Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05365/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05365-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Juan Hernandez, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

City of Phoenix, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-05365-PHX-MTL

ORDER 

This action was initiated by two plaintiffs, Sergeant Juan Hernandez of the Phoenix 

Police Department (the “Department”) and the Arizona Conference of Police and Sheriffs 

(“AZCOPS”), which is a group “dedicated to fair representation of law enforcement 

officers located around the State of Arizona.” (Doc. 1 at 3). Plaintiff Hernandez is one of 

the hundreds of Phoenix police officers who are AZCOPS members. (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 12 

at 2). Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for a Preliminary 

Injunction. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction against the City of Phoenix, Chief of 

Police Jeri Williams, and Commander Shane Disotell to prohibit potential disciplinary 

action under the Department’s Social Media Policy. Plaintiffs’ request a preliminary 

injunction based on prospective discipline of Plaintiff Hernandez for his previous social 

media posts which Plaintiffs claim would be a violation of his free speech rights and to 

enjoin enforcement of the Department’s Social Media Policy based on the claim that the 

threat of discipline has chilled employee speech as it relates to commenting on matters of 

public concern in violation of their free speech rights. 

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Factual Background

This factual recitation derives from the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the parties’ written 

submissions on the Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and the evidentiary 

hearing held on November 19, 2019 (argument only was continued on November 22,

2019). The City of Phoenix and the Department have adopted various rules and policies

concerning employee conduct that takes place outside of work hours. These polices can be 

found in the Phoenix Police Departments’ Operations Orders Manual and in the City of 

Phoenix’s Administrative Regulations that are applicable to all city employees. Particularly 

relevant to this case are the Department’s Social Media Policy, which was adopted in 

August 2013 and can be found in Operations Order 3.27, and the Department’s Purpose 

Statement and Guiding Values, which are in Operations Order 1.1.

On or about June 1, 2019, a group known as the Plain View Project publicized 

several Facebook social media posts made by various law enforcement officers. The posts 

of a number of officers in the Department, including Plaintiff Hernandez were publicized. 

(Doc. 1 at 3-5). While the Plain View Project republished 11 of Plaintiff Hernandez’s posts, 

the Department only seeks to potentially discipline him for four posts:

(1) September 30, 2013: A meme1 with what appears to be mugshots of men of 

Middle Eastern descent and containing the text “THE MOST COMMON 

NAME FOR A CONVICTED GANG RAPIST IN ENGLAND IS . . . 

Muhammad Note to the British media – these gangs are not comprised of 

‘Asians’; they are Muslims.” [Doc. 1-2, Exhibit 4];

(2) October 8, 2013: A meme entitled “You just got to love the Brits” recounting a 

story in which a Muslim taxi passenger asked the driver to turn off the music in 

the car for religious reasons, to which the driver responded “[i]n the time of the 

 

1

“A meme is ‘an idea, behavior, style, or usage that spreads from person to person 

within a culture.’ Meme, Merriam–Webster Online Dictionary (available at 

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meme) (last accessed November 6, 2015).” 

Braham v. Sony/ATV Music Publ'g, No. 215CV8422MWFGJSX, 2015 WL 7074571, at 

*4, n.4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2015).

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prophet, there were no taxis, so piss-off and wait for a camel!” [Doc. 1-2, Exhibit 

5];

(3) December 24, 2013: A meme entitled “RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO 

SCIENCE BY ISLAM” in which Muslim scholars and theologians expressed 

controversial opinions regarding female drivers, DNA testing in rape cases, the 

Earth revolving around the Sun, and the link between dressing modestly and 

earthquakes. [Doc. 1-2, Exhibit 6]; and 

(4) January 9, 2014: Article entitled “Military Pensions Cut, Muslim Mortgages 

Paid by US!” [Doc. 1-2, Exhibit 10].

The Department’s Professional Services Bureau (the “PSB”) investigates violations 

of Department policies, including the Department’s Social Media Policy. Commander 

Disotell leads PSB; however, at the time Plaintiffs filed this suit, he was on temporary 

assignment outside of Arizona. In his absence, Lieutenant Matthew Siekmann is in charge 

of PSB. On June 3, 2019, PSB opened an investigation into the Department officers whose 

posts appeared on the Plain View Project website. PSB investigators interviewed Plaintiff

Hernandez on June 20, 2019. They questioned him regarding the four posts described 

herein. When asked about his motivation for his posts, Plaintiff Hernandez told 

investigators that he wanted to foster discussion about issues including assimilation and 

veteran benefits. 

On October 9, 2019, Commander Disotell issued a report to Chief Williams 

concerning Plaintiff Hernandez’s Facebook posts. The report concluded that certain of 

Plaintiff Hernandez’s Facebook posts violated both the Social Media Policy and the 

Department’s Purpose Statement and Guiding Values. (Doc. 17 at 3). Specifically, the 

PSB report found infractions with respect to the following Social Media Policy provision:

Department personnel are free to express themselves as private citizens on 

social media sites to the degree that their speech does not impair working 

relationships of this Department, are detrimental to the mission and functions 

of the Department, that [sic] undermine respect or public confidence in the 

Department, cause embarrassment to the Department or the City, discredit 

the Department or City, or undermine the goals and mission of the 

Department or City. 

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Operations Order 3.27.9.B.(6), (New 08/13). (Doc. 1-2 at 78).

The PSB report also concluded that Plaintiff Hernandez’s posts violated the 

following provision of the Department’s Guiding Values: “Responsibility and Respect: We 

respect and honor the inherent dignity of all people, including ourselves, and pledge fair 

and equal treatment for all.” Operations Order 1.1.2.B.(3). (Doc. 1-2 at 79).

The report also concluded that Plaintiff Hernandez’s posts “could potentially spread 

fear and hatred towards people of Middle Eastern descent, as well as those practicing the 

Muslim faith. In addition [the posts] potentially reduced or contributed to the erosion of 

public trust. . . .” (Ex. 104 at 0028 (admitted into evidence November 19, 2019 (Doc. 31)). 

The report noted that the job description of a Phoenix police sergeant requires integrity, 

knowledge of social problems, and cultural diversity. (Id.). Moreover, the report says that 

testifying in court, as is sometimes required for police sergeants, is more complicated after 

an officer demonstrates bias. (Id.). Overall, the report concludes, the posts for which 

Plaintiff Hernandez is under investigation “do not align with the distinguishing features, 

essential functions and required knowledge as outlined in the City of Phoenix classification 

for a Police Sergeant.” (Id.). The report said that the type of policy violation at issue 

requires a “referral to the [Disciplinary Review Board] for a possible demotion and/or 40, 

80, or 240 hours suspension, or termination or referral to the Police Chief (or designee) for 

a. . .[h]earing.” (Id. at 0029).

The Department’s Disciplinary Review Board consists of an assistant chief, 

commanders, peers and civilians. (Doc. 1 at 8). It was set to meet on October 15, 2019 to 

consider disciplinary action against Plaintiff Hernandez. (Id.). Five days before that 

hearing, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this Court. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs attached Operations 

Order 3.27 to the Complaint; Operations Order 3.27 is the six-page Social Media Policy.

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Social Media Policy is unconstitutional on its 

face because it is overbroad, chills protected speech involving matters of public concern, 

and is impermissibly vague because there is no discernable standard for enforcement and 

Defendants enforce the policy arbitrarily. (Doc. 1 at 9-10). In the Amended Motion for

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Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff Hernandez specifically alleges that Defendants seek to 

discipline him for speaking on matters of public concern without appropriate justification. 

(Doc. 20 at 2-6). He thus argues that the Social Media Policy is unconstitutional as applied 

to him. 

Also alleged in the Complaint, but not before the Court in the Amended Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff Hernandez alleges that Chief Williams and Commander 

Disotell intentionally or recklessly allowed an investigation and proposed disciplinary 

action against him in violation of both the First Amendment and its Arizona counterpart. 

Plaintiff Hernandez alleges that Chief Williams and Commander Disotell negligently 

allowed the PSB investigation against him. Lastly, both Plaintiffs allege that the City of 

Phoenix and Chief Williams failed to train Commander Disotell in constitutionally 

permissible means of conducting internal investigations. 

Defendants agreed to postpone disciplinary action against Sgt. Hernandez pending 

the resolution of the Motion before the Court. (Doc. 11). After an initial hearing, Plaintiffs 

filed a Notice of Change In Factual Circumstances. (Doc. 16). This document alleges that 

Chief Williams announced that she would discipline officers for violating the Social Media 

Policy, taking the form of everything from written warnings to a termination. The Notice 

did not specify whether any of the officers Chief Williams was referring to were AZCOPS 

members, but Plaintiffs said that the announcement evidenced the chilling effect of the 

Social Media Policy. (Id.).

B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint along with a request for both a temporary restraining 

order and preliminary injunction on October 10, 2019. (Docs. 1 and 2). In asking the Court 

to enjoin enforcement of the Social Media Policy, Plaintiffs argue that the policy is facially 

overbroad, vague and subject to arbitrary enforcement. (Doc. 12 at 6-8, 10; Doc. 20 at 11).

Plaintiffs seemingly argue that disciplining Plaintiff Hernandez would be retaliation for 

Plaintiff Hernandez exercising his First Amendment rights and would send a chilling effect, 

causing members of AZCOPS to self-censor for fear of being disciplined themselves. (See 

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Doc. 20 at 2). This Court held a hearing the day after Plaintiffs filed the Complaint. (Doc. 

11). Because Defendants agreed to postpone Plaintiff Hernandez’s disciplinary hearing 

pending the resolution of the preliminary injunction motion, (id.), the request for a 

temporary restraining order became moot. Plaintiffs later filed an Amended Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 12). Defendants responded (Doc. 17). Plaintiffs filed a reply 

(Doc. 20). This Court held hearings on this matter on November 19 and November 22, 

2019.

II. ANALYSIS

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that a court never issues as a 

matter of right. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 

that the balance of equities tips in his favor and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Id. at 20. In the Ninth Circuit, a showing that there are “serious questions going to the 

merits and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of 

an injunction, assuming that the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.” 

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011). 

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

1. Governing law

Plaintiffs frame their request for a preliminary injunction as follows: “...the 

question presented is whether the Phoenix Police Department’s Social Media Policy 

violates the First Amendment rights of Phoenix Police Department employees.” (Doc. 12 

at 7-8). The Social Media Policy to which Plaintiffs refer is six-single-spaced pages. (Doc. 

1-2 at 6-11). At no point do Plaintiffs specify exactly which portion(s) of the Social Media 

Policy allegedly violates their First Amendment rights such that an injunction would be 

justified.

Instead, Plaintiffs give only one example in their motion of how a particular portion 

of the Social Media Policy might justify an injunction. In that example, Plaintiffs state, 

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“Specifically, the plain language of the PD Policy – ‘Employees are prohibited from using 

social media in a manner that would cause embarrassment to or discredit the Department 

in any way’ – does not limit its scope to prohibit actions taken in furtherance of department 

duties. [citation omitted]. Accordingly, this Court should find that the PD Policy reaches 

beyond the scope of Plaintiff Hernandez’s and police officers’ official duties.” (Doc. 12 at 

8-9). This language is one portion of Operations Order 3.27.9.B.(6). Again, Plaintiffs do 

not specify if this identified language alone forms the basis for their request for injunction. 

Nonetheless, it is the only language identified by Plaintiffs as potentially justifying their 

injunction.

As indicated above, the Court knows from the PSB report which portion of the 

Social Media Policy forms the underlying basis for Plaintiff Hernandez’s prospective 

disciplinary proceeding. (See Ex. 104). However, to the extent that Plaintiff AZCOPS 

purports to be in a different position than Plaintiff Hernandez or to be making a different 

argument than Plaintiff Hernandez, at no point does Plaintiffs’ counsel delineate between 

these two Plaintiffs and their different factual postures. 

Thus, on this record, it will be very difficult for AZCOPS to establish it is likely to 

succeed on the merits independent of Plaintiff Hernandez because Plaintiffs have made no 

arguments specific to this entity or its members. In other words, all of the factual arguments 

in the motion appear to be tied to Plaintiff Hernandez’s discipline; thus, as the record 

stands, AZCOPS is limited by the arguments both Plaintiffs have jointly advanced on 

behalf of Plaintiff Hernandez.

To succeed on the merits, or to show serious questions going to the merits, Plaintiffs 

must prevail under the Pickering (and its progeny) test. See generally Pickering v. Board 

of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). As discussed more fully below, Pickering (and its 

progeny) set forth the test for when the government may constitutionally regulate an 

employee’s speech. In other words, in the context of an employment relationship with the 

government, Pickering (and its progeny) are the only avenue by which Plaintiffs may 

prevail. A unique test is required for employees (as opposed to private citizens) because, 

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as the Supreme Court has stated, “[i]n Pickering and a number of other cases we have 

recognized that [the government] may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public 

employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.” United 

States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995) (“NTEU”). Similarly, 

the Supreme Court has stated, “surely a public employer may, consistently with the First 

Amendment, prohibit its employees from being ‘rude to customers,’ a standard almost 

certainly too vague when applied to the public at large.” Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 

661, 673 (1994) (plurality); cf. Drake v. Covington Cty. Bd. of Ed., 371 F. Supp. 974, 976

and n.4 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (holding under Pickering that if the Government prevails under 

a Pickering analysis, the Court need not reach a facial challenge. (“Drake claims the 

immorality provision of this section, which provided the statutory basis for her dismissal, 

is void for vagueness. She attacks the constitutionality of the statute both on its face and as 

applied to her. Following the example of the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of 

Education, 391 U.S. 563, we consider first her challenge to the statute as applied. We then 

find it unnecessary to reach her challenge to the statute on its face.”)).

In this case, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ briefing discusses the Pickering test as 

it relates to Plaintiff Hernandez, but also cites many cases that discuss the 

unconstitutionality of statutes for being too vague or overly broad as applied to private 

citizens and not in the employment context. The Court finds cases outside the employment 

context to be inapposite to this case. Plaintiffs appear to have arrived at the same 

conclusion as the Court regarding the governing law, as Plaintiffs’ reply discusses only 

Pickering and its progeny and does not re-advance any vagueness or overbreadth 

arguments. (See Doc. 20; see also Doc. 35 at 44-45 (Plaintiff’s counsel stating that 

Pickering and modified Pickering are the controlling test)).

2. Plaintiff Hernandez — Pickering and Eng (First Amendment 

Retaliation)

Defendants seek to hold a disciplinary hearing against Plaintiff Hernandez based on 

both the Social Media Policy (Ex. 104 at 0021, 0027) and based on Operations Order 

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1.1.2.B.(3) (Ex. 104 at 0029). For Plaintiff Hernandez to obtain an injunction to prevent 

this disciplinary hearing, he must make the showing summarized in Eng. Eng stated, 

It is well settled that the state may not abuse its position as employer to stifle 

“the First Amendment rights [its employees] would otherwise enjoy as 

citizens to comment on matters of public interest.” Pickering v. Bd. of 

Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Acknowledging the limits on the state’s ability 

to silence its employees, the Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he 

problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the 

[public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 

concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 

efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Id.

In the forty years since Pickering, First Amendment retaliation law has

evolved dramatically, if sometimes inconsistently. Unraveling Pickering’s

tangled history reveals a sequential five-step series of questions: (1) whether 

the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the plaintiff 

spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff’s 

protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse 

employment action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for 

treating the employee differently from other members of the general public; 

and (5) whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action 

even absent the protected speech. 

Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009).

“Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the speech addressed an issue of public 

concern.” Id. At the preliminary injunction hearing, the parties agreed that three of the 

questions were satisfied: whether Plaintiff spoke as a citizen rather than a public employee

(question 2), whether the speech at issue was a substantial or motivating factor in the 

proposed discipline (question 3), and whether the proposed discipline would not have 

occurred but-for the speech (question 5). (Doc. 26 at 7-10). Thus, in dispute is whether 

Plaintiff Hernandez spoke on a matter of public concern and whether Defendants’ interests 

in the proper functioning of the Department outweigh Plaintiff’s right to speak and the 

public’s right to hear that speech. 

a. Public Concern (question 1)

For the First Amendment’s protections to potentially apply, the speech must involve 

a matter of public concern. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. The Supreme Court and the 

Ninth Circuit have both declined to explicitly define “public concern,” noting that the test 

“is not an exact science” and “rigid multi-part tests” would be inappropriate. See 

Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations 

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and quotation marks omitted); see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004)

(per curiam) (“the boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined. . .”). That 

said, internal employee grievances usually do not qualify as a matter of public concern. 

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983). However, speech that helps citizens make 

informed decisions about government operations is very likely to be a matter of public 

concern. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Eng, 552 

F.3d at 1072-1073.

Courts look to the “content, form and context of a given statement, as revealed by 

the whole record” to discern when speech is a matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 

U.S. at 147-48. Of these factors, content is “the greatest single factor.” Desrochers, 572 

F.3d at 710. 

i. Content

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that for speech 

[t]o address a matter of public concern, the content of the [] speech must 

involve “issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable 

the members of society to make informed decisions about the operation of 

their government.” McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted); see also Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir.

1989) (describing “matter[s] of political, social, or other concern to the 

community” as matters of public concern). “On the other hand, speech that 

deals with ‘individual personnel disputes and grievances’ and that would be 

of ‘no relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of 

governmental agencies’ is generally not of ‘public concern.’” See Coszalter 

v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting McKinley, 705 

F.2d at 1114); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (stating that speech limited 

to “an employee grievance concerning internal office policy” is unprotected). 

The same is true of “speech that relates to internal power struggles within the 

workplace,” and speech which is of no interest “beyond the employee’s 

bureaucratic niche.” Tucker v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Desrochers, 572 F.3d at 710 (footnote omitted).

As recounted above, the posts for which Plaintiff Hernandez is potentially subject 

to discipline are his September 30, 2013 post which said the most common name for a 

convicted gang rapist in England is Mohammad; his October 8, 2013 meme post which 

recounts the story of a Muslim man being kicked out of a taxi after asking the taxi driver 

to turn off the music in the car as a religious accommodation; his December 24, 2013 post 

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which listed controversial opinions by Muslim scholars and theologians; and his December 

9, 2014 posting of an article entitled “Military Pensions Cut, Muslim Mortgages Paid by 

US!”

Plaintiff Hernandez casts his posts as being about issues of assimilation, federal 

spending and media coverage. (Doc. 12 at 10). However, the Court is not required to accept 

Plaintiff’s characterization of his posts. See Desrochers, 572 F.3d at 711 (“...the plain 

language of the grievances differs from the sergeants’ post hoc characterizations. We look 

to what the employees actually said, not what they say they said after the fact.”).

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has 

...defined the “scope of the public concern element . . . broadly,” Ulrich v. 

City & County of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 978 (9th Cir. 2002), and adopted a 

“liberal construction of what an issue ‘of public concern’ is under the First 

Amendment,” Roe v. City & County of S.F., 109 F.3d 578, 586 (9th Cir.

1997). But there are limits. “In a close case, when the subject matter of a 

statement is only marginally related to issues of public concern, the fact that 

it was made because of a grudge or other private interest or to co-workers 

rather than to the press may lead the court to conclude that the statement does 

not substantially involve a matter of public concern.” Johnson, 48 F.3d at 

425; see also Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 925 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (quoting the “close case” language of Johnson, but deciding that 

“[t]his is . . . not a close case”); Roe, 109 F.3d at 586 (applying the “close 

case” language of Johnson). 

Desrochers, 572 F.3d at 709–10. Further, the Supreme Court has cautioned that, “[t]he 

inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question [of] 

whether it deals with a matter of public concern.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 

(1987).

Here, Plaintiff Hernandez’s posts “did nothing to inform the public about any aspect 

of [his employer’s] functioning or operation.” Roe, 543 U.S. at 84. Thus, the content is 

not clearly a matter of public concern. At best, using Plaintiff’s characterization of the 

posts, coupled with the Ninth Circuit’s liberal construction policy, the posts are a “close 

call” as to whether they are matters of public concern. However, the Court can consider 

the true content of the posts, rather than Plaintiff’s characterization. Considering the actual 

content of the posts, the Court finds the subject matter to, again at best, be only marginally 

related to matters of public concern. Looking at the true content, the Court finds that the 

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posts are more properly seen as relating to a personal grudge or other private interest. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the content of the posts weighs against finding them to 

be on a matter of public concern.

ii. Context

“To aid us in ascertaining when speech . . . rises to a level of public concern, 

we examine the context of the speech, particularly the point of the speech.” 

Roth, 856 F.2d at 1405; see also Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 866 (“An employee’s 

motivation [is] relevant to the public-concern inquiry.”). In other words, why 

did the employee speak (as best as we can tell)? Does the speech “seek to 

bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust,” or is 

it animated instead by “dissatisfaction” with one’s employment situation? 

Connick, 461 U.S. at 148; Roth, 856 F.2d at 1405. The question of whether 

the speech was made to “further some purely private interest” is relevant to 

that inquiry, Havekost, 925 F.2d at 318, as is a determination of whether the 

speech was made in the context of a workplace “power struggle,” Tucker, 97 

F.3d at 1210 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Desrochers, 572 F.3d at 715.

In this case, Plaintiff Hernandez’s posts do not attempt to “bring to light” 

wrongdoing or breach of trust by the government. Indeed, several of the posts relate to 

other countries, not Plaintiff Hernandez’s local or national government. Further, the posts 

seem to further a purely private interest. On these facts, the Court finds that the context of 

Plaintiff Hernandez’s posts weigh against them being on matters of public concern.

iii. Form

Whether the speech is made internally, to a limited audience, or publicly all factor 

into determining whether the form of the speech weighs in favor of the speech being of 

public concern. Derochers, 572 F.3d at 714-715. For example, “[p]ublic speech is more 

likely to serve the public values of the First Amendment. Private speech motivated by an 

office grievance is less likely to convey the information that is a prerequisite for an 

informed electorate.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, “a limited 

audience weighs against a claim of protected speech.” Id. at 714 (alterations omitted).

Facebook is a platform that allows users to communicate around the world. See 

generally United States v. Browne, 834 F.3d 403, 405 (3rd Cir. 2016). It is a two-way form 

of communication, meaning that those who view posts can express their views as well. See 

generally id at 406. Politicians sometimes use Facebook to let others in the community 

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know about topics of interest. See Graziosi v. City of Greenville, Miss., 775 F.3d 731, 739 

(5th Cir. 2015). Here, Plaintiff Hernandez’s posts were set to public. (Doc. 26 at 64-65). 

Because Plaintiff Hernandez’s posts were made publicly, through Facebook, the form 

weighs in favor of finding that the posts were matters of public concern. 

iv. Public Concern Conclusion

Although the form of Plaintiff Hernandez’s communications weigh in favor of them 

being of public concern, the most important factor—content—does not. Further, the 

context of the posts also weighs against the posts being matters of public concern. 

Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff Hernandez’s speech was not on a matter of public 

concern.

b. Government Justification (question 4) as to Plaintiff 

Hernandez

Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiff Hernandez did not speak on a matter 

of public concern, Plaintiff Hernandez is not entitled to the Pickering balancing. Roe, 543 

U.S. at 82-83 (“a threshold inquiry (implicit in Pickering itself) [is] that in order to merit 

Pickering balancing, a public employee’s speech must touch on a matter of ‘public 

concern.’”). However, because whether the content of the posts should weigh in favor of 

the posts being on matters of public concern is a very close question,2the Court will 

 

2

 Specifically, some courts have implied that speaking about race is always a matter 

of public concern. See generally Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 926–

27 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Disputes over racial, religious, or other such discrimination by public 

officials are not simply individual personnel matters. They involve the type of 

governmental conduct that affects the societal interest as a whole—conduct in which the 

public has a deep and abiding interest. Litigation seeking to expose such wrongful 

governmental activity is, by its very nature, a matter of public concern.”); Connick, 461 

U.S. at 148, n.8 (“Mrs. Givhan’s right to protest racial discrimination—a matter inherently 

of public concern—is not forfeited by her choice of a private forum.” (citation omitted)). 

However, in both of these examples, the speaker was opposing or exposing discrimination. 

The Court does not interpret these cases as being a blanket ruling that all racist 

speech is per se a matter of public concern merely because such speech mentions race. 

Instead the speech in this case is more accurately characterized as advancing a personal 

grudge or private interest—as the Court has concluded above. Nonetheless, the view point 

of the speech cannot form the basis of determining whether the content is a matter of public 

concern. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387. As a result, it is a close call as to whether such 

speech is merely advancing a private grudge against a large group of people or speaking 

on a matter of public concern because it impacts a large group of people, albeit in a very 

negative way. Again, the Court has concluded that, when looking at the true content of the 

speech, the speech in this case merely advances a private grudge; however, acknowledging 

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alternatively consider the Pickering balancing test to determine whether Plaintiff 

Hernandez has shown a likelihood of success on the merits or serious questions going to 

the merits. 

As discussed above, under Pickering this Court must, “arrive at a balance between 

the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 

concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 

public services it performs through its employees.” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1070.

“In conducting [the Pickering] balancing, courts must give government 

employers ‘wide discretion and control over the management of [their] 

personnel and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove 

employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with 

dispatch.’” [citation omitted]. 

...

In balancing the competing interests, this court has considered a host of 

factors. We have inquired whether the speech (1) impaired discipline or 

control by superiors; (2) disrupted co-worker relations; (3) eroded a close 

working relationship premised on personal loyalty and confidentiality; (4) 

interfered with the speaker’s performance of his or her duties; or (5) 

obstructed routine office operations. [citation omitted]. “[P]ublic employers 

need not allege that an employee’s expression actually disrupted the 

workplace; ‘reasonable predictions of disruption’ are sufficient.” [citation 

omitted]. Moreover, this court has weighed (6) whether the speaker directed 

the statement to the public or the media, as opposed to a governmental

colleague, [citation omitted]; (7) whether the speaker served in a high-level, 

policy-making capacity; and (8) whether the statement was false or made 

with reckless disregard of the truth, [citation omitted]. Because the Pickering

balance necessarily involves a fact-sensitive inquiry involving the totality of 

the circumstances, no single factor is dispositive.

Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1999), as amended on 

denial of reh’g (July 15, 1999).

As discussed above, the government has greater authority to regulate the conduct of 

its employees than the general public. Roe, 543 U.S. at 80. This need to regulate conduct 

is particularly high with police employers, which have an interest in maintaining discipline, 

esprit de corps, morale and uniformity. See Cochran v. City of L.A., 222 F.3d 1195, 1201

(9th Cir. 2000). Courts give a wide degree of deference to the reasons law enforcement 

agencies articulate for what is necessary to accomplish the public safety mission. Connick, 

 

that this is a close question and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ liberal reading of what 

is a matter of public concern, Roe, 109 F.3d at 586, the Court is alternatively applying the 

Pickering balancing test.

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461 U.S. at 152. 

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the cases Defendants cite about the need for 

discipline within the Department by noting that many of those cases do not address offduty activity that did not directly refer to the police department. However, this distinction 

is unavailing because the effect the speech has on the Department is what the Department 

has an interest in regulating. This effect on the Department can be caused by on-duty or 

off-duty speech. See generally Roe, 543 U.S. at 80, 84 (“The [off-duty] speech in question 

was detrimental to the mission and functions of the employer.”).3

Defendants articulate four specific needs in carrying out the public safety mission 

that underlie their proposed action in this case: (1) promoting unity among coworkers in 

 

3 The Court notes that, in their motion, Plaintiffs specifically seek for this Court to 

make a finding that the Social Media Policy regulates speech beyond the scope of Plaintiff 

Hernandez and other officers’ “official duties.” (Doc. 12 at 8-9). However, Plaintiffs do 

not make any legal argument as to the result of such a factual finding.

The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals touched on whether there 

is a different protection for public-employee speech that is off-duty and non-work-related

in Roe. See Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1119 and n. 8 (9th Cir. 2004) 

overruled by City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004). The implied distinction appears 

to be that a public employee need not show that the speech at issue was on a matter of 

public concern as a threshold inquiry for the employee to be entitled to the Pickering

balancing when the speech is off-duty and non-work-related. Id. at n. 8. The Supreme 

Court did not directly address this distinction in reversing Roe, but the Supreme Court 

reaffirmed that “a threshold inquiry (implicit in Pickering itself) [is] that in order to merit 

Pickering balancing, a public employee’s speech must touch on a matter of ‘public 

concern.’” Roe, 543 U.S. at 82-83; see also Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 926 

(9th Cir. 2008) (“As the [Supreme] Court [in Roe] explained, before an employee is even 

entitled to have the balancing test applied, the ‘speech must touch on a matter of ‘public 

concern.’’”). Reconciling Roe, Pickering, and NTEU, the Second Circuit has explained 

that speech is “work related” if the speech impacts the work place. See Piscottano v. 

Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 272 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The NTEU principle does not immunize an 

employee’s expressive activities—even those that take place during his off-duty hours and 

outside of the workplace, and that purport to be ‘about subjects not related to his 

employment’—when his employer’s ‘legitimate and substantial interests’ are 

‘compromised by his speech.’ Roe, 543 U.S. at 81 . . . . In sum, to have a nexus to his 

employment, an employee’s speech need not comment on the workings or functioning of 

the employer’s operation; it is sufficient that that speech be detrimental to that operation.”)

Thus, in this case, if Plaintiffs were intending to make an argument premised on 

Plaintiffs’ speech being off-duty and non-work related, and if the Court were to embrace 

the distinction for off-duty, non-work-related speech noted in the Ninth Circuit’s Roe v.

San Diego decision, such a distinction would not change the outcome in this case. The 

outcome would not be impacted because the speech in this case would be considered “work 

related” because it impacts the Department’s legitimate and substantial interests, similar to 

the plaintiff’s speech in Roe. 543 U.S. at 84. To the extent Plaintiffs were attempting to 

imply some other legal argument, the Court has not divined what such argument might be 

and, therefore, cannot address it.

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the Department, some of whom are—or have relatives who are—Muslim; (2) preventing 

distrust of officers among the community; (3) preventing officer actions that could dissuade 

Muslims from reporting crimes or assisting law enforcement; and (4) preventing friction 

between Muslims and officers who have served in the Military. (Doc. 17 at 8). 

The Court gives wide deference to each of these reasons articulated by the 

Department for treating Plaintiff Hernandez’s speech differently than a member of the 

general public. Moreover, testimony before this Court showed that the Department 

underwent a major disruption because of the fallout from the Plain View Project’s 

dissemination of various officers’ posts. (Doc. 26 at 102-103). From phone lines being 

flooded, to shutting down social media efforts to recruit additional officers, the 

Department’s operations were hampered. (Id.). Even if the Court uses Plaintiff 

Hernandez’s summary of the content of his posts, Plaintiff Hernandez’s interest in 

discussing “assimilation” and “government spending” does not outweigh Defendants’ 

interest in the efficient functioning of the Department, which was in fact disrupted by the 

speech underlying this case. Thus, Defendants have met their burden of showing that their 

interest in promoting efficiency in the public services the Department performs through its 

employees outweighs both Plaintiff Hernandez’s interest in speaking and the public’s 

interest (if any) in hearing the speech. 

c. Conclusion: No Likelihood of Success on the Merits for 

Plaintiff Hernandez

Plaintiff Hernandez is not likely to succeed on the merits of his claim nor are there

serious questions as to the merits because Plaintiff Hernandez did not speak on a matter of 

public concern. Alternatively, under Pickering, Defendants had an adequate justification 

for treating Plaintiff Hernandez’s speech differently from a member of the general public. 

Finally, as noted in Drake, under Pickering if Plaintiff Hernandez cannot prevail on an asapplied challenge based on his prior behavior, the Court need not consider his facial 

challenge. 371 F. Supp. at 976.

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3. AZCOPS — NTEU

a. Governing Law

To the extent AZCOPS is advancing an argument for an injunction against 

enforcement of the entire Social Media Policy4 because it unconstitutionally chills 

prospective speech, Courts have recognized that any such claim must be made under a 

modified Pickering analysis. Specifically,

The legal framework governing public employee speech claims is well 

known. Public employees may not “be compelled to relinquish the First 

Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on 

matters of public interest.” Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 

Underlying this principle is the recognition that “public employees are often 

the members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions as 

to the operations of their public employers.” City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 

U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam). Nonetheless, a citizen who accepts public 

employment “must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.” Garcetti 

v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). Government employers enjoy 

considerable discretion to manage their operations, and the First Amendment 

“does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee 

complaints over internal office affairs.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 

(1983).

Courts begin the First Amendment inquiry by assessing whether the speech 

at issue relates to a matter of public concern. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 

If speech is purely personal, it is not protected and the inquiry is at an end. 

If, however, the speech is of public concern, courts must balance “the 

interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 

public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 

efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Id.; see 

also Connick, 461 U.S. at 142.

. . .

Here we deal with a broad social networking policy setting forth the 

parameters of public employee speech. In United States v. Nat’l Treasury

Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454 (1995), the Supreme Court 

addressed how courts should apply Pickering when a generally applicable 

statute or regulation (as opposed to a post-hoc disciplinary action) operates 

as a prior restraint on speech. NTEU involved a statute that prohibited federal 

employees from accepting any compensation for giving speeches or writing 

articles, even when the topic was unrelated to the employee’s official duties. 

See id. at 457. Emphasizing that the honoraria ban impeded a “broad category 

of expression” and “chills potential speech before it happens,” the Court held 

that “the Government’s burden is greater with respect to this statutory 

restriction on expression than with respect to [the] isolated disciplinary 

action[s]” in Pickering and its progeny. Id. at 467, 468. Accordingly, “[t]he 

 

4

 The Court notes Defendants object to this construction of Plaintiff AZCOPS’ 

argument because, as noted herein, Plaintiffs identify only one sentence of the six-page 

Social Media Policy as being potentially unconstitutional. (Doc. 17 at 11). Thus, 

Defendants argue that this identified sentence is the only sentence before the Court which 

the Court could enjoin, leaving the rest of the Social Media Policy in force.

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Government must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a 

vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of present and 

future expression are outweighed by that expression’s ‘necessary impact on 

the actual operation’ of the Government.” Id. at 468 (quoting Pickering, 391 

U.S. at 571). Further, the government “must demonstrate that the recited 

harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact 

alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.” Id. at 475.

Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 406–07 (4th Cir. 2016).

Similarly, the District Court in Nevada articulated the test as: 

A facial challenge to a public-employer’s policy that creates a prospective 

restriction on speech is similar to a retaliation claim, but it assesses the 

policy’s impact on all prohibited employee speech rather than merely the 

plaintiff’s interest in the specific speech that resulted in his discipline. Courts 

thus apply a modified version of the Pickering framework. First, courts 

assess the policy’s breadth by examining its text to determine “whether the 

restriction reaches speech on a matter of public concern, and . . . whether [it] 

reaches speech only within the scope of a public employee’s official duties.” 

Courts then look to the public employer’s justification for the policy, 

weighing “the impact of the ban as a whole—both on the employees whose 

speech may be curtailed and on the public interested in what they might 

say—against the restricted speech’s ‘necessary impact on the actual 

operation’ of the Government.” “‘Unlike an adverse action taken in response 

to actual speech,’ a prospective restriction ‘chills potential speech before it 

happens.’ The government therefore must shoulder a heavier burden when it 

seeks to justify [a prospective] restriction as opposed to ‘an isolated 

disciplinary action.’” Additionally, there must be a “close and rational 

relationship between the policy and legitimate government interests.”

Sabatini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 369 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1095–96 (D. Nev. 2019), 

reconsideration denied, 2019 WL 3307040 (D. Nev. July 23, 2019) (footnotes omitted).

b. Analysis

While the Court recognizes that there may be a circumstance in which AZCOPS 

could obtain an injunction to prevent enforcement of the portions of the Social Media 

Policy they claim run afoul of the modified Pickering framework, Plaintiff AZCOPS has 

failed to make such a showing in this case. As discussed above, Plaintiffs made no 

arguments in their Amended Motion as to only AZCOPS’ (or its members’) prospective 

harm.

In their reply, Plaintiffs argue that the Social Media Policy would potentially 

encompass officers posting about the department or other topics that could be construed as 

matters of public concern. (Doc. 20 at 8). Plaintiffs also argue that the balancing of 

Pickering and its progeny weigh in AZCOPS’ favor. (Doc. 20 at 8-11).

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The test as articulated in Liverman is whether the speech targeted by the policy is 

on a matter of public concern, and if so, whether the employee’s interest as a citizen in 

commenting on matters of public concern is outweighed by the government’s interest in 

promoting efficient public services through its employees. 844 F.3d at 406. Sabatini 

applied this same test but added the question of whether the policy reaches speech made 

only within the scope of the public employee’s office duties. 369 F. Supp. 3d at 1095-96. 

As to the last prong from Sabatini, in this case it appears undisputed that the Social 

Media Policy reaches speech that is outside the scope of the employee’s official duties; 

however, that speech impacted the employee’s duties. Further, facially the policy would 

potentially reach speech that is a matter of public concern.5

Thus, the Court must consider whether the balancing test articulated in Liverman 

and Sabatini weigh in the members of AZCOPS’ or Defendants’ favor. As the Court 

discussed with respect to the Pickering balancing as applied to Plaintiff Hernandez, the 

Court finds that the Department’s justifications for having the Social Media Policy to 

promote the efficient operation of the Department as a whole outweigh the employees’

interest in commenting on certain matters of public concern. In other words, this Court 

agrees with the court in Sabatini that, “the policy formulaically prohibits only the types of 

speech that would tilt the Pickering balance in [the police department’s] favor, [therefore] 

it is difficult to conclude that the policy as whole is overbroad.” 369 F. Supp. 3d at 1096-

97.6

Like the Court in Sabatini, this Court will next consider whether the one specific 

prohibition of the Social Media Policy identified by Plaintiffs as being unconstitutional is 

an acceptable regulation on employee speech under the Pickering balancing. Plaintiffs 

 

5 As discussed above, Plaintiff Hernandez cannot benefit from a facial challenge 

prospectively since he failed to prevail on an as-applied challenged based on his prior 

conduct. See Drake, 371 F. Supp. at 976. Moreover, Plaintiff Hernandez did not make 

himself available for the hearing in this case (Doc. 26 at 35-36) and, therefore, did not 

make any record on any future potential chilling effect on his speech.

6

 Again, as discussed in footnote 4 herein, the Court notes that Plaintiffs at best only 

vaguely made a challenge to the Social Media Policy as a whole. Nonetheless, the Court 

has considered this potential argument and rejected it. 

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identify the following prohibition as being unconstitutional: “Employees are prohibited 

from using social media in a manner that would cause embarrassment to or discredit the 

Department in any way.” (Doc. 12 at 8-9, ¶ 9.A.(1)). 

The Court in Sabatini next stated that it should construe any specific prohibition in

the Social Media Policy within the context of the broader Social Media Policy and 

“consider whether the [policy] is ‘readily susceptible’ to a limiting construction that would 

render it constitutional.” 369 F. Supp. 3d at 1097 (citing Kroger, 622 F.3d at 1208 (quoting 

Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)); see also, e.g., Liverman, 844 

F.3d at 409 (addressing whether another provision in the social-media policy at issue could 

“narrow” the policy’s reach). 

In this case, the Court finds that that the preambles in Sections 9.A. and 9.B., as well 

as the language presumptively allowing free expression found in 9.B.(6), work together to 

provide a limiting construction rendering this restriction on speech constitutional under the

modified Pickering balancing. For example, the preamble to 9.B. notifies the employees 

that Defendants are only targeting particular speech; specifically, “[p]ersonal social media 

activity must not interfere with work duties or the operation of the Department.” The 

preamble to 9.A. further advises the employees, “Department personnel are cautioned their 

speech and related activity on social media sites may be considered a reflection upon their 

position, and, in some instances, this Department.” Thus, the policy is limited to speech 

that would interfere with the work duties of the employee or the operation of the 

Department and that could be considered a reflection on the employee’s position in the 

Department or the Department as a whole. Indeed, at the hearing on the preliminary 

injunction, Lieutenant Matthew Siekmann, the acting head of the PSB, testified that the

Department does not punish officers for simply criticizing or making negative comments 

about the Department or its chief. (Doc. 26 at 112). Thus, the particular sentence of the 

Social Media Policy identified by Plaintiffs as potentially being unconstitutional, when 

taken in the broader context of the Social Media Policy as a whole, is subject to a limiting 

construction that renders it constitutionally permissible under the modified Pickering

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balancing test. Thus, the Court will not issue an injunction in favor of AZCOPS on its

facial challenge to the policy and its potential chilling effect on speech because Plaintiffs 

have failed to show serious questions going to the merits or a likelihood of success on the 

merits.7

B. Irreparable Harm

Money damages often serve as a remedy at law in employment cases, thus 

preventing the need for the extraordinary equitable relief of a preliminary injunction. See 

Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974). However, Plaintiffs argue that monetary 

damages alone will not suffice because Plaintiffs will have their future speech chilled by 

the Department’s Social Media Policy while this case is pending. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 

U.S. 347, 373 (1976). 

As to Plaintiff Hernandez, if he is wrongfully disciplined, he can be made whole by 

money damages in the form of back wages. (Doc. 26 at 81). Further, because he cannot 

show he is likely to succeed on the merits or that there are serious questions going to the 

merits of his as-applied challenge, he cannot bring a facial challenge regarding a future 

chilling effect. Accordingly, Plaintiff Hernandez has not shown irreparable harm and his 

request for an injunction is denied for this alternative reason.

With respect to AZCOPS, as discussed above, Plaintiffs make a generalized 

argument that the Social Media Policy will have a chilling effect on speech. However, on 

this record, there is no testimony from particular members of AZCOPS regarding any 

speech they wished to make that they were chilled from making. See Wooten v. BNSF Ry. 

Co., No. CV 16-139-M-DLC-JCL, 2017 WL 1066630, at *2 (D. Mont. Mar. 16, 2017), 

report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 16-139-M-DLC-JCL, 2017 WL 1089546 (D. 

Mont. Mar. 21, 2017) (“Even if [Plaintiff’s] prediction is correct, such a future chilling 

effect would have no impact on the party seeking injunctive relief in this litigation. The 

irreparable harm analysis focuses on the harm to the party seeking injunctive relief, not on 

 

7 At the hearing on November 19, 2019, Plaintiffs’ counsel also stated that Plaintiff 

AZCOPS was making an as-applied challenge to the Social Media Policy. (Doc. 26 at 51). 

However, Plaintiff AZCOPS made no factual or legal argument supporting this theory. 

Accordingly, relief on this basis is denied.

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potential harm to third parties. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (‘A plaintiff seeking a 

preliminary injunction must establish . . . that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 

absence of preliminary relief.’) (emphasis added)”). In other words, generalized 

speculation that some police officers (who may or may not be members of AZCOPS) might

have had their speech chilled is inadequate to show irreparable harm to a Plaintiff in this 

case.

8

 Thus, AZCOPS has failed to establish an irreparable harm as to its members on this 

record. 

C. Balance of Equities

In deciding whether to enter a preliminary injunction, the Court considers the 

balance of equities between the parties. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Here, the Pickering 

balancing test already balances the equities between the parties. As to both Plaintiff 

Hernandez and Plaintiff AZCOPS, the Court has concluded that this balance favors 

Defendants. For these reasons, the balance of equities in this case favors Defendants.

D. Public Interest

The public has a strong interest in hearing from police officers, especially about 

issues affecting the Department. However, as discussed above, Plaintiff Hernandez posts 

were not about matters impacting the Department; thus, the public interest does not favor 

him. Additionally, with respect to Plaintiff AZCOPS, there is no evidence in the record

from Plaintiffs, nor legal argument from Plaintiffs, specific to the desire of members of 

AZCOPS to post about matters affecting the Department and whether that would run afoul 

of a particular portion of the Social Media Policy. Conversely, Lieutenant Matthew 

Siekmann testified that posts that were critical of the Department or its chief would not 

result in discipline under the Social Media Policy. (Doc. 26 at 112-113). Moreover, 

Defendants have identified a strong public interest in maintaining public trust and 

 

8 At the November 19, 2019 hearing, Lieutenant Thatcher testified that he received 

some inquiries about what is and is not permitted under the Social Media Policy. (Doc. 26 

at 53-54). However, he did not specify whether those inquiries were from AZCOPS 

members, nor did he provide any specific testimony that a particular member of AZCOPS 

wished to make a specific post (that would be protected speech) and was chilled from doing 

so. (Id.). Moreover, for purposes of this Order, the Court has assumed that AZCOPS, as 

an entity, would have standing to represent all of its members in this case; however, neither 

party has briefed that issue and the Court has not substantively addressed it.

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confidence in their Department. Accordingly, the public interest in this case weighs against 

granting an injunction.

III. Conclusion

To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must meet all four prongs of Winter. 

555 U.S. at 20. Here, neither Plaintiff has met their burden of showing that they are likely 

to succeed on the merits or that there are serious questions going to the merits. Further, 

any discipline (including termination) against Plaintiff Hernandez is remediable by money 

damages; therefore, Plaintiff Hernandez cannot show irreparable harm. AZCOPS has not 

shown irreparable harm because it has not shown a chilling effect on a Plaintiff in this case. 

Additionally, the balance of equities favors Defendants. Finally, the public interest favors 

Defendants. Thus, Plaintiffs failed to meet all four prongs of Winter.

As a result, 

IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for a Preliminary 

Injunction (Doc. 12).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants must respond to Plaintiffs’ 

complaint within 7 days. (Doc. 34).

Dated this 8th day of January, 2020.

Case 2:19-cv-05365-MTL Document 36 Filed 01/08/20 Page 23 of 23