Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01697/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01697-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 The court corrects the spelling of defendant Haythorne’s name in the caption to reflect

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the correct spelling. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL WALLACE,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-1697 MCE GGH P

vs.

HAYTHORNE, et al., 1

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Haythorne and Ridge violated the Eighth

Amendment as well as state law by failing to repair holes in the kitchen floor where he worked. 

Plaintiff fell and injured himself after tripping on one of the holes.

Pending before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment. After

carefully reviewing the record, the court recommends that plaintiff’s motion be denied and

defendants’ motion be granted.

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Summary Judgment Standards Under Rule 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive

issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment

should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. 

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at

2553.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356

(1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may

not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its

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contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11,

106 S. Ct. at 1356 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is

material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); T.W. Elec.

Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct.

at 1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citation omitted).

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 Some of plaintiff’s pleadings allege that his injuries occurred on September 28, 2000. 2

This discrepancy is not material. 

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On September 11, 2006, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409,

411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

Undisputed Facts

On September 20, 2005, plaintiff worked in the main kitchen at California State

Prison-Sacramento (CSP-Sac). On September 20, 2005, defendant Haythorne worked as the

Correctional Food Manager at CSP-Sac. His duties included supervising the custody and

ancillary Food Service staff in the kitchen where plaintiff worked. On September 20, 2005,

defendant Ridge worked as an Assistant Correctional Food Manager at CSP-Sac. His duties also

included supervising the custody and ancillary Food Service staff in the kitchen where plaintiff

worked.

On September 20, 2005, plaintiff slipped and fell in the kitchen at CSPSacramento during his work shift. Plaintiff fell after his foot slipped into a hole in the floor 2

caused by a missing tile. 

Prior to September 20, 2005, both defendants were aware that there were some

broken or missing tiles. 

It is undisputed that non-prison employees complained about the holes in the floor

but, as will be discussed below, the parties dispute when these complaints occurred.

It is undisputed that a non-prison employee was injured by one of the holes but, as

will be discussed below, the parties dispute when this injury occurred. 

Disputed Facts

The parties dispute whether plaintiff complained about the holes in the floor prior

to his fall. Plaintiff claims that he constantly complained about the holes to defendants. Neither

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defendant remembers plaintiff complaining about the holes prior to his fall. 

The parties also dispute when any other non-prisoner kitchen employees

complained about the holes in the floor prior to the incident. Plaintiff claims that the nonprisoner employees complained about the holes before the incident. Defendants do not recollect

when the non-prisoner employees complained about the holes. 

The parties dispute when the non-prisoner employee was injured by the hole in the

floor.

Analysis

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on grounds that

plaintiff’s action is barred by the exclusive remedy of the California Worker’s Compensation

Act. “[T]o the extent [state] workers’ compensation precludes recovery for other causes of

action, it does not preclude recovery for claims involving ‘substantive rather than procedural

constitutional rights.’” Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1084 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Smith v. Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, defendants

are not entitled to summary judgment on this ground.

Turning to the merits of plaintiff’s claims, prisoners alleging Eighth Amendment

violations based on unsafe conditions must demonstrate that prison officials were deliberately

indifferent to their health or safety by subjecting them to a substantial risk of serious harm. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994). Prison officials display a

deliberate indifference to an inmate’s well-being when they consciously disregard an excessive

risk of harm to that inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-838, 114 S. Ct. at 1979-

80.

Slippery floors, without more, “does not state even an arguable claim for cruel and

unusual punishment.” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by

statute as stated in, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000); see also LeMaire v.

Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993) (shackling a dangerous inmate in shower, even if

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 Although defendants do not argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity, the court

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observes that in Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 1996) the Ninth Circuit found that

prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity for an Eighth Amendment claim based on

their failure to repair an oven door, which fell off and burned the plaintiff’s arm. In its analysis,

the Ninth Circuit did not reach the issue of whether the facts alleged demonstrated that

defendants acted with deliberate indifference, but instead determined that, in light of the clearly

established law, the officials could have believed their conduct was lawful. 92 F.3d at 937. In

support of this finding, the Ninth Circuit cited several of the cases cited above by this court

which held that minor safety hazards did not violate the Eighth Amendment, i.e. Tunstall v.

Rowe, supra, Snyder v. Blankenship, supra, and Robinson v. Cuyler, supra. 

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might fall, does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Tunstall v. Rowe, 478 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill.

1979) (greasy staircase that caused prisoner to slip and fall did not violate the Eighth

Amendment); Robinson v. Cuyler, 511 F. Supp. 161, 163 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (slippery kitchen floor

did not inflict cruel and unusual punishment); Snyder v. Blankenship, 473 F. Supp. 1208, 1212

(W.D Va. 1979) (leaking dishwasher which caused prisoner to slip and fall did not violate the

Eighth Amendment).

In Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit found

that slippery floors without protective measures could create a sufficient danger to warrant relief

where prison guards were aware that the inmate was on crutches and fell and injured himself

several times. 

The facts of the instant case are akin to those of the “slippery floor” cases

discussed above where no Eighth Amendment violation was found. Even assuming that

defendants were aware that a non-prisoner employee had previously tripped on one of the holes,

the court does not find that defendants unreasonably ignored an excessive risk. The facts of the

instant case are not like the facts in Frost v. Agnos, supra, in that plaintiff does not allege that he

was handicapped or that he suffered repeated injuries. Based on the cases cited above, the court

does not find that the holes in the floor caused by the missing tiles constituted an excessive risk. 

Accordingly, the court does not find that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a

substantial risk of serious harm. Accordingly, defendants’ summary judgment motion should be 3

granted as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

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Defendants move for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s state law claim for

negligence on grounds that plaintiff failed to file a tort claim. Because the court recommends

that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim be dismissed, it declines to exercise jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). On this ground, the court recommends that

plaintiff’s state law claim be dismissed. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s March 8, 2007, summary judgment motion be denied;

2. Defendants’ June 27, 2007, summary judgment motion be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 10/12/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

wall1697.sj

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