Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01013/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01013-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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28 Because oral argument will not be of material 1

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DENISE BROWN,

NO. CIV. S-06-1013 FCD DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF MODOC, MODOC MEDICAL

CENTER, MODOC MEDICAL AND

DENTAL CLINIC, EDWARD P.

RICHERT, M.D., and OWEN M.

PANNER, JR., aka OWEN PANNER,

M.D.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on three separate motions to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

filed by defendants Edward P. Richert, M.D. (“Richert”), Owen M.

Panner, Jr. aka Owen Panner, M.D. (“Panner”), and County of Modoc

(erroneously sued as Modoc Medical Center and Modoc Medical and

Dental Clinic) (the “County”) (sometimes collectively,

“defendants”). 

1

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In his motion to dismiss, Richert states that there 2

were no videotapes in the cameras at the time they were

discovered. (Def. Richert’s Mot. to Dismiss, filed July 25,

2006, at 2.)

2

For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motions are

GRANTED in part, with respect to plaintiff Denise Brown’s

(“plaintiff”) federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. As

those federal claims are dismissed without leave to amend, the

court otherwise dismisses the case, as it declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state law

claims.

BACKGROUND

In July 2001, plaintiff, a minor at the time, visited Panner

for treatment of a bladder infection. (Pl.’s Compl. for Damages

(“Compl.”), filed May 9, 2006, at ¶ 12.) The visit, which took

place in a building owned and operated by the County, Panner, and

Richert, included a pelvic examination performed by Panner.

(Compl. at ¶¶ 12-13.) Unbeknownst to plaintiff, Panner had

installed video cameras in the ceiling vents of the examination

room and used them to videotape the procedure. Plaintiff alleges

Panner did so for his own sexual gratification. (Compl. at ¶¶ 12,

27.) 

While it is not entirely clear from the complaint what

prompted the investigation, in October of 2001, officers from the

Modoc County Sheriff’s department discovered the video cameras

and confiscated them. (Compl. at ¶¶ 27-28.) Shortly 2

thereafter, Panner contacted the Sheriff’s department and

conceded that the cameras were his. (Compl. at ¶ 28.) The

complaint does not specify what, if any, actions were taken

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Although plaintiff titles her first claim for relief as 3

one brought under 28 U.S.C. 1983, because there is no such

statute and because she later refers to 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court

assumes this is an inadvertent typographical error. The exact

nature of plaintiff’s supplemental state law claims is difficult

to discern from the complaint. Defendants have identified them

as claims for professional negligence against Panner and Richert,

and a claim for negligent conduct of a public employee against

the County. However, the court need not specifically delineate

the claims here as it declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remainder of the action, as set forth

below.

3

against Panner as a result of the discovery of the cameras in

2001.

Subsequently, in March 2005, an eight-year-old child out

hunting with his father discovered the videotape of plaintiff’s

pelvic examination near a reservoir. (Compl. at ¶ 13.) The tape

was turned over to law enforcement and Panner was prosecuted and

ultimately convicted for his voyeuristic conduct. (Compl. at ¶

16.) He was sentenced to jail time and his medical license was

suspended. (Compl. at ¶¶ 16-17.) 

Plaintiff first learned of the existence of the videotape

during this 2005 law enforcement investigation. (Compl. at ¶

12.) Plaintiff thereafter brought the instant suit against

Panner, Richert, and the County on May 9, 2006. She alleges

violations of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (“section

1983"), as well as various common and state law claims. All 3

three defendants have separately moved to dismiss the section

1983 claims against them on the ground that Panner was not acting

under color of law when he illicitly videotaped plaintiff. Each

defendant’s motion will be addressed in turn.

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STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants

have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Calif. State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover, the

court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the

form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v.

Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

ANALYSIS

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, 

[e]very person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . subjects,

or causes to subjected, any citizen of the United

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States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

Section 1983 confers no substantive rights itself, but rather,

“provides remedies for deprivations of rights established

elsewhere.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816

(1985).

Panner’s Motion to Dismiss

A suit brought under section 1983 will implicate different

tests depending on whether the claim is brought against an

individual or a governmental entity. Where a claim is brought

against an individual, the question is whether that individual

“may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmonson Oil

Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Where relief is sought against a

municipality, the plaintiff must show that the government body

had a policy, ordinance, regulation, or custom which operated to

deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights. Monell v. Dept.

of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978). 

Where an individual is sued, “the traditional definition of

acting under color of state law requires that the defendant . . .

have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made

possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority

of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)(citations

omitted). The purpose of section 1983 is to prevent abuse of

state authority. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992)(citing

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-257 (1978)). Consequently,

the statute was not meant to remedy private wrongs, and private

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conduct is excluded from its ambit, no matter how discriminatory

or wrong. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. V. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50

(1999); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982); Shelley v.

Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). Thus, to the extent that

plaintiff is suing Panner for relief under section 1983, Panner

must have been acting under “color of law” at the time he

surreptitiously videotaped her pelvic exam, such that his actions

are “fairly attributable to the [s]tate” rather than to his

private conduct. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 

In that regard, plaintiff alleges that because Panner was

the “contract anesthesiologist” (Compl. at ¶ 13) for the County

at the time he videotaped plaintiff’s pelvic exam, and because

the exam took place at a facility jointly owned and operated by

the County, he was a state actor acting under color of law for

purposes of section 1983. Additionally, plaintiff alleges that

Panner was at all times relevant an employee or agent of the

County, acting under color of law and within the scope and course

of his employment. (Compl. at ¶¶ 7-8.) 

However, the mere existence of an employment relationship

between an individual and the state does not transform the

individual’s private actions into “state actions.” Johnson v.

Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117-1118 (9th Cir. 1997). An individual

acts under color of law only if he exercises authority under

“pretense of law” and his actions are affiliated to some extent

with performance of his official duties. Screws v. U.S., 325

U.S. 91, 111 (1945). It is well-settled that state employees

acting solely “in the ambit of their personal pursuits” are not

acting under color of law for purposes of section 1983. Id.; see

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See also Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859 (5th Cir. 2002) 4

(finding prison guard who injured inmate while the two were

engaged in consensual horseplay was “pursuing a private aim and

not acting by virtue of state authority”); Waters v. City of

Morristown, 242 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding veterinarian

who was also a city alderman was acting in pursuit of personal

interests and not in furtherance of city interests when he abused

and harassed his employee with whom he had a personal

relationship); Roe v. Humke, 128 F.3d 1213 (8th Cir. 1997)

(finding off-duty police officer acted in pursuit of his

“private” interests and not under color of law when he molested a

young girl, despite the fact that victim and her parents knew him

to be a police officer and trusted him).

7

also Huffman v. City of L.A., 147 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1998) (offduty police officer was “pursuing his own goals” when he killed a

patron in a bar fight, and was not acting under “pretense of law”

because he never identified himself as a police officer); Van Ort

v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 1996) (offduty police officer who returned to the scene of an investigation

in plain clothes and a mask for the purposes of robbing the house

was not acting in furtherance of any governmental goal). 

4

Here, it cannot be reasonably argued, and plaintiff does not

contend, that Panner was acting to advance a governmental goal or

purpose when he illicitly videotaped plaintiff. Indeed,

plaintiff alleges that Panner was acting in furtherance of his

own sexual interests. Plaintiff alleges that Panner videotaped

her solely for “lustful motives, unrelated to the practice of

medicine” (Compl. at ¶ 15)(emphasis added), a theme that is

reiterated throughout the Complaint. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 12

(taping was “for the sole purpose of [Panner’s] sexual

gratification”)(emphasis added); 19 (“for lustful and lewd

purposes”); 31 (“for sexual purposes”); 37 (“with the intent to

arouse, appeal, to or [sic] gratify the lust, passion, and sexual

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The court notes that the state law question of scope of 5

employment is a legally distinct inquiry from the question of

whether a state employee was acting under color of law for

purposes of section 1983. However, the Ninth Circuit has equated

“scope of employment” with acting “under color of law” when

determining whether a government officer was acting as a private

(continued...)

8

desire, of [Panner]”); 55 (“for illegal sexual gratifying

purposes”); and 60 (“for sexual purposes . . . ofr [sic] sexual

gratification”).) 

At this stage in the proceedings, the court must accept

plaintiff’s allegations as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. at 322. 

As such, plaintiff’s classification of Panner’s actions as

motivated solely by his personal goals and desires necessarily

means that he was pursuing his own interests and was not acting

under “color of law” when he videotaped plaintiff. 

On this issue, the case of Lisa M. v. Henry Newhall Mem’l

Hosp. is instructive. 12 Cal. 4th 291 (1995). Although Lisa M.

did not involve a section 1983 claim, the facts of the case are

strikingly similar to the instant suit. Lisa M., the plaintiff,

was molested by a medical technician during an ultrasound

examination. It was not until the next day, after discussing her

reservations about the procedure with her regular obstetrician,

that the plaintiff realized she had been molested. Id. at 295-

296. The plaintiff sought to hold the employer hospital

vicariously liable for the acts of the technician. Id. at 296. 

In finding that sexual assault by a medical technician is not

within the scope of employment, the California Supreme Court made

several prescient observations that are relevant to the case at

hand. 

5

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(...continued) 5

citizen. Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 835 (“if a government officer does

not act within his scope of employment or under color of state

law, then that government officer acts as a private citizen.”). 

Thus, the Lisa M. court’s treatment of scope of employment is

instructive to this court’s discussion of the private nature of

Panner’s action. Indeed, the parties addressed Lisa M. at length

in their briefs.

Panner also moves to dismiss plaintiff’s “Bivens” claim 6

against him. While it is not clear from plaintiff’s opposition

that she is pressing Bivens claim, to the extent she is, such a

claim is not cognizable. A Bivens cause of action is a

judicially created remedy for wrongs committed by federal

officers. Because federal officers generally do not act under

color of state law, a Bivens claim is separate and distinct from

(continued...)

9

First, the Court found it telling that, unlike police

officers, as a medical professional the defendant was “not vested

with any coercive authority.” Id. at 304. Second, the plaintiff

had been asked to trust the defendant for the limited purpose of

a medical examination. Id. The subsequent assault and battery

he committed on the plaintiff was wholly independent of this

purpose and was the result of the defendant’s “aberrant decision

to engage in conduct unrelated to his duties.” Id. at 303-304. 

Like the ultrasound technician in Lisa M., as alleged by

plaintiff, Panner’s decision to videotape plaintiff’s medical

exam was the result of his own “aberrant” desires and was wholly

unrelated to the purpose for which he was treating her. 

Moreover, plaintiff does not allege Panner was vested with any

coercive authority, the abuse of which section 1983 was meant to

curtail. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. at 161. 

Given the foregoing, the court finds that plaintiff has

failed to allege any facts to support a claim for relief against

Panner under section 1983. Consequently, Panner’s motion to 6

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(...continued) 6

a section 1983 claim. Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the

defendants are federal officers, nor could she. Accordingly, if

she is maintaining such a claim, it is dismissed as to all

defendants.

The court denies leave to amend this claim as any such 7

amendment would be futile under the facts here. 

In her state law claims, plaintiff alleges that Richert 8

is also vicariously liable for Panner’s tortious acts, by virtue

of their partnership. However, because this allegation is

included only as part of the state law professional negligence

claim, and because it is well settled that there is no vicarious

liability under section 1983 (Monell, 436 U.S. at 692), the court

does not address this contention.

10

dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice.7

Richert’s Motion to Dismiss

It is not entirely clear from the complaint whether

plaintiff is alleging a section 1983 claim against Richert,

however, to the extent that she is, Richert’s motion to dismiss

is granted as to that claim. 

In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that Richert “is the

Modoc County Health Officer for the Modoc County Public Health

Department,” and that he became aware that his partner, Panner,

was possibly videotaping patients after the October 2001

investigation that uncovered the cameras, yet he continued to

have a business relationship with Panner nonetheless. (Compl. at

¶ 30.) This is the extent of plaintiff’s allegations regarding

Richert.8

“To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege

facts which show a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity

secured by the Constitution or federal law by a person acting

under color of state law.” Lopez v. Dep’t of Health Svcs., 939

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Plaintiff attempts to allege some wrongdoing by Richert 9

as a result of his continued business relationship with Panner

after the video cameras were discovered in October 2001. (Compl.

at ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that Richert was constructively on

notice at that point that his partner was engaged in illicit

activity, and Richert was negligent in continuing the business

relationship. (Id.) Even accepting these allegations as true,

they do not establish any wrongdoing by Richert, let alone any

wrongdoing violating plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Additionally, plaintiff’s examination and videotaping took place

in July 2001, three months before the cameras were discovered. 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that Richert was on

notice prior to July 2001, or that she suffered a harm after

October 2001, when Richert was allegedly put on constructive

notice.

11

F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). As discussed

above, the mere existence of an employment relationship between

an individual and the state does not, by itself, mean that

individual’s actions were taken under color of law. Knowles, 113

F.3d at 1117-1118. Thus, the allegation that Richert is employed

as the County Health Officer is, without more, an insufficient

basis for section 1983 liability. Aside from the fact of state

employment, plaintiff has not pled any facts from which it could

be inferred that Richert acted under color of law. 

Moreover, plaintiff has failed to allege that Richert

“acted,” at all, to deprive her of her constitutional rights.

Richert was not involved in the examination, himself, nor does

plaintiff allege that he was aware that she had been videotaped

or was in any way individually responsible for Panner’s acts.9

See e.g. Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1060-1061

(5th Cir. 1994)(holding a plaintiff in a section 1983 action must

allege “sufficient involvement . . . to lay a foundation for

recovery under section 1983.”). Therefore, Richert’s motion to

dismiss the section 1983 claim against him is GRANTED with

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The court also denies leave to amend this claim as any 10

such amendment would be futile under the facts here. 

There is no respondeat superior liability under section 11

1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691)(“a municipality cannot be held

liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.”).

12

prejudice.10

The County’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff proceeds on a Monell theory of liability against

the County. (Compl. at ¶ 22.) Monell holds that when a section

1983 claim is asserted against a municipality, the plaintiff must

allege the deprivation of a constitutional right that is

attributable to a policy, ordinance, regulation or custom of the

municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691. At the pleading 11

stage, a bare allegation that a state actor was acting pursuant

to an official policy, custom, or practice will suffice. 

Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir.

2002); Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th

Cir. 1988); Shah v. County of L.A., 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir.

1986). In that regard, plaintiff asserts in her complaint that

she has been “deprived of a constitutional right as a result of

the official policy of Modoc county [sic]” (Compl. at ¶ 22), and

specifically, that the County failed to properly train

“government personnel in dealing with the privacy of patients”

(Compl. at ¶ 29) and failed to supervise “the devious sexual

habits of [Panner].” (Compl. at ¶ 27.) 

However, because the court has already determined that

plaintiff has failed to allege any “state action” by Panner, the

question arises whether the County can be liable for negligent

training and supervision under section 1983, without the

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involvement of a state actor. This was the precise question

addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Van Ort, and the court finds

that case controlling here. 92 F.3d 831.

In Van Ort, a group of police officers searched the

plaintiffs’ home for narcotics. Id. at 833. While the officers

found no drugs, they found a safe containing cash, jewelry, and

coins. Id. Over a month later, on an off-duty morning, one of

the officers, Stanewich, returned to the home dressed in jeans

and a mask for the purpose of robbing and assaulting the owners

at gunpoint. Although the owners thought they recognized him,

Stanewich denied that he was a police officer. Id. Stanewich

was ultimately shot and killed in the home by another police

officer responding to the robbery call. Id. at 834. 

The homeowners sued the deceased Stanewich’s estate and

asserted a Monell claim against the County and the Sheriff’s

Department which employed him. Id. at 834. On appeal, the Ninth

Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that Stanewich was

a private actor at the time he robbed and assaulted the

plaintiffs and was not acting under color or pretense of law. 

Id. at 838. Given that, the court then considered whether a

municipality can be held liable under Monell for negligent

hiring, training, or supervision when the person actually causing

the harm is not a state actor. Id. 

The court held that under the Monell framework, negligent

hiring or supervision “must be the proximate cause of the

injuries suffered” and, as a matter of law, unforeseeable private

actions are intervening causes which preclude municipal

liability. Id. at 837 (emphasis added). Because Stanewich’s

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At points in her Complaint, plaintiff appears to 12

contend not that the County should have prevented her videotaping

in July 2001, but that it somehow should have acted differently

after discovery of the cameras in October 2001. (Compl. at ¶

30.) For the same reasons as stated above, said facts do not

allege a section 1983 claim against the County. Additionally, in

her opposition papers, plaintiff states that after discovery of

the cameras, the County “should have made an inquiry via peer

review as to [Panner’s] involvement. Had this been done, th

[sic] future humiliation of the plaintiff via the discovery of

the videos and the videos being viewed by complete stranger [sic]

in Sacramento County would not have occurred.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to

(continued...)

14

criminal acts were entirely private and unforeseeable (even given

his history of discipline for excessive violence on the job), the

county could not be liable under section 1983. Id.; see also

Huffman, 147 F.3d at 1060 (off-duty police officer’s shooting of

a patron in a bar fight was a private act and not foreseeable,

despite the fact that the county required all off-duty officers

to carry firearms). Moreover, the court noted it was wellsettled that municipalities generally have no duty to protect

citizens from deprivations of their constitutional rights by

private actors. Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 831 (citing DeShaney v.

Winnebago City Dep’t of Social Svcs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)).

Applying Van Ort to the case at hand, the County cannot be

liable under section 1983 for failure to protect plaintiff from

Panner’s wholly private act of voyeurism. Furthermore, even

accepting as true plaintiff’s boilerplate allegations of a

policy, custom, or practice by the County related to inadequate

training or supervision, her own characterization of Panner’s

acts as deviant, lustful, lewd, and unrelated to the practice of

medicine constitutes an unforeseeable, intervening cause which

precludes a finding of municipal liability under section 1983.12

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(...continued) 12

County’s Mot. to Dismiss, filed Aug. 21, 2006, at 6.) To the

extent that plaintiff claims to have suffered injury from the

County’s failure to conduct a timely or proper investigation,

this is not a claim that is redressible under section 1983. See

Lopez, 939 F.2d at 883 (“a plaintiff must allege facts which show

a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the

Constitution or federal law”) (emphasis added).

The court also denies leave to amend this claim as any 13

such amendment would be futile under the facts here.

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Thus, the County’s motion to dismiss this claim is GRANTED with

prejudice.13

Remaining State Law Claims

Given the dismissal of plaintiff’s federal claims under

section 1983 without leave to amend, the court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining

state law claims. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d

999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Gini v. Las Vegas Metro.

Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[I]n the usual

case in which federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the

balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.”) (quoting

Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991)).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions are GRANTED

with regard to plaintiff’s claims brought under section 1983. 

Those claims are dismissed without leave to amend, and as the

court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state law claims, the case is otherwise dismissed. The 

///

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Case 2:06-cv-01013-FCD-DAD Document 19 Filed 10/13/06 Page 15 of 16
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Clerk of the Court is directed to close this file.

DATED: October 13, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-01013-FCD-DAD Document 19 Filed 10/13/06 Page 16 of 16