Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00766/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00766-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lyndall Dwaine Thompson, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents. 

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 CV-12-00766-TUC-DCB 

 ORDER 

This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald, pursuant 

to the Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, District of Arizona 

(Local Rules), Rule (Civil) 72.1(a). On July 31, 2015, he issued a Report and 

Recommendation (R&R), recommending that the Court dismiss the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

On April 11, 2008, a jury found Petitioner, Lyndall Dwaine Thompson, 

guilty of second degree murder for shooting and killing his brother. On July 14, 

2008, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term of sixteen years 

imprisonment. 

 After the shooting, Petitioner called police and claimed the shooting 

was in self-defense. Prior to being interviewed by police, he was Mirandized and 

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agreed to waive his Miranda rights, act as his own attorney, and answer police 

officer’s questions if they would answer his questions. Thereafter, he made 

incriminating statements. During the interview, police responded to his inquiries 

regarding his brother’s condition by acting like they didn’t know it, but they knew 

his brother was dead. His trial attorney did not seek to suppress the interview and 

a redacted recording of the interview was presented to the jury. Petitioner asserts 

that he did not see a copy of the un-redacted recording until after the trial, and 

Petitioner argues that there were differences in the redacted tape recording played 

to the jury which were so substantial as to amount to a presentation of false 

evidence. 

Petitioner’s claim of self-defense was that he had thrown his hand gun on the 

ground and believed his brother picked it up and was armed, and after he shot his 

brother he also threw his SKS automatic rifle on the ground and ran away. The 

testimony and statements from police were that they found both weapons on the 

top of a vehicle parked in his carport. There was some confusion over whether the 

guns were put there by the defendant or moved there by police because none of the 

investigating officers were responsible for initially locating the gun, and the 

Government in closing admitted: “we would like to know how the guns got there.” 

(Response (Doc. 11-3(A): TR at122.) Petitioner argues his counsel should have 

investigated and discovered which officer actually found the guns and where the 

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guns were found because proof that the guns were found on the ground would have 

supported his assertion of self-defense. Whereas, the guns being found together on 

top of the vehicle totally undermined his self-defense claim. 

On habeas, Petitioner raises eight (8) grounds for relief. First, Petitioner 

alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to an alleged failure to move to 

suppress incriminating statements, which he asserts were unconstitutionally 

obtained by police. Second, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

based on an alleged failure to move for additional disclosure and/or failure to 

investigate who found his weapons and where the guns were located when found. 

The remainder of Petitioner’s claims relate to his assertion that the State used false 

evidence against him because it introduced a redacted recording of his confession, 

which materially misrepresented his statements to the jury. Petitioner asserts that 

an evidentiary hearing is required. (Objection (Doc. 34) at 3 (citing Doody v Ryan, 

649 F.3d 986, 1021 (9th Cir. 2011); Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 

2004)). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The duties of the district court in connection with an R&R by a Magistrate 

Judge are set forth in Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in 

part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 

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72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where the parties object to an R&R, “‘[a] judge of 

the [district] court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the 

[R&R] to which objection is made.’” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). 

This Court's ruling is a de novo determination as to those portions of the 

R&R to which there are objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Wang v. Masaitis, 

416 F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). To the extent that no objection has been 

made, arguments to the contrary have been waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (objections are waived if they are not filed within fourteen days 

of service of the R&R), McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980) 

(failure to object to Magistrate's report waives right to do so on appeal); see also 

Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (citing Campbell v. United States 

Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974) (when no timely objection is filed, 

the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record 

in order to accept the recommendation)). 

The parties were sent copies of the R&R and instructed that, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), they had 14 days to file written objections. See also, Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 72 (party objecting to the recommended disposition has fourteen (14) days 

to file specific, written objections). The Court has considered the objections made 

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by the Petitioner, and the parties’ briefs considered by the Magistrate Judge in 

deciding the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

OBJECTIONS 

 Evidentiary Hearing 

In Petitioner’s Objection to the R&R, he charges that the Magistrate Judge 

erred in failing to order an evidentiary hearing to determine Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims one and two and his false evidence claim five. 

“Specific issues on which an evidentiary hearing is required in this case to resolve 

disputed factual claims include, although are not necessarily limited to: (1) whether 

Petitioner’s counsel performed deficiently in failing to move to suppress 

Petitioner’s custodial statements to police; (2) whether Petitioner’s counsel acted 

unreasonably in failing to further investigate and challenge the initial location of 

the weapons; and (3) whether Petitioner was prejudiced by these failures and 

omissions.” (Objection (Doc. 34) at 9.) 

Petitioner argues he has established a “colorable” claim for relief on counts 

one and two, and five, and he was never been accorded a state evidentiary hearing 

on them. He asserts that Magistrate Judge Macdonald made the same mistake. 

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to a hearing because he has established a colorable 

claim, i.e., he has alleged facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief. 

(Objection (Doc. 34) at 4.) This Court must decide “whether such a hearing could 

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enable [Petitioner] to prove the petition’s factual allegations.” Id. (citing Schriro v. 

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007)). 

The Court denies the Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing because 

he presents no evidence to suggest he could prove the Petition’s factual allegations 

at such a hearing. As noted by the Magistrate Judge: “’Judges are not like pigs, 

hunting for truffles buried in briefs.’” (R&R (Doc. 29) at 54 (quoting Christian 

Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Calif. V. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

In respect to counsel’s failure to investigate who located the guns and where 

the guns were located, the record reflects that all the investigating officers believed 

the guns were found on the top of the vehicle parked in the carport. Petitioner now 

asserts that he “discovered evidence after trial that Sgt. Janes actually discovered 

the weapons—contrary to Janes’ testimony at trial.” (Objection (Doc. 34) at 6.) In 

his Objection, Petitioner complains that the Magistrate Judge found only a “bald 

assertion” of this newly discovered evidence, but Petitioner still does not produce 

the allegedly “discovered evidence.” A bald assertion will not enable the 

Petitioner to prove this fact at an evidentiary hearing. 

In respect to counsel’s failure to move to suppress his incriminating 

statements, the failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se

ineffective assistance of counsel. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 

(1986). It is undisputed that Petitioner was given Miranda warnings prior to 

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making his statements to police. His argument is that his waiver was contingent on 

his agreeing to answer their questions if they answered his questions. About half 

way through the interview, he asked about his brother and police put him off by 

saying they would make inquiries and find out, but they knew his brother was dead. 

Petitioner argues that he intended to waive his right to have an attorney present and 

would act as his own attorney, and therefore, “’police were not allowed to lie or 

create gamesmanship.’” (R&R (Doc. 29) at 29 (quoting Petition (Doc. 1) at 7.) It 

is undisputed that the interviewing officers concealed the fact of his brother’s death 

and used trickery during the interview. 

The Court agrees with the State courts and the Magistrate Judge’s 

conclusion that there was no Miranda violation. “Deception is [] a permitted tactic. 

‘Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise 

to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda's concerns.’” 

Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Illinois v. Perkins, 496 

U.S. 292, 297 (1990)). “‘[T]rickery is not automatically coercion. Indeed, the 

police commonly engage in such ruses as suggesting to a suspect that a confederate 

has just confessed or that police have or will secure physical evidence against the 

suspect.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1061 (9th Cir. 

2004) (additional citations omitted)). 

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As the Magistrate Judge clearly outlined, the alleged quid pro quo promise 

occurred at the beginning of the taped interview. Petitioner told the investigators 

that he understood his rights and intended to act as his own attorney, that they 

could ask him anything and he would ask them anything. If they stopped 

answering, he would stop answering. They said: “ok.” The Court notes that there 

was no promise by either party to answer truthfully. Prior to beginning 

questioning about the incident, as noted by the Magistrate Judge, the detectives 

expressly told Petitioner that there were no promises and if he wanted to stop 

talking he could stop. Petitioner expressly told the detectives that he wanted to talk. 

(R&R (Doc. 29) at 30-31.) 

There was no Miranda violation. The record reflects that the statements 

were voluntary. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the Arizona 

courts got it right under clearly established federal law, Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984), when they concluded that counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to file a motion to suppress. (R&R (Doc. 29) at 32.) 

Petitioner’s false evidence claims, whether based on a due process violation, 

Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967), or a discovery violation, Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83 (1999), fail as well. Petitioner complains that the recording of his 

statements made during his interview with police was redacted by the State in a 

way that misrepresented facts and excluded favorable exculpatory statements. He 

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complains that he discovered this constitutional violation after his trial. To support 

his false evidence claim, Petitioner submits two transcripts. “The two transcripts 

(the 94-page transcript made by the State and the 117-page transcript made by the 

Public Defender’s Office) were materially different . . . .” (Objection (Doc. 34) at 

10) (emphasis in original). There is no Brady violation and no newly discovered 

evidence because the 117-page transcript, which Petitioner asserts reflects the full 

interview, was prepared by his attorney from the original recording which the State 

produced to the defense. Petitioner’s own statement of the facts defeats the Brady 

claim and any assertion of newly discovered evidence. 

The Court turns to Petitioner’s assertion that his constitutional right to a fair 

trial was violated by the presentation to the jury of the redacted recording of the 

interview. He gives “some glaring examples”: 1) the 23 page difference; 2) 

omitted references to Petitioner’s repeated requests about the condition of his 

brother and petitioner being distraught; 3) the redacted transcript changed “I don’t 

know where the .45 is” to “I know where the .45 is,” and 4) it excluded a plethora 

of exculpatory statements. (Objection (Doc. 34) at 11.) 

 The difference in total pages between the two transcripts is not evidence of 

a material difference. Beyond the allegedly “glaring examples,” above, the 

Petitioner refers the Court to the State’s Response, Exhibit 7 pages 34-43, Exhibit 

8 pages 1-43, and Exhibit 9, which is 27 pages long. Again, Petitioner invites the 

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Court to rut through the record. He does not refer the Court to where the redacted 

recording left out his inquiries about his brother. The Court found the first inquiry, 

as noted by the State in closing arguments, was about half way through both 

transcripts. (Response (Doc. 11-7) at 34: TR at 147.) The Court did find the 

discrepancy between the redacted transcript’s change from “I don’t know where 

the .45 is” to “I know where the .45 is.” The Court also stumbled across another 

change from “In the time it takes to figure out what they’ve got in their hand, 

they’re already shooting you” to “I’m already shooting him.” (Response (Doc. 11-

8) at #57.) Petitioner fails to refer the Court to exculpatory evidence that was 

omitted. The Court instead found that at least one exculpatory statement, I 

“defended myself with lethal force,” remained in the redacted transcript. Id. at # 

22. 

As the State courts noted, the redacted transcript was not given to the jury. 

The jury listened to the redacted State-recording. Therefore, the jurors heard what 

the Petitioner said, not what either of the two different transcribers heard. Playing 

the recording for the jury nullified differences between the transcripts attributable 

to the transcripts being prepared by two different transcribers, who apparently 

heard the tape differently. For example, if he said “I don’t know where the .45 is,” 

not “I know where the .45 is” – the jury would have heard the former not the latter. 

It would not matter what the State transcript read. 

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The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge and the State courts: there was 

no material difference between the redacted and unredacted transcripts and for the 

most part differences between the transcripts were remedied by presenting the 

recording to the jury. Petitioner fails to point the Court to any material omission in 

the redacted recording and the Court has found none. 

 The differences between the two transcriptions fail to support Petitioner’s 

assertion that the State presented false evidence for a claim under Miller. The 

Court can say with confidence that if the jury had heard the interview recording as 

transcribed by the Defendant, it would not have produced a different verdict. 

State Courts: Unreasonable Application of Clearly Established Federal Law 

For the reasons explained above, the Magistrate did not err in finding that 

the State courts did not unreasonably apply federal law. The State courts’ 

application of Strickland was reasonable because there was no clear argument that 

the Petitioner’s statements were involuntary. Likewise, Petitioner offers no clear 

argument that further investigation would have revealed the guns were found 

where he said they were found, on the ground. His trial attorney made a 

reasonable strategic choice to challenge the evidence by showing that none of the 

testifying officers were responsible for finding the guns, which forced the State to 

admit in closing that it did not know how the guns got on top of the vehicle. In 

large part, differences between the transcripts were nullified because the jury heard 

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the recording and did not rely on the State’s transcript. To the extent there were 

omissions in the redacted recording, the Petitioner has failed to refer the Court to 

any material omission that would suggest any intent by prosecutors to present false 

evidence. The Court finds that the State courts got it right, and likewise, the 

Magistrate Judge got it right in finding the State courts reasonably applied federal 

law. 

CONCLUSION 

After a de novo review of the issues raised in Petitioner's Objection, this 

Court agrees with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the 

Magistrate Judge in his R&R for determining the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus. The Court adopts the R&R, and for the reasons stated in the R&R, the 

Court denies the Petition. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 29) is 

adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law of this Court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED, and the Clerk of the Court 

shall enter Judgment, accordingly. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitioner’s Motion for a Certificate 

of Appealability (Doc. 36) is GRANTED. 

 Dated this 11th day of January, 2016. 

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