Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02613/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02613-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVOOD KHADEMI,

Plaintiff,

v.

NIELSEN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-2613 MCE KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel. At the time he filed the instant action, plaintiff 

was a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Placer County Main Jail, but is now housed at the 

Atascadero State Hospital. This action proceeds on plaintiff’s third amended complaint filed 

March 4, 2019. Presently pending are motions to dismiss plaintiff’s third amended complaint 

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by defendants Langes, Nielsen, 

and Jones (“moving defendants”). (ECF Nos. 50, 53.) Plaintiff filed oppositions; moving 

defendants filed replies. On July 26, 2019, plaintiff filed a fourth amended complaint. On 

August 12, 2019, moving defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth amended 

complaint, which is fully briefed. 

For the reasons that follow, the undersigned construes plaintiff’s fourth amended 

complaint as containing a request to amend, and grants the request. In light of such amendment, 

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moving defendants’ motions to dismiss directed to the third amended complaint are denied. The 

undersigned recommends that: (1) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth amended 

complaint be granted, and (2) this action be dismissed with prejudice. 

II. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint 

As argued by the moving defendants, once plaintiff amended his complaint as of right, he 

was required to seek leave of court prior to filing another amended pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a). Plaintiff has amended his original complaint three times, and defendants’ motions to 

dismiss plaintiff’s third amended complaint were pending at the time plaintiff filed his fourth 

amended complaint which was not accompanied by a separate motion to amend. On this record, 

plaintiff’s third amended complaint may only be amended upon leave of court or stipulation of all 

the parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Thus, unless the court grants plaintiff leave to proceed 

with his fourth amended complaint, his filing was improper under Rule 15(a)(2). 

Rule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so 

requires.’” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). “This policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” C.F. ex rel. 

Farnan v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2011). “This liberality in 

granting leave to amend is not dependent on whether the amendment will add causes of action or 

parties.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). But courts “need 

not grant leave to amend where the amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought 

in bad faith; (3) produces an undue delay in the litigation; or (4) is futile.” AmerisourceBergen 

Corp., 465 F.3d at 951.

Here, plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and the record reflects plaintiff’s difficulties in 

articulating his claims. Moreover, as moving defendants point out, plaintiff’s fourth amended 

complaint provides facts not included in his prior pleading. Such additional facts are related to 

his pending failure to protect and medical care claims, and may better enable the court to 

determine whether plaintiff’s claims are cognizable. While there was delay in bringing the fourth 

amended complaint, defendants will not be unduly prejudiced because this case has not yet been 

scheduled, and defendants have already filed their motion to dismiss the proposed fourth 

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amended complaint. For all of these reasons, the undersigned construes plaintiff’s fourth 

amended complaint as including a request to amend, and grants the request. Accordingly, 

defendants’ prior motions to dismiss are denied because they address plaintiff’s third amended 

complaint. The court turns now to defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth amended 

complaint. 

III. Motion to Dismiss Fourth Amended Complaint 

Moving defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint. Plaintiff filed 

an opposition,1and defendants filed a reply. 

A. The Verified Pleading

Plaintiff’s pertinent allegations are as follows.2 (ECF No. 58.) On April 29, 2017, 

plaintiff was housed in the Placer County Jail pending charges of attempted murder, assault with 

a deadly weapon other than a firearm, and making criminal threats. (ECF No. 58 at 7.) Plaintiff 

alleges that defendants Jones, Nielsen, Langes, and Mitchell3failed to protect plaintiff by 

intentionally placing inmate Chapman in plaintiff’s cell, with permission from defendant 

Kennedy. (ECF No. 58 at 5-6.) While plaintiff was housed with inmate Chapman for “a few 

days,” plaintiff noticed Chapman was facing serious felony charges, and was diagnosed with 

schizoaffective disorder. (ECF No. 58 at 7.) Plaintiff took note of Chapman’s history, speech 

and manic episodes that plaintiff observed while they were cellmates. (ECF No. 58 at 7.) On 

 

1

 In addition to addressing plaintiff’s constitutional claims, plaintiff included arguments that he is 

entitled to default judgment against defendants Nielsen, Langes and Jones. (ECF No. 60 at 2.) 

However, the Clerk of the Court properly declined entry of default on July 18, 2019, because 

defendants Langes and Nielsen had appeared in the action by filing their motion to dismiss. (ECF 

Nos. 50, 51.) Plaintiff further complained that the motion did not include defendant Jones; 

however, defendant Jones had not yet been served (ECF No. 69), which is why defendant Jones 

separately filed a motion to dismiss on August 12, 2019 (ECF No. 59). 

2

 Plaintiff’s pleading is difficult to decipher because he includes unrelated allegations concerning 

his underlying criminal offense and a subsequent alleged use of excessive force by defendant 

Langes in October of 2018. (ECF No. 58 at 7, 13, 14.)

 

3

 Service of process on prior defendant Michoul was returned unexecuted (ECF No. 48), but 

plaintiff did not include Michoul as a named defendant in the fourth amended complaint. Rather, 

plaintiff added Mitchell and Kennedy as newly-named defendants. 

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July 18, 2017, plaintiff asked to see the sergeant and the officer from classification. Plaintiff 

alerted defendants Jones, Mitchell, Langes and Nielsen. (ECF No. 58 at 8.) A few hours later, 

defendants Jones and Mitchell spoke to plaintiff for almost fifteen minutes as plaintiff pointed out 

various rules and regulations concerning classification, but both defendants refused to allow 

plaintiff to use the library. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ failure to address the issue put 

plaintiff at substantial risk of harm by not taking the information plaintiff provided. Plaintiff 

alleges that inmate Chapman was misclassified in light of his prior conviction and his guilty plea 

to his charges. (ECF No. 58 at 8.) 

On July 25, 2017, inmate Chapman, who was on psychotropic drugs, became violent and 

“appeared he wanted to take [plaintiff’s] food forcefully.” (ECF No. 58 at 9.) Inmate Chapman 

started punching plaintiff in the face, resulting in plaintiff losing a tooth and suffering a swollen 

face and facial pain. (ECF No. 58 at 9.) About five minutes later, rather than using the cell 

intercom to tell Chapman to stop, defendant Langes responded alone, and pulled both inmates 

out. Plaintiff was placed in the booking area for almost two hours after the incident. (ECF No. 

58 at 12.) Plaintiff contends defendants Nielsen, Jones, Langes and Mitchell were aware of the 

serious risk of substantial harm “by not paying attention to [plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” 

(ECF No. 58 at 12.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s 

serious medical needs following the attack by failing to request an emergency and to transfer 

plaintiff to an outside hospital.

4

 (ECF No. 58 at 12, 13.) After about two hours, defendant 

Nielsen and RN Shay responded, and RN Shay provided plaintiff with Motrin. No additional 

medical treatment was provided. Plaintiff requested an examination, pain relief and soft food 

 

4

 Plaintiff also included allegations concerning defendants’ failure to ensure Chapman was 

disciplined or charged, but such allegations fail to state a constitutional violation. There is no 

independent cause of action for violation of jail rules or regulations. See Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 

F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (section 1983 claims must be premised on violation of federal 

constitutional right); Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) (section 

1983 creates cause of action for violation of federal law); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 

F.3d 367, 370-71 (9th Cir. 1996) (federal and state law claims should not be conflated; to the 

extent the violation of a state law amounts to a deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches 

beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, section 1983 offers no redress) (quotation 

marks omitted). 

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from the medical department, but there was no response. Plaintiff claims he is still suffering 

injuries as he recently lost the other half of a tooth injured in the attack, and he does not have 

enough teeth to chew food. (ECF No. 58 at 14.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, 

as well as monetary damages.

B. Motion to Dismiss: Legal Standards

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for motions to dismiss for 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In 

considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court 

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 

(2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 

1999). Still, to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must contain more 

than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. Attachments to a complaint are considered to be part of the complaint for purposes 

of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Reiner & Co., 

896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). The court “need not accept as true allegations 

contradicting documents that are referenced in the complaint or that are properly subject to 

judicial notice.” Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. V. Behrens, 546 U.S. F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2006).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears 

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would 

entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In general, pro se 

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 

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404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe such pleadings liberally. Bretz 

v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal 

interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 

pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

1. Failure to Protect

a. Standards Governing Failure to Protect Claim

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit identifies the “elements of a pretrial detainee’s 

Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against an individual officer” as follows:

(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the 

conditions under which the plaintiff was confined;

(2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering 

serious harm;

(3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate 

that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances 

would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved -- making 

the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and

(4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s 

injuries.

Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016). In addition, “[w]ith 

respect to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable, a test that 

will necessarily turn on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Id., citing 

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 396 (1989). 

b. Discussion

i. Initial Alleged Misclassification

Taking the allegations of plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint as true, plaintiff fails to 

allege facts demonstrating that defendant Kennedy unreasonably assigned inmate Chapman to 

plaintiff’s cell. Although plaintiff alleges that the remaining defendants placed Chapman in 

plaintiff’s cell with defendant Kennedy’s permission, such allegation is insufficient to 

demonstrate that any of the remaining defendants were responsible for the classification or initial 

assignment of Chapman to share a cell with plaintiff. Moreover, plaintiff fails to allege any facts 

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demonstrating defendant Kennedy’s involvement after the initial classification of Chapman. 

Thus, plaintiff’s claims arising from the initial misclassification should be dismissed.

In his opposition, plaintiff contends that defendant Kennedy intentionally and knowingly 

placed inmate Chapman in plaintiff’s cell in violation of “the prison rule and policy and the 

California Code of Regulations.” (ECF No. 60 at 5.) Plaintiff argues that “the California Rules 

of Court” requires that inmates who are being sentenced or have taken a plea deal be housed 

separately from other inmates. (ECF No. 60 at 6.) In other words, plaintiff appears to argue that 

Chapman should have been transferred to a state hospital or prison, and not assigned to plaintiff’s 

cell. However, such generalized rules and regulations plaintiff cites are insufficient to support his 

arguments. He further suggests that inmates cannot be forced to share a cell “unless there is an 

agreement or permission by the court or more importantly the medical evaluator.” (ECF No. 60 

at 7.) But plaintiff provides no legal authority for such position. Plaintiff mentions Castro, and 

concedes the facts in Castro differ from plaintiff’s, but Castro lends no support for plaintiff’s 

view that the assignment of cellmates turns on court permission or a medical evaluation. 

Importantly, plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating that Chapman’s initial assignment 

as plaintiff’s cellmate was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. Unlike the prisoner 

in Castro, who alleged that he was housed with an inmate who was acting “bizarre” at the time of 

his arrest, and whose intake form characterized him as “combative,” and then Castro was beaten 

shortly thereafter, plaintiff pleads no such facts here. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1064. Indeed, plaintiff 

concedes that he was safely housed with Chapman for days before the July 25, 2017 attack. In 

addition, while plaintiff points to Chapman’s criminal charges as evidence of the risk he posed to 

plaintiff, plaintiff was also facing felony charges involving violence. 

ii. Retaining Plaintiff in Cell With Chapman

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that it was objectively unreasonable for 

Jones, Mitchell, Langes, or Nielsen to retain plaintiff in the cell with inmate Chapman after July 

18, 2017. Plaintiff concedes he was housed with Chapman for a few days without incident while 

plaintiff observed Chapman’s “speech and manic episodes.” (ECF No. 58 at 7.) On July 18, 

2017, plaintiff “alerted” defendants Jones, Mitchell, Langes, and Nielsen, and then spoke with 

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defendants Jones and Mitchell a few hours later, but plaintiff fails to set forth the specific facts he 

shared with any of them. (ECF No. 58 at 8.) Plaintiff claims defendants Mitchell and Jones were 

aware of plaintiff’s “fear for safety prior to the July 18, 2017 meeting,” but provides no facts 

demonstrating such awareness. (ECF No. 60 at 5.) Plaintiff fails to allege specific facts 

demonstrating that it was objectively unreasonable to leave plaintiff celled with inmate Chapman 

after July 18, 2017, or that by doing so, plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm. 

In his opposition, plaintiff now claims that his cellmate Chapman was “offering his 

prescribed medications to inmates and not taking [Chapman’s] meds [which led] to the substantial 

risk of [Chapman] being violent and aggressive due to [his] mental instability.” (ECF No. 60 at 

7.) Plaintiff does not indicate at what point Chapman started not taking his medications. But 

taking plaintiff’s new factual allegation as true, plaintiff includes no facts demonstrating that 

defendants Jones, Mitchell, Langes, or Nielsen were aware that inmate Chapman was not taking 

his medications. But even assuming plaintiff told any of these defendants that Chapman was not 

taking his medications, plaintiff included no facts showing that it was reasonably obvious that 

Chapman would pose a substantial risk of harm if Chapman did not take his medications.5 

iii. Conclusion

Under the standards set forth above, the court cannot find that plaintiff’s allegations state a 

Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against defendants Kennedy, Jones, Mitchell, 

Langes, and Nielsen, and the motion should be granted. 

2. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

a. Governing Standards

A claim of inadequate medical attention by a detainee is based on the Fourteenth

Amendment and evaluated under the deliberate indifference standard. See City of Revere v.

Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (pretrial detainees possess a constitutional right 

 

5

 In addition, taking as true the allegation that Chapman stopped taking his medications, such 

action would likely be an intervening event following defendant Kennedy’s initial placement of 

Chapman in plaintiff’s cell, superseding any liability on the part of defendant Kennedy because it 

would not be reasonably foreseeable that inmate Chapman would offer his medications to other 

inmates and not take them himself. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1075. 

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against deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs because such due process rights are 

“at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.”). 

Courts analyze inadequate medical care claims like other conditions-of-confinement claims, 

including failure to protect. Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 

2018). Specifically, pretrial detainees must show: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision 

with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the 

plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable 

available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances 

would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved -- making the consequences of the 

defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the 

plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 1125. 

Pretrial detainees do not have to prove that prison officials who allegedly administered 

subpar medical treatment were subjectively aware of the medical risk; instead, plaintiffs need 

only show that the misconduct was objectively unreasonable. Id.; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 

S. Ct. 2466, 2473-74 (2015). However, a plaintiff must prove more than mere negligence, or the 

lack of due care, to prove an intentional deprivation under this standard. Daniels v. Williams, 474 

U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071; Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125. Even gross 

negligence or medical malpractice fails to establish a constitutional violation. Wood v. 

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Thompson v. Worch, 6 F. App’x 614,

616 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that even malpractice does not establish a constitutional violation).

“[T]he plaintiff must ‘prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent -- something 

akin to reckless disregard.’” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (citing Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070). 

In addition, where delay in treatment is alleged, “the delay must have caused substantial 

harm.” Wood, 900 F.2d at 1334 (citing Shapley v. Nevada Bd. Of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 

F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

b. Discussion 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Mitchell, Jones, Nielsen, and Langes were “not paying 

attention to [plaintiff’s] serious medical need due to wanton and infliction of pain[,] facial 

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swelling[,] loss of teeth[,] internal injuries around [plaintiff’s] mouth and damage to . . . other 

teeth,” and failed to request an emergency transfer to an outside hospital. (ECF No. 58 at 12.) 

Plaintiff alleges he waited for two hours, during which he suffered bleeding and pain, then 

defendant Nielsen and RN Shay responded. Plaintiff was provided Motrin, but plaintiff claims no 

additional services were provided to plaintiff while he was in custody.6 

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to rise to the level of a constitutional violation under the

governing standards. Plaintiff was provided medical care by RN Shay two hours after the attack. 

Plaintiff makes no claim that the alleged delay was intentional on the defendants’ part. Rather, he 

claims they were “not paying attention,” which appears to be, at most, negligence. Daniels, 474 

US. at 330-31 (“mere lack of due care” is insufficient under the Fourteenth Amendment). Even if 

the delay in having plaintiff seen by RN Shay constituted negligence, it would not be actionable 

under Section 1983. See Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Mere 

negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a 

prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.”). To the extent plaintiff contends he should have been 

taken to an outside hospital for treatment rather than being seen by RN Shay, such claim 

constitutes a mere difference of opinion, which also fails to state a cognizable civil rights claim. 

A difference of opinion between a prisoner and jail or prison medical staff as to the proper course 

of treatment for a medical condition does not give rise to a § 1983 claim. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 

F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). Finally, plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating substantial 

harm he suffered as a result of the two hours delay.

Moreover, plaintiff includes no specific allegations that he subsequently sought medical 

care from any of the defendants. Rather, plaintiff states he requested such treatment from “the 

 

6

 Plaintiff then discusses an incident of excessive force in 2018, following which he suffered 

back pain, but concedes he is pursuing those claims in a separate lawsuit, which the court 

identified as Khademi v. Langes, No. 2:19-cv-0437 JAM EFB P (E.D. Cal.). Because such 

claims are not relevant to plaintiff’s claims resulting from the cellmate attack in July of 2017, the 

court does not address such allegations. (A court may take judicial notice of court records. See, 

e.g., Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e may take notice of 

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”) (internal quotation omitted).) 

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medical department.” (ECF No. 58 at 13.) Plaintiff does not identify the nurses or medical 

providers who allegedly denied him treatment following his initial care by RN Shay. Despite 

naming numerous custody officers, plaintiff at no time describes any subsequent instances of 

misconduct by any of the defendants by name. Sherrell v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2011 WL 

6749765, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2011) (held that where a plaintiff sues multiple defendants, 

“[s]pecific identification of the parties to the activities alleged by [a plaintiff] is required . . . to 

enable the defendant to plead intelligently.”) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, there 

must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation 

alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon, 88 

F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissal of individual defendants proper “because Ortez failed to 

allege that those defendants knew of or participated in activities connected to the alleged § 1983

violations”). Therefore, plaintiff’s allegations concerning the alleged failure to subsequently 

provide adequate medical care do not meet the pleading standard under Rule 8.

7

IV. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff has had multiple opportunities to set forth facts demonstrating that his 

constitutional rights were violated in July of 2017, while he was housed at the Placer County Jail. 

Despite such efforts, plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that defendants 

unreasonably housed, or unreasonably failed to re-house plaintiff or his cellmate, prior to the July 

 

7

 Moreover, as argued by defendants Nielsen, Langes, and Jones, it is unclear whether plaintiff 

could amend his pleading to state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim for the alleged 

failure to provide medical care after the July 18, 2017 incident. Plaintiff included no factual 

allegations that further significant injury was the result of any delay in medical treatment 

following the July 2017 incident. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. In addition, court records reflect 

that plaintiff also alleged that in April of 2017, prior to his instant incarceration, he had a tooth 

knocked out and another tooth broken during an assault by an individual named Ryan. Khademi 

v. Vanderwende, No. 2:18-cv-2798 TLN AC P (E.D. Cal.). (A court may take judicial notice of 

court records. See, e.g., Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e 

may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial 

system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”) (internal quotation 

omitted).) Thus, plaintiff’s allegations that over two years later he may have lost part of another 

tooth or was subsequently denied a soft food diet do not rise to the level of a constitutional 

violation, and are too attenuated to demonstrate they are related to the alleged two hour delay in 

treatment following the July 18, 2017 incident. 

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18, 2017 assault. While it is unfortunate that plaintiff was attacked by his cellmate, plaintiff 

alleges no facts demonstrating that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances as any named 

defendant would have understood plaintiff faced a high degree of risk by housing plaintiff with 

inmate Chapman or leaving plaintiff housed with inmate Chapman. Similarly, plaintiff fails to 

allege sufficient facts demonstrating that any named defendant was deliberately indifferent to 

plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Thus, it would be futile to grant plaintiff leave to amend under 

these circumstances. See Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 

824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “[f]utility of amendment” as a proper basis for dismissal without 

leave to amend); Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (leave to amend need 

not be granted where amendment would be futile). 

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s third amended complaint (ECF Nos. 50, 53) 

are denied as moot; 

2. The undersigned construes plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint as including a request 

to amend, and grants the request; 

3. Plaintiff’s motion to compel (ECF No. 70) is denied without prejudice.

Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 59) be granted; 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 71) be denied; and

3. This action be dismissed. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

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parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: February 6, 2020

/khad2613.mtd.4th.AC

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