Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02170/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02170-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELIZABETH KANZIE, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

AT&T MOBILITY SERICES, LLC, a 

Delaware limited liability company; and 

DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:19-cv-02170-AJB-BGS

ORDER ON DISCOVERY 

DISPUTE REGARDING ROG 16

[ECF 19]

I. INTRODUCTION

The Court ordered the parties to submit a Joint Statement addressing their 

disputes as to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 16 (hereinafter “ROG 16”). The Parties 

were to address the relevancy of the requested discovery and proportionality under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b). On May 21, 2020 the parties filed their Joint 

Statement for Discovery Dispute regarding Plaintiff’s ROG 16. (Doc. 19.) The Court 

will address the parties’ positions as relevant to the Court’s analysis of the dispute. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“An interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 

26(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). “Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not 

objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Rule 33(b)(3). 

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“The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity.” Rule 

33(b)(4). The party propounding the interrogatory may move to compel an answer if 

the party fails to answer. Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iii). 

The requested discovery must be relevant to important issues in the case. 

Relevant Evidence is defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 401: “Evidence is relevant 

if (a) it has a tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without 

the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”

Further, Rule 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding 

any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and 

proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake 

in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant 

information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the 

issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 

likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

“District courts have broad discretion in controlling discovery” and “in 

determining relevancy.” Laub v. Horbaczewski, 331 F.R.D. 516, 521 (C.D. Cal. 

2019) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) and Surfvivor 

Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

Rule 26(b)(2) also requires the court, on motion or on its own, to limit the 

frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by the rules if it determines that 

(1) “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be 

obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 

expensive;” (2) “the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the 

information by discovery in the action;” or (3) “the proposed discovery is outside the 

scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii).

The Advisory Committee emphasized that in adding the proportionality 

language to Rule 26(b)(1) “the objective is to guard against redundant or 

disproportionate discovery” and “to encourage judges to be more aggressive in 

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identifying and discouraging discovery overuse.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory 

Committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 

III. ANALYSIS: RELEVANCE AND PROPORTIONALITY

ROG 16 requests: 

IDENTIFY, by name, job title, dates of employment in the store, and last known 

contact information, every one of YOUR employees who worked in YOUR Pt. Loma 

store, at any time, between January 1, 2017 and December 1, 2017.

(Doc. 19 at 21

.) 

A. The Parties’ Positions

The Plaintiff asserts several grounds as to why the identities of all employees 

who worked with Plaintiff at the store in Pt. Loma are relevant. First, Plaintiff asserts 

this discovery is needed to prove she was a qualified person who had a disability since 

Defendant has denied she is disabled. (Id. at 3.) Co-worker testimony is relevant to 

prove Plaintiff was disabled and her managers knew it. (Id.) She claims that 

presumably her managers will testify that they did not know she was disabled. (Id.) 

Secondly, she contends the discovery is needed because Defendant is asserting that 

she could not perform the essential duties of her job with or without an 

accommodation. Plaintiff argues that the other employees could describe the essential 

duties of her job. (Id.) An employer’s description of the duties does not qualify as an 

undisputed statement of fact. (Id. at 3-4.) Lastly, Plaintiff states that other employees 

might corroborate that Plaintiff made multiple accommodation requests for time off 

and that it would not have been an undue hardship for Defendant to excuse her from 

work due to her disability. (Id. at 4.)

The Defendant responds that requesting a store roster is outside the scope of 

discovery because it is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims. (Id. at 5.) The primary issue is 

whether Defendant was required to excuse Plaintiff’s absences due to her alleged 

 1 The Court cites the electronic pagination in CM/ECF unless otherwise noted.

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disability. (Id.) Her peers had nothing to do with her termination, nor were they 

involved in Defendant’s decision to deny her time off work. (Id.) As to whether a 

peer perceived her as disabled, the Defendant argues it is not relevant because the 

primary issue is whether Plaintiff’s store manager was required to excuse her absences 

given Plaintiff’s failure to follow the company’s requirements for excusing time off. 

(Id. at 6.) In regard to relevancy to prove she could do the essential duties of her job 

with an accommodation, Defendant points out this case involves Plaintiff’s 

attendance, which was the reason for her termination. (Id.) This is not a case 

involving at work accommodation issues such as whether Plaintiff could lift, stand, or 

walk, and whether these activities are essential job functions. (Id.) In fact, her peers 

cannot provide any information regarding whether attendance is an essential job 

function because they were all subject to the same guidelines. (Id. at 7)

B. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations in the Complaint

For this analysis, the Court turns to the Factual Allegation section of Plaintiff’s 

complaint, wherein she incorporated the following facts into all of her claims 

regarding disability discrimination.2

 Plaintiff describes her disability as a debilitating 

back condition. (Compl. ¶ 15.3

) She alleges she needed an accommodation at work. 

(Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) For example, she needed to be allowed to occasionally sit. (Id. ¶ 15.) 

Plaintiff adds that her disabilities caused her to arrive late at work or miss work 

entirely when she sought medical treatment for her disabilities. (Id. ¶ 16.) She alleges 

she needed flexibility in her work schedule, but Defendant refused to accommodate 

her and instead fired her due to her disability related absences. (Id.) In paragraph 20,

she asserts that she was wrongfully terminated for her alleged failure to follow 

guidelines. (Id.) 

 2 The Court will not summarize the entire complaint for this dispute, only the relevant 

paragraphs for this analysis. (Doc. 1 [Notice of Removal], Exb. A (State Court 

Complaint (“Complaint”) for the entire complaint [ECF 1-3].)

3 For citations to the Complaint, the Court cites the paragraph numbers.

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In her individual claims, Plaintiff reiterates her theory of the case. In Claim 

One, alleging disability discrimination and wrongful termination she refers to and 

incorporates the preceding factual allegations. (Id. ¶ 19.) In her Second Claim for 

Failure to Accommodate, she states that the reasonable accommodation she needed 

was a finite time off work to treat, recuperate and heal from the symptoms associated 

with her disability. (Id. ¶ 33.) In her Third Claim for Failure to Engage in the 

Interactive Process, she alleges she gave notice to the employer that she had a 

disability that required medical leaves of absence. (Id. ¶ 51.) In her Fourth Claim 

alleging Retaliation, she claims that she requested intermittent medical leave of 

absence for her disability, but she was retaliated against by Defendant for this request 

which resulted in her termination. (Id. ¶ 60.) 

Given Plaintiff’s factual allegations combined with her arguments in the Joint 

Statement, the relevancy and proportionality considerations in this dispute regard the 

following issues:

(1) Whether Plaintiff was disabled, and whether the Defendant knew so;

(2) Whether being present at work was an essential duty of her job;

(3) Whether she requested of Defendant a medical leave of absence.

The initial inquiry for the Court is whether Plaintiff has shown that a store roster of 

coworkers “... has a tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” 

FRE 401. For this analysis the Court addresses the elements of the claims that cover 

this dispute. 

C. Disability Discrimination and Wrongful Termination

Plaintiff claims the discovery is relevant to her FEHA claim of disability 

discrimination and wrongful termination. “California has adopted the three-stage 

burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims 

of discrimination . . .based on a theory of disparate treatment.” Guz v. Bechtel 

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National Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 (2000). This “test reflects the principle that direct 

evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and that such claims must usually be 

proved circumstantially.” Id. “[B]y successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the 

test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood 

of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.” Id.

Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. The 

elements of a prima facie case of disability discrimination under FEHA are that a 

Plaintiff: (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) is otherwise qualified to perform 

his job; (3) was subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) some other 

circumstances suggest discriminatory motive. Id. at 355. 

“If [she] does so, the burden shifts to the employer to show a lawful reason for 

its action.” Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 29 Cal. App. 4th 1718, 1730

(1994). The employer must show that the procedure by which the employee was 

terminated was “validly and fairly devised and administered to serve a legitimate 

business purpose.” Id. at 1733.

The burden then shifts to the employee to prove that “the proffered justification 

is mere pretext.” Id. at 1730. The employee “must produce substantial responsive 

evidence” on this last point. Id. at 1735. “Pretext may be inferred from the timing of 

the discharge decision, the identity of the decision-maker, or by the discharged 

employee’s job performance before termination.” Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 

Cal. App. 4th 215, 224 (1999) (citing Flait v. N. Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal. App. 4th 

467, 476, 479 (1992)). “Pretext may be demonstrated by showing ‘that the proffered 

reason had no basis in fact, the proffered reason did not actually motivate the 

discharge, or, the proffered reason was insufficient to motivate discharge.” Id. (citing 

Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. 143 F.3d 1042, 1049 (6th Cir.1998)).

This test is only applicable at the summary judgment stage. By the time the 

case is submitted to the jury, the plaintiff has already established his or her prima facie 

case, and the employer has already proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

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for the adverse employment decision. The shifting burdens drop from the case and the 

jury is left to decide which evidence it finds more convincing. See Muzquiz v. City of 

Emeryville, 79 Cal. App. 4th 1106, 1118 (2000). 

The Court considers Plaintiff’s request for a store roster in the context of what 

Plaintiff has to prove for her claim of wrongful termination. Plaintiff has to prove she 

was disabled, and that the Defendant was so aware. As regards proving disability, the 

Court finds that co-workers who had contact with her could testify about their 

observations of her complaints and any physical pain from her back condition. 

However, the Court finds ROG 16’s request for a store roster for all the co-workers is 

overbroad in that it includes everyone, not only those that had frequent and direct 

contact with her. Further, such lay witness testimony about observations as opposed to 

Plaintiff’s medical records has limited probative value. Her peers are not trained 

medical professionals, and any conversations with the Plaintiff about her condition 

would be self-serving and only corroborative at best. The much more probative and 

important evidence of her having a disability are her medical records which would 

necessarily include her doctor(s)’ assessment of her condition and her need for time 

off to heal and recuperate. The Plaintiff has not summarized her medical records, nor 

explained why coworkers’ testimony is nonetheless important to resolve this issue. 

One of the proportionality factors this Court is to consider under Rule 26(b)(1) is “the 

importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” Without any summary of other 

discovery available such as medical records, the Plaintiff is in essence asking the 

Court to evaluate the importance of her request in a vacuum. The Court declines to do 

so.

Further, Rule 26(b)(2) also requires the court, on motion or on its own, to limit 

the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by the rules if it determines 

that “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be 

obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 

expensive.” The Court, under this Rule, exercises its discretion to deny ROG 16 

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because discovery to prove disability can be obtained from another, more reliable 

source, thereby making ROG 16’s request cumulative and of little probative value. 

Notwithstanding, if after obtaining and reviewing her medical records Plaintiff still 

believes she needs a limited roster to establish her disability, then she can timely 

follow the Court’s chambers rules regarding discovery disputes. 

As regards the relevancy of a store roster to prove Defendant was put on notice 

of her disability and her requests for medical leave of absence, ROG 16 is overbroad. 

Only co-workers who witnessed Plaintiff advising her supervisors of her need for 

medical leave due to her back condition would be relevant. Further, Plaintiff proffers 

that her two store managers during the eight-month time frame at issue will 

presumably (emphasis added) testify that they did not know Plaintiff was disabled and 

had no notice of her disability. It is clear from this contention by the Plaintiff that 

ROG 16’s request for coworkers who witnessed Plaintiff tell her managers of her 

disability is not ripe. It is based on the speculation that her managers presumably will 

deny notice, not that they do in fact deny notice. Nor does Plaintiff provide what 

discovery she possesses that shows her managers were not aware of her disability as 

well as her requests for medical leaves of absence. Written correspondence including 

emails, My Coach evaluations, Employee Attendance Reports which list illness 

absences, medical correspondence received regarding Plaintiff, Health Care Provider 

forms submitted by Plaintiff, text messages regarding her disability and need for 

leave, and the like are the type of information that the Plaintiff would need to present 

in order for the Court to perform its obligatory Rule 26(b)(1) analysis to determine the 

importance of the discovery in resolving these issues. The Court also has its hands tied 

in performing its Rule 26(b)(2) sua sponte duty to only allow discovery which is 

proportional to the needs of the case. At this point in the litigation the Plaintiff has 

failed to provide the full picture as to why coworker testimony is still important to 

prove that she gave notice of her disability to the Defendant. Therefore, as ordered 

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above, and for these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s ROG 16 for this relevancy 

ground. It is without prejudice as indicated above. 

D. Failure to Reasonably Accommodate 

Plaintiff claims ROG 16 will provide relevant discovery to show that she 

requested medical leaves of absence, that the Defendant knew of her requests, and that 

she could perform the essential duties of her job with this accommodation. 

Under FEHA, “an employer who knows of the disability of an employee has an 

affirmative duty to make known to the employee other suitable job opportunities with 

the employer and to determine whether the employee is interested in, and qualified 

for, those positions, if the employer can do so without undue hardship or if the 

employer offers similar assistance or benefit to other disabled or nondisabled 

employees or has a policy of offering such assistance or benefit to any other 

employees.” Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc., 53 Cal.App.4th 935, 950–951 (1997).

“Reasonable accommodation includes, (1) ‘Making existing facilities used by 

employees readily accessible to, and usable by, individuals with disabilities. [¶] (2) 

Job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant 

position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, adjustment or 

modification . . . of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of 

qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals 

with disabilities.” Hanson, 74 Cal. App.4th at 225 (quoting § 12926, subd. (m); Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7293.9, subd. (a). “However, FEHA’s list of accommodation 

measures, by its terms, is incomplete, and so we may look to its federal cognates for 

guidance.” Id. at 225-26 (citing Prilliman, 53 Cal.App.4th 948). In Hanson v. Lucky 

Stores, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 225–26 the court held that a finite leave of absence can be 

a reasonable accommodation under FEHA, provided it is likely that at the end of the 

leave, the employee would be able to perform his or her duties. 

As indicated in her complaint, Plaintiff claims Defendant did not reasonably 

accommodate her by not granting her medical leave of absences. She contends the 

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identity of all her coworkers could be relevant to test the Defendant’s description of 

the essential duties of her job, as well as corroborate her multiple accommodation 

requests, and that it would not have been an undue hardship on the Defendant to 

excuse her from work. 

The Court has concerns about whether the description of the essential duties of 

her job is a disputed issue given the factual allegations in her complaint and arguments 

in the Joint Motion. In both, the only identified essential duty of her job in dispute is 

the requirement that Plaintiff be present at work. This is not a case involving at work 

accommodation issues such as whether Plaintiff could lift, stand, or walk, and whether 

these activities are essential job functions. In fact, Plaintiff’s main liability contention 

as regards her discrimination claims centers around whether Defendant’s reason for 

terminating Plaintiff was due to her non compliance with its attendance policy, as 

Defendant claims, or whether this reason was pretext, as Plaintiff claims. She argues 

her request for this accommodation, medical leave, and her disability, were the true 

motives behind her termination. 

Further, it is unclear how her peers could provide any relevant information 

regarding whether attendance is an essential job function. All of her peers were

employed under the same attendance guidelines. The Plaintiff has not explained how 

these lay witnesses could provide relevant information that being at work was not an 

essential function of Plaintiff’s job. See Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr.,

675 F.3d 1233, 1237–38 (9th Cir. 2012) (It is a “rather common-sense idea ... that if 

one is not able to be at work, one cannot be a qualified individual.”) (quoting 

Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 482 (7th Cir. 1999)).

As regards her claim that she needs the store roster to corroborate that Plaintiff 

made multiple requests for medical leave, the Court adopts its holding above as 

concerned notice of her disability. It is also denied without prejudice under the same 

conditions above. 

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Finally, the Plaintiff contends that other employees might corroborate that 

Plaintiff made multiple accommodation requests for time off and that it would not 

have been an undue hardship for Defendant to excuse her from work due to her 

disability. Plaintiff adds no additional facts as to how coworkers are able to opine that 

allowing Plaintiff to take time off would not have been undue hardship for Defendant. 

Plaintiff appears to base its request on Defendant’s 15th Affirmative Defense, Undue 

Hardship. The Defendant does not address this issue, nor has either party identified 

what if any discovery has been done on this defense. The Court questions whether this 

defense will even be raised given Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff was terminated 

for not getting her medical absences approved under Defendant’s attendance policy. 

The Court denies ROG 16 without prejudice. The parties are to follow the discovery 

dispute process before bringing this dispute again.4

Given the Court’s order herein, the Court finds the dispute over privacy rights 

to be moot at this time. 

IV. CONCLUSION

AT&T is not required to response to ROG 16.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2020

 4 For future contested discovery disputes, each party should address the elements of 

claims/affirmative defenses that are in dispute, detail the discovery that has been 

provided on these issues, and explain why or why not the requested discovery 

complies with Rule 26(b)(1)-(2) and FRE 401.

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