Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_03-cv-00175/USCOURTS-ared-2_03-cv-00175-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Motor Vehicle Product Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HELENA DIVISION

JOHN H. SCHIPP, Administrator of the PLAINTIFFS

Estate of Jerome Neufelder, Deceased, and

KENNETH BRACY and JOCELYN BRACY

v. No. 2:03CV00175 JLH

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION and

ANN KENNEDY DEFENDANTS

ANN KENNEDY CROSS-PLAINTIFF

v.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION CROSS-DEFENDANT

OPINION AND ORDER

Ann Kennedy has filed a crossclaim against General Motors in which she alleges that the

accident at issue in this case was caused by a defect in the pickup truck that she was driving when

the accident occurred. Her lawyers have engaged Drs. Jahan Rasty and Dale Wilson as expert

witnesses to testify regarding the alleged defect. General Motors has moved to exclude the testimony

of Rasty and Wilson pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113

S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and for summary judgment. Both parties have submitted

affidavits and deposition transcripts, thoroughly briefed the issues, and presented evidence and

argument at a Daubert hearing. After careful consideration of the evidence and arguments, the Court

excludes the testimony of Rasty and Wilson as unreliable but denies summary judgment in favor of

General Motors.

I.

On July 24, 2002, Kennedy was driving a 2001 Chevrolet Silverado westbound on Interstate

Highway 40 when she lost control of the vehicle, crossed the center median, and struck two other

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 1 of 22
1

 She also alleges that the vehicle was defective in other unspecified ways. See ¶ 15 of

Kennedy’s crossclaim. Document #47.

2

vehicles. Kennedy testified that the Silverado began weaving, that she suddenly lost the ability to

control the direction of the vehicle, and that the vehicle then shot across the median. Her husband,

Thomas Kennedy, who was in the vehicle with her, testified that he saw the right front fender go

down and then come up. Next, he saw the left front fender go down “markedly,” followed again by

the right side. He testified that each time a side went down, it went down further and “got worse.”

He testified that when the right side went down, the front end of the Silverado moved toward the

right; when the left side went down, the front end of the vehicle moved towards the left. Mr.

Kennedy told his wife during this process not to oversteer, but after the right dip, left dip, and

another right dip, the vehicle “took off across the median.”

Kennedy claims that her vehicle’s left torsion bar adjuster, which is part of the suspension

system, was defective.1 A suspension system functions to isolate vehicle occupants from road

surface irregularities and, although it is distinct from the steering system, contributes to the ride and

handling characteristics of the vehicle. The Silverado’s front suspension system was a torsion bar

suspension system. The torsion bar, which is a steel or steel composite shaft, functions as a spring

in the suspension system and controls the vertical position of the suspension. It is connected from

a lower control arm to an adjustable mount at the torsion bar cross member. A hexagonal hole of

the lower control arm accepts the hexagonal-shaped front end of the torsion bar; the torsion bar

adjuster receives and secures the hexagonal-shaped back end of the torsion bar; and the torsion bar

cross member houses the torsion bar adjuster. The torsion bar adjuster allows adjustment of the ride

height of each side’s front suspension in order to ensure level height at rest.

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 2 of 22
2

 Photographs of the torsion bar adjuster are attached to this opinion.

3

 At the Daubert hearing, Kennedy conceded that Rasty is not qualified to opine that the

fracture of the torsion bar adjuster caused Kennedy to lose control. Kennedy argued that whether

the fracture of the torsion bar adjuster would cause her to lose control is nevertheless a jury

question.

3

Either before or during the accident, the left-side torsion bar adjuster was broken into two

pieces along a vertical plane at the six o’clock and twelve o’clock positions of the hexagonal hole.

A piece of the fractured torsion bar adjuster in the shape of a “y” was recovered; the remaining “u”

shaped piece was never found.2

The experts disagree as to how and when the torsion bar adjuster broke. General Motors’

experts say that it broke due to impact forces from the accident. Kennedy’s experts, Rasty and

Wilson, say that some unspecified manufacturing or material defect in the torsion bar adjuster

induced a fracture along the hexagonal hole which, in turn, caused the torsion bar adjuster to break

under normal operating forces. Rasty and Wilson say that the fracture originated in the lower portion

of the torsion bar adjuster at the six o’clock position of the hexagonal hole. According to their

testimony, the torsion bar adjuster was completely fractured at the six o’clock position of the

hexagonal hole and partially fractured at the twelve o’clock position for a significant period of time

before the accident, at least weeks but possibly months, and that the torsion bar adjuster completely

fractured at the twelve o’clock position immediately before the accident, which caused the torsion

bar adjuster to break into two pieces. Rasty offers the additional opinion that the fracture at the

twelve o’clock position caused the accident. He says that the final fracture of the torsion bar adjuster

meant that the torsion bar adjuster would no longer support the weight of the truck, which shifted

the center of gravity of the truck to the left and caused Kennedy to lose control.3

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 3 of 22
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II.

Rasty is an associate professor of mechanical engineering at Texas Tech University. He

teaches mechanical metallurgy and fracture and failure analysis, among other things. Wilson is a

professor of mechanical engineering at Tennessee Tech University. He researches in the areas of

fracture analysis and failure mechanics, among other things. Except for Rasty’s qualification to

opine that the fracture of the torsion bar caused the accident, General Motors does not dispute the

qualifications of Rasty and Wilson to testify as experts in the area of failure analysis. General

Motors does, however, contend that their testimony should be excluded under Daubert.

“The opinion of a qualified expert witness is admissible if (1) it is based upon sufficient facts

or data, (2) it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the expert has applied the

principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Canon U.S.A.,

Inc., 394 F.3d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing FED. R. EVID. 702). The inquiry “entails a

preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testing is

scientifically valid and of whether the reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts

in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S. Ct. at 2796. “Ordinarily, a key question to be

answered . . . will be whether [a theory] can be (and has been) tested.” Id. at 593, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.

Scientific methodology is “based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be

falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.”

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Other factors may include: whether the theory

has been subjected to peer review and publication; what the known or potential rate of error is; the

existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation; whether the theory has

received “general acceptance” in the relevant scientific community, whether the expertise was

developed for litigation or naturally flowed from the expert’s research; whether the proposed expert

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 4 of 22
4

 ASM International is a professional organization for those who work with metals,

composites, ceramics, polymers, and electronic materials.

5

ruled out alternate explanations; and whether the expert sufficiently connected the proposed

testimony with the facts of the case. Id. at 593-94; 113 S. Ct. at 2797; Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc.,

270 F.3d 681, 687 (8th Cir. 2001). The inquiry is flexible, but the focus is always on the principles

and methodology used by the proffered expert, not on the conclusions generated. Daubert, 509 U.S.

594-95, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.

The gatekeeping obligation that Rule 702 imposes on the district court applies to all expert

testimony, including that of engineers, not merely to “scientific” testimony as distinct from

“technical” testimony. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L.

Ed. 2d 238 (1999).

The ASM Handbook, an authoritative publication by ASM International,4 outlines the

principal stages of a failure investigation and analysis as follows:

• Collection of background data and selection of samples

• Preliminary examination of the failed part (visual examination and record

keeping)

• Nondestructive testing

• Mechanical testing (including hardness and toughness testing)

• Selection, identification, preservation, and/or cleaning of all specimens

• Macroscopic examination and analysis (fracture surfaces, secondary cracks,

and other surface phenomena)

• Microscopic examination and analysis

• Selection and preparation of metallographic sections

• Examination and analysis of metallographic sections

• Determination of failure mechanism

• Chemical analyses (bulk, local, surface corrosion products, deposits or

coatings, and electron microprobe analysis)

• Analysis of fracture mechanics

• Testing under simulated service conditions (special tests)

• Analysis of all the evidence, formulation of conclusions, and writing the

report (including recommendations).

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 5 of 22
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D.A. Ryder et al., General Practice in Failure Analysis, in 11ASMHANDBOOK (William T. Becker

et al. eds., 2002). Rasty testified that investigations differ according to circumstances and that an

engineer might not complete every stage in any particular investigation. Still, these steps define the

general practice in failure analysis and represent a reliable method of failure investigation and

analysis. Cf. Fireman’s Fund, 394 F.3d at 1057-58 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 113 S. Ct. at

2797).

Rasty’s opinion is based primarily on visual examination. The lower arm fracture surface

appears corroded and is darker in color than the upper arm fracture surface. Rasty opined that the

surface of the torsion bar adjuster arm at the six o’clock position was rust, which meant, he said, that

the surface of the fractured area had been exposed to the elements for a significant period of time

before the accident. A small segment of apparent corrosion is found at the fracture at the twelve

o’clock position, which according to Rasty, means that a small fracture at the twelve o’clock position

existed a significant time before the accident. Rasty opined that the torsion bar fractured completely

at the twelve o’clock position just before the accident, which in turn caused the weight of the vehicle

to shift to the left, as a result of which Kennedy lost control. In addition to the corrosion on the

fracture surface at the six o’clock position and on a small portion of the fracture surface at the twelve

o’clock position, Rasty pointed to the witness marks on the torsion bar adjuster and the nature of the

fracture as evidence that the fracture was caused by ordinary pressures of the torsion bar, not by the

collision.

Rasty did not perform subsequent steps of failure analysis, which is to say that he did not

perform steps that might disconfirm his opinion.

Rasty testified at his deposition, “if that material [on the fracture surface at the six o’clock

position] is not ferrous oxide [rust] and it’s predominantly dirt, you know, then basically it shoots

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 6 of 22
5

 At the Daubert hearing, Rasty testified on examination by Kennedy’s lawyer that the

torsion bar adjuster was made of cast steel. When told by General Motors’ lawyer that it actually

7

our – it shoots our theory basically.” Yet, he did not conduct chemical analysis of the material on

the fracture surface. Wilson and one of General Motors’ experts, Thomas Proft, analyzed the surface

of the fracture at the six o’clock position using a scanning electron microscope and energy dispersive

spectroscopy, which allows the determination of the chemistry of materials observed in the

microscope. It is undisputed that the chemical composition of the material on the fracture surface

is typically found in dirt. In fact, Proft analyzed a sample of dirt from the scene of the accident and

found that the chemical composition of that dirt matched the chemical composition of the materials

found on the fracture surface of the torsion bar adjuster. The material on the fracture surface is not

predominantly rust.

For purposes of the Daubert motion, the important point is not that Rasty’s opinion was

wrong; the important point is that he did not do the chemical analysis that could confirm or

disconfirm his theory. That analysis is one of the steps in general practice in failure analysis,

according to the ASM Handbook. Rasty’s failure to perform that step in the analysis leaves his

opinion – that the material on the fracture surface at the six o’clock position is rust – unreliable.

Rasty opined that the torsion bar adjuster was defective. He did not specify the nature of the

defect. He did say that the defect must have been present at the time the vehicle left the

manufacturer. The evidence showed that this opinion can be tested. The evidence showed that it

is feasible to use metallographic sectioning to analyze the material in the torsion bar adjuster to

determine the presence or absence of inherent material flaws. Proft performed this analysis and

found what one would expect for properly cast ductile iron of the type used in making the torsion

bar adjuster.5 According to Proft, the images showed no casting defect, porosity or shrinkage

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 7 of 22
is made of ductile iron, Rasty said, “it’s in the iron family is what I meant” and “I misspoke on

that.”

8

problems, high temperature oxide, or anything else indicative of a material or manufacturing flaw.

Instead, the features indicated what he called a “rapidly running, single-cycle” overload fracture, that

is, a fracture caused by stress imposed above the tensile strength of the material.

Again, for purposes of the Daubert motion, the significance of this examination is not the

conclusions drawn from it by Proft. The significance is that such an examination is part of general

practice in failure analysis. Such analysis is necessary to the formation of a reliable opinion; yet,

Rasty did not perform it. He did no metallographic sectioning. He testified that he was told that he

could not perform destructive testing. In December 2004, the Court entered an agreed order that

prohibited destructive testing except by agreement of the parties or a subsequent order. General

Motors sought and obtained (over Kennedy’s objection) a court order permitting destructive testing.

Kennedy never sought an agreement or an order to permit Rasty to perform the same testing. Rasty

was invited to attend the examination performed by Proft, but he did not go. Kennedy could have

sought and would have obtained agreement from the other parties or a court order to allow Rasty to

perform metallographic sectioning but did not. For whatever reason, Rasty did not perform the step,

which is part of the general practice in failure analysis. His opinion is unreliable.

One of the key issues surrounding Rasty’s opinion in this case is whether a torsion bar

adjuster with a complete fracture at the six o’clock position of the hexagonal hole and a partial

fracture at the twelve o’clock position could sustain the weight of the Silverado for any amount of

time without breaking. Rasty’s opinion assumes that a torsion bar adjuster fractured at the six

o’clock position of the hexagonal hole can support the weight of the vehicle for weeks or months.

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 8 of 22
9

The evidence shows that the issue of whether a fractured torsion bar adjuster would support

the weight of the vehicle could be analyzed in two ways. First, mathematical calculations can

provide evidence of whether it is possible for a fractured torsion bar adjuster to sustain the weight

of the vehicle. Second, the installation of a torsion bar adjuster severed at the six o’clock position

on a Silverado can provide evidence of whether the torsion bar adjuster will support the weight of

the vehicle. General Motors’ experts did both of these things. They performed mathematical

calculations that purport to show that a fractured torsion bar adjuster will not sustain the weight of

a Silverado. They also severed a torsion bar adjuster at the six o’clock position and installed it on

a Silverado. The torsion bar adjuster snapped as soon as the weight of the vehicle was placed on it.

Rasty disputes the calculations performed by the General Motors expert, which he says are

based on the assumption that the torsion bar adjuster is a straight member, whereas in reality it is a

curved member. He also cites “a number of errors” made in the analysis. Yet he did not offer

calculations based on the assumption that the torsion bar adjusting arm is a curved member. Rasty

says that the calculations of General Motors’ expert “do not demonstrate that it is a mathematical

impossibility that the torsion bar adjuster could retain the hexagonal end of the torsion bar with the

bottom half of the hexagonal loop of the torsion bar adjuster severed.” For purposes of this motion,

we assume that Rasty is correct – the calculations offered by General Motors do not show that it is

mathematically impossible for a severed torsion bar adjuster to support the weight of the vehicle.

However, for purposes of the Daubert motion, the important point is that Rasty did not perform

calculations to show that it is mathematically possible for a fractured torsion bar adjuster to support

the weight of the vehicle. His opinion assumes that it is possible for a torsion bar adjuster fractured

at the six o’clock position of the hexagonal loop to support the weight of the vehicle for a significant

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 9 of 22
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period of time – long enough for rust to form on the surface of the fracture – but he did no

calculations to determine whether that is possible.

Nor did he perform a test by fracturing an adjuster at the six o’clock position and installing

it on a Silverado. It should be an easy test to perform. Rasty testified that he thought of performing

the test but could not find a vehicle comparable to Kennedy’s 2001 Silverado. It is difficult to

believe that Rasty could not find a Silverado in or around Lubbock, Texas, where he lives, or that

Kennedy’s lawyers, who practice in Memphis, Tennessee, could not find one. Even if it is true that

Rasty could not find a Silverado of the same generation as the 2001 model, the fact remains that

Rasty’s opinion in this case rests on a significant assumption – that a torsion bar adjuster fractured

at the six o’clock position of the hexagonal loop could support the weight of a pickup truck – and

Rasty has not tested the assumption in any manner.

To summarize, Rasty’s opinions rest largely on visual examination. General practice in

failure analysis, as reflected in the ASM Handbook, requires further testing. In this instance, such

testing would include chemical analysis of the materials on the fracture surface using scanning

electronic microscope analysis, metallographic sectioning, and testing under simulated conditions

to see whether a fractured torsion bar adjuster would support the weight of the vehicle. Rasty

performed none of these tests. In essence, he adopted a hypothesis but failed to test it. His opinions

are therefore unreliable. His testimony is excluded.

Wilson, who did perform chemical analysis, testified that the deposits on the fracture surfaces

are predominately something other than rust and that only faint traces of rust existed. According to

him, for the most part, these deposits “appear to be just deposits” and are “not corrosion products.”

This fact did not alter Wilson’s opinion because his opinion depended more on his belief that the

deposits, whatever they are, would have taken weeks or months to form. Wilson conducted no

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 10 of 22
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testing to confirm this belief; he relied solely on his past experience of examining fracture surfaces.

Wilson also was aware that whether a fractured torsion bar adjuster would support the weight of the

vehicle was a critical issue, but he did nothing to determine whether his assumption that a fractured

torsion bar adjuster would support the vehicle was true. Wilson discussed the issue with Kennedy’s

accident reconstructionist but, as he stated at his deposition, he doesn’t “think we have ever known

[the answer] one way or the other.” Wilson admits that he was capable of calculating the amount

of force a fractured torsion bar adjuster could withstand if he was provided the proper data, but that

he has not performed those calculations. He testified at one point in his deposition that he began

performing them but “ended up seeing that I was doing that for a Dodge truck instead of . . . so the

dimensions weren’t – I didn’t have the correct dimensions.” Elsewhere, he testified that he had not

performed them because he hadn’t been asked to. Wilson testified that Kennedy’s team had also

tried to set up a physical experiment to test this issue but that they “didn’t have the capacity to do

that experiment.”

In short, Wilson’s opinion suffers from the same lack of testing as Rasty’s. His testimony

will be excluded.

III.

A court should enter summary judgment if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Cheshewalla

v. Rand & Son Constr. Co., 415 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2005). The party moving for summary

judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 11 of 22
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If the moving party carries its burden, the nonmoving party must “come forward with ‘specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475

U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1985) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e))

(emphasis in original). A genuine issue for trial exists only if there is sufficient evidence to allow

a jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2511.

When a nonmoving party cannot make an adequate showing on a necessary element of the case on

which that party bears the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. The Court is required to view the facts in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party and must give that party the benefit of all reasonable

inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts. United States v. Friedrich, 402 F.3d 842, 845 (8th

Cir. 2005).

A supplier of a product is liable for damages when the product supplied was in a defective

condition that rendered it unreasonably dangerous and the defective condition was a proximate cause

of the harm. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-86-102. Expert testimony is not necessary in every product

liability case. Dancy v. Hyster Co., 127 F.3d 649, 653 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating Arkansas law).

“Strictly speaking, since proof of negligence is not an issue, res ipsa loquitur has no application to

strict liability; but the inferences which are the core of the doctrine remain, and are no less

applicable.” Higgins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 287 Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741, 743 (1985).

“Consequently, ‘[p]roof of a specific defect is not required when common experience teaches the

accident would not have occurred in the absence of a defect.’” Dancy, 127 F.3d at 653 (quoting id.).

That said, “[t]he mere fact of an accident, standing alone, as where an automobile goes into the ditch,

does not make out a case that the product was defective, nor does the fact that it was found in a

defective condition after the event, where it appears equally likely that it was caused by the accident

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 12 of 22
13

itself.” Harrell Motors, Inc. v. Flanery, 272 Ark. 105, 108, 612 S.W.2d 727, 729 (1981). “Generally

speaking, when a vehicle suddenly goes out of control while being operated, driver error is a likely

cause, absent a reliable explanation in the alternative.” Yielding v. Chrysler Motor Co., 301 Ark.

271, 275, 783 S.W.2d 353, 355 (1990). Relevant then is the extent to which the plaintiff has negated

other possible causes. Dancy, 127 F.3d at 653.

As noted, Kennedy testified that the Silverado began weaving and then, after she lost control

of the steering, suddenly shot across the median. Her testimony was not that the vehicle pulled to

the left; her testimony was that she would turn the steering wheel but the wheels would not respond.

The relevant portion of her testimony is as follows:

Q . . . . So you’re driving down the road and we’re getting pretty close to where

the accident is going to happen. What is the first thing you notice that made you

concerned or was out of the ordinary?

A Just that we were kind of weaving on the road.

Q Okay.

A And I couldn’t – I had both hands on the steering wheel. And when I would

turn the steering wheel, I had no control over how the direction the vehicle was going

and no control over the steering wheel, the steering at all.

Q And did that happen just out of the blue?

A Just out of the blue.

Q You don’t recall hitting anything or making an evasive maneuver or anything

like that?

A No, I do not.

Q Did you hear any noises?

A No.

Q Okay. And I assume – 

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 13 of 22
14

A Not that I remember.

Q You will have heard some noises once the accident scenario was happening

and you are colliding with things, but – 

A Yes.

Q But as far as when you experienced this inability to steer the vehicle, there

was no noise, no – 

A Not that I remember.

Q Okay. And did you – did you make any comment or remark when you first

experienced this phenomenon of not being able to control the steering?

A The only thing that I remember is my husband saying, don’t over steer. And

I said, I’m not. I just had no control over it. And then, the next thing I know, we

were shooting across the median. And I remember say, oh, no. And – 

Q The – this absence of ability to control the steering, was that during the time

that you’re shooting across the median?

A No. Prior to it.

Q Before?

A Prior.

Q And so, is it your belief that you went from the outside lane through the

inside lane – 

A Yes.

Q – to get to the median? Okay. Didn’t hit anything at this point?

A No.

Q How – what is your best estimate of how long you experienced this inability

to control the steering wheel before you hit the median?

A A matter of seconds probably.

Q Very, very fast?

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 14 of 22
15

A I don’t know. Somewhere – you know, those things just happen so fast, you

can’t even tell. 30 to 60 seconds, I would guess. It wasn’t long at all. Didn’t have

time to think about how to correct the situation.

Q Do you recall your husband making any other comment other than don’t over

steer?

A No, I don’t.

* * *

Q I hate to go back through the actual accidents again, because I know it is

difficult for you. But now let [me] make sure I’m understanding. The inability – the

inability to steer is what I want to ask you another question about. Are you telling

me that you were able to turn the steering wheel and it simply did not control the

wheels, or you were not physically able to turn the steering wheel?

A I believe that I was able to turn the steering wheel, but nothing was

responding.

Q So you think you were able to turn the steering wheel to the right and to the

left – 

A And was getting no response.

Q – and that action was simply not having an effect on the front wheels?

A That’s correct.

Mr. Kennedy testified that he witnessed the front fender drop, once on the right, once on the

left, and then again on the right. Mr. Kennedy testified that the direction of the vehicle would move

in the direction of the side which dropped. Right before the car “took off across the median,” Mr.

Kennedy told his wife not to oversteer. Even if Rasty and Wilson were permitted to testify that the

torsion bar adjuster snapped shortly before the accident, there is no evidence that the failure of the

torsion bar adjuster would cause the vehicle to move in the manner described by either of the

Kennedys.

Case 2:03-cv-00175-JLH Document 169 Filed 08/10/06 Page 15 of 22
6

 Rasty testified that a defective torsion bar adjuster would “affect the handling of a

vehicle and more likely than not create a risk of a loss of control when [it] failed.” He opined

that complete fracture of the left torsion bar adjuster in a vehicle traveling 60 to 70 miles per

hour (the speed that Kennedy was traveling) and maneuvering a right curve, would “result in the

sudden drop in height of the left side of the vehicle, which in turn would cause the momentum of

the vehicle to suddenly shift to the left creating a sudden pull to the left.” According to him, this

sudden drop and pull would result in a loss of control of the vehicle and the vehicle would veer

left.

16

Failure mode analyses by General Motors lists as potential effects of a failed torsion bar

adjuster, among other things, “ride degradation” and “potential steer input.” David Wood, an expert

for General Motors, testified in his affidavit that:

[i]f a torsion bar or a torsion bar adjuster were to break, the vertical “at rest” height

of the affected wheel position would no longer be maintained. That wheel position’s

suspension would “drop” to a fully deflected position, and the lower control arm

would come to rest (or “bottom out”) against a urethane jounce bumper. The jounce

bumper would then be carrying the vertical load (instead of the vertical load being

converted to a twisting torque in the torsion bar). This would result in the affected

corner of the vehicle riding significantly lower than the normal “at rest” position.

This change in height would be approximately four to five inches with no load in the

vehicle, and the vehicle would “lean” approximately four to five degrees towards the

affected side as a result. A small steering torque (or pull) could occur as a result;

however, this would not change the driver’s ability to steer and to control the

vehicle’s path.

Kennedy initially offered Rasty’s opinions as to what impact the alleged failure would have

on Kennedy’s driving.6

 At the Daubert hearing, however, Kennedy agreed that Rasty was not

qualified to testify as an expert on the issue of the Silverado’s handling and stability. No one then

has stated that a failure of the torsion bar adjuster would cause Kennedy’s Silverado to take off

uncontrollably to the left as Kennedy described or to cause the front fenders alternatively to go up

and down as her husband described. Cf. Higgins, 287 Ark. at 394, 699 S.W.2d at 744. Wood’s

testimony that a failure of the torsion bar adjuster would not change the driver’s ability to steer is

undisputed.

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The issue, then, is whether the testimony of Kennedy and her husband suffices to defeat

General Motors’ motion for summary judgment. For purposes of ruling on the motion for summary

judgment, the Court is obligated to assume that the sworn testimony of Kennedy and her husband

is true. Jonnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 431 F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 2005). If that testimony is true, driver

error is negated; and, if that testimony is true, a nearly new Silverado experienced some failure in

the steering mechanism while Kennedy was driving at 65 miles per hour on an interstate highway.

In Higgins, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated, “We note that under appropriate

circumstances, a user’s testimony alone may be sufficient evidence.” Higgins, 287 Ark. at 392, 699

S.W.2d at 743. In support of that proposition, the court cited, among other authorities, Stackiewicz

v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 686 P.2d 925 (Nev. 1984). In Stackiewicz, the plaintiff and her

mother testified that, as they were driving at 50-55 miles per hour, the steering wheel locked and

would not turn, which caused an accident. Plaintiff’s counsel “retained various experts who were

unable to find a defect in the steering mechanism.” Id. at 927. A jury returned a verdict for the

plaintiff. The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Supreme Court of

Nevada reversed saying, “evidence of a steering malfunction which resulted in the driver losing

control of the vehicle might properly be accepted by the trier of fact as sufficient circumstantial proof

of a defect, or an unreasonably dangerous condition, without direct proof of the mechanical cause

of the malfunction.” Id. at 929. Other courts, presented with a steering malfunction and similar

proof, have ruled in line with Stackiewicz. See Stewart v. Ford Motor Co., 553 F.2d 130, 140 (D.C.

Cir. 1977) (“Plaintiffs were entitled to ask the jury to infer that the accident was caused by some

unknown defect which caused the steering system to malfunction.”); Buckley v. Gen. Motors Corp.,

2004 WL 725933 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Plaintiff’s testimony that the vehicle veered in a direction she

did not steer and failed to slow when she applied the brakes avoided summary judgment even though

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her expert was excluded.); Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 332 F. Supp. 901, 903 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff’d,

471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973) (“If he is unable by expert testimony to pinpoint the defect he can still

fall back on the fact of malfunction as evidence of a defect.”); Millette v. Radosta, 404 N.E.2d 823,

835 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (“Radosta testified that the steering suddenly failed and the failure caused

the accident. This testimony, alone, if believed, established that the vehicle was defective at the time

of the accident.”); Walczak v. Gen. Motors Corp., 340 N.E.2d 684 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (Plaintiff’s

testimony that the steering locked in a new vehicle was sufficient. Proof of a specific defect was not

required.); Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 332 A.2d 599 (N.J. 1975) (Plaintiff’s testimony that the

steering mechanism locked on his nearly new vehicle was sufficient circumstantial evidence of a

defect.); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 423 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (“Plaintiff’s

testimony that the steering wheel ‘seized right up’ and that it ‘would not turn’ was sufficient to

establish prima facie in strict products liability that a defect . . . existed . . . .”); Ducko v. Chrysler

Motors Corp., 639 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (“Mrs. Ducko’s testimony of the erratic

performance of the vehicle’s steering and braking systems . . . was sufficient to make a prima facie

case of a manufacturing defect in the vehicle.”); MacDougall v. Ford Motor Corp., 257 A.2d 676,

680 (Pa. 1969) (“Mrs. MacDougall’s testimony of the bizarre steering action both before and when

the accident occurred establishes a mechanical malfunction in the absence of abnormal use which

prevented her from maintaining control of the car.”). See also Christopher H. Hall, Strict Products

Liability: Product Malfunction or Occurrence of Accident as Evidence of Defect, 65 A.L.R. 4th 346

(1988).

General Motors relies upon an opinion by Judge Eisele in Ruminer v. General Motors Corp.,

No. 4:03CV00349 GTE (E.D. Ark. Feb. 6, 2006) (Document #149). There, the plaintiff contended

that the fact that the seatbelt system did not restrain him, or did not restrain him adequately, was

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sufficient to establish that the seatbelt system was defective. Judge Eisele held that, in the absence

of proof of a specific defect, the plaintiff must negate other causes of the seatbelt failure. The

evidence showed that a seatbelt may fail for many reasons other than a manufacturing or design

defect. Judge Eisele said, “Most, if not all, of these ‘potential causes’ appear to occur postmanufacture.” Id. at 9. Hence, the plaintiff did not negate possible causes other than a defect. Id.

at 15.

Here, the present state of the evidence leaves only two alternative causes for the accident:

either Kennedy lost control of the vehicle through driver error, or she lost control due to a

malfunction of the steering mechanism. Her testimony, and that of her husband, if believed, negates

driver error. It is for a jury to decide whether the Kennedys should be believed.

If the jury believes the testimony of Kennedy and her husband, it will find that the accident

was not caused by driver error but by some sudden, unexpected malfunction in the steering

mechanism of a nearly new vehicle. According to Stackiewicz, and the other cases cited, that

evidence is sufficient circumstantial proof of a defect to permit a finding against the manufacturer.

Therefore, General Motors’ motion for summary judgment is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons herein, the Court grants the motion of General Motors to exclude from

evidence the testimony of Dr. Jahan Rasty and Dr. Dale Wilson. Document #136. The Court denies

summary judgment in favor of General Motors on Kennedy’s crossclaim. Document #138. General

Motors also moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ complaint against it. For the same

reasons that the Court denies General Motors’ motion for summary judgment on the crossclaim of

Ann Kennedy, the Court also denies summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims against General

Motors. Document #30. Kennedy’s motion to strike is denied as moot. Document #153.

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IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of August, 2006.

J. LEON HOLMES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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