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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 31, 2016*

Decided November 1, 2016

Before

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐3355

JOSEPH TRZECIAK, SR.,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

GEORGE M. PETRICH,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana,

Hammond Division.

No. 2:10 CV 358

John E. Martin,

Magistrate Judge.

O R D E R

Joseph Trzeciak appeals from an order denying his motion to vacate the

dismissal of a suit under the diversity jurisdiction claiming attorney malpractice. We

affirm that decision.

                                                 

* Appellee George M. Petrich did not file a brief, and thus the appeal is submitted

on the appellant’s brief and the record. We have unanimously agreed to decide the case

without oral argument because the issues have been authoritatively decided. FED. R.

APP. P. 34(a)(2)(B).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 15-3355 Document: 32 Filed: 11/01/2016 Pages: 4
No. 15‐3355    Page 2

Trzeciak, a citizen of Indiana, was arrested at his home in that state in 2004. He

later was convicted of a federal crime committed in Indiana, as well as a state offense in

Illinois, where he presently is incarcerated. In 2004 he hired George Petrich, a lawyer in

Illinois, to pursue a homeowner’s insurance claim for damage to his house caused by

the arresting officers and vandals. Trzeciak also needed cash to pay his lawyers in the

criminal matters, so he authorized Petrich to sell the property on his behalf. To facilitate

a sale (Trzeciak was detained) he executed a quitclaim deed giving title to Petrich, who

notarized and filed the deed himself. But Petrich did not sell the house. Meanwhile, in

2005 the insurance company denied Trzeciak’s claim with the explanation that

documentation needed to complete its investigation had not been provided by Trzeciak

and Petrich.

Trzeciak then hired another lawyer, and in 2006 he brought a suit in Indiana state

court to quiet title to his house. In his complaint he alleged that Petrich had defrauded

him by taking and keeping his house while not performing any professional services of

value. The action was settled by Petrich agreeing to relinquish any claim to the property

in exchange for $6,000, which would come out of the proceeds of a sale. As part of the

settlement Trzeciak released Petrich from liability for all pending or contingent claims.

The state court dismissed the suit with prejudice.

Three years later Trzeciak sued the insurance company in an Indiana state court

seeking more than $1 million related to his unsuccessful loss claim. The company, a

citizen of Illinois, removed the suit to federal court based on the diversity jurisdiction.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. Trzeciak then amended his complaint to add Petrich as a

defendant, again accusing the lawyer of fraud. A district judge concluded that

Trzeciak’s suit against the insurance company was untimely and granted summary

judgment for the company. (The district court immediately entered a final judgment for

the insurance company under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and Trzeciak filed

a notice of appeal. But he failed to pay the appellate fees, so we dismissed that appeal.

Trzeciak v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No. 11‐3283 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 2011). In the case

now before us, Trzeciak has abandoned his claim against the insurance company.)

Meanwhile, Trzeciak amended his complaint a second time to allege specifically that

Petrich had engaged in fraud by recording the quitclaim deed and also committed

malpractice in his handling of the insurance claim.

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No. 15‐3355    Page 3

On July 17, 2015, a magistrate judge, presiding by consent, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),1

dismissed the claims against Petrich as barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. The

magistrate judge reasoned that all of the claims in the current lawsuit were, or could

have been, brought in the 2006 suit to quiet title, which was dismissed with prejudice

after the parties settled.  

Trzeciak moved for reconsideration, see FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e), asserting that the

second suit arose from significantly different facts. The magistrate judge, exercising his

continuing authority to rule on postjudgment motions arising from the underlying suit,

see Jones v. Ass’n of Flight Attendants‐CWA, 778 F.3d 571, 573 (7th Cir. 2015), denied the

motion on August 6, 2015. Six days later Trzeciak moved to vacate the judgment,

see FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b), because, he argued, Petrich had committed fraud and prevented

him from fully asserting his rights in the state‐court litigation. The magistrate judge

concluded that Trzeciak did not identify any newly discovered evidence, change in the

law, or legal error, and denied the motion on October 5. Two weeks later Trzeciak filed

a notice of appeal.

We entered an order limiting this appeal to a review of the magistrate judge’s

October 5 order denying relief under Rule 60(b). We explained that Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4(a) requires that a notice of appeal in a civil case be filed within

thirty days of entry of the judgment or order being appealed. In this case, judgment was

entered on July 17, 2015, and the order denying Trzeciak’s Rule 59 motion was issued on

August 6, which started the time for filing a notice of appeal. See Andrews v. E.I. Du Pont

De Nemours & Co., 447 F.3d 510, 515–16 (7th Cir. 2006). Trzeciak did not file his notice of

appeal until October 19; nearly six weeks late. So Trzeciak’s appeal is timely only as to

the order of October 5, 2015, and we consider only whether the magistrate judge erred

in denying the motion for relief from judgment based on Rule 60.

                                                 

1 A minute entry in the district court’s docket explains that Trzeciak and Petrich

orally consented to the magistrate judge conducting all proceedings. Section 636(c) and

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, which implements the statute, authorize magistrate

judges to preside by consent in civil cases but contemplate that consent will be made in

writing. Trzeciak does not suggest, however, that valid consent was not given, and we

have held that oral consent will suffice if it is on the record, clear, and unambiguous.

Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 883 (7th Cir. 2011); see Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 587

(2003).

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No. 15‐3355    Page 4

Trzeciak ignores this order. He asserts that the second suit arises from

significantly different facts and thus, he says, claim preclusion should not bar it. But an

appeal from the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) does not allow us to address the

propriety of the original judgment. See Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257,

263 n. 7 (1978); Bell v. McAdory, 820 F.3d 880, 883 (7th Cir. 2016). Trzeciak’s

disagreement with the magistrate judge’s application of claim preclusion is not a valid

ground for Rule 60(b) relief, and we see no reason to disturb the district court’s exercise

of discretion in denying Trzeciak’s motion.

AFFIRMED.

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