Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05121/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05121-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 14, 2010 Decided January 11, 2011

No. 09-5121

CYNTHIA ARTIS, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

BEN S. BERNANKE, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 

OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:01-cv-00400)

Walter T. Charlton argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellants.

Kenneth M. Willner argued the cause for appellee. With 

him on the brief were Richard M. Ashton and Katherine H. 

Wheatley, Associate General Counsel, Board of Governors of 

the Federal Reserve System, and John L. Kuray, Senior 

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Counsel. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 

entered an appearance.

Before: BROWN, GRIFFITH and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Appellants are members of a 

putative class of secretaries employed currently and formerly

by the Federal Reserve Board. They claim the Board 

systematically discriminated against them on account of their 

race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The district court dismissed the 

complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Because we conclude the secretaries completed informal 

counseling in a manner sufficient to give the Board an 

opportunity to investigate their claims, we vacate the district 

court’s dismissal of their complaint.

I

Some of these secretaries appeared before us in 1998 

when we affirmed the district court’s dismissal of their first 

putative class action without prejudice, due to their failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies. Artis v. Greenspan (Artis I), 

158 F.3d 1301, 1306–08 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Board regulations 

provide that “[a]ggrieved persons who believe they have been 

discriminated against on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 

national origin, age or disability must consult a Counselor prior 

to filing a complaint in order to try to informally resolve the 

matter.” 12 C.F.R. § 268.104(a). In Artis I, we held the putative 

class failed to complete counseling before bringing their 

claims of agency-wide discrimination. The would-be class 

agents, who were all employed in a single division of the 

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Board, had failed to “identify any agency-wide discriminatory 

personnel practices” in counseling. 158 F.3d at 1308. Instead, 

“[t]he four named complainants only addressed Board-wide 

complaints by way of asking for data on other secretaries.” Id.

at 1307.

While the Board’s motion to dismiss was pending in Artis 

I, the same putative class initiated a new round of 

counseling—this time represented by secretaries employed 

throughout the Board. 1 The Board’s Equal Employment 

Opportunity (“EEO”) counselors held group counseling 

sessions on January 15 and February 13, 1997, attended by 

several of the secretaries and their counsel. No 

contemporaneous record of the group counseling sessions 

exists.

On January 17, 1997, in response to the Board’s request 

for information at the January 15 group counseling session, the 

secretaries submitted fourteen identical copies of a document 

entitled “Resubmission of Class-Action Complaint.” In that 

document, the secretaries alleged “a systematic and pervasive 

pattern of discrimination against African-American . . . 

secretaries” by the Board. In particular, the secretaries claimed 

the Board paid them lower salaries than non-minority 

secretaries, awarded them fewer and smaller bonuses, granted 

them fewer promotions, deflated their performance appraisals, 

denied them privileges and training that non-minority 

secretaries enjoyed, unfairly enforced leave procedures against 

them, and discriminated against them in the quantity and 

quality of work assignments.

 1 For example, Barbara Carter was employed in the Bank Operations 

Division, Donna Dorey by the Research and Statistics Division, and 

Donna Love-Blackwell by the Banking Supervision and Regulation 

Division.

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Between approximately January 24 and February 18, 

1997, the Board’s counselors met individually with nine 

secretaries, including six who are named plaintiffs in this case. 

In the individual counseling sessions, the secretaries confirmed 

the general allegations in the “Resubmission,” and some of 

them alleged specific instances of discrimination from 

personal experience. The EEO counselors prepared reports 

based on the notes they took in these individual counseling 

sessions.

The secretaries filed their administrative complaint with 

the Board on March 3, 1997, and it wound its way through the 

adjudicatory functions of the Board and the U.S. Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) without 

success.

2

 2 The Board dismissed the secretaries’ administrative complaint on 

July 23, 1997. The EEOC affirmed the Board’s decision on 

November 18, 1998. Although we had filed our decision in Artis I 

almost a month earlier, the EEOC found “no indication in the record 

that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 

Circuit has issued a decision on the matter,” and concluded that 

dismissal was appropriate to avoid the risk of “inconsistent rulings 

by the United States Court of Appeals and the Commission.” See 29 

C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(1), (3) (“[T]he agency shall dismiss an entire 

complaint . . . [t]hat . . . states the same claim that is pending before 

or has been decided by the agency . . . or that was the basis of a civil 

action decided by a United States District Court in which the 

complainant was a party . . . .”). For reasons that are not clear on the 

record before us, an EEOC Administrative Law Judge dismissed the 

administrative class complaint again on December 18, 2000—again 

on the ground that it was the subject of the present civil action, then 

pending in the district court. The Board “fully implement[ed]” that 

decision on January 30, 2001.

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After we issued our decision in Artis I, the secretaries filed 

the underlying complaint in the district court.3 As in Artis I, 

the Board moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. The district court denied the motion 

and ordered discovery on the issue of exhaustion—specifically 

“whether plaintiffs have satisfied their obligation to engage in 

counseling” and whether “the administrative counseling 

process was a futile exercise.” Artis v. Greenspan, 223 F. 

Supp. 2d 149, 155 (D.D.C. 2002).

Following five years of contentious discovery, the Board 

renewed its motion to dismiss in 2005. The district court 

granted the motion on January 31, 2007, holding the court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the secretaries’ claims 

because, as in Artis I, the secretaries had failed to exhaust the 

counseling requirement. Artis v. Greenspan, 474 F. Supp. 2d 

16, 19 (D.D.C. 2007).4

 3 The operative complaint in this case was filed on February 22, 

2001, after the Board’s “final action” on the administrative 

complaint. See Dist. Ct. Docket No. 1. It was consolidated with a 

virtually identical complaint filed on August 3, 1999. See Dist. Ct. 

Docket No. 6.

4 We pause to note that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is 

not jurisdictional under current precedents. The Supreme Court 

recently clarified that “a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope 

shall count as jurisdictional” only “[i]f the Legislature clearly states” 

as much; otherwise “courts should treat the restriction as 

nonjurisdictional.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 

(2006). Because Title VII includes no such clear statement, we have 

recently said Title VII’s exhaustion requirements are not 

jurisdictional. See Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 

614 F.3d 519, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Colbert v. Potter, 471 

F.3d 158, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The filing time limit imposed by 

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), is not a jurisdictional 

requirement but rather is similar to a statute of limitations.” 

(quotation marks omitted)).

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The secretaries filed a motion for reconsideration, 

repeating their argument that they had successfully completed 

counseling in the group and individual sessions, and proffering 

for the first time the declaration of secretary Kim Hardy, who 

recounted her ten-year-old recollection of the January 15, 1997 

group counseling session. Dist. Ct. Docket No. 72. The district 

court denied the motion, holding Hardy’s declaration was not 

“new evidence” under the standard governing a Rule 59(e) 

motion to alter or amend the judgment. Artis v. Bernanke, 256 

F.R.D. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 2009). The secretaries appealed.

“A challenge to a dismissal for lack of administrative 

exhaustion is a question of law, which this court reviews de 

novo.” Brooks v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P., 606 F.3d 800, 807 

(D.C. Cir. 2010).

II

Title VII protects government employees, like private 

employees, from personnel actions that discriminate on the 

basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). To bring a civil action in federal court 

under this section, an employee must first be “aggrieved by the 

final disposition of his [administrative] complaint, or by the 

failure to take final action on his complaint.” Id.

§ 2000e-16(c). Federal Reserve Board regulations modeled on 

the EEOC’s regulations require Board employees to “consult a 

Counselor . . . in order to try to informally resolve the matter”

before filing an administrative complaint. 12 C.F.R. 

§ 268.104(a); see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). If the employee 

intends to file a class action, she must satisfy the counseling 

requirement on behalf of the class. See 12 C.F.R. § 268.204(b). 

“If a complainant forces an agency to dismiss or cancel the 

complaint by failing to provide sufficient information to enable 

the agency to investigate the claim, [s]he may not file a judicial 

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suit.” Wilson v. Peña, 79 F.3d 154, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The 

district court concluded the secretaries failed to satisfy this 

counseling requirement because they “declined to cooperate 

with the Board by failing to provide any meaningful 

information about specific instances of discrimination.” Artis, 

474 F. Supp. 2d at 19. We disagree.

A

The purpose of EEO counseling is clear from the text of 

the regulation: Counseling is designed to enable the agency 

and its employee “to try to informally resolve the matter” 

before an administrative charge is filed. 12 C.F.R. 

§ 268.104(a), quoted in Artis I, 158 F.3d at 1306; see Wilson, 

79 F.3d at 165 (“The purpose of the [administrative 

exhaustion] doctrine is to afford the agency an opportunity to 

resolve the matter internally and to avoid unnecessarily 

burdening the courts.”); see also Blackmon-Malloy v. United 

States Capitol Police Bd., 575 F.3d 699, 711–12 (D.C. Cir. 

2009) (“[U]nlike agency exhaustion in other contexts, the 

purposes of counseling and mediation are not to compile a 

record for judicial review but instead simply to afford the 

employee and the employing office an opportunity to explore 

and possibly resolve the employee’s claims informally.”

(describing a similar counseling requirement in the 

Congressional Accountability Act)).

Where counseling produces “sufficient information to 

enable the agency to investigate the claim,” that purpose has 

been served. Artis I, 158 F.3d at 1306 (quoting Wilson, 79 F.3d 

at 164). Thus, we recognized that “where a complainant has 

pleaded a nonpromotion claim to the agency, it is not her 

responsibility to identify the positions for which she applied.” 

Id. at 1308 (citing Mangiapane v. Adams, 661 F.2d 1388 (D.C. 

Cir. 1981) (per curiam)). To hold otherwise would turn the 

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informal counseling requirement into a trap for unwary 

counselees rather than a step toward remediation, and it would 

violate the principle that “Title VII’s exhaustion requirement 

should not be read to create useless procedural technicalities.” 

President v. Vance, 627 F.2d 353, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

An agency risks misusing the counseling requirement 

when it demands excessively detailed support for a class-wide 

complaint alleging a pattern and practice of subtle financial

and professional discrimination. Unlike an allegation of overt 

harassment or a specific instance of retaliation against an 

individual employee, class-wide claims of systemically 

depressed salaries, performance ratings, advancement 

opportunities, and the like can often be proven only by a 

statistical comparison of the employer’s treatment of the class 

to its treatment of non-minority employees. See generally 

Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“A 

plaintiff class seeking to show a pattern or practice of disparate 

treatment must carry the initial burden of offering evidence 

adequate to create an inference that employment decisions 

were based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under [Title 

VII]. This usually means providing evidence—often in 

statistical form—of a disparity in the position of members of 

the plaintiff class and comparably qualified whites.” (citation, 

quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)). Usually, such an 

analysis will be possible only after the employees obtain data 

from their employer, whether informally or through discovery.

It would be perverse to dismiss a complaint for failure to 

provide adequate detail in counseling when all of the relevant 

data is in the employer’s exclusive control.

B

In light of the nature of the secretaries’ claims, the 

information they provided collectively and in individual 

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counseling sessions satisfied the counseling requirement of 12 

C.F.R. § 268.104(a). At the first group counseling session on 

January 15, 1997, the EEO counselor and the Board’s lawyer 

met with approximately fourteen secretaries and requested 

more information about their claims. In response to the 

Board’s request, the secretaries provided a list of “class 

allegations” in a document entitled “Resubmission of 

Class-Action Complaint.” Copies of that document were 

signed individually by several of the putative class agents. The 

“Resubmission” alleged on behalf of the “named 

Complainants and the members of their putative class” that the 

Board discriminated against them by

a. Failing to pay class members at the 

comparable hourly rate or salary paid to 

non-class members who were no more qualified 

than were the class members.

b. Failure to pay the same amount of 

money for cash awards, merit increases, lump 

sum salary adjustments or other forms of 

bonuses to class members as was paid to 

comparable non-class members for similar 

performance. . . .

c. Failing to award class members cash 

awards, merit increases, special achievement 

awards, lump sum salary adjustments or other 

forms of bonuses as was done for comparable 

or inferior non-class members.

d. Failing to adequately and properly 

train class members as comparable non-class 

members were trained.

e. Maintaining certain positions for 

non-African-Americans and other positions for 

African-Americans.

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f. Maintaining certain facilities, within 

[the Board’s] workplace, which are segregated 

and inaccessible for African-Americans.

g. Failure to provide class members 

with equal amount [sic] of personal time on the 

phone as is afforded non-class members.

h. Failure to provide class members 

with equal time away from the office for 

personal reasons as is afforded non-class 

members.

i. Failure to treat class members 

equally with regard to utilization and 

enforcement of leave procedures and records as 

is afforded to non-class members.

j. Disparate treatment with regard to 

distribution of work, both in regards to 

workload and quality of assignment.

k. Failure to provide accurate 

Performance Appraisals, such as PMPs 

(Performance Management Programs) or its 

predecessors, for class members and non-class 

members, thereby creating a false discrepancy 

in the abilities of class members when 

compared to non-class members.

African-Americans’ PMPs are deflated and 

non-African-Americans’ PMPs are inflated as a 

systematic practice.

[l.] Failing and refusing, and continuing 

to fail and refuse, to promote Complainants on 

the basis of race.

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All of these allegations were affirmed in individual counseling 

sessions. Class agents corroborated most of them with relevant 

examples of personal discrimination.

5

Barbara Carter specifically addressed allegations (a), (d), 

(i), and (k). She told a counselor she was compensated less 

than comparable white employees because she had been 

“redlined since the early 70’s.” Carter also said her 

performance appraisal was deflated in the years 1993–1996 

and she was not permitted to take the classes she was told were 

necessary to achieve an outstanding rating. Carter said her 

supervisor, Joyce Zigler, failed to provide her with equal 

personal leave when Carter was working in the Research and 

Statistics Division.

Donna Dorey specifically addressed allegations (e), (i), 

(k), and (l) in her individual counseling session. She alleged 

that “Karen See, a white female, was preselected for a 

position” and groomed for it even though she lacked a college 

degree, which the job posting purported to require. According 

to Dorey, the job posting’s degree requirement, which was 

waived for preselected white candidates like Karen See, 

discouraged Dorey from applying because she lacked a degree.

Dorey also alleged specific incidents of discrimination by her 

supervisor, McKosh. She said McKosh denied her request to 

change her work hours so she could attend college courses, but 

 5 The only general allegations that were not directly corroborated by 

the specific allegations of class agents in counseling were (b), (f), 

(g), and (j), relating to the amount of money awarded in bonuses to 

class members, segregated facilities, discriminatory telephone usage 

policies, and unfair distribution of work. This appeal does not 

require us to decide whether these four claims are sufficiently related 

to others for which the secretaries exhausted administrative remedies 

such that they are proper subjects of the civil action. See Payne v. 

Salazar, 619 F.3d 56, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

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allowed a white employee to change her hours to join a 

vanpool. Dorey also claimed her leave requests are treated 

differently from those of white employees. She said McKosh 

once “humiliated her in front of the Board” by describing the 

circumstances of one particular request for leave. Dorey says 

her managers discussed her leave requests with human 

resources and shared personal information with other 

employees including Rena Carlton, an employee relations 

specialist. Dorey also claimed that the Board’s EEO Director, 

Sheila Clark, and EEO Counselor, Millie Wiggins, 

discouraged her from filing a previous EEO complaint alleging 

discrimination in her performance rating.

Donna Love-Blackwell specifically addressed allegations 

(c), (e), and (l). She claimed she had never received a cash 

award as white secretaries had, despite her excellent 

performance ratings. Love-Blackwell also said she had applied 

without success for other positions and that “this type of 

movement is easier for nonminorities” who are “primped for 

positions.”

Yvette Williams specifically addressed allegation (h). She 

claimed she was permitted to work out only within a prescribed 

lunch hour, while non-minorities were allowed to take their 

lunch break at any time.6

 6 The secretaries also argue statements secretary Kim Hardy 

allegedly made at the January 15, 1997 group counseling session 

should have been included in a counseling report and would confirm 

that she satisfied the counseling requirement. The district court did 

not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider Hardy’s 2007 

declaration. Her recollection was previously available to the 

secretaries, so her declaration was not an appropriate basis for a 

motion to alter or amend the judgment. See Messina v. Krakower, 

439 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

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Despite this evidence in the notes of the Board’s own 

counselors, the district court found the secretaries “fail[ed] to 

provide any meaningful information about specific instances 

of discrimination.” 474 F. Supp. 2d at 19. To the contrary, the 

secretaries argued consistently that they “counseled fully and 

completely to the extent allowed by the Board.” Dist. Ct. 

Docket No. 42, at 7. Their response to the Board’s motion to 

dismiss incorporated by reference the previously filed 

counselors’ reports. Id. at ii. In a motion for reconsideration, 

the secretaries directed the district court’s attention to

individual counseling reports, including those of Carter, 

Dorey, Love-Blackwell, and Williams, and quoted them at

length. Dist. Ct. Docket No. 72, at 2–3, 17–28. As the Board 

admitted in response to that motion, “[t]hese reports . . . have 

previously been filed with [the district court] by both plaintiffs 

and defendant on numerous occasions and their contents have 

been exhaustively discussed in the parties’ pleadings.” Dist. 

Ct. Docket No. 73, at 2. The Board therefore conceded that the 

evidence of successful counseling that is now before us was 

properly before the district court.

Considered together, the secretaries’ written description 

of their class allegations and their individual anecdotes of 

disparate treatment were sufficient to give the Board an 

opportunity to investigate and try to resolve their claims.

We affirmed the dismissal in Artis I because the four 

named plaintiffs each belonged to a single division of the 

Board and therefore could not establish commonality with the 

Board-wide class or “identify any agency-wide discriminatory 

personnel practices . . . despite the division-level decision 

making.” Artis I, 158 F.3d at 1308. We noted that “[i]f 

secretaries (perhaps even one secretary) outside of the Legal 

Division had agreed to pursue counseling, the ALJ might have 

had a basis on which to find specific facts that are common to 

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the class.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). That case is now 

before us. The secretaries’ class status is relevant to counseling 

only in that it allows a representative plaintiff to satisfy the 

counseling requirement on behalf of similarly situated class 

members. See 12 C.F.R. § 268.204(b) (“An employee or 

applicant who wishes to file a class complaint must seek 

counseling and be counseled in accordance with § 268.104.”). 

Like any other plaintiff, a class representative must simply 

provide “sufficient information to enable the agency to 

investigate the claim.” Artis I, 158 F.3d at 1306 (quoting 

Wilson, 79 F.3d at 164). Thus, the entire class exhausted 

administrative remedies by virtue of the class agents’ 

successful completion of counseling. 

C

On appeal, the Board argues that whatever counseling did 

occur was untimely. Under the Board’s regulations, “[a]n 

aggrieved person must initiate contact with a Counselor within 

45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory 

or, in the case of a personnel action, within 45 days of the 

effective date of the action,” unless she was unaware of the 

time limits or unable to meet them. 12 C.F.R. § 268.104(a). 

The Board now contends the secretaries’ complaint is based on 

events that took place more than 45 days earlier or events for 

which the secretaries failed to “provide any time period.” 

Appellee’s Br. 27. Although we are skeptical of this defense

given the nature of the secretaries’ claims, we need not decide 

the issue because the Board waived the time limitation by

failing to raise it in the district court. “A defense that has not 

been raised in a pleading, by motion, or at trial normally will be 

considered waived and cannot be heard for the first time on 

appeal.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. IRS, 765 F.2d 1174, 

1176 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quotation marks and alteration 

omitted). Contrary to the Board’s representation at oral 

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argument, Oral Arg. Recording 25:12–26, 25:47–53, the Board

did not raise the time bar in its opposition to the secretaries’ 

motion for reconsideration, see Dist. Ct. Docket No. 73. The 

Board failed to raise this defense in spite of the secretaries’ 

explicit argument that individual secretaries, including Carter, 

Dorey, Love-Blackwell, and Williams, provided sufficiently 

specific information to satisfy the counseling requirement. See 

Dist. Ct. Docket No. 72, at 2–3.

D

The Board suggests another basis for concluding the 

secretaries failed to exhaust administrative remedies: their 

alleged failure “to engage in counseling in good faith.” 

Appellee’s Br. 10. The Board cites several instances of 

obstruction of the counseling process by the secretaries and 

their lawyer that it attributes to bad faith: Some if not all the 

secretaries refused to discuss personal experiences of 

discrimination in group counseling sessions. Some also

refused to give specific examples of discrimination in their 

individual counseling sessions, despite the Board’s request for 

details. Finally, the secretaries’ counsel refused to agree to an 

extension of the 30-day counseling period so the Board could 

consider his request for statistical data and “obtain the 

information if appropriate.” Assuming the Board accurately 

perceives a lack of good-faith cooperation in this conduct, the

secretaries nevertheless satisfied the administrative counseling 

requirement.

The counselees’ alleged bad faith is relevant only to the 

extent it “completely frustrat[ed] the agencies’ ability to 

investigate complaints.” Blackmon-Malloy, 575 F.3d at 

713–14; see Wilson, 79 F.3d at 165. As we have explained, the 

Board was not so stymied. Despite their lawyer’s 

counterproductive advice, the secretaries managed to convey 

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much more than “bare ‘notice’ of the basis of [their] 

complaint.” Artis I, 158 F.3d at 1306. Doubtless other class 

agents were not as forthcoming as Carter, Dorey, 

Love-Blackwell, and Williams. But this is irrelevant to the 

administrative exhaustion issue, since a single class agent may 

satisfy the counseling requirement as to the entire class. See 

Blackmon-Malloy, 575 F.3d at 704 (“Under the doctrine of 

vicarious exhaustion, each individual plaintiff in a class action 

need not exhaust his or her administrative remedies 

individually so long as at least one member of the class has.”).

III

As the Board admits, the administrative counseling 

requirement is “not a difficult burden to meet.” Appellee’s Br. 

13. The secretaries fulfilled the purpose of 12 C.F.R. 

§ 268.104(a) by advising the Board of the specific nature of 

their claims and offering corresponding allegations of 

discrimination against individual class agents. This was 

enough to permit the Board to investigate and try to resolve 

their claims. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s order 

dismissing the secretaries’ complaint and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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