Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02808/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02808-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jose J. Rodriguez, )

)

 Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) CV 04-2808 PHX FJM (VAM)

)

Deputy Warden Tucker, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Jose J. Rodriguez ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner

raises two grounds for relief in the petition. (Doc. 1). 

Respondents filed an answer opposing the granting of habeas relief

and, subsequently, an amended answer. (Docs. 17 and 19). 

BACKGROUND

On October 31, 2000, petitioner was found guilty of felony

murder, armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, aggravated

assault, and unlawful flight in Maricopa County Superior Court. 

(Doc. 19 at Exhibit F). On February 1, 2002, petitioner was

sentenced to concurrent 15-year prison terms for the aggravated

assault and attempted armed robbery convictions, and a consecutive

natural life sentence on the felony murder charge to be served

concurrently with a 21-year prison sentence on the armed robbery

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charge and a 6-year sentence on the unlawful flight charge. (Doc.

19 at Exhibit H).

Petitioner appealed his sentences raising the following

issues:

1. Should Count 3 [felony murder] be remanded for

resentencing because the court erred when it found that

the State proved the aggravating factor of pecuniary

gain?

2. Should Count 3 be remanded for resentencing because

the maximum sentence for that count was

unconstitutional in this case, and the court sentenced

[petitioner] to what it believed was an intermediate

sentence, which was actually the maximum constitutional

sentence here?

(Doc. 19, Exhibit I at p. 1). In an order filed on February 25,

2003, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's

convictions and sentences. (Id. at Exhibit E). On August 13,

2003, the Arizona Supreme Court denied a petition for review

without comment. (Id. at Exhibit L).

On October 1, 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief. (Doc. 19 at Exhibit M). The state appointed

counsel but counsel moved to withdraw noting petitioner intended

to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against the

office in which she worked. (Id. at Exhibit O). On November 24,

2003, the court appointed attorney Kerrie Droban to represent

petitioner. (Id. at Exhibit P).

On January 13, 2004, Droban submitted a Notice of Completion

of Post Conviction Review pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 stating

"she is unable to find a tenable issue to submit to the court ..." 

(Doc. 19 at Exhibit Q). Petitioner was provided the opportunity

to submit a pro se post-conviction relief petition and he filed

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such a petition. (Id. at Exhibit R). Although no copy of the

brief is included in the habeas record, respondents state that

petitioner raised a claim alleging "his low intelligence

interfered with his ability to assist appellate counsel." (Doc.

19 at p. 4). Finding "no cognizable legal issue" and "no

colorable claim of inadequate trial or appellate counsel," the

trial court dismissed the Rule 32 petition on May 3, 2004. (Doc.

19 at Exhibit S). Petitioner did not seek further review in the

appellate courts. (See Doc. 1 at pp. 2, 3, 5; Doc. 19 at p. 4).

Petitioner then filed a federal habeas corpus petition

raising the following grounds:

GROUND I: Amendment VI

 My assined [sic] court apointed [sic] attorny

[sic] faile[d] to notify me on most of my court

[proceedings]. Also he failed to let the court an

opposing council [sic] know of my mental health. 

During trial I was diagnosed partly metaly [sic]

retirdation [sic]. Would like to notify courts about

this. I feel my attorney did not reprisent [sic] me to

his ful[l] ability; also have a I.Q. of 58.

Conviction obtained by the unconstitutional failure of

the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to the

defendant.

GROUND II: Amendment V

Right to a fair trial.

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that all claims raised by petitioner in

the habeas petition were not properly exhausted in state court and

are now procedurally barred from consideration on federal habeas

corpus review. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the following standard for

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granting a federal habeas petition originating from a state court

conviction applies:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

The Act also codifies a presumption of correctness of state

court findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) states that "a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof

to rebut the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." As

discussed more fully below, these provisions of the Act set the

standard for the Court’s evaluation of the merits.

The Act limits the district court’s discretion to hold

evidentiary hearings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) states:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual

basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court

shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim

unless the applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that

was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient

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to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

A petition may be denied on the merits even though it

contains unexhausted claims, and the state does not waive

exhaustion except by an express waiver on the record. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(2) and (3).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

1. Law Generally

A federal court has authority to review a federal

constitutional claim presented by a state prisoner if available

state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454

U.S. 1, 3 (1981)(per curiam); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829,

833 (9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in

case law and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, now states:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that--

 (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State; or

 (B)(i) there is an absence of available state

corrective process; or

 (ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

.......

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted

the remedies available in the courts of the State,

within the meaning of this section, if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available

procedure, the question presented.

The exhaustion requirement can be satisfied in one of two

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ways. First, a petitioner can fairly present his or her claims to

the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through

either the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Only one of these avenues of relief must be

exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. 

This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown

v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy,

827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059

(1989).

Claims presented in habeas petitions are considered

exhausted if they have been ruled upon by the Arizona Court of

Appeals. However, if the sentence received is life imprisonment,

the claims must be presented to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. Although a federal habeas petitioner

may reformulate somewhat the claims made in state court, Tamapua

v. Shimoda, 796 F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d in part on

other grounds by Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the

substance of the federal claim must have been "fairly presented"

in state court. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per

curiam); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971). While the

petitioner need not recite "book and verse on the federal

constitution," Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78 (quoting Daugherty v.

Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), it is not enough that

all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before

the state courts or that a "somewhat similar state law claim was

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made." Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6.

As an alternative to presenting his claims to the highest

state court, a petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement

by demonstrating that no state remedies remained available at the

time the federal habeas petition was filed. Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 125 (n. 28)(1982); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602

(9th Cir. 1989). However, this path is fraught with danger:

If state remedies are not available because the

petitioner failed to comply with state procedures and

thereby prevented the highest state court from reaching

the merits of his claim, then a federal court may

refuse to reach the merits of that claim as a matter of

comity.

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988); see also

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (determining that the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied if a petitioner presented a claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct review or via a petition

for post-conviction relief). This failure to comply with

reasonable state procedures is usually characterized as

"procedural default," "procedural bar," or a "waiver." As

discussed, exhausting state remedies by means of a procedural

default is risky. The burden is on the petitioner to show that he

or she has properly exhausted each claim. Dismissal of the

petition is proper when the record does not show that the

exhaustion requirement is met. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103,

1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023

(1982). If the unavailability of state remedies is in no way the

fault of the petitioner or his or her counsel, the exhaustion

requirement will likely be satisfied and a federal court may reach

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1

Appellate defaults are examined under the same standards that

apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim during trial.

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

8

the merits of the petitioner’s habeas claims.

In many cases, however, the lack of available state remedies

is a direct result of the petitioner’s failure to avail himself of

the state remedies in a timely or procedurally correct manner. In

such instances, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted, and may

not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of

"cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse the default.1

 Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-

91 (1977); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989);

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). "Cause"

is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). "Prejudice" is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Id.

"Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a

procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court ‘has not given the

term "cause" precise content.’" Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268,

1274 (11th Cir.)(quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that

cause should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to

petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a

claim was not reasonably available to counsel,

(citation omitted), or that "some interference by

officials," (citation omitted), made compliance

impracticable, would constitute cause under this

standard.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Harmon, 894

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F.2d at 1275; Allen v. Risley, 817 F.2d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1987).

The standard is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). The

"cause and prejudice" standard is equally applicable to pro se

litigants, Harmon, 894 F.2d at 1274; Hughes, 800 F.2d at 908,

whether literate and assisted by "jailhouse lawyers," Tacho, 862

F.2d at 1381; illiterate and unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909, or

non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989).

Finally, if a claim has been found to be procedurally

defaulted, the failure to establish cause for the default may be

excused under exceptional circumstances. For instance:

... in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of

one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ even in the absence of showing cause

for the procedural default.

Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

327 (1995)(to meet the Murray standard, "the petitioner must show

that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him in the light of the new evidence").

2. Application to the Facts of Petitioner's Case

Review of the habeas record reveals that all of the claims

raised by petitioner were not properly exhausted in state court. 

None of petitioner's habeas claims were raised on appeal. 

Although a copy of petitioner's brief in support of his Rule 32

petition filed in the trial court is not included in the record,

whatever claims were raised in that petition were not properly

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exhausted because petitioner did not seek review of the trial

court's dismissal of the petition in either the Arizona Court of

Appeals or Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 1 at pp. 3, 5; Doc. 19 at

p. 4). As a result, petitioner's habeas claims have not been

properly exhausted in state court. 

Petitioner claims he has an IQ of 58 and this contention is

supported by the findings of the state trial court after taking

evidence on whether petitioner was a proper candidate for

imposition of the death penalty. (Doc. 1 at p. 5; Doc. 19,

Exhibit Z at pp. 6-15). In light of those findings and the state

trial court's conclusion that petitioner is "mildly" mentally

retarded, petitioner's failure to properly exhaust his habeas

claims in state court may not be his fault and, if so, the Court

cannot conclude with any degree of certainty that he has no

remaining state remedies with respect to his habeas claims. 

Petitioner may still be able to present these claims in state

court by initiating a second Rule 32 petition (and seeking

appointment of counsel to aid him in this effort), particularly a

petition raising a claim concerning his mental competency to stand

trial or a claim challenging the effectiveness of his trial and/or

appellate counsel for failing to advance such a claim. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) and 32.2(b) (providing that pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(f) an applicant may file an untimely or

successive Rule 32 petition predicated on the notion that his

failure to properly exhaust claims on appeal or in a prior Rule 32

petition were due to factors which are not his fault). 

Because petitioner may still have state remedies available

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to him, the interests of comity require that the state courts be

given the first opportunity (including appellate review) to

address any issues concerning the validity of his convictions in

light of his claim of a lack of mental competency, as well as any

other claims petitioner may not have properly exhausted due to his

mental condition. The record indicates that the state courts

(particularly at the appellate level) have not been given the

opportunity to squarely address these issues. As a result, the

petition should be dismissed for failure to exhaust. See White v.

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Dismissal of a federal

habeas petition for failure to exhaust is appropriate only if the

prisoner had a currently available state remedy at the time of the

federal petition.").

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be dismissed.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

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of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation.

 DATED this 27th day of January, 2006.

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