Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01989/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01989-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Martial Ledvina, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Marana, Town of, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-01989-TUC-CKJ

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Martial Ledvina filed this civil rights Complaint alleging constitutional 

deprivations in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as state-law claims against 

numerous Defendants. (Doc. 1.) The parties stipulated to dismissal of the Marana 

Defendants, and on February 4, 2015, the Court dismissed the state law claims with 

prejudice and dismissed the federal constitutional claim against Defendant Sheriff 

Clarence Dupnik with leave to amend. (Docs. 26, 30.) Plaintiff filed a First Amended 

Complaint (FAC) against Dupnik and three Doe Defendants, and Defendants moved to 

dismiss. (Docs. 31, 32.) At oral argument before Magistrate Judge D. Thomas Ferraro, 

Plaintiff clarified that Dupnik was sued solely in his official capacity and that the Doe 

Defendants were sued in their individual and official capacities. (See Doc. 41 at 2.) 

 On June 19, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (R 

& R) recommending that the motion to dismiss be granted and finding that further 

amendment would be futile. (Doc. 41.) Plaintiff filed objections to the R & R and 

Defendant filed a response, asking the Court to overrule the objections. (Docs. 44, 45.) 

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 The Court will overrule Plaintiff’s objections, adopt the R & R, grant the Motion 

to Dismiss, and terminate the action. 

I. Governing Standard 

 The Court reviews de novo the objected-to portions of the Report and 

Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The Court reviews for 

clear error the unobjected-to portions of the Report and Recommendation. Johnson v. 

Zema Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); See also, Conley v. Crabtree, 14 

F.Supp.2d 1203, 1204 (D. Or. 1998). 

II. Factual Background and the Report and Recommendation 

The R & R states the following facts as taken from the FAC. Plaintiff does not 

object to the statement of facts, and the Court finds no clear error. 

 The action arises from Plaintiff’s arrest on January 14, 2013, for alleged domestic 

abuse and his subsequent one-day confinement in the Pima County Adult Detention 

Complex (P.C.A.D.C.). Plaintiff was an 83-year-old, 140-pound man with a heart 

condition. (Doc. 31 at 2.) Plaintiff underwent open heart surgery and began taking 

numerous medications to prevent complications 15 months prior to his arrest. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was arrested and booked into the Pima County Jail at 8:16 p.m. (Id.) During the 

intake screening interview, Plaintiff’s medical conditions and prescription doses were 

verified. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff promptly advised a correctional officer at the jail of his need 

to “see the nurse” but there was no response. (Id.) Plaintiff called out to the nurse 

directly, but she too ignored his pleadings, and he was subsequently removed to a cell. 

(Id.) On multiple occasions during the intervening hours of his detention, he reminded 

officers he needed to see the nurse and take his medication, but without success. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he experienced “much anxiety” from missing his evening and 

morning doses of medication. (Id.) Plaintiff was released at noon and his medication was 

returned. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff alleges there are no policies or procedures at the Pima County Jail 

governing the administration of prescription medication to newly arrested inmates. (Id. at 

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4.) He alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and seeks nominal and 

punitive damages. 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim should be 

dismissed because: (1) the claim is barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) 

because Plaintiff failed to allege more than a de minimis physical injury; and (2) Plaintiff 

failed to sufficiently allege a physical injury or real pain as necessary to establish 

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. 

III. Motion, Objections, Response, and Analysis 

 A. PLRA

 As the R & R notes, Defendants have withdrawn their argument under the PLRA 

in light of Talamantes v. Leyva, 575 F.3d 1021, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009), which holds that 

the term “prisoner” in the PLRA does not apply to a plaintiff who files his action after his 

detention has ceased. (Doc. 41 at 4.) But the Court takes the opportunity to address the 

PLRA argument because it had previously rejected the argument again urged by 

Defendants. In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants state the following: 

In dismissing Ledvina’s § 1983 claim, this Court agreed with the 

Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation that Ledvina failed to state a § 

1983 claim because he failed to allege that he experienced enough harm to 

implicate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 5:16-19. This Court also held that 

Ledvina’s claim was barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) because Ledvina did 

not allege a physical injury. Id. at 4:25-5:15. 

(Doc. 32 at 3.) 

 

 In fact, the Court did not hold that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the PLRA. 

Rather, the Court stated the following: 

In Oliver v. Keller, . . . the Ninth Circuit held that a claim for a 

constitutional violation as to conditions of confinement requires a showing 

of more than de minimis harm. 289 F.3d 623, 627 (9th Cir. 2002). The 

Oliver court also construed 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which provides that a 

prisoner may not bring a civil action for mental or emotional injury without 

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a prior showing of “physical injury.” The court held that this means that a 

prisoner may not obtain compensatory damages for mental or emotional 

injury if the “physical injury” is de minimis. But the physical injury 

requirement applies only to claims for mental or emotional injuries and 

does not bar claims for compensatory, nominal or punitive damages. Id. at 

630. In Oliver, the Court determined that even absent physical injury, a 

prisoner was entitled to seek compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages 

premised on violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 629-30. 

 A review of the claims in the FAC shows that Plaintiff seeks nominal and punitive 

damages for an alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, not a claim for 

compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury. See Oliver, 289F.3d at 627-29. 

 This district continues to be plagued by defendants making this frivolous 

argument, as the Hon. Stephen McNamee observed in a recent sealed Order to Show 

Cause (OSC). The Court wrote 

This “lack of injury” argument is untenable and actually contrary to the 

holding in Oliver, which specified that the PLRA’s physical-injury 

requirement applies only to claims for mental and emotional injury and that 

where, as here, an inmate has actionable claims for compensatory, nominal 

or punitive damages premised on constitutional violations—and not on any 

alleged mental or emotional injuries—the claims are not barred by 

§ 1997e(e). 289 F.3d at 629-30. 

 [Defendant] is represented by the Office of the Arizona Attorney 

General in Phoenix. Since at least 2006, that Office has been presenting 

this same argument for dismissal in prisoner civil rights cases; namely, that 

§ 1997e(e) bars as a matter of law a prisoner’s constitutional claim unless 

the prisoner demonstrates physical injury. See Halla v. Schriro, 05-cv0320-MHM (ECV) (Def.’s Mot., Doc. 36 at 6-7). And since that time, this 

Court has repeatedly rejected this argument and explained again and again 

that under Oliver, regardless of proof of a physical injury, § 1997e(e) does 

not bar a prisoner’s claims for damages premised on constitutional 

violations. Id., 2006 WL 3735983, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2006); see 

e.g., Fields v. State of Arizona, CV 13-8069-PCT-PGR (DKD) (Order, Doc. 

32 at 6 n.1) (D. Ariz. March 31, 2014); Baker v. Schriro, CV 07-0353-

PHX-SMM (JRI), 2008 WL 3877973, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2008); Hill 

v. Schriro, CV 04-1908-PHX-SRB, 2007 WL 1120305, at *3 (D. Ariz. 

April 11, 2007).1

 

1

 The Court has rejected this same argument from the Attorney General’s Office in 

Tucson and from private counsel. See e.g., Creamer v. Ryan, CV 10-0305-TUC-FRZ 

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 Other district courts within this circuit have also consistently 

concluded that under Oliver, if a plaintiff states a constitutional claim, as 

opposed to a claim for mental or emotional injuries, § 1997e(e)’s physical 

injury requirement does not apply. Low v. Stanton, CIV S-05-2211 MCE 

DAD P, 2010 WL 234859, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2010) 

 [Plaintiff] does not seek recovery for “mental or emotional injury”; 

rather, he seeks damages for an alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment 

rights (Doc. 25 at 29, 31). Accordingly, his claim against [Defendant] is 

not barred by § 1997e(e). See Greening v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 

1238 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument that the plaintiff’s claim was 

barred by § 1997e(e)’s “physical injury” requirement and finding that 

because he did not seek recovery for mental and emotional injury but 

instead sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief for alleged Eighth 

and Fourteenth Amendment violations, the claim was not barred). 

 It appears to this Court that Defendant’s argument is not only devoid of merit but 

is also legally frivolous. See United States v. Manchester Farming P’ship, 315 F.3d 

1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that a “frivolous [argument] is one that is groundless,” 

and an argument is groundless if it is “foreclosed by binding precedent or . . . obviously 

wrong”). This is particularly disturbing because this Court previously rejected the 

argument in this very case. 

 Defendant’s counsel is reminded of his obligations under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11. A copy of the Memorandum from the Attorney General’s Office issued 

following the OSC is attached. 

B. Constitutional Claim 

A constitutional violation regarding medical care occurs when there is (1) a 

deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of a prisoner that (2) results in 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

Mere delay in receiving treatment or care is insufficient to state a claim unless that delay 

 (Order, Doc. 134 at 12-13); Abney v. Astrue, CV 04-525-TUC-RCC, 2008 WL 2397334, 

at *7 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2008); Benge v. Scalzo, CV 04-1687-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 

2157024, at *10 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2008). 

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was harmful. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 

(9th Cir. 1985). 

 The Magistrate Judge noted in the R & R that in Plaintiff’s response to the Motion 

to Dismiss and at oral argument, Plaintiff sought to assert a Fourteenth Amendment claim 

with a legal standard distinct from the Eighth Amendment standard set forth above. 

Plaintiff suggested there was a constitutional right to be given medication as prescribed 

and that a violation of such right would not require a showing of harm but Plaintiff cited 

no cases to support this theory in his supplemental brief. Instead, he cited Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006), which states that the required harm need not be 

substantial, and argues that he alleges sufficient harm to state a claim. (Doc. 41 at 6; ref. 

Doc. 39 at 4-6.) 

 In his Objections, Plaintiff argues that the Court previously stated that: 

‘even absent physical injury, a prisoner was entitled to seek compensatory, 

nominal, and punitive damages premised on violations of his Fourteenth 

Amendment rights.’ See Doc. 30 at 5 (relying on Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 

623, 627 (9th Cir. 2002)). Seizing upon this legal premise, Plaintiff filed his 

First Amended Complaint (Doc. 31) seeking nominal and punitive damages 

for Defendants’ failure to administer his prescribed medication as directed 

by a physician while he was incarcerated at the County Jail. 

(Doc. 44 at 2.) 

 Plaintiff further asserts that although he suffered no harm in the traditional 

meaning of the word, he did suffer harm at a pharmacological and physiological level. He 

contends that based on the arguments regarding the degree of harm that must be 

experienced to maintain a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff included in 

his Supplement to Response to Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, 

an analysis of the medications that Plaintiff was denied and documentation showing that 

denial of those medications results in changes to the chemical balance of the patient thus, 

resulting in “physical” harm. (See Doc. 39 at 4-6.) Plaintiff argues that Jett states “[a] 

prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would provide additional 

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support for the inmate’s claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his 

needs.” 439 F.3d at 1096. Plaintiff also relies on the dictionary definitions of “harm” as 

“injury, loss or detriment,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 285 (Pocket ed. 1996), and 

additional definitions such as “bodily harm” which is defined as “physical pain, illness, 

or impairment of the body” and “physical” which is defined as “material as opposed to 

mental or spiritual” and “of or relating to the body.” Id.; THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER 

DICTIONARY 524 (1974) respectively. Plaintiff repeats these arguments in his 

objections. 

 The Report and Recommendation observed that Plaintiff also stated that “[t]he 

extent to which the missed doses harmed Mr. Ledvina may never be determined.” (Doc. 

41 at 6; ref. Doc. 39 at 5.) In his objections, Plaintiff acknowledges that this is true 

because to know the extent to which the level of medicine in Plaintiff’s body had 

changed would have required a blood test as soon as he was released from custody and 

prior to taking any more medication. (Doc. 44 at 3.) But Plaintiff asserts that it is not 

speculative that the level of medication in his system changed as a result of his not 

receiving his medication and that [a]ny licensed physician would testify accordingly.” 

(Id.) 

 The R & R found that the only harm alleged in the amended complaint is “much 

anxiety” precipitated by the Doe Defendants refusal to provide Plaintiff’s heart 

medication in a timely fashion. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff fails to 

allege in his complaint any facts upon which a reasonable inference could be drawn that 

he did suffer non-de minimis harm. The Magistrate Judge noted that Plaintiff did not 

allege that he experienced any pain, or that he suffered further medical complications due 

to this anxiety. As Plaintiff points out in his objections, the R & R discusses the 

allegations in the supplemental brief. The Magistrate Judge characterized the new 

allegations as “merely a hypothesis of harms that could occur when the medications 

prescribed to Plaintiff are not taken” and notes that Plaintiff “does not allege that any of 

them did happen to him. In fact, the supplemental brief states, ‘[t]he extent to which the 

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missed doses harmed Mr. Ledvina may never be determined.’” (Id. at 5 (emphasis in 

original).) The R & R holds that the additional facts in the supplemental brief are 

speculative and do not create a reasonable inference that Plaintiff suffered more than de 

minimis harm. 

 The R & R adequately set out the standard of review on a Motion to Dismiss for 

failure to state a claim, and this Court need not repeat that standard here. But it is worth 

noting that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Moreover, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Determining plausibility is a “context-specific 

task. . .” that requires the court to “draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 

Id. at 679. A complaint cannot survive dismissal where the court can only infer that a 

claim is merely possible rather than plausible. Id. . “The facts alleged must be sufficient 

to nudge the claims ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Solis v. City of 

Fresno, 2012 WL 868681, at *8 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 13, 2012 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007); see also Tesi v. Recon Trust NA, 2013 WL 2635613, 

*4 (D.Ariz. June 12, 2013).

 The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that even considering the allegations 

in the supplemental briefing, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. As Magistrate Judge Ferraro 

found, Plaintiff alleges only speculative injury. Plaintiff now argues that it is not 

speculative that the level of medication in Plaintiff’s body changed, but this is not 

enough. It is insufficient to merely allege a change; without more, there is no allegation 

of anything more than de minimis harm. Moreover, according to the facts alleged in the 

FAC, Plaintiff was in the custody of Defendant for fewer than 16 hours and when he was 

released his medication was returned to him. He does not claim that he immediately 

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sought medical attention or that he experienced medical complications as a result of 

either the anxiety or the untimely medication. There is insufficient factual content to 

allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that any Defendant may be liable for a 

Fourteenth Amendment violation. 

 The Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections. Moreover, the Court finds that further 

amendment of the Complaint will not correct the deficiency. The Court will grant the 

Motion to Dismiss and terminate the action. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 41) is adopted. 

 (2) Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 32) is granted; the remaining claims 

are dismissed with prejudice. 

 (3) The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the action and enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 Dated this 21st day of August, 2015. 

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