Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-01073/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-01073-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL DAYLE BARBAREE, )

#212 397, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:10-CV-1073-TMH

) [WO]

DENNIS MEEKS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at

the KilbyCorrectional Facility in Mt. Meigs, Alabama, challenges the conditionsto which

he was subjected while incarcerated at the Covington County Jail located in Andalusia,

Alabama. Plaintiff names Sheriff Dennis Meeks and Captain Preston Hughes as

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defendants. Plaintiff requests damages and injunctive relief.

Defendants filed a special report, answer, and supporting evidentiary materials

addressing Plaintiff' claims for relief. In these documents, Defendants assert Plaintiff

failed to exhaust an administrative remedy available to him while incarcerated at the

Covington County Jail. Pursuant to the orders entered in this case and governing case law,

the court deems it appropriate to treat Defendants' report as a motion for summary

judgment (Doc. No. 22). See Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11 Cir. 2008)

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(Although an exhaustion defense "is not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary

During the pendency of this action Plaintiff was transferred from the Covington County Jail.

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judgment[,]" the defense is appropriate for summary judgment when the evidence

demonstrates administrative remedies "are absolutely time barred or otherwise clearly

infeasible."). The court explained to Plaintiff the proper manner in which to respond to a

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a response to the special report filed by

Defendants. This case is now pending on Defendants' motion forsummary judgment. Upon

consideration of this motion and the evidentiarymaterialsfiled in support thereof, the court

concludes that Defendants' motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11 Cir.

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2007) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56© (Summary judgment "should

be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law."). The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the

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Effective December 1, 2007, “[t]he language of Rule 56 [was] amended ... to make the rule[] more

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easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes ... are

stylistic only.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic

changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior rule remain equally applicable

to the current rule.

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initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying

those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence

which would be admissible at trial indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by

showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element

of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

Defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact with respect to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond

the pleadings, that a genuine issue material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats and Clark, Inc.,

929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) ("When

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a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may not

rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must ... set out

specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial."). A genuine issue of material fact exists

when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to

return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263.

 To survive Defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff

is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" establishing proper exhaustion of

administrative remedies. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). "If the

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evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable ... or is not significantly

probative ... summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-250. "A mere 'scintilla' of

evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of

a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)." Walker v. Darby, 911

F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11 Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs

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are likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not

suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental

Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11 Cir. 2001); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555,

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1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (plaintiff's "conclusory assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible]

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supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment."); Harris v. Ostrout,

65 F.3d 912, 916 (11 Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate

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produces nothing beyond "his own conclusory allegations...."); Fullman v. Graddick, 739

F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) ("mere verification of party's own conclusory allegations is not

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sufficient to oppose summary judgment...."). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth

specific facts supported by appropriate evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial,

summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322 ("[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc.,

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814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (if on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents

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insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of

summary judgment is appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami,

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Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

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substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the

Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) ("Only

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factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude

entry of summary judgment."). "The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat

summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome

of the case." McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11 Cir. 2003)

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(citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing

summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the evidence

before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form

indicates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the party moving for

summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex,

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477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary materials

and affidavits before the court show there is no genuine issue as to a requisite material fact);

Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (to establish a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party

must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a

pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

issue of material fact. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529-530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2576, 165

L.Ed.2d 697 (2006); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, Plaintiff's

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pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of elementary principles of

production and proof in a civil case. In this case, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a requisite

genuine issue of material fact in order to preclude summary judgment. Matsushita, 475 U.S.

at 587.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff challengesthe conditions of confinement to which he wassubjected during

his incarceration a the Covington County Jail. In response to the complaint, Defendants

argue this case should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative

remedy provided at the Covington County Jail with respect to his claims prior to filing this

complaint as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

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The Prison Litigation Reform Act compels exhaustion of available administrative

remedies before a prisoner can seek relief in federal court on a § 1983 complaint.

Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) states that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctionalfacility untilsuch administrative remedies

as are available are exhausted." "Congress has provided in § 1997(e)(a) that an inmate

must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative

remedies." Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion

requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general

circumstances or particular episodes, and whethertheyallege excessive force orsome other

wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of all available

administrative remedies is a precondition to litigation and a federal court cannot waive the

exhaustion requirement. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325

(11 Cir. 1998); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006). Moreover, "the PLRA exhaustion

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requirement requires proper exhaustion." Id. at 93 (emphasis added).

"Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other

critical procedural rules [as a precondition to filing suit in federal court] because no

adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on

the courts of its proceedings.... Construing § 1997e(a) to require proper exhaustion ... fits

with the general scheme of the PLRA, whereas [a contrary] interpretation [allowing an

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inmate to bring suit in federal court once administrative remedies are no longer available]

would turn that provision into a largely useless appendage." Id. at 90-91. The Court

reasoned that because proper exhaustion of administrative remediesis necessary an inmate

cannot "satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement ... by filing an

untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal[,]" or by

effectively bypassing the administrative process simply by waiting until the grievance

procedure is no longer available to her. Id. at 83-84; Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152,

1157 (11 Cir. 2005) (inmate who files an untimely grievance or simply spurns the

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administrative process until it is no longer available fails to satisfy the exhaustion

requirement of the PLRA). Further, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement contains no futility

exception where there is an available inmate grievance procedure. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741

n. 6 ( “[W]e will not read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements

where Congress has provided otherwise.” ); Cox v. Mayer, 332 F.3d 422, 424-28 (6 Cir.

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2003) (holding that the exhaustion requirement applies to a former prisoner who filed his

complaint without exhausting his administrative remedies and who had since been released

from custody); see also Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733 (7 Cir. 1999).

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The record in this case establishes that the Covington County Jail provides a

grievance procedure for inmate complaints. (Doc. No. 21, Exhs. B, C, G, H.) This

administrative remedy is available to all Covington County Jail inmates including Plaintiff

at the time of his incarceration there. (Id.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to exhaust

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his administrative remedies with respect to his claims against them concerning the conditions

at the jail. To support this assertion, Defendants have offered affidavits and other record

evidence which makes it clear that Plaintiff failed to file any grievance with respect to the

actions about which he complains in the instant complaint. (Id., Exhs. B, C.) The court

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has thoroughly reviewed the evidentiary materials filed by Defendants. These materials

demonstrate that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust the grievance procedure provided to

him during his incarceration in the Covington County Jail. Plaintiff contends that he filed

grievances to have Defendants “acknowledge what they were doing to [him] was wrong,”

but he provides nothing to refute or explain Defendants’ evidence showing he failed to

pursue the county jail’s grievance process with respect to the specific claims presented in the

instant complaint. (Doc. No. 24 at pg. 1.) The undersigned finds there is no dispute of

material fact that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his

challenges made against Defendants with respect to his claims concerning various

unconstitutional conditions to which he was subjected during his confinement at the

Covington County Jail. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 218 (“The level of detail necessary in a

grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and

claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the

boundaries of proper exhaustion.”). The court, therefore, concludes that the claims

Defendants’ evidentiary material contains one grievance filed by Plaintiff in May 2010. 3

Plaintiff states, however, that the May 2010 grievance does not concern the allegations raised in his

complaint which he claims occurred between July 27, 2009 and January 4, 2010. (See Doc. No. 1 at pg.

2 and Doc. No. 24 at pg. 1.) 

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presented in this cause of action are subject to dismissal as Plaintiff failed to properly

exhaust administrative remedies available to him which is a precondition to proceeding in

this court on his claims. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 87-94.

As noted, Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the Covington County jail. Thus, the

administrative remedy provided by Defendants is no longer available to Plaintiff. Under

such circumstances, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368,

1375 n.1 (11 Cir. 2008); Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11 Cir. 2005);

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Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 710 (5 Cir. 1995) ("Without the prospect of a dismissal with

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prejudice, a prisoner could evade the exhaustion requirement by filing no administrative

grievance or by intentionally filing an untimely one, thereby foreclosing administrative

remedies and gaining access to a federal forum without exhausting administrative

remedies."); Berry v. Keirk, 366 F.3d 85, 88 (2 Cir. 2004) (footnotes omitted) (Inmate's nd

"federal lawsuits ... properly dismissed with prejudice" where previously available

administrative remedies had become unavailable and no special circumstancesjustified the

failure to exhaust.).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 21) be GRANTED to the

extent Defendants seek dismissal of this case due to Plaintiff's failure to properly exhaust

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an administrative remedy previously available to him at the Covington County Jail; and

2. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice in accordance with the provisions of

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust an administrative remedy available

to him during his confinement in the Covington County Jail.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before July 26, 2012 the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or

general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that

this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

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Done, this 12 day of July 2012.

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/s/Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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