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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

OLIVER BROWN, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

and 

CHARLES SMITH and KIMBERLY SMITH, 

Minor Children, By Their Mo ther 

And Next Friend, IND~ BROWN 

SMITH, et al., 

v. 

Intervening Plaintiffs/ 

Appellants, 

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 

SHAWNEE COUNTY, KANSAS, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 

F I L.E D 

; J()IH:d Star.t~~ Cmrt of Appeals t ,••t' ~ • ~ I • I ' • 

DtC l l 1989 

~()Bf c·T ~ <'('E.'(' . - ,, ~· ~.:..,. -· l •. d ./ ... '"".KER (~1-'•rlr '\.,..~ ,., . ' '\ 

87-1668 

Appeal from the United States District C6urt 

for · the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. T-316) 

Christopher A~ ~ansen (Richard Jones, Charles Sco tt , Sr., Charles 

Scott , Jr., and Joseph Johnson with him on the brief), American 

Civil Liberties Union Foundation, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Dan Biles, of Gates & Clyde, Overland Park, Kansas, Carl 

Galla gher, Assistant Attorney General {Robert T. Stephan, Attorney 

General with. him on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, and K. Gary 

Sebelius (Ann L. Baker, Charles D. Mc.Atee and Charles N. Henson 

with him on the bri ef) of Eidson, Lewis, Porter & Haynes, Topeka, 

Kansas for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before MCKAY, SEYMOUR, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circui t Judge. 

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"[O]nce you begin the process of segregation, it has its own 

inertia. It continues on without enforcement." 1 This comment by 

one expert on s-egre.gation in schools succinctly summarizes the 

state of affairs in Topeka. As a former d~ jure segregated school 

system, Topeka has long labored under the duty to eliminate the 

consequences of its prior state-imposed separation of races. 

Brown v. Bo~rd of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The district court 

.concluded that T-opeka has fulfilled that duty, and that the school 

system is now unitary. Because we are convinced that Topeka has 

not sufficiently countered the effects of both the momentum of its 

pre~Brown segregatlon and its subsequent segregative acts in the 

1960s, we reverse. Specifically, we hold that the district court 

erred in placing't~e burden on plaintiffs ~o prove interitional 

discriminatory conduct rather than.according plaintiffs the 

presumption that current disparities are causally related to past 

intentional conduct.. We are convinced that defendants failed to 

meet their burden of proving that the effects of this past 

1 Statement by William Lamson during trial. Rec., vol. II, at 

162-63. Mr. La~son has done demographic studies in desegregation 

cases since 1970. His services as an expert have been utilized by 

the Department of Justice, the Department of H.E.W., the 

N.A.A.C.P., the A.C.L.U., and various school boards. Rec., supp. 

vol. 12 pl. ex. 25. In 1975, the defendant Board of Education 

hired· him to put together a ten-year forecast of student 

enrollments. Rec., vol. II, at 103. 

The district court echoed Mr. Lamson's view about the nature 

of segregation: "[R]acially conscious student assignment with the 

goal of racial balance has been approved as a remedy in 

desegregation litigation. This is because s.chool segregation has 

an inertia which often dannot be countered by a purely neutral 

force." Brown v. Board of Educ., 671 F.Supp. 1290, 1297 (D.Kan. 

1987) (citation omitted) {emphasis added). 

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intentional discrimination have been dissipated . We also reverse 

the district court's holding that the Topeka school district has 

not violated Title VI. However, we affirm the court's dismissal 

of the Governor of the State of Kansas and its ruling that the 

State Board of Education bears.no liability fo r segrega tion in 

Topeka's schools. 

I • 

LEGAL HISTORY 

Piior to 1954, a K~nsas statute ~ermi tted certain cities to 

maintain separa te schools for white and black children below the 

high school. levei. In 1941, however , the Kansas Supreme Cour t 

held segregation in Topeka's junior high schools to be 

un6onstitutional. See Graham v. Board of Educ ., 114 P.2d 313 

(Kan ~ 1941) (separate fa cilities not equa~) . Topeka was thus 

legally permitted to operate segregated schools only at the 

elementa ry level. The Topeka Board of Education operated such a 

syst em. In 1951, black citizens of Topeka filed a class ac tion 

challenging the constitutionality of the Kansas law authori zing 

school segregation. Brown v. Board of Educ. , 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 

(Brown I ), followed, beg inning a new era of American· jurisprudence 

by bringing an end to the doctrine of "sepa rate but equal" and 

d.eclar ing segregation unconstitut ional. 

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The Topeka Board of Education did not wait for the decision 

in Brown I before .taking steps towa rds desegregating Topeka' s 

elementary schools. It began that process in .1953 by permitting 

black students to ·attend two formerly a l l-white schools. It then 

gradually increased the number of schools black students might 

attepd. Accordingly, when .the supreme Court consider~d the · 

question of the relief appropriate in school desegregation cases, 

it noted that "substantial progress" had already bee~ made in 

Topeka. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 u.s. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown 

l!>· On remand, the district court criticized one aspect of the 

Board's desegregation plan but described it overall as "a good 

faith effort to bring about full desegregatiori in the Topeka 

Schools in full compliance with the mandate of the Supreme Court." 

Brown v. Board of Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468, 470 (1955). The court · 

retained jurisdiction of the case, and the decision was not 

appealed. 

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Nineteen years later, in 1974, the Office of Civil Rights 

(OCR) of the Department of Health, Education, and ·Welfare (HEW) 

notified the Topeka school district that it was not ~n com~liance 

with section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 2 

After the Topeka Board of Education failed to adopt a plan 

designed to remedy · the noncomplying conditions identified by OCR, 

HEW began administrative enforcement proceedings against the 

Topeka school district. The Board filed suit in federal court and 

obtained a preliminary injunction against the admiriistratiVe 

proceeding on the ground that the district court's 1955 decision 

was a final order~ and that the school district was still . ' . . 

6perating under .that cou~ t ord~r and still subject to the court's. 

jurisdiction •. HEW was thereby precluded from taking 

administrative action. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 84 

2 Section 601 states: 

"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of 

race, color, or national origin be excluded from 

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be s~bjected to discrimin~tion under any program or 

activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 

42 u.s.c. § 200d (1982). The Topeka school district received 

fede ral funds through the Kansas State Department of Education. 

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F.R.D. 383, 390-91 (D. Kan. 1979). In 1976, the Boa rd submitted a 

plan acceptable to HEW, and both the administrative proceeding a nd 

the suit in federal court ·were dismissed. The Board implemented 

the plan over the next five yeais. 

In .l979, a group of black parents and children sought . to 

intervene in Brown as additional named plaintiffs on the ground 

that they were members of the original class and that the original 

named plaintiffs no longer had a sufficient interest in the· matter · 

to represent their interests. -The intervenors asserted that· 

- . 

Topeka has failed to desegregate its schools in compliance with 

the Sup~eme Court's mandate, and that the ~opeka school district 

currently maintains and operates a racially segregated school 

system. Their request to intervene wa~ granted.3 See Brown, 84 

F.R.D. 383. A long discovery and motion stage followed the 

granting of the intervenors' motion. 

Trial took place in October 1986. The court found the Topeka 

school district to be an integrated , unitary school system. Brown 

v. Board of Educ., 671 F. - Supp. 1290 (D. Kan. 1987} • . The court 

also held that the Topeka _school district had not violated· Ti tle 

VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, dismissed t he Gov~r nor of 

Kansas from the case, and found t~at the Sta te Board of Education 

3 Linda Brown; a child named plaintiff in the original suit, is 

now th~ mother of two intervening child plaintiffs. 

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bore no liabil ity for racial conditions in the school district. 

This appeal followed. 

II. 

. BRIEF FACTUAL HISTORY 

A. Population Change 

In 1950, Topeka's population was approximately 10% black. 

While Topeka'·s population grew significantly until 1970 -and then 

dropped, ~he· black perce~tage of the population remained 

approximately the same. The Hispanic population of Topeka h~s 

been slightly less than 5% since 1970. Other min6riti~s make up 

less than 1.5% of the population. 

The distribution of Topeka's .population has · changed more 

significantly than its cbmposition. In general, the outer parts 

of Topeka, p~rticularly on the western side, have grown 

considerably in population, while the inner city has declined. 

Until recently, _the western side of Topeka was almost exclusivel y 

white. The black population ·of Topeka was concentrated in a few 

areas in the center of the ciiy in the 1950s; it has since spread 

widely throughout the eastern part of the city and ha~ gradually . 

begun to move into the western side of Topeka. 

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The percentage of black and minority children in the Topeka 

schools has long been higher than the percentage of blac s and 

minorities in the Topeka pQpulation as a whole and has risen over 

time. In 1952, black students constituted 8~4% of the total 

number of students in Topeka. By 1966, the percentage of black 

students in the Topeka school district was 11.6% and the 

percentage of minority students was 16 . 0%. In 1975, black 

students constituted 14.7%, and minority students 20.9%, of the 

school population. The latest figures u~ed at tFi~l, those f o r 

the 1985 school year, showed 18.4% black and 25.95% minority 

children in the system.· 

B. Elementary Schools 

In 1951, four Topeka elementary schools were reserved for 

qlack children, Buchanan,··McKinley, Monroe, and Was~ington. 

Eighteen elementary schools educated white children. Black 

children were bused to their schools; white children attended 

neigri~orhood schools. 671 F; Supp. · at 1291. Under the four-s tep 

plan approved by the district court in 1955, all elementary 

schools were to be opened by September of 19~6 to black and white 

children under a neighborhood school policy. Id. at 1293. As a 

resul t of. the. new neighborhood school pol icy, three schools 

remained all- or virtually all-black (Buchanan (100%), Monroe 

(100%), Washington (99.4%)), and two others became more 

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than 20% black in a .school district with a black elementary 

student population of less than 10%. 4 McKinley was closed. 

During the late 1950s, . the school distri ct acquired by 

annexation the Avondale (outer Topeka, south) and Highland Park 

(middle and outer Topeka, east) school districts as well as other 

territory on th~ edg~s of the district. Existing schools within 

the acquired area were either primarily whi te or pr imar ily black. 

As school enrollments grew and the population began to shift, the 

school district began to close elementary schools in the inner 

part of th~ city and open them in the rapi~ly growing ou~er part 

of the city. Two of the closed schools were former de jure black 

schools (Buchanan, and Washington); another de jure school . 

(McKinley) had already been closed. The new schools were buil t in 

the newly acquired white areas and opened with all or virtually 

all white students. 

Racial statistics were not kept in an organized fashion from 

1956 to 1966 . In ~96 6, the school district oper ated- t hirty-five · 

elementary schools. There were some white studen~s {n every 

school. Minority students were present in thirty-two schools. 

Nineteen of the schools were 90+% white. An additional seven 

schools were 80-90% white. Four schools we re more than 50% 

4 Rec., ex. supp. vol ·. 13, pl. ex. 155 B. The record on appeal 

consists of pleadings, transcripts, and exhibits. We -cite them 

respect"ively as "Rec., doc. #," "Rec., val. #,"and "Rec.~ ex. 

vol. #". · 

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minority, and a fifth was almost-50%. The highest percentage of · 

-minority students was 93.1% (Parkdale), and the lowest was 0% 

(Lyman, McEachron, and Potwin). Sixty-five percent of white 

students attended 90+% whi te schools and an additional 18.7% 

attended 80-90% white schools. Close to half Df all minority 

students attended 50+% minority $Chools. 5 

A second major reorganization of the elementary schools took 

place in the late 1970s, after the HEW complaint was filed . Eight 

elementary schools closed over a six-year pe~iod , including the 

last of the four former de jure black schools (Mon roe). In 

September 1982, when the reorganization h~d ended, minority and 

·white students were present in each of the district's twenty-six 

elern~ntary schools.6 Five schools were 90+% whi te, and another 

seven were 80-90% white. Four schools were 50+% minority, two of 

them were .· schools that had been 50+% minority since +966; .· The 

highest percentage of minority students was 60.6% (Highland Park 

Nor th) , and the lowest was 3.4% (McClure). Close to one-quarter 

of all whit~ students ~ttended the 90+% white schools, and another 

third attended 80-90% white schools, totalling. 58% overall. The 

percentage of minority students in 50+% minor_i ty schools was 

35.5%. 7 This was the status of the elementary schools three years 

Rec., ex. vol. IV, at 54-56 . 

6 Lyman elementary school had been deannexed· in 1967 . vol. III, at 281. 

7 Rec ., ex. vol. IV, at 134-38 . 

-10..;.. 

Rec., 

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after plaintiffs moved. to intervene in this lawsuit on the grounds 

tl)at th.e school system had no't met its mandate to desegr ega te. 

With one or ·two exceptions, the relative percentages of white 

and minority students in the elementary schools have changed only 

by two or three perc~ntage points sihce that time. The most 

significant change is that the sch9ols with the highest white 

peicentages have gained some minority students. Thus, in 1985, 

the lowest percentage of mi~ority students in any school was. 7.2% 

(McClure). 8 

8 

Percentage of Minority Students 

In· Topeka Ele~entary Schools In 1985 

School % School % 

Avondale East 44.1 Lundgren 15.8 

Avondale w·est 16 .6 Mccarter 9 . 2 

Belvoir 61.9 McClure 7.2 

Bishop 19.5 McEachron 10.3 

Crestview 8.9 Potwin 7.7 

Gage 9.4 Quincy 20.5 

Highland Park Central -35 .1 Quinton Heights 49.4 

.Highland Park North 57.9 Randolph 14.8 

Highland Park South 28 Shaner 20 .7 

Hudson 46 •:55 State Street . 26. 3 

Lafayette 56.8 Stout 26.8 

Linn 29.4 Sumner 31.5 

Lowman Hill 41.9 Whitson 10.2 

27.2% of all elementary students in 1985 were minorities. 

Source: Rec., ex. vel. IV, at 170-74. 

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C. Secondary Schools 

In 1954, the Topeka school district operated six junior highs 

and one high. school. Two schools were 90+% white, and three were 

80+% white. The estimated percentage of black students at the 

junior high schools ranged from 1. 7% (Roosevelt) to 30% (East 

Topeka). 9 While the dissent e~phas'izes that segregation .was not 

mandated by law for the secondary schools when Brown I was 

decided, and the student bodies were racially mixed, Linda Br own 

Smith testified that the junior high school she attended in 1955 

(~urtis) had an ~11-~hite faculty.l 0 When . she entered Tcipek ~ High 

school, she recalls that it had ope black faculty me~ber. 11 

During the late 1950s-early 1960s peiiod of annex~tions and 

building, two jun~or high schools joined the school system, and 

thr~e junior highs .were built. At ~he high· sc~ool level, H~ghlcind 

Park high school was annexed, and Topeka West high school was 

9 Rec., · vol. ·III, at 306-07. · Plaintiffs' expert Lamson used 

the figures for bl ack rather than minority students i n ~is 

analysis and testi mony. Where we repeat hi s figures, we therefore 

refer to black students and white students. We also refer to 

black students when we discuss pre-1966 numbers, as it is onl y in · that year that figures begin to be available for minority students 

generally. Otherwise we refer to mi nority students. See Keyes v. 

School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973). The parties ar e in 

agreement that the difference in analysis between black students 

and minority students is not sig~ificant in .this case. Rec., vol. 

IV, at 409-10; rec., val. V, at 598, 602-03. 

10 Rec., vol. VII, at 1050. 

11 ' Id. at 1051. 

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built. All of these schools were in the newly acquired white 

outer part of the school district and opened as white or primarily 

white schools. 671 F. Sup~. at 1299. 

In 1966, there were thus eleven junior high and three high 

schools. At that time, the ·average minority percentage for the 

junior high and high schools was 15.3% and 14.9%,. respectively. 12 

Of the junior highs, five had 90+1 white students and another 

three had 80-90% white students; one had 50+% minority students. 

The highest percentage of minority students at one school was 

6~.8% (East Topeka), and the 1owest petcentag~ was 0% (Capper): 

Of the high schools, Topeka High was nearly. one-quarter minority, 

Highland Park Hi~h had close ·to· 15% minority. students, . cind Topeka 

West . had .4% mino~ity students. French · junior high school qpened 

in 1970 in the southwestern part of the school distr ~ct as a 

primarily· white school. 671 F. Supp. at 1.299. 

The reorganization of ·the late 1970s in response to the HEW 

complaint included the junior. high schools~ Two· junior highs 

closed in 1975. In 1980, five more junior highs closed and two 

schools were opened as the district shifted from a junior high 

(6-3-3) to a middle school (6-2-4) format. In 1981, after the endof the reorganization, there were six middle schools in the Topeka 

school district. ~wo were 90+% white and one was 80-90% white. 

12 Rec., ex. vol. II, at 56-57. 

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The highest percentage of minority students was 45.7% (Eisenhower) 

and the lowest .5.5% (French). By 1985, the relative percentages 

at some school~ had altered by approximately 5%, but the pattern 

across the district had not changed. 13 The percentage of minority 

students at the three high schools was 39.8% (Highland Park), 

32.5% (Topeka High), and s .. 25% (Topeka West) in 1981, and 33.6% 

(Highland Park), 30.9% (Topeka High), and 7.9%· (Topeka West) in · 

1985. 

III. 

THE PARTIES 

All of the parties to this case have changed • . The·original 

plaintiff children have long since left the Topeka ·school system. 

The school district has been reorganized, and the State Bqard of 

13 

Middle Schools 

Chase 

Eisenhower 

French 

Jardine 

Landon* 

Robinson 

Percentage of Minority Students 

In Topeka Secondary Schools in 1985. 

% 

33.4 

48.7 

6.2 

17.3 

9.3 

28.5 

High Schools 

Highland P~rk 

Topeka High 

Topeka West 

% 

33·. 6 

30.9 

7. 9 . 

The percentage of minority students in all middle schools was 

26.9%, while the minority percentage at the high school level was 

23.8% .• 

Source: Rec., ex. vol. IV, at 175-77. 

*Landon is now closed. 

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Education came into existence i n 1969 . These changes have 

affected the posture of the litigation to some ex tent. The 

original named plaintiffs represented black elementary school 

children and their parents. Current named plaintiffs represent 

black children throughout the school system and their parents. 

The school district grew cons~derably in size as the city of 

Topeka annexed territory, a~though the school district's 

boundaries wer~ fixed about 1960 while the city continued to grow. 

The district was also renamed Unified School District t 501 as 

part of a state-~ide reorganization of school_districts in ~965. 

671 F. _ Supp. at _1292. The State Board of Education is the product 

of a 1966 state constitutional amendment. · I_ts powers differ 

considerably from those of its predecessor. Id.; Brief for· . . . .. Individually-Named. Defendants Associated with the State· Board of 

Education at 1, 3-4. 

IV. 

GENERAL PRINCIPLES- OF UNITARINESS 

Unitariness is a finding of fact reviewed under the clearl y 

erroneous st~ndard. 14 Before we assess the status of school 

14 See, e.g., Riddick v. School Bd. of the City of Norfolk, ·784 

F.2d 521, 533 (4th Cir.}, cert. denied, 107 s. Ct. 420 (1986) ; 

United States v. Texas Educ. · Agency, 647 F.2d .504 , ·506 (5th Cir . 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); cf~ Dayton Bd. of Educ. 

v. Brinkman, 44 3 u.s. 526, s·34 & n.a (1979) (whether school 

district is intentionally operating a dual school system is a 

quest ion of fact). 

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deseg~egation in Topeka, we set forth the principles that guide 

our considera tion. of the unitariness issue.· 

The district court defined a unitary school system as "one in 

which the characteristics of the 1954 dual system either do not 

exist or, if they exist, are not the result of .past or present 

intentional segregative conduct of'' the school district. 671 F. 

Supp. at 1293. 1 5 These are necessary ingredients i n a unitariness 

determination because once a violation is found, ·'' [t]he Board has 

••. an affirmative responsibility .to see that pupil [and 

faculty]· assignment policies and school construction and 

abandonment practices 'are not used and do not serve to perpe tuate 

o"r. re-establish the dual sch9ol system. ''' · Dayton Bd. of Educ. v . 

Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979} (Dayton II) (quoting Columbus 

Bd. of Educ.· v. Penick, 443 u.s~ 449, 460 1979). An additional 

essen"t ial requirement of uni tar i ness t however, is whether "school 

authorities [have made] every effort to achieve the greatest 

possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the 

practicalities of the situatio.n.'' Davis v . Bd. of School Comm'rs, 

402 U.S . 33, 37 (1971); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 

Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971). 

15 The Fifth Circuit defines unitariness as 11 'a distri c t in 

which schools are not id~ntifiable by race and students and 

faculty are assigned in a manner that eliminates-the vestiges of 

past seg re~ation. '" Monteilh v. St. Landrj Parish School Bd., 848 

F.2d 625, 629 ( 5th Cir. 1988} (quoting United States v. St. 

Lawrence County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1034 (5th Cir. 

1986)). 

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To determine whether a s~hool district has beco~e unitary , 

therefore, a court must consider what the school district has done 

or not done to fulfill its affirmative duty to desegregate, the 

current eff~cts of those actions or inactions, and the extent to 

which further ~esegregation is .feasible. 16 After a plaintiff 

establishes i'ntentional segregation at some poin't in the past ·and 

a current condition of segregation, a defendant then bears the 

burden of proving that its past acts have eliminated all traces of 

past intentional segregation to the maximum feasible extent . 

A. Current Condition of Segregation 

The actual condition of the school district at the time of 

trial is perhaps the most crucial consideration in a unitariness 

determination. · The plaintiff bears the burden of· showing the 

existence of a · current condition ·of segregation.. The case law is 

16 Cf . Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 319 (1st Cir. 1987) 

(considering . number of one-race or racially identifiable schqo1s, 

good faith on the part of the school district, and maximum 

practicable desegregation); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 

699 F.2d 218, 227 (5th Cir. 1983) (considering conditions in 

district, accomplishments to date, and feasi bility of further 

measures). 

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decidedly unclear as to the precise meaning of that term.l7 I n 

our view, a plaintiff must prove the existence of racially 

identifiable schools, broadly defined, to satisfy the burden of 

showing a current condition of segregation." Racially identifiable 

schools may be identifiable by student assignment alone, in the 

case of highly one-race schools, or by a combination of factors 

where the school is not highly one-race in student assignment. 

"What is or is not a segregated school will 

necessarily depend on the facts of each ~articular case. 

In addition to the racial and ethnic composition of a 

school's student body, other factors, such as the racial 

.and ethnic composition of faculty and staff and the 

community and administration attitudes towa rd the 

school, must be taken into con~ideration." · 

Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 u.s. 189, 196 (1973). 

17 · The ' Supreme Court desegregation cases involved school systems 

in which the degree of segregatio~ was sufficiently great that the 

parties did not seriously dispute on appeal that the plaintiffs 

had satisfied their burden on this issue. See Dayton II, 443 U.S. 

at 529 (Daytpn public schools "highly segregated by ~ace"); Wright 

v; Council of City of Emporia~ 407 u.s. 451, ·455 (1972) (complete 

segregation) ; Swann, 402 u.s. at 24 (no challenge to finding of 

prior dual system); Green v. County School Bd. of Educ., 391 u.s. 

430, 435 (1968) (complete racial identification of schools). The 

issue was potentially more significant in recent circuit cases in 

which a school district had been under court order for some time 

and many of the vestiges of prior de jure segregation had been - eliminated. Even in these more recent cases , however, no clear 

standard has been articulated. See Morgan, 831 F.2d' at .319-21 

(considering number of one-race schools as part of unitariness 

determination) ; Price v. Denison Indep. School Dis t. , 69 4 F. 2.d 

334, 347-68 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing need to consider various 

factors in determining whether constitutionally violative 

condition of segregation exists}. 

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.Although virtual one-race schools "require close scrutiny," 

they are not a l ways un~onstitutional~l8 Swann, 402 u.s. at 26. 

Their existence in a system with a history of de jure segregation, 

however, establishes a presumption that they exist as the result 

of discrimination and shifts the burden of proof to the school 

system. Id. The presence of essentially one-race schools is thus 

sufficient to satisfy a plaintiff's initial burden of showing a 

current condition of segregation. 

Courts hav:e .used various standards to define "one-race 

schools·. nl9 Sta.ndards may appropr lately differ from school 

district to school district because the percentage of minority 

students -.may likewise vary. 20 Whatever the minority percentage 

18 · Given modern urban demography and geography, one-race schools 

may well have evolved for reasons beyond school board control • . See,~' Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717, 719 (5th Cir. 1975). 

Thus, where a school system. consists of de facto one-race schools, 

rather than de jure , the system is not unconstitut~onal. · 

19 See Morgan, 831 F.2d at 320 (listing standards ranging from 

70% .to 90% and declining to decide whether 80% or 90% is more 

appropriate for Boston); Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90, 91 n.2, 97 

n.lO (5th Cir. 1983) (90% standard for one-race schools; 75% 

standard for predominantly one-race schools). Swann did not . define the term "one-race school," presumably because two-thirds 

of Charlotte-Mecklenburg's black students attended schools that 

were 99+% black. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 7. 

20 See Morgan, 831 F.2d at 320 n.7 (rejecting 75% standard ·in 

district 72% black); Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 461 (5th 

Cir. 1986) (school. 97.88% Mexican-American not a vestige of 

discrimination in district 88% Mexican-American); Ross, 699 F.2d 

at 220, 226 (affirming finding· of unitariness .. for district 80% 

minority although 57 out of 226 schools were 90+% one-race); 

Price, 694 P.2d at 336, 339-40 (schools not necessarily racially 

identifiable in district 88% white although 7 out of 8 elementary 

schools 90+% white); Calhoun, 522 F.2d at 718-19 (85% black 

-19-

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district-wide, however, it is clear that a school with 90+% 

students of one race is a predominantly one-rae~ school. 21 . 

Moreover, this is true whether the students at the school in 

quest ion are white or minority.22 

Where racial imbalance in student assignment is still ex t reme 

in a sistem that formerly mandated segregation, appel late cou rts 

have reversed findings of unitariness without looking to other 

factors.23 However, no particular degree of ·racial balance is 

required by the Constitution. 24 A degree of imbalance is likely 

to be found in any heterog~neous school system. ~herefore, the 

existence of some racial imbalance in schools will often not be 

conclusive in itself. 

district unitary although more than 60% of schools all or 

substantially all black). 

21 See. Dayton II , 443 U.S. at 529 n.l; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 

u.s. 717, 726 (1974); Ross, 699 F.2d at 226; Lee v. Macon Coun ty 

Bd. of Educ., 616 F.2d 805, 808-09 (5th Cir. l980J. 

22 See Morgan, 831 F.2d at 320; Tasby, '71.3 F.2d at 91 n.2; Ross, 

699 F.2d at 226; Price, 694 F.2d at 364; Stout, 537 -F.2d at 8~ 

23 See Texas Educ . Agency, 647 F.2d at 508; cf. Lee v. 

Tuscaloosa City School System, 576 F.2d 39 (5th Cir.) (per 

curiam), cert. denied, 439 u.s. 1007 (1978); United States v. 

Board of Educ.: of Valdosta, Ga., ~76 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.) (per 

curiam) cert. denied, 439 u.s. 1007 (1978); Carr v. Montgomery 

County Bd. of Educ., 377 F.Supp. 1123, 1134 (M.D. Ala. 1974), 

aff'da 511 F.24 1374 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 

u.s. 986 (1975) •• 

24 See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 u.s. 267, 280 n.l4 (1977); 

Pasadena City Bd . of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976); 

Swann , 402 u.s. at 24-26. 

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Where numbers alone are insufficient to define racially 

identifabl~ schools, courts look to de~ography, geography, and the 

individual history of particular schools and areas o~ the city~2 5 

While a multi-race school cannot be classified as racially 

identifiable merely by tallying up the race of the students who 

attend it, such a school may b~ racially identifiable ''simply by 

reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff, the 

quality of school buildings and ~quipment, or the organization . of 

sports activities," among other factors . Swann, 402 u.s.. at 18. 26 

. . 

These factors alone can establish a prima facia case of a 

constitutional vioiation. Id~ Therefore, a plaintiff may prove a 

scho9l to be racially identifiable by factors that may, but need 

not, include student assignment. 

25 See Morgan, 831 F.2d at 320 -(noting difficulty of further 

desegregating schools located in geographically isolated or. 

heavily black sections of Boston}; United States v. Lawrence 

County. School Dist.,. 799 F.2d 1031, 1043-44, 1047 {5th Cir. 1986) 

(considering demography and geography in reversing trial court's 

refusal to or'de·r new student assignment plan}. Price, 694 F. 2d a t 

347-68 {authoritati vely demonstrating that degree of racial 

balance is only one of many factors to be considered); Stout, 537 

F. 2d 800 (aff irming re.medy leaving three schools one-race because 

of geographic isolation and b~rriers); cf. Carr, 377 F. Supp. at 

1141 (criticizing formulas for· determining racial balance as 

"highly artificial" and severel y disruptive). 

26 See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 u.s. 189, 196 (1973) 

(what is a segregated school depends on facts Of the particular 

case;. faculty and staff percentages and community and 

administrative attitudes as well as racial composition of student 

body are relevant); Price, 694 F.2d at 347-68; Lawrence County . School Dist., 799_ F.2d at 1039-40 (looking to student and facul t y 

percentages and history and location of school). 

-21-

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B. The Parties' Burdens 

/ 

Once a plaintiff .has proven the existence of a current 

condition o~ segregation, the school district bears the 

substantial burden of showing that that condition is not the 

result of its prior de jure segregation. Under the relevant 

Supreme Court decisions, mere absence of invidious intent on the 

part of the school district is not sufticient to satisfy its 

"heavy burden" of proof; the distri-ct's duty is to act 

affirmatively, not merely to act neutrally. 

. . 

"[T]he measure of the post-Brown I ~onduct of a school 

board under an unsatis.fied duty to liquidate a dual 

system is the effectiveness, hot the purpose, · of the 

actions in decreasing or increasing the segregation 

caused b.y the dual system. As was clearly . established 

in Keyes and Swann, the Board had to do more than · abandon its prior discriminatory purpose. The Board has 

had an affirmative responsibility to see that pupil 

assignment policies and school construction and 

aba.ndonment practices 'are not used and do not serve to 

perpetuate or re-establish the dual school system.'" . 

Dayton II, 443 u.s. at 538 (emphasis added) (c ~tations omitted). 

See also Swann, 402 U.S. at 26 (burden on school board to 

establish current racial composition- of ~chools not the result of 

their present or past actions). The 'school district must show 

that no causal connection exists between past and present 

segregation, not merely that it did not intend to cause current 

segrega~ion. The causal .link between prior and current. 

segregation is not snapped by the absence of discriminatory intent 

alone, or even by a firm commitment to desegregation , where it is 

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~ot accompanied by action that in fact produces a ·unified school 

district. Id. 

The dissent clearly has misconstrued the parties' ·burdens. 

The emphasis throughout the dissent is on the necessity of 

plaintiffs proving a current- condition of intentional segrega ~ion 

before any burden shifts to the school district. Although the 

revised dissent has removed a number of its prior references to 

11 intentional 11 when discussing 11 Current condition of segregati on, .. 

and contends that it has not misapplied. the burden, the tenor of 

the current version of the dissent belies this asserti on~ See 

Dissent at 8 (-11 In a former· de jure system, plaintiffs may 

establish ·the pri ma facie case by proving that ther~ is ·a current 

. condition of intentional segregation .. . ) (emphasis added); id. at 

35-36 ("a plaintiff may satisfy his initial burden of proof by 

relying upon evidence of 'recent and remot~ interitionally 

segregative actions' of the school board") (emphasis added}; id. 

at 67 ("This court misses the mark if it is implying that intent 

is not ·relevant in this case."); id. at 74 ( 11 intent, whether 

proven by direct or circumsta·ntial evidence, remains an essential 

element. 11 ); id. at 76 ("It is. clear that to sustain th~. 

presumption, the. plaintiffs were requir ed to prove 'a current 

condition of .segregation from intentional state action.'") . 

(emphasis added}; id. at 146-47 ( 11The requirement of a current 

condition of segregation resulting from past or present 

segregative intent (as opposed to segregation resulting from 

-23-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 23 
voluntary demographic change), prior to the ·operation of the 

presumption, atlows a school system to redeem itself.") See also 

Dowell v. Board of Educ., F.2d , No. ·88-1067, 

dissent at 34 (lOth Cir. filed Oct. 6, 1989) (Baldock, J., 

dissenting) ("To understand the problems with this court's 

approach, it is necessary to understand how the burden of proof is 

allocated before a school di~trict becomes unitary. In a system 

that was statutorily or officially dual, plaintiffs may establish 

t.he prima facie case by proving that there is a current condition 

of intentional segregation; that the de jure system or its 

vestiges remain or were reestablished in part of the school 

system.") (emphasis added)·. 

On the contrary, however, once a school system has been 

declared unconstitutional because of the existence of de jure 

segregation, ~[u]ntil the ••• School System achieves unitary 

itatus, official action that has the effect of perpetuating or 

reestablishing a dual school system violates the defendants' duty 

to desegregate." Pitts v. Freeman, 755. F.2d 1423, 1427 (11th Cir. 

1985) (emphasis in original); see also, ~' Morgan v. Nucci, 831 

F.2d 31~, 329 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]he fact that a particular 

school policy Qr program may be 'racially neutral,' in that it no 

longer reflects discriminatory animus, does not prove that the 

effects of prior discrimination have been purged"). Even the 

dissent in Dayton II recognized th~t "the affirmative duty renders 

-24-

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~· any discussion of segregative intent after 1954 gratuitous." 443 

.u.s. at 542-43·. 

The dissent falls into this error by viewing this case as one 

of initial liability. The cases the diss~nt relies on for its 

statements about plai~tiffs' need to prove intentional segregation 

are all cases describing a plaintiff's duty to ~stablish de jure 

segregation in the first instance. See~ ~, Columbus Bd. of 

Educ. v. Penick, 443 u.s. 44~ (1979) (dissent at B, 35-36, 53-54, 

68); Keyes (dissent at 9, 34-35, 72, 75-76). This is not such a 

case : As in Swann, plaintiffs here are alleging that a school 

syste~ which has already been -declared unconstitutional in earlier 

year~ has never fulfilled its affirmative d~ty to .eradicate the . 

effects of that· segregation. Under ·these circumstances, 

plaintiffs need only show that current racial dispa rities exist, 

not. £hat such di$p~rities a~e the result of current intentional 

se_g·regation on the part· of the school board. See Swann, 402 U.S. 

at 26. This is not a liability case in which plaintiffs must 

prove that the school board has committed unconstitutional acts; 

that was established in 1954. 

Where a plaintiff has established segregation in the past and 

the present, it is "enti~led to the presumption that current 

disparities are causally related to prior segregation, and the 

-25-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 25 
burden of proving otherwise rests on the defendants." 27. School 

Board of the City-of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, ~311 {4th 

Cir. 1987); see. also Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 536 (systemwide nature 

of de jure schools in 1954 "furnished prima facie proof that 

current segregation was caused at least in part by prior 

~ntentionallY seg~~gative official acts [and] judgment for the 

plaintiffs was authorized and required absent sufficient 

countervailing evidence by the defendant school officials."); 

Keyes, 413 U.S. at 211 n.l7 (after de jure segregation is 

established, "the burden becomes the school authorities' to show 

that the current segregation is in no way the r~sult of fhos~ past 

segregative actions)~ Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 991 

27 The 4issent mistakenly refers to this as the "Keyes 

presumption." Dissent at 36, 72-73, 76. The Keyes presumption 

states "th~t a finding of intention~! segregative school board 

actions in a meaningful portion of a school system . • • creates a 

presumption that· other segregated schooling within the system is 

not adventitious." Keyes, · 4.13 U.S. at 208 • . This is a presumption 

that is used to. establish initial de jure segregation in a case 

where no statutorily mandated segregation exists. The presumptio~ 

referenced .in the instant case applies only after either 

statutorily-mandated or policy-based de jure segregation has been 

established. See id. at 211 n.l7 (Keyes court making this 

distinction); ·see also Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90 , 94 (5th Cir . 1983) (district court relied on wrong presumption). The dissent's .misunderstanding of this difference has an obvious and critical 

impact on its assessment of this record. See dissent at 76 ("It ·-is clear that to sustain t:he presumption, the plaintiffs were 

required to prove . 'a current condition of segregation from __ _ intentional state action'"); id. at 145-46 ("The court simply ·has 

jumped the gun in invoking the Keyes presumption to arrive at the 

preliminary and critical conclusion that there is a current . condition of segregation in Topeka.")i see also id. at 146-7 (dire 

predictions if Keyes presumption is required _at the outset). The 

presumption required here is not the Keyes presumption but the 

presumption placed on all school districts previously found liable 

for operating a de jure system. 

-26-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 26 
(4th Cir. 19851 (same). This presumption ensures that 

subconscious racial discrimination does not perpetuate the denial 

of ·equal p~otection to our nation's school children. 28 A focus on 

provable intent .alone would deny a remedy to too many Americans. 

The dissent asserts that under this view of the law, 

liability in this case would be frozen as of 1954 and "we merely 

would decree a remedy based upon the failure of the school board 

to have absolute racial balance at every school and much of this 

court's opinion •.• would be superfluous." Dissent at 13. Of 

course, liability is not frozen;·it just remains until the school 

board, not the plaintiffs, bears the burden of proving that 

current racial disparities in the school system are not the result 

of the prior segregated school system. 

28 As one commentator has observed, "[A]mericans share a 

historical experience that has ~es~ted in individuals within-the 

culture ubiquitously attaching -a significance to race that is 

irration~l and often outside their awareness." Lawrence, The Id, 

the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning Wiih Unconscious Racism, 

39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 327 (1987). 

-26AAppellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 27 
{ 

Contrary to the district court 1 s apparent conclusion, see 671 

F. S~pp. at 1297, remoteness in time does not make past 

· intentional acts less intentional. See Dayton II , 443 u.s. at 

535-36; Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 u.s. 189, 210-11 (1973). 

The passag~ of time merely presents an opportunity for a school 

district to s~ow that the presumptive relationship between the de 

jure system .and the current system is so attenuated that there is 

no causal connection. See id. at 211. 

What the school district . has done to in~egrate is crucial in 

determining whether the causal link between the prior segregat~on 

and the current disparities has been severed. The district may 

carry its ~urden by sho~ing that it has acted affirmatively to . . desegregate. Absent such proof, the court must presum~ that. 

current se.gregation· is the result of prior intentional state 

action. A showing tha~ the school distri~t ~as nQt. promoted 

segregation and has allowed desegregation to take place where 

natural forces worked to that end is insufficient. 

The ultimate test of what the school district has. done is its 

effectiveness, most iignificant y .its effectivene~s in eliminating 

the separation of white and minority children.29 While a district 

is not always required to choose the most desegregative 

29 See Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 

(1972f;Davis, 402 U.S. at 37; · Swann, 402 lJ.S. at 25 . 

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alternative when it selects a particular ·optian, 30 the result of 

the sum of the choices made · by the district must be to desegregate 

the system to the -maximum possible extent.31 Furthermore, the 

school district may "not • •• take any action t-l:lat woutd impede 

the process of disest ablishing the dual system and its effects." 

Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 538. 

One choice frequently made by school districts, and the one 

made in Topeka, is to use a neighborhood school plan as the basis 

for. student assignme~t. Neighborhood schools ·a_re a deeply rooted 

and valuable part of American education.32 To· the extent that 

neighborhoods are themselves segregated, however, such plans tend' 

to prolong th_e .existence of segregation in schoo.ls. 33 Thus; they 

must be carefully scrutinized. They are not "per se adequate ·to 

meet the remedial responsibilities of local boards." Davis, 402 

U.S •. at 37; ~ United States v. Board of Educ:., . Indep. School 

Dist. No. 1, Tulsa County, 429 F.2d 1253 (lOth· cir. 1970)~34 

30- See Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1427 (11th Cir •. 1985). 

31 See Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 733 F.2d 660 (9th 

Cir. -1984) (en bane) . (castigating school district for consistently 

choosing more segregative alternatives), cert. denied, 471 u.s. 

1065 (1985). -

32 See 20 u~s.c. § 1701 (1982) (declaring it to be the public 

policy of the United States that neighborhood schools are the 

appropriate basis for determining public school assignments).; 

crawford ·v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., 458 u.s. 527, 537 n.l5 {1982); 

Diaz, 733 F.2d at 677 (Choy, J., dissenting) • 

. 33 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 28; Diaz, 733 F.2d at 664. 

34 On remand, the district court in Tulsa County developed .a 

·-28-

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Neighborhood school plans must be both neutrally administered 

and effective. A plan that is administered in a scrupulously 

neutral manner but is not effective in producing greater racial 

balance does not fulfill the affi(mative duty to desegregate. 35 

It is equally .i.mportant that a plan's neutrality be more than 

surface-deep. We have spe~ifically held that ~hen minorities are 

concentrated in certain areas of the city, neighborhood-school 

plans may be wholly insufficient to fulfill the district's 

affirmative duty to eliminate the vestiges of segregation. Tulsa 

County, 429 F.2d at 1258-59. ~v~n ~hen neighborhood school plans 

hold. the ptomise of being effective, courts must recpgniz~ that 

the school district's choices on s~ch questions as where to locate 

plan to desegregate Tu~sa's schools, which we subsequently · affirmed. 459 F.2d 720 (lOth C~r. 1972). The Supreme Court then .summarily reversed our affirmance. of the proposed plan and 

remanded fo~ reconsideration in light of Keyes. 413 u.s.· 916 

( 1973). w.e then .determined that "the factual premise upon wh i ch 

we based our original decision h~{d] been so materially changed 

both by lapse of time and the'specific and voluntary actions taken 

by the School Board and the students themselves that our further 

consideration under the present record would serve no useful 

purpose.·" ·492 F.2d 1189 (lOth Cir. 1974). We remanded to the 

district court for such further proceedings as might .be necessary 

to bring the school district in conformity with the Keyes mandate. 

Our original decision overturning the district court:s finding of 

no constitutional violation. remains the law of this circuit. 

35 See Morgan, 831 F.2d at 328-29 (racial neutrality is 

"unreliable talisman"); Diaz, 733 F.2d at 664 (adher ence to 

neighborhood plan nqt determinative on question of segregative 

intent); Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1285-86 (8th Cir~ 

1980) (en bane) (adoption of n~ighborhood school plan did not 

fulfill duty tu desegregate); cf. Pitts, 755 F.2d at 1426 (mere 

adoption of desegregation plan insufficient to render a dual 

system unitary). 

-29-

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new schools, which schools to close, how to react to overcrowding 

or underutilization, and what transfer policy to offer, all have 

obvious impact on the-school attendance boundar ie's the .district 

can draw under a neighborhood school plan~ 36 If these choicep are 

not made with an eye toward desegregation, a neighborhood school 

plan may 11 further lock the school system into a mold of separation 

of races.•• Swann, · 402 u.s. at ·21. Ul timately, whether the use of 

a neighborhood school plan in a particular case is consistent with 

a school district•s duty to desegregate turns on whether the 

11School authorities [have made} every effort to achi eve the 

greatest_ possible degree of actual de~egreg~tidn taki?g into 

account the practicalities of the situation ... Davis, 402 u.s. at 

33. Contrar~ to the ~issent•s suggestion, ~issent a t 21-22, a 

school district which chose _a neighborhood school system in 1954 

is not insulat·ed from a later contention that neighborhood schools 

did not result in des~gregation. 7 11A school system is 

not . . . • automatically desegregated when a constitutionally 

acceptable plan is adopted and implemented, for the remnants of 

discrimination are not readfl_y eradicated. 11 . Ross v. · Houston 

Indep. Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d tl8, 225 (5th Cir. 1983}.38 

36 See Columbus Bd. of Educ.", 443 U.S. 449, 462 & nn. 9-11 (1979~Swann, 402 u.s. at 28; Diaz, 733 F.2d at 667-71: Tulsa 

Coun t y, 429 F."2d at 1256-57. - -

37 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 21, 28: Adams,_620 P.2d at 1286 . 

38 See also Columbus, 443 u.s. at 459-60 ( 11 In Swann, it should 

be recalled, an initial desegregation plan had been ent~red in . 1965 and had been affirmed on appeal • . But . the case was reopened, 

and in 1969 the school board was required to come for t h with a 

-30-. 

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Actions the school district has not taken are also relevant 

in considering what the -district has done. A school district 

~hich has not made use of such classic segregative techniques as 

gerrymandering~ discriminatory transfer policies, and optional 

attend~nce zones is more likely to have fulfilled its duty to 

desegregate than a district that has done so. 39 Similarly, a 

school district that has made use of the various techniques 

available to encourage voluntary desegregation is more likely to 

. have fulfilled its duty than one that has not. 40 Such techniques 

may include, for ' example, the establishment of magnet schools and 

vigorous official encouragement of desegregative transfers.· 

Firially, objective proof of the school district's int~nt must 

be considered. How a district lobbies its patr~ns and government 

agencies 6n issues that affect desegregation, whether it. seeks and 

then heeds the desegregation recommendations of others, and the 

more effective plan); United States v. Lawrence County School 

Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1043 (5th Cir. 1986) ("the adoption of the 

plan does not exhaust the power of the court to direct elimination 

of vestiges of segregation that remain or become apparent only 

after the plan has been put into place"); Pitts, 755 F.2d at 1426. 

39 See Adams, 620 F~2d at 1288-91 (intact busing, school site 

selection, block busing, transfer policy, and segregated faculty 

assignments); Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 787 (6th 

Ci~. 1974) (listing segregative techniques); Tulsa County, 429 

F.2d at 1257 (transfer policy). 

40 See Ross, 699 F.2d at 222, 227; Price, 694 F.2d at 351-53; 

cf. Diaz, 733 F.2d at 672-73 (criticizing school district for 

implementing none of desegregation proposals made by citizens' 

committee) . 

-31-

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cooperativeness o~ the district in complying with court ·orders, 

.. for example, bear on the manner in which the district has shaped 

the current conditions in the school .district. 41 

c. Maximum Practicable Desegregation 

What more can and should be done, if anything, is the final 

ciomponent in a determination of unitary status. 42 Essential ly, a 

·defendant must demonstrate th~t it has done everything feasibl~. 

Courts must assess the schoo~ district's achievements with an eye 

to the possible and practical, but they must not let longstanding 

racism blur their ultimate focus on the ideal. 43 

In most unitariness casesy the school district has been 

implementing a court-approved desegregation plan under active . . . 

court supervisioti. The questi6n.is· usually whether closer 

41 See Columbus, 433 u.s. at 463 n.l2 (Board refused to seek 

advice on desegregation or implement recommendations)·; Morgan, 831 

F.2d at 321 (noting cooperation with court orders); Diaz, 733 F.2d 

at 671-74 (manipulation of committee studying segregation; 

statements suggest,ing fai).ure of bond issu.e would lead to forced 

busing); Ross, 699 F. 2d at 222-23 ( s _chool -district appointed 

community task force to develop magnet plan, opposed efforts to . disrupt integration plans, and promoted interdistrict transfer). 

42 See Davis, · 402 u.s. at 37; Morgan, 831 F.2d at 322-25; Ross, 

699 F.2d at 224-25. 

43 . See Morgan, 83l . F.2d at 324; Ross, 699 F.2d at 225. 

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adherence to the plan is practical or whether the plan has 

ach ieved its objectives 4 The district court in such cases has 

been intimately involved with the process of desegregation and is 

well a~are of the obstacles it faces. The court can thus make an 

informed judgment on the possibilities of further desegregation. 

Where the school district has complied with .the deseg regation plan 

to the best of 'its ability, and has done what can be done_ in spite 

of the obstacles i n its way, it is reasonable to conclud_e that no 

further desegreg~t ion is feasible. 45 

· The present case is one of those rare ones in which the 

uni~ariness determination is not directly tied to the execution of 

a particular desegregation plan . In such a case , the 

consideiation of whether further desegregation is practicable must 

include the obstacles that are likely to stand in its way, and 

whether they may be circumvented _ without imperiling students ' 

health or the educational process. See Swann, 402 u.s. at 30-31. 

Whe re there are no significant barriers to desegregation, or such 

barriers as exist may be overcome without undue hardship, further 

44. See Morgan, .B31 F. 2d at 322-25; Riddick, 784 F. 2d at 532-34; 

Calhoun, 522 F.2d 717. 

45 See Ross, 699 F.2d at 224 (further remedial efforts would be 

unreasonable and Inadequate); Calhoun v. Cook, 525 F.2d 1203 , 1203 

(5th Cir. 1975 ) (per curiam) ("It would blink reality .•• to 

hold the Atlanta School System to be nonunitary because fur t her 

integration is theoretically possible and we expressl y decline to 

do so. "). 

- 33-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 34 
desegregation is practicable. See id. at 28 (mere awkwardness or 

inconvenience is no barriei to carrying out desegregation plan). 

In sum, when a school system was .previously de jure, a 

plaintiff bears the burden of showing that there is a current 

condition of segregation • . It may do so by proving the existence 

of racially identifiable schools. The school district must then 

show that ~uch segregation has no causal connection with the prior 

de jure segregation, and that the district has in fact carried out 

the maximum desegregation practicable for that district. We now 

apply these legal principles to Topeka • 

. v. 

THE FINDING OF UNITARINESS 

Because Topeka's schools formerly operated und~r sys~em of 

de jure segregation, rr [ t ]he ~o~rd • s conU,riuing obligation 

[has been] 'to come forw~rd with a plan that promises 

. realistically to work • : • ~, ••• until it rs clear that 

state-imposed segrega'tion has been completely removed.'" Columbus 

Board of Educ. v. Penick, 443 u.s. 449, 459 (1979). P~ior to this 

case, no court had pronounced the Topeka school system unitary; 

hence, this duty never dissipated. The.district court concluded, 

however, that the effects of de jure segregation have been 

eliminated in Topeka. On appeal, plaintiffs attack this 

determination. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 35 
A. Burden of Proof 

Plaintiffs argue initially that the district court improperly 

required them to prove intentional discrimi natory conduct on the 

part of the school district over the -course of the . decades instead 

of according them the benefit of a presumption that current 

segregation stems from the prior de jure system. Plaintiffs quote 

a number of sentences from the district court's opinion as support 

for their argument that. the court placed on them the burden of 

proof on intent. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 27. 46 The 

court itself expressed some _confusion as to the proper burden of 

proof . 671 .F. Supp. at -1295. ·We have c"onsidered· both ·these 

citations and the tenor of the district ¢curt's opinion as a 

whole, and we are convinced that the court focused too greatly on 

the school district's lack ··of discriminatory· intent. Although the 

percentage. of minority students in Topeka_ is lower than in 6ther 

cities involved in desegregation cases and consequ~ntly the 

statistics alone do not appear as egr~gious, we are p~rsuaded that 

this overemphasis on the school district's intent led the . court to 

46 For example, the district court st"ated: 

11 Although, on its face, the construction of 

schools, particularly on the west side .of the d istrict, 

appears to· have promoted · racial separation~ the court 

does not believe that the district's.sctiool construction 

policy was ·intended to maintain or promote segregation." 

671 F. · Supp. at 1300 (emphasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 36 
make the same errors as did ·the district court iri Dayton II. It 

failed 11 tO apply the appropriate presumption and burden-shiftin·g 

principles of law. 11 Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243, 251 (6th 

Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Dayton Board of Education v •. Brinkman, 

443 u.s. 526 (1979).47 

The dis~rict court made the following findings: that the 

neighborhood school attendance boundaries dr~wn in 1955 had the 

effect of maintaining segregation; that the construction of new 

schools since that time had the effect of "promot[ing] racial 

separation11 ; that the reassignment of students from previ6~s de 

jure schools to adjacent schools withhigher-than-average 

percentages of minority students had the effect of increasing 

those percentages; and that the assignment of faculty had the 

effect of placing minority faculty disproportionately at schools 

with higher-than-average min~rity student percentages. · 671 ·F. 

supp. at 1300, 1301, 1304-05. It is .clear from the court's other 

findings that the school district's use of space additions, its 

siting of Topeka West high school, its drawing of attendance 

47 The dissent has fallen into the same error, as we have 

discussed supra at 23-26A & n.27. The dissent also asserts that 

we should have remanded to let the distr~ct court make appropriate 

findings in accordarice with the presumption and burden-shifting 

pr incipJ, es we believe apply. Dissent at 4. ·"Bu t fact findings 

made under an erroneobs view of the law or in the absence of a 

defined legal standard are not binding on appeal. 11 Oil, Chemical 

& Atomic Workers v. Amoco Oil Co., F.2d · , No. 86-

2838, dissent at 3 (lOth Cir. filed 9/15/89) (Baldock,~ 

dissenting and urging reversal of trial court's fact findings on 

grounds it applied erroneous view of legal standard). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 37 
boundaries, and its failure to adopt various reorganization pl ans 

did not further the .process of desegregation. Id. 'at 1298-1301, 

1308-09. Nevertheless, the court's discussion of most of thes e 

aspects of Topeka's history ends with the conclusion that because 

these actions were not taken with the intent to discriminate and 

were consistent with a "race-neutral" neighborhood school plan, 

they did not promote segregatiori. 48 The court evidently believed 

that if these two critetia, i.e., no intent to discriminate and 

consistency with a race-neutral neighborhood school plan, were 

met, the school district's actions would pass constitutional 

muster. The Supreme Court has made clear, howevg~, that a 

"race-neutral" neighborhood school policy is not sufficient where 

it fails to remedy de jure segreg4tion: 

·"Absent a ·constitutional violation there would be 

no basis for judically orderi.ng assignment of students 

on a racial basis. All thinga being equal, with no · history of discrimination, it might well be. desirable to 

·assign .pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all 

tnings are not equal in a system that has been 

deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce 

racial segregation. The remedy for such segregation may 

be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even 

bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens on 

some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be 

48 See, ~, 671 F. Supp. at 1298-99 ("the use of space 

additions was consistent with a race-neutral neighborhood 

policy ••. ~ [I]t has not been shown that space addi tions w·ere . intentional ly used to promote segregation ••.• "); i d. at 1300 

("The court believes the siting of Topeka West High School was a 

race-neutral decision."); id. at 1301 ("The district has 

consistently applied race-neutral, neighbochood school principles 

to the demarcation of attendance zones. 11 )i i d. at 1309 ("The court 

does not believe the distri ct's conduct over-thirty· years 

indicates a desire to perpetuate segregation by foregoing 

opportunities to desegregate schools~"}. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 38 
avoided in the interim period when remedial adjustments 

are being made to eliminate the dual school systems. 

" ••• 'Racially neutral' assignment plans 

p r oposed by school authorities to a district court may 

be i nadequa te; such plans may f a i l to counteract the 

continuing effects of past school segregation resulting 

from discriminatory location of school sites or 

distortion of school size in order to achieve or 

maintain an artificial racial separation. When school 

authorities present a district court with a 'loaded game 

board,' affirmative action in the form of remedial 

altering of attendance zones is proper to achieve truly 

non-discriminatory assignments. In short, an assignment 

plan is not acceptable simply because it appears to be 

neutral." 

Swann, 402 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added). 49 

Whil.e we agree w·ith the. district court's findings that the 

current school administration is not presently acting with 

discriminatory intent-- indeed, . there is evidence that the 

present school board has some commitment to desegregation -- we 

are persuaded that the court failed adequately to weigh the 

conduct of the .school district for the past thirty years, and the 

currerit effects· of that conduct. The court erred by limiting the 

49 The dissent recognizes this holding in Swann, dissent at 58, 

but emphasizes that Swann was a remedial case. As we have 

previously pointed out, one of the dissent's major errors is its 

treatment of this case as if plaintiffs were required to establish 

an initial case of de jure segregation. This is a remedy case. 

The question presented is whether the school board has remedied 

the de jure segregation that existed in 1954 • . One thing is 

abundantly clear: Creating neighborhood schools in 1954 did not 

integrate the Topeka schools. See supra at 8-9 (Three of the four 

previously all-black schools remained all-black or virtually so 

under the new neighborhood school policy.); see also Adams, 620 

F.2d at 1281 (St. Louis post-Brown neighborhood school plan did 

not change segregated nature of the system. "Those pre-Brown 

whtte schools located in the black neighborhoods •.. turned 

virtually all black immediatefy after the plan was implemented."). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 39 
school district's burden merely to showing that it had 

nondiscriminatory reasons _for acting as it did. As· thirty years 

of desegregation law have made clear, the Constitution requires . 

~ore than ceasing to promote segregation. See part IV supra. 

"[T]he measure of the post-Brown ! .conduct of a school board under 

an unsatisfied duty to liquidate a _dual system is the 

effectiveriess, -not the purpose, of the actions in decreasing or 

increasing the segregation caused by the dual system." Dayton II, 

443 u.s. at 538. A lack of intent to discriminate is therefore 

insufficient. "In short, [a student] assignment plan is not 

acceptable simply because it ·appears to be neutral." Swarin, 402 

u.s. at 2a. Mere adherence to a race-neutral but ineffective 

neighborhood school pl~n is i~sufficient. · In general , any course 

of action that fails to provide meaningful assurance of prompt and 

effective disestablishment of a dual system is unacceptable . 

. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 460 (1972). 

The distii~t court did not heed this mandate. While it did find 

that the school district had taken some actively desegregative 

actions, we are convinced that the court's overall: conclusion as 

to unitariness was fatally infected by the inadequacy of the 

burden of proof standard to which it held the school district. 

B . . The Evidence 

In order·to assess the district court's finding of 

unitariness under the appropriate burden of proof and the general 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 40 
principles we have outlined, we turn to a more specific review of 

the record. As a general matter, it is important to note that 

much of the record evidence consists of statistics and other 

undisputed facts. 50 Our differences with the district court lie 

mainly in how the essentially undisputed facts are assessed in 

light of the school district's mandate to dismantl e the segregated 

school system. We believe that the district court's findin~ of 

unitariness is flawed by the undue deference it·gave to the school 

distr_ict ' s neighborhood school policy and by the court 's failure 

to give proper weight to its.own findings that certain actions and · 

omissions by the ~chool district had a segregat~ve e f fect. 5i Cf. 

Diaz v. ~an Jose Unified School Dist., 733 ·F.2d 660, 674 (9th Cir. 

1984) (en· bane} ( 11 In making · itS determination in respect to .t he 

Board ' s intent, the dist~ict court erred in tailing to give weight 

to the. cumulative impact of the evidence"i district court's 

findings that defendarits act~d with6ut segregative intent heid . 

clearly erroneous). 

50 The dissent argues that it is the distri ct bourt's job, not 

ours, to decide which party's experts are more believable. We, of 

course, agree. In reaching our conclusion that the district court 

was clearly erroneous in i~s deteimination that the Topeka school 

system · has becom'e unitary, we did not rely. on the experts' 

opinions but· rather on the undisputed statistics about the r acial 

makeup of the various schools and their faculty/staffs, and the 

basically uncontroverted evidence about what the school board did, 

or failed to do, to meet its affirmative duty to dismantle the 

segregated system. 

51 We are similarly convi nced that the dissent.' s r e view of the 

record is colored by its erroneous understanding of the burdens of 

proof and the role of intent. See supra at 23-26A & n.27. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 41 
1. Current Condition of Segregation in Topeka 

The district court found that "there are disparities in the 

racial makeup of various schools 1 enrollments, '

1 and that 

"[p]laintiffs have demonstrated that in general there .are a 

greater than average number of minority faculty and staff in 

schools with a greater than average number of minority students." 

671 F. Supp. at 1295, 1304. Like most courts, however, the 

district court did not discuss separately the issues of current 

segregation and the causal connection between that segregation and 

the prior de jure segregation. · 

As we have pointed out, the simplest and ~ost compelling 

evidence o.f segregation is the presence of pre.dominantly one-race 

schools. In a system such as Topeka's, however, in which the 

mfnority student population is· relatively small, there may be a 

number of primaiily white schools even though minority students 

are spread through a significant number of other schools. In such 

a system, it is the concentration of minority students that is 

usually the hailrnark of discrimination.52 Because the 

52 The dissent is favorably imp·ressed that only three of 34 

Topeka schools currently have majority-minority popul ations. 

Dissent at 143. The dissent is similarly impressed that of the 

eight schools that plaintiffs identified ~t trial as racially 

identifiable minority, white students make up 49.3% of the total 

student population at these schools. Dissent at 110. · We are not 

so favorably impressed. In a school system with a 26% minor i ty 

student population, we think the number of schools in Topeka that 

approach or are over the 50% minority mark constitute persuasive 

evidence that the school system has not met its duty to 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 42 
significance of mostly white schools is therefore not necessarily 

a~ great in a mostly white system as it would be in a system with 

a heavy minority population, we focus on the broader form of 

racial identifiability discussed in part IV A above. In support 

of their argument .that there · is currently segregation in Topeka, 

plaintiffs point primarily to student assignment, and faculty and 

staff assignment~ 53 We . consider each in turn, and then together. 

a. Student Assignment 

Each of the experts who testified at trial u~ed a different 

standard for determining whether a school ~as racially 

identifiable in student assignment. Plaintiffs' main experts; Mr. 

Lamson a~d Dr. Foster, each used standards that took the 

disegregate. 

53 Plaintiffs do · not contest the district court's f i nding that 

the Topeka school system is unitary with respect to f acilities, 

extracurricular activities, curriculum, transportation, and 

equality of education. See Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1307-08. There 

are currently no optional attendance zones, and the district's 

transfer policy is a majority-to-minority program. See id. at 

1298. -

Plaintift"s commissioned a public opinion survey in order to 

aetermine whether Topekans perceive some schools as black/minor~ty 

and others as white, whether they perceive some schools as 

providing an inferior education, and whether t here is a 

correspondence between the two . While the results of the survey 

provide some support for plaintiffs' contentions, the survey was 

extensively criticized as unreliable by several of the school 

district's experts. The d~strict court discussed additional flaws 

and ·concluded that the survey was not strong evidence of the 

existence of segregation. 671 F. Supp. at 1305-06 . We iee no 

error in that conclusion~ We therefore disregard the survey 

results. 

-42-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 43 
percentage of black or minority students actually enrolled in the 

elementary or secondary schools (26% in 1985), and then added and 

sub-tracted some number to obtain a, range within which they did not 

consider schools to be racially identifiable on the basis of 

student assignment alone. Their methods differ to some extent, 

but fo r 1985 either method leads to a range of 11-41% (26% plus or 

minus. lS%).54 ~he school district's primary expert on· this issue, 

Dr. Armor, used an absolute rather than a relative standard. In 

his view, desegregated schools should optimally have 20~50% 

minbrity students, regardless of the percentage of minority 

students in the· system. Dr. Arinor also allowed a variance, wh ich 

resulted in a range of acceptability of 10~60%.55 

54 The dissent attacks the use of a +15% deviation from the 

district average of minority siudents Io assess the racial . identifiability of the schools, while at the same t~me c6nceding 

that "[t]he trial judge .seems to have analyzed the plaintiffs' 

case in part with a +15% standard," dissent at 78. In Swann, the 

Court accepted the· dTstrict.-wide ·-average of 71% white/29% b_lack, 

with no deviation, _ as an acceptable ·starting point for the 

district court in shaping a remedy. 402 UoS. at 24-25. Where, as . here, the school district has been held liable for imposing an 

unconstitutional segregated school system, we believe it perfectly 

reasonable to use a !15% deviation in assessing whether the school 

system ever ach ieved unitariness. 

55 The school district also offered two indices as a measure of 

desegregation in Topeka's schools. Rec., vol. XIII,· at 2574-80. 

The dissimilarity index measures how dissimilar schools are 

compared to th~ district's mean. Rec •. , vol. IV, at 558. The · exposure index is a measure of the potential for i nterracial 

contact. The indices are measures of system-wide desegregation, 

however; they say nothing about the racial balance in individual 

schools. Rec., vol. IV, ·at 554-57; rec., vol. XIII, at 2581 . The 

dissent places great reliance on these indices, pointing out ·that 

they have shown significant improve-ment since 1954. Disse!)t at 

83-85. Defendants' expert Dr. Armour agreed, however, that the 

indices are only summary measures, rec., . vol. XIII, at 2623-24, 

and conceded that it is possible to have a school system with a 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 44 
As plaintiffs point out, under any of these methods there are 

schools in Topeka that are racially identifiable by student 

assignment. Even under the most g~nerous of these numerical 

standards, proposed by the school board's expert, there are six 

elementary and three secondary schools that are racially . . 

identifiable by student assignment . 

Notwithstanding _the dissent's view that the statistic's 

~egarding the percentages of minorities in the racially 

overbalanced schools do not add up to a current condition of 

segregation, we believe the figures speak for themselves. See 

supra at 8-14. In this connection, the charts in the disserit 

showing the racial inventories over the years at Belvoir, Hudson, 

Highland Park North, Lafayette,. Quinton Heights, and Lowman Hill 

speak more eloquently about the current condition of segregation 

in Topeka than words ever could. See dissent at 111 n. 43; 114 n. 

44; 116 n. 45; 117-18 n.46; 121-21 n.47; 132-33 n.51. 

good exposure 'index that nonetheless contains an all-black school , id . at 2653-54. Therefore , even if a school system has relatively 

good rates on these indices, it is still necessary to look at the 

rac ial statistics at individual schools to get a true picture. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 45 
b. Faculty and Staff Assignment 

To determine racial identifiability by faculty/staff 

assignment, plaintiffs again used a standard based on the actual 

percentage of minority employees and a range of a few percentage 

points above and below that number. The . school district contested 

the accuracy of plaintiffs' standard .but presented no alternative 

one. We do not adopt plaintiffs' standard, but instead evaluate 

the data on its face.56 

In 1985, the percentage of minor~ty faculty/staff in.the 

Topeka school system was 11.2% for the elementary schools and 

12~65% -· for the secondary schools~ in the elementary schools, the 

percentage of minority faculty/staff at individual schools ranged 

from 0% to 33.3%. Nine schools had less than 5% minority faculty/ 

staff,· and two · h4d .more than 25%.57 In the secondary schools, th~ 

56 The range used by plaintiffs was very narrow, and it was 

extremely difficult for any school to fall within it. In 1985 , for example, onl:y four of the twenty-six elementary schools were 

not racially identifiable undsr plaintiffs' standard. While it is 

appropriate to use a · harsher standard for analyzing faculty 

assignments than student assignments,· since the schoo~ district 

may assign faculty as it sees fit, plaintiffs' standard is simply 

too difficult to meet in this case. We note, moreover, that the 

school district is limited to some extent in its ability to assign 

faculty because different teachers are -certified in different 

fields. This is particularly true at the secondary level. 

57 

School 

Minority Faculty/Staff In 

Topeka's Elementary Schools, 1985-86 

Total Minority Avondale East 31.4 10. 45' 

-45-

% 

33.3 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 46 
percentage ranged from 2.5% to 24.7%. One school had less than 5% 

minority ~acultyjstaff, an additional three schools had less than 

_ . 10%, and one had more than 20%. sa 

Avondale West 

Belvoir 

Bishop 

Crestview 

Gage 

Highland Park Central 

Highland Park North 

Highland Park South 

Hudson 

Lafayette 

Linn 

Lowman Hill 

Lundgren 

McCarter 

McClure 

McEachron 

Potwin 

Quincy 

Quinton Heights 

Randolph 

Shaner 

State Street 

Stout 

Sumner 

Whitson 

25.8 

25.95 

23.8 

31.65 

21.0 

34.6 

28.6 

29.2 

19.75 

32.6 

17.8 

25.6 

21.55 

27.4 

25.1 

23.5 

14-.15 

32.35 

20.4 

27.0 

21.9 

22.9 

20.6 

23.3 

35.35 

1.0 

3.85 

.4 

3. 4• 

1 . 0 

3 .• 9 

5.5 

5.4 

3.8 

5.65 

.3 

6 . 5 

2.8 

3.0 

0.0 

1.0 

2.0 

1.0 

4.4 

1 . 0 

2.0 

1.3 

2.0 

1.85 

1.0 

Average minority faculty/staff: 11.2%. 

Rec., ex. vol. IV, at 261. 

58 

:Minorit y Faculty/Staff In 

Topeka's secondary Schools, 1985-86 

School 

Chase 

Eisenhower 

French 

Jardine 

Landon 

Total . 40.5 

65.25 

42.6 

39.65 

31.1 

-46-

Minority 

7.45 

12.1 

2.4 

3.8 

3.0 

3.9 

14.8 

1.7 

10.7 

4.8 

11.3 

19.2 

18.5 

19.2 

17.3 

1.7 

25.4 

13.0 

10.9 

0.0 

4.3 

14.1 

3.1 

21.6 

% 

3.7 

9 . 1 

5.7 

9.7 

7.9 

2.8 

18.4 

18.5 

5.6 

9.6 

9.6 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 47 
Faculty/staff data have been kept only since 1973 and, except 

for 1981, that data does not distinguish between faculty and 

staff. Rec., ex. vql. IV, at 263-68. Faculty/staff includes 

managerial personnel at both .the school and district level, 

teacher aid.es, clerical/secretarial employees, skilled and 

technical employees, and service·work~rs, ci~ well as teachers and 

other professional staff. The distinction between faculty and 

staff is particularly relevant because the percentage of minor i ty 

employees has always been lower than the minority student . 

population, and has fall.en steadily at the elementary level over 

the p_eriod such data was kep~~ Moreover, minorities ·are 

represented_more heavily in staff posit~ons than in faculty 

positions. In 1985, for example, district-wide statistics showed 

that 11.3% of elementary .teachers and 8.0% of secondary teachers 

were minorities, whjle 19%. of teach~r aid~s and 20% of -service 

workers were mi~orities •. ~ec., vol. IV, at 268. Any one facul ty/ 

staff per.son listed at any one school is thus more likely to be a 

teach~r aide or service worker than a teacher. 

Robinson 

Highland ~ark 

Topeka 

Topeka West 

49.35 

118.25 

150.1 

1 20.0 

12.2 

13.65 

25 . 5 · 3.0 

Average minority faculty/staff: 12.6~%. 

Rec., ex. vol. IV, at 262. 

-47-

24.7 

11.5 

17.0 

2.5 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 48 
We recognize ·that the .small number of faculty and staff at 

any one school means that the presence or absence of one mino rity 

employee may have a considerable effect on the school~ minority 

percentage. Neverthel~ss, we see· no obviously neutral reason why 

McClure elementary school has no minority employees among its 25 

faculty/staff and Topeka West high school . has 3 among 120, while 

Avondale East elementary school has 10 minority facul ty/staff out 

of a total of 31 employees and Robinson middle school has 12 out 

of 49. 

c. Fac~ors considered together 

Because faeulty(staff assignment is largely within the 

control of the sch<?Ol dis.tr ict, i·t is a potent tool. for 

demonstrating that the district does or does not itself identify 

certain schools as white ot minority. It also provides an . . opportunity for undoing some of the harm of" ~egregated_ student 

assignments, because both white and minority students may benefit 

from the presence of iu·inor i ty role mqdels. See Washington v. 

Seattle School District, No. 1, 458 u.s. 457, 472 (1982) ("white 

as well as Negro childr~n benefit from exposure to ethnic and 

racial diversity in the classroom"). Conversely, if the district 

"disproportionately assigns minority faculty/staff to those schools 

with the highest percentages of minority students, the district is 

in effect reinforcing the identification of particular schools as 

white Qr minority . This practice of disproportionate assignments 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 49 
also reinforces the irrational notion that minority teachers are 

inferi~r and not fit to teach white children. 

In Topeka, although the correlation is not completely 

uniform, ~ 671 F. Supp. at 1305, there is a clear pattern of 

assigning minority faculty/staff in a manner that reflects 

minority student assignment. This correlation is fatal to the 

school district's effort to show a lack of current segregation. 

Both student ~ssignrnent and faculty/staff assignment can be 

expected to vary f~om school to school, the former because of 

population distribution, and the latter, to a lesser extent, 

because of differing teacher. credentials. When they vary 

together, as they do in Topeka, leading to schools that ·are 

noticeably more white or more minority in both students and 

faculty, it is difficult to posit a neutral explanation.59 The 

59 The ·racially identifiable schools in 1985-86 

standard were as follows: 

1985-86 

Elementary Schools {26) 

Belvoir 

Highland Park North · Lafayette 

Quinton.Heights 

Hudson· 

Avondale East 

Lowman Hill 

Bishop 

McEachron 

Min w Total 

146 90 236 

179 130 309 

217 165 382 

129 132 261 

108 124 232 

i28 162 290 

155 215 370 

36 3'06 342 

30 261 291 

-49-· 

% Min 

61.9 

57.9 

56.8 

49.4 

46.6 

44.1 

. 41.9 

10.5 

10.3 

under the +15% 

7 schools 

Tdent . minori t y 

by enrollment 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 50 
school district has not attempted to provide one. 

Moreover, when we look beyond the· numbers, we find that the 

schools that are marked as whi~e or minority by their students and 

faculty/staff are also so marked by their geography, the 

residential population in their attendance areas, and by their 

.history. Of th~ six racially identifiable elementary schools 

detected by Dr. Armor'~ method, five are now and always have been 

Whitson 38 334 372 10.2 

Gage 25 240 265 9.4 

McCarter 35 347 382 9.2 8 schools 

Crestview 32 326 358 8~9 Tdent. white 

Potwin 18 215 233 7.7 by enrollment 

McClure 23 296 319 . 7 ·. 2 

Rec., e~. supp .• vol. 13, pl. ex. 155 D 

1985-86 

Secondary ·Schools ( 9) Min w Total %·Min 

Eisenhower 218 230 448 48.7 1 school ident. 

minority by 

enrollment 

Landon 21 205 226 9.3 3 schools 

Topeka West Tdent. white 

High School 120 1391 1511 7.9 by enrollment · French 16 241 257 6.2 

Id. pl. ex. 155 G. 

When the schools in these tables are looked at in noies 59 

and 60 supra, one sees that all but Dne of the racially 

identifiable-minority elementary and junior high schools have 

minority faculty/staff percentages tanging from 17.3% to 33.3%. 

Six of the schools identified as racially identifiable white have 

minority faculty/staff percentages rangihg from 0.0% to 5.6%. 

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at~ ended almost exclusively by wh-ite students. They are located 

on the western and northwestern edges of the school district, 

areas with mostly white populations. 60 The same is true of ·the 

three secondary schools. See infra part V B(2)(c)(vii). The one 

remaining elementary school, Belvoir, is located on. the eastern 

edge of the .school district. The area has long been inhabited by 

a significant minority population, and the school's student 

population is now and has been for over twenty years more than 

half minority. See infra part V B(2)(c)(i). Finally, the 

correlation between student assignment and ~aculty/staff 

assignment is nat a one~year fluke. The same correlation has 

existed throughout the co~rse of this litigation. See infra part 

V B(2~(b)(ii). Considering all of these factors toge~her, there 

is sufficient evidence to support plaintiffs' contention that 

there is a current condition of segregation in Topeka. 61 

60 For two of these schools , Gage and Potwin, the district court 

specifically found that they have been predominantly white schools 

since the Supreme Court's decision in this case, arid remain. predominantly white schools adjacent to schools wit~ higher~thanaverage minority student popul ation. 671 F. Supp. at ·1303. 

61 . We do not consider this part of our opinion necessarily in 

conflict with the. district court's conclusion that there is no 

illegal segregation in Topeka, because the.~ourt did not 

separately consider the issue of current segregation apart from 

the question of causation. As we previously pointed out , the ·district court did find the exis~ence of racial disparities in 

school enrollment and staff/faculty assignment. See supra at 36 , 41. Our disagreem~nt with the ~istrict court is chiefly on the 

significance of these findings in a school district with Topeka's 

history , and bearing the weight of a presumption against it which 

the district court failed to accord. 

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2. The Causal Link Between De jure Segregation and the Current 

Condition of Segregation 

Brown I established that the Topeka school system was one of 

de jure segregatio9. Because there i s a current condition of 

segregation, we tu~n our attention to the causal link between 

these two conditions·of segregation, which ·must be assessed in 

light of the burden and factors set out in part IV B, supra. We 

are convinced that the school district failed to meet its burden 

of showing the absence of this link. This failure, wh ich the 

· district court_did not see because it failed to impos~ on 

defendants the proper burden of proof, is the key to our reversal. 

Timing is central to an assessment of the ~opeka school 

district's actions. After what was described ·as a "good faith" 

beginning, Brown, 139 F.Supp. at 470, the course the .school 

district followed in the late 1950s and early 1960s may . fairly be 

characterized as segregative. The decade from 1956 to 1966 is 

important because it established a . framework from which the school 

district subsequently deviated very little.62 A period of 

quiescence then followed, during which the system was simply 

62 Thus, one of the school district's experts, after reluctantly 

admitting that Lowman Hill elementary schoo~'s attendance 

boundaries were drawn in the 1950s with the effect of encompassing · the only two areas of black population in ~hat part of Topeka, and 

that the school was long surrounded by other schools with few to 

no black stud~nts, objected that "the boundaries of those school 

districts [were] in place." Rec., vol. XI, at 2345 . 

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administered as it stood. It -was not until HEW threatened to 

withhold federal funds in the mid-1970s that the school district 

undertook some positive action to desegregate its schools. After 

that brief flurry of action, the school district again turned its 

attention elsewhere, but to its good fortune the oft-maligned 

forces of demography began to work in its favor. Two things are 

apparent from the record. First, Topeka has · largely abted as if 

it had fulfilled its duty to desegregate at the conclusion of the 

·four-step plan implemented in the 1950s. Second, although 

Topeka's scho.ols have in fact be.come less segregated in the last 

decade, this lessening of segregation is due in part tb force~ 

beyond the control of the school district. Moreover, those 

desegre9ative actions ~hich the school board .did undertake weie 

primarilY the result of_ pres~ure from the federal government, or 

were instituted after this lawsuit was filed. 63 Although its 

record: is better tnan that of many oth.er school . d istricts, Topeka 

has engaged in voluntary desegregation with little enthusiasm. 

a. The general pattern in each decade 

.63 See Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 540 n. 11 ("(F]aculty ·segregation 

disappeared completely only after efforts of the Department of 

Health, Education, and Welfare.''); Columbus, 443 U.S. at 461 & n.8 

(practices of assigning black teachers to schools with substantial 

black populations and creating op.tional attendance zones to permit 

white students to avoid predominantly black schools ceased 

respectively only after Ohio Civil Rights Commission complaint and 

the instaRt lawsuit); Tasby, 713.F.2d at 93 ("'[T)he District has 

never voluntarily moved to desegregate the Dallas school syst~m; 

every step ·toward desegregation ·has been due to court action .'") . 

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i. The mid-50s to mid-60s 

~his period was one of signifi~ant change in the Topeka 

school district. Most notably, the district expanded greatly with 

several city-imposed annexations at th~ end of the 1950s, the 

_beginning of a spu r t in population growth and shift to the newly 

annexed areas, and the school district's consequent opening of new 

schools in this outer white part of Topeka. As the white 

population ~oved outwards, the inner city population became 

increasingly h~avily minority, and inner- city schools were closed. 

The mid-60s found the Topeka school system still heavily 

segregated. While the numeric ·polarization between schools had 

decreased to some extent systemwide,64 and minority students were 

somewhat less concentrated, 65 the number of schools serving 

primarily white children had incr~ased. Geographic polarization 

also increased, as a .result of the building of so many primarily 

white schools on the outer edges of the district. Plaintiffs 

64 In 1955, 3 elementary schools were 9~+% black aod 14 

elementary schools were 90+% white for a total of 17 out of the 23 

elementary schools. In 1966, 1 elementary school was 90+% 

minority and 19 elementary schools were 90+% white~ for a t otal of ·2o out of the 35 elementaiy schools. Rec., ex. vol IV, at 39-40, 

54-56. Pages 30-181 of volume IV of the exhibits consist of 

student enrollments for individual schools from 1950 to 198 5 . We 

henceforth refer to this part of the record as Student Tables. 

65 In 1955, about half of Topeka's black stude~ts attended three 

schools that were 99+% black. In 1966, . approx i mately the same 

percentage of minority students attended orie 90+% mihority school 

and three 50-80% minority schools. Student Tables, 1955, 1966. 

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introduced evidence tending to show .that the school district's use 

of portable classrooms and optional attendance zones served to 

maintain segregati-on by concentrating students of one race at 

certain schools. The cschool district's expert, Dr. Cla~k, 

co~ceded that his study of changes in attendance zone population 

because of changed attendance boundaries led him to conclude that 

one such boundary change might have had segregative effects not 

explainable solely by demographic shifts.66 

We have no doubt that during this period the school district 

in fact ma.intained and perhaps promoted a segregated system by 

current standards. Moreover, the .system that existed after the 

wav~ of school openings and closings ended, i.~., the location of 

schools and the race of their students, formed the basis for the 

current elementary system. Therefore, while the ~chool district 

should not be judged prim~rily by actions now· twenty or .more years 

in the past, neither can those actions be ignored. 

ii. Mid-60s to Mid-70s 

This period was -one of quiescence in the school district. 

Enrollment in the Topeka school system peaked in 1969, 

substantially ending the need for new school buildings. Outer 

Topeka continue,d to grow in white. population, .particularly in the 

66 Rec., vol. XI, at 2326. 

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western part of the city. Minority population began to spread out 

of its highly concentrated central areas int0 eastern Topeka. 

The only significant cha~ge in the school system at the end 

of this period was that the number of virtually all-white schools 

dropped. At the elementary level, 19 out of a total of 35 

elementary schools were virtually one-race in 1966; 13 out of a 

total of 34 were virtually one-race in 1974. 67 The change at the 

secondary level was even less: from 6 o~t of 14 schools in 196.6, 

to 5 out of 15 schools in 1974. This change took place primarily 

in schbols on the outskirts· of the southeastern part of Topeka, 

the area into which minorities were spreading. The school 

dis·tr ict • s qonduct durin'g this period can thus be summarized as 

let.ting deinogra.phic forces work without interference or 

encouragement. This also means that schools already heavily 

minority were allowed to increase in minority population.68 It is 

apparent that while ~opeka did not promote a segregated schoo~ 

system during this period, it maintained the system then ·in effect 

notwithstanding its affirmative duty to eliminate segregated 

schools. 

67 Student Tables, 1966, 1974. 

deannexed during this period. 

. Lyman elementary school was 

68 In 1966, Belvoir elementary school had 59.7% minority 

students and Lafayette elementary school ·had 54.5% miriorit~ 

students. By 1974, Belvoir had 67.1% minority students and 

Lafayette had ·6B . 9%·. At · the secondary level, Crane junior high 

rose from 34.45% minority in 1966 to 52.9% in 1974, while East 

Topeka .junior high remained more than 60% minority. Student 

Tables, 196~, 1974. 

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iii. Mid-70s to the present 

. In 1974, the HEW compl~ance action began the third ph~se of 

the Topeka school system since Brown I. At the elementary level, 

HEW cited unequa~ facilities for minority and white children as 

well as "student racial compositions not consonant with a unitary 

plan. " Five elementary schools were specific~l y listed as having 

"substantially disproportionate minority student 6ompositions 

clearly the result of a former dual pattern of operation." At the 

secondary level, HEW found that the junior high ·schools attended 

by most minority students were inferior in facilities to those 

schools attended largel~ by whi~e students. In addition, the 

district's transfer plan was criticized.69 The Board denied that 

the district was in noncompliance and obtained an injunction 

against further HEW .adminis.trative proceedings •. Nevertheless, the 

Board agreed to take "administrative steps to _assure a. more 

perfect unitary school distiict."70 It developed and implemented 

two plans largely approved oy HEW. 

These plans had some success. At the end of the 

reorganization, there were no 90+% minority elementary schools, 

the attendance boundaries of two 90+% white schools had been 

69 

70 

Rec., vol. ·v, at 12-14. 

Rec., val. XII, at 2485-91; rec., ex. vol. V, at 245-47 . 

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redrawn so that they were no longer one-race, and a third one-race 

white school had been closed. At the secondary level, t~o heavily 

minor"ity and one pr.i.marily white junior high school had been 

closed, although the minority population of one other junior nigh 

school had risen significantly as a result of the reorganization. 

The school district's de~egregation indices for elementary schools 

dropped significantly between 1975 and 1981.71 

Some of this decline, however, was the result of the movement 

of minorities into the western part of the school district. 

Outing the same six-year period, three additional elementary 

schools rose above the 10% minority level solely b~cause of this 

~em~graphic change.j~ This movement has continued. In 1985, t~o 

additional elementary schools were just barely no longer one-rade 

for that reason. 73 

The defendants' experts,· Dr •. Clark, see, ~ rec., vo.l. XI, 

at. 2338-39, and Dr. Armour, ~, ~' rec., vol. XII I, at 2579, 

71 Topeka's dissimilarity .index for elementary schools dropped 

from 62.1 in 1955 to 51.6 in 1975, a drop of approximately 10 . points. In 1981 . the index ·stood at 40.8. Topeka's relative 

exposure index for elementary schools fell from 47.7 in 1955 to 

27.1 i n 1975, and further to 17.2 in 1981. These drops indica te 

that the school system as a whole was becoming less segregated. 

Rec.; ex. vol. II, at 156-57. 

72 Student Tables~ 1975, 1981; compare rec., ex. vol. I, at 48-B 

(1974 map) with id. at 49-A (1979 map; .no change to Bishop, 

Avondale West, or Lundgren). 

73 Student Tables, 1985 (McEachron and Whitson). 

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the district court, ~ 671 F.Supp. at 1302-03, 1310, and the 

dissent, see, ~' dissent at 112, 114-15, 117, 120 , all 

mistakenly believe .that the changing demographics which resulted 

in unfavor-.able racial balances at various schools excuses the 

school board from achieving more acceptable racial balances. This 

view is clearly wrong where,· as here, the school system ·is under 

an affirmative duty to dismantle a ~ual school system. "Until a 

unitary system is created, a school system is not absolved from 

this duty by re~son of demographic changes." Vaughni v. Board of 

Educ., 758 F.2d at 988; see also, Lee v. Macon County Bd. of 

Educ., 616 F.2d 805, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. Tasby v. Wright, 

713 F.2d at 91 n. 3, 93 -(school districts • white population was 

58.2% when lawsuit filed in 1970 and dropped to 29.53t by 1981·; 

school district hot yet unitary). It is only , 

"(w]hen ~tate officials have n6t only made good-faith 

efforts to eliminate the vestiges of segregation, but 

have actually achieved a school system clean of every _residue of past official discrimination, [that) 

i romutaqle geographic factors and post-desegregation 

demographic changes that prevent the homogenation of all 

student bodies do not bar judicial recognition that the 

school system is_unitary." 

Ross~. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d at 225. The school 

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district's excuse for the racial imbalance which exists today in 

Topeka's schools is that shifting residential patterns caused the 

problem. That is an unacceptable excuse when the school district 

has never fully dismantled the effects of the prior de jure 

segregation. 

Other changes that took place in Topekafrom the m'id-70s to 

the date of trial are as follows: elections to the Board were 

changed in 1976 to ensure that all ~arts of the city were fairly 

represented; the Board has now, and has had for some time, 

signific~nt minority representation;. in 1981, the district 

abandoned a ~lightly segregative majority-to-minority transfer 

policy for a · ·transfer policy that is slightly desegregative; in 

1984, .while this trial·was pending, a black superintendent was 

appointed; and, five days before the beginning of trial, the 

district ac;iopted an ·expl_icit policy against discrimination in 

faculty a~d s·taff. assignment. 74 These changes are deliberate and 

voluntary actions on the part of the school district, and · 

co~stit~te evidence ih~t the district is, as it ~laims, now 

committed to desegregation.75 

74 Rec., vol. XII, at 2473-75. 

75 Plaintiffs point to the school board's refusal to adopt two 

desegregative reorganization plans proposed in 1984 by the Topeka 

school administration as. evidence that the district is not 

presently committed to desegregation.-· These plans were violent ly 

opposed by minorities and whites alike because they would have 

destroyed the neighborhood school system, and we do not believe 

that the failure to adopt them reflects a current lack of 

commitment to desegregation. Nevertheless, the proposal of plans 

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There is no doubt that . the Topeka school system has improved 

dramatically in the l~t ten years as far as desegregation is 

concerned. However, the system was equally undoubtedly in need of 

such improvement. The question now is whether these changes ~roke 

the causal link between t~e system that existed prior to them and 

the current system. Based on our review .of the record, we have a 

definite and firm conviction that they did not. Approximately one 

quarter of Topeka•s minority elementary students still attend 

three schools more than 50% minority,. two of which have fallen 

into this·category since at least 1966. One-race whit~ schools 

.have existed throughout the relevant period; many remain, and 

·thos~ . that are no ·loriger within the 90+% white. range are still 

heavily white schools. Most of the.reorganization took place in 

the center of the school districtt the schools on tbe periphery --

the ·ones most clearly marked as m~nority or white schools-- were . 

largely unaffected. The distribution ~f faculty/staff has 

improved, but in 1985 there was still one school with no minority 

facu lty/staff and eight schools with only one full- or part~time 

minority faculty/staff person, who may or may not be ·a teacher or 

other p~ofessional, and these schools are those same schools that 

have lacked minority faculty/staff since the 1960s. This is a 

system improved,. but it is still the same system. 

described as completely unworkable by a then-member of the Board 

does not satisfy the district's duty to desegregate ~ts schools. 

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b. Individual Factors 

Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968), 

identified faculty, statf transportation, extracurricular affairs, 

and facilities as facets of school operations that must b~ 

considered in determining racial identifiability of schoo~s. 

Swann added student attendance, ~chooL siting, opening and · 

closing, and the drawing of attendance boundaries as factors to be 

weighed. Swann, 402 U.S. at 25-29. The district court made 

detailed findi ngs as to most of these. We discuss below those 

factors that most clearly ~emonstrate the continuing 9ausal link 

between past and present segregation. 

i. Student assignment over time 

We begin by considering ·the ~ubsequent hi story of the schools 

·in existence at the time of Brown· II. No real pat~ern emerges. 

Seventeen elementary schools have more or less.maintained the same 

racial identity for the la~t twenty years, wh ile nine have 

changed. For the most part, the ~ajor shifts -in student · 

attendance mandated by the school district have had relatively 

little effect, although there has been some improvement in·the 

last ten year~. 76 Nevertheless, the record convinces us that the 

76 Two elementary schools with more than 80% minority students 

were closed (Monroe 1975, Parkdale 1978} and the target minority 

percentages approved by HEW in 1976 have either been met or 

improved on. Compare rec., ex. vol. V, at 37 (projected 

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causa! connection between the Topeka school system in 1955 and the 

same system in 1985 has not been broken. The school district has 

unquestionably had the opportunity to draw up and execute a scheme 

designed to lea.d to comprehensive desegregation. Moreover, Topeka 

does not have ' the kind of geographical barriers that have 

sometimes frustrated d.esegration plans. 77 . Its minority population 

is spread over half the city, not concentrated in hard-to-reach 

enclaves. 78 It has altered the attendance boundaries of almost 

every school and closed many o~ them; it has in place a slightly 

desegregative transfer plan that _potentially could he significant; 

and it has apparently faced little or no racially-motivated 

opposition from the community.79 Nonetheless, there is, we 

enrollments of elementary sch9ols under plan designed to satisfy 

HEW) with Student Tabies, 1985. It should be nbted that HEW did 

not; approve .the projected enrollments of more than 70% minority 

for Lafayette and· Belvoir under the plan cited .above. Rec., ex. 

vol. II, at 173. In the last five years, minority en~ollments have 

increased in ·the primarily white schools, bringing them to~ards or 

over 10% minority, .while the percentagB of minority students at 

disproportionately minority schools has remained steady or dropped 

slightly. Student Tables, 1980-1985. The difference between 

schools that are more heavily minority and those that are 

primarily white have thus been narrowing. 

77 Cf. Stout v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 537 F.2d 800 

(5th Cir. 1976) (mountain range and dangerous roads). 

78 Cf. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 320 (lst Gir. 1987} 

(racially identifiable schools in heavily .black ~reas or cut off . by harbor); Ross v. Houston Indep• School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 224 

(5th Cir. 1983) (Segregated schools located at opposite ends of 

large urban school district). 

79 We do not mean to suggest that the school district has not 

faced opposition on .other grounds. Both . the r.eorgani za t ion of the 

late 1970s and two plans proposed in 198• for further 

reorganization were met by community resistance. Rec., vol. XIII, 

at 2437-38. 

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repeat, no pattern to the changes over the years. There should 

have been one. We simply see no evidence that Topeka dedicated 

itself to.desegregation prior to the reopenirig of this case.ao 

Although former members of the Board testified that they did not 

vote for plans with segregative eff~cts, they did not testify that 

they r egularly took desegregation conc~rns into account.B1 The 

reaction of at least one Board member to the white flight of the 

1950s and. 1960s was "What could we do? · We can't make people not 

move, no way." 82 After hearing the testi mony of the Board 

members, the district court commented, "I am not interested in 

just any intentional acts that would hinder integration. I am 

~lso w6nd~ring if there is any action taken by this school board 

and past school boards to promote tha~ integration, rather than 

hinder. [A]re we going to get to this ••. ?" Rec., vel. 

XII,. at 2534. This perceptive question focused on precisely what 

is missing trom .the school district's evidence. By no ~tretch of 

imagination can the school district's cbnduct be characterized as 

acting "with all deliberate speed•' to "convert to a unitary system 

80 · Cf. Tasby v~ Wright, 713 F •. 2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1983); Ross, 

699 F.2d at 222. 

81 Rec., vel. XII, at 2418 (Board member 1957-1965: no 

discussions on segregative or desegregative effects of actions); 

rec., vel. XII, at 2440-41 (Board member 1977-1985: Board voted 

for open enrollment plan although warned it might have segrega tive 

effect); rec., vol. XII, at 2491 (Board member 1973-1977: Board 

resisted HEW e~fo~ts because i~ considered system uni tary then). 

82 Rec., vol. XII, at 2423. 

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in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and 

branch •. " 83 

We do not ignore the changes made to the school system in the 

la~e 1970s. In our view, however, the effect of these changes was 

to make a system that.was highly segr-egated ·as to student 

assignment into a system that is still segregated; although 

somewhat less so. 

ii . Faculty/staff assignment over time 

Plaintiffs do not dispute the district court's finding that 

the hiring of minority faculty and staff is not now 

discriminatory. 671 F. Supp. at· 1304. They do chall~nge the 

court's conclusion with respect to the assignment of faculty and 

staff. ·· They point ·out that the court in ·fact found that the 

as~ignment of faculty/st~ff is disproportibnate, and they argue 

that this disproportion, and its consistenc~ over time, is "one of 

the classic indices of a segregated school system." Brief for 

Piaintiffs-Appellants at 38. They criticize the district court 

for having unduly minimized the import of this evidence of · 

se9r~gation. 

83 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301; Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38. 

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For example, while it is true that al~ of the district's 

schools have been within 10% of the average percentage minority 

facultyfst'clff at least onc'E! ·in the last ten years, 671 F.: Supp-. at 

1305, that statement is misleading ·considering that the percentage 

of minority faculty/staff in the system as a whole has ranged only 

from 9.9% to 16% in the last ten years at the ~lementary level· and 

is currently about 11%. Thus, in 1975~ when the average 

percentage was 9.9%, schools with no ~inority faculty or staff 

were still technically within 10% of the average. The 10% oncein-ten-years standard includes both McEachron, which had no 

minority faculty/staff for riine of the . l3 years for which such 

statistics have been kept and in the last three years has had only 

one ~inority faculty/staff member out of approximately 25, and . 

Lowman Hill, .which has never · had less .than. 15% and has· once had 

more than 30% minority faculty/staff during the same time period·. 

Furt~ermore, ~hile it. is ~~ue, as the district cou~t noted, that . 

the p·ercentage of minority faculty/staff assignment has · not 

. . 

invariably tracked the percentage of minority students, there is 

nevertheless a distinct pattern of correlation. McClure, f6r · 

example, which has had more than 5% minority students only in 1979 

and 1985, has had no minority faculty/staff since 1979, while 

Avondale East, which has generally had minority student 

percentages in the 30s and 40s has also generally had minority 

faculty/staff percentages in the 20s and 30s. Finally, because . 

our data does not distinguish between faculty and staff, and 

because minority employees are more heavily represented as staff 

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than as faculty, it is quite possible that the one minority 

faculty/staff pe&son at McEachron, for instance, is a janitorial 

.. staff. person or other service worker rather than a teacher or 

other piofessional role model. 

The long-standing-pattern of imbalances coupled with the 

tracking .of student assignment percentages is strong evidence of a 

dual system because, as pointed out above, faculty/staff 

assignment is far less difficult to adjust t~an a factor such as 

student assignment. While the ratio of minority faculty/sta ff in 

schools ·with different levels of minority students has improved 

over the twelve ye~rs that records have been kept, that 

~mprovement al6ne does not alter the pattern. It merely makes it 

less dramatic. · 

There is one area in which the Topeka school system is 

clearly desegregated. Minorities are well~represented, indeed 

statistically over-represented, at the managerial level. Several 

principals are minorities, a• is the current supe~intendent. This 

is both laudable in itself and an indication that whatever bias 

lingers in the assignment of faculty/staff is not deliberate. 

Nevertheless, although there has been improvement in this area, 

racial disparity does in fact linger because the school district 

has not consciousl:'y addressed the p.r.oblem. 84 Inertia has thus· led 

84 According to Dr. Foster, the sch6ol district administrator in 

charge of personnel for 1984.stated in a deposition that he had 

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to the maintenance, .albeit in less striking for~, of a system that 

has kept white faculty at primarily white schools and minority 

faculty at predominantly minority schools. 

iii. Attendance boundaries and how {not) changed 

At tendance boundaries determine the neighborhoods from which 

neighborhood schools draw their students. They can · be used as an 

important tool in eithe~ imposing or undoing segregation under an 

ostensibly race-neutral neighborhood school policy. We do not 

~isagree with the district court's findin~ that attendance 

boundaries have not been drawn in recent years with racial animus. 

In the past, however, the ·school district drew boundaries with 

significantly segr~gative effects, although for _ the most part it 

avoided obvious gerrymandering. Many of the schools affected by 

segregative boundary changes were subs~quently closed, and other 

schools lost their status as predominantly minority "schools 

bordered by schools with much lowe r percentages of minority 

students when minorities moved into the residential areas of the 

bordering schools. 

11 no knowledge of ·an assignment policy regarding assignment of · minority personnel.'' Rec., vol. v, at 6a2. The school district 

does not deny that there was no policy directed expressly at 

assignment. Instead, it claims that its 1963 policy against 

discrimination in recruitment was broad enough to cover 

assignment. Rec., vol. X~ at 1517; rec., vol. XII, at 2428-29; 

rec., vol • . XIIi at 2692-99; .rec., ex. vol. II, at 58-59: rec., ex. 

vol, IV, at 217-19. 

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A number of existing schools do have peculiar-looking 

attendance boundaries. Randolph .has an arm jutting· out to the 

e~st. Stout and Quinton Heighfs both include areas to the north 

and east some ·distance away from the school building. In the case 

of Randolph and Stout, the extensions have a desegregative effect. 

The reverse is true of Quinton Heights' current boundaries. See 

infra Part V B(2)(c)(v}. As far as the record reflects, the 

current boundaries of Randolph and Stout are the only examples 

that Topeka has manipula~ed attendance boundaries in order to 

desegregate. Again, when it altered attendance .bounda ries the 

school board failed to use the opportunity i n most instances to 

further desegregation, despite its affirmative duty to do so. 

As the district court acknowledged, the most serious example 

of segregative attendance boundaries is Lowman Hill. Lowman 

Hill's attendance area is a .more or less square area with the 

school located in the center. Plaintiffs point out. that this area 

includes, and has included for the last 25 years, · two areas of 

heavy minority population. These areas are now part of a general 

central Topeka minority population, but were relatively isolated 

when Lowman Hill's b~undaries were first drawn to include them. 

Within the last ten years, three elementary schools bordering the 

Lowman Hill area, one with a minority stud~nt percentage 

significantly lower than ·Lowman Hill's, have close.ct. 85 The 

85 Clay closed in 1975. At the time, Clay had approximately 25% 

minority students while Lowman Hill had approx imately 45%. Rec., 

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closings did not affect bhe minority student percentage at Lowman 

Hill. It remains a school with a heavy minority percentage 

bordered by schools with much lower minority percentages. It also 

remains the school whose attendance boundaries include the only 

significant group of minority population in the northwestern 

9uarter of the school district. See infra Part VI B(2)(c){vi). 

The history of Lafayette .is similar although not as extreme. 

The border between Lafayette and State Street, t he school to 

Lafayette's north, has functioned as the boundary between the 

mostly white ~rea ~erved by Stat~ Street and th~ school to its 

north and the heavily minority area served by Lafayette and the 

schools to its ~outh and southwest. Lafayette has long had twice 

the minority population of State Street; thus, since 1966, 

Lafayette's minority population has ranged from 2% t o 69% wh ile 

State Street's ·has ranged from 27% to 34%.~6 See . infra Part .VI. 

B(2}(c)(iv). 

While the . boundaries of· Loman Hill and Lafayette are 

consistent with a neighborhood school policy, as held by the 

district court, the original decisions to draw them to include t he 

black population of· the area had a segregativ~ effect. which the 

·school district has never undone. The school district may not 

vol. III, at 282-83. Student Tables, 1975. Polk ' closed in 1919, 

and Central Park in 1980. Rec., vol. III, at 290-92. 

86 Student Tables, 1966-1985. 

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draw segregative attendance boundaries, maintain them for decades, 

and then take shelter behind the neutrality of its recent 

inaction. see Swann, 402 u.s. at 21. 

iv. Location of .new schools 

All of the elementary schools and all but one of the 

secondary schools opened by the school district since Brown II 

were built in the white outer part of the district. Robinson 

middle school, which_ serves th~ central part of Topeka, is the 

sole exception. Furthermo.re, ma_ny of these schools were built 

near to the edges of the district. Plaintiffs· criticize both the 

location of these schools and the fact·that the~ opened at ~11. 

With respect to the location, they _argue that Topeka deliberately 

placed new schools as far as possible from minority residential 

areas in order to ~olarize t~e diittict ·into white outer and 

minority inne~ schools. With respect to th~ new schools 

themselves, they argue that Topeka should have taken advantage .of 

the underutilized inner schoolsi that is, that Topeka should have 

voluntarily bused white children from outer Topeka to the inner . 

city schools instead of putting up new buildings. 

·Almost all of the-building in question took place in the late 

1950s and early 1960s, before the Supreme Court made clear that 

prior de jure school districts must do more than operate a neutra l 

system. Green, 391 u.s. 430. Moreover, the city was annexing new 

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territory during that time~ a matter beyond the control of the 

school district, and it is not entirely unreasonabl e for the 

district to build SchOols "where the children are.•• Nevertheless, 

the erection of so many schools devoted to educating white 

children had a significant segregative effect on the district. 

See i nfra Part V B(2)(a}(i). While the building of new school s t o 

accommodate an influ~ of white children arguably had a legitimate 

basis at the time, the school district did nothing to diminish the 

.segregative effect of those schools, . even after it became clear 

that school districts under an unfulfilled duty to desegregate 

must do more than operate a · facially neutral neighborhood school · 

system. · As we have said,. neighborhood school plans are 

permissible if they are effective in .actually reduci ng 

segregation. School openings and locations are a crucial variable 

in such plans. Swann, 402 . U.S. at 20-21. In Topeka, school 

openings under the neighborhood school plan in fac t work~d · to . 

increase segregation. A.school district conscious of its 

constitutional duty would have attempted to counteract that 

effect. See Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District, 733 F.2d 

660, 667-69 l9th Cir. 1984) (en. banc), cert. denied; 471 ·u.s. 1065 

(1985). Topeka did nothing. 

v • . School closings 

In contrast to school openings, the majority of school 

closings took place in the central and ~iddle parts of Topek~. 

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-Like school openings, this pattern was -dictated largely by the 

population shift to the outer part of the school district. 

Plaintiffs do not contend that schools were closed for .any other 

reason, or that the impact of the closings was borne primarily by · 

minority students. They focus instead on the effect of school 

closings, primarily on the opportunity closings provided for more 

equitably distributing. students to other schools. They contend 

that school cl9sings of highly ·segregated schools were not 

desegregative in pr~ctice because the school district simply 

reassigned the students at _those schools en masse t o a nearby 

school which then took over the •egregated status of the school 

closed. The evidence supports this contention for the 1950s and 

1960s. Although most of .the receiving schools remained .schools 

with a majority o·f white st'udents, plaintiffs arg.ue that these 

reassignments served to identify the schools to which the school 

distr~ct . would subsequently ·channel minority students. School 

closings in the 1970s and beyond had less segregated effects. I n 

this decade, the effects of closings have been mixed . A few 

scho61 closings were desegregative. These l~ter closings have not 

completely undone the effect of the earlier closings, however. On 

the whole, most school closings in the 1970s cannot be said to be 

either segregative or desegregative. 

In sum, although the hiring of minority faculty and staff 

became nondiscriminatory, and evei included significant 

representation .of minorities .in management, the district 

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neve r theless-maintained racial imbalance in the assignment of 

faculty and. staff. In addition, the location of new schools 

intensified the system's dual nature. Th~ drawing of attendance 

boundaries and other means of reassigning students were rarely 

used to desegregate. The closing of schools is the most 

significant desegregative device Topeka utilized. Even here, it 

is only in a few cases that a closing can unqualifiedly be 

characterized as desegregative. As we stated earlier, Topeka 

notably failed to focus its efforts on the complete eradication of 

the effects of prior segregation. 

c. Individual schools 

The dissent· spends a great deal of time attacking our 

analyses of individual schools. Th~ main point of that attack · is 

that the increasiqg minority percentages for these schools 

resulted from demographics, not from school board actions. As w~ 

have previously stated, however, a school district is not absolved 

by de~ographics from its affirmative duty to desegregate before it 

achieves unitariness. See supra at 58-60. 

Plaintiffs describe the history of the school district as one 

of targeting certain schools as minority. According to 

plaintiffs, w~ile the identity of those schools shif ts as 

population moves, the district as a whole is always· polarized into 

schools with clear racial identities. · We therefore. consider what 

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the district did and did not do with respect to individual 

schools. 

i~ Belvoir elementary school 

Belvoir is and has been since the 19~0s ·a school with one of 

the highest minority populations in the district. The school was 

annexed in the late 1950s and lies on the eastern edge of the 

current· district boundary. Two federal housing projects were 

built within its attendance area in 1963 and 1965. Since 1966, . . 

its student population has never been _less than 50% mlnority . 87 

It .is located in •n area of minority population that. was botdered 

by white populations to the north and south and a minority 

population to the west when the school was annexed. The bordering 

areas are now all areas with substantial minority populations. 

Belvoir•s Boundaries were once alter~d to take in part of the 

attendance areas of a school that was closed. That closing did 

have a modest desegregative effect at Belvoir, but it did: not 

change Belvoir•s ~tatus as the school with the highest minority 

percentage in the system. Althorigh it is no longer surrounded"by 

schools with markedly lower minority percen~ages, it remains an 

east-side minority school as opposed to the ·west-side white 

87 Student Tables, 1966-1985. 

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. schools. It cannot be said ·that the neighborhood school plan has 

been effective in desegrega~ing Belvoir. 

ii. Hudson elementary school 

The school district built Hudson in 1963 in n~w1y annexed 

territo~y. ~t is on the so~theastern e~ge of the district and 

opened as a primarily white schciol. While th~ passage of time has 

dissipated Hudson's ~dentity as a white school, this change is due 

solely to the spread of minqrities ·into its attendance area, riot 

to any action by the school district. The school was 46.55% . 

minority in 1985~76. Rec., ex. vol. IV at 171. 

iii. Highland Park North elementary school 

Highla.m1 Park North was annexed to t·he school district in the 

late 1950s. Its percentage of minority students has risen 

significantly over the years: 21.6% in 1966·, 42.1% in 1975, and 

57.9 % in 1985. This rise was paralleled by a shift in the 

surrounding residential population from primarily white to heavily 

minority·. This shift is cparacteristic of the eastern part of the 

city, where Highland Park North is located. The only significant 

action the school district took with respect to Highland Park 

·North was to-assign it Parkdale students when that school closed. 

This reassignment increased Highland Park North's minority 

percentage at a .time when it was ~!ready high. ·. 

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iv. Lafayette elementary school 

Lafayette was a white school in the Topeka school system at 

the time of Brown I. It was 13.7% black at the end of the fourstep .plan in 1956. Federally subsidized housing projects were 

built in Lafayette's area in 1961 and 1962. By 1966, the school 

was 54.5% minority (26.1% black). The school was then a 

transition school between Parkdale elementary school to the 

southwest, with 85% minority students, and Sumner, . State Street, 

and Rice elementary schools to the north and east, with 12.3%, 

27.5% and 3% minority studen~s~ respectively. Belvoir, to the 

south; had app~oximately the sam~ percentage of minority students. 

Lafayette has remained 55-65% minority (25-50% black). In 1985, 

Lafayette was 56.8% minority .(41.4% black)! It remains a 

transition school between schools with higher minor-ity percentages 

to the· south and lower percentages to the north and west. 

The closing of . three schools affected Lafayette's boundaries. 

We have insufficient information to evaluate one closing, in the 

1960s, and the other two closings had negligible effects on 

Lafayette's minority percentages. Under its neighborhood school 

plan, the school district simply maintained Lafayette as a school 

with disproporti~nate minority percentages. 

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. v. Quinton Heights elementary school 

Quinton Heights was a white school at the central southern 

part of the school district in the 1950s • . At the end of the fourstep desegregation plan it was 7.3% black • . - In 19.59, Pierce, an 

annexed black school, and in 1964, Van Bure.n, a formerly all-white 

school, were closed and some of their students sent to Quinton 

Heights. Quinton Heights' . attendance boundary was extended to the 

north as a r~sult.ss · By 1966, its minority student percentage was 

36.4%. It was bordered by heavily minority Monroe elementary 

s~hool to the northeast and otherwise by primarily white schools, 

including schools to the south annexed in the late 1950s. 

Plaintiffs characterize the reassignments in the 1960s as 

part of a process of focusing Quinton Heights as a school for 

black st.udents. In 1966, Quinton Heights' minority student 

percentage was seventh highest out qf thi rty-five elementary 

schools, and its minority population bordered two schools with 

much lower minority percentages · ccentral Park, with 15.5%, and 

Polk, with 11.5%). Indeed, on the maps available to us, it is 

quite noticeable that Polk's ·boundaries in 1970 correspond clos~ly 

88 Rec. , vol. I I I, 

Quinton ·Heights when 

people at the time. 

Quinton Heights into 

was closed, however. 

at 249-51, 254-55. The area assigned to 

Van Buren closed was apparently empty of 

The school district had already extended 

Van Buren's attendance area before Van Buren 

Rec., vol. III, at 251~53. 

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to a .patch of white population surrounded by minority population 

assigned to other schools, including Quinton Heights.89 

Two adjacent schools were closed during the 1970s. Each 

tim~, Quinton Heights' boundary was extended northwards. It is 

thus clear that Quinton HeLghts' current boundaries are the result 

of continued manipulation by the school district. They extend far 

into minority· areas to the north and east ot the school ·building 

and cross many natural barriers.90 Quinton Heights is a 

"neighborhood" school ~:mly in the sense that some of its. students 

do .·live in the immediate area of the school buiding. Most do not. 

Quinton Heights is entirely the pr9duct of the school district's 

actions; as such~ the district ~a~ not disclaifu responsibility for 

the makeup of ·the students who a~tend it. 

vi. LowmaJ1. Hill elementa·ry school 

Lowman Hill was a white school in the pre-Brown Topeka school 

system. It had 17.4% black students at the end of the four-step 

plan in . l956. During the next decade a number of small 

adjustments were made to optional attendance zones around the 

school. Plaintiffs describe these adjustments as a process of 

drawing Lowman Hill's boundaries to include as many black and as 

89 Rec., vol. I, at 48. 

90 Rec., vol. III, at 291-92, rec., vol. X, at 1536, 

vol. V, at 227. 

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few white students as possible. In ··1959, an .all-black school, 

Buchanan, was closed and its students sent to Lowman Hill. By 

1966, Lowman Hill was 49.6% minority. The minority percentage at 

the five surrounding schools ranged from .• 2~ to .l5.6%. It is 

noticeable on the ma~s in the record that in 1970 Lowman Hill's 

boundaries included the ~nly two significant areas of minority 

population in that part of Topeka.91 

Lowman Hill 1 s minority student percentage has ranged in the 

40s since th~t time, dipping briefly into .the high 30s in the 

early 1980s. It was not affected in any significant way by the 

reassignment of students due to the closing of neighboring'Clay 

elementary school in 1975 and Polk in 1979; while its boundaries 

expanded somewhat,. the student population it acquired was 

apparently of the same makeup as its existing population. Thus, 

the history of Lowman Hill is ·that the ·boundaries drawn in the 

1950s and 1960s largely remain, as do their effects. Lowman Hill 

still has a significantly higher minority student percentage than 

its neighbors, although the ~isparity between them is less (in 

1985, Lowman Hill was· 41.9% minority while its four neighbors 

ranged from 7.7% to 31.5%). The school ap~ears to have been 

designed and maintained as a school with a concentration of 

minority students. At best, it has been neglected in recent 

decades. See infra.Part V B(2)(b)(iii). 

91 Rec., ex. vol. I, ·at 48. 

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vii. Predominantly white schools 

Eight elementarr schools were at time of trial and have been 

during the course of this litigation ·primarily white school~.92 

Even in . l985 , only three of these schools -crossed the 10% min i mum 

that the school districtis expert proposed, and did so only just 

barely.93 The schools are in or near the western part of the 

district. Similarly, at the time of trial two ·middle schools and 

one high school -- one-third of the secondary school system --

were, and had been since they opened, primarily white schools. 

They too are in the western part of Topeka. 

Plaintiffs focus on Topeka West High School as the 

quintessential example of deliberate channeling of white students 

to schools in the western ·part of the school district. The school 

was opened in 1961 six blocks from the western edge of the school 

district, the part of the district most distant from centers of 

minority population. Consequently, it was then and remains now a 

school with more than 90% white students, while the percentage of 

minority.students at the other two high schools has been higher 

than -average. Little evidence was introduced on the other white 

92 The schoois are Bishop, Crestvie~, Gage, McCarter, McClure, 

McEachron, Potwin, and Whitson . 

93 Bishop was 10.5% minority, McEachron was 10.3% minority, and 

Whitson was 10.2% minority. 

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schools that has not already .been discussed elsewhere. See infra 

Part v B(2)(b)(iv). To summarize, these schools were either 

annexed or built by the school district iri .the late 1950s and 

early 1960s. Th~y 6pened as white schools with white faculty/ 

staff and have largely remained so. The school district offered 

no evidence that it had ever attempted to eliminate these schools' 

identity as schools for ' white children. 

3. Maximum Practicable Desegregation in Topeka 

We look ·at last away from what has · be.en done and what should 

have been done to what can still be done. The feasibility of 

further measures was not a foc~s of _the case, and there was little 

evidence on the ques~ion. ~he district· court explicitiy fo~nd 

that "[a]t any time, more could have been done to achiev~ racial 

balance in the schools . 11 Other courts that have found. scho.ol 

systems to be unitary have · specifically found that additional 

desegregation was impracticable.94 Similarly, courts have refused 

to find school system~ unitary where greater ·integration is 

achievable.9 5 

94 See, ~' Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 323 ("little more cart 

be done to integrate these schools given the available numbers of 

white students"); Ross v. Housto~ Indep. Sch. Dist., 699. F.2d a t . 229 (district court concluded that further measures woUld be 

impractical). 

9S See,~' United States v. Lawrence County School Dist., 799 

F·. 2d at 1047 ( 11 greater balance of students by race achievable"). 

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.It is apparent from this record ·that further desegretation in 

Topeka is not constrained by geographic obstacles as in some othercities.96 Furthermore, out of the panoply of desegregation tool s 

that have been developed, Topeka at present_apparently uses only 

one: its minimally effective majority-to-minority transfer plan. 

·we have no reason to think that Topeka has exhausted the 

repertoire available for desegregating schools. For example, it 

has failed to try magnet schools or to aggressively encourage 

. voluntary transfers to improv~ racial balance.9 7 

96 Cf. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1987). (harbour 

and concentration of black ·population in certain districts); Stout 

v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 537 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1976) 

(mountain range and dangerous roads). 

97 In this regard, the district court questioned defendants' 

expert Dr • Armou·r · about these·· poss i b i 1 it i es • The quest 1ons and 

answers are instructive: · 

"THE COURT: . . 

"Let me ask you a layman • s question her.e. Say we 

have .a school that has a 55 percent minority or 60 

percent minority, and we want to change that situation, 

and try to get it down below 50 percent minority. Has 

there been any experience in anything that you have ' run 

into where they have gone into what you might call a 

voluntary busing program where you would ask t~e people 

in that co~unity voluntarily ' to come forward, and allow 

their children to go to another area to try to redress 

the racial -- have you had any experience on that, or do 

you know of any experiences on that, or is that fanciful 

to think that that might happen? 

THE WITNESS: Not at all. In fact .that can be 

done. It can be done w.ithout the mandatory assignment, 

and has been done in many school districts, in fact wi t h 

schools a lot. more imba-lanced than 55 percent minority. 

What you try to do in those cases is two-fold. 

One, you have an M to M program usually with 

transportation provided. You really encourage and do a 

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Indeed, there is every reason to believe that further 

desegregation in Topeka is feasible. The present commitment of 

the school board and district administration, the already 

widespread distribution of minorities, and the expected continued 

movement of minorities into western Topeka should make the course 

of further desegregation relatively smooth. 

It was suggested ·at trial that further desegregation is, in . 

effect7 not worth the trouble. Under questioning from counsel for 

the ·state Board of Education, plaintiffs' expert Foster admitted 

lot of publicity and a ·lot of encour~g~ment of the 

minority transfers out of that school, so that helps by 

reducing the minority population because they will 

ftequently -- min~rity students will frequently, given 

the incentives, transfer out of that school to a 

predominantly white school in_a different part of the 

district. · 

Other (sic] thing .you do in a school like that 

generally that is successful is you put a special 

program in a magnet, pall them a magnet program. White 

parents or white students will generally not transfer 

out of a predominantly·· white area. neighborhood school 

into a school that is predominantly minority without an 

academic incentive, usually because they unlike some of 

the minority parents they feel their school is doing a 

fine job. So you will need to offer an attractive 

program. We have learned that computer science magnets, 

business, health professions. Depending upon the grade level~ there are programs that are very attractive to 

white parents, and will ·actually induce them to transfer 

into that school. · 

The combination of those two can frequently bring a 

school into the composition that you want." 

Rec., vol. X~I, at 2638-39 (emphasis added). 

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that in the 1985 school year the movement of only 265 elementary 

students, . or 3~ of all elementary ~~udents, a~d 77 secondary 

students, or 1.2% of all secondary students~ would have been 

. sufficient to bring all of Topeka's schools into plaintiffs' 15+/-

% range. Dr. Foster pointed out that this figure was arrived at· 

by simply removing students from schools outside the· 15+/-% range, 

without analyzing where they would go or· which students would take 

their place. The actual movement of students would thus be more 

complex and burdensome than the numbers .suggest. Dr. Foster aiso . . . . . 

pointed out that such an approach would move schools now just 

beyond the 15% range to just within it, an improvement he did not 

find greatly desegregative as it would preserve ·the existence of . 

schools differing by 30% in their minority percentage and thus 

stil~ marked as minority or white schools.98 A similar analysis 

was performed with respect to facultyistaff.99 

The exercise above is illuminat.ing in a number of respects. 

First, it indicates again ·that the desegregation plan which must 

be developed may not be too burdensome, a circumstance for which 

all can be thankful. Second, it reminds us of the dangers of 

focusi.ng on numbers alone. Although numbers are usually the focus 

98 Rec., ·vol . VI, at 794-801. 

99 The faculty/sta.ff ·analysis was performed for l-981, the only 

year for which there is faculty-alone data. Dr. Foster concluded 

that the movement of 25 faculty/staff, or approximately 3% of 

total faculty/staff, would satisfy plaintiffs' formula. This 25 

includes the movement both out of and into schools.· Rec., vol. V, 

at 663-64; rec., vol. VI, at 764-67, 773-74. 

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of .desegregation plans, racial balance in itself is not the goal. 

The goal is to wipe ·.out the effects of prior segregation. Setting 

target ranges is one means to that goal. It is clearly not the 

only one. Furthermore, as w.e have emphasized, schools are not 

rac ially identifiable by student and faculty assignment alone. 

The lack of evidence or any attempt ·to argue t·hat further· 

des~gregation i$ impracticable is perhaps the largest flaw in the 

school district's case. When the law requires the maximum 

desegregation reasonably feasible, and evidence suggests that more . 

can .be done, unitariness must await the implementation of those 

further steps. · When it can be said that Topeka can do no mor·e to 

e~adicate the . effects of. past segregation and segregati ve acts, 

the Topeka school system may be declared legally unitary.· 

c; Conclusion on Unitariness 

After rev~ewing the record, we have concluded that there is a 

.current condition . of segregation in Topeka. Contrary to the 

distri ct court, we are convinced that this condition i s causa lly 

connected to the prior de jure system of segregation. This causal 

connection for the most part does not stem from active promotion 

of segregation. Topeka has generally heeded the prohibition 

_against this form of discrimination. 

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Our basic disagreement with the district court is centered 

around the .fact that the duty to desegregate requires more. Wha t 

Topeka did not do is actively strive to dismantle the system that 

existed. It opened and closed schools with little or no thought 

given to the. effect of such actions on segr~gation,· and observed 

the segregative or desegregative effects of such .actions with 

indifference. Even those school board decisions that had some 

desegregative effect were not carried out in such a manner as to 

disestablish the dual system. For example, rather than integrate 

the f9rmer de jure black schools, Topeka gradually closed them . 

Their students were then reassigned virtually en mass~ to other 

schools, which then took on the same minority-school identity. 

The shifting distribution of Topekans throughout the city 

sometimes hindered, sometimes aided, the cause of desegregation, 

but the school di~i~{ct iought nei~h~r to reduce the im~act of the 

former nor to encourage the effects of the latier. I.t simply . 

administered the system, with due regard for economic efficiency 

and the quality of education in the district,. but without a 

commitment to undoing the segr~gated structure of ·that education. 

Consequently, it permitted Topeka's schools to fall into three 

categories: schools that are now and always have· been white, 

schools that are now and long have been .heavily .minority, and 

others • . As we have noted, the mere existence of racially 

identifiable schools does not violate the Constitution. Where 

prior de jure segregation exists, however, we are convinced that 

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permitting.wh~te schools and minority schools to remain racially 

identifiable as such without significant efforts to the ·contra r y 

is in ~ffect to permit the continuation of a dual system of 

education. Based on the evidence set out above, we have a 

definite and firm conviction that the district court erred when it 

found the Topeka school system to be uni ta·ry. Cf. Pitts v. 

Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423 (11th Cir. 1985); Diaz, 733 F.2d 660; Adams 

v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1980) (en bane); 

Brinkman v. Gilligan, . 583 F.2d 243 (6th ~ir •. 1978)! aff'd sub nom. 

Dayton Board of Education v.. Brinkman, 443 u.s. 526 (1979). 

VI. 

TITLE VI 

Plaintiffs argue that the school district violated both 

section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. 

S 2000d, and 34 C.F.R. S 100.3(b). Sectio~ 601 forbids p~ograms 

and activities receiving federal funds from discriminating on .the 

basis of race, among · other factors, 100 and 34 C.F.R. S 100 

100 Section 601 reads: 

"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of 

race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 

subjected to discrimination under any . program or 

activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 

42 u.s.c. s 2000d (1982)~ 

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contains regulations implementing Title VI. The Topeka school 

system receives federal funds. 

The ~upreme Court held in Regents of ~he University of 

California v. Bakk~, 438 u.s. 265 (1978), that discrimination 

under Title VI is to be measured by the constitutional standard of 

the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 284-87. Because we have 

.concluded that Topeka•s school· system is not unitary under 

constjtutional standards, we riecessarily reverse the district 

court's holaing that the school district has not violated Title 

VI • . 

VII. 

STATE DEFENDANTS. 

·The. state of Kansas 1ntervened as a defendant in Brown I to 

defend the constitutionality · of the Kansas law permitting 

segregation. It. was not again actively involved in the litigation 

of the case unt_il· May 1980, when the Governor and members of the 

State Board of Education were joined .as defendants for the purpose 

of granting injunctive relie~.lOl The district cour~ granted 

summary judgment before trial for the Governor on both the 

constitutional and Title VI claims. After trial; it held that the 

State Board of Education was-not responsible for the racial 

101 The state had been dismissed as a party to the action in 

1979. Brief of Appellee John Carlin at 3. •, 

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conditions in the Topeka school district. We affirm both of these 

rulings. 

The supreme executive power of the state of Kansas is vested 

in its Governor, who "shall be responsible for the enforcement of 

the laws of this state." Kan. Const. art. r, S 3. One of the . 

Governor'~ powers is that of reorganizing state exectitive 

agencies. "[C]onstitutiona~ly delegated functions of state 

officers and state boards" a r e exempt from this reorganization 

power. · Id. S 6(a). The State Board of Education is such an 

exempt· state board. Id. · art. 6, S 2; 'state ex rel. Miller v. 

Boar~ of Education, 511 P.2d 705, ~09 (Kan. 1973). Because the 

State Board of. Education is the Kansas organ of government 

responsible for education, these provisions limit the Governor's 

exe·cutive power over education to that embodied . in the power to 

enforce the laws of Kansas. Plaintiffs. have not suggested that 

any Kansas law is now implicated in this litigation. The Governor 

is not vested by the provisions cited above with the power to 

enforce federal law, and plaintiffs have not shown any other 

source of such power. The district court was correct in 

concluding that the Governor is not able, under state law, to 

comply with such injunctive relief as may be ordered in this case. 

It was therefore proper to dismiss him from the case. 

The correct disposition of the case against the members of 

the State Board of Education is more difficult to reso~ve. 

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Kansas, like many other·states, assigns the primary responsibility 

for the day-to-day. management of public schools to local school 

authorities. See Kan. Const . art. 6, § 5. At the time of Brown 

!, the Kansas Constitution ,provided for a Superintendent of Public 

Instruction with limited au~hority. In particular, this officer . 

did not have the authority to exercise· general .supervision o f. t he 

public schools. Miller, 511 ~.2d at 708. Apparently, the only 

method used by the state to encourage segregation was the 

permission granted by· the law struck down in Brown I for 

segregation below the high school level. The Kansas legislatu.r e 

promptly repealed this .statute in its next full session after : 

Brown I, and has since enacted civil and criminal laws against 

racial discr imina.tion. See Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 2·1-40.03 , and 

§§ 44-1001 et. seq. This history is in contrast to t he actions of . 

other states that have been held liable· for promoting 

segregation. 102 Moreover, the state was never held expressly. 

102 See Milliken .v •. Bradley, 433 u.s. 267 (1977) (affirming : 

remedy based in .part on state liability); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 

U.S. 717 (1974) (state provided funds for transporting white 

students but not· for desegregative busing, enacted laws designed 

to delay desegregation plan and rnainta i~ segregation, rescinded 

city's volun'tar·y desegrega·tion plan, and approved school sites and 

construction with segregative results); Liddell v. State of · Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1298 (8th Cir.) (state ~onstitution 

mandated segregation until 1976 and state took no act ion to 

desegegate schools after Brown I), cert denied, 469 u.s. 816 

(1984); Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School 

Dist., 714 F.2d 946, 948 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983) (listing state 

pol ici es and acts that helped to maintai n segregation), cert. 

denied, 467 u.s. 1209 (1984). Furthermore, in both Mi l liken and 

Los Angeles Branch NAACP there was clear state law giving the 

state,· as opposed to local school authori ties, a prominant role. 

See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 726 n.5 (Michigan constitution assigns 

''the whole subject" of education to the state); Los Angeles Branch 

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liable for the actual segregation in Topeka's schools. 

It is not necessary for us to decide whether requiring more 

of the state at this point would be consistent with the principle 

that a remedy may be no broader than the scope of the violation 

found, because plaintiffs have not shown that the State Board of 

Education has the power to act as they would have it 'act. The 

Kansas Constitution provides· both for the State Board of Educat ion 

.and for ·locally elected school boards. The State Board is given 

the power of "general supervision" of the local bo~~ds. Kart. 

Const. art~ 6, SS 2, 5. The Kansas Supr.eme Court ha·s defined this 

power as "something more than to advise but something less than to 

control." Miller, 511 P.'2d at .713. Among the powers of the State 

Board is accreditation of schools. Plaintiffs argue that the 

State Board could have withheld accreditation of segregated 

~cbools, citin~ evide~ce tha~ the Board is empowered to .withhol d . . . . . 

accreditation on this ba~is .l03 The evidence refers, however, to 

hypothetical situations such as an official poiicy of not hiring 

black teachers or .complete segregation of students. This does not 

establish that the State .Board had the power to deny accreditat ion 

under the facts of .this case. In addition, exhibits in the record 

show th~t the State Board was aware that there was actual 

NAACP, 714 F.2d at 949 (listing California cases detailing 

responslbility of state organs to aid in desegregation). 

lOJ Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellant·s, plaintiff • s exhibits 

45, 47. 

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segre.gation in ·some Kansas cities, and drew up a number of 

proposals to provide advisory assistance to these cities in 

desegregating;104 These p'roposals are <*>nsistent with the State 

Board's argument that its role is primarily advisory in the area 

of d~segregation. 

Kansas statutes authorize local school boards to appoint 

employees to serve at the board's pleasure, set attendance 

boundaries, open and close schools, and adopt all necessary · rules 

and regulations. Kan. Stat. Ann. S§ 72-8202e, 72-8212, 72-8213. 

These tools are the primary means of desegregating. No evidence 

suggests that the State Board exercises co~trol over these tools •. 

Plainti~fs argue that after Brown I some agency of the state h~d a 

duty to ensure that desegregation occurred. We are not persuaded 

that any authority other than the Topeka school district had then 

or has now the· power to desegregate Topeka's schools. 

VIII. 

CONCLUSION 

In concluding, we begin by stressing what we do not have in 

Topeka. We do not have a school system or a community actively 

resisting desegregation. Nor, on ·our. record, has Topeka ever 

interposed the kind of obstacles to desegregation found in other 

104 See·, ~' rec., ex. vol. II, at 190-235. 

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cities. In recent times, the ·school district has -won national 

recognition for its innovative work on its curriculum and has been 

honored with various awards for .the excellence of its schools. In 

short, the Topeka school distr.ict is actively engaged in improving 

the education of its ~tudents. 

This active engagement has largely been directed at concerns 

other than desegregation, however. Once the four-step plan 

approved by the district court in the 1950s was implemented, 

Topeka did not until very recent times, on our record, give 

serious consideration to 'the question of whether the duty imposed 

by Brown II had been fulfilled, sa~e under· the urging of HEW. 

Although that urging led to distinct improvements,· for. the most 

part the Topeka school-district h~s exercised ·a form of .benign 

· neglect. The duty imposed by the Constitution, and articulated in 

numerous c~ses by the highest court in this land; requires more •. 

We reverse the finding of the district court that the Topeka· 

school system is legally unitary. We remand the case to the 

district court for the formation of an appropriate remedy .• 

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No. 87-1668 , Oliver Brown, et al. and Charles Smith and Kimber l y 

Smith, Minor Children, By Their Mathe~ and Next 

Friend, Linda Brown Smith, et al ., ·V, Board of 

Education of Topeka, Shawnee .County, Kansas, et al. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge , dissenting. 

It is not by accident that the court begins its opinion in 

the liability p~ase of this case with a quote from the plaintiffs' 

expert, Mr. William Lamson . 1 For in deciding that the u~s-.o . 501 

school board operates a dual school system with respect to student 

assignment, the court has relied heavily on the plaintiffs' ·theory 

of the case as supported by the testimony of Mr . Lamson. In 

deciding that the board opera tes a dual system with respect to 

faculty assignment, the court has aqopted the plainti ffs' theory 

· in large part, _but impermissibly ~as made : its own. factual ·findings 

after an ad hoc evaluation of the evide~ce. See, ~· Court's 

. . Opinion at 45 {"We do not adopt plaintiffs' standard:r but instead 

evaluate the · data on its face."). 

In this case, the plaintiffs c·ontended that t·he school board · 

operated a dual school system as evidenced by: 1) racial 

1 Mr. Lamsori is a dernograp~ici con~ultant, whose pri ncipal 

source. of income is fee applications from desegregation cases . Rec . ex. vol . V at 4; vol . II at 372. Mr. Lamson dpes not appear 

to have pursued any formal study in the field of demographics; 

indeed, . his resume candidly reports that he has no degrees, advanced or undergraduate. Rec. supp. vol. XII at 4. Despite Mr. 

Lamson's previous service in this field as outlined by this court , Court's Opinion at 2 n.l, the district court was free to accept or 

reject his conclusions. . While the dis·trict court acknowledged that segregation may 

continue of its own inertia, id . (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 

671 F. Supp. 1290 , 129~ (D. Kan . 1987)), the district court 

specifically found that segregation had not so continued in this 

school district,. rather "the effec~ s of de jure segregation have 

been substantially countered." Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1296 . 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 96 
identifiability in student, faculty/staff assignment, 2) inferior 

facilities, equipment, curriculum and instruction at schools with 

higher black enrollments, 3) lower minority test scores, and 4) 

survey attitudes indicating that some schools were pe rceived as 

white schools and others as minority schools. See generally rec. 

vol .. I, doc. 2 42 (amended complaint) • 2 On the other hand, the 

defendants contended that the plaintiffs' measures of "racial 

identifiability" alone, given the historically sma ll percentage of 

minority students and faculty/staff did not indicate a current 

condition of intent ional segregation based upon either l) present 

discr iminatlon or 2) a failure to eliminate ,the vestiges of past 

state- imposed segregation. Defendants suggested that .de fact o and 

radially neutral considerations, · rather t.han de jure segreg-ation , 

explained the assignment of students and faculty/staff. 3 

Defendants also contended that recent school boards were committed 

2 The record on .appeal in this case generally will be· 

identified as Rec. vol. # or supp. vol. #, indicating pleadings or 

transcript. Selected exhibits, whi ch were paginat ed and bound by 

the parties in tive volumes, will be identified as Rec. ex. 

vol. #. 

3 The difference· between de jure a nd de facto segregation has 

been described as follows: 

De jure ("by law") segregation is racia l separation 

which is the product of some purposeful act by governmental authorities. De facto ("by the facts") 

segregation occurs because of housing and migration 

patterns and is unconnected to any purposeful 

governmental action to racially seg regate schools. 

2 R. Rotunda ; J. Nowak & J . Young, Treatise on Constitut ional Law 

§ 18.9 at 413 (1986); see a·lso Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 

U.S. 18~, -208 (1973),; Swann v. Charl otte-M~cklenburg Bd. of Educ., 

402 u.s. 1, 17-18 (1971). De jure segregation violates· the equal prote~tion clause, but "if a school district becomes · unintentional ly (de facto) segregated , there is no constitutional 

violation." R. Rotund~, J. Nowak & J. Young, supra, at 413. 

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to pursui ng racial balance in _s tudent , faculty/ staff assignment , 

·and equal educational oppor t unity. Finally, defendants relied 

upon the implementation of two desegregation plans afte r Brown v. 

Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and explained other 

steps taken to achieve and maintain a unitary system. The 

district court found in favor of the defendan ts on all issues and 

declared the system unitary . ·Brown v. Board of Educ., 671 F. 

Supp. 1290 (D. Kan. 1987). On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the 

district court's judgme nt concerning student and faculty/staff 

assignment. 

If appellate courts were empowered to make find ings of fact, 

perchance the approach of this court on the issues of student and 

·faculty/staff assignment could be justified . . But for reasons 

which the Supreme Court has made clear, we must accept . the fac tual 

findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. 

Fed. R. tiv •. P. 52(a); Anderson v. Cify of Bessemer Ci ty, 470 U.S~ 

0 . 

564 , 573- 76 (1985) ; see also Alexander -v . Youngstown Bd. of Educ ., 

675 F.2d 787, 792-93 (6th Cir~ 1982) . Although this court 

' . . acknowledges that the dist rict court's findi ng of un itariness must 

be upheld unless clearly erroneous, Court's Opinion at 15 , the 

court has failed to give effect to t his principle. Instead, this 

_pou rt has duplicated "the role of the distri ct court" and has 

impermissibly· engaged in "an exercise in appellate factfinding.'' 

See Jenk ins v. Missouri, 807 · F.2d 657, 667 {8th Cir. 1986) (en 

bane). Thi~ i s apparent throughout the court's opinion, but is 

especially salient in the court's characterization of what really 

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occurred in Topeka during each decade subsequent to Brown I, a 

characterization which totally ignores the district court's 

findings and forgets that w~ do not ~ry cases at the court of 

appeals. See Court's Opinion at 52-61. The ·same evidence that 

the district court found wanting this court accepts. This court 

is 11 engaging in an original evaluation of the voluminous and 

ofttimes contradictory record seeking an ultimate concl usion more 

satisfactory than that reached by .the district court." Jenkins, 

807 F.2d at 668 . . 

The court claims that the district court erred because it 

. . 

misunderstood the burden of proof in this desegregation case. 

Court's Opinion at 2, 3 5. If tha·t · is true, why does the court ·not 

remand the case to the district c6urt for appropriate findings . i n 

accordance with the correct presumption and burden-shi fting 

principles, given. that this is very much a record case? See infra 

note 6~ Vaughns v ; Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 992 (4th Cir. 

1985"} (court rem~ nded for new findings in light of correct legal· 

principles}. Instead, the court makes its own factua l findings 

and remands the case for an app'ropriate remedy. 

Moreover, I do not agree with this court that the district 

court ''failed 'to apply ttie appropriate presumption and 

burden-shifting principles of law.'" Court's ·opinion. at 35~36 

(quoting Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243~ 251 (6th Cir. 1978), 

aff'd, Dayton Board of Educ. v. Brinkman (Day ton II), 443 u.s. 526 

(1979}}. This court compares the district court's action with 

that of the errant district court in Dayton II. The comparison 

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misses the mark primarily because, as this court points out, 

Dayton II, like most of "[t)he Supreme Court desegregation 

cases(,] involved school systems in which the degree of 

segregation wa~ sufficiently great that the parties did not 

seriously dispute on appeal that the pl aintiffs -had satisfied 

their burden on" ["the existence of a current condition of 

segregation.~]~ Court's Opini on at 18 n.l7, 17~18. While the 

. "Dayton public _schools [were] _ 'highly segregated by race~[.]" 4 

Court's Opi nion at 18 n.17 (quoting Dayton II., 443 U.S. at 529 ) , 

this is not so in Topeka . Here, there exists a genuine i ssue of 

. fact as to whether there is even a current condition of 

segregation; particularly in the absence of any one-race minority 

or ·virtually one-race minor~ ty s~hools in this district. To be 

sure, there are eight 90%+ white schools (ianging from 6.23% to 

9 . 43% minority) ; however, those schools have steadily increased in 

minority enrollment. over the ·years; ~nd this is~ system in . which· 

31 out C?f 34 s choo.ls are majority white in student assignment. 

See infra note 18. Of the three schools that are 

majority-minority in student assignment, the greatest 

concentra tion is 61.86% mi nority. Id . This court's overinclusive 

approach to racial identifiability l eads it to an incorrect 

4 At the time of the district court hearing in Dayton II, 44.6% 

of the students were black, 47 out of 68 schools were virtually on~ race (22 black and 25 white). Dayton II, 443 u.s. at 529-30, 

n.l. This pattern of one-race schools in a system that was almbst 

evenly composed of white a nd black students was present in 

1951-52, 1963-64 and 1971- 72 . Id. at 537. · 

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finding that . there is a current condi tion of segregat i on in 

Topeka. 

The court begins by saying that, in a former de jure system , 

a school is racial l y identifiable and part of a current condit'ion 

of segregation if it deviate·s, plus ·or mirius (±} 15% or 20% or 

some other arbitrary amount, ·from .a system-wide average of 

minority composition. See Court's Opinion at 42-4_4, 49-50 n.59, 

50-51; but see Price v. Denison Indep. School Dist., 694 F.2d 334 , 

360-64, (5th Cir. 1982) (statistical racial identifiabi lity not 

necessarily indicacive of liability). Numbers- reflecting the 

racial composition of student and faculty/staff assignment within 

. . 

a ichoo~ system. are absolutely critical iri both the liability and 

the remedial phas~ of a school desegregation case. However, 

statistical measures of racial identifiabili~y ~re measures of 

racial balance, a vali'd sociological object-ive, but not a 

constitutional command with respect to student assignment. 

Neverthele~s~ this court d~t~rmines that once a 'plaint iff has 

shown statistical racial identifiability in a former de jure 

system, the pla.intiff has established a current condition of 

segregation. Court's Opinion at 18, 42-44. 

If a school is not racially identifiable as to student 

assignment by statistical measures~ that certainly does not 

suggest an absence of segregation to this court. Rather one must 

look to a ''broadly defined," Court's Opinion at 18, concept of 

racial identifiability which considers "demography, geography aod 

the individual history of particular schools and areas of the 

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city,~ in an effort to find liability . Id. at 21 . Although the 

court acknowledges that one-race schools may evolve from "modern 

urban demography and geography," id. at 19 n.l8 , a nd that "the 

mere existence of racially identifiab~e schools does not. violate 

· the Constitution," id. at 87, it completely fails to incorporate 

these observations in its naly~is of this system. Nor does it 

consider other statistical measures relied upon · by the district 

court which support a finding of no current condition of 

segregation and compliance with the affirmative duty to dismantl e 

the dual system. See id. at 41-48, 58 n.71. What the court has 

done is to apply an absolu te presumption against the Topeka 

schools from the outset because of de jure status in 1 954 . Even 

if the presumption applies, the court has given no weight· to the 

substantial evidence concerning de facto influences on racial 

composition in those schools. Although the court ratifies its 

conclusion concerni ng a current condition of segregatiori with 

descriptive references to geography, resia~nt al population and 

history, there is no attempt to consider causation in light of t he 

~ubstantial demographic testimony otfered by defendants. Id. at 

50-Sl, 58-61. 

·The district court implicitly recognized, Brown, .671 F. Supp. 

at 12 95, 11 that once a court has found an unlawful dual ·school 

system, .. School Bd. v. · Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1311 (4t h Cir. 

~9 87), the plaintiffs are ''~entitled to the presumpti on that 

c u rrent d isparities are causally related to prior segregation, _and 

the burden of proving othe rwise rests on the defendants.'" See 

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Court's Opinion at 25-26 (quoting Baliles, 829 F.2d at 1311) ; see 

also Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 537 {1979); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 

!, 413 U.S. 189, 21q-11 (1973); Swann v. Char lotte-Meck lenburg Bd. 

of Educ., 402 u~s. 1, 25-26 , (1971) (discussing remedy 9nce a 

violation is established) • . If the system has achieved 

uni tar i ness, the pr.esumption ends. Bali les, 8 29 F. 2d at 1311; 

Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F .• 2d 521, 543 (4th Cir. 1986) . 

In a former de ~ure system, plaintiffs may establish the 

prima facie case by proving that there is a current condition . of 

intentional segregation, that the de jure system or its vestiges 

remain or were reestablished in part of the school .system. 

Columbus Bd . of Educ. v. Penick, 443 u.s. 449, 464, 467 (1979); 

Keyes, 41 3 .u.s. at 200, 210. Even an isolated condition of 

current segregation_, resul_ting from past or present segregative 

acts, would. violate the affirmative duty to eliminate the dual 

system and its vestiges and to conve rt to a unitary system in 

which racial discrimination is eradicated. Dayton II, _443 U.S. at 

537; Columbus, 443 U.S. at 459; Swann, 402 U.S. at 15; ~ also L. 

_Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1498-1500 ( 2d ed. 1988) . 

(discussing Supreme Court school desegregation cases). 

That critical finding shifts the burden of proof to the 

defendants because it provides "a sufficient bas·is for an 

inferential finding of system-wide discriminatory intent" which in 

turn will be appl ied to explain "racial separation in other parts 

of t-he school ·system." Columbus, 443 U.S. at 467 -68. At that 

point, the defendants must come forward with "proof sufficient to 

·. 

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support a finding that segregative inten~ was not among the 

factors that motivated their actions." Keyes, 413 u.s. a t · 210. 

If int ent cannot be disproved, the defendant s must show that their 

"past segregative acts did not create or contribute to the current 

segregated cond~tion," in the other parts of the system. Id. at - 211 ; . see Dayton I I , 443 u.s. at 538 ("Board has a. 'heavy burden' 

of showing that actions that increased or continued the effects of 

the dual sys~em serve important and legitimate ends") . 

The district court correctly cited Keyes and Swann in its 

discussion concerning the burden of proof and noted that the 

factual justification in this case for the legal presumption was 

doubt~ul~ 5 Bro~n, .671 F. Supp. at 1295, 1295 n.4 & 5 . I take 

this t o mean that the plainti fs simply had not - proven a current 

condition of segregation (a constitutional _violation) i n the 

Topeka schools wh i ch would warrant sustaining the presumption. 

But the district court went furthei when it focused on -the 

defendants and held that, in the alternative and regardless of any 

presumptions in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants had proven 

the existence of a unitary system. Id. Merely because the 

distri ct court properly discussed an absence qf ·discriminatory 

intent does not negate the fact that in t h i s record6 there is 

5 In allowing the current plaintiffs to intervene in this 

action, the trial judge correctly discussed the presumption and 

burden shifting pr nciple~ potentially applicabl e t o this case. 

Brown v. Board of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 3~3, 399-400, 401-02 (D. Kan. 

1979) . . 

6 Trial of this matter lasted from October 6 to Oc t ober 31, 

1986, and consisted of the testimony of 37 witnesses, i ncluding 11 · (footnote continued ~n next page) 

. -9-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 104 
evidence tending to show that a·ny past segregative acts of this 

school district are not responsible for schools currently which do 

not approach the system-wide minority average. See infra pt. VII,· 

p. -108 (analyzing schools which court claims ~re racially 

identifiable and segregated). Indeed~ this court at various 

points acknowledges an absence of evidence of segregative intent 

by current school officials. Court •·s Opinion at 38 {"we agree 

with the district court's findings that the current school 

administration is not presently acting with d i scriminatory 

intent"), see also id. at 68, 86; but see id. at 49, 67 

(concerning faculty/staff assignment in 1985-86, "it is difficult 

. -

to posit a [racially} neutr-al explanation") & id. at ·79 ("It is 

thus clear that Quinton Heights' ·current boundaries are the result 

of continued manipulation by the school district."). . The distr·ict 

court also considered circumstantial evidence of past segregative 

intent- manifesting i~self in the current system, concerning the 

prima facie case and beyond. Of course, the district court had 

much quantitative and qualitative evidence to evaluate. Having 

performed its required task, it found that "the district's student 

and staff assignment criteria do not have the effect of 

discriminating against students because of their race." Brown, 

671 F. Supp . . at 1310 (denying_ relief based on Title VI regulat i on) 

(emphasis adde.d). Because the record supports the district 

court's determination that there is not unl~w ful segregation in 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

experts, and hundreds of exhibits. A 3,000 page trial transcript 

in 18 volumes was filed at the distri ct court. 

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Topeka and that the system is unitary, albeit on conflicting 

evidence, I respectfully dissent. 

In its opinion , the court dismisses my dissen t as a product 

of misconstruing the principles of school desegregation law. 

Court's Opinion at 23-25, 36 n.47, 40 n.Sl, 38 n.49. Apparently , 

the court views the affirmative duty to eliminate segregation and 

its vestiges a·s completely independent from, if not inconsistent 

with, the intent inquiry; To be sure, those s~atutory dual 

systems operating at the time of Brown I automatically assumed an 

affirmative duty to eliminate not orily the d~al system , but also 

the effects of that dual.system on pr~sent school oper~tions. 

Keyes, 413 U.S. at 200. However, the initial affirmative duty 

arises fr6m th~ presence of intentional segregation·wh~ther once 

-conunanded by statute o.r practice. 

Moreover, the intent inquiry is inclusive of whether a · school 

board has acfed affirmatively, ~ot ~er~ly neutrally, to eliminate .. 

a dual system existing_ in 1954~ A school board's proven failure 

to heed its affirmative duty and eliminate a dual system and its 

vestiges, whether that failure be by inaction· or by c6nscious 

decision,_ is in~icative of segregative intent and compounds the 

harm of an ·unconstitutional dua·l system. See Columbus, 443 u.s. 

at 461 ( 11Whatever the Board's current purpose with respect to 

racially separate education might be, it knowingly continued its 

failure to eliminate the consequences of its past intentionally 

segregative policies."); see also Green v. Courity School Bd., 391 

U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). In deciding whether a school system is 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 106 
unitary, the ultimate inquiry must ·be whe ther past or present 

~egregative intent has been eliminated from the pr~sent school 

operat ions. 

Thus,. a ·current condition of purposeful separation may arise 

either from a failure to eliminate 1954 de jure segregation and 

its effects or by subsequent actions which are segregative in · 

their own right . Stated another way, plaintiffs are entitled to a 

syst em-wide desegregation order upon a finding that there is 

current racial separation which is the result of segregative 

intent, past or -current. Plaintiffs are not entitled . to a 

system-wide desegregation order based upon proven de facto racial 

separation not attributable ·to the acti ons. of the school board. 

Keyes, 413 u.s. at 208 (uwe emphasize that the differentiating 

factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto 

segregation to which we refe rred in Swann is purpose or intent to 

segr ega te~ ") (emphasis in original). Thus, contrary to this 

court ' s reading of ·my dissent, I agree that school boar d action 

which has the effect of failing to disestablish the dual system 

violates the school · board's affirmative duty. See Court's Opinio n 

at 24 (quoting Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 14 23~ 1427 (11th Cir. · 

1985 )); Columbus, 443 U.S. at 449. 

I must reject however , this court's contention that '' [t ]his · 

is not a liability .case in which plaintiffs must prove that the · 

school board has committed unconstitutional acts; tha t was 

established in 1954. " Court 's Opini<?n at 25 {emphasis omitted ). 

While this. is not a case of initial liability, id . at 38 , it is 

not a case like Swann, 

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·· .. see Court's Opinion at 25, iri which all parties agreed that the 

1969 Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system was not uni t ary given the 

Supreme Co~rt's 1968 Green decision, announced three years after 

the first dese~~egation plan implemented by that district in 1965. 

Swann, 402 u.s. at 7. In Swann, the issue was whether the 

district court· was correct in selecting among alternative 

desegregation plans put forth by the parties. Id. at 11. 

Contrary to this court'~ assertion, Court's Opinion at 25, 38 

n.49, ours· is not now a remedy case. Upon the reopening of this 

case in 1979, some 24 years after the first ·COurt-approved· 

desegregation plan, the dis~rict court's task was to determine 

whether liability for the p-rior de jure system remained. Unlike 

Swann, the parties in our case hotly contested this issue. 

If. the 1iabili ty inquiry in this case was frozen as of 1954 

as suggested by the court, id. at 25, we merely would decree a 

·remedy based upon ~he failure of the school board .to ·have absolu t e 

racial ba·lance at every school and much of this court's opinion 

arguing that {1} . there is a current condition of segregation, {2} 

the school board has failed to fulfill its· affirmative duty, and 

(3) there is a link between ·present school .operations and the 

prior de jure .system, would be superfluous. The inquiry in .this 

case is not so ·simple because two complex factual issues are 

involved. The first is whether current disparities in. this case 

comprise a current condition of segregation given that there is 

not a single one-race minority or virtually one-race minority 

elementary, middle cir high school, in this system~ But if ther e 

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is a current condition of segregation, the burden of proof would 

shift to the school · board as discussed above. The next complex 

factual issue in· the case then becomes whether the effects of any 

past intentional segregation have.been eliminated. An "essential 

predi cate" for a system-wide remedy in this case is that the 

"Board's purposeful ly discriminatory conduct and pol icies, had 

current, system-wide impact." Columbus, 443 u.s. at 466 n.l5. 

The court also claims that the defendants• experts, the 

district court and I have erred because we have consi dered the 

school board's proof that, having dismant led a dual school system, 

it is not liable for schools which do not approach the system-wi de 

minority average in student assignment. See Court's Opinion at 

58-60. Who could. argue with the court·•s s t atement that 

demographic change does not excuse a school board's failure to 

comply with its affirmatiVe duty to eliminate the eff ects-of a 

dual system? Id. at 59.-60 (relying o_n Vaughns, 758· F. 2d at 988, 

and Lee v~ Macon County Bd. of Educ., 616 F.~d 805, 809-1~ (5th 

Ci r. 1980)). In both. Vaughns and Lee, the appellate court \-las 

concerned with virtually one-race minority schools wh i ch had not 

lost their raci al identities. Vaughns, 758 F.2d at 991; Lee, 616 

F.2d at 808, 811 (5 one-race m~nority schools}. The disagreemen~ 

between the court's opinion and my dissent on th~s point is that I 

view the school board as having accomplished its affi rma t ive duty 

-and having eliminated the effects that may be charged to a 

once-dual system. All virtually one-race minority schools have 

·been eliminated, and there are no schools on the threshold of 

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virtually one-race minority status. In any event, the school 

board is allowed to prove that schools which do not approach the 

system-wide minority average are not the product of ·past or 

present segregative intent or, stated another way, the school 

board may prove that its recent and remote actions are not the 

cause -of present racial imbalance. In Keyes, the Court recognized 

that ·school officials may defend by showing that current racial 

separation is not a product of past segregative actions. Keyes, 

413 u.s. at 211. Although the passage of time does not make 

intentional segregative acts which· occurred decades ago any less 

intentional, id. at 210~11, the effects of such action may well be - . 

attenuated, given the dynamic environment . of a school system . . The 

court's absolut~ refusal to consider this evidence is tantamount 

to imposing strict. liability on the school board in the absence of 

perfect racial balance. 

I • 

This action began when the original plaintiffs challenged 

Topeka's maintenance of.a segregated system of.schools for grades 

kindergarten through six {K-6) . . Brow~ v . Board of Educ ., 98 F. 

Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951), rev'd , 349 U.S. 294 (1955}. At the 

time, Topeka operated_22 elementary schools, 18 for whit~ children 

and · 4 for black children. Id . Many black chil9ren were bused a 

considerable distance.to the 4 black school s. Id. at 798 . The 

challenge involved both the contention that separate schools were 

inherently unequal and the contention that the physical 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 110 
facilities, curri~ula, faculty and student services· of the black 

schools were infer-ior. Id. at 797-98. Circuit Judge Huxman, 

writing for a three-judge district court, adhered to precedent, 

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 u.s. 537 (1896), and held that separate 

but equal facilities were 6onstitutional. Brown, 98 F. Supp. at 

798-99; see generaliy-In Memoriam, 474 P.2d preface at 13-14 

{1973) (discussing judge's difficult decision}. The district 

couri entered as a finding of fact that the "physical facilities, 

the curricula, the courses of study, qualification of and qual ity 

of teachers, as well as other educational· facilities i n the·two 

sets of·schools are comparable." Brown, 98 F. Supp~ at 798. The 

judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court, with initial arguments 

during the 1952 Term. 

During September 1953, and prior to the Suprem~ Court's 

opinion, the Topeka school board adopted a policy to terminate the 

maintenance of segregation in the ele~enta~y grades. Rec. ex. 

vol . II at 60. The board adopted the first step of a· 

desegregation plan which terminated the white-only segregation at 

two elementary schools (Southwest & Randolph) and disc6ntinued t he 

board's supplied transportation to 15 black .children in those 

districts~ In January 1954, the board adopted the seconq step of 

the desegregation plan to become effecti~e in September 1954. 

Rec. ex. vol. II at 61. The second step terminated the whit~-on y 

segre gation in 12 more elementary schools, eliminated 

transportation for black students in these 12 districts, and 

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permitted black students to continue at their former schools, if 

desired. Id. 

In May 1954, the historic decision of the Supreme Court 

reversed the three-judge district court . Brown I, 347 u.s. 483. 

The Court held that "the segregation of children in public schools 

solely on the ba~is o~ race" denied minority group children equal 

educational opportu.ni ties contrary to the fourteenth amendment. 

Id. at 493. With . respect to the Kansas case, the Court expressly 

found that the non-el~mentary grade levels of -the public schools . 

were "operated on a non-segregated basis," Id. a·t 486 n .1. The 

Court did not alter the finding of the district court of 

substantial equa li~y ''with respect to building~, transportation, 

curri cula, and educational qualifications of teachers.'' Id. at 

486 n.l. 

In February 1955, the Topeka board adopted the third step of 

the desegregation plan to become effective in September 1955 . 

~ec •. ex. vol. II at 63. The plan addressed the £our black 

elementary schools (McKinley1 Buchanan, Monroe and Washington). 

Under the third step, McKinley was close_d, and Buchanan, Monroe 

and Washington were placed within the general framework of the 

elementary school attendance districts. Id. All elementary 

students affected were given the option .of finishing elementary 

school in their present .schools, with the exception of McKinley 

students. Children entering kindergart~n in_school year 1955-56 

were given the option of attending the school they would have 

attended in 1954-55, had they been old enough. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 112 
Having decided the question of ~onstitutional l iabil ity, the 

Court ordered further argument on a remedy and issued its next 

opinion concerning appropriate relief in May 1955. Brown v. Board 

of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 .(1955). The Court noted that 

"substantial progress" had been·made in Kansas "from the· 

transition to a system of public education freed of racial 

discrimination.," Id. at 299. Recognizing that .full 

implementation of Brown. I might ''require solution of v~ried local 

problems" by school authorities, the Court remanded this case to 

the three-judge district court for consideration of whether the 

a~ticins of school authoriti~s constituted ~ good faith 

imple~entation of Brown I. Id. School authorities were to make a 

"prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance" with Brown I. 

Id. at 300. 

Once such a start has been made, the courts may find 

that additional time is necessary to carry out the 

ruling in_an. effective manner. The burden rests upon 

the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith 

compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that 

end, the courts may consider problems related to 

administration, arising from the physical condition of 

the scho61 ~lant, the school transportation system, 

personnel, revision of school districts and attendance 

areas into compact units to achieve a system of 

determining admission to the public schools on a 

nonracial basis • . •. . They will also consider the 

adequacy of any plans th.e defendants may propose to meet 

these problems and to effectuate a transition to a 

.ra·cially nondiscriminatory school system. 

Id. at 300-01. T~e district courts were to be guided by 

principles of equfty and to retain jurisdiction during the 

transition period. Id. In June 1955, the Supreme Co~rt mandate 

ordered the district court to. take such actions "as are necess~ry 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 113 
and proper to admit to public schools on a racially 

nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to 

these cases." Id. at 301. 

On remand,·the district court held a hearing on the 

formu lation 6f a dedree and judgment. In October 1955, the panel 

approved the plan already adopted and partially implemented by the 

Topeka board 11 as a good faith beginning to bring about complete 

desegregation." Brown v. Board of Educ., 139 F. Sup-p. 468, 470 

(D. Kan. 1955) (per curiam). The court characterized the plan as 

follows: 

The central principle of the plan is that hereafter, 

except in exceptional circumstances, school.children 

irrespective of race.or color shall be required to . attend the school in the district in which .they reside: .and that ·color or race is no el ement· of exceptional 

circumstances warranting · a deviation from this basic 

principle. 

Id. at 469. The court noted that in s~veral respects, which wer e 

minor .and not di~cussed, the plan dld not com~ly ful l y with ~he 

Supreme Court mandate. Id. On~ serious objection to the plan was 

that ·part which permitted kindergarten children to attend the 

s~hool which they would have attended had they started school one 

year previously. But because that part was temporary and not part 

of the permanent plan, it did not defeat a finding of good faith . 

At the hearing, the plaintiffs objected to certai n schools, 

such as Buchanan, remaining all black. The district court 

rejected this as a defect in the plan, stating: 

Desegregation does not mean that there must be 

intermingling of the races ·in all school districts. It 

means only that they may not be prevented from 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 114 
intermingling or going to school because of race or 

color. 

If it is a fact, as we understand it is, with 

respect to Buchanan School that the district is 

inhabited entirely by colored students, no violation of 

any constitutional right results be~ause they are 

compelled to attend the school in the district in which 

they live. 

Id . at 470~ In 1973, the Supreme Court indicated that this 

limited interpretation of Brown was rejected in 1968 by its 

decisi.on in Green, 391 u.s. at 437~38. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 200-01 

n.ll. · Me_anwh.ile, ·the district court retained jurisdiction of this 

case for the purpose of entering a final decree pendi ng full 

complianc~ with th~ Supreme Court's mandate t6 desegregate. The 

court's order approving the plan was not appealed. 

In December 1956 , the Topeka board considered the fourth step 

of its plan to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate in Brown II. 

as ordered by the district court. Rec. ex. vol. IV at 120. This 

final step· of the plan was to become effective· in September 1956 , 

and eliminated the kindergarten option provi~ion criticized by the 

district court. Rec. ex. vol. II at 66. The plan also required 

all elementary students moving into districts, not designated as 

optional districts between two or mo·re elementary schools, to 

attend the elementary school in the requisite district , subject 

only to traditional exceptions. Id. at 66. Two board members 

opposed the plan's optional feature s as prolonging the time before 

complete integr~t on. Id. at 67. Concern was expressed about the 

future of the teachers at the de jure black el~mentary schools. 

Id .• Notwithstanding, the superintendent, under questioning from 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 115 
the board, indicated that no additional steps were contemplated 

and that the adopt ion of the plan brought Topeka "into fu l l 

comJ;>liance with the law." Id. 

The fo~rth step of the plart was opposed by the president pf 

the NAACP, Mr. Burnette. Mr. Burnette told the board that the 

NAACP only took -legal action in this case as a "last r esort." 

Rec. ex. vol. IV at 120. He opposed the plan bec~use ""it would 

take seven long years to terminate racial ·segregation" and no 

steps had been taken to integrate bla~k teachers. I d. at 120-21. 

The fourth step of the plan wa$ approved in J~nuary 1956. Id. a t 

121. The plan had been implemented fully as of the 1960-61 scho9l 

year, and by 1961-62, all ele_mentary stude~ts, who had been 

permitted. to continue at " the school whicJ: t hey attended prior to 

implementation of step four of the plan,.· had completed their 

elementary education. 

Two observations should be made at this point • . "First, the 

school board hardly can be· faulted for implernenting ·its plan to 

desegregate the -elementary schools. In its revised opinion, the 

court has downgraded the school board's initial deseg rega tion 

effort s from "a remarkably enlightened beginning .in the 

mid-1950's, .. -see Brown v. Board of Educ., No. 87-1668 slip op. at 

42 (filed Jul. 2, 1989 & withdrawn Jul. 19; 1989), to "a 'g6od 

faith' beginning", Court's Opinion at 52 (quoting Brown, 139 F. 

Supp. at 470)·. This court then, characterizes ''(t ]he· mid-50s to 

mid-60s," as ·"no doubt" segregative under modern authority. 

Cour t~s Opinion at 54-55. The board had h~ approval of the 

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district court and federal authority well 'into the 1970's, 

including that of this circult, which echoed the d istri ct court' s 

conclusion that Brown I and Brown II, ·while prohib1ti ng 

segregation, did not require concern with integrative racial 

balancing in neighborhood schpols.7 See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 

7 The co.urt relies on United States v. Board of Educ . (Tulsa 11, 429 F.2d 1253 (lOth Cir. 1970) (Lewis, C.J.) for the 

proposition that "when minorities are concentrated in certain 

areas of the city, neighborhood school plans may be wholly 

insufficient to fulfill the d istrict's affirmative duty to 

eliminate the vestiges of segregation." Court's Opinion at 29. 

To the extent that the court implies that this circuit has 

premised constitutional liability on de facto segregation, the 

court is in error. in Tulsa I , the court required that 

nel.ghborhood plans evolve "from racially neutral demographic and 

geographical considerations," and that the board adhere "solely to 

those stated considerations in implementing and updating the · ne ighborhood policy." Id . at 1258 . The Tulsa system failed both 

tests. The court first determined that enforcement of restrictive 

covenants and .discriminatory housing practices were responsible 

for the concentration of blacks in north Tulsa . Tulsa I at 1255. 

In a clear attempt to circumvent Brown I and Brown II, the board 

drew boundaries for the 1955-56 school year which corresponded 

precisely with the previously segregated system. Id. a.t 1255-56. Thes~ ''superimposed" attendance zones were design~d to maintain 

racial segregation, and were hardly neutral . Moreover, the 

neighborhood system was inconsistent with its stated objectives. 

Id. at 1256~ 1259. -- In United States v. Board of Educ. (Tulsa II), 459 F.2d 720 

(10th Cir. 1972) (Lewis, C.J.), vacated, 413 U.S. 916 (1973), the 

court made it clear that it did not intend to change the rule in 

this circuit concerning neighborhood schools. The cour t cited 

Tulsa I and other Tenth Circu~t ·cases for the following 

proposition: 

The law of this circuit has been consistently 

stated by the court to be that neighborhood school 

plans, when impartially maihtained and administered, d6 

not violate constitutional rights even though the result 

of such plans is racial imbalance. 

Id . at 724 . Of course, Tulsa II was vacated for reconsideration 

in light of the Keyes presumption which peld that "a finding of 

intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful 

portion of a school system . • . creates a presumption that other 

segregated school ing within the system is ·not advent itious." 

Keyes, 413 u.s. at 208. Racial imbalance in a neighborhood school 

(fo6tnote coqtinued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 117 
!r 445 F.2d 990, 1005 {lOth Cir. 1971) {"We never consttued Brown 

to prohibit racially imbalanced schools provided they are 

established and maintained on racially neutral criteria, and 

neither have other circuits considering the issue."}t modified, 

.413 u.s. 189 (1973)' Board of Educi v. Dowell, 375 F.2d 158, 166 

(lOth Cir.) ("It is stlll the rule iri this Circuit and elsewhere 

that neighborhood school attendance policies, when impartially 

maintained and administered, do not violate any fundamental 

Constitutional principles or deprive certain classes of· 

individuals of their Constitutional rights. 11 ), cert. denied, 387 

u.s. 931 (1967)' Downs v. Board of E~~c., 336 F.2d·988, 995-~6, 

998 (lOth Cir. 1964) (neighborhood sthools which may result in 

racial imbalance·not actionablei no duty to integrate) 1 cert. 

denied, 380 u.s. 914 (1965); Bell v •. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 

209, 213 {7th Cir. 1963) (neighborhood school plan drawn with no 

· intent or purpose to segregate. is constitutional even if effect is 

tha~ some schools~will not be racially balanced)i cert. denied, 

377 U.S. 924 (1964). Second, courts do not speak unles~ spoken to 

and cannot decide what is not before them. Here, the school board 

made hundreds of decisions since 1952 that the plaintiffs contend 

reflect segregative intent and effect, yet not until 1979 was the 

court asked to intervene. While this in no way would excuse 

(footnote continued from previous page) . plan does not in and of itself support a constitutional violation.· 

Indeed, the Court has consistently refused to consider whether 

racial imbalance inherent in a neighborhood school policy will 

support a constitutional violation in·the absence of a finding of 

current de jure segregation in some part of the school system. 

Keyes, 413 u~s. at 212; Swann, 402 u~s. at 23. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 118 
noncompliance with the constitutional command to desegregate the 

schools, it does furnish a backdrop against which to understand 

the liability focus·of this case. 

II. 

The amplification of Brown I and Brown II began with the 

Court 's decision in G~een, 391 U~S. 430 (1968). The New Kent 

County, Virginia system was considerably smaller than the Topeka 

system, with an enrollment of 1300 students in two schools, 

approximately 57% bl~ck and 43% ~hite. Id . at 432. The court 

considered a plan which allowed ~ studerit to 6ho6se between 

schools which were essentially one-race schools with respect to 

"faculty, staff, . transportation, extracurric-qlar activities and 

fac ilities." Id. at 435. In every .way, .the schools were a 

product· of de jure segregation. Although. students had a choice 

between schools~ attendance patterns larg.ely refle.cted the de ju re 

system ~ Id. at 441. Eighty-five percent of the black children 

attended an all~black school. Id. at 441. The court made it 

clear that school boards operating st~te -compelled dual school 

systems at the time of Brown rr "were clearly charged with 

the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to 

convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would 

be eliminated root and branch." Id. at 437-38. 

From 1955-1969, the Topeka school district underwent 

substantial transition. Due t6 annexation and unifica tion between 

1957 and 1964, the size of the district. more than doub led,· 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 119 
increasing from 16 .60 to 37.45 square miles, which "fundamentally 

changed the system. •• See rec. vol ~ XI at 2 3 9 9 (commenting upon 

changes from 1955-60). The population in Topeka grew until 1970, 

and thereafter declined. · Rec. vol. XI at 2292~93; ex. vol. I at 

12. This trend was reflected in school enrollment which has 

declined substantially in recent years. 8 The ·black and hispanic 

population increased significantly. Rec! ex . vol. I at 12. And 

the Topeka school board continued with its responsibility to 

eliminate de jure segregation and its .vestiges . 

In the 1~55-56 school year, the board operated 23 elementary 

schools, 9 7 junior . high schools, 10 and l · high school. Brown, 671 

8 . The total enrollment for all USD 501 programs has declined 

over th~ recent years. Eniollment for the 1985- 86 scbool year was 

41.6% less than the peak·enrollment in 1969-70 . 

Total Enrollment U.S.D . .501 

Year 

1953-54 

1954-55 

1966-67 

1967-68 

1968-69 

1969-70 

1970-7 1 

Students 

11 ,977 

12,517 

24,631 

25,255 

25,737 

25,847 

25,002 

Year 

1971-72 

1972-73 

1973-74 

1974-75 

1975-76 

1976-77 

1977-78 

1978.-79 

Students 

24,183 

23,060 

21,7 51 

20,596 

20,242 

19,293 

18,383 

17,480 

Year 

1979-80 

1980-81 

1981-82 

1982-83 

1983-84 

1984-85 

1985-86 

Students 

16,875 

16,408 

15,960 

15,670 

15,264 

15,106 

15,103 

Rec. ex. vol. IV at 34 , 36, 57, 61, 65, 69 , 73 , 77, 81, 85, 89, 

92, 96, 100, 104, 108 , 112, 133, 145, 157, 169 & 181. 

9 

Racial Inventory of u.s.o. 501 Elementary Students 

School Year l955-56 

School Black White Total % Black 

Buchanan 88 . 0 88 100.0 

Central Park 16 354 370 4.3 

{ fo.otnote continued on next page) 

. -25-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 120 
F. Supp. at 1293; rec. ex. vol. IV at 38~ supp. vol. XI at 186, 

225. At the time of Brown I , the Cour t recognized that Topeka did 

no~ operate de jure secondary schools. Brown I, 347 u.s. at 486 

'(footnote continued from 

Clay 

Crestview 

Gage 

Grant 

Lafayette 

Lincoln 

Lowman Hill 

Lundgren (Oa.kland) 

Monroe 

Parkdale 

Polk 

.Potwin 

Quincy· 

Quinton Heights Randolph' 

State Street 

Stout 

.sumner 

Van Buren . . washington 

Whitson 

Total 

previous 

20 

0 

0 

75 

47 

73 

46 

0 

149 

67 

.2 

o · 34 

23 

2 

27 

0 

7 

42 

1·72 

8 

Rec. ex. vol. IV at 39~40. 

10 

page} 

180 

687 

645 

296 

314 

438 

242 

436 

0 

240 

227 

441 

407 

308 

543 

504 

263 

312 

206 

1 

716 

?.?60 

200 

687 

645 

371 

361 

511 

288 

436 

149 

307 

229 

441 

441 

331 

545 

53 1 

263 

319 

248 

173 

724 

8.658 

10.0 

0 

.o 

20.2 

13.0 

14.3 

15.9 

0 

100.0 

21.8 

.9 

0 

7.7 

6.9 

.4 

5 .1 

0 

2.2 

16.9 

99.4 

1.1 

Rac'ia1 Inventory of. U.S.D. Junior High Students 

School Year 1955-19 56 

School. Black White Total % Black 

E. Topeka 136 313 449 30.3 

Crane 75 292 367 20.4 

Boswell 55 454 509 10.9 

Curtis 35 235 270 12.9 

Holliday 9 ·335 344 2 •. 6 

Roosevelt 9 ' 491 500 1.7 

ca2eer 1 407 408 2 

Total m 2,~2z 2.847 11.2 

Rec: supp. vol. II at·l86 (Lamson Report). This information also · {footnote contiQued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 121 
n.l. In the 1955-56 school year, black elementary student~ 

attended 18 .out of 23 elementary schools. Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 

1293. At the elementary school level, the total black student 

population wa~ 10.4% and three schools were 90+% bl ack (Buchanan, 

Monroe and Washi ngton). See supra note 9. 45.6% o f the black 

elementary students attended these three schools. Id. Thirteen 

elementary schools were 90+% white. Id. At the ju?ior high 

school level, the total black student population was estimated to 

be 11.2%. See supra note 10. There were. no 90+% black junio~ 

high schools, but 3 schools were 90+% white (Hol l i day , Roosevel t & 

Capper). 

In the 1968-69 school year, the school board operated 34 

elementary school~, 11 11 junior high schoolsl 2 and 3 high 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

appears in supp. val. XI at 186. Although Mr . Lamson 's report 

appears in a pleading at supp. vol. II, I ordered s upp. vol . XI, 

which is the report as admitted i nto evidence by t he district 

cou . .i:t. Henceforth, I' will refer to the report as contained in 

supp. vol. XI. · 

11 

Racial Inventory of USD 501 Elementary Students 

School Year 1968-69 

School Minority White Total % 

Av·ondale East 107 445 552 

Avondale Southwest 14 457 471 

Avondale West 7 568 575 

Belvoir 294 224 518 

Bishop 15 488 503 

Central Park 65 - 298 363 

Clay ·46 '180 226 

Crestview 5 525 530 

Gage 2 393 395 

Grant 121 215 336 

H. P. Central 140 533 673 

(footnote continued on 

-27-

Minority 

1-9. 38 

2.97 

1.22 

56.76 

2.98 

17.91 

20.35 

0.94 

0.51 

36.01 

20.80 

next· page) 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 122 
schools, 13 having added Highland Park High School in 1959 through 

annexation and Topeka West High School in 1961 through 

coristruction. Rec. ex. vol. IV at 64; supp. vo1. XI at 225. The 

(footnote continued from 

H. P . North 

H. P. South 

Hudson 

Lafayette 

Linn 

Lowman Hill 

Lundgren 

McCarter 

McClure 

McEachron 

Monroe 

Parkdale 

Polk 

Potwin 

·Quincy 

Quinton Heights 

Randolph 

Rice· 

·sheldon 

State Street 

Stout 

Sumner 

Whi·tson 

Total 

previous 

145 

. 37 

23 

275 

35 

174 

7 

3 

3 

6 

172 

377 

30 

5 

61 

103 

3 

30 

17 

155 

7 

38 

3 

2.525 

Rec. ax. vol. IV at 62-63; 

12 

page) 

368 

570 

312 

247 

369 

210 

395 

548 

493 

471 

58 

38 

174 

362 

313 

192 

521 

293 

287 

400 

365 

248 

433 

1L993 

513 

607 

335 

522 

404 

384 

402 

551 

496 

477 

230 

415 

204 

367 

374 

295 

524 

323 ' 

304 

55.5 

372 

286 

436 

14.518 

28.27 

6.10 

6.87 

.52. 68 

8.66 

45.31 

1. 74 

o.s4 

0.60 

1.26 

74.78 

90.84 

14.71 

1.36 

16.31 

34.92 

0.57 

9.29 

5.59 

27.93 

1.88 

13.29 

·o. 69 

17.39 

Racial Inventory of USD 501 Junior High Students · School Year 1968-69 

School 

Boswell · Capper 

Crane 

Curtis 

East Topeka 

Eisenhower 

Highland Par k 

Holliday 

Jardine 

Minority White 

85 490 

2 565 

133 201 

83 169 

339 222 

47 476 

111 444 

89 324 

12 896 

(footnote 

-28-

Total %· Minority 

575 14. 78 

567 0.35 

334 39. 82' 

252 32.94 

561 60.43 

523 8.99 

555 20.00 

413 21.55 

908 1.32 

continued on next page) 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 123 
system had 25,737 students. Rec. ex. vol. IV at 65: see supra 

note 8. Three of the four initially de jure black elementary 

schools had been closed by the 1968-69 school year. McKinley was 

. . 

closed in 1955, Buchanan in 1959, and Washington in 1962. Brown, 

671 F. Supp. at 1293. Monroe, the only remaining de jure black 

elementary school (Monroe) had an enrollment which was 25%.white. 

Id. At the elementary school level, the iota! minorityl 4 student 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

Landon 7 500 507 1. 38 

Roosevelt __n_ 445 472 5.72 

Total m . 4,732 5, §21 . 16.50 

Rec. ex. vol. I.V at 64. 

13 

Racial Inventory of USD· 501 Seni·or High Students 

School Year i968-69 

School Minority · White Total % Minority 

Highland Park 220 1,202 . 1,422 15.47 

Topeka 584 1,480 2,064 28.29 

Topeka West 10 1,552 1,562 0.64 

Total w 4,:234 .s.o4a 16·.13 

Rec. ex. VOL IV at 65. 

14 .The initial data concerning the 1955-56 school year only 

contained information about black and white enrollment. As noted 

in the court's opinion at 12 n.9, in years subsequent to 1966, the 

board began keeping data on whites and minorities more broadly 

defined. See·rec. vol. IV at 432. Cont·rary to the court's 

assertion, however, it is far from clear that the "parties are in 

agreement that th~ difference between black and minority students 

is not significant." Id.; see rec. vol. IV at 562, 566 & 572. 

Minority students in 1985-8~umber 3,919 (25.95%) of the 15,103 

students. Of the minority amount,. 2,784 (18.43%) are black; 758 

( 5. 02%} are hispanic; 240 { 1. 59%) are American Indian; and 137 . ( .91%). are Asian American. Rec. ex. vol. IV at 181. 

In Dowell v. Board of Educ., No. 88-1067, slip op. at 7, 7 

n.2, 22, 32, 44 (lOth Cir. filed Oct. 6, 1989), this court. 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 124 
population was 17.39%.minority (12 .40% black), and one $Chool 

(Parkdale) was 90+% minority and three.others were 50+% minority . . 

(Belvoir, Lafayette , Monroe). See supra note 11. Eighteen 

elementary schools wer e 90+% white. Id . At th~ junior high 

school l evel, the ·total. rninority student population was 1 6 . 50% 

(11.81% black) . See supra note 12 . There were no ·90+% black 

junior high schools, but five juni or high schools were 90+% white 

(Capper, Eisenhower, Jardine, Landon & R6osevelt) . Id. There 

wer e no 90+% black high schools, but one high school ~as 90+% 

white (Topeka West). See supra note 13. Minority students 

attended every school in the ~istrict, but in widely varyirig 

numbers. See supra notes 11-13. 

In 1971, the Supreme Court provided greater guidance for the 

remedial phase of desegregation. Swann , 402 u.s. at 18. The 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system was considerably larger than 

the ·Topeka system, with an enrollment of more than· 84 , 0QO and ·107 

schools. Id. at 6. The racial composition was 71% white and 29~ 

black. To support liability, the Supreme Court mentioned that 

two-thirds of 21,000 black students in Charlotte city schools 

att ended 21 schools which were 99+% black . Id. at 7 . The 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

declined to aggregate the number of minority students of different 

races for .purposes of analyzi ng the racial composi tion of the 

Oklahoma City elementary schools. See id. dissent at 10-19 

(Baldock, J., dissenting) (arguing that aggrega t i on appropriate). 

The Supreme Court has indicated that minority groups should be 

treated together for the purpose of applying desegregation law. See Keyes, 413 u.s. at 195-98. Thus , the court's approach to 

aggregat i on in this cas e is consi stent with Supreme Cour t 

authori ty, but inconsistent with "our own precedent in Dowel l. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 125 
district court's objective was to have ·the schools approximate the 

racial composition of the system, 71% white and 29% black. Id. at 

9-10 n.4. To that end, the district court endorsed a plan that 

called for busing .to achieve schools 9% · to 38% black. Id. at 9 •· 

As a remedial phase case, Swann is import ant because it 

speaks "to what extent racial balanc~ or racial quotas. may be used 

. as an i mplement ·in a remedial order to correct a previously 

segregated system." Id. at 22. The school b_oard argue-d that the 

district cour.t erred by seeking racial balance in the 71%-29% 

range for each school. Id. at 23. The Court recognized that the 

district court's "use • . •. of .mathematica1 ratios was no more 

than a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather 

than an inflexiole require~entr" and was within th~ district 

court's equitable discretion. Id. at 25. 

The Court spoke to whether there is any constitutional 

re~u rement of r~cial balance. 

If we were to read the holding of the District Court to 

require, as a matter of substantive constitutional 

right, any particular degree of 'racial balance or 

mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would 

be obliged to reverse. The constitutional command to 

desegregate the schools does not mean that eve ry school 

i n the community must always reflect the raci al 

composition of the school system as a whole. 

Id. at 24. This is of paramount importance for this case because , 

despite the court's citation of this principle, see Court's 

Opinion at 20., 85-86, 87, the court has not allowed it t o operate. 

Rather, even after the Tope~a board has implemented f.ully two 

desegregation plans and the system "improved dramatically in the 

last ten years as far as desegregation is concerned,''· Court's 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 126 
Opinion at 61, the .liability fbcus of the plaintiffs. and the court 

is unmistakably on the principle that more could have been done t o 

achieve greater racial balance, that is more schools could 

·approach the system-wide minor.ity average in student assignment. 

See ·court's Opinion at 58-59, 6 2-64, 7 4-:-8 2 (analyzing. schools 

which plaintiffs suggest hav·e "clear racia l identit.ies," id. at 

74, and essentially criticizing school board decisions which 

resulted in these schools not approx~mating the system-wide 

average of minority students). However, "t~e fact that a school 

board's desegregation plan leaves some disparity in racial balance 

among various schools in the system does not alone make that plan 

unacceptable .• " Wright ·v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 

451, 464 (1972) (foqtn9te· omitted). 

Equally .important for this case is the Supreme Court's 

discussion ·in Swann of "wheth~r every all-Negro and all-white 

school ·must be eliminated as an indispensabl.e part of a remedial 

·process of desegregation." Swann, 402 U.S. at 22. In a section 

entitled "One-Race Schools," the Court applied a common.-sense 

approach to the problem of racial concentration in various parts 

of a metropoli tan area. 

The record in this case reveals the familiar 

phenomenon that in metropolitan areas minority groups 

are often found concentrated in one part of the city. 

In some circumstances certain schools may remain all or 

l argely of one race until new schools can be provi ded or 

neighborhood patterns change. School s al l or 

predominately of one race in a district of mixed 

population will require close scrutiny to determi ne that 

school assignments are not part of·state-enforced 

segregation. · 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 127 
( 

\ 

In light of the above, it should be clear that the 

existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually 

one-race, schools within a distri c t is not in and of 

itself the mark of a system that still practices 

segregation by law. The district judge or school 

authorities should make every effort to achieve ' the 

greatest possible degree of actual desegregation and ~ill thus necess~rily be concerned with the elimination 

of one-race schools. 

Id. at 25-26.. When there has been intentional ·segregati on in the 

past, there is a presumption against schools that are one-race 

minority or virtually one~race minority, and the school board has 

the burden of showing assignment is genuinely nondiscriminatory. 

Id. at 26; Price, 694 F.2d at 353-56. The district court 

recognized this presumption, ·although it noted that t his case does 

not "fit the Swann presumption easily." Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 

1295. Even though the proportion of mino~ity students iri this 

system is smaller than in many cases and t here are no one-race 

minority or virtually one-race minority schools, the literal Swann 

presumption could be applied to ·the 90+( white schools~ See Price 

694 F.2d ~t 364-65. 

This court acknowledges the critical i mportance of a finding 

of ,;one-race" schools to support a current condition of 

segregation and liability overall. · Court 's Opinion at 19-20. The 

court correctly notes. that the significance of "one-race" white 

schools in this case is limited because of Topeka's l~r ge majority 

white student population (74.05% in 1985). rd. at 41-42; see also 

·Price, 694 F.2d at 364-65 ~recognizing major purpose behind school 

.desegregation £ases is to secu!e rights of minority groups; 

literal compliance with Swann may not be required 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 128 
~hen system is heavily white and all schools are· majo!ity white). 

But the court . departs from Swann when it i~poses l iability on the 

basis of student assignment in the absence . of "one-race". rniilori ty 

schools ~r a di~trict 90urt finding of current. intentional. 

segregation. This court imposes liability f,or a lack of racial 

balance, while virtually ignoring the demographic testimony of 

defendants' expert (and other evi4ence· adduced by the deferidants),_ 

which was credited by the d istrict court. See Court' s Opinion at 

41-42 n.52 ("In~ school system with a 26% minority student 

· population, we . think the number of schools in Topeka t hat approach 

or are over the 50% minority mark constitute persuasive evidehce 

that the school system has .not met its duty to desegregate.") 

{ernpha~i~ ~dded) • 

.. 

In 1973, the Supreme Court added an important presumption 

which expanded the consequenc'es of a current condition of 

intentional segregation in any: part.of a school system. Keyes,. 

413 u.s. at 208. The district court irt that case had found 

contemporary and intentional segregation, including student and 

teacher assignrne.nt, with respect to schools in the Park. Hill area 

in Denver , which were attended by_almost. 38% of the bl ack student 

population. Id. at 199. Blacks comprised 14% of the students in 

the system~ hispanics comptised 20%; for a iystem minority 

popula tion of 34% ~ Id. at 195. Three of five elementary schools 

in the Park Hi1J,. area were 89+% minority; ·one ju-nior high was 76+% 

minority and the other was 96+% minority. Id. at 199 n.lO. Near 

Park Hill were 22 core city .schools, all 22 were 70+ % minority and 

-.34-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 129 
11 were 90+% black . . The district court and the court of appeals 

essentially required independent proof that the core city schools 

were a product of official segregation. Id. at 205. The Court 

stated: 

[W )e hol~ that a finding of intentionally segregative 

school board actions in a meaningful portion of · a school 

system, as ~n this case, creates a presumption that 

other segregated schooling within the system is not 

adventi tious. It establishes, in other words, a prima 

facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of 

school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the 

burden of proving that other segregated schools within 

the system are not also .the result of intentionally 

segregative actions. 

Id. at 208. The Court emphasized that purpose or intent to 

segregate is what differentiates actionable de jur.e segregation 

from de facto segregation. Id. Thus, plaintiffs would be 

entitled to the Keyes presumption - upon a showin~ of purposeful 

segregation in a meaningful part of the school system. Id. at 

208-09. As noted-, once the presumption is invoked, the defendant 

school board muat come forward wifh evidence showing that .''the 

existence of subsequent or other segregated schooling within the 

same system • • • is not also the result of_ intentionally 

segregative acts. " Keyes, 413 u.s. at 210. The school board ~ust 

either disprove segregative intent or show "that i ts past 

segregative act~ did not create or. contribute to the current 

segregated condition." Id. at 211. 

The framework in Keyes formed the basis for the Court's 

decision~ in Columbus and Dayton II. These cases held that if a 

school board was operating a dual school system i n 1954, even 

absent a state pr_ovision so allowing, a plaintiff may satisfy his 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 130 
initial burden of .proof by relying- upon evidence of "recent and 

·:remote intentionally segregative actions" of the school board • 

. columbus, 443 u.s. at 463-65 (emphasis added); see Dayton II, 443 

u.s. at 537 • . In both cases, the affirmative duty to eradicate the 

effects of past segregative con~uct not only had been unfulfilled, 

but also segre-gative ·practices persisted. Columbus, 443 u.s. at 

460~63; Dayton II, 443 u~s. · at 537. Either type of violation 

would satisfy the intent requirement under the fourteenth 

amendment; the basis for a system-wi~e remedy was "purposefully 

segregative practices with current segregative impact." Columbus, 

443 u.s. at 46~r Dayton II, 443 u.s .. at 537-38. 

This court questions the applicability of Keyes and Columbus 

Because those cases involved initial determinations of liabilit~ 

concerning ~olicy-based dual, ~ather than statutorily dual, school 

systems·. See Court's Opinion at 25. The court ex~lains that the 

presumption · developed in Keyes is limited only "to establish[ing) 

initial de jure s.egregation in a ·case where no statutorily 

mandated segregation exists." Court's Opinion at 26 n.27; see 

also Columbu~, 443 U.S. at 458 (using Keyes presumption to 

establish system-wide segregation i n 1954); Dayton II, 443 U.S. a t 

535 (same) . According to the court, a different presumption 

"applies . i • after eithei statutorily-mandated or policy~based 

de jure segregation has been established." Court's Opinion at 26 

n.27. The 6ourt then cites Dayto~~I in a later discussion for -

support. Court's Opinion at 26. However, like Columbus, Dayton 

II involved an initial determina ion of system-wide liability · in 

Ohio where statutorily mandated segregation ceased after 1888. 

- 36-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 131 
443 U.S . at 534-35, 537~ Columbus, 443 U.S. at 455-56, 455 n.4. 

Segregation by official policy, not by statute, was at issue. 

· In both Columbus and Dayt on II; the -Keyes presumption was 

employed to decree a current system-wide remedy.on the basis of 

recent and remote purposefully segregative action, including the 

failure to satisfy the affirmative duty to eliminate a dual 

system. Columb~s, 443 u.s. at 467-68 (discussing use of Keyes); 

Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 537 (citing Keyes) , 443 u.s. at 534, 541-42 

(consequences of 1954 dual system and intentionally segregative 

eff~6t of actions since 1954 furnished basis of liability). Thus, 

the supreme Couit not 6nly affir~ed lower court findings of 

officially dual school systems as of 1954, but also approved 

current system-wide · remedies .based upon the authority of Keyes·. 

Columbus, 443 u.s. at 467-68. 

III. 

In 1973, an action was filed against U.S.D. 501 and various 

'other governmental defendants principally alleging that children 

in east and north Topeka (with higher -concentrations of minority 

students) received inferior educational opportunities and 

facilities as compared to children in west and south Topeka . 

Johnson v. Whitt ier, No. T-5430 {D. Kan ~ filed Sept. 10 , 1973). 

The filing of Johnson led to an investigation in November and 

December of 1973, by the u.s. Department of Health, Education and 

Welfare (HEW) to determine whether U.S.D. 501 was in compliance 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 132 
with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. 

§ 2000(d). Rec. ex. vel. II at 30 . 

In Janua~y 1974 , HEW released its findings by letter. The 

findings of HEW are very similar to the plaintiffs' allegations in 

this case. Specifically, HEW determined four areas of 

non-compliance . First, HEW claimed that a "substantial number 

of ••• schools continue to operate with student racial 

compositions not consonant with a unitary plan of s~uden t 

assignment capable of.fully desegregating [the] di strict ." Rec. 

ex . vol. V at ·l3. HEW found that five elementary schools "have 

substantially disproportionate minority student compositions 

clearly the result of a former dual pattern of operation.'' • rd. 

The schools and minority percentages were: Monro.e ( 73. 98%), 

Lafayette (61.22%), Lowman Hill (49 .08), Parkda le (91.81%) and 

Belvoir (71.90%). Id .; rec. ex. vol. II at 72 . Second , optional 

attendance zones were criticized. In the "most extreme" (a nd 

only) case mentioned "students transferring from areas outside the 

Lafayette attendance area constitute approximately one-third of 

the minority enrollment." Rec. ex . vol. Vat 1~. Thus , HEW was 

concern~d with transf ers by min6rities to schools with already· 

high minority percentages. Third, HEW found that juni or high 

school facilities in schools with higher minority percentages 

(Crane, 50.85%; Curtis, 28.90%; East Topeka, 63.32%; and Highland 

· Park, 27.16 %) generally were infer i 'or to and older than the four 

schools with the lowest percenta~e of minority enrollment (French, 

2.97%; Landon , 1 . 89% , Ja rdine , 2.13% and Capper, 1 . 23%) . Id . at 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 133 
13-14: rec. ex. vol. IV at 84 (1973-74. ra6ial inventory). Fourth, 

HEW found that a larger percentage of minority students, as 

compared to. white students, attended elementary schools with 

inadequate kindergarten rooms and smaller library med i a centers. 

Rec. ex. vol. V at 1 4; vol. X at 1435. 

In Februa~y 1974, the board, while not ·admitt ing liability, 

directed its administrative staff to develop a plan for compliance 

which could include reassigning students, redefining attendance 

areas, closing- schools and constructing new or mod ify i ng existing 

faci l ities • . Rec. ex. vol. · II at ]2. The pl an deve l oped by the 

staff was presented in April 1974, and called for changing the 

attendance areas of 22 schools and closing 7 schoors. Id. A 

concerned parents group complained· about the lack of .parental 

involvement and -sought to be involved in the development of any 

plan. Id. at 74. -- - Unlike a federal court, a democratically 

- - elected school -board- is charged with· listening to parent al 

conc~rns. The plan prepared by the staff was not adopted. Id. at 

80. Instead, the board unanimously rejected the plan as creating 

inconvenience and hardship while lowering the qual i ty of 

education. Id. at 80, 82. The board resolved that the "District 

determine if inequality of educati onal opport unit i es exist, and i f 

so,. take the remedial steps necessary to _rectify the sam~,_ 

retaining the neighbo~hood school concept wherever possible." Id. 

at 80~ 

In June 1974, HEW initiated formal administra t ive proceedings 

to terminate federal funds for the district's a l l eged lack of 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 134 
compliance with Title VI. See In re Topeka Unified School 

District No. 501, HEW Docket No. S-79. In the Notice of 

Opportunity for Hearing, HEW's litigating position unfolded. Rec. 

ex. vol. v at 150-58. HEW alleged that Topeka never ·fully 

desegregated its elementary and junior high schools as required by 

Brown I and that there were a substantiar number of schools that 

were "one-race, virtually one-race, or substantially . 

disproportionate in student racial composition.~• Id. at 155 (~~ 

13, 13). In addition to .allegiqg a dual system with respect to 

student assignment and facilities, HEW claimed that the school 

district "has continued to assign faculty in a manner which 

reinforces the racial identity of its substantially 

dispr~portionat~ and one-race schools.~ id. at ' 14. 

The boar.d went to federal court and sought to enjoin HEW from 

holding the hearing and cutting off federa l funds. The board took 

the position that the entire Topeka system was still under the . . 

1955 order to comply with Brown I. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 

84 F.R.D. 383, 390-:-91 (D. Kan. 1979). The district judge agreed 

and concluded that the district court was the proper forum for 

resolving desegregation claims. Id. at 391 . ·The board then 

developed a short-range facilities plan which resulted in the 

closing of two elementary scho.ols (Clay, 25.35% minor ity 

percentage, and Monroe, 82.73%) and two junior high schools 

(Ciane, 52.85%, and Curtis, .25.64%), all at the end of the 1974-75 

school year. Rec. ex. vol. II at 90-92, 96; ex. vol IV. at 87-88; 

vol. X at 1436. Monroe Elementary was the ' last formerly de jure 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 135 
black school, and it·was closed at the end of the 1974-75 school 

year. Rec. ex. vol . II at 84, 90. Ironically, the board hired 

Dr. Gordon Foster, assisted by Mr. Lamson, who presented alternate 

suggestions. These parties became the plaintiffs' lead expert 

witnesses in this case. 

By May ·1975, the ·board hacj adopted an affirmative action 

- plan, and approved the creation of a citizens' adviso ry ·committee 

and a specialized learning center to "be operated in a manner 

intended to encourage integration among minority and majority 

studenfs. " Rec. ex. vol. II at 94: ex. vol. IV at 3-8~ vol •. X at 

. 1449-52. All of these programs are still in place, .i ncluding the 

learning center which is know~ as the Topeka Adventure ·center. 15 

See Brown, o7l -F. Supp. at 1~09 (discussi~g Adventure Center). 

In March 1976, a divided board ado~ted a long~ta nge 

faci lities plan, after sharing the proposal with and receiving 

input from the advisory committee and· the . cominunity. Rec . ex. 

vol. II at 96, 99; vol. X ~t 1437. The pl~n was a major 

restructuring of the Topeka schools and it required five years for 

implementation due ·to budgetary limitations (cost of capital 

improvements) and to avoid a reduction in force. Rec. ex. vol . II 

at 97-98; rec. vol. X at 1454-55 (deputy·superintendent Henson). 

The Adventure Center see.ks to emula te adult society by 

combining students from five or six different schools from various 

parts of Topeka and assigning the students various jobs in a model 

economy. Rec. supp. vol. VII at 2109-10, 2144. In the Adventure 

Center, all students become -productive members of society by 

holding various "salaried" jobs. rd. at 2110. Students in third 

grade s·pend two days a year at the Adventure Center; students in 

fifth grade spend two weeks, and all students participate. Id~ at 

2107. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 136 
The plan had three purposes: economic efficiency resulting in 

better conditions for students and staff alike, educational 

efficiency with respect to facilities and improvement of racial 

composition in the schools. Rec. ·vol. X at 1439. Board member 

· Stratton16 ~oted that financial conc~rns were important because of 

declining enrollment-~the district had lost almost one-quarter of 

its enrollment (6,000 students) in five years. Rec. ex. vol. II 

at 97. Board member Hurd noted the overwhelming support in the 

community for the neighborhood school concept. Id. at 98. The 

plan cont~mpla ted the construction of new schools, the ·closing ~f 

older facilities, and the redrawing of attendance boundaries, 

taking into consideration the anticipated effects on .the racial 

composition of the sch.ools. ·For our p·urposes, the principal 

components of the plan, which this · court refers t6 as. a "brief 

flurry of action," Court • s Opinion at 53, included: · eliminat~on 

of all remaining ·6ptional attendance areas; closure. of five junior 

. . high schools (Boswell,. Capper, East Topeka, Highland Park and 

Roosevelt); transfer of the ninth grade to the senior high schools 

16 It is easy to criticize the performance of school board -members, but far · more d~fficult to be a school board member facing difficult choices. For example, in adopting the long-range 

facilities plan, Mr. Stratton· said: 

It is very difficult to be able to satisfy all wishes of 

the patrons of the district. I think about all a Board 

Member can do is attempt to weigh the interests of each 

individual, not only the students or. parents of a 

district but also other people that live in the city, 

taxpayers, perhaps those who are on limited incomes and 

try to arrive at a decision which is as acceptable as 

possible. 

Rec. ex. vol. II at 97. Mr. Stratton testi~ied on behalf of the 

school board in this trial. Rec. vol. XII a t 2482 • 

.... 42-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 137 
in the 1980-81 school year, conversion of Central Park Elementary 

to a middle school and construction of a new middle school at the 

Holliday-State Street s}te; and the closure of six elementary 

schools (Central Park , Grant, Parkdale, Polk , Rice and Sheldon) •. 

Rec. ex. vol. II at 97-99, 100 (elimination of optional attendance 

zone at high scho6ls); rec. vel. X ~t 1439- 43 (discussion of 

middle school concept). In April , HEW officials came to Topeka 

for two days and discussed the. long-range facilities plan , .the 

capital improvements plan, th~ citizen's advisory group, the 

affirmative action plan and the Adventure Center. Rec. ex. vol. 

II at 101 . 

In September 1976, HEW moved to dismiss its·administrative 

enforcement proceedings on the grounds that the school district 

had "adopted a plan to remedy the violations of Title 

VI .. •• alleged in the Not ice of Opportunity for hearing in this 

matter.'' Id . at 175. An order of· dismissal without prejudice was 

entered. Id. at· 173 . In April 1979 , HEW receivea ·a complaint 

from Richa rd Gellar, M.D., alleging that the district's proposed 

closing of Central Park Elementary (which w~s to be converted into 

Robinson Middle School) '' could result in the segregated plac~ment 

of students within the District on the basis of race." Id . at 

181. Dr. Gellar than amended his complaint to allege that the 

implementation of the Long-Rarrge Facilities Plan '' has resulted in 

increased segregation of students in schools since 1976 ." Id. at 

184. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 138 
The Office of Civil Rights conducted an investigation and 

concluded that "there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that 

the District's pupil assignment practices implemented pursuant to 

the adoption of its Lon~ Range Facilities Plan olate ~itle VI.'' 

Id. at 185. The Office found that t he district was complying wi th 

the Long-Range Facil~ty Plan and ''reassigning students in a · 

· nondiscriminatory manner.". Id. at 186. The Office also concluded 

. . 

that an open enrollment poli~y, which permitted students to attend 

a school other than their neighborhood school, ''had not · 

significantly affected the racial composition ~f its schools at 

this time,~ bu~ continued monitoring was promised. Id. at.l87. 

The cbncern was that open enrollment would contribute to increased 

minority enrollments at schools wi~h high minority percentages •. 

During the sec6nd year of the open enrollment policy, the board · 

imposed a majority .to minority limitation on the program which 

~ssured that ~ransfers would only be approved if t bey enhance~ 

racial balance. See rec. vol. XIII at 2700-01. 

By the 1981-82 school year, the Long-Range Facilities Plan 

was implemented. Due to the conversion to middle schools, 

approximately 190 teachers were -reassigned in 1980 "to achieve a 

distribution of minority staff members which wi ll comply wi th the 

requirements of the law." Rec. ·ex. vol. IV at 218. rn -1981-82, 

the board operated 26 elementary schools, 6 middle schools, and 3 

high schools. See infra note 18. The administrative staff 

designed the Long-Range Plan to have ·an integrative effect as the 

distri9t court apparently recogn i zed, but this court i gnores. 

-44-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 139 
Rec. vol. X at 14&0-1461, XIII at 2719 (deputy superintendent 

Henson); Brown 671 F. Supp. at 1299-1300. For example, the junior 

high school areas formerly served by East Topeka (71.4% minority 

in 1979), were combined with those of Holliday and Curtis (lower 

minority percentages), to be served by Chase Middle School which 

opened in 1980 with 38.5% minority students. Rec. vol. IV at 

106, 110, X at 1461, XIII at 2722. Rice Elementary (33.6% 

minority in 1980), w~ich the district court noted had a desirable 

racial balance, 671 F. Supp. at 1299, was closed, but its 

attendance area was divided between Lafay et t~ and Belvoir , thereby 

reducing the minority percentage in these schools. Rec. ex. vol. 

IV at 109; vol. X at 1461;.vol. XIII at 2721. Lafayette went from 

61.3% minority to 56%, while Belvoir went from 75.6% to· 62.8% 

minority. Rec. ex. vol. IV at 109, 122. Likewise( the closing of 

Crane Junior High (52.9% minority in 1974) resulted in most of 

those student~ ~ttending Bo~well which inc~eased minority ~tudents 

·from 14.6% to 28.5%. Id. at 88, 91. Then Boswell (42.5% minority 

in 1979) was combined with Roosevelt (1.9.5% minori ty. in 1979), and 

.. 

all students were sent to the new Robinson Middle School which 

opened with 32 .9% minority students. Id. at 106, 110;. rec. vol. 

XIII .at 2722-23. Moreover, this court points out that "the target 

minority percentages approved by HEW in 1976-have eithei been met 

or improved on." Court's Opinion at 62-63 n.76. 17 

17 The court points out that "HEW did not appr9ve ·the projected 

enrollments of more than 70% minority for Lafayette or Belvoir." ·court's Opinion at 62-63 n.76 (citing rec. ex. vol. II at 173) 

(letter from school board attorney to HEW summarizing proposed 

(footnote continued on next .page} 

-45-· 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 140 
With one exception resulting in the combination of two middle 

schools (Landon into French), the . school boundaries for U.S.D .. ~01 

remained constant from the 1981-82 school year until the end of 

the 1985-86 school year. Rec. vol. X at 1503-04. All schools 

remained open and the grade configurations remained the same. 

Thus, in analyzing whether there is a current condition of 

· segregation, the dist~ict court had stable boundaries for· a 

five-year pe r iod and could analyze data which was consistent 

(compiled the · same way) and comparable (measuring the same 

phenomenon). What is apparent is that the racial composition 

.· r emained stable_, and even became more integrated·, given· slightly 

incireased minority .enro1lment. 1B Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1298. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

agreement between u.s.o. 501 and HEW). Under the.plan, after t he 

closure of Parkdale Elementary, Belvoir was expected to be 74.6% 

minor ity, while Lafayette was expected to be 70.7%. Rec. ex . vol. 

Vat 37. The letter from the board~s lawyer concerning the 

agreement between HEW and t·he board .indicates that HEW . was· going 

to ''express its concern that Lafayette and Belvoi r Elementary 

Schools are expected to contain a disproportionate number of 

minority students" in a report to the district court . . No. such 

letter is ~ontained in the record designat ed. Moreovei, in 

1985-86, Belvoir was 62.78% minority and Lafayette was 56.08% 

minority, well below the plan. Rec~ ex. vol. IV at 170-71. 

18 

School 

·Avondale 

Avondale 

Belvoir 

Bishop 

Racial Inventory of USD 501 Students 

School Years 1985-1986 compared with 1981-82 

.East 

West 

Elementary Schools 1985-86 

Minority White 

128 162 

45 226 

146 90 

36 306 

Total 

290 

271 

236 

342 

(footnote 

-46-

1985-86 1981-82 

~ Minority ! Mi nority 

44. 14 

16.61 

61.86 

10 .53 

continued 

35.18 

15.91 

62.78 . 

10 . 18 

on next page) 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 141 
IV. 

Having discussed the two desegregati on ' plans completely 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

Crestview 32 326 358 · 8.94 5.85 

Gage 25 240 265 9.43 7.92 

H. P. .central 140 259 399 35.09 35.58 

H. P. North 179 130 309 57.93 60.90 

H. P. South ~10 283 393 27.99 29.98 

Hudson 108. 124 232 46.55 38.26 

Lafayette 217 165 382 56.81 56.08 

Linn 57 137 194 29.38 31.44 

·Lowman Hill 155 215 370 41.89 41.79 

Lundgren 38 202 240 ·1 5 0 83 12 .99 

McCarter 35 347 382 9.16 9.20 

McClure 23 296 319 7.21 3.23 

McEachron 30 261 291 10.31 9.06 

Potwin 18 215 233 7.73 5.16 

Quincy 61 236 297 20.54 16.47 

Quinton Heights 129 132 261 49 .• '43 56.18 

Randolph 64 368 432 . 14.81 10 . 87 

Shaner . 71 272 343 20.70 19.37 

State Street 78 219. 297 26.26 25.71 

Stout 88 240 328 26.83 26.30 

Sumner 90 196 286 31.47 36.36 

Whi tson 38 334 372 10.22 8.29 

-El em . Total ,,l~ l ~' 2~1 . a,1,, 26.~6 25.22 

Middle Schools 1985-86 

1985-86 1981-82 

School Minority White Total % Minority % Minori t y - ~-

Chase 105 209 314 33.44 . 3 4. 1 5 

Ei.senhower 218 230 448 48.66 45.71 

French 1'6 241 257 6.23 5.49 

Jardine 57 273 330 17.27 12.41 

Landon 21 205 226 9.29 6.29 

Robinson 115 288 403 28.54 33.18 

Middle School 

Totals m l, 446 1. 978 26.90 25.05 

senior High Schools 1985-86 

1985-86 1981-82 . -

( f.ootno te continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 142 
.implemented -by the board as the · law developed, I now contrast the 

district court findings with this court's understanding of' those 

findirigs. As an initial matter, it is useful to consjder the 

scope of the school board's affirmative duty to desegregate and 

the scope of our review of the district court's findings. 

A. 

This court tells us that "[w]hat more can and should be done, 

if anything, . is the final component in a determination of unitary 

status." Courf•s Opinion at 32 . It is up to the school d i stri ct 

to "demonstrate· that it has done everythi'ng feasible." Topeka has 

implemented two desegregation plans~ one court-ordered and one 

- effectively imposed by the federal government. Apparently, this 

court does not think that either plan counts for much, repeating 

in stentorian tone, that there is "no pattern to the changes over 

the years." Court's Opinion at 63~64 (e~phasis omitted). Past 

efforts do not conform to the court's vision of that which must be 

done. See id. at 63 ("The school district has unquestionably had 

the opportunity to draw up and execute a scheme designed to lead 

(footnote continued from previous page) School Minority White Total % Minority ! Minority 

Highland Park 

High 427 845 1,272 33.57 39.81 

Topeka High 498 1 ,.113 1,611 30.91 32.52 

Topeka West 120 1,391 1!511 7.94 5.25 

Senior High 

Totals J,,Q~~ ~,J4~ 4,J~4 23.78 25.92 

Rec.·ex. vol. IV at 122-129, 170-177. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 143 
to comprehensive desegregation.'') (emphasis added). This court is 

unable· to see .the desegregative effect of many changes because it 

has strayed far beyond the. purpose of desegregation. law. 

To comply with fed~ral constitutional standards, the purpose 

of ~ desegregat~on plan, whether voluntary or decreed, is to 

eliminate an unconstitutional dual syste~ and its vestiges arising 

from state-impo~ed segregation. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15, 28. A 

desegregation plan should be matched with the nature and scope of 

the constitutional· violation. Id. at 16; ~ also Pasadena, 427 

u.s. at 434; Milliken v. Bradl ey (Milliken I), 418 u.s. 717, 738 

{1974). The plan should be remedial, designed to restore the 

victims of discriminatory conduct to ~he position they would have 

. . 

beeri in had the discriminatory conduct not ~ccurred. Milliken I 

at 746. And i~ evaluating the plan, the intrinsic value of state 

and local control of public education should be considered. 

Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 410. To those three ends, Mi lliken ~ 433 

u~s. · at 280-81, a voluntary plan should acco~piish the most 

desegregation feasible. · Feasibility includes not only geographic 

factors, but also funding and transportation factors. Lee v. 

Anniston City School System, 737 F.2d 952, 957 {11th Cir. 1984). 

"The effectiveness of .a remedy is the question and it makes no 

sense to co'nstruct decrees that do not gras.p the real world." 

United States v. Pittman, 808 F.2d 385, 394 (5th Cir. 1987} 

{Higginbotham, J., concurring). Or, as stated by the First 

Circuit: "A realistic approach, moreover, serves the broader 

objective of ensuring that the courts do not intervene in school 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 144 
affairs any longer ·than is strictly necessary." Morgan, 831 F.2d 

a t 324. 

Thus, unitary or desegregated status does not mean that every 

school must approach the system-wide aver~ge of minority 

composi tion. As noted by the Fifth Circuit : 

The constitution does not require school districts 

to achieve maximum desegregation; that the plan does not 

result in the most desegregation possible does not mean 

that the plan is flawed constitutionally. "The 

constitutional command to desegregate the schools does 

not mean that every school in the community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a 

whole." [Swann, 402 u.s. at 24.). . "The school board 's 

constitutional duty is to cure the continuing effects of 

the dual system, not to achieve an ideal racial b~lance." [Lee v. Tuscaloosa City School System, 576 

F.2d 39, 41 (5th Cir. ·1978 ).]. 

Monteilh v. St. Landry Pa!ish School Bd., . 848 F.2d 625, 632 (5th 

Cir. 1988) (foot.notes omitted); .accord Morgan~ 831 F.2d at 325 

("Both. the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly stated 

that · a judicially . imposed desegregation remedy goes too far if i t 

attempts to ·engineer ·some sort of idealized r·acial balance in .the 

schools."); Flax v. Potts, 864 F.2d 1157, 1160 {5th Cir. 1989) 

("There is no constitutional mandate that each school in the 

school district reflect the racial c.omposition of the school 

district as a whole."); Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1427 

(11th Cir. 1985} ("We do not hold, how~ver, that. the defendants' 

affirmative .duty compels them to adopt the most desegregative 

al.terriati ve available."); ~, 7 37 F. 2d 95~-57. 

When the constitutional violation is purposeful separation of 

the .races caused by school officials in ~tudent and faculty/staff 

assignment, ''[t ]he mix that would have occurred but for the rac i sm 

-soAppellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 145 
is a- judicially created hypothetical." United States v. Overton, 

834 F.2d 1171, ~176 ·csth Cir. 1987). The remedy is to match the 

school system to a model of unitary or desegregated status. Id. 

at 1176-77. A _rnajor. focus of this court's liability analysis is 

on schools which are predominantly white due to residential 

migration to the ~estern part of Topeka. But the dominant purpose 

of desegregation law is to remedy the racial discrimination 

against minority groups, discrimination which was ineluctably part 

of a- de jure system. See Price, 694 F.2d at- 364-65. Merely 

because some schools are largely white in this predominantly white 

- -

system is not "per se offensive to the Constituti6n ." Valley v. 

Rapides Parish School Bd., 702 F. 2d 1221, 1226 (5th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 464 U.S. 914 (1983). What would be offensive to .the 

Constitution would be the retention of all-minori t y or virtually 

all-minority schools "where reasonable alternatives may be 

.implemented." Id. (quoted in Monteilh , 848 F.2d _at 633); see, 

~, United States v. Pittman, 808 F.2d 385, 391 (5th Cir. 1987) 

(rejecting magnet school plan which did not eliminate 2 one-race 

black schools serving 40% of the black elementary ~tud~nts). 

Given the district court's findings, that condition is not present 

here because: 1) there are no all-minority or virtually 

all-minority schools in this system, -and 2) those. schools which 

have higher -than - average concentrations of minority students are 

not due to the effect of segr~gative actions by the defendants 

given the well-supported findings of the district court. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 146 
The·court also indicates its concern with the few schools 

which have majority-minori·ty or near majority-minority student 

enrollments, see supra note 18. Court's Opinion at 41-42 n.52, 

49-50 n.59. In a system which has achieved unitariness, a "no 

majority of any minority" requirement would be beyo:fld what the 

Constitution requires. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 

427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976). But even in a system which has not been 

declared unitary, the lack of absolute racial balance which is not 

attributable to the school board ·is not tantamount to hindering 

the process of d~segregation. 

B. 

Although this case involves constitutional clai ms of racial 

. segregation by school officials, it is essential to keep in mind 

the proper division of functions between this court and the 

· district court. Dayton v. Board of Educ. (Dayton ~1, 433·u.s. 

406, 410-11 (1977). The district court is charged with he~ring 

the evidence and rendering findings of fact. Our task is to 

review those findings under the clearly erroneous standard, with 

due regard for the power which Congress has invested in the 

district courts to make such findings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a}. 

"The reviewing court oversteps the bounds ?f its duty under Rule 

52(a) · if it undertak~s to duplicate the ·role of the lower court." 

Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573. Overstep, we have! 

"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 

evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Fed. 

-52-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 147 
R. Civ. P. 52{a). A finding is clearly erroneous ''when although 

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed." United States v. United States 

Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (emphasis added). This 

standard is not a licens~ to ~eplace the district court's view of 

the evidence with that of the ·reviewing court: the reviewing court 

may not reverse merely because it would have viewed the evidence 

differently or ".given greater weight to certain evidence." SA J. 

Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice, '52.03[1] (1989): 

accord Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 

u.s. 844, 855-58 (1982); United States v. National Ass'h of Real 

Estate Bds., 339 u.s. 485, 495-96 (1950). "Where there are two 

permissible views -of the eviderice, the factfinder's choice between 

them cannot be.clearly erroneous." Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. 

Applying these standards, the district court should be affirmed. 

Ther·e is. "great value" in relying on the factual findings of 

the district court. Dayton II, 443 u.s. at 534-35 n.S. The 

intent inquiry in school desegregation litigation almost always 

concerns objective numerical evidence that is circumstantial, in 

addition to testimonial evidence by school officials and other 

desegregation experts. Givea the law; the intent inquiry in a 

desegregation case, including whether segregative intent from 1954 

and beyond remains due to non-compliance with the board's 

affirmative duty, "is an issue that can present very difficult and 

-53- . 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 148 
subtle factual questions." See Columbus, 443 u.s. at 470-71 

(Stewart, J., concurring in result). 

This court apparently views its initial inquiry, concerning a 

current· condition of segregation, as largely numerical. But 

"where numbers alone are insufficient tci define racially 

identifiable schools,•• the court invokes a broader form of racial 

identifiability which concerns ''demography, geography, and the 

individual history of particular schools and areas of the city,· .. 

to virtually assure liability. See Court's Opinion at 17-18, 21 . 

This approach is the one urged by plaintiffs~ expert, Mr. Lamson~ 

. See rec. vol. III at 285-286, vol. ~V at 459, 493-~4, 522. Whi l e 

it is indisputable that raqial identifiability may exist without 

reference to itudent assignment, and that faculty/~taf~ 

assignment, facilities cir extracurricular activities may result i n 

a school being racially identifiable, see Keyes, 413 U.S. at 196 

(citing Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 74)~ Swanri, 402 u~s. at 18; the 

court's expanded definitiori of racial identifi ability is not 

supported by several of the cases it cit~s. 9 Court's Opinion at 

1 9 Three of the four relevant cases cited by the court involve 

situations in which courts have looked beyond the number of 

one-race schools or other numerical indications of racial 

identifiability in student assignment, and have concluded that, 

due to other factors, there was not necessarily a constitutional 

violation. In Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 320 (1st Cir. 1987), 

the. court decid~d that out of 118 public schools in Boston, one 

90+% school or thirteen 80+% sch6bls (eight of which were 80+% 

black) would not preclude ~ finding of unitariness. In Price, 694 

F.2d at 348, 350, the court decided that merely because a school 

had an enrollment less than 6.6% or greater than 17.6% black, it 

was not necessarily a racially identifiable school because racial 

identifiability is a question of fact, not of law. The court a l so 

recognized that the existence of "all-white or virtually all-whi te 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 149 
21 n .25. 

The court justifies its· de frQYQ review of.the numerical data 

as follows: 

As a general ·matter, it is important to note that· much 

of the record evidence consists of statistics and other 

undisputed facts. Our differences with the district 

court lie mainly in how the essentially undisputed fact~ 

are assessed in light of the school district 's mandate 

to s~antle the segregated.school system. We believe 

that the district court's finding of unitariness i s 

flawed by the undue deference it gave to the school 

dist rict's neighborhood school policy and the court's 

failure to give the proper weight to its own findings 

that certain actions and omissions by the school 

district had a segregative effect . 

(footnote continued f rom previous .page) 

schools," in the various circumstanc~s of ten previous Fifth 

Circuit cases, did· not necessitate the finding of a constitutional 

violation·. Id. at · 365-66. In Carr v. Montgome ry· Coun ty Bd. of 

Educ., ·377 F. Supp. 1123, 1141 (M.D. Ala. 1974), aff' d , 511 F.2d 

1374 (5th ·cir.), cert. denied, 423 U •. S. 986 (1975) , the district cou~t deci~ed that .a ±15% variation from the syst -w~de average, · which would r~sul t in schools less ·than 33.5% or more ·than 63. 5% 

black bei ng ''racially identifiable," was "highly artificial.'·' Id . Certain schools which were "racially identifiable 11 under the 

fo;rml.J.la we r:e nonetheless appr.ov.ed. Thu~ , the factors the court 

cites,. "demography, geography, and the individual history of 

particular sQhools and areas of the city," Court's Opinion at 21 , 

often have been used to narrow constitutional liability, not 

expand it. · This court also cites Unit ed States v. Lawr ence County School 

Dist., 799 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir . 1986) , which appears to have 

decided as a matter of law that residential racial separation is 

generally a product of past· segr~gated schools. See id . at · 1 043-44. This approach was criticized by Judge Higg inbotham in 

his conc ~rriri g and dissenting opinion in Lawrence. Id. at 

1052-1060 (Higginbotham, J.,· concurring and dissenting) . 11Where numbe rs alone are insufficient to define racially identifiable schools," Court's Opinion at 21, ~here probably is 

not constitufional liability when it comes to student assignment. 

But , the cou rt's opi nion seems to say that, even in the absence of 

one-race schools or schools whichare "racially identifia ble" 

given some numerical standard , there still may be an unlawful· condition of segregation given 11 demography, g·eography and the 

individual history of part·icular schools and areas of the city." Id . 

. -55-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 150 
Id. at 40 (footnotes -omitted). The court then makes the rather 

incredible statement that, in reaching its decision, "we did not 

rely- upon the experts' opinions." Id. at 40 n.SO; compare id. a t 

41-42 n.52 ("In _a school-district with a 26% minqrity student 

population, we think the number of schools in Topeka that approach 

or are over the 50% minority mark constitut e persuasive evidence 

that the school system has not met its duty to desegregate.") with 

rec. val. V a~ 622-23 (Dr. Foster's citing .the presence of 3 

elementary schools which ar~ over 50% minority and 4 which are 

over 42% minority when asked ~is opinion of whether vestiges of 

the former dual s6hool system exist). 

The court contends that its disagreement with the district 

court merely concerns assessment of "essentially undisputed" 

facts, id. at 40, and of "basically uncontroverted evidence," id. 

at 40 n.SO; however, in no way can it be said that the 

implications of the nume.rical data in this case· were uncontested. 

Indeed, the month-long trial of this case belies tha~ notion. 

Moreover, the characterization of the numerical data is inherently 

. . . 

the province of the district court. 

In 1985, -the Supreme Court settled that· the clearly erroneous 

standard applies "even when the district court's findings do not 

rest on credibility determinations, but are based on physical or 

documentary evidence or inferences from other facts." Anderson, 

470 o.s. at 574. In 19~5, Rule 52 also was amended to encompass 

documentary evide·nce. The Advisory Committee addressed and 

rejected c.onsiderations offered in support of the view that it was 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 151 
-not necessary to give special deference to factua l determinations 

based on documentary evidence as oppo~ed to credibility 

determinations: 

These consider~tions are outweighed by the public 

interest in the stability and judicial economy that 

woul·d be promoted by recognizing that the trial court, 

not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the 

facts. To permit. courts of appeals to ·share more 

actively in the fact-finding function would tend to 

undermine the legitimacy of the district courts in the 

eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by encou raging · . appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority. 

Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Proposed Amendments to the 

. . 

Rules of Federal Civil Procedure, 105 F.R.D. 218, 223 (198l). 

There are sound policy reasons for adhering to the clearly 

erroneous rule in all cases, whether documentary oi testimonial 

evidence is involved. 

c. 

Another reason .given for thls .court's rejection of the · 

district court's factual findings is that it gave "undue 

deference" to the school district's neighborhood school policy. 

Court's Opinion at 40. A neighborhood school policy is not, in 

and of itself, violative of the fourteenth amendment. Crawford v. 

Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, ~7 n.lS (1982). Just as equal 

educational opportunity is a national policy, so too is 

neighborhood schooling. See 20 u.s.c. § 1701. There are 

significant advantages to neighborhood schooling, such as students 

walking to school, the absence of long bus rides, easier 

participation ~n extracurricular activities and pos~ibly g r eater 

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parental involvement. Of course, .the advantages of neighborhood 

schools cannot outweigh the school board's duty to comply with the 

Constitu·tion and "dismantle the dual school system." Swann, 402 

u.s. at 28. To that end, this court has insisted that a 

neighbo~hood school plan be "impartially maintained and 

administered," and "not used as a mask to further and perpetuate 

racial discrimination." Dow~ll, 375 F.2d at 166. 

_The Supreme Court has spoken in the remedial phase of school 

desegregation litigation concerning neighborhood school plans: 

Absent a constitutional violation there would be no 

basis. for judicially ordering assignment o·f students on 

a racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign 

pupils nearest their homes. But all things are not 

equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed 

and maintained to enforce racial segregation. The 

remedy for such segregation may be administratively 

awkward, inconvenient, and ev~n bizarre in some 

situations and may impose burdens on some; but all 

awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the 

interim period when remedial adjustments are being made 

to eliminate the dual · school systems.· 

No fixed or even substantially fixed guidelines can. be established . as to how far a court can go, but it must 

be recognized that there are limits. The objective is 

to di-smantle the dual school system. "Racially neutral" 

assignment plans proposed by school authorities to a 

district court may be inadequate; such plans may f ail to 

counteract the continuing effects of past school 

segregation resulting from discriminatory location of 

school sites or distortion of school size in order to 

achieve or maintain an artificial racial separation. · When school auth6rities present a district court with a 

"loaded game board," affirmative action i n the form of 

remedial altering of attendance zones is proper to 

achieve truly non-discriminatory assignments. In short, 

an assignment plan is not acceptable simply because it 

appears to be neutral. · 

Swann, 402 U.S. at 28. As the above passage makes clear, it is a 

present constitutional violation which e~powers a federal court to 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 153 
depart from a neighborhood school plan in favor~of ~orne other form 

of assignment in order t·o dismantle a dual school system. See 

Davis v. Board of School Cornmr's, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) (remedy 

dependent on having found a violation). If the .dual school system 

has- been dismantled and there is no constitutional violation, a 

neighborhood school policy is constitutionally permissible. 

. . 

In the liability phase ~f this case, it was ent irely 

appropriate for the district court to consider whether the school 

district had maintained and administered its neighborhood school 

. . policy in a neutral fashion, particularly because the district 

.court found that "the effec ts of schoot segregation on residential 

choice, if any, are not cognizable today." Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 

1297 (emphasis added). There are other reasons to reject the 

court's criticism of the district. court's findings on this point. 

See Court's Opinion at 36-37, 37 n.48. First , the district court 

·was compelled to make its findings that the board ma intained its 

neighborhood school policy in a race-neut.ral fashion because the 

major part of the plaintiffs' case was devoted to proving 

otherwise. See, ~, rec. vol. II at 23-26; vol. X at 1418; 

supp . vol . XI a t 241 (summaries of Mr. am~on's findings}. That 

is crystal clear on this·3,000 page plus record . The district 

court found that the .neighborhood bounda ries were n·ot 

gerrymandered. Brown , 671 F. Supp. at 1301. Second, a fair 

reading of the district court's opinion in this case m~kes it 

evident that the district court was well aware of its 

responsibility to look beyond direct ev idence concerning the 

-59- . 

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intent of the .school board, and also consider a foreseeability 

test in deciding whether the school board had failed to dismantle 

the dual system. The district court looked beyond the 

neighborhood s~hool plan f9r segregative effect, thoroughly 

analyzing quantitative measures of racial composition. 

D. 

Another reason the court gives for rejecting the district 

court's factual findings is that this court would weigh the 

evidence differently. Cour~~s Opini6n at 40 (discussing "court's 

failure to give proper weigh~ to its owri findirigs th~t c~r~ain 

actions and omissions by the school district had a segregative 

effect"- and citing Diaz v. San Jose Unified -School Dist., 733 F. 2'd 

660 (9th Cir. _1984) (en bane)~ cert. denied, 471 U.S. 10'65 (1985), 

for an analago~s proposition about clearly erroneous dist~ict 

court findings concernirig ~egr~g~tive intent). Regrettably, this 

court does not give a fair recitation of the district court 

findings. We are told:' "The district court made the following 

find ings : 

(1) that the neighborhood school attendance boundaries drawn 

in 1955 had the effect of maintaining segregation." Court's 

Opinion at 36 (emphasis added). What the district court said was: 

A review of the school boundaries as they have 

developed over thirty years does not ·reveal a . : segregative pattern that remains today. The boundaries 

set around the former de jure black elementary schools _ after this case was remanded by the Supreme Court appear 

to have perpetuated the racial identity of those 

schools. B~t, the schools have long been closed and the 

segregative effects of those boundar i es have attenuated 

entirely .. 

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Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1300. It was not clearly erroneous for the 

district court .to find that 1955 boundaries for closed schools do 

not figure large into the current situation, over 30 years later. 

Tnough a·court must look closely and carefully, conduct which 

resulted in segregative effect thirty years ago may indeed be so 

- attenuat ed as to be insufficient to support a finding .of 

intentional segregation caused by the school board. Keyes, 413 

u.s. at 211~ Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 792 (6th 

Cir. 1974). Moreover, this finding demonstra~es that the district 

court did .consider the effect of school board action or inaction. 

(2) .. that the construction of new schools since that time had 

the effect of 'promot[ing] racial separation;"' Cour t ' s Opinion at 

36 (emphasis added}. 

The district court said: 

"Although, on its face , the construction of 

schools, particularly on the west side of the district, 

appears to have. promoted racial separation, the court 

does not believe that the district's school construction 

policy was intended to maintain or promote segregation~ 

Most of the construction occurred during the peak years 

of student enrollment. More schools were needed. The· 

location of the schools in areas of residential expan~ion was consistent with the race-neutral 

neighborhood school concept. There is no evidence that 

the students attending thes·e scho.o.ls could have been 

accommodated in the existing schools or that land was 

available in the older, more racially mixed areas of the 

district to build new schools. · 

In sum, it does not appear that the district's school 

construction policy has· promoted seg r egated residential 

patterns or segregated schools. 

Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1300 (emphasis added). This is a key 

find i ng, becarise with it, the trial court rejected Mr. Lamson's 

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theory that the school board coul d have sent students to inner 

city schools with higher minority concentrations that were 

underut~li~ed, rather than construct new facilities in areas that 

were expanding and predominantly white. See, ~· rec. vol. II 

at 150-51, 179; III at 268-73, 311-14, 334-36; supp. vol. XI at 

40~49. Contrary to this court's opinion, the trial court did not . 

find that school construction since 1955 promoted racial 

separation. 

(3} "that the reassignment of students from previous de jure 

schools to adjacent .schools with higher-than-average percentages 

ot·minority student~ had the effect of incr~asing those · 

percentages;" Court's Opinion at 36 (emphasis added). The 

district court d"iscussed only o"ne situation involving a de jure 

school on the page cited by this court,. namely the transfer of 

Monroe students to Quinton Heights elementary school. See 671 F. 

Supp. at 1301. Monroe was closed ai th~ ~ri4 of t he 1974-75 .school 

year because at the beginning ~f that school year it only had 102 

students. Rec. ex. vol. IV at 84, 90. Students we~e reassigned 

to Polk, Highland Park North and Q·uinton ·Heights. Rec •. supp. vol. 

XI at 173. The minority percentage at Quinton Heights went from 

37% (~4 out of 227) in 1974-75 to 39.09% {77 out of 197} in 

1975-76. Rec. ex. vol. IV.at 87, 94. Thus, after Monroe closed, 

7 fewer minor i ty students attended Quinton Heights even after the 

Monroe students-were added. Given that the percentage increase 

(2.09%) of ·minority enrollment was so small and was accompanied by 

a decrease in the · absolute number of minority enrollment, it is 

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hard to fault the district court for finding that the school 

district did not act improperly when it·sent Monroe students to 

three neighborhood schools, including Quinton Heights. 

(4) "and that the assignment of faculty had the effect of 

placing minority faculty disproportionately at schools with 

higher-than-average minority student percentages." Court's 

Opinion at 36 (emphasis added}. 

The district court said: 

Plaintiffs' major contention with regard to faculty 

and staff is that the assignment of faculty and staff 

has served to racially identify the schools in the 

district. 

E~amining the school ·system as a whole, despite the 

tendency to have more minority staff in schools with a 

greater than average minority student population, the · couit does not believe the district's assignment 

policies s~rve to identify schools as intended for white 

or black students. The pattern identified by plaintiffs 

is not monolithic. The current percentages of. minority staff· in the district's schools are generally within 

ranges acceptable to other courts in desegregation 

litigation. Other facets of faculty and staff policies 

are nondiscriminatory. ·rn sum, the record before the 

court wi th regard to the distri~t's approach to .faculty and staff is not indicative of a dual system of 

education. 

Id. at 130~-05. As discussed below, the faculty/staff assignm~nt 

.. pattern in this case was almost within the range set by 

plaintiffs' own expert, Dr. Foster, for the one year in which 

substantially complete data was available to him. See infra note 

31 and accompanying text. The district court's finding that the . 

faculty/staff assignment was noL·indicative of a current condition 

of segregation is supported by the record, particula rly 

considering the assignment figures for the 1986-87 year. 

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Continuing with·its description of the lower court findings, 

this court concludes that ( 5) "the school district '.s use of space 

additions, [(6)J its siting of Topeka West high school, [(7)] its 

drawing of attendance boundaries, and [(B)J .its failure to adopt 

various reorganization plans did not further the process of 

desegregation." Court's.Opinion at .36-37 (emphasis added) (citing 

Brown 621 F. Supp. at 1298-1301, 1308-09). That is only true if 

desegregation is viewed as repl~cating the system-wide minority 

average in every school, in addition to eliminating a de jure 

system and its vestiges . The emphasis of the pla i ntiffs' case was 

on the alleged . segre.9ative intent'and e-ffect of school board 

actions and the board's inattention to racial balance~ The board 

carne forward with legitimate, ·non-discriminatory rea~o·ns (strong 

enough to disprove segregative intent) for many of its actions ~nd 

attributed the racial composition of several schools to 

demographic forc-es. More importantly, the school board was able 

to convince the district court that there was not a · current 

condition of segregation in Topeka, something which is· amply 

supported by th~ record and not refuted by this court's opinion. · 

Contrary to the study by the plaintiffs' expert, the district 

court found that space additions were not "intentionall y used to· 

promote segregation or that schools are racially i mbalanced today 

because of space additions." Brown , 671 F. Supp. at 1299. 

As for the siting of Topeka West high school, it must be 

r~membered that Topeka never had a dual system of education at the 

high school level •. The site for Topeka West was acquired in the 

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early or mid-SO's from a single family because it was big (40 

acres) and well-located. Rec. vol. X at 1433, 1506-07. The 

district court found that the construction of Topeka West was a 

logical response to the overcrowding of Topeka High and the rap±d 

population growth which· was Qccurri~g in the western part of the 

district. Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1300; see also rec. ex. vol. I 

at 14 (building patterns indicating that over half. of new housing 

built in Topeka from 1950-70 was in the west area); rec. vol. X a t · 

1432-33 (Topeka High School was overcrowded; Topeka West was 

built, without a plan~ed athletic · facility, only a fter a second 

·bond election). Topeka doubled in population between 1955 and 

1965. Rec. supp. vol. VII at 2094. Indeed, the ·enrollment at 

Topeka West was so great that some of the attendance area was · 

transferred back to Topeka High School, furthering· integration. 

Rec. vol. X at 1434. A site in west Topeka made sense . because the 

newly annexed ·Highland Park Hi.gh served the east part -of the city·, 

while Topeka High was centrally located. Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 

1300; rec. ex. vol. I at 14. Moreover, the site was large enough 

· to meet the school board's needs. Rec. vol. X at· 1507. 

Reorganization plans N and X, proposed in 1984, assumed that 

no school would have a minority enrollment of gre~ter than 50%, 

and projections indicated that number would be reduced to 45%. 

Rec. ex. vol. V at 51; Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1308-09. In 

1985~86, three schools had majority-minority populations: Belvoir 

{61.86%); Lafayette (56.81%) and Highland Park North (57.93%). 

Brown, -67 1 F. Supp. at 1294. The d istrict court was correct in 

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finding that Plans N and X did not constitute a forgone 

opportunity to improve the racial composition of the schools. 

Indeed, the failure of Topeka to adopt Reorganizat ion Plans N and 

X in 1984 should count for nothing in this .case . See Court's 

Opinion at 60 n.75 (acknowledging opposition to plans) . If there 

is one consistent theme in this record it is that the plans were 

expensive ($13 million for N; $15 million for X) and that they 

~ere opposed by every segment in Topeka. See rec. vol. XII 

(testimony of former board members) at 2451 (~pposition came from . 

every quadrant geographically, as well as every racial segment), 

i452 (pians were ~x~ensive), 2467 (cost of plans), 2471-72 (plans 

would have closed many schools and created some very large 

schools), 2479 (no sector of community would support plans), 2481 

(NAACP vigor·ously opposed plans); val~ XIII (testimony. of deputy 

superintendent) at 2728 (community attached tremendous importance 

to neighborhood schools and opposed plans). 

In determining that there is no current condition of 

segregation in Topeka, the district court carefully examined 18 

factors: statistical measures of student population; student 

transfer policy; optional attendance zones; space additions; 

school closings; school openings; schoo~ site locations; school 

boundary locations; history of the schools; facilities; 

extracurricular activities; curriculum; transportation; faculty 

and staff; community attitudes; equality of educa tion; 

opportunities for desegregation; and other factors. The district 

court properly examined the traditional factors which bear on 

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unitariness, in addition to those factors raised by plaintiffs 

which might have a bearing on unitariness. Baliles, 829 F.2d at 

1312. Its findings in favor of· the defendants in each area are 

supported by the record, and its ultimate finding of unitariness 

is likewise supported. 

v. 

This court's criticism of the district court is succinctly 

stated: 

The court evidently believed that if these · t wo cri teria, 

i.e., no intent to discriminate and consistency with a · race-neutral neighborhood school plan, were met, the 

school district's actions would pass constitutional 

muster. · 

While it did find that the school district had ·taken. 

some actively desegregative actions, we are convinced 

that the court's overall. conclusion on unitariness was 

fatally infected by the inadequacy of the burden of 

proof to whi?h it held the school district . 

Court's Opinion at 37, 39. The district court's attention to the 

neighborhood school plan already has been discussed in part. See 

supra p. 57-60. This court misses the mark if it is implying that 

intent is not relevant in this c~se. At a minimum; there must be 

a finding that the condition complained of is the effect of 

discriminatory intent, whether that discriminat ory intent 

originated in 1954 or since. The district court made permissible 

inferences given the evidence. It determined that there was not a 

current condition of segregation and, therefore, t he plaintiffs 

were . not entitled to a presumption that the racial imbalance in 

the school system was a product of past segregative act i ons. 

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The whole of desegregation law is predicated upon a 

constitutional violation. "The school desegregation cases have 

also adhered to the basic equal protection principl e that the 

invidious qual ity of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory 

must ultimately be traced to a racially discr iminato_ry purpose." 

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S~ 229, 240 (1976). The Constitution 

does not employ a no-fault approach to liability when it comes to 

school board actions. Contrary to the court's opinion , intent is 

still relevant because it bears ori causation. Only intentional 

state action which brings about or maintains seg~egation results 

in a constitutional violation. Columbus, 443 U.S . . at 464. Even 

in a system that once was dual, whether by statute or practice, 

"[d]isparate impact and foreseeable consequences, . without·more, do 

not establish a constitutional violation •.• ,. [But] actions 

having foreseeabl e and anticipated disparate i mpac t are relevant 

ev.j.dence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden .purpose·. n Id . 

Thus, a district court may consider . a school board's adherenc~ to 

a neighborhood school policy which may lead to racial imbalance, 

as one factor among many, in deciding "'whether an inference of · 

segregative intent should be drawn. '" Id. at 46 5 (quoting Penick 

v. Columbus Bd . of· Educ. , 429 F. Supp. 229, 255 (S.D . Ohio 1977), . 

aff'd in part and vacated in part , 583 F.2d 787 {6th Cir. 1978), 

aff'd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)). "The inference is permissive, not 

mandatory." Higgins,· 508 F.2d at 793 ("While it is true that a 

court may infer such an intent .[purposeful segregation] from the 

circumstances there is no authority for the proposition that such 

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an intent must be inferred in all cases where segregated patterns 

exist in fact) (emphasis in original). 

In Dayton II, the Court .said: 

We have never held that as a general proposition the 

foreseeability of segregative consequences makes out a 

prima facie case of purposeful racial 'discrimination and 

shifts· the burden of producing evidence to ·the 

defendants if they ate to· escape judgment; and even more 

.clearly there is no warrant in our cases for holding 

that such foreseeability routinely shifts the burden of 

persuasion to defendants. Of course, as we hold in 

Columbus today , ante [443 u~s.], at 464-6 5, proof of 

foreseeable consequences is one type of quite relevant 

evidence of racially discriminatory purpose, and it may 

itself show a failure to fulfill the duty to eradicate 

the consequences of purposefully discriminatory conduct. 

Dayton II, 443 u.s. at 536 n.9. Merely because Topeka built and 

operated neighborhood schools that fall outside the statistical 

measures proposed by plaintiffs' experts does not mean that there 

is a current condition of segregation in Topeka. · After two 

desegregation pl ans, this case is, at best, one of 

"foreseeability'' based .upon effect, although plaintiffs contended 

that they. had .shown more. See, ~· rec • .vol. II at 23-26 

(opening statement}, III at 381 (plaintiffs' expert cataloged 

effect of school board actions), ·rv at 449 (plaintiffs' expert 

took "racial balance as your starting point," in proposing 

alternatives to board's admin istrative choi ces}. 

To be sure, "the .. rneasure of the post-Brown· I conduct of a 

school board under an unsatisfied duty to liquidate a dual system 

is the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in 

-·. decreasing or -increasing the segregation caused by the dual 

system." Dayton II, 443 u.s. at 538; Columbus, 44 3 u.s. at 

-69-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 164 
458-59; Green, 391 u.s. at 437-38. That, however, does not bar 

t he district court from considering the school board's evidence 

that its actions have been effective in dismantling the dual 

system, that the current racial composition 6f the school system 

is not a product of discriminatory intent originating before Brown · 

r·and ·living o~ in effect to the present day. This court's 

.. opinion, by downplaying jntent and causation, specifically the 

school board's evidence that segregative effects of -past 

discriminatory intent no longer remain, has imposed liability 

based on the inferences it wishes to draw from certain objective 

·evidence and testi mony upon which reasonable people could diffe r 

as to interpretation. On the surface, this process may appear to 

have the adva~tage of sim~licity and consistency. But the close 

evidence in this case was hardly simple and we are not allowed 

such consistency at the expense of district court findings which 

have support. in the record .. 

The d~strict court wa~ well aware that quantita tive data in 

school desegregation cases may be indicative of past or present 

segregative intent. . ' 

Brown~ 671 F. Supp. at 1295. It also was 

cognizant of the school board's affirmative duty to dismantle the 

dual system. Id. at 1292-~3. Finally, the district court 

recognized that it could draw an inference of segregative intent 

or an inference of the lack thereof , based upon the efficacy of 

the school board's desegregation efforts, including compliance 

with its affirmative duty: 

Evidence of segregative motive or the . absence of 

such intent is relevant but not controlling in 

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determining unitariness. "The measure ·of the 

post-Brown I conduct of a school board under an 

unsatisfied duty to l iquidate a dual system is the 

effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in 

decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the 

dual sy~tem." · Dayton II, supra, 443 U.S. at ~38, 39 

s.ct. at 2935. · 

~n sum, a unitary school system is one in which the . characteristics bf the 1954 dual system either dd not 

exist or, if they exist, are not the result of p·ast or 

present intentional segregative conduct of defendants or 

their predecessors. 

Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1293. 

The court shall examine many factors to decide 

whether illegal segregation exists in U.S.D. # 501 . 

But, the statistical measures of racial makeup of the 

schools' · student bodies are of pr i~e importance. Often 

in school desegregation cases such statistics alone 

prove a pattern of discrimination. 

Id. at 129.5. 

If a ~istrict has consistently. dragged its feet bn 

desegregation, then the vesti~es -of the segregated 

system may remain. 

Id. at 1308. Thus, I vehemently disagree with the court's 

conclusion that the district C?Ourt incorrectly considered intent , 

while ignoring the board's affiimative dtity. 

The district court in this case discussed those fac tors which 

supported an inference of segregative intent or non-compliance 

with the · affirmative duty to desegregate. It then explained why 

it reject'ed those inferences. See Alexander v. Youngstown ·Ed. of 

Educ., 675 F.2d 787, 792-93 (6th Cir. 1982) (trial court may 

· reject infererices· of segregative intent) : That critical 

discussion, however, is the departure for this cour s reversal. 

See Court's Opinion at 36-37 (summarizing district court's 

findings). This court simply does not agree with the district 

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court's declining to draw those inferences. Although this court 

claims that the district court did not properly evaluate the 

evid~nce for segregative eff~ct, no fair reading of the district 

court opinion wo~ld support that conclusion. Tha district court's 

exhaustive discussion of statistical racial identifiability and 

its implications, as wel~ as its detailed treatment of each school 

alleged to be racially identifiable, belie this court's conclusion 

that the district court "failed adequately to weigh the conduct of 

the school district." Id. at 38. 

Perhaps the court has decided to dispense with the intent and 

causation inquiry because it seeks to ameliorate the effects of 

·"subconscious -racial. discrimina tion .. " Court • s Opinion at 32. 

Indeed, the court's remark conce r ning 11 longstanding racism" 

carries ~ith it an implication which is unwarranted. Court's 

Opinion at 32 ("Courts must assess the school distri~ t 's 

achievements with a·n eye .to ·the possible and practical,· but they 

must not let longstanding racism tilur their ultimate focus on the 

ideal."}. The court's explanation of the presumption it invokes, 

which I maintain is the same presumption discussed in Keyes, 

conforms with the tenor of the court's opinion:_ 20 "This 

presumption ensures that subconscious racial discrimination does 

not perpetuate the denial of equal protection to our nation's 

school children." Court's Opinion at 26A (footnote omitted). 

20. "[A] finding of intentionally segregative school board 

actions in a meaningful portion of a scihool system ·• creates a 

presumption that other segregated schooling with in the system is 

not adventitious." Keyes, 413 u.s. at 208. 

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The court tells us that a presumption different than the one 

in Keyes, see supra note 20, applies i~ this case because the 

school district was operating a de jure system in 1954. Court's 

Opinion at 25-26r 26_n.27. Reliance is ~laced on a footnote in 

Keyes, 413 U.S. at 211 n.l7. That footnote is contained in a 

discussion of defenses the school board may raise to the prima 

facie case, including the defense that the effects of past_ 

segregative acts have been completely attenuated. The footnote 

explains that once the presumption is invoked, plaintiffs are not 

forced to prove non-atteriuation because .the burden shifts to the 

school board to prove attenuati0n . Id. Express languag ~ in Keyes 

makes it clear that the presumption ·is_ not l imited only "to 

establish[ing } init~al de jure segr-egation in a case where ' no 

statutorily _mandated segregation exists... Court '-5 Opinion at 26 

n.27.. The Keyes Co~rt stated: 

Thus, be it a statutory dual system or an allegedly _ unitary system where a meanfngful portion of the system 

is found to be intentionally segregated, the existence 

of subsequent or other segregated schooling within the 

same system justifies a rule imposing on the school 

authorities the burden of proving that this segregated 

schooling is not also the result of intentionally 

segregative acts. 

413 U.S. at 210; see also Columbus, 443 U.S. at 457 n.5. 

The reason for the presumption is that .,. 'the prior doing of 

other simil ar acts, whether clearly part of a scheme or not, is 

useful as reducing the possibility that t he act in .question was 

done with innocent intent."' Keyes, 413 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting 2 

J. Wig~ore, Evidence 200 (3d ed. 1940)) . Thus, "a finding of 

illicit intent ~s to a meaningful portion of the item under 

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question has substantial probat ive value on the question of 

illicit intent as to the remainder." Keyes, 413 O.s. at 207-08. 

The Supreme court has yet to inqorporate subconscious racial 

discrimination into the equal protection analysis. 21 While a 

findit:tg of de jure segregation pursuant to statute _in 1954 eases 

the plaintiffs' evidentiary burden, Columbus, 443 u.s. at 457 n.S, 

intent, whether proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, 

remains an essential element. This court apparently concedes as 

much, when in the context of its discussion of the burden of proof 

and unitariness states: 

21 As support for the notion that unconscious racism is 

prevalent, the court cites Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 

Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 

317, 327 (1987). Court's Opinion at 26~ n.28. In that article, 

the author concludes that "[t]he intent requirement is a 

centerpiece in an ideology of equal opportunity that legitimizes 

the continued existence of racially and economical ly 

discriminatory conditions· and rationa lizes the supero rdi nate 

status of privileged whites." Id. at 387.· The author s uggests ·that a "cultural meaning., test be incorporated int o equal 

protection for the ~urpose of -dealing with unconscious racism. 

Id. at 323-24, 355-Bl. Under the test, state action would be 

evaluated 

to determine whether it conveys a symbolic message to 

which the culture attaches rac ial significance. A 

finding that the culture thinks of an allegedly 

discriminatory governmenta l action in racial terms would 

also constitute a finding regarding the beliefs and 

motivations of the gover nmen t al actors: · The actors are 

themselves part of the culture and presumably could not 

have acted without being infl uenced by raci al 

considerations, even if they are unaware of their racist 

beliefs. Therefore, the court would apply strict 

scrutiny. 

Id. at 324~ see also id. at 355-56. The author does discuss the 

lack of judiCial restraint such a proposal invo lves, but is not 

dissuaded: "In short, it would not be a bad thing f or judges to 

base constitutional decisions on· Lheir own sense of what values 

best reflect our cultural tradition, so long as the conflicting .perspectives competing to define those values. are made explicit." 

Id. at 386; ~also id. at 381-387. 

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Finally, obje6tive proof of the school district's 

intent must be considered. How a district lobbies its 

patrons and government agencies on issues that affect 

desegregation, whether it seeks and heeds the 

desegregation recommendations of others, and the 

cooperat iveness of the district· in complyi ng with court 

orders, for example, bear on the manner in which the 

district has shaped current conditions in the sch9ol - district. 

Court's Opinion ·at 31-32 (emphasis added and footno t es omitted). 

. . 

Several cases, including one of our own, also have considered good 

faith of the school district in deciding unitariness . Dowell v. 

Board of Educ., No. 88-1067, slip. op. at 37 (lOth Cir. Oct. 6, 

1989): Morgan, 831 F.2d at 321; Ross, 699 F.2d at 226. Good faith 

speaks to intent and causation and makin·g such inquiries is· 

inconsistent with claiming that intent is irrelevant. 

The court comments that: "A focus on provable intent alone 

would deny a remedy to too many Arne rica ns . " .Court ' s Opinion at 

26A. While this. may be true once there has been a finding of a 

current condition of -segregation in a meaningful portion of a 

school system with a relevant history of segregation by law, see 

Keyes, 413 U.S. at 210, such a finding should be a prerequisite to 

invoke the presumption discussed in Keyes and insure that any 

resultant system-wide desegregation order is linked to past or 

present raci a l discrimination. What the court has done in this 

case is to substitute .its judgment for that of the district court 

concerning the degree of imbalance necessary to invoke and sustain 

the presumption . Nowhere is ~his mo~e evident than in the court' s 

discussion of whether there is a current condition of segregation 

with iespect to student and faculty/staff assignmen t in the Topeka 

schools. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 170 
VI. 

It is clear that to sustain the presumption, t he plaintiffs 

were required to prove "a current condition of segregation from 

intentional state action" -with respect to "a mean~ngful portion of 

[the] school system." 22 Keyes, 413 u.s. at 205, 208. 

"Significant racial imbalance" in s_chools may operate as a 

"signal" to shift ·burden of proof, but ~ven that "is a very 

different matter from equating racial imbalance with a 

constitutional violation calling for a remedy. " Milliken v. 

Bradley (Milliken.!), 418 U.S.· 717, 741 n.l9 (1~74). Turning 

first to student assignment, what the court has done is to decide 

th~t if 6ertain schools do not .fall within c~rt~in percentages of 

minority enrollment, say ll% to 41~ or even 10% to 6"0%, t"hose 

schools are racially identifiable and indicative of a current 

condition of seQregation. result.ing from the -pr lor de _jure system. 

Court's Opinion. at 42-44. 

A. 

Plaintiffs' expert Mr. Lamson testified that a school was 

racially identifiable as black if it had more than twice the 

22 This court evidences some confusion concerning the meaning of 

a ''current condition of segregat ion," when it tells us that "[t]he 

case law is decidedly unclear as to the precise meaning of the 

term." Court's Opinion at 17-18 (footnote omitted). In its 

explanatory fo6tnote, this court does not cite Keyes, 413 U.S. at 

205-06, from which the phrase originated. In Keyes, the Court 

explained that one "of the elements of de jure segregation was "a 

current condition .of s.egregation resulting from intentional . state 

action." Id . 

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system-wide average of black students. Rec. vol. III at 365. In 

1985-86, the black student percentage was 18.4%, so a school with 

than more than 36.8% black students would have been racially· 

identifiable. On the other hand, a school was· racially 

identifiable white if it had less than one-half the system-wide 

average of black students. Id. Thus, a school would have_ been 

racially identifiable white if it had less than 9.2% black 

students. Moreovet, under Mr. Lamson's view of racial 

identifiability, a school which had the system-.wide average of 

black students still might-be racially identifiable and segregated 

if neighboring schools had a greater percentage of white students. 

Rec. vol. IV at 531-32. Thus, according to ~is view, in 1952-53, 

Belvoir was segregated when it had 20.8%23 black students and 

system-wide black percentage was 11%. Id. at-456-459. Likewise, 

in 1985-86, Robinson Middle School was racially disproportionate, 

according to Mr. Lamson, when it had 20.84% black students and the 

system7wide middle school black percentage was 19.01%. Id. at 

486-88. Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Foster ~id not agree with Mr~ 

Lamson that a school which had ~he system-wide minority average 

still could be racially identifiable. Rec. vol. V at 687-88. 

Dr. Foster advocated using a me~sure of ±15% of the 

system-wide minority percentage to come up with racially 

identifiable schools, although he acknowledge~ using ±20% in other 

cases he had worked on. · Rec. vol. ~Vat 549-51; vol. vat 

23 It appears that the correct figure was 14.8%, as indicated by 

the numbers from the Annual Report of the County Superintendent of 

Shawnee County, 1952-53. Rec. vol. IV at 460. · 

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705-710. When the system-wide minority percentage was below 151 

or 10%, Dr. Foster used a sliding scale of ±10% or ±5%. Rec. vol. 

IV at 553-54, 575-78. Th~ trial judge seems to have analyzed the 

plaintif~s' case in part with a ±15% standard. Brown, 671 F. 

Supp. at 1295-96; see rec. vol. V at 578. But he came to a very 

different ultimate finding than this court, which has attached far . 

more significance to the measure: "~W]e bel{eve it perfectly 

reasonable to use a ±15% deviation in assessing wheth~r the school 

system ever achieved unitariness." Couit's Opinion at 43 n.54. 

Using this standard, there were 15· rac~ally identifiable 

elementary schools in 1985-86; 7 racially identifiable minority, 8 

racially identifiable white. Rec. vol. V at 593, 711; supp. vol. 

XIII (pl. ex. 1550); ~ Cotirt's.Opinion at 49-50 n.59. There 

were 4 racially identifiable secondary schools using the ±15% 

standard; 1 racially identifiable minority, 3 racially 

identifiablE? white. Rec .• supp. vol. XIII (pL ex. l55G); see 

Court's Opinion at 49-50 n.59. 

The court discusses the testimony of defendant's expert, Dr. 

Armor, and gives the impression that Dr. Armor suggested- a 

standard whereby a school would not be racially identifiable 

(segregated) if it contained minority students within a 10% to 60% 

range. ·court's Opinion at 43, 50-51; see also id. at 81 {court's 

discussion of "predominantly white schools."). The court then 

concludes, using this standard! that there are 9---schools which are 

racially identifiable. Id. at 44. Yet, Dr. Armor was critical of 

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the concept of basing liability on quantitative measures of racial 

identifiability.24 

'In the interest of completeness, this court sh6uld have 

summarized Dr. Armor's testimony concerning the implications of 

his "range of acceptability of 10-60%." Id. at 43. This court 

should have explained that Dr. Armor,_ under questioning from the 

court, offered his conclusion, based on three quantitative 

measures (his absolute standard, the dissimilarity index and the 

relative exposure index) that the school board had. met its 

24 Dr. Armor recognized that the concept of racial 

identifiability is one of racial balance. Rec. vol. XIII at 2567. 

So did the district court~ Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1294~95. Dr. 

Armor did not think deviating from.some given numerical standard 

was an appropriate measure for liability, because the concept was 

developed for remedial purposes, and although "nearly one-race" 

s-chools may prompt initial inquiry, one must look at the causes. 

Rec. vol. XIII at 2566-67. One must then determine whether school 

board action or demographic changes or both resulted in the 

current situation. Id. at 2571. Beyond that, use of the concept, 

even in the remedialphase of school desegregation,. is becoming le~~ prevalent because an attempt to attain racial balance in 

every school, say within a ±15% tolerance, requires techniques, 

such as pairing and clustering of schools, that are dependent on 

cross-district busing. Id. at 2567-68. Mandatory busing, in 

turn, often leads to white flight--existing·students moving out of 

the district or enroll in private schools and potential students 

not moving into the district. Id. at 2568-69. Dr. Armor noted 

that "the white flight problem has been so severe in most central 

city school districts that ~ere pursuing integration that what we 

have had is resegregation and school districts that become· 

predominantly minority because of the loss of the white 

population.n Id. at 2569. He also commented that the racial 

balance standard is difficult to apply to districts with very 

small minority composition. · Id. at 2569-70. Finally, Dr. Armor 

testified that measures of racial balance, because they emphasize· 

a certain distribution of students at _eacih school, do not give 

sufficient weight to whether there is "a meaningful ~~portunity 

·for contact among black and white students. 11 Id. at 2570. 11Tha t 

kind of contact can be attained in a whole variety of different 

configurations other than a system that is strictly racially 

balanced. u .Id. at 2570-71. 

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affirmative duty under Brown I and had desegregated the elementary 

grade's as to student assignment. 25 Rec. vol. XIII a t 2641-42. 

Had the court done so, it would not have been able to attribute a 

finding of nine racially identifiable schools .by· student 

assignment which result in a current condition of segregation, to 

Dr .• Armor. See Court's Opinion at 43-44, 50-51, 81 ( in_voking Dr. 

Armor's approach to justify findings). 

Dr. Armor did point out that under his 10-60% range, one 

elementary school (Belvoir; 61.86) exceeded it and five elementary 

schools fell below it (Crestview, 8.94%; Gage 9.43%; McCarter, 

9.16%; McClure, 7.21~; Potwin 7.73%). Rec. vol. XIII ~t 2580; ex. 

vol. IV at 170-74. Applying· this 10-60% range to the ~econdary 

schools, three schools were below (French,. 6.23%; Land.on, 9.29% 

[ now closed]; . Topeka West, 7.94%}. See rec. ex~ vol. IV at 

175-76. However, Dr. Armor preceded and concluded his list with 

the caveat that merely being outside his range is not necessarily 

indicative of a current condition of segregation. Rec. vol. XIII 

at 2579, 2580. This is in accord with plaintiffs' expert Dr. 

Foster who admitted that racially identifiable schools under his 

±15% standard are not necessarily unlawfully segregated. Rec. 

25 Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to impeach Dr. Armor with 

deposition testimony indicating that he would not address 

c9mpl iance with the affirmative duty, rec. v·ol. XIII at 2643-48. 

In his responses, Dr. Armor explained how he came to the 

conclusion, id. at 2642-43, and explained three times why his 

deposition ans~ers were not inconsistent with the scope of his 

trial testimony. Id. at 2646-2648. The district court chose to 

credit Dr. Arrnor's~estimony. See Brown 671 F. Supp. at 1298 

(finding high levels of integration based on dissimilarity index 

and exposure index}. 

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vol. VL at. 792-93. Dr. Armor testified as follows: 

What I have been talking about in terms of this standard 

or a definition of integrated school has been p~imarily 

from the social science conception of what would · constitute, what we ought to define as an integrated 

school or a desegregated school. It doesn't necessarily 

mean that a school that falls outside that range is, is 

in violation of the [C]onstitut~on or is wrong or is imprope~. One has, in any liability analysis ·one has to: 

add to that--even my standard one needs to add the 

analysis of why a school is 5 percent minority or 70 

percent minority outside my ideal range because if it•s 

not, if it's that way because of demographic factors, 

then I don't, I don't see necessarily a basis for why it 

has to be changed; but I would still hold that .ideally 

or what you strive for ought to be schools within that 

range. 

Rec. vel. XIII at 2579: The district court~s find~ng· that . 

"studerits are not separated on the basis of race," Brown, 671 F. 

Supp. at 1298, is supported by Dr. Armor's testimo~y and the 

factual findings regarding the above schools contained in the 

balance of the district court's opinion. Id~ at 1294, .1301~04. 

Assuming, arguendo, that this court's interpretation of Dr. 

Armor's testimony concerning the 10~60% range.had merit, I submit 

that it would be anomalous to find a current condition of 

segregation regarding student assignment based on only one 

elementary school (Belvoir) which exceeded the target minority 

percentage and just barely (by 1.86%). Regarding the 8 

predominantly white schools mentioned by Dr. Armo·r, in a system 

with low minority percentages overall, it is not unexpected to 

find some schools which will have large·percentages of white 

students. Court's Opinion at 41-42. More importantly, every 

si~gle one of those predominantly white schools identified by Dr. 

Armor, with the exception of.McCarter (which went from a 9.20% 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 176 
minority . percentage to 9.16%), . has increased the percentage of 

minority enrollment when the 1985-86 figures are compared to those 

in 1981-82. . See supra note 18. 

Moreover, the district court considered other measures of 

integration in deciding t~~t unlawful segregation did not exist. 

Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1298. Specifical y~ Dr. Armor testified 

concerning the dissimilarity index and the relative exposure index 

which are measures of system-wide integration. !t is passing 

strange for the court to all but dismiss the significance of these 

measures in its discussion of whether there is a current condition 

of segregation, yet report them26 and rely upon them concerning 

the positi~e effects of the board's implementation of its second 

desegregation plan. Court's Opinion at 43-44 n.SS (rejecting 

measures because they would not ident~fy a hypothetical all-black 

school), 57-58, 58 n.71 (relying on measures to indicate success 

of school district's desegregation efforts from 1975-81). ·The · . 

court's criticism of these measures, that "they say nothing about 

individual schools," Court's Opinion at 43-44 n.SS, is really only 

partially correct because the formulas rely upon data concerning 

each individua·l school. Dr. Armor readily indicated that these 

indices are to be supplemented by looking at individual schools. 

26 Both the elementary and "all school s" values of t hese i ndices 

present a picture of steady improvement over the years, reflecting 

the greater integration in the Topeka schools. See infra note 29. 

Significantly, the values of the these indices have continued to 

improve even·after 1981; when Topeka's second desegregation plan 

was implemented ~omple~ely. · 

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Rec. vol •XIII at 2655; see also Court's Opinion at 43-44 n. 55. 

And so the district court did. 

The dissimilarity index measures the departure of a school 

system from perfect racial .balance. 27 Id . at 2581. If every 

school had the system-wide minority composition , there would be 

perfeqt racial ba l ance and the index would have a value of zero. 

Id ~ On .the other hand,. if every school were comple_tely 

segregated, the index value would be expressed ~s 1 .. 0 .(or 100). 28 

Id. The relative exposure index measures the opportunity for 

interracial contact given the number of whites and minorities in 

the system. !d. at 2582. A value of zero indicates total 

interracial contact, whereas a · value of 1.0 (or 100) indicates a 

total separation. Id. Thus, regar~ing either measure, a . 

decreasirig value re~lects a desegregative effect. qr. Armor 

preferred the exposure index because it is less a measure of 

racial bal~rice. rd. at 2583. 

Dr. Armor calculated the dissimilarity index and relative 

exposure index for Topeka over time. 29 Regarding the elementary 

27 For discussion of the formulas for the dissimilarity index 

and exposure index, see F. ~elch & A. Light, New Evidence on 

School Desegregation--U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights Clearinghouse 

Pub. No. ·92, 37-39, 48 n.52 (1987}; see also Dowell v. Board of 

Educ., slip op .. at 49~50 n.l6 (lOth Cir. Oct. 6, 1989) (Baldock, 

J., dissenting}. 

28 Sometimes the indices are expressed as ranging from 0 to 1 .0, 

other times, ~rom 0 to 100. Rec. vol. XIII at 2582. 

29 

Topeka Desegregation Indexes Based on. Actual Enrollment Data 

Selected Years · 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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schools, he tes·tified that from 1966 to 1985 both indices dropped 

significantly indicating that: 1) there has been a "very 

substantial decline in the level of segregation» over 20 years, 

and 2) this improvement came at a time.when the percentage of 

minority students increased from less than 20% (l6.5%) to its 

present level of 26%, and 3) the 1985 value of approximately 15 in 

the exposure index suggests that a "very substantial degree of 

interracial contact" is occurring at the ele~entary level. Id. at 

2587. Regarding the middle schools, he reported similar trends, 

though not quite as dramatic: declines in both indices, 

improvement during a time when the percen'tage of minori'ty students 

rose from 15% to its _present level of -26%, and "a v.ery substantial 

degree of desegregation." Id. _at -2587-88. As to the high 

schools, neither index shows appreciable change over time, 

(footnote· continued from previous page) 

1955 · . 1966 1968 1975 1981 1985 

PERCENT MINORITY 

Elementary 10.4 16.5 17.4 21.5 25.2 26.4 

Junior High 0.0 15.3 16.5 20.2 25.1 26.9 

High School o.o 14.9 ' 16.1 19.1 25.9 23.8 

All Schools 10.4 15.9 16.9 20.6 25.4 25.7 

DISSIMILARITY 

Elementary 62.1 62.0 57.7 51.6 40.8 36.6 

J unior High o.o 53.2 52.0 39.8 39.1 32. 1 

High School 0.0 34.4 36.8 32.8 34.7 30.1 

All Schools 62.1 55.1 52.4 43.8 38.8 33.6 

RELATIVE EXPOSURE 

E-lementary 47.7 38.7 33.0 27.1 17.2 14.6 

Junior High 0.0 26.1 24.4 18.8 1 2.9 11.2 

High Schools 0.0 8.1 10.0 8.0 11.0 7.3 

All Schools 47.7 30.9 26.7 20.8 14.7 12.1 

Rec . ex. vat . II at 156-57. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 179 
although both indices have dropped slig~tly . Id. at 2588. The 

reason for this i~ that both indices started out qui t e low and it 

is difficult to get below 10 on the exposure index (1985 value for 

high schools was 7.3). Id. at 2588. 

Dr. Armor reasoned that had Topeka done_ nothing concerning 

integration , it is very likely that the indices would have 

remained at their significantly higher 1966 levels. Id. at 

2589 -90. Contrary to this court's appellate factfindi ng, see 

Court ~s Opinion at 68-71 (attendance boundaries) & 72-74 {school 

closings), Dr. Armor testified that 11 the reason why desegregation 

has improved to this extent was a series of school closings and 

boundary changes~ affecting predominantly minority or white 

schools. Rec. vol. XIII at 2590. · Dr. Armor also testified that 

the system's transfer policies over the years had no significant 

effects, either segregative or desegregative. Id. at 2598. The 

policies .were neutral. Id. This evidence favorable to the 

defendants was cofroborated by defendants' other expert, who 

considered what would have happened had school boundaries been 

held constant as of 1963.30 

30 For the most part, this court has chosen to discount the 

fina l conclusion of Dr. Clark, the defendants' expert demographe ~ 

See Court's Opinion at 56-59. Dr. Clark analyzed the attendance 

boundary changes for the 11 elementary school attendance area~ 

with the highest residential concentration of black residents 

(from 1963-64 through the 1985-86 school year). His find ings 

certainly are rel evant to this court's contention that various 

school board actions have resulted in segregative effects from ~hidh se~regat ve intent could be inferred : 

The overall conclusion of this analysis of population 

growth, its geographic dispersal over time and the 

attendance boundary analysis is that the major force 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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·. 

B. 

The plaintiffs' experts disputed Dr. Armor's work, just as he 

diSP..Uted theirs. . For example' . plaintiffs I expert Dr. Crain 

testified concerning the limitations of these indices and that 

other cities had lower dissimilarity and exposure indices and that 

more could be done as evidenced by Plans ~ and X that were not 

adopted. Rec. vol. IX at 1270-73, 1282-84, 1287; but see· F. Welch 

& A. Light, New -Evidence on School Desegregation-u.s. Cornm'n on 

Civil Rights Clearinghouse Pub. No. 92, 38 (1987) {"The fact that 

thci. dissimilarity index is useful in depicting changes within a 

district does not imply that it is useful in comparing 

districts."). Di . . Foster indicated that ~e used the dissimilarity 

index "to dete;·mine the progress. made across the State. of Florida 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

driving the system~f charig~ in the Topeka school system · was the demographic process and not the changes in 

attendance areas. The changes iri school enrollment were 

due to the changing growth rates of the white and black 

populations and to their geographic locations and not to 

the year to year attendance area shifts. Even the 

analysis of the optional zones in the earlier years had 

only minimal i mpact on the percent bl ack in the 

attendance areas. Indeed focusing on the last dozen 

years the school district has made changes which have 

provided real evidence .of desegregati ve or ne~tral 

impacts. · Given the.declining white population and the 

increasing black population, the imbalances which exist 

are the result of the demographic forces and not the 

result of boundary changes. 

Rec. ex. vol. I at 45: accord vol. XI at 2338-39. Al though 

plaintiffs contended that the study, by beginning with 1963-64 

boundaries, did not take into account any segregative effects 

remaining in those boundaries, the point of the study was to 

identify the role of demographic transition. Rec. vol. XI at 

2359. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 181 
in school desegregation from year 'to year when data are 

available," and explained that it was not used "on a 

school-to-school basis." Rec~ · vol. IV at 556, vol. Vat 686. In 

short, the experts disagreed concerning the proper approach and 

whether there was a current condition of segregation regarding 

student assignment. 

For this· reason, we need pay particular attention to the 

Supreme Court's conclusion in Anderson that a factual finding 

cannot be clearly erroneous when "there are two permissible views 

of the eviden.ce, 11 when credibility is at issue, -and even when it 

is not. 470 u.s at 574. We have noted: 

The Anderson Court justified this conclusion by 

asserting that ''[t]he rationale for deference to the 

original finder of-fact is not limited to the ~uperiority of the trial judge's position to make determination~ of credibility. The trial judge's major 

role is the determinatiOn of fact, and with experience 

in fulfilling that role comes expertise." Anderson, 470 

U.S. at 574, 105 S. Ct. at 1512. Although. even the 

trial ·judge may not always be confident that he ''knows" 

what happened, he is in the best position to "determine 

whether the plaintiff has succeeded in presenting an 

account of the facts that is more likely to be true than no~." Id. at 580, 105 S. Ct. at 1515. 

Pitre v. Western Elec, Co., Inc., 843 F.2d at 1262 , 1266 n.l (lOth 

Cir. 1988). If ever there were a case for . application of these 

principles, this is the one. 

For this case not only involves documentary ev idence, i t also 

involves credibility determinations. At one point, in 

consistently exercising his discretion to admit evidence tha t 

might bear upon.the truth of the issues, the trial judge remarked: 

"Let me say, it is the duty of a court to listen to the experts on 

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both sides, and decide which . set of experts to b~lieve. I thi nk 

it is necessary that I hear everything I can hear on this 

subject." Rec. val. IX at 1222. It does not surprise me that the 

trial judge exercised .his prerogative to believe the defendants' 

experts. 

Even on this cold· record~ it appears that the defendants' 

experts may have had a patina of believability that comes with 

acknowledging ambiguity (the evidence is rarely all one way), yet 

still supporting a position. See M. Chesler'· J. · Sanders & D. 

Kalmuss, Social Science in Court--Mobilizing Experts in the School 

Desegregation Cases 90-106 (1988). For example, defendantsi 

expert ·Dr. Armor testified that the. open enrollment ·plan. which 

operated ·for two years and then was discontinued in 1980 ·had a 

slightly segregat~ve effect • . Rec. vo1.·xrrr at 2624; Brown, 671 

·F. Supp. at 1298. Likewise, defendant's expert Dr. Clark 

testified that a boundary ~hange for Parkdale betwe~n 1963-64 and 

19 6-6-67, which resulted in a greater concentration of minority 

students "could be discussed in terms of having partly segregative 

effe.cts, partly demographic effects." Rec. vol. XI at 2326; ex. 

vol. I at 43. The court notes this fact in its opinion , Court' s 

Opinion a~ 55, while completely ignoring the conclusion of 

defendants' expert which supports the district court's findings. 

The plaintiffs put on much testimony concerning factual · 

matters whic~ the S~prem~Court decided as a matter of law yea rs 

ago, namely the educational and psychological harms· of 

segregation. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494-95. Plaintiffs' expert Dr. 

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Crain testified that segregated schools are responsible for the 

following problems as they affect blacks who might at tend such 

schools: 1) depressed performance on standard achievement tests, 

which cannot be remedied by compensatory education, 2) higher · 

failure rates on minimum competency testing, 3) a propensity to 

attend black colleges, 4} a propensity to quit college, if a white 

college is selected, 5) lack of clear career aspirations, 6} 

employment discrimination, 7) discomfort with white supervisors, 

8} more frequent job changes, 9) higher juvenile delinquency, 10) 

higher teenage pregnancy·, 11) greater unhappiness at age 40, 12) a 

d.esire to live in an unintegrated area, i3) infrequen·t home 

ownership, and 14) greater discomfort around whites. Rec. vol: IX 

at 12 31 , . 12 3 7·, . 12 4 3 , 12 51-52 , 12 54 , 12 55 , 12 57 , 12 59 , 12 6 0 , 12 61 , 

1262. Viewing· th~ tr.anscript, I do · not think that this r·emarkable 

list, which Dr. Crain claimed was a~plicable to Topeka based on 

his brief visit, id. at 1264-65, enh~nced his credibility. Nor 

did his definition of a seg~egated system ~eem consistent with 

that ter·m as commonly understood in desegregation cases. Dr. 

Crain testified that,.in his view, a segregated sy~tem was ''when 

you have that perception of unequal racial composition," because 

"the harmful effects are going to start occurring because the 

whole process of desegregation is going to start hitting." Rec. 

vol. IX at 1289. Finally, Dr •. Crain was quite willing to 

criticize the work of defendants' expert Dr. Poggio, by equat ing a 

cognitive abilities test wi~h the Kansas Minimum Competency Test , 

y~t Dr. Crain clearly was unawar·e of· the sequence of the tests and 

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the characteristics of each--regarding the Kansas Minimum 

Competency test, he did not know i ts objectives, what it pu r ports 

to measure, how the test was designed or whether the passing 

scores change from year to year. Rec. supp. -vo l . X at 2862-2871; 

supp. vol. IX at 2922-2931 (Dr. Poggio's refutation of Dr. Crain's 

criticisms) . Without que~tion, the trial . court credited Dr. 

Peggie's analysis over that of Dr. Crain. Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 

1307-08 . 

Plaintiffs' expert Mr. Lamson was similarly emphatic. He 

testified -that his task was "to identify all of those instances 

. . where administrative action ·would have tended to affect the racial 

comf)osition of the schools." Rec. vol. III at 363, see also vol. 

II a t 105. After 16oking at hundreds of physical and 

~dministrative decisions (construction, portable building use, 

attendance boundaries, optional attendanc~ zones) that affect 

student assignment for thirty years, Mr. Lamsqn~s conclusion is 

notable for its simplicity and its partiality: 

I can confidently state tha t I was unable to find one 

instance where any of those physical and administrative 

educational tools were used as a part of a purposef~l 

and ongoirig program of affirmative pupil desegre~ation 

at either the elementary, junior high or middle, or 

senior high school l eve l. 

Quite to the contrary •.• a ll of those 

administrative tools were used in an ongoing manner to 

actively separate the Black and white elementary, junior· high and middle, and senior high students of the Topeka 

school system wherever and whenever ·feasible. 

Rec. supp. vol. XI at 240-41 . Mr. Lamson•s ·test imony proves a bit 

much. Analyzing the motivations and actions of multimembered 

public bodi es over three decades is difficult at best, but 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 185 
concluding that the Topeka system underwent no de~egregation 25 

years after Brown I blinks reality. · common sense tells us that 

even a broken clock is right twice a day. Yet too much of Mr. 

Lamson's methodology has found its way into this court's opinion, 

given the trial court's rejection of the proposed findings 

supporting it. This is especially true concerning the court's 

conunents about optional attendance zones, attendance boundaries, 

and school openings and closings, Court's Opinion at 62-75, 

because plaintiffs' other lead expert, Dr. Foster, did not do an 

independent analysis of these factors. Rec. vol. V at 693; vql. 

VI at 739. 

c. 

The court also has fo~nd a .current condition of segregation 

pertaining to faculty and staff assignment. Court's Opinion at 

45-47. The court's reason.ing here is questionable because, after 

rejecting the plaintiffs' standard as "very narrow," id. at. 45 

n.S6, the court then finds ~iability when, ev~n under the 

plaintiffs' "very narr:ow" standard, all . that would have been 

necessary to eliminate racial identifiability regarding 

certificated faculty would have been to exchange 13 pairs of 

faculty members in 1981-82. Rec. val. V at 663-66. That is only 

26 certificated faculty out of 911 then employed, or 2.85%. 31 

31 The ~ourt discusses this finding as part of l arger discussion 

responding to an imaginary· contention made at trial. "that further 

c;lesegregation is, in effect, not wor th the trouble." Court's 

Opinion at 84.· Defendants did elicit from · Dr. Foster that the 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 186 
Id.; rec . vol. VI at 773-774. Faculty · members are not fungibl e ; 

whether this could- be accomplished depends upon being able to send 

13 minority faculty members into different schools, and replacing 

. them ~ith 13 white faculty members, ~hile making sure that all 

have the right teaching certificates. Rec. vol. V at 664 -65 . 

We begin with the proposition that "principals, ieachers, 

teacher~aides and other staff who work directly with children .at a 

school" may not be assigned so that the racial composition of the 

staff wil~ indicate that a school . is intended for white or 

minority students. Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School 

Dist., 419 F.2d 1211, 1217-18 (5th Cir.} (remedy phase), rev'd ·on 

other grounds, 396 U.S. 290 (1970). Even if the racial 

composition of- a school could be identified by -assignment of 

faculty, that factor, _in and of itself, do'es not mean that the 

school system is dual with respec t to itudent assignment . Dayton 

.!!' 443 u.s~ at 536 n.9. While a school should not be racially 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

school district could be irr statistical compl iance with his 

faculty/staff standard by moving 26 certificated faculty in 

1981-82, and in compliance with his ±15 % standard for racial 

identifiability in student assignment for 1~85-86 by moving 26 5 

out of 8,122 (3.26%) elementary students to different schools and 

by moving 77 secondary students out of 6,3~2 (1~20 ) to different school~. Rec. vol. VI at 773-74, 797-800. The point of this 

''illuminating exercise," Court's Opinion at 85, was to show that 

even under the plaintiffs' strict standard , statistical racial 

identifiability was slight, and it was . a close question as . to 

statistical rat:;:ial identifiability ,· given less. strict standards. 

Moreover, mere statistical racial identifiability does not mean 

that there is unlawful segregation, especially on these numbers. That is why it was important for the dist rict court to look beyond s~atistical racial identifiabi lity, before deciding whether those 

schools so identified were indicative of a current condition of · segregation. 

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identifiable by its faculty, United States v . Montgomery County 

Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 236 (1969), the racial composition of 

the faculty need ncit be equivalent to that of the student 

population, Fort Bend Indep • . School Dist. v. City of Stafford, 651. 

F.2d 1133, 1138 (5th Cir. 1981). It _ is possible for a school 

district -to be un i tary with respect t o _student assignment, but not 

with respect to faculty/staff assignment. Pasadena, 427 u.s. at 

436; Morgan, 831 F.2d at 318-19. 

Topeka is not heavily populated, has not been growing and 

does not have a large minority population as a percentage of the 

tota~· population.~ 2 This is reflected in the data on· minority 

employment, ··which .has remained fairly :constant over the last five 

years.33 Dr. Foster indicated that faculty composition should 

32 

Shawnee County, Kansas 

Year 

1986 

1980 

Total Persons 

160,800' 

154 ,916 

Population Characteristics 

1984 . 

Race 

White 

Black and 

other 

· Percent 

89.92 

10.08 

City of Topeka, Kansas 

Year 

1986 

198.() 

.Tot~l Persons 

118,580 

118,690 

Population Characteristics 

1980 

Race · · 

White 

Black 

Am. Indian 

Eskimo & · 

Aleu t 

Asian or Pac. 

Percent 

86. 17 

9.51 

1. 05 

Islander .53 

Hispanic 4~64 

Source: u.s. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book -A Stati~t cal Abstract Supplement 185,· 650 (1988) . 

33 

Racial Inventory 

{footnote continued on riext page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 188 
approximate · the minori ty -percentage ~nrollment in a school system,. 

something which has not occurred in Topeka.3 4 Rec. vol. V at 656. 

Dr. Foster acknowledged, however, that one would have to look at 

the relevant labor pool, an analysis that was ndt perfo rmed here. 

Id. at 657-58; see also Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 

433 u.s. 299, 308 (1977). But, Dr. Foster did test~fy that the 

demand far exceeds the supply of minority faculty members and that 

he found no fault with the district's recruiting policies. Rec. 

v·ol. VI at 757-59. 

~r. Foster analyzed faculty staff assignment, "not as a raw 

figure of percentage points · from the mean," e.g. ±15% or ±20 % from 

the sys~em-wid~ min~rity. average; but instead ''as a percentage of 

the mean minority," say ±15% _of the mean minor'i ty percentage. 

Rec. vol. Vat. 646. For example, ~n 1985-86, the percentage o f 

minority faculty staff at the elementary schools was 11. 23%·. Rec . 

(footnote continued from previous page} 

Employees 

Minority 

Professional Other 

Teaching . Minority Tota l 

Year Staff EmEloyees EmE1oyees % Mino rity 1981-82 84 141 1,974 11.4 

1982-83 . 108 116 1,933 11.6 

1983-84 114 116 1,926 11.9 

1984-85 120 121 1,938 12. 4. 1985-86 114 121 1,948 12.1 

Rec. ex. vol. IV at 266-68. 

34 Whi le the school system must observe its affirmative act ion 

policy, the students have no constitutional right to att end a 

school wi th any particular racial composition. Quarles v. Oxford 

Mun. Separate School Dist., 868 F.2d 750, 756 (5th Ci r. 1989)~ 

Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 

1983). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 189 
ex. val. IV at 261. 15% of 11.23% is 1.68%: thus, a school could 

vary by ±1.68% from the minority percentage of 11.23%. Id.; rec. 

val. Vat 650. This means that a school would be .racially 

identifiable if it had more than 12.9% (11.23% plus 1._68%) or less 

than 9.6% "(11.23% minus 1.68%) minority faculty/staff. Id. 

Applying this concept to the secondary schools which had a 

minority faculty staff percentage of 12.65%, a school would be 

racially identifiable if it had more than 14 .6% (12.65% plus 

1.90%) or less than 10.8% (12.65% minus 1.90%) minority faculty 

staff. Rec. ex. val. IV at-262. Applying this very ti9ht 

standard is based on the theory that the school district has 

greater control over fa~ulty staff assignments and that, ins9far 

as possible, we should "get every school just like every other.'' 

Rec. val . V at 646, 650-51. Under this method, 22 out of 26 

elementary schools are racially identifiable and 8 out of 9 

secondary schools are racially identifiable. Rec. ex. vol. IV at 

261-62. 

_This court has rejected Dr. Foster's standard. The court has 

also rejected th~ district court•s· approach which used a ±10% 

variation around the mean because in one year, 1975, the standard 

would not have classified elementary schools as racially 

identifiable .even if they had no minority fa culty and staff. 

Court's Opinion at 66; ~Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1305 (noting 

that in 1985 only six schools had minority staff: percentages 

beyond ±10% of the district-wide average and tha t all schools have 

been within ±10% range in. last 10 years). In fairness to the 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 190 
district cou~t, the problem identified by this court with the ±10% 

standard would have occurred only for the first of the ten years; 

in all other years, the district-wide elementary minority staff 

percentage. exceeded 10%. 35 Moreover, it should be rioted tha t iri 

Dowe ll, ·or . Foster testified that· ·he had "'no problem'" with a 

±1 0% standard, howeve r, the sxstem-wide average of black faculty 

in the. school district at issue (O~lahoma City.) was 36.9%. Dowe ll 

v. Boa rd of Educ ., .slip op . at ·79 (~O~h Cir. 19a9) (Baldock, J ., 

dissenting). 

In finding its "distinct pattern of correl~tion," Court ' s . 

Opinion at 66, bet~een minority enr6ll ment .and assignment of 

minority s t a ff , the court initially used an ad hoc approach which 

was difficult to a~ply objectively. I n it ~ revised opinfon, the . . 

co~rt has indica ted that a school i~ .. racially identifiable as to 

faculty/staff assignment if. it is racially· identifiable mino ri ty 

. 35 

Elementary Minor ity S~aff Percentage 

Minority Total 

Year Staff Staff % Minority 

1973- 74 127 708 17 . 94 

1974-75 116 933 12·. 43 

1975-76 99 997 9 .93 

1976-77 94.6 589 •. 7 16 . 04 

1977-78 109 . 8 780 .2 14 . 07 

1978-79 92.1 745.6 12.35 

1979-80 89.2 721.4 12.36 

1980- 81 90.5 706 . 5 12.81 

1981-82 82.3 666.5 12.35 

1982-83 76.10 678.65 11.21 

1983- 84 78.15 635.0 12.31 

1 984-85 75. 40, 662. 10 11.39 

Rec . ex. vol. IV at 238, 240, 242, 244, 246, 24 8, 250, 252 , 254 , 

255, 257, 259, ·261. 

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as to student assignmeht, using a ±15% standard, and 17.3% or more 

of the faculty/staff at the school is minority. Court's Opin i on 

at 49-50 n.59. Likewise, a racially identifiable white school 

(using a ±15% standard) is racially identifiable ~s to student 

assignment if 5.6% or less of tbe faculty is minority. Id. ·.Using 

this method, there are 14 out of 19 schools racially identifi able 

by faculty/staff assignment in 1985-86. This means that not all 

of the schools identified as.racially identifiable by the court as 

to student assignment are racially identifiable as to faculty/ 

staff assignment. 

Racially Identifiable Schools by Stud~nt Assignment (±15% std.) 

(Asterisk * Indicates Racial Identifiability as to Faculty/Staff} 

Unde r the Court's Method 

1985-86 1985-86 1986-87 

Elernentar:y Minority Minority Minority 

Schools (26) Students Faculty/Staff Faculty/Staff 

Bel·voi r 61.9 14 . 8 16.67 

Highland Park ·North 57.9 19.2: 18.18 

Lafayette 56.8 1.7.3* 14.81 

. Qui'nton Heights 49.4 21.6* ' 12.50 

Avondale East 44 .1 33 . 3* 18.18 

Hudson 46.6 19.2* 15.38 .7 r . i . 

Lowman Hill 41.9 25.4 13.04 min. 

Bishop 10.5 * 5.56 1. 7 * McEachron 10.3 4.3* 5.26 

Whi tson 10.2 2.8* 7.69 

Gage 9.4 4.8 7.14 

McCarter 9.2 10.9 .9 . 09 

Crestview 8.9 10.7 12.00 

Potwin 7.7 14.1 7.69 8 r. i. 

McClure · 7.2 o.o* 5.00 white 

.Middle Schools ( 6) 

1 r.i. 

Eisenhower · 48.7 1a.s* 15.56 min. 

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Landon closed 2 r . i. 

French 

9.3 

6.2 

9.6* 

5.6 1 3.89 wh i te 

High Schools {3} 

l r. i. 

Topeka West 7.9 2.5* 5.88 white 

Id. at 45-47, n.59 & 60, 49-50 ·n.6l; supp. vol. XIII (~1. ex. 155D 

& 155G); rec. ex. vol. IV at 122-29, 170-77, 261-62; rec. ex. vol. 

II at 160-61 • 

. Although the ·court p l ainly has adopted a ±15% standard for 

analyzing racial identifiabili~y as to student assignment, it is 

interesting-to compare the schools t hat ~he court finds·racially 

identifiable as to faculty/ staff ·assignment. with .the schools · 

identified (as to student assignment) using Dr. Armor's "moit 

generous" method. See Court's Opinion at 44, 48-50, 65-67; see 

also supra p. 80 (listing schools ident~fied by Dr. Armor for 

further study). There are only four schools in common to both 

lists (Gage, McClure, French and Topeka West). All of these 

schools have increased minority student representation over the 

years and in 1986-87, had increased minority faculty and 

administrative personnel.. 

The court notes that the data concerning faculty and staff 

was not as complete as it might be, and the problem seems to be 

that a breakdown of minority teaching and managerial personnel for 

each school was not ~vailable. Rec·. vol. V at 660. Dr. Foster 

was able to prepare a breakdown of the district by employment 

category which tends to refute some of the court's statements, 

however. Dr. Foster broke the data down into two areas overall. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 193 
I suspect that the first group must be certificated. 

1985-86 . 

Minority Total % Minority 

Categories EmEloyees EmElO:iees Em}2loyees 

District-wide Managerial 8 54 14.8 . 

School-based Managerial 8 50 16.0 

Elementary Classroom 

Teachers 42 373 11.3 

Secondary Clas~room 

Teachers 28 349 8.0 

Other Teachers & 

Professional Staff 44 467 9.4 

Subtotal 130 1,293 

Teacher Aides 37 195 19.0 

Clerical/Secretarial 14 165 8.5 

Skilled & Technical 10 83 12.0 

Service Workers 43 212 20.3 

Subtotal 104 655 

Total· m36 1, 948 ~ 

Rec. ex. vol. rv · at 268. According to Dr. Foster, given the 12.1% 

minority average, minorities wer~ slightly underrepresent~d ·as 

elementary classroom t~acher~ and were considerably 

underrepresented ·as. secon¢iaty classroom· teachers an·d clerical/ 

secretarial workers. Rec. vol. V at 662. The court tells us that 

"minoriti es are represented more heavily in staff positions than 

in faculty positio~s.•• Court•s Opinion at 47. After comparin~ 

the percentages, the court then ~akes the s~atement that "[a]ny 

. one [minority] faculty/staff person listed at any one school is· 

thus more likely to be a teacher aide or servi ce worker than a 

teacher ... ld. Given the similarity in the absolute numbers of 

elementary and secondary minority teachers (70) and teacher aide 

36 Shoul d be 234. 

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and service workers (80) in the system, one does not have to be a 

. statistician to realize the limited significance of this 

. . 

simplistic appellate finding. Still , that questionable finding is 

the springboard for the perhaps well-meaning, but very 

condescending, comment by the court that "because minority . . 

employee~ are more heavily represented as staff . than as faculty , 

it is quite possible that the one minority faculty/staff person at 

McEachron, for instance, is a janitorial Staff person or other 

service wo·rker rather than a teacher or other professional role 

model." Court's Opinion at 66-67; ~ also id. at 61. 

In that same vein, · the court remarks that the "practice of 

disproportionate assignments also reinforces the irrational notion 

that minority teachers ar, inferior and riot fit to teach white 

ch~ldren." Court's Opinion at 48-49. There simply is no evidence 

of that in the current Topeka system based on this record. No one 

disputes that it is important to have whit~ and minority students 

exposed to positive role mode~s of different race·s, see rec. vol. 

VI at 761, but the court's remark is simply inflammatory. Indeed, 

i n a colloquy between Dr. Fost er and counsel for the school board, 

it was revealed that as late as 1971, representatives ot" the b1ack 

community appeared before the board seeking 11 the assignment of 

black teachers as black role models in predominantly black 

schools." Rec. vol. VI at 762. Dr. Foster testified that 11 blacks 

consistently across the country have demanded that their school ~ 

not be staffed predominantly by white teachers , b~t that black 

principals and black teachers also appear be fo re the black 

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children.» Id. Of course, the bottom line here is the 

constitutional imperative that staffing decisions be ne~tral and 

"that you don't want an abdence of. either race o~ ethnic group in 

any school if you can avoid it'." Id. 

The court tells us that the distinction between faculty and 

staff ·is impo·rtant, but never comes to grips with what that 

distinction is. Court's Opinion at 47 . On the basis of absolut e 

numbers, it appears that 167 m~nority e~ployees are involved with 

the educational function (the first group above plus teacher 

aides) and 67 minority employees are involved with the service 

functirin. The strong implication of this c6urt--that minorities 

are being hired merely for janitorial and service jobs--is not 

supported. Moreover, such an implication is incons.istent with the 

court ' s obse~vation that the current superi~tendent is black, as 

are several princi pals and managerial personnel. Court's Opinion 

at 67. 

The ~istrict court recognized that there was a ~tendency to 

have m~re minority staff in schools with a greater than average 

minority student population ," yet after a careful review of all 

the evidence, decided that there was not a current condition of 

segregation with respect to staff assignment. Brown, 671 F. Supp . 

at 1-305. In decidi"ng that faculty/staff assignment. remains 

segregated, Court's Opinion at 49, this court has relied in part 

upo6 the extremes uf the data to conclude there is an ·unlawful 

pattern . For example, in 1985-86, every elementary school had 

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r 

some minority staff, with the exception of McClure. 37 Only one 

elementary school had more than 7 minority faculty/staff, ·Avondale 

East at 10.45 facu lty/staff' members. Yet, that is the one the 

court uses to illustrate its apparent conclusion that there is a 

segregated system of faculty staff assignment at the elementary 

level. Court's Opin-ion at 48; see also id. at 66. When one looks 

at the elementary data, it is apparent that a perfectly uniform 

37 

Elementary School Faculty/Staff Assignment 

1985-86 

Staff 

E.f.ementary School Mi nority Total Minority% 

~vondale East 10.45 31.40 33.3 

Avondale West 1. 00 25.80 3. 9. 

Belvoir 3 .85 25.95 14. 8 

Bishop .40 23. 80 ' 1.7 

C:re~tview 3 .40 31.65 10 . 7 

Gage ·1. 00 ' 21. 00 4~8 

Highland Park Central 3 .90 34 .60 11. 3 

Highland Park - North ·s. so 28.60 19 .2 

Highland Park South '5 . 40 -29.20 .18 . 5 

Hudson 3 .80 19.75 19.2 

Lafayette 5.65 32.60 17. 3 

Linn 0.30 17.80 1.7 

Lowman Hill 6.50 25.60 25.4 

Lundgren 2.80 ' 21. 55 13 .0 

McCarter 3.00 27.40 10.9 

McClure 0.00 ' 25.10 00 .0 

McEachron l. 00 23.50 4.3 

Potwin 2.00 14 .15 14. 1 

Quincy 1.00 32 .35 3.1 

Quinton Heigh ts 4 .40 20.40 21.6 

Randolph 1.00 27.00 3.7 

Shaner 2~00 21.90 9.1 

State Street 1.30 22.90 5.7 

Stout 2.00 20.60 9. 7 

Sumner 1. 85 23.30 7.9 

Whitson 1. 00 . 35 . 3 5 2.8 

Tota l 74.50 663.25 11.23 

Rec. ex. vol, IV at 261. 

-102-

White 

66.7 

96 . 1 

85.2 

98.3 

89.3 

95.2 

88.7 

80.8 

81.5 

80.8 

82.7 

98 . 3 

74 .6 

87.0 

89 . 1 

lOO . o' 

95.7 

85.9 

96.9 

78.4 

96.3 

90.9 

94.3 

90. 3 

92. 1 

97.2 

88.77 

% 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 197 
distribution is unlikely given the lack of elementary minority 

personnel-~there were 42 elementary classroom teachers and 74.50 

minority faculty/staff members to be assigned to 26 elementary 

schools. Rec. ex. vol •. IV at 261, 268. 

Likewise, the court compares Robinson Middle School with 

12.29 minority staff members out of 49.35, not with other mi ddl e 

schools38, but w~th Topeka West High School which had 3 minority 

out of 120. Court's Opinion at 48. Note that in 1984-85 Topeka 

West ·had almo~t three times the minor ity fa culty/staff (8.55 out 

of 114.30} th~n it did in 1985-86. 

Given the court's interest in complete data which breaks out 

the professional staff that actually works in the particular 

school s, it is most surprising that the c~urt's opinio"n does not 

cite or discuss t he minority staffing report for 1986-87 which 

finally includes administrative and certificated staff assigned to 

38 

Middle School and High School Faculty/Staff Assignment 

1985-86 

Staff 

Schoo l . Minor ity Total ·Minority% White 

Chase 7.45 40.50 18.4 81.6 

Eisenhower 12.10 65.25 18.5 81.5 

French 2.40 42.63 5.6 94.4 

Jardine 3. 80. 39.65 9.6 90.4 

Landon 3.00 31.10 9.6 90~4 

Robinson 12.20 .49. 35 24.7 75.3 

Highland Park H.S. 13.65 118.25 1 1. 5 88 .5 

Topeka H.S. 25.50 150 .10 17.0 83.0 

Topeka West 3.00 120.00 2.5 . 7.5 

Total 83.1Q 656.83 12 .65 87.35 

Rec. ex. vol. IV at 262. 

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% 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 198 
the schools. Rec. ex. vol. II. at ' l60-6l. Al t hough admitted over 

·plaintiffs' objection, rec. vol. XVI at 2523-2525, this more 

current and more relevant report presents a far less extreme 

picture of minori ty assignment for the system. Every school i n 

the system has minority personnel. With a 10.78% minority average 

for elementary school personnel (55 ·out of 510), elementary 

schools ran~e from 4.35% minority staffing (Quincy) to 18.18% 

(Avondale East and Highland Park North). 39 More significant, 

39 

Minority Staffing Report 

Elementary Schools 

Includes Administrative and certificated Staff . 1986-87 

Staff 'Elementary School Minority Total Minority% 

Avondal e East 4 . 0 22 . 0 18 . 18 

Avondale west 1.0 19.0 5.26 

Belvoir 3.0 18.0 16.67 

Bishop 1.0 18.0 5.56 

Crestview 3.0 25.0 12.00 

Gage 1.0 14 . 0 7.14 

Highland Park Central 4 . 0 25.0 16.00 

Highland Park North 4.0 22.0 18.18 

Highland Park South 4.0 23.0 17.39 

Hudson 2.0 13.0 ·1s. 38 

Lafayette 4.0 27.0 14.81 

Linn 1.0 12.0 8. 33 

Lowman Hi ll 3.0 23.0 13.04 

Lundgren 1.0 16.0 6.25 

McCarter 2.0 22.0 9.09 

McClure 1.0 20.0 5.00 

McEachron 1. 0 19.0 5. 26 

Potwin 1.0 13.0 7.69 

Quincy 1.0 23.0 4.35 

Quinton Heights 2.0 16.0 12.50 

Randolph 1.0 22.0 4.55 

Shaner 2.0 17.0 11.76 

State Street 1.0 19.Q 5.26 

Stout 2.0 19 . 0 10.53 

Sumner 3.0 17. o. 17.65 

(footnote continued on next 

-104-

page) 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 199 
because of the small numbers involved, is that every elementary 

school has from one to four minority personnel. Rec. vol. II at 

161. 

With a 13.22% minority average for middle school personnel 

(23 out of 174), schools range from 6.67% (J ardine) to i6.67% 

(Robinson). 40 Every school has fiom ~wo to seven minority 

personnel. Finally, at the high school level . there is a minority 

average of 9.77% for high school personnel, ranging from 5.88% 

(Topeka West) to .11.84% (Highland Par~ High). 41 The range is .from 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

Whitson 2.0 26.0 7.69 

Total 55.0 

Rec. ex. vol. II at 160-61. 

40 

. 510! 0 

Minority Staffing Report · Middle Schools 

10! 78· 

Includes Administrative and Certificated Staff 

1986-87' 

Staff 

Middle School Minority 

Chase 3.0 

Eisenhower 7.0 

French 5.0 

Jardine 2.0 

Robinson ~ 

Total . lla..Q. 

Rec. ex. vol. II at 160-61. 

41 

Total 

27.0 

45.0 

36.0 

30~0 

. 36.0 

lZ~1Q 

Minority Staffing Report 

High Schools 

Minority% 

11.11 

15.56 

13.89 

6.67 

16.67 

13.22 

Includes Administrative and Certif icated Staff 

1986-87 . 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 200 
five to eleven minor·i ty faculty members. 

D. 

The district court recognized that the "patterri identified by 

the plaintiffs is not ·monolithic." Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1305. 

And -it is not; The numerical- evidence ·on this point cuts both 

ways. But this court's finding . that this i s "a ·system that has . 

. kept white faculty at primarily white schools and minority faculty 

at predominantly minority schools," Court's Opinion at 68, appears 

radical given these numbers. Moreover, I agree with . the district 

cdurt that "as import~nt as the racial percentages of the i~culty 

a nd staff is the fair.assignment o~ qualified and dedicated 

faculty t.hroughout the district." Id.; see also . Milliken v. 

Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.s. ·267 , 280 n .15 (one must not lose 

sight of educational function of schools). This is a school 

district that is appl~ing the resea~ch concernin~ eff ective . 

schools. 42 See u .s. · oep't of Education, What works-Research About -- . 

· (footnote continued from previous page) Staff. 

High School Minority Total Minority% 

Highland Park H.S. 9.0 76 11.84% 

Topeka H.S. 11.0 95.0 11.58 

Topeka West H.S. .2..!.Q 85.0 . 5.88 

Total ~ 256.0 9.77 

Rec. ex . vol. II at 160-61. 

42 Dr . Herbert Walberg testified, based on his on-site vis its 

and review of the school system that " it 's an excellent syst~m . that is concentrating its resources on improving · the 

children--improving the education and achievement of all the 

{footnote continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 201 
Teaching and Learnin-g 45 (1986) ("The most important 

characteristics of effective schools ·are strong instructional 

leadership, a safe and orderly climate, school-wide emphasis on 

basic skills, high teache r expectations for student achievemen~, 

and c9ntinuous assessment of pupil piogreis."); rec. supp. vol. V 

at 1584-1608, 1635-36 (district has. uniform curriculum guides), 

1641-42 , 1651-53, "!749; supp vol . . VII at 2033; vo1. XII at 

2521-22. It is a system in which schools throughout the district 

have received outside recognition. Rec. supp. vol . Vat 1617-18 

(Highland Park H.S., 1984), 1619-20 (Topeka West H.S., 1985), 

1620-21 (Eisenhower Middle School, 1985), 1621 '(Highland Park 

Central,. 1985), . 1622 (School District, 19B6) '· 1623, (Topeka West . 

H.S.--National School of Excellence, 1984; Robinson Middle . 

School--National School of -Excellence, 1985),. 1624 (Bishop 

Elementary School--State Program of Excellence, 1986), 1732 (Head 

Start, 1974)~ Finally, the eviderice clearly established that the 

Topeka schools are committed to an awareness of cultural diversity 

and equal educationat opportunity_ for all. Rec. supp. vol. Vat 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

children in the system." Rec. supp. vol. VII at 2042-43. He 

found that: 1) ."effective schools' ·techniques were apparent in 

the schools," 2) uniform curriculum guides were in use throughout 

the district, 3) ~tudents are tested regul arly and there are hi gh 

expectations placed on students, 4) the Adventure Center, see 

supra note 15 , was "one of the most impressive educational--

experiences [he had] seen in public schools" and it gives white 

and black students exposure to one another, 4) there i s ''a great 

deal of constructive parental involvement," 5) schools are safe, 

orderly and well-maintained, 6} t here is "an award-winning Head. 

Start program and many multi-cul.tural and ethnic programs, 11 and 7) 

the preceding items accoun t for " the district's outstanding 

achievement test scores which have ·been high and rising for the. 

past several years." Rec. supp. vol. VII at 2033-35 . 

. -107-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 202 
1759, .1632, 1653-54, 1657-58, 1686, 1717, 1760-61, 1772 -73~ vo l . 

XII at 2444-45~ Ironically and commendably, this is a district 

that includes the study of Brown v. Board of Education in its 

curriculum. Rec. supp. vol. V at 1722. 

VII. 

At trial, plaintiffs contended that eight schools were 

"racially identifiabl~ non-white or vestige schools." Brown, 671 

F. Supp. at 1297. These incl~ded Eisenhower Middle School and 

seven elementary schools: Avondale East, Belvoir, Highland Park 

North, Hudson, Lafayette, Lowman Hill and Quinton ·He ights. The. 

court has analyzed the latter six of these .schools foi ''what the 

distri~t did and' did not do," Court's Opinion a t 74-75, totally 

ignoring the district court's findings and the de facto reasons 

for the racial composition of these schools. Court' s Opinion at 

74-82 . Part of the court's analysis of these schools i~ contained 

in an earlier part of its opinion. See Court's Opinion at 68-71 

(discussing attendance boundaries of Lafayette, Quinton Heights 

an~ Lowman Hill). Appendix A contains the 1969-70 elementary 

school attendance boundaries; appendix B contains those . for 

1985-86. 

Ironically, this court's analysis of these racially 

identifiable schools is placed in a section entitled "The Causal 

Link Between De jure Segreg~tion: and Current Condition of 

Segregation." Court's Opinion at 52. The court steadfastly 

refuses to consideJ an alternative interpretation of the evidence 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 203 
which would show the absence -of a link between the present lack of 

perfect racial balance and the prior de jure pegregation. The 

court's position is _that any consideration of demographic factors 

which resulted in a lack of, racial balance would be to absolve the 

school board of its affirmative duty. Id. at 58-60, 74. Not so. 

Courts routinely ~~ve considered the presen~e or absence of 

demographic factors over which the school board had no control in 

deciding whether school systems were unitary. See, ~· Morgan, 

831 F.2d at 320 (system unitary; court considered racial 

concentration in · court-drawn school districts); Lawrence, 799. F.2d 

at· 1043 ("In Law!en~e Coun~y, unlike the situation .in Pasadena 

Board of Education, the School Board's failure to achieve a 

desegregated school system has not resulted from population 

. .. . 

~igration into, or out of, or within this small r ural co~nty.'')~ 

Ross, 699 .F·. 2d at 226 (sys·tem unitary; current housing patterns 

After desegregation order resu lted in several one-race: schools·). 

The rationale for this is best stated by this court in a passage 

concerning one-race schools: 

Although virtual one race schoois ''require close 

scrutiny," they .are not always unconstitutional.l8 

18 Given modern urban demography and geography, 

one-race schools may well have evolved for reasons 

beyond school board control. See Calhoun v~· Cook, 522 

F.2d 717 , 719 (5th Cir. 1975).--rrhus, .where a school 

system consists of de facto one-race schools, rather 

than de jure, the system is not unconstitutional. 

Court's Opinion at 19, 19 n.l8. The above is equally applicable 

to schools which depart from ·the syst em-wide minority 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 204 
ave ra~e--" they are not always unconstitutional'' for they "may well 

have evolved for reasons beyond school board control." Id. 

Concerning these eight schools that the plaintiffs contend 

are ''iacially identifiable," the district court found that " the 

schools are attended by more whi te students than black students 

(1,248 white students, 1 ,079 black students) . Indeed , white 

students make up close to half (49.3%) of all the students that 

attend these_a llegedly non-white schools. " Brown, 671 F. Supp . at 

1298. As the follo.wing reveals, there is no need "for the 

appellate fact finding that is going .on here, the district court's 

finding that the~e sch6ols do not reflect a current condition of 

unlawful segregation is not clearly erroneous; indeed, it is amply 

s~pported by the record and t~e weight of the · evidence . Moreover, 

the district court's factfinding is free of several errors which 

permeate the appellate factfinding . 

A • . 

Belvoir elementary was annexed in approximately 1959, thus 

plaintiffs cannot claim it was a vestige of the fo rme·r de j ure 

system. Rec. supp. vo.l. XI at 148. Th is court attaches 

s ignificance to the fact that Bel voir's student popula tion has not 

been less that 50% minority. Court's .Opinion at 75. Yet , the 

district court carefully explained why this does not create 

liabi lity: . 

Belvoir Elementary School is centered in an area 

with a high minority population. It is surrounded by 

other schools with higher than average minority . populations. It is not the black school in a rac ially 

'-110-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 205 
mixed area. It is a school with a higher than average 

black student population in a residential area with a 

higher than average black population. 

Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1300 (emphasis in or.iginal}. The district 

.court made further findings, which certainly are corroborated by 

the data o~ racial composi tion.43 Th~ district court's findings 

also are supported by ~he defendants' ~xpert D~. Clark, who 

analyzed Belvoir's hypothetical rac{al composition, assuming its 

boundaries remained constant. Rec. ex. vol. I at 28, 34-3~ . 

43 

Racial Inventory-Belvoir Elementary 

1952- 1985 

Year Minority White Total % Minority 

1952 ·66 379 445 14.8 

1960 82 276 358 22 .7 

1966-67 255 172 427 59.72 

1967-68 276 210 486 56.79 

1968-69 294 224 518 56.76 

1969-70 274. 176 450 . 60.88 

1970-71 232 .131 363 63.91 

·1971-72 187 124 311 60·. 51 

1972-73 228 135 363 ' 62.81 

1973-74 218 102 320 68.12 

1974-75 198 . 97 295 67.12 

1975-76 168 . 67 235 71.49 

1976-77 190 45 235 80.85 

1977-78 163 48 211 77.25 

1978-7.9 159 57 216 73.61 

1979-80 150 52 202 74.26 

1980-81 152 49 201 75.62 

1981-82 167 g·g 266 62.78 

1982-83 156 107 263 59.32 

1983-84 121 82 203 59.61 

1984-85 112 81 .193 58.03 

1985-86 146 90 . 236 61.86 

Rec . val. IV at 460, supp. vol. XI at 149, 152; ex. vo1. IV at 54, 

58 , 62, 66, 70, 74, 78, 82, 86, 90, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109 , 122, 

134, 146, 158 & 170. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 206 
The district court found that two feder~ ly subsidized 

housing projects constructed in 1963 (Pine Ridge; 210 family 

units) and in 196 ~ (Trail Ridgei 14~ family units) caused the 

minority elementary student population to increase to over· 50%. 

Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1302; rec. ex. vol. IV at 215. Plaintiffs ' 

expert Mr. Lamson did not take these housing projects into 

account. Rec; vol. IV at 463. The distr~ct court also found that 

closing Rice Elementary in 1981 and reassigning some of those 

students to Belvoir improved the racial balance at Belvoir. 

Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 13-02. This court characterizes the closing 

as having "a modest desegregative effect at Belvoir," Court's 

Opinion at 75, but the data reveal that the minority percentage 

dropped by approximately 13%. See supra note 43. The Belvoir 

.attendance district now is largely minority q.nd the . ch~nged racial 

mix in the school has been caused by actions other than those of 

the school board. See Higgins,· 508 F.2d at 791 ("the law imposes ·· 

no affirmative duty upon school offi cials to correct the effects 

of segregation resulting from factors over which they have no 

control"). 

B. 

This court's complaint about Hudson Elementary is that 

"[w]hil~ the passage of time has dissipated Hudson's identity as a 

white schooY, this change is due solely to the spread of 

minorities into its attendance area, not to any action by the 

school district." Court':;. Opinion at 76. It seems anomalous to 

-112-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 207 
find fault with the school board concerning residential movement 

which altered the original racial composition at Hudson. But it 

is consist~nt with this court's view tha t residential patterns 

which detract fr om racial balance are always the responsibility of 

the school board, while residential migration which improves 

racial balance should not inure to the benef.it of the school boar.d 

insofar as liability is concerned. See Court's Opinion at 27 ( 11A 

showing that the school district has not promoted segregation and 

has allowed desegregation to take place where natural .forces 

worked ·to that end is insufficient."). Fol lowi ng this logic, 

residential movement could lead to absolute racial balance and 

still support a finding of school board liability, especially 

given the court's view that a school which ~pproaches the 

system-wide minority average may still be racially identifiable. 

Apparently, the defendants are constitutionally liable for 

Hudson because it now exce·eds the system-wide minority average by 

20%, with a 46. 55% ·minority student population. See· Court's 

Opinion at 76. Th~ plaintiffs view Hudson as ~acially 

identifiable black, · notwithstanding that 53.45% of the students 

were white in 1985-86 . Appellants' Brief at 38; Brown, 671 F. 

Supp. at 1301. Hudson is perhaps the archetype for illustrating 

the court's refusal to consider the effect of demographic £actori 

which result in chang ing student racial composition at va rious 

schools. The district court gave cl~ar re~sons explaining the 

racial composition at Hudson , reasons which do not encompass 

liability for these defendants. Hudson was constructed in 1963 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 208 
an_d. has steadily increased in minority enrollment. 44 The 

boundaries of Hudson have not changed since 1964. Rec. ex. vol. 

IV at 13-29. The ~istrict court _found that _ "the construction of 

subsidized hou~ing projects in the Hudson attendance area'' in 1965 

(Coloriial Townhouses; 137 family units), in 1967 (Highland Park 

Apartments; 200 f~mily units} and i n 1970 (Deer Creek; 92 fami l y 

units), · together ''with the general increase of rninoiity residents 

on the east side,~ was responsible for the increase in minority 

enrollment at Hudson. Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1302; rec. ex. vpl . 

IV at 215. Plaintiff's expert Mr. Lamson did not take into 

44 

Racial Inventory-Hudson Elementary 

1966-1985 

Year Minority . White · Total %Minority 

1966-67 18 .202 220 8.18 

1967-68 . 24 ii2 . 296 8.11 

1968-69 23 312 335 6.-87 

1969-70 33 306 339 . 9. 73 

1970-71 68 322 390 17.44 

1971-72 83 268 351 23.71 

1972-73 80. 2·23 303 26.40 

1973-74 83 211 294 28. 23 . 

1974-75 79 202 281 28.11 

1975-7.6 99 175 274 36.13 

1976-77 88 176 264 33.33 

1977-78 86 154 240 35.83 

1978-79 71 148 219 32.42 

1979-80 80 155 235 34.04 

1980-81 78 155 233 33,48 

1981-82 88 142 230 38.26 

1982-83 88 142 230 38.26 

1983-84 105 124 229 45.85 

1984-85 105 132 237 44.3 o- 1985.-86 1 08 124 232 46.55 

Rec. ex. vol. IV at .54, 58, 62, 66, 7Q, 74, 78, 82, 86, 90, 93, 

97, 101, .105, 109, 123, 135, 147, 159 .& 171. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 209 
account the effect of any of these demographic changes. Rec. vol. 

IV at 464-65. 

Plaint,iffs '· position concerning Hudson and Avondale is 

legally untenable. After conceding that the increased minority 

enrollment at Hudson and Avondale East is "purely [the] result of 

residential change," plaintiffs continue: 

In a de jure school system, the school board has the 

duty to react to residential change to ensure that no 

school becomes disproportionately Black. Swann, 402 

U.S. at 14. The failure of the Topeka · School Board to 

prevent Hudson and Avondale ~ast from becoming disproportionately Black is. a constitutional violation. 

Appellants' Brief at 38. Plaintiffs' position is not supported by 

the law or the facts. · After two desegregation plans and over · 

thirty years after Brown I and Br.own II, it cannot be said that 

TopeKa operates a de jure system. Apparently, plaintiffs' 

conception of the duty imposed by the Supreme Court i s 

never-ending. ·The Court, however, has declared to the contrary. 

In Swann, the. Court recogn i zed that once the constitu~ onal 

violation is eliminated, school authorities are not 

"constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the 

racial composition of stude~t. bodies" even i f the community 

experiences demographic changes. Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32. 

Moreover, there is no requirement that every school in the 

district reflect t he system-wide average minority enroll ment, 

either before or after a finding of unitariness. See Pasadena, 

427 u.s. at .434. 

-115-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 210 
c. 

Like Belvoir, Highland Park North Elementary was not part of 

the Topeka system in 1954. Instead it was annexed in 1959 , rec. 

vol. IV at 394, and is estimated to have had close to the 

system-wide average of minor ity students then . 4 5 There has been a 

steady increa-se in minority students attending due to · resident_i a l 

patterns. Brown , 671 F. Supp. at 1302. This court's complaint is 

that when Parkdale closed in 1978 , the reass ignme nt [of Parkda le 

students ) increased Highland Park North ' s minor ity percentage at a 

45 

Racial Inventory-Highland Park N6rth Elementary 

"19 52-1985 

Year 

1952 

1960 

1966-67 

1967-68 

1968-69 

1969-70 

1970-71 

1971-72 

1972-73 

1973-74-

1974-75 

1975-76 

1976- 77 

1977-78 

1978-79 

1979-80 

1980-81 

1981-82 

1982-83 

1983-84 

1984-85 

1985-86 

Minority 

18 

47 

119 

157 

145 

180 " 

143 

159 

152 

135 

142 

1 46 

140 

1 27 

170 

169 

149 

190 

197 

198 

174 

179 

White 

1 , 158 

500 

432 

371 

368 

350 

319 

282 

245 

211 

194 

201 

169 

142 

121 

103 

111 

122 

128 

121 

125 

130 

Total 

1,176 

547 

551 

528 

513 

530 

.462 

441 

397 

346 

3-36 

347 

309 

269 

291 

272 

260 

312 

325 

319 

299 

309 

%Minority 

1.5 

8 .. 5 

21.60 

29.73 

28.27 

33.96 

30 . 95 

3'6. 0 5 

38.29 

39.01 

42.26 

42.07 

45.31 

47.21 

58.42 

62. 13 

57.3 1 

60.90 

60.62 

62.07 

58. 19 

57.93 

Rec. supp. vol. XI at 149, 152; ex. vo1~ IV. at 54, 58 , 62, 66, 70 , 

74, 78 , 82, 86, 90, 93, 97, 101 , 105, 109, 123 , 135, 147 , 159, & 

171. 

. -116-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 211 
time when it was already high." Court' s Opinion at 76 . As .the 

disfr ict court points .out , however , the school boa-rd was ab.le to 

cl6se Parkdale, a predominantly black school (85.6% minority} 

while reassigning its students to a nearby school, Highland Park 

North. Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 130 2 . . Moreover, as footnote 45 

indicates, the increased minority percentage was caused by two 

factors: an increase of 43 (170-127) mi nority students and a 

decrease of 21 (142-121) white students. Considering the cou rt ' s 

fleeting approach to some of these schools, see , · Cour t 's 

Opinion at 76, it is unclear ~ow the coux t 's observation trumps 

the district court's reasoned analysis rejecting coristituiional 

liability. 

D. 

Lafayette Elementary began as an all-white de jure school. 

Id. at 1302 . It has increased in minqrity .enrol lment and has · 

remained a majority-minority school, although the composition of 

th~ minority groups has vari ed over the years.46 Id. {noting that 

46 

Year 

1953 

1954 

1955 

1956 

1966-67 

1967-68 

1968..:.69 

Rac ial Inventory- Lafayette Elementary 

1953-1985 

Non-Black 

Minority Black White Total 

0 0 382 382 

0 o . . 332 · 332 

0 47 314 361 

0 50 315 365 

136 125 218 479 ·133 140 188 461 

131 144 247 522 

(footnote continued 

-117-

%Minority 

0 

0 

13.0 

13.7 

54.49 

59.22 

52.68 

on next page) 

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 212 
minority composit ion was 56-59% over the last ·.five years, with a 

varied composition). This court notes that federally subsidized 

housing proj~cts were built in the area in the early 1960's. 

Court's Opinion at 77; rec. ex. vol. IV at 215 (1961-Eastboro 

Apts.; 28 family units; 1962-Eastboro Apts.; 76 family units). 

More ~nits were bu ilt . in 1970. Rec . ex. vol . IV at 21 5 (Ripley 

Park Apts·., 102 fam~ly units). 

This court first looks to 1966 and reports the racial 

c.ompositions of Lafayette's neighboring schools (omitting High-land 

Park North). Court's Opinion at 77 . I have done the same in 

chart form comparing the minority percentages· with the surrounding 

schools, in 1966 ~nd now. 

(footnote continued from 

1969- 70 157 

1970-71 162 

1971-72 134 .1972-73 108 

1973-74 91 

1974-75 102 

1975-76 67 

1976-77 36 

1977-78 36 

1978-79 48 

1979-:80 47 

1980-81 40 

198 1-82 60 

198 2-83 58 

1983-84 59 

1984-85 60 

1985-86 59 

previous 

l52 

170 

186 

177 

190 

179 

221 

117 

124 

170 

131 

143 

166 

1 80 

187 

161 

158 

pa·ge} 

244 

249 

261 

167 

163 

127 

140 

86 . 

97 

110 

108 

131 

177 

-163 

194 

172 

165 

553 

581 

581 

452 

444 

408 

428 

239 

257 

328 

286 

314 

403 

401 

440 

393 

382 

55.88 

57.14 

55.07 

63.05 

63.28 

68.87 

67.29 

64.02 

62.26 

66.46 

62.24 

58.28 

56.08 

59.35 

55. 91. 

56.23 

56.81 

Rec. supp. vol. XI at 56, 57 , 58, 59; ex. vol. IV · at 54, 58, 62, 

66, 70, 74, 78, 82, 86, 90, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109 , 123, 135, 147, 

159 & 171; see also ex. vo1. IV at 37-38 (estimating 8 .4% minority 

percentage in 1955 which district court relied upon). 

-118-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 213 
Direction 

from 1966-67 1985-86. 

School Lafayette Minority % Minority % 

Lafayette 54.49 56.81 

Parkdale sw 93.12 closed 1978 (85.62% min. ) 

Sumner NW 12.29 31.47 

State Street NE 27.52 26.26 

Rice· E 3.00 closed 1981 {33.55% min. ) 

Belvoir SE 59.72 61.86 

Highland P.N. sw 21.60 57.93 

Rec. ex. vol. II at 48-A, 49-B; ex. vol. IV at 54-55, 97, 109, 

· 170-74. The court then concludes that Lafayette "remains a 

transition school b~tween schools with higher minority percentages 

to th~ south and lower percentages to the north and west." 

Court's Opinion at 77. To understand what the court means, it is 

necess·~ry to refer to the court's previous discussion on school 

boundaries. ·Court's Opinion at ·70. There,· the· court decides that 

Lafayette is the product of segregated boundaries b~cause it bas a 

different minority ~ercentage than every one of its neighboring 

schools. In the words of the court: 

The border between Lafayette and State Street, t~e 

school to Lafayette's north, has functioned as the 

boundary between the mostly white area served by State 

Street and the school to its north [Lundgren] .•• and 

the schools to its south and southwest [Highland Park 

North and Belvoir]. Lafayette has long had twice the 

minority population of State Street; thus, since 1966, 

-Lafayette's minority population has ranged from 52% to 

69% while State Street's.has ranged from 27% to 34%. 

Id. (footnote omitted). This conclusion is remarkable not only 

because it is appe~late factfinding concerning intent including 

noncompliance with the affirmative duty on 11 0bjective" facts that 

are far from obvious, but also because it ignores that the 

surrounding population of the .Lundgren and State Street schools 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 214 
(as of 1980} had far less black concentration than did the 

surrounding populatiori of Lafayette, Highland Park North and 

Belvoir. See rec. ex. vol. I at 49. Moreover, it conflicts with 

the distri~t coutt's finding on this point attiibuting the 

in~reased minority percentage to demographic factors, .Brown, 671 

F. Supp. at 1303, rather than a "segregative ~ffect" of boundary 

changes by defendants. The district court's finding is supported 

by common sense and the defendants' expert, Dr. Clark! See rec. 

ex. vel. I at 35, 43-45. 

Once again, the district court's findings make more sense 

than ours. Looking at the chart, see supra p. 119, it is apparent 

that Topeka closed two schools with greater and lesser minor.ity 

concentrations. than Lafayette. The dis.trict court noted that the 

clcising of Parkdale result~d in the minority percentage increasing 

by four percent (from 62% to 66%}, Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1302; 

however, the next year saw the percentage retur~ to its prior 

level (from 66%. to 62%), and decrease thereafter. See supra note 

42. The district court then thought that the closing of Rice, 

·which resulted in reassignment of some students to Lafayette, may 

have contributed to the minority percentage decreasing in future 

years. Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1302. ·Dr. Clark, defendants' 

demographic expert,. using residential population data which had a 

high ~orrelation (.8 to .9 out of 1.0) with school attendance 

data, viewed the increased minority percentage at Lafayette as a 

result of demographic changes. He concluded that the ~lOsure of 

Parkdale, with respect to Lafayette, 

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was overall desegregative. Rec. vol. XI at 2338~ 2373, 2388-89; 

ex. vol. I at 35, 43, 45. 

This court's ultimate conclusion, that 11 [u]nder its 

neighborhood school plan, the school district simply maintained 

Lafayette as a school with disproportionate minorit~ percentages, .. 

Court's Opinion at 77; see also id. at 70, ignores the demographic 

factors involved and implies that the school district ·had an 

obliga~ion to racially balance Lafayette because it exceeded the 

system-wide minority percentage. 

E.· 

Like Lafayette, Quinton Heights Elementary began ~s an 

all-white de jure school. Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1303. The 

district court _noted the steady increase in minority student 

population, and that the minority concentration has remained 

approximately 50% over· the last several years. ~7 . Id. This 

47 

Racial Inventory-Quinton Heights Elementary 

1953-1985 

Year Minority White Total %Minority 

1953 0 187 187 0 

1954 10 288 298 3.4 

1955 23 308 331 6.9 

1956 26 329 355 7.3 

1966-67 114 199 313 36.42 

1967-68 102 184 286 35.66 

1968-69 103 192 295 34.92 

1969-70 113 161 274 . 41. 24 

1970-71 133 157 290 45.86 

1971.;_72 108 188. 296 36.48 

1972-73 93 161 254 '36. 61 

1973-74 92 160 252 36.51 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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court's approach to analyzing the school has been to adopt the 

conclusion of plaintiffs' exp~rt contained in his report and 

testimony, while simplifying the analysis ·and not discussing the 

effect of al.legedly segregative option~! attendance zones, as did 

Mr. Lamson. See Court's Opinion at 78-79; rec. vol. XI at 139-48, 

173-78 (Lamson.Report on Quinton Heigh~s, School Closings}, vol. 

III at 248-59 (Lamson testimony concerning Quinto~ Heights) (cited 

·in Court's Opinion at 78 n.88), 284, 287, 290-93 (closure of 

Monroe and Polk and affect on Quinton Heights}; ~also Court's 

Opinion at 54-55 (summarizing 1955-65 in Topeka 

~ystem-- .. Plaintiffs introduced evidence tending to show that the 

school district's use of port~ble classroom.s and optional 

attendance zones served to maintain segr~gation by concentrating 

. . students of one race at certain schools.~). Of course, ~o adopt 

the full arialysis with the discussion of pptional attendance zones 

would ·Conflict with the district court'~ findirig that· "any 

(footnote continued from 

1974-75 84 

1975-76 77 

1976-77 78 

1977-'78 62 

1978-79 67 

1979-80 111 

1980-81 119 

1981-82 iso 

1982-83 138 

1983-84 151 

1984-85 149 

1985-86 129 

previous page) 

143 227 

120 197 

126 204 

120 182 

105 172 

110 221 

115 234 

117 267 

127 265 

125 276 

140 289 

132 261 

37.00 

39.09 

38.24 

34.07 

38;95 

50.23 

50.85 

56.18 

52.08 

54.71 

51.56 

49.43 . 

Rec. supp. vo1. XI at 56, 57, 58, 59; ex. vo1. IV at 55, 59, 63, 

67, 71, 75, 79, 83, 87, 90, 94, 97, 101, 105, 109, 125, 137, 149, 

161 & 173; see also ex. vol. IV at 37-38 {estimating 2.8% minority 

percentage in 1955 which district court relied upon). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 217 
segregative effect of the zones was slight. and does not remain 

today." Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1298. Th~ ~istrict court's 

finding, which necessar~ly includes the optional at.tendance zones 

discussed by plain_tiffs' expert, is supported by the testimony and 

report of defendants' expert Dr. Clark. Rec. vol. XI at 2304-05, 

2309-10, 2318-19, 2321-22, 2327-2~. Dr. Clark analyzed the effect 

of boundary changes in Topeka, including optional attendance 

zones. See supra note 30; ~also rec. ex. vol. I at 19. But 

concerning school closings, the court has been convinced by the 

testimony of plaintif~s' expert. 

Ag·ain, we track this court's odyssey. The court begins by 

considering two closings: Pierce and van Buren. In 1957, Pierce 

was annexed to the district; in·l958 the adjacent schools to the· 

west with which it shared a_ common boundary were Quinton Heights 

and Monroe. Rec. supp. vol. XI at 140; rec. ex. vol. IV at 12. 

In 1958, the enrollment began to decline at Quin.ton Heights at an 

average rate of 21 students per year. Rec. supp. vol._ XI at 142. 

In 1959, the 79_ remaining black students at Pierce were asiigned 

to three other elementary schools: Quinton Heights, Highland Park 

North, and Highland Park Central. Id. at 142. Plaintiffs' expert 

admitted that what effect this had on the racial composition of 

Quinton Heights is not known. Id. at 143. Mr. Lamson also 

reported that during 1956-66 Quinton Heights lost white students 

while gaining black students. Id. at 142. 

In 1962, the. attendance boundary of Quinton Heights was 

expanded northward into what had been areas served by Van Buren 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 218 
and Central Park. Id. at 144; rec. vel. III at 251. This 

resulted in a gain of 45 students for Quinton Heights after it had 

lost an average .of 21 students for the previous 4 years. Rec. 

supp. vol. XI at 144. Van Buren, however, still had an attendance 

area and continued to operate. In 1964, Van Bu~en was closed; 

most students were sent to Monroe; some were sent to Quinton 

Heights. 48 Rec. voL III at 255; ·supp. vol.· XI at 145-46. 

This court continues with the observation that by 1966 the 

minority percentage of Quinton Heights was 36.4% and certain 

schools surrounding Quinton Heights had greater and lesser 

concentrations of minority students. ·court's Opinion at 78. And 

48 In foot~ote 88, Court's Opinion at 78, the court tells us 

about these two northward expansions of the boundary of Quinton 

Heights. Regarding the second ~xpansion, we are told: 11The area 

assigned to Quinton Heights was apparently empty of people at the 

time." Id. I do.n't think so. If that statement were· true, there 

would have been no students to send to Quinton Heights when Van 

Buren closed in 1964. The discussion in the transcript concerning 

the uninhabited area pertains to only a part of the area which was 

added--the fairgrounds. See rec. vel. III at 252-253 {1962 

northward expansion took in-3 areas; central third is the 

fairgrounds without permanent residents, e~stern third is east of 

the fairgrounds and 0-100% black, and western third is west of the 

fairgrounds and 0-89.9% black), id. at 1255 ( r.emainder of 

fairgrounds added to Quinton Heights' attendance area in 1964, as. 

well as part of the residential areas of Van Buren and Monroe). 

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so we continue. The following chart provides more detail. 

Direction 

from 

Quinton 1966-67 1985-86 

School Heights Minority % Minority % 

Quinton 

Heights 36.42 49.43 

Highland 

Park Central SE 16.64 35.09 

Avondale East SE 14.96 44.14 

Avondale West sw i.26 16.61 

Stout w .50 26.8~ 

Central Park NW 15.49 closed 1980 (42.90% min. ) 

Polk N 11.54 closed 1979 (48.00% min.) 

Monroe NE 79.45 closed 1975 (82.73% min.) 

Highland 

Park North NE 21.60 57.93 

Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1299; rec. ex. vel. I at 48A~ ex. vel. IV 

at 54-55, 87, .101, 105, ·170-73. The court tells us that by 1966 

Quinton Heights "was bordered by heavily minority Monroe 

. . . . . 

elementary school and oth~rwise by primarily white schools." 

Court's Opinion . at 78 •.. This statement is in error .• 

The average minority ~ercentag~ in 1966 for elementary 

schools was 16.49%. Rec. ex. vel. IV at 56. Keeping this in 

mind, it appears that other schools, besides neighboring Monroe, 

had minority pe~centages which · very nearly met, or exceeded, the 

systern-wide _elementary average. As the above chart points out, 

Highland Park Central, Avondale ·East , Central Park and Highland 

Park.North simply are not one-race white or virtually one-race 

white schools. Moreover, I do not see the. significance of the 

court's statement that Quinton Heights had the ?eventh largest 

minority population out of 35 schools. How does this fact create· 

liability? . Thus, the district court did not err when it rejected 

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the attempt to "characterize the reassignments in the 1960s as 

part of· a process of focusing Quinton Heights as a school for 

black students." Court's Opinion at 78. 

The court next demonstrates its ability to. find ·its own fac ts 

by describing the population density maps in ·relation to a 

neighboring schciol of Quinton Heights: "Indeed, on the maps 

available to us, it is quite noticeable that Polk's boundaries in 

1970 correspond closely to a patch of white population surrounded 

by minority population assigned to other schools, including 

Quinton Heights. •• · Court's Opinion at . 78-79. The court's 

subjective observation demonstrates ·the limitations of its 

approach~ 1he map cited by the court, rec. ex. vol. I at 67, 

tells·us the perdentage of black population by block • . 

Notwithstanding the intended breadth ·of the court's analysis, the 

map does not tell us about other minorities, e.g._, hispanic. Nor 

·does it teil . us much about population density or anything about 

student density. See rec. vol. IV at 485. Yet, the court's clear 

implication from looking at the map is that the boundary around 

Polk as of 1970 was drawn in such a way as to exclude minorities. . . 

The following chart, comparing· the minority perc"entages of Polk 

with its neighboring schools, including Quinton Heights, as of 

..,.126-

Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 221 
1970, the date of the map, undercuts the .court's finding. · 

Direction 

from 1970 

School Polk Minority % 

Polk 21.33 

Monroe SE 79.91 

Quinton 

Heights s 45.86 

ce·ntral Park sw 24 . 53 

Lowman Hill NW 41.52 

Clay NW 21.26 

Rec. ex. · vol. I at 48A; rec. ex . vol. IV 70-71. The court's 

findi ng is suspect for at least two· reaso ns.· Fi rst, as the above 

chart. shows': the minority populatio11 in the area is dispersed to 

several schools ' in the area . Polk is hardly an all-white school, 

with a 78.67% white stu~ent enrollment. Inde~d, aft e r Monroe 

closed. in 1975, plaintiffs' expert Mr. Lamson testifi ed that Pol k 

was racially disproportionate black with a 30.4% blac k enrollment , 

while fhe ~lementary average . was ·14.82%. Rec. vol. III at 284 and 

supp. vol. XI at 173; ex. vol. IV at .91. Second, Pol k exceeded 

the system-wide minority elementary average which was 18.67% in 

1970. Rec. ex. vol. IV at . 72. These factors, not considered by 

this court, convince me that the court has made a finding in 

error. 

Continuing with the analysis of Quin~on Heights, the court 

next complains about two adjacent school closures in the 1970's 

because they resulted in extending ·the no r t hern boun y of 

Quinton Heights into northern areas with high minori ty 

concentrations. Court's Opinion at 79. Unfortunately, the court 

does not share wi th us which c l osings a r e i nvolved, i d., but I 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 222 
suspect they are Monroe which closed in 1975, and Polk which 

closed in 1979. When Monroe closed, its attendance area was 

divided between Polk, Highland Park North and Quinton Heights. 

Rec. supp. voi. XI at 173. As I previousiy nbted, the effect on 

Quinton Heights was negligible; although the minority percentage 

increased from 37 to 39.09%, seven fewer minority students 

attended in 1975. See supra p. 62-63 (noting that f-09% increase 

largely due to declining white enrollment). Indeed, not until the 

fall of 1979 did th~ number of minority students .at Quinton 

Heights exceed what existed immediately pr·ior to the closing of 

Monroe. Thus, expanding Quinton Heights' attendance area 

northward when · Monroe closed could hardly support a firm arid 

definite conviction that Quinton. Heights' boundaries were being 

manipulated so as to racially . identify the school as intended for 

minority students. 

Apparently the· closing of Polk resulted in the reassignment 

of its students to Quinton He-ights, Sumner, and Lowman Hill. Rec. 

vol. III at 291. The minority percentage at Quinton Heights did 

increase from 38.95% (in 1978-1979) to 50.23% ( in 1979-BO), with 

the addition of· 44 minority students and 5 white students. This 

is the only action here which arguably is dicati~e of 

·inattention to the affirmative duty. The district court, however, 

rejected that inference. Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1303. B~sed on . 

the foregoing, I c~nnot agree with the statement that: "It is thus 

clear that Quinton Heights' current boundaries are the result of 

continued manipulation by the school district." Court's Opinion 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 223 
at 79. The court's analysis is inconsistent with its contention 

that the district court should not have focused on intent, and 

that there was indeed none. Court'sOpinion at 38-39. 

The court attaches great significance to the fact that 

Quinton Heights is a relatively long district which extends into 

minority populations in the north and ~ast. Id. at 79. But what 

the court does not point out is that the southernmost part 

includes al+ of the area for Topeka Country Club and the Kansas 

National Guard Armory, which easily comprises one-quarter of the 

school's attendance area. See rec. ex. vol. I at 49; rec. ex. 

vol. Vat 60. These area~ probably have few, .if any, element~ry 

students; thus from ·a practical perspective, t.he Quinton Heights 

area is not as long as it may appear because its southernmost area 

is oricupied by large institutions. Merely because the b~lance of 

the school's attendance boundaries includes minority population, 

or. that the sc~ool. includes Topeka Avenue or railroad track~, does 

not compel a conclusion that the boundaries were drawn with . . 

segregative intent or effect. See rec. vol. III at 291-92 (Mr. 

Lamson c_ommenting abou-t undesirable configuration of attendance 

area). Indeed, the presence of natural barriers in elementary 

attendance areas is hardly unique in this system. See rec. ex. 

vol. v at 225-228 (listing 20 elementary schools with natural 

barriers, e.g. institutional spaces, major thoroughfares, 

waterways, railroad tracks). 

The court's earlier discussion of "peculiar-looking 

attendance . boundaries" is pecul iar in itself because, like the 

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. cdurt's·subjective approach to map reading, the court of appeals 

-has moved far beyond its review function into the realm of a ·trial 

court. Court's Opinion at 69. Still, based on this"untethered 

perception of "peculiarity," the court declares that Quinton 

Heights' current boundaries_are segregative. Id. Put simply, the 

court-seeks to overturn the district court's factual ~inding that 

the attendance zones are not gerrymandered. Brown, 671 F. Supp. 

1300. Notwithstanding the countless hours spent on this case by 

the panel~ I remain firmly convinced that we have added very 

little to the _district court's amply supported findings. 

Admittedly, the evidence is not perfectly ~onsistent and all in 

defendants' favor. But it is not nearly so one-sided or in. favor 

of the plaintiffs' as this court·appar~ntly believes. "The trial 

judge had a firm grip on the applicable law and a superb command 

of the facts in this complex case. we have done no better, even 

assuming that we were so empowered. 

F. 

Notwithstanding that Lowman Hill Elementary began as an 

all-white de jure school, this court finds that "(t]he school 

appears to have been designed and maintai~ed as a school with a . 

concentration of minority students ... Court's Opinion at 80. The 

court begins by describing plaintiffs' contention concerning 

optional attendance zones;- ~~ppellants' Brief at 13 n.20; rec. 

supp. vol. XI at 96-98: vol. III at 235-41; however, it .is unclear 

whether. the court accepts those contentions, in light of the 

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district court's rejection of those .same contentions. Court's 

Opinion at 79-80; see Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1298 (optional 

attendance zones (all eliminated in 1976) did not have significant 

segregative effect; any effect attenuated). The . emphasis· of this 

cou~t seems to be on th~ inclusion of two areas that have greater 

c6nceritrations of black residents49 in the northwestern part of 

central Topeka, within the Lowman Hill attendance boundaries. The 

district court pointed out that these two areas "are closer to the 

Lowman Hill Schools than other. schools in the area." Brown, 671 

F. Supp. at 1301. Indeed, that was ~he observation of defendants' 

expert Dr. Clark. 50 Rec. vol ~ XI at 2344-45. 

49 ~he court tells us that Lowman Hill "remains the school whose at~endance boundaries include the only significant group of 

minority population in the northwestern quarter of the school 

district," and also discusses Lowman Hill as containing "the only 

two significant areas of minority population in. that part of 

Topeka." Court 's Opinion at 70, 80 (emphasis added). As support 

for its finding, the court refers to the same map discussed ·above 

which ·indicates percent black. population by block. · Id •. at 80 ·. n.91. Again the court'.s statement is too broad, we really have no 

way of knowing the concentration ·of other minority groups (e.g. 

hispanic) in the Lowman Hill area. · 

50 In footnote 62, Court's Opinion at 52, the court claims. that ·defendants' expert Dr. Clark admitted that the Lowman Hill 

boundaries were drawn with the effect of encompassing the black 

popula·tion in northwestern central Topeka, and· that he essentially 

threw up his hands claiming that the boundaries already "were'' in 

place. If this was true, it might provide some support for ·this 

court's finding that the Lowman Hill boundaries were drawn with 

the intent or ~ffect of segregating the black .elernentary students 

in northwestern central Topeka .. The transcript of Dr. Clark's 

testimony does not support that account, however. Dr. Clark 

explained why his work concerning· schools with larger 

concentrations of minority students (including Lowman Hill) 

depended upon a more detailed analysis than a visual' inspection of 

attendance areas would permit. Concerning Lowman ·Hill , the 

following excha~ge occurred: 

(footnote continued on ·next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 226 
In 1959, .a new qnd expanded .Lowman Hill school was 

constructed which received black students from Buchanan. Rec. 

supp. vol. XI at 92. This increased Lowman ~ill' s minority 

percentage to 49.63% by 1966, but the school has nev~r had a 

majority-minoriiy populatio~. 51 Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1301 . The 

(footnote continued 

Mr. Hansen:· 

Dr. Clark: 

from previous-page) 

But this is an example .where on visual 

analysis the bounda~ies were drawn in 

such a way -- from visual.analysis the 

boundary [sic] were drawn in such a way 

as to incorporate virtually all the black 

people in that part of town ·i nto one 

school in that part o·f town. Isn't .that 

right? . 

No, I don't think they were drawn to 

incorporate all the black people in that 

part of town. There are areas of yellow 

[ indica_ting lesser concentratiors of 

black residents] that are outside that. 

But the boundaries of tbose scbool 

districts are in place~ and ye~, they 

have substantial numbers of black people~ 

As I said ea~lier in the direct 

testimony, I t·ook all those areas which 

were subst'antially black, and under 

racial transition for more detailed 

analysis. 

~ec. vol. XI at 2345 (emphasis added). Taken in context and 

without the benefit of the court's crea~ive editing, e.g. changing 

"are" to "were," the above is hardly the admission· that the court 

would cast it to be. But this court's approach to Dr. Clark's 

testimony has not been one of balance. See, ~, Court's Opinion 

at 55 (out · of 8 potentially segregative cases concerning boundary 

changes, Dr. Clark ~oncludes that all are "overall desegregative 

or generated by demographic trends," rec. ex. voi. I at 43, yet 

this court discusses the one case concerning a now-closed school 

which could be considered partly demographic and partly 

segregative). 

51 

Racial Inventory-Lowman Hill Elementary 

1953-1985 

(footnote cont~nued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 227 
district e-ourt gave-very close attention to this school and its 

relationship to su~rounding schools. 

This court ~entions the closings of three surrounding schools 

and complains that these closings "did not affect the mino~ity 

student percentage at Lowman Hill. 11 Court's Opinion at 69. The 

court then provides the answer to "why not?" when it tells us that 

''the student population it [Lowman Hill} acquired was apparently 

of the same makeup as its ~xisting population." Id. at 80. The 

answer is not surprising when one compares the minority 

{footnote continued frqm previous page) 

Year Minority- White Total %Minority 

1953 0 292 292 0 

1954 0 274 274 0 

1955 46 242 288 16.0 

1956 53 251 304 17.4 

1966-67 199 202 401 49.63 

1967-68 184 245 429 42.89 

1968-69 174 210 384 45.31 

1969-70 186 219 405 45.9-3 

1970-71 . 157 222 379 41.42 

1971-72 -164 198 362 45.30 

1972-73 140 193 333 42.04 

1973-74 133 151 284 46.83 

1974-75 127 143 270 47.04 

1975-76 137 167 304 45.07 

1976-77 143 155 298 47.99 

1977-78 117 159 276 42.39 

1978-79 99 144 243 40.74 

1979-80 113 149 262 43.13 

1980-81 151 196 347 43.52 

1981-82 145 202 347 41.79 

1982-83 120 207 327 36.70 

1983-84 134 203 337 39.76 

1984-85 127 214 341 37."24 

1985-:86 155 215 .370 41.89 

Rec. supp~ vol 11 at 56, 57, 58, 59; ex. vol. IV at 54, 58, 62, 

66,_ 70, 74, 78, 82, 86, 90, 93, 97, 101, 105, 109, 124, 136, 148, 

160 & 172. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 228 
· .percentages of the schools that closed in relation to Lowman Hill. 

Lowman Hill 

Minority % 

School Minority % Year Other 

Year Closed Year Closed School Closed 

1975 Clay 25.35 47.04 

1979 Polk 48.00 40.74 

Central 

1980 Park 42.90 43.13% 

Rec. ex. vol. IV at 86, 101, 105. The above chart indicates that 

the schools that were closed were very similar in minority 

concentration to Lowman Hill. If anything, the presence of 

racially similar neighboring ~chools that were ultimately closed 

undercuts the court's finding that Lowman Hill is racially 

identifiable and used to concentrate minorities. · 

Looking at the neighboring schools and their racial 

composition in 1985 hardly compels the conclusio·n that Lowman Hill 

is racially identifiable. 

Direction 

from 

Lowman 1985-86 

School Hill Minority % 

Lowman 

Hill 41.89 

Quinton 

Heights SE 49.43 

Randolph sw 14.81 

Gage NW 9. 43 . Potwin N 7.73 

Sumner . NE 31.47 

Rec. ex. vol. I ~t 49B; rec. ex. vol. IV at 170, 173-74. It~ 

should be pointed out that nearby Quinton Heights had a higher 

·minority percentage than Lowman Hill. The district court 

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recogniaed that although several surrounding schools had a lower 

minority percentage, this alone did not require it to conclude 

that the actions of the school board resulted in a segregative 

effect. · Brown, 671 F. Supp. at ·1301. It notec1 that Lowman Hill 

was centrally located and had stable boundaries over time.. Id. 

Perhaps if this court had de novo review, the panel majority would 

come to a different conclusion, b~t on ·these very mixed facts the 

district court's call was certainly not clearly erroneous. 

G. 

The court next shifts to "primarily white schools," as 

racially identifiable. These apparent l y are schools which this 

court ha~ ~etermined should have ~reatet minority enrollments, . 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 230 
both in the past and the future.5 2 Court's Opinion at 81-82. 

··These schools purportedly have an identity as 11 schools for white 

children, II id. at 82, which I suspe-ct can only be changed to the 

52· Concerning Gage (9.4% minority) and Potwin (7.7% minority}, 

this court tells us that "the district court specifically found 

that they have been predominantly white schools .since the Supreme 

Court's decision ~n this case, and remain predominantly ~hite 

schools adjacent to schools with higher-than-average minority 

student population." Court's Opinion at 51 n.60 (citing Brown, 

671 F. Supp. at 1303). While the district court apparently 

considered Gage and Potwin "schools with low minority 

percentages," I simply cannot find, on the page cited by the 

court, any finding-that these schools "remain predominantly white 

schools adjacent to schools witp higher-than-average minority studept population." Court•s Opinion a~ 51 n.60. Lest the wrong 

impression be given, that Gage and ~otwin are totally sur~ounded 

by schools with higher-than-average minority concentrations, 

perhaps creating an inference of segregative inten.t including 

non-compliance with the board's affirmative duty, i~ is necessary 

to view the racial composition of those schools in relation to 

schools with neighboring attendance areas. Regarding Gage: 

School 

Gage 

Lowman 

Hill 

Randolph 

Whitson 

McCarter 

PotwinDirection 

from 

Gage 

SE 

- SE 

sw 

sw 

NE 

1985-86 

Minority % 

9.43 

41.89 

14.81 

10.22 

9.16 

7.73 

Rec. ex. vol. I at 49B, ex. vel. IV at 170, 172-74. Thus, only ~owman Hill has a higher-than-average minority concentration (avg. minority concentration 26.36%). 

Regarding Potwin: 

Direction 

from 1985-86 

School Potwin Minority %· 

Potwin 7.73 

Sumner SE 36.36 

(footnote continued on next page} 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 231 
court's satisfaction by strict racial balancing, regardless of the 

de facto reasons for their current racial composition. The 

.purpose of desegregation law is to wipe out the effects of the 

prior de jure .system, not to eliminate ·every difference in racial 

compos-ition between· schools. · See supra p. 48-52. Moreover, many 

of thes·e schools have experienced increases in minority 

percentages as a result·of residential movement. Brown, 671 F. 

supp. at 1303-04. Despite this court's ciear view that positive 

changes in racial composition due to demographic factors are not 

. . 

relevant to determining whether the vestiges of a prior de jure 

system remain, see .Court's Opinion .at 53, 56, one wo'uld expect 

that a school district operating a dual system would have taken 

action to oppose or modify the effects of trends. That is hot 

what has happened in _Topeka. Brown, 671 F. Supp~ at 1304. 

Concerning the locat ion of new schools, this court makes the 

following statemeni which could give the wr~ng impression : · 

All of the elementary schools and all but one of 

the second.ary schools opened by the school district 

since Brown II were built in the white outer part of the 

district.. Robinson middle school, which serves the 

central part of Topeka, is the sole exception. 

(footnote continu·ed from previous page) 

Lowman 

Hil l 

Gage 

Quincy 

sw 

sw 

NE 

41.89 

9.43 

20.54 · 

Rec. ex. val. I at 49B, ex. vol. IV at 170, 172-74. Thus, only 

Sumner and Lowman Hill have higher than average minority 

concentrations. 

The district court noted that schools with low minority 

percentages located in the western part of the dis~rict are 

expected to increase in minority enrollment if current trends 

continue. Brown, 671 F. Supp. at· 1303-04. 

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Furthermore, many of these schools were built near to 

the edges of the district. 

Court's Opinion at 71; ~also id~ at 54. The judgment in Brown . . 

II was announced May 31, 1955. To be sure, numerous schools were 

opened in the western part of the district and had substantial 

wh i te enrollments. The district court identified t hese as: 

McClure, Sheldon, McEachron, McCarter, Bishop and Hudson 

elementary schools, as well as Jardine [1961], 

Eisenhower [1961] and Landon Junior High Schools [1963] 

and Topeka West Senior aigh School [1961]. These 

schools were in areas of residential expansion. During 

the same period, new schools with mixed racial ·compositions replaced existing facilities a t Lowman . ··Hill, L~fay~tte, Highland Park Central, Central Park and 

~elvoir ele~entary schools. 

Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1299; rec. supp. val.. XI at 194, 225. It 

should be added that Qu~nton Heights was ~eplaced :in 1954. Rec . . 

supp. vol • . XI at 40, 50. Thus, several schools ~hich were not on 

.the outer edge of Topeka were included in the district's new 

school construction during and subsequent to the mid-50's: Lowman 

Hil·l, 195.9 i Quinton Heights, · 1954; La·fayet te, 1 9 56: Highland Park 

Central, 1965; Belvoir, 1967; Central Park, 1967. Brown, 671 F. 

Supp. at 1299; rec. supp. val. XI at 40, 43, 50, 92, 166, 170. 

Based on its erroneous finding that Topeka's ne ghborhood 

school plan resulted only in the construction of school s fo~ white 

children in the · far reaches of the district, thereby increasing 

segregation, the court tells. us that "[a] school dist rict 

conscious of its cbnstltutional duty would have attempt ed to 

counteract that effect." Court's Opinion at 72 (citing Diaz, 73 3 

F.2d at 667-69); ~also 

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Court's Opinion at 28 and 28 n.31 {endorsing "castigation" 

approach). Although Diaz contains helpful language that a 

neighborhood school policy must be carefuliy analyzed as to 

application and enforcement before constitutional liability may be 

imposed, 733 P.2d at 664, the case is both legally and factually 

·distinguishable. The duty of ·the school board in Diaz was 

different than that of these defendants; clearly established 

California state law required affirmative action to . relieve 

segregation, ·regardless of the cause. Diaz , 733 F . 2d at 666-67. 

Moreover, according to the majority in Diaz, the board failed to 

consider state guidelines and rejected alternatives ~hich would 

have enabled it to comply wi th its duty. Id. at 669. That : is not 

what occurred here. Noticeably absent from the plainti ffs' 

evidence is any complaint to the school board or the district 

court, when the school construction in question occurred. 

Finally, I come to Topeka West High School, buil t in ·1961 and 

considered by the plaintiffs and the court53 as "the 

quintessential example of deliberate channelirig of white students 

to schools in the western part of the school di$trict.'' Cour~'s 

Opinion at _81; . see also id. at 71 (plaintiffs/ court finding · "that 

Topeka delib~rately placed new schools as far as possible from 

minor ity residential areas in order to polarize the district into· 

53 · For some reason, perhaps to lessen t he appearance of its ·factual overinvolvement, the court constantly describes (and 

refines) the contentions of the plaintiffs (while ignoring those 

of the defendants) and then makes its factual findings, affirming 

the plaintiffs' · contentions. See Court's Opinion at 65, 71-74, 

78: ~ also id. at 54-55. · 

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white.outer·and minority .inner schools~"); Once again, this 

court's 'focus on "deliberate" conduct is inconsistent with its 

criticism of the district court for considering intent. Although 

this court criticizes the location of the school, which is near 

the western edge of the district, there were valid reasons, which 

have been discussed elsewhere, for placing ihe school in that 

location. See supra p. 64-65; see also Brown , 671 F. Supp. at 

1300. The notion that Topeka West was built to channel white 

students from Topeka High, as contended by the plaintiffs, .is not 

supported by. the facts. In 1961 , Topeka High was a winner of the · 

prestigious Bellarny .Award. Rec. vol . X. at 1500. But it was 

overcrowded with 2 ,300 students. Rec. ·vo l . IX at 1442-43. Topeka 

West op~ned with 700 students the first year , 900 the second, 1100 

the third and continued. to grow until 1969 when part of the 

attendance area was transferred back to Topeka High. Id. at 1434. 

Topeka High ied b~~h school enrollment totals for several years 

after the opening of Topeka West. Like Topeka ·Hig~, Topeka West 

has won a prestigious award: Topeka West was designated a 

National School of Excellence recently, rec . supp. vol. V at 

1622-23. Topeka West has had increased minority enrollment over 

the years as the western portion of Topeka becomes more 

res~dentially integrated. 54 

54 

Year 

Racial Inventory-Topeka ·west High School 

1966-1985 

Minority Whi te Total %Minor ity 

(footn~te continued on next page) 

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H. 

In addition to school openings, the court has undertaken to 

ov_erturn the district court's finding that, on the whole, school 

closings were "an integrative device." Brown, 671 F. Supp·. at 

1299. Again, the court takes-shelter in aescribing the 

plaintiffs' contention: "that school closings of highly 

segregated schools were not desegregative in practice because the 

sqho_ol district simply reassigned the students at those schools en 

masse to a nearby school which then took over the segregated 

status of the school closed." Court's Opinion at 73; see also 

supra note 53. The tourt then adopts this as its finding: "The 

evidence supports this contention for the ·1950s and 1960s." 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

1966-67 5 1,241 1,246 0.40 

1967-68 7 1-,414 1,421 0 . 49 

1968-69 .10 1,552 1,562 0.64 

1 969-70 10 1,626 1,636 0.61 

1970-71 9 • 11580 1,589 .57 

1971-72 9 1,567 1,576 ·. .57 

1972-73 18 1,522 1,540 1.17 

1973-74 19 1,485 1,504 1.26 

1974-75 35 1,421 1,456 2.40 

1975-76 31 1,399 1,430 " 2. 17 

1976-77 31 1,355 1,386 2.24 

1977-78 39 1,299 1,338 2.91 

1978-79 57 1,286 1,343 4.24 

1979-80 63 1,248 1,311 4.81 

1980-81 70 1,505 1,575 4.44 

1981-82 77 1,391 1,468 5.25 

1982-83 95 1;388 1, 483 6.41 

1983-84 97 ·_ 1,363 1,460 6.64 

1984-85 112 1,388 1,500 7.47 

1985-86 120 1,391 1,511 7.94 

Rec. ex. val. IV at 57, 61, 65, 69, 73, 77, 81, 85, 89 , ·91, 95, 

99, 103, 107, 111, 128, 140, 153 & 164 & 176. 

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Court's Opinion at 73. Regarding the 1970's on the whole, the 

court tells us that most closings. were not segregative or 

desegregative. Id. 

In its section on school closings, the district court. 

mentioned 13 closings by name. Brown, 671 F . Supp. at 1299. I 

have discussed several closings in the context of t his dissent and 

see no reason why the district court shQuld be overturned. This 

court's.one ·paragraph summary analysis of school closings, while 

giving the appearance of completeness, does not facilitate my 

review. I cannot respond to the court's position without knowing 

which closings are covered bi its findings and why. 

VIII. 

The district court recognized that the pl aintiffs "hinge 

their case on this absence of racial balance in a ll schools and 

the failure of the defendants to promote racial balance." Brown, 

671 F. Supp. at 1295. 

At ariy time, more could have·been done to achieve 

racial balance in the schools. But, it begs the issue 

of this case to argue that racial balancing must be done 

today because it was not done yesterday. More should be 

done to improve racial balance in the schools· if the 

existing imbalance follows f rom defendants' past . intentional segregative conduct. 

Id. at 1309. T~ereafter, the district court found that the 

present racial imbalance does not derive from "the .de jure system 

or a foot-dragging segregationist policy." Id. 

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In 1~8~-86, Topeka had no one-race or virtually one-race 

minority schoolsj ·. Whether we look at percentages or absolute 

numbers, the district court was not ~!early erroneous in deciding 

that the Topeka system was not currently segrega ted . Of 34 

schools, only. three had majority-minority populations. Brown, 671 

F. Supp. at 1294. Those three schools (Belvoir, 146 minority 

students (ms); Lafayette, 217 ms: and Highland Park North,. 179 ms} 

served 542 mino ri ty elementary students or· one-quarter of the 

minority elementary populat ion (2,141 ms). See rec. ex. vol. IV 

at 170, ~71, 174; Court's Opinion at 61. Five elementary schools 

(Crestview, 32 ms; Gage, 25 ms; McCarter, 35 .ms; McClure, 23 ms; 

Potwin, 18 ms) had 90+% white enrollment, yet they served 6.2% of 

the minority elementary population. Id. at 170, 172, 174 •. Two .of. 

the middle schools which are now combined (French; 241 white 

students (ws); and Landon, 205. ws) served 31 percent of the white 

middle ·SChoc:H ·poptilation (1,446 ws); whil.e serving 6.95% of the 

minority middle schoolpopulation (37 ms/532 rns). Id. a·t 175-176. 

At the high school level, Topeka West had a 90+% white enrollment, 

serving 41.6% (1391 ws/3349 ws) of the white high school 

population, but also serving 11.48% {120 ms(1045 ~s) of the 

minority high school pop~lati~n. Id. at 176-77~ Though this 

court views the evidence differently, I submit that the district 

court's finding is supported by these numbers, when considered on 

this record, ·and looking back to the prior years. See supra text 

accompanying notes 9-13; see also supra .note 18. 

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~lthough.the court repeatedly tells us that racial balancing 

is not the objec tive , .the court does acknowledge that 11 numbers are 

usually the focus of desegregation plans ... Court's Opi nion at 

85-86 ; ~ also id . at 20. Without question, numbers resulti.ng .in 

better (strict) racial balance are the only remedy for what the 

court perceives as 11 Schoo ls that are no~ and always have been 

whi te , schools that are now and l ong have been heavily minority, 

and others. 11 Court '.s Opinion .at 87. The court seems to be 

leaning toward replication of the sys.tem-wide minority average in 

every school when it indicates that even compliance with a ±15% 

standard for ~tudent assignment would be irisufficient. Cburt's 

Opinion at 85. In the words of this court: 

Dr. Foster· also pointed out that such an approach would 

move schools now just beyond the 15% range to just 

within it, an improvement he did not find greatly 

desegregative as would preserve the ·existence of schools 

differing by as much as 30% in their minority percentage 

and thus still marked as minority or white schools. 

Id. (footnote omitted). The inherent nature nf a ±15% standard 

foi student assignment means that some schools may vary by as much 

as 30%, thc;>ugh many probably will. not. My res earch has not 

disclosed any court finding that compliance with' a ±15% standard 

as to student assignment was indicative of a current condition of 

segregation. 

·when one looks carefully at the most recent data we have on 

studen·t assignment, see supr a note 18, while considering the 

racial composition of this system (74% white), this court's views 

are unique, given the wide distribution of minority students 

throughout the system and the absence of one-race minority 

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.schools. Indeed, several· courts reviewing desegregation plans 

have given effect to the language in Swann that some ~·one-race, or 

virtually one-race, schools.within a district [are] not in and of 

(themselves] the mark of a system t~at still practices ~egrega~ion 

by law." 402 U.S. at 26. · See,~, Morgan, 831 F.2d at 323 

(Boston system with majority-minority ~tudent enrollment unit~ry; 

the~e was ''subst~ntial degree of integration" despite several 

schools with 80%+ enrollments of one race and several schools out 

of compliance with court-ordered desegregation plan); Calhoun v. 

Cook, 522 F·. 2d 717, 719 (5th Cir. 1975 )' (Atlanta system with 85% 

black enrollment unitary; 92/148 schools 90%+ black); Ross v. 

Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 219, 226 <?th Cir. 

1983) (Houston sys~em with 74 % min~rity. enrollment unitary; 55/226 

. . schools w~re 90%+ black and. 2 scho.ols all white). I submit thatthe presence of som~ predominantly .white schools in this system 

and three schools·which have a sl{ght majority of minority 

students does not violate the equal protection c l ause. 

~ashington, 426 U.S. ~t 240 (predominantly one-race schools not 

alone violative of equal protection). 

Because the numbers are not indicative of a current condition 

of segregation, and the testimony relied upon by the district 

court supports the very opposite, it becomes necessary for the 

court to engage an unyielding presumption against the Topeka 

system from the outset. The court simply has jumped the ~un in 

invoking th& Keyes presumption to arrive at the preliminary and 

critical conclusion that there is a current condition of 

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segregation in Topeka. Nowhere is this more evident than in 

foo tnot e 61, Court's Opin ion at 51 , when the court explains that 

its discussion of the current condition does not conflict wi th the 

district court's conclusion that there is no unlawful segregation 

in Topeka. This court reasons that because the district court 

"did find the existence of racial qisparities in school enrollment 

anP, staff/faculty assignment," it should have· immediately invoked 

a presumpti on· agains~ Topeka: "Our disagreement with the distri ct 

court is chiefly on the significance of these findings in a 

district with Topeka's history, and bearing the weight of a 

presumption against it whi.ch tne district court failed to accord ." 

Court's Opinion at 51 n.61, This. court's understanding of the 

district c~urt•s findings differs from mine. See supra· p. 60-67. 

But even granting the comparatively small departure from perfect 

racial balance in this system, Topeka's history is one factor, 

among many, that a court may consider in d~cid ing whether the · 

'presumption should be invoked. "Wh ile that history of 

discrimination cannot and should not be. ignored, it 'cannot in the 

manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is n:ot 

itself unlawful.'" Riddick, 784 F.2d at 539 (quoting City of 

Mobi le v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) (plurality opinion by 

Justice Stewart)). To require perpetual application of the 

presumption would mean that no school district which had a de jure 

system in 1954 , could ever be free of the presumptio~ and achieve 

unitary status. The .requirement of. a current condition of 

segregation resulting from past or present segregative. intent (as 

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-opposed to segregation resulting from voluntary demographic . 

change), prior to the .operation of the presumption, allows a 

school system to redeem itself and, one day, be fTee of federal 

court supervision. See Riddick, 784 F. 2d at 538-39 (rejecting 

argument ,.that the .Norfolk school board must continue t o justify 

all of its actions because of the history of s~gregation."). That 

· day should come for u.s.o. 501 in Topeka. 

Alternatively, even if the presumption appl ies, the school 

board may adduce p roof that the effects of past segregative intent 

have attenuated completely. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 211. This was 

recognized in· D.ayton II when the Court indicated that the Dayton 

school board ''had failed to come forwa~d with evidence· to de~y 

'that the current racial composition of the school population 

reflects the systemwide impact 1 of the Board's pr.ior 

discriminatory conduct." Id. 443 U.S. at 537-38 (quoting 

Brinkman, 583 F~2d at 258). Here, "the Board was given ample 

opportunity to counter the evidence of segregative purpose and 

. current, s·ystemwide impact," Columbus, 443 u.s. at 467-68, and 

such evidence was credited by the district court. 

In. repeatedly· castigating the defendants for noncompliance 

with the affirmative duty, the court relres upon t he same 

incomplete approach that plaintiffs' ~xpert took--not considering 

regional and local migration and other demographic fac tors which 

necessarily influence school board decisions. See ~ec. vol. IV at 

510-511. For ~xample, the court criticizes the defendants for 

building new schools in the late 1950's and 60's t o accommodate 

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population growth in western Topeka and concludes that "the 

erection of. so many schools devoted to educating white children 

had a significant segregative effect on ·the· district. 1

• 55 Court's 

Opinion at 72. In arriving at t his conclusion, the ·court 

apparently relies upon the following: "Wi th respect to the new 

. schools themse lves, [the plaintiffs] argue that Topeka should have 

taken advantage o~ the underutili zed inner schools; that is, that 

Topeka should have voluntarily bused wh ite children from outer 

-Topeka to the inner city s chools instead of putting up new 

buildings." tourt•s Opinion at 71; see als6 rec. supp. ·val . XI at . --- - ---

158-72 (Lamson theory). It is one thing to theori ze th~t stud~nts 

could have been bused to a slightly underutilized seven grade 

{K-6) elementary school (e.g. Lowman Hill with an average o f 43 

spaces· unused from 1957- 66, or Quinton Heights with 28 spaces . . . 

unused in 1966) , but it is qu ite another to match the grade levels 

of spaces a vailable each year with the ~rade l~vels of a 

hypothetical grou~ that would ~e assigned ~o the school anriually. 

See rec. vol. IV a t 448-49 (underutilization analysis did not 

consider grade level _of students); vol . X at 1538-41; · supp . vol XI 

at 169. Moreover, this suggestion ignores t he complaint that HEW 

had in 1974 concern ing educating students in older school s. See 

supra p. 38. 

55 The courtJs choice of words is unfortunate because the clear 

implication of the court ' s reference to " schools devoted to 

educating white children," is that_ Topeka was unconcerned wi th 

educating minority children. The court's implication is not 

supported by the record. 

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Another of the administrative possibilities suggested by Mr. 

Lamson tb improve racial balance would have been to combin~ 

Highland Park Central and Highland Park South in 1968., and build a 

school between the two. This proposal would have entailed 

abandoning two existing buildings with large enrollments, and the 

~xpense of building ·a new school . Rec. · vol. X at 1475-76. The 

combined enrollment of the new school would have been 1 ,334 

students, something which has never occurred in Topeka, and what 

d~puty superintendent Henson thought was "too large an elementary 

school for this community or any community." Id.~ rec. vol. IV at 

512-13; see also supp. vol. XI at 170. Moreover, in suggesting 

a-lternatives for the 1950's and 1960's decisions concerning 

. elementary boundaries, some of these alternatives ~ould have 

required busing and lunch provisions for students, but Mr. Lamson 

did not consider that the Topeka system lacked a hot lunch program 

until the . mid-60's. Rec. val. IV ~t 443~448, 510; supp~ vol. · XI 

at 34-35, 56. 

Unfortunately, one could get the wrong impression concerning 

the board members' attitud~ about desegregation. This court seems 

· to fault the board. members for not testifying th.at they regularly 

took desegregation concerns into account. Court's Opinion at 64. 

1 do not read their testimony as precl uding s uch concerns. Mr. 

Dennis C. Payne, board member from 1957-65, explained that the 

neighborhood concept was in keeping with the desegregat~on 

required by Brown because, previously, black . children .were not 

allowed to attend the schools closest to their homes; Rec. vol. 

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XII .at 2417 ("So we felt the neighborhood concept was what 

everybody wanted and what we wanted."). Mr. Payne testified to an 

absence of gerrymandering .for racial segregation . Id. He also 

testified that he was ·aware of white flight due to the original 

four step plan and adherence to the neighborhood school plan. 

This ·court quotes his response: "What could we do? We can't make 

people move·, no. way." Id. at 2423 (quoted in Court's Opinion at 

64). Considering the time period to wh ich this statement refers, 

and the school district's then-recent adoption of a plan which met 

with the approval of this court, I would suggest that . the school 

b6ard could not ~rohibit people fro~ moving, although perha~s it 

could have changed the consequences of a move with respect to 

school assignment. Cf. Ross, 699 F.2d at 225 (when district has 

succ.essfully implemented plan to achieve unitary status., there .is 

"no affirmative fourteenth amendment duty to respond to the 

private·actions of those who vote with their feet"). 

Mr. Joe Douglas, Jr., the fire chief of the City of Topeka, 

and a board member from 1977-85 (board president for two years ), 

testifi ed that he and the other black member of th~ board op~osed 

the open enrollment plan, which was adopted due to pressure from 

working parents who wanted their children to attend schools close 

to day care· arrangements. Rec. val. XII at. 2441; see Court's 

Opinion at 64 n.81. The plan was soon discontinued because of its 

effect on minority percentages. Rec. val. XII at 2442-43. It 

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was replaced by a majority to minority transfer plan.56 Id. at 

2443-44; Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1298. While he was on .the board, 

Mr. Douglas advoca.ted that no school in the district should exceed 

50% minority, but the fact that some ~chools exceeded that 

percentage was not indicative of segregation, which he termed "as 

in the eye of the beholder." Rec. vol. XII at 2454-55. Contrary 

·to the court's assertion that board members did not consider 

desegregati~n concerns, Mr. Douglas testified that the school 

board that he served on "took as a priorit:y.the lowering of 

·minority percentages." 57 See Court's Opinion at 64; rec. vol. XII 

56 Perhaps because there .was no evidence concerning "vigorous 

official encouragement of desegregative transfers" this court 

views the majority to minority plan as "IT!inimally ·effective" and 

as !'a slightly desegregative transfer plan that potentiall y could 

be signif icaht." Court's Opinion at 31, 83, 83 n. 97, . 63. 

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has endorsed such plans, see Swann, · 402 · u.s • . at 26-27, and it is unclear·what feature of the plan this 

court objects to, · particularly considering the l ack of evidence on 

this· point at trial. See Court's Opinion at 82 ("The feasibility 

of further measure~ waSiiot a focus of this case, and there. was 

little evidence ori th.is question."). 

57 Mr. Douglas was asked the following question on direct 

concerning the goal of eliminating majority-minority schoo+s in 

the Topeka system: 

Mr. McAtee: 

Mr. Douglas: 

The fa~t that that goal has not yet .been 

achieved or does not exist today in this 

district, Mr. Douglas, .is that an 

indication to you that actions of t his 

Board of Education·present and past or 

inactions of t he Board of Education 

present and past have been undertaken 

with an intent to achieve a segregative 

effect ? 

; cer~ainly do not believe that and I 

have no knowledge of any such act i ons or 

inactions by ·the board. I certainl y believ~ at this parti cular point in t i me 

(footnote continued on next ppge) 

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at 2456. The current superint~ndent of schools, Dr. Edwards, 

supported the commitment to improve the racial composition of the 

schools. Rec. vol.· XII at· 2530. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

that this. district is not in 

noncompliance or is outside the law and I 

don't really feel that the district needs 

the ACLU or anyone else to mandate any 

directives as to what should be done in 

this district and that includes, if I may 

say so respectfully, this court. I think 

that the board has clearly exhibited, at 

least I know for the eight years that I 

was there and in ·looking at and listening 

to what had happened previously, ii 

certainly is indicative to me that the . board .has faced up to the problem and one 

of the kinds of things that they feel 

that they could do. I don' t think that 

anything.is perfect. I'm certainly not 

perfect, but I don't think I want to . throw me away or I'm n6t going to go have 

myself made over because I'm not perfect. 

I hope that I have a little time to 

continue to lmprove myself and that's the 

same way that I see the district and with 

all of the problems that are f acing . . education today, there's an old adage 

that I think is really appropriate for 

this particular situat~on. It. goes, 

while standing knee deep fn alligators, 

it is sometimes difficult ~o remember 

that your original reason for being there 

was to drain the swamp, and if you serve 

on a Board of Education t oday with all 

the myriad of problems that comes before 

you, I think it's· commendable that this 

board has taken as a priority, at least 

the board that I was on , took as a 

priority the lowering of minority 

percentages and the monitoring of those 

situations that could cause. those 

problems. 

Rec. vol. XII at 2455-56. 

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During trial, th~re was testimony -about concerns identified 

by the National Commission on Excellence in Education which 

prepared A Nation at Risk. Rec. supp. vol. VII at 1996-99. The 

Commission emphasized that improved education is essential not 

only to assure that the United States will remain competitive 

internationally, but also . to assure "the intellectual, moral and 

spiritual strengths of our people which knit together the very 

fabric of our society." National Commission on Excellence in 

Education, A Nation at Risk: The ·rmperative For Educational 

Reform, at. 7. It appears that Topeka has heeded the call to 

provide "all, regardless of race or class or economic 

status, a fair chance and • the tools for developing 

their individual powers of mind and spirit to the utmost;,. fo~ 

"indivi~uals in our society who do not possess. the levels of ski l l 

literacy, and training essential to this new era will be 

effectively disenfranchised, not simply from the material ·rewards 

that accompany competent performance, but also from the chance to 

pa~ticipate fully in our national life." A Nation at Risk at 4, 

i. "No person of goodwill toward his fellow man can logically ·· 

argue" with the naturally correct premise of Brown I: equal 

educational opportunity in a unitary system for all children 

regardless of race. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 52 1 F.2d 465, 

490 (lOth Cir. 1975) (Barrett, J., concuTring), cert. denied, 423 

u.s. 1066 (1976). But neither this court's opinion nor the record 

convinces me that the equal opportuni ty and benefits provided to 

all by Topeka's neighborhood schools will be improved by the 

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protracted federal court supervision which is.sure to .follow at 

the expense of valued local control.58 See Milliken I, 418 u.s. 

at 741 (re~ognizing virtues of local control of public education). 

Like the district court, I do not think that the 

constitutional command to eliminate the dual system goes unheeded 

35, or even 30, years after Btown I. Within that time, tremendous 

demographic and social change has affected Topeka and its school 

system. The school board .has demonstrated concern for improving 

the racial composition in the Topeka schools while retaining the 

neighborhood school concept. In some cases, the two are not 

compatible, but in this system substantial integration has been 

achieved, and the system ·is now unitary, although not perfect. 

Because I am not persuaded of a remaining constitutional 

violation, and I am persuaded that the appellate· court has retried 

the case for a different outcome, I would affirm the district 

court's judgment declaring the Topeka system unitary at last. 59 

Brown; . 6Jl F. Supp. at 1311. 

sa· Although the court is impressed with magnet schools to 

attract white students,· see Court's Opinion at 83-84 n. 97, and 

voluntary transfers to improve racial balance, it is most unlikely 

that these techniques can produce the type of racial balance so 

essential to the court's decision. See F. Welch & A. Light, supra 

note 27, at 23-25; 57 (smallest decrease in dissimilarity index 

associated with magnet programs); see also J. Hochschild, The New 

American Dilemma-Liberal Democracy-and-school Desegregation 70-79 

(1984); L. Hughes, w. Gordon & L. Hillman, Desegregating America's 

Schools 17~20 (1980). 

59 Accordingly, ~would affirm the district court's judgment 

insofar as denying relief under Title VI. I concur in this 

court's judgment insofar as it affirms the dismissal of the 

Governor and the state board of education defendants from this 

action. See Court's Opinion at 90 ("We affi rm both of these 

rulings."). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 249 
Appendix A 

Topeka Elementary School Attendance Boundaries 

1969-70 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 250 
Appendix B 

Topeka Elementary School Attendance Boundaries 

1985-86 

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Appellate Case: 87-1668 Document: 01019609515 Date Filed: 12/11/1989 Page: 251