Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00821/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00821-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Libel, Assault, Slander

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROY JACQUES, CASE NO. CV-F-12-821 LJO DLB

Plaintiff, ORDER ON EARLY WARNING’S MOTION

TO DISMISS (Doc. 8)

vs.

BANK OF AMERICA CORP., FIRST 

ADVANTAGE BACKGROUND SERVICES,

and EARLY WARNING SERVICES,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Early Warning Services (“Early Warning”) moves to dismiss plaintiff Troy Jacques’

(“Mr. Jacques’”) complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Early Warning argues that it must be

dismissed from this action because Mr. Jacques’ defamation claim fails to allege that Early Warning

reported, published, or used any information about Mr. Jacques. In addition, Early Warning contends

that Mr. Jacques cannot cure the defect, because his defamation claim is preempted by the Fair Credit

Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681, et seq. (“FCRA”). Mr. Jacques failed to oppose this motion. Having

considered Early Warning’s moving papers and the applicable case law, this Court finds this motion

suitable for a decision without a hearing and VACATES the June 25, 2012 hearing on this motion

pursuant to Local Rule 230(c) and (g). Forthe following reasons, this Court DISMISSES EarlyWarning

from this action but GRANTS Mr. Jacques leave to amend.

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BACKGROUND

Mr. Jacques asserts a defamation claim against defendants Bank of America Corporation (“Bank

of America”), First Advantage Background Services Corporation (“First Advantage”), and Early

Warning. Mr. Jacques alleges that he was fired by Wells Fargo based on the defamatory statements

Bank of America made about him that were subsequently published by First Advantage to Wells Fargo. 

Mr. Jacques alleges that defendants made these defamatory statements about him with malice and in bad

faith. He further asserts that the statements are defamatory per se because they ascribe characteristics

to Mr. Jacques that are incompatible with his business and profession and injure his professional

reputation.

Mr. Jacques was employed with Bank of America beginning December 5, 2005. He began

working at Wells Fargo on October 8, 2009. He was subsequently fired from Wells Fargo on April 15,

2012 based on the defamatory statements made by defendants to Wells Fargo.

Mr. Jacques first learned of the defamatorystatements on April 8, 2011, when he received a “PreAdverse Action Notification” from Wells Fargo. In that notice, he was informed that a decision

concerning his continued employment was pending review of Mr. Jacques’ consumer report. The notice

further advised that should Mr. Jacques believe that any of the information contained in the consumer

report to be inaccurate or incomplete, he should contact First Advantage to correct the information

before Wells Fargo takes further action based on the reported information.

Wells Fargo provided Mr. Jacques with the consumer report with the April 8, 2012 notice. The

consumer report was provided to Wells Fargo by First Advantage and contained information reported

by Bank of America. That report published highly defamatory allegations made by Bank of America

that there was an “internal fraud match.” The report indicated that the alleged “internal fraud match”

incident occurred on September 29, 2008 and has a “severity” of 100.

Wells Fargo notified Mr. Jacques on April 15, 2011 that he was no longer eligible for

employment based on the consumer report that Wells Fargo received from First Advantage and the

defamatory statements contained therein. Subsequently, Mr. Jacques engaged in reasonable actions to

remove the defamatorystatements without success. In addition, Wells Fargo, First Advantage, and Early

Warning refuse to correct the false information.

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Mr. Jacques filed his complaint against defendants on February 23, 2012. First Advantage

removed the action to this Court on May 18, 2012. On May 25, 2012, First Advantage and Early

Warning separately moved to dismiss the complaint. Mr. Jacques failed to oppose Early Warning’s

motion to dismiss. As set forth above, this Court vacates the June 25, 2012 hearing on this motion and

issues the following order. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the

pleadings set forth in the complaint. A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either

a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion

to dismissfor failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the allegations of the complaint,

construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolves all

doubts in the pleader's favor. Lazy Y. Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability,

it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (internal citations omitted). Thus, “bare

assertions...amounting to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’...are not entitled to

an assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (quoted in Moss v. United States Secret Serv.,572 F.3d

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962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)). A court is “free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions,

unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Farm

Credit Services v. American State Bank, 339 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). In

practice, a counterclaim “must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material

elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562.

DISCUSSION

Early Warning argues that Mr. Jacques fails to allege any element of a libel claim against it in

the complaint. “Under California law, ‘[l]ibel is a false and unprivileged publication...which exposes

any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or

which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.’” Gorman v. Wolpoff &Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d

1147, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code §45).

Mr. Jacques’ complaint includes only two allegations about EarlyWarning. Mr. Jacques alleges

that after he was employed with Bank of America, “Bank of America, First Advantage, and Early

Warning Services caused to be published, and/or republished such false and defamatory statements

about” him which caused him damage. Compl., ¶14. Mr. Jacques also alleges that he “engaged in

reasonable actions to remove the defamatory statements made” by Bank of America, First Advantage,

and Early Warning. Id. at ¶10.

Early Warning argues that these allegations are conclusory in nature and provide no indication

as to what Early Warning did or what statements Early Warning allegedly published. Early Warning

argues that this Court is “free to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted

references, and sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Farm Credit, 339

F.3d at 767. Early Warning concludes that because the complaint lacks allegations of wrongdoing

against Early Warning, it must be dismissed from the complaint.

The general factual allegations of the complaint detail the alleged wrongdoing of Bank of

America and First Advantage, but not Early Warning. The complaint makes clear that Wells Fargo

provided the false information to the credit reporting agencies and that First Advantage provided the

consumer report to Wells Fargo. There are no factual allegations related to Early Warning. From the

complaint, this Court cannot determine whetherEarlyWarning published information about Mr. Jacques

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how, or to whom. Accordingly, the factual allegations about Early Warning are “bare

assertions...amounting to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

at 1951. These allegations are “not entitled to the truth” and are subject to a motion to dismiss. Id.

Because the allegations against EarlyWarning are insufficient to state a claim against it, Early Warning

is dismissed from the complaint.

Next this Court must determine whether to grant leave to amend the complaint. Pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15, this Court should grant leave to amend freely. To the extent that the pleadings can be

cured by the allegation of additional facts, the plaintiff should be afforded leave to amend.Cook, Perkiss

and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir.1990) (citations

omitted). Here, Mr. Jacques could cure the defect of his defamation claim against Early Warning by

including specific allegations against Early Warning.

Early Warning argues that the defects of the complaint cannot be cured because, even if Mr.

Jacques were to add specific allegations against Early Warning, his defamation claim would be

preempted by the FCRA. Early Warning argues that the FCRA is applicable because Mr. Jacques’

defamation claim against EarlyWarning “is based exclusively on statements made in a consumer report

regarding his eligibility for employment.”

This argument is based on the assumption that Mr. Jacques’ specific allegations against Early

Warning fall within the FCRA. This Court cannot make this assumption at this stage. The complaint

alleges only that Early Warning is a limited liability corporation. Based on the complaint, this Court

cannot determine whether Early Warning is a consumer reporting agency or a furnisher of information.

Because, this Court cannot determine at this stage whether the FCRA is applicable to Early Warning,

this Court cannot dismiss Early Warning with prejudice.

Moreover, Early Warning argues that “no matter what allegations Jacques makes, the FCRA

preempts his defamation claim against Early Warning” because Mr. Jacques failed to plead specific

allegations of malice. “Even if [a plaintiff’s] libel claim is not preempted by §1681t(b)(1)(F), it is still

subject to §1681h(e), and so he must prove, in addition to the common law elements of libel, that the

information was ‘false’ and ‘furnished with malice or willful intent to injure.’” Gormon, 584 F.3d at

1168. Assuming without ruling that this section applies to Early Warning, this Court agrees that the

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allegations of malice in the complaint are insufficient as they are a mere “formulaic recitation of the

elements of the cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. This defect, however, could be cured by

amendment. Accordingly, Mr. Jacques is granted leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court:

1. VACATES the June 25, 2012 hearing on this motion;

2. GRANTS Early Warning’s motion to dismiss; and

3. GRANTS Mr. Jacques leave to amend. Mr. Jacques will have one opportunity to

amend his complaint to allege a claim against Early Warning sufficiently. An amended

complaint, if any, shall be filed no later than July 12, 2012.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 12, 2012 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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