Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02867/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02867-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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1 18-cv-2867-W

 08-cr-850-W 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH WAYNE MOORE,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Case No.: 18-cv-2867-W

03-cr-850-W 

 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[DOC. 1021]

Pending before the Court is Kenneth Wayne Moore’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the “Petition”). Respondent United States of 

America opposes.

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. 

See Civil Local Rule 7.1. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the Petition

[Doc. 1021].

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 12, 2008, a federal Grand Jury returned a Fifth Superseding 

Indictment charging Petitioner Kenneth Wayne Moore with Conspiracy to Commit Wire 

Fraud, Wire Fraud, Conspiracy to Launder Money, Money Laundering, Income Tax 

Evasion, and False Return. (See Indictment [Doc. 812].) Trial began on April 4, 2008.

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At trial, the United States presented evidence demonstrating that Petitioner joined a 

conspiracy to solicit individuals to invest in a fraudulent insurance company, the Good 

Samaritan Insurance Company (“Good Samaritan”), by making significant

misrepresentations. (Opp’n [Doc. 1025] Ex. A at 69.) For example, the evidence showed 

Petitioner failed to disclose to new investors that he previously invested hundreds of 

thousands of dollars in the company, which resulted in Petitioner having to declare 

bankruptcy. (Opp’n Ex. A at 69.) Petitioner also failed to disclose that all promises 

made to him while he was an investor were broken. (Id. at 69–70.) Evidence also 

revealed that after joining the conspiracy, Petitioner received into his personal account 

daily payments over a two-year period totaling $330,000 in 2002 and $279,500 in a short 

period in 2003. (Opp’n Ex. C at 44–45.) These payments represented new investor 

money resulting from his solicitation. (Id.)

On May 14, 2008, the jury returned a guilty verdict on counts 1 through 36. (May 

14, 2008 Min. Entry: Jury Trial [Doc. 849].) Petitioner was subsequently sentenced to 60 

months on counts 1 through 10, 150 months on counts 11 through 35, and 60 months on 

count 36, to be served concurrently. (September 15, 2008 Min. Entry: PO Report [Doc. 

886].) Petitioner then appealed and on March 8, 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his 

conviction and sentence. See United States v. Moore, 365 Fed. Appx. 800 (9th Cir. Feb. 

12, 2010) (unpublished). On October 4, 2010, the Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s 

petition for writ certiorari. Moore v. United States, 562 U.S. 908 (2010). 

On December 20, 2018, Petitioner filed the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Pet. 

[Doc. 1021].) The Petition raises the following six grounds for relief: (1) discovery of 

“new evidence” in July 2018; (2) violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (3) 

prosecutorial misconduct related to a plea agreement of William Leavitt; (4) prosecutorial 

misconduct related to two witnesses; (5) a motion to allow intervenors; and (5) judicial 

misconduct. (Pet.) 

On February 15, 2019, Respondent filed an opposition asserting that ground one is 

not a cognizable claim on habeas and that grounds two through six are time barred and 

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procedurally defaulted. (Opp’n [Doc. 1025] 1–2.) Petitioner filed his reply on July 17, 

2019.1 (Reply [Doc. 1045].)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Ground One

Petitioner claims that in July 2018 he discovered a habeas petition filed by his coconspirator Ken Kempton. (Pet. at 35.) Petitioner claims Kempton’s petition is new 

evidence that has some bearing on his innocence and that “[n]ot having this evidence at . . 

. trial prejudiced [Petitioner] because what [he] did was legal and . . .[he] was not aware 

of any of the above-mentioned information, nor was [he] aware that [he] was being set 

up.” (Id.) 

Newly discovered evidence, “short of proof of actual innocence,” is not a 

cognizable claim on habeas petition. United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th 

Cir. 2010). “[A] motion under section 2255 must be based upon an independent 

constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993)). Even 

new evidence that “casts grave doubt” on the correctness of a conviction is not a ground 

for relief on collateral attack. See Conley v. United States, 323 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2003). 

Rather, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 is the proper vehicle for a new trial based 

on newly discovered evidence. 

Here, the information in Kempton’s petition does not establish Petitioner’s 

innocence for at least two reasons. First, Kempton’s petition does not mention Petitioner, 

at all. (See Kempton Petition [Doc. 1015].) Second, Kempton’s petition does not negate

the substantial amount of evidence presented at trial showing Petitioner’s involvement in 

 

1

Petitioner filed a request for an extension of time to file his reply, which was granted on June 10, 2019. 

(June 10, 2019 Order [Doc. 1040].) On July 17, 2019, the Court granted Petitioner another extension of 

time to file his reply. (July 17, 2019 Order [Doc. 1046].) 

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the conspiracy. (See id.) As such, the Court finds Petitioner’s claim that Kempton’s 

petition is “new evidence” is not a cognizable under section 2255. 

Moreover, even if Petitioner intended to seek a new trial based on new evidence

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, he must have done so within three years of

the verdict. Because he failed to do so, such a motion would be untimely.

B. Grounds Two through Six Are Time Barred

28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides that “a 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a 

motion under this section.” Relevant to the present action, the limitations period runs 

from the latest of “the date on which the judgement of conviction becomes final” or “the 

date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A conviction becomes 

final upon the Supreme Court’s order denying the petition for writ of certiorari. Clay v. 

United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003). 

Here, Petitioner’s judgment became final on October 4, 2010 when the Supreme 

Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari. See Moore v. United States, 562 U.S. 908 

(2010). Because the Petition was filed roughly eight years after his judgment became 

final, Petitioner must establish that he could not have discovered the basis of his claims 

until December 22, 2017—one year before filing this petition. Petitioner fails to do so. 

In ground two, Petitioner alleges a Brady violation based on the contention that 

“AUSA Jason Forge deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence in my trial.” (Pet. 5.) In 

support of this claim, Petitioner alleges the prosecutor failed to present evidence 

regarding the value of certain technology: “At the time AUSA Forge presented this 

[claim that the technology had little to no value] to the Court, he knew this was a lie . . . 

He knew, at the time of my trial, that this technology had . . . value.” (Id. at 103) The 

problem with this argument is that Petitioner then acknowledges he was aware of the 

technology’s value by 2003 and informed his counsel about its value in 2004:

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I am aware of this technology and its significant value, because I witnessed 

the apparatus being detailed by William Job Leavitt, Jr., in San Diego, in the 

early part of 2002 and I was present when Dr. Leavitt presented this 

apparatus in Dallas, Texas on January 28, 2003, where I presided in a 

meeting called by John Harrell, with over 50 professionals present. [¶] I 

presented my knowledge of this extremely valuable asset to my retained 

attorney’s law office, in 2004. 

(Id.) Based on these statements, at the time of his trial Petitioner clearly knew (1) the 

technology’s value and (2) the prosecutor was asserting the technology had little to no 

value. Accordingly, Petitioner’s alleged Brady violation is time barred. 

In ground three, Petitioner alleges prosecutorial misconduct arising from 

Respondent’s plea deal with William Leavitt, who Petitioner alleges was a “key 

defendant.” (Pet. at 130.) According to Petitioner, “AUSA Jason Forge had cut a secret 

deal to remove Leavitt from the case and return to Nevada.” (Id. at 131.) Petitioner 

alleges this “secret deal” was done in order to make Petitioner the “scapegoat” and was in 

exchange for 375,000 paid to the prosecutor. (Id. at 7, 131.) But on December 22, 2006, 

a Consent to Transfer of Case for Plea and Sentence was entered in this case. (See 

Consent to Transfer [Doc. 567].) Consistent with its title, the document states: 

I, WILLIAM LEAVITT, defendant, have been informed that an indictment 

is pending against me in [criminal case no. 03cr850-W]. I wish to plead 

guilty to the offense charged, to consent to the disposition of the case in the 

District of Nevada in which I am held and to waive trial in the [Southern 

District of California].

(Id.) This document, filed in Petitioner’s criminal case more than a year before his trial, 

notified all parties—including Petitioner—that Leavitt had struck a plea deal and was 

being “removed” from the case. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is time barred. 

In ground four, Petitioner alleges prosecutorial misconduct involving two

witnesses, Christopher Holly and David Kendall. (Pet. at 8.) With respect to Holly, 

Petitioner contends the prosecutor “secretly cut a deal” whereby “Holly refused to appear 

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and testify to my innocence.” (Id. at 157.) Petitioner’s claim is time barred because 

during his trial, he knew Holly refused to testify: “I wanted [Holly’s] testimony to 

confirm the money I made his, as his partner. He refused to do so and gave me no reason 

for this.” (Id. at 158.2)

As for Kendall, Petitioner alleges AUSA Forge and “the IRS cut a secret deal with 

[him] to deliberately lie at my 2008 trial so that he could maintain a special counter to 

those lies by Kendall.” (Pet. at 157.) Again, during his trial, Petitioner knew the 

substance of Kendall’s trial testimony and knew it was false: “Kendall [the witness]

described me as not reporting my income for years with the IRS. That was a lie.” (Id.) 

Because Petitioner knew during his trial about Kendall’s alleged false testimony, this 

claim is time barred.

Petitioner’s purported fifth “ground” for relief is entitled, “motion to allow 

intervenors.” (Pet. at 180.) This “motion” is intended to “allow for further discovery.” 

(Id. at 182.) As an initial matter, the docket indicates that no one has sought to intervene 

in this case. Regardless, this is not a cognizable claim under section 2255.

Finally, in ground six, Petitioner alleges judicial misconduct. (Pet. at 229.) 

Petitioner claims the Court improperly “kept any mention of Las Vegas out of my case.” 

(Id. at 230.) Assuming for the sake of argument the Court “kept any mention of Las 

Vegas out of [Petitioner’s] case,” he was aware of this at the time of his trial. 

Accordingly, this claim is also time barred.

//

//

 

2 Petitioner also claims prosecutorial misconduct based on AUSA Forge’s alleged acceptance of a 

“deliberate false March 18, 2009 statement [from Holly] to the [FBI] Asset Forfeiture Unit, claiming 

zero financial gain from being my partner for nearly for years.” (Pet. at 157.) But Petitioner fails to 

explain how this statement to the FBI affected his trial. Petitioner does not contend the false statement 

was admitted into evidence at his trial. Moreover, assuming the document was admitted into evidence, 

Petitioner clearly knew at the time of trial that the statement regarding how much Petitioner paid Holly 

was false. (See Pet. at 158.)

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C. Grounds Two through Six Are Procedurally Defaulted

“[W]here a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on 

direct review, the claim may only be raised in habeas if the defendant can first 

demonstrate cause and actual prejudice, or that he is actually innocent. Bousley v. United 

States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 447 U.S. 478, 485 (1986)). 

“Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy and ‘will not be allowed to do service for an 

appeal.’” Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1984) (internal quotations omitted). 

The United States argues that Petitioner did not raise claims two through six on 

appeal. (Opp’n at 6.) Petitioner’s reply does not dispute this and there is no indication in 

the record that he raised any of these claims on appeal. (See Reply) In fact, Petitioner 

admits he did not raise grounds three and four on appeal and offers no explanation as to 

why he failed to raise them. (See Pet. at 7, 8.) Further, Petitioner has not shown cause, 

actual prejudice, or actual innocence to justify raising these claims in this proceeding. 

Thus, the Court finds Petitioner’s claims two through six are procedurally defaulted. 

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Petition [Doc. 1021]. The 

Clerk of the Court shall close the district court file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 18, 2019

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