Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00106/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00106-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOYCE GARDNER,

No. 2:06-cv-0106-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SHASTA COUNTY, GERALD BENITO,

ELIZABETH LESLIE, ANGELA

FITZGERALD, and CAROL GALL,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Joyce Gardner

(“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendants Shasta County (“County”),

Gerald Benito (“Benito”), Elizabeth Leslie (“Leslie”), Angela

Fitzgerald (“Fitzgerald”), and Carol Gall (“Gall”) (collectively

“Defendants”) violated her right of free speech under the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution and thereby violated

her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

Plaintiff also brings several state law claims, including

Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, Interference

with Prospective Economic Advantage, Defamation, and Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress. Now before this Court is

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims brought by

Plaintiff.1

BACKGROUND

At all relevant times up to October 2004, Plaintiff was

employed as the program director for the Shasta County Victim/

Witness Assistance Program (“VW Program”), a division of the

office of the Shasta County District Attorney. Defendant Leslie

started with the District Attorney’s Office in April of 2004 and

was Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor. Defendant Benito was the

District Attorney and Leslie’s supervisor. Defendant Gall worked

in the VW Program unit and was a subordinate of Plaintiff. 

Defendant Fitzgerald was Plaintiff’s successor, taking her

position after Plaintiff’s employment ended.

California’s Child Abuse Treatment Program (“CHAT”) provides

a grant to the VW Program for counseling services to victims of

child abuse, which in turn awards a sub-grant to a local therapy

provider. In early 2004, the CHAT grant was up for renewal,

having been previously awarded to Family Services Agency (“FSA”)

for the previous three years. 

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3

Three providers applied for the sub-grant: FSA, New Directions to

Hope (“NDTH”), and Creekside Counseling Center (“Creekside”). 

Plaintiff claims that her role was to relay information on the

applicants to her supervisor, Leslie, who would then decide which

provider was to receive the sub-grant.

In addition to applying to the VW Program for the CHAT subgrant, the counseling service providers could also bid directly

to the state, and against the Shasta County District Attorney’s

Office, for the main grant. Plaintiff claims that, after the

decision was made to award the sub-grant to Creekside, Leslie

indicated to her that she was going to notify FSA of the

decision, but not NDTH. This would serve to deprive NDTH of the

ability to apply directly to the state for the main grant. In

spite of Plaintiff’s protests regarding the dissimilar treatment

of FSA and NDTH, Leslie allegedly instructed Plaintiff to not

inform NDTH.

Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of her protests against

Leslie’s actions in the bidding process and as an effort to

restrict her from speaking out further, among other motivating

factors, she was subjected by all Defendants to repeated

intimidation, scorn and humiliation, embarrassment, and false

charges of mismanagement. Further, Plaintiff claims that, after

the end of her employment with the county, Defendants interfered

with her ability to seek employment elsewhere by communicating

with prospective employers about Plaintiff’s alleged work related

improprieties.

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4

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). 

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5

Once the moving party meets the requirements of Rule 56

by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the

non-moving party’s case, the burden shifts to the party resisting

the motion, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Genuine factual issues must exist that

“can be resolved only by a finder of fact, because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. 

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does

not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. See T.W. Elec. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809

F.2d 626, 630-631 (9th Cir. 1987), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

ANALYSIS

1. Right of Free Speech

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for violation of her

First Amendment right of free speech fails as a matter of law

because her protest of Leslie’s actions was made pursuant to her

official duties and not as a concerned citizen. Defendants cite

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) in support of their

argument. In Garcetti, plaintiff Ceballos worked as a deputy

district attorney for the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s

Office. Id. at 1955. Ceballos determined that an affidavit used

to obtain a critical search warrant contained serious

misrepresentations. Id. 

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6

After writing a memo and otherwise expressing his concerns, he

claimed that he was subjected to a series of retaliatory

employment actions. Id. at 1956. Ceballos sued in the United

States District Court for the Central District of California on

the grounds that his memo was protected speech under the First

Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment against

Ceballos and in favor of defendants. Id.

In upholding the District Court decision, the Supreme Court

stated that the controlling factor in the case was that Ceballos’

“expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar

deputy.” Id. at 1956, 1959-1960. The fact that Ceballos spoke

as a prosecutor in writing his memo to advise his supervisor

about how to best proceed with a pending case “distinguishes

Ceballos’ case from those in which the First Amendment provides

protection against discipline.” Id. at 1960. Ceballos wrote the

memo pursuant to his official duties because “that is part of

what he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to do.” Id. “[W]hen

public employees make statements pursuant to their official

duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First

Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their

communications from employer discipline.” Id.

In contrast to explaining why Cebellos’ speech was properly

restricted, the Supreme Court also detailed conditions under

which statements by public employees may receive First Amendment

protection. “The First Amendment protects a public employee’s

right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing

matters of public concern.” Id. at 1957. 

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7

The fact that a citizen works for the government does not remove

all speech protections from that citizen. Id. If employees are

“speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they must

face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their

employers to operate efficiently and effectively.” Id. Employer

restrictions on speech are properly placed “only [on] the

expressions an employee makes pursuant to his or her official

responsibilities, not to statements or complaints ... that are

made outside the duties of employment.” Id. at 1961.

Further, the fact that views are expressed only inside the

office, and only to a supervisor, is not dispositive of whether

First Amendment protection applies. Id. at 1959. Constitutional

rights of free speech are also not removed by the fact that the

views expressed relate to the employment of the speaker. Id.

The Supreme Court, however, did not establish a test for

determining when an employee’s speech is made pursuant to his or

her employment. Id. at 1961. In Garcetti, because the parties

agreed that Ceballos wrote his memo as part of the normal course

of his duties, the Court had “no occasion to articulate a

comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s

duties in cases where there is room for serious debate.” Id. 

The Court did, nonetheless, foreclose the possibility of

employers restricting employees’ rights of free speech “by

creating excessively broad job descriptions.” Id.

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8

The issue then in the instant case is whether Plaintiff, in

protesting the allegedly stated intention of Leslie to inform

FSA, but not NDTH, of the opportunity to bid for the CHAT grant

directly to the state, spoke within the scope of her duties as an

employee. It is undisputed that part of Plaintiff’s job

requirements was to provide information about sub-grant

applicants and the application process to Leslie. Also, as

Plaintiff concedes in her deposition, she protested to Leslie

about the unequal treatment of applicants, in part due to her

“responsibility regarding the CHAT application process.” Gardner

Dep. 123:20-23.

However, as Garcetti counsels, the fact that Plaintiff’s

protests “concerned the subject matter” of her employment is

“nondispositive” as to whether her expressions were made pursuant

to her employment responsibilities. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at

1959-1960. Further, Plaintiff claims that she also protested out

of an ethical and moral duty as an ordinary citizen “to point out

a potential conflict of interest in actions by state government

officials addressing a matter of public concern.” Gardner Decl.

¶ 6. Plaintiff further asserts that it was not one of her

official job responsibilities to monitor her supervisor for

potential misconduct. Id. ¶ 4.

Garcetti establishes that, with respect to the determination

of whether a particular expression is within the scope of an

employee’s duties, “[t]he proper inquiry is a practical one.” 

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9

Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961. In that light, Plaintiff’s

statements of opposition to such an allegedly one sided, biased,

and favorable treatment of one party over another, without any

mention of a proper supporting basis for such action, is not

easily construed as a duty within the scope of Plaintiff’s

employment, especially when that opposition was to the action of

her supervisor. It is difficult to imagine that Plaintiff was

hired to, under any circumstances, serve as a restraint on

arbitrary or biased actions taken by those charged with oversight

of her own employment.

Therefore, viewing all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff as the non-moving party, it cannot be

said as a matter of law that Plaintiff’s expressions of protest

regarding Leslie’s actions were wholly within her duties as an

employee. Accordingly, summary adjudication on this claim is not

proper, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Plaintiff’s claim for violation of her First Amendment right of

free speech is DENIED.

2. Defamation

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for defamation fails

as a matter of law because the statements allegedly made by

Defendants were either true, privileged, not defamatory, or not

made by Defendants. “The tort of defamation ‘involves (a) a

publication that is (b) false, c) defamatory, and (d)

unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or

that causes special damage.’” 

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10

Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 720 (2007) (quoting 5 Witkin,

Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 529, p. 782). 

California Civil Code section 47(c) provides that certain

communications made between interested persons regarding a matter

of common interest are privileged, if the statements are made

without malice. Lundquist v. Reusser, 7 Cal. 4th 1193, 1203-1204

(1994). A defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating

that an allegedly defamatory communication is shielded by a

privilege, after which the plaintiff must show that the defendant

made the statement with malice. Id. at 1208.

Plaintiff has alleged that the statements of each Defendant

were “false”, “unprivileged” and “motivated by malice and ill

will.” Compl. ¶ 83. That same allegation references paragraphs

51 and 53 to 60 of the complaint. Paragraphs 51, 55, and 56

detail defamatory statements allegedly made by Defendant

Fitzgerald; 53, 57, and 60 reference Defendant Gall; 54

references Defendant Leslie; and 58 references Defendant Benito. 

Defendant County may be held liable under respondeat superior, as

it is well established that a principal can be found responsible

for the malicious torts of employees acting within the scope of

their employment. Mercado v. Hoefler, 190 Cal. App. 2d 12, 17

(1961).

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11

In moving for summary judgment on these claims, Defendants

must show that there is an “absence of evidence to support

[Plaintiff’s] case.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Defendants must

therefore demonstrate that, when viewing evidence in Plaintiff’s

favor, Plaintiff cannot reasonably prevail in establishing

Defendants’ liability on at least one of the elements of

defamation. See Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. at 655, Taus, 40 Cal.

4th at 720.

In addressing the elements of defamation, Defendants expend

little effort in claiming that the alleged statements were not in

fact made. Likewise, Defendants do not place significant

reliance on the affirmative defense of truth to dispose of the

element of falsity. Defendants do attempt to ascribe the source

of several statements to individuals other than themselves,

claiming that the various Defendants were recipients of these

statements, not issuers. However, Defendants point to evidence

which merely contradicts Plaintiff’s contentions and thus have

not provided a sufficient basis to support summary judgment on

these elements. 

Defendants characterize the statements “unethical”, “greasy

palm”, “stalking”, “incompetent” and unlawfully withholding

$10,000 from a client, as not being defamatory. These statements

are not ambiguous or innocent on their face, and do not require

extrinsic evidence to establish a defamatory meaning. Indeed,

such statements by their very nature would likely have the

tendency to injure and cause special damage.

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Defendants primarily attempt to establish a lack of evidence

supporting Plaintiff’s case by claiming that the majority of

alleged statements made were shielded by the statutory privilege

found in California Civil Code section 47(c). However, while

much effort is made in claiming the “common interest privilege,”

much less is done to support these claims with evidence as to why

the privilege should necessarily apply to the various

circumstances. Defendants rely on cursory statements of

privilege applicability, without reference to affidavits, and

with scant discussion as to evidentiary bases for such claims.

Defendants list circumstances under which statements have

been found (or not contested) to fall within the statutory

privilege (see Def. Mot. Summ. J. 12, citing Taus, 40 Cal. 4th at

721), but fail to establish how those circumstances are

sufficiently indistinguishable from those present here. Those

circumstances involve statements disseminated through a

conference, seminar, and two letters. See Taus, 40 Cal. 4th at

721. The instant case, however, concerns conversations made in

meetings of only a few individuals. Substantial questions of

fact remain regarding the evidence in this case in terms of what

statements were made and the context in which they were issued. 

Defendants have not, therefore, established that the statements

were made under circumstances afforded the defense of privilege.

Further, the privilege provided by section 47(c) “may be

lost if the defendant abuses the privilege by excessive

publication or the inclusion of immaterial matter which have no

bearing upon the interest sought to be protected, or if the

uttered statements are actuated by malice.” 

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Deaile v. General Telephone Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d 841, 847 (1974)

(internal citations omitted). In their initial moving papers,

Defendants virtually ignore the “malice” provision of the

section, which negates the privilege if present in the

communication. See Id. In their Reply, Defendants assert that

Plaintiff “simply has no evidence to establish malice.” Def.

Reply at 28. However, Defendants discuss some of the evidence

Plaintiff has offered toward this end without providing any

substantive evidence of their own.

Plaintiff has affirmatively alleged that the various

statements made by Defendants were made with malice, and has

offered affidavits in support of that contention. The very

nature of the circumstances alleged, those of adverse employment

actions made in retaliation for objecting to a supervisor’s

improper course of action, among others, evokes an air of malice

in the issuance of the allegedly defamatory statements. 

Defendants’ contention that no evidence exists to support the

presence of malicious action is not well founded.

Defendants have also not established that the allegedly

defamatory statements made at various meetings consisted of

matters material to the “interest sought to be protected.” See

Deaile, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 847. Although the general purpose of

a particular meeting may provide privilege for communication

consistent with that same goal, statements made in that meeting

that are not relevant to that general end are not similarly

privileged. See Id. 

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14

Given that the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate “that

the allegedly defamatory communication was made upon a privileged

occasion,” Lundquist, 7 Cal. 4th at 1208, it follows that

defendant must show that the statements were material to the

proceedings.

Defendants have not met their Rule 56(c) burden of showing

an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim for

defamation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c). Even if Defendants

were adjudged to have made a prima facie showing in meeting their

burden under Rule 56(c), Plaintiff has met her Rule 56(e) burden

by sufficiently setting forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial. Accordingly, summary adjudication

on this claim is not proper, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim for defamation is DENIED.

3. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations;

Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for intentional

interference with contractual relations and interference with

prospective economic advantage fail as a matter of law because

either the statements allegedly made by Defendants were

privileged or that any loss of clients was not attributable to

Defendants. To prevail on a claim for intentional interference

with the performance of a contract, a plaintiff must prove “(1) a

valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2)

defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s

intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the

contractual relationship; 

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(4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship;

and (5) resulting damage.” Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Bear

Stearns & Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1126 (1990).

To prevail on a claim for interference with prospective

economic advantage, a plaintiff must prove “‘(1) an economic

relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the

probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the

defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts

on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the

relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5)

economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of

the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Youst v. Longo, 43 Cal. 3d 64, 71

(1987)). The primary difference in proof between the two torts

is that the latter “does not require proof of a legally binding

contract.” The primary analytical difference is that, under

interference with prospective economic advantage, defendant’s

actions are given wider latitude before liability attaches

because the “economic advantage interfered with is only

prospective.” Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 50 Cal. 3d at 1126.

Plaintiff alleges that she had contracts with various

private individuals and with the school district, that Defendants

intentionally made statements to disrupt these contracts, that

the contracts were in fact disrupted, and that Plaintiff has

suffered damage as a result. Defendants claim that privilege

protects Defendants from liability or that the contracts ended

for other reasons.

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16

As stated above, Defendants have not established that any of

the statements allegedly made were shielded by privilege. 

Defendants also cannot establish an absence of evidence to

support Plaintiff’s claims by simply averring causation by an

alternate source. Specifically, Defendants’ bald assertion that

Plaintiff’s loss of clients was attributable to a third party’s

recommendation does not foreclose the possibility of Defendants’

culpability, certainly not in viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to Plaintiff. Accordingly, summary adjudication

on these claims is not proper, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims for intentional interference

with contractual relations and interference with prospective

economic advantage is DENIED.

4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress fails as a matter of law because

the statements allegedly made by Defendants were either subject

to the Workers’ Compensation Exclusive Remedy Rule or shielded by

privilege as provided in California Civil Code section 47(c). To

prove a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a

plaintiff must show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the

defendant either with intent or reckless disregard, (2) severe

and extreme emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff, and

(3) actual and proximate causation. Christensen v. Superior

Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991). 

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To be outrageous, conduct “must be so extreme as to exceed all

bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” 

Davidson v. City of Westminister, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 209 (1982).

However, conduct by an employer, even outrageous conduct,

which is a “normal part of the employment relationship” is

subject to the exclusive remedy provisions of California’s

Workers’ Compensation Code (Cal. Lab. Code § 3200 et seq). Cole

v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District, 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160

(1987). Actions which are a normal part of employment include

“demotions, promotions, criticism of work practices, and

frictions in negotiations as to grievances.” Id. Claims

asserting intentional infliction of emotional distress do not

avoid being barred by the Labor Code “by characterizing the

employer's decisions as manifestly unfair, outrageous,

harassment, or intended to cause emotional disturbance resulting

in disability.” Id. The majority of California courts have

adopted the Cole test (see Id.), which “focuses whether the

actionable conduct ... is a normal part of the employment

relationship.” Horn v. Bradco Int’l, Ltd., 232 Cal. App. 3d 653,

668 (1991).

Many of the statements allegedly made by Defendants occurred

after her employment had terminated and were not related to her

position in the VW Program. These statements would not,

therefore, be subject to the exclusive remedy provisions of

workers’ compensation. 

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Because Plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress can stand on

grounds not subject to the Labor Code, this Court need not decide

for purposes of this order what statements, if any, were a normal

part of Plaintiff’s employment relationship, and thus barred by

statute.

Plaintiff has alleged that various Defendants stated that

Plaintiff was “unethical,” engaging in “greasy palm” activity,

“stalking,” “incompetent,” unlawfully withholding $10,000 from a

client, among others. These statements, if proved, would provide

a basis sufficient to support a finding of extreme and outrageous

conduct. Defendants’ blanket and cursory assertions that “there

is insufficient evidence of outrageous conduct” and that

Plaintiff “has not alleged any outrageous conduct” are therefore

unpersuasive.

As to the defense of privilege, Defendants cite Deaile, 40

Cal. App. 3d at 849, in support of the proposition that

California Civil Code section 47 bars claims for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Def. Mot. at 24-25. In

Deaile, a jury had previously determined that the privilege

shielding defendant’s statements regarding the plaintiff’s

claim for defamation was not negated by the presence of malice. 

Id. at 850. Further, the court ruled that because the

statements under the defamation claim were essentially the same

statements used to support the emotional distress claim,

privilege would defeat the latter as it had the former. Id. 

The jury’s finding in that case, of course, does not inform the

issues before this Court.

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As stated above, Defendants have failed to establish as a

matter of law that the statements in the present case are

shielded by privilege. The unsupported claims of privilege thus

do not aid Defendants in establishing an absence of evidence to

support Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Further, Defendants have not shown that no genuine

issue exists as to whether the injurious statements were made

with malice, the presence of which would deprive them of the

protection of privilege. Accordingly, summary adjudication on

this claim is not proper, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 1, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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