Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00892/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00892-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLOYD MOODY,

CDCR #G-26035,

Civil No. 09-0892 LAB (BGS)

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND

GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO ALTER, AMEND OR

VACATE JUDGMENT AND

GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME

TO RE-ATTEMPT U.S. MARSHAL 

SERVICE UPON DEFENDANT

MANORAM REDDY 

PURSUANT TO 

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m)

[Doc. No. 43]

vs.

PAULETTE FINANDER, Chief Medical

Officer; K. BALL, Chief Medical Officer;

RICHARD BUTCHER, MD; and

MANORAM REDDY, Medical Care

Provider,

Defendants.

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion to Alter or Vacate or Amend Judgment

[FED.R.CIV.P. 59]” [Doc. No. 43] in which he seeks reconsideration of the Court’s April 2, 2010

Order [Doc. No. 38]. 

I. Procedural Background 

The Court’s April 2, 2010 Order: 1) dismissed unserved Defendant Manoram Reddy on

grounds that Plaintiff had failed to effect service upon her pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m), (April

2, 2010 Order at 4-5, 20); 2) denied Defendant Finander, Ball and Butcher’s Motions to Dismiss

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 On April 15, 2010, Defendants Finander, Ball and Butcher filed their Answers [Doc. Nos. 39, 1

40].

Plaintiff also acknowledges that the Court’s April 2, 2010 Order verifying his satisfaction of 2

the $350 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) was “just,” but further requests that this Court

“address the erroneous deduction” of $44 from his prison trust account. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 3.) The Court

has already verified, however, that it has not collected any fees which “exceed the amount of fees

permitted by the statute for the commencement of [this] civil action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Any

further inquiry Plaintiff may wish to pursue regarding a Salinas Valley State Prison trust account

“decision, action, condition or policy” must be addressed through the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation’s inmate/parolee administrative appeal procedure. See CAL.CODE REGS.,

tit. 15 § 3084.1(a) (2009).

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Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claims pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b)(6), (id. at 7-11, 20); 3) granted Defendant Finander, Ball and Butcher’s Motions to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims without leave to amend pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6),

(id. at 11-12 & n.2, 21); 4) denied Plaintiff’s Motions for Appointment of Counsel, Preliminary

Injunction and Leave to Amend, (id. at 17-19, 21); 5) granted Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting

Verification of Fee Payment, (id. at 20, 21); and 6) ordered Defendants Finander, Ball and

Butcher to Answer the Eighth Amendment claims remaining in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.1

(Id. at 21.) 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion

A. Grounds

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure on grounds that he should have been permitted: 1) an opportunity to present and

produce evidence before the Court dismissed his conspiracy claims, (see Pl.’s Mot. [Doc. No.

43] at 3-4); 2) leave to file a supplemental complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 15(d) in order to

address “ongoing” and subsequent constitutional violations arising at Salinas Valley State Prison

since he initiated this action, (see Pl.’s Mem. or P&As in Supp. of Mot. [Doc. No. 43-1] at 1-2);

and 3) an extension of time in which to attempt “re-service” of his Amended Complaint upon

Defendant Reddy. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 1, 3; Pl.’s P&A’s at 3.) 

2

Plaintiff’s Motion was filed without proof of service by mail on any Defendant or counsel

for any Defendant. See FED.R.CIV.P. 5(a)(1)(D) (requiring “written motion[s], except one that

may be heard ex parte” be “served on every party.”), FED.R.CIV.P. 5(d)(1) (“Any paper after the

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Effective December 1, 2009, FED.R.CIV.P. 59(b) and 59(e) provide that the time for filing a 3

motion for new trial or to alter or amend a judgment must be filed “no later than 28 days after the entry

of the judgment.” FED.R.CIV.P. 59(b), (e). Before December 1, 2009, the time limit was 10 days. See

SLR Partners, LLC v. B. Braun Medical Inc., 2010 WL 330088 at *2 n.2 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (unpub.)

(“Effective December 1, 2009, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) gives parties 28 days to file a

motion to alter or amend a judgment.”). 

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complaint that is required to be served–together with a certificate of service–must be filed within

a reasonable time after service.”). Perhaps consequently, no Defendant has filed an Opposition.

B. Standard of Review 

If a motion to reconsider is filed within [28] days of the district court’s order on the

motion to strike and/or dismiss, the court will treat the motion as a Rule 59(e) motion. Zamani 3

v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 417 F.3d

1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005)). A Rule 59(e) motion is properly granted “if the district court (1)

is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was

manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Dixon v. Wallowa

County, 336 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003).

“A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) should not be granted, absent highly

unusual circumstances.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 342 F.3d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 2003). This type

of motion seeks “a substantive change of mind by the court.” Tripati v. Henman, 845 F.2d 205,

206 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir.

1983)). Most significantly in relation to Plaintiff’s case, “motions to reconsider are not vehicles

permitting the unsuccessful party to ‘rehash’ arguments previously presented.” United States

v. Navarro, 972 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (rejecting “after thoughts” and “shifting

of ground” as appropriate grounds for reconsideration under FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e)). 

C. Application to Plaintiff’s Case

Plaintiff first asks the Court to reconsider the dismissal of his conspiracy claims without

leave to amend against Defendants Finander, Ball and Butcher on grounds that he should be

permitted an “opportunity to present evidence” which would “remove doubt” that a conspiracy

“did, in fact, exist.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 2.) 

/ / /

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As discussed in the Court’s April 2, 2010 Order, however, a Motion to Dismiss brought

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) determines simply whether the complaint contains enough

factual content “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the

claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The Court found that the vague

Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations of conspiracy failed to meet this plausibility

standard, and that to the extent they amounted to mere speculation, amending them would be

futile. See April 2, 2010 Order at 11-12 & n.2. Plaintiff has not shown how the Court’s

conclusion was “clear error” or “manifestly unjust.” Dixon, 336 F.3d at 1022. 

Second, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s denial of injunctive relief related

to “ongoing” incidents at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) and leave to supplement his

pleading with new constitutional violations arising at SVSP subsequent to the initiation of this

action. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2-3; P&A’s at 1-3. In its April 2, 2010 Order, the Court denied

Plaintiff’s Motion for injunctive relief because it lacked jurisdiction over the parties Plaintiff

sought to enjoin. See April 2, 2010 Order at 18-19. The Court further denied Plaintiff’s Motion

for Leave to file a Supplemental Complaint adding new inadequate medical care and due process

claims against SVSP officials pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 15(d) because alleging those claims in

this case would violate 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)’s pre-suit administrative exhaustion requirement.

Id. at 19 (citing McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002); Vaden v. Summerhill,

449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff’s current Motion does not address either of these

conclusions; instead it seeks reconsideration because these new claims are “closely connected,”

“ongoing” and now left “unchecked.” (See Pl.’s P&A’s at 1-2.) These arguments, however, do

not justify relief under Rule 59(e) because they do not show “clear error” and instead merely

“rehash arguments previously presented.” McQuillion, 342 F.3d at 1014; Navarro, 972 F.

Supp. at 1299.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) does not permit reconsideration merely because

Plaintiff is unhappy with the judgment, frustrated by the Court’s application of the facts to

binding precedent or because he disagrees with the ultimate decision. See 11 Charles Alan

Wright & Arthur R. Miller Federal Practice & Procedure 2d § 2858 (Supp. 2009) (citing

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Edwards v. Velvac, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 504, 507 (D. Wis. 1956)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion

to Alter/Amend or Vacate its April 2, 2010 Order must be denied. See FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e). 

However, the Court does find good cause to extend the time in which Plaintiff may reattempt service of his Amended Complaint and summons upon Defendant Reddy pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m). 

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is

filed, the court–on motion or on its own after notice to the

plaintiff–must dismiss the action without prejudice against that

defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But

is the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must

extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m).

In cases involving a plaintiff proceeding IFP, a United States Marshal, upon order of the

court, shall serve the summons and the complaint. FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

(in IFP proceedings, “[t]he officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all

duties in such cases.”). “‘[A]n incarcerated pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is

entitled to rely on the U.S. Marshal for service of the summons and complaint.’” Walker v.

Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Puett, 912 F.2d at 275), abrogated on other

grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 

A marshal’s or court clerk’s delays or errors constitute “good cause” to avoid dismissal

under FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m). Puett, 912 F.2d at 273. Therefore, “[s]o long as the prisoner has

furnished the information necessary to identify the defendant, the marshal’s failure to effect

service is ‘automatically good cause’” for extending the time for service. Walker, 14 F.3d at

1422 (quoting Sellers v. United States, 902 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1990)). In fact, the Court

enjoys broad discretion under Rule 4(m) to extend time for service even without a showing of

good cause. In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 2001); Mann v. American Airlines, 324

F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that district court may, under the broad discretion

granted by FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m), extend time for service retroactively after the 120-day service

period has expired).

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However, where a pro se plaintiff failsto provide the Marshal with accurate and sufficient

information to effect service of the summons and complaint, the court’s sua sponte dismissal of

the unserved defendants is appropriate. Walker, 14 F.3d at 1421-22; see also Rochon v. Dawson,

828 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that plaintiff “may not remain silent and do nothing

to effectuate such service”; rather, “[a]t a minimum, a plaintiff should request service upon the

appropriate defendant and attempt to remedy any apparent defects of which [he] has

knowledge.”).

In its April 2, 2010 Order, the Court found that because Plaintiff had failed to execute

service via the U.S. Marshal upon Defendant Reddy within the 120 days permitted by

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m), and had not requested an extension of time in which to either locate or reattempt service upon Reddy after the summons was returned unexecuted on August 12, 2009,

dismissal of Reddy was appropriate. Walker, 14 F.3d at 1421-22; Rochon, 828 F.2d at 1110.

In his Motion, however, Plaintiff now asks that service be “re-issued” upon Reddy because he

was unaware of the service failure and “was under the impression that there would be a specific

phase appointed ... to call to mandate [any] [de]fects.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 3.)

Thus, because Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant Reddy are

substantially similar to those alleged and found sufficient to survive Defendant Finander, Ball

and Butcher’s Motions to Dismiss, (Amend. Compl. at 2, 6; Pl.’s Attach. to Amend. Compl. at

10-12), the Court finds good cause to re-issue the materials necessary to re-attempt service upon

Reddy, and to grant Plaintiff an extension of time pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m) within which

to do so. See In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d at 513; Mann, 324 F.3d at 1090.

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby:

1) DENIES in part and GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate

the Court’s April 2, 2010 Order pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e) [Doc. No. 43]. Plaintiff’s

Motion is GRANTED only to the extent it includes a request for an extension of time in which

to re-attempt service upon Defendant Reddy. 

/ / /

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2) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to provide Plaintiff with an additional “IFP Package”

consisting of: (a) two certified copies of this Order; (b) two certified copy of the Court’s July

17, 2009 Order Granting IFP and Directing U.S. Marshal Service of Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint [Doc. No. 10]; (c) two certified copies of the First Amended Complaint and its

Attachment [Doc. Nos. 4, 4-1]; (d) an embossed alias summons on Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint (and one copy); and (e) one blank USM Form 285 for purposes of re-attempting

service as to Defendant Manoram Reddy.

2) GRANTS Plaintiff an extension of time to effect service upon Defendant Reddy

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m). Plaintiff shall complete, as accurately and clearly as possible,

the new USM Marshal Form 285 provided to him, and shall return it to the United States

Marshal, along with all the necessary materials described in the Clerk’s letter accompanying his

IFP package, no later than July 9, 2010.

3) IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3), (m) and 28

U.S.C. § 1915(d), the U.S. Marshal shall, within 30 days of receiving Plaintiff’s new USM Form

285, re-attempt service of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and summons upon Defendant Reddy

as directed by Plaintiff. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States pursuant to

the Court’s July 17, 2009 Order granting Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and directing service

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 9, 2010

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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