Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00649/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00649-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOND E. LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

 v.

G.D. LEWIS, Warden, 

Respondent.

 /

No. C 13-0649 TEH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Raymond Lopez, a state prisoner, has filed this pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Respondent was ordered to show cause why the petition should not be

granted. Respondent has filed an answer, and Petitioner has filed a

traverse. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED.

I

On April 8, 2009, a Santa Clara County jury found

Petitioner guilty of first degree murder with personal use of a

weapon. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 426-28. He was sentenced to

26 years to life in state prison. CT at 449-51.

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1

 This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d

1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

2

Petitioner appealed his conviction in the California Court

of Appeal. On August 15, 2011, the California Court of Appeal filed

an unpublished opinion affirming the judgment. People v. Lopez, No.

H034631, 2011 WL 3568553 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2011). On December

14, 2011, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition

for review. Answer, Ex. 8. 

II

The following factual background is taken from the order

of the California Court of Appeal.1

In October 2007, Rosa Townes and Ryan Townes were married,

but they had separated. Rosa and Eric Diaz were friends,

and they had been “get [ting] high together” on

methamphetamine for a couple of months. They were not

romantically involved. Ryan had met Diaz about three

times and “didn't like him.” The two men never had any

arguments, but Rosa had told Diaz that Ryan did not like

it that Rosa was associating with Diaz. Ryan knew that

Rosa visited Diaz at his apartment, but Ryan did not know

which apartment was Diaz's apartment. Ryan had seen

Diaz's Ford Explorer, and Diaz believed that Ryan had

slashed one of the tires on Diaz's Explorer on the evening

of October 2, 2007. On the afternoon of October 3, 2007,

Rosa accused Ryan of having slashed Diaz's tire. Ryan

denied having done so. At about 10:00 p.m. that evening,

Rosa told Ryan that she would not go home with him that

night. Ryan was “hurt.” He called Rosa repeatedly after

that, but she did not answer her phone.

At about 11:00 p.m. on October 3, 2007, Diaz picked Rosa

up from the motel where she was staying and took her in

his Explorer to his apartment building. They went into

Diaz's second-floor apartment and used methamphetamine. 

After midnight, Ryan telephoned Rosa and said he knew

where she was and he was outside. Ryan said he wanted to

“clear the air” with Diaz about the slashing of the tire

on Diaz's Explorer. Rosa and Ryan telephoned and texted

back and forth, arguing. Rosa told Diaz that Ryan was

outside the apartment building. Rosa had previously told

Diaz that Ryan had beaten her a number of times, “nearly

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28 3

killing her sometimes.” Diaz wanted someone to pick up

Rosa and take her home. He figured that Ryan would leave

if Rosa left.

Diaz tried to call his cousin defendant on his cell phone. 

Diaz also sent a text to defendant that read: “Cousin, I

need help ASAP, no joke.” Rosa had met defendant several

times at Diaz's apartment. Eventually, Diaz reached

defendant by telephone and sought his assistance. 

Defendant told Diaz to “relax” and “wait it out.” Diaz

sent defendant additional texts and continued to telephone

him. “I told him someone was out there and we needed to

get out of there, that he might have a weapon, I'm not

sure. I was scared, and my daughter was there, and I

didn't want anything to happen to me or my daughter or

Rosa.” Diaz's three-year-old daughter was in the

apartment with Diaz and Rosa. Diaz told defendant that

the man outside “could be dangerous” and that he was

afraid that this person would “hurt” him. The reason Diaz

thought Ryan might have a weapon was because he believed

Ryan had slashed his tire.

A couple of Diaz's phone calls to defendant's cell phone

were answered by Diaz's other cousin Vincent Lopez. Diaz

told Vincent the same thing he had told defendant, and

Vincent also told him to “relax” and “wait it out.” 

Vincent expressed concern that this “someone” might have a

gun or a knife. Because by now Diaz could hear Ryan

yelling outside and knocking on doors downstairs, he told

either defendant or Vincent that “a dude was outside

acting crazy.” Diaz told Vincent that the man outside had

slashed the tire on his vehicle and was a “crazy

motherfucker.” He asked Vincent to come and pick up Rosa.

Diaz never described Ryan to either of his cousins, and

neither of his cousins had ever met Ryan.

Meanwhile, Rosa texted Ryan that he “needed to leave”

because Diaz had “called his cousin” and “I was scared for

him.” Ryan responded that he “wasn't going anywhere.” 

They continued to text back and forth for about an hour. 

She falsely told him she had called the police, but he did

not leave. At some point, Rosa heard Ryan yelling outside

for about 10 minutes. Shortly after 2:00 a.m., Ryan

knocked repeatedly on the door of one of the downstairs

apartments in the building. The resident was awakened,

and she came to the door. Ryan asked “if Rhonda was

there.” She told him “no one is here by that name.” Ryan

said: “Thank you, I'm sorry to bother you.” He did not

sound angry, and he was not speaking loudly.

Two hours after Diaz's first text to defendant, defendant

texted Diaz “we're going to be on our way soon....” 

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28 4

Vincent also texted Diaz: “We are going to try and do

something right now.” Diaz texted Rosa that his “cousins

were on the[ir] way.” Rosa heard Ryan's yelling stop. 

About 10 to 15 minutes later, Rosa heard Ryan loudly say

“whoa,” followed by sounds of “a fight” outside. Rosa

looked out the window and saw two males and a female

“around” Ryan. The female was standing to the side, while

one male was in front of Ryan and the other was behind

him. “It looked like they were punching him.” Ryan was

“[t]rying to fight back.” Rosa opened the apartment door

and started screaming. She saw the two males and the

female leaving the scene, and one of the males looked up

at her. Rosa recognized him as defendant.

Rosa ran to Ryan, who said “baby, I got stabbed. They

stabbed me.” Rosa ran back toward Diaz's apartment to get

her phone. On her way, she saw a knife lying on the

ground next to the tire of Diaz's Explorer. Rosa picked

up the knife because she thought it would “help” to “get

justice” for Ryan. She then retrieved her phone and

returned to Ryan. Rosa dropped the knife after she

returned to Ryan because she needed her hands free to call

911. Diaz came downstairs and moved his Explorer before

the police arrived because he did not want the police to

see his Explorer near Ryan.

When the police arrived, Ryan was bloody and unresponsive. 

His body was lying on some bushes. A police officer

attempted CPR, but Ryan did not respond. A closed knife

was clipped to the inside of Ryan's right front pants

pocket. There was no blood on the knife. A large knife

was found on the ground a few feet from Ryan's body. 

There was no visible blood on this knife.

Diaz told the police that “it was [defendant and Vincent]

there.” Defendant was arrested on the evening of October

4. Vincent, who is defendant's uncle, was in the same car

with defendant when the police stopped the car. When the

police asked for his name, defendant provided his name and

said “you're here for me.” Defendant had a bandaged wound

on one hand. The bandage covered a cut on his thumb. He

had no other injuries.

An autopsy determined that Ryan died from stab wounds to

his head, neck, and torso. He had 20 “sharp force

injuries,” which included both stab wounds and slash

wounds. Stab wounds are deeper than slash wounds. Ryan

had suffered a stab wound to the back of his neck, a deep

stab wound to his upper right chest, which penetrated a

large artery and a lung, 13 stab wounds to his back, and a

stab wound to the back of his upper right arm. Half of

the stab wounds to his back had penetrated the chest

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cavity and entered his lungs. Each of these stab wounds

was potentially fatal. There were also multiple slash

wounds on his face and head, and slash wounds to his right

hand. Ryan was under the influence of methamphetamine at

the time of his death. He was five feet, seven inches

tall, and he weighed 193 pounds. Defendant was six feet,

one inch tall and weighed 225 pounds.

Defendant spoke to the police 10 days later. He told them

that he was at Diaz's apartment building when Ryan was

killed, but he did not see the killing. He heard the

screams and came upon a man and a woman fleeing the scene,

so he too ran. Defendant told the police that Diaz had

told him that Ryan “had a gun.”

[Defense Case]

Defendant was charged with Ryan's murder. The only

defense witnesses at trial were defendant and an expert on

the effects of methamphetamine on human behavior.

The defense expert testified that a person under the

influence of methamphetamine had an increased “propensity

for violence” and would be “highly unpredictable.” He

also testified that “methamphetamine motivated or

influenced violence ... typically appears to be

unprovoked.” “[T]hey may interpret [something] as

offensive or threatening in some way....” Such a person

would be “primed for fighting.” However, he testified on

cross-examination that such a person would also be

“fearful” and “more prone to run away, depending on the

circumstances.”

Defendant testified at trial and admitted that he had

stabbed Ryan. He asserted that he had taken

methamphetamine earlier that day. He testified that he

received “urgent” messages over a couple of hours from

Diaz, who sounded “scared.” Defendant was aware that

Diaz, his daughter, and Rosa were in Diaz's apartment. 

Rosa had told defendant previously that her husband had

slashed a tire on Diaz's vehicle. Defendant assumed that

a knife would have been used to slash the tire. “If he

had a knife to slash the tire, he's not going to throw it

away after he slashes the tire.” Diaz told defendant that

Rosa's husband was outside, and he needed someone to pick

up Rosa. Defendant testified that Diaz also told him on

the phone “he's going to kill me, he's right outside my

door.” He also claimed that Diaz had said on the phone:

“he's crazy, he's out there, he's going to kill me.” 

Defendant claimed that he was spurred to action by a final

text from Diaz, which he claimed was the text which read:

“Cousin, I need help ASAP, no joke.” Defendant asserted

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28 6

that he was mainly concerned about the safety of Diaz's

daughter. He thought Ryan might have a weapon because “I

don't think you're going to go to an apartment looking for

your wife with no weapon....”

When he decided to go to Diaz's apartment building,

defendant brought two knives with him. He brought these

knives because “it seemed like the right thing to do at

the time.” One of the knives was his own, and the other

knife was someone else's knife that he grabbed “on the way

out the door” to go to Diaz's apartment building. 

Defendant admitted that he frequently carried a knife, and

that he did so so that “[i]f I had it and a situation

occurred, I would probably use it if I had to.” The

second knife he grabbed was a large, double bladed knife

that was bigger than a dagger. A woman gave him a ride

over to Diaz's apartment building. Although defendant did

not deny that other people were outside Diaz's apartment

building at the time of the stabbing, he refused to

identify any of them. Defendant denied that Vincent was

with him that evening, and he denied that Diaz had spoken

to Vincent on defendant's cell phone that evening.

When defendant arrived at Diaz's apartment building, he

walked up to within a few feet of Ryan before he saw him. 

Defendant had never met Ryan, and he initially had no idea

whether this man was Rosa's husband. According to

defendant, when Ryan saw defendant, he asked “do you know

Eric?” Defendant said “no.” Ryan then asked “do you know

Rosa?” Defendant again said “no.” At that point,

defendant assumed that Ryan was Rosa's estranged husband

and that Ryan was “very mad.” Ryan was standing sideways

to defendant, and defendant could not see Ryan's right

hand. Defendant reached into his pocket and unfolded his

folding knife inside his pocket. He kept his hand on the

knife. Defendant positioned himself so that he was

between Ryan and the apartment building, and his back was

to the apartment building. He turned and faced Ryan, told

Ryan “fucker, just leave,” and “smirk[ed].” Ryan refused

to leave. Defendant said “you need to immediately leave.” 

Ryan was an “arm's length” from defendant. Defendant

continued to tell Ryan to leave, and Ryan continued to

refuse to leave.

Ryan took a step toward defendant, which defendant took as

a “challenge.” At some point, Ryan started to pull a

knife out of his sweatshirt's front pocket. Ryan “didn't

have [the knife] all the way out. He was still pulling it

out.” Defendant could see “[a] couple inches” of the

blade, “[e]nough to know that it's a knife.” When

defendant was shown the large knife that Rosa had found,

he did not claim that Ryan had possessed that knife. 

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28 7

Instead, he claimed that he never saw “the full knife.” 

Defendant immediately pulled out his knife and “started

stabbing him.” “As soon as I seen the knife it just

happened. There was no time to think.” Defendant started

by stabbing Ryan in chest. “Once I started stabbing him I

just kept going, pretty much.” All of the stabbing

occurred within a 30–second period. Defendant paid no

attention to what happened to the knife he had seen Ryan

begin to remove from his pocket. Defendant thought: “It

was either him or me.” When he was done stabbing Ryan,

defendant “turned and ran.” The large second knife that

defendant had in his pocket fell out of his pocket as he

was running away. Defendant denied that this second knife

was the one Rosa found.

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *1-3 (footnotes omitted).

III

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal

habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the

state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). Additionally, habeas relief is warranted only if the

constitutional error at issue had a “substantial and injurious

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28 8

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams

(Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Moreover, in conducting

its analysis, the federal court must presume the correctness of the

state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the burden

of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). As the Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas

review, AEDPA ‘imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating

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state-court rulings’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt.’” Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct.

1305, 1307 (2011). 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly

established law to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. “[C]learly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of

[the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant

state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A federal court

may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different

from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at

best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003).

When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts. See Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion

from the state’s highest court, the court “looks through” to the

last reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. 

With these principles in mind regarding the standard and

scope of review on federal habeas, the Court addresses Petitioner’s

claims. 

IV

A

Petitioner first contends that there was insufficient

evidence to support the finding that the murder was the result of

deliberation and premeditation. He also argues that the trial court

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erred in responding to jury questions regarding these concepts. 

After setting forth the relevant state law, the state appellate

court denied this claim as follows:

Here, the jury's verdict was supported by substantial

evidence of “planning activity” and of a “manner of

killing” that were highly indicative of a deliberate and

premeditated murder.

Defendant did not simply encounter Ryan and use a knife

he just happened to have available on his person to kill

him. First, defendant deliberated for more than two

hours before deciding to respond to Diaz's request for

assistance. Next, after finally deciding to respond,

defendant arranged for a ride over to Diaz's apartment

building and, even though he already had one knife on his

person, took a second larger knife to aid in his

encounter. Then, almost immediately after coming upon

Ryan, defendant unfolded his knife in his pocket so that

it would be ready, and kept the knife in his hand and

concealed from sight. With his knife at the ready,

defendant positioned himself so that his back was

protected by the apartment building before launching his

attack on Ryan. In addition, the jury could have

reasonably concluded that defendant had also arranged

that another man would be present to provide him with

backup. All of this evidence reflected that defendant

had planned to stab Ryan and placed himself in the most

advantageous position available before launching his

attack. The fact that defendant suffered no wounds other

than a small cut on his hand strongly supported a

conclusion that his attack took Ryan so unaware that he

had no opportunity to defend himself.

The manner in which defendant killed Ryan was also

indicative of premeditation and deliberation. A stab

wound to the chest is likely to be fatal, but defendant

did not content himself with simply stabbing Ryan once in

the chest. He continued to stab him in the back, both in

the neck and the torso, vital areas of Ryan's body. 

Defendant also inflicted several slashes on Ryan's face,

wounds which the jury could have reasonably inferred

could not have been inflicted unless Ryan had already

been rendered defenseless. The sheer number of

potentially fatal stab wounds reflected that defendant

had made a deliberate decision to ensure that Ryan died.

We reject defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence of premeditation and deliberation.

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Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *5-6.

1

 The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact

necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges

that the evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be

fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of

fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a

constitutional claim, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321

(1979), which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas relief, see

id. at 324. 

The Supreme Court has emphasized that "Jackson claims face

a high bar in federal habeas proceedings . . . ." Coleman v.

Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062, 2064 (2012) (per curiam) (finding

that the Third Circuit "unduly impinged on the jury's role as

factfinder" and failed to apply the deferential standard of Jackson

when it engaged in "fine-grained factual parsing" to find that the

evidence was insufficient to support petitioner's conviction). A

federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does

not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338

(9th Cir. 1992). The federal court "determines only whether, 'after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Payne, 982 F.2d at 338

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(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Only if no rational trier of

fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has

there been a due process violation. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324;

Payne, 982 F.2d at 338. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state

court’s determination was an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court authority. The state court correctly noted that there was an

abundance of evidence that Petitioner’s killing of the victim was

deliberate and premeditated. Petitioner waited two hours before

deciding to go to the scene to aid his cousin, he sought a friend to

drive him and brought another cousin, and he brought two knives with

him. Petitioner stabbed the victim twenty times, and despite

inflicting a fatal stab wound to the victim’s chest, Petitioner

continued to stab him. Looking at all of this evidence, a rational

juror could have found that Petitioner’s actions were deliberate and

premeditated. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this

claim. 

 2

 Petitioner also contends that the trial court’s responses

to jury inquiries about premeditation and deliberation were

inadequate and erroneously described the two independent

requirements. The state appellate court set forth the relevant

state law and denied this claim as follows:

1. Background

At the end of the trial, the court instructed the jury

with CALCRIM No. 521 on what was required to prove first

degree murder. “If you decide the defendant committed

murder, you must decide whether it is murder in the first

degree or murder in the second degree. [¶] The

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defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People

have proved that he acted willfully, deliberately and

with premeditation. The defendant acted willfully if he

intended to kill. The defendant acted deliberately if he

carefully weighed the considerations for and against his

choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. 

[¶] The defendant acted with premeditation if he decided

to kill before commission of the act that caused death. 

[¶] The length of time the person spends considering

whether to kill does not alone determine whether the

killing is deliberate or premeditated. The time required

for deliberation and premeditation may vary from person

to person and according to the circumstance. A decision

to kill made rashly and impulsively without careful

consideration is not deliberate and premeditated. [¶] 

On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision to kill

can be reached quickly. The test is the extent of the

reflection. The length of time alone does not determine

it. [¶] All other murders are second degree murders.”

On the jury's second day of deliberations, the jury

submitted the following inquiry: “521 Murder: Degrees

clarification [¶] 1 Premeditation-do we need to determine

& agree at what time the premeditation occurred? [¶] 2

Would you please clarify premeditation further, i.e. via

an example OR if ‘the test is of the extent of the

reflection'-is 1 or 2 seconds adequate?” “521” refers to

CALCRIM No. 521, the jury instruction on first degree

murder. The judge responded in writing: “In answer to

Question 1, you do not need to determine and agree at

what time the premeditation occurred. [¶] With respect

to Question 2, I am unable to give you an example or

further clarify the extent of reflection required. I

would note that the third paragraph of Instruction 521

appears to answer your question.”

On the jury's third day of deliberations, the jury

submitted another inquiry to the judge. “1 Can a decision

to kill be NOT pre-meditated? (besides in self defense or

imperfect self defense).” The next morning, the judge

provided the jury with a lengthy written response which

began: “Hopefully the following additional instructions

will be helpful to you.” The trial court's “additional

instructions” were: (1) CALJIC No. 8.11, which defines

malice; (2) CALJIC No. 8.20, which defines first degree

murder; and (3) CALJIC No. 8.30, an instruction that,

where “the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation

and premeditation,” a murder is “[m]urder of the second

degree.” Later that day, the jury asked for a read back

of defendant's testimony. The jury returned its verdict

the next day.

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2. Analysis

. . . 

The trial court's responses to the jury's inquiries did

not violate Penal Code section 1138. The trial court

could have reasonably concluded that any direct response

to the jury's initial inquiry requesting “an example” and

asking “is 1 or 2 seconds adequate” would have improperly

invaded the jury's province. The court properly referred

the jury back to CALCRIM No. 521, which directly

addressed this issue. Even if that response was

inadequate, the court gave a much more detailed response

to the jury's second inquiry. This time, having

apparently concluded that the jury was having difficulty

with the language of CALCRIM No. 521, the court decided

to supply the jury with the alternative language used in

CALJIC No. 8.20, in hopes that this language would

further illuminate the concept for the jury. The fact

that the jury made no further inquiries reflects that the

court's detailed response to its second inquiry was

satisfactory.

Defendant claims that the court's response to the jury's

first inquiry should have been to “refer[ ] to the

requirement of deliberation and [tell the jury that] one

or two seconds is only adequate if deliberation is

shown.” We disagree. First, our review is for abuse of

discretion. The trial court was responding to an inquiry

regarding the time necessary for premeditation. It could

have reasonably determined that a response focused on

deliberation would not be appropriate. Instead, the

trial court reasonably concluded that the jury should be

referred back to the applicable jury instruction, CALCRIM

No. 521, which fully addressed this issue.

Defendant maintains that the court's response to the

jury's second inquiry should have been to tell the jury

that “a decision to kill may not be sufficient if

premeditation and deliberation are not shown.” Both

CALCRIM No. 521 and CALJIC No. 8.20 inform the jury that

a decision to kill is not sufficient and that both

premeditation and deliberation must be proved. (CALCRIM

No. 521 [“A decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or

without careful consideration is not deliberate and

premeditated”]; CALJIC No. 8.20 [“a mere unconsidered and

rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill,

is not deliberation and premeditation”].) Since the

trial court's initial reference back to CALCRIM No. 521

in response to the jury's first inquiry and its

subsequent instruction to the jury with CALJIC No. 8.20

in response to the jury's second inquiry conveyed

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precisely this concept, defendant's contention lacks

substance.

Although defendant repeatedly complains without

elaboration that these instructions “conflated and

confused the separate concepts of premeditation and

deliberation,” he does not directly attack either CALCRIM

No. 521 or CALJIC No. 8.20 and does not present any

argument that either of these instructions is

constitutionally deficient. Appellate courts may

disregard assertions which are not supported by adequate

argument but merely suggested in a brief. (People v.

Gordon (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 1223, 1244 fn.3, overruled on

another point in People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 787,

835.)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

responding to the jury's inquiries.

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *6-9 (footnote omitted).

"When a jury makes explicit its difficulties a trial judge

should clear them away with concrete accuracy." Bollenbach v.

United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1946). The trial judge has a

duty to respond to the jury's request for clarification with

sufficient specificity to eliminate the jury's confusion. See

Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2004)

(harmless due process violation occurred when, in responding to

request for clarification, court refused to give clarification and

informed jury that no clarifying instructions would be given). 

But when a trial judge responds to a jury question by

directing its attention to the precise paragraph of the

constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its inquiry, and

the jury asks no follow-up question, a reviewing court may

"presume[] that the jury fully understood the judge's answer and

appropriately applied the jury instructions." Waddington v.

Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 196 (2009). After all, the trial judge has

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wide discretion in charging the jury, a discretion which carries

over to the judge's response to a question from the jury. Arizona

v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2003). And just as a jury

is presumed to follow its instructions, it is presumed to understand

a judge's answer to a question. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225,

234 (2000). 

Petitioner has failed to show that the denial of this

claim was unreasonable. The appellate court noted that in answering

the first question, the trial court directed the jury to the

appropriate language in the jury instructions, but did not proceed

further as to not interfere with the jury’s fact finding function. 

When the jury asked a second question regarding the same issue, the

trial court provided further more detailed instructions. The jury

returned a verdict the following day without any more questions. 

The California Court of Appeal concluded that the jury understood

the instructions and appropriately followed them, therefore finding

that Petitioner was not entitled to relief. See Waddington at 196.

Petitioner has failed to assert specific arguments concerning how

the trial court’s actions were improper or how the appellate court’s

decision was an unreasonable application of federal law. He

concludes the jury was confused regarding premeditation and

deliberation but his conclusory arguments are insufficient to

warrant habeas relief. This claim is denied. 

B

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by

admitting evidence of his violent character. The state appellate

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court set forth the background for this claim as follows:

In its trial brief, the prosecution noted that it

intended to impeach defendant with evidence that he had

committed an aggravated assault (Pen.Code, § 245, subd.

(a)), dissuaded a witness (Pen.Code, § 136.1), and

committed arson (Pen.Code, § 451, subd. (d)). The

prosecution also pointed out that, if defendant

introduced character evidence regarding [the victim’s]

propensity for violence, the prosecution should be

permitted to introduce such evidence as to defendant

under Evidence Code section 1103. The evidence that the

prosecution sought to introduce was the same conduct that

it sought to impeach defendant with: the assault,

dissuasion, and arson.

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *9 (footnote omitted). 

Petitioner’s trial counsel elicited evidence of the

victim’s, Ryan’s, violent behavior, when he cross-examined Ryan’s

wife. Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *10. As a result of the evidence

of Ryan’s violent behavior, the trial court found that the

prosecution could introduce evidence of Petitioner’s violent

character under California Evidence Code section 1103. Id. at 9-10. 

The trial court issued a limiting instruction regarding the

character evidence, and the evidence was heard regarding violent

incidents Petitioner engaged in. Id. at 11-12. The California

Court of Appeal considered Petitioner’s arguments and denied this

claim:

The defense went to great lengths to introduce evidence

of Ryan’s [the victim’s] prior violence. Its

cross-examination of Rosa on this subject was very

detailed and extensive, and other witnesses were

questioned by the defense about their knowledge of Ryan’s

violence. In this context, the trial court would not

have abused its discretion in overruling a defense

objection to the prosecution introducing the “details” of

defendant's May 2007 and March 2008 acts of violence. 

Under Evidence Code section 1103, the prosecution was

entitled to utilize evidence of the details of

defendant's prior acts of violence to counter the

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defense's introduction of the details of Ryan’s prior

acts of violence.

Defendant also claims that the court's allegedly

erroneous admission of these “details” was exacerbated by

the court's ruling excluding evidence that defendant had

not been charged with assault for the May 2007 incident. 

Defendant was actually charged with witness dissuasion

and arson for the May 2007 incident, but it is difficult

to imagine a relevant basis for the prosecution to

introduce evidence that those charges had been brought or

that the assault victim was uncooperative to counter

evidence that no assault charge had been brought. 

Defendant asserts, without explanation, that “[t]he

prosecution was free to offer reasons for

non-prosecution.” It is not a sound argument that

irrelevant defense evidence could have been rebutted with

irrelevant prosecution evidence. The issue here was not

whether defendant's acts were criminal but whether they

were violent. The jury was explicitly instructed that

the evidence regarding the May 2007 incident was admitted

for the sole purpose of demonstrating that defendant had

committed prior acts of violence to show his character

for violence. The fact that an assault charge had not

been brought against him for that incident had no

relevance to whether he had engaged in a violent act on

that occasion. Furthermore, defendant did not deny

engaging in the acts of violence involved in the May 2007

incident. He freely admitted that he had repeatedly

stabbed a man on that occasion after having disarmed the

man. The trial court did not err in excluding irrelevant

evidence that defendant was not charged with assault for

the May 2007 incident.

Defendant also claims that, regardless of the propriety

of the trial court's rulings, the admission of the

Evidence Code section 1103 evidence violated his right to

due process. His argument fails to explain exactly how

it was that this evidence violated his right to due

process other than to state repeatedly that it created

“gross unfairness.” We find no basis in the record for

this assertion. Evidence of defendant's character for

violence was admissible at trial only because defendant

introduced evidence of Ryan's character for violence. It

was a reasonable tactical choice for defendant's trial

counsel to make, but the result was that evidence of

defendant's violent acts was admissible at trial. This

was not unfair, and certainly not “gross unfairness.” 

The counterbalance required by Evidence Code section 1103

is the essence of fairness, as it allows the defense, and

only the defense, to make a decision about whether

evidence of a character trait for violence will be

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admitted at trial. Defendant was not deprived of due

process.

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *13-14 (footnote omitted). 

A state court's procedural or evidentiary ruling is not

subject to federal habeas review unless the ruling violates federal

law, either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or

statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918,

919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, a federal court cannot disturb

on due process grounds a state court's decision to admit evidence of

prior crimes or bad acts unless the admission of the evidence was

arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally

unfair. See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995);

Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The United States Supreme Court has left open the question

of whether admission of propensity evidence violates due process. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991). Based on the

Supreme Court's reservation of this issue as an "open question," the

Ninth Circuit has held that a petitioner's due process right

concerning the admission of prior crimes to show propensity for

criminal activity is not clearly established under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) and therefore cannot form the basis for federal habeas

relief. See Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir.

2008) (because Supreme Court expressly reserved question of whether

using evidence of prior crimes to show propensity for criminal

activity could ever violate due process, state court's rejection of

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claim did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law). 

To the extent that Petitioner is arguing that the state

courts erroneously applied or interpreted state law with respect to

the admission of the evidence, no federal habeas relief is

available. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a federal

habeas writ is unavailable for violations of state law or for

alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. 

See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011). Nor is there any

established Supreme Court authority that the admission of irrelevant

or overtly prejudicial evidence can justify habeas relief. Holley

v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009).

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that the

admission of this evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. As discussed by the

California Court of Appeal, the jury was properly instructed on how

to review the evidence and there was overwhelming evidence against

Petitioner. Petitioner has failed to show that the admission of the

evidence rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. The claim is

denied.

C

Petitioner next argues that the prosecutor committed

misconduct during opening and closing arguments by making misleading

comments about Petitioner’s failure to call a witness, making a

statement that Petitioner carved the face of a victim in a prior

assault case similar to the victim in this case, and stating that

there was an arrest warrant for Petitioner for a prior crime.

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Prosecutorial misconduct is cognizable in federal habeas

corpus. The appropriate standard of review is the narrow one of due

process and not the broad exercise of supervisory power. Darden v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). A defendant's due process

rights are violated when a prosecutor's misconduct renders a trial

"fundamentally unfair." Id.; Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219

(1982) ("the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the

culpability of the prosecutor"). Under Darden, the first issue is

whether the prosecutor's remarks were improper; if so, the next

question is whether such conduct infected the trial with unfairness. 

Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Deck

v. Jenkins, 768 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that

Darden is the clearly established federal law regarding a

prosecutor's improper comments for AEDPA review purposes). A

prosecutorial misconduct claim is decided “‘on the merits, examining

the entire proceedings to determine whether the prosecutor's remarks

so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.’” Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d

926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995); see Trillo v. Biter, 769 F.3d 995, 1001

(9th Cir. 2014) ("Our aim is not to punish society for the misdeeds

of the prosecutor; rather, our goal is to ensure that the petitioner

received a fair trial.").

1

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor committed

misconduct by noting that Vincent Lopez, who was allegedly with

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2

 The Court will refer to Vincent Lopez by his first name because

he shares the same last name as Petitioner.

22

Petitioner during the incident, was not called as a defense witness,

when Vincent2

 had in fact invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. 

Vincent invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and was found to be

unavailable. Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 1072. The prosecutor

introduced Vincent’s preliminary hearing testimony where he stated

that he had no contact with Diaz or Petitioner on the night of the

incident and he denied using Petitioner’s phone that night. RT at

1074-79. Vincent stated that he never left his home that night. 

Id. 

During opening statements the prosecutor stated:

“Why have other people, why were other people coming in here

and lying for the defendant? ... [¶] Vincent Lopez, I'm sure

many of you believe Vincent was involved in this. If this was

self-defense, Vince didn't think it was, because if you

believe—Vincent Lopez was there. You heard his testimony, he

wasn't there. He didn't see it, he didn't get any phone

calls, he doesn't know what we're talking about. [¶] ... It's

not self-defense. There's no blood and there's no blood

trail, no fight. The bushes aren't broken. There's no injury

to [defendant] or Vincent Lopez, there is no struggling,

ladies and gentlemen; this was a vicious attack that came out

of nowhere. It was quick, it was violent, it was determined. 

It was premeditated. [¶] This again. You know what? If there

were any, any shred of believability in the defendant's

version, you know what, those people, he would have brought

somebody in. Because, you know what? As I talked about

before, it's not snitching on somebody if you didn't do

anything wrong. It's not snitching on anybody if, as by his

version, they weren't involved.” “He's lying about being the

only person there. He's lying about being the only person who

attacked Ryan Townes.”

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *15.

Petitioner’s trial counsel later objected and requested a

mistrial, but the trial court denied the motion. Id. Trial counsel

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then argued to the jury that Vincent’s failure to come forward was

due to fear for his own safety. Id. at 16. The prosecutor then

argued in closing statements:

“When we're talking about Vincent Lopez, he is exactly as the

court instructed you, he's unavailable. You're not to

speculate on why he's not here; he might be out of the city,

state or country. It's irrelevant because what we've got it

is Vince's testimony that he swore to under oath at a prior

hearing. That's what Vincent Lopez said. So when the defense

says there's no evidence of what Vincent Lopez thought, that's

not true. It's just not there. [¶] And when I talked about,

you know what, bring in those other people, what [defendant]

said not on that stand was, well, there were people at the

party that I left at the guy's apartment. Where is the guy

who he took the knife from to come in and say, no, the knife

that he took from me was, it had that snake and gold embossed

handle, or better yet, that it didn't look like this knife,

[the one found at the scene]. Where is that person? Where is

the person who can say, I drove [defendant] over there on Park

Avenue at this time. As he was going, he may have said

something about why he was going there. Where is that person

to corroborate his story? The defendant also said, you know

what, there was a guy there and another woman. Where is that

person? Where is that other woman who was there?”

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *16.

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim:

Defendant contends that the prosecutor's comments about

Vincent “were misleading and took unfair advantage of the

court's ruling ... that he was unavailable.” He argues that

the prosecutor's arguments suggested that defendant should

have called Vincent to testify, when he could not. Defendant

also claims that the prosecutor's comment, “[i]f this was

self-defense, Vince didn't think it was,” was improper because

there was no evidence to support it.

The prosecutor's remarks about Vincent in his opening argument

did not suggest that defendant was remiss in not bringing

Vincent in to testify on his behalf. Instead, the prosecutor

characterized Vincent as one of the people who were “coming in

here and lying for the defendant.” Thus, the prosecutor

acknowledged that Vincent had testified, and he asked the jury

to conclude that Vincent was lying. The prosecutor argued

that, if the jury concluded that Vincent was lying about not

being present, Vincent was doing so because he knew that

defendant had not acted in self-defense. These were

reasonable inferences to draw from the evidence. Diaz

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3

 After Diaz testified at trial that he did not see who attacked

the victim, the prosecutor noted that he had told police that

Petitioner and Vincent had committed the offense. RT at 458-59.

24

testified that he spoke to Vincent on defendant's cell phone

that evening and that both defendant and Vincent said they

were coming over. Rosa saw one man standing behind Ryan while

another man was stabbing Ryan. A reasonable juror could have

concluded from this evidence that Vincent was the man standing

behind Ryan and that, if Vincent had been there and seen

defendant act in self-defense, he would have told the truth in

his testimony to help his nephew rather than denying his

presence. While there were certainly other reasonable

inferences which could have been drawn from this evidence, as

defendant's trial counsel argued in his closing argument, the

prosecutor's remarks about Vincent in his opening argument

were a fair comment on the evidence and did not constitute

misconduct. (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal. 4th at p.

221.)

The prosecutor's remarks about Vincent in his closing argument

were also not misconduct. The prosecutor accurately pointed

out that Vincent's prior testimony was before the jury and

that Vincent was unavailable to testify at trial. He went on

to identify a number of people, a list that did not include

Vincent, who defendant could have called to testify in support

of his self-defense claim.

We find no prosecutorial misconduct in the prosecutor's

remarks about Vincent.

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *17.

The state appellate court’s decision was not an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. The

prosecutor’s comments were not improper or misleading. While

Vincent did not testify, his testimony from the preliminary hearing

was admitted and the prosecutor was able to comment on the testimony

and note that other witnesses, such as the victim’s wife and Diaz,

observed additional people at the scene.3

 

A prosecutor may properly comment upon a defendant's

failure to present witnesses so long as it is not phrased to call

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attention to defendant's own failure to testify. See United States

v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1083 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, Petitioner

testified in his own defense, and it was not improper for the

Prosecutor to call doubt on the testimony in relation to the other

evidence. Even assuming that the prosecutor’s remarks were

improper, they did not infect the trial with unfairness. There was

overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt and little to support

Petitioner’s claim of self-defense. This claim is denied.

2

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct

by arguing that Petitioner “carved” the face of the victim, Ryan,

and, in a prior incident, the face of another individual. The

prosecutor introduced several prior violent acts by Petitioner to

rebut the evidence of the victim’s violent character. A

correctional officer testified regarding a fight while Petitioner

was in custody involving Petitioner and several other inmates

against another inmate, where Petitioner punched and kicked the

other inmate who was on the ground. The inmate suffered numerous

injuries, including a cut near his ear. RT at 586-93. The trial

court denied trial counsel’s objections and ruled that the

prosecutor could argue the similarities between the cut on Ryan’s

face in the instant case and the cut on the inmate in the prior

incident. RT at 605-14. The prosecutor and trial counsel made the

following arguments to the jury:

In his opening argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury

that the stab wounds defendant inflicted during the May 2007

incident were “very similar” to the stab wounds to Ryan,

which, in his view, did not suggest that defendant was acting

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out of fear, but instead deliberately trying to kill these

men. He also urged the jury to compare the cut on Ryan's face

to the cut on [the inmate’s] face, which he characterized as

“similar.” “[T]his isn't self-defense. The defendant signed

his work. That is not a wound that happens in the heat of a

battle; that is not a wound that happens during a sudden

quarrel; that is not a wound that takes place under the

immediate fear in the necessity to act. What that is is a

carving on somebody's face. It's a perfectly straight line.

[¶] Now, [the inmate] was still alive and struggling. But

after the defendant got done stabbing Ryan Townes, he signed

it.” (Italics added.) “I want you to think, well, when did

[defendant] have time, under this anxiety and fear and

reacting, to sign his work? ” (Italics added.) Defendant's

trial counsel interposed no objection to this argument.

The defense argued that “there's no evidence whatsoever that a

cutting instrument was actually used on [the inmate]. If you

look at that mark, it could very well have been a scratch that

occurred, you cannot tell.” He argued that the marks were “a

coincidental occurrence.” “It is not something that was

specifically done.” “[T]hat is not a mark that was purposely

placed there. There wasn't time to do it, it doesn't fit with

the surrounding circumstances, it doesn't fit with him running

away and all the rest of it.... It's a coincidence....”

The prosecutor responded in his closing argument: “Again,

that's that mark again I was showing you about Ryan Townes. 

That's calm, that's cool, that's collected. Again, the mark

on [the inmate] ... that's calm, that's cool, that's

collected, that's planned, that's predetermined, that's

deliberate.”

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *18.

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim:

Defendant contends on appeal that the prosecutor's argument

regarding the similarities between [the inmate’s] facial wound

and Ryan's facial wound was misconduct because it (1) was

“false and misleading,” (2) utilized the evidence for a

purpose “outside the purposes for which it is properly

admissible,” and (3) lacked any evidentiary basis because

there was no evidence that defendant had inflicted the cut on

[the inmate’s] face.

We find no merit in defendant's claim that the prosecutor's

argument that the two cuts were similar was “false.” The

defense essentially conceded that the two cuts were similar,

and the jury had before it photographs of the facial wounds to

[the inmate] and Ryan. Nor do we credit his claim that the

prosecutor's argument utilized the Evidence Code section 1103

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evidence for an impermissible purpose. Evidence Code section

1103 evidence may properly be used to show a defendant's

character for violence. Defendant's violent infliction of a

facial wound on [the inmate] demonstrated his ferocity toward

a defenseless victim, and it tended to show that he acted in a

similarly fierce manner when he inflicted a similar wound on

Ryan when Ryan was defenseless. Character evidence is

properly used to show that a person acted in conformance with

that character trait. Evidence of the similar facial wounds

did so here.

Defendant's primary claim is that the prosecutor's argument

lacked any evidentiary basis because there was no evidence

that defendant was the person who inflicted [the inmate’s]

facial wound. It is true that there was no direct evidence

that defendant inflicted that wound or utilized a weapon

during the attack on Alfaro. However, the prosecutor was not

precluded from arguing based on reasonable inferences from the

evidence. Defendant was the initiator of the assault on [the

inmate]. [A correctional officer] testified that defendant and

Ledesma were the primary attackers, and Candelaria joined

them. Defendant denied that anyone other than Candelaria was

involved. [The inmate’s] injuries were primarily to his face,

and defendant was seen both punching and kicking him. The

jury could have reasonably concluded from this evidence that

defendant was the source of the wound to [the inmate’s] face. 

While no one saw defendant in possession of a cutting

instrument and no such instrument was recovered, the jury,

which had before it a photograph of [the inmate’s] wound,

could have concluded that this wound could have been inflicted

only by a cutting instrument of some kind. The jury was not

compelled to accept the defense argument that the wound was

merely a “scratch.” While the evidence on this point was

weak, the prosecutor must be permitted “‘“wide latitude”’” to

argue reasonable inferences from the evidence. (People v.

Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 221.)

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *19.

The California Court of Appeal’s denial of this claim was

not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. The

prosecutor argued that the two wounds were similar and this was a

reasonable inference based on the evidence. Prosecutors are allowed

reasonably wide latitude in closing arguments. See United States v.

Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 652 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended (2001)

(during closing argument “[p]rosecutors have considerable leeway to

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strike ‘hard blows' based on the evidence and all reasonable

inferences from the evidence”). Even if this was misconduct,

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it resulted in a denial of

due process. It is undisputed that Petitioner killed the victim. 

The evidence also demonstrated that Petitioner brought two knives,

stabbed the victim twenty times, and despite inflicting a fatal stab

wound to the victim’s chest continued to stab him. Petitioner is

not entitled to relief for this claim. 

3

Petitioner also contends that the prosecutor committed

misconduct by erroneously referencing a 2007 arrest warrant in

closing arguments when no such warrant existed. The state appellate

court described the relevant background and denied this claim:

The prosecutor argued to the jury in his opening argument that

defendant's statements at the time of his arrest demonstrated

consciousness of guilt. “The defense asked several of the

officers, well, did you know that he had a warrant out for his

arrest for, you know, that assault that had taken place in

May, and the defendant said, well, I wasn't sure they'd pick

me up for this right away.” (Italics added.) Defendant's

trial counsel immediately objected: “Your honor, object. 

Misstates the evidence, assault in May, a warrant for the

assault in May.” The court admonished the jury: “Ladies and

gentlemen, you're the judges of the facts in this case. 

You've heard all of the evidence. If the attorneys are at all

inaccurate in their arguments as to what you understand the

evidence to be, it's your understanding that's important. 

I'll allow counsel to continue, but keep in mind that what

counsel says is not evidence; you will determine the evidence

based upon the testimony you received.” The prosecutor

immediately corrected himself: “The defense asked several

witnesses several questions that they knew about the

occurrence that had taken place in May. Whether or not Mr.

Lopez was wanted for that.” (Italics added.) The defense

argued to the jury “there's no evidence at all that

[defendant] was charged with anything regarding that [May

2007] assault. The D.A. didn't present evidence to that

effect at all.” “That's self-defense. He wasn't charged with

that; there's no evidence of it.”

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The prosecutor unquestionably misspoke when he referred to an

“assault” charge for the May 2007 incident. However, the

prosecutor's mistake was readily corrected by the court's

admonition followed by the prosecutor's correction. In

addition, the defense pointed out in its argument that no

assault charge had been brought, and the prosecutor did not

claim otherwise. We can see no potential for prejudice from

the prosecutor's brief, immediately corrected, mistaken

reference to a nonexistent assault charge arising from the May

2007 incident.

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *20 (footnote omitted).

While the prosecutor did misstate the facts, the trial

court immediately admonished the jury and the prosecutor corrected

himself. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how this isolated

error violated his due process and that the state court’s denial of

this claim was unreasonable. See, e.g., Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,

416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974) (holding that the prosecutor did not

violate the petitioner's constitutional rights where misconduct “was

but one moment in an extended trial and was followed by specific

disapproving instructions”). In light of the evidence presented

against Petitioner, this minor misstatement that was immediately

corrected does not entitle him to habeas relief.

D

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in issuing

the following jury instructions regarding: 1) imperfect selfdefense; 2) provocation and contrived self-defense; 3) unjoined

perpetrators; 4) voluntary intoxication; and 5) accomplice

liability.

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under

state law does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus

proceedings. See Estelle, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72. See, e.g., Stanton

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v. Benzler, 146 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1998) (state law

determination that arsenic trioxide is a poison as a matter of law,

not element of crime for jury determination, not open to challenge

on federal habeas review). Nor does the fact that a jury

instruction was inadequate by Ninth Circuit direct appeal standards

mean that a petitioner who relies on such an inadequacy will be

entitled to habeas corpus relief from a state court conviction. See

Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 744 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72). 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury

charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by itself

so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414

U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S.

637, 643 (1974) (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146) ("'[I]t must be

established not merely that the instruction is undesirable,

erroneous or even ‘universally condemned,’ but that it violated some

[constitutional] right...'"). The instruction may not be judged in

artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the

instructions as a whole and the trial record. See Estelle, 502 U.S.

at 72. In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions in

the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the

entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169

(1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)); see,

e.g., Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 434-35 (2004) (per curiam)

(no reasonable likelihood that jury misled by single contrary

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instruction on imperfect self-defense defining "imminent peril"

where three other instructions correctly stated the law).

1

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in the

imperfect self-defense instruction because it repeatedly stated

“subjective reasonableness” rather than “subjective belief”. 

The following occurred at trial:

The court instructed the jury on both self-defense and

imperfect self-defense. It gave complete instructions on

both. The imperfect self-defense instructions told the jury:

“A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to

voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed a person

because he acted in imperfect self-defense or imperfect

defense of another. [¶] If you conclude the defendant acted

with complete self-defense or defense of another, his action

was lawful and you must find him not guilty of anything. [¶]

The difference between complete self-defense or defense of

another and imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of

another depends on whether the defendant's belief in the need

to [use] deadly force was reasonable. [¶] The defendant acted

in imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of another if:

[¶] One, the defendant actually believed that he or someone

else was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great

bodily injury; [¶] And two, the defendant actually believed

that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend

against the danger; [¶] But three, at least one of those

beliefs was unreasonable. [¶] Belief in future harm is not

sufficient, no matter how great or likely the harm is believed

to be .[¶] ... [¶] The People have the burden of proving

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in

imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of another. [¶] If

the People have not met that burden, you must find the

defendant not guilty of murder. [¶] The difference between

self-defense and imperfect self-defense is as follows: [¶]

Self-defense requires both subjective reasonableness and

objective reasonableness. [¶] Self-defense completely

exonerates the accused. Imperfect self-defense requires only

subjective reasonableness. Subjective reasonableness negates

malice aforethought, thus reducing homicide to voluntary

manslaughter.” (Italics added.)

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *20.

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The California Court of Appeal denied this claim:

The final three sentences of the court's imperfect

self-defense instructions contained an error. These sentences

erroneously substituted the phrase “subjective reasonableness”

for the phrase “subjective belief.” The words “subjective

reasonableness” were never defined for the jury. This portion

of the instruction conflicted with the remainder of the

instruction which unequivocally instructed the jury that

imperfect self-defense applied when the defendant had the

requisite beliefs in the imminency of the danger and the need

to use force but one or both of those beliefs was

unreasonable. Because the court's imperfect self-defense

instructions correctly informed the jury of the elements of

imperfect self-defense but then used incorrect words to

distinguish imperfect self-defense from perfect self-defense,

the court's instructions were potentially ambiguous.

“When reviewing ambiguous instructions, we inquire whether the

jury was ‘reasonably likely’ to have construed them in a

manner that violated the defendant's rights.” (People v.

Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal. 4th 174, 214.) We do not believe

that the jury was reasonably likely to misconstrue the meaning

of the imperfect self-defense instructions due to the court's

mistaken use of the words “subjective reasonableness” instead

of “subjective belief” in describing the difference between

self-defense and imperfect self-defense. The imperfect

self-defense instructions clearly stated that one of the

elements of imperfect self-defense was that one of defendant's

beliefs was “unreasonable.” These instructions also stated

that the difference between self-defense and imperfect

self-defense “depends on whether the defendant's belief ...

was reasonable.” Under these circumstances, it was highly

unlikely that the jury would have disregarded the correct

instructions and determined that the court's use of the phrase

“subjective reasonableness” meant that imperfect self-defense

did not apply unless defendant's beliefs were reasonable,

which would have made imperfect self-defense indistinguishable

from perfect self-defense.

Defendant argues that the impact on the jury of the trial

court's mistaken use of the phrase “subjective reasonableness”

was exacerbated by the prosecutor's arguments to the jury.

In his opening argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury:

“Imperfect self-defense. There's a subtle difference. Here,

we are talking about, well, not what was objectively thought

of under the situation, but did the defendant believe that his

actions were necessary? [¶] And again, I would say that the

defendant did not believe that there was imminent peril. He

still has to believe that, even if the killing occurred in a

sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, or the actual, but

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unreasonable belief in the necessity to defendant [sic]

oneself or others against imminent peril or GBI, great bodily

injury, again, does the defendant actually believe that? Not

what other people observed at the scene, but would he believe

that he needed to do that? ... [¶] ... [¶] Now we're trying to

delve into the defendant's head.” “In both perfect

self-defense and imperfect self-defense, the defendant must

subjectively, actually believe in the necessity to defend

against imminent peril.” “Again, malice is negated in both

self-defense and imperfect self-defense only if the defendant

honestly believes the degree of force was in fact necessary.” 

Nothing in the prosecutor's opening argument suggested that

imperfect self-defense required that defendant's beliefs be

reasonable. The defense closing argument was also consistent

with the trial court's correct instructions on the elements of

imperfect self-defense: “With respect to imperfect

self-defense, if one of your beliefs was unreasonable, ... you

can have imperfect self-defense.” If defendant had “an

unreasonable belief ... [i]t's called an imperfect

self-defense. Unreasonable on one of the points, that creates

the self-defense. [¶] So I think this is a self-defense case,

pure and simple.... But if you decide, I just can't go with

that with the knife thing, that's an unreasonable belief on

his part, you still can find that that's imperfect

self-defense and you have to find him not guilty of murder,

but rather guilty of voluntary manslaughter.”

Defendant relies on a few of the prosecutor's remarks in his

closing argument. The prosecutor argued in his closing

argument that, while “you can keep attacking until the danger

is over,” “you can't keep stabbing until the person is dead,

you can't stab this individual over and over again because

that's the way you think or that's your mindset. Not only for

self-defense does it have to be reasonable objectively and

subjectively. Even in imperfect self-defense. We can talk

about what he was thinking, but it still have [sic] to be

reasonable. He has to believe what he's doing is reasonable. 

And he didn't.” (Italics added.) “You know what, even in

imperfect self-defense, his belief, it has to be his

subjective belief, but at some point he has to reasonably, in

his mind it has to be an honest belief in his mind that person

needs to die immediately in order to justify his fears and his

actions, and we don't have that. We just don't have that. [¶]

Again, you have to believe that the defendant thought he was

in danger.” “This is not an [sic] case of imperfect

self-defense, because even the defendant didn't believe that

that's what happened.”

It is true that this portion of the prosecutor's argument

strayed into ambiguity about whether reasonableness played a

role in imperfect self-defense. The prosecutor argued that

imperfect self-defense required that the defendant “believe

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what he's doing is reasonable.” This is not an element of

imperfect self-defense. However, we do not think it is likely

that the jury would have been misled by these brief comments

in light of the trial court's explicit instructions that an

element of imperfect self-defense is that one or both of

defendant's beliefs were unreasonable. Defendant did not

object to this argument by the prosecutor, and he does not

assign it as misconduct on appeal. Although defendant argues

otherwise, it is well accepted that the applicable prejudice

standard for an error in instructions on imperfect

self-defense is the standard described in People v. Watson

(1956) 46 Cal. 2d 818. (People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal. 4th

82, 93.) “A conviction of the charged offense may be reversed

in consequence of this form of error only if, ‘after an

examination of the entire cause, including the evidence’ (Cal.

Const., art. VI, § 13), it appears ‘reasonably probable’ the

defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the

error not occurred (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836).” 

(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 142, 178.)

The prosecutor's brief remarks in his closing argument

suggested only that defendant had to believe that he was

acting reasonably in order to meet the elements of imperfect

self-defense. This was not really inconsistent with the

correct instructions on imperfect self-defense. Imperfect

self-defense depends on a defendant actually and honestly

believing that an imminent danger necessitates the use of

deadly force. While the prosecutor's use of the word

“reasonable” was not a good choice in this context, it is not

reasonably probable that the jury would have understood the

prosecutor's wording to refer to anything other than the

requirement that the defendant believe that his use of force

was necessary. A layperson would understand that a person who

believes that their action is necessitated by an imminent

danger would also believe that their action was reasonable.

The jury was given complete and correct instructions on the

elements of imperfect self-defense as set forth in CALCRIM No.

571, and the prosecutor's opening argument and the defense

closing argument were completely consistent with those correct

instructions. Under these circumstances, the jury was not

reasonably likely to be misled by the trial court's use of an

inaccurate phrase in three sentences of the paragraph it added

to the CALCRIM No. 571 instructions or by the prosecutor's

poorly worded remarks in his closing argument.

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *21-23 (footnote omitted).

In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, the inquiry is not

how reasonable jurors could or would have understood the instruction

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as a whole; rather, the court must inquire whether there is a

"reasonable likelihood" that the jury applied the challenged

instruction in a way that violated the Constitution. See Estelle,

at 72 & n.4; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990); Ficklin

v. Hatcher, 177 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (harmless error

when certain that jury did not rely on constitutionally infirm

instruction). In order to show a due process violation, the

petitioner must show both ambiguity and a "reasonable likelihood"

that the jury applied the instruction in a way that violates the

Constitution, such as relieving the state of its burden of proving

every element beyond a reasonable doubt. Waddington v. Sarausad,

555 U.S. 179, 190-191 (2009).

 A determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that the

jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violated the

Constitution establishes only that an error occurred. See Calderon

v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If an error is found, the

court also must determine that the error had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, see

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993), before granting

relief in habeas proceedings. See Calderon, 525 U.S. at 146-47.

In this case the trial court correctly stated the elements

of imperfect self-defense earlier in the disputed instruction. The

prosecutor also provided the correct instruction in his opening

argument, as did Petitioner’s trial counsel in his closing argument. 

The correct printed jury instruction was provided to the jury in the

complete set of instructions. CT at 415. The California Court of

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Appeal found that under these circumstances and because the

inaccurate phrases were just in three sentences of the oral

instruction, the jury was not reasonably likely to have been misled

and to have applied the instruction in a way that violated the

Constitution. The state court similarly found that the prosecutor’s

remarks later in his closing argument did not confuse the jury. The

state court’s decision was not unreasonable.

After reviewing the trial court records it is clear there

was not a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged

instruction in a way that violated the Constitution, especially as

the correct passage was repeatedly stated to the jury and present in

the printed instructions. Even if the jury misapplied the

instruction, Petitioner has not shown that the error had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury's verdict.

2

Petitioner also contends that the trial court erred in

instructing the jury on provocation and contrived self-defense

because the instruction was not supported by the evidence and it is

overbroad. The California Court of Appeal described the background

for this claim and denied relief:

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing

the jury: “A person does not have the right of self-defense if

he or she provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to

create an excuse to use force.”

He claims that the court should not have given this

instruction because there was no evidentiary basis for it. 

The evidence before the jury was sufficient to support the

court's instruction. Diaz testified that he sought

defendant's help solely to extricate Rosa from Diaz's

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apartment. Defendant did nothing to accomplish that goal. He

armed himself with two knives and arrived at the apartment

building without his own means of transport. After

encountering Ryan, who did nothing more than ask defendant if

he knew Diaz or Rosa, defendant immediately prepared to use

his knife by unfolding it and keeping his hand on it but also

keeping it concealed in his pocket. With his knife concealed

but ready for action, defendant positioned himself in front of

Ryan and within arm's reach. He proceeded to tell Ryan

“fucker, just leave” and “smirk[ed]” at him. The jury could

have concluded that defendant's conduct was intended to

provoke a fight so that defendant would have an opportunity to

use his knife on Ryan.

Defendant also contends that “the instruction is overbroad”

because it used the word “quarrel,” which the jury could have

understood to include a “verbal argument.” This argument

ignores the nature of the instruction. This instruction tells

the jury that a defendant may not intentionally “provoke [ ]”

a response by the victim so as to “create an excuse to use

force.” A defendant who provokes a physical or verbal

response by a victim solely to “create an excuse to use

force,” and then counters the victim's response with force, is

not defending himself when he uses force. The intent element

of the instruction is not the intent to “quarrel” but the

intent to create an excuse to use force. If defendant did not

intend to create an excuse to use force, then the instruction

would not apply. If he intended to provoke a verbal response

that excused his use of force, he could not rely on that

response to his provocation to excuse his use of force. By

restricting its ambit to those responses which were intended

to create an excuse to use force, the instruction avoids the

type of overbreadth that defendant claims it has.

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *23 (footnote omitted).

The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not

unreasonable. There was sufficient evidence to warrant issuance of

this instruction. Specifically, Petitioner took two knives and went

to the apartment, unfolded a knife in his pocket, and confronted the

victim. There was no error in the trial court issuing an

instruction regarding contrived self-defense, and Petitioner has not

shown that the state court opinion was unreasonable based on these

facts. Nor was the instruction given by the trial court overbroad

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for using the word “quarrel.” As noted by the appellate court, the

intent to “quarrel” is not the basis for the intent element of the

instruction; rather, the quarrel which provoked a verbal response

that led Petitioner to use force with the knife already ready in his

pocket was the basis for the instruction. The instruction was not

overbroad and Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to

relief.

3

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in

instructing the jury regarding unjoined perpetrators because it

chilled jurors’ consideration of whether Vincent’s testimony from

the preliminary hearing was influenced by the possibility that he

could be prosecuted. The state appellate court described the

relevant background and denied this claim:

Defendant claims that the trial court prejudicially erred when

it instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 373 regarding unjoined

perpetrators. The court instructed the jury: “The evidence

shows that other persons may have been involved in the

commission of the crime charged against the defendant. There

may be many reasons why someone who appears to have been

involved might not be a co-defendant in this particular trial. 

You must not speculate about whether those other persons have

been or will be prosecuted.” He contends that this

instruction was inappropriate because Vincent's testimony was

introduced at trial. Defendant argues that this instruction

improperly “chills jurors' consideration of significant

accomplice witness bias going to credibility.”

There is no merit to defendant's claim. The trial court

explicitly told the jury that “[t]he testimony of Vincent

Lopez [that] has been read to you ... [¶] ... must [be]

evaluate[d] ... by the same standards that you would evaluate

any other testimony of a witness who has testified here in

court.” “When the instruction [on unjoined perpetrators] is

given with the full panoply of witness credibility and

accomplice instructions, as it was in this case, a reasonable

juror will understand that although the separate prosecution

or nonprosecution of coparticipants, and the reasons therefor,

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may not be considered on the issue of the charged defendant's

guilt,” this limitation does not preclude the jury from

considering “evidence of interest or bias in assessing the

credibility of prosecution witnesses.” (People v. Price

(1991) 1 Cal. 4th 324, 446.)

This was not a case in which a coparticipant testified for the

prosecution and incriminated the defendant. Vincent's

testimony was a complete denial of any knowledge about these

events, which, if believed, did not inculpate defendant at

all. Of course the prosecutor argued to the jury that Vincent

had lied and that he had been with defendant when defendant

killed Ryan. However, the evidence of Vincent's participation

in the crime was not Vincent's testimony and did not depend on

whether the jury found Vincent to be a credible witness. 

Instead, the determination of whether Vincent had participated

in the crime depended on the testimony of Rosa and Diaz.

CALCRIM No. 373 correctly told the jury that it should not

speculate about whether Vincent would be prosecuted for this

crime. That was indeed irrelevant to the issues before the

jury at this trial. The jury was given the full panoply of

witness credibility instructions and specifically told to

apply those instructions to Vincent's testimony. Under these

circumstances, the trial court's instruction of the jury with

CALCRIM No. 373 was not likely to mislead the jury regarding

its duty to evaluate the credibility of Vincent's testimony.

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *24.

Petitioner argues that due to the instruction the jury could

not judge the credibility of Vincent’s testimony. His claim is

meritless because he has not shown the state court’s denial of this

claim was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. 

The jury was instructed to consider Vicent’s testimony using the

same standards as for other witnesses. Petitioner has not shown

that there was any instruction that urged the jury to not consider

whether Vincent had a motive to lie. Moreover, Vincent did not

incriminate Petitioner with his testimony; rather, he denied

involvement and stated he had no knowledge of whether Petitioner was

involved. This claim is denied.

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4

Petitioner argues the trial court’s instruction on

voluntary intoxication was erroneous because it stated that the jury

“may” consider the evidence instead of stating that the jury “must”

consider it. The California Court of Appeal denied this claim:

Defendant claims on appeal that the trial court's voluntary

intoxication instruction was prejudicially inadequate because

it instructed the jury that it “may” consider such evidence

rather than that it “must” consider such evidence.

At the instruction conference, defendant's trial counsel

stated: “I, for tactical reasons, do not want to argue

voluntary intoxication in this case; I don't think it's a

viable argument. I don't think it would be beneficial to my

client to use the argument.” Nevertheless, the court gave a

voluntary intoxication instruction. “You may consider

evidence, if any, of the defendant's voluntary intoxication

only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in

deciding whether the defendant acted with deliberation or

premeditation or the defendant acted with express malice

aforethought. [¶] A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or

she becomes intoxicated by willingly using an intoxicating

drink or other substance, knowing it could produce an

intoxicating effect or willingly assuming the risk of that

effect. You may not consider evidence of voluntary

intoxication for any other purpose.” Defendant's trial

counsel argued to the jury: “The D.A. made a big deal about,

well, if [defendant] was going to claim voluntary

intoxication, there's a jury instruction. It has nothing to

do with the case. That's not important to what we're talking

about here.” (Italics added.)

Any inadequacy in the voluntary intoxication instruction could

not have played a role in the jury's deliberations because

defendant's trial counsel explicitly told the jury that it was

irrelevant and “has nothing to do with the case.” We reject

defendant's claim that the trial court's voluntary

intoxication instruction was prejudicially erroneous.

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *24-25.

The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not

unreasonable. Petitioner’s trial counsel specifically told the jury

not to consider the instruction and that voluntary intoxication had

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nothing to do with the case. It is not likely the jury would have

considered the instruction based on these statements. Regardless,

the California Supreme Court has upheld this instruction and found

that a jury may, but is not required to, consider evidence of

voluntary intoxication. People v. Mendoza, 18 Cal. 4th 1114, 1133-

34 (1998). Nor has Petitioner shown that the inclusion of this

instruction violated due process. The claim is denied.

5

Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by adding an

extra sentence to the accomplice liability instruction regarding the

natural and probable consequences doctrine. This claim was denied

on direct appeal:

Defendant complains that a sentence regarding natural and

probable consequences was erroneously included in the aiding

and abetting instructions.

The court instructed the jury: “A person may be guilty of a

crime in two ways: [¶] One, he or she may have directly

committed the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator.

[¶] Two, he or she may have aided or abetted a perpetrator who

directly committed a crime. [¶] A person is equally guilty of

a crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and

abetted the perpetrator who committed it. Under some specific

circumstances, if the evidence establishes aiding and abetting

of one crime, a person may be found guilty of other crimes

that occurred during the commission of the first crime. [¶] To

prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding

and abetting that crime, the [prosecution] must prove that:

[¶] One, the perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] Two, the

defendant knew the perpetrator intended to commit the crime;

[¶] Three, before or during the commission of the crime, the

defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in

committing the crime; [¶] Four, the defendant's words or

conduct did in fact aid and abet the person's commission of

the crime. [¶] Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she

knows the perpetrator's unlawful purpose and he or she

specifically intends to and does in fact aid, facilitate,

promote, encourage or instigate the perpetrator's commission

of that crime.” (Italics added.)

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While it is clear that the trial court mistakenly included the

one sentence italicized above in the aiding and abetting

instructions, it is not possible that defendant was prejudiced

by its inclusion. Defendant admitted that he was the actual

perpetrator who stabbed Ryan to death. It was undisputed that

defendant was not an aider and abettor and that no crime other

than murder was ever contemplated. Hence, under any standard

of review, the trial court's mistake was harmless.

Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *25-26 (footnote omitted).

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

Petitioner testified that he was the direct perpetrator of the crime

and repeatedly stabbed the victim. While it was a mistake to

include this aspect of the instruction, any error was harmless as

noted by the state court. There were no other crimes Petitioner was

alleged to have been involved in for this instruction to apply. 

This claim is denied.

E

Finally, Petitioner contends that the cumulative effect of

the errors described above deprived him of his right to a fair

trial. The state appellate court denied the claim stating, “[t]he

only errors that the trial court made were giving an instruction

that used the phrase ‘subjective reasonableness’ rather than

‘subjective belief’ and including in the aiding and abetting

instruction an irrelevant sentence regarding natural and probable

consequences. As we have already explained, the former error was

harmless. The latter error plainly had no impact whatsoever on the

jury as it had no application to the undisputed facts. Thus, there

was no prejudice to cumulate.” Lopez, 2011 WL 3568553, at *26.

In some cases, although no single trial error is

sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect

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of several errors may still prejudice a defendant so much that his

conviction must be overturned. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d

862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing conviction where multiple

constitutional errors hindered defendant's efforts to challenge

every important element of proof offered by prosecution). 

Cumulative error is more likely to be found prejudicial when the

government's case is weak. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d

1164, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Payton

v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 815, 829 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the

only substantial evidence implicating the defendant was the

uncorroborated testimony of a person who had both a motive and an

opportunity to commit the crime). However, where there is no single

constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level

of a constitutional violation. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500,

524 (9th Cir. 2011). Similarly, there can be no cumulative error

when there has not been more than one error. United States v.

Solorio, 669 F.3d 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2012).

This Court has not found any constitutional errors let

alone multiple errors that cumulatively would allow for reversal. 

See Hayes, 632 F.3d at 524. Moreover, there was overwhelming

evidence implicating Petitioner in the murder and refuting his claim

of self-defense. This claim is denied.

V

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED.

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See

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Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner

has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner

demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not

appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court

but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions as

moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 5/18/2015 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

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