Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02250/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02250-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 160
Nature of Suit: Stockholder's Suits
Cause of Action: 28:1330 Breach of Contract

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Case No. 14-CV-02250-LHK 

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CHETAN UTTARKAR,

Plaintiff,

v.

EBIX, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-CV-02250-LHK 

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Re: Dkt. No. 99

On August 25, 2015, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff Chetan 

Uttarkar’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. ECF No. 95 (the August 25 

Order). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file seven claims against Defendant Sudhir Bajaj, but 

the Court denied Plaintiff leave to file any claims against Defendants Planetsoft, Inc. and Ebix, 

Inc. Id. On September 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a motion for 

reconsideration of the Court’s August 25 Order (“Motion for Leave”). ECF No. 99. Having 

considered Plaintiff’s motion, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court hereby 

DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

I. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff moves for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 

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ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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60(b). Under Rule 59(e), a party may move to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days after the 

entry of judgment. A Rule 59 motion “should not be granted . . . absent highly unusual 

circumstances.” 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). “In 

general, there are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: (1) if such 

motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if 

such motion is necessary to present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) if 

such motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an 

intervening change in controlling law.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 

2011).

Rule 60(b) “provides for reconsideration only upon a showing of (1) mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void 

judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) ‘extraordinary circumstances’ which 

would justify relief.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 

(9th Cir. 1993).

Additionally, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7–9(a), “[b]efore the entry of a judgment 

adjudicating all of the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties in a case, any party may 

make a motion before a Judge requesting that the Judge grant the party leave to file a motion for 

reconsideration of any interlocutory order. . . . No party may notice a motion for reconsideration 

without first obtaining leave of Court to file the motion.” Civil Local Rule 7–9(b) provides three 

grounds for reconsideration of an interlocutory order:

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists from 

that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for which 

reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the exercise of reasonable diligence 

the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of the 

interlocutory order; or

(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of 

such order; or

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ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments 

which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order.

Rule 7–9(c) further requires that “[n]o motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration 

may repeat any oral or written argument made by the applying party in support of or in opposition

to the interlocutory order which the party now seeks to have reconsidered.”

Plaintiff contends that reconsideration is warranted in this case for the following three 

reasons: (1) the Court improperly weighed the factors of Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 

(1962); (2) the Court failed to consider the issue of successor liability; and (3) Ebix, Inc. is a 

necessary party to this action. ECF No. 99. 

A. The Foman Factors

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court should freely give 

leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 15 

. . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Nonetheless, a district court may deny 

leave to amend a complaint due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 

movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” See

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 

F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). Of these considerations, known as the Foman factors, “it is the 

consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence 

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).

In its August 25 Order, the Court determined that the Foman factors for undue prejudice, 

undue delay, and prior opportunities for amendment all weighed against granting Plaintiff leave to 

amend to assert new claims against Ebix. ECF No. 95. The Court concluded that permitting 

Plaintiff to amend his complaint to add new claims against Ebix would prejudice Ebix because it 

would require Ebix to continue litigating a case in which Ebix has already secured dismissal with 

prejudice of all causes of action previously brought against Ebix in the original complaint and the 

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ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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first amended complaint. Id. The Court additionally found that Plaintiff unduly delayed in 

bringing the new claims against Ebix because the new claims are based on the same facts 

underlying Plaintiff’s original complaint and because Plaintiff offered no explanation for his delay 

of over ten months in adding the new claims against Ebix. Id. Finally, the Court noted that 

Plaintiff had already had an opportunity to amend his complaint in response to a motion to dismiss 

by Ebix, and “the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where 

plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” City of L.A. v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 

440, 454 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court concluded that because Ebix would be prejudiced by the 

proposed amendments, Plaintiff unduly delayed in bringing the new claims against Ebix, and 

Plaintiff had already had an opportunity to amend his complaint in response to a motion to dismiss 

filed by Ebix, the Foman factors weighed against granting leave to amend. ECF No. 95. 

Therefore, the Court denied Plaintiff leave to assert the new claims against Ebix. Id.

In the Motion for Leave, Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in its weighing of the Foman

factors. Plaintiff raises three challenges to the Court’s Foman analysis. First, Plaintiff argues that 

he did not unduly delay in bringing the new claims because Plaintiff had not discovered all of the 

facts upon which the new claims are predicated at the time Plaintiff filed his first amended 

complaint. ECF No. 99 at 7-8. Second, Plaintiff argues that it would be inappropriate for the 

Court to find undue prejudice sufficient to deny leave to amend when Plaintiff has only had one 

prior opportunity for amendment and the case is still in the pleading stage. Id. at 7-10. Third, 

Plaintiff argues that the prejudice to Ebix of permitting amendment is outweighed by the prejudice 

to Plaintiff of denying leave to amend. Id. at 10-11. 

All three of Plaintiff’s arguments argue that the Court failed to consider material facts or 

dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court in Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

file a second amended complaint. The Court therefore analyzes whether reconsideration is 

appropriate based on each of Plaintiff’s arguments under Civil Local Rule 7–9(b)(3) for “[a] 

manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were 

presented to the Court before such interlocutory order.”

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1. Whether Newly Discovered Evidence Excuses Plaintiff’s Undue Delay

The Court begins with Plaintiff’s argument that he did not unduly delay in bringing the 

new claims because Plaintiff did not discover the facts upon which the new claims are predicated 

until after Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint. Plaintiff specifically alleges that he did not 

discover Ebix’s quarterly filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) until 

after filing the first amended complaint on October 23, 2014. ECF No. 95 at 7-8. 

Plaintiff’s argument that he did not discover the 2013 Quarterly Report until after filing 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not change the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff unduly 

delayed in bringing the proposed new claims against Ebix. The only reference to these SEC 

filings in the proposed second amended complaint is:

One of the evidences of successor liability here is Defendant EBIX’s own 

admission in its 2013 Quarter 1 Quarterly Report to the SEC. A true and correct 

copy of Defendant EBIX’s United States Securities and Exchange Commission 

Q1 Quarterly Report is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 5 and incorporated by 

reference as though it is fully set forth herein.

ECF No. 63, Ex. 1 ¶ 43 (emphasis omitted). The Quarterly Report in question is Ebix’s 2013 

Quarter 1 Form 10-Q, which Ebix filed publicly on May 10, 2013. See ECF No. 98, Ex. 5 (copy 

of Ebix’s Form 10-Q attached to Plaintiff’s second amended complaint). Plaintiff fails to explain 

why he did not discover this public filing until after October 23, 2014, more than 17 months after 

it was publicly filed with the SEC. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to show that he exercised reasonable 

diligence, but still failed to find Ebix’s publicly filed document for 17 months.

Plaintiff cites the above information from Ebix’s SEC filings solely as evidence of Ebix’s

successor liability for PlanetSoft, Inc.’s “debts and liabilities.” See ECF No. 63, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 42-43, 

59. However, both Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed in May 2014, and his first amended 

complaint, filed in October 2014, alleged that Ebix was liable for PlanetSoft’s obligations under a 

theory of successor liability. ECF No. 1 ¶ 50 (Plaintiff’s original complaint, stating “[b]y

acquiring PlanetSoft, Inc., EBIX became the successor in interest to the obligations of PlanetSoft, 

Inc.”); ECF No. 33 ¶ 53 (Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, stating “EBIX became liable for this 

when it acquired PlanetSoft, Inc., and became the successor in interest to the obligations of 

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ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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PlanetSoft, Inc.”). Plaintiff additionally alleged in both his original complaint and his first 

amended complaint that Ebix had acquired all of PlanetSoft’s assets. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 25-26 

(original complaint, stating “PlanetSoft was purchased by Defendant EBIX . . . EBIX reportedly 

acquired all of the outstanding capital stock of PlanetSoft.”); ECF No. 33 ¶ 31 (first amended 

complaint, stating “EBIX reportedly acquired all of the outstanding capital stock and assets of 

PlanetSoft.”). Therefore, in both the original complaint and the first amended complaint, Plaintiff 

already alleged that Ebix had acquired all of PlanetSoft’s assets and should accordingly be liable 

as PlanetSoft’s successor. Thus, Plaintiff could have brought his new claims against Ebix on a 

theory of successor liability in the original complaint or the first amended complaint. 

Ebix’s 2013 SEC filing is not new because it was publicly available a year before Plaintiff 

filed his original complaint. Additionally, Plaintiff knew the factual predicate of his proposed new 

claims against Ebix at the time Plaintiff filed the original complaint and the first amended 

complaint. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff unduly delayed by not raising his proposed 

new claims against Ebix sooner, and reconsideration is not appropriate under Civil Local Rule 7–

9(b)(3).

2. Denying Leave to Amend at the Pleading Stage

Plaintiff next argues that it would be inappropriate to deny Plaintiff leave to amend a first 

amended complaint at the pleading stage of the litigation prior to the parties conducting extensive 

discovery. ECF No. 99 at 7. Plaintiff asserts that “there is no precedent for denial of leave to 

amend first amended complaint at pleading stage,” and that “there is no authority with analogous 

facts that dismisses leave to amend a first amended complaint at the pleading stages before the 

case is at issue.” Id. (emphasis and capitalization omitted).

Plaintiff is incorrect that there is no precedent for denial of leave to amend a first amended 

complaint at the pleading stage of the litigation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 permits a 

plaintiff to file an amended complaint as a matter of right only once during the litigation. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(1) (“A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course . . . .”). Further 

amendments require the opposing party’s written consent or the Court’s leave, regardless of the 

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stage of the litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). District courts routinely deny leave to amend to 

file a second amended complaint at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Mulato v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A., 76 F. Supp. 3d 929, 942-43 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (denying the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file 

a second amended complaint while the case was still at the pleading stage).

The fact that Ebix has not undertaken extensive discovery in this case does not alter the 

Court’s conclusion that Ebix would be unduly prejudiced by the proposed amendments. Ebix has 

already filed two successful motions to dismiss in this case. See ECF No. 29 (order dismissing the 

sole cause of action against Ebix in the original complaint without prejudice); ECF No. 59 (order 

dismissing the sole cause of action against Ebix in the first amended complaint with prejudice). 

As a result of these motions to dismiss, Ebix secured dismissal with prejudice of all causes of 

action brought against Ebix in the original complaint and the first amended complaint. See ECF 

No. 59 (order dismissing the sole cause of action against Ebix in the first amended complaint with 

prejudice). Ebix would be unduly prejudiced by having to continually brief motions to dismiss in 

this case after securing dismissal with prejudice. Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that the Court 

disregarded a dispositive legal argument, so Civil Local Rule 7–9(b)(3) does not permit 

reconsideration based on this argument.

3. Prejudice to Plaintiff

Plaintiff argues that the Court should reconsider its denial of leave to amend to add new 

claims against Ebix because the prejudice to Plaintiff of denying leave to amend is too great. ECF 

No. 99 at 10-11. Plaintiff cites Foman’s statements that “[i]t is too late in the day and entirely 

contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be 

avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities;” that “[t]he Federal Rules reject the approach that 

pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and 

accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits;” 

and that “[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper 

subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.” 371 U.S. 

at 181-82. Based on these statements in Foman, Plaintiff argues that he ought to be allowed to 

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bring his new claims against Ebix because the proposed amendment would bring “a viable claim 

or claims against EBIX.” ECF No. 99 at 11. According to Plaintiff, permitting Plaintiff to bring 

viable claims against Ebix outweighs any prejudice to Ebix “from defending itself in a proper 

suit.” Id.

Plaintiff’s selective quotations from Foman misstate Foman’s holding. First, neither 

Foman’s statement that “[i]t is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere 

technicalities,” nor the statement that “[t]he Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a 

game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the 

principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits,” were made in 

the context of whether to permit a plaintiff to file an amended complaint. 371 U.S. at 181-82. 

Instead, both statements were made in the context of reversing the Court of Appeals’ ruling that it 

was precluded from reviewing the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint because the 

appellant had failed to indicate on the notice of appeal that the appellant was appealing the 

judgment. Id. at 181.

Second, Foman’s statement that “[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by 

a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his 

claim on the merits” does not mean that the Court must give Plaintiff endless opportunities to 

amend the complaint to add all new viable claims, as Plaintiff appears to argue. See ECF No. 99 

at 11. Foman immediately qualifies its statement that a plaintiff “ought to be afforded an 

opportunity to test his claim on the merits.” 371 U.S. at 182. The next sentence in Foman states 

that “[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or 

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the 

amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 

‘freely given.’” Id. Notably, prejudice to the plaintiff is not one of the factors a district court 

should consider to determine whether there is a reason to deny leave to amend under Foman. 

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Foman further reiterates that “[o]f course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within 

the discretion of the District Court.” Id.

In this case, the Court considered the factors in Foman and concluded that the factors of 

undue prejudice, undue delay, and previous opportunities for amendment all counseled against 

permitting Plaintiff to add new claims against Ebix. The Court did not fail “to consider material 

facts or dispositive legal arguments” but instead appropriately exercised its discretion, consistent 

with Foman, to deny Plaintiff leave to amend. See Civil Local Rule 7–9(b)(3).

The Court concludes that Plaintiff unduly delayed in bringing the new claims against Ebix, 

that Ebix would be unduly prejudiced by the addition of the new claims, and that Plaintiff had 

previous opportunities to amend the complaint to add the new claims but chose not to do so. None 

of the arguments raised by Plaintiff in the Motion for Leave alter the Court’s conclusion that the 

Foman factors weigh in favor of denying Plaintiff leave to amend. Therefore, reconsideration is 

not warranted under Civil Local Rule 7–9(b)(3).

B. Successor Liability

Plaintiff argues that the Court should grant Plaintiff leave to amend to assert new claims 

against Ebix because Ebix is liable for PlanetSoft’s liabilities under a theory of successor liability. 

ECF No. 99 at 11-12. Plaintiff argues that the Court erred by not considering Ebix’s liability 

under successor liability because Plaintiff’s new claims would not be futile under successor 

liability. Id. The Court therefore analyzes whether reconsideration is appropriate under Civil 

Local Rule 7–9(b)(3) for “[a] manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive 

legal arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order.”

First, Plaintiff raised successor liability in his original complaint and in his first amended 

complaint. ECF No. 1 ¶ 50 (Plaintiff’s original complaint, stating “[b]y acquiring PlanetSoft, Inc., 

EBIX became the successor in interest to the obligations of PlanetSoft, Inc.”); ECF No. 33 ¶ 53 

(Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, stating “EBIX became liable for this when it acquired 

PlanetSoft, Inc., and became the successor in interest to the obligations of PlanetSoft, Inc.”). The 

Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims against Ebix in the original complaint and the first 

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amended complaint, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s allegations of Ebix’s successor liability. See ECF 

No. 29 (order dismissing the cause of action against Ebix in the original complaint without 

prejudice); ECF No. 59 (order dismissing the cause of action against Ebix in the first amended 

complaint with prejudice).

Furthermore, whether Ebix is liable for PlanetSoft’s liabilities in Plaintiff’s new claims 

under a theory of successor liability goes towards only one Foman factor: futility of amendment. 

However, the Court did not reach the issue of futility because the Court concluded that the factors 

of prejudice to the opposing party, undue delay, and prior opportunities for amendment all 

weighed against granting leave to amendment. Because the Court finds prejudice, undue delay, 

and prior opportunities for amendment, the Court is not required to consider the Foman factor of 

futility of amendment prior to denying leave to amend. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; Eminence 

Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight in the leave 

to amend inquiry); Texaco Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798 (“Undue delay is a valid reason for 

denying leave to amend”); City of L.A. v. San Pedro Boat Works, 635 F.3d 440, 454 (9th Cir. 

2011) (“[T]he district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where 

plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.”). Thus, the Court did not err by declining to 

consider the issue of successor liability, and reconsideration is not warranted under Civil Local 

Rule 7–9(b)(3).

C. Necessary Party

Plaintiff’s final argument is that Plaintiff should be allowed to bring the new claims against 

Ebix because Ebix is a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. ECF No. 12-13. 

Plaintiff does not explain why Ebix is a necessary party but instead merely asserts that Ebix 

“should be viewed as a necessary party.” Id. at 12. Plaintiff has not met the standard under Civil 

Local Rule 7–9(b) for leave to file a motion for reconsideration based on the argument that Ebix is 

a necessary party. Plaintiff has not shown that “at the time of the motion for leave, a material 

difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the court” before entry of the 

August 25 Order. See Civil Local Rule 7–9(b)(1). Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown diligence in 

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discovering any such fact or law. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not shown “[t]he emergence of 

new material facts or a change of law” occurring after the Court’s August 25 Order. See Civil 

Local Rule 7–9(b)(2). Finally, Plaintiff previously did not argue that Ebix is a necessary party, so 

Plaintiff has not shown “a manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive 

legal arguments which were presented to the Court” before the Court’s August 25 Order. See 

Civil Local Rule 7–9(b)(3). Thus, the Court denies Plaintiff leave to file a motion for 

reconsideration.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a motion 

for reconsideration.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 11, 2015

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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