Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00011/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00011-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eric David Boudette, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-11 PHX SMM (VAM)

)

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Dora B. Schriro, )

)

 Respondent. )

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, U.S. DISTRICT CHIEF JUDGE.

Eric David Boudette ("petitioner"), filed a pro se Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner raises three grounds for relief in the amended

petition. (Doc. 4). Respondents filed an answer opposing the

granting of habeas relief on the grounds that all claims raised

are barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. 21).

A. BACKGROUND

On September 15, 2000, petitioner was convicted by a Yavapai

County Court of the crimes of aggravated assault (firing a gun at

a peace officer during a traffic stop), attempted premeditated

first-degree murder, and dangerous criminal damage (recklessly

defacing or damaging a patrol car). (Doc. 21 at Exhibits A and

B). As a result of his convictions, petitioner was sentenced to

prison terms of 17 years for attempted first-degree murder, 14

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years for aggravated assault and 1.5 years for criminal damage. 

(Id. at Exhibit C). 

Petitioner filed a pro se appeal to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Doc. 21 at Exhibit E). In a memorandum opinion filed

on April 4, 2002, the court affirmed his convictions and

sentences. (Id. at Exhibit H). On September 24, 2002, the

Arizona Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for review

without comment. (Id. at Exhibit J). On October 28, 2002, the

Arizona Court of Appeals issued its order and mandate. (Id. at

Exhibit K). Nothing in the record indicates petitioner sought

review before the U.S. Supreme Court.

On April 23, 2003, petitioner filed several motions in the

state superior court. (Doc. 21 at Exhibit L). The court noted

that several of the motions "appear to be requests for postconviction relief" and referred them to the original trial court. 

(Id. at Exhibit M). On July 29, 2003, the trial court denied

relief on the basis of untimeliness and procedural infirmities,

but provided petitioner 30 days to file a proper petition for

post-conviction relief. (Id. at Exhibit R).

On September 8, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1. (Doc. 21 at

Exhibit S). On January 7, 2004, the trial court dismissed the

petition finding two claims procedurally barred and the remaining

claims without merit. (Id. at Exhibit U). Petitioner did not

seek review of the trial court's dismissal. (See Doc. 4 at p. 2). 

On January 4, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for federal

habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 1). On February 22, 2005, petitioner

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filed an amended petition raising three grounds for relief. (Doc.

4 at pp. 5-7 and Attachments).

B. DISCUSSION

Respondents seek dismissal of the amended petition solely on

the basis that all claims presented are barred by the 1-year

statute of limitations found at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (See Doc.

21).

A. Statute of Limitations

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-year statute of

limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and

sentences rendered by state courts. This provision, codified at

28 U.S.C. § 2244, states, in pertinent part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time

for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State

action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence.

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1

 The Ninth Circuit has held that, pursuant to the counting

provisions outlined in Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, the one-year limitations

period for all habeas petitioner's challenging convictions or

sentences finalized prior to the April 24, 1996 effective date of

the AEDPA is April 24, 1997. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

4

In Calderon v. United States District Court for the Northern

District of California ("Beeler")(en banc), 128 F.3d 1283 (9th

Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed the new limitations period

contained at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Court noted that prior

to § 2244(d)’s enactment "state prisoners had almost unfettered

discretion in deciding when to file a federal habeas petition" and

that "delays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a

prisoner from seeking relief." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1286.

The Court noted, however, that the provisions of § 2244(d)

"dramatically changed this landscape" and a petitioner was now

"required to file his habeas petition within one year of the date

his process of direct review came to an end." Id. The Court,

following other circuits, also held that the period of limitations

"did not begin to run against any state prisoner prior to the

statute’s date of enactment" of April 24, 1996. Beeler, 128 F.3d

at 1287. Thus, all federal habeas corpus claims concerning state

court judgments finalized prior to April 24, 1996, had to be filed

by April 23, 1997,1 or they were barred by the statute of

limitations absent a showing the circumstances surrounding the

filing of the petition fell into one of the categories listed in §

2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

The Beeler Court also held § 2244(d) established a customary

statute of limitations period "subject to equitable tolling." Id.

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at 1288-89. The statute itself provided for tolling the

limitations period when a "properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

However, the Court cautioned that equitable tolling of the

limitations period "will not be available in most cases but will

only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time." 

Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-89 (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United

States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (3rd Cir. 1997)).

B. Application of Law to Facts of the Case

Petitioner's direct appeal became final on December 26, 2002,

when petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari

within 90 days of the Arizona Supreme Court's denial of the

petition for review on direct appeal on September 26, 2002. Souch

v. Harkins, 21 F.Supp.2d 1083, 1084-85 (D.Ariz. 1998); see also

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). As a result,

the limitations period commenced running on December 27, 2002 and

continued until petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction

relief on September 8, 2003. (Doc. 21 at Exhibit S). A period of

more than eight months.

The limitations period was tolled from September 8, 2003,

until petitioner's Rule 32 proceedings concluded when the 30-day

period for seeking review of the trial court's denial of relief

elapsed on February 5, 2004. (See Doc. 21 at Exhibit U). 

Petitioner did not file for federal habeas relief until January 4,

2005, approximately 11 months later. When this 11-month period is

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combined with the 8-month period which elapsed between conclusion

of his direct review proceedings and initiation of his state Rule

32 petition, petitioner had a total of more than 19 months of

untolled time before he filed his federal habeas petition. As a

result, unless petitioner can show he is entitled to either

statutory or equitable tolling, his claims should be dismissed as

untimely.

Petitioner has provided no basis for statutory or equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations nor is any basis apparent

from the record. Moreover, even if the Court were to credit

petitioner for time prior to the actual filing of his Rule 32

petition on September 8, 2003, during which it might be argued he

attempted, albeit in a procedurally infirm way, to present these

claims in state court (beginning on April 21, 2003, when he filed

"motions" in the state superior court, to July 29, 2003, when the

state denied the motions), he is still left with a period of

approximately 16 months of untolled time. His January 4, 2005

habeas filing is still untimely. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied on the basis that all claims

raised are barred by the statute of limitations. 

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

District Court's order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

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Recommendation within which to file specific written objections. 

Thereafter, the parties shall have ten (10) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge

will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 11th day of October, 2005.

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