Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00189/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00189-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Graciela Espinoza, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant. 

 

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No. CIV 12-189-TUC-LAB

ORDER

The plaintiff filed this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner for

Social Security. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1383(c)(3). 

The Magistrate Judge presides over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) having

received the written consent of both parties. See FED.R.CIV.P. 73; (Doc. 13)

The court finds the final decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence and is free from legal error. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In September of 2007, Espinoza filed an application for Supplemental Security Income

benefits alleging disability due to panic attacks. (Tr. 96, 105) Her claim was denied initially

and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 52-55, 46-49) 

Espinoza requested review and appeared without counsel at a hearing before

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Milan Dostal on September 9, 2009. (Tr. 291-293) In his

decision, dated January 26, 2010, the ALJ found Espinoza was not disabled. (Tr. 16-23)

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Espinoza appealed and submitted additional exhibits, but the Appeals Council denied review

making the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 3-6); see 20

C.F.R. § 416.1481

 Espinoza subsequently filed this action appealing the Commissioner’s final decision. See

20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a). (Doc. 1) She argues the ALJ erred at step three of the disability

determination, failed to properly credit her subjective testimony of disability, failed to properly

credit the opinion of her niece; and failed at step five to properly describe her impairments in

his hypothetical to the vocational expert. (Doc. 40) In her response, the Commissioner argues

generally that the decision of the ALJ was supported by substantial evidence and is free from

legal error. (Doc. 43) Espinoza did not file a reply.

Claimant’s Work History and Medical History

Espinoza was 42 years old when she appeared at her hearing before the ALJ. (Tr. 297)

She has a seventh grade education. Id. She has never worked. Id. At the hearing, she

explained she cannot work because “I get anxiety that I can’t be around people.” (Tr. 301) 

Espinoza traces her anxiety to 2002 when her sister died and she took custody of her

sister’s children. (Tr. 124) Since that time, she has received psychological treatment at La

Frontera for depression and anxiety. (Tr. 275) 

In May of 2003, Espinoza was evaluated by Bruce Roberts, M.D., at La Frontera Center.

(Tr. 192) Roberts opined that Espinoza was “suffering from her first episode of major

depression as a result of the ongoing stresses associated with caring for her deceased sister’s

five children.” (Tr. 193) “She is also experiencing fairly severe anxiety with frequent panic

attacks.” Id. He diagnosed: Axis I, major depression, single episode, severe; panic disorder;

Axis II, deferred; Axis III, hypertension; GERD; Axis IV, severe psychosocial stressors; Axis

V, current GAF (Global Assessment of Functioning) of 50. (Tr. 194) Roberts prescribed Paxil

in addition to the Klonopin she was taking for anxiety. Id.

In March of 2008, Espinoza was examined by state agency consulting psychologist,

Noelle Rohen, Ph.D. (Tr. 124) Rohen diagnosed generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder

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with agoraphobia, and dysthymic disorder. (Tr. 126) She explained, “Ms. Espinoza presents

with history of mild depression and reportedly severe anxiety with agoraphobia.” Id. “She

asserts she has not left her house unaccompanied since 2002.” Id. “If her self-report of

symptom severity is accurate, she would be expected to have difficulty attending a job regularly,

and concentrating adequately once she arrived.” Id. 

Rohen completed a Psychological/Psychiatric Medical Source Statement. (Tr. 127) She

found Espinoza’s understanding and memory mildly impaired. Id. She found her

concentration and persistence adequate for “simple tasks for a couple hours at a time.” Id. She

further opined Espinoza “would do best in a position in which social interaction was limited.”

Id. She cautioned, however, that “[e]veryday difficulties appear to make her vomit” and “[s]he

appears easily stressed.” Id.

In April of 2008, non-examining state agency psychologist, Janine Foster-Valdez, Ph.

D., reviewed the medical records and completed a Psychiatric Review Technique form. (Tr. 36,

110-122). She assessed affective disorder (dysthymic disorder) and anxiety-related disorder

(generalized anxiety disorder and panic disorder with agoraphobia). Id. She opined Espinoza

was moderately limited in “maintaining social functioning” and mildly limited in activities of

daily living and “maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.” Id. She noted no episodes

of decompensation of extended duration. (Tr. 120). 

Foster-Valdez completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. (Tr. 106-

108). She found Espinoza moderately limited in her “ability to understand and remember

detailed instructions,” “ability to carry out detailed instructions,” “ability to work in

coordination with . . . others,” “ability to complete a normal work week without interruptions,”

“ability to interact appropriately with the general public,” “ability to get along with coworkers,”

“ability to travel in unfamiliar places,” and “ability to set realistic goals.” Id. She further

opined Espinoza was “able to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions,” “able

to make simple work related decisions,”able to “work with and around others,” and able to “deal

with changes in a routine work setting.” Id. 

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Eugene Campbell reviewed the medical record for the disability determination service

and affirmed Foster-Valdez’s opinion in July of 2008. (Tr. 34, 226)

In August of 2008, Espinoza was examined by Jerome Roghbaum, M.D., for the

disability determination services. (Tr. 129-131) His diagnostic impression was as follows:

anxiety/panic attacks, hypertension, and morbid obesity. (Tr. 131) Roghbaum completed a

Medical Source Statement of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Physical). (Tr. 132) He

opined Espinoza has no physical limitations. Id. 

Espinoza appeared without counsel at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Milan Dostal on September 9, 2009. (Tr. 291-293) She explained she has “panic attacks and

. . . social phobia.” (Tr. 298) She stated she cannot work because, “I get anxiety that I can’t be

around people.” (Tr. 301) 

She currently lives with her daughter, nephew, uncle, and boyfriend. (Tr. 301) None of

them work; they are all disabled. (Tr. 301) Around the house, Espinoza cleans, washes dishes,

and makes some meals. (Tr. 301) She does not drive. (Tr. 302) She has no hobbies, but she

watches television for an hour or two in the evening. (Tr. 303) When she leaves the house to

go shopping, she always goes with her niece. (Tr. 305) 

In October of 2011, Blanca Reina, a licensed professional counselor, completed a Mental

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) Assessment. (Tr. 288) She found Espinoza markedly

limited in 18 separate functional categories in the areas of understanding and memory,

concentration and persistence, social interaction, and adaptation. (Tr. 288-289) She opined

Espinoza would be unable to work more than five days per month due to mental illness. (Tr.

289)

CLAIM EVALUATION

Social Security Administration (SSA) regulations require that disability claims be

evaluated pursuant to a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The first

step requires a determination of whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If so, then the claimant is not disabled, and

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1 Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual can still do despite his or

her limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.

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benefits are denied. Id. If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the ALJ

proceeds to step two which requires a determination of whether the claimant has a “medically

severe impairment or combination of impairments.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),

416.920(a)(4). 

In making a determination at step two, the ALJ uses medical evidence to consider

whether the claimant’s impairment more than minimally limits or restricts his or her “physical

or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. If the ALJ concludes the impairment is not

severe, the claim is denied. Id. Upon a finding of severity, the ALJ proceeds to step three

which requires a determination of whether the impairment meets or equals one of several listed

impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,

App.1. If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, then the

claimant is presumed to be disabled, and no further inquiry is necessary. Tackett v. Apfel, 180

F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed

impairment, evaluation proceeds to the next step. 

The fourth step requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant has sufficient residual

functional capacity1

 (RFC) to perform past work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

If the ALJ concludes the claimant has sufficient RFC, then the claim is denied. Id. If the

claimant cannot perform any past work, then the ALJ must move to the fifth step which requires

consideration of the claimant’s RFC to perform other substantial gainful work in the national

economy in view of the claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4).

The ALJ’s Findings

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At step one of the disability analysis, the ALJ found Espinoza “has not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since September 6, 2007, the application date . . . .” (Tr. 18). At

step two, he found Espinoza has severe impairments: “obesity, generalized anxiety disorder,

panic disorder with agoraphobia and dysthymic disorder.” Id. At step three, the ALJ found

Espinoza’s impairments did not meet or equal the criteria for any impairment found in the

Listing of Impairments, Appendix 1, Subpart P, of 20 C.F.R., Part 404. Id. 

The ALJ then analyzed Espinoza’s residual functional capacity (RFC). (Tr. 19) He

found she “has the residual functional capacity to perform less than the full range of light work

as defined in 20 C.F.R. 416.967(b).” Id. “Claimant is able to lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally,

up to 10 pounds frequently and must avoid exposure to unprotected heights and hazardous

machinery due to obesity.” Id. “Claimant is moderately limited in her ability to comprehend,

remember and implement complex instructions, but is unlimited in her ability to perform simple

tasks provided there is only a moderate level of contact with the public and moderate level of

stress.” (Tr. 20) 

At step four, the ALJ found Espinoza has no past relevant work. (Tr. 22) At step five,

relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found Espinoza could work as a

janitor/cleaner or as a hand packager. (Tr. 23) Accordingly, he found Espinoza was not under

a disability since September 6, 2007. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An individual is entitled to disability benefits if he or she demonstrates, through

medically acceptable clinical or laboratory standards, an inability to engage in substantial

gainful activity due to a physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a

continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). “[A]

claimant will be found disabled only if the impairment is so severe that, considering age,

education, and work experience, that person cannot engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.

1993).

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The findings of the Commissioner are meant to be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),

1383(c)(3). The decision to deny benefits “should be upheld unless it contains legal error or is

not supported by substantial evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a

preponderance.” Id.

“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s

decision should be upheld.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 630. “However, a reviewing court must consider

the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of

supporting evidence.” Id.

In evaluating evidence to determine whether a claimant is disabled, the opinion of a

treating physician is entitled to great weight. Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (9th Cir.

1993). The ALJ may reject a treating physician’s uncontradicted opinion only if she sets forth

clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995).

If the treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may reject that

opinion only if she provides specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. No distinction is drawn “between a medical opinion as

to a physical condition and a medical opinion on the ultimate issue of disability.” Rodriguez

v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761 n.7 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“The opinion of an examining physician is, in turn, entitled to greater weight than the

opinion of a non[-]examining physician.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996).

“[T]he Commissioner must provide ‘clear and convincing’ reasons for rejecting the

uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician.” Id. “[T]he opinion of an examining doctor,

even if contradicted by another doctor, can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons

that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. at 830-31.

“Where medical reports are inconclusive, questions of credibility and resolution of

conflicts in the testimony are functions solely of the [Commissioner].” Magallanes, 881 F.2d

747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (punctuation omitted). The Commissioner’s finding that a claimant is

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less than credible, however, must have some support in the record. See Light v. Social Security

Administration, 119 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1997).

The ALJ need not accept the claimant’s subjective testimony of disability, but if he

decides to reject it, “[]he must provide specific, cogent reasons for the disbelief.” Lester, 81

F.3d at 834. “Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the

Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.”

Id. “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not

credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Espinoza argues first that the ALJ erred when he found she was not disabled at step three

of the disability determination. At step three, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s

impairment meets or equals one of several listed impairments that the Commissioner

acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1. If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals

one of the listed impairments, then the claimant is presumed to be disabled, and no further

inquiry is necessary. Ramirez v Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Specifically, Espinoza argues she meets listing 12.06 for anxiety related disorders. The

listing reads as follows:

In these disorders anxiety is either the predominant disturbance or it is

experienced if the individual attempts to master symptoms; for example,

confronting the dreaded object or situation in a phobic disorder or resisting the

obsessions or compulsions in obsessive compulsive disorders.

The required level of severity for these disorders is met when the requirements

in both A and B are satisfied, or when the requirements in both A and C are

satisfied.

A. Medically documented findings of at least one of the following:

1. Generalized persistent anxiety accompanied by three out of four of the

following signs or symptoms:

a. Motor tension; or

b. Autonomic hyperactivity; or

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c. Apprehensive expectation; or

d. Vigilance and scanning;

or

2. A persistent irrational fear of a specific object, activity, or situation which

results in a compelling desire to avoid the dreaded object, activity, or situation;

or

3. Recurrent severe panic attacks manifested by a sudden unpredictable onset of

intense apprehension, fear, terror and sense of impending doom occurring on the

average of at least once a week; or

4. Recurrent obsessions or compulsions which are a source of marked distress;

or

5. Recurrent and intrusive recollections of a traumatic experience, which are a

source of marked distress;

AND

B. Resulting in at least two of the following:

1. Marked restriction of activities of daily living; or

2. Marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or

3. Marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or

4. Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration.

OR

C. Resulting in complete inability to function independently outside the area of

one’s home.

20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 

The ALJ found that Espinoza’s anxiety disorder did not meet or equal the listed

impairment 12.06. He did not discuss whether Espinoza’s disorder met the requirements of

paragraph A. He did, however, explain that Espinoza did not meet the requirements of

paragraphs B or C and accordingly, found she did not meet the listed impairment. (Tr. 18-19)

Espinoza, on the other hand, argues that the ALJ’s discussion of paragraph C was insufficient

and that the evidence shows she does fulfil this requirement. The court does not agree.

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A claimant fulfils the paragraph C requirement if she has anxiety “[r]esulting in complete

inability to function independently outside the area of one’s home.” 20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P,

App. 1, listing 12.06. In his step three discussion, the ALJ stated simply that 

The undersigned has also considered whether the “paragraph C” criteria are

satisfied. In this case, the evidence fails to establish the presence of the

“paragraph C” criteria.

(Tr. 19) This explanation is too brief and conclusory to properly support the ALJ’s decision at

step three. Later in the decision, however, the ALJ explained more fully how he evaluated

Espinoza’s impairments and what information he relied upon to reach his conclusions.

Based on the medical record, the ALJ found Espinoza was “overwhelmed and stressed”

in 2002 when she took custody of her sister’s children and “began to have panic attacks.” (Tr.

21) At the time, she was “given a GAF of 50 indicative of a moderate level of symptoms.” Id.

Since that time, however, she has received psychiatric medication and therapy. Id. Her GAF

has risen to 60 “which is on the borderline between moderate and slight level of symptoms.”

Id. 

In his evaluation of Espinoza’s impairments, the ALJ gave “considerable weight” to the

opinion of the examining psychologist, Rohen. Rohen found that while Espinoza displayed

certain limitations in understanding and memory, “her concentration and persistence appeared

adequate during the examination which was inconsistent with her subjective complaints of

inability to leave the house.” (Tr. 21) Also, “her social interaction was at all times during the

interview appropriate which, again, was contrary to her subjective reports that she experiences

extreme anxiety in social situations.” (Tr. 21)

The ALJ’s conclusion that Espinoza did not have a “complete inability to function

independently” outside her home is supported by the treatment record and the observations of

the examining psychologist. Accordingly, his conclusion that Espinoza did not satisfy the

requirements of paragraph C and did not fulfil Listing 12.06 should be upheld.

Espinoza argues that evidence in the record supports her argument that she has a

complete inability to function independently outside her home. This court, however, must

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uphold the decision of the ALJ if it is supported by substantial evidence, and it is. See Orn v.

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007).

Espinoza argues next that the ALJ improperly discounted her subjective opinion of

disability. The court finds the opinion of the ALJ should be upheld.

The ALJ found Espinoza “is not entirely credible as her allegations as to the intensity and

limiting effects of her impairments are not corroborated by the medical evidence.” (Tr. 22) He

based his findings on the record of her daily activities, the observations of the examining

medical consultant, and her treatment record. He found specifically that she “is able to maintain

her household and care for her teenage child and nephew, attend treatment and attend the

hearing without incident.” (Tr. 22) “She is able to use public transportation, although she

requires accompaniment.” (Tr. 22) Moreover, “she was able to interact appropriately with the

consultative examiner who did not detect the level of anxiety asserted by claimant.” Id. The

ALJ further observed that she has benefitted from her medication and her GAF score has risen

from 50, when she began treatment, to 60 which “is on the borderline between moderate and

slight level of symptoms.” (Tr. 21); (Tr. 198) (“She finds the medication has been helpful in

not feeling as depressed and anxious”); (Tr. 193) (GAF 50); (Tr. 195, 197, 201, 203, 205)

(GAF 60) The ALJ has identified clear and convincing reasons for discounting Espinoza’s

subjective opinion of disability. The ALJ’s evaluation of Espinoza’s subjective testimony

should be upheld.

Espinoza next argues the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of her niece, Theresa

Granado. In general, the testimony of a lay witness is “an important source of information

about the clamant’s impairments, and an ALJ can reject it only by giving specific reasons

germane to each witness.” Regennitter v. Commissioner, 166 F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir.1999).

In January of 2008, Theresa Granado, Espinoza’s niece, submitted a Third Party

Function Report. (Tr. 79) Granado explained that Espinoza works around the house washing

dishes, sweeping, etc. (Tr. 79) She has no problem with her personal care or fixing her own

meals. (Tr. 80, 81) She does, however, have difficulty with anxiety. Espinoza leaves home to

go shopping every few days, but she is always accompanied by someone else. (Tr. 79, 82) Her

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social life is limited. She watches TV but does not socialize with others outside the family. (Tr.

83) She also has some difficulty with memory and maintaining attention. (Tr. 84) She does

not handle stress well and gets nervous speaking with someone in authority such as a landlord

or policeman. (Tr. 85) 

The ALJ considered Granado’s statement but did not give it much weight because,

among other things, her opinions are “not consistent with the preponderance of the opinions and

observations by medical doctors in this case.” (Tr. 22) This is an acceptable reason for

discounting a subjective third party opinion. See, e.g., Pacheco v. Astrue, 2012 WL 2065037,

5 (E.D.Cal. 2012). 

Moreover, the court observes that Granado’s observations of Espinoza’s daily activities

are not necessarily contrary to the findings of the ALJ. Like Granado, the ALJ believes that

Espinoza suffers from anxiety and has difficulty with memory and social interactions. He

simply concludes that these difficulties are not disabling, and nothing in Granado’s report

directly contradicts his opinion.

Finally, Espinoza argues the hypothetical offered by the ALJ to the vocational expert did

not accurately reflect Espinoza’s functional limitations. 

“At step five, the ALJ can call upon a vocational expert to testify as to: (1) what jobs the

claimant, given his or her residual functional capacity, would be able to do; and (2) the

availability of such jobs in the national economy.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th

Cir. 1999). “At the hearing, the ALJ poses hypothetical questions to the vocational expert that

set out all of the claimant’s impairments for the vocational expert’s consideration.” Id.

(punctuation modified). “The ALJ’s depiction of the claimant’s disability must be accurate,

detailed, and supported by the medical record.” Id. “The vocational expert then translates these

factual scenarios into realistic job market probabilities by testifying on the record to what kinds

of jobs the claimant still can perform and whether there is a sufficient number of those jobs

available in the claimant’s region or in several other regions of the economy to support a finding

of not disabled.” Id. (punctuation modified).

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Here, the ALJ asked the vocational expert to consider a hypothetical person who “has

some depression or anxiety. . . some symptoms of panic attacks and . . . could only, only

moderately understand and remember complex detailed instructions. . . and also, she would be

able to work in and around the public and deal with changes in routine work settings on a

moderate level. . . [s]o there would be . . . a moderate effect of . . . working in and around the

public.” (Tr. 309, 311) The vocational expert opined that if the claimant’s psychiatric problems

had only a “moderate effect on her ability to do basic work activity” she could work as a janitor

cleaner or a hand packager. (Tr. 310-11)

In this case, the ALJ’s hypothetical describing “moderate” impairments is supported by

the opinion of the non-examining state agency psychologist, Janine Foster-Valdez, Ph. D. (Tr.

36, 110-122). Foster-Valdez’s opinion, in turn, was based on the observations of the state

agency consulting psychologist, Noelle Rohen, Ph.D. (Tr. 124) The ALJ was entitled to rely

on these medical opinions particularly where, as here, there are no contrary opinions by an

“acceptable medical source.” See 20 C.F.R. 404.1513, 416.913. The ALJ’s finding at step five

that Espinoza was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Bayliss v.

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2005) (The ALJ’s reliance on the testimony of a

vocational expert was proper where she was given a hypothetical that contained all the

limitations the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record.).

Espinoza argues that evidence in the medical record indicates that her impairments are

more severe than represented by the ALJ in his hypothetical. The ALJ, however, need not adopt

in his hypothetical all of the restrictions proposed by the claimant. “Rather, the ALJ is free to

accept or reject these restrictions as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.”

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881, F.2d 747, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1989) (punctuation modified). 

Here, the ALJ accepted the functional limitations proposed by the non-examining

physician rather than those proposed by the claimant. Substantial evidence supports his

findings. Accordingly, the court finds the ALJ’s finding of non-disability is supported by

substantial evidence and is free from legal error. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211,

1217-18 (9th Cir. 2005) (The ALJ’s reliance on the testimony of a vocational expert was proper

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where she was given a hypothetical that contained all the limitations the ALJ found credible and

supported by substantial evidence in the record.). 

IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner’s final decision in this matter is AFFIRMED.

The Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.

DATED this 19th day of December, 2014.

Case 4:12-cv-00189-LAB Document 44 Filed 12/22/14 Page 14 of 14