Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01211/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01211-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Constitutionality of State Statute(s)

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1

 While the reconsideration motion was initially directed at the original

complaint, the FAC was filed contemporaneously with the plaintiff’s response to the

motion and the AIRC defendants’ reply was directed at the FAC. The Court thus

deems the FAC to be the applicable complaint for purposes of the motion’s

resolution.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Arizona State Legislature,

 Plaintiff,

vs.

Arizona Independent Redistricting

Commission, et al.,

 Defendants.

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No. CV-12-01211-PHX-PGR 

 ORDER

 

 

Pending before the Court is the AIRC Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration

of the Court’s June 13, 2012 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Convene a ThreeJudge Statutory Court (Doc. 9), filed pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(g). Having considered

the parties’ memoranda in light of the allegations of the First Amended Complaint

(Doc. 12), the Court finds that the motion should be denied.

In its First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)1

, plaintiff Arizona State Legislature

alleges that Arizona’s method of redistricting congressional districts violates the

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Elections Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides in relevant part

that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of Holding Elections for Senators and

Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof[.]” U.S.

Const. art I, § 4, Cl. 1. The gist of the FAC’s constitutional claim is that the state’s

redistricting process, as added to the Arizona Constitution in 2000 through

Proposition 106, is unconstitutional because it removes from the state legislature

the authority to prescribe congressional district lines and reassigns that authority to

the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (“AIRC”). The FAC, which

names as defendants the AIRC and its five members and the Arizona Secretary of

State, requests the Court to

a) declare that Proposition 106 is unconstitutional to the extent that it removes

congressional-redistricting authority from the Legislature, b) declare that the

congressional district maps adopted by the IRC are unconstitutional, and c)

enjoin the Defendants from enforcing or implementing any congressional

redistricting plan from the IRC beginning the day after the 2012 congressional

election is held in Arizona.

The day after commencing this action the plaintiff filed a Motion to Convene

a Three-Judge Statutory Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). The Court, prior to

the defendants appearing in this action, granted the motion and notified Chief Judge

Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals of its order so that a three-judge court

could be designated. The AIRC defendants shortly thereafter filed their pending

motion for reconsideration and the Court ordered the parties to fully brief the motion

and informed Chief Judge Kozinski of the filing of the reconsideration motion. As a

result of the pendency of the reconsideration motion, the requested three-judge court

has not yet been designated.

 When an application to convene a three-judge court is made to a district

court, a single district judge has the authority to determine if three judges are

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statutorily required, 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1), which they are “when an action is filed

challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts[.]”

28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). In making this determination, the court’s inquiry is limited to

whether (1) the constitutional question sought to be raised is substantial, (2) whether

the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief, and (3) whether

the case presented otherwise comes within the jurisdiction of the statute. Idlewild

Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962); Sellers v. Regents

of Univ. of California, 432 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir.1970). The AIRC defendants argue

that a three-judge court is not required in this action on two grounds: first, because

the plaintiff has raised a constitutional challenge to a provision in the Arizona

Constitution, i.e., Proposition 106, and not to a specific apportionment plan as

required by § 2284(a); and second, because the plaintiff’s claim is “insubstantial” in

that injunctive relief is not available.

As to the first issue raised by the AIRC defendants, which goes to the third

Idlewild factor, the Court agrees with the plaintiff that the AIRC defendants’

argument, the gist of which is that § 2284(a) is not applicable because the plaintiff

“is only challenging ‘how’ congressional districts are apportioned in Arizona rather

than any specific apportionment[,]” in effect elevates form over substance. While

this may not be the typical § 2284(a) case, the Court is persuaded that § 2284(a),

narrowly construed, encompasses this action in that it is clear from the FAC that the

plaintiff is in fact challenging the legitimacy of Arizona’s apportionment scheme and

its existing congressional districts. As noted by the plaintiff, it is seeking a

declaratory judgment not only that the existing state apportionment process is

unconstitutional but also that the fruits of that process, i.e., the currently drawn

congressional districts, are also unconstitutional, as well as permanent injunctive

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relief barring the enforcement of the challenged process and the congressional maps

resulting from that process. See Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175, 190 (3rd Cir.2001)

(“[T]he legislative history of the 1976 revisions to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 clearly

demonstrates that Congress was concerned less with the source of the law on

which an apportionment challenge was based than on the unique importance of

apportionment cases generally. The Senate Report, for example, consistently states

that three-judge courts would be retained ... in any case involving congressional

reapportionment[.] ... Questions regarding the legitimacy of the ... apportionment

(and particularly its review by the federal courts) are highly sensitive matters, and

are regularly recognized as appropriate for resolution by a three-judge district

court.”) (Emphasis included in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

As to the second issue, which goes to the first Idlewild factor, the AIRC

defendants argue that a three-judge court is not appropriate because the plaintiff’s

constitutional claim is insubstantial. The Supreme Court has described a

constitutionally insubstantial claim for three-judge court purposes as being

“essentially frivolous,” “wholly insubstantial,” “obviously frivolous,” and “obviously

without merit[,]” and has stated that 

[t]he limiting words “wholly” and “obviously” have cogent legal

significance. In the context of the effect of prior decisions upon the

substantiality of constitutional claims, those words import that claims

are constitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions inescapably

render the claims frivolous; previous decisions that merely render

claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them

insubstantial for purposes [of the statutory three-judge court.] A claim

is insubstantial only if its unsoundness so clearly results from the

previous decisions of [the Supreme Court] as to foreclose the subject

and leave no room for the inference that the questions sought to be

raised can be the subject of controversy.

Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973); accord, Connolly v. Pension Benefit

Guaranty Corp., 673 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1982); Lopez v. Butz, 535 F.2d 1170,

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2 While the sufficiency of the FAC is being challenged by the AIRC

defendants in their pending Motion to Dismiss, filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

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1171 (9th Cir.1976); see also, Kalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281, 288 n.13 (2d

Cir.2008) (“Although the early cases establishing the ‘insubstantial claim’ exception

arose under the pre-1976 versions of the three-judge court requirement, there is no

reason to think that the 1976 amendment intended to alter the exception.”) The

contention of the AIRC defendants is that the plaintiff’s constitutional claim is

insubstantial based on their defense of laches, i.e., that the plaintiff is not entitled to

injunctive relief because it unreasonably delayed in filing this action given that

Proposition 106 was enacted in 2000.

The Court cannot conclude that the plaintiff’s constitutional claim is clearly

without merit for the purpose of the three-judge court determination based on the

AIRC defendants’ laches defense. While such a defense may subsequently be

found to be meritorious, at this nascent stage of the litigation the Court’s focus is on

whether the plaintiff’s constitutional claim is so obviously foreclosed by the laches

defense that there can be no controversy on the issue as a matter of law, i.e., that

the governing law leaves no room for any conclusion other than that the doctrine of

laches bars all relief sought by the plaintiff. The AIRC defendants have made no

such showing in light of the existence of such issues as whether the equitable

defense of laches is even applicable to this situation given that the plaintiff is a

governmental entity pursuing a constitutional claim as the representative of the

people of Arizona, and if the defense is applicable, whether this particular plaintiff’s

lack of diligence was responsible for the twelve-year delay in raising the

constitutional claim at issue, and whether the AIRC defendants suffered any legally

significant prejudice from the plaintiff’s delay.2

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12(b)(6), the resolution of that motion must be made by the statutory three-judge

court. See Lopez v. Butz, 535 F.2d at 1172 (“Because a three-judge court was

required, the single district judge was without authority to determine the merits of

[the plaintiff’s] claims.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(3) (“A single district judge shall not ...

enter judgment on the merits [in any action required to be heard and determined by

a three-judge court.]”

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Because the Court finds that the constitutional claim in the FAC falls within the

purview of § 2284(a) and is substantial, the Court reaffirms its prior decision that the

convening of a three-judge court is required in this action. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Rule 1 Motion (Doc. 23) is denied as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the AIRC Defendants’ Motion for

Reconsideration of the Court’s June 13, 2012 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to

Convene a Three-Judge Statutory Court (Doc. 9) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall notify the

Honorable Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, of this

Order so that he may designate the other two judges of the three-judge court

as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1).

DATED this 12th day of August, 2013.

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