Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00536/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00536-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD LEROY SNOW,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO,

Respondent 

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Case No. 14CV536-LAB(BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Larry Alan

Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California. On March 10, 2014, Petitioner Edward Leroy

Snow, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, commenced these habeas corpus proceedings

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. ("Pet."). Petitioner challenges his conviction of first

degree murder. Id. Respondent filed an answer on May 6, 2014 [ECF No. 5-1 (“Answer”)] and

Petitioner filed a traverse on July 15, 2014 [ECF No. 9 (“Traverse”)]. 

This Court has considered the Petition, Answer, Traverse, and all supporting documents

filed by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner's

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal's opinion in People v.

Snow, Appeal No. D058200, slip op. (Cal. Ct. of App. Sept. 19, 2012). Lodgment 5. This Court

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presumes the state court's factual determinations to be correct absent clear and convincing

evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003);

see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including

inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness).

BACKGROUND

Prosecution Evidence

Larry Lemler owned Paxton's Towing (Paxton's), a towing service and impound

yard in Chula Vista. The yard had a small office building with two connecting

rooms. One room was a dispatcher's office. The other room was Lemler's office.

Access to the impound lot was through remote controlled pedestrian and vehicle

security gates, which were typically closed. There were 16 security cameras around

the impound yard and two inside the office building. The camera system was

housed in a locked security box wired to the wall.

Lemler also operated concession stands at local home improvement stores. The

concession stands' sales were all in cash, mostly in small denominations. Each day,

the concession stand employees packaged the day's cash receipts in yellow

sandwich wrap and placed them into a safe. A manager collected the money every

third day and brought it to Lemler. Lemler stored the money in large plastic bags

under his desk at Paxton's. He counted the money at the end of the month.

Lemler counted and wrapped most of the money other than $1 bills with paper

money bands he obtained from his bank. He wrapped the $1 bills with rubber

bands. On stacks of money with odd amounts, he wrote the amount on the bills

in pencil. He estimated he collected between $65,000 and $80,000 each month

from the concession stands.

Snow worked for Paxton's from May through August 2006,FN1 primarily as a tow

truck driver. In late July or early August, Snow discussed robbing Paxton's with his

coworker, James Myers.FN2 Snow told Myers they could get David Sanders, the

night dispatcher, out of the way by knocking him out and putting him in a portable

toilet or the trunk of a car.

FN1. Further calendar references are also to the year 2006 unless otherwise

indicated.

FN2. Myers admitted having a prior misdemeanor conviction for conduct involving

moral turpitude.

Sometime in mid-August, Snow took some money from Lemler's office and paid Myers $1,000 to keep quiet about it. Around the same time, Snow and Myers again

discussed robbing Paxton's. A few days after their discussion, in exchange for 20

to 25 percent of the robbery proceeds, Myers agreed to keep himself and another

coworker, Terry Taylor,FN3 out of the impound lot during the robbery.

FN3. Taylor admitted having a prior felony theft-related conviction.

Also around the same time, Snow told Lemler he had to go to Kansas because his

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grandfather was sick. About 10 days later, Snow told Lemler his grandfather had

died and he would be back to work soon. He picked up his pay at the end of

August and told Lemler he was ready to return to work, but Lemler never saw him

again. Snow told Myers he moved to Kansas and was growing marijuana. Snow

similarly told Taylor he was opening a business in Kansas and showed him pictures

of his marijuana field.

On September 18 Snow returned to the San Diego area. He checked into a

National City hotel and paid for three nights with a credit card. The vehicle listed

on Snow's registration card was a 2005 Dodge van. The van's rear window brake

light did not work.

That same day, Snow told Taylor he was planning to rob Paxton's on September

20. Snow said two other people were going to help him. They were going to put

Sanders in a portable toilet and then Snow was going to take money from Lemler's

office. He asked Taylor where the main power switch to the building was and

Taylor pointed it out on the office wall. Snow said he would give Taylor $10,000

or 10 percent of the robbery proceeds if Taylor stayed away from the impound lot

between 7:30 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. Snow also said Myers would be watching Taylor

to make sure Taylor stayed away. He told Taylor that Myers had helped him steal

money from Paxton's on four or five prior occasions.

In the evening of September 19 and again in the afternoon of September 20, Snow

met with Taylor to acquire methamphetamine for resale in Kansas. On the first

occasion, Snow and Taylor discussed the robbery further. Taylor told Snow he did

not want to participate in the robbery, but agreed to stay away from Paxton's

during the robbery. Snow told Taylor to “keep [his] mouth shut” and everything

would be okay. On the second occasion, Snow showed Taylor a chrome and black

gun. On both occasions, Snow drove a blue Dodge van.

Meanwhile, Myers had told his wife about the robbery plan and she talked him out

of participating. On September 20, Myers phoned Snow, told Snow he did not want

anything to do with the robbery, and tried to talk Snow out of going through with

it. They subsequently met for lunch and Myers again told Snow he did not want

anything to do with the robbery; however, Snow confirmed he was going through

with it. He told Myers he did not need him anyway because he had already told

Taylor about the robbery plan and Taylor agreed to stay away from Paxton's during

the robbery. Snow also told Myers to keep his mouth shut and that he hoped

Myers had not said anything to his wife because he did not want to see anything

happen to her. This remark frightened Myers.

That day, Lemler worked in his office until about 7:00 p.m. When he left, he locked

his office, which had about $89,000 in cash stored in it. At that point, Sanders was

alone.

Taylor went to work that day around 5:30 p.m. After towing one vehicle, he

returned to Paxton's around 7:15 p.m., where Myers was waiting for him. They left

in separate trucks around 7:45 p.m. and planned to stay away until 9:00 p.m. or

10:00 p.m. They went to a park and sat in their trucks. While they waited, Taylor

used some drugs. Sanders called Taylor around 8:30 p.m. to unlock a car. Taylor

declined to take the job. He and Myers then went to Taylor's house for awhile.

At around 9:30 p.m., Taylor tried to contact Sanders by phone and by radio. When

Sanders did not respond, Taylor and Myers drove back to Paxton's. They found the

vehicle security gate open and Sanders's body on the ground by the dispatcher's

office. His head was bleeding, and there was blood on the ground and the wall.

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Myers called 911.

Several police officers responded to the scene. The officers searched the grounds

and noticed Taylor and Myers standing near a tow truck. Taylor and Myers directed

the officers to Sanders's body. Sanders had two gunshot wounds that were

consistent with being caused by a handgun. One of the wounds was to his head

and the other was to his neck just behind his ear. He also had minor blunt trauma

to his head. There were no signs of a struggle. He died from the gunshot wounds.

Paxton's security camera system was missing. The wires for the system were cut

and all of the recording devices and videotapes were gone. Wire cutters lying next

to the cut wires contained a mixture of DNA from at least three contributors. Snow

could not be excluded as a contributor to the mixture.

Lemler's office door had been forced open and the deadbolt had been ripped out

of the wood. A stack of currency on Lemler's desk totaling more than $3,000 and

Paxton's cash box and drop safe had not been disturbed. However, a majority of

the bags of cash Lemler kept under his desk were gone.

Lemler originally told police about $12,000 was stolen. He later told police about

$50,000 to $60,000 was stolen. At the preliminary hearing, he testified that about $90,000 was stolen and, at trial, he testified that about $80,000 was stolen. Lemler

did not file an insurance claim for the loss and denied his failure to do so was

because he thought the insurance company might investigate the loss.

A security video from the business next door to Paxton's showed a tow truck with

a vehicle entered Paxton's at 7:29 p.m. At 7:42 p.m., two tow trucks left Paxton's.

At 9:13 p.m., a dark-colored vehicle entered Paxton's. It stopped and waited for

approximately 15 seconds for the vehicle security gate to open and then proceeded

into the impound lot. The vehicle did not have an illuminated third brake light. At

9:20 p.m., Paxton's yard lights shut off. At 9:21 p.m., the vehicle left Paxton's. At

9:25 p.m., the vehicle returned. This time, the gate was open and the vehicle did

not stop. The vehicle left again at 9:26 p.m. At 9:48 p.m., the two tow trucks

returned to Paxton's.

On September 21, Taylor called Snow several times. Snow told Taylor he had to

shoot Sanders. He also told Taylor not to worry and to keep his mouth shut. Taylor

asked Snow how much money he had taken and Snow said he had not counted it.

He wanted Taylor to come to Kansas to get his share. Instead, Taylor gave Snow

a bank account number and asked Snow to deposit the money into it. Snow never

did.

Taylor called Snow about three or four days later and asked him how much money he had taken, guessing it was $15,000 to $20,000. Snow said he had gotten five

or six times that amount. He told Taylor he had bought welding equipment and a

flat screen television and was living like a king.

Myers also called Snow three or four days after the robbery. Snow bragged that

“Wal–Mart loves him” and that he was watching his 52–inch television. Snow also

mentioned Myers would be getting “four zeros,” meaning $10,000 or more. Snow

asked whether Myers and Taylor had talked to the police and told Myers they had

better not do so. He also told Myers that Sanders had “never seen it coming.”

Although Taylor and Myers were at the scene when police officers arrived,

investigators did not consider them suspects. Investigators later learned of their

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involvement in the crime through a Crime Stoppers tip. Investigators interviewed

both men, who initially lied and then downplayed their involvement. Both men

eventually told investigators Snow had killed Sanders during a planned

robbery.FN4

FN4. Both men pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter for their roles in this

crime. Neither had been sentenced at the time of Snow's trial.

On October 10, police officers searched Snow's home in Kansas. They found a duffel bag in Snow's bedroom containing $24,953 in cash, banded in

denominations of $1, $5, $10, and $20. A fingerprint expert examined the money

and the bands. Snow's fingerprints were on four of the bands. Lemler's fingerprints

were not on any of the bands or any of the money. They also found cash in the amount of $8,400 in Snow's pants, consisting of 64 $100 bills and 100 $20 bills.

There appeared to be new kitchen appliances and a new flat-screen television in

the home. There were also three welding machines, two of which looked new, and

one air compressor in the garage.

The officers found a small pipe and $20 or less worth of marijuana along with

other drug-related paraphernalia. They did not find “pay and owe” sheets or other

items indicating Snow was growing or selling marijuana.

Lemler identified the money found in Snow's residence based on the type and color

of the paper bands used, the type of rubber bands used, the numbers written on

the bills, and the type of marking system used. The money bands on the bills

found in Snow's home matched the money bands supplied by Lemler's bank.

Defense Evidence

Snow's mother testified he visited her in Wyoming for three days between August

16 and 28 on his way to Kansas. He was alone and he had a large amount of

money in a coffee can. Snow and his mother went to a bank, got some money

bands, and counted and banded the money. It totaled between $30,000 and $38,000, consisting mostly of $1 and $5 bills. Neither Snow nor his mother wrote

on any of the money in pencil. Snow used some of the money to buy a house in

Kansas.

Snow's father-in-law was a truck driver and a mechanic. He had a compressor,

toolboxes and lots of tools, but no welding equipment. He gave Snow a

compressor and a toolbox full of tools because Snow wanted to start a welding

business.

Snow told his father-in-law he sold marijuana. His father-in-law thought Snow sold

marijuana in Kansas and that his money was from marijuana sales. Snow told his

father-in-law he paid cash for the house in Kansas. His father-in-law thought the house cost less than $20,000. Neither Snow nor his wife had a job in Kansas. While

in San Diego, they lived with Snow's mother-in-law rent free to save money for

Snow to start a business. Snow's father-in-law also gave them money for living

expenses so Snow could start a business, but he did not buy them a house, a flat

screen television, a refrigerator, or a stove.

Lodgment 5 at 2-9.

On June 13, 2007, the People of the State of California filed a felony complaint charging

Petition with murder. Lodgment 1 at 1. Following a jury trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty

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of first degree murder. Id. at 770. On September 8, 2010, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner

to an indeterminate term of fifty years to life. Id.

On November 11, 2011, Petitioner appealed his conviction arguing that (1) his “due

process rights were violated when the prosecutor failed to disclose material evidence to defense

counsel regarding the District Attorney’s simultaneous investigation of Bo Lemler for insurance

fraud during” Petitioner’s trial, (2) the court erred when it admitted evidence of guns found in

Petitioner’s home to corroborate a witness’s testimony that he saw Petitioner with a handgun a

few days before the shooting, and (3) that cumulative errors deprived Petitioner of a fair trial as

required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Lodgment 3. On September 19, 2012, the court of

appeal published a written opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court. Lodgment 5. On 

October 16, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, raising 

the claim that the evidence withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 383 U.S. 83 (1963) was

material because its nondisclosure “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial, regardless

of whether the evidence was sufficient to uphold a conviction.” Lodgment 6. The California

Supreme Court denied the petition for review on December 21, 2012. Lodgment 7.

On January 2, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego

Superior Court arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Lodgment 8. The

court denied the petition on January 29, 2014 noting that “[u]nder the circumstances of this

case, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could and should have been brought

on appeal.” Lodgment 9.

Petitioner began federal habeas proceedings on March 10, 2014, when he filed his Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Pet. In the petition, Petitioner alleges that his due process rights

were violated when the prosecutor failed to disclose material evidence under Brady. Pet at 6,

50. Respondent filed an answer to the petition on May 6, 2014 and lodged the relevant state

court records. ECF Nos. 5 and 6. Petitioner filed a traverse on July 17, 2014. ECF No. 9.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

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The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as

amended by AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In making this determination, a court may consider a lower court's

analysis. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991) (authorizing a reviewing court to look

through to the last reasoned state court decision). Summary denials are presumed to constitute

adjudications on the merits unless "there is reason to think some other explanation for the state

court's decision is more likely." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784-785 (2011).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court:

(1) "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases"; or (2)

"confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme]

Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent." Williams 

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).

A state court's decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law

where the state court "‘identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'" Lockyer

v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). "[A] federal habeas

court may not issue [a] writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment

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that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76 (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted). Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings,

as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant

state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

If the state court provided no explanation of its reasoning, "a habeas court must

determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court's

decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those

arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme

Court]." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786. In other words, a federal court may not grant habeas

relief if any fairminded jurist could find the state court's ruling consistent with relevant Supreme

Court precedent. 

Finally, habeas relief also is available if the state court's adjudication of a claim "resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1996); Wood v.

Allen, 558 US 290, 293 (2010). A state court's decision will not be overturned on factual grounds

unless this Court finds that the state court's factual determinations were objectively unreasonable

in light of the evidence presented in state court. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Rice v.

Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) (the fact that "[r]easonable minds reviewing the record

might disagree" does not render a decision objectively unreasonable). This Court will presume

that the state court's factual findings are correct, and Petitioner may overcome that presumption

only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550

U.S. 465, 473-474 (2007).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises one ground for relief in his petition, that his due process rights were

violated when the prosecutor failed to disclose material evidence under Brady. Pet. at 6, 50. 

In support, Petitioner argues that the state court’s opinion was both “contrary to, and an

unreasonable application of Federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, as

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well as an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the facts presented in the state

court proceeding.” Id. at 66. Petitioner argues that the fraud investigation evidence against

witness Bo Lemler which was withheld by the District Attorney’s office was material because Mr.

Lemler was a key prosecution witness. Id. at 67-68. Petitioner argues that the fraud evidence

would have shown the jury that Mr. Lemler was engaged in crimes of moral turpitude and an

“accomplished liar” which would have impacted his credibility with the jury. Id. at 68. Petitioner

argues that witness credibility was key to his case which had “little physical evidence linking

[him] to the murder.” Id. at 69; see also Traverse.

Respondent contends that the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s Brady claim was

reasonable. Answer at 14. In support, Respondent contends that Petitioner “has failed to show

that any favorable material evidence was suppressed by the prosecutor.” Id. at 20. Respondent

concludes that “it cannot be concluded that there was ‘no reasonable basis for the [state

appellate court’s] decision or that no fair-minded jurist could agree with the state court.’” Id.

(internal citations omitted).

Petitioner presented his claim to the California Supreme Court in a petition for review. 

Lodgment 6. The petition for review was summarily denied without a statement of reasoning

or citation of authority. Lodgment 7. Petitioner presented his claim to the appellate court in a

manner similar to the one that was presented to the state supreme court. Lodgment 3. The

appellate court denied the claim in a reasoned opinion. Lodgment 5. The Court will therefore

look through the silent denial by the state supreme court to the appellate court opinion. Ylst,

501 U.S. at 804. In denying the appeal, the appellate court stated the following:

Prosecutor's Failure To Disclose Evidence

A

More than a year after the jury returned its verdict, defense counsel FN5 moved

for new trial on the ground, among others, that the prosecution violated its

discovery obligations under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83. At the evidentiary hearing

on the motion, the evidence showed that, at the time of Snow's trial, the district

attorney's office was investigating Lemler for workers' compensation insurance

fraud, employment tax fraud and consumer fraud (predatory towing). The district

attorney's office learned of the worker's compensation insurance and employment

tax fraud claims approximately a year and a half before trial. The prosecutor

learned of them approximately five months before trial. The district attorney's

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office learned about the consumer fraud claim approximately a month before trial.

It is unclear from the record when the prosecutor learned of the consumer fraud

claim. However, the prosecutor did not disclose the fraud investigations to defense

counsel until approximately nine months after Snow's trial, when, following an in

camera review, the trial court ordered disclosure of the information.

FN5. By then, the trial court had relieved Snow's retained trial counsel at Snow's

request and appointed a public defender to represent him in posttrial matters.

After the hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court found the prosecution

willfully failed to properly discharge its discovery obligations, FN6 but the

undisclosed evidence was not material because it was not reasonably probable use

of the undisclosed evidence would have resulted in a different trial outcome. The

trial court reasoned it would have limited the use of the evidence under Evidence

Code section 352; Snow's defense counsel rigorously cross-examined Lemler about

his loss estimates, his operation of cash businesses, and his failure/unwillingness

to make an insurance claim; Lemler's testimony about his money marking method

was coherent and credible; and Lemler's testimony was not critical given Taylor's

and Myer's testimony, which was corroborated by cell phone records.

FN6. Because the People are not disputing this finding, we omit a summary of the

facts underlying it. We note, however, the record amply supports the finding.

B

Snow contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because the

trial court mistakenly determined the prosecution had not violated Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83. “ ‘In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held “that the

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request

violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”

[Citation.] The high court has since held that the duty to disclose such evidence

exists even though there has been no request by the accused [citation], that the

duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence

[citation], and that the duty extends even to evidence known only to police

investigators and not to the prosecutor [citation]. Such evidence is material “ ‘if

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” [Citation.] In

order to comply with Brady, therefore, “the individual prosecutor has a duty to

learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's

behalf in the case, including the police.” ' ” (People v. Letner (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99,

175 (Letner).)

A Brady violation has three components: “ ‘ “The evidence at issue must be

favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is

impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully

or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” [Citation.] Prejudice, in this

context, focuses on “the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt and

innocence.” [Citations.] Materiality, in turn, requires more than a showing that the

suppressed evidence would have been admissible [citation], that the absence of

the suppressed evidence made conviction “more likely” [citation], or that using the

suppressed evidence to discredit a witness's testimony “might have changed the

outcome of the trial” [citation]. A defendant instead “must show a ‘reasonable

probability of a different result.’ ” [Citation.]' [Citation.] We independently review

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the question whether a Brady violation has occurred, but give great weight to any

trial court findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence.” (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 176.)

The first two components of a Brady violation are satisfied in this case. The

prosecution had an obligation to disclose the fraud investigation evidence because

“the circumstance that a prosecution witness faced pending criminal matters, some

of which were being prosecuted by the same district attorney's office prosecuting

the defendant, constitutes evidence ‘favorable’ to the defense, in that a jury could

view this circumstance as negatively impacting the credibility of testimony by the

witness that was helpful to the prosecution.” (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 176.)

We, nonetheless, agree with the trial court the fraud investigation evidence was

not material. “ ‘ “In general, impeachment evidence has been found to be material

where the witness at issue ‘supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to

the crime,’ [citations], or where the likely impact on the witness's credibility would have undermined a critical element of the prosecution's case, [citation].” ' ” (

Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 177.) Neither circumstance applies here. Lemler's

testimony did not supply the only evidence linking Snow to the crime. Myers's and

Taylor's testimony also linked Snow to the crime and arguably did so as strongly

or more strongly than Lemler's testimony since they were Snow's coconspirators

and their testimony was corroborated by cell phone records.

Although Lemler's testimony supplied key evidence linking the cash found in

Snow's home to the crime, the fraud investigation evidence would not have

undermined this aspect of Lemler's testimony. As the trial court noted, Lemler's

testimony describing how he counted and banded his money, the materials he

used to band his money, and his method of marking stacks of money with odd

amounts was internally consistent and not inherently incredible. In addition, after

the discovery of the banded cash in Snow's home, a detective obtained sample

cash bands from Lemler and from Lemler's bank. The sample bands were

consistent with the bands used on the cash found in Snow's home, corroborating

Lemler's testimony.

Moreover, the jury already knew from Lemler's testimony that he paid most of his

employees in cash. They also knew from Myer's testimony that Lemler required his

employees to tow cars illegally. Given this testimony and Lemler's unconventional

cash management practices, it is doubtful the fraud investigation evidence would

have surprised the jury or appreciably affected the jury's assessment of Lemler's

credibility. To the contrary, the fraud investigation evidence might have bolstered

Lemler's credibility in some respects because the evidence would have helped

explain why Lemler had bags of cash stashed under his desk, why he could not

give a precise accounting of the stolen money, and why he did not report the theft

to his insurance company. Accordingly, we conclude the fraud investigation was

not material within the meaning of Brady, supra, 373 [sic] U.S. 83 and the trial

court did not err in denying Snow's new trial motion on this ground.

Lodgment 5 at 10-14.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the "suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the

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prosecution." Brady, 383 U.S. at 87. Evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence

in the outcome." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). To prevail on a Brady

claim, a petitioner must show that: (1) the evidence was exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the

evidence was suppressed by the State; and (3) the suppression resulted in prejudice. Strickler

v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). In determining prejudice, the question is “whether the

favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as

to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 290 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419

(1995)).

Here, the appellate court determined that the first two elements were present [Lodgment

5 at 12-13] and this Court accepts that determination. In concluding that the third element was

not satisfied, the appellate court determined that the withheld information regarding the fraud

investigation of Mr. Lemler was not material because it was not likely to have affected the verdict

and therefore did not prejudice Petitioner. Id. at 13-14. There is substantial evidence in the

record supporting the appellate court’s conclusion.

First, Mr. Lemler’s testimony was not critical to the jury’s guilty verdict because there was

a significant amount of other evidence, including the testimony of two individuals who

participated in the criminal conduct, supporting the verdict. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (“[t]he

question is whether ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in

such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict’”). In summary, Mr. Lemler

testified that he maintained a large amount of cash under his desk in his office, that a large

amount of money was stolen on the night of the murder, that he did not file an insurance claim,

and that based on the bands around the money, the money found at Petitioner’s home belonged

to Lemler. Lodgment 2 at 167-269. While this evidence provides motive for the robbery and

some evidence connecting Petitioner to the stolen money, it is not the most powerful evidence

of guilt presented during the trial.

In contrast, two of Petitioner’s co-workers provided extremely inculpatory testimony. Mr.

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James Myers testified that Petitioner once stole money from Paxton’s and paid him $1,000 to

“keep [his] mouth shut.” Lodgment 2 at 526. Mr. Myers further testified that on several

occasions, Petitioner discussed robbing Paxton’s and how easy it would be if he could just get

Dave Sanders, a Paxton employee, out of the way so the robbery could take place. Id. at 527-

529. Mr. Myers stated that Petitioner asked him to get involved with the robbery by keeping

Terry Taylor, another employee out of the yard in exchange for 20 to 25 percent of the proceeds

form the robbery. Id. at 529-33. Mr. Myer initially agreed to participate, but after discussing it

with his wife changed his mind. Id. at 531-532. During this time, Mr. Myer testified that there

were several phone calls between himself and Petitioner. Id. at 531-532, 576-586. When Mr.

Myers communicated his change of heart to Petitioner, Petitioner responded by saying “I hope

you didn’t tell your wife. I don’t want to see anything happen to her.” Id. at 535. Mr. Myer

testified that he went to work the evening of the murder and while there, Mr. Taylor informed

him that he had spoken with Petitioner and knew about the robbery. Id. at 540. That evening

Mr. Myer and Mr. Taylor returned to the yard after driving around in their tow trucks and found

Mr. Sanders lying on the ground bleeding. Id. at 546. Mr. Myers testified that a few days later,

he spoke with Petitioner who was bragging about all the money he had spent at WalMart and

the new 52 inch television he was watching. Id. at 555. Petitioner told Mr. Myers that “Old Dave

never saw it coming” and warned Mr. Myers not to speak to the police. Id.

Mr. Taylor testified that two days before the robbery and murder, Petitioner spoke with

him about the robbery and wanted information on the power switches at Paxton’s in case he

decided to shut down the power. Id. at 316-318. Mr. Taylor stated that Petitioner told him to

stay away from the yard on September 20th when the robbery would take place. Id. at 318. 

Mr. Taylor also testified that Petitioner offered to pay him $10,000 or 10% of what he got from

the robbery if Mr. Taylor stayed away from the lot. Id. at 321. Specifically, Mr. Taylor testified

that Petitioner told him to stay away from about 7:30 - 9:30 p.m. Id. at 321. Mr. Taylor further

testified that the next day Petitioner mentioned the robbery again and told him to keep his

mouth shut, to not tow any cars during the set time period, and that everything would be okay. 

Id. at 324. Petitioner also told Mr. Taylor that Mr. Myers was going to watch him and make sure

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that he stayed away from the lot. Id. Mr. Taylor testified that the day after the robbery/murder

he called Petitioner to ask him why he shot Mr. Sanders and Petitioner stated that “we had to

do it so don’t – just don’t worry about it. Just keep your mouth shut.” Id. at 356. A few days

later during another call with Petitioner, Mr. Taylor asked Petitioner how much money he got

from the robbery and Petitioner responded that he got about five or six times the $15,000 or

$20,000 that Mr. Taylor had guessed. Id. at 357. Given all of the strong evidence of guilt

provided by Mr. Myers and Mr. Taylor, and the minimal value of Mr. Lemler’s testimony, the fact

that Mr. Lemler was being investigated for fraud was not likely to affect the jury’s verdict. See

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (issue is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different”).

Second, the withheld evidence was not material because Mr. Lemler’s credibility already

was dramatically undermined during the trial by his cross-examination and the testimony of other

witnesses, both of which suggested illegal or fraudulent activities by Mr. Lemler. Gloeckner v.

Youngblood, 2012 WL 6719557, *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2012) (stating that "undisclosed

impeachment evidence is not material under Brady if it would not have added significantly to the

cumulative impact of other impeachment evidence already presented") (citing People v. Dickey

(2005) 35 Cal. 4th 884, 907–90); see also Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 599 (9th Cir.

2004) (where impeachment evidence is cumulative of evidence presented at trial, and the

impeachment evidence would not cast the witness in a significantly worse light, there is no

reasonable probability that the proceedings would have been different). Specifically, Mr. Myers

testified that Mr. Lemler required his employees to illegally tow vehicles. Lodgment 2 at 539. 

Mr. Myers also testified that Mr. Lemler paid all of his employees in cash and that taxes were not

taken out of the money. Id. at 608. 

Mr. Lemler testified that he had a concession stand business and that the cash money

from each concession stand was brought to his office at Paxton’s every third day where he would

store it under his desk in Ziplock bags for three to five weeks before counting it. Id. at 167-168. 

Mr. Lemler stated that he could have anywhere from $30,000 to $80,000 sitting in his office

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depending upon what month it was. Id. at 170. Mr. Lemler also testified that he paid his

employees in cash. Id. at 188. He further testified that he initially told police that he believed

that about $12,000 had been stolen, but that by the preliminary hearing, Mr. Lemler testified that

the loss was actually $90,000. Id. at 259-262. Mr. Lemler also stated that he did not file an

insurance claim for the stolen money because despite having been a business man for the past

thirty-five years, the thought “did not cross [his] mind.” He further testified that his decision not

to file an insurance claim was not because he was concerned that the insurance company may

investigate the loss. Id. at 263-264.

While the withheld evidence certainly would have challenged Mr. Lemler's honesty and

may have further negatively impacted his credibility, it is unlikely that the evidence would have

caused the jury to question Mr. Lemler's testimony linking the money found in Petitioner's home

to the money taken during the robbery. Mr. Lemler provided police with a description of his

accounting practices, including the manner in which he bound, stacked, and marked his money

and the products that he used to do so. Id. at 167-172 and 265-269. This testimony was

supported in part by evidence and information that the police were able to obtain from Mr.

Lemler's bank. Id. at 990-992, 995.

Finally, the withheld evidence was not material within the meaning of Brady even after

considering its cumulative effect. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436–37 and n. 10 (1995)

(after evaluating the tendency and force of the undisclosed evidence item by item, the court next

evaluates its cumulative or collective effect for purposes of materiality); Barker v. Fleming, 423

F.3d 1085, 1094-1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[O]ur materiality analysis is not complete

until we consider the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence.”). Here, the cumulative

effect of the testimony of Mr. Myers and Mr. Taylor likely had a larger impact on the jury with

respect to Petitioner's guilt than the testimony of Mr. Lemler and the likely effect of the withheld

evidence on Mr. Lemler's credibility. While it is true that Mr. Lemler's testimony provided a link

between the money that was stolen from Paxton's and the money that was found in Petitioner's

home, it was the testimony of Mr. Myers and Mr. Taylor that was key to the prosecution's case

and that provided the jury with details about Petitioner's plans to steal money from Mr. Lemler,

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his need to prevent Mr. Sanders from interfering with the robbery, and the subsequent murder

of Mr. Sanders. Barker, 423 F.3d at 1101 (finding that withheld evidence was not material where

the witness who would have been impeached by the evidence "was not the glue holding together

the prosecution's case nor would heaped-on impeachment evidence have altered his already

shattered credibility") (citing Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002) (evidence

was material when witness who would have been impeached was “critical” to the prosecution)). 

Moreover, the link between the money found in Petitioner’s home and Paxton’s money also was

provided by the officers’ testimony so even if the jury completely discounted everything Mr.

Lemler said, there still was overwhelming evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.

Because Mr. Lemler’s credibility was undermined by the evidence presented during trial

and because there was substantial evidence in addition to Mr. Lemler’s testimony supporting the

guilty verdict, the Court finds that the state court’s decision that the withheld evidence was not

material was not an unreasonable application of the clearly established federal law or contrary

to clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s

Petition be DENIED. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Judge issue

an order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that

Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 6, 2014, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later that October 31, 2014. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court's order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 9, 2014

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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