Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02672/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02672-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOE et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ALAMEDA UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-02672 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs, a minor and her parents, filed this action against defendants under 42

U.S.C. section 1681 (“Title IX”) and 42 U.S.C. section 1983, as well as various state law and

tort claims, arising out of a purported incident of child molestation by a teacher at a daycare

center. Now pending is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Alameda

Unified School District (“AUSD” or “District”), Woodstock Child Development Center

(“Center”), and Woodstock Elementary School (collectively “City defendants”). The

individual defendant, Roy Cameron, is not part of this motion. After carefully considering

the parties’ moving papers, including supplemental briefing, and with the benefit of oral

argument, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART. This Memorandum and Order supercedes the previous Memorandum and Order on

this motion, which shall be deleted from the docket forthwith. 

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2

BACKGROUND

I. Undisputed Facts

The facts of this case are limited and straight-forward. In July and August of 2003,

plaintiff M. Doe was a four year-old student at Woodstock Child Development Center

(“Center”), a daycare facility operated by the Alameda Unified School District. Defendant

Roy Cameron was a teacher at the Center. Plaintiffs claim that Cameron sexually assaulted

her some time between July 21, 2003, and August 10, 2003. A police investigation followed,

and upon learning of this investigation, the District suspended Cameron before eventually

dismissing him. 

At least one year prior to this incident, Diana Chiobotti, received complaints from

staff members about Cameron’s conduct in interacting with children. The specifics of the

complaints and the conduct are in dispute. It is undisputed that Chiobotti, the director of the

Center at all relevant times, had discussed with defendant Cameron the proper way to hold

children in response to some complaints by other Center employees at the staff meeting. 

Chiobotti received no other complaints at any other time regarding Cameron. 

II. Procedural History

After exhausting administrative remedies with the District, plaintiffs filed an

Amended Complaint on September 10, 2004, alleging federal law claims under Title IX and

section 1983, as well as a number state law claims. On October 14, 2005, City defendants

filed this motion for summary judgment. The Court held oral argument on November 21,

2005, at which time it permitted the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issue of of

Chiobotti’s policy-making authority. 

Of particular relevance, defendants contend in their motion that there is no admissible

evidence to support plaintiffs’ claim that Cameron sexually abused or molested M. Doe. 

Even if he did, defendants argue that the District had no prior actual notice of sexual abuse or

molestation as required under Title IX, and there is no evidence that the District had an

official custom or policy that resulted in the deprivation of M. Doe constitutional right as

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In their Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants also

contest whether M. Doe’s parents have standing to make the section 1983 and state law claims.

Yet defendants do not address plaintiffs’ response to this in their Reply. In addition, plaintiffs’

supplemental brief represented to the Court that plaintiffs’ counsel intends to file an application

for guardian ad litem on behalf of M. Doe’s parents. For these reasons, the Court finds that the

Doe parents have standing to pursue this litigation at this time. This ruling does not prevent

defendants from raising issues of standing related to specific claims at a later date.

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required under section 1983.1 Finally, defendants claim that the City did not act negligently

in hiring, supervising, or retaining Cameron.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). In applying this standard,

the Court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Diruzza v. County of Tehama, 323 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003). 

A principle purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to isolate and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A

party moving for summary judgment that does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial has the initial burden of producing evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claims or showing that the non-moving party does not have enough evidence

of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. See Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). 

If the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production, Rule 56(e) “requires

the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by affidavits or by the ‘depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

The non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s

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 The Court assumes that this 2005 date is an obvious typographical error in the plaintiff’s

answer. The next sentence in the answer reads that the other plaintiffs found out about this

conduct “during the period of August 1 through about August 10, 2003.” Exh. B, at p. 9:15-19.

Based on the defense’s motion and reply and the plaintiff’s opposition, there seems to be no

dispute or misunderstanding among the parties that the time period at issue concerning this

conduct is 2003, not 2005.

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evidence, but instead must produce admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue

of material fact for trial. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1102. A genuine

issue of fact is one that could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is

“material” only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).

DISCUSSION

I. Deprivation of M. Doe’s Rights

A deprivation of M. Doe’s constitutional rights is a necessary predicate to claims

under both Title IX and section 1983. Despite defendants’ contention that there is no

admissible evidence of sexual abuse or molestation of M. Doe by Cameron, plaintiffs submit

a response to interrogatories which outlines Cameron’s specific conduct that amounted to

sexual abuse. See M. Doe’s Second Supplemental Objections and Answers, Set No. 1, Exh.

B, at 9:15-19 (stating that “Cameron put his finger in and/or around her vagina, and . . . he

put his finger on and/or up her anus”). In addition, the answer states that these acts “occurred

most recently some time during the period July 21 through August 10, 2005.”2 Exh. B at

9:16-17. This is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact to be decided by an appropriate

fact-finder. See, e.g., Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th

Cir. 2005) (noting that it is not proper for a court to make credibility determinations

regarding answers to interrogatories in a motion for summary judgment); see also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c) (noting that summary judgment is only proper when “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

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3Because the answers to the interrogatories are sufficient to get past summary judgment

here, the Court has no occasion to determine the admissibility of statements made to the parents

Doe or to M. Doe’s doctor.

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that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law”) (emphasis added).3

II. Title IX Claim

A. Legal Standard for Municipal Liability Under Title IX

A school district may be held liable under Title IX for the sexual harassment of a

student by one of its teachers only if a district official, who at minimum has authority to

institute corrective measures on the district’s behalf, had (1) actual notice of the teacher’s

misconduct and (2) was nonetheless deliberately indifferent to that intentional misconduct. 

See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998). The Supreme Court

rejected the use of agency analysis, stating that it would “frustrate the purposes of Title IX”

to permit recovery based on principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice. See

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285. The “high standard imposed in Gebser sought to eliminate any ‘risk

that the recipient would be liable in damages not for its own official decision but instead for

its employees’ independent actions.’” Davis v. Monroe Cty Sch. Dist., 526 U.S. 629, 643

(1999) (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-291). 

B. Analysis

1. Actual Notice

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the contours of the actual notice standard under

Gebser. Other courts have attempted to define an appropriate standard that does not require

the plaintiff-student to complain of the precise type of harassment upon which the allegations

are based, but which ensures that the school had sufficient knowledge to implement remedial

measures that should have addressed the alleged conduct underlying the plaintiff’s claims. 

Courts have recognized that it “requires more than a simple report of inappropriate conduct

by a teacher” but less than “a clearly credible report of sexual abuse from the plaintiffstudent.” Doe A. v. Green, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1034 (D. Nev. 2004) (quoting Doe v. Sch.

Admin Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 63 (D. Me. 1999). Prior complaints from the student

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4As the director of the daycare center, Chiobotti is the “appropriate person” to whom

concerns about sexual harassment or abuse by teachers at the Center should be reported. This

is a different inquiry than whether she has final policy-making authority under section 1983,

discussed infra.

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would constitute actual notice even if the conduct complained of was not identical to the

subsequent allegations. See id. at 1033-1034 (citing cases). The same standard also would

logically apply if a parent of the plaintiff-student or another teacher reported improper

conduct to the school. The Court concurs with the pervailing standard among many other

district courts around the country that “the institution must have possessed enough

knowledge of the harassment that it reasonably could have responded with remedial

measures to address the kind of harassment upon which plaintiff’s legal claim is based.” 

Folkes v. New York College of Osteopathic Med., 214 F. Supp. 2d 273, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)

(quoting Crandell v. New York College of Osteopathic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304, 320

(S.D.N.Y. 2000)); see also Johnson v. Galen Health Institutes, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 679, 688

(W.D. Ky. 2003) (citing cases). 

There is no dispute that Anna Roche and others informed Diana Chiobotti, the Center

director,4 at a staff meeting in early 2002 of concerns about the “inappropriate” manner in

which Cameron held children at times. There is also no dispute that Chiobotti responded to

these concerns by discussing the proper method of holding children with Cameron after this

meeting. Plaintiffs further concede that Chiobotti never received express complaints that

Cameron had sexually molested or abused other students. Moreover, there is no admissible

evidence in the record that the topic of Cameron’s conduct in interacting with students was

ever brought to the attention of Chiobotti at a different time. 

The parties disagree, however, about whether Chiobotti received any complaints

relating to conduct other than Cameron’s inappropriate method of holding children. In her

deposition, Roche describes two incidents where she witnessed what appeared to be improper

conduct by Cameron. The first related to an incident where she saw Cameron inappropriately

hold a child. Exh. E, at 13-18. The second incident involved an attempt by Cameron to kiss a

child in a classroom. Id. at 22-24. Roche subsequently testified that she told Chiobotti about

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“the two incidents that I saw” at the staff meeting. Id. at 29. Defendants argue that Chiobotti

only received complaints about inappropriate holding and she took the proper remedial

measures in light of that complaint. Although the evidence supporting plaintiffs’ contention

that Chiobotti knew of the kissing incident is sparse, the Court must make all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party on a motion for summary judgment. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs submit enough admissible evidence to infer that

Roche informed Chiobotti that Cameron appeared to try to kiss a student. If true, this

knowledge of sexual abuse would plainly satisfy the actual notice standard and therefore put

the Center on notice that there was a substantial risk of future harassment. Because the Court

finds that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether the Center was on notice of

the second incident involving an attempted kiss, the Court does not need to determine

whether the reports of inappropriate holding are sufficient to put the Center on notice of a

substantial risk of future harassment that is alleged here.

2. Deliberate Indifference

If actual notice is provided, an official’s response is deemed “deliberately indifferent”

only where the response “is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” See

Davis, 526 U.S. at 648 (1999); see also Williams v. Paint Valley Local School District, 400

F.3d 360, 368 (6th Cir. 2005). This is not a mere reasonableness standard; rather, the

heightened standard of “not clearly unreasonable” is more easily satisfied as a matter of law. 

Davis, 526 U.S. at 649. 

Both parties agree that Chiobotti spoke to Cameron following the staff meeting. But

the record reveals that Chiobotti merely discussed how to properly hold children with

Cameron. See Deposition of Diana Chiobotti at 19-21. There is no evidence in the record to

support a finding that Chiobotti took any remedial measures regarding allegations of sexual

harassment. As a result, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the Center’s response of

speaking with Cameron about how to properly hold a child was clearly unreasonable when

there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a claim that the Center was on notice that

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5Plaintiffs appear to make a retaliation claim under Title IX, as well, although the basis

for this claim is unclear from the record. Because the Court denies summary judgment as to the

harassment claim under Title IX, the Court will reserve judgment as to the retaliation claim until

an appropriate time, if any. 

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he tried to kiss a young girl. The Court cannot find as a matter of law that the defendants’

response was not clearly unreasonable. Therefore, the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiffs’ Title IX claim is DENIED.5

III. Section 1983 Claim

A. Legal Standard for Municipal Liability Under § 1983

A city can be sued directly for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief under section

1983 where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that

body’s officers.” Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690

(1978). To establish such municipal liability, a plaintiff must satisfy four conditions: “(1)

that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the

municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the

plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the

constitutional violation.’” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted)).

A city or county may not be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its

employees under the theory of respondeat superior. See Board of County Comm’rs v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. “Instead, it is when

execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the

government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. For the

government to be held liable on the basis of custom, there must be a pattern of “persistent

and widespread discriminatory practices of state officials” which became “so permanent and

well settled as to [have] the force of law.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

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B. Analysis

There is no dispute that neither the District nor the Center had an official or written

policy instructing or allowing City officials to fail to act to prevent sexual harassment. 

Furthermore, plaintiffs have failed to submit sufficient evidence to support a claim that the

City defendants had a “persistent and widespread” practice or custom of failing to investigate

and act upon complaints of sexual harrassment. See Williams v. Paint Valley Local Sch.

Dist., 400 F.3d 360, 369 (6th Cir. 2005). In fact, plaintiffs merely present evidence of a

single occurrence of such behavior that does not approach the frequency required to prove

that a custom exists. Although plaintiffs confuse the standard of liability in section 1983

claims with that of Title IX claims, the Court reads plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim to rely upon

two theories of municipal liability. First, under a theory of liability outlined in Pembaur v.

City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), plaintiffs argue that Chiobotti is a policy-maker with

final authority whose failure to act upon notice of a single incident of sexual harassment

created a government policy subject to liability. Second, under a theory of liability outlined

in City of Canton v. Harris, plaintiffs allege that Chiobotti’s failure to properly train and

supervise Cameron establishes a custom or policy of inadequate supervision that gives rise to

municipal liability.

1. Liability under Pembaur

In Pembaur, the Supreme Court held that “municipal liability may be imposed for a

single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” 475 U.S. 469,

480 (1986). Liability may be imposed based on actions of other officials “whose edicts or

acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. In essence, the

Supreme Court has held that if a decision to adopt a certain action is made by “authorized

decisionmakers,” then that action is an official government policy that satisfies Monell. 

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481. Therefore, “where action is directed by those who establish

governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be

taken only once or to be taken repeatedly.” Id.

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However, “not every decision by municipal officers automatically subjects the

municipality to § 1983 liability.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481. The Pembaur Court stressed

that “[m]unicipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to

establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481

(emphasis added). “The fact that a particular official–even a policymaking official–has

discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to

municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 481-482. Therefore,

“municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where–and only where–a deliberate choice to

follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials

responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Id. at

483; see also Collins v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 341-342 (9th Cir. 1988). Whether

a particular official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law, see

McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786 (1997), and should be decided as a matter

of law by the judge rather than the jury. See Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 879 (9th Cir.

1996).

a. Chiobotti’s Policy-making Authority

Whether governmental officials are policy-makers does not depend upon the exercise

of policy-making authority in an “all or nothing” manner. See McMillian v. Monroe County,

520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997). The question is whether the officials are final policy-makers for

the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue. See id. Moreover, it is not

sufficient to show that the particular official had discretion to make the decisions affecting

the plaintiff's rights. Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d at 985 (9th Cir.

2002).

In this instance, plaintiffs’ supplemental brief on this issue fails to show that Chiobotti

has policy-making authority for the City in any area. As the Director of the Center, Chiobotti

has day-to-day oversight of the Center and she was the person responsible for responding to

complaints about sexual harassment at the Center. But those are precisely the type of

discretionary duties that Pembaur states are insufficient to establish municipal liability. In

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6Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the policy of the District and the policy of the Center.

This is unpersuasive. The Center is ultimately run by the District, and District policies apply to

the Center, as well. This conclusion is reemphasized by Chiobotti’s acknowledgment that her

recommendations ultimately go to the District’s school board. 

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truth, Chiobotti does not even have the authority to terminate an employee of the Center

much less establish the City’s policy on matters involving sexual harrassment. See Chiobotti

Depo. at 14 (noting that she could only recommend the termination of an employee to the

School Board). Plaintiffs concede as much by noting that the California school board is the

only entity empowered with the final authority to make official policy for the District. Pl.

Supp. Br. at 4.6

The Court finds that Chiobotti’s authority is analogous to that of a police sergeant

outlined in Collins v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1988). There, the court

stated: “Although a police sergeant may have discretion to recommend hiring, firing and

discipline of employees, he or she is not the city official responsible for establishing final

department policy in this area.” Id. at 341. Here, Chiobotti had discretion to oversee the

Center and make recommendations on a wide array of personnel matters, but she did not have

final policy-making authority sufficient to establish municipal liability under this theory. 

Consequently, the Court concludes that plaintiffs argument under Pembaur fails as a matter

of law. 

2. Liability for Policy or Custom of Inadequate Supervision

A local government may also be liable for constitutional violations resulting from its

failure to supervise, monitor or train, but only where the inadequacy of said supervision,

monitoring or training amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of the people with

whom the local government comes into contact. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

388 (1989); Davis v. City of Ellensberg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that

the same standard applies for claims of inadequate training and inadequate supervision).

Only where a failure to supervise and train reflects a “deliberate” or “conscious” choice by a

local government can the municipality be liable under section 1983. See Harris, 489 U.S. at

389. The Ninth Circuit has implemented Harris through a three-part test. Merritt v. County

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of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989). First, a court must determine whether the

existing training program is adequate. Id. Second, whether the “policymakers of the city can

be reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need” for more or different

training. Id. Third, whether the inadequate training “actually caused the constitutional

deprivation at issue.” Id.

Plaintiffs’ argument fails here for a number of reasons. First, there is no evidence of

an inadequate training program. The only evidence of inadequate training or supervision of

school employees is the alleged failure to act by Chiobotti in this case alone. But even if

Chiobotti failed to act in response to complaints about Cameron trying to kiss a student, she

affirmatively did act in response to complaints about Cameron inappropriately holding

students. In fact, the evidence in the record supports a finding that the program of

supervision was more than adequate, even if a trier of fact ultimately finds that Chiobotti

failed to supervise Cameron properly in this one instance. Second, there is no evidence that

Chiobotti’s alleged inadequate training or supervision was conducted pursuant to official

municipal policy. As discussed supra, Chiobotti does not have policy-making authority, and

plaintiffs submit no evidence regarding the City’s policy for training and supervising

employees. Finally, plaintiffs submit no evidence linking any purported inadequacies in the

training policies to Chiobotti’s conduct. 

To hold the City defendants liable in this case under section 1983 would amount to

assigning liability based on a theory of respondeat superior, which Monell expressly

disallows. Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim fails as a

matter of law. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the section 1983 claims is

therefore GRANTED.

IV. State Law Claims

Plaintiffs allege a number of state law claims, some of which only apply to defendant

Cameron and not the City defendants. Though the briefing on this issue is sparse, the only

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7Defendants also assert that under California law there is no respondeat superior liability

for acts of sexual molestation of a teacher on a student. Def. Mot. at 11 (citing John R. V.

Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 48 Cal. 3d 438 (1989) (holding that individual instances of sexual

harassment of students by teachers does not impute liability to the school districts under the

doctrine of respondeat superior). Yet in the absence of a motion for summary judgment as to

specific claims in the Amended Complaint, the Court will not issue a blanket ruling that may be

an advisory opinion on that issue. 

8None has been provided to the Court in this action.

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state law claim now before the Court is plaintiffs’ Twelfth cause of action for negligent

hiring and supervision (or retention) of Cameron.7 

Defendants cite a California Court of Appeals case for the proposition that municipal

liability under a claim of negligent hiring or supervision depends on whether employees of

the city knew or should have known of prior acts of sexual misconduct by Cameron. See

Virginia G. v. ABS Unified Sch. Dist., 15 Cal. App. 1848, 1855 (Cal. App. 1993) (citing

John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 453). Here, the Court finds it useful to separately address the hiring

and supervision claims.

Prior to hiring Cameron in 1998, the District conducted an investigation into

Cameron’s background, including a check on any prior arrests or criminal convictions. See

Declaration of Donald Sherratt at ¶ 3. This investigation revealed nothing unusual, and the

District was not aware of any acts of sexual abuse or molestation by Cameron. Id. Plaintiffs

do not provide evidence to the contrary. As a result, the Court finds that the District was not

negligent in hiring Cameron in 1998 and hereby GRANTS summary judgment as to that part

of the claim.

The Court determined supra that a genuine dispute exists as to whether Chiobotti

received information alleging that Cameron attempted to kiss a student, which would satisfy

any standard of sexual abuse.8 If this is true, then it would also be true that employees of the

District knew that Cameron had performed prior acts of sexual misconduct. Moreover, the

standard under California law is not as strict as under Title IX; even if Chiobotti should have

known of Cameron’s conduct, she may be liable for negligent supervision. Accordingly, the

Court cannot say that plaintiffs’ claim for negligent supervision fails as a matter of law. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to this part of the claim is therefore DENIED.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, City defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Title IX

claim is DENIED. Summary judgment on plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim is GRANTED. 

Summary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligent hiring claim under California law is GRANTED,

and summary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligent supervision or retention claim under

California law is DENIED. Finally, because Woodstock Elementary School has no relation

to the Center or defendant Cameron, all claims against it are DISMISSED. 

Counsel for all remaining parties shall appear at a case management conference on

March 31, 2006 at 8:30 am.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2006 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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