Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-13-03070/USCOURTS-ca2-13-03070-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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13-3070-cv 

Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp.

1 In the

2 United States Court of Appeals

3 For the Second Circuit

4

5 August Term, 2014

6 No. 13-3070-cv

7 MATTHEW ROACH, MELISSA LONGO, GARRETT TICHEN,

8 CHRISTINA APPLE,

9 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

10 v.

11 T.L. CANNON CORP., d/b/a Applebees, T.L. CANNON MANAGEMENT 

12 CORP., TLC WEST, LLC, TLC CENTRAL, LLC, TLC UTICA, LLC, TLC

13 EAST, LLC, TLC NORTH, LLC, DAVID A. STEIN, individually and as 

14 Owner and Chairman of T.L. Cannon Corp. and as Director and 

15 Chairman of T.L. Cannon Management Corp., MATTHEW J.

16 FAIRBARN, individually and as Owner and President of T.L. Cannon 

17 Corp. and as Director and Chief Executive Officer of T.L. Cannon 

18 Management Corp., JOHN A. PERRY, individually and as Vice19 President and Director of Operations of T.L. Cannon Corp. and as 

20 President of T.L. Cannon Management Corp.,

21 Defendants-Appellees.

22

23 Appeal from the United States District Court

24 for the Northern District of New York.

25 No. 10-cv-591 ― Thomas J. McAvoy, Judge.

26

27

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1 ARGUED: SEPTEMBER 8, 2014

2 DECIDED: FEBRUARY 10, 2015

3

4

Before: JACOBS and DRONEY, Circuit Judges; KAPLAN, District Judge. 5

* 1

6

7

8 Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for 

9 the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, Judge) denying class 

10 certification under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

11 Procedure. We hold that Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 

12 (2013), does not require that damages be measurable on a classwide 

13 basis for certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Since the district court 

14 denied class certification solely because it believed damages were 

15 not measurable on a classwide basis, we VACATE and REMAND. 

16

17

18 SCOTT MICHELMAN, Public Citizen Litigation 

19 Group, Washington, DC, (J. Nelson Thomas, 

20 Michael J. Lingle, and Annette Gifford, Thomas & 

21 Solomon, LLP, Rochester, NY, Frank S. Gattuso 

22 and‖ Dennis‖ G.‖ O’Hara,‖ O’Hara,‖ O’Connell & 

23 Ciotoli, Fayetteville, NY, Michael T. Kirkpatrick, 

24 Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC,

25 on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

26 CRAIG R. BENSON, Littler Mendelson, P.C. 

27 (Andrew P. Marks, Elena Paraskevas-Thadani, 

28 and Erin W. Smith, on the brief), New York, NY, 

29 for Defendants-Appellees.

 

* The Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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1 Jamie G. Sypulski, Law Office of Jamie Golden

2 Sypulski, and Douglas M. Werman, Werman Law 

3 Office, P.C., Chicago, IL, for the National 

4 Employment Lawyers Association as amicus curiae

5 in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

6

7

8 DRONEY, Circuit Judge:

9 This appeal presents the question of whether the Supreme 

10 Court’s‖ decision‖in‖Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013),

11 overruled the law of this Circuit that class certification pursuant to 

12 Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be 

13 denied merely because damages have to be ascertained on an 

14 individual basis. The United States District Court for the Northern 

15 District of New York (McAvoy, J.) concluded that Comcast permits 

16 certification under Rule 23(b)(3) only when damages are measurable 

17 on a classwide basis, and denied Plaintiffs-Appellants’‖ motion‖ for‖

18 class certification. 

19 We hold that Comcast does not mandate that certification 

20 pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) requires a finding that damages are 

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1 capable of measurement on a classwide basis. Accordingly, we 

2 VACATE the order of the district court denying class certification, 

3 and REMAND.

4 BACKGROUND

5 Plaintiffs-Appellants (‚Plaintiffs‛), four former employees at

6 certain Applebee’s‖restaurants‖owned‖and‖operated‖in upstate New 

7 York by‖T.L.‖Cannon‖Corp.‖(‚Cannon‛),‖filed‖suit against Cannon in 

8 the United States District Court for the Northern District of New 

York. 9 1 The amended complaint alleged a collective action for 

10 violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and a putative class action 

11 for violations of the New York Labor Law. Plaintiffs alleged that 

12 Cannon had a policy of not paying hourly employees an extra hour 

13 of pay when working a ten-hour work day as was then required by 

14 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, § 137-1.7‖(the‖‚spread-of-hours‛‖

 

1 Defendants also included corporate affiliates of Cannon and officers of 

the Cannon entities.

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claim).2 1 Plaintiffs also alleged that Cannon required its managerial 

2 staff to subtract pay for statutorily-mandated rest breaks that the 

employees did not actually take‖(the‖‚rest-break‛‖claim). 3 3

4 Following discovery, Plaintiffs moved to certify subclasses 

5 corresponding to each New York Labor Law claim pursuant to Rule 

6 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

7 With respect to Rule 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs argued that issues common 

8 to the question of liability predominated over any individual 

9 questions relating to damages. The district court referred Plaintiffs’

 

2 Effective January 1, 2011, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, § 137-1.7 

was repealed and its substantive provisions re-promulgated at N.Y. Comp. 

Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, § 146-1.6. See 32 N.Y. Reg. 26 (Dec. 29, 2010).

3 The New York Labor Law requires that employees be provided with meal 

breaks of specified lengths based on the times and durations of their shifts. See 

N.Y. Lab. Law § 162. 

Plaintiffs also alleged that Cannon had a policy of not reimbursing its 

employees for uniforms and not paying its employees laundry fees as was then 

required by N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, § 137-1.8. Those New York 

Labor Law claims, as well as the collective action claims brought under the Fair 

Labor Standards Act, are not at issue on appeal.

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1 motion to Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles, who issued a report 

2 and recommendation on March 5, 2013.

3 With respect to Plaintiffs’ spread-of-hours claim, Magistrate 

4 Judge Peebles recommended that Plaintiffs’ motion be granted in 

5 part. Magistrate Judge Peebles found that Plaintiffs had satisfied the 

6 Rule 23(a) prerequisites to class certification, but only with respect to 

7 minimum-wage employees employed between April 2005 and 

8 August 2010. Magistrate Judge Peebles also found that the common 

9 question of whether Cannon had a policy of depriving minimum10 wage employees the extra hour of pay was subject to generalized 

11 proof that predominated over individual questions, thus warranting 

12 class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).

13 With respect to the rest-break claim, Magistrate Judge Peebles 

14 recommended that Plaintiffs’ motion be denied. Magistrate Judge 

15 Peebles found that Plaintiffs had satisfied the commonality and 

16 typicality requirements of Rule 23(a), but that Plaintiffs could not 

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1 satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement because three of 

2 the four Plaintiffs, when serving in a managerial capacity, had 

3 revised employee timecards to deduct pay for untaken rest breaks. 

4 Because Plaintiffs could not satisfy the prerequisites to class 

5 certification under Rule 23(a), Magistrate Judge Peebles did not 

6 consider whether their rest-break claim warranted class certification 

7 under Rule 23(b).

8 Plaintiffs filed timely objections to‖Magistrate‖Judge‖Peebles’s‖

9 report and recommendation. With respect to Plaintiffs’ spread-of10 hours claim, Plaintiffs argued that the class should be certified for all 

11 claims arising after May 2004, when the statute of limitations first 

12 began to run. With respect to their rest-break claim, Plaintiffs

13 argued that they were adequate representatives for a rest-break class 

14 because they were not ‚employers‛‖within‖the‖meaning‖of‖the‖New‖

15 York Labor Law who could be subject to liability for revising 

16 employee timecards. Moreover, Plaintiffs argued, Roach never 

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1 worked in a managerial capacity and therefore was an adequate 

2 representative of the class.

3 On March 29, 2013, the district court issued a decision and 

4 order in response to Plaintiffs’‖ objections,‖ denying‖ certification‖ on‖

5 both Plaintiffs’ spread-of-hour and rest-break claims. See Roach v. 

6 T.L. Cannon Corp., No. 3:10-CV-0591 (TJM/DEP), 2013 WL 1316452 

7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013). The district court noted that the Supreme 

8 Court’s‖ decision‖in‖Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013),

9 had‖ issued‖ after‖ Magistrate‖ Judge‖ Peebles’s‖ report‖ and

10 recommendation, and that, in light of Comcast, class certification was 

11 inappropriate. Roach, 2013 WL 1316452, at *3.

12 The district court construed Comcast as holding that‖ ‚*t+he‖

13 failure of the proponent of the class to offer a damages model that 

14 [is] ‘susceptible of measurement across the entire class for purposes 

15 of Rule 23(b)(3)’ *is+‖fatal‖to‖the‖certification‖question.‛‖‖Id. (quoting

16 Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433). Plaintiffs’‖ view that the presence of 

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1 individualized damages was not fatal to the predominance inquiry, 

2 the district court concluded, was therefore contrary to Comcast. Id.

3 Having so construed Comcast, the district court analyzed

4 whether either the spread-of-hours or rest-break claim merited 

5 certification. Without considering whether there existed any 

6 common questions of law or fact with respect to Plaintiffs’ spread7 of-hours‖ claim,‖ the‖ district‖ court‖ explained‖ that‖ ‚damages‖ in‖ this‖

8 putative‖class‖are‖.‖.‖.‖highly‖individualized.‛‖‖Id. Because Plaintiffs 

9 did‖ not‖ offer‖ a‖ ‚model‖ of damages‖ susceptible‖ of‖ measurement‛‖

10 across the putative class, the district court concluded that ‚Rule‖ 23‖

11 certification must be denied for Plaintiffs’‖ failure to satisfy their

12 requirements under Rule‖ 23(b)(3).‛‖ ‖Id. (citing Comcast). Given its 

13 exclusive reliance on Comcast, the district court did not address 

14 Plaintiffs’ objections‖ to‖ Magistrate‖ Judge‖ Peebles’s‖ report‖ and‖

15 recommendation. Id. at *4.

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1 The‖ district‖ court’s‖ resolution of Plaintiffs’ rest-break claim

2 was substantially identical. Without considering whether there 

3 existed any common questions of law or fact, the district court 

4 concluded‖ that‖ ‚proof‖ of‖ damages‖ on‖ this‖ claim‖ is‖ highly‖

5 individualized‛‖ and‖ ‚*q+uestions‖of‖individual‖damage‖calculations‖

6 will inevitably overwhelm‖ questions‖ common‖ to‖ this‖ class.‛‖ ‖Id. at 

7 *4-5. Again, citing Comcast,‖ the‖district‖ court‖ concluded‖ that‖ ‚class‖

8 certification‖ of‖ this‖ claim‖ fails‖ under‖ Rule‖ 23(b)(3).‛‖ Id. at *5. As

9 with the spread-of-hours claim, the district court relied exclusively 

10 on Comcast and did not address Plaintiffs’‖ objections‖ to‖ the report 

11 and recommendation. Id. at *4. 

12 Plaintiffs sought leave to file this interlocutory appeal 

13 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of 

14 Civil Procedure, which motion we granted.

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1 DISCUSSION

2 Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in holding that,

3 after Comcast, class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) requires a 

4 finding that damages are measurable on a classwide basis. We 

5 review a district‖court’s‖class‖certification‖determination‖for‖abuse‖of‖

6 discretion,‖ applying‖ a‖ ‚noticeably‖ less‖ deferential‛ standard when 

7 the district court has denied class certification. Augustin v. Jablonsky 

8 (In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases), 461 F.3d 219, 224-25 (2d Cir. 

9 2006) (quoting Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d 

10 Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation mark omitted). While we review the 

11 district‖court’s‖construction‖of‖legal‖standards‖de novo, we review the 

12 district‖court’s‖application‖of‖those‖standards‖for whether the district 

13 court’s‖ decision‖ falls‖ within‖ the‖ range‖ of‖ permissible‖ decisions.‖‖

14 Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 547 (2d Cir. 2010).

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1 I

2 A class may be certified only if, ‚after‖a‖rigorous‖analysis,‛‖the‖

3 district court is satisfied that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the 

4 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are met. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 

5 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 

6 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)). Those prerequisites require showing 

7 that: (1) ‚the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 

8 impracticable‛; (2) ‚there are questions of law and fact common to 

9 the class‛; (3) ‚the claims or defenses of the representative parties 

10 are typical‛ of those of the class; and (4) ‚the representative parties 

11 will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.‛ Fed. R. 

12 Civ. P. 23(a).

13 In addition, the district court must be satisfied that 

14 certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b). Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 

15 1432. One of the bases for certification under Rule 23(b), at issue 

16 here, allows for certification if both (1) ‚questions‖ of‖ law‖ or‖ fact‖

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1 common to class members predominate over any questions affecting 

2 only individual members,‛ and‖ (2)‖ ‚a‖ class‖ action‖ is‖ superior‖ to‖

3 other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 

4 controversy.‛ Fed.‖R.‖Civ.‖P.‖23(b)(3).‖‖Predominance‖is‖satisfied‖‚if‖

5 resolution of some of the legal or factual questions that qualify each 

6 class member’s‖ case‖ as a genuine controversy can be achieved 

7 through generalized proof, and if these particular issues are more 

8 substantial‖ than‖ the‖ issues‖ subject‖ only‖ to‖ individualized‖ proof.‛‖‖

9 Catholic Healthcare W. v. US Foodservice Inc. (In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. 

10 Pricing Litig.), 729 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting UFCW Local 

11 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2010)) (internal 

12 quotation marks omitted). 

13 Prior‖to‖the‖Supreme‖Court’s‖decision‖in‖Comcast,‖it‖was‖‚well14 established‛‖in‖this‖Circuit‖that‖‚the‖fact‖that‖damages‖may‖have‖to‖

15 be ascertained on an individual basis is not sufficient to defeat class 

16 certification‛‖under‖Rule‖23(b)(3).‖‖Seijas v. Republic of Argentina, 606 

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1 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2010); see McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 

2 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bridge v. 

3 Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008); see also Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 

4 at 2558‖ (‚*I+ndividualized‖ monetary‖ claims‖ belong‖ in‖ Rule‖

5 23(b)(3).‛). ‚*T+he‖fact‖that‖damages‖may have to be ascertained on 

6 an individual basis‛‖ was‖ simply one ‚factor that we [had to]

7 consider in deciding whether issues susceptible to generalized proof 

8 ‘outweigh’‖ individual‖ issues‛ when certifying the case as a whole. 

9 McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 231. 

10 We do not read Comcast as overruling these decisions.

11 II

12 In Comcast, the plaintiffs filed a class-action antitrust suit 

13 claiming‖ that‖ Comcast’s‖ acquisition‖ of‖ competitor‖ cable television

14 providers in sixteen counties clustered around Philadelphia violated 

15 the Sherman Act. 133 S. Ct. at 1430. Comcast’s‖clustering‖strategy‖

16 had increased its market share in that geographical area from 

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1 around twenty to seventy percent. Id. The plaintiffs sought to 

2 certify the class of Comcast subscribers in that geographical area 

3 under Rule 23(b)(3), claiming that questions of law and fact common 

4 to the class predominated over any questions affecting individual 

5 members. Id. The district court held, and neither the plaintiffs nor 

6 defendants contested on appeal, that in order to meet the 

7 predominance requirement, the plaintiffs had to show that: (1) the 

8 injury‖ suffered‖ by‖ the‖ class‖ was‖ ‚capable‖ of‖ proof‖ at‖ trial‖ through‖

9 evidence that [was] common to the class rather than individual to its 

10 members‛;‖ and‖ (2)‖ ‚the‖ damages‖ resulting‖ from‖ *the‖

11 anticompetitive] injury were measurable on a class-wide basis 

12 through‖ use‖ of‖ a‖ common‖ methodology.‛‖ ‖ Id. (first alteration in 

13 original) (quoting Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 154 (E.D. 

14 Pa. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

15 The plaintiffs offered four theories of antitrust injury or 

16 impact, only one of which the district court concluded was 

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1 susceptible of classwide proof:‖ Comcast’s‖ clustering around 

2 Philadelphia reduced competition from ‚overbuilders,‛ competitors 

3 who build competing cable networks where there exists an 

incumbent cable provider.4 4 Id. at 1430-31. To prove that the 

5 damages resulting from the anticompetitive injury were measurable 

6 on a classwide basis, the plaintiffs offered expert testimony that 

7 modeled the class damages based on all four theories of antitrust 

8 injury; the model did not isolate damages resulting from the 

9 ‚overbuilder‛‖ theory.‖ ‖ Id. at 1431. Nevertheless, both the district 

10 court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 

11 concluded that the expert testimony was sufficient to establish that 

12 damages resulting from the ‚overbuilder‛‖ theory‖ of‖ injury were 

13 measurable on a classwide basis. Id. Rejecting the notion that the 

 

4 The other three theories of injury were that‖ Comcast’s‖ clustering: (1) 

permitted it to withhold local sports programming from satellite competitors, 

thereby reducing competitor market penetration; (2) ‚reduced the level of 

‘benchmark’ competition on which cable customers rely to compare [provider]

prices‛; and (3) ‚increased‖ Comcast’s‖ bargaining‖ power‖ relative‖ to content 

providers.‛ Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430-31.

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1 plaintiffs were required to offer a model of classwide damages that 

2 attributed damages only to the ‚overbuilder‛ theory of injury, the 

3 Court of Appeals explained that the plaintiffs were required merely

4 to provide assurance that, ‚if they can prove antitrust impact, the 

5 resulting damages are capable of measurement and will not require 

6 labyrinthine‖individual‖calculations.‛‖‖Id. at 1431 (quoting Behrend v. 

7 Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 206 (3d Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation 

8 mark omitted). A more rigorous analysis, the Court of Appeals 

9 concluded,‖ would‖ constitute‖ an‖ ‚attac*k+‖ on‖ the‖ merits‖ of‖ the‖

10 methodology [that] [had+‖no‖place‖in‖the‖class‖certification‖inquiry.‛‖‖

11 Id. (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Behrend, 655 F.3d 

12 at 207) (internal quotation marks omitted).

13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. After noting that 

14 neither‖ party‖ had‖ contested‖ the‖ district‖ court’s‖ holding‖ that‖ Rule 

15 23(b)(3) predominance required a showing that damages resulting 

16 from the anticompetitive injury were measurable on a classwide 

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1 basis, id. at 1430, the Court identified the question presented as 

2 whether‖ the‖plaintiffs‖‚had‖.‖.‖.‖establish*ed+‖ that‖damages‖could‖be‖

3 measured‖on‖a‖classwide‖basis,‛‖id. at 1431 n.4. The Court reversed, 

4 holding that the plaintiffs’‖ expert‖ testimony‖ failed‖ to‖ carry‖ that‖

5 burden. Id. at 1432-33.

6 The Court began by noting that it had recently held that 

7 establishing the Rule 23(a) prerequisites to class certification 

8 required‖ a‖ ‚rigorous‖ analysis,‛‖ which‖ would‖ ‚frequently entail 

9 ‘overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.’‛ Id. at 

10 1432 (quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551).‖ ‖ Those‖ ‚same‖ analytical‖

11 principles,‛‖the‖Court‖explained,‖govern‖the‖Rule‖23(b)‖inquiry.‖‖Id.

12 The Court then held that the‖ plaintiffs’‖ expert‖ testimony‖ did‖

13 not withstand the ‚rigorous‖ analysis‛ for the Rule 23(b)(3) 

14 predominance test. The Court explained that the plaintiffs would be 

15 entitled only to damages resulting from their theory of injury. Id. at 

16 1433. Thus,‖ ‚a‖model purporting to serve as evidence of damages 

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1 . . .‖must‖ measure‖ only‖ those‖ damages‖ attributable‖ to‖ that‖ theory.‛‖‖

2 Id. ‚If‖ the‖ model‖ does‖ not‖ even‖ attempt‖ to‖ do‖ that,‛‖ the‖ Court‖

3 explained,‖‚it‖cannot‖possibly‖establish‖that‖damages‖are‖susceptible‖

4 of measurement across the entire class for purposes of Rule 

5 23(b)(3).‛‖ ‖ Id. Because‖ there‖ was‖ ‚no‖ question‛‖ that‖ the‖ damages‖

6 model‖was‖not‖based‖solely‖upon‖the‖‚overbuilder‛‖theory‖of‖injury

7 certified by the district court, but also included calculations 

8 accounting for the three other theories of injury, id. at 1433-34, the 

9 Court‖concluded‖that‖‚Rule‖23(b)(3)‖cannot‖authorize‖treating‖*cable+‖

10 subscribers within the Philadelphia cluster as members of a single 

11 class,‛‖id. at 1435.

12 Comcast, then, did not hold that a class cannot be certified 

13 under Rule 23(b)(3) simply because damages cannot be measured on 

14 a classwide basis. See id. at 1430 (noting that the requirement of a 

15 classwide‖ damages‖ model‖ ‚is‖ uncontested‖ here‛);‖ id. at 1436

16 (Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (‚*T+he‖decision‖should‖not‖be‖

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1 read to require, as a prerequisite to certification, that damages 

2 attributable‖ to‖ a‖ classwide‖ injury‖ be‖ measurable‖ ‘on‖ a‖ class-wide 

3 basis.’‛).‖ ‖ Comcast’s‖ holding‖ was narrower. Comcast held that a 

4 model for determining classwide damages relied upon to certify a 

5 class under Rule 23(b)(3) must actually measure damages that result 

6 from‖the‖class’s‖asserted‖theory‖of‖injury; but the Court did not hold 

7 that proponents of class certification must rely upon a classwide 

8 damages model to demonstrate predominance. See id. at 1433; see

9 also In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 817 (5th Cir. 2014) 

10 (construing‖ the‖ ‚principal‖ holding‖ of‖ Comcast [as being] that a 

11 ‘model‖ purporting‖ to‖ serve as evidence of damages . . . must 

12 measure‖only‖those‖damages‖attributable‖to‖th*e+‖theory’‖of‖liability‖

13 on‖which‖the‖class‖action‖is‖premised‛ (ellipsis and second alteration 

14 in original) (quoting Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433)); Butler v. Sears, 

15 Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2013) (construing Comcast

16 as‖holding‖only‖‚that‖a‖damages suit cannot be certified to proceed 

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1 as a class action unless the damages sought are the result of the 

2 class-wide injury that‖the‖suit‖alleges‛ (emphasis in original)); Leyva 

3 v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013) (interpreting 

4 Comcast to hold that class-action‖ plaintiffs‖ ‚must‖ be‖ able‖ to‖ show‖

5 that their damages stemmed from the‖ defendant’s‖ actions‖ that‖

6 created the legal liability‛); accord Catholic Healthcare W. v. US 

7 Foodservice Inc. (In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig.), 729 F.3d 108, 

8 123 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013) (‚Plaintiffs’ proposed measure for damages is 

9 thus directly linked with their underlying theory of classwide 

10 liability . . . and is therefore in accord with the Supreme Court’s 

11 recent decision in Comcast .‖.‖.‖.‛). Indeed, as the Court explained, if 

12 all four types of anticompetitive injury had been approved for 

13 certification by the district court, the‖ plaintiff’s‖ damages

14 methodology ‚might have been sound, and might have produced 

15 commonality‖of‖damages.‛ Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434.

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1 To be sure, Comcast reiterated that damages questions should

2 be considered at the certification stage when weighing 

3 predominance issues, but this requirement is entirely consistent with 

4 our‖ prior‖ holding‖ that‖ ‚the‖ fact‖ that‖ damages‖ may‖ have‖ to‖ be‖

5 ascertained on an individual basis is . . . a factor that we must 

6 consider in deciding whether issues susceptible to generalized proof 

7 ‘outweigh’‖ individual‖ issues.‛‖ McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 231. The 

8 Supreme Court did not foreclose the possibility of class certification 

9 under Rule 23(b)(3) in cases involving individualized damages 

10 calculations.

11 Our reading of Comcast is consistent with the‖Supreme‖Court’s‖

12 statement in Comcast that its decision turned‖ upon‖ ‚the‖

13 straightforward application of class-certification‖principles.‛‖‖ 133‖ S.‖

14 Ct. at 1433. Our reading is also consistent with the interpretation of

15 those Circuits that have had the opportunity to apply Comcast. See 

16 AstraZeneca AB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Unions & Emp’rs

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1 Midwest Health Benefits Fund (In re Nexium Antitrust Litig.), No. 14-

2 1521, 2015 WL 265548, at *8, *10 (1st Cir. Jan. 21, 2015) (explaining 

3 that Comcast ‚simply‛‖requires that a damages calculation reflect the 

4 associated theory of liability, and discussing the‖ ‚well-established‛‖

5 principle that individualized damages do not automatically defeat

6 Rule 23(b)(3) certification); Dow Chem. Co. v. Seegott Holdings, Inc. (In 

7 re Urethane Antitrust Litig.), 768 F.3d 1245, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2014)

8 (‚Comcast did not rest on the ability to measure damages on a class9 wide‖basis.‛); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 817 (rejecting, post10 Comcast,‖ the‖ argument‖ ‚that‖ certification under Rule 23(b)(3) 

11 requires a reliable, common methodology for measuring classwide 

12 damages‛ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Butler, 727 F.3d at 801

13 (holding,‖upon‖the‖Supreme‖Court’s‖grant‖of‖certiorari,‖vacatur, and 

14 remand in light of Comcast,‖ that‖ ‚the‖ fact‖ that‖ damages‖ are‖ not‖

15 identical across all class members should not preclude class 

16 certification‛);‖ Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp. (In re Whirlpool Corp. FrontCase 13-3070, Document 115-1, 02/10/2015, 1434860, Page23 of 26
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1 Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig.), 722 F.3d 838, 860-61 (6th Cir. 2013) 

2 (noting that Comcast was‖ ‚premised‖ on‖ existing‖ class-action 

3 jurisprudence‛‖and‖that‖‚it‖remains‖the‖‘black‖letter‖rule’‖that‖a‖class‖

4 may obtain certification under Rule 23(b)(3) when liability questions 

5 common to the class predominate over damages questions unique to

6 class‖ members‛);‖ Leyva, 716 F.3d at 513 (reiterating Ninth Circuit 

7 precedent, post-Comcast,‖ that‖ ‚damage‖ calculations‖ alone‖ cannot‖

8 defeat‖certification‛ (quoting Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 

9 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation mark 

10 omitted)). 

11 III

12 Cannon does not argue that Comcast precludes certification 

13 whenever damages are not measurable on a classwide basis. Rather, 

14 Cannon maintains that the district court denied class certification 

15 because Plaintiffs had failed to establish that any common issues of 

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1 law and fact predominated over the individualized nature of the 

2 damages inquiry.

3 But in considering whether to certify Plaintiffs’‖ spread-of4 hours and rest-break claims under Rule 23(b)(3), the district court 

5 did not evaluate whether the individualized damages questions

6 predominate over the common questions of liability identified by 

7 Magistrate Judge Peebles. The district court also did not consider

8 that Magistrate Judge Peebles had identified such common

9 questions. Rather,‖ the‖ district‖ court’s‖ reasoning‖ was limited to an 

10 analysis of whether Plaintiffs’‖ damages would be capable of 

11 measurement on a classwide basis. Because the district court 

12 concluded damages were not capable of measurement on a 

13 classwide basis—and only because the district court concluded 

14 damages were not capable of measurement on a classwide basis—

15 the district court refused to certify Plaintiffs’ spread-of-hours and 

16 rest-break claims. That holding was not required by Comcast, was 

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1 contrary to the law of this Circuit—left undisturbed by Comcast—

2 that individualized damages determinations alone cannot preclude 

3 certification under Rule 23(b)(3), see Seijas v. Republic of Argentina, 

4 606 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2010), and cannot support the district‖court’s‖

5 denial of Plaintiffs’‖motion‖for‖certification.

6 Accordingly, because we do not read Comcast as precluding 

7 class certification where damages are not capable of measurement 

8 on‖ a‖ classwide‖ basis,‖ we‖ reject‖ the‖ district‖ court’s‖ sole‖ reason for

9 denying Plaintiffs’‖motion for class certification. 

10 CONCLUSION

11 For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the order of the 

district court denying class certification, and REMAND. 12 5

 

5 We decline Plaintiffs’‖invitation‖to‖order‖class‖certification‖on‖the‖present‖

record. Whether to certify a class is within the discretion of the district court, 

largely because it is the district court that has the ‚inherent power to manage and 

control pending litigation.‛ Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 547 (2d Cir. 2010)

(quoting Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 493 F.3d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 2007)) 

(internal quotation mark omitted). We cannot hold, on this record, that an order 

denying certification upon consideration of the Rule 23(b)(3) standards would be 

outside the range of permissible decisions upon the proper application of 

Comcast. See id.

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