Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01330/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01330-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAULINE HARRINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant. 

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Civil No. 07cv1330 JM(RBB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT [DOC. NO. 18],

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[DOC. NOS. 19, 20], AND

REMANDING FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff, Pauline Harrington, seeks judicial review of Social

Security Commissioner Michael J. Astrue’s determination that she is

not entitled to Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental

Security Income payments. On July 23, 2007, Plaintiff filed her

Complaint for Judicial Review and Remedy on Administrative Decision

Under the Social Security Act [doc. no. 1]. Defendant filed an

Answer [doc. no. 11] and filed the Administrative Record [doc. no.

12] on November 8, 2007.

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. no. 18] on

May 3, 2008, with a Memorandum in Support of Motion, requesting

that this Court reverse Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Larry

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Parker’s October 16, 2006, decision and order the payment of

benefits. (Pl.'s Mem. P. & A. 25.) On June 6, 2008, Defendant

filed two identical Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment [doc. nos.

19, 20]. Neither party filed an opposition to the Motion for

Summary Judgment filed by the other.

The Court finds this matter is suitable for decision without

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). S.D. Cal.

Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court

GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, DENIES

Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and REMANDS to the

Commissioner for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on January 5, 1957; she was forty-nine

years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. (Admin. R. 21, 249.) 

She has a high school education and past relevant work experience

as a nurse’s assistant, school cafeteria cook, and fast food cook. 

(Id. at 21.) Plaintiff claims to be disabled due to degenerative

osteoarthritis, obesity, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, atypical

chest pain, status post-knee surgery, depression, and diabetic

pedal neuropathy. (Id. at 18, 249, 296-97.)

Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance

Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) payments

on April 1, 2005. (Id. at 16.) Her claim was denied, and the

denial was upheld by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)

after reconsideration. (Id.) A hearing was held before ALJ Larry

Parker on October 3, 2006. (Id. at 316.) He issued a written

decision on October 16, 2006, finding Harrington was not disabled. 

(Id. at 23.) The denial of benefits became final when the Appeals

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Council upheld the ALJ’s decision on May 24, 2007. (Id. at 6-8.) 

Plaintiff then commenced this action for judicial review pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) on July 23, 2007. (Compl. 1);

see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (West 2008).

II. MEDICAL EVIDENCE

A. Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians

On October 2, 2001, Plaintiff complained of pain in her feet,

legs, hands and joints, and Doctor Gregory B. Fox diagnosed her

with hypertension, obesity, fatigue, and menopause/vasomotor

symptoms. (Admin. R. 157-58.) The physical examination showed she

enjoyed full range of motion at all joints and no inflammation. 

(Id. at 157.) Harrington was diagnosed with fatigue,

menopause/vasomotor symptoms probable perimenopausal, hypertension,

and obesity and recommended a low-fat and low-salt diet. (Id.) 

Doctor Fox, on February 13, 2002, diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic

hypertension and diabetes. (Id. at 152-53.)

On April 29, 2004, Plaintiff saw Christina M. Anderson, a

certified physician's assistant ("PA-C"), and complained of a

lesion on her right upper posterior thigh. (Id. at 174.) A

physical examination the following week showed that the lesion was

healing. (Id. at 173.) During that visit, Plaintiff “request[ed]

[a] statement that she needs to not work right now so that she can

get her health in order[,]” explaining that “[s]he has severe pain

that is unable to be controlled [by] meds and can be covered by

son-in-law’s insurance if she lives with them and cannot work.” 

(Id.)

On May 19, 2004, Anderson prepared a statement that Plaintiff

had hypertension, diabetes mellitus type 2, depression, allergic

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rhinitis and arthritic pain and that her osteoarthritis caused pain

in her knees, hands, shoulders and hips, which progressively

worsened and could not be controlled by conservative medical

therapy or rest. (Id. at 171.) The physician's assistant listed

prescribed medications for hypertension, diabetes mellitus and

allergic rhinitis, but she did not list any medication for

osteoarthritis. (Id.) Anderson explained that Plaintiff was

“unable to maintain one posture or perform motor activities for an

extended length of time[]” and that “employment at this time [was]

impractical.” (Id.)

On January 18, 2005, Plaintiff complained of experiencing

“light headedness/dizziness” during the prior two weeks. (Id. at

183.) She was referred to the "ER" for a workup. (Id.) On April

25, 2005, Plaintiff returned to Anderson and complained of stomach

pain and “burning like acid reflux.” (Id. at 170.) The

physician's assistant prescribed medication for hypertension,

diplopidemia, and diabetes mellitus; Anderson also recommended

dieting and exercise. (Id.)

Plaintiff saw Dr. Lori Strohecker on October 11, 2004, and on

July 14, 2005; she complained of dizziness when she gets up or lies

down and “off and on” chest pain. (Id. at 203, 280.) She also had

pain in her hands, lower back, and chest. (Id. at 280.) On July

26, 2005, Plaintiff asked for a refill of medication and complained

of feeling light-headed and experiencing dizziness lying down. 

(Id. at 201, 278.) A cardiology consultation was recommended. 

(Id. at 279-80.)

Dr. Tri T. Nguyen, a cardiologist, saw Plaintiff on July 29,

2005, for complaints of brief sharp chest pain, brief dull pressure

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chest pain, palpitations twice a week, and dizziness. (Id. at

211-216, 284-287.) She stated that she had “[n]o known drug

adverse reaction.” (Id. at 211.) The doctor performed an exercise

treadmill test, during which Plaintiff achieved 86% of the

predicted maximum heart rate for her age and 7.7 metabolic

equivalents (METs) without any exercise-induced dyspnea or chest

pain. (Id. at 212.) An ecocardiogram showed normal sinus rhythm

and mild left ventricular hypertrophy. (Id.) The ecocardiogram

findings were consistent with hypertensive heart disease. (Id.) 

Dr. Nguyen opined that Plaintiff did not have severe coronary

artery disease, but she had significant risk factors, including

diabetes mellitus, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, and obesity. 

(Id.) Dr. Nguyen recommended a strict diet and increased exercise. 

(Id.)

On September 1, 2005, Plaintiff complained to Dr. Strobecker

of pain in her hands, joints and knees. (Id. at 276.) She was

told to take Tylenol for the pain and to continue her other

medication. (Id.) Harrington returned to Dr. Strobecker on

December 7, 2005, and described pain in her knees and fingers,

difficulty sleeping, and dizziness. (Id. at 275.) She also asked

for of refill of all her medications. (Id.)

On April 28, 2006, Plaintiff saw Martin Taubman, D.P.M., for a

foot evaluation and complaints of painful/numb feet and bilateral

bunions. (Id. at 298.) At that appointment and again on September

1, 2006, Harrington denied past or present dizziness. (Id. at

296-98.) Dr. Taubman's diagnoses included diabetic pedal

neuropathy, onychomycosis, arteriosclerotic foot disease, and

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bunions on both feet. (Id.) He gave counseling on diabetes

mellitus foot care and recommended roomy shoes. (Id.)

On March 20, and April 11, 2006, Harrington reported that she

walked about two miles twice a week. (Id. at 261, 265.) Her

physician instructed her to diet, walk twenty minutes three times a

week, and sign up for swim class to treat obesity. (Id. at 261.) 

At her next appointment, Plaintiff stated that her arthritis was

bothering her and explained that she walked three times a week a

distance of about one and one-half miles. (Id. at 259.) She was

assessed as having arthritis and instructed to try water aerobics. 

(Id.)

On September 16, 2006, Plaintiff complained that she had back

pain and that her knee "pops" and hurts; she was prescribed Elavil

for pain and told to exercise. (Id. at 253.) The following week,

Plaintiff's treating physician advised her to watch her diet, start

water aerobics or continue walking three times a week to help with

her pain. (Id. at 252.) It was also noted that Plaintiff had lost

thirty pounds to 264 pounds in six months. (Id.)

B. Examining Physicians

On July 27, 2005, Ajit Raisinghani, M.D., a board-certified

internist and cardiologist, performed an internal medicine

evaluation of the Plaintiff. (Id. at 190-94.) Harrington

described constant and chronic joint pain in her hands, legs,

knees, hips, shoulders and back which worsened with physical

activity, “although she does stand and walk about 20 minutes.” 

(Id. at 190.) Plaintiff also complained of off-and-on chest pain

during the prior five months, usually occurring at night and

occasionally with exertion. (Id.) Harrington claimed to have

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taken medication for joint pain, and she had been given

nitroglycerin but experienced hot sweats, palpitations, and

dizziness from it. (Id.) Plaintiff weighed 291 pounds and was

described as fairly obese. (Id. at 191, 193.)

Dr. Raisinghani reported that Plaintiff's handgrip and wrist

range of motion were normal, with no joint deformity or warmth. 

(Id. at 191-92.) He noted that the range of motion in her neck,

back, shoulders, elbows, hands, wrists, hips, knees, feet, and

ankles was normal despite bilateral knee crepitus and complaints of

tenderness when touching her forearm and pain in her hands at

various joints. (Id. at 192-93.) The doctor explained that

Plaintiff’s diffuse joint pain did not represent any form of

connective tissue disease, and except for crepitus in both knees,

there was no overt effusion, swelling, or warmth of any joints. 

(Id. at 193.)

Dr. Raisinghani described the Plaintiff's limitations as

follows: “Lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally. Lift/carry 10 pounds

frequently. Stand and/or walk up to six hours in an eight-hour

day. Bend/crouch occasionally. Sit for six hours in an eight-hour

day.” (Id.)

Matthew Carroll, M.D., a board-certified psychiatrist,

performed an adult psychiatric evaluation on Harrington and

concluded that she had no mental restrictions. (Id. at 187-89,

233.)

C. Nonexamining Physicians

On August 8, 2005, George G. Spellman, M.D., completed a

Residual Functional Capacity form and concluded that Plaintiff

could occasionally lift and/or carry twenty pounds, frequently lift

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and/or carry ten pounds, stand and/or walk up to six hours in an

eight-hour workday, and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday. 

(Id. at 237-44.) He also found that she could never climb a

ladder, ropes or scaffolds, and only occasionally perform

balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching or crawling activities,

and Harrington should avoid workplace hazards and concentrated

exposure to extreme cold or heat, and to wetness or humidity. (Id.

at 239, 241.) His findings were affirmed by Dr. Thu N. Do on

October 18, 2005. (Id. at 244.)

On August 8, 2005, Emanuel H. Rosen, M.D., completed a

Psychiatric Review Technique form. (Id. at 217-34). He considered

Dr. Carroll’s psychiatric evaluation and agreed that Plaintiff did

not have a severe mental impairment. (Id.) Dr. Rosen's findings

were also affirmed. (Id. at 217, 219.)

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING

A. The Plaintiff’s Testimony

Harrington testified at a hearing before Judge Parker on

October 3, 2006. (Id. at 318-28.) She explained that she stopped

working in May 2004 because she had arthritis, experienced low

back, leg, and knee pain, and her blood pressure was high. (Id. at

321.) Christine Anderson, a physician’s assistant, saw her and

told her to stop working. (Id. at 321, 325.) She claimed to have

seen a doctor at the clinic in which Anderson worked but could not

recall the doctor’s name. (Id. at 325.) 

Plaintiff explained that her symptoms included “constant pain”

in her knees, legs, hands, shoulders, and lower back which, on a

scale of one to ten, she estimated to be an eight without

medication and a seven with medication. (Id. at 322-23.) She also

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claimed to have high blood pressure, difficulty sleeping, shortness

of breath, and acid reflux. (Id. at 322.) “Sitting too long,

walking, bending, stooping, [and] lifting[]” caused her pain. (Id.

at 322-23.) Harrington said that she experienced side effects from

her medication that include feeling dizzy, light-headed, tired and

weak. (Id. at 325.)

Plaintiff described her typical day as getting up and making

her bed, washing the morning dishes while standing for about ten

minutes, folding clothes, fixing her meals, taking two to three

brief naps, spending a majority of her time lying down, and

watching four or five hours of television. (Id. at 323-25.) She

also drives about three times a week to run errands. (Id. at 325.) 

Harrington estimated that she could stand about two hours,

walk about an hour, and sit about forty minutes in an eight-hour

workday. (Id. at 325-26.) She explained that based on the types

of activities she performs at home, she could lift and carry ten

pounds frequently for two to six hours in an eight-hour workday. 

(Id. at 326.) Plaintiff believes she could bend twice in an eighthour workday, but it would cause her pain; she does not crouch or

crawl, and she avoids stairs. (Id. at 327.)

B. The Medical Expert’s Testimony

Sheldon Steiner, M.D., testified at the hearing as a medical

expert. (Id. at 328-33.) He concluded that Harrington did not

meet any listing alone or in combination. (Id. at 329.) The

doctor explained that even though Harrington had some chest pain,

she had a negative cardiac evaluation, reached 7.7 METs on the

treadmill, and achieved eighty-six percent of the maximum heart

rate. (Id. at 329.) Additionally, the treadmill was on an uphill

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slope, and 7.7 METS is “pretty fast,” so “her knee couldn’t have

been hurting that much[.]” (Id. at 329.)

Dr. Steiner explained that Plaintiff showed no abnormalities

in her echocardiogram; she had hypertension in 2002, but it was

under control with no organ damage; her weight had dropped from 290

to 264, so she was able to loose weight; she exercised three times

a week for twenty minutes; her diabetes is under control with no

organ damage; and she has arthritis but was not on narcotic

medication. (Id. at 328-33.) He acknowledged that Dr. Raisinghani

diagnosed Plaintiff with crepitus bilaterally, but Dr. Steiner

found that Harrington did not require an assistive device to walk,

and she walked twenty minutes three times a week, which is a "fair

amount" of walking. (Id. at 333.) He also commented that she did

not require narcotic pain medication even though she exercised

often. “[Y]ou can’t sleep most of the day and lose 30 pounds in 6

months.” (Id. at 332.) Dr. Steiner opined that Harrington could

perform light work. (Id. at 333.)

C. The Vocational Expert’s Testimony

Nelly Katsell testified as a vocational expert. (Id. at 333-

35.) She classified the Plaintiff’s relevant work experience

during the past fifteen years, including skill and exertional level

as follows: "Nurse assistant DOT [Dictionary at Occupational

Titles] 355.674-014, SVP four, semiskilled, exertional level

medium. Cook/school cafeteria, DOT 313.381-030, SVP six, skilled,

exertional level medium. Cook/fast food, DOT 313.374-010, SVP

five, skilled, exertional level medium." (Id. at 333-34.) But

none of Plaintiff's skills were transferable. (Id. at 334.)

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When presented with a hypothetical using the claimant’s

testimony, Katsell stated Plaintiff would not be able to return to

either her past work or any other work. (Id.) The vocational

expert was given another hypothetical of a person who was three

months younger than fifty years old, had a high school equivalency

degree, could lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally, lift

and/or carry ten pounds frequently, stand and/or walk up to six

hours in an eight-hour workday, sit for six hours in an eight-hour

workday, and bend or crouch only occasionally; Katsell explained

that the person was below Plaintiff’s past work level, but there

were unskilled jobs that person could perform. (Id. at 334-35.) 

The unskilled jobs in the local and national economies included

"Counter clerk-photo finish, DOT 249.366-010, San Diego 1,600,

[United States] 140,000. Cashier-self service gasoline, DOT

211.462-010, San Diego area 17,000, [United States] 1,700,000. 

Office helper, DOT 239.687-010, San Diego 3,500, [United States]

170,000." (Id. at 335.)

IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION

After considering the record, ALJ Parker made the following

findings:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirement of

the Social Security Act through December 31, 2009.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since May 19, 2004, the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: 

diabetes mellitus, obesity, knee impairment and

depression.

. . . .

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically

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equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

. . . .

5. After careful consideration of the entire record,

the [ALJ] finds that the claimant has the residual

functional capacity to lift and carry 20 pounds

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She can sit,

stand and walk for 6 hours, each, in an 8 hour

workday. She should never climb ladders, ropes or

scaffolds and can occasionally climb stairs, bend,

kneel, crouch and crawl. She should avoid

concentrated exposure to extreme heat, cold, wet,

humidity and work place hazards. The claimant can

understand detailed but uncomplicated instructions

and simple, one/two step instructions, can maintain

concentration and attention for simple repetitive

work, can relate and interact with the public,

supervisors, and co-workers, and can tolerate low

and moderate to high stress work.

. . . .

6. The Claimant is unable to perform any past relevant

work.

. . . .

7. The claimant was born on January 5, 1957 and was 47

years old when the alleged disability onset, which

is defined as a younger individual age 45-49. The

claimant will turn 50 years of age on January 5,

2007, and will be an individual closely approaching

advanced age. Her 50th birthday is within 6 months

of the date of this decision.

8. The claimant has at least a high school education

and is able to communicate in English.

9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in

this case because claimant’s past relevant work is

unskilled.

10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, there

are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the

national economy that claimant can perform.

. . . .

///

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11. The claimant has not been under a "disability" as

defined in the Social Security Act, from May 19,

2004 through the date of this decision.

(Id. at 18-22 (citations omitted)). 

Based on all of the above, Judge Parker concluded that

Harrington is not entitled to a period of disability, or disability

insurance benefits or supplemental security income. (Id. at 22-

23.) 

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security

Act, an applicant must show two things: (1) He or she suffers from

a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to last

for a continuous period of twelve months or more or result in

death; and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable of

performing the work that he or she previously performed or any

other substantially gainful employment that exists in the national

economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A) (West 2008). An

applicant must meet both requirements to be classified as

“disabled.” Id.

Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act

allow applicants whose claims have been denied by the SSA to seek

judicial review of the Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (West 2008). The Court should

affirm the decision unless “it is based upon legal error or is not

supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d

1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d

599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)).

"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the ALJ’s]

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conclusion[,]” considering the record as a whole. Webb v.

Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It means “‘more than a mere

scintilla but less than a preponderance[]’” of the evidence. 

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1214 n.1 (quoting Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601). 

“‘[T]he court must consider the evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion . . . .’” Frost

v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 359, 366-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jones v.

Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Universal Camera

Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951).

To determine whether a claimant is “disabled,” the Social

Security regulations use a five-step process outlined in 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520 (West 2008). If an applicant is found to be “disabled”

or “not disabled” at any step, there is no need to proceed further. 

Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Schneider v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 974 (9th

Cir. 2000)). Although the ALJ must assist the applicant in

developing a record, the applicant bears the burden of proof during

the first four steps. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 & n.3

(9th Cir. 1999). If the fifth step is reached, however, the burden

shifts to the Commissioner. Id. at 1098. The steps for evaluating

a claim are as follows:

Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a

substantially gainful activity? If so, then the claimant

is “not disabled” within the meaning of the Social

Security Act and is not entitled to disability insurance

benefits. If the claimant is not working in a

substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s case

cannot be resolved at step one and the evaluation

proceeds to step two.

Step 2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If

not, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not

entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the

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claimant’s impairment is severe, then the claimant’s case

cannot be resolved at step two and the evaluation

proceeds to step three.

Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of

a list of specific impairments described in the

regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled” and

therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If

the claimant’s impairment neither meets nor equals one of

the impairments listed in the regulations, then the

claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and the

evaluation proceeds to step four.

Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he

or she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is

“not disabled” and is not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work

he or she did in the past, then the claimant’s case

cannot be resolved at step four and the evaluation

proceeds to the fifth and final step.

Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? 

If not, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore

entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the

claimant is able to do other work, then the Commissioner

must establish that there are a significant number of

jobs in the national economy that claimant can do. There

are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of

showing that there is other work in “significant numbers”

in the national economy that claimant can do: (1) by the

testimony of a vocational expert, or (2) by reference to

the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden,

the claimant is “not disabled” and therefore not entitled

to disability insurance benefits. If the Commissioner

cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability benefits.

Id. at 1098-99 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also

Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001) (giving

an abbreviated version of the five steps).

Section 405(g) permits this Court to enter a judgment

affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42

U.S.C.A. § 405(g)(West 2008). The matter may also be remanded to

the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

“If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or

reversing the Secretary’s conclusion, the court may not substitute

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its judgment for that of the Secretary.” Flaten v. Sec’y Health &

Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court must

uphold the denial of benefits if the evidence is susceptible to

more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the

ALJ's decision. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.

2005).

VI. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff complains that ALJ Parker erred by (1) relying on

the vocational expert, whose testimony was inconsistent with the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles; (2) mischaracterizing the

vocational expert's testimony; (3) relying on legally insufficient

reasons to discredit Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling pain; (4)

failing to consider the side effects from Plaintiff's medications;

(5) rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating provider without

appropriate findings; and (6) ignoring evidence from Harrington's

treating physician that she has a severe physical impairment which

significantly affected her ability to perform work activities. 

(Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 3, 10, 12, 20, 21, 23.) In his Cross-Motion

for Summary Judgment, Defendant asserts that the Commissioner’s

decision should not be disturbed because it was supported by

substantial evidence and based on proper legal grounds. (Def.’s

Mem. P. & A. 6.) 

A. Whether the ALJ Erred in Relying on the Testimony of the

Vocational Expert

Harrington argues that the ALJ’s decision limited her residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to simple repetitive tasks, which

corresponds to reasoning level one, but the three jobs cited by the

ALJ require reasoning at levels two and three, exceeding her RFC. 

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(Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 4-6.) Plaintiff concludes that the ALJ's

failure to evaluate the conflict between her level one RFC and the

level two and level three jobs cited by the vocational expert

requires the Court to reverse. (Id. at 6.)

Defendant argues that a reversal is not required because the

vocational expert “specifically indicated that the jobs that he

[sic] identified were ‘unskilled,’ which was consistent with

Plaintiff’s mental limitations and consistent with the DOT.”

(Def.’s Mem. P. & A. 9-10 (citation omitted).) The Commissioner

contends that “several courts have found level two reasoning to be

consistent with the ability to do simple, routine and/or repetitive

work tasks.” (Id. at 11.)

One measure of unskilled work is the specific vocational

preparation (“SVP”) level of a DOT listing, which addresses the

time it takes a typical worker to learn the job. Riggs v. Astrue,

No. C07-5242RJB-KLS, 2008 WL 1927337, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25,

2008). A job's General Education Development (“GED”) reasoning

level “by contrast, gauges the minimal ability a worker needs to

complete the job's tasks themselves.” Meissl v. Barnhart, 403 F.

Supp. 2d 981, 983 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Plaintiff argues that the GED

reasoning levels attributable to the three DOT listings the

vocation expert recommended (levels two and three) were

inconsistent with the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding,

and this unresolved conflict created reversible error.

Harrington argues that the ALJ's finding that she can only

perform "simple repetitive work" means that she is limited to jobs

with a level one GED rating. (Pl.'s Mem. P. & A. 6.) A job's SVP

is distinct from its GED rating. Riggs v. Astrue, No. C07-5242

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RJB-KLS, 2008 WL 1927337, at *19-20. The specific vocational

preparation score "specifies the vocational preparation required to

perform a job." Id. at *20 (quoting Cooper v. Barnhardt, 2004 WL

2381515, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 15, 2004). "'The reasoning level .

. . appears more similar to whether or not a claimant has a

limitation to performing only simple tasks.'" Id. Thus, the Court

will only address the GED reasoning levels.

1. The Residual Functional Capacity Designation of Plaintiff

at Level Two

The positions of counter clerk (DOT No. 249.366-010) and

office helper (formerly DOT No. 239.687-010, currently DOT No.

239.567-010) require reasoning at level two, which means the worker

must “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but

uninvolved written or oral instructions[] and [d]eal with problems

involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized

situations.” 1 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES Nos.

239.567-010, 249.366-010, at 210, 217 (4th ed., rev. 1991). The

cashier position, (DOT No. 211.462-010) requires reasoning at level

three; this employee must “[a]pply commonsense understanding to

carry out instructions furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic

form[] [and] [d]eal with problems involving several concrete

variables in or from standardized situations.” DOT, supra, No.

211.462-010, at 183. Reasoning at GED level one is defined as

“[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out simple one- or

two-step instructions[] [and] [d]eal with standardized situations

with occasional or no variables in or from these situations

encountered on the job.” DOT, supra, No. 230.687-010, at 205.

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The ALJ found that Harrington has the following residual

functional capacity:

The claimant can understand detailed

but uncomplicated instructions and

simple, one/two step instructions, can

maintain concentration and attention

for simple, repetitive work, can relate

and interact with the public,

supervisors, and co-workers, and can

tolerate low and moderate to high

stress work.

(Admin. R. 19.)

Judge Parker did not limit Plaintiff to only having the

ability to apply “commonsense understanding to carry out simple

one- or two-step instructions” or only “deal with standardized

situations with occasional or no variables,” which is the essence

of reasoning level one. DOT, supra, No. 230.687-010 at 205. 

Rather, he found that Plaintiff can understand “detailed but

uncomplicated instructions” and perform “simple, repetitive work.” 

(Admin. R. 19.) The residual functional capacity finding clearly

puts Plaintiff beyond reasoning at level one. But it does not go

so far as to encompass reasoning at level three, which includes

the ability to follow instructions "furnished in written, oral, or

diagrammatic form” and “[d]eal with problems involving several

concrete variables.” DOT, supra, No. 211.462-010 at 183. The ALJ

determined that Plaintiff could perform jobs that exceed reasoning

level one.

Additionally, even if Judge Parker had limited Plaintiff to

only simple, routine or repetitive work, courts have found that

consistent with reasoning at level two rather than at reasoning

level one, which is the lowest level of reasoning available. See

Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005)

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(explaining that the RFC which included simple and routine work

tasks appeared to be consistent with level-two reasoning); Meissl,

403 F. Supp. 2d at 983-85 (finding limitation to simple and

repetitive tasks closer to level-two reasoning than level one);

Riggs, 2008 WL 1927337, at *18 (finding level-two reasoning

because the ALJ did not mean to assign plaintiff to the lowest

level of the reasoning development scale).

But some courts take the position that reasoning level one is

more appropriate. See Lucy v. Chater, 113 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir.

1997) (requiring testimony from vocational expert to determine

whether claimant limited to following only simple instructions can

engage in unskilled sedentary work when many jobs in that category

require reasoning at level two or higher); Allen v. Barnhart, No.

C-02-3315 EDL, 2003 WL 22159050, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2003)

(finding that jobs with GED reasoning level of two, which

presupposes ability to follow detailed and involved instructions,

are not available for a worker who is limited to jobs with a

specific vocational preparedness of level one — simple, routine

tasks).

In this case, although the ALJ found that Plaintiff can

perform “simple, repetitive work,” he also found that she was

able to “understand detailed but uncomplicated instructions, and

simple one/two step instructions." (Admin. R. 19.) The ALJ did

not intend to relegate Plaintiff to the lowest rung on the

reasoning ladder; thus, he found her able to perform work

exceeding reasoning at level one, which is supported by

substantial evidence in the record.

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This Court agrees with the analysis in Riggs v. Astrue, No.

C07-5242RJB-KLS, 2008 WL 1929337, at *21. "There is no

inconsistency between the [two] jobs identified by the vocational

expert and adopted by the ALJ requiring level 2 reasoning and the

limitation to simple instructions and decisions." Id. Judge

Parker did not err by relying on the testimony of the vocational

expert.

2. Whether the ALJ’s Failure to Ask the Vocational Expert

if Her Testimony Conflicted With the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles Created Reversible Error

Social Security Ruling 00-4p provides: 

[B]efore relying on VE or VS evidence to

support a disability determination or

decision, our adjudicators must: Identify and

obtain a reasonable explanation for any

conflicts between occupational evidence

provided by VEs or VSs and information in the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) . . .

and Explain in the determination or decision

how any conflict that has been identified was

resolved.

Soc. Sec. Ruling 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *1 (Dec. 4, 2000). 

The Ninth Circuit interpreted this ruling in Massachi v. Astrue,

486 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2007), and described the responsibilities

at the ALJ as follows: 

For the first time, we address the

question whether, in light of the

requirements of SSR 00-4p, the ALJ may rely

on a vocational expert's testimony regarding

the requirements of a particular job without

first inquiring whether the testimony

conflicts with the Dictionary of Occupational

Titles. We hold that an ALJ may not.

Id. at 1152.

///

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Where there is an apparent conflict between the VE’s

testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, “at a

minimum” the ALJ must “inquire through a vocational expert into

the possible inconsistency.” Clarendon v. Astrue, No. ED CV

07-1520-E, 2008 WL 2561894, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2008)

(remanding where ALJ improperly relied on the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines with no vocational expert testimony); Burns v.

Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 127 (3rd Cir. 2002) (finding that Social

Security Ruling 00-4p requires the ALJ to ask the vocational

expert whether any possible conflicts exist between the

vocational expert's testimony and the DOT). The ALJ must then

“explain in his decision how the conflict was resolved.” Burns,

312 F.3d at 127; see also Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d

789, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that an explanation and

persuasive supporting evidence must accompany any administrative

deviation from the DOT).

 Here, the ALJ never asked the vocational expert, Nelly

Katsell, if her testimony conflicted with the DOT. (Admin. R.

333-36.) Instead, Katsell simply identified two reasoning level

two jobs that Plaintiff could hold: "Counter clerk-photo finish,

DOT 249.366-010, San Diego 1,600, [United States] 140,000 . . . .

[and] Office helper, 239.687-010, regional San Diego 3,500,

[United States] 170,000." (Id. at 335.)

Judge Parker found that Harrington could not perform her

past relevant work. (Id. at 21.) The finding that she could

perform other jobs that exist in the national economy was based

on the two and one-half pages of testimony given by the

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vocational expert. (Id. at 333-35). The result in this case is

dictated by the conclusion in Massachi.

[T]he ALJ did not ask the vocational expert

whether her testimony conflicted with the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles and, if so,

whether there was a reasonable explanation

for the conflict. Thus, we cannot determine

whether the ALJ properly relied on her

testimony. As a result, we cannot determine

whether substantial evidence supports the

ALJ's step-five finding that Wassachi could

perform other work. Accordingly, we instruct

the district court to remand this case so

that the ALJ can perform the appropriate

inquiries under SSR 00-4p.

Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d at 1153-54 (footnotes omitted). ALJ

Parker's step-five analysis suffers from the same defect.

B. Whether the ALJ's Hypothectical Mischaracterized the

Testimony of the Vocational Expert

Plaintiff argues that “the final RFC of the ALJ’s decision

did not correspond to the hypothetical question posed to the

vocational expert at the hearing.” (Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 10.)

Harrington contends that the “hypothetical RFC question was

missing at least fourteen limitations which were contained in the

final RFC . . . . (Id. at 11 (citation omitted).) Therefore, the

ALJ's findings were not supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to include

mental limitations in his hypothetical question to the vocational

expert which “renders the subsequent testimony of the vocational

expert void of evidentiary value.” (Id. at 12.)

In support of his Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,

Defendant argues that “[t]o the extent that Plaintiff . . .

complains of the ALJ’s failure to include all environmental

and/or postural limitations, there was no error because VE

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testimony was not necessary as such limitations do not erode the

light work occupational base.” (Def.’s Mem. P. & A. 10.) 

Additionally, “[b]ecause the ALJ’s mental RFC finding was

consistent with unskilled work, there is no basis for a remand

based on an incomplete hypothetical question.” (Id.) Defendant

concludes that reversal or remand is not required because any

omission of these limitations from the hypothetical questions

posed to the vocational expert is harmless error. (Id.)

The claimant bears the burden of establishing her disability

and the medical severity of physical and mental impairments which

prevent her from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b-f),

416.920(b-f) (West 2008). At step five of the disability

analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the

claimant can perform other gainful work that exists in

substantial numbers in the economy. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d

715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998).

If the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence

and properly applied law, it will not be reversed for harmless

error. See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir.

1990). The ALJ may rely on the testimony of the VE to make

“specific findings showing that the claimant has the physical and

mental capacity to perform specified jobs, taking into

consideration the requirements of the job as well as the

claimant’s age, education, and background.” Hall v. Sec’y of

Health, Educa. & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir. 1979).

Hypotheticals posed to the vocational expert must include

“‘all of the claimant's functional limitations, both physical and

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mental’ supported by the record.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562,

570-71 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1043 (9th Cir. 1995). Where an incomplete hypothetical is posed,

the vocational expert's opinion that the claimant can perform

jobs in the national economy is not supported by competent

evidence. Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1466 n.3 (9th Cir.

1996); see also DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 850 (9th Cir.

1991).

The ALJ may properly limit questioning of the vocational

expert to only physical impairments, if there are no mental

impairments supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir.2001); see also

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217. “[A]n ALJ may accept or reject

alleged restrictions in a hypothetical question that are not

supported by substantial evidence.” McHugh v. Astrue, No. C

06-3616 JL, 2008 WL 3876475, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008)

(citing Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1164-65); accord Bradford v.

Astrue, No. EDCV 07-1022-JTL, 2008 WL 2523833, at *7 (C.D. Cal.

June 20, 2008).

1. Functional Limitations

Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ found more functional

limitations than those posed in his questions to the VE, the

hypotheticals were incomplete and had no evidentiary value. 

(Pl.'s Mem. P. & A. 10-11). Judge Parker found that Harrington's

functional limitations were as follows:

[T]he claimant has the residual capacity to

lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10

pounds frequently. She can sit, stand and

walk for 6 hours, each, in an 8 hour workday. 

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She should never climb ladders, ropes or

scaffolds and can occasionally climb stairs,

bend, kneel, crouch and crawl. She should

avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat,

cold, wet, humidity and work place hazards.

(Admin. R. 19.) But during the hearing, the ALJ posed the

following hypothetical:

[H]ypothetical person one would be closing

[sic] approaching advanced age as the

claimant will be within 3 months or less

50, and also GED, high school equivalency

degree, and using Dr. [Raisinghani’s] and

Dr. Steiner’s testimony, that is 20 pounds

occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, stand

or walk up to 6 out of 8 hours a day, sit

for 6 out of 8, bending and crouch [sic]

only occasionally.

. . . .

. . . Are there jobs available that the

hypothetical person could perform with

those limitations?

(Id. at 334-35.) 

Judge Parker found that Plaintiff should “never climb

ladders, ropes or scaffolds” and occasionally climb stairs,

kneel, and crawl, and she “should avoid concentrated exposure

to extreme heat, cold, wet, humidity and work place hazards.” 

(Id. at 19.) These additional limitations do not change her

ability to perform unskilled light work activity. See Soc.

Sec. Ruling 83-14, 1983 WL 31254, at * 5 (1983) ([T]here are

nonexertional limitations or restrictions which have very

little or no effect on the unskilled light occupational base. 

Examples are inability to ascend or descend scaffolding, poles,

and ropes; inability to crawl on hands and knees . . . .

Environmental restrictions . . . would also not significantly

affect the potential unskilled light occupational base.”); see

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also Soc. Sec. Ruling 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at * 7 (1985) (“If

a person can stoop occasionally[,] . . . the sedentary and

light occupational base is virtually intact.”). The failure to

include these additional functional limitations, which have a

negligible effect on a person’s ability to perform unskilled

light work, is harmless error.

2. Mental Limitations

Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ found mental

limitations that were not included in the hypothetical to the

VE, the hypothetical was incomplete and lacked evidentiary

value. (Pl.'s Mem. P. & A. 12.) The ALJ found that Harrington

had minimal mental limitations.

The claimant can understand detailed but

uncomplicated instructions and simple,

one/two step instructions, can maintain

concentration and attention for simple

repetitive work, can relate and interact with

the public, supervisors, and co-workers, and

can tolerate low and moderate to high stress

work.

(Admin. R. 19.) The ALJ’s hypothetical did not include any of

these limitations. (Id. at 334-35.)

Prior to the administrative hearing, Plaintiff had been

treated for depression and prescribed Zoloft. (Id. at 171,

203-06.) She was examined by Dr. Carroll on June 30, 2005, and

he concluded that Harrington had no mental restrictions. (Id.

at 187-89.) Dr. Rosen, a nonexamining physician who completed

the Psychiatric Review Technique form, noted that Plaintiff had

a depressive disorder" (id. at 222) but agreed that she did not

have a severe mental impairment. (Id. at 219.) Plaintiff

submitted no other medical evidence of mental limitations. 

Additionally, at the hearing she did not discuss any mental

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limitations. (Id. at 318-28.) Nevertheless, the ALJ found

that Harrington was suffering from depression, although it was

insufficient, alone or in combination with other severe

impairments, to meet or equal the criteria contained in the

Commissioner's listing of impairments. (Id. at 18).

The hypothetical posed to the VE must include all of the

claimant's limitations which are supported by evidence in the

record. See Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1165; accord Bayliss, 427

F.3d at 1217; Thomas, 278 F.3d at 956; Flores, 49 F.3d at

570-71. In Osenbrock, like here, "[t]he omission of depression

from the hypothetical question is supported by substantial

evidence in the record." Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1165. There

was no evidence that establishes that Harrington's depression

"presented [a] significant interference with the ability to

perform basic work-related activities." Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at

1165. Therefore, the question to the vocational expert was

proper and is supported by substantial evidence.

C. Whether the ALJ Relied on Legally Insufficient Reasons to

Discredit Plaintiff’s Allegations of Disabling Pain

Harrington contends that nine of the reasons given by the

ALJ for rejecting her excess pain testimony were legally

insufficient. (Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 12-19.)

 In his findings, ALJ Parker explained that “the

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably

be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, but . . . the

claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible.” 

(Admin. R. 19.) The ALJ then gave the specific reasons why he

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did not believe the Plaintiff’s excess pain testimony. (Id.

at 20.)

An ALJ may reject a claimant’s subjective pain or symptom

testimony entirely if the claimant fails to produce any

objective medical evidence of an impairment that could

reasonably be expected to produce the claimed symptoms or pain.

Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986); accord

Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th

Cir. 2004). The severity of pain need not be proven by

objective medical evidence; the medical evidence must only show

that it “could reasonably have caused some degree of the

symptom.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citing Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1994);

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)).

The level of pain experienced from a given physical

impairment varies from person to person. Smolen, 80 F.3d at

1282 (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 601). “Unless there is

affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering,

the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s

testimony must be ‘clear and convincing.’” Reddick, 157 F.3d

at 722 (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th

Cir.1995); Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir.

1989)). The ALJ must provide “specific, cogent reason[s] for

the disbelief” to reject a claimant's subjective complaints. 

Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). There 

must be specific findings “stat[ing] which pain testimony is

not credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not

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credible.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.

1993). Social Security Ruling 96-7p provides as follows:

It is not sufficient for the adjudicator

to make a single, conclusory statement that

"the individual's allegations have been

considered" or that "the allegations are (or

are not) credible." It is also not enough

for the adjudicator simply to recite the

factors that are described in the regulations

for evaluating symptoms. The determination

or decision must contain specific reasons for

the finding on credibility, supported by the

evidence in the case record, and must be

sufficiently specific to make clear to the

individual and to any subsequent reviewers

the weight the adjudicator gave to the

individual's statements and the reasons for

that weight.

Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996).

 “[A] finding that the claimant lacks credibility cannot

be premised wholly on a lack of medical support for the

severity of his pain.” Light, 119 F.3d at 792 (citing Lester

v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 834; Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d at 1407

(explaining “‘[e]xcess pain’ is, by definition, pain that is

unsupported by objective medical findings[]”)); see also Soc.

Sec. Ruling, No. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *5-6 (stating that

the absence of objective medical evidence substantiating the

pain testimony must be considered along with the entire record

including the claimant’s pain testimony in evaluating

credibility).

In weighing a claimant’s credibility, the

ALJ may consider his reputation for

truthfulness, inconsistencies either in his

testimony or between his testimony and his

conduct, his daily activities, his work

record, and testimony from physicians and

third parties concerning the nature,

severity, and effect of the symptoms of

which he complains.

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Light, 119 F.3d at 792. “The ALJ can disregard a claimant's

self-serving statements if they are unsupported by objective

findings.” Maounis v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir.

1984). 

Questions of credibility are left to the ALJ to resolve. 

Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982)(citing

Waters v. Gardner, 452 F.2d 855, 858 n.7 (9th Cir. 1971)).

Courts should not “second-guess” credibility determinations. 

Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 580 (9th Cir. 1984). If the

evidence is conflicting and could be rationally interpreted

more than one way, the court “must uphold the decision of the

ALJ." Id. at 579. Where the ALJ’s credibility assessment is

supported by substantial evidence, it will not be disturbed

even where some of the reasons for discrediting a claimant's

testimony are properly discounted. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242

F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001).

The ALJ may make credibility determinations, but he

“cannot insulate ultimate conclusions regarding disability

from review by turning them into questions of 'credibility.'" 

Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 1985); see also

Hammock v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1989). It is

improper to reject pain simply because it is "out of

proportion" to the objective medical findings. Estala v.

Sullivan, No. CV F-88-447-ADC, 1989 WL 280269, at *3-4 (E.D.

Cal. Aug. 31, 1989) (finding that ALJ did not rely on

substantial evidence to discredit claimant and claimant’s

doctor’s testimony regarding her severe pain). It is not

enough to merely list multiple factors to discredit pain

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testimony without explaining how those factors affected the

claimant's credibility. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152,

1158 n.13 (9th Cir. 1989).

1. Harrington's Failure to Take Narcotic Pain

Medication

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s first reason to discredit

her pain allegation, that she was not taking medication for

pain, was insufficient because he “failed to specify the names

of specific medications that he has deemed associated with

severe disabling pain[,] [and] . . . without additional

evaluation from the ALJ, it is unclear whether the combination

of Plaintiff’s multiple medications and her gastroesophageal

reflux disease (GERD) prevented her from taking other pain

medications.” (Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 14.)

Defendant maintains that the ALJ’s decision was properly

supported by the fact that “Plaintiff was not receiving

treatment consistent with severe disabling pain such as

narcotic medication.” (Def.’s Mem. P. & A. 7 (citation

omitted).) Additionally, “[h]er treating physician diagnosed

a number of conditions, but did not mention any work-related

restrictions." (Id. (citations omitted).)

Here, the record does not support Plaintiff’s contention,

raised for the first time in this motion, that the combination

of Plaintiff’s multiple medications and her gastroesophageal

reflux disease (“GERD”) prevented her from taking other pain

medications. Her doctors never expressed a desire to place

her on narcotic pain medication or chose not to do so because

of complications with her medication regimen, nor was

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Plaintiff ever diagnosed with GERD, but she complained of acid

reflux. (Admin. R. 170, 332.) Harrington's pain was treated

with "over-the-counter pain relievers and prescription antiinflammatory medications." (Id. at 171.) “The ALJ can

disregard a claimant's self-serving statements if they are

unsupported by objective findings.” Maounis, 738 F.2d at

1034. Thus, the medical record did not require Judge Parker

to consider whether Plaintiff’s other medications or her

stomach complaints prevented her from taking pain medications.

The ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s failure to seek

or receive narcotic pain medication for her allegedly

disabling pain. He may also discredit subjective pain

complaints where the claimant received “minimal” and

“conservative” treatment. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

1114 (9th Cir. 1999). "Another relevant factor may be

'unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek

treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.'” 

Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (en

banc) (quoting Fair v. Bowers, 885 F.2d at 603). ALJ Parker

found Plaintiff’s testimony about severe disabling pain

unconvincing in light of the evidence that she failed to seek

or receive more than minimal and conservative pain treatment. 

This reason for concluding that Plaintiff’s pain testimony was

not credible is supported by clear and convincing evidence. 

2. Dr. Raisinghani's Conclusion About Light Work

Harrington argues that Dr. Raisinghani's conclusion that

Plaintiff could perform light work was not an adequate reason

to reject her complaints of severe pain because “Dr.

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Raisinghani’s actual findings revealed bilateral knee

crepitus[,] [and] [he] also opined Plaintiff may have some

degenerative changes.” (Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 15 (citations

omitted).)

Defendant counters that the ALJ properly assessed

Plaintiff's subjective complaints because “[h]er treating

physician diagnosed a number of conditions, but did not

mention any work-related restrictions." (Def.’s Mem. P. & A.

8 (citations omitted).)

 The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had a knee

impairment, but he discounted the “intensity, persistence and

limiting effects” that Plaintiff claimed. (Admin. R. 19.) 

“[O]nce the claimant produces objective medical evidence of an

underlying impairment, an adjudicator may not reject a

claimant's subjective complaints based solely on a lack of

objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged

severity of pain.” Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345 (emphasis added). 

Here, ALJ Parker reviewed the record as a whole to come to his

conclusions. See generally Light, 119 F.3d at 792; Soc. Sec.

Ruling, No. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *5-6. Although Dr.

Raisinghani diagnosed Plaintiff with bilateral knee crepitus,

he concluded that Harrington was able to perform light work

(Admin. R. 20, 192-93.) The doctor found that Plaintiff was

able to perform certain physical tasks, contrary to what she

claimed at the hearing. (Compare id. at 193, with id. at 325-

28.) Dr. Raisinghani's conclusion, when coupled with the

other reasons given by Judge Parker for rejecting the

Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain, was supported by

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the record and establishes clear and convincing evidence for

finding Plaintiff's pain testimony was not credible.

3. Connective Tissue Disease, Overt Effusion, Swelling

or Warmth of Any Joints 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s third reason to reject

her complaints of pain was erroneous. (Pl.'s Mem. P. & A. 15-

16.) Judge Parker relied on Dr. Raisinghani's statement that

Plaintiff did not have connective tissue disease, overt

effusion, swelling or warmth of any joints." (Admin. R. 20.) 

Harrington states that “Dr. Martin Taubman, noted Plaintiff’s

feet were warm with edema and moderate pitting.” (Id. at 16.) 

She argues that his opinion should be given more weight

because “Dr. Taubman’s examinations were conducted from April

2006 to September 2006 and represent a more accurate picture

of Plaintiff’s physical condition.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not

address the ALJ's "seventh" [sic] (Id. at 20) reason for

rejecting her excess pain allegation. "Dr. Taubman stated

that the claimant has a diabetic pedal neuropathy,

arteriosclerotic disease of her feet and bunions on her feet. 

However, he only prescribed wearing rooming [sic] shoes. He

did not mention any work related restrictions." (Id.

(citation omitted).) The Defendant argues that this finding

shows that Dr. Taubman's conclusions do not undermine Dr.

Raisignhani's opinion. (Def.'s Mem. P. & A. 7.)

Dr. Taubman’s examination notes are objective medical

evidence of underlying symptoms; thus, ALJ Parker may not

reject Plaintiff’s pain complaint based solely on a lack of

objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged

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severity of pain associated with her underlying ailments. 

Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345. The ALJ considered Dr. Taubman’s

examinations. The doctor’s recommendation indicates that the

pain associated with his diagnosis is not as severe or

debilitating as Plaintiff claims. Additionally, Harrington

agrees that Dr. Raisinghani correctly stated that she was not

suffering from a connective tissue disease. (Pl.’s Mem. P. &

A. 15.) Dr. Taubman’s examination notes, recommendation of

“roomy shoes,” and his failure to specify any work-related

limitations support the decision that Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints of pain were not credible. 

4. Severe Coronary Artery Disease

Harrington argues that the ALJ’s fourth reason for

rejecting her complaints of pain — that she did not have

severe coronary artery disease — “failed to specify what

aspects of Plaintiff’s testimony is undermined by the fact

that the ALJ did not conclude that Plaintiff’s coronary artery

disease was not severe.” (Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 16-7.) 

Defendant explains that “[a]s to Plaintiff’s complaints

of chest pain, it was not related to a medical condition such

as severe coronary disease, but was of unknown etiology[,]”

and “the medical evidence such as Dr. Raisinghani’s opinion

showed that Plaintiff could perform light work.” (Def.’s Mem.

P. & A. 8 (citations omitted).) 

At the administrative hearing, the medical expert

described his assessment of Plaintiff’s medical records. 

(Admin. R. 19.)

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[T]he complainant had complained of chest

pain and was seen by Dr. Nguyen, who stated .

. . although complainant was severely obese,

after performing several cardiac tests,

including an exercise treadmill test where

claimant achieved 7.7 METS and 86% of the

predicted maximum heart rate for her age

without exercise induced chest pain, dyspnea,

ST depression or arrhythmia. 

(Id.)

The ALJ considered the inconsistencies between

Plaintiff’s pain testimony and cardiac tests in making his

credibility determination. Light, 119 F.3d at 792. In

addition, Plaintiff’s performance on the treadmill test,

without experiencing pain or other adverse effects, is

inconsistent with a claim of excessive chest or joint pain. 

The ALJ's third reason for finding that Plaintiff’s pain

testimony was not credible is supported by clear and

convincing evidence.

E. Losing Weight, Not Using an Assistive Device to

Walk, and Being Advised to Walk Three Times a Week 

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s fifth through seventh

reasons to discredit her pain allegation which were that she

has been successful in losing weight; Plaintiff did not use

an assistive device to walk; and her treating physician

advised her to walk three times a week. (Pl.’s Mem. P. & A.

17-18.) Harrington complains that the ALJ failed to describe

which corresponding testimony is not credible, and she argues

that exercising three times a week is not inconsistent with

her pain allegations. Id.

In his Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the

Commissioner asserts that Harrington’s complaints of pain

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were inconsistent with findings that “(1) she did not use an

assistive device to walk even before losing some weight, and

(2) her doctors advised her to walk at least 20 minutes three

times a week even when she complained of pain . . . .” 

(Def.’s Mem. P. & A. 8.)

Harrington correctly points out that in Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d at 722, the Ninth Circuit wrote that

“‘[g]eneral findings are insufficient; rather the ALJ must

identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence

undermines the claimant’s complaints.’” (Pl.’s Mem. P. & A.

17 (quoting Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722).) Judge Parker,

however, did not make insufficient "general findings."

Reddick cites Lester v. Charter, 81 F. 3d at 834, and

Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d at 918, as authority for

requiring an identification of what testimony is not

credible. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. In Lester, 81 F.3d at

834, “the ALJ offered her conclusion that the claimant’s

complaints were ‘not credible’ and ‘exaggerated,’ [but] she

did not provide any specific reasons for her disbelief other

than a lack of objective evidence.” Likewise, in Dodrill, 12

F.3d at 918, the court gave the following reasons for

discrediting the claimant:

[The ALJ] did note that Dodrill left her last

job not because of medical necessity, but to

follow her husband to the State of Washington

when he retired, [citation omitted], and that

her general condition “appears to be the same

as when she was employed,” [citation

omitted]. But beyond these observations, he

merely repeated that there was little or

nothing in the record to support Dodrill’s

claims . . . .

Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 918.

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Judge Parker’s reasoning is sufficiently specific. In

his decision, the ALJ stated that claimant has alleged a

“knee impairment,” but he explained that the medical expert

opined that Plaintiff’s “knee appears to be fine as evidenced

by the fact that she did so well on her treadmill test. . . .

[H]er hypertension is under control and she has lost weight. 

In fact, on September 30, 2006, the claimant was reported to

have lost 30 pounds in sixth [sic] months.” (Admin R. 19

(citation omitted).) Judge Parker stated that Harrington

“will continue to help herself if she loses more weight.”

(Id.)

With regard to her joint pain, the ALJ found no evidence

that her obesity had an effect on her joints, and “[a]lthough

she does complain about her knees, there is no objective

evidence that there is a problem . . . .” (Id.) The ALJ

added that she worked after her knee surgery, was not taking

narcotic pain medication, and did not use an assistive device

to walk. (Id. at 20.)

The determination that Plaintiff was successful in

losing weight and would continue to benefit from further

weight loss is a legitimate consideration in evaluating a

Plaintiff’s claim of excessive pain. In Osenbrock v. Apfel,

240 F.3d at 1165-66, the Ninth Circuit upheld the ALJ’s

rejection of the claimant’s allegation of pain in excess of

the medical findings. Id. The ALJ concluded that the

claimant’s limitation of daily activities was self-imposed

and predicted that the claimant could improve his position if

motivated to do so. Id. at 1166-67. Plaintiff’s ability to

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lose weight and her ability to continue her weight loss are

clear and convincing reasons for discrediting her claim of

excessive pain.

Evidence that Harrington did not use an assistive device

to walk and that her treating physician advised her to walk

three times a week is inconsistent with a claim of disabling

pain. The ALJ may discredit the Plaintiff’s claims of

excessive pain based on inconsistencies in the evidence. See

Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346. “These findings, properly

supported by the record, [are] sufficiently specific to allow

a reviewing court to conclude that the adjudicator rejected

the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds . . . .” Id.

Thus, the fifth, sixth, and seventh reasons for discrediting

Harrington’s excess pain allegations are clear and

convincing.

6. Attending the Hearing, Participating in Her Own Behalf,

and Taking Care of Her Personal Needs

Plaintiff contends that “[d]enial of benefits cannot be

based on the ALJ’s observations [at the hearing], when the

applicant’s statements to the contrary are supported by

objective evidence.” (Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 18.) She also

argues that discrediting her pain testimony because she did

not need assistance with her “personal needs” was erroneous

because “[t]he Social Security Act does not require that

claimant’s [sic] be utterly incapacitated to be eligible for

benefits, and many home activities may not be easily

transferable to a work environment where it might be

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impossible to rest periodically or take medication.” (Id. at

19.)

The Defendant does not address all of the ALJ’s reasons

for his credibility assessment. Instead, he argues that the

medical and related evidence were the “main, specific, and

legitimate reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony.” 

(Def.’s Mem. P. & A. 8.) 

The Ninth Circuit rejects "sit and squirm

jurisprudence," explaining that “[d]enial of benefits cannot

be based on the ALJ's observation of [claimant], when

[claimant]'s statements to the contrary . . . are supported

by objective evidence.” Perminter v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 870,

872 (9th Cir. 1985). But there is a difference between a

denial of benefits based on the ALJ’s observations and the

consideration of those observations. “‘The inclusion of the

ALJ’s personal observations does not render the decision

improper.’” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d

595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted)); accord

Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, the ALJ’s reliance on personal observations of

Plaintiff does not constitute clear and convincing evidence.

Finally, the ALJ may consider the claimant’s daily

activities and may reject excess pain allegations where the

person “is able to spend a substantial part of her day

performing household chores or other activities that are

transferable to a work setting.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284

n.7. The claimant need not be “utterly incapacitated” to

obtain disability benefits. Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. The ALJ

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may consider whether a Plaintiff’s daily activities

contradict her claim of excess pain. But Judge Parker’s

findings do not attempt to correlate Harrington’s daily

activities to a particular type of job.

The ALJ may not reject Plaintiff’s pain testimony based

on his personal observations or because Plaintiff can take

care of her personal needs without assistance, especially

when those tasks are not transferable to a work setting. The

last two reasons for not crediting Plaintiff’s allegations of

disabling pain are not clear and convincing. 

Where the ALJ’s determination is otherwise supported by

substantial evidence, it will not be disturbed even where

some of the reasons for discrediting a claimant's testimony

are properly discounted. See Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1148. 

Because the ALJ’s other reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s

complaint of excessive pain are clear and convincing, the

decision to discredit Plaintiff’s claim of disabling pain is

supported by substantial evidence. 

D. Whether the ALJ Properly Excluded Plaintiff’s Claims of

Side Effects From Her Medications

Harrington maintains that the ALJ “has a duty to

consider factors such as medication side effects and

subjective symptom testimony in determining a claimant’s

disability.” (Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 20.) She states that the

record “repeatedly outline[s] her complaints to her treating

physicians of side effects from medication including

tiredness, diarrhea, drowsiness, fainting, lightheadedness,

and stomach aches.” (Id. at 20 (citation omitted).) 

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Plaintiff testified that she suffered from side effects from

medication, including “dizziness and tiredness/sleepiness.”

(Id. (citation omitted).) Harrington argues that the ALJ

failed to analyze medication side effects and did not include

side effect symptoms in the hypothetical he posed to the

vocational expert. (Id. at 20-21.)

According to the Defendant, “Plaintiff mischaracterizes

the record when alleging that the ALJ did not take into

account of [sic] her side effects from medication. The

record is devoid of any references to side effects: the only

notations in the record [are] that Plaintiff complained of

various problems of unknown etiology and that her medications

were simply refilled.” (Def.’s Mem. P. & A. 8.)

The ALJ must consider as a whole all factors that have a

“significant impact on an individual’s ability to work,”

which may include medication side effects and subjective

evidence of pain. Erickson v. Shalala, 9 F.3d 813, 817 (9th

Cir. 1993) (citing Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

846 F.2d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1988)(discussing step five of the

disability analysis). The failure to consider side effects

of medication is not error where the side effects are not

supported by the record. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217

(noting “there was record support that did not depend on

Bayliss’s subjective complaints[]"); accord Thomas, 278 F.3d

at 960 (finding that ALJ properly excluded claimant’s alleged

side effects in hypothetical where “the only evidence

regarding these symptoms is [claimant’s] own statements to

her doctor and her testimony at the hearing[]”).

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Here, there was no objective evidence of medication side

effects. Plaintiff made some statements to the doctors

explaining symptoms, most often dizziness while lying down,

and testified that she experienced dizziness and tiredness. 

(Admin. R. 144, 147, 183, 201, 203, 211, 256, 275, 278, 280,

324-25). When Harrington’s attorney asked if she had any

side effects from medications, Plaintiff responded, “Dizzy. 

I’m dizzy. Dizzy and light headed, and tiredness. I’m tired

and weak all the time.” (Id. at 325.) Yet, when examined by

Dr. Nguyen on August 6, 2005, Plaintiff reported, “No known

drug adverse reaction.” (Id. at 211.) Furthermore, her

doctors never attributed her dizziness, or other complaints,

to side effects of medication, nor did they alter her

medication as a result of Plaintiff’s complaints.

Where the only evidence of medication side effects is

Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ may properly exclude that

evidence. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 960. The ALJ’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence despite his failure to

address the side effects of medication.

E. Whether the ALJ Rejected the Opinion of Plaintiff’s

Treatment Provider Without Making Appropriate Findings

Plaintiff argues that Judge Parker improperly rejected

the opinion of her treatment provider, physician assistant

Christina M. Anderson, dated May 19, 2004, which stated that

full time employment would be “impractical” at that time. 

(Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. 21-22.) Harrington challenges the three

reasons the ALJ set forth to justify his rejection of

Anderson’s opinion. (Id. at 22-23.) 

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Defendant argues, “The ALJ properly relied on the State

Agency physicians’ opinions, which were consistent with the

overall record.” (Def.’s Mem. P. & A. 6 (citation omitted).) 

Additionally, “none of Plaintiff’s doctors found limitations

in excess of the RFC finding, and the medical assistant’s

opinion was not reliable. . . . [Her] broad statement failed

[sic] short from setting specific limitations and was an

opinion on the ultimate issue of disability, which is

reserved to the Commissioner.” (Id. at 6-7 (citation

omitted) (footnote omitted).) The Commissioner adds that

“the letter [by PA-C Anderson] appeared to have been written

to accommodate Plaintiff’s need to secure medical insurance.”

(Id. at 7 n.6.) And finally, because the opinion was that of

a physician’s assistant, it does not qualify as medical

source opinion and is therefore not entitled to special

significance. (Id. at 6 n.4.)

Claimants may prove their disability with medical

opinions which are defined as “statements from physicians and

psychologists or other acceptable medical sources.” 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a), 416.927(a) (West 2008). "Social

Security separates information sources into two main groups: 

acceptable medical sources and other sources. It then

divides other sources into two groups: medical sources and

non-medical sources." Sloan v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 883, 888

(8th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 416.902

(2007)). A physician assistant is in the "other sources"

group but is a "medical source" in that group. Id. (citing

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d), 416.913(d) (2007)). Still,

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"[i]nformation from these 'other sources' cannot establish

the existence of a medically determinable impairment. 

Instead, there must be evidence from an 'acceptable medical

source' for this purpose." Soc. Sec. Ruling 06-03p, 2006 WL

2329939, at *2 (Aug. 9. 2006). A physician’s assistant is

not an acceptable medical source, but the ALJ is allowed to

consider evidence from a physician’s assistant to determine

“the severity of [claimant’s] impairment(s) and how it

affects [claimant’s] ability to work.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1513(a), (d), 416.913(a), (d) (West 2008).

Cases that have examined this issue have determined that

although physician assistants are not "acceptable medical

sources," their opinions should be evaluated on "key issues

such as impairment severity and functional effects . . . ." 

Sloan v. Astrue, 499 F.3d at 888-89; accord Bowman v. Astrue,

511 F.3d 1270, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 2008); Tourney v. Astrue,

No. ED CV 07-609-SH, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis, 51649, at *4-5

(C.D. Cal. July 3, 2008); Smith v. Shalala, 856 F. Supp. 118,

122 (E.D. N.Y. 1994) (explaining that a physician’s assistant

is not an acceptable medical source and is accorded less

weight).

Here, the only medical professional to state that

Plaintiff had any work limitation was a physician’s assistant

who, on May 19, 2004, stated that Harrington's pain has

progressed and is "no longer controlled" with conservative

treatment, so "employment at this time is impractical.” 

(Admin. R. 171.)

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ALJ Parker gave three reasons for rejecting Anderson's

opinion.

First, the determination of disability is a

determination reserved to the Commissioner.

Secondly, the claimant’s osteoarthritis that

is alleged is not evidenced on x-rays and

the level of pain allegations are not

supported by the claimant’s level of pain

medication. Third, Ms. Anderson did not set

out the individual limitations that claimant

has in her work related abilities.

Id. at 21. The ALJ determined that Anderson’s opinion

conflicted with the medical evidence in the record, including

the opinion of "acceptable medical sources" that Plaintiff

was capable of working with restrictions. Although a more

complete discussion of his reasons for rejecting the

physician assistant's opinion would have been helpful, the

ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting her

opinion.

F. Whether the ALJ Ignored Evidence from a Treating

Physician

Finally, Harrington argues that “[t]he ALJ did not

evaluate the substantial evidence that Plaintiff suffered

from diabetic pedal neuropathy, arteriosclerotic disease of

the feet and bilateral bunions of the feet.” (Pl.’s Mem. P.

& A. 24.) She states that “Dr. Taubman’s records contradict

the testimony of the medical expert that Plaintiff’s diabetes

was under control and did not cause any end organ damage.”

(Id. (citation omitted).) Plaintiff maintains that the

failure to evaluate Dr. Taubman’s treatment records requires

that her case be remanded. (Id.)

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The Commissioner argues, “The ALJ properly relied on the

State Agency physicians’ opinions, which were consistent with

the overall record.” (Def.’s Mem. P. & A. 6 (citation

omitted).) Defendant explains that “none of Plaintiff’s

doctors found limitations in excess of the RFC finding, . . .

[and] Dr. Taubman, for instance, did not mention any

restrictions to address Plaintiff’s foot problem.” (Id. at 6

(citations omitted) (footnote omitted).)

The opinion of an examining doctor is entitled to

greater weight than that of a nonexamining doctor. Lester,

81 F.3d at 830 (citing Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506

(9th Cir. 1990); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir.

1984)). “In addition, the regulations give more weight to .

. . specialists concerning matters relating to their

specialty over that of nonspecialists.” Holohan v.

Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), (5)).

“[W]here the treating doctor’s opinion is not

contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for

‘clear and convincing’ reasons.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830

(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir.

1991)); see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. “Even if the

treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor,

the Commissioner may not reject this opinion without

providing ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by

substantial evidence in the record . . . .” Lester, 81 F.3d

at 830 (citing Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.

1983)).

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“[T]he findings of a nontreating, nonexamining physician

can amount to substantial evidence, so long as other evidence

in the record supports those findings.” Saelee v. Chater, 94

F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonexamining physician’s

opinion must be “supported by other evidence in the record

and [be] consistent with it.” Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600.

The ALJ must set out a “'detailed and thorough summary

of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his

interpretation thereof, and making findings.'” Id. at 600-01

(quoting Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750). The ALJ is not

required to discuss each item of evidence, but he must

explain why “significant probative evidence has been

rejected.” Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393,

1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984).

Here, ALJ Parker noted that “Dr. Taubman stated that the

claimant has a diabetic pedal neuropathy, arteriosclerotic

disease of the feet and bilateral bunions of the feet.” 

(Admin. R. 20.) The ALJ observed that Dr. Taubman “only

prescribed wearing rooming [sic] shoes. He did not mention

any work related restrictions.” (Id. (citations omitted).)

The doctor did not find that the impairment significantly

affected Plaintiff's ability to perform work activities. The

treating physician did not impose any work-related

restrictions because of Plaintiff’s foot problems;

consequently, the ALJ’s functional capacity findings were

consistent with Dr. Taubman's conclusions.

Although ALJ Parker gave the state agency physician’s

opinion “significant weight,” he specifically addressed

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K:\COMMON\CHMB_MIL\__SIGNED ORDERS\9 29 08\07cv1330_grant in part msj_9 29 08 50 07cv1330 JM (RBB)

Plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinions and made findings

which were supported by the state agency physicians and were

consistent with the medical record.

VII. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part, and Defendant’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. This case is REMANDED

to the Commissioner for further proceedings with directions

to elicit testimony from the vocational expert consistent

with Social Security Ruling 00-4p and this Order.

DATED: September 29, 2008

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: Judge Brooks

All parties of record

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