Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_13-cv-00051/USCOURTS-alsd-2_13-cv-00051-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CAROLYN BATES, :

Plaintiff, :

v. : CA 13-00051-KD-C

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DISPOSITIVE ISSUES 

AND ORDER ON NON-DISPOSITIVE ISSUES

This matter is before the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), 

on the government’s motion for sanctions (doc. 135 at 17-24),

1 the Plaintiff’s response 

(docs. 159 and 160) and the government’s reply (doc. 164); and various other pending 

 1 As stated by the undersigned in Robinson v. Ryla Teleservices, Inc.,

[T]he critical issue in determining whether I have jurisdiction to issue an order, 

pursuant to § 636(b)(1)(A), or a report and recommendation to Judge DuBose, 

pursuant to § 636(b)(1)(B), “is what sanction [I] actually impose[], rather than the 

one requested by the party seeking sanctions.” La Barbera v. ASTC Labs., Inc., No. 

CV 2006-5306(DLI)(MDG), 2007 WL 1423233, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2007) 

(quoting 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3068.2 (2d ed. 1997)); see also Point Blank 

Solutions, Inc. v. Toyobo Am., Inc., No. 09–61166–CIV, 2011 WL 1456029, at *3 (S.D. 

Fla. April 5, 2011) (noting that “[f]ederal magistrate judges in this circuit 

frequently enter orders in cases where parties seek [dispositive] sanctions, 

including default judgments or dismissals, for spoliation”) (emphasis added) 

(listing cases). In La Barbera, Magistrate Judge Go determined not to impose the 

requested sanction of default judgment, and stated that if she had “determine[d]

that the sanction of dismissal [was] appropriate, [she] would [have] convert[ed 

her order] to a report and recommendation for consideration under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b).” 2007 WL 1423233, at *1 (citations omitted); see also Covington v. Patriot 

Motorcycles Corp., No. CV-07-955-PHX-FJM, 2008 WL 1971388, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 

2, 2008) (“If the sanctionable conduct is so egregious[ ] to warrant imposition of a 

dispositive order, such as, striking a defendant’s answer and entering default, a 

magistrate judge may only issue a report and recommendation to the assigned 

district judge.”) (citations omitted).

Robinson, No. CA 11-131-KD-C, 2012 WL 505856, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 19, 2012).

Case 2:13-cv-00051-KD-C Document 167 Filed 08/03/15 Page 1 of 25
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motions and objections filed by the parties (docs. 144, 151, 152, 153, 154 and 155). (See 

doc. 156 (carrying all objections and requests for relief presented in docs. 144, 151, 152, 

153, 154 and 155 to be considered in conjunction with the government’s motion for 

summary judgment.).) The government’s motion for sanctions (doc. 135 at 17-24) is 

DENIED for the reasons discussed herein. The numerous issues raised in documents 

144, 151, 152, 153, 154 and 155 and the undersigned’s rulings with respect to those 

issues are explained below.

Additionally, this matter is before the Magistrate Judge for entry of a report and 

recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), on the motion of the United 

States of America (“United States”) for summary judgment (doc. 135); the Plaintiff’s 

response (docs. 159 and 160); and the United States’ reply (doc. 164). After 

consideration of the motion and briefs, as well as the parties’ filings, it is the Magistrate 

Judge’s RECOMMENDATION that the government’s motion for summary judgment 

be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as discussed below.

United States’ Motion for Sanctions

The government seeks dismissal of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) and 

41(b) as a sanction for the Plaintiff’s discovery violations and failure to prosecute this 

matter. (Doc. 135 at 17-24.) At the outset, the undersigned stresses that this is not a case 

where the Plaintiff failed to pursue her cause of action and allowed her case to 

languish.2 Throughout the pendency of this matter, the Plaintiff has been more than 

active when it comes to submitting motions, objections and various other filings with 

the Court. (See docket sheet.) The Plaintiff, however, has exhibited a reluctance to 

cooperate with the discovery process, and it is that failure to cooperate and, at times, 

 2 However, the Plaintiff did fail to appear in Court for one of the hearings held by 

the undersigned. (See doc. 87 at 2.)

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failure to comply with discovery rules and court orders, that the government seizes 

upon in its motion for sanctions. (Doc. 135 at 17-24.) While the undersigned previously 

addressed the Plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery procedures, (doc. 87), the 

undersigned specifically advised the government—both orally at the August 7, 2014 

hearing and in the Court’s written order—that it should employ compulsory process 

and move to compel compliance if needed. (Id. at 2.) Specifically, the undersigned 

stated as follows:

[B]ecause, thus far, the Plaintiff has failed to cooperate with the discovery 

process, the United States is advised to proceed with discovery through 

the utilization of compulsory process. If the Plaintiff continues to fail to 

comply with discovery procedures, as previously stated by defense 

counsel, the government is to present the Court with a properly supported 

motion to compel.

(Id.) Subsequently, the government failed to seek any relief from this Court during the 

discovery period. (See docket sheet.) In fact, during the entire pendency of this case, 

the government never filed a single motion to compel. (See id.) Instead, the 

government waited until after the discovery period closed and filed a motion to dismiss 

this entire case as a sanction for discovery violations. (Doc. 135 at 17-24.)

The undersigned acknowledges that discovery in this matter was poorly 

conducted and that the Plaintiff was responsible, in part.

3

 However, the government

was complicit in the failure of the discovery process by failing to file a motion to compel 

the Plaintiff’s compliance. Given the government’s failure to file a motion to compel as 

directed by the Court, the undersigned finds that the imposition of such an extreme 

sanction as dismissal is inappropriate and unwarranted. See Robinson, 2012 WL 505856,

 3 The undersigned notes that the Plaintiff has repeatedly accused the government 

of discovery abuses. Regrettably, the parties have spent far too much time and effort placing 

blame on each other and too little time working out their discovery disputes. However, when 

attempts at cooperation are rebuffed and discovery is stalled by failures to comply with 

discovery rules and court orders, as the government contends, the party seeking compliance 

must seek relief from the Court in a properly supported motion to compel. 

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at *2 (“Especially considering that the defendant never moved to compel [the plaintiff’s] 

attendance at her deposition, her conduct does not warrant dismissal—with or without 

prejudice—of her claim.” (emphasis omitted)); Swofford v. Eslinger, No. 6:08-cv-66-Orl35DAB, 2009 WL 1025223, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2009) (“Plaintiffs did not file a timely

motion to compel, which might have served to resolve this issue during the discovery 

period. Sanctions are not warranted.” (citing Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 308 F. App’x 

364, 371, 2009 WL 139507, *4 (11th Cir. 2009) (unpublished))); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Core 

Carriers, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-585-J-20MCR, 2008 WL 686153, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2008) 

(“Defendant made a tactical decision to wait to seek a sanction. As such, [d]efendant is 

partly to blame for the delay in addressing [p]laintiff's behavior and the Court will not 

grant the sanctions requested by [d]efendant at this time.”); Williams v. Grieg Shipping 

A/S, 219 F.R.D. 537, 540 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (“[A]t this juncture, sanctions involving 

expenses and fees for alleged discovery abuses are procedurally invalid because 

[p]laintiff never filed a motion to compel disclosure or discovery.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37)). Accordingly, the government’s motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) and 41(b) is DENIED.

United States’ Motions to Substitute Affidavits 

Submitted in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment

The United States moved to substitute new declarations of Frances S. Davis and 

Brenda M. Howell for the declarations of said individuals filed originally in conjunction 

with the government’s motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 153 and 154.) Ms. Davis’ 

original declaration contained a typed signature, (doc. 135-12), and the government 

moves to substitute it with a declaration that is signed by hand, (doc. 153-1). (Doc. 153.) 

Ms. Howell’s original declaration was filed with several pages missing due to a 

scanning error. (Doc. 135-2.) The government seeks to correct that error by filing the 

Case 2:13-cv-00051-KD-C Document 167 Filed 08/03/15 Page 4 of 25
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complete declaration of Ms. Howell. (Doc. 154-1.) The government’s motions (docs. 

153 and 154) are hereby GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s Various Objections and Requests for Relief

The Plaintiff has filed three documents in which she asserts various objections, 

(docs. 144, 151 and 155), and the government has responded to some of those objections 

(doc. 152). The Plaintiff titles those three filings as motions, but it is not entirely clear 

the relief the Plaintiff seeks. Despite the disorganized and confusing nature of said 

filings, the undersigned has parsed through them and addresses the Plaintiff’s 

arguments herein. Because many of the issues are repeated throughout the three 

filings, the undersigned considers them together.

First, the Plaintiff objects to several of the government’s filings as being untimely. 

These timeliness objections are MOOT because the undersigned either granted the 

government extensions of time before the documents were filed, or the undersigned 

entered orders after the fact stating that the late filings are permitted, (see, e.g., doc. 143 

at 1 n.1.; doc. 149). Furthermore, the undersigned has granted multiple extensions of 

time for both parties in this matter, and neither party has been prejudiced by those 

extensions.

Second, the Plaintiff objects to three declarations filed by the government in 

support of its motions. (Doc. 155, ¶¶ 3, 13-15.) The Plaintiff’s objection with respect to 

Brenda Howell’s declaration is MOOT because that declaration was apparently only 

filed in support of the government’s motion for dismissal as a discovery sanction,4 and 

 4 The government cites to Ms. Howell’s declaration on page 23 of its motion. (Doc. 

135 at 23.) She cites to the declaration—without reference to any specific paragraph in the 

seven-page document—for the proposition that “[the Plaintiff] waited until after her client’s 

hearing to go down to the first floor and report the alleged incident to the guard.” (Id.) The 

impact of that statement for purposes of resolving a motion for discovery sanctions is lost on the 

undersigned. Ms. Howell is a paralegal assisting defense counsel with this case. Her 

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the undersigned denied that motion above. The Plaintiff’s objections with respect to 

Jonathan Lear’s and Frances Davis’ declarations are OVERRULED. The Plaintiff argues 

that said affidavits contain inadmissible evidence, but the Plaintiff has not identified 

inadmissible statements or explained why they are inadmissible. (Id., ¶¶ 14-15.) The 

Plaintiff also argues that Mr. Lear’s and Ms. Davis’ declarations are untimely; however, 

they were timely filed in conjunction with the government’s motion for summary 

judgment. (Doc. 135-5; doc. 135-12.) As discussed above, the government has moved to 

substitute a hand-signed version of Ms. Davis’ declaration, and the undersigned 

granted that motion. The Plaintiff also contends that the government improperly 

withheld Ms. Davis’ declaration during discovery. (Doc. 144, ¶ 23.) However, the 

Plaintiff has not provided any support for that claim, (see id.), and a review of the file 

indicates that Ms. Davis’ declaration was disclosed to the Plaintiff before discovery 

began when the government filed it as an exhibit to the government’s original motion to 

dismiss. (Doc. 12-12.)

The Plaintiff appears to move the Court to enter a default judgment against the 

government as a sanction. (Doc. 144 at 1-2; doc. 151 at 1-2; doc. 155 at 1-2.) To the 

extent the Plaintiff moves for such relief, that motion is unwarranted, lacks sufficient 

factual support and is hereby DENIED.

The Plaintiff states, without any development, that summary judgment should 

be entered in her favor. (Doc. 144 at 1; doc. 151 at 1; doc. 155 at 1-2.) However, to the 

extent the Plaintiff seeks such relief, it is wholly unsupported. The Plaintiff has not 

“identif[ied] each claim or defense . . . on which summary judgment is sought,” as 

 declaration consists of a lengthy recounting of the information gathered from interviewing 

witnesses during the investigation of this case. (See doc. 154-1.) The government never explains 

the significance of the declaration with regard to advancing the motions pending before the 

Court, and the government never explains how the contents would be reduced to an admissible 

form at trial. It is easily disregarded. 

Case 2:13-cv-00051-KD-C Document 167 Filed 08/03/15 Page 6 of 25
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required by Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Plaintiff also failed to “show[] that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” as required by the Rule. Id. Without 

providing any factual or legal support and without following any of the procedures 

associated with a motion for summary judgment, the undersigned cannot construe the 

Plaintiff’s demands for judgment as a matter of law and references to Rule 56, (see doc. 

144 at 1; doc. 151 at 1; doc. 155 at 1-2), as a properly filed motion for summary 

judgment.

The Plaintiff filed an exhibit (doc. 151-4), which appears to contain medical and 

other confidential information. The Plaintiff has moved to maintain that exhibit under 

seal. (Doc. 151 at 1.) Said motion is GRANTED and the clerk is directed to maintain 

document 151-4 under seal. 

The undersigned now turns to the government’s motion for summary judgment.

United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment

As stated above, the undersigned has considered the government’s motion for 

summary judgment and hereby submits the following report and recommendation on 

said motion to the District Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

Background

The Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, asserts claims of negligence, wantonness5 and 

negligent infliction of emotional distress against the United States pursuant to the 

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) and §§ 2671 et seq. (Doc. 17.) 

The FTCA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity whereby a plaintiff may 

sue the United States for personal injuries caused by employees of the United States 

“under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to 

 5 As discussed further below, Count II of the Amended Complaint is labeled as a 

gross negligence claim, but is, in fact, a wantonness claim.

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the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission 

occurred.” § 1346(b)(1). Here, the Plaintiff’s claims arise out of an incident that 

occurred on August 27, 2009, at the federal courthouse in Selma, Alabama. (Doc. 135-3.) 

Therefore, Alabama law governs the Plaintiff’s claims. See Stone v. United States, 373 

F.3d 1129, 1130 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“The [FTCA] was designed to provide 

redress for ordinary torts recognized by state law. . . . As the alleged tort here occurred 

in Florida, Florida tort law applies.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Findings of Fact6

On August 27, 2009, the Plaintiff appeared at the federal courthouse in Selma, 

Alabama, for a disability hearing where she served as the representative of a disability 

claimant. (Doc. 135-3; doc. 159 at 70.) The disability claimant’s parents, Marvin and 

Bernetta Shields, were also present that day. While waiting in the second floor hallway 

of the courthouse, the Plaintiff started to sit down on one of the courthouse benches. 

(Doc. 135-3 at 1.) However, as the Plaintiff sat down, the bench tipped over causing the 

Plaintiff to fall to the floor, and the bench then fell on top of the Plaintiff. (Doc. 135-1 at 

1.) The bench had not been fastened or secured to the floor. (Id.) Marvin and Bernetta 

Shields lifted the bench off of the Plaintiff and helped the Plaintiff to her feet. (Doc. 159 

 6 The undersigned notes that the facts outlined herein are not actual findings of 

fact, but merely a statement of the facts cast in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff for 

purposes of determining whether the United States is entitled to judgment as a matter of law at 

the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. See Manning v. Tractor Supply Co., Civil Action 

No. 14-00366-KD-M, 2015 WL 1578158, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 9, 2015) (“On summary 

judgment, the Court must ‘resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the [non-movant], and 

then determine the legal question of whether the [movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law under that version of the facts.’” (quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 

2004))); Perry v. United States, No. 1:11-CV-2747-VEH, 2012 WL 4340057, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 

18, 2012) (“This statement does not represent actual findings of fact” (citing In re Celotex Corp., 

487 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007))). 

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at 71, 76, 79.)7 The Plaintiff then reported the incident to Officer Bettie Davis, who 

reported the incident to Sergeant Ernest Barnes of the Federal Protection Service. (Doc. 

135-1 at 1-2; doc. 135-3 at 1; doc. 159 at 97.) Later that day, the Plaintiff presented to the 

emergency room at Vaughan Regional Medical Center with complaints of neck and 

back pain radiating to her right hip and right leg. (Doc. 159 at 87-91.) She was 

prescribed pain medication by the emergency medicine physician, (id. at 91), and she 

subsequently underwent additional treatment related to her injuries, (see, e.g. doc. 159 at 

51-56).

According to Sergeant Barnes, Officer Maurice Stevenson—another security 

officer at the courthouse—reported that the same bench that flipped over on the 

Plaintiff also flipped over on another individual. (Doc. 159 at 97.) Sergeant Barnes did 

not state whether the other incident with the bench occurred before or after Plaintiff’s

incident. (Id.) In any event, Sergeant Barnes subsequently arranged for all the benches 

at the courthouse to be bolted to the floor to prevent any further such incidents. (Id.)

8

 7 The government objects to all excerpts from deposition transcripts attached to 

the Plaintiff’s response brief, including excerpts from the depositions of Marvin and Bernetta 

Shields, on the grounds that those deposition excerpts are unauthenticated and uncertified and 

because pages are omitted and the excerpts are not presented in chronological order. (Doc. 164 

at 3.) First, exhibits used at the summary judgment stage need not be authenticated or 

otherwise presented in admissible form; rather, they must be capable of being reduced to an 

admissible form at the time of trial. Johnson v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., Civil Action No. 13-

0431-WS-M, 2015 WL 1538774, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 7, 2015); Abbott v. Elwood Staffing Services, 

Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1133-35 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (explaining that, under the 2010 amendments 

to Rule 56, authentication of documents is no longer required). The government offers no 

reason why the testimony contained in the deposition excerpts cannot be reduced to an 

admissible form. Second, although the undersigned agrees that the excerpts were incorporated 

into the Plaintiff’s brief in a confusing manner, the undersigned finds that they are sufficiently 

comprehensible and may be considered by the Court on summary judgment. See O’Hara v. 

Univ. of W. Fla, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (concluding that parties are not 

required to file unabridged certified copies of depositions in support or in opposition to a 

motion for summary judgment). 

8 Jonathan Kevin Lear, the General Services Administration’s building manager 

for the federal courthouse in Selma, is not aware of this other incident involving the courthouse 

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Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.

Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) (“The mere existence of some alleged factual 

dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for 

summary judgment.”); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) 

(“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate even if ‘some alleged factual dispute’ between the 

parties remains, so long as there is ‘no genuine issue of material fact.’”). 

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of informing 

the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based upon the discovery 

instruments outlined in Rule 56(c), that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); see also Allen v. Bd. of Pub. 

Educ., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The moving party bears the initial burden of 

showing the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of 

material fact that should be decided at trial.”). Once this initial demonstration is made, 

the “responsibility then devolves upon the non-movant[s] to show the existence of a 

genuine issue . . . [of] material fact.” Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th 

Cir. 1993); see also Allen, 495 F.3d at 1314 (“‘When a moving party has discharged its 

burden, the non-moving party must then “go beyond the pleadings,” and by its own 

affidavits, or by “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” 

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”); see Comer v. 

 bench. (See doc. 135-5.) He stated that the incident reported by Ms. Bates is the only incident he 

is aware of involving a courthouse bench moving or tipping when an individual sat down. (Id.) 

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City of Palm Bay, 265 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Once the moving party 

discharges its initial burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence to support 

the non-moving party’s case, the non-moving party must specify facts proving the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial confirmed by affidavits, 

‘”depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.”’”).

Forbidding reliance upon pleadings precludes a party from “choos[ing] to 

wait until trial to develop claims or defenses relevant to the summary 

judgment motion.” This effectuates the purpose of summary judgment 

which “‘is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see 

whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Thus, “mere general 

allegations which do not reveal detailed and precise facts” will not 

prevent the award of summary judgment upon a court’s determination 

that no genuine issue for trial exists.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 592 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal 

citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. Resolution Trust Corp., 516 U.S. 817, 116 S.

Ct. 74, 133 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1995); see also LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 

835 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[The nonmoving party] must raise ‘significant probative evidence’ 

that would be sufficient for a jury to find for that party.”). In other words, there is no 

genuine issue for trial “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 

trier of fact to find for the non-moving party[.]” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); see Comer, 265 

F.3d at 1192 (“Summary judgment is required where the non-moving party’s response 

to a motion is merely ‘a repetition of his conclusional allegations’ and is unsupported 

by evidence showing an issue for trial.”).

As stated above, in considering whether the United States is entitled to summary 

judgment in this case, the Court has viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the 

Plaintiff. Comer, 265 F.3d at 1192 (“We view the evidence and all factual inferences 

raised by it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all 

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reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-moving party.”). 

The requirement to view the facts in the nonmoving party’s favor extends 

only to “genuine” disputes over material facts. A genuine dispute requires 

more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” A “mere 

scintilla” of evidence is insufficient; the non-moving party must produce 

substantial evidence in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 

Garczynski, 573 F.3d at 1165 (internal citations omitted).

Conclusions of Law

I. Negligence (Count I)

“In a negligence action asserted under the FTCA, a plaintiff . . . must show the 

prima facie elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.” Perry v. United 

States, No. 1:11-CV-2747-VEH, 2012 WL 4340057, at *2 (citing Sessions v. Nonnenmann, 

842 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. 2002); DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Elec. Membership Corp., 988 So. 2d 

454, 460 (Ala. 2008)). “More specifically, this is a premises liability case . . . [and] ‘[t]he 

duty owed by a landowner to an injured party depends upon the status of the injured 

party in relation to the landowner's land, i.e., is the injured party a trespasser, a licensee, 

or an invitee.” Manning, 2015 WL 1578158, at *2 (quoting Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Davis, 58 

So. 3d 93, 98 (Ala. 2010)). Here, the parties agree and the undersigned agrees that the 

Plaintiff was an invitee. (See doc. 159 at 4; doc. 135 at 11-17.)9 At the time of the 

incident, the Plaintiff was an invitee and, more specifically, a business invitee, because 

she was at the courthouse to contribute to a legal proceeding as a representative for a 

claimant during a hearing before the Social Security Administration. See Freeman v. 

Freeman, 67 So. 3d 902, 907-08 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (“A business visitor is a person who 

is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with 

 9 The United States did not conclusively state that the Plaintiff was an invitee; 

however, it argued its motion within the context of the duties owed to an invitee and in reliance 

on cases dealing with invitees. (Doc. 135 at 11-17.) Accordingly, the undersigned construes the 

United States’ motion as a concession that the Plaintiff was an invitee.

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business dealings of the possessor of the land. On the other hand, a person who enters 

the land of another with the landowner’s consent or as the landowner’s guest, but 

without a business purpose, holds the legal status of a licensee.” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)). A premises owner owes an invitee

a duty to “use reasonable care and diligence to keep the premises in a safe 

condition or, if the premises [are] in a dangerous condition, to give 

sufficient warning so that an invitee might avoid danger by the use of 

ordinary care.” Hunter v. Durr Sys., Inc., 2007 WL 1215075, at *2 (M.D.Ala. 

Apr. 24, 2007). This duty does not extend to “open and obvious” dangers,

however. Id.

In premises liability cases, “[t]here is no presumption of negligence 

which arises from the mere fact of an injury to an invitee[,]” and a 

premises owner is not an insurer of the safety of its invitees. Ex parte 

Harold L. Martin Distrib. Co., 769 So. 2d 313, 314 (Ala. 2000). See also Giles v. 

Winn–Dixie Montg., LLC, 574 Fed. Appx. 892, 894 (11th Cir. 2014) (same). 

Manning, 2015 WL 1578158, at *2-3. 

In this case, the Plaintiff alleges that the government was negligent by failing to 

maintain the courthouse floor and benches in a reasonably safe condition. (Doc. 17 at 3-

4.) Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that the government breached its duty of care (1) by 

failing to ensure that the courthouse benches were secured to the floor; (2) by allowing 

the floor to be wet; and (3) by allowing the floor to be in disrepair. (Id.) The Plaintiff 

further alleges that the government breached its duty of care by failing to post signs in 

the second floor hallway warning of the unsecured benches, the wetness of the floor, 

and the disrepair of the floor. (Id.)

a. Wetness and disrepair of the floor

The government argues that there is no evidence of the floors being wet or in 

disrepair. (Doc. 135 at 17.) The undersigned agrees. Although the Plaintiff asserts in 

her response brief that the floor was wet and in disrepair, the Plaintiff provides no 

sworn statement or declaration from any witness attesting to those facts. (See doc. 159 

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at 82.)10 Instead, the Plaintiff relies on a photograph that apparently displays the floor 

in the second floor hallway of the courthouse. (Id. at 83.) However, it is in no way 

evident from the photograph that the floor is wet or in disrepair. Furthermore, the 

photograph is undated and there is no way the Court can determine whether the 

photograph reflects the condition of the floor at the time of the incident on August 27, 

2009. (See id.) Even if the undersigned concluded that the photograph constituted 

competent evidence supporting the wetness and disrepair of the floor at the time of the 

incident, such evidence would be irrelevant to the Plaintiff’s claims because the Plaintiff 

has not made any showing connecting the alleged wetness or disrepair of the floor to 

her injuries. (See id. at 82-83.)

Because the undersigned finds that the Plaintiff has failed to present substantial 

evidence that the floor was wet and in disrepair at the time of the incident in question, 

the undersigned RECOMMENDS that summary judgment be GRANTED in favor of 

the government on the issue of whether the government negligently maintained the 

courthouse floor.

b. Condition of the bench

Whereas the evidence fails to support the Plaintiff’s claims that the floor was wet 

and in disrepair, the evidence clearly establishes that the benches in the second floor 

hallway, including the bench at issue, were not secured to the floor on August 27, 2009. 

(Doc. 135-3 at 1; doc. 159 at 97.) However, the government suggests that summary 

judgment should be granted in its favor because the tipping of the bench was an open 

and obvious condition. (See doc. 135 at 13 (“[O]ther factors to consider are whether the 

tilting/tipping of the bench/pew constituted an open and obvious condition[.]”).) A 

 10 Notably, the Plaintiff’s affidavit includes no mention of the floor being wet or in 

disrepair at the time of her fall. (See 135-3.)

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premises owner does not owe an invitee a duty to warn of dangers that are open and 

obvious. Manning, 2015 WL 1578158, at *2. However, the government has not 

established that it should have been obvious to the Plaintiff that the bench at issue in 

this case was dangerous and could flip on top of her if she sat on it. (See doc. 135 at 12-

13.) Furthermore, the cases cited by the government addressing open and obvious 

conditions involved mechanical bulls, Lilya v. Greater Gulf State Fair, Inc., 855 So. 2d 

1049, 1055 (Ala. 2003), excavated land, Ex parte Mountain Top Indoor Flea Market, Inc., 699 

So. 2d 158, 160 (Ala. 1997), a hole in the asphalt of a parking lot, Douglas v. Devonshire 

Apartments, L.L.C., 833 So. 2d 72, 74-75 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), and the roof of a house the 

plaintiff was repairing, Knight v. Seale, 530 So. 2d 821, 821-22 (Ala. 1988). This case is 

easily distinguishable from those cases involving obvious dangerous conditions. 

Accordingly, the government has not shown that summary judgment should be granted 

on the grounds that the bench was an open and obvious condition. 

Next the government argues that the Plaintiff’s fall from the bench resulted from 

her contributory negligence. (Doc. 135 at 13-15.) “While the question of contributory 

negligence is normally one for the jury, if the facts are such that all reasonable people 

would logically have to reach the conclusion that the plaintiff was contributorily 

negligent, then contributory negligence may be found as a matter of law.” Serio v. 

Merrell, Inc., 941 So. 2d 960, 964 (Ala. 2006) (citations omitted). “In order to establish 

contributory negligence, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff 1) 

had knowledge of the dangerous condition; 2) had an appreciation of the danger under 

the surrounding circumstances; and 3) failed to exercise reasonable care, by placing 

h[er]self in the way of danger.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The government has not met this burden. The government relies on the declaration of 

Frances S. Davis, who stated that the Plaintiff’s hands were full when she sat on the 

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bench, that the bench only tipped forward slightly when the Plaintiff sat on it, that the 

Plaintiff did not fall, and that the bench did not fall on the Plaintiff. (Doc. 135 at 14-15 

(citing doc. 135-12).) The government argues that the Plaintiff “contributed negligently 

to her own injuries by not maintaining a proper lookout and/or carrying too many 

items in preparation for the hearing.” (Doc. 135 at 14.) Notably, the government 

provided no evidence that the Plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout, nor has the 

government explained the need for maintaining a proper lookout while sitting on a 

bench. (Id.) Furthermore, there is no evidence connecting the Plaintiff’s fall to her 

“carrying too many items” because Ms. Davis, the witness who stated the Plaintiff’s 

hands were full, also stated that the Plaintiff did not fall at all. (Doc. 135-12, ¶ 7.) 

Clearly, there is a genuine dispute among the parties as to whether or not the Plaintiff 

fell. Given that persistent factual dispute, the undersigned finds that a determination 

regarding contributory negligence is not appropriate at summary judgment and, 

instead, should be rendered by the trier of fact. 

The government also argues that summary judgment should be granted in its 

favor because the Plaintiff has not produced evidence that the government had actual 

or constructive notice of the danger posed by the bench. (Doc. 135 at 15-17.) In 

response, the Plaintiff cites to the declaration of Sergeant Barnes as evidence that the 

bench had injured another individual and, thus, the government had notice that the 

bench was a defective condition. (Doc. 159 at 96-97.) Sergeant Barnes stated that 

Officer Stevenson reported another incident in which the bench flipped over on an 

individual. (Id. at 97.) In a footnote of the government’s reply brief, the government 

questioned the reliability, veracity and authenticity of Sergeant Barnes’ declaration. 

(Doc. 164 n.3.) Specifically, the government asserts, and the undersigned agrees, that 

the declaration is formatted suspiciously. (Id.) The government also contends that the 

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declaration “include[s] an untrue statement,” (id.), but the government fails to identify 

the false statement or explain why it is false, (id.). Significantly, the government has not 

moved to strike the declaration on any grounds. Based on the undersigned’s own 

review of Sergeant Barnes’ declaration, it appears that Sergeant Barnes’ statements 

regarding a separate incident involving the bench do not appear to be based on 

Sergeant Barnes’ personal knowledge, but, rather, on a report by Officer Stevenson. (See 

doc. 159 at 97.) The government, however, has not objected to the declaration on that 

basis or otherwise challenged the declaration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) or 

56(c)(4). (See doc. 164.) The undersigned declines to do so on the government’s behalf. 

In any event, the undersigned rejects the government’s notice argument without relying 

on Sergeant Barnes’ declaration as evidence that the government had notice of the 

condition of the bench. 

A plaintiff asserting a premises liability action is not always required to show 

evidence of notice to survive summary judgment. See Manning, 2015 WL 1578158, at *3 

(citing Isbell v. Aztecas Mexican Grill, 78 So. 3d 420, 423 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)). The 

Alabama Supreme Court distinguishes cases involving slips and falls on wet surfaces 

from cases involving a defect or instrumentality that is part of the premises. Mims v. 

Jack’s Restaurant, 565 So. 2d 609, 610-11 (Ala. 1990). As the supreme court explained in 

Mims, 

[i]n . . . slip and fall cases, a plaintiff not only must make a prima facie 

showing that her fall was caused by a defect or instrumentality (a 

substance causing a surface to be slick) located on the premises, but she 

must also present prima facie evidence that the defendant had or should 

have had notice of the defect or instrumentality at the time of the accident. 

Massey v. Allied Products Co., 523 So. 2d 397 (Ala. 1988); Tice v. Tice, 361 So.

2d 1051 (Ala. 1978). On the other hand, in cases where the alleged defect is 

a part of the premises (in this case, a loose threshold in the main entrance 

of a restaurant), once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that a 

defect in a part of the premises has caused an injury, then the question 

whether the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the defect will 

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go to the jury, regardless of whether the plaintiff makes a prima facie 

showing that the defendant had or should have had notice of the defect at 

the time of the accident. For example, in Winn–Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. 

Weeks, 504 So. 2d 1210 (Ala. 1987), a mother was going through a grocery 

store pushing a shopping cart, in which her son was sitting. The only 

unusual thing she noticed about the cart was that the wheels made a loud 

noise and were wobbly. While she left the cart for a moment, the child 

leaned over to reach for candy in a display rack, and, as he did so, the cart 

tilted over and his left cheek was impaled on an allegedly broken wire 

that was sticking up on the display rack. The defendants, appealing from 

a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, argued that 

there was no evidence that they had constructive notice of the defect. This 

Court affirmed, holding that the question whether the grocery store had 

constructive notice of the alleged defect was for the jury. Winn–Dixie 

Montgomery, Inc. v. Weeks, 504 So. 2d at 1211.

In both this case and in Weeks, the alleged defect or instrumentality 

was a part of the premises. Unlike a spilled substance, a defective 

threshold or a cart or a display rack is a fixture that requires ordinary and 

reasonable maintenance in order to provide safe premises for the store's 

customers. Because it was the main entrance of the restaurant, we find 

that the question whether [the restaurant] should have known that the 

threshold was defective was a question for the jury.

Mims, 565 So. 2d at 610-11. Subsequently, in Isbell, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

followed Mims and concluded that the trier of fact should determine whether a 

premises owner had notice of an alleged defect in a booth seat that collapsed. Isbell, 78 

So. 3d at 425. Specifically, that court stated as follows:

Given our supreme court's holding in Mims . . . , we must agree with [the 

plaintiff] that, because the booth seat that collapsed under him was a 

fixture or “a part of the premises,” the issue whether [the owner] had 

actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect in the booth seat should 

“go to the jury, regardless [of the fact that [the plaintiff] failed to make] a 

prima facie showing that [the owner] had or should have had notice of the 

defect at the time of the accident.” 565 So. 2d at 610. For that reason, we 

reverse the summary judgment in favor of [the owner] and remand the 

cause for further proceedings.

Isbell, 78 So. 3d at 425.

Like the restaurant entrance in Mims, the shopping cart in Weeks, and the booth 

seat in Isbell, the bench in this case “is a fixture that requires ordinary and reasonable 

maintenance in order to provide [a] safe premises.” Mims, 565 So. 2d at 611. As such, 

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the question of whether the government should have known that the unsecured bench 

was a defective condition is for the trier of fact. See id.; Isbell, 78 So. 3d at 425; see also

Perry, 2012 WL 4340057, at *2-3 (rejecting the government’s argument that summary 

judgment was warranted due to the lack of notice where the plaintiff was struck by an 

overhead fire door).11 

c. Causation and damages

In its reply, the government includes a discussion of the facts relating to the 

issues of causation and damages. (Doc. 164 at 3-7.) Though not entirely clear, the 

undersigned presumes that the government means to argue that it is entitled to 

summary judgment because there is no genuine dispute of material fact with regard to 

those issues and the Court should conclude that the Plaintiff cannot prove those 

 11 The undersigned notes that the Plaintiff may have insufficient evidence to 

establish that the unsecured courthouse bench constituted a defective condition. See Manning, 

2015 WL 1578158, at *4 (“The problem is, there is insufficient evidence that the shelf was even 

defective.”); Burlington Coat Factory of Ala., LLC v. Butler, 156 So. 3d 963 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) 

(concluding that the trial court erred when it denied the defendant’s motion for judgment as a 

matter of law following the close of evidence at trial because “the jury had no evidence before it 

to support an inference that the brackets were defective or dangerous or that they had been 

improperly installed”). The government, however, failed to assert such an argument, (see doc. 

135; doc. 164), and the undersigned declines to develop that argument on the government’s 

behalf. The closest the government comes to such an argument is where it states that “[t]here 

could be no breach of duty to inspect the bench at issue in this case because a reasonable 

inspection would not have revealed the bench could topple on a person trying to sit on it, which 

is supported by the fact no such incident had ever been reported the entire time the benches 

have been in the hallway.” (Doc. 135 at 16.) The government cites to no evidence supporting its 

assertion that “a reasonable inspection would not have revealed the bench could topple” when 

a person sits down. (Id.) Furthermore, the government cites to no evidence supporting its 

assertion that no other incidents have been reported. (Id.) Aside from the fact that the 

government’s statement conflicts with Sergeant Barnes’ declaration—the value of which the 

undersigned questions above—the government has not shown that another incident involving 

the bench flipping over has never been reported. Presumably, the government means to rely on 

the declaration of Mr. Lear, the GSA building manager for the courthouse, who stated that he is 

not aware of any such reports before or after the Plaintiff’s incident on August 27, 2009. (Doc. 

135-5, ¶ 3 (misnumbered as paragraph 2).) However, Mr. Lear stated that he did not become 

the building manager for the courthouse until August 2009, (id., ¶ 2), and he had the bench 

bolted to the floor following the Plaintiff’s incident, (id., ¶ 8 (misnumbered as paragraph 7).) 

Thus, Mr. Lear’s statement apparently applies to a rather short window of time and hardly 

establishes for purposes of summary judgment that another incident with the bench has never 

been reported. 

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elements of her claim. To the extent the government asserts such an argument, it comes 

too late because it was not asserted in the government’s motion. (See doc. 135.)12 

Arguments raised for the first time in a reply are improper and ordinarily will not be 

considered by the Court. See, e.g., Thomas v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 829 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 

1171 (S.D. Ala. 2011). Therefore, the undersigned rejects the Plaintiff’s newly asserted 

arguments on that basis. Moreover, even if the government’s arguments were timely 

raised, the undersigned would find that they lack merit.

The government boldly asserts, “Plaintiff has not provided any credible or 

reliable evidence that the bench fell on her.” (Doc. 164 at 3.) While the government 

surely will present an argument of this kind at trial, it is not well received on summary 

judgment. The Plaintiff stated in her affidavit and Marvin and Bernetta Shields testified 

at their depositions that the Plaintiff fell and that the bench fell on top of her. (Doc. 135-

1 at 1; doc. 159 at 71, 76, 79.)13 Such evidence clearly suffices for the purpose of 

summary judgment.

Additionally, the government states that the Plaintiff has not provided any 

expert testimony establishing that her alleged injuries were caused by the fall at issue. 

(Doc. 164 at 5.) However, the government did not provide any legal authority 

supporting the proposition that expert testimony is required to link the Plaintiff’s 

medical injuries to the fall she allegedly sustained at the courthouse, (see id. at 3-7), and 

 12 The undersigned acknowledges that, in the section of the government’s motion 

seeking dismissal of the Plaintiff’s case for failure to prosecute and as a discovery sanction, the 

government included sporadic statements arguing that the Plaintiff was not injured as a result 

of the incident at the courthouse. (Doc. 135 at 17-24.) Those statements could not be fairly 

characterized as legal argument, and certainly do not consist of a coherent argument seeking 

summary judgment.

13 The government attacks the form of the deposition excerpts filed by the Plaintiff 

in opposition to the government’s motion for summary judgment. The undersigned rejected 

that attack above. See supra note 7.

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the undersigned has not discovered any such authority. See Taylor v. Pezold Management 

Assocs., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-188-WKW, 2015 WL 914906, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2015)

(concluding in a premises liability case that the plaintiff was not required to provide 

expert testimony to provide the causal link between a defective condition and the 

plaintiff’s injuries). 

The government’s damages argument is more difficult to follow. (See doc. 164 at 

4-7. The government clearly disputes the Plaintiff’s claim that the injuries documented 

in her medical records were caused by the incident with the bench at the courthouse. 

However, that factual dispute is for the trier of fact. The government has articulated no 

meaningful legal argument why summary judgment should be granted in the 

government’s favor due to the facts related to damages in this case. (See id.)

14 While the 

Plaintiff may ultimately have difficulty proving damages to the extent alleged and 

demonstrating that those damages were caused by the incident at the courthouse, the 

Plaintiff has made an adequate showing of causation and damages to survive summary 

judgment. (See, e.g., doc. 159 at 51 (“Mechanism of injury – trauma: sat on a bench and 

the bench fell forward onto her.”).) 

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED by the undersigned that the government’s 

motion for summary judgment be DENIED with respect to the Plaintiff’s claim that the 

government negligently failed to maintain the courthouse benches in a reasonably safe 

condition. 

II. Wantonness (Count II)

The Plaintiff labels Count II of the Amended Complaint “Gross Negligence.” 

 14 To the extent the government’s argument rests on its contention that the medical 

records filed by the Plaintiff fail to establish damages for summary judgment because they are 

not authenticated, the government’s argument fails for the reasons stated above in footnote 7. 

See supra note 7 (explaining with citation to authority that the Defendant is not required to 

authenticate exhibits filed in opposition to the government’s motion for summary judgment).

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(Doc. 17 at 5-6.) However, based on the allegations in Count II, the Plaintiff actually has 

stated a wantonness claim. (See id.) 

“Under Alabama law, gross negligence is a degree of negligence; it is not the 

same as wantonness.” Craft v. Triumph Logistics, Inc., --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2015 WL 

1565003, at *7 n.* (M.D. Ala. Apr. 8, 2015) (citing Miller v. Bailey, 60 So. 3d 857, 867 (Ala. 

2010) (“Gross negligence is negligence, not wantonness.”); Armistead v. Lenkeit, 160 So. 

257, 259 (Ala. 1935) (“Gross negligence is defined as a want of slight care, as 

distinguished from ordinary care, on the one hand, and less culpable than wanton 

injury, on the other.”)); accord Belk v. Thompson, No. 2:11-cv-415-MEF, 2012 WL 353763, 

at *2 n.1 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 2012) (“Gross negligence is merely a greater degree of 

negligence[,] . . . and cannot be construed as a claim of wantonness, which is a 

qualitatively different tort concept of actionable culpability.” (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted)); Ex parte Anderson, 682 So. 2d 467, 470 (Ala. 1996) 

(“Wantonness is not merely a higher degree of culpability than negligence. Negligence 

and wantonness, plainly and simply, are qualitatively different tort concepts of 

actionable culpability. Implicit in wanton, willful, or reckless misconduct is an acting, 

with knowledge of danger, or with consciousness, that the doing or not doing of some 

act will likely result in injury. . . .” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

As the Alabama Supreme Court stated,

“Wantonness” is statutorily defined as “[c]onduct which is carried on with 

a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Ala.

Code 1975, § 6–11–20(b)(3). “Wantonness” has been defined by this Court 

as the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty, while 

knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing 

or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result. 

Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So. 2d 1250, 1256 (Ala. 1998) (citing Bozeman v. 

Central Bank of the South, 646 So. 2d 601 (Ala. 1994)).

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Here, the Plaintiff alleges in Count II that the United States breached its duty to 

the Plaintiff “by wantonly, willfully and recklessly failing to provide safe floors, dry 

floors and safely secured and fastened pews.” (Id., ¶ 32.) Thus, the Plaintiff alleges the 

type of conduct—willful and reckless conduct—associated with a claim for wantonness, 

not gross negligence. Accordingly, despite the fact that the Plaintiff refers to Count II as 

a gross negligence claim, it is, in fact, a wantonness claim. 

The government did not raise an argument as to whether summary judgment 

should be granted with respect to Count II. (See doc. 135.)15 However, a review of the 

record reveals that there is no evidence that the government exhibited a conscious or 

reckless disregard for the safety of others or that the government knew that injury was 

likely to result from its acts or omissions. Accordingly, the Plaintiff lacks sufficient 

evidence to move forward on her wantonness claim and judgment with respect to that 

claim should be entered as a matter of law. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED by the 

undersigned that summary judgment be GRANTED in favor of the government on the 

Plaintiff’s wantonness claim (Count II).16

III. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count III)

Although the government did not present any argument regarding the Plaintiff’s 

negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, said claim is due to be dismissed 

because “’[n]egligent infliction of emotional distress is not actionable in Alabama.’” 

 15 The undersigned notes that the government correctly argues that the Plaintiff 

cannot recover punitive damages in a claim asserted under the FTCA, see 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (“The 

United States . . . shall not be liable [in an FTCA claim] . . . for punitive damages.”), but also 

notes that the Plaintiff has not asserted a claim for punitive damages in the Amended 

Complaint, (doc. 17).

16 Furthermore, as discussed above, the Plaintiff has not put forth substantial 

evidence that the courthouse floor was wet or in disrepair. Therefore, the allegations of 

wantonness in Count II relating to the alleged wetness and unsafe condition of the floor—as 

opposed to the condition of the bench—are unsupported on that basis as well.

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Manning, 2015 WL 1578158, at *6 (citing Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 

545 n.3 (1994); Wilson v. Doss, 2012 WL 5877854, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 21, 2012)) (other 

citations omitted). Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED by the undersigned that Count 

III of the Amended Complaint (doc. 17 at 6-7) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ORDERED by the undersigned that 

the government’s motion for the entry of dismissal as a sanction (doc. 135 at 17-24) is 

DENIED; and the government’s motions to substitute the affidavits of Brenda Howell 

and Frances Davis (docs. 153 and 154) are GRANTED. The Plaintiff’s motion for a 

default judgment (doc. 144 at 1-2; doc. 151 at 1-2; doc. 155 at 1-2) is DENIED; the 

Plaintiff’s motion to maintain document 151-4 under seal (doc. 151) is GRANTED; and 

the Plaintiff’s various objections are either MOOT or OVERRULED.

Additionally, for the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED by the 

undersigned that the government’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 135 at 1-17) be 

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Summary judgment should be 

GRANTED in favor of the government on the issue of whether the government 

negligently maintained the floor on the second floor hallway of the courthouse. 

However, summary judgment should be DENIED on the issue of whether the 

government negligently maintained the bench at issue in this case. Thus, Plaintiff’s 

negligence claim (Count I) should proceed only as it relates to the condition of the 

bench. Summary Judgment should be GRANTED in favor of the government on 

Plaintiff’s wantonness claim (Count II), and the Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction 

of emotional distress (Count III) should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this order and report and recommendation shall be served on all 

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parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this order and 

recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service 

of this document, file specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. L.R. 72.4. The parties should note that 

under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s 

findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance 

with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the 

district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party 

was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for 

failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on 

appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to 

be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which 

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is 

found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing 

before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

DONE and ORDERED this the 31st day of July 2015.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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