Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00166/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00166-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO MD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert Jay Crowley, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Apache Junction Police Chief, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-00166-PHX-SPL (MHB) 

ORDER 

On January 28, 2014, Plaintiff Robert Jay Crowley, who was confined in the Pinal 

County Jail, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) 

and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a January 31, 2014 Order, the 

Court denied the deficient Application to Proceed and gave Plaintiff 30 days to either pay 

the filing and administrative fees or file a complete Application to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis. On February 11, 2014, Plaintiff filed a new Application to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis. In an April 21, 2014 Order, the Court denied the deficient Application to 

Proceed and gave Plaintiff 30 days to either pay the filing and administrative fees or file a 

complete Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. On May 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed 

another Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. On June 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a 

Notice of Change of Address, indicating that he was no longer in custody. In a June 6, 

2014 Order, the Court granted the Application to Proceed and required Plaintiff to either 

pay the filing fee or show good cause why he cannot pay. On July 3, 2014, Plaintiff paid 

the filing fee. 

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The Court will dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

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stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 

facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 

of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but because it may 

possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend. 

II. Complaint 

 In his eight-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues Apache Junction Police Detectives 

Jason Riggs #222 and Chacom #145, the Apache Junction Police Chief, and Pinal County 

Sheriff Paul Babeu. Plaintiff seeks damages. 

 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated 

and alleges the following facts: On or about June 6, 2013, around 1:30 p.m., Defendants 

Riggs and Chacom stopped Plaintiff in his 1966 Chevy Truck, Arizona license plate 

number HVRT67, and arrested Plaintiff for dangerous drug sales. A search warrant to 

search Plaintiff’s 2002 Chevy Truck, Arizona license plate numberAJX9166, was 

reportedly executed at 3:15 p.m., although there is no time stamp on the face of that 

search warrant, and search warrant number SW-2013-0016 “has failed to be public 

information.” Plaintiff contends there was no probable cause. 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were 

violated on or about June 6, 2013 by an “illegal unvalid execution of a search warrant.” 

As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he lost his home and all the property inside due to a 

burglary. Property was “unsecured by AJPD Detectives & officers. Warrant not 

properly served (executed). Property not named in search warrant.” 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were 

violated on or about June 6, 2013 when he lost his “business & livel[i]hood; not named in 

search warrant by Apache Junction Police Department.” 

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 In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were 

violated on or about June 6, 2013 when he lost his 1966 Chevy truck with Arizona 

license plate number HVRT67 “not named in search warrant due to theft & unsecured by 

AJPD.” 

 In Count Five, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were 

violated on or about June 6, 2013 when he lost his 2002 Harley Davidson Night Train 

“not named in search warrant due to theft unsecured by AJPD.” 

 In Count Six, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were 

violated on or about June 6, 2013 when he lost his 1991 International Harvester Hydrotilt 

Truck “not named in search warrant due to theft unsecured by AJPD.” 

 In Count Seven, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were 

violated on or about June 6, 2013 when he lost $100,000 “worth of equipment & tools not 

named on said search warrant due to theft of unsecured property by AJPD.” 

 In Count Eight, Plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were 

violated, that he has lost equal protection under the law, and “unlawful imprisonment & 

detainment” by Defendant Babeu. Plaintiff further alleges that he has been denied his 

civil right “guilty till innocent” and was “not allowed to file charges against the people 

who[] stole from [him] as a result of AJPD’s action of failure to protect [his] right & 

property.” 

III. Failure to State a Claim

 To prevail in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the 

defendants (2) under color of state law (3) deprived her of federal rights, privileges or 

immunities and (4) caused her damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 

1163-64 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game 

Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that she 

suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and she must 

allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

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A. Apache Junction Police Chief 

 Plaintiff names the Apache Junction Police Chief as a Defendant. While the 

Apache Junction Police Chief may be sued under § 1983, Plaintiff fails to state a claim 

against him or her. 

 To state a claim against a defendant, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply 

conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of 

his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). For an 

individual to be liable in his official capacity, a plaintiff must allege that the official acted 

as a result of a policy, practice, or custom. See Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 

1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, there is no respondeat superior liability under 

§1983, so a defendant’s position as the supervisor of someone who allegedly violated a 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not make him liable. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 

436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A 

supervisor in his individual capacity, “is only liable for constitutional violations of his 

subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 

violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. 

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts against the Apache Junction Police Chief. 

Plaintiff does not allege that the Apache Junction Police Chief violated his constitutional 

rights, nor does he allege facts to support that Plaintiff’s rights were violated as a result of 

a policy, custom, or practice promulgated, endorsed, or condoned by the Apache Junction 

Police Chief. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the Apache Junction 

Police Chief and the Apache Junction Police Chief will be dismissed. 

B. Babeu 

 Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against Defendant Babeu. Plaintiff makes one 

conclusory allegation in Count Eight that he has “lost equal protection under the law & 

unlawful imprisonment & detainment by Sheriff Paul Babeu.” It is not clear if Plaintiff’s 

claim against Babeu is based on a theory of respondeat superior or if Plaintiff is alleging 

that Babeu personally imprisoned and detained him. As noted, there is no respondeat 

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superior liability under §1983. Therefore, if Plaintiff’s claim is that Babeu supervised 

someone who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, then that claim fails. In 

addition, Plaintiff has presented no facts supporting that Babeu actually participated in or 

directed any alleged violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent 

them. Finally, Plaintiff does not allege facts to support that Plaintiff’s rights were 

violated as a result of a policy, custom, or practice promulgated, endorsed, or condoned 

by Babeu. Accordingly, Defendant Babeu will be dismissed. 

C. Count One 

 Plaintiff alleges in Count One that he was arrested by Defendants Riggs and 

Chacom and deprived of his freedom and liberty. To establish that he was wrongly 

arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff must show that Defendants made 

the arrest without probable cause. Dubner v. City & County of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 964 

(9th Cir. 2001). To determine whether arresting officers had probable cause at the time 

of a warrantless arrest, the Court considers “whether at that moment the facts and 

circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge . . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent 

man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.” 

Edgerly v. City & County of San Francisco, 495 F.3d 645, 651 (9th Cir. 2007). 

“Probable cause supports an arrest so long as the arresting officers had probable cause to 

arrest the suspect for any criminal offense, regardless of their stated reason for the arrest.” 

Id. at 651-52. 

 Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that he was arrested 

without probable cause. Plaintiff makes one conclusory assertion in Count One regarding 

probable cause, and the Court cannot tell if Plaintiff’s assertion, “without probal [sic] 

cause,” refers to his arrest or the search warrant. Regardless, a mere conclusory assertion 

that officers lacked probable cause is insufficient to state a claim, and Count One and 

Defendants Riggs and Chacom will be dismissed. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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D. Counts Two through Seven 

 In Counts Two through Seven, Plaintiff alleges that he lost his home and all the 

property inside his home (Count Two), his business and livelihood (Count Three), a 1966 

Chevy truck (Count Four), a 2002 Harley Davidson Night Train (Count Five), a 1991 

International Harvester Hydrotilt truck (Count Six), and $100,000 worth of equipment 

and tools (Count Seven). In each of those counts, Plaintiff alleges that the property was 

not named in a search warrant. In all but Count Three, Plaintiff appears to allege that his 

property was stolen because it was unsecured either by “AJPD detectives & officers” 

(Count Two) or simply by the “AJPD” (Counts Four, Five, Six, and Seven). 

 In addition to failing to name an identifiable defendant responsible for the alleged 

deprivations of property, Plaintiff fails to state a claim in Counts Two, Four, Five, Six 

and Seven because he has an adequate post-deprivation remedy in state court. In Parratt 

v. Taylor, the Supreme Court held that due process is not violated when a state employee 

negligently deprives an individual of property, as long as the state makes available a 

meaningful post-deprivation remedy. 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), overruled on other 

grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The rationale underlying Parratt

is that pre-deprivation procedures are impractical when the deprivation of property 

occurs through negligent conduct of a state employee because a state cannot know when 

such deprivations will occur. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Moreover, 

“[w]here a government official’s act causing injury to life, liberty, or property is merely 

negligent, ‘no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required.’” Daniels, 474 

U.S. at 333 (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 548) (emphasis added). 

 The logic of Parratt has been extended to intentional unauthorized deprivations of 

property by state actors because a state also cannot know when such deprivations will 

occur. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. As with negligent deprivations, where a state makes 

available a meaningful post-deprivation remedy, such as a common-law tort suit for 

intentional unauthorized deprivations, a federal due process claim is precluded. Hudson, 

468 U.S. at 534-35; King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 826 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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 In this case, Plaintiff fails to state a claim because he has an available adequate 

post-deprivation remedy in Arizona state courts. See Howland v. State, 818 P.2d 1169, 

1172-73 (Ariz. App. 1991) (the prisoner failed to state a due process claim where Arizona 

law provided an available state tort remedy to recover the value of his property). Thus, 

Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim regarding the loss of his property and Counts 

Two, Four, Five, Six and Seven, and those Counts will be dismissed. 

 As to Count Three, although Plaintiff claims that he lost his livelihood and 

business, it is not clear from Plaintiff’s cursory allegation what happened to cause him to 

lose his business and livelihood. Moreover, if Plaintiff were able to prevail on a claim 

such as wrongful arrest and imprisonment, and if the loss of Plaintiff’s business and 

livelihood were a result of that wrongful arrest and imprisonment, then the loss of 

Plaintiff’s business and livelihood would be an element of Plaintiff’s damage claim and 

not a separate constitutional violation. Accordingly, Count Three is dismissed. 

E. Count Eight 

 Plaintiff’s allegations in Count Eight are mostly unintelligible. He purports to 

bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim and states that he has lost “equal protection under 

the law,” was unlawfully imprisoned and detained by Defendant Babeu, has been denied 

his “civil right guilty till innocent,” and was “not allowed to file charges against the 

people” who stole from him. 

 Aside from the allegation that Defendant Babeu unlawfully imprisoned and 

detained him, Plaintiff fails to state who specifically denied him equal protection, his 

civil rights, or prevented him from filing charges. Moreover, Plaintiff’s vague and 

conclusory allegations fail to support an equal protection, or any other, claim. Although 

pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), 

conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of 

Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a liberal 

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim 

that were not initially pled. Id. Accordingly, Count Eight will be dismissed. 

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 In addition, “[t]o state a claim . . . for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . 

. [,] a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to 

discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Barren v. 

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has not alleged he is a 

member of a protected class. 

 The United States Supreme Court has also recognized “successful equal protection 

claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that [he] has been 

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational 

basis for the difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 

564 (2000); see also SeaRiver Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 

662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002). Even under this standard, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege that he was treated differently than other similarly situated 

individuals and that there was no rational basis for treating him differently. 

IV. Leave to Amend 

 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a 

first amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The Clerk of Court will 

mail Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a first amended complaint. If 

Plaintiff fails to use the court-approved form, the Court may strike the amended 

complaint and dismiss this action without further notice to Plaintiff. 

 If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must write short, plain statements 

telling the Court: (1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the name 

of the Defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly what that Defendant did or failed to 

do; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation of 

Plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of 

that Defendant’s conduct. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-72, 377. 

 Plaintiff must repeat this process for each person he names as a Defendant. If 

Plaintiff fails to affirmatively link the conduct of each named Defendant with the specific 

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injury suffered by Plaintiff, the allegations against that Defendant will be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim. Conclusory allegations that a Defendant or group of 

Defendants has violated a constitutional right are not acceptable and will be 

dismissed. 

 Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “First 

Amended Complaint.” The first amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its 

entirety on the court-approved form and may not incorporate any part of the original 

Complaint by reference. Plaintiff may include only one claim per count. 

 A first amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 

F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat an original 

complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised 

in the original complaint and that was voluntarily dismissed or was dismissed without 

prejudice is waived if it is not alleged in a first amended complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 

V. Warnings

A. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

B. Copies

 Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See

LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further 

notice to Plaintiff. 

 C. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik, 963 

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F.2d at 1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any 

order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff 

has 30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a first amended complaint in 

compliance with this Order. 

 (2) If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of 

Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with 

prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

(3) The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved form for filing a 

civil rights complaint by a prisoner. 

 Dated this 11th day of July, 2014.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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