Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01084/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01084-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONNA JEAN MAYFIELD,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:16-cv-01084-SAB

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S 

UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ATTORNEY 

FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

(ECF Nos. 22, 23)

Petitioner Young Cho (“Counsel” or “Petitioner”), attorney for Donna Jean Mayfield

(“Plaintiff”), filed the instant motion for attorney fees on February 18, 2020. (Pet’r’s Mot. Att’y 

Fees (“Mot.”), ECF No. 22.) Counsel requests fees in the net amount of $23,785.00 pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Plaintiff was served with the motion and advised that any opposition to 

the motion was to be filed within fourteen days. (Mot. 2, 14.) Plaintiff did not file an opposition 

to the request. On March 10, 2020, the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”), filed a 

statement of non-opposition in response to the motion for attorney fees, specifying the filing was 

made in a role resembling that of trustee for Plaintiff. (Def.’s Statement Non-Opposition (“Def’s 

Statement”), ECF No. 23.) For the following reasons, Petitioner’s motion for attorney fees shall 

be granted.

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Case 1:16-cv-01084-SAB Document 24 Filed 03/19/20 Page 1 of 6
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I.

BACKGROUND

On July 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed this action challenging the denial of social security 

benefits. (ECF No. 1.) On September 5, 2017, the Court granted in part Plaintiff’s social 

security appeal, remanded the case for further development of the record, and entered judgment 

in favor of Plaintiff. (ECF No. 25.) 

Following remand, on April 8, 2019, the Defendant granted Plaintiff’s application for 

benefits, and on February 10, 2020,1the Defendant issued a notice that Plaintiff was entitled to 

receive $119,140.00 in retroactive benefits. (Mot. 3; Decl. Young Cho (“Cho Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-4, 

Exs. 2-3, ECF Nos. 22 at 12; 22-2; 22-3.) The Commissioner withheld $29,785.00 from the 

past-due benefit for attorney fees. (ECF No. 22-3 at 5.) This amount equals twenty-five percent 

(25%) of the retroactive benefit award. (Id.) Petitioner has previously received payment of 

$4,000.00 in EAJA fees. (ECF No. 21; Mot. 3.) In the instant motion, Petitioner seeks an order 

awarding attorney fees in the amount of $23,785.00, and further ordering Petitioner to reimburse 

Plaintiff in the amount of $4,000.00. (Mot. 3.) Thus, the total attorney fee award, following 

reimbursement to Plaintiff, would be $23,785.00, or approximately twenty percent (20%) of the 

total $119,140.00 retroactive benefits awarded.2 (Mot. 3-4.) 

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides that when a federal court “renders a 

judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney,” the 

court may allow reasonable attorney fees “not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due 

benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” The payment of such 

award comes directly from the claimant’s benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).

The Supreme Court has explained that a district court reviews a petition for section 

 

1

 While Petitioner’s motion states the notice was issued on February 5, 2020 (Mot. 3), the notice appears to be dated 

February 10, 2020. (ECF No. 22-3 at 1.)

2

 While Petitioner states he is seeking twenty percent (20%) of the past due benefits, the Court notes that twenty 

percent (20%) of $119,140.00 is $23,828.00, not $23,785.00. 

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406(b) fees “as an independent check” to assure that the contingency fee agreements between the 

claimant and the attorney will “yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. 

Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). The district court must respect “the primacy of lawful 

attorney-client fee agreements,” and is to look first at the contingent-fee agreement, and then test 

it for reasonableness.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793). The twenty-five percent maximum fee is not an automatic 

entitlement, and courts are required to ensure that the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 

U.S. at 808–09 (“§ 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory 

ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those 

agreements”). Agreements seeking fees in excess of twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits 

awarded are not enforceable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. The attorney has the burden of 

demonstrating that the fees requested are reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807 n.17; Crawford, 

586 F.3d at 1148.

While the Supreme Court in Gisbrecht did not expressly “provide a definitive list of 

factors that should be considered in determining whether a fee is reasonable or how those factors 

should be weighed, the Court directed the lower courts to consider the ‘character of the 

representation and the results the representative achieved.’ ” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 

(quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). The Ninth Circuit has stated a court may weigh the

following factors under Gisbrecht in determining whether the fee was reasonable: (1) the 

standard of performance of the attorney in representing the claimant; (2) whether the attorney 

exhibited dilatory conduct or caused excessive delay which resulted in an undue accumulation of 

past-due benefits; and (3) whether the requested fees are excessively large in relation to the 

benefits achieved when taking into consideration the risk assumed in these cases. Crawford, 586 

F.3d at 1151-52. 

Ultimately, an award of section 406(b) fees is offset by an award of attorney fees granted 

under the EAJA. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796; Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 

1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting “the EAJA savings provision requires an attorney who 

receives a fee award under § 2412(d) of the EAJA in addition to a fee award under § 406(b) for 

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the ‘same work’ to refund to the Social Security claimant the smaller award.”). 

III.

DISCUSSION

The Court has conducted an independent check to insure the reasonableness of the 

requested fees in relation to this action. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. Here, the fee agreement 

between Plaintiff and Petitioner provides that if the “matter requires judicial review of any 

adverse decision of the Social Security Administration, the fee for successful prosecution of this 

matter is a separate 25% of the past due benefits awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable 

ALJ decision for work before the court. Attorney shall seek compensation under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act and such amount shall credit to the client for fees otherwise payable for 

court work.” (Social Security Representation Agreement, ECF No. 22-1 at 1 (emphasis in 

original).) Plaintiff has been awarded retroactive benefits in the amount of $119,140.00. (Mot. 

3; Cho Decl. ¶ 4; ECF No. 22-3.)

In determining the reasonableness of the fees requested, the Court is to apply the test 

mandated by Gisbrecht. There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted for 

substandard performance. Counsel is an experienced, competent attorney who secured a 

successful result for Plaintiff. (Cho Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 7.) Specifically, Counsel has been practicing 

Social Security law as an attorney since 1997. (Cho Decl. ¶ 7.) Although this action does 

involve backpay beginning in 2012, there is no indication that Counsel was responsible for any 

substantial delay in the court proceedings, having initiated timekeeping on June 22, 2016, and 

judgment being entered in favor of Plaintiff on September 5, 2017. (ECF Nos. 19; 22-4.)

Plaintiff agreed to a twenty-five percent (25%) fee at the outset of the representation, 

however, Petitioner is not seeking the full amount under the agreement, but rather approximately 

twenty percent (20%) of the payment in the amount of $23,785.00.3 The $23,785.00 fee is not 

excessively large in relation to the retroactive award of $119,140.00. In making this 

determination, the Court recognizes the contingent nature of this case and the risk that counsel 

 

3

 As the Court noted above, twenty percent (20%) of $119,140.00 is $23,828.00, not $23,785.00. 

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took of going uncompensated. Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003).

In support of the motion, Petitioner does not state his or the paralegal’s normal hourly 

rates, but does submit a log of the time spent in prosecuting this action. (Cho Decl. ¶ 5; Time 

Log, Ex. 4, ECF No. 22-4.) The log demonstrates that 3.9 paralegal hours were expended in this 

action and Petitioner spent 19.3 hours on this action. (Id.) Therefore, Petitioner is seeking 

$23,785.00 for 23.2 hours of paralegal and attorney time. When considering the total amount 

requested by Petitioner, the fee request translates to $1,025.22 per hour for the services provided 

in this action. 

In Crawford the Ninth Circuit found that fees of $519, $875, and $902 per hour, for time 

of both attorneys and paralegals, was not excessive. Crawford, 486 F.3d at 1153 (Clifton, J., 

concurring in part). Further, since Gisbrecht, courts note that reducing a fee request is dicey 

business and find fee awards of an effective hourly rate much higher than this to be reasonable. 

Williams v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 15-919-KK, 2018 WL 6333695, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 

2018) (awarding fee request that provides an effective hourly rate of $1,553.36 per hour); Coles 

v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 14-1488-KK, 2018 WL 3104502, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2018) 

(effective hourly rate of $1,431.94 reasonable under the circumstances); Palos v. Colvin, No. CV 

15-04261-DTB, 2016 WL 5110243, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2016) (fees sought translate to 

$1,546.39 per hour for attorney and paralegal services); see also Villa v. Astrue, No. CIVS-06-

0846 GGH, 2010 WL 118454, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2010) (“In practice, the more efficient 

counsel is in court, the higher will be the hourly fee amount represented in a § 406 fee award.”) 

The Court finds that the requested fees are reasonable when compared to the amount of 

work Petitioner performed in representing Plaintiff. Petitioner’s representation of the claimant

resulted in the action being remanded for further proceedings and ultimately, substantial benefits 

were awarded. Counsel also submitted a detailed billing statement which supports the request. 

(ECF No. 22-4.) 

The award of Section 406(b) fees is offset by any prior award of attorney fees granted 

under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. In this instance, Petitioner has 

previously been awarded $4,000.00 in EAJA fees and the award of fees under Section 406(b) 

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shall be offset in that amount. 

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the fees sought by Petitioner pursuant to 

Section 406(b) are reasonable. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the 

amount of $23,785.00 is GRANTED; 

2. Pursuant to Counsel’s request, this amount shall be paid directly to the Law 

Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing. The Commissioner is to remit to Plaintiff any 

remainder of her withheld benefits; and

3. Petitioner is ordered to refund $4,000.00 of the Section 406(b) fees awarded, to 

Plaintiff as an offset for EAJA fees previously awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2412(d).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 19, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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