Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01170/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01170-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Salvador Reza, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Russell Pearce, 

Defendant. 

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CV 11-01170-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendant Pearce's motion to dismiss (doc. 35), plaintiff's

response (doc. 40), and Pearce's reply (doc. 45).

Plaintiff, a Mexican-American and vocal critic of former Arizona State Senate

President Russell Pearce, attended a public hearing relating to a bill co-sponsored by Pearce

on February 22, 2011. The hearing was held at the Arizona State Senate building. Although

people voiced their support of or opposition to the bill by cheering and booing, plaintiff

alleges that he was neither disruptive nor disorderly. 

Two days later, plaintiff entered the State Senate building. He had plans to meet

privately with another state senator. Plaintiff was approached upon entry by two police

officers (former defendants Trapp and Burton), who told him that "by order of Senate

President Russell Pearce he was no longer allowed inside the Arizona State Senate building"

due to "disorderly and disruptive behavior." Compl. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff was arrested for

trespassing. He was not prosecuted. 

Case 2:11-cv-01170-FJM Document 46 Filed 04/23/12 Page 1 of 4
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Officers Trapp and Burton were dismissed from this action on October 21, 2011 (doc.

25). Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Pearce remain. Plaintiff contends that Pearce banned

plaintiff from entering the Senate building not due to disruptive behavior at the February 22,

2011 hearing, but rather because of his public criticism of Pearce and because of his Mexican

ancestry. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. 

Pearce moves to dismiss, arguing that he is entitled to absolute legislative immunity.

The Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution "immunizes Congressmen

from suits" for acts performed "in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." Supreme

Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731-32, 100 S. Ct. 1967,

1974 (1980) (citation omitted). The purpose of cloaking legislative acts with absolute

immunity is to ensure that "the legislative function may be performed independently without

fear of outside interference." Id. at 731, 100 S. Ct. at 1974. For similar reasons, "state

legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their legislative acts." Id. at 732,

100 S. Ct. at 1974; see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49, 118 S. Ct. 966, 970

(1998) ("state and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under

§ 1983 for their legislative activities").

To determine whether an act is legislative, we must analyze the "nature of the act"

rather than the actor's motive or intent. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S. Ct. at 973. The

Ninth Circuit considers four factors in deciding whether an act is legislative: "(1) whether

the act involves ad hoc decisionmaking, or the formulation of policy; (2) whether the act

applies to a few individuals, or to the public at large; (3) whether the act is formally

legislative in character; and (4) whether it bears all the hallmarks of traditional legislation."

Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho, 623 F.3d 945, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation

omitted).

Pearce argues that the two-part test cited in Schultz v. Sundberg, rather than the

factors reaffirmed in Community House, controls. In Schultz, the Ninth Circuit held that a

legislator is entitled to absolute immunity for an act that is within the "legitimate legislative

sphere" because it is "an integral part of the deliberative and communicative process by

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which members participate in committee and house proceedings" and it "address[es]

proposed legislation or some other subject within" a legislature's jurisdiction. Schultz v.

Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1985). Pearce contends that the Schultz test provides

absolute immunity for "certain actions that are not legislative in nature." Reply at 2. We

disagree. Absolute legislative immunity is by definition only available for legislative acts.

See Chateaubriand v. Gaspard, 97 F.3d 1218, 1220 (9th Cir. 1996) (absolute immunity does

not extend to actions taken by legislators "in their administrative or executive capacities").

The whole purpose of asking whether an act is within the legitimate legislative sphere is to

determine whether that act is legislative. Moreover, Schultz was decided pre-Bogan, a

decision which prompted a change in the determination of whether an act is legislative. See

Bechard v. Rappold, 287 F.3d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 2002) ("in evaluating whether an act is

legislative, we have been directed by the United States Supreme Court to look to whether the

act is 'formally legislative[in] character' and whether it bears 'all the hallmarks of traditional

legislation'") (citing Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55, 118 S.Ct. at 973).

Applying the Community House factors, we conclude that Pearce's issuance of an

order excluding plaintiff from the State Senate Building was not a legislative act. First, the

decision was ad hoc in nature. An ad hoc decision is one made with a particular result in

mind. Community House, 623 F.3d at 961. Decisions that are directed towards a specified

individual "are normally considered to be ad hoc." Id. Pearce argues that the Senate rule

requiring the Senate President to maintain order and decorum within the building authorized

him to remove plaintiff. This rule is generic. A decision that plaintiff in particular was

unruly and needed to be banned is one directed to a specific person and designed to

accomplish a particular end. Pearce's order was not related to the creation or implementation

of broader policy to promote decorum within the Senate building. It was plaintiff who was

no longer permitted inside, not a particular kind of conduct. Second, Pearce's order applied

to plaintiff alone. See Kaahumanu v. Cty. of Maui, 315 F.3d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir. 2003)

("When the act in question applies to a few individuals rather than the public at large,

legislative immunity is disfavored."). Third, the act was neither formally legislative nor

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legislative in character. It did not involve the proposal or passage of a bill, ordinance,

resolution, rule, vote, or other formal legislative act. He was not, for example, ejected from

a legislative hearing for conduct at that hearing. As such, Pearce's order bears none of the

hallmarks of traditional legislation.

Pearce maintains that he is entitled to immunity "because restricting [p]laintiff was

pursuant to the Senate Rules to preserve and maintain decorum and order so that the Arizona

State Senate can conduct its business." Reply at 3. An action is not legislative simply

because it is authorized by a Senate rule. Accepting plaintiff's allegations as true, at the time

of his arrest he was not attending a legislative hearing or legislative session. He was not on

the Senate floor. Plaintiff does not allege that Pearce ordered him banned from the building

during the February 22, 2011 hearing. Moreover, plaintiff was not merely banned from

attending future legislative sessions or hearings, but "was no longer allowed inside the

Arizona State Senate building." See Compl. at ¶ 11. Based on these facts, Pearce is not

entitled to absolute legislative immunity.

Finally, Pearce argues for the first time on reply that to the extent plaintiff asserts

claims of false arrest and false imprisonment against him, these claims must be dismissed.

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply. See Turtle Island

Restoration Network v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 672 F.3d 1160, 1166 n.8 (9th Cir. 2012).

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED DENYING defendant Pearce's motion to dismiss

(doc. 35). 

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2012.

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