Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00097/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00097-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Melvin Gene Ross, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-97 PHX DGC (VAM)

)

Dora Schriro, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Melvin Gene Ross ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner

raises five grounds for relief in the petition. (Doc. 1 at pp. 5-

9 and Attachments). Respondents filed an answer opposing the

granting of habeas relief. (Doc. 13).

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged by Information in CR 98-017796 with

auto theft, a Class 3 felony on December 28, 1998. (See Doc. 14,

Exhibit G at 16). Subsequently, the State amended the Information

to include the charges that petitioner committed the offense while

released on bond in another case, CR 98-016058, and that he had

five historical prior felony convictions in CR 96-93770 (burglary

in the third degree), CR 92-09161 (burglary in the second degree

and burglary in the third degree), CR 90-04554 (resisting arrest)

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and CR 150619 (burglary in the second degree). (Id. at 21,22).

Trial was held from April 6-7, 1999, and petitioner was

convicted of the crime as charged. (Doc. 16, Exhibit J at pp. 64-

65). On May 5, 1999, a hearing was conducted with respect to the

State's sentencing-enhancement allegations. As a result of this

hearing, the trial court concluded that petitioner had been

convicted of felonies in three separate cases, namely, CR 96-

93770, CR 92-09161 and CR 150619. (Doc. 16, Exhibit K at p. 18). 

In addition, the trial court found that petitioner committed the

auto theft while on release in CR 98-016058. (Id. at pp. 18-19). 

As a result of the convictions and these findings of prior felony

convictions and that the crime was committed while on release in

another case, the Court sentenced petitioner to the presumptive

term of 13.25 years in prison. (Doc. 16, Exhibit L at p. 34).

Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the Arizona Court of

Appeals raising the following issues:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it

denied [petitioner's] request for an evidentiary hearing

on his motion for a new trial?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing

[petitioner's] request for a curative instruction on the

accused's right not to testify following the

prosecutor's unequivocal rebuttal comment that the

accused did not testify?

(Doc. 16, Exhibit M at p. 6, 7-10 and 11-13).

On July 25, 2000, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

petitioner's conviction in a memorandum decision. (Doc. 16 at

Exhibit Q). Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme

Court. In his pro se petition for review, petitioner, in addition

to the claims raised before the Arizona Court of Appeals, stated

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"other issues needing discussion by this court ..." Petitioner

then listed several statements that do not make sense. (See Doc.

16, Exhibit U at p. 2). In addition, petitioner also filed a

motion in the Arizona Supreme Court "TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF

VEHICLE DAMAGES ON THE BEHALF THE STATE'S VICTIM CLAIMS OF

EXTENSIVE DAMAGES PURSUANT TO RULE 31.19 AND A.R.S. § 13-1813(c)

AND 13-1813(D); 13-2305." (Id. at Exhibit V). In essence, this

motion challenges the restitution order issued by the trial court.

The Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review and

the Motion to Address the Issue of Vehicle Damages ..." without

comment on March 22, 2001. (Doc. 16 at Exhibit W).

On May 29, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 in the trial

court raising numerous issues. (Doc. 15, Exhibit G at 132). On

February 3, 2003, the trial court summarily dismissed the Rule 32

petition with respect to all claims raised. (Id., Exhibit H at

156). 

Petitioner filed for review of the trial court's denial in

the Arizona Court of Appeals, raising the following grounds:

1. Insufficient Evidence.

2. Inappropriate Restitution Lien.

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in failing to

contact, interview, list, and call witnesses that were

vital to the defense strategy including:

a. Girtha Gist;

b. The Victim's Employer;

c. A tow truck driver.

(Doc. 16, Exhibit X at pp. 3-17).

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After filing his original petition for review, petitioner

attempted to file supplemental briefing which was denied. (Doc.

16 at Exhibit Y). Petitioner later filed additional motions to

amend or supplement, (Id. at Exhibits Z, BB and DD), which were

also denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at Exhibits AA,

CC and EE, respectively). On June 14, 2004, the Arizona Court of

Appeals summarily denied the petition for review. (Id. at Exhibit

FF). 

On January 10, 2005, petitioner filed two separate petitions

for writ of habeas corpus in the District Court. CV 05-98-PHX-DGC

(VAM) challenged the validity of his conviction in state CR 98-

016058. CV 05-97-PHX-DGC (VAM) the case at issue here, challenged

the conviction in CR 98-017796. (See Doc. 1 at p. 1). 

Respondents sought to consolidate these cases, petitioner objected

to consolidation and the motion was denied. (Docs. 7, 8 and 12). 

However, the proposed consolidated answer was ordered by the Court

to be filed as the answer in this case. (Doc. 12 at p. 3).

In his habeas petition, petitioner makes the following

statements:

GROUND I: [FEDERAL] DUE PROCESS OF LAW VIOLATED.

On 12/8/98, with Jason Grant's [own] permission, I was

allowed to possess and to control the listed vehicle. 

Allegedly reported as stolen to the Glendale Police

Authorities on 12/9/ - 10/98 .... On 12-11-98, I was

anonymously trailed by Phx. police officer's (Beauchamp

and Margiotta). These cops performed a vehicle plate

check - NCIC. Justification for their actions was

claimed to be that of supicious [sic] driving. Yet

neither officer bothered to conduct a vehicle traffic

stop, thus allowing me to park the vehicle in a welllighted Walgreen's parking lot as this was at 8:59 p.m. 

Upon parking, both officers returned and approached me

with guns to effectuate my arrest. I quickly complied

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and was searched and cuffed to be escorted to the patrol

car. The key to Mr. Grant's vehicle was found in my

pocket but never preserved as exculpate nor inculpate

evidence? Shortly thereafter, Officer Margiotta

questioned me but without first Mirrandadizing [sic] me. 

This officer elicited some statements from me that the

State used to incriminate me with. Later, Officer

Beauchamp questioned me then arrested me to be booked

.... For these reasons the evidence was insufficient. 

Thus causing defense counsel to move for a directed

verdict ....

GROUND II: [FEDERAL] DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

On 7/30/99, during sentencing phase, claims for

restitution [were] heard by both sides. Mr. Grant [the

owner of the stolen car] failed to attend. Trial Court

lacked jurisdiction to impose restitution .... Mr.

Gordon, the insurance agent was the only witness (for

the State) that was present. The evidence adduced was

unreliable and inaccurate .... The defense counsel, Mr.

Rossi pointed out the fact that the State's evidence

failed to support vehicle damages as resulting from the

alleged offense. [Citation omitted]. The Court sided

with the State, regardless to settle the issue(s). In

fact, the appraisal reports and the supplied photo taken

by CCC-Business service for Guide One Insurance Co.,

indicate that those significant damages to the vehicle

occurred while the vehicle was in the owner's

possession. The Court tacitly aggreed (sic) by

admitting that the damages were "dents" but not at the

milage as claimed ....

GROUND III: [FEDERAL] DUE PROCESS OF LAW VIOLATIONS.

This petitioner was systematically denied effective

assist. of Counsel representation. [a] No interview was

conducted of the exculpatory witnesses who were made

know, (see PRCP-Records). [b] No meaningful

investigation was ever conducted by the defense

[counsel] into the alleged theft claims prior to precourt activity. [c] No relevant pre-trial motions were

filed (See J. Ground I); [d] petitioner was unduly

denied the compulsory process to confront the witness

Micheal Gordon in the trial proceedings. [e] The defense

counsel failed to reveal the prosecutorial's intent to

establish false-evidence by usage of perjured testimony. 

The body of the offense (corpus delicti) was established

on false-claims. [f] Counsel failed to object to the

hearsay testimony on record thereby allowing a grave

[injustice] prosecutorial practice to infect the trial

with lies! [g] The preliminary counsel denied petitioner

the right to move the Justice of the Peace to entertain

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the question of a 'Gerstein Violation' because of a

failure to investigate prior to the prelim. hearing. [h]

There were damaging waiver(s) of my rights and my trial

counsel failed to file my own version of the N.T. Motion

as well [as] the Motion to Vacate Judgement .... State

court review of this Ground was inadequate. MANDATING a

Fed. hearing de novo DUE to a structural (trial) error

not [amenable] to harmless error analysis. Requires a

reversal.

GROUND IV: [FEDERAL] DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS.

The petitioner produced newly discovered evidence for

which the State claims lacked relevance to the issues

presented. [Citation omitted]. The newly [discovered]

evidence is authenticated in accord with federal law. 

It raises the question of a 'reversible error' because

of a prosecutorial withholding [of] exculpatory

documents requested by the defense prior to the trial. 

Including Mr. Gordon and Officer Beauchamp's photographs

taken during the recovery of the listed, allegedly

stolen, vehicle ....

GROUND V: [FEDERAL] DUE PROCESS VIOLATION.

For the reason that the trial lawyer informed me that

the State wanted to convict me for my prior offenses and

not so much the alleged offense itself, constitutes

double jeopardy ....

(Doc. 1 at pp. 5-8 and Attachments).

DISCUSSION

A. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the following standard for

granting a federal habeas petition originating from a state court

conviction applies:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

The Act also codifies a presumption of correctness of state

court findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) states that "a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof

to rebut the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." As

discussed more fully below, these provisions of the Act set the

standard for the Court’s evaluation of the merits.

The Act limits the district court’s discretion to hold

evidentiary hearings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) states:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis

of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall

not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that

was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

A petition may be denied on the merits even though it

contains unexhausted claims, and the state does not waive

exhaustion except by an express waiver on the record. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(2) and (3).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

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1. Law Generally

A federal court has authority to review a federal

constitutional claim presented by a state prisoner if available

state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454

U.S. 1, 3 (1981)(per curiam); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829,

833 (9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in

case law and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, now states:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that--

 (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available

in the courts of the State; or

 (B)(i) there is an absence of available state

corrective process; or

 (ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

.......

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted

the remedies available in the courts of the State,

within the meaning of this section, if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available

procedure, the question presented.

The exhaustion requirement can be satisfied in one of two

ways. First, a petitioner can fairly present his or her claims to

the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through

either the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Only one of these avenues of relief must be

exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. 

This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown

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v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy,

827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059

(1989).

Claims presented in habeas petitions are considered exhausted

if they have been ruled upon by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

However, if the sentence received is life imprisonment, the claims

must be presented to the Arizona Supreme Court. Swoopes, 196 F.3d

at 1010. Although a federal habeas petitioner may reformulate

somewhat the claims made in state court, Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796

F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d in part on other grounds by

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the substance of the federal

claim must have been "fairly presented" in state court. Anderson

v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam); Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971). While the petitioner need not recite

"book and verse on the federal constitution," Picard, 404 U.S. at

277-78 (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir.

1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support

the federal claim were before the state courts or that a "somewhat

similar state law claim was made." Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6.

As an alternative to presenting his claims to the highest

state court, a petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement

by demonstrating that no state remedies remained available at the

time the federal habeas petition was filed. Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 125 (n. 28)(1982); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602

(9th Cir. 1989). However, this path is fraught with danger:

If state remedies are not available because the

petitioner failed to comply with state procedures and

thereby prevented the highest state court from reaching

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1

Appellate defaults are examined under the same standards that

apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim during trial.

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

10

the merits of his claim, then a federal court may refuse

to reach the merits of that claim as a matter of comity.

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988); see also

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (determining that the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied if a petitioner presented a claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct review or via a petition

for post-conviction relief). This failure to comply with

reasonable state procedures is usually characterized as

"procedural default," "procedural bar," or a "waiver." As

discussed, exhausting state remedies by means of a procedural

default is risky. The burden is on the petitioner to show that he

or she has properly exhausted each claim. Dismissal of the

petition is proper when the record does not show that the

exhaustion requirement is met. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103,

1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023

(1982). If the unavailability of state remedies is in no way the

fault of the petitioner or his or her counsel, the exhaustion

requirement will likely be satisfied and a federal court may reach

the merits of the petitioner’s habeas claims.

In many cases, however, the lack of available state remedies

is a direct result of the petitioner’s failure to avail himself of

the state remedies in a timely or procedurally correct manner. In

such instances, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted, and may

not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of

"cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse the default.1 Reed v.

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Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-

91 (1977); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989);

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). "Cause"

is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). "Prejudice" is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Id.

"Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a

procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court ‘has not given the

term "cause" precise content.’" Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268,

1274 (11th Cir.)(quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that

cause should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to

petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a

claim was not reasonably available to counsel, (citation

omitted), or that "some interference by officials,"

(citation omitted), made compliance impracticable, would

constitute cause under this standard.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Harmon, 894

F.2d at 1275; Allen v. Risley, 817 F.2d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1987).

The standard is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). The

"cause and prejudice" standard is equally applicable to pro se

litigants, Harmon, 894 F.2d at 1274; Hughes, 800 F.2d at 908,

whether literate and assisted by "jailhouse lawyers," Tacho, 862

F.2d at 1381; illiterate and unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909, or

non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989).

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2

Respondents originally intended their answer to be

consolidated with respect to claims raised in CIV 05-98-PHX-DGC

12

Finally, if a claim has been found to be procedurally

defaulted, the failure to establish cause for the default may be

excused under exceptional circumstances. For instance:

... in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ even in the absence of showing cause for

the procedural default.

Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

327 (1995)(to meet the Murray standard, "the petitioner must show

that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him in the light of the new evidence").

2. Application of Law to Facts of the Case

Respondents contend that petitioner's claims, save the claims

raised in Grounds I, II, and portions of Grounds III and IV are

procedurally barred from federal habeas review. With respect to

Ground III (raising several claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel), respondents assert that the only claim which was

properly exhausted is the claim that trial counsel failed to

properly interview and call at trial certain "exculpatory"

witnesses. Respondents assert all other claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel are procedurally defaulted. Similarly, with

respect to the claims presented in Ground IV, respondents assert

the only exhausted claim is petitioner's claim of failure to

disclose exculpatory evidence. Respondents contend all other

claims raised in Grounds III, IV and Ground V are procedurally

defaulted.2

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(VAM). As a result they argue that the claims raised in that

habeas petition (which they designate as Grounds VI, VII, VIII and

IX), with one exception, are also all procedurally defaulted. In

light of the Court's denial of the motion to consolidate, the Court

should not consider any claims with respect to CIV 05-98. Those

claims will be dealt with when the Court decides that case.

13

Upon review, the Magistrate Judge agrees that the substance

of the claims presented in Ground III (save the claim of

ineffective assistance with respect to failing to interview and

present exculpatory witnesses), IV and V were not properly

exhausted in state court. Review of both petitioner's direct

appeal and petition for Rule 32 relief, show that the substance of

the claims raised in Ground V were not presented. With respect to

Ground III (raising various claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel), review of his brief in support of his petition for

review to the Arizona Court of Appeals shows that the only claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel presented is the claim

concerning the failure to interview and call exculpatory

witnesses. (See Doc. 16, Exhibit X at pp. 10-14). Similarly, to

the extent petitioner raises a claim of failure to disclose

exculpatory evidence (from the victim's insurance carrier) in

Ground IV, this claim was presented in his Rule 32 petition. (See

id. at p. 13).

In his answer, petitioner states he presented the substance

of the claims raised in Grounds III, IV and V in a special action

proceeding filed on June 4, 2004, in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

No documentation has been filed concerning this special action by

respondents. However, petitioner has included with his petition,

a copy of an order issued by the Arizona Court of Appeals which

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3

Similarly, as noted by respondents, petitioner sought leave

to supplement his Rule 32 petition on several occasions, but each

time the motion was denied. (See Doc. 16, Exhibits Z, AA, BB, CC,

DD and EE).

14

disposes of a motion for an "Emergency Petition for Interlocutory

Relief and Special Action Relief" and a motion "By Leave of Court

to Plead Cause for the Writ of Special Action to be Issued". (See

Doc. 1 at Attached Order). Thus, it appears petitioner did not

file a separate special action proceeding, rather he sought leave

to that effect as part of his Rule 32 and his motions were denied. 

Thus, the only issues ever properly before the Arizona Court of

Appeals were those issues raised in his Rule 32 petition.3

 

In light of petitioner's failure to present the substance of

the issues raised in Ground III (except the failure to interview

and call exculpatory witnesses) and Ground V, those claims are

procedurally defaulted and should be denied.

As noted by respondents, petitioner did raise the substance

of the claims raised in Grounds I and II in his Rule 32 petition. 

(See Doc. 16, Exhibit X at pp. 3-14). However, review of the

State Rule 32 petition shows that neither of these claims were

presented in state court as violations of federal law or

petitioner's federal constitutional rights. (See id.). As such,

the federal nature of these claims was not exhausted in state

court. Petitioner's failure to raise these issues in state court

as federal violations means the claims are not cognizable on

federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In addition,

the time for petitioner to present any claims regarding his

convictions and sentences in CR 98-017796 in state court, via

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appeal or post-conviction relief, has long since passed. 

Petitioner has not made, nor is there any reason to believe,

petitioner could present a viable basis for presenting an untimely

Rule 32 petition in state court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a);

32.1(d) - (g). As a result, to the extent petitioner argues in

his federal petition that his claims in Grounds I and II violate

his federal constitutional rights, those claims were not presented

in state court and are procedurally defaulted.

The Court may ignore the procedural default if petitioner

presents a colorable claim of actual innocence such that failure

to consider the claims would result in his conviction, though

actually innocent. Nothing in the record supports such a claim. 

As a result, the only claims properly exhausted in state court are

the claim that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance when

he failed to interview and call certain witnesses (Ground III),

and the claim of a Brady violation raised in Ground IV.

C. Merits of Petitioner's Properly Exhausted Claims

1. Standard of Review for Habeas Claims

Under the AEDPA the issuance of writs of habeas corpus is

limited to circumstances in which the state court adjudication

"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States ... or

resulted in a decision that was an unreasonable determination of

the facts ..." 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) and (2). "[A] state court

decision applies 'clearly established' Supreme Court law under the

AEDPA when it 'applies a rule dictated by [Supreme Court]

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precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became

final." Campbell v. Rice, 265 F.3d 878, 889 (9th Cir.

2001)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 376 (2001)). As

stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the 'reasonable

application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court's decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner's case.

...

[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is

different from an incorrect application of federal law

...a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, the application must also be unreasonable.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring in

part, and concurring in the judgment). "In order for a state

court's application of federal law to be unreasonable, it must

have been clearly erroneous." Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143,

1152-54 (9th Cir. 2000). "Petitioner cannot meet his burden by

simply convincing the federal court that he has the better of two

reasonable legal arguments." Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832,

837 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1154)).

2. Petitioner's Remaining Habeas Claims

a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

i. Law Generally

Claims of ineffective assistance are analyzed pursuant to

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1994). In order to

prevail on such a claim, petitioner must show:

1. Counsel's representation fell below the objective

standard for reasonableness; and

2. There is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694; see also United States v.

Thornton, 23 F.3d 1532, 1533 (9th Cir. 1994)(per curiam); United

States v. Solomon, 795 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986).

 This two-pronged test "deficient performance and prejudice"

poses a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

698; Thompson v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 1509, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The court hearing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must

consider the totality of the evidence with an eye toward the

ultimate issue of whether counsel's conduct so undermined the

functioning of the adversarial process that the proceeding lacked

fundamental fairness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Card v.

Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1990)(observing that counsel

cannot be labeled ineffective for failing to raise issues which

have no merit). Reasonableness is judged from counsel's

perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986);

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

 Deficient performance is one in which counsel's errors were

so great he or she was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed

by the Sixth Amendment. Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864 (9th Cir.

1986). To prove such ineffectiveness, a petitioner must

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4

The Magistrate Judge notes that in his Rule 32 petition to

the trial court he did not specify the basis for ineffective

assistance of counsel. (Doc. 15, Exhibit G at p. 132). However,

the Magistrate Judge is unclear whether the complete Rule 32

petition was filed as part of the record on review.

18

demonstrate that counsel's actions were "outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." United States v. Houtchens,

926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687-90). There is a strong presumption counsel's conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be

considered sound trial strategy. United States v. QuinterroBarraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519

U.S. 848 (1996); United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th

Cir. 1991).

ii. Analysis of Petitioner's Ineffective Assistance Claim

Petitioner asserts his counsel rendered ineffective

assistance when "[n]o interview was conducted of the exculpatory

witnesses who were made known, ..." (Doc. 1 at p. 7). This claim

echoes his claim presented in his Rule 32 brief, wherein he

contended counsel failed "to contact, interview, list, and call

witnesses vital to the defense strategy." (Doc. 16, Exhibit X at

p. 10). Specifically, petitioner cited the following witnesses:

(1) Girtha Gist:

(2) The truck owner's (Jason Grant's) employer:

(3) A tow truck driver.4

(See Doc. 16, Exhibit X at pp. 10-12).

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I. Trial Evidence

At this point it is helpful to recount the evidence adduced

at trial. The State first called one of the arresting officers,

David Beauchamp. Officer Beauchamp testified he noticed

petitioner while on his shift on December 11, 1998 at

approximately 9:00 p.m. Petitioner pulled into a Walgreens

parking lot as soon as the officer pulled in behind him. 

Beauchamp ran a records check of the license plate and the truck

and it was identified as stolen. Beauchamp then pulled into the

parking lot, petitioner was walking away and the officer arrested

him. (Doc. 15, Exhibit I at pp. 94-97). After Beauchamp

"Mirandized" petitioner, petitioner told him he had permission to

drive the truck. (Id. at p. 99). Beauchamp testified that

petitioner told him he picked up the truck around 61st Avenue and

Grand on December 9, 1998 at 4 p.m. Petitioner told him he had

permission to drive the truck but petitioner did not know the name

of the person who gave him permission. (Id. at p. 100). 

Beauchamp stated that petitioner told him he had known the car's

owner for about two weeks but did not know his name. (Id.). 

Beauchamp testified he asked petitioner why this person gave him

the truck and petitioner told him that the owner wanted him to

purchase drugs and "to possibly wreck the vehicle for some type of

insurance scam." (Id. at p. 101). Beauchamp found keys to the

vehicle on petitioner's person. (Id. at p. 98). Beauchamp

testified that the vehicle had sustained physical damage, in

particular, to the driver's side door. (Id. at p. 118).

Similarly, Officer Margiotta, another Phoenix police officer,

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described his contact with petitioner on the night in question,

December 11, 1998. Margiotta testified when he heard about

Officer Beauchamp making a stolen vehicle stop, he proceeded to

the area to act as backup, arriving shortly thereafter. (Doc. 15,

Exhibit I at pp. 121-22). Margiotta testified that when he

arrived, Officer Beauchamp had already placed petitioner in

custody. Margiotta stated he then looked at the vehicle in

question, processed fingerprints and asked for a tow truck. (Id.

at p. 123). Margiotta testified that he didn't recall any damage

to the truck but admitted he did not look the truck over

"extensively." (Id.).

Next, the State called Jason Grant to testify. Grant

testified that he worked for a company named Kitchen Renew in

December, 1998. Grant also testified he owned a 1995 Dodge Dakota

pickup which he drove to work on December 9, 1998. (Doc. 15,

Exhibit I at pp. 126-27). He testified he did not drive his truck

home that night because he worked late, needed to pick up supplies

at Home Depot to finish a job and, as a result, borrowed his

boss's truck, which was bigger and fully insured. (Id. at p.

128). As a result, he took his boss' truck home and picked up the

supplies at the Home Depot the next morning on his way to work. 

(Id.). 

Grant testified his vehicle was locked and in front of the 

Kitchen Renew building when he drove home from work in his boss's

truck at about 7 or 8 p.m. on December 9, 1998. He states he kept

a spare key to the vehicle in a glove box of the truck. When he

returned the next day at about 9 a.m, his truck was gone. (Doc.

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15, Exhibit I at p. 130). Grant states he contacted the Glendale

Police to see if the vehicle might have been towed, found out it

was not towed and then made a stolen vehicle report. (Id.). 

Grant testified he did not know petitioner and did not give him

permission to drive his truck. (Id.). Grant testified he

identified his truck later after police told him they recovered it

and that it was badly damaged when he saw it. (Id. at p. 133). 

II. Failure to interview potential witnesses.

In his habeas petition, petitioner does not outline the

specific witnesses he claims counsel erred in not interviewing,

however, in his Rule 32 brief filed in the Arizona Court of

Appeals, petitioner asserts counsel erred in failing to interview,

and subsequently call as witnessess Girtha Gist, vehicle owner

Jason Grant's employer, and a tow truck driver. (Doc. 16, Exhibit

X at pp. 10-11). Petitioner states that Ms. Gist saw him driving

the vehicle before it was reported stolen; the victim's boss would

have corroborated Ms. Gist and the tow truck driver could have

impeached the insurance witness on the vehicle's condition. 

(Id.). 

Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance fails at the

most basic level. Petitioner has provided no evidence, by way of

affidavit or other sworn statement, to establish that any of the

witnesses in question would have testified as he claims. Without

some assurance as to the nature of their testimony beyond his

self-serving assertions, he cannot show that counsel erred in

failing to interview or call these witnesses to testify, let alone

establish prejudice for failing to do so. See Evans v. Cockrell,

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285 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[C]omplaints of uncalled

witnesses are not favored in federal habeas corpus review because

allegations of what the witness would have testified are largely

speculative .... unsupported claims regarding the uncalled witness

are speculative and disfavored by this Court as grounds for

demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel."); United States

v. Ashimi, 932 F2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991) ("... evidence about

the testimony of a putative witness must generally be presented in

the form of actual testimony or by the witness by affidavit.

[Citation omitted]. A defendant cannot simply state that the

testimony would have been favorable; self-serving speculation will

not sustain an ineffective assistance claim."). 

b. Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Petitioner asserts in Ground IV of the habeas petition that

the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of

Brady v. Maryland, 383 U.S. 83 (1963). Specifically, petitioner

cites the testimony of Jason Grant's insurance agent, Michael

Gordon, at the sentencing hearing, as well as an appraisal report

and photographs of the damaged truck obtained by Gordon on behalf

of the insurance agency. To support his assertion in the habeas

petition that the failure to disclose the evidence presented by

Michael Gordon at the sentencing hearing constituted a Brady

violation, petitioner cites his argument in his state Rule 32

proceedings. 

In his brief in support of his petition for review filed with

the Arizona Court of Appeals, petitioner asserts exculpatory

evidence, including testimony from and photos of the vehicle taken

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by Michael Gordon, an insurance representative who testified at

petitioner's sentencing hearing, should have been disclosed by the

prosecution pursuant to the pre-trial discovery requests of the

defense. (See Doc. 16, Exhibit X at p. 13). Petitioner appears

to contend that Gordon's testimony and the photos he took of the

vehicle would have supported his defense at trial that Grant gave

him permission to use the truck to obtain drugs and to damage the

truck as part of an insurance scam. 

Petitioner further states:

 The [Trial] Judge apparently agreed that the

vehicle at issue did not sustain significant damages as

alleged by the victim [Jason Grant]. The Court viewed

the photos taken of the vehicle after it was confiscated

from petitioner. [Citation omitted].

 This was material exculpatory evidence that the

defense counsel neglected to ascertain as to whether the

prosecutor was in violation of Rule 15.1 discovery. Had

the material been used during trial, as well as Mr.

Gordon being called upon to testify at trial, the result

would have been different as to the verdict.

 The witnesses stated herein, had knowledge that was

relevant to the condition of the vehicle at issue. 

These witnesses, had they testified, could have

corroberated [sic] with the [Trial] Court's assessment

of the vehicle's condition, before the jurors. Their

testimony would have certainly aided the defense in

showing the jury that Jason Grant was not being truthful

regarding the claims he made about theft and the

vehicle's condition. Such showing of untruthfulness

could have been coupled with other areas where the

[Grant] told the truth while testifying, [t]hus, testing

[Grant's] creditability.

(Doc. 16, Exhibit X at p. 13). 

In Brady, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "suppression of

evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or

punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the

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prosecution." Brady, 383 U.S. at 87. Such evidence is material

if there exists "a reasonable probability that, had the evidence

been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would

have been different." A "reasonable probability, is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States

v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Three factors are weighed in

assessing a Brady claim: "(a) suppression by the prosecution after

a request by the defense, (b) the evidence's favorable character

for the defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence." Moore

v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972). 

Petitioner has provided no evidence to indicate that the

evidence possessed by Gordon for the the insurance company was in

the possession of the prosecution but was "suppressed." In

addition, petitioner's claim that this evidence is exculpatory is

dubious at best. Irrespective of the condition of the vehicle,

Jason Grant testified that he did not know petitioner and

petitioner did not obtain his permission to take the truck. This

testimony is bolstered by the fact that according to Officer

Beauchamp, when he initially stopped petitioner, petitioner could

not identify who gave him permission to drive the stolen vehicle

and gave what can only be described as a generic, nebulous

description of the owner, as a "dude at 61st Avenue and Glendale -

or Grand" and who was white, about 160-180 pounds with brown hair

and green eyes and was about 30 years old. (Doc. 15, Exhibit I at

p. 100). Similarly, in addition to Jason Grant's testimony,

Officer Beauchamp testified that the vehicle had sustained damage

when he made the stop and was very muddy. (Id. at pp. 118-19).

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In light of these facts, petitioner's claim that the 

testimony of Michael Gordon and the photos he took for insurance

purposes were exculpatory is without merit. Though not clear, 

petitioner seems to argue that if the truck were as damaged as

Gordon testified to at the sentencing hearing, the police officers

at the scene would have noticed and that this challenges the

credibility of the owner (Grant) who testified to extensive damage

to the truck after it was recovered. (See Doc. 16, Exhibit L at

pp. 18-21). It is unclear how the testimony by Gordon at

sentencing of extensive damage (which is consistent with Grant's

testimony), constitutes exculpatory evidence proving petitioner

did not steal the truck and petitioner's effort to explain this is

not coherent. 

Although the police officers who were present when the

vehicle was recovered did not describe extensive damage or note

the same in their report, Officer Beauchamp did describe damage to

the driver's side door and observed that the car was covered in

mud (which may explain why he did not see more damage). In

addition, it was dark at the time and both he and Officer

Margiotta, his backup, had other duties to attend to in regard to

the felony stop they executed. As such, any exculpatory value

from the testimony of Gordon is doubtful at best and petitioner

cannot establish, even if this information was in the

prosecution's possession and was not given to them, that it would

have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. Petitioner's

Brady claim should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

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Habeas Corpus be denied.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 18th day of August, 2005.

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