Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-01133/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-01133-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KAREN BUSH,

Plaintiff,

v.

WINN DIXIE MONTGOMERY, LLC,

Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.

2:15-cv-1133-WMA

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Karen Bush (“Bush”), has moved to remand her above

entitled action to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County (Bessemer

Division), from which it was removed by defendant, Winn Dixie

Montgomery, LLC (“Winn Dixie”). The notice of removal invokes this

court’s original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332,

claiming that the parties are diverse and that the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. The

question before the court, however, is not whether the requisites

for § 1332 jurisdiction exist, but whether the removal was timely

under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

Winn Dixie was served with the complaint on July 21, 2014. It

did not remove until July 7, 2015, nearly a year later, when it was

bumping up on the one-year limitation on removal provided by 28

U.S.C. § 1446(c). It attempts to justify its delay by asserting in

its notice of removal that it only learned that Bush was seeking

more than $75,000 when she failed to respond to its request made in

state court on May 28, 2015, for an admission that “[p]laintiffs

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FILED

 2015 Aug-31 PM 04:07

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:15-cv-01133-WMA Document 10 Filed 08/31/15 Page 1 of 9
[sic] seek damages in this action in excess of $75,000.00,

exclusive of costs and interest.” Winn Dixie offers no explanation

for its nine month wait to request the said admission.

Although Bush’s complaint contained no ad damnum clause, it is

impossible for this court to believe that in today’s world Winn

Dixie, a sophisticated business entity, believed that the amount

being sought by Bush was less than $75,000 or was so speculative

that clarification was needed. Most Alabama defendants and federal

judges, including this one, are not guessing or speculating when

they recognize the obvious from the complaint itself, based on

their experience, intelligence, and common sense. All of this will

be discussed infra.

Not too many years ago, the fact that a complaint filed in an

Alabama court contained no ad damnum would have been an invitation

for a defendant to do exactly what Winn Dixie did here. But,

because federal judges in Alabama in that earlier era were

routinely remanding diversity cases for lack of a clear appearance

of the jurisdictional amount in the state court complaint, the

Eleventh Circuit took corrective steps. That court, which binds

this court and every other Alabama federal court, has finally

acknowledged the self-evident, namely, that a plaintiff like Bush,

who claims to have sustained a very substantial personal injury at

the hands of a defendant and who charges that defendant with

wantonness and who seeks to recover for pain, suffering, and mental

anguish, and seeks punitive damages, is realistically hoping to

recover more than $75,000. This is no more than a recognition of

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verdict inflation since the jurisdictional amount was raised from

$10,000 to $50,000 in 1988, and from $50,000 to $75,000 in 1996,

and of the Congressional intent when it enacted § 1332 to provide

a federal forum for defendants that are faced with major financial

exposure if they proceed to trial in the state forum chosen by a

resident plaintiff. This new opening of the federal courts of

Alabama to non-resident defendants has taken away the artificial

and unfair obstacle to removal erected by Alabama plaintiffs,

namely, the expedient of leaving out an ad damnum clause. This

court has since 2010 reversed course and held that a plaintiff like

Bush who wants to stay in her chosen forum must formally

acknowledge a $74,999.99 limitation on any recovery. See Smith v.

State Farm Casualty Co., 868 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ala. 2012). It

was in Smith v. State Farm that this court coined the phrase “THAT

WAS THEN. THIS IS NOW.”

This revolutionary proposition was thoroughly and persuasively

expounded by the Eleventh Circuit in Roe v. Michelin North

American, Inc., 613 F.3d 1058 (2010). The court affirmed the

opinion of district judge Thompson of the Middle District of

Alabama in Roe v. Michelin North American, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d

995 (2009), and held:

Michelin's notice of removal states that it is facially

apparent from Roe's complaint that the case, more likely

than not, exceeds the $75,000 amount-in-controversy

requirement. Roe argues it is not for the district court

to determine whether the claim likely exceeds $75,000, if

the plaintiff has not explicitly stated the amount of

damages he seeks.

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If a plaintiff makes “an unspecified demand for damages

in state court, a removing defendant must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in

controversy more likely than not exceeds the . . .

jurisdictional requirement.” Tapscott v. MS Dealer

Service Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 1996),

abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot,

Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000). In some cases, this

burden requires the removing defendant to provide

additional evidence demonstrating that removal is proper.

See, e.g., Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d

744 (11th Cir. 2010). In other cases, however, it may be

“facially apparent” from the pleading itself that the

amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum,

even when “the complaint does not claim a specific amount

of damages.” See id. at 754 (quoting Williams v. Best Buy

Co., Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001)).

* * *

Eleventh Circuit precedent permits district courts to

make “reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or

other reasonable extrapolations” from the pleadings to

determine whether it is facially apparent that a case is

removable. See id. at 754. Put simply, a district court

need not “suspend reality or shelve common sense in

determining whether the face of a complaint . . .

establishes the jurisdictional amount.” See id. at 770

(quoting Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d

995, 999 (M.D. Ala. 2009)); see also Williams, 269 F.3d

at 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (allowing district courts to

consider whether it is “facially apparent” from a

complaint that the amount in controversy is met).

Instead, courts may use their judicial experience and

common sense in determining whether the case stated in a

complaint meets federal jurisdictional requirements. This

approach is consistent with those of other circuits.

* * *

The issue arises with some frequency in the Fifth

Circuit, because “plaintiffs in Louisiana state courts,

by law, may not specify the numerical value of claimed

damages.” Gebbia v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880,

882 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing La. Code Civ. Proc. art.

893).

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Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit requires

that when the complaint omits a specific allegation as to

the damage amount, “the removing defendant must prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in

controversy is adequate.” See Felton v. Greyhound Lines,

Inc., 324 F.3d 771, 773 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotations

omitted). The defendant may meet its burden “by

establishing that it is ‘facially apparent’ that the

claims probably exceed $75,000.” Id.

In Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., for example, the

Fifth Circuit held that a complaint sufficiently

established federal diversity jurisdiction in a case

removed from Louisiana state court, despite the lack of

a specific damage request. 171 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir.

1999). The Fifth Circuit “found [the] complaint's

allegations of property damage, travel expenses, [an]

emergency ambulance trip, six days in the hospital, pain

and suffering, humiliation, and a temporary inability to

do housework . . . combined to meet the jurisdictional

requirement even though no amount of damages was pled.”

Felton, 324 F.3d at 774 (summarizing the holding in

Luckett); Luckett, 171 F.3d at 298 (“Reading the face of

the complaint, the district court did not err in finding

that Luckett's claims exceeded $75,000.”).

Similarly, in Gebbia, the Fifth Circuit held that a

complaint lacking a specified damage request met the

amount-in-controversy requirement. The court explained

that the plaintiff's allegations—that her slip and fall

resulted in severe physical injury, lost wages, lost

enjoyment of life, and pain and suffering—appeared to

comprise a claim worth more than $75,000. 233 F.3d at 883

(affirming the district court's denial of the plaintiff's

motion to remand to Louisiana state court).

* * *

For instance, a plaintiff could “defeat federal

jurisdiction simply by drafting his pleadings in a way

that did not specify an approximate value of the claims

and thereafter provide the defendant with no details on

the value of the claim.” Id. Plaintiffs skilled in this

form of artful pleading could, with this “trick,” simply

“make federal jurisdiction disappear.” See id. Indeed, if

courts were to rely solely on a plaintiff's damage

statements, as Roe suggests, it is difficult to imagine

a punitive damages suit that could be removed against a

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plaintiff's wishes. Both policy and precedent counsel

against rewarding such obfuscating tactics.

* * *

District Judge Thompson independently appraised Roe's

claims and concluded that they likely met the

jurisdictional amount in controversy. We review this

determination de novo, applying our own judicial

experience and common sense. See Williams, 269 F.3d at

1318. After carefully considering the complaint, we agree

with Judge Thompson's conclusion that the value of Roe's

claims more likely than not exceeds $75,000. Even Roe

does not argue that Judge Thompson's appraisal of the

worth of the claims was inaccurate; rather, Roe contends

only that the district judge lacked the power to engage

in that analysis in the first place. As Part II.A.

explains, however, the district court did not overstep by

relying on its judicial experience and common sense to

determine whether Roe's claims likely exceed $75,000.

Roe, 615 F.3d at 1060-65 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

The eyes of this court were opened by Roe v. Michelin, as is

reflected in this court’s subsequent opinions. Other Alabama

federal courts agree with this court, that is, with the notable

exceptions of two fine judges in the Southern District of Alabama.

In Lambeth v. Peterbilt Motors Co., No. 12-169-WS-N, 2012 WL

1712692 (S.D. Ala. May 15, 2012) and Earl v. Diebold, Inc., No. 14-

498-KD-C, 2015 WL 789763 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 2015), Judges Dubose

and Steele remanded cases which had been removed based on the

defendants’ allegations that the jurisdictional amount for a § 1332

removal could be discerned from the face of the complaints that, as

usual, lacked ad damnum clauses. This court respectfully disagrees

with his learned colleagues in the Southern District and would have

denied remand and kept both cases. It would be interesting to know

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whether after the two cases were remanded the defendants got a

confession that plaintiff sought more than $75,000 and thereupon

removed again. If that happened, there was a considerable waste of

judicial resources.

Winn Dixie, of course, relies on Lambert and Earl and says

that it was precluded from speculating about the indeterminate

jurisdictional amount, so that in order to remove it needed the

assurance of an admission. As this court held in Smith v. State

Farm, the existence of the jurisdictional amount in a case like

this one is not speculative. The complaint itself is the wake-up

call. The defendant cannot snooze through it. The 30 day

opportunity to remove provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)was triggered

by the complaint. If a removing defendant in such a case is so

unfortunate as to have its case assigned to a judge who reads Roe

v. Michelin as do the two judges in the Southern District, it can,

of course, litigate in the state court and bide its time until the

plaintiff in his opening statement to the jury itemizes his

damages, putting on the blackboard something like this:

Medical expenses $40,000

Pain and suffering $100,000

Punitive damages $2,000,000

Total $2,140,000

According to Winn Dixie’s reasoning if this happened it could

immediately file its notice of removal, saying that it learned for

the first time what had previously been a closely guarded secret

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and something that could not have been ascertained from the face of

the complaint upon an exercise of good judgment, after due

rumination and cogitation.

As recently as August 20, 2015, this court denied a

plaintiff’s motion to remand a diversity case removed within 30

days from its filing in state court. Geodesic Consulting, LLC v.

BBVA USA Bancshares, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1225-WMA, 2015 WL 4985474

(N.D. Ala. 2015). The complaint there was enigmatic with respect to

damages in that it lacked any quantification of damages, but the

defendant there was alert to the lessons in Roe v. Michelin and in

Smith v. State Farm. It did not snooze. It succeeded in getting

into federal court.

This court is not the only court that has read Roe v. Michelin

as this court reads it. See Cowan v. Genesco, Inc., No. 3:14-cv261-J-34JRK, 2014 WL 3417656 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2014) (in which

Judge Howard quotes from Smith v. State Farm); and Seckel v.

Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., No. 4:12-cv-4163-KOB, 2013 WL

360421 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2013) (in which Judge Bowdre quotes from

Smith v. State Farm).

CONCLUSION

This court can find no logical reason why it was not just as

apparent to Winn Dixie when it first read this complaint, as it now

is, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 when the

complaint was filed. Because the removal occurred more than 30 days

after the jurisdictional amount was clearly apparent, the motion to

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remand will be granted.

DONE this 31st day of August, 2015.

_____________________________

WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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