Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00954/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00954-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Adam Bernard Sernas, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-0954-PHX-DJH (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Adam Bernard Sernas filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on May 5, 2014, 

challenging his conviction in Maricopa County Superior Court for the murder of Jessica 

Gallardo. His habeas petition raises three claims: erroneous jury instructions, ineffective 

assistance of counsel, and improper admission of testimonial reports. As explained 

below, the Court recommends that Sernas’ petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

 A Maricopa County Superior Court jury found Sernas guilty of second degree 

murder, a class 1 dangerous felony. (Doc. 9, Ex. E) On April 29, 2005, the Court 

sentenced Sernas to an aggravated sentence of 22 years. (Id.) Sernas’ timely appeal 

argued that the trial court should have provided a jury instruction on the lesser-included 

offense of manslaughter and should have excluded a statement under Arizona Rule of 

Evidence 404(b). (Doc. 9, Exs. A, H) On April 10, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

Case 2:14-cv-00954-DJH Document 14 Filed 04/15/15 Page 1 of 5
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

disagreed and affirmed his conviction and sentence. (Id.) Sernas’ petition to the Arizona 

Supreme Court for review was denied on November 8, 2006. (Id.) Sernas did not file a 

petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 

 On November 28, 2006, Sernas filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the 

Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 9, Ex. B) At the conclusion of briefing in 

Sernas’ post-conviction proceeding, the Court concluded that Sernas failed to raise a 

colorable claim and dismissed his post-conviction relief proceedings on January 15, 

2008. (Doc. 9, Exs. C, I) Sernas did not move for reconsideration or attempt to appeal. 

 On September 19, 2012, Sernas filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the 

Maricopa County Superior Court and a Memorandum In Support of Pro-Se Petition for 

Post-Conviction Relief (“2012 Rule 32 proceedings”). (Doc. 9, Exs. D, J) In his Notice 

and Memorandum, Sernas argued error in his jury instructions, ineffective assistance of 

counsel, and improper admission of testimonial reports in violation of his right to 

confront witnesses. (Id.) He also argued that Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), 

and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), constituted significant 

changes in the law that, if applied retroactively to his case, would probably affect the 

outcome of his conviction or sentence. (Id.) On October 10, 2012, the Court dismissed 

his Notice after finding that his claims could not be raised in an untimely and successive 

Rule 32 proceeding, and that Martinez did not apply to Sernas or proceedings in State 

court. (Doc. 9, Ex. E) On November 8, 2012, Sernas petitioned the Arizona Court of 

Appeals for Review. (Doc. 9, Ex. F) The Court of Appeals granted review and denied 

relief in a memorandum decision filed on January 15, 2014. (Doc. 9, Ex. G) Sernas did 

not move for reconsideration or petition for review of this decision. (Id.) 

 On May 5, 2014, Sernas filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court 

raising the same three arguments that he raised in his 2012 Rule 32 proceedings: error in 

his jury instructions, ineffective assistance of counsel, and improper admission of 

testimonial reports in violation of his right to confront witnesses. (Doc. 1) Respondents 

contend that his Petition is untimely. The Court agrees that his Petition is untimely and, 

Case 2:14-cv-00954-DJH Document 14 Filed 04/15/15 Page 2 of 5
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

further, that he is not entitled to tolling. Accordingly, the Court recommends that this 

Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

Sernas’ Petition for Habeas Relief is Untimely.

 A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court conviction is 

required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of limitations is statutorily tolled during 

the time in which a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the State 

courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

 On November 8, 2006, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Sernas’ petition for 

review. Accordingly, his conviction became final on January 26, 2007, when the time 

period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court 

expired. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012). However, on 

November 28, 2006, Sernas timely filed a Notice for Post-Conviction Relief which 

initiated a tolling period. Isley v. Arizona Dep’t. of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th

Cir. 2004) (tolling starts on the date that a Notice is filed under Rule 32 for purposes of 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). 

 On January 15, 2008, the Superior Court dismissed Sernas’ post-conviction relief 

proceedings. This means that he had to petition the Arizona Court of Appeals for review 

by February 19, 2008. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a), 32.9(c). For over four years after the 

Superior Court dismissed his post-conviction relief proceedings, Sernas did not have any 

proceedings pending in the State courts or in this Court. Accordingly, his one year 

timeframe expired and, once expired, it could not be revived by subsequent filings. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005) (no AEDPA tolling from untimely state postconviction petitions); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 

2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the 

state petition was filed”). Thus, Sernas’ Petition is untimely. 

Case 2:14-cv-00954-DJH Document 14 Filed 04/15/15 Page 3 of 5
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Sernas is Not Entitled to Tolling.

Sernas’ Petition should be denied as untimely unless he can show that he is 

entitled to equitable tolling. To make such a showing, Sernas must demonstrate both that 

he pursued his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance prevented him 

from filing his petitions. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 

 Sernas acknowledges that he filed Notices for Post-Conviction relief in 2012. 

(Doc. 13 at 2) However, he never attempts to explain why he abandoned his postconviction proceeding after the January 15, 2008 Superior Court dismissal, why he 

waited over four years between the dismissal of his first post-conviction proceeding and 

the initiation of his second post-conviction proceeding, or why he waited over six years 

between the dismissal of his first post-conviction proceeding and the filing of his habeas 

petition in this Court. (Id. at 3) 

 Instead, similar to his 2012 Rule 32 proceedings, he seems to argue that Martinez 

and Melendez-Diaz are changes in the law that entitle him to file an untimely petition 

under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.1(f) and 32.3(b). (Doc. 13 at 2, 4) This 

argument is unavailing. First, Martinez does not address the limitations bar in Section 

2244(d)(2) and it does not excuse an untimely habeas petition. E.g., Madueno v. Ryan, 

2014 WL 2094189, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2014); Marshall v. Ryan, 2014 WL 710954, 

at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2014); Moreno v. Ryan, 2014 WL 24151, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 2, 

2014). Second, Melendez-Diaz has not been made retroactive by the U.S. Supreme Court 

or the Ninth Circuit. Meras v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 2012). But even if 

Melendez-Diaz had restarted Sernas’ one year clock, this argument still fails. The 

Melendez-Diaz opinion was issued on June 25, 2009, Sernas did not raise this argument 

until more than three years later in his 2012 Rule 32 proceedings, and his alleged 

ignorance of this case does not entitle him to tolling. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an 

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling”). 

Case 2:14-cv-00954-DJH Document 14 Filed 04/15/15 Page 4 of 5
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Adam Bernard Sernas’ Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Dated this 15th day of April, 2015. 

Case 2:14-cv-00954-DJH Document 14 Filed 04/15/15 Page 5 of 5