Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03024/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03024-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 Plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice his gender discrimination claims

(Docs. ##27, 29).

BL

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Paul T. Stavenjord, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Corrections Corporation of America, 

et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-3024-PHX-DGC (GEE)

ORDER

Plaintiff Paul T. Stavenjord filed a pro se action, which was removed to this Court,

against Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), Corrections Officer Figueroa, Facility

Grievance Officer Carl Richey, and Chaplain Aguirre, alleging that they violated his

constitutional and statutory rights by seizing and refusing to return an altered prison blanket

and a bandana which he used as a prayer mat and an offering cloth (Doc. #12). The Court

will construe Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as a Motion to Dismiss to the

extent that Defendants’ argue Plaintiff failed to exhaust his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The

Court will then grant Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment.

I. Background

Plaintiff alleged that on March 23, 2004, Figueroa searched Plaintiff’s cell and

confiscated various items, including two items of religious significance, a prayer mat and a

personal offering cloth (bandana) (Doc. #12).1

 Plaintiff’s requests for the return or

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replacement of these items were denied because only Native Americans can possess a

bandana and the prayer mats were in the chapel and only available for Muslims (Id.).

Plaintiff maintained that such actions resulted in the denial of his right to observe his

religious beliefs (Id.).

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies as to his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims; (2) Defendants did not violate

the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA); (3) Defendants did not

violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (4) Plaintiff cannot recover emotional distress

damages; and (5) Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages (Doc. #38). Defendants

attached various facility policies, documentation of Plaintiff’s grievances, Requests for

Services submitted by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s deposition (Doc. #37).

According to the summary judgment evidence, Plaintiff was serving a criminal

sentenced imposed by Alaska state courts. Although the Alaskan Department of Corrections

retains legal custody of Plaintiff, it transferred physical custody to CCA, a private company

under contract with the State of Alaska, who housed Plaintiff in an Arizona facility (Doc.

#46). Plaintiff was an ordained minister with the Universal Life Church, and was authorized

to perform all Sacerdotal duties, including the marriage rite (Id., ex. 1). In 2002, Plaintiff’s

request to purchase two bandanas was granted (Id., ex. 2).

On March 23, 2004, Plaintiff’s cell was searched and various items, including a prayer

mat and a bandana which Plaintiff maintained were of religious significance, were

confiscated (Doc. #37, exs. 1; 7 at 30-31; Doc. #46, ex. 4). Plaintiff testified that the bandana

was an offering cloth which had a cross sewn in the corner and scriptures and writings on it

and in which Plaintiff kept Buddhist-type prayer beads (Doc. #37, ex. 7 at 34). The prayer

beads were not confiscated (Id. at 35).

Plaintiff requested the return or replaced of these items (Doc. #37, exs. 1, 5). He was

informed that his religious designation did not authorize his possession of these materials

because only Native Americans could possess bandanas (Id. exs. 1, 4-6). Further, Plaintiff

was informed that he needed to define a reason or a belief behind the request (Id. ex. 6).

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Plaintiff’s requests always referred to a bandana, never an “offering cloth” (Id. ex. 2).

Plaintiff was also informed that he could not “check-out” a prayer mat as there were

insufficient mats for individual use (Id. ex. 2; ex. 7 at 50-52; ex. 8). Plaintiff, however,

testified that even in the faith pod he could not use the prayer mat because he was not

Muslim (Doc. #49, ex. 1 at 51). Plaintiff subsequently requested permission to purchase oil

for religious purposes, but was informed that he needed to be a member of a faith group and

submit a letter from the faith-group confirming his membership (Doc. #37, ex. 10).

Plaintiff submitted a Request to Change his Religious Preference, indicating that his

religious preference was omni-denominational Monastic Zen Muslim (Doc. #37, exs. 2, 9).

Plaintiff noted on the form that the requirement that he submit a letter confirming his

membership in a religion did not apply to him (Id. exs. 2, 9; Doc. # 48, ex. 7 at 24). Chaplain

Aguirre asked Plaintiff to meet with him to discuss his request for religious items and his

religious designation (Doc. #37, ex. 1). Plaintiff refused to respond to the request for the

meeting or to informed Aguirre of the religious significance of the confiscated items (Doc.

#37, exs. 2, 7 at 36; Doc. #49, ex 4 at 53). 

Plaintiff testified that he was an omni-denominational Monastic Zen Muslim, which

indicated that he “takes in everything” (Doc. #37, ex. 7 at 23). Specifically,

“omni-denominational” indicates that all religions are valid, “monastic” indicates that the

religion is based on self-study, “Zen” indicates that it is based on abstract philosophical

ideals, and “Muslim” indicates that the religion is ritualistic (Id. at 17-18). Plaintiff believed

that “God is the goal and however one gets there is as valid as the next person” (Id. ex. 18).

Plaintiff conceded that his religion was not formalized, and there is no outside group or

church with whom to practice his religion (Id. ex. 7 at 23; Doc. #48, ex. 2 at 23-27).

Plaintiff testified that he continued to practice his religion without the confiscated

items; although it was more difficult (Doc. #37, ex. 7 at 22-23; Doc. #48, ex. 3 at 62).

Plaintiff would listen to tapes, mediate, write in his journal, study various religious texts, and

discuss his beliefs with others (Doc. #37, ex. 7 at 22-23, 29). Plaintiff also used a rolled-up

blanket as a prayer mat (Id. at 32-33). Plaintiff began storing his prayer beads in his locker

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2Because Defendants did not argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his RLUIPA claims,

the Court only will consider exhaustion with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

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and continued to use them during meditation (Id. at 35). Plaintiff kept notes and scripture

writings on loose pieces of paper (Id.).

II. Failure to Exhaust

A challenge to a § 1983 action due to the failure to exhaust administrative remedies

“should be treated as a matter in abatement, which is subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b)

motion rather than a motion for summary judgment.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,

1119-20 (9th Cir. 2003). This is primarily because summary judgment is granted on the

merits, while a “dismissal of an action on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative

remedies is not.” Id. at 1119 (citations omitted). Accordingly, to the extent Defendants

argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the Motion for Summary

Judgment will be construed as a Motion to Dismiss.2

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner may

not bring a lawsuit with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 unless all available

administrative remedies are exhausted. See Roles v. Maddox, 439 F.3d 1016, 1017 (9th

Cir.), cert denied 127 S.Ct. 232 (2006). Exhaustion is mandated “regardless of the relief

offered through administrative procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).

It is required in all inmate suits regarding prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523

(2002). To be “properly exhausted,” the prisoner “must complete the administrative review

process in accordance with the applicable rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to

bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2384 (2006). 

 Defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt,

315 F.3d at 1119. The Court has broad discretion as to the method to be used in resolving

the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365,

369 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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B. Analysis

Under CCA regulations and policies, an inmate may grieve any matter that falls within

CCA’s control (Doc. #37, ex. 18). An inmate may not grieve issues concerning classification

or disciplinary decisions, administrative transfers, prohibited conduct of prisoners, or Alaska

Parole Board or court procedures or decisions (Id.). To properly exhaust his administrative

remedies, an inmate must first attempt to resolve the problem informally by submitting a

“Request for Interview” (Doc. #37, ex. 18). If the inmate is unable to resolve the issue

informally at that step, he must file a formal Grievance within 30 days from the date of the

alleged incident (Id.). Formal grievances are screened by the Grievance Coordinator (Id.).

A dissatisfied inmate may seek formal review of the Grievance Coordinator’s conclusion to

the Superintendent or Deputy Director (Id.). The inmate may appeal that decision to the

Deputy Director or Director, whose decision may be appealed to the Grievance and

Compliance Administrator (Id.).

According to the evidence, Plaintiff submitted a Prisoner Grievance on May 10, 2004,

more than 30 days after his items were confiscated (Doc. #37, ex. 3). The Grievance

Coordinator dismissed Plaintiff’s grievance because it was not filed within 30 days of the

incident (Id.). Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Warden, who addressed the issue of

timeliness and the merits of Plaintiff’s claim (Id., ex. 2). Plaintiff did not, however, seek

review from the Grievance and Compliance Administrator. Defendants have established that

the Department had a grievance procedure that was available to Plaintiff and of which

Plaintiff failed to fully avail himself.

Plaintiff argued that because his issues concerned disciplinary action, a grievance

procedure was not available or, alternatively, that he fully exhausted his remedies. The first

contention fails because there is no evidence that Plaintiff was disciplined for possession of

the confiscated items. The second contention fails because there is no evidence that Plaintiff

ever submitted a final appeal. Rather, the evidence reflects that Plaintiff believed he could

grieve his claims. Despite his complaint having been addressed on the merits after he filed

a late grievance, he did not appeal his claims to the next level. Plaintiff therefore failed to

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exhaust his claims regarding the confiscated items. As to Plaintiff’s claim concerning the

failure to replace the confiscated items, the record is devoid of any evidence that Plaintiff

filed any grievance complaining that his religious items were not replaced. 

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and his § 1983 claims will

be dismissed. Further, as discussed in the following section, because Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims, they also would be entitled to summary

judgment on the merits of his § 1983 claims.

III. Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff alleged that the confiscation of and refusal to replace his prayer mat and

offering cloth violated his rights under RLUIPA (Doc. #12). Defendants argue that they did

not violate RLUIPA because they had two compelling interests in maintaining prison safety

and security (Doc. #38). First, the restrictions prevent inmates from, among other things,

using altered facility blankets and bandanas to connote gang affiliations (Id.). Second,

making exceptions to the restrictions based on ambiguous and undefined individual religious

beliefs would prevent prison officials from maintaining reasonable contraband policies and

would be overly burdensome (Id.). Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s religious practices

were not substantially burdened (Id.). 

Plaintiff responded that his beliefs were personal and sincerely held, he was entitled

to worship as he pleases, and there was no compelling governmental interest in refusing him

a prayer mat or an offering cloth (Doc. #46). Plaintiff also argued that he was authorized to

purchase the bandana more than two years before the seizure (Id.).

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of

presenting the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record, together with

affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

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Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party who must demonstrate that the fact in contention is

material and that the dispute is genuine. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,

250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995).

A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 250. The opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions

of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89

(1968). Finally, when considering a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

non-movant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

“Section 3 of RLUIPA provides, in relevant part, that ‘[n]o government shall impose

a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an

institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general application,’ unless the

government established that the burden furthers ‘a compelling governmental interest,’ and

does so by ‘the least restrictive means.’” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9 Cir.

2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2)) (emphasis in original). Based on the facts

of this case, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because Defendants did not place

a substantial burden on the exercise of Plaintiff’s religion.

Plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that Defendants placed a substantial

burden on the exercise of his religion. Id.. A “substantial burden” is one that is

“‘oppressive’ to a ‘significantly great’ extent.” Id. at 995 (quotations omitted). It “must

impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon [religious] exercise.” Id. (quotations

omitted). A substantial burden includes situations “‘where the state . . . denies [an important

benefit] because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure

on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his belief.’” Id.

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Plaintiff alleged that possession and use of a prayer mat and an offering cloth is “a

sincerely held belief,” but conceded that he was able to practice his religion without them.

In place of the prayer mat, Plaintiff used a rolled-up blanket. In place of an offering cloth,

Plaintiff put his prayer beads in his locker, wrote scriptures on slips of paper, and used a

towel to cover his eyes while meditating. Plaintiff has not presented evidence from which

a reasonable trier of fact could find that these modifications to his religious practices are

“oppressive to a significantly great extent” or amount to a “significantly great restriction or

onus upon [his religious] exercise.” Id.

More importantly, Plaintiff proffered no evidence that he would have been denied

access to a prayer mat or an offering cloth had he merely submitted the proper paperwork or

met with Aguirre. The requirement that an inmate complete paperwork or meet with his

chaplain in order to obtain religious items is not a substantial burden. See Resnick v. Adams,

348 F.3d 763, 768 n. 6 & 771 (9th Cir. 2003). Absent evidence that authorization to possess

the religious items would have been denied had Plaintiff met with the chaplain, Plaintiff

cannot demonstrate that Defendants substantially burdened the exercise of his religion.

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #38) is construed as a Motion

to Dismiss to the extent Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies. Defendants’ motion is granted and Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are dismissed

without prejudice.

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #38) is granted. Plaintiff’s

RLUIPA claims are dismissed with prejudice.

(3) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment in favor of Defendants, and dismiss

Plaintiff’s action.

DATED this 26th day of January, 2007.

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