Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00377/USCOURTS-alsd-1_14-cv-00377-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SIMP McCORVEY, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 14-0377-WS-C

 )

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE JACK )

WEAVER, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on a filing styled “Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Reconsiration [sic] to the Court Un-Lawfully [sic] Granting the Defendant Jack B. Weaver 

Immunity” (doc. 15).

Plaintiff, Simp McCorvey, who is proceeding pro se, commenced this lawsuit against 

multiple defendants, including Jack B. Weaver, a Circuit Judge in Monroe County, Alabama. In 

his Complaint, McCorvey sharply criticized Judge Weaver’s handling of a state-court matter in 

which McCorvey was a litigant. Specifically, McCorvey alleged that Judge Weaver had failed to 

send him written notice of the trial setting, that McCorvey (who resides out of state) had learned 

of the trial date too late to arrange his attendance, that Judge Weaver refused to grant McCorvey 

a continuance and conducted the trial without him, that Judge Weaver granted the other party’s 

request to dismiss the jury demand and proceed as a bench trial, that Judge Weaver ruled against 

McCorvey, and that Judge Weaver delayed sending written notice of his ruling until it was too 

late for McCorvey to appeal. The Complaint repeatedly brands Judge Weaver as “corrupt” and 

suggests that his conduct was motivated by a desire for personal financial gain via the other 

litigant. In terms of relief sought, the Complaint requests that Judge Weaver’s ruling be 

rescinded and that McCorvey be awarded monetary damages totaling $400,000.

On October 21, 2014, the undersigned entered an Order (doc. 11) granting Judge 

Weaver’s Motion to Dismiss, on grounds of both judicial immunity and the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. With regard to the former, the October 21 Order explained that Judge Weaver was 

Case 1:14-cv-00377-WS-C Document 16 Filed 11/14/14 Page 1 of 7
-2-

insulated from this lawsuit by absolute judicial immunity. In particular, the October 21 Order 

found that Judge Weaver’s challenged acts and omissions were undertaken in his judicial 

capacity, inasmuch as he was clearly performing a normal judicial function (i.e., hearing and 

deciding a case assigned to him as a Monroe County Circuit Judge), and the subject events 

happened in his chambers or courtroom. The October 21 Order further explained that the 

Complaint was devoid of factual allegations supporting an inference that Judge Weaver was 

acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction; therefore, both prongs of the judicial immunity 

doctrine were satisfied. Alternatively, the October 21 Order concluded that McCorvey’s claims 

against Judge Weaver were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, inasmuch as McCorvey is a 

state-court loser seeking what in substance would be appellate review of a state-court judgment 

rendered before these federal proceedings commenced and inviting this Court to reject such a 

judgment based on alleged constitutional infirmities.

Now, McCorvey comes forward and requests reconsideration of the October 21 Order on 

the following grounds: (i) the October 21 Order wrongfully “blames the plaintiff” for his 

misfortune; (ii) the October 21 Order is riddled with “knowing” and “willful” false statements of 

fact; (iii) the absence of notice received by McCorvey negates judicial immunity for Judge 

Weaver; (iv) principles of prosecutorial immunity require a different result; and (v) lack of notice 

to plaintiff precludes dismissal pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

As an initial matter, McCorvey’s Motion for Reconsideration fails to identify or comport 

with the stringent legal standard governing such motions. Although McCorvey does not 

acknowledge it, his Motion appears to have been filed pursuant to Rule 59(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. 

Under that rule, a dissatisfied federal litigant is not entitled to reconsideration of anything and 

everything, merely because he disagrees with a court’s ruling or thought of something else to 

say. To the contrary, “[t]he only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are newly-discovered 

evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” United States v. Marion, 562 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th

Cir. 2009) (citation and internal marks omitted); see also Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 

(11th Cir. 2007) (similar). Authority is legion for the proposition that motions to reconsider “may 

not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have 

been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5, 

Case 1:14-cv-00377-WS-C Document 16 Filed 11/14/14 Page 2 of 7
-3-

128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008) (citation omitted).1 Rule 59(e) motions do not afford an 

unsuccessful litigant “two bites at the apple.” American Home Assur. Co. v. Glenn Estess & 

Associates, Inc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985). Nor are such motions properly filed “as a 

kneejerk reaction by a dissatisfied federal court loser.” Lee v. Thomas, 2012 WL 3137901, *2 

(S.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2012).2 “They are neither appeal substitutes nor a ‘dry run’ to test arguments 

in anticipation of a forthcoming appeal.” Id. McCorvey’s Motion consists in large part of 

arguments that either (i) were considered and rejected previously, or (ii) could have been raised 

previously but were not. Either way, the Motion for Reconsideration falls outside the narrow 

parameters in which Rule 59(e) relief may be appropriate.

Even if the Motion were proper, it would fail. The five “errors” on which McCorvey 

relies as the basis for his Rule 59(e) Motion are the product of either imagined slights or 

McCorvey’s fundamental misunderstanding of the law. First, plaintiff repeatedly criticizes the 

October 21 Order for “wrongly blaming the Plaintiff” for the events occurring in state court. 

(Doc. 15, at 1-2.) The October 21 Order does no such thing. Nowhere does that Order state, 

 1 See also Smith v. Ocwen Financial, 2012 WL 3758378, *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 

2012) (“A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise arguments, or 

present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”) (citation omitted); 

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir. 2010) (similar); Kight v. IPD Printing & 

Distributing, Inc., 2011 WL 2015055, *1 (11th Cir. May 24, 2011) (motion for reconsideration 

properly denied where movant “merely attempted to relitigate old matters and presented 

evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment”); Morton v. Astrue, 2010 

WL 2130613, *3 (11th Cir. May 27, 2010) (“In his motion to alter or amend judgment, ... 

Morton merely attempted to reargue factual issues previously decided by the district court. The 

district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.”); Dyas v. City of 

Fairhope, 2009 WL 5062367, *3 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 23, 2009) (“Motions to reconsider ... do not 

exist to permit losing parties to prop up arguments previously made or to inject new ones, nor to 

provide evidence or authority previously omitted. They do not, in short, serve to relieve a party 

of the consequences of its original, limited presentation.”).

2 See also Hughes v. Stryker Sales Corp., 2010 WL 2608957, *2 (S.D. Ala. June 

28, 2010) (rejecting notion that motions to reconsider “are appropriate whenever the losing party 

thinks the District Court got it wrong,” but finding that they are “an extraordinary remedy” that 

must be “employed sparingly”) (citations omitted); Garrett v. Stanton, 2010 WL 320492, *3 

(S.D. Ala. Jan. 18, 2010) (“Far too often, litigants operate under the flawed assumption that any 

adverse ruling on a dispositive motion confers upon them license ... to relitigate issues that have 

already been decided, to champion new arguments that could have been made before, and 

otherwise to attempt a ‘do-over’ to erase a disappointing outcome. This is improper.”).

Case 1:14-cv-00377-WS-C Document 16 Filed 11/14/14 Page 3 of 7
-4-

opine, or insinuate that it was McCorvey’s fault he allegedly did not receive timely notice of the 

state court trial.3

Second, McCorvey suggests that the October 21 Order reflects judicial bias against him, 

as he contends that this Court engaged in “knowingly false statements” and “willful mis-stating 

the facts” in that Order. (Doc. 15, at 2, 3, 4, 13.) Plaintiff even asserts that the October 21 Order 

was “based solely on the Judge’s emotions,” rather than the law. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff’s reckless 

accusations of partiality have no basis in reality. The undersigned is well versed in the legal 

standard for judicial disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 and knows of no facts or 

circumstances that might reasonably call into question his impartiality in this matter. More to the 

point, each of the alleged “false statements” that McCorvey cites from the October 21 Order are, 

in fact, well grounded in the pleadings and court documents.4

Third, McCorvey maintains that it was error for the October 21 Order to dismiss Judge 

Weaver on grounds of judicial immunity because Judge Weaver had provided “no-Notice to the 

Plaintiff that this defendant would be the New Judge, No – Notice of Hearing, No-Notice to the 

 3 The flashpoint of plaintiff’s dissatisfaction appears to be a statement in the 

October 21 Order that “Simp’s geographic distance from Alabama, coupled with his pro se 

status, created certain logistical difficulties in the Monroe County Lawsuit with regard to 

scheduling and conducting court proceedings.” (Doc. 11, at 2.) Plaintiff’s reliance on this 

statement as a ground for his Motion to Reconsider is misplaced because (i) nothing therein 

declares or implies that McCorvey is to blame for not receiving notice or that out-of-state 

litigants are entitled to lesser legal protection than in-state litigants; and (ii) the statement itself is 

a fair and accurate characterization of facts contained in pleadings filed in this case, as well as in 

the underlying state-court proceedings, of which judicial notice may properly be taken.

4 For example, plaintiff characterizes as a “willful misstatement” the October 21 

Order’s recitation that “[o]n September 3, 2013, Simp alleges, he was notified for the first time 

that Judge Weaver had set the Monroe County Lawsuit for trial on September 11, 2013 (barely 

one week later), but that Simp could request a continuance if he wished.” (Doc. 11, at 3.) 

Plaintiff now blusters at length that this statement is false, and that this Court willfully distorted 

the truth in the October 21 Order. (Doc. 15, at 3.) A glance at the Complaint reveals the 

frivolity of this objection. In McCorvey’s own Complaint, he recounted a telephone 

conversation he had with Judge Weaver’s staff on September 3, 2013, to-wit: “The Judge 

Assistant came back to the phone and stated that the Judge had stated that there was a trial set for 

09/11/2013 and that the plaintiff had to request a continuous [sic] for a more reasonable date.” 

(Doc. 1, at 3.) Thus, what McCorvey now slams as a willful misstatement of the truth is actually 

a fair paraphrasing of his own allegations in the Complaint. His other accusations of knowing 

falsehoods in the October 21 Order are equally baseless.

Case 1:14-cv-00377-WS-C Document 16 Filed 11/14/14 Page 4 of 7
-5-

Plaintiff ... that this Defendant was be starting at 9/11/2013 at 7:00am acting as a Judge and 

would act in an official Judicial Capacity.” (Doc. 15, at 4.) In McCorvey’s view, the lack of 

notice issue absolutely forecloses Judge Weaver from claiming judicial immunity. (Id. at 12.) 

Once again, plaintiff is wrong.

“Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on 

whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred 

in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the 

judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial 

capacity.” Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005). The only facts before this 

Court are that Judge Weaver was the assigned state-court judge presiding over the Monroe 

County Circuit Court action, that McCorvey is complaining about events that occurred in Judge 

Weaver’s chambers or courtroom, and that the entire thrust of this lawsuit is McCorvey’s 

dissatisfaction with Judge Weaver’s handling of a case assigned to him and his unfavorable 

rulings in such case. These circumstances are a textbook example of those in which judicial 

immunity applies. For purposes of this immunity, it does not make any difference whether Judge 

Weaver gave McCorvey notice or not, whether Judge Weaver was motivated by corrupt or 

improper objectives, whether Judge Weaver acted in violation of the Constitution, and so on. 

See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (“A 

judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is 

flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”); Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 914 

(11th Cir. 1986) (“Judicial immunity is an absolute immunity; it applies even where a judge acts 

maliciously.”). Judicial immunity applies.5

 5 In a further attempt to bolster this objection, McCorvey states, “Case Law makes 

it clear that the Defendant did not nor never had any jurisdiction over this matter.” (Doc. 15, at 

12.) Plaintiff identifies no law that might support the proposition that a state-court judge would 

lack jurisdiction to enter rulings in these circumstances. More importantly, the pleadings and 

state court record confirm that Judge Weaver was not acting in the “clear absence of all 

jurisdiction;” therefore, he is entitled to judicial immunity for actions taken in his judicial 

capacity. Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are devoid of legal or factual support. McCorvey 

also devotes more than five pages of his Motion to a discussion of due process principles, 

apparently on the premise that judicial immunity does not apply to due process violations. (Doc. 

15, at 7-12.) McCorvey is mistaken. See, e.g., Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 164-65 (11th

Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claims against judge, where plaintiff claimed that 

(Continued)

Case 1:14-cv-00377-WS-C Document 16 Filed 11/14/14 Page 5 of 7
-6-

Fourth, McCorvey devotes several pages of his Motion for Reconsideration to a 

discussion of prosecutorial immunity. (See doc. 15, at 4-6.) Prosecutorial immunity has no 

application here. Judge Weaver is a judge, not a prosecutor; therefore, McCorvey’s claims 

against him are properly analyzed through the lens of judicial immunity, not prosecutorial 

immunity. To the extent that McCorvey seeks reconsideration of the October 21 Order based on 

principles of prosecutorial immunity, then, his Motion is frivolous.

Fifth, McCorvey assigns error to the October 21 Order’s alternate holding that dismissal 

of the claims against Judge Weaver was appropriate under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In 

doing so, McCorvey reasons that the lack of notice and the paucity of state-court rulings during 

the pendency of that case foreclose application of that doctrine. (Doc. 15, at 13.) However, the 

law is crystal clear that Rooker-Feldman “continues to apply with full force to cases brought by 

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the 

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 

judgments.” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Lozman v. City of 

Riviera Beach, Fla., 713 F.3d 1066, 1072 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine states 

that federal district courts have no authority to review final judgments of a state court.”) 

(citations omitted). That is precisely the case here; therefore, McCorvey’s claims against Judge 

Weaver (wherein he seeks to have this Court review and overturn Judge Weaver’s rulings in the 

underlying state court litigation) were properly dismissed via Rooker-Feldman principles.6

 

judge’s rulings in underlying case “violated Rolleston’s constitutional rights to due process and 

equal protection”); Frone v. City of Riverdale, 521 Fed.Appx. 789, 791 (11th Cir. June 5, 2013) 

(affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against judge on theories of due process and equal 

protection violations, because judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity).

6 Plaintiff’s position is not strengthened by his insistence that the October 21 Order 

erred in finding that McCorvey “had ample opportunity to raise any federal claims or issues he 

wished in the Monroe County Lawsuit at any time during its four-year lifespan.” (Doc. 21, at 7.) 

Plaintiff’s objection here is frivolous. Most notably, his Complaint documents numerous filings 

that he made and was permitted to make in the state court action, and on appeal. (See doc. 1, at 

2-4.) From plaintiff’s pleadings, it is clear that he had a full and fair opportunity to raise any 

federal issues he wanted in the state-court litigation. That he chose not to do so, or that the state 

courts ruled against him on those federal issues, does not entitle him to use the federal courts as a 

second layer of appeals from unfavorable state-court rulings.

Case 1:14-cv-00377-WS-C Document 16 Filed 11/14/14 Page 6 of 7
-7-

For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (doc. 15) is 

denied.

DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of November, 2014.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00377-WS-C Document 16 Filed 11/14/14 Page 7 of 7