Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02563/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02563-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Harold Eugene Markland, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV 14-02563-PHX SMM (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. McNAMEE, U.S. District Judge:

 Harold Eugene Markland (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1) challenging his convictions in 

Maricopa County Superior Court, case #CR-2006-006142-001-DT, based on jury guilty 

verdicts on October 24, 2006, for aggravated assault, which the jury found to be a 

dangerous offense, and attempted kidnaping. After the jury found aggravating 

circumstances on both counts of conviction, Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent 12 

and 5 year terms of imprisonment, respectively. Respondents filed an answer (Doc. 10), 

and Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 11). As explained below, the Court recommends that 

the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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I. BACKGROUND1

A. Proceedings Leading to Conviction and Sentence 

On September 28, 2005, Petitioner was indicted on one count of aggravated 

assault, a class 3 dangerous felony (Count 1), and one count of kidnapping, a class 2 

dangerous felony (Count 2), for events on September 16, 2005, as well as on two counts 

of aggravated assault, class 3 dangerous felonies (Counts 3 and 4), and one count of 

attempted kidnapping, a class 3 felony (Count 5), for events on September 17, 2005. 

(Exh. B, Doc. 10-1 at 15-19.) The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice on the 

State’s motion when the State could not locate the victim, permitting the State later re-file 

the charges. (Exh. C, Doc. 10-1 at 20-21.) 

Petitioner was again indicted on February 8, 2006, on one count of kidnapping, a 

class 2 dangerous felony (Count 2), and one count of aggravated assault, a class 3 

dangerous felony (Count 3), for events on September 16, 2005, as well as two counts of 

aggravated assault, class 3 dangerous felonies (Counts 1 and 4), and one count of 

attempted kidnapping, a class 3 felony (Count 5), for events on September 17, 2005. 

(Exh. D, Doc. 1-1 at 22-26.) The trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner. 

(Exh. E, Doc. 10-1 at 27, 29.) 

Petitioner’s case proceeded to trial. Before the conclusion of the state’s case-inchief, the parties stipulated outside of the presence of the jury that Counts 1, 2, and 3 

would be dismissed in exchange for releasing Detective Udd from his subpoena for 

additional limited trial testimony based on a late disclosed report. (Doc. 1-4 at 16–23; 

Doc. 1-2 at 185-188; Doc. 1-3 at 59-85.) Petitioner was present during all the discussions 

with the Court and personally approved the stipulation on the record. (Doc. 1-4 at 16–23; 

Doc. 1-2 at 185-188; Doc. 1-3 at 59-85.) The trial court then advised the jury that they 

were not to consider Counts 1, 2, and 3 and that they were only to consider counts Counts 

4 and 5, which remained. (Doc. 1-4 at 92–94.) 

 

1

 The trial transcripts were submitted by Petitioner as attachments to his Petitioner, 

and the referenced alphabetical exhibits were submitted with Respondents’ Answer, Doc. 

10. The page references herein are to this Court’s electronic record. 

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At the conclusion of the five day trial on October 24, 2005, the jury found 

Petitioner guilty of Counts 4 and 5, and further found Count 4 to be a dangerous offense. 

(Exh. F, Doc. 10-1 at 35-39; Doc. 1-5 at 60-61.) The jury then found four aggravating 

circumstances applicable to both Counts 4 and 5. (Exh. G, Doc. 10-1 at 40-43.) On 

November 29, 2006, the court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of 12 years’ 

imprisonment with credit for 417 days of presentence incarceration for Count 4, and an 

aggravated term of 5 years imprisonment for Count 5, to run concurrently with the 

sentence in Count 4. (Exh. H, Doc. 10-1 at 44-48.) On the same day, Petitioner received 

(and acknowledged receipt of) his notice of rights of review after conviction. (Exh. I, 

Doc. 10-1 at 49-51.) 

B. Appeal Proceedings 

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his convictions and sentences. (Exh. J, 

Doc. 10-1 at 52-54.) On November 27, 2007, Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed a 

revised opening brief raising two issues: 1. The evidence is insufficient to support the 

convictions for count four, aggravated assault, and count five, attempted kidnapping; and 

2. The trial court improperly used the use of a weapon to aggravate his sentence. (Exh. 

K, Doc. 10-1 at 55-77.) The State filed an answering brief. (Exh. L, Doc. 10-1 at 78-

109.) In a memorandum decision dated August 26, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed the convictions and sentences. (Exh. M, Doc. 10-1 at 110-120.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts supporting the convictions 

and sentences as follows: 

Police were called to a man’s home by neighbors at 9:00 a.m. on September 

17, 2006 where they found [co-assailant Young] and [Petitioner] standing 

over [victim Pena] who was on the ground and covered in blood. There was 

evidence that [victim Pena] had been beaten inside the living room of the 

home and then beaten outside. A broken gun was found in the living room, 

and a bullet hole was found in the living room wall. 

(Exh. M, Doc. 10-1 at 112.) Regarding insufficient evidence on the aggravated assault 

charge, the appellate court wrote, “[Petitioner] acknowledges that the victim’s testimony 

supported the aggravated assault charge but argues that the jury should not have believed 

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the victim,” reviewed the trial evidence, and concluded that “there was substantial 

evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that a gun had been used by [Petitioner] in his 

assault on the victim.” (Exh. M, Doc. 10-1 at 113-116.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals also found that there was sufficient trial evidence to 

support the element of the attempted kidnaping conviction that Petitioner restricted or 

attempted to restrict the victim’s movement in a manner which interfered substantially 

with the victim’s liberty: 

A neighbor who went to the scene reported that when he first saw the three 

men, [Petitioner] was holding the victim down. In addition, the victim 

testified that when his assailants ‘[took] a break from beating on [him]’ 

inside the house and one of them left the room, he ‘made a break for it.’ He 

testified that he ‘ran out the back door’ and that [Petitioner] caught him, 

tackled him, got him on the ground, and called for the other man to help. 

There was also evidence that [Petitioner] and the other man intended to 

detain the victim on the ground more than momentarily. Duct tape with 

blood on it was found in the backyard, and the victim testified that they had 

tried to duct tape his mouth to keep him from screaming. 

(Exh. M, Doc. 10-1 at 116-117.) In accordance with applicable law, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ recitation of the facts established at trial supporting the convictions will be 

given presumption of correctness in this habeas proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), 

(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 

686 F.3d 758, 763 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that statement of facts in state 

appellate court’s opinion should not be afforded the presumption of correctness); section 

II, infra. 

After the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmation of the convictions and sentences, 

Petitioner filed a pro per petition for review, a pro per amendment to the petition for 

review, and a pro per motion for injunction. (Exhs. N–P, Doc. 10-1 at 121-148.) In 

response to the petition to review, the State filed a notice of acknowledgment asserting 

that “[b]ecause the issues presented by Petitioner were either adequately resolved against 

Petitioner’s position on appeal, or cannot be considered by this Court in a Petition for 

Review from a direct appeal, Respondent will file no further response.” (Exh. Q, Doc. 

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10-1 at 149-153.) After summary denial by the Arizona Supreme Court, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals issued the order and mandate on April 2, 2009. (Exhs. R, S, Doc. 10-1 

at 154-159.) 

C. PCR proceedings

Petitioner filed some early post-conviction papers, some without counsel and 

another with counsel, none of which proceeded to substantive review.2 (Exhs. T-Z, Doc. 

10-1 at 160-Doc. 10-2 at 26.) Petitioner was thereafter appointed new post conviction 

counsel for his Rule 32 proceedings. (Exh. AA, Doc. 10-2 at 27-45.) On December 27, 

2011, counsel for Petitioner filed a PCR petition, which was treated by the superior court 

as timely. (Exh. AA, DD, Doc. 10-2 at 27-45, 86-92.) Three ineffective assistance of 

counsel (“IAC”) claims were raised in this PCR petition. (Exh. AA, Doc. 10-2 at 27-45.) 

PCR counsel asserted that trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 688 (1984), when: (1) he failed to assert Petitioner’s speedy trial rights; (2) he 

failed to file a motion in limine regarding Petitioner’s relationship with a minor; and (3) 

he failed to request a mistrial rather than stipulate to the dismissal of Counts 1, 2, and 3 

during trial. (Exh. AA, Doc. 10-2 at 27-45.) After response and reply, the superior court 

issued a detailed ruling denying the PCR petition, finding that trial counsel was not 

ineffective. (Exhs. BB–DD, Doc. 10-2 at 46-92.) 

 Asserting the same claims that had been raised in the PCR petition, on October 17, 

2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review, to which the state filed a response and 

Petitioner filed a reply. (Exhs. EE-GG, Doc. 10-1 at 93-140.) On November 19, 2013, 

the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review and denied relief, finding the claims 

precluded (despite that the state did not argue such and the trial court did not consider 

such) and, alternatively, meritless. (Exh. HH, Doc. 10-3 at 1-4.) The Arizona Court of 

 

2

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26), and appointed counsel filed a notice that, “Counsel has researched all legal and factual concerns raised by [Petitioner] and is unable to find a tenable issue to submit to 

the court pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure” (Exh. U, Doc. 10-1 

at 162-164). 

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Appeals issued the mandate on January 7, 2014. (Exh. II, Doc. 10-3 at 6-7.)3

II. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 HABEAS PETITION – LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 On habeas review, this Court can only grant relief if the petitioner demonstrates 

prejudice because the adjudication of a claim either “(1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision 

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This is a “’highly 

deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings’ which demands that state court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997)). 

In conducting an analysis under AEDPA, this Court considers the last reasoned 

state court decision addressing the claim. See Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” 

or involved an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, courts look 

exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court’s decisions that existed at the time of 

the relevant state court’s decision. See Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011); 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660–61 (2004). 

A state court is not required to cite to a relevant Supreme Court decision or even 

be aware of its existence; rather, the focus is on whether the result of the state-court 

decision contradicted relevant Supreme Court precedent. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 

12, 16 (2003); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (holding that to be entitled to 

deference under the AEDPA, a state court need not even be aware of relevant Supreme 

 

3

 Before the mandate was issued in his previous Rule 32 proceeding, Petitioner filed a subsequent pro per PCR notice and petition in the trial court on December 16, 

2013. (Exhs. JJ–KK, Doc. 10-3 at 7-Doc. 10-4 at 105.) On February 12, 2014 (filed on February 13, 2014), after identifying Petitioner’s December 16, 2013, pro per PCR petition as Petitioner’s “fourth Rule 32 proceeding,” the superior court dismissed the PCR petition because it was untimely and failed “to state a claim for which relief can be granted in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding.” (Exh. LL, Doc. 10-4 at 105-108.) It 

appears that Petitioner refers to his December, 2013, PCR petition as his third PCR petition, not his fourth PCR petition. (See, e.g., Doc. 1 at 5) 

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Court cases, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision 

contradicts them”). 

Additionally, this Court presumes that the state court’s factual determinations are 

correct and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and 

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239–40 

(2005); Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004). The “presumption of 

correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court, as opposed to a trial court, 

makes the finding of fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593 (1982). 

III. PETITIONER’S HABEAS CLAIMS 

On November 20, 2014, Petitioner timely filed the instant Petition (Doc. 1). 

Respondents were ordered to file an answer, which could be limited to relevant 

affirmative defenses. (Doc. 4.) Petitioner’s federal petition raises the following twelve 

grounds for relief, omitting a Ground Eight4

: 

In Ground One, Petitioner contends his convictions were obtained as 

the result of evidence that was insufficient to persuade a properly 

instructed, reasonable jury, beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims 

this violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment right to due 

process. 

In Ground Two, he alleges the State failed to disclose evidence 

favorable to the accused during the pretrial discovery stage. Petitioner 

claims this violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment right to 

due process. 

In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that the State failed to provide 

confidential records or his “lawyer never requested or subpoenaed never 

using hospital or doctor[’]s report which provides exculpatory information 

fictitious bullet wound and other alleged injuries.” Petitioner claims this 

violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. 

In Ground Four, he claims he was denied the right to access 

potentially exculpatory biological evidence “in violation of balancing test 

which weighed the risk of convicting an innocent person against the 

 

4

 Petitioner’s grounds for relief are numbered as Grounds One through Seven and Grounds Nine through Thirteen. 

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government[’]s risk of a[]voiding disclosure of exculpatory blood trail in 

front of house.” He contends this violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial. 

In Ground Five, Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor knowingly 

used perjured testimony to obtain a conviction and knew or should have 

known that the testimony was false. Petitioner alleges this violated his 

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. 

In Ground Six, Petitioner claims his conviction resulted from state 

court errors which, taken together, denied Petitioner a fair trial. He claims 

the trial court excluded “crucial key battleground evidence.” Petitioner 

alleges this violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights to due process and a fair trial. 

In Ground Seven, he asserts he was denied the right to defend by the 

trial court’s and the prosecution’s “restrictions or presentation of culpability 

evidence that a third party . . . had committed the actual charged crime.” 

Petitioner claims this violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial. 

Petitioner did not assert a Ground Eight. 

In Ground Nine, Petitioner contends that “[o]utside influences upon 

the jury raise a presumption of prejudice that imposes a heavy burden on 

the state to overcome by showing that the influences were harmless to 

Petitioner.” Petitioner asserts that this violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights to a jury trial and a fair trial. 

In Ground Ten, he asserts that he is “actually innocent of committing 

the charged crime: hence procedural default cannot be used to deny him the 

right to have his habeas claim heard on its merits.” Petitioner claims the 

prosecutor withheld witness statements and that there is evidence to believe 

these statements provide “exculpatory evidence of innocence neg[a]tive to 

[the] prosecution[’]s case.” Petitioner alleges that this violated his rights to 

due process and a fair trial under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments. 

In Ground Eleven, Petitioner claims he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel’s advice regarding an appeal, in violation of his Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He asserts that his attorneys were 

ineffective “for failing to advise the defendant of the right to appeal where 

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the defendant could have been expected to appeal specifically to Exhibits 

30, 19, 2, 43 & 40 and obviously issues raised in this appeal.” 

In Ground Twelve, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective 

in failing to file a motion in limine “in reference to Petitioner[’]s 

relationship.” Petitioner claims this violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel, due process, and a fair trial. 

In Ground Thirteen, Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to file a “motion to dismiss, for mistrial trigg[er]ed by 

[the] state” when the lead investigator “did not return under subpoena.” 

Petitioner contends this violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel, due 

process, and a fair trial. Petitioner alleges that he presented all of these 

issues to the Arizona Court of Appeals and also presented the issue in 

Ground One to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

(Doc. 4 at 1-3). 

A. Actual Innocence Claim 

Petitioner claims actual innocence in Ground Ten of the Petition. He cites Schlup 

v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), asserts that he is “actually innocent of committing the 

charged crime hence procedural default cannot be used to deny him the right to have his 

habeas claim heard on its merits,” and claims that the prosecutor withheld witness 

statements that were exculpatory. (Doc. 1 at 24.) Actual innocence is not cognizable in 

federal habeas as a separate constitutional claim for habeas relief. The United States 

Supreme Court’s “habeas jurisprudence makes clear that a claim of ‘actual innocence’ is 

not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner 

must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” 

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404–05 (1993). Thus, Ground Ten’s actual innocence 

claim is not cognizable on habeas review. See Coley v. Gonzales, 55 F.3d 1385, 1387 

(9th Cir. 1995) (“Coley seems to be making the claim that he is factually innocent—but 

that claim alone is not reviewable on habeas.”). 

Despite that Petitioner asserts actual innocence a separate claim for habeas relief, 

it appears that he is primarily asserting Ground Ten in an attempt to excuse his 

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procedural defaults of his habeas claims, and the Court will treat it as such, see section 

III(B)(2)(d), infra. To any extent, however, that Petitioner is asserting actual innocence 

as a freestanding and separate claim or ground for relief, this claim cannot and will not be 

considered. 

B. Exhaustion of Remedies & Procedural Default 

Respondents assert that all of the grounds other than Grounds Twelve and Thirteen 

are procedurally defaulted, without excuse, and therefore are barred (Doc. 10 at 13). 

1. Applicable law 

a. Exhaustion of Remedies 

A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court remedies before this Court 

may grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 

(1991); Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008). Proper exhaustion 

requires a habeas petitioner to give the state “a fair opportunity to pass upon [his 

claims].” Edwards v. Carpenter, 529, U.S. 446, 453 (2000) (citations omitted). Arizona 

prisoners properly exhaust state remedies by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate manner; if a prisoner fails to do so, the claim is 

unexhausted. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Castillo v. 

McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). This 

requires a petitioner to “invoke[e] one complete round of the state’s established appellate 

review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845. 

To be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and 

the specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. at 365-66 (“If state 

courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal 

rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under 

the United States Constitution”). 

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Indeed, “a petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by 

citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal basis is ‘selfevident,’ . . . or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same 

considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted), modified by 247 

F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 

2005) (“[P]etitioners must plead their claims with considerable specificity before the state 

courts in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.”). One of the implications of the 

so-called “exhaustion” doctrine is that habeas corpus petitioners are required to place 

state courts on notice that they are seeking to vindicate their federal rights during trial, on 

appeal, and when seeking other forms of post-conviction relief. See Gray v. Netherland, 

518 U.S. 152, 162–63 (1996) (a state prisoner “must include reference to a specific 

federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of facts that 

entitle the petitioner to relief.”); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. at 365– 66 (“If a habeas 

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the 

due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in 

federal court, but in state court.”). 

Even when a claim’s federal basis is “self-evident,” or the claim would have been 

decided “on the same considerations under state or federal law,” a petitioner must still 

present the federal claim to the state courts explicitly, “either by citing federal law or the 

decision of the federal courts.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d at 668 (quotations omitted), 

amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 32 (claim 

not fairly presented when state court “must read beyond a petition or a brief . . . that does 

not alert it to the presence of a federal claim” to discover implicit federal claim). It is not 

enough, for example, that “all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before 

the state courts, . . . or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” Anderson v. 

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (internal citation omitted). “If a petitioner fails to alert the 

state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is 

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unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.” Johnson v. 

Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). 

b. Procedural Default 

A claim can also be subject to an express or implied procedural bar. Robinson v. 

Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express procedural bar exists if the state 

court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural bar “that is both ‘independent’ of 

the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989); Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s 

“Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of federal law because they do not 

depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 

U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist when a state strictly or regularly follows 

its procedural rules). See also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson 

v. Schriro 595 F.3d at 1100. In determining whether the state courts have imposed a 

procedural bar, this Court reviews the last “reasoned” decision of the state courts, Bailey 

v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2003), and a subsequent decision denying 

review without comment does not vitiate the procedural default. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. at 802 (when last reasoned state court decision imposes a procedural default, 

court presumes on habeas that subsequent decision rejecting claim did not consider 

merits). 

An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). In Arizona, claims not previously presented to 

the state courts via either direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from 

federal review because any attempt to return to state court to present them is futile unless 

the claims fit in a narrow category of claims for which a successive PCR petition is 

permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(a) & (b) (successive petition for postCase 2:14-cv-02563-SMM Document 17 Filed 09/22/16 Page 12 of 30
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conviction relief are limited to claims of being held in custody beyond sentence 

expiration, newly-discovered material facts, requests for delayed appeal, significant 

change in the law retroactively applicable that would probably overturn conviction or 

sentence, and actual innocence); Spreitz v. Ryan, 617 F. Supp.2d 887, 899–900 (D. Ariz. 

2009) (describing Arizona’s preclusion rule). 

 In addition to the limits regarding successive PCR petitions, Arizona has a time 

bar requiring filing of a notice for post-conviction relief within 90 days of sentencing or 

30 days from issuance of the mandate if an appeal is taken. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.4(a); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing 

untimeliness bar under Rule 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissing an Arizona petition for postconviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). If a claim does not fall 

within one of the exceptions in Rule 32 or is filed outside the time limits, the petition is 

subject to summary dismissal. See, e.g., State v. Diaz, 269 P.3d 717, 719–21, ¶¶ 5–13 

(Ariz. App. 2012). Because Arizona’s preclusion rule (Rule 32.2) and time-bar rule 

(Rule 32.4) are both independent and adequate either when specifically applied to a 

claim by an Arizona court, or when precluding a return to state court to exhaust a claim, 

they procedurally bar subsequent review of the merits of that claim by a federal habeas 

court. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (finding determinations made 

under Arizona’s procedural default rule are “independent” of federal law); Beaty v. 

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding unexhausted claims were 

procedurally defaulted because petitioner was “now time-barred under Arizona law from 

going back to state court”). 

 c. Cause and Prejudice 

This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 

(1986); States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). To demonstrate “cause,” a state 

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prisoner must show that some objective factor external to the prisoner or his counsel 

impeded efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 

U.S. at 488; Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908– 09 (9th Cir. 

1986). To show prejudice, the prisoner must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); 

see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 (“Such a showing of pervasive actual 

prejudice can hardly be thought to constitute anything other than a showing that the 

prisoner was denied ‘fundamental fairness’ at trial.”). To prove a “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice,” a prisoner must establish that, in light of new evidence, “it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. at 327; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536–40 (2006) (reaffirming 

Schlup’s miscarriage-of-justice exception and highlighting the standard is “demanding” 

and will permit review only in “extraordinary” cases); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). 

2. Petitioner’s Unexhausted/Defaulted Claims 

a. Ground One is Unexhausted 

Ground One is unexhausted because it was not raised as a federal claim in state 

court. In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that his convictions were “obtained as a result of 

evidence that was insufficient. . . ,” which violates his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights; Petitioner cites Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307 (1979). (Doc. 1 at 

7.) 5 Although Petitioner raised an insufficiency of the evidence claim in his direct appeal 

opening brief, he did not assert that this violated any federal law or constitutional right. 

(Exh.K, Doc. 10-1 at 52-76.) Petitioner’s appellate brief cites only Arizona cases and 

statutes. (Exh.K, Doc. 10-1 at 52, 68-74.) Thus, Ground One is unexhausted, see 

section III(B)(1)(a), supra. 

 

5

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insufficient evidence. 

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b. Grounds Two through Seven and Nine through Eleven are 

Unexhausted

 By not presenting grounds Two through Seven and Nine through Eleven to any 

state court, Petitioner failed to exhaust those grounds. Proper exhaustion requires a 

petitioner to “invok[e] one complete round of the State’s established appellate review 

process,” presenting the same federal claim to each court in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845; see also Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 

at 1025. A petitioner fails to exhaust a claim for federal review unless he presents it to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d at 998 & n.3 (citing 

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d at 1010–11). 

Grounds Two through Seven and Nine through Eleven were not raised in either 

Petitioner’s direct appeal (Exh.K, Doc. 10-1 at 52-76.) or in his PCR petition (Exh. AA, 

Doc. 10-2 at 27-45 ) that was considered on its merits (Exh. DD, Doc. 10-2 at 86-92). In 

this habeas action, Petitioner concedes that the first time he raised any of these grounds 

was in his “third PCR petition” — his December, 2013, pro per PCR petition at Exh. JJ, 

Doc. 10-3 at 7-82. (See Doc. 1 at 5, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 24.) Because the 

December, 2013, pro per PCR petition (Exh. JJ, Doc. 10-3 at 7-82), was dismissed as 

untimely (Exh. LL, 10-4 at 106-108), Grounds Two through Seven and Nine through 

Eleven were not fairly presented to the state court. “When a state-law default prevents 

the state court from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily not 

be reviewed in federal court.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 801. Thus, because 

Petitioner’s state-law default prevented the state court from reaching the merits of these 

claims, this federal court is barred from reviewing Two through Seven and Nine through 

Eleven as they are unexhausted. 

 c. Procedural Default/Futility 

It would be futile for Petitioner to return to state court for proper exhaustion of 

Grounds One through Seven and Nine Through Eleven. Any further PCR petition or any 

petition for review from the denial of an untimely PCR notice would be found untimely. 

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Further, any attempt to raise these claims in a successive PCR petition, including raising 

them as federal claims, would be unsuccessful because these claims would be precluded 

given that these claims were not raised in Petitioner’s direct appeal or previous PCR 

proceedings. They also would not qualify for any of the limited exceptions to the timebar or preclusion rules to raise in a successive PCR petition. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.1(d), 32.2(a)(2), 32.2(b), & 32.4(a). This applies equally to Ground Eleven alleging 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67, ¶ 14 

(Ariz. 2006) (“As a general rule, when ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, 

or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding, subsequent claims of 

ineffective assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.”) (internal quotation 

omitted). Accordingly, Grounds One through Seven and Nine through Eleven are 

procedurally defaulted. 

 d. Cause and Prejudice 

Petitioner has not suggested an external, objective factor that could have 

reasonably prevented him from raising Grounds One through Seven and Nine through 

Eleven in the state courts. Nor has Petitioner shown actual prejudice to excuse the 

procedural default. Further, he has not alleged or demonstrated that it would be a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice to deny jurisdiction to hear Grounds One through 

Seven and Nine through Eleven. 

In Ground Ten, Petitioner claims that he is actually innocent of committing the 

charged crime. (Doc. 1 at 24 of 87.) To the extent that Ground Ten’s actual innocence 

claim is an attempt to excuse his procedural defaults, Petitioner does not set forth new 

reliable evidence of innocence nor does he make a sufficient showing of innocence to 

establish a miscarriage of justice. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. at 536–40; Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. at 327. 

“‘[A]ctual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency” of 

the evidence. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623–24 (1998); see also United 

States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating petitioner’s “procedural 

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default could be excused if he could show actual, factual innocence, not just legal 

insufficiency of the evidence”). “To be credible,” a gateway claim of actual innocence 

requires “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, 

trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at 

trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 324. “‘[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold 

requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no 

juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.’” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. --, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) (quoting 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 329). Actual-innocence claims open the gateway for review 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of non-harmless constitutional error.’” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1936 

(quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 316). 

In support of his actual innocence claim, Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor 

withheld witness statements that “provide exculpatory evidence of innocence negative to 

prosecutions case” when Detective Udd testified to the grand jury about “fictitious bullet 

wounds, fictitious injuries.” (Doc. 1 at 24.) Petitioner’s argument is essentially that the 

evidence was insufficient to indict and/or convict, which is not only belied by the record, 

but does not present new exculpatory evidence. Petitioner did not meet the “demanding” 

actual-innocence standard in his Petition. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1928. 

Petitioner did not provide any new exculpatory evidence. As Respondent points 

out, statements made by Detective Udd to the grand jury do not constitute new evidence. 

Further and importantly, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient 

trial evidence to convict Petitioner. See pages 3 & 4, supra. Trial evidence reviewed by 

this Court is consistent with the findings of the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Count 4 charged Petitioner with aggravated assault, which required the State to 

prove that Petitioner “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused a physical injury to” 

the victim using a “deadly weapon, to wit: a handgun.” (Doc. 1-1 at 157.) Count 5 

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charged Petitioner with attempted kidnapping, which required the State to prove that 

Petitioner “knowingly attempted to restrain [the victim’s] movements” and “the restraint 

was accomplished . . . by physical force, intimidation or deception” in a manner that 

interfered substantially with the victim’s movements, “with the intent to inflict death, 

physical injury. . .” (Doc. 1-1 at 157-158.) 

At trial, the victim testified that he knew Petitioner through a friend (named 

Young) of the victim’s girlfriend, and the victim also knew Young’s minor daughter. 

The victim testified that on September 17, 2005, he was staying with Young. He walked 

into Young’s house, and Petitioner hit him in the eye with the back end of a .40 caliber 

gun. The victim testified that Petitioner and Young beat him for 5 to 10 minutes in the 

living room, and at one point, Petitioner fired his gun and the bullet grazed the victim’s 

head. The victim ran out the back door and yelled for help, but Petitioner caught up to 

him and tackled him to the ground. Young followed them outside, where Petitioner and 

Young held the victim down and continued kicking him and beating him for another 5 to 

10 minutes. Because the victim was on the ground being beaten by both Petitioner and 

Young, he “couldn’t go no wheres.” (Doc. 1-4 at 27-42, 70, 85, 89-90, 95-96) 

Further, according to the victim’s testimony, Petitioner and Young duct-taped the 

victim’s mouth to keep him from screaming, but the victim was able to pull the tape off 

because his blood prevented the tape’s adhesive from sticking to his face. The beating 

finally ended when the police said, “Freeze,” and Petitioner as well as Young “just 

dropped everything.” (Doc. 1-4 at 38-39, 41.) 

The victim’s testimony was corroborated by Young’s neighbor, Rodriguez, a 

retired federal law enforcement officer, who lived five houses down from Young. 

Rodriguez witnessed some of the assault and kidnapping. He testified at trial that he was 

fixing his coffee that morning when a neighbor ran over and told him about the 

commotion at Young’s house. Rodriguez told his wife to call 911, grabbed his gun and 

badge, and ran towards the house where the incident was happening. As Rodriguez 

approached the house, the police were arriving at the scene. Through a chain link fence, 

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Rodriguez saw three people and heard someone yelling for “help” and saying, “I swear I 

didn’t hit her.” Victim Pena was on the ground, covered with blood, Petitioner was 

holding victim Pena’s hands, to “keep him down,” and Young was by Pena’s legs, 

reaching for a piece of wood. At that point, Rodriguez yelled “freeze” and announced 

that he had a gun. Then the police officers came over. (Doc. 1-2 at 121–28, 131–32.) 

Trial testimony by several responding law enforcement officers also corroborated 

the victim’s account of the assault and attempted kidnaping. The officers arrived at the 

scene, heard the victim’s panicked screams and when they got to the backyard, saw 

Rodriguez pointing a gun through a chain link fence at Petitioner, Young, and the victim. 

Law enforcement witnesses testified that when they found victim Pena in the backyard, 

he was “very, very bloody,” his eyes were swelling shut, and he was screaming that he 

had been shot in the head. Petitioner was standing over the victim when the police 

arrived. Petitioner had blood on his clothes. Both Petitioner and Young had their “hands 

up almost like they were ready to strike” the victim. (Doc. 1-2 at 105–112, 139–147; 

Doc. 1-3 at 12–19, 52-53.) 

Detective Udd presented more corroborating trial testimony. He found a bullet 

hole in the living room wall, a gun with a broken grip, and wet blood spatter stains. 

Based on the position of the slide on the gun and the shell casing of the bullet in the gun, 

Detective Udd testified that, “the gun was most likely striking somebody at the time it 

was actually discharged.” When Detective Udd interviewed the victim five months after 

the assault, the victim’s shaved head revealed several scars and staples on the crown of 

his head. (Doc. 1-2 at 36- 41, 52-55, 65-66, 101, 144–45.) 

 Petitioner’s assertions of “actual innocence” amount, at best, to a reasonable 

doubt argument. Even if there was not overwhelming trial evidence against Petitioner, a 

possible reasonable doubt argument is not enough. When evaluating an actual innocence 

claim, “[i]t is not the district court’s independent judgment as to whether reasonable 

doubt exists that the standard addresses.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. at 329. Because 

Petitioner has not provided any new reliable evidence to show that “no juror, acting 

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reasonably would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” Petitioner 

has not shown he is actually innocent under the demanding standard for actual innocence 

in the federal habeas context. Id. 

C. Petitioner’s Exhausted Claims Are Not Meritorious 

 Remaining Grounds Twelve and Thirteen, while exhausted, are without merit 

under the deferential standard required by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act (“AEDPA”). See section II, supra. Grounds Twelve and Thirteen both allege 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Under clearly established Federal law regarding 

ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”), Petitioner needs to show that his trial counsel’s 

performance was both (a) objectively deficient and (b) caused him prejudice. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

 “Mere conclusory allegations in support of a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue.” Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 

1042 (5th Cir. 1998) (habeas petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

ensure that bench conferences were all recorded was not supported by facts showing 

prejudice). In Strickland v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court provided guidance to 

courts assessing claims such as Petitioner’s: 

Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is 

all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after 

conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining 

counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a 

particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. . . . [A] court must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689 (citations omitted). “[T]here is a strong 

presumption that [counsel took certain actions] for tactical reasons rather than through 

sheer neglect”. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 191 (2011) (citations omitted). 

Strategic choices as to how to defend a case are “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690. 

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This results in a “doubly deferential” review of counsel’s performance. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011). The Court has discretion to determine which 

Strickland prong to apply first. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1998). 

A habeas court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must determine 

“whether there is a reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential 

standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an unreasonable 

application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist could disagree 

that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). In other words, this Court’s “pivotal question 

is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). 

Petitioner received objectively deficient representation if his counsel “’fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness’ such that it was outside ‘the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 

725 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687). To demonstrate 

prejudice, Markland “must show that there [wa]s a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694. 

 1. Ground Twelve 

Ground Twelve asserts that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to file a motion 

in limine in reference to Petitioner’s relationship with Young’s minor daughter (Doc. 1 at 

31–33.) The PCR petition filed December 27, 2011, and considered by the superior 

court on its merits, asserted that “defense counsel should have filed a motion to preclude” 

evidence that Petitioner “had a relationship with a minor and that was the reason for the 

assault” and the failure to do so was ineffective and prejudiced Petitioner. (Exh. AA 

Doc. 10-2 at 27-45.) 

After response and reply to the December 27, 2011, PCR petition, the superior 

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court fully discussed and expressly denied the claim, finding that trial counsel was not 

ineffective. (Exhs. BB–DD, Doc. 10-2 at 46-92.) The superior court found that the 

relationship evidence was permissible as “proof of motive” under Arizona Rules of 

Evidence 404(b) and because “preemptive introduction of this evidence was a tactical 

decision well within the accepted professional guidelines and did not improperly 

prejudice” Petitioner’s case. (Exh. DD, Doc. 10-2 at 86-92.) The superior court wrote : 

Petitioner’s argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

move in limine to exclude evidence of his relationship with a minor also 

fails. Although Arizona does not allow the admission of prior crimes, 

wrongs, or other acts in order to show a defendant’s character and action in 

accordance therewith, that evidence may be admitted to show “proof of 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident.” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). However, even the 

most relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the threat of its prejudicial effect. Ariz. R. 

Evid. 403. 

A trial court has wide latitude in exercising its discretion over the relevancy 

and admissibility of evidence at trial. See, e.g., State v. Neal, 143 Ariz. 93, 

101, 692 P.2d 272, 280 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Smith, 136 Ariz. 273, 276, 

665 P.2d 995, 998 (Ariz. 1983). A trial court’s exercise of discretion cannot 

be reversed absent clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Taylor, 169 Ariz. 

121, 126, 817 P.2d 488, 493 (Ariz. 1991). 

The State introduced evidence of Petitioner’s relationship with a minor, the 

daughter of Petitioner’s co-defendant, on the theory that Petitioner’s 

jealousy towards a perceived relationship between the minor and the victim 

motivated the assault. This theory made the evidence relevant and 

admissible under Rule 404. The Court finds that probative value of the 

evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Evidence that goes 

towards motive is often admitted and may be detrimental to a defendant’s 

case. However, it takes more to preclude evidence under Rule 403. 

Petitioner believes the motive is a fiction, created by the State for the sole 

purpose of introducing Petitioner’s relationship with a minor to prejudice 

the jury. Further, Petitioner believes that his co-defendant never made any 

statements to Detective Udd regarding Petitioner’s relationship with the 

minor. Petitioner speculates that Detective Udd simply fabricated these 

statements and added them to the transcript of the interview. A colorable 

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claim recognizable under Rule 32 requires more than fanciful speculation 

of police misconduct. See Adamson, 136 Ariz. at 265, 665 P.2d at 987 

(holding that bare allegations of misconduct fail to state a “colorable claim” 

worthy of Rule 32 relief). 

Petitioner also takes exception to the manner in which his trial attorney 

decided to deal with the evidence of Petitioner’s relationship with the codefendant’s minor daughter. Rather than wait for the State to present 

evidence of the relationship between Petitioner and the minor child, 

Petitioner’s attorney presented the evidence proactively. “Drawing the 

sting” is a well established tactical decision designed to reduce the impact 

of harmful evidence. The Court need only repeat that a attorney’s tactical 

decision as to how to defend a case is virtually unassailable in subsequent 

proceedings. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Here, the Court finds no error. 

(Exh. DD, Doc. 10-2 at 86-92.) In deciding the petition for review of the superior court’s 

decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals first found the claim precluded because Markland 

failed to raise this claim in his first PCR proceeding. (Exh. HH, Doc. 10-3 at 1-4.) The 

Court then found, “[e]ven ignoring preclusion,” relief is denied because the trial court 

correctly ruled upon the issue. Id. Because the Arizona Court of Appeals simply adopted 

the superior court’s ruling, in denying relief, the superior court’s decision denying 

Petitioner’s PCR petition is the last reasoned state court decision. The superior court’s 

ruling was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Strickland and was not 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the trial evidence. 

 Trial counsel’s decision not to file a motion in limine and instead be the first to ask 

a witness about Petitioner’s relationship with Young’s minor daughter did not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to file meritless 

motions. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (“the failure to take a 

futile action can never be deficient performance”); see also Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 

346 (9th Cir. 1994). Generally, ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a 

motion is a two-fold to show not only likelihood of success on the motion, but also that 

the grant of a motion would create a more favorable outcome itself. Styers v. Schriro, 

547 F. 3d 1026, 1030 (9the Cir. 1998); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 

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383-91 (1986). 

In this case, the prosecutor was laying the groundwork for Petitioner’s motive to 

assault the victim on direct examination of Detective Udd. The prosecutor asked 

Detective Udd in direct whether his early interviews revealed evidence that the victim 

had molested Young’s daughter. (Doc. 1-2 at 45-46.) Counsel knew before trial and 

Detective Udd testified at trial that one of Detective Udd’s reports stated that Young’s 

minor daughter claimed that the victim tried to crawl into bed with her several times on 

dates preceding the alleged events and made her uncomfortable. (Doc. 1-2 at 68-69.) 

Counsel also knew before trial that one of Detective Udd’s reports stated that Young 

reported a romantic relationship between Petitioner and Young’s minor daughter. (Doc. 

1-2 at 72-73). 

A motion in limine to preclude evidence of Petitioner’s relationship with Young’s 

minor daughter would have been unsuccessful because, as the trial court correctly found, 

evidence of other acts may be admitted as proof of motive. Here, evidence of Petitioner’s 

relationship with Young’s minor daughter was proof of Petitioner’s motive to assault the 

victim who had gotten into bed with the minor daughter and made her uncomfortable. 

Simply because this evidence was detrimental to Petitioner’s case does not mean that it 

was more prejudicial than probative. 

 Further, defense counsel’s decision to fully question Detective Udd about the 

relationship before the state did so to “draw the sting” from this evidence, as well as to 

use the lack of reference to the relationship in a witness interview recording to impeach 

Detective Udd (Doc. 1-2 at 59-92), was a strategic decision that did not constitute 

deficient performance. “[D]rawing the ‘sting’ from the opposing party’s anticipated 

arguments through the presentation of one’s own case is a standard and proper litigation 

technique.” United States v. Feldman, 788 F.2d 544, 555 (9th Cir. 1986). This litigation 

technique does not constitute deficient performance. See Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 

1263, 1273 (9th Cir. 1986) (counsel not ineffective for first mentioning that the defendant 

was talking about a drug deal and had prior convictions for drug offenses to draw the 

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sting from impeachment of the defendant when he testified.). Defense counsel’s 

strategic decision to draw the sting on the purported relationship between Petitioner and 

his co-assailant’s minor daughter finds support in the “strong presumption that counsel’s 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (citations omitted). Moreover, Petitioner has 

failed to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id.

The Court has reviewed the record that was relied on by the superior court and 

concurs with its factual and legal conclusions. Because Petitioner has not shown 

deficient performance, much less prejudice, the superior court’s ruling denying this claim 

was neither contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Strickland, and was not based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. 

Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on ground 12. 

2. Ground Thirteen 

Ground Thirteen of the Petition asserts that Petitioner’s trial counsel was 

ineffective by agreeing to the dismissal of the charges in Counts 1, 2, and 3 in exchange 

for releasing Detective Udd from further testimony and not filing a motion for mistrial 

based on possible unavailability of Detective Udd for further trial testimony. (Doc. 1 at 

34–37.) The same PCR petition with his second appointed PCR counsel, filed December 

27, 2011, that raised Ground Twelve also raised Ground Thirteen. The PCR petition filed 

December 27, 2011, asserted that defense counsel was ineffective when he failed to move 

for a mistrial instead of agreeing to the dismissal of Counts 1, 2, and 3 because Detective 

Udd was unable to return to court and complete his testimony. (Exh. AA, Doc. 10-2 at 

27-45.) It was further asserted that defense counsel never consulted with Petitioner 

regarding this agreement and that if he had, Petitioner would have requested a full 

mistrial, or alternatively, that the trial court strike the detective’s testimony. (Id.) The 

same assertion, that Petitioner did not approve the stipulation, is in the Petition before this 

Court. (Doc. 1 at 34; Doc. 11 at 12.) 

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After considering the PCR petition response and reply (Exhs. BB–DD, Doc. 10-2 

at 46-92), the superior court denied the claim, finding that “by accepting the stipulation 

rather than moving for a mistrial, Petitioner’s attorney acted well within reasonable 

professional standards” and this “did not prejudice Petitioner’s case.” (Exh. DD, Doc. 

10-2 at 86-92.) The trial court wrote: 

Petitioner’s final ground for post-conviction relief is the least meritorious, 

and, therefore, the easiest to resolve. Petitioner contends that trial counsel 

was ineffective in agreeing to release Detective Udd from his subpoena in 

exchange for the dismissal of counts 1, 2, and 3. The argument goes that 

because Petitioner was never asked if he was willing to agree to this 

stipulation, he is entitled to post-conviction relief in this Court. 

First, the decision to trade the subpoena for the dismissal of three counts of 

the indictment was a tactical decision by trial counsel that is entitled to 

great deference by the Court. Second, Petitioner’s argument is not 

supported by the facts. The Court engaged Petitioner in a discussion about 

the stipulation. The Court asked Petitioner if Petitioner understood what 

was happening regarding the stipulation, if Petitioner had weighed the pros 

and cons, if Petitioner had been advised by his lawyer regarding the 

stipulation, and if Petitioner agreed to the stipulation. Petitioner made a 

knowing and reasonable decision with the assistance of not only his own 

attorney, but following a lengthy colloquy with the Court itself. R.T. 

10/23/06, at 15-23. Petitioner’s decision saved him from the possibility of 

conviction on three felony counts. A mistrial simply would have put him 

back at square one. 

(Exh. DD, Doc. 10-2 at 86-92.) Ground Thirteen, like Ground Twelve, was raised in the 

petition for review of the superior court’s decision. (Exh. EE, Doc. 10-2 at 93-116.) 

Also like for Ground Twelve, the Arizona Court of Appeals first found the claim 

precluded because Petitioner failed to raise this claim in his first PCR proceeding. (Exh. 

HH, Doc. 10-3 at 1-4.) The Court of Appeals then found, “[e]ven ignoring preclusion,” 

relief is denied because the superior court correctly ruled upon the issue. (Exh. HH, Doc. 

10-3 at 1-4.) The superior court’s decision denying Petitioner’s PCR petition is the last 

reasoned decision of the state courts because the Arizona Court of Appeals simply 

adopted the superior court’s ruling, in denying relief. 

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The superior court’s ruling was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application 

of Strickland, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented at trial. Petitioner was present when the parties first discussed 

Detective Udd not being available because of a planned vacation and possible options 

because of his unavailability. (Doc. 1-2 at 185-188; Doc. 1-3 at 59–85.) Further, 

Petitioner was present for the additional discussion amongst the parties and the trial court 

about releasing Detective Udd from further subpoena. 

In addition, the trial court engaged in a colloquy with Petitioner which 

demonstrated that Petitioner was consulted about the stipulation, had adequate 

opportunity to discuss the stipulation with his counsel, understood the stipulation, and 

agreed on the record to the stipulation. (Doc. 1-4 at 16–23.) Petitioner answered “yes” 

and “correct” to the following inquiries of him by the trial court: “[Y]ou’ve heard the 

discussion here on the record regarding the issue relating to Detective Udd’s continued 

availability for testimony here in the court. You were present during all of that?” “And 

you’ve had an opportunity to talk to your lawyer not only about that but about this offer 

that was made by the state; is that correct?” “And you’ve weighed and balanced the pros 

and cons based on your conversation with your lawyer; is that correct?” “And are you 

agreeing to the stipulation as now stated on the record?” “And you agree to have 

Detective Udd released from his subpoena as a result of that, correct?” (Doc. 1-4 at 16–

23.) 

 To be clear, Detective Udd did testify on direct, cross, and re-direct during the 

trial. (Doc. 1-2 at 18-102.) Defense counsel vigorously cross examined Detective Udd. 

(Doc. 1-2 at 59-92.) A portion of this cross examination was highlighted in the Petition. 

(Doc. 1 at 32-33.) The only cross examination that did not take place was based on a 

supplemental report that was disclosed to defense counsel the day of Detective Udd’s 

testimony (Doc. 1-2 at 83); the trial court stated in response to defense counsel’s request 

for Detective Udd to be recalled about the newly disclosed report: 

Counsel, to make it clear for the record, I will grant you leave to further 

examine this officer with respect to – I believe it was described as A to the 

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original report. 

I am not – I wanted to make it clear that you will not have free reign or 

open-ended cross examination or ability to recall this this witness for 

purposes of cross-examination, but only on the limited basis of not having 

received the report, and you may choose not to recall him, but you will 

have that possibility. 

(Exh. 1-2 at 92.) Further, a part of the agreement to dismiss the charges in Count’s 1, 2, 

and 3 was that the statements reflected in the supplemental report may be used for 

impeachment purposes of the victim at trial. (Doc. 1-2 at 83, Doc. 1-4 at 23.) 

Stipulations are generally given deference upon review. “Review of counsel’s 

performance is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s 

conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable representation.” United States v. 

Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Hensley v. Crist, 67 

F.3d 181, 184-85 (9th Cir. 1995) (tactical decision to submit murder case on stipulated 

facts was not ineffective). Even where a stipulation is entered over the defendant’s 

objection, which was not the circumstance here, failure to show lack of consultation or 

prejudice can fail the claim of effectiveness. See Allerdice v. Ryan, 395 Fed. Appx. 449 

(2010). 

 The benefit to Petitioner of the stipulation is obvious, that he faced only two 

charges instead of five, which greatly lessened his exposure to a longer sentence. The 

counts which were dismissed occurred on a separate occasion than Counts 4 and 5, such 

that the sentences would have been imposed consecutively. 

Furthermore, Detective Udd was an adverse witness and his testimony was 

harmful to Petitioner’s case. It was in Petitioner’s best interests for Detective Udd not to 

return to present additional trial testimony. Petitioner’s counsel had already extensively 

and effectively cross-examined Detective Udd. (Doc. 1-2 at 59-90.) Had Detective Udd 

returned for supplemental examination, it is possible that some of the damage caused by 

defense counsel’s cross-examination would have been cured. 

Also Petitioner’s counsel’s statements while discussing the Detective Udd 

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testimony issue with the trial court and prosecutor outside of the presence of the jury are 

consistent with the view that further cross of Detective Udd was not desired; what was 

desired is opportunity to impeach the victim if needed with a late disclosed report by 

Detective Udd. Petitioner’s counsel stated that based on his review of the report, “I don’t 

think I’m gonna cross-examine him any further,” (Doc. 1-3 at 65), but delayed final 

decision on such which parlayed Detective Udd’s unavailability for further trial 

testimony into dismissal of three of the serious charges against Petitioner (Doc. 1-3 at 65-

85, Doc. 1-4 at 15-23). 

The Court has reviewed the record that was relied on by the superior court and 

concurs with its factual and legal conclusions. For the reasons above, Petitioner is not 

entitled to federal habeas relief on Ground Thirteen. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 The Petition should be denied and dismissed with prejudice because Ground Ten, 

asserting actual innocence, to the extent it is raised as an independent ground, is not 

cognizable as a federal habeas claim, Grounds One through Seven and Nine through 

Eleven are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted without excuse, there is no Ground 

Eight in the Petition, and Grounds Twelve and Thirteen are without merit. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Harold Eugene Markland’s 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be

denied because dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists 

of reason would not find the ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the 

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 22nd day of September, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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