Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01178/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01178-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUY ORLANDO WILLIAMSON,

CDCR #BG-9879,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITIATION; BRIONES, 

Correctional Officer,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-1178-AJB-KSC

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM AND 

FOR SEEKING MONETARY 

DAMAGES AGAINST IMMUNE 

DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND § 1915A(b)

Plaintiff, Guy Orlando Williamson, a state inmate currently housed at the Richard 

J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California has filed a 

civil rights Complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1) In 

addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) 

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I. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ S. Ct. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (U.S. 2016); Williams v. Paramo, 

775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified prison trust 

account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. See ECF 

No. 3 at 2-3; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This certificate shows that Plaintiff had an 

available balance of $0.00 at the time of filing. Therefore, the Court will not assess 

Plaintiff an initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a 

civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the 

prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a 

“failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, declines to “exact” 

the an initial partial filing fee because his prison certificate shows he “has no means to 

pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary for the CDCR to collect the 

entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to 

the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preAnswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

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“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of 

Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

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B. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that the “had asked C/O Briones for a spoon” when he “first 

arrived” at RJD. (Compl. at 3.) Briones told Plaintiff that he would get him a spoon 

“within a few days.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff did not receive the spoon and claims that it 

“resulted into [Plaintiff] committing suicide and going to the crisis bed because of this.” 

(Id.)

C. Inadequate Mental Health Care claim

Plaintiff’s allegations are brief and lack sufficient factual allegations to support any 

claim. Plaintiff alleges “cruel and unusual punishment” but it is not clear how the failure 

to provide a spoon led to his suicide attempts. Based on the few facts provided, the Court 

liberally construes Plaintiff’s claim as an allegation that he was denied adequate mental 

health care. 

In order to allege a violation of the Eighth Amendment for inadequate medical or 

mental health care, Plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective standard. 

Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). Only “deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A determination of ‘deliberate 

indifference’ involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s 

medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. 

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., 

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 

Plaintiff must plead the existence of an objectively serious medical or mental 

health need. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60 (“The existence of an injury that a 

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; 

the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that 

a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.”) Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does 

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not adequately address the nature of Plaintiff’s mental health care needs. However, even 

if the Court found that Plaintiff’s pleadings provided sufficient allegations of a serious 

mental health care need, it is clear that the Complaint fails to include any further “factual 

content” to show that any Defendant acted with “deliberate indifference to [his] serious 

medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006), quoting Gamble, 

429 U.S. at 104. 

Plaintiff does not set forth any specific allegations, other than the failure to provide 

a spoon, that Briones acted with deliberate indifference to his plight by “knowing of and 

disregarding an excessive risk to his health and safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 837 (1994); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. Therefore, the Court 

must dismiss Plaintiff’s inadequate mental health care needs claims for failing to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.

D. Eleventh Amendment

Plaintiff also names the “California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation” 

as a Defendant. (Compl. at 1.) The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state, 

absent the state’s affirmative waiver of its immunity or congressional abrogation of that 

immunity. Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 

963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its 

agencies for all types of relief, absent unequivocal consent by the state.”) (internal 

citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[t]he State of California has not 

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 

in federal court, and the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate 

a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Brown v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 

554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 

58, 67, 71 (1989) (“We cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the wellestablished immunity of a State from being sued without its consent. [...] We hold that 

neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under 

§ 1983.”).

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Accordingly, the dismisses the CDCR as a party to this action sua sponte pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

III. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court:

1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2).

2) DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION;

3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph 

Diaz, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) sua sponte for failing to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary damages against 

immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). 

5) GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to file an Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted. 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his 

original pleading. Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended 

Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

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The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to provide Plaintiff with a blank copy 

of its form Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Plaintiff’s use and 

to assist him in complying with LR 8.2.a’s requirements. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 15, 2019

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