Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01356/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01356-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders these matters submitted on the

briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MAMEMOR MBACKE, an individual

doing business as Arts

d’Afrique,

NO. CIV. S:06-1356 FCD EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TRANSCON CARGO, INC., a

California corporation,

Defendant.

____________________________/

AND ALL RELATED ACTIONS.

____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on motions for summary

judgment brought by third-party defendant/fourth-party plaintiff

Shipco Transport, Inc. (“Shipco”) and third- and fourth-party

defendant Maersk Sealand, Inc. (“Maersk”).1 For the reasons set

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2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts herein are

undisputed. (See Pl.’s Response to Maersk’s Stmt. Of Undisp.

Facts (“RMUF”), filed Jan. 2, 2008; Pl.’s Response to Shipco’s

Stmt. Of Undisp. Facts (“RSUF”), filed Jan. 2, 2008.) Where the

facts are in dispute, the court recounts plaintiff’s version of

the facts. (See Pl.’s Stmt. Of Add’l Disp. Facts (“ADF”), filed

Jan. 2, 2008 [Plaintiff refers to these facts as “undisputed”

facts, but they are properly treated as additional disputed

facts.].)

3 The court notes that Maersk filed objections to

evidence, in which Shipco joined, on January 16, 2008, objecting

to various aspects of Mbacke’s evidence submitted in opposition

to the motions. Except where otherwise noted below, the court

finds Maersk’s objections irrelevant to the motion, as the court

does not rely upon the subject evidence in rendering its

decision. As such, Maersk’s objections are overruled as moot.

2

forth below, Shipco’s and Maersk’s motions for summary judgment

are DENIED.

BACKGROUND2

A. The Mbacke and Transcon Contracts

Plaintiff Mamemor Mbacke (“Mbacke”) entered into two written

contracts with Transcon Cargo, Inc. (“Transcon”), a freight

forwarder, to arrange for the shipment of two ocean containers,

one traveling from California to Dakar, Senegal (the “Senagal

shipment”) and another traveling from Oakland, California to

Kampala, Uganda (the “Uganda shipment”). (RMUF ¶ 1.)3 The

Uganda shipment, the only shipment at issue on the motions,

consisted of a 40-foot container carrying used computers,

monitors, servers, and x-ray equipment. (RMUF ¶ 2.) The

shipment was to be delivered to Shell Mulaugo, the consignee of

the cargo. (RMUF ¶ 5.) Merian Zakye (“Zakye”) was the owner of

Shell Mulaugo. (RMUF ¶ 5.)

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4 An NOVCC is statutorily defined as “a common carrier

that does not operate the vessels by which the ocean

transportation is provided, and is a shipper in its relationship

with an ocean common carreir.” 46 U.S.C. § 1702(17)(B).

3

B. The Subcontracts

Trascon, acting as Mbacke’s forwarding agent, hired Shipco,

a Non-Vessel Operating Carrier (“NVOCC”),4 to transport the

Uganda shipment. (RMUF ¶¶ 3-4; RSUF ¶ 5.) Shipco, in turn,

hired Maersk as the underlying carrier for the Uganda shipment.

(RMUF ¶ 4.)

C. The Shipment Leaves Oakland

Maersk loaded the container onto its vessel in Oakland on or

about December 27, 2004. (RMUF ¶ 9.) Mbacke claims he expected

the shipment to arrive in Kampala within 35 days. (RMUF ¶ 15.) 

Zakye also asserts that she expected the cargo to arrive in

January 2005. (RMUF ¶ 17.) In any event, Mbacke expected the

cargo would arrive in Kampala no later than March 2005. (RMUF ¶

16.)

Mbacke had individually shrink-wrapped each piece of cargo, 

loaded them into the container, and sealed the container before

Maersk received it. (RMUF ¶ 9.) Mbacke had stored the cargo in

an enclosed warehouse prior to loading the container, and the

container was not damaged. (ADF ¶ 5.) (ADF ¶ 5.) Both Shipco

and Maersk issued bills of lading for the Uganda shipment. (RMUF

¶¶ 6, 10.)

1. The Shipco Bill of Lading

Shipco issued a bill of lading for the Uganda shipment on

December 30, 2004. (RMUF ¶ 6.) The bill of lading consisted of

two pages, a front page and a back page. (RMUF ¶ 6; Shipco’s Ex.

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5 Mbacke also claims the front page bill of lading

produced by Shipco and Maersk is not the bill of lading front

page he received. The court notes that the faxed copy of the

bill of lading produced by Mbacke is missing the freight and

charges information contained in Shipco’s proffered copy of the

bill of lading. (Compare Pl.’s Ex. B, filed Jan. 2, 2008, with

Shipco’s Ex. 1, filed Nov. 29, 2008.)

6 Uganda is a landlocked country. (RSUF ¶ 16.) Mombasa,

Kenya is the closest ocean port to Kampala, Uganda. (RSUF ¶ 17.)

4

1, filed Nov. 29, 2007.) Mbacke claims he never received the

back page of the bill of lading.5 (ADF ¶ 12.)

a. Front page

The front page of the bill of lading contained information

about the Uganda shipment. The bill of lading named African

American Import/Export Group, the name under which Mbacke was

doing business, as the shipper. (RMUF ¶ 6.) The consignee was

identified as Shell Mulaugo, and Transcon was named as the

forwarding agent. (RMUF ¶ 6.) The carrying vessel was listed as

Dirch Maersk, and Maersk Uganda Limited was identified as the

person to apply to for delivery in Uganda. (RMUF ¶ 6.) The bill

of lading listed Mombasa, Kenya6 as the port of discharge for the

Uganda shipment. (RMUF ¶ 13.)

The front page of the bill of lading also contained

information regarding the cargo. The bill of lading designated

the number of packages as “1.” (RSUF ¶ 11.) In the section

labeled “Description of Packages or Goods,” the bill of lading

listed “1559 pieces.” (RSUF ¶ 13.) The bill of lading also

contained a designated space to declare an excess value for the

cargo, which was not filled in. (RSUF ¶¶ 14-15.) Shipco charged

$7,967 in freight for the shipment. (RMUF ¶ 8.)

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7 A Clause Paramount is a statement required by federal

law to be in a bill of lading for transportation of goods by sea

from the United States to a foreign port. Carriage of Goods by

Sea Act (“COGSA”) § 13 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 30701 note

(2007)). The clause specifies that COGSA governs the bill of

lading. Id.

8 A “carrier” is defined by the bill of lading as “the

Company stated on the front of this Bill of Lading as being the

Carrier on whose behalf this Bill of Lading has been signed.”

(RMUF ¶ 27.)

9 The bill of lading defined “participating carrier” as

“the ocean carrier and any other water, land or air carrier

involved in the Carriage of the Goods whether it be a Port to

Port or a Combined Transport movement.” (RMUF ¶ 28.)

5

b. Back page

The back page of the bill of lading contained several terms

and conditions regarding Shipco’s liability. First, a “Clause

Paramount”7 stated that the liability of the carrier8 would be

exclusively determined pursuant to the Carriage of Goods by Sea

Act (“COGSA”). (RMUF ¶ 32.) The application of COGSA extended

to the entire time the goods were in the custody of the carrier

or participating carrier.9 (RMUF ¶ 32.)

The bill of lading also limited the carrier’s liability to

$500 per package or shipping unit in the event of loss or damage. 

(RMUF ¶ 33.) This provision could be avoided by declaring the

value of the cargo, on the front page of the bill of lading, and

paying a correspondingly higher freight rate. (RMUF ¶ 34.) 

Similarly, the bill of lading provided that the carrier would not

under any circumstance be liable for any consequential loss or

damage as a result of delay. (RMUF ¶ 35.)

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10 A Himalaya Clause is a contractual provision for the

benefit of a third-party that is not a party to the contract. 

The term originates from the English Court of Appeal decision in

Adler v. Dickson, (1954) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 267 (A.C.), in which a

passenger on the S.S. Himalaya was injured while crossing the

gangway. The passenger’s ticket contained a no-liability clause

exempting the carrier, so the passenger sued the ship master and

boatswain. The ship master and boatswain argued they too were

exempt from suit pursuant to the no-liability clause. The court

ultimately disagreed with the ship master and boatswain, finding

the ticket did not expressly or impliedly benefit servants or

agents. Following the decision, however, so-called “Himalaya”

clauses expressly benefitting stevedores and others began to be

included in bills of lading.

6

Lastly, the bill of lading contained a “Himalaya Clause”10

that extended its terms and conditions to Shipco’s agents and

independent contractors, including participating carriers. (RMUF

¶ 31.) The bill of lading also required all suits to be brought

within one year of the date of delivery of the cargo or the date

the cargo should have been delivered. (RMUF ¶ 30.)

2. The Maersk Waybill

Maersk issued a non-negotiable waybill (“waybill”) for the

Uganda shipment on January 6, 2005. (RMUF ¶ 10.) The waybill

consisted of a single page, but expressly incorporated the terms

and limitations of Maersk’s long form bill of lading. (RMUF ¶

22.) Plaintiff claims he never received a copy of the waybill. 

(UF ¶ 13.)

a. Single page waybill

The waybill contained information about the Uganda shipment. 

The shipper on the waybill was identified as Shipco, and Shell

Mulaugo was listed as the consignee. ( RMUF ¶ 10.) The waybill

identified Mombasa, Kenya as the port of discharge for the Uganda

shipment. (RMUF ¶ 14.)

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The waybill also contained information regarding the cargo. 

In the space designated for the description of the goods or

packages, the waybill listed “1 x 40 container said to contain

1559 pieces.” (RMUF ¶ 11.) The waybill designated the number of

packages as “1.” (RMUF ¶ 11.) The waybill also provided a space

for declaring the value of the cargo, which was not filled in. 

(RMUF ¶ 12.) Maersk charged $7,911 in freight for the shipment. 

(RMUF ¶ 12.)

b. Long form bill of lading

Maersk’s long form bill of lading, incorporated by reference

in the waybill, contained numerous terms and conditions on

Maersk’s liability. Many of these terms and limitations are the

same as those contained in Shipco’s bill of lading. For example,

Maersk’s liability for loss or damage to cargo was limited to

$500 unless a higher value for the cargo was declared. (RMUF ¶¶

23-24.) There was one difference, however, between the Shipco

bill of lading and Maersk’s long form bill of lading. While

Shipco’s bill of lading stated Shipco would not in any

circumstances be liable for consequential loss or damage,

Maersk’s long form bill of lading limited Maersk’s liability for

consequential loss or damages to the amount of the freight

charges. (RMUF ¶ 25.)

D. The Shipment Arrives in Mombasa

The container arrived at the port of Mombasa on or about

March 7, 2005. (RMUF ¶ 19.) The parties dispute the next

sequence of events.

 Maersk asserts that sometime before March 6, 2005, it sent

an arrival notice to the consignee stating that the container was

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due to arrive on or about March 6, 2005, and was expected to be

available for delivery to the consignee on or about March 31,

2005. (RMUF ¶ 18.) Zakye denies receiving such notice. (Pl.’s

Ex. D ¶ 7, filed Jan. 2, 2008.)

Zakye maintains that sometime in March 2005 Maersk informed

her that a revised invoice, showing the dollar value of the

individual goods, was required by Mombasa customs to release the

container. (UF ¶ 10.) Zakye asserts that she provided this

documentation in April 2005. (UF ¶ 10; Pl.’s Ex. D ¶ 5, filed

Jan. 2, 2008.) According to a letter produced by Shipco,

however, Maersk requested the revised invoice in April 2005. 

(Shipco’s Ex. 3, filed Nov. 29, 2007.)

Mbacke and Zakye assert they made repeated inquiries into

the status and location of the container after it failed to be

delivered in January 2005. (UF ¶¶ 8, 14.) They further claim

Maersk continually represented the cause of delay as “backlog.” 

(UF ¶¶ 8, 11.) Shipco asserts that any delay regarding the

shipment was due to Zakye’s failure to submit the revised

invoice. (RSUF ¶ 19.) However, an internal email from a Shipco

employee faults Maersk as the source of the delay and failure to

locate the container: 

This is unacceptable..how come you just found out about

it?? These had been requested since February and you

are sending them now??? Thi a totally lack of

professionalism, Am I supposed to tell my customer

Maersk was supposed to send docs their agent in

February and you sti haven’t?? What about the

container..where is it?? You still have not answered

question..where is the container right now?? Did you

call yr agent this morning as you promised?? Mindy,

Can you pls help?? It seems that your customer service

and documentat dept are not able give us the answer we

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11 Shipco and Maersk object to the court’s admission of

this evidence as hearsay. Because it is an email from one of

Shipco’s employees to Maersk, it falls within the hearsay

exception for an admission by a party-opponent. Fed. R. Evid.

801(d)(2) (“A statement is not hearsay if . . . offered against a

party and . . . [a statement] by a party’s agent or servant

concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment,

made during the existence of the relationship[.]”) Relating to

this email, Mbacke filed a declaration on January 16, 2008; said

declaration was untimely filed. However, the court has

consideration the declaration, in some respects relevant to the

motion, since there is no prejudice to Shipco or Maersk in that

they filed formal objections to the email, as well as other

objections to evidence, which addressed the matters contained in

Mbacke’s declaration.

9

are looking for.11

(UF ¶ 19; Pl.’s Ex. C p. 6, filed Jan. 2, 2008.)

The parties also disagree as to when the container left

Mombasa and arrived in Kampala. Maersk asserts the container

left Mombasa on July 9, 2005, and arrived in Kampala on July 13,

2005. (RMUF ¶ 20.) Zakye, however, maintains that Maersk

notified her of the container’s arrival in August 2005. (UF ¶

15; Pl.’s Ex. D ¶ 7, filed Jan. 2, 2008.) Neither party disputes

that Zakye rejected the cargo in August 2005, allegedly because

of water contamination. (RMUF ¶ 21.)

E. The Instant Action

On April 21, 2006, Mbacke filed a complaint in Sacramento

Superior Court against Transcon alleging four causes of action:

(1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing; (3) intentional and negligent

misrepresentation; and (4) conversion. Mbacke claims the value

of the cargo was $88,000 and that he suffered consequential

damages of $340,000. (UF ¶¶ 23-24.)

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12 Said stipulation of dismissal was entered after the

filing of the instant motions for summary judgement. Thus, to

the extent the motions are directed at Transcon, they are now

moot and those issues are not considered by the court herein.

10

On June 16, 2006, Trancon removed the complaint to this

court and filed a third-party complaint against Shipco. Shipco,

in turn, filed a fourth-party complaint against Maersk on

November 17, 2006. Transcon amended its third-party complaint on

May 8, 2007, to name Maersk as a third-party defendant. 

On December 26, 2007, Mbacke stipulated to the dismissal of

Transcon. Transcon thereafter stipulated to dismiss its thirdparty complaint against Shipco and Maersk on January 2, 2008.12

Thus, this matter proceeds presently on Shipco’s fourth-party

complaint against Maersk.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment where “the pleading, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see California v.

Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). The evidence must

be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, “the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

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13 COGSA applies to any contract for carriage of goods

between a port in the continental United States and a foreign

port. COGSA § 13 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 30701 note (2007)). 

The Uganda shipment of goods from Oakland, California to Mombasa,

Kenya satisfies this requirement.

11

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, if the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party only needs to show “that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 325.

Once the moving party has met its burden of proof, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence on which a reasonable trier

of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in

light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. 

See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th

Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its

allegations without any significant probative evidence tending to

support the complaint. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at

1107. Instead, through admissible evidence the nonmoving party

“must set for specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

ANALYSIS

Section 4(5) of COGSA13 limits a carrier’s liability for

loss of damage of goods to $500 per package. 46 U.S.C. App. §

1304(5). The shipper may, however, increase the carrier’s

liability by declaring on the bill of lading a higher value for

the goods shipped, and paying an accordingly higher freight

charge. Under the law of the Ninth Circuit, a carrier can take

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14 A deviation is defined as a “voluntary departure

without necessity, or any reasonable cause, from the regular and

usual course of the voyage.” Vision Air Flight Serv., Inc. v.

M/V Nat’l Pride, 155 F.3d 1165, 1175-76 n.12 (9th Cir. 1998)

(internal quotation and citation omitted).

12

advantage of COGSA’s liability limit “only if the shipper is

given a ‘fair opportunity’ to opt for a higher liability by

paying a correspondingly greater charge.” Nemeth v. General S.S.

Corp., 694 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1982). The fair opportunity

requirement is meant to give the shipper notice of the legal

consequences of failing to opt for a higher freight rate. Id.

The carrier bears the initial burden of proving “fair

opportunity.” Id. The carrier can meet this initial burden by

showing that the language of COGSA Section 4(5) is contained in

the bill of lading. Id. Such an express recitation is prima

facie evidence that the shipper was given a fair opportunity to

choose a higher liability. Id. The burden of disproving fair

opportunity is then shifted to the shipper.

A. Unreasonable Deviation

As a threshold matter, Mbacke argues that any contractual

limitations on Shipco’s or Maersk’s liability are unenforceable

because a triable issue of fact exists as to application of the

doctrine of unreasonable deviation, whereby a deviation14 from

the contract of carriage deprives a carrier of Section 4(5)’s

liability limitations. Mbacke thus argues that the court need

not reach the merits of Shipco’s and Maersk’s motions for summary

judgment. The court disagrees.

At common law, a geographic deviation from a scheduled route

of voyage stripped a carrier of its defense to liability based on

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13

exculpatory provisions of a bill of lading. Vision Air Flight

Servs. v. M/V Nat’l Pride, 155 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deviation was regarded as exposing the goods to such

unreasonable risks not anticipated by the parties as to

constitute a breach of the contract for carriage. Id. at 1171. 

Although the doctrine was initially limited to geographic

deviations alone, its underlying rationale applied to other

contexts in which a carrier exposed goods to unreasonable risks

not contemplated by the parties. Id. The doctrine therefore

expanded to include serious breaches of the contract for

carriage, which became known as “quasi-deviations.” Id. The

most common example of quasi-deviation was stowage of cargo on

deck. Id.

Although the doctrine was traditionally applied broadly, the

Ninth Circuit in Vision Air Flight Servs. v. M/V Nat’l Pride, 155

F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 1998), held the enactment of COGSA “limited

the circumstances under which it applies.” Id. at 1172. Only

intentional destruction of the goods a carrier contracts to

transport constitutes an unreasonable deviation; it is not enough

to show the carrier was negligent, grossly negligent, or even

reckless. Id. at 1175. 

Thus, under the current law in the Ninth Circuit, in order

for Mbacke to withstand summary judgment, he must present

admissible evidence supporting an inference of intent on the part

of Shipco and/or Maersk to damage the cargo. The court finds

Mbacke has not satisfied this burden. 

Mbacke admits the cargo was properly routed through Mombasa. 

However, he argues the continued delay on the part of Shipco and

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Maersk evince an intent to damage the cargo. With respect to

Shipco, there is no evidence in the record from which to infer an

intent to damage the cargo. The email correspondence between

Shipco and Maersk indicates Shipco was just as dissatisfied with

the situation as Mbacke and made repeated attempts to locate the

container. In regards to Maersk, although the email

correspondence provided some notice to Maersk that the delay was

unacceptable, at most, the subsequent delay of five months

amounts to gross negligence or recklessness on the part of

Maersk. 

Mbacke relies on Sea-Land, Inc. v. Lozen Intern LLC, 285

F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2002), to support his assertion that Maersk’s

continued apathy following the email exchange raises a triable

issue of fact as to unreasonable deviation. While there are some

factual similarities between this case and Sea-Land, the court

ultimately finds important factual distinctions between the two

which require a different result in this case.

In Sea-Land, a cargo owner sued a carrier for delay in the

shipment of grapes from Mexico to England. 285 F.3d at 813. The

grapes were to be transported by truck to California, and then

transported by rail to New Jersey, where they would be loaded

onto the carrier’s vessel sailing to England. Id. The carrier’s

railroad agent, however, mistakenly placed the cargo on the wrong

train. Id. After the error was discovered, the carrier

attempted to take possession of the cargo and transport it by

truck to New Jersey so that it would arrive at the ship on time. 

Id. at 818. The railroad, however, refused to comply with the

carrier’s repeated requests. Id. In an internal company email,

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one of Sea-Land’s employees admitted that the railroad was aware

of the damage that would result from delay and still refused to

comply with the carrier’s request to transport the cargo by

truck:

I got with [the railroad] to see if we could get

containers taken from the train . . . I kept telling

[the railroad] that these units were vessel protected

loads, and they had to make the vessel. There was no

ambiguity in my needs, with regards these units. It

comes down to me wanting to truck these units . . . but

[the railroad], in their infinite wisdom, decided not

to allow us to do this.

Id. The court subsequently held this evidence, coupled with a

letter from Sea-Land to plaintiff expressing the same, raised a

triable issue of fact as to whether the railroad had

intentionally caused damage to the cargo by refusing to transport

the shipment by truck. Id. at 818-19.

Unlike Sea-Land, in the present case, there is no evidence

to raise an issue of fact as to whether Maersk intentionally

caused damage to the cargo. Maersk, unlike the railroad in SeaLand, had no reason to believe that a delay in shipment would

damage the contents of the cargo. The equipment was not

perishable and, according to Mbacke, each piece of equipment had

been individually shrink-wrapped, “carefully” loaded, and sealed

in the container prior to the container being loaded on Maersk’s

vessel. (ADF ¶ 5.) Further, Mbacke never requested Maersk to

ship the cargo by other, faster means like the carrier in Sealand. Such request, if refused, might have raised a triable

issue as to whether Maersk intentionally delayed transport to

cause damage to the goods. Instead, the only evidence in the

record is an email from Shipco to Maersk notifying Maersk that

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the delay was upsetting and unacceptable. The delay of five

months subsequent to this email, at most, constitutes gross

negligence or recklessness on the part of Maersk. To hold

otherwise and find the delay in transport of the Uganda shipment

an unreasonable deviation would inappropriately expand the

doctrine. This circuit and others have expressly cautioned

against such expansions. See, e.g., Vision Air Flight Services,

Inc. v. M/V Nat’l Pride, 155 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“[C]ourts and commentators agree that the doctrine should be

sharply limited and have displayed a certain hostility toward

expansion of the deviation doctrine, especially in the context of

quasi-deviation.”); Rockwell Internat’l Corp. v. M/V Incotrans

Spirit, 998 F.2d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1993) (“We decline to expand

the doctrine to [negligent off-loading].”); Universal Leaf

Tobacco Co. v. Campanhia De Navegacao Maritima Netumar, 993 F.2d

414, 417 (4th Cir. 1993) (refusing to “extend the unreasonable

deviation doctrine beyond its current boundaries”) (internal

quotations omitted); SPM Corp. v. M/V Ming Moon, 965 F.2d 1297,

1304 (3d Cir. 1992) (“We agree with our sister circuits that the

doctrine of quasi-deviation is not to be viewed expansively in

the post-COGSA era.”); B.M.A. Industries, Ltd. V. Nigerian Star

Line, Ltd., 786 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The principle of

quasi-deviation is arguably inconsistent with COGSA, and is not

one to be extended.”) (internal quotations omitted).

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Mbacke, the court finds there is no genuine issue of material

fact as to the doctrine of unreasonable deviation. The court

will thus consider whether Shipco and Maersk are entitled to

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summary judgment based on the liability limitations in the bill

of lading.

B. Fair Opportunity

Shipco and Maersk claim they have met their evidentiary

burden of showing “fair opportunity” by reciting Section 4(5) in

their respective bills of lading. Indeed, Clause 8(3) of

Shipco’s bill of lading and Clause 7.3 of Maersk’s bill of lading

provide the shipper with the option of declaring a higher value

in exchange for paying additional freight. It is also undisputed

that Shipco’s bill of lading and Maersk’s waybill contained a

designated space for declaring a higher value, which was not

filled in. Mbacke, however, argues he never received either the

back page of Shipco’s bill of lading, which contains Clause 8(3),

or a copy of Maersk’s waybill, which incorporates Clause 7.3.

The court finds there is a factual dispute over whether

Mbacke received notice on the bill of lading of the limited

liability provision in Section 4(5). Such factual dispute

precludes the granting of Shipco’s and Maersk’s motions for

summary judgment. Nemeth v. Gen. Steamship Corp., Ltd., 694 F.2d

609, 612 (9th Cir. 1982) (reversing grant of summary judgment in

carrier’s favor because triable issues of fact remained as to

whether shipper was given fair opportunity to choose a higher

liability); Komatsu v. States Steamship Co., 674 F.2d 806, (9th

Cir. 1982) (affirming partial grant of summary judgment in

shipper’s favor where incorporation by reference of Section 4(5)

in the bill of lading was insufficient to give shipper notice of

opportunity to declare a higher value for the goods).

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The Ninth Circuit in similar cases has held that a carrier

cannot meet his initial burden of showing fair opportunity where

the bill of lading is difficult to read or does not fully recite

Section 4(5) of COGSA. For instance, in Nemeth v. Gen. Steamship

Corp., the owner and shipper of household goods sought to recover

from an ocean carrier and his agent $22,000 in damages to the

goods during transport from Buenos Aires to Los Angeles. 694

F.2d at 610-11. The carrier and his agent contended that their

liability was limited to $500 per package based on a provision

reciting Section 4(5)’s liability limitations in the bill of

lading. Id. at 611. The court reversed the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of the carrier and his agent

because the recitation of Section 4(5) in the bill of lading was

“microscopic and blurry.” Id. at 611-12. The court reasoned

that such an “illegible recitation” of Section 4(5) could not

provide notice to the shipper of the choice of liabilities and,

therefore, was not prima facie evidence of fair opportunity. Id.

Similarly, in Komatsu, Ltd. v. States Steamship Co., a

shipper filed suit against a carrier for damage to a tractor

during transport from Kobe, Japan to Seattle, Washington. 674

F.2d at 808. The carrier argued his liability was limited to

$500 based on both a Clause Paramount in the bill of lading that

provided COGSA’s provisions governed the parties’ contractual

relations and a separate clause of the bill of lading that

provided: “[r]eference is hereby made specifically to value

limitations (46 U.S.Code 1304(5)) and time limitations for filing

claim and bringing claim (46 U.S.Code 1303(6))[.]” Id. at 809-

10. The court affirmed a partial grant of summary judgment in

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the shipper’s favor because “merely incorporating COGSA’s

provisions into a Paramount Clause was not prima facie evidence

that a carrier gave the shipper the opportunity to declare a

higher value.” Id. at 809 (citing Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v.

Cal. Stevedor & Ballast Co., 559 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1977) (per

curiam)). The court reasoned that the clauses in the bill of

lading contained only “oblique reference” to the contents of

Section 4(5) and the shipper could not be charged with

constructive notice of the minute details of COGSA. Id. at 810.

Here, the reference is neither “blurry” or “oblique.” 

Plaintiff contends there can be no showing of fair opportunity to

declare a higher value because he never received the page which

contains Clause 8(3) or incorporates Clause 7.3. Like the

defendants in Nemeth and Komatsu, Shipco and Maersk are alleging

their respective bills of lading are prima facie evidence of

“fair opportunity.” However, just as in Nemeth and Komatsu,

plaintiff Mbacke argues the bill of lading he received did not

provide sufficient notice of Section 4(5)’s limitations. 

In Nemeth, the plaintiff argued that an illegible recitation

of Section 4(5) was not sufficient to provide notice of an

opportunity to declare a higher value for the goods, and thereby

was not prima facie evidence of “fair opportunity.” In Komatsu,

the plaintiff claimed the mere incorporation of Section 4(5) into

the bill of lading was similarly insufficient to constitute prima

facie evidence of “fair opportunity.” Here, Mbacke asserts that

neither the Shipco bill of lading nor the Maersk waybill were

delivered to him. These allegations of non-delivery of the “fair

opportunity” provisions clearly support a finding of genuine

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issues of material fact.

Shipco and Mbacke cite Carman Tool & Abrasives, Inc. v.

Evergreen Lines, 871 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1989), and Royal Ins. Co.

v. Sea-Land Servs., 50 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 1995), as supporting

their assertions. Those cases, however, are inapposite because

they dealt with the delayed issuance or receipt of a bill of

lading, not whether the bill of lading delivered to the plaintiff

contained notice of Section 4(5). See Carman Tool, 871 F.2d at

899-900 (“[Plaintiff] concedes that [defendant’s] bill of lading

satisfies [“fair opportunity”]. . . . It argues, nonetheless,

that it was denied a fair opportunity to opt for the higher

liability limits because it did not see a copy of the bill of

lading until long after the goods were shipped.”); Royal Ins., 50

F.3d at 728-29 (“[Plaintiff] argues that because the bill of

lading was issued [after the goods were loaded onto the vessel],

its liability limitations do not apply, even though the bill of

lading complies in every respect with COGSA.”). Thus, Carman

Tool and Royal Ins. do not provide a basis for determining the

adequacy of the notice on Shipco’s bill of lading or Maersk’s

waybill.

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mbacke,

a reasonable fact finder could conclude that neither Shipco’s

bill of lading nor Maersk’s waybill is prima facie evidence of

“fair opportunity.” Accordingly, summary judgment of Mbacke’s

damages claim is DENIED.

C. Agency

Shipco argues, in the alternative, that even if Mbacke never

received a copy of the bill of lading or waybill, he can

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nonetheless be held to its terms. Shipco argues that because an

NOVCC, like Trascon, generally acts as the agent of the cargo

shipper when it contracts with the ocean carrier, acceptance of

the bill of lading by Transcon imputes knowledge of its terms to

Mbacke. 

The use of general agency principles to hold shippers to the

terms of a bill of lading has been called into question in recent

years. The Ninth Circuit in Kukje Hwajae Ins. Co., Ltd. v. M/V

Hyundai Liberty, 294 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2002), held that an

NOVCC acted as a cargo owner’s agent when negotiating a bill of

lading with a downstream carrier. Id. at 1175. That holding,

however, was vacated by the Supreme Court in light of Norfolk

Southern Railway v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14 (2004). Green Fire &

Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. M/V Hyundai, 125 S. Ct. 494 (2004),

vacating 294 F.3d 1171. In Norfolk, the Court considered whether

an intermediary can bind a cargo owner to the terms of a

carrier’s bill of lading based on principles of agency law. 

Norfolk, 543 U.S. at 30. The Court stated that “reliance on

agency law is misplaced” because the traditional indicia of

agency, a fiduciary relationship and control by the principal,

are generally lacking in relationships between cargo owners and

freight forwarders. Id. at 34. Nonetheless, the Court held that

“an intermediary binds a cargo owner to the liability limitations

it negotiates with downstream carriers.” Id. In reaching this

conclusion, the court relied heavily on the fact that the

intermediary in question was in actual possession of the goods

when negotiating the bill of lading with the downstream carrier. 

Id. (“[W]e hold that intermediaries, entrusted with goods, are

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‘agents’ only in their ability to contract for liability

limitations with carriers downstream.”) (emphasis added). Thus,

there is some question whether an intermediary can bind a cargo

owner to the terms of a bill of lading where, as here, the NOVCC

was not entrusted with the goods.

Nevertheless, even assuming agency law can be used to bind a

cargo owner to the terms of a bill of lading, the court finds

Shipco has not established prima facie evidence of “fair

opportunity.” The only evidence in the record of Transcon’s

receipt of Shipco’s bill of lading is the declaration of a Shipco

employee, stating she sent a copy of the bill of lading to

Transcon. Putting aside the fact it is uncorroborated and selfserving, the declaration does not establish that Transcon

received a copy of Shipco’s bill of lading. The declaration

merely provides that a copy of the bill of lading was “sent” to

Transcon. Further, a reasonable factfinder could infer that

Transcon never received a copy of the relevant portions of

Shipco’s bill of lading based on Mbacke’s assertion that he never

received a copy of the bill of lading’s back page.

By the same token, the court cannot grant summary judgment

to Maersk on a related claim that Shipco accepted the waybill as

an agent of Mbacke. Even though Shipco received a copy of

Maersk’s waybill, and putting aside the question of whether

Shipco was acting as Mbacke’s agent at the time, a reasonable

factfinder could still deem the waybill insufficient to establish

prima facie evidence of “fair opportunity.” 

The court in Komatsu, supra, expressly rejected an argument

by a carrier that incorporation of Section 4(5) by reference was

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15 Maersk’s cites the recent decision of Starrag v.

Maersk, Inc., 486 F.3d 607 (9th Cir. 2007), as supporting the

proposition that incorporating by reference a long form bill of

lading satisfies fair opportunity. However, the issue in Staragg

was whether a long form bill of lading extending liability

limitations beyond the term in Section 7 of COGSA conflicts with

COGSA such that the package limitations cannot be enforced. 

Starrag is therefore not a case about “fair opportunity.”

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sufficient to provide notice of an opportunity to declare a

higher liability, despite the fact the plaintiff was an

experienced shipper. 674 F.2d at 810. The court held that the

“opportunity to declare a higher value must present itself on the

face of the bill of lading to constitute prima facie evidence.” 

Id. (internal quotations omitted). Incorporation by reference of

Section 4(5), therefore, was not sufficient because “shippers are

not to be charged with constructive notice of the minute details

of COGSA.” Id.

By analogy, Maersk cannot rely on the incorporation of its

long form bill of lading to show prima facie evidence of “fair

opportunity.” The Maersk waybill suffers from the same defect as

the bill of lading in Komatsu--it does not recite the opportunity

to declare a higher liability “on its face.” Instead, just as in

Komatsu, the waybill merely incorporates a separate document that

recites Section 4(5)’s liability limitations. Accordingly,

Maersk’s waybill does not establish prima facie evidence of “fair

opportunity.”15

Finally, Shipco asserts that summary judgment is appropriate

because it had done business with Transcon on numerous occasions;

thus, Transcon should have been aware of the terms and conditions

in Shipco’s bill of lading through their course of dealing. The

case cited by Shipco in support, Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vessel

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16 Shipco also cites Port of Tacoma v. S.S. Duval, 364

F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1966), for the proposition that a tariff gives

constructive notice to a shipper of a bill of lading’s terms. 

Port of Tacoma, however, addressed whether a published tariff

that purported to give the port a lien on vessels for failure to

pay wharfage and cargo handling services gave carriers

constructive notice of its terms. Id. at 617. Port of Tacoma is

therefore distinguishable from the present action.

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Sam Houston, 26 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1994), however, dealt with a

situation in which an intermediary was entrusted with goods to

negotiate transportation with a downstream carrier. Further, the

intermediary received a bill of lading that satisfied “fair

opportunity.” Aside from the question of whether an intermediary

never entrusted with goods, like Transcon, can be considered

Mbacke’s agent for purposes of liability, the court has already

noted that the proffered evidence in support of Shipco’s

assertion does not provide prima facie evidence of Transcon’s

“fair opportunity” to declare a higher liability. Accordingly,

summary judgment is DENIED as to these theories.

D. Tariff

Shipco claims that even if Mbacke, or Transcon acting as

Mbacke’s agent, never received a copy of the bill of lading,

Mbacke is nevertheless on notice of its terms because of Shipco’s

published tariff. As support, Shipco cites Komatsu, Ltd. V.

States Steamship Co., supra, 674 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1982).16 

However, Komatsu assumed, without deciding, that a tariff

gives a shipper constructive notice. 674 F.2d at 811. The court

never addressed the constructive notice issue because it found

the tariff at issue provided inadequate notice of Section 4(5). 

Id. In Komatsu, the tariff stated that damage liability would be

governed by the bill of lading. Id. The bill of lading, in

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turn, incorporated by reference Section 4(5). Id. The court

held it would be “anomalous to conclude a tariff rule provides

[constructive] notice if that rule’s operation depends upon the

shipper having constructive notice of the same COGSA provision.” 

Id. 

 If the court in Komatsu had addressed the constructive

notice issue, it is not entirely clear it would have accepted the

tariff argument as a viable theory of “fair opportunity.” In

Komatsu, the court rejected an argument by a carrier that

incorporation of Section 4(5) by reference was sufficient to

provide constructive notice of an opportunity to declare a higher

liability, despite the fact the plaintiff was an experienced

shipper. 674 F.2d at 810. The court reasoned that “[t]he bill

of lading is usually a boilerplate form drafted by the carrier,

and presented for acceptance as a matter of routine business

practice to a relatively low-level shipping employee.” Id. at

810. “[I]mputing such knowledge of COGSA applicability and

provisions,” the court concluded, “is an assumption that may go

beyond the bounds of commercial realism.” Id. If the Ninth

Circuit was unwilling to recognize constructive notice through a

provision in a bill of lading incorporating COGSA’s Section 4(5),

it is doubtful the Ninth Circuit would hold a recitation of

Section 4(5) in a carrier’s published tariff provides

constructive notice of “fair opportunity.”

However, even assuming constructive notice through a tariff

is a viable legal theory (which is not entirely clear from the

caselaw and which issue the court does not decide herein), the

court finds there is insufficient evidence to hold Mbacke on

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17 In a final effort to succeed, Shipco argues Mbacke is

bound by the terms of the bill of lading because he was a party

to the bill of lading under the definition of “Merchant.” See

All Pacific Trading, Inc. v. Vessel M/V Hanjin Yosu, 7 F.3d 1427

(9th Cir. 1993) (holding shipper to terms of bill of lading where

he fell within the bill of lading’s definition of a “Merchant”). 

Like all contracts, however, bills of lading require some form of

acceptance, such as filing suit on the bill of lading. Id. at

1432. No such acceptance exists in this case because Mbacke

contends he never received a copy of the back page of the bill of

lading, which defines Merchant, and he is not suing on the basis

of the bill of lading.

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constructive notice of Shipco’s tariff. Shipco has not provided

the court with the copy of its tariff. Rather, the Supplemental

Declaration of Carol Ann Burch, filed by Shipco on January 11,

2008, states that a copy of Shipco’s tariff can be accessed

online through Dart Maritime’s website. The court has visited

said website and learned it could only obtain a copy after

registering with Dart Maritime for a fee of $50. It is Shipco’s

burden to proffer this evidence in admissible form. It is not

incumbent on the court to obtain it by registering on behalf of

Shipco with Dart Maritime. Therefore, because there is

insufficient evidence of the tariff itself, the court cannot

determine whether the contents of Shipco’s purported tariff are

sufficient to provide constructive notice. Based on the

foregoing, summary judgment as to this theory is DENIED.17

E. Indemnity

Maersk argues that in the event it is found liable to Shipco

for damages, such damages are limited to $500 under the terms of

the waybill and incorporated long form bill of lading. 

There is no Ninth Circuit case addressing the issue of

whether a freight forwarder can demand full indemnification when

the carrier waybill’s terms limit the carrier’s liability. 

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However, the issue was addressed by the Northern District in

Seagate Tech. LLC v. Dalian China Express Internat’l Corp. Ltd.,

169 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2001). In Seagate, a freight

forwarder demanded full indemnification plus the cost of

defending the shipper’s original suit from a carrier. Id. at

1144. The carrier’s air waybill limited its liability to $20 per

kilogram of goods lost unless a higher value for the cargo was

declared and an additional charge paid. Id. at 1139. The

freight forwarder urged the court to adopt the Second Circuit’s

holding in Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, Inc., 917

F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding waybill liability limitations do

not extend to a claim for indemnity). Seagate, 169 F. Supp. 2d

at 1143. Like the district court in Seagate, this court also

finds Victoria Sales’ analysis of the issue persuasive. Id. at

1145. 

In Victoria Sales, a freight forwarder agreed to ship

pharmaceuticals from Germany to New York. 917 F.2d at 706. The

freight forwarder hired a carrier to handle the transport, who in

turn hired another carrier to transport the shipment. Id. When

the consignee of the shipment arrived in New York, the shipment

could not be found. Id.

 The issue for the Second Circuit in Victoria Sales was

whether the carrier that actually handled the shipment was

required to indemnify the freight forwarder when provisions of

the carrier’s waybill limited its liability to $20 per kilogram

of goods unless a higher liability was declared. Id. at 708. 

The court held the waybill’s liability limitation applied only to

claims for loss or damage to cargo; “[i]t [did] not address the

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right and liabilities between [the carrier] and a party in [the

freight forwarder’s] status.” Id. The court reasoned that to

hold otherwise would abrogate the common law principle that a

primary wrongdoer must indemnify a party whose liability is

secondary. Id. Thus, “[a]bsent an explicit contractual

provision to the contrary,” the Second Circuit saw “no reason to

extend the waybill’s liability limitations to [the freight

forwarder’s] indemnity claim.” Id.

Applying these principles, this court holds that Shipco can

seek full indemnification from Maersk. Neither COGSA Section

4(5) nor the liability limitations clause of the Maersk long form

bill of lading purport to include all types of claims in the

$500-per-package limitation. The statute and the bill of lading

are concerned with protecting carriers against exposure to

liability for the loss of cargo when the shipper has not declared

the value and paid additional freight for it. Further, the

common law permits a party, vicariously liable for injury, to

seek indemnity from a party primarily liable for injury. See

United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 399 (9th Cir. 1964)

(“There is general agreement that indemnity is permitted where

the indemnitee has only an imputed or vicarious liability because

of a special relationship with the actual wrongdoer but is not

personally at fault.”). Here, because Shipco hired Maersk to

handle the cargo, it is arguably responsible for Maersk’s acts. 

It is further clear from the record that the damage to the cargo

occurred while in Maersk’s custody and control. Thus, Shipco may

have a claim for indemnity in the event it is found liable to

Mbacke for damages to the cargo.

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18 Maersk also cites Caterpillar Overseas v. Farrell

Lines, Inc., 1988 A.M.C. 2894 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff’d 900 F.2d 714

(4th Cir. 1991). The court in Caterpillar, however, did not

explain its reasoning for applying Section 4(5)’s liability

limitations to indemnity actions. 1988 A.M.C. at 2901-02. 

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Maersk urges the court to follow E.M.S. Industrie S.A. v.

Polskie Towarzystwo Okretowe, 608 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)

(holding contribution claim is subject to $500-per-package

limitation in bill of lading).18 In E.M.S., a carrier moved for

summary judgment limiting its liability in indemnity to $500

based on a provision of its bill of lading reciting Section 4(5). 

608 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. The court held the limitation applied

because the language of the bill of lading indicated the carrier

would not “in any event” be liable for any damages to the goods

exceeding $500. Id. at 1135. The court reasoned that “any

event” included holding the carrier liable in indemnity for the

full amount of loss. The court thus refused to “frustrate the

statutory scheme of liability” and limited the indemnity claim to

the $500-per-package limitation in the bill of lading Id. at

1135-36.

The reasoning of E.M.S., however, is not persuasive. As

previously noted, Section 4(5) does not purport to cover all

types of claims and such an expansive reading of the statute

would abrogate several common law doctrines, including indemnity,

in COGSA actions. Cf. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. M/V Ocean Lynx, 901

F.2d 934, 942 (2d Cir. 1991) (allowing attorney’s fees recovery

in COGSA indemnity action); Noritake Co. v. M/V Hellenic

Champion, 627 F.2d 724, 730 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing recovery of

pre-judgment interest in COGSA action); Seagate Technology LLC v.

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Dalian China Express Internat’l Corp. Ltd, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1137,

1144 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding claim for indemnity is not limited

by the terms of the bill of lading in COGSA action). Absent an

express contractual provision in the bill of lading to the

contrary, the court will not hold that an action for indemnity is

limited to the terms of Maersk’s bill of lading. Maersk’s motion

for summary judgment as to this claim is therefore DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, third-party defendant/fourthparty plaintiff Shipco’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

Fourth-party defendant Maersk’s motion for summary judgment is 

also DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: January 25, 2008. 

Case 2:06-cv-01356-FCD-EFB Document 75 Filed 01/25/08 Page 30 of 30