Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01428/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01428-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASHISH JOBANPUTRA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF ANDERSON, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-01428-JAM-SCR

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

INTRODUCTION OF CASE 

Before this Court is the City of Anderson’s (“the City”) and 

Anderson Fire Protection District’s (collectively, “Defendants”) 

motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) by Ashish 

Jobanputra, Manish Thakkar, and Classic Hospitality, LLC 

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”). See ECF Nos. 17 and 18. 

Plaintiffs filed an opposition. See Opp’n, ECF No. 28. 

Defendants replied. See Reply Briefs, ECF Nos. 31 and 32. For 

the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss.1

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for November 19, 2024.

Case 2:24-cv-01428-JAM-SCR Document 36 Filed 12/23/24 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

This case concerns a red-tagging incident which led to the 

closure of a hotel undergoing construction. In 2019, Plaintiffs 

purchased the Baymont Inn and Suites hotel property (“the 

property”) in Anderson, California with the intention of 

renovating the hotel to increase its value and profitability. 

Compl. ¶ 18. According to Plaintiffs, the hotel was a 

“dilapidated, dangerous” structure in need of serious 

maintenance. Id. Soon after purchase, Plaintiffs obtained 

necessary documentation and permitting to begin renovations, 

which occurred without incident over the next few years into 

2021. See generally, Compl. ¶¶ 19-23. 

However, Plaintiffs allege that in March of 2022, the 

relationship between Plaintiffs and the City became strained when 

the City’s new building inspector demanded additional documents 

and permits for the second phase of the remodel. See Compl. 

¶ 25. Plaintiffs’ engineers submitted new documentation in April 

2022, but the City was unsatisfied, which “caus[e]d delays for 

the remodeling.” See Compl. ¶ 28. Ultimately, this led to an 

inspection by the fire marshal and subsequent red-tagging of the 

hotel property for “unsafe conditions” on May 17, 2022. See

Compl. ¶ 31, 32. Two years and three days after the hotel 

property was red-tagged, Plaintiffs filed a complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging two causes of action under the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s due process and equal protection guarantees. See

Compl., ECF No. 1. 

///

///

Case 2:24-cv-01428-JAM-SCR Document 36 Filed 12/23/24 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

II. OPINION

A. Analysis

1. Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a 

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under the plausibility 

pleading standard set forth in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007), a plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss by alleging 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court must accept 

all nonconclusory factual allegations of the complaint as true 

and construe those facts and the reasonable inferences that 

follow in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Id.; see 

also Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 

However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual 

factual allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). In the event dismissal is 

warranted, it is generally without prejudice, unless it is clear 

the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment. See Sparling v. 

Daou, 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005).

2. Timeliness of Plaintiffs’ Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred 

because Plaintiffs filed their complaint three days after the 

statute of limitations had accrued. See ECF No. 18 at 7. In 

support of their argument, Defendants cite RK Ventures, Inc. v. 

City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), which held 

that a § 1983 statute of limitations period commences when a 

city makes an “operative decision” to take action. In response, 

Case 2:24-cv-01428-JAM-SCR Document 36 Filed 12/23/24 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Plaintiffs do not raise any tolling arguments but instead argue 

that their filing is timely because the statute of limitations 

is measured at “completion” of the red-tagging or when final 

action had occurred. See Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 2-3. 

The applicable statute of limitations for a cause of action 

under § 1983 is the statute of limitations established by the 

forum state for personal injury torts. Wallace v. Kato, 549 

U.S. 384, 387 (2007); see also Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San 

Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). In California, 

the relevant statute of limitations is two years. Cal. Civ. 

Proc. Code § 335.1. For § 1983 claims in particular, a statute 

of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues, 

which is when the plaintiffs know or have reason to know of the 

injury that is the basis of their action. Cabrera v. City of 

Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Because Plaintiffs repeatedly allege in their complaint 

that on May 17, 2022, city and fire officials red-tagged the 

hotel property, “effectively shutting down the business and 

forcing the immediate eviction of all guests, workers, and 

employees,” the Court finds that Plaintiffs knew or should have 

known that a constitutional violation occurred on May 17, 2022 

and that the two-year statute of limitations period for their 

§ 1983 claims began to accrue on that date. Compl. ¶ 45. 

Regardless of the successive actions the City or fire department 

took, the “operative decision” to shut down the hotel property 

occurred when the inspectors and fire marshal ordered the 

immediate eviction of all guests, workers, and employees on May 

17, 2022. 

Case 2:24-cv-01428-JAM-SCR Document 36 Filed 12/23/24 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Plaintiffs attempt to artificially extend the statute of 

limitations period by contending that hotel guests continued to 

be evacuated on the morning of May 18, 2022, that the City did 

not provide an official notice of reasons for the red-tagging 

until May 18, 2022, and that a ruling rescinding the red-tagging 

occurred on June 10, 2022. However, none of these facts are 

alleged in the First Amended Complaint and instead appear for 

the first time in Plaintiffs’ opposition papers. Even if the 

Court were to assume these unalleged facts and credit 

Plaintiffs’ arguments, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in RK 

Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle is clear that subsequent 

actions falling within the limitations period which are merely

the “effect of [the initial] decision” do not constitute 

separately unconstitutional acts. RK Ventures, Inc., 307 F.3d 

at 1058. It follows that any actions resulting from the initial 

evacuation and red-tagging are simply the natural consequences 

of the City’s decision to temporarily close the hotel property

and do not counteract the fact that the City’s alleged 

unconstitutional action took place the day they ordered the 

hotel to shut down. Plaintiffs make no attempt to distinguish 

RK Ventures, Inc., which clearly mandates the result in this 

case.

While Plaintiffs’ filing is only a few days past the 

statute of limitations period, as Defendants point out, claims 

are barred even when actions are filed one day date. See United 

States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 101 (1985); Caglia v. Berryhill, 

No. 1:19-cv-1376-JLT, 2020 WL 897174 at [*2] (E.D. Cal. March 3,

2020); Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 1:17-cvCase 2:24-cv-01428-JAM-SCR Document 36 Filed 12/23/24 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

0760 -JLT, 2019 WL 1556659 at [*4] (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2019). 

Moreover, “[i]t should not be forgotten that time-limitations 

provisions themselves promote[] important interests; ‘the period 

allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value 

judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of 

protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in 

prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.’” Delaware State 

College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259–60 (1980) (quoting Johnson 

v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975)).

Thus, the Court finds that the red-tagging on May 17, 2022 

was the operative constitutional violation and that the statute 

of limitations ended two-years later on May 17, 2024. Because 

May 17, 2024 fell on a Friday and did not fall on a weekend or 

holiday, Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 

6(a) are inapplicable. Accordingly, the Court dismisses with 

prejudice Plaintiffs’ claims as untimely.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the 

Court is directed to close this case.

 Additionally, the Court imposes a $550 sanction on 

Plaintiffs’ counsel for violations of the specified page limits 

for memoranda of law in support of or opposition to motions and a 

$200 sanction on Defendants Anderson Fire Protection District and 

Steven Allred’s counsel pursuant to the Order Regarding Filing 

Requirements, ECF No. 8-2. Counsel shall pay these sanctions to 

the clerk of the Court within five (5) days of this Order. Under 

the same filing requirements, Plaintiffs’ additional reply 

Case 2:24-cv-01428-JAM-SCR Document 36 Filed 12/23/24 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

briefs, ECF Nos. 34 and 35, are also stricken. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: Dated: December 20, 2024

Case 2:24-cv-01428-JAM-SCR Document 36 Filed 12/23/24 Page 7 of 7