Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06046/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06046-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s answer. 1

 All future statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

2

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLENN FOSTER,

Petitioner,

v.

M. POWERS,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 04-6046 DLB HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECTING CLERK

OF COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN

FAVOR OF RESPONDENT

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

On July 3, 2001, following a jury trial in the Kern County Superior Court, Petitioner was

convicted of failing to register as a sex offender in violation of California Penal Code section 2

290, subdivision (g). Further, the jury found true enhancements for a prior prison term (§ 667.5,

subd. (b)) and prior felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (e)). Petitioner was sentenced to prison for

seven years. (Respondent’s Exhibit 1, attached to Answer.)

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth

Appellate District. On April 3, 2003, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. (Respondent’s

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Exhibit 3.)

On May 8, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. 

The petition was denied on June 18, 2003. (Respondent’s Exhibit 4.)

On August 5, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Kern

County Superior Court. The petition was denied on September 30, 2003. (Respondent’s Exhibit

5.)

On October 9, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Fifth

District Court of Appeal. That petition was denied on November 20, 2003. (Respondent’s

Exhibit 6.)

On January 2, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

California Supreme Court. On July 14, 2004, the Court denied the petition. (Respondent’s

Exhibit 7.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 3, 2004. 

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on November 23, 2004, and Petitioner filed a traverse

on December 27, 2004. Petitioner submitted additional exhibits on August 10, 2005. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Prosecution Evidence

In 1978, Petitioner was convicted of rape and deviate sexual assault in Illinois. (SCT,

certified November 19, 2001, at 13; People’s Exhibit 6; RT 56-58.) 

On January 11, 1999, prior to his release from custody, Petitioner signed a notification

registration requirement form. (SCT, certified November 19, 2001, at 5.) The notice form

contains a statement setting forth Petitioner’s registration requirement. The notice form is also

signed by a correctional officer who certified that he had personally notified Petitioner of his

registration responsibilities. (SCT, certified November 19, 2001, at 5.) Petitioner listed his

address as 11703 South Berendo Avenue, No. 7, Los Angeles, California. (RT 61-64; People’s

Exhibit 2; SCT, certified November 19, 2001, at 4-5.) Subsequently, a Kern County Sheriff’s

Department fingerprint specialist testified that Petitioner’s thumbprint appeared on the

notification of registration form. (RT 164-165.) On July 2, 1999, Petitioner was stopped for a

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traffic violation in California City. (RT 138.) On January 26, 2000, California City Police

Officer Matthew Alexander arrested Petitioner; he gave his address as 8012 Greenwood Avenue. 

(RT 104-105.) 

On March 5, 2000, Corporal Eric Hurtado went to the Greenwood address to arrest

Petitioner on a warrant out of Madera County. (RT 110, 113.) 

William Durst lived on the corner of Greenwood and Neuralia in California City. On

December 1, 2000, he and his grandson sold a car to Petitioner. (RT 140, 142.) Petitioner

approached Durst about buying the vehicle. Durst knew that Petitioner was staying at the house

located behind his, but he was not certain whether Petitioner was a permanent resident. (RT

142.) Durst had seen Petitioner at the residence no more than half a dozen times. (RT 143.) 

On December 1, 2000, the registration for the vehicle was transferred into Petitioner’s

name; his address was listed as 8012 Greenwood Avenue. (RT 132; People’s Exhibit 9; SRT,

certified November 19, 2001, at 22.) A Department of Motor Vehicles “Soundex” listed

Petitioner’s address as 8012 Greenwood Avenue on march 3, 2001. (RT 134-135; People’s

Exhibit 10; SRT, certified November 19, 2001, at 25.) 

Andre Ford lived at 8060 Greenwood Avenue. Although he had never spoken with

Petitioner, Ford considered him a neighbor; having seen him at the residence, coming and going

and sitting on the front porch on several occasions. (RT 151-154.) 

Defense Evidence

Petitioner’s sister-in-law, Donna Marie Foster, testified that before her husband’s

(Petitioner’s brother) death in 1998, Petitioner did not visit California City regularly. (RT 209-

211.) Foster knew Margo Jordan as Petitioner’s “off and on” girlfriend who lived at 8012

Greenwood Avenue. (RT 213.) From August of 1999 to January of 2000, Foster rented the

house at 8012 Greenwood Avenue from Jordan. During that time, Petitioner visited Foster and

stayed the weekend. (RT 214-215.) Foster testified that Jordan worked in Los Angeles and

would come to California City on the weekends and stay with Petitioner at the home on

Greenwood. (RT 216, 224.) Although Foster did not see Petitioner during the week, she

acknowledged that he could have been residing in California City. (RT 226-227.) 

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Willie Campbell met Petitioner in Long Beach, California in 1990. (RT 230-231.)

Sometime around 1998 or 1999, Campbell began to take Petitioner to California City. Petitioner

would sometimes stay the weekend there with relatives. Campbell estimated he took Petitioner

to California City between 70 to 80 times. (RT 232-233.) In the year and a half prior to

Petitioner’s trial, Campbell estimated that he took Petitioner to California City ten or twelve

times. (RT 234.) Campbell could not say whether or not Petitioner lived in California City. (RT

251.)

Petitioner testified that when he was released from prison in Illinois in 1979 he was not

told to register as a sex offender. (RT 260.) Petitioner first came to California in 1981. (RT

260.) He was subsequently convicted of robbery and was released from prison in 1983. (RT

260-261.) He was incarcerated for several parole violations subsequent to his release. (RT 261.) 

Petitioner was never told of the registration requirement. (RT 261, 262.) In 1990, Petitioner was

sent to prison for another robbery conviction and was released in 1994. He went back to prison

on parole violations several times between 1995 and 1998 and was finally released in 1999. (RT

262.) Petitioner testified that prior to each release from prison he was given several forms to sign

and he was told if he did not sign them he would not be released. (RT 263.) Specifically, when

he was released in 1999, petitioner was presented with between eight and ten documents to sign. 

Petitioner stated: “I’m just signing signatures if I’m getting out, you know what I mean, you

know, trying to go on.” (RT 263.) 

On January 25, 2000, Petitioner went to the emergency room at Robert F. Kennedy

Hospital. He told hospital officials that he lived in Los Angeles. Petitioner testified that he

never lived in California City. (RT 264-265.) Petitioner stated that he never lived with Jordan,

but would see her on the weekends when he wanted to get out of Los Angeles. (RT 271.)

Petitioner used 8012 Greenwood Avenue as his mailing address because he was in and out of jail

and he needed a stable place to receive his mail. (RT 274.) 

On cross-examination, Petitioner claimed that some of the writing on the registration

form (People’s Exhibit 2) was not his. Petitioner claimed the signature on the form looked like

his writing, but he stated he was not sure and that he “may have signed it.’ (RT 281-282.) 

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DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

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 Although Petitioner raised and Respondent addressed the ineffective assistance of counsel claims first, the 3

Court finds that because the ineffective of counsel claims must be analyzed with regard to Petitioner’s other claims,

it is logical to address it last. 

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proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Breach of 1978 Plea Agreement3

Petitioner contends that because there was no registration requirement pursuant to the

plea agreement in his 1978 Illinois convictions, the plea agreement was breached and he could

not be convicted of failing to register.

When a plea agreement rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the

prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise

must be fulfilled. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 22 (1971). To the extent Petitioner

contends that he was not informed that his convictions could later be subjected to registration

requirements, his claim is without merit. Due process requires that a defendant be informed of

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all the direct consequences of a guilty plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970). 

There is no due process violation where a trial court fails to inform the defendant of collateral

consequences, such as the potential for enhancement in the future. United States v. Garrett, 680

F.2d 64, 65-66 (9th Cir. 1982). Thus, Petitioner’s lack of knowledge that his 1978 Illinois

convictions could later subject him to registration requirements while residing in California does

not violate due process. 

Although Petitioner may not have been required to register pursuant to his Illinois plea

agreement, it in no way follows that Petitioner cannot subsequently be convicted in California for

failing to follow California’s registration requirements based on his Illinois conviction. 

Petitioner’s claim is simply without merit. Further, there is no evidence that the prosecutor

promised in exchanged for his guilty plea that Petitioner did not have to register as a sex offender

and, as Respondent submits, it is highly unlikely a prosecutor would make such a promise. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is without merit. 

D. Violation of Illinois and California’s Statute of Limitations

Petitioner contends that there was a violation of both the Illinois and California statutes of

limitations. Specifically, Petitioner argues:

[Petitioner] was incarcerated in California State Prison, Soledad, on a

parole violation only, controlling case robbery 2 . Shortly before his release in nd

Jan. 1999, appellant was misled into signing a notice of registration form, along

with other release papers. This is not the correct procedure in triggering a duty of

registration requirement. For the state of [C]alifornia to impose or subject

appellant to a duty of registration 21 years after Chicago, Ill. 1978 plea agreement

conviction, where there was no requirement of registration, does and will violate

the statute of limitations and also put state of [C]alifornia in violation of Subject

Matter Jurisdiction, which is also an issue in this writ of habeas corpus.

(Petition, Ground Three, at 2.)

As Respondent submits, although Petitioner attempts to phrase his argument in terms of a

due process violation, it fails to state a federal constitutional violation. Further, Petitioner has

failed to demonstrated any statute of limitations violation. As Respondent submits, Petitioner

was timely prosecuted for a violation of section 290, subdivision (2)(D), for failing to register as

a sex offender as a result of his Illinois conviction. Petitioner was not charged again in Illinois,

therefore, the Illinois statute of limitations was not violated. 

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E. Double Jeopardy

Petitioner contends that the duty to register as a sex offender in California is a violation of

the Double Jeopardy Clause because there was no duty to register pursuant to his 1978 plea

agreement on the Illinois sexual offense charges.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states that: 

"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or

limb." U.S. Const. amend. V; see also United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135,

2139 (1996). The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same

offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3)

multiple punishments for the same offense. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229, 114 S.Ct. 783,

789 (1994); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076 (1969), overruled

on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201 (1989). 

The Double Jeopardy Clause is inapplicable to the instant case because Petitioner has not

been twice convicted for the same offense. In 1978, Petitioner was convicted of rape and deviate

sexual assault in Illinois and was, therefore, required to register as a sex offender in California. 

(§ 290, subd. (2)(D).) Petitioner failed to do so. (SCT, certified November 19, 2001, at 11-19;

RT 56-58.) As Respondent submits, the requirement to register as a sex offender is not punitive

in nature. In Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 955 (9 Cir. 2004), the petitioner asserted an Ex Post th

Facto and Due Process Clause violation by an amendment to California’s sex offender

registration statute which added Petitioner’s crime to the list of those requiring registration years

after he had been convicted. (Id. at 961.) The Court first determined that the sex registration

requirement was not punitive. (Id. at 961-967.) Because Petitioner was not twice convicted of

the same offense and because the life-long requirement to register as a sex offender is not

punitive in nature, there was no Double Jeopardy violation. 

F. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Petitioner contends that California had no subject matter over his Illinois conviction. 

As Respondent submits, Petitioner’s claim fails to raise a cognizable federal question

and, in any event, is without merit. As previously stated, federal habeas corpus is available only

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on behalf of a person in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). A claim that

California did not have subject matter over his Illinois conviction, fails to state a constitutional

violation. 

In any event, California did have jurisdiction over the crime for which he was convicted,

failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290, subdivision (2)(D). Petitioner was

convicted of rape and deviate sexual assault in Illinois in 1978. (SCT, certified November 19,

2001, at 13, 16-18.) Had Petitioner been convicted in California, his offense would have

punishable as rape, pursuant to section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A). Therefore, pursuant to section

290, subdivision (2)(D), Petitioner was required to register as a sex offender, and California had

subject matter jurisdiction over this offense as he was residing in California. 

G. Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for

failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290. 

The law on insufficiency of the evidence claim is clearly established. The United States

Supreme Court has held that when reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim on habeas, a

federal court must determine whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from

it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Id. at 324, n. 16. 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal, the Court of Appeal held:

[Petitioner] challenges the sufficiency of the evidence proving that he

actually knew he had a duty to register. He argues that although he signed the

notice form, this does not show that he was verbally notified of the registration

requirement. Since he testified that he did not read the notice form, and there is

no other evidence proving that he was notified of his duty to register, the actual

knowledge element was not proven. This argument is specious. The bottom of

the notice form contains a statement signed by a correctional officer, C.

Plymesser, certifying that he notified [Petitioner] of his duty to register. Although

the notice form does not explicitly state that the correctional officer orally

apprised [Petitioner] of his obligations pursuant to section 290, this is the only

reasonable construction of the certifying officer’s statement because the

registration duties have already been set forth in writing in an earlier section of the

form. In fact, we are baffled why the Attorney General did not mention the

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certifying officer’s statement in his responsive brief.

[Petitioner] also argues that his testimony overcame the inference of actual

knowledge arising from his signature and thumbprint on the notice form

[citation.] We reject this argument because it conflicts with settled principles of

appellate review. Reversal is not warranted merely because the facts of the case

might be reconciled contrary to the judgment. [citation.] On appeal, the evidence

is considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution and all inferences are

drawn in support of the verdict. The appellate court presumes in support of the

judgment the existence of every fact the trier reasonably could have deduced from

the evidence. [citation.] [Petitioner’s] signature and his thumb print on the notice

form are sufficient evidence proving that he had knowledge that he was required

to register. [citation.] The notice form contains a statement setting forth the

registration obligations and a correctional officer certified therein that he notified

[Petitioner] of his registration obligations. By returning a guilty verdict, the jury

rejected [Petitioner’s] shifting testimony that he did not sign the notice form, that

he might have signed the notice form, that the notice form was “doctored” and

that even if he did sign the notice form he did not read it. [Petitioner’s] variable

testimony lacked credibility and, standing alone, does not overcome the

presumption in favor of the jury’s verdict as a matter of law. That the jury asked

the judge a question during its deliberations about ignorance of the law does not

cause this court to modify the established standard of appellate review. The

verdict has adequate evidentiary support. [citation.] 

(Respondent’s Exhibit 3, at 5-7.)

Although the Court of Appeal’s decision did not cite to Jackson v. Virginia, the standards

as set forth and applied by the state court comport with the Jackson standard, and the decision is

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that a state court need not cite

United States Supreme Court cases so long as the state court’s reasoning and result do not

contradict Supreme Court precedent.) As the Court of Appeal held, the only testimony of lack of

knowledge came from Petitioner himself, and was contradicted by the documentary evidence

indicating otherwise. The jury was properly instructed that in order to convict Petitioner it must

find that he had actual knowledge of the registration requirement, thus indicating that the jury

rejected Petitioner’s self-serving testimony. Although the jury questioned the significance of

ignorance of the law, the trial court’s response was proper in that that question was properly

resolved by reference to the elements as set forth by section 290. If the jury believed Petitioner’s

testimony that he did not have actual knowledge of the registration requirement, it was required

by the law, as properly instructed by the trial court, to acquit Petitioner. (CT 192; RT 350.) 

There was clearly sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Petitioner had

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actual knowledge of the registration requirement. Petitioner signed the notice form setting forth

the registration requirement under California Penal Code section 290 prior to his release from

prison in 1999. (SCT, certified November 19, 2001, at 5.) Furthermore correctional officer, C.

Plymesser, attested that Petitioner was informed of his registration requirement. (Id.) As the

Court of Appeal acknowledged, “[a]lthough the notice form does not explicitly state that the

correctional officer orally apprised [Petitioner] of his obligations pursuant to section 290, this is

the only reasonable construction of the certifying officer’s statement because the registration

duties have already been set forth in writing in an earlier section of the form.” (Respondent’s

Exhibit 3, at 6.) Additionally, there was evidence that the thumb print affixed to the notice form,

dated January 11, 1999, matched the thumb print from Petitioner’s 1978 Illinois convictions. 

(RT 74-81, 164-165; SCT, certified November 19, 2001, at 5, 7, 19.) The state courts’

determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is without merit. 

H. Removing Element of Section 290 From Jury’s Consideration

Petitioner contends that “[the] [t]rial court committed reversible error, lessened the

peoples [sic] burden of proof, and denied [Petitioner] his state and federal constitutional right to

trial by jury and due process by removing an element of section 290 from the jurys [sic]

consideration.” (Petition, Ground G.) Specifically, as set forth by the Court of Appeal, the jury

was given a special instruction that correctly set forth the five elements necessary to prove that

Petitioner had violated section 290, including that in order for the jury to find Petitioner the

People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was convicted of a qualifying offense. 

Here, as in the state court, Petitioner contends the trial court later erred by removing the

issue from the jury’s consideration by instructing them that individuals who have been convicted

of rape and deviate sexual assault are required to register. The Court of Appeal held as follows:

We agree that this element should not have been removed from the jury’s

consideration, but conclude that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

[citation.] Stephanie Kennedy, a Kern County Sheriff’s Department records

technician, testified that she interpreted a CLETS document showing the sexual

crimes [Petitioner] committed in Illinois were offenses that required [Petitioner]

to register. [Petitioner] did not counter this testimony or present any evidence

contesting this element of the offense. During his closing argument, defense

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 In United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), the Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires 4

the judge to submit any question of materiality concerning a defendant’s false statement to the jury. In Gaudin, the

trial judge had instructed the jury that “[t]he issue of materality . . . is not submitted to you for you decision but

rather is a matter for the decision of the court. You are instructed that the statements charged in the indictment are

material statements. Id. at 508. The Court held that because the trial judge had abrogated the jury’s ability to make

factual determinations on one of the requisite elements of the offense, a constitutional violation had occurred. Id. at

523. 

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counsel did not argue that the rape and oral copulation convictions were not

qualifying offenses. There is no possibility that the jury would have had a

reasonable doubt about the qualifying offense element if the instructional error

had not occurred.

(Respondent’s Exhibit 3, at 9.)

Due process requires that the jury be instructed on every element of an offense. This is

because the prosecution has the burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt.

Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2420 (1989) (citing In re Winship, 397

U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970)). In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), the Supreme

Court determined whether the omission of a single element of the offense from the jury’s

determination was subject to harmless error analysis. There, Neder was convicted of filing

federal income tax returns and of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. At trial, the

District Court determined that materiality with regard to the tax and bank fraud charges was not a

question for the jury and found that the evidence established that element. The Court thereafter

instructed the jury that, to convict on the tax offenses, it “need not consider” the materiality of

any false statements “even though that language is used in the indictment.” (Id. at 6.) It was

conceded that the District Court erred under United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), by

failing to submit the materiality element of the tax offense to the jury. (Id. at 8.) 4

The Court found that its decision in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), was

instructive. “Johnson was a perjury prosecution in which, as here, the element of materiality was

decided by the judge rather than submitted to the jury.” (Id. at 9.) The Court concluded that the

error did not warrant reversal in light of the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence

supporting the materiality element. (Id.) 

The Court went on to state that “[i]n other cases, we have recognized that improperly

omitting an element from the jury can ‘easily be analogized to improperly instructing the jury on

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an element of the offense, an error which is subject to harmless-error analysis.” (Id. at 10) (citing

Johnson, supra, at 469; California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996) (per curiam) (“The specific error

at issue here - - an error in the instruction that defined the crime - - is . . . as easily characterized

as a ‘misdescription of an element’ of the crime, as it is characterized as an error of ‘omission’”). 

In this instance, the trial court instructed the jury that any person who since July 1, 1944,

has been convicted of rape or deviate sexual assault is required to register his address with the

Chief of Police of the city or the Sheriff of the county in which he is temporarily residing or

domiciled. (CT 194-195; RT 351.) This, as found by the Court of Appeal was error, however it

was harmless. 

As the Court of Appeal properly found, the prosecution submitted, through the testimony

of Stephanie Kennedy, a Kern County Sheriff’s Department records technician, a CLET

document showing the sexual crimes of which Petitioner was convicted in Illinois were offenses

that required Petitioner to register in California. (SCT, certified November 19, 2001, at 3;

People’s Exhibit 1-A; RT 53-57.) Petitioner did not counter this testimony or present any

evidence contesting this issue. Further, here, Petitioner does not demonstrate or argue that he

was not convicted of a qualifying offense in Illinois. Petitioner merely argues, at length, that his

Illinois plea agreement did not contain a requirement that he register as a sex offender, a wholly

irrelevant argument. 

The Court of Appeal properly found that the instant error was harmless. As stated by that

Court, as there was no issue, evidence, or argument that Petitioner’s Illinois convictions for rape

and sexual deviant assault were not qualifying offenses, there is no possibility that the jury would

have had a reasonable doubt about the qualifying offense element if the error had not occurred. 

As the Supreme Court found in Neder, reversal without any consideration of the effect of the

error upon the verdict would send the case back for retrial - - a retrial not focused at all on the

issue of whether Petitioner suffered a qualifying offense, but on contested issues of which the

jury was properly instructed. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits. 

I. Instructional Error - CALJIC No. 1.20

In Ground H, Petitioner contends that “The trial court committed reversible error,

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lessened the people[’]s burden of proof, and denied [Petitioner] his state and federal

constitutional right to trial by jury and due process of law by incorrectly instructing the jury on

the actual knowledge element of section 290.” 

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action. See, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72

(1991). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show

that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process. See id. at 72. Additionally, the instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation,

but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. The

court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a

component of the entire trial process. See, United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982)

(citing Henderson v, Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). Furthermore, even if it is determined

that the instruction violated the petitioner’s right to due process, a petitioner can only obtain

relief if the unconstitutional instruction had a substantial influence on the conviction and thereby

resulted in actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710

(1993) (whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.). See, Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9 Cir. 1996). The burden of

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demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral

attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing

required to establish plain error on direct appeal." Id. 

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal, the Court of Appeal held:

CALJIC No. 1.20 provides, “The word ‘willfully’ when applied to the

intent with which an act is done or omitted means with a purpose or willingness to

commit the act or to make the omission in question. The word ‘willfully’ does

not require any intent to violate the law, or to injure another, or to acquire any

advantage. Citing Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th 744, [Petitioner] challenges inclusion

of CALJIC No. 1.20 in the jury charge, arguing that it undermines the actual

knowledge element. We disagree. Garcia did not disapprove of CALJIC No.

1.20. Provided additional instruction is given on the element of actual knowledge,

use of CALJIC No. 1.20 remains authorized. (Id. at pp. 753-754.) Since the trial

court here instructed on the element of actual knowledge in the special instruction

defining the elements of the offense, no error occurred.

(Respondent’s Exhibit 3, at 9-10.) 

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In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), “the Supreme Court considered whether a

provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, imposing criminal penalties upon convicted felons

who remain in Los Angeles for more than five days and who fail to register with the chief of

police, was unconstitutional as applied to a person who had ‘no actual knowledge of his duty to

register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge.’ [citation.] The

Court reasoned that when such ‘a person did not know of the duty to register and where there was

no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due

process.’” Bartlett v. Alameida, 366 F.3d 1020 (9 Cir. 2004). The Court of Appeal cited People th

v. Garcia, 25 Cal.4th 744 (2001), which quoted Lambert finding that there must be actual

knowledge of the registration requirement. 

In the instant case, as the Court of Appeal stated, the jury was specifically and properly

instructed that a violation of section 290 required actual knowledge of the registration

requirement and no due process violation has occurred. (CT 192; RT 350.) A violation of

section 290 is a general intent crime as described in CALJIC No. 3.30 (CT 191; RT 349-350.) 

CALJIC No. 1.20 describes properly describes the general intent element of such crime. (CT

193.) Thus, there was no federal constitutional error in the jury instruction. See Estelle, at 72.

(federal habeas relief is warranted only if there is instructional error that “so infected the entire

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” The California Court of Appeal’s

rejection of Petitioner’s due process claim was not an unreasonable application of or contrary to

clearly established federal law. 

K. Instructional Error - CALJIC No. 4.35

In Ground I, Petitioner contends that “The trial court committed reversal [sic] error,

lessened the peoples burden of proof, and denied [Petitioner] his state and federal constitutional

right to trial by jury and due process of law by refusing his request for caljic no. 4.35, and

incorrectly answering the jurys [sic] question regarding ignorance of the law.” (Petition, Ground

9.)

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal, the Court of Appeal held:

[Petitioner] also challenges the trial court’s refusal to give CALJIC No.

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 CAJLIC No. 4.35 provides: 5

An act committed or an omission made in ignorance or by reason of a mistake of fact

which disproves any criminal intent is not a crime. [¶] Thus a person is not guilty of a crime if

[he][she] commits an act or omits to act under an actual [and reasonable] belief in the existence of

certain facts and circumstances which, if true, would make the act or omission lawful.

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4.35, which instructs on the mistake-of-fact defense. The court reasoned that this 5

instruction was cumulative to the special instruction setting forth the elements of

the offense. We agree that the court should have acceded to [Petitioner’s] request

and given this instruction either as part of the initial jury charge or in response to

the jury’s question whether ignorance of the law excused noncompliance.

[footnote omitted.] The defense was based in substantial part on the theory that

[Petitioner’s] failure to register was not criminal because [Petitioner] was unaware

that he had a duty to register; [Petitioner] may have signed the notice form but he

did not read it. [Petitioner’s] testimony supports his theory. Even in the absence

of a request, the trial court is obligated to instruct sua sponte on defenses that are

relied on by the [Petitioner] and are supported by evidence that is deserving of the

jury’s consideration. [Citation.]

. . . . 

Yet, we have also concluded that omission of this instruction does not

necessitate reversal of the judgment. [Citation.] the omission did not foreclose the

jury’s consideration of the question whether [Petitioner] knew of the registration

requirement. Defense counsel argued in closing that [Petitioner] was not aware of

the registration requirement and therefore the prosecutor had not satisfied his

burden of proving the element of actual knowledge. As recognized by the

Attorney General, in order for the jury to conclude that [Petitioner] was guilty, it

had to determine that he actually knew of the duty to register and therefore was

not ignorant of the law. Turning to an examination of the record, the only

evidence supporting the mistake-of-fact defense was [Petitioner’s] testimony and

he lacked credibility. No reasonable jury would have believed him. The jury’s

question about ignorance of the law does not change our assessment of

[Petitioner’s] believability. . . . 

(Respondent’s Exhibit 3, at 11-12.)

A criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case provided that it

is supported by law and has some foundation in the evidence. Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734,

739 (9 Cir. 2000). To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner th

must show that the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violates due process. See Estelle v McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72. Additionally, the

instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the

instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous

instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity

of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error on

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direct appeal." See Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9 Cir. 1996). Moreover, a th

Petitioner whose claim involves the omission of an instruction "bears an especially heavy

burden," because an omission is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. 

Reynolds v. Maddock, 1999 WL 354366, *3 (N.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d 232 F.3d 896 (9 Cir. 2000). th

As stated above, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court erred in failing to give

CALJIC No. 4.35, the mistake-of-fact defense instruction; the Court held, however, that any error

was harmless and nonprejudical. The state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

The evidence of Petitioner’s lack of actual knowledge was presented and argued to the

jury, both in Petitioner’s testimony and counsel’s closing argument. Specifically, Petitioner

testified that he was never told of the registration requirement. (RT 261, 262.) In 1990,

Petitioner was sent to prison and was released in 1994. He went back to prison on parole

violations several times between 1995 and 1998 and was finally released in 1999. (RT 262.)

Petitioner testified that prior to each release from prison he was given several forms to sign and

he was told if he did not sign them he would not be released. (RT 263.) Specifically, when he

was released in 1999, petitioner was presented with between eight and ten documents to sign. 

Petitioner stated: I’m just signing signatures if I’m getting out, you know what I mean, you know,

trying to go on.” (RT 263.) 

During closing argument, defense counsel argued Petitioner’s lack of knowledge of the

requirement to register and that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of proving actual

knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. (See RT 326-334.) 

Although the Court of Appeal found, the mistake-of-fact likely should have been given to

the jury, the fact that it was not did not result in prejudice to Petitioner and was therefore

harmless error. As the Court of Appeal stated and found, the jury’s question regarding ignorance

of the law does not change this findings.

Approximately forty minutes prior to rendering a verdict of guilty, the jury submitted a

question of whether ignorance of the law was a ground for not complying. (CT 138.) In

response to this question, the judge instructed the jury that the answer could be resolved by

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 Although Petitioner argues at length that his 1978 Illinois plea agreement did not contain a requirement to

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register as a sex offender, that argument was not presented at trial, and even if it were presented it is not a valid

argument as it is irrelevant to the California registration requirement. 

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reference to the elements as set forth in section 290. (RT 357.) As the Court of Appeal found,

there is no evidence in the record that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the defense of

mistake-of-fact resulted in actual prejudice. Although the jury questioned whether ignorance of

the law was a ground for not complying, the trial court properly instructed the jury that the

answer could be found by reference to the elements as set forth in section 290. If the jury found

that Petitioner did not have actual knowledge of the registration requirement then that element

was not met and Petitioner could not be convicted. Further, ignorance of the law is not a defense

to a violation of the law. Mistake-of-fact is, however, a defense. But, Petitioner’s defense was

not mistake-of-fact, but rather that he did not have actual knowledge of the registration

requirement negating an essential element for a conviction. However, the jury’s finding of guilt

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implies that the jury specifically found that Petitioner had actual knowledge of the registration

requirement, rejecting Petitioner’s defense of mistake-of-fact. As such, the Court of Appeal’s

finding that the error was harmless is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court precedent. 

K. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner contends that counsel was incompetent in several respects: (1) failing to

subpoena the transcripts from the prior convictions; (2) failed to argue lack of jurisdiction,

double jeopardy, ex post fact concerns, statute of limitations, and breach of 1978 plea agreement;

(3) failed to inform jurors that section 290 did not apply to Petitioner’s prior conviction and that

he was never required to register as a sex offender; (4) challenge the 1999 notice of registration

form; (5) object to the Illinois prison packet as hearsay; (6) object to trial court’s refusal to

instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 4.35; (7) object to the court’s error of removing an element of

the case (Petitioner’s prior conviction of a qualifying offense) from the jury’s consideration; (8)

object to the trial court’s misinstruction regarding the actual knowledge element and the courts

answer to the jury’s question regarding ignorance of the law; (9) object to Petitioner being denied

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the right to fully present his defense; (10) properly represent Petitioner; and (11) advise Petitioner

of applicable defenses. 

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe,

151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9 Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective th

assistance of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 Cir. 1994). First, th

the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that

counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s

alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment

considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348

(9 Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. A court indulges

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a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v.

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9 Cir.1994). th

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different," 466 U.S., at 694.

Petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair

trial, one whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must evaluate whether

the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id.;

Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356, 1461 (9 Cir. 1994). th

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since the defendant must

affirmatively prove prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily

fail. However, there are certain instances which are legally presumed to result in prejudice, e.g.,

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where there has been an actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel or where the

State has interfered with counsel’s assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; United States v.

Cronic, 466 U.S., at 659, and n. 25, 104 S.Ct., at 2046-2047, and n. 25 (1984).

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable

application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d

1058, 1062 (2000). With this standard in mind, the Court now turns to each of Petitioner’s

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

With respect to Petitioner’s first and second grounds of ineffectiveness, Petitioner fails to

state a claim. Because the transcripts from the 1978 Illinois convictions regarding his plea

agreement are irrelevant to whether Petitioner can later be convicted in California for failing to

register, as discussed above, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective, let

alone that he was prejudiced by counsel’s inactions. Further, as explained herein, Petitioner has

failed to demonstrate a double jeopardy, statute of limitations, and breach of the 1978 plea

agreement, accordingly, counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to argue these claims

and Petitioner was therefore not prejudiced. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9 Cir. 1994); see th

also Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9 Cir. 1989) (“The failure to raise a meritless th

legal argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (quotation marks and

citation omitted.)

With respect to Petitioner’s third claim that counsel failed to inform Petitioner that his

prior conviction did not apply to section 290, is without merit. As stated herein, Petitioner did

suffer two qualifying offenses, rape and deviant sexual assault, which qualify for registration

under section 290, and counsel’s failure to argue this ground was not ineffectiveness nor was

Petitioner prejudiced. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9 Cir. 1994); see also Shah v. United th

States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9 Cir. 1989) (“The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does th

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted.)

With regard to Petitioner’s fourth and fifth claims that counsel did not challenge the 1999

notice of registration form or object to the Illinois prison packet as hearsay, Petitioner’s claims

are without merit. First, Petitioner’s claims are conclusory in nature. “Conclusory allegations

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which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James v.

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9 Cir. 1994). Second, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that counsel was in th

anyway ineffective or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions. Petitioner provides no

grounds, nor can this Court conceive of any which provide a basis for objection or further that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been

different. As such, Petitioner’s claims fail. 

With regard to Petitioner’s sixth claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to

the trial court’s failure to give CALJIC 4.35, which instructs on the mistake-of-fact defense. 

Here, as stated under section K, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the

trial court’s failure to give CALJIC 4.35, even assuming counsel was ineffective for failing to

object. As such, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. 

With regard to Petitioner’s seventh claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to the trial court’s removing the element of Petitioner’s prior conviction as a qualifying offense

from the jury’s consideration, it too is without merit. As stated under section H, Petitioner was

not prejudiced by the trial court’s action in instructing the jury that Petitioner’s Illinois

convictions were qualifying convictions, it logically follows that Petitioner has not, and cannot,

demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions in failing to object. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits. 

With regard to Petitioner’s eighth claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to the trial court’s misinstruction regarding the actual knowledge element and the trial court’s

answer to the jury’s question regarding ignorance of law, it too is without merit. As stated herein

under section I, was properly instructed on the actual knowledge element of the offense and the

trial court properly responded to the jury’s question regarding ignorance of the law, and

Petitioner therefore cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object. 

With regard to Petitioner’s claims that he was denied his right to fully present his defense,

and that counsel failed to adequately represent and advise Petitioner, Petitioner fails to state a

claim. Petitioner’s claims are conclusory in nature and Petitioner has utterly failed to

demonstrate how counsel was ineffective or how he was in any prejudiced by counsel’s actions. 

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That is, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s action, the result of the proceedings would have been different. As such, Petitioner’s

claims fail.

To the extent Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek to

introduce evidence that Petitioner was taking psychotic medication when he signed the notice

form, it too is without merit. As stated by the Court of Appeal, 

[T]he record affirmatively demonstrates that counsel’s omission was a

conscious, reasonable tactical decision. During in limine motions defense counsel

told the court: “my client wanted me to - - desired the subpoenaing of a lot of

mental health records, especially from the Department of Corrections. And what I

said back in chambers was it is my understanding that this crime is a failure to

register as a sex offender pursuant to Penal Code Section 290. And as such it is a

general intent crime, not a specific intent crime. So a lot of the records from the

Department of Corrections would not be relevant at the present time.” As

previously explained, counsel’s recognition that section 290 is a general intent

crime is correct. [Citation.] [Petitioner] fails to recognize that the mere fact that he

was taking psychotropic medication does not necessarily prove that [he] was

unable to process new information and acquire actual knowledge of the

registration requirement. [Petitioner] has assumed that proof that he ingested such

medication proves that he was unable to comprehend and retain the contents of

the notice form. We reject this assumption. It scarcely bears repeating that many

people function at high cognitive levels while they are being treated for mental

illnesses. Thus, evidence of medication usage is not necessarily relevant. 

Furthermore, since defense counsel already had to contend with [Petitioner’s]

recidivism and his sexual offender status, to raise the specter of mental illness in

front of the jury would have been a risky proposition. It could have further

prejudiced some of the jurors against him by causing them to think that if they

acquitted [Petitioner] they were releasing a mentally-disordered sex offender into

their midst. Thus, this court can conceive of a satisfactory explanation why a

diligent and reasonably competent attorney would have chosen to forego the

opportunity to present evidence that [Petitioner] was taking psychotropic

medication when he was released from Soledad Prison.

(Respondent’s Exhibit 3, at 7-8.) 

In this forum, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s

silent denial, nor the Court of Appeal’s disposition of this issue was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application, of Strickland. Specifically, Petitioner has not demonstrated that

counsel was ineffective, let alone that Petitioner was somehow prejudiced by the failure to

attempt to admit this evidence. As such, Petitioner fails to state a claim. 

M. Cumulative Error

Petitioner contends that “the cumulative impact of the instructional errors and the

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exclusion of relevant evidence crucial to [Petitioner’s] defense mandates reversal of his

conviction.” (Petition, Ground 12.)

Although no single alleged error may warrant habeas corpus relief, the cumulative effect

of errors may deprive a petitioner of the due process right to a fair trial. See Ceja v. Stewart, 97

F.3d 1246, 1254 (9th Cir.1996). Cumulative error will be found where "there are several

substantial errors," and their cumulative effect is "so prejudicial as to require reversal." Killian v.

Poole 282 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002). However, where there is no single constitutional

error, there is nothing to accumulate to a level of a constitutional violation. Mancuso v. Olivarez,

292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002).

In rejecting this claim on direct appeal, the Court of Appeal held:

Finally, [Petitioner] contends that the cumulative prejudicial effect of the

court’s errors denied him a fair trial, due process of law and a reliable verdict in

violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. We disagree. [Petitioner] is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. 

(United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-509 (1983).) When a [Petitioner]

invokes the cumulative error doctrine, the litmus test is whether [Petitioner]

received due process and a fair trial. When a claim based on cumulative errors is

raised, the record must be assessed to see if it is reasonably probable that the jury

would have reached a result more favorable to [Petitioner] in the absence of the

errors. [Citation.] We are convinced that [Petitioner] received a fair trial. Only

two defects were found in the jury charge. Even considered cumulatively, they

did not unfairly taint the trial process. The evidence proving that [Petitioner]

knowingly failed to register after coming to reside in California City was strong. 

It is not reasonably probable that [Petitioner] would have been acquitted if the jury

charged had been flawless. [Citation.]

(Respondent’s Exhibit 3, at 12-13.)

No single error was made at Petitioner’s trial that was sufficiently prejudicial on an

individual basis so as to warrant relief. Likewise, even considering the cumulative effect of each

of Petitioner’s allegations, this Court is not left with the impression that the errors were so

prejudicial as to require reversal. Petitioner’s claim of cumulative error is without merit and

must be denied. 

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ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 3, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06046-DLB Document 20 Filed 10/03/05 Page 24 of 24