Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02213/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02213-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 120
Nature of Suit: Marine Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The following facts have been taken from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. The Court notes that

both Plaintiff and the moving defendants have attempted to supplement the factual allegations contained

in the Amended Complaint by submitting additional evidence and testimony through declarations.

However, since the Amended Complaint is before the Court on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court's analysis

is limited to the allegations that are actually contained in the Amended Complaint and any exhibits that

have been incorporated by reference. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court may not consider

additional allegations or evidence without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment.

Id. Accordingly, the Court has not considered the Declaration of Michael Hopkins, the Supplemental

Declaration of Michael Hopkins, the Declaration of Massoud Messkoub, the Declaration of Aogu

Andrew Tsukamoto, the Declaration of Raimi Shoaga, or the exhibits attached to the Opposition of

Raimi Shoaga. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAIMI SHOAGA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BLOSADA, et al., 

Defendants.

/

No. C 05-02213 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 27]

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines, Ltd.'s Motion

to Dismiss [Docket No. 27]. Having read and considered the arguments presented by the parties in the

papers submitted to the Court, the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing.

The Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants Maersk, Inc. and Maersk

Lines, Ltd.'s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 27]. 

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background1

1. Parties

Defendant Maersk, Inc. ("Maersk, Inc.") is an oceangoing shipping company and an agent for

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The alleged contract between Plaintiff and Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines is not attached to

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. However, Plaintiff has attached the Bill of Lading, which appears to

have been issued by a company named Target Shipping, Inc. Id. at Ex. 5. The Bill of Lading indicates

that the "Release Agent" is Maersk Nigeria.

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maritime cargo shipping services, with cargo forwarding facilities in Oakland, California. Amended

Complaint ("AC") at 2:8-10. Defendant Maersk Lines, Ltd. ("Maersk Lines") is similarly an oceangoing

shipping company and agent for maritime cargo shipping services, with cargo forwarding facilities in

Oakland, California. Id. at 2:12-14. Maersk Nigeria, Ltd. ("Maersk Nigeria") and Blosada are also

named as defendants, but neither has joined the instant motion. Both Maersk Nigeria and Blosada are

located in Lagos, Nigeria. Id. at 2:5-6, 2:16-17. Plaintiff Raimi Shoaga ("Plaintiff") is an individual

and resident of the city of Oakland, California. Id. at 2:2-3.

2. Allegations

According to Plaintiff, on or about January 29, 2004, Plaintiff entered into a pre-paid shipping

agreement with both Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines, wherein it was agreed that in exchange for $5,100,

Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines would provide Plaintiff with cargo shipping and demurrage services to

Lagos, Nigeria in connection with the delivery of a shipping container supplied by Defendants and filled

with Plaintiff's personal effects. Id. at 2:19-3:1.2

 Pursuant to this contract, the container was to be

released by the Federal Government of Nigeria. Id. at 2:27-3:3. The alleged contract also provided that

the Federal Government of Nigeria would have, after inspection, the sole responsibility for the release

of Plaintiff's cargo. Id.

The container arrived in Lagos in August 2004. Id. at 2:27-3:1. However, from August 2004

to January 2005, the cargo was not released. Id. at 3:5-6. In January of 2005, Plaintiff visited Nigeria

and was informed that he owed an outstanding balance for additional shipping and demurrage charges

of more than $10,000 and that the defendants would not release the container to Plaintiff until such

charges were paid. Id. at 3:8-15. Plaintiff subsequently attempted to receive an explanation justifying

the additional charges, but never received such explanation. Id. at 3:17-19. In April 2005, Plaintiff was

informed by defendants Blosada and Maersk Nigeria that Plaintiff was liable to all of the defendants for

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Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that Plaintiff received certain invoices detailing the

charges. See id. at Exs. 3-4. These invoices appear to have been prepared by an entity known as

"Maersk Sealand." Id.

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the additional charges. Id. at 3:21-23.3

Plaintiff contends that, during the relevant period, each of the defendants knowingly made

certain unspecified false statements to him and that these statements were made with the intention of

inducing Plaintiff to pay $5,100 in shipping charges. Id. at 4:13-23. 

B. Procedural Background

On June 1, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in propria persona on behalf of himself and three

other individuals. The Complaint named as defendants a person known as "Bolsada," an entity referred

to as "Maersk Sealand Shipping Worldwide dba Maersk," Target Shipping, Inc., and Maersk Nig. Ltd.

From the Complaint, it appeared that Bolsada and Maersk Nig. Ltd. were foreign entities or persons

located in Nigeria. Plaintiff's Complaint alleged causes of action for "extortion," breach of contract of

carriage, "illegal revenue enhancement," fraudulent misrepresentation, intentional and negligent

misrepresentation, "corruption," and illegal demurrage charges. Plaintiff also alleged that federal

jurisdiction was premised on admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 

On September 6, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default as to defendants Bolsada,

Maersk Nig. Ltd., and Maersk Sealand Shipping Worldwide. Additionally, Plaintiff moved for entry

of default against Maersk Lines, Ltd. Also on September 6, 2005, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed

defendant Target Shipping, Inc.

On September 19, 2005, the Clerk of Court declined to enter default against defendants Bolsada

and Maersk Nig. Ltd. The Clerk also declined to enter default against Maersk Lines, Ltd.

On September 22, 2005, Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines, Ltd. specially appeared in the action

by filing a Separate Case Management Conference Statement and Motion for Sanctions ("Motion for

Sanctions"). In the Motion for Sanctions, Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines, Ltd. informed the Court that

"Maersk Sealand Shipping Worldwide" was a non-existent entity and that Plaintiff had attempted to

serve process on Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines, Ltd., despite the fact that the companies were not

actually named as defendants in Plaintiff's Complaint. 

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18 U.S.C. § 1951 is entitled "Interference with commerce by threats or violence." 

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18 U.S.C. § 201 is entitled "Bribery of public officials and witnesses."

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On September 29, 2005, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines, Ltd.'s

Motion for Sanctions. 

On October 5, 2005, the Court issued an Order denying the Motion for Sanctions. The Court

also struck reference to the three other "plaintiffs" on whose behalf Plaintiff had brought the suit.

Additionally, Plaintiff was explicitly instructed to file proofs of service with the Court demonstrating

that the defendants named in the Complaint had been properly served pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4 on or before October 19, 2005.

On October 14, 2005, Plaintiff filed the instant Amended Complaint in propria persona on

behalf of himself and against defendants "Blosada," Maersk, Inc., Maersk Lines, Ltd., and Maersk Nig.

Ltd. The Amended Complaint alleges three causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; (2) violations

of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2)4

 and 18 U.S.C. § 201;5 and (3) fraud. Plaintiff contends that federal

jurisdiction is premised on admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) and 46

U.S.C. § 740. 

On November 3, 2005, defendants Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines, Ltd. filed the instant Motion

to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). Defendants Blosada and

Maersk Nigeria have not yet appeared in this action. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss should be granted if it

appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). For purposes of such a motion, the

complaint is construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and all properly pleaded factual

allegations are taken as true. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Everest and Jennings,

Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994). All reasonable inferences are to

be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Jacobson v. Hughes Aircraft, 105 F.3d 1288, 1296 (9th Cir. 1997).

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When a plaintiff attaches exhibits to the complaint, those exhibits may be considered as part of the

pleadings. Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1980).

The court does not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast

in the form of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981);

see Miranda v. Clark County, Nev., 279 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[C]onclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.");

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 ("Nor is the court required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences."),

as amended by, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th

Cir. 1988) ("[C]onclusory allegations without more are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim.")). 

When a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, "leave to amend should be granted

unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading

could not possibly cure the deficiency." Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d

1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). The court should consider factors such as "the presence or absence of undue

delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue

prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment." Moore v. Kayport Package

Express, 885 F.2d 531, 538 ( 9th Cir. 1989). Of these factors, prejudice to the opposing party is the

most important. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Zenith

Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1971)). Leave to amend is properly

denied "where the amendment would be futile." DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th

Cir. 1992). 

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides as follows:

In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting 

fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,

knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred 

generally.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

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The Moving Defendants also assert that Plaintiff's Opposition was filed late and should

therefore be disregarded by this Court. The Court hereby admonishes Plaintiff for filing an untimely

Opposition, and therefore failing to comply with the Civil Local Rules. However, the Court notes that

the Moving Defendants have not been unduly prejudiced by Plaintiff's late filing. In fact, it appears that

the Moving Defendants had an adequate amount of time to review and respond to Plaintiff's Opposition.

Accordingly, the Court declines to strike Plaintiff's Opposition. 

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"[The Ninth Circuit] has interpreted Rule 9(b) to require that 'allegations of fraud are specific

enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud

charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything

wrong.'" Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 671 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d

727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985)). "The pleader must state the time, place, and specific content of the false

representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation." Schreiber Distributing

Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Semegen, 780 F.2d at 731).

ANALYSIS

I. Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines' Motion to Dismiss

In the instant Motion to Dismiss, Defendants Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines (hereinafter referred

to as the "Moving Defendants") have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on the grounds

that: (1) Plaintiff's first cause of action fails to state a claim against the Moving Defendants because

Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines never entered into a contract with Plaintiff; (2) Plaintiff has not stated

a claim for bribery or extortion and may not prosecute alleged violations of those criminal statutes as

a private citizen; and (3) Plaintiff has not plead fraud with the requisite specificity.6

A. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract

In support of his first cause of action, Plaintiff claims that he entered into a pre-paid shipping

agreement with the Moving Defendants to deliver cargo from Oakland, California to Lagos, Nigeria.

In support of these allegations, Plaintiff has attached to his Amended Complaint a Bill of Lading, which

functions as a contract in the shipping industry. The Bill of Lading appears to be a contract between

Target Shipping, Inc. and Plaintiff. There is no reference to either Maersk, Inc. or Maersk Lines on the

Bill of Lading. 

Accordingly, the Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of contract

must be dismissed because the Bill of Lading does not show that either Maersk, Inc. or Maersk Lines

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The Court finds it important to note that this not a finding by the Court that Plaintiff has shown

such facts to be true or applicable. However, since Plaintiff is pro per, the Court must construe his

pleadings liberally. Further, on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences are to be drawn

in Plaintiff's favor. Jacobson, 105 F.3d at 1296.

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ever directly entered into an agreement with Plaintiff. However, the fact that Plaintiff contracted with

Target Shipping, Inc. to arrange for the transport of his cargo does not necessarily prove, as a matter of

law, that the Moving Defendants were not also parties to the transaction. For example, it appears that

Target Shipping, Inc. may be a non-vessel operating common carrier ("NVOCC"), which acts as an

intermediary between shippers and vessel operators to arrange for the consolidation of small shipments

into larger ones. See 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 609 (4th ed. 2001);

see also National Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n of America, Inc. v. U.S., 883 F.2d 93, 101 (D.C.

Cir. 1989) (citing 46 U.S.C. § 1702(17)) ("The Shipping Act of 1984 recognized the NVOCC as a legal

entity with the status of 'a shipper in its relationship with an ocean common carrier but the status of a

carrier in its relationship with exporter customers.'"). It is therefore possible that Target Shipping, Inc.

entered into an agreement with the Moving Defendants on behalf of Plaintiff for the shipment of his

goods. If this were indeed the structure of the relationship, then it is possible that the Moving

Defendants could be liable to Plaintiff for breach of contract.7

The Moving Defendants also argue that they are not liable under Plaintiff's breach of contract

theory because the instant dispute arose in Nigeria and solely concerns Maersk Nigeria, which is a

separate entity. The Court agrees that it appears that Plaintiff is alleging that the dispute arose after the

unloading of the cargo in Lagos. However, at this stage in the litigation, the Court has no basis to

conclude that the Moving Defendant's alleged contractual liability ended after the unloading of the cargo

at the port. For example, sea carriers generally contract with a stevedore company to load and unload

freighters at port. See SCHOENBAUM, supra, at 610. However, the contract of carriage may continue

to govern the relationship between the shipper and the carrier after the discharge but before the delivery

of the cargo to the consignee. Id.; Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 807 (2d Cir.

1971). Thus, it is possible for a shipping contract with a carrier to continue to have effect after the cargo

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Again, this not a finding by the Court that Plaintiff has shown such facts to be true or applicable.

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is unloaded, even when the dispute arises from subsequent actions of the stevedore company.8

Given the standard that this Court must apply on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Moving

Defendants' arguments against Plaintiff's breach of contract claim are therefore insufficient to warrant

dismissal of his claim. Plaintiff has specifically alleged that the Moving Defendants entered into a

contract with him for the transport of his goods and subsequently breached that agreement. When the

Court construes these allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff's allegations are

sufficient to state a claim. Accordingly, the Moving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's first

cause of action is DENIED.

B. Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for Extortion and Bribery

The Moving Defendants have also moved for dismissal of Plaintiff's second cause of action

on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for either extortion or bribery and on the

alternative grounds that the statutes cited in Plaintiff's second cause of action are criminal and do not

provide Plaintiff with a private right of action. 

1. Extortion Claim 

Plaintiff's second cause of action is premised in part on 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). This statute

reads in pertinent part:

(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or

the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or

extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical

violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do

anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or

imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

(b) As used in this section– . . . 

(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from

another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or

threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.

(3) The term "commerce" means commerce within the

District of Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the

United States; all commerce between any point in a State,

Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any

point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the

same State through any place outside such State; and all other

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commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.

18 U.S.C.A § 1951.

As an initial matter, the Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff's dispute over the release of his

cargo is actually with the Federal Government of Nigeria. In support of this, the Moving Defendants

refer the Court to the portion of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint wherein he admits that the Federal

Government of Nigeria had sole responsibility for the inspection of, and release of, his cargo. However,

the Amended Complaint also states that Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines were responsible for failing to

release Plaintiff's cargo from August 2004 to January 2005. AC at 3:5-6. Thus, even with this apparent

contradiction, the Amended Complaint could still be reasonably interpreted as asserting that the Moving

Defendants were required to release the cargo to the Federal Government of Nigeria before the cargo

could be released to the owner. However, the statute also requires that Plaintiff plead and prove that

the defendants interfered with his cargo by robbery, extortion, or through the commission or threat of

physical violence. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not state any such facts. Accordingly, he has

not stated a claim under 18 U.S.C.A § 1951. 

More importantly, however, Plaintiff cannot proceed on this claim because no private right of

action exists under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which is a criminal statute. See Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank,

167 F.3d 402, 407 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1998)) ("We agree

that neither the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 nor its legislative history reflect an intent by

Congress to create a private right of action."). The Court finds that no factual pleading by Plaintiff

could cure this deficiency. As such, Plaintiff's claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

2. Bribery Claim

Plaintiff's second cause of action is also brought under 18 U.S.C. § 201. This statute reads in

pertinent part:

(a) For the purpose of this section--

(1) the term "public official" means Member of Congress, Delegate, or

Resident Commissioner . . . or an officer or employee or person acting for or

on behalf of the United States . . . in any official function, under or by authority

of any such department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror;

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...

(3) the term "official act" means any decision or action on any question, matter,

cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or

which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's

official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit.

(b) Whoever--

(1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises

anything of value to any public official . . . or offers or promises

any public official . . . to give anything of value to any other

person or entity, with intent--

(A) to influence any official act; or

(B) to influence such public official . . . to commit or aid

in committing, or collude in, or allow, any fraud, or

make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on

the United States; or

(C) to induce such public official . . . to do or omit to do

any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official or

person[.]

18 U.S.C. § 201 (emphasis added). 

As the Moving Defendants point out, the Amended Complaint does not contain any facts that

would trigger liability under this statute. In fact, the Amended Complaint merely states, without any

factual support, that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201 has been committed. There is no accusation that

anything was offered or given to anyone in return for any influence. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to

show how any United States official was involved, or could possibly have been involved, in the alleged

criminal activities, as required by the statute. 

Additionally, like 18 U.S.C. § 1951, 18 U.S.C. § 201 is a criminal statute and does not provide

Plaintiff with a private right of action. See Ray v. Proxmire, 581 F.2d 998, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 439 U.S. 933 (1978) ("[T]his legislation 'is a bare criminal statute with absolutely no indication

that civil enforcement of any kind was available to anyone.' . . . [A]ppellant has no privately-enforceable

right under this penal provision."); accord City of San Francisco v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 1116,

1129 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Because the Court finds that no factual pleading by Plaintiff could cure this

deficiency, Plaintiff's claim under 18 U.S.C. § 201 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Moving

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's second cause of action is therefore GRANTED.

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C. Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action for Fraud

Last, the Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff's third cause of action must be dismissed

because Plaintiff has failed to comply with the more stringent pleading requirements of Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 9(b). 

The Moving Defendants are correct that the Rule 9(b) pleading requirements are applicable to

Plaintiff's cause of action for fraud. Applying the Rule 9(b) pleading standard, it is quite apparent that

the Amended Complaint falls considerably short of its requirements. For example, Plaintiff does not

provide any specifics as to when, where, or how the alleged fraudulent acts took place. Instead, he

merely makes conclusory statements that the defendants knowingly made false statements and induced

him to rely on these statements. The Moving Defendants cannot possibly be expected to adequately

defend against such broad and unparticularized assertions. Under the standards mandated by Rule 9(b),

more specificity is clearly required. 

Plaintiff also fails to "plead with sufficient particularity attribution of the alleged

misrepresentations or omissions to each defendant . . . to 'distinguish among those [being sued to]

enlighten each defendant as to his or her part in the alleged fraud.'" In Re Silicon Graphics, 970 F.Supp.

746, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (quoting Erickson v. Kiddie, 1986 WL 544, *7 (N.D. Cal 1986)) (emphasis

added). In fact, Plaintiff has made absolutely no effort to distinguish between defendant Maersk, Inc.'s

and Maersk Lines' contributions to the alleged fraudulent behavior. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Moving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's third

cause of action. However, since it is conceivable that Plaintiff could cure the deficiencies in his

Amended Complaint by sufficiently pleading the particular facts necessary to satisfy the Rule 9(b)

requirements, Plaintiff is granted LEAVE TO AMEND his Amended Complaint. 

II. The Defendants Who Have Not Filed a Motion to Dismiss

As a final matter, although the Court notes that defendants Blosada and Maersk Nigeria have

not filed a motion to dismiss or any responsive pleading or document in this action, the Court finds it

necessary to raise the question of personal jurisdiction sua sponte. See, e.g., Burleson v. Toback, 391

F. Supp. 2d 401, 422 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (citing System Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy,

242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir.2001)). Raising this issue sua sponte is necessary and appropriate when the

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Further, it does not appear that Plaintiff has effectively served Blosada or Maersk Nigeria

pursuant to the standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f). In fact, it appears that

Plaintiff has merely "served" these defendants by mailing a copy of the summons and Amended

Complaint to an address in Nigeria. The postal cards attached to Plaintiff's proofs of service do not

indicate that the mail was ever received by a Nigerian post office, much less by the actual defendants.

This also warrants dismissal of these two defendants. The Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction

over a defendant unless there has been proper service over a defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4. Direct Mail Specialists v. Eclat Computerized Technologies, Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th

Cir.1988) (citing Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir.1982)). Without substantial

compliance with Rule 4, it is irrelevant whether a defendant has notice of a plaintiff's claims. Id. Here,

not only does Plaintiff's method of service fail to comport with Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), but it does not appear

that service by mail is even allowed in Nigeria. See Zhu v. First Atlantic Bank, 2005 WL 2757536

(S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("We are satisfied that Nigerian law . . . prohibit[s] service of process by mail[.]"). 

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allegations in a complaint do not establish a basis for the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id.

Here, Plaintiff admits in his Amended Complaint that Blosada resides in Lagos, Nigeria and that Maersk

Nigeria is an entity located in Lagos, Nigeria. See AC at 2:5-6, 2:16-17. Further, the Amended

Complaint does not state that Blosada or Maersk Nigeria committed any acts outside of Nigeria. See

id. at 3:8-23.9

 As such, the question of whether this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over

Blosada and Maersk Nigeria is squarely presented.

 Personal jurisdiction can be asserted over a foreign defendant only if permitted by California's

long-arm statute and if doing so will not violate federal due process. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.

National Bank of Cooperatives, 103 F.3d 888, 893 (9th Cir.1996). Thus, in order to establish personal

jurisdiction, Plaintiff must demonstrate "that the forum state's jurisdictional statute confers personal

jurisdiction, and that the exercise of jurisdiction accords with federal constitutional principles of due

process." Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir.1990), rev'd on other grounds, 499

U.S. 585 (1991). Here, California's long arm statute provides that the court can exercise jurisdiction "on

any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. § 410.10. Therefore, it is only necessary to analyze whether the assertion of jurisdiction comports

with due process under the U.S. Constitution. See Rocke v. Canadian Auto. Sport Club, 660 F.2d 395,

398 (9th Cir.1981).

Under the jurisdictional test enunciated in International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,

(1945), "due process require[s] that non-resident defendants have certain minimum contacts with the

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forum state, so that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice." Id. The factors to be balanced when considering whether the exercise of jurisdiction

would comport with "fair play and substantial justice" are: (1) the extent of the defendant's purposeful

interjection within the forum state; (2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum; (3) the

extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's state; (4) the forum state's interest in

adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance

of the forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an

alternative forum. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 464, 476 (1985).

There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. Reebok International, Ltd.

v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 908 (1995). The presence

of either general or specific jurisdiction will sustain the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a

defendant. Rano v. SIPA Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 587 (9th Cir. 1993). If the court has "general

jurisdiction" over the defendant, it may "hear cases unrelated to the defendant's forum-related activities."

Shute, 897 F.2d at 380. However, general jurisdiction exists only when it is established that the

defendant has "continuous and systematic contacts with the forum [such] that the exercise of jurisdiction

does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. The Supreme Court and the

Ninth Circuit have indicated that the necessary contacts to establish general jurisdiction are quite high.

See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 

If the defendant's contacts are not sufficient to establish general jurisdiction, then "a court may

nevertheless assert jurisdiction for a cause of action arising out of the defendant's activities within the

forum." Shute, 897 F.2d at 381 (emphasis added). This type of jurisdiction is referred to as "specific"

or "limited" jurisdiction. Id. In order to establish “specific jurisdiction” over a non-resident defendant,

the defendant must have done some act by which he purposefully availed himself of the privilege of

conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Id.

Further, the claim must arise out of the defendant's forum related activities. Id.

Based on the standards set forth above, the Court concludes that the allegations in the Amended

Complaint do not sufficiently establish that this Court has either general or specific personal jurisdiction

over Blosada or Maersk Nigeria. Accordingly, Blosada and Maersk Nigeria are hereby DISMISSED

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from the lawsuit. However, although the Court is doubtful that Plaintiff will be able to effectively

demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction over these defendants would comport with the notions of

"fair play and substantial justice," the Court recognizes that it may not dismiss these defendants from

the lawsuit without prejudice until Plaintiff has been afforded "a reasonable opportunity to present any

available evidence supporting the Court's jurisdiction." System Pipe & Supply, 242 F.3d at 325;

Burleson, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 422. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby granted leave to file a second

amended complaint against Blosada and Maersk Nigeria only if he can allege, in good faith, facts

sufficient to show that the Court can exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction over these

defendants. Plaintiff is explicitly warned that, if he does not sufficiently demonstrate in his second

amended complaint that jurisdiction over these defendants is proper, he will be immediately

ordered to show cause why the case should not dismissed with prejudice with respect to these

defendants.

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT defendants Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines, Ltd.'s Motion

to Dismiss[Docket No. 27] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Motion to Dismiss

is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's first cause of action. However, the Motion is GRANTED with

respect to Plaintiff's second cause of action, which is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The

Motion is also GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff'sthird cause of action, which is hereby DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT defendants Blosada and Maersk Nigeria, Ltd. are

DISMISSED from this lawsuit WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff is hereby granted leave to file a

second amended complaint by no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Plaintiff

may name Blosada and Maersk Nigeria, Ltd. in his second amended complaint so long as Plaintiff can

sufficiently demonstrate that this Court has a basis to assert personal jurisdiction over those

defendants. Plaintiff is expressly warned that, if he fails to plead facts sufficient to establish personal

jurisdiction, the Court will issue an order to show cause and Plaintiff will be directed to appear

before the Court and will be required to produce specific evidence demonstrating that jurisdiction

is proper. The Court further reminds Plaintiff that, once a second amended complaint is filed, it will

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supercede the prior complaints. The second amended complaint must be self-contained and cannot refer

to, or incorporate by reference, any part of the initial Complaint or the Amended Complaint.

Additionally, Plaintiff is expressly warned that, if his second amended complaint fails to rectify the

deficiencies identified in this Order, it shall constitute sufficient grounds to support a finding that further

leave to amend would be futile. If Plaintiff elects not to file a second amended complaint, the Amended

Complaint will remain the operative complaint, and Plaintiff will be allowed to proceed on his first

cause of action against defendants Maersk, Inc. and Maersk Lines, Ltd. ONLY.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Case Management Conference currently scheduled for

January 24, 2006 at 1:00 p.m. is VACATED. The parties shall appear for a telephonic Case

Management Conference on Wednesday, March 8, 2006 at 2:30 p.m. The parties shall meet and

confer prior to the conference and shall prepare a joint Case Management Conference Statement which

shall be filed no later than ten (10) days prior to the Case Management Conference. Counsel for

defendants shall be responsible for filing the statement as well as for arranging the conference call. All

parties shall be on the line and shall call (510) 637-3559 at the above indicated date and time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 24, 2006 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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