Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-01637/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-01637-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES R. KNOWLES, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

NAPA STATE HOSPITAL, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 18-01637 EJD (PR) 

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL 

AND OF SERVICE; DIRECTING 

DEFENDANTS TO FILE 

DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR 

NOTICE REGARDING SUCH 

MOTION; INSTRUCTIONS TO 

CLERK 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against medical staff at the Napa State Hospital (“NHS”).1 The Court 

deemed the amended complaint filed on July 20, 2018, as the operative complaint and 

conducted an initial screening. (Docket No. 50.) The Court dismissed the complaint with 

leave to file a second amended complaint, to attempt to state a cognizable claim against 

supervisor defendants. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. (Docket 

No. 55.) 

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1

 This matter was reassigned to this Court on April 10, 2018. (Docket Nos. 8 & 9.)

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DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 

cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally 

construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Plaintiff’s Claims 

Plaintiff claims that since his arrival at NHS in April 2012, Dr. Michelle Martin, Dr. 

Michael Glasser, Dr. Surulinathan Sanmakan, and Dr. Chong Yang have been illegally 

drugging him without his consent, (Docket No. 55 at 3, 7-13), which he alleges amounts to 

aggravated assault and battery, and that their actions resulted in great bodily injury, 

including diabetes type 2, loss of vision, fibromyalgia diabetes, neuropathy, loss of 

memory, and psychological and physical injury, (id. at 5). Plaintiff seeks damages and 

injunctive relief. (Id. at 14.) 

Plaintiff’s claim that he does not suffer from a mental illness and therefore should 

not have been forced to take psychotropic drugs, liberally construed, states a claim for the 

violation of his liberty interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs. See 

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 

F.3d 684, 691 (9th Cir. 2010). Although Plaintiff does not specifically identify Drs. 

Martin, Glasser, Sanmakan, and Yang as Defendants in this action, his allegations indicate 

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that their alleged actions directly resulted in the violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights. 

Accordingly, the Court will liberally construe the complaint as naming them as Defendants 

in this matter. 

On the other hand, the second amended complaint expressly identifies two 

Defendants: Pamela Ahlin, the Executive Director of Napa State Hospital who is 

“responsible for the overall[l] operation of Napa State Hospital under its jurisdiction, 

including for the welfare of all the patients,” and Dr. Amarpreet Singh, the attending 

doctor for Plaintiff who is “responsible for the care of patients on Unit T-12 at Napa State 

Hospital.” (Docket No. 55 at 5.) However, Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegations 

against Director Ahlin. (Id. at 6-13.) Furthermore, the only factual allegations against Dr. 

Singh is that he had a “few meetings” with Plaintiff to discuss treatment, and that he 

allegedly asserted in the last meeting “that patient is okay with out psychotropic 

medications,” (id. at 12), which does not indicate that Dr. Singh was responsible for or 

endorsed Plaintiff being forcefully drugged. By his description of their positions at the 

Hospital, Plaintiff appears to be attempting to hold these Defendants liable based on their 

supervisory positions. 

Plaintiff was already advised of the standard for stating supervisor liability. 

(Docket No. 50 at 3-4.) “In a § 1983 or a Bivens action – where masters do not answer for 

the torts of their servants – the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious 

liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or 

her own misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). A supervisor may be 

liable under section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional 

deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 

conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th 

Cir. 2012). However, under no circumstances is there respondeat superior liability under 

section 1983. Or, in layman's terms, under no circumstances is there liability under section 

1983 solely because one is responsible for the actions or omissions of another. See Taylor 

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v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home 

Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff has already been advised of this 

standard for stating a claim of supervisory liability. (Docket No. 50 at 3-4.) Here, Plaintiff 

has again failed to allege sufficient facts to show that Defendants Ahlin and Singh are 

liable as supervisors based on their personal involvement or a causal connection because 

their wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Willden, 678 F.3d at 1003-04. 

Plaintiff shall not be afforded another opportunity to do so. See Wagh v. Metris Direct, 

Inc., 363 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2003); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 

1992). Accordingly, Defendants Ahlin and Singh are DISMISSED from this action for 

failure to state a claim against them. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons state above, the Court orders as follows: 

1. Defendants Pamela Ahlin and Dr. Amarpreet Singh are DISMISSED from 

this action for failure to state a claim against them. The Clerk shall terminate them from 

this action. 

2. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for 

Waiver of Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy 

of the second amended complaint, (Docket No. 55), all attachments thereto, and a copy of 

this order upon Defendants Dr. Michelle Martin, Dr. Michael Glasser, Dr. 

Surulinathan Sanmakan, and Dr. Chong Yang at the Napa State Hospital (2100 Napa 

Vallejo Hwy, Napa, CA 94558-6293). The Clerk shall also mail a copy of this Order to 

Plaintiff. 

 3. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the 

summons and the amended complaint. Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being 

notified of this action and asked by the Court, on behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the 

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summons, fail to do so, they will be required to bear the cost of such service unless good 

cause shown for their failure to sign and return the waiver form. If service is waived, this 

action will proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date that the waiver is filed, 

except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be required to serve and file 

an answer before sixty (60) days from the day on which the request for waiver was sent. 

(This allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of summons 

is necessary.) Defendants are asked to read the statement set forth at the foot of the waiver 

form that more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of 

service of the summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but 

before Defendants have been personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days 

from the date on which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days from the date 

the waiver form is filed, whichever is later. 

 4. No later than ninety-one (91) days from the date this order is filed, 

Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion with 

respect to the claims in the amended complaint found to be cognizable above. 

 a. Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by adequate 

factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor 

qualified immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If any Defendant is of the 

opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the 

Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. 

 b. In the event Defendants file a motion for summary judgment, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that Plaintiff must be concurrently provided the appropriate 

warnings under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). See 

Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 5. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court 

and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date Defendants’ 

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motion is filed. 

 Plaintiff is also advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (holding party opposing summary judgment 

must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on every essential 

element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an opposition to 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment may be deemed to be a consent by Plaintiff to 

the granting of the motion, and granting of judgment against Plaintiff without a trial. See 

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 

F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1994). 

 6. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after 

Plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

 7. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

 8. All communications by the Plaintiff with the Court must be served on 

Defendants, or Defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true 

copy of the document to Defendants or Defendants’ counsel. 

 9. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local 

Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery. 

 10. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the 

court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s orders in a 

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to 

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

 11. Extensions of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to be 

extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause. 

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United States District Court 

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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: _____________________ ________________________ 

EDWARD J. DAVILA 

United States District Judge 

Order of Partial Dismissal and Service 

PRO-SE\EJD\CR.18\01637Knowles_svc 

4/1/2019

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