Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01649/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01649-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 315
Nature of Suit: Airplane Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CAROL DAVIS, JOHN DAVIS, and

MICHELLE TORIGIANI, 

NO. CIV. S-03-1649 WBS DAD

Plaintiffs, NO. CIV. S-04-0300 WBS GGH 

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY

LOCKHEED MARTIN, et al., JUDGMENT

Defendants.

_____________________________

LAURIE H. LABARE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LOCKHEED MARTIN, et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________

TRIAD INTERNATIONAL MAINTENANCE

CORPORATION, and TIMCO AVIATION

SERVICES, INC.,

Third-Party Plaintiffs,

v.

HAWKINS & POWERS AVIATION, INC.,

Third-Party Defendant.

_______________________________

Case 2:03-cv-01649-WBS-DAD Document 104 Filed 04/19/05 Page 1 of 10
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Unless otherwise noted, all of these facts are 1

undisputed.

2

This case is about liability for an airplane crash in

2002. The heirs of those who died in that crash have sued, among

others, defendant Aero Corporation, who worked on the plane in

1984, and two other related companies, Triad International

Maintenance Corporation and TIMCO Aviation Services, Inc.

(collectively “TIMCO”). TIMCO, in turn, has filed a third-party

complaint seeking contribution, equitable indemnification, and

declaratory relief against the decedents’ employer, third-party

defendant Hawkins & Powers Aviation, Inc. (“Hawkins”), who owned

and operated the plane at the time of the crash. Hawkins now

moves for summary judgment on TIMCO’s claims pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

I. Factual and Procedural Background1

On June 17, 2002, a Lockheed C-130A airplane broke

apart in flight while executing a fire retardant delivery near

Walker, California. The airplane was registered to and operated

by Hawkins, who had obtained it in 1988. All three flight crew

members perished in the crash. Among them were Craig LaBare and

Michael Davis (“decedents”), two California residents employed by

Hawkins. Decedents’ heirs were compensated for the deaths of

their family members under Hawkins’ workers’ compensation

insurance policy. Heirs Laurie H. LaBare and Carol Davis are 

California residents. 

Subsequent testing at the direction of the National

Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) revealed cracks under the

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Doublers are rectangular plates installed on the lower 2

wing surfaces overlapping the forward and middle wing panels. 

(See Ryan Decl. Ex. 2 (NTSB Report) at 25). 

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doublers and heavy stress placed on the wings during fire- 2

fighting aerial maneuvers. Maintenance protocol for the plane

included crack inspection instructions. Hawkins admits that it

subscribed to technical bulletins from the Federal Aviation

Administration (“FAA”) which warned that the C-130A was

susceptible to cracking in the wing structure. TIMCO contends

that Hawkins chose to ignore those bulletins. 

Hawkins is a Wyoming corporation with its principal

place of business in Wyoming. The TIMCO defendants are Delaware

corporations with their principal places of business in North

Carolina. TIMCO and Hawkins had no contractual or other like

relationship, and no express indemnity agreement between them. 

Hawkins contends that TIMCO’s claims fail as a matter of law. 

II. Discussion

The court must grant summary judgment to a moving party

“if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party adverse to a motion for summary

judgment may not simply deny generally the pleadings of the

movant; the adverse party must designate “specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Simply put, “a

summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on

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conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data.” Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). The nonmoving party

must show more than a mere “metaphysical doubt” as to the

material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

A. Request for Declaratory Relief

TIMCO seeks declaratory relief regarding any rights it

has to contribution and/or equitable indemnity from Hawkins for

any judgment entered against it on behalf of the heirs of

Hawkins’s former employees. This requested relief completely

overlaps TIMCO’s separate claims for contribution and equitable

indemnity. Declaratory relief should not be refused merely

because there is another adequate remedy available to the moving

party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 57; Delno v. Market St. Ry. Co., 124

F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1942). However, “[i]t is well settled .

. . that a declaratory judgment may be refused where it would

serve no useful purpose. . . .” McGraw-Edison Co. v. Preformed

Line Prods. Co., 362 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1966)(citing Yellow

Cab v. City of Chicago, 186 F.2d 946, 950-51 (7th Cir. 1951)). 

TIMCO’s election to seek overlapping remedies in this court makes

its request for declaratory relief superfluous. Therefore, the

court will grant Hawkins’s motion to deny this request. 

B. Choice of Law

The parties dispute whether California law or Wyoming

law should govern TIMCO’s two remaining claims. When faced with

a conflict of laws, a district court sitting in diversity applies

the choice of law rules of the forum state in which it sits. 

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 

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California applies a government interest analysis to resolve

choice-of-law disputes. Tucci v. Club Mediterranee, 89 Cal. App.

4th 180, 188 (2001). This analysis involves up to three steps:

First, the court determines whether the foreign law actually

differs from that of the forum. If it does not differ, there is

no choice-of-law problem. Second, if there is a difference, the

court examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the application of

its own law to determine whether a true conflict exists. Id. at

189. If only one state has a legitimate interest in the

application of its law, the court follows the law of that state. 

Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 580 (1974). But if

both jurisdictions have a legitimate interest in the application

of their own law, the court takes a third step and analyzes the

comparative impairment of the interested jurisdictions, applying

the law of the state whose interest would be more impaired if its

law were not applied. Tucci, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 189. 

With respect to TIMCO’s contribution claim, there is no

choice-of-law issue. Both California and Wyoming law preclude

third-party tortfeasors from seeking contribution from a

plaintiff’s concurrently negligent employer. E.B. Wills Co. v.

Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 650 (1976)(Cal. Lab. Code § 3864

precludes third-party wrongdoer’s contribution claim against

concurrently negligent employer); Schneider Nat’l Inc. v. Holland

Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 570 (Wyo. 1992)(noting statutory repeal

of Wyoming’s cause of action for contribution in 1986); Cities

Serv. Co. v. Northern Prod. Co., 705 P.2d 321, 325 (Wyo. 1985)

(contribution claim brought by third-party tortfeasor against

plaintiff’s employer barred by Wyoming Workers’ Compensation

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Act). Therefore, regardless of which state’s law applies,

TIMCO’s contribution claim must be denied. 

TIMCO acknowledges that, under California law, their

indemnity claim also fails. (See Third-Party Pls.’ Opp’n at

6(citing Cal. Labor Code § 3864(limiting employer’s indemnity

liability for injuries caused to its employees to situations

involving express indemnity agreements))). However, TIMCO

contends that their indemnity claim survives under Wyoming law. 

Neither party has cited, nor has the court found, any

case dealing directly with the issue of whether, under Wyoming

law, workers’ compensation immunity bars third-party claims for

equitable indemnity. However, Wyoming has long held that

workers’ compensation provisions do not bar third-party indemnity

claims based on express indemnity agreements. Pan Am. Petroleum

Corp. v. Maddux Well Serv., 586, P.2d 1220, 1224 (Wyo. 1978). 

In the context of a third-party claim for implied contractual

indemnity against an employer, the Supreme Court of Wyoming also

recently held that “workers’ compensation immunity does not bar

third-party claims based on implied indemnity.” Gainsco Ins. Co.

v. Amoco Prod. Co., 53 P.3d 1051 (Wyo. 2002)(addressing implied

contractual indemnity). Under Wyoming law, equitable indemnity

claims are based on implied indemnity. See Schneider, 843 P.2d

at 574(stating the elements of a cause of action for “equitable

implied indemnity” under Wyoming law). Therefore, the court

interprets Gainsco as extending Wyoming’s erosion of workers’

compensation immunity to third-party claims for equitable implied

indemnity as well. See Gainsco, 53 P.3d at 1069(“[W]orkers’

compensation immunity does not protect employers from indemnity

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Restatement Torts (Second) § 886B(2) applies only to 3

instances in which:

(a) The indemnitee was liable only vicariously for the

conduct of the indemnitor;

(b) The indemnitee acted pursuant to direction of the

indemnitor and reasonably believed the directions to be lawful;

(c) The indemnitee was induced to act by a misrepresentation

on the part of the indemnitor, upon which he justifiably relied;

(d) The indemnitor supplied a defective chattel or performed

defective work upon land or buildings as a result of which both

were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or

negligently failed to discover the defect;

(e) The indemnitor created a dangerous condition of land or

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actions brought by [] third parties.”). Thus, the laws of the

two states would lead to disparate results if TIMCO had a claim

under Wyoming law. 

TIMCO, however, has no claim for equitable implied

indemnity under Wyoming law. To state such a claim, TIMCO would

have to show:

(1) an independent relationship with [Hawkins] the

third-party defendant; (2) negligent breach by the

third-party defendant of the duty created by the

independent relationship; (3) under circumstances

falling within the situations addressed in Restatement

Torts (Second) § 886B(2); and (4) that the breach of

the duty to the third-party plaintiff contributed to

cause the injuries and damage to the original

plaintiff.

Diamond Surface Inc. v. Brasel & Sims Constr. Co., 963 P.2d 996,

1003 (Wyo. 1998)(citing Schneider, 843 P.2d at 572, 575-

79)(emphasis omitted). TIMCO has produced no evidence that it

ever had an independent relationship with Hawkins. In fact,

TIMCO’s only connection to Hawkins, other than this lawsuit,

appears to be their mutual involvement, at different times, with

the airplane whose crash forms the basis of the lawsuit. 

Furthermore, none of the situations addressed in the Second

Restatement of Torts § 886B(2) applies here. Therefore, TIMCO’s 3

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chattels as a result of which both were liable to the third

person, and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to

discover the defect;

(f) The indemnitor was under a duty to the indemnitee to

protect him against the liability to the third person. 

Restatement Torts (Second) § 886B(2).

 Wyoming law does allow tort claims against third-party 4

co-employees where the plaintiff is an employee. Poulos v. HPC,

Inc., 765 P.2d 364 (Wyo. 1988). However, no such claims have

been raised here, and the time for joinder of new parties has

passed. (See October 7, 2003 Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order

at 2). Therefore, this exception is irrelevant. 

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equitable indemnity claim fails under both California and Wyoming

law. These identical results moot any choice-of-law issue. 

TIMCO’s alternative basis for a supposed exception to

workers’ compensation exclusivity does not change the court’s

analysis. TIMCO argues that, under both Wyoming and California

law, its indemnity claim survives because Hawkins’s alleged

culpable negligence nullifies its general immunity from employee

tort suits. TIMCO is wrong on both counts. As noted above,

TIMCO has no claim for either contribution or indemnity under

Wyoming law. Furthermore, Wyoming law is clear that employers

covered by Wyoming’s Workers’ Compensation Act enjoy absolute

immunity from such suits “regardless of whether the[ir] behavior

amounted to culpable negligence or an intentional tort.” Wessel

v. Mapco Inc., 752 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Wyo. 1988). 

4

California law is no less favorable to TIMCO’s

position. TIMCO cites Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701

(1994) for the proposition that California workers’ compensation

laws except from their scope intentional employer conduct that

exceeds normal employment risks or contravenes fundamental public

policy. (See Third-Party Pls.’ Opp’n at 8). However, that same

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case states that violations of safety standards fall within the

scope of the workers’ compensation bargain. Id. at 723 n7(“It is

an expected part of the [workers’] compensation bargain that

industrial injury will result from the employer’s violation of

health and safety, environmental and similar regulations.”)

(citing Johns-Mavnille Prod. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.3d

465, 474-75 (1980)). Therefore, no exemption from the workers’

compensation laws of either state applies here, and there is

still no conflict of law. 

C. Rule 56(f) Reference

In the next-to-last paragraph of their opposition,

TIMCO notes that they have not yet completed discovery regarding

Hawkins’s alleged disregard of safety risks to its employees and

cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). TIMCO apparently

seeks this discovery to bolster its argument that Hawkins’s

culpable negligence exempts it from workers’ compensation

exclusivity laws. (See Third-Party Pls.’ Opp’n at 8). Rule

56(f) states that where 

. . . it appear[s] from the affidavits of a party

opposing a motion [for summary judgment] that the party

cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts

sufficient to justify the party’s opposition, the court

may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 

continuance to permit affidavits to be taken or

discovery to be had or may make such other order as is

just. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). 

The Ninth Circuit has made it clear that “[r]eferences

in memoranda and declarations to a need for discovery do not

qualify as motions under Rule 56(f).” Brae Transp. Inc. v.

Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). “Rule

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56(f) requires affidavits setting forth the particular facts

expected from the movant’s discovery.” Id. Failure to produce

such affidavits is sufficient ground for denying discovery and

proceeding to summary judgment. Id. Because TIMCO failed to

submit the requisite affidavits, and has made no representation

as to what specific information further discovery is expected to

develop, its attempted Rule 56(f) request is denied. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Hawkins’ motion for

summary judgment on TIMCO’s claims for contribution and indemnity

and TIMCO’s request for declaratory relief be, and the same

hereby is, GRANTED.

DATED: April 18, 2005

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