Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01308/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01308-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Defendant removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). May 26, 2004, is the

date plaintiff filed his complaint in state court.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESHANE J. HOLMES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-1308 RRB EFB P

vs.

STEVE TEER,

Defendant. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a prisoner without counsel seeking relief for alleged civil rights violations. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on the May 26, 2004, complaint1

 in which plaintiff

alleges that (1) defendant Teer discriminated against plaintiff based on plaintiff’s race by

belittling him, assigning him to menial tasks while giving less qualified prisoners more difficult

tasks, refusing to verify plaintiff’s apprenticeship work hours, replacing plaintiff with a white

prisoner and excluding plaintiff from a list of “critical workers” who were released from lockdown to perform essential tasks; and (2) defendant Teer fired plaintiff from his job as an

electrician in retaliation for plaintiff’s filing grievances against him. The matter is now before

the court on defendant Teer’s motion for summary judgment.

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I. Facts

Plaintiff does not state the time frame during which the alleged violations occurred. 

However, the parties agree that on May 1, 1999, plaintiff commenced an apprenticeship to

become a maintenance electrician. Furthermore, defendant Teer has submitted evidence

showing that he was the foreman of plaintiff’s Inmate Day Labor (“IDL”) work crew (explained

below) from May 2002 until October 2003. Plaintiff has not disputed this evidence. Thus, the

court takes this to be the relevant time.

In order to understand these findings and recommendations, it is necessary to understand

the basic structure of and connection between the apprenticeship and the IDL programs. The

IDL is a joint venture program of the State of California that employs prisoners confined within

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Rau Decl., filed August

18, 2006, at 2; Melton Dec., filed August 18, 2006, at 1-2. This program permits employers to

provide job opportunities for prisoners so they can obtain skills and habits that will enable them

to be productive upon their release from prison. California Department of Corrections

Operations Manual (“DOM”), § 53140.1. All prisoners hired by IDL for construction projects at

CSP Solano are designated “general laborers.” Rau Decl., at 2. General laborers must record

their hours and IDL staff must certified them. Id. Thus, regardless of having experience in a

particular vocation, a prisoner on an IDL crew may be directed to perform any and all tasks

necessary at a construction site. Id. at 2. The apprenticeship program provided more specialized

training. Prisoners participated in particular vocational educational courses within the CDCR in

order to obtain marketable skills. To become indentured, and apprentice was required

successfully to complete classes in the area of their vocation before embarking on an assignment. 

DOM § 53090.4.7. After at least six months in an apprenticeship program and upon

recommendation by the educators, a prisoner apprentice is eligible to be assigned to day labor

projects. Id. In fact, an apprentice with the proper custody and classification levels must be

given priority with respect to day labor assignments. Id. However, an apprentice who is

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assigned to IDL or other programs must continue to have “four hours of related instruction” each

week. Pl.’s Opp’n, filed September 12, 2006, Ex. D. 

The facility apprenticeship coordinator makes all job assignments for apprentices. Id. 

When an apprentice receives an assignment, the facility apprenticeship coordinator must give

written notice thereof to the classification committee, the prisoner’s counselor, the assignment

office and the prisoner. Id. The notice must also be placed in the prisoner’s central file. Id. 

Other than removal for medical, custodial or legal reasons, an apprentice may not be removed

from his assigned training program without approval of the facility apprenticeship coordinator. 

Id. 

The parties agree that on November 1, 2003, all prison apprenticeship programs except

the HVAC/R program were discontinued. Pl.’s Opp’n, Exh. D; Melton Decl., at 2. Plaintiff has

submitted evidence that vocational instructors could follow particular guidelines to reinstitute

their particular program. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. D. There is no specific evidence that the electrical

apprenticeship program was reinstituted according to the applicable guidelines.

Prisoner apprentices must maintain a record of the hours worked toward satisfaction of

the apprenticeship agreement. Melton Decl., at 2. Only Vocational Instructors can verify that

these hours were completed. Id. ; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. D. While some apprenticeship work may

occur within IDL (explained below), the Apprenticeship Coordinator must approve it. Melton

Decl., at 3; see also Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. D. Even within the apprenticeship program itself, a

prisoner must obtain permission from his supervisor to transfer from one work assignment to

another. Melton Decl., at 3. Voluntarily leaving an assignment without permission terminates

participation in the apprenticeship program. Id. With this overview, the court turns to the facts

of this case.

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a prisoner at California State Prison,

Solano (CSP Solano). As stated, on May 1, 1999, plaintiff became an indentured apprentice in

the area of electrical maintenance. Compl., Ex. A; Melton Decl., at 2. He signed a formal

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 On the bottom of a form styled, “Inmate Work Supervisor’s Time Log,” completed by

Vocational Instructor Wong, there is a notation stating, “03/05/02 - unassigned to MET - 3.093.” 

Maiorino Decl., filed August 18, 2006, Ex. D. The parties do not explain this notation.

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agreement requiring him to complete 6,000 hours between May 1, 1999, and May 1, 2002, to

record the hours he worked each day, and to have a Vocational Instructor verify his hours. 

Compl., Ex. A; Melton Decl., at 2. Manuel Ibarra and, after Ibarra retired in June 2001, Spencer

Wong, were plaintiff’s Vocational Instructors, i.e., apprenticeship supervisors. Melton Decl., at

2; Maiorino Decl., Ex. F, Pl.’s Dep. (“Pl.’s Dep.”). For the third quarter of 2000, Manuel Ibarra

reported that plaintiff’s work performance was above average. Compl., Ex. A. Plaintiff actively

participated in the apprenticeship program until at least sometime in March 2002. Pl.’s Dep. 

In March 2002, plaintiff’s only apprenticeship assignment was classroom-based. Id.,

Pl.’s Dep. at 5. Defendant submits evidence that plaintiff, without permission, left this

assignment in March 2002, and began working in the Metal Fabrication unit. Melton Decl., at 3. 

At his deposition, plaintiff admitted that he left his vocational class in February 2002, explaining

that since his teacher, Manuel Ibarra, had retired he did not think he could learn anything more. 

Pl.’s Dep. at 5. Plaintiff did not get permission from the Vocational Instructors, their supervisors,

the Apprenticeship Coordinator or from the Metal Fabrication Unit supervisor to make this

change.2

 Id., at 9, 11, 12. While plaintiff did exclusively electrical work in the Metal

Fabrication Unit, Tom Melton, the Apprenticeship Coordinator, states in his declaration that

there are no written records showing that plaintiff had permission to transfer from one

assignment to another. Id., at 12; Melton Decl., at 3. Plaintiff believed he did not need written

permission from his instructor to leave one assignment and go to the next. Pl.’s Dep. at 5, 9. He

also believed that he was assigned to the Metal Fabrication Unit as an apprentice. Id. Plaintiff

submitted evidence that he received a letter dated December 24, 2003, from Apprenticeship

Consultant Terri A. Lutz. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. F. Ms. Lutz sent to plaintiff booklets for recording

his apprenticeship-related work, requested information about plaintiff’s program, and requested

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that she, plaintiff and his instructor have a telephone conference. Id. 

During the summer and fall of 2003, defendant Teer, an electrician with the International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), was employed as Electrical Foreman for IDL at CSP

Solano. Teer Decl., filed August 18, 2006, at 1. Defendant Teer has never been a Vocational

Instructor at Solano State Prison or any responsibility or authority within that program. Id., at 4. 

Thus, he had no authority or responsibility to hire or fire any prisoner. Id., at 3. He never was

responsible for verifying plaintiff’s work or hours. Id.

From May 2002 until about October 2003, plaintiff was employed by IDL as a general

laborer. Rau Decl., at 2. When plaintiff was hired, IDL recognized his basic electrical training. 

Maiorino Decl., Ex. B at 1. Teer submitted the declarations of Tom Melton and Brian Rau as

evidence that this employment was not associated with any apprenticeship program. Rau Decl.,

at 2. 

Teer supervised a five-man IDL electrical crew working on new construction, repairs and

renovations. Teer Decl., at 2. Several other crews, i.e., electrical, masonry and sheet metal, each

with a supervisor, worked alongside Teer’s crew. Pl.’s Dep. at 17. There also were prisoners

who worked solely on maintaining the IDL worksites, which involved picking up demolition

debris or carrying materials between job sites. Id. Plaintiff was on Teer’s crew from about May

2002 until October 2003. Teer Decl., at 1-2. At deposition, plaintiff described a typical work

day as involving either a project or “small things to do,” including running conduit, changing

panels, demolition and replacing “stuff,” especially in the prison’s medical facility, which was

being renovated. Pl.’s Dep. at 18. Teer’s crew also replaced light fixtures, junction boxes and

completed other relatively small jobs associated with renovating an old facility. Id. Teer

believed that clean equipment and a clean work environment were necessary for safety reasons. 

Teer Decl., at 1-2. Therefore, he required all the workers under his supervision, not just plaintiff,

regularly to clean the job site by picking up trash, sweeping, washing equipment and cleaning

light fixtures. Id. Plaintiff observed other prisoners sweep and pick up debris or trash before

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leaving a work site, but he did not know whether Teer instructed them to do these tasks or not. 

Pl.’s Dep. at 17. Plaintiff thought that only the maintenance crew consisted of “general

laborers,” and that it was their job was to keep the work area clean. Id. Plaintiff submits the

declaration of a fellow prisoner who states that in August or September of 2002, he heard

defendant Teer tell plaintiff that he “would not authorize a jail-house electrician,” and that

plaintiff “would do better in the trade as a black female.” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. G. Shortly after

hearing these comments, he observed that plaintiff was performing tasks such as washing light

fixture covers and repairing damaged power cords on tools while less qualified prisoners, such as

a carpenter, were assigned to larger projects like installing conduit and installing power panels. 

Id. 

Plaintiff has submitted documentary evidence in the form of “Work Supervisor’s

Reports” that for the quarterly periods of January through March 2003 and April through June

2003, an unidentified “supervisor” reported that plaintiff’s work performance in IDL was

exceptional. Id. However, he also submitted evidence that defendant Teer maintained a written

record of plaintiff’s poor attitude and job performance and his disrespect for other workers. Pl.’s

Opp’n, Ex. H. Defendant Teer asserts that plaintiff’s productivity was low, quality of work was

poor, attitude and treatment of other prisoners were poor, and that he reported these concerns to

the IDL supervisory management staff. Teer Decl., at 3. The general foreman, Brad Baker, also

reported to his supervisor that plaintiff was causing friction with other workers and that his

“work habits became sloppy and very unproductive.” Maiorino Decl., Ex. B at 1. In July 2003,

when Teer found that plaintiff’s work was sloppy and advised him to correct it, plaintiff was not

receptive to the criticism. Teer Decl., at 3. Defendant Teer found at least two other electrical

jobs of plaintiff were so substandard that they violated the National Electric Code, the industry

standard. Id. at 4. In August 2003, an IDL supervisor, Brian Rau found that plaintiff did not

have a supervisor review his work on a transformer. Rau Decl., at 3. Rau examined the work

and found that plaintiff did not ground the wires entering a 480-volt conductor, which could have

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resulted in an explosion. Id. When Rau discussed the problem with plaintiff, plaintiff attempted

to blame other IDL employees. Id.

In August or September of 2003, CSP Solano was placed on lockdown. Teer Decl., at 3. 

Thus, prisoners were not released from their cells for job assignments. Id. At some point,

defendant Teer was permitted to select two prisoners to be on the list of “critical workers,” i.e.

workers who were permitted to return to their jobs. Id. Defendant Teer selected Sykes and

Mitchell, who are African American and Caucasian, respectively. Id. Several weeks later,

defendant Teer was permitted to select two more workers. He selected Monteon and Pullen, who

are Hispanic and Caucasian, respectively. Teer Decl., at 3. Before this, Monteon worked for the

IDL custody maintenance crew. Id. at 17. Plaintiff asserts that Monteon was not qualified to be

on the electrical crew because he was hired as a “general laborer” but “expressed an interest in

becoming an electrician.” Pl.’s Dep. at 26. Plaintiff “was very vocal” about his belief that

Monteon was unqualified to do electrical work, and admits that there was “friction” between

himself and Monteon. Id. He also told defendant Teer that since the IDL was not a vocational

class, it was not right for Monteon to be on the crew. Id. Teer responded that plaintiff should

help Monteon to learn, and paired Monteon with Pullen. Id. In his declaration, Teer asserts that

he did not select plaintiff as a critical worker because plaintiff was the least productive member

of the crew, had the most difficulty getting along with other crew-members, and caused

disruption amongst co-workers by being unjustifiably critical of their work. Teer Decl., at 3. At

his deposition, plaintiff admitted that he was critical of the other electrical workers. Pl.’s Dep. at

98-99. This was so, he explained, because they were not qualified and their work was

substandard, which made him concerned for the safety of the work site. Id.

On September 23, 2003, plaintiff filed a grievance against defendant Teer complaining

that he should have been selected as a critical worker. Pl.’s Dep. at 24. On October 1, 2003,

after the lockdown was lifted, plaintiff reported to the IDL crew. Id. He approached defendant

Teer to discuss his exclusion from the critical workers list. Id. At that time, defendant Teer said,

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“You shouldn’t have wrote that 602.” Id. Plaintiff explained to Teer the grievance process and

his concerns about the apprenticeship and wanting critical worker status. Id. Teer responded by

telling plaintiff, “Well, I got to let you go.” Id. Plaintiff admits that Teer said that if it were

Teer’s decision to make, plaintiff would not be fired and that “higher ups” made the decision. 

Id.

A letter dated October 9, 2003, from a construction supervisor to plaintiff informs

plaintiff that he no longer was part of the IDL crew with which he worked before the lockdown.

Maiorino Decl., Ex. A. The letter states that initially, a four-member crew was sufficient, but

that once they decided to add a crew member, that person would not be plaintiff. Id. The letter

states that the decision to replace plaintiff “was made by the lead electricians and myself,” based

on concerns of “the electrical supervisors about safety and work ethic.” Id. In his declaration,

defendant Teer states that he did not consider the newly hired prisoner, Bryant Fowlie, to be a

replacement for plaintiff. Teer Decl., at 4. 

At deposition, plaintiff testified to his belief that Fowlie was hired to replace plaintiff

even though he was less qualified. Plaintiff believes that Fowlie was hired into the IDL ahead of

about 150 other prisoners on the waiting list. Pl.’s Dep. at 23. In support of this belief, he said

that Fowlie joined Teer’s work crew about two weeks after plaintiff left, but while plaintiff

officially was still assigned to it. Id. In addition, he explained, “[b]ecause the waiting list for

IDL, there are inmates on the IDL, waiting list that had been on the list for eight months before

they were called out there.” Id. Plaintiff never had seen the list. Id. Plaintiff testified that

Pullen was friends with Fowlie and tried to get Fowlie a job on the crew. Id. Plaintiff believed

that Fowlie was “enrolled in a professional career development institute course for being an

electrician,” and testified that Teer said that Fowlie was “just trying to learn how to bend

conduit.” Id. Plaintiff believes that Fowlie, who was white, was unqualified for the position

because Fowlie said that he had been hired as a carpenter. Pl.’s Dep. at 26. 

////

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 On February 4, 2004, the court informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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On March 9, 2004, IDL Construction Supervisor Steve Ponce drafted a document

requesting that plaintiff be “officially unassigned from the Inmate Day Labor (IDL) construction

crew.” Maiorino Decl., Ex. C. Ponce based the request on “written information” received from

the previous supervisor and from plaintiff’s on-site supervisors stating that plaintiff’s poor

attitude and substandard, unsafe work made Holmes not well suited for that particular crew. Id.,

Exs. B, C. Ponce also noted that plaintiff had been excluded from the work-site since October of

2003. Id., Ex. C. Finally, he noted that the evaluations reflecting plaintiff’s above average IDL

performance were completed by a custody officer, not by a construction supervisor, and were

inaccurate. Id. 

In his declaration, defendant Teer denies ever having referred to plaintiff as a “prison

house electrician.” Teer Decl., at 4. He also denies telling plaintiff that plaintiff should not have

filed an appeal about his exclusion from the critical workers list. Id. 

II. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).3

 The utility of Rule 56 to determine whether there is a

“genuine issue of material fact,” such that the case must be resolved through presentation of

testimony and evidence at trial is well established:

[T]he Supreme Court, by clarifying what the non-moving party

must do to withstand a motion for summary judgment, has

increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the Court has

made clear that if the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and that party

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of

fact with respect to the existence of that element, then summary

judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary judgment,

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the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine factual

issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). There can be no genuine issue as to any

material fact where there is a complete failure of proof as to an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case because all other facts are thereby rendered immaterial. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323.

III. Analysis

"As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at

248, 252. Here, plaintiff’s action arises under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and the First, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. To prevail at trial, he must prove that the defendants deprived him of

his rights while acting under color of state law. To prove that his First Amendment right of

access to the courts was violated, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of competent evidence

that he was denied necessary assistance in preparing and filing a habeas corpus petition or

section 1983 complaint and that the deprivation actually injured his habeas or section 1983

litigation efforts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 354, 356 (1996). To prove an Eighth

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Amendment violation, plaintiff must show that the defendant knew plaintiff faced a risk of harm

that “is not one that today’s society chooses to tolerate,” and that the defendant was “deliberately

indifferent” to that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994). To prove a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause, plaintiff must prove that the defendants intentionally

discriminated against him based upon membership in a protected class. Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (1998). 

For the reasons explained below, the court finds there is no genuine issue for trial.

A. Equal Protection

Plaintiff claims that defendant Teer made racially derogatory remarks to him, assigned

him to menial tasks while giving less qualified prisoners more difficult ones, refused to verify

plaintiff’s apprenticeship work hours, excluded plaintiff from a list of “critical workers” who

were released from lock-down to perform essential tasks, and ultimately fired him, replacing him

with a less qualified white prisoner. Defendant Teer contends there is no genuine issue about

whether he acted with discriminatory intent.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection is a command that states

treat similarly situated persons alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.

432, 439 (1985) (per curiam). This guarantee applies inside prison walls. Lee v. Washington,

390 U.S. 333, 333 (1968). The Supreme Court has made clear that when a prisoner alleges

discrimination based on race, strict scrutiny applies. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 

(2005). The purpose of this level of scrutiny is to “smoke out illegitimate uses of race by

ensuring that the government’s classification is closely fitted to the compelling goals that it seeks

to achieve.” Richmond v. J. S. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). Thus, once a prisoner has

come forward with evidence of intentional race-based discrimination, prison officials have the

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the disparate treatment is a “narrowly

tailored measure [] that further[s] compelling governmental interests.” Adarant Constructors,

Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-240 (1976).

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 Defendant also points out that the alleged statement, “[y]ou would do better in the trade

as a female,” was not racially motivated. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 7. Regardless, plaintiff did

not include this alleged statement in his complaint. The only statement that plaintiff seems to

allege constitutes a freestanding violation of his rights is defendants’ repeatedly referring to

plaintiff as a jailhouse electrician. Thus, the court does not consider whether the “doing better in

the trade” remark, standing alone, violated plaintiff’s rights.

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B. Teer’s Alleged Statements

Plaintiff asserts that defendant Teer made racially derogatory remarks. If true, the

statements of racial antipathy could serve as evidence of a racial motivation for the prison work

assignments, hours and other actions he challenges. Verbal abuse alone is insufficient to

establish an equal protection violation but it can be evidence of racial animus. See Freeman v.

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 & n. 6 (9th Cir. 1997). However, the statements alleged here fail to

show any suggestion of racial animus.4

 The complaint alleges that Teer frequently referred to

plaintiff as a “prison house electrician” to emphasize that he received his electrical training while

in prison. Compl. at 2. Indeed, the complaint alleges that the comment was motivated by

plaintiff’s status as a prisoner. Prisoners are not a protected suspect class under the Fourteenth

Amendment that would trigger an elevated of scrutiny. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne

Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (discrimination based on characteristics other than race,

alienage, national origin and sex must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest). Here,

however, under any level of scrutiny, plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim. The verbal

abuse he alleges is not remotely racial in nature. Therefore, no reasonable jury could find in

plaintiff’s favor on this issue and defendant Teer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

C. Discrimination at the IDL Worksite

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Teer, knowing that plaintiff was an apprentice for

electrical maintenance, assigned plaintiff to perform “menial chores and mundane tasks having

little to no trade value whatsoever, such as, [sic] washing light fixtures, sweeping up trash, etc.,”

but assigned tasks requiring electrical skills to those with less experience and training than

plaintiff. Compl. at 2-3. Defendant contends that there is no triable issue because plaintiff has

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no “constitutional right to a prison job,” and he was hired as a “general laborer,” rather than as

an electrician. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 9-10. As a threshold matter, plaintiff does not

present this as a due process claim. For purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, it does not

matter whether there is a constitutional right to a job. The relevant question is whether

defendant treated plaintiff differently from similarly situated persons solely because of plaintiff’s

race. See Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (“racial discrimination in the

assignment of jobs violates equal protection). It is undisputed that Teer was the electrical

foreman at the IDL construction site and that plaintiff was on Teer’s crew. From these two facts,

it is reasonable to infer that defendant Teer’s authority extended to projects requiring electrical

skills, and that plaintiff was assigned to assist with those projects. Thus, the only question is

whether defendant Teer excluded plaintiff from such projects because of plaintiff’s race.

It is important to note that at trial, plaintiff has the burden of proving discriminatory

intent. See Walker, 370 F.3d at 973. Thus, in opposing this motion he must present evidence

that a reasonable fact finder could rely on at trial to "return a verdict for [him] on the evidence

presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252. Defendant Teer has

submitted evidence that he believed a safe a work site must kept be clean, and that all crew

members were expected to help with a variety of tasks, such as digging trenches, removing

installation, concrete, sheet-rock or electrical materials. There is no evidence that these activities

are wholly unrelated to electrical work done during construction at a prison. Teer also has

submitted evidence that all crew members were expected to remove trash and debris, regardless

of an individual’s level of electrical training and that he so directed them. Plaintiff has not

shown a genuine issue in this regard. At his deposition he conceded that he saw other crew

members picking up trash and the like. He also admitted that he did not know if defendant Teer

had directed them to do it or if they were acting on their own initiative. Plaintiff adduces

evidence, which defendant Teer disputes, that Teer told plaintiff that he “would not authorize a

jail-house electrician,” and that plaintiff “would do better in the trade as a black female.” 

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Plaintiff’s evidence, also disputed by Teer, shows that shortly after Teer made these statements,

plaintiff was assigned to perform tasks such as cleaning light fixture covers and repairing broken

tools while prisoners with less electrical experience than he worked on larger, more complex

projects. This dispute, however, is not material. Even if a jury found plaintiff’s evidence to be

true, it does not create a genuine issue about whether Teer acted out of racial animus. As

explained above, the “jail-house electrician” statement singles out prisoners, not AfricanAmericans, or even African-American prisoners. The “black female” comment alluding to race

and sex, is too thin a reed upon which to find a genuine issue of material fact in light of the other

evidence. Perhaps a reasonable jury could conclude that Teer disliked plaintiff. However,

personal animosity does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The evidence presented could

not justify a finding that defendant Teer directed plaintiff to perform jobs other than those

directly utilizing plaintiff’s electrical skills because of plaintiff’s race. Teer is therefore entitled

to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252.

D. Teer’s Refusal to Verify Plaintiff’s Work Hours

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Teer prevented him from completing his apprenticeship

by refusing to verify the hours he worked so that he could report those hours within the

apprenticeship program. Compl. at 3. Defendant Teer argues that plaintiff’s IDL work was not

part of an apprenticeship. It is undisputed that CDCR policies would have permitted an

apprentice in the Electrical Maintenance program to work in IDL. But it is immaterial whether

plaintiff was an apprentice who worked within IDL. Defendant Teer has submitted evidence that

only Vocational Instructors could verify an apprentice’s hours, and he was not a Vocational

Instructor. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that defendant Teer was required to confirm

that plaintiff worked certain hours so that plaintiff could rely on his IDL work for his

apprenticeship. Moreover, there is no evidence to even remotely suggest that Teer’s failure to

verify hours had anything to do with the plaintiff’s race. Without evidence that defendant Teer

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had the authority to verify hours worked in the apprenticeship program, or more improperly that

he treated plaintiff differently (e.g., verified hours for others but not plaintiff) because of racial

animus, no reasonable jury could find for plaintiff on this claim. Accordingly, defendant Teer is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252.

E. Exclusion from the Critical Workers List

Plaintiff claims that defendant Teer excluded him from the critical workers list because of

his race. Defendant Teer asserts that he selected critical workers based on work performance

and attitude. Again, as the party with the burden of proof at trial, plaintiff must be able to

produce evidence that this exclusion was the result of intentional, invidious discrimination. It is

undisputed that Teer’s entire crew consisted of two Caucasian workers, two African American

workers and one Hispanic worker. Defendant Teer has submitted evidence that he was permitted

to select two prisoners at a time to be critical workers. When given his first opportunity, he

selected one African American and one Caucasian worker. When given his second opportunity,

he selected one Hispanic and one Caucasian worker. That defendant Teer selected an African

American as one of his two initial critical workers when there were five possible candidates

tends to show that race was not a factor in excluding plaintiff. Again, while it is possible that

Teer disliked plaintiff, mere dislike does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. There is no

evidence to establish a racial motivation here. 

In addition, defendant Teer has submitted evidence that plaintiff’s work was so

substandard that at times it violated national standards for the safety of electrical work. He also

has submitted evidence that plaintiff did not get along well with the other crew members because

he was unjustifiably critical of their work. Plaintiff asserts that defendant Teer has no records or

other documentary evidence suggesting that plaintiff’s work was inadequate, and has submitted

evidence that plaintiff’s work in January through March and April through June 2003 was more

than satisfactory. But plaintiff does not submit any work performance reports from June 2003

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through September 2003, the period immediately preceding the lockdown. Nor does he submit

evidence showing that the specific work Rau and Teer described as falling below national

standards actually was completed satisfactorily. Finally, plaintiff concedes that he criticized

other members of the IDL crew for their work. His assertion that he was justified in doing so

because he was the only one with electrical training does not create any dispute about whether

his criticism was misplaced if only because it caused friction on the crew. On this evidence, a

reasonable jury could not conclude that plaintiff’s race was the motivating factor behind Teer’s

declining to select plaintiff as a critical worker following the lockdown. Therefore, Teer is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252

F. Decision to Fire Plaintiff

Plaintiff claims that defendant Teer fired him from the IDL crew because of plaintiff’s

race. Teer asserts that he did not make the decision to fire plaintiff and that in any event,

plaintiff presents no evidence to prove discriminatory intent. It also is undisputed that when

Teer was ready for five crew members after the lockdown, plaintiff was not hired. Instead, a

white prisoner named Fowlie was hired. It is undisputed that defendant Teer lacked authority to

hire and fire prisoners. This was the job of prison officials. However, there is evidence that a

prison supervisor informed Teer that his opinions about plaintiff would heavily influence any

decision about whether to retain or discharge plaintiff. Thus, Teer had a great amount of

influence over whether plaintiff remained on the crew. For purposes of summary judgment, the

court deems Teer’s influence over this decision sufficient to confer liability on him. However,

plaintiff has not submitted any direct evidence that Teer communicated any preference to the

supervisors. The evidence is that Teer told plaintiff both that supervisors made the decision and

that Teer told plaintiff that he had to “let plaintiff go.” For purposes of summary judgment, the

court takes the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, plaintiff, and finds

that Teer’s opinions were a motivating factor behind his supervisors’ decision to remove plaintiff

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from his work crew. However, this does not establish that plaintiff was fired because of his race.

Plaintiff’s beliefs about why Fowlie was hired in plaintiff’s stead are insufficient to

withstand defendant’s motion. Plaintiff testified at deposition that Teer wanted Fowlie on the

crew, Fowlie “circumvented” the waiting list for that particular position, Fowlie was white, and

Fowlie was less qualified than plaintiff. Since plaintiff has the burden of proof at trial and

defendant’s motion is properly supported, plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment based on

unsupported beliefs. He introduces no direct evidence whatsoever about Fowlie’s qualifications,

whether Fowlie was not in fact next on the waiting list for the job, or if he was not, that there

was no reason to justify that decision. Furthermore, as discussed above, plaintiff’s evidence that

his work performance was above average does not cover the time immediately preceding the

lockdown and is contradicted by his own evidence that his performance was substandard. 

Plaintiff does not submit evidence to contest Teer’s evidence of plaintiff’s substandard work on

several projects, and plaintiff caused friction on the crew. On this evidence, no reasonable jury

could find that defendant Teer either caused plaintiff to be removed from the crew, or caused

Fowlie to be hired in plaintiff’s stead, based on racial animus. Accordingly, defendant Teer is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252

G. Retaliation

Plaintiff claims that defendant Teer fired plaintiff in retaliation for filing a grievance

about not being selected as a critical worker. Defendant Teer contends that plaintiff cannot

adduce evidence that being discharged from the work crew was connected to the grievance he

filed. There are five elements to a retaliation claim: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some

adverse action against a prisoner; (2) because (3) the prisoner engaged in protected conduct; (4)

resulting in the chilling of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights; and (5) the action did not

reasonably advance a legitimate penological goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68

(9th Cir. 2003). Institutional order and discipline are legitimate penological goals. Rizzo v.

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Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). It is undisputed that plaintiff was discharged from

Teer’s work crew after the lock-down. It is undisputed that in September 23, 2003, plaintiff filed

a grievance about not being selected as a critical worker. Pl.’s Dep. at 24. Plaintiff adduces

evidence that on October 1, 2003, when he returned to the IDL work site, he went to speak with

Teer about being excluded from the critical workers’ list. Id. Plaintiff testified at deposition

that Teer told plaintiff that he believed the grievance was personal, and then said that he had to

“let plaintiff go.” Id. However, defendant Teer has submitted evidence that he legitimately was

concerned about the quality of plaintiff’s work and plaintiff’s ability to work well with other

crew members. In the context of a prison work site, good work and the ability to work well with

others are legitimate goals equivalent to discipline and order. On the evidence before the court,

no reasonable jury could find that Teer lacked a legitimate penological reason for having

plaintiff removed from the work crew. Accordingly, Teer is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252

For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that defendant’s August 18, 2006, motion for

summary judgment be granted and that judgment be entered in his favor.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 29, 2007.

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