Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02023/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02023-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 Plaintiff named three other individuals as defendants. They submitted a pretrial

statement on November 28, 2005.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARVEY M. LEONARD,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-02-2023 LKK EFB P

vs.

EDWARD N. BONNER, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is confined in Atascadero State Hospital (“ASH”) pursuant to California’s

Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”). See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6600 et seq. (West

1998). He appears on his own behalf seeking relief for alleged civil rights violations. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983. He filed his initial complaint on September 16, 2002 and this action proceeds on

the February 7, 2003, first amended complaint. That complaint alleges that defendant Steve

Frank1

, a physician’s assistant, approved the confiscation of an “air cast,” explained below, that

was used for treatment of an ankle injury, thereby causing plaintiff to suffer severe pain. 

////

////

Case 2:02-cv-02023-LKK -EFB Document 92 Filed 08/31/07 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

 Neither party explains what ROM means, but the court construes it as “range of

motion.” 

2

Defendant Steve Frank has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that this action is

untimely and that plaintiff cannot adduce evidence to prove that approving the confiscation was

not a proper medical judgment.

I. Facts

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a civil detainee pursuant to California’s

Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”), see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6600 et seq. (West

1998), and was confined either at the Placer County Jail or at ASH. Defendant Steve Frank was

a Physician’s Assistant at the Placer County Jail. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Attach. 2, Frank

Decl., at 1. Frank has about nine years of orthopedic experience in the area of sports medicine. 

Id., at 2. 

On or around June 19, 2001, plaintiff injured his ankle while playing basketball at ASH. 

Pl.’s Dep., lodged May 14, 2004, at 15; see Frank Decl., at 2. Plaintiff recalls Dr. Belanger, who

is not a defendant, telling plaintiff that he had torn tendons. Pl.’s Dep., at 26. A June 20, 2001,

notation in plaintiff’s medical records states that plaintiff had sprained his ankle while playing

basketball, walked into the examination room, suffered mild swelling of his foot and it was

“painful on ROM.”2

 Frank Decl., Ex. 1. Dr. Belanger prescribed an air cast, a support device, to

be worn for seven days. Pl.’s Dep., at 16; Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, Belanger Dep., at 6,

8. Dr. Belanger testified that depending on how severe a sprain is, an air cast may be prescribed

for a week and then its use may be extended, or not, based on a follow-up examination. 

Belanger Dep., at 23. While it is not unusual for a sprain to take up to three months to heal,

using an air cast for too long can cause weakening of the muscles that support the ankle. Id. For

treating an acute injury, Dr. Belanger ordinarily prescribes rehabilitative exercises and

discontinues use of an air cast within three weeks. Id., at 23-24. After a severe injury, however,

appropriate treatment can include use of an air cast during sports activities for an indefinite

Case 2:02-cv-02023-LKK -EFB Document 92 Filed 08/31/07 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

period of time. Id., at 24.

On July 3, 2001, plaintiff was transferred to the Placer County Jail for SVPA court

proceedings. Pl.’s Dep., at 16-17; Belanger Dep., at 7. Around the time of plaintiff’s transfer,

defendant Frank received a fax from ASH containing the June 20, 2001, notation described

above. Frank Decl., at 2. On August 25, 2001, a jail nurse approved plaintiff’s use of the air

cast. Frank Decl., at Ex. 2; Pl.’s Dep., at 17. Immediately after plaintiff left a court appearance

on August 27, 2001, a sergeant at the Placer County Jail ordered plaintiff onto the ground and

removed plaintiff’s air cast. Pl.’s Dep., at 13-14, 69. A day or two later, plaintiff requested

medical attention. Id., at 26. As a result, plaintiff saw defendant Frank who informed plaintiff

that he had approved removal of the air cast two days earlier. Id., at 36, 70. Frank could see the

swelling in plaintiff’s foot, but he did not examine plaintiff and did not return the air cast to

plaintiff. Id. On August 29, 2001, Frank informed plaintiff that the air cast had been prescribed

for one week of use, and that he already should have discontinued using it. Frank Decl., at 2. 

Plaintiff understood Dr. Balenger to have instructed plaintiff to use it for one week and thereafter

to use it as necessary. Pl.’s Dep., at 27. He continued to use the brace beyond the time

prescribed because walking without it for any distance more than a few steps was painful and

would cause swelling. Pl. Dep., at 24-25.

Plaintiff returned to ASH on September 6, 2001. Belanger Dep., at 9. At deposition,

plaintiff testified that his foot was so swollen that a doctor immediately prescribed another air

cast and ultimately concluded that plaintiff should use a wheelchair. Pl. Dep., at 19, 29. In

contrast, Dr. Belanger testified at deposition that a different physician found no swelling or

bruising, even though plaintiff reported pain in his foot and ankle. Belanger Dep., at 9, 10. Dr.

Belanger also testified that the June 20 injury was so remote that it was unlikely to have caused

plaintiff discomfort in September. Id., at 10.

Plaintiff had several problems with his foot. Other than the June 19, 2001, injury, he had

a bone spur on his heel, and at some time had torn some tendons. Id., at 10; Pl.’s Dep., at 27. He

Case 2:02-cv-02023-LKK -EFB Document 92 Filed 08/31/07 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

 On May 1, 2003, the court informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a motion

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d

952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). 

4

resisted injections to treat the bone spur, which caused pain independent of his ankle injuries. 

Belanger Dep., at 10. In August 2002, Dr. Balanger prescribed plaintiff an air cast for sports and

walking to be used for as long as plaintiff needed it. Id., at 11. 

II. Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).3

 The utility of Rule 56 to determine whether there is a

“genuine issue of material fact,” such that the case must be resolved through presentation of

testimony and evidence at trial is well established:

[T]he Supreme Court, by clarifying what the non-moving party

must do to withstand a motion for summary judgment, has

increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the Court has

made clear that if the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and that party

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of

fact with respect to the existence of that element, then summary

judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary judgment,

the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine factual

issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

Case 2:02-cv-02023-LKK -EFB Document 92 Filed 08/31/07 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). There can be no genuine issue as to any

material fact where there is a complete failure of proof as to an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case because all other facts are thereby rendered immaterial. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. 

With these standards in mind, it is important to note that plaintiff bears the burden of

proof at trial over the issue raised on this motion, i.e., whether defendant Steve Frank’s actions

were punitive in nature. Therefore, to withstand defendant’s motion, plaintiff may not rest on

the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. He must demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. 

Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 1989). He must rely on evidence

based upon which a fair-minded jury "could return a verdict for [him] on the evidence

presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252.

III. Analysis

"As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248. Here, plaintiff’s action arises

under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. To prevail at trial, he must prove

that the defendant deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment rights while acting under color of

state law. To prove a Fourteenth Amendment violation, plaintiff must show by a preponderance

of competent evidence that the defendant’s actions were punitive in nature. Jones v. Blanas, 393

F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004). As discussed below, plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine

dispute for trial over this material issue.

IV. Statute of Limitations

As stated above, defendant Frank asserts that this action is untimely. He asserts that

plaintiff had one year from the time the cause of action accrued to file the complaint in this

Case 2:02-cv-02023-LKK -EFB Document 92 Filed 08/31/07 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 4

 At least one of these officers is a defendant in this action.

6

action. Defendant does not inform the court whether state or federal law applies, does not cite to

the applicable statutes with specificity, does not address whether statutory tolling applies and

does not address whether equitable tolling applies. In short, defendant makes no discernable

argument. He has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that plaintiff filed the complaint

beyond the one year limitation period. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on this basis. The court now turns to the merits. 

V. Standards for Conditions of Confinement for Civil Detainees

As stated, plaintiff claims that defendant Frank violated his rights by giving law

enforcement officers4 approval to confiscate the air cast he wore on his ankle, thereby causing

plaintiff to suffer severe pain. Defendant Frank contends that plaintiff cannot adduce evidence

to prove acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs under either Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment standards. Defs.’

Mot. for Summ. J., at 8-9. The court concludes that Fourteenth Amendment not Eighth

Amendment standards apply, and that under these standards plaintiff has not produced sufficient

evidence to demonstrate a genuine dispute for trial as to defendant Frank’s actions.

A person confined pursuant to California’s SVPA is civilly committed based on a

concern that past convictions for sexually violent offenses and a diagnosed mental disorder

makes it likely that the person will engage in sexually violent behavior in the future. Cal. Welf.

& Inst. Code §§ 6600 et seq. (West 1998). “Persons who have been involuntarily committed

[pursuant to civil process] are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of

confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” 

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 305, 321-22 (1982). Civil detainees retain greater liberty

protections than individuals detained under criminal process. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-24. 

////

Case 2:02-cv-02023-LKK -EFB Document 92 Filed 08/31/07 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “At a bare minimum, then, an individual detained under civil

process - like an individual accused but not convicted of a crime - cannot be subjected to

conditions that “‘amount to punishment.’” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004). 

On its face, the Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. Am.

VIII. Eighth Amendment standards provide insufficient protection “for those whom the state

cannot punish.” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 636, 696 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Jones, 393 F.3d

at 931-34. The Eighth Amendment does not apply to challenges to the adequacy of medical care

brought by persons confined pursuant to civil statutes that are not punitive. Thus, to prevail on

his claim, plaintiff need not prove deliberate indifference. Jones, 393 F.3d at 934. 

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, conditions of confinement are subject to a rebuttal

presumption that they are punitive if they are “identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than

those under which pretrial criminal detainees are held, or where the individual is detained under

conditions more restrictive than those he or she would face upon commitment.” Jones, 393 F.3d

at 934. The question is whether the conditions are “punitive,” i.e., they are intended to punish or

are “excessive in relation to [a] non-punitive purpose.” Id. (quotation marks and citation

omitted). Under this standard, a court must consider whether the purpose to be served could

have been served with “alternative and less harsh methods.” Id. (citation omitted). The

presumption may be rebutted by a showing of “legitimate, non-punitive interests justifying the

conditions” to which the detainee was subjected, and a showing that the restrictions or conditions

were not “excessive” in relation to those interests. Id.

To resolve defendant’s motion, the court must determine whether there is a material

dispute about whether defendant Frank’s action was “punitive” in that his giving approval to law

enforcement staff to remove the air cast was excessive in relation to some “legitimate, nonpunitive interest.” Plaintiff asserts that defendant merely subjugated any exercise of medical

judgment to whatever orders he received from law enforcement officers. Pl.’s Dep., at 79-80. 

////

Case 2:02-cv-02023-LKK -EFB Document 92 Filed 08/31/07 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

Defendant Frank asserts that he gave his approval in the interest of plaintiff’s health. It is

undisputed that on June 20, 2001, Dr. Belanger prescribed the use of the air cast for seven days. 

It also is undisputed that, at least for a minor sprain, use of an air cast for more than three weeks

ordinarily is contraindicated. More than three weeks had passed when defendant approved the

confiscation. While defendant Frank, a physician’s assistant, does not dispute plaintiff’s

assertion that he did not examine plaintiff before approving the confiscation, plaintiff does not

adduce any evidence that examination was necessary in light of the expired prescription and the

length of time he had been using the air cast. Dr. Belanger, not the assistant Frank, prescribed

the use of the air cast for seven days. Moreover, the evidence corroborates Franks’assertion that

plaintiff’s health, not some other purpose, motivated the approval that the air cast be removed. 

Dr. Belanger testified in his deposition that using an air cast for too long can cause weakening of

the muscles that support the ankle and for that reason prolonged use is contraindicated.

Whether there were less confrontational means to remove the air cast appears to be a

question to be resolved at trial regarding the officers who actually removed it. Those officers,

not Frank, applied whatever force was used and is challenged by plaintiff. But this motion

addressed the decision by Frank that the air cast should be removed. Plaintiff criticizes the

decision and argues that it was poor judgment. However, the evidence presented in opposition to

this motion fails to demonstrate in any way that Frank approved the removal for any punitive

purpose or was motivated by any other concern than the fact that the prescription was for one

week, plaintiff had used it for several weeks beyond the prescription ,and its prolonged use

weakens surrounding muscle tissue and makes the condition worse. That hardly shows Frank’s

decision was “punitive,” i.e., intended to punish or was “excessive in relation to [a] non-punitive

purpose.” Jones, 393 F.3d at 934. Where, as here, “ the nonmoving party will bear the burden

of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and that party fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate.” California Arch. Bldg. Prod., 818 F.2d at 1468 (citing 

Case 2:02-cv-02023-LKK -EFB Document 92 Filed 08/31/07 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317).

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendant Steve Frank’s August 16,

2006, motion for summary judgment be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 31, 2007.

Case 2:02-cv-02023-LKK -EFB Document 92 Filed 08/31/07 Page 9 of 9