Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_05-cv-00005/USCOURTS-alnd-1_05-cv-00005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

HOLLIE LEDBETTER, an individual; )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

CALHOUN COUNTY, ALABAMA, )CIVIL ACTION NO.

an Alabama county; )

CALHOUN COUNTY COMMISSION, ) 05-HS-0005

the governing body of Calhoun County; )

LARRY AMERSON, an individual; )

BRUCE BARTLIFF, an individual; )

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER HANSON, )

an individual; )

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MADDOX, )

an individual; )

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER CLEMMONS, )

an individual; )

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER WALKER, )

an individual; )

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MARITATE, )

an individual; and, )

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BURCHFIELD, )

an individual; )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants

Larry Amerson, Sheriff of Calhoun County, Bruce Barclift, Jail Administrator

of the Calhoun County Jail, and Correctional Officer Kelly Birchfield. 

The Complaint in this case alleges the use of excessive force against, and

FILED

 2005 Apr-20 AM 09:23

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 1 of 19
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the assaulting and raping of, a pregnant 19 year old woman while she was

incarcerated in the Calhoun County Jail. Complaint, at ¶ 19. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Motion to Dismiss should not be granted unless it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99,

2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (emphasis added). The threshold for a complaint to

survive a motion to dismiss is "exceedingly low." Ancata v. Prison Health

Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting Quality Foods de

Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Development Corp., S.A.,

711 F.2d 989, 995 (11th Cir.1983)). “When a federal court reviews the

sufficiency of a complaint before the reception of any evidence either by

affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one.” Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)(overruled on

other grounds). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed

it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and

unlikely but that is not the test. Moreover, it is well established that in passing

on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the

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subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the

complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.” Id. (emphasis

added). 

III. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Larry Amerson, Sheriff of Calhoun County, is sued in his individual

capacity only, and only under Federal law. Bruce Barclift, Jail Administrator

of the Calhoun County Jail, is sued in his individual capacity only.

Correctional Officer Kelly Birchfield is sued in his individual capacity only. 

Count II of the Complaint alleges a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for violation of the Plaintiff’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.

This Count is alleged against Defendants Amerson and Bartliff only. Count III

of the Complaint alleges a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation

of the Plaintiff’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. This Count is

alleged against Defendant Burchfield, among others. Lastly, the Complaint

also alleges various state law claims against certain Defendants.

In pertinent part, the Complaint states as follows:

17. During all of the events made the basis of this suit,

Ms. Ledbetter was incarcerated at the Calhoun County Jail

(“Jail”).

18. In December 2002, January 2003, February 2003,

March 2003, April 2003 and May 2003, Ms. Ledbetter, was an

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inmate at the Jail.

19. While an inmate, Ms. Ledbetter, was repeatedly

assaulted and repeatedly required to perform sexual acts,

including sexual intercourse, on multiple male jail staff members.

20. From November of 2002 until January 2003, she was

in a general cell in the general population at the jail.

21. From late January 2003 until May 2003, Plaintiff was

moved to a private cell next to the “booking” location. 

22. In late January of 2003 it was determined that Ms.

Ledbetter was pregnant. Ms. Ledbetter was taken to her

obstetrician, Dr. Daniels, by Defendant Maddox, a male

Correctional Officer. Defendant Maddox came with her into the

examination room while she undressed for her examination by her

physician. This was done over a nurse’s objection. While Ms.

Ledbetter was undressing, Correctional Officer Maddox

mentioned that he had been watching her in the jail shower while

she bathed naked. 

23. About four or five days after Ms. Ledbetters’

examination at Dr. Daniels’ office, Defendant Maddox made

inappropriate physical contact with Ms. Ledbetter by rubbing her

breast and other parts of her body in the shower room. 

24. Approximately one week later, Defendant Maddox

had sexual intercourse with Ms. Ledbetter while in a private cell

near the booking area.

25. While an inmate at the Jail, after she was moved in

late January 2003, Defendant Hanson, another Male Correctional

Officer, came to Ms. Ledbetter’s cell and asked if she wanted

some water. Defendant Hanson took Ms. Ledbetter to the

fingerprinting room under the guise of getting Ms. Ledbetter a

drink of water. Defendant Hanson then asked her to perform a

sexual act for him as she had performed a sexual act for Defendant

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Maddox. When Ms. Ledbetter refused, Defendant Hanson

threatened Ms. Ledbetter physically and said that he would “allege

that she had attempted to escape or had done something wrong”.

Ms. Ledbetter was made to feel that she would be punished and

harmed physically if she did not perform the sexual act on

Defendant Hanson. Accordingly, she did so against her will and

in violation of her constitutional rights. While Ms. Ledbetter was

performing a fellatio act upon Defendant Hanson, Correctional

Officer Rowe (“Rowe”) came upon them and took Ms. Ledbetter

back to her jail cell. Rowe took Defendant Hanson away and

asked Correctional Officer Kofer, who was a female Correctional

Officer, to go to Ms. Ledbetter’s cell and talk to her about the

situation.

26. The following day after this event, Defendant

Bartliff came to Ms. Ledbetter’s cell to talk to her about the sexual

assault by Defendant Hanson and asked if Ms. Ledbetter would

agree to a lie detector test. She agreed. 

27. Two weeks after the event, Defendant Bartliff and an

unidentified man not in uniform came to the Jail for Ms. Ledbetter

and she gave a videotaped and recorded statement regarding the

sexual assault by Defendant Hanson which was videotaped and

recorded. Defendant Bartliff and the unidentified man requested

that Ms. Ledbetter give them certain clothes from her to test for

DNA. Defendant Bartliff and the unidentified man questioned

Ms. Ledbetter about Defendants Hanson and Maddox, and the

inappropriate sexual activities with both, as well as inappropriate

sexual acts done by other inmates with Correctional Officers. 

28. While an inmate at the Jail and in the private cell next

to the “booking” room, Ms. Ledbetter was beaten on several

occasions. Ms. Ledbetter had been given instructions from her

obstetrician that she would need plenty of drinks of water and

bathroom breaks during her pregnancy. On one occasion, Ms.

Ledbetter was attempting to get the attention of the Correctional

Officers to come to her cell and allow her to go to the bathroom.

At that time she was not allowed to go to the bathroom. She was

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 5 of 19
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required to urinate in her cell.

29. On another occasion in late January of 2003, Ms.

Ledbetter was in front of her cell when Defendants Walker and

Clemmons choked her because she had requested to use the

bathroom. Defendants Walker and Clemmons refused to allow

Ms. Ledbetter to go to the bathroom and while strapping her to a

chair Defendants Walker and Clemmons punched her on the legs

and physically abused her. 

30. In February of 2003, Ms. Ledbetter was again

attempting to get the Correctional Officers’ attention that she

needed a bathroom break. Defendants Maritate and Burchfield

handcuffed Ms. Ledbetter’s feet. Defendants Maritate and

Burchfield threatened Ms. Ledbetter with physical abuse while

strapping Ms. Ledbetter to a chair with force that was excessive

and unneeded. She was bruised and battered. 

IV . ANALYSIS

A. State Law Claims Against Barclift and Birchfield

The Plaintiff concedes that these claims are due to be dismissed.

Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the State Law Claims against Defendants

Barclift and Birchfield will be GRANTED, and these claims will be

DISMISSED, with prejudice.

B. Claims for Injunctive Relief Against All Defendants

The Plaintiff agrees that these claims are due to be dismissed.

Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss all claims for injunctive relief against all

Defendants will be GRANTED, and these claims will be DISMISSED, with

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prejudice.

C. Qualified Immunity and the Section 1983 Claims

1. Whether the Plaintiff’s Complaint Meets the Eleventh

Circuit’s Pleading Requirement.

The Defendants first argue that the Section 1983 claims against the

Defendants should be dismissed because the Complaint, “on its face, does not

meet the Eleventh Circuit’s pleading standard for § 1983 cases involving

qualified immunity.” Defendants’ Brief, at 2. 

The Eleventh Circuit has stated:

However, while Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 allows a plaintiff considerable

leeway in framing its complaint, this circuit, along with others,

has tightened the application of Rule 8 with respect to § 1983

cases in an effort to weed out nonmeritorious claims, requiring

that a § 1983 plaintiff allege with some specificity the facts which

make out its claim. See Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963

F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Arnold v. Bd. of Educ.,

880 F.2d 305, 309 (11th Cir.1989)). Some factual detail in the

pleadings is necessary to the adjudication of § 1983 claims. This

is particularly true in cases involving qualified immunity, where

we must determine whether a defendant's actions violated a

clearly established right. Accordingly, when reviewing a district

court's disposition of a motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim on

qualified immunity grounds, we are guided both by the regular

12(b)(6) standard and by the heightened pleading requirement. See

id.

GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th

Cir. 1998). In more recent years the Court has held:

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 7 of 19
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In examining the factual allegations in the complaint, we must

keep in mind the heightened pleading requirements for civil rights

cases, especially those involving the defense of qualified

immunity. GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d

1359, 1367 (11th Cir.1998). The complaint must allege the

relevant facts "with some specificity." Id. "[M]ore than mere

conclusory notice pleading is required.... [A] complaint will be

dismissed as insufficient where the allegations it contains are

vague and conclusory." Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-

57 (11th Cir.1984). See also Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917, 922

(6th Cir.1995) (holding that complaint must "include the specific,

non-conclusory allegations of fact that will enable the district

court to determine that those facts, if proved, will overcome the

defense of qualified immunity"). Moreover, in reviewing a motion

to dismiss, we need only accept "well-pleaded facts" and

"reasonable inferences drawn from those facts." Oladeinde v. City

of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir.1992).

"[U]nsupported conclusions of law or of mixed fact and law have

long been recognized not to prevent a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal."

Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n. 16 (11th

Cir.2001). We must also keep in mind the fact that "[w]e generally

accord ... official conduct a presumption of legitimacy." United

States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 179, 112 S.Ct. 541,

550, 116 L.Ed.2d 526 (1991).

Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, *1235 (11 Cir. 2003). th

The Defendants contend that the “Plaintiff has failed to identify any

particular policy of [sic] custom of Sheriff Amerson that lead to the alleged

violations of the Plaintiff’s rights. The Plaintiff has also sprinkled conclusory

allegations throughout her Complaint without providing any factual allegations

in support.” Defendants’ Brief, at 4. 

As to Amerson and Bartliff, the Complaint, at Count II, states as follows:

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 8 of 19
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40. At all times mentioned herein, Defendants Amerson

and Bartliff acted under color of Alabama law as Sheriff of

Calhoun County. Under Alabama law, Defendant Amerson

and/or Bartliff had direct control over the operations of the

Calhoun County Jail and its correctional officers and/or jailers,

and were responsible for setting policy and enforcing compliance

with regulations of the Calhoun County Jail, and for ensuring that

the Correctional Officers of the Calhoun County Jail, obey the

laws of the State of Alabama, the United States Constitution and

the laws of the Untied States of America. As such, Defendants

Amerson and Bartliff were the commanding officers of the

Correctional Officers at the Calhoun County Jail, and were

responsible for the appointing, directing, overseeing, hiring,

managing, training, supervising, and directing the conduct of the

Correctional Officers.

41. In addition, Defendants Amerson and Bartliff were

charged with setting policy and custom at the Calhoun County

Jail. As such they allowed a history of widespread abuse to occur

and a custom or policy to occur as follows: the failure to properly

monitor and protect inmates from correctional officer physical

contact, abuse, relationships and sexual contact. 

42. Defendant Amerson’s and Bartliff’s failure to

properly appoint, direct, oversee, hire, manage, train and supervise

employees, as well as their creation of a policy and custom at the

Calhoun County Jail that created a lawless environment –

allowing for deliberate indifference of Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights to bodily integrity and to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment – violated 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Complaint, at 10-11. As to Defendant Birchfield, the Complaint, at Count III,

states as follows:

45. The conduct of the Defendants was deliberately

indifferent to Ms. Ledbetter’s constitutionally protected rights

while a female inmate in the Calhoun County Jail. Such actions

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include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) male

Correctional Officers Maddox and Hanson had personal

relationships with, and/or sexual contact, assault and intercourse

with, Ms. Ledbetter; (2) Correctional Officer Hanson raped Ms.

Ledbetter; (3) Correctional Officers Clemmons, Walker, Meritate

and Burchfield knowingly and willfully failed to allow Ms.

Ledbetter to have water or bathroom breaks while pregnant (and

when directed by her obstetrician); (4) Correctional Officers

Clemmons, Walker, Meritate and Burchfield knowingly and

willfully violated Ms. Ledbetter’s constitutionally protected rights

when they used unneeded and excessive force in attempting to

restrain her, and physically abused Ms. Ledbetter, after she

requested water and/or bathroom breaks; (5) ; Correctional Officer

Maddox watched Ms. Ledbetter while she bathed to clean herself;

and (6) Correctional Officer Maddox knowingly and willfully

violated Ms. Ledbetter’s constitutionally protected right to privacy

when he watched her undress at her doctor’s appointment without

legal justification to do so.

46. As a direct and proximate result of the actions and/or

omissions of Defendants as set forth in this document, Ms.

Ledbetter endured unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,

stress, anxiety, and fear.

47. The actions of the Defendants as set forth above were

intentional, wanton and malicious, and violated her

constitutionally protected rights and liberties.

Complaint, at 11-12. 

When taken together, the Court is convinced that these Counts

sufficiently allege relevant facts with at least “some specificity”, as required by

the applicable case law.

2. Whether the Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified

Immunity in this Case.

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 10 of 19
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a. Outline of the Law of Qualified Immunity

i. Complete Protection to Governmental

Officials Sued in Their Individual Capacity

"Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government

officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct 'does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.' " Vinyard v.

Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396

(1982)). 

Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 877 (11 Cir. 2003). 

th

ii. Purpose of Qualified Immunity

"The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to

carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal

liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the

plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal

law." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Wood, 323 F.3d at 877. 

That qualified immunity protects government actors is the usual

rule; only in exceptional cases will government actors have no

shield against claims made against them in their individual

capacities. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738 (officials

"generally are shielded from liability for civil damages"); Barts v.

Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir.1989) ("The Harlow

decision sets up a bright-line test that is a powerful constraint on

causes of action under section 1983."); Dartland v. Metropolitan

Dade County, 866 F.2d 1321, 1323- 24 (11th Cir.1989) (when "no

bright-line standard puts the reasonable public employer on notice

of a constitutional violation, the employer is entitled to immunity

except in the extraordinary case where [First Amendment case

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 11 of 19
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law] would lead to the inevitable conclusion that the [act taken

against] the employee was unlawful"). Unless a government

agent's act is so obviously wrong, in the light of pre-existing law,

that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly

violating the law would have done such a thing, the government

actor has immunity from suit. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,

341-43, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096-97, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Because

qualified immunity shields government actors in all but

exceptional cases, courts should think long and hard before

stripping defendants of immunity.

Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University, Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149

(11 Cir. 1994) th

While qualified immunity almost always applies in damage claims

against government actors in their individual capacities, the

defense is a narrow one, leaving plaintiffs other avenues of relief.

Plaintiffs remain free (subject to Eleventh Amendment

constraints) to seek money damages against government actors in

their official capacity. Plaintiffs may also seek injunctive relief.

Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University, Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 n.

2 (11 Cir. 1994). th

iii. How a Defendant Can Receive Qualified

Immunity

(a) Burden Shifting Analysis

To receive qualified immunity, "the public official must

first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary

authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). . . . "Once the defendant establishes that

he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts

to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate."

Id.

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 12 of 19
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Id.

(1) Defendant’s Burden to Prove

Scope of the Official’s

Discretionary Authority

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recently restated the law as follows:

Instead of focusing on whether the acts in question involved the

exercise of actual discretion, we assess whether they are of a type

that fell within the employee's job responsibilities. Our inquiry is

two-fold. We ask whether the government employee was (a)

performing a legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a

job-related goal), (b) through means that were within his power to

utilize. See *1266 Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d

1176, 1185 n. 17 (11th Cir.1994) ("A government official acts

within his or her discretionary authority if objective circumstances

compel the conclusion that challenged actions occurred in the

performance of the official's duties and within the scope of this

authority." (emphasis added)).

One might reasonably believe that violating someone's

constitutional rights is never a legitimate job-related function or

within the scope of a government official's authority or power. As

we explained in Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282

(11th Cir.1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted), however,

"the inquiry is not whether it was within the defendant's authority

to commit the allegedly illegal act. Framed that way, the inquiry

is no more than an untenable tautology." In applying each prong

of this test, we look to the general nature of the defendant's action,

temporarily putting aside the fact that it may have been committed

for an unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional manner, to

an unconstitutional extent, or under constitutionally inappropriate

circumstances.

Consider the first prong of the test--whether the official is engaged

in a legitimate job-related function. In Sims v. Metropolitan Dade

County, 972 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir.1992), "we did not ask whether

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 13 of 19
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it was within the defendant's authority to suspend an employee for

an improper reason; instead, we asked whether [the defendant's]

discretionary duties included the administration of discipline."

Harbert, 157 F.3d at 1282. Similarly, in assessing whether a

police officer may assert qualified immunity against a Fourth

Amendment claim, we do not ask whether he has the right to

engage in unconstitutional searches and seizures, but whether

engaging in searches and seizures in general is a part of his jobrelated powers and responsibilities. See, e.g., Madiwale v.

Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir.1997). Put another way,

to pass the first step of the discretionary function test for qualified

immunity, the defendant must have been performing a function

that, but for the alleged constitutional infirmity, would have fallen

with his legitimate job description.

Of course, we must be sure not to characterize and assess the

defendant's act at too high a level of generality. Nearly every act

performed by a government employee can be described, in general

terms, as ostensibly "furthering the public interest." If we jump to

such a high level of abstraction, it becomes impossible to

determine whether the employee was truly acting within the

proper scope of his job-related activities. Consequently, we

consider a government official's actions at the minimum level of

generality necessary to remove the constitutional taint. In

considering whether an act of allegedly excessive force fell within

a police officer's duties, for example, we do not ask whether

police have the right to use excessive force. We also do not

immediately jump to a high level of generality and ask whether

police are responsible for enforcing the law or promoting the

public interest. We instead ask whether they have the power to

attempt to effectuate arrests. See, e.g., Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1194

(holding, in an excessive force suit, "there can be no doubt that

[the police officer defendant] was acting in his discretionary

capacity when he arrested [plaintiff]").

After determining that an official is engaged in a legitimate jobrelated function, it is then necessary to turn to the second prong of

the test and determine whether he is executing that job-related

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 14 of 19
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function--that is, pursuing his job-related goals--in an authorized

manner. The primary purpose of the qualified immunity doctrine

is to allow government employees to enjoy a degree of protection

only when exercising powers that legitimately form a part of their

jobs. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 & n. 34, 102 S.Ct. at 2739

& n. 34 (limiting the availability of qualified immunity to

situations where "an official's duties legitimately require action"

and to "actions within the scope of an official's duties"). Each

government employee is given only a certain "arsenal" of powers

with which to accomplish her goals. For example, it is not within

a teacher's official powers to sign her students up for the Army to

promote patriotism or civic virtue, or to compel them to bring

their property to school to redistribute their wealth to the poor so

that they can have firsthand experience with altruism.

Employment by a local, county, state, or federal government is not

a carte blanche invitation to push the envelope and tackle matters

far beyond one's job description or achieve one's official goals

through unauthorized means. Pursuing a job-related goal through

means that fall outside the range of discretion that comes with an

employee's job is not protected by qualified immunity.

Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 -1267 (11 Cir. th

2004).

(2) Plaintiff’s Burden to Show

Qualified Immunity Not

Appropriate 

– Whether the Plaintiff’s

Allegations, If True,

E s t a b l i s h a

Constitutional Violation.

The Supreme Court has set forth a two-part test for the qualified

immunity analysis. "The threshold inquiry a court must undertake

in a qualified immunity analysis is whether [the] plaintiff's

allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation." Hope v.

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 15 of 19
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Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2513, 153 L.Ed.2d 666

(2002) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151,

150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). "If no constitutional right would have

been violated were the allegations established, there is no

necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity."

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. 

Wood, 323 F.3d at 877 -878.

– Was the Right Clearly

Established?

However, "[i]f a constitutional right would have been violated

under the plaintiff's version of the facts, 'the next, sequential step

is to ask whether the right was clearly established.' " Vinyard, 311

F.3d at 1346 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151).

Id. at 878.

For a "right" to be clearly established, "[t]he contours of the right

must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97

L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (emphasis added). "[I]n the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Id. As the en

banc court recently explained: 

When considering whether the law applicable to

certain facts is clearly established, the facts of cases

relied upon as precedent are important. The facts

need not be the same as the facts of the immediate

case. But they do need to be materially similar. See,

e.g., Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1277 (11th

Cir.1989). Public officials are not obligated to be

creative or imaginative in drawing analogies from

previously decided cases. 

Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff's Dept., 962 F.2d 1563, 1575

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 16 of 19
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(11th Cir.1992) (Edmondson, J., dissenting), approved en banc,

998 F.2d 923 (11th Cir.1993). Put differently, "[i]f case law, in

factual terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity

almost always protects the defendant." Post v. City of Fort

Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1993). 

Rodgers v. Horsley, 39 F.3d 308, 310 -311 (11 Cir. 1994) (finding no clearly th

established right where Plaintiff had failed to show that at the time of the

alleged tort the law was clearly established because she pointed to no bright line

established by pre-existing case law that would make it "apparent" to the

defendants that what they were doing (or failing to do) was unlawful). If there

is no such bright line shown, a plaintiff can overcome qualified immunity

“only by showing that the official's conduct lies so obviously at the very core

of what the [law] prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily

apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of caselaw.” Smith v. Mattox,

127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11 Cir. 1997). th

b. Application of Qualified Immunity to the Instant

Case.

The Defendants have failed to make the initial showing that their

conduct, as alleged in the Complaint, fell within their discretionary authority.

As is pointed out above, the Qualified Immunity analysis is a burden shifting

analysis. The failure of the Defendants to offer proof, or even allege that their

conduct falls within their discretionary authority, does not establish the defense

of qualified immunity, nor shift the burden to the Plaintiff to rebut same. Under

these circumstances, the Court cannot find that the Defense of Qualified

Immunity is appropriate. As to that ground, the Motion to Dismiss will be

DENIED.

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D. Eighth Amendment Claims and Section 1983

The Defendants next contend that “[b]ecause the alleged misconduct

occurred prior to Plaintiff’s conviction, the Eighth Amendment was not, and

has not, been implicated. Eighth Amendment protections do not attach until

after conviction and sentencing.” Defendants’ Brief, at 9. The Eleventh Circuit,

however, has held that pre-trial detainees’ claims may be properly analyzed

under the Eighth Amendment. See Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579,

1582 (11 Cir. 1995). Accordingly, this aspect of the Defendants Motion to th

Dismiss is due to be DENIED.

E. Claims for Punitive Damages Under Section 1983

Concerning the propriety of punitive damages in Section 1983 cases it

has been held:

Making no distinction between claims against him in his official

capacity versus claims against him in his individual capacity, the

Sheriff contends that a suit against him is a suit against the state

and, therefore, no punitive damages can be awarded. If this were

true, no damages could be awarded at all. There is, however, a

distinction between official capacity claims, which the Court has

ruled are due to be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity

grounds, supra p. 1163, and individual capacity claims, as to

which punitive damages are permissible. See Colvin v.

McDougall, 62 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir.1995).

Gaines v. Choctaw County Com'n, 242 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1166 (S.D.Ala. 2003).

Punitive damages claims against the Defendants in their individual capacities

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 18 of 19
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are acceptable. As to this point, the Motion to Dismiss is due to be DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons the Motion to Dismiss of the Defendant will

be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

DONE this 19th day of April, 2005.

 

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

Case 1:05-cv-00005-VEH Document 22 Filed 04/20/05 Page 19 of 19