Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00372/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00372-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donald J Gregory, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Arizona Division of Child Support 

Enforcement, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV11-0372-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 After the Court dismissed pro se Plaintiff’s complaint on May 10, 2011 (Doc. 10), 

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 27, 2011 seeking injunctive and other 

equitable relief (Doc. 11). Defendant Melanie Gregory filed a motion to dismiss the 

amended claims against her (Doc. 15), and Plaintiff has not filed a timely response. 

 Defendant argues the complaint should be dismissed for several reasons, 

including: (1) no allegations are pled against her (Doc. 15 at 5); (2) the complaint fails to 

explain how Defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other causes of action (Doc. 15 

at 4); and (3) the complaint fails to allege plausibly that Defendant was involved in the 

proceedings challenged by the complaint (id.). Defendant urges the Court to award her 

attorney fees pursuant to Rule 54(d), framing the complaint as vexatious. Doc. 15 at 5. 

 A pro se complaint is to be construed liberally, and should not be dismissed with 

prejudice unless it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove [any] set of facts in 

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

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521 (1972) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); accord Weilburg v. 

Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007). A pro se complaint must be dismissed 

without prejudice, however, if it fails to give the defendant fair notice of the claims 

against her and the ground on which the claims rest. See Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers’ 

Int’l Ass’n, 804 F.2d 1472, 1482 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that modern pleading standards are higher with regard to 

plausibility but that pro se plaintiffs’ pleadings should nonetheless be construed 

liberally). 

 The complaint alleges that every year Defendant Melanie Gregory files requests to 

have the Arizona Division of Child Support Enforcement (“ADCSE”) collect child 

support payments from Plaintiff. Doc. 11 at 2:17-22. Plaintiff also alleges that he is no 

longer required to pay any child support (id. at 2-8), that a September 2008 determination 

by the ADCSE lists Plaintiff as owing support to a child to whom support was never 

owed (id. at 3-4), and that Plaintiff has had liens levied against his property as a result of 

invalid child-support determinations and proceedings (id. at 5-6). The complaint appears 

to assert seven causes of action: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of 42 

U.S.C. § 1985; (3) conspiracy; (4) fraud; (5) common law conspiracy; (6) negligent 

infliction of emotional distress; and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Doc. 11 at 2. 

 The flaw in the complaint is not that it fails to allege facts that may entitle Plaintiff 

to at least some sort of relief from Defendant under some legal right, but that it fails to 

(1) allege sufficient facts to give Defendant Melanie Gregory fair notice of which claims 

are asserted against her and the factual and legal basis of those claims, and (2) fails to 

plead sufficient facts from which the Court may conclude Defendant is liable under any 

of the seven causes of action cited above. With regard to Defendant Gregory, the 

complaint only alleges that she annually submits requests for child support to the ADCSE 

and that as a result of ADCSE’s actions related to those requests Plaintiff was wrongfully 

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injured. As a non-exhaustive example, the complaint does not allege facts that if 

assumed true show Defendant agreed or conspired with ADCSE to violate Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights, or that Defendant provided misinformation to ADCSE. Moreover, 

the complaint does not appear to suggest that all claims are asserted against Defendant 

Gregory – in fact, many of the claims appear leveled at the ADCSE. In the absence of 

fair notice, Defendant should not be required to expend legal resources to guess which 

claims are asserted against her or to defend all claims “just in case.” Nor should 

Defendant be subjected to discovery in the absence of properly-pled claims. Cafasso, 

U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 

pleading must state ‘enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will 

reveal evidence of [the misconduct alleged].’” (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007))). The complaint against Defendant Gregory will be dismissed 

without prejudice due to deficient pleading. 

 Defendant’s request for attorney fees under Rule 54(d) will be denied, however, 

because Defendant fails to make the showing required by Rule 54(d)(2)(B). 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) is granted as 

stated above. 

 Dated this 27th day of July, 2011. 

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