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Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 3, 1995 Decided April 21, 1995

No. 93-5397

AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(93cv0126)

Darryl J. Anderson argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Robert L. Shapiro, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the

brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John D. Bates and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant United States Attorneys, and Brian M. Reimer, Attorney, United States Postal Service.

Before: WALD, SILBERMAN, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, appeals from a

district court order enforcing an arbitrator's award in favor of the United States Postal Service.

Appellant claims that the award was procured through "undue means," because the arbitrator

considered an arrest record that had been expunged under Connecticut law. We affirm the district

court.

I.

Madeline Goodwin was employed at the Post Office in Stamford, Connecticut. On May 29,

1991, Goodwin was involved in an incident with two supervisors, Robert Townes, Jr., and George

Reale. According to Townes and Reale, Goodwin left her work area, disobeyed orders to return to

her work, became verbally abusive, struck Townes on the arm, and was generally "disrespectful."

After several unsuccessful attempts to persuade Goodwin to leave the workplace, Reale contacted

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the postal police, who in turn asked the local police to escort Goodwin out of the postalfacility. The

local police arrived, Goodwin refused to leave the facility, and she was arrested and removed.

Criminal charges were brought against Goodwin based upon her conduct.

Goodwindisputed the supervisors' characterizationofthe events. Their version was reflected,

however, in a SupplementalInvestigativeMemorandumPostalInspector Feeneydrafted inJuly1991.

Goodwin did not offer Feeney a competing version, despite the Inspector's efforts to get her

statement. The state law criminal charges against Goodwin stemming from the incident were dropped

on August 5, 1991, in a proceeding before a state judge. Feeney submitted a final Supplemental

Investigative Memorandum on August 14, 1991.

The Postal Service then discharged Goodwin, who also had a past record of disciplinary

infractions. On behalf of Goodwin, the American Postal Workers' Union brought a grievance

challenging Goodwin's discharge, which ultimately led to arbitration. The arbitrator credited the

testimony of Townes and Reale, and found Goodwin's version of the events in question

"unbelievable"; she relied at least in part on the Connecticut arrest record, over the objection of the

union representative, as "probative support for the credible testimony" of Townes and Reale. (The

union representative objected on groundsthat the charges against Goodwin had been dropped.) The

arbitratorthus determined that the supervisors had acted properlyand that Goodwin's conduct in light

of her past record was sufficient to support removal.

The union brought suit in district court to overturn the arbitrator's award. It was, and is,

claimed that the Postal Service procured the award through "undue means" in violation of § 10(a) of

the Federal Arbitration Act. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1988) (award may be vacated where "procured

by corruption, fraud, or undue means."). The alleged "undue means" was the introduction into

evidence of Goodwin's arrest, notwithstanding a Connecticut statute which bans the "dissemination

of an arrest record by any law enforcement agency." See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(e) (West

Supp. 1995) ("Erasure of criminalrecords"). The district court rejected the union's claim, concluding

that the union had waived its objection to the disputed evidence by not raising the Connecticut statute

before the arbitrator, and that, in any event, neither "fraud" nor the term"undue means" encompasses

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the union's claim. This appeal followed.

II.

The union reiterates before us its argument that the alleged violation of the Connecticut

statute constituted "undue means." It claims that its representative before the arbitrator, a

non-lawyer, could not be expected to be familiar withConnecticut law,so that the district court erred

in concluding that the union waived its claimby not raising it before the arbitrator. The district court,

it is argued, improperly extended to an "undue means" case a requirement courts have imposed on

parties seeking to set aside awards on the grounds of fraud. See, e.g., A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.

v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 970 (1993). The

Service responds that there is no good reason why the union was not obliged to raise its objection

relating to the arrest record before the arbitratorwhether its claim is based on fraud or undue

means. The union, after all, chose to use a business agent as its advocate and it must live with the

consequences. The Service, moreover, was not aware of the Connecticut statute, so even if it could

be thought "a law enforcement agency," it should not be charged with "procuring" (i.e., actively

gaining or purposefully influencing) the award through undue means. Finally, the parties dispute

whether or not the arrest record was actually "disseminated" within the meaning of the Connecticut

statute, and whether it was decisive in contributing to the award.

Our scope of review of an arbitrator's award interpreting a collective bargaining agreement

is extremely narrow. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567

(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578

(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel &Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)

("Steelworkers Trilogy" ); Hotel Assoc. of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Hotel &Restaurant Employees

Union, 963 F.2d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball &Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175,

1178 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Indeed, the premise of appellant's argumentthat the FAA controls this

caseis by no means obvious. The Act does not apply to "contracts of employment," 9 U.S.C. § 1,

and federal courts look to it only as guidance in fashioning federal common law governing suits for

breach of contract (which include challengesto arbitrator's awards) under § 301 ofthe FederalLaborUSCA Case #93-5397 Document #118517 Filed: 04/21/1995 Page 3 of 6
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Management Relations Act. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40

n.9 (1987).

We think it fair to assume, however, that even under our limited scope of review of an

arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement a party's use of certain kinds of

techniquesto gain an award could be thought to authorize our rejection ofthe award. If an arbitrator

were bribed (corruption) or a party were guilty of fraud in obtaining an award, it could be said that

the result was equivalent to an arbitrator "dispensing his own brand of industrial justice." See

Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597. Appellant would have us extend

that reasoning by applying its definition of "undue means" in this case. The union's difficulty,

however, isthat even under the FAAno court has eversuggested that the term"undue means" should

be interpreted to apply to the submission of evidence that is merely legally objectionable. See A.G.

Edwards, 967 F.2d at 1403-04 (defining "undue means" as conduct "that is immoral if not illegal";

held not to apply to defendant's raising of frivolous defenses during arbitration, or "sloppy or

overzealous lawyering"); Remmey v. Painewebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 1994) ("undue

means" held not to include potential arbitrator conflict of interest where fully aired, or past

disciplining of arbitrator). Particularly as applied to review of a labor arbitration, undue means must

be limited to an action by a party that is equivalent in gravity to corruption or fraud, such as a

physical threat to an arbitrator or other improper influence. That definition cannot reasonably be

applied to a situation in which a party unknowingly used an arguably inappropriate (under state law)

document or record. It seems to us gross hyperbole to accuse the Postal Service of undue means in

a case like this. See Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 108 (N.D. Ill. 1980)

(defining "undue means" as requiring bad faith conduct). The Service's action here could hardly be

thought malum in se.

Thus, although the union characterizes its claim as alleging undue means, it really challenges

the award on grounds that it violates public policy. In its opening brief, the union argues that it does

not matter whether the Service knew of the Connecticut law or not. If the award was secured

because of the Service's violation of that law, to permit the award to stand would violate public

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policy. But the union's reply brief expressly disavows that its challenge is based on the "public policy

exception" to the principle that labor arbitrators' awards are final and binding on the parties. Because

the union forfeits its public policy argument, we do not decide whether the public policy exception

applies here. We do note, however, that the Supreme Court has made clear that to overturn a labor

arbitration award as contrary to public policy is a daunting task. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local

Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983). An alleged violation of Connecticut law would be relevant

in this sort of case only if the Connecticut statute reflected a public policy that can be described as

"well defined" and "dominant." See Misco, 484 U.S. at 43; W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766. Appellant

does not argue that the Connecticut law can be so characterized.

We do not think it necessary, therefore, to determine whether the Postal Service can be

thought a law enforcement agency under Connecticut law, and if so, whether the arrest record was

"disseminated" in this case. Nor need we decide whether the union waived its public policy argument

by not raising it before the arbitrator. Even if the Postal Service's actions could be regarded as

contrary to Connecticut law, that state law would not directly apply to a labor arbitration unless the

erasure statute represented a "dominant public policy"; labor arbitration is fundamentally and

mandatorily governed by federal law and the parties' agreement. Whether or not the grievant's arrest

record could be introduced in evidence in a discharge arbitration is really a question of contract

interpretation, and therefore it need not be decided in accordance with Connecticut law because of

the fortuitous location of a workplace at a post office in Connecticut (unless the agreement

incorporated Connecticut law). The Postal Service, like most large employers, will have collective

bargaining agreements in many states, and it would be expected that much of the same contractual

language would be found in various locations throughout the country, though local laws governing

police records varywidely. In sum, an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement

can be overridden by a state statute only if that statute is incorporated into federal law because it

reflects dominant public policy.

* * * *

Accordingly, we uphold the district court's refusal to vacate the arbitrator's award and the

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grant of appellee's motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment.

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