Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02242/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02242-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO LMH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William Mark Isbell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Justin Hughes, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 04-2242-PHX-JAT (VAM)

ORDER

Plaintiff William Isbell, a state prisoner, filed this action claiming that his Fourth

Amendment rights were violated by a search of his home and by excessive force in his arrest.

Currently pending are:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants’ Response

and Plaintiff’s Amended Reply (Doc. ##39, 42, 85, 100-101); 

(2) Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff’s Amended

Response, and Defendants’ Reply (Doc. ##83-84, 94-95,100-101); and

(3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Possess and Use Personal Typewriter for

Pro-Se Procedures, Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction Hearing, and Defendants’ Response (Doc. ##53, 70-

71).

 

The Court will (1) grant in part Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion for his claim that

Officers Hughes and Gallant illegally entered his home but deny in part as to the City of El

Mirage, (2) grant in part Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on the excessive

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force claim but deny in part Defendants’ contentions regarding the availability of punitive

damages, and (3) deny Plaintiff’s motions seeking injunctive relief. The Court’s decision

leaves for trial the issue of compensatory and punitive damages for the unconstitutional entry

and ensuing search.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff sues the City of El Mirage and Officers Hughes, Gallant, Tevault and

Chambers, contending that they violated the Fourth Amendment by searching his home

without a warrant and without the express consent of his stepson on December 12, 2003, and

by using excessive force in Plaintiff’s arrest later that day. 

Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the search issue against Officers

Hughes and Gallant, and the City of El Mirage (Doc. ##39, 42). He submitted his own

declaration in support and attached excerpts of testimony by Officer Hughes from a state

court criminal trial, an affidavit of Jodie Isbell, and copies of newspaper articles (Doc. #39).

Plaintiff expressly declined to move for summary judgment on his claim of excessive force

in arrest (Pl.’s Decl. at 1, Doc. #39). 

Defendants responded and cross-moved for summary judgment, contending that:

(1) they are entitled to qualified immunity because: 

(a) Plaintiff’s minor son impliedly consented to the search, or the

officers did not violate a clearly established constitutional right in

believing they had consent, 

(b) there was no excessive force in the arrest, and the officers did not

violate a clearly established constitutional right in pointing their guns;

(2) the City cannot be liable based on respondeat superior, and 

(3) Plaintiff cannot be awarded punitive damages. 

(Defs.’ Resp. & Cross-Motion, Doc. ##83, 85). In support, they submit a Statement of Facts,

along with (1) police reports, (2) deposition excerpts by Plaintiff, his ex-wife Jodie Sue

Holmes, and his stepson A.C., and (3) Officer Hughes’ affidavit (DSOF, Doc. #84).

Plaintiff submitted an Amended Reply and Response, contending that (1) the City

failed to train and supervise its officers, (2) the search lacked consent and was not merely a

protective sweep, (3) excessive force was used against him, (4) punitive damages are

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available, and (5) the qualified immunity defense is not viable (Doc. ##100-101). In support,

he filed a Statement of Facts (PSOF, Doc. #101).

Defendants filed a Reply in support of their summary judgment motion and a

controverting statement of facts (Doc. ##94-95). The parties have also filed an Amended

Joint Pretrial Statement (Doc. #105).

II. Factual Background

On the day of the events at issue, December 12, 2003, Plaintiff lived in El Mirage with

his wife, Jodie Isbell (now Jodie Sue Holmes), his 11-year-old stepson A.C., and his son,

who was under 2 years old. During the previous year, police had been summoned to the

Isbell residence on several occasions, frequently for domestic violence incidents between

Plaintiff and Jodie. 

On September 22, 2002, Officer Hughes and another officer responded to a call that

Jodie Isbell needed protection because Plaintiff threatened her. A background check showed

that Plaintiff was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood gang (DSOF ¶¶ 3-4 & Ex. B-2). On

October 27, 2002, Officers Hughes was asked to assist with service of an order of protection

on Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 6 & Ex. B-4.

On November 13, 2002, Plaintiff was arrested for criminal damage/domestic violence.

Officer Hughes reported that Jodie Isbell told him that she had an argument with Plaintiff

about getting divorced, and he had backed his Pathfinder, with their nine-month-old son

seated in the back, into her empty Taurus in the driveway. When he continued to push the

Taurus with his Pathfinder, she told him to stop, and he drove back into the garage (DSOF

¶¶ 8-9 & Ex. B-6). 

Plaintiff was arrested for assault/domestic violence on December 11, 2002. An officer

who is not a defendant reported that Jodie Isbell said that she had an argument with Plaintiff

over financial matters, and he punched her in the chest and drove away (DSOF ¶ 10 & Ex.

B-7). 

On September 3, 2003, Officer Tevault responded to a call regarding a family fight.

Jodie told Tevault that she had an argument with Plaintiff about picking up her son, and she

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At Plaintiff’s criminal trial arising from the incident in May 2004, the parties

stipulated that the incident did not cause the broken pelvis (PSOF Ex. 22).

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thought he tried to hit her while driving a large truck (DSOF ¶ 12 & Ex. B-14). The next

day, Plaintiff was arrested for aggravated assault. Tevault reported that a high-risk stop had

been made because of the nature of the felony and Plaintiff’s affiliation with the Aryan

Brotherhood. Id. ¶ 13 & Ex. B-15. On October 18, 2003, Plaintiff was served with an order

of protection. Id. ¶14 & Ex. B-16.

On November 18, 2003, police were summoned after several neighbors called and

reported that Plaintiff had run over Jodie with his car (DSOF ¶ 15 & Ex. B-19). Jodie said

that she suffered a fractured pelvic bone. Id. ¶¶16-17, Ex. B-19, & Ex. C – Jodie Sue Homes

Dep. at 35, Jan. 19, 2006.1

 She and Plaintiff reportedly argued about Plaintiff’s drug use.

Id. Ex. B-19 and Holmes Dep. at 36. Plaintiff had left the scene. The narrative report by

Officer Hennessy indicated that after Jodie said that Plaintiff was violent and carried

weapons, a background check was run and Plaintiff had convictions in the mid-1990s for a

weapons charge, aggravated assault with a weapon, and assault. Id. ¶ 31 & Ex. B-19. The

officer requested that charges be filed for aggravated assault. Id.

On November 20, 2003, Jodie reported to police that she believed Plaintiff had

returned to the home and stolen her checkbook (DSOF, Ex. B-20). On November 21, a

person named Brian Beitman reported that his car had been parked at the Isbell home.

Jodie’s cousin was considering buying the car, and Jodie was holding the keys for Beitman.

Plaintiff reportedly took the car and hit Jodie with it. Id. Ex. B-21. Plaintiff also told

Beitman that he did not intend to return the car. Id.

On November 26 and 28, 2003, police unsuccessfully attempted to arrest Plaintiff

(DSOF ¶¶ 19 & Ex. B-22-24). Defendants claim that Plaintiff was “at large,” but Plaintiff

asserts that he was living at his home a few days after Thanksgiving “around November 27,

2003” (Am. Reply & Resp. at 6). 

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On December 3, Officer Hughes received a report from Jodie that Beitman’s stolen

car was in a parking lot at a McDonald’s at McDowell and 7th Avenue in Phoenix. The car

was recovered (DSOF, Ex. B-22). 

The incident that is at issue in this case occurred on December 12, 2003, when

Officers Hughes and Gallant went to Plaintiff’s home. Plaintiff’s 11-year-old stepson A.C.

was babysitting his younger brother. The officers entered the home, and the parties dispute

whether A.C. impliedly consented to their entry. Notably, there is no dispute that the officers

did not expressly ask for permission to enter the home. There is a dispute regarding whether

once the officers were inside, they conducted a protective sweep or made a more extensive

search described by Plaintiff as “ransacking.” It is undisputed that the search did not result

in evidence of any illegal activity.

While at the home, Hughes and Gallant learned that Plaintiff was on his way back, and

they called back-up officers. Plaintiff stopped his car at a park near his home, and he was

arrested at gunpoint for aggravated assault. The other officers involved were Tevault and

Chambers. The parties dispute whether the force used during the arrest was excessive.

Regardless, Officer Hughes requested that Plaintiff be charged with aggravated assault

(domestic violence), unlawful use of means of transportation, and theft (DSOF Ex. B-25).

In the Maricopa County Superior Court Plaintiff was tried for aggravated assault. On

May 9, 2004, a jury found him not guilty (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 8 & Ex. 4, Doc. #39). Plaintiff is

nevertheless serving a 221⁄2-year sentence in state prison for other crimes (Pl.’s Dep. at 49).

III. Summary Judgment Standard

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

When considering a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the non-movant is “to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). These inferences are limited, however, “to those

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upon which a reasonable jury might return a verdict.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co.,

68 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who, after

adequate time for discovery, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof

at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue of

material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of a

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id.

IV. Search

A. Evidence

When Officers Hughes and Gallant arrived at Plaintiff’s home on December 12, 2003,

Plaintiff’s 11-year-old son A.C. was home babysitting his younger brother. Plaintiff and his

wife were not there. The purpose of their visit is disputed; Defendants claim they were

looking for Plaintiff and made only a protective sweep, but Plaintiff claims they were looking

for evidence of illegal activity and “ransacked” his home.

More than two years after the incident, on December 28, 2005, A.C. testified at his

deposition as follows:

A. . . . I saw two cops, so I just opened the door.

Q. And when you opened the door, what did you say?

A. I don’t remember.

Q. Okay. Do you remember what they said?

A. Not really. Like, I remember, like they asked me where my dad was,

and they asked me to call him and ask him, so I did.

While I was on there, they just sort of kind of walked in. I didn’t like,

tell them to come in and, like – them, like, after, like, I called my dad,

I like, ummm, went over, and I was, like talking to one of the cops.

And one of the cops was over there, like, in the kitchen. I don’t know

what he was doing. And then we, like, talked.

I don’t know. I just asked, like, why – well, like, I kind of wanted to

know what was going on, so I was asking like, “Well, why are you guys

here?”

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This was after I called my dad and asked him. And then I told them,

and they were just, like, kind of in the house, and I didn’t want to, like,

say anything because they are kind of cops. I didn’t want to tell them,

“Get out now.”

Then I think they left, like, after that. And then, like, I tried to go, like,

tell my dad – because they, like, told me not to tell him the cops were

here. So I went over to, like, go call him and at least tell him, like,

“Something is, like – cops were just here.”

And they, like – because, like, the number was on the caller ID and the

caller ID number was missing.

And then they just kind of left. And I remember my mom coming

home and she was crying.

And that’s all I know about this, that I remember. You can ask some

questions and that might refresh my memory more.

Q. Okay. Tell me this; when the cops were first there, did you have a

suspicion that they wanted to arrest your dad?

A. Yeah. I knew, like – I knew, like, it was something – either my dad or

my mom, and I just kind of took a wild guess and said it was something

about my dad.

Q. Tell me why your wild guess would lead to – 

A. I don’t know.

Q. – that conclusion.

A. I have no clue.

Q. Okay. So you didn’t know the reason why they wanted to arrest him,

you just thought that the cops were there to arrest your dad?

A. Yeah. That – like, they told me they weren’t going to do anything, but

I knew that was a lie because they didn’t, like, knock on the door to

say, “How’s it going?”

So I knew, like, something was going on. And that’s it.

Q. Okay. Do you remember anything more about the conversation that

you had with the two officers when they were first at your door and you

said – they asked if your dad was there and you said no? Did they ask

whether or not they could come in and check?

A. No. They didn’t really ask that. They just asked me to call him.

Q. Okay. So what you remember is they came to the door, you opened the

door, they asked if he was there or not, and then they asked you to call

him?

A. Yeah, they asked me to call him and ask him where he was, so I went

and did that.

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Q. And did they follow you into the house when you went to call?

A. They, like, probably walked in, like, then, like, when I started dialing

the number, I, like, saw them in there, I was just, like, okay, because I

didn’t want to tell them anything like “Get out” or something.

Q. Did they ask if they could come in?

A. No, they didn’t.

(A.C. Deposition on Dec. 28, 2005, at 33-36, DSOF, Ex. E, Doc. #84) (emphasis added). 

According to the affidavit of Jodie Isbell, when she arrived home after Plaintiff’s

arrest, she found A.C. crying and saying that “th[ey] got daddy.” A.C. said that the

detectives made him call his parents. Jodie Isbell went upstairs and saw that the lights were

on and the drawers were open. She returned downstairs and asked A.C. if the detectives had

searched the house, and he said yes. She asked him if they had asked to do so, and A.C. said

“no.” (Pl.’s Decl. – Jodie Isbell Aff., Ex. 2, Doc. #39). 

The only other evidence on the circumstances of the entry into the home is from

Officer Hughes. None of the parties have submitted any evidence originating from Officer

Gallant. Hughes asserted in his affidavit that when A.C. answered the door, he said that his

mom was not home and “they” were out running errands (Hughes Aff. ¶ 5, DSOF., Ex. D).

The officers asked who “they” was, and A.C. became nervous. Id. Hughes asked if his

father was back living in the house, and A.C. responded affirmatively. Id. ¶ 6. A.C. also said

that he did not want to tell them that his father was living there because he knew his father

would have to go to jail. Id. ¶ 7. A.C. said that his parents would be home soon. Id. ¶ 8.

According to Hughes, he and Gallant “did enter the plaintiff’s home with the permission of

A.C, in an attempt to determine the whereabouts of plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 9. There is no indication

from the affidavit that the “permission” given by A.C. was anything other than implied.

There is also no indication that the officers asked permission to enter the home.

Hughes’ affidavit appears to rely on his narrative report given two days after the

incident, as it follows it nearly word for word (Officer Hughes Narrative Report, DSOF., Ex.

B-25). The statement are similar to those Officer Hughes testified about on May 14, 2004,

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Despite Defendants’ answer stating that Plaintiff was arrested on an outstanding

warrant for the charge of aggravated assault (Doc. #12, ¶ 4), in response to interrogatories,

Defendants denied that they were “armed with a search or arrest warrant”(PSOF Ex. 27 ¶ 15,

Doc. #101). Also, Officer Hughes described their visit to the home that day as “follow-up.”

Id. Ex. 26 ¶ 30, Ex. 27 ¶13.

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presumably at Plaintiff’s criminal trial, except that at trial Officer Hughes said that A.C.

began to cry after he asked if his parents were home (Pl.’s Decl. at 39-40, Ex. A. Doc. #39).

B. Analysis

1. Implied Consent 

Absent exigency or consent, police may not conduct a search of a home without a

warrant, Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006); U.S. v. Reid, 226 F.3d

1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000), nor may police enter a home to make an arrest without a warrant,

even if they have probable cause, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980). It is

undisputed that in this case, there were no exigent circumstances, and Officers Hughes and

Gallant did not have search warrant. Defendants also do not contend that they had an arrest

warrant.2

 Instead, they contend that the entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment because

Plaintiff’s 11-year-old stepson gave implied consent. It is undisputed that (1) neither Officer

Hughes nor Officer Gallant expressly requested permission to enter, and (2) A.C. did not give

express consent to search. 

 Generally, the question is whether consent was voluntary, which is a question of fact

to be determined from all the circumstances. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996);

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). Consent may not be coerced, no

matter how subtly. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228. Whether the circumstances justified the

officer’s action is assessed objectively, regardless of the officer’s subjective motivation.

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006) (quotation omitted). Thus, if the

officers reasonably believed that they were given consent by a third party, the entry is not

unreasonable. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186-88 (1990); Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171.

In a criminal case, the government bears the burden of showing that consent was voluntary

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Neither party cited Shaibu.

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but in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden on each element of his claim,

including lack of consent. Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Defendants place much stake upon the argument that a minor has the capacity to give

consent. Existing case law holds that a person’s age is a factor to be considered in

considering whether the consent is voluntary. See U.S. v. Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d

1225, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 1998); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1548-49 (11th Cir. 1995);

United States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1990). Regardless, A.C.’s tender years

are not dispostive on the issue of consent.

Instead, the Court finds that the decision in U.S. v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.),

amended, 912 F.2d 1193 (1990) controls this case.3

 In Shaibu, the police were looking for

one man at an apartment complex and pressed a buzzer at the entrance gate. A voice

(Shaibu) asked who was there, and the police did not respond. The gate opened, and they

entered. The police walked into a hallway, and Shaibu stepped out of his apartment, leaving

his door open. An officer identified himself and asked if the man they were looking for was

inside. Shaibu turned around and walked into his apartment, leaving the door open. The

police followed. There, the police did not find the man they were looking for, but they found

evidence that Shaibu committed bank fraud. The district court found that Shaibu had given

an “implicit invitation” to enter and search his apartment when he walked in and left the door

open. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that when police do not expressly request

permission to search, consent may not be inferred. 

In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit began with the concept that consent is not lightly to

be inferred. Shaibu, 920 F.2d at 1426. Under some very limited circumstances a court will

infer consent from the cooperative attitude of the defendant, but “this court has never

sanctioned entry to the home based on inferred consent.” Id. (citations omitted). It is “one

thing to infer consent from actions responding to a police request, and “quite another to

sanction the police walking in to a person’s home without stopping at the door to ask

permission.” Id. at 1427. The court of appeals found:

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 Although an open door may thus affect the range of permissible action for

police possessing a warrant, there is no authority that an open door gives

police legal grounds to enter the home without explicit request when they infer

consent from mere acquiescence. United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228,

1233 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) (in implied consent cases, “the suspect himself takes

some action” showing “unequivocal and specific” consent). We do not expect

others to walk in to our homes, even if the door is open, without first

requesting permission to enter. That the police would so enter, without

request, creates an impression of authority to do so. In light of the standard in

this Circuit, that “[c]oercion is implicit in situations where consent is obtained

under color of the badge,” United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir.

1962), we interpret failure to object to the police officer’s thrusting himself

into Shaibu’s apartment as more likely suggesting submission to authority than

implied or voluntary consent. Such submission is not effective consent.

Even if there was not implicit coercion in fact here, the government may not

show consent to enter from the defendant’s failure to object to the entry. To

do so would be to justify entry by consent and consent by entry. This will not

do. . . . . We hold that in absence of a specific request by police for permission

to enter a home, a defendant’s failure to object to such entry is not sufficient

to establish free and voluntary consent. We will not infer both the request and

the consent.

Shaibu, 920 F.2d at 1427 (some citations and quotations omitted). 

The primary difference between this action and Shaibu is that the alleged consent in

Shaibu originated from the putative defendant and in this case, from A.C., a third party.

Defendant cites an earlier decision, U.S. v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1984), which

addressed implied consent by a third party. In Impink, the issue was whether a landlady

implicitly consented to search of the leased property. The parties conceded that she was

never explicitly asked to consent to a search and did not volunteer consent. The Ninth

Circuit rejected the contention that the landlady, by calling police and cooperating with the

investigation, had impliedly consented to the search. The Court of Appeals noted that “we

are asked to infer consent from the actions of a third party – a most uncommon situation.”

Id. at 1233 n.3. The court, however, focused on the lack of the capacity of the landlady to

consent because she lacked joint access to the premises with the lessee, and that the lessee

was present and actively opposed the search. Id. at 1233 (distinguishing U.S. v. Matlock,

415 U.S. 164 (1974)). In contrast, Plaintiff’s stepson A.C. had some capacity to consent

based upon sharing the home with Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was not present to oppose the

search. Thus, the Impink decision does not control this action and regardless, by its result

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lends credence to the idea that consent may not be impliedly given when there is no express

request. 

The Court finds the result in this case is dictated by Shaibu’s clear and express

holding that “We will not infer both the request and the consent.” Shaibu, 920 F.2d at 1428.

There is no evidence to show that either Officer Hughes or Gallant expressly requested

permission to enter Plaintiff’s residence. Officer Hughes has not testified that he or Officer

Gallant made a request, and there is no testimony from Officer Gallant to contradict him.

The only clear testimony is from A.C., who clearly testified that the police did not ask to

come in. His testimony is corroborated by his mother, whose affidavit indicates that A.C.

told her later that the police did not request to search. Thus, the record leaves no dispute that

the officers did not make an express request to enter or search the home. 

It is also undisputed that A.C. did not give express consent to enter. Defendants’

contention that he implicitly consented is not persuasive in light of Shaibo’s holding that

consent cannot be inferred when there is no express request to search. Consequently, the

entry into Plaintiff’s home violated the Fourth Amendment.

2. Qualified Immunity for Defendants Hughes and Gallants

Defendants assert the defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is “an

entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511, 526 (1985). A two-step evaluation of qualified immunity requires both a

constitutional inquiry and an immunity inquiry. The “constitutional inquiry” asks whether,

when taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the facts alleged show the

official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

This question is answered affirmatively because the Court has found that on the undisputed

facts of this record, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. 

When the first question is satisfied, the court turns to the “qualified immunity inquiry”

and asks whether the officer could have reasonably but mistakenly believed that his conduct

did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-05.

Defendants contend that for the Court to permit suit against them, the Court must find that

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the law gives the officers notice that implied consent by a minor is not valid. As stated in the

foregoing, whether a minor can give implied consent is not the question under these

circumstances. Rather, the question is whether implied consent is effective when there is

no express request to search a home. Defendants have not addressed qualified immunity

under those terms. In any case, the Ninth Circuit held in Shaibu, a decision that issued 13

years before the facts of this case, that a search is unreasonable if based on implied consent

when there is no express request to search. The right was clearly established, and the officers

could not have reasonably believed that they had authority to enter without an arrest or

search warrant. Accordingly, the qualified immunity defense fails. 

3. Liability of the City

The City cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional search unless its policy or

custom caused the constitutional injury. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics

Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In other words, a § 1983 claim against the City

“cannot succeed as a matter of law” unless Plaintiff contends that the City maintains a policy

or custom pertinent to his injury, and explains how such policy or custom caused his injury.

Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2864 (2006). 

In his motion, Plaintiff contends that the City fails to train and discipline its officers.

He claims that the City turns a “blind eye,” that 13 officers have been accused of misconduct,

that Officer Hughes has not been properly disciplined, and that an in-depth management

study of the police department revealed that it was not properly functioning. However, in

his Amended Reply & Response, Plaintiff sets forth various contentions regarding how

Officers Hughes and Gallant violated police department policy regarding searches (Am.

Reply & Resp. at 13-15, Doc. #100). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the officers

violated departmental policy stating that: (1) persons may not be aware of their right to refuse

permission to search, (2) warrants must be obtained if the defendant or anyone in standing

objects, (3) consent searches are limited to the areas for which consent is given, (4) consents

must be in writing, and (5) protective sweeps occur near the arrestee. Plaintiff asserts that

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the policy is “clear” and that Defendants “abused discretion by not following policy or being

sure of their actions . . . . ” Id. 

The actions of individuals may support liability only if the employees were acting

pursuant to an official policy or custom of the municipality. Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d

971, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1419 (2006); Cortez v. County of Los

Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). In light of Plaintiff’s contention that Officers

Hughes and Gallant failed to follow established policies of the police department that would

have prevented the unconstitutional search, it is unclear how a policy or custom of the City

of El Mirage caused them to violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Even if, as Plaintiff

contends, the City has a policy or custom of permitting abuses by police officers or

mismanaging its police department, Plaintiff has not explained how that policy or custom

caused the unconstitutional search by Officers Hughes and Gallant. The Court will therefore

grant summary judgment in favor of the City of El Mirage on the search claim.

4. Damages

a. Availability of punitive damages

Plaintiff has requested an award of exemplary damages of $500,000 against each

Defendant. A jury may award punitive damages under § 1983 either when a defendant’s

conduct is driven by evil motive or intent, or when it involved a reckless or callous

indifference to the constitutional rights of others. Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir.

2005) (quotation omitted). Defendants contend that punitive damages are not proper because

their conduct was not oppressive, malicious, or in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s rights. The

Court finds that for the question of the unreasonable search, there are sufficient facts from

which a reasonable jury could infer that the punitive damages standard was met. Defendants’

cross-motion on this point will be denied.

b. Compensatory damages

Plaintiff has requested compensatory damages of $250,000 against each Defendant.

The abstract value of the violated constitutional right may not form the basis for an award

of compensatory damages. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,

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308 (1986) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978). Plaintiff must prove that the

unlawful entry caused him “actual, compensable injury.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

487 n.7 (1994); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam). The Ninth Circuit has held that the § 1983 victim is “entitled to recover

compensatory damages for all injuries suffered as a consequence of those deprivations”

according to general tort principles applicable to the type of deprivation proved. Borunda

v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1989). This may include “compensation for

economic harm, pain and suffering, and mental and emotional distress that results from the

violations.” Id. at 1389; see also Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 157 (3d Cir. 2000) (because

liability must be assessed in terms of the risks that are constitutionally relevant, victims of

an unreasonable search may recover damages directly related to the invasion of their privacy,

including physical injury, property damage, injury to reputation, etc.). 

Possibly, the question of compensatory injury could depend in part on the scope of

the search of the home. The parties dispute whether Defendants conducted a cursory

protective sweep or a more extensive invasion into areas like the master bedroom, filing

cabinets, and electronically-stored information on Plaintiff’s phone. In the Court’s opinion,

because the entry was unlawful, any ensuing search would also violate the Fourth

Amendment, no matter its breadth. For this reason, the parties’ dispute regarding the extent

of A.C.’s authority to permit a search of areas such as the master bedroom is now immaterial

to the question of the Fourth Amendment violation, but the extent of the search may bear

some relevance to the question of damages. As stated, Plaintiff must be able to prove

“actual, compensable injury” to recover compensatory damages. 

5. Conclusion

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment for his claim that

Officers Hughes and Gallant unlawfully entered his home because Defendants have

essentially conceded that the police officers did not make a request to enter and, as a matter

of law under Ninth Circuit precedent, consent cannot be inferred from the circumstances.

The City of El Mirage is entitled to summary judgment in its favor because there is no

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evidence to show how a policy or custom of the City caused the unconstitutional search. The

remaining issue for the jury is whether to award any compensatory or punitive damages.

V. Arrest

A. Legal Standard

Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment, contending that the force used in

Plaintiff’s arrest was not excessive. A Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force is

analyzed under the reasonable standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386 (1989). The analysis is objective: whether the officers’ actions are objectively

reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. Id. at 397. The Court

must balance the “nature and quality of the intrusion” on a person’s liberty with the

“countervailing governmental interests at stake” to determine whether the use of force was

objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 396. 

The relevant factors include: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether he

is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

These factors are not exclusive, because the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness test is not

“capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” Id. The factors bear on the

reasonableness of a particular application of force used to effect a particular seizure. Smith

v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 669, 702 (9th Cir. 2005), cert denied, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005).

Thus, the first step is to consider the quantum of force used. Id.

B. Analysis

Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment if the evidence, viewed in a light

most favorable to Plaintiff, could support a finding of excessive force. Smith, 394 F.3d at

702. Even when solely considering Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the events, a reasonable

jury could not find that the force used was excessive. 

It is undisputed that while at Plaintiff’s home, A.C. called Plaintiff on his cell phone

and learned that he was on his way home with Jodie. The officers then called for back-up,

which was Officers Tevault and Chambers, the other Defendants in this action. 

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At Plaintiff’s deposition on December 19, 2005, he testified that he and Jodie had

turned onto the street of their home when a marked and an unmarked car pulled up behind

them, without lights on (William Mark Isbell Dep. at 57, Sept. 19, 2005, Ex. A, Doc. #84).

His wife suggested that he drive to the end of the park and “deal with this then.” Id.

Plaintiff’s house was about four to six houses down the street, and as soon they drove past,

the police turned the lights on. Id. at 57-58. Plaintiff pulled over. Then four or five more

marked units “came into play.” Id. at 58. The officers boxed in Plaintiff’s car. Officer

Chamber’s vehicle was facing the front, Tevault’s was facing the driver’s side, and Hughes

was parked behind. Gallant’s car was behind Hughes’ car. Id.

Tevault and Chambers jumped out with weapons pointed at Plaintiff’s head. (Pl.’s

Dep. at 58). Tevault began screaming, “Move and I will kill you. Move and I will kill you.”

Id. Chambers said the same thing. Id. at 59. Plaintiff kept saying, “I’m doing what you said.

Please don’t shoot me.” Id. Jodie Isbell’s car door was opened, and Officer Hughes “ripped”

her out by the arm and threw her to the ground. Id. at 58-59, 62. Plaintiff repeatedly asked

why she was being treated that way. Id. at 59.

Plaintiff had been told to take the keys out of the car and put them on the hood, and

he complied. Id. at 59-60. He then put his hands in the air continually so he would not be

shot. Id. at 60. While his hands were in the air, either Tevault or Chambers brought a dog

to the car. Id. The dog continually barked and nipped at Plaintiff. Id. at 60-61. (Plaintiff

does not state that the dog actually bit him or harmed him in any way.) Tevault grabbed

Plaintiff and threw him to the ground as he put handcuffs on him. Id. at 60. They told him

that he was being detained and took him to the police station. Id. at 60-61. 

Based on Plaintiff’s testimony, the use of force was holding him at gunpoint under a

threat of death if he made inappropriate movements and handcuffing him while on the

ground. First, Plaintiff was a suspected felon. The government has “an undeniable

legitimate interest in apprehending criminal suspects,” and that interest is even stronger when

the criminal is suspected of a felony. Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir.

2003). 

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Second, Plaintiff had a known history of violence, and police believed he was “at

large” for a felony so that a “high-risk” stop was necessary. Plaintiff has not controverted

that assertion, and the method of the arrest certainly demonstrates that the officers believed

him to be a high risk. Moreover, Plaintiff admits that the police were “under the impression”

that he is a gang member and a drug dealer (Pl.’s Dep. at 69). He claims the impression is

false, but he admits that in 1999 in the Arizona Department of Corrections, he was validated

as a member of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang. Id. at 69-70. He also has tattoos

associated with the gang, including swastikas. Id. at 71-72. He has the letters SWP tattooed

on his stomach, but denies that “WP” means White Pride; he just “liked those three letters.”

Id. at 73. Under these circumstances, it was not excessive to point a gun at Plaintiff to ensure

that he did not endanger the officers’ lives. Compare Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d

1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002) (where no dangerous exigent circumstances are apparent at the

time of detention and officers outnumbered the plaintiff, it was unreasonable to point a gun

at an unarmed misdemeanor suspect who was approaching the officers peacefully and who

was not charged with any crime). 

Third, it was not an excessive use of force to put Plaintiff on the ground to handcuff

him, particularly considering that Plaintiff does not claim that he suffered any physical harm

during the arrest and handcuffing. “Not every push or shove, even if may later seem

unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Graham,

490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, no reasonable juror could infer that the use of force to arrest

Plaintiff was excessive. The Court will grant Defendants’ summary judgment motion on this

issue.

VI. Retaliation

Plaintiff makes some references to a retaliation claim. This claim, brought as Count

III, was dismissed on screening (Doc. #14). Plaintiff may not raise it again.

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VII. Motions Seeking Injunctive Relief

A. Motion for Typewriter

Plaintiff requests an order requiring the Arizona Department of Corrections to provide

him with a typewriter for this action and two other actions he has pending in state court (Doc.

#53). He is housed in Special Management Unit II at one of the highest custody levels, a

placement that is commonly known to house inmates who can fabricate weapons from

common every day objects. Plaintiff asserts that his hands sometimes shake from

hypertension and borderline diabetes, which sometimes causes him to take days to draft

pleadings. Plaintiff’s motion, however, is unsupported by any medical evidence that he

cannot write, and this action contains numerous legible pleadings filed by Plaintiff. In

addition, Plaintiff’s request for a typewriter for his state court proceedings are properly

presented to the state court, not this Court. The motion will be denied.

B. Motion to Review Deposition

Plaintiff requested injunctive relief to preclude Defendants from using his deposition

transcript because he had not had an opportunity to review it and make changes under Rule

30(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. #70). Defendants responded that

Plaintiff’s motion may be denied as moot because he has since been provided with the

opportunity to review his deposition (Doc. #71). Later proceedings bear this assertion to be

true (Doc. ##89, 92). The motion will therefore be denied as moot.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Typewriter (Doc. #53) is denied.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

Hearing (Doc. #70) is denied as moot.

3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #39) is granted in part

on Plaintiff’s claim that Officers Hughes and Gallant violated his Fourth Amendment right

by entering his home on December 12, 2003. The motion is denied in part as to the City of

El Mirage.

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4. Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #83) is granted in part

and denied in part. Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force in arrest is dismissed, but

Defendants’ contention that punitive damages are not available is denied. 

5. Defendants City of El Mirage, Officers Tevault and Chambers are dismissed.

6. The remaining claim for trial is a question of damages against Officers Hughes and

Gallant.

DATED this 3rd day of August, 2006.

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