Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02166/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02166-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY BRYAN BROOKS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-02-2166 MCE EFB P

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a prisoner without counsel suing for alleged civil rights violations. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on the October 2, 2003, verified second amended complaint

in which plaintiff claims that defendant Captain Kirsten Millingar was deliberately indifferent to

his need for safety and defendants Ted Yin Hui and D. Harman were deliberately indifferent to

his serious medical needs. He alleges the following: (1) defendant Millingar knew that plaintiff

was housed in a particularly violent unit and should have prevented other prisoners from

attacking plaintiff with boiling water and clubs; (2) defendant Harman knew plaintiff required

medical treatment following the attack, but placed him in administrative segregation without

medication instead of in the hospital; (3) defendant Yin Hui knew plaintiff required pain

medication and care for his swollen knee and elbow but failed to take reasonable measures to

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1

 In this motion, plaintiff alleges that defendant Millingar knew plaintiff was not so

dangerous as to warrant placing him in the unit where he was attacked, but housed him there

anyway. This ground for relief was not alleged in the complaint. Therefore, the court does not

consider it.

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provide these things. On May 12, 2006, plaintiff moved for summary judgment.1 On October

10, 2006, defendants opposed plaintiff’s motion and cross-moved for summary judgment. For

the reasons explained below, the court finds that there is no genuine issue dispute over any

material issue of fact and defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

I. Facts

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a prisoner confined at Deuel Vocational

Institution (“DVI”). Defendant Millingar was a Facility Captain, defendant Harman was a

Correctional Lieutenant and defendant Yin Hui was a physician at DVI. 

On July 23, 2002, plaintiff was housed in a unit known by prisoners and staff as “Z”

dorm. Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), at 8. The unit’s appellation referred to the high

concentration of extremely violent prisoners housed there. Declaration of Plaintiff in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Decl.”), at 6; Ex. C to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. At around

2:30 a.m., plaintiff was scalded with hot water while he slept in his “Z” dorm cell, causing him

to fall from the third-level bunk bed. Declaration of Millingar (“Millingar Decl.”), at ¶ 2. At

first, plaintiff told prison staff that he had spilled hot water on himself while making coffee. Exs.

C & D to Defs.’ Mot. He denied having enemies at DVI. Ex. C to Defs.’ Mot. The prison’s

Investigative Service Unit determined that two other prisoners, nowhere identified in the record,

put hot water on top of a locker next to plaintiff’s bunk and the water fell on plaintiff while he

slept. Millingar Decl., at ¶ 4. The motive was plaintiff’s failure to pay a drug debt. At the time,

plaintiff had no documented enemies at DVI, and to Millingar’s knowledge, plaintiff had no

undocumented enemies and never expressed any concern for his safety at DVI. Millingar Decl.,

at ¶¶ 4, 5. 

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3

As a result of this incident, plaintiff had severe burns on the back of his neck, skin

sloughing to the left chest, neck and back, a chipped front tooth, a laceration to the forehead and

injuries to his left knee and elbow. Exs. C, F, I, L to Defs.’ Mot. Prison doctors cleaned and

dressed the injuries to plaintiff’s head, back and neck and referred him to Doctor’s Hospital of

Manteca (“DHM”). Exs. F, G, I to Defs.’ Mot. Medical staff at DHM cleaned plaintiff’s

lacerations and burns, stapled the cuts, applied a topical antibiotic, and performed a CT scan of

plaintiff’s head. Ex. J to Defs.’ Mot. at unnumbered page 6. The CT scan showed no

abnormalities. Id. The aftercare instructions were to keep the wounds clean and dry and to

remove the staples within 6-8 days. Id., at unnumbered page 2. Plaintiff was discharged within

a few hours. Id., at unnumbered pages 1, 7. Defendants submit evidence that medical staff at

DHM did not recommend or even mention that plaintiff should be monitored or have medication. 

Id. Plaintiff asserts that he needed pain medication and that someone placed the “treatment

sheet from the Manteca Hospital in plaintiff’s medical history.” SAC at unnumbered page 4. 

When plaintiff returned from the hospital, medical staff examined him and determined that he

should have a one-day “lay in” and should be seen in six to eight days to remove the staples. 

The staff also referred him for a dental consultation for the chipped tooth. Ex. H to Defs.’ Mot. 

Prison officials determined that, as the victim of an attack, plaintiff posed a threat to the

safety and security of the institution. Ex. C to Defs.’ Mot.; Harman Decl., at ¶ 6. Defendant

Harman therefore directed that plaintiff be placed in administrative segregation under the

authority of Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3335(a). Ex. C to Defs.’ Mot. Prison officials sought to

protect him from additional assaults or threats, and to protect prison staff and other prisoners

from the possibility that plaintiff would seek reprisal, and to ensure the integrity of the

investigation into the attack. Harman Decl., at ¶ 6. Defendant Harman asserts that before

deciding to place plaintiff in administrative segregation, he reviewed the opinions and

recommendations of doctors at DVI and at Doctors’ Medical Hospital in order to ensure that

plaintiff did not require medical care that warranted hospitalizing him. Harman Decl., at ¶ 7.

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4

The day after the attack, plaintiff saw a dentist at the prison. Ex. K to Defs.’ Mot. Dental

staff did not note any complaints of pain. Id. They took x-rays of the broken tooth and directed

plaintiff to return for a follow-up appointment. Id. There is a notation on the dental record that

on August 27, 2002, plaintiff did not appear for his appointment. Id. 

On August 8, 2002, Dr. Hui saw plaintiff for a follow-up appointment, during which Dr.

Hui removed the staples. Ex. L to Defs.’ Mot. at unnumbered page 1. Plaintiff had a headache

and pain in his left knee and left elbow. Id. Dr. Hui noted that plaintiff had not been

experiencing vomiting, he was alert, but his left elbow and left knee were swollen. Id. Plaintiff

had slightly less than full extension in his left knee but had full range of motion. Id. Dr. Hui

noted that the burn wounds were healing with decreased skin pigmentation. Id. Dr. Yin Hui

prescribed medicine for plaintiff’s headache, ordered x-rays for plaintiff’s left knee and elbow,

and referred plaintiff to optometry for glasses. Ex. L to Defs.’ Mot. at unnumbered page 1-2. 

Dr. Hui concluded that, at that point, it did not appear that plaintiff required additional care. 

Declaration of Dr. Hui at ¶ 7. Plaintiff did not complain of excessive pain and his burns had

healed with no complications. Id. The x-rays Dr. Hui ordered showed no evidence of bone

damage to plaintiff’s left knee or elbow and the examination showed no ligament damage. Id. 

Therefore, Dr. Hui was of the opinion that plaintiff’s knee and elbow injuries were of the soft

tissue and would heal over time. Id.

On November 14, 2002, plaintiff saw a dentist for his chipped tooth. Ex. O to Defs.’

Mot. at unnumbered page 1. The dental record shows that staff determined that the chipped

tooth was “asymptomatic.” Id. Palpation of the gingiva and probing of the tooth produced no

“pain or discomfort,” or “sensitivity.” Id. Plaintiff refused to have the chipped tooth extracted. 

Ex. O to Defs.’ Mot. at unnumbered page 2.

On January 28, 2003, plaintiff was examined by a medical technical assistant before

transfer to the administrative segregation unit in a different prison. Ex. M to Defs.’ Mot. at

unnumbered page 1. Plaintiff denied having medical problems. Id. 

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2

 On October 5, 2004, the court informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).2 The standards under Rule 56 to determine whether there is a

“genuine issue of material fact” are well established:

[T]he Supreme Court, by clarifying what the non-moving party

must do to withstand a motion for summary judgment, has

increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the Court has

made clear that if the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and that party

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of

fact with respect to the existence of that element, then summary

judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary judgment,

the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine factual

issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). There can be no genuine issue as to any

material fact where there is a complete failure of proof as to an essential element of the

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nonmoving party's case because all other facts are thereby rendered immaterial. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. 

With these standards in mind, it is important to note that plaintiff bears the burden of

proof at trial over the issue raised on this motion, i.e., whether the defendant acted with

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s safety. Equally important is that “deliberate

indifference” is an essential element of plaintiff’s cause of action. Therefore, to withstand

defendant’s motion, plaintiff may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. He

must demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1142

(9th Cir. 1989). He must rely on evidence based upon which a fair-minded jury "could return a

verdict for [him] on the evidence presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248,

252.

"As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248. Here, plaintiff’s action arises

under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment. To prevail at trial, he must prove that

the defendant deprived him of his Eighth Amendment rights while acting under color of state

law. Plaintiff has the initial burden of showing by a preponderance of competent evidence that

the defendants knew of plaintiff’s serious medical needs but failed to take reasonable measures

to treat it. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 106 (1976). But defendants have the burden of proving that they were unaware of the risk, or

if they knew of it, that they responded reasonably even if the harm nevertheless occurred. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. As discussed below, the evidence fails to demonstrate a genuine

dispute about whether defendant Millingar was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s need for

safety or that defendants Yin Hui or Harman were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious

medical needs.

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7

III. Analysis

Plaintiff claims that defendant Millingar was deliberately indifferent to his safety by

failing to prevent the hot water attack and that defendants Yin Hui and Harman were deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs resulting from the attack. He faults defendant Millingar

for not preventing five men from entering his cell with clubs and a pot of boiling water. Pl.’s

Mot. for Summ. J. at 1. He faults defendant Harman for placing him in administrative

segregation without medication instead of in the hospital, where necessary care was available. 

Id. at 3. Finally, he faults Yin Hui for failing to provide adequate pain medication and treatment

for a crushed knee, elbow, face plate and chipped tooth. Id. at 3-4. All defendants assert that

plaintiff has not adduced evidence that would prove the allegations against them. Defendant

Millingar asserts that plaintiff cannot prove that she knew plaintiff was at risk of attack by other

prisoners. Defendant Yin Hui asserts that plaintiff cannot prove that he failed to take reasonable

measures to treat plaintiff’s injuries. Defendant Harman asserts that plaintiff cannot show that it

was unreasonable in light of plaintiff’s injuries, to place him in administrative segregation

following the attack. 

A. Safety Concerns

Plaintiff alleges that Millingar obviously failed to protect him because “the attack was

less than 30 feet from the catwalk with the armed guard who claimed not to see the 5 big black

guys carrying prison made clubs and a pot of boiled water attack plaintiff while he slept on the

top rack of a triple bunk . . . .” Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 2. 

The Eighth Amendment requires that the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, even if

harsh, have some legitimate penological purpose. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 584

(1984); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). It is important to bear in mind that,

“having incarcerated persons with demonstrated proclivities for antisocial criminal, and often

violent, conduct,” and “having stripped them of virtually every means of self-protection and

foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state

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of nature take its course.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Simply stated, the

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments imposes on prison officials

“a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. at 833. Prison

officials violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments if they are deliberately

indifferent to a substantial risk of harm at the hands of other prisoners. Id. at 837. To be

deliberately indifferent, a prison official must know of, or infer from the circumstances, a

substantial risk of harm, yet fail to take reasonable actions to mitigate or eliminate that risk. Id.

at 837.

Plaintiff has submitted the declarations of three prisoners showing that “Z” dorm is

known as the “zoo” because most of the prisoners housed there are very difficult to control. But

he has not submitted any evidence that defendant Milligard knew that plaintiff himself was at

substantial risk of an attack and failed to take reasonable measures to protect him. Milligard has

submitted evidence that plaintiff had no documented enemies and she did not know of any

undocumented enemies. Plaintiff at first claimed that he spilled hot water on himself, suggesting

that he wanted to conceal from prison officials whatever risk of harm in fact existed. It was

prison officials’ decision to investigate the matter that resulted in the formal determination that

plaintiff was in fact attacked and that the motive was plaintiff’s failure to pay a drug debt. 

Plaintiff submits no evidence that Milligard knew plaintiff owed money to other prisoners for

any reason, much less for contraband. Nor does he submit evidence that Milligard failed to take

reasonable security measures given the concentration of extremely violent prisoners in that unit. 

Furthermore, the attack occurred at 2:30 a.m., when prisoners presumably were locked in their

cells, an inherently secure situation as long as prisoners are compatibly housed. Neither party

submits evidence concerning the identity of the prisoners who put the water near plaintiff’s

bunk. Plaintiff alleges that his attackers entered his cell during the night. Absent a serious

security breach, this is an unlikely turn of events. There is no evidence that plaintiff’s cell was

not properly secured or that if it was, these prisoners were able to circumvent that security.

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There is simply no evidence on which a reasonable jury could conclude that Milligard

knew that plaintiff was any more likely to be subject to an attack than other prisoners with no

known enemies. Therefore, defendant Milligard is entitled to summary judgment. 

B. Medical Concerns

Plaintiff asserts that Harman placed plaintiff into administrative segregation without

providing plaintiff his prescribed medication and that he repeatedly requested pain medication

while in administrative segregation, but Harman ignored the requests. With respect to defendant

Dr. Yin Hui, plaintiff alleges that on August 8, 2002, this defendant violated plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment rights, 

by inadequate medical care in that Dr. Ted Yin-Hui had in his power the

individual responsibility for obtaining or providing medical care that Yin-Hui

knew this plaintiff needed to eliminate substantial risk of serious harm, but

deliberately disregarded the risk by failing to take reasonable measures resulting

in avoidable persistent sever pain or avoidable substantial personal injury.”

SAC at unnumbered page 5. Plaintiff also asserts that as a result of the chip, he suffered severe

pain because a root was exposed and defendant Yin Hui ignored his pain. SAC at unnumbered

page 5. 

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they engage in “acts or omissions

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A prison official is deliberately indifferent when he knows of

and disregards a risk of injury or harm that “is not one that today’s society chooses to tolerate.” 

See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

The official must “be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. 

 Deliberate indifference “may be manifested in two ways. It may appear when prison

officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the

way in which prison physicians provide medical care." Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d

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3

 It is worth noting here that the court found that plaintiff exhausted these claims not

because he pursued his grievance to the Director’s Level of Review, but because plaintiff

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390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). When prison medical personnel act based on “a medical judgment that

either of two alternative courses of treatment would be medically acceptable under the

circumstances, plaintiff has failed to show deliberate indifference, as a matter of law.” Jackson

v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1996). Prison officials provide constitutionally

inadequate care when they know that a particular course of treatment is ineffective, but they do

not alter it in an attempt to improve treatment. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1097-1098

(9th Cir. 2006).

With respect to plaintiff’s claims against Harman, it is undisputed that Harman is not a

doctor and that he decided to place plaintiff into administrative segregation. Harman submits

evidence that he based his decision on the need to minimize the risk that this incident could lead

to other attacks against prisoners and staff. Plaintiff submits no evidence to the contrary. Even

if, for purposes of Harman’s motion, the court draws the inference that defendant Harman was

responsible for ensuring that plaintiff received medication immediately upon being placed in

administrative segregation, this does not help plaintiff. Defendants submit evidence that the

discharge orders from DHM included no recommendation of medication. Plaintiff has not

submitted any prison records showing that he should have received medication, but he alleges

that someone placed the “treatment sheet from the Manteca Hospital in plaintiff’s medical

history.” SAC, Continuations Sheet, first unnumbered page. There is no evidence that

defendant Harman misplaced the sheet or that he knew someone else did but failed to take

reasonable measures to find it. In support of his assertion that defendant Harman ignored his

complaints of severe pain, plaintiff submits copies of grievance forms dated July 26, 2002, and

August 6, 2002, complaining of severe pain and requesting medication for it. But the forms do

not have a log number or any other marking showing that plaintiff submitted it to prison

officials.3

 Even if he did, as he testified in his sworn declaration in support of his motion for

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26 attempted to file grievances and prison staff ignored them. See Findings and Recommendations

filed January 11, 2005; Order filed February 15, 2005.

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summary judgment, there is no evidence that defendant Harman knew of plaintiff’s complaints

but ignored them. There is no evidence on which a reasonable jury could rely to conclude that

defendant Harman was aware of but deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs. 

Therefore, defendant Harman is entitled to summary judgment.

Plaintiff’s claim against Yin Hui, liberally construed, alleges that defendant Yin Hui

knew of the grievances plaintiff asserts he submitted, yet failed to take reasonable measures to

alleviate plaintiff’s pain. The evidence fails to demonstrate a genuine dispute over this claim. 

For the same reason the court cannot find a genuine dispute that Harman knew of the grievances,

the court cannot find a genuine dispute that defendant Yin Hui knew of them. Even if, for

purposes of defendant Yin Hui’s motion, the court infers that plaintiff was in excruciating pain

and requested treatment therefor, there is no evidence that defendant Yin Hui knew plaintiff was

not receiving pain medication until August 3, 2002, when, as plaintiff alleges, he prescribed such

medication.

With respect to plaintiff’s chipped tooth, it is undisputed that plaintiff saw a dentist the

day after the attack. Defendant Yin Hui has submitted evidence that plaintiff had a dental

examination, including an x-ray of the chipped tooth on July 24, 2002, and that although a

follow-up appointment was scheduled, plaintiff did not appear. There is no documentary

evidence showing that plaintiff refused to leave his cell for this appointment. It therefore is

reasonable to infer, for purposes of defendants’ motion, that officers in administrative

segregation refused to escort plaintiff to this appointment. But this does not help plaintiff

because there is no evidence that defendant Yin Hui knew this but failed to take reasonable

measures to have plaintiff escorted. Furthermore, when plaintiff did appear for a dental

appointment, dental staff palpated and probed the tooth and surrounding tissue and found no

sensitivity. They offered to extract the chipped tooth, but plaintiff refused. On these facts, no

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reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff suffered severe pain from the chipped tooth and that

defendant Yin Hui knew this, yet failed to take reasonable measures to ensure that plaintiff

received care for it. Therefore, defendant Yin Hui is entitled to summary judgment.

For all these reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s May 12, 2006, motion for summary judgment be denied;

2. The October 10, 2006, cross-motion for summary judgment by Millingar, Harman and

Hin Yui be granted and that judgment be entered in their favor.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 21, 2007.

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