Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01831/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01831-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 23:134 P.I.- Auto Negligence

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BESSIE IRENE WALTZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et )

al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-1831-SMS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS (DOC. 17)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED

COMPLAINT (Doc. 23)

ORDER GRANTING REQUESTS FOR

JUDICIAL NOTICE (DOCS. 25, 33)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO

ENTER JUDGMENT

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for all

proceedings, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b), and Local Rule 73-301.

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

action, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, and

Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint. 

The motions came on regularly for hearing on January 11,

2008, at 9:34 a.m. in Courtroom 7 before the Honorable Sandra M.

Snyder, United States Magistrate Judge. Ernest Robert Wright of

the United States Attorney’s Office appeared on behalf of

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 1 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Defendants; Warren R. Paboojian and Jason Bell appeared on behalf

of Plaintiff. After argument the matter was submitted to the

Court.

I. Background 

In this action for damages suffered by Plaintiff Bessie

Irene Waltz from physical injuries allegedly caused by the

negligent conduct of an employee of Defendants United States

Department of Agriculture (USDA), United States Forest Service

(USFS), and United States of America (USA), Defendants move

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) for dismissal of Plaintiff’s

complaint, or for summary judgment in the alternative. Defendants

filed a notice of motion, memorandum of points and authorities,

and exhibits on October 25, 2007. Opposition was filed on

November 21, 2007, including a memorandum, reply or response to

Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts, request for judicial

notice, appendix of authorities, and declarations of Warren R.

Paboojian and Jason Bell. Defendants replied on December 26,

2007, with the filing of a memorandum and declarations of Kristi

Kapetan and Cindi Boukidis, as well as objections to the

declaration of Bell. Plaintiff filed objections to the

declarations of Kapetan and Boukidis on January 3, 2008, and she

also filed declarations of Paboojian and Bell in opposition to

the motion. Defendants filed on January 8, 2008, a declaration of

Cindi Boukidis in reply to Bell’s final declaration.

Plaintiff also moves for leave to file an amended complaint.

The motion was filed on November 21, 2007, along with a

memorandum, request for judicial notice, appendix, and

declarations of Warren R. Paboojian and Jason Bell; opposition

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 2 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Plaintiff also cites Local Rule 56-260 concerning citing specific evidence in support of material facts in a 1

motion for summary judgment and filing with the Clerk all evidentiary documents cited in the moving papers.

However, the Court is proceeding pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and not Rule 56.

3

was filed on December 26, 2007, including an attachment of

unpublished cases; and Plaintiff replied on January 3, 2008, with

a memorandum, supplemental declarations of Paboojian and Bell in

support of the motion, and an appendix.

II. Requests for Judicial Notice

Both parties have submitted requests for judicial notice of

various documents filed in the instant action. (Defendants, Doc.

25; Plaintiff, Doc. 33). The Court may take judicial notice of

court records. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. BernalObeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9 Cir. 1993); Valerio v. Boise Cascade th

Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, 645 F.2d

699 (9 Cir. 1981). th

Accordingly, the requests will be granted.

III. Procedural Issues

The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections (Docs. 50, 51) to

the Court’s considering the declarations or any new facts

submitted or sought to be established by Defendants in their

reply papers. Plaintiff relies on Local Rule 78-230(a), which

states that the moving party shall file copies of all documentary

evidence that the party intends to submit in support of the

motion. Plaintiff also argues that it is inappropriate to 1

consider arguments made for the first time in a reply. See,

United States v. Boyce, 148 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1085 (S.D.Cal. 2001);

United States ex rel. Giles v. Sardie, 191 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1127

(S.D.Cal 2000). However, here it was not until Plaintiff raised

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 3 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

equitable tolling and waiver of the statute of limitations in the

response to the motion that the additional facts became

pertinent; given the nature of the factual controversy before the

Court, it does not appear that the government necessarily would

have anticipated Plaintiff’s response to the motion.

Further, the Court notes that in addition to the objections

submitted by Plaintiff, Plaintiff submitted additional

declarations in opposition to the motion to dismiss after the

reply was filed by the government, and the government has

submitted yet another declaration in response to these

declarations. There is no express provision for such objections

or additional factual submissions at such a point in the motion

process. 

However, even if Defendant were to object to the procedure,

the Court determines that it is fair and efficient to permit

Plaintiff as well as Defendant to have an opportunity to submit

evidentiary material in response to the issues that have arisen

during the course of the motion process. Both parties have had

such an opportunity. 

In summary, the Court considers the parties’ efforts to

submit evidentiary documents to be appropriate and timely in view

of the nature of the dispute before it, and it exercises its

considerable discretion with respect to enforcement of the

pertinent rules to overrule Plaintiff’s objections and to decline

Plaintiff’s request to strike the new matter. See, Dulange v.

Dutro Construction, Inc., 183 F.3d 916, 919 n. 2 (9 Cir. 1999). th

IV. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 4 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies as required by the Federal Tort Claims

Act prior to filing suit. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) states:

3) Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. If the court

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.

Defendants are necessarily moving pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1), which states that the defense of lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction may be asserted by motion.

The presence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction of a

federal court is a question of law. McCarthy v. United States,

850 F.2d 558, 560 (9 Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 th

(1989). Except in removed cases, it is in effect presumed that

the Court lacks jurisdiction, and it is the plaintiff who bears

the burden of proof of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994); Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville

Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9 Cir. 1989); Valdez v. United th

States 837 F.Supp. 1065, 1067 (E.D.Cal. 1993), aff’d., Valdez v.

United States, 56 F.3d 1177 (9 Cir. 1995). th

Challenges to jurisdiction by way of Rule 12(b)(1) may

proceed on the basis of the face of the complaint, or on the

basis of evidence beyond the complaint. When proceeding on the

basis of the face of the complaint, the Court must accept all of

the factual allegations of the complaint as true and ask whether

the allegations state a claim sufficient to survive a motion to

dismiss. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327 (1991);

Berkovitz v.United States, 486 U.S. 531, 540 (1988). 

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 5 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

However, when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1), the district court is not restricted to the face

of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits

and testimony, and may weigh the evidence and resolve and

determine factual disputes concerning the existence of

jurisdiction; this consideration of evidence does not convert the

motion into a motion for summary judgment. McCarthy v. United

States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9 Cir. 1988). Under such th

circumstances, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the

plaintiff’s allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173,

1177 (9 Cir. 1987). th

Nevertheless, where the facts upon which jurisdiction

depends are also an essential element of the federal claim, the

challenge to the facts goes both to federal jurisdiction (which

is otherwise always a question of law for the Court) and to the

merits of the claim. The Court should not resolve genuinely

disputed facts where the question of jurisdiction is dependent on

the resolution of factual issues going to the merits. Roberts v.

Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9 Cir. 1987). In such a case, th

the district court assumes the truth of factual allegations in a

complaint unless controverted by undisputed facts in the record.

Dismissal is then appropriate where it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief. Id.

Here, the facts upon which jurisdiction depends do not

relate to the merits of the claim, but rather relate to the

conduct of the parties and their counsel after the incident which

forms the basis of the complaint. The merits of the action

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 6 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

involve the question of whether or not negligent conduct of the

Defendants with respect to the collision of the government truck

with Plaintiff’s vehicle caused injury to Plaintiff; the question

of jurisdiction concerns the actions of Plaintiff’s counsel in

filing various documents and the conduct of the government’s

counsel and agents in dealing with Plaintiff’s counsel. Thus, the

Court will proceed to resolve and determine the disputed facts

pertinent to the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

V. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies under the

 Federal Tort Claims Act

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) states that a tort claim against

the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented

in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two years

after such claim accrues, or unless an action is begun within six

months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered

mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to

which it was presented. 

It is established that an action brought by one who fails to

exhaust his administrative remedy by making written a claim

against the government in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)

fails for lack of jurisdiction. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) states

that a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action "shall not be

instituted" against the United States for money damages for

injury or loss of property or personal injury or death unless the

claimant first presents his claim to the "appropriate Federal

agency," and the claim is finally denied in writing and sent by

certified or registered mail. Section 2675(a) further provides

that the failure of an agency to make final disposition of a

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 7 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court notes that Plaintiff did file another complaint in this Court in a separate action on November 20, 2

2007 (Waltz v. United States of America Department of Agriculture et al., 1:07-cv-01691-LJO-GSA). Subsequently,

the two cases were related, the undersigned Magistrate Judge was assigned to the new case, and the parties consented

to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge for all purposes in the separate action (now 1:07-cv-01691-SMS).

8

claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of

the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the

claim for purposes of this section. The claim requirement of §

2675(a) is a jurisdictional limitation. McNeil v. United States,

508 U.S. 106, 112 (1993); Blain v. United States, 552 F.2d 289,

291 (9th Cir. 1977).

 Here, it is undisputed for purposes of this motion that on

May 20, 2006, a USFS employee was acting in the scope of the

government employment and was driving a government-owned truck

that collided with Plaintiff’s motorcycle, which resulted in

permanent injuries to Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s attorneys mailed an

administrative tort claim to the USFS on June 22, 2006; the claim

was dated June 21, 2006. The agency received the claim four days

later on June 26, 2006. Plaintiff initiated the present action by

filing it in this Court on December 18, 2006. On February 13,

2007, the Forest Service sent by certified mail a letter

notifying Plaintiff and her attorney of the final denial of the

Plaintiff’s administrative tort claim. Plaintiff did not file any

complaint against the United States during the six months

immediately following the denial of her administrative tort

claim, a time period ending on or about August 11, 2007. (Defts.’

Undisputed Facts & Plaintiff’s Response thereto, items 1 through

6, 8-9, 12.)2

Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a), a claim is deemed to have

been presented when a federal agency receives from the claimant

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 8 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

written notification of an incident accompanied by a claim for

money damages in a sum certain for death, personal injury, or

loss or injury to property. Here, the claim was presented on June

26, 2006. The lawsuit was filed before the passage of six months

after the presentation of the claim and thus before the claim was

deemed denied by the passage of time pursuant to § 2675(a).

Further, the lawsuit was filed before the claim was actually

denied in February 2007. No additional action was filed

thereafter during the six-month period after denial of the claim. 

Accordingly, with respect to the showing that Defendants

made in their initial moving papers, it is concluded that

Defendants have shown their entitlement to dismissal of this suit

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

VI. Equitable Tolling and Equitable Estoppel

Plaintiff argues that the time period for filing a complaint

during the six months immediately following the denial of her

administrative tort claim is tolled from February 13, 2007, to at

least October 25, 2007,the date of the government’s filing of the

motion to dismiss, because Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that the

Assistant United States Attorney handling the case informed him

that the case was prematurely filed but that counsel need not

file another complaint. Plaintiff argues that the time period

should be equitably tolled, and the government should be

equitably estopped from asserting the lack of jurisdiction.

Further, Plaintiff argues that because Defendants did not

assert the statute of limitations defense in its answer, the

government has waived its defense, and thus, the motion should be

denied.

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 9 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Defendants referred generally to the distinction between excusable neglect and the affirmative 3

governmental misconduct required for a finding of equitable tolling; Defendants did not address specific facts that

later were brought forward by Plaintiff. (Mot. pp. 9-12.)

10

A. Legal Standards

Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that a statute of

limitations that has run should be equitably tolled. Cooper v.

Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1214 (9 Cir. 1980). Equitable tolling th

focuses primarily on the plaintiff’s excusable ignorance of the

limitations period. Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016

(9 Cir. 1998). In this case, the government adverted to th

equitable tolling in a general sense only in the initial moving 3

papers. However, the government conceded that for equitable

tolling to apply, a plaintiff must show that an affirmative

misrepresentation or affirmative concealment of a material fact

by the government somehow prevented or made impossible the filing

of a timely complaint, and that the plaintiff neither knew nor

reasonably should have known the material facts. Irwin v.

Department of Veterans Affair, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990) (waiver

of sovereign immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) was

rebuttably presumed to be subject to equitable tolling in the

absence of any congressional provision to the contrary, and the

court noted that equitable tolling is permitted where the

claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a

defective pleading during the statutory period or where the

complainant has been induced or tricked by the adversary’s

misconduct in allowing the filing deadline to pass, but not where

the claimant failed to exercise due diligence or where the

circumstances involved at best a garden variety claim of

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 10 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

excusable neglect); Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, (9th

Cir. 1998) (where the Plaintiff filed suit before the agency

issued a written notice of final denial but after the time period 

which the pertinent statute required for waiting for a denial,

the suit was timely; Plaintiff then dismissed it allegedly in

reliance on the government’s promise to engage in settlement

negotiations, and filed a second action, which was filed beyond

six months after the denial of the claim; it was held that the

second action was time-barred and that neither equitable tolling

nor equitable estoppel applied). Equitable tolling is available

in suits against the United States absent evidence that Congress

intended the contrary, and it has been recognized that nothing in

the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) indicates that Congress

intended for equitable tolling not to apply. Alvarez-Machain v.

United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996). Thus, it is th

available in appropriate circumstances. 

Equitable tolling applies when the defendant’s wrongful

conduct prevents the plaintiff from asserting a claim or when it

is impossible for the plaintiff to file on time due to

extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the plaintiff.

Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. th

1996) (abduction of the plaintiff by the government sufficient).

In contrast, counsel’s ignorance of the limitations period or its

application was not excusable in Lehman; the government’s

lawyer’s failure to explain to the plaintiff’s counsel the

consequences of a voluntary dismissal did not amount to

affirmative misleading or advice about the statute of

limitations, and the opposing party had no duty to inform the

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 11 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

plaintiff of the statute of limitations. Lehman, 154 F.3d at

1016. Lehman was not a case in which the government stated that

it would forego a statute of limitations defense or that the

statute would be tolled. Id. at 1016. 

Equitable estoppel focuses on the actions of the defendant;

its elements are 1) the party to be estopped knows the facts, 2)

he or she intends that his or her conduct will be acted on or

must so act that the party invoking estoppel has a right to

believe it is so intended, 3) the party invoking estoppel must be

ignorant of the true facts, and 4) he or she must detrimentally

rely on the former’s conduct. Lehman, 154 F.3d at 1016. When a

party seeks to invoke equitable estoppel against the government,

an additional showing is required that the agency engaged in

affirmative conduct going beyond mere negligence and that the

public’s interest will not suffer undue damage as a result of the

application of the doctrine. Lehman, 154 F.3d at 1016-17.

In Lehman, the plaintiffs received a notice of final denial

of their administrative claim which contained written advice of

the six-month period of limitation; further, it involved an

omission to give advice, and such an omission is insufficient to

support equitable estoppel. Lehman, 154 F.3d at 1017.

Equitable estoppel would be made out where an employee in

the agency told the plaintiff that he was not allowed to file a

charge, and the plaintiff relied thereupon. Cooper v. Bell, 628

F.2d 1208 (9 Cir. 1980). th

B. Facts

The Court proceeds pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(i) to

determine the matter upon the papers submitted and the argument

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 12 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

at the hearing. 

Plaintiff’s lead counsel, Warren Paboojian, declared that he

received a telephone call from Assistant United States Attorney

Kristi Kapetan in which she advised Paboojian that she would be

representing the United States in the action. The date of this

call is not stated. 

Paboojian also declared that he and Kapetan spoke with each

other about the case near the end of the month of January 2007

(no date is stated) in connection with Rule 26 and the Court’s

order. Paboojian states that they discussed the facts of the case

and substantive, liability issues. 

Paboojian also refers to a “Rule 26 meeting” (Decl. ¶ 7); it

appears he is speaking of the same conversation in January 2007.

He informed Kapetan of Plaintiff’s injuries, including loss of an

eye, substantial orthopedic injuries, reconstructive facial

surgery, and other surgeries; he also informed Kapetan that

Plaintiff was a substantial wage earner, earning about

$100,000.00 per year; and he conveyed his thoughts regarding

liability of the Defendants. He and she also discussed mediation,

and he informed Kapetan that he believed that Plaintiff’s past

medical expenses would exceed $500,000.00. No notes concerning

this conversation are referred to or produced, although Paboojian

attached an e-mail dated Thursday, February 1, 2007, from Bell to

Kapetan, replying to Kapetan’s e-mail of the same day in which

she stated that it was good to talk to Bell that day, and

specified the times for arranging completion of the statement and

the time and date of the actual conference. (Decl., Ex. A.)

Paboojian declared that during that same conversation,

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 13 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Kapetan informed him that his complaint was a few days premature

but told him not to worry about filing another complaint, that it

was no big deal, that she was not that technical, and that

Paboojian would not need to refile it despite its slight

technical prematurity. Paboojian stated in argument before the

Court that he did not know that the legal effect of the premature

filing was a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction. Paboojian

declared that he informed Kapetan that Jason Bell would be

assisting him on the upcoming joint scheduling conference;

Kapetan said she would prepare a rough draft of the joint

scheduling conference statement; it was his understanding that

Kapetan and Bell discussed the specifics to be included in the

statement later.

Paboojian declared that based on Kapetan’s representations

that he did not need to refile the complaint, he instructed his

associate, Jason Bell, not to worry about refiling the complaint

and that Kapetan had waived any technicalities regarding the

premature filing.

In his declaration filed on November 21, 2007, Jason Bell,

an associate in Paboojian’s firm, stated that he met with

Paboojian at the end of January 2007 to discuss the case, and

Paboojian informed him of a conversation he had just had with

Kapetan in which she told Paboojian that the complaint was filed

a few days prematurely but not to worry about filing another

complaint; she said that the prematurity was not a problem

because she would not require it to be refiled. Paboojian

instructed Bell to discuss with Kapetan the filing of the joint

scheduling conference statement, which Kapetan would prepare and

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 14 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

send over for additional input. Bell declared that in a

conversation on or about February 1, 2007, Bell spoke with

Kapetan about the statement, and she offered to prepare and send

it as reflected in the previously mentioned e-mail of February 1,

2007. Bell declared that at no time during his conversation with

Kapetan did she make any statements that differed from what

Paboojian had reported.

Although Defendants object to Bell’s declaration regarding

the purported contents of his conversation with Paboojian on the

grounds of hearsay, the Court considers the evidence for the nonhearsay purpose of the matter being stated to Bell, and not for

its truth.

In her declaration filed on December 26, 2007, Kapetan

stated that she handled the case for the government until August

2007, when she became a judge. She read the declarations

submitted by Paboojian and Bell. She addressed only one specific

conversation with Paboojian and one with Bell.

With respect to her conversation with Paboojian, she stated

she did not have a substantive conversation with him on February

1, 2007, but rather believed her first conversation with

Paboojian as to the specifics of the case was on February 8,

2007. Although they discussed factual issues about the case, she

declared that Paboojian did not ask her if he had to file a new

complaint; she did not tell him he did not have to refile his

complaint; and the subject of the timeliness of his complaint

simply did not come up in any conversation she had with

Paboojian. She never received any correspondence from him

regarding any alleged waiver of the premature filing. Further, in

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 15 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

her subsequent communications with Paboojian regarding the case,

Paboojian never stated she had previously waived the issue of the

premature filing of the complaint.

Her note of the conversation (Decl., Ex. 2) reflects a date

of February 8, 2007, and entries regarding the accident,

Plaintiff’s injuries and employment, and her medical treatment;

it stated that Kapetan would do the “SC” statement, and Paboojian

would file a medical release. There are no entries regarding the

prematurity of the complaint, subject-matter jurisdiction, or the

statute of limitations.

In his supplemental declaration filed on January 3, 2008,

Paboojian declares that when he received the motion to dismiss on

October 25, 2007, while involved in an ongoing jury trial, he was

surprised and shocked to see the motion because of his prior

agreement with Kapetan. It appears that some words are missing

from the declaration because the sense of the text on the first

page is not continued on the second, and the text on the second

page begins in the middle of a sentence. It appears that at some

time on that day he spoke with Kapetan and told her of his

surprise; Kapetan informed him that she did not remember their

conversation one way or the other, and she “acknowledged that it

was not in Joint Scheduling Conference and that was probably

defense for me.” Again, the sense of the text is unclear. He

states that because she was caring for her father, she asked him

to call back later, but he was not able to reach her until

Friday, October 26, 2007, when she reiterated that she did not

recall the conversation one way or another and that if she were

to sign a declaration, that is what she would say. She also

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 16 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

advised Paboojian that someone from Texas had spoken with Bell

and informed him that the complaint was filed prematurely.

Paboojian has not spoken with Kapetan since that last

conversation. He dictated notes as to his conversations of

October 25 and 26, which were transcribed by his office on

November 7, 2007, and he produced a true copy of his notes

(Decl., Ex. A). The notes reflect conversations consistent with

those described in the declaration. 

With respect to her conversation with Bell, Kapetan declared

that she briefly spoke with Bell on February 1, 2007, concerning

the upcoming joint scheduling conference. The subject of the

premature complaint did not come up in any conversation she had

with Mr. Bell; she never said anything to Mr. Bell about the

premature complaint or any issues connected thereto; after filing

the answer on February 26, 2007, which expressly raised the

affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative

remedies, she never received a call or correspondence from Bell

contending that she had previously waived the issue of the

premature filing of the complaint. Her note of the conversation

(Decl., Ex. 1) reflects a date of February 1, 2007, a reference

to the scheduling conference and its date, a listing of several

facts concerning Plaintiff’s injuries, treatment, and employment,

and addresses for Bell. At the end of the notes in the middle of

the paper is an entry stating “T/C w/ Warren Paboojian 2/1/07,”

but nothing follows it on the page.

The declaration of Cindi Boukidis, a claims specialist at

the USFS, which is an agency of the United States Department of

Agriculture (USDA), was filed on December 26, 2007. Boukidis

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 17 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

states that in working on Plaintiff’s claim, she spoke with Jason

Bell on or around January 30, 2007, who identified himself as an

attorney representing Plaintiff (she believed him to be named

Jason “Beal” at the time) and asked for the contact information

for the U.S. attorney who was going to handle the case because of

an upcoming meet and confer deadline. Boukidis stated she

explained to Bell that the tort claim had been submitted to the

USDA office for general counsel for processing on January 26,

2007, and that she would try to have the U.S. attorney contact

him once Boukidis learned the attorney’s identity. She explained

to Bell that it appeared that the lawsuit had been filed

prematurely. 

In his declaration filed on January 3, 2008, Bell states

that he did not have a conversation with anyone in the USDA

regarding Plaintiff’s suit being filed prematurely; he would not

have had this conversation with Defendants because Paboojian was

the handling attorney, and Bell would not have had such

substantive discussions with Defendants relating to the statute

of limitations and/or timely claims procedures. Further, at no

time did he ever receive correspondence from Cindi Boukidis at

the USDA confirming the alleged conversation of January 30, 2007,

confirming that it appeared that the lawsuit was filed

prematurely. However, at the hearing on the motion, Mr. Bell

appeared to acknowledge that a conversation occurred but that the

matter of the premature filing of the complaint was not

mentioned.

Boukidis filed an additional declaration on January 8, 2008,

in which she appended her notes of the conversation of January

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 18 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

30, 2007, with Bell. (Decl., Ex. A.) Boukidis declared that Bell

contacted her directly, and she took handwritten notes as was

routine. Her notes reflect that she told him the action looked

premature, and he stated he would not have filed but did so

because they had been non-responsive. 

The joint scheduling conference statement filed on February

13, 2007, did not indicate any issue of subject-matter

jurisdiction or exhaustion of administrative remedies in the

portion addressing undisputed and disputed legal issues. It

referred to the disputed legal issues “[a]t this time,” and

listed only substantive issues concerning negligence. (Stmt. p.

2.) Paboojian declared in his initial declaration that he and

Kapetan attended the conference on February 21, 2007, and Kapetan

did not dispute jurisdiction or assert premature filing despite

the fact that the standing order issued by the Court pursuant to

Fed. Rule Civ. P. 16 required discussions of issues relating to

jurisdiction. The Court notes that the order setting the

conference, filed on December 18, 2006, stated in part that the

joint scheduling report should include a summary of legal issues

as to which there is no dispute, such as jurisdiction, etc., as

well as a summary of the disputed legal issues. (Order, Ex. A.)

Paboojian declared that at the conference, Kapetan acknowledged

that no jurisdiction or other legal issues existed except those

specifically raised in the statement, and those issues related

only to issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and

contribution of another party. No other legal issues were

reserved in the order. The parties proceeded to engage in

discovery, including written discovery and a vehicle inspection

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 19 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

in July 2007; Kapetan never mentioned an issue regarding

jurisdiction or retraction of any prior representations.

The answer, signed by Kapetan and dated February 15, 2007,

was filed on February 26, 2007, and it denies the complaint’s

allegation regarding Plaintiff’s alleged compliance with the FTCA

and asserts the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. (Ans. ¶ 5, and p. 3, second affirmative

defense.)

Paboojian declared initially that he reasonably relied on

Kapetan’s assurances and representations, Plaintiff would suffer

substantial prejudice if the case were dismissed, and the

government would not be prejudiced because it has been able to

conduct substantial discovery.

C. Analysis

It is the Plaintiff’s burden to establish jurisdiction and

to establish the equitable bases upon which Plaintiff seeks to

rely. After considering all the evidence, the Court concludes

that Plaintiff has not submitted evidence sufficient to meet her

burden in this case. The Court has considered all the evidence

submitted to it, and it is particularly swayed by the lack of any

written confirmation or documentation of the alleged statement by

the Defendants’ counsel, and by the improbability of the

government’s counsel’s having purported to waive subject-matter

jurisdiction.

The Court finds that former Assistant United States Attorney

Kapetan did not represent to Plaintiff’s counsel that it was not

necessary to file another complaint or action. The government did

not engage in any wrongful conduct. The answer specifically

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 20 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

denied Plaintiff’s allegations that she had fully complied with

the FTCA by presenting a claim and that the claim had been

denied; although the government did not expressly state lack of

jurisdiction as a defense, it clearly denied the affirmative

allegations of the complaint concerning jurisdiction and

Plaintiff’s allegations that she had complied with the

requirements of the FTCA. (Ans. ¶¶ 5, 6.) The government also

expressly stated that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies. (Id. at second affirmative defense.)

This information was sufficient to alert Plaintiff’s counsel,

undisputedly an experienced and expert personal injury attorney,

to the defense. 

Further, the denial of the claim that issued on February 13,

2007, expressly stated the requirement of filing an action within

six months of the final denial:

This is the final denial of the claim of Mrs. Waltz.

The Department of Agriculture’s regulations require

us to inform you that if your client is dissatisfied

with this final action on her claim, she may file

suit against the United States of America in an 

appropriate United States District Court not later

than six (6) months from the date of mailing of

this letter, which is the date shown above.

I note that suit is pending against the United States

in the United States District Court, Eastern District

of California, regarding the allegations set forth 

in the claim. However, should the action presently

in litigation be dismissed on any grounds, you are

reminded of the requirement that suit be filed in 

an appropriate United States District Court not

later than six (6) months after the date of the 

mailing of this letter, which is the date shown above.

(Memo. in Supp. of Mot., Ex. 2.) Considering the conversations

between Boukidis and Bell and between Kapetan and Paboojian, as

well as the denial of Plaintiff’s allegations of compliance with

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 21 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

the FTCA that was set forth in Defendants’ answer, this warning

could be construed as the third tip-off that a new complaint was

required to be filed. Yet none was filed until after the six

months had come and gone. Although the government did not

formally announce its intention to move to dismiss on the basis

of lack of jurisdiction, there was no trickery or

misrepresentation; the Court notes that the government may move

to dismiss on the basis of an absence of subject-matter

jurisdiction at any time.

Further, considering all the circumstances, the Court cannot

conclude that Plaintiff’s counsel was diligent or that any

ignorance of the defense or its jurisdictional nature was

excusable. In this instance, Plaintiff’s expert counsel knew the

facts concerning Plaintiff’s filing of the claim and any response

thereto, and counsel is held to have known the legal effect of

the facts. The government was not obligated under the

circumstances to give advice to Plaintiff’s counsel. See, Lehman,

154 F.3d at 1016-17.

Finally, Plaintiff was not prevented from filing a new

complaint within the pertinent six-month period after final

denial of her claim. She was represented by able attorneys at all

stages of the proceedings.

VII. Disposition

The Court has thus exercised its jurisdiction to determine

jurisdiction, and it concludes that it is without subject-matter

jurisdiction over the instant action due to Plaintiff’s having

failed to comply with the FTCA before filing this action. The

motion to dismiss will be granted. 

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 22 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

Because the Court decides the motion before it on the basis

of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to

consider the statute of limitations.

Further, because this Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction over this action, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

file an amended complaint is denied by operation of law. 

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that

1) The parties’ requests for judicial notice (Docs. 25, 33)

ARE GRANTED; and

2) Defendants’ motion to dismiss the action for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction IS GRANTED; and

3) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint

IS DENIED by operation of law; and

4) The Clerk IS DIRECTED to enter judgment for Defendants

and against Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-01831-SMS Document 56 Filed 01/16/08 Page 23 of 23