Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00490/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00490-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to oppose the motion to dismiss will be

granted and the opposition will be deemed timely.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD DAVID JONES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

P. MASTERANGLO, #12771; S.

DERRICO #43107; T. A. BEERS,

#46894; JOHN DOE; G. A. KELLY; M.

J. NIMROD; N. GRANNIS; and R. J.

KIRKLAND,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-0490 PJH (PR)

ORDER RULING ON

MOTIONS

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. In the initial review order

the court ordered service on defendants Masteranglo, Derrico, and Beers. The other

claims were dismissed with leave to amend, and plaintiff has not amended. Those claims

will now be dismissed without further leave to amend.

Plaintiff has filed a number of motions and defendants Masteranglo, Derrico, and

Beers have filed a motion to dismiss. These are now before the court for ruling.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

All remaining defendants, Masteranglo, Derrico, and Beers, have moved to dismiss. 

Because the ruling on that motion has the potential to be dispositive of the case, it will be

addressed first.1

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2 Bell Atlantic Corp. disapproved the "no set of facts" language in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Conley had stated "the accepted rule that a complaint should not be

dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 45-46. Bell

Atlantic Corp. decided that "this famous observation has earned its retirement. The phrase is

best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard." Bell

Atlantic Corp, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. 

2

A. Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary;

the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations

omitted). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds of his

'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A motion to dismiss should be granted if the

complaint does not proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face." Id. at 1986-87.2

 

B. Failure to Protect Claim

Plaintiff contends that defendant Derrico was the escort officer for an inmate

returning from the medical clinic, but instead of escorting him to his cell, abandoned the

escort task en route. The inmate he should have been escorting attacked plaintiff and

broke his jaw. In the initial review order the court concluded that this was an Eighth

Amendment failure to protect claim against Derrico. 

Prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other

prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). However, failure of prison

officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates or from dangerous conditions at

the prison violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the

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deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is,

subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

A prisoner states a § 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment against prison

officials only where the officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to the threat of serious

harm or injury to an inmate by another prisoner. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th

Cir. 1986). Neither negligence nor gross negligence constitutes deliberate indifference. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36 & n.4. A prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the standard

for criminal recklessness is met, i.e., the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk

to inmate health or safety. Id. at 837. The official must both be aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he or she

must also draw the inference. Id. However, an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show

that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an

inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his or her knowledge of a

substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 842. 

Allegations in a pro se complaint sufficient to raise an inference that the named

prison officials acted with deliberate indifference – i.e, that they knew that plaintiff faced a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it – states a “failure-to-protect” claim. Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d

1036, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Plaintiff alleges that because the prison was on lock-down all prisoners had to be

escorted to and from the medical clinic, that Derrico was escorting Sanders back from the

clinic, that Derrico “turned loose or abandoned [Sanders] in route,” and that Sanders

attacked plaintiff, hitting him in the mouth hard enough to nearly knock him unconscious. 

He also alleges that when Masteranglo, who is not a defendant on this claim, asked him if

he was “all right,” plaintiff responded with an “equivocal ‘yes’ along with a shoulder shrug.” 

When Derrico was then escorting plaintiff to the medical clinic for treatment of his mouth,

Derrico asked who had hit him; when told “Sanders,” Derrico responded with an expletive

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3

 WMX Technologies overruled McGuckin only to the limited extent that McGuckin

suggested that a court's dismissal with leave to amend is a final judgment for

purposes of appeal where the plaintiff simply does not choose to file an amended

complaint. See WMX Technologies, 104 F.3d at 1136. Rather, a further district

court determination dismissing the complaint must be obtained before the order

can be appealed. Id.

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and “you’ve got to be kidding me.”

The issue is whether these factual allegations are sufficient to “state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65 (2007). The is nothing

“plausible” about an inference from these facts that Derrico knew of and disregarded an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety, a necessary part of an Eighth Amendment safety

claim against him. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff does not allege that he and Sanders

were enemies, nor that Sanders was a particularly dangerous prisoner, or anything else

that suggests Derrico knew there was a substantial risk of serious harm. The motion will be

granted as to this claim.

B. Medical Care Claim

After the attack, plaintiff’s jaw was bleeding. Derrico took him to the medical clinic,

where after twenty minutes defendant Beers ordered Derrico to take him back to his cell

because the infirmary was crowded and it was almost time for count. As a result, plaintiff

was not given medical attention until two hours after the incident, and suffered “unbearable

pain” for that time. Plaintiff also contended that Derrico and defendant Masterangelo were

aware of the injury but failed to make sure he received care. In the initial review order the

court concluded that this was an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a

serious medical need against Derrico, Beers, and Masterangelo.

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).3

A determination of "deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

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seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to

that need. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps

to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The prison official must not only “be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but

he or she “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of

the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter

how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002).

In order for deliberate indifference to be established, therefore, there must be a purposeful

act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at

1060. A claim of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to make out a violation of

the Eighth Amendment. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2004).

Petitioner alleges that after securing Sanders, Masteranglo asked plaintiff if he was

all right and received the “equivocal yes” and shoulder shrug mentioned above. About ten

minutes later Masteranglo told Derrico that plaintiff needed a medical evaluation. Derrico

took plaintiff to the medical clinic; on the way, Derrico noticed that plaintiff had blood

dripping form his mouth and asked him what he had in his mouth, to which plaintiff

answered “nothing.” Derrico locked plaintiff in a holding cell at the clinic at about 10:40 and

informed clinic staff members plaintiff was there. They waited about twenty minutes, at

which point defendant Beers told Derrico to return plaintiff to his living unit; plaintiff told

Beers that there was something wrong with his jaw and he needed to see medical staff

immediately. Beers told plaintiff that the clinic was crowded and that it was almost time for

count, and that he would be seen right after count. Derrico escorted him back to the living

unit, where plaintiff several times told Derrico he was in severe pain. After about thirty

minutes plaintiff cried out for help and Masteranglo said he would contact the medical clinic. 

At 12:15 Derrico escorted plaintiff back to the medical area where he remained in a holding

case until 12:35, when he was seen by medical staff.

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The question is whether these allegations are "enough facts to state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face," Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65, under the standard for

deliberate indifference outlined above. As plaintiff says, the over-all delay in his receiving

medical care was approximately two hours. Plaintiff was bleeding from his mouth, but had

said he was all right when asked and had told Derrico he had nothing in his mouth when

asked. On the other hand, he objected to being returned to the living unit and asked for

medical care once there.

To amount to deliberate indifference there must be a purposeful act or failure to act

on the part of the defendant and resulting harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. The

allegations here are that Derrico and Masteranglo were attempting to obtain medical care

for plaintiff; the allegations are not sufficient to allege deliberate indifference, but rather

show that Derrico and Masteranglo took reasonable steps to abate the problem. The

motion will be granted as to them.

The claim against Beers is closer, because he sent plaintiff back to the living unit for

count, delaying care by about an hour and a half. Plaintiff alleges that he was in severe

pain for that time; "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" caused by failure to provide

treatment is indicative of a serious medical need, McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104), and plaintiff has pled that Beers caused it not to be treated. It

may be that, for instance, there were so many prisoners ahead of plaintiff at the clinic that

sending him back to his living unit for count made no difference, but plaintiff obviously did

not plead that, or facts that would establish it, and at the pleading stage to draw that

conclusion would be to go beyond what may be fairly inferred from the facts pleaded. 

 Defendants’ contention that plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead that he suffered

harm from the delay is without merit. Plaintiff has alleged that he suffered excruciating pain

for the duration of the delay, which is harm in itself. 

In sum, the motion will be granted as to the medical claims against Derrico and

Masteranglo, and those claims will be dismissed with leave to amend. See Weilburg v.

Shapiro, No. 05-15540, slip op. 6657, 6662 (9th Cir. June 1, 2007) (a pro se complaint

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must be liberally construed and “‘may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only where “it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.”’”) (citations omitted). The motion will be denied as to the

medical claim against Beers.

C. State Law Claims

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s supplemental state law negligence contentions

are insufficient to state a claim because he does not allege exhaustion of his tort claim

remedies. As a condition precedent to suit against a public entity or its employee, the

California Tort Claims Act (CTCA) requires "the timely presentation of a written claim and

the rejection of the claim in whole or in part." Mangold v. California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 67

F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal. App. 3d 861,

193 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1983)). Compliance with the California tort claims act must be

pleaded. Id. 

Defendants are correct that plaintiff did not plead compliance with the California Tort

Claims Act. It appears from some of plaintiff’s other filings that he may be attempting to

comply at this late date, perhaps by attempting to obtain permission to file a late claim. In

any event, he has not pleaded compliance, so the state law claims will be dismissed with

leave to amend.

II. Plaintiff’s Motions

Plaintiff’s many motions will be addressed in the order in which they were filed.

Plaintiff’s “Motion for Admission of Rule 36(a) FRCP” is a discovery request which

should not have been field with the court. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 5(d). It will be stricken. 

Plaintiff’s “Motion to Plead” does not contain a comprehensible request for court

action. It will be denied.

Plaintiff also renews his request for appointment of counsel. There is no

constitutional right to counsel in a civil case, Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S.

18, 25 (1981), and although district courts may "request" that counsel represent a litigant

who is proceeding in forma pauperis, as plaintiff is here, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), that

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does not give the courts the power to make "coercive appointments of counsel." Mallard v.

United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may ask counsel to represent an

indigent litigant only in "exceptional circumstances," the determination of which requires an

evaluation of both (1) the likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the

plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

It is difficult to determine what the likelihood is that plaintiff will succeed on the merits

because at this stage of the case it is not known what unpleaded facts may support his

allegations, but in any event even the allegations make for a weak case, as discussed

above. So, although it is clear that plaintiff does have difficulty with written work, on

balance the court determines that the interests of justice do not require appointment of

counsel.

Plaintiff’s motion to compel has been mooted by the stay of discovery, as has his

motion to extend discovery. His motion for partial summary judgment goes only to the

dismissed due process claims, so will be denied.

Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file his opposition to defendants’ motion

to dismiss will be granted and the opposition will be deemed timely. 

Plaintiff’s motion for a stay appears to be in part about his attempts to exhaust his

state tort claim, but his explanation is not clear. Most of the motion, however, consists of

unclear arguments that go to whether his summary judgment motion should be granted. 

Because it is not possible to determine whether a stay would be appropriate from what has

been provided, the motion will be denied. 

Plaintiff’s most recent motion is “Motion: To Enter Pleading, Admission.” This

appears to be a notice that he filed his motion for a stay. To whatever extent it is a motion,

it will be denied.

///

///

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CONCLUSION

1. Plaintiff not having amended after the court’s dismissal of some defendants with

leave to amend, the claims against defendants G. A. Kelly, M. J. Nimrod, N. Grannis, and

R. J. Kirkland are now DISMISSED with prejudice. 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for admissions (document number 15 on the docket) is

STRICKEN. 

3. Plaintiff’s motions to plead (document 24), for appointment of counsel (document

25), to compel (document 26), for summary judgment (document 30), for discovery

(document 39), for stay (document 41), and to enter pleading (document 43) are DENIED. 

4. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to oppose the motion to dismiss

(document 33) is GRANTED. The opposition is deemed timely. His earlier motion for an

extension (document 32) is DENIED as moot.

5. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (document 31) is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. It is GRANTED as to all claims against defendants Masteranglo and

Derrico. It is also GRANTED as to the state law claims. It is DENIED as to the medical

claim against Beers. Those claims as to which the motion has been granted are

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

6. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint to remedy the deficiencies identified

above. Because an amended complaint complete replaces all previous complaints, the

amended complaint must contain all the claims plaintiff wishes to pursue. See Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). If plaintiff wishes to file an amended

complaint, he shall do so within thirty days of the date this order is entered. If no amended

complaint is filed, the claims listed above as to which the motion to dismiss has been

granted will be dismissed without further leave to amend, that is, they will be out of the case

for good. After expiration of the time to amend the court will enter a scheduling order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/30/07 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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