Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01016/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED - Vlllted States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 16 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

THE GEHL GROUP, a Florida corporation; ) 

MICHAEL K. BRADY; FRATERNAL ORDER OF ) 

POLICE, NORTHERN COLORADO LODGE #3; and ) 

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, COLORADO ) 

METROPLEX, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

THOMAS KOBY, individually and in his 

official capacity as Chief of Police 

for the Police Department of the City 

of Boulder, Colorado; GEORGE EPP, 

individually and in his official 

capacity as Sheriff of Boulder County, 

Colorado; BOULDER CITY POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; BOULDER COUNTY SHERIFF'S 

DEPARTMENT; BOULDER, CITY OF; BOARD OF 

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF 

BOULDER, COLORADO; DAVE HAYES, 

individually and in his official 

capacity as a Sergeant for the Police 

Department of the City of Boulder, 

Colorado; DETECTIVE ROSS, individually 

and in his official capacity as a 

Detective for the Police Department of 

the City of Boulder, Colorado; and 

JOHN DOES NO. 1-12, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-1016 

Appeal from the United states District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 92-K-2375) 

Donald B. Gentry of Wood, Ris & Hames, P.C., Denver, CO 

(Michael E. Gurley of Hamilton & Faatz, Denver, co, with him on 

the brief) for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Appellate Case: 94-1016 Document: 01019279495 Date Filed: 08/16/1995 Page: 1 
Robert M. Liechty of Halaby, McCrea & Cross, Denver, CO 

(Theodore S. Halaby, of Halaby, McCrea & Cross, and Thomas B. 

Buescher of Brauer, Buescher, Valentine, Goldhammer & Kelman, 

P.C., Denver, CO, co-counsel for Defendants-Appellees Dave Hayes 

and Detective Ross, with him on the brief) for DefendantsAppellees Thomas Koby, the Boulder City Police Department, City of 

Boulder, Dave Hayes, and Detective Ross. 

Thomas B. Buescher of Brauer, Buescher, Valentine, Goldhammer & 

Kelman, P.C., Denver, CO for Defendants-Appellees Dave Hayes and 

Detective Ross, submitted on the briefs. 

H. Lawrence Hoyt, Boulder County Attorney, and Andrew R. 

MacDonald, Assistant Boulder County Attorney for DefendantsAppellees George Epp, the Boulder County Sheriff's Department, and 

the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Boulder, 

submitted on the briefs. 

Before BRORBY, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge and 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiffs-Appellants ("Plaintiffs"), two Colorado chapters 

of the Fraternal Order of Police ("FOP") and their solicitation 

agent, the Gehl Group ("Gehl"), as well as Gehl's regional manager 

Michael Brady ("Brady"), brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1983 & 1985 and Colorado state law. Plaintiffs charged that 

various law enforcement and other officials of the City of Boulder 

("City Defendants") and the County of Boulder ("County 

Defendants") tried to prevent them from soliciting charitable 

contributions in the Boulder area in violation of their 

constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiffs maintain that 

Defendants filed baseless criminal charges against them and 

selectively and vindictively prosecuted them because of FOP's 

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constitutionally protected activities in contravention of their 

First Amendment, equal protection, procedural due process, and 

substantive due process rights. The district court rejected each 

of these claims and granted summary judgment for Defendants. We 

conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Defendants 

abridged their constitutional rights, and affirm the judgment of 

the district court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The FOP is a private national association of law enforcement 

personnel that engages in a variety of activities to promote the 

interests of its members. Northern Colorado Lodge No. 3 ("Lodge 

No. 3") and the Colorado Metroplex are local FOP groups affiliated 

with the national association and are active in various Colorado 

counties, including Boulder County.1 Beginning in 1988, Lodge 

No. 3, the Colorado Metroplex, and other Colorado FOP chapters 

hired Gehl to assist in their fund-raising efforts by soliciting 

charitable contributions and selling tickets to entertainment 

shows sponsored by the FOP. 

As a result of Gehl's activities in the Boulder area, the 

Boulder Police Department began to receive complaints from 

citizens in January 1991 alleging that Gehl solicitors were 

misrepresenting that contributions would go directly to the 

Boulder Police Department and not to the FOP. The volume of 

complaints increased when an article appeared in The Daily Camera 

1 Lodge No. 3 has its principal place of business in Fort 

Collins and is active in Larimer, Weld, and Boulder counties. The 

Colorado Metroplex represents 21 lodges active in the Denver 

metropolitan area, including Boulder County. 

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newspaper in Boulder on January 9, 1991 in which Boulder Police 

Department Sergeant David Hayes ("Hayes") disclaimed the 

department's association with the fund-raising solicitations. 

After Hayes verified two of the citizen complaints in the summer 

of 1991, Boulder police detective John Ross ("Ross") drafted a 

criminal complaint against Gehl's regional manager Michael K. 

Brady ("Brady"), charging Brady with violation of Colorado's Fraud 

in Effecting Sales Act, codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-5-301.2 

Ross obtained the approval of the Boulder Police Department's 

legal advisor before drafting the complaint; Hayes then submitted 

the complaint to the district attorney's office. 

Deputy District Attorney Joan Nagel ("Nagel") reviewed the 

summons and complaint, as well as a file from the district 

attorney's consumer affairs division chronicling complaints about 

FOP fund-raising activities, and concluded that, "my 

recommendation at this time is not to begin a criminal 

prosecution." Appellant App. at 64. Nagel advised against 

pursuing criminal charges because the FOP had been cooperative in 

dealing with the problem, had taken affirmative steps to prevent 

future misrepresentations, was sending out accurate literature, 

and actually had several Boulder area law enforcement personnel as 

members. Nevertheless, Nagel stated that "[a]fter reading over 

the case files and the statute, I believe we have a prosecutable 

2 Under Colorado law, a peace officer can issue a summons and 

complaint for "a misdemeanor or a petty offense committed in his 

presence or, if not committed in his presence, which he has 

probable cause to believe was committed and probable cause to 

believe was committed by the person charged." Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 16-2-104. 

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Appellate Case: 94-1016 Document: 01019279495 Date Filed: 08/16/1995 Page: 4 
case," and she proceeded to provide Hayes with advice on how to 

bring charges if he decided to do so. Nagel suggested that, if 

the department wished to prosecute, the summons should be (1) 

issued specifically for Fraud in Effecting Sales under Colo. Rev. 

Stat. § 18-5-301(1) (e), a class two misdemeanor; (2) issued to the 

FOP affiliates and/or Gehl, depending on who was making the 

misrepresentations, and not to any individuals (because one 

identified offending solicitor had already left Gehl, and a charge 

against Gehl would have a more long-lasting impact); and (3) 

served on the registered agent(s) of the corporation(s). 

Contrary to Nagel's recommendation, Ross served a summons on 

Brady, the designated representative for Gehl, naming Brady as the 

defendant but describing the offense as Gehl's making of 

misleading statements. Allegedly, when Ross wrote the summons he 

commented to Brady that "I don't want to write this Summons; I 

don't think this is much of a case; I'm following orders and have 

to do it; I want you to know I don't want to do this." Appellant 

App. at 92. 

In any event, before the trial was scheduled to begin, 

Plaintiffs requested a meeting with Boulder law enforcement 

representatives. A meeting was held on January 7, 1992 and 

attended by Boulder Chief of Police Thomas Koby ("Koby"), Hayes, 

Ross, Sheriff of Boulder County George Epp ("Epp"), attorneys from 

the district attorney's office and the Boulder Police Department, 

Fort Collins police officer and the president of the Colorado FOP 

at the time, Scott Goff ("Goff"), attorneys representing the FOP 

and Gehl, Brady (via a conference call), the president of the 

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Boulder Police Benefit Association, who was the collective 

bargaining representative for Boulder police officers at the time, 

and the head of the University of Colorado Police. The parties 

dispute what transpired and was said at the meeting. 

Goff maintains that FOP representatives began the meeting by 

stating that they were willing to take any corrective measures 

necessary to prevent future misrepresentations, but that Sheriff 

Epp responded, "we ran the Denver Sheriff's Union and the Aurora 

PPA out of Boulder and if you don't stop soliciting, there will be 

felonies filed against you. I don't want you calling Boulder." 

Appellant App. at 88. Brady corroborates Goff's recollection. 

Appellant App. at 93. Furthermore, Goff and Brady assert that 

Koby called the FOP "prostitutes of the law enforcement 

profession." Koby contends that he simply stated that the FOP was 

"prostituting themselves off the back of the police officers by 

allowing themselves to be sold so cheaply," and that at the time 

he made the statement he understood that professional fund-raisers 

like Gehl only return 10 percent of collected money to the 

charitable organization. Appellant App. at 69. Nevertheless, 

according to Goff and Brady, Koby continued to warn that although 

Plaintiffs were not committing a felony or violating the law and 

that the charges were being dropped, he wanted the FOP out of 

Boulder County and would continuously file charges in the future 

until "something stuck" or the FOP stopped calling in Boulder. 

Appellant App. at 89, 92. When Goff and Brady told Koby that his 

actions were illegal and different from how other solicitors' were 

treated in Boulder County, they maintain that Koby responded that 

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he did not care about other solicitors, wanted the FOP to stop 

soliciting in Boulder County, and would continue to solicit 

complaints from citizens. 

Koby and Epp do not explicitly deny making the statements 

described by Goff and Brady. However, they contend that although 

FOP representatives offered to improve their solicitation methods, 

they were unable to guarantee that none of their solicitors would 

make misrepresentations. As such, Koby and Epp explain that 

Plaintiffs were told that they would or could face prosecution if 

they remained unable to comply with the law. Goff and Brady deny 

that they stated that they could not control their solicitors, and 

reiterate that Koby and Epp warned that charges would be filed 

until they stopped soliciting. 

Two days after the meeting, the district attorney moved to 

dismiss the criminal case, stating that (1) the summons and 

complaint were improperly issued to Brady on behalf of Gehl; (2) 

the charges were improperly brought under the Fraud in Effecting 

Sales Act rather than the Colorado Charitable Solicitations Act, 

codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 6-16-101 et seg.; and (3) the 

people intended to investigate the case further and refile at a 

later date. Although the charges were dropped, Plaintiffs assert 

that Defendants continued to discriminate against them through an 

ongoing investigation by the police and sheriff's departments. 

Plaintiffs also state that the Chief of the Lafayette Police 

Department threatened to fire an FOP member (who is not a 

plaintiff in this action) if he continued to allow his name to be 

used in any Boulder County solicitations. Hayes acknowledges that 

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he investigated some citizen complaints following the meeting, and 

asserts that none formed the basis of new charges. Koby states 

that he intended to solicit citizen complaints after the meeting, 

but that plans were dropped when the person who would have headed 

the effort changed jobs. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs maintain that 

FOP solicitations in the Boulder area continued to decline from 

past levels. 

Plaintiffs then brought suit in the United States District 

Court for the District of Colorado, raising federal and state law 

claims and requesting compensatory and punitive damages and 

injunctive relief. In particular, Plaintiffs alleged federal 

claims under (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of their First and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for 

Defendants' purported conspiracy to violate their civil rights. 

Plaintiffs asserted state law claims for (1) interference with 

business relations; (2) malicious prosecution; (3) abuse of 

process; (4) defamation; and (5) outrageous conduct. The City 

Defendants and County Defendants answered and filed separate 

motions for summary judgment based in part on the defense of 

qualified immunity. The district court granted both motions and 

dismissed Plaintiffs' action.3 Gehl Group v. Koby, 838 F. Supp. 

1409, 1419-20 (D.Colo. 1993). First, the court found that, even 

3 The district court did not explicitly address Plaintiffs' 

claims against the municipal entities, which would not be entitled 

to qualified immunity. Nevertheless, the court granted 

Defendants' motions for summary judgment in all respects, and 

Plaintiffs do not raise the issue of municipal liability in this 

appeal. Accordingly, we do not address that issue. However, we 

note that our disposition of Plaintiffs' claims against the 

individual defendants would also resolve all claims against the 

municipal defendants. 

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assuming that Plaintiffs asserted a clearly established First 

Amendment right to solicit charitable contributions or a due 

process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to conduct a lawful 

business, Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because a 

reasonable police official would have believed that the actions 

taken against Plaintiffs were lawful. Second, the court found 

that Plaintiffs failed to state a cognizable claim that Defendants 

violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights 

by verbally threatening to prevent them from operating in Boulder 

County, or their equal protection rights by treating them 

differently than other solicitors. Because Plaintiffs did not 

prevail on any of their underlying claims, the court held that it 

did not need to reach Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim. Finally, the 

court dismissed Plaintiffs' pendent state law claims without 

prejudice.4 Plaintiffs then filed this timely appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION 

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same legal standards employed by the district 

court. James v. Sears. Roebuck, & Co., 21 F.3d 989, 997-98 (10th 

Cir. 1994). "Summary judgment is appropriate if 'there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party 

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Hagelin for 

President Comm. v. Graves, 25 F.3d 956, 959 (10th Cir. 1994) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 

4 Plaintiffs do not appeal the court's dismissal of their 

pendent state law claims without prejudice. Accordingly, we do 

not address those claims. 

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(1995). In making this determination, "we construe the factual 

record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Blue Circle 

Cement, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1503 (lOth 

Cir. 1994). 

In the instant case, the district court granted summary 

judgment as to some of Plaintiffs' claims on the merits and as to 

others on the grounds of qualified immunity. The individual 

defendants' qualified immunity shields them from liability if 

their actions did not "violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In 

analyzing qualified immunity claims, we first ask if a plaintiff 

has asserted the violation of a constitutional right at all, and 

then assess whether that right was clearly established at the time 

of a defendant's actions. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 

(1991). Once a public official raises a qualified immunity 

defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of (1) coming forward with 

sufficient facts to show that the defendant's conduct violated the 

law; and (2) demonstrating that the relevant law was clearly 

established when the alleged violation occurred. Pueblo 

Neighborhood Health Ctrs .. Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 

(lOth Cir. 1988). Where a plaintiff fails to demonstrate that a 

defendant's conduct violated the law, we need not reach the issue 

of whether the law was clearly established. Hinton v. City of 

Elwood, Kan., 997 F.2d 774, 782 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

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Plaintiffs claim that Defendants singled out the FOP in 

response to their constitutionally protected solicitation efforts 

for the purpose of suppressing those activities.5 Specifically, 

Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants' arbitrary and discriminatory 

attempts to prevent them from soliciting in Boulder violated their 

First Amendment right to free expression and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights to procedural due process, substantive due process, and 

equal protection of the law. We address each claim in turn and 

hold that Plaintiffs have failed to show that Defendants violated 

their constitutional rights, clearly established or otherwise. 

5 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to raise a claim 

below based on Defendants' alleged improper motive and should, 

therefore, be barred from raising such a claim on appeal. As a 

general rule, we will not consider an issue raised for the first 

time on appeal. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970 

(lOth Cir. 1991). However, we conclude that Plaintiffs alleged 

claims based on Defendants' purported retaliatory motive before 

the district court. First, Plaintiffs' complaint clearly asserted 

claims based on the First Amendment, see, e.g., Appellant App. at 

7, 9, ,!,! 44 & 52, and emphasized both that Defendants prosecuted 

them without probable cause and discriminatorily singled them out 

for selective prosecution, see, e.g., id. at 4, 7, ,!,! 25 & 42-45. 

Second, although Plaintiffs stated in their response to 

Defendants' motion for summary judgment in one section that a 

claim "boiled down" to whether Defendants acted with probable 

cause, Appellee Supp. App. at 33, 39, Plaintiffs addressed a whole 

section to Defendants' improper motive and stated explicitly that 

even if the court found that Defendants acted with probable cause, 

they should be able to conduct discovery to explore Defendants' 

motives, id. at 42-46, 58. Moreover, the district court 

implicitly acknowledged that Plaintiffs raised claims based on 

motive when it stated that "Plaintiffs argue that Defendants acted 

with improper motive," even though the court proceeded to find 

that Plaintiffs failed to show how such arguments supported a 

viable First or Fourteenth Amendment claim. Gehl Group, 838 

F. Supp. at 1419 n.9. As explained in the text, we disagree with 

the court's suggestion that motive is irrelevant to Plaintiffs' 

claims, but nonetheless affirm the court's dismissal of 

Plaintiffs' action. 

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A. First Amendment 

Plaintiffs' First Amendment claim is essentially one of 

vindictive prosecution, claiming that Defendants prosecuted them 

in retaliation for their exercise of First Amendment rights.6 

There is no doubt that Plaintiffs have the right under the First 

Amendment to solicit charitable contributions. As the Supreme 

Court held in Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, "the 

solicitation of charitable contributions is protected speech," 487 

U.S. 781, 789 (1988), and government action which chills such 

speech contravenes the First Amendment, id. at 794. Of course, 

that right is not absolute, and the First Amendment does not 

immunize Plaintiffs from prosecution under Colorado's generally 

applicable and otherwise valid fraud laws, which Plaintiffs do not 

challenge as facially invalid. See Roberts v. United States 

Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (explaining that practices "like 

violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that 

produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact 

... are entitled to no constitutional protection"); Citizen 

Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 u.s. 131, 139-40 (1969) 

(upholding regulation of newspapers under generally applicable 

6 In a vindictive prosecution claim, the claimant has the 

burden of showing (1) actual vindictiveness; or (2) circumstances 

which would give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. United 

States v. P.H.E .. Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 860 (lOth Cir. 1992) 

(quoting United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1040 (lOth Cir. 

1991)). The burden then shifts to the prosecution to establish 

objectively legitimate reasons for its actions, and the ultimate 

inquiry is whether "as a practical matter there is a realistic or 

reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial conduct that would not have 

occurred but for the hostility or punitive animus towards the 

defendant because he exercised his specific legal rights." 

Raymer, 941 F.2d at 1042. 

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antitrust laws); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 

(upholding conviction of magazine subscription salesman under 

municipal ordinance prohibiting certain types of solicitation and 

explaining that "[f]reedom of speech or press does not mean that 

one can talk or distribute where, when and how one chooses"). 

Nevertheless, government actors cannot intentionally suppress 

constitutionally protected expression because of its content and 

avoid First Amendment scrutiny simply by claiming that they were 

acting pursuant to an otherwise valid criminal law. As we stated 

generally in DeLoach v. Bevers, "[a]n act taken in retaliation for 

the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable 

under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason, 

would have been proper." 922 F.2d 618, 620 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

(quoting Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984)), 

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 814 (1991). "[A] prosecution motivated by 

a desire to discourage expression protected by the First Amendment 

is barred and must be enjoined or dismissed, irrespective of 

whether the challenged action could possibly be found to be 

unlawful." United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 853 (lOth 

Cir. 1992) .7 As the Supreme Court said in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 

7 Several other examples exist of otherwise proper government 

actions rendered unconstitutional when undertaken with the intent 

of suppressing expression because of its content. For example, as 

the Supreme Court explained in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 

Educ. v. Doyle, although a school board could refuse to rehire a 

nontenured teacher for "no reason whatever" and without a hearing, 

it violated the First Amendment if its decision not to rehire was 

"made by reason of his exercise of constitutionally protected 

First Amendment freedoms." 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977); see also 

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 

788, 812-13 (1985) (explaining that the existence of neutral and, 

therefore, otherwise permissible grounds for limiting expression 

(continued on next page) 

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11 [t]he chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights 

may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the 

prospects of its success or failure." 380 u.s. 479, 487 (1965). 

Accordingly, in the instant case, we must address Plaintiffs' 

contention that Defendants were acting to suppress their protected 

expression and not to enforce Colorado's criminal laws.8 

However, when the issue is presented in the context of the 

defendant's claim for summary judgment based on qualified 

immunity, some special rules apply. When state of mind is an 

essential element of the plaintiff's substantive claim, we have 

adopted a modified approach to considering a public official's 

(continued from prior page) 

does not immunize government action that is in reality motivated 

by a desire to suppress a particular point of view) ; Pueblo 

Neighborhood Health Ctrs., 847 F.2d at 647 (stating that "the 

governmental actor's intent, motive, or purpose is the critical 

element" in First Amendment and equal protection claims). 

8 Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), and Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), are not to the contrary. Albright 

simply provides that all constitutional challenges to a 

prosecution based on the claim that the prosecution was initiated 

without probable cause must be brought and judged under the Fourth 

Amendment, and not according to the more generalized substantive 

due process analysis. 114 S. Ct. at 813. Thus, Albright extended 

Graham, which provided that excessive force claims are analyzed 

under the Fourth Amendment according to an objective 

reasonableness standard, and not under broader notions of 

substantive due process, 490 U.S. at 395. Neither case, read 

separately or in conjunction, provides that the Fourth Amendment 

governs claims that a prosecution was motivated by a 

discriminatory animus or a desire to suppress a particular 

viewpoint. In fact, the Court had no occasion to establish such a 

rule in Albright or Graham, because those cases only involved 

challenges to police conduct based on the lack of probable cause 

and not based on the alleged abridgement of any other specific 

constitutional rights. Claims that police acted without probable 

cause should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, but claims 

that police acted to suppress protected expression or with 

racially discriminatory animus, for example, should be analyzed 

under the equally explicit constitutional guarantees of the First 

Amendment and Equal Protection Clause respectively. 

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qualified immunity defense on a motion for summary judgment. 

First, the defendant "must make a prima facie showing of the 

'objective reasonableness' of the challenged conduct." Bruning v. 

Pixler, 949 F.2d 352, 356-57 (lOth Cir. 1991) (quoting Lewis v. 

City of Ft. Collins, 903 F.2d 752, 755 (lOth Cir. 1990)), cert. 

denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992). If Defendants carry their burden of 

showing objective reasonableness, the burden then shifts to 

Plaintiffs to establish that Defendants acted on the basis of a 

culpable subjective state of mind. Once the defendant has shown 

his or her objective reasonableness, the plaintiff's burden to 

establish subjective motivating animus becomes heightened, 

requiring specific and concrete evidence rather than mere 

speculation. Bruning, 949 F.2d at 357; Pueblo Neighborhood Health 

Ctrs., 847 F.2d at 649.9 

9 Bruning involved a Fourth and Fifth Amendment claim, and no 

such claims are asserted here. Bruning is not cited to suggest 

that a First Amendment vindictive prosecution claim is governed by 

Fourth or Fifth Amendment analysis. Rather, it is cited for its 

discussion of the process to follow in analyzing a defense of 

qualified immunity when the underlying substantive claim is one 

that involves an element of the defendant's subjective intent. As 

Bruning explains, ordinarily an analysis of qualified immunity 

involves only an objective evaluation of the defendant's 

reasonableness. However, when the underlying substantive claim 

involves an element of a defendant's subjective intent, the 

element of motive cannot be wholly disregarded. In such a 

situation, a two-step process is required. The first step is the 

familiar objective one, and the burden falls on the defendant to 

make a prima facie showing of the reasonableness of the challenged 

conduct. If the defendant makes such a showing, then the second 

step incorporates a subjective element and shifts the burden to 

the plaintiff to produce "specific evidence of the defendant's 

culpable state of mind" in order to survive summary judgment. 

Bruning, 949 F.2d at 356-57. The plaintiff's burden in the second 

step of showing impermissible motive is heightened and requires 

specific evidence because the defendant in step one will have 

already established that by objective standards the conduct was 

reasonable. For other Tenth Circuit cases utilizing this two-step 

(continued on next page) 

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Applying that methodology, we conclude that Defendants have 

shown that their actions were objectively reasonable by 

demonstrating that they acted with probable cause. We further 

conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to rebut that showing with 

specific evidence that Defendants acted with the impermissible 

motive of suppressing their protected speech. 

Defendants have shown objective reasonableness by 

demonstrating that a reasonable officer with knowledge of the 

information that they possessed would have believed that there was 

a basis to bring charges against Brady and Gehl. A showing of 

probable cause to issue an arrest warrant clearly establishes 

objective reasonableness. Here, City DefendantslO only issued 

Brady and Gehl a summons and complaint after receiving numerous 

citizen complaints about misrepresentations made by Gehl's 

solicitors and investigating several of those complaints. 

Furthermore, the Boulder Police Department's legal advisor 

approved the charges, and District Attorney Nagel concluded that 

the police had a prosecutable case. None of Nagel's reasons for 

recommending against bringing charges undercut her conclusion that 

(continued from prior page) 

analysis in evaluating qualified immunity claims when the 

underlying claim involves an element of subjective intent, see 

Hicks v. City of Watonga, Okla., 942 F.2d 737, 749 (lOth Cir. 

1991) (First Amendment retaliatory discharge claim); Lewis, 903 

F.2d at 754-60 (employment race discrimination claim); Pueblo 

Neighborhood Health Ctrs., 847 F.2d at 649 (First Amendment and 

race discrimination claims based on impermissibly motivated search 

and seizure) . 

10 Plaintiffs have not produced any evidence that County 

Defendants were involved in the filing of charges against Brady 

and Gehl. As such, the only way that County Defendants 

potentially can be liable is for the statements made by Epp at the 

January 7, 1992 meeting. 

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probable cause existed to prosecute. Similarly, Ross's alleged 

statement that he did not think "this is much of a case" does not 

refute the objective evidence upon which a reasonable officer 

would have believed that Gehl or Brady were violating Colorado 

law.11 Accordingly, we conclude that Defendants have made a prima 

facie showing that the issuance of the summons and complaint was 

objectively reasonable. 

Defendants similarly have established that their threats to 

bring future charges were objectively reasonable. There had been 

a pattern of past conduct that reasonably appeared to have been in 

violation of the law, and there was a substantial basis to doubt 

that Brady or Gehl could adequately control their solicitors in 

the future.12 

11 Plaintiffs argue that even if probable cause existed to 

believe that misrepresentations were made by Gehl solicitors, 

police lacked any reasonable basis to believe that Brady or Gehl 

could be criminally liable for those misrepresentations. The 

summons listed Brady as the named defendant and described the 

offense as Gehl's making of misleading statements. Ultimately, 

the district attorney moved to dismiss the charges in part because 

the summons and complaint were improperly issued to Brady on 

behalf of Gehl. Nevertheless, we agree with the district court 

that the number of complaints received by the Boulder police, and 

the supervisory role of Brady, provided an objective basis to 

bring charges initially against Gehl and Brady. Moreover, the 

mere fact that charges were ultimately dismissed does not 

demonstrate that there was no reasonable basis for bringing the 

charges initially. Cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 57 (1975) 

(noting that "there is no logical inconsistency between a finding 

of probable cause and an acquittal in a criminal proceeding"). 

12 Neither do Defendants' actions following the meeting 

demonstrate that Defendants would prosecute Plaintiffs even if 

they were not breaking the law. As a starting matter, no new 

charges were ever filed. Koby admitted his intent to solicit new 

complaints, but never took any such actions. Furthermore, Hayes' 

acknowledgment that he investigated several additional complaints 

certainly does not demonstrate that Defendants intended to file 

charges without regard to their merit. 

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Thus, Defendants have established that their conduct was 

objectively reasonable, and the burden then shifted to Plaintiffs 

to support their allegation that Defendants singled them out for 

prosecution in retaliation for and to suppress their legal and 

constitutionally protected solicitation efforts. To avoid summary 

judgment, Plaintiffs must establish that "as a practical matter, 

there is a realistic or reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial 

conduct that would not have occurred but for hostility or punitive 

animus towards the defendant because he exercised his specific 

legal right." P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 860 (quoting United States v. 

Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1042 (lOth Cir. 1991)) .13 That is, 

Plaintiffs must produce specific evidence that, notwithstanding 

the existence of probable cause, it is likely that, but for the 

exercise of their constitutional right to solicit in Boulder, 

Defendants would not have brought or threatened to bring charges 

for any illegal misrepresentations for which Plaintiffs were 

alleged to be responsible. 

13 P.H.E. and Raymer involved challenges to prosecutorial 

conduct as part of a defense to a prosecution. However, we view 

those cases as instructive despite the different context of a 

constitutional tort involved in the present action. Moreover, a 

similar burden of proof has been placed on those challenging 

otherwise discretionary government conduct in other contexts. See 

Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287 (providing that plaintiff in 

constitutional tort action had burden of showing that his 

constitutionally protected conduct was a "substantial factor" or 

"motivating factor" in his firing); Phelps v. Hamilton, F.3d 

___ , No. 93-3280, 1995 WL 406636, at *4 (lOth Cir. July 11, 1995) 

(providing that federal plaintiff seeking to enjoin state 

prosecution must show that retaliation for protected conduct was a 

substantial motivating factor). In any event, we do not believe 

that any alteration of Plaintiffs' burden of proof would affect 

the outcome of this case, and,· therefore, do not dwell on the 

issue. 

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Although Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Defendants 

exhibited some hostility toward the FOP, they have not introduced 

evidence that the hostility was rooted in disapproval of the FOP's 

protected activity, as opposed to disapproval of its allegedly 

misleading, potentially illegal, and unprotected solicitations. 

See Phelps v. Hamilton, F.3d , No. 93-3280, 1995 WL 406636, 

at *5 (lOth Cir. July 11, 1995) (noting that "no prosecutor looks 

favorably upon lawbreakers" and that animosity in and of itself 

does not establish retaliatory motive) . Plaintiffs allege that 

Defendants treated other non-police soliciting groups in a 

different manner; however, they have offered no evidence that 

citizens complained about these other groups or that Defendants 

refrained from prosecuting them in the face of evidence that they 

also were violating Colorado's fraud laws. Furthermore, 

Plaintiffs were subject to only a single prosecution -- which we 

have already held was supported by probable cause -- and, 

therefore, cannot identify a pattern of harassment from which we 

might be able to infer Defendants' retaliatory motivations. See 

W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 312-13 

(1967) (contrasting a pattern of prosecutions brought in response 

to the exercise of First Amendment rights with conclusory 

allegations that a threatened prosecution was based upon an 

unconstitutional purpose) . 

Although Plaintiffs point to statements made by Koby and Epp 

regarding their intention to file future charges, those statements 

are ambiguous and easily susceptible to an interpretation that 

Defendants were of the belief that Plaintiffs would engage in 

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further unlawful activity, and that when that occurred, they would 

bring further charges. None of the statements constitute the kind 

of strong evidence of unconstitutional motivation that Plaintiffs 

were obligated to present to avoid summary judgment once 

Defendants came forward with evidence that their conduct was 

objectively reasonable -- and indeed even predicated upon probable 

cause. Cf. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 235 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 

("The heightened pleading standard is a necessary and appropriate 

accommodation between the state of mind component of malice and 

the objective test that prevails in qualified immunity analysis as 

a general matter."). 

Plaintiffs, thus, have failed to carry their heavy burden of 

producing specific evidence that Defendants acted with an 

unconstitutional motive and that it was likely that Plaintiffs 

would not have been prosecuted or threatened but for their 

exercise of their constitutional right to solicit charitable 

contributions in Boulder. Accordingly, we reject Plaintiffs' 

First Amendment claim and affirm the district court's grant of 

summary judgment on that issue for the reasons articulated herein. 

B. Equal Protection 

For substantially the same reasons, we also reject 

Plaintiffs' equal protection claim. Plaintiffs' equal protection 

claim is essentially one for selective prosecution, claiming that 

they were singled out for prosecution because of their exercise of 

a fundamental right.l4 Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants 

14 To make out their claim that they were selectively 

(continued on next page) 

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violated their equal protection rights by treating them 

differently from other solicitation groups in the Boulder area 

because of an animosity toward their constitutionally protected 

solicitation activities. Such differential treatment could 

implicate equal protection concerns, just as it could First 

Amendment concerns. As the Supreme Court explained in Police 

Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, where city officials apply an 

ordinance differentially to similarly situated groups, "the equal 

protection claim [] is closely intertwined with First Amendment 

interests." 408 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1972); see also Wayte v. United 

States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (Although officials enjoy 

particularly broad discretion to decide whether to bring charges 

when probable cause exists to believe that someone has committed a 

crime, "the decision to prosecute may not be deliberately based 

upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other 

arbitrary classification, including the exercise of protected 

statutory and constitutional rights.") (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). However, Plaintiffs have failed to establish 

that Defendants treated them differently than other similarly 

situated solicitation groups, or that Defendants brought the 

prosecutions against them because of their membership in a 

protected class or their exercise of fundamental rights. 

(continued from prior page) 

prosecuted, Plaintiffs must show (1) that they were singled out 

for prosecution while other similarly situated groups were not for 

equivalent conduct; and (2) that the discriminatory selection was 

invidious and based on the exercise of their First Amendment 

rights. See United States v. Amon, 669 F.2d 1351, 1356 & n.6 

(lOth Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). 

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Plaintiffs state that "[t]here is no evidence that other nonpolice soliciting groups were run out of town .... " Appellant 

Br. at 26. However, it remains Plaintiffs' burden to establish 

that they were treated discriminatorily. Defendants had probable 

cause to bring charges against Brady and/or Gehl. In contrast, 

Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that Defendants did not bring 

charges against other groups who were breaking the law, or who 

police had probable cause to believe were breaking the law. 

Plaintiffs' assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, Koby's 

statement at the January 7 meeting that he did not care about 

other solicitors but was concerned about the FOP does not 

constitute an admission that he was, in fact, treating other 

similarly situated groups differently. Plaintiffs' equal 

protection claim must fail because they have not made even the 

threshold showing that they were treated differently than other 

similarly situated solicitation groups. 

C. Procedural Due Process 

Plaintiffs next argue that Defendants deprived them of their 

liberty right to conduct a lawful trade or occupation without due 

process of law. Plaintiffs base this procedural due process claim 

on the filing of charges against them, the threat to bring future 

charges, and Koby's allegedly defamatory labelling of the FOP as 

the "prostitutes of the law enforcement profession." Plaintiffs 

maintain these actions, together, damaged their reputation and 

prevented them from pursuing their lawful business of soliciting 

contributions. For the reasons outlined below, we hold that 

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Plaintiffs have not established that Defendants unconstitutionally 

deprived them of any protected liberty interest. 

Assuming Plaintiffs possess a protected liberty interest in 

pursuing their chosen trade or occupation, see, e.g., Wroblewski 

v. City of Washburn, 965 F. 2d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The 

concept of liberty protected by the due process clause has long 

included occupational liberty -- the liberty to follow a trade, 

profession, or other calling.") (internal quotation omitted), 

Defendants have not deprived them of that interest without due 

process of law. First, as to Koby's prostitute remark, Plaintiffs 

have not shown that the comment -- even if defamatory -- caused 

them any adverse impact beyond their private meeting with 

Defendants, or compromised their ability to solicit contributions. 

Moreover, even if Koby damaged the FOP's reputation, "the interest 

in reputation . is neither 'liberty' nor 'property' guaranteed 

against state deprivation without due process of law." Paul v. 

Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) .15 

Plaintiffs contend that the harm they suffered from Koby's 

statements rose beyond the mere stigma held not actionable in Paul 

v. Davis, because it was coupled with Defendants' literal 

exclusion of Plaintiffs from the Boulder market. Yet Plaintiffs 

were not prevented from operating in Boulder, and the record 

suggests Plaintiffs continued to operate in Boulder after the 

15 The district court also found that Koby's statements were not 

defamatory, and, therefore, could not form the basis of a 

procedural due process claim. Gehl Group, 838 F. Supp. at 1417. 

Given our holding that Plaintiffs have not shown that they were 

deprived of a protected liberty interest even if the statement was 

defamatory, we do not review this aspect of the district court's 

opinion. 

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remarks in question. Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiffs 

suffered some curtailment of their activities, it was the result 

of proper and objectively reasonable law enforcement actions. As 

we explained above, Defendants had probable cause both to file 

actual charges -- even though those charges were later dismissed 

-- and to threaten to bring future charges should Plaintiffs break 

the law. Thus, Defendants accorded Plaintiffs due process before 

interfering with their ability to solicit contributions. As the 

Supreme Court explained in Gerstein v. Pugh, 11 [t]he Fourth 

Amendment [probable cause requirement] was tailored explicitly for 

the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual 

and public interests always has been thought to define the 

'process that is due' for seizures of person or property in 

criminal cases . II 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975). 

Therefore, to the extent Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of any 

protected liberty interest, they accorded Plaintiffs all of the 

process that they were due. 

D. Substantive Due Process 

Plaintiffs claim finally that Defendants' actions were so 

arbitrary that they 11 shock the conscience 11 in contravention of 

substantive due process norms. We disagree. First, Defendants' 

actions were objectively reasonable and do not nearly approach the 

arbitrariness required to shock the conscience. Second, we must 

guard against imprudently expanding the concept of substantive due 

process. Albright, 114 s. Ct. at 812 (quoting Collins v. Harker 

Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). Plaintiffs' substantive due 

process claim is based on their charge that Defendants' actions 

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were not justified by law enforcement concerns but were instead 

motivated by a desire to prevent Plaintiffs from exercising their 

constitutional rights. Just as in Albright where the Supreme 

Court explained that a challenge to a prosecution as being without 

probable cause should be brought under the specific guarantees of 

the Fourth Amendment rather than the generalized protections of 

substantive due process, Plaintiffs' claims are properly analyzed 

under the more specific guarantees of the First Amendment, Equal 

Protection Clause, and procedural component of the Due Process 

Clause. Having already addressed those claims, we conclude that 

Plaintiffs have not established that Defendants violated their 

constitutional rights, and do not reach the issue of whether the 

law upon which Plaintiffs rely was clearly established.16 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Defendants were 

entitled to summary judgment and AFFIRM the decision of the 

district court. 

16 We also conclude that Plaintiffs have not established a claim 

under 42 u.s.c. § 1985. Plaintiffs have not raised any separate 

arguments as to § 1985; therefore, given our rulings under § 1983, 

we need not address any further issues as to § 1985. In any 

event, § 1985(3) requires a plaintiff to show a defendant's 

"racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously 

discriminatory animus," Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 

(1971), which Plaintiffs here have failed to do. 

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