Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02313/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02313-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAS ADISA GAMBA OLUWA,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-2313 ALA P 

vs.

M. PEREZ, et al., ORDER

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff Ras Adisa Gamba Oluwa is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that the

Board of Prison Term (“BPT”) denied his request for a term setting hearing in violation of his

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Before this Court is Defendant M. Perez’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed

May 4, 2007, and Defendant M. Perez’s Motion for Summary Judgment, also filed on May 4,

2007. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is moot.

I

Plaintiff is serving a sentence of 15-years to life for second degree murder. In his

verified complaint, he alleges that in or about August 2004 he requested the BPT “to

perform his overdue term setting hearing which is normally independent of parole

consideration hearings pursuant to Chairman’s Directive No. 75/30.” Compl. at ¶ IV. He

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 On November 28, 2007, this Court also granted Defendant’s request for judicial notice

of the California Department and Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) web page outlining

the various Divisions and Boards under the purview of the CDCR.

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claims that, although “such hearings were given to other 2nd degree murders,” the BPT

declined his request. Id. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief that the BPT’s denial of his

request for a term setting hearing violates his equal protection and due process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Plaintiff also seeks a permanent injunction

ordering the BPT to grant him “an immediate term setting hearing in accordance with no.

75/30 without reference to parole suitability.” Id.

On November 28, 2007, this Court granted Defendant’s request for judicial notice

of documents filed in Oluwa v. Director of California Department of Corrections, et al.,

Case No. 2:04-CV-0233 MCE GGH P (“Oluwa I”).1

 Plaintiff filed the complaint in

Oluwa I in the United States District Court in the Eastern District of California on

January 29, 2004. In the Oluwa I complaint, Plaintiff sought, among other relief, “an

order commanding the Director of the Department of Corrections to transmit sentencing

records to the Board of Prisons Terms with notification that the Board (BPT) is to

conduct a ‘distinct’ term-setting hearing for [Plaintiff].” Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. A

(Compl. at ¶ V). 

The Oluwa I court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on March

22, 2007. Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. B (findings and recommendations), Ex. C (order

adopting findings and recommendations). The Oluwa I court explained the issue:

Plaintiff maintains that he has a right to a distinct term-setting hearing

without consideration of suitability under a 1975 directive of the CDCR

Director . . . Defendant asserts that plaintiff has no independent rights under

the 1975 directive (as plaintiff describes it, Chairman’s Directive 75/30),

including any right to a distinct term-setting hearing outside the parole

hearing process . . . [because] that Directive 75/30 is an outdated and

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obsolete CDC provision that does not apply to plaintiff’s sentence and

therefore does not create an independent right to a hearing beyond the

established parole rights and procedures afforded to life prisoners under

state law. 

Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. B at 7:17-24, 8:16-19. The Oluwa I court ruled that

plaintiff’s claim was without merit, in part, because plaintiff’s crime and sentence

occurred after 1977 and the “provisions of Chairman’s Directive 75/30 plainly apply to

the setting of primary terms on indeterminate sentences imposed for felonies committed

prior to July 1, 1977.” Id. at 9:24-25, 10:11-11:9. 

II

In the instant case, the Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on

the ground that this case is duplicative to Oluwa I. Specifically, Defendant argues that

Plaintiff’s “present lawsuit involves the same subject matter, at the same time, in the same

court, and against the same defendant” as in Oluwa I. Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at

3:19-22. Plaintiff contends that the instant case is not duplicative because Oluwa I “did

not assert identical claims for relief, against parties in privy to one another, and has not

received a final judgment on the merits.” Opp’n to Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 2:6-8. 

Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]fter the

pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a party may move for judgment

on the pleadings.” “‘A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the

allegations in the pleading as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.’” Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1999)

(citations omitted). The court must assume the truthfulness of the material facts alleged

in the complaint. All inferences reasonably drawn from these facts must be construed in

favor of the responding party. Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v.

Seventh Day Adventist Congregation Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir.1989). 

If matters outside the pleadings are considered, the motion shall be treated as one

for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(d). However, when considering a motion

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 Thus, here, the Court will consider the allegations in the complaint and the

documents which were judicially noticed in the order dated November 28, 2007.

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for judgment on the pleadings, a district court “may consider facts that ‘are contained in

materials of which the court may take judicial notice.’” Heliotrope Gen., 189 F.3d at 981

n.18 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).2

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the proper remedy for

duplicative litigation is dismissal. See Adams v. Cal. Dept. of Health Services, 487 F.3d

684 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, — S. Ct. —, 2007 WL 2945087 (Dec. 10, 2007)

(upholding the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of a duplicative action). Plaintiffs

generally have “no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject

matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.” Id. at 688. 

“To determine whether a suit is duplicative, we borrow from the test for claim

preclusion.” Id. “Thus, in assessing whether the second action is duplicative of the first,

we examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or

privies to the action, are the same.” Id. at 689. 

A

The “transaction test” is used to determine whether two actions are the same. Id. 

In applying this test, four criteria are considered: “(1) whether rights or interests

established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the

second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two

actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether

the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Id. (explaining that the

“‘last of these criteria is the most important’”) (citations omitted).

Here, the claims and relief sought in Oluwa I arise out of the same transactional

nucleus of facts as in the instant case. In both cases, Plaintiff claims his constitutional

rights were violated and seeks a term setting hearing, distinct from and without reference

to parole suitability, which he claims is mandated by Chairman’s Directive 75/30. 

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 The Court notes that in Oluwa I, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Judgment on April

4, 2007. It appears from the docket that this motion is currently pending.

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Compare Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. A (Compl. at ¶ V) with Compl. at ¶ V. The only

difference between the two suits is that in Oluwa I Plaintiff also requested that “the

Director of Corrections transmit [Plaintiff’s] sentencing records to the Board of Prison

Terms.” Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. A (Compl. at ¶ V). However, Plaintiff only

requested that those records be transmitted so that BPT would conduct a “distinct” term

setting hearing. Id. 

Because Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts as

asserted in Oluwa I, substantially the same evidence would be used in the instant case to

determine whether there was infringement on Plaintiff’s constitutional due process and

equal protection rights. Moreover, the judgment entered in favor of defendant in Oluwa I

might “be destroyed or impaired by a judgment in the present action.” Adams, 487 F.3d

at 691. 

Plaintiff’s argument that there was no final judgment in Oluwa I is without merit. 

A final judgment is one that fully and finally determines the entire action with respect to

all parties. United States v. Lee, 786 F.2d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 1986). The Oluwa I court

granted the summary judgment in favor of defendant and ordered that “judgment [was]

entered for defendant.” Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. C at 2:5-6. The Oluwa I court’s

order “effectively terminated the district court litigation, sending the parties out of federal

court,” and, thus, constituted a final judgment. Lee, 786 F.2d at 956; see also Casey v.

Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the final judgment

rule was satisfied where the district court granted summary judgment in favor of

defendant and concluded “it so ordered,” and plaintiff subsequently moved for relief from

judgment).3

B

The next step in determining whether Oluwa I is duplicative of the current action is

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to address whether the parties are the same in both actions. Adams, 487 F.3d at 689. In

Oluwa I, the named defendant was the Director of the California Department of

Corrections (now the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, “CDCR”). 

In the instant case, the named defendant is M. Perez, the Chair of the BPT. Plaintiff’s

claim that these are not the same parties fail because the defendant in the instant action is

“virtually represented” by the defendant in Oluwa I. Id. at 691.

“Although the concept of privity traditionally applied to a narrow class of

relationships . . . we have expanded the concept to include a broader array of relationships

which fit under the title of ‘virtual representation.’” Id. (citations omitted). “The

necessary elements of virtual representation are an identity of interests and adequate

representation. Additional features of a virtual representation relationship include ‘a

close relationship, substantial participation, and tactical maneuvering.’” Id. (citations

omitted)

Here, the CDCR “oversees the activities of its boards and divisions,” one of which

is the Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”) which was formerly the BPT. Req. for Judicial

Notice, Ex. D. Furthermore, in Oluwa I, Plaintiff sued the CDCR for the purpose of

directing the BPH to set a term setting hearing. Thus, the CDCR, the defendant in Oluwa

I, and the BPH, the defendant in the instant case, have a “close relationship” and their

interests “are aligned” with each other. Adams, 487 F.3d at 691-92 (holding that agency

was in “privity with” and “virtually represented” new defendants added to subsequently

filed action because new defendants’ interests aligned with agency’s interests). 

Because the claims, the relief sought, and the parties are the same in Oluwa I as

here, this case is duplicative. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings is granted and the case is dismissed. No leave to amend will be permitted. The

deficiencies of Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant cannot be rectified through

amendment. See Adams, 487 F.3d at 692 (upholding the district court’s dismissal with

prejudice of a duplicative action); see also DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d

655, 658 (9th Cir.1992) (“A district court does not err in denying leave to amend where

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 The Court notes that the arguments which are set forth in the Motion for Summary

Judgment, and in Defendant’s opposition to the motion, are the same as those which the Oluwa I

court addressed. In the instant case, Defendant argues that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff is

not entitled to a distinct term setting hearing because the Chairman’s Directive 75/30 “is

inapplicable to Plaintiff’s sentence.” Mot. for Summ. J. at 2:7. Plaintiff claims that “has

a right to a ‘distinct’ term-setting hearing outside the parole suitability hearing process as

given to other second degree murders.” Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 1:19-20. The

Oluwa I court addressed this issue and ruled that: 

Plaintiff’s claim that the is entitled to a term-setting hearing, pursuant to a

superannuated Chairman’s Directive, absent a finding of suitability for parole by

the BPH, is without merit; that directive has no application to plaintiff. Defendant

correctly states that plaintiff’s indeterminate sentence is governed by Cal. Penal

Code § 1168(b), and the only procedure for plaintiff to obtain a fixed date for

release is through the action of the BPH.

Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. B at 11:3-8 (citing Cal. Penal Code § 3040; Cal. Code Regs.

tit. xv, § 2000(b)(10)). 

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the amendment would be futile.”).

III

Because Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted,

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is moot. It is, therefore, unnecessary to

address this motion.4

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted and the case is dismissed with prejudice. 

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DATED: December 19, 2007

/s/ Arthur L. Alarcón UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

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