Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01077/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01077-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332lr Diversity - Labor

---

1

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA T. GONZALEZ, on behalf 

herself and of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

EXAMINATION MANAGEMENT 

SERVICES, INC.; LABORATORY 

CORPORATION OF AMERICA 

HOLDINGS; SOKO UNITED CORP.; 

and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING 

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF 

CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT; 

(2) PROVISIONALLY CERTIFYING 

SETTLEMENT CLASS; 

(3) APPOINTING CLASS COUNSEL; 

(4) APPOINTING PLAINTIFF 

MARIA T. GONZALEZ AS CLASS 

REPRESENTATIVE; 

(5) APPOINTING CLAIMS 

ADMINISTRATOR;

(6) APPROVING NOTICE AND 

DIRECTING DISTRIBUTION OF 

NOTICE; AND 

(7) SETTING SCHEDULE FOR 

FINAL APPROVAL PROCESS

(ECF No. 66)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval 

of Proposed Class Action Settlement (“Prelim. Approval Mot.,” ECF No. 66). The Court 

vacated the hearing and took the matter under submission without oral argument pursuant 

to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). See ECF No. 69. Having reviewed the terms of the Proposed 

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 19
2

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs’ arguments, and the law, the Court preliminarily 

concludes that the settlement falls within the range of reasonableness warranting 

preliminary approval, i.e., that the settlement appears fundamentally fair, reasonable, and 

adequate. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Preliminary Approval Motion.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

This case began when Plaintiff Maria T. Gonzalez filed an action against LabCorp 

and Examination Management Services, Inc. (“EMSI”) on May 24, 2017. See generally 

ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff alleged Defendants improperly classified her and other 

phlebotomists as independent contractors. Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiff further alleged that this 

misclassification caused damages under several provisions of both federal and state law, 

including damages for failure to pay minimum wage, failure to provide accurate wage 

statements, and failure to provide timely payment of all wages upon discharge. Id. ¶ 3.

On November 10, 2017, EMSI added Soko United Corporation (“Soko”) as a thirdparty defendant, alleging indemnity-based claims. See generally ECF No. 27. Plaintiff 

filed a Second Amended Complaint that added Soko as a defendant and alleged that Soko 

was the joint employer of Plaintiff and the proposed class along with EMSI and LapCorp. 

See generally ECF No. 29 (“SAC”).

On March 7, 2018, the Parties attended a telephonic Early Neutral Evaluation with 

the Honorable Jill L. Burkhardt; however, the Parties did not agree to settlement terms at 

that time. See generally ECF No. 52. The Parties attended a mediation conducted by 

Jeffrey Krivis of First Mediation Corporation on July 5, 2018. Prelim. Approval Mot. 3. 

Through that mediation, the Parties reached an “outstanding [s]ettlement on behalf of 

Plaintiff and the proposed Class.” Id. at 4. The resulting Proposed Settlement Agreement 

is now before the Court.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 19
3

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

SETTLEMENT TERMS

The Parties have submitted a comprehensive Proposed Settlement Agreement with 

approximately forty pages of substantive terms, Prelim. Approval Mot. Ex. 1, ECF No. 

66-2 at 2–46,

1 as well as a Proposed Notice. Id. at 48–65.

I. Proposed Settlement Class

The Proposed Settlement Class is defined to include “all Persons, regardless of 

specific title, who currently work for, or previously worked for, Soko as a phlebotomist, 

examiner, and/or PST Specialist who also worked at a LapCorp location pursuant to the 

Independent Contractor Agreement between Soko and EMSI, and/or the Provider 

Agreement between EMSI and LapCorp, at any time during the period of May 24, 2013 

through the date of the Preliminary Approval Order.” Proposed Settlement Agreement 

¶ 2.6. According to the Parties’ investigation and available data, this constitutes “one 

hundred eighteen (118) Class Members.” See id.

II. Proposed Monetary Relief

The Proposed Settlement Agreement provides for $700,000 in Gross Settlement 

Proceeds, Proposed Settlement Agreement ¶ 5.1(a), “used to pay [$175,000 in] Attorneys’ 

fees and [$5,000 in] Expenses, [$6,500 in] Administrative Expenses, [$5,000 for] the Class 

Representative Service Award, and payment to the [California Labor and Workforce 

Development Agency (“LWDA”)] pursuant to [the Private Attorneys General Act 

(“PAGA”)] in the amount of $10,000,” Prelim. Approval Mot. at 4–5 & n.2, with “the Net 

Settlement Proceeds . . . used to pay class Members.” Id. at 5. 

Each Class Member will receive a portion of the Settlement Fund “based on weeks 

worked” during the class period. Proposed Settlement Agreement ¶ 5.1(b); see also Ex. 

A-2, ECF No. 66-2 at 60–63 (“Individual Work Weeks Form”). Consequently, “[w]hile 

members will receive varying amounts based on the number of weeks they worked, if a 

 

1 Because both the Proposed Settlement Agreement and Proposed Notice are filed as part of ECF No. 66-

2, the Court identifies the documents using the CM/ECF pagination.

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 19
4

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

straight average allocation were made . . . , each member will receive more than $4,224.” 

Prelim. Approval Mot. at 5. The Parties have also specified the percentage amount (as 

against the 100% Net Settlement Proceeds) each Class Member will recover. Individual 

Work Weeks Form at 1–4. In exchange, the Class Members will release all “claims, 

liabilities, damages, obligations, costs, or causes of action of whatever kind of nature that 

were asserted . . . in the Second Amended Class Action Complaint.” Settlement Agreement 

¶ 10.2.

None of the Settlement Fund will revert to Defendants and, to the extent that any 

funds remain after the initial Class-Member distribution, that amount “will be paid in 

accordance with California Code of Civil Procedure section 384 to the Legal Aid Society 

of San Diego, a nonprofit organization providing civil legal services to the indigent.” 

Prelim. Approval Mot. at 6.

III. Injunctive Relief

Those Class Members who continue to work for Defendants will be reclassified as 

Internal Revenue Service Form W-2 employees. Proposed Settlement Agreement ¶ 5.1(c). 

Further, Defendants will not require Class Members to arrive at work ten minutes prior to 

the billable start time, unless such time is compensated in compliance with applicable laws 

and regulations. Id.

RULE 23 SETTLEMENT CLASS CERTIFICATION

Before granting preliminary approval of a class action settlement agreement, the 

Court must first determine whether the proposed class can be certified. Amchem Prods. v. 

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (indicating that a district court must apply “undiluted, 

even heightened, attention [to class certification] in the settlement context” to protect 

absentees). 

Class actions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. To certify a class, 

each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) must first be met. Zinser v. Accufix Research 

Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 23(a) allows a class to be certified 

only if:

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 19
5

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 

typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 

the interests of the class.

In addition to Rule 23(a)’s requirements, the proposed class must satisfy the 

requirements of one of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186. Here, 

Plaintiff seeks to certify the Settlement Class under subdivision Rule 23(b)(3), see Prelim. 

Approval Mot. at 19–21, which permits certification if “questions of law or fact common 

to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members” 

and “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 

adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The Court addresses each of these 

requirements in turn.

I. Rule 23(a)(1): Numerosity 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) requires that a class must be “so numerous 

that joinder of all members is impracticable.” “[C]ourts generally find that the numerosity 

factor is satisfied if the class comprises 40 or more members and will find that it has not 

been satisfied when the class comprises 21 or fewer.” Celano v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 242 

F.R.D. 544, 549 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 

Here, the proposed Settlement Class consists of one hundred eighteen members. 

Prelim. Approval Mot. at 4. Accordingly, joinder of all members would be impracticable 

for purposes of Rule 23(a)(1), and the numerosity requirement is therefore satisfied. 

Jordan v. L.A. Cnty., 669 F.2d 1311, 1320 n.10 (9th Cir.) (collecting “[c]lasses with fewer 

known class members [that] have been certified”), cert. granted & judgment vacated, 459 

U.S. 810 (1982), aff’d, 713 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1983).

/ / /

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 19
6

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. Rule 23(a)(2): Commonality

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) requires that there be “questions of law or 

fact common to the class.” Commonality requires that “the class members ‘have suffered 

the same injury.’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2011) (quoting 

Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). “The existence of shared legal 

issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts 

coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 

F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).

Here, the Parties have defined the Settlement Class to encompass all people who 

worked as a phlebotomist, examiner, or PST Specialist at a LabCorp location pursuant to 

an independent contractor agreement between Soko and EMSI or a provider agreement 

between EMSI and LabCorp. Prelim. Approval Mot. at 4; see also Proposed Settlement 

Agreement ¶ 2.6. Common questions thus revolve around the Defendants’ collective 

conduct of misclassifying Settlement Class Members as independent contractors.

Accordingly, it is appropriate for these issues to be adjudicated on a class-wide basis, and 

Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied. See, e.g., Norris-Wilson v. Delta-T Grp., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 596, 

604 (S.D.Cal. 2010) (holding that question of whether workers who were hired by the 

defendant and classified as independent contractors under the same agreement were

independent contractors or employees was sufficient to meet commonality requirement

under Rule 23(a)(2)).

III. Rule 23(a)(3): Typicality

To satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3), the named plaintiffs’ claims 

must be typical of those of the class. The typicality requirement is “permissive” and 

requires only that the named plaintiffs’ claims “are reasonably coextensive with those of 

absent class members.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. “The test of typicality ‘is whether other 

members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is 

not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by 

the same course of conduct.’” Hanon v. Dataprods. Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 19
7

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1992) (quoting Schwartz v. Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D. Cal. 1985)). “[C]lass 

certification should not be granted if ‘there is a danger that absent class members will suffer 

if their representative is preoccupied with defenses unique to it.’” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff was an employee whose claims allegedly arise out of the same 

underlying policies and practices of Defendants as those pertaining to the proposed 

Settlement Class. Prelim. Approval Mot. at 18. As with the Settlement Class Members, 

Plaintiff was “misclassified by Defendants as an independent contractor, received similar 

wage statements, and was paid the same $175 daily wage.” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

claims are typical of the claims of proposed Settlement Class Members, thus satisfying 

Rule 23(a)(3). See, e.g., Norris-Wilson, 270 F.R.D. at 605 (“The entire class alleges an 

identical injury, namely that they were wrongfully classified as independent contractors by 

[the defendant] and, as a result, denied a panoply of work-related benefits that are afforded 

to employees under California labor laws.”).

IV. Rule 23(a)(4): Adequacy

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) requires that the named representatives 

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. “To satisfy constitutional due 

process concerns, absent class members must be afforded adequate representation before 

entry of judgment which binds them.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 

311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940)). To determine legal adequacy, the Court must resolve two 

questions: “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with 

other class members, and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the 

action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Id.

Here, there is no reason to believe that the Class Representative or Class Counsel 

have any conflict of interest with the proposed Settlement Class Members. There is also 

no reason to believe that the Class Representative or Class Counsel has failed to vigorously 

investigate and litigate this case to this point. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel, 

who has “exchanged substantial data” with Defendants to investigate and research

Plaintiff’s claims. Prelim. Approval Mot. at 3. Furthermore, Class Counsel has significant 

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 19
8

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

class action litigation experience. Id. 19; see also Ex. 4, ECF No. 66-5 (“Firm Resume”).

Accordingly, the Class Representative and Class Counsel adequately represent the 

proposed Settlement Class Members, and Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement is met.

V. Rule 23(b)(3)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) permits certification if “questions of law 

or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 

class members” and “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 

efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”

A. Predominance

“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether the proposed classes are 

sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 

at 623. “Rule 23(b)(3) focuses on the relationship between the common and individual 

issues.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022.

Here, the common issue of whether Defendants misclassified the Settlement Class 

Members as independent contractors predominates over any individual issues. See Prelim. 

Approval Mot. at 21; see also Norris-Wilson, 270 F.R.D. at 608 (“Because the degree of 

[the defendant]’s control over the workers is susceptible to common proof, and because the 

same can be said of a good number of the secondary factors that define an employment 

relationship, the Court finds that common issues predominate over individual ones with 

respect to the threshold question whether putative class members are employees of [the 

defendant] or independent contractors.”). Further, for purposes of the Proposed Settlement

Agreement, Class Members are not required to prove any evidentiary or factual issues that 

could arise in litigation. Accordingly, the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is 

satisfied.

B. Superiority

The final requirement for certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

23(b)(3) is “that a class action [be] superior to other available methods for fairly and 

/ / /

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 19
9

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” The superiority inquiry requires the Court to 

consider the four factors listed in Rule 23(b)(3):

(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the 

prosecution or defense of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 

controversy already begun by or against class members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 

litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

See also Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1190. A court need not consider the fourth factor, however, 

when certification is solely for the purpose of settlement. See True v. Am. Honda Motor 

Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1066 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 

(“Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not 

inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, for the 

proposal is that there be no trial.”). The superiority inquiry focuses “‘on the efficiency and

economy elements of the class action so that cases allowed under [Rule 23(b)(3)] are those 

that can be adjudicated most profitably on a representative basis.’” Zinser, 253 F.3d at 

1190 (quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Practice 

& Proc. § 1780, at 562 (2d ed. 1986)). A district court has “broad discretion” in 

determining whether class treatment is superior. Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 

205, 210 (9th Cir. 1975).

Here, the Settlement Class Members’ claims involve the same issues arising from 

the same factual bases. If the Settlement Class Members’ claims were considered on an 

individual basis, more than one hundred cases would follow a similar trajectory and each 

would come to a similar result. Furthermore, the individual cases would consume a 

significant amount of the Court’s and the Parties’ resources. It is also likely that the 

Settlement Class Members would not pursue litigation on an individual basis due to the 

high costs of pursuing their individual claims. The interests of the Settlement Class 

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 19
10

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Members in individually controlling the litigation are minimal, especially given the same 

broad-based policy and practices would be at issue. Given all the above, class treatment is 

the superior method of adjudicating this controversy, and the superiority requirement of 

Rule 23(b)(3) is met. See, e.g., Norris-Wilson, 270 F.R.D. at 612 (“The Court has already 

determined that the threshold question whether [the defendant]’s healthcare professionals 

are employees or independent contractors is susceptible to common proof, and that the 

specific claims can be adjudicated with minimal attention to individual issues. The bases 

for that determination also compel the conclusion that certain of Plaintiffs’ claims are best 

adjudicated on a class-wide basis.”).

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds certification of the Settlement Class 

proper under Rule 23(b)(3). Accordingly, the proposed Settlement Class is CERTIFIED

for settlement purposes only.

RULE 23 PRELIMINARY FAIRNESS DETERMINATION

Having certified the proposed Settlement Class, the Court must next make a 

preliminary determination as to whether the Proposed Settlement Agreement is “fair, 

reasonable, and adequate” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1)(C). 

Factors relevant to this determination include:

The strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, 

and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining 

class action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in 

settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the 

proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence 

of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class 

members to the proposed settlement.

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. “Where a settlement is the product of arms-length negotiations 

conducted by capable and experienced counsel, the court begins its analysis with a 

presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable.” Garner v. State Farm Mut. Auto 

Ins. Co., No. CV 08 1365 CW (EMC), 2010 WL 1687832, *13 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) 

(quoting Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-03082-LB, 2016 WL 631880, 

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 19
11

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016)). “Additionally, there is a strong judicial policy that favors 

settlements, particularly where complex class action litigation is concerned.” In re Syncor 

ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 

955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992)).

I. Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case

To succeed on the merits, Plaintiff would have to prove that Defendants 

misclassified their phlebotomists as independent contractors in violation of California’s 

wage and hour laws. See FAC ¶ 1. Plaintiff also claims that Defendants willfully 

misclassified the class members in violation of California Labor Code § 226.8. See id.

¶ 59. Defendants steadfastly deny any wrongdoing. See generally ECF Nos. 8, 12, 34. 

Given this juxtaposition, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of finding the 

Proposed Settlement Agreement fair, reasonable, and adequate.

II. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

Were the case to proceed to further litigation, the Parties would each bear substantial 

risk and a strong likelihood of protracted and contentious litigation. Even though the 

Parties have agreed to settle this action, they fundamentally disagree regarding the validity 

of Plaintiff’s claims. Compare ECF No. 29, with ECF Nos. 8, 12, 34. The Parties have 

yet to engage in substantial motion practice, including for class certification and summary 

judgment. Accordingly, this factor weights in favor of the Proposed Settlement Agreement 

being fair, reasonable, and adequate.

III. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout Trial 

Defendants dispute whether the classes can be validly certified in the absence of the 

Proposed Settlement Agreement. See ECF No. 8 ¶ 147; ECF No. 12 ¶ 131; ECF No. 34 

Def.’s Aff. Defenses ¶ 6. Implicit in this disagreement is the likelihood of initial challenges 

to class certification and the potential for decertification motions even if class status were 

granted. Weighed against the fact that Defendants do not object to a finding that the class 

elements are met for purposes of the Proposed Settlement Agreement, this factor weighs 

in favor of the Proposed Settlement Agreement being fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 19
12

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. Amount Offered in Settlement

Defendants have offered to pay Gross Settlement Proceeds of $700,000, with EMSI 

to pay $410,000, Soko to pay $150,000, and LabCorp to pay $140,000. See Proposed 

Settlement Agreement ¶ 5.1(a). Less the Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, Administrative 

Expenses, the Class Representative Service Award, the employer’s share of payroll taxes, 

any Opt-Out Reduction, and the LWDA payment, the Net Settlement Proceeds are to be 

allocated and distributable based on the number of weeks each Class Member worked. See 

id. ¶ 5.1(b). A straight averaged allocation for each of the 118 Class Members would result 

in distribution of more than $4,224 each. See Prelim. Approval Mot. at 5. The Parties note 

that “Plaintiff is obtaining a near equivalent to the recovery initially expected.” Id. at 13. 

Given the risks of litigation, the Court determines that the amount offered in the Proposed 

Settlement Agreement is fair and reasonable and that this factor weighs in favor of 

settlement.

V. Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of Proceedings

Although this action was filed in May 2017, see ECF No. 1, it is still in the relatively 

early stages of litigation. Nonetheless, “prior to mediation, Plaintiff engaged in informal 

discovery[ and] reviewed information provided by Defendants, including data regarding 

the scope of the class and the relationships between Defendants.” Declaration of Aaron 

M. Olsen in Support of Prelim. Approval Mot., ECF No. 66-1, ¶ 10. “The Parties seriously

investigated the facts and analyzed the relevant legal issues regarding the claims and 

defenses asserted in the Action.” Id. “Plaintiff also conducted formal post-mediation 

discovery, including serving Requests for Admission[], to confirm the material points of 

the Parties’ contentions.” Id. 

Accordingly, it appears the Parties have entered into the Proposed Settlement 

Agreement with a strong working knowledge of the relevant facts, law, and strengths and 

weaknesses of their claims and defenses. This factor therefore weights in favor of the 

Proposed Settlement Agreement being fair, reasonable, and adequate.

/ / /

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 19
13

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

VI. Experience and Views of Counsel 

“The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of 

reasonableness.” Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1979). “Here, 

counsel for the Parties endorses the Settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable” and 

“Plaintiff’s Counsel have extensive experience in prosecuting and litigating employment 

and consumer class action cases.” Prelim. Approval Mot. at 13. Because the presumption 

of reasonableness is warranted under these circumstances, the Court concludes that this 

factor weighs in favor of finding the Proposed Settlement Agreement fair, reasonable, and 

adequate.

VII. Attorneys’ Fees Provision

In the Ninth Circuit, a district court has discretion to apply either a lodestar method 

or a percentage-of-the-fund method in calculating a class fee award in a common fund case. 

Fischel v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of U.S., 307 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002). When 

applying the percentage-of-the-fund method, an attorneys’ fees award of “twenty-five 

percent is the ‘benchmark’ that district courts should award.” In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig., 

47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 

F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990)); Fischel, 307 F.3d at 1006. A district court, however,

“may adjust the benchmark when special circumstances indicate a higher or lower 

percentage would be appropriate.” In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d at 379 (citing Six 

Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1311). “Reasonableness is the goal, and mechanical or 

formulaic application of either method, where it yields an unreasonable result, can be an 

abuse of discretion.” Fischel, 307 F.3d at 1007.

Here, Defendants have agreed not to oppose to Class Counsel’s request for the Court 

to approve attorneys’ fees in the amount of up to twenty-five percent of the total benefits 

conferred to the Class Members by the Proposed Settlement Agreement, or $175,000, plus 

documented litigation costs. See Proposed Settlement Agreement ¶ 7.1. Because this fee 

is in line with the Ninth Circuit’s benchmark, the Proposed Settlement Agreement’s 

attorney-fee provision should not bar preliminary approval.

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 19
14

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

VIII. Class Representative Service Award Provision 

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that named plaintiffs in class action litigation are 

eligible for reasonable incentive payments. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th 

Cir. 2003). The district court must evaluate each incentive award individually, using 

“‘relevant factors includ[ing] the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of 

the class, the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions, . . . [and] the 

amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation.’” Id. (citing 

Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998)).

Here, the Parties have agreed to a Class Representative Service Award up to a 

maximum total amount of $5,000. See Proposed Settlement Agreement ¶ 7.2. The Court 

finds that this modest incentive award is reasonable and should not bar preliminary 

approval.

IX. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s unopposed Preliminary 

Approval Motion.

PROPOSED SETTLEMENT NOTICE

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B), “[f]or any class certified 

under Rule 23(b)(3) the court must direct to class members the best notice that is 

practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can 

be identified through reasonable effort.” Because the Court has determined that 

preliminary certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3), the mandatory notice 

procedures required by Rule 23(c)(2)(B) must be followed. 

Where there is a class settlement, Federal Rule of Procedure 23(e)(1) requires the 

court to “direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound 

by the proposal.” “Notice is satisfactory if it ‘generally describes the terms of the 

settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to 

come forward and be heard.’” Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Churchill Vill., LLC v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004)); see 

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 19
15

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

also Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 120 (8th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he 

mechanics of the notice process are left to the discretion of the court subject only to the 

broad ‘reasonableness’ standards imposed by due process.”).

In the present case, the Parties intend to notify the Class Members through first-class 

mail and email. See Proposed Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 6.2(b)(i)–(ii). Defendants shall 

provide the Claims Administrator with the Class Members’ “last known mailing address, 

email address, and telephone number,” id. ¶ 6.2, and the Claims Administrator “shall use 

standard skip-tracing methods to obtain forwarding addresses of Class Members if any of 

the mailed Class Notices are returned as undeliverable.” Prelim. Approval Mot. at 7. The 

eight-page Proposed Notice provides:

(1) a short, plain statement about the Action and the essential 

terms of the Settlement; (2) an appropriate means for obtaining 

additional information regarding the Action and the Settlement; 

(3) appropriate information concerning the procedure for 

objecting or opting-out from the Settlement; and (4) information 

that any relief to Class Members is contingent on the Court’s 

final approval.

Id. at 7; see also Proposed Notice.

Having thoroughly reviewed the jointly drafted Proposed Notice, the Court finds that 

both the method and content of the Proposed Notice comply with Rule 23. Accordingly, 

the Court APPROVES both the content of the Proposed Notice and the proposed 

notification plan.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Preliminary Approval

Motion (ECF No. 66) and HEREBY ORDERS:

1. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT 

AGREEMENT: The Settlement Agreement is PRELIMINARILY APPROVED as fair, 

reasonable, and adequate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).

2. PRELIMINARY CLASS CERTIFICATION: Pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), the Action is PRELIMINARILY CERTIFIED, for settlement 

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 19
16

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

purposes only, as a class action on behalf of the following Settlement Class Members with 

respect to the Released Claims asserted in this Action:

Settlement Class Members: “[A]ll Class Members who do not exclude themselves 

from the Settlement Class in the manner and time prescribed by the Court in the 

Preliminary Approval Order.” Proposed Settlement Agreement ¶ 2.40.

Class Member(s): “Plaintiff, in addition to and also all Persons, regardless of 

specific title, who currently work for, or previously worked for, Soko as a phlebotomist, 

examiner, and/or PST Specialist who also worked at a LabCorp location pursuant to the 

Independent Contractor Agreement between Soko and EMSI, and/or the Provider 

Agreement between EMSI and LabCorp, at any time during the period of May 24, 2013 

through the date of the Preliminary Approval Order.” Proposed Settlement Agreement 

¶ 2.6.

3. CLASS REPRESENTATIVE, CLASS COUNSEL, AND CLAIMS

ADMINISTRATOR: Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Court 

PRELIMINARILY CERTIFIES, for settlement purposes only, Plaintiff Maria T. 

Gonzalez as the Class Representative and Haeggquist & Eck, LLP as Class Counsel. 

Additionally, the Court APPROVES AND APPOINTS Phoenix Class Action 

Administration Solutions as the Claims Administrator.

4. NOTICE: The Court PRELIMINARILY APPROVES the form and 

substance of the Proposed Notice set forth in the Settlement Agreement. See ECF No. 

66-2 at 48–65. The form and method for notifying the Class Members of the Settlement

Agreement and its terms and conditions satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 23(c)(2)(B) and 23(e). The Court further concludes that the Notice Procedure 

constitutes the best notice practicable under the circumstances. As provided in the 

Settlement Agreement, the Claims Administrator SHALL PROVIDE notice to the Class 

Members and respond to Class Member inquiries. Within thirty (30) days of the date on 

which this Order is electronically docketed, the Claims Administrator SHALL

/ / /

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 19
17

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DISSEMINATE the Notice in the Form attached as Exhibit A to the Proposed Settlement 

Agreement and in the manner and form provided in the Proposed Settlement Agreement. 

5. FINAL APPROVAL HEARING: Judge Sammartino SHALL CONDUCT

a Final Approval Hearing on Thursday, August 22, 2019, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 4D 

of the Edward J. Schwartz United States Courhouse, 221 W. Broadway, San Diego, CA 

92101, to consider:

a. the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement;

b. Plaintiff’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs;

c. the Class Representative Service Award;

d. dismissal with prejudice of the Action with respect to Defendants; and

e. the entry of final judgment in this Action. 

At the Final Approval Hearing, the Parties shall also be prepared to update the Court on 

any new developments since the filing of the Motion, including any untimely submitted 

opt-outs, objections, and claims or any other issues as the Court deems appropriate. The 

date and time of the Final Approval Hearing SHALL BE INCLUDED in the Notice to be 

mailed to all Class Members. 

6. MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION 

SETTLEMENT: No later than twenty-one (21) days before the Final Approval Hearing, 

the Parties SHALL FILE a Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement. The 

Motion SHALL INCLUDE AND ADDRESS any Objections received as of the filing 

date. In addition to the class certification and settlement fairness factors, the motion 

SHALL ADDRESS the number of putative Class Members who have opted out and the 

corresponding number of claims.

7. APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS, AND CLASS 

REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE AWARD: No later than twenty-one (21) days before 

the Final Approval Hearing, Class Counsel SHALL FILE an application for attorney fees, 

costs, and a Class Representative Service Award. Class Counsel SHALL PROVIDE

documentation detailing the number of hours incurred by attorneys in litigating this action, 

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 19
18

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

supported by detailed time records, as well as hourly compensation to which those 

attorneys are reasonably entitled. Class Counsel SHALL ADDRESS the appropriateness 

of any upward or downward departure in the lodestar calculation, as well as reasons why a 

percentage-of-the-fund approach to awarding attorney fees may be more preferable in this 

case. Class Counsel SHALL BE PREPARED to address any questions the Court may 

have regarding the application for fees at the Final Approval Hearing.

8. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS: In the event the Proposed Settlement 

Agreement is not consummated for any reason, the conditional class certification SHALL 

BE of no further force or effect. Should the Settlement not become final, the fact that the 

Parties were willing to stipulate to class certification as part of the Settlement SHALL 

HAVE no bearing on, nor be admissible in connection with, the issue of whether a class 

should be certified in a non-settlement context.

9. SCHEDULE: The Court orders the following schedule for further 

proceedings:

Event Date

Deadline for Defendants to 

send Claims Administrator a 

list of Class Members

Within 21 days of the date on 

which this Order is 

electronically docketed

Deadline for Claims 

Administrator to mail 

Proposed Notice

Within 30 days of the date on 

which this Order is 

electronically docketed

Deadline for Objections Within 45 days of publication 

of the Proposed Notice

Deadline for Class Counsel to 

file motion for attorneys’ fees 

and costs and Class 

Representative Service Award

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

No later than 21 days prior to 

the Final Approval Hearing

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 19
19

17-CV-1077 JLS (JLB)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Deadline for the Parties to file 

a motion for final approval of 

class action settlement

No later than 21 days prior to 

the Final Approval Hearing

Deadline for Claims 

Administrator to prepare and 

Class Counsel to file 

Declaration of Compliance 

with Class Notice 

requirements

No later than 14 days prior to 

the Final Approval Hearing

Final Approval Hearing August 22, 2019, at 10:00 a.m.

10. STAY: At the request of the Parties, pending the Final Approval Hearing, all 

proceedings in the Action, including all current deadlines other than those set forth herein, 

are STAYED until further Order from this Court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 30, 2019

Case 3:17-cv-01077-JLS-JLB Document 73 Filed 04/30/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

 19