Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02024/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02024-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 05:551 Administrative Procedure Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Florina Ortega-Morales; Marcela OrtegaMorales, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Loretta Lynch, U.S. Attorney General, et 

al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-14-02024-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

Plaintiffs seek a de novo determination of the Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) 

as to whether they are United States citizens. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. 14). For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and 

denied in part. 

 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiffs Florina Ortega-Morales and Marcela Ortega-Morales are sisters born in 

Mexico in 1963 and 1968, respectively. Their father was a United States citizen. They 

reside in Phoenix, Arizona. 

On August 6, 2012, Plaintiffs filed N-600 Applications for Citizenship with the 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). Under the governing 

statute, Plaintiffs are citizens if their father lived in the United States for at least ten years 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 1 of 18
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

before their birth, as long as five of those years were after he turned fourteen. See

8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1964); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1970).1

 On September 13, 2013, 

USCIS Field Office Director John M. Ramirez denied Plaintiffs’ applications. Plaintiffs 

did not appeal this denial to the Administrative Appeals Unit of USCIS. 

On September 12, 2014, Plaintiffs brought this action to determine their 

citizenship de novo, to declare invalid the denial of their applications, and to compel 

Defendants (collectively “the government”) to grant their applications. (Doc. 1.) 

Plaintiffs assert the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Mandamus Act (28 U.S.C. 

§ 1361), Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.), and 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). 

(Id. at ¶¶ 1-3, 41.) They claim relief pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1433, and they invoke the 

Court’s authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202). (Id. at 

¶¶ 4-5.) The government moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 14.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a 

defendant may challenge jurisdiction by either (1) attacking jurisdictional allegations as 

insufficient or (2) contesting the truth of those allegations, usually by introducing 

evidence outside the pleadings. Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). 

The first, a facial attack, is resolved as it would be under Rule 12(b)(6): accepting the 

allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the court 

determines whether the allegations are legally sufficient to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. 

Id. The second, a factual attack, requires the plaintiff to support her jurisdictional 

 1

 The statute in place at the time of Plaintiffs’ birth governs. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 39; Doc. 

14 at 2-3.) However, Plaintiffs cite a more recent version of the statute under which the 

citizen parent must have lived in the United States for only five years before their birth. 

(Doc. 1 at ¶ 38.) 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 2 of 18
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

allegations with competent proof, under the same evidentiary standard applied on 

summary judgment. Id. Here, the government contends Plaintiffs’ allegations are legally 

insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. 

B. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted 

On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), all 

allegations of material fact are assumed to be true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 

2009). That does not apply to legal conclusions or conclusory factual allegations. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Dismissal can be based on “the lack of a 

cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable 

legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A 

complaint need contain only “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

Generally, material beyond the pleadings may not be considered in deciding a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion. However, a court may consider evidence on which the complaint 

necessarily relies if (1) the complaint refers to the document, (2) the document is central 

to the plaintiff’s claim, and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy of the 

document submitted to the court. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). 

III. MANDAMUS ACT 

Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the 

Mandamus Act. “The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1361, 

is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff only if he has exhausted all other avenues 

of relief . . . .” Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984). Here, Plaintiffs have not 

exhausted all other avenues of relief because “the alternative of a judicial declaration of 

nationality under 8 U.S.C. § 1503 is more than adequate” to provide all the relief they 

have sought by mandamus. Cartier v. Sec’y of State, 506 F.2d 191, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 3 of 18
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

see also S.T. ex rel. Trivedi v. Napolitano, No. CIV.A. H-12-285, 2012 WL 6048222, at 

*5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2012). Plaintiffs do not dispute the adequacy of 8 U.S.C. § 1503 to 

vindicate their claims. Therefore Plaintiffs’ claims under the Mandamus Act will be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 

Plaintiffs similarly fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The APA provides judicial review for “final 

agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. 

Where a “substantive statute independently authorizes a private right of action, the APA 

does not govern the plaintiffs’ claims.” Washington Toxics Coal. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 

413 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005). Because 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) affords Plaintiffs a 

right of action, the APA does not apply. See Trivedi, 2012 WL 6048222, at *4. 

Therefore Plaintiffs’ claims under the APA will be dismissed with prejudice. 

V. 8 U.S.C. § 1433 

Plaintiffs’ reliance on 8 U.S.C. § 1433 is misplaced. By its terms that statute 

applies only to a citizen parent’s application for naturalization of a minor child, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1433(a), whereas here, Plaintiffs claim their own citizenship. Perhaps Plaintiffs 

intended to invoke 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g), which they mistakenly describe as “now repealed 

and found under 8 U.S.C. § 1433.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 38.) But § 1401(g) does not by itself 

create a cause of action. It merely lists biographical characteristics sufficient to confer 

United States citizenship. As such, it is only a definitional statute. See Hassan v. Holder, 

793 F. Supp. 2d 440, 446-47 (D.D.C. 2011). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiffs rely on 

§ 1433 or § 1401(g) as a cause of action, their claims will be dismissed with prejudice. 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 4 of 18
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

VI. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) 

Plaintiffs’ claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) requires more careful analysis.2

 Under 

§ 1503(a), a person whose right or privilege is denied by an agency on the ground that he 

is not a U.S. national may bring an action for declaratory judgment as to his nationality: 

If any person . . . claims a right or privilege as a national of 

the United States and is denied such right or privilege by any 

department or independent agency, or official thereof, upon 

the ground that he is not a national of the United States, such 

person may institute an action under the provisions of section 

2201 of Title 28 against the head of such department or 

independent agency for a judgment declaring him to be a 

national of the United States . . . . 

Denial of an N-600 citizenship application filed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1452(a) occasions 

such an action. See, e.g., Rios-Valenzuela v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 506 F.3d 393, 397 

(5th Cir. 2007). 

However, the action “may be instituted only within five years after the final 

administrative denial of such right or privilege”: 

An action under this subsection may be instituted only within 

five years after the final administrative denial of such right or 

privilege and shall be filed in the district court of the United 

States for the district in which such person resides or claims a 

residence, and jurisdiction over such officials in such cases is 

conferred upon those courts. 

8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). 

The government argues there was no “final administrative denial” here because 

Plaintiffs never appealed the denial of their citizenship applications to the Administrative 

Appeals Unit of USCIS. This argument mistakes finality for exhaustion, a confusion 

common in judicial discussions of this and other statutes. To address the government’s 

argument one must first dispel that confusion. 

 2

 The government says Plaintiffs fail to cite § 1503(a) in their complaint. This is 

incorrect. (See Doc. 1 at ¶ 41.) 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 5 of 18
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

A. Finality versus exhaustion 

“The question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is conceptually 

distinct . . . from the question whether an administrative action must be final before it is 

judicially reviewable.” Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of 

Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 192 (1985). “While the policies underlying the two concepts 

often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial 

decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, 

concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial 

procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision . . . .” Id.

at 193; see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144 (1993). 

Finality and exhaustion both limit judicial intervention in the administrative 

process, but they do so in different ways. Finality prevents courts from reviewing agency 

decisions that have no real effect. Exhaustion, where required, prevents courts from 

reviewing agency decisions for which the party did not seek intra-agency review. 

These requirements are independent. For example, a party might attain a 

definitive agency decision but then fail to file an intra-agency appeal, thereby satisfying 

finality but not exhaustion. See, e.g., Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. I.C.C., 675 F.2d 763, 764 

(5th Cir. 1982). Conversely, a party might attain intra-agency review of a non-definitive 

agency decision, thereby satisfying exhaustion but not finality. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. 

Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232, 243 (1980). 

Often, application of either requirement yields the same outcome. As a result, 

courts “often mingle” the requirements. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. F.T.C., 814 F.2d 731, 745 

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (opinion of Williams, J.). But this is a case where the distinction 

matters. In § 1503(a), Congress expressly made finality a prerequisite to judicial 

consideration, but not exhaustion. Therefore, the government’s argument—that finality 

is lacking because exhaustion was forgone—erroneously conflates two different 

objections. 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 6 of 18
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

B. Whether the denial of Plaintiffs’ citizenship applications was “final” 

As stated above, § 1503(a) confers jurisdiction on district courts only where there 

has been a “final administrative denial” of a person’s right or privilege. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1503(a); see also Fletes-Mora v. Brownell, 231 F.2d 579, 581 (9th Cir. 1955) (no 

jurisdiction under § 1503 where plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege, among other things, 

that it was filed within five years after final administrative denial of right or privilege). 

Where the statute does not define “final,” the “more general doctrine of finality in 

administrative agency law” applies. Indus. Customers of Nw. Utilities v. Bonneville 

Power Admin., 408 F.3d 638, 645 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). An agency action is 

“final” when the action (1) is one by which “rights or obligations have been determined” 

and (2) marks the “consummation” of the agency’s decision-making process, i.e., is not 

“merely tentative or interlocutory.” See id. at 646 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 

154, 177-78 (1997)). 

Under this definition, USCIS Field Office Director John M. Ramirez’s decision to 

deny Plaintiffs’ citizenship applications became final no later than when the opportunity 

for higher agency review had passed. The decision “determined rights or obligations” of 

American citizenship. And it marked the “consummation” of USCIS’ decision-making 

process, as evident from the letter USCIS sent to Plaintiffs. (Doc. 14-1 at 5, 11.) The 

letter began with the prominent heading “DECISION”. (Id. (emphasis in original).) It 

then stated, in no uncertain terms: “Upon consideration, it is ordered that the [citizenship 

application] is denied . . . .” (Id.) Lest there be any doubt, the letter gave an 

administrative appeal deadline of 30 days later and stated: “If no appeal is filed within the 

time allowed, then this decision is final.” (Id.) When no further administrative appeal 

was filed within 30 days, the decision then became final. 

C. Whether Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust further administrative remedies 

bars their action 

The government really means to argue that this action under § 1503(a) is barred, 

though the agency decision is final, because Plaintiffs allowed the decision to become 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 7 of 18
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

final without first appealing to the Administrative Appeals Unit of USCIS. That is a 

defense of failure to exhaust required administrative remedies. 

A duty to exhaust may arise by statute or by court-made rule known as prudential 

exhaustion. If Congress explicitly requires a party to exhaust particular remedies as a 

prerequisite to judicial consideration, a court “cannot excuse” this statutory requirement. 

2 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 15.2, at 1219-20 (5th ed. 2010). 

However, the court-made exhaustion requirement is “flexible and pragmatic” and 

“subject to several judge-made exceptions.” Id.

Here, although USCIS regulations permit an appeal to the Administrative Appeals 

Unit before seeking a § 1503(a) citizenship determination, neither Congress nor USCIS 

requires it. Nor does the Court. 

1. Statutory exhaustion3

“Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. But where 

Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs.” 

McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (citations omitted), superseded by 

statute on other grounds, as recognized in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740 (2001). 

Inquiry into whether Congress has “specifically mandated” exhaustion begins with the 

statutory text. 

a. Statutory text 

By its terms, § 1503(a) does not impose any exhaustion requirement. It does even 

not mention exhaustion. 

 3

 Statutory exhaustion is not necessarily “jurisdictional” exhaustion. See 2 Pierce, 

Administrative Law Treatise § 15.3, at 1241. This is because a statute might require 

exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review, but not as a jurisdictional prerequisite to 

judicial review. See Union Pac. R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen 

Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 81-82 (2009). Because there is 

no statutory exhaustion requirement for § 1503(a) actions, there is no occasion to say 

whether it would be jurisdictional. 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 8 of 18
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

The government would construe the statutory term “final administrative denial” as 

necessarily requiring exhaustion too. But the plain text does not support this reading 

because finality and exhaustion mean different things. Congress knows the difference. 

For example, Congress knows how to require exhaustion apart from finality. It did so 

elsewhere in Title 8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of 

removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the 

alien as of right . . . .” (emphases added)). Congress also knows how not to require 

exhaustion as distinct from finality. It did so in the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“[Unless 

required by statute or regulation,] agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes 

of this section whether or not there has been . . . an application for . . . an appeal to 

superior agency authority.” (emphases added)); Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 147 

(1993) (interpreting this provision). Thus, congressional silence with respect to 

exhaustion under § 1503(a) is not a clear indication of intent to require exhaustion. 

Furthermore, in its letter to Plaintiffs, USCIS used the term “final” to mean nearly 

the opposite of exhaustion. The letter stated that if Plaintiffs do not timely appeal the 

denial of their applications—i.e., if remedies are not exhausted—then the decision would 

be “final.” (Doc. 14-1 at 5, 11.) Having told Plaintiffs exhaustion is necessary to avoid

finality, the government cannot now claim exhaustion is necessary for finality. To permit 

this doublespeak would transform the statutory finality requirement into “a trap for 

unwary litigants.” Darby, 509 U.S. at 147. 

b. Regulatory framework 

The government also argues that agency regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 

make exhaustion a prerequisite for judicial determination of citizenship under § 1503(a). 

Far from it. The regulations simply make an administrative appeals process available. 

The language is explicitly permissive, not mandatory. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(ii) 

(stating decisions “may be appealed”). 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 9 of 18
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

This regulatory framework is materially identical to the one found in Young v. 

Reno not to require exhaustion of available administrative remedies. 114 F.3d 879 (9th 

Cir. 1997). There, the petitioner sought court review of agency revocation of 

immigration visas. Id. at 881. The statute conferring district court jurisdiction, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1329, had no exhaustion requirement. Id. at 882. But agency regulations, 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 205.2, 3.1(b)(5), provided that a petitioner “may appeal” revocation decisions to the 

intra-agency Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned 

that “because the regulations do not explicitly require a petitioner to appeal to the BIA 

prior to seeking judicial review, such intra-agency review is optional.” Id. The court 

concluded that the petitioner “need not have sought review by the BIA prior to bringing 

her action in the district court.” Id. at 882-83. Young governs this case. 

c. Case law 

Despite the lack of any textual basis to require exhaustion, the government argues 

that courts regularly do interpret § 1503(a) as requiring exhaustion. The government 

quotes statements from courts in other circuits, but such statements are usually dicta and 

none is binding or persuasive. 

In United States v. Breyer, the Third Circuit stated that under the statute’s finality 

requirement, “a federal district court does not have jurisdiction to declare citizenship 

absent exhaustion of an applicant’s administrative remedies.” 41 F.3d 884, 892 (3d Cir. 

1994). But that was dictum. Although the court held that the district court below lacked 

jurisdiction to consider a citizenship claim, the reason was that the citizenship claim was 

“separate and distinct from” the case before the district court, not that the claim was 

unexhausted. Id. at 892-93. Moreover, in Breyer, unlike here, the citizenship claim was 

still pending before the agency. Id. at 887-88. There was no final agency decision 

precisely because the applicant was still pursuing additional agency review. 

In Rios-Valenzuela v. Department of Homeland Security, the Fifth Circuit stated in 

a footnote that a person “must exhaust the agency procedures” before bringing an action 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 10 of 18
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

under § 1503(a). 506 F.3d 393, 397 n.4 (5th Cir. 2007). But that statement too was 

dictum. That court held the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider a citizenship 

claim under § 1503(a), but the reason was that the citizenship claim arose in connection 

with a removal proceeding, not that the claim was unexhausted. Id. at 398-99. 

Moreover, like Breyer, Rios-Valenzeula is distinguishable on its facts. There the person 

claiming citizenship had completed the intra-agency appeals process. Id. at 396. The 

quoted footnote was classic dictum, unnecessary under the facts of the case. 

Though not cited by the government, the Fourth Circuit in Johnson v. Whitehead

also stated that § 1503(a) requires exhaustion. 647 F.3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 2011). But 

that statement was dictum as well. The question before the court was whether a habeas 

petition could be used to obtain judicial review of a citizenship question that arose in a 

removal proceeding. Id. at 124. The court answered that Congress specifically 

prohibited this use of habeas petitions. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)). The court then 

asserted that the habeas petition was also barred for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies under § 1503(a). Id. at 125. This passing reference to § 1503(a) was 

unnecessary to the court’s conclusion. Indeed it was irrelevant, since § 1503(a) by its 

terms does not apply to citizenship questions arising in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1503(a) (providing that “no such action may be instituted in any case if the issue of 

such person’s status as a national of the United States . . . arose by reason of, or in 

connection with any removal proceeding . . . .”). 

The government cites no other federal appellate case on this issue, nor does the 

Court know of any. Because the pertinent parts of the circuit court opinions mentioned 

above are dicta, it appears that no circuit court has squarely held that § 1503(a) requires 

exhaustion. 

Next the government cites seven district court cases stating that § 1503(a) requires 

exhaustion. But in four of those cases the statements were dicta and played no part in the 

court’s analysis. See Headley-Ombler v. Holder, 985 F. Supp. 2d 379, 384-88 (E.D.N.Y. 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 11 of 18
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2013) (dismissing citizenship claim raised during removal proceeding); Cineus v. 

Nepolitano, No. CV 310-103, 2011 WL 3022565, at *3 (S.D. Ga. June 30, 2011) 

(dismissing citizenship claim raised only in habeas proceeding); Fairclough v. Holder, 

No. CV 311-013, 2011 WL 2111723, at *1-2 (S.D. Ga. May 26, 2011) (same); Barham v. 

United States, No. CV 99-3983, CR 96-543, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18160, at *5-6 

(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1999) (same). 

In the three district court decisions containing more than dicta, the reasoning is 

unpersuasive. First, in Dung Quoc Nguyen v. United States Department of Homeland 

Security, the court offered no analysis in support of its statement that § 1503(a) requires 

exhaustion. No. 5:09-CV-202-DCB-JMR, 2011 WL 1499216, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 21, 

2011). Instead the court gave two citations. One was to the Fifth Circuit’s perfunctory 

footnote in Rios-Valenzuela, described above. Id. The other was to a previous district 

court opinion stating that § 1503(a) requires exhaustion of “all administrative remedies.” 

Id. (quoting Manning v. Rice, No. 4:06CV464, 2008 WL 2008712, at *4 (E.D. Tex., May 

2, 2008)). But that previous opinion involved peculiar facts. There, the plaintiff sought a 

citizenship declaration because government officials had denied her sister’s visa and had 

confiscated her own driver’s license, birth certificate, and military identification card. 

See 2008 WL 2008712, at *1. Before the court decided the matter, the plaintiff received 

a United States passport and successfully renewed her driver’s license. Id. at *2, *4. The 

court concluded: “There is no showing here that Plaintiff was ever denied any right or 

privilege as contemplated by the statute.” Id. at *3. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs’ 

citizenship applications remain denied. 

In the second such district court opinion, Harris v. Department of Homeland 

Security, the court noted that § 1503(a) requires a “final administrative denial” and that 

agency regulations permit an intra-agency appeal. 18 F. Supp. 3d 1349, 1354-55 (S.D. 

Fla. 2014). But as explained above, the regulations do not make this process mandatory. 

Next, the court cited a district court opinion that makes no mention of § 1503(a). Id. at 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 12 of 18
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1355 (citing Russell v. INS, No. 98 C 6132, 1999 WL 675255 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 1999)). 

Lastly, the court identified practical reasons to require exhaustion. Id. But practical 

considerations are relevant to the application of prudential exhaustion (discussed below), 

not the determination of statutory exhaustion. See 2 Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 

§ 15.2, at 1219-20. In any event, the court did not explain how those practical 

considerations applied to the case before it. 

In the third such opinion, Xia v. Kerry, the court offered only two case citations in 

support of its statement that § 1503(a) requires exhaustion. 73 F. Supp. 3d 33, 45 

(D.D.C. 2014). One was to a district court opinion that interpreted § 1503(a) without 

analysis or citation. Id. (citing Roman-Salgado v. Holder, 730 F. Supp. 2d 126, 131 

(D.D.C. 2010)). The other was to Harris, which is unpersuasive for the reasons stated 

above. 

To sum up, nothing in § 1503(a) or the regulations requires exhaustion, and the 

few cases stating otherwise are inapposite or unpersuasive. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ failure 

to appeal to the Administrative Appeals Unit of USCIS does not run afoul of any 

statutory exhaustion requirement. 

2. Prudential exhaustion 

The question remains whether Plaintiffs’ failure to file an intra-agency appeal bars 

their claims by operation of the court-made doctrine known as prudential exhaustion. 

This doctrine allows courts in appropriate circumstances to require exhaustion despite 

silence of the governing statutes and regulations. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 

140, 144 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds, as recognized in Booth v. 

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740 (2001).4

 In such instances, “sound judicial discretion 

governs.” Id. In exercising this discretion, courts should balance the goals of “protecting 

 4

 In APA cases, however, the statutory text explicitly excludes exhaustion, and 

courts may not infer higher agency review as a requirement of judicial review. Darby v. 

Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 147 (1993).

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 13 of 18
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

administrative agency authority” and “promoting judicial efficiency” against “the interest 

of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum.” Id. at 145-46. 

Here, that balance tilts strongly against imposing prudential exhaustion. 

a. Protecting agency authority 

Prudential exhaustion is premised on “the notion, grounded in deference to 

Congress’ delegation of authority to coordinate branches of Government, that agencies, 

not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that Congress has 

charged them to administer.” Id. at 145. Exhaustion also respects the agency’s decisionmaking process by giving the agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with 

respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court” and by 

discouraging “frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Exhaustion is particularly appropriate where the underlying substantive issue 

involves the agency’s “discretionary power” or “special expertise.” Id.

Those considerations carry little weight here. Critically, “deference to Congress’ 

delegation of authority” in this context does not create a preference for the administrative 

process over the judicial process. When it comes to citizenship determinations, Congress 

gave the agency “primary responsibility” only in the sense that the agency makes the first 

decision. After that, the final and entire responsibility is solely with the courts. 

This point is best illustrated by way of contrast. When allocating responsibility 

between courts and agencies, Congress often assigns to the agency the main decisionmaking role and to the courts only a reviewing role to check whether the agency crossed 

over its bounds of determining facts and law and of exercising discretion. In such 

instances, “the ultimate power of decision remains with the agency and the courts only 

monitor the agency’s performance.” 33 Charles Alan Wright & Charles H. Koch, Jr., 

Federal Practice & Procedure: Judicial Review of Administrative Action § 8330 (2015). 

The APA is an example of this allocation. Under the statute, agency action is subject to 

“judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704. On review, courts can set aside an agency 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 14 of 18
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

action only if it falls short of certain statutory standards. 5 U.S.C. § 706. Courts cannot 

substitute their judgment for that of the agency. Fence Creek Cattle Co. v. U.S. Forest 

Serv., 602 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010). 

For citizenship applications, however, Congress allocated responsibility 

differently. USCIS makes the decisions first, see 8 U.S.C. § 1452(a), but the courts make 

the real decisions all over again, see 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). This allocation charges the 

courts with an independent and comprehensive role in determining citizenship. “A suit 

under section 1503(a) is not one for judicial review of the agency’s action. Rather, 

section 1503(a) authorizes a de novo judicial determination of the status of the plaintiff as 

a United States national.” Richards v. Sec’y of State, Dep’t of State, 752 F.2d 1413, 1417 

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Delmore v. Brownell, 236 F.2d 598, 599 n.1 (3d Cir. 1956) 

(§ 1503(a) authorizes “trial de novo”). Because § 1503(a) requires a de novo

determination, the weight and importance of USCIS’ initial decision vanish entirely. 

Thus, Congress did not make USCIS the “primary” decision-maker on citizenship 

applications in any substantive sense. Accordingly, one of the usual reasons for requiring 

exhaustion—deference to an expressed congressional preference for administrative 

decision-making—is absent here. 

Further, exhaustion is not necessary to prevent “frequent and deliberate flouting” 

of USCIS’ administrative process. There is no indication that Plaintiffs or other 

citizenship applicants have abused the process with perfunctory, bad faith applications so 

they can jump to court to put on a serious case. It would be against their self-interest to 

forgo one of two independent chances to prove their citizenship. See McKart v. United 

States, 395 U.S. 185, 200 (1969) (declining to require exhaustion where parties were not 

likely to bypass agency procedures “with the thought that their ultimate chances of 

success in the courts are enhanced thereby”). The courts’ ability to see through sham 

conduct should suffice to defeat any specific instance of bad faith evasion of agency 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 15 of 18
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

procedures. See McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 488 (1971) (requiring exhaustion 

where “the bypass was deliberate and without excuse”). 

Finally, the substantive issue in this case does not involve an agency’s 

“discretionary power” or “special expertise.” Whether Plaintiffs are citizens turns on 

when their father lived in the United States. Resolving this issue is a matter of routine 

fact-finding and application of clear statutes. Federal district courts are just as well 

equipped for this task as USCIS is. Compare McKart, 395 U.S. at 197-98 (declining to 

require exhaustion where the substantive issue did “not require any particular expertise” 

and was “not a matter of discretion”) with McGee, 402 U.S. at 486 (requiring exhaustion 

where the substantive issue “depended on the application of expertise by administrative 

bodies in resolving underlying issues of fact”). 

b. Promoting judicial efficiency 

Usually prudential exhaustion “promotes judicial efficiency in at least two ways.” 

McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145. First, when “an agency has the opportunity to correct its own 

errors, a judicial controversy may well be mooted, or at least piecemeal appeals may be 

avoided.” Id. Second, “even where a controversy survives administrative review, 

exhaustion of the administrative procedure may produce a useful record for subsequent 

judicial consideration, especially in a complex or technical factual context.” Id.

These considerations also carry little weight here. Giving USCIS the “opportunity 

to correct its own errors” is unlikely to increase efficiency overall. All appeals to the 

Administrative Appeals Unit cost administrative and applicant resources. On appeal, the 

Appeals Unit might (1) overturn the initial agency decision and grant citizenship, (2) 

affirm the initial agency denial, or (3) remand for further consideration. If the Appeals 

Unit grants citizenship, then resources are spent at the administrative level instead of at 

the judicial level. But if the Appeals Unit affirms the initial agency denial, a third round 

of litigation becomes necessary. If the Appeals Unit remands, then the applicant may 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 16 of 18
- 17 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

become a shuttlecock within the agency with no escape in sight—a loathsome prospect 

that could not happen once the court gives its de novo decision. 

More fundamentally, the goal of avoiding “judicial controversy” misses the point 

of § 1503(a), which is to allow applicants to hale USCIS into federal court after it has 

made an adverse decision. The statute gives to the citizenship applicant the choice 

whether to expend more resources in the agency that has denied her claim or to expend 

those resources in the fresh forum to which she is entitled. 

Moreover, exhaustion can “produce a useful record for subsequent judicial 

consideration” only in cases of judicial review of agency action. In such cases, a 

thorough administrative record is useful because the “focal point for judicial review 

should be the administrative record already in existence.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 

142 (1973) (interpreting the APA). As explained above, however, an action under 

§ 1503(a) is not judicial review of agency action, but a de novo trial in which new 

evidence may be presented. Richards, 752 F.2d at 1417; Delmore, 236 F.2d at 599 n.1. 

Thus, the usual interest in developing an administrative record is absent here. 

c. Interest of the individual 

The interest of the individual applicant cuts entirely against inferring a duty to 

pursue higher administrative review. “[F]ederal courts are vested with a virtually 

unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 

146 (citation omitted). “In determining whether exhaustion is required, federal courts 

must balance the interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial 

forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.” Id. 

“Application of this balancing principle is intensely practical, because attention is 

directed to both the nature of the claim presented and the characteristics of the particular 

administrative procedure provided.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 17 of 18
- 18 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Here, the agency has little or no “countervailing institutional interests favoring 

exhaustion.” As already discussed, exhaustion would not significantly protect agency 

authority or promote judicial efficiency. 

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have a critical interest in prompt and economical 

determination of their claim to citizenship. “[T]he right to acquire American citizenship 

is a precious one.” Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981). No doubt it is 

the preciousness of American citizenship that led Congress to accord applicants the rare 

protection of de novo trial in federal court. The interest in promptly and economically 

determining citizenship is defeated if applicants are forced to slog through an extra layer 

of administrative procedure in the name of allowing USCIS to fix its own mistakes. Such 

delay is especially unwarranted given that USCIS’ mistakes will not matter in a de novo

trial, where both parties may introduce new evidence. 

Further, as explained above, nothing in the statutes, regulations, or USCIS’ letter 

to applicants states that an intra-agency appeal is necessary to a § 1503(a) action. Thus, 

to require exhaustion by inference would allow USCIS to spring a trap on the unwary, 

and even on the wary who read everything Congress and the agency said on the matter. 

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ failure to appeal to the Administrative Appeals Unit does not 

violate any prudential exhaustion requirement. The government’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ § 1503(a) claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies must be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is 

granted to the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims under the Mandamus Act, the Administrative 

Procedure Act, and 8 U.S.C. § 1433 are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. The Motion is otherwise denied. 

 Dated this 9th day of March, 2016. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

Case 2:14-cv-02024-NVW Document 21 Filed 03/09/16 Page 18 of 18