Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01449/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01449-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Alan Marcel Sojka II, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-01449-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 On July 16, 2013, Petitioner Alan Marcel Sojka II filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. The Court referred the petition to 

Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan, and later to Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett. 

Docs. 5, 38. Judge Willett issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) recommending 

that the Court dismiss the petition as untimely. Doc. 39. Pro se Petitioner filed an 

objection to the R&R. Doc. 50. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will overrule 

his objections and adopt Judge Willett’s recommendation that the petition be dismissed. 

I. Introduction.1

 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

establishes a one-year statute of limitations for habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As relevant here, the limitations period runs from “the date on 

which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of 

 

1

 For general background on this case (to which Petition has not objected), see the R&R. Doc. 39 at 2-4. 

Case 2:13-cv-01449-DGC Document 53 Filed 02/12/16 Page 1 of 9
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the time for seeking such review.” § 2244(d)(1)(A). The limitations period is subject to 

both statutory tolling and equitable tolling. Statutory tolling is available for “[t]he time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” § 2244(d)(2). 

Equitable tolling is available where “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s 

control ma[d]e it impossible to file a petition on time.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 

968 (9th Cir. 2006). In addition, a petitioner is entitled to an equitable exception to the 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations if he makes “a credible showing of actual innocence.” 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013). 

 Judge Willett determined that (1) the AEDPA limitations period began to run on 

January 2, 2009, the last day on which Sojka could have petitioned the Arizona Supreme 

Court for direct review of his conviction (Doc. 39 at 7 & n.5); (2) the limitations period 

was subject to statutory tolling from January 6, 2009 through February 10, 2012, during 

which Sojka’s petition for post-conviction review (“PCR”) was pending before the 

Maricopa County Superior Court (id. at 8-9); and (3) the limitations period was not 

subject to any additional statutory tolling because Sojka did not have a “properly filed” 

PCR petition pending in state court at any time after February 10, 2012 (id. at 9-14). 

Next, Judge Willett determined that Sojka was not entitled to equitable tolling because he 

had not shown that extraordinary circumstances made it impossible for him to file a 

timely habeas petition. Id. at 14-19. Finally, Judge Willett determined that Sojka was 

not entitled to an equitable exception to the limitations period because he had not made a 

credible showing of actual innocence. Id. at 19-21. Based on these findings, Judge 

Willett concluded that the limitations period expired on February 6, 2013, making 

Sojka’s petition 160 days late. Id. at 19. 

 In his written objections, Sojka argues that (1) he is entitled to statutory tolling (or, 

in the alternative, equitable tolling) for the period between February 11, 2012 and 

September 24, 2012, when he was seeking reconsideration of the Superior Court’s denial 

on his PCR petition (Doc. 50 at 4-7); and (2) he is entitled to equitable tolling for the 

Case 2:13-cv-01449-DGC Document 53 Filed 02/12/16 Page 2 of 9
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

period between September 25, 2012 and July 16, 2013, when he diligently sought to 

appeal the denial of his reconsideration petition but was impeded by the Superior Court’s 

unexpected application of a state-law procedural bar (id. at 7-12). The Court reviews 

Sojka’s objections de novo; the portions of the R&R to which he does not object will be 

adopted without further discussion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).

II. Analysis. 

 A. Statutory Tolling. 

 On February 10, 2012, the Superior Court denied Sojka’s PCR petition. Doc. 39 

at 3 (citing Doc. 17-2 at 130-41). The court initially set March 30, 2012 as the deadline 

to file a petition for reconsideration, but later granted Sojka’s request for an extension. 

Id. (citing Doc. 17-2 at 147-48, 150-52, 165). On May 7, 2012, the court extended the 

deadline to file a motion for reconsideration until June 29, 2012, warning Sojka “that no 

further continuances will be granted absent a substantial showing of extraordinary 

circumstances.” Id. at 10 (citing Doc. 17-5 at 151). Sojka failed to file his 

reconsideration motion by this deadline, and instead filed three additional extension 

requests. Id. The court denied these requests on August 7, 2012, finding that Sojka had 

“failed to make the required showing of extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify 

a further extension of time.” Id. (citing Doc. 17-5 at 151). 

 In September 2012, Sojka filed a motion to set aside the final decision, a motion to 

extend the deadline to file a petition for review by the Court of Appeals, and a petition for 

reconsideration. Id. at 11 (citing Docs. 17-3 at 3-8, 9-101; 17-4). On September 24, 

2012, the Superior Court issued a minute entry denying the motion to set aside the final 

decision, but granting the motion to extend the time for seeking appellate review. Id.

(citing Doc. 17-5 at 2). The court subsequently amended the minute entry to deny the 

petition for reconsideration as well. Id. (citing Doc. 17-5 at 4). 

 Judge Willett found that statutory tolling was not available for this period because 

Sojka never presented the Superior Court with a “properly filed” petition for 

Case 2:13-cv-01449-DGC Document 53 Filed 02/12/16 Page 3 of 9
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

reconsideration. Doc. 39 at 9-11. She noted that “time limits, no matter their form, are 

‘filing’ conditions,” which means that an untimely PCR petition is not “properly filed” 

for purposes of AEDPA. Id. at 7-8 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 

(2005)). 

 Sojka notes that the Superior Court dispensed with a prior, improperly filed 

motion with an order stating that “no action w[ould] be taken” on the motion. Doc. 50 at 

4 (citing Doc. 17-2 at 155). Because the Superior Court did not enter a similar order with 

respect to his reconsideration petition, he reasons, it must have concluded that it was not 

improperly filed. Id. Relatedly, he argues that it must be presumed that a summary 

denial was made on the merits. Id. at 5 (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 

(2011) (“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has 

denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits 

in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”)). 

 Sojka’s arguments are unavailing. First, there is no question that Sojka’s petition 

was untimely. After an initial extension, the Superior Court ordered Sojka to file his 

petition by June 29, 2012, warning him that further extensions would not be granted 

absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances. Sojka did not file his petition before 

June 29, 2012, and his requests for an additional extension were denied. Thus, Sojka’s 

motion was untimely and not properly filed. 

 Second, the April 12, 2012 minute entry did not purport to establish a generally 

applicable procedure for improperly filed motions; it merely stated that the court would 

not take action on the particular motion pending before it. Sojka does not point to any 

Arizona case or rule of procedure requiring the Superior Court to deal with subsequent 

improper filings in the same way. 

 Third, although Sojka is right that courts generally presume that a summary denial 

was made on the merits, he overlooks the fact that this presumption “may be overcome 

when there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court’s decision is more 

likely.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99-100 (citation omitted). That is the case here. Sojka’s 

Case 2:13-cv-01449-DGC Document 53 Filed 02/12/16 Page 4 of 9
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

motion was dismissed several months after the court-ordered filing deadline, after the 

court found that Sojka had not demonstrated any extraordinary circumstances justifying 

an extension, and after the court explicitly denied three additional extension requests. It 

would be highly unusual for a court, after refusing to extend the filing deadline, to 

nonetheless consider the merits of a petition filed several months late. In any event, even 

if the Superior Court did overlook the obvious untimeliness of Sojka’s petition to deny it 

on the merits, that would not render the petition “properly filed” for purposes of AEDPA. 

See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225-26 (2002) (explaining that “[a] court will 

sometimes address the merits of a claim that it believes was presented in an untimely 

way,” but that does not render the claim properly filed for purposes of AEDPA). 

 Because Sojka’s reconsideration petition was never properly filed, he is not 

entitled to statutory tolling for the period between February 11, 2012 and September 24, 

2012. 

 B. Equitable Tolling. 

To establish his entitlement to equitable tolling, Sojka must show that (1) he 

pursued his claims diligently during the relevant period; (2) extraordinary circumstances 

beyond his control made it impossible for him to file a timely habeas petition; and (3) 

these circumstances proximately caused his untimeliness. Roy, 465 F.3d at 969; Allen v. 

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 295 F.3d 1046 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

 1. February 11, 2012 to September 24, 2012. 

Sojka argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling for the period during which he 

sought reconsideration because he diligently pursued his rights during this time but was 

thwarted by circumstances beyond his control. Doc. 50 at 6-7. Specifically, Sojka states 

that he was unable to file a proper petition for reconsideration because (1) a prison 

lockdown made it impossible for him to comply with the court-ordered filing deadline; 

(2) the court failed to docket his first extension request; and (3) the court denied his 

subsequent extension requests based on the mistaken assumption that “he was trying to 

Case 2:13-cv-01449-DGC Document 53 Filed 02/12/16 Page 5 of 9
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

use the rehearing process to relitigate the PCR petition.” Id. at 7. 

 The problem for Sojka is that his arguments address the wrong question. The 

pertinent question is not whether extraordinary circumstances prevented Sojka from filing 

a timely reconsideration petition, but whether extraordinary circumstances prevented him 

from filing a timely habeas petition. Sojka has not shown that the difficulties he faced in 

complying with the reconsideration deadline had any bearing on his ability to file a 

timely habeas petition. Nor could he. As of the date his reconsideration petition was 

denied, Sojka still had 136 days to file a habeas petition, and he made several significant 

filings in state courts during this time. Because the difficulties Sojka faced in complying 

with the reconsideration deadline did not make it impossible to file a timely habeas 

petition, he is not entitled to equitable tolling based on these difficulties. 

 2. September 25, 2012 to July 16, 2013. 

 After the Superior Court denied Sojka’s petition for reconsideration, Sojka sought 

to extend the deadline to appeal this decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals. On 

November 5, 2012, the Superior Court granted an extension until November 30, 2012, 

warning that no additional extensions would be granted “absent a substantial showing of 

extenuating circumstances.” Doc. 39 at 12 (citing Doc. 17-5 at 156). Shortly before this 

deadline, Sojka filed another extension request. Id. After the deadline, but before the 

Superior Court could act on this request, Sojka petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals 

for review. Id. (citing Doc. 17-5 at 28-128). The State moved to preclude Sojka’s 

petition as untimely, and the Court of Appeals granted this motion, indicating that the 

Superior Court could authorize a late filing if it found that Sojka was not responsible for 

the delay. Id. at 13 (citing Doc. 17-6 at 14-16, 29). On March 5, 2013, the Superior 

Court ruled that Sojka was not entitled to an extension, stating: “Upon review and 

consideration of [Sojka’s] present submission, the Court finds that [he] has failed to make 

the required showing of extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify a further 

extension.” Doc. 17-6 at 27. 

 Sojka argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling for this period because he 

Case 2:13-cv-01449-DGC Document 53 Filed 02/12/16 Page 6 of 9
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

diligently sought to appeal the denial of his reconsideration petition but was impeded by 

the Superior Court’s unexpected application of state law, which precluded him from 

obtaining appellate review and rendered him ineligible for statutory tolling under 

AEDPA. Doc. 50 at 7-11. Sojka notes that the court’s November 5, 2012 order stated 

that the court would grant an extension upon “a substantial showing of extenuating 

circumstances,” while its March 5, 2013 order applied an “extraordinary circumstances” 

standard. Doc. 50 at 8-9. Sojka argues that he made a showing of “extenuating 

circumstances,” and that his petition for review would have been allowed to proceed but 

for the Superior Court’s retroactive application of the more stringent “extraordinary 

circumstances” standard. Id. In support of this argument, Sojka cites Urcinoli v. Cathel, 

546 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 2008), for the proposition that “a court’s action, even if legitimate 

when taken, may constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling if 

it later operates to prevent a plaintiff from pursuing his rights.” Id. at 275. 

 For several reasons, the Court finds Sojka’s argument insufficient. First, it asks 

this Court to find that the Superior Court misapplied Arizona law (as set forth in the 

Superior Court’s own November 5, 2012 order). But a federal habeas court will not 

disturb a state court’s interpretation of state law unless the interpretation is “untenable or 

. . . a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional violation.” Oxborrow v. 

Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989). The Superior Court’s interpretation of 

its prior order was neither. Although a distinction might be drawn between “extenuating” 

and “extraordinary” circumstances, nothing in Arizona law requires such a distinction, 

and it was not unreasonable for the Superior Court to conflate the terms. 

 Second, Sojka has not shown that Superior Court’s failure to apply an 

“extenuating circumstances” test resulted in the denial of his extension request. Sojka 

argues that there were extenuating circumstances justifying an extension: his limited 

education, lack of access to case law, and inability to conduct factual research in a timely 

manner. Doc. 50 at 8. But the Superior Court was aware of all of this when it set the 

November 30, 2012 deadline; it clearly did not intend to grant an extension absent 

Case 2:13-cv-01449-DGC Document 53 Filed 02/12/16 Page 7 of 9
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

evidence that Sojka faced some additional impediment to timely filing. Because Sojka 

fails to identify any such impediment, he cannot show that the Superior Court’s failure to 

apply an “extenuating circumstances” standard resulted in the denial of his extension 

request. 

 Third, even if Sojka could show that the Superior Court’s failure to apply an 

“extenuating circumstances” standard resulted in the denial of his extension request, he 

could not show that this denial proximately caused him to miss the AEDPA filing 

deadline. Sojka was not required to wait for the Superior Court to decide his extension 

request before filing his habeas petition; he could have filed a protective habeas petition 

immediately after he missed the deadline for filing a reconsideration petition. See Pace, 

544 U.S. at 416 (where there is “reasonable confusion” about whether prisoner’s state 

court petition will be deemed timely, the prisoner may file a protective habeas petition in 

federal court). Sojka has not shown that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from 

filing such a protective petition, and the possibility that the Superior Court might have 

allowed his reconsideration petition to proceed was certainly no impediment to the filing 

of such a petition. 

 The fact that Sojka could have filed a protective habeas petition renders Urcinoli 

distinguishable. That case involved a federal habeas court’s dismissal – after the 

limitations period had ended – of a prisoner’s timely, exhausted claims. 546 F.3d at 273. 

Because the district court’s action completely foreclosed any possibility that the prisoner 

could obtain federal habeas relief on claims he had properly presented in a habeas 

petition, the Third Circuit held that the district court’s decision was an “extraordinary 

circumstance” justifying equitable tolling. See id. at 273-77. By contrast, nothing the 

Superior Court did prevented Sojka from filing a protective habeas petition within the 

limitations period. His decision not to do so is not an extraordinary circumstance 

justifying equitable tolling. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett’s R&R (Doc. 39) is accepted. 

Case 2:13-cv-01449-DGC Document 53 Filed 02/12/16 Page 8 of 9
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 2. Sojka’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is denied with prejudice. 

 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this action. 

 Dated this 12th day of February, 2016. 

Case 2:13-cv-01449-DGC Document 53 Filed 02/12/16 Page 9 of 9