Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08150/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Bobbi Jo Farley, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-08150-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Bobbi Jo Farley seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied her 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under sections 216(i), 

223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Because the decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and is not based 

on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed. 

I. Background. 

 Plaintiff is a 38-year-old female with a tenth grade education. She previously 

worked as a nursing assistant, hotel porter, stocker, waitress, cashier, and store manager. 

On May 8 and June 3, 2008, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning December 14, 2007. A 

hearing was held, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, but the Appeals Council 

remanded the matter to the ALJ for consideration of a few additional matters. A.R. 161-

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63. On January 16, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with her attorney and testified at a video 

hearing before the ALJ. A vocational expert also testified. On March 13, 2013, the ALJ 

issued a decision that Plaintiff was disabled from September 1, 2008 through October 1, 

2009 (the “Closed Period”) and not disabled outside of the Closed Period within the 

meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for 

review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 

F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

III. The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation Process. 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 

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§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to 

be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is 

still capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant 

is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final 

step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 

The ALJ analyzed two different avenues of disability: (1) disability during the 

Closed Period and (2) disability outside of the Closed Period (prior to September 1, 2008 

and beginning October 2, 2009). For the Closed Period, at step one, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

September 30, 2009, and that she had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during 

the Closed Period. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe 

impairments: Chiari malformation1

 with congenital syringomyelia, status post brain 

surgery, right upper extremity cellulitis and furunculosis of the right arm, a mood 

disorder, and a personality disorder. A.R. 20. At step three, the ALJ determined that 

during the Closed Period Plaintiff did have an impairment or combination of impairments 

that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 

C.F.R. Pt. 404. A.R. 21. Consequently, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was under a 

disability during the Closed Period given the severity of her Chiari malformation and 

resulting symptoms. A.R. 22. 

 

1

 “Chiari malformations are structural defects in the cerebellum” and may cause symptoms such as muscle weakness, numbness, and headaches. Chiari Malformation, WebMD, http://www.webmd.com/brain/chiari-malformation-symptoms-types-treatment (last visited April 24, 2015). 

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For Plaintiff’s claim of disability outside of the Closed Period, the ALJ noted that 

Plaintiff’s “impairments have remained the same throughout the period under 

adjudication.” Id. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled prior 

to the Closed Period, that “medical improvement occurred as of October 2, 2009,” that 

Plaintiff’s disability ended, and that Plaintiff therefore does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 

Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

has the RFC to perform: 

light work with restrictions . . . Occasionally, the claimant can lift 20 

pounds and 10 pounds with the right hand used in conjunction with the left 

hand. The claimant requires a sit/stand option and can occasionally crouch 

and squat, but never crawl, climb, or kneel. In addition, the claimant is 

limited to unskilled work. 

A.R. 24. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant 

work after October 2, 2009. A.R. 27. At step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering 

Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are 

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could 

perform. 

IV. Analysis. 

 Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s decision is defective for three reasons: (1) the ALJ’s 

decision is not supported by substantial evidence, (2) the ALJ failed to account for the 

effects of Plaintiff’s obesity, and (3) the ALJ erroneously relied on the opinion of an 

orthopedic physician to testify regarding Plaintiff’s neurological impairments. The Court 

will address each argument below. 

A. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence. 

 In her first claim of error, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have found her 

disabled because she demonstrated “complete destruction of her elbow” before and after 

the Closed Period. Plaintiff asserts that after her surgery in 2009, an MRI demonstrated 

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“syrinx formation at the T4 and T5 and at C3 and other levels.” Doc. 12 at 9. She also 

argues that she demonstrated she had no use of her upper right extremity and substantial 

difficulty using her upper left extremity. The Court disagrees. 

 Plaintiff underwent a craniotomy to correct her Chairi malformation on August 4, 

2009. A.R. 598. After her surgery, Plaintiff visited Dr. Nimfa Aguila on October 29, 

2009. A.R. 638-41. During the visit, Plaintiff complained of “right arm weakness and 

swelling.” A.R. 638. On examination, Dr. Aguila found Plaintiff had good peripheral 

pulses in her extremities, no edema, and swelling in the right arm. A.R. 639. She also 

found Plaintiff had full strength in all muscle groups and was able to perform a finger to 

nose exercise without difficulty. She noted “[f]inger tapping and rapid alternating 

movements were normal” and Plaintiff exhibited “good arm swing.” Id. Dr. Aguila 

diagnosed Plaintiff with right arm lymphedema (swelling) and right median and ulnar 

neuropathies (numbness and tingling in fingers). Id. Dr. Aguila recommended 

occupational therapy and a follow-up visit. 

 In April 2010, an MRI of Plaintiff’s left elbow revealed a small osteophyte of the 

ulnar nerve, but otherwise normal findings. A.R. 718. In January 2011, an examination 

of Plaintiff’s spine evidenced “subtle syrinx formation within the spinal cord at the T4 

and T5 levels,” but otherwise unremarkable findings. A.R. 738. 

 This evidence indicates Plaintiff’s condition improved after her surgery. Plaintiff 

overstates the significance of the evidence, claiming that it conclusively demonstrates 

Plaintiff’s disability. Rather, the records indicate that although she still experienced 

symptoms of Chiari malformation, her condition was improving over time. The ALJ’s 

interpretation of the records is supported by substantial evidence. 

 The only evidence Plaintiff cites to support her argument is an April 2010 

“Medical Source Statement” provided by treating source Dr. Michael Seiff. A.R. 647-54. 

Dr. Seiff noted Plaintiff’s headaches “are essentially resolved” and that her “[e]lectrical 

cramping pains have not recurred.” A.R. 647. Dr. Seiff noted that emotional factors, 

such as depression and anxiety, contribute to Plaintiff’s symptoms. A.R. 649. He found 

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that Plaintiff could stand or walk continuously for an hour, could sit for no more than 

four hours in an eight hour workday, and that she could not carry more than five pounds. 

A.R. 650-51. The Medical Source Statement also noted Plaintiff could never reach, 

handle, or finger anything with her right hand, but could occasionally reach and 

frequently handle and finger with her left hand. A.R. 652. Dr. Seiff ultimately found that 

Plaintiff would miss more than three days of work per month. A.R. 653. Plaintiff asserts 

this opinion should have been given controlling weight. 

 The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give greatest weight to a treating 

physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to 

one of a non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th 

Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when 

evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, 

frequency of examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective 

evidence). If it is not contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, the opinion of a treating 

or examining physician can be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). A 

contradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician “can only be rejected for 

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043). An ALJ can meet the 

“specific and legitimate reasons” standard “by setting out a detailed and thorough 

summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, 

and making findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 The ALJ gave “very little weight” to Dr. Seiff’s opinion because it was based on 

Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms and inconsistent with the medical evidence. A.R. 25. 

Indeed, Dr. Seiff noted that he and Plaintiff filled out the statement together. A.R. 647. 

The statement was a simple check form that contained no supporting clinical evidence or 

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findings. In noting its inconsistency with other medical evidence, the ALJ cited objective 

medical evidence in the record, including the MRI of Plaintiff’s left elbow (A.R. 718), 

Plaintiff’s spine examination (A.R. 738), and Dr. Aguila’s findings, none of which 

Plaintiff dispute. These records indicate improvement over time and do not support a 

conclusion that Plaintiff cannot ever use her right arm, and, contrary to Plaintiff’s 

argument, actually support a conclusion that Plaintiff can use her left arm without much 

difficulty. In addition, Dr. Seiff’s conclusion that Plaintiff will miss three days of work 

per month is devoid of any support or explanation. Therefore, the ALJ properly 

discounted the testimony with specific reasons supported by substantial evidence. See 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31.2

B. The ALJ’s Failure to Evaluate Plaintiff’s Obesity is Harmless. 

 Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred by failing to account for the effects of her 

obesity as directed by the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council’s remand order 

instructed the ALJ to consider Plaintiff’s obesity and to further consider Plaintiff’s 

maximum RFC in light of her obesity. A.R. 162. “According to Social Security Rules, 

in evaluating obesity to determine a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ’s assessment ‘must 

consider an individual’s maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an 

ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis.’” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 

F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting SSR 02-01p (2002)). It appears the ALJ did not 

provide an assessment of Plaintiff’s obesity in the decision. Nonetheless, the error 

identified by Plaintiff is harmless. 

 Harmless error principles apply in the Social Security Act context. Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). An error is harmless if there remains 

 

2

 In her reply brief, which was untimely, Plaintiff argues for the first time that the 

ALJ erred by failing to consider the medical records submitted by Dr. Daniel Frank. 

A.R. 501-02. This claim of error is not properly before the Court. See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). Even if it were, however, the opinion was rendered during the Closed Period in which the ALJ found Plaintiff disabled, as well as prior to Plaintiff’s corrective surgery. It is therefore not probative as to Plaintiff’s condition postsurgery. 

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substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error does not affect the 

ultimate nondisability determination. Id. The claimant usually bears the burden of 

showing that an error is harmful. Id. at 1111. 

 Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that her obesity would 

have affected the ALJ’s ultimate disability determination. Plaintiff points out the error in 

her opening brief, but provides no analysis or explanation as to how her obesity would 

have affected her functional limitations. There are no citations to any medical evidence 

in the record, and nowhere does Plaintiff explain how her obesity affects her daily living. 

In fact, Dr. Eric Schmitter, when testifying at the hearing, stated that Plaintiff is 

“morbidly obese,” but noted that the record was devoid of “good objective findings” 

related to how obesity affects Plaintiff’s condition. A.R. 43. Moreover, at none of the 

three hearings in this case did Plaintiff’s attorney question Plaintiff, the vocational expert, 

or Dr. Schmitter about Plaintiff’s obesity and whether it would affect her functional 

capacity. See A.R. 35-59 (January 16, 2013 hearing); A.R. 60-86 (June 9, 2010 

supplemental hearing); A.R. 87-137 (April 29, 2010 hearing). “[T]he medical record is 

silent as to whether and how [Plaintiff’s] obesity might have exacerbated her condition.” 

Burch, 400 F.3d at 683. 

 In addition, Plaintiff challenges none of the substantial evidence that supports the 

ALJ’s ultimate decision. The ALJ found Plaintiff capable of light work with additional 

restrictions, which were presumably based on Plaintiff’s obesity. A.R. 27 (detailing the 

ALJ’s decision not to find Plaintiff capable of the full range of light work, which would 

result in a finding of “not disabled,” but instead imposing several restrictions). The RFC 

was based on objective medical evidence in the record along with Plaintiff’s own 

statements at the hearing, which the ALJ found only partially credible. Plaintiff does not 

dispute the ALJ’s credibility assessment. The Court finds the ALJ’s error harmless. 

 

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C. The ALJ Did Not Err in Relying on the Opinion of Dr. Schmitter. 

 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by relying on Dr. Schmitter, an orthopedist, 

to testify as to Plaintiff’s neurological impairments. Plaintiff argues that a neurologist 

should have been consulted instead, and that the “record is devoid of any other evidence 

to support the decision to award plaintiff only a one year closed period.” Doc. 12 at 11. 

 At the January 15, 2013 hearing, Dr. Schmitter testified that Plaintiff has “no 

neurologic issues” that would require sitting or standing limitations. A.R. 43. When 

questioned about Plaintiff’s syringomyelia with respect to Listing 11.19B, Dr. Schmitter 

stated that “this is not really orthopedics, this is neurosurgical,” and acknowledged that 

he is not an expert in neurology. A.R. 44. He also stated that he was familiar with 

decompression surgeries and was able to describe Plaintiff’s condition. A.R. 40-41, 47. 

 The Court is not convinced that the ALJ relied on the testimony for any of 

Plaintiff’s conditions outside the Closed Period. The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. 

Schmitter’s testimony in finding Plaintiff disabled “for the period of September 1, 2008 

through October 1, 2009.” A.R. 22. But the ALJ appears to have relied on Dr. 

Schmitter’s testimony only as it relates to Plaintiff’s “neuropathic degeneration of the 

right elbow” and an “abnormality in formation of the cervical cord in her neck,” for 

which the ALJ awarded benefits. Id. Nowhere in the analysis of whether Plaintiff was 

disabled after the Closed Period does the ALJ refer to Dr. Schmitter’s testimony. Instead, 

the ALJ relies on the objective medical evidence that demonstrated improvement in 

Plaintiff’s condition post-surgery. 

 Plaintiff also seems to argue that the ALJ relied on Dr. Schmitter’s testimony for a 

finding that Plaintiff did not meet Listing 11.19B. But Plaintiff points to no evidence that 

the listing was otherwise satisfied for the time period in dispute – evidence of 

“[s]ignificant and persistent disorganization of motor function in two extremities, 

resulting in sustained disturbance of gross and dexterous movements, or gait and 

station.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, 11.04B, 11.19B. Therefore, even if the 

ALJ relied on Dr. Schmitter’s testimony improperly, Plaintiff fails to show that Listing 

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11.19B would have applied outside the closed period. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

 Dated this 27th day of April, 2015. 

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