Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00103/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00103-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GENGHIS KHAN ALI STEVENSON

Plaintiff,

v.

GREGORY BLAKE, et al., 

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 11-0103-LAB (WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST

FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY

(Doc. No. 33)

Plaintiff Genghis Khan Ali Stevenson (“Plaintiff”) sues

Defendant Gregory Blake (“Blake”) for alleged violations of his

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Plaintiff alleges that

on March 13, 2007, his civil rights were violated when Blake was

fixing the lock on the holding cage in which Plaintiff was placed. 

Pending before the Court is Blake’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(“Motion”). Having considered the Motion, Opposition1/ and Reply

papers, the evidence presented, and the relevant law, the Court

1/

On November 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion For Extension of Time To

Submit A Supplemental Opposition to Blake’s Motion. On November 26, 2012, the

Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time and ordered that a

Supplemental Opposition to Blake’s Motion be filed by December 17, 2012. Plaintiff

did not file a Supplemental Opposition.

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RECOMMENDS that Blake’s Motion be DENIED. The Court also DENIES 

Plaintiff’s request for additional discovery.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On January 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed a civil rights Complaint

alleging that Blake acted deliberately indifferent to his safety in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

On September 15, 2011, Blake filed an Answer to the Complaint, and a Demand For Trial By Jury.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

The Complaint alleges as follows:

Plaintiff is an inmate incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison. [Complaint Under the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(“Complaint”) at 1.]2/ On March 13, 2007, Plaintiff was transported

by Correctional Officer Lima (“Lima”) to the Administration

Segregation Unit’s (“A.S.U.”) law library. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff

was placed and locked inside an individual isolated holding study

cage by Officer Armstrong (“Armstrong”). (Id.) 

Defendant Blake, the correctional plant locksmith, entered

the study cage area with his welding equipment where Plaintiff was

located. (Id.) Armstrong asked Blake, “What are you doing?” Blake

replied that “he was going to fix the study cage locks today.” 

(Id.) Armstrong then asked, “Can’t you see I have inmates inside of

the study cages?” (Id.) Blake ignored Armstrong and put on his

2/

 All page references to documents contained in the Court’s docket are to

the Court Clerk’s renumbered pages, not the document’s native, pre-filing,

pagination.

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safety gloves, helmet, and face shield, and began to weld on the

study cage in which Plaintiff was placed. (Id.)

Plaintiff was less than one foot away from the study cage

door where Defendant welded, and had nowhere to escape when flames,

fire, and sparks began to fly. (Id.) While Blake welded, Plaintiff

was burned on his arm, left side of his body, and in his left eye

even though he tried to protect himself. (Id.) Plaintiff asked

Blake to stop because he was getting burned by the sparks, but Blake

ignored Plaintiff’s pleas. (Id.) Blake welded on Plaintiff’s study

cage for five to ten minutes before Blake moved on to the next study

cage. (Id.)

Plaintiff informed Armstrong that he was burned on his face,

the left side of his body, and that flames and sparks got into his

eye, which caused redness and blurry vision. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was transported by Lima to the A.S.U. medical clinic

where he was examined and treated for injuries. (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that he did not ask and did not want “to be

inflicted with this unnecessary pain.”3/ Plaintiff contends that

Blake acted with deliberate indifference to his safety on March 13,

2007, which constituted an “excessive, maliciously [sic], and

sadistically [sic] injury to Plaintiff [sic] health and safety.” 

(Id.)

3/

 Taken in the context of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court construes this

statement to mean that Plaintiff did not ask or want Blake (or anybody else) to

weld on the study cage while Plaintiff was locked inside of it.

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C. Blake’s Statement Of Facts

1. Welding Performed On Plaintiff’s Cage

Defendant’s Motion and attached Declarations provide an

explanation of the incident on March 13, 2007,4/ which is contrary

to Plaintiff’s account: 

Blake worked at Calipatria State Prison as a locksmith from

April 2004 until he retired in December 2010. [Declaration of

Defendant Blake in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (“Blake Decl.”) at ¶ 1.] On the morning of March 13, 2007,

prior to the beginning of the normal work day, repairs were

completed on all of the holding cells’ tray slot locks and the locks

on the door levers in the A.S.U. law library, but one of the door

levers needed further repair. [Defendant’s Notice of Motion and

Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support (“Motion for Summary Judgment”) at 7.] Plaintiff was

brought to the law library on the morning of March 13, 2007 and

placed in a study cage. (Id.) 

The study cages in the law library, have two locks on each

door; one for the food tray port (used to pass food, papers, or

other items into the cage) and another on the door lever used to

open or close the cage. (Id.) On the date of the incident, Blake

was verbally instructed to return (for a second time) to the law

library to fix the lock on the door lever attached to cage number 6. 

(Id.) Blake briefly spoke to Armstrong, but Blake does not believe

that Plaintiff overheard their conversation. (Id.)

4/

 For the remainder of this Report and Recommendation, “incident” will

refer to the events of March 13, 2007.

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Blake used a grinder to cut the chain from the door lever,

which took approximately one to three seconds. (Blake Decl. at ¶

8.) Blake then used a welder to reattach the chain to the outer

lever, which took less than five seconds. (Id.) It was a speedy

process. (Id.) During the welding, a small flame was emitted from

the end of the welder, but the flame was focused on the object being

welded (the lock), not freely scattered. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Tiny sparks

were discharged while Blake welded, but not beyond the area of the

tray slot, as a large metal plate protected the area where Blake

worked.5/ (Id.) 

When Blake re-welded the chain on the outer door lever, he

did not hear Plaintiff say anything, nor did he hear Plaintiff make

any objections or complaints, as Plaintiff’s back was to Blake. 

(Id. at ¶ 10.) If Blake had heard Plaintiff object to the welding,

he would have stopped and informed Plaintiff of what he was doing. 

(Id.) Accordingly, Blake did not even know Plaintiff’s identity

until Plaintiff later filed his grievance. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Blake

did not intend to hurt Plaintiff, nor did he conceive that he was

putting Plaintiff at any risk of harm because the tray slot metal

plate was located between Blake and Plaintiff during the welding,

and the entire repair process was short. (Id. at ¶ 12.)

5/

 Plaintiff claims that the large metal plate was left open during the

welding process. “[T]he passing slot was left open for Ofc. Armstrong [to] remove

the handcuff section of the waist restraint [in order to] pass material back and

forth, [but] Plaintiff did not close the passing slot, Ofc. Armstrong did not

close it and we know Def. Blake did not close it.” [Defendant’s Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Opposition”) at 6; see also Plaintiff

Genghis Khan Ali Stevenson, Supporting Declaration for Response to Defendant Blake

Summary Judgment (“Stevenson Decl.”) at ¶2 (“[I] left the passing slot up to get

my legal request ready.”)].

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2. Nurse’s Examination Of Plaintiff

Licensed Vocational Nurse, T. Molina (“Molina”), examined

Plaintiff on March 13, 2007 at approximately 12:45 p.m. [Declaration

of T. Molina in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(“Molina Decl.”) at ¶ 3.] Plaintiff told Molina that he felt a burn

on his skin and his vision was blurry. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Molina

examined Plaintiff and found no indication that Plaintiff was

burned. (Id.) In fact, Plaintiff has since admitted that he does

not have any marks on his body resulting from the incident.

[Deposition of Genghis Khan Ali Stevenson (“Stevenson Dep.”) at 12.] 

Molina peered into Plaintiff’s eye with an otoscope,6/ and concluded

that Plaintiff’s inner pupil was “somewhat red,” but she saw no

signs of a foreign object or any scratch to the cornea or other

surface of the eye. (Molina Decl. at ¶ 7.) Moreover, Molina 

conducted a Snellen test,7/ which determined that Plaintiff had 20/20

vision. (Id.) Molina cleaned out Plaintiff’s eye with saline

solution. (Id.)

On March 14, 2007, Plaintiff was examined by his primary care

physician S. Young (“Dr. Young”).8/ (Motion for Summary Judgment at

9.) During that visit, Plaintiff denied all signs of eye problems. 

(Id.) Plaintiff was told to schedule another appointment in a month

6/

 An otoscope is “an instrument for examining the interior of the ear,

especially the eardrum, consisting essentially of a magnifying lens and a light.” McGraw-Hill Concise Dictionary of Modern Medicine (2007), available at

http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/otoscope. (An otoscope can also

be used in eye examinations.) 

7/

 A Snellen test is a “test for visual acuity using a Snellen chart.”

McGraw-Hill Concise Dictionary of Modern Medicine (2007), available at

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Snellen+Test.

8/

 The Court notes that Blake has not attached a Declaration from Dr. Young

regarding his/her examination of Plaintiff.

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for a follow-up, or to return to see Dr. Young sooner if he was

having problems with his eye. (Id.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) mandates the grant of

summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” The standard for granting a motion

for summary judgment is essentially the same as for the granting of

a directed verdict. Judgment must be entered “if, under the

governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the

verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250

(1986). But “[i]f reasonable minds could differ,” judgment should

not be entered in favor of the moving party. Id. at 251; see also

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“If a rational trier of fact might resolve the issue in favor of

the nonmoving party, summary judgment must be denied.”) (alteration

omitted). 

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof as

would apply at a trial on the merits, including plaintiff’s burden

to establish any element essential to their case. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 252; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

Lack of genuine issues of material fact on a single element of a

claim for relief is sufficient to warrant summary judgment on that

claim. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the

elements of the claim in the pleadings, or other evidence, and

“‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district court – that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

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case.” Id. at 325; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A material

issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and

requires a trial to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the

truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir.

1982). 

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish

beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine dispute for trial. 

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. To successfully rebut a properly

supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must

point to some facts in the record that demonstrate a genuine issue

of material fact and, with all reasonable inferences made in the

plaintiffs’ favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for the

plaintiff.” Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736,

738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Rule 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323;

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).

“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of

which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable

jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the

facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” 

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

III. Discussion

A. Blake Is Not Entitled To Summary Judgment On Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff asserts that Blake violated his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because Blake was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety when he welded on the

door of the holding cage while Plaintiff was locked inside of the

cage. (Complaint at 3.) Blake asserts that Plaintiff’s Eighth

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Amendment rights were not violated. (Motion for Summary Judgment at

12.)

“A prison official's ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To succeed on

the merits of a deliberate indifference claim, Plaintiff must show

that: (1) the Defendant knew Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of

serious harm; and (2) Defendant disregarded that risk by failing to

take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 847. In order to

establish the second element of the Farmer test, a defendant must

know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.

Id. at 837. Therefore, a plaintiff must prove more than mere

negligence on the defendant’s part. Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d

1436, 1440 (9th Cir. 1995); see also L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894,

900 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Deliberate indifference to a known, or so

obvious as to imply knowledge of, danger, by a supervisor who

participated in creating the danger, is enough. Less is not a

enough.”).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Blake ignored Armstrong, and

welded on the cage, even though Armstrong directed Blake’s attention

to Plaintiff’s positioning inside the holding cage. [Complaint at

3; see also Stevenson Decl. at ¶ 7 (“I witness[ed] Ofc. T. Armstrong

[stepping back] trying to protect herself and [she told] Def. Blake,

‘Can’t you see that I have inmates in here?’ And to stop it. Def.

Blake ignore[d] [Armstong].”)]. Plaintiff was only one foot away

from where Blake welded. (Complaint at 3.) During the incident,

Plaintiff and Armstrong requested Blake to stop because Plaintiff

was being burned by the fire, sparks, and flames emitted during the

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process. (Id.; see also Stevenson Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 12.) Plaintiff

says that the welding continued for over five minutes. (Stevenson

Decl. at ¶ 12.)

Blake argues that the elements of the Farmer test have not

been met because Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant perceived

any risk of harm to Plaintiff “because there was a solid metal

barrier (the tray slot metal plate) between Stevenson and the

welding, and the repairs were very quick.” [Motion for Summary

Judgment at 12; see also Blake Decl. at ¶ 12 (“I do not believe the

sparks went beyond the area of the tray slot, as this large metal

plate protected the area where I was welding.”)]. As noted above,

Plaintiff asserts that the metal plate was left open. Therefore, if

the tray slot metal plate was left open, Blake may have had

knowledge of Plaintiff’s substantial risk of serious harm, especially because Plaintiff told Blake that sparks were striking him. 

Additionally, if the tray slot metal plate was left open, it is

clear that Blake did not take reasonable steps to alleviate the

harm, if he in fact welded for over five minutes, despite Plaintiff’s cries for help.

“If conflicting inferences may be drawn from the facts, the

case must go to the jury.” LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d

947, 959 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s and

Blake’s version of the incident differ in material respects. 

Neither Plaintiff nor Blake presented a statement or declaration of

Armstrong (the only third party witness) regarding the incident’s

duration or the positioning of the tray slot metal plate. However,

Correctional Plant Manager II, S. Ochoa (“Ochoa”), recommended

further administration action be taken regarding the incident in the

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Confidential Supplement to Appeal: “Appeal Inquiry.” This Court is

not prepared to declare the record so lopsided that Blake must

prevail as a matter of law. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 

(maintaining that justifiable inferences are to be drawn in nonmovant’s favor); see also Nelson v. City of Davis, 571 F.3d 924, 929

(9th Cir. 2009) (“A judge must not grant summary judgment based on

his determination that one set of facts is more believable than

another.”). Here, there is a question of fact as to whether the

tray slot metal plate was opened or closed during the time when

Blake welded on the holding cage in which Plaintiff was placed. If

the tray slot metal plate was open during the welding, and Blake

welded for more than five minutes, a trier of fact could find that

Blake knew that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm

and that Blake disregarded the risk by failing to take reasonable

steps to abate it. As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Blake’s

Motion in this regard be DENIED.

B. Defendant Is Not Entitled To Summary Judgment Even

Though Plaintiff Suffered De Minimis Injuries

Blake contends that Plaintiff did not suffer any physical

injuries based on Molina’s report, which indicated that she “found

no signs of any burn marks such as blisters, welts, redness, or any

other objective indicia of having been burned.” (Molina Decl. at ¶

6.) Even if Plaintiff did not suffer physical injury, the Court

rejects the argument that physical injury is required for a

Plaintiff to establish an Eighth Amendment claim. In Farmer, the

Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that an inmate must

wait until he is actually harmed to bring his Eighth Amendment

claim. 511 U.S. at 846 (“[A] subjective approach to deliberate

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indifference does not require a prisoner seeking ‘a remedy for

unsafe conditions [to] await a tragic event... before obtaining

relief.’”) (citations omitted). Although Farmer was decided in the

context of injunctive relief, where the petitioners in that case

sought to prevent a substantial risk of harm from ripening into

actual harm, the Court declines to depart from the plain language of

that case, which requires inmates only to “face a substantial risk

of serious harm,” not suffer actual harm.9/ Id. at 847. 

However, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff’s

injuries were de minimis, and agrees with Blake that Plaintiff

cannot recover for psychological injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 

Section 1997e(e) bars federal civil actions by prisoners for mental

or emotional suffering that occurs while in jail absent physical

injury. The Ninth Circuit has determined that a plaintiff who

suffers de minimis injury is similarly barred from bringing a

1997e(e) action. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 629 (9th Cir.

2002) (concluding that appellant’s injuries that included mild back

and leg pain, and a canker sore were de minimis). Similarly here,

Plaintiff’s contention that he may need long-term eye care is

unsupported by the record, and his burnt arm hair cannot be

considered more than a de minimis injury.

C. Plaintiff’s Request For Additional Discovery Is Denied

Plaintiff seeks to obtain affidavits from Armstrong and Lima

regarding the incident because Plaintiff claims that they are eye

9/

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s version of the incident is inconsistent

with his benign injuries. If Blake welded on Plaintiff’s cage for five to ten

minutes while sparks dispersed everywhere, Plaintiff probably would have been

subjected to more than burnt arm hair and a red eye. But Plaintiff’s and Blake’s

version of the incident significantly differ such that summary judgment is

precluded.

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witnesses that could “give [] first hand account[s]” of the

incident, and Plaintiff “requested these documents in discovery.” 

[Plaintiff’s Request to Deny Defendant Blake Summary Judgment; Rule

56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 56(f) Motion”)

at 2.] The Court construes this to mean that the Plaintiff is

referring to his Request for Production of Documents, No. 3, which

states:

Any and all documents, written reports, originals or

copies, identifiably as “Confidential Supplement to

Appeal Inquiry Log No. CAL-A-07-0054" of Calipatria State

Prison Completion of the investigation final review

concerning the incident of March 13, 2007.

Documents responsive to this request were produced by Blake

pursuant to this Court’s Order of October 3, 2012, and with the

Declaration of M. Ormand in Support of Blake’s Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions. Affidavits of Armstrong and Lima

were not included in those productions of documents. In any event,

Plaintiff had ample time to obtain the statements of, or take the

depositions of, Armstrong and Lima, and did not do so. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s request is DENIED because the discovery cutoff in this

case has long since expired.

D. Blake Is Not Entitled To Qualified Immunity

Blake contends that summary judgment is proper because he is

entitled to qualified immunity in that he did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff contends that Blake is not

entitled to qualified immunity because “this case presents...

misconduct so egregious that any reasonable official would have

known that it violates the Constitution...” (Opposition at 10.)

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing

discretionary functions from liability for civil damages unless

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their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “In a suit against

an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, the

requisites of a qualified immunity defense must be considered in

proper sequence. Where the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a

ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that

the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is

dispositive.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).10/

“Qualified immunity is ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or

face the other burdens of litigation.’” Id. at 197 [quoting Mitchell

v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)]. The privilege is “an

immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like

an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if the case is

erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. 

Thus, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly... stressed the importance

of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in

litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per

curiam).11/ 

“A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue

must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged

10/

 Pursuant to the holding in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), the

Court uses its discretion, and determines the qualified immunity issue, for

purposes of summary judgment, pursuant to the Saucier two-step inquiry.

11/ “[Q]uite aside from the special concerns regarding the need for early

resolution of matters concerning immunity, litigants are ordinarily entitled to

resolution of their summary judgment motions through a determination whether there

are material facts in dispute regarding the elements necessary to establish

liability.” Paine v. City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal

citation omitted).

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show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This

must be the initial inquiry.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 199 [citing

Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)]. “If no constitutional

right would have been violated were the allegations established,

there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified

immunity.” Id.

“On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a

favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential

step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. This

inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” 

Id. Thus, “the right the official is alleged to have violated must

have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence

more relevant sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.” Id. [citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at

640)]. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a

right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to the

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.” Id. [citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)

[“(A)s... explained in Anderson, the right allegedly violated must

be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court

can determine if it was clearly established.”)]. “If the law did

not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly

unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.” Id. at 2156-57 [citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986) (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent

or those who knowingly violate the law.”)].

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Here, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, Blake

may have violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right when he welded

on the lock of Plaintiff’s cage for over five minutes while

Plaintiff asked Blake to stop because Plaintiff was getting burned. 

As stated above, the Court has found a question of fact as to

whether Plaintiff was free from cruel and unusual punishment and

whether Blake was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety. 

Therefore, pursuant to the analysis under Saucier, Plaintiff may be

able to show to a trier of fact that his Eighth Amendment rights

were violated.

Further, it is clearly established than an inmate must be

free from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth

Amendment. Since the Court has found a question of fact as to

whether Plaintiff was free from cruel and unusual punishment, so too

is there a question of fact as to whether Blake knew welding on the

lock of a holding cage for over five minutes while being asked to

stop by the Plaintiff incarcerated in that cage, because that inmate

was being burned by sparks, violated clearly established law. 

Therefore, Blake is not entitled to summary judgment as to qualified

immunity under the circumstances of this case. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court, having reviewed Blake’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment,

Blake’s Reply, and all the documents lodged therewith and attached

thereto, finds that a question of facts exists at to whether Blake

violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Further, the Court

finds that Blake is not entitled to qualified immunity under the

circumstances of this case. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that

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Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED. The Court also

DENIES Plaintiff’s request for additional discovery.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 15, 2013, any party

to this action may file written objections with the court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

March 1, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 1, 2013

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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