Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03543/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03543-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kimbra Cumby, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Scottsdale Unified School District; John

Baracy, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-3543-PHX-FJM

ORDER

This court has before it defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal (doc. 9), plaintiff's

Response (doc. 11), and defendants' Reply (doc. 15). Based on the following, we grant in

part and deny in part defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal (doc. 9).

I. Background

Plaintiff was hired as the Executive Director of Human Resources for defendant

Scottsdale Unified School District ("District") in July 2000, and served under Dr. Barbara

Erwin for four years. In July 2004, defendant John Baracy became the Superintendent after

Dr. Erwin resigned. During the 2002-2003 school year, a highly-publicized controversy

arose regarding alleged misconduct by Maureen Booth, a school principal in the District.

Plaintiff was extensively involved in the investigation of the allegations against Booth, and

in the termination proceedings that followed. The District's five-member governing board

Case 2:05-cv-03543-FJM Document 16 Filed 04/18/06 Page 1 of 7
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("Board") eventually sought the discharge of Ms. Booth. However, at least one Board

member, Christine Schild, strongly opposed the termination, and publicly criticized the

District's expenditure of legal fees in the Booth matter, and complained that the District and

the Board were not kept informed as legal expenses accrued. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 7, 12

(doc. 6). After Booth resigned in lieu of termination, supporters of Booth, including Ms.

Schild, "fueled the controversy by focusing on the legal bills incurred by the District in the

Booth dispute as a means of disparaging Dr. Erwin and the law firm she had selected to

represent the District." Id. ¶ 12. 

Plaintiff claims that after Dr. Erwin resigned it became her responsibility and that of

the District CFO, Robert Flach, to "disclose that they were knowledgeable of the fees and the

reasons why the amount of the fees was not unreasonable." Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges that

her report to the Board was "the primary way in which the Board and the public could learn

the facts and end the disparagement and misinformation that Schild and others were creating

about the attorneys' fees." Id. "After the audit of the fees was done by the District, and

Plaintiff presented her factual information, the fee issue was resolved" in favor of the law

firm. Id. ¶ 18. 

In January 2005, a new Board majority was in place, and Christine Schild was elected

the new Board President. Baracy informed plaintiff that Ms. Schild was determined to get

rid of plaintiff. Id. ¶ 19. He assured plaintiff that "the situation had absolutely nothing to do

with her performance," id. ¶ 20, but that she was "viewed as loyal to [Dr. Erwin]." Id. ¶¶ 19,

20. Baracy explained that he "couldn't get three votes [from Board members] to renew

[plaintiff's contract]." Id. ¶ 21. 

Baracy also allegedly told plaintiff that in the future "all administrator contract

renewals would have to be approved by the Board and that many of the administrative

positions would be reorganized, requiring the positions to be posted and current employees

to re-apply and obtain Board approval." Id. ¶ 22. Based on the information from Baracy,

plaintiff concluded that it would be unwise for her to subject herself to a public ordeal, and

therefore, on February 25, 2005, she chose to resign, effective June 30, 2005. Id. ¶ 23. Four

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months later, when none of the policy changes predicted by Baracy occurred, plaintiff sought

to rescind her resignation. Baracy rejected plaintiff's offer. Id. ¶ 24.

Plaintiff then filed this action claiming that Dr. Baracy constructively discharged her

in unlawful retaliation for her exercise of free speech under the United States and Arizona

constitutions when she provided information regarding legal fees to the Board. She also

claims her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process were violated because her

constructive discharge unlawfully deprived her of property rights in her employment, as well

as her right to procedural due process. Plaintiff's allegations of fraud, negligent

misrepresentation, and sex discrimination are not the subject of the present motion to dismiss.

II. Free Speech Violation

The First Amendment protects government employees from termination because of

their speech on matters of "legitimate public concern." Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391

U.S. 563, 571, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1736 (1968). Matters of public concern are those that can "be

fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the

community." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1690 (1983). Whether

a public employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern is a question of law. Id. at

148 n.7, 103 S. Ct. at 1690 n.7. When making this determination the court looks to the

"content, form, and context" of the speech. Id. at 147-48, 103 S. Ct. at 1690.

Plaintiff argues that her presentation to the Board regarding attorneys' fees, including

information that District management knew about the fees, addressed matters of public

concern, and therefore was constitutionally-protected free speech. She claims that she was

constructively discharged for speaking publicly about the expenditure of attorneys' fees by

the District, in violation of both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(d).

Defendants contend, on the other hand, that plaintiff's speech is not protected because

it was made in the normal course of her job duties. They argue that plaintiff was speaking

neither as a citizen on a matter of general concern, nor for the purpose of evaluating the

performance of the District. Instead, defendants describe plaintiff's speech as merely

providing factual information requested as part of her job responsibilities. 

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Public employees, by virtue of their public employment and access to information, are

in a unique position to make valuable contributions to public debate. Pickering, 391 U.S. at

572, 88 S. Ct. at 1736. However, "[t]o presume that all matters which transpire within a

government office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark–and

certainly every criticism directed at a public official–would plant the seed of a constitutional

case." Connick, 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S. Ct. at 1691. Therefore, absent extraordinary

circumstances, constitutional protection is unavailable "when a public employee speaks not

as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of

personal interest." Id. at 147, 103 S. Ct. at 1690. 

A public employee's speech is not deprived of constitutional protection simply

because the views are expressed in the course of the employee's normal job duties. See, e.g.,

Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 543 U.S. 1186,

125 S. Ct. 1395 (2005); Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d 639, 644-45 (6th Cir. 2003). Instead, the

critical inquiry is the "point of the speech in question." Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174 (quoting

Roth v. Veteran's Admin., 856 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1988). "[W]as it the employee's

point to bring wrongdoing to light? Or to raise other issues of public concern, because they

are of public concern? Or was the point to further some purely private interest?" Id. In

essence, we must determine whether the speech at issue was made primarily in the

employee's role as citizen, or primarily in the role of employee. See Connick, 461 U.S. at

147, 103 S. Ct. at 1690); see also Morris v. Crow, 142 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir. 1998)

("[n]ot only must the speech be related to matters of public interest, but the purpose of the

expression must be to present such issues as matters of 'public' concern"); Koch v. City of

Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1448 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding relevant that employee was not

"motivated or inspired by . . . alleged improprieties or by the desire to expose those

improprieties"). 

This is clearly not a case where the employee's purpose was to assert "employee

grievances." Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S. Ct. at 1690. Nor is this the kind of speech at

the other end of the spectrum, where an employee is speaking out about "corruption,

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wrongdoing, misconduct, wastefulness, or inefficiency by other government employees."

Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff does not

allege that she was "bring[ing] to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public

trust." Connick, 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S. Ct. at 1691. Yet she was speaking in response to

such a charge. 

Plaintiff contends that she submitted the legal fees report to the Board, because "it was

up to . . . [her] to disclose that [she was] knowledgeable of the fees and the reasons why the

amount of the fees was not unreasonable." Amended Complaint ¶ 16. Although this

explanation does not create a "public concern" context for the speech, she further alleges that

her report "was the primary way in which the Board and the public could learn the facts and

end the disparagement and misinformation that Schild and others were creating about the

attorneys' fees." Id. In the context of a high profile political dispute among public officials,

we are of the view that uncertainty about where on a spectrum of protection a claim lies

should be resolved in favor of the protection of speech. This is especially so in the posture

of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we deny defendants' motion to dismiss

Counts I and III of the Complaint. 

III. Due Process Violation

Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which

she asserts that she was denied her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when

defendant Baracy's misrepresentations resulted in her constructive discharge. She contends

that Baracy misrepresented to her that "all administrator contract renewals would have to be

approved by the Board and that many of the administrative positions would be reorganized,

requiring the positions to be posted and current employees to re-apply and obtain Board

approval." Amended Complaint ¶ 39. Plaintiff claims that based on Baracy's statements, she

was "tricked into submitting her resignation" id. ¶ 40, and was thereby deprived of her

property interest in her employment agreement. 

Plaintiff's employment agreement provided:

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On or before May 15, the Governing Board shall offer a contract for the

next school year to each administrator who is in the last year of her

administrative contract unless, on or before April 15, the Governing Board, a

member of the Board acting on behalf of the Board or the Superintendent of

the District gives notice to the administrator of the Board's intention not to

offer a new administrative contract. 

Complaint ¶ 37. If notice of nonrenewal is given, the employee has the right under the

employment agreement to appeal. Id. Plaintiff claims that these contractual provisions

created a constitutional property right in her continued employment and the right to due

process before the District could terminate that property right. 

A benefit contained in a public employment contract may rise to the level of a

constitutionally-protected property interest if the plaintiff has a legitimate claim of

entitlement to it. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972).

A "unilateral expectation" of a right is insufficient. Id. Here, plaintiff cannot show that she

had a property interest in continued employment under her employment agreement. The term

of the agreement was one year. According to the language of the agreement, the District did

not have an obligation to renew the agreement; it simply had to provide notice of

nonrenewal. Complaint ¶ 37. The fact that plaintiff's contract had been previously renewed

did not create a claim of entitlement to continued employment, where the language of the

employment agreement clearly allowed the District to choose not to renew if prior notice of

nonrenewal is given. 

Furthermore, even if plaintiff had a protected property interest in continued

employment, she waived her right to the appeal process contained in her employment

agreement by not pursuing it. We assume for purposes of this motion that Baracy

misrepresented that plaintiff's contract would not be renewed, that all administrator contracts

had to be presented to the Board, and that current employees would have to reapply.

Nevertheless, once plaintiff learned of these new procedures and that her contract would not

be renewed, plaintiff retained the option to appeal that decision. Baracy's alleged

misrepresentations did not affect this contractual right. Plaintiff, however, did not pursue

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that option, and in failing to do so, she relinquished her right to appeal. Accordingly,

plaintiff's due process claim must fail.

Based on the foregoing, defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Complaint is

granted.

IV. Conclusion

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED DENYING defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss

Counts I and III (doc. 9). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING defendants' Partial

Motion to Dismiss Count II (doc. 9).

DATED this 17th day of April, 2006.

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