Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00364/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00364-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0427 Social Security Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARLIES NICHOLSON, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-364 KJM

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security (“Commissioner”) denying an application for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) under

Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or remand and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion

for summary judgment. 

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 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 1

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, disability

is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) &

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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I. Factual and Procedural Background 

In a decision dated April 14, 2006, the ALJ determined plaintiff was not disabled.1

The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council

denied plaintiff’s request for review. The ALJ found plaintiff’s insured status expired on

December 31, 2004; plaintiff has a severe impairment of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar

spine with facet arthropathy but this impairment does not meet or medically equal a listed

impairment; plaintiff is not totally credible; plaintiff has the residual functional capacity for a

significant range of sedentary work; plaintiff can perform her past relevant work as a secretary

and bookkeeper; and plaintiff is not disabled. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 35. Plaintiff

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contends the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of a treating physician and failed to

appropriately develop the record. 

II. Standard of Review

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is

based on proper legal standards under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the

record as a whole supports it. Copeland v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing

Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but less than a

preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Sorenson v.

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975)). “It means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 402, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S.

197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938)). The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler,

782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that

detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir.

1985). The court may not affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of

supporting evidence. Id.; see also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If

substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence

supporting a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see

Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an

improper legal standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d

1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. Analysis

A. Treating Physician’s Opinion

Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of her treating

physician, Dr. McMullin. The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they

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are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating

professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.;

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record,

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons, that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999) (treating physician’s conclusory,

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

Dr. McMullin completed a physical residual functional capacity questionnaire

dated March 24, 2005, in which he opined plaintiff had significant functional limitations that

would limit plaintiff to less than a sedentary residual functional capacity. AT 280-283. Dr.

McMullin opined to similar limitations in a form dated October 5, 2005. AT 284-291. The ALJ

accorded no weight to Dr. McMullin’s opinion. AT 33-34. Plaintiff contends the ALJ should

have accorded controlling weight to this opinion and that the reasons set forth for rejecting Dr.

McMullin’s opinion are insufficient. Dr. McMullin, however, expressly stated that the earliest

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 Plaintiff also relies on an undated progress note. AT 228. The ALJ correctly noted that 2

although Dr. McMullin claimed he would support disability, at the same time the doctor noted

plaintiff was doing well with relatively little medication. AT 31, 33-34. The inconsistency of

this statement was a sufficient reason for the ALJ’s rejection of it. Moreover, there is no

indication as to which time period the doctor was referring and no functional limitations are

assessed in this progress note.

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date the limitations assessed in the March 24, 2005 questionnaire applied was January 7, 2005. 

AT 283. Plaintiff’s insured status expired on December 31, 2004. AT 24-25. Thus the 

limitations assessed are irrelevant to the time period at issue. Moreover, the court finds no error 2

in the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. McMullin’s opinions. The ALJ correctly noted that although Dr.

McMullin was plaintiff’s treating physician, he saw her only four times since 2001 and Dr.

McMullin’s records did not support the degree of limitation he assessed. AT 33, 222 (Dr.

McMullin unable to fill out medical source statement in September 2004 due to lack of contact

with patient), 226-238 (minimal objective findings). The ALJ also properly rejected Dr.

McMullin’s opinion as based on plaintiff’s subjective reporting of her symptoms, which were

discredited by the ALJ, a finding not challenged by plaintiff. AT 33, 355-356. There was no

error in the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. McMullin’s opinion. 

B. Development of the Record

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ failed to appropriately develop the record with

respect to plaintiff’s obesity and alleged knee impairment. Disability hearings are not

adversarial. See DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Crane v.

Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir.1996) (ALJ has duty to develop the record even when

claimant is represented). Evidence raising an issue requiring the ALJ to investigate further

depends on the case. Generally, there must be some objective evidence suggesting a condition

that could have a material impact on the disability decision. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,

1288 (9th Cir.1996); Wainwright v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 939 F.2d 680, 682

(9th Cir.1991). “Ambiguous evidence . . . triggers the ALJ’s duty to ‘conduct an appropriate

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inquiry.’” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d

at 1288). 

Although plaintiff is overweight, there is no indication in the record that her

obesity contributes to any functional limitations. The examining consulting physician, Dr. Pliam,

noted plaintiff’s weight and height and attributed no functional limitations to obesity, noting

plaintiff rose from a chair without difficulty and had a normal gait. AT 205-210. The treating

physician’s records note no problems due to obesity. AT 226-238. With respect to plaintiff’s

alleged knee impairment, the ALJ examined plaintiff on the issue during the hearing and plaintiff

gave minimal testimony with respect to this impairment. AT 353. Moreover, plaintiff herself

only claimed the knee impairment was disabling starting in May 2004 and the treating physician

first reported a knee problem in August 2004. AT 102, 226. In light of plaintiff’s last insured

date of December 31, 2004, the knee impairment would not fulfill the one year durational

requirement. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 (to be found disabled, plaintiff must demonstrate

physical impairments of twelve months duration). In addition, the ALJ specifically asked

plaintiff and her counsel if there were other impairments not discussed at the hearing and whether

all medical records relevant to the decision had been provided; they responded that the record

was complete. AT 33, 357-359. Under the circumstances presented here, there was no duty to

further develop the record with respect to plaintiff’s obesity or knee impairment. See Burch v.

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2005).

The ALJ’s decision is fully supported by substantial evidence in the record and

based on the proper legal standards. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or remand is denied, and

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted.

DATED: March 26, 2008.

006 nicholson.ss

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