Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_03-cv-02399/USCOURTS-alnd-5_03-cv-02399-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

CORY R. MAPLES,

Petitioner, 

vs.

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, Commissioner

of the Alabama Department of

Corrections,

Respondent.

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CASE NO. 5:03-CV-2399-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is presently before the court on CoryR. Maples’s Amended Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus, (doc. 24),1

seeking relief from his state-court conviction for capital

murder and death sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Maples was convicted of capital

murder and sentenced to death for the murders of Stacy Alan Terry and Barry Dewayne

Robinson, II. He has filed this petition seeking habeas relief pursuant to § 2254 based, inter

alia, on the alleged constitutionally-ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. For the

reasons set forth below, the court finds that Maples’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus is due to be denied.

1Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to each

document as it is filed in the court’s record and citations to page numbers in such documents

refer to page number assigned to the document in the court’s electronic filing system. Unless

otherwise indicated, citations to the state-court records reflects the volume, tab, and page

numbers assigned by respondent.

FILED

 2015 Sep-14 PM 02:15

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:03-cv-02399-KOB Document 82 Filed 09/14/15 Page 1 of 178
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. THE OFFENSE CONDUCT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

II. THE SENTENCING ORDER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

IV. APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

A. HABEAS STANDARD OF REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

1. Generally.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2. The Rule 32 Court’s Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

B. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL DEFAULT, AND THE CAUSE-ANDPREJUDICE STANDARD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

C. CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . 21

1. The Performance Prong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2. The Prejudice Prong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3. Deference Accorded State Court Findings of Historical Fact and Decisions

on the Merits When Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Claims.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

D. EVIDENTIARY HEARING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

V. THE POST-REMAND INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE CLAIMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

VI. THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE GUILT PHASE OF

TRIAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

1. Counsel’s Chosen Strategy Not to Investigate, Pursue, and Present a

Defense Based on Intoxication Was Unreasonable. . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

a. History of the claim. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

b. Prejudice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

c. Evidence at trial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

i. Maples’s videotaped confession. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

ii. Testifying guilt phase witnesses who saw Maples before the

murders.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

iii. Guilt phase witnesses who saw Maples after the murders

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

iv. Additional witnesses counsel failed to adequately interview

or investigate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

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d. Notice of Maples’s extreme intoxication through penalty-phase

testifying witness Dr. Shealy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

e. Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

2. Counsel’s Failure to Request the Assistance of a Pharmacologist or Other

Expert in Drug Interactions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

3. Counsel Failed to Request Jury Instructions on Intoxication and

Manslaughter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

4. Counsel Was Ineffective for Admitting Critical Elements of the Charged

Offenses During Closing Argument and Arguing a Position That Was

Inconsistent with His Opening Statement.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

a. Maples’s claim.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

b. Counsel’s Arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

c. Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

5. Alabama’s System of Indigent Representation in Capital Cases Contributed

to Counsel’s Deficiencies and Further Deprived Maples of Effective

Assistance of Counsel.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE PENALTY PHASE OF

TRIAL... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

1. Alabama Code § 13A-5-46(f).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

2. Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate Maples’s Family History and

Character References... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

a. Procedurally barred allegations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

b. Maples’s family history (abuse and abandonment by his mother).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

i. The trial evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

A. Dr. Allen Shealy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

B. Philip Maples.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

C. Elyse Maples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

D. Kenneth Maples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

ii. The alleged undisclosed evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

A. Philip Maples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

B. Denise Imgrund.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

C. Elyse Maples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

D. Other Family Members. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

iii. Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

c. Maples’s Character References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

i. The trial evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

ii. The post-conviction allegations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

iii. Analysis.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

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3. Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate Mr. Maples’s Drug Addiction

and Attempted Recovery, Depression, and Suicide Attempts... . . 133

4. Counsel Failed to Present Evidence of Maples’s Assistance to the Police in

Their Enforcement of Drug Law Violations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

5. Counsel Failed to Procure a Competent Psychological Evaluation... . 148

6. Counsel Failed to Investigate Maples’s Post-Arrest Behavior.. . . . . . 156

7. Counsel Failed to Investigate Maples’s Head Trauma.. . . . . . . . . . . . 157

C. COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE FOR USING CONTRADICTORY

STRATEGIES IN THE GUILT PHASE AND PENALTY PHASE. . . . 165

D. COUNSEL’S CUMULATIVE ERRORS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

I. THE OFFENSE CONDUCT

In its decision denying Maples relief on direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals adopted the statement of facts set forth in the trial court’s sentencing order. These

facts were set forth in the court’s prior Memorandum Opinion and are not disputed.

At some time in the late evening hours of Friday, July 7, 1995, or the

early morning hours of Saturday, July 8, 1995, Stacy Alan Terry, Barry

Dewayne Robinson II, and the Defendant, [Cory]

2 Ross Maples, arrived at the

residence of the Defendant on Mud Tavern Road in Morgan County. All three

of the young men were acquaintances. Mr. Terry, whose nickname was

[“]Twinky,[”] and the Defendant had spent the evening of July 7 drinking,

playing pool, and [“]riding around[”] in Mr. Terry’s 1995 Camaro. The

Defendant and Mr. Terry had attended high school together until the

Defendant dropped out his senior year. As evidenced by the testimony of

family and friends, the two young men had spent a considerable amount of

time together during the week preceding [the murders].

2Throughout the state proceedings, Cory Maples was referred to as “Corey Maples.” 

The correct spelling is “Cory.”

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Mr. Robinson was new to the area, but had known Mr. Terry and the

Defendant for several months. Mr. Robinson asked Mr. Terry for a ride home

from the pool hall where all three young men were playing pool. 

Once the three young men arrived at the home of the Defendant, [Cory]

Maples, he left the car and went into the mobile home. The defendant picked

up a .22 caliber rifle and walked back outside to the car where Mr. Terry and

Mr. Robinson sat getting ready to leave. The Defendant walked to the driver’s

side of the car and shot Mr. Terry twice in the head and then shot Mr.

Robinson twice in the head. 

At some time around 1:00 a.m. on July 8, 1995, the Defendant’s

half-brother, Daniel Maples, and his friend, Matt Shell, arrived at the residence

on Mud Tavern Road and found the body of Stacy Terry lying in the driveway

close to the trailer where the Defendant and his half-brother lived with their

father and the Defendant’s stepmother. 

At some time around 9:00 p.m. on July 8, 1995, the Decatur police

received a report of a body found in a creek commonly referred to as Mud

Tavern Creek, one mile down the road from the Defendant’s residence. The

body was identified as that of Barry Robinson II. 

During the ensuing investigation of the two young men’s murders,

officers of the Morgan CountySheriff’s Department obtained information that

implicated [Cory] Ross Maples in the killings of Mr. Terry and Mr. Robinson. 

The officers began to look for the Defendant and Mr. Terry’s missing Camaro

with the personalized tag bearing the word [“]TWINK.[”] 

In the late evening of August 1, 1995, the Nashville MetropolitanPolice

Department received a telephone call from an individual who had spotted the

Defendant at the Best Rest Motel off I-10 in Nashville. The individual had

seen a picture of the Defendant and heard a description of the car from a local

television station. Members of the Nashville Police Department apprehended

the Defendant at the motel. The Defendant was then transported to the

Nashville Metropolitan Police Department where he was held until members

ofthe Morgan CountySheriff’s Department arrived. During the earlymorning

hours of August 2, 1995, the Defendant gave Investigators Howard Battles and

Byron Whitten of the Morgan County Sheriff’s office a statement of

confession to the murders. 

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Mr. Terry and Mr. Robinson died as a result of gunshot wounds to the

head. Both young men were shot twice in the head. The medical examiner

determined that each man’s death was instantaneous to the shots to the head. 

The wounds were consistent with an execution-type slaying. The evidence

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant shot both men. He was

armed with a .22 caliber rifle which belonged to his father.

Evidence, both circumstantial and direct, overwhelminglysupported the

foregoing finding: Count I of the indictment charged the Defendant, [Cory]

Maples, in the killing of two people in a single transaction or occurrence as

described in Ala. Code [1975,] § 13A-5-40[(a)](10)(1994 repl. vol.). Count

II of the indictment charged the Defendant, Corey Maples, with the murder of

Stacy Terry during the course of a robbery as described in Ala. Code [1975,]

§ 13A-5-40[(a)](2)(1994 repl. vol.). The jury returned a verdict of guilty on

both counts of capital murder after five plus days of testimony. The Defendant

was the sole participant in this brutal double murder of Stacy Alan Terry and

Barry Dewayne Robinson II, as well as the murder of Stacy Alan Terry in the

course of robbing Stacy Alan Terry of his 1995 Camaro automobile. (C.R.

554-56.)

(Doc. 34 at 3-5 [quoting Maples v. State, 758 So. 2d 1, 14-16 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)]

(internal quotations omitted).) 

II. THE SENTENCING ORDER 

The pertinent portions of the trial court’s sentencing order are set forth below:

Application of the Law 

The only sentences available to the court in this proceeding are death

or life imprisonment without parole. The Alabama Code provides a rather

strict procedure to be followed in determining whether to sentence a Defendant

who has been convicted of a capital offense to death or life imprisonment

without parole. See Ala. Code § 13A-5-39 through 13A-5-59 (1994 repl. vol.) 

Each person who is convicted of a capital offense must be sentenced in

accordance with the statutory scheme. The court will follow the statutory

arrangement in explaining its application of the law to the fact of this case.

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The crime. The Defendant was convicted of murder during the

commission of a robbery in the first degree and murder of two persons

pursuant to a common plan or scheme. See Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a) (1994

repl. vol.) 

The aggravating circumstances. The State proved beyond a reasonable

doubt that one statutory aggravating circumstance applies in this case: The

capital offense was committed while the Defendant was engaged . . . in the

commission of . . . robbery . . . . See Ala. Code § 13A-5-49(4) (1994 repl.

vol.).

The Defendant committed the capital offense while he was engaged in

the commission of a robbery. See Ala. Code § 13A-5-49(4) (1994 repl. vol.). 

This aggravating circumstance also constituted the aggravating component of

the capital offense. Therefore, the jury verdict which found the Defendant

guilty of a murder during the commission of a robbery in the first degree

established this aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The State did not rely on any other statutory aggravating circumstance

as those circumstances are defined and construed. The court has not

considered any of the facts of this case as non-statutory aggravating

circumstances. . . . [T]he State did not rely on any other aggravating

circumstances, [and the court finds all other statutory aggravating

circumstances to be inapplicable].

. . . 

The mitigating circumstances.

3 The defense asserted the presence of

mitigating circumstances. Although the defense did not rely on all of the

statutory mitigating circumstances, the court reviews all of the statutory

mitigating circumstances in this sentencing order.

1. The Defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.

See Ala. Code § 13A–5–51(1) (1994 repl. vol.). The court finds this

3

In Alabama, “A mitigating circumstance is a fact or situation that does not bear on

the question of a defendant’s guilt but is considered in imposing punishment and [especially]

in lessening the severity of a sentence.” Ex parte Lewis, 24 So. 3d 540, 543-44 (Ala.

2009)(quoting BLACK’SLAW DICTIONARY 260 (8th ed. 2004))(internal quotations omitted). 

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mitigating circumstance is present in this case. The District Attorneyconceded

this point during the sentencing phase of the trial, and the court concurs.

2. The capital offense was committed while the Defendant was under

the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. See Ala. Code §

13A–5–51(2) (1994 repl. vol.). The Court finds this mitigating circumstance

is inapplicable.

The Defense asserts that the Defendant had been drinking beer the night

of the murders and had a history of drug addiction. The Defense further

alleges that this substance abuse was extensive and a triggering factor in the

events of July 7 and July 8. This evidence falls woefully short of the statutory

mitigating circumstance that the offender was under the influence of extreme

mental or emotional disturbance. Dr. Alan [Shealy], a clinical forensic

psychologist testifying for the Defendant, presented evidence that the

Defendant’s background and history fit a profile of a passive-aggressive

personality. This profile resulted from Dr. [Shealy]’s feeding a computer

program information provided by the Defendant in an interview. The court

notes the State psychologist did not markedlydiffer fromDr. [Shealy]’s report. 

Both doctors agreed the Defendant was fit to stand trial and understood the

difference between right and wrong. The only difference between the two

experts being the Defendant’s expert testified alcohol and past drug abuse

might be a trigger for the actions taken by the Defendant on the night of July

7, 1995. However, the Defendant, in a videotaped confession, denied the use

of drugs on the night of the murders and robbery.

3. The victim was a participant in the Defendant’s conduct or

consented to it. See Ala. Code § 13A–5–51(3) (1994 repl. vol.). The court

finds this mitigating circumstance is inapplicable.

. . .

4. The Defendant was an accomplice in the capital offense committed

by another person and his participation was relatively minor. See Ala. Code

§ 13A–5–51(4) (1994 repl. vol.). The Court finds this mitigating circumstance

is inapplicable.

. . .

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5. The Defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial

domination of another person. See Ala. Code § 13A–5–51(5) (1994 repl.

vol.). The Court finds this mitigating circumstance is inapplicable.

No evidence exists to lead this court to believe the Defendant acted

under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. 

Quite the contrary, the evidence shows the Defendant asserted he alone killed

the two men with no external influences. This mitigating circumstance was

neither asserted nor proved; the court rejects this mitigating circumstance.

6. The capacity of the Defendant to appreciate the criminality of his

conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially

impaired. See Ala. Code § 13A–5–51(6) (1994 repl. vol.). The court finds

this mitigating circumstance is inapplicable.

The court notes the Defense never specifically addressed this particular

mitigating circumstance. While the defense does assert the defendant had

been drinking alcohol extensively during the period before the crime, the

evidence falls short ofsupporting the assertion the Defendant was so impaired

by alcohol he could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct. The court

notes the Defendant stole the vehicle of Stacy Terry and fled the state because

he knew the authorities would be after him. The court finds such evidence too

weak and unpersuasive to support this statutory mitigating circumstance.

7. The age of the Defendant at the time of the crime. See Ala. Code §

13A–5–51(7)(1994 repl. vol.). The court finds this mitigating circumstance

is inapplicable.

The Defendant was 21 years of age at the time of this capital murder. 

The court is not persuaded this constitutes a mitigating circumstance. 

Although the age of an offender may be an important consideration in deciding

punishment, a 21-year-old offender is not so youthful the Court should treat

him differently than other adults.

8. § 13A–5–52. Mitigating Circumstances – Inclusion of Defendant’s

character, record, etc. The court finds evidence of this circumstance in this

case.

The defense presented seven nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to

be considered in the sentencing phase of the trial. They are as follows:

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(1) That the Defendant suffered abuse, neglect, and abandonment by

his birth mother during his childhood. The court does not doubt the

abandonment of the Defendant by his birth mother as introduced into evidence

by the Defendant’s psychologist and the Defendant’s family. However, the

Court also notes the testimony supports the fact that the Defendant has good

relations with his step-mother, who he has known as his mother since the

Defendant was the age of three. The psychologists’ testimony and testimony

fromthe Defendant’s familylead one to the inescapable conclusion that [Cory]

Ross Maples is a troubled young man with a history of abuse from his mother

and self-abuse through drugs and alcohol.

(2) That the Defendant has suffered from past drug dependency. 

Testimony elicited throughout the trial from various witnesses, including the

Defendant,4established the Defendant had a drug dependency on marijuana,

crystal methamphetamine, crack, and various other illegal controlled

substances. The court does not doubt the testimony the Defendant has suffered

from addiction to various controlled substances.

(3) That the Defendant has made efforts at controlling his drug

dependency in drug rehabilitation. Testimony elicited from the Defendant's

father and step-mother established the Defendant spent some time in the latter

half of 1994 at the Quest Recovery Program for Drug Addiction. The court

finds this testimony credible.

(4) That the Defendant has cooperated and assisted law enforcement

authorities in its enforcement of drug law violations. The Defendant’s

stepmother testified the Defendant had assisted the Decatur Police Department

in apprehending a drug violator. The court notes no police officer testified at

trial, nor was there any corroboration of the stepmother’s testimony.

(5) That the Defendant had diminished mental capacity at the time of

the crime due to his consumption of alcohol. 

While the defense presents this as a mitigating factor, the Court fails to

be convinced by the conflicting testimony at trial that this is a mitigating

factor. The Defendant acknowledges no inordinate amount of alcohol

4Maples did not testify at trial. However, his statements were introduced into

evidence through his videotaped confession and Shealy’s testimony.

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consumption on the evening of the murder, nor is there any evidence that the

amount of alcohol consumption on the evening of July 7, 1995[,] was any

different than any other night.

(6) That the Defendant displayed remorse and candor in his videotaped

confession to law enforcement authorities and further during this confession

he accepted full responsibility of the murder of Stacy Terry and Barry

Robinson, II.

The court has considered this non-statutorymitigating circumstance and

finds the Defendant did candidly speak of the events of July 7 and July 8,

1995. The court is not persuaded the Defendant exhibited any remorse over

the consequences of his actions. While the Court commends the Defendant’s

candor, the court finds no evidence of remorse.

(7) That the crime was absent of any prolonged suffering or torture by

either of the Decedents.

While the defense presents this as a mitigating factor, the Court fails to

be convinced by the testimony at trial that this is a mitigating factor.

Weighing the Circumstances

The court now proceeds to weigh the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances to determine the appropriate sentence under the law. The Court

has not merely tallied for the purpose of numerical comparison the aggravating

and mitigating circumstances, but has [marshaled] and considered in an

organized fashion all of the relevant circumstances.

The evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one

statutoryaggravating circumstance. The defense did prove bya preponderance

of the evidence that the Defendant has no significant history of prior criminal

activity. Insofar as the Defense attempted to assert the presence of several

statutorymitigating circumstances, the facts failed to meet the definition of the

circumstance or the evidence disproved the factual existence of the

circumstance by at least a preponderance of the evidence. The court did weigh

several non-statutory mitigating circumstances in addition to the one statutory

mitigating circumstance, but found them weak and unpersuasive.

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The court is unable to find the kind of mitigating facts that would

justify the imposition of a sentence oflife imprisonment without parole despite

the existence of one statutory aggravating circumstance. The statutory

aggravating circumstance far outweighed the mitigating facts. The court

considered the jury’s recommendation as required by law. See Ala. Code 13A5-47(e) (1994 repl. vol.). The court, though, understands the jury’s verdict

does not require this court to impose the sentence of death.

The jury deliberated for about four hours before returning the advisory

verdict affixing punishment at death, ten for death and two for life without

parole. 

The courts accepts the jury’s recommendation. The court fixes the

Defendant’s punishment at death. 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 62, at 3-12 [footnotes added].)

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 29, 2006, this court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Final

Judgment denying Cory R. Maples’s petition for habeas relief based on his failure to timely

appeal the Rule 32

5

court’s denial of his ineffective assistance claims. (See docs. 34 and 35.) 

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this court’s judgment. See Maples v. Allen,

586 F.3d 879 (11th Cir. 2009). That court held, in part, “It is undisputed that Maples never

appealed [the Rule 32] court’s dismissal of his Rule 32 claims. Thus, Maples did not

properly exhaust those claims in state court. And because any further attempts by Maples

5

In Alabama state courts, “Rule 32, A.R. Cr. P., provides a procedure for securing the

post-conviction relief from a conviction or sentence previously provided by either a writ of

habeas corpus or a writ of error coram nobis.” Ex parte Powell, 641 So. 2d 772, 775 (Ala.

1994)(citing H. Maddox, ALABAMA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 32.0 (1990)). 

Throughout this Memorandum Opinion the court has used the term “Rule 32” to refer to the

state post-conviction proceedings.

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to exhaust those claims in state court would be futile, Maples’s unexhausted claims are

procedurally defaulted.” Id. at 886 (citing, inter alia, O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,

848 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991)). Also, the Eleventh

Circuit found that Maples had not established “cause” under the “cause and prejudice” 

standard because “counsel’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal of the Rule 32 Order 

cannot establish cause for his default because there is no right to post-conviction counsel.” 

Id. at 891 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752; Jimenez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 481 F.3d 1337,

1344 (11th Cir. 2007)).

Maples petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Maples

v. Allen, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2010 WL 2727329 (July 9, 2010), and the Court

granted the petition as to the following issue:

Whether the Eleventh Circuit properly held – in conflict with the decisions of

this Court and other courts – that there was no “cause” to excuse any

procedural default where petitioner was blameless for the default, the State's

own conduct contributed to the default, and petitioner’s attorneys of record

were no longer functioning as his agents at the time of any default.

Id., 2010 WL 2727329 at *i; Maples v. Thomas, 131 S. Ct. 1718 (2011)(granting in part

Maples’s cert. petition).

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit, finding the

“extraordinary circumstances” surrounding Maples’s failure to appeal the Rule 32 court’s

order “show[ed] ample cause . . . to excuse the procedural default in which he was trapped

when counsel of record abandoned him without a word of warning.” Maples v. Thomas, ___

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U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927 (2012). The Court reversed and remanded the case for

consideration of whether Maples could establish prejudice under the cause-and-prejudice

standard, id. at 927-28, an issue not previously reached by this court or the Eleventh Circuit.

On March 8, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to this court with

directions to comply with the Supreme Court’s instructions. Maples v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t

of Corr., 460 Fed. Appx. 860 (11th Cir. 2012).

This court entered a scheduling order based upon the parties’ joint proposed briefing

schedule. (Doc. 59.) Pursuant to that order, Maples was directed to “file a brief explaining

a) why Claims I, II, and IIIin his amended habeas petition (doc. 24 which was filed May 23,

2005) are not procedurally barred, and b) why he is entitled to relief based on Claims I, II,

III.”6(Doc. 59 at 1.) Respondent, the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of

Corrections, was directed to respond to Maples’s “Opening Brief, and explain why Claims

6Maples alleged thirty-five claims in his habeas petition, but only Claims I, II and III

are subject to the prejudice inquiry dictated by the Supreme Court’s remand instructions. As

pointed out by Maples in his initial post-remand brief – 

[This] court rejected Claims VI, VII, XI, XXXIII, and XXXIV because they

were not presented at trial or on direct appeal and thus had been procedurally

barred by the trial court at the state postconviction stage. [(Doc. 34 at 17-18.)] 

The district court rejected on the merits Claims IV, V, VIII, IX, X, XII, XIII,

XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV,

XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, and XXXV. (Id. at

18-120.) [to] XXXII, and XXXV. (Id. at 18-120).

(Doc. 60 at 32 n.5.) Accordingly, the determinations made regarding Claims IV through

XXXV in the 2006 Memorandum Opinion and Final Judgment remain final and will not be

disturbed.

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I, II, and III in petitioner’s most recent habeas petition are procedurally barred or otherwise

not meritorious.” (Id.) Thereafter, Maples was afforded an opportunity to file a ReplyBrief,

followed by respondent’s Sur-ReplyBrief. (Id. at 1-2.) The parties have complied with these

briefing obligations. 

IV. APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Since Maples’s habeas petition was filed after 1996, it is governed by the AntiTerrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets several limits on the

power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a state prisoner. Section 2254(a) permits a federal court to entertain

only those applications alleging that a person is in state custody “in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Sections 2254(b)

and (c) provide that a federal court may not grant such applications unless,

with certain exceptions, the applicant has exhausted state remedies.

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). The ultimate purpose

of these limitations is to ensure that state courts are afforded the first opportunity to correct

only federal questions affecting the validity of state court convictions. O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999).

A. HABEAS STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. Generally

The parties agree that Maples’s ineffectiveness claims were adjudicated on the merits

by the Rule 32 court. Therefore – 

Under § 2254(d), [his] application [for habeas relief] “shall not be granted with

respect to [such a] claim . . . unless the adjudication of the claim”:

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“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.”

This is a “difficult to meet,” Harrington v. Richter, [562 U.S. 86, 102,] 131

S. Ct. 770, 786, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011), and “highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt,” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.

Ct. 357, 154 L. Ed. 2d 279 (2002)(per curiam)(citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). The petitioner carries the burden of proof. Id., at 25, 123 S.

Ct. 357.

Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1398.

The “backward-looking language” of § 2254(d) “requires an examination of the

state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited

to the record in existence at that same time i.e., the record before the state court.” Id. Also,

the “[s]tate court decisions are measured against [the Supreme] Court’s precedents as of ‘the

time the state court renders its decision.’” Id. at 1399 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 588 U.S.

63, 71-72 (2003)). 

2. The Rule 32 Court’s Order

Maples argues that the Rule 32 court’s decision should not be afforded 2254(d)

deference because the Supreme Court expressed consternation that the order was a word for

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word copy of the proposed order the State had submitted.7

(Doc. 60 at 36 [quoting Maples,

132 S. Ct at 919 n.5].) The Supreme Court has – 

. . . criticized courts for their verbatim adoption of findings of fact

prepared by prevailing parties, particularlywhen those findings have taken the

form of conclusory statements unsupported by citation to the record. See, e.g.,

United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656-657, 84 S. Ct.

1044, 1047-1048, 12 L. Ed. 2d 12 (1964); United States v. Marine

Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 615, n. 13, 94 S. Ct. 2856, 2866, n. 13, 41 L.

Ed. 2d 978 (1974). We are also aware of the potential for overreaching and

exaggeration on the part of attorneys preparing findings of fact when they have

already been informed that the judge has decided in their favor. See J. Wright,

The Nonjury Trial – Preparing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Opinions, Seminars for Newly Appointed United States District Judges 159,

166 (1962). Nonetheless, our previous discussions of the subject suggest that

even when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are

those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous. United States

v. Marine Bancorporation,supra, at 615, n.13, 94 S. Ct., at 2866, n.13; United

States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., supra, 376 U.S., at 656-657, 84 S. Ct., at

1047-1048.

Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985), quoted in Jefferson v. Upton, 560

U.S. 284, 293-94 (2010)(“Although we have stated that a court’s ‘verbatim adoption of

findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties’ should be treated as findings of the court, we

have also criticized that practice. . . . And we have not considered the lawfulness of, nor the

application of the habeas statute to, the use of such a practice where (1) a judge solicits the

7The Supreme Court did not actually express any opinion regarding the Rule 32

court’s adoption of the State’s proposed order; it noted only, “One of Maples’[s] attorneys

observed, without contradiction, that the trial court’s order was a ‘word for word copy of the

proposed Order that the State had submitted [with] its [December 2001] Motion to Dismiss.’” 

Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 919 n.5.

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proposed findings ex parte, (2) does not provide the opposing party an opportunity to

criticize the findings or to submit his own, or (3) adopts findings that contain internal

evidence suggesting that the judge may not have read them”)(internal citations omitted).

Maples filed his initial Rule 32 petition on July 24, 2001. (Rule 32 C.R., Vol. 32, Tab

47.) On September 27, 2001, The State filed an answer and motion to dismiss Maples’s

initial Rule 32 petition. (Id. at Tab 48). The State also submitted a proposed dismissal order

based on the claims as alleged in the initial Rule 32 petition. On December 7, 2001, Maples

filed an amended Rule 32 petition along with a response in opposition to the State’s motion

to dismiss. (Id., Vol. 33, Tabs 49 and 50.) Maples defended his initial petition in the motion

but also stated that he was submitting an amended petition to correct the alleged deficiencies. 

While many of the claims in the amended Rule 32 petition were identical to the initial Rule

32 petition, others were reworded and contained additional factual allegations.8 On

December 12, 2001, Maples filed two broad-based discovery motions (one for institutional

files and another pursuant to Rule 16, Ala. R. Crim. P.) and a general ex parte motion for

funds. (Doc. 80, Tabs 22, 24, and 25.) 

On December 27, 2001, the Rule 32 court found that the “Petition” was adequately

pleaded. (Doc. 78, Tab 4.) No further judicial action was taken until some 18 months later,

on May 22, 2003, when the Rule 32 court signed the State’s proposed order. (Rule 32 C.R.

8To the extent a claim in the amended Rule 32 petition differs from the initial Rule 32

petition such that a notation or ruling is appropriate, the court has done so.

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Vol. 37, Tab 66.) The only alteration the trial judge made to the proposed order was to

change the year and to sign his name. (Id. at 86.) 

Although the wholesale adoption of a party’s proposed opinion may be disfavored,

it is not per se illegal or improper. In this case, the Rule 32 court’s order is neither

conclusory nor unsupported. Moreover, the judge that presided over Maples’s postconviction proceedings also presided over his trial. As such, the Rule 32 court had extensive

personal knowledge of the facts underlying Maples’s claims. The court finds that the Rule

32 court’s order was an adjudication on the merits of Maples’s ineffectiveness claims and

is entitled to deference.

B. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL DEFAULT, AND THE CAUSE-ANDPREJUDICE STANDARD

The sole issue facing this court on remand is whether Maples has established

prejudice sufficient to excuse his procedural default with regard to his ineffective-assistance

claims. In keeping with well-established principles of comity and federalism, a petitioner is

required to first present his federal claims to the state court by exhausting all of the state’s

available procedures. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666 (2005)(holding that a petitioner

“can seek federal habeas relief only on claims that have been exhausted in state court”). 

However, “Procedural default may be overcome . . . by a showing of (1) cause and prejudice;

or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243,

1258 (11th Cir. 2013)(quoting Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015, 1022-23 (11th Cir. 1996)). In this

case, the only exception at issue is the cause-and-prejudice exception. And, because the

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Supreme Court held that Maples has shown cause for his procedural default, the only issue

before this court is whether he has shown the necessary prejudice.

To establish prejudice sufficient to excuse his procedural default, Maples “must

shoulder the burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of

prejudice, but that theyworked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire

trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170

(1982)(emphasis in original). Indeed, “A mere possibility of actual prejudice resulting from

an error at trial will not waive the procedural default bar where other substantial evidence of

guilt is present.” McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 1992)(citing

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977)(finding no “actual prejudice” when “[t]he other

evidence of guilt presented at trial . . . was substantial to a degree that would negate any

possibility of actual prejudice” as a result of the alleged error)).

Maples received an adjudication on the merits of the ineffectiveness claims from the

Rule 32 court. He has retooled and significantly altered the factual basis of some of his

ineffectiveness claims when compared to the claims he presented to the Rule 32 court. 

Accordingly, those claims, or aspects of those claims, are subject to dismissal for

nonexhaustion, and, thus, are procedurally defaulted on that basis. See Kelley v. Secretary

for Dept. of Corrections, 377 F.3d 1317, 1345 (“The habeas petitioner can escape the

exhaustion requirement only by showing cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting

therefrom . . . . Absent the applicability of [this] exception[], nonexhausted claims cannot

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be raised in federal habeas corpus petitions.”)(citations omitted). Maples has not argued

cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural default of claims not presented to the

Rule 32 court.

C. CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The Supreme Court’s “benchmark” for judging any claim that trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance is “whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning

of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just

result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The Court’s opinion in

Strickland established a two-pronged standard for judging, under the Sixth Amendment, the

effectiveness of attorneys who represent criminal defendants at trial:

A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so

defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two

components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the

Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose

result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said

that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the

adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 

Id. at 687; see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000); Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d

1194, 1215 (11th Cir. 2001).

Therefore, the two parts of the Strickland standard are conjunctive; a petitioner

accordingly bears the burden of proving both “deficient performance” and “prejudice” by

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“a preponderance of competent evidence.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313

(11th Cir. 2000)(en banc). However, a court is not required to address both aspects of the

Strickland standard when a habeas petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one of the

two prongs. Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)(“Because both parts

of the test must be satisfied in order to show a violation of the Sixth Amendment, the court

need not address the performance prong if the defendant cannot meet the prejudice prong,

or vice versa.”).

1. The Performance Prong

“The burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that counsel’s performance was unreasonable.” Stewart v. Secretary, Department

of Corrections, 476 F.3d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir. 2007)(citing Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1313). 

To satisfy the performance prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must prove that counsel

made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The standard for gauging attorney

performance is “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688; see

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91 (2000); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184

(1986); Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1313. “The test of reasonableness is not whether counsel

could have done something more or different,” but whether counsel’s performance “fell

within the broad range of reasonable assistance at trial.” Stewart v. Secretary, Department

of Corrections, 476 F.3d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir. 2007)(citing Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1313). 

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“Furthermore, [the court] must recognize that omissions are inevitable. But, the issue is not

what is possible or what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally

compelled.” Id. (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987))(internal quotations

omitted). The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a defendant the very best counsel or the

most skilled attorney, but only counsel that performs within reasonable professional norms. 

“The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even

what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at

the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.” White v.

Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 1992).

The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is judged from the perspective of the

attorney at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances. See, e.g.,

Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176 (11th Cir. 2001)(giving lawyers “the benefit of

the doubt for ‘heat of the battle’ tactical decisions”); Mills v. Singletary, 161 F.3d 1273,

1285-86 (11th Cir. 1998)(noting that Strickland performance review is a “deferential review

of all of the circumstances from the perspective of counsel at the time of the alleged errors”).

 Under this standard, there are no “absolute rules” dictating what reasonable

performance is or what line of defense must be asserted. [Chandler, 218 F.3d]

at 1317. Indeed, as we have recognized, “[a]bsolute rules would interfere with

counsel’s independence — which is also constitutionally protected — and

would restrict the wide latitude counsel have in making tactical decisions.” 

Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1244 (11th Cir. 2001).

Michael v. Crosby, 430 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005). Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s

performance is required to be “highly deferential,” because representation is an art, and an

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act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another. 

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Indeed, reviewing courts are instructed that they “must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range ofreasonable

professional assistance.” Id. at 689. 

It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after

conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining

counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular

act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney

performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting

effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. 

Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

might be considered sound trial strategy. There are countless ways to provide

effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense

attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rogers

v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994)(holding that, “[w]hen reviewing whether an

attorney is ineffective, courts should always presume strongly that counsel’s performance

was reasonable and adequate” (internal quotations omitted)).

“Based on this strong presumption of competent assistance, the petitioner’s burden

of persuasion is a heavyone: ‘petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have

taken the action that his counsel did take.’” Stewart, 476 F.3d at 1209 (quoting Chandler,

218 F.3d at 1315). “Even if many reasonable lawyers would not have done as defense

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counsel did at trial, no relief can be granted on ineffectiveness grounds unless it is shown that

no reasonable lawyer, in the circumstances, would have done so.” Rogers, 13 F.3d at 386.

2. The Prejudice Prong

“A petitioner’s burden of establishing that his lawyer’s deficient performance

prejudiced his case is also high.” Van Poyck v. Florida Department of Corrections, 290 F.3d

1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002). “It is not enough for the [habeas petitioner] to show that the

errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 693; see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112 (“The likelihood of a different result must be

substantial, not just conceivable.”). Instead, to prove prejudice, the habeas petitioner “must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

results of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probabilityis a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see

Williams, 529 U.S. at 391. In the context of the death sentence itself, “the question is

whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have

concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant

death.” Stewart, 476 F.3d at 1209 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). 

In order to satisfy this high standard, a petitioner must present competent evidence

proving “that trial counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of ‘a trial whose result is

reliable.’” Brown v. Jones, 255 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)(quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687). In other words, “[a] finding of prejudice requires proof of unprofessional errors

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so egregious that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect.” Johnson

v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1177 (11th Cir. 2001)(quoting Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d

1307, 1313 (7th Cir. 1996)(quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374

(1986)))(internal quotation marks omitted).

Because he did not exhaust his claims in state court, to succeed on his claims for

habeas relief based on ineffective assistance, Maples “must make two showings of prejudice. 

First, [he] must show that counsel’s failure[s alleged in his amended petition] prejudiced him

for the purposes of determining whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel.” Owens

v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64 n.13 (1st Cir. 2007)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104

S. CT. 2052). “Second, [he] must also show prejudice to excuse his procedural default on

[his ineffective assistance of trial counsel] claim.” Id. (citing Knight v. United States, 37

F.3d 769, 774 (1st Cir. 1994)). “A finding of cause and prejudice does not entitle the

prisoner to habeas relief [but] merely allows a federal court to consider the merits of a claim

that otherwise would have been procedurally defaulted,” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320;

however, because “these showings of prejudice overlap, [the court will] resolve them

simultaneously,” Owens, 483 F.3d at 64 n.13 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282

(1999)); see also Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1147 and n.86 (11th Cir. 2000)(citing Prou

v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 49 (1st Cir. 1999)).

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Therefore,the court has addressed themerits of Maples’s ineffective-assistance claims

for the purpose of deciding whether he can establish actual prejudice to excuse his procedural

default.

3. Deference Accorded State Court Findings of Historical Fact and Decisions on

the Merits When Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

When the state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s ineffectiveness claims on the

merits, the findings of historical facts made in the course of evaluating that claim are subject

to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). See Thompson v.

Haley, 255 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001). To overcome the state court’s finding of fact,

the petitioner must show that those findings were unreasonable in light ofthe evidence before

it and carry his burden of proving the facts by “clear and convincing evidence.”9

9The court is aware of some caselaw in this Circuit holding that the interplay between

the presumption of correctness accorded factual determinations under § 2254(d)(2) and the

burden of proof that must be met to overcome the presumption under § 2254(e)(1) remains

an open question. In Cave v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 638 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2011),

the Eleventh Circuit held, “[N]o court has fully explored the interaction of § 2254(d)(2)’s

‘unreasonableness’ standard and § 2254(e)(1)’s ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard.” 

Cave, 638 F.3d at 746 (quoting Gore v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 492 F.3d 1273, 1294 n.51

(11th Cir. 2007)). Just the year before, the Eleventh Circuit had held, “[W]e must presume

the state court’s factual findings to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption

by clear and convincing evidence.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d at 1177 (citing § 2254(e)(1) and 

Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835-36 (11th Cir. 2001))(emphasis supplied). Also in Ward,

the Eleventh Circuit held unequivocally that “28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) commands that for a

writ to issue because the state court made an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts,’ the

petitioner must rebut ‘the presumption of correctness [of a state court’s factual findings] by

clear and convincing evidence.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).” Id. at 1155 (emphasis added).

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Deference to a state court resolution of a claim of ineffective assistance involves a

double layer of reasonableness. Under the AEDPA, the federal habeas court may grant relief

on such a claim only if the state court determination involved an “unreasonable application”

of Strickland to the facts of the case. Strickland itself, of course, requires an assessment of

whether counsel’s conduct was professionally unreasonable or did not result in actual

prejudice. These two assessments cannot be conflated into one. See Harrington, 562 U.S.

at 101-02. Thus, habeas relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be granted

with respect to a claim actually decided by the state court only if the habeas court determines

that it was “objectively unreasonable” for the state court to find that counsel’s conduct was

not “professionallyunreasonable” or did not result in actual prejudice. The HarringtonCourt

explained, 

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. [356], [371], 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284

(2010). An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules

of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so the

Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest “intrusive

post-trial inquiry” threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right

to counsel is meant to serve. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689-690, 104 S. Ct.

2052. Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel’s

representation is a most deferential one. Unlike a later reviewing court, the

attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the

record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the

judge. It is “all too tempting” to “second-guess counsel’s assistance after

conviction or adverse sentence.” Id., at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052; see also Bell v.

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002); Lockhart

v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S. Ct. 838, 122 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1993). The

question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence

under “prevailing professional norms,” not whether it deviated from best

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practices or most common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S. Ct.

2052.

Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was

unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created

by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential,” id., at 689, 104 S.

Ct. 2052; Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 138 L.

Ed. 2d 481 (1997), and when the two apply in tandem, review is “doubly” so,

Knowles [v. Mirzayance], 556 U.S.[111, 123], 129 S. Ct. [1411], 1420

[(2009)]. The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable

applications is substantial. 556 U.S., at [123], 129 S. Ct. at 1420. Federal

habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness

under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d)

applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The

question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard.

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105; see also Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 123 (2011).

D. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Maples has asked the court for an evidentiary hearing on his claims. “If a claim has

been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome

the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) [and (d)(2)] on the record that was before that state court.” 

Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1400; see Landers v. Warden, 776 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir.

2015)(applying Cullen to claim brought pursuant to § 2254(d)(2)). “Therefore, before a

habeas petitioner may be entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing on a claim that has been

adjudicated [on the merits] by the state court, he must demonstrate a clearly established

federal-law error[, § 2254(d)(1),] or an unreasonable determination of fact[, § 2254(d)(2),]

on the part of the state court, based solely on the state court record.” Landers, 776 F.3d at

1295 (emphasis added). “Once a petitioner has demonstrated such an error or unreasonable

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determination, the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing rests in the discretion of the

district court.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Therefore, Maples must show prejudice sufficient to excuse his procedural default,

as well as his right to relief under § 2254(d), based on the record before the Rule 32 court

before the court will consider his request for an evidentiary hearing.

V. THE POST-REMAND INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE CLAIMS

In his post-remand brief, Maples declares that the habeas claims subject to the

Supreme Court’s remand instruction are “[t]hose claims focused on the ineffective assistance

provided by state-appointed trial counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases of [his] trial for

the shooting deaths of two individuals in 1995 (Claims I, II, and III of Maples’[s] Amended

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus).” (Doc. 60 at 14.) Maples alleges that he was

“unquestionably” prejudiced by the procedural default because – 

As a result of the default, [he] was denied any federal review of the merits of

serious – and in Maples’[s] view, meritorious – claims that this trial and death

sentence were tainted by constitutional error. Those claims . . . focus on the

appalling representation that Maples received at trial and sentencing which

ultimately led to Maples’[s] sentence of death rather than life imprisonment

without parole (or another severe term of imprisonment). 

(Id. [emphasis in original].) He contends that his “attorneys made at least three terrible

mistakes that fell well short of the minimally competent representation that the Constitution

guarantees to all defendants:” (1) “counsel inexplicablypursued fundamentallycontradictory

theories both during different stages of the guilt phase and during the guilt and sentencing

phases that doomed his case,” (2) “counsel inexplicably failed to investigate and present an

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obvious intoxication defense,” and (3) “counsel failed to investigate, develop and present

mitigating evidence that would have created a reasonable probability that the jury and court

would have struck a different balance on death versus life imprisonment without the

possibility for parole.” (Id. at 16, 17, 18, 19.) Maples also argues that Alabama’s system of

compensating capital defense attorneys caused his counsel’s ineffectiveness.10 (Id. at 20-22,

95-97.)

The ineffectiveness sub-claims that are discussed in Maples’s post-remand briefs do

not refer to the claim numbers in his amended petition. Also, these sub-claims do not bear

the same alphanumeric identifiers as the claimsin his amended petition. Moreover, the postremand briefs do not address many of the sub-claims alleged in Claims I, II and III of the

amended petition at all. Instead, Maples has left this court with the task of determining

which claims in his amended habeas petition he contends are not procedurally defaulted and

have merit. 

The court’s review shows that Maples has foregone the opportunity to establish why

all the sub-claims in Claims I through III of his amended petition are not procedurally

defaulted and why he is entitled to relief as to those claims. Therefore, Claims I.D.,11 E.i &

10In the Background section of his post-remand Opening Brief, Maples criticizes

Alabama’s “low eligibility requirements” for appointed counsel in capital cases. (Doc. 60

at 20-21.) His amended petition does not contain a claim for relief based on Alabama’s

system for appointing counsel in capital cases. (See doc. 24.) Therefore, this claim has not

been considered.

11

“Counsel Failed to AdequatelyChallenge the State’s Investigation and Presentation

of the Case” during the guilt stage. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 37-65.)

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iii,12 and F. through J.

13

, as well as Claims II.C.,14 G.,15 I.,

16 and J.

17 in the amended petition

12

“Counsel Failed to Request and Use Necessary Expert Assistance” during the guilt

stage. (Id. ¶¶ 67-70 [mental health expert]; id. ¶ 73 [ballistics expert]; id. ¶ 74 [blood splatter

expert]; id. ¶ 75 [neurologist].) In his post-remand briefs, Maples contends, “Nor did counsel

consult or try to put on an expert witness that could explain the extreme level of intoxication

that would be experienced by a man of relatively slight built like Maples after having twenty

alcoholic drinks over the course of an afternoon and evening, or the exacerbating effect that

the use of illegal narcotics like marijuana, crystal meth, and/or crack can have on a man who

has consumed such a copious quantity of alcohol over that relatively short period.” (Doc. 60

at 65-66.) Therefore, the court finds that Maples’s claim that counsel were ineffective based

on their failure to request a pharmacologist or other drug expert, (see doc, 24 ¶¶ 71-72), has

not been abandoned.

13In these claims, Maples alleges his counsel were ineffective during the guilt stage

as follows:

F. Counsel Failed to Present, Adequately Argue and/or Obtain Favorable Rulings on

Motions, (id. ¶¶ 76–89);

G. Counsel Failed to Adequately Question and Investigate Venire Members’

Backgrounds, (id ¶¶ 90-92);

H. Counsel Requested Verdict Forms that Were Inconsistent with the Strategy of the

Defense, (id. ¶¶ 93-94);

I. Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate the State’s Capital Murder Charge, (id.

¶¶ 95-100); and

J. Counsel Failed to Prevent or Even Object To Egregious Instances of Prosecutorial

Misconduct, (id. ¶¶ 101-18).

14Counsel were ineffective during the penalty stage based on “Counsel[’s] Fail[ure]

to Obtain the Services of a Mitigation Expert.” (Id. ¶¶ 142-43.)

15Counsel were ineffective during the penalty phase based on “Counsel[’s] Fail[ure]

to Investigate Post-Arrest Medical Issues.” (Id. ¶ 158.)

16Counsel were ineffective during the penalty stage based on “Counsel[’s] Fail[ure]

to Prevent or Otherwise Object to Egregious Instances of Prosecutorial Misconduct.” (Id.

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are deemed ABANDONED and remain PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED as set out in

this court’s September 29, 2006, Memorandum Opinion and Judgment. (Docs. 34 and 35.)

The sub-claims in the amended petition that are addressed in Maples’s briefs are:

Claims I.A. through C., Claims II.A. and B., D. through F., H., and Claim III. To the extent

Maples fails to argue all additional sub-claims and claims that are embedded within these

sub-claims,those claims have been deemedABANDONEDand remainPROCEDURALLY

DEFAULTED as set out in this court’s September 29, 2006, Memorandum Opinion and

Judgment. (Docs. 34 and 35.) 

With these rulings in mind, the reader is advised that the use of the words “claim” and

“claims” in the remainder ofthis MemorandumOpinion, unless otherwise specificallynoted,

refer only to those ineffectiveness sub-claims that Maples has addressed and argued in his

post-remand briefs.

¶¶ 160-175.)

17Counsel were ineffective during the penalty stage based on “Counsel[’s] Fail[ure]

to Recognize or Adequately Object to Trial Error During the Sentencing Phase.” (Id. ¶¶

177-79.)

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VI. THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS

A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE GUILT PHASE OF

TRIAL

1. Counsel’s Chosen Strategy Not to Investigate, Pursue, and Present a Defense

Based on Intoxication Was Unreasonable. (Doc. 24, Claim I.C., ¶¶ 26-31.) 

a. History of the claim

In his amended habeas petition, Maples alleges:

26. As detailed below, substantial evidence existed that Mr. Maples

was intoxicated on alcohol and drugs on the night of the offense, showing that

Mr. Maples lacked the capacity to form the specific intent necessary under

Alabama’s capital murder statutes. Some, but not all, of this available

evidence of intoxication was presented by the State during the guilt phase of

the trial. Counsel’s performance was unreasonable and woefully inadequate

in that, as further explained below, (a) they failed to introduce all available

evidence of intoxication, (b) they systematically objected when the State

attempted to introduce evidence that showed or tended to show that Mr.

Maples was intoxicated, thereby causing some of the evidence favorable to the

defense not to be included and (c) they called “defense” witnesses whose

testimony tended to contradict the more reliable available evidence that Mr.

Maples was intoxicated and cross-examined prosecution witnesses to rebut

evidence of Mr. Maples’ use of alcohol and drugs. Counsel’s conduct in

failing to pursue and present a defense based on intoxication “fall[s] ‘outside

the wide range of professionally competent assistance.’” Daniels v. State, 650

So. 2d 545, 552 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).

27. The State introduced extensive evidence proving that Mr. Maples

was intoxicated by the time he went to a pool hall shortly before the shootings

(drinking a “few beers” at an evening cookout (R. at 2738-39.); drinking more

alcohol at a party, (R. at 2740.); and going to a bar and continually drinking

more alcohol between 8:30 p.m. or 9:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. or 11:00 p.m. (R.

at 1795-1821.)). At the pool hall, Mr. Maples appeared drunk to some of those

present. A witness at the pool hall testified that Mr. Maples was acting “[j]ust

loud in general, you know, like a drunk person would act when they get too

much in them or something.” (R. at 1858-60.) Jason Boyd, who was at the

pool hall and played pool with Mr. Maples, testified that Mr. Maples “wasn’t

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shooting [pool] as well [as normal] and seemed like he was a little hyper, but

that was about it” and that it was possible that he was affected by “something.” 

(R. at 1848.)

28. The State also introduced evidence that Mr. Maples used crack and

crystal methamphetamine on the night of the shootings: evidence of drug

paraphernalia (R. at 2516-17.), testimony from April Phillips, an acquaintance

of Mr. Maples whom Mr. Maples visited shortly after the shootings, that Mr.

Maples had drugs in his hand and told her that he had been doing “crystal meth

and crack” that evening (R. at 1894, 1910-11, 1915.), and testimony that Mr.

Maples bought crack cocaine on the night of the shootings (R. at 1458, 1983,

1986).

29. In stark contrast, Counsel attempted to establish through crossexamination of State witnesses and the testimony ofseveral defense witnesses

that Mr. Maples was not intoxicated at the time of the shootings. Amazingly,

while summarizing the cross-examination and direct examination testimony

during his closing argument, Counsel inaccurately told the jury that “[t]here is

no evidence that he consumed drugs that night.” (R. at 2920.)

30. Given this abundant evidence that Mr. Maples was intoxicated at

the time of the offense, no reasonable counsel would have failed to present and

pursue a defense of intoxication. Such failure, which could only amount to

Counsel’s failure to conduct a substantial investigation into any of Mr.

Maples’[s] plausible lines of defense, constituted ineffective assistance of

counsel. See House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 617-18 (11th Cir. 1984). 

Indeed, a defense based on intoxication would have rebutted the specific intent

element required by law for each capital offense Mr. Maples was charged. In

the absence of specific intent, Mr. Maples could only be convicted of a lesser

included offense (Ala. Code § 13A-1-9(a) (1994)), in this case manslaughter

(Ala. Code § 13A-6-3 (1994)). In addition, a finding of intoxication at the

guilt phase of the trial would have been consistent with the mitigating factors

presented by the defense during the sentencing phase of the trial. . . .

30A. Similarly, Counsel failed to investigate evidence of intoxication. 

Accordingly, although Counsel briefly interviewed James Smith (a.k.a.

“Fishbone”), one of the prosecution’s witnesses regarding Mr. Maples’[s]

post-crime behavior, Counsel never inquired about whether Mr. Maples

appeared to be intoxicated. Nor did Counsel ask the three other individuals

who were present at Mr. Smith’s house about Mr. Maples’[s] appearance,

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although Counsel were already aware of the conclusive evidence of Mr.

Maples’[s] intoxicated state shortly before the shootings . . . , as well as after

the shootings, based, among other things, on his interview of Ms. Phillips

conducted at about the same time as Mr. Smith’s interview. Therefore,

Counsel unreasonably failed to properly investigate all the evidence of Mr.

Maples’[s] intoxicated state available to him.

30B. Had Counsel done so, Counsel would have learned that Mr.

Maples appeared to be intoxicated and in fact told Mr. Smith that he had taken

drugs prior to his arrival at Mr. Smith’s house. Such evidence could have been

used to support an intoxication defense; it also would have undermined the

State’s robbery theory by demonstrating that Mr. Maples apparently did not

need to sell the cue stick found in Mr. Terry’s vehicle in order to obtain drugs,

thus establishing a reasonable doubtregarding Mr. Maples’[s] intentions to rob

in order to feed a drug habit. . . .

31. In light of the foregoing, Counsel’s performance fell so far below

the standard of reasonable performance that it cannot be considered either a

strategic decision or effective assistance of Counsel. Given the evidence

against Mr. Maples and the prosecution’s strategy at trial, no competent

counsel would have made the strategic choices Counsel made or conducted the

defense as Counsel did. Counsel’s choice of strategy, use of inconsistent

strategies, and efforts (or lack thereof) to implement these strategies were

unreasonable and constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Chandler

v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000). Thus, “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

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(Doc. 24 ¶¶ 26-31.) This habeas claim is identical to the claim as pleaded in Maples’s

amended Rule 32 petition.18 (Compare doc. 24 ¶¶ 26-36 with Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 33, Tab 49,

at 7-13.)

Denying this claim, the Rule 32 court held:

. . . Maples alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

present a defense based on intoxication. Maples contends that there was

extensive evidence that he was intoxicated on the night of the murders. This

claim is not supported by the record.19 See Maples, 758 So. 2d at 24. 

Evidence was presented that Maples consumed alcohol before the murders and

possessed illegal drugs after the murders. No evidence was presented at trial

establishing that Maples was intoxicated at the time of the murders to the

degree that he was incapable of forming the specific intent to kill. See

Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 1275, 1332 (Ala. Crim. App, 1996)(holding

voluntary intoxication must amount to insanity rendering defendant incapable

of forming specific intent to commit crime). Maples fails to plead any facts

in his petition that were available to his trial counsel that would have

established such extreme intoxication.

Moreover, not presenting evidence of intoxication during the guiltphase of trial could have been a strategic choice by trial counsel given that

Maples stated in his videotaped confession, which was admitted into evidence,

that he was not intoxicated at the time of the murders. Maples contention that

anyreasonable attorneywould have presented an intoxication defense presents

18Maples’s Rule 32 petition contained the same allegations as his amended Rule 32

petition, except his original petition did not assert that counsel had failed to adequately

interview and present additional evidence from witnesses April Phillips, James Smith, and

the three unidentified individuals at Smith’s house. (Rule 32 C.R., Vol. 32, Tab 47, at 7-10.) 

Moreover, in his post-remand briefs, Maples alleges facts in support of this claim that were

never presented to the Rule 32 court or set out in his third amended habeas petition.

19The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held: “The testimony at trial did not

establish that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the murders. Although there was

some testimony that he had ingested alcohol several hours before the murders occurred, there

was no testimony that he was intoxicated at the time of the murders. Also, there was no

evidence that he had ingested drugs before the murders.” Maples v. State, 758 So. 2d at 24.

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the wrong standard of review for courts reviewing post-conviction petitions. 

As pointed out by the State, the Eleventh Circuit in Chandler v. United States,

218 F.3d 1305, 1315, 1318 (11th Cir. 2000)(en banc) held:

[B]ecause counsel’s conduct is presumed reasonable, for a

petitioner to show that the conduct was unreasonable, a petitioner must

establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that

his counsel did take.

[C]ounsel’s reliance on particular lines of defense to the

exclusion of others – whether or not he investigated those other

defenses – is a matter of strategy and is not ineffective unless the

petitioner can prove the chosen course, in itself, was unreasonable.

(Emphasis added)

In [this] claim, Maples fails to plead facts which, if true, would entitle

him to relief. Given the overwhelming evidence against him, Maples has

failed to establish that the line of defense taken by his trial counsel was

unreasonable; thus, he fails to demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance

was deficient or prejudicial. . . .

. . . Maples contends that trial counsel were ineffective for not

requesting jury instructions on intoxication and manslaughter. The underlying

substantive issue was raised on direct appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals

held that no plain error had occurred because “there was no rational basis for

an instruction on intoxication and manslaughter under the evidence presented

in this case.” Maples, 758 So. 2d at 24.

Based on the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Maples is

unable to establish that trial counsel’s performance caused him to suffer any

substantial prejudice, thus, he is unable to establish ineffective assistance

under the Strickland test.

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 13-15 [footnote added].)

Maples declares, “The Alabama trial court’s conclusion that [his] counsel’s handling

of the intoxication issue was constitutionally effective is based on an unreasonable

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application of Strickland and an unreasonable assessment of the trial record.” (Doc. 73 at

29.) This court disagrees. For the reasons set forth infra, the evidence at trial and the

additional facts alleged are not sufficient to establish as reasonable probability that the result

of the guilt phase of the trial would have been different if counsel had investigated and/or

presented an intoxication defense.

b. Prejudice

In his post-remand brief, Maples argues that intoxication was the “most plausible line

of defense,” (doc. 60 at 66), and that, despite notice of his extreme intoxication at the time

of the murders, counsel “were constitutionally deficient in failing to investigate, develop and

present an obvious intoxication defense that probablywould have sparedMaples a conviction

for capital murder,” (id. at 62). He concedes that counsel may decide not to pursue one

defense strategy if there is “an alternative reasonable defense theory,” but he argues that “no

reasonable decision was made in this case.” (Id. at 66 [citing Hunt v. Comm’r, Ala. Dept. of

Corr., 666 F.3d 708, 726 (11th Cir. 2012].)

As discussed above, Strickland requires the petitioner to show that the alleged errors

“actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Similarly, to

show prejudice sufficient to overcome a state-court default, the petitioner must show “actual

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750 (1991). Under both standards, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability

that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for the alleged ineffective

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assistance of counsel. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999); Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694.

[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely

to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support. 

Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due account of the effect

of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making the prejudice inquiry

must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision

reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.

Therefore, in order to establish either prejudice to excuse his default or Strickland

prejudice, Maples must show “ a reasonable probabilitythat, butfor counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the [guilt phase of his trial] would have been different.” Id. at 694; see

also Spencer v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 609 F.3d 1170, 1180 (11th Cir.

2010)(quoting Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003)). This

determination entails consideration of whether the intoxication defense he claims counsel

was ineffective for failing to raise had a reasonable probability of success under the law as

it existed at the time of his trial. See Reaves v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 717

F.3d 886, 903-04 (11th Cir. 2013); Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1198-99 (10th Cir.

2012); Zamora v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1987).

In Alabama, a defense of intoxication requires showing – 

that the intoxication “[was] of such character and extent as to render the

accused incapable of consciousness that he is committing a crime.” [Jones v.

State, 362 So. 2d 1303, 1315 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978).] Also, [the Alabama

Supreme] Court has stated that “[m]ere drunkenness, voluntarily produced, is

never a defense against a criminal charge, and can never palliate or reduce the

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grade of an offense, unless it is so extreme as to render impossible some

mental condition which is an essential element of the criminal act.” Gautney

v. State, 284 Ala. 82, 88, 222 So. 2d 175 (1969)(quoting Walker v. State, 91

Ala. 76, 82, 9 So. 87, 89 (1890))(emphasis omitted). Intoxication “must be so

excessive as to paralyze the mental [faculties], and render the accused

incapable of forming or entertaining the design to take life.” Id. The degree

of intoxication necessary to negate specific intent and, thus, reduce the

charge, must amount to insanity. Crosslin v. State, 446 So. 2d 675 (Ala. Cr.

App. 1983), appeal after remand, 489 So. 2d 680 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984), citing

Maddox v. State, 31 Ala. App. 332, 344, 17 So. 2d 283, 285 (1944)(other

citations omitted).

Ex parte Bankhead, 585 So. 2d 112, 120-21 (Ala. 1991) (emphasis added), rev’d on other

grounds 625 So. 2d 1146 (Ala.1993); see also Ex parte McWhorter, 781 So. 2d 330, 340-

343 (Ala. 2000). “Under Alabama law, a murder defendant . . . may offer evidence that he

was insane from voluntary intoxication and thereby hope to raise a reasonable doubt as to

whether he possessed the requisite intent to kill, reducing the maximum charge to

manslaughter.” Williams v. Campbell, No. 04-0681-WSC, 2007 WL 1098516, at *10 (S.D.

Ala. April 11, 2007).

c. Evidence at trial

i. Maples’s videotaped confession

As the Rule 32 court found, the evidence against Maples was overwhelming. (Id. at

9, 14.) This court notes that the evidence that Maples was not so intoxicated as to paralyze

his mental faculties is strong. Indeed, the most damning piece of evidence was Maples’s

videotaped confession. Maples’s two-hour20 confession was shown to the jury. (Doc. 78,

20This court has examined the videotape in its totality. (See doc. 78, Exhs. 230 and

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Exh. 230.) This confession established Maples’s guilt of the two capital offenses and

negated an intoxication defense.

Maples was arrested in Tennessee and two investigators from the Morgan County

Sheriff’s Department interviewed him shortly thereafter. The interview was videotaped and

this video was played for the jury at Maples’s trial.

During the interview, Maples initially said that he did not remember a lot about the

murders; however he later recounted many details of his thoughts and actions before, during,

and after the murders. He told the investigators Terry had claimed to be tired and so they

decided to leave Q Balls around 11:30 or 11:45 p.m. on Friday night. Terry had agreed to

give Robinson a ride home, and they decided to take Maples home first, even though they

had to pass by Robinson’s house on the way to Maples’s house. Maples said that he did not

know if Terry and Robinson had other plans after they dropped him at his house. He said 

that he had been in the front passenger seat of Terry’s car and Robinson had been in the back

seat behind him during the ride from Q Balls to his house. At his house, Maples got out of

the car and went in through the back door; he told the investigators that he “probably” had

decided to kill Terry and Robinson by the time he walked into his house. He went into his

parents’ bedroom and saw his father’s shotgun. He bent down to pick up the weapon and he

231.) The tape of the entire interview is almost three hours long. However, the final hour

is devoted exclusively to discussion about another unsolved murder and Maples’s

relationship with Jamie Dobbs and Alex Foley. This portion of the tape was excluded from

the evidence presented at trial. (See R. Vol. 20, Tab 21, at 3041.) 

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looked out his parents’ bedroom window at Terry and Robinson in the driveway. He said

that he had watched as Robinson appeared to be playing with the passenger seat; Robinson

was bent over like he was looking for something. Maples said that he walked out the back

door with the shotgun in hand. Terry’s window was open and Maples said that he placed the

barrel of the shotgun an inch or two inside the window and shot Terry twice. Then, in a

single motion, he took a half step forward and shot Robinson. He told the investigators that

he had said nothing to either victim and that neither victim had provoked him. He

remembered that Robinson had jumped a little when he shot Terry, but Robinson had not

tried to get out of the car.

After he shot both men, he pulled Terry’s body from the car and left it in the yard. 

Initially, he told the investigators that he could not remember what he had done with the

shotgun, but, later in the interview, he told them he had taken the shotgun back into the house

and placed it exactly where he found it. Before leaving he took Terry’s wallet out of his

pocket and took the cash – he remembered Terry had $100 in $20 bills. He knew everyone

would know he was responsible for the murders, so he left town. He drove away in Terry’s

car with Robinson’s body. A short distance down the road he stopped at a bridge over a little

creek, where he dumped Robinson’s body over the edge of the bridge and into the creek. 

During the interview, the investigators asked Maples about his consumption of drugs

and alcohol before, during, and after the offense. Maples said he had been drinking the

afternoon and night of the murders and that he was mad, but his anger and gloominess had

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nothing to do with the victims. The investigators asked Maples if he had been drinking “a

lot,” and Maples said, “Yes sir, a little bit.” When they asked how much he had to drink,

Maples stated that he had seven to eight beers when he attended a BBQ and another party at

the home of Terry’s sister, Carla Terry. He further stated that they had some liquor but that

he had not been “on it that hard.” He did not say when, with whom, or how much of this

liquor he had consumed.

Later, Maples stated that he had between six and seven beers by the time he had left

a party at Carla Terry’s house at about 7:30-7:45 p.m., which was about 30 to 45 minutes

after he arrived. He told the investigators that he could tell he had six beers, but he also told

them that he was not starting to get drunk or staggering or anything. He said he had smoked

a joint with a girl at an undisclosed time that afternoon or evening. However, he repeatedly

denied consuming any hard drugs, including crack or methamphetamine, before the murders,

and he told the investigators that he had not used any crack cocaine in three or four months

before the murders. He denied going to a bar before the murders, he denied going to “Crack

Town” after the murders, and he denied doing drugs at Phillips’s house.

Maples told the investigators that “stuff from the past and personal problems” had

been on his mind at the time of the murders and that, when he drank, these problems got to

him easier. The problems on his mind included that he was a “screw-up,” that he was lonely,

that he was down on himself about problems he had caused his family, and that he had issues

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with his “real” mom. He denied getting into any fights or arguing with anyone before the

murders.

Throughout the interview, Maples was able to describe his activities the afternoon and

evening before the murders, the details ofthe murders, and his actions immediatelyfollowing

the murders through to his arrest. At times during the interview, he was vague and he left

out some details. For instance, he never mentioned stopping anywhere before arriving in

Ardmore, Tennessee, the morning after the murders; he told the investigators that he had

driven around all night without getting out of the car. However, when specifically asked if

he had stopped at someone else’s house, he admitted he had gone to Phillips’s house and that

he had placed his bloody socks under her couch.21 He told the investigators that, after the

murders, he did not buy drugs, trade the victims’ possessions for drugs, or sell Terry’s pool

cue;22 he said that he did have something to drink with him when he got to Phillips’s house.

During his videotaped confession, Maples was able to recall his thoughts and actions

before, during, and after the murders. The confession is strong evidence that Maples was not

“insane fromvoluntaryintoxication” at the time ofthe murders, and, therefore, such evidence

negates any inference that he was prejudiced bycounsel’s failure to investigate and to present

an intoxication defense.

21Robinson’s DNA was found on the socks Maples left at Phillips’s house.

22Evidence presented at trial indicated Maples had traded Terry’s pool cue for crack. 

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ii. Testifying guilt phase witnesses who saw Maples before the

murders

In his Amended Petition, Maples contends:

27. The State introduced extensive evidence proving that Mr. Maples

was intoxicated by the time he went to a pool hall shortly before the shootings

(drinking a“few beers” at an evening cookout (R. at 2738-39.); drinking more

alcohol at a party, (R. at 2740.); and going to a bar and continually drinking

more alcohol between 8:30 p.m. or 9:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. or 11:00 p.m. (R.

at 1795-1821.). At the pool hall, Mr. Maples appeared drunk to some of those

present. A witness at the pool hall testified that Mr. Maples was acting “[j]ust

loud in general, you know, like a drunk person would act when they get too

much in them or something.” (R. at 1858-60.) Jason Boyd, who was at the

pool hall and played pool with Mr. Maples, testified that Mr. Maples “wasn’t

shooting [pool] as well [as normal] and seemed like he was a little hyper, but

that was about it” and that it was possible that he was affected by “something.” 

(R. at 1848.)

(Doc. 24 ¶ 27; see also doc. 60 at 70.)23

23In his post-remand brief, Maples contends that “the State itself introduced evidence

that Maples had been drinking heavily throughout the day and night” before the murders,

including:

• The State presented evidence that Maples had been drinking a “few

beers” at a cookout (R. at 2738-39); had been drinking more alcohol at

a party (R. at 2740); had been drinking more alcohol between 8:30 p.m.

or 9 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. or 11 p.m. (R. at 1795-1821).

• The State presented evidence that at the Caddy Shack, Maples and

Terry “were just up going back and forth to the bar” (R. at 1801) and

that the group was “having alcohol ... to drink” (R. at 1802).

• Le Ann Clemons testified that at the Caddy Shack Maples was telling

her “stuff that really didn’t make much sense.” (R. 1803.)

• At the pool hall, Jason Boyd testified that Maples “wasn’t shooting

[pool] as well and he seemed like he was a little hyper.” (R. at 1848.)

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In his post-remand Opening Brief,Maples argues that TatumFrank Terry [hereinafter

“Tatum”] “testified that Maples had called Terry from the BBQ twice; that a group of

individuals left the BBQ to go to Terry’s sister’s house so that Maples could meet up with

Terry;” that he did not observe “any problems or arguments or fights or anything else

between [Maples] and Stacy [Terry] at that time;” and “that he never saw Stacy Terry again

and did not see Maples again until the week of Maples’[s] trial.” (Doc. 60 at 32 [citing R.

Vol. 19, Tab 17, at 2738-40, 2742].) Tatum also testified that Maples had a few beers in his

presence during this time and that Maples did not appear to be drunk or impaired when he

left the party. (R. Vol. 19, Tab 17, at 2741.) 

About 8:45 p.m. or 9:00 p.m., Maples and Terry sat with Le Ann Clemons and

Beverly Shawnbaum at the Caddy Shack bar for about an hour and one-half. (R. Vol. 14 at

1799-800.) Clemons testified that, during this time, she saw Maples get up to go the

bathroom twice and go back and forth to the bar. (Id. at 1801.) She admitted they were all

• Jason Bright testified that at the pool hall Maples was acting “[j]ust

loud in general, you know, like a drunk person would act when they got

too much in them or something.” (R. at 1858-60.)

• April Phillips testified that Maples told her that he was doing “crystal

meth and crack cocaine” on “th[e] day” of the shootings. (R. at 1912.)

• James “Fishbone” Smith testified that Maples tried to borrow money

for crack cocaine on the day of the shootings. (R. at 1883-84.) 

Fishbone also testified that two guys got into Maples’[s] car and took

him to get some crack. (R. at 1986.)

(Doc. 60 at 70-71.)

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drinking alcohol, but she denied that anyone in the group was “real drunk,” appeared like

they “had been drinking heavily,” or was “high or [did] not know what was going on or [was]

kind of out of it.” (Id. at 1802.) Also, she testified that Maples did not appear sad, angry,

argumentative, or fearful. (Id. at 1801-02, 1806.) Their conversation was general in nature

and nothing about the evening caused her concern. (Id.) She testified that Maples asked her

out, and she declined. (Id. at 1803.) She stated that Maples was telling her that he had been

an Auburn student and “stuffthat really didn’t make much sense,” to which Maples’s defense

counsel objected based on relevance. (Id.) The trial court allowed the prosecution to

proceed, and, when Clemons was asked if Maples had told her anything else she believed to

be untrue, she replied that Maples told her that he had a condo in Decatur and asked if she

wanted to move in with him. (Id. at 1803-05.) Clemons testified she had laughed and said,

“no.” (Id. at 1805.) Maples did not get upset with her response and she interpreted his

behavior as attempts to impress her or to flirt with her. (Id. at 1806, 1808.) 

Clemons and Shawnbaum closed their bar tabs and left the bar between 10:30 and

11:00 p.m. (Id. at 1800, 1816.) Defense counsel elicited from Clemons that Maples had paid

everyone’s tab. (Id. at 1810.) As they were leaving, Terry and Maples pulled up in Terry’s

car and asked the women if they wanted to ride, which they declined. (Id. at 1806-07.) 

Again, no one was upset or angry. (Id.) Shawnbaum’s testimony was similar to Clemons’s

testimony about the events of the evening, including her testimony about Maples’s

appearance and demeanor. (See id. at 1811-18.) 

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Curtis Collins, owner of Q Balls, testified that, although he was unsure of the time,

he thought that he had seen Terry’s car enter the Q Balls parking lot around 9:00 p.m. He

saw that the passenger, Maples, had trouble getting out of the car, so he had checked Terry

and Maples for the smell of alcohol when they walked in; he detected nothing. (Id. at 1825-

27.) Collins explained that Q Balls was a non-alcoholic, kid-friendly establishment and that

he did not want alcohol or loud talk. (Id. at 1831-33.) Later Collins testified he had heard

a commotion in the poolroom and quieted Maples and another individual who were having

a “loud talk.” (Id. at 1827-29.) The men complied without incident.

Luke Skinner, testified that around 9:00 or 9:30 p.m., he got into a loud argument with

Maples, but he did not remember what it was about. (Id. at 1836.) The argument was broken

up by a Q Balls employee. (Id. at 1837.)

Jason Boyd testified he had played pool with Maples sometime that evening. (R. Vol.

15 at 1847-48.) When asked if Maples had appeared to be drunk, Boyd testified he had

noticed Maples did not play pool as well as he usually did and that he seemed a little hyper. 

(Id.) He conceded that it was possible that Maples had been drinking. (Id. at 1848.) 

Jamie Dobbs24testified that Maples, Terry, and a third person came to his house in

Decatur, Alabama, sometime between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. (R. Vol. 16 at 2066-74, 2089.) 

He testified that Maples had wanted to come inside to talk to him, but he blew him off. (Id.

24Shortly after murdering Terry and Robinson, Maples called the Decatur police and

confessed to the murders; however, he told the police he was Jamie Dobbs and gave the

police Dobbs’s address.

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at 2074.) Dobbs indicated that sometimes when Maples came to his house Dobbs would

either let him in or give him some excuse so Maples was aware that might be a possibility;

Dobbs testified that Maples did not seem angry. (Id.) 

Daniel Maples, Maples’s brother, testified that he had seen Maples at Q Balls around

10:30 or 11:00 p.m. and that Maples did not appear to be drunk, intoxicated, or impaired. 

(R. Vol. 19, Tab 17, at 2757.)

Jason Bright played pool with Terry from about 11 p.m. to around midnight. (R. Vol.

15 at 1855.) He noticed that Maples “seemed a little energetic” and “[a] little hyperactive

. . . [because he] was being a little loud.” (Id. at 1857-58.) When asked to explain, Bright

testified that Maples was “[j]ust loud in general, you know, maybe like a drunk person would

act when they get too much in them or something.” (Id. at 1858.) When asked if he thought

Maples “was drunk or had been drinking a good bit,” Maples’s counsel objected on grounds

of speculation and the question was withdrawn. (Id.) Nevertheless, Bright testified that he

did not get close enough to Maples that night to smell alcohol and had been around Maples

only three times prior to that evening. (Id. at 1859.) Maples’s counsel asked Bright if his

characterization of Maples as “a little more energetic, maybe a little loud” was truthful, and

Bright answered, “Yes.” (Id. at 1860.) 

Landon Pendleton was also at Q Balls that evening and saw Terry and Maples around

midnight.25 (R. Vol. 13, Tab 16, at 1500.) When asked if “there seem[ed] to be anything

25In his videotaped statement, Maples said that he and Terry had gone to Q Balls twice

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unusual or odd going on at Q Balls that night,” Pendleton answered, “Not really. Everybody

was kind of acting a little cocky up there, but nothing really out of the ordinary.” (Id. at

1495.)

Maples faults counsel for not speaking with or questioning differently guilt-phase

witnesses Tatum Terry, Le Ann Clemons, Beverly Shawnbaum, Jason Bright, and Jason

Boyd, (doc. 60 at 32, 65), but he has not alleged what these witnesses would have said that

was different from their actual trial testimony. Each of these witnesses testified about seeing

Maples before the murders. However, none of these witnesses perceived Maples to be

extremely impaired. Moreover, even if one or more of these witnesses would have testified

that Maples was extremely intoxicated, the jury still heard Maples’s statement that he had a

“little bit” to drink the night of the murders as well as his detailed recollection of the events

of that night. Therefore, the court finds that the testimony of these witnesses at trial does not

that evening. The first time was after they left Terry’s sister’s house, and they stayed 30-45

minutes playing three or four games of pool, and left to go riding around before going back

to Q Balls around 10:00 to 10:30 p.m. Maples denied that he had been to the mall that

evening and did not mention he had been to the Caddy Shack bar.

In his cross-examination of Pendleton, defense counsel intentionally asked about the

Caddy Shack bar. Pendleton also had been to Q Balls twice that night. Specifically,

Pendleton testified that after he, Matt Shell, and Daniel Maples left the party at Terry’s

sister’s house, they drove to town and around the mall, where the Caddy Shack bar was

located. (R. Vol. 13, Tab 16, at 1494, 1500.) Pendleton saw Terry’s car sitting in front of

the Caddy Shack. (Id. at 1499.) The group then went to Q Balls, and did not see Terry or

Maples there at that time. (Id. at 1500.)

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support a finding that Maples was prejudiced based on his counsel’s failure to raise an

intoxication defense with these witnesses.

iii. Guilt phase witnesses who saw Maples after the murders

Maples alleges that counsel failed to adequately investigate two witnesses who saw

him after the murders: April Phillips and James “Fishbone” Smith.26 (Id.) He contends:

28. The State also introduced evidence that Mr. Maples used crack and

crystal methamphetamine on the night of the shootings: evidence of drug

paraphernalia (R. at 2516-17.), testimony from April Phillips, an acquaintance

of Mr. Maples whom Mr. Maples visited shortly after the shootings, that Mr.

Maples had drugs in his hand and told her that he had been doing “crystal meth

and crack” that evening (R. at 1894, 1910-11, 1915.), and testimony that Mr.

Maples bought crack cocaine on the night of the shootings (R. at 1458, 1983,

1986.)

. . .

30A. Similarly, Counsel failed to investigate evidence of intoxication. 

Accordingly, although Counsel briefly interviewed James Smith (a.k.a.

“Fishbone”), one of the prosecution’s witnesses regarding Mr. Maples’[s]

post-crime behavior, Counsel never inquired about whether Mr. Maples

appeared to be intoxicated. Nor did Counsel ask the three other individuals

who were present at Mr. Smith’s house about Mr. Maples’[s] appearance,

although Counsel were already aware of the conclusive evidence of Mr.

Maples’[s] intoxicated state shortly before the shootings (see Paragraphs 26 to

29), as well as after the shootings, based, among other things, on his interview

of Ms. Phillips conducted at about the same time as Mr. Smith’s interview. 

Therefore, Counsel unreasonablyfailed to properlyinvestigate all the evidence

of Mr. Maples’[s] intoxicated state available to him.

26In his post-remand brief, Maples asserts that counsel neglected to “speak with” these

witnesses. (See doc. 60 at 65.) However, he admitted in his amended habeas petition that

counsel “briefly interviewed” Smith and interviewed Phillips “at about the same time as Mr.

Smith’s interview.” (Doc. 24 ¶ 30A.) 

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30B. Had Counsel done so, Counsel would have learned that Mr.

Maples appeared to be intoxicated and in fact told Mr. Smith that he had taken

drugs prior to his arrival at Mr. Smith’s house. Such evidence could have been

used to support an intoxication defense; it also would have undermined the

State’s robbery theory by demonstrating that Mr. Maples apparently did not

need to sell the cue stick found in Mr. Terry’s vehicle in order to obtain drugs,

thus establishing a reasonable doubt regarding Mr. Maples’[s] intentions to rob

in order to feed a drug habit.

(Doc. 24 ¶¶ 28, 30-31.)

April Phillips testified that she first saw Maples at around 1:00 a.m., and she observed

him intermittently between that time and 4:00 a.m. Maples contends that counsel should

have interviewed her further concerning her testimony that Maples had behaved and talked

frenetically during this time and that he had reported doing drugs and held crack and

methamphetamine in his hands. (R. Vol. 15 at 1884-99, 1905-16.) Phillips testified that

Maples appeared at her home in Terry’s car and told her that Terry had let him borrow it. (Id.

at 1889.) He wanted to see Phillips’s roommate, his ex-girlfriend Heather Davis, who lived

with Phillips, but Davis was at work. (Id. at 1889-90.) He also told Phillips that he had

been in a fight at the pool hall and he wanted to clean the blood off; and Phillips allowed him

to use her bathroom. (Id. at 1890-91.) 

During the time he was at her home, Maples repeatedly talked, in a bragging tone,

about beating up someone, he showed Phillips the blood in Terry’s car, he touched the bloody

seat, and he worried aloud about cleaning the inside of the car because Terry would be angry. 

(Id. at 1891-92, 1895-97.) According to Phillips, while holding drugs in his hand, Maples

had told her he had been using crystal meth and crack cocaine that day, and he repeatedly

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asked her to take drugs with him. (Doc. 60 at 31 [citing R. Vol. 15 at 1912, 1893-94,

1916].) She testified that Maples left her house once to “get more dope.” (Id. [citing R. Vol.

15 at 1915].)

On cross-examination, defense counsel tried to discredit Phillips’s testimony based

on her long-held dislike for Maples, the fact that Robinson had once been her boyfriend, and 

her history of drug addiction at the time of the murders. They also elicited Phillips’s

admission that she had not seen Maples take drugs, only that she had seen drugs in his hands. 

(R. Vol. 15 at 1907-08, 1911-14.) Although Maples complains about counsel’s failure to

investigate or question Phillips, he does not allege what more Phillips would have said that

would be relevant to Maples’s intoxication at the time of the murders. 

James “Fishbone’ Smith testified at trial that he was partying with friends on his front

porch at about 1:00 a.m. when he first saw the man his friends identified as “Cory.” He

testified Maples sold him Terry’s pool cue. (R. Vol. 15 at 2004, 2005-06, 2015.) According

to Smith, Maples wanted to purchase crack cocaine and Smith directed him to three

individuals; these individuals left with Maples to buy drugs before returning about fifteen to

twenty minutes later. (Id. at 1991-1995.) Smith testified he did not get into Maples’s car

because there was something “nasty” in it that looked like paint and that Maples had this

stuff all over the back of his shirt and his pants. (Id. at 1883, 1992-94.) Smith had never

seen Maples prior to that night, and he could not identify Maples in the courtroom. (Id. at

1995.) 

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Counsel tried to discredit Smith based on his history of drug offenses, the fact that he

lived in a crack house, and the fact that Smith blamed Maples for his being caught pawning

Terry’s pool cue.27 (Id. at 2002-03, 2007-08.) Maples admits counsel interviewed Smith, but

he contends that, had counsel asked Smith, he would have reported that Maples “appeared

to be intoxicated and in fact told Mr. Smith he had taken drugs prior to his arrival at Mr.

Smith’s house.” (Doc. 24 ¶ 30B.) Maples does not allege what type of drugs he told Smith

he had taken, which arrival time Smith was referring to (before or after Maples left with

Smith’s friends to buy crack), or the extent to which Smith perceived Maples to be impaired. 

Moreover, given his denial of any drug use before the murders, Maples has not established

that Smith’s testimony was relevant to his level of intoxication at the time of the murders,

which preceded his arrival at Smith’s house.

Importantly, Maples fails to mention that his brother, Daniel Maples, testified that he

had spoken with Maples at about 2:00 a.m. (R. Vol. 19, Tab 17, at 2760-61.) He said

Maples had called him to say that he would not be coming home that evening; Daniel told

him to come home because someone had shot Terry. (Id.) Daniel testified that Maples had

sounded normal; he was not talking crazy. (Id.)

27At the time Smith was found to have pawned Terry’s pool cue, the murders had been

publicized and it had been reported that police were looking for Cory Maples. Trevor

Nickens, a pawnbroker, testified that Smith had pawned the pool cue that was identified as

belonging to Stacy Terry. (R. Vol. 15 at 2020.) Several days later, Smith also tried to pawn

a ring and Nickens called the Decatur Police Department. (Id. at 2022.) Smith testified that

he voluntarily contacted the police about the pool cue, but Nickens’s testimony contradicted

Smith’s testimony.

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Considering Maples’s videotaped confession, the testifying witnesses’ perceptions of

Maples before the murders, and his brother’s perception of him shortly after the murders, the

court finds the overwhelming evidence negates any contention that Maples was so impaired

at the time of the offense that legal intoxication was a plausible defense, much less the most

plausible defense. The record evidence supports a defense strategy – the only one left after

Maples’s confession – that Maples did not murder the victims in order to obtain money for

drugs and that the facts supported reasonable doubt as to whether Terry and Robinson were

shot at the same time. A concession that Maples was high, based on the available evidence

that showed he was not so incapacitated as to lack specific intent, would have provided the

State with a motive for the killings – he needed money for drugs. Counsel’s discrediting of

Phillips and Smith was in furtherance of the defense strategy to defeat the offenses of capital

murder, particularly murder during the course of a robbery, by proving Maples did not need

to rob Terry in order to pay for drugs.

Moreover, if Smith’s additionalstatement that Maples appeared intoxicated had been

considered, counsel would have been placed in the position of crediting the remainder of

Smith’s testimony. Contrary to Maples’s contention, Smith’s testimony would not have

rebutted the State’s argument that Maples had robbed Terry because he needed Terry’s pool

cue and other property to exchange for crack cocaine. Instead, it would have supported the

State’s theory of murder in the course of a robbery. To the extent Maples may be

complaining that defense counsel called Daniel Maples as a defense witness, and that Daniel

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Maples’s testimony regarding Maples’s impairment was not as reliable as the other testifying

witnesses, he has made no factual allegations to support this contention. None of the

witnesses who saw Maples before the murders testified that he was extremely impaired. 

Maples had denied he was intoxicated at the time of the murders and his actions after the

murders and his ability to recall the details of the murders during his videotaped confession

overwhelmingly prove that he was not legally incapacitated by drugs or alcohol at the time

of the murders. Further, Daniel Maples’s post-murder impression of Maples countered the

testimony of April Phillips and the alleged additional statement James Smith would have

proffered, and thus assisted the defense with its argument that Maples did not rob and murder

the victims in order to buy crack. 

In the end, the allegations of counsel’s failure to investigate Maples’s intoxication

further and his attack on the tactics taken by counsel in connection with the guilt phase

testifying eyewitnesses shows nothing more than the same testimony counsel faced at trial

– with the exception of Smith. The State’s trial evidence did not establish extreme

intoxication at the time of the offense and Maples has not alleged sufficient facts to show a

reasonable probability that the alleged additional testimony would have changed this

conclusion. Maples cannot show actual prejudice based on the evidence of how he appeared

to Phillips and Smith after the murders; evidence of intoxication after the murders does not

support an intoxication defense. Moreover, being forced to credit Phillips’s testimony and

Smith’s testimony would have supported the State’s claim that Maples had murdered

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Robinson and Terry to obtain money and property to purchase drugs. Under the

circumstances in this case and given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, the court finds

that Maples has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the result of the guilt phase

of his trial would have been different if counsel had presented an intoxication defense.

iv. Additional witnesses counsel failed to adequately interview or

investigate 

Maples also faults counsel for not “ask[ing]” three unidentified individuals at Smith’s

house about Maples’s appearance after the murders. Maples has not alleged how the

testimony of these three individuals that saw him after the murders and for the purpose of

obtaining crack would have rebutted his own statement that he had not taken drugs and had

only had a little bit to drink before the murders and other witnesses who testified that Maples

was not legally intoxicated before the murders. Regardless, the court finds that Maples’s

counsel was aware of these witnesses and Maples has failed to allege facts showing that trial

counsel did not know what they would say.

The trial record shows that, on December 13, 1995, the defense filed a detailed

motion for discovery of prosecution files, records, and information necessary to a fair trial. 

(R. Vol. 1, Tab 2, at 93-106). Counsel was already aware of at least 41 witnesses from

previous discovery requests. (Id. at 97.) The discoverymotion also requested the names and

addresses of all persons who had given any statements or had any knowledge of “all events

pertaining to the deaths of the victims and events leading up to the[] deaths,” “[a]ny

condition of [Cory] Maples, including but not limited to his mental or physical state at any

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time[,]” and any exculpatory or favorable evidence relating to guilt or punishment, including

whether he had a mental or emotional disturbance, or could not conform his conduct to the

requirements of law. (Id. at 98, 100.) At a hearing on January 19, 1997, counsel explained

that they had hired former agent of the Alabama Bureau of Investigation, Johnny Nesmith,

at a rate of approximately $30.00 per hour, and that he had performed $1,000 worth of

services. (R. Vol. 6 at 220.) At that time, the court awarded $1,500 to counsel for Nesmith’s

services to supplement the $500.00 original award. (Id. at 221.) In a May 22, 1997, pre-trial

motion hearing in which defense counsel was attempting to secure even more information

from third parties on some of the 110 individuals identified by the State to the defense during

the discovery process, defense counsel stated that a witness named Michael Hatton

corroborated Smith’s story. (R. Vol. 7, Tab 10, at 308, 329.) 

In his opening argument at the guilt phase of trial, counsel stated that, in addition to

James Smith, the State might call “a bunch of other witnesses, three or four witnesses, that

are going to testify that they saw [Cory] in that section of town[, Smith’s crack house,] in the

after hours.” (R. Vol. 13, Tab 15, at 1469.) The State never called the “three or four

witnesses” from the crack house at trial. However, defense counsel asked Investigator

Howard Battles, with the Morgan County Sheriff’s Office, whether officers had taken

statements from individuals who had witnessed the events at the Smith’s crack house,

including Jimmy Jacob Chambers, Barbara Nicholas, Corrocas Bledsoe and Larry Cantrell

Byrd. (R. Vol. 20 at 2849-50.) Therefore, the court finds this demonstrates that trial counsel

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were aware of the identity of individuals at the crack house and that they were generally

aware of the nature of their anticipated testimony.

This evidence of counsel’s knowledge of the witnesses at the crack house highlights

Maples’s failure to plead with any specificity any facts that, if true, would establish that

counsel’s failure to question the three individuals referred to in paragraph 30A of his

amended petition resulted in any actual prejudice. All indications are that if counsel had

done so, the witnesses would have provided the same testimony as Smith did – and provided

the motive for the capital murder-robbery of Terry and Robinson. Maples has failed to allege

facts that, if true, would establish ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the

failure to call these witnesses.

Next, in his post-remand brief, Maples alleges counsel “neglected to speak with or call

to testify at trial” unidentified individuals at the BBQ he attended earlier on the day of the

murders and the bartender at Caddy Shack about his level of impairment. (Doc. 60 at 65.) 

He goes even further in his post-remand reply brief and asserts that counsel failed to speak

to other patrons at Q Balls and “failed to speak with witnesses who could have testified that

the owner of the pool hall regularly overlooked patrons drinking and taking controlled

substances outside his establishment.” (Doc. 73 at 33.) Maples did not include these

allegations in his Rule 32 petitions,28 and, therefore, the Rule 32 court would not have been

28Maples contends that he filed a discovery request with the Rule 32 court asking for

production of information including the name of any person who had seen him consume

alcohol or had reported him as appearing to be under the influence of alcohol or a controlled

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on notice that Maples was arguing this specific factual basis for the claim. Therefore, this

sub-claim is procedurally defaulted. Maples has not argued that he is excepted from this

default under a cause and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage of justice theory. Moreover,

given the other evidence in the record, including Maples’s specific denial that he was drunk

or high at the time of the murders, the court finds no actual prejudice arising from counsel’s

failure to speak with these additional witnesses.

The court finds that Maples has failed to identify by name these witnesses, to declare

what the witnesses would have told counsel about Maples’s level of intoxication if they been

discovered, to explain how these statements would have established a viable intoxication

defense or another defense more plausible than that chosen by trial counsel, and to show how

he suffered actual prejudice by the lack of these witnesses’ testimony. (See doc. 60 at 65.) 

There was trial testimony from witnesses who saw and interacted with Maples at the BBQ,

Caddy Shack, and Q Balls. Tatum was with Maples at the BBQ and at Carla Terry’s house;

he testified that Maples was not intoxicated. Le Ann Clemons and Beverly Shawnbaum

testified that they actually sat, drank, and interacted with Maples at Caddy Shack for an hour

and a half that evening and that Maples did not appear to be high or extremely intoxicated. 

substance within the 12-hour period before the murders. (Doc. 73 at 67-68; see also doc. 78,

Tab 25 at 143-44.) He argues that his discovery request put the Rule 32 court on notice that

the requested information formed the factual basis of his post-conviction claim for relief. 

(Doc. 73 at 66.) However, there is no Alabama rule or case law that supports a finding that

information sought in a discovery request constitutes the factual basis of a properly pled

claim for post-conviction relief.

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A number of State witnesses who were at Q Balls – Jason Bright, Jason Boyd, Landon

Pendleton, and Luke Skinner – testified concerning Maples’s level of impairment, stating

Maples either was not impaired or he was not extremely impaired. Daniel Maples also

testified that Maples was not impaired.29

Counsel reasonablycould have limited theirinvestigation based on the testimonyfrom

these witnesses as well as Maples’s own statement. Moreover, considering the content of

their testimony, the court finds no reasonable probability that Maples was prejudiced by

counsel’s purported failure to investigate the other unidentified witnesses based on Maples’s

present conclusory allegations. The court finds that Maples has failed to allege facts that, if

true, would establish actual prejudice based on counsel’s failure to investigate or call as

witnesses other individuals with Maples before the murders.

Finally, in his post-remand reply brief, Maples alleges:

Upon information and belief, Maples consumed more than 20 alcoholic drinks

over the course of the day and night of the shootings. Upon information and

belief, Maples also smoked several joints of marijuana during that period as

well.30 Moreover, Maples told his trial counsel at the outset of the

29The record shows John Lansdale and Matt Shell, as well as Robinson’s roommate,

Frank Mienen, were also at Q Balls. Also, although not at Q Balls, Jamie Dobbs saw Maples

between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. Maples makes no allegations regarding these witnesses.

30In his initial post-remand brief, Maples alleged:

Based on information and belief, Maples consumed alcohol (including not only

beer, but vodka and whiskey) and drugs even in excess of the copious

quantities described by the evidence at trial. If granted an evidentiary hearing,

Maples would seek to document such use.

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representation about the enormous quantities of alcohol and drugs he

consumed in the hours leading up to the shootings and told his lawyers that

[unidentified] others would testify that he was drunk and high. 

(Doc. 73 at 70 [footnote added].) He also alleges in a footnote that “upon information and

belief, Maples continued to drink and smoke marijuana after he left the Caddy Shack.” (Id.

at 39-40 n.5.)

(Doc. 60 at 25-26 n.2.) In another footnote in that brief, he asserted that he –

has not had an opportunity to discover evidence concerning counsels’ failure

to investigate, develop, and present evidence concerning the guilt (e.g.

Maples’[s] intoxication on the evening of the offense) . . . . phase. If he is

granted an evidentiary hearing, he will seek to do so. 

(Id. at 29 n. 4.) The court notes that when the magistrate judge entered a scheduling order

in this case on March 9, 2005, and that order states, “The parties may not engage in discovery

without the express permission of the court.” (Doc. 20 at 6.) Moreover, the order requires

Maples, the petitioner, to demonstrate his need for discovery and an evidentiary hearing –

“Petitioner shall have the burden to allege and demonstrate that the petitioner did not receive

a full, fair and complete hearing in state court and that the records of those proceedings are

not a sufficient basis for determining the issues in this petition. Failure to do so will result

in this court's examination only of the record of the state court proceedings.” (Id.) Maples

filed his third amended petition thereafter, and, in his Prayer for Relief, he asked the court

to “grant petitioner discovery under Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases and

a sufficient period of time to conduct discovery, and further grant petitioner authority to

obtain subpoenas to further document and prove the facts set forth in this petition.” (Doc.

24 ¶ 472(b).) Rule 6(b) of the Habeas Rules requires, “A party requesting discovery must

provide reasons for the request. The request must also include any proposed interrogatories

and request for admissions, and must specify any requested documents.” Maples’s Prayer

for Relief is not a proper request for discovery. He did not include in his Prayer for Relief

the scope of discovery sought; he did not submit the proposed interrogatories and requests

for admission; and he did not specify the requested documents. Therefore, his Petition has

been decided based on the record of the state court proceedings.

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Maples filed his initial habeas petition on August 29, 2003, and his third amended

habeas petition on May 23, 2005. Yet, more than eight years after the habeas petition was

filed, Maples attempts to insert new allegations of even more alcohol and marijuana

consumption on the afternoon and evening of the murders than he relayed to law enforcement

officers in 1993, or to Shealy, the defense psychologist, in 1997. Nothing about the claim

as pleaded in the Rule 32 court would have notified that court that these facts, asserted for

the first time in the post-remand Reply Brief, were being proffered as support for the claim. 

Such “circumstances present . . . a case in which the prisoner has attempted to expedite

federal review by deliberately withholding essential facts from the state courts.” Vasquez v.

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257, 260 (1986). Accordingly, these allegations are unexhausted and

procedurally defaulted, and Maples has not argued that he is excepted from the default under

a cause and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage of justice theory.

Alternatively, Maples does not allege that counsel should have called him to testify

at the guilt phase of trial, he does not state whether the “more than twenty drinks” is a

reference to Shealy’s testimony that he drank between 18 and 21 alcoholic beverages that

afternoon and evening or some other unknown number, he fails to identify by name the

“others” about which he told counsel – although he must know who they are, he does not

allege counsel failed to investigate these other witnesses, he does not allege what the other

witnesses would have stated about his consumption or impairment, he does not allege how

the other witnesses’ testimony would have supported a more plausible intoxication defense

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in light of the other trial evidence set out above, and he does not allege how he was

prejudiced under Strickland. Since he has not alleged facts that, if true, would entitle him

to relief on this aspect of his ineffectiveness claim, he cannot establish actual prejudice to

overcome the procedural default of his untimelycollateral appeal and/or Strickland prejudice. 

d. Notice of Maples’s extreme intoxication through penalty-phase

testifying witness Dr. Shealy

In his post-remand briefs, Maples alleges “his trial counsel had ample notice that they

had a strong intoxication defense,” based on the notice of his alcohol and marijuana

consumption on the day of the murders several months before trial from Shealy’s report. 

(Doc. 60 at 64.) While counsel certainly was aware of Shealy’s report before the trial, for

the reasons already discussed and the reasons set out herein, it does not follow that counsel

was ineffective for failing to investigate and pursue an intoxication defense based upon that

report. 

Maples told Shealy he drank between 18 and 21 alcoholic beverages between 2:00

p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on the day of the murders and that he had smoked a marijuana joint with

someone at 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3112-17, 3132.) Shealy

testified that Maples had “seven or eight beers [at the BBQ], then he went to [Carla Terry’s]

house to meet [Terry].” (Id. at 3115.) Maples “funneled a couple of beers” at Carla Terry’s

house, and “had two or three more standing around talking.” (Id. at 3116.) Maples and Terry

then went to Caddy Shack “for about two hours” and had “seven or eight mixed drinks;

White Russians.” (Id.) Maples reported no alcohol or drug usage after leaving Caddy Shack,

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and he told Shealy that he and Terry went to Q Balls around 10:00 p.m. and stayed until

midnight. (Id. at 3116-17.) Maples never reported to Shealy that he smoked crack or used

crystal methamphetamine before the murders and there was no testimony from Shealy

regarding anything Maples told him about his drug and alcohol consumption after the

murders.31

Notice of the information in Shealy’s report must be considered in light of and

weighed against other known evidence of impairment – evidence that showed Maples was

not extremely intoxicated at the time of the offense – taking into account what could be

argued as contradictory evidence of impairment. Neither Maples nor Shealy testified at the

guilt phase of trial, and Maples does not allege that he or Shealy32 should have been called

to testify at that phase for the purpose of establishing legal intoxication. He also does not

dispute the State’s contention that Shealy’s testimony regarding Maples’s alcohol and

31

In the “Statement of Events” portion of his post-remand Opening Brief, Maples

states that Shealy’s testimony shows that on the day of the murders he, along with other

friends, had “consumed at least ‘two fifths of whiskey and some beer.’” (Doc. 60 at 26

[quoting R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3114].) This misrepresents the record. At that portion of the

trial record, Dr. Shealy testified that Maples had reported drinking this amount of alcohol on

July 4, 1995, and, due to his hangover, he did not begin drinking again until July 7, 1995, the

day of the murders. 

32In his amended habeas petition, Maples alleges “[a] mental health expert would have

testified during the guilt phase of Mr. Maples’[s] trial to the effects of [Maples’s history of

physical abuse and abandonment, prior experience with violent deaths, past head injuries, and

drug and alcohol abuse on the day of the murders] upon [his] narrative style and his flat

affect . . . apparent on the videotape of his statement to the police and in his courtroom

demeanor.” (Doc. 24 ¶ 68; see also id. ¶ 67.) He did not raise this claim in his post-remand

briefs, and as such, it has already been deemed abandoned. 

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marijuana consumption was inadmissible hearsay. (See doc. 70 at 60 n.6 [“Maples’s brief

references Dr. Shealy’s penalty-phase testimony that Maples told Dr. Shealy he began

drinking alcohol at 2:00 p.m. and continually drank alcohol up until the time of the crime,

a period of approximately ten hours. . . . Although testimony based on hearsay may be

allowed during the penalty phase . . . , Maples has not attempted to demonstrate that such

hearsay testimony could be presented during the guilt phase. There is no exception to the

hearsay rule for a party’s own statements.”].) Maples simply argues that notice of the

information in the report should have prompted counsel to “consult or try to put on an expert

witness,” (doc. 60 at 65), “who could have testified to the impact on Maples’[s] mental

functioning at the time of the shootings [after] having consum[ed] such copious quantities

of alcohol and drugs,” (doc. 73 at 33). This allegation refers to his claim that counsel were

ineffective for failing to consult with and present the testimony of a pharmacologist or a drug

expert, discussed infra.

Reasonable counsel could have concluded that, considering the evidence of Maples’s

impairment through his own videotaped statement and Shealy’s report, Maples’s proclaimed

consumption of 20 drinks and a marijuana joint over approximately a 9 hour period may have

simply filled in details of his consumption that Maples left out in his videotaped confession

and would not have established that Maples was extremely intoxicated, as opposed to

partially intoxicated or simply drunk at the time of the offense. It is not necessarily the

amount ofintoxicants that establishes extreme intoxication, but the effect ofthose intoxicants

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on a particular individual.33 The effects of any intoxicants on Maples before the offense are

a known quantity based on witness testimonyconcerning his demeanor, his denial that he was

intoxicated, and his clear recollection of his actions before, during, and after the murders.

An additional problemthat Maples’strial counselfacedwhen considering the “notice”

of Maples’s intoxication from the Shealy report is the problem of Maples’s credibility, i.e.,

whether Maples exaggerated or lied outright about his alcohol consumption to Shealy. The

possibility that Maples lied to Shealy is particularly true since Maples’s report of his mental

processes to Shealy before, during, and after the murders showed that he was aware of and

remembered the details of the conversation he had on the way home from Q Balls, and he

was sufficiently cognizant of his own thoughts to negate any assertion that he was stupefied

by drugs and/or alcohol. He told Shealy that he believed it was odd that Terry and Robinson

decided to drop him off at home first when they had initially stated Robinson would be taken

home first and the group had to pass byRobinson’s house in order to take Maples home. (Id.

at 3117.) He told Shealy he remembered getting out of the car at his house and struggling

to find his keys. (Id. at 3118.) He remembered going into the house with the intent to go to

bed and yet he also stated that he went to his parent’s bedroom because he knew that was the

33Indeed, the trial court remarked in its sentencing order that Maples’s alcohol use on

the night of the murders was no different than any other night for Maples. (Rule 32 C.R.

Vol. 37, Tab 62, at 10-11 [“The Defendant acknowledges no inordinate amount of alcohol

consumption on the evening of the murder, nor is there any evidence that the amount of

alcohol consumption on the evening of July 7, 1995[,] was any different than any other

night.”].)

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room he could look out the window to view Terry and Robinson’s exact location outside. 

(Id. at 3112, 3118.) He remembered that Robinson was standing outside of the car with his

head in the door as if he were looking for something. (Id. at 3118.) He claimed he did not

know what made him go back outside and “that his memory started getting fuzzy when he

came out of the house.” (Id. at 3111.) Maples then told Shealy that the next thing he

remembered was standing ten feet from the driver’s door, seeing Terry dead with his head

laid back on the seat and Robinson’s body prostrate half way in and half way out of the car. 

(Id. at 3118-19.) These statements directly contradicted his videotaped confession regarding

the murders, in which he told the investigators that he had shot Terry first by sticking the rifle

through the open car window and then, taking a half step forward, shot Robinson. (See, e.g.,

doc. 78, Exh. 230.) In his petition, Maples alleges that counsel did not ask Shealy to view

Maples’s videotaped confession. (Doc. 24 ¶ 69.) But even without this information, Shealy

testified that Maples’s memory was not completely obliterated by intoxication, a conclusion

buttressed by the videotaped confession. He testified, “Most of us know that if you drink

enough you can’t remember,” (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3113-14), and Maples “wasn’t so

intoxicated that his memorywas totallywiped out because he remembered the details of what

happened before [the murders],” and “[h]e remembered the details afterward,” (id. at 3122-

23). Shealy said:

He couldn’t remember what happened during a particular part of that time. 

The hypothesis would have been that there was either a disassociative

experience where he blocked out that part from his memory which would have

been perhaps contributed to by the intoxication; the alcohol and drugs, or

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another possibility that I considered at that time was because of his heavy

hallucinogenic drug usage, LSD and so forth, it could have been a

disassociative experience related to a flashback. Particularly – not being a

clear motive – I mean, there hadn’t been a falling out or a fight or anything

based on what I had been told in terms of what he knew at that time and what

he told me, and so I was trying to form some hypotheses about why he might

not be able to remember. One hypothesis was that he might be lying or he

might be malingering and saying that he didn’t remember. Those were all

possibilities that I considered.

(Id. at 3123-24.) Shealy opined that “alcohol and drug use combined with perhaps some

internal stimulus from some memory or something that provoked [Maples],” (id. at 3168);

he testified on cross-examination that the alcohol and drugs alone were not enough to

provoke Maples’s murder of Terry and Robinson, (id. at 3170-71). 

Even setting aside Maples’s statements to Shealy about his alcohol consumption and

memory lapse, Maples’s videotaped statement that he was not intoxicated at the time of the

murders, his detailed account of the murders, the testimony of witnesses who saw him before

the murders, and his brother’s testimony that he sounded normal shortly after the murders 

overwhelming negates any inference of intoxication rising to the level of insanity before or

during the murders. Thus, contrary to Maples’s contention, Shealy’s report did not put

counsel on notice of a viable intoxication defense.

e. Discussion

Considering the evidence presented at trial and the evidence Maples alleges counsel

should have presented regarding his intoxication at the time of the murders, the court finds

Maples has not shown a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been

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different if counsel had investigated and presented an intoxication defense. The totality of

the evidence pertaining to Maples’s mental state at the time of the murders, actually

presented and alleged, is such that no reasonable juror would have believed that he was

intoxicated to the level of insanity, i.e., he was not conscious that he was committing a crime

or was incapable of forming the intent to murder.

In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in the

required prejudice, a court should presume . . . that the judge or jury acted

according to law. An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable

to the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice,

“nullification,” and the like. A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a

lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be reviewed. The

assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the

decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the

standards that govern the decision. . . . 

The governing legal standard plays a critical role in defining the

question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from counsel’s errors. When

a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a

reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a

reasonable doubt respecting guilt.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95. Therefore, in order to find that he was prejudiced by

counsel’s failure to raise an intoxication defense, Maples must establish a reasonable

probability that the jury would have found he was not guilty of capital murder based on

evidence of his intoxication.

Under Alabama law, as set forth above, the jury had to find that Maples was

intoxicated to the point of insanity in order to find him not guilty of capital murder. See Ex

parte Bankhead, 585 So. 2d at 120-21. “[E]vidence that the defendant ingested alcohol or

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drugs, standing alone, does not warrant a charge on intoxication. There must be evidence

that the ingestion caused a disturbance of the person’s mental or physical capacities and that

mental or physical disturbance existed at the time the offense was committed.” Johnson v.

State, 2014 WL 2061147 at *48 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014)(internal quotations and citations

omitted). The evidence that Maples contends supports a viable intoxication defense shows,

at best, that he was drunk at the time he shot Terry and Robinson. However, this evidence

does not support a reasonable probability that the jury would have found Maples to be so

drunk that his “mental facilities” were “paralyze[d]” and he was “incapable of forming or

entertaining the design to take life.” Ex parte Bankhead, 585 So. 2d at 120-21. Indeed,

Maples’s videotaped confession overwhelmingly negates any argument that he was so drunk

he could not form the intent to murder Terry and Robinson given his ability to recall the

details and his thoughts before and during the murders. See Reaves v. Secretary, Florida

Dept. of Corrections, 717 F.3d 886, 904 (11th Cir. 2013)(finding no prejudice to defendant

arising from counsel’s failure to present an intoxication defense, in part, because of

defendant’s “abilityto later recall the [murder] in considerable and vivid detail” (citing Davis

v. State, 875 So. 2d 359, 367 (Fla. 2003))); Ex parte McWhorter, 781 So. 2d 330, 342-43

(Ala. 2000)(“The evidence offered byMcWhorter as to his alleged intoxication was glaringly

inconsistent with his own statement giving detailed descriptions of the events occurring at

the crime scene.”); see also Lucas v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison,

771 F.3d 785, 795 (11th Cir. 2014)(finding no Strickland prejudice arising from counsel’s

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failure to present evidence “suggesting the petitioner had no memory of the events of the

murder due to drug use or brain damage” because substantial evidence, including a

videotaped confession, demonstrated “a memory of the murders”); Harich v. Dugger, 844

F.2d 1464, 1471-72 (11th Cir. 1988)(finding no prejudice based on counsel’s failure to raise

an intoxication defense based, in part, on petitioner’s statement recalling details about where

he went and what he did), overruled in non-pertinent part by Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d

1471, 1482 (11th Cir. 1997).

In his videotaped confession, Maples said he was not intoxicated at the time of the

murders, having “a little bit” to drink, and he denied using any hard drugs. He was able to

recall details of the murders, including what he was thinking at that time. Individuals who

saw him before the murders said he was not intoxicated. No one who saw him after the

murders could testify to his condition at the time of the murders. The evidence of Maples’s

conduct before and during the murders “suggests a perfectly adequate understanding of his

actions” that negates any suggestion that he was legally intoxicated at the time of the

murders. Hunt, 666 F.3d at 728 (citing White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir.

1992)). Moreover, Maples’s expert Shealy reported that he did not think Maples was so

intoxicated at the time of the murders that he did not know what he was doing.

The court finds that Maples has not established that he suffered actual prejudice as a

result of counsel’s failure to raise an intoxication defense. Based on the facts presented at

trial and consideration of the evidence that Maples alleges should have been presented, the

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court finds no reasonable probability that the result of Maples’s trial would have been

different and no reasonable jurist could decide otherwise. See Brooks v. Commissioner,

Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 719 F.3d 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2013). Also, the court finds

the decision of the Rule 32 court denying this claim was based on a reasonable application

of Strickland and reasonable determination of the facts based on the record before it.

Therefore, Maples’s claim for relief based on counsel’s failure to present an

intoxication defense is due to be denied as procedurally defaulted and, in the alternative,

without merit. Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing or opportunity for discovery is

denied.

2. Counsel’s Failure to Request the Assistance of a Pharmacologist or Other

Expert in Drug Interactions. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 71-72.)

Maples contends that counsel should have “obtain[ed] an expert to testify as to [his]

cognitive ability to form an intent to rob, and whether and to what extent that ability was

impacted by his drug ingestion, especially [his] impairment after ingesting drugs and alcohol

following a relatively drug-free period.”34 (Doc. 24 ¶ 71.) Also, he alleges:

34The record does not contain evidence that Maples had refrained from drinking

alcohol for any period of time. Indeed, the record contains evidence that he continued to

drink after leaving rehab. (See R. Vol. 19, Tab 17, at 2749; R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3169-70.) 

During the cross-examination of Shealy, the following occurred:

Q. Can you see anything in particular about this particular incident

about why it would lead to a homicidal rage when obviously from the history

he gave you that he had been drunk and extremely intoxicated over a couple

of years period of time? I mean, is there anything in particular about this

incident why it would set him off to kill two people?

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Under these circumstances, Counsel [were] ineffective for failing to

request the services of an expert who could review the available evidence,

determine how much of which drugs Mr. Maples ingested or used prior to the

shootings, and offer testimony about the effects those drugs would have had

on his mental state at the time of the shootings. Depriving Mr. Maples of his

constitutionally guaranteed assistance of experts cannot be considered a

strategic decision under Ake and its progeny. But for Counsel’s failure to

request a pharmacologist or other expert in drug interactions and elicit

testimony from that expert, the outcome of Mr. Maples’[s] trial would have

been different.

(Id. ¶ 72.)

The Rule 32 court held this claim was “deficiently pleaded and not specific” because

Maples had “fail[ed] to plead facts that would establish what a pharmacologist or neuropharmacologist’s testimony would have been or that their testimony would have even been

favorable to his defense.” (Rule 32, Vol. 37, Tab 66 at 30-31.) Similarly, Maples has not

alleged the substance of the expected testimony of a pharmacologist or other drug expert. 

In his confession, Maples describes drinking before the murders and he says he

smoked a joint. However, he denied, unequivocally and repeatedly, any use of hard drugs. 

He remembered not only the details of the evening – including shooting Terry through his

open window twice and, in a single motion, taking a half step forward and shooting

Robinson. He told the investigators that he had troubling thoughts that night, as he often did

when he drank. He never stated that he was so drunk or high that he did not know what he

A. No. It’s a very good question, and certainly puzzling probably to

everybody, I would imagine to everybody here. . . . .

(R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3169-70.)

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was doing. His statement to the investigators, recorded on videotape and played for the jury,

shows Maples knew what he was doing – even if he denied knowing why he was doing it –

when he murdered Terry and Robinson. Moreover, his confession shows that he was capable

of rationale thought – he took the money from Terry’s billfold after taking his body out of

the car and laying it on the ground, he replaced the weapon, and he left in Terry’s car. He

got rid of Robinson’s body by throwing it over a bridge and into a creek. He had sufficient

self awareness to know that he had to leave town because he would be suspected of the

murders.

Assuming an expert in the effects of drugs and alcohol examined this case, the court

finds no realistic probability that such an expert would testify that Maples, in light of his

confession and other evidence in the record before the state court, was unable to form the

intent to murder Terry and Robinson at the time he shot both men. Perhaps this is the reason

that Maples did not specifically plead what the expert’s expected testimony would be.35

Regardless, considering Maples’s amended petition, his post-remand briefs, and the entire

state-court record, this court finds no reasonable probability that the result of Maples’s guiltphase trial would have been different if Maples’s trial counsel had consulted and/or obtained

an expert in drug use and effect. The evidence that Maples was not so intoxicated as to be

insane at the time of the murders is overwhelming – he said he was not intoxicated, he

35In Harrington, the Supreme Court held that reasonable counsel may choose not to

consult an expert if the expert “would be fruitless,” or even “harmful to the defense.” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 108 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). 

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recalled the details of the night, including his thoughts at the time of the murders, he left

town to avoid being arrested for the murders, people who saw him before the murders

testified he was not intoxicated to an extreme extent, and his brother who spoke with him

about an hour after the murders denied Maples seemed anything but normal.

The court finds that Maples has not shown that a pharmacologist or similar expert

would have testified that he was intoxicated to the point of insanity at the time of the

murders. Therefore, he cannot show actual prejudice based on counsel’s failure to consult

a pharmacologist or similar expert.

The court finds this claim is procedurally defaulted or, in the alternative, due to be

denied on the merits. To the extent Maples may be requesting an evidentiary hearing as to

this claim, it is due to be denied. Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1400.

3. Counsel Failed to Request Jury Instructions on Intoxication and

Manslaughter. (Doc. 24, Claim I.C.ii., ¶¶ 32-36.)36

Maples alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to request jury instructions on

intoxication and manslaughter based on the evidence presented at trial and additional

“available evidence of intoxication.” (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 32, 35.) Had counsel done so, Maples

contends that he “would have been entitled to a jury instruction on intoxication that could

have negated [the] specific intent required to establish capital murder[,]” and a manslaughter

36This claim is identical to the amended Rule 32 petition. The initial Rule 32 petition

made the same allegations as the amended Rule 32 petition, except Maples claimed only that

counsel should have requested an intoxication and manslaughter instruction based on the

State’s evidence as presented at trial. (See Rule 32 C.R., Vol. 32, Tab 47 at 7-10.)

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verdict would have rendered him ineligible for the death penalty. (Doc. 60 at 63-64 [citing

Coon v. State, 494 So. 2d 184, 186-87 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Crosslin v. State, 446 So. 2d

675, 681-82 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983)]; see also doc. 24, ¶¶ 32-36.)

On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held:

The testimony at trial did not establish that the appellant was intoxicated at the

time of the murders. Although there was some testimony that he had ingested

alcohol several hours before the murders occurred, there was no testimony that

he was intoxicated at the time of the murders. Also, there was no evidence that

he had ingested drugs before the murders. Thus, there was no rational basis for

instructions on intoxication and manslaughter under the evidence presented in

this case.

Furthermore, instructions on intoxication andmanslaughter would have

been inconsistent with his defense strategy. At trial, the appellant specifically

contended that he was not intoxicated at the time of the murders. He also

contended that, at most, he was guilty of two intentional murders, but not two

counts of capital murder. Thus, the trial court did not err in not instructing the

jury on intoxication and manslaughter.

Maples v. State, 758 So. 2d 1, 24 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).

 The Rule 32 court held:

. . . Maples contends that trial counsel were ineffective for not

requesting jury instructions on intoxication and manslaughter. The underlying

substantive issue was raised on direct appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals

held that no plain error had occurred because “there was no rational basis for

an instruction on intoxication on manslaughter under the evidence presented

in this case.” Maples, 758 So. 2d at 24.

Based on the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Maples is

unable to establish that trial counsel’s performance caused him to suffer any

substantial prejudice, thus, he is unable to establish ineffective assistance

under the Strickland test. Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 108, 133 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2000). [This claim] is without merit; therefore, it is due to be dismissed. 

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(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 13-15.) 

As set forth supra, the court finds that Maples was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure

to present an implausible and unsupported intoxication defense. “Counsel’s failure to request

an intoxication instruction is . . . justified by the implausibility, on this record, of an

intoxication defense.” Hunt v. Commissioner, Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 666 F.3d 708,

727 (11th Cir. 2012). For this reason, Maples cannot show the Rule 32 court unreasonably

rejected this claim. Given the Court of Criminal Appeals finding that such instructions were

not warranted by the evidence, reasonable jurists would agree with the Rule 32 court’s

conclusion that failure to request jury instructions on the intoxication defense and

manslaughter that were not warranted by the evidence did not cause Maples’s actual

prejudice. Id. at 729 (finding no prejudice when “there is no realistic possibility that, had

[such] instruction[s] been given, the jury might actually have concluded that [defendant’s]

intoxication amounted to insanity and acquitted him of capital murder on that basis”).

This claim is procedurally defaulted, or in the alternative, due to be denied on the

merits. To the extent Maples may be requesting an evidentiary hearing as to this claim,

which was adjudicated on the merits in the Rule 32 court, the request for a hearing will be

denied. Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1400.

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4. Counsel Was Ineffective for Admitting Critical Elements of the Charged

Offenses During Closing Argument and Arguing a Position That Was

Inconsistent with His Opening Statement. (Doc. 24, Claim I.B.i.-iii., ¶¶ 19-25.)

a. Maples’s claim

In his amended habeas petition, Maples claims that counsel was ineffective during

closing arguments of the guilt phase of his trial because he admitted that Maples was guilty

of capital murder and that he flipped positions between his opening and closing arguments.37

Specifically, Maples alleges:

19. The relevant Alabama statute enumerates one capital offense as

“[m]urder wherein two or more persons are murdered by the defendant by one

act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.” Ala. Code § 13A-5-40

(10) (1994) (“Count One”). During closing arguments, Counsel admitted both

elements of this offense – (1) the intentional murders of two people (2)

pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. But for Counsel’s ineffective

performance in these admissions, there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome of Mr. Maples’[s] trial would have been different. Counsel’s

admissions denied Mr. Maples his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

37To the extent Maples alleges that counsel conceded guilt to the capital offenses with

three statements in his closing argument, this habeas claim is virtually identical to that

presented in the Rule 32 petition, (R. 32 C.R., Vol. 32, Tab 47, ¶¶ 11-17 at 5-6), and the

amended Rule 32 petition, (id., Vol. 33, Tab 49, ¶¶ 11-17 at 5-7). To the extent Maples

alleges that counsel’s initial strategy was to deny that he committed the killings and then flipflopped strategies in his guilt-phase closing arguments, this is a retooling of the claim as

alleged in all previous pleadings. Nonetheless, since the propriety of counsel’s guilt-phase

closing arguments necessarily requires a determination of the reasons why counsel made the

arguments he did and the Rule 32 court’s order reflects that it was on notice of this aspect

of Maples’s claim and conducted its analysis in such a manner, the post-remand retooling

does not raise a new claim. Thus nonexhaustion with regard to the allegations in Maples’s

post-remand brief is not at issue.

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i. Counsel’s Admission of Intent.

20. Counsel’s admissions during trial deprived Mr. Maples of his

constitutional right to be tried before an impartial jury. During closing

arguments, Counsel told the jury that Mr. Maples intentionally caused a loss

of life and that he should be guilty of at least one lesser included count of

murder. “We are asserting that there is at least sufficient evidence as to one

murder that he’s guilty of and possibly two.” (R. at 2913-14, 2939.) Later in

the closing, Counsel admitted “two murders, ladies and gentlemen, his own

actions for which he is responsible.” (R. at 2918, 2929-30.)

ii. Counsel’s Admission of One Scheme or Course of

Conduct.

21. Counsel also admitted that Mr. Maples murdered pursuant to one

scheme or course of conduct. “What we have here is the instance of him

walking out to the car and in an instantaneous rush killing two people.” (R. at

2918.) The State noted this admission during closing argument when they

argued that “[Counsel] told you both deaths were caused instantaneously.” (R.

at 2959.)

iii. These Admissions by Counsel Constitute Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel.

22. Despite Mr. Maples’[s] desire, expressed in open court, to plead not

guilty to all of the counts contained in the indictment, Counsel’s admissions,

as detailed in Paragraphs 20 to 21, were the functional equivalent of a plea of

guilty to capital murder, a plea which resulted in a sentence of death. . . . It

is fundamental that counsel may not override their client’s decision to plead

not guilty. . . . Therefore, Counsel’s conduct in overriding Mr. Maples’[s]

decision to plead not guilty falls outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance. . . .

23. The crime of intentional murder is automatically elevated to capital

murder when two or more persons are murdered by the defendant by one act

or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. . . . Thus, Counsel’s

admission of Mr. Maples’[s] guilt to a capital crime denied him the right to

have his guilt presented to the jury as an adversarial issue. . . .

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24. The jury, having been informed by Mr. Maples’[s] own Counsel

that he was guilty as charged, could not possibly have accorded Mr. Maples a

presumption of innocence. Thus, Mr. Maples was tried by a jury that had a

fixed opinion of his guilt prior to deliberations. Unsurprisingly, the jury

deliberated less than four hours before unanimously determining that Mr.

Maples was guilty of two counts of capital murder.

25. Counsel’s admissions during closing arguments at the guilt phase

of the trial deprived Mr. Maples of a fair trial and were based on a failure to

know or understand the law that cannot be accorded deference as a reasonable

trial strategy. . . . There is a reasonable probability that, but for Counsel’s

deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

(Doc. 24 ¶¶ 19-25 [internal citations and quotations omitted, except as otherwise indicated].)

In his post-remand brief, Maples declares that counsel was ineffective because he

“flipped positions,” hurting Maples’s credibility. (See doc. 60 at 53-55.) He argues:

During opening arguments, Maples’[s] counsel took the position that Maples

was innocent of the shootings altogether, telling the jury that the State could

provide no reason that Maples would “suddenly snap” and murder a friend (R.

at 1466); that the State had essentially focused its investigation on Maples

from the outset and stopped asking “who did this” (R. at 1468); and that there

are “at least doubts” going to “the very issue of who did this crime” (R. at

1473). 

. . . 

Having opened the trial by telling the jury that someone else committed

the shootings and having apparently tried to advance that theorywith a meager

and confusing presentation during the trial in response to the State’s evidence

. . . , what counsel did during the closing arguments of the guilt phase was

utterly unreasonable and destroyed any chance that Maples would be spared

a capital murder conviction. At closing, Maples’[s] counsel suddenly flipped

positions. Rather than sticking with the position that Maples should be

acquitted of the shootings because of doubts over who committed them,

counsel told the jury that Maples had committed the shootings. Specifically,

counsel told the jury at closing that “[w]e are asserting there is at least

sufficient evidence as to one murder that he’s guilty of and possibly two” (R.

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at 2939; see R. at 2913-14), and counsel admitted to the jury “two murders,

ladies and gentlemen, his own actions for which he is responsible.” (R. at

2929-30.) That was a shocking turn of events and must have seriously

undermined Maples’[s] credibility to the jury.

(Id.)

The Rule 32 court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

[Maples] alleges that trial counsel were ineffective for arguing that

“[he] intentionally caused a loss of life and that he should be guilty of at least

one lesser included account of murder.’” (Maples petition at p. 5)

A claim of ineffective assistance regarding trial counsel’s closing

argument cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of

the entire argument and the evidence presented at trial. Duren v. State, 590 So.

2d 360, 367 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). When viewed in the proper context, the

two quotes . . . of Maples’s petition from trial counsel’s guilt-phase closing

arguments do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. 

A defense attorney’s performance is not ineffective “as long as the

approach ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Chandler, 218 F.[3d]

[1305] at 1314 [(2000)], quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2474

(1986). Trial counsel’s guilt phase strategy was to convince the jury that,

though Maples may have been guilty of two intentional murders, he was not

guilty of capital murder. Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented

against Maples, including his videotaped confession and DNA evidence, this

was a reasonable trial strategy. 

Maples has failed to plead and prove that, given the facts of the case,

“no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” 

Chandler, 218 F.[3]d at 1315. The allegation . . . does not establish deficient

or prejudicial performance on behalf of trial counsel as required by the

Strickland test. [This claim] is without merit; therefore it is dismissed. Rules

32.3, 32.6(b), and 32.7(d), ARCrP. 

[In the next claim,] Maples alleges that trial counsel were ineffective

for admitting that he murdered the victims pursuant to one scheme or course

of conduct. In support of his allegation, Maples quotes this Court one sentence

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[that Maples acted in an instantaneous rush] from trial counsel’s entire closing

argument that covers 33 pages of record. (R. 2908-2941)

. . .

When read in the context of trial counsel’s entire closing argument and

the evidence presented at trial it is obvious that trial counsel was arguing that

Maples suffered from some form of diminished capacity and that he did not

murder the victim[s] with the intent to rob Terry. This was in keeping with

trial counsel’s strategy that, though Maples have been guilty of intentional

murder, he was not guilty of capital murder. Trial counsel never told the jury

that Maples was “guilty as charged” as Maples contends in his petition. 

Maples has failed to plead or prove that, even if trial counsel erred,

“that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial

whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2064. Claim

I.B. (ii) does not establish deficient or prejudicial performance on behalf of

trial counsel as required by the Strickland test. Claim I.B.(ii) is without merit;

therefore, it is dismissed. Rules 32.3, 32.6(b), and 32.7(d), ARCrP. 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 12-13.) Elsewhere in its opinion, the court held:

During the guilt phase, trial counsel’s strategy was to attack the

elements of the indictment that raised the offenses from intentional murders

to capital murders. Trial counsel attempted to show that the murders were not

committed pursuant to a common plan or scheme as alleged in Count I of the

indictment by arguing that the lapse of time between the discovery of Terry’s

body and the discovery of Robinson’s body established a reasonable doubt that

someone else could have murdered Robinson. Trial counsel attempted to show

that Maples took Terry’s car as a mere afterthought and not as part of a plan

to rob him . . . .

(Id. at 85.) 

Maples asserts the Rule 32 court’s determination that – 

“[t]rial counsel’s guilt phase strategy was to convince the jury that, though

Maples may have been guilty of two intentional murders, he was not guilty of

capital murder[]” . . . . is flat wrong, and an objectively indefensible

characterization of the trial record. As the opening statements quoted above

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made clear Maples’[s] counsel’s strategy for the guilt/innocence phase was to

deny that Maples was guilty of the shootings at all – apparently by trying to

create reasonable doubt about “who did this crime.” (R. at 1473). It was not

until closing arguments that Maples’[s] counsel adopted the strategy identified

by the Alabama trial court. But in doing so, it abandoned the strategy it

opened with. 

(Doc. 60 at 41 [quoting Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 12]; see also id. at 42-43 [“the

court utterly failed to recognize that counsel had specifically told the jury at opening

statements that Maples did not commit the shootings”].)

b. Counsel’s Arguments

At the beginning of his opening statement, Maples’s counsel told the jury:

On July 7th or 8th of 1995, two young men lost their lies in Morgan County,

Alabama, tragically. It is also a fact that the State of Alabama has leveled a

finger of accusation at [Cory] Maples and says that he is responsible for those

two young men’s deaths. It is equally a fact that to that charge, [Cory] Maples

today asserts before you, the trier of this case, that he is not guilty of that

charge; hence the reason for this trial.

(C.R. Vol. 13, Tab 15, at 1464-65.) He then asked the jury to consider the following

questions:

• “[W]hy would [Cory] Maples suddenly, after a week of spending time

with this young man[, Stacy Terry,] that he had known his whole life,

why would he suddenly snap or do whatever and become a murderer of

. . . his friends[?] (Id. at 1466.)

• “Why would he suddenly at the end of [a] week [spent with Terry]

decide to become both a murderer and a robber?” (Id.)

• “It is true that [Cory] was ultimately found in possession of the car of

Stacy Terry. That is not in contest or in question. The issue is what

does that mean.” (Id. at 1467.)

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• “How” did Terry pool cue “end[ ] up in the hands of individuals in the

Northwest Decatur section of town[?]” (Id. at 1467-68.)

• Why does Maples, in his videotaped statement, inaccurately describe

“how the two young men died”? (Id at 1470-71.)

In summation, he asked the jury to “[c]ompare the evidence and search vigorously for

the truth because the State has not done that in this case,” and to return a verdict of not guilty. 

(Id. at 1473.)

During closing argument, counsel stated:

Now, at the beginning of this case, all we had faced before us were the charges

in the indictment. Throughout this case it has become apparent the Court is

going to charge you on lesser included offenses. At the beginning of this case

when I said [Maples] was not guilty, I still say he’s not guilty of the charges

in the indictment, but I am telling you unequivocally that the proper and just

verdict would be a finding of guilty as to at least one count of regular

murder.

(C.R. Vol. 20, Tab 19, at 2913 [emphasis added]; see also id. at 2914-15 [“While the

evidence may be sufficient as to the cause of death, as to these other circumstances, we assert

to you the evidence is insufficient to remove all reasons of doubt of his guilt of capital

murder.”].) The focus of counsel’s argument thereafter was to negate the factors that

supported the capital murder charges – “Since we have conceded to you there was a loss of

life caused intentionally at the hand of [Cory] Maples, it is really two questions. The first

one is, were these deaths caused, quote, pursuant to one act or one scheme or course of

conduct. . . . The second one is in count number two, were they committed during the course

of a robbery . . . .” (Id. at 2914.)

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In discussing “the so-called robbery count,” counsel argued, inter alia:

Remember the crucial point in [Maples’s videotaped] statement when he was

talking about his past and he says, “I’m not making excuses, I’m responsible.” 

Do [you] remember him saying that? This is not a man trying to get out of

anything or hide anything or conceal anything. He said, “I don’t know, no

apparent reason, pointless.” He said, “I’ve been thinking about that personal

stuff all night; that stuff I think about when I drink.” He said he didn’t say

anything to [Terry and Robinson] before the events. There is no element of

provocation or that . . . he said [“]get out of the car.[”] If it was a robbery, he

could have held a gun to them and forced them out of the car at gunpoint and

gunned them down then and left in the car. There would have been no blood

or anything. What we have here is the instance of him walking out to the car

and in an instantaneous rush killing two people. Now, as Mr. Matthews

pointed out, after the events he testified he “freaked out hard.” He said, “What

the blank have I done.” When asked, he said “there was no money involved.” 

When asked about the problemsthat was on his mind, he said, “Those were my

usual personal problems.” He said, “There was no real reason why I did it.” 

He didn’t try to make justification[s].

(Id. at 2917-18 [emphasis added].) Counsel argued, “The only evidence [of robbery] that

comes in [Maples’s] statement when he says[,] after the fact, after both men are dead, then

he takes the car. The testimony is that this was a mere afterthought.” (Id. at 2925-26.) Then

counsel stated, “Now, is this a man who is evasive and trying to hide and run from the police

and try to keep that car for himself, or is this a tortured man who did something he never

quite understands and flipped out and snapped and his whole life was turned upside down

by his own actions for which he is responsible; two murders, ladies and gentlemen, his own

actions for which he is responsible.” (Id. at 2929-30 [emphasis added].)

As to the one-scheme-or-course-of-conduct capital murder charge, counsel began by

noting that the State had “rel[ied] upon Maples’[s] statement to say that these two young men

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were killed together at the same time or roughly the same time.” (Id. at 2930.) He argued

that the testimony of Pat Bradberry, a neighbor, was inconsistent with Maples’s videotaped

statement that he shot Terry and Robinson at the same time:

Mrs. Bradberry tells us there [were] two sets of shots and that is inconsistent

with what [Cory] Maples testified to in this statement. When I say there is no

evidence of that, [Cory] Maples testified in his statement or stated in his

statement that these things . . . all happened like that (snapping fingers). He

doesn’t mention a time period passing or more shots; he doesn’t mention any

of this kind of evidence. The State is now saying that must have happened

because they have to in order for you to believe that [Cory] Maples killed these

two young men pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct.

(Id. at 2931-32.) He pointed to a number of inconsistencies between Maples’s videotaped

confession and other evidence, including:

• Evidence that Robinson moved in reaction to being shot; Maples said

Robinson did not move, (id. at 2932);

• Evidence of blood splatter in the back seat of the car; Maples stated, at

the time he shot Robinson, Robinson was in the front seat, (id. at 2932-

33);

• Evidence that Robinson was found without of his shoes, (id. at 2933);

• Evidence that Robinson’s body was not in the creek at 4:00 p.m. the

afternoon following his murder, although Maples had stated he put

Robinson’s body in the creek at 1:00 or 1:15 a.m., (id. at 2934-35); and

• Picture of Robinson’s body in the creek shows his clothing is “soaked,

but “[t]here is at least six or seven inches between the water and his

clothing,” (id. at 2935).

Based on this evidence, counsel argued “a reasonable inference is that [Terry and Robinson]

were killed at separate and distinct times.” (Id. at 2937; see also id. at 2939.)

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In summation, counsel told the jury:

. . . Maples stands before you on the first words I told to you . . . on his plea of

not guilty to the charges in the indictment. The State has elected to pursue

these charges [of capital murder] and now we know . . . that you will assert and

agree with us that this evidence that I have just mentioned creates real

reasonable doubts as to whether the State has proven these two charges. . . . 

[Y]ou will be asked a second question, and that is, is he guilty of murder. We

are asserting there is at least sufficient evidence as to one murder that he’s

guilty of and possibly two. You will be asked for that. It will be a serious

verdict, it will send a message, it will condemn murder clearly, and it will be

the just and appropriate verdict.

(Id. at 2939.)

In response, the State argued, inter alia, “[I]f I understood [Maples’s counsel] right,

when he was talking about the robbery count, he . . . said something about instantaneously

killing two people. Well, that sounds to me pretty much like in count one, one course of the

same transaction, instantaneously.” (R. Vol. 20, Tab 20, at 2955.) The State also argued:

Mr. Craig [Maples’s counsel] wants to get [Robinson’s] body off somewhere

to get all this separated out, but if I understand him right, he told you both

deaths were caused instantaneously. . . . If the deaths didn’t happen at the

same time, then what do you think happened? . . . Do you think for a second

that Barry Robinson – that after [Maples] killed Terry that Robinson just

continued to sit there and wait awhile for his turn? Is that logical? Is that

believable, or is it more logical to believe it happened just like the defendant

told you on the tape. Somebody said something about there not being any

eyewitnesses in this case. There was an eyewitness and he told you what

happened on the tape.

(Id. at 2959-60.)

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c. Discussion

Maples alleges that counsel’s closing argument was “the functional equivalent of a

plea of guilty to capital murder.” (Doc. 24 ¶ 22.) The court disagrees.

First, the court notes that, assuming counsel conceded Maples was guilty of capital

murder, such concession was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea:

[Maples] retained the rights accorded a defendant in a criminal trial. The State

was obliged to present during the guilt phase competent, admissible evidence

establishing the essential elements of the crimes with which [Maples] was

charged. . . . That aggressive evidence would thus be separated from the

penalty phase, enabling the defense to concentrate that portion of the trial on

mitigating factors. . . . Further, the defense reserved the right to

cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution and could endeavor, as [counsel]

did, to exclude prejudicial evidence. . . . In addition, in the event of errors in

the trial or jury instructions, a concession of guilt would not hinder the

defendant’s right to appeal.

Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 188 (2004)(internal citations omitted).

However, the court finds that counsel did not concede Maples was guilty of capital

murder. As set forth above, counsel argued that Maples was guilty of intentional (“regular”)

murder of Terry and maybe Robinson. Given the evidence, counsel’s strategy was to admit

what could not be denied – the fact that Maples shot Terry. The evidence regarding

Robinson’s murder was slightly less definitive, and counsel so argued, pointing to evidence

that suggested Robinson was not murdered at the same time as Terry. Nevertheless, this

evidence was inconsistent with Maples’s videotaped statement that he had shot both men at

the same time. “Attorneys representing capital defendants face daunting challenges in

developing trial strategies, not least because the defendant’s guilt is often clear.” Id. at 191. 

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Therefore, conceding guilt may be a valid and reasonable strategy. Harvey, 629 F.3d at

1243; see Darden v. United States, 708 F.3d 1225, 1230 (11th Cir. 2013). Also, such a

strategydoes not constitute constitutionally-ineffective assistance unlessthe habeas petitioner

can show that the result of the guilt proceeding would have been different had counsel not

made the statements of which he complains.

Maples complains of three comments: (1) two comments conceding Maples’s guilt

to one or two intentional murders, (R. Vol. 20, Tab 19, at 2929-30 [“two murders, ladies and

gentlemen, his own actions for which he is responsible”]; id. at 2939 [“We are asserting there

is at least sufficient evidence as to one murder that he’s guilty of and possibly two.”]); and

the “instantaneous rush” comment, (id. at 2918 [“What we have here is the instance of his

walking out to the car and in an instantaneous rush killing two people.”]). These comments

were made in an effort to convince the jury that Maples, who had confessed to killing Terry

and Robinson and taking Terry’s car, was not guilty of either of the capital murder charges

in the indictment. The overwhelming evidence, including the videotaped confession, negates

any reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of both counts of capital

murder had counsel not made these three comments and/or had made a more effective closing

argument. Lee v. Thomas, 2012 WL 1965608, at *54 (S.D. Ala. 2012)(“There being no

showing of prejudice here, particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence that

[defendant] was in fact guilty of murder, the Court finds no Strickland prejudice in trial

counsel’s concession to the jury during the guilt phase without prior consultation with

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[defendant]. Defendant has not shown that, but for his counsel’s murder concession, there

is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different.”)(citations

omitted); see Atwater v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 799, 808-09 (11th Cir. 2006); Parker v. Head, 244

F.3d 831, 840 (11th Cir. 2001).

The court finds that Maples has not shown actual prejudice for purposes of

overcoming the procedural default flowing from the untimely collateral appeal or

establishing Strickland prejudice. Therefore, this claim is procedurally defaulted or, in the

alternative, without merit. Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing is denied.

5. Alabama’s System of Indigent Representation in Capital Cases Contributed

to Counsel’s Deficiencies and Further Deprived Maples of Effective Assistance

of Counsel. (Doc. 24, Claim I.A., ¶¶ 17-18.)38

Maples alleges that his trial counsel were ineffective, in part, because “of the

insufficient funding available for counsel in a capital case” at the time of his trial. (Doc. 24

¶¶ 17-18.) Specifically, he argues:

17. In part, Counsel’s ineffectiveness was the product of the

insufficient funding available for counsel in a capital case. At the time of Mr.

Maples’[s] trial, Alabama law provided that court-appointed attorneys in

capital cases could not be compensated more than $1,000 for out-of-court

work for each phase of a capital trial, based on a $20 hourly rate. See Ala.

Code § 15-12-21 (1994). Accordingly, Counsel received no compensation

whatsoever for out-of-court work in excess of fifty hours, other than overhead

expenses, and were compensated at rates far below market level for the initial

fifty hours. If Counsel had received adequate compensation, Counsel could

38This habeas claim is substantially similar to its predecessors as set forth in Maples’s

initial and amended Rule 32 petitions. (Rule 32 C.R., Vol. 32, Tab 47, ¶¶ 9-10 at 3-4 “Rule

32 petition”; id., Vol. 33, Tab 49, ¶¶ 9-10 at 3-4 “Amended Rule 32 petition.”)

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have performed adequate investigation in preparation of both the guilt and

penalty phases of Mr. Maples’[s] trial, including searching for and

interviewing relevant witnesses. If adequately compensated, Counsel also

could have adequately prepared the few defense witnesses called to testify on

Mr. Maples’[s] behalf. Adequate compensation of Counsel could also have

resulted in the avoidance of the multitude of issues raised in this Petition that,

individuallyand cumulatively, result in ineffective assistance of counsel. This

compensation is simply inadequate for the time required to adequately

represent a capital defendant. But for Counsel’s inadequate compensation, the

outcome of Mr. Maples’[s] trial would have been different.

18. This inadequate and statutorily-limited compensation violated the

separation of powers doctrine, deprived Mr. Maples of effective assistance of

counsel and violated his due process and equal protection rights. . . . “It is by

this time well-established that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to criminal

defendants not only the right of assistance of counsel, but requires that

assistance be ‘legally effective.’” Walthrop v. State, 506 So. 2d 273, 275

(Miss. 1987)(citation omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984). The failure to provide adequate funding to Mr. Maples’[s]

court-appointed Counsel curtailed this most fundamental right.

(Doc. 24 ¶¶ 17-18.)

In his post-remand brief, Maples contends:

Alabama’s system of funding in capital cases, which severely

constrained Maples’[s] counsel’s efforts on behalf of their client, compounded

those errors. As detailed above, at the time of Maples’[s] trial, under Ala.

Code § 15-12-21(d)(Supp. 1994), a court-appointed attorney in a capital case

can be compensated no more than $1000 for each phase of the trial. This

presupposes 50 hours of work at $20 per hour [for work performed outside of

the courtroom]. Counsel accordingly received no compensation for

out-of-court work in excess of fifty hours and was compensated far below

market level for the initial fifty hours of work. Thus, the absence of additional

funds greatly limited counsel’s ability to investigate and develop Maples’[s]

defense. At bottom, Alabama’s funding system for capital cases was simply

inadequate for the time required to thoroughlyand adequately prepare a capital

defendant’s case.

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The Supreme Court recognized that Maples’[s] counsel were

“underfunded.” Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 919. And other courts have recognized

the impact of poor funding in capital cases on an accused’s defense. See

Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503, 508-09 (S.C. 1992)(holding that capital

litigation complexity required court-appointed attorneys to receive reasonable

compensation from state and county funds); Makemson v. Martin Cnty., 491

So. 2d 1109, 1112-13 (Fla. 1986)(holding that $3,500 limit on compensation

in capital trial violated separation of powers and denied capital defendants

effective assistance of counsel).

In this case, the Alabama indigent capital representation scheme almost

certainly contributed to the ineffective assistance of counsel that Maples

received (we do not yet know how much, because Maples has never received

an evidentiary hearing into counsel[’s] out-of-court work on his case), and the

systematic shortcomings in that scheme provide an additional and independent

basis for holding that Maples was deprived of effective assistance of counsel

under the Sixth Amendment. Serious facial constitutional challenges have

been brought against the Alabama system of indigent representation in capital

cases. But even if the system is constitutional on its face, it deprived Maples

of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in this case.

(Doc. 60 at 95-97.)

The Supreme Court did not hold, and never has held, that Alabama’s system for

appointing and compensating counsel for indigent capital defendants is unconstitutional per

se under the United States Constitution.

Also, specifically as to Maples’s takings claim, the court finds that Maples has no

standing to assert a claim for the loss of counsel’s property by virtue of an unconstitutional

taking. Maples was not denied just compensation; rather, his lawyers labored under the

severe compensation caps, perhaps depriving them of fair compensation for their work. 

Similarly, even if the compensation caps amount to a violation of the separation-of-powers

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doctrine,39 and the court does not believe that they do,40 Maples has no standing to object to

it. As with the takings claim, Maples’s lawyers suffered the alleged injury, if any, of

inadequate compensation, not petitioner, and they, not he, would have standing to assert such

a claim. Finally, Maples’s equal protection claims seem to assert that the compensation caps

deprive him and other indigent defendants of equal protection because the caps result in a

denial of effective assistance of counsel. This pleads nothing more than that Maples was

deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel because he received

ineffective assistance of counsel. For the foregoing reasons, the court finds Maples has not

established that he was actually prejudiced based on counsel’s alleged inadequate

compensation. 

Inadequate funding of counsel appointed to represent capital defendants, as unfair as

it might be to the attorneys, does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel unless the

lack of adequate funding caused actual errors or shortcomings in the performance of counsel

39Presumably, Maples’s separation-of-powers claim is based on the Alabama

legislature’s failure to provide adequate and reasonable financing of indigent defense in

Alabama courts. See Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 531 (1979)(citing, inter alia, Ala.

Const. amend. 328(6.10)).

40

“Indeed, ‘Alabama courts have repeatedly held that caps on attorney's fees for

indigent defendants do not violate the separation of powers doctrine, do not constitute a

taking without just compensation, do not deprive indigent capital defendants of the effective

assistance of counsel, and do not deny equal protection.’ Williams v. State, 782 So. 2d 811,

841 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000)(citations omitted). See also McGowan v. State, 990 So. 2d 931,

1001 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)(‘The Alabama Supreme Court, as well as this court, has

addressed these same contentions in a number of previous cases and has consistently rejected

them.’)(citations omitted). This claim does not provide a basis for habeas relief.” James v.

Culliver, CV-10-S-2929-S, 2014 WL 4926178, *147 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2014).

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that resulted in prejudice. The Strickland standard requires an analysis of specific errors or

shortcomings by counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 693 (1984); see also

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 n.26 (1984)(“Apart from circumstances [of

the complete denial of counsel], however, there is generally no basis for finding a Sixth

Amendment violation unless the accused can show how specific errors of counsel

undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt.”)(citations omitted). The Strickland Court

wrote:

A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify

the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in

light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance. In making that

determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel’s function, as

elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing

process work in the particular case.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Thus, the allegation that compensation caps hindered the ability

of counsel to represent a capital defendant has meaning only by reference to specific errors

or shortcomings purportedly caused by inadequate defense funding. Only by examining

specific errors or shortcomings can it be determined, first, that it was an error outside the

broad scope of competence expected of counsel, and second, whether the error caused real

prejudice to the defendant.

Consequently, the claimthat the State of Alabama provides inadequate compensation

for indigent capital defense cases divorced fromanalysis of anyparticular errors or omissions

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does not state a basis for habeas relief. As the district court for the Southern District of

Alabama has held:

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective “in part” due to “grossly

insufficient funding available for defense counsel in capital cases.” Am. Pet.

¶¶ 28-30. Smith pleads no facts in support of this claim. Instead, his

argument is based on the assumption that counsel was ipso facto inadequate

because, in Smith’s opinion, Alabama inadequatelycompensated his attorneys. 

But Smith’s conclusion does not follow. Other capital defendants in this state

have made similar claims based on Alabama’s statutory scheme. See, e.g.,

Hallford v. Culliver, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1279 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (“The

essence of [Petitioner]’s argument becomes simply that the court ought to

presume counsel could not provide constitutionally adequate representation

because of the inadequate compensation.”), aff’d, 459 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir.

2006). However, even if the Court were to agree that the compensation

provided to defense counsel in death cases in Alabama is woefully inadequate,

“that fact is insufficient as a matter of law to overcome the presumption of

effectiveness which attends the performance of counsel.” [Hallford, 379 F.

Supp. 2d at 1279.] Whereas “attorneys are expected to competently represent

indigent clients” regardless of how much or little they are paid, see id. (citing

Waters v. Kemp, 845 F.2d 260, 263 (11th Cir. 1988)), and whereas Petitioner

has pled no facts to rebut that presumption, the Court does not find that

counsel’s performance was deficient and concludes that no habeas relief is due

Petitioner on his inadequate compensation-based claim.

Smith v. Thomas, Civil Action No. 05-0474-CG-M, 2013 WL 5446032, *11 (S.D. Ala. Sept.

30, 2013)(footnote omitted).

Like the petitioner in Smith v. Thomas, Maples has alleged counsel were ineffective

“in part” due to inadequate funding and, also, he fails to allege a specific connection between

the inadequate funding and the deficient performance of his trial counsel.41 Instead, he

41The only specific allegation of a potential effect of inadequate funding on counsel

performance is found in Maples’s post-remand reply brief and states, “Such an expert also

could have testified to the impact on the brain of a history of alcohol and drug abuse, as

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complains about below market hourly compensation and the 50- hour cap for out of court

work on his case and supports that complaint with a vague, general, conclusory assertion that

“the absence of additional funds greatly limited counsel’s ability to investigate and develop

Maples’[s] defense.” (Doc. 60 at 96.) In equally conclusory fashion, Maples alleges that

trial counsel could have “search[ed] for and interview[ed] relevant witnesses[,] . . . . 

adequately prepared the few defense witnesses called to testify on Mr. Maples’[s] behalf, .

. . [and] avoid[ed] . . . the multitude of issues raised in this Petition that, individually and

cumulatively, result in ineffective assistance of counsel” if only counsel had adequate

funding at the guilt and penalty phases of trial.42 (Doc. 24 ¶ 17.)

In his post-remand brief, he declares that he does not know if the compensation caps

had any effect on his trial counsel’s ability to represent him because he has never been

afforded an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 60 at 96.) His vague factual allegations and the latter

assertion put the cart before the horse. In order to receive an evidentiary hearing, Maples

first must allege a claim with specific allegations that, if true, would entitle him to relief. See

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007)(“In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary

hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to

Maples had. Yet Maples’[s] counsel – perhaps due to the sharp funding restraints on

out-of-court work – never even consulted such an expert to explore this defense.” (Doc. 73

at 33 [emphasis added].) For reasons set forth above, the court finds Maples has not

established actual prejudice with regard to counsel’s failure to procure such expert testimony.

42Maples points to the guilt and penalty phases of trial even though he places this

claim under the heading of those claims pertaining to ineffectiveness at the guilt phase of

trial only.

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prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal

habeas relief.”); see also Landers v. Warden, 776 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015)(“before

a habeas petitioner may be entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing on a claim that has been

adjudicated by the state court, he must demonstrate a clearly established federal-law error or

an unreasonable determination of fact on the part of the state court, based solely on the state

court record”). Maples has not done so in connection with this claim because it is supported

only with conclusory allegations, followed by an admission that he does not know if the

compensation caps affected his counsel’s performance. 

Alternatively, the claim is without merit. The Rule 32 court rejected this claim,

holding:

Maples alleges trial counsel were ineffective based, in part[,] on

inadequate compensation. The underlying substantive claim was raised and

rejected on direct appeal. Maples, 758 So. 2d at 80. The appellate courts of

Alabama have rejected this claim on numerous other occasions. See, Ex parte

Smith, 698 So. 2d 219 (Ala. 1997); Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 75 (Ala.

1985); Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); Stewart v. State,

730 So. 2d 1203 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); Barbour v. State, 673 So. 2d 461

(Ala. Crim. App. 1994). This claim fails to allege a material issue of law;

therefore, it is summarily dismissed. Rule 32.7(d), [Ala. R. Crim. P.]

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 10.) On direct review, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals rejected Maples’s claim that the limitation cap for attorney compensation “violates

the separation of powers doctrine, constitutes a taking without just compensation, and denies

equal protection in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution[.]” Maples v. State, 758 So. 2d at 80. For reasons already set out

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herein above, Maples cannot establish that the state court’s adjudication is contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and/or is an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence before it.

Accordingly, this claim is due to be dismissed. Maples’s request for an evidentiary

hearing is due to be denied.

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE PENALTY PHASE OF

TRIAL.

Maples alleges that his trial counsel were ineffective at the penalty phase of trial for

failing to investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence regarding the following: (1)

his troubled family history; (2) his health history, including depression, suicide attempts, and

serious head trauma; and (3) his good moral character. (Doc. 60 at 81-95.) Maples admits

that trial counsel presented some evidence of his dysfunctional and abusive family history

and his good moral character; however, he argues that trial counsel, having notice of

mitigating circumstances, unreasonably failed to properly prepare the limited witnesses of

which they were aware so that the breadth of this mitigating evidence was before the jury and

trial judge. Maples also contends that counsel unreasonably failed to expand their

investigation and discover additional witnesses and further mitigation evidence regarding

these topics. He contends that counsel failed to investigate and present any evidence of his

history of depression, suicide attempts, and head trauma.43 (Doc. 73 at 58.)

43In the December 2005 reply brief, Maples alleged:

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“When a defendant challenges a death sentence such as the one at issue in this case,

the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer

. . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did

not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. To make this finding the court considers

not only petitioner’s allegations of evidence that was not, but should have been, presented

to the judge or jury during sentencing but also prosecution evidence that surely would have

been presented in response to the mitigation evidence. As the Supreme Court has stated:

To establish [Strickland] prejudice, [the habeas petitioner] must show

“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S., at

694, 104 S. Ct. 2052. That showing requires [the petitioner] to establish “a

reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of [the available

Lead trial counsel has admitted to Mr. Maples’[s] current counsel that he was

wholly unprepared for the penalty phase of trial. In other words, he conducted

no investigation that would have permitted him to make a strategic decision

not to introduce mitigating evidence. 

Thus, trial counsel’s failure to present such evidence cannot be deemed

a reasonable strategy. Indeed, realizing the deficiencyin his performance, lead

trial counsel has stated that he did not know how to prepare a mitigation case. 

(Doc. 33 at 49.) Maples did not make these allegations to the Rule 32 court and these

allegations fundamentally alter the claims that were presented to the Rule 32 court. Also, he

did not include these allegations in his amended habeas petition, (doc. 24), or his postremand briefs, (docs. 60, 73). He has offered no cause and/or prejudice to overcome his

state-court default; he has offered no excuse for his failure to raise and, in effect, to abandon

the allegations during this habeas proceeding. Accordingly, these allegations shall not be

considered. Even if these allegations could be considered supplemental facts, for the reasons

set out in the body of this Memorandum Opinion, Maples cannot establish the prejudice

required to overcome the procedural default or to show that he is entitled to relief on this

ineffective-assistance claim.

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mitigating evidence], would have introduced it at sentencing,” and “that had

the jury been confronted with this . . . mitigating evidence, there is a

reasonable probability that it would have returned with a different sentence.” 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535, 536, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471

(2003).

. . .

In evaluating that question, it is necessary to consider all the relevant

evidence that the jury would have had before it if [trial counsel] had pursued

the different path – not just the mitigation evidence [trial counsel] could have

presented, but also [other] evidence that almost certainly would have come in

with it. See Strickland, supra, at 695-696, 700, 104 S. Ct. 2052.44 Thus, to

establish prejudice, [the petitioner] must show a reasonable probabilitythat the

jury would have rejected a capital sentence after it weighed the entire body of

mitigating evidence (including the additional testimony [trial counsel] could

have presented) against the entire body of aggravating evidence (including the

[evidence of another murder]). . . . 

Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 20 (2009)(emphasis in original and footnote added).

1. Alabama Code § 13A-5-46(f)

Before addressing Maples’s ineffectiveness claims, the court pauses to address an

assertion by Maples regarding the jury’s vote count. Maples argues that he can establish

prejudice as a result of counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness during the penalty phase “because

it is reasonably likely that the vast amount of mitigating evidence that counsel failed to

investigate and present” would have “altered the balance that the jury and [the trial] court

44In Strickland, the Supreme Court noted, “Indeed, admission of the evidence

respondent now offers might even have been harmful to his case: his “rap sheet” would

probably have been admitted into evidence, and the psychological reports would have

directly contradicted respondent's claim that the mitigating circumstance of extreme

emotional disturbance applied to his case.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.

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struck in sentencing Maples to death.” (Doc. 60 at 103.) He contends he suffered actual

prejudice because, even without the undisclosed evidence, the jury recommended a death

sentence by a vote of ten to two, and, “Under Alabama law if more than two jurors vote

against the death penalty, the jury’s recommendation automatically becomes life without

parole.” (Doc. 60 at 105 [citing Ala. Code § 13A-5-46(f)](emphasis added).) According to

Maples, he “was one juror away from a recommendation of life without parole even with his

counsel’s constitutionally inadequate performance.” (Id.)

Maples’s assertion that he was only one juror away from an advisory verdict for life

is without merit. Under Alabama’s capital-murder sentencing law, “[t]he decision of the jury

to recommend a sentence of death must be based on a vote of at least 10 jurors.” Ala. Code

§ 13A-5-46(f). However, less than ten jurors voting for death would not support an advisory

verdict for life.

Section 13A-5-46(f) provides:

The decision ofthe jury to return an advisory verdict recommending a sentence

of life imprisonment without parole must be based on a vote of a majority of

the jurors. The decision of the jury to recommend a sentence of death must

be based on a vote of at least 10 jurors.

Ala. Code § 13A-5-46(f). If the jury returns an advisory verdict in which six to nine jurors

vote for death, the trial court will refuse to accept the recommendation and will send the jury

back for further deliberations until at least seven jurors vote for life or at least ten jurors vote

for death or until a mistrial is declared. See Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 796 n.11 (11th

Cir. 2011); see also Johnson v. State, 120 So. 3d 1130, 1157-58 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). In

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Alabama, a jury recommendation of death is proper if the number of jurors recommending

death is ten or greater; a jury recommendation of life without parole is proper if the number

of jurors recommending life is seven or greater. Any combination of jurors not falling within

these requirements will result in continued deliberations until a sufficient number or jurors

vote for life or for death or a mistrial is declared. 

The court rejects Maples’s assertion that he was only one vote away from an advisory

verdict for life without parole. The court finds that he was five jurors away from the seven

jurors required to return an advisory verdict for life without parole. 

2. Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate Maples’s Family History and

Character References. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 119-37.)

a. Procedurally barred allegations

Maples added more factual allegations to support this claim between the time he filed

his Rule 32 petition and his amended Rule 32 petition. (Compare Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab

47, ¶¶ 115-132 at 50-57 with id., Vol. 33, Tab 49, ¶¶ 115-132 at 57-68.) The amended

petition filed in this court is virtually identical to the amended Rule 32 petition, with one

exception. In his amended habeas petition, Maples alleges:

Counsel offered nothing to convey the history of mental illness afflicting Mr.

Maples’[s] birth mother and grandmother. Nor did Counsel offer any evidence

regarding Petitioner’s mother’s Pseudotumor Cerebri,45 a condition that

45

“Pseudotumor cerebri . . . occurs when the pressure inside your skull (intracranial

pressure) increases for no obvious reason. Symptoms mimic those of a brain tumor, but no

tumor is present. Pseudotumor cerebri can occur in children and adults, but [it is] most

common in obese women of childbearing age.” Gurganus v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 6:11-

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severely affected her brain. Counsel failed to have Petitioner tested for the

same condition, failed to investigate Petitioner’s medical historyand condition

adequately, and failed to present evidence regarding these issues.

(Doc. 24 ¶ 123 [footnote added].) This claim was not raised during his Rule 32 proceedings;

therefore, this claim is procedurally defaulted for that reason. Maples does not assert that he

can establish cause and prejudice for his default nor does he contend that a miscarriage of

justice will occur if the claim is not heard. Therefore, the court finds that this claim is

procedurally defaulted. 

Moreover, Maples made specific factual allegations in a reply brief, filed December

19, 2005, that were never alleged in his amended habeas petition or his post-remand briefs. 

(Compare doc. 33 at 38-46 with docs. 24, 60, 73.) The majority of these factual allegations

go far beyond acceptable supplementation of the factual allegations he raised before the Rule

32 court. Specifically, Maples declares that his father and step-mother, Philip and Elyse

Maples, abused him physically and emotionally, that his father was an alcoholic womanizer

who was frequently absent and introduced him to alcohol at age five,46 and that his father

would physically retaliate when attacked by his mother, Denise Imgrund. (Id. at 38-44.) He

describes specific incidents of the physical and emotional abuse by Philip and Elyse Maples

that included beatings with whips, belts, tree branches, and wires that produced scars on his

CV-4262-SLB, 2013 WL 5354156, *2 n.1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2013)(citing

http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/pseudotumor-cerebri/DS00851).

46Maples reports that he has a genetic predisposition to substance abuse, as his “greatgreat-grandfather, great-grandfather, and grandfather on his mother’s side were alcoholics,”

and his father “is an alcoholic with a family history of alcoholism.” (Id. at 44.)

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back; forcing him to eat cigarettes until he vomited; and sleeping in the woods as punishment

or because he was unwanted in the home, which forced him to scrounge for food, shelter and

warmth. (Id.) Philip Maples purportedly worked Maples “like a dog,” and Philip and Elyse

Maples repeatedly told Maples he was no good, called his mother a “crazy bitch,” and berated

and shamed him in front of others.47 (Id. at 39.) 

Also, Maples alleges that he suffers from symptoms of an emotional disorder because

his mother, Denise Imgrund, reported that he was fidgety, clingy, and chronically scratched

right after she divorced Maples’s father. (Doc. 33 at 41-42.) Philip and Elyse Maples would

report that he was a fidgety, disruptive child who “lacked concentration” and was “always

talking and not listening.” (Id. at 43-44.) Maples contends he began self-medicating with

beer at age 12 and smoking marijuana at age 13 to cope with his “emotional turmoil.” (Id. at

45.) He also “self-mutilated” by cutting himself with razor blades. (Id.) He declares that his

friends, Chris Basden and Shannon Ferrell, would report that he engaged in heavy drug use

after being abandoned by his mother for the second time as a teenager and was “chronically

depressed and suicidal.” (Id. at 46.) Also, Basden was aware of Maples’s self-mutilation. 

(Id.)

47The court notes that at the penalty phase of trial, defense psychologist Dr. Alan

Shealy testified that Maples had reported that “he always had a good relationship with his

father.” (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3125.) He also had “always gotten along with his stepmother” all in all. (Id. at 3128.) Growing up, he was disciplined by his father and that

included “being whipped with a belt when he was younger and as he became older it was

being grounded or having restrictions placed on him.” (Id. at 3128-29.)

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Maples alleged his counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that his

mother’s – 

family history is replete with instances of learning disabilities, emotional

disorders and substance abuse. Ms. Imgrund has first cousins with Tourette’s

Syndrome and dyslexia. Her 39-year-old brother has suffered from bouts of

depression and social isolation. Her maternal grandfather and paternal

great-grandfather were both alcoholics, and so is her father. And her mother,

according to Ms. Imgrund, suffered from “mood swings.”

(Id. at 42.) Also, Denise Imgrund suffered “severe headaches as a result of optic nerve

damage” and suffered “two weeks of blindness.” (Id.) Maples alleges that, as a child, he

“began to suffer from debilitating headaches, similar to his birth mother,” that would cause

nose bleeds and blurred vision. (Id. at 44.) Also, he alleges that he “continues to suffer from

these headaches today, which reduce him to a fetal position.” (Id.)

Finally, Maples alleges that he “suffered additional, substantial losses in his young

life,” including the loss of three friends in vehicle accidents, his maternal grandmother when

he was an infant, and his paternal grandfather when he was ten years old. (Id. at 45.)

These allegations fundamentally alter the claim that was raised in state court and are

an attempt to create a significantly different and more substantial claim that is in a stronger

posture than that which was before the Rule 32 court. Maples’s failure to present these

allegations to the Rule 32 court is fatal to his federal habeas claim based on these allegations,

which he also failed to raise in his amended habeas petition and/or his post-remand briefs. 

Accordingly, these allegations, are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Maples has not

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alleged that he can establish cause and prejudice to overcome this particular default or that a

miscarriage of justice will occur if these aspects of the claim are not heard. 

b. Maples’s family history (abuse and abandonment by his mother). (Doc.

24, Claim II.A., ¶¶ 123-28, 130, 132-34.)

Maples complains (1) that the scope of trial counsel’s investigation into his “troubled

family history” and “physical[] and mental[] abuse[] by his birth mother” was unreasonably

limited considering information known to counsel, and (2) that counsel unreasonably failed

to present the full expanse of his mother’s physical and mental abuse at the penalty phase of

the trial. (Doc. 60 at 82-86; see also doc. 73 at 44-45 [“Had counsel properly investigated all

mitigating evidence, they could have presented to the jury a far more compelling and complete

view of (among other things) the nightmarish abuse Maples suffered at the hands of his

mother, his troubled mental health history, his efforts to help law enforcement authorities

combat illegal drug use, and his good moral character.”].) He contends that had trial counsel

interviewed additional family members, who were willing corroborating witnesses, counsel

could have discovered “a mountain of undisclosed information [concerning hismother’s abuse

and two abandonments that] would have been especially important to the jury’s assessment

of culpability given that Maples was . . . 21 when the shootings occurred.” (Doc. 60 at 85.) 

According to Maples, this evidence establishes that, “in this case, ‘the violence experienced

by [him] as a child far exceeded – in both frequency and severity – the punishments described

at sentencing,’” (doc. 60 at 85 [quoting Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d at 1342]), and would have

changed the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors in favor of life without parole.

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i. The trial evidence

Maples does not dispute the accuracy of the Rule 32 court’s findings concerning the

mitigating evidence actually presented at the penalty phase of trial. This evidence is set forth

below.

A. Dr. Allen Shealy

With regard to Maples’s childhood abuse and abandonment, the Rule 32 court

determined:

Dr. Allen [Shealy], an expert in forensic psychology, testified for Maples

at the penalty phase of trial. Shealy stated that Maples said that his biological

mother[, Denise Imgrund,] “beat him a lot”, that “[h]e remembers being tied to

a chair and whipped with a broom handle”, and that “his mother was crazy, that

she had stabbed his father and poured grease on [his father] while he was

asleep.” ([R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at] 3126). Shealy indicated that [Maples]

remembered his biological mother leaving him when he was three years old and

that the abuse and abandonment of Maples at the hands of his biological mother

would have had “a lot of long term effects”. ([Id. at] 3137). 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 47-48.) Shealy also testified that Maples had told him “that

his grandmother used to tell him he would come to her house on the weekends with fingernail

marks on his neck and bruises on his body from his mother’s abuse[.]” (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27,

at 3126.) However, Maples denied remembering these incidents, but it made him angry and

he wondered what he had done to cause it. (Id. at 3127-28.) Shealy also testified that Maples

told him that at age 18, after 15 years with no contact, he went to stay with his mother for a

few months and that she was “easily angered.” (Id. at 3127.)

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According to Shealy, Maples was damaged psychologically by this abuse and

abandonment. (See id. at 3136-39.) Although Maples denied that it had any effect on him and

“didn’t bother him,” Shealy testified:

The effects of abandonment would be most severe before . . . age two,

so [at] age three, he was not the most vulnerable but still vulnerable to the

effects of abandonment by the mother. The physical abuse would have been

during the most vulnerable years, the years when he was totally dependent on

– dependent on his mother. As infants we are essentially dependent on our

mothers for survival. If the mother is abusive [to an infant], that is pretty

emotional – it has a lot of long term effects on people. A lot of people that Isee

in mental hospitals and so forth suffered from abandonment or neglect or abuse

during their early childhood. 

 . . .

Children who have been abused or neglected or abandoned during early

childhood are much more likely to seek out – well, first of all to be rebellious

against authority since they have been betrayed by authority, and sort of act out

in some antisocial ways and have a problem trusting authority . . . . As part of

their rebellion, they are likely to run with a bad crowd, and also because of the

frustrated dependency needs and the affectional needs of the child, are much

more likely to use substances to escape from bad feelings . . . to numb them

from hurt and pain. That became a psychological hypothesis during this

evaluation as I saw Corey Maples describe to me his sort of going from being

the hurt child during childhood to being that nothing bothered him. . . . . I saw

this young man who essentially denied the pain of what obviously had to be a

very painful experience of having been abandoned and abused by the mother. 

. . . [He would n]ot allow himself to have any feelings because of going

through life with sort of numbing feelings that happen[] to people who have

been traumatized and abused during early childhood, or just pretending they

have no feelings about it. 

(Id. at 3136-38.)

B. Philip Maples

The Rule 32 court found:

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Maples’s father[, Philip Maples,] testified that Maples’s biological

mother “is just the woman that had him”, that “she’s a nut case”, and she “tried

to kill [Cory Maples] and [Philip Maples] on several different occasions.” (R.

[Vol. 21, Tab 27, at] 3194). Philip Maples said that Cory’s biological mother

“beat [Cory Maples] on several occasions, choked him, left him in the car with

the windows rolled up, slapped him, you know, just crazy stuff.” ([Id. at] 3195) 

Philip Maples also testified that his ex-wife had stabbed him and poured hot

grease on him while he slept. Regarding her temper, Philip Maples stated that

“[y]ou could be talking to her one minute and she would be fine and the next

minute she was a whole other person in the world.” ([Id. at] 3196).

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 49-50.) Philip Maples also testified that Denise Imgrund

had shot at him. (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3196.) He was aware that Denise Imgrund had tied

Cory Maples to a chair and beat him. He testified, “I was at work and I didn’t know about it

until I went home and seen the bruises and stuff. A kid two years old, you know, you get to

playing and stuff, and [Cory] showed me basically what had went on. Of course, he had rope

marks on his arm and stuff.” (Id. at 3195.) Soon after, Philip Maples divorced Denise

Imgrund.

When discussing the evidence presented regarding the effect that Denise Imgrund’s

second abandonment of Maples, the Rule 32 court held,

Philip Maples testified that when Maples came back from living with his

biological mother that he was changed. Philip Maples said his son’s mind

wandered a lot, that he would not check in when he went out and [he had] heard

that Maples was “running around” with people that were known to be into

drugs. (R. 3199) Philip Maples testified about getting Cory treatment for his

drug addiction and how treatment was beneficial to him.

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 51.)

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C. Elyse Maples

During the penalty phase, Maples’s step-mother, Elyse Maples, testified that Maples

went to stay with his mother for a little while at around age 17. (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3180-

81.) She testified:

I’m not sure if it even lasted three months; his actual living with her. I think he

wanted us to believe that he was, but she called me at work several times and

would tell me things like she had company coming over and she didn’t want

[Cory] there when her company come over, could he stay with me and I would

tell her yes, of course he could, and he would never call for us to make

arrangements for him to come to the house, so he was actually on the streets

basically. She called me three weeks after she hadn’t seen him any more and

asked me if he came home and he hadn’t, so he was basically on the streets

then. 

(Id.) 

D. Kenneth Maples

Kenneth Maples, Maples’s paternal uncle and a firefighter, lived approximately a

quarter mile from Maples. (Id. at 3188-89.) He testified he had been called to the scene of

the crime and had taken part in the attempt to resuscitate Stacy Terry. (Id.) Kenneth testified

he had known Maples all of his life, but he had only met Denise Imgrund “once or twice,” 

explaining that he worked the night shift and odd hours and thus never saw “a lot of people.” 

(Id. at 3190.) He never saw Denise Imgrund around Maples as he was growing up. (Id. at

3191.) Kenneth Maples testified that he believed Maples“was okay” until “the incident with

his mother.” (Id. at 3190.) He knew Maples had a DUI and “some other misdemeanor

charge.” (Id. at 3191.) He testified that he felt that Maples had been a “pretty good kid,” and

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he did not believe Maples would have been facing the death penalty “[i]f it wasn’t for drugs.” 

(Id. at 3192.)

ii. The alleged undisclosed evidence

A. Philip Maples

Maples claims that, “[i]f Philip Maples had been examined more effectively, the judge

and the jury would have learned that Mr. Maples’[s] birth mother, Denise Imgrund, was

mentally unstable and subject to frequent violent outbursts.” (Doc. 24 ¶ 124.) He alleges that,

in addition to the assaultive incidents about which Philip Maples testified at trial, he would

have testified to a violent choking incident witnessed by Denise Imgrund’s father, John

Imgrund, after which John Imgrund had told Philip Maples that he was afraid Denise would

kill Cory Maples. Philip Maples also could have testified to other incidents when Denise

Imgrund had assaulted either Philip or her friends and that Denise was unpredictable and

extremely volatile. He also could have testified that Denise Imgrund was self-destructive –

pulling out her hair and scratching herself until she bled. Further Maples alleges his father

could have testified that his maternal grandmother had behaved in a similar manner. Maples

alleges his father could have testified that his mother tried to sell him to a neighbor, Joey

Hembree, when he was three. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 123-26,128.) These incidents are repeated in his

December 2005 brief. Further, Maples alleges that, after he was born, his mother left for four

weeks, that his mother left the family home and his father had left him with the paternal

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grandparents, and that he had lived with his maternal grandparents and his mother after his

parents separated. (Doc. 33 at 36-39.)

In his post-remand reply brief, Maples asserts for the first time that Philip Maples had

“informed counsel” that they should contact John Imgrund and Joey Hembree. (Doc. 73 at

49.) John Imgrund purportedly “witnessed first-hand the abuse Maples suffered and . . . could

have testified about his belief that Denise [Imgrund] would have killed young Cory Maples

if [he had] stayed in her custody.” (Id.) Joey Hembree “had firsthand knowledge of the abuse

Maples suffered from his mother and . . . could have testified about . . . the time that Denise

[Imgrund] tried to sell [Cory Maples] to Hembree for $10,000.” (Id.)

Embedded in his allegations about what Philip Maples would have testified to, Maples

alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to contact Denise Imgrund’s “former friends

or associates . . . to provide testimony substantiating her violent and unpredictable behavior.” 

(Doc. 24 ¶ 125.) However, Maples did not identify these friends and associates nor does he

allege with any specificity what counsel would have discovered from the unnamed

acquaintances of Denise Imgrund. (See id.) Such allegations are insufficient to comply with

the fact pleading requirements of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases and have not been

considered by this court.

B. Denise Imgrund

Maples contends, “At no time did Counsel attempt to contact Denise, although her

testimonywould have revealed extensive mitigating circumstances, including evidence of her

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severe physical and mental abuse of Mr. Maples, as well as evidence of history of mental

illness in the family.” (Doc. 24 ¶ 126.) The only specific allegations of Denise Imgrund’s

predicted testimony are found in Maples’s December 2005 brief. In that brief, the only

admissions specifically attributed to Denise Imgrund are that she never bonded with her son

and that her mother had mood swings. (See doc. 33 at 40, 42.)

C. Elyse Maples

Maples alleges that, had Elyse Maples been adequately prepared, she would have

testified that, after Maples turned three, he occasionally spent time with his mother. She

would have testified that Maples once returned from a visit with his mother with scratches on

his neck that his mother had inflicted, and that Maples had told her it was his fault that Denise

Imgrund had scratched him. (Doc. 24 ¶ 130.) Elyse Maples could have testified that Maples

“cried for his mother until his early teenage years,” and that she “would sit with [Cory] Maples

at night because he had nightmares and would ask about his mother.” (Id.) She also “would

have provided more details about the circumstances leading up to Denise Imgrund’s second

abandonment of Mr. Maples,” and that Denise would call frequently saying she did not want

Maples in her house over the weekend. (Id.) On occasion, she would throw Maples out of

the house.48 (Id.)

48In his post-remand brief, Maples alleges that he had “nightmares about his mother”

and “that [his] mother abandoned him a second time when Maples was seventeen – without

any notice, leaving his clothes out on the steps.” (Doc. 60 at 84-85.) In his December 2005

brief, Maples alleges that his mother had actually moved without telling him. (Doc. 33 at

41.)

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D. Other Family Members

With regard to other family members who did not testify, Maples alleges that he spent

most of his childhood with the families of two paternal aunts, Margaret Daniels and Dale Ray,

and that these family members could have provided extensive evidence of the effect of his

mother’s abuse. (Doc. 73 at 49.) The Daniels family members could have testified about

Denise Imgrund’s “erratic nature” and that Maples, who was a good-natured child, had spent

summers at their home and attended church with them. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 132-33.) Also, “[t]he

Rays would have testified that until Maples was seventeen, he spent nearly every weekend at

their home.” (Id. ¶ 133.) According to his amended petition,

When Mr. Maples was younger, he would ask the Rays why his mother was not

around, and they would try to make him understand that it was not his fault that

she left him. The Rays were also witnesses to the effects of Denise’s mental

illness. Once, the Rays and Denise were chatting in the kitchen when Denise

suddenly became angry for no apparent reason, and stormed out the room. Dale

Ray also noticed that Denise was both physically and emotionally distant from

Mr. Maples. In addition, at least one family member saw Denise physically

abuse Mr. Maples. Other family members saw Denise act erratically towards

[them] and their friends.

(Id.) Another aunt, Dianne Ferrell, could have testified that she saw Denise slap Maples

once.49 (Id. ¶¶ 132, 133.)

49In his post-remand brief, Maples cites to ¶ 133 of his Habeas Petition as support for

his claim that family members would testify that his mother beat him in public. (See doc. 60

at 84 [citing “Compl. ¶ 133”].) Although Maples alleges in his petition and his amended

petition that “Diane Ferrell once saw Denise slap Mr. Maples because he was crying,” and

that “at least one family member,” presumably in addition to Diane Ferrell, “saw Denise

physically abuse Mr. Maples,” he has not alleged that these isolated incidents occurred in a

public place. (See doc. 1 ¶ 133; doc. 24 ¶ 133.) Thus, the court has not considered this claim

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Maples contends that his brother, Daniel Maples, could have testified that CoryMaples

had told him about an incident when Denise Imgrund had left Cory alone in a pool once and

Philip Maples had found him when he came home from work. (Id. ¶ 134.)

iii. Analysis

The procedural default question can be resolved on the Strickland prejudice prong, and

therefore, the court foregoes analysis of the Strickland performance prong. This approach is

approved by the Supreme Court in Strickland and by Eleventh Circuit precedent. As

explained in Lee v. Comm’r, Ala. Dept. of Corr., 726 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 2013):

In this case, we need not reach the performance prong because we are so

readily convinced Lee has not shown the requisite prejudice. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069 (“[A] court need not determine whether

counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”); Frazier v. Bouchard,

661 F.3d 519, 531-32 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating we “may decline to reach the

performance prong of the ineffective assistance test if convinced that the

prejudice prong cannot be satisfied” (internal quotation marks omitted));

Windom v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 578 F.3d 1227, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009) (per

curiam); Hall v. Head, 310 F.3d 683, 699 (11th Cir. 2002). Indeed, the

Supreme Court has said that “[t]he object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to

grade counsel’s performance” and consequently, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of

an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack ofsufficient prejudice, which we

expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. 

Lee, 726 F.3d at 1193.

regarding public abuse.

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Maples cannot establish actual prejudice to overcome the procedural default or

establish Strickland prejudice because he cannot establish actual prejudice resulted from

counsel’s purported failure to present additional evidence of his troubled, abusive childhood.

In Maples’s case, the additional testimony “‘basically substantiat[ed]’ and

‘support[ed]’ the story that [Maples’s] trial lawyers had put before the jury[.]” Holsey v.

Warden, Georgia DiagnosticPrison, 694F.3d 1230, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2012)(quoting Cullen,

131 S. Ct at 1435). “[G]enerally . . . evidence presented in postconviction proceedings is

‘cumulative’ or ‘largely cumulative’ to or ‘duplicative’ of that presented at trial when it tells

a more detailed version of the same story told at trial or provides more or better examples or

amplifies the themes presented to the jury.” Id. at 1260-61 (citations omitted). The evidence

Maples contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present consists of the same

examples, perhaps with more details, or different examples of abuse and abandonment of

Maples by his mother, Denise Imgrund. Contrary to Maples’s contention, his post-conviction

allegations of abuse and abandonment do not “far exceed[] – in both frequency and severity”

– the evidence of abuse and abandonment actually presented during the penalty phase. (See

doc. 60 at 85 [quoting Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326, 1342 (11th Cir. 2008)].) Maples’s

father, his step-mother, and Shealygave detailed testimonythat Maples was abused frequently

and severely by his mother, that she had abandoned him twice, and that she was “a nut case.” 

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Moreover, Shealy explained the serious psychological effects of the abuse and abandonment. 

This testimony did not deal lightly the abuse and abandonment.50

The allegations concerning testimony of additional witnesses specifically pleaded and

not already deemed defaulted – namely, Denise Imgrund, John Imgrund, Joey Hembree, the

Daniels, the Ferrells, and the Rays – do “not paint a vastly different picture of [Maples’s]

background than that created by” the testimony presented at the penalty phase of Maples’s

trial. See Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d at 1342. Indeed, their testimony regarding any physical

and emotional abuse by Denise Imgrund offers little evidentiary color to the picture actually

painted during the penalty phase and it is decidedly less powerful than the testimony actually

presented.

Further, during the penalty phase, the trial court found that mitigating evidence of

Maples’s childhood abuse and abandonment existed and that Maples was a disturbed young

man who had engaged in drug-induced self-abuse. However, he also found the mitigating

50Maples alleges that counsel’s examination of his uncle, Kenneth Maples, elicited

nothing but a “brief and cursory” recitation that Maples was okay and that this examination

of Kenneth Maples is an example of “an inexcusable lack of preparation” because Kenneth

Maples did not know Denise Imgrund. (Doc. 24 ¶ 132 [citing R. at 3190].) Even if Kenneth

Maples’s testimony was brief, he agreed with Elyse Maples’s assessment of Maples as an

okay child and he verified that Denise Imgrund was not in Maples’s life when he was a

child. Maples does not allege how counsel should have effectively examined Kenneth

Maples, what additional, beneficial information would have been derived therefrom, or how

counsel can be faulted because Kenneth Maples did not know Denise Imgrund. Maples has

not alleged with any specificity how he was prejudiced by Kenneth Maples’s testimony or

his failure to testify differently. Because Maples has not established that he was prejudiced

by counsel’s performance, he has not shown actual prejudice to overcome the procedural

default of this aspect of this claim.

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weight of this evidence to be “weak and unpersuasive,” noting that Maples “ha[d] good

relations with his step-mother, who he has known as his mother since the . . . age of three.” 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 62, at 10-11.) The Rule 32 judge and the trial judge were one and

the same.

The Rule 32 court found “any additional evidence regarding alleged abuse that Maples

suffered would have been at best, cumulative,” to the testimony of Philip Maples and Shealy. 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 48-57.) Specifically, it found that the trial record refuted

that counsel were ineffective for failing to prepare Philip Maples adequately and to have him

testify to Maples’s abuse and abandonment at the hand of Denise Imgrund. (Id. at 49-50, 51-

52.) The court dismissed as insufficiently pled Maples’s contention that Philip Maples would

have testified that Denise Imgrund and her mother suffered from the same mental illness on

the basis that Maples had failed to show by records or affidavits that either individual suffered

from a mental illness.51 (Id. at 52 [citing Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.3, 32.6(b)

and 32.7(d)].) Maples’s assertion that counsel failed to contact Denise Imgrund’s former

associates and friends was subject to Rule 32.6(b) dismissal because he did not identify any

friend or associate or “indicate what evidence or testimony [they] would have provided.” (Id.

at 50.) Counsel’s alleged failure to contact Denise Imgrund was also dismissed pursuant to

51Other than an assertion that Philip Maples could have testified that Denise Imgrund

behaved in the same manner as her mother, Maples has not alleged that Philip Maples was

competent to testify that both women suffered from a mental illness, much less the same

mental illness.

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Rule 32.6(b) because Maples did not “indicate how trial counsel could have contacted [her]

or indicate what ‘extensive mitigating circumstances’ she would have testified about.”52 (Id.

at 51.) His assertion that Elyse Maples could have detailed more instances of abuse also was

subject to Rule 32.6(b) dismissal because “Maples fail[ed] to indicate what additional facts

counsel would have learned had they more thoroughly interviewed his stepmother.” (Id. at

53.) The court denied the ineffectiveness claim concerning Kenneth Maples, finding that,

although his testimony might not have been helpful, Maples had failed to establish he was

prejudiced by it. (Id. at 55.) Finally, the court found that Maples had failed to identify any

familymember or to indicate with any specificity what the substance of their testimonywould

have been. (Id. at 56.) The court further found that “any additional testimony regarding

alleged abuse that Maples suffered at the hands of his biological mother would have been, at

best, cumulative.” (Id.) 

Fairminded jurists could debate whether the state court’s adjudication of this claim

reflects a reasonable application of Strickland. This court recognizes that the Rule 32 court

addressed many of Maples’s allegations in support of this claim paragraph by paragraph, and

found that several were insufficiently pled because he had failed to identify witnesses and/or 

assert the substance oftheir testimony. In some instances, Maples’s amended Rule 32 petition

identified those witnesses and the substance of the witness’s testimony. Regardless, the Rule

52Philip Maples testified, “Obviously, she lives in Birmingham and he has been at the

county jail for over two years and she hasn’t been here to see him and she ain’t been to trial.” 

(R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3198.) 

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32 court also found that any additional testimony was cumulative of the testimony presented

at trial. Even if the state court unreasonably determined that Maples failed to identify

witnesses and the substance of their testimony in the amended Rule 32 petition, its decision

that any additional testimony from witnesses would have been cumulative of that presented

at trial is not an unreasonable application of Strickland. Alternatively, even if this aspect of

the claim is considered de novo, Maples’s allegations, if true, fail to show Strickland actual

prejudice because this court finds the alleged testimony was merely cumulative of the

testimony presented at trial and would not have changed the result of the penalty phase. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, this claim is procedurally defaulted, or in the

alternative, due to be denied on the merits. Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing is due

to be denied. 

c. Maples’s Character References

The court notes that the allegations supporting this claim are included within Maples’s

allegations concerning evidence of his abusive childhood. (Doc. 24 at ¶¶ 129, 131-37.) The

good-character habeas allegations are virtually identical to the claim as pleaded in Maples’s

amended Rule 32 petition. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab 47, ¶¶ 121, 123, 124-29.) The initial

Rule 32 petition specifically identified Philip, Elyse, and Daniel Maples, and the substance

of their purported character evidence testimony. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 33, Tab 49, ¶¶ 121, 123,

126.) It also identified generally the substance of the good-character testimonyof other family

members, teachers, counselors, coaches and friends in the amended Rule 32 petition, but

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Maples did not identify any of those individuals by name, except jailor Sam Frost, or attribute

specific testimony to any unidentified character witness. (Id. ¶¶ 125-29 at 54-55.)

i. The trial evidence

Maples does not dispute the Rule 32 court’s factual findings regarding the testimony

of Philip and Elyse Maples as to his good character at the penalty phase of trial. The Rule 32

court wrote:

While Philip Maples did not testify concerning his son’s “good moral

character”, Elyse Maples, Cory’s step-mother since he was three years old,

testified that Maples was a “very fun loving” child that “enjoyed being around

other kids a lot.” (R. 3176) Elyse testified that Maples “was a typical boy”, that

he “was adventuresome’, and “wasn’t somebody that got into trouble a lot.” (R.

3177) Elyse said that Maples “did very well in school” and “was very smart.” 

(Id.) Elyse testified that Maples tested above average intelligence and was in

special class until “the sixth or seventh grade and then his grades started

falling.” (R. 3178)

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 52-53.)

Also, during the penalty phase, Shealy testified that he had spoken to Sam Frost, a

jailor at the Morgan County Jail. (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3143.) Frost had been friends with

Maples since high school and he told Shealy that Maples had participated in football and

baseball in high school, had not been a troublemaker, was not a person who got into fights,

and was a perfectionist. (Id. at 3143-44.) Shealy also testified that Maples reported he was

only a half credit short of graduating high school; he told Shealy that he had quit school

because he was disappointed he could not graduate with his class. Shealy testified that

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Maples had tried to get in the Army, but they had not accepted him because he had failed a

drug test. (Id. at 3142.) 

The trial record contains evidence that Maples had no serious criminal record at the

time of the murders; friends and acquaintances had testified that Maples was not a

troublemaker and that the charges against him were surprising. (See R. Vol. 16 at 2041

[Danny Mayberry]; id. at 2082 [Jamie Dobbs]; R. Vol. 19 at 2750 [Allen Birdsong]). Allen

Birdsong testified during the guilt phase of the trial that Maples had lived with and worked

for him in his cable TV installation business until approximately one month before the

murders, when they parted on good terms. (R. Vol. 19 at 2746.) He trusted Maples around

large sums of money, he allowed Maples to use his vehicles, and he considered Maples to be

a personal friend. (Id. at 2746-49.)

In his videotaped confession Maples stated that he had gone to a Baptist church. (Doc.

78, Exh. 230.) 

ii. The post-conviction allegations

Maples alleges that counsel failed to investigate and to present evidence of his “good

moral character” from his family – Philip, Elyse, and Daniel Maples, his “sport coaches,

teammates or anyone at Maples’s church,” his school guidance counselor; and his friends –

Chris Basden, Kenneth Hall, Mike and KathyHall, Sam Frost, and Frost’s relatives. (See doc.

24 ¶¶ 123, 129, 132-37.)

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Maples contends that his father could have testified that he played Little League and

competed in horse competitions as a young man. (Doc. 24 ¶ 129.) Elyse Maples could have

testified that although he dropped out of high school, he passed a G.E.D. test with “high

enough marks to qualify for admission to the University of Alabama in Huntsville.” (Id. ¶

131.) Also, she could testify that he tried to enter the Army but was rejected because he

failed a drug test. (Id.) His aunts, uncles, cousins, and brother could have testified to his

“good moral character and friendliness.” (Id. ¶¶ 132-34.) The Daniels would relate that he

spent summers at their home until he was thirteen, playing with his cousins and attending

church. (Id. ¶ 132.) The Ferrells would state that Maples spent nearly every weekend at their

home until he was seventeen and he was a friendly person who never looked down on anyone. 

(Id. ¶ 133.) Daniel Maples would testify that “Maples was a fun, loving brother who

respected his father and did what he was told to do;” also Daniel would have testified that

Cory Maples “did not allow Daniel to hang around Mr. Maples’[s] drug associates.” (Id. ¶

134.)

He alleges that “anyone at [his] church” could have testified that Maples was baptized

in the Baptist church, went to church regularly until he was twelve or thirteen years old, and

participated in church events.” (Id. ¶ 129.) Gaye Lenhardt, Maples’s high school guidance

counselor, would have testified that Maples was easy to talk to and polite and he “had

relatively few absences and very few disciplinary problems.” (Id. ¶ 135.) Maples also took

challenging courses, including vocational courses in electrical engineering, but did not

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complete them and dropped out of high school. (Id.) Glen Lang, Maples’s high school

football and golf coach, would testify that he was not a good golfer although he tried, and was

friendly and polite. (Id.) 

Chris Basden, Maples’s childhood friend, would have testified that Maples was a

“softy” although he portrayed a “tough guy” image, and was witness to Maples’s drug

addiction. (Id. ¶ 136.) Basden purportedly would have testified that he remained friends with

Maples throughout his addiction even after fighting once, that he witnessed Maples’s

happiness to see his mother as a teenager, that Maples became addicted to drugs after his

mother abandoned him, and that, shortly before the murders, Maples seemed to be getting

better and recovering from his drug addiction. (Id.) Maples alleges that the evidence would

show that counsel knew about Basden “through other interviews” and considered him to be

“an appropriate witness for the second stage,” but then failed to call him. (Id. ¶¶ 136-37.)

Kenneth Hall and his parents, Mike and Kathy Hall, could have testified that Maples 

was “very respectful” and spent time on the Halls’s property playing sports and engaging in

outdoor activities. (Id. ¶ 137.) The Halls were aware Maples had “some problems with

drugs,” but they also noticed that “just prior to the shootings” Maples seemed to have “gotten

his act together.” (Id.)

Sam Frost would have testified that Maples “was generally happy in high school and

never got into fights,” and he would have indicated to counsel that his brother, grandmother,

and other relatives would have testified to the same thing. (Id.) Sam Frost also did not

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believe Maples had committed the crimes “knowing Maples’s character” and, despite the

murder charges, he still considered Maples a friend. (Id.)

iii. Analysis

Much of the testimony Maples contends that these witnesses would have testified to

was cumulative of the testimony of his father, step-mother, Shealy and the witnesses at the

guilt phase of trial whom had expressed surprise that Maples would be involved with a such

a serious crime. Further, the additional testimony boils down to a “generic impression of

[Maples’s] good nature.” Brooks v. Comm’r, Ala. Dept. of Corr., 719 F. 3d 1292, 1301 (11th

Cir. 2013). The court notes that presentation of this repetitive, generic “good character”

testimony could easily have spurred the prosecution to undercut it by highlighting the

circumstances surrounding the two capital offenses for which Maples had been convicted. 

Maples had robbed and murdered execution style two individuals, one of whom was his close

friend. Had counsel elicited testimony that Maples was a good and nonviolent person, the

prosecutor would have argued that, despite his intelligence and supportive extended family,

Maples chose a culture of drugs and violence over education and responsibility. Maples had

admitted that he ripped off his best friend, Kenneth Hall, on a drug transaction in revenge for

sleeping with Maples’s then-girlfriend.53 Also the State could have argued that Maples was

53Shealy testified that Maples related this story to him.

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clever and brazen enough to call police mere hours after the murders, identifyhimself as Jamie

Dobbs, give the police Dobbs’s address, and confess, as Dobbs, to Terry’s murder.54 

54At the guilt phase of trial, the State introduced a Decatur police dispatch audiotape,

recorded at approximately 5:00 a.m. on the morning of the murders, from an individual

claiming to be Jamie Dobbs and asserting that he had just committed a murder by killing

Stacy Terry with a .22 calibur pistol. (R. Vol. 15 at 1919-22; 1941-42.) The individual

stated he was driving from Athens to Decatur and did not want to come to the station, but that

police could come to his house in Decatur, and gave police what turned out to be an accurate

description of Jamie Dobbs’s car and Dobbs’s actual address. (Id. at 1922-24.) The police

immediately sent a patrol unit to Dobbs’s residence; they discovered that Dobbs’s vehicle

was in the driveway and that the hood was cold. (Id. at 1925-26.) Thereafter, Jamie Dobbs

called the police department to ask why officers were at his home. (Id. at 1930.) This call

was recorded as well, and an officer testified that the second individual’s voice was distinctly

different from the voice of the first “Jamie Dobbs.” (Id. at 1930-31.)

Jamie Dobbs testified that the first recorded tape that contained the murder confession

was Cory Maples’s voice. (R. Vol. 16 at 2077-80.) Dobbs had been good friends with

Maples for three years. (Id. at 2067.) Dobbs had a large inheritance and the two often ran

around together until Maples moved to Tennessee approximately six months before the

murders. (Id. at 2068-69.) The two had “had words and stuff and altercations.” (Id. at

2069.) Dobbs described one altercation several months before the murders that began as an

“argument and then it escalated into a fight, if you call it that. That was all that was ever –

you know, after that it was through with. We started talking again a month later.” (Id.) 

Defense counsel elicited from Dobbs that Maples had not exhibited “violent

tendencies or anything of that nature” around him. (Id. at 2082.) Dobbs was surprised that

Maples had been accused of double murder. (Id.) Dobbs admitted that when police knocked

on his door he was initially concerned that there was a warrant for his arrest because he had

been in trouble before. (Id. at 2083.) Defense counsel also asked whether police had

continued to call him and question him about the whereabouts of Maples because they

suspected Dobbs was somehow involved, to which Dobbs answered, “Yes, sir, that maybe

I might have known where he was at.” (Id. at 2083-84.) After Maples was arrested, Dobbs

was not contacted again by law enforcement. (Id. at 2084.) 

The prosecution argued that the voice on the first recorded audiotape and Maples’s

videotape showed that both voices belonged to Maples. During guilt phase deliberations, the

jury asked to listen again to the first audiotape and videotape for a few minutes.

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Moreover, with regard to Daniel Maples and Chris Basden, defense counsel and the

prosecutor were privy to a portion of Maples’s videotaped confession that was excluded from

the jury. In that portion of the videotape, Maples had said that, a few months before the

murders, he was avoiding Alex Foley, a drug dealer and personal associate to whom he owed

money for drugs. (Doc. 78, Exh. 231.) One night, Dobbs had called Maples and had asked

him to come to his house. Maples and his brother Daniel drove byDobbs’s house, but decided

not to stop because they saw Foley’s car and thought Maples was being set-up. When they

drove back by later, Foley’s car was no longer at Dobbs’s house and Maples and Daniel went

in. Basden was at Dobbs’s house. A fight broke out between Maples and another man when

that man pushed Daniel. Dobbs punched Maples in the head and Maples turned around and

saw Dobbs with a knife in one hand and a beer bottle in the other. Maples left Dobbs’s

residence, went home, and got two guns. He returned to Dobbs’s residence and exited the car

with a gun in his pocket. When he saw Maples with a gun, Dobbs either threatened to call the

police or said he had called the police. Maples realized that his actions could get him into

trouble and he allowed Dobbs to “con” him into giving his weapons to Dobbs. Maples denied

he had traded his weapons for drugs, but he never got his weapons back from Dobbs.55 

55Although the story Dobbs told to the jury during the guilt phase of the trial appears

to refer to this event, the jury was not made aware of many details. Maples also told a

version of this story to Shealy and Shealy testified to it at trial. However, in that version,

Maples did not mention his brother was present or that the incident had occurred onlymonths

before the murders.

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Had Maples called Daniel Maples to testify that Maples told him not to become

involved in drugs and that Maples was not violent, Daniel would have been questioned about

the incident at Dobbs’s house. Likewise, Basden would have been subject to the same line

of questioning had he been called to testify as to Maples’s good character. Additionally, and

pursuant to Maples’s own allegations, he and Basden also had been in a fight once. Instead

of mere generic evidence of good character from Daniel Maples and Chris Basden, the jury

would have been reminded that Maples had been involved in at least one, and maybe two,

other violent incidents with his drug culture friends and he had not sheltered his brother from

drug activity. Thus, counsel may have strategically chosen not to call Daniel Maples or Chris

Basden as character witnesses because these witnesses could have been “more harmful than

helpful.” See Evans v. Sec., Dept. of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1342 (11th Cir. 2013)(internal

quotation omitted). Even if the decision not to call these witnesses was not strategic, Maples

was not prejudiced by the failure. Indeed, there is a reasonable probability that their testimony

would have had an aggravating rather than a mitigating effect by negating his alleged

recovery, his protection of his brother, and his non-violent nature. 

“In the light of seriousness of [Maples’s] crime,” there is no reasonable probability that

the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors would have been altered by “the minimally

consequential testimony regarding [his] ‘good qualities.’” See McClain v. Hall, 552 F.3d

1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008). The probability is even less so when one considers the doubleedged nature of some of the generic good character testimony and the possibility that an

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emphasis on generic good character evidence would have given the prosecutor incentive and

opportunity to undermine it. Because Maples has not established actual prejudice caused by

trial counsel’s failure to present evidence of Maples’s good character, the court finds this

claim is procedurally defaulted. Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing is denied.

Alternatively, the court finds the claim is without merit. To the extent Maples makes

allegations concerning the good character evidence his step-mother could have offered, the

Rule 32 court found this claim to be “refuted by the record,” and, therefore, meritless. (Rule

32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66 at 52-53.) The court also rejected Maples’s contention that counsel

was ineffective for failing to elicit from Elyse Maples that, although he had dropped out of

high school, he passed the GED exam, and that he had attempted to enlist in the Army but was

rejected because of drug problems. It found:

“‘The mere fact other witnesses might have been available or that other

testimony might have been elicited from those who testified is not a sufficient

ground to prove ineffectiveness of counsel.’” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1316, n.

20, quoting Waters v. Thomas, 46 F. 3d 1506, 1514 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 

Maples has failed to plead and prove that any addition[al] testimony from his

stepmother would have resulted in a different recommendation by the jury or

different sentence by this Court. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

(Id. at 53-54.) Not only is the state court’s rejection of this aspect of the claim reasonable, the

additional testimony concerning Maples’s GED score and his attempt to enlist in the Army is

cumulative of Shealy’s testimony at the penalty phase of trial. 

With regard to the testimony Daniel Maples purportedly would have offered, the Rule

32 court held:

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“There has never been a case where additional witnesses could not have

been called. Fortenberry v. State, 659 So. 2d 194, 199 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)

(quoting State v. Tarver, 629 So. 2d 14, 21 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). 

Additionally, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held:

“We refuse to set a standard that a court may be reversed because

it did not hear unoffered testimony from still more friends and

relatives. We also refuse to say that a member of the bar is guilty

of ineffectiveness for not calling every witness and friend who

was willing to testify.”

Williams v. State, 782 So. 2d 811, 824 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), quoting State v.

Tarver, 629 So. 2d 14, 21 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). 

Maples has failed to proffer any evidence that testimony from his half

brother would have produced a different result at the penalty phase of trial. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. 

(Id. at 56-57.) The Rule 32 court’s application of Strickland to the allegations concerning

Daniel Maples is reasonable. 

As for other family, teachers, coaches, counselors and friends, the Rule 32 court

rejected the claim for lack of specificity on the basis that Maples failed to identify these

individuals or specifically allege the substance of their testimony. (Id. at 55-58.) Maples’s

amended Rule 32 petition identified those witnesses and, for the most part, the substance of

the witnesses’ testimony. However, even ifthe Rule 32 court’s determination is unreasonable,

the additional good character testimonyfromthese witnesses either is refuted byor cumulative

of the testimony in the trial record, and is generic good character evidence that either carries

with it an aggravating edge or could have spurred the prosecutor to undermine it. Maples has

not shown that counsel was objectively deficient for failing to investigate and present more

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generic evidence of his good character at the penalty phase of trial and there is no reasonable

probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors would have been altered at

the penalty phase of trial had the evidence been presented. 

For all the foregoing reasons, this claim is procedurally defaulted, or in the alternative,

without merit and is due to be denied. Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing is due to

be denied. 

3. Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate Mr. Maples’s Drug Addiction and

Attempted Recovery, Depression, and Suicide Attempts. (Doc. 24, Claim II.B., ¶¶

138-41.)56

Maples alleges that his counsel were ineffective because they failed to investigate and

present evidence of his history of addiction, depression and suicide attempts that occurred

during the time “he was abusing crack cocaine, crystal methamphetamine, LSD and other

drugs,” and his efforts to recover from drug addiction. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 138, 140.) Specifically,

he contends:

56This habeas claim is virtually identical to the claim as pleaded in his amended Rule

32 petition. (See Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 33, Tab 49, at 68-70.) The amended Rule 32 petition,

supplemented the allegations of his initial Rule 32 petition. In the initial Rule 32 petition,

Maples complained that counsel did not interview any witnesses about his suicide attempts

or depression when he was on drugs, and he supported that contention with allegations that

Philip and Elyse Maples could “have more thoroughly testified to [his] dedication to

conquering drug problems,” that counsel “never contacted any of the counselors at Quest

who interacted with [him],” that Birdsong would have testified that he was “hard working[,]”

that counsel did not contact any other employer, and that his “friends and family noted that

[when he returned from Tennessee] he looked happy, put on weight and appeared to be on

the path to recovery.” (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab 47, at 56-57.)

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138. Counsel did not interview any witnesses about Mr. Maples’[s]

depression and suicidal behavior prior to the shootings, when Mr. Maples was

abusing crack cocaine, crystal methamphetamine, LSD and other drugs. [Elyse]

Maples would have testified that Mr. Maples wrote poetry about depression and

loneliness. He even left a suicide note stating that he had always been a

screw-up. After discovering the note, [Elyse] Maples found Mr. Maples hiding

in the woods. Mr. Maples’[s] ex- girlfriend, [Heather] Davis, could have

testified that around 1994 she was with Mr. Maples when he took over thirty

sleeping pills and drank a bottle of alcohol just before crashing [Elyse]

Maples’[s] car. [Jamie] Dobbs, a friend of Mr. Maples, also could have

testified that he witnessed Mr. Maples play Russian roulette on at least one

occasion, sticking a gun into his mouth and pulling the trigger. Mr. Dobbs

could also testify that he saw Mr. Maples attempt suicide by slashing his wrists

with a butcher knife. Both [Elyse] Maples and Philip Maples could have more

thoroughly testified to Mr. Maples’[s] dedication to conquering his drug

problems. In 1995, Mr. Maples voluntarily applied and was admitted to Quest

RecoveryCenter, a non-residential drug treatment programin Morgan Country. 

Counsel never contacted any of the counselors at Quest who interacted with Mr.

Maples. If such evidence had been presented, the jury would have learned

about Mr. Maples’[s] mental state at the time of the shootings. Counsel’s

failure to present such evidence prejudiced Mr. Maples and, if the evidence had

been presented, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have

returned a different sentence.

139. Prior to the shootings, Mr. Maples went to Tennessee to work with

a friend, Allen Birdsong, and [to] escape the drug culture he was caught up in. 

Mr. Birdsong would have gladly testified to the hard working character Mr.

Maples demonstrated while he and Mr. Maples were together in Tennessee. 

Mr. Maples’[s] hard working character also would have been a mitigating

factor. See Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1463 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that

the fact that defendant was a “hard worker” was mitigating evidence). 

However, Counsel failed to elicit such testimony from Mr. Birdsong during the

penalty phase of Mr. Maples’[s] trial and failed to even contact any other

employer who could have testified to Mr. Maples’[s] hard working moral

character. But for Counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability that the jury

would have returned a different verdict.

140. Counsel had in their possession Mr. Maples’[s] application to

Quest that chronicled his past drug use, his suicide attempts and his desire to

improve his life, but Counsel inexplicably failed to submit the application into

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evidence, nor did they contact any of the counselors at Quest who interacted

with Mr. Maples, including Kathy Goodwin, the director of Quest who initially

interviewed Mr. Maples for admission into the program. If Counsel had

contacted Ms. Goodwin or any other counselors at Quest and presented their

testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a

different sentence. Such a failure to contact and present these witnesses

prejudiced Mr. Maples and, as there is a reasonable probability that the jury

would have returned a different sentence if they had heard such evidence,

constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

141. Because Counsel failed to adequately interview and present the

testimony of those few witnesses that they did call at the penalty phase and did

not call many potential witnesses who were sources of important information

about Mr. Maples’[s] life, . . . Counsel were unable to present an adequate

picture of Mr. Maples’[s] life to the jury. Thus, Counsel were unable to

articulate to the jury any coherent reason why the jurors should refrain from

sentencing Mr. Maples to death. If Counsel had called these witnesses and

properly presented this evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the jury

would not have sentenced Mr. Maples to death.

(Id. ¶¶ 138-41.)

A review of the testimony presented at the penalty phase of trial shows that Maples

reported his extensive history of drug use to Shealy. Shealy testified that Maples had

described himself as an outgoing child whose years in elementary and junior high school were

“good years [and] he got along with everybody.” (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3129.) According

to Shealy,Maples “started drinking around age thirteen” and “began smoking marijuana when

he was eleven or twelve in the sixth grade.” (Id.) From the age of seventeen until he was

twenty, “he had used heroin once, he had used Ecstacy, various pills, crack cocaine,

methamphetamine, PCP, and something called Crank.”57

 (Id. at 3117.) 

57

“Crank” is another name for crystal meth. See United States v. Espinoza, 550 Fed.

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Maples told Shealy that Jamie Dobbs introduced him to cocaine. (Id. at 3133.) 

Maples reported – 

Jamie had a big inheritance and they partied a lot together, and for a period of

what seemed almost a year of time, some period of months, he and Jamie spent

most of their time essentially staying intoxicated with various drugs; cocaine,

marijuana, heroin, LSD, and they ran through this inheritance . . . . They both

were smoking crack. [Cory] told [Shealy that he] wanted out of the situation,

that he made a New Year’s resolution to not do [crack] any more. He held up

to his end, and a friend accused him of stealing from him. Jamie got into the

middle of it and . . . Jamie hit [Cory] in back of the head with a beer bottle and

[Cory] pulled a razor and [Maples] told [Shealy] he got a gun after [Dobbs], and

then during those days ofserious drug use and drug abuse, he spent a lot of time

on the street. He told me sometime in the Spring of 1993 to New Year’s 1994

were in the street days and the heavy drug use days.

(Id. at 3134.) Shealy reported that about a year before the murders, Maples had received

treatment at Quest Recovery Center for “all kinds of drugs, hallucinogenics, LSD.” (Id. at

3113.) 

In addition to his testimony based on Maples’s reports, Shealy testified, based on the

results of the Minnesota Multiphastic Inventory [MMPI] test, that Maples was suffering from

mild situational depression. (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3147-48.) He also testified that, although

Maples claimed he was not hurt or haunted by his mother’s abuse, he had adopted a tough-guy

mentality to overcome his emotional pain.

Elyse Maples testified during the penalty phase that she and Philip Maples tried to help

Maples with his drug problem, of which they became aware after Maples left or was kicked

Appx. 690, 692 (11th Cir. 2013)(unpublished); see also United States v. McIntosh, 23 F.3d

1454, 1458 (8th Cir. 1994)(“crank” is a street name for methamphetamine).

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out of Denise Imgrund’s home when he was a teenager. (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3182.) She

testified that she had tried to get help for Maples; a women “who was with the Mental Health

Association in Decatur” had helped her find places Maples could go to. (Id.) She and Philip

Maples tried to get Maples into Bradford and Decatur General West, but due to financial

constraints were only able to get him into Quest RecoveryCenter. (Id. at 3182-83.) Maples’s

treatment ended in January 1995, over six months before the murders. (Id. at 3183.) At that

time, Elyse Maples saw a lot of improvement, but Maples did not stay with her for very long

because “[w]e had some problems with some threats, so we moved him out of the State.”58

(Id. at 3183-84.)

While in Tennessee, Maples found work with Birdsong. Birdsong had testified during

the guilt phase of the trial that Maples had lived with him in Ardmore, Tennessee, until

approximately a month before the murders. (R. Vol. 19, Tab 17, at 2745-47.) He testified that

he and Maples drank alcohol, “partied, . . . socialized, [and] went out”, but he had not seen

Maples use drugs. (Id. at 2749.) 

Philip Maples testified that he knew Maples was drinking alcohol as a teenager before

he went to live with his mother at 17. He did not know Maples was into drugs and spending

time with people who were “up to no good and [were known to be] into drugs and stuff” until

58Elyse Maples testified, “[Cory] had worked with the Decatur city police to catch

somebody with some drugs, and we had some threats – some telephone threats and we just

didn’t feel like [Cory] would be safe in the area so we moved him.” (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at

3184.)

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after Maples moved back to his house after living with his mother. (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at

3199.) Philip Maples testified that Quest had helped Maples, but he added: “It’s a long

[drawn] out thing. You don’t just get over something like [drug addiction] overnight, you

know, but it was a big change back toward the good.” (Id. at 3199-200.)

Although he contends counsel should have called an employee from Quest to testify

during the penalty phase, Maples does not allege specifically what the Director of Quest or

any other employee would have testified nor does he allege specifically what additional

testimony Philip or Elyse Maples would have offered concerning his good faith attempt at

recovery and how this evidence would be mitigating. However, he has offered specific

allegations of his prior suicide attempts witnessed by Elyse Maples, Davis, and Dobbs, and

this evidence was not before the jury. Nevertheless, he does not allege that he had severe

depression or suicidal thoughts as an on-going condition after he went to Quest or at the time

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of the murders.59 Instead, by his own allegations, Maples’s bouts of severe depression and

suicide attempts were caused by his drug use. 

In the amended petition, Maples frames this claim in such a way that the relevance of

the depression and suicide attempts is tied to another mitigating factor that was well known

to the jury – his history of drug abuse and his attempted recovery. The trial court did not

doubt that Maples had suffered from addiction and it found that he had made an attempt at

recovery. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 62, at 11-12.) Nevertheless, it found the weight of this

evidence in mitigation to be weak and unpersuasive. (Id.) Even if Maples’s drug-induced

depression and suicide attempts had been made a part of the evidence to support the mitigating

factor that Maples suffered froma serious drug addiction from which he attempted to recover,

this court finds that this evidence would not likely have changed the balance of aggravating

and mitigating factors such that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the

59In state court, Maples never presented this claim in amanner that would have alerted

the state court that he was offering his severe depression and suicidal ideation for any time

period other than his drug-use prior to attending the Quest program, nor did he do so in the

amended habeas petition filed in this court. The allegations that Maples had a long history

of depression or symptoms of emotional disorders set out in his December 2005 brief were

a significant departure from the claim raised in the Rule 32 court, in the amended habeas

petition in this court, and the post-remand briefs, wherein this claim was abandoned. Such

allegations would alter the fundamental nature of the claim as raised in the Rule 32 court and,

therefore, are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Maples has offered no showing of

cause or prejudice to excuse his procedural default nor has he shown that a miscarriage of

justice will occur if these allegations are not heard. Therefore, the claim that Maples had a

long history of depression and suicidal ideation after he completed the Quest program has

not been considered.

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penalty phase of trial would have been different. Therefore, the court finds that Maples has

not shown actual prejudice and this claim is procedurally defaulted.

In the alternative, the court finds that this claim is without merit. The Rule 32 court

found:

In [this claim] of Maples’s petition, he alleges trial counsel were

ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his drug addiction, depression

and attempted recovery. In paragraph 130, Maples alleges that his father and

stepmother “could have more thoroughly testified to [his] dedication to

conquering his drug problems.” (Maples’s Petition at p. 56) Also, Maples

allege[s] trial counsel did not contact any counselors at Quest Recovery Center

who interacted with him. 

Maples fails to indicate what additional testimony his father and

stepmother would have provided that would have caused a different result in the

jury’s recommendation or this Court’s sentencing. Maples also fails to identify

any drug counselor by name or indicate what his or her testimony would have

been.

“A claim of failure to call witnesses is deficient if it does not show what

the witnesses would have testified to or how that would have changed that

testimony might have changed the outcome.” Thomas [v. State], 766 So. 2d

[860,] 893 [(Ala. Crim. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte

Taylor, 10 So. 3d 1075 (Ala. 2005)]. The allegation . . . is insufficiently

pleaded and is not specific; therefore it is summarily dismissed. Rules 32.3,

32.6(b) and 32.7(d), ARCrP. 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 58-59.)

The Rule 32 court’s determination is a decision on the merits for purposes of habeas

review. While fairminded jurists could agree with the Rule 32 court’s decision insofar as

Maples’s failure to allege with specificity any testimony his father or the drug counselor

would have proffered in support of the claim, no reasonable jurist would agree with the trial

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court’s determination that the claim did not identify witnesses Elyse Maples, Heather Davis,

Jamie Dobbs, and Allen Birdsong and describe the substance of their testimony. As such, that

portion of the Rule 32 court’s denial of Maples’s claim is unreasonable based on the record

before it. Nevertheless, Maples is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim because he has

not established Strickland prejudice. Even if the court assumes these allegations are true,

Maples still cannot establish actual prejudice for purposes of Strickland.

To establish Strickland prejudice, Maples must show that “there is a reasonable

probability that,” had the jury and the trial judge heard evidence of his depression and suicide

attempts during the time he was abusing drugs and his efforts at recovering from drug

addiction, they “would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances did not warrant death.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. The trial judge found

that Maples had a “history of . . . self-abuse through drugs and alcohol,” that he had “suffered

from addiction to various controlled substances,” and that he had “made efforts at controlling

his drug-dependency in drug rehabilitation.” (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 62, at 10.) 

Considering this evidence, the trial judge stated in his sentencing order, “The court is unable

to find the kind of mitigating facts that would justify the imposition of a sentence of life

imprisonment without parole despite the existence of one statutory aggravating circumstance. 

The statutory aggravating circumstance far outweighed the mitigating facts.” (Id at 11-12.) 

Simply put, additional evidence that Maples suffered depression and had tried to kill himself

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during the time before he completed the Quest program is not sufficient to shift the balance

of the aggravating circumstance in favor of mitigating circumstances and life without parole.

For all of the foregoing reasons, this claim is procedurally defaulted, or in the

alternative, due to be denied. Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing is due to be denied.

4. Counsel Failed to Present Evidence of Maples’s Assistance to the Police in

Their Enforcement of Drug Law Violations. (Doc. 24, Claim II.D., ¶¶ 144-48.)60

Maples alleges that, although counsel had a written report prepared by the Decatur

Police “that clearly and incontrovertibly documented Mr. Maples’s assistance to the Decatur

Police in arrest of a prominent drug dealer,” counsel failed to offer that report into evidence

at the penalty phase of trial. (Doc. 24 ¶ 144.) The trial court had rejected Maples’s assistance

to the police as a mitigating factor because no police officer had testified regarding Maples’s

assistance and Elyse Maples’s testimony on this issue had not been corroborated. In his

habeas petition, Maples alleges:

144. Counsel were ineffective at the penalty phase of the trial by setting

forth mitigating factors but then failing to present any substantial evidence in

support of those factors. In particular, Counsel failed to present any substantial

evidence in support of the non-statutory mitigating factor that Mr. Maples

cooperated and assisted the police in their enforcement of drug law violations. 

Counsel failed to present any substantial evidence even though, at least five

months prior to trial, Counsel received documentation that clearly and

60The content of the claim virtually identical to that alleged in the amended Rule 32

petition. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 33, Tab 49, ¶ 135-39 at 71-74.) In his initial Rule 32 petition,

Maples alleged counsel were ineffective for failing to corroborate with documentary

evidence his past cooperation with the police. Therefore, Elyse Maples’s testimony was

subject to attack by the prosecutor and deemed uncorroborated by the trial court. (Rule 32

C.R. Vol. 32, Tab 47, ¶ 135-39 at 57-59.)

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incontrovertibly documented Mr. Maples’[s] assistance to the Decatur Police

in the arrest of a prominent drug dealer. A jury can consider “as a mitigating

factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record . . . that the defendant

proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.

586, 604 (1978). Given the importance of having the jury consider ANY aspect

of a defendant’s character or record during the penalty phase of a death penalty

case, it is inexcusable for Counsel to possess incontrovertible evidence in

support of a mitigating factor and fail to present it. Such an unreasonable

decision falls below the minimum standard of effective assistance and cannot

be considered reasonable trial strategy. Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350 (11th

Cir. 1995). If such evidence had been presented to the jury, there is a

reasonable probability that the jury would not have sentenced Mr. Maples to

death.

145. The only evidence Counsel presented in support of this mitigating

factor was the testimony of Mr. Maples’[s]step-mother, who told the court that

“Mr. Maples had worked with the Decatur city police to catch somebody with

some drugs.” (R. at 3184.) No other evidence or testimony was offered.

146. During closing, the prosecution scoffed at Counsel’s attempt to

present this evidence in support of this mitigating factor:

[Mr. Maples] didn’t clean up drugs in the City of Decatur. If he had

made a mark over there or done anything major, they would have police

officers and narcotics officers over here to tell you about it. Defense

lawyers love to call police over here to testify. I mean, if they can get a

police officer to come to their side, they are just tickled pink, and they

would have been over here by the hand full. (R. at 3292-93.)

Likewise, in the sentencing order, the court judge determined that Mr. Maples

had not cooperated and assisted law enforcement authorities in their

enforcement of drug laws. “The court notes no police officer testified at trial,

nor was there any corroboration of the step-mother’s testimony.” (Sentencing

Order at 10.)

147. If Counsel had investigated and presented available evidence in

their possession, the court and the jury would have read a case report filed with

the Decatur Police Department, written by Lieutenant Larry Greene, detailing

Mr. Maples’[s] assistance in the October 1994 arrest of Mark Carroll, who died

before the trial, for unlawful distribution of controlled substances. The case

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report includes transcripts of conversations recorded by Mr. Maples over the

course of several weeks, between himself and Mr. Carroll, including a

conversation in which Mr. Maples purchased the drugs from Mr. Carroll that

resulted in his immediate arrest. The case report lists many other officers

involved in this transaction who could have testified on Mr. Maples’[s] behalf,

including, but not limited to, Detective Greene, Sergeant Larry Glover,

Lieutenant FrankDeButy,InvestigatorChrisMatthews, Officer Denise Stogner,

Officer Proncey Robertson and Investigator Faron White, along with other

investigators of the Decatur Police Narcotics Unit and the Morgan CountyDrug

Unit. If this evidence had been presented to the jury, there is a reasonable

probability that the jury would not have sentenced Mr. Maples to death.

148. Counsel’s failure to advocate for their client at sentencing, when

the sentence was death, was equivalent to providing no representation at all at

a critical stage of his trial. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659

(1984). Had the jury and court heard this evidence, they would have been less

inclined to impose death, and much more inclined to impose a sentence of life

without the possibility of parole.

(Id. ¶¶ 144-48.)

In his December 2005 brief, Maples contends that “Greene could have testified about

Mr. Maples’[s] assistance and his good character. Officer Greene has stated that during the

investigation, Mr. Maples was very nice, polite and punctual. Indeed, Officer Greene

repeatedly referred to Mr. Maples as a ‘straight-up guy’ who kept his word.” (Doc. 33 at 48.) 

Maples alleges for the first time in his post-remand reply brief, “Upon information and belief,

[Elyse] Maples had extensive knowledge about Maples’[s] involvement with the Decatur

police department as a confidential informant.” (Doc. 73 at 52.) He also asserts that she

identified Larry Greene as the officer Maples worked with and that Greene “had first-hand

knowledge about the threats that Maples received because he witnessed several of them and

eventually began to stake out [Elyse] Maples’[s] work place for her protection.” (Id.) Yet,

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counsel did not ask further questions of Elyse Maples about this fact nor did they attempt to

contact Officer Greene. (Id.) The court finds the allegations are supplemental to the claim

as raised in the Rule 32 court. Still, Maples cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the

lack of additional testimony and, thus, cannot establish actual prejudice to overcome his

procedural default even if these allegations are considered.

A review of the testimony at the penalty phase shows that Elyse Maples testified that

Maples had assisted the Decatur police with the capture of “somebody,” that thereafter her 

family had been threatened, and that Maples had been sent to Tennessee because of these

threats. (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3184.) Following this testimony, in his closing argument, the

prosecutor argued that, as he understood the testimony, Maples had assisted law enforcement

with the arrest of one person, but the defense had not called any Decatur City police officers

to testify on his behalf to verify, in essence, what a good citizen he had been and how he had

assisted the drug enforcement officers in any significant manner. (R. Vol. 22, Tab 30, at

3292-93.) Moreover, the prosecutor pointed to testimony that Maples had admitted to

“ripping off” Kenneth Hall, his former friend, during a drug deal as revenge for Kenneth

having slept with Maples’s girlfriend. (Id. at 3293.) The prosecutor then asked the jury if they

thought Maples had assisted law enforcement officers to help the community or to get even

with someone else like he had done to Kenneth Hall. (Id.)

An examination of the police report shows that, in September 1994, Maples had

contacted the Decatur Police Department to offer his assistance in creating a drug case against

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Mark Carroll, an individual from whom he had previously bought drugs. (Doc. 33-1 at 37-

45.) Maples acted as an informant, bought marijuana and cocaine from Carroll, and

subsequently Carroll was charged with unlawful distribution of a controlled substance in

violation of Alabama law based on Maples’s drug buys. Maples contends that each of the

officers involved in the operation could have testified on his behalf and each officer’s name

appears in the report.

In light ofthe prosecutor’s closing arguments, which were supported bytrial testimony,

the court finds there is no reasonable probability that the jury or the trial judge would have

found Maples’s cooperation with law enforcement officers to be a significant mitigating factor

even if the report and the police officers’ testimony had been admitted into evidence and even

if the judge had found Else Maples’s testimony regarding the threat to be credible. First, the

court notes that testimonyof Maples’s assistance to law enforcement likelywould have caused

the prosecutor to present and emphasize Maples’s prior lawless behavior. Moreover,

presentation of this evidence would have allowed the prosecution to present evidence of

Maples’s reasons for providing assistance, which may have shown Maples was not motivated

by civic duty. Even if Maples’s assistance with law enforcement was given some weight

toward mitigating his sentence for the murders of Robinson and Terry, this evidence is not of

such quality and weight that it would likely have shifted the balance from the single statutory

aggravating circumstance, which the trial court had found “far outweighed” the mitigating

facts, toward the mitigating circumstances and life without parole.

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Under these circumstances, even if Maples’s assistance to law enforcement had been

corroborated in the manner he alleges and had been considered a mitigating factor, its weight,

if any, as mitigation for the murders was only slight. This court finds no reasonable

probability that evidence of Maples’s cooperation in the arrest of Carroll would have altered

the balance of mitigating versus aggravating factors to such an extent that the sentence would

have been different. The court finds that Maples has not shown actual prejudice; therefore,

this claim is procedurally defaulted.

The court finds that, even assuming counsel had presented evidence of the Decatur

police report as well as the alleged testimony from officers, there is no reasonable probability

that this evidence would have changed the outcome of the penalty phases, thus establishing

prejudice to support his Strickland claim. Because Maples has not shown actual prejudice

based on counsel’s failure to present additional mitigating evidence of his assistance to law

enforcement, he cannot show his counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard.

The court finds this claim is procedurally defaulted, and, in the alternative, without

merit. Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing is due to be denied.61

61Maples complains that he requested discovery regarding this claim in state court, in

that he asked for all information and documentation regarding his cooperation. (See doc. 73

at 68.) This is the only other sub-claim, other than his intoxication claim, where he

specifically points out that he requested discovery. (See also doc. 78, Tab 25 at 144.) 

However, Maples clearly already had the Decatur police report with the names of police

officers and the information concerning details of his assistance before he filed his amended

Rule 32 petition. Thus, he already had the necessary information to state his claim before the

Rule 32 court.

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5. Counsel Failed to Procure a Competent Psychological Evaluation. (Doc. 24,

Claim II.E., ¶¶ 149-55.)62

In his amended habeas petition, Maples alleges:

149. Counsel hired a psychologist to evaluate Mr. Maples’[s] mental

state both at the time of the crime and at the time of his arrest. The

psychologist’s evaluation, as detailed in Paragraphs 150 to 155, infra, was

woefully inadequate, which should have been apparent to Counsel. In addition,

Counsel’s presentation of the psychological evaluation to the jury was

confusing and misleading and, upon information obtained through interviews

with jurors, may have resulted in the jury’s discounting much, if not all, of the

psychologist’s testimony.

150. Counsel failed to inform the psychologist of important facts and

circumstances in Mr. Maples’[s] background . . . thereby assuring that even if

the psychologist had done his job properly, he could not have done it well.

151. The psychologist retained by Counsel spent very little time with

Mr. Maples. And he spent no time at all with any family members or people

who knew Mr. Maples other than a former schoolmate who – fortuitously for

the psychologist – happened to be working in the jail the afternoon the

psychologist went to the jail to interview Mr. Maples. According to the

psychologist’s testimony, he spent only four hours at the jail, conducted only

two tests – one a simple intelligence test – and based his entire evaluation only

on Mr. Maples’[s] direct reporting to him. And even that reporting was skimpy

and incomplete because of the psychologist’s superficial interaction and failure

to probe, as was apparent during his confusing and inadequate testimony.

152. As a result, the psychologist failed to discover, for example, that

Mr. Maples had suicidal thoughts and had, in the past, attempted suicide. He

failed to discover that Mr. Maples was being given an anti-depressant while he

was in the Morgan County jail and failed to learn the reasons why Mr. Maples

had been prescribed such medication. He failed to discover more instances of

his birth mother’s physical abuse and abandonment when he was a small child,

62The content of the claim is identical to that alleged in the initial and amended Rule

32 petitions. (See Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab 47, ¶¶ 140-146; Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 33, Tab 49,

¶¶ 140-146.) 

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instances Mr. Maples had suppressed, but which were well known by his father

and other family members. He failed to discover the long-standing pattern of

self-destructive and abusive behavior by Mr. Maples’[s] birth mother and

maternal grandmother, possibly indicative of genetic mental illness or disease. 

He failed to probe Mr. Maples’[s] feelings about his birth mother, either as he

remembered her from his childhood, or when he met her again as a teenager. 

He also failed to probe Mr. Maples’[s] feelings when she abandoned him a

second time as a teenager. And, of course, he could not have known many other

facts about Mr. Maples’[s] background . . . because Counsel never informed

him of those facts.

153. Based on this superficial and inadequate psychological evaluation,

which Counsel should have recognized as superficial and inadequate, the

psychologist incorrectly concluded and testified that Mr. Maples had passiveaggressive personality disorder. (R. 3149.) Equally damaging to Mr.

Maples’[s] defense was the defense psychologist’s assertion, on both direct and

cross-examination, that there was virtuallyno difference between his evaluation

and the prosecution psychologist’s evaluation of antisocial personalitydisorder. 

(R. 3158.) He testified to this in spite of the fact that the prosecution

psychologist’s evaluation was patentlyincorrect underthe diagnostic criteria set

forth in the standard psychological manual, the Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual IV.

154. Counsel should have engaged a psychologist who could carefully

and thoroughlyevaluate Mr. Maples’[s] mental state and who could explain that

mental state and its causes to the jury. In addition, Counsel should have

thoroughly investigated Mr. Maples’[s] family, social, medical and life history

and shared all they learned with the psychologist. But Counsel did neither of

these things, and as a result, they obtained a severely limited and compromised

psychological evaluation. In addition, their inadequate preparation of the

psychologist to testify resulted in his testimony being confusing, difficult to

follow, misleading and completely devoid of any explanation of Mr. Maples’[s]

flat affect. Upon information learned from interviews with jurors, because of

the superficiality of the psychologist’s evaluation, and the inadequate

presentation of his testimony by Counsel, some of the jurors may have

discounted the psychologist’s testimony.

63

63In its order, the Rule 32 court found that Maples had presented “absolutely no

evidence that any juror discounted any of Dr. Shealy’s testimony.” (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37,

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155. It was Counsel’s legal obligation to obtain, adequately prepare, and

properly question an expert for the mitigation phase of Mr. Maples’[s] trial. 

They failed completely in this task. Such a failure cannot be strategic. Instead,

Counsel’s failure was ineffective assistance of counsel and deprived Mr.

Maples of his right to a reasonably substantial penalty phase investigation. See

Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (11th Cir. 1982); Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d

1501 (11th Cir. 1995).

(Doc. 24 ¶¶ 149-55 [footnote added].)64

Maples attacks Shealy for failing to discover his suicidal ideations and past suicide

attempts, that he was being given an anti-depressant in jail and the reason why the medication

was prescribed, and more instances of the abuse and abandonment by his mother, as well as

a “possible genetic mental illness or disease” she and his maternal grandmother suffered. (Id.

¶ 152.) He contends Shealy “incorrectly concluded and testified” that Maples suffered from

passive-aggressive personality disorder and “that there was virtually no difference between

Tab 66, at 62.)

64In his December 2005 reply brief, Maples alleged, “[A]lthough Dr. Shealy

interviewed Mr. Maples, he has admitted to habeas counsel that, if he had it to do over, he

would have gathered a detailed social history from collateral sources.” (Doc. 33 at 47.) 

Maples did not make these allegations to the state court and has offered no cause and

prejudice pertinent to it to overcome that default. Even if the allegation was considered

supplemental, Maples still fails to allege how or why Shealy’s opinion or conclusions would

have changed had he independently discovered that information. Also, Maples does not

allege that Shealy’s testimony or opinion would have been altered in connection with any of

the other alleged deficiencies Shealy purportedly displayed as set out in this claim. To the

extent that he might be contending that Shealy or counsel failed to discover the physical and

emotional abuse he suffered from Philip and Elyse Maples, or his depression or symptoms

of an emotional disorder, or any other allegation set out above, those allegations are

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Maples has not argued cause and prejudice to

overcome that default or miscarriage of justice if the allegations are not heard, and Maples

abandoned these allegations in his post-remand briefs. 

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his evaluation and the prosecution psychologist’s evaluation of anti-social personality

disorder.” (Id. ¶ 153.) As for the latter diagnosis, Maples argues “that the prosecution

psychologist’s evaluation was patently incorrect under the diagnostic criteria set forth in the

standard psychological manual, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual [DSM] IV.” (Id.) He

complains that counsel’s inadequate preparation of Shealy caused his testimony to be

“confusing, difficult to follow, misleading and completely devoid of any explanation of . . .

Maples’s flat affect.” (Id. ¶ 154.) He declares that interviews with jurors showed that “some

of [them] may have discounted the psychologist’s testimony” because of its “superficiality”

and “inadequate presentation.” (Id.)

With regard to Maples’s childhood abuse and abandonment from his mother, he does

not allege how Shealy’s knowledge of additional incidents of abuse would have changed or

altered his opinion or alerted reasonable counsel to seek additional expert assistance, and he

has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating

factors at the penalty phase of trial would have been altered. Indeed, Shealy testified in detail

about Maples’s abusive childhood and abandonment and the psychological effects thereof, all

of which was to Maples’s benefit for mitigation purposes.

Maples also fails to allege specific facts concerning his suicidal thoughts, past history

of suicide attempts65and jailhouse prescription,66 or explain how this additional information

65As set forth above, Maples alleged in the Rule 32 proceedings that he was depressed

and suicidal during his drug-use days, thus supporting the non-statutorymitigating factor that

he suffered from serious drug addiction from which he had attempted to recover. Shealy,

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would have altered or changed Shealy’s diagnosis or opinion in any fashion, much less

describe how the change in Shealy’s opinion would have resulted in a reasonable probability

that he would have been sentenced to life without parole. Even if this court assumes that

reasonable counsel would have recognized that Shealy had failed to independently discover

this information, Maples has failed, nevertheless, to explain how and why this information

would have produced an opinion or conclusion from any expert such that there is a reasonable

probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors would have been altered.

Maples does not explain why Shealy’s diagnosis of passive-aggressive personality

disorder is wrong nor does he explain with any specificity how and why the State’s expert

misapplied the DSM IV criteria in his diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder. Diagnoses

of mental health disorders are within the special knowledge of the experts. Without detailed

allegations regarding the correct diagnosis as well as allegations that his attorneys knew or

should have known the experts’ opinions were incorrect, Maples cannot show a reasonable

probability the result would have been different. The court finds Maples has failed to allege

facts establishing Shealy’s alleged inadequacies, and, therefore, he has failed to allege facts

Philip Maples, and Elsye Maples testified about Maples’s historyof drug abuse and addiction

and his attempt at recovery. The trial judge credited it as a mitigating factor although he

found its weight to be weak and unpersuasive.

66Maples alleged in his Rule 32 petition that he had suffered nightmares in jail and

he was prescribed Elavil for six months. He contends that his use of Elavil could have

explained his flat affect and disputed the prosecutor’s argument that he showed no remorse. 

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that would establish that counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize the inadequacies or

that he was prejudiced thereby.

The record shows that Shealy drew his results from his interview with Maples and the

MMPI, a test which Maples fails to mention in his amended petition. (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at

3146-52, 3164-65. See generally doc. 24.) Shealy also administered a Bendner Gestalt

Performance Test, which Maples also does not mention, the results of which showed Maples

did not have a “conduct disorder, impulse disorder, [or] chronic acting out . . . .” (R. Vol. 21,

Tab 27, at 3166.) Shealy disagreed with the State’s expert, who had diagnosed Maples with

an anti-social personality disorder; Shealy noted that expert had not performed a complete

examination and had limited his evaluation to the issue of Maples’s competency to stand trial. 

(Id. at 3159, 3161.) The State’s expert did not testify at the penalty phase of trial. While it

is true that Shealy testified that there was not much difference between a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder and passive/aggressive personality disorder, he testified that

passive/aggressive individuals suppress their anger, are over-controlled, and do not have a

pattern of violent behavior going back to childhood. (Id. at 3161.) Shealy’s testimony that

Maples has a passive/aggressive personality disorder, not an antisocial personality disorder,

certainly was to Maples’s benefit. 

Maples has alleged that he suffered from depression and suicidal thoughts and actions

during the period of time he was abusing drugs. He has not alleged that he suffered from

clinical depression or some other mental health disorder at the time of the murders or that he

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did not suffer from passive/aggressive personality disorder. Assuming counsel should have

had Maples examined by another mental-health expert or they should have required Shealy

to interview Maples’s family and/or Maples more thoroughly, nothing in the record before the

trial court or the Rule 32 court indicates what other diagnosis Shealy or another psychologist

would have made.

Maples does not allege why Shealy’s testimony was confusing or misleading or why

counsel’s preparation of Shealy was inadequate. Moreover, his contention that counsel failed

to prepare Shealy to explain Maples’s “flat affect” is completely devoid of any context.

Maples does not describe why counsel’s preparation was inadequate, does not state what

inferences or conclusions Shealywould have drawn fromhis “flat affect,” allege whyShealy’s

testimony regarding Maples’s demeanor would have been mitigating, or how Shealy’s

testimony would be of such mitigating significance that there is a reasonable probability that

the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors would have tipped in his favor. Indeed,

Maples ignores the fact that Shealy testified Maples had adopted a tough-guy image and did

not display his feelings to cover the pain he suffered as a result of his mother’s abuse and

abandonment. This testimonywas adequate to address Maples’s flat affect or stoic demeanor.

Finally, Maples’s allegations of interviews with unnamed jurors who “might” have

discounted Shealy’s testimony is tantamount to an attempt to use jury testimony to impeach

a verdict; therefore, this is not “competent evidence” in this court. Brown v. United States,

720 F.3d 1316, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013)(rejecting affidavits fromjurors “who swore some of the

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additional evidence gathered during the habeas process might have had an impact on jury

deliberations” (citing Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-21 (1987) and Fed. R. Evid.

606(b))). Alabama law follows the same “historic ‘anti-impeachment’ rule” rejecting jurors’

testimony regarding their verdict. See Jones v. State, 753 So. 2d 1174, 1203-1204

(1999)(quoting Ala. R. Evid. 606, advisory committee’s note). 

This court finds that Maples has failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate actual

prejudice. His allegations regarding Shealy’s testimony and other psychological testimony

that should have been presented is not sufficient to shift the burden between mitigating and

aggravating circumstances such that there exists a reasonable probability of a different

outcome. Accordingly, Maples has not shown actual prejudice to overcome the procedural

default of this claim and it remains procedurally defaulted.

Because Maples has not shown actual prejudice based on counsel’s failure to present

additional mitigating evidence of his assistance to law enforcement, he cannot show his

counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard.

The court finds this claim is procedurally defaulted, and, in the alternative, without

merit. Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing is due to be denied.

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6. Counsel Failed to Investigate Maples’s Post-Arrest Behavior. (Doc. 24, Claim

II.F., ¶¶ 156-57.)67

Maples declares that counsel were ineffective because records and witnesses from the

county jail could have shown that Maples had exhibited good behavior during the two years

he spent in Morgan County Jail awaiting his capital murder trial. (Doc. 24 ¶ 156 [citing

Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986)].) He alleges that this “good behavior is

especially significant because county jails are not intended as places for such long term

incarceration and consequently are not usually equipped with facilities and resources for

activities and outdoor exercise” to relieve the “tedium” of jail. (Id. ¶ 157.) He identifies one

witness, a jailer, Sam Frost, who could have testified to Maples’s “good behavior.” (Id. ¶

156.)

As Maples contends, the Supreme Court has stated that evidence of good behavior in

jail cannot be excluded from the jury during the penalty phase and can be valid evidence of

mitigation. However, Maples has made no specific allegations that would establish that his

good behavior would have carried sufficient, if any, mitigating weight to create a reasonable

probability of a different verdict during the penalty phase. The court finds that evidence of

Maples’s good behavior in jail is not so weighty. Indeed, the court finds very little likelihood

67The habeas claim is virtually identical to the claim as pleaded in Maples’s amended

Rule 32 petition. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 33, Tab 49, ¶¶ 147-48.) Maples presented a similar

claim in his initial Rule 32 petition, but did not identify Officer Frost as a witness or assert

that there was documentary evidence to support his good behavior in jail. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol.

32, Tab 47, ¶¶ 147-48.)

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that such evidence would have influenced either the jury or the trial court. Therefore, the

court finds Maples has not established actual prejudice to overcome his procedural default.

Because Maples has not shown actual prejudice based on counsel’s failure to present

additional mitigating evidence of his good behavior in jail, he cannot show his counsel was

ineffective under the Strickland standard.

The court finds this claim is procedurally defaulted, and, in the alternative, without

merit. Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing is due to be denied.

7. Counsel Failed to Investigate Maples’s Head Trauma. (Doc. 24, Claim II.H.,

¶ 159.)68

Maples alleges that

Counsel were ineffective for failing to discover that Mr. Maples had suffered

a number of traumatic head injuries, including, a fall off a twenty foot cliff onto

rocks when he was a teenager and having been hit with a baseball bat during an

attack on him the year before the shootings. Although documentary and other

evidence in the form of hospital records and oral testimony from Ms. Maples

and from friends who were with Mr. Maples during these incidents was

available, Counsel did not use this information in any way. If the jurors had

been aware of these traumas, or if the psychologist[, Dr. Shealy,] had

adequately explained the impact of these traumas upon Mr. Maples’s behavior

and mental state, there is a reasonable probability that Mr. Maples would not

have been sentenced to death.

(Doc. 24 ¶ 159.) In his post-remand brief, Maples argues:

Counsel’s failure to uncover that a defendant experienced head trauma

or had other brain damage likewise contributes to a finding of ineffective

68The content of the claim identical to that alleged in the initial and amended Rule 32

petitions. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 32, Tab 47, ¶ 150 at 63; id., Vol. 33, Tab 49, ¶ 150 at 78,

respectively.)

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performance. See Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1432-34 (11th Cir.

2011)(defendant prejudiced bycounsel’s failure to uncover mitigating evidence

showing that defendant “had organic brain damage”). Indeed, serious head

injuries maycause “‘problems with planning, sequencing and impulse control’”

and are therefore particularly relevant mitigating factors in a death penalty case. 

Sears, 130 S. Ct. at 3262 (citation omitted); Frazier v. Bouchard, 661 F.3d 519,

529 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 184 L. Ed. 2d 58 (2012); Baxter, 45 F.3d at

1512 n.30.

Despite notice that Maples may have diminished mental capacity – such

as his noted sporadic behavior, attention deficit, and sudden outbursts of anger

(R. at 3169-70, 3145, 3199) – counsel failed to investigate and uncover

Maples’[s] past serious head traumas. Dr. Shealy’s assertion that there was no

“evidence of any neuropsychological problems” (R. at 3148) is markedly

insufficient to satisfy counsel’s obligation to investigate their client’s mental

capacity, because, as noted above, the report was simply geared towards fitness

to stand trial and had glaring inaccuracies and missing information that should

have put counsel on notice that further inquiry was warranted. See Cooper, 646

F.3d at 1345.

Had counsel investigated further, the jury would have learned that

Maples had fallen onto rocks off a twenty-foot cliff. (Compl. ¶ 159.) The jury

would have also learned that Maples had been hit in the head with a baseball bat

during the year before the shootings. (Id.) These injuries could have

reasonably impaired Maples’[s] judgment and diminished his mental capacity

and were therefore pertinent as mitigating factors during the penalty phase. See

Powell v. Allen, 602 F.3d 1263, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010)(requiring that counsel

address the relationship between head injuries and the defendant’s subsequent

behavior), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1002 (2011). Counsel’s failure to investigate

and present this evidence therefore amounts to ineffective assistance. See

Baxter, 45 F.3d at 1512-14 & n.30 (finding counsel deficient in part because he

failed to discover the defendant had been dropped on his head as a baby, leaving

a “sunken place” in his head.)69

69The court notes that Maples’s situation does not begin to compare with the

petitioner’s history of injury and mental illness in Baxter. In addition to being dropped as

a baby, the petitioner in Baxter had been institutionalized in a psychiatric hospital for three

years as a teenager because he was too disturbed to stay at the Children’s Home, his school

records placed his IQ in the intellectually-disabled range, and he had left school in the second

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(Doc. 60 at 90-91.)

Maples fails to reveal the content of the hospital records evidencing the alleged head

injuries. Also, he has not described what Elyse Maples and his friends, who he does not

identify, would have said regarding the nature and severity of his head injuries and he has

offered no evidence as to the effect of the head injuries (or that these witnesses would have

been qualified to testify as to the effects of these head injuries). Maples also does not allege

how Shealy’s testimony failed to adequately explain why or how these head injuries impacted

his behavior and/or mental state. Also, Maples has failed to allege his counsel acted

unreasonably with regard to presenting this unknown evidence regarding the impact of his

head injuries. Without this sort of detail, Maples cannot establish that this evidence was

reasonably likely to alter the balance between the mitigating and the aggravating facts

sufficient to show actual prejudice. Accordingly, Maples has not established actual prejudice

to overcome the procedural default of this claim and it remains procedurally defaulted. 

Moreover, the court notes that in his post-remand briefs and for the first time in any

pleading, Maples alleges, “Despite notice that [he] may have diminished mental capacity –

such as his noted sporadic behavior, attention deficit, and sudden outbursts of anger (R. 3169-

70, 3145, 3199) – counsel failed to investigate and uncover Maples’[s] past serious head

traumas.” (Doc. 60 at 90.) Maples did not present these allegations to the Rule 32 court. The

grade. Baxter, 45 F.3d 1501, 1512-13 and nn. 30, 32. Maples has no such history of being

institutionalized and the evidence is that he is of average, if not above average, intelligence.

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allegations do not simplysupplement the claimpresented to that court, rather theyare intended

to alter the nature of the claim as presented in the Rule 32 court. Accordingly, the allegations

are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Maples has not argued that he can establish

cause and prejudice to overcome the exhaustion requirement with regard to his post-remand

allegations. Alternatively, even if the court considered the allegations to be supplemental

allegations to the claim as presented in state court, Maples’s reliance on mere citations to the

record to support these allegations is insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements for

habeas corpus cases, and thus cannot, in conjunction with the allegations made in the petition,

establish the requisite actual prejudice to overcome the procedural default. 

Alternatively, the court notes that none of the citations to the state-court record support

Maples’s assertion that counsel had “notice” of his brain injury. (Doc. 60 at 90 [citing R. at

3169-70, 3145, 3199].) Instead, one citation simply shows Shealy’s hypotheses as to what

might have triggered Maples to murder the victims on the night of the murders. (R. Vol 21, 

Tab 27, at 3169-70.) Shealy testified:

Q. Can you see anything in particular about this . . . incident about why

it would lead to a homicidal rage when obviously from the history he gave you

that he had been drunk and extremely intoxicated over a couple of years period

of time? I mean, is there anything in particular about this incident why it would

set him off to kill two people?

A. No. It’s a very good question, and certainly puzzling probably to

everybody, I would imagine to everybody here. I don’t know what evidence has

been presented, but in my evaluation and what I know about it without hearing

the evidence from witnesses in this case, I puzzled over what might have been

the cue. Combined with the weakened mental state from the intoxication, what

might have been the cue that set him off, and I wondered if it had to do with the

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intoxicated state. Maybe there was anger about this friend who had betrayed

him earlier, or these two friends that had betrayed him earlier; this Kenneth or

this Jamie. Maybe it was accumulated rage, maybe he was going back to his

mother and other people who had betrayed him, and something about the

situation which I could only guess at. It might even have been an internal

fantasy that he had. There is no way really to know or you could know from the

evidence that has been presented, but I certainly couldn’t know what set him

off.

Q. There is no way to know, and obviously from what you have seen,

the alcohol and drugs weren’t enough on their own to do it?

A. Right.

(Id. at 3169-71.) This testimony does not support Maples’s assertion that his counsel should

have been on notice of a brain injury based on a history of diminished mental capacity.

70

Likewise Shealy’s testimony at page 3145 concerns his finding that Maples was

reading at a college level, which he considered unusual. (Id. ast 3145.) He testified:

Usually, when you find people who have a history of – a criminal defendant

with a history of antisocial behavior, you would find under achievement. That

is, the actual intelligence would be higher than the achievement. In this case

[Maples’s] achievement, what he had actually learned, is more than you would

expect from his actual ability which suggested that he had actually been –

probably had applied himself and been a good student. What I’m saying is

usuallywith a psychopathic personality and antisocial personality disorder, you

usually . . . find a lower achievement and a higher intelligence. In this case we

found a higher achievement . . . .

70It also is completely contradictory to numerous pages of Maples’s pleadings in

which he contends that he was not a person who would burst into anger or violence. Indeed,

at trial and to this day, Maples relies on his history of non-violence to support his allegations

of good behavior as a mitigating factor.

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(Id. at 3145-46.) This testimony does not support Maples’s assertion that his counsel should

have known that he had a traumatic brain injury. Indeed, this testimony regarding Maples’s

achievement level negates any assertion that he had difficulty in concentration and focus.

Finally the testimony at page 3199 of the transcript is Philip Maples testifying as to

Maples’s drug problems after returning home from living with his mother. (Id. at 3198-99.) 

Philip Maples testified as follows:

Q. Did [Maples] ever – after he went to stay with his mother at age

seventeen, though, did you start to see some drug problems?

A. I seen a change in him. I mean, it was like his mind was wandering

a lot, you know, or he didn’t check back in with me like he always did when he

first moved in with her or whatever. He called and would check in with us and

let us know he was all right, and then he got to where we didn’t hear from him

more and more and more, so it was just signs like that, and we heard from

different people that the folks he was running around with was up to no good

and was well-known into drugs and stuff.

(Id.) Again, this testimony does not support Maples’s contention that his counsel should have

had notice of his diminished mental capacity due to traumatic brain injury. This testimony,

except for a mention of his mind wandering, does not concern Maples’s mental capacity at all;

rather, his father is testifying to clues from Maples’s behavior that supported Philip Maples’s

conclusion his son had a drug problem.

None of the pages cited by Maples support his claim that his counsel had notice of his

“diminished mental capacity” sufficient to warrant investigation of possible traumatic brain

injury. Moreover, the information available to counsel demonstrates counsel’s failure to

investigate such a brain injury was reasonable. Maples knew that he was smart and capable,

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reporting that he was in advanced placement classes in the sixth grade, but went from this

level to quitting high school because it wasn’t “cool” to be smart, and because he would not

be allowed to graduate with his classmates. (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27 at 3129, 3142.) Further, Dr.

Shealy’s psychological testing showed that Maples was focused, meticulous, “extremely

orderly, organized, careful, conscientious[,]” and not “expansive and impulsive.” (Id. at

3167.) Frost allegedly told Shealy that Maples was a well-behaved, perfectionist who was

always “three sheets to the wind”71the year before the murders. (Id. at 3143.) Also, based

on his objective testing, Shealy “ruled out that [Maples] was brain damaged.” (Id. at 3148.) 

Maples does not contend that Shealy was unaware of his past physical injuries. Maples has

not shown that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate possible traumatic brain

injury.

Moreover, the court finds that Maples has failed to show that further investigation

would have revealed that he actually suffered from such a brain injury and that its existence

71

“Three sheets to the wind” is a euphemism for drunkenness. One writer stated the

origin of the phrase as follows:

On a square-rigged sailing ship, a “sheet” is a line attached to the lower

corners of a squaresail, used for trimming it to the wind. When sheets are

allowed to run free, the sails lose their wind and flap and flutter. The ship’s

forward motion stops, and as she loses steerageway, she becomes impossible

to control. A person is said to be “three sheets to the wind” when in an

advanced state of inebriation, fluttering and wallowing around out of control.

R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Supreme Court and Local Government Law: Two Sheets

to the Wind, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361, 361 (1999)(citing Olivia A. Isil, WHEN A LOOSE

CANNON FLOGS A DEAD HORSE THERE’S THE DEVIL TO PAY 102 (1996)).

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would have shifted the balance between the aggravating circumstance and mitigating

circumstances such that the result of his sentencing proceedings would have been different.

The court further notes that Maples requested an extension of time to file the amended

habeas petition, in order to have a neuropsychologist examine him so that he could have the

results of that exam when he filed his third amended petition. (Doc. 23 at 4.) Although he

was granted the requested extension, Maples did not include the results of such examination

in his amended petition.

Maples has not established actual prejudice to overcome the procedural default and as

such, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing is due

to be denied. 

Alternatively, the Rule 32 court rejected the claim and made the following findings:

Maples fails to provide the Court with any supporting documents, such

as a report from a doctor or hospital or an affidavit from any individual that

would lend any credibility to this claim. Paragraph 150 is deficiently pleaded

because it contains only a bare allegation with no factual basis. “[N]o purpose

would be serviced by any further proceedings” by the Court; therefore, [this

claim] is summarily dismissed. Rules 32.3, 32.6(b) and 32.7(d), ARCrP.

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 67.) In his post-remand reply brief, Maples contends that

his claim contained “sufficient specificity” to entitle him to relief. (Doc. 73 at 59.) However,

this court’s review of that pleading shows that the Rule 32 court reasonably rejected this claim

for lack of specificity. At least fairminded jurists could debate the determination. The trial

court’s decision is not made unreasonable because the court found that Maples had failed to

provide documentary evidence lending credibility to his claims. The import of that comment

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was that Maples had left the court with no specific allegations to support his ineffectiveness

claim and no way to discern the supporting facts; it did not dismiss this claim based on a lack

of documentary proof.

For the foregoing reasons, this claim is procedurally defaulted and due to be denied. 

Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing is due to be denied.

C. COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE FOR USING CONTRADICTORY

STRATEGIES IN THE GUILT PHASE AND PENALTY PHASE (Claim III, Doc. 24

¶¶ 180-87.)72

Maples alleges:

180. Counsel were ineffective for using different and contradictory

strategies about Mr. Maples’[s] intoxication during the guilt and penalty phases

of Mr. Maples’[s] trial. Presenting affirmative evidence that is internally

inconsistent renders Counsel’s performance ineffective. See Waters v. Thomas,

46 F.3d 1506, 1530 (11th Cir. 1995)(Clark, J. dissenting)(“[B]ecause the guilt

phase and penalty trials are integrally related, devising one strategy for the guilt

phase and a separate one for the penalty phase is also insufficient. In order to

be effective, a capital defense attorney must develop a consistent theory to be

used at the guilt and penalty phases.”)(citing Welsh S. White, Effective

Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993

U. Ill. L. Rev. 323, 356-57); Sobel v. State, 564 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1990)(holding that counsel was ineffective when he called witnesses who gave

testimony adverse to the insanity defense he had asserted). Conflicting

evidence also confuses the jurors and causes them to distrust all evidence

presented by Counsel, thus undermining Mr. Maples’[s] credibility. See

generally, White, supra, para. 180.

72This habeas claim is virtually identical to the claim as pleaded in Maples’s Rule 32

petition and amended Rule 32 petition (which were themselves identical), with the exception

of the last sentence in which Maples argues that the jury was “more conviction prone” and

therefore “less able to fairly consider factual issues that individuallyor collectivelymay raise

reasonable doubt[.]” (Doc. 24, ¶¶ 180-87; Rule 32 C.R., Vol. 32, Tab 47, ¶¶ 171-78; Rule

32 C.R., Vol. 33, Tab 49, ¶¶ 171-178.)

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181. During the guilt phase of the trial, the State introduced substantial

evidence proving that Mr. Maples was intoxicated by the time he went to a pool

hall shortly before the shootings. . . . 

182. The State also introduced evidence that Mr. Maples used crack and

crystal methamphetamine on the night of the shootings. . . . 

183. In stark contrast, during the guilt phase Counsel attempted to

establish through cross-examination that Mr. Maples was neither intoxicated

nor under the influence of drugs at the time of the shootings. Counsel also

called several witnesses in a misguided attempt to show that Mr. Maples was

not intoxicated prior to the shootings. Inexplicably, while summarizing the

cross-examination and direct examination testimony during his closing

argument, Counsel inaccurately told the jury that “[t]here is no evidence that he

consumed drugs that night.” (R. at 2920.)

184. However, during the penalty phase, Counsel employed a strategy

directly contradictory to his guilt phase strategy. In Counsel’s opening

statement at the penalty phase, Counsel expressly contradicted their argument

in the guilt phase and substantially undercut their own credibility, as well as Mr.

Maples’[s] credibility, by stating that “there was at least evidence of at least

alcohol usage on this occasion . . . but there was also drug usage.” (R. at 3085.) 

Counsel further stated that Mr. Maples was so intoxicated and under the

influence of drugs at the time of the offense that “but for the alcohol and for the

drug usage on this occasion, this would probably not have happened. That is

a mitigating factor.” (R. 3085-86.) Counsel then introduced evidence of Mr.

Maples’[s] alcohol and drug usage to support at least two mitigating factors: 

(1) that the shootings occurred while Mr. Maples was under the influence of

extreme mental or emotional disturbance due to his use of drugs and alcohol

prior to the shootings (Ala. Code § 13A-5-51(2) (1994)) and (2) that the

capacity of Mr. Maples to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to

conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired by

drug and alcohol use (Ala. Code § 13A-5-51(6) (1994)).

185. Dr. Allen Shealy, a psychologist, testified that Mr. Maples was

drinking steadily for a period of approximately ten hours just prior to the

shootings, in addition to smoking at least some marijuana during this time (a

marijuana joint and 2/5th of whisky and some beer before 5 p.m., 7-8 additional

beers by 7:30 p.m., then funneling (quickly drinking) at least 2 more beers prior

to meeting friends at a bar where he drank 7-8 White Russian mixed drinks. (R.

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at 3109-24.) This pattern of alcohol and marijuana abuse served as a trigger

that, along with an internal stimulus due to emotional instability, contributed to

a state of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. (R. at 3168.) It also

impaired Mr. Maples “in terms of his capacity to behave in a normal fashion or

to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law.” (R. at 3155.) Thus,

Counsel provided evidence at the penalty phase of the trial in order to support

two of Mr. Maples’[s] mitigating factors that directly contradicted evidence

they presented at the guilt phase.

186. As instructed by the trial judge during the penalty phase, the jury

can consider evidence introduced by either party during both the guilt phase and

the penalty phase. (R. at 3318-19.) Counsel’s conduct in presenting

contradictory evidence severely damaged Mr. Maples’[s] case by undermining

his credibility and confusing the jurors, thus strengthening the State’s case and

leaving the jury little alternative but to sentence Mr. Maples to death. “Such

conduct . . . brings into question the fundamental fairness of the trial and shows

a collapse of the adversarial process.” Ex parte Womack, 541 So. 2d 47, 68

(Ala. 1988); see also Freeman v. Class, 95 F.3d 639, 642-43 (8th Cir.

1996)(holding that counsel was ineffective under Strickland when counsel

introduced into evidence documents that directly inculpated the defendant).

187. This error of contradictory strategies fell far below the standard of

reasonable performance and demonstrated such a failure to know or understand

the law that it cannot be considered permissible trial strategy. Counsel even

admitted at the beginning of the penalty phase that they lacked knowledge of

the law with respect to how to conduct an effective penalty phase defense,

telling the court, “I don’t know . . . I’m unfamiliar with this process.” (R. at

3064.) However, lack of knowledge of the law cannot be considered a trial

strategy. See Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1991). Here, Counsel’s

deficient performance prejudiced the jury against Mr. Maples, resulting in a

conviction of death that the jury would not otherwise have returned. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Further, the fact that the jury

was more conviction prone, Green, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 33-34, and such juries

are less able to fairly consider factual issues that individually or collectively

may raise a reasonable doubt, magnifies the errors of Counsel . . . and heightens

the probability that but for Counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding

would have been different.

(Doc. 24 ¶¶ 180-87.)

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According to Maples, his trial counsel “took fundamentally inconsistent positions

[about his] intoxication between the guilt phase and the penalty phase.” (Doc. 60 at 59.) He

alleges that, even if counsel’s decision not to pursue an intoxication defense at the guilt phase

of trial was not constitutionally deficient under Strickland, their “flip flop on the fact and

relevance of intoxication from the guilt phase to the penalty phase was itself constitutionally

deficient under Strickland.” (Id.) He contends that he was prejudiced because counsel

directly contradicted their position on intoxication, which “deprive[d] the jury of any

confidence of relying on his intoxication as a mitigating factor on which to base a

recommendation for life in prison instead of the death penalty.” (Id. at 100.)

This court already has addressed the reasonableness of counsel’s strategy at the guilt

phase of trial. Indeed, the court notes that the number ofstrategic options available to counsel

during the guilt phase of the trial were limited by Maples’s videotaped confession, including

his statement that he was not intoxicated at the time of the murders. In addition to Maples’s

statement denying he was intoxicated, his actions on the night of the murders and his ability

to recall the details of that night, as well as the testimony from witnesses that saw him before

the murders, severely limited counsel’s ability to argue a legal intoxication defense

persuasively. In the guilt phase closing argument, defense counsel argued that there was no

evidence that Maples was under the influence of drugs at the time of the offense. Counsel was

clearlyreferring to crack cocaine and/or crystal methamphetamine, which the State had argued

was the reason that Maples robbed and murdered Terry and Robinson – to feed a drug habit. 

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(R. Vol. 20, Tab 19, at 2920-24 [arguing that the testimony of Phillips and Smith did not show

that he robbed the victim to get crack cocaine or meth, asserting that Maples had denied using

crack and crystal meth consumption, no State witness had testified that they saw Maples

consume these drugs, and that the State’s assertion that Maples robbed Terry because he was

in love with the vehicle was unbelievable].) Counsel did not mention marijuana but he did

state that Maples could only surmise that the murders occurred because the personal demons

he thought about when he drank caused him to mentally snap. (Id. at 2917-18.) Counsel did

not take any legal position on the subject of Maples’s intoxication. 

What counsel did at the penalty phase closing argument was to emphasize Maples’s

alcohol and marijuana usage. They also built credibility with the jury by openly

acknowledging and expressing that counsel understood that, as evinced by their guiltyverdict,

the jury had accepted evidence that defense counsel had not, including evidence that after the

murders Maples had bought some crack cocaine. The penalty phase evidence supported

defense counsel’s maintenance of its own guilt phase factual position because that evidence

revealed that Maples may have consumed 18 to 21 alcoholic drinks (beer and liquor) and

shared a marijuana joint.

Maples’s counsel also did not pursue intoxication at the time of the offense as a

singular, isolated mitigating factor during the penaltyphase oftrial. Instead, counsel’s penalty

phase strategy was to argue that Maples’s actions on the night of the offense were based upon

several mitigating factors that, in combination, established Maples should be sentenced to life

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without parole. (R. Vol. 22, Tab 29, at 3273-76.) Specifically, counsel declared that Maples

had a history of childhood trauma. (Id.) He argued that the childhood abuse drove him to

self-medicate with alcohol and illegal drugs, and Maples had sought treatment for his drug

addiction. (Id.) Also, counsel argued that childhood abuse played a part in Maples’s

diminished mental capacity as result of a personality disorder. (Id.) Counsel argued that the

combination of the alcohol consumption and his personality disorder caused him to snap and

commit the murders. (Id.) Counsel clearly explained to the jury during the penalty phase the

relevance of Maples’s intoxication on the night of the offense. Maples’s credibility was not

damaged at this stage of the trial because counsel did not take a “fundamentally” or “directly”

contradictoryposition concerning the nature and extent of Maples’s alcohol and drug use from

the guilt phase of trial to the penalty phase of trial – either factually or legally. That the

penalty phase revealed that Maples had informed Shealy that he had more drinks than

previously admitted does not change or alter that conclusion. 

By taking no legal stance on Maples’s alcohol and marijuana ingestion at the guilt

phase of trial, and then explaining its legal relevance at the penalty phase of trial, counsel

maintained a fairly consistent position on the matter throughout both phases of trial. That

consistency matched counsel’s strategies at the guilt and penalty phase of trial, i.e., Maples’s

alcohol and marijuana use did not rise to the level necessary to negate specific intent to

commit the capital offenses, but such use was sufficient to lessen or mitigate Maples’s

culpability for the murders. 

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Moreover, and contrary to Maples’s contention, (see doc. 73 at 59-60), counsel’s

statement at the penalty phase closing argument that he was “unfamiliar with this process”

does not establish that his counsel’s performance was deficient. Counsel made a selfdeprecating statement, admitting his inexperience with the penalty phase of a capital case, but

the evidence presented, the strategies taken, and his penalty phase argument as a whole show

that counsel knew well what his duties were. (R. Vol. 21, Tab 25, at 3081-82.) In any event,

Maples has not shown otherwise with regard to this claim or any other penalty phase

ineffectiveness claim. There is no reasonable probability that the result of the penalty phase

would have been different had counsel argued that Maples was intoxicated at the guilt phase

of his trial. Therefore, the court finds Maples has not established actual prejudice, and this

claim remains procedurally defaulted. Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing is due to

be denied. 

Alternatively, the court finds this claim without merit. The Rule 32 court held:

In [this] Claim . . . of Maples’s petition he alleges that trial counsel were

ineffective for “using different and contradictory strategies about [his]

intoxication during the guilt and penaltyphase of [his] trial.” (Maples’s petition

at p. 75) Specifically, Maples contends that the State “introduced substantial

evidence” that he was intoxicated shortly before the murders, and that he used

crack and crystal methamphetamine on the night of the murders and, “[i]n stark

contrast”, trial counsel attempted to establish that Maples was not intoxicated

or under the influence of drugs. Maples contends that, during the penalty phase,

trial counsel “employed a strategy directly contradictory to his guilt phase

strategy”, by attempting to establish that alcohol was the cause of the murders. 

During the guilt phase of trial, Maples’s confession to police was

admitted into evidence. In it, Maples said he was not intoxicated at the time he

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committed the murders. On direct appeal, the Criminal Court of Appeals held

that:

[a]lthough there was some testimony that [Maples] had ingested

alcohol several hours before the murders occurred, there was no

testimony that he was intoxicated at the time of the murders. 

Also, there was no evidence that Maples ingested drugs before

the murders. 

Maples, 758 So. 2d at 24. 

During the penalty phase of trial, Dr. Shealy testified concerning

statements Maples made during their interview. According to Shealy, Maples

said that he was intoxicated at the time he committed the murders. The Court

of Criminal Appeals found that:

[Shealy] testified that [Maples] told him he was intoxicated and

on drugs on the night of the murders, but [Maples] denied that on

his videotaped confession.

Maples, 758 So. 2d at 56.

In Strickland, the Supreme Court stated that:

The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or

substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or

actions. 

466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. 

In Bui v. State, 717 So. 2d 6 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), the petitioner

contended that his trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase of his

trial for presenting allegedly inconsistent defenses. The Court of Criminal

Appeals held that “an attorney’s presentation of somewhat inconsistent

alternative defenses is not necessarily defective performance.” Id. at 21. 

The Bui Court went on to indicate that:

We are loathe to find fault with the appellant’s trial counsel for

attempting to make the most of the unfavorable facts of a case he

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was presented with and for advocating as many plausible

explanations for the appellant’s actions as the evidence might

support, even where those explanations may not have been

entirely consistent. 

Id.

During the guilt phase, trial counsel’s strategywas to attack the elements

of the indictment that raised the offenses from intentional murders to capital

murders. Trial counsel attempted to show that the murders were not committed

pursuant to a common plan or scheme as alleged in Count I of the indictment

by arguing that the lapse of time between the discovery of Terry’s body and the

discovery of Robinson’s body established a reasonable doubt that someone else

could have murdered Robinson. Trial counsel attempted to show that Maples

took Terry’s car as a mere afterthought and not as part of a plan to rob him as

alleged in Count II of the indictment. 

Although Maples argues that trial counsel’s guilt and penalty “strategies

fell far below the standard of reasonable performance and demonstrated such

a failure to know or understand the law that is cannot be considered permissible

[trial] strategy”, he fails to plead and prove, given the overwhelming evidence

against him, “that no counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did

take.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315. Maples has failed to carry his burden of

proof and show that, “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct.

at 2968. Maples has failed to establish that trial counsel’s performance was

deficient or caused him to be prejudiced. 

 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66, at 83-86.)

Maples declares that the “Alabama trial court’s conclusion [that counsel’s] astounding

handling of the intoxication issue was constitutionally adequate is clearlywrong and based on

an unreasonable application of Strickland.” (Doc. 73 at 27.) After careful consideration, this

court rejects Maples’s argument. The Rule 32 court did not unreasonably determine that

counsel’s guilt and penalty phase strategic decisions were dictated by the evidence – including

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Maples’s videotaped taped confession. Maples’s denial on videotape of using drugs and being

drunk at the time of the murders limited the arguments that counsel could make regarding

Maples’s actual drug and alcohol use before the murders. Indeed, his detailed recollection of

his thoughts and actions before, during, and after the murders on videotape limited the

arguments counsel could make persuasively regarding the effect of marijuana and alcohol

consumption on Maples at the time of the murders.73 Nothing Maples has argued regarding

the performance of counsel underthe circumstances demonstrates that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel and/or that he suffered actual prejudice.

The court has difficulty imagining any course of action available to counsel that had

any remote possibility of changing the outcome of this case. Given Maples’s videotaped

confession – admitting to the murders and to taking Terry’s car and denying he was drunk or

had used any hard drugs, the court finds no reasonable probability that the result of either the

guilt or penalty phases of his trial would have been different but for the alleged errors of

counsel. Counsel committed to a reasonable guilt phase strategy that avoided intoxication

because that defense was not legally viable under any of Maples’s statements about the level

of his alcohol and marijuana ingestion and to the extent that crack or crystal meth might have

been included in the mix, carried with it the dangerous prospect of supplying motive. Had

counsel’s reasonable strategy been successful, they would have won an acquittal as to the

73Shealy testified that the alcohol and marijuana alone were not enough on their own

to set off Maples. (R. Vol. 21, Tab 27, at 3170-71.)

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capital offenses by convincing the jury to convict Maples of non-capital intentional murders. 

However, their guilt phase strategy failed. And, at the penalty phase counsel addressed the

issue of intoxication head on and as sympathetically as possible by arguing that the impetus

for the murders was Maples’s prior substance abuse history, his drunkenness at the time of the

offenses, and his mental disorder – all of which were connected to the abuse and abandonment

he suffered.

Maples has not shown actual prejudice as a result of his counsel’s alleged contradictory

strategies at the guilt and penalty phases. For all of the foregoing reasons, this claim is

procedurally defaulted, or in the alternative, due to be denied. Maples’s request for an

evidentiary hearing is due to be denied.

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D. COUNSEL’S CUMULATIVE ERRORS.74

Maples asserts that “when considered cumulatively, there can be no doubt that Maples

suffered prejudice” under Strickland. (Doc. 60 at 106.) This court has examined counsel’s

alleged errors, addressed in this Memorandum Opinion above, as a whole, for the purpose of

determining whether Maples has established actual prejudice for purposes of overcoming his

procedural default and/or for establishing his Strickland claims. Based on this consideration,

this court finds Maples has not shown actual prejudice. There is no reasonable probability that

the result of Maples’s trial would have been different if not for the alleged errors of counsel. 

The court finds that the record contains overwhelming evidence that Maples was guilty

of capital murder in the deaths of Terry and Robinson. Moreover, the evidence he contends

mitigates his crimes actually provides little or no reason for lessening the severity of his

74In his habeas petition, Maples raised this as a separate claim (Claim XXXV), and

alleged that the “cumulative effect” of all errors alleged in his petition entitled him to relief. 

(Doc. 24 ¶ 470.) That claim was denied on the merits in this court’s September 29, 2006,

Memorandum Opinion. (Doc. 34 at 120.) The Rule 32 court also denied this claim, but did

so after globally excepting the ineffective assistance of counsel claims from its holding. 

(Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 37, Tab 66 at 7.) At the time this court’s Memorandum Opinion was

entered, the ineffectiveness claims were found to be procedurally defaulted by the untimely

collateral appeal.

Now, the court is asked to conduct a 2254(d) analysis as to whether there was

cumulative prejudice in connection with Maples’s ineffectiveness claims. Turning again to

the state court’s order, this court finds the state court did not consider this question in

connection with that claim as a whole (or the guilt or penalty phases of trial), but only in

connection with those ineffectiveness sub-claims for which Maples specifically made a

cumulative error argument. Maples did not assert a specific, cumulative-error argument

within any of the ineffective-assistance sub-claims; accordingly, there was no ruling on this

question.

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punishment. The court finds none of Maples’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel –

separately or together – “were so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result

is reliable.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “The defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probabilitythat, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,the result ofthe proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. Nothing Maples has presented undermines the court’s

confidence in the outcome of his trial.

The court finds this claim is procedurally defaulted, and, in the alternative, without

merit. Maples’s request for an evidentiary hearing is due to be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Maples’s claims are due to be denied and

his Petition is due to be dismissed. An Order dismissing Maples’s Amended Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus, (doc. 24), will be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum

Opinion.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Courts, the district court must issue or denya certificate of appealabilitywhen it enters

a final order adverse to the habeas petitioner. This Court may issue a certificate of

appealability “only if the applicant has a made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, Maples must

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demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the

constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), or

that “the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,”

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)(citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). This court finds that Maples’s claims do not satisfy either standard.

Therefore, the district court will deny Maples a certificate of appealability in the Order

entered contemporaneously herewith.

DONE this 14th day of September, 2015.

 

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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