Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02992/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02992-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

---

1

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT SCHUTZA and JOHN 

KARCZEWSKI,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO; AIR 

CALIFORNIA ADVENTURE, INC., a 

California Corporation doing business as 

TORREY PINES GLIDERPORT, and 

DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

ORDER ON MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

[Doc. No. 104]

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Scott Schutza and John 

Karczewski’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Attorneys’ Fees under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). [Doc. No. 104.] The Court finds the matter suitable for 

determination on the papers submitted in accordance with Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) and 

therefore denies Defendants’ request oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Court grants the motion. 

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of

 13
2

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Background

Plaintiffs are both unable to walk or stand independently as the result of paraplegia, 

and use wheelchairs for mobility. In the Spring of 2013, Plaintiffs visited the Torrey Pines 

Gliderport (“Gliderport”) seeking to join other spectators in watching the sailplanes, hang 

gliders and paragliders and encountered various barriers that denied them full and equal 

access to and enjoyment of the premises. 

On December 12, 2013, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants alleging violations 

of ADA, 41 U.S.C Sections 12101, et seq., the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (the 

“Unruh Act”), California Civil Code Section 51, et seq., and the California Disabled 

Persons Act (“CPDA”), California Civil Code Sections 54.1 et seq. [Doc. No. 1.]

After two years of litigation, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. 

[Doc. Nos. 47, 50.] On June 29, 2016, this Court issued an Order that denied Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion for 

summary judgment. [Doc. No. 65.] In its Order, the Court determined that the Gliderport 

was a place of public accommodation that was subject to the ADA. The Court granted 

Plaintiffs’ Title III ADA claim related to the portable toilets located at the Gliderport, the 

Unruh Act claim and the CPDA claim. Finding triable issues of fact regarding the ease of 

remediation of the violations occurring at the parking lot, concession stand and picnic 

tables and whether the relief sought by Plaintiffs were reasonable accommodations, the 

Court denied Plaintiffs’ Title II ADA claim and the Title III ADA claims on these barriers.

Following the November 4, 2016 Pretrial Conference, the parties engaged in 

settlement discussions that culminated in the issuance of a consent decree. [Doc. No. 107.] 

Under the terms of the consent decree, Defendants would provide two designated disable 

accessible parking spots, one fully compliant accessible unisex bathroom and an accessible 

concession stand at the Gliderport. The parties also agreed to have the Court determine the 

amount of recoverable statutory penalties and the attorneys’ fees award.

On April 14, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their application for attorneys’ fees and costs, 

requesting a total of $90,533. [Doc. No. 104.] Additionally, Plaintiffs request $24,000 in

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of

 13
3

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

statutory penalties under the Unruh Act. [Id. at 61.] Defendants filed their opposition [Doc. 

No. 108] and Plaintiffs filed their reply [Doc. No. 109].

II. Legal Standard

The ADA provides that the court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, 

other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and 

costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. “A prevailing plaintiff under the ADA should ordinarily 

recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” 

Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Without this fee-shifting provision “few aggrieved parties would be in a 

position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal 

courts.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam). 

“Consequently, recovery is the rule rather than the exception.” Jankey, 537 F.3d at 113 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, any person found in 

violation of the Unruh Act “is liable for . . . any [attorneys’] fees that may be determined 

by the court. . . .” CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a).

Typically, “plaintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees 

purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the 

benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) 

(citation omitted). “The prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the 

relief obtained.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992). Rather, in ADA cases, “[f]or 

a litigant to be a ‘prevailing party’ for the purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees, he must 

meet two criteria: he must achieve a material alteration of the legal relationship of the 

parties, and that alteration must be judicially sanctioned.” Jankey, 537 F.3d at 1129-30 

(quoting P.N. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 474 F.3d 1154, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007)).

 

1 Document numbers and page references are to those assigned by CM/ECF for the docket entry.

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of

 13
4

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The most useful starting point for determining attorneys’ fees awarded under the 

ADA is by performing the lodestar calculation – the number of hours reasonably expended 

on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. For a 

fee request to be adjudged reasonable, it must “exclude from this initial fee calculation 

hours that were not ‘reasonably expended’” and should not include fee requests for hours 

that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Id. at 433-34. 

III. Discussion

Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ prevailing party status. Having entered 

judgment for Plaintiffs on one of their ADA claims, their Unruh Act claim and their CDPA 

claim, the Court finds them to be the prevailing party and therefore entitled to recover fees 

and litigation expenses under the ADA and Unruh Act. 

With their motion for attorneys’ fees and judgment, Plaintiffs submit a declaration 

from one of their attorneys, Mr. Mark Potter, along with supporting documentation that 

provide an itemized description of the time spent by their counsel on this matter beginning 

on March 18, 2013 and ending in March 2017. [Doc. Nos. 104-2, 104-3.] The declaration 

also sets forth counsel and his colleagues’ qualifications and hourly rates. Plaintiffs request 

a total award in the amount of $90,533.00 demanding $84,055 in attorneys’ fees and $6,478 

in litigation expenses. Further, Plaintiffs seek $24,000 in statutory penalties under the 

Unruh Act; $12,000 per Plaintiff for each violation they encountered on three different 

occasions. [Doc. No. 104-1 at 6.]

Defendants do not dispute the hourly rates of Plaintiffs’ counsel but object to the 

award of any fees, and in the alternative, argue that any award should be proportionally 

reduced to take into account all the facts and circumstances of the case and the results 

obtained. [Doc. No. 108 at 5-25.] Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs should not be 

awarded statutory damages, and assuming that they are so entitled, argue that Plaintiffs 

must mitigate their damages under the Unruh Act. [Id. at 26-27.]

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of

 13
5

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. Fee award proportional to Plaintiffs’ recovery

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ recovery should be reduced to reflect the minimal 

success they achieved. [Doc. No. 108 at 11-14, 22-23.] Defendants posit that “Plaintiffs 

received essentially no relief as a result of their attorney’s effort; the vast majority of the 

relief received was provided voluntarily, independent of any settlement discussions, and 

prior to the settlement demanded by Plaintiffs’ attorneys.” [Doc. No. 108 at 13:17-20.] 

Plaintiffs counter that they have substantially prevailed, achieved excellent results that 

warrant granting the full fee amount and that Defendants are downplaying the results 

achieved. [Doc. No. 109 at 10-14.] The Court agrees with Plaintiff.

In determining the amount of fees to award, district courts must consider the results 

obtained. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his 

attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee.” Id. at 435. In such circumstances 

reduction of the fee award is not required simply because plaintiff has not prevailed on 

every issue. Id. “If on the other hand, a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited 

success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a 

reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount.” Id. at 436. 

The Court finds Defendants’ claim that Plaintiffs achieved little or no success 

disingenuous and a misrepresentation of their stance throughout this litigation. While 

Defendants claim they willingly made changes to alleviate the barriers long before the 

negotiation of the settlement, they were unwilling to make any concessions or remedy any 

of the barriers until after their summary judgment motion was denied in full. Further, the 

Court finds Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiffs’ pursuit of their claims after they were 

aware of Defendants compliance “unreasonable and vexatious tactics [that] accomplished 

little more than to multiply the proceedings in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927” lacks merit. 

28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides that any person “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case 

unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess 

costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” In the 

Court’s view, Plaintiffs were simply ensuring that Defendants’ continued responsibility to 

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of

 13
6

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

provide accessible parking spots, toilets and a concessions area was appropriately 

memorialized. 

In the complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that there were multiple barriers at the Gliderport 

which prevented them, and similarly situated persons, “full and equal” access to 

Defendants’ public facilities as required by the ADA. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 2.] Plaintiffs 

identified the following barriers: (1) no designated accessible parking spaces; (2) no 

accessible restroom facilities; (3) unsafe pedestrian paths of travel that were not accessible 

to wheelchair uses; (4) no accessible picnic tables; (5) a concessions stand with a counter 

that was too high and which had no accessible path to it and its adjoining seating area. [Id. 

at ¶15.] As a result of Plaintiffs’ efforts, Defendants are obligated to provide and maintain 

two designated accessible parking stalls with access aisles, a fully compliant accessible 

restroom, an accessible transaction counter, and a picnic table that is accessible, properly 

designated and reserved. [Doc. No. 107.]

The Court is familiar with the positions taken by the parties during this case. For 

example, it was Defendants who contended that the Gliderport was not a place of public 

accommodation and asserted that it did not have to provide ADA compliant restrooms, 

eating areas and parking spaces because of the historic nature of the Gliderport. [Doc. Nos. 

47, 55, 58, 63.] Furthermore, Defendants’ unwillingness to effectuate changes at the 

Gliderport was evidenced by their contentions in their summary judgment briefings that 

the public street provided an alternative site for watching the sailplanes, hang gliders and 

paragliders [Doc. No. 63 at 5, fn. 4], and that replacing the partially complaint toilet with 

one that was completely compliant was not readily achievable, would cost too much money 

and that under the applicable ADA standard they were relieved of any responsibility to 

provide any accessible toilet at all. [Doc. No. 55 at 11, 12; Doc. No. 63 at 10.] The Court 

is not convinced that any of the changes effectuated at the Gliderport would have occurred 

but for Plaintiffs’ pursuit of this lawsuit.

The Court is also unwilling to interpret Plaintiffs’ abandonment of their pedestrian 

paths of travel claim as evidence of their ineligibility for a fee award. Rather, the Court 

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of

 13
7

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

views it as a pragmatic response in consideration of how “readily achievable” remediation 

of a coastal bluff would be. Defendants assert that “the single most divisive issue in this 

case has been the grading of the coastal bluff in order to provide level parking or compliant 

paths of travel.” [Doc. No. 108 at 8.] Yet, it was Defendants who claimed that the potential 

presence of native artifacts and sensitivity of the surrounding ecosystem necessitated 

involving multiple agencies, would cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and take years to 

conclude while scoffing at Plaintiffs suggestions that it did not require such excessive 

structural changes. [Doc. No. 47-1, 47-14, 47-16, 55-5, 55-6.] Notably, the consent decree 

provides for the designation of two accessible stalls with access aisles, and allows for 

delineation of the spaces via blue pavers, a solution that is markedly similar to one proposed 

by Plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage. 

Upon consideration of the results achieved, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have 

“obtained excellent results, [and their] attorney[s] should recover a fully compensatory 

fee.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.

B. Lodestar calculation supports requested fee 

Having found Plaintiffs’ excellent results support an award of fees, the Court 

considers whether the lodestar amounts supports the requested attorneys’ fee award. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel declares that they have worked over 246.9 on the case, and that the 

calculated lodestar fee on these hours is $84,055.00. The Court concludes that the lodestar 

amount supports approval of the requested attorneys’ fees.

Under the lodestar method, “the Court first determines the appropriate hourly rate 

for the work performed, and then multiplies that amount by the number of hours properly 

expended in doing the work. “Although ‘in extraordinary circumstances’ the amount 

produced by the lodestar calculation may be increased, ‘there is a strong presumption that 

the lodestar is sufficient.’” Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 643 F.3d, 1165, 

1176 (9th Cir. 2010). Typically, “affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys 

regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases, 

particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the 

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of

 13
8

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 

407 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 1205, 1214 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

See also PLCM Group v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000) (a reasonable hourly rate 

is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant 

community). In addition to considering affidavits and evidence submitted by the parties, 

the court may “rely on its own familiarity with the legal market.” Ingram v. Oroudjian, 

647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011). For a fee request to be adjudged reasonable it must 

“exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not ‘reasonably expended’” and 

should not include fee requests for hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise 

unnecessary. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34.

1. Reasonableness of hourly rate

Defendants do not object to the hourly rate. Plaintiffs calculate the lodestar with the 

following hourly rates for attorneys from the law firm Potter Handy, LLP and its’ Center 

for Disability Access Division: $425 for Mark Potter, $425 for Russell Handy, $350 for 

Phyl Grace, $250 for Chris Carson, $250 for Isabel Masanque, $250 for Amanda Lockhart, 

$250 for Tamara Zaki. [Doc. No. 104-1 at 10.] In support, declarations and other evidence 

are offered to demonstrate the reasonableness of these rates compared to the prevailing 

market rates in the San Diego community for attorneys of their experience and ability. 

[Doc. Nos. 104-2, 104-3.] Included as evidence are four central district cases, from 2011, 

2015 and 2016, where Plaintiffs’ counsel requested similar hourly rates that were found to 

be reasonable by the court. [Doc. Nos. 104-6 – 104-9.] See, e.g., Salinas v. Rite Aid Lease 

Mgmt. Co., et al., No CV 10-7499 SVW (FMOx), 2011 WL 1107213, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. 

Mar. 17, 2011) (approving hourly rate of $425 for Messrs. Potter and Handy); Lopez v. 

Gordon, Case No. 2:14-cv-07791-CAS(BKx), 2016 WL 6998563, at * 2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 

28, 2016) (concluding that the Mr. Potter’s hourly rate of $425, Ms. Grace’s hourly rate of 

$350, Ms. Carson’s hourly rate of $250 and Ms. Masanque’s hourly rate of $250 were 

reasonable.).

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of

 13
9

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

After reviewing the evidence offered and awards in similar cases, the Court 

concludes the hourly rates Plaintiffs seek are reasonable. See United Steelworkers, 896 

F.2d at 407 (rate determinations in other cases setting a rate for plaintiffs’ attorney provide 

satisfactory evidence).

2. Inclusion of unnecessary hours in fee request

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ fee request should be reduced for unnecessary 

hours. After tallying the entries in the chart proffered by Defendants, it appears that they 

are requesting 23.4 hours be subtracted from the number of hours worked. Defendants 

posit that Plaintiffs’ inclusion of the claim regarding the accessible picnic tables at the 

Gliderport was in bad faith and take issue with a number of entries in Plaintiffs’ billing 

records. [Doc. No. 108 at 13-22.] Plaintiffs object to all but one of Defendants’ challenged 

entries, claiming entitlement to all but 2.2 of the 246.9 hours worked. 

As to the picnic tables, the Court finds no merit in Defendants’ assertion. In the 

order on the cross motions for summary judgment the Court determined that “[w]hether or 

not these picnic tables are ADA compliant is a material fact in dispute.” [Doc. No. 65 at 

24:14-15.] Defendants’ claim that Plaintiffs “acted in bad faith when they continued to 

pursue their claim regarding the tables knowing all along that there were, in fact, accessible 

tables at the Gliderport” ignores the Court’s earlier finding on the issue. If Defendants had 

provided compliant picnic tables at the Gliderport prior to the filing of this lawsuit, they 

did not provide such compliance evidence to the Court, or the issue would have been moot. 

See Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011) (an ADA claim 

becomes moot once the defendant corrects the violation because “damages are not 

recoverable under Title III of the ADA – only injunctive relief is available for violations 

of Title III.”). Accordingly, the Court declines to reduce the fee award on this basis.

Further, the Court has reviewed the billable entries that Defendants take issue with. 

[Doc. No. 108 at 14-22.] While Defendants have generated a chart that includes the 43 

challenged entries, they provide very little information pertaining to the reasons for the 

challenge, aside from the conclusory entries “admin,” “attorneys cannot bill for review of 

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of

 13
10

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

one’s own billing entries,” “unnecessary time expended,” “discussion between two 

attorneys representing the same client cannot be billed to the client,” “discovery motion 

denied,” “block billing” and “not billable.” The Court does not find such challenges 

adequately describe why these hours were excessive. Furthermore, Defendants provide no 

case law in support of their boilerplate conclusions or any evidence to support their 

contentions before summarily concluding that “[n]one of the foregoing items are billable 

or should be counted as compensable items.” Without more, the Court is unwilling to find 

that these entries are not billable or that the time was not “reasonable expended” on the 

litigation.

As Plaintiffs concede the duplicative billing entry regarding the public records 

search performed by Mr. Potter, the Court will deduct 2.2 hours of his time, at a rate of 

$425 an hour, from the total fee award.

C. Award of statutory damages under the Unruh Act

Plaintiffs assert that they are both entitled to $12,000 in statutory damages. 

Defendants counter that an award of damages under the Unruh Act is at the discretion of 

the Court and are not automatically awarded due to a violation. [Doc. No. 108 at 23-25.] 

Relatedly, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs must mitigate their damages under the Unruh 

Act and are precluded from “stacking their damages.” [Id. at 26-27.]

The Unruh Act provides that:

Whoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discriminatory or 

distinction contrary to Section 51 or 51.5, is liable for each and every offense 

for the actual damages, and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or 

a court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of the three times the amount 

of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and 

any attorney’s fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto, 

suffered by any person denied the rights provided by Section 5.1 or 51.5

CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a). Because actual damages and statutory damages are listed as two 

separate categories “proof of actual damages is not a prerequisite to recovery of statutory 

minimum damages.” Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2000). 

See also Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The litigant need 

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 13
11

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not prove she suffered actual damages to recover the independent statutory damages of 

$4,000.”); Moore v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2015) 

(“To recover statutory damages, plaintiffs must showed that they were denied “equal 

access,” proof of actual damages is not required.”). Further, when a plaintiff brings an 

Unruh Act claim on the grounds that a defendant has violated the ADA, they “may obtain 

statutory damages on proof of an ADA access violation without the need to demonstrate 

additionally that the discrimination was intentional.” Munson v. Del Taco, 46 Cal. 4th 661, 

670 (2009); Moore 85 F. Supp. 3d at 1183 (a violation of the ADA constitutes a violation 

of the Unruh Act, therefore “[w]here the basis of liability for an Unruh Act violation is an 

ADA violation, plaintiff need not prove intentional discrimination.”).

The Court declines Defendants’ invitation to revisit the issue of whether or not 

Plaintiffs were denied full and equal access to the Gliderport, choosing instead to stand by 

its earlier finding at the summary judgment stage. There, the Court concluded “Plaintiffs 

established that they encountered an ADA violation on March 11, 2013 and March 13, 

2013, and in September 2014 and therefore have established Unruh Act violations.” 2[Doc. 

No. 65 at 26:1-3.] See, e.g., Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1170 (S.D. 

Cal. 2006) (holding that the evidence established three visits in which Plaintiff was denied 

full access which entitled each Plaintiff to $12,000, $4,000 each per violation.). See also 

Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (Plaintiff’s declaration 

that he encountered barrier once and that his knowledge of the barrier deterred him from 

making two subsequent visits was affirmative evidence sufficient to show three violations 

of the Unruh Act. The court awarded Plaintiff $12,000 in statutory damages.) 

 

2 Details regarding the access issues Plaintiffs’ experienced during their March 11 and March 13, 2013 

visits to the Gliderport are provided in their declarations, [Doc. Nos. 50-3, 50-4], submitted in support of 

their motion for summary judgment. While at the Gliderport, Plaintiffs were unable to use the portable 

restrooms, were unaware of the existence of a toilet at the concession stand that may be wheelchair 

accessible, found only one parking spot designated for disable use, and encountered a concession stand 

with a counter that was too high for them. [Doc. No. 47-16 at 16-21, 39, 40-42, 43; Doc. No. 50-3; Doc. 

No. 50-4.]

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 13
12

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court also disagrees with Defendants assertion that Plaintiffs are obligated to 

mitigate damages. The Court continues to find that “there is no requirement that Plaintiff 

mitigate damages when he is merely seeking statutory damages.” Langer v. McHale, Civil 

No. 13cv2721-CAB-NLS, 2014 WL 5422973, at * 4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 20. 2014). 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that under Section 52, Plaintiffs are entitled to 

statutory damages totaling $24,000. Each Plaintiff shall receive an award of $12,000, 

$4,000 for each of the three visits.

D. Litigation Expenses

As the prevailing party, Plaintiffs are also entitled to costs. See 29 U.S.C. § 1920, 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), and Local Rule 54.1. 

Defendants object to the inclusion of $1,200 paid to Mr. Taylor as “the fourth person 

billing for site inspections and taking pictures.” [Doc. No. 108, at 22.] Within the 

declaration of Mr. Potter filed in in support of the motion, Mr. Taylor is identified as the 

individual who performed the investigations and visits to the Gliderport throughout the 

case, gathered photographs and confirmed/denied Defendants’ representations about facts. 

[Doc. No. 104-2 at ¶ 3.] The Court finds nothing untoward about the inclusion of Mr. 

Taylor’s costs in the application and therefore declines to make any reduction in the 

requested costs amount. See United Steelworkers, 896 F.2d at 407 (“Out of pocket 

litigation expenses are reimbursable as part of the attorneys’ fee, distinct from the costs 

already awarded under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.”)

Accordingly, the Court accepts counsel’s declaration regarding costs and awards 

$6,478.00 in costs.

IV. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds the requested fees are reasonable, and grants

Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $83,1203and $6,478 in costs. The 

 

3 This amount includes a deduction of $935 for 2.2 hours that Plaintiffs concede were duplicative.

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 13
13

3:13-cv-2992-CAB-(KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court also awards $12,000 in statutory damages to each of the Plaintiffs for the three 

violations of the Unruh Act. 

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 24, 2017

Case 3:13-cv-02992-CAB-KSC Document 110 Filed 07/24/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 13