Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-00538/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-00538-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY T. DAVIS,

Petitioner, No. C 02-0538 PJH

ORDER GRANTING CERTIFICATE

v. OF APPEALABILITY; GRANTING

COUNSEL’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW

D.L. RUNNELS, WARDEN,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

This is a habeas case under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by a state prisoner. On

August 2, 2007, this court denied Davis’ petition on the merits. Before the court is

Davis’ application for a certificate of appealability (“COA”), and his appointed attorney,

Michael Thorman’s motion to withdraw as counsel.

To obtain a COA, Davis must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where a district court has rejected the

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward. “The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Section 2253(c)(3) requires a court granting a

COA to indicate which issues satisfy the COA standard. Here, the court finds that the

six issues presented by Davis in his petition meet the above standard and accordingly

GRANTS the COA as to those issues. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322

(2003). Those issues include Davis’ claims:

Case 4:02-cv-00538-PJH Document 58 Filed 08/31/07 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

 (1) That he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his courtappointed attorney failed to investigate evidence that Davis’ hand was

allegedly cut by Alexander in support of his self-defense theory; and 

(2) California Evidence Code § 1370 is facially unconstitutional and

violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment;

(3) application of California Evidence Code § 1370 to Davis violated

the Confrontation Clause;

(4) the Confrontation Clause was violated when Persons’ and

Alexander’s hearsay statements to Officer Salazar were admitted

as spontaneous statements;

(5) the Confrontation clause was violated when the state trial court

denied Davis’ motion for a new trial, based on “newly discovered”

evidence that demonstrated that Alexander and Persons contrived

to misrepresent the incident in order to protect Alexander from

criminal charges;

(6) that the alleged cumulative errors denied him a fair trial.

Turning to Thorman’s motion to withdraw as counsel, the court begins by noting

that counsel was appointed in this case on April 19, 2004, after the habeas petition was

fully briefed, and following the United States Supreme Court’s decision Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), for the purpose of addressing the retroactivity of

Crawford and its potential effect on Davis’ Confrontation Clause claims. However, after

supplemental briefing was complete, the United States Supreme Court decided

Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (Feb. 28, 2007), and held that Crawford does not

apply retroactively. Accordingly, as this court noted in its April 9, 2007 order denying

Davis’ request for additional briefing on the merits, Davis’ Confrontation Clause claims

are therefore governed by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). See Bolton v.

Knowles, 2007 WL 793200 at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 13, 2007) (noting that habeas petitioner’s

Confrontation Clause claim is governed by the standards set forth in Ohio v. Roberts);

accord Miller v. Fleming, 2007 WL 840981 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2007). 

The Supreme Court’s decision in Whorton, succeeding Thorman’s appointment

as counsel, has thus eliminated the complexity that justified appointment of counsel in

April 2004. Accordingly, Thorman’s motion to withdraw as counsel is GRANTED. To

the extent that Davis seeks appointment of counsel on appeal, Davis should direct his

Case 4:02-cv-00538-PJH Document 58 Filed 08/31/07 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

request to the Ninth Circuit. It will be within the Ninth Circuit’s discretion to determine

whether appointment of counsel on appeal is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3006(a)(2)(B).

The clerk shall forward the file, including a copy of this order, to the Court of

Appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th

Cir. 1997).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2007

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:02-cv-00538-PJH Document 58 Filed 08/31/07 Page 3 of 3