Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05050/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05050-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 330
Nature of Suit: Federal Employers' Liability
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 5, 2002 Decided June 11, 2002

No. 01-5050

Dolly Kyle Browning and

Direct Outstanding Creations Corporation,

Appellants

v.

William Jefferson Clinton, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv01991)

Larry Klayman argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants.

David E. Kendall argued the cause for appellee William

Jefferson Clinton, et al. With him on the brief were Allen P.

Waxman, Kevin Hardy, Bruce Lindsey, appearing pro se,

and William C. Oldaker.

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John D. Aldock argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee Robert S. Bennett.

Floyd Abrams and Landis C. Best were on the brief for

appellee Jane Mayer and Advanced Magazine Publishers Inc.

Before: Edwards, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: In this appeal, we review the district

court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of eight common and federal

law claims against former President Clinton, two of his

lawyers, one of his aides, The New Yorker, and a journalist.

Construing the complaint liberally and giving appellant the

"benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts

alleged," Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271,

1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994), we affirm as to all appellees except Mr.

Clinton; with respect to Mr. Clinton, we affirm the dismissal

of six claims and reverse two.

I.

This case involves appellant Dolly Kyle Browning's "longstanding friendship" with former President Clinton--a friendship she alleges "included an extramarital, sexual relationship"--and her "semi-autobiographical novel" in which the

female protagonist has a long-standing extramarital affair

with the governor of a southern state. Am. Compl. p p 15, 20.

Browning copyrighted her novel in 1988 and sent it to Warner Books, where an editor "encouraged [her] to continue to

work on [it]." Id. p 22. Thereafter, Browning charges, Clinton and the other appellees engaged in a scheme to prevent

publication of her book and defame her. According to the

amended complaint, the scheme involved the following:

In 1992, Browning's own brother, allegedly at Clinton's

direction, telephoned to "warn[ ] [Browning], 'if you cooperate

with the media we will destroy you.' " Id. p 32. Clinton's

brother also "threaten[ed] [her]" by phone. Id. p 33. The

following year, appellee Bruce Lindsey, then serving as Deputy White House Counsel, "threatened [ ] Browning by telling

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her sister[,] 'we've read your sister's book and we don't want

it published.' " Id. p 38.

In 1994, Browning and Clinton met at their thirtieth high

school reunion where, according to Browning, Clinton "apologized to [her] for the threat that had been made against her."

Id. p 41. Shortly thereafter, Browning's sister and Lindsey,

acting as intermediaries, reached an "understanding" about

what Browning could say: She "was permitted to say publicly

that she and Clinton had a thirty-three year relationship that

from time to time included sex," but "agreed not to tell the

true story" and "not to use ... the 'A words' ... adultery

and affair"; Clinton agreed "not [to] tell any lies about [her]."

Id. p 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Browning retained a literary agent in the summer of 1995.

Later that year, Esquire magazine published an article about

Browning and her book, and in early 1996, Publisher's Weekly reported that Browning was "ready to go public in a big

way via the book business[,] ... assuming, that is, that a

publisher bites. This month, [Browning's literary agent] will

begin shopping around a bombshell roman A clef that could

knock Primary Colors right out of the headlines." Id. p 47

(internal quotation marks omitted) (first alteration in original). In the end, however, Browning received no "positive

responses, offers to publish, or contracts from any of the

publishers that she contacted." Id. p 55. Appellant Direct

Outstanding Creations Corporation, a business created by

Browning's husband, subsequently "acquired ... rights to

... the manuscript ... [but] has not been able to sell [those]

rights to ... any publisher[ ]." Id. p 56.

Appellee The New Yorker ran an article in 1997 by appellee

Jane Mayer attributing comments to publisher Alfred S.

Regnery about "a memoir by a putative Presidential mistress." Id. p 51 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the article, although "[i]t seemed plausible ... that

[such] a memoir ... would find a home at Regnery [Publishing Co.][,]" Regnery said he "wouldn't touch [the book] with a

ten-foot pole" because it wasn't "particularly newsworthy"

and was "far below [Regnery's] standards." Id. (internal

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quotation marks omitted). Browning claims that she never

sent her manuscript to Regnery, and that Regnery never

made these statements.

In January 1998, Clinton, in connection with his deposition

in the Paula Corbin Jones litigation, produced a handwritten

memo summarizing his high school reunion conversation with

Browning. The memo, which Clinton testified he and appellee Marsha Scott, a White House aide, prepared several days

after the reunion, states that when Clinton "pointed out that

[Browning's book] wasn't true, [Browning] said[,] 'well, I'll

say it's just fiction, just a story[,]' and that she needed the

money and she didn't care if it hurt me or the presidency,

that others had made money and she felt abandoned." Id.

p 69 (internal quotation marks omitted). In his deposition,

Clinton explained that after writing the first part of the

memo, he gave it to Scott who read it and added her own

notes. Id. p 73. Scott's portion reports that Browning "repeatedly" stated that "her story was not true but ... she was

angry and needed money." Id. p 74 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Time later published excerpts from the memo.

In March 1998, Jones, in opposition to Clinton's motion for

summary judgment in that litigation, filed a ninety-page brief

and 600 pages of exhibits, among which were statements from

several witnesses, including a four-page affidavit from Browning describing her alleged affair with Clinton. Appellee

Robert S. Bennett, Clinton's attorney, appeared on CNN and

described Jones's filing as "scurrilous." Id. p 80 (internal

quotations omitted). At a press conference later that month,

Bennett called Jones's "700-page filing"

little more than a web of deceit and distortions....

Despite the plaintiff's ... insistence on using her last

filing to dump into the media every piece of garbage they

can get before the court, we will not respond in kind to

that. Despite their vicious and false attacks, our filing

focuses on the weaknesses of the plaintiff's case and her

witnesses .... Because they dumped so much garbage

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.... we had to move to strike it and to present substantial evidence ... to rebut that salacious material.

Id. p 81.

Based on the foregoing, Browning asserts eight common

and federal law claims: (1) tortious interference with prospective business opportunity (against all appellees); (2) disparagement of property (against The New Yorker and Mayer);

(3) defamation (against Clinton, Scott, and Bennett); (4)

"false light" invasion of privacy (against Clinton, Scott, and

Bennett); (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress

(against Clinton, Lindsey, Scott, and Bennett); (6) civil RICO

(against Clinton and Lindsey); (7) Bivens liability for violation of the First Amendment (against Clinton and Lindsey);

and (8) civil conspiracy (against all appellees). Concluding

that Browning failed to state a claim with respect to each

count and denying leave to amend, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice under Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 15(a). Browning appeals.

II.

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a

complaint: dismissal is inappropriate unless the "plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957). Reviewing de novo, Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 192

(D.C. Cir. 1995), we accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as

true and construe the complaint "liberally," "grant[ing] plaintiff[ ] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the

facts alleged," Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. At the Rule 12(b)(6)

stage, we do not assess "the truth of what is asserted or

determin[e] whether a plaintiff has any evidence to back up

what is in the complaint." ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr,

952 F.2d 457, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1991). As the Supreme Court

reiterated in a case decided after the district court dismissed

this case, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires "simply

[that] ... 'the defendant [give] fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' This

simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery

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rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts

and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, ___, 122 S. Ct. 992, 998

(2002) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). That said, we accept

neither "inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are

unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint," nor "legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." Kowal, 16

F.3d at 1275; cf. 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure s 1357, at 347-48

(2d ed. 1990) (explaining that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate where the allegations contradict the claim asserted,

e.g., where the allegations in an action for negligence showed

that the plaintiff's own negligence was the sole proximate

cause of the injury).

With these standards in mind, we begin with Browning's

allegation that appellees "intentionally ... [and] maliciously

... interfered with" her business opportunity to publish her

novel. Am. Compl. p 91. To survive a motion to dismiss on

this claim, Browning must plead "(1) the existence of a valid

business relationship or expectancy, (2) knowledge of the

relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3)

intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy, and (4) resultant

damage." Bennett Enters. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 45 F.3d

493, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The first element--business expectancy--must be "commercially reasonable to anticipate."

Whelan v. Abell, 953 F.2d 663, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Although Browning's

allegation that she "had a reasonable expectation" of selling

her book to a publisher, Am. Compl. p 88, might, standing

alone, fall short, she also alleges not only that a Warner

Books editor "encouraged" her to continue working on the

book, id. p 22 (appellees mischaracterize Warner's response

as an unequivocal "reject[ion]," Clinton Appellees' Br. at 4),

but also that she received favorable press coverage in the

Esquire and Publisher's Weekly articles. Indeed, the latter

described her novel as a "bombshell" that "could knock

Primary Colors right out of the headlines.' " Am. Compl.

p 47. Reading the complaint liberally in Browning's favor

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and bearing in mind that discovery and summary judgment

motions, not Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, are the appropriate

vehicles for weeding out unmeritorious claims, see Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 998, we think these

allegations, though thin, could support an inference that it

was "commercially reasonable [for Browning] to anticipate"

selling the book. Whelan, 953 F.2d at 673 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). We certainly understand how

the district court could have concluded that the lack of

responses from publishers "contradicted" the reasonableness

of any such expectation, Browning v. Clinton, No. 98-1991,

slip op. at 15 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2001), but Browning theorizes

that no one responded because "Clinton, acting individually

and through various agents, ... threaten[ed] ... potential

publishers," Am. Compl. p 50.

Insisting that we should nevertheless affirm the dismissal

of the tortious interference claim, three appellees--Clinton,

Lindsey, and Scott--argue that Browning failed to plead

another element of the claim, i.e., causation. It "defies logic,"

they say, to conclude that Clinton and others caused publishers "with a wide range of political beliefs" to reject the book.

Clinton Appellees' Br. at 6. At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage,

however, we must give Browning the benefit of all inferences

and confine our analysis to the facts alleged. The amended

complaint neither identifies publishers she contacted nor

characterizes their "political beliefs." Whether a triable issue

of fact exists regarding her allegation that "potential publishers" failed to respond positively due to "threat[s]" from

Clinton and his "agents" is a question for summary judgment.

We are equally unpersuaded by these appellees' argument

that Browning failed to plead still another element, i.e.,

intentional interference. Browning cannot rely on her allegation that Clinton and his "agents" "threaten[ed] ... potential

publishers," they say, because in failing to specify statements,

publishers, or times, the allegation is too "conclusory." Id. at

5. Though extremely general and based only "on information

and belief," Am. Compl. p 50, the allegation satisfies Rule 8 as

to Clinton (like the parties, we read the word "agents," when

used in connection with alleged threats to publishers, to

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include neither Lindsey nor Scott nor any other appellee).

The allegation gives "fair notice of what [Browning's] claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S.

at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 997 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). By signing the complaint, moreover, Browning's

counsel affirmed (on pain of sanctions) that he made "reasonable inquiry" into the facts supporting the complaint. See 5

Wright & Miller, s 1224, at 205 (explaining that pleading

"on information and belief" is appropriate unless special

pleading requirements apply or the information is within the

plaintiff's knowledge, and noting the relationship between this

permissive standard and Rule 11(b)'s requirement that the

attorney who signs the pleadings affirms having made "reasonable inquiry" into the allegations).

These three appellees also argue that Browning cannot rely

on the alleged threats to intimidate her into not publishing

her story because her claim requires conduct that induced

third parties--here, potential publishers--to decline a business relationship. The Restatement of Torts, upon which

appellees rely, actually defines tortious interference more

broadly, including conduct that "prevent[s] the [plaintiff] from

acquiring or continuing the prospective relationship" in addition to conduct that "induc[es] or otherwise caus[es] a third

person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation."

Restatement (Second) of Torts s 766B (1977). The amended

complaint, however, alleges that after (and therefore despite)

the threat Browning made concerted efforts to sell her

book--thus contradicting any basis for her claim other than

interference with third parties. Although the amended complaint's allegations against Clinton and Scott are not limited

to actions directed at Browning, this is not the case as to

Lindsey. The only allegations against him are that he threatened Browning and, on Clinton's behalf, negotiated the "understanding" with her. We will therefore affirm the dismissal

of this claim against Lindsey.

The claim against Scott also fails, but on statute of limitations grounds. The amended complaint alleges that in 1994,

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Scott added notes to the memo describing Browning's encounter with Clinton at their high school reunion, and that

Scott showed those notes to Clinton--conduct Browning characterizes as defamatory, and which forms the sole basis for

her tortious interference claim against Scott. This tortious

interference claim is therefore "intertwined" with Browning's

defamation claim. See Mittleman v. United States, 104 F.3d

410, 415-17 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that a claim is "intertwined" with another claim when they are based on the same

underlying facts). When a cause of action with no prescribed

statute of limitations is "intertwined" with one having a

prescribed limitations period, District of Columbia courts

apply the prescribed period. See id. at 415-16. In the

District of Columbia, tortious interference with business expectancy claims have no prescribed statute of limitations, so

we must apply the one-year statute for defamation. See D.C.

Code s 12-301(4) (West 2001). Because Scott's conduct occurred more than a year before Browning filed her complaint,

we will affirm the dismissal of the tortious interference claim

against Scott. By contrast, the tortious interference claim

against Clinton is not "intertwined" with Browning's defamation claim. Browning alleges that Clinton and his unidentified

"agents" intentionally interfered with her business opportunity through conduct other than defamation--including by

threatening publishers.

Appellee Bennett urges us to affirm the dismissal of

Browning's tortious interference claim against him because

his CNN and press conference statements, the only conduct

Browning alleges he engaged in, could not have "hindered her

ability to publish her book." Appellee Bennett's Br. at 12.

Even given the liberal reading owed pleadings, we agree.

Made two years after Browning and her agent contacted

publishers, Bennett's comments focused on what he called

"salacious," "scurrilous," and "deceit[ful]" filings by Jones.

Am. Compl. p p 80, 81. Those filings included a Browning

affidavit describing her alleged relationship with Clinton.

But even if a listener familiar with the circumstances of the

Jones case could infer that Bennett's language applied to

Browning, see infra pp. 14-15, their timing and content make

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the necessary causal inference "unsupported by the facts set

out in the complaint." Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1275. We will

therefore affirm the dismissal of the tortious interference

claim against Bennett.

The final two appellees, The New Yorker and Jane Mayer,

argue that Browning cannot show that Mayer's article "interfered with Browning's longstanding and unsuccessful prior

efforts to publish her novel ... [since] 1988," pointing out

that the article "profiled a publisher[,] ... did not focus on

Browning or her novel[,] [and] ... did not even mention

Browning or the novel by name." The New Yorker Appellees'

Br. at 13. Although we think these appellees overstate their

case when they characterize Browning's efforts as "unsuccessful ... since 1988"--after all, the Warner Books editor

"encouraged" her, Am. Compl. p 22--we agree that in view of

the content of Mayer's article, the relationship between the

article and any publisher's failure to buy Browning's book is

too attenuated for her to have successfully pleaded causation.

We will therefore affirm the dismissal of this claim against

The New Yorker and Mayer.

The foregoing leaves the tortious interference claim intact

against Mr. Clinton only. We will therefore reverse the

dismissal of that claim and remand for further proceedings.

This requires that we also reverse the dismissal of the

common law civil conspiracy claim against Mr. Clinton. In

dismissing this claim, the district court relied on its conclusion that Browning failed to plead an underlying tort. See

Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1983)

(holding that civil conspiracy is not a separate cause of action,

but rather a means of establishing liability for underlying

torts). We have determined, however, that Browning has

stated a tortious interference claim against Mr. Clinton, and

he offers no basis for affirmance other than the absence of an

underlying tort. As to the other appellees, however, we will

affirm the dismissal of the civil conspiracy claim because, as

we indicate below, Browning has failed to allege an underlying tort against any of them.

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III.

We agree with the district court that Browning's remaining

claims cannot survive Rule 12(b)(6) review. We explain each

in turn.

As support for her disparagement of property claim against

The New Yorker and Mayer, Browning relies on the article

reporting Regnery's negative comments. A disparagement of

property claim requires that the plaintiff plead "special damages," Fowler v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 182 F.2d 377, 378 (D.C.

Cir. 1950), that is, "pecuniary harm resulting from the defendant's unprivileged publication of false statements, with

knowledge or reckless disregard of the falsity, concerning the

plaintiff's property or product," Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v.

United States, 753 F.2d 1151, 1155 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

Fedral Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g) requires that special

damages be "specifically stated," i.e., the plaintiff must allege

actual damages with "particularity" and specify " 'facts showing that such special damages were the natural and direct

result' " of the defendant's conduct (here, the alleged false

and disparaging article). Fowler, 182 F.2d at 379 (quoting

Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Labs., 17 F.2d

255, 261 (8th Cir. 1926)). This heightened pleading standard

applies because "special damages," unlike general damages,

are "not the necessary consequence of [the] defendant's conduct, [but] stem from the particular circumstances of the

case." 5 Wright & Miller, s 1310, at 700. A plaintiff can

satisfy this pleading obligation by identifying either particular

customers whose business has been lost or facts showing an

established business and the amount of sales before and after

the disparaging publication, along with evidence of causation.

See Art Metal-U.S.A., 753 F.2d at 1155 n.6 (explaining the

type of allegations required to plead special damages); cf.

Fowler, 182 F.2d at 379 (affirming a dismissal for failure to

plead special damages where the plaintiffs alleged only that

"as a result of the malicious publication" they lost a total

dollar amount of business).

Browning's amended complaint states that "[a]s a proximate result of the publication of [Mayer's article], ... neither

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[ ] Browning nor Direct Outstanding Creations Corporation

were [sic] able to sell the publishing and other rights in the

manuscript," and therefore that they suffered damages "including but not limited to marketing and other business

expenses incurred ..., loss of goodwill, [and] emotional distress and mental anguish." Am. Compl. p p 96, 95. According to Browning, these allegations satisfy Rule 9(g) because

they "notify the defendant as to the nature of the claimed

damages." Appellant's Br. at 19. Amplifying this point at

oral argument, counsel insisted that "the standard of pleading

special damages has been relegated to notice pleading." Tr.

of Oral Arg. at 10. We find no support for this proposition.

Indeed, it runs counter to the very case Browning cites,

Schoen v. Washington Post, which expressly requires that

disparagement of property claims set forth "the precise nature of the losses as well as the way in which the special

damages resulted from the allegedly false publication." 246

F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The plaintiff in Schoen

specified his business receipts before and after defendant's

disparaging publication, alleged that the publication caused

"many customers to withdraw their custom," and identified

three such customers. Id. Browning's amended complaint

contains no allegations remotely like those in Schoen. She

neither quantifies her loss nor identifies any lost business

relationships. She alleges no facts suggesting causation.

While it may not be "necessary ... to provide ... the

maximum degree of detail that plaintiff might be capable of

providing," Appellant's Br. at 19 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted) (emphasis added), Browning merely

asserts in general terms that The New Yorker article cost her

financially. We agree with the district court that Rule 9(g)

requires more.

Browning alleges three separate defamatory acts by Clinton and one each by Scott and Bennett. For her first claim

against Clinton, she asserts that the 1994 memo he and Scott

prepared was defamatory and that Clinton "published" it

when he showed his notes to Scott. See Croixland Ltd.

Props. v. Corcoran, 174 F.3d 213, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

(explaining the publication requirement for a defamation

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claim). The district court found the memorandum protected

by both the "common interest" and the "conditional[ ] ...

common law" privileges. Browning, No. 98-1991, slip op. at

18. Browning appeals only the latter, so we will affirm based

on the former. See Corson & Gruman Co. v. NLRB, 899

F.2d 47, 50 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that an appellant

waives an issue not argued in brief). Because her claim

against Scott also concerns the 1994 memo, and because

Browning also fails to challenge the district court's "common

interest" finding with respect to Scott, we will affirm that

portion of the district court's order as well.

Browning next claims that Clinton defamed her by producing the 1994 memo in the Jones litigation and then testifying

about it in his deposition. "[S]tatements preliminary to or in

the course of a judicial proceeding," however, enjoy an "absolute privilege" "so long as the defamatory matter has some

relation--a standard broader than legal relevance--to the

proceeding." Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran v. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., 774 A.2d 332, 338 (D.C. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). According to

Browning, Clinton's production of the memo was "not incidental to any judicial proceeding," but, rather, Clinton gratuitously "use[d] the judicial system in furtherance of his

scheme to defame [ ] Browning." Appellant's Br. at 25, 29.

She points to Jones's first set of document requests, the

responses to which, Browning contends, did not include her

affidavit. Unmentioned by Browning, however, Clinton's response to Jones's second set of document requests indicates

that Jones actually sought "all documents created in or

relating to the time from May 8, 1986 to the present concerning Dolly Kyle Browning," and that Clinton "produced all

documents responsive to this request." Resp. to Pl.'s Second

Set of Doc. Reqs. at 19. Because Clinton's production of

Browning's affidavit thus "ha[d] some relation" to the Jones

litigation, Finkelstein, 774 A.2d at 338 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted), it is, as the district court found,

absolutely privileged.

Browning contends that Time's publication of excerpts

from the 1994 memo amounted to another defamatory act by

Clinton. The amended complaint, however, nowhere links

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Clinton to the Time publication. Instead, the amended complaint vaguely alleges that "[o]n information and belief, Clinton ... published [the] memorandum to other individuals."

Am. Compl. p 75. Browning has thus failed to plead a critical

element of defamation, i.e., that Clinton "published" the defamatory statement. See Croixland, 174 F.3d at 215.

The defamation claim against Bennett rests on his press

statements about Jones's filing. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, Browning must allege that Bennett's statements

"concern[ed]" her--that is, that a "reasonable listener" could

think that Bennett was referring to Browning even though he

never named her--and that the comments were defamatory.

Id. When a statement refers to a group, a member of that

group may claim defamation if the group's size or other

circumstances are such that a reasonable listener could conclude the statement referred to each member or "solely or

especially" to the plaintiff. Serv. Parking Corp. v. Wash.

Times Co., 92 F.2d 502, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts s 564A (1977) ("[G]eneral[ly] ... no action lies

for ... defamatory words concerning a large group or class of

persons," but it may when "the words are ... reasonably

understood to have personal application ... [based on the]

circumstances[.]"). Insisting that she successfully alleged

this element, Browning points out that Bennett's statements

refer to Jones's court filings, which included Browning's

affidavit, and to Jones's "witnesses," of which Browning was

one. "Bennett," Browning asserts, "was plainly accusing

[me] of criminal conduct--perjury." Appellant's Br. at 35.

According to Bennett, because he described Jones's filings

in their totality, emphasizing their voluminous nature--a

"700-page filing"--no reasonable person could think his statement applied to Browning's four-page affidavit. Although

that may be true generally, a listener who knew Jones's filing

contained the Browning affidavit might well believe that

Bennett's reference to Jones's "witnesses" pertained to each

witness, including Browning. See Restatement (Second) of

Torts s 564 cmt. b (1977) ("If the applicability of the defamaUSCA Case #01-5050 Document #682880 Filed: 06/11/2002 Page 14 of 20
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tory matter to the plaintiff depends upon extrinsic circumstances, it must appear that some person ... familiar with

the circumstances ... [could] reasonably believe[ ] that [the

statement] referred to the plaintiff."). We need not resolve

this issue, however, for we believe that no reasonable person

would be able to infer that Bennett was accusing Browning of

deceitfulness, let alone perjury. Bennett aimed his words of

falsehood--"web of deceit and distortions," "vicious and

false"--at Jones's entire "700-page" filing. Am. Compl. p 81.

By contrast, when Bennett expressly mentioned "witnesses"

(again, this included Browning), he spoke merely of their

"weaknesses." Id. Given the hotly contested and high profile nature of the Jones litigation, Bennett's other allegedly

defamatory words--"scurrilous," "garbage," "salacious"--

amount only to non-actionable "hyperbole." See Moldea v.

New York Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 313 n.2, 314 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (holding that "hyperbole" is protected from defamation

claims due to the "constitutional protection afforded to parody, satire, and other imaginative commentary," and explaining the "importance of context" in identifying hyperbole); see

also, e.g., Nat'l Assoc. of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S.

264, 286 (1974) (calling a strikebreaker a "traitor to his

country" was "merely rhetorical hyperbole").

Browning's false light invasion of privacy claim rests on the

same facts as her defamation claim. We will therefore affirm

the dismissal of that claim as well. See White v. Fraternal

Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding

that the privileges and defenses applicable to a defamation

claim apply to a false light claim based on the same facts).

We turn next to Browning's charge of intentional infliction

of emotional distress by Clinton, Bennett, Scott, and Lindsey.

This tort requires conduct so " 'outrageous in character, and

so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' " Bernstein v. Fernandez, 649

A.2d 1064, 1075 (D.C. 1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of

Torts s 46 cmt. d (1965)). Liability requires more than

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sions, or other trivialities." Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812,

818 (D.C. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the two cases Browning cites demonstrate, the tort

is reserved for truly outrageous behavior. In one case, the

defendant gave the plaintiff's home address to a third person

who the defendant should have expected would harass and

even threaten the plaintiff's life. See id. at 818-20. In the

other case, a landlord not only tolerated unsafe and unsanitary conditions in his rental properties, but when tenants

organized a rent strike, hired workers who harassed and

intimidated the tenants, even "brandish[ing]" firearms. Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 934-35 (D.C.

1995). Browning's allegations are not at all comparable.

In support of her intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim against Bennett, Browning again relies on Bennett's

statements at the press conference. In our view, however, no

reasonable jury could find terms like "scurrilous" and "garbage," uttered during politically charged litigation, to "go

beyond all possible bounds of decency." Ordinary Washington press conferences would otherwise routinely invite litigation.

Browning's claim against Clinton relies on the threats she

alleges were conveyed through Lindsey and others, the negotiations culminating in the "understanding" that she would

"not use 'the A words' " and that Clinton would not "tell lies

about her," and Clinton's creation of the 1994 memo and its

production in the Jones litigation. Yet no reasonable jury

could conclude that either the threats or the "A word"

"understanding," disturbing as they may have been to Browning, amounted to conduct "utterly intolerable in a civilized

community." Id.; cf. McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up

Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a

plaintiff failed to state an emotional distress claim against her

supervisor, who, when the plaintiff sought time off to have

surgery, "threatened to fire her," and made comments described by the court as "cruel" and "unfair"). And certainly

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ly" by privately meeting with an aide to prepare a memorandum (even an allegedly false one), and then producing it in

response to a discovery request. Because the allegations

against Clinton encompass Scott's and Lindsey's behavior,

Browning's emotional distress claims against them fail as

well.

Browning's civil RICO claim alleges that Clinton and Lindsey violated the RICO statute by "acquir[ing]," "maintain[ing]

control of," and "conduct[ing]" "the affairs" of the Office of

the President through a "pattern of racketeering activity," 18

U.S.C. s 1962(b), (c), directed at concealing Clinton's extramarital relationships (including with Browning). She also

accuses appellees of "conspir[ing]" to engage in this pattern

of racketeering. Id. s 1962(d). Browning alleges a series of

racketeering activities: threats intended both to deter her

from revealing her story and to frighten her into agreeing to

the "A word" "understanding" (in violation of the Hobbs Act,

id. s 1951); interstate telephone calls to negotiate the "understanding," with which she says Clinton had no intention of

complying, and to secure the publication of The New Yorker's

allegedly disparaging article (in violation of the wire fraud

statute, id. s 1343); and Clinton's allegedly false Jones testimony (in violation of the obstruction of justice statute, id.

s 1503). Because of these "racketeering activities," Browning claims, she suffered "injury to [her] business and property." Am. Compl. p 135; see 18 U.S.C. s 1964(c) (authorizing

a civil damages suit by "[a]ny person injured in his business

or property by reason of a [RICO] violation").

Construing Browning's amended complaint to allege injury

by a scheme to intimidate her into keeping her story secret--

that is, foregoing her "property right ... to market and sell

any description of her long-standing relationship with Clinton"--the district court found this claim barred by the fouryear statute of limitations for civil RICO claims because,

although Browning alleges receiving threats back to 1992, she

did not sue until September 1998. Browning, No. 98-1991,

slip op. at 20-22. On appeal, Browning claims (as she also

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did in the district court) that her injury was her "[in]ability to

market and publish [her] book," Appellant's Br. at 55, an

injury she claims to have discovered no earlier than "the

Spring of 1996," when she began "attempting to find a

publisher," id. at 49. Stated this way, her civil RICO claim

still fails. Putting aside whether the alleged conduct violates

the cited criminal statutes and therefore constitutes racketeering activity, see 18 U.S.C. s 1961 (listing crimes qualifying as acts of racketeering), Browning pleads no facts suggesting "some direct relation between the injury asserted and

the injurious conduct alleged"--in other words, proximate

causation, Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258,

268 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Although the threats and telephone calls leading to the "A

word" agreement bear on Browning's charge that Clinton and

Lindsey frightened her into not revealing her story, they have

nothing to do with the failure of any publisher to buy her

novel. Similarly, the relationship between any evaporation of

interest in Browning's book and the publication of The New

Yorker article is "too remote." Id. at 269. Equally unpersuasive is Browning's claim that Clinton's allegedly false and

"defamatory" Jones testimony "injure[d] [her] ability to market ... [her] book," Appellant's Br. at 55, for no factual

allegations support this utterly conclusory contention. Linking the alleged racketeering activity with her claimed injury

requires, as the district court observed, "a huge leap in logic."

Browning, No. 98-1991, slip. op. at 23.

Browning's Bivens claim, asserted against Clinton and

Lindsey, alleges violation of her First Amendment rights

because Clinton, acting through Lindsey: (1) "threaten[ed]

[her] if she spoke publicly" about her relationship with Clinton; and (2) "forced [her]," by "threatening to defame her,"

not to use the words "adultery" or "affair" to describe that

relationship. Am. Compl. p p 138, 139 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Critical to a successful Bivens claim, of

course, Clinton and Lindsey must have acted "under color of

[federal] authority." Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics

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Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). Browning theorizes that as

"officials at the highest level of the federal government," they

"used [their] office[s]" to "threaten and intimidate" her. Appellant's Br. at 57. "All actions of a government official,"

however, "are not, simply by virtue of the official government's employ, accomplished under the color of ... law."

Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 1997)

(affirming a 12(b)(6) dismissal of a section 1983 suit against a

state legislator because the defendant's actions were related

to his role as a member of his political party, not to his

position as an elected official, and therefore he was not acting

under color of state law) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To be "under color of authority," the conduct

must be "cloaked with official power [and the official must]

purport[ ] to be acting under color of official right." Lopez v.

Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1236 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding

that a state court judge's preparation of a criminal complaint

against the defendant, and presentation of those charges to

himself, were actions taken under color of state law). As the

district court found, Browning alleges no facts suggesting

that Clinton and Lindsey purported to act under color of

official right, or in other words, that their alleged threats

(including to defame her) reflected anything more than a

private dispute. See Gritchen v. Collier, 254 F.3d 807, 812-13

(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a police officer's threat to bring a

defamation suit did not constitute action under color of law

because "[p]ursuing private litigation [was] not abuse [of the

officer's] position or authority as a police officer"). Concluding otherwise would entirely eviscerate the "under color of

authority" requirement.

Finally, Browning's counsel asserted at oral argument that

the district court erred by dismissing the amended complaint

with prejudice. Because that argument appears nowhere in

Browning's brief, however, we will not consider it. See

Corson, 899 F.2d at 50 n.4.

IV.

In sum, we: (1) affirm the dismissal of the amended

complaint against all appellees except former President ClinUSCA Case #01-5050 Document #682880 Filed: 06/11/2002 Page 19 of 20
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ton; (2) affirm the dismissal of the defamation, false light

invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

civil RICO, and Bivens claims against Mr. Clinton; and (3)

reverse the dismissal of the intentional interference with

business opportunity claim against Mr. Clinton (and the

related common law civil conspiracy claim) and remand for

further proceedings. With respect to the latter causes of

action, we emphasize that given the generous reading due

complaints at this stage, we find only that Browning has

stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Assuming

the district court determines that it either has diversity

jurisdiction over the remaining common-law claims, see 28

U.S.C. s 1332, or that it should retain supplemental jurisdiction, see id. s 1367(c)(3), whether Browning can then survive

summary judgment or ultimately prevail depends on whether

she is able to produce evidence to support her allegation that

Mr. Clinton intentionally interfered with her "commercially

reasonable expectation" of publishing her book. Proceedings

in the district court must concern this narrow issue only.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the district court

all the authority it needs to prevent the use of discovery for

unrelated purposes.

So ordered.

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