Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03540/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03540-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCENT M. LOPEZ, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

ALEXANDER LORENZO GEE, W.

OWEN,

Defendants

____________________________

_ 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 05-3540 MMC (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL; DENYING

APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS; DENYING

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

(Docket Nos. 2 & 3)

Plaintiff, an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison, filed the above-captioned civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff names two defendants: his roommate, Alexander

Gee (“Gee”), and a Correctional Officer W. Owen (“Owen”). He alleges that Gee has sexually

harassed and threatened him, and that Owen tried to make plaintiff fall while he was handcuffed

to a waist chain. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss

any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).

B. Defendant Gee

The complaint fails to state a claim against Gee because Gee is not a state actor. To

state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged

violation was committed by a person acting “under color of state law.” See West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff’s complaint fails on the second of these elements because the

only defendant named in the complaint is a private individual who does not act “under color of

state law.” A person acts under color of state law if he "exercise[s] power possessed by virtue

of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of

state law." Id. at 49. A private individual, such as plaintiff’s cellmate, does not act under color

of state law. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Simply put: there is no

constitutional right to be free from the infliction of deprivations by private individuals. See

Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). As the defendant in this case

is not a state actor, but rather a private individual, plaintiff may not pursue any § 1983 claims

against him. Accordingly, the claims against defendant Gee are DISMISSED.

C. Defendant Owen

The complaint also fails with respect to defendant Owen, as the complaint is premature. 

Plaintiff has recently written to the Court indicating that his administrative grievance against

Owen “is still at the third level in Sacramento, California.” The Prison Litigation Reform Act

of 1995 amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect

to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined

in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted." See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement under §

1997e(a) is mandatory and not merely directory. Porter v. Nussle , 122 S. Ct. 983, 988 (2002). 

All available remedies must be exhausted; those remedies "need not meet federal standards, nor

must they be 'plain, speedy, and effective.'" See id. (citation omitted). Even when the prisoner
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a

prerequisite to suit. See id.; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Exhaustion is a

prerequisite to all prisoner lawsuits concerning prison life, whether such actions involve

general conditions or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some

other wrong. See Porter, 122 S. Ct. at 992. 

The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to appeal

administratively "any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In order

to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed

through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC

602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4)

third level appeal to the Director of the California Department of Corrections (“Director”) in

Sacramento, California. See Barry v Ratelle , 985 F. Supp 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5). A final decision from the Director’s level of review

satisfies the exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). See id. at 1237-38. 

A concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal, provided no exception to

exhaustion applies. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). Here,

plaintiff concedes in his letter to the Court that he has not had a final decision from the

Director’s level of review on his grievance against defendant Owen. Such a decision is

necessary in order to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. As it is clear from plaintiff’s

letter that he has not completed all levels of administrative appeal available to him, dismissal

of his claims against Owen without prejudice is appropriate. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s claims against defendant Gee are DISMISSED for

failure to state a cognizable claim for relief; plaintiff’s claims against defendant Owen are

DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling after administrative remedies have been exhausted.

In light of this dismissal, the application to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED and

no fee is due. Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel likewise is DENIED. There is no
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

right to appointment of counsel in civil actions such as this.

This order terminates Docket Nos. 2 and 3.

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 20, 2005

_________________________

 MAXINE M. CHESNEY

 United States District Judge