Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05409/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05409-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 12, 1999 Decided July 13, 1999

No. 98-5408

Joyce A. Barbour,

Appellee

v.

Carol M. Browner, Administrator,

United States Environmental Protection Agency,

Appellant

---------

Consolidated with

No. 98-5409

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv00208)

(No. 95cv02013)

Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Wilma A.

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Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

Janet Cooper argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee.

Before: Silberman, Ginsburg, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

Circuit Judge Tatel.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: Joyce Barbour sued the Environmental Protection Agency under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-2(a)(1), claiming that the

agency had refused to promote her because of her race

(black) and had failed to prevent an agency contractor from

harassing her. A jury found for her on both counts, and the

district court entered judgment accordingly. The EPA now

appeals, arguing that because neither of Barbour's claims was

supported by sufficient evidence, the district court erred by

denying the agency's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

We agree and hence reverse.

I. Background

Barbour began working for the EPA's Toxic Substances

Control Act "security staff" in 1990. She says that her

supervisor, Doug Sellers, told her when she started that he

would promote her from GS-12 to GS-13 after a year if she

performed well. Accordingly, when she was rated "exceeds

expectations" after her first annual review, she thought Sellers would promote her immediately. Her job, however, is not

one that ordinarily allows promotion above GS-12, so Sellers

told her that she would have to demonstrate, by means of a

"desk audit," that she had responsibilities beyond those commensurate with her GS-12 level. If the audit revealed that

she was performing GS-13 level tasks, Sellers assured her, a

promotion would follow. Claiming an audit unnecessary,

Barbour refused. She ultimately received the promotion

without having an audit, but not until 1996.

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Barbour contrasts her experience with that of Janette

Peterson, a white member of the security staff who received a

promotion to GS-13 after two years as a GS-12. Barbour

concedes, however, that Peterson's promotion followed a desk

audit. Moreover, although Peterson's job duties overlapped

to some degree with Barbour's, there is undisputed evidence

that Peterson had management responsibilities that Barbour

did not have. Barbour disputes the importance of these

differences, pointing out that the EPA occasionally waives the

desk audit requirement and that the additional duties Peterson had were of a sort usually assigned to a GS-14, not to a

GS-13, employee.

Barbour's harassment claim arises out of her supervision of

work performed by Computer Based Systems, Inc. (CBSI), a

contractor that performed data management services for the

EPA. Despite her position of authority, Barbour says, CBSI

employees consistently treated her with disrespect. One

CBSI supervisor directed a subordinate to drag his heels on a

request Barbour had made. Another turned her back on

Barbour during a contentious meeting. Still others would call

Sellers or Peterson to verify the accuracy of the instructions

Barbour had given them. When Barbour complained to

Sellers about CBSI's conduct, his response was half-hearted.

When white EPA employees, who had fewer problems with

CBSI, complained to Sellers, his intervention was more effective.

Barbour filed this suit in 1994. In March, 1997 the parties

tried the case to a jury, which returned a verdict in Barbour's

favor on both her failure to promote and her harassment

claims. The EPA appealed after the trial court denied its

motion for judgment as a matter of law.

II. Analysis

We review de novo a district court's disposition of a motion

for judgment as a matter of law, in the sense that we apply to

the jury's decision the same forgiving standard as did the

district court: The jury's resolution of a factual dispute will

stand if it is reasonably supported by the evidence. See, e.g.,

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Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1995). As

to so-called "mixed questions of law and fact," which require

the application of a broad legal standard to particular facts,

see Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19

(1982), there is no obvious way to decide whether determinations made at the trial level should be reviewed deferentially

or independently. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114

(1985) (standard of review "turn[s] on a determination that, as

a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial

actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in

question"). Therefore, the reviewing court must make a

reasoned judgment whether the risk of an erroneous trial

level decision, or the need to clarify the governing law, or any

other value secured by review de novo, is warranted in view

of the added costs of such review. See, e.g., Ornelas v.

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) ("Independent review

[of probable cause determinations] is ... necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the

[governing] legal principles"); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984) (appellate

courts independently review jury determinations that speech

is unprotected by the First Amendment "both to be sure that

the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected

category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected

category within acceptably narrow limits"). We touch upon

this issue because, as will be seen, the present appeal requires us to review jury findings on two mixed questions of

law and fact, and we have not previously addressed the

standard of review applicable to either.

A. Failure to Promote

The first question is whether "all of the relevant aspects of

[Barbour's] employment situation were nearly identical" to

those of Janette Peterson, and therefore whether Peterson's

more rapid promotion could be said to indicate racial bias on

the part of the EPA. Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis,

116 F.3d 1549, 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1997). We think the jury's

implicit finding in favor of Barbour on this issue should be

reviewed deferentially, although it necessarily entails a judgment about which aspects of her employment situation were

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"relevant." The issue does not seem to be of general importance, peculiarly in need of clarification, or otherwise deserving of specially probing review. Nor, contrary to the EPA's

representations, does either our decision in Mungin or our

decision in Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43

F.3d 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1995), contain any indication that we

should review this question de novo. Like the mine run of

mixed questions, therefore, it should be resolved in the first

instance by a jury, whose decision should be disturbed on

appeal only if it could not reasonably be based upon the

evidence properly received. See United States v. Gaudin,

515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995).

In this case, however, we agree with the Government that

no fair comparison can be drawn between Barbour and

Peterson; hence, the jury's verdict cannot stand. As the

EPA points out, Barbour was responsible for only seven

"specific task management activities," all of which dealt with

"things which were in place and functioning." Peterson's

duties were both more numerous and more weighty; they

included some related to the development and implementation

of new policies. Furthermore, Peterson, unlike Barbour,

agreed to a desk audit in order to document that she performed the duties of a GS-13 level job.

Barbour does not deny these differences; rather, she maintains that they do not relate to any "relevant aspect[ ]" of her

employment situation. First, she contends, the additional

duties Peterson performed were usually assigned to a GS-14

position; consequently, a rational juror could find those

duties irrelevant to the EPA's decision to promote her, and

not Barbour, to GS-13. In other words, a rational juror, we

are told, could determine that in deciding not to promote

Barbour the EPA did not rely upon Peterson's performance

of higher level responsibilities. This flies in the face of

reason. That Peterson was capable of handling more important GS-14 level tasks is plainly relevant to whether she

would acquit herself adequately in a GS-13 level position--or

so an employer is entitled to believe.* Title VII, it bears

__________

* There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record to suggest that

the EPA--as opposed to Barbour--regarded the difference as

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repeating, does not authorize a federal court to become "a

super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decisions." Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458,

464 (7th Cir. 1986). This is precisely the role the court would

play, however, were the jury to ignore Peterson's GS-14 level

job duties on the basis of the argument Barbour advances.

Barbour next argues that her limited job duties could not

have been material to the EPA's decision because, without

having assumed any new ones, she received the promotion in

1996. In effect, she attempts to undercut the agency's explanation of its decision by means of another comparison--not,

this time, between herself and Peterson, but between her

younger and her older selves. This approach is creative, but

it is at odds with Sellers' undisputed testimony that she

received the promotion because her performance improved

between 1991 and 1996. When she first requested the promotion, she had been with the security staff for only one year.

When the promotion finally came, she had been on the job for

six. It is not unusual, of course, that an increase in productivity would accompany a five-fold increase in experience.**

__________

irrelevant. Our dissenting colleague contends that a rational juror

could find Peterson's additional job duties immaterial because Sellers did not condition his promise to promote Barbour upon her

performance of such duties. [Dissent at 8]. This theory was not

advanced by Barbour herself, and hence is not properly before us.

In any event, it is unpersuasive. Whether Sellers kept his word to

Barbour is irrelevant as this is not a contract case. The only

relevant question is whether a jury could reasonably conclude that

the agency's failure to promote Barbour was the product of racial

discrimination, which Barbour tries to prove by comparing her

treatment to that accorded Peterson.

** Our dissenting colleague contends that Seller's reason for

promoting Barbour in 1996--her performance had improved--belies

his explanation for not promoting her in 1991, namely, her job

duties were too narrow. The EPA can hardly be faulted for having

failed to reconcile Sellers' statements, however, because Barbour

does not argue there is any conflict between them. Nor are the

statements inconsistent: At some point, an employee's increase in

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Finally, Barbour suggests that because the EPA has in the

past sometimes waived the desk audit requirement, a rational

juror could have doubted the bona fides of the agency's

refusal to promote her without one in 1991. We wonder; the

record contains evidence of only one instance in the early

1990's in which the agency waived the rule. Assuming for the

sake of the argument, though, that the jury could have found

the agency to have overstated the importance of a desk audit,

that would little avail Barbour.

While we usually afford "considerable ... significance" to

evidence showing that an employer's explanation of a challenged decision may be pretextual, Aka v. Washington Hosp.

Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1292 (1998), two circumstances make this

case unusual. First, Barbour calls into doubt only part of the

EPA's proffered explanation for its refusal to promote her,

for the agency's assertion that it promoted Peterson more

rapidly because she performed more advanced job duties is

not in doubt. This case therefore stands in clear contrast to

Aka, which was premised upon evidence in the record from

which a reasonable juror could find that, absent invidious

discrimination, the challenged employment decision was inexplicable. See id. at 1292 ("Events have causes; if the only

explanations set forth in the record have been rebutted, the

jury is permitted to search for others, and may in appropriate

circumstances draw an inference of discrimination"). If

Barbour had produced evidence suggesting the EPA's statements regarding the importance of a desk audit are not

merely incorrect, but intentionally deceitful, then this difficulty could perhaps be overcome. See id. at 1289 n.3 (term

"pretext ... sometimes ... means that an employer's explanation is incorrect, and sometimes it means both that the

explanation is incorrect and that the employer's real reason

was discriminatory"); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (evidence of pretext is particularly indicative of bias if it supports a reasonable "suspicion of mendacity"). Evidence that the EPA invoked the desk audit require-

__________

productivity will come to outweigh the limited scope of her responsibilities.

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ment only when employees of an allegedly disfavored race

sought promotions, for instance, might demonstrate that the

agency was purposefully using the rule to cover up its discriminatory practices. Here, however, the white employee

was obligated to undergo a desk audit, while the black

employee was subjected to treatment that was at first identical, and later preferable. That the agency applied its rule

more strictly to the white employee than to the black one

hardly demonstrates that it used the rule to discriminate

against blacks. See Mungin, 116 F.3d at 1556 (employer's

failure to follow its procedures, standing alone, does not

reveal intent to deceive).

Also removing this case from the purview of the rule in

Aka is Barbour's inability to adduce any other evidence. In

Aka, we assumed that, prior and in addition to showing

pretext, the plaintiff will have presented sufficient evidence to

make out a prima facie case of discrimination. See Aka, 156

F.3d at 1289 (evidence in Title VII case consists of "(1) the

plaintiff's prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff

presents to attack the employer's proffered explanation for its

actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that

may be available to the plaintiff.... We are [here] faced

with the issue of when evidence in categories (1) and (2) alone

can suffice to support a jury verdict for the plaintiff"). In

this case, the assumption proves unwarranted: Barbour's sole

affirmative evidence of bias is the apples-and-oranges comparison she draws between herself and Peterson, which we

rejected above. Of course, the case has been tried, so the

question whether she established a prima facie case is now

irrelevant. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors

v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983). This does not mean,

however, that in our analysis of "the ultimate question of

discrimination vel non," id. at 714, we are obliged to pretend

that there is evidence supporting a prima facie case when in

fact there is not. In short, unlike the plaintiff in Aka,

Barbour has nothing to buttress her evidence of pretext.

Because that evidence standing alone has virtually no probative value, we conclude that the district court should have

granted the EPA's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

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B. Harassment

Barbour's claim that the EPA failed adequately to protect

her from harassment by employees of CBSI requires us to

examine the second mixed question of law and fact raised by

this case, namely, whether the behavior of which she complains was sufficiently egregious to violate Title VII. Not all

abusive behavior, even when it is motivated by discriminatory

animus, is actionable. Rather, a workplace environment becomes "hostile" for the purposes of Title VII only when

offensive conduct "permeate[s] [the workplace] with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's

employment and create an abusive working environment."

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998,

1001 (1998).

Whether the harassment in a particular case can be considered "severe or pervasive" is manifestly a mixed question of

law and fact; in order to answer it, one aligns the established

historical facts along side the legal rule, and determines

whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard. See

Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 289 n.19; see also Jordan v.

Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1375 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988). As we have

seen, though, calling the issue mixed does not resolve the

more important question: How closely should the appellate

court review the fact-finder's determination that the harassment was severe or pervasive? Compare id. (de novo review)

with Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Division, 32 F.3d 1007,

1009 (7th Cir. 1994) (deferential review). Nor is it clear

whether de novo or deferential review would be preferable as

a matter of policy. On the one hand, it is often difficult under

current law to distinguish "simple teasing, offhand comments,

and isolated incidents," Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118

S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998), from the serious, discriminatory

conduct that violates Title VII. To the extent that de novo

appellate review could help flesh out the governing standard,

it would provide a significant benefit to employees and employers alike. On the other hand, because harassment cases

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sive" will often be of limited value to courts in subsequent

cases. Any clarification of the law to be had by virtue of de

novo review, therefore, may not be worth the additional

burden it entails. See Shira A. Scheindlin & John A. Elofson,

Judges, Juries and Sexual Harassment, __ Yale L. & Pol'y

Rev. __ (1999).

We need not resolve this issue today, however, because it is

clear that the EPA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

regardless of the standard of review we apply. Barbour

asserts that employees of CBSI subjected her to a hostile

working environment from 1990 to 1992. To support this

claim, she relies primarily upon two incidents: the meeting at

which a CBSI employee turned her back on Barbour and

refused to answer any of her questions, and a CBSI supervisor's intentionally slow response to one of her requests for

information. These episodes certainly reflect poorly upon the

professionalism of CBSI's employees. No reasonable juror,

however, could conclude that they were "sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of [Barbour's] employment."

See Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366

(10th Cir. 1997) (five mild incidents of harassment over 16

month period did not create hostile working environment);

Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir.

1993) (same with two incidents over three week period); cf.

Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995)

(sexual assault sufficiently severe to create hostile work environment).

Barbour tries to fill the hole in her case by pointing to

testimony that CBSI employees were habitually uncooperative and unfriendly. Much of this consists of conclusory, and

therefore unhelpful, statements that CBSI employees had

less respect for Barbour than they had for Peterson. See

Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 938 (7th Cir.

1996) ("[S]pecific allegations of discriminatory or harassing

conduct directed at [plaintiff]" required to show hostile work

environment). She does complain specifically that employees

of CBSI, in an attempt to have the deadlines she imposed

relaxed, would often ask Sellers to confirm her instructions.

It is hardly surprising, however, that a contractor would try

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to play off one of its Government overseers against another in

this way. Barbour's protestation is like to that of a waitress

who complains that her customers are sometimes rude: treatment that would be objectionable in other contexts is an

inevitable part of the job. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003

(application of severe or pervasive test "requires careful

consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target"). Although

CBSI's gamesmanship, like its other questionable behavior,

was probably regrettable, it subjected Barbour to little if

anything more serious than the "ordinary tribulations of the

workplace." Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2284. Consequently, the

district court should have awarded the EPA judgment as a

matter of law on this claim as well.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is

Reversed.

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Tatel, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part:

This court's opinion leaves no doubt which way my colleagues would have voted on Barbour's failure-to-promote

claim had they been jurors. Our job as appellate judges,

however, is not to weigh the evidence ourselves, but simply to

assess its legal sufficiency. Because I find sufficient evidence

in the record to support the jury's failure-to-promote verdict,

I cannot join that portion of the court's opinion. In the end,

however, I too would reverse, but for a different reason: I

agree with EPA that the district judge made improper and

prejudicial comments in the jury's presence.

In a sense, the jury's role in this case has now been

usurped twice: first by the district judge, who jeopardized its

impartiality with his prejudicial comments, and now by my

colleagues, who have substituted their judgment for the jurors'. Because both sides were entitled to have this discrimination dispute resolved by the jury, see 42 U.S.C.

s 1981a(c)(1) (1994), I respectfully dissent.

Failure to Promote

Beginning with the court's discussion of the standard of

review governing Barbour's failure-to-promote claim, I think

my colleagues' formulation fails to capture the very limited

scope of our role. It has long been settled law, as the court

seems to acknowledge, see Maj. Op. at 5, that the standard of

review governing the jury's verdict is "whether the evidence

was sufficient for a reasonable jury to have reached [it]."

Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see

also Swanks v. WMATA, No. 98-7115, 1999 WL 397413 (D.C.

Cir. June 18, 1999). Nowhere in its opinion, however, does

the court acknowledge that sufficiency challenges require us

to view the evidence "in the light most favorable" to the

prevailing party, and to give the prevailing party "the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference that the evidence

may justify," Coburn v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,

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711 F.2d 339, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). Judgment as a matter of law is

appropriate only "if the evidence, together with all inferences

that can reasonably be drawn therefrom, is so one-sided that

reasonable [jurors] could not disagree on the verdict." Hayman v. National Academy of Sciences, 23 F.3d 535, 537 (D.C.

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Bearing this highly deferential standard in mind, I turn to the

record in this case.

In 1990, Douglas Sellers, then section chief of EPA's Public

Information Section, began recruiting Joyce Barbour, an

African-American who had worked for EPA for twelve years,

to join his staff. See Trial Tr. 3/18/97 at 34, 38. Sellers

needed someone to take over contract oversight duties that

previously had been performed by Janette Peterson, a white

employee who had worked for EPA for five years. See Trial

Tr. 3/19/97 at 23-24, 42-45. Peterson had performed the

contract oversight job for two years, first as a GS-12 and

then as a GS-13. See id. at 28.

When Barbour took over, she was given a GS-12 grade.

She was also given a position description that EPA concedes

had nothing to do with her actual job; rather, it had been

written for a group of employees performing other tasks in a

different section, and Barbour testified without contradiction

that she never performed any of the duties detailed in it. See

Trial Tr. 3/18/97 at 40. An EPA personnel officer explained

that this position description had not been properly updated

following a 1986 division reorganization. See Trial Tr. 3/19/97

at 119-20.

In addition to the erroneous GS-12 position description,

Sellers gave Barbour a set of "performance standards"--

goals against which her performance would be measured--

that he fashioned based upon Peterson's GS-13 position description. See Trial Tr. 3/20/97 at 58; Trial Tr. 3/18/97 at 113.

Sellers devised Barbour's performance standards simply by

photocopying the standards he had written for Peterson as a

GS-13, neglecting on several pages even to change the grade

from Peterson's GS-13 to Barbour's GS-12. See id. at 42.

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Although Barbour did not immediately complain to Sellers

about being a GS-12, she testified that Sellers took it upon

himself to promise that he would promote her to GS-13 if she

performed well for a year:

He brought it up. As a matter of fact, I never brought it

up because I didn't have to. He always did. When I

first took the job, he told me, "Joyce, if you're in the job

for a year and have your first performance evaluation, I

see no reason why I can't promote you, and I will." And

throughout the year, as time went on, he constantly

reminded me of that.

Id. at 44; see also id. at 109, 136. Never flatly denying that

he made these statements, Sellers testified only that he "d[id]

not remember ever promising her a promotion." Trial Tr.

3/20/97 at 11.

At Barbour's first annual performance review in October

1991, Sellers rated her as "[e]xceeds expectations," just a few

points below "outstanding." See Trial Tr. 3/18/97 at 45.

According to Barbour, Sellers again brought up the prospect

of promoting her to GS-13, telling her, " 'Joyce, I see no

reason why I can't initiate promoting you in three to four

months.' " Id. When Barbour reminded Sellers of his earlier promise to promote her upon her first evaluation, not

months thereafter, Sellers instructed her to consult Sarsah

McClean, the personnel officer, to find out what needed to be

done to secure a promotion. See id. at 45-46. McClean told

Barbour that because her position description (the concededly

erroneous one) did not allow for promotion past GS-12,

Sellers could only promote her either through a process

called "accretion of duties," or by creating a new GS-13

position for which she would have to compete. See Trial Tr.

3/19/97 at 114. Under the accretion-of-duties route, the employee's supervisor writes a memo to the personnel officer

explaining that the employee is actually performing duties at

a level higher than the grade specified in the position description. See id. Although this process often includes a desk

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audit--where the personnel officer sits down with the employee and examines the duties she is performing--the supervisor

can request waiver of a desk audit. See id. at 121-22. From

EPA's Office of Personnel Management, Barbour confirmed

that an employee can obtain an accretion-of-duties promotion

without a desk audit so long as the supervisor agrees that the

employee is actually performing duties at a higher grade

level. See Trial Tr. 3/18/97 at 47.

Two months after her performance review, Barbour testified, she tried to confront Sellers about the status of her

promotion. See id. Although he initially attempted to avoid

her, they finally got together in December, at which time

Sellers told her that she would have to have a desk audit.

See id. at 48-49. When Barbour explained that both McClean and OPM confirmed that he had authority to waive the

desk audit requirement, Sellers asked her to write a memorandum justifying her promotion to GS-13. See id. at 49.

In response, Barbour prepared a memorandum dated February 4, 1992, which relied primarily on the fact that she had

the same performance standards that Peterson had when

Peterson was a GS-13. See id. at 49-50. Claiming the

memorandum was insufficient, Sellers told Barbour that he

needed something detailing the duties she was actually performing. See Trial Tr. 3/20/97 at 16. Barbour prepared a

second memorandum, this time appending to it a copy of

Peterson's GS-13 position description, which described the

duties Peterson performed before Barbour took over her job.

This second memorandum expressly asserted that Barbour

was performing each task itemized in Peterson's GS-13 position description. See Trial Tr. 3/19/97 at 161.

In May, Sellers wrote Barbour a memorandum of his own,

agreeing that Peterson's GS-13 position description was the

relevant comparison, see Trial Tr. 3/20/97 at 17-18, but concluding that he could not recommend her for promotion

because she was not performing all of the duties detailed in

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forming, would justify her promotion in six months. See id.

at 17. Barbour testified not only that she was already

performing most of those duties, but also that any duties that

she was not performing Peterson had not performed either.

See id. at 41-45. Four and a half years later, without

assuming any additional duties, and without undergoing a

desk audit, Barbour received a promotion to GS-13. See

Trial Tr. 3/18/97 at 51, 53.

EPA makes three arguments challenging the sufficiency of

Barbour's evidence, none of which is persuasive. First, the

agency argues that no reasonable juror could have found race

discrimination based on a comparison between the experiences of Barbour and Peterson because, unlike Barbour,

Peterson obtained her promotion by submitting to a desk

audit. However, not only did EPA's personnel officer testify

that a supervisor can waive a desk audit, see Trial Tr. 3/19/97

at 121-22, but the record contains at least three examples of

employees in Barbour's section who were promoted to GS-13

without desk audits: Sarsah McClean, Kimberly Orr, and

Barbour herself, see id. at 109, 115. To be sure, only one of

these three non-desk audit promotions occurred "in the early

1990's." Maj. Op. at 7. That the other two promotions did

not occur until 1996, however, is irrelevant absent evidence

that EPA's desk audit policy changed in the interim. EPA

offered no such evidence. Indeed, toward the end of the trial

EPA's lawyer obtained leave from the district court to call an

additional witness to testify on precisely this subject, see Trial

Tr. 3/19/97 at 166, but inexplicably never did.

Not only does the promotion of these three employees to

GS-13 without desk audits undercut EPA's argument that

Barbour and Peterson were not similarly situated, but it

amounts to affirmative pretext evidence that reasonably could

have led the jury to doubt the agency's truthfulness. Assuming the role of jurors, however, my colleagues disregard

Barbour's evidence that EPA's desk audit justification was

false, concluding instead that the justification could not have

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been "intentionally deceitful" because EPA applied the putative desk audit rule to a white employee, not just to AfricanAmerican employees. See Maj. Op. at 7-8. It is true that

Aka v. Washington Hospital Center suggests two hypothetical situations in which no reasonable juror could infer discrimination despite the demonstrated falsity of the employer's

asserted justification: where "the plaintiff shoots himself in

the foot" by proving improvidently that the employer's real

motivation was something other than discrimination; or

where the evidence undercutting the employer's stated justification is weak and there is also "abundant independent

evidence in the record that no discrimination has occurred,"

such as evidence that the employer "has a strong record of

equal opportunity employment." 156 F.3d 1284, 1291 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (en banc). Neither hypothetical bears any relationship to the facts of this case. Barbour never shot herself in

the foot, and not only did EPA fail to introduce any evidence

of a "strong" EEO record, but Barbour actually introduced

evidence that the agency's EEO record was poor. See infra

p. 11.

This court now creates a third situation in which evidence

disproving an employer's asserted justification cannot support

an inference of discrimination: where the false justification

has not been applied exclusively to African-Americans. This

proposition assumes that an employer who tells the same lie

to two different employees necessarily does so for the same

reason. Although this assumption may well be accurate in

some situations, it may be inaccurate in others. Under Aka,

the jury was entitled to conclude that EPA's false desk audit

justification--viewed in light of all of the other record evidence of discrimination, see infra pp. 7-12--was pretext for

race discrimination even though as applied to Peterson it was

not. My colleagues' novel holding to the contrary creates an

impenetrable legal safe harbor from Title VII liability: An

employer who has denied promotion to a minority employee

ostensibly because of tardiness, writing deficiency, or inability

to get along with others, for example, can render legally

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fication merely by asserting that it has denied promotion to a

white employee for the same reason.

EPA next argues that no reasonable juror could have found

race discrimination based on a comparison between the experiences of Barbour and Peterson because "Barbour failed to

refute Sellers' and Peterson's testimony that the duties of the

two women differed." Appellant's Br. at 16-17. EPA insists

that the record demonstrates that Peterson performed fifteen

task management duties as a GS-13 and that Barbour took

over only seven, see id. at 17, but the portion of Sellers's

testimony it cites belies this assertion. While it is true that

EPA's entire contract with CBSI entailed a total of fifteen

task management functions, no one--not even Peterson--

testified that Peterson performed all fifteen. Indeed, the

obvious gist of Sellers's testimony was that Peterson was

performing eight task management functions--not fifteen--

and that when Barbour took over she inherited all but one.

See Trial Tr. 3/19/97 at 45-46; see also id. at 88-89. Asked at

oral argument how many of Peterson's task management

functions Barbour would have to have performed before

jurors could reasonably conclude that she and Peterson were

"nearly identical" in all relevant aspects, EPA's counsel,

believing erroneously that Peterson had been performing all

fifteen duties, conceded that thirteen out of fifteen would

certainly suffice. Why then isn't it sufficient for my colleagues that Barbour in fact took over seven out of eight?

To be sure, the record reflects that in addition to those task

management functions that Barbour did inherit, Peterson had

been performing various GS-14 level policy functions that

Barbour did not inherit. According to my colleagues, that

these policy functions are GS-14 functions, not GS-13 functions, is of no significance because the fact "[t]hat Peterson

was capable of handling more important GS-14 level tasks is

plainly relevant to whether she would acquit herself adequately in a GS-13 level position--or so an employer is

entitled to believe." Maj. Op. at 5. The question before us,

however, is not what this court thinks an employer is entitled

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to believe, but whether the jury reasonably could have believed that the fact that Barbour performed no GS-14 level

policy functions was not the real reason why EPA refused to

promote her to GS-13. The record contains ample evidence

to support such a conclusion.

To begin with, when Sellers first hired Barbour, he did not

tell her, "Joyce, if you're in this job for a year and have your

first performance evaluation, and if I determine at that time

that you are performing not only GS-13 level functions but

also GS-14 level policy functions like your friend Janette

Peterson, I see no reason why I can't promote you, and I

will." Quite to the contrary, the jury heard testimony that

Barbour's promised promotion in no way hinged on her

performing GS-14 level functions. See Trial Tr. 3/18/97 at 44,

109, 136. In his May 1992 memorandum responding to

Barbour's promotion request, moreover, Sellers made no

mention of her failure to take on GS-14 level policy duties;

his memo focused exclusively on duties in Peterson's GS-13

position description that he said Barbour would have to

perform for six months in order to earn a promotion. See

Trial Tr. 3/20/97 at 16-17. And in the end Barbour was

promoted to GS-13 without taking on any additional GS-14

level policy duties. See Trial Tr. 3/18/97 at 52-53. If by

pointing out that "this is not a contract case" my colleagues

mean to suggest that a supervisor's statements regarding

promotion criteria are, as a matter of law, irrelevant to the

question of pretext in Title VII cases, see Maj. Op. at 6 n.*,

they are mistaken.

The court's conclusion that Barbour's eventual promotion

without assuming additional duties is somehow irrelevant

because her performance may have improved between 1991

and 1996 is also mistaken. See id. at 6. Just as Sellers's

testimony regarding Barbour's improvement supports my

colleagues' belief about why EPA eventually promoted her, it

likewise supports the jury's apparent conclusion that EPA

lied about its justification for not promoting her in the first

place. If Sellers had testified that he refused to promote

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Barbour in 1991 because her performance of existing duties

needed improvement--not that she needed to undergo a desk

audit and take on additional duties (as he actually testified)--

this court's view of the evidence might well have carried the

day in the jury room. Weighing the evidence, my colleagues

conclude for themselves that Sellers's varying statements

were not "inconsistent," id. at 6 n.**, but this court has no

authority to ignore the jury's totally plausible conclusion that

they were inconsistent. To be sure, the court correctly

observes that "Barbour does not argue there is any conflict

between" Sellers's statements, id., but she made no such

argument for a good reason: EPA itself never argued that it

refused to promote her because her performance needed

improvement--not at trial, not in its opening appellate brief,

not in its reply brief, and not at oral argument.

Finally, EPA argues that no reasonable juror could have

found race discrimination based on a comparison between the

experiences of Barbour and Peterson because Peterson was a

GS-12 task manager for two years before being promoted to

GS-13, whereas Barbour sought her promotion after only one

year. Once again, however, the jury reasonably could have

concluded from abundant record evidence that this fact had

nothing to do with Barbour's non-promotion. In testimony

that the jury was entitled to credit, Barbour said that Sellers

expressly promised her that she would be promoted after one

year, not two. See Trial Tr. 3/18/97 at 44, 109, 136. Then

after one year, Sellers told her he would promote her in three

to four more months, not twelve more months. See id. at 45.

And EPA ultimately took six years, not two, to promote

Barbour to GS-13. See id. at 51.

My colleagues give two reasons for distinguishing this case

from Aka. First, they say that unlike the plaintiff in Aka,

"Barbour calls into doubt only part of the EPA's proffered

explanation for its refusal to promote her." Maj. Op. at 7.

But Barbour actually called into doubt all of EPA's proffered

explanations: the putative desk audit requirement, which

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Barbour demonstrated was not just waivable in theory but

actually waived for at least three employees in her section;

the fact that Peterson performed some GS-14 policy functions, which Barbour demonstrated had nothing to do with

her eligibility for promotion to GS-13; and the fact that

Peterson had an additional year of experience as a GS-12

task manager, which Barbour also demonstrated had nothing

to do with her GS-13 eligibility. See supra pp. 5-9. This

case is thus just like Aka. There, as here, the record

contained evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the challenged employment decision was inexplicable absent invidious discrimination. As Aka said: "Events

have causes; if the only explanations set forth in the record

have been rebutted, the jury is permitted to search for

others, and may in appropriate circumstances draw an inference of discrimination." 156 F.3d at 1292.

As its second ground for distinguishing Aka, the court says

that Barbour's "apples-and-oranges" comparison of herself

and Peterson fails to establish even a prima facie case of race

discrimination. Maj. Op. at 8. This is a curious point given

my colleagues' concession that the entire burden-shifting

paradigm is now irrelevant and that the only question before

the jury was the " 'ultimate question of discrimination vel

non.' " Id. at 9 (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)). But even

taking the comparison issue on the court's terms, the question

is simply whether the jury reasonably could have concluded

from the record that Barbour and Peterson were similarly

situated in all relevant respects. Surely a hypothetical jury

would be free to conclude that two employees were similarly

situated for purposes of a given promotion even if the employer introduced evidence that one was more polite or better

read than the other, so long as the record reasonably supported the conclusion that politeness or erudition were not

relevant promotion criteria. The record in this case amply

supports the jury's apparent conclusion that Barbour was

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similarly situated to Peterson in all respects relevant to the

GS-13 position.

Also missing from the court's Aka discussion is any mention of the fact that in addition to Barbour's evidence that she

and Peterson were similarly situated with respect to the GS13 position, and in addition to her evidence that each of

EPA's proffered justifications was pretextual, Barbour testified that EPA has a poor equal employment opportunity

record with respect to African-Americans in her division:

The history of the program has been that minorities

have been pretty much on the lower end of it. Out of

400 to 500 staff people, you only have, I'd say, maybe two

section chiefs who were at the 14 level. One was temporary. 13's in IMD out of my division, 50, 60 people,

maybe four--maybe five or six 13's who were AfricanAmerican, if that many.

Trial Tr. 3/18/97 at 59. Perhaps there is a good answer to

Barbour's assertion. For example, perhaps these numbers--

five or six African-American GS-13s out of fifty or sixty

total GS-13s--actually reflect the availability of AfricanAmericans in the relevant labor market. But EPA never

offered any such evidence, nor did it move to strike Barbour's

testimony as either irrelevant or lacking in foundation. As

Aka made clear, the jury could properly have considered

Barbour's unrebutted testimony in determining whether EPA

failed to promote her because of her race. See Aka, 156 F.3d

at 1295 n.11.

Of course Title VII "does not authorize a federal court to

become 'a super-personnel department that reexamines an

entity's business decisions.' " Maj. Op. at 6 (quoting Dale v.

Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986)). But

neither does Title VII authorize federal judges to become

super-jurors, weighing evidence and drawing independent

conclusions regarding the ultimate question of discrimination.

I have certainly seen stronger Title VII cases than this one;

indeed, had I been a juror, I might well have cast my vote for

the employer. But acknowledging that the merits of this case

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are debatable is a far cry from holding that no rational person

could agree with the jury's conclusion.

Racial Harassment

I do agree with my colleagues that the record contains

insufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that

CBSI's treatment of Barbour rose to the level of actionable

racial harassment. Even giving Barbour "the advantage of

every fair and reasonable inference that the evidence may

justify," Coburn, 711 F.2d at 342, the most this record

demonstrates is that CBSI employees sometimes put Barbour's requests at the bottom of the pile, and that on one

occasion a CBSI employee turned her back on Barbour in a

meeting. Though we must not reverse a jury verdict unless

the evidence "is so one-sided that reasonable [jurors] could

not disagree," Hayman, 23 F.3d at 537, I cannot fathom on

what basis the jury could have determined that Barbour's

" 'workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that [was] sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and

create an abusive working environment.' " Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998)

(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).

Perhaps the answer is this: The jury never made that

determination because it was never instructed regarding the

meaning of the legal term of art "harassment." The only

instruction the district court gave the jury with respect to

Barbour's harassment claim was the following:

[T]he plaintiff must show ... that [she] gave notice to

the defendant ... that racial harassment was being

engaged in by the corporation or by the employees of the

contractor, and that the defendant failed to take ...

prompt and adequate remedial action against it.

Trial Tr. 3/21/97 at 46. The jury thus had no way of knowing

that to rule for Barbour, it had to find not just "harassment,"

but "severe or pervasive" harassment. Although EPA does

not raise this issue, I suspect the district court's incomplete

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instruction may explain the jury's untenable harassment verdict.

The District Court's Comments on the Evidence

Since I would affirm the district court's denial of judgment

as a matter of law on Barbour's failure-to-promote claim, I

must address EPA's alternative argument that it is nonetheless entitled to a new trial because the district court prejudiced the jury through improper comments on the evidence.

Because I agree with EPA that the district court's comments

were prejudicial, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

Federal judges have "inherent authority ... to comment on

the evidence," United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 438 (D.C.

Cir. 1974), but that authority "is not arbitrary and uncontrolled, but judicial, to be exercised in conformity with the

standards governing the judicial office," Quercia v. United

States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933). Judges must " 'use great

care that an expression of opinion upon the evidence should

be so given as not to mislead, and especially that it should not

be one-sided.' " Wabisky v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 326 F.2d

658, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (quoting Quercia, 289 U.S. at 470).

Applying this standard, I believe the trial judge crossed the

line by making statements that the jury could have viewed as

signaling not just his hostility toward the agency, but also

that he believed the evidence demonstrated that Barbour was

a victim of discrimination. For example, in overruling an

EPA objection during Barbour's cross-examination, the district judge said this:

Let me just give you the reason why I overruled your

objection. As far as I am concerned, in these discrimination cases coming out of federal agencies, the agencies

have all the powerful people in there, from the director

or chairman or administrator on down; they have all the

records; they have all the files; they make up the rules;

and they can go on and on, and the person who is

complaining about them is usually alone, with just one

lawyer and maybe a couple of people who also claim they

are discriminated against. When they come to court,

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which is the first time that they come to a place where

justice is done--where people don't protect each other,

where people don't agree with each other from the lowest

to the highest--here they get a fair shake and here they

get a chance to talk, and they are going to get a chance

to talk as long as I am here whether you object to it or

not.

Trial Tr. 3/20/97 at 54-55. At another point, the judge

responded to the testimony of a defense witness (an EPA

employee) by stating: "No wonder the public and the Congress are upset about agencies in Washington." Id. at 38.

In a trial like this, where the agency's veracity was central to

its defense, I can hardly imagine anything more prejudicial

than for the judge to tell the jury that agencies like EPA

"have all the power[ ]," that they "make up the rules," that

they cover up for each other through lies, that they refuse to

do justice until hauled into court, and that the public no

longer has any confidence in them.

The judge also challenged Sellers's credibility: "That's

under oath? You are testifying under oath?" Id. at 13.

Because Barbour's failure-to-promote claim ultimately hinged

on Sellers's credibility, our statement in United States v.

Tilghman applies here as well: "Because juries, not judges,

decide whether witnesses are telling the truth, and because

judges wield enormous influence over juries, judges may not

ask questions that signal their belief or disbelief of witnesses." 134 F.3d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

District judges certainly enjoy wide discretion to manage

trials, including questioning witnesses aggressively and commenting on the evidence. In fact, most of the judge's comments that EPA challenges were not at all inappropriate.

But because of the particular comments discussed above, I

think the district court went too far. Indeed, the judge's

comments may well help explain why the jury ruled for

Barbour on this relatively weak (though sufficient) record.

Just as Barbour deserved to have her case decided by the

jury without improper judicial interference, so did EPA.

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