Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02115/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02115-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK RUDOLPH ESTRADA,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATT MARTIN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19–cv–2115–JAM–KJN PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

(ECF Nos. 18, 21)

This action concerns a dispute between Plaintiff Frank Rudolph Estrada, who is 

proceeding without counsel in this action, and defendants Sandra Reese, a Principal at 

Woodland–Pioneer High School, Student Resource Officer Hannah Gray, and Sheriff Deputies 

Matt Martin and Erin Forrester.1 (ECF No. 1.) Estrada asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

for alleged violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants now 

move to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds, which Estrada opposes. (ECF Nos. 18, 21, 

31.)

For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends the motion to dismiss be GRANTED, 

and Estrada’s claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

///

1 This action proceeds before the undersigned per 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 302(c)(21).

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Background2

In the spring of 2016, Estrada’s daughter was suspended by unnamed officials at Pioneer 

High School, and thereafter was “cited by Hannah Gray, Woodland Police Department Student 

Resource Officer.” (ECF No. 1 at p. 4.) Sometime prior to August 22, 2016, Principal Reese 

authorized a change of school for Estrada’s daughter. (Id.) Additionally, district officials began 

coordinating with Woodland police officers to investigate Estrada’s relationship with his 

daughter. (Id.) Estrada attempted to withdraw his daughter from the school, but was told to “stay 

away.” (Id. at p. 5.) Estrada filed multiple administrative complaints with the school district 

against Principal Reese, and with the sheriff’s department against the officers. (Id.) On August 

22, 2016, Deputy Forrester placed an emergency call, which led to Estrada’s arrest. (Id.) 

Estrada was charged with one count of evading a peace officer and one count of endangering the 

health of a child. (ECF No. 18–2 at p. 4.) A Superior Court jury found Estrada guilty of both 

offenses, and Estrada was sentenced to probation. (Id.)

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the complaint. Vega v. JPMorgan Chase 

Bank, N.A., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109 (E.D. Cal. 2009). When a court considers whether a 

complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, all well-pled factual allegations must 

be accepted as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and the complaint must be 

construed in the light most favorable to the non–moving party, Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 

F.3d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 2007). The court is not, however, required to accept as true “conclusory 

[factual] allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint,” or “legal 

2 The facts herein are construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff—the non-moving party. 

Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). They derive from the 

Complaint (ECF No. 1) as well as certain exhibits submitted by defendants. (See ECF No. 18-2). 

The Court takes judicial notice of specific exhibits under Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). United States v. 

Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A court may [] consider certain material-documents 

attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of 

judicial notice-without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”); 

see also Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record appropriate).

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conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 

559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a 

complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-

57 (2007). Simply, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility means pleading “factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & fn. 7 

(9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). Prior to dismissal, the court is 

to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and give the plaintiff an opportunity to cure 

them––if it appears at all possible the defects can be corrected. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, if amendment would be futile, no leave to 

amend need be given. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).

Parties’ Arguments

Defendants note that, even assuming the truth of all facts alleged in the Complaint, the 

alleged events took place sometime in the fall of 2016, and Estrada did not file his lawsuit in this 

court until October of 2019. Thus, defendants maintain Estrada’s three claims are barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations––two years. Defendants also argue that even if the claims are not 

time-barred, Estrada’s Complaint fails to state cognizable claims against any defendant. (ECF 

Nos. 18–1, 21–1.)

Estrada maintains California civil procedure does not dictate the statute of limitations for 

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the statute of limitations is six years. Further, Estrada 

states that “interference(s), delay(s) and occurrence(s) outside of petitioner’s control” caused a 

“chain of events” that prevented him from filing a complaint before October 18, 2019. Estrada 

also reasserts that the facts of the case, as stated in the complaint, give rise to causes of action 

under § 1983 for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment parental rights. (ECF No. 

31.)

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Analysis

Estrada’s Complaint asserts three claims for alleged violations of his First, Fourth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Section 1983 

provides that “[e]very person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

Section 1983 does not contain a specific statute of limitations. “Without a federal 

limitations period, the federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal 

injury actions, along with the forum state’s law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, 

except to the extent any of these laws is inconsistent with federal law.” Butler v. National 

Community Renaissance of California, 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014). The statute of 

limitations runs from the time the action accrues, which is “when the plaintiff knows or has 

reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Lukovsky v. City & Cty. of San 

Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). In California, the limitations period for tort 

actions, such as those brought under Section 1983, is two years. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 335.1; 

Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018) (borrowing California’s 

two–year statute of limitations in § 1983 suits); see also Morgan v. Komers, 151 F. App'x 546, 

548 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming application of two-year statute of limitations where the plaintiff 

alleged substantive due process claims under Section 1983). 

Here, the most recent date alleged in Estrada’s Complaint is August 22, 2016. (ECF No. 

1.) Based on a liberal read of Estrada’s description of the events, he had reason to know of these 

alleged violations of his civil rights on (or before) this date. Estrada did not commence this 

action until October 18, 2019. (Id.) Thus, Estrada’s claims are time-barred. 

While leave to amend is normally granted liberally, the Court need not do so when 

amendment would be futile. Cahill, 80 F.3d at 339. Estrada’s asserts that “interference(s), 

delay(s) and occurrence(s) outside of [his] control” caused a “chain of events” that prevented him 

from filing earlier. (ECF No. 31.) However, the court notes that Estrada provides no facts to 

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indicate why this is so, and the judicially-noticeable documents indicate plaintiff was given 

probation for his offense in this case.

3

 Thus, Estrada’s conclusory assertions cannot support a 

finding that the limitations period should be tolled, and so it would be futile to allow amendment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 18, 21) be GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff’s request for “early subpoena” (ECF No. 34) be DENIED AS MOOT;

3. Plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and

4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: April 10, 2020

estr.2115

3 The Court recognizes that Cal. Civ. Pro. § 352.1 grants a two–year extension of the statute of 

limitations due to “disability of imprisonment.” However, this tolling period is inapplicable 

based on the facts of this case. See, e.g., Rollin v. Cook, 466 F. App'x 665, 667 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(Under California law, limitations period for arrestee's illegal search and seizure claim against 

county officials was not tolled while he was incarcerated after entry of judgment in criminal case 

against him); Ciria v. Rubino, 394 F. App'x 400, 401 (9th Cir. 2010) (State prisoner knew or had 

reason to know of his Section 1983 claims . . . during prisoner's murder trial, triggering applicable 

two-year limitations period under California law).

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