Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01011/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01011-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID ROWLAND YOUNG,

CDCR #V-28942,

Civil No. 14cv1011 LAB (JMA)

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION

(Doc. No. 9) 

vs.

CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL HEALTH

CARE SERVICES, Office of Third Level

Appeals Health Care; L.D. ZAMORA, Chief

Appeals Coordinator; Dr. LEE, Chief

Medical Officer, Ironwood State Prison;

UNNAMED CDCR Employees, Doctors,

Defendants.

David Rowland Young (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Centinela State

Prison (“CEN”) in Imperial, California, and proceeding in pro se, filed this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1) in April, 2014.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) (Doc. No. 2). Plaintiff later filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 4)

and a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No. 6).

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On August 29, 2014, however, the Court sua sponte dismissed the action without

prejudice for lack of proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and § 1406(a). See

Aug. 29, 2014 Order (Doc. No. 7). 

Specifically, the Court noted that:

While Plaintiffis currently incarcerated atCEN, his Complaintseeks

damages and injunctive relief against the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) Health Care Services Office of

Third Level Appeals, and a “Chief Appeals Coordinator” named Zamora,

who is alleged to reside in Sacramento, California. See Compl. at 2. In

addition, Plaintiff names the Chief Medical Officer of Ironwood State

Prison (“ISP”), Dr. Lee, and two other “unnamed” doctors as Defendants,1

based on claims that they denied his right to “proper and professional care,”

and caused him to suffer “physical pain, damage, and injury that was not

necessary” while he was incarcerated at ISP “for four years.” Id. at 7.

Id. at 2.

Because Plaintiff’s Complaint named no CEN officials as Defendants, contained

no allegations of constitutional wrongdoing committed by anyCEN official, and instead

appeared to challenge the adequacy of his medical treatment at Ironwood State Prison

(“ISP”) where Plaintiff wasincarcerated before his transfer to CEN, by medical officials

at ISP, including Dr. Lee, who was alleged to be ISP’s Chief Medical Officer, the Court

found that “the substantial part of the events or omissions which might give rise to a

federal claim occurred at ISP,” and that venue therefore appeared proper in the Central

District of California, Eastern Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 84(c)(1), and not in the

Southern District of California, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 84(d). Id. at 3. 

Because Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed in the wrong district, the Court simply

denied his Motions to Proceed IFP, to AppointCounsel, and for a Temporary Restraining

Order as moot, and dismissed his case without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 

Id.

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Plaintiff also mentioned a “Doctor Lewis” at Ironwood State Prison in the body 1

of his Complaint, but Lewis was not named as a Defendant. See Compl. at 6, 7.

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II. Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiff has since filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 9). He argues

venue is proper in the Southern District because he, the Plaintiff, is the “substantial part

of property . . . which is the subject of the action,” and because he used the Latin phrase

“et al.” in the caption of his Complaint to indicate “there are many defendants here at

Centinela and atIronwood State Prison,” who “may live in the City ofImperial,” because

it is “only one hour away” from ISP. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2-3, 5. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for

reconsideration. However, the Court may reconsider matters previously decided under

Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989);

In re Arrowhead Estates Development Co., 42 F.3d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1994). In

Osterneck, the Supreme Court stated that a ruling may be re-considered under Rule 59(e)

motion where it involves “‘matters properly encompassed in a [previous] decision on the

merits.’” 489 U.S. at 174 (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Employ’t Sec., 455

U.S. 445, 451 (1982)). Reconsideration is generally appropriate only if the district court

“(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial

decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling

law.” School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations

omitted).

As noted above, the Court’s August 29, 2014 Order simply dismissed Plaintiff’s

case without prejudice to his refiling it in the proper venue (Doc. No. 7). Plaintiff bears

the burden of showing that venue is proper in the chosen district. Piedmont Label Co.

v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Hope v. Otis

Elevator Co., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1243 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (“Plaintiff has the burden of

proving that venue is proper in the district in which the suit was initiated,” citing Airola

v. King, 505 F. Supp. 30, 31 (D. Ariz. 1980)). “When there are multiple parties and/or

multiple claims in an action, the plaintiff must establish that venue is proper as to each

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defendant and as to each claim.” Kelly v. Echols, Civ. No. F05118 AWI SMS, 2005 WL

2105309, *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2005).

While Plaintiff resides at CEN, which islocated in the Southern District, the court

looks to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) to determine the proper venue. Section 1391(b) does not

depend on Plaintiff’s residency; instead, it provides, in pertinent part, that a “civil action

may be brought in–(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants

are residents of the State in which the district is located;” or “(2) a judicial district in

which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise of the claim occurred, or

a substantial part of property that is subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b). 

Plaintiff first argues that he isthe “property’ which isthe subject of the action, and

that therefore, venue is proper wherever he is situated. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2. Plaintiff’s

Complaint seeks damages and injunctive against prison officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 based on alleged violations of his right to “proper and professional [medical]

care” at ISP. See Compl. at 7. In a tort action like Plaintiff’s, the court looks primarily

to the “locus of the injury” to determine whether venue is proper under § 1391. See

Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Open Road

Ventures, LLC v. Daniel, 2009 WL 2365857, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2009) (“Because

the injury occurred inCalifornia, venue is proper [t]here under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).”);

Williamson v. American Mastiff Breeders Council, 2009 WL 634231, at *7 (D. Nev.

Mar. 6, 2009) (“If a harm suffered by a plaintiff is felt in a specific place, then that place

is one where the actions giving rise to the claim or occurrence happened.”); Mathis v.

County of Lyon, 2007 WL 3230142, at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 24, 2007) (“The locus of the

injury has been deemed to be a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim in

a tort action.”); City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern, 2006 WL 3073172, at *6 (C.D.

Cal. Oct. 24, 2006) (“Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries in the Central District constitute

substantial events giving rise to the cause of action, and thus venue is proper ....”). 

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Next, Plaintiff argues that his use of the term “et al.” in the caption of his pleading

is sufficient to show venue is proper in the Southern District because “there are many

defendants . . . at CEN” who are yet unidentified, but who may be later added as parties

“after he amends his complaint.” See Pl.’s Mot. at 4-5. Plaintiff further suggests that

these persons may reside in San Diego or Imperial Counties because they are “only an

hour away” from ISP in Riverside. Id. at 3.

Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that Plaintiff

specifically name each defendant in the caption of his complaint, however. See

FED.R.CIV.P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties.”). And while

he may have attached the ambiguous phrase “et al.” to the caption in order to suggest an

intent to sue two other “unnamed CDCR employees” he describes only as “doctors,” he

failed to carry his burden to allege that those yet-to-be-identified employees reside in

either San Diego or Imperial Counties. See Compl. at 2; 28 U.S.C. § 84(d); Piedmont

Label Co., 598 F.2d at 496.

Therefore, because the substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to

Plaintiff’s claims of inadequate medical care are alleged to have occurred at ISP in

Riverside County, ISP is where he claims Dr. Lee is employed, and ISP is where Plaintiff

was incarcerated at the time he alleges to have been injured, the Court finds it was

correct to conclude that venue lie in the Central District of California, and not the

Southern District. And because Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration offers no newly

discovered evidence, fails to show clear error, demonstrates no manifest injustice, and

does not identify any intervening change in controlling law which would alter the

Court’s August 29, 2014 conclusion, the Court finds it unavailing. See School Dist.

No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263. 

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No.

9) is DENIED, and this action remains dismissed without prejudice for lack of proper

venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1406(a).

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The Court further CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445

(1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is

permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 21, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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