Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-07156/USCOURTS-caDC-07-07156-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 16, 2008 Decided November 14, 2008

No. 07-7156

BRIDGETTE FEEMSTER, ET AL.,

APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

v.

BSA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

Consolidated with 07-7166

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv01901)

Robert E. Greenberg argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant/cross-appellee.

Julie H. Becker argued the cause for appellees/crossappellants. With her on the briefs were Barbara McDowell and

Clifford J. Zatz. Eliza T. Platts-Mills entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, GARLAND, and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judges.

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1

 “Section 8” refers to Section 8 of the United States Housing Act

of 1937, which was added by the Housing and Community

Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 633,

662-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f).

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Current and former tenants in

properties owned by BSA Limited Partnership contend that BSA

unlawfully refused to accept their federal vouchers as payment

for rent, in violation of federal housing statutes and the District

of Columbia Human Rights Act. The district court granted

summary judgment for the tenants on the federal claims and for

BSA on the Human Rights Act claim. We affirm the judgment

in favor of the tenants but reverse the judgment in favor of BSA.

I

BSA has owned and managed a set of residential properties

in northwest Washington, D.C., known as the Bates Street

Townhomes, since the early 1980s. The development contains

thirty-seven units spread across thirty buildings on five streets.

From 1982 to 2004, BSA participated in the Section 8 rental

assistance program administered by the United States

Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).1

Throughout that period, BSA contractually agreed to limit a

tenant’s portion of the rent to a percentage of the family’s

income and to accept the remainder from HUD in the form of a

“project-based” subsidy. HUD also provided BSA with

mortgage insurance for the Bates Street Townhomes. All nine

plaintiffs in this case received rental assistance through the

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2

 BSA did not dispute the tenants’ statement of facts in the district

court, see Feemster v. BSA Ltd. P’ship, 471 F. Supp. 2d 87, 88 n.2

(D.D.C. 2007), nor does it here. We therefore follow the district court

in treating their factual assertions as conceded.

Section 8 program. Several have lived in the Bates Street

Townhomes for over twenty years.2

Following the expiration of its Housing Assistance

Payments Contract in 2002, BSA decided to opt out of the

Section 8 program. It prepaid its HUD-insured mortgage, sent

a one-year notice to tenants on September 30, 2003, and allowed

its final contract extension with HUD to expire on September

30, 2004. In the summer of 2004, BSA employees began to

encourage -- and then to press -- tenants to vacate their units,

offering financial compensation to those who agreed to leave.

At the time of its opt-out, BSA had arranged to sell the Bates

Street Townhomes to a third-party developer. Although the

initial deal fell through, BSA continued its efforts to sell the

properties and in 2005 found a new buyer, TMS Investments,

LLC. The contract with TMS expressly conditioned the

purchase of individual units on their being vacant at the time of

closing. BSA has not accepted new tenants at the Bates Street

Townhomes since January 2003.

Under federal law, when an owner opts out of a projectbased Section 8 contract, assisted families in that project may

elect to remain in their units and receive “enhanced vouchers.”

See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t). With such a voucher, the tenant’s rent

subsidy may be “enhanced” (pursuant to a formula) to cover the

difference between the previous rent and the new market rent.

Id. Alluding to the enhanced voucher provision, BSA’s opt-out

letter to its tenants stated: 

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Federal law allows you to elect to continue living at

this property provided that the unit, the rent, and we,

the owners, meet the requirements of the Section 8

tenant-based assistance program. As an Owner, we

will honor your right as a tenant to remain at the

property on this basis as long as it continues to be

offered as rental housing, provided that there is no

cause for eviction under Federal, State or local law.

J.A. 670.

In conjunction with BSA’s opt-out, the District of Columbia

Housing Authority (DCHA), which administers the Section 8

program in the District, determined that the tenants were eligible

for enhanced vouchers. When tenants tried to use their vouchers

for rental payments, however, BSA refused to accept them or to

execute the necessary lease agreements. Starting in September

2004, BSA wrote letters to the tenants declaring that it would

not sign the paperwork required for use of the vouchers, but

stating that, “provided you pay the rent charged and otherwise

abide by the terms of your tenancy, you may continue to reside

in the property which you currently lease until such time as

[you] may be required to vacate upon appropriate notice.” J.A.

673-78. Each letter specified the “current rent” for that tenant’s

unit. Id. Thereafter, the tenants “continued to pay rent each

month to BSA, either at the full market amount or at the [lower]

amount established by the project-based Section 8 program.”

J.A. 594 (Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute

¶ 15).

On November 2, 2004, the tenants filed their initial

complaint in this action, together with an application for a

temporary restraining order (TRO). The district court granted

a TRO two days later, requiring BSA “to initiate the process of

accepting [the tenants’] enhanced vouchers, to wit: immediately

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3

 The four plaintiffs who purchased their homes were Mary

Brown, Beatrice Harris, Shirley Holland, and Dyanne Johnson. See

Feemster v. BSA Ltd. P’ship, No. 04-1901, Joint Status Report ¶ 1

(D.D.C. June 30, 2006). The lead plaintiff, Bridgette Feemster, did

not purchase her unit and moved out of the Bates Street Townhomes

in February 2006. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs Michelle Hawkins, Lillian

Johnson, Sabrina Lymore, and Dorothy Paul still reside in their units

as tenants. In light of these developments, the plaintiffs conceded that

the injunctive claims were moot with respect to Feemster and the four

homebuyers, but continued to press their damages claims. Id. ¶¶ 1-2.

sign, complete, and submit any necessary papers to the District

of Columbia Housing Authority to begin the ‘lease-up’ process

so that [the tenants] will be able to use their enhanced vouchers

at their current homes.” Feemster v. BSA Ltd. P’ship, No.

04-1901, TRO at 2 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2004). BSA initiated the

lease-up process with DCHA as ordered, but refused to complete

the paperwork that DCHA required to pay the rent subsidy on

behalf of the tenants.

Shortly after the court issued the TRO, BSA offered the

tenants the opportunity to buy their homes, in accordance with

the District of Columbia’s Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act,

D.C. Code § 42-3404.02 et seq. With assistance from a local

nonprofit housing developer, four tenants negotiated contracts

for sale. On the day before closing, BSA informed the tenants

that it would not complete the sales unless they reimbursed it for

approximately $37,000 in rent they allegedly had not paid since

the commencement of the litigation -- rent that would have been

covered by the enhanced vouchers had BSA been willing to

accept them. To allow the sales to go forward, the district court

facilitated an arrangement under which the tenants agreed to

place the disputed sum in an escrow account administered by a

settlement attorney.3

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In January 2005, BSA served the remaining tenants with

180-day eviction notices. When the tenants refused to move out

at the end of the 180 days, BSA brought an action to evict them

in District of Columbia Superior Court. On August 28, 2007,

the Superior Court ruled that BSA’s eviction notices were

“inadequate as a matter of law” and that the tenants were

entitled to remain in their units. Hawkins v. BSA Ltd. P’ship,

No. 04-6839, Order at 4 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Aug. 28, 2007). BSA

has filed an appeal from that judgment in the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals, where it is currently pending.

In their U.S. District Court complaint, the tenants argued

that BSA was required to accept their enhanced vouchers until

their tenancies were validly terminated under District of

Columbia law, and that its refusal to do so violated both federal

housing statutes and the District of Columbia Human Rights

Act. On January 12, 2007, the district court granted summary

judgment for the plaintiffs on their federal claims, finding it

“clear that ‘families renting at the time of the termination of [a]

project-based subsidy contract [have] the right to remain in their

units, using enhanced vouchers, for so long as the tenant remains

eligible for the vouchers or until the tenant is evicted.’”

Feemster v. BSA Ltd. P’ship, 471 F. Supp. 2d 87, 98 (D.D.C.

2007) (quoting Jeanty v. Shore Terrace Realty Ass’n, No. 03-

8669, 2004 WL 1794496, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2004)). On

the D.C. Human Rights Act claim, however, the district court

granted summary judgment in favor of BSA, finding that the

plaintiffs failed to show “that an impermissible factor played a

motivating or substantial role” in BSA’s refusal to accept their

enhanced vouchers. Id. at 102.

BSA now appeals the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the tenants on the federal housing law

claims. The tenants cross-appeal the court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of BSA on the D.C. Human Rights Act

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4

 The tenants’ complaint also alleged that BSA’s actions violated

the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C.

Code § 28-3901 et seq. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 94-96. The district

court granted summary judgment to BSA on this claim, and the

tenants do not pursue it on appeal.

5

 Additional statutory and regulatory provisions echo § 1437f(t)’s

right-to-remain language. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(8)(A) (requiring

owners’ opt-out notices to “include a statement that . . . in the event of

termination [HUD] will provide tenant-based rental assistance to all

eligible residents, enabling them to choose the place they wish to rent,

which is likely to include the dwelling unit in which they currently

reside”); 24 C.F.R. § 402.8(c) (2006) (“In the case where a contract

for Section 8 rental assistance for a project is terminated or expires, an

assisted family may elect to remain in the project and, if eligible,

receive tenant-based Section 8 assistance under Section 8(t) of the

United States Housing Act of 1937.”).

claim.4 We review grants of summary judgment de novo.

Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 991 (D.C.

Cir. 2002). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c),

summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

II

The United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended by the

Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of

1997 and subsequent legislation, gives a family that receives an

enhanced voucher the right to “elect to remain in the same

project in which the family was residing on the date” that the

project owner’s Section 8 contract expires. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1437f(t)(1)(B).5 BSA does not dispute that § 1437f(t) gives

tenants the right to remain in their units despite an opt-out; it

does not dispute that, under appropriate circumstances, an

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opting-out project owner must permit its tenants to use enhanced

vouchers for rental payments; and it does not dispute that the

tenants may sue to enforce their § 1437f(t) rights in federal

court. “This is a single issue case,” BSA informs us, and that

issue is whether its units were being “offered for rental housing”

at the time it refused the tenants’ enhanced vouchers.

Appellant’s Br. 7; see Oral Arg. Recording at 10:48. 

According to BSA, tenants have the right to remain in their

units, and landlords have a corresponding obligation to accept

the tenants’ enhanced vouchers, only as long as the units are

“offered for rental housing.” Moreover, whether a unit is

offered for rental housing is a question of the landlord’s

subjective intent. Because BSA seeks to exit the rental business

-- because it wants to offer its units for sale rather than for rent

-- BSA maintains that it is not “offer[ing]” its units for rental

housing.

The caveat upon which BSA rests its entire appeal -- that a

tenant’s right to remain is “conditioned on the unit[] being

‘offered for rental housing,’” Appellant’s Reply Br. 9 -- does not

appear in § 1437f(t). Nor does it appear anywhere else in the

U.S. Housing Act or in any other statute or regulation. Instead,

it appears in a sentence in a HUD policy guide that describes the

right-to-remain provision. See OFFICE OF MULTIFAMILY HOUS.,

U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SECTION 8 RENEWAL

POLICY § 11-3.B (2001) [hereinafter Policy Guide]. The

sentence in question reads as follows: “Tenants who receive an

enhanced voucher have the right to remain in their units as long

as the units are offered for rental housing . . . .” Id. (emphasis

added).

The degree of deference that we owe to such a policy guide

is uncertain. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,

234-35 (2001); see also Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki,

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128 S. Ct. 1147, 1156 (2008); Public Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t

of Health & Human Servs., 332 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

At the least, it is “eligible to claim respect according to its

persuasiveness.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 221 (citing Skidmore v.

Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). But even if we were to

accord the policy guide the full measure of deference dictated by

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984), under which we will uphold an agency’s

reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory language, it

would not help BSA’s case.

It does seem reasonable that the statutory right “to remain

in the same project in which the family was residing,” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1437f(t)(1)(B), applies only as long as the property itself

remains a rental property. The plaintiffs do not dispute this

point. They acknowledge that, if and when BSA lawfully

terminates their tenancies under D.C. law, “nothing in the

enhanced voucher rules will stand in its way” should BSA then

decide to refuse their vouchers and evict them. Appellees’ Br.

17. What the tenants dispute is BSA’s contention that their right

to remain in their homes -- and their concomitant right not to be

regarded as in default merely because they tendered vouchers

rather than cash -- depends on the subjective intent of the project

owner. In the tenants’ view, whether a unit remains a rental

property is determined by the law of the local jurisdiction. And

as of this date, the District of Columbia courts have determined

that the tenants have the right to continued occupancy.

The language BSA quotes from the policy guide -- that the

tenants have the right to remain “as long as the units are offered

for rental housing” -- is ambiguous. It could, as BSA asserts, be

read to condition a tenant’s right to remain on the landlord’s

intent rather than on the law of the jurisdiction. In context,

however, it is clear that this is not what HUD meant in using the

words “are offered.” Indeed, the very next sentence of the

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policy guide reflects the view of the plaintiffs in this case:

“Owners may not terminate the tenancy of a tenant who

exercises this right to remain except for cause under Federal,

State or local law.” Policy Guide § 11-3.B. Elsewhere in the

same policy guide, HUD requires owners to certify “that they

will comply with the requirement to allow families receiving

enhanced vouchers who elect to remain to do so as long as the

property remains a rental property, unless the owner has just

cause for eviction,” id. § 1-6.I (emphasis added), and to “agree

not to terminate the tenancy of a tenant who exercises [his or

her] right to remain, except for cause under State or local law,”

id. Attachment 3A-1, at 6. A contemporaneous HUD “Policy

and Processing Guidance” concerning Section 8 opt-outs

contains similar language: “A family that receives an enhanced

voucher has the right to remain in the project as long as the units

are used for rental housing and are otherwise eligible for

housing choice voucher assistance . . . . The owner may not

terminate the tenancy of a family that exercises its right to

remain except for a serious or repeated lease violation or other

good cause.” OFFICE OF PUB. & INDIAN HOUS., U.S. DEP’T OF

HOUS.&URBAN DEV.,NOTICE PIH2001-41, § II.B, at 26 (2001)

(emphasis added).

HUD’s publications thus use the phrase “offered for rental

housing” as synonymous with “remains a rental property” and

“used for rental housing.” Moreover, in each case the phrases

are coupled with a prohibition on terminating the tenancies

without cause. There is no reference at all to the landlord’s

intent. Taken together, HUD’s statements make clear that it

considers a property to be “offered for rental housing” until it is

withdrawn from rental use in accordance with the law of the

local jurisdiction. Accord Jeanty, 2004 WL 1794496, at *4

(“HUD has interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1437f to mean that families

who receive enhanced vouchers have the right to remain, and

that a landlord must accept their enhanced vouchers unless the

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6

 In addition to their U.S. Housing Act claim, the tenants’

complaint also alleged, and the district court held, that BSA’s actions

violated the National Housing Act, which instructs the Secretary of

HUD to assure that Section 8 “project owners not interfere with the

efforts of tenants to obtain rent subsidies or other public assistance.”

12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1b(b)(2). Because the parties did not brief this

issue on appeal and do not suggest that violation of this statute yields

a remedy any different from violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B),

we have no need to consider it.

landlord evicts them through the court system.” (citing the HUD

Policy Guide)). This is an objective inquiry tied to the legal

status of the property, not to the owner’s intentions. In light of

the statute’s plain text, its anti-displacement purpose, and

HUD’s reasonable and persuasive interpretation, the district

court correctly determined that the tenants’ right under

§ 1437f(t) to remain in their homes, and to pay their rent with

enhanced vouchers, is secure unless and until their tenancies are

validly terminated under D.C. law.

BSA protests that this interpretation of the statute will

ensnare landlords in an “endless lease.” Appellant’s Br. 12.

That is simply not the case. Neither the U.S. Housing Act nor

HUD’s interpretation of that Act bars landlords from terminating

a tenancy on any ground permitted by D.C. law. One thing that

BSA may not do, however, is refuse to accept payment by

voucher and then contend that eviction is warranted for

nonpayment of rent.6

III

The District of Columbia Human Rights Act makes it

unlawful to refuse to “conduct any transaction in real property,”

to “require different terms for such transaction,” or to “include

in the terms or conditions of a transaction in real property” any

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condition or restriction “wholly or partially for a discriminatory

reason based on” any of a list of specified factors, including an

individual’s “source of income.” D.C. Code § 2-1402.21(a)(1),

(2). The Act expressly provides that monetary assistance “under

section 8 of the United States Housing Act . . . shall be

considered a source of income under this section.” Id. § 2-

1402.21(e). Aggrieved persons have a cause of action for

damages and other remedies in any court of competent

jurisdiction. Id. § 2-1403.16. 

The tenants do not dispute that, during the time in which

they “remained in their units -- while their challenge to BSA’s

eviction claim was pending in the local D.C. courts -- they were

liable for monthly rent payments.” Appellees’ Reply Br. 1. Nor

does BSA dispute that, during this same period, it demanded that

the tenants pay rent from their own funds and not through the

Section 8 voucher program. BSA insists that this was not

“source of income” discrimination, however, because it was not

motivated by animus against vouchers or their users but rather

by “a desire to vacate the units so it could sell them.”

Appellant’s Reply Br. 8. The district court accepted BSA’s

argument that motive was dispositive. Applying what it

described as a “mixed motive” analysis, Feemster, 471 F. Supp.

2d at 100-01, the court concluded that “plaintiffs have not

established a prima facie case of discrimination under the

[Human Rights Act] because they have not shown that an

impermissible factor played a motivating or substantial role in

the action [BSA] has or has not taken; namely, that BSA refused

to accept the plaintiffs’ enhanced vouchers because their source

of income was the tenant-based Section 8 program,” id. at 102-

03.

The district court erred in resolving this case based on its

assessment of BSA’s motive. Although the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals has not yet “outlined the boundaries of sourceUSCA Case #07-7156 Document #1149273 Filed: 11/14/2008 Page 12 of 14
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of-income discrimination under the Human Rights Act,”

Blodgett v. University Club, 930 A.2d 210, 220 (D.C. 2007), in

interpreting that Act it has “‘generally looked to cases from the

federal courts involving claims brought under [Title VII of] the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance,’” Nicola v. Washington

Times Corp., 947 A.2d 1164, 1171 (D.C. 2008) (quoting

Benefits Commc’n Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299, 1301

(D.C. 1994)). And under Title VII, when a policy is

“discriminatory on its face,” the defendant’s motive is

irrelevant. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111,

121 (1985); see Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,

499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (“[T]he absence of a malevolent

motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a

neutral policy with a discriminatory effect. Whether an

employment practice involves disparate treatment through

explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the

employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the

discrimination.”); see also Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power

v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978) (holding that an

employer’s policy requiring female employees to make larger

pension fund contributions than male employees was

discriminatory on its face in violation of Title VII).

Since September 2004, BSA has refused to accept Section

8 voucher payments from its tenants, while demanding and

accepting rent from the tenants’ own funds. Just as it would

constitute a facial violation of Title VII to discriminate in

leasing on the basis of a renter’s race -- regardless of whether

the landlord professed a “benign” motive for so doing -- it is a

facial violation of the Human Rights Act to discriminate on the

basis of the renter’s source of income. Although BSA claims

that it only demanded cash because it had “a right to be paid for

the use of its property” while the tenants remained in their units,

Appellant’s Reply Br. 12, this does not explain why BSA agreed

to accept payment in cash and not in vouchers. 

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The only rationale BSA has suggested for its policy is that

it did not want to accept vouchers because the voucher program’s

requirements are burdensome, particularly the requirement that

the landlord execute an initial lease or ratification with the

tenant. See, e.g., Oral Arg. Recording at 5:12-25. Were we to

accept that excuse, however, we would render the Human Rights

Act’s definition of “source of income” nugatory. The Act

expressly defines “source of income” as encompassing the

Section 8 program; indeed, Section 8 vouchers are the source-ofincome provision’s paradigm case. See D.C. Code § 2-

1402.21(e). Permitting BSA to refuse to accept Section 8

vouchers on the ground that it does not wish to comply with

Section 8’s requirements would vitiate that definition and the

legal safeguard it was intended to provide.

Because the material facts are uncontested, and because they

make out a facial violation of the District of Columbia Human

Rights Act, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of BSA and remand for a determination of

appropriate relief.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the tenants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both their United

States Housing Act claim and their District of Columbia Human

Rights Act claim. The district court’s grant of summary

judgment in their favor on the former is affirmed. Its grant of

summary judgment against the tenants on the latter is reversed,

and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

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