Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_21-cv-01477/USCOURTS-alnd-7_21-cv-01477-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 33:1365 Environmental Matters

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

PRO-BUILT DEVELOPMENT, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELTA OIL SERVICESM INC., 

BURGESS EQUIPMENT REPAIR, LLC,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 7:21-CV-01477-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on Defendant Burgess Equipment Repair, LLC’s Motion to 

Dismiss. (Doc. # 16). The motion is fully briefed (Docs. # 16, 20) and ripe for decision. For the 

reasons discussed below, the motion (Doc. # 16) is due to be denied.

I. Background 

Plaintiff Pro-Built Development, LLC operates in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. (Doc. #14

at 1). Defendant Burgess Equipment Repair, LLC owns land upstream from Plaintiff, and it leases 

a portion of that land to Defendant Delta Oil Services, Inc. (Id. at 2, 5). The land is used by Delta 

Oil to park tanker trucks overnight. (Id.). Burgess Equipment’s business includes storing petroleum 

products in the form of used oil. (Id. at 2). Delta Oil is an oil, gas, solvent, and chemical disposal 

company. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that the Alabama Department of Environmental Management (“ADEM”)

investigated Burgess Equipment’s property in 2014 and 2020, noting several areas of 

noncompliance (e.g., a 250-gallon tote containing used oil was not properly marked and there were 

visible oil stains on the ground). (Id. at 2-4). Plaintiff also alleges that, in May 2021, ADEM 

reported that a release of oil was discovered at Burgess Equipment’s land the previous month. (Id.

FILED

 2022 Mar-14 PM 03:23

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:21-cv-01477-RDP Document 23 Filed 03/14/22 Page 1 of 6
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at 5). Plaintiff contends that ADEM conducted a site visit of Burgess Equipment’s property and 

found Spectrum Industrial Services in the process of removing the impacted soil. (Id.). Plaintiff 

further alleges that, in conjunction with Tuscaloosa County Emergency Management Agency and 

Northport Fire Department, ADEM investigators discovered a nearby area of wetlands saturated 

with petroleum products that were leaking into a tributary of Carrol Creek, which empties into 

Lake Tuscaloosa. (Id. at 6, 7). The investigators noted that the point source of the spill appeared 

to be two Delta Oil tanker trucks parked on Burgess Equipment’s property. (Id.).

On November 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed this action alleging a violation of the Clean Water 

Act (along with state-law tort claims) against Delta Oil and Burgess Equipment. (Docs. # 1, 14). 

Burgess Equipment responded by filing a motion to dismiss arguing that (1) Plaintiff had not 

alleged a point source and (2) that Plaintiff’s allegations were predicated on wholly past conduct. 

(Doc. # 4 at 5). On January 6, 2022, Plaintiff amended its compliant, adding allegations of a point 

source as well as continuous and ongoing violations of the Clean Water Act. (See Doc. # 14).

Burgess Equipment filed a second motion to dismiss, which focused on the argument that Plaintiff 

lacks standing and the court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate a Clean Water Act claim that concerns 

wholly past conduct. (Doc. # 16 at 1).

II. Standard of Review 

A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1). Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 807 n.8

(11th Cir. 1993). The jurisdiction of the federal court may be attacked facially or

factually. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). In a facial challenge,

a court assumes the allegations in the complaint are true and determines whether the complaint

sufficiently alleges a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525,

1529 (11th Cir. 1990). Factual attacks, on the other hand, “challenge the ‘existence of subject

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matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as

testimony and affidavits, are considered.’” Id. (citation omitted). Regardless of whether a

challenge is facial or factual, “[t]he burden for establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction rests

with the party bringing the claim.” Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 839 F.3d 1312,

1314 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247

(11th Cir. 2005)).

However, when a defendant’s factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction implicates an 

element of the cause of action, “[t]he proper course of action . . . is to find that jurisdiction exists 

and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's case.” Lawrence, 919

F.2d at 1529 (quoting Williamson v. Tucker 645 F.2d 404, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1981). By refusing to 

treat an indirect attack on the merits as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court affords “a greater level 

of protection to the plaintiff who in truth is facing a challenge to the validity of his claim” (i.e., a 

Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 challenge). Id. That is the case here. Accordingly, the court analyzes 

Burgess Equipment’s motion under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). However, the complaint must include enough facts “to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Bell Atlanta Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that 

contain nothing more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not 

meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon “labels and 

conclusions” or “naked assertion[s]” without supporting factual allegations. Id. at 555, 557.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

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misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although “[t]he plausibility 

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” the “complaint must demonstrate ‘more than 

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’” Id. A plausible claim for relief requires 

“enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support 

the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “1) eliminate any allegations in the 

complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-pleaded factual 

allegations, ‘assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.’” Kivisto v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, PLC, 413 F. App'x 136, 138 

(11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 

2010)). That task is context specific and, to survive the motion, the allegations must permit the 

court based on its “judicial experience and common sense . . . to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. If the court determines that all the well-pleaded 

facts, accepted as true, do not state a claim that is plausible, the claims are 

due to be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

III. Analysis 

The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) makes it unlawful to discharge any pollutant into navigable 

waters of the United States unless otherwise authorized by the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). To 

establish a CWA violation, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) there has been a discharge; (2) of a 

pollutant; (3) into waters of the United States; (4) from a point source; (5) without a NPDES 

permit.” Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1008 (11th Cir. 2004). The CWA 

grants citizens the right to file a civil action:

against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental 

instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 

Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or 

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limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State 

with respect to such a standard or limitation.

33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (emphasis added). This language indicates “that the harm sought to be 

addressed by the citizen suit [must] lie[] in the present or the future,” rather than lying wholly in 

the past. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 US. 49, 59, 64 

(1987). Thus, in order for a court to have subject-matter jurisdiction over a CWA citizen-suit, there 

is an additional element that must be alleged (and eventually established): there must be “a state 

of either continuous or intermittent violation—that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter 

will continue to pollute in the future.” Gwaltney, 484 US. at 57, 64 (1987).

As the Supreme Court noted, the conclusion that a citizen suit requires an ongoing violation 

is bolstered by the Act’s notice requirement: “It follows logically that the purpose of notice to the 

alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the Act 

and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.” Id. at 59-60. Further, “the citizen suit is meant 

to supplement rather than to supplant government action.” Id. at 60.

A defendant can move for summary judgment on standing if “the allegations [are] a sham 

and raise[] no genuine issue of fact.” Id. at 66 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 

(1973)). The Eleventh Circuit clarified Gwaltney. At the Rule 56 stage, a plaintiff is required to 

present substantial evidence (that is, facts) of an ongoing CWA violation at the time they filed the 

lawsuit to be able to maintain an action for civil penalties. Day, LLC v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 

315 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1235-36 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (citing Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. 

Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1135 (11th Cir. 1990). As that rule applies here, Plaintiff must 

show that as of November 4, 2021 (the filing date of this action) there was an ongoing discharge 

from a point source controlled by Defendants or a reasonable likelihood of a future point source 

leak by Defendants. See id. at 1239. In addition to jurisdictional concerns, the mootness doctrine 

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will prevent a suit for injunctive relief if a defendant comes into compliance with the CWA after 

the filing of the complaint and “there is no reasonable likelihood that the wrongful behavior will 

recur.” Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1135 (11th Cir. 

1990).

But here, we are at the pleadings stage. The court must apply Rule 12(b)(6). So, all that is 

required of Plaintiff is to show that the complaint contains a good-faith allegation of an ongoing 

violation that is well-pleaded in accordance with Rule 8.

Plaintiff does not dispute that its complaint includes wholly past conduct. (Doc. # 20 at 1). 

Rather, Plaintiff argues that it has sufficiently pleaded that Defendants are past polluters and that 

there is a reasonable likelihood that Defendants will continue to pollute in the future. (Id. at 2-5). 

At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, Plaintiff has met its exceedingly light burden under Gwaltney: it has 

made a good-faith and adequate allegation that Defendants are past polluters and that there is a 

reasonable likelihood that Defendants will pollute again. To the extent there is actual “evidence” 

to the contrary, the court will deal with that under Rules 12(b)(1) and/or 56 at the appropriate time.

IV. Conclusion 

Defendant Burgess Equipment’s motion is due to be denied. A separate order in accordance 

with the memorandum opinion will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED this March 14, 2022.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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