Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02086/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02086-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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SC

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cornelius James Caldwell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Sun City Endoscopy, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 08-2086-PHX-DGC (MHB)

ORDER 

Plaintiff Cornelius James Caldwell, who is confined in the California State PrisonSolano, in Vacaville, California, filed a pro se Complaint. (Doc.# 1.) The Court dismissed

Count III for failure to state a claim and ordered Plaintiff to show cause why his remaining

claims and this action should not be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc.#

10.) Plaintiff has filed a response in which he attempts to show cause why his remaining

claims should not be dismissed as time-barred. (Doc.# 12.) Plaintiff has failed to show cause

why his remaining claims and this action are not barred by the statute of limitations. This

action will therefore be dismissed. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints.

The Court is required to screen civil complaints brought by prisoners. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis statute); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (prisoner case screening

statute); and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act). The Court

must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally

frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek money

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

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1

 Boswell Memorial and Arrowhead Hospitals are located in the Phoenix metropolitan

area. Plaintiff alleged that the events at issue occurred in Arizona. It appears that the parties

are completely diverse for purposes of jurisdiction, although Plaintiff did not allege an

amount in controversy.

2

 See http://ssdi.rootsweb.ancestry.com/cgi-bin/ssdi.cgi.

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II. Complaint.

Plaintiff alleged two state law counts for the wrongful death of his mother, Marlene

Smith Foulds, due to medical malpractice. He sued Sun City Endoscopy, Arrowhead

Hospital, and Drs. David L. Child, Craig Nagle, Caren Borjeson, and Jagdeep K. Bains, who

were employed at Boswell Memorial or Arrowhead Hospitals. Plaintiff seeks compensatory

relief.1

Except as otherwise indicated, Plaintiff alleged the following facts: Plaintiff’s mother

lived in Surprise, Arizona, when she sought treatment for rectal pain. His mother, who was

poor, belonged to an unidentified Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). That HMO

wrongfully delayed prompt examination of Ms. Foulds by physicians. When she was finally

examined, she was diagnosed with colon cancer, which necessitated surgery to remove

tumors in December 2003. Shortly after the colon surgery, Ms. Foulds began to seek

examination of a painful lump in her breast, but the HMO again delayed an examination. By

the time she was examined, she was found to have breast cancer and to require a mastectomy.

Depression over her health prompted Ms. Foulds to move from Arizona back to Cleveland,

Ohio, to die. According to publicly available records, Plaintiff’s mother died in Ohio on

February 24, 2006.2

III. Failure to State a Claim Under State Law. 

In Counts I and II, Plaintiff alleged state law claims for medical malpractice and/or

wrongful death of his mother. A complaint fails to state a claim where a defense is complete

and obvious from the face of the pleadings. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th

Cir. 1984) (applying former § 1915(d) now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Further,

in the absence of waiver, a court may raise the defense of statute of limitations sua sponte.

See Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Hughes

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3

 Section 12-561 provides that unless the context otherwise requires:

1. “Licensed health care provider” means both:

(a) A person, corporation or institution licensed or certified by the state to

provide health care, medical services, nursing services or other health-related

services and includes the officers, employees and agents thereof working under

the supervision of such person, corporation or institution in providing such

health care, medical services, nursing services or other health-related services.

(b) A federally licensed, regulated or registered blood bank, blood center or

plasma center collecting, processing or distributing whole human blood, blood

components, plasma, blood fractions or blood derivatives for use by a licensed

health care provider and includes the officers, employees and agents working

under the supervision of the blood bank, blood center or plasma center.

2. “Medical malpractice action” or “cause of action for medical malpractice”

means an action for injury or death against a licensed health care provider

based upon such provider’s alleged negligence, misconduct, errors or

omissions, or breach of contract in the rendering of health care, medical

services, nursing services or other health-related services or for the rendering

of such health care, medical services, nursing services or other health-related

services, without express or implied consent including an action based upon

the alleged negligence, misconduct, errors or omissions or breach of contract

in collecting, processing or distributing whole human blood, blood

components, plasma, blood fractions or blood derivatives.

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v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (appropriate to dismiss prisoner’s complaint

sua sponte as time-barred under § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of

Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 956 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (same); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d

Cir. 1995) (same); Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); Johnson

v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 107-08 (1st Cir. 1991) (same). 

The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions, including medical

malpractice and wrongful death, is two years. See A.R.S. § 12-542; Madden-Tyler v.

Maricopa County, 943 P.2d 822, 824 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d

476, 478 (9th Cir. 1991). Section 12-542 of the Arizona Revised Statutes provides in

relevant part that: 

[T]here shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause

of action accrues, and not afterward, the following actions:

1. For injuries done to the person of another including causes of action for

medical malpractice as defined in § 12-561.3

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4

Arizona’s former tolling provision for prisoner causes of action, A.R.S. § 12- 502(B),

was repealed effective July 20, 1996. See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir.

1999). Because Plaintiff’s claims accrued after repeal of the tolling provision, he is not

entitled to tolling on that basis. 

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2. For injuries done to the person of another when death ensues from such

injuries, which action shall be considered as accruing at the death of the party

injured.

Arizona law provides for the tolling of the statute of limitation after a cause of action accrues

for the period during which a plaintiff was less than 18 years old or of unsound mind.4

A.R.S. § 12-502. 

Plaintiff filed his complaint on November 10, 2008. For his state claims to be timely,

they must have accrued no earlier than November 10, 2006, two years before his Complaint

was filed. Under state law, a claim for wrongful death accrues at the death of the party

injured. As noted above, Plaintiff’s mother died in February 2006. The Court accordingly

ordered Plaintiff to show cause why his state law claims should not be dismissed as timebarred. 

In his response, Plaintiff states that he is his mother’s only child and a layperson, who

lacked access to Arizona law. He “throws” himself on the mercy of the Court. Plaintiff also

asserts that he at one point had a breakdown and was treated for depression. Plaintiff

otherwise argues, based on inapposite case law, that he should be allowed to proceed under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff acknowledges that his mother died in February 2006 and that he

learned as much no later than March 2006. While the distress and loss Plaintiff expresses

over his mother’s death are understandable, Plaintiff fails to show any legally cognizable

basis for his failure to commence suit prior to the running of the statute of limitations.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims and this action will be dismissed as

barred by the statute of limitations. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Counts I and II and this action are dismissed.

(2) The Clerk of Court must enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with

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prejudice that states that the dismissal counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DATED this 14th day of April, 2009.

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