Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01652/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01652-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTATE OF DWAYNE ZACHARY, No. 2:06-cv-1652-MCE-PAN

LINDA LAMPKIN, REPRESENTATIVE; 

DWAYNELA ZACHARY; AUSTUSTINE 

ZACHARY; SHAMIKA THOMAS; 

KYANNA SMITH; AILEEN ELDORA 

ZACHARY; DWAYNE ZACHARY; LARRY 

MARTWAINE ZACHARY; JOSHUA 

CLEARANCE ZACHARY,

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; CITY OF

SACRAMENTO; SACRAMENTO COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; LOU

BLANAS, individually and in

his official capacity as

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF;

SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT;

ALBERT NAJERA, individually

and in his official capacity

as CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE CITY

OF SACRAMENTO; SACRAMENTO

SHERIFF OFFICERS BRETT SPAID,

CRAIG HARMON, MATTHEW TALLMAN,

KEVIN JORDAN, BRENT JARVIS,

REBECCA PURDY, ANDREW CROLEY,

LT. BILL MYERS; JEREMY DAY;

DONALD VAGT; KENNETH WIGHT;

GRANT JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL

DISTRICT; OFFICERS DAVID LUGO

AND EMILY KELLY OF THE GRANT

JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL

DISTRICT; BILL ROBERTS

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

individually and in his

official capacity as CHIEF OF

POLICE OF GRANT JOINT UNION

HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT,

SACRAMENTO SHERIFF OFFICERS

DOES 1-49; SACRAMENTO POLICE

OFFICERS DOES 50-99; GRANT

JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL

DISTRICT DOES 100-149, and

ADDITIONAL DOES 150-200

inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiffs claim that numerous

Defendants violated their civil rights during the course of

investigating a domestic disturbance call at the home of now

deceased Dwayne Zachary. Plaintiffs also allege several state

law claims. Presently before the Court is the Motion of

Defendant Grant Joint Union High School District (“Grant School

District” or “District”) to Dismiss all claims brought against it

in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. The District’s Motion is

based on the sovereign immunity of the state, pursuant to the

Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, against

suit brought in federal court.1

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3

BACKGROUND

On August 4, 2005, seven to ten Sacramento County Sheriff’s

Deputies, Sacramento City Police Officers, and Grant School

District Officers responded to a domestic disturbance call

directing them to the residence of Dwayne Zachary, an AfricanAmerican man. Mr. Zachary answered the door dressed only in his

bathrobe. The caller was not present at the residence, and

officers quickly determined the caller was not in danger from

Mr. Zachary. Upon proceeding to leave the premises, Mr. Zachary

allegedly made statements that caused the officers to turn back

and charge toward Mr. Zachary. Mr. Zachary retreated inside his

home and unsuccessfully tried to close the door on officers.

Plaintiffs allege the officers, at least two of which were

employed by Defendant Grant School District, forced their way

into Mr. Zachary’s home. Plaintiffs claim that the officers then

began kicking, tasering, and beating him. Plaintiff Shamika

Thomas, daughter of Mr. Zachary, approached her father’s

residence during the time officers were engaged in the

altercation inside the home. She allegedly sought entry into the

home and attempted to persuade the officers to cease their attack

on Mr. Zachary. Shamika alleges officers precluded her from

entering the home. She then states she watched the altercation

from an open kitchen window on the north side of the premises. 

At some point, Dwayne Zachary was brought out of his home,

motionless, and on a gurney. Mr. Zachary was then rushed to a

nearby hospital but was pronounced dead late in the day on

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4

August 4, 2005. The Coroner’s Final Report listed the cause of

death as “Sudden cardiac arrest while being restrained prone

after physical altercation with police that included [the] use of

tazers.” The present action followed.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)

requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the

defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.

Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). While a complaint attacked by a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiffs’ obligation to provide the “grounds” of

his “entitlement to relief” requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 2007

U.S. LEXIS 5901, 20-22 (U.S. 2007) (internal citations and

quotations omitted).

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5

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level. Id. at 21 (citing 5 C.

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp.

235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must contain something

more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should

“freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, ... undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of ... the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to

amend is only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of

the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow

Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

1. State Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution

provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall

not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by

Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any

Foreign State.” 

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6

Federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States “was

not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the

judicial power of the United States.” Hans v. Louisiana, 134

U.S. 1 (1890). “[T]he Eleventh Amendment was introduced to

clarify the intent of the Framers” that Article III, section two

of the Constitution “would not provide a mechanism for making

States unwilling defendants in federal court.” Employees of the

Missouri Public Health Dep’t, 411 U.S. 291-292 (Marshall, J.,

concurring). This prohibition extends to suits against a state

“brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of

which the Amendment is but an exemplification.” In re State of

New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921). “[A]n unconsenting State is

immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens

as well as by citizens of another State.” Employees of the

Missouri Public Health Dep’t v. Dep’t of Public Health & Welfare,

411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973).

2. State Agency Immunity

Eleventh Amendment immunity is not limited to suits in which

the state itself is a named party. Regents of the University of

California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). “It has long been

settled that the reference to actions ‘against one of the United

States’ encompasses not only actions in which a state is actually

named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state

agents and state instrumentalities.” Id. (quoting Poindexter v.

Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 287 (1885)). 

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7

The Ninth Circuit has established a five-factored test for

determining whether a governmental agency is an “arm of the

state,” and thus afforded the same constitutional immunity as the

state. Belanger v. Madera Unified School District, 963 F.2d 248,

250 (9th Cir. 1992) (referencing the balancing test summarized in

Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist, 861 F.2d 198, 201

(9th Cir. 1988)). These five factors are 1) “whether a money

judgment would be satisfied out of state funds,” 2) “whether the

entity performs central governmental functions,” 3) “whether the

entity may sue or be sued,” 4) “whether the entity has the power

to take property in its own name or only the name of the state,”

and 5) “the corporate status of the entity.” Belanger, 963 F.2d

at 250-251.

In Belanger, the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo the district

court’s finding that a California school district was immune to

suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 249-250. The court,

in a detailed discussion, analyzed the five factors listed above

and concluded that the district court had “correctly applied the

Mitchell test and determined that the school district was immune

to suit under the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. at 254; Mitchell, 861

F.2d at 201. The court found that because “[t]he school district

is an agent of the state that performs state governmental

functions and ... a judgment would be satisfied out of state

funds,” it was therefore an arm of the state, and possessed the

state’s immunity to suit. Belanger, 963 F.2d at 250, 254.

The California Court of Appeal has also found that a school

district is immune from suit in federal court. Kirchmann v. Lake

elsinore Unified School District, 100 Cal. App. 4th 1098 (2000). 

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8

The court noted that most district and state courts, following

the United States Supreme Court decision in Mt. Healthy City

School Dist. Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977),

have found that the Eleventh Amendment does not afford local

school districts immunity from suit. Kirchman, 100 Cal. App. 4th

at 1106-1107. However, because each state structures its public

education systems independently, the above precedents were of

“limited assistance” to the court’s analysis. Id. Indeed, the

question of whether a particular state agency is an arm of the

state is a question of federal law that “can be answered only

after considering the provisions of state law that define the

agency's character.” Regents of the University of California,

519 U.S. at 429. Instead, the court performed a detailed

analysis of the basis for the Mitchell factors as applied in

Belanger, focusing primarily on the impact of any judgment

against the school district on the state treasury and the

centrality of governmental functions performed by the school

district. Kirchman, 100 Cal. App. 4th at 1106-1115. The court

concluded that “the relevant criteria favor immunity.” Id. at

1115. The court also noted that “the Ninth Circuit in Belanger

correctly determined a California school district should be

considered an arm of the state for purposes of the Eleventh

Amendment.” Id. at 1115. Therefore, this Court finds that the

Grant School District is an “arm of the state” and thus immune

from suit in federal court. As a result, Plaintiffs’ complaint

against the District has failed to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Accordingly the District’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against it is GRANTED.

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3. Supplemental Jurisdiction

The Eleventh Amendment also works to bar supplemental

(pendent) claims. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120 (1983). The amendment “should not be

construed to apply with less force to this implied form of

jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear

federal claims.” Id. The history of the amendment “confirms

that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III

power.” Id. To hold otherwise would be to allow a federal court

to “award damages against a State on the basis of a pendent

claim.” Id. “[P]endant jurisdiction does not permit such an

evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment.” 

Id. at 121. Therefore, “neither pendent jurisdiction nor any

other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 

Id. Therefore, this Court finds that the Grant School District

is additionally immune from suit under the Court’s supplemental

jurisdiction and accordingly grants the District’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law claims against it.

4. Waiver of Immunity

There are, however, exceptions to Eleventh Amendment

immunity. Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways and Public

Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987). “If a State waives its

immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the suit is not

barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. 

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Nonetheless, the Court will find that a state has waived its

immunity only where specified “by the most express language, or

by such overwhelming implication from the text as would leave no

room for any other reasonable construction.” Murray v. Wilson

Distiling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909). A state must “give an

‘unequivocal indication’ that it consents to be sued in a federal

court.” Collins v. State of Alaska, 823 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir.

1987). This indication may arise from 1) express consent by the

state, 2) a provision in a state statute or in the state

constitution, or 3) the clearly expressed intent of Congress “to

condition the state’s participation in a program or activity on

the state’s waiver of immunity.” Id. at 331-332. 

As to the first factor above, Plaintiffs have made no

showing that Grant School District has consented to the Court’s

jurisdiction in this case. On the express disclaimer of Grant

School District as provided in their Motion to Dismiss, this

Court finds that the District has made no express consent to be

sued in federal court.

Given the determinations of the Kirchmann and Belanger

courts that a California school district is immune from suit, the

second and third factors above can also not stand as a basis to

find waiver in the present case. “In order for a state statute

or constitutional provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh

Amendment immunity, it must specify the State’s intention to

subject itself to suit in federal court.” Atascadero State

Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (superseded by

statute on other grounds). 

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No relevant California state statute or constitutional provision

has been identified that would effectuate a waiver of sovereign

immunity from suit, in federal court, against the state or an

entity found to be an arm of the state. “California has not

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Shaw v. California

Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 603 (9th Cir.

1986). Further, Congress did not clearly express an intent to

abrogate the immunity of states in passing the federal Civil

Rights statutes. “Neither a federal court nor a state court may

entertain a § 1983 action against [a state].” Howlett, By and

Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376 (1990). Therefore,

this Court finds that no waiver of immunity to suit has been made

that would subject Grant School District to liability in federal

court.

5. Leave to Amend

The immunity of Grant School District cannot be diminished

by any re-working of the Plaintiffs’ complaint. Thus, the

deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, this

Court grants the District’s Motion to Dismiss without leave to

amend.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Grant Joint Union

School District’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED without leave to

amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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