have repeatedly characterized 

Rule 32 of-right proceedings as the functional equivalent of direct appeals, and have distinguished 

them from other Rule 32 proceedings.” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715–16 (9th Cir. 2007). 

As such, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded “that Arizona’s Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding for plea convicted defendants is a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 

U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers, 481 F.3d at 716–17.

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 3 of 36
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to continue and appointed counsel to Petitioner. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., 

Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-109769-001 DT, Rule 32 PCR (Exh. “F”) (Doc. 21). 

On July 31, 2014, Petitioner’s counsel filed a notice confirming that she had reviewed the 

trial file, but “did not find an issue with respect to the change of plea or sentencing.”

5

 See

Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-109769-001, 

Pet.’s Not. of Completed Review (Exh. “G”) (Doc. 21). On August 5, 2014, the trial court 

directed counsel to forward “the complete trial and appellate file including all transcripts 

in counsel’s possession” to Petitioner and set a deadline for Petitioner to file a pro se PCR 

petition. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-

109769-001 DT, Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction Relief by Counsel Due Date for 

Pro Per Petition 8/5/2014 (Exh. “H”) (Doc. 21).

On September 8, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion to Appoint New Counsel with the 

Rule 32 court. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. 

CR2009-109769-001, Pet.’s Mot. to Appoint New Counsel (Exh. “I”) (Doc. 21). On 

September 18, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate Plea Agreement and on November 

7, 2014, he filed a Motion to Extend Page Count. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior 

Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-109769-001, Pet.’s Mot. to Vacate Plea 

Agreement (Exh. “J”) (Doc. 21) & Mot. to Extend Page Count (Exh. “K”) (Doc. 22). On 

October 16, 2014, the trial court denied Petitioner’s request for counsel and construed 

Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate Plea Agreement as his pro se PCR Petition requiring a 

response. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-

109769-001 DT, Request for Counsel Denied[,] Pet. Received[,] Resp. Due Date (Exh. 

5 The Arizona Supreme Court has held that in Rule 32 proceedings, where counsel 

concludes that the proceeding has no merit, “a pleading defendant has a right under Ariz. Const. 

art. 2 § 24 to file a pro se PCR petition.” Montgomery v. Sheldon (I), 181 Ariz. 256, 260, 889 P.2d 

614, 618 (1995). Subsequently, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed this rule and reiterated:

If, after conscientiously searching the record for error, appointed counsel in a PCR 

proceeding finds no tenable issue and cannot proceed, the defendant is entitled to 

file a pro se PCR.

State v. Smith, 184 Ariz. 456, 459, 910 P.2d 1, 4 (1996).

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 4 of 36
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“L”) (Doc. 22).

1. PCR Petition

Petitioner asserted a single claim of error by the trial court regarding Petitioner’s 

competency during his change-of-plea due to heavy psychotropic medication and five (5) 

counts of ineffective assistance of counsel and argued that all of these were violations of 

his Sixth Amendment rights. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, 

Case No. CR2009-109769-001, Pet.’s Mot. to Vacate Plea Agreement (Exh. “J”) (Doc. 21)

& Mot. to Extend Page Count (Exh. “K”) (Doc. 22). Petitioner urged that at the point of 

the plea proceeding where he informs the court that he has taken medication in the prior 

twenty-four (24) hours, the court should have stopped the hearing and set a competency 

hearing. Id., Exh. “J” at 76–78 & Exh. “K” at 18–20. Petitioner noted that trial counsel’s

constant instructions to Petitioner regarding what to say during the plea proceeding is 

evidence of his incompetence. Id., Exh. “J” at 82–83 & Exh. “K” at 22–25. Petitioner 

further argued that trial counsel was ineffective because he spent just over six (6) hours 

visiting Petitioner in jail over the course of a year, despite this being a “complex capital 

case.” Id., Exh. “K” at 29–31. Petitioner also alleged that trial counsel was ineffective due 

to a failure to interview key witnesses favorable to Petitioner. Id., Exh. “K” at 31–33. 

Petitioner asserted that trial counsel was ineffective due to an alleged failure to file a motion 

for disclosure regarding Officer Cassidy’s report and photographs regarding witness 

interviews. Answer (Doc. 20), Exh. “K” (Doc. 22) at 33. Petitioner alleged a Brady6

violation regarding a failure to disclose the allegedly favorable evidence contained in 

Officer Cassidy’s report. Id., Exh. “K” at 33. Finally, Petitioner asserted that trial 

counsel’s alleged failure to file motions for impeachment regarding certain witnesses 

constituted ineffective assistance. Id., Exh. “K” at 34–37.

2. Rule 32 Court Order

On February 3, 2015, the Rule 32 court issued its Order dismissing the Petition for 

PCR. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-

6 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 5 of 36
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

109769-001 DT, Minute Entry 2/3/2015 (Exh. “O”) (Doc. 22). The Rule 32 court 

delineated the test for ineffective assistance of counsel, stating that a Defendant was 

required “to show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, that is, not reasonable 

under all the circumstances and under prevailing professional standards; and (2) the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense, that is, there is a reasonable probability that 

but for counsel’s deficient conduct, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Id., Exh. “O” at 164 (citing State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 414, 844 P.2d 566, 581 (Ariz. 

1992)). The Rule 32 court further noted that “[a] reviewing judge must ‘indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.’” Id., Exh. “O” at 164–65 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). The Rule 32 court observed that 

“[t]here [wa]s a question as to whether this claim is timely[,] [but] [r]egardless of that issue, 

his claims have no factual merit.” Id., Exh. “O” at 165. Regarding the issue of Petitioner’s 

competency during his change-of-plea, the Rule 32 court noted that “Defendant said on the 

record that the prescribed medications helped him to understand the proceedings rather 

than impeding his mental competency.” Id., Exh. “O” at 165. The Rule 32 court further 

observed that Petitioner’s “counsel also commented on his personal observations that the 

medications ‘[we]re helping him more.’” Id., Exh. “O” at 165. The Rule 32 court found 

that Petitioner’s “claim regarding lack of jail visits by his attorney [was] without merit and 

[was] not supported by the record.” Answer (Doc. 20), Exh. “O” (Doc. 22) at 165. The 

Rule 32 court also observed that “Defendant d[id] not show how any of the witnesses he 

claimed were not interviewed could have possibly helped his defense[,] . . . [because] all 

or most of these witnesses related to counts that were dismissed as part of the plea.” Id., 

Exh. “O” at 165. Regarding the photographs of the cul-de-sac, the Rule 32 court noted that 

they had been disclosed and “any prejudice would have related to count 6 only.” Id., Exh. 

“O” at 165. Lastly, the Rule 32 court stated that “all information regarding witness’s prior 

criminal histories were disclosed to defense counsel.” Id., Exh. “O” at 165. As such, the 

Rule 32 court found the petition without merit. Id., Exh. “O” at 165.

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 6 of 36
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. PCR Appeal

On March 9, 2015, Petitioner filed his Petition for Review with the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 15-0142-PRPC,

Pet.’s Pet. for Review (Exh. “R”) (Doc. 23). Petitioner sought relief based upon alleged 

ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct/disclosure, and competency. 

Id., Exh. “R” at 20. Petitioner argued that the trial court violated his due process rights

when it “failed to cease proceedings at his acknowledgment of defendant [sic] competency 

issue’s [sic]” and order a hearing to determine competency. Id., Exh. “R” at 27. Petitioner 

further asserted that the Rule 32 court judge also presided over Petitioner’s change-of-plea 

hearing, and as such could not be impartial. Id., Exh. “R” at 26–27. Petitioner also urged 

that his impairment lasted throughout the duration of his criminal case and that these 

concerns were also raised with the court during sentencing. Id., Exh. “R” at 29–32.

Petitioner argued that trial counsel was ineffective because he spent just over six (6) 

hours on his case in the course of a year.7 Answer (Doc. 20), Exh. “R” (Doc. 23) at 33–

37. Petitioner further asserted that trial counsel was ineffective because he “fail[ed] to 

investigate and interview . . . witnesses to preserve such statements which would have 

exonerated defendant of COUNT 1 FIRST DEGREE MURDER, COUNT 2 FIRST 

DEGREE MURDER AND COUNT 6 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.” Id., Exh. “R” at 37–

38 (emphasis in original). Petitioner contended that counsel’s alleged failure to interview 

witnesses prior to conducting plea negotiations constituted ineffective assistance. Id., Exh. 

“R” at 37–42. Petitioner also argued that trial counsel was ineffective based on an alleged 

“failure to file a motion to request a ‘Rule 609 Hearing’ to impeach” certain witnesses. Id., 

Exh. “R” at 42–44. Petitioner asserted that trial counsel was ineffective due to an alleged 

failure “to file a motion for the State to disclose the ‘Review of Law Enforcement Integrity 

File’ pursuant to Brady v. Maryland[.]” Id., Exh. “R” at 44–45. Additionally, Petitioner 

alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to depose detective 

7

It appears that Petitioner is conflating the amount of time counsel visited with him at the 

jail versus the total amount of time spent on the case. See Answer (Doc. 21), Exh. “K” at 29–31.

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 7 of 36
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

witnesses, as well as failing to move for remand for a new determination of probable cause 

and challenge the grand jury proceedings. Id., Exh. “R” at 45–47. Finally, Petitioner 

asserted that the prosecutor failed to disclose an officer’s supplemental report in violation 

of Brady, as well as Petitioner’s due process and equal protection rights. Id., Exh. “R” at 

47–50.

On June 9, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion to Appoint Mental Health Expert, a 

Motion for Production of Documents and Disclosure, and Motion to Appoint Private 

Investigator with the trial court. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa 

County, Case No. CR2009-109769-001 DT, Pet.’s Mot. to Appoint Mental Health Expert 

(Exh. “S”) (Doc. 23) & Pet.’s Mot. for Prod. of Docs. and Discl. (Exh. “T”) (Doc. 23) & 

Pet.’s Mot. to Appoint Private Inv. (Exh. “U”) (Doc. 23). On July 28, 2015, the trial court 

acknowledged the filings but, in light of Petitioner’s pending appellate review, concluded 

that the motions were solely for information and took no action. Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. 

Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-109769-001 DT, Pldg. Intended for 

Other Ct. (Exh. “V”) (Doc. 23).

On April 27, 2017, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. 

See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 15-0142-PRPC, Mem. Decision

4/27/2017 (Exh. “W”) (Doc. 23). The appellate court observed that in asserting that his 

pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary due to taking psychotropic medication 

under a doctor’s care, Petitioner failed to offer any evidence from a medical professional 

to explain the effects of the medication, and the medical records he provided ended six (6) 

months prior to the change-of-plea hearing. Id., Exh. “W” at 80. The appellate court also 

noted that at the change-of-plea hearing, Petitioner did not identify the medications or 

complain of their effects but did explain to the court “that the medications helped him think 

more clearly.” Id., Exh. “W” at 80. The appellate court held that “[n]othing about [the 

change-of-plea] colloquy suggest[ed] [Petitioner’s] pleas were not knowing, intelligent and 

voluntary.” Id., Exh. “W” at 80. The appellate court further held that “because Sovero 

failed to present a colorable claim regarding his pleas, he has also failed to present a 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 8 of 36
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to raise this issue 

at the change-of-plea hearing.” Id., Exh. “W” at 81.

Regarding Petitioner’s argument that “the State failed to disclose the supplemental 

report of an officer who investigated the aggravated assault[,]” the appellate court observed 

that “a plea agreement waives all non-jurisdictional defenses, errors and defects that 

occurred before the plea, meaning relief on this ground properly is denied.” Answer (Doc. 

20), Exh. “W” (Doc. 23) at 81 (citing State v. Moreno, 134 Ariz. 199, 200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

1982)). The appellate court next considered Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims and explained that “[t]o state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below objectively reasonable 

standards and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” Id., Exh. “W” at 

81 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Regarding the time 

counsel spent at the jail facility visiting Petitioner, the appellate court held that “[t]o argue 

counsel was not at the jail facility for as many hours as counsel claimed nearly a year before 

Sovero pled guilty does not present a colorable claim that counsel’s performance fell below 

objectively reasonable standards or that Sovero suffered any prejudice.” Id., Exh. “W” at 

81. Secondly, the appellate court found that Petitioner’s argument regarding an alleged 

failure to investigate and/or interview witnesses was not supported by affidavits from those 

witnesses. Id., Exh. “W” at 81. Third, the court of appeals determined that Petitioner’s 

“argument regarding a Rule 609 hearing . . . show[ed] no basis for relief[,] because [t]here 

was no reason to seek such a hearing unless and until it became apparent that the matter 

would proceed to trial and those witnesses would testify.” Id., Exh. “W” at 82. Finally, 

the appellate court held that Petitioner failed to present argument to the Rule 32 trial court 

regarding counsel’s alleged failure to obtain “law enforcement integrity files,” depose 

investigators, and challenge the grand jury proceedings. As such, the appellate court 

declined to address the issues. Id., Exh. “W” at 82.

On January 3, 2018, Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Amended Petition (Doc. 10), Ariz. Supreme Ct., Case No. 2 CR 17-0231-PR, Pet.’s Pet. 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 9 of 36
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

for Review 1/3/2018 (Exh. “A”) at 17–38. On the same date, Petitioner filed a motion to 

suspend Rules 32.9(c)(1) and 32.9(c)(1)(i) relating to the time for filing a petition for 

review. Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Supreme Ct., Case No. 2 CR 17-0231-PR, Pet.’s Mot. to 

Suspend Rules 1/3/2018 (Exh. “X”). On March 14, 2018, the Arizona Supreme Court 

granted Petitioner’s motion to suspend the rules and denied his petition for review. 

Amended Petition (Doc. 10), Ariz. Supreme Ct., Case No. 2 CR 17-0231-PR, Ltr. to Sovero 

3/14/2018 (Doc. 10-1) at 14. On April 13, 2018, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its 

mandate. Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 15-0142-PRPC, Mandate

4/13/2018 (Exh. “Y”) (Doc. 23)

C. The Instant Habeas Proceeding

On September 18, 2018, Petitioner filed his Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1). 

On November 27, 2018, Petitioner filed an amended Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 10). 

Petitioner asserts two (2) grounds for relief. See Amended Petition (Doc. 10). First, 

Petitioner alleges a violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments because the high dosages of psychotropic medications he was taking 

impaired his mental state during the proceedings. Id. at 6. Petitioner asserts that he was 

not competent due to the high doses and as such did not enter his plea knowingly and 

voluntarily. Id. Petitioner further contends that the Maricopa Superior Court did not 

conduct a competency hearing, which Petitioner asserts it should have, given his level of 

impairment. Id. Petitioner urges that the court was made aware of this issue through the 

testimony of family members. Id.

Second, Petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. at 9. As an 

initial matter, Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective because he “was aware of 

petitioners [sic] impairment of psychotropic medications during Plea Hearing and 

Sentencing therefore allowing petitioner to enter into his plea NOT knowingly and 

intelligently.” Id. (emphasis in original). Petitioner also asserts that counsel was 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 10 of 36
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ineffective because he allegedly failed to 1) obtain Brady material from the county 

attorney; 2) “provide sufficient time to discuss defense strategies as this case was a capital 

offense; 3) “investigate and interview witnesses” resulting in Petitioner entering his plea 

unknowingly and unintelligently; 4) obtain law enforcement “integrity files” “to suppress 

[and] impeach detectives fabricated claims[.]” Id.

On March 25, 2019, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 20).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. In General

The federal courts shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus by a person 

in state custody:

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 

1398, 179 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2011). Correcting errors of state law is not the province of federal 

habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480, 116 L. Ed.

2d 385 (1991). Ultimately, “[t]he statute’s design is to ‘further the principles of comity, 

finality, and federalism.’” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 

2854, 168 L. Ed. 2d 662 (2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 123 S.

Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003)). Furthermore, this standard is difficult to meet and 

highly deferential “for evaluating state-court rulings, [and] which demands that state-court 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 11 of 36
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S. Ct. at 

1398 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 

1214, mandates the standards for federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The 

“AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims 

have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16, 

187 L. Ed. 2d 348 (2013). Federal courts reviewing a petition for habeas corpus must 

“presume the correctness of state courts’ factual findings unless applicants rebut this 

presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 

473–74, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 

Moreover, on habeas review, the federal courts must consider whether the state court’s 

determination was unreasonable, not merely incorrect. Id., 550 U.S. at 473, 127 S. Ct. at 

1939; Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2013). Such a determination is 

unreasonable where a state court properly identifies the governing legal principles 

delineated by the Supreme Court, but when the court applies the principles to the facts 

before it, arrives at a different result. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 

770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.

Ed. 2d 389 (2000); see also Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 2004). “AEDPA 

requires ‘a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented 

in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . beyond any 

possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 10 (quoting Harrington, 562 

U.S. at 103, 131 S. Ct. at 786–87) (alterations in original).

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Prior to application for a writ of habeas corpus, a person in state custody must 

exhaust all of the remedies available in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This 

“provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims 

to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court.” Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1982). As such, the exhaustion 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 12 of 36
- 13 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

doctrine gives the State “the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its 

prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 

L. Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he exhaustion doctrine is 

principally designed to protect the state courts’ role in the enforcement of federal law and 

prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings.” Rose, 455 U.S. at 518, 102 S. Ct. at 1203 

(internal citations omitted). This upholds the doctrine of comity which “teaches that one 

court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of 

another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have 

had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.” Id. (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 

204, 70 S. Ct. 587, 590, 94 L. Ed. 761 (1950)).

Section 2254(c) provides that claims “shall not be deemed . . . exhausted” so long 

as the applicant “has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure 

the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). “[O]nce the federal claim has been fairly 

presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.” Picard v. Connor, 

404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 512, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1971). The fair presentation 

requirement mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a 

federal claim” in his petition, simply labeling a claim “federal” or expecting the state court 

to read beyond the four corners of the petition is insufficient. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 33, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that 

his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did not 

indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices having 

the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not fair 

presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed 

to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in 

state court only on state grounds). Furthermore, in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, 

the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29, 124 S.

Ct. at 1349. “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement if he properly 

pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire direct appellate process of the state, or (2) 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 13 of 36
- 14 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

throughout one entire judicial postconviction process available in the state.” Casey v. 

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas 

Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (9th ed. 1998)).

In Arizona, however, for non-capital cases “review need not be sought before the 

Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies.” Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D. Ariz. 

2007); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998). Additionally, the 

Supreme Court has further interpreted § 2254(c) to recognize that once the state courts 

have ruled upon a claim, it is not necessary for an applicant to seek collateral relief for the 

same issues already decided upon direct review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350, 

109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1989).

C. Procedural Default

“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the 

technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to 

him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2555, 115 L. Ed. 2d 650 

(1991). Moreover, federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided by a 

state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the 

federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Id., 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S. Ct. at 

2254. This is true whether the state law basis is substantive or procedural. Id. (citations 

omitted). Such claims are considered procedurally barred from review. See Wainwright 

v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the difference between exhaustion 

and procedural default as follows:

The exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never been 

presented with an opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims and that 

opportunity may still be available to the petitioner under state law. In 

contrast, the procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim 

applies only when a state court has been presented with the federal claim, but 

declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons, or if it is clear that the state 

court would hold the claim procedurally barred. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 

F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 14 of 36
- 15 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

omitted). Thus, in some circumstances, a petitioner’s failure to exhaust a 

federal claim in state court may cause a procedural default. See Sandgathe 

v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 

987 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A claim is procedurally defaulted ‘if the petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would 

be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement 

would now find the claims procedurally barred.’”) (quoting Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)).

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, a prisoner’s habeas

petition may be precluded from federal review due to procedural default in two ways. First, 

where the petitioner presented his claims to the state court, which denied relief based on 

independent and adequate state grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S. Ct. at 2554. 

Federal courts are prohibited from review in such cases because they have “no power to 

review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment, resolution of 

any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would 

therefore be advisory.” Id. Second, where a “petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies 

and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to 

meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 

735 n.1, 111 S. Ct. at 2557 n.1 (citations omitted). Thus, the federal court “must consider 

whether the claim could be pursued by any presently available state remedy.” Cassett, 406 

F.3d at 621 n.6 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice); see also 

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 2666, 91 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1986) 

(recognizing “that a federal habeas court must evaluate appellate defaults under the same 

standards that apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim at trial.”). “[T]he existence 

of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 15 of 36
- 16 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with 

the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645, 

91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 

1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, [as such] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). In addition to cause, a habeas petitioner must show actual prejudice, 

meaning that he “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, 

but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. at 2648 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). Without a showing of both cause and 

prejudice, a habeas petitioner cannot overcome the procedural default and gain review by 

the federal courts. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 2649.

The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that “the cause and prejudice standard 

will be met in those cases where review of a state prisoner’s claim is necessary to correct 

‘a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 

2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135, 102 S. Ct. 

1558, 1572–73, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982)). “The fundamental miscarriage of justice 

exception is available ‘only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a 

colorable showing of factual innocence.’” Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 S.

Ct. 853, 862, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993) (emphasis in original) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 

477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2627, 91 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1986)). Thus, “‘actual 

innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas 

petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the 

merits.” Herrara, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S. Ct. at 862. Further, in order to demonstrate a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice, a habeas petitioner must “establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would 

have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B).

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 16 of 36
- 17 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In Arizona, a petitioner’s claim may be procedurally defaulted where he has waived 

his right to present his claim to the state court “at trial, on appeal or in any previous 

collateral proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018). “If an asserted claim is of 

sufficient constitutional magnitude, the state must show that the defendant ‘knowingly, 

voluntarily and intelligently’ waived the claim.” Id., 2002 cmt. Neither Rule 32.2. nor the 

Arizona Supreme Court has defined claims of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” 

requiring personal knowledge before waiver. See id.; see also Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 

446, 46 P.3d 1067 (2002). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that this 

assessment “often involves a fact-intensive inquiry” and the “Arizona state courts are better 

suited to make these determinations.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 622.

III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A. Timeliness

As a threshold matter, the Court must consider whether Petitioner’s petition is 

barred by the statute of limitation. See White v. Klizkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921–22 (9th Cir. 

2002). The AEDPA mandates that a one-year statute of limitations applies to applications 

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 

2244(d)(1) provides that the limitations period shall run from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

the State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States 

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 17 of 36
- 18 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). “The time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Respondents do not dispute the timeliness of Sovero’s petition. The Court has 

independently reviewed the records and finds that the Amended Petition (Doc. 10) is timely 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Ground One: Competency

Petitioner alleges that “[c]ompentency [sic] issue’s [sic] due to impairment of HIGH 

dosages of Psychotropic Medications which impaired petitioners [sic] mental state during 

the proceedings of Maricopa County Superior Court CASE NO. CR2009-109769-001 

which said dosages had been administered till point of sentencing by STATE COURT 

judgment there accrued violation of Constitutional law under the United States Const. 

Amend. 14 & 5.” Petition (Doc. 10) at 6 (emphasis in original). Respondents assert that 

“Sovero did not raise any due process claim relating to this issue in his petition for postconviction relief[,] . . . [and] [a]s such, this claim has not been raised before both the trial 

court and court of appeals and cannot now be raised in his petition.” Response (Doc. 20) 

at 13–14. The Court agrees with Respondents.

As discussed in Section II.B., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a 

habeas petitioner must first present all claims to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 

509, 520, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation requirement 

mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” 

in his petition. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 

(2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because 

his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a 

violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 18 of 36
- 19 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000) (holding that petitioner failed 

to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in 

state court only on state grounds). Merely labeling a claim “federal” or making a passing 

reference to the United States Constitution does not constitute “fair presentment.” See 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 

364, 365–66 115 S. Ct. 887, 888, 130 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given 

the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely 

be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 

Constitution”). Moreover, Petitioner cannot expect the state court to read beyond the four 

corners of the petition to meet the fair presentation requirement. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 33, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion 

that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did 

not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices 

having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not 

fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner 

failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim 

in state court only on state grounds).

Here, Petitioner presented his claim regarding the trial court’s alleged error as to

competency to the Rule 32 court as a violation of the Sixth Amendment and state law, 

without mention of Due Process. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa 

County, Case No. CR2009-109769-001, Pet.’s Mot. to Vacate Plea Agreement (Exh. “J”) 

(Doc. 21) & Mot. to Extend Page Count (Exh. “K”) (Doc. 22). “Whether a claim is 

exhausted through a direct appellate procedure, a post-conviction procedure, or both, the 

claim should be raised at all appellate stages afforded under state law as of right by that 

procedure.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Liebman & 

Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (4th ed. 1998)). Thus, 

“where the claim has been presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 19 of 36
- 20 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

which its merits will not be considered unless ‘there are special and important reasons 

therefor’ . . . [r]aising the claim in such a fashion does not, for the relevant 

purpose, constitute ‘fair presentation.’” Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). 

Petitioner raised his due process claim as part of the appeal of Rule 32 petition to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 15-

0142-PRPC, Pet.’s Pet. for Review (Exh. “R”) (Doc. 23). Because Petitioner only raised 

this issue to the Arizona Court of Appeals during review of his PCR petition, it does not 

constitute fair presentation. Casey, 386 F.3d at 918.

As such, the claim would now be precluded and meets the technical requirements 

for exhaustion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s 

claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s 

claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S. Ct. 

2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and 

the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet 

the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). 

Additionally, when a Petitioner presents his claim to the state court, and is denied upon 

independent and adequate state grounds, this Court is prohibited from review. This is 

because the “state law determination [] is sufficient to support the judgment, [and] 

resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment 

and would therefore be advisory.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S. Ct. at 2554. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 20 of 36
- 21 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner 

“must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear 

and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder 

would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As 

such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S. Ct. at 2564 

(citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

B. Ground Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner asserts five (5) claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, as follows: 1) 

because counsel “was aware of petitioners [sic] impairment of psychotropic medications 

during Plea Hearing and Sentencing therefore allowing petitioner to enter into his plea 

NOT knowingly and intelligently”; 2) for allegedly failing to obtain Brady material from 

the county attorney; 3) for allegedly failing to “provide sufficient time to discuss defense 

strategies as this case was a capital offense; 4) for allegedly failing to “investigate and 

interview witnesses” resulting in Petitioner entering his plea unknowingly and 

unintelligently; and 5) for allegedly failing to obtain law enforcement “integrity files” “to 

suppress [and] impeach detectives fabricated claims[.] Amended Petition (Doc. 10) at 9 

(emphasis in original). The Court will address each of these allegations in turn.

1. Ground 2(a): Impairment Due to Psychotropic Medications

Petitioner’s first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based upon counsel’s 

alleged awareness that Petitioner was impaired by psychotropic medications during his 

change-of-plea and sentencing but allowed Petitioner to “enter into his Plea Agreement 

NOT knowingly and intelligently[.]” Amended Petition (Doc. 10) at 9. Respondents assert 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 21 of 36
- 22 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that although Petitioner raised this claim in his PCR petition, he did not raise it in his 

petition for review to the court of appeals. Answer (Doc. 20) at 14. The Court agrees with 

Respondents.

As discussed in Section II.B., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a 

habeas petitioner must first present all claims to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 

509, 520, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation requirement 

mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” 

in his petition. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 

(2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because 

his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a 

violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court 

decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000) (holding that petitioner failed 

to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in 

state court only on state grounds). Merely labeling a claim “federal” or making a passing 

reference to the United States Constitution does not constitute “fair presentment.” See 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 

364, 365–66 115 S. Ct. 887, 888, 130 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given 

the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely 

be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 

Constitution”). Moreover, Petitioner cannot expect the state court to read beyond the four 

corners of the petition to meet the fair presentation requirement. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 33, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion 

that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did 

not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices 

having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not 

fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner 

failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 22 of 36
- 23 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in state court only on state grounds).

Additionally, “[a]s a general matter, each ‘unrelated alleged instance [ ] of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness’ is a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion.” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 

F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th 

Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original). This means “all operative facts to an ineffective 

assistance claim must be presented to the state courts in order for a petitioner to exhaust 

his remedies.” Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). This is 

“[b]ecause ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, but are instead highly factdependent, [requiring] some baseline explication of the facts relating to it[.]” Id. As such, 

“a petitioner who presented any ineffective assistance of counsel claim below can[not] later 

add unrelated instances of counsel’s ineffectiveness to that claim.” Id. (citations and 

internal quotations omitted); see also Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736, 788 (D. Ariz. 

2008) (“Petitioner’s assertion of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on one 

set of facts, does not exhaust other claims of ineffective assistance based on different 

facts”). “Whether a claim is exhausted through a direct appellate procedure, a postconviction procedure, or both, the claim should be raised at all appellate stages afforded 

under state law as of right by that procedure.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 

23.3b (4th ed. 1998)).

Here, Petitioner presented his claim regarding counsel allegedly failing to spend 

sufficient time meeting with Petitioner to the Rule 32 court as a violation of the Sixth 

Amendment. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. 

CR2009-109769-001, Pet.’s Mot. to Vacate Plea Agreement (Exh. “J”) (Doc. 21) & Mot. 

to Extend Page Count (Exh. “K”) (Doc. 22). He did not, however, raise this claim as part 

of the appeal of the Rule 32 petition to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Answer (Doc. 

20), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 15-0142-PRPC, Pet.’s Pet. for Review (Exh. “R”) 

(Doc. 23). Because Petitioner only raised this to the Rule 32 court in his PCR petition, it

does not constitute fair presentation. Casey, 386 F.3d at 918.

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 23 of 36
- 24 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As such, the claim would now be precluded and meets the technical requirements 

for exhaustion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s 

claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s 

claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S. Ct. 

2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and 

the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet 

the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner 

“must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear 

and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder 

would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As 

such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S. Ct. at 2564 

(citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

. . .

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 24 of 36
- 25 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Ground 2(b): Brady Material

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain Brady

material from the Maricopa county attorney. Amended Petition (Doc. 10) at 9. Respondent 

acquiesces that broadly construed, Petitioner properly exhausted this claim in state court 

but urges that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how counsel’s actions fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness. Answer (Doc. 20) at 21. The Court questions 

whether Petitioner fairly presented his claim to both the Rule 32 court and the appellate 

court; however, it agrees with Respondents that he cannot show that counsel’s actions fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness.

a. Legal Standards

For cases which have been fairly presented to the State court, the Supreme Court 

elucidated a two-part test for determining whether a defendant could prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to overturn his conviction. See Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). First, Petitioner must 

show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. “This 

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, Petitioner 

must show that this performance prejudiced his defense. Id. Prejudice “requires showing 

that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial whose result 

is reliable.” Id. Ultimately, whether or not counsel’s performance was effective hinges on 

its reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 

S. Ct. at 2065; see also State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 771 P.2d 1382 (1989) (adopting 

Strickland two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims). The Sixth 

Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance is not meant to “improve the quality of 

legal representation,” rather it is to ensure the fairness of trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 

104 S. Ct. at 2065. “Thus, ‘[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must 

be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 

process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’” Cullen v. 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 25 of 36
- 26 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2011) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 at 686) (emphasis and alteration in original).

“The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ . . 

. and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so[.]” Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 105, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011) (citations omitted). Judging 

counsel’s performance must be made without the influence of hindsight. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. As such, “the defendant must overcome the 

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered 

sound trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S. Ct. 158, 

164, 100 L. Ed. 83 (1955)). Without the requisite showing of either “deficient 

performance” or “sufficient prejudice,” Petitioner cannot prevail on his ineffectiveness 

claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S. Ct. at 2071. “[T]he question is not whether 

counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 

F.3d 884, 899 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, 131 S. Ct. at 788) 

(alterations in original). “The challenger’s burden is to show ‘that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104, 131 S. Ct. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052). Accordingly, “[w]e apply the doubly deferential 

standard to review the state court’s ‘last reasoned decision.’” Vega v. Ryan, 757 F.3d 960, 

966 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). “By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any 

claim ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court, subject only to the exceptions in 2254(d)(1) 

and (d)(2).” Harrington, 131 U.S. at 98, 131 S. Ct. at 784. As such, Petitioner also bears 

the burden of showing that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an 

objectively unreasonable manner. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698–99, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 

1852, 152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

b. Counsel’s Performance

Petitioner cannot show that counsel’s performance was deficient. In his PCR 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 26 of 36
- 27 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

petition, Petitioner asserted that:

Officer Cassidy dint [sic] get his report of residence in cul-de-sac photo’s 

[sic] ect. [sic] which would have proved NO ASSAULT ON POLICE. This 

is clearly a Brady issue because State did NOT disclose the supplements from 

this officer – Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 

215 (1963). TRIAL COUNSEL failed to file a – MOTION for Disclosure –

this shows clearly of counsel’s ineffectiveness. –see–Exhibit (75) How 

Officer Cassidy interviewed [sic] resident 3001 E. Nisbet Rd & 3009 E. 

Nisbet Rd. Interview not included in police report – State did not disclose.

Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-109769-001, 

Pet.’s Mot. to Extend Page Count (Exh. “K”) (Doc. 22) at 33 (emphasis in original). The 

Rule 32 court stated that “[i]neffective assistance of counsel is determined by a twopronged test, requiring Defendant to show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, 

that is, not reasonable under all the circumstances and under prevailing professional 

standards; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, that is, there is a 

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient conduct, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case 

No. CR2009-109769-001, Minute Entry 2/3/2015 (Exh. “O”) (Doc. 22) (citing State v. 

Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 414, 844 P.2d 566, 581 (Ariz. 1992)). The Rule 32 court further 

observed that “the ineffective assistance claim is likewise without factual merit and does 

not present a colorable claim . . . the photographs of the Cul-de-sac were disclosed and any 

prejudice would have related to count 6 only.” Id., Exh. “O” at 165.

On appeal, Petitioner asserted a Brady violation in the context of prosecutorial 

misconduct and/or a failure of disclosure. Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 

CA-CR 15-0142-PRPC, Pet.’s Pet. for Review (Exh. “R”) (Doc. 23) at 47–50. Petitioner 

urged that if Officer Cassidy’s supplemental report had been disclosed, Petitioner would 

have been exonerated of the aggravated assault claim. Id., Exh. “R” at 49. The appellate 

court considered Petitioner’s argument as focusing on the State’s alleged failure, not 

ineffective assistance of counsel and noted that “a plea agreement waives all nonjurisdictional defenses, errors and defects that occurred before the plea, meaning relief on 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 27 of 36
- 28 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

this ground properly is denied.” Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 15-

0142-PRPC, Mem. Decision 4/27/2017 (Exh. “W”) (Doc. 23) at 81. Regarding Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the appellate court indicated that “[t]o state a 

colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s 

performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defendant.” Id., Exh. “W” at 81 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984)). The court of appeals held that on the record before it, relief was properly 

denied because Petitioner “failed to present a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.” Id., Exh. “W” at 81.

As is evidenced by Petitioner’s argument to the court of appeals, any Brady issue 

relates to the conduct of the prosecutor, not Petitioner’s counsel. The record does not 

support a finding that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2011) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 at 686) (emphasis and alteration in original). Petitioner has also 

failed to present any evidence to suggest that the Arizona courts’ decisions regarding his 

ineffective assistance claim regarding a motion for Brady material is contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law or based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Bell v. Cone, 

535 U.S. 685, 698–99, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1852, 152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002). Accordingly, this 

Court finds that the Arizona courts did not unreasonably apply clearly established Federal 

law or unreasonably determine the facts in light of the evidence presented, and Petitioner 

cannot meet his burden to show prejudice. See Gulbrandson, 738 F.3d at 991. Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the alleged failure to file a motion for 

Brady material is without merit.

3. Ground 2(c): Time with Petitioner

Petitioner asserts that counsel “failed to provide sufficient time to discuss defense 

strategies as this case was a capital offense[.]” Amended Petition (Doc. 10) at 9. 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 28 of 36
- 29 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Respondents assert that in his PCR petition, Petitioner raised the claim that counsel “did 

not spend enough time preparing for his complex capital case[,]” but he did not allege that 

“counsel failed to allow enough time to discuss defense strategies.” Answer (Doc. 20) at 

14. Respondents contend that due to this failure, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally 

defaulted. Id. The Court agrees with Respondents.

As discussed in Section II.B., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a 

habeas petitioner must first present all claims to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 

509, 520, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation requirement 

mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” 

in his petition. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 

(2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because 

his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a 

violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court 

decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000) (holding that petitioner failed 

to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in 

state court only on state grounds). Merely labeling a claim “federal” or making a passing 

reference to the United States Constitution does not constitute “fair presentment.” See 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 

364, 365–66 115 S. Ct. 887, 888, 130 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given 

the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely 

be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 

Constitution”). Moreover, Petitioner cannot expect the state court to read beyond the four 

corners of the petition to meet the fair presentation requirement. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 33, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion 

that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did 

not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices 

having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 29 of 36
- 30 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner 

failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim 

in state court only on state grounds).

Additionally, “[a]s a general matter, each ‘unrelated alleged instance [ ] of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness’ is a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion.” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 

F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th 

Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original). This means “all operative facts to an ineffective 

assistance claim must be presented to the state courts in order for a petitioner to exhaust 

his remedies.” Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). This is 

“[b]ecause ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, but are instead highly factdependent, [requiring] some baseline explication of the facts relating to it[.]” Id. As such, 

“a petitioner who presented any ineffective assistance of counsel claim below can[not] later 

add unrelated instances of counsel’s ineffectiveness to that claim.” Id. (citations and 

internal quotations omitted); see also Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736, 788 (D. Ariz. 

2008) (“Petitioner’s assertion of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on one 

set of facts, does not exhaust other claims of ineffective assistance based on different 

facts”). 

Here, Petitioner argued that counsel was ineffective because counsel spent only six 

(6) hours and seventeen (17) minutes with Petitioner preparing his case. Answer (Doc. 

20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-109769-001, Pet.’s Mot. to 

Extend Page Count (Exh. “K”) (Doc. 22) at 28–31. On appeal, Petitioner argued that 

counsel only spent just over six (6) hours preparing his case in the course of a year. Answer 

(Doc. 20), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 15-0142-PRPC, Pet.’s Pet. for Review (Exh. 

“R”) (Doc. 23) at 33–37. Petitioner did not assert to the state courts that counsel was 

ineffective in the time in which he discussed defense strategy to Petitioner.

As such, the claim would now be precluded and meets the technical requirements 

for exhaustion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 30 of 36
- 31 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s 

claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S. Ct. 

2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and 

the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet 

the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). 

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner 

“must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear 

and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder 

would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As 

such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S. Ct. at 2564 

(citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

4. Ground 2(d): Witness Interviews

Petitioner asserts that counsel allegedly “failed to investigate and interview 

witnesses therefore allowing petitioner to enter plea NOT knowingly & intelligently[.]” 

Amended Petition (Doc. 10) at 9. Respondents assert that Petitioner references postconviction counsel’s alleged failure to “pursue the uninterviewed witnesses or investigate 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 31 of 36
- 32 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

any of Petitioner’s PCR claims” and is a non-cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of 

PCR counsel. Amended Petition (Doc. 10) at 22. The Court disagrees with Respondents 

assertion that this claim is non-cognizable; however, finds the claim without merit.8

In his PCR petition, Petitioner alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to interview key witnesses favorable to Petitioner. Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., 

Maricopa County, Case No. CR2009-109769-001, Pet.’s Mot. to Extend Page Count (Exh. 

“K”) (Doc. 22) at 31–33. The Rule 32 court denied Petitioner’s claim because he failed to 

“show how any of the witnesses he claimed were not interviewed could have possibly 

helped his defense[,] . . . [because] all or most of these witnesses related to counts that were 

dismissed as part of the plea.” Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, 

Case No. CR2009-109769-001 DT, Minute Entry 2/3/2015 (Exh. “O”) (Doc. 22) at 165. 

Petitioner reasserted this claim to the court of appeals. Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Ct. App., 

Case No. 2 CA-CR 15-0142-PRPC, Pet.’s Pet. for Review (Exh. “R”) (Doc. 23) at 37–42. 

Upon review, the appellate court found that Petitioner’s argument regarding an alleged 

failure to investigate and/or interview witnesses was not supported by affidavits from those 

witnesses. Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 15-0142-PRPC, Mem. 

Decision 4/27/2017 (Exh. “W”) (Doc. 23) at 81.

As discussed in Section IV.B.2.a, supra, the standard requires Petitioner to show 

“that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Here, Petitioner has failed to show counsel 

acted deficiently and has not presented any evidence to suggest that the Arizona courts’ 

decisions regarding his ineffective assistance claim regarding witness interviews is

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law or 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also 

8 Because Petitioner pled guilty, his post-conviction proceeding was his only form of direct 

review. See Section I.B. n. 4, supra. As such, the Court finds Petitioner’s claim would be 

cognizable even if directed at PCR counsel; however, as asserted, the Court finds Petitioner is 

directing this claim at trial counsel.

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 32 of 36
- 33 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698–99, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1852, 152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002). 

Accordingly, this Court finds that the Arizona courts did not unreasonably apply clearly 

established Federal law or unreasonably determine the facts in light of the evidence 

presented, and Petitioner cannot meet his burden to show prejudice. See Gulbrandson, 738 

F.3d at 991. Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding the alleged 

failure to interview witnesses is without merit.

5. Ground 2(e): Integrity Files

Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective for an alleged failure “to obtain ‘law 

enforcement integrity files’ as to supress [sic] and impeach detectives fabricated claims.” 

Amended Petition (Doc. 10) at 9. Respondents assert that Petitioner only raised this claim 

before the court of appeals, and it is now procedurally defaulted. The Court agrees with 

Respondents.

As discussed in Section II.B., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a 

habeas petitioner must first present all claims to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 

509, 520, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation requirement 

mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” 

in his petition. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 

(2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because 

his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a 

violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court 

decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000) (holding that petitioner failed 

to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in 

state court only on state grounds). Merely labeling a claim “federal” or making a passing 

reference to the United States Constitution does not constitute “fair presentment.” See 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 

364, 365–66 115 S. Ct. 887, 888, 130 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given 

the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 33 of 36
- 34 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 

Constitution”). Moreover, Petitioner cannot expect the state court to read beyond the four 

corners of the petition to meet the fair presentation requirement. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 33, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion 

that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did 

not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices 

having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not 

fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner 

failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim 

in state court only on state grounds).

Additionally, “[a]s a general matter, each ‘unrelated alleged instance [ ] of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness’ is a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion.” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 

F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th 

Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original). This means “all operative facts to an ineffective 

assistance claim must be presented to the state courts in order for a petitioner to exhaust 

his remedies.” Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). This is 

“[b]ecause ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, but are instead highly factdependent, [requiring] some baseline explication of the facts relating to it[.]” Id. As such, 

“a petitioner who presented any ineffective assistance of counsel claim below can[not] later 

add unrelated instances of counsel’s ineffectiveness to that claim.” Id. (citations and 

internal quotations omitted); see also Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736, 788 (D. Ariz. 

2008) (“Petitioner’s assertion of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on one 

set of facts, does not exhaust other claims of ineffective assistance based on different 

facts”). “Whether a claim is exhausted through a direct appellate procedure, a postconviction procedure, or both, the claim should be raised at all appellate stages afforded 

under state law as of right by that procedure.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 

23.3b (4th ed. 1998)).

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 34 of 36
- 35 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, Petitioner only presented his claim regarding counsel’s alleged failure to 

obtain “integrity files” as part of his appeal of the Rule 32 petition to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. See Answer (Doc. 20), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 15-0142-PRPC, Pet.’s 

Pet. for Review (Exh. “R”) (Doc. 23). This does not constitute fair presentation. Casey, 

386 F.3d at 918. As such, the claim would now be precluded and meets the technical 

requirements for exhaustion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018); see also Baldwin v. 

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly 

present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 735 n. 1, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to 

exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present 

his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner 

“must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear 

and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder 

would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As 

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 35 of 36
- 36 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S. Ct. at 2564 

(citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

V. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner’s habeas claims are either 

procedurally defaulted or without merit and recommends the Amended Petition (Doc. 10) 

be denied.

VI. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Judge enter an order DENYING Petitioner’s Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a 

Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 10).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served 

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another party’s 

objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District Court. If 

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-18-2948-PHXJGZ.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review.

Dated this 11th day of February, 2020.

Case 2:18-cv-02948-JGZ Document 31 Filed 02/11/20 Page 36 of 36