Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00057/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00057-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Plaintiff filed oppositions to the motions brought by Defendants

Woodford, Janda, and Giurbino, but did not file an opposition to the

motion brought by Defendant Bourland.

07cv0057

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY NORWOOD, CDC #J-53407,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants. 

 

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Case No. 07-CV-0057-WQH (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE

(1) DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) AND

(2) DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS

AGAINST DEFENDANT RUTLEDGE

[Doc. Nos. 33, 44, 58] 

This matter comes before the Court on three Motions to

Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) brought by Defendants

Jeanne Woodford (“Woodford”) and J.A. Janda (“Janda”) [Doc. No.

33], M.E. Bourland (“Bourland”) [Doc. No. 44], and J.A. Giurbino

(“Giurbino”) [Doc. No. 58] pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court has considered the

papers filed in support of and in opposition to Defendants’

motions, as well as all relevant pleadings and documents in the

Court’s file.1 For the following reasons, the Court recommends

that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss be DENIED. 

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2

Unless otherwise noted, page number references used by the Court

herein refer to the numbers printed by the Court’s docketing system,

located at the top of each page. 

3

Plaintiff has since been relocated again and is currently

incarcerated at California State Prison, Corcoran. 

4

Defendants note that according to the FAC, Plaintiff was

transferred to the Administrative Segregation Unit on December 10,

2005, resulting in a deprivation of outdoor exercise of only 33 days

which can be attributed to the lockdown. Defs.’ Mem. (Woodford &

Janda) at 6 n.2; (Giurbino) at 7 n.1; (Bourland) at 6 n.2 (citing FAC

at 8-11). However, because Plaintiff does not allege that the

lockdown did not affect outdoor exercise in the Administrative

Segregation Unit, this Court will conduct its analysis using the 39

day period alleged in the Complaint.

5

Plaintiff also alleges a separate claim for violation of his

First Amendment rights against Defendant Torres. Defendant Torres has

not yet been served. Thus, this Report and Recommendation does not

2 07cv0057

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 18, 2005, Calipatria State Prison (“Calipatria”)

was placed on lockdown following an alleged assault involving

Hispanic inmates and staff. FAC at 22.2 On November 7, 2005,

Plaintiff was transferred from California State Prison,

Sacramento, to Calipatria. Id.3 Upon Plaintiff’s arrival,

Calipatria remained on lockdown stemming from the August 18, 2005

incident. Id. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the

lockdown, he was confined to his cell for twenty-four hours a

day, seven days a week, with the exception of brief shower

periods. FAC at 3. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, alleges that

his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment was violated when Defendants Woodford, Janda,

Bourland, and Giurbino deprived him of outdoor exercise from

November 7, 2005 to December 16, 2005, a period of 39 days.

Id.4 The deprivation of outdoor exercise allegedly caused

Plaintiff to suffer headaches, muscle cramps, stress, anxiety,

and depression. Id.5 

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address the claim against him. 

6

Plaintiff has attached copies of his Appeal Form, Second Level

Appeal Response, and Director’s Level Appeal Decision to his FAC. See

FAC at 21-26. Plaintiff has not attached a copy of the denial of his

original Form 602 grievance. 

3 07cv0057

On November 21, 2005, Plaintiff filed a CDC Form 602

grievance on behalf of a group of inmates to request the

provision of outdoor exercise. Id. at 21-23. The grievance was

apparently denied by Defendant Janda, the then Associate Warden. 

FAC at 6.6 Plaintiff then filed a Second Level Appeal, the

denial of which was issued and signed by Defendant Bourland, the

Chief Deputy Warden at the time. Id. at 24-25. Plaintiff’s

Director’s Level Appeal was also denied. Id. at 26. The denials

indicate that no recreational activities were permitted for

general population inmates due to the State of Emergency

instituted on August 18, 2005. Id. at 24, 26. The denials also

indicate that the modified program and lockdown were initiated

for reasons of security and safety, the continued suspension of

yard privileges was necessary, and the decision regarding the

reinstatement of yard privileges was being reviewed on a daily

basis. FAC at 24-26. 

II. DEFENDANTS’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) MOTION

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff has failed to

sufficiently allege an Eighth Amendment claim relating to the

deprivation of outdoor exercise and (2) Defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity. Defs.’ Mem. (Woodford & Janda) at 8;

(Giurbino) at 9; (Bourland) at 8. 

//

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A. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the

claims in the complaint. A claim can only be dismissed if it

“appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Hishon v.

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The court must accept

as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as

reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, and must construe

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL

Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); Parks

Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.

1995).

The court looks not at whether the plaintiff will

“ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer,

468 U.S. 183 (1984). Unless it appears beyond a doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim, a

complaint cannot be dismissed without leave to amend. Conley,

355 U.S. at 45-46; see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129-

30 (9th Cir. 2000).

Where a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe

the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of

the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d

621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. 

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Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Presumably 

unskilled in the law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to

making errors in pleading than the person who benefits from the

representation of counsel.”). In giving liberal interpretation

to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, a court “may not

supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially

pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of

official participation in civil rights violations are not

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also

Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (conclusory allegations unsupported by facts are

insufficient to state a claim under section 1983). “The

plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity

overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the

plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation

omitted). 

B. Eighth Amendment - Deprivation of Outdoor Exercise

“Whatever rights one may lose at the prison gates, . . . the

full protections of the eighth amendment most certainly remain in

force. The whole point of the amendment is to protect persons

convicted of crimes.” Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 

(9th Cir. 1979). The Eighth Amendment, however, is not a basis 

for broad prison reform. It requires neither that prisons be

comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might

find desirable. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.

1982) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)). Rather, 

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the Eighth Amendment proscribes the “unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain,” which includes those sanctions that are “so 

totally without penological justification that it results in the

gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153, 173, 183 (1976); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994). This includes not only physical torture, but any

punishment incompatible with “the evolving standards of decency

that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles,

356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

102-03 (1976). 

In Spain, the court stated that “regular outdoor exercise is

extremely important to the psychological and physical well being

of the inmates.” Spain, 600 F.2d at 199. Although courts have

recognized that prison administrators may need, on occasion, to

briefly deprive an inmate of outdoor exercise due to logistical

problems, a long-term deprivation, even due to practical

difficulties, may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under

the Eighth Amendment. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th

Cir. 1995). To assert an Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation

of humane conditions of confinement, a prisoner must satisfy two

requirements, one of which is objective and the other of which is

subjective. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087.

“Under the objective requirement, the prison official’s acts

or omissions must deprive an inmate of ‘the minimal civilized 

measure of life’s necessities.’” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087

(citation omitted). A prisoner meets the objective requirement

by alleging the deprivation of what courts have defined as a

basic human need. Id. at 1088.

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The subjective requirement, relating to the prison

official’s state of mind, requires “deliberate indifference.”

Id. at 1087. “Deliberate indifference” exists when a prison

official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Finally, the court must analyze each

claimed violation in light of these requirements, for Eighth

Amendment violations may not be based on the “totality of

conditions” at a prison. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246-47.

1. Objective Requirement

Plaintiff contends that outdoor exercise constitutes “a

basic human need” and Defendants, by denying him outdoor exercise

for 39 days, deprived him of this need. FAC at 3. Defendants

contend that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the objective

element of an Eighth Amendment claim because his alleged

deprivation resulted from a lockdown of the entire general

population triggered by multiple inmate attempted murders of

prison staff. Defs.’ Mem. (Woodford & Janda) at 10-13;

(Bourland) at 11-13; (Giurbino) at 11-13. 

In Hayward v. Procunier, the case upon which Defendants

primarily rely, the court acknowledged that when a lockdown is

instituted in response to a genuine emergency, decisions 

regarding when and how to provide for outdoor exercise “are

delicate ones, and those charged with them must be given

reasonable leeway.” Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 603 (9th

Cir. 1980). Plaintiff, on the other hand, cites to, inter alia,

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8 07cv0057

Lopez v. Smith and Allen v. Sakai. In Lopez, the Ninth Circuit

found that a complete denial of exercise lasting 6-1/2 weeks

(i.e., 46 days) was sufficient to invoke Eighth Amendment

protection. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1133. In Allen, the Ninth

Circuit found that permitting inmates only 45 minutes of outdoor

exercise per week over a 6 week period (i.e., 42 days) was also

sufficient to meet the objective element of an Eighth Amendment

claim. Allen, 48 F.3d at 1086-87. 

In Defendants’ view, cases which involve a lockdown

situation should be distinguished from those which do not. 

Defendants accordingly ask the Court to disregard Allen and Lopez

on the basis that the periods of deprivation of outdoor exercise

in those cases did not arise in response to an emergency lockdown

situation. Defs.’ Mem. (Woodford & Janda) at 12; (Bourland) at

12; (Giurbino) at 13. The Court declines to do so. Defendants

have cited no authority supporting their argument that an

emergency lockdown situation excuses the deprivation of what the

courts have found to be a “basic human need” under the objective

component of an Eighth Amendment claim. See Allen, 48 F.3d at

1088. Although the Ninth Circuit found the 28 day deprivation in

Hayward did not cross the Eighth Amendment line because of an

emergency lockdown situation, the court did not make a finding

that the claim did not meet the objective component. Hayward,

629 F.2d at 603. Moreover, Hayward is distinguishable as the 

plaintiffs in that case were permitted outdoor exercise within a

month after the imposition of the lockdown. Id. The same is not

true here, if Plaintiff’s allegations are accepted as true. 

Plaintiff alleges a deprivation of outdoor exercise of 39 

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days. Though the 39 day deprivation is less than the 42 and 46

day deprivations found to invoke Eighth Amendment protection in

Allen and Lopez, neither Allen, Lopez, nor any other case

suggests that a 42 or 46 day deprivation constitutes the minimum

amount of time required to invoke Eighth Amendment protection,

and the Court declines to apply a bright line test requiring that

minimum duration. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s alleged

deprivation is sufficiently close in duration to the deprivations

in both Allen and Lopez that Eighth Amendment protection may be

invoked. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged the objective element of an Eighth Amendment

claim.

2. Subjective Requirement

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has not established the

subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. As set forth

above, the subjective component requires “deliberate

indifference.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. Deliberate indifference

is found when a prison official knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837. The Court shall discuss the subjective component as to each

Defendant in turn. 

a. Defendant Woodford

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Woodford, as Director of

California State Prisons during the relevant time period between 

November 7, 2005 and December 16, 2005, was responsible for

Plaintiff’s deprivation of outdoor exercise because “she had to

approve the deprivation period.” FAC at 2. Defendant Woodford 

argues that the subjective requirement is not satisfied because 

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Plaintiff makes no allegations that the lockdown or deprivation

was directed at him, or that she acted with deliberate

indifference toward Plaintiff. Woodford contends instead that

she acted in accordance with an emergency situation triggered by

multiple attempted murders of staff by inmates. Defs.’ Mem.

(Woodford & Janda) at 14-15. 

Defendant Woodford fails to cite any authority supporting

her position that the subjective element is only satisfied when

the deprivation is targeted at a specific inmate, and the Court

declines to draw this conclusion. The inquiry under the

subjective requirement is whether the Defendant knew of and

disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety -–

specifically, whether Defendant knew that the lack of outdoor

exercise alleged by Plaintiff presented an excessive risk to

Plaintiff’s health or safety. Defendant Woodford’s suggestion

that the subjective element can only be met if the lockdown or

deprivation was targeted at a specific inmate thus misses the

point. Plaintiff need not allege that the deprivation was

directed at him in order to satisfy the subjective requirement. 

Rather, he need only allege that Defendant acted with deliberate

indifference. Turning to this issue, Defendant Woodford 

argues that because the lockdown was in response to investigating

and preventing further potentially deadly prison violence, she

cannot be found to have acted with the requisite state of mind. 

In support of her argument, Defendant Woodford cites to the cases

of Hurd v. Garcia and Hayes v. Garcia, in which courts in this

district found that 5 and 10 month deprivations of outdoor 

exercise did not meet the subjective component when the 

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11 07cv0057

deprivations were initiated for the primary purpose of responding

to, investigating and preventing prison violence. See Hayes v.

Garcia, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1207-08 (S.D. Cal. 2006); see also

Hurd v. Garcia, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1044 (S.D. Cal. 2006). 

This Court recognizes that in some circumstances, an

emergency lockdown situation may justify a deprivation of outdoor

exercise and may lead to a finding that the subjective

requirement of an Eighth Amendment claim has not been met. 

However, the courts in Hurd and Hayes made their findings on

motions for summary judgment, and only after the plaintiffs

failed to set forth evidence of deliberate indifference. Hurd,

454 F. Supp. 2d at 1043; Hayes, 461, F. Supp. 2d at 1207. On a

motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus.,792 F.2d at 898;

Parks Sch. of Bus., 51 F.3d at 1484. Here, Plaintiff alleges the

lockdown was not in response to an emergency situation or for

penological reasons, but rather was implemented to punish him and

was “utilize[d] as a deterrent to future staff assaults by

subjecting inmates to such extreme suffering[] that they would

dread another lockdown.” FAC at 5, 7. As to Defendant Woodford

specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she, as Director of

California State Prisons, approved the deprivation period. 

Reading the pleadings liberally, Plaintiff has adequately alleged 

that Defendant Woodford acted with deliberate indifference

because she approved the deprivation period and knew that the 

lack of outdoor exercise presented a risk to Plaintiff’s health 

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and safety. Plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support

his claims. 

b. Defendants Janda and Bourland

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Janda and Bourland, as

Associate Warden and Chief Deputy Warden of Calipatria between

November 7, 2005 and December 16, 2005, respectively, were

responsible for Plaintiff’s deprivation because both Defendants 

were made aware of the deprivation through his CDC Form 602

grievance, and because both Defendants could have provided him

with outdoor exercise. FAC at 2. Defendants Janda and Bourland,

like Defendant Woodford, contend that the subjective requirement

cannot be established when the lockdown and resultant deprivation

of outdoor exercise were instituted in response to an emergency

situation. Defs.’ Mem. (Woodford & Janda) at 16; (Bourland) at

13-16. As discussed above, the Court finds this argument

unconvincing at this stage in the case. 

Defendants Janda and Bourland also argue that by Plaintiff’s

own pleading, they had no authority to override the state of

emergency and provide Plaintiff with outdoor exercise

opportunities since Defendant Woodford had to approve the

lockdown. Defs.’ Mem. (Woodford & Janda) at 16; (Bourland) at

13-16. Neither defendant, however, has established that

Plaintiff, by his own pleading, concedes that Janda and Bourland

had no authority to override the state of emergency and provide

Plaintiff with outdoor exercise. Defs.’ Mem. (Woodford & Janda)

at 16; (Bourland) at 16. To the contrary, Plaintiff has

specifically alleged that Defendants Janda and Bourland were both

made aware of his deprivation of outdoor exercise through his CDC 

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Form 602 grievance and that both defendants could have provided

him with outdoor exercise opportunities. FAC at 2. Reading the

pleadings liberally, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged that Defendants Janda and Bourland acted

with deliberate indifference because they knew of Plaintiff’s

deprivation of outdoor exercise and the risk the deprivation

presented to Plaintiff’s health and safety, and that they could

have provided Plaintiff with outdoor exercise opportunities but

failed to do so.

c. Defendant Giurbino

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Giurbino, as Warden of

Calipatria between November 7, 2005 and December 16, 2005, was

responsible for Plaintiff’s deprivation because he was

responsible for Plaintiff’s custody, treatment, and discipline,

and because he had to approve the lockdown. FAC at 5. Like the

other three defendants, Giurbino argues that the subjective

component cannot be satisfied because the deprivation was in

response to an emergency situation. The Court finds this

argument unconvincing for the same reasons set forth above.

Defendant Giurbino further argues that because the

deprivation of outdoor exercise had to be approved by Defendant

Woodford in her capacity as Director of Prisons, he cannot be

found to have acted with the requisite state of mind,

particularly because the lockdown was not instituted without

oversight. Def.’s Mem. (Giurbino) at 14-16. Plaintiff has

alleged, however, that Defendant Giurbino, in addition to

Defendant Woodford, had to approve the lockdown and deprivation

period. FAC at 5. Reading the pleadings liberally, the Court 

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finds Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendant Giurbino

acted with deliberate indifference because he approved of the

lockdown, knew that the lack of outdoor exercise presented a risk

to Plaintiff’s health and safety, and could have provided

Plaintiff with outdoor exercise opportunities, but failed to do

so. 

The Court accordingly concludes that Plaintiff has made

sufficient allegations to meet the subjective element of an

Eighth Amendment claim as to all four defendants. 

C. Qualified Immunity

Defendants further contend that they are entitled to

dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) based on their

qualified immunity. The entitlement to qualified immunity “is an

immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis omitted). 

“[Q]ualified immunity operates ‘to ensure that before they are

subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is

unlawful.’” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (citing Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (1991)). The defense of qualified

immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

1. Step One – Constitutional Violation

The threshold question in a qualified immunity analysis is

whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a 

constitutional violation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Jackson v. 

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City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001); Johnson v.

County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting 

that because qualified immunity is “‘an entitlement not to stand 

trial’ . . . courts, not juries, [must] settle the ultimate

questions of qualified immunity”) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 

526). “If no constitutional right would have been violated were 

the allegations established, there is no necessity for further

inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at

201; see also Haynie v. County of Los Angeles, 339 F.3d 1071, 

1078 (9th Cir. 2003).

As discussed above, the Court has found, taking the facts

alleged in the Complaint in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, that Plaintiff has adequately alleged an Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendants for denying him any outdoor

exercise for a period of 39 days. Accordingly, because

Plaintiff’s allegations survive the first prong of qualified

immunity analysis, the Court must turn to the 

next inquiry.

2. Step Two – Clearly Established Law

If a constitutional violation could be made out on a

favorable view of Plaintiff’s allegations, “the next, sequential

step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it

would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. “If the

law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be

clearly unlawful,” a finding of qualified immunity is 

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appropriate, as “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law’.” Id.

(citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges denial of any outdoor exercise for 

39 days as a result of Defendants’ conduct. Defendants argue

that there is no clearly established right to outdoor exercise 

under the specific facts of this case. Defs.’ Mem. (Woodford &

Janda) at 16-18; (Giurbino) at 16-18; (Bourland) at 16-18. 

Specifically, Defendants contend that “the call is so close” as

to whether a right to outdoor exercise existed under the facts of

this case that it cannot be said to have been clearly

established. Id. They also argue that there is a “void” in

authority addressing the deprivation of outdoor exercise during a

period between 28 and 42 days, and ask the Court to consider the

difference between normal prison operations and an emergency

lockdown situation. Id. 

Under Saucier, it is not required that “courts must have

agreed upon the precise formulation of the standard.” Saucier,

533 U.S. at 202. Rather, so long as various courts have found

that certain conduct is a constitutional violation “under facts

not distinguishable in a fair way from the facts presented in the

case at hand,” an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity. 

Id. at 202-03. See also Hope, 536 U.S. at 739 (“This is not to

say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity

unless the very action in question has previously been held

unlawful . . . but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing

law the unlawfulness must be apparent[]” (citations omitted)). 

It is also recognized that officers may make reasonable mistakes 

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as to the legal restraints on particular conduct. “If the

officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable,

however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.”

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.

The critical inquiry here is whether reasonable prison

officials in Defendants’ positions would have believed that

depriving Plaintiff of outdoor exercise for 39 days was 

constitutionally permissible. Stated differently, the Court must

determine whether Defendants were on “fair warning” that their 

alleged treatment of Plaintiff was unconstitutional. See Hope, 

536 U.S. at 741. The Court finds that it was clearly established

in 2005, when the deprivation allegedly occurred, that the denial 

of outdoor exercise for prison inmates for an extended period of

time was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Spain, 600

F.2d at 199; Allen, 48 F.3d at 1088; Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d

1083, 1089-90. Although these cases do not involve precisely the

same facts as those present here, they provided Defendants with

fair warning concerning their conduct. “[O]fficials can still be

on notice that their conduct violates established law even in

novel factual circumstances.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. 

The Court concludes that, notwithstanding the lockdown, any

reasonable official in Defendants’ positions would have

understood that the denial of outdoor exercise for an extended

period of time was unconstitutional. The Eighth Amendment may be

violated even in a lockdown situation. See, e.g., Hayward, 629

F.2d at 603 (examining conditions imposed during an emergency

lockdown to determine whether they crossed the Eighth Amendment

line). Furthermore, as discussed above, Plaintiff does not

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allege that the deprivation was a response to an emergency

situation or that it was due to penological reasons. Rather, he

alleges it was implemented to punish him and to inflict “extreme

suffering” upon the inmates. FAC at 5, 7.

Finally, although Defendants Janda and Bourland advance the

additional argument that reasonable officers in their positions

would not know they had a “duty to usurp the authority of the

Director of California State Prisons, ignore the confines of the

lockdown, and thereby provide inmates with outdoor exercise,” 

they provide absolutely no authority supporting their position.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 

on qualified immunity grounds be DENIED.

III. DEFENDANT RUTLEDGE

The original Complaint in this case set forth two claims: an

Eighth Amendment claim against Woodford, Bourland, Giurbino and

Janda, and a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Torres and

Rutledge. Compl. [Doc. No. 1] at 1-2. After the Court dismissed

Plaintiff’s original complaint without prejudice (see Mar. 15,

2007 Order, Doc. No. 8), Plaintiff filed a First Amended

Complaint, which is presently the operative pleading in this

case. The First Amended Complaint sets forth two claims: again,

an Eighth Amendment claim against Woodford, Bourland, Giurbino

and Janda (referred to by Plaintiff in the FAC as “Ground One”),

and a First Amendment claim against Torres (referred to by

Plaintiff in the FAC as “Ground Two”). FAC at 1-14. Plaintiff

explicitly states that he “names no other defendant as to Ground 

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Two.” Id. at 9. Although Plaintiff refers to Rutledge in the

supporting facts relating to his First Amendment claim (see id.

at 8, 10), it appears that Plaintiff did not intend that he be

named as a defendant. 

The Court’s March 15, 2007 order dismissing Plaintiff’s

original Complaint expressly warned Plaintiff that his First 

Amended Complaint “must be complete in itself without reference

to the superseded pleading,” and that “[d]efendants not named and 

all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed 

to have been waived.” Mar. 15, 2007 Order at 9. Accordingly,

because Defendant Rutledge is not named as a defendant in the

FAC, the Court recommends that any claims against him be 

dismissed and that his status be reflected as “terminated” on the

Court’s docket.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court recommends that

the District Judge issue an Order:

1. DENYING Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claim;

2. DENYING Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss on qualified

immunity grounds; and

3. DISMISSING any claims against Defendant Rutledge.

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the

Honorable William Q. Hayes, United States District Judge assigned

to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the Court

and serve a copy on all parties on or before July 18, 2008. The 

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document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.” Any reply to the Objections shall be served and

filed on or before August 8, 2008. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 30, 2008

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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