Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01354/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01354-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOU SENG SEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

RIVAS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-01354-NODJ-BAM (PC)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DENY 

SCREENING REQUIREMENTS AND 

STANDARDS BY U.S. MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE AS MOOT

(ECF No. 19)

ORDER VACATING DECEMBER 22, 2023 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(ECF No. 18)

AMENDED FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING 

DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN CLAIMS

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Mou Seng See (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On December 22, 2023, the undersigned screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and 

issued findings and recommendations that this action proceed against Defendants R. Rivera and 

M. Dorado for deliberate indifference to the need for medical care in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. (ECF No. 18.) The undersigned further recommended that all other claims and 

defendants be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state claims upon which relief may be 

granted. (Id.) The findings and recommendations were served on Plaintiff and contained notice 

that any objections were to be filed within fourteen days after service. (Id. at 10–11.) On January 

2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to deny screening requirements and standards by U.S. Magistrate 

Judge, (ECF No. 19), and on January 4, 2024, filed objections to the findings and 

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recommendations, (ECF No. 20).

II. Plaintiff’s Motion Regarding Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction

In his motion, Plaintiff states that he did not consent to allow a Magistrate Judge to 

preside over his case, and therefore the undersigned does not have jurisdiction to screen this 

action. (ECF No. 19.)

Plaintiff’s motion is denied as moot. Plaintiff is correct that a Magistrate Judge does not

have jurisdiction to make dispositive rulings without all parties’ written consent. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c). However, even if a party declines to consent, a Magistrate Judge shall continue to 

perform all duties as required by Local Rule 302. This includes the screening of complaints. 

Plaintiff is informed that any potentially dispositive rulings, such as the dismissal of claims or 

defendants, are referred to the District Judge for review by the issuance of findings and 

recommendations. Unless all parties provide written consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction, the 

undersigned will continue to issue findings and recommendations for any potentially dispositive 

rulings, and those findings and recommendations will be reviewed by a District Judge. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is denied as moot.

III. Plaintiff’s Objections

In his objections, Plaintiff argues that his third and fourth claims, which were included on 

additional pages attached to the form complaint, were omitted from the screening order. (ECF 

No. 20.) Plaintiff does not raise any other objections to the findings and recommendations. Upon 

review of Plaintiff’s objections and the first amended complaint, the Court finds that the third and 

fourth claims were inadvertently omitted from the Court’s screening. Accordingly, the Court 

finds it appropriate to vacate the findings and recommendations issued on December 22, 2023 and 

to issue the following amended findings and recommendations.

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed November 22, 2023, is therefore currently before 

the Court for screening. (ECF No. 11.)

IV. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 

or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 

true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 

is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

V. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility 

(“SATF”) in Corcoran, California, where the events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. 

Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Sgt. A. Rivas, E-yard; (2) RN P. Roman, E-yard; (3) 2nd Watch 

E-Kitchen Supervisor R. Rivera; and (4) M. Dorado, E-yard Officer 2.

In claim 1, Plaintiff alleges Eighth Amendment violations for “medical care, failure to 

protect, condition of confinement (slippery floor),” Fourteenth Amendment violations of equal 

protection and deliberate indifference,1and for state law negligence.

///

1 Plaintiff’s claims will be screened under the Eighth Amendment. “Inmates who sue prison 

officials for injuries suffered while in custody may do so under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel 

and Unusual Punishment Clause or, if not yet convicted, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause.” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016).

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On 7/24/23, Plaintiff was found by Officer R. Rivera. Defendant Rivera found Plaintiff 

unconscious, unresponsive, with bruising, swelling on Plaintiff’s face and unable to walk on 

Plaintiff’s own. Plaintiff was seriously injured and in need of immediate medical aid. Officer 

Rivera failed to initiate his alarm for assistance and “medical personal officer knew that he should 

of waited for medical personal because if he moves me not knowing it will do further damage 

then the injuries I have already suffered.” (ECF No. 1, p. 5 (unedited text).) He did not care for 

Plaintiff’s well-being. Health officer woke Plaintiff up and picked Plaintiff up and escorted 

Plaintiff to another officer for assistance. Officer R. Rivera knows his actions can result in 

Plaintiff sustaining more injuries but he didn’t care. Plaintiff believes the officer made this 

decision because he knew that Plaintiff filed several lawsuits against the department. He knew 

the decision that he made can result in Plaintiff losing Plaintiff’s memories or life, which will 

result in Plaintiff’s lawsuits being dismissed or Plaintiff being physically unable to file further 

lawsuits or complaints.

Officer Rivera knows that every day after workers are done feeding the inmate population, 

they clean their work stations. Officers are aware that inmates have slipped in the past due to wet 

floors. Officer Rivera never took the time to address the situation and to use wet floor signs. 

Someone could be assaulted because of slipping on wet floor “like in my case.”

In claim 2, Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment violation for medical care and failure to 

protect, a First Amendment violation for retaliation, and a Fourteenth Amendment violation for 

violation of equal protection. 

On 7/24/23, Officer R. Rivera escorted Plaintiff to the front of E-dining and passed 

Plaintiff off to Officer M. Dorado. The officer saw that Plaintiff was unable to walk on his own 

and had bruising around one of Plaintiff’s eyes and cuts. The visual signs indicated that Plaintiff 

was injured, but Plaintiff does not remember the events as he was unconscious. Instead of calling 

for immediate assistance, Officer M. Dorado handcuffed Plaintiff, searched Plaintiff, and took

Plaintiff to the E-yard gym. Officer Dorado put Plaintiff in a holding cage and left Plaintiff there 

to suffer and die. The officer knew that Plaintiff was injured and if he moved Plaintiff again, it 

could further injuries. He did not care about Plaintiff’s life or injuries. Plaintiff believes Officer 

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Dorado made the decision because he knew that Plaintiff had multiple lawsuits against the 

department and knew his action would result in further injuries and damages to Plaintiff.

In claim 3, Plaintiff alleges Eighth Amendment violations for medical care and failure to 

protect, a First Amendment violation for retaliation, and a Fourteenth Amendment violation of 

equal protection.

On 7/24/23, Plaintiff was in the E-yard gym. He only knows how he got there by officer 

reports. Plaintiff was unconscious and does not remember RN P. Roman ever conducting a 

medical evaluation. Defendant Roman says that Plaintiff was in the holding cage, claims that 

Plaintiff refused medical care, and said that if Plaintiff wanted medical care he needed to put in a 

7362 Request to be seen. Plaintiff believes RN Roman is lying because he does not remember 

Roman ever asking him any questions and he does not remember even seeing her in the gym. 

RN Roman knew Plaintiff was injured because in her report she states “Abrasian, 

Scratches, Bruises, Discolored area Swollen area and Redness area Front right and left face and 

neck area.” (ECF No. 1, p. 8.) She also stated at the chapel that she saw the video of what had 

happened to Plaintiff, proving that Plaintiff was in need of medical aid the whole time. Roman 

left Plaintiff in the E-gym holding cage to suffer and die. She saw Plaintiff’s back head hitting 

the wall, Plaintiff getting kicked in the head with a boot, and Plaintiff unconscious for who knows 

how long. Roman knew the longer she waited to provide medical attention can and will result in 

further damage, injuries, even death, but she chose to ignore her training.

Plaintiff believes Roman knew that he filed several lawsuits against the department and 

knew that her decision could result in Plaintiff not being able to file future complaints and his 

cases being dismissed if she decided to not provide medical aid.

In claim 4, Plaintiff alleges Eighth Amendment violations for medical care and failure to 

protect, a First Amendment violation for retaliation, and a Fourteenth Amendment violation of 

equal protection.

On 7/24/23, Sgt. A. Rivas was informed by Officer Rivera that Plaintiff was involved in 

an altercation and was discovered as having injuries. Sgt. Rivas stated he reviewed the video 

footage of the altercation, proving that Sgt. Rivas was aware that the back of Plaintiff’s head hit 

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the wall, he was knocked out, was on the floor, and was kicked in the head with a boot. Sgt. 

Rivas failed to notify medical personnel, and failed to call in that he saw the video and that 

Plaintiff needed immediate medical attention because Plaintiff was seriously injured.

Sgt. Rivas came to the E-gym, and at that time could have told the nurses that he saw the 

video and that Plaintiff needed to be treated immediately, but he did nothing. Instead, Sgt. Rivas 

came to mock Plaintiff, saying Plaintiff was fighting. Sgt. Rivas made a hand gesture that can 

only be seen by watching the video footage. Sgt. Rivas’s actions prove that he did not care for 

Plaintiff’s life, wellbeing, or health. Sgt. Rivas’s failure to notify medical personnel resulted in 

Plaintiff having complications. Sgt. Rivas knew his inaction could result in further injuries, even 

death, but chose to do nothing because Plaintiff filed a complaint on him for lying on a legal 

document, and because Plaintiff is filing several lawsuits against the department. Sgt. Rivas 

knew that Plaintiff’s injuries could result in Plaintiff not being able to continue with his lawsuit if 

he died from his injuries, which would benefit Sgt. Rivas and the department.

As remedies, Plaintiff seeks damages. 

VI. Discussion

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Pursuant to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must 

set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations 

are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969.

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is short, but is not a clear statement. As to most of Plaintiff’s 

factual allegations, they are conclusory as to how each defendant knew Plaintiff had a serious 

medical need but were deliberately indifferent, as explained below, and fails to identify how each

defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are not 

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sufficient. Plaintiff has been unable to cure this deficiency.

B. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2006). The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) 

(citations omitted). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must 

provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994) (quotations omitted).

1. Medical Care

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment where the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate 

indifference requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that failure 

to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

A defendant does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the defendant “knows 

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994). “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard,” Simmons v. Navajo Cty. Ariz., 609 

F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004), and is 

shown where there was “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible 

medical need” and the indifference caused harm. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. In applying this 

standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have 

been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’

‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter 

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06). Even gross 

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negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood 

v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).

Further, a “difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner—or between 

medical professionals—concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to 

deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. 

Vild, 891 F.2d at 242, overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 

1082–83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2012)) (citing 

Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, Plaintiff “must show that the 

course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and 

that the defendants chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.”

Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation marks omitted).

At the pleading stage, and liberally construing the allegations, Plaintiff has alleged facts 

that he was in serious medical need. He was unconscious or unable to walk and visibly injured. 

Liberally construing the allegations in the first amended complaint, Plaintiff states a claim 

against Defendants Rivera, Dorado, Rivas, and Roman for deliberate indifference to medical care.

2. Failure to Protect

It is unclear if Plaintiff is attempting to allege a claim for failure to protect. Prison 

officials “are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the 

inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). A prisoner may state a Section 1983 

claim under the Eighth Amendment against prison officials where the officials acted with 

deliberate indifference to the threat of serious harm or injury to him. Labatad v. Corrs. Corp. of 

Amer., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013). Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth 

Amendment to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners or others because 

being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for 

their offenses against society. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 

(9th Cir.2009); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). However, prison 

officials are liable under the Eighth Amendment only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference 

to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate; and it is well settled that 

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deliberate indifference occurs when an official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a 

substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 841; Clem, 566 F.3d at 1181; Hearns, 

413 F.3d at 1040. The official is not liable under the Eighth Amendment unless he “knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts 

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 

must also draw the inference.” Farmer, at 837.

Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against any Defendant because Plaintiff fails to 

allege any factual support that any defendant was aware that Plaintiff was at risk of serious harm 

at the hands of another inmate and failed to take reasonable action. Plaintiff’s conclusory 

allegation that he was assaulted is insufficient. Plaintiff does not allege factual support that any 

Defendants “knew” Plaintiff was at risk but failed to take reasonable action.

3. Conditions of Confinement – Slippery Floor

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane conditions of confinement, 

including in work programs. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344–37 (1981). Thus,

[i]n the working conditions context, the Eighth Amendment is implicated only 

when a prison employee alleges that a prison official compelled him to “perform 

physical labor which [was] beyond [his] strength, endanger[ed] his life] or health, 

or cause[d] undue pain.” Morgan [v. Morgensen], 465 F.3d [1041] at 1045 [(9th 

Cir. 2006)], quoting Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 1994). Resolution of 

an Eighth Amendment claim entails inquiry into the official’s state of mind. 

Prison officials are liable only if they were deliberately indifferent to a substantial 

risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Howard v. Hedgpeth, Civil No. 08cv00859–RTB (PCL), 2011 WL 386980, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 

3, 2011). “Not every injury that a prisoner sustains while in prison represents a constitutional 

violation.” Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Negligently ignoring a 

safety hazard falls short of the “deliberate indifference” required to establish a constitutional 

violation, unless the defendant’s conduct exacerbated an existing danger in some manner. See, 

e.g., Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9th Cir. 1985); Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934 

(9th Cir. 1996) (defendants entitled to qualified immunity against prisoner’s Eighth Amendment

claim stemming from second degree burns suffered when oven door fell off its hinges and burned 

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his arms); Jackson v. State of Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) (slippery floors, by 

themselves, do not amount to cruel and unusual punishment).

Plaintiff alleges only a negligence claim for the slippery floor. Further, the Constitution 

does not mandate any specific training by supervisors for prison work assignments (unless 

deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm), and specifically here, where a 

potential injury from a slippery wet floor is obvious. Plaintiff has been unable to cure this 

deficiency.

C. First Amendment – Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to 

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. 

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First 

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some 

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that 

such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did 

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567−68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva, 

658 at 1104; Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

Adverse action taken against a prisoner “need not be an independent constitutional 

violation. The mere threat of harm can be an adverse action.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114 

(internal citations omitted). A causal connection between the adverse action and the protected 

conduct can be alleged by an allegation of a chronology of events from which retaliation can be 

inferred. Id. The filing of grievances and the pursuit of civil rights litigation against prison 

officials are both protected activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567–68. The plaintiff must allege 

either a chilling effect on future First Amendment activities, or that he suffered some other harm 

that is “more than minimal.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. A plaintiff successfully pleads that the 

action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal by alleging, in addition to a 

retaliatory motive, that the defendant’s actions were “arbitrary and capricious” or that they were 

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“unnecessary to the maintenance of order in the institution.” Id.

Plaintiff fails to allege facts for each of the elements of a claim for retaliation against any 

defendant. Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory as to any protected conduct he in engaged in, 

and fails to allege facts that each defendant knew of Plaintiff’s lawsuits, i.e., the causal 

connection. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation of his “belief” that defendants knew of his lawsuits 

is insufficient. Plaintiff also fails to allege that any conduct chilled Plaintiff’s First Amendment 

rights or that it did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Plaintiff has been 

unable to cure this deficiency.

D. Fourteenth Amendment – Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all similarly situated people 

equally. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). This does not 

mean, however, that all prisoners must receive identical treatment and resources. See Cruz v. 

Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972); Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 1993); Allen v. 

Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 568–69 (9th Cir. 1987).

“To prevail on an Equal Protection claim brought under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts 

plausibly showing that ‘ “the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against 

[them] based upon membership in a protected class,’ “ (citing Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 

F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005)) (quoting Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001)), 

or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational 

relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601–02 

(2008); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 

546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th 

Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable equal protection claim. Plaintiff does not allege that 

he was discriminated against because of his membership in any protected class. He also does not 

allege factual support that he was intentionally treated differently than other similarly situated 

inmates without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Plaintiff has not provided 

any factual support for this claim. Fletcher v. Clendenin, No. 1:22-CV-00249 AWI BAM, 2022 

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WL 2791480, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 15, 2022) (Equal Protection claim dismissed for failure to 

allege factual support for denial of treatment based on membership in a protected class). Plaintiff 

has been unable to cure this deficiency.

E. State Law Claim – Negligence 

Plaintiff alleges a negligence claim. To the extent Plaintiff also alleges violations of 

California law, Plaintiff is informed that the California Government Claims Act requires that a 

tort claim against a public entity or its employees be presented to the California Victim 

Compensation and Government Claims Board no more than six months after the cause of action 

accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950–950.2. Presentation of a written 

claim, and action on or rejection of the claim are conditions precedent to suit. State v. Super. Ct.

of Kings Cty. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1239 (Cal. 2004); Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 

Cal. 4th 201, 209 (2007). To state a tort claim against a public employee, a plaintiff must allege 

compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.6; Bodde, 32 Cal. 4th at 

1244. “[F]ailure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement 

subjects a compliant to general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.” Bodde, 32 Cal.4th 

at 1239.

As Plaintiff has not alleged compliance with the Government Claims Act, he has failed to 

state a claim under California law. 

VII. Conclusion and Order

Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint states a 

cognizable claim against Defendants A. Rivas, P. Roman, R. Rivera, and M. Dorado for 

deliberate indifference to the need for medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

However, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state any other cognizable claims for relief. 

Despite being provided with the relevant pleading and legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable 

to cure the identified deficiencies and further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to deny screening requirements and standards by U.S. Magistrate Judge, 

(ECF No. 19), is DENIED as moot; and

2. The December 22, 2023 findings and recommendations regarding dismissal of certain 

claims and defendants, (ECF No. 18), are VACATED.

* * *

Furthermore, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed November 22, 2023, 

(ECF No. 11), against Defendants A. Rivas, P. Roman, R. Rivera, and M. Dorado for 

deliberate indifference to the need for medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment; 

and

2. All other claims be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state claims upon which relief 

may be granted.

* * *

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that the failure to file objections within the specified 

time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 

appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 9, 2024 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:23-cv-01354-KES-BAM Document 22 Filed 01/10/24 Page 13 of 13