Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cv-04259/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cv-04259-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK CHRISTOPHER CREW, 

 Petitioner, 

 vs. 

RON DAVIS, Warden of San Quentin State 

Prison 

 Respondent. 

Case No.: 12-CV-4259 YGR

CAPITAL CASE

ORDER 

INTRODUCTION 

 In his Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Respondent states that Claims Five, 

Eight (specifically the subclaim regarding the prosecutor’s commission of misconduct during his 

opening statement), Eleven D, Eleven F, Thirteen, Thirty and Thirty-One are procedurally defaulted 

and, therefore barred from federal habeas review. Respondent also challenges Claims Three, Six, and 

Forty-Five on the ground that they fail to state a cognizable claim that would entitle Petitioner to 

federal habeas relief and Claims Nine and Eighteen as inadequately plead. For the reasons stated 

herein, Claims Five, the challenged subclaim of Claim Eight Eleven D, Eleven F, Thirteen, Thirty and 

Thirty-One are procedurally defaulted, but will proceed to merits briefing in lieu of a determination on 

the cause and prejudice arguments. Claims Three, Six, and Forty-Five are DISMISSED. In the 

alternative, Claims Three and Six are DENIED on the merits, as are Claims Four and Seven, their 

related ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Finally, Claims Nine and Eighteen are found to be 

adequately pled. 

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STATEMENT 

1. Statement of Facts 

The following facts are taken from the October 29, 2003 opinion of the California Supreme 

Court on direct appeal from the jury verdict. This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 

282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir.2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

1. Prosecution’s case 

Defendant met Nancy Jo Wilhelmi Andrade (Nancy), a nurse, at the Saddle 

Rack bar in San Jose in 1981, shortly after Nancy’s divorce. Nancy owned a purebred 

horse and a Ford pickup truck. Nancy and defendant were romantically involved until 

November or December of 1981, after which they did not see each other until April of 

1982, when they resumed the relationship. 

In January 1982, when Nancy and defendant were not romantically involved, 

Nancy and her friend Darlene Bryant planned a trip across the United States for the 

summer, and that spring Nancy bought a yellow Corvette for the trip. In May 1982, 

Richard Elander, one of defendant’s best friends, began work at a ranch in Utah run by 

Richard Glade. Before Elander left for Utah, defendant had talked to him about killing 

Nancy during a trip across the country. While in Utah, Elander asked Glade about 

carrying a body into the wilderness of the Utah mountains. Disturbed by the 

conversation, Glade fired Elander. 

Defendant asked Nancy to move to Greer, South Carolina, where defendant’s 

mother and stepfather lived. When Nancy replied she did not want to move so far 

away unless married, defendant agreed to marry her. The wedding took place on June 

4, 1982. 

The marriage soon floundered. Nancy was living with Darlene at the latter’s 

home, but defendant was rarely there. Nancy twice saw defendant with some women 

at the Saddle Rack bar. She told several friends she was thinking of an annulment of 

the marriage. 

Defendant had been romantically involved with Lisa Moody, to whom he 

proposed marriage in June 1982, the same month he married Nancy. Defendant and 

Moody did not set a date for the wedding. 

In July 1982, defendant and his friend Richard Elander moved to Greer, South 

Carolina, where they stayed with defendant’s parents and started a truck service 

business. That same month, Nancy and her friend Darlene took their planned vacation 

trip across the country. They stopped in Greer, South Carolina, and Nancy spent the 

night with defendant. 

After Nancy’s visit to South Carolina, defendant and his stepfather, Bergin 

Mosteller, decided to return to California to kill Nancy. Defendant discussed with 

Elander different ways of killing her, including suffocation, hitting her with a large 

wrench, and “bleeding her in the shower so she wouldn't make any mess.” They also 

discussed leaving her body in the Utah wilderness, where they could bury her or “hang 

her in a tree, let the bears eat her.” 

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After returning to California in early August 1982, Nancy often spoke on the 

telephone with defendant. She decided to move to South Carolina in an effort to make 

the marriage work, and she began to make arrangements to do so. She gave custody of 

her two children from a prior marriage to their father and closed out her bank account, 

obtaining $10,500 in cash and a money order for $2,500. When Deborah Nordman, 

one of Nancy’s friends, remarked that Nancy might be left in the desert during the trip 

with defendant to South Carolina, Nancy replied, “If you don't hear from me in two 

weeks, send the police.” 

On August 21, 1982, defendant and his stepfather came to Darlene’s house, 

where Nancy was living, in a station wagon pulling a horse trailer. They loaded 

Nancy’s belongings into the trailer and picked up Nancy’s horse from a stable in 

Gilroy. The plan was for Mosteller to drive the station wagon to Texas, where he 

would leave the horse with relatives. Nancy and defendant would follow in Nancy’s 

Corvette and truck. They would leave the truck in Texas, where defendant’s friend, 

Richard Elander, would retrieve the truck, the horse, and Nancy’s belongings and take 

them all to South Carolina. Nancy and defendant would then leave Texas in Nancy’s 

Corvette to go on a two-week honeymoon. Mosteller, however, never went to Texas. 

He boarded the horse in a stable in San Jose, drove to Nevada, and finally flew to 

South Carolina. 

On August 23, Nancy and defendant went to Nancy’s parents’ home in Santa 

Cruz, California, where they picked up Nancy’s dog and some of her belongings, 

including a microwave, stereo components still in the original cartons, and personal 

documents. That same day, Nancy and defendant ostensibly left for South Carolina. 

That same night, however, defendant checked into a Motel 6 in Fremont, 

California, where he registered to stay for two nights. The next day, he arrived at the 

home of Lisa Moody, the woman who had accepted defendant’s marriage proposal 

shortly after his marriage to Nancy. Over the next two days, defendant gave Lisa a 

stereo and a microwave, took her to see a horse in a San Jose stable, and arranged for 

her to convert $5,000 in cash into a cashier’s check payable to Bergin Mosteller, 

defendant’s stepfather. 

On August 28, 1982, defendant and Lisa left for South Carolina in a pickup 

truck with a horse in a trailer. They stopped in Texas, where they stayed at defendant’s 

grandmother’s house for a couple of days. While there, defendant became upset and 

agitated after receiving a phone call. After defendant and Lisa arrived in Greer, South 

Carolina, defendant opened a bank account in which he deposited Nancy’s $2,500 

money order. Elander and Mosteller sold Nancy’s clothing and possessions at a flea 

market for about $500, burned her documents in a backyard, and sold the horse trailer 

and Nancy’s horse. 

Defendant and Lisa returned to San Jose in mid-September. Defendant then 

sold Nancy’s truck for $4,200, giving the purchaser a certificate of title with Nancy’s 

forged signature. On October 13, 1982, defendant told Lisa that the phone call he 

received in Texas while they were at his grandmother’s house was about a woman who 

loved him and was telling people in South Carolina she was going to marry him. 

According to defendant, the woman went to the head of the Mafia in Arizona to 

complain about defendant, but the Mafia killed her instead. Defendant told Lisa that 

he was forced to dispose of the body to avoid being blamed for the woman’s death, and 

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that he buried it in his friend Bruce Gant’s backyard. The phone call defendant had 

received in Texas was actually from Gant who told him that the “body was beginning 

to stink.” That same day, defendant returned to South Carolina in Nancy’s Corvette. 

Richard Elander testified under a grant of immunity. He said that on the day 

defendant and Lisa arrived in Greer, South Carolina, defendant told him the details of 

Nancy’s killing. According to Elander, after defendant and Nancy left San Jose, 

California, they stopped and walked up a hillside into the woods. While Nancy and 

defendant were sitting on the hillside talking, defendant shot her in the back of the 

head and rolled the body down a ravine where he covered it with blankets. Defendant 

then drove one of the cars to Bruce Gant’s house in Campbell, California. Defendant 

and Gant returned to the scene and retrieved the other vehicle. 

The next evening, defendant and Gant got drunk and returned to the site where 

defendant had shot Nancy. When defendant walked down to her body, it had moved. 

Defendant “freaked out,” ran back to the truck, and told Gant. Gant went down the 

ravine where he tried to strangle Nancy and break her neck. He eventually cut off 

Nancy’s head. Defendant told Elander that they put Nancy’s body in a 55–gallon drum 

filled with cement and buried it in Gant’s backyard. They put her head in a five-gallon 

bucket filled with cement and threw it off the Dumbarton Bridge between Alameda and 

San Mateo Counties, California. 

A few days after defendant returned to South Carolina, Elander testified, he 

sold Nancy’s Corvette to Marion Mitchell. When Mitchell repeatedly asked for title to 

the car, Elander told him that defendant had killed his wife by shooting her, cutting off 

her head, putting the body in a barrel filled with concrete, and burying it in a backyard. 

Elander then forged defendant’s signature on a bill of sale and gave it to Mitchell. 

In January 1983, defendant made arrangements to stay in Connecticut with 

Jeanne Meskell, with whom he previously had a relationship. While there, defendant 

told Meskell that he had killed a girl, that she was in two pieces in two drums filled 

with cement, and that one drum was in the San Francisco Bay and one was in a 

backyard. In March 1983, the San Jose police searched Bruce Gant’s house, where 

they recovered a Tiffany lamp identical to one of Nancy’s. A search of Gant’s yard 

with steel probes in March 1983 and again in 1984 did not reveal anything. Nancy’s 

body was never found. 

2. Defense case 

The defense at the guilt phase consisted primarily of challenges to the 

credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The defense introduced evidence that Elander 

was an untrustworthy drug addict who had engaged in “lying contests” with defendant 

and that a woman with blonde hair and a dog had come to the San Jose stable with 

defendant. Because Nancy had blonde hair and owned a dog, the evidence was 

introduced to try to show that Nancy was aware that Mosteller had taken her horse to 

the San Jose stable. The defense also introduced evidence to raise doubts over the 

burial of Nancy’s body in Gant’s backyard in Campbell, California. San Jose Police 

Officer Demowski testified that officers searched Gant’s backyard three times without 

finding Nancy’s body. District attorney investigator Ronald McCurdy testified that he 

could not find any records tying Gant to the crime or the disposal of the body. 

// 

// 

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B. Penalty Phase 

1. Prosecution case 

The prosecution did not introduce any additional evidence in its case in chief at 

the penalty phase. 

2. Defense case 

The parties stipulated defendant had no prior felony convictions. 

Defendant’s father, William Crew, testified that defendant was born in Fort 

Worth, Texas in 1954. The family moved to Novato, California, in 1957 and to 

Petaluma, California, in 1966. During this time, defendant did well in school and was 

involved in sports. Defendant was never physically abused as a child. 

Defendant’s parents began to experience marital difficulties. His mother 

became noncommunicative and withdrawn. In 1969, defendant's parents divorced; 

defendant and his father moved to San Jose. Defendant continued to do well in school. 

In 1970, when defendant was 15 years old, defendant’s father married Barbara 

Martin. Defendant did not get along with his stepmother and one of her three children. 

When defendant’s father and stepmother bought a home, his stepmother’s children 

were each given a bedroom while defendant had to sleep on a couch. Defendant’s 

grades in school began to decline. When he was 17 years old, defendant quit high 

school and joined the Army. 

Defendant did well in the Army. He became a squad leader in charge of 12 to 

14 men, rose to the rank of sergeant, and became the driver for Colonel Donald Pearce, 

the base commander. While he was in the Army, defendant married Patty, his high 

school girlfriend, and they had one daughter. When a friend and fellow-enlistee, James 

Gilbert, was getting in trouble because of his drinking, defendant showed concern and 

compassion for him. Before his honorable discharge from the Army in 1976, 

defendant and Patty divorced. 

Thereafter, defendant married Debra Lunde and they moved to Minnesota. 

When his marriage to Debra ended in 1981, defendant moved to Texas, where he lived 

with and took care of his grandmother, Irene Watson, who was suffering from 

cataracts. In 1978, defendant returned to California, where he worked as a truck driver 

and attended junior college. He then became involved with Emily Bates, whom he 

treated well. 

Part of the testimony of two witnesses, Richard Elander and Kathy Harper, 

actually given during their guilt phase testimony, was referenced at the penalty phase 

as well as mitigating evidence about defendant’s background. That testimony 

consisted of Elander’s testimony that defendant protected and cared for him when 

Elander was a young man strung out on drugs. And Kathy Harper testified that when 

she was financially destitute, defendant moved in with her and provided financial 

support for her and her son. 

Emily Bates testified at the penalty phase that she had a relationship with 

defendant in 1977 and again in 1980. Defendant treated her well. 

Defendant’s father, William Crew, asked the jury to spare his son’s life because 

as an intelligent and capable person he could lead a productive life in prison by doing 

assigned tasks. 

Defendant’s grandmother, Irene Watson, testified that defendant took care of 

her for two or three months in 1981 when she was in ill health. 

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James Gilbert, defendant’s friend whom defendant had helped while they were 

in the Army, described defendant as a caring and generous person. 

Colonel Pearce, the base commander for whom defendant was the assigned 

driver while in the Army, said that defendant was intelligent, dependable, full of 

common sense, and mature. He described defendant as a top soldier. In his view, 

defendant should not be put to death because he could lead a productive life in prison 

by, for instance, teaching auto repair. 

The defense also presented evidence from three Santa Clara County Sheriff’s 

Deputies (Ron Yount, Toby Council, and Donald Varnado) who had daily contact with 

defendant during the four years he spent in the Santa Clara jail awaiting trial. 

According to them, defendant interacted well with prisoners and staff. Deputy 

Varnado mentioned that defendant prevented trouble by telling him about a plan by 

male inmates to overpower a female officer. All three deputies were of the view that if 

sentenced to life in prison, defendant could lead a productive life by helping other 

inmates and doing assigned tasks. 

Jerry Enomoto, the former head of the California Department of Corrections 

and an expert on prisons, expressed the view that defendant would not be a high 

security risk in prison. His opinion was not changed by defendant’s alleged 

participation in a 1985 escape attempt, because it involved an unsupervised outdoor 

area and was based on informant statements; because the district attorney concluded 

there was insufficient evidence to prosecute defendant; and because the plan did not 

involve weapons, violence, or the taking of hostages. 

3. Prosecution rebuttal 

Clinton Williams, an informant, testified that in 1985, while in the county jail 

with defendant, the latter discussed an escape plan, which involved cutting a hole in 

the surrounding fence. Defendant said he wanted to escape because he thought he 

would be found guilty of the first degree murder of a woman whose body was buried in 

an orchard outside California. 

People v. Crew, 31 Cal.4th 822, 828-34 (2003). 

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of murder and the jury found true a 

special circumstance allegation that the murder was carried out for financial gain. The jury 

sentenced Petitioner to death. 

2. Procedural Background 

On August 13, 2012, Petitioner initiated the present habeas corpus action. Counsel for 

Petitioner were appointed on October 29, 2012. Through his appointed counsel, petitioner filed his 

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on December 6, 2013, asserting 47 claims. Respondent 

filed his Answer on October 3, 2014. In it, Respondent asserted affirmative defenses based on 

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procedural default, cognizability, and summary dismissal. Petitioner filed his Traverse on May 29, 

2015, in which he addresses Respondent’s affirmative defenses. On June 23, 2015, Respondent filed 

a statement saying that he deemed any further response regarding his asserted affirmative defenses 

unnecessary. The matter of Respondent’s asserted affirmative defenses in now ripe for decision. 

ANALYSIS 

In his Answer, Respondent has raised three categories of affirmative defenses: procedural 

default, failure to state a cognizable claim, and claims subject to summary dismissal due to inadequate 

pleading. 

1. Procedural Default 

Under the doctrine of procedural default, federal courts will not review questions of federal 

law decided by a state court if the decision also rests on a state law ground that is independent of the 

federal question and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 

(1991), overruled on other grounds by Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). The 

doctrine of procedural default is a specific application of the general doctrine as to adequate and 

independent state grounds. Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d 757, 762 (9th Cir. 1997). It bars a federal 

court from granting relief on a claim when a state court declined to address the claim because the 

petitioner failed to meet a state procedural requirement. 

 In the habeas context, the procedural default rule furthers the interests of comity and 

federalism. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730. It helps ensure that the state criminal trial remains the “main 

event” rather than a “tryout on the road” for a later federal habeas proceeding. Wainwright v. Sykes, 

433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977). 

 The procedural default analysis proceeds in two steps. First, the federal court must consider 

whether the procedural rule the state court invoked to bar the claim is both “independent” and 

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“adequate” to preclude federal review. “For a state procedural rule to be ‘independent,’ the state law 

basis for the decision must not be interwoven with federal law.” LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 

704 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)). A state law ground is 

interwoven with federal law in those cases where application of the state procedural rule requires the 

state court to resolve a question of federal law. Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 

2000) (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985)). If the state court does not make clear that it 

is resting its decision on an independent and adequate state ground, then the state denial is presumed 

to have been based at least in part upon federal grounds. Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of 

Cal. (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 For a state procedural rule to be “adequate,” it must be clear, well-established and consistently 

applied. Bean, 96 F.3d at 1129. The issue of whether a state procedural rule is adequate to foreclose 

federal review is itself a federal question. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965). The 

adequacy of a state procedural rule must be assessed as of the time when the petitioner committed the 

default. Fields, 125 F.3d at 760. 

 The burden of proving the adequacy of a state procedural rule lies with the state. Bennett v. 

Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 2003). However, once the state has adequately pled the 

existence of an independent and adequate procedural ground as a defense, the burden to place that 

defense at issue shifts to petitioner, who “may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority 

demonstrating inconsistent application of the rule.” Id. at 586. “‘The scope of the state’s burden of 

proof thereafter will be measured by the specific claims of inadequacy put forth by the petitioner.’” Id. 

at 584-85 (citation omitted). 

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 Second, if the procedural rule invoked by the state court is both adequate and independent, 

then the next step of the evaluation requires the federal court to consider whether the petitioner has 

established either “cause” for the default and “actual prejudice” as a result of the alleged violation of 

federal law, or that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The “cause” standard requires petitioner to show that some factor 

external to the defense impeded trial counsel’s efforts to raise the claim in state court. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Such objective impediments include a showing that the factual or 

legal basis for a claim was not available to counsel, or that “some interference by officials” made 

compliance with a procedural rule impracticable. Id. Additionally, ineffective assistance of counsel 

may serve as “cause” for the procedural default. Id. “Not just any deficiency in counsel’s 

performance will do, however; the assistance must have been so ineffective as to violate the Federal 

Constitution.” Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000). 

 “Federal courts retain the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus in a further, narrow class 

of cases despite a petitioner’s failure to show cause for a procedural default. These are extraordinary 

instances when a constitutional violation probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the 

crime.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991). This class of cases implicates a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. 

Respondent asserts that Claims Five, Eight (specifically the subclaim regarding the 

prosecutor’s commission of misconduct during his opening statement), Eleven D, Eleven F, Thirteen, 

Thirty and Thirty-One are procedurally defaulted on the grounds that Petitioner failed to object to the 

errors complained of at trial. 

// 

// 

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A. Adequacy and Independence of State Procedural Bar 

For Claims Eight, Eleven D1, Thirteen, Thirty, and Thirty-One, Petitioner relies on Smith v. 

Campbell, 2011 WL 1321585 (N.D. Cal. 2010), and the cases cited therein, to support his argument 

that the contemporaneous objection rule has not been applied consistently to prosecutorial misconduct 

claims and, therefore, is inadequate. Traverse at 22, 33, 34, 44, 48, 140 and 142. It is noted that not 

all of the claims challenged by Respondent raise allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. 

Specifically, Claims 11D, Thirteen, and Thirty do not contain a prosecutorial misconduct component. 

As such, any argument Petitioner has raised under Smith is not applicable to those claims. 

In Smith, the court determined that based on the cases cited by the petitioner there, cases 

which are incorporated by reference into Petitioner’s response, “Petitioner has met his Bennett burden 

by showing a large number of cases demonstrating that California’s contemporaneous objection rule 

had been applied inconsistently up to the time of petitioner’s trial in 2002.” Smith, 2011 WL 1321585 

at *6. 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held repeatedly upheld the adequacy and independence of 

California’s contemporaneous objection rule, even for prosecutorial misconduct claims. See 

Cunningham v. Wong, 704 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013); Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1069-

70 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Howard v. Campbell, 305 Fed.Appx. 442, 444 (9th Cir. 2008); Vigil v. 

Carey, 240 Fed.Appx. 199, 201 (9th Cir. 2007). See generally Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 958 

(9th Cir. 1997) (finding procedural default under the contemporaneous objection bar); Bonin v. 

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842-43 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Bonin I”) (finding default based on failure to object 

at trial). 

 

1

 Petitioner does not raise a challenge to the procedural default finding by the California Supreme 

Court as to Claim Eleven F. Even if Petitioner were to have raised the same defense he raised for the 

remainder of the claims found defaulted on direct appeal, for the reasons stated herein, he would not 

prevail. 

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Because the issue of whether a state procedural rule is adequate to foreclose federal review is 

itself a federal question, this Court is bound by the Ninth Circuit’s determination regarding the rule’s 

adequacy and independence. See Douglas, 380 U.S. at 422 (1965). Accordingly, these claims are 

barred by the independent and adequate state contemporaneous objection rule. 

Petitioner’s also argues that Claims Five and Thirty, which were presented in his second 

habeas petition, are not barred by an adequate and independent state rule because the California 

Supreme Court cited to In re Seaton, 34 Cal.4th 193, 199-200 (2004). Petitioner says that the rule of 

default it announces did not come into effect fifteen years after Petitioner’s trial and, therefore, is 

inapplicable to Petitioner’s claims. This argument is unavailing. The passage Petitioner cites is a 

mere recitation of the already existing contemporaneous objection rule. Accordingly, Claims Five 

and Thirty are barred by the state’s adequate and independent contemporaneous objection rule. 

 B. Cause, Prejudice, and Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

 Since the determination of whether Petitioner has established exceptions to default involves an 

examination of the merits of Petitioner’s claims, the Court defers ruling on the former until after it has 

considered the latter. See Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that, if 

deciding merits of claims proves to be more efficient than adjudicating exceptions to procedural 

default, a court may exercise discretion to take this course of action). The Court will consider issues 

of cause, prejudice and the miscarriage of justice with respect to any claims that appear to have merit 

at a later date. Accordingly, Petitioner shall brief the merits of these defaulted claims. 

2. Cognizability And Related Claims 

 Violations of state law generally do not implicate federal due process concerns. It is only 

when a state statute creates a protected “liberty interest” that the violation of state law raises federal 

constitutional concerns on federal habeas corpus. See Bonin, 59 F.3d at 841. A state law creates a 

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“liberty interest” protected by the Due Process Clause if the law: (1) contains “substantive predicates” 

governing official decision making; (2) contains “explicitly mandatory language” specifying the 

outcome that must be reached if the substantive predicates are met; and (3) protects “some substantive 

end.” See id. at 842. The state law must provide more than merely procedure. See id.; Dix v. County 

of Shasta, 963 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1992).). 

Several panels of our court of appeals also have required that the state law violation result in 

the deprivation of a substantive right protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., Bonin v. Calderon, 77 

F.3d 1155, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Bonin II”) (even assuming violation of state law in setting 

execution date, no federal habeas claim because there is no deprivation of federal substantive right); 

Bonin I, 59 F.3d at 842 (California statute which gives defendant in capital case right to have two 

defense attorneys argue in his behalf does not create protected liberty interest cognizable in habeas 

because it contains neither “substantive predicates” nor “explicitly mandatory language,” and there is 

no federal constitutional right to have two attorneys make closing arguments); Moran v. Godinez, 57 

F.3d 690, 698 (9th Cir. 1995) (although post-conviction court violated Nevada law when it placed 

burden of proving competency on defendant, violation of state law did not result in deprivation of 

substantive right because state provided defendant with constitutionally adequate procedures to 

evaluate his competency, even with burden of proof on him). 

A. Claim Three: Santa Clara County Lacked Jurisdiction to Try, Convict and 

Sentence Petitioner. 

 This claim argues that Petitioner’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were 

violated because there was insufficient evidence to confer jurisdiction and venue on Santa Clara 

County. Am. Pet. at 41-42. He argues that this state-created right confers a due process right, as 

envisioned in Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343. Id. Petitioner also states that his “rights under the 

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury trial, to fundamental fairness, equal 

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protection, to a reliable guilt determination and a reliable, individualized and non-arbitrary sentencing 

determination were violated” by the improper venue. Id. at 42. Petitioner includes a subclaim 

arguing that all of these rights were violated by the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury 

that it was the jury’s province to determine the issue of venue. Id. 

 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence to 

warrant venue in Santa Clara County. Crew, 31 Cal.4th at 836. The state court declined to reach the 

merits of any subclaims related to jury instructions or whether the matter should have been submitted 

to the jury at all, finding the issue waived because Petitioner failed to offer his own instruction. Id. 

Respondent contends that the entirety of Claim Three is not cognizable on federal habeas 

because “the Supreme Court has never determined whether the question of venue under state law is a 

question for the jury to decide as a matter of federal constitutional law, much less one requiring proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Answer at 84. Respondent notes that this asserted violation of state law 

is not the type that was envisioned by Hicks. Id. at 83, 87. Respondent also argues that the 

instructional error subclaim is procedurally defaulted based on Petitioner’s waiver of the issue. Id. at 

87. 

Petitioner responds that the state-created right to venue is sufficient to make the claim 

federally cognizable. Traverse at 12. Petitioner argues, with specific regard to the instructional error 

subclaim, that he cannot waive a right to sua sponte instruction. Id. at 15-16. Petitioner also asserts 

that the waiver rule was not independent and adequate at the time of its application to Petitioner’s 

claim. Id. at 16. 

i. Cognizability 

This claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Petitioner’s reliance on Hicks here is 

misplaced. There, the defendant had been sentenced to a mandatory 40-year sentence under a 

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sentencing statute that was later declared to be unconstitutional. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 344-45. The 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged the ruling, but determined that the defendant had 

not been prejudiced because the 40-year sentence was within the range of what the jury could have 

imposed. Id. at 345. The United States Supreme Court overturned the sentence finding: 

By statute in Oklahoma, a convicted defendant is entitled to have his punishment fixed 

by the jury. . . . Where . . . a state has provided for the imposition of criminal 

punishment in the discretion of the trial jury, it is not correct to say that the defendant’s 

exercise of that discretion is merely a matter of state procedural law. The defendant in 

such a case has a substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his 

liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory 

discretion. 

Id. at 345-46. Hicks, therefore, had a substantive right to have his sentence determined by a jury, as 

opposed to a judge. 

 By contrast, the venue statutes Petitioner cites do not confer jurisdiction on the superior courts 

within California. People v. Simon, 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1096 (“[T]he issue of venue in criminal as well 

as civil cases does not involve a question of ‘fundamental’ or ‘subject matter’ jurisdiction over a 

proceeding.”) (emphasis in original). The Simon court discussed the history of the venue requirement 

when deciding whether a defendant could waive his right to challenge venue.2

 That court noted, “As 

a leading treatise explains: ‘If the crime is one over which California can and does exercise its 

legislative jurisdiction because it was committed in whole or in part within the state’s territorial 

borders, California courts have jurisdiction to try the defendant.’” Id. They are designed to protect a 

 

2

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Simon decision issued more than twelve years after his appeal. In Simon, the California Supreme 

Court held that the waiver rule they articulated therein would not be retroactive. Thus, it would not be 

applicable to Petitioner. However, the state court’s discussion about the nature of the venue statutes 

and their purpose is not a statement of a new rule. Rather it is a historical commentary. Thus, the 

general statements about the venue requirement in California are instructive, even though the new rule 

announced in the case is not applicable to Petitioner. The same holds true for People v. Posey, 32 

Cal.4th 193 (2004). 

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defendant from being haled into court in a faraway jurisdiction. Id. at 1095. While this arguably 

meets the test set out by Bonin I, there is no correlative federal right to venue. 

Moreover, the venue requirement does not encompass a statutory right to have venue 

determined by a jury. People v. Posey, 32 Cal.4th 193, 201 (2004) (“In addition to concluding that 

the rule that venue is a question of fact for the jury is unsound, we also conclude that this rule 

properly may be reconsidered and modified by this court without awaiting action by the Legislature, 

because the rule was established by judicial decision and has not been incorporated by any statute.”). 

While the trial court may have erred according to prevailing practice at the time of Petitioner’s 

trial by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury that it needed to find venue properly rested in Santa 

Clara County, that does not necessarily give rise to a federal constitutional claim. See Rivera v. 

Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 159 (2009) (not every state-law error rises to the level of a federal due process 

violation). Petitioner did not have a statutory right to have the venue issue determined by jury trial 

like the petitioner in Hicks. Nor does the state confer jurisdiction of the case onto a particular court. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s venue and related instructional error claims are for state law errors only and, 

therefore, are not cognizable on federal habeas review. Rhoades v. Henry, 611 F.3d 1133, 1142 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (“In short, violations of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas review”). This 

claim is, therefore, DISMISSED because it is not cognizable. 

ii. Merits 

Even if Petitioner had raised a cognizable claim, such a claim would be without merit. Under 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, a district court may not grant 

habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

As noted, the United States Supreme Court has not held that the failure to follow a state venue 

statute constitutes a deprivation of Due Process or any other constitutional right. Therefore, the 

California Supreme Court’s decision cannot be said to be an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. 

Moreover, the California Supreme Court evaluated Petitioner’s claim that there was 

insufficient evidence to confer evidence in Santa Clara County and determined there was. Crew, 31 

Cal.4th at 835-36. The state court’s determination that there was no state law violation is binding on 

this court. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988). 

As a result, Hicks v. Oklahoma is irrelevant. 

Petitioner also has failed to show prejudice. Even if a petitioner meets the requirements of 

section 2254(d), habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a substantial 

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 638 (1993). “Under this test, relief is proper only if the federal court has ‘grave doubt about 

whether a trial error of federal law had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury's verdict.’ (Citation omitted.) There must be more than a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the error 

was harmful.” Davis v. Ayala, __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 1297-98 (2015). While Petitioner asserts 

that he was denied the right to “a reliable guilt determination and a reliable, individualized and nonarbitrary sentencing determination,” he fails to put forth any argument as to how that occurred. Nor 

could he make a showing. 

As noted, venue is not a component of the crime, nor does it confer jurisdiction over the court. 

The point of the venue statutes is to allow the state to prosecute defendants for crimes committed 

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within the state while providing the defendant and the counties reasonable access to witnesses. 

Simon, 25 Cal.4th at 1096-97. Petitioner has not alleged any prejudice consistent with the right he 

asserts and he has failed to make any showing that because his case was venued in Santa Clara 

County that either his trial or his sentence was fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, in the alternative, 

this claim is DENIED on the merits. 

iii. Procedural Default 

 Because the Court finds this claim, and all subclaims within it, either not cognizable or 

lacking in merit, it does not need to reach the issue of procedural default for Petitioner’s instructional 

error subclaim. 

B. Claim Four: Trial Counsel Were Ineffective for Failing To Make 

Appropriate Arguments Regarding the Issue of Venue 

In Claim Four, Petitioner argues, “Trial counsel unreasonably failed to request that the jury be 

instructed or be required to make express findings of the jurisdictional facts, and had no tactical 

reason for such failures.” Am. Pet. at 48. Petitioner adds, “Even though the California Supreme 

Court found that there was sufficient evidence in the record to establish jurisdiction and venue, there 

was at minimum, a factual question for the jury as to whether sufficient acts occurred in Santa Clara 

to confer jurisdiction.” Id. at 49. The California Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits on 

habeas without explanation. 

Respondent does not raise an affirmative defense regarding Claim Four. However, since 

Claim Three, the substantive claim underlying this ineffective assistance of counsel claim, was 

dismissed or, in the alternative, denied on the merits, the Court will review the merits of this related 

claim now. 

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim, Petitioner 

must establish two things. First, he must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that it 

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fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by 

counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. 

First, Petitioner must show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient. See id. at 688. 

Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a 

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance. See id. at 689. “Although courts may not indulge ‘post hoc rationalization’ for counsel’s 

decisionmaking that contradicts the available evidence of counsel’s actions, . . . neither may they 

insist counsel confirm every aspect of the strategic basis for his or her actions. There is a ‘strong 

presumption’ that counsel’s attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics 

rather than ‘sheer neglect.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109 (2011) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner has the burden of showing through evidentiary proof that trial counsel’s performance was 

deficient. See Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741, 743 (9th Cir. 1990). It is unnecessary for a federal 

court considering a habeas ineffective assistance claim to address the prejudice prong of the 

Strickland test if Petitioner cannot even establish incompetence under the first prong. See Siripongs v. 

Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Second, Petitioner must show that trial counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. A court need not 

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by 

Petitioner as the result of the alleged deficiencies. See id. at 697; Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 

1470 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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Furthermore, under AEDPA, the state court’s determination of an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim is afforded additional deference: 

The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard 

was unreasonable. This is different from asking whether defense counsel’s 

performance fell below Strickland’s standard. Were that the inquiry, the analysis 

would be no different than if, for example, this Court were adjudicating a Strickland 

claim on direct review of a criminal conviction in a United States district court. Under 

AEDPA, though, it is a necessary premise that the two questions are different. For 

purposes of § 2254(d)(1), “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law.” . . . A state court must be granted a deference 

and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under the 

Strickland standard itself. 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. 

As noted above in relation to Claim Three, Petitioner did not have a statutory right to have the 

issue of venue submitted to the jury. Trial counsel did file a motion to dismiss based on insufficient 

evidence to support venue in Santa Clara County, which was denied by the trial court. RT at 4474-79. 

Counsel were not unaware of the potential challenge to venue and raised the issue. Petitioner, 

therefore, has failed to show deficient performance. 

 Additionally, Petitioner has failed to show prejudice as a result of counsel’s failure to request 

jury instructions regarding venue or to challenge the prosecutor’s misstatement about what evidence is 

needed to show venue because the California Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence 

to support venue in Santa Clara County under state law. As noted above, this Court is bound by that 

determination. 

 Thus, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s decision denying this claim was “contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or that it “resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented” to it. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Claim Four is DENIED. 

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C. Claim Six: Petitioner’s Extrajudicial Statements Were Erroneously 

Admitted Because There Was No Proof of Corpus Delecti 

In this claim, Petitioner argues that in the absence of a corpus delecti, or evidence sufficient to 

permit a reasonable inference to be drawn that the victim died and the death was caused by criminal 

agency, the admission of his extrajudicial statements violated his “Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights to a jury trial, fundamental fairness, equal protection, proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt of each element of the crime charged, a fair and reliable guilt determination, and an 

individualized, non-arbitrary and reliable sentencing determination.” Am. Pet. at 57. The California 

Supreme Court denied this claim on appeal finding that the prosecution produced sufficient evidence 

to satisfy the rule. Crew, 31 Cal.4th at 749-50. 

Respondent argues that this claim challenges a state court’s adherence to a state rule and, 

therefore, is not cognizable on federal habeas. Answer at 99. Petitioner responds that his claim is 

cognizable, that it is nearly identical to a claim considered on the merits in Savell v. Eps, 2010 WL 

3724549 (S.D. Miss. 2010), and that it amounts to a Due Process violation under Hicks. Traverse at 

25-26. 

i. Cognizability 

Respondent is correct that this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Under 

California law, “the corpus delicti rule requires that a conviction be supported by some evidence, 

which need only constitute a slight or prima facie showing, but must be in addition to and beyond the 

defendant’s untested inculpatory extrajudicial statements.” People v. Rivas, 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 

1428 (Cal.App. 6 Dist.2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The California 

Supreme Court further explained the rule in People v. Alvarez, 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1171 (2002), “[O]nce 

the necessary quantum of independent evidence is present, the defendant’s extrajudicial statements 

may then be considered for their full value to strengthen the case on all issues .” 

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However, this requirement that independent evidence support a defendant’s extrajudicial 

statements is purely a matter of state law. See, e.g., Alvarez, 27 Cal.4th at 1173 (“[i]t is undisputed 

that the corpus delicti rule is not a requirement of federal law”); Holland v. Glebe, 2014 WL 5306674 

*16 (W.D. Wa. Oct. 15, 2014); Hicks v. Paramo, 2014 WL 3767416, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2014) 

(collecting cases); Lopez v. Allison, 2014 WL 3362228, at *7 (E.D.Cal. July 8, 2014) (stating that 

“California’s corpus delicti rule is a matter of state law,” and collecting cases); Rodriguez v. Cate, 

2013 WL 5521997, at *13 (C.D.Cal. Oct.2, 2013) (the corpus delicti rule is a state rule that “is not 

grounded in federal law or the federal constitution”). Accordingly, as noted above for Claim Three, 

there is no federal relief available. Again, Petitioner’s reliance on Hicks v. Oklahoma is unavailing. 

Accordingly, this claim is DISMISSED because it is not cognizable on federal habeas review. 

ii. Merits 

Even if Petitioner had stated a cognizable claim, such a claim would be meritless. The 

California Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence to satisfy the corpus delecti rule. “[T]he 

quantum of evidence required [to meet the rule] is not great, and ‘need only be “a slight or prima facie 

showing” permitting an inference of injury, loss, or harm from a criminal agency, after which the 

defendant’s statements may be considered to strengthen the case on all issues.’ [Citation.]” People v. 

Ledesma 39 Cal.4th 641, 722 (2006). “The inference [that a crime has been committed] need not be 

‘the only, or even the most compelling, one ... [but need only be] a reasonable one.’” Id., quoting 

People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301–302 (1998). 

The California Supreme Court on direct appeal cited evidence that the victim’s 

contacts with her friends abruptly stopped after she left San Jose with [Petitioner]. For 

20 years, Nancy had telephoned her friend Jeanette St. John on August 24, Jeanette’s 

birthday. She promised to call another friend . . . every other week after her arrival in 

South Carolina. Shortly before her disappearance, Nancy told Debbie Nordman to call 

the police if Nordman had not heard from her in two weeks. In addition, shortly after 

Nancy’s disappearance, [Petitioner] sold Nancy’s truck, car, horse, clothes, and spent 

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her money. This evidence is more than sufficient to support a reasonable inference that 

Nancy is dead and her death was the result of a criminal agency. 

Crew, 31 Cal.4th at 834. Petitioner has failed to show that this was an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law or “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, this claim is DENIED in the alternative to the 

dismissal for lack of cognizability. 

D. Claim Seven: Trial Counsel Were Ineffective For Failing To Seek To Exclude 

Petitioner’s Statements Based on the Corpus Delecti Rule 

 As noted above, the California Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence to 

satisfy the California corpus delecti rule. Petitioner has failed to show that any motion to exclude his 

statements would be successful in light of the evidence supporting their inclusion under the corpus 

delecti rule. 

Because Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s decision denying this claim was 

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or that it 

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented” to it. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this claim is DENIED. 

E. Claim Forty-Five: Petitioner Was Denied Meaningful Review of the Claims 

Raised in His State Habeas Petition Regarding the Modification of His Sentence 

Under § 190.4(e). 

Petitioner claims that his confinement is unlawful because his conviction and sentence were 

illegally and unconstitutionally obtained in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments “due to the California Supreme Court’s failure to fully and fairly adjudicate the claims 

raised in Petitioner’s first habeas petition . . . including, but not limited to the failure to permit 

Petitioner to obtain discovery, interrogatories and depositions, subpoenas, an evidentiary hearing and 

other mechanisms for factual development and the summary denial of the petition.” Am. Pet. at 365. 

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Respondent asserts that this claim is not cognizable because habeas relief is not available for errors of 

state law. Answer at 277. 

As Petitioner concedes, it is well settled that “a petition alleging errors in the state postconviction review process is not addressable through habeas corpus proceedings.” Franzen v. 

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir.1989). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim that the California Supreme 

Court’s denial of his habeas petition violated his federal constitutional rights is not cognizable in this 

Court. Accordingly, this claim is DISMISSED. 

3. Summary Dismissal 

A court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 

19, 21 (1975). Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements. McFarland v. 

Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). An application for a federal writ of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner 

who is in state custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court must “specify all the grounds for relief 

which are available to the petitioner ... and shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each 

of the grounds thus specified.” Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. 

2254. “‘[N]otice’ pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a 

‘real possibility of constitutional error.’” Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 

431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)). Summary dismissal is appropriate only where the allegations in 

the petition are vague or conclusory, palpably incredible, or patently frivolous or false. See Hendricks 

v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75–76 

(1977)). Respondent asserts that Claims Nine and Eighteen are inadequately pled. 

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In Claim Nine, Petitioner states that his “confinement and sentence are illegal, unconstitutional 

and void because trial counsel were ineffective for failing to seek appropriate instructions in response 

to the prosecutor’s misconduct as set forth in Claim [Eight] and object to the misconduct in opening 

statement in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution.” Am Pet. at 69. In Claim Eighteen, Petitioner argues that his Fifth, Sixth, 

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated “because the prosecution failed to disclose 

material, exculpatory and impeaching evidence known to the prosecution but not to the defense; 

misrepresented and/or suppressed material, exculpatory and impeaching evidence known to the 

prosecution but not the defense; knowingly presented perjured testimony; and failed to correct false 

statements at trial.” Am. Pet. at 131-32. For this claim, Respondent asserts that “with the exception 

of petitioner’s complaint about the prosecution’s alleged agreement not to investigate or prosecute 

Elander for perjury, this claim is inadequately pled.” Answer at 157. 

In his Traverse, Petitioner cites to specific facts that would support his claim, some of which 

are detailed more thoroughly in other claims and incorporated by reference. Because Petitioner is 

required only to present a summary of supporting facts, the Court finds these two claims to be 

adequately pled. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above: 

 The following claims are procedurally barred, but shall proceed to merits briefing: 

Five, Eight (specifically the subclaim regarding the prosecutor’s commission of 

misconduct during his opening statement), Eleven D, Eleven F, Thirteen, Thirty and 

Thirty-One; 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

 The following claims are DISMISSED in their entirety because they are not cognizable 

on federal habeas review: Three, Six, and Forty-Five. In the alternative, Claims Three 

and Six are DENIED in their entirety on the merits. 

 The following claims related to non-cognizable claims are DENIED: Four and Seven. 

 The following claims are deemed adequately pled and shall proceed to merits briefing: 

Nine and Eighteen. 

The Court directs the parties to meet and confer and file a joint statement identifying which of 

the remaining claims in the Petition are record-based and will, therefore, not require an evidentiary 

hearing. As part of the joint statement, the parties also shall submit a proposed litigation schedule for 

the resolution of the remaining claims. The joint statement is due within thirty (30) days of the filing 

date of this order. The Court will issue a briefing schedule for the record-based claims following 

receipt of the joint statement. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 30, 2015 

____________________________________ 

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case 4:12-cv-04259-YGR Document 43 Filed 11/30/15 Page 25 of 25