Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00951/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00951-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JAMES ARKENS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SUTTER; RON 

SULLENGER, JIM WHITEAKER, DAN 

FLORES, and NATE BLACK as 

individual citizens and in 

their official capacities as 

Sutter County employees; and 

DOES 1 through 50,

Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:16-951 WBS KJN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff James Arkens filed this case against--(1) the 

County of Sutter (“the County”); (2) Sutter County Supervisors

Ron Sullenger, Jim Whiteaker,1 and Dan Flores; and (3) Sutter 

 

1 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint spells Mr. 

Whiteaker’s last name “Whitaker” on multiple occasions. (See,

e.g., First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 30 (Docket No. 16).) The correct 

spelling of Mr. Whiteaker’s last name is “Whiteaker.” See Jim 

Whiteaker Bio, 

https://www.co.sutter.ca.us/doc/government/bos/bios/bos_whiteaker

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

County Auditor Nate Black (collectively “defendants”)--alleging 

wrongful discharge, defamation, age discrimination, and 

retaliation in violation of state and federal law. (First Am.

Compl. (“FAC”) at 13-17 (Docket No. 16).) Defendants now move to 

dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 

(“Defs.’ Mot.”) (Docket No. 18).)

I. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff began to work for the County as its Chief 

Administrative Officer on February 4, 2013. (FAC ¶ 17.) 

Plaintiff alleges that in March 2013, January 2014, and

July 2014, he declined to provide certain health and retirement 

benefits to Supervisor Sullenger on behalf of the County because 

doing so was illegal. (Id. ¶¶ 23-27.) During the July 2014 

exchange between plaintiff and Sullenger, Sullenger allegedly 

asked plaintiff to fire a female employee who had explained the 

health insurance enrollment process to Sullenger. (Id. ¶ 26.) 

Sullenger allegedly stated, “[F]ire her, she doesn’t know what 

she’s doing and she’s one of the b-h’s that filed charges against 

me for looking at her ass.” (Id.) Plaintiff refused. (Id. ¶ 

27.) Plaintiff alleges that after these events, his interactions 

with Sullenger were “reduced to almost zero and were extremely 

hostile.” (Id. ¶ 24.)

During plaintiff’s employment at the County, Supervisor 

Flores and other County staff allegedly made comments about 

plaintiff’s age. (Id. ¶ 52.) Flores allegedly called plaintiff

 

(last visited Sept. 25, 2016). The court will use “Whiteaker” in 

this Order.

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

“old” and asked him “when [he] would retire.” (Id. ¶¶ 52, 54.) 

Plaintiff is “over the age of sixty.” (Id. ¶ 51.) 

In April 2015, County Auditor Black met with plaintiff 

concerning the County’s annual independent audit. (Id. ¶ 38.) 

Black told plaintiff that he had drafted a letter concerning 

plaintiff’s involvement in the Chevron Energy Project (“the 

Project”). (Id. ¶ 37-38.) The County Board of Supervisors (“the 

Board”) had approved the Project in February 2014 after a public 

hearing and approval from the Sutter County Counsel’s Office. 

(Id. ¶¶ 33-34.) Black’s letter accused plaintiff of embezzling 

$2.5 million from the Project. (Id. ¶ 39.) Black allegedly sent 

the letter to the County Counsel’s Office, the Sutter County 

District Attorney, the independent auditor working on the County 

audit, and the media. (Id. ¶¶ 39-40, 43.)

Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that before

Black sent out the letter, the County Counsel’s Office had

informed Black that “the allegations [against plaintiff] were not 

true and that he should drop his issues with [plaintiff].” (Id.

¶ 42.)

On September 29, 2015, the Board informed plaintiff 

that the County would not be renewing his employment contract and 

that if he did not resign, the County would place him on 

administrative leave. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff did not resign at 

that time and the Board placed him on administrative leave on 

October 15, 2015. (Id. ¶ 58.)

In December 2015, the District Attorney convened a 

grand jury to investigate the charges against plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 

45.) The grand jury subpoenaed plaintiff to appear in January 

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

2016. (Id. ¶ 46.)

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants on May 

5, 2016, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of public 

policy, defamation, age discrimination, unlawful retaliation, and 

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

(Compl. at 10-12 (Docket No. 1).) On July 25, 2016, this court 

dismissed plaintiff’s wrongful discharge and emotional distress 

claims with prejudice, and his other claims without prejudice

(“July 25 Order”). (July 25, 2016 Order (“July 25 Order”) at 21 

(Docket No. 15).)

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 12, 

2016, asserting claims for: (1) “constructive discharge” against 

all defendants2; (2) defamation against the County and Black; (3) 

discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §621, against the County, 

Sullenger, Whiteaker,3 and Flores; and (4) “federal and state 

retaliation,” Cal. Gov. Code § 12900 et. seq. and Cal. Lab. Code 

§ 1102.5, against all defendants. (FAC at 13-17.) Presently 

 

2 Plaintiff sues the individual defendants in both their 

individual and official capacities. (See FAC ¶¶ 10-15.) As in 

the July 25 Order, the court will treat plaintiff’s claims 

against the individual defendants as against them in their 

individual capacities, as his official capacity claims are 

duplicative of his claims against the County. See Will v. 

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 89 (1989) (“An 

official-capacity suit . . . generally represent[s] only another 

way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer 

is an agent.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

3 Whiteaker’s role in this case is not as clear as the 

other defendants’. Plaintiff’s dispute with Whiteaker appears to 

be that he partook in the County’s decision to not renew his 

contract and fabricated employment-related charges against him to 

justify the County’s decision. (See FAC ¶¶ 30, 49-50.)

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 

first amended complaint. (Defs.’ Mot.)

II. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations in the 

pleadings as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), 

overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 

(1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). To survive a 

motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation

omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” 

and “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal 

conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

The “plausibility” standard, “asks for more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” and 

where a plaintiff pleads facts that are “merely consistent with a 

defendant’s liability,” the facts “stop[] short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 557). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a 

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing 

court to draw on its experience and common sense.” Id. at 663–64 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

III. Analysis

A. Plaintiff’s “Constructive Discharge” Claim is Not a 

Plausible Claim for Relief

Plaintiff titles his first cause of action

“constructive discharge.” (FAC at 13.) He states in his 

Opposition that the title “constructive discharge” is a misprint,

and that he meant for the title to read “wrongful discharge.” 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 (Docket No. 19).) 

In either case, plaintiff has failed to state a 

plausible claim for relief. “Standing alone, constructive 

discharge is neither a tort nor a breach of contract, but a 

doctrine that transforms what is ostensibly a resignation into a 

firing.” Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1251 

(1994). “Even after establishing constructive discharge, an 

employee must independently prove a breach of contract or tort in 

connection with employment termination in order to obtain damages 

for wrongful discharge.” Id. Plaintiff is not entitled to 

relief merely for “constructive discharge.” 

With respect to “wrongful discharge,” the court assumes 

that plaintiff is referring to the tort of wrongful discharge in 

violation of public policy under California law--that is, a 

Tameny claim.

4 See Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 

 

4 To the extent plaintiff meant for “wrongful discharge” 

to refer to a different claim, that claim fails under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8 for vagueness. See Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (a complaint must 

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

170 (1980). The court dismissed plaintiff’s Tameny claim with 

prejudice as to all defendants in the July 25 Order. (July 25 

Order at 7.) Accordingly, for the same reasons, the court will 

dismiss plaintiff’s first cause of action.

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Plausible Claim for 

Defamation

Plaintiff brings a defamation claim against the County 

and Black. (FAC at 14.) Under N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 

U.S. 254 (1964), “a public official [cannot] recover[] damages 

for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct 

unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual 

malice’--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 

reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 279-

80. The court dismissed plaintiff’s original defamation claim in 

the July 25 Order because plaintiff failed to plausibly allege, 

inter alia, ‘actual malice’ on Black’s part. (See July 25 Order 

at 11.) 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint does nothing to remedy 

that defect. The only new fact that plaintiff alleges relevant 

to his defamation claim is that the County Board and Counsel’s 

Office approved the Project after a public hearing. As the court 

explained in the July 25 Order, even if the County informed Black 

that his accusations were false, that alone does not indicate 

that Black, the County Auditor, “was reckless in not simply 

accepting [the County’s] statement at face value.” (Id.) 

Nothing in plaintiff’s amended complaint undermines that 

 

“give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests”).

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

rationale.

Moreover, plaintiff’s amended complaint does nothing to 

address the court’s inference that Black’s accusations were not 

unreasonable, much less reckless, in light of the District 

Attorney’s decision to convene a grand jury to investigate the

accusations. (See id. (citing Guillory v. Superior Ct., 31 Cal. 

4th 168, 174 (2003), which noted that under “the California Rules 

of Professional Conduct, [prosecutors are prohibited from]

‘institut[ing] or caus[ing] to be instituted criminal charges 

when [they] know[] or should know that the charges are not 

supported by probable cause.’”).) If anything, the amended 

complaint further confirms the reasonableness of Black’s 

accusations by indicating that the County Auditor who preceded 

Black also viewed plaintiff’s involvement in the Project with 

suspicion. (FAC ¶ 35 (alleging that former County Auditor 

refused plaintiff’s request to “place the project on the County 

books.”).)

Because plaintiff has failed to remedy the defects 

noted by the court in the July 25 Order, the court will dismiss 

plaintiff’s amended defamation claim.5

 

5 Plaintiff does allege a new incident between Black and 

plaintiff that suggests ill will on Black’s part. (See FAC ¶¶ 

36-37 (alleging that one month before Black published the

accusations, plaintiff refused to support a proposal by Black to 

convert the County Auditor position into an unelected position).) 

That allegation may defeat defendants’ common interest privilege 

defense, which requires an absence of statutory malice, defined 

as “ill will” or “lack[ of] reasonable grounds for belief in the 

truth of the publication,” Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 18 Cal. 

3d 406, 413 (1976) (internal citation omitted). Even if the 

allegation defeats defendants’ common interest defense, however, 

it cannot save plaintiff’s defamation claim because plaintiff has 

failed to allege ‘actual malice’ under N.Y. Times.

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

C. Plaintiff Fails to State a Plausible Claim for Age 

Discrimination Under the ADEA

The ADEA makes it unlawful to “to discharge any 

individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . 

because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To

state a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, 

plaintiff must plead “that he was (1) at least forty years old, 

(2) performing his job satisfactorily, (3) discharged, and (4) 

either replaced by substantially younger employees with equal or 

inferior qualifications or discharged under circumstances 

otherwise giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.” 

Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 

2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In lieu 

of alleging that the County discharged him, plaintiff may allege

that it constructively discharged him. See Brooks v. City of San 

Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Like his amended defamation claim, plaintiff’s amended 

ADEA claim fails to sufficiently address the deficiencies noted 

in the July 25 Order. Plaintiff argues that the County 

discharged or constructively discharged him when it told him that 

“if he did not immediately accept the County’s Offer to resign, 

he would be placed on Administrative leave.” (FAC ¶ 20.) That 

statement is not a discharge. With respect to whether it was a 

constructive discharge, the court noted in the July 25 Order that

plaintiff would need to address the following questions in order 

to state a claim of constructive discharge: (1) how long the 

leave was for, (2) whether the leave was paid, (3) whether 

plaintiff could return from the leave, and (4) whether plaintiff 

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

resigned. (July 25 Order at 14.) Plaintiff’s amended complaint 

answers none of these questions.

Plaintiff also claimed at oral argument that the Board 

discharged him when it provided him late notice of nonrenewal of 

his employment contract and did not retain him after the contract 

expired. Plaintiff’s contract with the County states that his

employment was to run from February 4, 2013 to February 3, 2016, 

at which time the contract would “automatically renew for an 

additional term of three years unless the Board, by 120-days 

advanced written notice, notifies Employee of its intent to 

terminate the agreement.” (Compl. Ex. A, Employment Agreement at 

1 (Docket No. 1-2).) 

Like his original complaint, plaintiff’s amended 

complaint does not allege that the Board failed to provide him

written notice prior to the specified deadline. Contrarily, the 

amended complaint alleges that the Board notified plaintiff--the 

court assumes orally--on September 29, 2015 that the Board would 

not be renewing plaintiff’s employment contract.6 (FAC ¶ 20-22.) 

The amended complaint states that September 29, 2015 “was several 

days past” the notice of nonrenewal deadline. (Id. ¶ 21.) That 

date is in fact 127 days before the end of plaintiff’s contract, 

 

6 The amended complaint states, multiple times, that the 

County first gave plaintiff notice of nonrenewal on September 29, 

2015. (FAC ¶¶ 20-22.) It also states, multiple times, that the 

Board first gave him notice on October 15, 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 60, 

82.) It is difficult to tell which of the two dates plaintiff 

first received notice on. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim of 

discharge based on nonrenewal fails for the separate reason that 

it does not give defendants “fair notice of what the . . . claim 

is and the grounds upon which it rests.” See Lee, 250 F.3d at 

679.

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

and therefore seven days ahead of the deadline. Accordingly, 

plaintiff has not stated a claim that the Board discharged him by 

letting him go after his contract had automatically renewed.

Because plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to remedy 

the defects noted in the July 25 Order with respect to discharge 

and constructive discharge, the court need not address whether 

the complaint sufficiently alleges the other elements of a prima 

facie ADEA claim. Accordingly, the court will dismiss 

plaintiff’s ADEA claim.

D. Plaintiff Fails to State a Plausible Claim for Unlawful 

Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that defendants retaliated against 

him in violation of “federal and state” law when they placed him 

on administrative leave and refused to renew his contract. (Id.

at 17.) Defendants took adverse action against him, according to 

plaintiff, in part because he refused to comply with Sullenger’s 

illegal demands for health benefits and to terminate a female 

employee based on her gender. (Id.) 

As an initial matter, plaintiff still has not cited a 

federal law that defendants allegedly violated by retaliating 

against him. Accordingly, for the reasons previously discussed, 

the court must dismiss plaintiff’s federal retaliation claim. 

See Salazar v. County of Orange, 564 F. App’x 322, 322 (9th Cir. 

2014) (“A complaint should fully set[] forth who is being sued, 

for what relief, and on what theory . . . .” (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted)).

With respect to his state retaliation claim, plaintiff

has failed to address the court’s July 25 holding that there is 

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

an absence of “any factual allegations” indicating that the Board 

considered the Sullenger incidents in taking adverse action 

against him. (See July 25 Order at 17.)

In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that 

defendants violated California Government Code section 12900 et. 

seq. and California Labor Code section 1102.5 when they placed 

him on administrative leave. (FAC at 17.) California Government 

Code section 12940(h) prohibits employers from retaliating

against employees who “oppose[] any practices forbidden under 

[the California Fair Employment and Housing Act].” Cal. Gov. 

Code § 12940(h). The California Fair Employment and Housing Act 

(“FEHA”) prohibits employers from discharging employees based on 

their “sex” or “gender.” Id. § 12940(a). California Labor Code 

section 1102.5 prohibits employers from retaliating against 

employees who “refus[e] to participate in an activity that would 

result in a violation of state or federal statute.” Cal. Lab. 

Code § 1102.5.

Both statutes require proving “a causal link” between 

engagement in the protected activity and the adverse action. See

Washington v. California City Correction Ctr., 871 F. Supp. 2d 

1010, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that there must be “a causal 

link between the retaliatory animus and the adverse action” under 

California Government Code section 12940(h)); Edgerly v. City of 

Oakland, 211 Cal. App. 4th 1191, 1199 (2012), as modified (Dec. 

13, 2012) (“To establish a prima facie case [under California 

Labor Code section 1102.5(c)], a plaintiff must show that he or 

she was subjected to adverse employment action after engaging in 

protected activity and that there was a causal connection between 

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

the two.”).

The court dismissed plaintiff’s retaliation claims in 

the July 25 Order in part7 because “[p]laintiff [did] not include 

any factual allegations giving rise to the plausible inference 

that the Board considered [the Sullenger] incidents” in taking 

adverse action against him. (July 25 Order at 17.) Relevant to 

the court’s ruling there was the fact that the Sullenger 

incidents took place in March 2013 and July 2014, while the 

decision to place plaintiff on leave and not renew his contract 

took place in September or October 2015--at least fourteen months 

after the incidents. (Id.)

Plaintiff has not alleged any new facts supporting a 

plausible inference that the County took adverse action against 

him due to the Sullenger incidents. Plaintiff states in his 

Opposition that his issues with Sullenger were “ongoing” and that 

the “instances cited in the complaint are . . . not intended [to 

be] exhaustive of the protected activity in which Plaintiff 

participated and alleges were considered when the defendants 

retaliated against him.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 13-14.) Contrary to

this explanation, however, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 

requires plaintiff to state his factual allegations in the 

complaint, not have defendants and the court guess at them. See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief . . 

. . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

 

7 The court’s other stated reason for dismissing 

plaintiff’s retaliation claims was that plaintiff did not cite 

any specific statutes that defendants allegedly violated. (July 

25 Order at 17.)

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” (emphases added)).

Because plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to address 

the court’s concern with respect to causation, the court will 

dismiss plaintiff’s state retaliation claim.

D. Dismissal With Prejudice

Defendants request that the court dismiss each of 

plaintiff’s claims with prejudice and without leave to amend. 

(Defs.’ Mot., Mem. at 23 (Docket No. 18-1).) “[A] district court 

need not grant leave to amend where the amendment: (1) prejudices 

the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an 

undue delay in litigation; or (4) is futile.” AmerisourceBergen 

Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006); 

see also Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(holding the same).

The court has already dismissed plaintiff’s Tameny

claim with prejudice. (July 25 Order at 21.) With respect to

plaintiff’s other claims, plaintiff has failed to allege facts 

that so much as address, much less remedy, the concerns expressly 

noted in the court’s July 25 Order despite having ample 

opportunity to do so. In the instance of plaintiff’s federal 

retaliation claim, the neglected remedy was as simple as citing a 

federal statute. To give plaintiff leave to amend his complaint 

a second time after his first amended complaint failed to even 

address the issues raised by the court would constitute undue 

delay and prejudice to defendants. Moreover, plaintiff indicated

at oral argument that the reason he did not plead curative facts 

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

was because none exist. Accordingly, the court will dismiss 

plaintiff’s entire complaint with prejudice. See Bonin v. 

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of 

amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for 

leave to amend.”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint be, and the same 

hereby is, GRANTED. Plaintiff’s entire complaint is DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE.

Dated: October 5, 2016

Case 2:16-cv-00951-WBS-KJN Document 22 Filed 10/06/16 Page 15 of 15