Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01965/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01965-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID B. TURNER, Jr.,

CDCR #G-30643,

Booking No. 13719099,

Civil No. 14cv1965 LAB (WVG)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(ECF Doc. No. 4)

AND 

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM AND AS

FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

vs.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY; 

SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF;

WILLIAM D. GORE; 

VISTA DETENTION,

Defendants.

David B. Turner, Jr., (“Plaintiff”), a former state prisoner serving his sentence at

the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Vista Detention Facility (“VDF”), in Vista,

California,1

 initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 21,

2014 (ECF Doc. No. 1). 

1

 On September 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address in Turner

v. San Diego Central Jail, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 13cv1133 WQH (BGS) (Doc. No. 68), indicating his anticipated release from state custody on September 29, 2014.

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I.

Procedural History

Plaintiff did not prepay the $400 civil filing fee required to commence a civil

action by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead he filed a Motion to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 2). 

On November 7, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP,

however, because it failed to adequately describe his post-incarceration income, assets,

or expenses. See Nov. 7, 2014 Order (ECF Doc. No. 3) at 6-7. Plaintiff was granted

thirty days in which to file a supplemental IFP motion which “include[d] an affidavit

documenting his post-release income, assets, and expenses,” and demonstrated his current

inability to pay the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff was

further cautioned that should he elect to proceed by filing a supplemental Motion to

Proceed IFP, his Complaint would be subject to the sua sponte screening required by 28

U.S.C. § 1915A, and immediately dismissed if it was found frivolous or malicious, if it

failed to state a claim, or if it sought damages from immune governmental defendants. 

Id. at 6-7 & n.5.

Plaintiff has since filed a supplemental Motion to Proceed IFP in compliance with

the Court’s November 7, 2014 Order (ECF Doc. No. 4).

II.

Supplemental Motion to Proceed IFP

As Plaintiff knows, all parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a

district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must

pay a filing fee of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a

plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir.

1999). A federal court may authorize the commencement of a civil action without

prepayment of fees if a person submits an affidavit, including a statement of all assets he

possesses, that shows he is unable to pay the required filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

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The determination of indigency falls within the court’s discretion. See Cal. Men’s

Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S.

194 (1993). See also Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)

(noting that while a civil litigant need not “be absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit of

the [28 U.S.C. § 1915],” his affidavit must nevertheless demonstrate to the court that he

cannot, because of poverty, pay or give security for the costs of suit “and still be able to

provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.”) (internal quotations

omitted). The facts as to the affiant’s poverty must be stated with “some particularity,

definiteness, and certainty,” however. United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th

Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has now submitted an affidavit sufficient to

satisfy both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff claims he is a

“poor person” and has “no way to pay the full filing fee for this case.” See Pl.’s Mot.

(ECF Doc. No. 4) at 1. He further claims to receive a monthly income of only $194 in

food stamps and $307 in cash relief, and has attached photocopies of his monthly Notice

of Benefits under the County of San Diego’s General Relief and CalFresh Benefits

Program. Plaintiff’s General Relief Notice also indicates he has been “found

unemployable through 02/28/2015.” Id. at 2. 

From this supplemental accounting, the Court finds Plaintiff has insufficient

available funds from which to pay any filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(4). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF

Doc. No. 4).

III.

Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)

A. Standard

As Plaintiff is also aware, the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s amendments to 28

U.S.C. § 1915 also require that the Court review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who file while “incarcerated or detained in

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any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss

complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim,

or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there

are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this

plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th

Cir. 2009).

While a plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts “have

an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe

the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v.

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,

1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not

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initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982). Even before Iqbal, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations” were not “sufficient to withstand a motion to

dismiss.” Id.

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the County of San Diego, its Sheriff William D.

Gore, and the Vista Detention Facility itself, violated his constitutional rights in

December 2013, January 2014, and April 2014, by exposing him to unsanitary cell

conditions and polluted air. See Compl. at 2-5. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as well

as $700,000 in both compensatory and punitive damages.2

 Id. at 7.

C. Defendant Vista Detention Facility

First, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint requires sua sponte dismissal pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1) and § 1915A(b)(1) to the extent it seeks relief under

§ 1983 against the “Vista Detention Facility.” See Compl. at 1, 2.

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 

Campbell v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011)

(citing Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). A county jail

or detention facility (like VDF) is not a proper defendant under § 1983. See Vance v.

County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal

department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against

2

 Plaintiff’s release from custody has rendered moot his claims for injunctive relief related to conditions at VDF. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975) (inmate’s request for declaratory judgment rendered moot by his transfer to another prison). When an inmate has been released from custody or transferred to another prison and there is no reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability that he will again be subjected to the conditions from which he seeks injunctive relief, his claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995). The possibility that an inmate might be transferred back to the prison where the injury occurred is too speculative to overcome mootness. Id.; see also Wiggins v. Rushen, 760

F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1985). 

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a municipality.”) (citation omitted); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758

(N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ who violates someone’s

constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not a ‘person.’). 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can

be granted against VDF and any purported claims against VDF must be dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 191A(b)(1). 

D. Municipal Liability

Second, while Plaintiff’s Complaint also names the County of San Diego as a

Defendant, and the County may be considered a “person” properly subject to suit under

§ 1983, see Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Hammond v.

County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1988), the County may be held liable only

where the Plaintiff alleges facts to show that a constitutional deprivation was caused by

the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated” by the municipality, or a “final decision maker” for

the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board of the County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 402-04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). In other

words, “respondeat superior and vicarious liability are not cognizable theories of recovery

against a municipality.” Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 279 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th

Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to hold the County liable based on claims that

unidentified “local prison officials” at VDF failed to provide “humane conditions of

confinement.” See Compl. at 3. However, “a municipality cannot be held liable solely

because it employs a tortfeasor.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Navarro, 72 F.3d at 714. 

Instead, to allege a claim of municipal liability, Plaintiff must include in his pleading

enough “factual content” to support a reasonable inference to show that: (1) he was

deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the county had a policy; (3) the policy amounted

to deliberate indifference to his constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving

force behind the constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831,

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835 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918

(9th Cir. 1996). 

As currently pleaded, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) because he has failed to allege any facts which

“might plausibly suggest” that he was subject to unsanitary or unsafe conditions pursuant

to any municipal custom, policy, or practice implemented or promulgated with deliberate

indifference to his constitutional rights, or that such a policy was the “moving force”or

cause of his injury. See Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir.

2012) (applying Iqbal’s pleading standards to Monell claims); Brown, 520 U.S. at 404

(“[I]t is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable

to the municipality . . . [t]he plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate

conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, a

plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of

culpability and must demonstrate a causal link between the municipal action and the

deprivation of federal rights.”).

E. Vicarious Liability

Third, as to the only individual person currently named as a Defendant, William

D. Gore, the San Diego County Sheriff, Plaintiff’s Complaint also fails to state a claim

upon which § 1983 relief can be granted, because it contains no individualized allegations

of wrongdoing by Sheriff Gore, and instead only describes him as the “local prison

official” presumably responsible for failing to provide him with “humane conditions.” 

See Compl. at 2, 3.

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits,” Plaintiff “must

plead that each Government-official defendant, though the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff’s Complaint,

however, contains no further “factual enhancement” to describe what Gore did, or failed

to do with regard to his overflowing toilet on January 21, 2014, or his alleged exposure

to “toxic fumes” on April 6, 2014. See Compl. at 3, 5; Estate of Brooks v. United States,

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197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Causation is, of course, a required element of a §

1983 claim.”). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties

and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to

have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.

1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d

457, 460 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section

1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to

perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the

plaintiff complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). There is no

respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433,

1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Thus, without some specific “factual content” that might allow the Court to “draw

the reasonable inference” that Sheriff Gore may be held personally liable for any

unconstitutional conduct directed at Plaintiff, the Court finds his Complaint, as currently

pleaded, contains only the type of “defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusations,” which

Iqbal makes clear, fail to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 568.

F. Duplicative Claims

Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims of being exposed to “polluted” air

that “c[ame] out of the vents” while he was housed not at VDF, but rather, at George

Bailey Detention Facility on December 23, 2013, see Compl. at 4, must be dismissed as

frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)(1). These allegations are

simply duplicative of claims he has previously alleged in a separate civil rights case

currently pending before Judge Sammartino. See Turner v. County of San Diego, et al.,

S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 13cv2729 JLS (PCL) (ECF Doc. No. 4), “Amend. Compl.” at

1, 3. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (court “‘may take notice

of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if

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those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’”) (quoting Bennett v.

Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). A prisoner’s complaint is

considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) if it “merely repeats pending or

previously litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir.

1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations

omitted). 

IV.

Conclusion and Order

 Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 4) is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff’s duplicative claims are DISMISSED as frivolous pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) and without leave to amend. See Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“When a case may be classified

as frivolous or malicious, there is, by definition, no merit to the underlying action and so

no reason to grant leave to amend.”).

3. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are DISMISSED without prejudice and with

leave to amend for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff is GRANTED thirty (30)

days leave from the date this Order is filed in which to re-open this case by filing a

Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading described above. 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his

original complaint. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that

claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading

may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

/ / /

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Should Plaintiff elect not to proceed by filing a Amended Complaint within the

time provided, the Court will enter a final Order of dismissal of this civil action as

frivolous, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and

§ 1915A(b)(1), and based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute in compliance with a Court

Order requiring amendment.

DATED: March 13, 2015

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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