Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02564/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02564-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO SVK 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Timothy Olmos, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 10-2564-PHX-GMS (BSB) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Timothy Olmos filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against various officials of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC). (Doc. 21.) 

Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, and the remaining Defendants—Director 

Ryan and Allen Ortega—cross-moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims. 

(Docs. 116, 163.) The Court denied Plaintiff’s motions and granted Defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment in part, denied it in part, and dismissed Ortega. (Doc. 208.) 

Specifically, the Court denied summary judgment to both parties on Plaintiff’s claim for 

alleged underpayment as a kitchen worker and alleged improper charges for “chronic 

care” visits for allergies. (Id.) 

 The parties have now filed second cross motions for summary judgment on both 

remaining claims.1

 (Docs. 214, 219.) Defendant Ryan submits his motion (Doc. 214), 

 

1

 The Court provided Plaintiff Notice pursuant Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960 (9th 

Cir. 1998) of Plaintiff’s obligation and requirements for responding. (Doc. 216.) 

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his Statement of Facts (Doc. 215 (DSOF)), and the declaration of Angelo Daniels, 

Correctional Administrator II of ADC’s Offender Operations Division, with attachments 

(id., Ex. A, Daniels Decl.). Plaintiff submits his Response/Cross-motion (Doc. 219) and 

a Statement of Facts (Doc. 220 (PSOF)) and exhibits. 

 The Court will grant Defendant summary judgment on the remaining claims and 

deny summary judgment to Plaintiff. 

I. Count VII—Charges for Allergy Treatment and Care 

The Court will dismiss this claim without prejudice on the ground that Plaintiff 

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

 A. Background 

In Count VII of his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges due process 

violations based on allegedly improper charges for a laundry list of items, including 

chronic care treatment. (Doc. 21, count VII at 5E.) In his first motion for summary 

judgment, Plaintiff relied on several statutes, including Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-201.01 (I), 

which provides that the ADC director is to exempt certain inmates or medical visits by 

inmates from payment of medical and health services fees and fees for prescriptions, 

medication or prosthetic devices, including “inmates who are undergoing follow-up 

medical treatment for chronic diseases.” Plaintiff claims that under ADC policies, he was 

improperly charged for chronic care visits and medications for allergies, as well as a 

number of other medical conditions.2

 The Court previously denied Defendant’s Motion 

 2

 Specifically, Department Order 1100 provides for health care fees to be deducted from 

inmate accounts and that “no one shall waive the payment of health care fees, except in the following situations: . . . Inmates who undergo follow-up health treatment specifically for their chronic conditions per provider request.” (Doc. 164, Ex. B, Attach. 3, DO 1101 

at 21-22 (164-1 at 105-06.)) The DO also states the following: 

[c]hronic conditions requiring regular examinations and/or treatment: 

cancer, diabetes, hypertention, seizure disorder, heart disease, respiratory 

disease, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDs, serious mental illness (and other mental 

illnesses of inpatients at the Alhambra Special Psychiatric Hospital and the 

Flamenco mental Health Center,) or any condition requiring regular 

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for Summary Judgment insofar as Plaintiff may have been charged for allergy visits and 

medications and granted it as to all other matters raised in Count VII. (Doc. 208 at 15.) 

The Court also denied Plaintiff’s motion as to all matters, including charges regarding 

allergies because he did not submit proof of such charges. (Id.) 

B. Cross-motions 

 In his present motion, Defendant argues that (1) Plaintiff did not exhaust his 

administrative remedies as to any claim regarding improper charges for his allergy 

condition, (2) under DO 1100, respiratory diseases refer to conditions such as asthma or 

emphysema, not seasonal allergies, which are typically intermittent and do not require 

regular check-ups and do not normally qualify as chronic conditions unless they are in 

combination with other conditions, and (3) Plaintiff had a meaningful post-deprivation 

remedy through the prison grievance procedure. (Doc. 14.) Plaintiff responds to these 

arguments and submits charts allegedly showing money charged for allergy medications 

or treatment. (Doc. 219, Ex. A, Pl. Decl.) 

C. Discussion 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner must exhaust 

available administrative remedies before bringing a federal action concerning prison 

conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 

2009). Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 

 

examinations and or treatment that are directly related to a qualifying 

disability, as defined by 42 U.S.C. [§] 12102(2) of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act. Arizona Department of Corrections health care providers 

shall determine whether regular examinations and or treatment are directly 

related to a qualifying disability. There is no health care fee for these 

conditions. 

 (Id. at 21-22.) But the definitions state that chronic conditions include allergies and developmental disabilities, as well as the conditions listed in the material quoted above. (Doc. 164, Ex. B, Attach. 3, DO 1101 at 21 (164-1 at 105.)) 

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516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the administrative 

process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). And a prisoner must complete the 

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v. 

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). 

 Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). 

Thus, the defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. 

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because exhaustion is a matter 

of abatement in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the 

pleadings to decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad 

discretion as to the method to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l 

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation 

omitted). 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not exhaust his remedies in grievance A02-

056-010 regarding charges for treatment or medication for allergies. (Doc. 214 at 3-4.) 

The Court previously addressed exhaustion of administrative remedies in Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 152.) The Court specifically found in examining grievance 

number A02-056-010 that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies for certain 

claims in Count VII—authority to charge for renewal of diabetic diet, rate of pay, and 

missed special diet meals. (Id. at 2.3

) The Court did not consider whether Plaintiff 

exhausted administrative remedies regarding charges for allergy medication or treatment.

 Plaintiff responds that although he did not exhaust the issue in grievance A02-056-

 3

 As to grievance A02-056-010, the inmate letter states that Ryan has exceeded his authority with policies that levy assessments without authorization. “Assessments 

include, but are not limited to costs associated with: replacement IDs and ID clips, legal supplies, legal mail postage, legal phone calls, and urinalysis testing. My resolution is that the Director remove all illegal monetary assessment policies, and refund all monies assessed via those policies.” (Doc. 132, Ex. A, Attach. 3 at 1-11, 3.) The Court found 

that documents do not refer to assessments for renewal of a diabetic diet, rate of pay, [and] missed special diet meals and would not have sufficed to put prison officials on notice of those issues. (Doc. 152 at 10-11.) 

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010, he exhausted this claim in another grievance filed in 2008. (Doc. 219 at 2; ref. Doc. 

52-2 at R4-R7.) Defendant replies that this grievance also did not mention a complaint 

about follow-up care or medication for allergies. (Doc. 224 at 5.) 

 The Court finds that neither grievance A02-056-010 nor the grievance documents 

to which Plaintiff now refers are insufficient to exhaust on the issue. A “grievance 

suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” 

Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120. The documents for grievance A02-056-010 do not refer to 

charges for allergy care or medication. As to the grievance documents to which Plaintiff 

now directs the Court, the Inmate Letter complains about being charged for a diabetic 

diet; it does not mention allergies, and the response from the prison refers to e-mailing a 

copy of Plaintiff’s restricted-diet order to the Facility Health Administrator; that the diet 

is for hypoglycemia, not diabetes; and that hypoglycemia is not covered as chronic. 

(Doc. 52, Inmate Letter, dated 8/13/08, and Inmate Letter Resp., dated 9/18/08 (Doc. 52-

2 at 47, 48).) Likewise, the grievance refers only generally to chronic diseases and 

recurring medications and specifically to his medical diet, and the appeal to the Director 

has no specifics, referring only to the former documents. (Id., Grievance, dated 9/26/08, 

Appeal, dated 10/28/08 (Doc. 52-2 at 49, 50).) Given Plaintiff’s focus on his medical 

diet, his lack of specific reference to allergies, and the number of conditions that are 

considered chronic under DO 1100, the Court finds that the grievance documents would 

not have put prison officials on notice that Plaintiff was claiming that his allergies were 

chronic conditions for which he should not be charged for treatment or medication. 

 Defendant has met his burden to show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies as to his claim for charges for treatment and medication for 

allergies. The Court will dismiss this claim without prejudice. 

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II. Count IX—Kitchen Worker Compensation 

Plaintiff asserts that in violation of due process, he was undercompensated for his 

work performed for ADC’s food service contractor. The Court will grant Defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment on this claim and deny Plaintiff’s motion.

 A. Background 

 Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to payment of at least $2.00 per hour for his 

work as a kitchen worker, rather than payment at the scale for the Work Incentive Pay 

Program (WIPP). He relies primarily on Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-254. (Doc. 219 at 2-3.) 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-254 now provides that:4

 

4

 The Ninth Circuit addressed a prior version of § 31-254 in Piatt v. MacDougal, 773 

F.2d 1032, 1034, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1985). There, the court found that the statute 

unambiguously created a right to compensation at the minimum wage for work 

performed for private parties and that the right could not be denied without due process. 

Id. at 1036. The former version of § 31-254 provided that 

 A. Each prisoner who is engaged in productive work in any state prison or 

institution under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections as a part 

of the prison industries program shall receive for his work such 

compensation as the director of the department of corrections shall 

determine. Such compensation shall be in accordance with a graduated 

schedule based on quantity and quality of work performed and skill 

required for its performance, but in no event shall such compensation 

exceed fifty cents per hour unless, pursuant to § 41–1624.01, the director 

enters into a contract with a private person, firm, corporation or association 

in which case such compensation shall be as prescribed by the person, firm, 

corporation or association, but shall not be below the minimum wage. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41–1624.01(A) stated that the director shall compensate prisoners for 

their services pursuant to § 31–254. In Piatt, the court held that the language of the 

statute was unambiguous and, accepting the plaintiff’s assertions as true that he engaged 

in productive work as a prisoner, he was entitled to compensation; further, if his work 

was done as part of a contract with a private entity, he was is entitled to pay at least equal 

to the minimum wage. 773 F.2d at 1032. 

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A. Each prisoner who is engaged in productive work in any state prison or 

institution under the jurisdiction of the department or a private prison under 

contract with the department as a part of the prison industries program shall 

receive for the prisoner’s work the compensation that the director 

determines. The compensation shall be in accordance with a graduated 

schedule based on quantity and quality of work performed and skill 

required for its performance but shall not exceed fifty cents per hour unless 

the prisoner is employed in an Arizona correctional industries program 

pursuant to title 41, chapter 11, article 3. If the director enters into a 

contract pursuant to § 41-1624.01 with a private person, firm, corporation 

or association the director shall prescribe prisoner compensation of at 

least two dollars per hour. Compensation shall not be paid to prisoners for 

attendance at educational training or treatment programs, but compensation 

may be paid for work training programs. 

(Emphasis added.) Section § 41-1624.01 relates to Arizona Correctional Industries 

(ACI), which is a program pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1622(B). Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 41-1624.01 provides that: 

 

A. The director shall compensate prisoners for their services pursuant to 

§ 31-254. 

B. The director or his designee may contract with any state agency, political 

subdivision or state department or any private person, firm, corporation or 

association to provide services or labor rendered by prisoners. 

C. All monies derived from contract services provided pursuant to 

subsection B of this section shall be deposited in the fund established 

pursuant to § 41-1624.5

 

 B. Discussion 

To have a due process claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that he has a state created 

right to compensation for the kitchen work at the rate of $2.00 per hour. See Piatt, 773 

 

5

 Section 41-1624 relates to the ACI revolving fund to pay for, among other expenses, compensation of prisoners and ACI professional and outside services. A.R.S. 

§ 41-1624A2. 

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F.2d at 1036. Reading the relevant provisions of § 31-254 and § 41-1624.01 together, it 

is apparent that the $2.00 per hour minimum compensation is not triggered by just any 

contract between the Director or his designee and a private person, firm, corporation or 

association, even when inmate labor may be involved. Rather, the inmate must be 

employed in an Arizona correctional industries program; the contract must be one 

pursuant to § 41-1624.01, that is, ACI; and it must be to provide services or labor 

rendered by prisoners. 

 Defendant provides copies of portions of the relevant contract and contract 

renewals. (Doc. 215, Ex. A, Attach. 1.) The contract is between the Arizona Department 

of Corrections and Compass Group/Canteen for the provision of food services. (Doc. 

215, Ex. A. Attach. 1.) The Notice of Request for Proposal, which was issued by the 

Department of Corrections, is for Food Service Management. (Id. 215-1 at 6.) The 

“Special Terms and Conditions” provide that “Contractor” means the organization which 

is to provide food services. (Id., 1.22.2 (Doc. 215-1 at 22).) “Department” means 

Department of Corrections, the State of Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, 

where applicable. (Id. § 1.22.4.) There is no reference to ACI.6

 Plaintiff points to the language of the contract that provides for the use of inmate 

labor and supervision and training. (Id. § 7, (Doc. 215-1 at 23.) The language provides, 

in part: 

The Contractor shall train and utilize the inmate workers in production and 

sanitation capacities both as a cost effect (sic) labor pool and as an on-thejob training activity within the institution. The inmate labor shall be 

arranged and coordinated with the designated persons in concert with the 

Contractor. Inmate labor used by the Contractor shall be paid for by the 

Department’s Work incentive pay (WIPP) budget. 

 

6

 Compare e.g., Castle v. Eurofresh, 09-8114-PCT-JWS, Inmate Work Contract between 

Eurofresh Farms, Inc. and the Director of the Department of Corrections on behalf of 

Arizona Correctional Industries to provide inmates to work on a farm. (Doc. 1, Ex. 4.) 

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(Id. § 7.1) (emphasis added). Likewise, the “Special Terms and Conditions” state that 

inmate labor is to be paid for by the Department’s WIPP budget. (Id. § 1.22.10.) 

Plaintiff argues that the level of control by the Contractor over the inmate labor “qualifies 

as the usage of services or labor by prisoners pursuant to Ariz. Rev. State. § 41-1624.01” 

even though “it illegally stipulates to the underpayment of inmate kitchen workers.” 

(Doc. 219 at 7-8.) He asserts that his labor does not fall into other statutory categories—

specifically, Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-252, 31-253, and 41-1671.7

 (Doc. 219 at 8.) He 

 

7

 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-252 provides in part: 

A. The director may enter into a cooperative agreement with any state agency or political 

subdivision of this state or any department or agency of the federal government to 

provide hard labor by prisoners on public works. 

C. The director may authorize the use of prisoner work crews to participate in community 

betterment projects for public and private nonprofit entities. The department may 

compensate prisoner work crews from monies appropriated by the legislature for the 

work incentive pay program established by the department. 

D. For purposes of this section: 

1. “Community betterment project” means any public or private works project that uses 

prisoners and serves to benefit this state in terms of health, safety, welfare or aesthetics. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-253 provides in part: 

A. The director of the state department of corrections and the director of the department 

of administration shall use prisoner labor to the maximum extent feasible in the 

construction of all prison facilities. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1671 provides in part: 

A. The director, in consultation with the director of the department of administration and 

the chief executive officer of the Arizona commerce authority, may establish programs 

for the employment of offenders by private employers and enter into agreements with 

private employers under which the employer constructs, leases or otherwise establishes 

facilities within the exterior boundaries of any adult correctional facility to manufacture 

or process goods or conduct any other business, commercial or agricultural enterprise and 

employ offenders at the correctional facility. 

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argues that Defendant is exercising his authority to use the “catch all” provision of § 41-

1624.01(B), which provides no limits on the kinds of situations for which inmate labor 

can be used and accuses Defendant of “cooking the books.” (Id.) 

 The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments. Plaintiff is essentially 

claiming that Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-252, 31-253, and 41-1671 limit the Director’s 

authority regarding inmate employment in WIPP to only the types of work specified in 

those statutes. But the statutes do not say that. 

 Arizona requires its prisoners to work. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-251(A), (B)(1). “The 

director has the authority to require that each able-bodied prisoner under commitment to 

the state department of corrections engage in hard labor for not less than forty hours per 

week.” Id. Moreover, under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1604(A), the Director possesses broad 

powers and wide discretion with respect to his responsibility “for the overall operations 

and policies of the department” and to “[m]aintain and administer all institutions and 

programs within the department.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1604(B)(1), (2) provides the 

Director with authority to “[a]dopt rules to implement the purposes of the department and 

the duties and powers of the director” and “[t]ake any administrative action to improve 

the efficiency of the department.” Id. The Director can also “authorize work crews to 

perform acceptable tasks in any part of the state.” Id. § 41-1604(B)(2)(f). The Court has 

already held that “the nature of corrections and its effect on employees, inmates, and the 

public subject it to strict regulation and that delegation of rule-making power should be 

liberally construed.” (Doc. 208 at 11.) 

 According to Department Order 903, Inmate Work Activities, inmate work 

programs include: 

1.1. 1 Labor program subject to WIPP scale, pursuant to A.R.S. 31-254. 

1.1.2 Arizona Correctional Industries (ACI). 

1.1.3 Intergovernmental Agreements (IGA). 

1.1.4 Education, treatment, and Work Based Education (WBE) programs. 

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(DO 903.01.)8 (See also Doc. 215, Ex. A, Daniels Decl. ¶ 5.) Inmates are assigned by 

their Correctional Officer IV to labor subject to the WIPP scale; ACI, Inter-governmental 

Agreements; or Intergovernmental Service Agreements (ISA). (DO 903.03 § 1.1.4.) The 

only reference to kitchen assignments is in 903.04, Minimum Criteria for Assignment—

Internal Risk/Custody Level, § 1.2.2.2. Nothing in the Department Order specifies 

kitchen work as in being in the ACI program. (DO 903.05, ACI Assignments and Pay.) 

Moreover, WIPP labor is defined as a labor program subject to WIPP scale, pursuant to 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-254. (DO 903.01 § 1.1.1, 903.03 § 1.1.4.1.) 

 The Court finds that there is no language in the statutes or regulations that requires 

contracted kitchen work to be part of the ACI Program or precludes kitchen work at the 

prison from being part of WIPP and paid “the compensation that the director determines,” 

which is “in accordance with a graduated schedule based on quantity and quality of work 

performed and skill required for its performance but [does not] exceed fifty cents per 

hour unless the prisoner is employed in an Arizona correctional industries program

pursuant to title 41, chapter 11, article 3.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff’s argument that 

the Contractor’s “level of control” qualifies the kitchen work as part of ACI is without 

support in the statutes or regulations. The work policy in question can be reasonably 

implied from “a consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole” because they relate to 

the operations of ADC and administration of programs within ADC. See Longbridge Inv. 

Co. v. Moore, 533 P.2d 564, 567 (Ariz. App. 1975). Plaintiff has no state-created right to 

be employed by ACI merely because the ADC contract for food services incidentally 

includes use of inmate labor. 

 Pursuant to the relevant contract, Plaintiff was a prisoner engaged in productive 

work in a state prison or institution under the jurisdiction of the department as a part of 

 

8 http://www.azcorrections.gov/Policies/900/0903.pdf. Last visited February 7, 2014. 

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the prison industries program and was specifically to be paid from the WIPP budget. 

Plaintiff points to no language in the contract regarding Arizona Correctional Industries. 

 Because Plaintiff has established no state-created right to the $2.00 per hour 

compensation he seeks, he has no property right protected by due process. The Court 

will grant summary judgment to Defendant on this claim and deny summary judgment to 

Plaintiff. 

 Because no claims remain, the Court will terminate the action. 

 IT IS ORDERED:

 (1) The reference to the Magistrate is withdrawn as to Defendant’s Second 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 214) and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 219).

 (2) Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 214) is granted, 

and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 219) is denied. 

(3) Plaintiff’s claim for improper charges for treatment and medication for 

allergies (Count VII) is dismissed without prejudice, and his claim for undercompensation as a kitchen worker (Count IX) is dismissed with prejudice. 

 (4) The action is terminated, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 Dated this 25th day of February, 2014. 

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