Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04726/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04726-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL GEARY WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-04726-JCS 

SECTION 1915 REVIEW AND ORDER 

DENYING MOTION TO EXPEDITE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Michael Geary Wilson brings this pro se action against the Florida Department 

of Revenue (“FDOR”), the California Health and Human Services Agency (“CHHS”), the County 

of Contra Costa (“Contra Costa”), four Contra Costa employees in their official and individual 

capacities, and John Does 1-45. On November 10, 2014 he filed a First Amended Complaint, 

which is now the operative complaint in the action. Having previously granted Plaintiff‟s 

Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, the Court now considers whether Plaintiff‟s Complaint

should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires dismissal of an in forma 

pauperis complaint that is (1) frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may 

be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 

Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has consented to the jurisdiction of 

the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons 

stated below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff‟s complaint in part with leave to amend.1 The Case 

Management Conference set for January 23, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. is vacated.

 

1

Plaintiff also brings an emergency motion to expedite review under § 1915. Docket No. 15. 

That motion is DENIED on the basis that it is moot.

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II. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

In the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff asserts claims relating to efforts to 

collect child support payments from him by FDOR and CHHS after his parental rights were 

allegedly terminated by a Florida Court on June 13, 2011. He also asserts claims based on 

allegations that he was prevented from entering the office of Contra Costa‟s Department of Child 

Support Services (“DCSS”) on August 19, 2014 and has been excluded from that office since that 

date. Plaintiff‟s factual allegations are as follows. 

Plaintiff alleges that on June 13, 2011, a Florida court (“the Florida Court”) entered a 

Termination of Parental Rights order (“Florida Order”) against Plaintiff as to his only child, 

“G.C.W.,” who is a minor. FAC ¶ 8. The Florida Order is attached to the FAC as an exhibit and 

reflects that a Florida Superior Court modified its previous parenting plan to give Plaintiff‟s 

former wife “sole parental responsibility for the parties‟ minor child” and to prohibit time-sharing 

of any kind by Plaintiff with the minor child “until further order of the Court.” Id., Appendix A. 

Plaintiff further alleges that on October 24, 2011, a California court (“the California Court”) 

issued an order (“California Order”) confirming the enforceability of the Florida Order. Id. ¶ 19. 

That order also is attached to the FAC and reflects that on October 24, 2011, the Superior Court 

for the County of Alameda issued a Minute Order denying Plaintiff‟s petition to enforce an out-ofstate custody determination. Id., Appendix A. The court stated that Plaintiff had provided a July 

13, 2009 hearing disposition form rather than an actual custody order, and that a 2009 custody 

order had been modified by the Florida Order discussed above. Id. 

Plaintiff contends his obligation to provide child support ended when the Florida Court 

modified the custody order for his minor child giving all parental responsibilities to his former 

wife. Id., ¶ 20. He further alleges that “[s]ince about April 2012, Defendant FDOR, by and 

through its unidentified employees and agents, has stolen thousands and thousands of dollars from 

PLAINTIFF, committed mail and/or wire fraud against him, defamed him and intentionally 

interfered in his business relationships under the pretext of collecting child support payments, 

which were not and are not due from PLAINTIFF.” Id. ¶ 21. In particular, he alleges that 

Defendants FDOR through “unidentified employees and agents” interfered with his contractual

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relationship with his former employer, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (“Kaiser”) by 

attempting to collect child support payments. Id. ¶¶ 21-24. He further alleges that FDOR,

CHHS, and Contra Costa, through their employees and agents, including Defendants Dippel, 

Linnel and Self, interfered with his contractual relationship with Bank of America by causing an 

“Order to Withhold” to be placed on two bank accounts held by Plaintiff with Bank of America. 

Id. ¶ 28.

Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or about July 21, 2014, in a face-to-face conversation that was 

on the record, Defendant LINNELL expressed her and Defendant SELF‟S mutual understanding 

to PLAINTIFF that none of his parental rights regarding G.C.W. survived after June 13, 2011 

when the Florida TPR order was entered.” Id. ¶ 26. He further alleges that “[o]n or about August 

7, 2014, Defendant LINNELL reconfirmed in writing the aforementioned understanding regarding 

the Florida TPR order.” Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff also alleges that “certain employees of Defendant 

FDOR” knew about Plaintiff‟s relationship with Kaiser, id. ¶ 23, and that certain employees of 

CHHS and Contra Costa, including Defendants Dippel, Linnel and Self, knew or should have 

known of Plaintiff‟s contractual relationship with Bank of America. Id. ¶ 27. 

Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or about August 19, 2014, PLAINTIFF attempted to lawfully 

exercise his constitutionally protected rights to access 50 Douglas Drive, Suite 100, in Martinez, 

California, which is a public area of a public building, during regular business hours, in order to 

observe, gather information about, scrutinize and criticize certain governmental activities 

occurring there, and petition Defendant CONTRA COSTA‟S DCSS for redress of grievances. In 

retaliation for and as a prior restraint of engaging in those protected activities, Defendant 

CARDENAS blocked PLAINTIFF‟S access to that public area of that public building. According 

to other DCSS employees‟ responses to PLAINTIFF‟S repeated inquiries thereafter, Defendant 

DIPPEL ratified the foregoing actions by Defendant CARDENAS. As a direct result, the 

Defendants have kept PLAINTIFF from accessing Defendant CONTRA COSTA‟S DCSS office 

for any of the foregoing lawful purposes ever since on or about August 19, 2014.” Id. ¶ 31. 

Plaintiff alleges that CHHS and Contra Costa, by and through its employees, including 

Defendants Dippel, Linnel and Self, have refused his “multiple demands, the most recent of which 

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occurred on November 3, 2014, to immediately correct his balance, stop their collection efforts 

against him, release their unlawful withholding of his money and remove him from their child 

support case(s) regarding G.C.W.” Id. ¶33. 

Plaintiff alleges that on November 4, 2014, G.C.W.s “alienating mother” “caused a 

message to be sent from the email address for G.C.W. that PLAINTIFF created in early 2009.” Id. 

¶ 34. The message, in redacted form, is attached to the FAC as Appendix B. The message is 

addressed to “daddy” and states, inter alia, “I love you so much and hope to see you VERY 

VERY VERY VERY VERY VERY VERY soon!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!” Id., Appendix B. Plaintiff 

alleges that G.C.W.‟s mother “was either impersonating or using G.C.W. in a blatant attempt to 

manufacture a further fraudulent basis for the Defendants‟ wrongdoing that has benefitted her at 

G.C.W.‟S and PLAINTIFF‟S expense.” Id. ¶ 34. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants‟ actions have caused him to “experience symptoms 

associated with his disabilities,” id. ¶ 38, and that Defendants were aware of his disabilities. Id. ¶¶ 

39-41. According to Plaintiff, 

He was shocked that the Defendants abused him as they did. As a

direct result of the Defendants‟ misconduct on or about July 21, 

2014 and thereafter, PLAINTIFF has suffered emotional distress; he 

has been preoccupied with the denial of his rights. He has been upset 

and had trouble sleeping. His health has deteriorated. PLAINTIFF 

knew he had not violated the law, but he worried that some false 

charge and/or a conviction on his record would prevent him from 

vindicating his rights and resuming his career as a leader in his field.

Id. ¶ 32.

Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n information and belief, employees and/or associates of 

Defendants CHHS and CONTRA COSTA, including Defendants DIPPEL, LINNELL, SELF, 

knew of PLAINTIFF‟S disabilities before July 21, 2014.” Id. ¶ 42. He further alleges that

“Defendants conspired to chill, frustrate, deny and/or retaliate against PLAINTIFF‟S

exercise of his rights to protect himself from fraud, extortion, speak and gather information about

governmental activities free from prior restraint and viewpoint and/or other discrimination, 

petition the government for redress of grievances, due process and equal protection under law.” 

Id. ¶ 43. 

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Plaintiff further alleges that the “Monell Defendants had policies and/or customs of 

indifference to misconduct by their employees by failing to properly investigate complaints of 

misconduct and to discipline them.” Id. ¶ 47. According to Plaintiff, the “Monell Defendants also 

had policies and/or customs of tolerating a „code of silence‟” and had customs of “making it 

difficult for citizens to file complaints about the conduct of its employees,[]” “breaching the 

confidentiality of citizens‟ confidential complaints[,]” “enabling retaliation against and 

intimidation of citizens who file complaints[,]” and “performing negligent and/or sham 

investigations of citizens‟ complaints.” Id. ¶¶ 48-49.

Plaintiff asserts the following claims in his FAC:

Claim One: Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against all Individual Defendants based on 

alleged violation of Plaintiffs “rights to freedom of speech (e.g., protections against viewpoint 

discrimination, protection of gathering and recording information about government activities, 

etc.) and to petition the government for redress of grievances under the First Amendment to the 

United States Constitution, to freedom from threatened arrest, seizure and search without probable 

cause under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to freedom from deprivation 

of liberty and property without due process of law, including such deprivation by means of 

threatened false arrest, under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as

applied under the Fourteenth Amendment, and his fundamental liberty interest in the care, 

custody, and management of his child, which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. ¶ 

60. Plaintiff also alleges as part of this claim that: Defendants “perpetrated crimes against 

PLAINTIFF under 18 U.S.C. § 241: CONSPIRACY AGAINST RIGHTS; 18 U.S.C. §

242: DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW; 18 U.S.C. § 371: ONSPIRACY; 

18 U.S.C. § 1503(A): OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE; 18 U.S.C. § 1512: TAMPERING WITH A

WITNESS, VICTIM, OR AN INFORMANT; 18 U.S.C. § 1513: RETALIATING AGAINST A

WITNESS OR VICTIM; and 18 U.S.C. § 2(A): AIDING AND ABETTING. They also committed 

civil wrongdoing against PLAINTIFF under 42 U.S.C. § 12132: DISCRIMINATION and other 

provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as amended.” Id.

Claim Two: Violations of Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, against all Individual 

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Defendants, based on allegation that Defendants “interfere[ed] with and/or attempt[ed] to interfere 

with PLAINTIFF‟S exercise and enjoyment of his rights as secured by the United States 

Constitution, California Constitution and common law and statutory rights, including protection 

from discrimination on the basis of his disabilities or economic status and protection from the

following state crimes: CPC § 518, EXTORTION; CPC § 136.1(b)(1); CPC §§

136.1(c)(1),136.1(c)(2)AND/OR 137(b) or (c): INFLUENCING, INTIMIDATING OR

THREATENING A WITNESS, VICTIM, OR AN INFORMANT; CPC § 182(a)(1), (2) & (5):

CONSPIRACY.” Id. ¶ 64.

Claim Three: Violations of Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 52, against all 

Individual Defendants, based on allegation that “the Individual Defendants “interfere[ed] with and 

or attempt[ed] to interfere with PLAINTIFF‟S exercise and enjoyment of his rights as secured by 

the United States Constitution, California Constitution and common law and statutory rights, 

including protection from discrimination on the basis of his disabilities or economic status and

protection from the following state crimes: CPC § 518, EXTORTION; CPC § 136.1(b)(1); CPC 

§§ 136.1(c)(1),136.1(c)(2)AND/OR 137(b) or (c): INFLUENCING, INTIMIDATING OR

THREATENING A WITNESS, VICTIM, OR AN INFORMANT; CPC § 182(a)(1), (2) & (5):

CONSPIRACY.” Id. ¶ 68.

Claim Four: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, against all Individual 

Defendants, based on allegation that Defendants engaged in outrageous acts or omissions 

intentionally or in reckless disregard of the probability of causing Plaintiff emotional distress. Id. 

¶¶ 70-74.

Claim Five: Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations – Kaiser, against all 

Individual Defendants Employed By Defendant FDOR.2

Claim Six: Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations – Bank of America, against 

all Individual Defendants Employed By Defendants CHHS and CONTRA COSTA. 

 

2

Plaintiff does not name any individual defendants employed by FDOR. However, he seeks to 

sue unidentified “DOE” defendants who were “responsible for the occurrences or injuries alleged 

in [the FAC], acted as an agent or employee of the other defendants and ratified the conduct of 

other defendants.” FAC ¶ 9. 

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Claim Seven: Fraud, against all individual Defendants Individual Defendants based on 

allegations that they and their agents “have knowingly misrepresented, omitted, and/or concealed 

material facts in their reports, investigations and representations before and/or on behalf of

California courts, and in their communications to PLAINTIFF.” Id., ¶ 85. According to Plaintiff, 

“[t]hese false representations are detailed throughout this Complaint and include falsified reports, 

the true authorship of them, the denial of any improper contact with each other, the supposed 

independence and neutrality of Defendants and their reports, investigations and representations, 

and the fraudulent endorsements of those reports, investigations and representations.” Id. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants “made these misrepresentations and/or omissions in their 

reports, sham investigations and representations to California courts with the intent of obtaining 

favorable rulings and/or actions from them, enabling the Monell Defendants employees to harass, 

intimidate and otherwise harm PLAINTIFF and his interests, and to propagate false and 

defamatory information about PLAINTIFF to court staff, other employees of the Monell

Defendants, private individuals and corporations in contractual relationships with PLAINTIFF and 

members of the public.” Id. ¶ 87.

Claim Eight: Defamation, against all Individual Defendants.

Claim Nine: Negligence, against all Individual Defendants

Claim Ten: Trespass to Chattels, against all Defendants, based on allegations that they 

have interfered with Plaintiff‟s use of his property and harmed his good reputation, which is one of 

his most valuable assets. 

Claim Eleven: Civil conspiracy, against all Defendants.

Claim Twelve: Monell Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants FDOR, CHHS 

and CONTRA COSTA (“the Monell Defendants”), based on the alleged violations of Plaintiff‟s 

“constitutional and other federal rights as well as the federal crimes perpetrated against him by the 

Individual Defendants were caused by the policies and customs of the Monell Defendants.

Claim Thirteen: Request for Declaratory Judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) that Plaintiff 

does not have a child support obligation toward G.C.W., against all Defendants.

Claim Fourteen: Request for Injunction and Declaratory Judgment Pursuant to California 

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Code of Civil Procedure § 526a, against Defendants CHHS and/or CONTRA COSTA and their 

employees enjoining the unlawful and/or unconstitutional acts alleged in the FAC.

In his prayer, Plaintiff seeks damages, attorneys‟ fees and costs and injunctive and 

declaratory relief. FAC at 21-22.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

If a plaintiff is found to be indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and is permitted to 

proceed in forma pauperis, the court must undergo a preliminary screening of the complaint and 

dismiss any claims which: (1) are frivolous and malicious; (2) fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim for relief, Plaintiff must make “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

When reviewing the sufficiency of the Complaint, the Court takes “all allegations of material fact 

as true and construe(s) them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Parks Sch. of 

Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1990). The “tenet that a court must accept a 

complaint‟s allegations as true,” however, “is inapplicable to . . . mere conclusory statements.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 

(2007)). The complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but must allege facts 

sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, the court generally 

looks only to the face of the complaint and the documents attached thereto. Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990). Complaints filed by 

pro se litigants must be liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

B. Claims One and Twelve (42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monell)

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against a “person who, under color of any [state 

law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any [person] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 does not 

create any substantive rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by 

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governmental officials.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff 

bringing a claim under § 1983 must show that “(1) the action occurred „under color of state law‟ 

and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right.” 

Id. (citation omitted). “In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under 

section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation: 

there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.” Id. 

Although municipalities are not subject to vicarious liability under § 1983 solely on 

account of the actions of their employees, § 1983 “imposes liability on a government that, under 

the color of some official policy, „causes‟ an employee to violate another‟s constitutional rights.” 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). One way to establish a claim under 

Monell is to prove that an officer “committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a 

formal governmental policy or a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard 

operating procedure of the local governmental entity.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346

(9th Cir. 1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In the alternative, Monell liability may be 

established where the “individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final 

policy-making authority‟” or “an official with final policy-making authority ratified a 

subordinate‟s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Id. at 1346-1347 (citations 

omitted). 

Plaintiff seeks to assert his § 1983 claim on the base of alleged violations of: 1) his “rights 

to freedom of speech (e.g., protections against viewpoint discrimination, protection of gathering 

and recording information about government activities, etc.) and to petition the government for

redress of grievances under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution;” 2) his right to 

“freedom from threatened arrest, seizure and search without probable cause under the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution;” 3) “freedom from deprivation of liberty and 

property without due process of law, including such deprivation by means of threatened false 

arrest, under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied under the 

Fourteenth Amendment, and his fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management 

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of his child, which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” FAC ¶ 60.3 The Court addresses 

each of these theories below. 

1. First Amendment

Plaintiff‟s § 1983 claim under the First Amendment is based on the allegation that he has 

been denied access to the Contra Costa County Office of the Department of Child Support 

Services located in Martinez California since August 19, 2014. FAC ¶ 31. In particular, Plaintiff 

alleges that Adan Cardenas, Jr., employed by Contra Costa County as a Child Support Specialist 

III, blocked his access to the Contra Costa County Office of the Department of Child Support 

Services located in Martinez California on August 19, 2014. Id. He further alleges that Linda 

Dippell, Director of the Department of Child Support Services for Contra Costa County, ratified 

the actions of Cardenas, and that Plaintiff has not been permitted to enter this office since August 

19, 2014. Plaintiff alleges that in doing so, individual Defendants Cardenas and Dippell infringed 

his right “to observe, gather information about, scrutinize and criticize certain governmental 

activities occurring there, and petition Defendant Contra Costa DCSS4for redress of grievances.” 

FAC ¶ 31.

Whether Plaintiff will ultimately prevail on his First Amendment claim depends on the 

character of the property at issue. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 

37, 44 (1983) (“The existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which

limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at 

issue”). In Perry, the Court explained that there are three categories of public fora: 1) the 

traditional public forum; 2) the designated public forum; and 3) the nonpublic forum. Id. at 45-

47. 

The first category includes “places which by long tradition or by government fiat have 

 

3

Plaintiff also invokes numerous provisions of the California Penal Code. These alleged 

violations are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits individuals to assert claims 

for alleged violations of the United States Constitution or of a federal statute only. See Collins v. 

City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 119 (1992) (§ 1983 “provides the citizen with an 

effective remedy against those abuses of state power that violate federal law, it does not provide a 

remedy for abuses that do not violate federal law”).

4

In fact, Plaintiff has not named Contra Costa DCSS as a Defendant. He has, however, named 

Contra Costa County as a Defendant. 

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been devoted to assembly and debate,” such as streets and parks. Id. at 45. In such places, “the 

rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.” Id. 

The second category “consists of public property which the state has opened for use by the 

public as a place for expressive activity.” Id. “Although a state is not required to indefinitely 

retain the open character of [such a] facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards 

as apply in a traditional public forum.” Id. at 46. 

Finally, “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public 

communication is governed by different standards.” Id. at 46. In particular, the Court has 

recognized that “the „First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is 

owned or controlled by the government.‟ ” Id. (quoting United States Postal Service v. 

Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)). Thus, “[i]n addition to time, place, and 

manner regulations, the state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or 

otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress 

expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker‟s view.” Id.; see also Cornelius 

v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985) (“The 

reasonableness of the Government‟s restriction of access to a nonpublic forum must be assessed in 

the light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances”). 

Here, Plaintiff has alleged no facts suggesting that the government office to which he was 

denied entry is a traditional public forum or has been opened up for use by the public as a place for 

expressive activity. Thus, the Court assumes that defendant may impose reasonable restrictions as 

to time place and manner and may reserve the forum for its intended purpose. As plaintiff‟s 

allegations indicate that he wished to enter the office in connection with his concerns about his 

child support obligations, which is apparently the intended purpose of the office from which he 

was excluded, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim on this 

basis.5 

 

5

The Court notes that the inquiry as to whether public property is a public or nonpublic forum is 

fact specific, as is the question of whether a restriction is reasonable in cases involving a 

nonpublic forum. See Albrecht v. Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority, 338 F.Supp.2d 

914, 923-924 (N.D. Ill. 2004). Therefore, although the Court assumes for the purposes of its 

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2. Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment protects persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. 

Const. amend. IV. A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a violation 

of the Fourth Amendment. Dubner v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir.2001). The 

Fourth Amendment also protects against detention without reasonable suspicion, see Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and the use of excessive force. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 

Plaintiff has alleged none of these, however. He has alleged only that his “freedom from 

threatened arrest, seizure and search” was infringed. A claim for threatened arrest, seizure or 

search is not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. Further, Plaintiff has alleged no facts 

regarding the “threatened arrest, seizure, or search.” Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff‟s Section 

1983 claim is based on an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment, the claim is dismissed with 

leave to amend.

3. Due Process 

The Fourteenth Amendment contains both procedural and substantive due process 

protections. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). Plaintiff appears to be alleging 

both types of due process claims. In particular, his assertion that his due process rights were 

violated based on his fundamental right to the care, custody and management of his minor child 

appear to be based on his substantive due process rights, while his assertion that he was deprived 

of liberty and property without due process of law appears to be a procedural due process claim.

a. Substantive Due Process

The substantive component of the Due Process Clause “forbids the government from 

depriving a person of life, liberty, or property in such a way that shocks the conscience or 

interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 

F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir.1998) (internal quotations omitted). It “protects individual liberty against 

 

Section 1915 review that the office to which Plaintiff allegedly was denied entry is not a public 

forum, it does not actually decide that question, which is more appropriately addressed at a later 

stage of the case. Similarly, the Court‟s finding that Plaintiff states a claim based on his exclusion 

from the office does not bar Defendants from seeking to establish that the restriction was 

reasonable.

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„certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.‟” 

Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 

474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). Substantive due process “forbids the government to infringe certain 

„fundamental‟ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement 

is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302

1993). However, “[s]ubstantive due process is ordinarily reserved for those rights that are 

„fundamental.” Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Washington v. 

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721–22 (1997)). In the absence of a fundamental liberty interest, the 

government need only show that the intrusion is rationally related to the achievement of a 

legitimate government interest. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.

As a general rule, parents have “a constitutionally protected liberty interest in making 

decisions about the care, custody, and control of their children.” Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 

1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 2004). Consequently, “parents will not be separated from their children 

without due process of law except in emergencies.” Mabe v. San Bernardino County Dep’t of Soc. 

Services, 237 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001). Even where a court has limited the parent‟s 

custodial rights, the parent‟s liberty interest is reduced but may not be eliminated altogether. See

Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2006). For example, in Brittain, the court held that a 

non-custodial parent who has visitation rights under a court order had a liberty interest in those 

visitation rights that might support a due process claim if violated. Id. at 992.

Plaintiff, however, does not challenge any conduct that violates a liberty interest in the care 

and custody of his child. In particular, he does not dispute that he does not have custodial rights or 

even any visitation rights as to his minor child. To the contrary, he points to the Florida Order in 

support of his assertion that his parental rights have been terminated and does not allege anywhere 

in the complaint that the decision of the Florida Court itself constituted a violation of his right to 

due process. Further, the Florida Order eliminates Plaintiff‟s parental responsibility and timesharing. Thus, the order affords Plaintiff no rights that might be the subject of a due process claim 

based on the parental right to care, custody or control of a minor child. Therefore, Plaintiff‟s due 

process claim fails to the extent it is based on Plaintiff‟s purported liberty interest in the care, 

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custody and control of his child.

b. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff also contends he has been deprived of liberty and property without due process of 

law. To the extent his claim is based on an alleged deprivation of liberty, Plaintiff fails to state a 

claim. The allegations in the complaint are sufficient to survive Section 1915 review as to his due 

process claim to the extent it is based on the assertion that the County of Contra Costa is 

attempting to collect child support payments he does not owe, however. 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that he has been deprived of liberty without 

due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment‟s Due Process Clause protects individuals against 

deprivations of liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const., amend. XIV. Thus, for example, 

due process requires that individuals may be incarcerated only on the basis of a criminal 

conviction. Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir.2002). Further, an individual cannot be 

detained prior to trial except upon a showing of probable cause at the time of arrest. Baker v. 

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979). Here, however, Plaintiff has alleged no facts showing that 

he was deprived of liberty in violation of his right to due process. At most, he has alluded to 

“threatened arrest” (though he has not included any specific facts in his complaint to support this 

conclusory allegation). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim based on deprivation of liberty 

without due process of law.

On the other hand, to the extent Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are attempting to collect 

child support payments that he does not owe, Plaintiff has asserted a colorable due process claim.

The due process clause protects property interests, which “are created and their dimensions are 

defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state 

law.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Here, Plaintiff 

alleges that under Florida state law, he does not owe child support payments, citing the Florida 

Order. That order eliminates Plaintiff‟s right to participate in any decision-making about his child

and takes away his time-sharing rights as to his child. Under Florida law, a parent‟s obligation to 

support a minor child “is not affected by the fact that the custody of the children has been taken 

from the parent by a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.” Engle v. Engle, 323 So.2d 658, 

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659 (1975). However, where parental rights have been terminated, the parent has no further 

obligation to pay child support. Ponton v. Tabares, 711 So.2d 125, 126 (1998). The Court does 

not have a complete record before it that would allow it to make a determination as to whether 

Plaintiff‟s parental rights were, in fact terminated under Florida law. Therefore, the Court 

concludes that it this early stage of the case, Plaintiff‟s procedural due process claim based on 

Defendants‟ efforts to collect child support payments from him is sufficient to survive the Court‟s 

preliminary review.

4. Monell Liability

Plaintiff alleges that the individual defendants who improperly excluded him from the 

DCSS office and collected child support payments he did not owe did so as a result of improper 

training and supervision and acted according to policies and customs of, inter alia, indifference to 

the misconduct of employees and making it difficult for citizens to file complaints about employee 

misconduct. FAC ¶¶ 46-49. He also alleges that Defendant Dippell, who is the director of DCSS

and an employee of Contra Costa County, ratified the actions of the individual who excluded 

Plaintiff from the office. These allegations are sufficient to survive Section 1915 review as to 

Contra Costa County under Monell. See Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d at 1347. On the other 

hand, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish Monell liability as to Defendant CHHS. 

In particular, Plaintiff‟s allegations as to CHHS are entirely conclusory and he has not identified 

any individual acting on behalf of CHHS whose conduct may have violated his constitutional 

rights or given rise to Monell liability. See, e.g., FAC ¶ 3 (alleging that CHHS is “the public 

employer of several heretofore Unidentified Defendants”). The Court notes that all of the 

individuals who have been named in this action (Dippel, Self, Linnell and Cardenas) are alleged to 

be employees of Contra Costa but that none of these individuals is alleged to be an employee of 

CHHS.

C. Claim Two (Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1)

California Civil Code § 52.1 allows an individual to bring a civil action for damages where 

“a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, 

or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or 

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enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.” To prevail on a 

Bane Act claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) an act of interference with a legal right by 2) 

intimidation, threats or coercion. Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329, 334 (1998). Plaintiff‟s 

claim is alleged only in a conclusory manner, however. Plaintiff does not identify the specific 

conduct he alleges constituted “threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Nor does he explain how that 

conduct interfered with any specific right under the Constitution or under federal or state law. 

Therefore, this claim is dismissed with leave to amend.

D. Claim Three (Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 52)

The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides that [a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state 

are free and equal, and no matter what their ... disability, [or] medical condition ... are entitled to 

the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 

establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ.Code § 51(b). In 1992, the Act was amended 

to provide that a violation of the right of any individual under the ADA also constituted a violation 

of the Act. Id. § 51(f). Plaintiff refers in his complaint to an unspecified disability. See FAC, ¶¶ 

38-41. He does not, however, allege any specific facts that support an inference that he was 

subject to discrimination on the basis of a disability. Therefore, this claim is dismissed with leave 

to amend.

E. Claims Four through Ten (state common law claims)

In Claims Four through Ten, Plaintiff asserts common law claims against the individual 

defendants, all of whom are employees of public entities. Where defendants are employees of a 

public entity, the plaintiff must allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act to state a 

claim. Jackson v. California, 2014 WL 670104, at *9 (E.D. Cal., Feb. 20, 2014) (citing Cal. Gov‟t 

Code § 950.6; State v. Superior Court of Kings County (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 (2004)). 

Under the California Tort Claims Act, a tort claim against a public entity or its employees must be 

presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board no more than six 

months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov‟t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2. 

Suit may not be brought until the Board has rejected or acted on the claim. Bodde, 32 Cal. 4

th at 

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1239. Because Plaintiff has not alleged that he has presented his state common law claims to the 

Board or that the claims have been rejected or acted upon, all of his common law claims are 

subject to dismissal with leave to amend to allege facts showing that he has complied with the 

California Tort Claims Act. To the extent Plaintiff may be able to remedy this deficiency, the 

Court addresses below the sufficiency of Plaintiff‟s allegations in support of his common law 

claims. 

1. Claim Four (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)

To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must 

establish: “1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, 2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of 

the probability of causing emotional distress, 3) severe emotional suffering and 4) actual and 

proximate causation of the emotional distress.” Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal.3d 

148, 155 n.7 (1987). Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress generally “„does not 

extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities,‟ but 

only to conduct so extreme and outrageous „as to go beyond all possible bonds of decency, and to 

be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.‟” Alcorn v. Anbro 

Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 499 (quoting Rest.2d Torts, § 46, com. d).

Plaintiff alleges that the individual Defendants have attempted to collect child support 

payments from him even though his parental rights have been terminated and (according to 

Plaintiff) employees of CHHS and the County of Contra Costa have acknowledged as much. He 

also alleges that he has been excluded from the CHHS office and thereby prevented from 

petitioning for redress. As a consequence, he alleges, he has suffered severe emotional distress. 

The Court finds that these allegations would be sufficient to survive the Court‟s preliminary 

review as to Plaintiff‟s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress assuming Plaintiff is 

able to amend to allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act.

2. Claim Five (Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations – Kaiser)

Plaintiff asserts a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations against “all 

individual defendants employed by Defendant FDOR” on the basis that they attempted to collect 

from Plaintiff‟s former employer, Kaiser, child support payments he did not owe. As these 

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defendants are not identified, this claim is asserted against “Doe” defendants.

To state a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must 

allege the following elements: (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) 

defendant‟s knowledge of the contract; (3) defendant‟s intentional acts designed to induce a 

breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the 

contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 

50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126 (1990).

Plaintiff alleges that he had a contractual relationship with Kaiser of which unidentified 

employees of FDOR were aware and that those individuals, “under the pretext of collecting child 

support payments,” interfered with Plaintiff‟s contractual relationship with Kaiser. FAC ¶¶20-24.

His allegations are entirely conclusory, however. He does not allege any specific facts to show the 

existence of a contract or how any FDOR employee may have been aware of the contract. Nor 

does he allege any facts as to how these individuals interfered with his contract or showing that 

Plaintiff‟s contractual relationship with Kaiser was damaged as a result of their conduct. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the allegations are insufficient as to this claim.6

3. Claim Six (Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations – Bank of 

America)

Plaintiff also asserts a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations against 

“all individual defendants employed by Defendants CHHS and Contra Costa.” Plaintiff‟s 

allegations in support of this claim are somewhat more specific than his allegations in support of 

Claim Five. In particular, he alleges that the defendants knew of his accounts with Bank of 

America and interfered with his contractual relationship with Bank of America by placing an 

 

6

The Court notes that although the use of Doe defendants is not favored in the Ninth Circuit, 

where the identity of alleged defendants cannot be known prior to the filing of a complaint, the 

plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify them. See Gillespie v. 

Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.1980). Nonetheless, even as to Doe defendants, a plaintiff 

must allege sufficient facts to state a claim to survive dismissal on the pleadings. See Lopez v. 

Bank of America, 2011 WL 1134671, at *3 (E.D.Cal., March 28, 2011) (recognizing that 

plaintiffs generally should be permitted to pursue discovery as to identity of Doe defendants but 

dismissing Doe defendants for failure to state a claim because they were only named in the caption 

and the court had “no clue why the John Does [were] being named as defendants”). 

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Order to Withhold on two of Plaintiff‟s accounts, even though Defendant Linnell had 

acknowledged that the Florida Order terminated all of Plaintiff‟s parental rights. FAC ¶¶ 26-28. 

Construing the complaint liberally in light of Plaintiff‟s pro se status, the Court concludes these 

allegations would be sufficient to survive Section 1915 review assuming Plaintiff is able to amend 

to allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act.

4. Claim Seven (Fraud)

Plaintiff asserts his fraud claim against all individual defendants based on alleged false 

representations and omissions. The elements of fraud are “(a) a misrepresentation (false 

representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent 

to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” Hinesley v. Oakshade Town 

Ctr., 135 Cal.App. 4th 289, 294 (2005) (citing Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 

(1996)). Further, the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure apply in federal court. Rule 9(b) requires a party to “state with particularity the 

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a 

person‟s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Plaintiff has not alleged specific 

facts concerning the circumstances of the alleged fraud, having failed to even identify the specific 

misrepresentations or omissions upon which it is based or to allege any facts demonstrating the 

remaining elements of fraud, namely, scienter, intent to induce reliance, justifiable reliance and 

resulting damage. Therefore, Plaintiff‟s fraud claim is insufficiently pled. 

5. Claim Eight (Defamation)

Plaintiff asserts a claim for defamation against all of the individual defendants in the case. 

Under California law, the elements for a claim for defamation are 1) a publication, 2) that is false, 

3) defamatory, and 4) unprivileged, and 5) that has a natural tendency to injure or that causes 

special damage. Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683, 720, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 775, 151 P.3d 1185 (2007).

While the exact words or circumstances of the defamation need not be alleged, the substance of 

the defamatory statement must be alleged to state a claim. Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Crystal 

Dynamics, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 1303, 1314 (N.D.Cal.,1997). Plaintiff has merely alleged that all of 

the individual defendants have published false and unprivileged statements that hold him in a false 

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light, without identifying any specific statement upon which the claim is based. Therefore, 

Plaintiff‟s defamation claim is insufficiently pled. 

6. Claim Nine (Negligence)

To state a claim for negligence under California law, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts 

to show “1) duty; 2) breach; 3) causation; and 4) damages.” Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 

1203 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). With respect to negligence by a public employee, such an 

employee is generally “liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a 

private person.” Cal. Gov't Code § 820(a). Here, Plaintiff‟s negligence claim is entirely 

conclusory. He does not allege facts showing that each individual defendant has owed Plaintiff a 

duty. Nor does he allege facts showing that any specific duty was breached. Therefore, the Court 

concludes this claim is insufficiently pled. 

7. Claim Ten (Trespass to Chattels)

The tort of trespass to chattels “lies where an intentional interference with possession of 

personal property has proximately caused injury.” Intel Co. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1350 

(2003). Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants have intentionally intermeddled with his possession of 

his funds by collecting child support he does not owe. As to the individual defendants, Plaintiff‟s 

allegations would be sufficient to survive the Court‟s Section 1915 review were Plaintiff to allege 

compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. As to the public entities, Plaintiff‟s allegations 

are not sufficient because in California, a governmental entity can only be sued in tort pursuant to 

an authorizing statute or enactment . Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 840 (9th Cir. 

1996). Plaintiff has not identified any statutory authority that permits him to assert a claim for 

trespass to chattel against the public entity defendants. Accordingly, the claim is insufficiently 

alleged. 

F. Claim Eleven (Conspiracy)

“The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are the formation and operation of the 

conspiracy and damage resulting to plaintiff from an act or acts done in furtherance of the 

common design.” Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal.4th 503, 511 (1994) 

(citations omitted). “Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability 

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on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate 

tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.” Id. Assuming conspiracy may be 

asserted as a stand-alone claim, “there must be some factual content pled to support the conspiracy 

claim.” See Yagman v. Galipo, 2013 WL 141785, at *13 (C.D.Cal., Jan. 7, 2013). Plaintiff has 

not identified any specific facts to support this claim. Therefore, the claim is dismissed with leave 

to amend.

G. Claim Thirteen (Declaratory Judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a))

The Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, provides in pertinent

part:

In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of 

the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may 

declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 

seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be 

sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a 

final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). “A declaratory judgment is not a theory of recovery.” Commercial Union 

Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., Ltd., 41 F.3d 764, 775 (1st Cir.1994). The DJA “merely offers an 

additional remedy to litigants.” Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Karp, 108 F.3d 17, 21 (2nd Cir.1997). 

To the extent the Court has found that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts as to his claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, there is an actual controversy. Whether the Court should exercise its discretion to 

award declaratory relief is an issue more appropriately addressed at a later stage of the case. 

Therefore, Plaintiff‟s allegations are sufficient to survive the Court‟s Section 1915 review.

H. Claim Fourteen (Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Pursuant to California Code 

of Civil Procedure § 526a)

California Code of Civil Procedure § 526a authorizes taxpayer actions “restraining and 

preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of 

a county . . . against any officer thereof.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 526a. Under this provision, a 

taxpayer may sue to enjoin wasteful expenditures by state agencies as well as local governmental 

bodies. Cates v. California Gambling Control Com., 154 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1308 (2007). “While 

the statute speaks of injunctive relief, taxpayer standing has also been extended to actions for 

declaratory relief.” Id. The term “waste” “has been described as „a useless expenditure ... of 

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public funds‟ that is incapable of achieving the ostensible goal.” Chiatello v. City and County of 

San Francisco, 189 Cal.App.4th 472, 482 (2010) (quoting Harnett v. County of Sacramento, 195 

Cal. 676, 682-683 (1925)). It also “reaches outright fraud, corruption, or collusion.” Id. (citing 

Harman v. City and County of San Francisco, 7 Cal.3d 150, 160, (1972); Nickerson v. San 

Bernardino, 179 Cal. 518, 522-523 (1918)). “Waste does not encompass the great majority of 

governmental outlays of money or the time of salaried governmental employees, nor does it apply 

to the vast majority of discretionary decisions made by state and local units of government.” Id. 

As the court in Chiatello explained, to avoid “constant harassment of city and county officers by 

disgruntled citizens,” “courts should not take judicial cognizance of disputes which are primarily 

political in nature, nor should they attempt to enjoin every expenditure that does not meet with a 

taxpayer‟s approval.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants 

CHHS and Contra Costa and their employees based on their allegedly wrongful collection of child 

support from him. He does not, however, allege facts that persuade the Court that this is the type 

of expenditure that constitutes “waste” under Section 526a. In particular, the Court notes that 

while Plaintiff has included conclusory allegations of fraud and conspiracy in his FAC, he has 

alleged no specific facts in support of those allegations. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this 

claim with leave to amend. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts 

to support his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged violation of his First Amendment 

and Due Process rights by Defendants Dippel, Self, Linnel and Cardenas and, under Monell, 

Contra Costa County. Plaintiff‟s remaining claims are dismissed with leave to amend for the 

reasons stated above. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint to address the deficiencies 

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identified in this Order within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. The Court will determine 

whether service of the amended complaint is appropriate at that time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2015

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

United States Magistrate Judge

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