Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-00602/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-00602-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL S. DANIELS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ALAMEDA COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-00602-JSC 

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS AND STRIKE FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 54

Paul Daniels and Nanette Dillard allege that they were prosecuted by the Alameda County 

District Attorneys’ Office in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights. The Court 

previously granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 malicious and 

retaliatory prosecution claim because Plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that each defendant 

caused Plaintiffs’ prosecution or that there was an absence of probable cause for their prosecution. 

(Dkt. No. 48.) In response to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Defendants have again moved

to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and to strike the state law claims under 

California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, the anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 

Participation (anti-SLAPP) statute.1 (Dkt. No. 54.) Having considered the parties’ briefs and 

having had the benefit of oral argument on November 21, 2019, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss without leave to amend. Plaintiffs have failed to cure the pleading defects in 

their First Amended Complaint.

//

 

1 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 7 & 9.)

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DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on multiple grounds. The threshold 

question, however, is whether Plaintiffs have adequately pled their malicious and retaliatory 

prosecution Section 1983 claims and cured the pleading defects identified in the Court’s prior 

Order. Because they have not, the Court need not and does not address Defendants’ other 

arguments. 

A. Section 1983 Malicious and Retaliatory Prosecution Claims

To prevail on a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim a plaintiff must prove that 

criminal proceedings were instituted with malice, without probable cause, and for the purpose of 

denying the plaintiff a specific constitutional right. Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 

1189 (9th Cir. 1995). The claim “requires ‘the institution of criminal proceedings against another 

who is not guilty of the offense charged’ and that ‘the proceedings have terminated in favor of the 

accused.’” Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 653 (1977)). A Section 1983 retaliatory prosecution claim requires a showing 

of a “‘retaliatory motive on the part of an official urging prosecution combined with an absence of 

probable cause supporting the prosecutor’s decision.’” Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 865 

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265 (2006)). 

The Court’s prior order examined Plaintiffs’ malicious and retaliatory prosecution claims 

in detail. The claims were dismissed because (1) Plaintiffs had not adequately tied their 

allegations to misconduct by any particular defendant, and (2) Plaintiffs had not adequately 

alleged an absence of probable cause. The same defects remain.

1) Allegations Tying Defendants to the Prosecution

To state either a malicious or retaliatory prosecution claim, Plaintiffs must allege facts that 

support a plausible inference that each defendant “improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, 

knowingly provided misinformation to him, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise 

engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of 

legal proceedings.” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004); see also

Beck, 527 F.3d at 865 (holding that a retaliatory prosecution claim requires a showing of a 

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“retaliatory motive on the part of an official urging prosecution combined with an absence of 

probable cause supporting the prosecutor’s decision”); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th 

Cir. 1988); see also Gressett v. Contra Costa Cty., No. C-12-3798 EMC, 2013 WL 2156278, at 

*15 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2013) (the plaintiff must “plead sufficient facts to hold each Individual 

Defendant liable for malicious prosecution”).

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint fails allege facts sufficient to show that each of the named 

defendants—Alameda County, the Alameda County Auditor-Controller Agency, the Alameda 

County Board of Supervisors, Nate Miley, Scott Haggerty, and Patrick O’Connell—“engaged in 

wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal 

proceedings.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067. With respect to Defendants Miley and Haggerty, 

Plaintiffs (1) quote a news article stating that “Scott Haggerty says he has spoken to the District 

Attorney’s office about a criminal investigation into Dillard’s involvement in allegedly bilking 

ACAP,” and (2) allege that “Miley and Haggerty were both exerting political pressure upon the 

District Attorney’s Office to find something for which Dillard could be prosecuted.” (FAC at ¶ 

18.) The “mere allegation” that Mr. Haggerty had a conversation with the District Attorney a year 

before Plaintiffs was charged does not plausibly suggest that the District Attorney brought the 

charges because of what Mr. Haggerty said. See Bala v. Stenehjem, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1096 

(D.N.D. 2009) (“the mere allegation that former United States Attorney Wrigley met with law 

enforcement officials, state authorities, and the IRS does not suggest plausible illicit activity.”).

Similarly, the “bare allegation” that Mr. Miley and Mr. Haggerty were exerting political pressure

on the District Attorney to bring charges is a conclusory statement that is “little more than a 

formulaic recitation of the elements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009); see also Riley 

v. City of Richmond, No. C 13-4752 MMC, 2014 WL 1101036, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) 

(finding that “plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that ‘the case lacked probable cause for 

prosecution’ [] and that defendants ‘provided misinformation’ to and ‘concealed exculpatory 

evidence’ from the prosecutor [], are insufficient as a matter of law”). 

Nor have Plaintiffs included specific allegations which tie Alameda County, the Alameda 

County Board of Supervisors, the Alameda County Auditor-Controller Agency, and Patrick 

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O’Connell to the alleged wrongful prosecution. Indeed, for Defendants the Alameda County 

Auditor-Controller Agency and Patrick O’Connell, the only allegation as to them has nothing do 

with the District Attorney and instead is that they “created a fraudulent accounting purporting to 

verify that ACAP lacked funds to go forward” so that Mr. Miley and Mr. Haggerty could 

dismantle ACAP and dismiss all its employees including Mr. Daniels. (FAC at ¶ 17.) Similarly, 

while there are numerous allegations with respect to Alameda County and the Alameda County 

Board of Supervisors, there are no allegations which tie these entities’ actions to Plaintiffs’ 

prosecution except for the allegation that an “Alameda County representative” threatened Ms. 

Dillard at the mediation of her Brown Act case that if she did not refund the settlement payment 

she and Mr. Daniels would be prosecuted. (FAC at ¶ 27.) This vague allegation that an unnamed 

Alameda County representative threatened Ms. Dillard does not plausibly support an inference 

that the Alameda County Board of Supervisors or Alameda County caused the District Attorney’s 

Office to bring charges two weeks later—two months before the Brown Act case settled. (Id. at ¶ 

29.)

Plaintiffs have therefore again failed to allege a plausible basis for liability as to any 

Defendant. 

2) Absence of Probable Cause

“[A] plaintiff alleging a retaliatory prosecution must show the absence of probable cause

for the underlying criminal charge. If there was probable cause, the case ends.” Lozman v. City of

Riviera Beach, Fla., 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1952 (2018) (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265-

66 (2006)); see also Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 (2019) (“It has long been “settled 

law” that retaliatory prosecution requires proving “the want of probable cause”). The same 

probable cause analysis applies to a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim. See Awabdy, 368 

F.3d at 1066 (“to prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff ‘must show that 

the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause...’” (citation omitted)).

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs insist that the probable cause determination is based on 

federal law rather than state law. The Court, however, already considered and rejected this 

argument in its prior order. Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the Ninth Circuit meant something other 

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than what it said when it stated “[w]e look to California law to determine the legal effect of the 

state court’s action because we have incorporated the relevant elements of the common law tort of 

malicious prosecution into our analysis under § 1983,” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 

1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004), is without support. And indeed, less than six months ago, the Ninth 

Circuit restated this rule in Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. 

denied sub nom. Mills v. Covina, CA, No. 19-321, 2019 WL 5150535 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2019) 

(stating that “Federal courts rely on state common law for elements of malicious prosecution.”). 

This Court is bound by the Ninth Circuit and Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 

in Blue v. Lopez, 901 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2018), is thus unpersuasive. Likewise, the Court 

squarely rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the Supreme Court in Hartman somehow overruled 

Awabdy and Plaintiffs have provided no reason to reconsider this holding. Accordingly, 

California law governs whether probable cause supports Plaintiffs’ convictions.

“In California, as in virtually every other jurisdiction, it is a long-standing principle of 

common law that a decision by a judge or magistrate to hold a defendant to answer after a 

preliminary hearing constitutes prima facie—but not conclusive—evidence of probable cause.” 

Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067 (collecting cases). A plaintiff can rebut a “finding of probable cause [] 

by showing that the criminal prosecution was induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated 

evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith.” Id. Where, however, “a trier of fact 

after a fair adversary hearing reach[ed] a determination on the merits against the defendant in the 

prior proceeding” there is a “conclusive presumption of probable cause” and “the defendant in that 

proceeding may not thereafter institute an action for malicious prosecution, whether the matter 

was criminal or civil, even though he shows that the determination in question was reversed on 

appeal or set aside by the trial judge.” Cowles v. Carter, 115 Cal. App. 3d 350, 358 (1981); see 

also Norton v. John M.C. Marble Co., 30 Cal.App.2d 451, 454-55 (1939) (holding that a 

conviction establishes probable cause). The only exception to this conclusive presumption is 

where the conviction is obtained by means of fraud or perjury. Cowles, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 358; 

see also Plumley v. Mockett, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1031, 1053 (2008) (collecting cases re: the same); 

Rest.2d Torts, § 667(1) [“The conviction of the accused by a magistrate or trial court, although 

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reversed by an appellate tribunal, conclusively establishes the existence of probable cause, unless 

the conviction was obtained by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means”].).

Because Plaintiffs were convicted of some counts and acquitted of others, the Court must 

engage in separate analysis of each.

a) Probable Cause for Convicted Counts

Plaintiffs were convicted of grand theft by false pretenses for unlawfully taking grant funds 

from DHHS (Count 2) and making a false account of public moneys by signing and sending false 

and inaccurate letters to DHHS (Count 3), and Ms. Dillard was separately convicted of preparing 

false and ante-dated documentary evidence by preparing a memoranda regarding the residency 

status of agency clients and an agenda of a seminar at a hotel (Count 6). (FAC, Ex. A, Dkt. No. 51 

at 26.). Their convictions conclusively establish probable cause. See Plumley, 164 Cal. App. 4th 

at 1053 (“[V]ictory at trial. . . conclusively establishes probable cause to bring the underlying 

action”); see also Cowles, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 358; Norton, 30 Cal. App. 2d at 454-55. Thus, 

Plaintiffs can only show that these convictions lacked probable cause if they were obtained by 

fraud or perjury. 

Plaintiffs advance two arguments.2 First, Plaintiffs contend—as they did in response to the 

prior motion to dismiss—that the convictions are invalid or void because they violated the 

Supremacy Clause. However, Plaintiffs’ argument that a reversal based on federal preemption 

eliminates the otherwise conclusive presumption of probable cause is not supported by the law. 

See Plumley, 164 Cal. App. 4th at 1052; see also Cowles, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 355 (1981) (“In the 

event the plaintiff in the prior action obtains judgment after trial, such judgment is, unless 

procured by fraud, conclusive proof that the proceedings were prosecuted with probable cause, 

notwithstanding the fact that the judgment is reversed on appeal.”) (emphasis added); Norton, 30 

Cal. App. 2d at 454 (“a final judgment duly rendered after trial on the merits, in a court having 

complete jurisdiction, adverse to the defendant in the proceedings in which the judgment is 

rendered, is, unless procured by fraud which may be either extrinsic or intrinsic, conclusive proof 

 

2 Plaintiffs make no argument regarding Ms. Dillard’s conviction on Count 6.

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that the proceedings were prosecuted with probable cause, notwithstanding the fact that the 

judgment is reversed on appeal.”) (emphasis added).

Second, Plaintiffs insist that Defendants fraudulently manufactured the theft by false 

pretenses and making a false account of public moneys counts, both of which related to the use of 

the AFI grant funds. In particular, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Ambrose “acting under directions 

from Haggerty, Miley, and the Alameda Board of Supervisors, refused to cooperate with DHHS to 

adjust the status of the AFI grant, and instead deliberately caused DHHS to issue a deficiency 

notice, so that the deficiency notice could be used as a tool to craft a state law theft cause of action 

against Dillard and Daniels, in violation of federal DHHS policies and federal regulations.” (FAC 

at ¶ 21.) However, Plaintiffs do not dispute that they drew down the AFI grant fund or that they 

made a false accounting to DHHS; instead, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants—after the draw down

and after their termination—refused to work with DHHS to fix the problems with the AFI grant 

despite the fact that DHHS’s own internal operating procedures and the AFI grant regulations 

required the agency to “work with grantee ACAP to adjust accounting to bring the grant into 

compliance.” (Id.) These allegations do not plausibly support an inference that the convictions 

related to Plaintiffs’ use of the AFI funds were procured by fraud; indeed, according to the FAC, 

the trial judge excluded evidence “of the propriety of the county’s interference with the federal 

Department of Health and Human Services’ administration of its grant program.” (Id. at ¶ 32.) 

What Defendants did after Plaintiffs committed the acts which led to their convictions does not 

plausibly support an inference that Plaintiffs’ convictions were obtained by fraud.

b) Probable Cause for Acquitted Counts

Plaintiffs were acquitted of two charges: (1) conspiracy to commit grand theft by false 

pretenses for submitting a false certification to DHHS (Count 1), and (2) using public moneys for 

a purpose not authorized by law; namely improperly using over $280,000 of funds intended for a 

DHHS grant program to fund agency payroll and other expenses (Count 4). (Dkt. No. 51 at 26.) 

Ms. Dillard was also acquitted of appropriating money for her own use by instructing employees 

to work on her personal residence at below-market rates and obtaining reimbursement for 

improper business expenses (Count 5). (Id.)

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“In California, as in virtually every other jurisdiction, it is a long-standing principle of 

common law that a decision by a judge or magistrate to hold a defendant to answer after a 

preliminary hearing constitutes prima facie—but not conclusive—evidence of probable cause.” 

Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067 (collecting cases re: same). “[A] plaintiff can rebut a prima facie 

finding of probable cause by showing that the criminal prosecution was induced by fraud, 

corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith.” Id. 

Thus, the question is whether Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to support a plausible 

inference that their criminal prosecutions for Counts 1, 4, and 5 were induced by fraud, corruption, 

perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith.

Plaintiffs’ only argument with respect to Count 4 is that it is void because it violated the 

Supremacy Clause. The Court has already considered and rejected this argument, supra. With 

respect to Count 1, Plaintiffs allege that to induce the District Attorney to file this count

“Defendants misled the District Attorney to believe that Paul Daniels had stolen a computer from 

ACAP, altered data, and then returned the computer to ACAP.” (FAC at ¶ 30.) However, Count 

1 was for conspiracy to commit grand theft by false pretenses for submitting a false certification to 

DHHS regarding the availability of non-federal match funds in a Citibank account. (Dkt. No. 51 

at 25-26.) Plaintiffs offer no explanation as to how the false accusation that Mr. Daniels stole a 

computer led to Count 1 which related to the availability of funds in a Citibank account. Plaintiffs 

have thus not alleged facts that support a plausible inference that the Count 1 charge was induced 

by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad 

faith.

As for Count 5, which charged Ms. Daniels with appropriating public money for her own 

use “by instructing employees to work on her personal residence at below-market rates and 

obtaining reimbursement for improper business expenses,” (Dkt. No. 15-2 at 20), Plaintiffs allege 

“Defendants induced the District Attorney to file this meritless charge by supplying a 

reimbursement receipt that had been altered and then duplicated at the Alameda County AuditorController Agency.” (FAC at ¶ 30.) Aside from Plaintiffs’ failure to identify any particular 

Defendant who supplied the receipt, they do not make any allegations regarding the receipt that 

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would support an inference that it was material to the charging decision. See Blankenhorn v. City 

of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 482 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs can rebut the prima facie showing of 

probable cause by alleging that “the criminal proceedings were initiated on the basis of the 

defendants’ intentional and knowingly false accusations and other malicious conduct.” Awabdy, 

368 F.3d at 1067 (emphasis added); see also Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 

1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (“a coroner’s reckless or intentional falsification of an autopsy report that 

plays a material role in the false arrest and prosecution of an individual can support a claim under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983”). Plaintiffs have not alleged facts that support a plausible inference that Ms. 

Dillard’s prosecution on Count 5 was based on this unidentified falsified receipt. 

Further, Count 5 was based on two acts: obtaining reimbursement for personal expenses, 

and Ms. Dillard instructing employees to work at her personal residence at below-market rates. 

While a receipt could conceivably be material to the prosecution of Ms. Dillard for the first act, it 

appears irrelevant to the second act. Indeed, when asked at oral argument what more Plaintiffs 

could allege as to this receipt if given leave to amend, Plaintiffs did not proffer any facts relevant 

to Ms. Dillard having employees work at her personal residence.

Plaintiffs’ argument that the entire prosecution was tainted by fraud, corruption, and 

wrongful conduct because it was done so that Mr. Miley and Mr. Haggerty could “continue their 

corrupt practices,” so that the County could obtain an insurance payment, and to punish Plaintiffs 

all goes to the why and not the how of the prosecution. 3(Dkt. No. 55 at 17.) It is not enough in a 

malicious or retaliatory prosecution action to allege why the defendants might have wrongfully 

done something, plaintiffs must allege that the defendants’ actions “were instrumental in causing 

the filing and prosecution of the criminal proceedings.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1068 (emphasis 

added). This Plaintiffs have not done.

***

 

3 Likewise, Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants spoliated evidence prior to their trial by 

expunging ACAP’s computer server such that they were “[un]able to obtain exculpatory evidence 

when Defendants moved forward with their plan to have them prosecuted” fails to allege what 

evidence was destroyed or how such evidence was material to their defense. (FAC at ¶ 23.) 

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Plaintiffs have again failed to plead facts sufficient to overcome the conclusive 

presumption of probable cause with respect to the convicted counts or the prima facie showing of 

probable cause with respect to the acquitted counts, and have failed to tie their allegations of 

wrongdoing to specific actions by any defendant let alone each defendant. The Court therefore 

dismisses the section 1983 claim. The dismissal is without leave to amend. The Court previously 

granted leave, and specifically advised Plaintiffs that they must allege facts that support an 

inference that each Defendant induced the allegedly wrongful criminal charge. Yet the amended 

complaint does not do so. Putting that deficiency aside, Plaintiffs also fail to allege any facts that 

tie any particular fraudulent conduct to the charges. While at oral argument Plaintiffs suggested 

that they could allege more about the unidentified receipt that somehow led to Count 5 against Ms. 

Dillard, the proffered allegations as to the receipt are unrelated to the charge that Ms. Dillard had 

employees work on her personal residence at below-market rates. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ attempt to obtain compensation for the personal and financial hardship they 

have suffered as a result of their prosecution is understandable. The law, however, does not 

permit recovery merely because a defendant is acquitted or a conviction reversed; instead, 

compensation is permitted only when the prosecuted persons can prove that deliberate misconduct 

caused the prosecution. Plaintiffs are unable to allege facts to meet this burden. 

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the section 1983 claim is 

GRANTED without leave to amend. The state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. See 

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

This Order disposes of Docket No. 54. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 2, 2019

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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