Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01533/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-01533-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DONNIE R. PHILLIPS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BRAMUCCI, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 15-01533 EJD (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(Docket No. 38) 

Plaintiff, a California inmate, filed a pro se civil rights complaints under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against medical officials at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) where he was 

previously incarcerated. The Court found the complaint, liberally construed, stated 

cognizable claims and ordered service of the complaint on Defendants.1

 (Docket No. 11.) 

Defendants Swift, Puget, Ducart, Tupy, Murphy, Barneburg, and Bramucci filed a motion 

for summary judgment asserting that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies, 

the claims fail on the merits, and they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Docket No. 38, 

hereafter “Mot.”.) Plaintiff filed an opposition, (Docket No. 53), and Defendants filed a 

 

1

 The Court also dismissed with prejudice some claims for failure to state a claim and 

dismissed with leave to amend other claims, but Plaintiff did not file an amended 

complaint in the time provided. (Docket No. 11.) Accordingly, the action proceeded only 

on the cognizable claims identified in the Order of Service. (Id.) 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 24
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

reply, (Docket No. 57). 

Along with his opposition, Plaintiff filed an affidavit “in support of Rule 56(d)(1)” 

asserting that facts are unavailable to him due to lack of discovery, miscommunications 

with custody staff, and “overburdensome tactics of the defense over a layman.” (Docket 

No. 55 at 2.) Rule 56(d) provides that if a party opposing a summary judgment motions 

shows “by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts 

essential to justify its opposition, the court may (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; 

(2) allow time to obtain affidavit or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other 

appropriate order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). 

In reply, Defendants assert that the Court should not grant Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) 

request for several reasons: (1) Plaintiff failed to request any discovery since filing this 

action, and has provided no reason why he could not do so; (2) Plaintiff had access to all or 

most of the documents pertaining to his claim during his deposition and was provided with 

a complete copy of their summary judgment motion, including supporting exhibits; and (3) 

Plaintiff fails to specify what discovery he believes will produce material facts or what 

those material facts may be. (Reply at 4.) 

After reviewing the affidavit and Plaintiff’s communications with this Court over 

the course of this action, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show due diligence on 

his part with respect to discovery. Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that 

Defendants have not been forthright in responding to his discovery requests, if any, or 

describe what “miscommunications” with custody staff or “overburdensome tactics” by the 

defense prevented him from obtaining the necessary facts to refute Defendants’ motion. 

Furthermore, the Court notes that Plaintiff never once filed a request for an extension of 

time to obtain further discovery and prepare his opposition. Accordingly, the Court finds 

no merit to Plaintiff’s request, and DENIES it. 

The matter is deemed submitted, and is discussed below. 

/// 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 24
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

DISCUSSION 

I. Statement of Facts and Claims2

 A. Gang Validation 

 Plaintiff was first validated as an associate of the Black Guerrilla Family (“BGF”) 

prison gang on July 25, 2006, and was housed in the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”). 

(Phillips Dep. 17:16-18:14.) On October 26, 2012, Office of Correctional Safety (“OCS”) 

Special Agent Rogers, a non-party to this action, reviewed Plaintiff’s validation, which 

included the gang validation package submitted to the OCS by PBSP Institutional Gang 

Investigator (“IGI”), Defendant Barneburg. (Bond Decl. Ex. H at 4; Barneburg Decl. 3:13-

15, Ex. B; Phillips Dep. 117:30-120:5.) At that time, an inmate could be re-validated if at 

least one source item concerning gang activity within the past six years directly linked the 

inmate to another validated gang associate.3

 See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3378(c)(1) 

(2012); (Barneburg Decl. 3:18-4:2 & Ex. A.) 

 The package included two letters Plaintiff had written in October 2008 in which he 

referenced two inmates who were also housed in the SHU. (Bond Decl. Ex. H at 4; 

Barneburg Decl. Ex. B.) Both of the referenced inmates were validated associates of the 

BGF prison gang and documented members of the Crips disruptive group. (Barneburg 

Decl. 4:15-24 & Ex. B.) Based on this information, the reporting officer determined that 

“[t]he fact that PHILLIPS keeps current regarding the location of other BGF associates and 

is informing his correspondents of this, shows his continued association with both the BGF 

prison gang, and the Crips disruptive group, and should be considered in any gang status 

update of PHILLIPS as association [sic] as described in CCR Title 15, section 

 

2

 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. 

3

 According to Defendants, several amendments to Title 15 in 2015 changed the gang 

validation process, including shortening the relevant time period from six years to four 

years. (Mot. at 4, fn. 3, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3378.2(b) (2015).) Defendants 

assert that even under the new standard, Plaintiff’s 2008 letters would have been relevant 

gang activity at his 2012 review. (Id., citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3378, et seq. (2012).) 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 3 of 24
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

3378(c)(8)(G).” (Id. at 4:21-24.) Based on this evidence and IGI Barneburg’s findings 

and recommendations, Agent Rogers validated Plaintiff as a BGF-associate. (Id. at 5:20-

22.) 

Plaintiff claims that he was wrongly validated as a prison gang member and 

assigned to isolation in the SHU in retaliation for his litigation against prison officials; in 

retaliation for an altercation between Plaintiff and prison officials, and as part of prison 

officials’ attempt to isolate black inmates in the SHU in response to “overblown” fears of 

race riot. (Compl. at 7, 9.) Plaintiff was eligible for inactive review and release from SHU 

in 2012 pursuant to a 2012 Special Threats Group (“STG”) plan implemented by 

Defendant Stainer, which requires that an inmate’s gang status be reviewed every four 

years. Plaintiff claims that he was wrongfully re-validated as a gang member based on 

Defendant Barneburg’s false claim that gang-related materials had been discovered during 

a search of Plaintiff’s cell which he then submitted to the OCS. (Compl. at 5, 8.) Plaintiff 

claims the OCS “maliciously approved the items” as gang-related without taking into 

account Plaintiff’s written objections. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the submission of false 

evidence was initiated by Defendant Murphy, who had “promised” that Plaintiff would 

spend the rest of his life in SHU if he did not “confess and separate from a statewide 

conspiracy by black inmates to kill staff.” (Id. at 5.) 

The Court found that Plaintiff’s allegations, liberally construed, stated cognizable 

due process claims against Defendants Stainer, Barneburg, Bradbury, Murphy, and Walsh. 

(Docket No. 11 at 7.) 

 B. Correspondence 

 With respect to the two letters Plaintiff wrote in October 2008 discussed above, see 

supra at 2-3, Defendants confiscated the letters in December 2008, finding that the letters 

demonstrated Plaintiff’s continued association with the BGF prison gang and the Crips 

disruptive group, and recommended that the letters be considered in Plaintiff’s gang 

validation review. (Barneburg Decl. 4:21-24 & Ex. B.) 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 4 of 24
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

 On August 2, 2012, Plaintiff requested approval to correspond with his daughter, 

Donnesha R. Phillips. (Bond Decl. Ex. D. at 13; Tupy Decl. 2:20-25.) Plaintiff stated his 

BGF affiliation and that Donnesha Phillips had been incarcerated for shooting her fiancé 

and was “now terribly stressed and alone in Nevada.” (Bond Decl. Ex. D at 13; Tupy 

Decl. Ex. A.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence of his fatherdaughter relationship with Donnesha Phillips. (Bond Decl. Ex. D at 13; Tupy Decl. 2:20-

25.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s correctional counselor recommended denying Plaintiff’s 

request. (Bond Decl. Ex. D at 13; Tupy Decl. 2:26-3:4 & Ex. A.) Defendant Correctional 

Lieutenant Tupy then reviewed the request and adopted the counselor’s recommendation. 

(Tupy Decl. 3:5-9; Bond Decl. Ex. D at 13; Phillips Dep. 95:16-18.) 

 The Court found that Plaintiff’s complaint, liberally construed, stated a violation of 

his First Amendment right to send and receive mail based on the allegation that Defendants 

Tupy, Ducart, Puget, Barneburg, Swift, and Murphy confiscated two letters written in 

December 2008, and prevented him from corresponding with his daughter. (Docket No. 

11 at 9-10.) 

C. Cancellation of Cable Channel 

 Cable television at PBSP is provided by Charter Communications. (Rico Decl. 2:1-

4.) In March 2014, Charter changed its cable service from analog to digital. (Id.) 

Following this change, two channels, BET4 and ESPN, would no longer be included in the 

basic cable package, and would instead be offered for a premium. Under the Department 

Operations Manual (“DOM”), section 23010.6, PBSP lacks authority to pay for channels 

that are not within Charter’s basic cable package. (Id. at 2:12-18.) As a result, PBSP no 

longer receives BET. (Id. at 2:19-20.) On March 27, 2014, PBSP distributed a 

memorandum notifying inmates of this change. (Id. at 2:8-11 & Ex. A; Bramucci Decl. 

2:13-15 & Ex. A.) 

 

4

 BET stands for Black Entertainment Television. 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 5 of 24
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

 The Court found that Plaintiff’s complaint, liberally construed, stated a cognizable 

claim under the Equal Protection Clause based on the allegation that the prison is required 

to have racial balance in its television programming and that the cancellation of the black 

television station was in retaliation for a successful hunger strike that resulted in 

negotiations and two Senate bills. (Docket No. 11 at 11-12.) The Court also found 

sufficient facts to state a claim against Defendants Ducart and Bramucci under 42 U.S.C. § 

1981 which prohibits racial discrimination. (Id. at 15.) 

II. Summary Judgment 

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show 

that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court will grant summary judgment 

“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof 

at trial . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of 

the lawsuit under governing law, and a dispute about such a material fact is genuine “if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Generally, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of 

the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue 

at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other 

than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the 

burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of 

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. If the evidence in opposition 

to the motion is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 6 of 24
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

be granted. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50. 

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by 

her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file,’ designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex 

Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted). If the nonmoving party fails to make this 

showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 323. 

The Court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a material fact. See T.W. 

Elec. Serv., Inc. V. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the 

inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. See id. at 631. It is not the task of the district court to scour the record 

in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 

1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying with reasonable particularity 

the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to do so, 

the district court may properly grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. See

id.; see, e.g., Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, 237 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 

(9th Cir. 2001). 

A. Exhaustion 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to 

provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 

U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or 

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the 

discretion of the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (citing Booth v. 

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). “Prisoners must now exhaust all ‘available’ 

remedies, not just those that meet federal standards.” Id. Even when the relief sought 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 7 of 24
8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

cannot be granted by the administrative process, i.e., monetary damages, a prisoner must 

still exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 85-86 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 734). The 

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion” of available administrative 

remedies. Id. at 93. 

 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) provides 

its inmates and parolees the right to appeal administratively “any departmental decision, 

action, condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon 

their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). It also provides its inmates the right 

to file administrative appeals alleging misconduct by correctional officers. See id. § 

3084.1(e). Under the current regulations, in order to exhaust available administrative 

remedies within this system, a prisoner must submit his complaint on CDCR Form 602 

(referred to as a “602”) and proceed through three levels of appeal: (1) first formal level 

appeal filed with one of the institution’s appeal coordinators, (2) second formal level 

appeal filed with the institution head or designee, and (3) third formal level appeal filed 

with the CDCR director or designee. Id. § 3084.7. 

 Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 

549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). Defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence 

of exhaustion, and inmates are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion 

in their complaints. Id. at 215-17. In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the 

face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en 

banc). Otherwise, defendants must produce evidence proving failure to exhaust in a 

motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. 

If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to 

exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. at 1166. But if 

material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied and the district judge 

rather than a jury should determine the facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id. 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 8 of 24
9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

 The defendant’s burden is to prove that there was an available administrative 

remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available administrative remedy. Id. at 

1172; see id. at 1176 (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants 

on issue of exhaustion because defendants did not carry their initial burden of proving their 

affirmative defense that there was an available administrative remedy that prisoner 

plaintiff failed to exhaust); see also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(as there can be no absence of exhaustion unless some relief remains available, movant 

claiming lack of exhaustion must demonstrate that pertinent relief remained available, 

whether at unexhausted levels or through awaiting results of relief already granted as result 

of that process). Once the defendant has carried that burden, the prisoner has the burden of 

production. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. That is, the burden shifts to the prisoner to come 

forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the 

existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. 

Id. But as required by Jones, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant. Id. 

1. Inmate Appeals Challenging Gang Validation 

According to the complaint, Plaintiff claimed that he exhausted six administrative 

appeals concerning his 2012 gang validation. (Compl. at 2.) Defendants assert that all but 

one of those appeals failed to reach the final level of review. (Bond Decl. 4:7-6:4; Voong 

Decl. Ex. A.) Furthermore, the one appeal that was exhausted (No. PBSP-14-03060) 

concerned the inactive review eligibility date that was applied at Plaintiff’s 2014 annual 

hearing. (Bond Decl. 6:5-9 & Ex. J; Voong Decl. Ex. A at 2 & Ex. C.) Plaintiff did not 

file any other appeals regarding his gang validation. (Bond Decl. Ex. A; Voong Decl. Ex. 

A.) 

In opposition, Plaintiff merely asserts that the one appeal which was exhausted (No. PBSP14-03060) “specifically speaks to his due process claim.” (Opp. at 4.) 

In his complaint, Plaintiff claims that his indeterminate SHU term for gang 

association violates his due process rights in the following ways: (1) Defendants placed 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 9 of 24
10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

and/or retained him in the SHU on the basis of erroneous, unreliable, and untrue 

information that fails to satisfy the “some evidence” standard; (2) Defendants failed to 

provide meaningful classification reviews in 2013 and 2014; (3) Defendants’ incorrect 

labeling of Plaintiff as a gang member prevents him from becoming an inactive gang 

member since that process requires him to divulge information about his non-existent gang 

membership; (4) Defendants’ gang validation and debriefing process is merely a pretext 

for retaining Plaintiff in the SHU; and (5) Defendants failed to assess the reliability of the 

items used to validate him and failed to show that the items related to actual gang activity. 

However, none of these claims were raised in appeal No. PBSP-14-03060. As asserted 

by Defendants, the only issue raised by Plaintiff in that appeal was that incorrect 

active/inactive review dates were used to retain him in the SHU during an October 1, 2014 

“committee action.” (Voong Decl. Ex. C at 5.) Furthermore, Plaintiff did not raise this 

particular claim in the instant action. Accordingly, it cannot be said that appeal No. PBSP14-03060 exhausted any of the due process claims raised in this action. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of 

producing evidence showing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 

with respect to any of the due process claims raised in this action. Albino, 747 F.3d at 

1166. In response, Plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence showing that 

existing and generally available administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to 

him. Id. at 1172. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the due 

process claims under Rule 56. Id. at 1166. 

2. Inmate Appeal Challenging Denial of Correspondence 

Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal on August 21, 2012, (No. PBSP-D-12-02661) 

challenging the denial of his request to correspond with his daughter. (Bond Decl. Ex. A 

at 3 & Ex. D.) The first level of review denied the appeal on September 21, 2012, for lack 

of proof of a familial relationship with Donnesha Phillips, noting her status as a Nevadastate-prisoner. (Bond Decl. Ex. D at 11.) Plaintiff appealed and was denied at the second 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 10 of 24
11 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

level of review on October 9, 2012, on the same basis. (Bond Decl. Ex. D at 9-11.) 

Plaintiff then submitted the birth certificate of Donnesha Phillips as proof of their fatherdaughter relationship in his appeal to the third level of review. (Bond Decl. Ex. D at 12.) 

The third level review rejected the appeal on December 12, 2012, and sent the appeal back 

to the second level for an amended decision in light of the additional evidence. (Ducart 

Decl. at ¶ 3.) In an amended second level response dated January 3, 2013, Plaintiff’s 

appeal was again denied, this time based on his gang validation. (Bond Decl. Ex. D at 1-

3.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not thereafter appeal the matter to the third and 

final level of review. (Bond Decl. Ex. D; Voong Decl. Ex. A.) 

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that appeal No. PBSP-D-12-02661 was decided at the 

third level on December 12, 2012, and thereby constitutes exhaustion. (Opp. at 5.) But as 

discussed above, the third level of review did not issue a decision on December 12, 2012, 

but rather rejected it and sent the matter back down to the second level to consider the new 

evidence provided by Plaintiff. There is no evidence, and Plaintiff does not assert, that he 

then appealed the second level review’s amended decision denying the matter to the third 

level. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of producing 

evidence showing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect 

to this First Amendment claim. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. In response, Plaintiff has failed 

to come forward with evidence showing that existing and generally available 

administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. Id. at 1172. Accordingly, 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment claim under Rule 

56. Id. at 1166. 

3. Inmate Appeals Challenging Cancellation of BET 

On March 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed an appeal (No. PBSP-D-14-00872), alleging 

racial discrimination in the cancellation of the BET channel. (Bond Decl. Ex. A at 3 & Ex. 

B.) PBSP Television Specialist Rico, a non-party to this action, informed Plaintiff that the 

cable service provider decides the cable channels at PBSP. (Id. at Ex. B at 5; Phillips Dep. 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 11 of 24
12 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

86:23-89:9.) On April 8, 2014, Correctional Lieutenant Hall, a non-party to this action, 

added that PBSP’s cable package had changed based on budget considerations and directed 

Plaintiff’s attention to the DOM, section 23010.6. (Bond Decl. Ex. B at 5-6; Phillips Dep. 

89:10-90:12.) PBSP Inmate Appeals Analyst, Defendant Bramucci, then issued Plaintiff a 

letter the next day cancelling Plaintiff’s appeal on the basis that the matter was outside 

CDCR’s jurisdiction. (Bramucci Decl. 2:17-21 & Ex. C; Bond Decl. Ex. B at 7.) 

On April 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed another inmate appeal (No. PBSP-D-14-00991), 

challenging Bramucci’s cancellation of his first appeal on the matter. (Bond Decl. Ex. A at 

3 & Ex. C.) His appeal bypassed the first level and was reviewed directly at the second 

level of review. (Bond Decl. Ex. C at 3.) In a letter dated May 12, 2014, Defendant 

Ducart denied Plaintiff’s appeal on findings that Charter Communications had 

discontinued BET and that such action had no racist motive or effect. (Bond Decl. Ex. C 

at 1-2.) Plaintiff appealed to the third level of review, who denied the appeal on August 

21, 2014. (Voong Decl. Ex A at 1 & Ex. B at 1-2.) The third level of review explained 

that “the Examiner will only address the cancellation decision of [Plaintiff’s appeal]. All 

other issues will not be addressed and administrative remedies are not considered to be 

exhausted for these issues.” (Id. at Ex. B at 1.) 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff only appealed Bramucci’s cancellation decision and 

not the underlying issue regarding the BET channel. (Mot. at 10.) As Defendants point 

out, the third level of review explicitly stated that the Examiner was only addressing the 

cancellation decision and that administrative remedies were not considered to be exhausted 

for all the other issues not addressed. (Voong Decl. Ex. B at 1.) Plaintiff does not refute 

his failure to exhaust the issue of the cancelled BET channel in opposition. Accordingly, 

the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of producing evidence showing that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his equal protection 

and racial discrimination claims. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. In response, Plaintiff has 

failed to come forward with evidence showing that existing and generally available 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 12 of 24
13 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. Id. at 1172. Accordingly, 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s equal protection and racial 

discrimination claims under Rule 56. Id. at 1166. 

B. Due Process 

Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s due process claim challenging his gang 

validation fails on the merits because there was “some evidence” to support the decision. 

(Mot. at 11.) 

Changes in conditions of confinement may amount to a deprivation of a statecreated and constitutionally-protected liberty interest, provided the liberty interest in 

question is one of “real substance,” see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477, 484-87 

(1995), and, in particular, where the restraint “imposes atypical and significant hardship on 

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” see id. at 484. In 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), the Supreme Court held that disciplinary 

proceedings do not satisfy due process requirements unless there is “some evidence” in the 

record to support the findings of the prison disciplinary board. The Ninth Circuit requires 

that “some evidence” also support a decision to place an inmate in segregation for 

administrative reasons. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1104 (9th Cir. 1986). 

This standard applies to placement in a SHU for gang affiliation. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 

1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that any one of three pieces of evidence -- a sheriff’s 

department report that prisoner was a gang member, a probation report that prisoner’s 

codefendant was a gang member, and a statement from a prison informant -- would 

constitute “some evidence”). The standard is met if there was some evidence from which 

the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 

1105 (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455). Ascertaining whether the standard is satisfied does not 

require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of 

witnesses or weighing of the evidence. See id. Instead, the relevant question is whether 

there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached. See id. 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 13 of 24
14 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

The Ninth Circuit also requires that the evidence relied upon by prison disciplinary 

boards contain “some indicia of reliability,” Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 

1987), but has not directly considered whether a corresponding need for evidentiary 

reliability exists when prison officials segregate an inmate for administrative reasons. 

Some district courts have extended the reliability requirement to the administrative 

context, however, holding that “the evidence relied upon to confine an inmate to the SHU 

for gang affiliation must have ‘some indicia of reliability’ to satisfy due process 

requirements.” Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1273-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s validation comports with due process because it 

was supported by two letters written by Plaintiff. (Barneburg Decl. 4:15-19 & Ex. B.) In 

the two letters dated October 26, 2008, and October 30, 2008, Plaintiff communicated to 

the intended recipients the housing location for two validated BGF-associates and 

documented Crips-members. (Id.) According to Defendants, gangs often communicate 

using subtle messages through similar letters. (Mot. at 12, citing to Murphy Decl. 4:18-

5:17; Barneburg Decl. 4:25-5:17.) They assert that seemingly innocuous messages to 

someone who is unfamiliar with gang operations may actually further gang activity, and 

that the location of gang associates throughout the prison system is key information for 

organizing gang members to action. (Id.) Defendants also assert that merely 

demonstrating such knowledge of such information to other gang affiliates is a way that 

gang associates communicate “their continued commitment to the gang and their relevance 

in the gang’s hierarchy.” (Id.) In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that the letters at issue 

merely “ridiculed the administration’s abuse of the validation process for having two other 

‘known’ street thugs housed as associates to the defunct prison gang.” (Opp. at 4.) 

Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that the letters constitute some 

evidence to support the decision to re-validate Plaintiff as a prison gang associate. See 

Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1105. Defendant Barneburg reviewed the two letters and found 

certain factors that indicated gang activity: the mention of the location of Plaintiff’s fellow 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 14 of 24
15 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

BGF associates had no context within the rest of the letter; the location of gang members 

may help determine where the gang has strength throughout the CDCR; in conveying the 

information, Plaintiff might be demonstrating his own commitment to the BGF and Crips; 

and at a minimum, by communicating the location of the two BGF associates to a third 

party, Plaintiff was indicating those associates’ importance. (Barneburg Decl. at ¶¶ 10-

12.) These considerations were certainly sufficient to identify the letters as source items to 

support Plaintiff’s ongoing association with the BGF. Furthermore, the letters clearly bear 

“some indicia of reliability” as it is undisputed that they were written by Plaintiff. 

Even if the information in the letters was truly innocuous and not intended to further 

gang activity, Plaintiff’s validation as a gang member based thereon did not violate due 

process. The information contained in the letters and the Defendants’ valid concerns 

regarding their relevance in furthering gang activity constitutes evidence that supports the 

decision to re-validate Plaintiff. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1105. Lastly, the fact that a 

prisoner may have been placed incorrectly in administrative segregation does not raise a 

due process issue. The Constitution demands due process, not error-free decision-making. 

See Ricker v. Leapley, 25 F.3d 1406, 1410 (8th Cir. 1994); McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 

863, 868 (5th Cir. 1983). 

Based on the evidence presented, Defendant has shown that there is no genuine 

issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s due process claim. See Celotex Corp., 477 

U.S. at 323. In response, Plaintiff has failed to point to specific facts showing that there is 

a genuine issue for trial, id. at 324, or identify with reasonable particularity the evidence 

that precludes summary judgment, Keenan, 91 F.3d at 1279. Accordingly, Defendants are 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. 

C. First Amendment 

1. Confiscation of Letters 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim regarding the confiscation 

of his letters is barred under the applicable statute of limitations. (Mot. at 13.) 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 15 of 24
16 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. The appropriate period is 

that of the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. 

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999); 

Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994). In the event the state has 

multiple statutes of limitations for different torts, courts considering § 1983 claims should 

borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions. See Silva v. Crain, 169 

F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999). In California, the general residual statute of limitations for 

personal injury actions is the two-year period set forth at California Civil Procedure Code 

§ 335.1 and is the applicable statute in § 1983 actions. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 

945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Silva, 169 F.3d at 610 (limitations period for filing § 

1983 action in California governed by residual limitations period for personal injury 

actions in California, which was then one year and was codified in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 

340(3)); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (current codification of residual limitations period, 

which is now two years; enacted in 2002). 

It is federal law that determines when a cause of action accrues and the statute of 

limitations begins to run in a § 1983 action. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); 

Elliott, 25 F.3d at 801-02. Under federal law, a claim generally accrues when the plaintiff 

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. See TwoRivers, 

174 F.3d at 991-92; Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802. The statute of limitations generally begins to 

run only once a plaintiff has knowledge of the “critical facts” of his injury, which are “that 

he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury.” United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 

111, 122 (1979). 

A federal court must give effect to a state’s tolling provisions. See Hardin v. 

Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989); Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 

1986). In California, this includes tolling the statute of limitations during imprisonment 

and while criminal charges are pending. The statute of limitations begins to run 

immediately after the recognized disability period ends. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 16 of 24
17 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Park, 159 F.3d 374, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1998) (following California Law). California Civil 

Procedure Code section 352.1 recognizes imprisonment as a disability that tolls the statute 

of limitations when a person is “imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the 

sentence of a criminal court for a term of less than for life.” See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 

352.1(a). The tolling is not indefinite, however; the disability of imprisonment delays the 

accrual of the cause of action for a maximum of two years. See id. Thus, an inmate has 

four years to bring a § 1983 claim for damages in California, i.e., the regular two year 

period under section 335.1 plus two years during which accrual was postponed due to the 

disability of imprisonment. 

Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claim regarding the confiscation of his 

letters in December 2008 accrued when he exhausted his administrate appeal regarding the 

matter on March 3, 2009. (Bond Decl. Ex. K; Voong Decl. Ex. A at 2.) The Court agrees 

that March 3, 2009, was the latest date when Plaintiff knew of the injury which is the basis 

of this action, and the earliest date when he could proceed with a section 1983 action in 

federal court after satisfying the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See TwoRivers, 174 

F.3d at 991-92. Plaintiff had four years thereafter, including two years for tolling for the 

disability of imprisonment, to file a timely action, i.e., no later than March 3, 2013. See 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). However, Plaintiff waited over six years from that time 

to file this action on April 3, 2015. (Mot. at 13.) Plaintiff offers no argument in opposition 

to refute Defendants’ assertion of the timeliness bar. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment claim regarding the unlawful confiscation of his December 2008 letters is 

DISMISSED with prejudice as untimely. 

2. Denial of Correspondence with Daughter 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claim regarding the denial of his request to 

correspond with his daughter fails on the merits because there was a substantial 

government interest of preventing gang activity. (Mot. at 14.) 

Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow v. 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 17 of 24
18 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 

(1989)). A prison, however, may adopt regulations or practices which impinge on a 

prisoner’s First Amendment rights as long as the regulations are “reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The 

Turner standard applies to regulations and practices concerning all correspondence 

between prisoners and to regulations concerning incoming mail received by prisoners from 

non-prisoners. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413. 

Defendants assert that the restriction on Plaintiff’s correspondence with his 

daughter, who was a prisoner in Nevada, furthered the substantial governmental interest of 

preventing gang activity. (Mot. at 15.) The request was denied in an amended decision at 

the second level because Plaintiff was a validated associate of a prison gang. (Bond Decl. 

Ex. D.) Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that it “would not have been unreasonable” to 

perceive a risk that he would exercise his gang influence to help his daughter in prison. 

(Phillips Dep. 106:23-107:24.) Accordingly, the denial of the request furthered the 

substantial government interest of preventing gang activity. The Court agrees. There is no 

dispute that preventing gang activity is a legitimate penological interest. Furthermore, the 

restriction on corresponding with his daughter was narrowly tailored for the time that she 

was incarcerated; Defendants point out that there is no allegation or evidence the Plaintiff 

was prevented from corresponding with her before her incarceration or upon her release. 

(Mot. at 15.) Plaintiff makes no assertion to the contrary for this Court to believe 

otherwise. 

Based on the evidence presented, Defendant has shown that there is no genuine 

issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim with respect to the 

temporary restriction of correspondence with his daughter. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 

323. In response, Plaintiff has failed to point to specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial, id. at 324, or identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that 

precludes summary judgment, Keenan, 91 F.3d at 1279. Accordingly, Defendants are 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 18 of 24
19 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. Id.; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. 

D. Equal Protection and § 1981 Claims 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s equal protection and § 1981 claims regarding the 

cancellation of the BET channel fail on the merits because there was no intentional racediscrimination. (Mot. at 16.) 

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no 

State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ 

which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” 

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. 

Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). A plaintiff alleging denial of equal protection under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 based on race or other suspect classification must plead intentional unlawful 

discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an inference of discriminatory 

intent. Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). 

To state a claim for relief, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant state actor acted at 

least in part because of plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. Serrano v. Francis, 345 

F.3d 1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003). Proof of a discriminatory intent or purpose is required 

to show an equal protection violation based on race. See, e.g., Thornton v. City of St. 

Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005) (mere indifference to effect of decision on 

member of protected class not discriminatory intent; conclusory statements of bias not 

sufficient to prevent summary judgment); Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1082 (plaintiff must 

produce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the decision was motivated by the plaintiff’s membership in the 

protected class to avoid summary judgment). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to show that Defendants acted because of his race. The 

undisputed facts show that the BET channel became unavailable on the basic cable 

package due to changes by the cable service provider, not due to any action by the 

Defendants. See supra at 4-5. Furthermore, PBSP lacked authority to pay for any 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 19 of 24
20 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

additional channels that were not within the basic cable package, which was a racially 

neutral policy. Id. Accordingly, there is no evidence that Defendants were directly 

responsible for the unavailability of the BET channel, or that there was any discriminatory 

intent or purpose in denying the request for the channel to be restored when it was beyond 

the authority of PBSP to do so. Furthermore, Defendants point out that BET was cancelled 

for all inmates at PBSP, not just for Plaintiff and those of his race. (Mot. at 18-19.) 

Accordingly, it cannot be said that the unavailability of the BET channel resulted in a 

racially discriminatory treatment of Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff offers no argument in 

opposition to show otherwise. Because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this equal protection claim. 

With respect to Plaintiff’s claim under § 1981, that section provides that all persons 

shall have the same right “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, 

and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 

property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 prohibits racial 

discrimination through both state and private action. See Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 

1344 (9th Cir. 1989). Because of § 1981’s historical roots in the Equal Protection Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment, it covers only acts involving intentional discrimination, 

excluding from the statute’s reach actions that merely have a disparate effect. Doe, 470 

F.3d at 836 (citing Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390-91 

(1982)); see Evans, 869 F.2d at 1344 (claim under § 1981 does not require allegations of 

conspiracy, but does require showing of intentional discrimination on account of race). In 

the context of a contract other than one for employment or education, the Ninth Circuit has 

held that in order to establish a prima facie case under § 1981, the plaintiff must show that 

he is a member of a protected class, he attempted to contract for certain services, and he 

was denied the right to contract for those services. See Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 

432 F.3d 954, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying § 1981 to a claim of racial discrimination 

by a hotel contracting with an African-American group for use of a hotel ballroom). The 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 20 of 24
21 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Ninth Circuit has not decided whether such a plaintiff must also show that the services 

remained available to similarly-situated individuals who were not members of the 

plaintiff's protected class. See id. at 959-60. 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim fails because he cannot demonstrate 

that he was intentionally treated unequally because of his race or that he has contractual 

rights to the continuation of the BET channel. (Mot. at 15, 17-18.) In opposition, Plaintiff 

asserts that he negotiated with prison officials to keep the BET channel in exchange for the 

black population refraining from “blasting the music out loud” when the administration 

contemplated the removal of all speakers from radios and television. (Pl.’s Decl. in Supp. 

Opp. at 1; Docket No. 55.) In reply, Defendants assert that such an agreement is 

immaterial because the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff was not a party to the contract 

for cable services between PBSP and Charter. (Reply at 3.) Furthermore, Defendants 

point to decisions showing that courts have recognized that inmates are not entitled to 

rights under a prison’s contract for cable services. (Mot. at 17, citing Webster v. Stanton, 

No. CIVS072282MCEKJMP, 2008WL 1721902 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2008) 

(dismissing as frivolous inmate’s claim that prison officials were biased against black 

inmates because BET was not accessible in the prison.) 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim under § 1981 fails 

because Plaintiff ultimately cannot show intentional discrimination based on his race. As 

discussed above, the unavailability of the BET channel was not due to any action on the 

part of Defendants, but rather a change of service by the cable company. See supra at 17. 

Furthermore, PBSP simply has no authority to pay for channels beyond the basic cable 

package, be it BET or ESPN, under a racially neutral policy. Accordingly, it cannot be 

said that Defendants intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s right to view a particular 

television station, assuming such a right exists, because of his race. 

Based on the evidence presented, Defendant has shown that there is no genuine 

issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff’s equal protection and § 1981 claims. See 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 21 of 24
22 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. In response, Plaintiff has failed to point to specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, id. at 324, or identify with reasonable 

particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment, Keenan, 91 F.3d at 1279. 

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Celotex Corp., 

477 U.S. at 323. 

E. Unserved Defendants 

Defendants Stainer, Bradbury, and Walsh have not been served in this action 

although it was so ordered in the Court’s Order of Partial Service. (Docket No. 11 at 16.) 

The claim against Defendants Stainer, Bradbury, and Walsh is that they denied Plaintiff’s 

right to due process during the gang validation. (Id.); see supra at 3. 

Summary judgment may be granted by the court sua sponte in favor of a 

nonappearing party on the basis of facts presented by other defendants who have appeared. 

See Columbia Steel Fabricators v. Ahlstrom Recovery, 44 F.3d 800, 802-03 (9th Cir.) 

(affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of nonappearing defendant where plaintiff, 

in response to summary judgment motion filed by defendant who had appeared, had “full 

and fair opportunity to brief and present evidence” on dispositive issue as to claim against 

nonappearing defendant), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 864 (1995); see also Abagninin v. 

AMVAC Chemical Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding district court 

properly granted motion for judgment on the pleadings as to unserved defendants where 

such defendants were in a position similar to served defendants against whom claim for 

relief could not be stated); Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 

1981) (holding district court on its own motion may grant motion to dismiss as to 

defendants who have not moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar 

to that of moving defendants). 

Here, Defendants Stainer, Bradbury, and Walsh are in a position similar to served 

Defendants who have shown that they are entitled to summary judgment based on 

Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies and on the merits. See supra at 8-9, 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 22 of 24
23 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

13-15. Based on a thorough review of the single inmate appeal at issue, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff has also failed to exhaust his claim against Defendants Stainer, Bradbury, and 

Walsh. As discussed above, inmate appeal No. PBSP-14-03060 contained none of the due 

process claims raised in this action. See supra at 9. Accordingly, it cannot be said that this 

appeal satisfies the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement with respect to any of the due process 

claims against Defendants Stainer, Bradbury, and Walsh. Furthermore, the Court has 

determined that Plaintiff’s re-validation as a gang associate comports with due process, 

and therefore his due process claim fails on the merits. Because Defendants Stainer, 

Bradbury, and Walsh are in a position similar to that of moving defendants with respect to 

this claim, they are also entitled to summary judgment on the merits. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court sua sponte grants summary judgment in favor of 

Defendants Stainer, Bradbury, and Walsh on the basis of facts presented by other 

Defendants who have appeared, showing that Plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust 

any of the due process claims in this action, including the claims against Defendants 

Stainer, Bradbury, and Walsh, and on the merits. See Columbia Steel Fabricators, 44 F.3d 

at 802-03. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, Defendants Swift, Puget, Ducart, Tupy, Murphy, 

Barneburg, and Bramucci’s motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 38), is 

GRANTED.

5

 The claims against them are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

Because unserved Defendants Stainer, Bradbury, and Walsh are in a position 

similar to the Defendants who have appeared in this action with respect to the due process 

claim against them, summary judgment is also granted in their favor. The claims against 

 

5

 Because the Court finds that no constitutional violation occurred, it is not necessary to 

reach Defendant’s qualified immunity argument. 

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 23 of 24
24 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

them are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

This order terminates Docket No. 38. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: _____________________ ________________________ 

EDWARD J. DAVILA 

United States District Judge 

PRO-SE\EJD\CR.15\01533Phillips_grant.msj 

9/30/2016

Case 5:15-cv-01533-EJD Document 59 Filed 09/30/16 Page 24 of 24