Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00496/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00496-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Christopher Howard, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV11-0496-TUC-FRZ (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Christopher Howard’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the Rules of 

Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and 

recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after an independent review of the record, dismiss the Petition with 

prejudice. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Howard was indicted in Pima County in May 2009 in CR 20091662 on one 

charge of fraudulent scheme and artifice and eight charges of forgery. Answer, Ex. 

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A, pp. 1-2. In June 2009, Howard was again indicted in Pima County in CR 

20092057 on two charges of aggravated taking the identity of another, three charges 

of false statement as to financial condition or identity, one charge of taking the 

identity of another, and one charge of fraudulent scheme and artifice. Id., Ex. B, pp. 

1-2. In July 2009, Howard entered into a plea agreement covering both criminal 

cause numbers, in which he pled guilty to one charge of fraudulent scheme and 

artifice in the first case and one charge of aggravating taking the identity of another 

in the second case. Id., Exs. C (Plea Agreement), D (Change of Plea). On August 

28, 2009, the trial court sentenced Howard to concurrent terms totaling 6.5 years 

imprisonment. Id., Ex. E (Sentencing Minute Entry). 

 In October 2009, Howard filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. Id., Ex. F. On October 23, 2009, the trial court appointed 

counsel and ordered that Howard’s petition be filed within 60 days of receiving the 

transcripts. Id., Ex. G. On November 3, 2009, Howard filed another notice of postconviction relief. Id., Ex. H. Howard never filed a petition for post-conviction relief 

and, by order filed on February 25, 2010, the trial court dismissed Howard’s notice of 

post-conviction relief. Id., Ex. I. However, in March 2010, Howard’s counsel filed a 

Rule 32 petition in which she avowed she could find no issues for review. Id., Ex. J. 

The trial court then granted Howard leave to file a pro per Rule 32 petition by April 

26, 2010. Id., Ex. K. When Howard failed to timely file his pro per petition, the trial 

court, by order filed on May 4, 2010, once again dismissed his petition. Id., Ex. L. 

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 Howard filed a motion to reconsider that ruling, which the trial court denied 

on June 8, 2010. Id., Exs. M, N. A few months later, Howard sent a letter to a Pima 

County Superior Court judge in which he argued that his failure to timely file his 

Rule 32 petition was not his fault. Id., Ex. O. The trial court construed the letter as a 

motion for rehearing under Rule 32.9, Ariz.R.Crim.P., vacated its previous order 

dismissing the petition, and again granted Howard an extension to file a pro se Rule 

32 petition by October 18, 2010. Id. 

 Howard timely filed his pro per Rule 32 petition on October 7, 2010. Id., Ex. 

P. The trial court found that Howard had failed to establish any colorable claim for 

relief, and by order filed on January 7, 2011, summarily dismissed the petition. Id., 

Ex. Q. Howard then filed a petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., 

Ex. R. The court of appeals dismissed the petition as untimely. Id., Ex. S. Howard 

then filed a motion for reconsideration which the court of appeals granted. Id., Exs. 

T, U. By Memorandum Decision filed June 30, 2011, the Court of Appeals granted 

review, but denied relief and adopted the decision of the trial court. Id., Ex. V. 

Howard did not seek review of that decision in the Arizona Supreme Court and the 

mandate was issued on September 23, 2011. Id., Ex. W. 

 The instant petition was deposited in the prison mail system on July 28, 2011. 

(Doc. 1.) Howard alleges four grounds for relief. In Ground One he alleges that his 

lawyer failed to investigate certain e-mail accounts and transactions that would have 

established Howard’s innocence. In Ground Two he alleges that evidence obtained 

by an unconstitutional search and seizure was improperly admitted before the grand 

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jury and at trial.1

 In Ground Three, Howard alleges that his pre-trial statements 

obtained in violation of his right to counsel were improperly admitted at trial. In 

Ground Four, Howard alleges his counsel provided ineffective assistance by urging 

him to enter into the plea agreement. 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. Timeliness of the Petition 

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

 

1

 In Grounds Two and Three, Howard references the use of evidence and statements 

against him “at trial.” However, the record establishes that Howard entered into a 

plea agreement and waived his right to a trial. Answer, Exs. C (Plea Agreement), X, 

pp. 5-6 (waiver of right to trial at change of plea hearing). In Ground Two, however, 

Howard also argues that the evidence was improperly admitted before the grand jury. 

Giving Howard the benefit of the doubt, the Court will construe both claims as 

directed at the grand jury proceedings and the indictment. 

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recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 Although his Rule 32 petitions were twice dismissed and his petition for 

review by the Arizona Court of Appeals was untimely filed, each time Howard 

sought reconsideration of the dismissals and his pleadings were reinstated. As such, 

Howard had an application for post-conviction review pending until the Court of 

Appeals denied relief in June 2011. Howard filed the instant petition less than two 

months later. As such, and as Respondents recognize, the petition was timely filed. 

 B. Waiver Based on Guilty Plea 

 As a threshold matter, Respondents contend that Howard waived Grounds 

One, Two and Three of the petition by signing a written plea agreement. The general 

rule is that a guilty plea bars a petitioner from obtaining federal habeas corpus relief 

on the basis of pre-plea constitutional violations. Hudson v. Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 

1029–30 (9th Cir.1985). Thus, Howard’s claims that his trial lawyer was ineffective 

for failing to investigate the email and credit transactions and that evidence was 

improperly admitted against him are unavailable as grounds for habeas relief. See 

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. (1973) (“while claims of prior constitutional 

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deprivation may play a part in evaluating the advice rendered by counsel, they are not 

themselves independent grounds for federal collateral relief.”). The rule is justified 

because “a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it 

in the criminal process,” and a defendant may therefore, “only attack the voluntary 

and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice received from 

counsel was not within [the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases.]” Id. Thus, Grounds One, Two and Three do not present independent grounds 

for relief if Howard’s plea is determined to have been voluntary and intelligent. 

 C. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

 Respondents contend that Grounds One, Two and Three were not properly 

exhausted and are barred from habeas review. A state prisoner must exhaust the 

available state remedies before a federal court may consider the merits of his habeas 

corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 

1004 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state 

court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: 

(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the 

proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 

668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). "To exhaust one's 

state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct 

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appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then 

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Additionally, a state prisoner must not only present the claims to the proper 

court, but must also present them fairly. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the 

petitioner has described the operative facts and federal legal theories on which the 

claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 

F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly 

presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 

904 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must alert the state court to the specific federal 

constitutional guaranty upon which his claims are based, Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001), however, general appeals in state court to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair 

trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. Moreover, it is not enough that a petitioner presented to the 

state court all the facts necessary to support an inadequately identified federal claim 

or that a “somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 28 (2004); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (mere similarity 

between a claim of state and federal error insufficient to establish exhaustion). 

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“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of 

an underlying federal legal theory.” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

 Claims may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review 

in a variety of circumstances. If a state court expressly applied an adequate and 

independent state procedural bar when the petitioner attempted to raise the claim in 

state court review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is barred. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). Arizona courts have been consistent 

in the application of the state’s procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 

856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz.R.Cirm.P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent 

procedural bar). In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts on 

either direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review 

because any attempt to return to state court to present them would be futile unless the 

claims fit into a narrow range of exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

(precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief 

petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty 

days of trial court’s decision). Because these rules have been found to be 

consistently and regularly followed, and because they are independent of federal law, 

either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, or their operation to 

preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally bar subsequent 

review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas court. Stewart, 536 U.S. at 

860; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32, Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

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is strictly followed); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and 

preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings). 

 A federal court may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim 

unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for his noncompliance and actual 

prejudice, or establish that a miscarriage of justice would result from the lack of 

review. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). To establish cause, a 

petitioner must point to some objective factor external to the defense impeded his 

efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (2004). “[C]ause is an external impediment such as government interference 

or reasonable unavailability of a claims factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Ignorance of the state’s procedural 

rules or the lack of legal training do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a 

petitioner’s failure to fairly present a claim. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of 

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 

1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the 

constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 

1984); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Alternatively, a federal court may review the merits of a procedurally 

defaulted claim where a petitioner can establish that a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” would otherwise result. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 327. A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice exists when a constitutional violation resulted in the conviction 

of one who is actually innocent. Id. 

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 1. Analysis of Claims

In his Rule 32 petition and his brief filed in the appeal of the denial of the 

petition, Howard made no reference or mention to any federal authority in support of 

Grounds One, Two, and Three. Answer, Exs. P, R. Because he failed to do, he has 

not ‘fairly presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court. Lyons, 

232 F.3d at 668 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, these claims are subject to review only if 

Howard can show cause for his failure to exhaust and resulting prejudice. 

 2. Cause and Prejudice 

 Respondents contend and Howard does not contradict, that Howard is 

procedurally barred from now raising his claims in State court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3) (“A defendant shall be precluded from relief under [Rule 32] based upon 

any ground . . . [t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral 

proceeding.”) Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, the 

merits of the claims need not be addressed unless Howard establishes cause and 

prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred. Howard does not 

argue that cause and prejudice exist in this case and, therefore, the claims are not 

subject to review. 

D. Merits

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

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based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 1. Ground Four 

 A guilty plea based on an attorney's advice may be involuntary if the attorney 

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56–57 

(1985); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). The Strickland test applies 

to a petitioner’s challenge of his guilty plea based upon ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir.2005) (citing Hill, 474 

U.S. 52). In the plea context, “the ineffectiveness inquiry probes whether the alleged 

ineffective assistance impinged on the [petitioner's] ability to enter an intelligent, 

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knowing and voluntary plea of guilty.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 980 (9th 

Cir.2004). 

 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Howard must show 

both deficient performance and prejudice in order to establish that counsel’s 

representation was ineffective. 466 U.S. at 687. In the context of habeas claims 

evaluated under § 2254(d)(1) standards, the question “is not whether a federal court 

believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination 

was unreasonable– a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 

465, 473 (2007). 

 In evaluating counsel's advice concerning a plea offer under Strickland's

performance prong, a reviewing court must “respect the latitude Strickland requires” 

by according substantial deference to counsel's judgment. Premo, 131 S.Ct. at 741, 

742. The question is not “whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel's 

advice to be right or wrong, but . . . whether that advice was within the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 

U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Hill, 474 U.S. at 56. 

 The prejudice component requires a showing of a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the petitioner would not have pleaded guilty 

and would instead have insisted on going to trial. Premo, 131 S.Ct. at 743; Hill, 474 

U.S. at 59. Federal habeas courts must exercise caution in evaluating the prejudice 

prong “in light of the uncertainty inherent in plea negotiations.” Premo, 131 S.Ct. at 

743. 

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 In Ground Four, Howard claims his counsel was ineffective because she did 

“absolutely none of the things asked of her by me.” The specific failures he alleges 

include her failure to act on his claim that he did not know the check he had cashed 

was fraudulent, that she did not use email evidence that would have indicated 

somebody else was at fault, that she guaranteed him a sentence of 3.5 years if he 

entered the plea and that she threatened him with a 9 or 10 year sentence if he did 

not. 

 In its decision denying this claim, which was subsequently adopted by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, the trial court, addressing Strickland’s performance prong, 

evaluated the impact of Howard’s counsel’s alleged missteps on the plea. The court 

explained: 

 A lawyer’s guarantee of a particular sentence is not reflected in 

the plea agreement, as the petitioner alleges here, would present a 

question of the validity of the plea. But the court finds the petitioner’s 

account not credible and contradicted by the record. The petitioner 

affirmed at the time of the plea that he understood its terms and the 

possible sentence it envisioned and that no one had threatened him or 

promised him anything outside of the plea agreement, particularly 

relating to the sentence. If anything the recorded July 14 disagreement 

between the petitioner and [his counsel] regarding the factual basis for 

the plea reflects the petitioner’s willingness to speak up and set the 

record straight rather than his acquiescence in the face of alleged 

threats. The petitioner ultimately admitted to the actions giving rise to 

the charge and took responsibility for those actions at sentencing; it 

was only after he received a sentence longer than he apparently 

expected that he recanted his admission and challenged the validity of 

the plea. His statement upon sentencing demonstrates an understanding 

that the court maintained the discretion to decide his sentence within 

the ranges set forth in the plea agreement. Had he been promised a 

shorter sentence, nothing prevented him from clarifying as much on the 

record at either hearing, including his purported assumption that [his 

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counsel] had “cleared” some unwritten guarantee with the state and the 

court. 

 The petitioner may well have been initially resistant to the plea 

deal, and [his counsel] may well have strongly urged him to accept it, 

properly invoking the possibility of a harsher sentence should the case 

go to trial. No doubt, having received his sentence, the petitioner now 

regrets pleading guilty. But such facts, if true, do not invalidate the 

plea or demonstrate threats. The record is clear: [his counsel] did not 

guarantee the petitioner a 3.5-year sentence. The court was correct in 

finding that “the defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily” 

pleaded guilty. The petitioner’s counsel was not deficient. 

Answer, Ex. Q, pp. 3-4 (internal citation omitted). The state court’s findings are not 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

 Howard claims he would not have entered into the plea agreement if his 

counsel had not threatened him and had done more in preparing his defense. 

However, the state court’s recitation of the events at his change of plea hearing show 

that he was fully aware of the implications of the plea agreement and was more than 

willing to speak up when he felt the need to do so. At the change of plea hearing, 

Howard answered “yes” when asked if he intended to enter into a plea agreement. 

Answer, Ex. X, p. 3. He again responded affirmatively when asked if he understood 

that the sentencing range available under the terms of the agreement were from 5 to 

12.5 years in case number CR-20091662, and from 3.5 to 8.75 in case number CR20092057. Id. Howard also indicated that he had read the agreement and it had also 

been explained to him. Id., p. 5. The trial court then asked if anyone had made any 

promises or threats of force or intimidation to get him to plead guilty and he 

answered “no.” Id. Howard was then specifically asked if anyone had promised him 

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“exactly what your sentence would be,” and he again answered no and said he 

understood that the court would make the sentencing decision. Id., p. 6-7. Then, 

after some back and forth with the court about the factual basis for the plea, with 

Howard actively participating in the discussion with the court, he admitted to 

assisting in the production of fraudulent checks. Id., Howard then admitted to 

obtaining credit cards under the name Patrick Warren and using the cards to 

fraudulently charge over $20,000.00. Id., p. 13. After taking the pleas, the court 

asked Howard if he understood all that had happened in the hearing and he replied, 

“yes.” Id., p. 16. When asked if he wished to speak at sentencing, Howard 

apologized to the victims of his fraud and accepted responsibility for what he had 

done. Answer, Ex. Y, p. 8. 

 Considering the facts and representations reflected in the transcripts of 

Howard’s change of plea and sentencing hearing, there is no doubt that the trial court 

reasonably applied the Strickland standards in denying Howard’s Rule 32 petition. 

The trial court’s determination that Howard’s lawyer was not ineffective, and that his 

plea was knowing and voluntary, is fully supported by the record and is not contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of established federal law. Accordingly, Howard 

has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that, “but for counsel’s errors, 

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 

474 U.S. at 57. His § 2254 petition should therefore be dismissed with prejudice. 

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III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Howard’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and 

file written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report 

and Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party's objections within 

fourteen days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by 

the district court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If 

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 11–496–

TUC–FRZ. 

 Dated this 26th day of July, 2013. 

 

 

Case 4:11-cv-00496-FRZ Document 18 Filed 07/26/13 Page 16 of 16