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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

M. HISHAM TARABISHI , ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

Pl LED 

Uoited ·states 0-Jur:t of Appeals 

Tenth C!r::uit 

APR 18 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

V • ) 

) 

McALESTER REGIONAL HOSPITAL, ) 

a/k/a McAlester Regional Health) 

Center; JAMES L. DUNAGIN, M. D., ) 

No. 88-1226 

(D.C. No. 84-171-C) 

(E . D. Oklahoma) 

Chief of Staff; THURMAN ) 

SCHULLER, M.D .; ROBERT M. ) 

ADAMS, M.D.; MICHAEL F. BOYER, ) 

M.D . ; and M.D. BELLAMY, M. D., ) 

) 

· Defendants-Appellees . ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, BRORBY , and EBEL, Circuit Judges . 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res ~jud!cata, or collateral estoppel . 10th Cir . R. 36 . 3 . 

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Appellate Case: 88-1226 Document: 01019971491 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 1 
assist the determination of this~ appeal~ See Fed. R. App. P. 

34 (a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

This is an appeal from the dismissal of plaintiff's case as a 

sanction for noncompliance with the trial court's order for the 

filing of a pretrial statement. After examining the record and 

taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of this case, 

we believe the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the 

case against defendant McAlester Regional Hospital; consequently, 

we vacate the order. In our supervisory capacity, however, we 

point out Dr. Tarabishi's attempt to retry claims already resolved 

is unavailing. 

The record furnished by appellant is very sparse, consisting 

o~ly of some pleadings anq the trial court's minute order notices. 

While this may be the only record available, we are nonetheless 

left without any benefit of the trial court's reasoning, if any. 

Compounding the problem, appellant's brief contains a significant 

amount of detail that is far beyond the record before us. We 

shall, however, confine our judgment to the record. 

The genesis of this appeal is historical. Appellant, M. 

Hisham Tarabishi, filed an action in 1984 against McAlester 

Regional Hospital, and Doctors Schuller, Adams, Boyer, and 

Bellamy. Judgment on this action was ultimately rendered against 

Dr. Tarabishi and in favor of all defendants. Dr. Tarabishi 

appealed, but raised issues only concerning the judgment for 

McAlester Hospital. See Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hosp., 

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827 F.2d -648 (10th Cir. 1987) •1 It is- noteworthy that while the --- -~~ 

caption includes the'names of the defendant doctors who prevailed 

in the trial court, the issues raised on appeal pertained only to 

the judgment rendered in favor of the hospital. 2 Of more 

importance, the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant 

doctors on Dr. Tarabishi's civil rights and state law claims was 

unaffected by this court. 

This court did, however, partially reverse and remand the 

judgment entered against McAlester Regional Hospital and its board 

of trustees. 3 We held that whether the hospital was a state actor 

in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a question of fact, and 

the district court erred in submitting that question to the jury. 

We affirmed the trial court on the remaining issue and remanded 

the case to the district court "for further proceedings." 

Tarabishi, 827 F.2d at 653. 

Upon remand, Dr. Tarabishi apparently retained the services 

of his present counsel who took over for the attorneys who had 

represented him in the first trial and through the oral argument 

on appeal. The district court set the matter for trial on 

February 1, 1988, prompting a joint motion by plaintiff's counsel 

1Many of the facts referred to in this order and judgment have 

been gleaned from the opinion entered in that case. 

2 "Hisham Tarabishi (Tarabishi), appeals from an adverse judgment 

entered in favor of McAlester Regional Hospital (MRH) and its 

board of trustees, hereinafter collectively referred to as 

appellees." Tarabishi, 827 F.2d at 649. 

3Nothing in the record explains whether the board of trustees 

included all of the defendant doctors who were also sued in their 

individual capacities. Nonetheless, it is unassailable that the 

judgments entered in favor of the doctors in their individual 

capacities were left intact. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1226 Document: 01019971491 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 3 
and counsel for McA-lester -Hospital for a cont±nuance. (Counsel 

for the hospital also filed a separate motion seeking the same 

relief.) Apparently, - in response to these motions, the district 

court entered a minute order resetting the trial to February 29, 

1988, and scheduling a pretrial hearing for January 22, 1988. In 

addition, the court ordered the filing of a "Joint Pretrial 

Statement" by January 19, 1988. 

On January 19, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion seeking an 

enlargement of time in which to file the pretrial statement. 

(R . I, doc. 7). In this motion, plaintiff's counsel stated: 

"Counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendant McAlester 

Regional Hospital cannot reach an agreement concerning the Joint 

Agreed Pretrial Memorandum . " Counsel disclosed, "There exists 

differences between the parties regarding the interpetation [sic] 

of the opinion rendered by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 

this matter . Accordingly, the parties have been unable to reach 

an agreement concerning the pretrial memorandum." Annexed to this 

motion were unexecuted drafts of a pretrial memorandum and joint 

agreed pretrial statement . The draft pretrial memorandum 

represents there are three claims to be tried: the§ 1983 claim 

resulting from this court's reversal, and claims under 42 U.S.C 

§ 1985(3), a liberty interest claim, and state common law tort 

claim. The draft joint agreed pretrial statement reiterates the 

three claims as causes initiated in plaintiff's second amended 

complaint (which apparently went to judgment in the first trial) 

subliminally suggesting all claims were still viable despite the 

verdict and the limited appeal therefrom. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1226 Document: 01019971491 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 4 
·The record conta0ins no ,,ruling ~upon the motion for enlargement 

of time. Instead, on January 20, 1988, the district court entered 

- a minute - order- dismissing the· case~"for lack o~ prosecution for 

failure of counsel to file an agreed Pretrial Statement, as 

directed by the Court on January 4, 1988." This order was 

modified on motion to clarify the dismissal was without prejudice. 

This appeal followed. 

It is clear from the brief filed in this court counsel for 

the plaintiff has misperceived the issues remaining to be tried as 

a result of our prior reversal. This misperception is the root of 

the difficulties the plaintiff has suffered since remand. 

Before disposing the only issue really before us, and in the 

interest of sparing further anguish and time, we take the 

opportunity to point out a fundamental fact. The judgments 

rendered in the first trial are binding upon all the parties 

except as modified on appeal. The three claims raised in the 

second amended complaint have been tried and resolved except for 

the § 1983 claim against McAlester Regional Hospital. The 

"further proceedings" for which this court remanded the case 

plainly was the retrial of the§ 1983 claim only. Because the 

appeal upon which Dr. Tarabishi prevailed did not include anyone 

other than the hospital, there is no claim to be tried against 

anyone else. 4 

4In his brief, plaintiff's counsel makes the bald assertion the 42 

u.s.c. § 1985(3) claim persisted following reversal because: "the 

flawed instruction [reversed on appeal] clearly impacted the 

§ 1985(3) claim as well as the§ 1983 claim." Counsel has not 

carefully read either§ 1985(3) or this court's opinion. None of 

the elements of a§ 1985(3) claim pertain to "state action." See ·· (Continued to next page.) 

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Appellate Case: 88-1226 Document: 01019971491 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 5 
At the · junction at ~which plaintiff f~led the motion for 

enlargement of time, the only parties before the district court 

were plaintiff and the hospitaL -_ Thus, · we must- judge whether the 

court's dismissal of the remanded claim simply for the failure · of 

counsel to agree on the contents of an "agreed" pretrial statement 

is appropriate. 5 We must conclude dismissal was improper. 

The sparsity of the record impels our conclusion because it 

appears from all we have before us the trial court's action was 

sua SEonte and precipitous. We have no record of a motion by 

defendants for sanctions, nor for that matter, does it appear the 

hospital sought clarification of the issues to be tried by the 

district court. Although plaintiff asserts in his brief in this 

court he appended to the motion for enlargement of time a 

"supporting brief," the record we have belies that assertion. 

The record indicates only that one day after the plaintiff 

sought an enlargement of time (based upon a real, albeit 

misdirected, dispute) the trial court dismissed the cause. The 

court apparently made no effort to determine the nature of the 

dispute or which party was at fault. Without any apparent effort 

to determine the propriety of the ultimate sanction, and without 

(Continued from prior page.) 

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S . 88, 103-04 (1971). Our reversal 

of the "flawed instruction" was because the question of whether a 

defendant has engaged in "state action" is a question of law and 

not a question of fact to be submitted to a jury. We said, "[W]e 

hold that the evidence did establish as a matter of law that the 

appellants [sic] were acting under color of state law and that the 

court erred in submitting that issue to the jury." Tarabishi, 827 

F.2d at 652. Plaintiff is simply wrong that the reversal left 

anything to be tried except the§ 1983 claim against the hospital. 

5Given the recitals above, it is plain .there was real substance, to 

the inability of the parties to reach agreement. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1226 Document: 01019971491 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 6 
setting forth the factual considerations for the action, the court 

terminated the case. Under the circumstances, that sanction was 

an abuse of discretion which must be ·vacated. Joplin v. 

Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 671 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1982). 

The dismissal order of the district court is VACATED. The 

case is REMANDED with instructions to reinstitute the plaintiff's 

§ 1983 claim against McAlester Regional Hospital. Within ten days 

of entry of this order, counsel for Dr. Tarabishi shall file with 

the Clerk of this court a written response to the request of 

Doctors Boyer and Bellamy for the imposition of sanctions for 

prosecuting a frivolous appeal against them. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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