Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00204/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00204-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 Because the pages in Goudlock’s First Amended Complaint are

not consecutively numbered, the Court will cite to this document

using the page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing

system.

1 08cv00204 BEN (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACIE LEE GOUDLOCK, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

THOMPSON, et al.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 08cv00204 BEN (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENYING DEFENDANT THOMPSON’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AS

MOOT [ECF NO. 52] AND GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 53], AND

ORDER CORRECTING NOTICE OF

DOCUMENT DISCREPANCIES [ECF

NO. 49]

Plaintiff Jacie Lee Goudlock, Jr., a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint on February 1,

2008, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF No. 1]. He filed a First

Amended Complaint on August 8, 2008 [ECF No. 7].1

 Plaintiff

alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when prison

officials delayed the medical response to Goudlock’s fall from the

top bunk bed in his cell. (Am. Compl. 3-4, ECF No. 7.) Also,

Plaintiff claims that his rights were violated when he was forced

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to live in conditions that were inadequate in light of his medical

condition. (Id. at 8, 14.)

Warden Robert Hernandez and Associate Warden Silvia Garcia

were named Defendants in Plaintiff’s original Complaint, but

Plaintiff did not name them in the Amended Complaint and dropped

these two Defendants from the caption. (Compare Compl. 1, with Am.

Compl. 1, ECF Nos. 1, 7.) On December 2, 2008, the Court screened

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint pursuant to §§

1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) [ECF No. 12]. Defendants

Hernandez and Garcia were dismissed, and the United States Marshal

was directed to effect service of process. (Order Dismissing Defs.

Hernandez & Garcia & Directing Marshal 3, ECF No. 12.) Defendant

Peterson filed a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 23]; this Court

subsequently recommended that the Motion be granted [ECF No. 33];

and on September 15, 2009, United States District Court Judge Roger

Benitez adopted this Court’s Report and Recommendation and granted

Defendant Peterson’s Motion to Dismiss count two of the First

Amended Complaint [ECF No. 34].

Defendant Thompson waived service of the First Amended

Complaint, and her Waiver of Service was filed on October 6, 2010. 

(Waiver Service, Oct. 6, 2010.) Plaintiff did not serve Defendant

Cruz within 120 days of filing the First Amended Complaint;

consequently, on October 13, 2010, Judge Benitez dismissed Cruz

without prejudice [ECF No. 48]. Therefore, the only remaining

Defendant is Correctional Officer Thompson. 

Defendant Thompson filed this Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint on November 19, 2010, along with a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion and

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 The Court will also cite to the Motion to Amend using the

page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system.

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an exhibit [ECF No. 52]. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to

the Motion to Dismiss, and Thompson did not file a reply. On

December 20, 2010, the Court found Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

suitable for decision without oral argument [ECF No. 54]. See S.D.

Cal. Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1). Although Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c)

provides that failure to oppose a motion may constitute consent to

the granting of the motion, this Court will evaluate the merits of

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 

On December 2, 2010, while Thompson’s Motion to Dismiss was

pending, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint -- Adding New

Defendants Sgt. R. Perez, R. Amiling, R. Esquilin [ECF No. 53].2

In his Motion, Goudlock seeks to add three defendants: (1)

Correctional Sergeant R. Perez, (2) Correctional Officer R.

Amiling, and (3) Correctional Officer R. Esquilin. (Mot. Amend

Compl. 1, ECF No. 53.) Defendant Thompson has not filed an

opposition, to Plaintiff’s Motion. 

The Court has reviewed the First Amended Complaint, Defendant

Thompson’s Motion to Dismiss and its attachment, and Plaintiff’s

Motion to Amend Complaint and the exhibit. For the reasons stated

below, the district court should DENY Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

and should GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The allegations in the First Amended Complaint arise from

events that occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Richard J.

Donovan State Prison (“Donovan”). (Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 7.) 

Goudlock’s first cause of action is against unknown correctional

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officers. He claims that on June 15, 2007, at approximately 4:00

a.m., he fell off the top bunk bed in his cell while sleeping. 

(Id. at 3.) As a result, Plaintiff “cut [his] left foot to the

point that the injury needed stitches, and was bleeding profusely,

as well as twist[ed] [his] ankle, shav[ed] off skin on [his] right

thigh, and caus[ed] further damage to an already damaged [s]ciatic

nerve.” (Id.) He contends that the unknown officers failed to

respond to his calls for help, in violation of his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.) 

In count two, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Peterson, a

registered nurse, caused Goudlock to wait five hours for medical

treatment after he arrived at Facility One Medical Clinic. (Id. at

4.) Plaintiff asserts that he was told that stitches were no

longer a treatment option because too much time had elapsed since

his injury. (Id.) 

Goudlock alleges in count three that Defendants Thompson and

Cruz forced him to live in conditions that were inadequate for his

medical condition. (Id. at 8.) Defendants placed Goudlock in

“cell 220 up” and ignored his Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono,

in which a physician noted that Plaintiff should be assigned to a

ground floor cell and a bottom bunk. (Id.; see id. at 16.) 

Goudlock also claims he suffers from a “sleeping disorder” that

causes him to urinate in his bed at least twice per night. (Id. at

8.) As a result of soaking in his urine, he developed a severe

rash. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that both Thompson and Cruz could

have prevented his injuries if they did not ignore his medical

accommodation chrono. (Id.) 

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Lastly, Goudlock’s fourth cause of action is against

Correctional Sergeant Cruz for forcing him to sleep on the top

bunk. (Id. at 14.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

A. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe

County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). “The old formula –-

that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt

without merit –- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)].” Limestone

Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008). 

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009). The court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

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 The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will

“ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where there

“is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts

alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc., 382 F.3d at 973 (quoting

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.

1994)) (stating that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “is not

required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from

the facts alleged[]”). “Nor is the court required to accept as

true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions

of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, courts may not generally consider materials outside

of the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

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Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,

236 (7th Cir. 1993)). 

“When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc, 51 F.3d at

1484 (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir.

1980)). The court may also consider documents “‘whose contents are

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions,

but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff’s]

pleading.’” Sunrize Staging, Inc. v. Ovation Dev. Corp., 241 F.

App’x 363, 365 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Janas v. McCracken (In re

Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig.), 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir.

1999)) (alteration in original); see Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am.

W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996). 

These Rule 12 (b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

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In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see

also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint “unless it determines that the pleading could

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe

v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before

a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must

provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s

deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where

amendment of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial

of leave to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d

1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting “under color of state law”

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

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Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2010); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

III. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant Thompson asserts that the allegations against her

should be dismissed because Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed

Thompson in a letter, dated October 7, 2010, Goudlock attempted to

file, and the Court rejected. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 2, ECF No. 52 (citing id. Ex. A).) Defendant includes a copy of

the rejected letter with the Motion to Dismiss, which is also a

part of the public docket. (See id. Ex. A at 4-5; Notice Doc.

Discrepancies 1-2, ECF No. 49); see also Coto Settlement v.

Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that on

motions to dismiss, courts may consider matters of public record). 

In the Motion, Thompson cites a portion of the Plaintiff’s

letter. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2, ECF No. 52

(citing id. Ex. A at 5); Notice Doc. Discrepancies 2, ECF No. 49.)

C/O Thompson is not the officer involved in my

case. The correctional officers involved are

as follows. On 6-11-07 in build[ing] #3 on the

FAC #1. H/U # floor. Estes, R. H/U 3 floor

Snyder R. 6-15-07. H/U 3 on 1st watch. In

control - Amiling R. H/U 3 on floor 1 watch

Esquilin. R. These are the Defendants.

Can you tell me what else do I do. These

are the names of the true Defendants. I would

like to drop Officer Thompson, she was named by

mistake through erroneous information.

(Notice Doc. Discrepancies 2, ECF No. 49.) The letter appeared to

request that the Clerk of Court amend Plaintiff’s Complaint. (See

id.) The letter was returned to Goudlock with the following

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explanation: “Request not grantable by the Clerk without further

direction of the Judge.” (Id. at 1.)

Defendant states that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(a)(1)(A)(i), a plaintiff may dismiss an action before the

opposing party serves a responsive pleading. (Id.) Defendant

urges the Court to construe Plaintiff’s October 7, 2010 rejected

letter as an express attempt by Goudlock to dismiss Thompson from

the action. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2, ECF No. 52.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) establishes two

methods by which an action may be voluntarily dismissed without a

court order or a motion. First, the plaintiff may file a notice of

dismissal before an answer or summary judgment motion has been

served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Second, the plaintiff may

at any time file a stipulation of dismissal signed by all the

parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Defendant Thompson

asserts that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed

under subsection (i). (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2, ECF

No. 52 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i)).) 

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) provides that “the plaintiff may dismiss

an action without a court order by filing: (i) a notice of

dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a

motion for summary judgment . . . .” A plaintiff has the “absolute

right” to voluntarily dismiss an action in this manner, and only

notice to the court is required. Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111

F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Concha v. London, 62 F.3d

1493, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995)); Safeguard Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Hoeffel,

907 F.2d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 1990); McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d

1178, 1184 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing that the purpose of Rule

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41(a) is to enable plaintiffs to either start over or terminate the

litigation). Unless otherwise stated, the dismissal is ordinarily

without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to commence another

action for the same cause against the same defendants. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B); Concha, 62 F.3d at 1506. 

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) requires “filing” the notice of dismissal. 

Wilson, 111 F.3d at 692. In fact, not even service is required to

effect dismissal. Id. at n.5 (citing Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d

1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990)). Dismissal is effective if the

plaintiff files a notice of dismissal before the defendant’s

service of an answer or motion for summary judgment. Id. at 692;

see id. at n.5 (discussing that the drafters specifically intended

that the notice of dismissal must be filed). “The [filing of

notice] itself closes the file. There is nothing the defendant can

do to fan the ashes of that action into life and the court has no

role to play.” Pedrina v. Chun, 987 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1993);

McCall-Bey, 777 F.2d at 1185. “[I]t is beyond debate that a

dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is effective on filing, no court

order is required . . . and the district court lacks jurisdiction

to do anything about it.” Commercial Space Mgmt. Co. v. Boeing

Co., 193 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999).

The October 7, 2010 letter from Goudlock states that because

he mistakenly sued Defendant Thompson, he would like to “drop” her

as a Defendant and add additional correctional officers to the

action. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. Ex. A at 4-5, ECF

No. 52; Notice Doc. Discrepancies 1-2, ECF No. 49.) According to

Plaintiff, he recently learned the identities of the unknown

defendants and would like to name these officers. (Mot. Dismiss

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Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. Ex. A at 5, ECF No. 52; Notice Doc.

Discrepancies 2, ECF No. 49.)

No Defendant has filed an answer or a motion for summary

judgment, and the Court has not converted a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim to a summary judgment motion. See

Swedberg v. Marotzke, 339 F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2003); see also

Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d

Cir. 1991); Kennedy v. Full Tilt Poke, No. CV 09-07964 MMM (AGRx),

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112119, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010). 

Consequently, Goudlock may dismiss this action under Rule 41(a)(1)

by filing a notice of dismissal. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

41(a)(1)(A)(i).

As discussed above, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s October 7,

2010 letter for filing because it construed the letter as a request

that the Clerk of Court amend Goudlock’s Complaint and add new

Defendants without the filing of a motion to amend. (Notice Doc.

Discrepancies 1, ECF No. 49.) This Court instructed, “IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED: The document is NOT to be filed, but instead REJECTED.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff’s letter to the Clerk of Court was an inadequate

attempt to add Defendants. It does, however, also state that

Goudlock wants to “drop” Defendant Thompson from the case. (See

id.)

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) does not require a particular form of a

notice of dismissal. See Williams v. Ezell, 531 F.2d 1261, 1263

(5th Cir. 1976) (holding that a failure to cite Rule 41 was

irrelevant, and giving no weight to plaintiff’s choice to title the

document “motion to dismiss” as opposed to “notice of dismissal”);

see also Harvey Honore’ Constr. Co. v. Louisiana Associated, No.

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96-1976 c/w 95-3699 SECTION “A” (1), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16335,

at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 29, 1996). “Failure to label the document a

‘notice of dismissal’ is generally harmless if the intent for

filing is clear and the plaintiff does not invite any action by the

court.” 8 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice §

41.33[4][b], at 41-50 (3d ed. 2010). 

It is not significant that Goudlock’s letter is not captioned

“Notice of Voluntary Dismissal” or does not cite Rule 41. Id.

(“[L]etters from pro se plaintiffs requesting withdrawal of the

action have been given the effect of notices.”) Accordingly, the

Court construes Goudlock’s request that Thompson be “dropped from

the case” as a notice of voluntary dismissal. See Kennedy v. Full

Tilt Poke, No. CV 09-07964 MMM (AGRx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

112119, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010) (construing plaintiffs’

“notice of non-opposition” as a notice of voluntary dismissal

because plaintiffs cited Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) in their pleading);

Paul v. Doe, No. 08-1047 MLH (RBB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at

*2-3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2009) (construing plaintiff’s filed

“Motion for Voluntary Withdrawal” as a notice of voluntary

dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) and dismissing the action

without prejudice); Dugan v. Lingle, No. 07-00236 DAE-KSC, 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44518, at *8-10 (D. Haw. June 19, 2007)

(construing plaintiff’s statement in a letter that if he is not

appointed counsel, he “will be forced to request a dismissal (sic)

without prejudice on this case” as a notice of voluntary dismissal

under Rule 41(a)(1)).

To the extent that Goudlock’s October 7th letter was a request

directed to the Clerk of Court for permission to add new

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Defendants, it was properly rejected for filing. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(a)(1), (2). Plaintiff recognized this and has since filed a

Motion to Amend Complaint –- Adding New Defendants. (Mot. Amend.

Compl. –- Adding New Defs., ECF No. 53.) To the extent that

Goudlock’s letter was a request to dismiss (“drop”) Correctional

Officer Thompson from this suit, the letter should have been filed

as a “Notice of Dismissal.” Consequently, the Court will correct

the mistake by amending the Notice of Document Discrepancies [ECF

No. 49] to permit the October 7, 2010 letter to be filed as a

“Notice of Dismissal” of Defendant Thompson, but leaving unchanged

the rejection of the letter as an attempt to amend the Complaint. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a).

This is consistent with Goudlock’s intention at the time. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff has not opposed Thompson’s Motion to

Dismiss. Under these circumstances, Goudlock’s letter should be

part of the record. See McCall-Bey, 777 F.2d at 1185 (stating that

the filing requirements under Rule 41 is more than a technicality

because it ensures that the document becomes part of the permanent

record). Therefore, the requirements of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) have

been met.

Accordingly, Defendant Thompson’s Motion to Dismiss should be

DENIED as moot. Plaintiff’s letter, dated October 7, 2010, shall

be filed as a Notice of Dismissal of Defendant Thompson.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND

On December 2, 2010, Goudlock filed a Motion to Amend

Complaint - Adding New Defendants Sgt. R. Perez, R. Amiling, R.

Esquilin [ECF No. 53]. First, Plaintiff seeks to substitute

Correctional Sergeant R. Perez for Defendant Cruz. (Mot. Amend

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Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 53.) As noted above, Cruz was dismissed

without prejudice on October 13, 2010. (Order Dismissing Def. Cruz

Without Prejudice 1-2, ECF No. 48.) Plaintiff argues in the Motion

to Amend that he discovered new information from the prison

litigation coordinator and asserts that Sergeant Perez is the

appropriate defendant. (Mot. Amend Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 53.) 

Second, Plaintiff seeks to substitute Correctional Officer R.

Amiling and Correctional Officer R. Esquilin for two of the three

unknown defendants initially sued as “3 Unknown C.O.’s on 1st

Watch, Building 3.” (Id. at 2.) Defendant Thompson, the only

remaining named Defendant, has not opposed Plaintiff’s Motion to

Amend.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) provides, “A party

may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: (A) 21

days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after

service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is

earlier.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) states that

“[i]n all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court

should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Because

Plaintiff has already amended his Complaint once as a matter of

course (before a responsive pleading was served), he must seek

leave of court to file a second amended complaint. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

Amendments pursuant to Rule 15(a) are liberally granted. 

United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule

15’s policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied

with ‘extreme liberality.’”) (citation omitted); see Eldridge v.

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Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987). “In exercising its

discretion ‘a court must be guided by the underlying purpose of

Rule 15 –- to facilitate decision on the merits rather than on the

pleadings or technicalities.’” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833

F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Webb, 655 F.2d at 979). 

Nonetheless, the moving party must state the grounds for its motion

to amend “with particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b); Confederate

Mem’l Ass’n, Inc. v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(noting that a bare request in an opposition to a motion to

dismiss, without any indication of the grounds for amendment, is

not a proper motion to amend under Rule 15(a)); Waters v.

Weyerhauser Mortgage Co., 582 F.2d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1978). 

When assessing requests for leave to amend, courts should

consider factors such as (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3)

prejudice to the opposing party, and (4) futility of amendment. 

Ditto v. McCurdy, 510 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Roth

v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 628 (9th Cir. 1991)); see Foman v.

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Loehr v. Ventura County Community

College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1319 (9th Cir. 1984); Howey v. United

States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973). “‘The party opposing

amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice[,]’ futility, or

one of the other permissible reasons for denying a motion to

amend.” First Ascent Ventures, Inc. v. DLC Dermacare, LLC, No. CV

06-1794-PHX-JAT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70641, at *8 (D. Ariz. Oct.

24, 2006) (quoting DCD Programs, Ltd., 833 F.2d at 187)). 

“[T]he ‘rule favoring liberality in amendments to pleadings is

particularly important for the pro se litigant.’” Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809

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3

 Defendant Cruz was dismissed from the First Amended

Complaint without prejudice because Plaintiff was unable to serve

Cruz in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). 

(Order Dismissing Def. Cruz Without Prejudice 1-2, ECF No. 48.) 

17 08cv00204 BEN (RBB)

F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). Indeed, the denial of a pro se

litigant’s request for leave to amend may be appropriate if the

complaint lacks merit entirely or if amendment would be futile. 

Id. at 1130; see also Krier v. Ray, 341 F. App’x 295, 297 (9th Cir.

2009) (quoting Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.

2007)). But failing to apply Rule 15(a) with extreme liberality

could penalize a pro se prisoner “not because his complaint is

meritless, but because he is ‘unskilled in the law’ and lacks

counsel, a result that is directly contrary to the spirit of the

federal pleading rules.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Noll,

809 F.2d at 1448). 

A. Correctional Sergeant R. Perez

In count three of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants Thompson and Cruz3 violated his Eighth

Amendment rights when they forced him to live in conditions that

were inconsistent with his medical condition. (Am. Compl. 8, ECF

No. 7.) Goudlock contends that Defendants placed him in a top-tier

cell and ignored Plaintiff’s accommodation chrono stating that he

should be assigned to a ground floor cell and a bottom bunk. (Id.;

see id. at 16.) Plaintiff claims his sleeping disorder causes him

to urinate in his bed, and he has developed a severe rash as a

result. (Id. at 8.) According to Goudlock, Defendants Cruz and

Thompson could have prevented these injuries. (Id.) In count

four, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Cruz forced him to live in

these conditions, condoned the constitutional violations, and

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ignored Goudlock’s statements about his medical complications. 

(Id. at 14.) 

In his Motion to Amend, Plaintiff seeks to substitute

Correctional Sergeant R. Perez for Defendant Cruz. (Mot. Amend

Compl. 1, ECF No. 53.) Goudlock states that “[o]n 11-8-2010, [he]

received information regarding the identification of defendant

formally listed on [his] complaint as Sgt Cruz.” (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that the litigation coordinator recently told him there has

never been a Sergeant Cruz employed at Donovan, and the sergeant on

duty that day was Correctional Sergeant R. Perez. (Id.) 

Even after dismissal, courts should grant leave to amend

unless the plaintiff cannot allege any facts sufficient to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Warner v. Alexander Grant

& Co., 828 F.2d 1528, 1531 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). The

party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing bad faith,

undue delay, futility, or prejudice. First Ascent Ventures, Inc.,

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70641, at *8 (quoting DCD Programs, Ltd., 833

F.2d at 187); see also Richardson v. United States, 841 F.2d 993,

999 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that leave to amend should be freely

granted unless the opposing party makes an affirmative showing of

bad faith or undue prejudice). Prejudice can result if a defendant

would be required to participate in additional or extended

discovery. See Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087

(9th Cir. 2002); Solomon v. N. Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d

1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998).

Applying the four factors courts consider when assessing

motions for leave to amend —— bad faith, undue delay, prejudice,

and futility —— granting Goudlock leave to amend is appropriate. 

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See Ditto, 510 F.3d at 1079. Since the action’s inception,

Plaintiff has struggled to ascertain and locate the proper

defendants. The United States Marshals Service made two

unsuccessful attempts to serve Defendant Cruz on Goudlock’s behalf. 

(Summons Returned Unexecuted Cruz, Dec. 30, 2008, Aug. 12, 2010, 

ECF Nos. 15, 42). Service was still not accomplished after Judge

Benitez directed the Deputy Attorney General to assist in locating

Cruz. (Order Directing Att’y Gen. Provide Forwarding Address 2-3,

ECF No. 43.) Judge Benitez ultimately dismissed Cruz. (Order

Dismissing Def. Cruz Without Prejudice 1-2, ECF No. 48 (citing Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(m).)

Although Plaintiff filed this Motion to Amend more than two

years after filing the First Amended Complaint, he filed it only

three months after receiving confirmation that no sergeant by the

name of “Cruz” was employed at Donovan during the relevant time

period. (Mot. Amend Compl. 4, ECF No. 53; Att’y General’s Notice

Compliance 5, ECF No. 45.) The facts do not suggest that Goudlock

seeks to amend his pleading in bad faith or to cause undue delay. 

See Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994) (denying

leave to amend because plaintiff had two prior amendments, caused

undue delay, and knew of the evidence before seeking leave to

amend); Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798-99 (9th Cir.

1991) (finding undue delay where plaintiff waited until after

discovery was over, and eight months after summary judgment was

granted against it, to seek leave to amend). 

Additionally, Goudlock’s proposed amendment is not futile. 

The sufficiency of Goudlock’s allegations against Cruz and Thompson

in counts three and four has not been considered; Cruz was

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dismissed because Plaintiff was unable to effect service, and

Thompson moves to dismiss based on Goudlock’s allegedly voluntary

dismissal. (Order Dismissing Def. Cruz Without Prejudice 1-2, ECF

No. 48; Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2, ECF No. 52.) The

Court therefore cannot conclude that amendment of Plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference and conditions of confinement claims would

be futile. See Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214

(9th Cir. 1988) (stating that amendment is futile only if no set of

facts may be proved under the amendment that could constitute a

valid claim). Finally, undue prejudice is not likely because the

proposed amendment to substitute Perez arises out of the same

transaction and events as alleged against Defendant Cruz in the

First Amended Complaint. DCD Programs, Ltd., 833 F.2d at 188

(“Where the underlying facts or circumstances of a case ‘may be a

proper subject for relief, [a plaintiff] ought to be afforded an

opportunity to test his claims on the merits.’”) (quotation

omitted). 

Based on this four-factor analysis, Goudlock should be given

the opportunity to amend the claims he asserted against Defendant

Cruz. Warner, 828 F.2d at 1531 (stating that courts should freely

grant amendments, even after a complaint has been dismissed); see

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 (favoring liberality in amendments for pro

se litigants). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his

Eighth Amendment claims in counts three and four to substitute

Correctional Sergeant Perez for Correctional Sergeant Cruz should

be GRANTED. 

The district court should allow Goudlock to amend his

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim and his

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conditions of confinement claim against Defendant Cruz for

assigning Plaintiff to a top-tier cell, ignoring his medical

chrono, and failing to address Goudlock’s statements about his

medical condition. Plaintiff should be given leave to file a

second amended complaint with claims identical to the ones alleged

in the First Amended Complaint, except that previous references to

“Defendant Cruz” should be replaced by references to “R. Perez.” 

B. Correctional Officers R. Amiling and R. Esquilin

When he filed the First Amended Complaint, Goudlock did not

know the names of the correctional officers who were on duty on

June 15, 2007, the day Plaintiff claims the unknown officers

violated his Eighth Amendment rights. (Am. Compl. 1-3, ECF No. 7.) 

Consequently, Goudlock named “3 Unknown C.O.’s on 1st Watch,

Building 3” as Defendants in count one. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff

alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when prison

officials’ medical response was delayed after he fell off the top

bunk bed in his cell. (Id. at 3-4.) 

All pleas for help were completely ignored [by]

the Unknown Correctional Officers of First

Watch in Building 3, thus causing a gross

violation of [his] eighth amendment [right]

against cruel treatment/Punishment, because the

officers heard [his] calls for help, and choose

to ignore [his] pleas, causing [him] to

unnecessarily suffer without medical treatment.

(Id. (citations omitted).)

 In his Motion to Amend, Goudlock states that he has recently

learned the names of two of these unknown defendants, Correctional

Officers R. Amiling and R. Esquilin, and he seeks to name them in

the lawsuit. (Mot. Amend Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 53.) Plaintiff

explains, “This information was provided by the litigation

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coordinator J. Ramirez[] as staff that was on duty on 6-15-07 at

2200 - 0600 HRS 1st watch. The date and time of the incident in

question.” (Id. at 2.) 

When a plaintiff does not know the identity of the alleged

defendant before filing the complaint, the plaintiff should be

afforded the opportunity to identify the unknown defendants. 

Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting

Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). But

see, Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (9th

Cir. 2003) (affirming refusal to permit plaintiff to substitute

defendants after remand when he did not seek leave to amend to add

the previously unknown individuals as named defendants). The

failure to give the plaintiff the opportunity to learn the identity

of unknown defendants through discovery is error. Wilds v. Gines,

No. C 08-03348 CW (PR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12127, at *4 (N.D.

Cal. Jan. 22, 2010) (citing Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1163). “This

liberality in granting leave to amend is not dependent on whether

the amendment will add causes of action or parties.” DCD Programs,

Ltd., 833 F.2d at 186. 

After applying the four factors, the Court again finds no

evidence that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend count one to name

Officers Amiling and Esquilin is brought in bad faith or to cause

undue delay. See Ditto, 510 F.3d at 1079 (identifying the factors

courts consider when ruling on motions to amend). Goudlock

explains how he discovered that Amiling and Esquilin were the

officers on duty when his calls for help were ignored. (Mot. Amend

Compl. 1-2, 7, ECF No. 53.) Moreover, the amendment would not be

futile. Plaintiff made Eighth Amendment allegations against three

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unknown correctional officers in count one of his First Amended

Complaint, and amendment of his pleading to include the names of

two of these officers would facilitate a decision on the merits. 

See DCD Programs, Ltd., 833 F.2d at 186. Lastly, the risk of undue

prejudice is low. Filing a second amended complaint to include

Amiling and Esquilin would not alter the facts on which the

original claims are based or introduce new theories of recovery. 

See Bell v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 452, 454 (8th Cir.

1998) (finding prejudice because proposed amendments raised issues

involving new legal and factual bases and would require additional

discovery); Baisa v. Indymac Fed. Reserve, No. CIV. 2:09-1464 WBS

JFM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63025, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2010)

(“A proposed amendment is prejudicial only when it unfairly affects

the defendants’ ability to prepare a defense to the amended

pleading.”)

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend describes with particularity what

changes he wishes to make to his First Amended Complaint and why

further amendment is necessary. (See Mot. Amend Compl. 1-2, ECF

No. 53); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to

Amend his Eighth Amendment allegations against “3 Unknown C/O’s” in

count one to name Correctional Officer R. Amiling and Correctional

Officer R. Esquilin should be GRANTED. 

The district court should allow Plaintiff to amend his cruel

and unusual punishment claim against unknown officers for providing

a delayed medical response after Goudlock fell off the bed in his

cell and ignoring his calls for help. Plaintiff should be granted

leave to file a second amended complaint with the same claims as

those alleged in the First Amended Complaint, except that all

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previous references to “unknown officers” should be replaced by

references to Correctional Officers “R. Amiling” and “R. Esquilin.”

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Thompson relies on the

October 7, 2010 letter Goudlock attempted to file to argue that, in

effect, he voluntarily dismissed Thompson under Rule

41(a)(1)(A)(i). The letter should have been filed as a notice of

dismissal. The mistake is corrected with this Order. As a result,

the requirements of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) are met, and Thompson is

dismissed from this action. For this reason, Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint should be DENIED as

moot. 

To ensure that all of the issues and parties are before the

Court, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his First Amended Complaint

should be GRANTED. Goudlock should be granted leave to file a

second amended complaint asserting only his deliberate indifference

to serious medical needs claim and his conditions of confinement

claim against “Correctional Sergeant R. Perez.” Plaintiff should

be allowed to file an amended pleading asserting only his cruel and

unusual punishment claim against “Correctional Officer R. Amiling”

and “Correctional Officer R. Esquilin.”

Goudlock’s second amended complaint should be complete in

itself without reference to the prior pleading. S.D. Cal. Civ. L.

R. 15.1. The amended pleading should be filed and should include

copies of all exhibits to which it refers. Id. Defendants not

named and claims not realleged in the second amended complaint will

be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\1983\PRISONER\GOUDLOCK204\R&R re MTD and Mot. Amend.wpd 25 08cv00204 BEN (RBB)

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before February 11, 2011. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before February 28,

2011. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: January 28, 2011 ____________________________ Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Benitez

All Parties of Record

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