Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_19-cv-00096/USCOURTS-ared-5_19-cv-00096-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

EDDY STANLEY HARRIS, JR., PLAINTIFF 

ADC #132946 

V. 5:19CV00096-JM-JTK 

 

DEMARCUS DAVIS, et al. DEFENDANTS 

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United States District Judge 

James M. Moody, Jr. Any party may serve and file written objections to this recommendation. 

Objections should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis for the objection. If 

the objection is to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that supports 

your objection. An original and one copy of your objections must be received in the office of the 

United States District Court Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings 

and recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party. Failure to file timely 

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 

If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new, different, or 

additional evidence, and to have a hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at 

the same time that you file your written objections, include the following: 

1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is inadequate. 

2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing before the District Judge (if such a 

hearing is granted) was not offered at the hearing before the Magistrate Judge. 

 

3. The detail of any testimony desired to be introduced at the hearing before the 

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District judge in the form of an offer of proof, and a copy, or the original, of any documentary or 

other non-testimonial evidence desired to be introduced at the hearing before the District Judge. 

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional 

evidentiary hearing, either before the Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge. 

Mail your objections and AStatement of Necessity@ to: 

Clerk, United States District Court 

Eastern District of Arkansas 

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149 

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325 

 DISPOSITION 

I. Introduction 

Plaintiff Eddy Harris is a state inmate incarcerated at the Maximum Security Unit of the 

Arkansas Division of Correction (ADC). He filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. ' 1983, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA). (Doc. No. 2) Plaintiff’s ADA claim was dismissed on April 4, 2019. (Doc. 

No. 6) 

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief in Support 

and Statement of Facts filed by Defendants LeMarcus Davis,1 Keith Taylor, and Lakita Patterson. 

(Doc. Nos. 23-25). Plaintiff filed a Response, Brief, and Statement of Facts (Doc. Nos. 30-32). 

II. Claims 

 Plaintiff alleged that he broke his leg while playing basketball at the Unit on July 16, 2018 

and was placed in a cast and given crutches. (Doc. No. 2, p. 6) On September 26, 2018, Defendants 

 

1 Harris originally identified Davis as DeMarcus. (Doc. No. 2) 

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Taylor and Patterson escorted him by wheelchair to west isolation after Plaintiff was found guilty 

of failing a drug test. (Id., p. 7) Taylor told Plaintiff that Defendant Captain Davis said he could 

not keep his crutches while in the isolation cell, and Taylor and Patterson failed to take Plaintiff to 

the infirmary for a medical pre-lock up assessment. (Id.) After Plaintiff arrived at his cell, he asked 

Defendant Taylor to contact Defendant Davis so that Plaintiff could speak to him about the 

crutches. (Id.) Taylor called Davis and then left with Patterson and Plaintiff’s crutches. (Id., p. 8) 

When Davis arrived, he told Plaintiff he could not keep the crutches because they could be used 

as a weapon, and that Plaintiff could use the table and walls of his cell to aid his movement. (Id.) 

Davis then agreed with Plaintiff that there should be rails on the walls to aid his movement but 

told Plaintiff he did not have time to move him to an available handicap cell. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged 

that Defendants Patterson and Taylor violated his rights by failing to take him to the pre-lockup 

assessment in the infirmary, and he alleged that non-party nurses failed to respond to his requests 

for pain medication. (Id., p. 9) He also alleged Davis violated his rights when he refused to move 

him to an available handicap cell and when he refused to allow Plaintiff to keep his crutches in his 

cell. (Id., p. 11) 

III. Summary Judgment 

Pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. See Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1997). AThe moving party bears 

the initial burden of identifying >those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.=@ Webb v. Lawrence County, 144 F.3d 

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1131, 1134 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (other 

citations omitted)). AOnce the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot 

simply rest on mere denials or allegations in the pleadings; rather, the non-movant >must set forth 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.=@ Id. at 1135. Although the facts are 

viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Ain order to defeat a motion for summary 

judgment, the non-movant cannot simply create a factual dispute; rather, there must be a genuine 

dispute over those facts that could actually affect the outcome of the lawsuit.@ Id. 

A. Defendants’ Motion 

 Defendants state that Plaintiff cannot show that they acted with deliberate indifference to 

his serious medical needs, and ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them in their 

individual capacities, based on qualified immunity, which protects officials who act in an 

objectively reasonable manner.2

 It may shield a government official from liability when his or 

her conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

Qualified immunity is a question of law, not a question of fact. McClendon v. Story County 

Sheriff's Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 2005). Thus, issues concerning qualified immunity 

are appropriately resolved on summary judgment. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 

(1985) (the privilege is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an 

absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”). 

 To determine whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the courts generally 

consider two questions: (1) whether the facts alleged or shown, construed in the light most 

 

2 Plaintiff sued Defendants in their individual capacities only. (Doc. No. 2, p. 2) 

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favorable to the plaintiff, establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) whether 

that right was so clearly established that a reasonable official would have known that his or her 

actions were unlawful. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).3 Defendants are entitled 

to qualified immunity only if no reasonable fact finder could answer both questions in the 

affirmative. Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2009). 

 In support of their Motion, Defendants present their Declarations, together with Plaintiff’s 

deposition testimony. 

1) Defendant Davis 

 Davis stated that at the time of the incidents at issue he was employed as the acting security 

chief of the Unit and oversaw the security at the unit and participated in classification hearings. 

(Doc. No. 23-2, p. 2) He was aware that Plaintiff used crutches at the time, and discussed with 

Plaintiff prior to his disciplinary hearing the possibility that he could be placed on walking 

punitive, which would keep Plaintiff out of the punitive isolation area. (Id.) However, he told 

Plaintiff that the Deputy Warden would make the final decision about that, and the classification 

Committee assigned Plaintiff to a cell in the west isolation area. (Id.) 

 Davis spoke with Erica Jackson, the Director of Nursing, concerning whether Plaintiff 

needed to keep his crutches while in west isolation, and she advised him that he would not need 

them because he could maneuver the small area without them. (Id.) Davis also spoke with a 

classification officer about assigning Plaintiff to a handicap cell, but was told there were no cells 

 3

Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two 

prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances 

in the particular case at hand.” Nelson, 583 F.3d at 528 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 

236). 

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in the west isolation area with such accommodations or rails on the walls. (Id.) Davis was told that 

rails were removed because inmates took them off the walls and used them as weapons against 

correctional officers. (Id., pp. 2-3) Davis then instructed Defendants Taylor and Patterson to escort 

Plaintiff to the west isolation area and to take his crutches because they were not permitted because 

of security risks. (Id., p. 3) Davis explained all these things to Plaintiff. (Id.) 

 Davis also stated that general population inmates are permitted crutches because they must 

walk to the restroom, water fountain, and the chow hall, while Plaintiff’s cell in west isolation 

which measured approximately 6 foot by 10 foot, contained a toilet and sink right beside the bed. 

(Id., p. 4) Finally, Plaintiff could use the crutches when escorted to any activities outside his cell, 

and they were returned to him when he was removed from west isolation. (Id., pp. 3-4) 

2) Defendant Taylor 

 Taylor held the position of sergeant at the time of the incident. (Doc. No. 23-3, p. 1) 

Defendant Davis instructed him, together with Defendant Patterson, to escort Plaintiff to the west 

isolation cell and to take his crutches. (Id., p. 2) At Plaintiff’s request, Taylor called Davis to speak 

with Plaintiff about the crutches. (Id.) ADC policy provides that inmates segregated from general 

population should be evaluated by a health professional prior to placement in segregation. (Id.) 

Taylor stated that he did not refuse to take Plaintiff for his medical assessment, but rather forgot 

about it because Plaintiff was upset about not being able to keep his crutches. (Id.) Taylor also 

stated that Plaintiff did not say anything to him about the missed evaluation or that he needed his 

medication., and after they locked him in the cell, he and Patterson called the infirmary to tell them 

he had been moved to west isolation. (Id.) 

3) Defendant Patterson 

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Patterson was employed as a corporal at the time of the incident and escorted Plaintiff to 

the west isolation area in September 2018 pursuant to Defendant Davis’s instructions. (Doc. No. 

23-4, p. 1) Davis told her that Plaintiff could not keep his crutches and that the Director of Nursing 

stated that Plaintiff would not need the crutches. (Id.) Davis also instructed Patterson and Taylor 

to place the crutches in the control booth and to return them to Plaintiff whenever he was removed 

from his cell. (Id., p. 2) Patterson stated that she did not refuse to take Plaintiff for the pre-lock up 

medical assessment, and that Plaintiff did not say anything about needing his medication. (Id.) She 

also stated that she and Taylor notified the infirmary that Plaintiff had been moved to the west 

isolation area. (Id.) 

4) Plaintiff’s Deposition 

Plaintiff stated that he broke his leg, for the second time, in July 2018, and after he was 

treated at a local hospital he was housed in a one-man cell. (Doc. No. 23-1, pp. 13-15) He was 

provided crutches and a prescription for ibuprofen. (Id., p. 13) Prior to his disciplinary hearing in 

September 2018, Defendant Davis discussed with him the possibility of being placed on walking 

punitive because of his use of the crutches. (Id., p. 18) However, Defendants Taylor and 

Patterson took him to west isolation on September 26, 2018, and told him that Davis said he could 

not keep his crutches while there. (Id., p. 20) He became distraught thinking about being in 

isolation with no crutches and did not think to tell the officers to first take him to the infirmary. 

(Id., p. 22) After Defendants Taylor and Patterson helped him to his bed in the cell , they called 

Defendant Davis, who told him he could not keep the crutches because they could be used as a 

weapon but that he could have them when he came out of his cell for a shower. (Id., pp. 24, 26) 

Davis also told him that he could not move him to a handicap cell. (Id., p. 27) Plaintiff was 

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released back to general population eight days later. (Id., p. 34) Plaintiff admitted that the isolation 

cell contained a bed, toilet and sink and that food was delivered to him, but stated that it was cruel 

and unusual punishment for him to have to hop around on one leg for eight days without support. 

(Id., p. 34) He stated that as a result it took longer for his leg to heal and that when it did heal it 

was not “flush.” (Id., pp. 43-45) He stated that he was able to use the crutches through December, 

even after the cast was removed. (Id., p. 47) He also stated that Defendants Taylor and Patterson 

violated ADC policy when they failed to take him to the infirmary for a pre-lock up medical 

assessment, and admitted that they did not refuse to take him but just forgot. (Id., pp. 36-38) 

B. Plaintiff=s Response (Doc. No. 31) 

 Plaintiff denies that Davis told him he spoke with the Director of Nursing or the 

classification officer and claims that Davis fabricated these facts. (Doc. No. 31) Plaintiff claims 

he was never evaluated or seen by the Director of Nursing concerning his injury. Finally, he states 

that Defendants Taylor and Patterson disregarded his serious medical need when they failed to 

abide by ADC policy and take him for a pre-lock up medical assessment. He told Davis at the time 

that he was violating his rights by not placing him in a handicap cell and that his incarceration 

placed him in danger of serious harm. (Id.) 

C. Analysis 

In order to support a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, Plaintiff must prove that 

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Plaintiff must show that he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a 

substantial risk of serious harm,” and that defendants “acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of 

mind.’” Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 642 (8th Cir. 2017 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.) Yet, 

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mere negligence or inadvertence is not sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Kulkay, 847 

F.3d at 642. In addition, an inmate who complains that a delay in medical treatment constitutes a 

constitutional violation must provide Averifying medical evidence@ in the record to establish the 

detrimental effect of the delay, in order to succeed on his claim. Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 

1326 (8th Cir. 1995) (overruled in part on other grounds). 

In this case, Plaintiff provides no proof that the failure of Defendants Patterson and 

Taylor to take him for a pre-lockup assessment constituted deliberate indifference to his serious 

medical needs. He does not allege that he complained to them that he needed his medication, 

and he admitted in his deposition that they all “forgot.” Plaintiff also does not dispute 

Defendants’ statements that after they placed him in the isolation cell, they notified medical 

personnel. Finally, the failure to follow an ADC policy does not support a constitutional claim 

for relief. “[T]he mere violation of a state law or rule does not constitute a federal due process 

violation.” Williams v. Nix, 1 F.3d 712, 717 (8th Cir. 1992). 

The Court also finds that no reasonable fact finder could find that the facts alleged or shown 

by Plaintiff, construed in the light most favorable to him, established a violation of a constitutional 

or statutory right by Defendant Davis. While Plaintiff disputes that Davis told him he consulted 

with the Director of Nursing and the classification committee, he does not dispute that Davis 

actually did inquire as to the need for crutches or the availability of a handicap cell. Plaintiff also 

does not dispute that Defendant Davis did not make the decision to house Plaintiff in the west 

isolation cell (as opposed to placing him on walking punitive), or that ADC policy prohibits the 

use of crutches in those cells for security reasons. Although the Court questions the safety of 

placing an inmate with a leg cast into a cell without crutches, the Court finds that Davis’s failure 

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to permit the crutches was not sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. In addition, Plaintiff 

provided no verifying medical evidence to show that the placement resulted in a detrimental effect 

on the healing of his leg. See Beyerbach, 49 F.3d at 1326. 

Defendants provided to the Court two non-Eighth Circuit cases which dealt with the failure 

to provide an inmate with a handicap cell without rails or crutches. In Rychwalski v. CMS, the 

court held that an inmate who was housed in a cell without his crutches did not describe conditions 

so severe to provide fair warning to Defendants that their conduct was unconstitutional. No. 

CIV.A. GLR-13-2082, 2014 WL 4232710 (D. MD. 2014), aff’d 599 F.App’x 491 (4th Cir. 2015) 

The Court noted that the inmate was placed in the cell without crutches for approximately one 

week and provided no proof of serious physical or psychological injury. In contrast, where an 

inmate with a broken ankle was not permitted crutches inside his cell and not provided access to a 

handicap-accessible shower, a court found that a reasonable jury could find that the inmate was 

housed under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Stanley v. Menard, No. 2:15-

CV-87, 2016 WL 11476993 (W.D. Mich. 2016), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., 

Stanley v. Olsen, 2016 WL 6802895 (W.D. Mich. 2016). In that case, the court noted that the 

inmate encountered trouble entering and exiting the shower because he had to hop over a foot high 

“lip,” which caused him to fall on at least one occasion. (Id., *3) The court found a triable issue of 

fact existed concerning whether placement in the cell without crutches and an adequate shower 

facility resulted in the violation of his constitutional rights. (Id., *4) 

The Court finds the present case more similar to Rychwalski. Plaintiff was provided his 

crutches for all out-of-cell activities, including use of the shower, and did not allege difficulty in 

maneuvering to and from the shower area. In addition, Defendant’s placement (as directed by the 

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classification committee) for eight days in a 6 foot by 10 foot cell which contained a bed, sink, and 

toilet, absent any allegation of injury, fails to support a constitutional claim for relief. 

IV. Conclusion

IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. No. 23) be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff=s complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED this 4th day of February, 2020. 

_________________________________ 

JEROME T. KEARNEY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

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