Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01671/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01671-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

LUMINARA WORLDWIDE, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

LIOWN ELECTRONICS CO. LTD., LIOWN 

TECHNOLOGIES/BEAUTY ELECTRONICS, LLC, 

SHENZHEN LIOWN ELECTRONICS CO. LTD., 

BOSTON WAREHOUSE TRADING CORP., ABBOTT 

OF ENGLAND (1981), LTD., BJ’S WHOLESALE 

CLUB, INC., VON MAUR, INC., ZULILY, INC., 

SMART CANDLE, LLC, TUESDAY MORNING 

CORP., THE LIGHT GARDEN, INC., CENTRAL 

GARDEN & PET COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellants

AMBIENT LIGHTING, INC.,

Defendant

______________________ 

2015-1671

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Minnesota in No. 0:14-cv-03103-SRN-FLN, 

Judge Susan Richard Nelson. 

______________________ 

Decided: February 29, 2016 

______________________ 

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2 LUMINARA WORLDWIDE, LLC v. LIOWN ELECTRONICS CO. LTD. 

JON WRIGHT, Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox, PLLC, 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by DAVID K.S. CORNWELL, RICHARD D. COLLER, III; 

COURTLAND COLLINSON MERRILL, DANIEL RYAN HALL, 

Anthony Ostlund Baer & Louwagie P.A., Minneapolis, 

MN.

DAN L. BAGATELL, Perkins Coie LLP, Phoenix, AZ, argued for all appellants. Defendants-appellants Liown 

Electronics Co. Ltd., Liown Technologies/Beauty Electronics, LLC, Shenzhen Liown Electronics Co. Ltd. also represented by KENNETH J. HALPERN, Palo Alto, CA; JOSEPH P.

REID, THOMAS N. MILLIKAN, San Diego, CA.

ALAN GARY CARLSON, Carlson, Caspers, Vandenburgh, 

Lindquist & Schuman, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for defendants-appellants BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., Central 

Garden & Pet Company. Also represented by TARA 

CATHERINE NORGARD. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Appellants Liown Electronics Co.; Shenzhen Liown 

Electronics Co.; and Liown Technologies/Beauty Electronics, LLC (collectively, “Liown”), and enjoined distributors 

Boston Warehouse Trading Corp.; Abbott of England 

(1981), Ltd.; BJ’s Wholesale Club., Inc.; Von Maur, Inc.; 

Zulily, Inc.; Smart Candle, LLC; Tuesday Morning Corp.; 

Ambient Lighting, Inc.; The Light Garden, Inc.; and 

Central Garden & Pet Co. (collectively, “Distributors”) 

appeal from the district court’s grant of a preliminary 

injunction barring Liown from supplying Distributors 

with artificial candle products that infringe Disney Enterprises, Inc.’s U.S. Patent No. 8,696,166. We vacate and 

remand for further proceedings.

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LUMINARA WORLDWIDE, LLC v. LIOWN ELECTRONICS CO. LTD. 3

BACKGROUND

The patents asserted in this case—the ’166 patent and 

U.S. Patent Nos. 7,837,355; 8,070,319; and 8,534,869—

teach improved techniques for making the light from 

artificial candles flicker like the flames of real candles. 

These techniques were first developed for the “Haunted 

Mansion” ride at Disneyland. Disney Enterprises, Inc., a 

wholly-owned subsidiary of The Walt Disney Company, is 

the owner of the asserted patents, which claim priority to 

2008. 

In 2008, Disney Enterprises granted Candella, LLC,1

a four-year worldwide license to “make, have made, use,

sell, offer for [sale], and import” products practicing 

“Artificial Flame Technology,” which was defined to 

include Disney’s patents and know-how relating to “creating a unique artificial flickering flame effect.” J.A. 368, 

370. In May 2012, Disney Enterprises and Candella 

renewed the license until 2020 on similar terms. The 

original terms of the license restricted Candella’s rights to 

the Artificial Flame Technology in several ways. For 

example, Candella could not assign, sublicense, or transfer ownership of its rights without Disney’s consent, nor 

could Candella sue to enforce the patents or settle litigation without Disney’s consent. 

The dispute between the parties in this case stems 

from early 2010, when Candella first approached Liown to 

manufacture its candles. Negotiations between the 

companies soon broke down, and Liown subsequently filed 

a patent application in China on flameless candles. 

Allegedly, Liown based this application on confidential 

information about the Artificial Flame Technology it 

 

1 Candella, the former plaintiff in this case, merged 

in late 2014 with Luminara Worldwide, LLC, the party 

bringing this appeal. 

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obtained during its negotiations with Candella. In 2012, 

Liown began selling its flameless candles in the United 

States. 

On October 31, 2012, Disney Enterprises and Candella amended the license agreement to grant Candella more 

rights, including (1) the right to sublicense its interest in 

the Artificial Flame Technology according to the terms of 

the license agreement; (2) the right to assign its interest 

with Disney’s consent, not to be withheld unreasonably; 

and (3) the right to sue without Disney’s consent. J.A. 

439–46 (“2012 Amendment”). The license agreement has 

since been amended three more times, each time to grant 

Candella more rights in the Artificial Flame Technology. 

On July 26, 2013, Disney Enterprises and Candella 

amended the agreement to give Candella the option of 

extending the agreement in successive periods until six 

years after the expiration of the last of the licensed patents. On December 20, 2013, Disney Enterprises and 

Candella amended the agreement to give Candella the 

right to select and retain counsel to respond to any petition for post grant review or reexamination of the licensed 

patents. And on September 9, 2014, Disney Enterprises 

and Candella amended the agreement to give Candella 

rights to additional patents. We refer to the license 

agreement, as amended by all four amendments, as the 

“Amended Agreement.”

Two days after the 2012 Amendment, Candella sued 

Liown for patent infringement. The parties settled, and

Liown agreed to stop selling infringing candles in the 

United States. Following the settlement, Candella and 

Liown reopened negotiations for Liown to manufacture

flameless candles having the Artificial Flame Technology. 

However, the relationship again deteriorated. Days after 

receiving its own U.S. patent covering similar artificial 

flame technology, Liown advised Candella that it would 

no longer comply with the terms of the settlement agreement. Liown then allegedly began selling its own flameCase: 15-1671 Document: 90-2 Page: 4 Filed: 02/29/2016
LUMINARA WORLDWIDE, LLC v. LIOWN ELECTRONICS CO. LTD. 5

less candles to Candella’s exclusive customers based on 

information it learned about those customers in the 

period after the settlement proceedings. 

Candella again filed suit against Liown, alleging patent infringement, tortious interference, and trademark 

infringement. After filing this suit, Candella merged into 

Luminara. Luminara now possesses all of the rights 

formerly held by Candella. 

Shortly after the suit was filed, Liown moved to dismiss for lack of standing. The district court denied 

Liown’s motion, finding that Luminara had both constitutional and prudential standing. Luminara Worldwide, 

LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., No. 14-CV-3103 SRN/FLN (D. 

Minn. Apr. 3, 2015), ECF No. 143; J.A. 1–59 (“Standing 

Order”). Luminara moved for a preliminary injunction 

based on Liown’s alleged infringement of claim 1 of the 

’166 patent and Liown’s alleged tortious interference with 

Luminara’s customers. The court granted Luminara’s

motion based on the alleged infringement without reaching the alternative ground of tortious interference. Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., No. 14-CV3103 SRN/FLN, 2015 WL 1967250 (D. Minn. May 1, 

2015), ECF No. 147; J.A. 60–114 (“Preliminary Injunction 

Order”), order clarified by Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. 

Liown Elecs. Co., No. 14-CV-3103 SRN/FLN, 2015 WL 

3559273 (D. Minn. May 22, 2015), ECF No. 210; J.A. 115–

48 (“Clarification Order”). Liown appealed, challenging 

the court’s holding that Luminara had standing to bring 

the suit and its grant of a preliminary injunction. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION 

I. Disney Has Not Retained the Right to License the

Patent Through the “Affiliate” Clause 

Under our precedent, only parties with exclusionary 

rights to a patent may bring suit for patent infringement. 

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See Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007); WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 

1257, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Amended Agreement 

sets out the scope of Candella’s rights to the Artificial 

Flame Technology; thus, we look to it to determine 

whether Candella had exclusionary rights to the asserted 

patents at the time this suit was filed. California law 

governs the interpretation of the Amended Agreement. 

Under California law, “[a] contract must be so interpreted 

as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it 

existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is 

ascertainable and lawful.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1636. We 

review the district court’s interpretation of a contract de 

novo. DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Kaleidescape, Inc., 97 

Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).

Liown argues that Candella does not have exclusionary rights to the asserted patents because Disney retained the right to freely license the technology to any 

entity by creating new Affiliates. In § 2.2 of the Amended 

Agreement, Disney Enterprises retained the right for its 

Affiliates to practice the Artificial Flame Technology: 

Reservation of Rights. Notwithstanding the exclusive license grant above, Disney expressly reserves for itself and its Affiliates the right 

throughout the world to make, have made, use, 

sell, offer for sale and import the Licensed Products, within and outside the Product Categories. 

J.A. 422. Thus, whether Candella could bring suit for

patent infringement turns on the interpretation of Affiliate in the Amended Agreement. If Disney Enterprises 

could indeed license any entity to manufacture and sell 

candles having Artificial Flame Technology, Candella

would not have had exclusionary rights to the asserted

patents. However, if Disney Enterprises did not retain 

the effective right to license the Artificial Flame Technology to any entity through the Affiliate provision, Candella

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would have had exclusionary rights, and therefore could

sue to prevent Liown from infringing the asserted patents. 

Section 1 of the Amended Agreement defines “Affiliate” as: 

“Affiliate” means any entity controlling or controlled by or in common control with a Party, 

where “control” is defined as the ownership of at 

least 50% of the equity or beneficial interest of 

such entity or the right to vote for or appoint a 

majority of the board of directors or other governing body of such entity. For purposes of this 

Agreement, a Licensor Affiliate shall include: (1) 

any other entity with respect to which Licensor or 

any of its Affiliates has management or operational responsibility (even though Licensor or its 

Affiliate may own less than 50% of the equity of 

such entity); and (2) any other entity, theme park, 

or venue operated by or under license from The 

Walt Disney Company or any of its Affiliates. 

J.A. 420. This provision lays out three categories of 

Disney Enterprises’ Affiliates. First, an Affiliate can be

“any entity controlling or controlled by or in common 

control with” Disney Enterprises. J.A. 420. Second, a 

Disney Enterprises Affiliate includes “any other entity 

with respect to which [Disney Enterprises] or any of its 

Affiliates has management or operational responsibility 

(even though [Disney Enterprises] or its Affiliate may 

own less than 50% of the equity of such entity).” J.A. 420. 

And third, a Disney Enterprises Affiliate includes “any 

other entity, theme park, or venue operated by or under 

license from The Walt Disney Company or any of its 

Affiliates.” J.A. 420. 

Liown does not argue that Disney Enterprises can

freely create Affiliates through the first two of these 

categories, both of which require Disney Enterprises to 

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have management or operational control over the Affiliate. Instead, Liown points to the third category, which 

defines Affiliate to include any entity “operated by or 

under license from The Walt Disney Company or any of its 

Affiliates.” J.A. 420 (emphasis added). Liown contends 

that any entity “under license” from Disney Enterprises 

can practice the patent as an Affiliate, effectively allowing 

Disney Enterprises to freely license the patent.2 It argues 

that this provision only requires Affiliates to obtain a 

license to the Artificial Flame Technology with “any other 

technology . . . no matter how trivial that technology may 

be and no matter whether the licensee pays any extra 

consideration for the additional technology.” Appellants’

Br. 32–33. It argues there is no explicit requirement for 

Disney Enterprises to have operational or management 

control over Affiliates that operate under license from it. 

In support of its interpretation, it points to § 2.2 of the 

Amended Agreement, which provides:

For purposes of this section 2.2 the term “Affiliate” does not include an entity operated under license from the Walt Disney Company where such 

license is only a license to Artificial Flame Technology. 

J.A. 422. It argues that the fact that the Amended 

Agreement explicitly excludes an entity operated under a 

license to the Artificial Flame Technology from the definition of Affiliate “necessarily implies that Disney may

license any entity to use Artificial Flame Technology . . . 

when any other technology is included within the license.” 

Appellants’ Br. 32. 

 

2 As a wholly owned subsidiary of The Walt Disney 

Company, Disney Enterprises is one of The Walt Disney 

Company’s Affiliates. As a result, an Affiliate may fall

under this provision if it were operated by or under license from Disney Enterprises.

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Like the district court, we conclude that “Affiliate” 

does not have the broad meaning that Liown claims. The 

first two categories of Affiliates require operational control, as does the “operated by” provision in the third 

category. And the plain language of the “operated . . . 

under license” provision requires the license to relate to 

the operation of the Affiliate in some way, such as with a 

franchise agreement. Moreover, the Amended Agreement 

repeatedly states that Candella would have “exclusive” 

rights to the Artificial Flame Technology. See J.A. 422 

§§ 2.1, 2.2; J.A. 440, art. 2(a), 2(b); J.A. 441, art. 2(c), 2(d); 

J.A. 608, art. 2(a); J.A. 614, art. 2(a). If Disney Enterprises could license the Artificial Flame Technology to any 

other entity merely by licensing some additional technology to that entity, Candella’s promise of an “exclusive” 

license would be a fiction. 

Candella and Disney Enterprises amended their original license agreement four times. Each time, Disney 

Enterprises gave Candella more rights to the Artificial 

Flame Technology. Liown itself avers that the parties’ 

intent in agreeing to the 2012 Amendment was to “confer 

standing on Candella,” and thereby allow it to bring suit 

against Liown. Appellants’ Br. 13. Any interpretation of 

the Amended Agreement that permits Disney Enterprises 

to license any entity as an Affiliate, such that it can freely 

practice the Artificial Flame Technology, runs counter to 

the parties’ intent as expressed in the Amended Agreement. We hold that Candella had exclusionary rights to

the Artificial Flame Technology when this suit was 

brought. Disney did not retain the broad licensing rights 

proposed by Liown. 

Liown’s next standing argument is that Disney retained substantial rights which prevent Luminara from 

bringing suit in its own name without joining Disney. If a 

party (exclusive licensee) has “all substantial rights” to a 

patent, it “may be deemed the effective ‘patentee’ under 

35 U.S.C. § 281,” and thus may maintain an infringement 

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suit in its own name, without joining the patentee. Prima 

Tek II, LLC v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 

2000). If not, however, an exclusive licensee must join the 

patentee to bring suit.3 This joinder requirement exists 

for two reasons. First, joinder protects the alleged infringer from facing multiple lawsuits on the same patent. 

Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 

1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Second, joinder protects the patentee from losing substantial rights if its patent claims 

are invalidated or the patent rendered unenforceable in 

an action in which it did not participate. Id. 

Because one purpose of the joinder requirement is to 

protect the alleged infringer from multiple lawsuits, the 

transfer of the right to sue for infringement is critical. 

See Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear 

Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining 

that the right to sue is frequently “the most important 

consideration”); Aspex Eyewear, 434 F.3d at 1342 (describing the right to sue as “[a] key factor”). If the patentee 

retains the right to sue, the infringer could face multiple 

suits for the same alleged infringement—in one suit 

defending itself against the patentee, and in another 

defending itself against the exclusive licensee. To prevent 

this, we require joinder of the patentee if it has retained 

the right to sue for infringement. 

Disney Enterprises has not retained the right to sue 

here. Instead, Luminara has the “sole and exclusive 

right” to sue infringers of the patents-in-suit under the 

Amended Agreement. J.A. 608, 614. Thus, Disney Enterprises need not be joined to protect Liown against the 

possibility of facing multiple lawsuits on the same patent.

 

3 We have commonly referred to this concept as 

“prudential standing.” See, e.g., Prima Tek II, 222 F.3d at

1377. 

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The second purpose of joinder is to protect the patentee from losing substantial rights if its claims are invalidated or the patent is rendered unenforceable in an action 

in which it did not participate. Aspex Eyewear, 434 F.3d 

at 1343. Thus, an exclusive licensee that does not have 

“all substantial rights” to a patent must join the patentee 

to bring suit. For example, if the patentee has retained 

the right to freely license the patent, it stands to lose 

substantial rights if the claims are held invalid or the 

patent held unenforceable. Other considerations include: 

the scope of the licensee’s right to sublicense, the 

nature of license provisions regarding the reversion of rights to the licensor following breaches of 

the license agreement, the right of the licensor to 

receive a portion of the recovery in infringement 

suits brought by the licensee, the duration of the 

license rights granted to the licensee, the ability of 

the licensor to supervise and control the licensee’s 

activities, the obligation of the licensor to continue 

paying patent maintenance fees, and the nature of 

any limits on the licensee’s right to assign its interests in the patent. 

Mann Found., 604 F.3d at 1360–61. 

Luminara has extensive rights under the Amended 

Agreement, including its exclusionary rights. It has a

worldwide license to “make, have made, use, sell, offer for 

[sale], and import” products practicing the Artificial 

Flame Technology. J.A. 422. It has the sole right to 

sublicense the asserted patents—Disney Enterprises did 

not retain the right to license the asserted patents

through the “Affiliate” provision, as discussed supra pp.

6–10. And it has the reasonable right to assign its rights 

under the Amended Agreement. 

The rights that Liown argues Disney Enterprises retains are: the right for Disney Enterprises and its Affiliates to practice the patents; title to the patents; the 

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responsibility to pay maintenance fees to keep the patents 

in force; a financial interest in litigation and licensing; 

and a right to notice of litigation and licensing activities.4 

None of these retained rights individually or cumulatively are substantial enough to preclude Luminara from 

bringing suit in its name alone. Although Disney Enterprises retains the right for it and its Affiliates to practice 

the patents, this is not a substantial right requiring 

joinder. This is because Disney Enterprises will not lose 

this right if the claims are invalidated or the patent held 

unenforceable. Rather, if the claims were invalidated or 

the patent held unenforceable, everyone, including Disney 

Enterprises and its Affiliates, could freely practice the 

patent. A patentee that merely retains the right to practice the patent does not risk losing a substantial right if 

the claims are invalidated or the patent held unenforceable. The retained right to practice a patent is not the 

same as a retained right to exclude others from doing so.

We have previously held that a financial interest in 

litigation and licensing without more does not amount to 

a substantial right forcing joinder of the patentee. See, 

e.g., Propat Int’l Corp. v. RPost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1191

(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he fact that a patent owner has 

retained a right to a portion of the proceeds of the commercial exploitation of the patent, . . . does not necessarily 

defeat what would otherwise be a transfer of all substantial rights in the patent.”); Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. 

Meccanica Euro Italia SpA, 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 

1991) (holding that “a right to receive infringement damages” was not “so substantial as to reduce the transfer to 

a mere license or indicate an intent not to transfer all 

substantial rights”). And title to the patents, the responsibility to pay maintenance fees on the patents, and a 

 

4 This decision is limited to these rights argued by 

Liown.

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right to notice of litigation and licensing activities are not 

substantial rights that the patentee risks losing if the 

claims are invalidated or the patent held unenforceable. 

We hold that Luminara has all substantial rights to 

the patent and therefore it is not necessary to join Disney 

Enterprises in this lawsuit. Thus, we reject the standing 

arguments raised by Liown.5 

II. Preliminary Injunction

We review the grant of a preliminary injunction for 

abuse of discretion. Amazon.com Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To 

 

5 We note that the same facts upon which we rely to 

conclude that Luminara can proceed in the absence of 

Disney also support a finding that Disney is not an indispensable party within the meaning of Rule 19 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

19(a). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 19 discuss 

the concerns that Rule 19 is intended to address: 

The first factor brings in a consideration of what a 

judgment in the action would mean to the absentee. Would the absentee be adversely affected in a 

practical sense, and if so, would the prejudice be 

immediate and serious, or remote and minor? The 

possible collateral consequences of the judgment 

upon the parties already joined are also to be appraised. Would any party be exposed to a fresh 

action by the absentee, and if so, how serious is 

the threat?

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 19 advisory committee’s note (1966)

(citing A. L. Smith Iron Co. v. Dickson, 141 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 

1944); Caldwell Mfg. Co. v. Unique Balance Co., 18 F.R.D. 

258 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)). These are the very factors we 

consider here.

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obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show “that 

[it] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [it] is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 

relief, that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and 

that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. 

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Furthermore, a patentee must establish a causal nexus 

between the infringement and the alleged harm. Apple, 

Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 

2012). We review claim construction de novo except for 

subsidiary facts based on extrinsic evidence, which we 

review for clear error. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, 

Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841–42 (2015).

Liown argues that the preliminary injunction was improperly granted because there is a substantial question 

of validity—namely, whether Disney Enterprises’ earlier 

U.S. Patent No. 7,261,455 anticipates claim 1 of the ’166 

patent. We agree.

Although Luminara alleges infringement of four patents in this suit, claim 1 of the ’166 patent forms the sole 

basis for the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. Claim 1 recites (emphasis added):

A pendulum member for generating a flickering 

flame effect, comprising: 

a body with upper and lower portions;

a flame silhouette element extending outward 

from the upper portion of the body; and

a hole in the body below the flame silhouette element, wherein the hole is configured to receive a 

flame support element such that the flame support element passes through the hole and the body 

is free to pivot when supported by the flame support element. 

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The ’455 patent is also directed to artificial flame technology. This patent teaches a flame element above a supporting two-axis gimbal, such that the flame element may 

rotate around two axes. The parties agree that the ’455 

patent discloses every element of claim 1 of the ’166 

patent except the requirement that “the body is free to 

pivot when supported by the flame support element.” But

the parties dispute whether rotation around two axes

using gimbals (as taught in the ’455 patent) satisfies this 

limitation. 

In considering whether there is a substantial question 

of invalidity, the district court construed “free to pivot” to 

mean “to run on, or as if on, a pivot.” Preliminary Injunction Order at *6. The district court then wrote that the 

specification teaches that the pendulum described in 

claim 1 of the ’166 patent “is suspended using a V-shaped 

wire passing through a larger hole.” Id. at *11. This 

“relatively loose suspension allows the pendulum to rotate 

around three axes” and “slide along the wire,” among 

other movements. Id. The court concluded that the 

pendulum “moves in at least four different ways, and 

moves in a random, unpredictable manner.” Id. Because

the ’455 patent teaches a body that moves in only two 

ways (that is, rotates around only two axes), the court 

held that it did not satisfy the “free to pivot” limitation. 

Id. at *11–12. In essence, the district court construed 

“free to pivot” to include two additional limitations: 

(1) chaotic movement and (2) movement that is more than

rotation around two axes. 

The ordinary meaning of “free to pivot” does not plainly require either of these limitations. Pivoting includes 

rotation around a single axis—for example, when a door 

pivots on its hinges, a dancer turns on a pivot foot, or a 

lever pivots on a fulcrum. And being “free to pivot” does 

not require chaotic motion. 

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Absent lexicography or disavowal, we do not depart 

from the plain meaning of the claims. Thorner v. Sony 

Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 

2012). The standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are “exacting.” GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, 

Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). To act as a 

lexicographer, a patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term” and “clearly express an

intent to redefine the term.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365

(internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, disavowal 

requires that “the specification [or prosecution history] 

make[] clear that the invention does not include a particular feature.” SciMed Life Sys. Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

While such disavowal can occur either explicitly or implicitly, it must be clear and unmistakable. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., No. 2015-1146, 2016 WL 

386068, at *2–3 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2016). We have found 

disavowal or disclaimer based on clear and unmistakable 

statements by the patentee that limit the claims, such as 

“the present invention includes . . .” or “the present invention is . . . ” or “all embodiments of the present invention 

are . . . .” See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. AGA 

Med. Corp., 717 F.3d 929, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Honeywell 

Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1316–19 

(Fed. Cir. 2006); SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d at 1343–

44. When a patentee “describes the features of the ‘present invention’ as a whole,” he implicitly alerts the reader 

that “this description limits the scope of the invention.” 

Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 717 F.3d at 936.

At this preliminary stage, we see no definition and no 

disavowal or disclaimer in the specification requiring 

motion in four different ways or directions. Certainly, the 

specification teaches that in some embodiments, the body

has a hole that is larger than the diameter of the supporting wire, allowing it to move side-to-side and to rotate 

around the support element. ’166 patent, col. 7 ll. 22–35. 

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LUMINARA WORLDWIDE, LLC v. LIOWN ELECTRONICS CO. LTD. 17

However, the specification also teaches that in other 

embodiments, it is preferable to have a rigid or semi-rigid

support element—not a wire. Id. at col. 7 ll. 35–37. In 

these embodiments, the body would rotate around the 

support elements, but would not flutter or move side-toside or in the other ways required by the district court. 

Thus, the specification teaches that non-rotational motion 

is optional. We have been shown no prosecution history 

that is to the contrary. As a result, we see no basis for 

departing from the plain meaning of the term “free to 

pivot.”

By contrast, the specification disclaims non-chaotic 

pivoting. It explains that solitary flames are “complex 

kinetic interactions” that “produce a continuously and 

randomly moving light.” ’166 patent, col. 1 ll. 39–41. It 

teaches that flame displays in the prior art “are relatively 

poor imitations of a real flame and have not been widely 

adopted by the commercial or retail markets.” Id. at col. 2 

ll. 13–16. The specification further explains that “[t]he 

present description addresses the above and other problems by providing kinetic flame devices that create lighting effects driven by real but chaotic physical movements.” 

Id. at col. 2 ll. 23–25 (emphasis added); see also id. at col. 

4 ll. 52–58 (“The present description involves devices that 

create lighting effects driven by real, chaotic, and physical 

movements.”), col. 4 l. 62–col. 5 l. 2 (“[T]he present invention stimulates and/or perturbs a complex interaction 

between gravity, mass, electromagnetic field strength, 

magnetic fields, air resistance, and light, but the complex 

interaction is not directly modulated or controlled.”). By 

teaching that the “present description” solves the problems associated with the prior art candle devices because 

it is driven by “real but chaotic movements,” the patentee 

disclaims devices driven by rhythmic or metronomic 

patterns. 

Thus, we preliminarily construe claim 1 of the ’166 

patent to require chaotic pivoting, with no further reCase: 15-1671 Document: 90-2 Page: 17 Filed: 02/29/2016
18 LUMINARA WORLDWIDE, LLC v. LIOWN ELECTRONICS CO. LTD. 

quirements on movement. The ’455 patent undisputedly 

teaches pivoting in two axes. Furthermore, the ’455 

patent teaches that the flame reflector, balanced on a 

gimbal mechanism allowing movement on a minimum of 

two axes, is “articulated by a natural and chaotic external 

or internal force (such as wind, magnetism)” to “randomly 

simulat[e] blowing in the wind.” ’455 patent, col. 6 ll. 53–

62 (J.A. 1410). The final limitation in claim 1 of the ’166 

patent—chaotic movement—seems to be met with this 

discussion of chaotic forces that can articulate the flame 

reflector of the candle device in the prior art ’455 patent. 

As a result, we conclude that Liown’s argument that the 

’455 patent anticipates claim 1 of the ’166 patent raises a 

substantial question of validity. 

Luminara asks us to maintain the preliminary injunction on the basis of its claim for tortious interference or on 

the basis of Liown and the Distributors’ infringement of 

other patent claims (such as claim 14 of the ’166 patent) 

not decided by the district court. We will not consider 

these claims in the first instance on appeal; however, 

nothing in this opinion should be taken to prejudice these 

arguments. Our analysis as to whether there is a substantial question of validity is limited to claim 1 of the 

‘166 patent, the only claim upon which the district court 

based the preliminary injunction. And to be clear, this 

holding is based on our preliminary claim construction 

ruling.

CONCLUSION

We vacate the district court’s grant of a preliminary 

injunction and remand for further proceedings. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to Luminara. 

Case: 15-1671 Document: 90-2 Page: 18 Filed: 02/29/2016