Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01286/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01286-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 15:2(a) Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J.C. IGLESIAS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HOMEJOY, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-01286-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

Docket No. 33

Plaintiff J.C. Iglesias filed this collective and class action on behalf of individuals who 

have worked as cleaners for Defendant Homejoy, Inc. The complaint alleges that Homejoy 

violated its employees’ rights under both federal and state law by, inter alia, misclassifying 

cleaners as independent contracts, failing to pay overtime wages, and failing to reimburse for 

business expenses. Currently pending before the Court is Mr. Iglesias’s motion for entry of 

default.1 In spite of being served, Homejoy did not file an opposition to the motion. Having 

considered the papers submitted, as well as all other evidence of record, the Court hereby 

GRANTS the motion for entry of default. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Iglesias initiated this lawsuit in March 2015. See Docket No. 1 (complaint). Counsel

for Homejoy made an appearance in April 2015. See Docket No. 13 (notice of appearance). 

Subsequently, the parties stipulated to, and the Court ordered, a stay of proceedings pending 

mediation. See Docket Nos. 18-19 (stipulation and order). 

In July 2015, the parties submitted another stipulation for the Court’s consideration. This 

 

1 Although the motion is technically captioned as a motion for default judgment, the substance of 

the motion reflects that it is actually a motion for entry of default. 

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stipulation was an agreement between the parties that counsel for Homejoy could withdraw as 

counsel. See Docket No. 23 (stipulation). The Court denied, without prejudice, the proposed 

order permitting withdrawal, noting as follows:

In any future filing, [counsel] shall demonstrate that it has obtained 

its client’s informed consent to withdraw, and specifically informed 

its counsel of the possibility of default if replacement counsel is not 

timely obtained, and other possible negative consequences of 

withdrawal. Homejoy shall certify that it has been so notified in 

detail, understands the risks, and agrees to the withdrawal.

Docket No. 24 (order) (emphasis added).

Thereafter, Homejoy’s CEO submitted a declaration “to certify that Homejoy has given 

[counsel] its informed consent to withdraw.” Docket No. 27 (Cheung Decl. ¶ 2). The CEO 

explained:

Homejoy has made a decision to terminate operations and wind 

down its financial affairs. In connection, Homejoy expects to enter 

into an Assignment for Benefit of Creditors under California law 

(“ABC”) in the next two weeks. Paul Hastings [counsel] has 

advised Homejoy of the possible negative consequences of Paul 

Hastings’ withdrawal, including that, as a corporate entity, Homejoy 

cannot appear in the action without counsel; that accordingly, failure 

to retain replacement counsel and to timely respond to the 

Complaint could result in entry of a default judgment against 

Homejoy; and that the lifting of the stay pending mediation may 

trigger other litigation deadlines, including the need to respond to 

any discovery served by Plaintiff. Paul Hastings has urged Homejoy 

to move quickly to locate new counsel, so that Homejoy can ensure 

a smooth transition of the case to new counsel. Due to the 

impending ABC, Homejoy is not able to find replacement counsel 

for Paul Hastings at this time. However, I have been informed that 

once HomeJoy enters into the ABC, the Assignee intends to appoint 

replacement counsel. 

Docket No. 27 (Cheung Decl. ¶ 3).

Based on the declaration, the Court permitted counsel for Homejoy to withdraw. See

Docket No. 28 (order).

In July 2015, Homejoy notified the Court through a status report that (1) it would be 

terminating operations at the end of the month; (2) that it expected to enter into an Assignment for 

the Benefit of Creditors under California law in August 2015; and (3) that it expected the assignee 

to appoint replacement counsel. Accordingly, Homejoy asked for the Court to extend the stay. 

See Docket No. 29 (status report). The Court granted the stay extension. See Docket No. 31 

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(order). Under the Court’s order, the stay expired on or about August 19, 2015.

Because no appearance of counsel was made after the expiration of the stay, Mr. Iglesias 

filed the currently pending motion for entry of default on September 8, 2015. 

II. DISCUSSION

Entry of default is appropriate in the instant case for several reasons.

First, Homejoy was specifically advised that, as a corporation, it could not appear in this 

action without counsel, see Civ. L.R. 3-9 (providing that a “corporation, unincorporated 

association, partnership or other such entity may appear only through a member of the bar of this 

Court”), and that failure to obtain counsel could lead to a default judgment. While the Court has 

accommodated Homejoy by, e.g., granting a stay extension so that the anticipated assignee could 

make an appearance through replacement counsel, the stay has now expired and no appearance has 

been forthcoming. Moreover, even though Mr. Iglesias served a copy of his motion for entry of 

default on Homejoy, the Court has heard nothing from either Homejoy or any assignee. Under 

these circumstances, entry of default is proper. See, e.g., Employee Painters’ Trust v. Ethan 

Enters., Inc., 480 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that corporation’s failure to comply with 

local rule requiring a corporation to be represented by counsel “suffices to support the default 

judgment against the corporation”); United States v. High Country Broad. Co., 3 F.3d 1244, 1245 

(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that it was “perfectly appropriate” for a court to enter a default judgment 

against a corporation that failed to retain counsel to represent it).

Second, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), the Clerk of the Court is directed to 

enter default against a party if it “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 

Here, in waiving service of the summons and complaint, Homejoy indicated its understanding that 

it had an obligation to respond to the complaint after the expiration of the stay for mediation. See

Docket Nos. 21-22 (waiver). But now, even after that stay and the stay extension have passed, 

Homejoy and/or any assignee have not made any attempt to respond to the complaint or otherwise 

defend. Cf. Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that “failure to make timely 

answer to a properly served complaint will justify entry of default judgment”).

Accordingly, Mr. Iglesias’s motion for entry of default is granted.

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The Court further orders as follows:

(1) The Clerk of the Court shall immediately enter Homejoy’s default. 

(2) Mr. Iglesias shall file a motion for default judgment within sixty (60) days from the 

date of this order. The motion shall be served on Homejoy as well as the assignee (to the extent 

Mr. Iglesias has contact information for the assignee2). Mr. Iglesias must address, in his motion 

for default judgment, the Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986), factors. 

(3) Mr. Iglesias shall immediately serve a copy of this order on Homejoy and the 

assignee (again, to the extent Mr. Iglesias has contact information for the assignee). Proofs of 

service must be filed within a week of the date of this order.

(4) The Clerk of the Court shall provide a courtesy copy of this order to former counsel 

for Homejoy (Paul Hastings). 

This order disposes of Docket No. 33.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 29, 2015

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

 

2

If Mr. Iglesias does not currently have contact information for the assignee, then he shall make a 

reasonably diligent effort to obtain the information, including, e.g., contacting former counsel for 

Homejoy (Paul Hastings).

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