Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00164/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00164-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Steven Dale Hare,

Petitioner, 

vs.

G. Fizer, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV-06-164-PHX-DGC (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Steven Dale Hare, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison

Complex, Catalina Unit, in Tucson, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1) and Respondents’ Answer

to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. No. 10). The Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court dismiss the petition on the ground that it is time barred.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 6, 2002, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to one

count of forgery, a class 4 felony, with one prior felony conviction. (Answer, Ex. F.)

Petitioner also entered into a second plea agreement on the same date, pleading guilty to

identity theft, a class 4 felony, with one prior felony conviction. (Answer, Ex. G.) In each

of the plea agreements, Petitioner agreed to serve a term of imprisonment of between 4.5

years (the presumptive term) and 6 years. (Answer, Exs. F & G.) The two terms were to run

concurrently. (Id.) The plea agreements were accepted by the Maricopa County Superior

Court on August 13, 2002. (Answer, Ex. H.) 

On November 5, 2002, the trial court sentenced petitioner to two aggravated,

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concurrent, 5.5-year terms of imprisonment, with credit for 206 days of presentence

incarceration. (Ex. I & J.) 

On December 15, 2004, Petitioner filed pro se notices of post-conviction relief in his

two criminal cases, citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). (Answer, Exs. K &

L.) The trial court dismissed both matters, finding that (1) the notices were not timely, and

(2) because Blakely did not apply retroactively, the notices did not fall within any exception

to the timeliness requirement of Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. (Answer, Ex. M.) 

On January 15, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for rehearing, arguing that

Blakely should be applied retroactively. (Answer, Ex. N.) The trial court denied the motion

on February 22, 2005. (Answer, Ex. O.) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Court

of Appeals or in the Arizona Supreme Court. 

On January 12, 2006, Petitioner filed his present federal habeas petition in this Court.

(Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner claims that the trial court sentenced him to an aggravated sentence

in violation of Blakely. (Petition, pg. 5.) 

DISCUSSION

Federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners are governed by a

one-year statute of limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The statute of limitations begins to run from the latest of: (1) the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review; (2) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (3) the date on which the

constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). 

Of these possible starting dates, only the first and third are relevant to the present

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action. Petitioner does not allege that he was unconstitutionally impeded from timely filing

the present federal Petition. Nor does Petitioner allege that his Petition is predicated on

newly-discovered evidence that could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise

of due diligence. 

Petitioner's conviction became final on November 5, 2002, the date the trial court

entered its judgment and sentence (Answer, Exs. I & J) because, under Arizona law,

Petitioner waived his right to direct appeal by pleading guilty. See A.R.S. § 13-4033(B) ("In

noncapital cases a defendant may not appeal from a judgment or sentence that is entered

pursuant to a plea agreement or an admission to a probation violation."); see also Rule

17.1(e), Ariz. R. Crim. P. ("By pleading guilty or no contest in a noncapital case, a defendant

waives the right to have the appellate courts review the proceedings by way of direct appeal,

and may seek review only by filing a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32

and, if denied, a petition for review."). 

Petitioner alleges in his Petition, however, that his sentence violates Blakely. Blakely

was decided on June 24, 2004. See 542 U.S. 296 (2004). If Blakely recognized a new

constitutional right and made that right retroactive to cases on collateral review, then,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), Petitioner's statute of limitations began to run on June

24, 2004. However, Blakely does not apply retroactively on collateral review. See Schardt

v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, Petitioner's limitation period

began to run on November 5, 2002, the date that his conviction became final, not on the date

that the Blakely decision was issued. 

The statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed application for

state post-conviction relief is pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In this case, however,

Petitioner's subsequent notices of post-conviction relief were not timely filed. (Answer, Ex.

M.) Accordingly, they were not “properly filed” and did not continue the statutory tolling.

See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 408-09 (2005); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8

(2000).

 Equitable tolling may be available even after the statute of limitations period has

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expired if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file

a petition on time." Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998)(en banc). Equitable tolling is appropriate only if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time, and is unavailable

in most cases. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999) and Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288). Petitioner has not

argued that he was unable to timely file the pending petition due to extraordinary

circumstances beyond his control.

The last day of the limitations period was November 5, 2003, the one-year anniversary

of the trial court’s judgment and sentence. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246

(9th Cir. 2001) (calculating the 1-year period using the “anniversary method” of Fed. R. Civ.

P. 6(a)). The instant petition was filed on January 12, 2006. It is time-barred. The Court

does not reach the respondent’s alternate argument concerning procedural default.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that any objections

filed are to be identified with the following case number: CV-06-164-PHX-DGC.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 20th day of March, 2007.

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