Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00371/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00371-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 06cv371 NLS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD ALLEN, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE GHOULISH GALLERY, an entity of

unknown form; TIM TURNER, an individual,

APRIL TURNER, an individual, and DOES 1

through 10, inclusive,

Defendants. 

TIM TURNER, an individual, APRIL

TURNER, an individual, dba THE

GHOULISH GALLERY,

Counterclaimants,

v.

EDWARD ALLEN, an individual,

Counterdefendant.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 06cv371 NLS

ORDER:

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE

APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF

TIME TO FILE MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY’S FEES [Doc. No. 149];

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

[Doc. No. 156]; and

(3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

[Doc. No. 158].

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 06cv371 NLS

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

The Trial.

The Court held a bench trial in this matter. At trial Edward Allen (Plaintiff) pursued his claims

against defendants Tim Turner dba The Ghoulish Gallery and April Turner (collectively, Defendants). 

At the end of Plaintiff’s case defendant April Turner moved for a nonsuit. The Court granted the

motion. 

Before trial April Turner requested to dismiss her counterclaims against Plaintiff. See Mem. &

Ruling, p.2, n.1 [Doc. No. 135]. In its Memorandum and Ruling, the Court explained that April Turner

was no longer a party in the case, and focused its ruling on Tim Turner (Defendant). 

The trial lasted five days. Plaintiff represented himself. He had an assistant with him at

counsel’s table. The Court afforded both parties thirteen hours and forty-five minutes, exclusive of

breaks, to prosecute and defend their respective cases. The Court was mindful that Plaintiff was

proceeding with his case pro se and presumably without the help of legal counsel. For example, the

Court always accepted Plaintiff’s trial documents even though he filed most of them late. See, e.g.,

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Pretrial Disclosures [Doc. No. 75 (due July 11 but filed July 19, 2007)];

Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendant’s Pretrial Disclosures [Doc. No. 82 (due Aug. 3 but filed Aug. 4,

2007)]; Plaintiff’s Oppositions to Motions in Limine [Doc. Nos. 105, 106 (due Sept. 24 but filed Sept.

25, 2007)]; Revised Pretrial Order [Doc. No. 113 (due Sept. 25 but filed Sept. 28, 2007)]; Joint Final

Exhibit List [Doc. No. 116 (due Sept. 25 but filed Sept. 28, 2007)]; Plaintiff’s Final Witness List [Doc.

No. 118 (due Sept. 25 but filed Sept. 28, 2007)]; Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law (Doc. No. 119 (due Sept. 25 but filed Sept. 30, 2007)]. The Court generously gave him a second

opportunity to try to present valid evidence of his copyright. And, though Plaintiff ran out of his allotted

time at trial, the Court gave him extra time to give a closing argument. 

At trial, Plaintiff testified on direct exam until the second afternoon of trial. Most of the exhibits

he testified to revolved around the components of the parties’ websites, such as the font, gallery pages,

frames, background pattern, matting, character biographies and use of the word “Little.” He also

testified about his copyright claim on re-direct exam. While Plaintiff’s direct exam of Defendant

touched on all issues, it focused on issues relevant to the copyright claim. Defendant’s counsel did a

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 06cv371 NLS

direct exam of Plaintiff on day five of trial, and took significant time to go through each argument

Plaintiff posed in his copyright claim and rebutted it with a number of exhibits.

On day one of trial, Plaintiff requested judicial notice of the certificate of copyright registration. 

The Court denied the request without prejudice because the certificate, on its own, was not evidence of

what was allegedly copyrighted. Mindful that he was proceeding pro se, the Court allowed Plaintiff an

additional opportunity to provide visual depictions of the copyrighted material. On day four of trial, the

Court held a special hearing where Plaintiff presented to the Court and to opposing counsel–for the first

time–a copy of a CD rom. The copied CD rom allegedly contained Plaintiff’s copyrighted material, and

Plaintiff testified that his agent submitted the original CD rom to the copyright office. The Court

ultimately denied the request for judicial notice of the CD rom because Plaintiff did not adequately

authenticate it. The Court did recognize, however, that Plaintiff presented evidence that screenshots

printed from the CD rom were accurate representations of what Plaintiff created and sought to

copyright. 

In his pre-trial brief, Plaintiff devoted over eleven pages to his copyright claim and used less

than seven pages to discuss his remaining five claims. In his post-trial brief, Plaintiff spent over six

pages discussing his copyright claim, while he spent less than nine pages discussing his other five

claims in the complaint.

The Court’s Ruling.

On November 21, 2007, the Court entered judgment as to all the claims and counterclaims.

Plaintiff prevailed on his claims for false advertising under the Lanham Act and unfair business

practices under California’s Business and Professions Code sections 17200 et seq. Defendant

successfully defended against Plaintiff’s claims for copyright infringement, common law unfair

competition, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and trade libel.

Plaintiff successfully defended all of Defendant’s counterclaims, specifically, false advertising

under the Lanham Act, false or misleading statements under state law, common law unfair competition,

intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, trade libel and defamation.

In its ruling the Court spent over seven pages addressing Plaintiff’s copyright claim. It devoted

approximately seventeen pages to discuss the remaining eleven claims.

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

Unless otherwise specified, all references to “Rule” will refer to a Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure.

4 06cv371 NLS

Motions for Attorney’s Fees.

On December 5, 2007, Defendants filed a motion for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff filed a motion for

attorney’s fees on December 12, 2007. On January 2, 2008 Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for an

extension of time to file his motion for attorney’s fees. After the Court received and reviewed all

pleadings associated with the motions, the Court ordered most of the documents stricken from the record

because they included confidential statements from settlement negotiations. Plaintiff’s pleadings also 

included personal attacks on Defendants and their counsel which violated this Court’s rules governing

professionalism. See Jan. 16, 2008 Order. The Court specifically identified the line numbers or

paragraphs of the text that it wanted deleted, and allowed the parties to re-file redacted versions of the

stricken documents by January 23, 2008.

DISCUSSION

Timeliness Under Rule 54.1

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(A) requires a prevailing party to make a claim for

attorney’s fees by motion. The motion must be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment. 

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(d)(2)(B)(i). Civil Local Rule 54.1 states that the service and filing of an attorney’s

fees motion shall “in no event be later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the decree or judgment.” 

To request the acceptance of an untimely filed motion, the applicant may file an ex parte application for

extension of time, only if he or she files that application before the 14 days has expired. Fed. R. Civ.

Proc. 6(b)(1). If the time to file the attorney’s fees motion has already expired, any request to extend the

deadline must be made through a fully noticed motion that demonstrates the party failed to act because

of excusable neglect. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 6(b)(1)(B). 

“Failure to comply with the time limit in Rule 54 is a sufficient reason to deny a motion for fees

absent some compelling showing of good cause.” Petrone v. Veritas Software Corp., 496 F.3d 962, 972

(9th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of attorney’s fees motion because it was filed 15 days late and movant

did not show a compelling reason for the delay). To show excusable neglect for the delay, a court must

examine these factors under Rule 6(b): “(1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 06cv371 NLS

of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the

movant acted in good faith.” Id. at 973 (internal quotations omitted). “[I]nadvertence, ignorance of the

rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable’ neglect.” Committee for

Idaho's High Desert v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing possible examples of excusable

neglect as “illness, injury or death of counsel, or members of his family, or fire, flood, vandalism or

destruction of counsel's law office or word processing equipment”).

Here, Plaintiff filed his fees motion December 12, 2007, seven days after the deadline. He

waited until January 2, 2008–the day before his reply was due–to file an ex parte application requesting

that the Court accept his untimely motion. To show excusable neglect for his late filing, Plaintiff argues

that Defendant still had ample time to file an opposition. Plaintiff also argues he “was confused by the

wording of the court’s document titled ‘Memorandum and Ruling Following Trial’ which stated ‘The

Clerk is hereby directed to enter judgment . . .’”, and that based on that language, he did not think that

judgment had yet been entered. Pl.’s Ex Parte Application, p.3 (emphasis in original). Finally, Plaintiff

says that after a brief illness he was able to file his declaration late.

Here, Plaintiff’s request that the Court accept the late attorney’s fees motion is procedurally

improper. Plaintiff had already missed the 14-day deadline, so he should have made any request to

accept the late-filed motion by a fully noticed motion, and not by an ex parte application. Further,

considering the substance of the motion, the Court finds that Defendants were prejudiced by the

untimely filing of the motion because Plaintiff filed the declaration to support his motion on December

28 [Stricken Doc. No. 147], the day after Defendants had filed their opposition [Stricken Doc. No. 143]. 

Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that he did not understand the language “the Clerk is hereby directed to

enter judgment” is unavailing because, even if the wording confused him, he could have called on a

number of resources–including his attorney that he admits to consulting with throughout this process–to

clarify the meaning. See Pl.’s Mem. Ps&As p.5, ll.20-21; pp. 2-6, lower left corner (includes attorney

Matthew Becker’s name and address); Allen Decl. In Support of Pl.’s Motion ¶ 9. 

While this Court has extended Plaintiff numerous courtesies in allowing him extra time to file

pleadings, it did so because (1) it was operating under the belief that Plaintiff was proceeding pro se;

and (2) the deadlines at issue were imposed by this Court’s own orders. In his moving papers Plaintiff

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

Plaintiff did not prevail on his claim insofar that it alleged Defendant fabricated customer

feedback on The Ghoulish Gallery website.

6 06cv371 NLS

admits that he, in fact, has not been proceeding pro se and has been contracting work to his attorney. 

But now, both federal statute and local rule impose the 14-day deadline at issue. The Court is bound by

pertinent authority to make a finding of excusable neglect before exercising its discretion on whether to

accept the filing. Based on Plaintiff’s procedural violations, especially in light of his collaboration with

counsel, and his lack of any substantive reason for the late filing, this Court cannot make a finding of

excusable neglect that meets the standard set forth in Rule 6(b). Accordingly, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s ex parte application for an extension of time to file his motion for attorney’s fees and

DENIES his motion for attorney’s fees as untimely. Notwithstanding this finding, the Court analyzes

the substance of Plaintiff’s motion and also denies it on alternative grounds, as explained below.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Fees and Costs.

1. Request for Attorney’s Fees.

The Court found in Plaintiff’s favor on one aspect of his false advertising claim, finding that

Defendant violated the Lanham Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).2

 Specifically, the Court found

Defendant’s promotional statements that the Ghoulish Gallery had been in the portrait changing

business since 1995 were either “false, or at the very least misled, confused or deceived consumers.” 

Mem. & Ruling Following Trial (“Ruling”), pp.13-14. Now, Plaintiff asks for attorney’s fees and costs

for prevailing on his false advertising claim. Pl.’s Amended Mem. Ps&As, p.2.

 A court, using its discretion, may grant a plaintiff damages for violations of the Lanham Act:

“the plaintiff shall be entitled... and subject to principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2)

any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Even

though Plaintiff did not present evidence of actual lost sales, the Court used its equitable power under 15

U.S.C. § 1117(a) and awarded Plaintiff $ 2,500 in damages. Ruling, p.15. The Court also awarded

Plaintiff injunctive relief, and required Defendant to remove any statement from his website that stated

The Ghoulish Gallery had been in the changing portrait business since 1995. 

The court, in exceptional cases, may award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party for violations

of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); see U-Haul Intern., Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034,

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 06cv371 NLS

1042 (9th Cir. 1986) (trademark infringement cases are instructive; the Ninth Circuit has stated “we see

no significant distinction between false advertising cases and other cases under Lanham Act § 43(a)”). 

Exceptional cases contemplate “conduct that is malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or wilful.” Int’l

Olympic Committee v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 781 F.2d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal

quotes omitted); see McClaran v. Plastic Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 347, 364 (9th Cir.1996) (“[e]xceptional

cases include bad faith or other opprobrious conduct.”) (internal quotes omitted). Intentional acts do not

necessarily equate with the malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful conduct usually required before

deeming a case exceptional. Watec Co., Ltd. v. Liu, 403 F.3d 645, 656 (9th Cir. 2005) (jury finding of

intentional infringement does not necessarily make a case exceptional). Further, the statute’s use of the

word “may” makes the award discretionary, even if the conduct fits within the standard of an

exceptional case. See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1014 (9th

Cir.1985). 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant acted in bad faith because Defendant sent Plaintiff an

inflammatory email and provided dubious evidence and testimony to defend the false advertising claim. 

See Pl.’s Mem. Ps&As pp.3-5. Plaintiff says he spent a total of $87,645.50 on attorney’s fees, including

fees incurred after he went “pro se.” He attributes 20% of those fees to his copyright claim, and the

remaining 80% to litigating the false advertising claim, which he says is impossible to separate from the

cost of litigating the remaining claims.

Plaintiff does not persuade the Court with his arguments. First, the email Defendant sent to

Plaintiff in October 2004 has nothing to do with the any of the facts involving the false advertising

claim. Second, the Court evaluated the evidence Defendant provided and made a determination on the

false advertising claim based on that evidence. Third, in finding Defendant violated the federal false

advertising law, the Court held that Defendant made statements that either were false, or, misled,

confused or deceived consumers. The Court never determined that Defendant’s acts were intentional. It

never found that Defendant’s evidence was fabricated. And, it never concluded that Defendant’s actions

in making the statements were malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or wilful. 

Based on these findings, the Court finds that this is not an exceptional case for purposes of

awarding attorney’s fees and costs for the false advertising violation. The Court has already considered

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 06cv371 NLS

how to compensate Plaintiff for any losses he may have suffered, and awarded him damages and

injunctive relief. The principles of equity do not dictate that he also recover attorney’s fees or costs for

the false advertising claim. Further, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to recover fees for prevailing on the

false advertising counterclaim, the Court finds that Defendant’s acts were not malicious, fraudulent,

deliberate or wilful because he raised debatable issues of law and fact. Therefore, as an alternative to

the denial of Plaintiff’s motion based on timeliness, the Court also DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for

attorney’s fees on substantive grounds.

2. Request for Costs.

Civil Local Rule 54.1 allows the prevailing party to file and serve a bill of costs “in no event . . .

later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the decree or judgment.” The request must itemize the costs

and be supported by a memorandum of costs and affidavit stating that “the costs claimed are allowable

by law, are correctly stated, and were necessarily incurred.” Civ. Local R. 54.1. Within his motion for

attorney’s fees Plaintiff makes a summary request for costs for this action.

The Court has no grounds on which to award costs to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not been deemed the

overall prevailing party in this case. He filed his request for costs late and did not show excusable

neglect for the untimely filing. He did not itemize the costs. He made no attempt to show that they are

allowable by law, correctly stated and were necessarily incurred. Considering all these procedural

shortcomings, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for costs. 

Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees.

1. Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees.

The Court found that Defendant did not commit copyright infringement. Specifically, the Court

did a side-by-side comparison of Plaintiff’s work with Defendant’s work, and concluded that under both

the applicable objective and subjective tests, any similarities between the selection and/or arrangement

of the websites were not substantial enough to qualify as copyright infringement. Ruling, p. 10. 

Further, the Court granted April Turner’s motion for nonsuit. Together, these Defendants move the

Court for an order awarding them reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of $61,250.00, plus the fees

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

While April Turner is entitled to her costs as the prevailing party on all claims, she limits her

request to reasonable attorney’s fees. Defs.’ Mem. Ps&As, p.2, n.2.

9 06cv371 NLS

they incur with bringing this motion, based on their prevailing against Plaintiff in his copyright claim.3

Under the Copyright Act, a court in its discretion may “award a reasonable attorneys’ fee to the

prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. The court must treat prevailing plaintiffs and

prevailing defendants alike when deciding whether to award attorney’s fees. Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc.,

510 U.S. 517, 534-535 (1994) (rejecting the dual standard that prevailing plaintiffs should generally be

granted attorneys’ fees and prevailing defendants should be awarded fees only when the plaintiff’s

copyright claim was frivolous, in bad faith or unreasonable); Historical Research v. Cabral, 80 F.3d

377, 378 (9th Cir. 1996). In determining whether to grant attorney’s fees, the court may consider this

non-exclusive list of factors: frivolousness; motivation; objective unreasonableness (both legal and

factual); the need to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence; and promotion of the

Copyright Act’s objectives. Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Fogerty, 510

U.S. at 535 n.1). Exceptional circumstances are not a prerequisite for awarding fees for a copyright

claim. Historical Research, 80 F.3d at 378.

Defendants argue they are entitled to fees as the prevailing party for defending the copyright

claim because Plaintiff’s copyright claim was frivolous and objectively unreasonable, and because

awarding fees advances considerations of compensation and deterrence. They also ask for their fees

incurred in connection with bringing this motion. Plaintiff advances mostly inapplicable arguments in

opposing Defendants’ fee claim, arguing that Defendants brought their counterclaims (which did not

include a counterclaim for copyright infringement) in bad faith. Regarding frivolousness, Plaintiff cites

to a non-conclusive statement in the Court’s ruling regarding proof of whether Defendant was a

“copycat” of Plaintiff’s unprotected work. That statement related to Defendant’s counterclaim for trade

libel and is inapposite to the issue here.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s copyright claim was frivolous and objectively unreasonable. 

Plaintiff claimed to hold a valid copyright in the entire content of the “Haunted Memories Changing

Portrait Website.” For the first fourteen months of this case–most notably during the time the complaint

was filed and the parties conducted and completed discovery–Plaintiff was represented exclusively by

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 06cv371 NLS

counsel. Apparently the only discovery Plaintiff produced relevant to his copyright was a copy of the

registration certificate that listed the name of the website and the nature of the work as “audiovisual

material.” He never produced any evidence of what he actually copyrighted. As Plaintiff proceeded

with his case while misrepresenting his status as a “pro se” party, the Court afforded him every

opportunity to present evidence, any evidence, of what, exactly, constituted his copyrighted work. 

Plaintiff was not able to produce any such evidence until the fourth day of a five-day trial when he

proffered an unauthenticated CD rom as evidence of his original copyrighted work. While the Court

admitted his evidence, it found that Plaintiff failed to prove he held a valid copyright in any of the

individual components of the website. The Court found that Plaintiff established evidence of a

protectable copyright in the selection, arrangement, and presentation of his website by only a

preponderance of the evidence, and that the copyright was not entitled to a presumption of validity. 

Ruling, p. 7

 In the end, of the hundreds exhibits admitted, only six exhibits–Trial Exs. 55-6 to 55-11–showed

any evidence of Plaintiff’s copyright. The Court and Defendants saw these exhibits for the first time on

the fourth day of trial. Therefore, for most of Plaintiff’s case in chief where he testified or examined

Defendant about numerous exhibits related to their websites, that testimony and those exhibits were

irrelevant to Plaintiff’s copyright claim. In defending the claim, Defendant succinctly presented several

exhibits that convincingly showed Defendant did not infringe Plaintiff’s copyrighted work.

Even after the Court admitted evidence of Plaintiff’s copyright, it remained unclear about how,

exactly, Plaintiff claimed Defendant was infringing his copyright. See Ruling, p.6. The Court therefore

examined nine individual components of Plaintiff’s website and the selection, arrangement, and

presentation of his website. The Court found that none of the individual elements were entitled to

copyright protection. See Ruling pp.5-6. For example, Plaintiff claimed protection in his use of the

“Buy It Now” button. The Court found that “Buy It Now” buttons are commonly used in the public

domain as a feature of retail websites, and concluded that use of the “Buy It Now” button was not

original to Plaintiff nor entitled him to copyright protection for it. In another example, Plaintiff claimed

protection in a charcoal colored frame that he used to display his portraits. Ruling p. 6. The Court

found that the frame itself is constructed with publicly available materials and is one commonly used to

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 06cv371 NLS

display “scary” photographs; thus it was not a proper subject for copyright protection. Ruling p. 6. The

Court also compared Plaintiff’s selection, arrangement and presentation of his website as it looked in

December 2004 (the date of the copyright registration) with several versions of Defendant’s website. 

See Ruling pp.6-10. The Court considered the use of color, background wallpaper, text, specific gallery

portraits, specific frames, fonts, mats and original mini-biographies on Plaintiff’s website. Comparing

all those elements, using the objective test the Court found only one substantial similarity between the

two websites, which was use of the Ruben font for the business name and Rudelsberg font for the tag

line. Ruling p.9. Substantial evidence showed that Plaintiff did not create either font, they are both

publicly available and they are both commonly used in the haunt industry. Ruling pp. 6, 9. Using the

subjective test, the Court found that the websites were not substantially similar. Ruling p. 9. Overall,

the Court found that Defendant did not infringe any of Plaintiff’s protected work.

Plaintiff continued with his copyright claim despite never identifying or producing any evidence

of an actual copyright in discovery, and only producing minimal evidence of it at trial. The evidence he

did produce was unavailing and did not raise a debatable issue of law or fact. Further, Plaintiff cannot

rely on his “pro se” status to try to excuse his behavior, because throughout the relevant parts of the

case–the filing of the complaint and through discovery–Plaintiff was represented exclusively by counsel. 

And even when Plaintiff was apparently proceeding “pro se,” he was in fact represented by counsel. 

Based on these facts Plaintiff’s copyright claim was frivolous and objectively unreasonable and

Defendants are entitled to recover their attorney’s fees for defending the copyright claim. See Maljack

Prod. Inc., v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding defendant

entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees after concluding the copyright claims were objectively

unreasonable); see also Florentine Art Studio v. Vedet K. Corp., 891 F. Supp. 532, 541-42 (C.D. Cal.

1995) (finding plaintiff’s case was objectively unreasonable because he litigated despite knowing that

defendants had never copied one of the works and while knowing there were multiple opportunities for

innocent copyright infringement in the industry so that any copying here was probably innocent).

In addition to awarding fees based on the unreasonableness and frivolousness of the claim, a fee

award is warranted to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence. Plaintiff’s actions forced

Defendants to incur substantial cost, time and effort to defend a claim for which Plaintiff had no

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Defendants explained in their trial brief: “To discourage any negative discussion of his own

behavior, Plaintiff has often threatened to sue individuals who speak against him. In fact, earlier this

year, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles against Turner and three others

alleging various causes of action including, but not limited to slander, defamation, and libel in

connection with the Haunt X Convention in 2006.”

5

In a post-trial filing where he asked the Court to preserve certain evidence, Plaintiff expressly

referred to another lawsuit that he filed against Defendants and their counsel: “Plaintiff respectfully

requests that the court preserves [sic] the original book submitted as evidence of Tim Turner’s

“Mother’s Journal” (Trial Exhibit 180-6) for use in future proceedings. These proceedings include, but

are not limited to, a pending action for MALICIOUS PROSECUTION against Defendants and

Counterclaimants Tim Turner and April Turner, and their attorneys, including, but not limited to, Amy

L. Borlund (SBN 205361), Bela G. Lugosi (SBN 35663), and Jerrold Abeles (SBN 138464).” Pl.’s Ex

Parte Application for the Preservation of Evidence, p.3, ll.15-21 (emphasis in original) [Doc. No. 137].

12 06cv371 NLS

legitimate basis. Defendants should be compensated for defending such a claim, especially in light of

Defendant’s counsel having to invest substantially more time in dealing with a pro se plaintiff than they

would if dealing directly with counsel. See Borlund Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15. Further, at trial the parties referred

to other litigation where Plaintiff has sued Defendant. See, e.g., Defs.’ Trial Brief, p.13, ll.5-9 [Doc. No.

102].4 A fee award is appropriate so that Plaintiff may fully consider and appreciate the monetary,

emotional and physical costs of litigating unsubstantiated claims.5 Encouraging such an appreciation

will help the parties focus on the real claims at issue, and will promote judicial economy by allowing the

Court to focus its resources on warranted claims.

In light of these findings, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. The

Court also GRANTS Defendants’ request for the fees associated with bringing this motion.

2. Reasonableness of Defendants’ Attorney’s Fees.

Under Rule 54(d)(2)(C), the court may decide issues of liability for fees before receiving

submissions on the value of services. Here, the Court has found that Plaintiff must pay Defendants for

their attorney’s fees incurred in defending the copyright claim. Defendants represent that they incurred

in excess of $245,000 in total fees. They object to providing actual time and billing records to Plaintiff

due to the possibility of ongoing litigation. Defs.’ Mem. Ps&As p.9, n.3. They estimate that they spent

50% of the fees in defending the complaint and 50% in prosecuting the counterclaim. The Court finds

this estimate to be reasonable. 

Defendants also say of the fees incurred in defending the complaint, half of those fees went

specifically to defending the copyright claim. The Court finds this to be a very reasonable estimate, as it

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 06cv371 NLS

finds that Plaintiff’s primary focus in prosecuting his complaint was his copyright claim. For example,

in his pretrial and post-trial briefs and evidence at trial, Plaintiff primarily focused on the copyright issue

and devoted substantial more attention to that claim alone than to the combination of his remaining

claims and defense of the counterclaims.

To determine the reasonableness of the totality of the fees from which the Court can apportion

25% of the fees requested to defense of the copyright claim, the Court must examine, and allow Plaintiff

an opportunity to object to, the billing records. See In re Washington Pub. Power Supply System Secur.

Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring a fully detailed itemization of the date, hours and

nature of the work performed). Mindful of Defendants’ confidentiality concerns, the Court ORDERS

Defendants to file redacted copies of their billing records documenting the hours expended. The billing

records shall be redacted so as to remove all information that is protected by the attorney-client and

work-product privileges. Defendants must also file a declaration summarily identifying how many

hours Jerrold Abeles, Bela Lugosi, Amy Borlund and Jennifer Terry each worked on this matter. The

Court already has information on the special skill and experience of counsel as well as their billing rates. 

Defendants must file the redacted bills and declaration by March 5, 2008. Plaintiff may file objections

to the billing entries by March 12, 2008. See Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992)

(“the party opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to

the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged”). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 19, 2008

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:06-cv-00371-NLS Document 162 Filed 02/19/08 Page 13 of 13