Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00119/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00119-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Defendants Mabeus, Green and Kacalek are the only defendants proceeding in this 1

action. In his second amended complaint, filed on April 16, 2004, plaintiff did not name former

Sacramento County Sheriff Lou Blanas as a defendant.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON JONES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-0119 DFL DAD P

vs.

LOU BLANAS, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the court is defendants’ Mabeus, Green and Kacalek’s motion for

summary judgment.1

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff was confined at the Sacramento County Jail when he filed his original

complaint. Plaintiff alleged that while he was confined at the jail, he received inadequate

medical care with respect to both his left elbow and ankle condition. On August 22, 2003, the

court granted plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis but dismissed the complaint with

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leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff was advised that he must provide allegations

concerning each named defendant. Plaintiff was also advised regarding the legal standards

governing a claim of inadequate medical care. 

On October 20, 2003, plaintiff filed an amended complaint but on October 28,

2003, notified the court that he had inadvertently identified the wrong individuals as defendants. 

On March 29, 2004, the court dismissed the amended complaint and directed plaintiff to file a

second amended complaint naming the proper defendants.

On April 16, 2004, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint naming

defendants Dr. Mabeus, Deputy Green and Deputy Kacalek as defendants. On June 23, 2004, the

undersigned authorized service of process on those three defendants. Service for defendants

Green and Kacalek were returned unexecuted. Meanwhile, defendant Mabeus filed his answer

on October 5, 2004. The court again ordered the U.S. Marshal to attempt service on defendants

Green and Kacalek on December 2, 2004. Waiver of service was returned on February 16, 2005

for defendant Kacalek and March 4, 2005 for defendant Green.

On February 11, 2005, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On August 4, 2005, the

undersigned filed findings and recommendations recommending that the motion to dismiss be

denied. The findings and recommendations were adopted in full on September 16, 2005. 

Subsequently, on October 14, 2005, defendants Green and Kacalek filed their answer. 

The court’s discovery order was filed on October 12, 2004 and a scheduling order

was filed on October 27, 2005. The deadline for completion of all discovery was February 24,

2006. Prior to that deadline, the parties filed several discovery motions. On January 5, 2006, the

court ordered plaintiff to provide supplemental responses to defendant Mabeus’ special

interrogatories and to produce certain documents. On June 15, 2006, the court denied

defendants’ motion to compel responses to special interrogatories and for sanctions, denied

defendant’s renewed motion for sanctions, and denied as untimely plaintiff’s motion for

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discovery. In that same order plaintiff was provided an extension of time to file his opposition to

defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

On July 25, 2006, the court vacated the dates for the filing of the parties’ pretrial

statements, as well as the pretrial conference and trial dates pending disposition of defendants’

summary judgment motion. 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Dr. Mabeus was deliberately indifferent to

plaintiff’s medical care concerning his ankle condition. In this regard, plaintiff contends that his

ankles are swollen, he is in extreme pain and he can only walk short distances as a result. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Mabeus has failed to provide him with any medical treatment for

this condition and has not referred plaintiff to an orthopedic doctor for appropriate treatment.

Plaintiff claims that defendants Green and Kacalek, deputies at the jail, were also

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical care. In this vein, he alleges that on January 3,

2003, defendants Green and Kacalek ignored plaintiff’s request to see the nurse and told plaintiff

that if he pushed the cell’s call-button again to request the nurse, they would issue a disciplinary

infraction charge against him. 

STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

“[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the

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‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A]

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. Summary judgment should be granted “so

long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact does exist. See Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits and/or

admissible discovery material in support of the contention that a dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The party opposing summary judgment must show

that any fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In trying to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the party opposing

summary judgment need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in his or her favor. It

is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the

“purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see

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whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

The evidence of the party opposing summary judgment is to be believed, and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in

favor of the party opposing summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587. Inferences will not be drawn out of the air, however; it is the opposing party’s

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which an inference may be drawn. See Richards v.

Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On June 23, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

I. Defendants’ Motion

Defendants argue that judgment in their favor should be granted because their

alleged malfeasance does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. In so arguing,

defendants’ rely on excerpts from plaintiff’s deposition, a declaration from defendant Mabeus,

plaintiff’s medical records, and the second amended complaint.

Defendants contend that the following material facts are undisputed: On

December 17, 2002 during outdoor recreation, plaintiff fell down a set of stairs while retrieving a

basketball and twisted his left ankle. (Mot. for Summ. J. (MSJ) at 3.) At the time of his injury,

plaintiff weighed 288 pounds. (Id.) Plaintiff was seen by defendant Dr. Mabeus about twenty

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minutes after he arrived at the medical clinic and, after a physical examination, defendant

Mabeus determined that plaintiff had suffered a left ankle sprain. (Id. at 3-4.) Defendant

Mabeus ordered that plaintiff be given an analgesic (800 mg. of Motrin) for thirty days for pain

relief and to reduce swelling, crutches, a lay in slip for a lower bunk, a lower tier assignment and

an x-ray of the left ankle. (Id. at 4.) The x-ray was negative for a fracture or dislocation and

defendant Mabeus instructed plaintiff to keep weight off his ankle and to keep his leg elevated

for the next several days. (Id.) Plaintiff requested an ice pack but defendant Mabeus refused,

explaining that the swelling would go down by itself because it was not an acute injury. (Id.) 

Defendant Mabeus did prescribe an analgesic for plaintiff. (Id.) 

As to defendants deputies Green and Kacalek, the incident at issue occurred on

January 3, 2003 at approximately 2:00 p.m. when plaintiff was released from his cell by

defendant Green for a sick call appointment that plaintiff had made due to his ankle pain. (Id. at

5.) After waiting in the day room for one hour and forty-five minutes, plaintiff was returned to

his cell by defendant Kacalek. (Id.) After returning to his cell, plaintiff pushed the emergency

call button and told the deputies that he was in pain due to his twisted ankle and that he needed to

see a doctor. (Id.) Plaintiff was told that the nurse or doctor would see him that afternoon but

that the nurse was currently busy. (Id.) Plaintiff used the emergency button again and stated that

he needed to see the doctor. (Id.) Plaintiff was told not to push the button again unless there was

an emergency. (Id.) Plaintiff pressed the emergency button again and explained that he had a

medical emergency because he could hardly walk due to the ankle pain. (Id.) Plaintiff was told

that the doctor would see him later. (Id.) Plaintiff cannot recall when he was subsequently seen

by medical staff. (Id. at 6.) However, on January 6, 2003, plaintiff was seen by defendant

Mabeus who noted that although plaintiff’s left ankle was still swollen, the swelling was less

than it was on December 17, 2002. (Id.) It was also noted that plaintiff came to the appointment

without the use of crutches and that this exacerbated both the pain and swelling in light of

plaintiff’s obesity. (Id.) On January 22, 2003, plaintiff was again seen for his ankle pain and

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swelling. (Id.) During the visit plaintiff admitted that he exercised daily which was in direct

contradiction to defendant Mabeus’ advice. (Id.) 

Defendants contend that plaintiff cannot establish that defendant Mabeus’ actions

constitute deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 9-10.) Citing Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), defendants argue that defendant Mabeus’s refusal to order

an ice pack demonstrates merely a difference of opinion as to the proper course of medical

treatment which does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 10.) Furthermore,

defendants argue that plaintiff admitted at his deposition that he has no medical evidence to

suggest that defendant Mabeus’ refusal to provide him an ice pack resulted in his ankle pain. (Id.

at 11.) 

Defendants argue that defendants Green and Kacalek are also entitled to summary

judgment concerning the January 3, 2003 incident because plaintiff has not demonstrated that he

had a serious medical need, and there is no causal connection between the defendants conduct

and plaintiff’s actual injury. (Id. at 12.) Defendants argue that since plaintiff’s complaints about

his ankle were the same on January 3and January 6, 2003, and there was no change in treatment

previously prescribed, plaintiff did not face a substantial risk of serious harm when he was

allegedly denied treatment on January 3. (Id. at 13.) Defendants also contend that there is no

causal link since plaintiff admitted at his deposition that the defendants’ refusal to have plaintiff

seen immediately by medical staff did not exacerbate his ankle injury. (Id.) Finally, defendants

argue that plaintiff’s own actions, including his failure to keep weight off the ankle, not using

crutches and exercising, were the likely cause of his ongoing ankle pain. (Id.)

II. Plaintiff’s Opposition

Plaintiff contends that defendants did not submit the complete transcript of his 

deposition to the court and because seventy-seven pages of that deposition testimony were

omitted, summary judgment should not be granted. (Opp’n at 2, 5.) Plaintiff also argues that

defendants have not presented any evidence supporting their motion for summary judgment. 

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(Id.) Plaintiff disputes defendants’ assertion that plaintiff did not tell defendant Mabeus when his

injury occurred. (Id. at 4.) He argues that “[a]ny doctor knows that any individual who sprained

their ankle needs ice to take the swelling down off the ankle . . . .” (Id.) Plaintiff questions

whether the medical records and deposition testimony support the assertions made in the

declaration submitted by defendant Mabeus in support of the motion for summary judgment. 

(Id.) For instance, although defendant Mabeus states that plaintiff came to an appointment

without his crutches, plaintiff contends that in his deposition he testified that correctional officers

confiscated his crutches and that he was forced to walk on his sore ankle. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff

contends that he has a witness who saw plaintiff’s crutches being taken away; however, because

he has missed the discovery deadline, he cannot use this evidence. (Id. at 6.) Finally, plaintiff

states that he will not disclose the location of his evidence because he fears it will be misused by

defendants. (Id.)

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s contention that defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be

denied because the entire transcript of his own deposition was not submitted with the motion, is

without merit. See Local Rule 5-133(j) (“Pertinent portions of the deposition intended to become

part of the official record shall be submitted as exhibits in support of a motion or otherwise.”) 

Defendants properly attached excerpts from the deposition transcript as an exhibit in support of

their motion. Furthermore, on April 21, 2006, defendants lodged the original copy of the

deposition transcript in its entirety. 

I. Legal Standards for Fourteenth Amendment Medical Care Claim

Because plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged constitutional

violation, his right to receive adequate medical care derives from the Fourteenth Amendment’s

due process clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual

punishment. Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998), and

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Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996)). However, “the due process clause imposes,

at a minimum, the same duty the Eighth Amendment imposes: persons in custody ha[ve] the

established right to not have officials remain deliberately indifferent to their serious medical

needs.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the

legal standards applicable to an Eighth Amendment claim regarding allegedly inadequate medical

care apply in this case. 

In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment

based on inadequate medical care, plaintiff must prove “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to

evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976). A claim of constitutionally inadequate medical care has two elements: “the seriousness

of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.”

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992). 

A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could

result in further significant injury of the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” 974 F.2d

at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious medical need include “the

presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities.” Id. at

1059-60. In demonstrating the existence of a serious medical need, a prisoner satisfies the

objective requirement for proving an Eighth Amendment violation. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

Next, plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants responded to the serious medical

need with deliberate indifference. Proof that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference is

required to satisfy the subjective prong of the two-part test that is applicable to any Eighth

Amendment claim. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

Before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged with regard

to medical care, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’

‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter

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Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). Deliberate

indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence” and “requires ‘more than

ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (quoting

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). A physician need not fail to treat an inmate

altogether in order to violate that inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial,

884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). A failure to competently treat a serious medical condition,

even if some treatment is prescribed, may constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. 

Id. However, mere differences of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff as to

proper medical care do not give rise to a § 1983 claim. See Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242

(9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Additionally, mere delay in medical treatment without more is insufficient to state

a claim of deliberate medical indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com’rs,

766 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985). Although the delay in medical treatment must be harmful,

there is no requirement that the delay cause “substantial” harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060

(citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 1990) and Hudson v. McMillian,

503 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1992)). A finding that an inmate was seriously harmed by the defendant’s

action or inaction tends to provide additional support for a claim of deliberate indifference;

however, it does not end the inquiry. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. In summary, “the more

serious the medical needs of the prisoner, and the more unwarranted the defendant’s actions in

light of those needs, the more likely it is that a plaintiff has established “deliberate indifference

on the part of the defendant.” Id. at 1061.

II. Defendant Mabeus

At his deposition, plaintiff confirmed that his claim against defendant Mabeus

concerns the doctor’s refusal to give plaintiff an ice pack.

Q [defendants’ attorney]. And so I am quoting up here, the reason

you are suing him is because he didn’t give you that ice pack,

right?

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A [plaintiff]. I mean it’s - - if you’re asking - - if you’re in pain

and you are telling this doctor, look, I need ice for this to take the

swelling down for this. And he is telling you no, and he keeps

telling you no. How would you feel?

Q. I just want to make sure I have it correct up here, because in the

law we have to be certain about what your allegations are, okay. 

And I think I understand everything you have told me about how

Dr. Mabeus treated you.

 It seems like the heart of it, your beef with him, so to speak, is because

he is telling you you don’t need the ice pack. And you are telling him I

need the ice pack.

A. Correct.

(Dep. at 51-52.) 

In his opposition to the pending motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues

that it is common knowledge that ice should be applied to a sprained ankle to reduce the

swelling. (Opp’n at 5.) Defendant Mabeus has stated in his affidavit that based on his

examination and observations, it was his “professional medical opinion that Plaintiff had suffered

a left ankle sprain.” (MSJ, Ex. B, Decl. of Duane Mabeus, ¶ 3 at 2.) Defendant Mabeas ordered

an anti-inflammatory to reduce the swelling, crutches, a lay in slip for a lower bunk and a lower

tier assignment, an x-ray, and advised plaintiff to keep the weight off his ankle for the next

several weeks. (Id. ¶ 4 at 2.) As for the ice pack, “I declined Plaintiff’s request for an ice pack

because in my professional opinion, I knew Plaintiff’s injury was not acute and knew that the

swelling would diminish on its own in light of the analgesic prescription.” (Id. ¶ 6 at 2.) 

The court finds that this disagreement over whether treatment of plaintiff’s

sprained ankle should have included icing to ease the swelling reflects a mere difference of

opinions about the proper course of treatment which does not rise to the level of a cognizable

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 Plaintiff disputes defendants’ assertions that plaintiff contributed to his ankle problem 2

by failing to use crutches, exercising, and failing to inform defendant Mabeus about when his

ankle was injured. (Opp’n at 3.) The court finds that these disputed facts are immaterial for

determining whether defendant Mabeus was deliberately indifference to plaintiff’s medical

needs. 

12

constitutional claim. See Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d at 242 (differences of medical opinion are

insufficient to establish deliberate indifference). 

2

Therefore, since plaintiff has failed to establish an essential element for his

Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court will recommend that summary judgment be granted for

defendant Mabeus. 

III. Defendants Green and Kacalek

Plaintiff alleged in his second amended complaint that his requests for medical

care on January 3, 2003 were ignored and/or delayed by defendants Green and Kacalek. Plaintiff

clarified his allegations in this regard at his deposition, testifying as follows:

Q [defendants’ counsel]. . . . . Your contention against them is

you were in pain on that date and they should have immediately

had you seen by a physician on that date, correct?

A [plaintiff]. Correct.

Q. Because you had scheduled to see a nurse and you hadn’t seen

the nurse, for whatever reason.

A. Correct.

Q. But you’re not denying (sic) that they prohibited that nurse

from seeing you though, correct?

A. Correct.

(Dep. at 91.) Plaintiff also testified that he believed his ankle pain should have been treated as an

emergency condition.

A [plaintiff]. When I pushed the [emergency] button [in the cell] I

told them that - - why haven’t I seen the doctor. They told me why

- - let me rephrase that.

 I asked them how come I’m not allowed to see the nurse. They

told me the nurse is busy and the nurse will see you later.

I explained to them this is an emergency, you know. I mean, I

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signed up for sick call to see the nurse and you’re telling me I can’t

see the nurse. I was told again the nurse is busy. We will call you

back. Don’t push the button unless it’s an emergency. Then I

explained to them this is an emergency.

Q. And what was the emergency, was it the swelling on your left

ankle?

A. It was in pain. My whole foot and ankle was in pain.

(Dep. at 70-71.) 

As set forth above, an allegation of mere delay in providing medical treatment

without more is insufficient to state a cognizable claim of deliberate indifference to a medical

need; the delay must have resulted in some harm. In opposing the motion for summary

judgment, plaintiff offers no evidence or arguments which would show that he suffered further

harm to his ankle as a result of this alleged delay in obtaining treatment. In fact, at his deposition

plaintiff testified that the ankle injury was not exacerbated by these events. 

Q [defendants’ attorney]. Has any doctor told you that the deputies

[sic] refusal to have you seen immediately by medical staff

exacerbated your ankle injury?

A [plaintiff]. Exac - - - what?

Q. Exacerbate, made worse.

A. No.

(Dep. at 99-100.) 

Three days after plaintiff sought medical attention on January 3, 2003, defendant

Mabeus examined plaintiff’s. In his affidavit, defendant Mabeus stated:

Plaintiff’s medical records reflect that the first time he was seen by

medical staff in January 2003 was on January 6, 2003, when he

was seen during physician sick call by myself. On said date

Plaintiff complained that his left ankle as still swollen. During my

observation of the ankle joint, I noted that there was still some

swelling on the left ankle, but much less than his visit on

December 17, 2002. These observations confirmed my previous

left ankle sprain diagnosis and therefore I did not alter the

treatment plan I previously provided to Plaintiff. Namely that

meant that Plaintiff was to continue to take 800 mg of Motrin for

both pain relief and to act as an anti-inflammatory to reduce

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swelling, continue use of his crutches, and keep weight off the

ankle joint. . . .

(MSJ, Mabeus Decl. ¶ 7 at 2.) Since there is no evidence that plaintiff suffered harm due to the

3-day delay in having his ankle examined, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that defendants

Green and Kacalek were deliberately indifferent to his medical care. See McGuckin v. Smith,

974 F.2d at 1060. It is perhaps understandable that plaintiff was upset and in discomfort after

waiting over an hour to see the nurse during sick-call. However, there is nothing in the record 

indicating that defendants interfered with this medical appointment or with plaintiff’s later

requests to see a doctor or nurse on the day in question. Moreover, the court is not persuaded

that defendants’ admonishments that plaintiff would receive a disciplinary if he continued to

press the emergency call button is evidence of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. 

After plaintiff was returned to his cell, he continued to press the call button even after he was

told that medical personnel was unavailable at that time and even though there was no apparent

change in his medical condition. There is no evidence that the lack of immediate medical

attention to plaintiff’s ankle demonstrates constitutionally inadequate medical care. Indeed,

when plaintiff was examined three days later, no modifications were made to his treatment plan. 

Since there is no evidence even suggesting that defendants Green and Kacalek

were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical care, summary judgment should also be

granted in favor of these defendants. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed on April 21, 2006, be

granted; and

2. This action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: January 16, 2007.

DAD:4 

jone0119.57

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