Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03364/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03364-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL JOSEPH SCHULTZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. LEWIS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-03364-JST (PR)

SECOND ORDER OF SERVICE

On October 8, 2015, plaintiff, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”) filed a pro 

se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he has been denied necessary medical 

treatment for pain in his back, shoulder, and right knee. On January 12, 2016, the Court screened 

plaintiff’s complaint and found that, liberally construed, it stated cognizable Eighth Amendment 

claims under Section 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The Court ordered 

service on three defendants at SQSP.

On January 22, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to name an 

additional defendant. On January 28, 2016, the Court denied the motion on the ground that 

plaintiff failed to attach a proposed amended complaint as required by Civil Local Rule 10-1. The 

denial was without prejudice to filing another motion submitted with a proposed amended 

complaint. Plaintiff then filed a renewed motion for leave to amend the complaint along with a 

proposed first amended complaint. On February 10, 2016, the Court granted plaintiff leave to 

amend but noted that the proposed first amended complaint did not include the 84-pages of 

exhibits that were attached to the original complaint. Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to refile his first amended complaint with exhibits. On March 9, 2016, Plaintiff re-filed his first 

amended complaint with exhibits (“FAC”). Dkt. No. 26. The FAC is now before the Court for 

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review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.

§ 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, however. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although 

in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . 

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint 

must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

A “serious medical need” exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further 

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significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 

F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104), overruled in part on other 

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A 

prison official is “deliberately indifferent” if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of 

serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

Neither negligence nor gross negligence warrant liability under the Eighth Amendment. 

Id. at 835-36 & n4. An “official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have 

perceived but did not, . . . cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” 

Id. at 838. Instead, “the official’s conduct must have been ‘wanton,’ which turns not upon its 

effect on the prisoner, but rather, upon the constraints facing the official.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 

F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991)). Prison 

officials violate their constitutional obligation only by “intentionally denying or delaying access to 

medical care.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. 

According to the FAC and exhibits attached thereto, plaintiff suffers from pain in his lower 

back, right knee, and right shoulder. He has been diagnosed with minimal degenerative disk 

disease in his back, abnornmal medial meniscus in his right knee, and right shoulder bursitis. In 

2007, he was referred to a pain management program by an orthopedic specialist. Over the next 

several years, he received steroid injections and received various pain medications including 

morphine and ibuprofen. Beginning in 2014 and continuing into 2015, plaintiff’s primary care 

provider, defendant Dr. Leighton, tapered plaintiff off his injections and pain medications. 

Defendant J. Lewis, Deputy Director of California Correctional Healthcare Services, defendant 

Dr. E. Tootell, SQSP Chief Medical Officer, and defendant Dr. Lisa Pratt, then-SQSP Chief 

Physician and Surgeon1, proceeded to deny plaintiff’s inmate healthcare appeals requesting to 

have his pain medication restored, to be removed from Dr. Leighton’s care, and to receive a 

consultation with a private doctor. Plaintiff alleges that the decision was the result of statewide 

 

1

Plaintiff reports that Dr. Pratt is now employed at San Francisco County Jail. See Dkt. No. 20.

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cost reductions in inmate medications, which mainly included opioids and narcotic medications. 

These claims, liberally construed, state a claim of deliberate indifference against Dr. Leighton, Dr. 

Tootell, J. Lewis, and Dr. Pratt. 

The potential liability of defendants Dr. Tootell, J. Lewis, and Dr. Pratt who allegedly 

reviewed and rejected plaintiff’s inmate appeals is under the Eighth Amendment, and is not under 

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. There is no constitutional right to a prison or 

jail administrative appeal or grievance system in California, and therefore no due process liability 

for failing to process or decide an inmate appeal properly. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 

860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). It is alleged here, 

however, that by denying or improperly handling such appeals, defendants Dr. Tootell, J. Lewis, 

and Dr. Pratt denied medical care that plaintiff alleges was sorely needed. Thus, it is for the denial 

of medical care that these defendants may be held liable, not simply for denying administrative 

appeals. 

In addition to the defendants discussed above, plaintiff names as a defendant SQSP 

Warden Ronald Davis. A supervisor may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon either a showing 

of the supervisor’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman 

v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Consequently, a 

supervisor generally “is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to 

prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Under no circumstances is 

there respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, i.e., under no circumstances is there 

liability under § 1983 solely because one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another. Id.

Here, none of the allegations in the second amended complaint link Davis to any of 

plaintiff’s claims. In particular, there is no indication that Davis either knew of or personally 

participated in the denial of health care to plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim of respondeat 

superior liability against Davis are dismissed. If plaintiff can allege facts to establish supervisorial 

liability against Davis, he may move to amend his pleadings.

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Plaintiff also claims that unknown Eastblock correctional officers at SQSP utilized 

electronic surveillance devices that caused vibrating of his bunk and cell as a means of harassing 

plaintiff. This claim is DISMISSED without prejudice because it is unrelated by fact or law to the 

first claim. Plaintiff is advised that a plaintiff may properly join as many claims as he has against 

an opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). But parties may be joined as defendants in one action 

only “if any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with 

respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 

occurrences; and any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Put simply, claims against different parties may be joined together in one 

complaint only if the claims have similar factual backgrounds and have common issues of law or 

fact. Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 1997). If plaintiff wishes to pursue 

relief for his claim regarding surveillance devices, he must file a separate civil rights action.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. The FAC states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs as against Dr. Leighton, Dr. Tootell, J. Lewis, and Dr. Pratt. 

2. Defendants Dr. Leighton, Dr. Tootell, and J. Lewis have already been ordered 

served. Accordingly, the Clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, 

without prepayment of fees, a copy of the FAC in this matter, and a copy of this order on Doctor 

Lisa Pratt at San Francisco Jail Health Services, 650 5th Street, #309, San Francisco, CA 94107. 

The Clerk also shall serve a copy of this order on plaintiff.

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, defendants must file 

and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. A motion for summary 

judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely and 

adequate notice of what is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 

F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th 

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Cir. 1998), must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).2 

If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 

defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date the motion is due. 

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 

motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 

provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion. 

4. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must 

do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be 

granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in [current Rule 56(c)], that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations 

and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not 

submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered 

 

2

 If defendants assert that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as 

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), defendants must raise such argument in a motion for summary 

judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 

2014) (en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held 

that failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 

should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Such a motion should 

also incorporate a modified Wyatt notice in light of Albino. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 

1108, 1120, n.14 (9th Cir. 2003); Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012).

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against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no 

trial. Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A).

(The Rand notice above does not excuse defendants’ obligation to serve said notice again 

concurrently with a motion for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939).

5. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants’

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants’ counsel. The Court may disregard 

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until defendants’

counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to 

defendants, but once defendants are represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

counsel rather than directly to defendants.

6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

before the parties may conduct discovery.

7. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

8. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought 

to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

9. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 

case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2016

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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