Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06327/USCOURTS-ca10-92-06327-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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F APPEALS F I L . . J ' UNITED STATES COURT O --united States Cor,r,of Appea1• ~renth Cil":uit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ALMER K. GOLDSMITH, JR., ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ROY CHAMPION, and ATTORNEY GENERAL) 

OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

MAR19 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-6327 

(D.C. No. CIV-92-1354-A) 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Mr. Goldsmith, a state inmate, appeals the denial of habeas 

corpus relief. 

Mr. Goldsmith was convicted on June 19, 1990 of possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute after former conviction of two 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

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Appellate Case: 92-6327 Document: 010110191187 Date Filed: 03/19/1993 Page: 1 
or more felonies and sentenced to forty years imprisonment. Mr. 

Goldsmith, who was represented by retained counsel, appealed his 

conviction to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and filed 

his brief-in-chief on April 29, 1991. Mr. Goldsmith's direct 

appeal came of issue on June 28, 1991, when the state filed its 

timely response brief. 

Mr. Goldsmith filed his prose habeas corpus petition with 

the federal c ourt on July 22, 1992. Mr. Goldsmith adopts by 

reference his brief-in-chief, as filed with the Oklahoma Court o f 

Criminal Appeals, and the claims stated therein . Mr. Goldsmith 

further alleges denial of due process as the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals has yet to hear his direct appeal "because of 

that court's overwhelming backlog of unresolved appeals." He 

asserts the delay "prejudices his ability to defend himself at 

a new trial" and argues "the state's inordinate delay ... bars the 

... requirement of exhaustion." 

The district c ourt first found this case should not be joined 

with the cases consolidated for hearing pursuant to Harris v. 

Champion, 938 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1991) , reasoning it to be 

distinguishable as Mr. Goldsmith was represented in his direct 

appeal by retained counsel and the state court briefs were timely 

filed with no extensions. 

The district court then dismissed Mr. Goldsmith's habeas 

corpus petition, without prejudice, after concluding the delay was 

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Appellate Case: 92-6327 Document: 010110191187 Date Filed: 03/19/1993 Page: 2 
not inordinate and therefore Mr. Goldsmith had to exhaust his 

state remedies. 

Mr. Goldsmith appeals arguing that thirteen months, which 

extends from the date his direct appeal came of issue to the date 

he filed his federal habeas corpus action, with no decision by the 

Oklahoma Court of Appeals is an inordinate delay. 

11 [A] state [inmate] is relieved of his obligation to exhaust 

his state remedies whenever there has been excessive and 

unjustified delay in the disposition of his state direct or postconviction remedy proceeding." Harris, 938 F.2d at 1064 (quoting 

D. Wilkes, Federal and State Postconviction Remedies and Relief 

§§ 8-19, at 186 (1987)). In Prescher v. Crouse, 431 F.2d 209, 

210-11 (10th Cir. 1970), we held a fifteen month delay in waiting 

for an appeal was not necessarily inordinate. 

We cannot hold, under the facts of this case, that thirteen 

months is an inordinate delay. Mr. Goldsmith fails to demonstrate 

why the delay is unjustified or how the delay caused him 

prejudice, instead, he claims that the mere passage of thirteen 

months time supports his due process claim. 

is void of any details which might help 

The record on appeal 

us resolve whether 

thirteen months is excessive delay in this case. While a thirteen 

month delay raises constitutional concerns, we will not hold, 

under these circumstances, that Mr. Goldsmith's delay is excessive 

or unjustified. Therefore, Mr. Goldsmith must first exhaust his 

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Appellate Case: 92-6327 Document: 010110191187 Date Filed: 03/19/1993 Page: 3 
state remedies. Since the district court dismissed the habeas 

corpus petition without prejudice, Mr. Goldsmith is not precluded 

from again petitioning for habeas corpus relief should he be able 

to show any further delay to be both excessive and unjustified. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED . 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 92-6327 Document: 010110191187 Date Filed: 03/19/1993 Page: 4