Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04756/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04756-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 896
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Arbitration
Cause of Action: 9:9 Motion to Confirm Arbitration Loan

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leslie E. Orman,

Petitioner,

v. 

Central Loan Administration & Reporting, 

et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-04756-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

Pending before the Court are the “Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award Or, in the 

Alternative, to Dismiss for Improper Venue and Request for Sanctions” by CitiMortgage, 

Inc. (“CMI”) (Doc. 13), the “Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award Or, in the Alternative, 

to Dismiss for Improper Venue and Request for Sanctions” by Central Loan Administration 

& Reporting (“Cenlar”), which appears to have been filed three times (Docs. 15, 16, 17), 

the “Application for Withdrawal” by Petitioner’s counsel, Jeremy Claridge (“Counsel”)

(Doc. 18), and Petitioner’s “Response and Motion to Strike Respondents’ Pleadings As 

Frivolous and Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award” (Doc. 19). The Court will 

address the motion to strike and the application to withdraw as counsel of record.

I. Motion To Strike

Pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(m), “[u]nless made at trial, a motion to strike may be filed 

only if it is authorized by statute or rule, such as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(f), 

26(g)(2) or 37(b)(2)(A)(iii), or if it seeks to strike any part of a filing or submission on the 

ground that it is prohibited (or not authorized) by a statute, rule, or court order.” Petitioner 

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does not identify any statute or rule that would authorize her motion to strike, nor does she

suggest that Respondents’ motions are prohibited (or not authorized) by statute, rule, or 

court order. Petitioner’s filing offers only arguments as to why the motions should be 

denied, not as to why they should be struck. Thus, Petitioner’s motion to strike is denied.1

II. Identical Motions

Unrelated to Petitioner’s motion to strike, the Court notes that Cenlar appears to 

have filed the same motion three times, and the three filings appear to be identical. (Docs. 

15, 16, 17.) The Court assumes this was an error. Thus, for the sake of clarity, the Court 

will strike two of the three identical motions (Docs. 16 and 17) and leave only the first one 

(Doc. 15) pending. The Clerk of Court shall update the docket such that the title of the 

filing at Doc. 15 reflects the full title of the motion.

III. Motion To Withdraw

Counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel for Petitioner was filed on the heels of two 

motions for sanctions against both Petitioner and Counsel.

On August 15, 2019, CMI filed a request for sanctions, averring:

[T]here was no legitimate justification for Orman’s attorney’s decision to 

initiate these proceedings and force CMI into Court to address an arbitration 

award that, on its face, clearly lacked any valid legal basis. No reasonable 

attorney, proceeding as he is required to proceed under Rule 11, could have 

looked at Orman’s Proposal and believed it provided any basis on which to 

conduct an arbitration and/or render an award.

(Doc. 13 at 10.) 

CMI bases its request for attorneys’ fees on three grounds: (1) Rule 11 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and (3) the Court’s “inherent authority” to 

award fees when a party has acted “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 

reasons.” Id. (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)). At least one of those grounds 

(§ 1927) applies only to Counsel, and to the extent CMI seeks fees pursuant to Rule 

11(b)(2), that ground also applies only to Counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5)(A).

 

1 The filing at Doc. 19 purports to be a response, a motion to strike, and a motion to 

confirm the arbitration award, which the Court construes as a motion for summary 

judgment on the petition. The motion to strike is denied, but to the extent this filing is also 

a motion for summary judgment, it remains pending.

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On August 27, 2019, Cenlar also filed a request for sanctions, seeking attorneys’ 

fees from both Petitioner and Counsel and citing the same three legal bases as CMI. (Doc. 

15 at 13.)

On August 30, 2019, Counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Petitioner 

with Petitioner’s signed consent. (Doc. 18). Counsel stated that “to effectively advocate 

her claims . . . and to efficiently defend herself from the bold allegations made by 

Respondents, it is imperative that she be able to respond directly without a filter from 

[Counsel].” (Id.)

On August 30, 2019, Petitioner’s “Response and Motion to Strike Respondents’ 

Pleadings As Frivolous and Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award” was filed, 

signed not by Counsel but rather by Petitioner, purporting to be “pro per.” (Doc. 19 at 1.) 

On September 3, 2019, Petitioner filed a “supplement” to her response (which is not 

permitted by LRCiv 7.2(e)),2also signed not by Counsel but rather by Petitioner. (Doc. 20 

at 17.) 

Because the Court has not yet ruled on the motion to withdraw, Petitioner remains 

represented by Counsel. Thus, Petitioner’s recent filings (Docs. 19, 20) violate Rule 11(a), 

which states that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at 

least one attorney of record in the attorney’s name—or by a party personally if the party is 

unrepresented.” See also LRCiv 83.3(c) (“Whenever a party has appeared by an attorney, 

that party cannot thereafter appear or act in that party’s own behalf in the cause, or take 

any steps therein, unless an order of substitution shall first have been made by the Court 

after notice to the attorney of each such party, and to the opposite party. The attorney who 

has appeared of record for any party shall represent such party in the cause and shall be 

recognized by the Court and by all the parties to the cause as having control of the client’s 

case, in all proper ways, and shall, as such attorney, sign all papers which are to be signed 

on behalf of the client.”).

 

2 The Court will let it slide because Petitioner could have filed two separate responses 

to the two separate pending motions (Doc. 13 and 15), so the “supplement” can be deemed 

to be one of those responses.

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Furthermore, these filings were electronically filed by Counsel. To the extent the 

filings purport to be pro se, this violates LRCiv 5.5(d) (“Unless the Court orders otherwise, 

parties appearing without an attorney shall not file documents electronically.”). It also 

means Counsel is squarely on the hook for those filings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (attorney 

becomes accountable for a paper “by presenting” it, “whether by signing, filing, submitting, 

or later advocating” it) (emphasis added).

Regarding the motion to withdraw as counsel of record, Counsel did not indicate 

Petitioner’s telephone number, which is a deficiency under LRCiv 83.3(b). Nevertheless, 

Petitioner’s phone number is listed on the filing at Doc. 19, and thus the Court will overlook 

this violation. 

The requirements of LRCiv 83.3 having otherwise been met, the Court must 

determine whether, in the exercise of its discretion, it should grant the motion. Gagan v. 

Monroe, 2013 WL 1339935, *4 (D. Ariz. 2013). “Factors that a district court should 

consider when ruling upon a motion to withdraw as counsel include: (1) the reasons why 

withdrawal is sought; (2) the prejudice withdrawal may cause to other litigants; (3) the 

harm withdrawal might cause to the administration of justice; and (4) the degree to which 

withdrawal will delay the resolution of the case.” Id.

The Court is skeptical about the proffered reason for withdrawal—that if 

Petitioner’s arguments were subjected to the “filter” of Counsel’s legal expertise, she 

would be less able “to effectively advocate her claims . . . and to efficiently defend herself.” 

(Doc. 18.) The assistance of an attorney generally improves, dramatically, the 

effectiveness of advocacy. Moreover, the Court has denied requests to withdraw as counsel 

when motions for sanctions against both counsel and client were pending. See, e.g., Brown 

v. City of Glendale, 2019 WL 3969901, *2 (D. Ariz. 2019) (noting that a withdrawal motion 

was denied “in part because it came at a ‘sensitive juncture’ in the case”—the pendency of 

an attorneys’ fees motion targeting both counsel and client).

Nevertheless, the fact Petitioner has consented to the withdrawal weighs heavily in 

favor of granting it. Also, Petitioner has already responded to the pending motions, so this 

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is not as sensitive a juncture in the case as when withdrawal of counsel would leave a client 

bereft of counsel right before an important deadline. Cf. Edwards v. Vemma Nutrition, 

2019 WL 2492253, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2019) (juncture too sensitive where an already-extended 

important case deadline was less than a week away). The withdrawal will not harm the 

administration of justice in this case.

Nor will withdrawal affect whether Respondents succeed in their request for 

sanctions against Counsel. The Court retains jurisdiction over Counsel regardless of 

whether he withdraws as counsel of record for Petitioner. Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 

671, 677 (9th Cir. 2005).

Finally, Counsel’s withdrawal will cause minimal delay. “[A]n attorney subject to 

discipline is entitled to procedural due process, including notice and an opportunity to be 

heard.” Pac. Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th 

Cir. 2000). However, “[t]he opportunity to brief the issue fully satisfies due process 

requirements.” Id. The first-filed motion for sanctions was filed only three weeks ago. 

Allowing Counsel time to respond to the motions will delay the case only 14 days. See

LRCiv 7.2(c).

For these reasons, the Court will permit Counsel to withdraw as counsel of record 

for Petitioner. The Court will retain jurisdiction over Counsel for purposes of resolving 

the sanctions motions. Counsel shall respond to the pending sanctions motions by 

September 19, 2019. Counsel is reminded that—as of this Order—Petitioner is a pro se

litigant, and Counsel may not appear on her behalf, draft any paper on her behalf, or file 

any paper on her behalf. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to strike (Doc. 19) is denied, but to the 

extent this filing is also a motion for summary judgment, it remains pending.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that of the three identical motions filed by Cenlar 

(Docs. 15, 16, 17), the first (Doc. 15) shall remain pending and the Clerk of Court shall 

update the docket such that the title of the filing at Doc. 15 reflects the full title of the 

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motion. The other two (Docs. 16, 17) are struck.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counsel’s application to withdraw as counsel 

of record for Petitioner with client consent (Doc. 18) is granted. Counsel is withdrawn as 

counsel of record. The Court will retain jurisdiction over Counsel for purposes of resolving 

the sanctions motions. Counsel is reminded that—as of this Order—Petitioner is a pro se

litigant, and Counsel may not appear on her behalf, draft any paper on her behalf, or file 

any paper on her behalf. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall update the docket to 

reflect that Petitioner will proceed pro se, that her address is 150 W. Catalina Dr. Lot #54 

Yuma, AZ 85364, and that her telephone number is 267-664-3633.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counsel shall respond to the pending motions 

for sanctions by September 19, 2019.

Dated this 5th day of September, 2019.

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