Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-00161/USCOURTS-alnd-7_14-cv-00161-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Property Damage

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

MARK SMITH, LEE COLEMAN, ERIC

WHEELER, and WILLIE DANNER,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FAMILY DOLLAR STORES, INC.,

METROGROUP DEVELOPMENT, and

FORESITE GROUP, INC.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO. 7:14-cv-161-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is presently pending before the court on defendant MetroGroup

Development II, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 28.)1 Upon consideration of the record,

the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law, the court is

of the opinion that defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 28), is due to be denied.

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Defendant MetroGroup Development II, LLC has moved to dismiss plaintiffs’

Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 28 at 1.) The

purpose of such motions, authorized by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, is to test the facial sufficiency of the plaintiff’s statement of his claims for relief.

Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997).

1Reference to a document number, [“Doc. ___”], refers to the number assigned to

each document as it is filed in the court’s record.

FILED

 2015 Apr-28 AM 07:59

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:14-cv-00161-AKK Document 35 Filed 04/28/15 Page 1 of 6
Rule 12(b)(6) must be read together with Rule 8(a)(2), which “requires that a pleading

contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief

in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). 

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’

but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment]

to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted). Accordingly, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are

true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations and footnote omitted). The plaintiff need not

prove his case but must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Id. at 570 (emphasis added).

Additionally, “[w]hen considering a motion to dismiss, all facts set forth in the

plaintiff’s complaint ‘are to be accepted as true and the court limits its consideration to the

pleadings and exhibits attached thereto.’” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228,

1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting GSW, Inc. v. Long Cnty., Ga., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir.

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1993)). Further, all “reasonable inferences” are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. St. George

v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). However, while the court must

accept all factual allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As set forth in the court’s Memorandum Opinion addressing plaintiffs’ Motion to

Remand, the facts of this case are as follows:

Plaintiffs filed this action against defendants Family Dollar Stores, Inc.,

(“FamilyDollar”), MetroGroup Development (“MetroGroup”), and Foresite

Group, Inc. (“Foresite”) (collectively “defendants”) in the Circuit Court for

Sumter County, Alabama. In February 2012, defendants began construction

of a Family Dollar store in Sumter County. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 11.) During

construction defendants developed and implemented a moat as a drainage

system for the store. (Id. ¶ 17.) The construction of the store created various

noises and vibrations that affected plaintiffs’ property. (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.) The

moat/drainage system also caused continuous water drainage onto property

owned by Smith and lawfully occupied by Coleman, property owned by

Wheeler, and property lawfully occupied by Danner. (Id. ¶¶ 1-4, 18-21.) 

The plaintiffs filed suit against defendants on December 23, 2013. The

Complaint sets forth claims for trespass, nuisance, negligence/wantonness,

and combined and concurring negligence/wantonness. (Id. ¶¶ 31-55.) As a

result ofthese actions, plaintiffs seek compensatorydamages for interference

with the use and enjoyment of plaintiffs’ property, “personal injury, mental

and emotional anguish, suffering and distress, anxiety, and for such future

damages as are appropriate;” punitive damages; exemplary/enhanced

damages; and additional further relief. (Id. at 14.)

Foresite removed this action on January 29, 2014, alleging diversity

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 1.)

(Doc. 14 at 1-2.) 

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Case 7:14-cv-00161-AKK Document 35 Filed 04/28/15 Page 3 of 6
DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs assert in their Complaint that MetroGroup, along with the other defendants,

began construction of the Family Dollar store, made the decision to build a moat around the

store, implemented the moat as a drainage system, and caused and allowed water to drain

from the Family Dollar property onto plaintiffs’ properties with knowledge of the effect on

plaintiffs’ properties. (Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 11, 16-17, 21-22.) To survive defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss, plaintiffs’ Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

In it Motion to Dismiss, defendant argues that plaintiffs’ claims asserted against it

should be dismissed because “MetroGroup Development II, LLC has never owned,

developed, or constructed improvements on the real property that is the subject of this

action.” (Doc. 28 ¶ 4.) While defendant entered into contracts to purchase and develop 700

4th Avenue, York, Alabama, the real property at issue in this case, it “assigned those

contracts to another entity before purchasing or developing the property and before any

improvements to the property were ever made.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendant further asserts that the

“ownership of the property and building permits were not in the name of Metro Group

Development II, LLC, and were a matter of public record before construction began.” (Doc.

34 ¶ 3.) 

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Case 7:14-cv-00161-AKK Document 35 Filed 04/28/15 Page 4 of 6
First, if defendant believes that plaintiffs sued the wrong party, defendant must

produce evidence of the assignment. Defendant has not attached any contract or other

document showing an assignment of its contract rights to purchase and develop 700 4th

Avenue in York, Alabama to another entity. Therefore, because “[s]tatements by counsel in

briefs are not evidence,” the court has no evidence of the alleged assignment. Travaglio v.

American Exp. Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Skyline Corp. v.

N.L.R.B., 613 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotations omitted).

Even if defendant had produced evidence of the assignment, defendant has not

provided anyevidence or stated any facts explaining its relationship with the unnamed entity

to whomdefendant assigned its contracts. Depending on the relationship between defendant

and the assignee entity, and whether defendant retained any control over the purchase and

development of the property, defendant may ultimately be liable to plaintiffs for any damage

caused by the assignee through, for example, vicarious liability or an alter ego theory. See

Lifestar Response of Ala., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 17 So. 3d 200 (Ala. 2009) (“The test for

determining whether a person is an agent or employee of another, rather than an independent

contractor, is whether that other person has reserved the right of control over the means and

method by which the person's work will be performed, whether or not the right of control

is actually exercised. Alabama Power Co. v. Beam, 472 So. 2d 619 (Ala.1985). Vicarious

liability arises from the right of supervision and control over the manner of the alleged

agent's performance. Kennedy v. Western Sizzlin Corp., 857 So. 2d 71 (Ala.2003).

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Generally, one is liable for the actions of an agent but is not liable for the actions of an

independent contractor. Gonzalez, LLC v. DiVincenti, 844 So. 2d 1196 (Ala.2002).”); M.B.

Barge Co., Inc. v. Kudzu Marine, Inc., No. 12-0686-WS-N, 2014 WL 4979139, at *3 (S.D.

Ala. Oct. 6, 2014) (Under Alabama law, “liability under an alter ego theory requires: [(1)]

‘complete control’ by the defendant over the subservient corporation; (2) ‘misuse’ of that

control; and (3) harm or loss proximately caused by the misused control.”) (quoting Messick

v. Moring, 514 So. 2d 892, 894-95 (Ala. 1987)).

Further, even if defendant had produced evidence of the assignment and its

relationship with the assignee, this evidence would properly be the subject of a Rule 56

motion, not a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1336-

37 (11th Cir. 2012) (“At the pleading stage of litigation, we ask only if plaintiffs have

adequately stated a claim for which relief can be granted. Carnival’s argument . . . is more

appropriate after discovery at the summary judgment stage or at trial.”).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that defendant MetroGroup Development II,

LLC’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 28), is due to be denied. An order in accordance will be

entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion. 

DONE this 27th day of April, 2015. 

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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