Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02725/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02725-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Edward Gilmore, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Franco, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 06-2725-PHX-FJM (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, James Edward Gilmore, who is presently confined in the Cocopah Unit of

the Arizona State Prison Complex in Yuma, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this

matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the

Court are the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1) and Respondents’

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”). (Doc. No. 10.) The Magistrate

Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 11, 2004, in Maricopa County Superior Court, Petitioner pleaded guilty to

one count of theft of means of transportation and one count of possession of burglary tools.

(Answer, Ex. F.) In his plea, Petitioner acknowledged the existence of a prior felony

conviction for possession of dangerous drugs. (Id.) On May 31, 2004, Petitioner was

sentenced to an aggravated, 8-year term of imprisonment on Count 1, with credit for 163

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days of presentence incarceration. (Answer, Ex. G.) On Count 2, the trial court sentenced

Petitioner to an aggravated, concurrent 2.25-year term of imprisonment. (Id.) In imposing

an aggravated sentence, the sentencing court relied on its finding, admitted in Petitioner's

plea agreement, that Petitioner had a prior felony conviction. (Id.)

 On June 14, 2004, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule

32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. ("Rule 32 petition"). (Answer, Ex. H.) On November 1, 2004,

Petitioner filed his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in which he raised two claims: (1) his

sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), because the trial court

enhanced Petitioner's sentence based on his prior felony conviction despite the fact that a jury

had not made a finding with respect to the prior conviction, and (2) Petitioner received

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because trial counsel failed to argue at sentencing

that Petitioner had a right to jury determination of aggravating factors. (Answer, Ex. I.) On

March 30, 2005, the trial court dismissed the Rule 32 petition. (Answer, Ex. K.) 

On May 13, 2005, Petitioner petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review of

the trial court's dismissal of his Rule 32 petition. (Answer, Ex. L.) In his petition for review,

Petitioner argued only that his sentence violated Blakely. The Court of Appeals summarily

denied review on March 3, 2006. (Answer, Ex. M.) 

Petitioner petitioned for review to the Arizona Supreme Court; that court summarily

denied review on July 7, 2006. (Answer, Exs. N & O.) 

On November 14, 2006, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

federal court. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner's Petition presents two claims for relief:

1. Ground 1: Petitioner's sentence violated Blakely because the trial court enhanced

Petitioner's sentence based on his prior felony conviction despite the fact that a jury

had not made a finding with respect to the prior conviction;

2. Ground 2: Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because trial

counsel failed to argue at sentencing that Petitioner had a right to jury determination

of aggravating factors.

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(Petition, pgs. 5-6.) 

DISCUSSION

The Magistrate recommends that the Petition be denied because Petitioner has failed

to exhaust his state court remedies with respect to Ground 2 and because Ground 1 is without

merit.

A. Exhaustion

i. Legal Standard

Ordinarily, before a federal court will consider the merits of a habeas petition, the

petitioner must exhaust the remedies available to him in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(1)(A); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). First enunciated in Ex parte

Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), the exhaustion requirement is designed "not to create a

procedural hurdle on the path to federal habeas court, but to channel claims into an

appropriate forum, where meritorious claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation

obviated before resort to federal court." Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).

The requirement is grounded in principles of comity, and reflects a desire to protect state

courts' role in the enforcement of federal law. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989)

(citation omitted). The requirement is also based on a pragmatic consideration that fully

exhausted claims will usually be accompanied by a complete factual record once they reach

federal court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). 

A petitioner must exhaust his claims by fairly presenting them to the state's highest

court, either through a direct appeal or collateral proceedings, before a federal court will

consider the merits of habeas corpus claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Rose, 455

U.S. at 519. A petitioner must have also presented his claim in a procedural context in which

its merits will be considered. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. A habeas petitioner's claims may

be precluded from federal review on exhaustion grounds in either of two ways. First, a claim

may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state court but

found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson,

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501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). Second, the claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal

court if the petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary state court and "the court to

which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735 n.1. If a petitioner

has procedurally defaulted a claim in state court, a federal court will not review the claim

unless the petitioner shows "cause and prejudice" for the failure to present the constitutional

issue to the state court, or makes a colorable showing of actual innocence. See Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 337 (1992); Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).

ii. Ground 2

Petitioner presented Ground 2 in his Rule 32 petition but did not present it in his

appeal of that petition to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and therefore Ground 2 was not

properly exhausted. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 519 (stating that a petitioner must exhaust his

claims by fairly presenting them to the state's highest court, either through a direct appeal or

collateral proceedings, before a federal court will consider the merits of habeas corpus claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)

(stating that claim must be presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in post-conviction

proceedings in order to be exhausted). Although Petitioner made a brief mention in his

petition for review that his "claim[] of ... ineffective counsel [is] valid," (Answer, Ex. L, pg.

4), such a cursory reference does not amount to fair presentation of his claim. See Anderson,

459 U.S. at 6 (holding that a claim is "fairly presented" if the petitioner has described the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state

courts have a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon

his constitutional claim). Thus, Ground 2 is procedurally defaulted, absent a showing of

cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, which Petitioner does not assert.

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted);

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Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, Ground 2 should be

dismissed for failure to exhaust.

B. Merits

Petitioner properly presented Ground 1 in his Rule 32 proceedings. Accordingly,

Ground 1 is properly exhausted and the Court will consider the merits of this claim.

i. Standard of Review

On habeas review, a state court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of

correctness when fairly supported by the record. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426

(1985). The presumption of correctness also applies to a state appellate court's findings of

fact. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981). The question presented in a state prisoner's

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is “whether the state proceedings satisfied due process.”

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Federal courts may entertain a state prisoner’s petition for habeas relief only on the

grounds that the prisoner’s confinement violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994). General improprieties occurring in state

proceedings are cognizable only if they resulted in fundamental unfairness and consequently

violated the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)(“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

state court determinations on state law questions.”); Bonin, 77 F.3d at 1158. The Supreme

Court has held in the habeas context that "this Court will not review a question of federal law

decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). The provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) govern this case and pose special burdens. Chein v. Shumsky,

373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc). Under AEDPA, when reviewing a state criminal

conviction, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if a state court proceeding

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

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clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established

Supreme Court precedent "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth" in Supreme Court cases or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court decision but "nevertheless arrives at a

result different from" that precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A

state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if "the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle" from a Supreme Court decision

"but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. In

considering whether a state court has unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, "a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable."

Id. at 411; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). In conducting habeas review, we

"presum[e] that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,

24 (2002).

ii. Ground 1

In Ground 1, Petitioner contends that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by

imposing aggravating prison sentences based on facts not found by a jury as required by

Blakely. 

The Supreme Court's holding in Blakely is not retroactive to cases where the judgment

is final and the case is on collateral review. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004);

Cook v. United States, 386 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner's judgment became final

on May 11, 2004, when he entered his guilty plea, because he waived his direct appeal rights.

Petitioner's case was still considered to be on direct, rather than collateral, review during the

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time that Petitioner was pursuing post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim.

P. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that Arizona's Rule 32 ofright proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct review within the meaning

of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the AEDPA statute of limitations). Blakely was decided on

June 24, 2004, before Petitioner's Rule 32 petition was filed. Thus, Petitioner is eligible for

retroactive application of Blakely.

Applying Blakely retroactively to Petitioner's sentence does not help Petitioner's

cause. Use of a prior felony conviction as an aggravating factor is permissible under Blakely.

See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 ("other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." (emphasis added)). Thus, the

trial court did violate Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights when it enhanced Petitioner's

sentence based on the prior conviction that he admitted in his plea agreement.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use

the following case number: CV-06-2725-PHX-FJM.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 20th day of June, 2007.

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