Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05061/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 1995 Decided August 2, 1996

No. 95-5057

SCOTT ARMSTRONG, ET AL.,

APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

v.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES

Consolidated with

95-5061

-

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 89cv00142)

Freddi Lipstein, Senior Counsel, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for

appellants, with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United

States Attorney, and Leonard Schaitman, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, were on

the briefs. Michael J. Singer, Assistant Director, and Matthew M. Collette, Attorney, United States

Department of Justice, entered appearances.

Michael E. Tankersley argued the cause for appellees, with whom David C. Vladeck and Alan B.

Morrison were on the briefs.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, GINSBURG and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: This case presents the question whether the National Security

Council is an "agency" subject to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(f), that is, whether

the NSC is an "executive department ... or other establishment in the executive branch." If so, then

the NSC is both subject to the disclosure requirements of the FOIA and obligated to preserve its

records in accordance with the Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101-07, 3301-14.

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 1 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The plaintiff-appellees are the National Security Archive, a research institute and library;

Scott Armstrong, a journalist affiliated with the Archive; and several associations, including the

National Library Association and the National Historical Association (hereinafter referred to

collectively as Armstrong). The defendant-appellants are the Executive Office of the President; the

Office of Administration and the NSC, which are components of the EOP; the White House

Communications Agency, an element ofthe Department of Defense; and Trudy Peterson, the Acting

Archivist of the United States.

The district court granted Armstrong's motion forsummary judgment, declared that the NSC

is an agency subject to the FOIA, and directed it to comply with both the FOIA and the FRA. The

court carved out an exception, however, for the records of high-level officials of the NSC who serve

solely to advise and assist the President. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 877 F.

Supp. 690, 705-06 (D.D.C. 1995).

The Government appeals, arguing that because the NSC does not exercise substantial

authority, independent of the President, it is not an agency within the meaning of the FOIA and that

its treatment as such would so intrude upon the core functions of the President as to "raise a

significant constitutional concern" about the separation of powers. Armstrong cross-appeals,

challenging the exception for high-level officials who act solely as advisers to the President.

Because the NSC operatesin close proximity to the President, who chairsit, and because the

NSC does not exercise substantial independent authority, we conclude that the NSC is not an agency

within the meaning of the FOIA. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court without

reaching the question raised by the plaintiffs' cross-appeal.

I. Background

The statutory mandate of the NSC is generally "to advise the President with respect to the

integration of domestic, foreign, and military policiesrelating to the nationalsecurity" and to perform

"such other functions as the President may direct." National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §§

402(a)-(b). The Council members are the President and certain cabinet-level officials, including the

National Security Adviser (NSA)formally, the Assistant to the President for National Security

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 2 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

*For clarity of exposition, we refer to the President and the cabinet-level officials who

constitute the senior decision-making body of the NSC as the "Council" or "statutory Council." 

We use "the NSC" to mean, depending upon the context, either the staff that supports the

statutory Council or the entire organization, including both the Council and the staff. 

Affairs. The NSC staff, which numbers about 150 persons, is headed by an Executive Secretary, who

reports to the NSA, and whom the President appoints without need of Senate confirmation. Id. §

402(c).*

The Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., which applies to most NSC

documents, providesin part that a president'srecords are to be made publiclyavailable five years after

he leaves office, except that national defense and certain other information isto be made available no

later than 12 years after the end of a president'sterm. § 2204. For purposes of the PRA, presidential

records do not include "any documentary materials that are ... official records of an agency," as the

term "agency" is defined in the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(f). 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B)(I). At the same

time, the coverage of the FRA is coextensive with the definition of "agency" in the FOIA, see

Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1993). As a result, no

record is subject to both the FRA and the PRA: "The FRA describes a class of materials that are

federal records subject to its provisions, and the PRA describes another, mutually exclusive set of

materials that are subject to a different and less rigorous regime." Id.

The PRA and the FRA differ in severalrespectsthat are of concern to the partiesto this case.

First, while both laws require the preservation of records, the procedures to prevent improper

destruction of documents covered by the FRA are significantly more demanding; hence, the district

court ordered the NSC to adopt new guidelines in order "to ensure that non-Presidentialrecords are

preserved under the Federal Records Act and not destroyed under the guise of the Presidential

Records Act." 877 F. Supp. at 707. Second, record-keeping requirements of the FRA are subject

to judicialreview and enforcement; those of the PRA are not. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 295

(D.C. Cir. 1991). Third, the joint regime of the FRA and the FOIA can affect a president's daily

operations during his term of office, while the PRA is applicable to a president's papers only after he

hasleft office. Fourth, insofar as NSC records are subject to the FRA, a president may not take such

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 3 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

documents with himupon leaving office (as past presidents have generallydone) without the approval

of the Archivist. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3303, 3303a; see also 44 U.S.C. § 3106 (Attorney General may

initiate legal action to retrieve records unlawfully removed).

The legal controversy over proceduresfor the preservation of NSC records has a lengthy and

complex history, which is fully recounted in Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1280-82. In January 1989

Armstrong made a request under the FOIA for all documents stored in the EOP and the NSC

electronic communications systems since their installation in the mid-1980's. At the same time

Armstrong sought a declaration in district court that those electronic documents and associated

backup tapes are federal or presidential records, and an injunction prohibiting their destruction. For

our present purpose it issufficient to recall that the district court concluded that certain items stored

in the NSC's computer system are recordssubject to the FRA, and that the NSC's guidelines relating

to the preservation of those records were arbitrary and capricious. Armstrong v. Executive Office

of the President, 810 F. Supp. 335 (D.D.C. 1993). When, four months thereafter, the Government

still had not promulgated new guidelinesfor the management of those electronic records, the district

court entered an order of contempt. 821 F. Supp. 761 (D.D.C. 1993). On appeal we agreed that the

NSC's guidelines were inadequate, but we reversed the contempt citation, which was premised upon

the Government's failure to act by a date certain. 1 F.3d at 1274. At the same time, upon

Armstrong's cross-appeal challenging the NSC's proceduresfor classifying records, we remanded the

matterforthe district court to determinewhethertheNSCproperlydistinguishes betweenpresidential

and federal records. Id.

The Office of Legal Counsel then rendered an opinion reversing the position it had taken in

1978 and declaring that the NSC is not an agency subject to the FOIA and therefore does not have

to comply with the FRA. Memorandum of Walter Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney General,

Office of Legal Counsel to Alan J. Kreczko, Special Assistant to the President, Sept. 20, 1993.

President Clinton adopted the OLC's new position but instructed his NSA, Anthony Lake, that the

NSC should voluntarily disclose "appropriate" records, including those that had been "transferred by

one Administration to another for transition and continuity purposes." Memorandum from the

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 4 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

President, Mar. 2, 1994. The Executive Secretary thereupon revoked the NSC's FOIA guidelines and

asserted that all NSC documents are presidential records, exempt from both the FOIA and the FRA.

Memorandum of William H. Itoh to William H. Leary, Mar. 25, 1994.

The district court then issued the decision that we now review. The court rejected the OLC's

analysis and held that the NSC is an agency subject to the FRA and must maintain and preserve its

records in accordance with that statute. 877 F. Supp. at 695. According to the district judge, the

NSC does not solely advise and assist the President. Id. at 700. Rather, the NSC exercises authority

independent ofthe President in several areas, including: overseeing the CIA, providing guidance and

direction to the intelligence community, and protecting classified information. Id. at 702-03.

Nonetheless, the court held that in "limited circumstances" when "high level officials of the NSC ...

act not as members of an agency but, solely as advisors to the President," the resulting records are

governed by the PRA, not by the FRA. Id. at 705. In the alternative, the district court held that the

NSC should be treated as an agency because the NSC had itself previously determined that it was an

agency and operated accordingly but had not offered a reasoned explanation for its later change of

position. Id. at 706.

On this appealthe Government contends, inter alia, that the interaction between the President

and the NSC requires privacyand confidentiality. Notwithstanding that national security information

and deliberative documents are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) and

(5), the Government contends that the possibility of premature disclosure pursuant to the FOIA

would make the President's conduct of national security policy excessively circumspect and would

chillthe communication necessaryfor effective and efficient decision-making. We need not wade into

such deep waters, however, in order to resolve the present controversy.

II. Analysis

"Records" are defined by the FRA as documentary materials "made or received by an agency

of the United States Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public

business." 44 U.S.C. § 3301. For purposes of the FOIA, the Congress originally defined an agency

as "each authorityofthe Government ofthe United States," subject to certain enumerated exceptions

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 5 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

not relevant here. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). In Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d

1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which concerned coverage under the FOIA ofthe Office of Science and

Technology, another unit in the Executive Office of the President, we interpreted this definition to

encompass "any administrative unit with substantial independent authority in the exercise ofspecific

functions." In 1974 the Congress amended the FOIA definition to cover any "establishment in the

executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President)." 5 U.S.C. §

552(f). This expanded definition was not, however, meant to cover "the President's immediate

personal staff or units in the Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the

President." H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974).

That the Congress intended to codify Soucie is clear enough. See Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d

1288, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Less clear is the test of an entity's status as an "agency" subject to the

FOIA. Is it (a) whether the entity exercises "substantial independent authority," as we put the matter

in Soucie; or (b) whether, in the terms of the Conference Report, the entity's "sole function is to

advise and assist the President"? As applied to an official or a group of officials who serve in dual

roles, the two tests may yield different results. On the difficulty presented by the so-called dual-hat

problem, see Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (unit or official that

is part of agency and has non-advisory functions cannot be "non-agency in selected contexts on a

case-by-case basis"), and Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156

(1980) (notes made by National Security Adviser "in his capacity as Presidential adviser, only" not

agency records despite NSA's dual role as official of NSC).

Because we conclude below that neither the statutory Council nor the NSC staff performs

significant non-advisory functions, we need not address the dual-hat controversy. Nor need we

address the implications of that controversy for the exception created by the district court for

high-level officials.

A. The Three-Factor Test of Meyer

In Meyerthe court managed to harmonize the "sole function" and the "substantialindependent

authority" criteria by using a three-factor test to determine the status under FOIA of a unit in the

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 6 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Executive Office of the President. There we held that a group of senior advisers to the President,

working within the EOP as the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, did not constitute an agency under

the FOIA even though the group "evaluated agency regulatory efforts and had authority to provide

some direction over agency rulemaking." 981 F.2d at 1292. Reading the Conference Report against

the background of Soucie, we inferred that the Congress intended the phrase "solely to advise and

assist the president" to refer to "entities whose characteristics and functions were similar to those of

the president's immediate personal staff." Id. at 1293. Therefore we identified "three interrelated

factors" relevant to determining whether those who both advise the President and supervise others

in the Executive Branch exercise "substantial independent authority" and hence should be deemed an

agency subject to the FOIA. These factors are: (1) "how close operationally the group is to the

President," (2) "whether it has a self-contained structure," and (3) "the nature of its delegat[ed]"

authority. Id. These three factors are not necessarily to be weighed equally; rather, each factor

warrants consideration insofar as it is illuminating in the particular case.

The closer an entity is to the President, the more it islike the White House staff, which solely

advises and assists the President, and the less it is like an agency to which substantial independent

authority has been delegated. And while a definite structure may be a prerequisite to qualify as an

"establishment within the executive branch," see id. ("The President does not create an

"establishment' ... every time he convenes a group of senior staff or departmental heads to work on

a problem"), not every establishment is an agency under the FOIA. Although structure and function

may be related for purpose of defining an agencyclear lines of authority facilitate the

implementation of policythey are not the same consideration.

The three-part test of Meyeris designed succinctly to capture the court's prior learning on the

subject whether a unit within the Executive Office ofthe President is an agency covered by the FOIA.

As reflected in those cases, the specific evidence bearing upon that question varies with the entity in

question. In Pacific Legal Foundation v. Council on Environmental Quality, 636 F.2d 1259, 1262-

63 (D.C. Cir. 1980), we held that the Council on Environmental Quality is an agency because of its

independent authority to "issue guidelines to federal agencies," "coordinate federal programs," and

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 7 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

oversee certain activities of other federal agencies. The Office of Science and Technology is within

the ambit of the FOIA, notwithstanding its proximity to the President, because it has independent

authority to evaluate federal scientific programs, initiate and support research, and award

scholarships. Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1075. The Office of Management and Budget is a FOIA agency,

in part because it has a statutory duty to provide budget information to the Congress. Sierra Club

v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

On the other hand, although the Council of Economic Advisers is fairly characterized as an

"establishment"it has a staff, a budget, and a defined structureit has no regulatory power or other

functions, under either its organic statute or anyExecutive Order, that would suggest that it exercises

independent authority; therefore, it is not a FOIA agency. Rushforth v. CEA, 762 F.2d 1038, 1043

(D.C. Cir. 1985). Nor do the staff of the Executive Residence come under the FOIA; their duty is

to manage the President's home subject to his direction and approval, which they do without the

delegation of substantial independent authority. Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 852, 854-55 (D.C.

Cir. 1995).

In this case, if the operating relationship between the NSC and the President is as close asthe

Government maintains, then a hierarchical structure, large staff, and separate budget will not by

themselves subject the NSC to the FOIA; Armstrong will have to show that the NSC exercises

significant independent authority in order to qualify it as an agency. It is not the number of functions

delegated to the NSC, but the degree of the NSC's independence in discharging them, that matters.

See Meyer, 981 F.2d at 1293. If Armstrong shows that the NSC does exercise substantial

independent authority, then the NSC cannot be said solely to advise and assist the President; that is

the consequence of the "sole function" test set forth in the Conference Report and fleshed out in

Meyer.

Whether an entity without a self-contained structure could ever qualify as an agency that

exercisessubstantial independent authority seems very doubtful. For this reason, we take up first the

question whether the NSC has a self-contained or determinate structure. If the organizational lines

of authority and responsibility within the NSC are undefined, or the NSC cannot readily be

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 8 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

distinguished fromother elements ofthe Executive Office ofthe President thatsolelyadvise and assist

the President, then we do not need to go any further down the Meyer road in order to conclude that

the NSC is not a distinct agency. Because we conclude that the NSC's structure is self-contained,

however, we do go on to examine the other Meyer factors; only then are we led to the conclusion

that the NSC is not an agency subject to the FOIA.

1. The Structure of the NSC

We said in Meyer that a "characteristic of the President's immediate staff is its lack of a firm

structure." 981 F.2d at 1296. Here the district court correctly characterized the NSC as having a

"firm structure," a staff, and a separate budget, 877 F. Supp. at 700-01, making it less like (to quote

the Conference Report again) "the President'simmediate personalstaff or [a] unit[ ] in the Executive

Office [of the President] whose sole function is to advise and assist the President." For its part,

however, the Government contends that the NSC staff overlaps that of the President's immediate

personalstaff and that the structure of the NSC merely reflects and confirms its role as the personal

instrument of the President; the organization and functions of the NSC staff are molded by each

President, acting through his National Security Adviser, to reflect the priorities of that President.

President Clinton's National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, implies, in a declaration

submitted to the district court, that the NSC is not the self-contained structure it might seem from

a glance at its organization chart. The NSC staff, he reports, "operates within the White House as

the President's foreign policy and national security staff "; indeed, he points out, several individuals

occupy positions on the organizational charts of both the White House and the NSC.

Armstrong responds by emphasizing the hierarchical NSC organization chart, which, he

argues, reveals an elaborate, self-contained structure and bureaucracy of the sort indicative of an

agency under the analysis in Meyer. We agree. The NSC staff is not an amorphous assembly from

which ad hoc task groups are convened periodically by the President. On the contrary, it is a

professional corps of more than 150 employees, organized into a complex system of committees and

working groups reporting ultimately to the Executive Secretary. There are separate offices, each

responsible for a particular geographic region or functional area, with clearly established lines of

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 9 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

authority both among and within the offices. The several points of tangency between the White

House and the NSC staff noted by Mr. Lake do not intertwine the NSC with "the President's

immediate personalstaff " in anywaythat obscuresthe line of perforation between the NSC and other

unitsin the EOP; in fact, all of the individuals holding titles on both the NSC and White House staffs

are in a non-substantive area, public affairs.

We conclude that the NSC has a structure sufficiently self-contained that the entity could

exercise substantial independent authority. The remaining question is whether the NSC does in fact

exercise such authority. We approach that question, as we did in Meyer, by considering how close

the operation of the NSC is to that of the presidency, and by examining the nature ofsuch authority

as has been delegated to the NSC.

2. The Proximity of the NSC to the President

Armstrong concedes that the NSC is "proximate" to the President, but he could hardly do

otherwise: The President chairs the statutory Council, and his National Security Adviser, working

in close contact with and under the direct supervision of the President, controls the NSC staff. The

intimate organizational and operating relationship between the President and the NSC is, in our view,

entitled to significantly greater weight in evaluating the NSC's arguable status as an agency than is

the self-contained structure of the entity. Accordingly, Armstrong must make a strong showing

indeed regarding the remaining factor under Meyer before we can conclude that the NSC exercises

substantial authority, independent of the President.

3. The Nature of the Authority Delegated to the NSC

The Government's position is, as it must be, that neither the Congress nor the President has

delegated any function to the NSC other than that of advising and assisting the President. We

consider first the question of congressional delegation.

Under the National Security Act, the NSC is authorized to: (a) advise the President upon

nationalsecuritymatters; (b) coordinate the policies and functions of other departments and agencies

regarding nationalsecurity matters; (c) assess and appraise the objectives and commitments of, and

the risks facing, the United States; (d) consider policies on national security matters; and (e) make

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 10 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

recommendationsto the President. 50 U.S.C. §§ 402(a)-(b). The Government deems it self-evident

that these statutory provisions do not by themselves authorize the NSC to perform any non-advisory

function.

Armstrong's only argument to the contrary is based upon a section of the Act providing that

the Director of CentralIntelligence acts "[u]nder the direction of the National Security Council" and

"asthe President or the National SecurityCouncil may direct." 50 U.S.C. §§ 403-3(a)(1), 403(c)(6).

Armstrong maintains that this provision (as "reinforced" by Executive Order 12,333) delegates

independent authority to the NSC. As we understand it, however, the statute delegates authority not

to the institutional NSC but to the President and the statutory Council headed by the President. A

member of the Council acts not as the head of his or her department but as an adviser or assistant to

the President. Our observations in Meyer regarding the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, of which

the President was not himself a member, are even more clearly applicable to the statutory Council,

which the President chairs:

[I]t is rather hard to imagine that ... any ... head of a department or agency who

reports directly to the President, would acquiesce in a [Council] decision that was

thought not to represent directly and precisely the President's opinion. It seems

implicit that ... members of the [Council] were not expected to resolve disputes

themselves, without presenting those disputes to the President, unless they already

knew the President's views on the exact issue. This, of course, means the [Council]

was not expected to act with significant independence.

981 F.2d at 1295 (emphasis in original).

Nor does anything in the record suggest that the President has empowered the NSC staff to

direct the DCI in any way. On the contrary, the staff's Senior Director for Intelligence Programs

stated at his deposition, "I don't have the ability to issue instructions or directions to agencies. I

would merely convey a decision made by the President or by the National SecurityAdviser or Deputy

National Security Adviser on behalf of the President."

We conclude that the NSC staff does not "direct" the CIA in the conduct of its business, nor

tell the DCI what to do except insofar as it may relay the decisions of the President and his senior

advisers on the statutory Council. Indeed, we find it inconceivable that the DCI, who himself sits on

the Principals Committee (the seniorinteragencydecision-making group for nationalsecuritypolicy),

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 11 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

would take direction from a member of the NSC staff acting on his or her own behalf.

The larger battle between the parties is not over the statute in any event; it is over various

presidential delegations to the NSC. The district court, observing that successive presidents have,

through a series of Executive Orders and National Security Decision Directives(NSDDs), expanded

the NSC's involvement in the areas itemized in the Act, concluded that the NSC has accreted

authority to act independently in a variety of areas. It is this position that Armstrong defends most

expansively on appeal.

In the Government's view, the district court mistook the gradual expansion of the NSC's

advisory and assisting functions for the delegation of independent authority. Indeed, we are told,

successive presidents expanded the NSC's responsibilities not in order to hypothecate their powers

but, on the contrary, the better to secure their personal control over the fragmented nationalsecurity

apparatus. This interpretation finds direct support in the report of the Tower Commission, which,

in the course of examining possible involvement by NSC staff members in the Iran-Contra matter,

concluded that the NSC "has from its inception been a highly personal instrument of the President"

and "remain[s] a strictly advisory body." John Tower et al., Report of the President's Special Review

Board, at II-1, II-2 (1987).

Armstrong argues that the President has delegated authority to the NSC in a number of

specific areas. We review below his best examples, each of which the Government vigorously

disputes. We conclude that, notwithstanding Armstrong's detailed efforts to document a decisional

role for the NSC staff, the staff exercises no substantial authority either to make or to implement

policy. Insofar as the staff has been delegated authority to make policy recommendations for

approval by the President, his NSA, or the statutory Council, the staff's functions are, of course,

quintessentially advisory. Likewise, to the extent that the NSC assists the President in coordinating

the activities of the various agencies with national security responsibilities, it exercises no authority

of its own.

Protection of national security information. Executive Orders 12,333 and 12,356

respectivelyauthorize the NSC(1) to provide "review of, guidance for, and direction to, the conduct"

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 12 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

of intelligence activities, and (2) to "provide overall policy direction for the information security

program." According to Armstrong, these (to us rather cryptic) delegations make the NSC the

administrative court of last resort for resolving disputes over what information can be released to

government contractors and disputes betweenagencies concerning the protection and declassification

of classified information. The NSC offers a different perspective on its role: In providing overall

policy direction and carrying out the referenced Executive Orders, the NSC merely monitors other

agencies in order to assure that the objectives of the President, who retains ultimate authority over

classified information, are achieved. Specifically, the NSC states that its declassification reviews,

although described by the district court as "adjudicatory," 877 F. Supp. at 702, are really nothing

more than the internal management of the information that the NSC generates in advising the

President.

At oral argument, Armstrong took strong exception to this last assertion. He contends that

the NSC's declassification function extendsto all "material produced or processed for the NSC staff,

even if not originally classified by an authorized member of the staff." That is, some of the material

subject to NSC declassification is held by other agencies. If so, then the NSC would seem to be

exercising discretionary authority beyond the internal management of its own information.

When pressed for an example, Armstrong referred the court to § 3.1(c) of Executive Order

12,356, in which the President authorized the NSC to hear appeals from the decisions of the

Information Security Oversight Office, an entity outside the NSC with jurisdiction over

declassification procedures. In response to a question from the bench, however, Armstrong conceded

that he is aware of no instance in which the appellate process has been invoked. We are reluctant to

consider the mere formality of a delegation of authority, unexercised and for all that appears,

therefore, of no consequence, the indicium of an entity with substantial independence from the

President.

Moreover, in April 1995 President Clinton issued a new directive, replacing Executive Order

12,356 and transferring overall policy direction for information security to the Director of the Office

ofManagement and Budget, in consultation with the NSA. Armstrong is therefore limited to arguing

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 13 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

that the NSC was an agency by virtue of the Executive Order when the records at issue in this action

were created.

Our dissenting colleague goes further, however. Focusing upon a regulation promulgated

under the since-revoked Executive Order that authorized the NSC to decide whether a federal agency

should be granted a waiver permitting it to use a non-standard security form for access to classified

information, 32 C.F.R. § 2003.20(k),Judge Tatelsuggests not only that we look to whether the NSC

was an agency when the disputed records were produced, but also that the regulation may remain in

effect notwithstanding the revocation ofExecutive Order 12,356 and the issuance ofExecutive Order

12,958. Our response is twofold: First, the burden is upon Armstrong to show that a regulation

issued pursuant to a superseded Executive Order remains in effect, and he has not even tried to do

so. Second, we are not asked in this round of litigation to resolve the status of particular documents;

instead, we must declare whether the NSC is an agency subject to the FOIA and the FRA. In

reaching that judgment, we apply the law in effect at the time we render our decision. Bradley v.

Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974).

Telecommunications policy. Armstrong argues next that the NSC has a non-advisory role

in controlling the National Communications Systema consortium of entities responsible for

providing communicationsfor the federalgovernment under emergencyconditions, including nuclear

attack. By virtue of a regulation issued by the Federal Communications Commission, under the

authority of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 606, and various other statutes, the NSC

has "[a]uthority to develop plans, policies, and procedures for the establishment of ... priorities"

aimed at restoring communications services in a national emergency. 47 C.F.R. §§ 211.1(b),

211.6(g). Control over the National Communications System is not, however, assigned to the NSC;

the presidentially appointed "Executive Agent" is the Secretary of Defense. Exec. Order 12,472 §

1(e). Armstrong maintains that while the Secretary has been delegated authority over some specified

matters involving telecommunications, the NSC is responsible for other matters. See National

Communications System Directive 2-1 § 8. The NSC counters that whatever authority it has over

telecommunications it does not exercise autonomously; i.e., the NSC may propose, but it is for the

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 14 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

President to approve, policy in this area.

The governing regulations and Executive Order 12,472 establish that the NSC participates

in setting prioritiesfor the restoration oftelecommunications during a national emergencypriorities

that may bind even non-governmental telecommunications common carriers and users. See, e.g., 47

C.F.R. § 213.0(b). Armstrong has not, however, established that any of this authority can be

exercised without the consent of the President, and the NSC cannot be deemed an "agency" if it does

not exercise some substantial non-advisory authority of its own.

Our dissenting colleague asserts that because 47 C.F.R. § 213.7(g) provides that certain

telecommunications "authority is reserved to the National Security Council" in the event of an

emergency, Armstrong has satisfied his burden ofshowing that the NSC can exercise such authority

without the consent of the President. The regulation affords a scant basis upon which to conclude

that the NSC can act, independent of the President, should an emergency arise. Nor is there any

support for the dissent's view that the NSC, merely by developing the telecommunications plan set

forth in 47 C.F.R. §§ 201-16, has already demonstrated substantial independence of the President.

The development of a plan, without more, does not attest to its independent preparation much less

to its adoption without the consent of the President or his NSA.

Emergency preparedness. The President has delegated to the NSC some authority over

emergency preparedness and crisis management, see Exec. Order 12,656 § 104(a), and instructed all

departments and agencies with responsibility for national defense preparedness to adhere to NSC

"policy and guidelines" in that area. Exec. Order No. 12,919 § 104(c). The NSC nonetheless

disclaims any autonomous role in emergency preparedness policy-making, that is, any role beyond

providing advice and assistance to the President. Instead, the NSC claims that it serves simply as "the

principal forum" for consideration of policy (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,656 § 104(a)).

In reply, Armstrong points to NSDD 188, which establishes a Senior Interagency Group

(SIG) for National Security Emergency Preparedness, reporting to the President through the NSC.

This group, which is chaired bythe NationalSecurityAdviser, is authorizedagain rather cryptically,

it seems to usto "oversee the implementation of the goals and principles" involved in emergency

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 15 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

mobilization planning. When asked at oral argument whether there is anything in the record to

indicate what the SIG actually does, Armstrong conceded that there is nothing before us to confirm

that the SIG in fact oversees anything or anyone. In any event, for the NSC to serve as an

intermediary between the President and a group that "oversee[s] the implementation of ... goals and

principles" set by the President is not to implement those goals itself. We are hesitant to conclude

that merely "overseeing" (if it does) and reporting to the President upon the activities of others are

functions sufficiently distinct from advising and assisting the President to weigh in favor of treating

the NSC as an agency subject to the FOIA.

Non-proliferation. Both Armstrong and the dissent argue that the NSC exercises authority,

independent of the President, in the area of nonproliferation because the NSC examines and makes

recommendations to the Department of Commerce regarding export license applications. We

disagree. First, if the Departments of Commerce and Energy make an initial determination that an

examination is necessary, 15 C.F.R. pt. 778, supp. 1 (1995), that examination is actually undertaken

not by the NSC but by an ad hoc interagency working group that may not even qualify as an

"establishment within the executive branch." Meyer, 981 F.2d at 1293 ("The President does not

create an "establishment' ... every time he convenes a group ofsenior staff or departmental heads to

work on a problem"). Second, although the NSA acknowledges that the working group is part of

the NSC, he also notes that a "Special Assistant to the President ... represents the President on each

[group] ... [and he] takes his direction from me or my Deputy, on behalf of the President." Finally,

the Secretary of Commerce must consider, but is not bound by, the recommendation of the working

group. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2409(f)(1)(1994).

The dissent dismisses this last point on the ground that the APA treats as an agency even an

entity whose decisions are "subject to review by another agency." 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). That

obliteratesthe distinction betweenmaking a decision that will be implemented unlessit is disapproved

upon appeal to a higher authority, and rendering advice that will not be implemented unless it is

affirmatively adopted by that authority. Furthermore, Judge Tatel's suggestion that there is no

material difference between ex ante approval and ex post review equates "preview" (to view in

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 16 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

advance) with "review" (to view again). Quite clearly, the NSC's recommendations are previewed,

not reviewed, by the Department of Commerce before they are adopted.

Public diplomacy. In NSDD 77 the President directed an interagency Special Planning

Group, chaired by the National Security Adviser, to engage in "diplomatic and technical planning

relative to modernization of U.S. international broadcasting capabilities, the development of

anti-jamming strategies and techniques, planning relative to direct radio broadcast by satellite and

longer term considerations of the potential for direct T.V. broadcasting." This Special Planning

Group is "responsible for the overall planning, direction, coordination and monitoring of

implementation of public diplomacy activities." Id. The NSC coordinates the work of four standing

committees of the Special Planning Group, each of which is chaired by a member agency.

Armstrong argues that NSDD 77 vests in the NSC authority to "direct" public diplomacy

programs. The Government responds that NSDD 77, while it does contemplate that the interagency

Planning Group will be supported by NSC staff, does not assign substantive authority to the NSC;

all activities are carried out by the member agencies.

From NSDD 77 itself we think it quite clear that ultimate authority to set objectives,

determine policy, and establish programsrests elsewhere than with the NSC. Armstrong would have

the court equate a monitoring function to the authority to establish and implement programs. As we

see it, however, the President uses the NSC to provide the direction and coordination necessary to

secure conformity to overall goals fixed by the President. That is not a delegation of substantial

authority for the NSC to act independently of the President.

Our dissenting colleague suggests that the reviewing function of the Special Planning Group

is "sufficiently similar to the evaluative function that we found warranted treating the OST as an

agency in Soucie." Even if we were to agree with that assessment, it is simply not relevant to the

NSC. (Recall our emphasis in Meyer upon the "interrelated" nature of the three factorsset out there.

981 F.2d at 1293.) That the Special Planning Group may review the activities of four permanent

coordinating committeesis notsufficient to offset the essentialidentitybetween the statutoryCouncil

and the Presidentan identity distinctive to the NSC and completely without parallel at the OST.

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 17 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Further, Judge Tatel elaborates the responsibilities of two of the committees supervised by

the Special Planning Group, and concludes that activities such as "training private groups to

encourage the growth of democratic institutions" and "planning and coordination of international

broadcasting" constitute substantial delegations of authority to act, independent of the President.

According to the dissent, "[t]he key question is not who setsthe goalstoward which an entityworks,

but whether an entity itself takes action in furtherance of executive branch goals." Therein lies the

crux of our disagreement.

In determining whether an entity is an agency we do not lump together all its activities that

advance any goal of the executive branch. Rather we distinguish between advising and assisting the

President on the one hand and exercising independent authorityon the other. The question is not only

whether the President sets the goal, but the generality of that goal; the more general the goal the

greater the likelihood that the responsible entity is vested with some element of discretion and is not

just advising or assisting the President. Neither Armstrong nor the dissent has demonstrated that the

Special Planning Group or any of the four interagency committees that it supervises is vested with

sufficient discretion to say that it exercises authority, independent of the President.

4. Summary and Conclusion

We determined first that the NSC has the self-contained structure necessary for it to be

considered an executive establishment, and second that structure, standing alone, is not sufficient to

overweigh the significance of the close proximityindeed the essential identitybetween the

statutory Council and the President. Only with a strong showing that the NSC staff exercises

substantial independent authority, therefore, could Armstrong succeed in portraying the NSC as an

agency subject to the FOIA.

We conclude that on the record before us Armstrong has not carried his burden of showing

that the NSC exercises meaningful non-advisory authority. Most clearly, the Congress has not itself

(i.e., by statute) delegated substantial authority to the NSC. Armstrong therefore rests his case

principallyupon such delegations assuccessive presidents have made in variousExecutive Orders and

National Security Decision Directives. Under none of these, however, does the NSC appear to

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 18 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

exercise any significant non-advisory function.

Armstrong has shown that the NSC staff has authority to review requests for document

declassification, and has apparent authority to decide appeals from decisions of the ISOO, but the

record is silent upon the question whether the NSC uses that authority and does so without direct

supervision by the President. Armstrong has also pointed to delegations from the President to the

NSC of functions in telecommunications, non-proliferation, and public diplomacy; but he has not

shown that the NSC plays a substantive role apart from that of the President, as opposed to a

coordinating role on behalf of the President. When arrayed against the overwhelming fact that the

President is the head of the NSC, more is required to demonstrate that these staff activities cast the

NSC in any role outside its statutory assignment to advise and assist the President. Therefore, we

hold that under the three-part test of Meyer, the NSC is not an agency subject to the FOIA.

B. Past Conduct and Statements

Armstrong also suggeststhat, quite apart fromthe Meyertest, the NSC's own past statements

and conduct demonstrate that the NSC hasfunctionsin addition to those of advising and assisting the

President. See Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1075 (prior conduct weighed in assessing whether entity is an

agency). Armstrong cites these recent examples: (1) the Executive Secretary's 1993 staff

memorandum on recordkeeping stating that "the NSC both advises and assists the President and is

an agency"; (2) the Joint Statement of Facts submitted to the district court in this case, in which the

parties state that the NSC's "responsibilitiesinclude ... performing independent functions set forth in

the governing statute, as well as in regulations and Executive Orders"; and (3) the NSC's

memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss a previous case brought byArmstrong, in which the

NSC reports having responsibilities in the "management of the interagency process for national

security affairs". Armstrong notes also that each Administration has left behind so-called institutional

records of the NSC, which the NSC has managed under the FRA rather than the PRA; he claims that

the NSC thereby implicitly conceded that it is an agency.

According to the Government, these examples of the NSC's past statements and conduct do

not have the significance that Armstrong claims for them. First, the Executive Secretary's

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 19 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

recordkeeping memorandumwasintended to guide NSC staff membersin creating, maintaining, and

preserving records in conformity with the OLC's legal opinion, then prevailing within the Executive

Branch, that the NSC was an agency. That opinion was reversed some months later. Second, the

NSC's submissions in earlier rounds of this litigation can hardly be read to concede the central point

in contention here. In the Joint Statement of Facts, the NSC was just acknowledging that it does a

variety ofthings pursuant to the delegationslisted therein; in the memorandum of law supporting the

Government's motion to dismiss the prior case, it acknowledged only a coordinating role

("management of the interagency process") typical of an entity within the Executive Office of the

President acting on behalf of the President in relation to the agencies with operating responsibilities.

As to Armstrong's third point, about "institutional records," the NSC responds that every president

has treated most of the NSC's records as presidential records and removed them at the end of his

administration. That the NSC, in the interests of permitting public access to some NSC records and

ensuring a smooth transition on nationalsecurity matters, voluntarily subjected certain of its records

to the FOIA and the FRA does not reflect any intention to concede, and should not be taken to

establish as a matter of law, that the NSC is subject to those statutes.

We agree with the Government on this point as well. The NSC's prior references to itself as

an agency are not probative on the question before the courtwhether the NSC isindeed an agency

within the meaning of the FOIA; quite simply, the Government's position on that question has

changed over the years. Moreover, as Armstrong conceded at oral argument, even as the NSC was

treating some ofitsinstitutionalrecords asthough theywere subject to the FOIA and the FRA, it was

declining to treat other records in that way. In sum, the NSC's past behavior has been

inconsistentboth logically and factuallyand therefore does not illuminate the legal question here

in dispute.

Finally, the district court held in the alternative that the NSC did not set forth, in the March

25, 1994 memorandum from William H. Itoh to William H. Leary, a reasoned explanation for its

change of position on the question whether it is an agency, and that thisis a sufficient ground in itself,

pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), to set aside the Government's

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 20 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

newly adopted position as arbitrary and capricious. 877 F. Supp. at 706 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983)). Armstrong made no such

argument in district court, nor does he defend the judgment of the district court upon this alternate

ground. In any event, invocation of the APA begs the question whether the NSC is an "agency"

within the meaning of that term as it is used in the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (agency defined as

"each authority ofthe Government ofthe United States"). Because we have concluded that the NSC

is not, after all, an agency subject to the FOIA, the district court's alternative rationale, regardless of

its provenance, is now moot.

C. The Legislative History of the PRA

Before concluding, we respond to the suggestion elaborated at some length in the dissent that

the status of the NSC as an agency could be resolved by looking instead to the legislative history of

the PRA rather than to our own prior cases. The argument, in brief, goes like this: When the

Congress enacted the PRA in 1978, both the Congress and the President were aware that the NSC

complied with the FOIA. Moreover, the Congress intended that any agency which, apparently like

the NSC, "is now subject to the FOIA would remain so." H.R. REP. NO. 1487, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5732, 5742. Accordingly, by its express terms, the PRA

excluded from coverage any documentary materials that are official records of an agency subject to

the FOIA. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B). Ergo, for us to hold that the NSC is not an agency within the

meaning of the FOIA, and is therefore subject to the PRA rather than to the FRA, is contrary to the

intent of the Congress that passed the PRA.

The legislative history of the PRA also reveals, however, that the Congress intentionally

aligned the definition of "agency" in the FOIA with the test we had announced in Soucie. See Meyer,

981 F.2d at 1291 ("As clearly shown by the legislative history ... Congress intended to codify our

earlier decision ... in Soucie"); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1974). By

incorporating the Soucie test, the Congress made a deliberate decision to forego specifically listing

the NSC and other EOP units as agencies, as had been done in the House Report. H.R. REP. NO.

876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6274. Instead, the

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 21 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Congress adopted a flexible, judicially-created test and handed the matter back to the courts,

anticipating that we would continue to shape and refine the basic Soucie definitionasindeed we did

when we established the three-factor test in Meyer. There is nothing to indicate that the Congress

intended specifically to define the NSC as a FOIA agency apart from a judicial determination to that

effect.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the record before this court, we conclude that the NSC is not an agency under

the FOIA and, therefore, that its records need not be managed in compliance with the FRA. The

NSC has a self-contained structure, but the proximity of the NSC's operationsto the President, who

chairsthe statutoryCouncil, is more significant; the close working relationship between the NSC and

the President indicates that the NSC is more like "the President's immediate personal staff " than it

is like an agency exercising authority, independent of the President. Accordingly, for Armstrong to

prevail, his showing regarding the nature of the authority delegated to the NSC must be compelling,

which on this record it is not. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court that the

NSC is an agency under the FOIA is

Reversed.

TATEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The court today concludes that the National Security

Council does not exercise sufficiently independent authority to be an "agency" for purposes of the

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), and the Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§

2101-18, 2901-09, 3101-07, 3301-14 (1994). I respectfully disagree. The NSC, an entity within the

Executive Office of the President that complied with FOIA during the administrations of Presidents

Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush, declared itself exempt from FOIA only recently while thislitigation

was pending. In my view, the record demonstrates that the NSC exercises, in areas such as

information security, telecommunications, non-proliferation, and public diplomacy, just the sorts of

independent authoritythat our cases hold satisfythe requirements ofthe FOIA definition of "agency."

Holding the NSC subject to FOIA and the Federal Records Act is consistent with those statutes and

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 22 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

their purposes. Moreover, FOIA's exemption for national security materials, combined with the

inapplicability of FOIA and the Federal Records Act to certain materials produced by NSC members

who hold separate non-NSC positions, such asin the Office of the President or the Office of the Vice

President, ensures that the NSC's compliance with these statutes would not interfere with the

President's development of foreign policy.

I.

Our task in this case isto determine whether the NSC is an agency for purposes ofthe Federal

Records Act and is therefore subject to the records disposal guidelines set forth in that statute.

Because the same documents cannot simultaneously be subject to the different requirements of the

FederalRecords Act and the PresidentialRecords Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-07 (1994),see Armstrong

v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Armstrong II), and because

the Presidential Records Act specifies that its coverage and the coverage of FOIA are mutually

exclusive,see 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2)(B), this court hastreated the definition of "agency" in the Federal

Records Act as coterminous with the FOIA definition of "agency," see Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1293.

We have also held that, in light of the suggestion in FOIA'slegislative history that Congressintended

to adopt this court's approach in Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), FOIA's definition

of "agency," though literally including "any ... establishment in the executive branch of the

Government (including the Executive Office of the President)," 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (emphasis added),

does not include EOP units whose sole functions are to advise and assist the President or that do not

exercise "substantial independent authority." See Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisors, 762

F.2d 1038, 1040-43 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1073, 1075. Although these two

formulations of the Soucie rulethe "sole function" test and the "substantial independent authority"

inquirymight conceivably point in different directions for certain entities, see Maj. op. at 7, our

precedents seem to require us to view them, to the extent possible, as essentially opposite sides of

the same coin. In other words, if an entity has some significant function apart from advising and

assisting the President, then we should view the agency as exercising substantial independent

authority and therefore as a FOIA agency.

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 23 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

A.

In Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993), we held that in determining whether an

entity within the Executive Office of the President that "help[s] the President supervise others in the

executive branch" exercisessubstantial independent authority, we should focus on three factors: the

unit's proximity to the President, "the nature ofits delegation fromthe President," and "whether it has

a self-contained structure." Id. at 1293. We treated the three factors not as elements to be weighed

against each other as in a balancing test, but rather as keys to understanding the nature of an EOP

unit's functions in order to determine whether the unit exercises substantial independent authority

apart from advising and assisting the President. Although I agree with the court's conclusion that the

NSC has a self-contained structureMeyer's final factorI think the court fails to appreciate the

functional nature of the Meyer inquiry in its analysis of the first two factors.

Regarding the first Meyer factorproximity to the PresidentI certainly agree with my

colleagues that, in light of the President's membership on the NSC, the NSC is proximate to the

President. In my view, that conclusion should simply be a starting point for our consideration of the

second Meyer factor; we still must analyze how the President's membership on the NSC affects that

entity's functions. With all due respect, I fear the President's membership on the NSC has obscured

from my colleagues the extent to which the NSC actually exercises independent authority.

In Meyer, we "assume[d] ... that Congressintended the phrase "solely to advise and assist' the

President to refer to entities whose characteristics and functions were similar to those of the

President's immediate personal staff." Id. In other words, the EOP units that Congress meant to

exclude from the coverage of FOIA are those as close operationally to the President as his personal

staff. Apparently to make clear that proximity to the President is important to the extent that it

suggests something about function, we explained that the proximity factor referred to a unit's

"continuing interaction" with the President. Id.

Generally, an entity's proximity to the President makes it more likely that its functions are

advisory. That is, the closer an entity is to the President, the less likely we are to find truly

independent authority; the further from the President, the more likely the entity's authority is truly

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 24 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

independent. The entity at issue in Meyer, the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, was a small

committee operating in such close proximity to the President that none of its decisions could fairly

be described as independent of him. See id. at 1294. The NSC has a more complex structure than

the Task Force. On the one hand, the President himself is a member of the NSC. On the other hand,

the NSC is a much larger entity, many of whose parts are not nearly as close to the President as was

the Task Force in Meyer. According to the reasoning underlying Meyer 's proximity factor, then,

while we should expect some NSC functions to be akin to those of the President's personalstaff, we

should not be at allsurprised to find independent functions exercised by the less proximate NSC staff

and numerous NSC interagency groups. Even with the President as a member, the NSC is a legal

entity distinct from the President, and the record indicates that responsibilities delegated to the NSC

are in fact carried out without the personal involvement of the President.

It is with respect to the remaining element of the Meyer inquirythe nature of the authority

delegated to an EOP unitthat I part most significantly from the court's approach. In my view, the

greatest challenge posed by the Soucie and Meyer tests is reading the phrase "advise and assist the

President" in a meaningful but not overly broad way. A host of executive branch activities that

Congresssubjected to FOIA can also be viewed as activitiesthat "assist the President," for surely the

President is assisted in executing the laws by every delegation of power that he makes. See Meyer,

981 F.2d at 1293. As we made clear in Meyer, we must not allow the "advise and assist" exception

to swallow the FOIA rule. That is exactly what I fear the court has done today.

Apparently because of the President's membership on the NSC, the court treats the Meyer

delegation prong in what I believe to be an unrealistic fashion, expecting Armstrong to demonstrate

that NSC activitiesreflect a sort of independence from the President that neither FOIA nor our cases

envision as a requirement for FOIA agencies. For example, I think the court makes too much turn

on whether an entity may act without the consent of the President. The court suggests that an entity

cannot have "substantial non-advisory authority of its own" unless it may exercise its authority

"without the consent of the President." Maj. op. at 17. Although saying that an entity does not seem

"independent" if it must obtain consent before acting makes a certain amount of linguistic sense, this

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 25 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

cannot be what our cases mean by "independent." To be an agency under the Administrative

Procedure Act (and thus FOIA) an entity does not need to be able to act without consent. The APA

definition of "agency"which is less encompassing than the FOIA definitionincludes "each

authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by

another agency." 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1994) (emphasis added). Nothing in the APA definition

suggeststhat it excludes entitiesthat, before taking action, must submit plansfor review and approval

by another agency. That is, even an entity that acts only with the consent of another agency could

still be an agency under the APA and thus under FOIA. Crucial to the "agency" inquiry is not whether

an entity is unaccountable to all other agencies within the executive branch, but whether the entity

has the power to act provided no higher authority disapproves.

This case, of course, does not concern an executive branch entity that must obtain the consent

of another agency, but an entity within the Executive Office of the President that may under certain

circumstances have to obtain the consent of the President, who is not an "agency" under the APA,

see Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992). That an entity's actions are subject to the

President's consent is hardly unusual and should certainly not be a basisfor exempting an entity from

FOIA. I doubt that any President would permit an EOP unit to act against his will or that other

executive agencies would comply with any order from an EOP unit thought not to reflect either the

President's wishes or his general policies, yet FOIA clearly specifiesthat EOP units can be "agencies"

under the statute. The problem with the court's view of consent is that the very notion of agency

embodies consent. As the Government argued in an earlier stage of this litigation, "An "agency' is

generally understood as being responsible to a "principal': it is the instrumentality through which

another works. The President ... is the principal in the executive branch to whom agencies are

responsible." Brief for Appellants at 19, Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (No. 90-

5173) (citation omitted).

The court's focus on consent risks treating FOIA as if it were more concerned with

decisionmaking than with decision implementation. Nothing in FOIA contains any such indication.

FOIA gives private citizens access to information from executive branch agencies that do the work

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 26 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

of government. Its "sole function" exception excludes only a small subset of entities within the

Executive Office of the President that do not themselves "do" anything apart from advising the

President and assisting him in what he does.

In determining whether an EOP unit exercises independent authority or only advises and

assists the President, I would therefore focus on whether the unit actually takes action itself, as

opposed to taking stepssimply to assist the President in taking action. For example, a unit within the

Executive Office of the President might be viewed as merely assisting the President if its activities

prepare the President for action or facilitate his actions. In contrast, if the President actually delegates

to the unit responsibility for taking certain action itself, then the unit is not simply assisting the

President to take action, but isitself exercising delegated authority. If the entity is itself taking action,

then it matters little that the President retains power to approve or disapprove the entity's action.

Indeed, if the President were to delegate an enormous amount of authority to an entity within the

Executive Office of the President with the understanding that the entity would submit weekly

proposals ofits actionsfor the President's approval, the mere fact that the entity could not act without

the President's consent would not be groundsto exempt that entity from the coverage of FOIA or the

Federal Records Act as long as it is the entity itself that acts. To the extent that the entity does the

work of governmentexercising authority in a way that has concrete effects either on the interests

of private citizens or on other parts of the governmentthe entity is engaging in just the sort of

official activity that the Federal Records Act and FOIA were designed to bring into public view.

B.

In my view, the court's failure to appreciate the functional focus of the Meyerinquiry has led

it to the erroneous conclusion that the NSC does not exercise substantial independent authority apart

fromadvising and assisting the President. Although a court applying the "sole function" test need find

only one non-advise-and-assist function to conclude that an EOP unit is an agency for FOIA and

FederalRecordsAct purposes, I describe below several examples ofsignificant non-advise-and-assist

functions carried out by the NSC that should render it an agency.

Information Security

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 27 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The record persuasivelydemonstratesthat the NSChasrepeatedlyperformed a classic agency

adjudicatory function in deciding whether waiversshould be granted to permit federal agenciesto use

non-standard security forms. Federal regulations establish that, as part of a "government-wide

information securityprogram" to "enhance the protection of nationalsecurity information and/or [to]

reduce the costs associated with its protection," executive branch departments and independent

agencies must use a standard non-disclosure form (or one of its predecessors). 32 C.F.R. § 2003.1

(1995). The regulations require that all employees of executive departments and independent

agencies, as well as employees of government contractors and licensees,sign a standard securityform

"before being granted accessto classified information." § 2003.20(b)-(c). Agencies may also require

other persons to sign the standard form before obtaining such access. § 2003.20(d). According to

the regulations, although use of the standard form by departments and agencies is "mandatory," §

2003.2, an agency may request a waiver from the requirement of using the standard form. §

2003.20(k). The regulations provide that "[o]nly the National Security Council may grant an agency's

request for a waiver from the use of the [standard form]." Id. An agency requesting a waiver must

submit a proposed alternative to the Director ofthe InformationSecurityOversight Office, who, after

consulting with the Department ofJustice on the enforceabilityofthe proposed alternative agreement

form, will "mak[e] a recommendation to the National Security Council." Id.

The record in this case documents several instances in which the NSC has exercised this

independent function. It approved waivers for the Central Intelligence Agency (after a dispute

between that agency and the ISOO), for the National Security Agency, and for the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In the course of the present litigation, the Government

has admitted that "[o]fficials of the NSC approve or disapprove requests for waiver from the

obligation to use standard forms prescribed by32C.F.R. Part 2003, without the personalinvolvement

of the President." Supplemental Responses of Defendant to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for

Admission, Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 877 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1995) (No.

89-0142). Although the Government argues that "it is the National Security Advisor, in his role as

the President's advisor, who performs the key functions of approving" waivers, Brief of Appellants

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 28 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

at 34, the record demonstrates that the NSC staff reviews waiver requests and the Executive

Secretary ofthe NSC signs grants of waivers. Significantly, the relevant regulation does not give this

power to the National Security Advisor, but rather states that "[o]nly the National Security Council

may grant" such waivers. 32 C.F.R. § 2003.20(k). This function aloneexercising the power,

without the personal involvement of the President, to decide whether executive branch and

independent agencies may use non-standard security formswould be sufficient to render the NSC

an agency.

Whether the regulation that gives the NSC the power to grant these waivers is still in effect

is not entirelyclear. The ISOO issued the regulation pursuant to section 5.2(b)(7) of Executive Order

No. 12,356, which in 1983 gave the ISOO Director "the authority to prescribe, after consultation

with affected agencies, standard forms that will promote the implementation of the information

security program." Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 5.2(b)(7), 3 C.F.R. 166, 176 (1983), reprinted in 50

U.S.C. § 435 (1994). Under Executive Order No. 12,356, the NSC had responsibility for "overall

policydirection for the information securityprogram." Id. § 5.1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 175 (1983),reprinted

in 50 U.S.C. § 435. In 1995, President Clinton revoked Executive Order No. 12,356. See Exec.

Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825, at 19,843 (1995). Executive Order No. 12,958 gave the

Director ofthe Office ofManagement andBudget authorityto issue directivesto implement the order

and placed the ISOO within the OMB. See id. §§ 5.2(a), 5.3, 60 Fed. Reg. at 19,838-39. Although

Executive Order No. 12,958 gave the Director of the ISOO "the authority to prescribe, after

consultation with affected agencies, standardization of forms or procedures that will promote the

implementation of the program established under this order," id. § 5.3(b)(7), 60 Fed. Reg. at

19,839a delegation similar to the one in Executive Order No. 12,356 under which the ISOO issued

the regulation originally giving the NSC finalresponsibility over waiver decisionsthe NSC may no

longer retain this power under Executive Order No. 12,958.

Nevertheless, even if the NSC no longer has the power to rule on these waiver requests, it

exercised substantial, independent authority without the involvement of the President, and was thus

an agency, when it did have this authorityincluding when some ofthe records at issue in thislawsuit

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 29 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

were produced. Because a functional test serves to determine whether an entity is an "agency" for

purposes of FOIA and the FederalRecords Act and because presidential delegations of authority can

suffice to render an entity an agency, executive orders can have the effect of bringing an entity within

or outside the coverage of FOIA. The "sole function" test requires that, to be exempt from FOIA,

an EOP unit have no significant non-advise-and-assist functions. Therefore, the NSC's waiver

authority, when it existed, was alone sufficient to bring the NSC within FOIA's definition of "agency."

The court's citation of Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974), for the

proposition that "we apply the law in effect at the time we render our decision," Maj. op. at 16, is

beside the point. Bradley presented the question whether a statute enacted during the course of a

particular lawsuit should be applied to that lawsuit. See Bradley, 416 U.S. at 709-11. In the present

case, the relevant "law [that is] in effect at the time we render our decision" and that we must apply

to the factsin the record isthe FOIA definition of "agency." Armstrong seeks access to NSC records

dating from the mid-1980s. The question before us, then, is whether the NSC is now or was for any

time since the mid-1980s an agency under the FOIA definition. The court's effort to discount the

relevance of a delegation of authority that may no longer be in effect is unpersuasive. In any event,

as I explain below, I think that other NSC functions are enough to render the NSC an agency even

if the NSC no longer has power to rule on security form waiver requests.

Telecommunications

The NSC possesses and has exercised substantial independent authority in the area of

telecommunications. Together with the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the NSC has

published extensive plans for telecommunications regulation "during crises and emergencies." See

47 C.F.R. §§ 201-216 (1995). Included among these plans is a "precedence system for the

expeditious handling of messages and callstransmitted over Government and public correspondence

facilities in all types of situations from peacetime to massive nuclear attack." § 213.1(a). With the

Federal Communications Commission, the NSC has established a "Priority System for Intercity

Private Line Services" in order to protect "[p]rivate line servicesfor military, governmental, and other

essential users." § 213.7(g) (citing FCC Order 67-51). These telecommunications plans provide that

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 30 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

during emergencies, although communications common carriers will normally be permitted to "use

their judgment in determining" how many circuits to devote to categories of public correspondence

entitled to precedence over other messages and calls, "the authority is reserved to the National

Security Council or the Federal Communications Commission, as appropriate to the time and

situation, to revise the decisions ofthe carriersrespecting the allocation of circuits, and to resolve any

questions which are referred to them by the carriers or the users." Id. Thus, during national

emergencies, the NSC has authority to decide whether communications common carriers have

devoted adequate circuits to public correspondence deserving precedence and to resolve other

questions referred by carriers or the users of their services. To me, this is a classic example of

substantial independent authority.

In rejecting the NSC's emergency telecommunications responsibilities as substantial

independent authority, the court states that "Armstrong has not ... established that any of this

authority can be exercised without the consent of the President." Maj. op. at 17. The court offers

no explanation, however, of what it would have Armstrong show. If the court means that Armstrong

must show that the NSC is not obligated to obtain the President's consent each time it exercises its

authority, Armstrong has satisfied this burden: The regulation clearly states that the relevant

"authority isreserved to the National SecurityCouncil or the FederalCommunications Commission,

as appropriate to the time and situation." 47 C.F.R. § 213.7(g). The plain language of the regulation

thus gives the NSC, where appropriate for it to act instead of the FCC, the authority to act without

first seeking the President's consent. If the court means that Armstrong must show that the NSC may

exercise its authority even over the objection of the President, then the court has created an

impossible hurdle. No EOP unit can be "independent" of the President in the way that independent

agencies outside the executive branch can.

Proposing another possible reasonto discount theNSC'stelecommunicationsresponsibilities,

the Government arguesthat responsibilitiesshared with other entities cannot suffice to bring the NSC

within FOIA. This argument has no foundation in either the statute or the "sole function" test. The

Meyertest is premised in part on the notion that, in order for an EOP unit to be considered an agency,

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 31 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

it must not be too similar to the President's personalstaff; in other words, the agency must take some

sort of action that is independent of the President's action. But nothing in FOIA or the sole function

test requires that an agency's authority be independent of authority exercised by another executive

branch entity. The fact that a delegation of authority requires two executive branch entities to

cooperate in carrying out clearly non-advise-and-assist functions does not mean that the entities

exercise no authority sufficiently separate from the President to be "agencies" under FOIA. It simply

means that both agencies exercise such authority together and are thus both potentially subject to

FOIA.

One other potential objection to giving weight to the NSC's telecommunications

responsibilities is their possibly hypothetical nature. The record does not indicate whether the NSC

has ever exercised its authority over communications common carriers during an emergency. I raise

this point because, with respect to another NSC function, the court expresses its "reluctan[ce] to

consider the mere formality of a delegation of authority, unexercised and for all that appears,

therefore, of no consequence, the indicium of an entity with substantial independence from the

President." Maj. op. at 16. My colleagues express their hesitation with respect to a powerto

decide appealsfrom certain decisions of the ISOOwhose non-exercise is apparently due to the fact

that it has been found to be of little or no use. The NSC's telecommunications authority, in contrast,

would likely prove very useful and perhaps necessary given the occurrence of certain events, such as

a national emergency. I doubt that the Government or the court would suggest that an entity given

important responsibilities in the event of a national emergency would not be subject to FOIA until

such an emergency took place. Once such an emergency occurred and the entity exercised its

contingent authority, the entity certainly would be an agency subject to FOIA. It defies the purpose

of FOIA to suggest, however, that the statute Congress passed to bring government operation into

more public view would not entitle the public to important information about the entityincluding,

for example, information about whether it is in fact prepared to carry out its responsibilities in case

of a national emergencyuntil it is too late for the information to be of perhaps its most important

use.

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 32 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Most important, not all ofthe NSC'stelecommunications authority is hypothetical. The NSC

has already acted in conjunction with the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the FCC to

develop the elaborate telecommunications plan contained in 47 C.F.R. §§ 201-216. In my view, then,

the NSC's telecommunications responsibilities are enough to render it an "agency" for FOIA and

Federal Records Act purposes.

Non-proliferation

The NSC has also been delegated authority to review and make recommendations regarding

export license applications. Under regulations implementing section 309(c) of the Nuclear NonProliferationAct of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2139a(c) (1994), theSecretaryofCommerce hasresponsibility

for initiating procedures for review of export licenses for "items ... that could be of significance for

nuclear explosive purposes if used for activities other than those authorized at the time of export."

15 C.F.R. § 778.2(a) (1996). According to procedures adopted pursuant to the Non-Proliferation

Act, if the Departments of Commerce and Energy believe that an export license application should

be denied or reviewed by another agency, these departments must refer the application to the

Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination ("SNEC") of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on

Nonproliferation, which "shall promptly consider any such application and provide its advice and

recommendations to the Department of Commerce." See Procedures Established Pursuant to the

Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act of 1978, pt. F, § 1(b), reprinted in 15 C.F.R. pt. 778, supp. 1 (1996)

[hereinafter Non-Proliferation Procedures]. If the SNEC reaches agreement on the application, the

Commerce Department must considerthe SNEC'srecommendation,see 50 U.S.C. App. § 2409(f)(1)

(1994) (requiring the Secretary of Commerce to "take into account any recommendation of a

department or agency with respect to [an] application in question"), and must give the license

applicant an opportunity to respond to a negative SNEC recommendation, see 50 U.S.C. App. §

2409(f)(2) (1994). If the SNEC cannot reach agreement on the application, then the SNEC may refer

the matter to the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation, also an interagency working group, or

afterward to the President. See Non-Proliferation Procedures, pt. F, § 1(b).

Because the non-proliferation procedures explicitly provide that the President has final

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 33 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

authority to resolve interagency disagreements on the SNEC, review by the NSC Ad Hoc Group on

Non-Proliferation in the event that the SNEC cannot reach agreement does not qualify assubstantial

independent authority under Meyer. In considering a similar review procedure whereby the Task

Force on Regulatory Relief had the option of either resolving interagency disputes itself or referring

themto the President, we expressed doubt in Meyerthat "any ... head of a department or agencywho

reports directly to the President, would acquiesce in a Task Force decision that was thought not to

represent directly and precisely the President's opinion." Meyer, 981 F.2d at 1295.

This does not settle whether, in those more numerous cases in which the SNEC reaches

agreement about an export license application, SNEC application review and SNEC recommendations

to the Commerce Department constitute exercises ofsubstantial independent authority. As an initial

matter, the SNECan interagencyworking group that includes a nonvoting NSC representative and

voting representativesfromthe Departments ofCommerce, Energy, Defense, and State and the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agencyis clearly part of the NSC. The Government does not dispute

this. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 43 n.30. Indeed, the current Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs so stated in a declaration in the record, and President Clinton's Presidential

Decision Directive 2 on the "Organization ofthe NationalSecurityCouncil," dated January 20, 1993,

makes clear that interagency working groups are part of the NSC. Second, evaluating applications

to determine their propriety is a classic agency function. Because the APA treats as agencies even

entities whose decisions are "subject to review by another agency," 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), it matters not

that the Secretary of Commerce is bound only to consider the SNEC's recommendations, not to

accept them. The SNEC's authority to evaluate export license applications for potential nuclear

proliferation risks and make recommendations to another agency is no less "substantial independent

authority" than was the Office of Science and Technology's power to evaluate federal research

programs, which we held in Soucie was sufficient to render the OST an agency under the APA. See

Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1073, 1075. Having no power to act upon its evaluations, the OST simply

conducted its reviews and made its findings available for other government entities. Finally, SNEC

authority to review license applications is far from hypothetical; the parties' joint statement of facts

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 34 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

before the district court indicates that the SNEC regularly exercises this authority and that its

recommendations have substantial influence in the Commerce Department'sreview of export license

applications. According to the record, SNEC has reviewed hundreds of license applications under

these procedures, and theDepartment ofCommerce uniformlyfollowstheSNEC'srecommendations.

Public Diplomacy

Armstrong has also demonstrated that certain NSC interagency groups have substantial

independent authority in the area of public diplomacy. In 1983, National Security Decision Directive

77 established an NSC Special Planning Group chaired by the Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs and including as members the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Directors of the

United StatesInformation Agency and the Agency for International Development, and the Assistant

to the President for Communications. See Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National

Security, NSDD 77 at 1 (Jan. 14, 1983). NSDD 77 provides that the Special Planning Group "shall

be responsible for the overall planning, direction, coordination and monitoring of implementation of

public diplomacy activities" and "shall ensure that a wide-ranging program of effective initiatives is

developed and implemented to support nationalsecuritypolicy, objectives and decisions." Id. NSDD

77 also creates four interagency committees under the Special Planning Group's supervision. One

ofthese committees, the International PoliticalCommittee, is "responsible for planning, coordinating

and implementing international political activities in support of United States policies and interests

relative to nationalsecurity." Id. at 2. Among its tasks are providing "aid, training and organizational

support for foreign governments and private groupsto encourage the growth of democratic political

institutions and practices." Id. In my view, training private groups to encourage the growth of

democratic institutions can be considered "assisting the President" only by defining assisting the

President so as to encompass nearly all executive branch activity.

Another of the four committees under the supervision of the Special Planning Group is the

International Broadcasting Committee, which is "responsible for the planning and coordination of

international broadcasting activities sponsored by the U.S. Government." Id. at 3. NSDD 77

specifiesthat "[a]mong its principalresponsibilities will be diplomatic and technical planning relative

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 35 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

to modernization of U.S. international broadcasting capabilities" and "the development of

anti-jamming strategies and techniques." Id. Technical planning of United States international

broadcasting capabilities and developing both strategies and techniques of avoiding jamming of

United States broadcasts are substantialdelegations of authoritythat are almost certainlyindependent

of any direct involvement by the President.

The court sayslittle about the activities of these committees. Focusing instead on the Special

Planning Group that reviews and provides guidance to these committees, the court finds dispositive

that the Special Planning Group acts "to secure conformity to overall goals fixed by the President."

Maj. op. at 20. Under this reasoning, nearly every EOP unit would be exempt from FOIA and

FederalRecords Act coverage. One way or another, the President sets goals for all executive branch

agencies, including EOP units. The key question is not who sets the goals toward which an entity

works, but whether an entity itself takes action in furtherance of executive branch goals. NSDD 77

clearlydelegatesto the SpecialPlanning Group planning and monitoring responsibilities distinct from

the actions of the President. Because it makes special provision for "[p]ublic diplomacy activities

involving the President or the White House," requiring that these activities "be coordinated with the

Office of the White House Chief of Staff," NSDD 77 at 1, NSDD 77 suggests that the Special

Planning Group has responsibility for public diplomacy activities that do not involve the President.

I do not understand how the purposes of the sole function test warrant the conclusion that an entity

charged with "the overall planning, direction, coordination and monitoring of implementation of

public diplomacy activities," id., has no "substantial independent authority." At the very least, the

Special Planning Group's function of "periodically review[ing] the activities of the four permanent

coordinating committees to insure that plans are being implemented and that resource commitments

are commensurate with established priorities," id., issufficientlysimilarto the evaluative function that

we found in Soucie warranted treating the OST as an agency.

C.

I think the framers ofthe FederalRecords Act, FOIA, and the PresidentialRecords Act would

be quite surprised to learn from the court's opinion that the Federal Records Act does not cover and

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 36 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

FOIA does not guarantee citizens access to nonsensitive NSC documents regarding the request by

the Federal Reserve System and other agencies to use nonstandard security forms with their

employees and contractors; the NSC's national emergency telecommunications plans; hundreds of

reviews of export license applications conducted by an NSC interagency group; and an NSC

interagency group's development of anti-jamming broadcast strategies and techniques. These

functionsalong with other NSC activitiesare classic examples of agency action performed

without the personal involvement of the President. They are just the sorts of activities that subject

an entity to FOIA and the Federal Records Act.

Holding that the NSC exercisessubstantial independent authority and issubject to FOIA and

the FederalRecords Act would be perfectly consistent with what those who enacted the Presidential

Records Act thought they were doing when they designed the mutual exclusivity of that statute and

FOIA. Unlike the Task Force at issue in Meyer, an entity created after the passage of FOIA and the

Presidential Records Act, the NSC predates both statutes. In applying the legislative-history-based

Meyer test, it therefore makes sense to take into account legislative history relevant to the NSC's

status, not to sidestep Meyer and its elaboration of Soucie's sole function test, but to hold in check

this court's application ofthat test. This is so particularly because the language of the FOIA definition

of "agency""any ... establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the

Executive Office of the President)"clearly coversthe NSC and because the only statutory basisfor

exempting the NSC from FOIA's coverage is a limited exception derived from the legislative history

of FOIA. In my view, the legislative history of the Presidential Records Act indicates just how far

the court's application of the Meyer test has strayed from Congress's commands.

The Presidential Records Act and its legislative history clearly indicate that it was not the

purpose of the Presidential Records Act to cover entities subject to FOIA at the time of the

PresidentialRecords Act's passage. In 1978, when the House Report on the Presidential Records Act

provided that "that which is now subject to FOIA would remain so," H.R. REP. NO. 1487, 95th

Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5732, 5742, Congress was officially on

notice of the NSC's compliance with FOIA from two separate sources. The NSC had issued FOIA

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 37 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

regulations on February 19, 1975, see 40 Fed. Reg. 7316 (1975) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 2101),

and, as the record in this case indicates, the NSC had complied in 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978 with

FOIA's requirement that each covered agency annually submit a copy of its FOIA regulations and a

report of its administration of FOIA to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the

President of the Senate for referral to appropriate congressional committees, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)

(formerly § 552(d)). In addition, the record of the 1978 hearings before the House Subcommittee

of the Committee on Government Operations includes a report by the Library of Congress's

Congressional Research Service concluding that eight EOP units, including the NSC, were agencies

for FOIA purposes. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,

APPLICABILITY OFTHEFREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT TO THE EXECUTIVEOFFICEOFTHEPRESIDENT

20 (1978), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 10998 and Related Bills Before a Subcomm. of the House

Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95thCong., 2d Sess. 759, 778 (1978) [hereinafter Presidential Records

Act Hearings]. The report noted: "The NSC has FOIA regulations and has been the subject of court

cases under the Act. The NSC has an active FOIA component." Id. at 8, reprinted in Presidential

Records Act Hearings at 766. The CRS report further stated that, with respect to the Vice President,

"it would seem that records generated by his duties as Smithsonian regent or NSC member would be

the only records available under the FOIA from the Office of the Vice President, assuming there are

such records and they are located in that Office." Id. at 18, reprinted in Presidential Records Act

Hearings at 776. In addition, by the time President Carter signed the Presidential Records Act into

law in November 1978, see 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1965 (Nov. 6, 1978), the Office of Legal

Counsel had advised the President in its Memorandum of September 6, 1978 that the NSC is an

agency for FOIA purposes. See 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 197, 205 (1978), withdrawn,

Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alan

J. Kreczko, SpecialAssistant to the President and LegalAdvisor, Nat'l Sec. Council(Sept. 20, 1993).

Clearly, then, those responsible for the enactment of the Presidential Records Act in 1978both

Congress and the Presidentwere on notice of the NSC's compliance with FOIA and its apparent

status as a FOIA agency. Such indications in the legislative history of the Presidential Records Act

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 38 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

that those who enacted that statute likely thought that it would not cover the NSC should make us

hesitant to rule that Congress did not subject the NSC to FOIA.

Further support for treating the NSC as a FOIA agency may arguably be found in the

legislative history of the 1974 FOIA amendments. A House Report noted that the amended FOIA

definition of "agency" would include "such functional entities as ... the National Security Council."

H.R. Rep. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974),reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6274. This

court has disavowed reliance on the House Report on the ground that a Conference Report

subsequent to theHouseReport adopted the Soucie test without enumerating specificFOIAagencies.

See Rushforth, 762 F.2d at 1040. Nevertheless, then-Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Supreme

Court inKissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980), cited the

1974 House Report and described it as "indicating that the National Security Council is an executive

agency to which the FOIA applies." Id. at 156.

II.

Because the court concludes that the NSC is not an agency for purposes of the Federal

Records Act, it does not reach the issue raised inArmstrong's cross-appeal: whether the district court

erred in holding that the PresidentialRecords Act rather than the FederalRecords Act appliesto NSC

records "in the limited circumstance in which a high level official of the NSC actssolely to advise and

assist the President." Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 877 F. Supp. 690, 706 (D.D.C.

1995). In view of my conclusion in Part I that the NSC is an agency, I would reach this issue. To

comply with one of our precedents and a decision of the Supreme Court, I would recognize an

exception different from the one the district court suggested.

In Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980), we found no basisin FOIA

to distinguish between the Attorney General and the Department of Justice such that the Attorney

General would not be an agency for FOIA purposes when acting solely in an advisory capacity to the

President. See id. at 786-89. A few weeks later, in Kissinger, the Supreme Court held that, assuming

the NSC were an agency to which FOIA applies, documents related to the activities of the Assistant

to the President for National Security Affairs when "act[ing] in his capacity as a Presidential adviser,

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 39 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

only" were not subject to FOIA. Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156.

Although the holdings of Ryan and Kissinger may appear in tension with one another, they

are easily reconcilable. Indeed, we followed Ryan in a case concerning the Government in the

Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b, decided within a year of Ryan and Kissinger, see Pacific Legal

Found. v. Council on Envtl. Quality, 636 F.2d 1259, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and we have since

discussed Ryan 's holding without suggesting that Kissinger called it into question, see, e.g.,

Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1295. The Supreme Court's holding in Kissinger was quite limited. The

Court simply concluded that because the Office of the President is not part of the EOP and because

Congress clearly wished to exclude from FOIA's coverage entities within the Office of the

Presidentthat is, the President's immediate personal staff and assistantsdocuments related to

activities performed by a person with two positions, one in a FOIA agency and one in the Office of

the President, while serving in his or her capacity in the Office of the President are not subject to

FOIA. See Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156. Thus, a presidential assistant such as the Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs is not subject to FOIA while serving in that capacity even if

he is subject to FOIA when acting in another capacity, for example, as a member of the NSC. See

id. In contrast, Ryan involved the Attorney General, who, while often advising the President, does

not hold an official position in the Office of the President as a presidential assistant. As we observed

in Ryan, see 617 F.2d at 787-89, nothing in FOIA, in its legislative history, or in Soucie, which the

legislative history purports to adopt, supports treating agencies or their parts as non-agencies

whenever they performadvisoryfunctions. Rather, Congress subjected to FOIA all EOP units except

those whose sole functions are to advise and assist the President. See Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1295.

Naturally, then, many entities subject to FOIA will also advise and assist the President.

The Kissinger holding thus addresses a limited situation: someone holding two positions, one

in a FOIA agency and one in the Office of the President as a presidential assistant. Consistent with

Kissinger, I would therefore hold that records created or received by, and in the control of, any NSC

member who also holds a separate position, such asin the Office of the President or the Office of the

Vice President, while acting in his or her non-NSC capacity are not NSC records. Holding the NSC

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 40 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

subject to FOIA and the Federal Records Act would thus not render subject to those statutes

documents ofthe Assistant to the President for National SecurityAffairs, the Vice President, or other

NSCmembers while acting intheir non-NSCcapacities(unlesstheir non-NSCactivities are otherwise

subject to FOIA and the Federal Records Act). Cf. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL

RESEARCH SERVICE, supra, at 18-19, reprinted in Presidential Records Act Hearings at 776-77

(reaching similar conclusion with respect to the Vice President). I think it is in keeping with

Kissinger, however, to hold that the records of such officials are subject to FOIA and the Federal

Records Act when those officials act in connection with the NSC to carry out or assist in carrying out

NSC functions, even when those NSC functions are advising or assisting the President. Consistent

with this court's decision in Ryan but contrary to the district court's holding, otherwise qualifying

records in the control of NSC officials while acting in NSC capacities should be considered agency

records for purposes of FOIA and federal records under the Federal Records Act, even if such

officials hold high level positions within the NSC and even in circumstances in which such officials

act to advise or assist the President.

III.

My view that the NSC is an agency for purposes of FOIA and the Federal Records Act also

requires that I consider the Government's argument that subjecting the NSC to the requirements of

these statutes would violate constitutional separation of powers principles by intruding improperly

into the President's exercise of his constitutional duties. The district court rejected this argument, as

would I. Although we should avoid statutory constructions that would raise serious constitutional

problems, see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,

485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988), none is raised by subjecting the NSC to FOIA and the Federal Records

Act. In upholding a statute giving the Administrator of General Services the authority to take

custody of former President Nixon's presidential papers and tape recordings, the Supreme Court

noted that there was "abundant statutory precedent for the regulation and mandatory disclosure of

documentsin the possession of the Executive Branch." Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,

433 U.S. 425, 445 (1977). Citing FOIA and the Federal Records Act, the Court stated that "[s]uch

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 41 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

regulation of material generated in the Executive Branch has never been considered invalid as an

invasion of its autonomy." Id.

The Government's request that we rule the NSC exempt from FOIA on the basis of broad,

general allegations of unconstitutional intrusion has no foundation in precedent. We have suggested

that such broad constitutional attacks are inappropriate if in particular contexts steps might be taken

to avoid undue intrusions on the executive branch. In Pacific Legal Foundation, we rejected the

Government's argument that applying the Government in the Sunshine Act to the Council on

EnvironmentalQualitywould violate constitutionalprinciples ofseparationofpowers. We explained:

The constitutional issues ... are posed in an abstract context that is inappropriate for

their adjudication. It may be that by closing certain meetings, the Council could avoid

possible constitutional problems. We apply the settled rule that federal courts "will

not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance ofthe necessity of deciding

it.' "

Pacific Legal Found., 636 F.2d at 1265 (quoting Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S.

288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). The record contains no evidence that the conduct of

foreign affairs or national security preparedness under Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush,

or indeed during the first year of the Clinton Administration, suffered from FOIA compliance.

Consistent with our approach in Pacific Legal Foundation, we could hold the NSC subject to FOIA

with the understanding that the Government is free to raise another day constitutional objections to

subjecting particular documentsto the requirements ofthat statute. Cf. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443 ("[I]n

determiningwhetherthe [PresidentialRecordings andMaterialsPreservation] Act disruptsthe proper

balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it

prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only

where the potential for disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified

byan overriding need to promote objectiveswithinthe constitutional authorityofCongress." (citation

omitted)).

Even were it appropriate for usto entertain the Government's broad attack on applying FOIA

and the Federal Records Act to the NSC, the Government's case would be weak. Because FOIA

exempts from its coverage materials classified "in the interest of national defense or foreign policy,"

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 42 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A), as well as "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which

would not be available by law to a party ... in litigation with the agency," § 552(b)(5), applying FOIA

to the NSC presentslittle risk of improper intrusion into the President's exercise of his constitutional

responsibilities. Indeed, the broad applicability of the national security exemption to NSC records

likely explains the NSC's ready compliance with FOIA for nineteen years under Presidents Ford,

Carter, Reagan, and Bush. In addition to the FOIA exemptions of national security materials and

discovery-immune documents, my suggested exemption of certain documents of NSC officials

holding separate positions, such as in the Office of the President or the Office of the Vice President,

see supra Part II, provides further assurance that subjecting the NSC to the requirements of FOIA

and the Federal Records Act will not intrude impermissibly into the President's interactions with his

closest advisors. Under the holding I recommend, the President would be perfectly free to have

FOIA-exempt interactions with his Assistant for National Security Affairs. Indeed, the Office of

Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice concluded in 1978 that subjecting the NSC to FOIA

would not unconstitutionally intrude upon the President or the NSC:

[D]ue to the nature of the work of the NSC and its staff it is clear that valid

exemptions are available for the vast bulk of the material which constitutes NSC

records....

We have also considered whether NSC could raise a valid constitutional claim

to general immunity from the FOIA, and we believe this possibility is very weak.

Certain records of the NSC could, if necessary, be protected by a claim of executive

privilege, but such a claim could not successfully be invoked to preclude Congress

fromopening to public view some NSC administrative records and other nonsensitive

records to which the claim could not reasonably attach. Nor could it be shown on

evidence now available that the Act's impact on NSC is so onerous that its ability to

function in support of the President will be impaired.

2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 205 n.15, withdrawn, Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to Alan J.

Kreczko (Sept. 20, 1993).

Presumablyin recognition ofCongress's authority to preserve documents ofthe United States

Government, including the executive branch, the Government does not assert that the Presidential

Records Act represents an unconstitutional intrusion upon the President's exercise of his

constitutional duties. Consequently, the Government's challenge to application of FOIA and the

Federal Records Act to the NSC must hinge upon the differences between the burdens imposed by

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 43 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the Presidential Records Act on the one hand and the Federal Records Act and FOIA on the other.

In my view, the differences are insufficient to sustain the Government's constitutional claim.

First, in light of Congress's broad authority over executive branch documents,see Nixon, 433

U.S. at 445, little rests on the Federal Records Act's more demanding procedures to prevent

destruction or unauthorized taking of documents,see 44 U.S.C. §§ 3303, 3303a. Leaving for another

day the possibility that executive privilege might entitle the President to keep or destroy particular

documents, I think the Government has failed to offer any persuasive reason to hold that Congress

is without power to subject nonsensitive NSC documents to the Federal Records Act.

Second, the Government argues that although the Presidential Records Act makes records

available under FOIA procedures, it gives the President the power to specify a period of time, not to

exceed twelve years, during which the materials will not be available, see 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a),

thereby allowing the President while in office to avoid the supposedly intrusive effects of FOIA and

the Federal Records Act. The risk of serious intrusion, however, is slight in view of existing FOIA

exemptions and the President's ability to have non-NSC interactions with his Assistant for National

Security Affairs and other NSC officials who hold separate, purely advisory, non-NSC positions.

Furthermore, the timing differences between the Presidential Records Act and the Federal Records

Act must be viewed together with other differencesthat make the former more burdensome than the

latter in certain respects. In particular, under the Presidential Records Act, certain materials that are

altogether exempt from FOIAspecifically, memoranda or letters not subject to discovery in

litigationare available under the Presidential Records Act using FOIA procedures. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(5); 44 U.S.C. § 2204(c)(1).

Finally, the differences in the statutes' provisions for judicial review cannot sustain the

Government's constitutional claim. Although judicial review is not available for compliance with the

requirements of the Presidential Records Act as it is under the Federal Records Act, see Armstrong

v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Armstrong I), judicialreview of presidential guidelines

describing which materials are presidential records is available even under the Presidential Records

Act, see Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1292-94. The Government has offered no convincing rationale for

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 44 of 45
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

holding unconstitutional the application of the judicial review provisions of FOIA and the Federal

Records Act to the NSCas opposed to other EOP units that advise and assist the President in

addition to exercising substantial independent authority, or as opposed to other executive agencies

involved in sensitive foreign affairs issues yet subject to FOIA, such as the Department of State and

the Central Intelligence Agency.

IV.

I would thus conclude that the NSC is an agency for purposes of FOIA and the Federal

Records Act and that the Constitution presents no bar to subjecting the NSC to these statutes. I

dissent.

USCA Case #95-5061 Document #215305 Filed: 08/02/1996 Page 45 of 45