Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_04-cv-00423/USCOURTS-ared-5_04-cv-00423-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-101 (Supp. 2001).

2

Doc. Nos. 9-3 and 33-2, p. 3.

3

Doc. No. 9-4.

1

IN THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

COSTELLA RUDD-BROWN PLAINTIFF

v. 5:04CV00423-WRW

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT

OF COMMUNITY CORRECTION DEFENDANT

ORDER

Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to unlawful discrimination on the basis of race in job

assignments, employment conditions, promotion and benefits in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981and 1983, the 14th Amendment, and the

Arkansas Civil Rights Act.1

 Plaintiff also asserts that disparate treatment and retaliation were so

harsh that she was forced to resign; i.e. constructively discharged. Defendant has moved for

Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 9). Plaintiff has responded (Doc. Nos. 23, 28). For the reasons set

forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. History

On September 20, 1999, Plaintiff applied for the positions of (1) Counselor, Grade 18

position, (2) Substance Abuse Program Leader, a Grade 19 position, and (3) Clinical Supervisor, a

Grade 20 position with the Arkansas Department of Corrections (“ADC”).2

 Plaintiff was offered

and accepted the Substance Abuse Program Leader position on December 3, 1999.3

Case 5:04-cv-00423-BRW Document 35 Filed 06/28/06 Page 1 of 12
4

Doc. No. 9-5, p. 2. 

5

Doc. No. 33-2, p. 4-6.

6

Doc. No. 9-5, p. 2. 

7

Id. 

8

Id. 

9

Id. 

10Id. 

11Id. 

12Id. 

2

In October 2000, the ADC advertised the positions of Clinical Supervisor, a Grade 20

position, and Treatment Coordinator, a Grade 21 position. Plaintiff applied for both positions.4

Bernie Lamb, an Asian-American male, and Melody Rogers, an Asian-American female,5 also

applied for the Treatment Coordinator position. Rogers, who already held the position of Clinical

Supervisor, was given the Treatment Coordinator position.6 Plaintiff was given the Clinical

Supervisor position on November 27, 2000.7

Within two months of accepting the Treatment Coordinator position, Rogers resigned and

the position was re-advertised.8

 Plaintiff did not submit an application for the position.9 Ken

Robinson, a white male, was awarded the position. On March 14, 2001, Robinson accepted a

position out-of-state and resigned as Treatment Coordinator.10 Plaintiff applied for the position on

March 19, 2001. On May 3, 2001, four applicants (Plaintiff, a white female, and two AfricanAmerican males) were interviewed.11 None of the four applicants were offered the job, and it was

re-advertised.12

Case 5:04-cv-00423-BRW Document 35 Filed 06/28/06 Page 2 of 12
13Doc. No. 9-5, p. 3. 

14Id. 

15Id. 

16Id. 

17Doc. No. 9-7.

18Id. 

19Doc. No. 9-8 (“I am aware that there are deficiencies, as you have so avidly pointed out,

and there will continue to be, until more staff and resources are available.”). 

3

Plaintiff, with six other applicants, applied for the Treatment Coordinator position in July

2001. On August 23, 2001, four applicants (including Plaintiff) were interviewed. The position was

offered to Annette Lane, an African-American female, but she turned down the offer.13 The position,

which had been unfilled since March 2001, was advertised for the third time. Plaintiff did not reapply for the Treatment Coordinator position.14 After interviews on October 24, 2004, Moki Ellison,

a white female, accepted the position.15

Phyllis Callaway-Silas, the Center Supervisor, discovered in early March 2004, that many

of the treatment files were not being reviewed on a monthly basis.16 On March 2, 2004, Moki

Ellison, the Treatment Coordinator, Plaintiff and Beverly Holler, the two Clinical Supervisors, were

each reprimanded for their failure to timely review the treatment files.17 Ellison and Holler received

verbal warnings, but because Plaintiff had already received a previous verbal warning for “failing

to audit resident files,” Plaintiff was given a written warning.18

After receiving the written warning on March 2, 2004, Plaintiff prepared a Memorandum

entitled “Treatment Files/Non-Compliance,” wherein she acknowledged that there were deficiencies

in her performance.19 Nowhere in the memo does Plaintiff allege discrimination. Rather, she argues

Case 5:04-cv-00423-BRW Document 35 Filed 06/28/06 Page 3 of 12
20Doc. No. 9-9.

21Doc. No. 9-5, p. 4. 

22Doc. No. 9-10.

23Doc. No. 9-11.

24Doc. No. 9-12.

25Doc. No. 9-13.

26Doc. No. 9-14.

4

that the deficiencies will continue as long as her department is under staffed. On March 3, 2004,

Plaintiff submitted her letter of resignation, in which she stated that she felt “blessed to have been

able to share both positive and negative experiences while here.”20 Before she left, Silas conducted

an exit interview. In her deposition, Silas states that “at no time during our meeting did [Plaintiff]

state to me that she felt she was being discriminated against or being treated differently based on her

race.”21

In her April 6, 2004, application for unemployment benefits, Plaintiff stated that she was

terminated under duress.22 In its denial of unemployment benefits entered on April 20, 2004, the

Arkansas Employment Security Department found that Plaintiff had “left work voluntarily and

without good cause.”23 Plaintiff appealed the denial of benefits on April 28, 2004.24 After a hearing

on Plaintiff’s appeal on May 17, 2004, the Arkansas Appeals Tribunal affirmed the denial of benefits

finding that Plaintiff “did not complain of discrimination” and “quit” after receiving a reprimand.25

Plaintiff then appealed that decision to the State Board of Review. In an opinion entered on July 9,

2004, the Board of Review affirmed the denial of benefits finding that Plaintiff had not shown “good

cause” for quitting her job.26

Case 5:04-cv-00423-BRW Document 35 Filed 06/28/06 Page 4 of 12
27Doc. No. 9-15.

28Id. 

29Doc. No. 9-16.

30Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1987); Fed R. Civ. P. 56. 

31Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

32Inland Oil & Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1979).

33Id. at 728.

5

Having been denied unemployment benefits, Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC on

August 24, 2004.27 In the charge, she alleged race discrimination.28 Plaintiff was issued a right to

sue letter on August 26, 2004.29

II. Standard of review

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, so

that the dispute may be decided on purely legal grounds.30 The Supreme Court has established

guidelines to assist trial courts in determining whether this standard has been met:

The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the

need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that

properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be

resolved in favor of either party.31

 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has cautioned that summary judgment is an 

extreme remedy that should only be granted when the movant has established a right to the judgment

beyond controversy.32 Nevertheless, summary judgment promotes judicial economy by preventing

trial when no genuine issue of fact remains.33 This court must view the facts in the light most

Case 5:04-cv-00423-BRW Document 35 Filed 06/28/06 Page 5 of 12
34Id. at 727-28.

35Counts v. MK-Ferguson Co., 862 F.2d 1338, 1339 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting City of Mt.

Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268, 273-74 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted)). 

36Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

37See Roark v. City of Hazen, 189 F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Chambers v.

Wynne Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir. 1990). 

38Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-105 (Supp. 2001).

6

favorable to the party opposing the motion.34 The Eighth Circuit has also set out the burden of the

parties in connection with a summary judgment motion:

[T]he burden on the party moving for summary judgment is only to demonstrate,

i.e.,“[to point] out to the District Court,” that the record does not disclose a genuine

dispute on a material fact. It is enough for the movant to bring up the fact that the

record does not contain such an issue and to identify that part of the record which

bears out his assertion. Once this is done, his burden is discharged, and, if the record

in fact bears out the claim that no genuine dispute exists on any material fact, it is

then the respondent’s burden to set forth affirmative evidence, specific facts,

showing that there is a genuine dispute on that issue. If the respondent fails to carry

that burden, summary judgment should be granted.35

Only disputes over facts that may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.36 

III. Analysis

Plaintiff asserts that she suffered race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII,

§ 1981, § 1983 and ACRA. The burdens of proof for claims brought under Title VII, § 1981, and

§ 1983 are identical.37 Likewise, claims under ACRA receive the same analysis as Title VII claims.38

Therefore, this Order will consider the Title VII claims as including the § 1981, § 1983, and ACRA

claims. 

Case 5:04-cv-00423-BRW Document 35 Filed 06/28/06 Page 6 of 12
39See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (180-day limit under Title VII); Shempert v. Harwick

Chem. Corp., 151 F.3d 793, 796 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1998) (180-day filing limit in Arkansas).

40Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002); Tandeme v. Saint

Cloud State Univ., 328 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting continuing violation theory to

failure to promote).

41See, e.g., Morstad v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 147 F.3d 741, 744

(8th Cir. 1998) ([A]bsent a waiver, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes the state and its officials

from § 1983 liability.).

42Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).

7

A. EEOC

Under Title VII, an EEOC charge must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory

conduct.39 Plaintiff first applied for the Treatment Coordinator position in October 2000.

Thereafter, Plaintiff applied for the Treatment Coordinator position on March 19, 2001 and on July

30, 2001. After not receiving the position in July 2001, Plaintiff did not apply for any other position

with the ADC. The Supreme Court has explicitly held that failure to promote is a discrete act

requiring a timely charge of discrimination.40 Because Plaintiff did not file her EEOC claim until

August 24, 2004, her failure to promote arguments are time barred as a matter of law.

B. Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits a plaintiff from suing a state,

state agency, or state employee in the employee’s official capacity for damages, except insofar as

the state or the Congress of the United States has abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity.41 The

ADC is immune from suit for money damages under both § 1981, § 1983 and ACRA; therefore42

all Plaintiff’s § 1981, § 1983, and ACRA claims for money damages against the ADC are dismissed

Case 5:04-cv-00423-BRW Document 35 Filed 06/28/06 Page 7 of 12
43Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

44Coller v. State of Missouri, Department of Economic Development, 965 F. Supp. 1270,

1276 (W.D. Mo. 1997). 

45Okruhlik v. University of Arkansas, 255 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 2001); Maitland v. University

of Minnesota, 260 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2001).

46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); McNeail-Tunstall v. Marsh USA, 307 F. Supp. 2d 955

(W.D. Tenn. 2004). 

47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

48 Bradley, 232 F.3d at 633.

8

because it has Eleventh Amendment Immunity and is not a “person” for claims of this nature.43

Plaintiff’s claims for prospective injunctive relief remain.44

Title VII abrogates a states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in accordance with § 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment.45 Under Title VII, an employee is protected against employer retaliation

for opposing any practice that the employee reasonably believes to be a violation of Title VII.46

Further, Title VII is designed to protect individuals, such as Plaintiff, from discriminatory animus

and all its inequitable manifestations. Because Title VII claims against the state and its agencies are

not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims remain.

C. Discrimination

Title VII prohibits an employer from treating an employee differently with respect to the

“terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of her race.47 “The ultimate question in

every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the

plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.”48 In order to establish a prima facie case of

racial disparate treatment, the plaintiff must prove (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2)

Case 5:04-cv-00423-BRW Document 35 Filed 06/28/06 Page 8 of 12
49LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 240 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 2001).

50Montandon v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 116 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 1997). 

51Shanklin v. Fitzgerald, 379 F.3d 596, 603-604 (8th Cir. 2005). 

52Id. 

9

that she was qualified to perform her job; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and

(4) that the defendant treated similarly situated, non-minority employees more favorably.49 

There is no question that Plaintiff, an African-American, is a member of a protected class.

Nor does Defendant dispute that Plaintiff was qualified to perform her job. Instead, the question is

whether Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action and whether similarly situated, nonminority employees were treated more favorably. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to

withstand summary judgment.

Plaintiff primarily raises the following as proof of discrimination: (1) the ADC’s denial of

her requests for promotion; (2) retaliation; and (3) unmanageable workload not given to those

similarly situated. Plaintiff’s failure to promote claims were disposed of above and will not be

addressed again. 

Plaintiff argues that she was retaliated against for filing internal grievances of discrimination.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that she engaged in statutorily

protected activity, that the defendant took adverse action against her, and a connection between the

two.50 The defendant may then rebut the plaintiff’s case by showing a legitimate, nonretaliatory

reason for the adverse employment action.51 “If the defendant makes this showing, the plaintiff

must show that the defendant’s proffered reason was a pretext for illegal retaliation.”52

Case 5:04-cv-00423-BRW Document 35 Filed 06/28/06 Page 9 of 12
53Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998) (Plaintiff must have

personally engaged in protected conduct).

54Doc. Nos. 30-1, 30-2, p. 16-17, 32-3.

55Doc. No. 9-17.

56Doc. No. 30-2, Exhibits 2, 3, 5, and 6. 

57Ghane v. West, 148 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 1998).

58Doc. No. 9-18.

10

Plaintiff cannot establish that she participated in statutorily protected conduct.53 Plaintiff

maintains that she filed internal grievances when she was denied promotions and complaining that

the “selection process was rigged to keep a white person at a higher position of the treatment

program.”54 Sherry Enderle, the ADC’s Grievance Officer, who has sole responsibility to receive “all

employee grievances filed,” stated in her deposition testimony that she has no record of Plaintiff ever

filing a grievance.55 Moreover, the Center Supervisor, Phyllis Silas, maintains that Plaintiff never

complained of discrimination.

Plaintiff did write several memos to her superiors.56 A review of the memos reveals that

Plaintiff complained about the amount of work required of her but did not complain about racism

or the hiring selection process. At a minimum, there has to be factual allegations of discrimination

against a member of a protected group and the beginning of a proceeding or investigation under Title

VII.57 Because no evidence has been presented that Plaintiff participated in a statutorily protected

activity, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims fail and are DISMISSED.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that she was given an unmanageable work load that other similarly

situated employees were not. Despite Plaintiff’s assertions, the other Clinical Supervisors were

assigned the same duties.58 Plaintiff admits in her affidavit that Clinical Supervisors “came and went

Case 5:04-cv-00423-BRW Document 35 Filed 06/28/06 Page 10 of 12
59Doc. No. 30-1. 

60Doc. No. 30-2, Exhibit 4.

61Tatum v. City of Berkeley, 408 F.3d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 2005). 

62Tidwell v. Meyer’s Bakeries, Inc., 93 F.3d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1996). 

11

due to the constant over-stretching demands . . .” Plaintiff goes on to say “ . . . I was strapped for

resources and personnel to do the enormous tasks placed on my desk . . . however, I continued to

try to bring to the attention of my [supervisors] that my staff and I were overworked.”59 Plaintiff

admits that Beverly Haller, a fellow Clinical Supervisor and a white female, was required to do the

same work. In fact, Plaintiff attached a memo written by Haller to their mutual supervisor, Moki

Ellison, complaining about the amount of work she and Plaintiff were being required to

accomplish.60

Plaintiff has failed to establish that she was treated differently than other similarly situated

employees. The work may have been burdensome, but everyone was being asked to do the same

work. More importantly, Plaintiff’s rate of pay and rank never changed. Therefore, she has failed

to establish any adverse employment action.

D. Constructive Discharge

In her final argument, Plaintiff claims that she was forced to resign due to the burdensome

work environment. “A constructive discharge occurs when an employee resigns after the employer

has created an intolerable working environment in a deliberate attempt to compel such a

resignation.”61 “An employee who quits without giving [her] employer a reasonable chance to work

out a problem has not been constructively discharged.”62 

Case 5:04-cv-00423-BRW Document 35 Filed 06/28/06 Page 11 of 12
63Valadez v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149 (D.C. Fla. 1979) (Since court ruled that there had

been no violations of federal law or constitutional principles, claims of civil rights violations based

on the same constitutional and statutory provisions must fail as a matter of law.); see also Mosby v.

Mabry, 697 F.2d 213, 215 (8th Cir. 1982).

12

In the present case, Plaintiff was reprimanded on March 2, 2004 and quit the following day.

The ADC was not given an opportunity to fix the problem because Plaintiff never filed a grievance.

In her exit interview, Plaintiff did not mention discrimination and in her letter of resignation, she

said that she was “blessed to have worked there.” Based on the above, there has been no showing

that Plaintiff was constructively discharged. 

 E. Constitutional Allegations

Plaintiff alleges federal civil rights violations - - namely, violations of due process and equal

protection guaranteed by the Constitution and § 1981, § 1983. Plaintiff’s allegations fail to trigger

any Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause protections as a matter of law. The Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that a State shall not deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Because it has already been determined that

Plaintiff failed to prove a violation under any of her causes of action, Plaintiff’s constitutional claims

also fail as a matter of law.63

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment; therefore,

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of June, 2006.

 /s/Wm. R. Wilson, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

 

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