Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00337/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00337-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISMAEL MACHADO SEPULVEDA,

Petitioner,

v.

P. COVELLO, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 19-cv-00337-CAB (JLB)

ORDER DENYING PETITION AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

On February 15, 2019, Petitioner Ismael Machado Sepulveda (“Petitioner”), a 

California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the constitutionality of his state court convictions. 

(ECF No. 1.) Subsequently, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition. (ECF No. 13

(“FAP”).) On May 30, 2019, Respondent P. Covello (“Respondent”) filed the Answer and 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer as well as lodgments of 

the state court record. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.) On July 1, 2019, Petitioner filed a Traverse. 

(ECF No. 11.) In granting Petitioner’s motion to amend the petition, the Court deemed the 

Answer and Traverse responsive to the First Amended Petition. (ECF No. 12.) For the 

reasons set forth below, the First Amended Petition is DENIED and the Court DECLINES

to issue a certificate of appealability.

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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 20, 2017, a jury found Petitioner guilty of lewd acts against B.Z., a child 

under the age of 14 (counts 1-6), and against P.M., also a child under the age of 14 (counts 

7-9), in violation of California Penal Code § 288(a). (See ECF Nos. 10-1 at 2; 10-8 at 54-

64, 106-08.) The jury also found true the multiple victim allegation on each count and the 

“substantial sexual conduct” allegation on count 9. (Id.) Lastly, the jury found that 

Petitioner’s prosecution on counts 7-9 was timely commenced under former California 

Penal Code § 801.1(a). (Id.) On March 6, 2017, the court sentenced Petitioner to 15 years 

to life. (Id.)

Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal. (ECF No. 10-2.) 

On appeal, Petitioner argued, among other things, that the jurors were instructed incorrectly 

on the burden of proof for counts 7-9. (Id. at 43-70.) Specifically, Petitioner argued that 

the jury should have been instructed that the People’s burden of proof on whether the 

counts fell within the statute of limitations was proof beyond a reasonable doubt and not 

preponderance of the evidence. (Id.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s 

judgment of conviction in an unpublished written opinion. (ECF No. 10-1.) The Court of 

Appeal rejected Petitioner’s contention that commencement of a criminal prosecution 

within an applicable statute of limitations must be proved under the beyond a reasonable 

doubt standard. (Id. at 16-20.) The Court of Appeal also found that there was “substantial 

evidence in the record to support the jury’s findings that the prosecution of counts 7, 8, and 

9 was timely commenced” under former California Penal Code § 801.1(a). (Id. at 15.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review on this issue with the California Supreme Court. (ECF 

No. 10-3.) On June 13, 2018, the California Supreme Court denied review without 

comment. (ECF No. 10-4.)

On February 15, 2019, Petitioner filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the constitutionality of his state court convictions. 

(ECF No. 1.) Subsequently, Petitioner filed a substantially similar First Amended Petition. 

(ECF No. 13.) Petitioner seeks relief from his convictions on the grounds that (1) the 

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burden of showing that facially time-barred charges were committed within the statute of 

limitations is beyond a reasonable doubt and not a preponderance of the evidence, and (2) 

the jury instructions to the contrary violated the Due Process Clause. (Id.) The petition is 

timely and properly exhausted. (See ECF Nos. 1; 13 at 2-5; 10-1; 10-4.)

On May 30, 2019, Respondent filed an Answer and Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support of the Answer as well as lodgments of the state court record. (ECF 

Nos. 9, 10.) Respondent contends that the California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably 

apply Supreme Court precedent in rejecting Petitioner’s claims. (See ECF No. 9.) On July 

1, 2019, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 11.)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts that follow are taken substantially from the California Court of Appeal 

opinion, an unpublished written decision affirming the judgment against Petitioner.1 (ECF 

No. 10-1.) A presumption of correctness attaches to state court determinations of factual 

issues on federal habeas review.2 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

P.M. testified that she was born on August 22, 1994; that 

her father, defendant herein, and mother divorced when she was 

very young; and that after her parents’ divorce, she and her older 

twin brothers had visitations with defendant, particularly on 

weekends. P.M. testified that during some visits they would 

travel to Tijuana to visit defendant’s family, where they often 

would stay overnight. P.M.’s last visit or contact with defendant 

took place in about late August 2002 when she was eight years 

old, about a week after she disclosed his “[s]exual molestations”

of her.

P.M. testified that defendant molested her on “[m]ore than 

one occasion”; that these molestations took place both in 

 

1 As in the California Court of Appeal opinion, the factual overview included 

herein is limited to victim P.M., as Petitioner does not challenge his convictions with 

respect to B.Z. (ECF No. 10-1 at 2 n.2.)

2 Petitioner does not challenge the factual findings of the California Court of 

Appeal. (See FAP.)

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Tijuana3and in Chula Vista, where she lived; and that her first 

recollection of defendant molesting her was when they were at 

her grandparents’ house in Tijuana on what she believed was 

New Year’s Day because she recalled her brothers were setting 

off fireworks.

On that occasion, P.M. recalled that, while her brothers 

were outside, defendant took her into her grandparents’ room, 

closed the door, and laid her on the bed. P.M. was fully clothed, 

as was defendant. According to P.M., defendant then laid on top 

of P.M., grabbed her arms, and held them near her head so she 

could not move them. Defendant next began rubbing his “his 

private part over [her] private part,” which she identified as his 

“penis” on her “vagina,” using his knees to exert pressure as he 

rubbed against her. When defendant finished, he told P.M. not 

to “say anything” including to her mother, as it was their 

“secret.”

P.M. testified about an incident of sexual misconduct by 

defendant that took place in Chula Vista about a week before her 

disclosure. P.M. recalled it was a school day when defendant 

came to visit them at her mother’s condominium. One of P.M.’s 

brothers called her to come outside and see defendant, who was 

sitting in the driver’s seat of his parked car. Defendant next 

placed P.M. on his lap, with her legs “sitting across his legs.” As 

she was “facing her brother,” defendant began kissing P.M.’s ear 

and mouth, including putting his tongue inside both.

P.M. testified that she felt uncomfortable as defendant was 

kissing her ear and mouth; that she wanted her brother to see 

what their father was doing to her; that her brother instead was 

looking down at some “paper” while the kissing incident was 

taking place; and that her brother refused to look up and watch, 

and was instead “laughing.” P.M. was eight years old when this 

incident occurred.

P.M. recalled another incident of sexual misconduct by 

defendant that took place inside her mother’s condominium. 

During this incident, her brothers, but not her mother, were 

 

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(footnote in original) The jury was specifically instructed that defendant was not 

being charged with any incidents of sexual misconduct that took place in Tijuana, Mexico.

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home. While her brothers were busy playing video games, 

defendant, who was seated on a couch, picked up P.M. and 

placed her on his lap, facing him. P.M. testified her legs were 

around defendant’s hips. Defendant next “put a hold on [her] 

from [her] hips and . . . picked [her] up to his chest, or his 

stomach,” and then dropped her so that her vagina was touching

“his private part.” Although defendant repeated this motion 

several times, according to P.M. her brothers did not see this 

activity because they were facing the other way. P.M. could not 

recall exactly when this incident occurred but knew it was before 

she turned eight years old.

P.M. described another incident that took place at her 

uncle’s house in Tijuana. During this incident, defendant put his 

hand inside P.M.’s pants, under her underwear, and rubbed her 

vagina. P.M. could not recall when this incident took place, only 

that it was before she turned eight years old.

P.M. described these incidents as being the “most clear”

in her mind. She testified the sexual misconduct by defendant 

was more or less “ongoing,” but that her “mind ha[d] erased a lot 

of it.” She further testified that she waited to disclose the sexual 

misconduct by defendant because she was “scared” of him, did 

not want him to be “mad” at her, and knew her mother would be 

upset.

However, in early September 2002, P.M. told an older 

cousin, Angela, about defendant’s sexual misconduct. P.M. 

testified that Angela was pregnant and had recently moved into 

their family home for support; and that she looked up to Angela, 

much like an older sister. Because Angela was pregnant, P.M. 

testified that one night she asked Angela whether she (i.e., P.M.) 

could also become pregnant based on what defendant was “doing 

to [her].” On questioning by Angela, P.M. then reluctantly 

disclosed the sexual misconduct by defendant.

Although P.M. asked Angela not to tell P.M.’s mother 

about what defendant had done, Angela did in fact tell P.M.’s 

mother. The following day, P.M. returned home from school and 

found several police officers at her home. Crying, P.M.’s mother 

next took P.M. upstairs and asked P.M. what had happened. P.M. 

testified she then felt “ashamed” for not telling her mother about 

the sexual misconduct by defendant. P.M. recalled meeting with 

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police officers and then going to the hospital to speak with a lady 

about what had happened. P.M. also recalled speaking to another 

lady from Child Protective Services (CPS) about defendant’s 

sexual misconduct.

P.M. testified that detectives contacted her in 2014 and 

disclosed they were reinvestigating her 2002 case. This made 

P.M. “sad,” as she and her mother had just moved to Spain, after 

P.M.’s depression and anxiety had worsened and P.M.’s doctor 

had expressed concerns about P.M.’s well-being.

Angela testified that in 2002, she lived with P.M.’s family 

for about six months; that at the time, she was about 18 years old 

and pregnant; and that she and P.M. were then close, as she 

would babysit P.M. when her aunt, P.M.’s mother, worked. 

Angela recalled in August/September 2002 P.M. was in her room 

shortly before bedtime. P.M. asked Angela, “Since you’re 

pregnant, do you think I might be pregnant?” When Angela

asked P.M., “Why would you ask that?” P.M. responded, “Well, 

this stuff that is happening to me. I don’t know. That might lead 

to a pregnancy.”

On further questioning, P.M. expressed concern about

telling Angela “all [of] this” because P.M. was worried her 

mother might not believe her or even “blame” her for what

defendant had been doing. P.M. then disclosed that “every time 

she went to visit with her father she felt very uncomfortable . . . 

because he would do stuff to her that she – she pretty much felt 

uncomfortable.” According to Angela, P.M. then asked if 

Angela’s father had kissed Angela on the “on the lips . . . and 

ears” with his tongue and had “ever touch[ed Angela].” When 

Angela asked where P.M.’s father had touched her, P.M., who

was crying, pointed at her vagina and said her father would “put 

his hand under her underwear.” Angela told P.M. that this 

touching was “not normal” and that they needed to tell P.M.’s 

mother because this was “very, very serious.”

During this same conversation, P.M. also disclosed that 

when she and her brothers visited their father he would touch her 

“every time,” including laying on top of her and moving his body 

in a way to “feel” her body, after her two brothers went outside 

to play. P.M. further disclosed to Angela that defendant used his 

tongue when he kissed P.M.; that he would watch P.M. dress and 

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also touch her body while she was doing so; and that once he 

even got into the shower with her. P.M. confided that defendant 

had told her not to say “anything because what he was doing to 

[P.M.] was pretty bad.”

Angela testified that as P.M. was disclosing the sexual 

misconduct, P.M. appeared angry and afraid. Angela in turn was 

“very, very . . . upset” and “confused” by P.M.’s disclosure. 

Angela testified that, during the time she lived with the family 

leading up to P.M.’s disclosure, Angela had “felt like something 

was going on” with P.M. and her father because “every time 

[P.M.] had to go to visit” defendant, P.M. would ask Angela,

“Can you keep me? Can you baby-sit me? Can you tell Mom to 

keep me here? Because I want to stay with you.”

Angela testified she told P.M.’s mother about the sexual 

misconduct by defendant the same night P.M. made this 

disclosure. Angela stated that P.M.’s mother, Alejandra C., was 

“very angry” at defendant and attempted to talk to P.M. that same 

night. P.M., however, did not want to talk to her mother about it 

and was, according to Angela, very afraid.

Alejandra testified that she was married to defendant for 

about seven years until they divorced in 1995, when P.M. was 

about a year old. When Alejandra became pregnant with twins, 

her sister Norma D. and their mother came to San Diego to help

Alejandra. Alejandra estimated Norma lived in their home for 

about two years, until one day Norma just left.

When her twins were about two years old, Alejandra asked 

Norma why she left their home and whether anything “had been 

going on while she was living there.” Norma disclosed that 

defendant was “sexually abusing her” and that she was “very 

ashamed.” Norma told Alejandra that after defendant would 

drop off Alejandra at work, he would come home and go into 

Norma’s bedroom. Because Norma described this happening

“several times,” Norma made sure the lock on the door was 

working and even slept with a knife under her pillow.

Alejandra testified that, after Norma’s disclosure, she 

confronted her husband, who “swore . . . nothing had happened.”

Alejandra at the time chose to believe her husband and not 

Norma.

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After Alejandra and defendant separated, they agreed to a 

more formalized visitation schedule. As P.M. became a little 

older, somewhere between about six and eight years old, 

Alejandra noted that P.M. sometimes did not want to go on visits 

with defendant. In May 2002, a few months before P.M. 

disclosed the sexual misconduct by defendant, P.M. came home 

from a weekend visit with defendant and complained about

having an “irritated vagina.” Because P.M. in the past had made 

similar complaints about her vagina hurting, Alejandra took P.M. 

to the doctor, who suggested the irritation might be caused by 

P.M. rubbing herself too hard while bathing or by the soap P.M. 

was using.

Alejandra recalled when her niece, Angela, disclosed what 

P.M. had told Angela. Alejandra notified P.M.’s school and the 

police on both sides of the border. Alejandra testified that she 

attempted to speak with her daughter P.M. about the sexual 

misconduct, but that P.M. never wanted to open up to her. At 

some point after CPS became involved, Alejandra was informed 

no charges then would be filed against defendant. Defendant’s

visitation with his children, including P.M., was supervised. 

Even then, P.M. did not want to visit with him.

Norma testified that Alejandra is her older sister; that 

when she was about 14 years old, she came to the United States 

to help because Alejandra was having twins; and that she initially 

viewed defendant like a brother. After their birth, Norma was 

the twins’ “nanny” when Alejandra worked.

As time went on, defendant began treating Norma like she 

was his “girlfriend.” Norma testified that “[e]very day”

defendant would tell her she was “pretty” and “attractive”; that 

he would make facial gestures toward her including “bit[ing] his 

lips” and “wink[ing]” at her; and that, as a result, Norma felt 

uncomfortable around defendant. Norma testified that on one 

occasion defendant kissed her on the lips while she was sleeping 

on the couch. On another occasion while she was sleeping, 

Norma awakened only to find defendant next to her, fondling her 

breasts over a blanket. On this occasion, Norma got out of bed 

and went to the kitchen. According to Norma, defendant

followed her into the kitchen and asked, “So, what’s wrong with 

that?” and then stated, “There’s nothing wrong with that.”

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Because she felt harassed and scared of defendant, Norma 

began sleeping in the twins’ room. At one point, Norma noticed 

the “button to the lock” on the twins’ door was missing, which 

caused her to become even more afraid. As a result, Norma 

began to hide a knife under pillow. She testified she hid the knife 

in case defendant tried to “force[] himself upon” her.

Norma was questioned by a CPS worker in October 2002. 

During that interview, Norma disclosed that defendant, while in 

his underwear, grabbed his penis, moved it side to side, and 

“lick[ed] his lips” while looking at Norma. Shortly after 

defendant touched her breasts, Norma moved out. Norma then 

did not disclose to her sister Alejandra why she had moved out.

At some later point, Norma told Alejandra about defendant’s 

sexual misconduct toward her. Alejandra did not believe Norma, 

however.

Norma recalled when she learned P.M. had disclosed that 

defendant had engaged in sexual misconduct toward P.M. Norma 

testified that she and P.M. have never spoken to each other about 

what defendant did to them.

Both of P.M.’s brothers testified at the trial. Her one 

brother, Ivan M., testified that he was about 12 years old when 

P.M. made the disclosure about being molested by defendant; 

and that, although at trial he could not recall making any 

statements to CPS during its initial investigation, in late April 

2003 he told a social worker he had a “bad feeling” about, and 

suspected something was happening between, P.M. and their 

father, but that he then did not speak up because he did not know 

what that was.

Sergeant Matthew Botkin of the San Diego Police 

Department testified that in August 2013 he was assigned a 

sexual molest case involving victim B.Z.; that during B.Z.’s 

forensic interview, B.Z. disclosed that, while defendant was 

molesting her, he admitted “he had done the same thing to his 

daughter”; that on further investigation, Sergeant Botkin learned 

defendant had been arrested in 2002 but not charged for

molesting M.P.; and that Sergeant Botkin thus decided to 

investigate simultaneously the cases involving B.Z. and M.P.

In connection with his investigation of M.P.’s case, 

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Sergeant Botkin initiated contact with, and interviewed, M.P.’s 

brothers, M.P., Alejandra, and Angela among others. Sergeant 

Botkin noted that even after more than a decade, it was “clearly 

a very difficult topic for [P.M.] to speak about” what defendant 

had done to her. According to Sergeant Botkin, neither of 

defendant’s victims (i.e., B.Z. and M.P.) nor their families knew 

about the other when Sergeant Botkin began his simultaneous 

investigation into the molests.

Defendant testified in his own defense. Defendant 

testified that he was affectionate toward his daughter, would 

“hug” and “squeeze” her; would “give her kisses”; and would 

“tickle” her and “raise her up” while playing. When asked about 

the kissing, defendant stated he would give P.M. a “loud kiss”

“on her little mouth.” Defendant, however, denied using his 

tongue when kissing P.M., stating that “[n]ever” happened. He 

admitted to kissing P.M.’s ears occasionally, and noted he also 

kissed his two sons “in the same way” he kissed P.M.

When asked if he ever kissed P.M. with “any type of 

sexual intent,” defendant testified, “Never.” Defendant 

described how P.M. would “laugh” when he tickled her by

“rub[bing his] beard on her neck” and when he “rub[bed]” and 

“bl[e]w bubbles” on her “tummy” during playtime. When again 

asked if he tickled P.M. with any type of sexual intent, defendant 

testified, “Never.” Defendant provided the same testimony when 

asked about his “kiss[ing]” and “nibbl[ing]” of P.M.’s ears and 

when asked if he had ever used his tongue when kissing P.M.’s 

ears.

With regard to P.M.’s testimony that defendant molested 

her while she was sitting on his lap, defendant testified that he 

often sat P.M. on his lap and hugged her; that sometimes he 

would sit P.M. on his legs so she was facing him; and that he 

recalled P.M. sitting on his lap when they were on the couch 

during visits and when he was behind the driving wheel of his 

car, when the children would come outside and see him.

As before, defendant testified he never sat P.M. on his lap 

with the intention of becoming “arouse[d],” nor did he ever move 

P.M. in “any way in which her vagina would rub on any part of 

[his own] body,” including his penis. Defendant reiterated he

“[n]ever” had any sexual intent when he engaged in playtime 

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with P.M., including when he would “bounc[e] her up and down”

or throw her into the air and catch her. Other than when he 

“clean[ed],” “bathe[d],” and “change[d]” P.M. when she was 

very young, defendant denied any touching of P.M.’s vagina, 

including both under and outside her clothing. Defendant also 

denied sexually molesting anyone else, including his two sons;

B.Z.; and Norma, whom defendant described as “[f]lirtatious.” 

Specifically, with regard to Norma’s testimony that he felt 

her breasts over the blanket while she was “sleeping” in the 

twins’ room, defendant testified, “That never happened.” He 

admitted on direct examination that one morning when he went 

to kiss the twins before leaving for work, he saw Norma sleeping 

in the bed in the twins’ room and had been “tempt[ed]” to “raise[] 

the blanket” and “see her,” but that he had not in fact done so and 

instead only pulled the blanket on top of Norma as it was starting 

to fall to the floor.

(ECF No. 10-1 at 2-12.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for 

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

[sic] behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation 

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Additionally, Petitioner’s habeas claims are subject to the provisions of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 

U.S. 320, 326 (1997) (Federal courts reviewing any petition filed in federal court after the 

April 24, 1996 enactment of “AEDPA,” will apply its provisions). Under AEDPA, the 

standard of review for Petitioner’s habeas claims, is as follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

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merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Clearly established Federal law,” as understood in the context of § 2254(d)(1), 

consists of holdings of Supreme Court decisions. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 365 

(2000) (stating that the phrase “clearly established Federal law,” as determined by the 

United States Supreme Court, refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the 

Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision”). In order 

to grant habeas corpus relief, a federal habeas court must rule out whether it is possible that 

“fair-minded jurists” could disagree that the decision is inconsistent with clearly 

established federal law. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). To satisfy 

§ 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state 

court’s adjudication of his claims rest, assuming it rests upon a determination of the facts, 

are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

Where, as here, there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court on appeal, 

the federal habeas court “looks through” to the underlying appellate decision to determine 

whether AEDPA’s standard for habeas relief is met. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

801-06 (1991); see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99-100 (holding that an unexplained denial 

of a claim by the California Supreme Court is an adjudication on the merits of the claim 

and is entitled to deference unless “there is reason to think some other explanation for the 

state court’s decision is likely”). Therefore, the appellate decision before this Court is the 

California Court of Appeal’s March 23, 2018, written decision affirming Petitioner’s 

conviction. (ECF No. 10-1.)

/ / / / / 

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IV. DISCUSSION

As set forth above, Petitioner seeks relief from his convictions on the grounds that 

(1) the burden of showing that facially time-barred charges were committed within the 

statute of limitations is beyond a reasonable doubt and not a preponderance of the evidence, 

and (2) the jury instructions to the contrary violated the Due Process Clause. (See ECF 

No. 13.) “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 

he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Petitioner contends that “the 

facts that revive a time-barred action or exempt it from the normal statute of limitations are 

directly linked to criminal culpability because otherwise there would be no prosecution.”

(FAP at 14.) Therefore, the civil burden of preponderance of the evidence is inapplicable. 

(Id.)

In addition, Petitioner contends “that the rationale of [People v. McGill, 10 Cal. App. 

2d 155, 157 (1935)] and the cases following it are incorrect and that jury instructions that 

apply that standard violate the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution.” (Id.) Petitioner contends that the trial court’s instruction that proof 

of timely commencement need be only by a preponderance of the evidence violates the 

Due Process Clause. (Id. at 28.) Therefore, Petitioner claims that “reversal should be 

granted to correct this Federal Constitutional error.” (Id. at 7.)

A. Background

With respect to the statute of limitations issue raised by Petitioner, the California 

Court of Appeal provided the following additional background: 

The record shows the information alleged counts 7, 8, and 

9 involving P.M. occurred between August 22, 2000 and 

September 6, 2002, when P.M. was between six and eight years 

old. The record further shows the prosecution of defendant on 

these counts commenced in October 2014 with the filing of a 

felony complaint. 

Although the parties discussed the jury instructions 

including any proposed changes to them, the record shows the 

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defense did not object to the court giving a modified version of 

CALCRIM No. 3250, titled “Statute of Limitations, Minor 

Victim, Filed before 28th Birthday,” after the court referenced it 

along with the other instructions and asked the parties if they had 

any questions with respect to the instructions.

CALCRIM No. 3250,4as modified by the court, provided:

“The People have the burden of proving the 

defendant is guilty of the charged offenses beyond a 

reasonable doubt. If you find the defendant guilty of Lewd 

Act upon a Child, as charged in Counts 7 through 9, you 

must then decide whether, as to each crime, the People 

have proved the following factual allegation by a 

preponderance of the evidence: [¶] 1) The victim was 

under 18 when the crime occurred; and [¶] 2) This action 

commenced before the victim’s 28th birthday. 

“Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a 

different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that 

the fact is true. 

“If the People have not met the burden of proving 

this allegation by a preponderance of the evidence, you 

must find that the allegation has not been proved. 

“You must return a separate finding on the factual 

allegations required for each crime charged in Counts 7, 8, 

and 9.”

. . . 

[T]he prosecution proceeded on the theory that former 

section 801.1 governed the statute of limitations with respect to 

P.M. and counts 7, 8, and 9. Former section 801.1 was enacted 

 

4

(footnote in original) CALCRIM No. 3250 is a “template” instruction that is used 

when “any enhancements, sentencing factors, or factual issues” are submitted to the jury 

that are not otherwise covered in previous instructions.

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in 2004, effective January 1, 2005.5 (Stats. 2004, ch. 368 (A.B. 

1667), § 1.) When originally enacted, this statute provided, 

“Notwithstanding any other limitation of time described in this 

chapter, prosecution for a felony offense described in 

subparagraph (A) of paragraph 2 of subdivision (a) of Section 

290 shall be commenced within 10 years after commission of the 

offense.”

Section 801.1 was amended a year later (Stats. 2005, ch. 

479 (S.B. 111), § 2) to add subdivision (a), which is the provision 

relied on by the parties and the trial court in the instant case.6It 

provides in relevant part, “Notwithstanding any other limitation 

of time described in this chapter, prosecution for a felony offense 

described in Section . . . 288 . . ., that is alleged to have been 

committed when the victim was under the age of 18 years, may 

be commenced any time prior to the victim’s 28th birthday.”

 

5

(footnote in original) When former section 801.1 became effective in 2005, 

defendant already was subject to a six-year statute of limitations for the crimes he 

committed against P.M. between August 2000 and September 2002. (See former § 800 

[providing in part that a “prosecution for an offense punishable by imprisonment in the 

state prison for eight years or more shall be commenced within six years after commission 

of the offense” (italics added)]; & former § 288, subd. (a) [providing in part that a “person 

who willfully and lewdly commits any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or 

any part or member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14 years” with the requisite 

intent “is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 

three, six, or eight years” (italics added)].) Because the applicable statute of limitations 

had not yet run against defendant when section 801.1 became effective in 2005, there is no 

ex post facto clause violation in this case, as defendant correctly recognizes. (See Stogner 

v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607, 617–621, 632-633 (Stogner) [noting the ex post facto 

clause prohibits the revival of a time-barred prosecution, but not the extension of a 

limitations period before the prior limitations period has expired].)

6

(footnote in original) Section 801.1 was further amended in October 2007 (stats. 

2007, ch. 579 (S.B. 172), § 40, eff. Oct. 13, 2007), but that amendment did not change 

subdivision (a) of former section 801.1. Effective January 1, 2017, current section 801.1, 

subdivision (a) provides the prosecution for a felony offense, including under section 288, 

which is alleged to have been committed when the victim was under 18 years of age “may 

be commenced any time prior to the victim’s 40th birthday.” (Stats. 2016, ch. 777 

(S.B.813), § 2, italics added.)

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(ECF No. 10-1 at 13-15.)

B. Analysis

1. Applicable Statute of Limitations

On October 24, 2014, a complaint was filed against Petitioner charging him with 

nine violations of California Penal Code § 288(a) and an arrest warrant was issued. (ECF 

No. 10-7 at -14, 20-28.) These actions fixed the date of commencement of the prosecution 

as well as the ending date of the statute of limitations. See Cal. Penal Code § 804; see also 

People v. Smith, 98 Cal. App. 4th 1182, 1186 (2002). On April 3, 2015, an information 

was filed against Petitioner charging him with the same nine violations of California Penal 

Code § 288(a). (ECF No. 10-7 at 15-19.) The information specifically charged Petitioner 

with three violations against P.M., stating in part: “On or about and between August 22, 

2000 and September 6, 2002, [Petitioner] did willfully and lewdly commit a lewd and 

lascivious act upon and with the body and any part and member thereof of [P.M.], a child 

under the age of fourteen years . . . .” (Id. at 18.)

At the time Petitioner was charged, the following statute of limitations was in effect

for Penal Code § 288(a):

§ 801.1(a): Notwithstanding any other limitation of time described in this 

chapter, prosecution for a felony offense described in Section . . . 288 . . . ,

that is alleged to have been committed when the victim was under the age of 

18 years, may be commenced any time prior to the victim’s 28th birthday.

Cal. Penal Code § 801.1(a) (2007). 

Petitioner does not dispute the applicability of this statute of limitations. (See ECF 

No. 13 at 15-16.) Petitioner also does not dispute the Court of Appeal’s finding that P.M. 

was under the age of 18 years old at the time the violations were committed, and that the 

prosecution was commenced prior to P.M.’s 28th birthday. In this regard, the Court of 

Appeal stated:

Here, we conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the 

jury’s findings that the prosecution of counts 7, 8, and 9 was timely 

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commenced under subdivision (a) of former section 801.1. (See People v. 

Ruiloba (2005) 131 Cal. App. 4th 674, 681–682 [noting that when an issue 

involving a statute of limitations has been tried, as was the case here, an 

appellate court reviews the record to determine whether substantial evidence 

supports the findings of the trier of fact]; People v. Padfield (1982) 136 Cal. 

App. 3d 218, 225-226 (Padfield) [noting that, when “it cannot be said that as 

a matter of law the statutory period has run, the issue is a question of fact for 

the trier of fact” and that on appeal, “the issue is tested by the substantial 

evidence standard”].)

Indeed, the record shows the offenses involving P.M. were alleged to have 

been committed between August 2000 and September 2002, when she was 

between six and eight years old. Moreover, as noted the prosecution was 

“commenced” for purposes of subdivision (a) of former section 801.1 in 

October 2014, when the felony complaint was filed, clearly well before P.M.’s 

28th birthday. As such, we conclude the prosecution of counts 7, 8, and 9 was 

commenced within the applicable statute of limitations. (See former § 801.1, 

subd. (a).) 

(ECF No. 10-1 at 15-16.)

Petitioner suggests that the charges were “facially time-barred.” (See ECF No. 13 

at 15.) However, the charging document alleges that the violations were committed when 

P.M. was under 14 years old, and if P.M. was under 14 years old in September 2002, she 

would be under 28 years old at the time the prosecution was commenced in October 2014. 

Therefore, there is nothing to suggest that the charges were time-barred on their face.

Petitioner also concedes in his FAP that “the amendment to section 801.1 did not, in 

this case ‘revive a previously time-barred prosecution.’” (ECF No. 13 at 16.) Therefore, 

as the Court of Appeal held, Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), does not apply:

Stogner merely involved the issue of whether a statute of limitations for 

a criminal prosecution that had expired could be revived by statute without 

violating the ex post facto clause. As noted (see fn. 5, ante), this is not an 

issue in the instant case because former section 801.1, subdivision (a) merely 

extended the unexpired statute of limitations for the criminal prosecution of 

defendant on counts 7, 8, and 9. (See Stogner, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 618 

[noting that “courts have upheld extensions of unexpired statutes of 

limitations (extensions that our holding today does not affect [citation])”].) 

Stogner is thus inapposite in the instant case.

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(ECF No. 10-1 at 19.)

2. California Law

Petitioner contends that the rationale of McGill and the cases following it “are 

incorrect and that jury instructions that apply that standard violate the Fifth, Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” (FAP at 14.) In McGill, a 

California court of appeal addressed a provision of the California Penal Code which 

provided that:

An indictment for any other felony than murder, the embezzlement of public 

money, or the falsification of public records, must be found, or an information 

filed, within three years after its commission.

McGill, 10 Cal. App. 2d at 156.

The provision further provided the following:

If, when the offense is committed, the defendant is out of the state, the 

indictment may be found or an information filed within the term herein limited 

after his coming within the state, and no time during which the defendant is 

not an inhabitant of, or usually resident within this state, is part of the 

limitation.

Id. at 156-57.

On appeal, the appellant contended “that ‘the burden of proof was upon the state to 

prove that the defendant was absent from the state. The People failed to establish this 

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty.’” Id. at 159. The 

court rejected this contention, concluding:

In that connection it would appear to be the rule that, in circumstances such 

as are here presented, the duty devolves upon the People both to allege and to 

prove the fact of defendant’s absence from the state for a period of time 

sufficient to prevent the full operation of the bar to the prosecution of the 

action. (State v. Bilboa, 38 Idaho, 92 [213 Pac. 1025, 222 Pac. 785]; State v. 

Steensland, 33 Idaho, 529 [195 Pac. 1080, 13 A. L. R. 1442]; People v. Miller, 

12 Cal. 291; and see generally monographic note, 13 A. L. R. 1449; 16 Cor. 

Jur. 530; 37 Cor. Jur. 1243 et seq.; 4 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 3586.) But it 

is to be noted that none of such authorities goes to the length of declaring that 

the burden of proof requires that the absence of defendant from the state must 

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be established beyond a reasonable doubt. As a general rule, as far as this 

state is concerned, the doctrine of reasonable doubt extends to evidence by 

which “every material issue” of the corpus delicti is sought to be proved. (8 

Cal. Jur. 182.) However, it should be clear that the facts which prove the 

existence of the corpus delicti are entirely distinct and separate from those by 

which the liability of the defendant to be prosecuted for the commission of the 

crime are sought to be established; and that, although the right to maintain the 

action is an essential element in the final power to pronounce judgment, that 

element constitutes no part of the crime itself.

Id. 

The California Court of Appeal in this action cited at least one case that cited 

McGill—People v. Zamora, 18 Cal. 3d 538, 566 (1976)—in concluding that “while the 

elements of former section 801.1, subdivision (a) were necessary to convict [Petitioner] on 

counts 7, 8, and 9 . . . , they did not need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt because 

they did not bear upon [Petitioner’s] guilt vis-à-vis his innocence, such that there was the 

risk of an innocent [person] . . . being condemned.” ECF No. 10-1 at 19 (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the Court of Appeal in this action held as 

follows: 

Initially, we note that none of the facts relevant to the statute of 

limitations, including its extension thereof, was a “fact necessary to constitute 

the crime with which [defendant was] charged.” (See In re Winship (1970) 

397 U.S. 358, 364 (Winship) [noting the United States Constitution “protects 

the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 

of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he [or she] is 

charged”]; see also United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, 230 [same]; 

& People v. Linder (2006) 139 Cal. App. 4th 75, 84 (Linder) [noting that, 

“[a]lthough the right to maintain the action is an essential part of the final 

power to pronounce judgment, that right ‘constitutes no part of the crime 

itself’ [citation]”].) Nor were any facts relevant to the statute of limitations 

used to establish or increase punishment. (See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey

(2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [noting that every finding that increases the 

punishment possible for an offense must be submitted to the jury and proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt].) 

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Moreover, although the prosecution has the burden of proof of “‘every 

ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt’” (Sandstrom v. Montana

(1979) 442 U.S. 510, 524; Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 364), the statute of 

limitations is not an ingredient of an offense but a substantive matter for which 

the prosecution’s burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. (See 

People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal. 3d 538, 566, fn. 27 (Zamora) [noting that 

for the statute of limitations, the “proper burden is a preponderance of the 

evidence and thus when a limitation issue goes to the jury the preferable 

practice should be to carefully instruct the jury as to that burden making it 

clear the lesser burden applies solely to the limitation issue”]; People v. 

Mahoney (2013) 220 Cal. App. 4th 781, 790 [noting the People had the burden 

to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence” that the defendant possessed 

child pornography within the 10-year statute of limitations applicable to a 

violation of section 311.11, subdivision (a)]; People v. Castillo (2008) 168 

Cal. App. 4th 364, 369 [noting that the People have the burden of proving the 

criminal action was commenced within the applicable limitations period and 

that this “burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence”]; People v. 

Smith (2002) 98 Cal. App. 4th 1182, 1187 [noting that because a statute of 

limitations is not an element of the offense, the “prosecutor need only 

demonstrate that the crime occurred within the applicable statute of 

limitations by a preponderance of the evidence”]; People v. Le (2000) 82 Cal.

App. 4th 1352, 1360 [noting the statute of limitations is a “matter which the 

prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence”], citing Cowan 

v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 367, 374; and Padfield, supra, 136 

Cal.App.3d at p. 226 [noting the “People bear the burden of proof on the 

statute of limitations issue and that burden is one of preponderance of the 

evidence”].)

Thus, California law overwhelming rejects defendant’s contention that 

a statute of limitations is an element of an offense and as such, that the burden 

of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt and not preponderance of the evidence. 

Despite this overwhelming legal authority, defendant contends the Supreme 

Court decision in Stogner, supra, 539 U.S. 607—which predates much of it—

requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution was 

commenced within the applicable statute of limitations. We disagree. 

In Stogner, the court held that a newly enacted statute of limitations for 

child molestation (§ 803, subd. (g)) could not be used to revive a time-barred 

prosecution without violating ex post facto principles. (Stogner, supra, 539 

U.S. at pp. 618–619.) In so doing, the Stogner court disapproved of our high 

court’s decision in People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737, 763 (Frazer), 

which had concluded that “it makes no difference for ex post facto purposes 

whether a postcrime change in the statute of limitations ‘revive[s] a 

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prosecution already dead’ or ‘give[s] it a longer lease of life.’” In disagreeing

with this aspect of Frazer, the Court in Stogner ruled the “resurrection of 

otherwise timebarred criminal prosecutions . . . enacted after pre-existing 

limitations periods ha[ve] expired” violates the ex post facto clause. (Stogner, 

at p. 609.) 

Stogner merely involved the issue of whether a statute of limitations for 

a criminal prosecution that had expired could be revived by statute without 

violating the ex post facto clause. As noted (see fn. 5, ante), this is not an 

issue in the instant case because former section 801.1, subdivision (a) merely 

extended the unexpired statute of limitations for the criminal prosecution of 

defendant on counts 7, 8, and 9. (See Stogner, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 618 

[noting that “courts have upheld extensions of unexpired statutes of

limitations (extensions that our holding today does not affect [citation])”].) 

Stogner is thus inapposite in the instant case.

We conclude that, while the elements of former section 801.1, 

subdivision (a) were necessary to convict defendant on counts 7, 8, and 9 (see 

Linder, supra, 139 Cal. App. 4th at p. 84), they did not need to be proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt “because they did not bear upon [defendant’s] guilt 

vis-à-vis his innocence, such that there was the risk of an ‘innocent [person] . 

. . being condemned.’” (See Renderos v. Ryan (2006) 469 F.3d 788, 796-797 

[rejecting argument that jury should have been required to find beyond a 

reasonable doubt the elements to trigger an extension of the applicable statute

of limitations and noting petitioner failed to “identify any Supreme Court 

precedent clearly establishing that statutes of limitations must be proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt”], citing Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 364.) We 

thus reject defendant’s contention that commencement of a criminal 

prosecution within an applicable statute of limitations must be proved under 

the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. [footnote omitted]

(ECF No. 10-1 at 16-19.)

To the extent Petitioner asks this Court to review California law, the Court cannot 

do so. “[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). [I]t 

is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on 

state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding 

whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id.

at 67-68 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975) (per curiam)). 

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Accordingly, the Court turns to Petitioner’s argument that the prosecution’s failure to prove 

the statute of limitations beyond a reasonable doubt violated clearly established federal 

law.

3. Clearly Established Federal Law

“The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 

358, 361 (1970) (emphasis added). As explained by the Supreme Court in In re Winship:

The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of 

criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of 

convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance 

for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock axiomatic and elementary 

principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of 

our criminal law.

. . .

The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our 

criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal 

prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the 

possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the 

certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a 

society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not 

condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt 

about his guilt. 

Id. at 363-64 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court

held “that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 

he is charged.” Id. at 364.

Petitioner contends that In re Winship requires the People to plead and prove the 

statute of limitations beyond a reasonable doubt. (See ECF No. 13 at 14.) As set forth 

above, the California Court of Appeal disagreed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

finds that the California Court of Appeal’s decision did not result in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court 

law. 

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The Ninth Circuit addressed this question in Renderos v. Ryan, 469 F.3d 788 (9th 

Cir. 2006) and held that the California Court of Appeal was not objectively unreasonable 

in its application of Supreme Court due process law in rejecting the petitioner’s claim that 

“prevailing federal constitutional law concerning the burden of proof in criminal cases 

requires us to now declare the factual allegations concerning the statute of limitations 

should be deemed an element of the offense that must be established beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. at 796. As in Renderos, Petitioner here has not identified any Supreme Court 

precedent clearly establishing the statute of limitations must be proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See id.; see also Dozier v. Palmer, No. 3:08-CV-00190-RCJ, 2011 WL 3419568, 

at *12 (D. Nev. Aug. 2, 2011) (“There is no United States Supreme Court case which 

clearly establishes that the statute of limitations must be proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt.”).

On the contrary, Supreme Court law indicates the opposite. In Smith v. United 

States, 568 U.S. 106 (2013), the Supreme Court stated: 

The State is foreclosed from shifting the burden of proof to the defendant only 

“when an affirmative defense does negate an element of the crime.” Martin 

v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 237, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (Powell, 

J., dissenting). Where instead it “excuse[s] conduct that would otherwise be 

punishable,” but “does not controvert any of the elements of the offense 

itself,” the Government has no constitutional duty to overcome the defense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6, 126 S.Ct. 

2437, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006).

. . . 

[A]lthough the statute of limitations may inhibit prosecution, it does not 

render the underlying conduct noncriminal. Commission of the crime within 

the statute-of-limitations period is not an element of the conspiracy offense. 

See United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168, 180, 21 L.Ed. 538 (1872). The 

Government need not allege the time of the offense in the indictment, id., at 

179–180, and it is up to the defendant to raise the limitations defense, 

Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police of City of New York, 245 U.S. 128, 135, 

38 S.Ct. 41, 62 L.Ed. 193 (1917). A statute-of-limitations defense does not 

call the criminality of the defendant’s conduct into question, but rather reflects 

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a policy judgment by the legislature that the lapse of time may render criminal 

acts ill suited for prosecution. 

Id. at 110-12.

Similarly, in Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6 (2006), the Supreme Court stated 

that where a defense “excuse[s] conduct that would otherwise be punishable,” but “does 

not controvert any of the elements of the offense itself,” the Government has no 

constitutional duty to overcome the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 6-8. More 

recently, in Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 717-18 (2016), the Supreme Court 

explained the following:

The history of the limitations bar in [18 U.S.C.] § 3282(a) demonstrates that 

it is a defense that becomes part of a case only if the defendant presses it in 

the district court. This Court held in United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168, 21 

L.Ed. 538 (1872), that a statute of limitations—identical in all relevant 

respects to § 3282(a)—was “a matter of defence and must be pleaded or given 

in evidence by the accused.” Id., at 181; see § 32, 1 Stat. 119 (statute of 

limitations); see also Cook, supra, at 173, and n. * (citing and describing 

statute of limitations). When a defendant introduces the limitations defense 

into the case, the Government then has “the right to reply or give evidence”

on the limitations claim. 17 Wall., at 179.

Cook was decided more than 140 years ago, and we have adhered to its 

holding. Just three Terms ago, we reaffirmed that “[c]ommission of [a 

federal] crime within the statute-of-limitations period is not an element of the 

. . . offense,” and “it is up to the defendant to raise the limitations defense.” 

Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 714, 720, 184 L.Ed.2d 

570 (2013) (citing Cook ; emphasis deleted); see also Biddinger v. 

Commissioner of Police of City of New York, 245 U.S. 128, 135, 38 S.Ct. 41, 

62 L.Ed. 193 (1917) (“The statute of limitations is a defense and must be 

asserted on the trial by the defendant in criminal cases ...” (citing Cook)). 

There is, in sum, a long history of treating the operative language in § 3282(a) 

as providing a nonjurisdictional defense that a defendant must press at trial to 

insert into the case.

Id. at 717-18.

Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal was not objectively unreasonable in its 

application of Supreme Court due process law in rejecting Petitioner’s claim that the statute 

of limitations must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

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4. Jury Instructions

When a petitioner challenges a jury instruction on a habeas petition, “[t]he only 

question . . . is ‘whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the 

resulting conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) 

(quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). “[T]he instruction . . . must be 

considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” Id. “If the 

charge as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a ‘reasonable likelihood 

that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.’”

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 

72). A “reasonable likelihood” is lower than “more likely than not” but higher than a mere 

“possibility.” See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 

316 (1990).

As Petitioner does not contend that the California Court of Appeal erred in its finding 

that there was “substantial evidence in the record to support the jury’s findings that the 

prosecution of counts 7, 8, and 9 was timely commenced” under former California Penal 

Code § 801.1(a), the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to establish that the instruction 

by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. 

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The threshold for granting a Certificate of Appealability is “relatively low.” 

Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002). “[T]he only question is 

whether the applicant has shown that jurists of reason could disagree with the district 

court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues 

presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Buck v. Davis, 580 

U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 759, 773 (2017). The district court “shall indicate which specific issue 

or issues satisfy the standard for issuing a certificate, or state its reasons why a certificate 

should not be granted.” United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997).

The Court finds, applying that standard, that a Certificate of Appealability is not 

warranted. The claims and issues raised in this action are not sufficiently meritorious to 

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deserve encouragement to proceed further, and Petitioner has not shown jurists of reason 

could disagree with the foregoing resolution. 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For all the foregoing reasons, the First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus is DENIED. The Court DENIES a Certificate of Appealability.

Dated: January 23, 2020

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