Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00372/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00372-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Stephen Kimble, an individual, and Robert

Grabb, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Marvel Enterprises, Inc., 

Defendant.

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CV 08-372-TUC-DCB

ORDER

On December 2, 2009, Magistrate Judge Ferraro issued a Report and Recommendation

(R&R). (Doc. 77.) He recommends granting Defendant’s motion on termination of

royalties when the patent expires and Plaintiffs’ motion on the definition of “net product

sales.” He recommends denying Plaintiffs’ four other motions. After an independent review

of the record, the Court adopts the R&R as the opinion of the Court and grants and denies

the motions for summary judgment accordingly.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The duties of the district court in connection with a R&R by a Magistrate Judge are set

forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The

district court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). Where the parties object to a R&R, “[a] judge of the [district] court shall make a

de novo determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is made.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). When no objection is

filed, the district court need not review the R&R de novo.

Case 4:08-cv-00372-DCB Document 85 Filed 03/02/10 Page 1 of 13
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 1Plaintiff Grabb was not a party to the 1997 action. He acted as Kimble’s attorney during

that proceeding and is a signatory on the Agreement and a Plaintiff in this action. 

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This Court's ruling is a de novo determination as to those portions of the R&R to which

there are objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13

(9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). To the extent that no objection has been made, arguments to the contrary have been

waived. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (objections are waived if they are not filed within ten

days of service of the R&R), McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980) (failure

to object to Magistrate's report waives right to do so on appeal); Advisory Committee Notes

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (citing Campbell v. United States Dist. Court for N.D. Calif., 501 F.2d

196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974) (when no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself

that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation)). 

Accordingly, the Court reviews only the objections raised in the briefs filed in objection to

the R&R and reviews de novo the arguments urged before the Magistrate Judge that pertain

to such objections. All other objections are waived.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1997, Plaintiff Kimble1

 sued Toy Biz (now known as Marvel) for patent infringement

and breach of contract based on an oral agreement in CV 97-557 TUC RCC. Kimble

invented a web shooting toy, patent no. 5,072,856, which expires no later than May 25,

2010. In 1990, he met with Toy Biz to discuss his patent application and related ideas. Toy

Biz agreed it would not use the ideas disclosed by Kimble without first negotiating a

reasonable royalty payment for their use. Toy Biz subsequently made and sold a toy, “Web

Blaster” and refused to pay Kimble any royalty. Kimble sued Toy Biz. The District Court

ruled as a matter of law that the Web Blaster did not infringe the Kimble patent, but there

were disputed questions of fact as to the verbal agreement between the parties. After a jury

trial, the court entered judgment for Kimble finding the Web Blaster was covered by the

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verbal agreement and awarded damages “to be 3.5% of net product sales, past, present and

future excluding refill royalties.” Both parties appealed. (R&R at 3.)

While the appeal was pending, the parties entered into a settlement agreement (the

Agreement). They withdrew their appeals and agreed to vacate the Judgment. The “key

provision” of the Agreement, is as follows:

3. Marvel agrees to purchase from the Patent Holders and the Patent Holders

agree to sell to Marvel the Patent which will be evidenced by an instrument of

assignment in the form of exhibit C hereto. The purchase price for the Patent shall

be payable to the Patent Holders as follows: 

a. $516,214.62 upon execution and delivery of this Agreement; and

b. 3% of “net product sales” (as such term is used in the Judgment) excluding

refill royalties made after December 31, 2000. For purposes of this paragraph

3.b, “net product sales” shall be deemed to include product sales that would

infringe the Patent but for the purchase and sale thereof pursuant to this

Agreement as well as sales of the Web Blaster product that was the subject of

the Action and to which the Judgment refers.

Id. at 4 (citing doc. 47: Agreement at 4). The Agreement contains no expiration date.

On January 6, 2006, Marvel entered a licensing agreement with an independent

company, Hasbro, effective in 2007, giving Hasbro copyright and trademark rights for

Marvel characters in certain toy categories, and Hasbro began making versions of the Web

Blaster. Id. at 4.

Hasbro refused to sign a sublicense to pay Plaintiffs royalties owed under the

Agreement. Since 2007, Hasbro has reported quarterly to Marvel the units sold, and Marvel

receives royalties from Hasbro amounting to 10% of net sales of the licensed products. Up

until May 2008, Marvel paid Plaintiffs 3% of Hasbro’s net sales of various Web Blaster

products. On May 23, 2008, Marvel informed Plaintiffs they were not entitled to royalties

on Extra Value Items and that it had recalculated the 2007 royalties and determined Marvel

had overpaid Plaintiffs by $282,700.00 Id. at 4-5.

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Plaintiff filed for breach of contract in state court. The action was removed to federal

court by Defendant, who answered and counterclaimed for overpayment and declaratory

judgment as to its obligations under the Agreement. 

The matters have been fully briefed. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

requesting the Court deny Marvel’s counterclaim for the overpayment. (Ps’ MSJ) (doc. 47). 

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Marvel’s

counterclaim of overpayment as to royalties owed on “3% of net product sales” for multifunctional toys, which are those that shoot not only the foam web but shoot additional things

like darts, missiles, water, etc. (Ps’ MPSJ) (doc. 48). Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment seeking declaratory judgment that Marvel continues to be

responsible for certain obligations beyond the expiration of the patent, May 25, 2010. (Ps’

MSJ) (doc. 49). Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on

Marvel’s counterclaim of overpayment as to royalties owed on “3% of net product sales” for

“extra value items” of the Web Blaster. (Ps’ MSJ) (doc. 50). Plaintiffs filed a Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment regarding the definition of “net product sales.” (Ps’ MPSJ) (doc.

51). Defendant, Marvel, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment for a declaratory judgment

that any obligation to make payments pursuant to the Agreement terminates on the date the

Kimble patent underlying the Agreement expires, May 25, 2010. (MSJ) (doc. 54).

The Magistrate Judge addressed the issues raised in these interrelated summary

judgment motions in one R&R, as follows: Section B: whether, as a matter of law, Marvel

owes royalties under the Agreement after the patent expires; Section C: whether, as a matter

of law, “net product sales” is defined in the Agreement; Section D: whether, as a matter of

law, Marvel owes royalties under the Agreement for Hasbro’s net product sales, and Section

E: whether, as a matter of law, Marvel owes royalties for improved Web Blasters and Extra

Value Items.

The Magistrate Judge found that as a matter of law, Marvel is not required to pay

royalties under the Agreement after the May 25, 2010, expiration of the Kimble patent. He

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found there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the definition of “net product

sales” in the Agreement – it means 93% of gross product sales. He found there are genuine

issues of material fact in dispute which preclude summary judgment on the issue of sales by

Hasbro for improved Web Blasters and Extra Value Items.

On December 16, 2009, the parties filed Objections to the R&R on the question of law:

whether Marvel owes royalties after the expiration of the patent under the terms of the

Agreement; whether Marvel owes royalties under the Agreement for Hasbro’s “net product

sales,” and whether “net product sales” is defined as 93% of gross product sales. 

PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS

Plaintiffs object to Magistrate Judge Ferraro’s finding that the royalty Agreement ends

when the patent expires. Plaintiffs argue that the Agreement transferred both patented and

non-patented rights and while the royalties for the patented rights end with the patent, they

do not end for non-patented rights which cover the Web Blaster.

This Court notes that Plaintiffs’ position on whether the Web Blaster infringes on the

Kimble patent has changed since the 1997 law suit and settlement. On appeal, Kimble

argued that the Web Blaster infringed the patent. Kimble had prevailed on his breach of

contract claims related to Defendant’s oral agreement to not use the ideas he disclosed

without negotiating a reasonable royalty payment, but he lost on summary judgment his

patent infringement claim. Defendant appealed the Judgement for Kimble on the breach of

contract claim. 

The Agreement vacated the Judgment, which had issued in favor of Kimble on the

breach of contract claim. The parties agreed for Marvel to purchase the patent at the

purchase price of: “$516,214.62 and 3% of “net product sales” (as such term is used in the

Judgment) . . . For purposes of this paragraph 3.b, “net product sales” shall be deemed to

include product sales that would infringe the Patent but for the purchase and sale thereof

pursuant to this Agreement as well as sales of the Web Blaster product that was the subject

of the Action and to which the Judgment refers.” “Net product sales,” as such term was

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used in the Judgment referred to the Web Blaster that had been found to not infringe on the

Kimble patent. The 3% net product sales was deemed to “include product sales that would

infringe the Patent as well as sales of the Web Blaster product that was the subject of the

Action and to which the Judgment refers.” This language in the Agreement is arguably in

keeping with the parties’ interpretations of the Agreement “as transferring the patent right

and the rights to the toy idea(s) verbally exchanged between Kimble and Toy Biz in 1990.” 

(R&R at 8.)

“Because the parties are in agreement, and the outcome is the same whether the

Agreement transferred only patent rights or both patent and non-patent rights, the

[Magistrate Judge] also assessed the latter possibility.” Id. The Magistrate Judge correctly

found that the Agreement is a hybrid under the law. Plaintiffs’ argument that the Agreement

creates separable rights, “patent rights” and “non-patent rights” fails because there is no

distinction between the royalties for these two. (R&R at 8-9) (discussing hybrid concept

from Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (11th Cir. 1983); Boggild v.

Kenner Products, 776 F.2d 1315, 1319 (6th Cir. 1985)).

Plaintiffs’ argument also fails under the seminal case on the issue, Brulotte v. Thys Co.,

379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964), in which the Court held that “a patentee’s use of a royalty agreement

that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.” Id. at 6. In

Brulotte, the Court distinguished the situation from ones in which non-patented items

are priced based on long-term use or in which different arrangements would apply before

and after the expiration of a patent. Id. (citing Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 31-32). “The Court

emphasized that because the terms were the same both before and after expiration of the

patent, they were “‘unable to conjecture what the bargaining position of the parties might

have been and what resultant arrangement might have emerged had the provision for postexpiration royalties been divorced from the patent and nowise subject to its leverage.’” Id.,

see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 259-262 (1979) (distinguishing a

situation with two agreements, one for a 5% royalty for the item in the inventor’s pending

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patent application and the second for a 2 1⁄2% royalty if the patent application was not

allowed within five years, because the 2 1⁄2% royalty did not rely on a patent). As noted by

the Magistrate Judge the reduced royalty in Aronson was negotiated for the express purpose

of compensation in the absence of a patent. The Aronson agreement did not offend the

principle emphasized in Brulotte that it is unlawful to leverage a patent monopoly beyond its

expiration.

This Court has read Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2007) and agrees with

the Magistrate Judge that even though Plaintiffs rely on this case, it does not support them. 

Id. at 7. In Zila, the Ninth Circuit considered an Agreement containing a royalty provision

for “a five percent (5%) royalty on gross sales of [Zila] of the invention” in perpetuity. Zila,

502 F.3d at 1017. It was uncontested that when the parties entered into the Agreement they

did not know whether any patent would issue on the invention, and they did not intend the 

royalties to relate in any way to patents that might or might not be obtained. Id.

Subsequently, however, patents were obtained. After criticizing Brulotte and its progeny,

the Ninth Circuit held that for the sake of national uniformity in patent law it would follow

the majority view that under Brulotte state contract law is preempted “on facts that (1) a

patent did not issue in [a] case and (2) the underlying agreement provided for a lower royalty

if no patent issued than if one did.” Id. at 1022. The court held that since a patent did issue

for the Zila invention, Brulotte controlled and the royalty provision was unenforceable after

the last of the patents covering the invention ended. In Zila, the court applied Brulotte to a

royalty provision covering “the invention,” covering both patent and non-patent rights. 

Following Zila, the Magistrate Judge correctly applied Brulotte in this case to find that

the royalty provision is unenforceable after the expiration of the Kimble patent.

DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS

Defendant raises two objections: 1) whether Marvel owes royalties for Hasbro’s “net

product sales” and 2) whether “net product sales” is defined as 93% of gross product sales. 

(D’s Objection at 1.) 

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First, Defendant objects to what Plaintiffs correctly point out is dicta in the Magistrate

Judge’s R&R: “‘Marvel owes Plaintiffs a 3% royalty for anyone’s product sales covered by

the Agreement.’” (D’s Objection at 2 (quoting R&R at 14)). Specifically, Defendant

objects to the following:

Contrary to Marvel’s contention, this would not obligate [Marvel] to pay for sales

by an unrelated third-party. A third-party with no relationship to Marvel could not

legally manufacture a toy within either of these categories [in paragraph 3.b of the

Agreement] because Marvel owns the patent and it owns the right to Spider-Man,

and the Web Blaster is a Spider-Man toy. Thus, Marvel has complete control over

the sale of any toys within those two categories.

Id. (citing R&R at 13). “Marvel object to the above findings because they misapprehend the

facts and overstate Marvel’s rights as an intellectual property holder.” (D’s Objection at 2.)

The issue before the Court has nothing to do with an unrelated third-party. As

Defendant recognizes, the “plaintiffs themselves have conceded that the Agreement would

not require Marvel to pay royalties on such sales.” Id. at 3. “Plaintiffs admitted that if a

third-party such as Mattel were to independently come out with a toy that infringed the

Kimble patent, Marvel would not be obligated to pay Kimble a royalty on Mattel’s sales of

that product.” Id. Defendant then argues that because Marvel would not be obligated to

pay royalties for a third-party’s sales of products covered by the Agreement if the company

had no relationship with Marvel, the fact of the licensing relationship between Marvel and

Hasbro should not change the result, “given that the [A]greement between Hasbro does not

license any of the rights covered by the Agreement.” (Objection at 3.)

Whether or not the licensing agreement between Hasbro and Marvel licensed any rights

covered by the Marvel-Kimble Agreement is a disputed question of fact to be resolved at

trial, and as thoroughly discussed in the R&R the relationship between Hasbro and Marvel

does make a difference. “Under the licensing agreement, Marvel receives 10% of Hasbro’s

net sales for the use of the Spider-Man license and trademark.” (R&R at 13.) “Hasbro,

which is making the Web Blaster, is making it as Marvel’s assignee and paying Marvel for

the rights to do so.” (Ps’ Reply to D’s Objection at 3.) In other words, the 3% royalty

provision in the Agreement applies, if a jury finds that Hasbro is manufacturing and selling

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any product under its licensing agreement with Marvel, covered by the Marvel-Kimble

Agreement.

Second, “Marvel objects to the ruling in section III.C of the report and recommendation

for the reasons stated in defendant’s opposition to plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment

section IV.C.4. (dkts. 59 at p. 23-24 and 60.)” (D’s Objection at 5.) “In response, Plaintiffs

incorporate those relevant portions of their Motion for Summary Judgment.” (Ps’ Reply at

3.)

Defendant fails to raise a proper objection to the R&R to invoke this Court’s de novo

determination of this portion of the R&R. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) (explaining when no objections are filed, the district court need not

review the R&R de novo). “The filing of objections to a magistrate’s report enables the

district judge to focus attention on those issues-factual and legal-that are at the heart of the

parties’ dispute.” Thomas, 474 U.S. at 147. Precluding review of any issue not contained in

an objection, prevents a litigant from “sandbagging” the district judge by failing to object

and then appealing. “Absent such a rule, any issue before the magistrate would be a proper

subject for appellate review.” Without the rule requiring parties to object, the district court

would have to review every issue in every case, no matter how thorough the magistrate’s

analysis. The rule promotes the efficient use of judicial resources. Id. These principles

require a party to do more than simply object, without identifying and explaining the

objection. Defendant has done nothing more than the legal equivalent of filing a notice of

some nondescript objection. 

Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed de novo Subsection III.C of the R&R, wherein the

Magistrate Judge found that as a matter of law in the Agreement the definition of “net

product sales” means 93% of gross product sales. (R&R at 10.) The Court agrees with the

Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the Agreement is ambiguous because “net product sales”

is not defined, but only refers to the term as used in the Judgment, and the term was not

defined in the Judgement. Id.

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The Magistrate Judge relied on extrinsic evidence of deposition testimony from the 1997

action and the parties’ performance under the Agreement through 2006, during the time it

was selling toys. The Magistrate Judge found that the Defendant’s arguments were

conclusory, and Defendant failed to provide any conflicting evidence or any other definition

the parties may have intended at the time they adopted the Agreement. The Defendant’s

unsupported contentions remain unsupported, and as recommended by the Magistrate Judge,

this Court finds that the term “net product sales” means 93% of gross product sales.

CONCLUSION

As a matter of law, Defendant is not required to pay royalties under the Agreement after

the May 25, 2010 expiration of the patent. As a matter of law, the term “net product sales”

in the Agreement means 93% of gross product sales. There are genuine issues of material

fact precluding summary judgment on all other issues. 

After de novo review of the issues raised in the parties’ Objections, this Court agrees

with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Magistrate Judge in his Report

and Recommendation for determining the pending motions.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation is adopted as the Opinion of

the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc.

49) is DENIED; the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 54) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

(doc. 51) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other summary judgment motions (doc. 47,48,

50) are DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED WITHDRAWING THE REFERENCE from Magistrate

Judge Ferraro. This matter shall be tried by the Honorable David C. Bury.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file a Joint Pretrial Order by March

26, 2010. (See attached form of Order.) Subsequently, the Court shall set a pretrial

conference and the trial date will be set at the pretrial conference.

DATED this 1st day of March, 2010.

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FORM OF PRETRIAL ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Plaintiff, )

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v. ) CV TUC DCB

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) PRETRIAL ORDER

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Defendant. )

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(Although the text of the pretrial order appears in single space, the actual order submitted by

the parties must be double spaced and conform in all other respects to the Local Rules.) 

The following are pretrial proceedings in this cause pursuant to Rule 16.2 of this

Court, and IT IS ORDERED:

I. NATURE OF ACTION

This is an action for: (Short concise statement of the case, including the nature of the

action and the relief sought.)

II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Statement of jurisdiction: (state the claims and cite the statutes which give this Court

jurisdiction over each claim.)

III. CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW/FACT

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State the ultimate issues of fact and law which must be decided at trial. State only the

issues of fact and law necessary and material for a verdict in this case. Each issue must be

stated separately and specifically.

IV. LIST OF EXHIBITS

Each party shall list the exhibits it intends to offer at trial.

V. LIST OF WITNESSES

Each party shall list the witnesses it intends to call at trial.

VI. JURY TRIAL or BENCH TRIAL

The parties shall state whether the trial is a jury or bench trial.

For a Jury Trial

At the Pretrial Conference, the Court will direct the parties to file proposed voir dire,

objections to exhibits, deposition testimony, stipulated jury instructions, counsel’s additional

proposed jury instructions, motions in limine, and trial memoranda 20 days prior to trial.

Any opposition shall be filed five days thereafter.

For a Bench Trial

At the Pretrial Conference, the Court will direct the parties to file trial briefs,

objections to exhibits, motions in limine, and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law 20 days prior to trial. Any opposition shall be filed five days thereafter.

VII. PROBABLE LENGTH OF TRIAL

Each party shall identify the estimated length of time it will take to present its case.

VIII. CERTIFICATION

The undersigned counsel for each of the parties in this action do hereby approve and

certify the form and content of this proposed Joint Pretrial Order. 

_____________________________ ___________________________

Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney for Defendant

This Joint Pretrial Order is hereby approved on this day of , 2006.

_____________________________________

David C. Bury

United States District Judge

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