Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04690/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04690-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY CHAVEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

CLARK E. DUCART, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 13-cv-04690-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS 

PETITION AS UNTIMELY; AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner Jerry Chavez, a state prisoner, filed the instant pro se action for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before the Court is Respondent’s renewed motion to 

dismiss the instant petition as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations established by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Dkt. 

25. Petitioner filed an opposition to the renewed motion. Dkt. 29. Respondent filed a reply. Dkt. 

30.

Having read and considered the papers submitted and being fully informed, the Court 

GRANTS Respondent’s renewed motion and DISMISSES the petition with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

As discussed in the Court’s February 20, 2015 Order denying Respondent’s previouslyfiled motion to dismiss, the following procedural background is undisputed:

On November 8, 2010, in Santa Clara County Superior Court 

Case No. CC768276, Petitioner pled guilty to voluntary 

manslaughter with personal use of a firearm in exchange for the 

dismissal of a charge of felony murder. Dkt. 1 at 4. On March 11, 

2011, he was sentenced to twenty-one years in state prison, 

consecutive to his other pending case. Dkt. 1, Ex. F. In Santa Clara 

County Superior Court Case No. 211398, Petitioner pled guilty to 

conspiracy to sell drugs, conspiracy to transport drugs, and 

participation in a criminal street gang. Dkt. 1 at 6. Also on March 

11, 2011, he was sentenced to five years and eight months. Dkt. 1, 

Ex. G. Petitioner did not appeal the aforementioned convictions.

On July 17, 2012,1Petitioner filed his first state habeas 

 

1 A pro se federal or state habeas petition is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to 

prison authorities for mailing. See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001), 

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petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on 

November 14, 2012. Dkt. 15, Ex. 1 (Case No. S204213). 

On September 13, 2012, Petitioner filed a second state 

habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied 

on November 14, 2012, with a citation to In re Dexter, 25 Cal. 3d 

921, 925-926 (1979) (petitioner must exhaust administrative 

remedies for claim). Dkt. 15; Ex. 2 (Case No. S205377). 

On October 25, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion to modify the 

restitution fines in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, which 

was denied on October 29, 2012, as waived, untimely, and for lack 

of jurisdiction. Dkt. 1, Ex. N.

On December 12, 2012, Petitioner filed a state habeas 

petition in the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on 

January 18, 2013. Dkt. 15, Ex. 3 (Case No. H039100). 

On March 14, 2013, Petitioner filed his third state habeas 

petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on May 

15, 2013. Dkt. 15, Ex. 4 (Case No. S209369).

On December 30, 2013, Petitioner filed another habeas 

petition in the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on 

February 21, 2014. Dkt. 15, Ex. 5 (Case No. H040507). The denial 

order noted that to the extent Petitioner was claiming he was 

improperly validated as a gang member, the petition was denied 

without prejudice to allow him to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Id.

On September 4, 2013,2Petitioner filed the instant federal 

petition, alleging in part that the trial court improperly imposed 

restitution fines in his two cases and breached the terms of the plea 

agreement, and that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object 

to the restitution fines. Dkt. 1 at 4-6.3

Dkt. 22 at 1-2 (footnotes in original and renumbered).

On November 26, 2013, the Court issued an order to show cause. Dkt. 10. On March 26, 

2014, in lieu of an answer, Respondent moved to dismiss the petition as untimely. Dkt. 15. After 

full briefing by the parties, the Court issued an order finding that the petition “barred as untimely 

 

vacated and remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (holding that a 

federal or state habeas petition is deemed filed on the date the prisoner submits it to prison 

authorities for filing, rather than on the date it is received by the court). Petitioner signed his first

state supreme court petition and his federal habeas petition on July 17, 2012 (Dkt. 15 at note 1) 

and September 4, 2013 (Dkt. 1 at 7), respectively. For the purposes of this discussion, the Court 

deems those petitions as filed on those dates. See Saffold, 250 F.3d at 1268.

2

See supra note 2.

3

Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by Petitioner.

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under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) unless he can show that he is entitled to . . . equitable tolling.”

4

 Dkt. 

22 at 6. In his opposition to the motion, Petitioner had argued that he is entitled to equitable 

tolling on the grounds that his lack of access to the law library contributed to his delay in filing his 

federal petition. Dkt. 16 at 1-2. However, the Court found that Respondent had not adequately 

addressed that argument. Dkt. 22 at 10. Consequently, the Court denied the motion to dismiss the 

petition as untimely, without prejudice to Respondent’s renewing the motion and addressing 

equitable tolling. Id.

In the instant renewed motion to dismiss, Respondent renews the argument that all of the 

claims in the petition are untimely and addresses the matter of equitable tolling. Dkt. 25 at 3-6. 

On July 27, 2015, Petitioner filed an opposition. Dkt. 29. On August 10, 2015, Respondent filed 

a reply. Dkt. 30.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Overview

AEDPA, effective April 24, 1996, imposes a limitations period on petitions for a writ of 

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. In prisoner actions challenging non-capital state 

convictions or sentences, a habeas petition must be filed within one year of, inter alia, the date the 

judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct 

review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). If a petitioner could have sought review by the state court of 

appeals or the state supreme court, but did not, the limitation period will begin running against 

him the day after the date on which the time to seek such review expired. See Smith v. Duncan, 

297 F.3d 809, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2002) overruled on other grounds by Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Cal. Rule of Court 8.308(a) (providing that appeal from criminal 

judgment must be filed within sixty days after rendition of judgment or making of order being 

appealed) (formerly Cal. Rule of Court 31). 

 

4

The Court previously found that statutory tolling was not sufficient to overcome the time 

bar to Petitioner’s federal habeas petition. Dkt. 22 at 4. The Court also rejected Petitioner’s 

argument that he was entitled to a delayed commencement of the limitations period because, 

among other reasons, he did not exercise due diligence in discovering the factual predicate of his 

claims and thus was not entitled to such a delayed start of the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1)(D). Id. at 5-6.

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In the present case, the statute of limitations started running on May 10, 2011, when 

Petitioner’s judgment became final sixty days after his March 11, 2011 sentencing. See

§ 2244(d)(1)(A); Cal. Rule of Court 8.308(a). Thus, Petitioner had one year or until May 10, 2012 

to file his federal habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Petitioner did not file the present petition until September 4, 2013, almost a year and four 

months after the limitations period had expired. The petition is therefore untimely unless 

Petitioner can show that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

5

B. Standard for Equitable Tolling

The Supreme Court has determined that AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to 

equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). “When 

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely 

claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). However, equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases because 

extensions of time should be granted only if “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court 

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted), overruled in part on other 

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

The party seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his 

way,” preventing timely filing. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). “[T]he threshold 

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the 

rule.” Id. at 1066 (internal quotations and citation omitted). At the same time, “[r]ather than let 

procedural uncertainties unreasonably snuff out a constitutional claim, the issue of when grave 

difficulty merges literally into ‘impossibility’ should be resolved in [a petitioner’s] favor.” Lott v. 

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). When a prisoner is proceeding pro se, his allegations 

 

5 As mentioned above, the Court previously found that the time bar to Petitioner’s federal

habeas petition could not be overcome by statutory tolling, and that Petitioner was not entitled to a 

delayed commencement of the limitations period. Dkt. 22 at 4-6. 

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regarding diligence in filing a federal petition on time must be construed liberally. Roy v. 

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). 

C. Analysis

As mentioned above, the Court has found that the instant federal petition filed on 

September 4, 2013 is untimely by almost a year and four months. Petitioner has previously sought 

equitable tolling based on his lack of law library access. Specifically, Petitioner claimed that he 

was confined in the administrative segregation unit of North Kern State Prison (“NKSP”) from 

March 23, 2011 through May 15, 2012, during which time he had no access to the law library. 

Dkt. 16 at 1-2. Petitioner added that on May 15, 2012, he was transferred from NKSP to the 

California Correctional Institution and that “this was the first time [he] had regular access to the 

legal library and/or legal resource material to file with the courts.” Id. at 6. 

The Court conducted the following calculation to determine whether granting Petitioner 

equitable tolling—from the relevant time frame of May 10, 2011 (when the limitations period 

started to run) until May 15, 2012 (when he regained access to the law library)—would save his 

petition from being untimely:

If the statute of limitations had started to run on the date he regained 

law library access on May 15, 2012, then Petitioner would have had 

one year—or until May 15, 2013—to file his federal habeas petition. 

Petitioner could be entitled to statutory tolling because his first state 

supreme court petition was filed on July 17, 2012, prior to the 

limitations period expiring. Before filing his first state supreme 

court petition on July 17, 2012, the limitations period would have 

run unabated for a total of 63 days (from May 15, 2012 through July 

17, 2012). Petitioner would have been entitled to statutory tolling 

during the almost four-month period during which his state supreme 

court petition was pending from July 17, 2012 through November 

14, 2012. The limitations period then would have begun to run 

again when the state supreme court denied his petition on November 

14, 2012, and it would run unabated for 294 more days until he filed 

his federal petition on September 4, 2013. Therefore, only 357 days 

(63 days plus 294 days) of the limitations period would have run 

before his federal petition was filed. Said another way, his federal 

petition could be timely because there was still 8 days (365 days 

minus 357 days) of the limitations period left when he filed it. Thus, 

if Petitioner could avail of equitable tolling due to lack of law 

library access, his federal petition could be timely filed based on the 

aforementioned calculation.

Dkt. 22 at 8-9.

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In the Ninth Circuit, constitutionally acceptable means of access to the courts include the 

provision of an adequate law library or a professional or quasi-professional legal services plan. 

Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 

831 (1977)). In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), the Supreme Court restricted the scope of 

Bounds, clarifying that it created only a right of “access to the courts,” not an “abstract, 

freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance.” Id. at 350-351. “[P]rison law libraries and 

legal assistance programs are not ends in themselves, but only the means for ensuring ‘a 

reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights 

to the courts.’” Id. at 351. The Supreme Court rejected the notion that federal courts can mandate 

specific hours of library availability for state prisoners, and held that although prisoners on 

lockdown may experience delays in receiving legal materials, where such delays are related to 

legitimate penological interests they have “no constitutional significance.” Id. at 361-362. The 

Supreme Court emphasized that it is the capability to challenge a conviction, “rather than the 

capability of turning pages in a law library, that is the touchstone” of the right to access. Id. at 

356. Furthermore, “ordinary prison limitations on . . . access to the law library and copier” do not 

constitute extraordinary circumstances or make it impossible to file a federal petition on time. 

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted); see, e.g., Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 

(prisoner’s pro se status, law library missing a “handful” of reporter volumes, and reliance on 

inmate helpers who were transferred or too busy to attend to his petitions are not extraordinary 

circumstances “given the vicissitudes of prison life”). However, in the present action, the Court 

still found it “conceivable that equitable tolling might be warranted because Petitioner was 

prevented from preparing a timely petition due to his lack of access to the law library.” Dkt. 22 at 

9. The Court further found that Respondent “did not fully address this issue in his reply to 

Petitioner’s opposition,” stating:

Respondent merely refers to an August 8, 2011 letter from 

Petitioner’s attorney and states that it showed that Petitioner had the 

“ability to conduct legal research and prepare a claim during the 

relevant period.” Dkt. 18 at 3. Such an argument is conclusory, and 

Respondent fails to address Petitioner’s claim that his lack of access 

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to the law library prevented him from filing a timely petition. In 

support of his claim, Petitioner alleges that while he was housed in 

administrative segregation at NKSP, “inmates didn’t have physical 

entry access into a facility law library for the purpose of using its 

legal resources.” Dkt. 16 at 2. As mentioned above, Respondent 

has failed to refute Petitioner’s allegations that he was denied law 

library access during that time.

Dkt. 22 at 9-10.

In the renewed motion to dismiss, Respondent again argues that Petitioner is not entitled to 

equitable tolling. First, Respondent clarifies that the aforementioned August 8, 2011 letter was not 

written by Petitioner’s attorney, and that it was actually written by Petitioner and “reproduced” by 

his attorney, stating:

We argued that petitioner’s “reproduced” letter to his attorney dated 

August 8, 2011, which was during the time period when petitioner 

contended he was totally stymied due to lack of library access, 

demonstrated that he was actually able to conduct legal research 

during that time, because the letter set forth a coherent claim 

concerning conduct credits and cited a number of supporting cases. 

Doc. 18 at 3, citing Opp., Exh. D. However, this Court erroneously 

believed the letter was from petitioner’s attorney. Doc. 22 at 9-10. 

We reiterate here that the letter showed petitioner’s ability to 

research his claims during the relevant time period. 

Dkt. 25 at 5 note 4 (citations omitted). Second, in response to the Court’s request to address 

Petitioner’s claim that his lack of access to the law library prevented him from filing a timely 

petition, counsel for Respondent has 

. . . obtained documentation from North Kern State Prison that 

conclusively refutes petitioner’s contention. According to the 

prison’s Operations Manual, inmates housed in administrative

segregation “may access the law library resources through the 

paging process,” whereby they request that particular legal materials 

be delivered to their cells. Exh. 6. Moreover, petitioner in fact 

obtained legal materials through the paging process no less than nine 

times during the period in question, between March 23, 2011 and 

May 15, 2012. Exh. 7. Specifically, petitioner received materials 

on June 10, 2011 (4 items); August 5, 2011 (3 items); September 23, 

2011; October 7, 2011 (2 items); October 14, 2011 (2 items); 

January 27, 2012 (3 items); February 10, 2012; March 2, 2012 (5 

items); and March 16, 2012 (4 items). Id. Therefore, petitioner 

clearly had sufficient access to the law library before the limitations 

period expired on May 12, 2012. He has not met his burden to show 

that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely 

federal petition.

Dkt. 25 at 6 (footnote omitted). Counsel supports his aforementioned argument with prison logs 

that he received from NKSP and attached as Exhibit 7 to the renewed motion, which consist 

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chiefly of copies of what are purportedly the logs showing Petitioner’s use of the paging process 

to obtain legal materials during the relevant time frame. Dkt. 25, Ex. 7.

In his opposition, Petitioner relies on Bounds, asserting that “[a]ccess to the court requires 

that prison authorities assist inmates to prepare and file meaningful legal papers by providing 

petitioner with adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Dkt. 29 at 9; see Bounds, 

430 U.S. at 828. Petitioner concedes that he “did receive material through the paging process to 

obtain certain material” and does not dispute that the aforementioned prison logs indicate his use 

of such a process. Dkt. 29 at 4. Petitioner adds that some of the materials he requested included: 

“inmate/parolee appeal CDCR 602, proof of service, trust account withdrawal order CDCR 193, 

California Code of Regulations Title 15, Department Operational Manual – DOM, Inmate/Parolee 

request for interview CDCR Form 22, Legal Rights of Prisoners Handbook, and Health Care 

Services Request CDCR Form 7362 etc.” Id. Petitioner complains that he only “received the bare 

minimum (i.e., outdated CCR Title 15/legal books if they were available, and Administrative 

material) via the paging process for two hours inside the cell.” Id. He further argues that 

Respondent “only vaguely accounts for the times I was provided ‘items,’ but doesn’t account for 

times I requested paging services and did not receive [any] assistance.” Id. at 8. He adds the 

“[c]orrectional officers weren’t consistent or reliable with using the paging system . . . .” Id. 

Further, Petitioner points to certain time frames where inmates were “without legal help or use of 

the paging process” in “April-May 2011 (no legal assistance); July 2011 (no legal assistance); 

November-December 2011 (no legal assistance); and April-May 2012 (no legal assistance).” Id.

at 7. Finally, Petitioner contends he did not have access to the “Law Library Electronic Data 

System (LLEDS) computers loaded with electronic copies of legal titles accessible for inmates 

during [his] incarceration of 3-23-2011 to 5-15-2012.” Id. at 6. Petitioner claims the LLEDS 

computers were finally installed “inside until D6 Ad/Seg holding cages as of 2014, which 

functions as a law library.” Id. at 7.6 

 

6

The Court finds Petitioner’s remaining arguments in his opposition unavailing. 

Petitioner’s argument that he “was not aware of the statute of limitations” is contradicted by the 

fact that he has admitted that he “clearly” understood the one-year statute of limitations

requirement. Compare Dkt. 29 at 1-2 with id. at 8-9. Moreover, Petitioner fails to support his 

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Meanwhile, Respondent argues that “regardless whether petitioner personally visited the 

library or had access to a computer, he clearly had sufficient “access to the courts” as

contemplated by Lewis and Ramirez.” Dkt. 30 at 2. Furthermore, Respondent argues that 

Petitioner “fails to identify any particular document that he was unable to obtain in a timely 

manner through the paging system and that he believes was necessary in order to present his 

claim; consequently, he cannot show that the restrictions on library access proximately caused his 

late filing.” Id. (citing Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey 

v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1013-1014 (9th Cir. 2009)). Respondent points out that the “[f]ailure 

to show that a ‘nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated’ is fatal to [Petitioner’s] Bounds 

claim.” Id. at 2 (citing Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 2008)). Therefore,

Respondent contends that Petitioner “has not met his burden to show that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling.” Id. at 2-3 (citing Holland, 560 U.S. at 649; Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1077 

(9th Cir. 2014) (“This is a very high bar, and is reserved for rare cases.”)). 

Upon reviewing the record, this Court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner had law 

library access through the paging process, and notes that Petitioner conceded to taking advantage 

of it during the relevant time period. Petitioner also acknowledged that the “paging system 

consisted of in cell studies for two hours,” but argues that “[t]he inability to research legal books, 

legal materials, or obtain regular access to the law library on a weekly basis did restrict 

Petitioner[’s] adequate assistance, which did cause harm.” Dkt. 29 at 8 (citation omitted). 

However, Petitioner has made conclusory allegations relating to his need for physical law library 

access, and he fails to elaborate why the paging process was insufficient. As Respondent has 

previously pointed out, Petitioner’s August 8, 2011 letter—written three months after the statute of

limitations commenced (on May 10, 2011)—indicated that he wished to pursue a legal claim, and 

 

argument by showing evidence that the prison law library did not have a copy of 28 U.S.C. § 2244

in 2011—fifteen years after AEDPA was enacted in 1996. Equally unavailing is Petitioner’s 

argument that the prison staff could not provide him with the mailing addresses necessary for him 

to mail his state habeas petitions. Id. at 5-6. Petitioner claims that he did not obtain the necessary

addresses until his appellate counsel provided them to him on March 5, 2012. Id. However, 

Petitioner provides no supporting evidence that the prison was unable to provide these addresses. 

Moreover, Petitioner fails to explain why he did not ask his appellate counsel for these addresses

sooner, if in fact he could not obtain them from prison staff or other legal materials. 

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alerted his attorney that “all necessary paperwork is enclosed,” and “all necessary legal documents 

are here to support my argument.” Dkt. 16, Ex. D. In Petitioner’s attached declaration, he shows 

that he was able to set forth a coherent claim concerning conduct credits, and he cited a number of 

supporting cases. Id. Therefore, the Court agrees that Petitioner’s August 8, 2011 letter 

demonstrates his ability to conduct legal research and prepare a legal claim during the relevant 

time period. Petitioner’s attorney timely responded on September 4, 2011 with instructions that 

Petitioner brought up “legal issues” which he would have to “pursue [] with appellate or habeas 

counsel.” Dkt. 29 at 21. The record indicates that while Petitioner lacked physical access to the 

law library from March 23, 2011 through May 15, 2012, he had access to the paging system 

during that relevant time frame, and that he made use of the paging process. Even though 

Petitioner claims he had problems because he only received the “bare minimum” of legal materials 

through the paging process, he fails to show diligence in pursuing his claims because he allowed

six months to pass from September 2011 until March 2012, when he contacted his appellate 

attorney relating to his state habeas petitions. Dkt. 29 at 13-14. The record shows that on March 

5, 2012—two months before the limitations period expired on May 10, 2012—Petitioner’s 

appellate counsel responded to Petitioner’s March 1, 2012 letter, recommended that Petitioner file 

his state appellate and supreme court petitions, and included the necessary court addresses. Dkt. 

29 at 13-14. The appellate attorney also explained that the deadline for the state appellate court 

petition was April 22, 2012. Id. at 13. Instead of immediately filing his state habeas petition, 

Petitioner waited over four months before filing his first state habeas petition in the California 

Supreme Court on July 17, 2012. Dkt. 15, Ex. 1 (Case No. S204213). Thus, it seems that even 

though Petitioner has argued that he lacked physical law library access and such a limitation 

prevented him from filing a timely federal petition, Respondent rebuts such an allegation by: 

(1) showing evidence of Petitioner’s efforts to avail of law library access through the paging 

process and (2) arguing that it was Petitioner’s lack of diligence as opposed to his limited access to 

the law library that was the cause of his untimeliness. In addition, Petitioner has never explained 

why physical access to the law library was necessary at all in the timely filing of his petition.

Furthermore, Petitioner does not deny he was in possession of his state court record, and thus 

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presumably he could have prepared the bulk of the state and federal habeas petitions he filed 

within his cell. In sum, Petitioner fails to show either that he has been diligent or that 

“extraordinary circumstances” stood in his way and prevented a timely filing. 

Lastly, in his opposition to the renewed motion, Petitioner does not dispute that his petition 

is untimely, instead he stresses that aside from his limited access to the law library, he was in need 

of “adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Dkt. 29 at 9. The Court construes the 

aforementioned as Petitioner’s renewed argument that he is entitled to equitable tolling based on 

his pro se status and alleged lack of intelligence. As mentioned in the Court’s Order denying the 

previously-filed motion to dismiss, “ignorance of the law and lack of legal sophistication do not 

alone constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling.” Dkt. 22 at 8 footnote 5

(citing Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006)). When accompanied with the 

fact that Petitioner’s law library access was limited, such circumstances could arguably be 

considered “extraordinary.” However, “it is important to note that the standard for equitable 

tolling requires both the presence of an extraordinary circumstance and the inmate’s exercise of 

diligence.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649; Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. At the time the Court denied 

Respondent’s previously-filed motion to dismiss, the question of Petitioner’s diligence was 

unclear. However, after further factual development of the record, the Court has found above that 

Petitioner has failed to show that he exercised the requisite diligence in attempting to file a timely 

petition. Thus, without the requisite presence of an extraordinary circumstance and Petitioner’s 

exercise of diligence, Petitioner’s allegation of his pro se status alone does not entitle him to 

equitable tolling. Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154; cf. Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295, 299-300 

(5th Cir. 1998) (pro se status during state habeas proceedings did not justify equitable tolling); 

United States v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1993) (pro se status, illiteracy, deafness and 

lack of legal training not external factors excusing abuse of the writ). 

In conclusion, the Court finds that Petitioner’s pro se status and his limited access to the 

prison law library did not make it impossible for him to file a federal petition on time, Beeler, 128 

F.3d 1288; nor were they the cause of his untimeliness, Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Accordingly, 

Respondent’s renewed motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

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Northern District of California

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have been amended to 

require a district court that dismisses or denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate of 

appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. 

foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 

For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a COA is DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Respondent’s renewed motion to dismiss petition (dkt. 25) is GRANTED, and the 

petition is DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. Petitioner may seek a certificate of 

appealability from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate all pending motions, and 

close the file. 

4. This Order terminates Docket No. 25.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

 December 4, 2015

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