Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05591/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-05591-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

2

 Plaintiffs have assigned their claims to the Wayne Seminoff Company to prosecute on

their behalf.

Case No. C 03-05591 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(JFLC1)

** E-filed on 8/8/05 **

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CITY OF CAMPBELL, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 03-05591 JF

ORDER1 GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR, IN THE

ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION

[Docket No. 33]

Defendants move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion.2 The Court has read the moving and responding papers and has

considered the oral arguments of counsel presented on August 5, 2005. For the reasons set forth

below, the motion will be granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

On December 12, 2003, Plaintiffs City of Campbell (“City”), Robert G. Slade (“Slade”),

and Russell and Kathleen Berg (“the Bergs”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant action
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Richard Atkinson, who also was the County controller/treasurer at the time of the events

alleged in the complaint, is named as a fourth defendant in the complaint but does not appear to

have been served with the summons and has not made an appearance in this case.

4

 The orders in five of the latter six cases—Rose, Pereira, Jakob, Fellman, and

DiLonardo—specified that those actions had been settled.

2

Case No. C 03-05591 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(JFLC1)

against Defendants County of Santa Clara (“County”), David Elledge (“Elledge”), and Scott

Johnson (“Johnson”) (collectively “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants failed to pay them

interest owed on money deposited with the Santa Clara Superior Court (“Superior Court”) in

connection with litigation before that court between 1973 and 1985, inclusive. Elledge and

Johnson were the County controllers/treasurers at the time of the events alleged in the

complaint.3

The City’s claims arise out of its deposit of $194,142 with the Superior Court in seven

eminent domain lawsuits it filed in 1973: (1) City of Campbell v. Jacobson (No. 285817), (2)

City of Campbell v. Rose (No. 285816), (3) City of Campbell v. Pereira (No. 285811), (4) City of

Campbell v. Colombini (No. 285809), (5) City of Campbell v. Jakob (No. 285810), (6) City of

Campbell v. Fellman (No. 285815), and (7) City of Campbell v. DiLonardo (No. 285807). See

Rossi Aff., Exs. A-H. The cases were resolved the same year they were filed, at which time the

Superior Court ordered the County controller to draw a warrant for and the County treasurer to

pay, in Jacobson, the entire deposited amount to the City following dismissal of the action by the

City and, in the other six cases, the entire deposited amount to the defendant(s).4See id. In

responding to the County’s special interrogatories in the instant action, the City has stated that it

does not have “personal knowledge” of (1) the exact amount of money, if any, that the Superior

Court ordered returned to the City or that the City received from the County or (2) the date, if

any, that the City received such money from the County in Jacobson, Rose, Pereira, Colombini,

Jakob, or DiLonardo, and it has suggested that the County may have such information. See Rossi

Aff., Ex. P. However, Defendants’ counsel has declared that, after a diligent search of County

records, Defendants themselves have been unable to locate documents regarding the original

deposits, copies of judgments or warrants, or documents regarding any settlements in the
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 This statement also applies to Defendants’ inability to locate documentary evidence,

other than the Superior Court’s orders described in this Order, with respect to Slade’s and the

Bergs’ underlying cases. See infra.

3

Case No. C 03-05591 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(JFLC1)

underlying cases other than the Superior Court’s orders described above.5See Rossi Aff. ¶¶ 28-

29.

Slade’s claims arise out of the deposit of $38,855 with the Superior Court in New York

Life Insurance Company v. Slade (No. 435097), an interpleader action in which he was the

assignee of one of the defendants. See Rossi Aff., Exs. I-K. The plaintiff in New York Life

Insurance Company made the deposit in 1979, and the terms under which the case was settled

required payment of $15,542 to Slade. Id. In 1984, the Superior Court ordered the County

controller to draw a warrant for and the County treasurer to pay such amount to Slade from the

deposit. See id. In responding to the County’s special interrogatories in the instant action, Slade

has stated that he does not have “personal knowledge” of (1) the exact amount of money that the

Superior Court ordered paid to him or that he received from the County or (2) the date that he

received such money from the County, and he has suggested three other people who may have

such information. See Rossi Aff., Ex. R.

The Bergs’ claims arise out of the deposit of $49,033.98 with the Superior Court in

Wilson v. Rathjen (No. 534641), an action in which they were defendants and cross-defendants.

See Rossi Aff., Exs. L-M. The plaintiff in Wilson made the deposit at the commencement of the

action, and, in 1985, the Superior Court found that the Bergs were entitled to $46,089.91 from

the deposit. See id. The clerk of the court was ordered to “pay the entire balance of the sum

deposited by Plaintiff together with accrued interest, if any, to Plaintiff,” and then the plaintiff

was ordered to pay to the Bergs, in addition to the aforementioned sum, 94.1 percent of any

interest that had accrued on the deposit. Rossi Aff., Ex. L. In responding to the County’s special

interrogatories in the instant action, Russell Berg has stated that he does not have “personal

knowledge” of (1) the exact amount of money that he received from the County or (2) the date

that he received such money from the County, and he has suggested that the County or the
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Case No. C 03-05591 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(JFLC1)

plaintiff in Wilson may have such information. See Rossi Aff., Ex. N.

Plaintiffs variously bring claims for violations of their civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, breach of trust, open book account, and violations of section 573 of the California Code

of Civil Procedure. They also seek, in addition to money damages and attorney’s fees, a

declaration that Defendants’ alleged custom, policy, and practice of withholding interest on

money deposited with the Superior Court violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment

and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Material facts are those that

might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. There

is a genuine dispute about a material fact if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to

return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The moving party bears the initial burden of

informing the Court of the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of

a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the

party moving for summary judgment would not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it

must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or

defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element

to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos.,

210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to

present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmoving party may not rely on the mere

allegations or denials in its pleading in order to preclude summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 Having found that either of those two grounds are sufficient to warrant summary

judgment in Defendants’ favor, the Court need not address the parties’ arguments regarding the

other grounds advanced by Defendants.

5

Case No. C 03-05591 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(JFLC1)

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec.

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987). Summary judgment thus is not

appropriate if the nonmoving party presents evidence from which a reasonable jury could resolve

the material issue in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49; Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132,

1134-36 (9th Cir. 1991). 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants advance numerous independent grounds for granting summary judgment in

their favor. The Court will address two of those grounds, which provide alternative bases for

granting Defendants’ motion.6 First, Defendants argue that neither the County nor the County

treasurer can be held liable for the alleged failure of the County treasurer to pay interest on funds

deposited with the Superior Court, because at all relevant times the County treasurer was acting

as an officer not of the County but of the Superior Court. They contend that the instant case is

controlled by the California Court of Appeal’s decision in City of Santa Clara v. County of Santa

Clara. In that case, the City of Santa Clara alleged that it suffered a loss of nearly $8,000 in

interest as a result of the county’s failure to place the city’s deposits from certain condemnation

proceedings into the state treasury, where they would have earned interest, rather than into the

county treasury, where they did not earn interest. City of Santa Clara v. County of Santa Clara,

81 Cal. Rptr. 643, 644 (Ct. App. 1969). In the underlying condemnation proceedings, the

superior court had ordered the city to deposit a total of $54,500 with the clerk of the court, but it

had not specified in its orders which depository should be used. Id. The city’s theory of recovery

against the county was that the county, acting through its employees, the county clerk and the

county treasurer, was responsible for the loss. Id. However, the Court of Appeal rejected the

argument that the county could be liable for the actions of the county treasurer in either accepting

the deposit into the county treasury or not himself depositing the funds into the state treasury,
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 This reasoning also has been applied to deposits with the court in interpleader actions.

See Ostly v. Saper, 305 P.2d 946 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).

8

 Section 573 of the California Code of Civil Procedure was repealed recently and

replaced with text requiring that deposits with the court be deposited with the court’s treasury as

provided in section 68084 of the California Government Code. However, this recent statutory

change does not affect the county treasurer’s obligations or status in relation to the Superior

Court at the time of the events giving rise to the instant lawsuit.

6

Case No. C 03-05591 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(JFLC1)

because those actions occurred in the course of the treasurer’s duties as treasurer of the superior

court. See id. at 646. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that neither the county treasurer nor

the county itself—the latter under the theory of respondeat superior—could be liable for the

alleged loss of interest. See id. at 645.

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal relied heavily upon the California Supreme

Court’s analysis in Metropolitan Water District v. Adams, a case in which the plaintiff sought to

collect interest on funds deposited with the court at the commencement of the underlying

eminent domain proceedings. See Metro. Water Dist. v. Adams, 197 P.2d 543, 544 (Cal. 1948).

There, the deposits had been turned over to the county treasurer, who in turn had deposited the

money into various bank accounts. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that

moneys deposited with the court as in the nature of security or a cash bond in

order to gain possession of the subject property in eminent domain proceedings

are legally in the custody and within the control of such court and that any interest

paid on such moneys by a bank in which they are deposited attaches in ownership

to the owner of the moneys and, being in the custody of the court, is, like the

principal sum, subject to the court’s control.

7

Id. at 544-45 (emphasis added). It further concluded that “[i]t is clear that the funds were not in

the custody of the county as such, for the sums remain subject to the order of the court, and the

county treasurer in handling the funds must look to the court for direction.” Id. at 548 (emphasis

added); see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 573 (requiring money deposited with the court to be

deposited with the county treasurer and “to be held by him subject to the order of the court”).8

Accordingly, the county treasurer was found to be “in effect the treasurer of the court, an

ex-officio officer,” and to “hold[] the money for the court, not for the county.” Metro. Water
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Case No. C 03-05591 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(JFLC1)

Dist. v. Adams, 197 P.2d at 548.

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have misapplied City of Santa Clara to the instant case.

However, their argument that the County is a proper defendant because it is the custodian of the

funds Plaintiffs seek to recover is contradicted by the very cases they discuss in their opposition

brief. For example, in Metropolitan Water District, the Supreme Court explicitly concluded that

deposits and any interest earned thereon were in the custody and under the control of the court,

not the county. Plaintiffs cite no case that establishes the opposite proposition. Moreover,

Plaintiffs attempt, in a mere three sentences, to distinguish the instant case from City of Santa

Clara on their respective facts, asserting that Plaintiffs “do not seek damages on a negligence

theory a [sic] based on a mishandling the [sic] deposited funds, thereby causing a loss of

interest,” but instead have filed the instant lawsuit to compel the County “to disgorge monies it

holds as a custodian.” Opp’n at 8. However, while the two cases involve different claims and

obviously are not factually identical, Plaintiffs’ argument once again is based on the erroneous

assumption that the County—and not the Superior Court—was the custodian of the funds. 

City of Santa Clara and Metropolitan Water District clearly establish the legal

relationships among the relevant entities—Plaintiffs, the Superior Court, and the County and its

officers—that govern the instant dispute. Plaintiffs seek to recover funds that were—and, if they

were not paid out, still are—in the custody and under the control of the Superior Court. In legal

terms, the County itself had no control over those funds, and the County treasurer, when acting

with respect to such funds, was acting as an officer of the Superior Court and had no authority to

do anything with the funds except as directed by the Superior Court. As such, neither the County

nor the County treasurer can be liable to Plaintiffs for the alleged failure to pay them interest on

the deposits in the underlying cases. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

may be granted on this ground. 

Defendants also argue, as a second ground for summary judgment in their favor, that

Plaintiffs lack sufficient evidence of an essential element of their claims to carry their burden of

persuasion at trial, see Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1102, because (1) Plaintiffs
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

 Although Defendants have not submitted the same interrogatory responses from

Plaintiffs with respect to Fellman as they have with respect to the City’s other six underlying

cases, see supra p. 2, that does not alter the fact that Plaintiffs have failed to produce

documentary evidence of the alleged nonpayment of interest.

10 At the hearing on the instant motion, Plaintiffs also suggested that the orders from the

underlying cases, which were submitted into evidence by Defendants, prove that Plaintiffs were

not paid interest. However, with one exception, see supra pp. 3-4, those orders show only the

amount of the deposits made and how the deposits themselves were to be disbursed; they do not

even mention the interest that may have accrued on the deposits, much less state what was to be

done with it, and thus cannot carry Plaintiffs’ burden to prove the nonpayment of interest,

especially in light of Plaintiffs’ inability to produce any other documents or testimony proving

that they did not actually receive interest.

11 Seminoff’s general observations and conclusions regarding practices in other California

counties (e.g., that interest sometimes was not paid even when it was ordered paid, that interest

has been underpaid) are irrelevant to the actions allegedly taken by the County of Santa Clara, a

8

Case No. C 03-05591 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(JFLC1)

have declared that they lack personal knowledge of the amount of money they received from the

County, as well as the date of receipt, following resolution of the underlying lawsuits and (2)

they have not produced any documents demonstrating that they were not paid the interest they

now seek.9 In response, Plaintiffs argue that they can prove that Defendants failed to pay interest

on the deposits; however, the only evidence that they have submitted in support of this argument

is the affidavit of Wayne Seminoff (“Seminoff”) of the Wayne Seminoff Company.10

Seminoff is in the business of “locating and recovering abandoned or dormant assets for

lawful owners of the assets.” Seminoff Opp’n Aff. ¶ 2. As part of his business, he has “personally

examined at least 10,000 court files in all of the most populous states in the United States and

many files in foreign countries,” as well as “thousands of pages of financial records made

available to [him] by courts and other public entities.” Id. Based on this experience, he has

observed that the state court cases that are the subject of this lawsuit have the “same indicators of

unpaid interest” as the “over 5,000 cases” he has researched “where interest was not paid,” and

he has concluded that no interest was paid in the underlying cases. Id. ¶ 3. Specifically, he has

declared that he has found no orders for payment of interest in the court files and that he has not

been able to locate any other records showing that interest was paid to Plaintiffs.11 See id. ¶¶ 3, 5.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

separate governmental entity. The Court has considered only the portions of Seminoff’s affidavit

that clearly relate to the cases that are the subject of the instant lawsuit.

12 Inexplicably, the County subsequently refers to the located records as “court deposit

records.” Seminoff Aff., Ex. B. Whatever the label used, it is clear that the County was trying to

communicate that whatever records it located indicated that interest had been paid.

13 Seminoff states that Defendants have not produced the records, but there is no evidence

that Plaintiffs ever moved to compel production of these documents.

9

Case No. C 03-05591 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(JFLC1)

In the absence of such records, he has concluded that interest in fact was not paid. See id. ¶¶ 3, 5,

6. In addition, with respect to the City’s seven cases, Seminoff has submitted a copy of a letter he

received from the County in April 2003 in which the County stated that it could not locate the

“court deposit records” but that the records that were located “show[] that on October 8, 1987,

the County paid all accrued interest on each of those cases.”12 Seminoff Opp’n Aff., Ex. B. No

party has submitted copies of these records.13

The Court concludes that the evidence submitted and cited by Plaintiffs is inadequate to

preclude summary judgment, because Plaintiffs have not shown that they have sufficient

evidence of an essential element of each of their claims—the nonpayment of interest—to carry

their burden of persuasion at trial. Seminoff’s affidavit, while not irrelevant, by itself is too

speculative and conclusory to carry Plaintiffs’ burden. The most Plaintiffs have shown is that

they cannot find a record demonstrating payment of interest either in admittedly incomplete files

from state court cases that were resolved twenty or more years ago or, as would be suggested by

their interrogatory responses and their failure to submit additional documentary evidence, in any

of their own files. However, contrary to the suggestion in their opposition brief that they are not

required to “prove a negative, i.e., that they were not paid,” Opp’n at 20, it is Plaintiffs’ burden to

prove that they were not paid the money they now seek through the instant lawsuit. Having failed

to present sufficient evidence that they would be able to carry their burden of persuasion at trial,

Plaintiffs cannot preclude summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Accordingly, Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment may be granted on this ground as well. 

//
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Case No. C 03-05591 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(JFLC1)

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication is GRANTED. The pretrial 

conference currently set for August 19, 2005, and the trial date currently set for September 2,

2005, are VACATED.

DATED: August 8, 2005

/s/ (electronic signature authorized)

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Case No. C 03-05591 JF

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

(JFLC1)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Nicholas Damer nicliberty@aol.com, kldamer@aol.com

Michael L. Rossi michael.rossi@cco.co.scl.ca.us