Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02878/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02878-27/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DERRICK SATCHELL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

FEDEX EXPRESS,

Defendant. /

No. C 03-2659 SI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO FILE THIRD AMENDED

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to file a third amended complaint, which is currently scheduled for

a hearing on November 17, 2006. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines the matter

is appropriate for resolution without oral argument, and VACATES the hearing. For the reasons set

forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs the amendment of complaints. It states that if a

responsive pleading has already been filed, the party seeking amendment “may amend the party's

pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely

given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). This rule reflects an underlying policy that

disputes should be determined on their merits, and not on the technicalities of pleading rules. See

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962). Accordingly, the Court must be very liberal in granting

leave to amend a complaint. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th

Cir. 1990) (leave to amend granted with “extreme liberality”); Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co.,

866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989).

Case 3:03-cv-02878-SI Document 163 Filed 11/14/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Under Rule 15(b), the party opposing amendment has the burden of showing that amendment

would be prejudicial to that party’s defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). There are several accepted

reasons why leave to amend should not be granted, including the presence of bad faith on the part of the

plaintiff, undue delay, prejudice to the defendant, futility of amendment, and that the plaintiff has

previously amended the complaint. See Ascon Properties, 866 F.2d at 1160; McGlinchy v. Shell

Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 1988). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek leave to amend the complaint primarily in order to “streamline and simplify” their

trial presentation and eliminate any confusion as to who the trier of fact is as to particular claims.

Plaintiffs’ proposed third amended complaint deletes the class claim under FEHA, divides the Title VII

claim into separate claims for disparate impact and disparate treatment, corrects some “factual and

editing errors,” and adds to the Prayer for Relief “an order expunging disciplinary records” that relate

to FedEx’s allegedly discriminatory practices. Defendant opposes the amendment on the ground that

plaintiffs have delayed in seeking leave to amend, and defendant will be prejudiced by any amendment.

The Court concludes that plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend. Even if defendant is

correct that plaintiffs could and should have sought leave to amend earlier, defendant has not

demonstrated that it would be prejudiced by the proposed amendments. Defendant has not articulated

any reason why plaintiffs should not be permitted to reorganize their Title VII claims to more clearly

separate disparate impact from disparate treatment claims. By allowing the proposed amendment, the

Court expresses no view on how those claims are tried to the Court versus to the jury. The deletion of

plaintiffs’ FEHA class claim cannot prejudice defendant, and indeed defendant does not address that

proposed change in its opposition. 

Defendant also contends that plaintiffs have “extensively expanded” their disparate impact

allegations and theories. A comparison of the second amended complaint and the proposed third

amended complaint belies that assertion, however. For the most part, plaintiffs have reorganized

existing paragraphs, and thus while the numbering has changed, the substance of the paragraphs has not.

Compare e.g., Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 31, 34, 43, 44, 177 & 178, with Proposed Third Amended

Case 3:03-cv-02878-SI Document 163 Filed 11/14/06 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Defendant asserts that proposed paragraphs 152-157 “completely change” the nature and scope

of Satchell’s claims. However, paragraphs 153-56 are identical to paragraphs contained in the second

amended complaint. Compare Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 140-43 with Third Amended Complaint

¶¶ 153-56.

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Complaint ¶¶ 31-33, 38, 46-49, 190-92. To the extent plaintiffs have elaborated on their disparate

impact allegations, such as by providing examples of alleged discrimination, those additional allegations

do not introduce any new issues into this case. 

Similarly, defendant has failed to establish that it would be prejudiced from the correction of

“factual and editing errors.” For example, the second amended complaint states that plaintiff Tyrone

Merritt’s job title is “handler,” while the proposed third amended complaint states that his job title is

“material handler.” Defendant fails to demonstrate how any prejudice flows from this factual correction,

particularly when the information has always been within FedEx’s possession and indeed where FedEx

deposed Merritt about his job history. The same holds true for the proposed correction regarding

Gonzales; that correction states that FedEx would not allow Gonzales to participate in FedEx’s

management program, ASPIRE, rather than that FedEx would not allow him to apply for management

positions. Defendant also incorrectly asserts that the proposed complaint asserts a new claims for

plaintiff Smith. See Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 117 (compensation claim); 118-22 (termination and

retaliation). 

To the extent the proposed complaint raises new factual issues or new claims on behalf of

particular plaintiffs, the Court finds there is no prejudice because defendant has questioned plaintiffs

about the issues in their depositions, and/or because the factual allegations underlying the claims were

contained in the second amended complaint. For example, defendant is correct that the proposed

complaint adds two new paragraphs of factual allegations regarding plaintiff Satchell and ASTRA

scanning procedures.1

 However, plaintiff has provided excerpts from Satchell’s deposition showing that

FedEx deposed Satchell about these very issues. Thus, defendant cannot credibly claim to be prejudiced

by the addition of these factual allegations. 

Similarly, defendant asserts that plaintiffs have added retaliation claims for plaintiffs Guerrero,

Hutchins and Boykin to the non-class claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The second amended

complaint alleges the factual underpinnings of the individual retaliation claims for all three plaintiffs,

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The deposition excerpts provided by plaintiffs shows that while plaintiffs were questioned

about their terminations, for the most part they were not specifically questioned about their retaliation

claims.

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see, e.g., Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 88 (Guerrero); 99 (Hutchins); 167-69 (Boykin), and the nonclass claims, § 1981 cause of action incorporated those paragraphs. The Court agrees with plaintiff that

it appears to have been a drafting error not to specifically re-allege that FedEx retaliated against

Guerrero, Hutchins and Boykin. In order to ensure that FedEx is not prejudiced by the amendment of

these claims, the Court will permit FedEx to redepose each of these plaintiffs for one hour.2

 The parties

shall meet and confer regarding the scheduling of these depositions.

Finally, although defendant objects to the addition to plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief, defendant has

not shown how it is prejudiced by that amendment, particularly since it would be within the Court’s

equitable power to grant the proposed relief absent amendment in the event plaintiffs prevail at trial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion

for leave to file a third amended complaint. (Docket No. 491).The proposed third amended complaint

shall be deemed filed, Docket No. 491 Ex. A, and defendant shall file an answer within 20 days of the

filing date of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 14, 2006 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:03-cv-02878-SI Document 163 Filed 11/14/06 Page 4 of 4