Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02679/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02679-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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LAWRENCE 

v. 

SLADE, 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, } 

) 

) No. 

) 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

FILED 

United St.a.tea Court ot' Appeals 1'/)nth r.h·~·-,it. 

MAY 301989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

87-2679 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 87-C-192-C) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Michael James King of Winters, King & Associates, Inc., Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Jesse L. Butler, Assistant General Counsel, James A. Friedman, 

Attorney, Office of Labor Law, United States Postal Service, 

Washington, D.C., Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney, Nancy 

Nesbitt Blevins, Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 87-2679 Document: 01019957934 Date Filed: 05/30/1989 Page: 1 
In this Title VII action, the appellant, Lawrence Slade, 

contends that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint 

for failure to sue the proper party within the thirty-day statute 

of limitations. 1 Based on the Supreme Court's decision in 

Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986), the district court -------------

ruled that Mr. Slade's amendment of his complaint to name the 

Postmaster General, the proper party defendant in such an action, 

did not relate back to the original date of filing under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), and it therefore dismissed the complaint. 

We reverse. 

The facts of this case are undisputed. On March 18, 1987, 

one day before the expiration of the limitations period, Mr. Slade 

filed the instant action in federal court, naming the United 

States Postal Service (USPS) as defendant. Mr. Slade's complaint 

against the USPS arose out of a long-standing dispute over his 

efforts to gain employment with the agency, the facts of which are 

not germane to this appeal.· On March 19, 1987, the last day of 

the limitations period, Mr. Slade sent by certified mail a copy of 

the complaint to the United States Attorney for the Northern 

District of Oklahoma and to the Attorney General of the United 

States. Neither the United States Attorney nor the Attorney 

1 The limitations provision for an action against the federal 

government under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states 

that a civil action for redress of employment grievances must be 

brought "[w]ithin thirty days of receipt of notice of final action 

taken by a department, agency, or unit." 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-16(c) 

(1982). Mr. Slade received his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC 

on February 17, 1987. The thirty-day limitations period for his 

action against the Postmaster General thus extended through 

March 19, 1987. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2679 Document: 01019957934 Date Filed: 05/30/1989 Page: 2 
General received service of Mr. Slade's complaint until March 20 

and 23, respectively, which was after the limitations period had 

run. Mr. Slade did not serve process on the Postmaster General of 

the United States at that time, Mr. Preston R. Tisch, who was the 

only proper party defendant to such an action. See Johnson v. 

United States Postal Service, 861 F.2d 1475, 1478 (10th Cir. 

1988). 

On April 29, 1987, the USPS moved to dismiss Mr. Slade's 

complaint on the grounds that the complaint failed to name the 

proper party, that service was insufficient, and that the 

complaint could not be amended to name the proper party so as to 

relate back to the original date of filing under Rule 15(c). The 

motion was referred to a magistrate, who recommended it be 

granted. The magistrate. reasoned that since neither the USPS nor 

the Postmaster General had received actual notice of the suit 

before the limitations period had passed, Rule 15(c) would not 

permit amendment of the complaint to relate back to the original 

date of filing. On October 7, 1987, the district court granted 

the USPS' motion, substantially adopting the magistrate's 

recommendation. The district court additionally held that notice 

could not be imputed to the USPS or the Postmaster General through 

service on the United States Attorney or the Attorney General, 

since neither party received service until after the expiration of 

the limitations period. Mr. Slade now appeals this ruling. 

The central issue in this appeal is the proper application of 

Rule 15(c) to the undisputed facts of this case. Since this 

involves a purely legal determination, we review the district 

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Appellate Case: 87-2679 Document: 01019957934 Date Filed: 05/30/1989 Page: 3 
court's conclusions de novo. In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 

F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988). Rule lS(c) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure governs the relation back of amendments to 

pleadings. Relation back of an amendment changing a party against 

whom a claim is asserted has four requirements, all of which must 

be satisfied: 

(1) the basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct 

set forth in the original pleading; (2) the party to be 

brought in must have received such notice that it will 

not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense; (3) that 

party must or should have known that, but for a mistake 

concerning identity, the action would have been brought 

against it; and (4) the second and third requirements 

must have been fulfilled within the prescribed 

limitations period. 

_S_c_h_i_a_v_o_n_e_ v_. __ F_o_r_t_u_n_e, 477 U.S. at 29. With respect to actions 

brought against an agency or officer of the United States, Rule 

15(c) further provides that "[t]he delivery or mailing of process 

to the United States Attorney . . . or the Attorney General of the 

United States" satisfies the second and third requirements of the 

Schiavone test. 

In this case, neither party disputes that Mr. Slade has met 

the first requirement of the Schiavone test. Rather, the question 

is whether Mr. Slade's mailing of process to the United States 

Attorney and the Attorney General within the limitations period 

satisfies the second, third, and fourth requirements of the 

Schiavone test. In concluding that Mr. Slade did not meet these 

requirements, the district court focused on the fact that neither 

the United States Attorney nor the Attorney General received the 

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Appellate Case: 87-2679 Document: 01019957934 Date Filed: 05/30/1989 Page: 4 
complaint and summons within the limitations period. Under our 

reading of Rule 15(c}, however, this was not required. 

First, Rule 15(c) provides that effective service on eLther 

the United States Attorney or the Attorney General within the 

limitations period satisfies the final three requirements of the 

Schiavone test. See Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 

79, 82 (7th Cir. 1987); Edwards v. United States, 755 F.2d 1155, 

1158 (5th Cir. 1985). To determine whether these parties were 

effectively served, we note that Rule 15(c} expressly states that 

"delivery or mailing'' is permissible. This language most likely 

was designed to be consistent with the provisions of 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4) and 4(d}(5}, which specify that service is 

made on the United States or an officer or agency thereof by 

delivery of the summons and complaint to the United States 

Attorney, and by sending the same by certified mail to the 

Attorney General and to the officer or agency being sued. 

It is undisputed that, on the last day of the limitations 

period, Mr. Slade sent a copy of the summons and complaint by 

certified mail to both the United States Attorney and to the 

Attorney General. While service on the United States Attorney was 

deficient since it was not personally made, service on the 

Attorney General was complete upon mailing and therefore 

accomplished within the limitations period. See also 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(service by mail is complete upon mailing). 

Accordingly, by virtue of service on the Attorney General within 

the limitations period, notice of Mr. Slade's claim is imputed to 

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Appellate Case: 87-2679 Document: 01019957934 Date Filed: 05/30/1989 Page: 5 
the Postmaster General, and all of the requirements of the 

Schiavone test are met. 

This result is consistent with the philosophy behind the 1966 

amendment to Rule 15(c), which incorporated the provision 

permitting service on the United States Attorney or the Attorney 

General under such circumstances. The purpose of this amendment 

was to address the problems raised when plaintiffs inadvertently 

named an improper party in suits against government agencies or 

officials. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory cqmmittee's note (1966 

amendment); Johnson v. United States Postal Service, 861 F.2d at 

1480; Edwards, 755 F.2d at 1157-58. Consequently, we conclude 

that the district court erred by not permitting Mr. Slade to 

amend his complaint pursuant to Rule 15(c) and in granting the 

USPS' motion to dismiss. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED and REMANDED for further 

proceedings in accordance herewith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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