Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00397/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00397-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY OLIVER,

Petitioner,

v.

C.E. DUCART,

Respondent.

Case No. 15-cv-00397-JD 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

AND DENYING CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY

Henry Oliver, a pro se state prisoner, has brought a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and 

lodged exhibits with the Court. The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

Oliver was found guilty by a jury of human trafficking and seven counts of committing 

lewd acts on a child under 14 during a kidnapping. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 539-67. Oliver 

had two prior prison terms and was sentenced to 33 years to life in state prison. CT at 701-02, 

722-25. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and the California Supreme 

Court denied a petition for review. People v. Oliver, No. A132263, 2014 WL 1270308, at *1 (Cal. 

Ct. App. March 28, 2014); Answer, Exs. 6, 8; People v. Oliver, S218296 (July 9, 2014)

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the crime as follows:

Jane Doe was born in 1997 and was fourteen-years-old and 

attending seventh grade at the time she testified in this case. Doe 

ran away from home for the first time in November 2009 because 

she was upset that her father had walked out on her family, and 

because there was “nothing at home for [her].” She described 

herself as a “daddy’s girl” who “needed [her] dad in [her] life” and 

testified, “I felt like if he can leave, then I can too.” She left home 

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with $50 her mother had given her for a bus pass. She met a girl on 

International Boulevard in Oakland who said she made a lot of 

money as a prostitute. Because Doe needed money to survive, she 

decided to try working as a prostitute. She stayed with different 

people, including a man named Jay Rich (Rich), but did not give the 

money she earned to a pimp. She had various names, including 

Crystal, Luscious, Chocolate, and Tomarionna, and told people she 

was 19 years old.

Eventually, Doe was returned to her mother's home and was 

grounded for running away. On March 1, 2010, she ran away again. 

She saw Rich and “went with him” because she liked him. He 

bought her things, helped her out, and did not act violently towards 

her. On her first night, she stayed with him at a hotel. She had one 

“date” on her first day working as a prostitute with him and gave 

him $40 of the $60 she earned.

Doe first saw appellant-who she came to know by his nickname, 

Swift-on March 1, 2010 when she was working in Richmond on 

23rd Street. Appellant was a passenger in a “[c]hampagne goldish” 

colored Lexus. The Lexus did not stop that day, but she saw it again 

the next day when she was working in the area of Stanford Street 

and San Pablo Avenue in the Berkeley, North Oakland, Emeryville 

area. Doe had just exited the car of a customer and was walking 

back to San Pablo Avenue when she saw the Lexus parked across 

the street. Appellant and his friend were there. Appellant got out of 

the car and started walking towards Doe, who felt scared because of 

the way he was looking at her, and because she could tell he was a 

pimp. Doe started to “circle the other way” and appellant walked 

towards her, then in front of her, to block her way. He said, “‘Either 

you get in the car or me and my friend are going to chase you.’” 

She started to run but appellant grabbed her arm. She felt threatened 

and was afraid of being chased, so she got in the car. Appellant’s 

friend was sitting in the front passenger seat.

They went to pick up another prostitute, “Busy,” near Golden Gate 

Elementary School in Berkeley. They then drove to Telegraph 

Avenue and 55th Street to pick up another prostitute, “Lil Mama.” 

From there they drove to a Motel 6 on the Embarcadero in Oakland 

and dropped off Busy and Lil Mama. While they were driving 

around, Doe had a brief telephone call with Rich and sent him three 

text messages to tell him she had been picked up by another pimp. 

She was scared and hoped that Rich would pick her up. Appellant 

soon took her cell phone from her.

Appellant took Doe to a music studio in downtown Oakland where 

she observed approximately ten to twenty men. Appellant told Doe 

she needed to make $300 for him if she wanted to leave the studio. 

Doe understood this to mean she had to perform acts of prostitution. 

Appellant then left Doe in the room with the other men. Doe felt 

sad and angry because she wanted to leave. She believed the other 

men were also pimps, and that her only choices were to earn the 

money for appellant or ask one of the other men to become her 

pimp.

Eventually appellant and his friend-who Doe later learned was 

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nicknamed Dame-took Doe back to the Lexus. They picked up 

another girl, Apple Bottoms, and returned to Motel 6 in the late 

afternoon. Appellant gave Doe some marijuana to smoke and 

cognac to drink. After ingesting the drugs and alcohol Doe became 

more comfortable around appellant. Appellant then directed Busy to 

take nude photographs of Doe to post on the internet, which Busy 

shot in the bathroom. That night, appellant had vaginal sex with 

Doe while Dame, Busy, Lil Mama and Apple Bottoms were in the 

room, or in the bathroom. Doe slept in the motel that evening. 

When she awoke the next morning appellant and Apple Bottoms 

were gone, and Busy and Lil Mama were performing oral sex on 

Dame. Dame threw a bottle cap at Doe and told her to join in orally 

copulating him. She complied, then went back to sleep.

When appellant returned, Doe, Dame, Busy and Lil Mama got back 

in the Lexus and drove to Sacramento, where they stopped at the 

apartment of a girl named Slim and smoked marijuana. They then 

drove to a motel, and appellant and Dame dropped off Doe, Busy, 

and Lil Mama and returned a little while later. Busy was taken to a 

date while Doe and Lil Mama went to work walking Folsom 

Boulevard. Doe had one date and gave the money to appellant. The 

group spent two days in Sacramento with Doe working both days on 

Folsom Boulevard. They then drove to a Motel 6 on Tully Road in 

San Jose.

When they arrived at Motel 6, appellant, Dame and Lil Mama left, 

and Doe had a date with a Mexican man she picked up on Tully 

Road. After paying Doe, the man demanded his money back, and 

Busy pretended to call the police, but instead called Dame. 

Appellant and Dame returned to the motel, beat up the Mexican 

man, and took his money. The Mexican man went to a nearby 

police officer who responded to the room. Police officer Anthony 

Torres, who was dispatched to the room at about 11:50 p.m., found 

three males-Caesar Rios, appellant and Damian Ferrara, or Dameand three females. The females said their names were Shanei Davis, 

Brandie Pinky-Jones and Tomarionna Johnson, and Tomarionna 

Johnson gave her date of birth as January 20, 1991, which would 

have made her nineteen years old at the time. Doe testified that she 

gave the fake name and birth date because she did not want the 

officer to know she was a runaway, and did not want him to return 

her to her home. Doe initially told appellant she was 19 years old 

because she believed if she told him her actual age he would leave 

her and she would not have anywhere to go. At some later date, 

appellant again asked Doe her age and she told him she was 17. 

Torres ran a warrant check and arrested appellant. The rest of the 

group returned to Oakland and stayed overnight at Dame’s sister’s 

house in East Oakland.

In the morning, Dame brought appellant back. Appellant told Doe 

to go to International Boulevard, and she and Lil Mama and Busy 

went there to prostitute. Doe was not certain how many days she 

stayed in Oakland. The group returned to Sacramento and stayed 

there for two days. She worked on Stockton Boulevard with Lil 

Mama and Busy. Doe believed she had three dates while working 

on Stockton Boulevard. Appellant never told Doe how much to 

charge for a date. She always gave the money to appellant because 

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she feared appellant would beat her. Busy told Doe that Dame had 

twice broken her cell phone and had also broken her laptop. Doe 

trusted Busy and Lil Mama because they were older and had 

befriended her. While the relationship Dame had with Busy and Lil 

Mama was not clear, Doe considered only appellant to be her pimp, 

not Dame.

From Sacramento, the group traveled to Richmond. They stayed at 

Dame’s sister’s house and Doe went to work on 23rd Street. In 

Richmond, Doe had one date with a man named Manny who took 

Doe to his hotel for vaginal and oral sex. She gave the money she 

received from Manny-which she believed was $150-to appellant, 

and they returned to Dame’s sister’s house. The group spent the 

night in Richmond and returned to Oakland the next day. Back in 

Oakland, Doe worked the street on International Boulevard and gave 

the money she received to appellant. Appellant would drive by at 

times and would look at Doe as she worked the street. He would 

sometimes stop his car, and she would hand him her money.

In addition to working the street, Doe also had dates that appellant 

“set [her] up on.” For example, on one occasion, appellant took Doe 

to a house in Berkeley. Once inside, appellant spoke to a “darkskinned,” “older,” “bald,” man. He told Doe, “You’re going to date 

him,” then left the house. Doe understood that to mean that she was 

going to have sex with the man. Doe and the man had vaginal sex, 

and she was at the house for “a long time.” “[W]hen the sex was 

done,” appellant came back and spoke to the man, who told 

appellant that he wanted Doe to stay longer. Doe therefore stayed 

longer and had vaginal sex with the man again. Doe never received 

any money and did not see the man give any money to appellant. 

Appellant returned to the man’s house and told Doe to take a 

shower, which she did.

Appellant gave Doe a new cell phone so he could call or text her 

when she was working the streets. She listed him in her contact by 

his nickname, Swift, but appellant changed the name to Bill so that 

if Doe were caught working, the police would not be able to identify 

him as her pimp. Appellant took Doe to discount stores to buy her 

clothes, and he bought food for her. He decided when and where 

Doe would work, and he paid for the hotels in which they stayed. 

He brought Doe to his mother’s house on two occasions. She had 

sex with appellant on almost all of the days she was with him, and 

she had oral sex with him “[e]very day and every night,” once in the 

morning before she went to work, and once at night when she was 

done working for the day. She did not feel she could decline when 

appellant wanted to have sex. On one occasion, when she told him 

she was not in the mood to have sex, he replied in a demanding 

voice, “Well, you better get in the mood.” Doe believed appellant 

would beat her if she did not comply, so she would “just do it so I 

wouldn’t get beat.” She also could not decline to work because she 

believed he would beat her if she did so. On one occasion, while 

Doe was having vaginal sex with appellant, appellant forced his 

penis into her anus. Doe tried to move away because she did not 

want him to do that, because she was surprised and scared, and 

because it was painful. Appellant “said something” but she could 

not remember what he said, and she could not remember if appellant 

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hit her when she tried to move away.

Doe testified that she believed appellant would beat her if she 

refused to have sex with him because he had threatened her a couple 

of times, and because she heard appellant, Dame, Busy, and Lil 

Mama talking about how appellant beat “his other girl before [Doe]” 

by taking off his belt and “whacking at her” when she refused to go 

walk the streets because it was cold outside. After appellant 

“whacked” the girl, she agreed to work and went back outside. On 

one occasion, when Doe did something to make appellant angry, he 

pulled out his belt and she was afraid he was going to hit her with it. 

Instead, he said, “You lucky you’re cute and I like you,” then 

walked out of the room. Doe also knew that Dame had beat one of 

the girls when she did something to make him mad. This made Doe 

surprised and a little frightened. Doe testified that when she first got 

picked up by appellant, she was planning out in her head how she 

was going to escape. When he took her phone, she felt she had no 

options and that she would not be able to escape because appellant 

would find her.

On or about March 17, 2010, appellant and Doe checked into the 

Motel 6 on Hegenberger Road in Oakland. The next day, March 18, 

2010, she had a feeling that “something was going to happen,” so 

instead of working “outside,” she stood in an alleyway near 

International Boulevard. A man in a truck drove up and wanted a 

date, but he changed his mind when a police car went by.

Oakland police officers Hamann Nguyen and James Saleda were 

working undercover that afternoon in their assignment in the Child 

Exploitation Unit. At about 4:20 p.m., Saleda observed Doe near 

the alleyway by International Boulevard. He asked Doe how much 

she would charge for oral sex, and whether she had a room. Doe 

told him it would be $40 for oral sex and pointed in the direction of 

her hotel. Saleda called for back up officers to arrest Doe. Doe 

heard police sirens and started to walk off, but police came down the 

alley and arrested her. Nguyen suspected Doe was a juvenile, and 

confirmed that she was when he obtained her personal information.

Doe identified her pimp as Swift and said that his real name was 

Henry Lee Oliver. The pimp’s name was listed as Bill on the cell 

phone she had, which belonged to “her pimp.” Nguyen noticed 

while he was with Doe that she received as many as eight text 

messages and a phone call from Bill. After Nguyen let the phone 

call ring through to voice mail, a text message from Bill came in 

asking, “Why aren’t you answering your phone?” Nguyen asked 

Doe to respond that she was busy with a “trick.” Bill replied, 

“Okay, babe, but when I text, text back.” Doe responded, “Okay, 

Daddy, I’m trying to get you this dough.” Bill replied, “Okay, but 

don’t be so nice.”

Doe told Nguyen that she had been forced into prostitution and 

wanted her pimp arrested “for forcing her to be out there.” Nguyen 

spoke to his supervisors and they decided to set up a plan to lure 

appellant out to arrest him for prostituting a juvenile. Nguyen told 

Doe to call him back and tell him she had $200 from the john who 

had just left, and that there was another pimp in the area who was 

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following her and was trying to “take her.” Doe did as instructed, 

and Nguyen heard a male voice saying, “You have $200?” and Doe 

answering, “Yes.”

Doe, as instructed, arranged for appellant to meet her at the Burger 

King at 14th Avenue and East 12th Street in Oakland. Nguyen ran 

appellant’s name in his computer and showed the photograph to Doe 

to confirm he was the person for whom they were waiting. After a 

while a blue Pontiac with a female driver and male passenger slowly 

entered the parking lot. When the vehicle passed the drive-through 

without stopping, the police stopped the car and appellant exited. 

Appellant’s cell phone was discovered during a search of the car. 

Comparisons of the contact lists and call logs for Doe’s cell phone 

and the cell phone found in the car in which appellant was a 

passenger confirmed that the calls exchanged after Doe’s arrest were 

with appellant.

Saleda testified as an expert in “street trafficking, prostitution, 

pimping and child exploitation.” He explained that there are 

essentially two types of pimps. A “guerilla pimp” drives around and 

“snatch[es]” a girl off the street and “uses fear of force to get a girl 

to work for [him].” Often a guerilla pimp will take the girl to a 

“break house” to “break her down, have his friends have sex with 

her until she agrees to work for him.” The second type is the 

“Romeo pimp,” who manipulates the girl with attention and love. 

He tries to make his girls feel they are a part of his family and will 

sometimes give the girls marijuana and alcohol to make it easier for 

the girls to work. Often, pimps will have a new girl work with other 

girls to create a “family type of atmosphere.” Both tactics of the 

guerilla pimp and the Romeo pimp are used to control the girls. 

Saleda testified that approximately eighty-five percent of girls who 

were on the street were there because they had been sexually, 

physically, or emotionally abused, and were looking for “any type of 

attention.” Pimps avoided girls who appeared confident and 

targeted girls who had been sexually abused because they were 

“already numb” and “easy to break down.”

Saleda testified that pimps take their girls to work “the circuit” 

around the Bay Area, moving the girls from city to city, including 

Oakland, San Jose, Sacramento, and Santa Rosa. There are “tracks” 

in each city where pimps put the girls up in cheap motels near where 

they will be working, such as the Motel 6 on Tully Road in San 

Jose. Pimps move the girls around because they know that if they 

are in one city too long, “the girls get known, the police may target 

them, or they may get a warrant in that city.” Pimps almost always 

give their girls a cell phone, which allows the girl to have customer 

contact, and allows the pimp to track the girl.

Saleda testified that pimps refer to what they do as “the game.” One 

rule of the game is that if a pimp is standing on the corner, a 

prostitute who is walking down the street must not look him in the 

eye and must walk around him. If she breaks that rule, the pimp 

may consider her his, and will “take the girl regardless of whether or 

not she wants to go with him.” The new pimp then has the option of 

keeping her as his own, or “ransom[ing] her back to her [old] pimp.” 

Another rule is that a prostitute must not keep any money, and will 

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suffer consequences if she tries to do so. Saleda testified that the 

first rule of the game is “you don’t give up your pimp.” Pimps also 

direct their girls to list them in the cell phone contact list under a 

common first name so if the girl is arrested it will not be 

immediately apparent who her pimp is. When arrested, girls often 

do not give police their real names.

Saleda described Doe as “one of the most cooperative victims I dealt 

with in a long time.” She did not take a long time or stall in 

answering questions. At the time of Doe’s arrest, the police had 

been searching for her as a missing person at risk. They had been in 

contact with Doe’s mother and knew she was looking for Doe.

Oliver, 2014 WL 1270308, at *1-5 (footnotes omitted).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first 

prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority only if “the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable 

application of” Supreme Court authority if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from 

the Supreme Court's decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision 

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the 

application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under Section 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will not 

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be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. 

Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). In conducting its analysis, the federal court must 

presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the burden of 

rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to 

consider the petitioner’s claims, the Court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Nunnemaker at 

801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

DISCUSSION

As grounds for federal habeas relief, Oliver asserts that: (1) the trial court failed to sua 

sponte issue a lesser-included-offense jury instruction; (2) there was insufficient evidence to find 

a continuous aggravated kidnapping to support the lewd conduct counts; (3) the trial court failed to 

properly instruct regarding the “continuing period of detention”; and (4) there was an improper 

jury instruction regarding consent which diluted the burden of proof for the kidnapping counts. 

I. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE

Oliver asserts that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte issue a jury instruction for 

the lesser-included offense of committing a lewd act during a simple kidnapping, as opposed to an 

aggravated kidnapping. But Oliver was not charged with aggravated kidnapping. He was charged 

with committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14, and each count included an 

enhancement for aggravated kidnapping because the kidnapping increased the risk of harm to the 

victim. The kidnapping allegations enhanced the lewd act counts, and as a result the One Strike 

sentencing law became applicable to Oliver.

Legal Standard

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim 

cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 

(1991). The failure of a state trial court to instruct on lesser-included offenses in a noncapital case 

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does not present a federal constitutional claim. See Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 

2000). However, “the defendant’s right to adequate jury instructions on his or her theory of the 

case might, in some cases, constitute an exception to the general rule.” Solis, 219 F.3d at 929 

(citing Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984)). Solis suggests that there must be 

substantial evidence to warrant the instruction on the lesser-included offense. See Solis, 219 F.3d 

929-30 (no duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter as lesser-included offense to murder 

because evidence presented at trial precluded a heat of passion or imperfect self-defense 

instruction; no duty to instruct on involuntary manslaughter because evidence presented at trial 

implied malice).

Due process does not require that an instruction be given unless the evidence supports it. 

See Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant is not entitled to

have jury instructions raised on his or her precise terms when the given instructions adequately 

embody the defense theory. United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996). To 

obtain relief for the state court’s refusal to give an instruction, the error must have so infected the 

trial that the defendant was deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 

See Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988).

Discussion

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim.

We review this issue de novo (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 

Cal. 4th 690, 733), bearing in mind that an offense is a lesser 

included offense if “either the statutory elements of the 

greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory 

pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such 

that the greater cannot be committed without also 

committing the lesser.” (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 

108, 117.)

The offense of simple kidnapping (§ 207) is a lesser included 

offense of aggravated kidnapping (§ 209). Thus, an 

instruction on the lesser included offense would have been 

appropriate if appellant had been charged with aggravated 

kidnapping (§ 209). He was not. Rather, he was charged 

with 24 counts of committing a lewd act with a child under 

the age of fourteen, and for each such count, there was an 

enhancement allegation that he kidnapped the victim “and 

the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk 

of harm to the victim over and above that level of risk 

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necessarily inherent in the commission of that offense, 

within the meaning of . . . section 667.61(d)(2).” The 

information further alleged that appellant was “punishable 

under the provisions of section 667.61(a). . . .” In other 

words, the kidnapping allegations acted to bring each count 

of a lewd act with a child within the ambit of the One Strike 

sentencing law.

In People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 385, 410–411 

(Majors), the California Supreme Court held that a trial 

court’s obligation to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included 

offense does not extend to enhancements. One of the 

primary reasons for requiring instructions on lesser included 

offenses is “‘to eliminate the distortion of the factfinding 

process that is created when the jury is forced into an all-ornothing choice between [guilt] and innocence’”-that is, to 

eliminate “‘the risk that the jury will convict . . . simply to 

avoid setting the defendant free.’” (Schad v. Arizona (1991) 

501 U.S. 624, 646–647.) This risk is wholly absent with 

respect to enhancements, which a jury does not even 

consider unless it has already convicted defendant of the 

underlying substantive offenses. (See generally, People v. 

Wims (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 293, 307[“[A] sentence 

enhancement is not equivalent to a substantive offense, 

because a defendant is not at risk for punishment under an 

enhancement allegation until convicted of a related 

substantive offense. . . . At that time, a defendant’s liberty 

interest ‘has been substantially diminished by a guilty 

verdict.’ [Citation.] The Legislature, moreover, has in 

various ways expressed its intention that enhancements not 

be treated as substantive offenses.”].) Under these 

circumstances, we hold that a trial court’s sua sponte 

obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses does not 

encompass an obligation to instruct on “lesser included 

enhancements.” (Ibid.) Similarly, here, because the jury 

was asked to make the determination under section 667.61, 

subdivision (d)(2), only after it had found appellant guilty of 

the offense of lewd and lascivious conduct, there was no risk 

that it would be forced into an “all-or-nothing” choice. (See 

Schad v. Arizona, supra, 501 U.S. at pp. 646–647.)

Appellant tries to distinguish People v. Majors, supra, 18 

Cal.4th 385 by arguing that that case concerned a firearm 

enhancement, which “has no substance absent attachment to 

a principle [sic] term.” The case, however, did not limit its 

application of the rule regarding enhancements to situations 

in which the enhancement is unrelated to the principal term. 

Alternatively, appellant relies on the court’s description of 

the One Strike Law as an alternative sentencing scheme in 

People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 735, 738, 741 

(Mancebo), to argue that section 667.61 is not an 

enhancement, but that it simply “provides an ‘alternative, 

harsher sentencing scheme’ for those crimes that fall within 

its ambit.” The court in Mancebo, however, had no occasion 

to consider whether a sentence imposed upon a finding of an 

applicable circumstance under the One Strike Law was an 

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“enhancement,” and certainly did not hold that the finding of 

an enumerated circumstance under that law was equivalent 

to an underlying substantive offense. We conclude the court 

had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury regarding simple 

kidnapping.

Oliver, 2014 WL 1270308, at *10-11.

The California Court of Appeal found that while simple kidnapping is a lesser-included 

offense of aggravated kidnapping, Oliver was convicted of committing lewd acts on a child with 

the enhancement that the child was under 14 and kidnapped. Oliver was not charged with 

aggravated kidnapping, Cal. Penal Code section 209; therefore, the trial court had no duty to 

instruct on simple kidnapping as a lesser-included offense. The California Court of Appeal also 

found no error for the failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser-included enhancement which 

occurred in this case. To the extent that Oliver asserts a violation of state law regarding the lesserincluded offense or the One Strike sentencing law, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Nor 

is federal habeas relief available for the failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses in a 

noncapital case. See Solis, 219 F.3d at 929.

Oliver is entitled to relief only if he can demonstrate that the failure to instruct on the 

lesser-included offense violated due process. He cannot meet this high burden. There was a great 

deal of evidence that Oliver committed lewd acts on the 14-year-old victim, whom he kidnapped,

which increased the risk of harm to her. He had sex with the underage victim and forced her to 

work as a prostitute. The state court denial of this claim was not unreasonable and the clam is 

denied.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Oliver next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of a 

continuous aggravated kidnapping to support the lewd conduct counts because the victim had the 

opportunity to leave after the initial kidnapping.

Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the 

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evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a 

rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional claim, 

see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas 

relief, see id. at 324. 

The Supreme Court has emphasized that “Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas 

proceedings . . . .” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062, 2064 (2012) (per curiam) (finding 

that the Third Circuit “unduly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder” and failed to apply the 

deferential standard of Jackson when it engaged in “fine-grained factual parsing” to find that the 

evidence was insufficient to support petitioner’s conviction). A federal court reviewing 

collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence 

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The federal court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 

has there been a due process violation. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338.

Discussion

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim:

Appellant contends that even if the evidence shows he kidnapped 

Doe when he placed her in his car on San Pablo Avenue in Oakland, 

the evidence was insufficient to show the kidnapping continued 

throughout the period in which the lewd and lascivious acts 

occurred. We disagree. 

. . . 

The jury convicted appellant of seven counts of lewd and lascivious 

acts against Doe in violation of section 288, subdivision (a). For 

each count, the jury found true the allegation under section 667.61, 

subdivision (d)(2), that appellant “kidnap[ped] the victim . . . and the 

movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to 

the victim over and above that level of risk necessarily inherent in 

the commission of that offense. . . .” “The plain wording of this 

enhancement requires two elements: (1) a simple kidnapping (§ 207, 

subd. (a)); and (2) a substantial increase in the risk of harm to the 

victim.” (People v. Diaz (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 243, 246, fn. 

omitted.)

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Section 207, subdivision (a), defines simple kidnapping: “Every 

person who forcibly, or by any other means of instilling fear, steals 

or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any person in this state, and 

carries the person into another country, state, or county, or into 

another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping.” The 

forcible detention of a victim is an element of kidnapping; 

“therefore, as long as the detention continues, the crime continues.” 

(Parnell v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal. App. 3d 392, 407–408 

(Parnell ); see also People v. Thomas (1994) 26 Cal. App. 4th 1328, 

1334, People v. Masten (1982) 137 Cal. App. 3d 579, 588, 

disapproved of on different grounds by People v. Jones (1988) 46 

Cal. 3d 585, 592, fn. 4.)

In Parnell, the defendant kidnapped seven-year-old Steven S. in 

1972 and sexually abused him. (Parnell, supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d 

392, 398.) The defendant changed Steven’s name, enrolled him in 

school, and told him he had gone to court and obtained custody of 

him. (Id. at p. 398.) Steven was often cared for by babysitters and 

was also “outside [the defendant’s] control” while in school and 

while the defendant was at work. (Id. at p. 399.) He also 

periodically stayed overnight at friends’ houses, traveled out of town 

with his football team, went to the movies, had access to bicycles, 

made phone calls to his friends, mailed letters without the 

defendant’s knowledge, and was in police custody for a brief time 

when he was caught shoplifting. (Ibid.) Despite the new life and 

identity the defendant had created for him, Steven never forgot his 

parents or his true identity, and testified at trial that he knew at all 

times the defendant “had [him] improperly.” (Ibid.) Finally, in 

1980, when Steven learned that the defendant had abducted another 

little boy, he left the defendant’s home with the boy while the 

defendant was at work, coached the boy how to enter the police 

station to turn himself in, then walked away. (Id. at pp. 399–400.) 

When the boy became scared and ran after Steven, the police 

brought both boys back to the station. (Id. at p. 400.) After some 

coaxing, Steven identified the defendant as his abductor. (Ibid.)

The defendant, who was charged with kidnapping and other crimes, 

moved to set aside the information asserting, among other things, 

that the statute of limitations had expired on his 1972 kidnapping of 

Steven. (Parnell, supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 401, 405–406.) 

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s denial of the motion, 

holding the kidnapping was a continuing offense that did not end 

until the detention ended. (Id. at pp. 407–409.) The court held that 

while Steven “enjoyed considerable freedom of movement and 

association,” it was not “unreasonable to infer that the boy, who had 

been subjected to continual sexual abuse and taken far from his 

home and family, remained with [the defendant] out of fear.” (Id. at 

p. 409.)

Although there are factual dissimilarities between Parnell and the 

present case, the same principles apply. Appellant argues that any 

kidnapping that occurred when he placed Doe in his car “concluded” 

when “appellant discussed Doe working for him” and “Doe was 

returned to the street.” In his view, everything that occurred after 

that was Doe’s choice. He argues that because the detention ended 

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when he put Doe to work on the streets, the lewd and lascivious acts 

he performed on her did not occur during the kidnapping. Appellant 

makes much of Doe’s apparent willingness to stay with the group, 

particularly on the night he was arrested in San Jose, when Doe gave 

a false name and birth date to police so that she would not be 

required to go home. Doe, however, testified that after appellant 

forcibly placed her in his car and took her cell phone, she felt she 

could not do anything and that he would find her if she left. She 

also testified that she was frightened after appellant threatened her 

with a belt, and after she heard he had beat “his other girl” with a 

belt when she refused to do as instructed. Appellant also took all the 

money she made and made her dependent on him for her survival 

by, among other things, buying all of her clothes and food, thereby 

making her particularly vulnerable to his assertion of authority.

Moreover, there was evidence that Doe was a “daddy’s girl” who 

felt there was nothing left for her at home after her father left the 

family. Appellant, who initially used what Saleda described as 

“guerilla pimp” tactics by sending Doe to a break house and scaring 

her, later used “Romeo pimp” tactics by using Doe’s family 

background to his advantage by surrounding her with other girls 

who befriended her, giving her marijuana and alcohol so she would 

be more comfortable, and making her feel like she was part of a 

family. Under the circumstances confronting Doe—a thirteen year 

old runaway who was scared to go home and afraid appellant would 

find her if she left—the jury could reasonably find that she was not 

free and that the kidnapping did not end until she was taken into 

custody on March 18. Accordingly, there was substantial evidence 

supporting the jury’s finding that Doe was kidnapped at the time the 

lewd and lascivious acts oc[c]urred.

Oliver, 2014 WL 1270308, at *6-7.

Oliver’s argument that the kidnapping had ended when the lewd conduct occurred was 

rejected by the state court. To the extent Oliver argues that the state court was incorrect in its 

analysis of state law, he is not entitled to habeas relief. The Jackson standard must be applied with 

reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 324 n.16; see, e.g., Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 968 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding it was 

not unreasonable, in light of Oregon case law, for Oregon court to conclude that a rational jury 

could find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner intended to kill his victim based on proof that 

he anally penetrated several victims with knowledge that he could infect them with AIDS). The 

state court’s ruling on the state law issue is binding on this Court. 

The “minimum amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause requires to prove the 

offense is purely a matter of federal law,” Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 2064, and, Oliver has not shown 

that the state court was objectively unreasonable in finding sufficient evidence to support the 

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conviction in light of the high bar for Jackson claims. There was sufficient evidence that the 

victim remained with Oliver out of fear, even though she had opportunities to escape. She was 13 

years old, had been forcibly put into the car, her cell phone had been taken, and she believed that 

Oliver would find her if she left. The victim had been threatened with a belt, had almost 

immediately been forced to commit sex acts after being kidnapped, and because Oliver took all of 

her money, she was dependent on him. Viewing all of this evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, the jury could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Oliver has failed to meet the high threshold of a sufficiency of the evidence 

claim and he is not entitled to habeas relief.

III. CONTINUING DETENTION JURY INSTRUCTION

Oliver contends that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding the 

continuing period of detention with respect to how long the kidnapping lasted. Oliver asserts that 

because the prosecution argued that the kidnapping lasted from when the victim was placed into 

the car until she was taken into police custody, the trial court should have instructed the jury on 

the phrase, “continuing period of detention.”

Legal Standard

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law is not cognizable in 

federal habeas corpus proceedings. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. Federal habeas relief is available 

for instructional error only if the error “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violate[d] due process.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). Petitioner must show 

that there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury misapplied the instruction. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 

72. “It is well established that the instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must 

be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” Id. A 

determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged 

instruction in a way that violates the Constitution establishes only that an error has occurred. 

Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If an error is found, the court also must 

determine that the error had a substantial and injurious influence in determining the jury’s verdict, 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993), before granting relief in habeas proceedings. 

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Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146-47.

The omission of an instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the 

law. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 

U.S. at 155). Thus, a habeas petitioner whose claim involves a failure to give a particular 

instruction bears an “‘especially heavy burden.’” Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155). The significance of the omission of such an 

instruction may be evaluated by comparison with the instructions that were given. Murtishaw v. 

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Henderson at 156); see id. at 972 (due 

process violation found in capital case where petitioner demonstrated that application of the wrong 

statute at his sentencing infected the proceeding with the jury's potential confusion regarding its 

discretion to impose a life or death sentence).

Discussion

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim:

“‘“It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a 

request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law 

relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The 

general principles of law governing the case are those principles 

closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and 

which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” 

[Citation.]’” (People v. Middleton (1997) 52 Cal. App. 4th 19, 30, 

disapproved on other grounds in People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal. 

4th 745, 752–753, fn. 3.) “The language of a statute defining a 

crime or defense is generally an appropriate and desirable basis for 

an instruction, and is ordinarily sufficient when the defendant fails 

to request amplification.” (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 306, 

327.)

Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury with the elements of 

the enhancement under section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2), when it 

instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3175.7 Because CALCRIM 

No. 3175 correctly states the law, the court satisfied its duty of 

instructing the jury on the general principles of the law that applied 

in the case. Appellant asserts the court had a sua sponte duty to go 

beyond CALCRIM No. 3175 and provide an instruction regarding 

“continuous period of detention.” However, such an instruction 

would have been a “pinpoint instruction,” which is an instruction 

that “‘relate[s] particular facts to a legal issue in the case or 

“pinpoint” the crux of a defendant’s case, such as mistaken 

identification or alibi,’” and which a court is not required to give 

unless it is requested, and unless there is “‘evidence supportive of 

the theory.’” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal. 4th 789, 824, 

quoting People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 1103, 1119.) If appellant 

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wanted a pinpoint instruction, it was his burden to request it from 

the trial court. (People v. Gutierrez,supra, 45 Cal. 4th at p. 824.) 

He cannot raise the issue for the first time in this court.

In any event, even assuming he had made a request, we would 

conclude the trial court was not required to provide the pinpoint 

instruction. Appellant provides us with no authority for his position 

that an instruction regarding the phrase “continuing period of 

detention” was required, and does not propose the language of the 

instruction he claims the trial court was required to give. Instead, he 

draws the phrase from language in cases such as People v. Parnell, 

supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d at pages 407–410 and People v. Thomas,

supra, 26 Cal. App. 4th at page 1334, in which the court used the 

term to describe what had occurred. “Language in an appellate court 

opinion which may be a good statement of law or of the reasoning of 

the appellate court does not necessarily make a good jury 

instruction.” (People v. Adams (1987) 196 Cal. App. 3d 201, 204–

205; see also People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 206, 221, fn. 

13.) The fact that appellate courts have discussed the concept of 

“continuing period of detention” does not mean the trial court was 

required to give it in a jury instruction in this case.

Appellant nevertheless asserts the court should have provided 

further instruction because the jury, which submitted several 

questions during deliberations, must not have understood the phrase. 

He argues, for example, that the jury’s question-“can substantial 

distance be measured from a single point for all counts or from each 

individual occur[re]nce or count?”-shows it was confused as to the 

meaning of continuing period of detention. The question, however, 

addressed the movement requirement of the enhancement under 

section 667.1, subdivision (d)(2). In essence, the jury was asking 

whether each count required a new movement of the victim, or 

whether a single movement could suffice for all counts. This 

question does not mean, as appellant asserts, that the jury had doubts 

as to Doe’s continuing detention. Rather, it showed the jury 

believed that appellant and Doe may not have always moved to a 

new location prior to each lewd act. The court adequately 

responded to this question by stating, “Depending on the facts as 

you find them to be, the substantial distance for kidnapping can be 

one continuous act from the initial event on March 3, 2010 to the 

concluding sex act with the defendant, on or about March 18, 2010 

or it could be measured by each incident, or combination thereof. [¶] 

To find the kidnapping allegation to be true all jurors must agree 

that the defendant committed the same act or acts. It is not 

necessary that the particular act agreed upon be stated in your 

verdict. This instruction should be read in conjunction with all the 

other instructions which are applicable to the facts as you have 

found them to be.” Appellant does not assert that this was an 

incorrect statement of the law, and we conclude it was appropriate. 

Read in conjunction with CALCRIM No. 3175, the jury would have 

understood that while the movement for purposes of finding that 

appellant kidnapped Doe could be one continuous act, the lewd and 

lascivious acts had to occur during any kidnapping for the 

enhancement to apply. There was no error.

Oliver, 2014 WL 1270308, at *7-9 (footnotes omitted).

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Respondent argues that Oliver procedurally defaulted this claim because he failed to 

contemporaneously object and request his proposed instruction at trial. A federal court will not 

review questions of federal law decided by a state court if the decision also rests on a state law 

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman 

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). The Ninth Circuit has recognized and applied the 

California contemporaneous objection rule in affirming the denial of a federal petition on grounds 

of procedural default where there was a complete failure to object at trial. See Inthavong v. 

Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1092-93 (9th 

Cir. 2004). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court, 

federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the 

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that 

failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750. Oliver has not responded to the procedural default argument and the record suggests 

procedural default, but the Court will nevertheless look to the merits of the claim.

The California Court of Appeal held that even if Oliver had requested the instruction and 

the trial court denied the request, there was no error. The California Court of Appeal found that 

the trial court properly instructed the jury on the principles of law that applied in the case and the 

elements of each enhancement were properly explained. Oliver is not entitled to habeas relief for 

his argument that the state court misapplied state law. Moreover, Oliver provided no sample of 

the jury instruction that he argues should have been provided; instead, he cites to discussions in 

court opinions. The state court noted that “[l]anguage in an appellate court opinion which may be 

a good statement of law or of the reasoning of the appellate court does not necessarily make a 

good jury instruction.” People v. Middleton, 52 Cal. App. 4th 19, 30 (1997), disapproved on other 

grounds. 

Oliver has failed to show that the court’s failure to give an instruction on the phrase 

“continuing period of detention” had a substantial and injurious influence on the verdict in this 

case. The jury was properly instructed, and the state court found that the jury questions did not 

require further instructions and that the trial court responded appropriately to the jury’s questions. 

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The state court’s determination was not objectively unreasonable, and Oliver has not met the 

especially heavy burden of showing error for court’s the failure to give an instruction. He is not 

entitled to relief, and this claim is denied.

IV. CONSENT JURY INSTRUCTION

Oliver argues that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct regarding “consent 

given” and “good faith belief in consent” and that the trial court’s answers to jury questions about 

consent diluted the prosecution’s burden of proof.

Discussion

Oliver was found guilty of committing lewd acts on a child under 14 during an aggravated

kidnapping in violation of Cal. Penal Code sections 288(a) and 667.61(d)(2). Section 667.61(d)(2)

outlines the punishment when, “[t]he defendant kidnapped the victim of the present offense and 

the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above 

that level of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying offense . . .” 

The jury was instructed with CALCRIM 3175 regarding section 667.61(d)(2) which stated, 

“the People must prove that . . . . 4) Jane Doe did not consent to the movement; and 5) the 

defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that Jane Doe consented to the movement . . . . 

The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People 

have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.” CT at 656. 

Oliver contends that the trial court should have sua sponte instructed the jury with CALCRIM 

1215 in response to several questions from the jury.

The California Court of Appeal discussed the background and denied this claim:

CALCRIM No. 1215 provides: “Defense: Consent Given [¶] The 

defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if the other person consented 

to go with the defendant. The other person consented if (he/she) (1) 

freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the 

defendant, (2) was aware of the movement, and (3) had sufficient 

maturity and understanding to choose to go with the defendant. The 

People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the other person did not consent to go with the defendant. If the 

People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not 

guilty of this crime.” It also provides: “Defense: Good Faith Belief 

in Consent [¶] [The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if (he/she) 

reasonably and actually believed that the other person consented to 

the movement. The People have the burden of proving beyond a 

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reasonable doubt that the defendant did not reasonably and actually 

believe that the other person consented to the movement. If the 

People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not 

guilty of this crime.]”

Here, the trial court-while not using the language provided in 

CALCRIM No. 1215-did define the terms “consent” and the 

defendant’s “belief as to consent.” First, in response to the jury’s 

question regarding whether Doe had the legal capacity as a minor to 

consent, the trial court stated, “And just to refresh your recollection 

that’s the instruction that deals with kidnapping as an allegation 

which is part of the charges here. And Item No. 4 and No. 5 

enumerated that the things that the People must prove including that 

Jane Doe did not consent to the movement. [¶] The answer is, yes, 

she can consent but it must be considered in light of the following 

context: [¶] To consent to an act or transaction a person must, one, 

act freely and voluntarily and not under the influence of threats, 

force or duress; two, have knowledge of the true nature of the act or 

transaction involved; and three, possess sufficient mental capacity to 

make an intelligent choice whether to do or not to do something 

proposed by another person. In deciding whether Jane Doe 

consented to the movement, you should consider the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the event and Jane Doe’s age.” Defense 

counsel agreed with this response prior to the trial court reading it to 

the jury.

Second, the jury asked the following question: “‘The defendant did 

not actually and reasonably believe that Jane Doe consented to the 

movement.’ Must he believe that Jane Doe consented in the same 

way the court defined consent in response to [the prior question 

regarding consent?]” The trial court responded, “And I went back to 

your earlier question that brought about the Court’s instruction to 

you on consent. And that question focused on Jane Doe. Basically 

it asked: As a minor at age 13, does she legally have the ability to 

consent to movement? And so that definition, in that context, was 

really directed towards whether or not a 13 and under, what 

circumstances and what you should consider. So my short answer to 

your question is does that definition apply to the defendant? And 

the answer is the best definition of what is supposed to be 

considered is what is set forth in the language. Because we’re 

dealing with different contextual settings. And the language here is 

the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that Jane Doe 

consented to the movement. It means just that. Under the totality of 

the circumstances, is it reasonable for the defendant to believe that 

Jane Doe was consenting to the movement, whatever it is. And I 

don’t necessarily have any further definition than that and I 

apologize if it doesn’t really help. Hopefully, it does. Just given the 

plain language of the words. It’s normal interpretation. And take a 

look at it. Is it reasonable that the defendant believed that she was 

consenting to movement given the totality of the circumstances. 

And there’s a lot of circumstances there for you to consider.” 

Defense counsel did not object to this response.

Appellant does not contend that the trial court’s definition of 

“consent” or “belief as to consent” was wrong. Instead, he asserts 

the court should have used CALCRIM No. 1215 instead of using its 

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own language to respond to the jury’s questions because when he 

told the jury to consider the terms “consent” and “belief as to 

consent” under “the totality of the circumstances,” thereby 

“replac[ing] reasonable doubt with totality of the circumstances.” 

He argues, “The ‘totality of the circumstances’ is not the same as 

‘beyond reasonable doubt,’ and indeed diluted the standard of 

proof.”

We disagree that the trial court’s responses to the jury’s questions 

“diluted the standard of proof.” Rather, the court was explaining to 

the jury that in evaluating both Doe’s consent and appellant’s good 

faith belief as to her consent, it should consider all of the evidence 

relevant to those issues, rather than a single factor—such as Doe’s 

age—in isolation. The court did not use the term “totality of the 

circumstances” in manner related to the burden of proof. Further, 

the jury had been instructed separately and repeatedly that the 

People had the burden to prove every element beyond a reasonable 

doubt, including the two elements for which consent was an issue, 

and the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 220 –

Reasonable Doubt, which stated in part, “Whenever I tell you the 

People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a 

reasonable doubt unless I specifically tell you otherwise.” Defining 

the terms relating to consent did not obligate the court to reinstruct 

the jury on the burden of proof. We presume a jury is capable of 

understanding and correlating all jury instructions that are given. 

(People v. Yoder (1979) 100 Cal.App.3 d 333, 338.) We have no 

reason to believe the jury was unable to do so in this case.

Oliver, 2014 WL 1270308, at 9-10 (footnote omitted).

Oliver does not argue that the trial court provided incorrect definitions of “consent” or 

“belief as to consent.” He argues that the trial court should have used CALCRIM 1215 instead of 

the language that was used. The Court of Appeal’s holding that the trial court’s language was 

proper was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority or an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Oliver is not entitled to federal habeas relief for his allegation that the 

trial court used its own language instead of CALCRIM 1215.

The Court of Appeal was also not unreasonable in determining that the trial court’s 

instructions were appropriate and did not dilute the standard of proof. The trial court used the 

phrase “totality of the circumstances” in instructing the jury on how to evaluate the victim’s 

consent to go with Oliver and Oliver’s good faith belief as to her consent. The trial court did not 

use “totality of the circumstances” in any way related to the burden of proof. The trial court 

repeatedly instructed the jury that the prosecution had to prove every element beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The trial court’s instruction also stated that the prosecution had the burden of proving that 

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the victim did not consent. This claim is denied.

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, petitioner has made no showing warranting a certificate and so none is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A Certificate 

of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 17, 2016

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY OLIVER,

Plaintiff,

v.

C.E. DUCART,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-00397-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on February 17, 2016, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Henry Oliver ID: V-53030

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500

Crescent City, CA 95532-7000 

Dated: February 17, 2016

Susan Y. Soong

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

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