Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00696/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00696-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Respondent submits that effective July 1, 2005, the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency and the 1

departments and boards within it became the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Thus, Mr.

Hickman, as the Secretary, is the proper Respondent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); see Cal. Penal Code §§ 5050, 5054,

5055; see also Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12838, 12838.5, 12838.7. 

 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s answer to the 2

petition. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL S. BANKUTHY,

Petitioner,

v.

MR. HICKMAN, Secretary,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-00696 AWI DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

1

PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

Petitioner is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation pursuant to a conviction in the Los Angeles County Superior Court on March 27,

2002, for corporal injury in violation of California Penal Code section 273.5(a), with an

enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury during the commitment of a domestic violence

felony, in violation of California Penal Code section 12022.7(e). (Exhibit 1, Abstract of

Judgment, Answer.) Petitioner was sentenced to a seven-year prison term. (Id.) 

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On or about August 2004, Petitioner filed an administrative appeal purporting to submit a

California Penal Code section 2934 waiver and seeking to obtain day-for-day credits based on his

participation in the Inmate Work Training Incentive Program (IWTIP). Petitioner claimed that

the denial of these credits was an equal protection violation. (Petition, Exhibit B, Inmate

Appeal.) Petitioner’s appeal was denied. (Petition, Exhibit B.)

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles County Superior

Court, which was summarily denied on February 2, 2005. (Petition, Exhibit E.)

On March 3, 2005, Petitioner filed a state habeas corpus petition in the California Court

of Appeal’s Second Appellate District raising the same claims asserted in the instant federal

petition. The petition was denied on March 17, 2005. (Petition, Exhibit E.)

In the meantime, on January 31, 2005, prior to receiving a response from the superior

court, and before filing in the appellate court, Petitioner filed a state habeas corpus petition in the

California Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on March 16, 2005. (Petition, Exhibit

E.) 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 16, 2005, in

the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The petition was

transferred to the this Court on June 1, 2005. (Court Doc. 1.)

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on November 2, 2005, and Petitioner filed a

traverse on November 30, 2005. (Court Docs. 7, 8.) 

On August 30, 2006, Petitioner filed a request for judicial notice. (Court Doc. 11.) On

September 13, 2006, the Court construed Petitioner’s request for judicial notice as a supplement

to his traverse. (Court Doc. 12.) 

 DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

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violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Petitioner challenges his

classification at Pleasant Valley State Prison in Coalinga, California, which is located within the

jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

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While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as to the basis for the state court

judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)). Where, as here, the state court reaches a decision on the merits but

provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the

record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. 

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9 Cir. 2000). th

Although Petitioner is not challenging the validity of his conviction, section 2254 is

nonetheless the exclusive vehicle for a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court

conviction to challenge, as here, the execution of his sentence. White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002,

1009-1010 (9 Cir. 2004). th

C. Equal Protection

Petitioner contends his equal protection rights have been violated because CDCR

arbitrarily and automatically gives some violent and serious felons the waiver and half-time

credits, while refusing to give it to others. Petitioner contends that he has participated in the

IWTIP, however, CDCR has refused to give him the worktime credits he has already earned

under the program. 

The Supreme Court has held that the equal protection clause means "that no State shall

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is essentially a

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direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne, Texas v.

Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985); Clark v. California,

123 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997). The first step in any equal protection analysis is to identify

petitioner’s classification or group. Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.

1995). Petitioner must show that the law has been applied in a discriminatory manner on him or

imposes different burdens on different groups. Id.; Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th

Cir. 1988). The second step requires the Court to determine the level of scrutiny with which the

Court should review the statute. Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1187. Discrimination on the basis of race

or national origin and discrimination that affects fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny.

Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 1914 (1988). "The general rule is that

legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute

is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,

473 at 440. A heightened standard of review is applied only "when a statute classifies by race,

alienage, or national origin" or infringes on fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 

Id. 

By contrast, classifications that do not involve a suspect class or fundamental right are

subject to the rational relationship test and accorded a strong presumption of validity. Heller v.

Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). Rational basis review "is not a licence for courts to

judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." Id. (citations omitted). The

classification must be upheld if there is any "reasonably conceivable state of facts that could

provide a rational basis for the classification." Id. (citations omitted). The burden is on the "one

attacking the legislative arrangement to negate every conceivable basis which might support it." 

Id. (citations omitted). As Petitioner’s classification involves neither a suspect class nor a

fundamental right, it is subject to the rational basis test.

The California Legislature has mandated that the CDCR require every able-bodied

prisoner to work “as many hours of faithful labor in each day and every day during his or her

term of imprisonment” as provided in the Department’s rules and regulations. Cal. Penal Code §

2700; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3040, subd. (a). Work-time credits are a privilege not a right. 

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Cal. Penal Code § 2933. “Eligibility to earn [these] credits is determined by the type of crime

committed and the specific date on which the commitment offense occurred.” CDCR Dept.

Operations Manuel § 53130.4.

Under California Penal Code section 2933, inmates may earn day-for-day credits for fulltime performance in a qualifying work, training or education program. However, under

California Penal Code section 2933.1, “notwithstanding any other law, any person who is

convicted of a felony offense listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 shall accrue no more than

15 percent of worktime credits, as defined in section 2933.” Voluntary manslaughter is listed in

that section. Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(c)(1). Because Petitioner was convicted of voluntary

manslaughter, he may not reduce his sentence by more than fifteen percent. Cal. Penal Code §

2933.1; see also Respondent’s Exhibit C, ¶ 10. 

Despite Petitioner’s adamant contention to the contrary, Petitioner is not entitled to a

waiver under California Penal Code § 2934. Under section 2934, an inmate who committed a

felony before 1983 can waive his or her right to automatically receive good behavior credits

under Penal Code section 2931, which are capped at one-third, and instead earn half-time credits

under Penal Code section 2933 by participating in approved programs. In re Strick, 148

Cal.App.3d 906, 910 (1983). Because Petitioner committed his offense in 2002, he is statutorily

ineligible for the waiver. 

Petitioner is unable to establish a violation of equal protection based on the above

statutory scheme. Although Petitioner argues that he is forced to work and should earn day-forday credits accordingly, the statutory scheme serves numerous interests and advances legitimate

goals. Inmates are required to work so that they will develop job skills and a work ethic, thereby

improving their chances for reintegration into society. People v. Goodloe, 37 Cal.App.4th 485,

488 (1995). Further, as Respondent notes, idle inmates can lead to trouble in the prison setting. 

Moreover, the manifest purpose of California Penal Code section 2933.1 is to limit

conduct credits for violent felons. As the California courts have explained, “[s]ection 2933.1 . . .

is an expression of the Legislature’s desire to delay the parole of violent felons . . . and is

intended to identify ‘violent felonies’ and to single them out for special consideration ‘when

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imposing a sentence to display society’s condemnation for these extraordinary crimes against the

person.” People v. Ramos, 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 816 (1996). This credit limitation is therefore

intended to protect the public from dangerous offenders who might otherwise be released on

parole on an earlier date. People v. Van Buren, 93 Cal.App.4th 875, 880 (2001) (citations

omitted), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mosby, 33 Cal.4th 353, 365 n.3 (2004). 

“By limiting custody credits for defendants convicted of violent felonies, section 2933.1

complements the purpose of the Three Strikes law to ensure longer prison sentences for those

who commit serious or violent felonies.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Based on the foregoing, the California statutory scheme serves to advance the legitimate

goals of public safety and therefore does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. See e.g.

McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834-835 (9 Cir. 1991) (finding no denial of equal th

protection in having persons sentenced under one system for crimes committed before July 1,

1984 and another class of prisoners sentenced under a different system). 

Petitioner’s claim that the two groups of persons, i.e. prisoners who are not eligible for

day-for-day credits are still receiving them, and prisoners who are also not eligible for day-forday credits that are working under the IWTIP but are not being given the credits, is a violation of

his equal protection rights, is without merit. In support of his claim that similarly situated

prisoners are being treated differently, Petitioner submits five Legal Status Summaries (LSS) and

one Time Credit Waiver form (Penal Code section 2934); however, these documents simply do

not support or establish that these unidentified inmates are similarly situated to Petitioner. (See

Petition, Exhibit A.) 

As Respondent submits, with respect to the waiver form, inmate McDonald, (C-24488)

was apparently convicted before 1983, and, therefore, unlike Petitioner, was eligible for a Penal

Code section 2934 waiver. The first inmate’s controlling case is Penal Code section 245,

subdivision (a)(1), assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, which is not a violent

offense under Penal Code section 2933.1 as it is not listed in Penal Code section 667.5,

subdivision (c). (Respondent’s Exhibit 2, Declaration of Pam Webster, at ¶ 13.) As such, this

inmate’s classification credit code is a “1" and he is currently eligible to earn up to one-half

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credit under Penal Code section 2933. The second inmate’s controlling case was Penal Code

section 32, accessory to a felony. Again, this is not a violent felony, and this inmate’s credit

earning capacity is not limited by Penal Code section 2933.1 on his controlling offense. (Id.) 

However, the second inmate was limited to fifteen percent on two of the offenses listed as noncontrolling, Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(2), assault with a firearm, and Penal Code

section 12022.5, subdivision (a), the firearm enhancement, because these two crimes are listed in

Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c). (Id.) The third inmate’s controlling case, is a

conviction of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, disregard for safety, which is not a violent felony,

and, therefore, this inmate is not subject to the fifteen percent credit limit of Penal Code section

2933.1. (Id.) The fourth inmate’s LSS indicates that his controlling case was a second degree

burglary conviction, in violation of Penal Code section 459. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion

otherwise, because that offense is not listed in Penal code section 667(c), the fourth inmate is not

subject to the fifteen-percent credit limitation in Penal Code section 2933.1. (Id.) Finally, the

fifth inmate’s controlling case involves convictions for Penal Code section 667(c), assault with a

deadly weapon, and Vehicle Code section 2800.2, disregard for safety. Neither of these offenses

is listed in Penal Code section 667.5(c), and therefore section 2933.1 does not limit this inmate’s

credit earning ability. (Id.) Further, although each of the five LSS’s for the above inmates

reference Penal Code section 2934 with the phrase “CREDITS AUTO RE-VESTED PER PC

2934" that notation is merely an indication that these inmates are eligible for the two-for-one

credits. (Id.) 

In this instant case, Petitioner’s Credit Code is “4" because his controlling offense is a

conviction for violating Penal Code section 12022.7(e), which is listed as a violent felony in

Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c)(8), and Petitioner is therefore limited to no more than

fifteen percent credit off of his sentence. (Exhibit 1; Exhibit 2, ¶¶ 10-14, Attachment B

[Petitioner’s Legal Status Summary], attached to Answer.) 

Finally, Petitioner’s reliance on In re Monigold, 205 Cal.App.3d 1224 (1988), in support

of his claim that CDCR is prohibited under equitable estoppel principles from denying him dayfor-day credits, is misplaced. In Monigold, the petitioner was serving an indeterminate term of

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15 years to life for second degree murder. The California Department of Correction erroneously

allowed him to earn day-for-day worktime credits pursuant to section 2933 and a waiver was

signed. Petitioner’s minimum eligible parole date was recalculated and reflected a cut of 26

months. In re Monigold, 205 Cal.App.3d at 1226. In April 1987, after earning day-for-day

worktime credits for four years, the Attorney General informed the CDC that it erred in allowing

the petitioner to participate in the worktime credit program, given the Attorney’s General’s

March 1987, conclusion that state prisoners serving indeterminate sentences of 15 years to life

were ineligible for worktime credits under section 2933. As a result, the petitioner’s worktime

credits were revoked and a new minimum eligibility parole date was recalculated. Id. at 1226-

1227. Based on principles of equitable estoppel, the Court of Appeal, held that the state was 

estopped from revoking the petitioner’s earned credits because he worked under that program in

good faith and in reliance on his early release date for four years. Id. at 1230-1231. In contrast,

here, the CDCR never informed Petitioner that he was eligible for worktime credits under section

2933. In fact, when Petitioner attempted to present a “waiver” to the CDCR, it was refused. 

(Petition, Attachment, at 7.) Thus, any belief that Petitioner was entitled to earn day-for-day

worktime credits was based on his own misinterpretation of the statutory scheme, and not on the

CDCR’s acceptance into the program. In sum, the CDCR was statutorily unauthorized to contract

with Petitioner for day-for-day credits, and Petitioner was never informed to the contrary. 

D. Due Process Violation

To the extent Petitioner contends that his due process rights have been violated because

he has a liberty interest in earning “halftime” credits pursuant to California Penal Code § 2933

because he has participated in the IWTIP program, his claim is without merit.

In order to state a due process claim, Petitioner must show that a constitutionally

protected liberty interest is implicated. Baumann v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841,

844 (9th Cir. 1985). A state may create a constitutionally protected liberty interest if it

establishes regulatory measures that impose substantive limitations on the exercise of official

discretion. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1983). Contrary to Petitioner's assumption,

California has not created a protected liberty interest in earning credits pursuant to Section 2933.

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See California Penal Code § 2933 ("[w]orktime credit is a privilege, not a right"); Kalka v.

Vasquez, 867 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir.1989) ("section 2933 does not create a constitutionally

protected liberty interest"); Touissant v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1094-95 (9th Cir.1986)

("[e]xamination of section 2933 leads to the conclusion that prisoners have no right to earn the

one-for-one worktime credits provided by that section). In addition, Section 2934, which

provides for waivers, cannot serve as the basis of a liberty interest in work credits. Miller v.

Rowland, 999 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1993). Petitioner simply has no constitutional right to

earn credits. Because Petitioner has not shown a violation of the Federal Constitution, Petitioner

is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (habeas corpus available for

violations of the Constitution or federal law.)

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 8, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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