Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05443/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05443-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 5, 1999 Decided November 12, 1999

No. 98-5443

Robert E. Hill,

Appellant

v.

William J. Henderson, Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv02365)

Waite P. Stuhl argued the cause for appellant. With him on

the briefs was Ernest C. Hadley.

Eric M. Jaffe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the briefs were Wilma A. Lewis,

U.S. Attorney, and Mark E. Nagle and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 1 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Wald and Williams,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Williams.

Williams, Circuit Judge: A district court order dismissing

one of several claims or parties is not a "final decision"

qualifying for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. s 1291--

unless the district court expressly determines "that there is

no just reason for delay" and enters judgment under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 54(b). The logic of this deferral of review is that, on

net, it economizes on judicial resources. In some cases, to be

sure, the deferred review will generate a need for new and

duplicative proceedings that immediate review would have

avoided. But if review is deferred, it is less likely that the

appellate court will face overlapping issues and circumstances

on two occasions, and often the issues involved in the dismissal will be mooted by the outcome on the other counts (such as

settlement or recovery by plaintiff of full compensation).

Rule 54(b) provides an escape hatch, enabling the district

court to make such a partial disposition a "final judgment."

See, e.g., Justice v. Pendleton Place Apartments, 40 F.3d 139,

142 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that interrelated claims are generally not appropriate for 54(b) certification because remaining

claims will force the same issues to be reheard and future

proceedings may moot the issues certified for appeal).

Here a district court dismissed Count One of the plaintiff's

four-count complaint and ordered the remainder of the case

transferred to the district court for the Northern District of

Illinois under 28 U.S.C. s 1404(a) (1994). It made no determination under Rule 54(b), yet plaintiff seeks review of the

dismissal. The issue is whether, simply because of the transfer order, we nonetheless have a "final judgment" reviewable

in this circuit. The alternative is that the potential for

appellate review of the one-count dismissal goes along with

the rest of the case, with review occurring in the Seventh

Circuit when and if the ordinary prerequisites of appellate

review should be satisfied. Given the strong policy against

piecemeal appeals, we find that there is no final decision and

thus dismiss the appeal.

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 2 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

* * *

In 1992 and 1993, the United States Postal Service

("USPS") restructured its executive level workforce. Robert

Hill was employed as "General Manager, Real Estate," in the

Chicago office of the Illinois Facilities Service Center. His

position was classified in the USPS's top executive tier: the

Postal Career Executive Service ("PCES"). As part of the

restructuring, he was removed from his job and placed on

temporary detail. When the USPS filled its new positions,

Hill was not selected for any of the new PCES jobs, nor was

he offered a position in the tier below the PCES known as the

Executive and Administrative Schedule ("EAS"). He filed a

formal complaint of discrimination dated May 10, 1993, which

was received by the USPS Equal Employment Opportunity

("EEO") Office on May 17, 1993. His complaint alleged that

"[a]ll of the selectees for the various positions were younger

than Mr. Hill, and many of the selectees were of a different

race, color, and sex than Mr. Hill." Hill v. Runyon, 959

F. Supp. 488, 493 (N.D. Ill. 1997).1

On November 18, 1993, 185 days after his complaint was

received, the USPS EEO Office officially acknowledged receipt. On December 8, 1993 the EEO Office first requested

Hill's assistance in clarifying the issues raised therein. In the

next two years, Hill sought to have his complaint heard by

the Merit Systems Protection Board and by an EEOC administrative judge, largely ignoring the USPS EEO Office's

requests for additional information. On February 16, 1996,

after both the MSPB and the EEOC found themselves without jurisdiction to hear Hill's claims, he returned to the USPS

EEO Office and began to cooperate with its investigation.

On April 3, 1996, however, he abandoned administrative proceedings by filing a civil action against the USPS in the

__________

1 In view of this wording, and the observation by the Northern

District of Illinois that all of the 18 PCES slots were filled with

white males like Hill, see id. at 492 n.9, we are uncertain why that

court, and evidently the USPS EEO Office as well, did not perceive

the initial complaint as alleging discrimination in the EAS selection

process. See id. at 495.

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 3 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

district court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging

discrimination on the basis of race and sex in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-16

(1994), and discrimination on the basis of age in violation of

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") of

1976, 29 U.S.C. s 633a (1994). On May 11, 1996 the USPS

EEO Office dismissed Hill's administrative complaint because

of his decision to initiate a civil action. See 29 C.F.R.

s 1614.107(c) (1999).

After discovery, the district court granted the USPS's

motion for summary judgment on Hill's Title VII and ADEA

claims related to the PCES positions. It also dismissed

without prejudice his claims related to the EAS positions on

the ground that he had not exhausted administrative remedies--based on his failure to cooperate with the USPS EEO

Office. See Hill, 959 F. Supp. at 489-90. We note that the

non-cooperation necessarily began only after that office acknowledged receipt of his EEO complaint; that in turn

occurred more than 180 days after the filing of the EEO

complaint. Thus the asserted non-cooperation occurred in a

period when, under the applicable regulations, Hill was already free to file a lawsuit. See 29 C.F.R. s 1614.408(b)

(allowing suit starting 180 days after filing of EEO complaint). Hill then moved to have his remaining claims dismissed without prejudice, so that he might return to the

USPS EEO Office and cure his failure to exhaust; the

district court granted the request.

On April 24, 1997 Hill asked the USPS EEO Office to

reopen its proceedings, but on July 14, 1997 it declined to do

so because it found that Hill could not cure his prior failure to

exhaust.

Hill filed this action in the district court here on October

10, 1997, alleging race, sex, and age discrimination related to

the EAS selection process and retaliation for his pursuit of

EEO claims. The district court dismissed Hill's EAS claim

because it found that his failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies was not subject to cure. For the finding of inadequate exhaustion the court evidently relied on the decision of

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 4 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the Northern District of Illinois, presumably on the view that

issue preclusion made it conclusive against Hill. Hill filed a

timely notice of appeal. The district court also issued an

order to show cause why the action should not be transferred

to the Northern District of Illinois, and later ordered the

transfer. Hill has not sought review of that order.

* * *

We start with our own precedent. In Reuber v. United

States, 773 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the district court

dismissed the entire case against one of several defendants

and transferred the rest of the case to another district (in our

case necessarily out-of-circuit). Despite the absence of a

Rule 54(b) order, we found that the dismissal of the party was

a final judgment reviewable here. We saw the issue only as

one of timing, assuming that if we treated the dismissal order

as non-final it would mature into finality, in this circuit, when

the transferee court disposed of the rest of the case. We said

rhetorically that surely Rule 54(b) could not require the

plaintiff to await the end of proceedings in the transferee

court "before pursuing in our circuit the question of whether

[the dismissed defendant] may be sued here." Id. at 1368

(emphasis added). On that assumption, the probability of two

appeals on overlapping facts and issues was about equally

great whichever choice the court made; the only consequence

of refusing to treat the dismissal as a final judgment would

have been to delay the appeal in our circuit. The court did

not mention the possibility that appeal of the dismissal would

flow to the transferee circuit; that, as Judge Hand put it,

"[t]he review of any order of the district court in a transferred cause, made before transfer, is within the jurisdiction

of the court of appeals of the circuit to which the cause has

been transferred." Magnetic Eng'g & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg.

Co., 178 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1950). Under that view, of

course, it is possible to fully accomplish the purposes of the

final judgment rule.

Reuber is still good law in this circuit; gaps in a decision's

reasoning do not destroy its precedential value. But at the

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 5 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

same time, when we are asked to extend Reuber from dismissal of a party to dismissal of a claim, its reasoning does

not bar us from considering the real-world alternatives.

Thus we do consider the prospect of review in the transferee

circuit (if the issue is not mooted or abandoned).

We think that dismissals of claims and parties are properly

distinguished for these purposes. The efficiencies sought to

be achieved by the final judgment rule seem more likely to be

accomplished if a claim dismissal tags along with the transfer

than if a party dismissal does. With claims as opposed to

parties there are greater probabilities that circumstances will

moot dismissal of the appeal (e.g., by overall settlement, or by

a recovery on one of the claims that effectively compensates

plaintiff for loss under the dismissed claim), and that issues

between the two (hypothetical) appeals will overlap.

In fact, there seems no great reason to suppose that

insistence on the ordinary final judgment rule is unsuitable in

the context of claim transfer. Temporarily withholding review of a dismissal of fewer than all the claims may eliminate

any need for appellate review (as where the recovery satisfies

the plaintiff), and may confine a package of related issues to

one court, one time. It is presumably this practical consideration that has led most courts that have considered the

question to follow the path marked by Judge Hand. See, e.g.,

EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 188 F.3d 695, 700 (6th Cir.

1999) (reviewing pre-transfer order of an out-of-circuit district court granting summary judgment on one claim and

dismissing other claims); Chaiken v. VV Publishing Corp.,

119 F.3d 1018, 1025 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997) (same for dismissal of

two defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction); Mackensworth v. S.S. Am. Merchant, 28 F.3d 246, 249-52 (2d Cir.

1994) (same for rejection of motion to amend pleadings and a

motion to compel the defendant to abandon its defense

against plaintiff's claims); Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS

Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1992) (same for

dismissal of plaintiff's RICO claims); cf. Chapple v. Levinsky,

961 F.2d 372, 374 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that dismissal of

certain defendants prior to transfer order could be appealed

to the circuit into which the case had been transferred);

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 6 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 225, 228 (3d

Cir. 1990) (noting that a transfer order based on a finding by

the transferor court that it lacked personal jurisdiction could

be appealed at the conclusion of the case in the transferee

circuit).

Against these cases stands the analysis of the Tenth Circuit

in McGeorge v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 871 F.2d 952 (10th

Cir. 1989). A district court here had dismissed some of

plaintiff's claims and then transferred the case to the Western

District of Oklahoma, which dismissed the remainder. The

circuit court held that it had no jurisdiction over appeals from

the dismissals in the District of Columbia district court

because of 28 U.S.C. s 1294 (1994), which states that

appeals from reviewable decisions of the district ...

courts shall be taken to the courts of appeals as follows:

(1) From a district court of the United States to the

court of appeals for the circuit embracing the district....

28 U.S.C. s 1294(1). The court saw this as "leav[ing] no

room for doubt that we do not have jurisdiction over the D.C.

appeal." 871 F.2d at 954. It contrasted the "reviewable

decisions" language of s 1294 with that of s 1291(a), affording review of all "final decisions." Since the decisions of the

District of Columbia district court were the sort of decisions

normally subject to eventual review (and thus, the court

assumed, "reviewable decisions"), and had plainly been issued

by a district court outside the Tenth Circuit, the court saw

s 1294 as flatly barring its review. It recognized that its

decision would create a "jurisdictional hiatus," id., for it

assumed that the orphaned claim dismissals would not qualify

for review in the D.C. Circuit because of the final judgment

requirement, id.

We think Congress's distinction between "final decisions" in

s 1291 and "reviewable decisions" in s 1294 is consistent with

our view that the appealability of the claim dismissal here

flows to the transferee circuit. The Tenth Circuit seemingly

understood "reviewable decisions" to encompass every ruling

of a district court that might in due course ultimately pass

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 7 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

under the scrutiny of an appellate court. But the term is

susceptible to a narrower reading: decisions subject to review

at the time they are entered, namely, (a) final decisions, (b)

non-final decisions embraced by s 1292's provision for review

of certain types of interlocutory orders, (c) decisions treated

as final under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v.

Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), and (d)

(perhaps) non-final decisions subject to immediate mandamus.

The McGeorge court pointed out that the district court here

could have cured the "jurisdictional hiatus" by entering an

order under Rule 54(b). 871 F.2d at 954. True enough, and

if we agreed with the court's reading of s 1294 we might be

especially inclined to agree with a district court's Rule 54(b)

certification that the circumstances presented a case where

there was "no just reason for delay": delay would, under the

Tenth Circuit's assumptions, mean complete exemption from

appellate review, and for no good reason. But that undesirable consequence, of course, turns on the Tenth Circuit's view

of s 1294, which we do not share. Moreover, we note that

under the McGeorge court's view, any non-final ruling that is

not eligible for Rule 54(b) treatment, and is not under one of

the exceptions for review of non-final decisions--e.g., a devastating discovery order--would completely elude review.

In support of its reading of s 1294 the McGeorge court

cited cases in which various circuit courts of appeals had

found themselves without jurisdiction over district courts

outside of their circuit. 871 F.2d at 954. We find them all,

as well as the additional cases we have been able to discover,

distinguishable. Most do not really involve inter-circuit

transfer at all. C.P.C. Partnership v. Nosco Plastics, Inc.,

719 F.2d 400, 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983), involved the Federal

Circuit, which s 1294 explicitly excepts from its coverage;

the court ruled that it had no mandamus jurisdiction over a

motion to disqualify counsel because its jurisdictional grant

did not provide general supervisory authority over any district court. In General Electric Co. v. Byrne, 611 F.2d 670,

672 (7th Cir. 1979), the court found itself without mandamus

jurisdiction over matters in a case that was slated for transfer

into the circuit, but had not been physically transferred. Two

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 8 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

cases arising out of the same multidistrict litigation, In re

Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 620 F.2d 1086,

1090-91 (5th Cir. 1980), and In re Corrugated Container

Antitrust Litigation, 662 F.2d 875, 880-81 & nn.10-11 (D.C.

Cir. 1981), turn on a special grant of power by 28 U.S.C.

s 1407(b), enabling the transferee district court to "exercise

the powers of a district judge in any district for the purpose

of conducting pretrial depositions." Both hold that appeal

from a contempt order of a judge wielding that power goes to

the circuit where the deposition is being held. We regarded

the locus of appeal as controlled by s 1407(b)'s having effectively transformed the out-of-circuit judge into an in-circuit

one. We noted the trade-off between the interests of securing uniformity of outcomes in the multidistrict litigation and

uniformity in decisions on depositions in the circuits where

they are held. Id. at 881 n.11. Finally, MacNeil Bros. v.

Cohen, 264 F.2d 186, 187 (1st Cir. 1959), simply rejects a

motion to transfer an appeal to another circuit, noting that

there is no equivalent of 28 U.S.C. s 1404(a) for transfers

from one court of appeals to another and expressing doubt

that the proposed transferee circuit could review decisions of

an out-of-circuit district court. Obviously McNeil Bros.--like

the other cases discussed above--in no way involves the issue

of how the appeals forum may shift after a proper s 1404(a)

transfer.

The remaining cases that deny reviewability of pre-transfer

orders in the transferee circuit are ones considering the

transfer orders themselves. See, e.g., Roofing & Sheet Metal

Serv. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d 982, 986-87 (11th

Cir. 1982); Linnell v. Sloan, 636 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1980).

Transfer orders under s 1404 are not final appealable orders,

nor, generally speaking, reviewable collateral orders. Ukiah

Adventist Hospital v. FTC, 981 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Commonly, however, courts of appeal in the circuit of origin

entertain mandamus petitions to review such orders, certainly

for legal infirmity, and in some circuits, for abuse of discretion. See In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 15

Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 9 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

s 3855 (1986 & Supp. 1999) (collecting cases from every

circuit).

Once a case is transferred most circuits have found that

they lack jurisdiction to review a transfer order from a court

outside of their circuit upon final judgment. See In re

Brisco, 976 F.2d 1425, 1426 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that

absent exceptional circumstances a transfer order should not

be reviewed by transferee circuit and "therefore may effectively become immune from appellate scrutiny"); TEC Floor

Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 4 F.3d 599, 602 (8th Cir.

1993) (finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the

transfer order of a court outside of its circuit); Moses v.

Business Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir.

1991) (same); Reyes v. Supervisor of the DEA, 834 F.2d 1093,

1095 (1st Cir. 1987) (same); Roofing & Sheet Metal Serv., 689

F.2d at 986-87 (same); Linnell, 636 F.2d at 67 (same); Purex

Corp. v. St. Louis Nat'l Stockyards Co., 374 F.2d 998, 1000

(7th Cir. 1967) (same). But a few have asserted at least some

degree of reviewability in the transferee circuit. Thus Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 773 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984),

said that on final judgment a transferee court could determine whether venue did lie in the transferee court, citing

Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 340 n.9 (1960), discussed

below. See also American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. United

States Dist. Ct., 538 F.2d 1371, 1377 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976)

(refusing to grant mandamus because a transfer order is

reviewable after final judgment even if transferor court was

not within its circuit); Magnetic, 178 F.2d at 868-70 (same).

A possible explanation for finding transfer orders nonreviewable in the transferee circuit is that such orders are

usually effectively subject to immediate review via mandamus

in the circuit of the transferring court. They may thus

immediately become "reviewable decisions" under s 1294. In

any event, a party transferred against its will can indirectly

secure at least partial review of the transfer in the transferee

circuit by filing a motion for retransfer, the denial of which is

clearly reviewable by the court of appeals of the transferee

district. See, e.g., Nascone, 735 F.2d at 765-66; Linnell, 636

F.2d at 67; Purex Corp., 374 F.2d at 1000. Although at the

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 10 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

time of a motion to retransfer the transfer order would be law

of the case binding the second district court (in the absence of

clear error or manifest injustice, see Chrysler Credit Corp. v.

Country Chrysler, 928 F.2d 1509, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991)), the

court of appeals in the transferee circuit would not be bound

by the decision of either lower court. Indeed, in Hoffman v.

Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), the Supreme Court affirmed a

transferee circuit's grant of mandamus to correct the transferee district court's denial of such a motion, saying that the

"question of that court's jurisdiction still remained subject to

attack as of right on appeal to the [transferee circuit court]

from any final judgment in the action." Id. at 341 n.9; see

also Nascone, 735 F.2d at 772 n.7 (noting that when the

Supreme Court said "jurisdiction" it plainly referred to inadequacies of venue rather than of subject matter jurisdiction).2

In short, transfer orders themselves have engendered a complex and somewhat conflicting pattern of reviewability that

does not appear to contradict our--and the other circuits'--

view that reviewability of pre-transfer orders shifts to the

transferee circuit.

Transfers by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

under s 1407 have received special treatment that is also

consistent with our view of s 1294. The practice has favored

certification by the transferee court of potentially outcomedeterminative rulings for immediate, consolidated appeal under 28 U.S.C. s 1292(b) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), before the

cases are returned to their courts of origin. See In re

Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d

1171, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); FMC Corp. v. Glouster Eng'g Co., 830 F.2d 770, 771-72

(7th Cir. 1987); see also In re Food Lion, Inc., 73 F.3d 528,

533 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing the use of Rule 54(b)). An

appeal before re-transfer enhances the likelihood of achieving

the coordination benefits sought by s 1407 (the "just and

__________

2 If the party transferred against its will to a new court failed

to move for retransfer, the omission might waive any claim on the

subject. See Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 867

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 11 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

efficient conduct" of multidistrict actions), as the circuit of the

s 1407 transferee court can give the issues a unified treatment, and its interlocutory decision is likely to be accepted as

binding law of the case once the cases are transferred back to

their courts of origin. See In re Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d

at 1180. In appeals such as Hill's, by contrast, the appeal's

being towed along to the transferee circuit normally carries

the greatest probability of conserving judicial resources.

In FMC Corp., the Seventh Circuit ruled that an appeal

certified under s 1292(b) in a s 1407 case by the district

court of consolidation must proceed in the circuit court for

that district, rather than the court of appeals that would have

jurisdiction on re-transfer. See 830 F.2d at 772. This corresponds with our reading of s 1294, for on certification the

appealed decision becomes a "reviewable decision" that

s 1294 requires to be reviewed in the circuit for the issuing

district court. Of course if there is no s 1292(b) certification,

or if it is rejected by the court of appeals, the issue would

potentially return to the court of appeals for the district court

where the action began, as one of the cases cited in FMC

Corp. held. See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. LeMay, 448 F.2d

1341, 1344-45 (7th Cir. 1971) ("The transferor court when the

case is returned to it is, in our opinion, in the position of a

third court on a second change of venue and takes the case

with all of its errors, if any, that may have fastened on the

carcase theretofore.").

Although it is our considered view that appellate jurisdiction will arise on the issuance of a final judgment by the

Northern District of Illinois, we recognize that the Seventh

Circuit might regard the Tenth Circuit view as more convincing. Would that leave Hill bereft of appellate review on

Count One? We think not, because whatever the Seventh

Circuit's analysis, a decision of a court of coordinate status is

entitled to be considered "law of the case." Christianson v.

Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (stating

that courts should be loathe to disturb the decision of a

coordinate court unless the initial decision was "clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice").

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 12 of 13
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Finally, it emerged at oral argument that in the case's first

appearance in the Northern District of Illinois the government moved for dismissal on the ground that proper venue

for the now dismissed claim did not lie in that court (whereas

it did in the District of Columbia). The district court there

never ruled on the motion, and of course in the district court

here there was no occasion for the government to make such

a motion. If venue provisions in fact bar adjudication of

Count One in the district court in Illinois, the prospect of

achieving the full economies of the final judgment rule might

begin to wane; for reversal of the dismissal would open up

the prospect of separate litigations here and in Illinois. Of

course there would have been, through that point, only one

appeal. But if the destiny of this case entails litigation in two

circuits, separation under Rule 54(b) might make sense. In

fact, because the district court has not yet sent the files to the

Northern District of Illinois, it could hereafter enter a Rule

54(b) order. Alternatively, of course, either the government

might waive any venue defense to Count One in the Northern

District of Illinois, or the district court might revoke its as yet

unconsummated transfer order. On the present record, however, the appeal must be

Dismissed.

USCA Case #98-5443 Document #476458 Filed: 11/12/1999 Page 13 of 13