Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00310/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00310-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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1 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the federal habeas corpus statute that permits a prisoner to challenge

his imprisonment on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States. See generally Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968). 

2 On July 7, 2010, Petitioner notified the Court that he had been transferred to the federal

prison in Lompoc, California. (Doc. 6.) Respondent’s counsel notified the Court that the warden at

that facility with custody of Petitioner is Linda Sanders; therefore, the Court has substituted her as the

Respondent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (requiring that an application for habeas corpus name the person

with custody over the petitioner). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Patrick Russell Parsons, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Linda Sanders,

Respondent. 

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No. CV-10-310-TUC-JMR-DTF

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2241.1

 Petitioner, Patrick Russell Parsons, while confined

in the Federal Prison Camp in Tucson, AZ,2

 alleged that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)

erroneously applied 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) and followed improper procedures in the application.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge

Ferraro for a Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are the Petition (Doc. 1) and

Respondent’s Answer (Doc. 10).

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Petitioner is serving an 84-month sentence, for possession with intent to distribute

marijuana, 18 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b), and use and carrying of a firearm during a drug trafficking

offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (Doc. 10, Ex. 1, Att. 2.) He is projected to be released from

prison via good time conduct on March 8, 2013. (Id.) Petitioner is currently participating in

a BOP Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP). 

MERITS

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Respondent contends Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to

filing the pending Petition. In response, Petitioner argues that exhaustion would have been

futile. Because exhaustion is not jurisdictional and because, for the reasons stated in Section

B below, Petitioner’s Petition is without merit, the Court declines to consider Respondent’s

exhaustion argument.

B. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner alleges BOP incorrectly preluded him from early release eligibility under 18

U.S.C. § 3621(e); BOP provided inadequate notice regarding the change in early release

eligibility under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e); and the designation of early release decisions to a central

office constitutes venue shopping and is an abuse of discretion. The Court articulated these

three claims in its Order calling for an answer (Doc. 7 at 1-2); Respondent substantively

answered only Claim 1.

Claim 1

Petitioner asserts that BOP erroneously concluded he was not eligible for early release

under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), a federal prisoner convicted

of a nonviolent offense that completes a RDAP may receive a sentence reduction of up to one

year. Since May 1995, BOP has been trying to exclude from eligibility for this statutory

sentence reduction, by classifying as a violent offense, crimes that involve the carrying,

possession or use of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense. See Arrington v. Daniels, 516

F.3d 1106, 1110-11, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008). In Arrington, the Ninth Circuit held that the 2000

rule promulgated by BOP to achieve that goal violated the Administrative Procedures Act, thus,

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3

 A Program Statement is an internal, interpretive rule promulgated by the BOP. See

Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F.3d 29, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2008).

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the court granted those petitioners habeas relief in the form of a sentence reduction. Id. at 1114,

1116.

Prior to March 16, 2009, Program Statement P5330.103

 provided the policy and

procedural guidelines for inmates’ early release eligibility after participation in a RDAP. (Doc.

10, Ex. 1, Att. 5.) One of the eligibility requirements for RDAP was that the inmate generally

had to be within 36 months of his release date. (Id. at 5.4.4.) In response to Arrington, BOP

promulgated a new rule governing early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e), and Petitioner does

not contest the rule’s validity. BOP issued Program Statement P5331.02 on March 16, 2009,

which excludes from early release eligibility inmates with a current conviction for an offense

involving the use, possession or carrying of a firearm or other dangerous weapon. (Doc. 10, Ex.

1, Att. 4 at 4.)

Petitioner alleges that he requested to participate in a RDAP prior to March 16, 2009, at

which time he should have been eligible for a sentence reduction for successful completion.

Petitioner avers in his affidavit that his case manager informed him that he could not be

considered for RDAP until he was within 36 months of his release date. (Doc. 1-1 at 13.)

Petitioner acknowledges that BOP consistently enforced this policy of not considering inmates

for early release under § 3621(e) unless they were within 36 months of release. However, he

contends that notwithstanding that policy he would have been considered for early release prior

to the March 16, 2009 new procedures.

Petitioner may be correct that pursuant to Arrington, prior to March 16, 2009, he would

not have been precluded from sentence reduction based on his conviction for use and carry of

a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. However, he concedes that BOP policy required that

he be within 36 months of release for RDAP consideration. He did not satisfy that criteria until

March 2010. Thus, prior to March 2009, Petitioner was ineligible for participation in a RDAP

and, therefore, not eligible for the accompanying sentence reduction. Since March 2009, when

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the new rules were put into effect, Petitioner has been ineligible for sentence reduction due to

his firearm conviction. Thus, Petitioner has not established entitlement to a sentence reduction

under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e).

Claim 2

Petitioner alleges BOP provided inadequate notice of the March 16, 2009 eligibility

changes for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e), which violated his right to due

process. He contends that if the notice had clearly informed him that, after March 16, 2009, he

would no longer be eligible for sentence reduction, he would have requested to participate in

a RDAP prior to the rule change.

As set forth above in Claim 1, Petitioner was not eligible for participation in a RDAP

prior to March 16, 2009, because he was not within 36 months of release. Thus, even if

Petitioner had been provided additional notice of the impending changes to the eligibility

requirements for sentence reduction and had made a request for RDAP participation prior to the

change, he was not eligible for the program at that time. Regardless of any alleged notice

violation, Petitioner was not harmed and is not entitled to relief.

Claim 3

Petitioner alleges that BOP’s policy – that eligibility for § 3621(e) sentence reduction

is determined by the national Designation and Sentence Computation Center (DSCC) –

constitutes impermissible venue shopping. There appear to be two possible factual allegations

in Claim 3. First, Petitioner alleges that this consolidation of decision-making precludes

administrative relief at the local level. Alleged errors in BOP’s administrative review process

are not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding because they do not attack the

lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention. See Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989)

(per curiam) (finding allegations of error in state post-conviction review process noncognizable); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997). Second, Petitioner

alleges that venue is proper in this Court, with review to the Ninth Circuit, not the Fifth Circuit

where the DSCC is located. Regardless of where the BOP decision regarding Petitioner’s

ineligibility for § 3621(e) sentence reduction was made, neither Respondent nor this Court

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contends that venue is not proper in this district. Additionally, appeal from this Court’s decision

is to the Ninth Circuit. Thus, this claim is without a factual basis and has no merit.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

DISMISS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections

are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 10-310-TUC-JMR.

DATED this 20th day of December, 2010.

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