Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00075/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00075-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Maria Victoria Gemma Ramirez, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Katrina Kane, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 08-0075-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Presently pending before the Court are Petitioner Maria Victoria Gemma Ramirez’s

petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt.#1), Respondent Katrina

Kane’s Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt.#8), Petitioner’s

Reply to Respondent’s Response (Dkt.#9), and Petitioner’s Motion to Hold Proceedings in

Abeyance Pending Extrajudicial Resolution Efforts (Dkt.#12).

The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Glenda Edmonds who issued a Report

and Recommendation (RR) on July 16, 2008. Magistrate Judge Edmonds recommended that

the petition be granted, “unless the government within 60 days of the District Court’s order

provides a hearing to the petitioner before an Immigration Judge with the power to grant bail

unless the government establishes that she is a flight risk or will be a danger to the

community.” (Report and Recommendation, p. 4) (Dkt.#10). The government filed an

Objection to the Report and Recommendation. (Dkt.#11) 

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This Court reviews the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc).

I. Background

Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines who became a lawful permanent resident of

the United States on March 15, 1999. (Report and Recommendation, p. 2.) On July 31, 2006,

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear charging

her with removability because she was convicted of an aggravated felony under California

state law. Id. On September 11, 2006, the Immigration Judge sustained the charge of

removability based on Petitioner’s conviction and ordered her removed to the Philippines.

Id. Petitioner filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) who dismissed

her appeal on December 21, 2006. Id. Petitioner then filed a motion to stay and a petition

for review with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, who granted her motion on June 12,

2007. Id. Petitioner’s appeal remains pending. Id. On March 26, 2007, DHS reviewed

Petitioner’s custody status and decided to continue her detention. Id. 

Petitioner has been in custody since July 31, 2006. Id.

The RR issued by the Magistrate Judge found, based on briefing provided by both

Petitioner and Respondent, that Petitioner had been detained by the government pursuant to

authority granted under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). (Report and Recommendation, p. 3.) Section

1226(c) requires the Attorney General to take into custody any alien who is deportable by

virtue of their having been convicted of certain crimes that are “denominated as aggravated

felonies.” (Report and Recommendation, p. 3), citing 8 U.S.C. § § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii);

1101(a)(43)(R). The Magistrate Judge further found that Section 1226(c) “governs the

alien’s detention until the start of the ‘removal period.’” Id. 

While agreeing with the government that Section 1226(c) is the controlling statute,

Petitioner argued that her continued detention was neither directly authorized by Section

1226(c), nor its most relevant interpretation by the Ninth Circuit in Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d

1241 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner contended that under Tijani, Section 1226(c) only authorized

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detentions during an “expedited” removal period, but the statute did not permit extended

periods of detention, such as that imposed on Petitioner. Id. The government responded by

claiming that the detention in Tijani was for two years and eight months, whereas Petitioner

had been detained for only 23 months–9 months less. Id. Magistrate Judge Edmonds’ found

the government’s position unavailing, noting that Petitioner’s continued detention could in

no sense be classified as “expeditious.” Id. at 4.

The government also argued that unlike Tijani, Petitioner’s “holding and

administrative proceedings were expeditiously concluded and her extended period of

detention is the result of her own litigation [efforts].” Id. This position was similarly rejected

by the Magistrate Judge, who found that the court’s reasoning in Tijani was not “based on

who was responsible for the extended detention period.” Instead, Tijani focused on the

possibility that a prolonged detention of an alien under 1226(c) absent judicial review may

violate the constitutional rights of the detained party. Id.

Therefore, Magistrate Judge Edmonds recommended to this Court that Petitioner’s

Writ of Habeas Corpus be granted, unless the government provides a hearing before an

Immigration Judge with the power to grant bail. Id. The Magistrate Judge further

recommended that in such a hearing it is the government that must bear the burden of

establishing Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Id.

The government filed an Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s RR, arguing two points:

(1) that Petitioner is not being detained under Section 1226(c), but rather under Section

1226(a), thereby entitling her to a bond hearing; and (2) that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly

placed the burden of proof on the government to demonstrate that Petitioner is a flight risk

or danger to the community when that burden should be borne by Petitioner. (Respondent’s

Objections to Report and Recommendation, p. 1-2.)

The government filed a subsequent motion, asking this Court to Hold Proceedings in

Abeyance Pending Extrajudicial Resolution Efforts. (Dkt.#12.) The government requested

that this Court take no action until October 3, 2008, so that it may determine the impact of

two recent Ninth Circuit decisions on the instant petition. (Respondent’s Motion to Hold

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As per the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Prieto-Romero, Petitioner Ramirez’s detention

is not justifiable under Section 1231(a), since “the removal period under Section 1231(a)

does not begin until [the Ninth Circuit] denies the petition and withdraws the stay of

removal.” Prieto-Romero, WL 2008 2853396, at *3. As in Prieto-Romero, Petitioner’s appeal

remains pending, as the court granted her Motion to Stay and Petition for Review on June

12, 2007. (Report and Recommendation, p. 2.) 

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Proceedings in Abeyance Pending Extrajudicial Resolution Efforts, p. 1-2.) Those cases are

Casas-Castrillon v. Dept. of Homeland Security, _F.3d_, 2008 WL 2902026 (9th Cir. July

25, 2008) and Prieto-Romero v. Mukasey, _F.3d_, 2008 WL 2853396, (9th Cir. July 25,

2008).

After conducting a de novo review of Magistrate Judge Edmond’s RR, along with all

briefing submitted by the parties, this Court will adopt in part the Magistrate Judge’s RR.

This Court will adopt the facts found in Magistrate Judge Edmonds’s report, and will also

adopt the recommendation submitted by Magistrate Edmonds, but for different legal reasons.

II. Analysis

A. Petitioner Ramirez is Being Detained Under Section 1226(a)

This Court agrees with the government’s initial contention raised in its Objections to

the Report and Recommendation. As the holdings of Casas-Castrillon and Prieto-Romero

make clear, the statutory authority for Petitioner’s continued detention is found under Section

1226(a) and not under Section 1226(c). 

In Casas-Castrillon, petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, was found by an

Immigration Judge to be a removable alien after he had been convicted of two crimes of

moral turpitude. Casas-Castrillon, WL 2008 2902026, at * 1. This determination was

affirmed on appeal by the BIA. Id. The Ninth Circuit then granted the petitioner review of

his final order of removal. Id. As he awaited judicial resolution of his case, petitioner

remained in the custody of the federal government. The court reasoned that the statutory

scheme provided only two ways to justify this continuous detention of petitioner. Id. at *2

. The first was through Section 1226(c). The second was through Section 1226(a).1 Id.

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After noting in its objection that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, the

government later states that Petitioner “can request a bond redetermination hearing before

an immigration judge.” (Objections to Report and Recommendation, p. 2.) This Court finds

that statement to be in error. There is nothing in Casas-Castrillon to suggest that Petitioner

must affirmatively request a bond hearing. Instead the government must provide Petitioner

a bond hearing, regardless of whether or not she has made such a request.

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With respect to a detention whose authority is found under Section 1226(c), CasasCastrillon holds that Section 1226(c)’s mandatory detention provision applies only to

expedited removal of criminal aliens, which should typically be no more than “a month and

a half in the vast majority of cases . . . and about five months in the minority of cases in

which the alien chooses to appeal.” Casas-Castrillon, WL 2008 2902026, at *4, quoting

Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510. 527-28 (2003). Detentions of aliens under 1226(c) end

“when the BIA [has] affirmed . . . [an alien’s] order of removal.” Casas-Castrillon, WL 2008

2902026, at *4.

Once the BIA affirms an order of removal for a lawful permanent resident who has

been convicted of a statutorily enumerated crime, Casas-Castrillon holds that authority to

continue the detention must be found in Section 1226(a). Id. Section 1226(a) allows the

Attorney General to engage in discretionary detentions “pending a decision on whether the

alien is to be removed from the United States.” Id.

In the instant case, the BIA has dismissed Petitioner Ramirez’s appeal, and after the

Ninth Circuit granted her petition for review and motion to stay, her case is currently

pending. For these reasons, Petitioner Ramirez’s continued detention cannot be justified

under Section 1226(c). Instead, Petitioner Ramirez is being held pursuant to Section 1226(a).

B. Petitioner Ramirez is entitled to a Bond Hearing Within 60 Days or She Must

Otherwise be Released

With respect to what measure of relief Petitioner is entitled to, this Court agrees with

the government’s contention that Petitioner Ramirez must receive a bond hearing.2

 Casas-Castrillon states that where an alien has been detained following a

determination by the both an Immigration Judge and the BIA that they are removable, the

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government retains an interest in assuring the alien’s presence at removal, and it is within the

power granted to the Attorney General by Congress to continue the detention. CasasCastrillon, WL 2008 2902026, at * 5. Therefore, Petitioner Ramirez is not entitled to

immediate release. 

However, under Casas-Castrillon, an alien is entitled to an “individualized

determination as to the necessity of his detention.” Casas-Castrillon, WL 2008 2902026, at

* 5. Casas-Castrillon notes that Congress has not authorized the “long-term detention of

aliens such as [Petitioner Ramirez] without providing them access to a bond hearing before

an immigration judge.” Id. Moreover, a bond hearing must comply with the requirements

of Tijani: meaning, the hearing must take place within 60 days of the court’s order, it must

be before an Immigration Judge with the power to grant bail. Moreover, the Writ of Habeas

Corpus shall issue if the government fails to provide such a hearing. Id. at *7.

In the instant case, Magistrate Judge Edmonds’ recommended this precise course of

action. While the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation was based on the court’s holding in

Tijani, this Court finds that the RR conforms to the procedural requirements set forth by the

Ninth Circuit in Casas-Castrillon. Thus, Petitioner Ramirez must have a bond hearing before

an Immigration Judge with the power to grant bail within 60 days of this order, otherwise she

must be released.

C. The Government Shall Bear the Burden of Proof at Petitioner’s Future Bond

Hearing

In its objection to the Magistrate Judge’s RR, the government contended that

Petitioner should bear the burden of proof on the issue of whether she is a risk of flight or a

danger to the community. (Objections to Report and Recommendation, p. 3.) This claim is

incorrect and runs counter to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Casas-Castrillon, which

specifically held that, “an alien is entitled to release on bond unless the government

establishes that he is a flight risk or will be a danger to the community.” Casas-Castrillon,

WL 2008 2902026, at * 7 (quotations omitted) (emphasis added), citing Cooper v. Okla., 517

U.S. 348, 363 (1996).

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D. Respondent’s Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance

Reacting to opinions issued by the Ninth Circuit in the cases of Casas-Castrillon v.

Dept. of Homeland Security, _F.3d_, 2008 WL 2902026 (9th Cir. July 25, 2008) and PrietoRomero v. Mukasey, _F.3d_, 2008 WL 2853396, (9th Cir. July 25, 2008), Respondent

moved this Court to hold proceedings in abeyance until October 3, 2008. (Dkt.#12) This

Court does not believe that an abeyance in this proceeding is necessary. The mandate and

instructions provided by the appellate court in Casas-Castrillon and Prieto-Romero are clear.

Petitioner has been in federal custody since July 31, 2006. In October, the government will

have the same duty to conduct a bond hearing that it has today.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED adopting in part the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation as the Order of the Court. (Dkt.#10.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus, unless

Respondent provides a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge with the power to grant

bail no later than October 27, 2008; and that Respondent shall bear the burden of proof on

the issue of whether Petitioner poses a risk of flight or is a danger to the community.

(Dkt.#1.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Respondent’s Motion to Hold Proceedings

in Abeyance Pending Extrajudicial Resolution Efforts. (Dkt.#12.)

/ / / 

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IT FURTHER ORDERED directing Respondent to file a status report with the Court

by November 3, 2008.

DATED this 4th day of September, 2008.

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