Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01091/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01091-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LIONELL THOLMER,

CDCR #D‒72928,

Plaintiff,

v.

PATRICK COVELLO, Warden, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01091-DMS-JLB

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND 

DENYING THIRD MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE 

RELIEF AS MOOT

[ECF Nos. 20, 22]

Plaintiff Lionell Tholmer, currently incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison, in 

Ione, California, is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action, which he first filed on 

June 11, 2019, while he was incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in 

San Diego (“RJD”), and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) 

I. Procedural History

At the time he submitted his Complaint, Tholmer did not prepay the $400 filing fee 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), followed by separate motions seeking injunctive 

relief and pretrial discovery. (See ECF Nos. 2, 6, 8, 10.)

On July 30, 2019, the Court granted Tholmer leave to proceed IFP, conducted its 

mandatory initial screening of his Complaint, dismissed it sua sponte for failing to state a 

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claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), and denied his other 

motions. (See ECF No. 11 at 25-26.)1 The Court also granted Tholmer leave in which to 

file an amended complaint that addressed all the deficiencies of pleading it identified. (Id. 

at 11-21, 25); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading 

was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured.”) (citations 

omitted)).

On September 9, 2019, and before his amended complaint was due, Tholmer filed 

a motion requesting an extension of time in which to amend, claiming he needed more 

time in this case “as a result of [his] responsibilities” in another case he had pending in 

the Ninth Circuit. (See ECF No. 12 at 1.) On September 12, 2019, this Court granted 

Tholmer’s motion and gave him until October 18, 2019, in which to file his amended 

complaint. (See ECF No. 13). The Court explicitly advised Tholmer that “[n]o further 

extensions of time w[ould] be granted, however, unless [he] demonstrate[d] good cause 

based on circumstances beyond his own control.” (Id. at 3.)

On October 18, 2019, Tholmer filed a second motion for extension of time—again 

citing only his need to comply with deadlines set by the Ninth Circuit in Tholmer v. 

Covello, et al., Appeal No. 19-71827 (9th Cir. July 22, 2019). (See ECF No. 14 at 1-2.) 

Tholmer then submitted a letter claiming his legal and personal property has been 

“stolen” by two RJD officers. (See ECF No. 16 at 1.)

Based in part of his letter, on November 11, 2019, the Court granted Tholmer’s 

second request for extension of time, and reiterated that no further extensions would be 

granted. (See ECF No. 17). A week later, Tholmer filed a third motion seeking 

 

1 The Court granted Tholmer’s IFP Motion despite his documented history as a vexatious 

litigant because his initial Complaint, while insufficient to state a claim upon which § 1983 

relief could be granted, when considered together with his motions for preliminary 

injunctive relief, included plausible claims of “imminent danger of serious physical injury” 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (See ECF No. 11 at 4‒5 & n.3.)

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preliminary injunctive relief (ECF No. 20), but no amended complaint. Instead, and after 

the time granted for amendment had again elapsed, he filed a “Motion to Withdraw.” (See 

ECF No. 22). 

II. Motion to Withdraw

In this Motion, Tholmer now asks the Court to dismiss his case without prejudice, 

claiming that his personal files and “records related to the instant civil rights complaint” 

have either been delayed or have gone missing as a result of his transfer from RJD, and 

that he “does not have sufficient information or facts to attest under penalty of perjury.” 

(Id. at 3.) Tholmer further concedes he cannot yet assess whether he “is or is not still in 

imminent danger.” (Id.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A) provides that “the plaintiff may 

dismiss an action without a court order by filing: (i) a notice of dismissal before the 

opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Here, while Tholmer’s “Motion to Withdraw” is not formally captioned 

as a Notice for Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A), that is what 

he clearly seeks. See Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“Courts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally, including pro se motions as 

well as complaints.”); Christensen v. CIR, 786 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1986) 

(construing pro se taxpayer’s motion to “place statements in the record” as a motion for 

leave to amend). 

“The filing of a notice of voluntary dismissal with the court automatically 

terminates the action as to the defendants who are the subjects of the notice.... Such a 

dismissal leaves the parties as though no action had been brought.” Am. Soccer Co. v. 

Score First Enterprises, a Div. of Kevlar Indus., 187 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999)

(citing Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations and 

footnote omitted)). Thus, because Tholmer has notified the Court that he does not wish to 

pursue civil litigation at this time, no party has yet to be served with any valid pleading, 

and no answer or motion for summary judgment has yet to be filed, voluntary dismissal 

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pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) is appropriate.

Tholmer is cautioned, however, that because he is a prisoner and has brought this 

civil action IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), he remains “required to pay the full 

amount of a filing fee” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). (See ECF No. 11 at 3‒

4, 25.) Moreover, because the Court has already found his allegations insufficient to state 

any plausible claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted, the dismissal of this action

is without prejudice except that it may be counted as an additional “strike” against him 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) should he remain incarcerated and seek to proceed in forma 

pauperis in future litigation. See Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(“A prisoner may not avoid incurring strikes simply by declining to take advantage of 

[an] opportunity to amend.”). “[W]hen (1) a district court dismisses a complaint on the 

ground that it fails to state a claim, and (2) the court grants leave to amend, and (3) the 

plaintiff then fails to file an amended complaint, the dismissal counts as a strike under 

§ 1915(g).” Id.

III. Conclusion and Orders

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw (ECF No. 22),

DENIES his Third Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 20) as moot, and

DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter a judgment of voluntary dismissal without 

prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i), and to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2020

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