Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01857/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01857-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE DELGADILLO JIMINEZ,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1857 RRB JFM P 

vs.

DERRAL G. ADAMS,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with an application for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2000 conviction

on three counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years and three counts

of forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years, and the aggregate state

prison term of twelve years imposed thereon. He seeks relief on multiple grounds: first, that

petitioner’s right to due process was violated by jury instruction error (CALJIC 2.50.01); next

that the trial court abused its discretion by (i) using a supplemental jury instruction concerning

multiple acts; (ii) permitting the prosecution’s chart of “separate touchings” to be taken into the

jury room, (iii) interrupting defense counsel’s closing argument, and (iv) permitting the

prosecution to introduce evidence of petitioner’s alleged prior bad acts; then that the admission

of evidence pursuant to California Evidence Code § 1108 violated his right to due process and

equal protection; and finally that the prosecutor committed misconduct. After careful

consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that

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 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 1

Appellate District in People v. Jiminez, No. C036340 (June 19, 2002), a copy of which is

attached as Exhibit E to Respondent’s Answer, filed November 12, 2003.

2

petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be granted with respect to his claim of jury

instruction error. Because the claim of jury instruction error rests upon clear and recent Circuit

authority, petitioner’s remaining claims are not addressed. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

In November, 1996, seven-year-old D. G. (hereafter D.) moved to a

house on Norstrom Way in Sacramento with her mother and

brother. [Petitioner] lived across the street and a couple of houses

down with his wife and four sons. D.’s family and [petitioner’s]

family soon became friends and D. often played at [petitioner’s]

house with [petitioner’s] son, Armando. On several occasions, she

spent the night in the living room of [petitioner’s] house with

Armando and Armando’s cousin. She slept either on the floor, or

on a couch.

 During one sleep-over, when D. was eight years old, she was

awakened by the feel of [petitioner] rubbing her breasts. 

[Petitioner] squeezed her thighs and rubbed the area of her vagina,

first over and then under her clothes. He stuck his finger inside her

vagina. [Petitioner] also rubbed D.’s “bottom,” first over and then

under her clothes, and stuck his finger inside her “bottom.” D.

eventually told [petitioner] she had to use the bathroom. She did

so and, when she returned, [petitioner] was gone.

 Initially, D. did not tell anyone about the incident. [Petitioner]

had threatened to do something to her, or her family, if she told of

the incident. D. and her family moved away from the area in

September 1998. In January 1999, D. informed her brother of the

molest. Her brother then reported it to their mother who

questioned D. D. later told her father she had not reported the

matter sooner, because she was afraid and embarrassed and

worried she would not be able to see the other members of

[petitioner’s] family again.

 [Petitioner] was interviewed by police. Initially, he denied ever

touching D. Later, [petitioner] acknowledged having slapped the

victim on the butt a couple of times in a playful way and said he

might have touched her chest while wrestling around as he did with

the other children in the house. Eventually, [petitioner] admitted

that one night before going to bed he squeezed the victim’s butt

and vaginal area for a couple of seconds. [Petitioner] said he felt

terrible about having done it and was ashamed of himself.

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3

 [Petitioner] was charged with eight counts of lewd and lascivious

conduct (§ 288, subd. (a)) and 12 counts of forcible lewd and

lascivious conduct (§ 288, subd. (b)), arising out of the sleepover

incident and several others reported by the victim. He was tried,

but the jury was unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was

declared. In a second trial, the jury found [petitioner] guilty of six

counts of lewd and lascivious conduct, three forcible and three

nonforcible, arising out of the sleep-over incident. [Petitioner] was

found not guilty on 10 counts, and no verdict was reached on the

remaining four counts. [Petitioner] was sentenced to the upper

term of eight years on one count of forcible lewd and lascivious

conduct and consecutive terms of two years (one-third the middle

term) on the other forcible counts. On the nonforcible counts,

[petitioner] received concurrent terms of six years.

(People v. Jiminez, slip op. at 2-4.)

Petitioner filed a timely appeal of his conviction in the California Court of Appeal

for the Third Appellate District, raising eleven claims. (Answer, Ex. B.) The Court of Appeal

rejected all of petitioner’s claims in an opinion issued June 19, 2002. (Answer, Ex. E.) 

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was

denied without comment on September 11, 2002. (Answer, Ex. F.) 

On September 8, 2003, petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas

corpus. 

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

/////

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4

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal

question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) The court looks

to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court judgment. Avila v. Galaza,

297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

II. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner claims that the use of the pre-1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01

together with CALJIC 2.50.1 at his trial violated his right to due process because it allowed the

jury to convict him based on propensity that was established only by a preponderance of the

evidence. For the reasons explained below and in light of binding authority, the court will

recommend that habeas corpus relief be granted with respect to this claim.

The record reflects that the state trial court admitted the evidence regarding

petitioner’s actions involving a thirteen year old former neighbor “K.” pursuant to California

Evidence Code § 1108, finding that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its

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 California Evidence Code § 1108 provides, in pertinent part:

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(a) In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a

sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another

sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section

1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.

 California Evidence Code § 352 provides: 

The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its

admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b)

create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the

issues, or of misleading the jury.

The California Court of Appeal concluded that the admission of evidence at petitioner’s trial of

his actions involving K. did not violate either the language or the spirit of California Evidence

Code § 1108 and did not deny petitioner his due process right to a fair trial, or his right to equal

protection of the laws. (Opinion at 21-25.) 

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prejudicial effect. (Opinion at 22; Clerk’s Transcript at 206.) In instructing petitioner’s jury 2

how to evaluate this evidence, the trial court gave the pre-1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01. 

That instruction provided as follows:

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the

[petitioner] engaged in sexual offenses other than those charged in

this case.

“Sexual offense” means a crime under the laws of the state that

involves any of the following -- And we’re just talking about one

definition here:

Any contact -- Any conduct made criminal by Penal Code Section

288(a). And the elements of this crime are set forth elsewhere in

these instructions. That is the charge made in this case, about --

288(a) or 288(b). And we’ll be getting to those. 

Now, if you find that the [petitioner] committed a prior sexual

offense, you may, but are not required to, infer that the [petitioner]

had a disposition to commit the same or similar types of sexual

offenses. 

If you find that the [petitioner] had this disposition, you may but,

are not required to, infer that he was likely to commit and did

commit the crime or the crimes of which he is accused.

Unless you are otherwise instructed, you must not consider this

evidence for any other purpose.

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 This instruction was revised in 1999 to clarify how jurors should evaluate a defendant’s 3

guilt relating to the charged offense if they found that he had committed a prior sexual offense. 

Id. at 818. The newly revised instruction added the following language: 

However, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the

defendant committed prior sexual offenses, that is not sufficient by

itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the

charged crimes. If you determine an inference properly can be

drawn from this evidence, this inference is simply one item for you

to consider, along with all other evidence, in determining whether

the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of

the charged crime.

 CALJIC No. 2.50.01 (7th ed. 1999). 

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(Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 1043-44.) Petitioner’s jury was also instructed with 3

CALJIC No. 2.50.1, as follows:

Now, within the meaning of the preceding instructions, the

prosecution has the burden of proving through a preponderance of

the evidence that the [petitioner] committed a sexual offense other

than those for which he is on trial.

You must not consider this evidence for any purpose unless you

find by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . [petitioner]

committed the other sexual offense.

(Id. at 1044.) After giving this instruction the trial court followed it by instructing the jury on the

preponderance of the evidence standard as follows:

Preponderance of the evidence means evidence that has more

convincing force than that opposed to it. 

If the evidence is so evenly balanced that you are unable to find

that the evidence on either side of an issue preponderates, your

finding on that issue must be against the party who has the burden

of proving it. You are to consider all the evidence bearing upon

every issue, regardless of who produced that evidence.

(RT at 1044.)

Petitioner claims that the use at his trial of the pre-1999 version of CALJIC No.

2.50.01, together with CALJIC No. 2.50.1, violated his right to due process because it allowed

the jury to convict him of the crimes he was actually charged with on the basis of evidence of

uncharged conduct “even if the evidence of the charged offenses failed to satisfy the reasonable

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doubt standard.” (Pet. at 11-12.) Petitioner reasons that the jury may have convicted him of the

charged offenses simply because they found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he had

committed the subsequent uncharged acts. (Id. at 15-17.) Essentially, petitioner is claiming that

he suffered structural error at his trial because the jury instructions regarding propensity evidence

lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof required to convict him of the charged offenses. 

Petitioner’s argument in this regard was rejected both by the California Court of

Appeal in a written decision on appeal, and summarily by the California Supreme Court. 

(Answer, Exs. E, F.) The California Court of Appeal explained its analysis as follows: 

 Several Court of Appeal decisions have concluded the

instructions as given here could mislead the jury as [petitioner]

suggests. (See People v. Orellano (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 179,

181, 184-186; People v. Frazier (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 34-37;

People v. Vichroy (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 92, 99.) However, others

have reached the opposite conclusion. (See People v. Regalado

(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1062-1963; People v. O’Neal (2000)

78 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1078-1079; People v. Van Winkle (1999) 75

Cal.App.4th 133, 147-149.)

 In People v. Jeffries (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 15, this court adopted

a middle-ground approach, recognizing some confusion

engendered by the instructions but finding no reversible error in

light of the instructions as a whole and the evidence presented. We

explained that, while CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01 and 2.50.1 permit an

inference of guilt from prior offenses, which need be proven only

by a preponderance of the evidence, CALJIC No. 2.01 instructs

that, while guilt may be proven by circumstantial evidence, “‘each

fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary

to establish the defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” (Id. at p. 23, italics omitted.) We concluded: 

“CALJIC Nos. 2.50.1 and 2.50.01 are not contrary to CALJIC No.

2.01. The former instructions provide only that an inference of

guilt may be drawn from prior offenses that have been proved by a

preponderance of evidence. They do not suggest that an inference

so drawn is sufficient for a finding of guilt. Contrary to

[petitioner’s] argument, neither CALJIC No. 2.50.01 nor any other

instruction told the jury ‘that they could find that the defendant

“did commit” the charged offenses based on a preponderance of

the evidence.’ (Italics added.) The jury could so infer, but it could

not rely on that inference to find [petitioner] guilty unless it found

that the underlying facts had been proved beyond a reasonable

doubt.” (Id. at pp. 23-24.)

/////

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8

 Instructions are not to be considered in isolation. (People v.

Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 823-824.) “Whether instructions

are correct and adequate is determined by consideration of the

entire charge to the jury.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 419,

477.) In order to prevail on a claim that the jury instructions were

misleading, [petitioner] must prove there is a reasonable likelihood

the jury misunderstood the instructions when considered as a

whole. (See People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36.)

 In addition to the instructions mentioned previously, the jury was

informed [petitioner] is presumed innocent and guilt must be

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was told a defendant

need not testify but may rely “upon the failure, if any, of the People

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the

charge or charges made against him.” The jury was also told that

in order to find the [petitioner] guilty of a particular offense, “it is

necessary for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

the commission of the act or acts constituting each crime . . . .”

 [Petitioner’s] theory is that CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01 and 2.50.1

permitted the jury to convict him solely on a finding that he

committed an uncharged offense of a similar nature. However, as

the Court of Appeal in People v. O’Neal, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at

page 1078 explained: In order to apply the instructions in this way,

“a juror would have to conclude that a defendant could be found

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the currently charged crime

even if no evidence whatsoever had been presented to prove the

elements of the charged offense.” (Italics added.) 

 In this matter, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury

rejected all the evidence against [petitioner], including his

videotaped admissions and the medical evidence, yet convicted

him of the charged offenses solely, because it believed by a

preponderance of the evidence he committed a prior offense

against K. This is made even clearer by the fact [petitioner] was

convicted of six offenses stemming from a single incident, which

he partly admitted but found not guilty of 10 other offenses for

which the evidence was weaker. Thus, any confusion created by

the challenged instructions had no bearing on the verdict reached in

this matter.

(Opinion at 14-17.)

The decision of the California Court of Appeals affirming petitioner’s conviction

was contrary to clearly established federal law and he is therefore entitled to federal habeas relief

on this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This conclusion is compelled by the decision

in Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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9

“Although the Constitution does not require jury instructions to contain any

specific language, the instructions must convey both that a defendant is presumed innocent until

proven guilty and that he may only be convicted upon a showing of proof beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Lopez, 500 F.3d 840, ___, 2007 WL 2429368, *5 (9th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Gibson, 387 F.3d at 820). “Any jury instruction that reduces the level of proof

necessary for the Government to carry its burden is plainly inconsistent with the constitutionally

rooted presumption of innocence.” Id. (quoting Gibson, 387 F.3d at 820.)

In Gibson v. Ortiz, the habeas petitioner claimed that the use of CALJIC Nos.

2.50.01 (1996 version) and 2.50.1 together at his trial had unconstitutionally permitted the jury to

find him guilty of the charged offenses based on a preponderance of the evidence. The United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that CALJIC No. 2.50.01 and

CALJIC No. 2.50.1, when given together at a criminal trial, violate the defendant’s Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because they allow

a jury to: (1) find that a defendant had committed prior sexual offenses by a preponderance of

the evidence; (2) infer from those past offenses a predilection for committing sexual offenses;

and (3) further infer guilt of the charged offense based on those predilections. Gibson, 387 F.3d

at 822. In this regard, the court concluded that “the interplay of the two instructions allowed the

jury to find that Gibson committed the uncharged sexual offenses by a preponderance of the

evidence and thus to infer that he had committed the charged acts based upon facts found not

beyond a reasonable doubt, but by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

Even though the jury in Gibson had been given the standard "beyond a reasonable

doubt" instruction, as was petitioner’s jury in this case, the Ninth Circuit found that this did not

prevent the possibility of the jury finding the defendant guilty only on the basis of past offenses

that had been established by a mere preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 822-23. The court

concluded that the challenged instructions, when given together, “[ran] directly contrary to

Winship’s maxim that a defendant may not be convicted except ‘upon proof beyond a reasonable

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 The prosecutor in the instant case reminded the jury that if it found petitioner 4

committed a prior sexual offense, the jury “may, but [is] not required to, infer that [petitioner]

had a disposition to commit similar types of sexual offenses.” (RT 1069.) The prosecutor also

encouraged the jury to make the inference and find petitioner had a disposition to commit the

charged crimes. (RT 1070.) Similarly, in Gibson, the court had noted that the prosecutor in that

case had done so for purposes of showing “a disposition,” from which the jury was encouraged to

make the inference that the defendant “did in fact commit these crimes. Gibson v. Ortiz, 387

F.3d 812, 824 (9th Cir. 2004). The court in Gibson clarified that “the prosecutor’s arguments are

weighted much less heavily in our analysis than the instructions of the trial judge.” Id., 387 F.3d

at 824. Finally, the determination that the challenged jury instructions gave rise to constitutional

error was reached by the court in Gibson prior to any discussion of the prosecutor’s closing

argument. See Dixon v. Lamarque, No. C 01-4974 MMC (PR), 2007 WL 2316254, * 7 (N.D.

Cal. Aug. 7, 2007) (citing Gibson, 387 F.3d at 822).

 The subsequent 1999 revision to CALJIC No. 2.50.01 has been found to have cured the 5

constitutional defects found by the Gibson court in the 1996 version given at petitioner’s trial.

See Smith v. Ryan, 220 F. App’x 563, **3 (9th Cir. 2007); McGee v. Knowles, 218 F. App’x

584, **1 (9th Cir. 2007); Cata v. Garcia, No. C 03-3096 PJH (PR), 2007 WL 2255224, *15-16

(N.D. Cal Aug. 3, 2007). 

10

doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’” Gibson, 387

F.3d at 822 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Finally, the court held that the

giving of these jury instructions in tandem constituted structural error within the meaning of

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993), precluding harmless error review and

requiring the granting of relief. Gibson, 387 F.3d at 824-25. 

 The instant case is indistinguishable from Gibson in all material respects.4

Petitioner’s jury was instructed with the same version of CALJIC Nos. 2.50.01 and 2.50.1 that

were given in Gibson. The decision of the California Court of Appeal approving the trial court’s

use of the pre-1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, in light of the jury also being instructed 5

with CALJIC No. 2.50.1, was contrary to clearly established federal law. This is because the

state trial court violated petitioner’s right to due process, and committed structural error, by

inviting the jury to convict him based only on propensity established by a mere preponderance of

the evidence. 

Based on the decision in Gibson v. Ortiz, this court recommends that habeas relief

be granted on petitioner’s claim that the use of the pre-1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01

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violated his right to due process. See Mejia v. Garcia, No. Civ. F 03-5489 REC DLB HC, 2006

WL 1283510 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2006) (granting habeas relief on identical claim); Vaughn v.

Adams, CV F-01-5241 OWW DLB HC, 2006 WL 2585041 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2006), adopted in

2007 WL 499629 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007) (same); McKinstry v. Ayers, No. 1:02-CV06267

JKS, 2007 WL 1113531 (E.D. Cal. April 13, 2007) (same); Dixon v. Lamarque, No. C 01-4974

MMC (PR), 2007 WL 2316254 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007) (same); Moreno v. Kernan, No. 2:04-

cv-00289-JKS-DAD (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2008)(same). 

III. Petitioner’s Other Claims

In light of the clear authority referenced above petitioner’s other claims have not

been addressed. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT petitioner’s application for a writ of

habeas corpus be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 23, 2008.

001; jimi1857.157

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