Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02307/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02307-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLEN VIERRA,

Plaintiff,

 v

MICHAEL J ASTRUE, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

 

No C 05-02307 VRW

 ORDER

Plaintiff Glen Vierra appeals from a determination by the

Social Security Administration (SSA) that he is not disabled and

accordingly not entitled to social security disability benefits. 

The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff in the alternative seeks remand. The court now GRANTS

defendant Michael J Astrue’s motion and DENIES plaintiff’s motions.

I

A

Plaintiff was honorably discharged from the military in

1975 then worked as a shipbuilder and welder until late 2002. AR

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72, 83, 173. Plaintiff injured his back while working in 1989 and

thereafter began to suffer panic attacks. AR 62, 172. Whether

this injury caused plaintiff to miss work for any length of time is

unclear from the record, although he visited both

acupuncturist/chiropractor Dr Dennis L Greenlee for his back (AR

74) and psychiatrist Dr Frederick Whipple for his panic attacks

until 1990. AR 73, 172. Plaintiff hired counsel in pursuit of his

worker’s compensation claims for these injuries in 1991. AR 75. 

There is no indication that plaintiff sought any treatment for his

back after 1990 despite injuring it again in 2000. AR 62. 

In 1997, plaintiff was diagnosed with hepatitis C during

a life insurance evaluation and underwent a liver biopsy, the

results of which are not included in the record. AR 169, 176. 

Plaintiff claims that during the ensuing years the hepatitis C made

him so ill that he was “just dragging [him]self to work, and just

barely making it [sic].” AR 211.

In February 2002, plaintiff’s regular physician, Dr Bruce

N Tucker, ordered both lab tests and an abdominal ultrasound scan. 

AR 138, 165-66. Lab tests showed elevated aspartate and alanine

aminotransferase levels but normal albumin and bilirubin levels

(symptoms consistent with hepatitis C), as well as an elevated alpha

feto protein level, sometimes a symptom of primary liver cancer. AR

165-66; Mark H Beers, MD, ed, The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and

Therapy, 18th ed (Merck Research Laboratories, 2006), Hepatic and

Biliary Disorders at “Chronic Hepatitis” and “Primary Liver Cancer,”

online at http://www.merck.com/mmpe/sec03.html (visited March 22,

2007). Plaintiff’s abdominal ultrasound scan, 

//

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used to detect structural abnormalities such as tumors, was

“unremarkable.” AR 138; Beers, Merck Manual at “Imaging Tests.” 

Around March 2002, plaintiff was referred to Dr Roy

Musick, a gastroenterologist. AR 132, 161. Dr Musick ordered a

liver biopsy which showed “chronic hepatitis,” “2+ stainable iron”

and no evidence of malignancy. AR 135. Lab tests showed hepatitis

C in copies/ml (the viral titer) at 1,060,180. AR 162.

In July 2002, Dr Musick ordered an abdominal computed

tomograhy (CT) scan, used to detect tumors, ascites and diffuse

disorders such as iron overload. AR 131; Beers, Merck Manual at

“Imaging Tests.” Plaintiff’s liver appeared “normal.” AR 131.

Dr Musick began to treat plaintiff’s hepatitis C with

pegalated interferon and ribavirin in late October 2002. AR 130-32. 

Plaintiff reported that he stopped working shortly thereafter due to

the side effects of the treatment (AR 71) which included: feeling

ill for two to three days after each injection (AR 214); seeing

double while welding (AR 130); difficulty concentrating; difficulty

driving; weakness; and pain. AR 210. Plaintiff also complained of

fatigue, but by September and October 2003, plaintiff reported

“slightly less fatigue,” and “feeling well [with] more energy.” AR

122-29. 

Plaintiff, however, did not return to work upon completion

of the treatment because “the virus came back.” AR 215. Beginning

in November 2003, plaintiff’s viral titer steadily increased,

reaching 4,160,000 by April 2004. AR 141, 201. 

During the course of the treatment, Dr Musick noted in his

file that plaintiff might have an iron storage disorder and referred

him to Dr Thomas S Stanton, oncologist and hemotologist. AR 125,

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169. Although Dr Stanton concluded that plaintiff suffered from

“hyperferritinemia,” he explained that it was likely due to the

liver disease but that the liver biopsy results were most accurate,

and plaintiff’s were “normal.” AR 170. Dr Stanton did not

recommend treatment. Id. 

Plaintiff saw Dr David A Charp, his family doctor, from

January 2003 to early August 2004. AR 199-200. What can be

deciphered of Dr Charp’s notes mostly reflect plaintiff’s subjective

complaints of lower back pain, his hepatitis C treatment and viral

load and the progress of his application for Social Security

disability benefits. Id. There is no indication in the record that

Dr Charp treated plaintiff for these complaints.

In August 2004, Dr Musick provided a letter to SSA 

stating that plaintiff’s viral titer indicated that he was a “nonresponder” to the interferon treatment whose “major symptoms are

fatigue and low back pain” and that he was disabled. AR 201. Dr

Musick noted having referred plaintiff to the University of

California Hepatology Program but there are no records from that

facility in the record. Id.

B

On August 28, 2003, plaintiff applied to the SSA for

disability benefits alleging inability to work due to chronic

hepatitis C and a herniated disk. AR 13, 71. Plaintiff wrote that

he could no longer “work hard,” was slower, needed more rest and was

“weak, sick, and in pain.” AR 71, 82. 

Plaintiff nonetheless reported performing numerous daily

activities including: dressing, bathing and cooking except that

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“[he] start[ed] the morning with dry bread and water to get the

strength to cook”; walking up to one mile two to three days per week

which made him “feel better”; lifting things around the house;

performing housework such as vacuuming and dishes; driving; working

in the yard; and walking the dog. AR 80-81. Plaintiff admitted,

“if I can get enough rest [and] good diet good food I do ok [sic].” 

AR 80. Plaintiff listed interferon as his only medication, although

Dr Musick’s notes refer to plaintiff’s use of medical marijuana,

both prescribed and “street purchased,” as early as July 8, 2003. 

AR 82, 124. 

Because plaintiff reported a history of panic attacks, SSA

sent him to psychiatrist Dr Emily Toch for a comprehensive

evaluation on December 18, 2003. AR 172. Dr Toch’s report listed

plaintiff’s complaints, including dizziness, difficulty

concentrating and some depression and anxiety, but also noted

plaintiff’s broad range of activities, such as watching television,

exercising, playing sports, doing volunteer work delivering

groceries and reading. AR 172-73. Dr Toch diagnosed a depressive

disorder but concluded that the “claimant is fully functional” and

assessed a score of 65 for plaintiff on the Global Assessment of

Functioning Scale, which corresponds to generally good functioning. 

AR 175, American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed, (Washington DC, American

Psychiatric Association, 2000), 34.

The SSA also sent plaintiff to Dr Benjamin Fritz for a

comprehensive internal medicine examination, conducted on January

22, 2004. AR 176. Dr Fritz noted that he had no records to review

but took down a detailed verbal history from plaintiff, who

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mentioned his depressive symptoms, dizziness and arthritis —— all of

which he attributed to his hepatitis C and related treatment. Id. 

Dr Fritz concluded that plaintiff could stand and walk for an

unrestricted period during an eight-hour day, lift or carry twenty

pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, might need to limit

bending, stooping or crouching due to his balance difficulties, but

was subject to no other workplace limitations. AR 179. 

On February 22, 2004, based on the consultative examiners’

reports, the SSA rejected plaintiff’s application. AR 22. Soon

after, plaintiff requested reconsideration and filed a notice of

appointment of representative, attorney Candace C Davenport. AR 33,

34, 100. 

Plaintiff’s request alleged nothing new about his

condition except that the “virus is back in my blood” and that he

was experiencing more pain and resting more. AR 100, 104. On April

13, 2004, having reviewed new reports from Drs Charp and Musick per

plaintiff’s request, the SSA again rejected plaintiff’s application. 

AR 28. Plaintiff then filed a request for a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). AR 35. 

On forms plaintiff completed in April and May of 2004, he

noted no change in his daily activities and acknowledged that he

could “take care of [him]self” and used medical marijuana for his

ailments. AR 93, 97, 109. Plaintiff claimed, however, that his

condition had changed because of a “bad” blood test administered in

April 2004. AR 96, 107. Plaintiff may have been referring to a

blood test noted in Dr Musick’s letter, referred to supra, which

showed a significantly higher viral titer. AR 201. 

//

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In May 2004, the SSA requested from plaintiff’s

representative additional evidence for the ALJ’s consideration,

offering assistance if needed. AR 36. In July 2004, plaintiff

appointed attorney Patrick Kelly as his representative, who obtained

Dr Charp’s clinical notes and Dr Musick’s letter. AR 41, 198-201.

The hearing before the ALJ took place on October 28, 2004. 

Plaintiff described his medical and employment history, AR 207-28,

then testified that prior to November 2002, when he stopped working,

he had lacked energy due to the hepatitis C. AR 208-09, 211. 

Plaintiff described the debilitating side effects of the interferon,

saying he thought “it was going to kill me.” AR 214-15. Plaintiff

reported that the increase in his viral titer caused him weakness,

difficulty concentrating, fatigue and a need for “constant

nourishment.” AR 217. Plaintiff also reported flu-like symptoms

related to his iron storage problems and enfeebling pain from his

disk disease. AR 218-20. Plaintiff testified that “my liver

prevents me from taking a lot * * * of pain medication,” but that

medical marijuana made it possible for him to eat, rest and “calm

down.” Id. Finally, plaintiff testified that “UCSF” had

recommended another liver biopsy to ascertain the degree of

degeneration in his condition. AR 216.

Plaintiff testified that he did volunteer work on

Friday afternoons for over two hours delivering groceries, adding

“[i]t makes me feel better.” AR 221. Plaintiff testified that

he otherwise rested, watched TV, used the internet for half-hour

periods, visited the library, read newspapers and walked. AR

221-22.

\\

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The Vocational Expert (VE) analyzed plaintiff’s work

history then answered the following hypothetical question:

Let’s assume we have an individual of

[plaintiff’s] age, vocational and educational

background. Let’s assume he can perform at the

light level of exertion with the following

limitations: he should be limited to occasional

bending, stooping, or crouching and * * * simple

repetitive work * * * . It does not require a

great amount of concentration. Would there be

any job in the regional or national economy such

a person could perform?

AR 224. The VE responded with three possible vocations: (1)

cashier II, with a specific vocational preparation (SVP) level of 2,

of which there were 3,500,000 in the national economy and 144,000 in

California; (2) counter rental clerk, with an SVP level of 3, of

which there were 450,000 nationally and 59,000 in California; and

(3) office helper, with an SVP level of 2, of which there were

150,000 nationally and 25,000 in California. AR 225-26. 

The ALJ found that plaintiff’s impairments were “severe”

within the meaning of the regulations but that he retained the

residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work modified to

accommodate his postural and concentration limitations. AR 15, 18. 

The ALJ relied on the consultative examiners’ conclusions and

plaintiff’s testimony regarding his daily activities. AR 15-16. 

The ALJ gave no weight to Dr Musick’s conclusion that

plaintiff is disabled, noting that “disability” is a finding

reserved to the SSA and Dr Musick’s definition of “disability” was

unclear. AR 16. The ALJ noted that Dr Musick cited no grounds for

his conclusion except symptoms that were neither quantified nor

related to functional limitations and included pain in plaintiff’s

back which Dr Musick had not examined. Id. Finally, the ALJ noted

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the inconsistency between Dr Musick’s opinion and Dr Fritz’s

conclusion that plaintiff could perform light work. Id. 

The ALJ determined that plaintiff was unable to perform

his past relevant work and was limited to light work. He also

determined that plaintiff’s allegations of complete disability were

“not fully credible when viewed in light of the entirety of the

evidence of record.” Id. The ALJ emphasized and underscored

plaintiff’s numerous daily activities, his lack of side effects from

medications and his failure to seek treatment for his back pain. 

Id. Finally, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was “capable of

making a successful adjustment to work that exists in significant

numbers in the national economy” and was not disabled as defined by

20 CFR § 404.1520(g). AR 17. 

In January 2005, plaintiff sought review by the SSA

Appeals Council. AR 9. In a handwritten letter, plaintiff asserted

that his hepatitis C would result in his death and caused him

confusion and weakness which prevented him from working or living

independently, saying, “I have to make myself eat and I make myself

walk to try to stay strong enough to keep living! [sic].” AR 204. 

He claimed that he sought no treatment for his back because he had

exhausted all treatment options and reported that the “UCSF liver

clinic” had told him he needed a new liver and another liver biopsy

to determine the extent of liver damage. Id. As noted earlier, the

record contains no documentation of any visits to this facility.

The Appeals Council denied the request for review. AR 5-

7. Plaintiff then filed the instant action seeking judicial review.

\\

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II

The court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining whether

the SSA’s denial of benefits is supported by substantial evidence in

the administrative record. 42 USC § 405(g). A district court may

overturn a decision to deny benefits only if the decision is not

supported by substantial evidence or if the decision is based on

legal error. See Andrews v Shalala, 53 F3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir

1995); Magallanes v Bowen, 881 F2d 747, 750 (9th Cir 1989). The

Ninth Circuit defines “substantial evidence” as “more than a mere

scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Andrews, 53 F3d at 1039. Determinations of

credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical testimony and all

other ambiguities are to be resolved by the ALJ. See id;

Magallanes, 881 F2d at 750. 

III

A

“Disabled” is defined as “unable to do any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months.” 20 CFR § 404.1527. 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled and entitled

to benefits, the SSA conducts a five-step sequential inquiry. 20

CFR § 404.1520; 20 CFR § 416.920. Under the first step, the ALJ

considers whether the claimant is currently employed in substantial

gainful activity. If not, the second step examines whether the

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claimant has a “severe impairment” that significantly affects his or

her ability to conduct basic work activities. In step three, the

ALJ determines whether the claimant has a condition which “meets” or

“equals” the conditions outlined in the Listing of Impairments in 20

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 CFR § 404.1520. If the

claimant does not have such a condition, step four asks whether the

claimant can perform her past relevant work. If not, in step five,

the ALJ considers whether the claimant has the ability to perform

other work which exists in substantial numbers in the national

economy. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(b)-(f); §§ 404.920(b)-(f). 

A claimant may be found “not disabled” at any step in the

five-step evaluation process; a claimant may be found “disabled”

only at steps three or five. 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(4), 20 CFR §

416.920(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one

through four. Bustamante v Massanari, 262 F3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir

2001) (citing Tackett v Apfel, 180 F3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir 1999)). 

At step five, the burden of proof shifts to the SSA. Id; see also

Brown v Apfel, 192 F3d 493 (5th Cir 1999) (“This shifting of the

burden of proof [] is neither statutory nor regulatory, but instead,

originates from judicial practices.”). If a plaintiff reaches step

five, the SSA has the burden of proving that there are jobs in the

national economy that plaintiff can perform. Oyen v Shalala, 865 F

Supp 497, 504 (D Ill 1994).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled the SSA must

consider all symptoms, such as pain and fatigue. 20 CFR

404.1529(a). Once plaintiff has established a medically

determinable impairment that could reasonably produce the asserted

symptoms “the adjudicator may not discredit the claimant’s

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allegations of the severity of pain solely on the ground that the

allegations are unsupported by objective medical evidence.” Bunnel

v Sullivan, 947 F2d 341, 343 (9th Cir 1991); 20 CFR 404.1529(b-c). 

But the adjudicator may make specific findings supporting a

conclusion that the claimant’s allegations of the severity of

symptoms are not credible and discount the allegations accordingly. 

Id at 345. Examples of such specific findings include evidence that

the claimant engages in daily activities transferrable to the

workplace, unexplained failure to seek treatment and ordinary

techniques of credibility evaluation. 20 CFR 404.1529(c)(3); SSR

96-7; see also Burch v Barnhart, 400 F3d 676, 680 (9th Cir 2005). 

The SSA distinguishes among the opinions of treating

physicians and non-treating examining physicians. 20 CFR

404.1527(d). As a general rule, more weight should be given to the

opinion of a treating source than a non-treating one. Id. If a

treating physician’s opinion differs with that of a non-treating

examining physician “it is then solely the province of the ALJ to

resolve the conflict.” Andrews 53 F3d at 1041 (citing Magallanes,

881 F2d at 751). The ALJ must, however, provide “specific and

legitimate reasons” for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion. 

Murray v Heckler, 722 F2d 499, 502 (9th Cir 1983). 

The SSA will re-contact medical sources or provide

consultative examinations when the medical evidence provided by a

treating physician is insufficient to support a determination. 20

CFR 416.912(e). “[T]he ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly

develop the record.” Smolen v Chater, 80 F3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir

1996). 

//

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Under the regulations, the opinion that a claimant is

disabled is deemed not a “medical opinion” but, as the ultimate

issue, is reserved to the SSA. 20 CFR 416.927(e). When a physician

opines that a claimant is disabled, the SSA will review all of the

evidence that supports that statement will independently determine

whether the claimant is disabled. Id. It is the SSA’s policy to

make every reasonable effort to re-contact the physician for

clarification if the bases of such an opinion are unknown to the

ALJ. SSR 96-5.

At step five, the SSA may use either the Medical

Vocational Guidelines at 20 CFR Part 404 Subpart P Appendix 2, the

services of a VE or the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to

determine whether jobs that the claimant can perform exist in the

national economy in substantial numbers. Osenbrock v Apfel, 240 F3d

1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir 2001) (citations omitted); see also 20 CFR

404.1566(d-e). But when the claimant has significant non-exertional

impairments, such as pain, fatigue or difficulty concentrating, the

ALJ cannot rely on the guidelines. Osenbrock 240 F3d at 1162-63. 

When there is a conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT the

ALJ may rely on the VE’s testimony only if the record contains

persuasive evidence to support the deviation. Johnson v Shalala, 60

F3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir 1995)

B

In support of his motion plaintiff contends that: (1)

substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that

plaintiff’s alleged limitations are not fully credible; (2) the ALJ

erred by not developing the record fully and by giving credence to

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Dr Fritz’s opinion over Dr Musick’s; and (3) the SSA failed to carry

its burden in step five of the evaluation because the hypothetical

posed to the VE was inadequate and the vocations proffered by the VE

had reasoning levels outside plaintiff’s capacity. The court

disagrees with each of these contentions.

1

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s evaluation of

plaintiff’s credibility is not supported by substantial evidence. 

Doc #30 at 7-13. The court disagrees.

The ALJ documented numerous reasons for determining that

plaintiff was not credible, such as the evidence that plaintiff: 

lived independently; reported no disabling side effects from

medications; did housework and yard work; did volunteer work

delivering food; and took walks and went to the library. AR 15-16. 

The ALJ also allowed for many of plaintiff’s subjective complaints

in the RFC. AR 16. 

Plaintiff asserts numerous alternative readings of each

asserted piece of evidence relied on by the ALJ in his credibility

determination. Doc #30 at 9-10. But when, as here, the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court must

uphold the ALJ’s decision. Andrews, 53 F3d at 1039-40. Thus,

plaintiff’s alternative interpretations of the evidence are

irrelevant.

 Plaintiff points to no additional evidence in the record

that would counter-weigh that cited by the ALJ. The court,

moreover, has carefully examined the record and found none. 

Plaintiff suggests that the record contains “strong” objective

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medical evidence of fatigue and pain, but the record only contains

plaintiff’s subjective complaints to his doctors and his own

testimony. AR 82, 125-28, 217. The ALJ may consider a claimant’s

lack of credibility when evaluating a physician’s opinion based on

the claimant’s own reports of his symptoms. Andrews, 53 F3d at

1043. The ALJ properly discredited plaintiff’s reports of his

symptoms and, accordingly, was not required to accept medical

opinions based on those reports. 

Plaintiff points out that the ALJ disregarded evidence of

detrimental side effects from interferon; plaintiff’s treatment,

however, ceased in October 2003 along with any side effects.

Plaintiff further asserts that the ALJ erred by inserting

his own observations of plaintiff at the hearing in the credibility

determination. Doc #30 at 11-12. Plaintiff relies on Perminter v

Heckler, 765 F2d 870, 872 (9th Cir 1985). Perminter is inapposite

here because the ALJ’s observations in that case were the sole basis

for the credibility determination. Nothing in Perminter prevents

the ALJ from relying on observations in addition to other

substantial evidence in assessing plaintiff’s credibility. Contrary

to plaintiff’s position, “[t]he inclusion of the ALJ’s personal

observations does not render the decision improper.” Nyman v

Heckler, 779 F2d 528, 531 (9th Cir 1985). Accordingly, it was not

error for the ALJ to note that plaintiff “exhibited no stress during

the 30 minute hearing” where other substantial evidence supported

the credibility assessment. AR 16.

//

//

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2

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ had a duty to ascertain the

bases for Dr Musick’s opinion before rejecting it. Doc #30 at 14-

16. Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ applied the wrong legal

standard for rejecting a treating physician’s opinion and that Dr

Fritz’s opinion did not constitute substantial evidence to support

the determination that plaintiff was not disabled. Id at 16-18. 

Citing SSR 96-5, plaintiff argues that the ALJ “did not

know how Dr Musick came to his conclusion” and was therefore

required to supplement the record by re-contacting Dr Musick for

clarification. The court reads the ALJ’s opinion differently. The

ALJ noted that “Dr Musick provides no grounds for his opinion except

to cite the claimant’s diagnosis of hepatitis C and his symptoms of

fatigue and chronic back pain,” (AR 16) —— that is, Dr Musick

neither related the bases for his opinion to functional limitations,

nor defined his understanding of the term “disabled.” Id. Here,

the administrative record already contained copies of all the

records of plaintiff’s treating relationship with Dr Musick. The

ALJ, simply put, found no support for Dr Musick’s conclusion in the

bases he relied on. “The ALJ need not accept a treating physician’s

opinion which is brief and conclusionary in form with little in the

way of clinical findings to support its conclusion” and may consider

plaintiff’s lack of credibility in assessing an opinion based on

plaintiff’s claims. Magallanes, 881 F2d at 751; Andrews, 53 F3d at

1040. Dr Musick’s opinion was brief and conclusory and relied on

plaintiff’s subjective complaints of fatigue and pain. AR 16. And,

though more weight is given to the opinion of a specialist on issues

related to his or her area of specialty, Dr Musick’s cited bases are

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not within his area of specialty. Andrews, 53 F3d at 1042 n 4

(citing 20 CFR 416.927(d)(5)). 

Moreover, the SSA made numerous efforts to help plaintiff,

was represented by counsel, develop the medical evidence. The SSA

sent letters to plaintiff’s identified medical sources, obtained

comprehensive medical and psychological examinations and offered to

help obtain evidence. AR 36-37, 112-21, 172-84. Additionally,

plaintiff’s counsel obtained supplemental reports from Drs Charp and

Musick later in the proceeding. AR 198, 201.

Although the duty to develop the record fully exists

whether or not a plaintiff is represented by counsel, the facts of

this case are not comparable to cases in which the Ninth Circuit has

found that the ALJ failed in his or her duty to develop the record

fully. See, e g, Celaya v Halter, 332 F3d 1177 (9th Cir 2003)(ALJ

erred by not developing medical record when illiterate and

unrepresented claimant may not have known that she could assert

obesity as partial basis of her disability); Higbee v Sullivan, 975

F2d 558 (9th Cir 1992)(ALJ had a duty to develop record when

unrepresented and mentally ill claimant’s testimony was sole basis

for decision); Smolen v Chater, 80 F3d 1273 (9th Cir 1996)(ALJ erred

in rejecting physician’s opinion for failure to list bases of

opinion when the opinion was uncontroverted and corroborated). 

Here, plaintiff was represented by counsel, was offered help by the

SSA in obtaining medical evidence, underwent consultative exams, and

claimed no mental impairment that would prevent his understanding of

the proceedings.

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Finally, the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr

Fritz, could properly serve as substantial evidence (Andrews, 53 F3d

at 1041) if based on independent clinical findings, as it was. See

Magallanes, 881 F2d at 751. Whether Dr Fritz asked the patient

about fatigue is irrelevant since the ALJ could reject any portion

of Dr Fritz’s report that was based on plaintiff’s subjective

complaints, having already properly discredited them.

3

Turning to plaintiff’s challenges to step five, in which

the SSA must demonstrate the existence of other work which a

claimant can perform, plaintiff asserts that: (1) the hypothetical

question was faulty because it excluded plaintiff’s subjective

complaints; (2) he is incapable of performing the semi-skilled job

of counter rental clerk offered by the VE; and (3) the reasoning

levels listed in the DOT for the jobs identified by the VE are

incompatible with his concentration limitation. Doc #30 at 18-23. 

Plaintiff also points out that the VE gave the wrong call number for

the cashier II vocation during the hearing; this, however, was

harmless error, since the VE used the correct job title and the ALJ

referred to the correct vocation in his decision. Id at 21. 

The ALJ’s hypothetical was sufficiently complete. AR 224. 

An ALJ may limit evidence included in a hypothetical, particularly

properly-rejected allegations of subjective symptoms, as long as the

assumed facts are supported by the record. Magallanes, 881 F2d at

756; See also, Rollins v Massanari, 261 F3d 853, 857 (9th Cir 2001). 

Here, the VE was asked to identify “simple and repetitive” work

which accounts for some, but not all, of plaintiff’s subjective

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complaints. AR 224. The ALJ was not required to include

discredited complaints of pain and fatigue in the hypothetical. 

Plaintiff correctly asserts that the counter rental clerk

vocation is not properly included in the ALJ’s finding. Because the

ALJ found that the skills from plaintiff’s prior job were not

transferable, only “unskilled” jobs, listed in the DOT as SVP 1 or

2, would be suitable. AR 17; Terry v Sullivan, 903 F2d 1273, 1276-

77 (9th Cir 1990); 20 CFR 404.1568; SSR 00-4. The counter rental

clerk job corresponds to an SVP of 3. Dictionary of Occupational

Titles, 4th Ed, revised 1991, s v 279.357-054. The error is

harmless, however, because the VE identified two other jobs that

exist in significant numbers that plaintiff can perform. See Barker

v Secretary of Health and Human Services, 882 F2d 1474, 1479 (9th

Cir 1989)(holding that 1,266 jobs constitutes a significant number). 

“A decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are

harmless.” Burch, 400 F3d at 679. 

Plaintiff claims that the cashier II and office helper

jobs identified by the VE do not account for the concentration

requirement included in the hypothetical question. In support,

plaintiff refers to the “reasoning levels” specified in the DOT

which describe each vocation’s requirement for understanding and

carrying out different forms of instructions and dealing with

problems with different amounts of concrete variables. See

Dictionary of Occupational Titles, s v 211.462-010 and 239.567-010. 

It is the SSA’s policy that the testimony of a VE should

be consistent with the information contained in the DOT but can

include information not listed in the DOT. SSR 00-4. The VE’s

description of the proffered jobs as “simple and repetitive” does

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not necessarily conflict with the reasoning levels listed in the

DOT; these do not refer specifically to concentration or a worker’s

ability to focus but to a standard definition of reasoning: “the

process by which one judgement is deduced from another or others

which are given.” The Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2d ed, s v

“reasoning,” online at http://dictionary.oed.com (visited March 19,

2007). Although there may be some correlation between concentration

and reasoning, the reasoning levels listed in the DOT do not control

the concentration limitation specified in the hypothetical question. 

The ALJ was precluded from applying the guidelines due to

plaintiff’s non-exertional impairments yet concentration

requirements are not listed in the DOT. Tackett, 180 F3d at 1101. 

Thus, the ALJ was correct to rely on the VE to determine which jobs

could accommodate plaintiff’s non-exertional impairments, such as

his concentration limitation. Even if the reasoning level 3 job,

cashier II, were excluded, moreover, the ALJ’s disposition would

still stand since the level 2 office helper job would remain an

option. See Barker, 882 F2d at 1479. 

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IV

The ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence

in the record as a whole and was based on correct legal principles. 

For the foregoing reasons, the court affirms the ALJ’s decision to

deny benefits. Accordingly, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment (Doc #27) and GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary

judgment (Doc #25).

The clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the

defendant and against plaintiff and to terminate all pending

motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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