Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00573/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00573-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Introduction, Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Jose Lopez Hernandez is a former federal prisoner proceeding pro se in this action 

brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 

388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), which provides a remedy for violation of civil rights by federal actors.

Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 14.)

Plaintiff initiated this action on March 30, 2015. Plaintiff’s complaint was originally filed in 

the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division. Plaintiff 

was housed at the United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute (“USP Terre Haute”) at the time he filed this 

action. Subsequently, this action was transferred to this Court on the grounds that the events at issue 

allegedly occurred at or near Atwater, California, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the United States 

Penitentiary in Atwater (“USP Atwater”). (ECF No. 5.) 

JOSE LOPEZ HERNANDEZ,

 Plaintiff,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-00573-BAM (PC)

SCREENING ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF 

TO EITHER FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR 

NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO 

PROCEED ONLY ON COGNIZABLE CLAIMS

(ECF No. 1)

THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE

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Plaintiff’s complaint is currently before the Court for screening. The Court is required to 

screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an 

officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any 

portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s 

allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

While prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, the pleading standard is now higher, 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), and to survive screening, 

Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court 

to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 

962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and 

mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

Bivens actions and actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “are identical save for the replacement of a 

state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens.” Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th 

Cir. 1991). Under Bivens, a plaintiff may sue a federal officer in his or her individual capacity for 

damages for violating the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. To state a claim 

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a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution of the United States was violated, 

and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a federal actor.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is a former federal prisoner. The events alleged in Plaintiff’s amended complaint 

occurred while he was housed at various federal penitentiaries. Plaintiff names the following 

defendants: (1) the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”); (2) H.A. Riso, Jr., Warden, at USP Atwater; 

(3) Officer Saragosh, Special Investigative Services (“SIS”) Officer, at USP Atwater; and (4) Officer 

Estrada, SIS Officer, at USP Atwater. 

In 2007, Plaintiff was infected with and diagnosed as having Hepatitis C. Lab reports show that 

Plaintiff had Hepatitis C as early as April 7, 2009. Plaintiff was housed at United States Penitentiary, 

Florence (“USP Florence”) in 2009, but did not receive treatment. On April 7, 2009, Derick Phillip, 

M.D., conducted a lab test on Plaintiff, which revealed that he was afflicted with the Hepatitis C 

genotype. Dr. Phillip refused to order any treatment. 

Plaintiff was housed at USP Atwater for six months in 2011, and the Clinical Director, Jon F.

Franco, M.D. refused to treat Plaintiff with medicine called, “Interferon.” All other medical staff at 

other BOP facilities where Plaintiff was housed fell in concert with this established denial. Interferon 

could have arrested the disease, if not cured it. Warden H.A. Rios, Jr. had knowledge of Plaintiff’s 

affliction. 

Defendants H.A. Rios, Jr., Officer Saragosh, and Officer Estrada were told by Plaintiff and 

others that the Mexican Mafia intended to kill Plaintiff if he went into the prison’s general population. 

Nevertheless, these Defendants ordered Plaintiff to leave the Segregated Housing Unit at USP 

Atwater, and enter the prison’s general population. Consequently, on June 7, 2011, members of the 

Mexican Mafia attacked and tried to kill Plaintiff, inflicting severe and disabling injuries. Plaintiff was 

stabbed several times and beaten with clubs, etc., injuring his head, brain, hands, wrist and back. 

Plaintiff remains partially crippled. Plaintiff will require a lifetime of medical care and attention due to 

his injuries, and will be unable to return to his former occupation as a wage earner and support himself 

and his family. These Defendants conspired with members of the Mexican Mafia prison gang.

///

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On January 5, 2012, Plaintiff was transferred to Federal Correctional Complex, Butner (“FCC 

Butner”), and one month later, on February 3, 2012, was evaluated by Ramsey Roscoe, M.D. It was 

determined that Plaintiff had Hepatitis C. Plaintiff was provided with a psychological warning as to 

the effects of treatment for Hepatitis C with Interferon. No treatment was provided. Plaintiff attaches a 

liver ultrasound dated February 2, 2012, which states that Plaintiff had Hepatitis C, and the liver study 

was unremarkable. (ECF No. 1-10, p. 5.) Plaintiff struggled with the BOP employees at FCC Butner,

attempting to receive treatment for Hepatitis C. It got to the point where the BOP would not sign any 

medical documents or give a reason on paper saying why this medical procedure was being denied. 

On August 29, 2012, a biopsy was taken at the request of Sielicki Stanislaw, M.D. The biopsy 

showed “chronic hepatitis, mild activity (grade 1) with possible early bridging fibrosis (stage 1-2).” 

(ECF No. 1-5, p. 1.)

On May 14, 2013, Plaintiff received notification of the side effects to the triple therapy which 

is a prerequisite to the treatment itself, conducted by Allisa M. Marquez, psych. pre-doctorial intern. 

Then Plaintiff received an administrative note from medical records which showed that Stander Klint, 

M.D., notified psychology for an updated evaluation dated May 29, 2014. No dual notice of the side 

effects to treatment are required, and no re-notification of side effects was ever given. Plaintiff was 

seen on August 14, 2014 by Clinical Director Wilson, but the report was falsified/altered to reflect 

treatment by Klint, M.D. Neither of them filed a referral for the psychological evaluation. The reports 

also do not show Hepatitis C. was diagnosed. The neglect and failure to treat Plaintiff caused him to 

urinate blood. 

On or about September 2013, Plaintiff asked Warden J. Andrews why he was not being 

administered treatment for Hepatitis C, and the response was, “Oh, you have already started to file 

your administrative remedies, so you will not be getting any treatment, and don’t you ever bother me 

again.” (ECF No. 1-1, p. 3.) Warden Andrews and Associate Warden Williams frustrated and stymied 

Plaintiff’s efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

Plaintiff was transferred to USP Terre Haute on March 21, 2014, and was seen by Clinical 

Director William Wilson, M.D., shortly after his arrival. Plaintiff requested treatment for his Hepatitis

C. He signed off on the Notice to Adverse Effects of the Treatment, which set up a series of denials by 

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the staff at USP Terre Haute. Warden J.F. Caraway asserted that there was not enough evidence for 

treatment.

On May 29, 2014, an algorithm for treatment of Hepatitis C was requested by Stander Klint, 

M.D., and warnings were to be given to Plaintiff, but Plaintiff did not receive them until September 

10, 2014. 

On July 1, 2014, Plaintiff emailed the pharmacist inquiring why he was not receiving treatment 

for Hepatitis C. The pharmacist responded that a non-formulary was sent to the central office and they 

denied it on June 26, 2014. Plaintiff has learned that the denial was by the regional director for the 

North Central Region of BOP. Plaintiff emailed others regarding his treatment, including the complex 

warden, Wilson MD/CD, and Rupska (HAS). On July 31, 2014, Plaintiff emailed health services 

requesting x-rays of the hand and back besides Percocet, but the only treatment he received for all his 

illnesses and injuries was Prednisone, which he was told would be discontinued on August 4, 2014. 

Plaintiff sent another email on August 11, 2014, and the response the same day was sent by someone 

unwilling to identify themselves. 

The reason for refusing to provide Interferon to Plaintiff was based on ethnicity, and not 

medical considerations or price. The BOP has a policy not to prescribe Interferon to prisoners who are 

subject to deportation at the expiration of their sentence, including Plaintiff. More than twenty whites 

Plaintiff spoke to informed him that they were given treatment without any hassle, but AfricanAmericans he talked to were discriminated against just like Mexicans, where this cure was concerned. 

The information concerning racial discrimination was brought to Warden Caraway’s attention, 

but he explained away both the BOP’s denial of treatment and its practices. An August 15, 2014 email 

attached as an exhibit from Warden Caraway discusses a medical report cited by Plaintiff, and states 

that: “This means in order for you to be a candidate [for treatment with Interferon], you must have a 

repeat liver biopsy and laboratory testing completed to rule out other diagnoses. Then if you meet the 

criteria for medication, a treatment plan can be discussed. This is in no way related to your race.” 

(ECF No. 1-9, p. 1.)

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Plaintiff alleges he has suffered emotional distress, fear, loss of sleep, mistrust, deterioration of 

the liver, humiliation, loss of future income, medical expenses, loss of sex drive, fractured spine, and 

loss of mobility in hand and back. Plaintiff further alleges that his life expectancy has been severely 

shortened, and he will experience unnecessary pain and suffering, and incur substantial medical costs 

and expenses for the treatment of Hepatitis C and its affiliated symptoms, all of which would have 

been avoided through proper administration of Interferon while he was a federal prisoner. 

Plaintiff seeks $2M in compensatory damages for the refusal to treat his Hepatitis C, and $2M 

in damages for the injuries and damages from the physical attack on June 7, 2011. He also seeks

punitive damages.

III. Discussion

A. Pleading Standards

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed 

factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–

557; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

Plaintiff’s complaint does not include a short and plain statement of his claims. Instead, it is a 

lengthy narrative detailing various events taking place from 2007 to 2014, regarding various events 

involving various people, while Plaintiff was housed at several different institutions. Plaintiff has also 

pieced together what appears to be three different complaints drafted at different times into one 

document. The complaint also contains conclusory statements, conjecture, and assumptions of fact, 

such as assertions of conspiracy. 

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2. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20

Plaintiff asserts numerous allegations against different defendants based on different, 

unconnected events. Plaintiff may not bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single 

action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. 

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff only may bring a claim against multiple defendants 

so long as (1) the claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and 

occurrences, and (2) there are commons questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); Coughlin v. 

Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 

623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). Only if the defendants are properly joined under Rule 20(a) will 

the Court review the other claims to determine if they may be joined under Rule 18(a), which permits 

the joinder of multiple claims against the same party.

Plaintiff may not pursue claims for relief in this action arising from events which occurred 

outside of this district at other institutions. Plaintiff may only proceed on claims which accrued 

following his transfer to USP Atwater. If Plaintiff wishes to impose liability under Bivens for the 

events which occurred at USP Florence, FCC Butner, USP Terre Haute, or elsewhere, he must file suit 

in the jurisdictions for those institutions.

Further, even with regards to events at USP Atwater, Plaintiff cannot bring claims against 

certain defendants related to his medical treatment, and other defendants regarding the June 7, 2011 

attack by the Mexican Mafia, in the same action. As explained in more detail below, if Plaintiff elects 

to amend his complaint, he must decide which incidents and which defendants he seeks to pursue in 

this action. Plaintiff is not precluded from filing separate actions against unrelated defendants 

involving different incidents. 

B. Legal Standards

1. Liability Against BOP

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to name BOP as a Defendant, he may not pursue a claim against a 

federal agency under Bivens. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486, 114 S. Ct. 996, 127 L. Ed. 2d 308 

(1994); see also Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 2008) (“no Bivenslike cause of action is available against federal agencies or federal agents sued in their official 

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capacities”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a Bivens claim against the Bureau of 

Prisons.

2. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 

must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, S. Ct. 285, 291, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 

(1976)). Plaintiff must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a 

prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction 

of pain and (2) defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Deliberate indifference is shown where the official is aware of a serious medical need and fails 

to adequately respond. Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir.2010). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1019; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 

F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004). The prison official must be aware of facts from which he could make 

an inference that “a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and he must make the inference. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994).

Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Defendant Rios for deliberate indifference to a serious 

medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff only makes a conclusory allegation that 

Defendant Rios knew Plaintiff’s affliction, but does not explain what that Defendant knew about the 

risk to Plaintiff from any failure to treat, and how that Defendant failed to adequately respond. 

Plaintiff has not named Clinical Director Jon F. Franco, M.D., as a defendant, but to the extent 

he seeks to state a claim against Dr. Franco, he has not done so. Plaintiff has alleged that Dr. Franco 

designated him not to be treated using Interferon, suggesting a disagreement with Dr. Franco’s 

treatment recommendation. When a plaintiff disagrees with the course of treatment, the plaintiff “must 

show that the course of treatment was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the 

defendant chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson 

v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s allegations are inadequate to show that Dr. Franco’s treatment 

recommendation was medically unacceptable under the circumstances, or was done in conscious 

disregard of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health.

3. Eighth Amendment – Failure to Protect

Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants Rios, Saragosh, and Estrada for failing to protect 

him from the beating he suffered on June 7, 2011 by members of the Mexican Mafia. The Eighth 

Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane conditions 

of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2005). Prison officials must take 

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33, 114 S. Ct. at 

1976 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In a “failure-to-protect” Eighth Amendment violation 

claim, an inmate must show that a prison official’s act or omission (1) is objectively, sufficiently 

serious, and (2) the official is deliberately indifferent to inmate’s health or safety. Id. at 834, 1977; 

Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005). The failure of prison officials to protect 

inmates from attacks by other inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation where 

prison officials know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer, 

522 U.S. at 847, 114 S. Ct. at 1984; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040.

Plaintiff has stated cognizable claims against Defendants Rios, Saragosh, and Estrada for the 

failure to protect him from the initiation of a beating on June 7, 2011, by members of the Mexican 

Mafia.

4. Fifth Amendment – Equal Protection

Plaintiff asserts that he was treated differently from other inmates regarding the provision of 

Interferon, in violation of his equal protection rights. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment “subjects the federal government to constitutional limitations that are the equivalent of 

those imposed on the states by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Consejo 

de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C., v United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1170 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of 

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985); Hartmann v. 

California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 

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F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal 

protection claim may be established by showing that Defendants intentionally discriminated against 

Plaintiff based on his membership in a protected class, Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Furnace, 705 F.3d 

at 1030; Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702-03 (9th Cir. 

2009); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 

668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently 

without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 

553 U.S. 591, 601-02, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (2008); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 

120 S.Ct. 1073 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North 

Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not state an equal protection claim as he has not provided 

sufficient facts demonstrating that he was intentionally discriminated against based on his membership 

in any protected class, or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently 

without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Plaintiff’s allegations that he was denied 

Interferon due to race or deportation status are vague and conclusory. Plaintiff alleges a BOP policy, 

but without any information about the policy, including whom applied it to Plaintiff. Further, although 

he alleges whites received Interferon, he has not alleged enough factual detail from which the Court 

could infer that he was similarly situated to such individuals. Also, the exhibits to his complaint that 

Plaintiff cites in support of this claim discuss the treatment decision as medically-based.

5. Conspiracy

An actionable Bivens conspiracy claim requires (1) the existence of an express or implied 

agreement among the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and (2) an actual 

deprivation of those rights resulting from that agreement. Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1512 

(9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations of a conspiracy between Defendants Rios, 

Saragosh, and Estrada and the Mexican Mafia. Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient factual allegations 

to establish the existence of an express or implied agreement among those defendants to have him 

harmed by the Mexican Mafia. 

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IV. Conclusion and Order

The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against Defendants Rios, Saragosh, 

and Estrada for the failure to protect him from the initiation of the June 7, 2011 beating by members of 

the Mexican Mafia, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, Plaintiff has failed to state any 

other cognizable claims. The Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the identified 

deficiencies which Plaintiff believes in good faith, are curable. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his 

amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 

If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, 

unrelated claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(no “buckshot” complaints). 

If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and he is agreeable to proceeding only 

on the cognizable claims identified by the Court, he may file a notice informing the Court that he does 

not intend to amend and he is willing to proceed only on his cognizable claim. The remaining 

defendants and claims will then be dismissed, and the Court will provide Plaintiff with the requisite 

forms to complete and return so that service of process may be initiated. 

If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be 

brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must also state what each named defendant did that led to the 

deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-89, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49. 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations admitted). 

Plaintiff is also reminded that Plaintiff’s amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

Lacey, 693 F.3d at 927. Absent prior court approval, the amended pleading must be complete in itself 

without reference to any prior pleading. Local Rule 220.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

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a. File a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the 

Court in this order, or 

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and he is willing to proceed only on the cognizable claims identified above; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed, without 

prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and for failure to prosecute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 18, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00573-AWI-BAM Document 18 Filed 07/18/16 Page 12 of 12