Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01671/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01671-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SINCLAIR WILLIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a 

government entity; SACRAMENTO 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, 

a government entity; SCOTT R. 

JONES, individually and in his official 

capacity as SACRAMENTO COUNTY 

SHERIFF; DAVID CUNEO, individually; 

ADAM TEDFORD, individually; and 

DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, 

individually, jointly, and severally,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-01671-MCE-EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Sinclair Willis (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action against Defendants County of 

Sacramento (“County”), the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s 

Department”), Sheriff Scott Jones, and Officers David Cuneo and Adam Tedford 

(collectively “Defendants”) seeking to recover for injuries Plaintiff suffered when he was 

shot during the course of a burglary. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges violations of both 

state and federal law. Presently before the Court are Defendants’ two Motions to 

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Dismiss for failure to state a claim (ECF Nos. 6, 7). For the following reasons, 

Defendants’ Motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

1

BACKGROUND2

On January 27, 2012, at approximately 2:07 a.m., two Sacramento Sheriff’s 

Deputies, Defendants Tedford and Cuneo, responded to an alarm at an “It’s a Grind” 

coffee shop in Galt, California. When Tedford and Cuneo arrived at the scene, they 

found Plaintiff burglarizing the shop. According to Plaintiff, surveillance video shows 

that, as he attempted to flee, Cuneo discharged his firearm three times, striking Plaintiff 

once in the lower back and once in the buttocks. The third shot missed. Plaintiff, who 

was apparently carrying an axe at the time, alleges that he was not close enough to 

present a threat to Defendants and that the shooting was thus unjustified. In postincident interviews, however, Cuneo stated that he shot Plaintiff in defense of Tedford, 

because he believed Plaintiff was about to strike Tedford with the axe. For his part, 

Tedford originally stated that he lost visual of Plaintiff, heard shots, and then heard 

Officer Cuneo state, “Show me your hands,” “What’s in your hands,” and “Put it down.” 

Tedford later clarified that he actually heard Officer Cuneo yelling prior to hearing the 

gunshots. Id. 

Plaintiff filed a claim with the County, which was later denied. He subsequently 

filed his instant Complaint in state court, alleging causes of action under both state and 

federal law for: violation of his federal civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 

U.S.C. § 1985; violation of his state civil rights pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52.1 and

51.7; as well as battery, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 

negligent hiring, supervision and retention. After removing the case to federal court 

 1 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

2 The following recitation of facts is taken, sometimes verbatim, from Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Exhibit 

to ECF No. 1.

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Defendants filed Motions to 

Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

STANDARD

When reviewing a motion brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6),

3 all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair 

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

A complaint does not require detailed factual allegations. However, to survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his 

entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a 

factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading 

must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion 

[of] a legally cognizable right of action.”)). 

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and 

 3 Unless otherwise stated, all further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

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quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 

to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 

the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202). A pleading must contain “only enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the 

“plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, 

their complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may 

proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, 

and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing 

party. . . carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 

833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it 

is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. 

Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 

411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 

1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the 

complaint. . . constitutes an exercise in futility . . . ”)).

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ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss the bulk of Plaintiff’s causes of action for failure to 

state a claim. More specifically, Officers Cuneo and Tedford and Sheriff Jones in his 

individual capacity (“the individual Defendants”) seek dismissal of all claims, except the 

excessive force claim to the extent it is directed at Officer Cuneo, on grounds, very 

generally, that the individual Defendants are either immune or that the Complaint is 

factually deficient. The County, the Sheriff’s Department, and Sheriff Jones in his official 

capacity (“the entity Defendants”) argue that Plaintiff’s claims against them are 

insufficient because: (1) the claims against the Sheriff’s Department are duplicative and 

unnecessary; (2) the claims against Sheriff Jones are duplicative and insufficiently pled; 

and (3) the allegations against the County are insufficient to establish liability.

A. Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

1. Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Tedford (First Cause 

of Action)

Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s first cause of action for unreasonable 

search and seizure and excessive force against Defendant Cuneo. Instead, they argue 

solely that this first cause of action fails as alleged against Defendant Tedford. 

Liability may not be imposed under § 1983 without a showing of personal 

participation by the defendant. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Therefore, to establish liability there must be evidence linking each individual officer to 

specific actions. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 

that individual officers are not liable for misconduct solely for being present at the scene 

of an alleged unlawful act). 

The crux of Plaintiff’s case against Tedford is that he should have intervened to 

prevent Cuneo from shooting him. ECF No. 1 at 7, 11. “Police officers [do] have a duty 

to intercede when their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or 

other citizen.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000). However, a 

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police officer’s duty to act is only triggered when an opportunity to do so arises. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges neither that Defendant Tedford participated in the shooting in any way 

nor that there was ever an opportunity for Tedford to intervene to prevent any harm to 

Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED with leave to amend as to 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Cause of Action against Tedford. 

2. Fourteenth Amendment claim against Officers Cuneo and 

Tedford (First Cause of Action)

In addition to the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff also purports to bring his first cause 

of action under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, as Defendants point out, 

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims are essentially duplicative of this Fourth 

Amendment cause of action. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842

(1998); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal of 

these claims, and Defendants’ Motion is thus GRANTED with leave to amend.

3. Conspiracy claim against Officers Cuneo, Tedford and Sheriff 

Jones (Second Cause of Action)

The individual Defendants next move to dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy cause of 

action under § 1983 and § 1985 because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to 

establish his allegations that the Defendants conspired to violate his rights. Plaintiff 

does not oppose dismissal, and dismissal in this instance is proper because Plaintiff has 

included in his complaint only a boilerplate recitation of the elements of the cause of 

action, which is insufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. Defendants’ Motion is thus 

GRANTED with leave to amend.4

4. Monell claim against Sheriff Jones in his individual capacity 

(Third Cause of Action)

Defendants next contend that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for supervisory 

liability against Defendant Jones in his individual capacity. A valid claim for a Monell

 4

 The entity Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss this claim is also unopposed and is granted for the 

same reason, as set forth below. For clarity, however, the Court addresses each Motion separately. 

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violation under § 1983 seeks to “impose personal liability upon a government official for 

actions he takes under color of state law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985). Generally, a claim against an individual would impose personal liability, while a 

Monell claim will look to the underlying policy or custom as set by the governmental 

entity. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. Because Plaintiff fails to state a proper Monell

claim against Defendant Jones, Defendants’ Motion—which Plaintiff does not oppose—

is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

5. Bane Act claim against Officers Cuneo and Tedford (Fourth 

Cause of Action)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim under the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code

§ 52.1, fails substantively because Plaintiff has not pled that any of the Defendants, by 

threat, intimidation, or coercion, prevented Plaintiff from doing something he was 

“lawfully permitted to do.” ECF No. 8 at 9-10. The relevant portion of section 52.1 

authorizes a claim for relief “against anyone who interferes, or tries to do so, by threats, 

intimidation, or coercion, with an individual's exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by 

federal or state law.” Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 331 (1998). Under the

statute, to prove a Bane Act violation, a plaintiff therefore must show that a defendant

attempted to, or did, “prevent the plaintiff from doing something that he had the right to 

do under the law, or to force plaintiff to do something that he was not required to do 

under the law.” Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 883

(2007).

Here, Plaintiff was neither within his rights to burglarize a coffee shop, nor was he 

protected under the law to resist arrest. Plaintiff argues instead that he maintained a 

“right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” ECF No. 9 at 8. However, a

violation of the Bane Act must include a “showing of coercion separate and apart from 

the coercion inherent in an unlawful arrest.” Bender v. County of Los Angeles, 217 Cal. 

App. 4th 968, 979 (2013). When an arrest is lawful, allegations must be made that 

sustain a claim of threat, intimidation, or coercion outside those protected under the 

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Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine. Id., at 978-80; see also Lanier v. City 

of Fresno, No. CV F 10–1120 LJO SKO, 2011 WL 149802, *1, *4-*5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 

2011) (finding no Bane Act violation where plaintiff driving stolen vehicle and police 

officer shot him multiple times in the back while effectuating arrest). In short, “not every 

wrongful detention is a violation of the Bane Act. Nor . . . is every case of excessive 

force in the effectuation of an otherwise lawful arrest a violation of the Bane Act.” 

Bender, 217 Cal. App. 4th at 981. As pled, Plaintiff fails to adequately set forth a 

violation of the Bane Act, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of 

Action is GRANTED with leave to amend as to Officers Cuneo and Tedford.

6. Ralph Act claim against Officers Cuneo and Tedford (Fifth 

Cause of Action)

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action under California 

Civil Code § 51.7 (“Ralph Act”) because Plaintiff failed to allege facts showing that he

was subjected to violence based on his race. Under the Ralph Act, all persons in 

California have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of 

violence, committed against their person on account of any characteristic listed in 

California Civil Code section 51(e) which expressly prohibits violence on account of race. 

Austin B., 149 Cal. App. 4th at 880-81. The required elements to sustain a Ralph Act 

claim are: “(1) [t]hat the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the 

plaintiff or his or her property; (2) [t]hat a motivating reason for the defendant's conduct 

was his perception of the plaintiff; (3) [t]hat the plaintiff was harmed; and (4) [t]hat the 

defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff harm.” Id. (internal 

citations omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Tedford’s and Cuneo’s actions were “motivated 

by prejudice.” However, Plaintiff fails to show any racial animus outside of claiming that 

he was “recognizable” as being African-American, which would be a “motivating reason” 

for Cuneo’s actions. This fact alone, without more, is insufficient to state a claim under 

the Ralph Act. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of 

Action is GRANTED with leave to amend as to both Officers Tedford and Cuneo. 

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7. Battery against Officers Cuneo and Tedford (Sixth Cause of 

Action)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state 

a claim for battery against Defendant Tedford. At a minimum, a claim of battery against 

an officer must show that “(1) [the] defendant intentionally performed an act that resulted 

in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff's person; (2) [the] plaintiff did not 

consent to the contact; and (3) the harmful or offensive contact caused injury, damage, 

loss or harm to [the] plaintiff.” Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 527 (2009). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks allegations showing that Defendant Tedford took any action 

resulting in contact, injury, or damage to Plaintiff. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action against Tedford is therefore GRANTED with leave to 

amend. 

Defendants’ similarly move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of battery against Officer 

Cuneo pursuant to the immunity set forth in California Government Code section 845.8, 

which states that "[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: . . . [a]ny 

injury caused by: . . . [a] person resisting arrest." However, California courts have 

interpreted section 845.8 as only granting officers immunity from suit where injury results 

to a third party or to the suspect due to self-inflicted injury. See also Ladd v. County of 

San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913, 918-19 (1996); Kisbey v. California, 36 Cal. 3d 415, 418-19 

(1984). While immunity generally will apply to officers, immunity does not extend to

liability for injuries to a person caused by the officer’s use of excessive force. See

Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 724 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Larson v. 

City of Oakland, 17 Cal. App. 3d 91, 95-98 (1971); Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 

256, 262-68 (1967); Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 136-38

(1965). Defendants’ argument is thus rejected, and Defendant’s Motion is DENIED as to

Officer Cuneo.

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8. Negligence against Officers Cuneo and Tedford (Seventh 

Cause of Action)

Defendants attack Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action as being barred under 

California Civil Code section 3333.3. Pursuant to that statute, “In any action for 

damages based on negligence, a person may not recover any damages if the plaintiff's 

injuries were in any way proximately caused by the plaintiff's commission of any felony, 

or immediate flight therefrom, and the plaintiff has been duly convicted of that felony.” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.3. Convicted felons may nonetheless still recover for “some 

injuries, such as those incurred while committing or fleeing a crime—for instance those 

resulting from the use of ‘excessive force’ during an arrest” because such action is due 

to an intentional tort. Espinosa v. Kirkwood, 185 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1273 (2010); see

also Jenkins v. County of Los Angeles, 74 Cal. App. 4th 524, 530 (1999) (finding 

§ 3333.3 precludes recovery of damages in any action based on negligence, yet does 

not apply to intentional torts). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s instant cause of action, which is 

based on negligence and not an intentional tort, fails pursuant to section 3333.3.

5

 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action is therefore 

GRANTED with leave to amend. 

9. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against Officers 

Cuneo and Tedford (Eighth Cause of Action)

Defendants next contend that Plaintiff’s Eighth Cause of Action for Intentional 

Infliction of Emotion Distress (“IIED”) should be dismissed because Tedford and Cuneo 

are immune to these claims, or, in the alternative, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts 

sufficient to state a claim for IIED.

The elements for an IIED claim are “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the 

defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of 

causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional 

distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the 

 5 To the extent Plaintiff argues Cuneo acted intentionally, that is not a negligence claim.

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defendant's outrageous conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009). A 

defendant's conduct is only found to be “outrageous” when it is so “extreme as to exceed 

all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community . . . [a]nd the defendant's 

conduct must be intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will 

result.” Id. at 1050-51 (citing Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001

(1993)).

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants Tedford and Cuneo acted with intent 

to inflict injury, and Defendant Tedford “ratified” Defendant Cuneo’s actions by his 

“presence.” ECF No. 1 at 22. However, Plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite 

extreme or outrageous conduct. According to Plaintiff’s complaint, Officer Cuneo shot 

him in defense of Officer Tedford, who, as alleged, was merely present and had no 

opportunity to stop the shooting. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges no outrageous 

conduct, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Cause of Action is GRANTED 

with leave to amend.

10. Negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, against Sheriff 

Jones (Ninth Cause of Action)

Finally, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Ninth Cause of Action as to Sheriff 

Jones in his individual capacity for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention because 

Plaintiff did not allege that a duty existed between Defendant Jones and Plaintiff, or, in 

the alternative, because the Complaint does not contain sufficient facts showing 

Defendant Jones made any hiring decisions with respect to Defendants Tedford or 

Cuneo. “Absent such a special relationship, there can be no individual liability to third 

parties for negligent hiring, retention or supervision of a fellow employee, and hence no 

vicarious liability.” C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 4th 861, 877

(2012). Defendants are correct, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Ninth 

Cause of Action is GRANTED with leave to amend as to Sheriff Jones in his individual 

capacity. 

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B. Entity Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants County, Sacramento Sheriff’s Department, and Sheriff Jones in his 

official capacity contend that all claims against them should be dismissed. 

1. Claims against the Sheriff’s Department

Defendants contend that all claims against the Sheriff’s Department are 

improperly pled because the Sheriff’s Department is not a “person” for purposes of 

§§ 1983 and 1985 and cannot be held liable under California Government Code section 

940.4. Defendants also argue that, since the County is also a named defendant, the 

claims against the Sheriff’s Department are unnecessary and duplicative. Defendants’ 

Motion is unopposed and is thus GRANTED with leave to amend.

2. Claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity 

Plaintiff’s claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity fail because “[a]

suit . . . against a governmental officer in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit 

against the governmental entity itself.” Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 

2001). The claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity are thus duplicative of the 

claims against the County. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the claims 

against Defendant Jones in his official capacity is GRANTED with leave to amend.

3. Claims against the County 

To the extent Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual Defendants were dismissed 

above, they also fail as alleged against the County. Plaintiff’s remaining claims arise 

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the Bane Act, Ralph Act, and state common law. 

For the following reasons, the bulk of these causes of action are dismissed as well.

a. Violations of §§ 1983 and 1985 (Second and Third 

Causes of Action)

Defendants first move to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims because Plaintiff has 

failed to allege sufficient facts to establish Monell liability under § 1983 or to state a claim

of conspiracy under § 1985. Defendants’ motion is well taken. Plaintiff does not oppose 

County’s contention that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to establish the existence of a 

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conspiracy against him. Specifically, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not present any facts 

indicating that the County conspired with anyone to either shoot Plaintiff or to cover up 

such a shooting. 

In addition, “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a 

tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under [§] 1983 on a 

respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (a local government may be held 

liable under § 1983 only for constitutional injuries inflicted by edicts or acts that may be 

fairly said to represent official policy or custom). Municipalities can be sued under 

§ 1983 only when a “policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those 

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that 

the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 693. Plaintiff’s cause of 

action under Monell is deficient because he fails to set forth the existence of a policy or 

custom that operated to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Thus, Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims against the County is GRANTED with leave to 

amend.

b. Bane and Ralph Act violations (Fourth and Fifth Causes 

of Action)

As already discussed above, Plaintiff’s claims under California Civil Codes 

sections 52.1 and 51.7 fail because Plaintiff fails to plead coercion, as necessary to

substantiate a Bane Act claim, or the racial animus necessary to support a claim under 

the Ralph Act. See Bender, 217 Cal. App. 4th at 979 (finding a violation of the Bane Act 

must include a “showing of coercion separate and apart from the coercion inherent in an 

unlawful arrest”); Austin B., 149 Cal. App. 4th at 880-81 (finding that a Ralph Act claim 

must show the harm caused by the defendant was due to motivation based on racial 

animus.) Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth cause of 

action against the County is GRANTED with leave to amend.

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c. Battery (Sixth Cause of Action)

It is not entirely clear to the Court whether the County moves to dismiss the 

battery claim alleged against it. However, to the extent Plaintiff’s battery claim survives

against Defendant Cuneo, it also survives as to Defendant County. See Garcia v. City of 

Merced, 637 F. Supp. 2d 731, 749 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (Public entities are liable for battery 

where employees are not immune to such claims). Accordingly, any Motion to Dismiss 

this claim is DENIED.

d. Negligent hiring, supervision, and retention (Ninth Cause 

of Action)

Finally, Defendants state that Plaintiff’s Ninth Cause of Action fails to state a claim 

for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention because a public entity cannot be liable 

except as provided by California statute. See Cal. Gov. Code § 815(a) (“A public entity 

is not liable for an injury, [e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.”). Where a pleading 

does not “identify a statute creating liability” for a public entity, claims against that public 

entity “must be dismissed with leave to amend.” D.K. ex rel. G.M. v. Solano Cnty. Office 

of Educ., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1198 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Searcy, 177 Cal. App. 3d 

at 802). Such is the case here, and Defendants’ motion is thus GRANTED with leave to 

amend. 

CONCLUSION

As set forth above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF No. 6, ECF No. 8) are

GRANTED with leave to amend in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff may, but is not 

required to, file an amended complaint. If no amended complaint is filed within twenty 

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(20) days of the date of this Order is electronically filed, the causes of action dismissed 

by this Order shall be dismissed with prejudice without further notice to the parties.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 11, 2014

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