Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00316/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00316-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RELAUN V. DEADMON,

 Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFERY WANG, et al., 

 Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00316-LJO-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

(ECF No. 1)

AMENDED PLEADING DUE IN THIRTYDAYS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action filed on March 6, 2014 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Complaint is before the Court for screening. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee,

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or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method 

for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that 

a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, 

legal conclusions are not. Id. at 667-68.

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III. THE COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff names as Defendants (1) Wang, M.D., Corcoran State Prison (“CSP”) 

Chief Medical Executive, (2) Macias, former CSP Chief Executive Officer, (3) Obaiza, 

CSP Chief Executive Officer, (4) McCabe, CSP Physician, (5) Yu, CSP Physician, (6) 

Aye, CSP Physician, (7) Beregovskaya, CSP Physician, (8) Rouch, CSP Nurse 

Practitioner, (9) Lopez, CSP Registered Nurse, (10) Epstein, CSP Correctional Officer, 

and (11) Gil, CSP Correctional Officer. 

Plaintiff’s allegations can be summarized essentially as follows:

Plaintiff requested treatment at the CSP clinic for chronic hiccups for which he 

induced vomiting when breathing became difficult. He was given antacid and told by 

Defendant Nurse Lopez that there was nothing she could do for hiccups. 

He had a follow-up visit with Defendant Dr. Yu, who found no symptoms of 

distress and told him to put in a medical service request if his hiccups persisted. 

Plaintiff returned to the clinic and presented the same complaints many times 

over the ensuing months. Dr. Yu requested referral for a GI specialist but the request 

was denied by the Chief Medical Officer as not meeting InterQual criteria. Plaintiff was 

given different medications for the hiccups and a chest x-ray by Defendant Dr. 

Beregovskaya. Defendant Dr. Aye told him the hiccups were benign. Dr. Yu told him 

there were no acute findings relating to the hiccups.

Plaintiff’s self-induced vomiting eventually resulted in his vomiting blood. He was 

hospitalized where he was given a GI consultation, gastric endoscopy and a CT scan of 

his neck, each of which was normal. 

Plaintiff suffered two incidents of respiratory distress or failure in the presence of 

Defendant Correctional Officers Epstein and Gil. Defendant Gil had to Heimlich Plaintiff 

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to restore normal breathing. Neither Epstein nor Gil filed incident reports.

Plaintiff filed a prison medical appeal seeking appropriate treatment for his 

hiccups, vomiting and breathing difficulties. The appeal was partially granted (for 

medication) at the first level by Defendant McCabe, partially granted (for GI test) at the 

second level by Defendants Obaiza, Wang and Macias, and denied by nonparty CDCR 

Appeals Chief Zamora at the third level. 

In this action Plaintiff seeks (1) monetary damages, (2) a declaration his rights 

have been violated, and (3) an affirmative injunction directing that he receive 

appropriate care. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Medical Indifference

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, 

an inmate must show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006), quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 

(1976). This requires the plaintiff to show (1) “a serious medical need by demonstrating 

that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) “the defendant's response to the 

need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096, quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 

974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. 

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997).

1. Serious Medical Need

Plaintiff claims difficulty breathing, including episodes in which he stopped 

breathing altogether, and chronic vomiting, at times vomiting blood. He demonstrates a 

serious need for medical treatment. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (a “serious medical 

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need” may be shown by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could 

result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain); 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059–60 (the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or 

patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a 

medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence 

of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a serious 

need for medical treatment).

These allegations, taken as true for purposes of screening, suggest significant 

distress which necessitated ongoing treatment, prescription medication and 

hospitalization. 

2. Indifferent Response

However, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not include facts suggesting Defendants 

knowingly denied, delayed, or interfered with medically necessary care or knowingly 

provided unacceptable medical care. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058–60 (9th 

Cir. 2004). Although Plaintiff complains that Defendants did not treat his medical needs, 

his allegations reflect that during the four months following his initial medical services 

request, he was seen in the CSP clinic not less than nineteen times. During this period 

he was provided medications and x-rays. He was sent for outside specialty GI treatment

when he vomited blood. Granted Plaintiff thinks he needed, and he wanted, additional

and different treatment. However, his mere dissatisfaction and disagreement with 

treatment decisions, without more, is not a basis for an inadequate medical care claim 

unless the treatment chosen was medically unacceptable and in conscious disregard of 

an excessive risk to his health. See Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.

1981); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). Nothing here suggests 

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Defendants intentionally provided medically unacceptable care or acted maliciously. So 

long as the treatment provided was adequate, Plaintiff’s preference for different 

treatment does not give rise to a civil rights violation. Evan v. Manos, 336 F.Supp.2d 

255, 261 (W.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Veloz v. New York, 339 F.Supp.2d 505, 521 

(S.D.N.Y. 2004), citing Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1994) (“To 

establish deliberate indifference, plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants actually 

wished him harm, or at least, were totally unconcerned with his welfare.”).

Plaintiff makes no showing that Defendants acted maliciously or with a conscious 

disregard of a serious risk he might be harmed by their action or inaction. Rather it 

appears Defendants provided care consistent with their medical judgment .

Plaintiff suggests that there was actionable delay in referring him to a GI 

specialist. However, it appears there was just a difference of opinion as to whether 

Plaintiff needed such a referral prior to the time he was vomiting blood. In any event, 

there is no indication Plaintiff suffered any substantial harm from the delay in referral.

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1 332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff’s GI consultation 

came back negative. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060, citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of 

State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (any alleged delay in receiving

medical treatment must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a 

claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs). It does not appear that 

Plaintiff’s symptoms increased as a result of lack of treatment, or caused or placed him 

at risk for any further harm.

Finally it is noted that mere negligence, i.e., failure to properly treat Plaintiff in 

accordance with the medical standard of care, would not give rise to a federal civil rights 

violation. See Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing 

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Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06 (1976) (mere indifference, negligence, or medical 

malpractice will not support this cause of action).

Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend his Complaint. If Plaintiff chooses 

to amend, he must allege facts demonstrating that Defendants knowingly denied, 

delayed, or interfered with treatment of a serious medical need, or knowingly provided 

medically unacceptable care, in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to Plaintiff's 

health and resulting in harm to Plaintiff.

B. Medical Incident Report 

Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Correctional Officers Epstein and Gil failed to 

file incident reports that would have documented alleged episodes of respiratory

distress. However, Plaintiff has no independent right to accurate prison medical records. 

Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff may not assert a constitutional violation based solely on a claim 

Defendants failed to file incident reports.

C. Health Care Appeal

Plaintiff claims his health care appeal was improperly denied. 

Prison staff actions in responding to a prisoner grievance alone cannot give rise 

to any claim for relief under § 1983 for violation of due process. “[A prison] grievance 

procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the 

inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993), citing Azeez v. 

DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8, 10 (D.C. Ill. 1982). A prisoner does not have a claim of 

entitlement to a grievance procedure. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.

1988); Ramirez v. Galarza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff may not assert a constitutional violation based solely on a claim 

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Defendants improperly handled and disposed of his health care grievance.

D. State Law Medical Negligence

Plaintiff claims care provided by Defendants was medically negligent.

“To establish a medical malpractice claim, the plaintiff must allege: (1) 

defendant's legal duty of care toward plaintiff; (2) defendant's breach of that duty; (3) 

injury to plaintiff as a result of that breach-proximate or legal cause; and (4) damage to 

plaintiff.” Rightley v. Alexander, 1995 WL 437710 at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 1995), citing 

Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach School Dist., 22 Cal.3d 508, 514 (Cal. 1978); 6 B.E. Witkin, 

Summary of California Law, Torts § 732 (9th ed. 1988). “[M]edical personnel are held in 

both diagnosis and treatment to the degree of knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed 

and exercised by members of their profession in similar circumstances.” Hutchinson v. 

United States, 838 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1988).

Under the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”), a plaintiff may not maintain an 

action for damages against a public employee unless he alleges facts demonstrating 

presentation of a written claim to the state Victim Compensation and Government 

Claims Board within six months of accrual of the action. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 905, 

911.2(a), 945.4 & 950.2; Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201, 209 (Cal.

2007); Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). A 

plaintiff may file a written application for leave to file a late claim up to one year after the 

cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov't Code § 911.4.

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint does not include facts showing 

Defendants fell below a professional standard of care and thereby caused Plaintiff

harm. 

Plaintiff does not allege compliance with CTCA claim filing requirements. Failure 

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to demonstrate such compliance constitutes a failure to state a cause of action and will 

result in the dismissal of state law claims. State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde),

32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240 (2004).

Additionally, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law 

claim absent a cognizable federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family 

Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Gini v. Las 

Vegas Metropolitan Police Dep't, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994). “When . . . the 

court dismisses the federal claim leaving only state claims for resolution, the court 

should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice.” 

Les Shockley Racing v. National Hot Rod Ass'n, 884 F.2d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1989).

If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must allege facts showing Defendants’ state law 

negligence under the above standards within the Court's supplemental jurisdiction.

E. Injunctive Relief 

Plaintiff seeks an order directing he receive appropriate medical care. 

Plaintiff may not seek injunctive relief where there is no underlying federal claim. 

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102 (1983) (plaintiff must show a “case 

or controversy” and “real and immediate” threat of injury). His disagreement with 

Defendants’ treatment does not alone suggest a present and immediate threat of 

irreparable harm. Id.

Plaintiff's Complaint does not state any cognizable claim against Defendants for 

the reasons stated. Injunctive relief is moot.

F. Declaratory Relief

In addition to damages, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, but because his claims 

for damages necessarily entail a determination whether his rights were violated, his 

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separate request for declaratory relief is subsumed by those claims. Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, this action properly 

proceeds as one for damages and injunctive relief only.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

The Complaint fails to state any cognizable claim. The Court will provide Plaintiff 

with an opportunity to file an amended complaint that cures noted deficiencies. Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a), but must state what each named Defendant did or did not do that led to the 

deprivation of his constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78, 

consistent with this Order. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555. Further, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 

claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012), and must be “complete in itself 

without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights amended 

complaint form and (2) a copy of his Complaint filed March 6, 2014, 

2. The Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, 

3. Plaintiff shall file a signed amended complaint within thirty (30) days from 

service of this Order, and 

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4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this Order, 

the undersigned will recommend the action be dismissed, with prejudice, 

for failure to state a claim and failure to prosecute, subject to the “three 

strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v, Di Vittorio, 658 

F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 30, 2014 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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