Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02269/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02269-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 730
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Report &amp; Disclosure
Cause of Action: 

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PltSO 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Uoir~ Sftffl Courr uf Appeals 

·renth Circuit 

AUG 8 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECK.ER 

DAVID D. Clerk JONES, } 

} 

Plaintiff-Appellant, } 

} 

vs. } 

} 

CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS } 

CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, } 

a Delaware corporation; and } 

TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, } 

WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS LOCAL } 

UNION NO. 17, } 

} 

Defendants-Appellees. } 

No. 87-2269 

(D.C. No. 82-F-1159} 

(D. Colo.} 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BALDOCK, WRIGHT** and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

On August 1, 1980, defendant-appellee Consolidated 

Freightways Corporation of Delaware (Consolidated} issued a 

warning letter to its employee, plaintiff-appellant David D. 

Jones, for excessive absenteeism. The parties' collective 

bargaining agreement stated in pertinent part that an employer 

"shall not discharge or suspend any employee without just cause, 

but in respect to discharge or suspension shall give at least one 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** The Honorable Eugene A. Wright, United States Circuit Judge, 

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 87-2269 Document: 01019974440 Date Filed: 08/08/1989 Page: 1 
(1) warning notice of the complaint against such employee to the 

employee in writing . " Brief of Appellant at 2. Following 

further absences, Jones was terminated on August 15, 1980. Jones 

and his union, defendant-appellee Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 

Warehousemen & Helpers Local No. 17 (Local 17), filed grievances 

from the August 1, warning letter and the subsequent decision to 

terminate. The grievances were heard by a committee of union and 

management representatives, which upheld the warning letter but 

deadlocked on the termination issue. Pursuant to the labor 

agreement, that issue was presented to a second committee, which 

upheld the termination. 

Jones then filed the instant civil action in federal district 

court pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185 against Consolidated for breach 

of its collective bargaining agreement, and against Local 17 for 

breach of its duty of fair representation in handling his 

grievances. Jones claimed that Consolidated fired him without 

just cause, based on his specific contentions that: 

1) Consolidated was bound by its past practice to issue two 

warning letters prior to termination, 2) Consolidated had not in 

the past terminated employees whose attendance problems were the 

result of injuries, 3) Consolidated treated him differently than 

similarly situated employees, and 4) all absences from the date of 

his receipt of the warning letter until his termination were for 

legitimate health reasons. Jones claimed that his union 

representative, Robert Collier, failed to investigate the relevant 

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Appellate Case: 87-2269 Document: 01019974440 Date Filed: 08/08/1989 Page: 2 
facts adequately, and presented the grievances in a grossly 

deficient, perfunctory manner. 

The case was tried before a jury which found in favor of 

Consolidated and Local 17, and against Jones. Jones filed a 

motion for a new trial, which was denied by the district court. 

Jones contends that the district court erred in failing to conduct 

a sufficiently detailed voir dire of potential jurors, in denying 

a motion in limine seeking to exclude all but Jones' immediate 

past attendance records, and in refusing to submit Jones' tendered 

jury instructions. Pursuant to our review of a final judgment 

under 28 u.s.c. § 1291, we affirm. 

I • 

The district court conducted voir dire as permitted by Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 47(a). 1 The district court's initial examination 

revealed that three potential jurors, Roy Topping, Ronald Mosley, 

and William Shipp, had direct responsibility for the hiring and 

firing of employees. Counsel for Jones asked the district court 

to explore more closely the attitudes of these potential jurors, 

expressing his concern that they might identify unduly with the 

1 Rule 47(a) provides: 

(a) Examination of Jurors. The court may permit the 

parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination of 

prospective jurors or may itself conduct the 

examination. In the latter event, the court shall 

permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the 

examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper 

or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such 

additional questions of the parties or their attorneys 

as it deems proper. 

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litigation position of Consolidated. Thereupon, the district 

court proceeded to question each juror specifically. The voir 

dire of venireman Topping provides a representative example: 

COURT: Mr. Topping, you are self-employed at this 

time; is that correct please? 

MR. TOPPING: Yes. 

COURT: Would you automatically take the view of 

management over an employee in this case 

merely because of your profession at this 

time? 

MR. TOPPING: No. 

COURT: Or would you look on this case as a case 

of equals and you will determine what the 

facts are? 

MR. TOPPING: I believe I would. 

COURT: You would not bring any self-interest into 

this lawsuit because of your profession or 

responsibility at this time; is that 

correct, please? 

MR. TOPPING: Yes. 

COURT: Are you of that frame of mind that you 

would want a juror to be in the event 

that you had a matter pending before 

the Court? 

MR. TOPPING: Yes, I would. 

COURT: That same degree of fairness; is that 

correct, please? 

MR. TOPPING: Yes. 

Rec. vol. II at 46. Jones claims that the district court erred by 

failing to question the potential jurors in sufficient detail. 

The scope and extent of the voir dire examination is 

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Connors v. 

United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895); Hinkle v. Hampton, 388 

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Appellate Case: 87-2269 Document: 01019974440 Date Filed: 08/08/1989 Page: 4 
F.2d 141, 144 (10th Cir. 1968). In United States v. Espinosa, 771 

F.2d 1382 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1023 (1985), we 

considered an analogous situation in the criminal context, 2 where 

the proof against various defendants depended largely on police 

testimony, with the officers' credibility at issue. The 

defendants contended that the trial court erred by refusing to ask 

each prospective juror whether he or she would give more weight to 

the testimony o f a law enforcement officer simply by virtue of 

that status as an officer. In Espinosa, the voir dire by the 

trial court disclosed those prospective jurors who either had ever 

been employed by the government, or who had friends or relatives 

in law enforcement, after which the trial court posed further 

questions about possible biases arising from such relationships. 

The trial court concluded by asking whether the prospective jurors 

were in the frame of mind the defendants would not want in a 

juror. Id. at 1405. This questioning, coupled with a jury 

instruction directing the jurors to reach a verdict without 

prejudice or sympathy, led us to conclude that the defendants were 

adequately protected from prejudice. Id. 

2 Courts often look to criminal cases in the civil context when 

considering voir dire. See, ~ ... =. ... 9 ... .=_1 Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 

1109, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1981); Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 622 F.2d 

281, 284 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1980). As noted in Fietzer, Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 24(a), dealing with voir dire in criminal trials, is cast 

in terms similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 47(a). Fietzer, 622 F.2d at 

284 n.3. The advisory committee note to Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a) 

states that: "This rule is similar to Rule 47(a) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure ... and also embodies the practice now 

followed by many Federal courts in criminal cases. Uniform 

procedure in civil and criminal cases on this point seems 

desirable." (quoted in Fietzer, 622 F.2d at 284 n.3.). 

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Similarly, the district court in this case conducted voir 

dire filling 25 pages of transcript which disclosed relationships 

bearing potential for prejudice, and at the request of counsel, 

probed those relationships further for actual bias. The district 

court received assurances from each of the prospective jurors that 

they possessed the frame of mind and degree of fairness they would 

desire of a juror if they were appearing before the court. As in 

Espinosa, the jury was instructed not to "be influenced by 

sympathy or by prejudice for or against any party in this case." 

Rec. vol. VII at 755 (Instr. No. 7). And in contrast to Espinosa, 

the district court in the instant case did ask the prospective 

jurors if they would automatically take the view of management 

over an employee merely because of their professions. ~, rec. 

vol. II at 46 (prospective juror Topping). Based on the voir dire 

and the instructions to the jury, we find no abuse of discretion 

by the district court. 

II. 

Jones claims next that the district court erred by denying 

his motion in limine and allowing the introduction of evidence 

regarding his pre-1980 attendance record. Jones argues 

specifically that the parties' collective bargaining agreement 

provided that at least one valid warning letter must have been 

issued prior to a termination decision, and that the warning 

letter issued to Jones was based on his attendance record from 

January 1 to July 31 of 1980, covering the last nine months of his 

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employment. According to Jones, therefore, the introduction of 

any evidence of his attendance record prior to January 1980 was 

irrelevant and prejudicial. 

We note first that the trial court has broad discretion in 

receiving or rejecting evidence on relevancy grounds, Harriss v. 

Illinois-California Express Inc., 687 F.2d 1361, 1369 (10th Cir. 

1982), and the trial court's decision to admit evidence will not 

be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Id. The 

trial court's discretion is similarly broad in determining whether 

the probative value of evidence is outweighed by potential 

prejudice. May v. Interstate Moving & Storage Co., 739 F.2d 521, 

524 (10th Cir. 1984). Here, the district court properly admitted 

Jones' pre-1980 attendance record. 

While the collective bargaining agreement requires that a 

decision to terminate not occur prior to the issuance of a valid 

warning letter, Jones points to no requirement that the decision 

to terminate be based solely on the conduct giving rise to the 

warning letter. Consolidated's terminal manager testified that 

the decision to terminate involved consideration of Jones' past 

attendance record, rec. vol.Vat 428-29, as is clear from the 

face of the letter of discharge which stated that "[y]our 

absenteeism has been a long time problem and repeated warnings and 

progressive discipline being administered to you have not 

corrected the problem." Brief of Appellee Local 17 at 8. If two 

employees have identical attendance records over a recent ninemonth period which give rise to warning letters, common sense 

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suggests that they may be treated differently upon future 

attendance problems, based in part on the frequency of similar 

conduct in the more remote past. What common sense suggests does 

not appear to be precluded by the collective bargaining 

agreement. 3 Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in admitting evidence of Jones' pre-1980 attendance record. 

III. 

Jones argues that the district court erred by refusing to 

submit his tendered instructions to the jury. "The trial court's 

instructions are adequate if, taken as a whole, they sufficiently 

advised the jury of the parties' contentions and the law 

applicable thereto." May v. Interstate Moving & Storage Co., 739 

F.2d 521, 524 (10th Cir. 1984). Jones' contentions regarding the 

sufficiency of the jury instructions are without merit. The 

tendered instructions either were sufficiently covered by 

instructions actually given or were not fairly supported by the 

3 Unless Jones has failed to supply the court with a crucial 

provision of the collective bargaining agreement, the difficulty 

with his argument appears to lie in flawed logic. In his reply 

brief, Jones states that "[a]ppellees do not contest the obvious 

point that [Consolidated] could not have terminated Appellant on 

August 15, 1980 based solely upon his attendance record in prior 

years," and that "the company would not have had just cause to 

terminate Appellant if he had been absent for legitimate reasons 

during the fifteen-day period described in the letter of 

discharge." Reply Brief of Appellant at 9. Both of these 

statements may well be true. But it does not follow from these 

premises that the decision to terminate may not be influenced by 

other factors. While certain predicates, such as a valid warning 

letter or unjustified absences after receipt of the warning 

letter, may be required to exist as a minimum to satisfy just 

cause, there is no indication that more may not be considered in 

the decision to terminate. 

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state of the evidence or the authority asserted on behalf of the 

instructions. 

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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