Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00852/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00852-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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All documents filed in CV-11-0852 will be designated as “CVDoc” and all

documents filed in the related criminal action, CR-05-355, will be designated as “CRDoc.”

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles Edward Vaughn, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dennis R. Smith, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV-11-0852-PHX-JAT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter comes before this Court upon consideration of an Amended Petition for

Habeas Corpus Relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 (hereinafter “habeas petition”), filed on

August 2, 2011, by Petitioner Charles Edward Vaughn, acting pro se. (CVDoc. 15.)1

Respondent, Dennis R. Smith, filed a Response and Motion to Dismiss on August 22, 2011

(CVDocs. 17, 18), and on September 6, 2011, Petitioner filed a Traverse and Objection to

Respondent Response and Motion to Dismiss (CVDoc. 25). 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is an inmate currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional InstitutePhoenix. (CVDoc. 15, at 4.) On March 20, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to 130 months’

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Sealed Exhibits to Respondent’s Response and Motion to Dismiss. 

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incarceration for Possession with Intent to Distribute 5 Kilograms or more of Cocaine and

5 grams or more of Cocaine Base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§841(b)(1)(A), 841 (b)(1)(B),

and 846, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. (CRDoc.

11.) The sentence was ordered to run concurrent to the sentence imposed by the Superior

Court of Contra Costa County (Case No. 05-032100-0), and the Court recommended

“placement of defendant in federal facility for remainder of [his] sentence, with date of

12/17/02 to sentence calculation.” (Id.)

Petitioner had been transferred into federal custody from California State custody on

a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to face this charge on November 7, 2005.

(CVDoc2

. 24, at 63, ¶7.) Petitioner had been in continuous state custody since August 4,

1999, when he was arrested on Possession/Purchase for Sale of Cocaine Base charge out of

Solano County, California. (Id., at 62, ¶2.) On March 15, 2001, he was sentenced in that

matter to a term of seven years. (Id., at 63, ¶3.) On October 4, 2004, Petitioner was paroled

from this sentence, but remained in state custody on a charge of Voluntary Manslaughter,

Case No. 05-032100-0 (the case Petitioner’s federal sentence was ordered to run concurrent

to). (Id., at ¶4.) On January 25, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced in that matter to six years

in prison. (Id., at ¶5.)

After Petitioner’s federal sentence was imposed, on April 6, 2006, he was returned to

the California Department of Corrections in satisfaction of the writ. (CVDoc. 24, at 64, ¶9.)

The Bureau of Prisons (hereinafter, “BOP”) designated the California Department of

Corrections for service of Petitioner’s federal sentence in order to “make . . . possible” the

District Court’s recommendation that Petitioner’s federal sentence run concurrently with his

state sentence. (Id., at ¶10.) On August 30, 2007, Petitioner was paroled from the California

Department of Corrections and was released to federal custody for continued service of his

federal sentence. (Id., at ¶11.) Petitioner claims that on March 20, 2006, the BOP had

originally credited Petitioner with a sentence start date of March 15, 2001. (CVDoc. 15, at

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8.) He does not provide support for this claim, but a sentence monitoring computation form

dated June 8, 2010, indicates that prior credit had been removed, as having been improperly

credited. (CVDoc.24, at 47.) A later computation form, dated July 20, 2011, confirms that

1831 days of credit was removed on June 18, 2010, and that this removal had been affirmed

by court order on September 29, 2010. (Id., at 10.) 

On June 22, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for Clarification of Record in federal

court asking the sentencing court to amend its judgment to “include a recommendation that

[Petitioner] receive credit for time served from 12/7/2002 thru 3/19/2006 as credit towards

his federal sentence.” (CRDoc. 14, at 2.) In his motion, Petitioner notes that BOP originally

had applied the requested credit to his sentence, but that on March 29, 2010, BOP removed

the credit and recalculated his sentence start date from the date of his sentence. (Id.) On

August 12, 2010, the Court denied the requested relief indicating that there was “no need for

the court to modify or clarify the Judgment,” because the Court did recommend the credit,

and that recommendation was part of the record received by the BOP. (CRDoc. 15.)

Furthermore, the Court noted that it is the BOP that calculates the time served and determines

the credit toward that time, and that the Court “only makes a recommendation.” (Id.)

On October 29, 2010, Petitioner filed another request for resentencing, asking for the

same credit. (CRDoc. 16.) On the same date, the Court denied his request, noting that, “as

[Petitioner] was told at the time of sentencing and repeatedly since then, the Bureau of

Prisons calculates the time to be credited to sentences, not the court.” (CRDoc. 19.) In its

Order, the Court also directed Petitioner to cease filing any further documents that attempt

to revisit the issue, and indicated that it would issue “no further orders” relating to the issue.

(Id.) Petitioner filed another Motion to Correct Sentence on February 11, 2011, pointing out

to the Court that the sentencing transcript reflected that the Court ordered his sentence to

begin on 12/17/2002, in contrast to the minutes of the sentencing, which indicated that the

Court had recommended as such. (CRDoc. 20.) The BOP had denied credit, according to

Petitioner, because of the Court’s use of the word “recommend” and not “order.” (Id.) The

docket does not reflect a ruling by the Court on this motion.

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Petitioner argues that the BOP arbitrarily and capriciously rescinded jail time credit

that it had previously granted to him, and requests that this Court grant him 39 months of

back time, to December 17, 2002, the starting date recommended by the federal sentencing

judge. (CVDoc. 15.) 

LAW

Petitioner’s sentence calculation was prepared pursuant to BOP Program Statement

5880.28, Sentence Computation Manual and 18 U.S.C. §3585(a). (CVDoc. 24, at 64, ¶12.)

 The BOP calculated Petitioner’s sentence to begin on March 20, 2006, the date of his federal

sentencing, and calculated 87 days of credit for the time between when he was paroled from

his first seven-year state sentence until the date of his sentencing in his second state case, the

Voluntary Manslaughter case. His projected federal sentence completion date is June 2,

2015, via good conduct time release. (Doc. 24, at 4-5, ¶3.) His full term sentence expiration

date is October 24, 2016. (Id.) Upon learning of this sentencing calculation, Petitioner

exhausted his administrative remedies at the Institutional, Regional, and Central Office

Levels, before filing his habeas petition. (Id., at 5, ¶4.)

As the District Judge in the Northern District of California correctly noted, the BOP

is responsible for computing the sentences of federal offenders. See 18 U.S.C. §3585(a);

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). The BOP has the responsibility of

administering the sentences of federal prisoners, and for computing a federal prisoner’s

sentence. 18 U.S.C. §3585(b); Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334-35; Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d

476, 478-81 (3rd Cir. 1990). The BOP has interpreted 18 U.S.C. §3585(a) to mean that the

earliest date a federal sentence can commence is the date of imposition of the sentence.

(CVDoc. 24, at 64, ¶12.) Consistent with this interpretation, the Ninth Circuit has recently

held that 18 U.S.C. §3585(a) means that “a federal sentence cannot commence until a

prisoner is sentenced in federal district court.” Schleining v. Thomas, 642 F.3d 1242, 1244

(9th Cir. 2011). In Schleining, the Ninth Circuit adopted other Circuits’ interpretation of the

meaning of §3585(a): 

that a federal sentence cannot begin before the defendant has been sentenced

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in federal court. A federal sentence can not be “backdated” to begin before a

defendant has been sentenced in federal court. See United States v. Gonzalez, 192 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a district court cannot

“backdate” a federal sentence to the beginning of a state prison term on related

state charges); United States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 841 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[A]

federal sentence cannot commence prior to the date it is pronounced, even if

made concurrent with a sentence already being served.”).

Id., at 1244 (emphasis in original). See also, United States v. Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 99

(2nd Cir. 1998) (court’s backdating of sentence “foreclosed” by 18 U.S.C. §3585(a); court

exceeded authority as a matter of law).

The calculation of a term of imprisonment may include credit for prior custody served

prior to the date sentence commences that is “the result of any other charge for which the

defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was

imposed . . . that has not been credited against another sentence.” 18 U.S.C. §3585(b). In

enacting this statute, “Congress made clear that a defendant could not receive a double credit

for his detention time.” Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337; see also Boniface v. Carlson, 856 F.2d

1434, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988).

During Petitioner’s sentencing hearing, his counsel asked the Court to give Petitioner

credit for time served since December 17, 2002, the date of his federal indictment. (CRDoc.

13, at 10-11.) The Court inquired as to whether Petitioner’s case had anything to do with the

other matter (the Voluntary Manslaughter case, for which he was detained during the ensuing

time period), and Petitioner’s counsel conceded that it did not, and that the federal and state

cases were unrelated. (Id., at 11.) The Probation Officer indicated that Petitioner’s guideline

calculation was 210 to 262 months. (Id., at 14.) The Court imposed a sentence of 130

months to run concurrently with the Voluntary Manslaughter case. (Id., at 15.) After some

discussion regarding the correct case number, the following statement is attributed to

Petitioner’s counsel: “[s]entence to run concurrent with that and to commence to run with

respect to this offense on December 17, 2002.” (Id., at 16.) Petitioner and Respondent

believe that the statement should have been attributed to the Court. (CVDoc.18, at 4, n.1.)

If Respondent and Petitioner are correct, there is a conflict between the Court’s oral

pronouncement, and the sentencing minutes which reflect that the Court only recommend

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U.S.S.G. §5G1.3(b) does not apply, as Petitioner’s state conviction was not the basis

for an increase in his offense level under Chapter Two or Chapter Three. (CVDoc. 24, at 74-

75, ¶¶28-38).

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that Petitioner’s sentence begin on December 17, 2002. 

Petitioner does not contest the fact that he was in state custody the entire time between

his indictment and the time he was writted into federal custody, or that he received credit

toward his state sentences for all of that time, with the exception of 87 days, which the BOP

ultimately credited toward Petitioner’s federal sentence. Although Petitioner argues that he

did not receive the concurrent sentence that he bargained for in his plea agreement (CVDoc.

24, at 15, ¶9), he conflates the notion of concurrent sentence with presentence credit, or the

“backdating” of a sentence. His federal sentence did run concurrently with his state sentence.

Once his federal sentence was imposed, his time continued to run after he was writted back

into state custody to continue serving his sentence in the Voluntary Manslaughter case.

Those two sentences ran concurrently by definition. The crux of Petitioner’s complaint is

the failure of BOP to give him credit for the time he spent in state custody after he was

indicted, and before he was writted into federal custody.

Because the time Petitioner would like credited to his federal sentence was time that

was already credited toward his state sentences, he is not entitled to that credit. As is made

clear above, the Court had no authority to order such a credit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3585.

Petitioner also argues that the District Court had the power to exercise its discretion, pursuant

to U.S.S.G. §5G1.3(c)3

, which provides:

(c) (Policy Statement) In any other case involving an undischarged term

of imprisonment, the sentence for the instant offense may be imposed to run

concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undischarged

term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant

offense.

The Application Note to this Policy Statement provides, however, that this subsection

does not authorize an adjustment of sentence, but may, “in an extraordinary case involving

an undischarged term of imprisonment under subsection ©,” provide the basis for a

downward departure. U.S.S.G. §3G1.3, Applications Note 3(E). See, United States v.

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The references to what was previously “told” and “explained” to Petitioner do not

appear anywhere in the record.

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Destio, 153, Fed.Appx. 888, *5, n.6 (3d Cir. 2005) (policy statements and commentary are

binding on the federal courts, and 3(E) clearly states such a credit is properly deemed a

downward departure); United States v. Brown, 417 Fed.Appx. 488, *3 (6th Cir. 2011);

United States v. Simmons, 450 F.Supp.2d 574, 580 (E.D.Pa., 2006) (“[T]his Court has found

no authority for the proposition that, under §5G1.3©, a statutory minimum federal sentence

can be imposed to run concurrently with an unrelated state sentence, dating back to the

inception of the state sentence.”). 

The District Court did not indicate any intention to authorize a downward departure

during Petitioner’s sentencing hearing. The Court sentenced Petitioner to 80 months less

than the minimum advisory guideline sentence, and ran his federal sentence concurrently to

an unrelated state sentence. While the sentencing transcript is ambiguous as to whether the

Court ordered Petitioner’s sentence backdated to 2002, the Court subsequently made clear

its intentions. When the Court denied Petitioner’s second request for re-sentencing, the

Court emphasized the benefit Petitioner had already received:

Furthermore, as [Petitioner] was told at the time of sentencing and repeatedly

since then, the Bureau of Prisons calculates the time to be credited to

sentences, not the court. As explained in the court’s last order[4] defendant

received substantial consideration in the plea agreement that set the period for

his incarceration. He is not entitled to anything more than was bargained for.

(CVDoc. 24, at 58.)

Petitioner correctly notes that if there is a conflict between the sentence orally

imposed (if the statement is correctly attributed to the Judge) and the written judgment, the

oral pronouncement controls. U.S. v. Aguirre, 214 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2000); United

States v. Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1974) (in the case of an

“unambiguous oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment and commitment,”

the oral pronouncement must control). In the instant case, arguably the sentencing transcript

is ambiguous, and the comments made in context seem out of sequence and unclear.

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Petitioner’s sentencing guideline calculation was 210-260 months. (Doc. 24, at 83, ¶86).

The probation officer did not identify any factors that would warrant a downward departure,

and, while recognizing that Petitioner’s counsel had requested that his sentence begin in

2002, the probation officer did not recommend it. (Id., at 86, ¶100, 89-90.) The Court

likewise did not identify any basis for downward departure, other than that the stipulation in

the plea agreement that Petitioner receive a sentence of 130 months.

Notwithstanding, even if the statement is attributed to the Court, there was no legal

basis for the BOP to award the credit, or “backdate” Petitioner’s sentence. In limited

circumstances, when a record is “ambiguous as to whether a district court has allowed a

mistake of law to affect its sentencing decision [here, if the District Court had intended to

adjust the number of months imposed as a sentence further downward to account for

Petitioner’s state time],” a remand may be appropriate to allow the court to reconsider its

decision. United States v. Montez-Gaviria, 163 F.3d 697, 703 (2d Cir. 1998). Any claim of

mistake in sentencing, however, must be brought first before the sentencing court, and then

on appeal of that decision, and in limited circumstances by way of a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255. The BOP did not abuse its discretion in

removing the credit.

Subsequent to the completion of briefing in this matter, on December 30, 2011,

Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56©,

seeking summary judgment on the same claims presented by his habeas petition. (CVDoc.

28.) This Court will recommend denial of that motion as mooted by the denial of Petitioner’s

habeas petition.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (CVDoc. 15)be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (CVDoc. 28) be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

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Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 12th day of January, 2012.

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