Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-03022/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-03022-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EOLAS TECHNOLOGIES 

INCORPORATED,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMAZON.COM INC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.17-cv-03022-JST (JSC)

ORDER RE: PRIVILEGE WAIVER 

DISPUTE

Dkt. Nos. 466, 467, 470, 477, 484

In this consolidated action, Eolas alleges that Amazon, Google, and Walmart are infringing

on United States Patent No. 9,195,507 (“the ’507 Patent”). Defendants Amazon and Google 

(Defendants) contend that Eolas’ attorneys violated a patent prosecution bar imposed in an earlier 

action. Eolas admits that it violated the bar as of July 22, 2014—the date it thought it expired—

but denies that it violated before that date. At a hearing in March 2018, Eolas consented to 

disclosure of its attorney-client privileged communications prior to July 22, 2014 and those 

communications have been produced. Defendants now contend that Eolas must produce its 

privileged communications after July 22, 2014 because it expressly waived the privilege as to 

those communications by consenting to disclosure of the pre-July 22, 2014 material and because it 

impliedly waived the privilege by raising harmlessness and good faith defenses. After carefully 

considering the parties’ written submissions and having had the benefit of oral argument on 

November 9, 2018, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to compel. The Court finds that Eolas 

has not expressly or impliedly waived its attorney-client and attorney work-product privilege in 

the post-July 22, 2014 material. The Court also DENIES Eolas’ motion to compel related 

discovery.

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 1 of 13
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

BACKGROUND

Eolas, Amazon, and Google were parties to prior litigation in the District Court for the 

Eastern District of Texas regarding similar (according to Amazon identical) patents.1 See Eolas 

Tech. v. Adobe Sys, Inc., 6:09-cv-00446-LED (E.D. Tex.). In that earlier action, the district court 

issued an order imposing the following prosecution bar:

“Any person who reviews or otherwise learns the contents of 

Technical Protected Material produced by another Party may not 

participate, directly or indirectly, in the prosecution of any patent 

claims ... claiming the subject matter disclosed in the Patents-inSuit from the time of receipt of such information through and 

including one (1) year following the entry of a final non-appealable 

judgment....”

(Dkt. No. 262-2 at 6.) That case went to trial in 2012 and the jury found the patent claims 

invalid—based on anticipation and obviousness—and returned a verdict in favor of the 

defendants. See Eolas Tech. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 6:09-cv-00446-LED, Dkt. No. 1353 (Jury 

Verdict, Feb. 9 2012). Eolas appealed and the Federal Circuit affirmed and entered judgment on 

July 22, 2013. See Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 521 F. App'x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The 

law firm of McKool Smith represented Eolas in this prior action.

A year and a half later, Eolas—again represented by McKool Smith—filed the underlying 

actions against Amazon, Google, and Walmart, again in the Eastern District of Texas. Eolas 

alleges infringement of the ’507 Patent” entitled, “Distributed Hypermedia Method and System for 

Automatically Invoking External Application Providing Interaction and Display of Embedded 

Objects Within A Hypermedia Document,” which was issued by the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office on November 24, 2015. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 14.) Eolas owns the patent and the 

 

1

The patents in this prior action were U.S. Patent Nos. 5,838,906 (“the ‘906 Patent”) and 

7,599,985 (“the ‘985 Patent”). The ‘906 Patent was entitled “Distributed Hypermedia Method for 

Automatically Invoking External Application Providing Interaction and Display of Embedded 

Objects Within a Hypermedia Document.” The ‘985 Patent was entitled “Distributed Hypermedia 

Method and System for Automatically Invoking External Application Providing Interaction and 

Display of Embedded Objects Within a Hypermedia Document.” The ‘906 and ‘985 Patents were 

generally directed to a software system that is operable without user activation to access an object, 

present it in a browser display window, and then allow a user to manipulate the object. Eolas is 

the exclusive licensee of these patents.

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 2 of 13
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

named inventors of the ’507 patent are Michael Doyle, David Martin, and Cheong Ang—these are 

the same inventors of the patents in the prior suit. 

Shortly after Eolas brought the action it filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a 

declaration that the Patent and Trademark Office’s 1042-day patent term adjustment was not 

invalid. (Dkt. No. 88.) This was a preemptive motion because Defendants contended that the 

patent term adjustment was invalid because Eolas engaged in gamesmanship and, in particular, 

unreasonably and intentionally delayed its prosecution of the ‘507 patent. Without the patent term 

adjustment, the ‘507 patent arguably expired in October 2014—20 years from the filing of the 

parent application. The Texas court denied Eolas’ motion for summary judgment without 

prejudice on the grounds that there were disputes of fact as to whether the prosecution history 

reflects an effort to delay or expedite the prosecution. (Dkt. No. 202 at 5.) 

Each of the defendants thereafter sought to have the actions dismissed for improper venue 

or transferred to the Northern District of California. The district court denied each of these 

motions. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 196.) However, the Federal Circuit subsequently granted Google’s 

petition for a writ of mandamus and ordered the action transferred to this District. (Dkt. No. 249.) 

The Google action was transferred here on February 24, 2017. (Dkt. No. 251.) Two months later, 

the Texas court separately transferred the Amazon and Walmart actions. (Dkt. Nos. 326, 327.) 

The consolidated actions were assigned to District Judge Tigar.

Prior to transfer, Amazon filed a motion for an order to show cause regarding Eolas’

alleged violation of the prosecution bar imposed in the prior action between Amazon and Eolas. 

(Dkt. No. 262.) Amazon’s motion contended that Eolas violated the prosecution bar because 

McKool Smith delivered prosecution advice to Eolas’ Chief Legal Officer, Jim Stetson, who 

forwarded the information to Eolas’ outside patent lawyer, Charles Krueger. Amazon contends 

that “this scheme” began as early as six months after the ’507 patent application was filed in 

November 2011. (Dkt. No. 262 at 8.) 

The fully briefed motion for an order to show cause was transferred to this District prior to 

a decision. On September 1, 2017, Judge Tigar issued an order regarding the motion addressing 

the threshold issue of when the prosecution bar expired. (Dkt. No. 387.) Eolas insisted that the 

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 3 of 13
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

bar expired on July 22, 2014, one year after the Federal Circuit entered its order affirming the jury 

verdict; whereas Amazon maintained that the bar expired on October 20, 2014—90 days after 

final judgment which is the period within which a party could seek review with the Supreme 

Court. This argument contradicted the position that Amazon and Google had previously taken. 

(Dkt. No. 118 at 7 (Amazon stated the bar ended in July 2014 “one year after the Federal Circuit’s 

Rule 36 affirmance”); Dkt. No. 119 at 4 (Google stated, “the August 2014 amendment occurred 

just one month after the Prosecution Bar in the prior case expired (using the Federal Circuit’s July 

22, 2013 affirmance as the nonappealable final judgment)”.) Judge Tigar held that the bar expired 

on October 20, 2014. finding that there was no reason to distinguish this case from one in which a 

petition for writ of certiorari was filed. In so holding, Judge Tigar noted that Eolas had failed 

show that judicial estoppel applied to justify the earlier date. (Dkt. No. 387 at 3.) Judge Tigar 

then ordered the parties meet and confer regarding next steps “including production of documents 

or in camera review of additional documents by the Court.” (Id.)

Pursuant to Judge Tigar’s order, the parties thereafter filed competing proposals. (Dkt. 

Nos. 399 & 400.) Eolas argued that no further discovery regarding the prosecution bar was 

necessary because their interpretation of the expiration date as July 22, 2014 was reasonable. Eolas 

also insisted that Amazon had not been prejudiced by any violation of the prosecution bar between 

July and October 2014 because the Patent Office did not take any action until March 2015, and 

while Eolas amended the claim in August—before the prosecution bar expired—it could have 

amended just a few months later in November 2014 and the course of the patent prosecution 

would not have changed. Eolas further objected to any attempt by Amazon to obtain documents 

or other discovery regarding privileged attorney-client communications. (Dkt. No. 399.) 

Amazon, for its part, insisted that it should be allowed to review McKool Smith’s 

communications so that it could “brief the Court on their import.” (Dkt. No. 400 at 2:16-21.) 

Amazon suggested two alternatives: (1) Eolas could produce these documents subject to a limited 

subject-matter waiver and with the express agreement that any materials so produced will be used 

exclusively to resolve the Motion and for no other purpose; or (2) if Eolas produced the materials 

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 4 of 13
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

for in camera review, then the parties would engage in limited written and deposition discovery 

intended to provide as much information as possible without invading any bona fide privilege. 

Judge Tigar essentially adopted Amazon’s proposal and ordered Eolas to produce 

documents “involving any Eolas representatives or agents bound by the prosecution bar related 

directly or indirectly to the prosecution of the application leading to the ‘507 patent.” (Dkt. No. 

403 at ¶ 1.) In particular, Judge Tigar ordered Eolas to: (1) lodge with the Court a BATESlabeled, unredacted copy of the withheld document(s) for in camera review; (2) produce to 

Defendants and lodge with the Court, a BATES-labeled, redacted copy of the withheld 

document(s), with redactions narrowly limited to only the content Eolas contends is protected by 

privilege; (3) produce to Defendants and file with the Court a privilege log identifying each 

withheld document or document with redacted contents; and (4) produce to Defendants and file 

with the Court a list of counsel with identifying information. (Id. at ¶ 2.) The order also stated that 

upon receipt of the in camera production the court “may refer the matter to a Magistrate Judge; 

invite briefing on the basis of the privilege logs; conduct its own in camera review; or take other 

action to resolve whether the submitted materials must be produced to Amazon.” (Id. at ¶ 4.) The 

order explained that once the court resolved any privilege dispute, Defendants could notice 

depositions of (a) a representative of McKool Smith to testify about the produced documents and 

any potential violation of the prosecution bar, and (b) any other individuals for testimony limited 

to the produced documents and any potential violation of the prosecution bar (including, if 

requested, Dr. Doyle (Named Inventor/Eolas), and Messrs. Stetson (Eolas), Swords (Eolas), and 

Krueger (Prosecution Attorney) for further deposition)” and serve written discovery. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-

6.) Eolas would then have the opportunity to serve objections and, if after meeting and conferring

the parties were not able to resolve any dispute, they could advise the Court and request a hearing. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 7-9.) Then, after Defendants conducted their discovery, the parties are to “file a 

proposed briefing and hearing schedule (or if necessary, competing schedules) for briefing 

remedies, including dismissal and/or judgment.” (Id. at ¶ 10.) 

Judge Tigar thereafter referred discovery matters, including the prosecution bar discovery 

dispute, to this Court, and stayed the action pending resolution of Amazon’s prosecution bar 

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 5 of 13
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

motion. (Dkt. Nos. 405, 407.) On November 16, 2017, this Court ordered Eolas to provide a 

paper copy of the in camera submission and directed Amazon to file a short statement identifying 

those entries on the privilege log which it contends suggest that McKool Smith violated the patent 

prosecution bar because the entries on the privilege log did not match those referenced in 

Amazon’s original order to show cause. (Dkt. No. 409.) Eolas thereafter provided seven banker’s 

boxes full of binders of documents for in camera review. In addition, Amazon filed a further 

statement which clarified that the privilege log Eolas provided after Judge Tigar’s order was 

different from the log which it relied upon when preparing the order to show cause and pointed to 

entries which it contends suggested violation of the prosecution bar. (Dkt. No. 410.) Eolas’

responsive statement clarified that the difference in logs was a result of Judge Tigar’s order and 

that the newer log omitted communications from Eolas’ prosecution counsel, Charles Krueger. 

(Dkt. No. 413.) 

After reviewing the documents in camera, the Court issued an order setting a hearing and 

(1) noting that the vast majority of the documents on Eolas’ privilege log were not confidential 

because they included publicly available court filings from the prior action as exhibits; (2) 

ordering Eolas to supplement its in camera production with the omitted Krueger documents; and 

(3) ordering the parties be prepared to discuss various matters at the upcoming hearing. (Dkt. No. 

414.)

The parties appeared for a hearing on March 29, 2018. At the hearing, Eolas admitted that 

it had violated the patent prosecution bar as of July 22, 2014. (Dkt. No. 430 at 17, 24.) After the 

Court indicated that its in camera review of the withheld documents supported a prima facie 

inference that the prosecution bar had been violated before July 22, 2014 (id. at 16-17), Eolas

agreed to produce all of its withheld pre-July 22, 2014 communications on the condition that the 

documents would be produced attorneys’ eyes only and could only be used for purposes of the 

prosecution bar motion and patent adjustment invalidity theory (given that the theory is 

intertwined with the prosecution bar issue). (Dkt. No. 430 at 24-29.) While Defendants claimed 

cutting off the production at July 22, 2014 would deprive them of the relevant context for the 

earlier documents, the Court noted that Defendants’ review of the pre-July 22, 2014 documents 

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 6 of 13
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

might provide them with grounds to argue to the Court that Eolas should have to produce the postJuly 22, 2014 privileged communications, notwithstanding Eolas’ concession that it violated the 

prosecution bar after that date. (Id. at 30.) 

The following month the Court held a hearing on the discovery status. (Dkt. No. 444.)

Eolas agreed to produce all pre-July 22, 2014 internal McKool Smith documents that referenced 

the ‘507 patent. (Id. at 10.) McKool Smith also reiterated its intent to maintain the attorney-client 

privilege as to the post-July 22, 2014 documents. (Id. at 11.) Thereafter, when the Court had not 

heard from the parties for a few months, it requested a written status update. (Dkt. No. 448.) In 

the update, Defendants proposed a timeline for other discovery to occur in September -November 

and for the parties to file “any motion regarding any outstanding discovery issues” in December 

2018 with the hearing sometime in January 2019. (Dkt. No. 450 at 5-6.) Eolas’ timeline was 

substantially the same. (Id. at 9-10.) The Court held a further status hearing on September 6, 

2018 and set a briefing schedule for Defendants’ motion to compel post-July 22, 2014 attorneyclient privileged documents. (Dkt. No. 453.) The parties thereafter filed written submissions and 

the Court held a hearing on November 9, 2018.

DISCUSSION

Defendants Amazon and Google move to compel Eolas to produce its attorney-client 

privileged communications created after July 22, 2014; that is, communications made after Eolas 

admits it violated the patent prosecution bar. They make two primary arguments in support of 

their motion: (1) Eolas expressly waived the privilege as to those communications, and (2) Eolas 

impliedly waived the privilege. Neither argument persuades the Court to compel Eolas to produce 

its post July 22, 2014 attorney-client privileged communications.

A. Choice of Law

Federal Circuit law governs the privilege waiver question. These consolidated actions were 

transferred here from the Eastern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Dkt. No. 326 

at 2); accordingly, Fifth Circuit law would normally apply. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 

U.S. 516, 522 (1990). However, because the privilege question here relates to a question of 

substantive patent law, Federal Circuit law applies. See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. 

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 7 of 13
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Federal Circuit law applies when 

deciding whether particular written or other materials are discoverable in a patent case, if those 

materials relate to an issue of substantive patent law.”); see also In re Queen’s Univ. at Kingston, 

820 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Federal Circuit law applies regarding “whether 

particular documents are discoverable in a patent case because they relate to issues of validity and 

infringement”); see also id. (Federal Circuit law also applies “when making ‘a determination of 

the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to [a party’s] invention record [because it] clearly 

implicates, at the very least, the substantive patent issue of inequitable conduct.”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)). Nonetheless, no party contends that the law of the Federal, 

Fifth or Ninth Circuit differs in a material way as to the privilege waiver issue. 

B. Express Waiver

Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a) provides that when a party waives the attorney-client 

privilege or work-product protection in a federal proceeding, “the waiver extends to an 

undisclosed communication or information . . . only if: (1) the waiver is intentional; (2) the 

disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter; and 

(3) they ought in fairness be considered together.” Defendants urge that Eolas’ waiver as to the 

pre-July 22, 2014 communications was intentional, the sought-after post-July 22, 2014

communications regarding the ‘507 patent application concern the same subject matter as the preJuly 22, 2014 communications, and in fairness all the communications ought to be considered 

together.

Assuming, without deciding, that Rule 502(a) applies in the unique circumstances here 

(Dkt. No. 403 at 23:5-8 (noting that Eolas’ waiver is not a subject-matter waiver)), the Court finds 

that fairness does not require Eolas to disclose the post-July 22, 2014 communications. “[A] 

subject matter waiver (of either privilege or work product) is reserved for those unusual situations 

in which fairness requires a further disclosure of related, protected information, in order to prevent 

a selective and misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of the adversary.” Fed. R. 

Evid. 502(a) Advisory Committee Note (2011); see also Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick Townsend & 

Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (observing that Rule 502(a), enacted in 2008, 

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 8 of 13
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

“limited the effect of waiver by strongly endorsing fairness balancing.”). The Court is

persuaded that permitting Eolas to maintain its privilege over the post-July 22 communications 

does not lead to a selective and misleading presentation of the evidence to Defendants’ 

disadvantage.

Eolas concedes that it violated the patent prosecution bar after July 22, 2014. In response 

to Defendants’ insistence that the privilege log showed that it had violated the privilege before that 

date, Eolas waived the privilege for communications prior to July 22, 2014. Thus, the parties have 

equal access to the material relevant to any argument as to whether Eolas violated the privilege 

before July 22, 2014. Defendants nonetheless argue that because, in their view, the produced 

documents demonstrate that Eolas violated the prosecution bar before July 22,2“documents 

created after that date could certainly speak to the scope and consequences of earlier violations.” 

(Dkt. No. 467 at 8.) That documents created after July 22 might be relevant is not the same as 

saying that in fairness they need to be produced to avoid a misleading presentation as to whether 

Eolas violated the bar prior to July 22, 2014. The Court does not understand how something Eolas 

and its counsel did after it admittedly violated the bar is material to whether it violated the bar 

prior to July 22. When Eolas waived the privilege as to the pre-July 22 communications, the Court 

noted that Defendants might learn something from that material that would warrant compelling 

production of the post-July 22 material; to put it another way, they might discover information that 

for fairness sake would require disclose of privileged material after Eolas concedes the 

prosecution bar was violated. (Dkt. No. 430 at 30.) Defendants, however, have not identified 

anything in the production that suggests as a matter of fairness Defendants need to see Eolas’ 

privileged communications about the ‘507 patent application during the period Eolas admits its 

counsel was assisting with the prosecution of the application and thus violating the bar.

Defendants also argue that because Eolas contends that the pre-July 22 documents show 

 

2 Defendants represent in their motion that this Court stated, “that upon review of in camera

documents, there was participation in violation of the prosecution bar before July 22, 2014.” (Dkt. 

No. at 8.) The Court made it clear, however, that its statement was based on its review alone 

without any argument. It further clarified that it was making a prima facie finding that permitted 

the issue to go forward. (Dkt. No. 430 at 26.) This Court has not been tasked with and has not 

found whether Eolas violated the prosecution bar prior to July 22, 2014.

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 9 of 13
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

that it did not violate the patent prosecution bar prior to July 22, Eolas is unfairly relying on 

selective documents to tell its side of the story. That argument might sway if Eolas was also 

contesting that it violated the patent prosecution bar after July 22—but it is not: it admits it 

violated the bar after July 22, 2014. It disputes that it violated the bar prior to that date and has 

waived the privilege for its communications up to that date. Again, Defendants fail to explain 

what, if anything, post-July 22 would shed light on whether Eolas violated the bar prior to that 

date and the Court is not aware of anything, let alone anything that makes it unfair for Eolas to 

maintain its privilege as to the post-July 22 materials. Defendants chanting that it is unfair does 

not make it unfair.

Defendants’ reliance on Theranos v. Fuisz Technologies, Inc., 2013 WL 2153276 (N.D.

Cal. May 16, 2013), is misplaced. There, the defendant produced selective privileged emails that 

he contended showed that he had not used the plaintiff’s intellectual property to secure a patent. 

The court held that it would be unfair to permit the defendant to rely on those documents in his 

defense while withholding other privileged communications that might show that he in fact used 

the plaintiff’s intellectual property. Id. at *4. Here, in contrast, Eolas has not selectively waived 

the privilege as to some privileged communications during the pre-July 2014 period—it has 

waived the privilege as to all pre-July 20, 2014 documents; that is, the documents that would show 

what activities its counsel engaged in and thus whether it violated the patent prosecution bar 

during that period. 

The Court accordingly finds that Eolas did not waive its attorney-client privilege as to 

post-July 22 communications by voluntarily waiving the privilege as to communications during 

the period it contends it did not violate the patent prosecution bar. 

C. Implied Waiver

Next, Defendants contend that Eolas has impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege as 

to the post-July 22 communications by raising the defenses of (1) harmlessness, and (2) good 

faith. 

“[A]n implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurs when (1) the party asserts the 

privilege as a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit; (2) through this affirmative act, the 

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 10 of 13
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

asserting party puts the privileged information at issue; and (3) allowing the privilege would deny 

the opposing party access to information vital to its defense.” Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell 

Moss & Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1995). “An overarching consideration is whether 

allowing the privilege to protect against disclosure of the information would be ‘manifestly unfair’ 

to the opposing party.” Id.

1. Harmlessness

Eolas urges that its admitted violation of the patent prosecution bar after July 22, 2014 was 

harmless. Its temporal argument goes like this: (1) it is undisputed that the patent prosecution bar 

expired on October 14, 2014, (2) publicly available documents show that the Patent and 

Trademark Office did not act on the proposed claim amendment until February 2015, and 

therefore, (3) Eolas could have submitted its proposed amendment in November 2014 with the 

assistance of McKool Smith—when no bar was in place—and the result would have been the 

same as when they submitted the amendment in August 2014 in violation of the bar. (Dkt. Nos. 

399 at 3; 472 at 19.) Whatever its merits, this defense does not place Eolas’ attorney-client 

privileged communications at issue as it has nothing to do with the quality or even quantity of 

McKool Smith’s assistance, only its timing. A defense that McKool Smith’s assistance was not 

material to the proposed amendment would likely put McKool Smith’s work product and 

communications with Eolas during that period at issue, but Eolas has not raised such a defense. 

Defendants appear to argue that because the nature of McKool Smith’s involvement in the 

prosecution of the ‘507 patent is relevant to any harm suffered by Defendants, Eolas has waived 

the privilege as to the post-July 22, 2014 communications. But that argument confuses relevance 

with waiver. The post-July 22, 2014 communications are relevant to Defendants’ motion; the 

question, however, is whether Eolas has taken some affirmative act that puts the privileged 

information at issue. Its “harmlessness” argument based solely on the timing of the PTO’s action 

is not such an act.

2. Bad Faith

Eolas also contends that its understanding that the prosecution bar expired on July 22, 2014

was objectively reasonable based on: (1) the protective order language, (2) a Federal Circuit 

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 11 of 13
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Information Sheet, (3) both Amazon and Google stating in signed pleadings in this case that the 

bar expired in July 2014, and (4) an expert opinion. (Dkt. No. 399 1-2; Dkt. No. 413 at 18-21; 

Dkt. No. 472 at 20-22.) None of these objective, external facts places Eolas’ attorney-client 

privileged communications at issue. To hold otherwise would mean that any time a defendant 

challenges a charge of willfulness or bad faith by pointing to caselaw or government agency 

guidance or other objective external evidence, the defendant waives its attorney-client privilege as 

to its subjective belief. That is not the law of attorney-client privilege. 

Defendants urge further that because Eolas has insisted that Defendants do not have any 

evidence of a bad faith violation of the prosecution bar Eolas has somehow put its privileged 

communications at issue. However, merely pointing out that the admissible, discoverable 

evidence does not support a party’s position is not an affirmative act that waives the attorneyclient privilege and Defendants do not cite any case that suggests otherwise. 

D. Eolas’ Counter Motion 

As a related matter, Eolas seeks to compel Defendants to respond to interrogatories, 

requests for admissions and document requests regarding (1) the bases for Defendants’ position 

that the prosecution bar expired on July 22, 2014, and (1) Defendants’ understanding of the 

prosecution bar expiration. (Dkt. No. 484.)

Eolas’ motion is DENIED. As Defendants’ explain, the Court did not previously rule that 

such discovery was warranted. Further, such discovery is not relevant to Eolas’ objective good 

faith defense and it seeks attorney-client privileged communications for which there has been no 

waiver. Given the lack of relevance, no privilege log is required.

CONCLUSION

In any dispute over the violation of a patent prosecution bar the accused’s attorney-client 

privileged communications will always be relevant. But privileged communications are not 

discoverable merely because they are relevant. As Eolas admits that it violated the patent 

prosecution after July 22, 2014, and it did not waive the privilege as to its post-July 22, 2014 

privileged communications by waiving the privilege as to its communications during the period it 

contests violation of the bar, Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a) does not compel disclosure of the 

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 12 of 13
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

post-July 22, 2014 communications. Further, Eolas’ temporal harmlessness defense and its 

insistence that its belief that the bar expired on July 22, 2014 was objectively reasonable did not 

impliedly waive privilege as to post-July 22, 2014 communications. Thus, Defendants’ motion to 

compel is denied. Eolas’ motion to compel is likewise denied.

On or before January 4, 2019, the parties shall submit to the Court a schedule for the 

completion of the patent prosecution bar discovery.

The Administrative Motions to seal portions of the briefs and exhibits that reflect Eolas’ 

attorney-client privileged communications that were produced subject to an attorneys-eyes only 

agreement are GRANTED. (Dkt. Nos. 466, 470, 477.) The Court notes that a different standard 

may apply to sealing these documents when they are used in briefing to the district court regarding 

whether the prosecution bar was violated prior to July 22, 2014.

This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 466, 467, 470, 477, and 484.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 14, 2018

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:17-cv-03022-JST Document 492 Filed 12/14/18 Page 13 of 13