Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-06092/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-06092-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IZMO, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROADSTER, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-06092-NC 

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 38

Before the Court is defendant Roadster, Inc.’s motion to dismiss part of plaintiff 

Izmo, Inc.’s second amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 38. The sole question in Roadster’s 

motion is whether, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Fourth Estate Pub. 

Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 586 U.S. ____, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019), Izmo may 

amend its complaint to assert copyright infringement of photographs that were not 

registered at the time it initiated this lawsuit.

A brief recap of the procedural and factual background is useful. Izmo initiated this 

lawsuit in October 2018, alleging that Roadster infringed its copyright in 79 photographs 

of cars.1 See Dkt. No. 1. Roadster moved to dismiss the first amended complaint on 

February 14, 2019. See Dkt. No. 29. While that motion was pending, the Supreme Court 

 

1

Izmo’s original complaint lists 80 photographs, but one of those images was a duplicate. 

See Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A. Izmo amended its complaint to fix this error. See Dkt. No. 28.

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decided Fourth Estate, holding that a copyright plaintiff must obtain registration of its 

copyrights with the Copyright Office before filing suit. See Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 

892.2 With the Supreme Court’s ruling in hand, the Court denied Roadster’s motion to 

dismiss, but sua sponte ordered Izmo to amend its complaint to comply with Fourth 

Estate. See Dkt. No. 34 at 3, 7.

Izmo filed its second amended complaint on April 8, 2019. See Dkt. No. 35. It its 

amended complaint, Izmo lists 80 copyrighted photographs and the date registration was 

made for each photograph. See id., Ex. A. Out of those photographs, only 11 were 

registered prior to the filing of the original complaint. The remaining 69 photographs were 

registered on April 3, 2019, exactly six months after Izmo initiated this lawsuit. See id.

Roadster now contends that Izmo’s copyright infringement claims must be 

dismissed to the extent it alleges infringement of those 69 pictures. See Dkt. No. 38 at 1. 

Izmo argues that dismissal is not warranted because, when it initiated this lawsuit, 

registration had been made for 11 of the asserted copyrights. See Dkt. No. 40 at 7. The 

newly-registered copyrights, Izmo argues, merely supplements the list of preexisting 

registrations. Id. Because Izmo did not commence this lawsuit prior to obtaining any

copyright registration, Izmo argues that Roadster’s motion must be denied. Id.

As the Court previously explained, the Supreme Court recently held that a 

registration “has been made” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) when the

Copyright Office “has registered a copyright after examining a properly filed application.” 

Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 892. The Supreme Court clarified that “although an owner’s 

rights exist apart from registration . . . registration is akin to an administrative exhaustion 

requirement that the owner must satisfy before suing to enforce ownership rights.” Id. at 

887. In reaching this result, the Supreme Court reasoned that permitting copyright 

claimants to sue before obtaining registration of the underlying material would render 

much of the statutory scheme superfluous. See id. at 889–90.

 

2 The registration requirement is subject to several exceptions involving movies, musical 

compositions, or live broadcasts not relevant to this case. See id. at 888.

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The Supreme Court’s opinion, however, did not squarely address the issue here: 

whether a copyright claimant may amend its complaint to include subsequently registered 

material. But in Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 18-cv-10956-JMF, 2019 WL 1454317 

(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2019), the Southern District of New York held that Fourth Estate bars 

the addition of infringement claims relating to copyrighted material registered after the 

commencement of the lawsuit. Relying on Second Circuit precedent and McNeil v. United 

States, 508 U.S. 106, 112 (1993), the Malibu Media district court noted that “legal 

proceedings are instituted by the . . . filing of the original complaint.” Id. at *8 (emphasis 

in original and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court reasoned that the statutory 

language of § 411(a) serves to prohibit “an amended complaint [from] add[ing] copyright 

claims that, although timely as of the date of their addition to the action, would have been 

premature when the action was ‘instituted.’” Id. at *8 n.2; see also 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) 

(“no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be 

instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been made”).

This Court agrees with the reasoning of Malibu Media. The Supreme Court has 

made clear that the registration requirement of § 411(a) was “akin to an administrative 

exhaustion requirement that the owner must satisfy before suing to enforce ownership 

rights.” Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 887. In related contexts, the Ninth Circuit has

rejected amendment of pleadings as a means to cure a claimant’s failure to comply with 

administrative exhaustion requirements. See, e.g., McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 

1200–01 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring dismissal without prejudice in prison condition cases 

where claimant did not exhaust administrative remedies). Here, permitting amendment to 

cure a claimant’s failure to register its copyright before suing would undermine the 

objectives animating the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourth Estate. The fact that Izmo 

properly “commenced” this lawsuit as to some of its copyrights does not excuse its failure 

to comply with § 411(a) as to its other copyrights.

Izmo’s reliance on Zito v. Steeplechase Films, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1025 

(N.D. Cal. 2003) and other efficiency concerns is unavailing. Zito was decided long before 

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Fourth Estate. It is unclear whether Zito remains good law in light of the Supreme Court’s 

repudiation of this Circuit’s previous approach to the registration prerequisite to suit. The 

Supreme Court also largely rejected efficiency concerns animating Zito and other related 

authorities. See Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 891–92 (rejecting arguments relating to the 

timely adjudication of copyright holders’ rights).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Roadster’s motion to dismiss. Izmo’s copyright 

infringement claims are dismissed without prejudice to the extent they allege infringement 

of photographs registered before October 3, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 4, 2019 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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