Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00491/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00491-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

EARL BALL, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

CHARLES L. RYAN, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-491-TUC-DCB (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Petitioner Earl Ball, presently confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence,

has filed a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. No.

1.) Petitioner has also filed "Supplemental Filing of Points and Authorities in Support of

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254" (Doc. No. 8), and a second

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 18). The Court ordered both documents

stricken from the record, and allowed Petitioner an additional 30 days to file a motion to

amend and lodge a proposed amended petition with the Clerk of Court. No motion to amend

nor proposed amended petition was received by the Court. 

Respondents have filed an answer to the original petition (“Answer”) with exhibits

A through EEE attached. (Doc. No. 12.) A reply was filed by Petitioner with Exhibits A

through E attached. (Doc. No. 13.) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation.

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1 The page numbers in all references to the Answer refer to the

Respondent’s sequential numeration in the bottom right corner

of each page. Additionally, all alphabetical exhibits refer to the

exhibits attached to the Respondent’s Answer (Doc. No. 12.) 

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For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court enter an order DISMISSING the Petition in its entirety.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. First Indictment

A search warrant was obtained for two properties, including Petitioner’s residence,

following the interview of an 18 year old runaway who had been residing at Petitioner’s

mobile home for approximately half a year. (Ex. A at 2-4.)1

 Two pornographic videotapes

and 15 pornographic photographs were seized during the search, and Petitioner was indicted

by Cochise County Grand Jurors in two criminal cases based upon the seizures: CR-98-296

(“‘296") and CR-98-345 (“‘345"). (Id., Ex. B, Ex. C.) 

The ‘296 indictment, filed on June 19, 1998, charged Petitioner with one count of

sexual exploitation of a minor for possession of a videotape containing child pornography,

a class 2 felony. (Ex. B.) The ‘345 indictment, filed on July 24, 1998, charged Petitioner

with sixteen counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, one count for possession of a second

videotape containing child pornography, and fifteen counts for possession of photographs

reflecting child pornography, all class 2 felonies. (Ex. C.) Additionally, all seventeen counts

were alleged to be “dangerous crime[s] against children” pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.01.

(Exs. B, C.) The cases were consolidated for trial. (Ex. D.) 

B. Pretrial Proceedings

The ‘296 indictment was remanded twice for a redetermination of probable cause, the

second time after Petitioner filed a special action in the appellate court. (Ex. E, at 16-18, 23-

24.) The Grand Jury returned indictments after both remands. (Id. at 19-20, 25-27.) A third

motion to remand the ‘296 indictment was filed on May 13, 1999. (Ex. F.) On August 13,

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2 Although the order was entered on August 13, 1999, it was not

filed until October 4, 1999.

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1999, the court, after a hearing (Ex. H.), denied the third motion to remand.2 (Ex. I.)

Petitioner did not file a special action challenging the trial court’s ruling. (See Ex. J at 73-74,

77, 89, 95.) 

On August 11, 1999, Petitioner filed a motion to continue for the purpose of

investigating evidence suggesting that the charges might be barred by the statute of

limitations. (Ex. G.) Petitioner’s arguments were based on a recent discovery suggesting

that law enforcement may have been aware of the existence of the videotapes prior to the

present discovery, and, calculating from that date forward, the statute of limitations would

have expired. (Ex. K at 98-99.) After a hearing, the motion was denied, based on the trial

court’s determination that sexual exploitation of a minor based on possession of child

pornography is a continuing offense, and thus, unless the possession ceased and the statute

of limitations could then be applied, the offense continues for purpose of the statute of

limitations. (Ex. H, at 58.) 

C. First Trial

Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of sexual exploitation

of a minor based on his knowing possession of pornographic videotapes. (Ex. N., at 116-

119, 122.) The jury was not able to reach verdicts on the remaining fifteen counts related to

Petitioner’s possession of pornographic photographs, and the trial court declared a mistrial

on those counts. (Ex. N at 117, 123.) 

D. Post-trial Proceedings

Following the trial, the court granted a motion Petitioner had made to dismiss the

“dangerous crimes against children” allegations. (Ex. O.) Petitioner was sentenced on

October 4, 1999. (Ex. P.) The trial court imposed an aggravated, ten-year term of

imprisonment on each of the two convictions, to be served consecutively. (Ex. P. at 126-30,

133-34, 136.) Petitioner was also sentenced at that time to a 1.5 year prison term for a felony

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conviction in a separate case. (Ex. P.) Petitioner filed a motion to vacate judgment in the

‘296 and ‘345 cases, based on a statute of limitations argument. (Ex. T.) On November 24,

1999, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the motion. (Ex. V.) No

appeal from the trial court’s order was filed. (Ex. J at 75, 78-79, 88, 95.) 

E. Second Trial

Petitioner was retried on fifteen counts of sexual exploitation of a minor for knowing

possession of pornographic photographs. The jury found Petitioner guilty of ten of the

remaining fifteen counts. (Ex. X.) The trial court found Petitioner had been previously

convicted of one prior felony. (Ex. Y at 232.) Petitioner waived counsel, and proceeded to

sentencing acting on his own behalf. (Ex. Y at 234, Ex. Z at 235, 237.) On October 16,

2000, the trial court imposed the presumptive sentence of 9.25 years imprisonment for each

of the ten counts, to run concurrently to each other, and to the previously imposed sentences

based on the videotapes. (Ex. Z at 239.) 

F. First Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

On January 4, 2000, Petitioner filed a pro se Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Ex. BB.) On February 28,

2000, Petitioner filed a second pro se Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, together with a

request for counsel and a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (Ex. CC.) Petitioner

raised the following grounds for relief:

(A) “The conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of

the United States or the State of Arizona, Rule 32.1(a)”

(B) “The court was without jurisdiction to render judgment, Rule 32.1(b);”

(C) “Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence, Rule 32.1(e);”

(D) “There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant’s case would probably overturn the defendant’s

conviction or sentence, Rule 32.1(g).”

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(Ex. CC at 252.) More specifically, Petitioner argued that the offense of possession of child

pornography is not a “continuing crime,” and that, because he possessed the pornography at

issue before the statute prohibiting such conduct was enacted, the State’s prosecution of his

conduct was prohibited as an ex post facto law. (Id. at 253-54.) Petitioner also argued that

“there may have been ineffective assistance of counsel in the representation of Petitioner as

Defendant by the Office of the Cochise Public Defender,” and that the trial court was without

jurisdiction to hear the trial “as the statute of limitations had run for prosecution for

possession of proscribed visual depictions.” (Id. at 255-56.) On March 29, 2000, the trial

court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in his petition for post-conviction relief

(“PCR”). (Ex. EE.) On June 20, 2000, Petitioner filed a pro se Supplement of Law to

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Ex. II.) The supplement provided points and authorities

in support of the previously raised claims, including (1) Statue of Limitations (Id. at 268-71);

(2) Ex Post Facto Law (Id. at 271-74); and (3) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (“IAC”)(Id.

at 275-76). Additionally, Petitioner raised new claims that were not alleged in his first

petition, including (1) prosecutorial misconduct (Id. at 274-75); and (2) the trial court’s

failure to strike the testimony of L.B. at trial (Id. at 275.).

The State moved to strike the supplement, arguing that Petitioner was represented by

an attorney and had not received authorization to file premature pleadings in pro per. (Ex.

JJ.) Petitioner responded, asserting that the court should consider his petition as a motion to

vacate judgment. (Ex. KK.) 

On October 16, 2000, the trial court denied Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate Judgment

(Petitioner’s claims asserted in the first PCR) (Ex. Z at 236-37.) The trial court also

substituted counsel for Petitioner’s PCR proceedings. (Ex. Z at 240.) Although Petitioner

filed a notice of appeal from the Judgment and Sentence entered by the trial court that same

date (See. Ex. AA), Petitioner did not appeal from the denial of Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate

Judgment. (See Ex. ZZ at 439-41.) On January 30, 2001, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion to

Revisit Motion to Vacate Judgment. (Ex. MM.) The trial court considered the motion one

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for reconsideration of the court’s previous denial, and denied the motion on June 4, 2001.

(Ex. OO.) 

G. Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Petitioner filed a pro se motion for an Evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 32.8 and

a pro se Petition for Post Conviction Relief (the “Second Petition for PCR”) on December

12, 2000. (Ex. LL.) The Second Petition for PCR asserted the following claims for relief:

(A) “The conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the

United States or the State of Arizona, Rule 32.1(a)”

(B) “The court was without jurisdiction to render judgment, Rule 32.1(b):”

(C) “Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence, Rule 32.1(e[)]”

(D) “There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant’s case would probably overturn the defendant’s

conviction or sentence, Rule 32.1(g).”

(Ex. LL at 285.) Petitioner asserted that the statute of limitations began to run in 1989

when the State became aware that photographs may have existed at that time, and that the

offense of possession of the photographs was not a “continuing crime.” (Id. at 286, 289-

292.) Petitioner also argued that because he possessed the photographs before any statute

prohibited such conduct, his prosecution was prohibited as an ex post facto law. (Id. at 285-

87, 292-95.) Petitioner also argued that the photographs depicted his emancipated wife, who

should not be treated as a “minor” for purposes of such charges. (Id. at 287.) Petitioner

alleged claims for prosecutorial misconduct (Id. at 295-96), and trial error through the trial

court’s failure to admonish the jury and take corrective measures regarding the prosecutorial

misconduct (Id. at 296). Petitioner asserted that “there may have been ineffective assistance

of counsel in the representation of Petitioner as Defendant by the Office of the Cochise

County Public Defender.” (Id., at 288, 296-97.) 

The trial court considered the petition, and found that Petitioner had failed to satisfy

his burden of ineffective counsel under the Strickland analysis; further, that Petitioner’s claim

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of ineffective assistance of counsel was without merit. (Ex. RR at 338.) The trial court

further found that “no material issue of fact or law exists which would entitle the Petitioner

to relief” on the remaining claims; that the Petitioner was precluded from relief based on any

ground raisable on direct appeal under Rule 31, or on a post trial motion under Rule 24, and

that Petitioner’s motion pursuant to Rule 24 had been previously denied. (Id.) The trial court

found that, in order to raise a colorable claim, the petition must raise some factors that

demonstrate that the attorney’s representation fell below the prevailing objective standards,

but that the petition did not raise a colorable claim. (Id. at 338-39.) The trial court

summarily dismissed the petition. (Id. at 339.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals on July 6, 2001.

(Ex. SS.) Petitioner raised the following issues: (1) “Exculpatory information withheld from

Grand Jury”; (2) “Abuse of discretion by both Judge Borowiec and Judge Fell”; (3)

“Legislative intent as well as Defendant’s intent”; (4) “Statute of Limitations”; (5) “Ex-PostFacto law”; and (6) “Ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Ex. § at 344.) On July 24, 2001,

the Arizona Court of Appeals consolidated the direct appeals and petition for review. (Ex.

YY.) 

H. Direct Appeal

On October 21, 1999, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal for each count based on the

possession of the pornographic videotapes. (Ex. R at 142-43.) The trial court stayed the

appeal pending determination of a petition for post-conviction relief. (Ex. S.) On October

25, 2000, the State filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s designation of the

charges in the indictment as not being an offense involving dangerous crimes against children

under A.R.S. § 13-604.01. (Ex. AA at 241.) On November 1, 2000, Petitioner filed a notice

of appeal from the convictions based on the ten counts of possession of photographs, and a

request for appointment of counsel. (Ex. AA at 243.) The court of appeals lifted the stay of

appeal on July 24, 2001 (Ex. YY.), and, on May 2, 2005, following appointment of counsel

(Ex. UU, VV), Petitioner filed the opening brief of his direct appeal, and petition for review

of denial of post-conviction relief in both criminal cases, raising the following issues: 

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1. The aggravated sentence imposed by the trial court violated the Sixth

Amendment.

2. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to try Ball for the crime of sexual

exploitation of a minor because the State of Arizona commenced the case more

than seven years after it discovered the violation.

3. The trial court should have excluded the testimony of Ball’s wife, L.B.

4. The trial court should have suppressed Ball’s statements to the police because

the police did not honor his requests to speak with counsel and not to be

recorded.

5. When the jury heard that the videotape showed Ball having sex with his

daughter, the judge should have declared a mistrial.

6. The trial court should not have allowed Reverend Tim Thacker, Ball’s

minister, to testify because Thacker’s testimony revealed information disclosed

in the context of giving spiritual advice.

7. The trial court should have suppressed the items seized pursuant to the search

warrant because the affidavit contained materially false information.

(Ex. WW at 372-73.)

On August 31, 2006, in an unpublished memorandum decision, the court of appeals

affirmed the convictions, and granted review of the petition, but denied relief. (Ex. ZZ.) On

November 28, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for reconsideration. (Ex. BBB.) The

court of appeals denied the motion on December 13, 2006. (Ex. CCC.) 

On January 12, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review to the Arizona

Supreme Court raising the following issues: (1) Blakely Relief, (2) Statute of Limitations;

and (3) Marital Privilege. (Ex. DDD.) On June 25, 2007, the Arizona Supreme Court denied

the petition for review. (Ex. EEE.) 

I. Federal Habeas Petition

On October 1, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition, raising the following

issues: 

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1. The trial prosecutor failed to present exculpatory evidence to the Grand

Jury;

2. Petitioner’s sentence violates Blakely;

3. The trial court erred in not finding the allegations against Petitioner

barred by the statute of limitations; and

4. Petitioner’s trial and appellate counsel were ineffective.

(Doc. No. 1.) 

On November 20, 2007, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Filing of Points and

Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

(Doc. No. 8.) The supplement raised claims not asserted in his initial Petition, and was

stricken by order of the Court dated April 16, 2009. (Doc. No. 19.) A Second Petition (Doc.

No. 18) was also ordered stricken. Petitioner was given 30 days to file a motion to amend

and lodge a proposed amended petition in conformance with Local Rules. (Doc. No. 19.)

No motion or proposed amended petition was filed. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (“AEDPA”).

B. Statute of Limitations

A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ of habeas corpus

within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review [.]” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). “The time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction

or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not

be counted toward any period of limitation[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

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C. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Before a federal court may review a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a petitioner must

exhaust his state remedies, which means he must have presented in state court every claim raised

in his federal habeas petition. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); O’Sullivan

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (a state prisoner in a federal habeas action must exhaust

his federal claims in the state courts “by invoking one complete round of the State’s established

appellate review process” before he may submit those claims in a federal habeas petition);

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Exhaustion of state remedies is required

in order to give the state the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its

prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). In order to provide a state with this necessary opportunity, “the prisoner

must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the

federal nature of the claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal

theories on which his claim is based. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). In

state court, the petitioner must describe not only the operative facts but also the asserted

constitutional principle, for if “state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged

violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-

66 (1995) (“If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial

denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so,

not only in federal court, but in state court.”). A petitioner does not ordinarily “fairly present”

a federal claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition, brief, or similar papers

to find material that will alert it to the presence of a federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32-33

(rejecting contention that petition fairly presented federal ineffective assistance of counsel claim

because “ineffective” is a term of art in Oregon that refers only to federal law claims, since

petitioner failed to demonstrate that state law uses “ineffective assistance” as referring only to

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federal law rather than a similar state law claim); Harless, 459 U.S. at 6 (holding that mere

presentation of facts necessary to support a federal claim, or presentation of state claim similar

to federal claim, is insufficient; petitioner must fairly present the substance of the federal claim);

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)(holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal

due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state court only on state

grounds); Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed to

“fairly present” federal claim to state courts where he failed to identify the federal legal basis for

his claim). 

In Arizona, exhaustion is satisfied if a claim is presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

A discretionary petition for review to the Supreme Court of Arizona is not necessary for

purposes of federal exhaustion. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010; State v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777

P.2d 220 (1989) (in non-capital cases, state remedies are exhausted by review by the court of

appeals); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Swoopes for

assertion that in cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, “claims of Arizona

state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of

Appeals has ruled on them”). Contrary to Respondents’ assertion, in Arizona, unless a

prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the

petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct

appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925

(D.Ariz.2007)(discussing Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained the distinction between exhaustion

and procedural default as follows: 

The exhaustion requirement is distinct from the procedural default rule. The

exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never been presented with

an opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims and that opportunity may still

be available to the petitioner under state law. In contrast, the procedural

default rule barring consideration of a federal claim applies only when a state

court has been presented with the federal claim, but declined to reach the issue

for procedural reasons, or if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim

procedurally barred. Thus, in some circumstances, a petitioner’s failure to

exhaust a federal claim in state court may cause a procedural default. A habeas

petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the

technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer

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“available” to him. A federal claim that is defaulted in state court pursuant to

an adequate and independent procedural bar may not be considered in federal

court unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice for the default, or

shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the federal

court refused to consider the claim. 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). In other words, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from

federal review in either of two ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal

court if it was actually raised in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state

procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, the claim may be procedurally

defaulted in federal court if the petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary state court

and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet

the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1.

This is often referred to as “technical” exhaustion, because although the claim was not

actually exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. 

If a claim is procedurally defaulted, it may not be considered by a federal court unless

the petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse the default in state court, or

demonstrates that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. Id. at 750; Sawyer v.

Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-339 (1992). If a claim has never been fairly presented to the state

court, a federal habeas court may determine whether state remedies remain available. See

Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269-70 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989);

White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Cause is defined as a “legitimate excuse for the default,” and prejudice is defined as

“actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.” Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (a showing of

cause requires a petitioner to show that “some objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule”). Prejudice need not

be addressed if a petitioner fails to show cause. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. To bring

himself within the narrow class of cases that implicate a fundamental miscarriage of justice,

a petitioner “must come forward with sufficient proof of his actual innocence,” Sistrunk v.

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3

Should the Court reject the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation,

Respondents have requested leave to file a supplemental answer to address the merits of the

claims raised in the petition. (Answer, at 43, n.20.)

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Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted), which can be shown when “a petitioner ‘presents evidence of innocence so strong

that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also

satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.’” Id. at 673 (quoting

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)).

D. Standard of Review: Merits3

Petitioner's habeas claims are governed by the applicable provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for habeas relief”

with the “acknowledged purpose of ‘reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal

criminal sentences.’ “ Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-475 (2007) (quoting

Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The AEDPA's “ ‘highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings' ... demands that state-court decisions be given the

benefit of the doubt .” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting

Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7).

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving a party's claim

which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural or other

non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). The

relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision regarding a claim. Barker v.

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Timeliness

 Respondents concede that the Petition is timely. (Doc. No. 12 at 17.) Based on a

review of the record, the Court finds that the petition is timely under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). 

B. Ground One:

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor improperly withheld exculpatory

evidence from the Grand Jury. (Doc. 1 at 6.) 

1. Relevant Facts

The trial court initially denied this claim when it denied Petitioner’s Third Motion to

Remand. (Ex. I.) Petitioner did not challenge the trial court’s ruling by filing a special

action in the Arizona Court of Appeals before trial, (Ex. J at 73-74, 77, 89, 95), thus, the trial

court denied this claim when it summarily denied Petitioner’s Second Petition for PCR, on

the grounds that, with the exception of his IAC claim, all of his claims were precluded by

Rule 32.2(a)(1) because they were raisable on appeal or on post-trial motion. (Ex. RR at

338.) See State v. Murray, 906 P.2d 542, 565 (1995) (“[t]o obtain review of a denial of

redetermination of probable cause, a defendant must seek relief before trial by special

action”). Like the trial court, the Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s Grand Jury Claim

by imposing a procedural bar:

The trial court correctly concluded that each of [Petitioner’s] claims except the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was waived or precluded under Rule

32.2(a). First, “[t]o obtain review of a denial of redetermination of probable

cause, a defendant must seek relief before trial by special action.” State v.

Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 32, 906 P.2d 542, 565 (1995). The only exception to this

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rule is when the state “knew [the indictment] was partially based on perjured,

material testimony.” Id. In those cases, the defendant may challenge the

indictment on appeal. [In his Second Petition, Petitioner] argued only that

material exculpatory evidence was withheld, not that perjured testimony was

presented to secure his indictment. Therefore, the trial court properly found

this claim was precluded. See Murray.

(Ex. ZZ at 449.) 

The Arizona Supreme Court implicitly adopted this procedural bar when it denied

review of Petitioner’s grand jury claim without comment. (Exs. DDD at 478; EEE.) See Ylst,

501 U.S. at 802 (when last reasoned state court decision imposes a procedural default, court

presumes on habeas that subsequent decision rejecting claim did not consider merits). 

2. Procedural Default

Respondents are correct in their assertion that Ground One is procedurally defaulted

because both the trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals imposed a procedural bar to

avoid reaching the merits of Ground One, which constitutes an independent and adequate

state law ground barring federal review. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802-05. This Court must defer

to the state courts’ conclusion that Petitioner was procedurally barred from raising the instant

grand jury claim after trial because this issue is a matter of state law. See e.g., Poland v.

Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Poland further argues that the trial court

improperly applied Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 in holding these claims

defaulted, since the conditions for inferring waiver under the rule were not satisfied. Federal

habeas courts lack jurisdiction, however, to review state court applications of state procedural

rules.”); see also Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1121–23 (9th Cir. 1091) (finding

procedural default where the Arizona Court of Appeals held that habeas petitioner had

waived claims by failing to raise issues on direct appeal or in first petition for post-conviction

relief). Because Petitioner presented Ground One to the Arizona courts in a procedurally

defective manner, Ground One is procedurally defaulted. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802–05;

Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 665; see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1.

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Accordingly, federal habeas review of Ground One is barred absent a showing of

“cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S.

386, 393-94 (2004); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. 

C. Ground Two:

Petitioner argues in his second claim that “the trial court [properly] ruled that A.R.S.

§ 13-604.01 did not apply to [his] case, so there was no grounds for imposing an aggravated

sentence of 10 years,” and “Blakely should apply to [his] sentence.” (Doc. 1 at 7; Doc. 1-3

at 4.) 

1. Relevant Facts

The court of appeals considered Petitioner’s Blakely claim, and found that Petitioner

entered into a stipulation that the victim, J., had been between the ages of ten and twelve at

the time the videotapes were made. (Answer, Ex. ZZ at 4-5.) Because Petitioner stipulated

to the victim’s age, and the jury was instructed that the stipulation was binding, it could not

have found that the victim was fifteen years of age or older, and, pursuant to state law, the

statutory maximum sentence Petitioner could have received was seventeen years, even

without being designated a dangerous crime against children. (Id.) The appellate court

found that the trial court erred, in Petitioner’s favor, by determining that, contrary to the plain

language of former § 13-3553(B), the offenses were not dangerous crimes against children,

and sentencing Petitioner to ten year terms. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that, at the time Petitioner’s attorney

stipulated to the victim’s age, the State, in another case involving a different defendant, had

not objected to the trial court’s ruling that A.R.S. § 13-604.01 did not apply to possession

under § 13-3553(A)(2). (Answer, Ex. BBB) Petitioner argued that, pursuant to the Arizona

constitution, Article 6, section 13, the order of one judge shall have the same force and effect

as if all Judges of the Court had presided, and the process of the court shall extend to all parts

of the state. (Id.) Petitioner questioned the appellate court’s ruling stating “How can this

court hold that one defendant POSSESSING hundreds of child pornographic pictures be

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exempt from A.R.S. 13-604.01 while another is not?” (Id.) The appellate court denied the

motion for reconsideration without comment. (Answer, Ex. CCC.) 

Petitioner raised the same argument before the Arizona Supreme Court, arguing that,

because personal possession of visual material is not an offense “committed against a minor,”

the allegation pursuant to § 13-604.01 must be dismissed. (Answer, Ex. DDD.) The

supreme court denied the petition for review without comment. (Answer, Ex. EEE.) 

2. Cognizabile Federal Claim

Respondents assert that the first part of Petitioner’s claim, that the Arizona Court of

Appeals erred by overturning the trial court’s ruling that A.R.S. § 13-604.01 did not apply

to possession under A.R.S. § 13-3553(A)(2), fails to present a cognizable ground for habeas

relief because the claim presents only an issue of interpretation of a state sentencing statute.

Respondents are correct. A violation of state law would not be grounds for habeas

relief. See Estelle v. Mcguire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (it is not the province of a federal

habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions; a federal court

is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States). Petitioner argues no set of facts that support a federal claim. 

Although Petitioner did assert a Blakely claim in his appeal, Petitioner does not

elaborate in these federal habeas proceedings how the alleged error by the State Courts

presents a cognizable federal claim. Petitioner’s reference to federal law (Blakely) does not

transform this claim into a federal claim. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.

1996)(Petitioner may not transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting

a constitutional violation; alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in

federal habeas corpus.) Petitioner is challenging the State Court’s application of a state law,

not a federal law. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that this claim be dismissed as failing

to present a cognizable federal claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

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3. Alternative Ruling on the Merits

Alternatively, should the District Court find that Petitioner has presented a federal

claim, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Blakely claim be dismissed for the

following reasons. 

Petitioner has made no showing that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ determination was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004),

or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court explained in

Blakely that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 542 U.S. at

301 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). The “statutory maximum”

for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of

the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. Blakey, 542 U.S. at 303

(citations omitted)(emphasis added). The Arizona Court of Appeals correctly identified and

applied Blakely when it determined that, under state law the presumptive sentence of

seventeen years was, “the statutory maximum sentence [Petitioner] could have received.”

(Ex. ZZ at 439.) Although the sentencing court did not apply A.R.S. § 13-604.01 to enhance

Petitioner’s sentence, the court of appeals found that it could have, and, should have

determined that A.R.S. § 13-3553(C) required Petitioner to be sentenced pursuant to section

604.01. because of the binding stipulation made by Petitioner that the victim had been

between the ages of 10 and 12 at the time the videotapes were made. Had Petitioner been

sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-604.01, the presumptive term for violation of A.R.S. § 13-3553

would have been seventeen years. This was not an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Pursuant to the statute in effect at the time, A.R.S. § 13-3553 provided that “Sexual

exploitation of a minor is a class 2 felony and if the minor is under fifteen years of age it is

punishable pursuant to § 13-604.01.” A.R.S. § 13-3553 (West 1989). Despite the trial court

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4 The court of appeals did not reach this question as the State failed to assert

this claim in it’s cross-appeal in its brief. 

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finding that the crime was not a dangerous crimes against children4, Petitioner was still

subject to sentencing pursuant to § 13-604.01. Thus, this Court cannot say that the State

courts’ adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d).

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that this claim be dismissed. 

D. Ground Three:

Petitioner argues in Ground Three that the trial court erred by “ruling that the acts

depicted on the tapes were barred by the statute of limitations, but refused to grant the same

ruling on the completed act of possession or to allow the issue to be argued based on the

same law.” (Petition at 8.) 

1. Relevant Facts

Petitioner raised Ground Three in the following pleadings: (1) Motion to Vacate filed

on November 5, 1999 (Ex. T at 164-67), (2) First Petition for PCR (Exs. CC at 256; II at

268-71), (3) Second Petition for PCR (Ex. LL at 289-92), (4) direct appeal opening and reply

briefs (Exs. WW at 396-98; XX at 426-28), (5) Petition for Review by the Court of Appeals

(Ex. § 349-55), (6) Motion for Reconsideration by the Court of Appeals (Ex. BBB at

456-62), and (7) Petition for Review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Ex. DDD at 471-74.)

In his Motion to Vacate and his First and Second Petitions for PCR, Petitioner relied solely

on his argument that, pursuant to A.R.S. §13-107(B), Arizona’s statute of limitations was

triggered in 1989 because, if the State had exercised reasonable diligence, it would have

discovered Petitioner’s possession of child pornography in 1989. (Exs. T at 162; CC at

255-56; II at 268-71; LL at 289-92.) Petitioner did assert in his Motion to Vacate and his

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Petition for Review by the Arizona Supreme Court that United States Supreme Court

precedent would prohibit the State from attempting to justify its inexcusably dilatory filing

of the indictment by attempting to rely on the “doctrine of continuing offenses.” (Ex. T at

164; Ex. DDD at 474.) In his direct appeal, Petitions for Review and Motion for

Reconsideration, Petitioner consistently claimed that the trial court had misinterpreted,

misconstrued, and misapplied Arizona’s state statute of limitations (A.R.S. §13-107). (See

Exs. WW at 396-98; XX at 426-28; § at 351-55; BBB at 456-62; DDD at 471-74.) 

2. Cognizable Federal Claim

Although Petitioner exhausted his statute of limitations claim in the state courts,

Respondents assert that none of these pleadings cited any federal law to support Petitioner’s

claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him for the relevant crimes because

Arizona’s state statute of limitations had expired.

 More importantly, Petitioner does not present any allegation that his conviction was

in violation of federal law in this federal habeas. Petitioner argues only that the trial court

was without jurisdiction, pursuant to the abundantly clear “law in Arizona.” (Petition at 17.)

A violation of state law, however, is not grounds for habeas relief. See Estelle v. Mcguire,

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

state-court determinations on state-law questions; a federal court is limited to deciding

whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States).

Petitioner argues no set of facts that support a federal claim. 

Petitioner does not elaborate in this federal habeas proceeding how the alleged error

by the state courts to find his conviction barred by the appropriate state statute of limitations

presents a cognizable federal claim. Moreover, although Petitioner did argue in his Motion

to Vacate and both his Petition for Review to the Appellate Court and to the Arizona

Supreme Court that the State could not attempt to justify its inexcusably dilatory filing of the

indictment by attempting to rely on the “doctrine of continuing offenses,” citing Supreme

Court cases in support of his claim, (Ex. T at 164; Ex. § at 349-51; Ex. DDD at 474),

Petitioner raises no such claim in his federal habeas. Moreover, even if he had, this claim

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5 Respondents have identified eight sub-claims, A through H, in Petitioner’s

habeas petition. This Court identifies only seven claims, finding that the

sub-claims identified by Respondents as sub-claims D and E are actually

a single claim. To avoid confusion, the Court will refer to the single claim

identified in Respondents’ Answer as D and E as sub-claim “(D,E).” 

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would be procedurally defaulted, as the court of appeals held, in the last reasoned decision

by the state court on this issue, that pursuant to Rule 21.2(a) and 31.2(d), that Petitioner’s

failure to properly appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate judgment barred Petitioner

from raising an argument that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s motion to vacate

judgment. 

Petitioner is challenging the state courts’ application of a state law, not a federal law.

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that this claim be dismissed as failing to

present a cognizable federal claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

E. Ground Four:

Petitioner argues in Ground Four that “[b]oth trial counsel and appellate counsel not

only failed, but refused to raise the constitutional issues that have merit.” (Petition at 9.)

Petitioner raises seven specific claims of ineffectiveness. Petitioner argues that appellate

counsel was ineffective by (A) failing to challenge the trial court’s decision that Petitioner’s

offenses were continuing offenses; and (B) failing to “raise the valid constitutional issues that

Petitioner has filed a plethora of motions on, from 2001 to date.” (Petition, Points and

Authorities, at 17.) Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for: (C) Refusing

Petitioner’s “request to be present at the examination of Laurie Ann (Abate) Ball and L.[B.]”

(Id. at 18); (D,E)5

 learning that the county attorney had withheld exculpatory information

from the Grand Jury, but refusing to ask for a mistrial when Judge Borowiec asked if

Petitioner wished to move for a mistrial (Id.); (F) denying Petitioner’s request to file a special

action or to withdraw from the case after the trial court denied the motion to continue trial

to investigate the statute of limitations issue (Id. at 18-19); (G) failing to challenge the trial

court’s decision that Petitioner’s offenses were continuing offenses (Id. at 17.); and (H)

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failing to “raise the valid constitutional issues that Petitioner has filed a plethora of motions

on, from 2001 to date” (Id.).

1. Relevant Facts

Petitioner raised a claim in his Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief that there

may have been ineffective assistance of counsel in the representation of Petitioner. (Ex. LL

at 288.) No factual assertions were specifically alleged, although Petitioner did allege that

“counsel did not individually or collectively take remedial or corrective measures” “when

[the prosecutor] was transgressing” and “expended considerable energy in asking the court

for permission to be let off the case rather than filing certain post-trial motions.” (Id. at 296-

97.) The trial court denied the claim because Petitioner “failed to specify acts and omissions

of counsel that allegedly constituted that allegedly constituted ineffective assistance,” nor did

Petitioner show “that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. (Ex. RR at 337-38.)

The court also found that Petitioner’s claim was not colorable because Petitioner failed to

demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below the prevailing standards. (Id. at 339.)

Petitioner argued to the court of appeals in his Petition for Review that trial counsel

was inadequate and ineffective, alleging eight new factual allegations of ineffectiveness. (Id.

at 358-60.) The appellate court denied Petitioner’s IAC claims because (1) the court of

appeals agreed with the trial court that Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim of IAC by

stating that he believed there may have been ineffective assistance of counsel without

alleging specifically how counsel had erred; and (2) Petitioner had waived the eight new

claims of IAC by presenting them for the first time to the court of appeals without raising

them first to the trial court. (Ex. ZZ at 450-51.) 

2. Exhaustion/Procedural Default

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, claims (A), (B) were

never raised at any point in the state court proceedings. (See Exs. CC; II; LL; §; DDD.)

Neither did Petitioner raise claim (G), a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge the trial court’s decision that Petitioner’s offenses were continuing offenses while

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the Court of Appeals held that Petitioner’s offenses were completed offenses, in the state

court proceedings. (See Id.) 

Petitioner’s right to direct review having been completed, he would have to present

these claims in an additional petition for post-conviction relief in order to exhaust the claim.

Under Arizona law, a defendant convicted following a trial must file a notice of

post-conviction relief within ninety days of the entry of judgment and sentence or within

thirty days after the issuance of the final order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever

is the later. 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. If Petitioner were to fairly present these issues in

another petition for post-conviction relief, such presentation would be untimely. Moreover,

this claim does not qualify for any of the timeliness exceptions. Rules 32.1 and 32.4(a),

Ariz.R.Crim.P. Such a new petition, therefore, would be subject to summary dismissal.

State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266 (App.1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432 (App.1995);

Moreno v. Gonzales, 192 Ariz. 131, 135 (1998) (timeliness is a separate inquiry from

preclusion). Moreover, Petitioner would be precluded from raising these claims in another

petition for post-conviction relief. Rule 32.2(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. These claims, therefore, are

procedurally defaulted. Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir.2000) (federal

habeas review is precluded where prisoner has not raised his claim in the state courts and the

time for doing so has expired). 

Accordingly, federal habeas review of claims (A), (B), and (G) of Ground One is

barred absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004); Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. 

3. Procedural Bar/Procedural Default

The state courts imposed a procedural bar to avoid reaching the merits of claims

(C),(D,E),(F) and (H). (See Exs. § at 358-60; ZZ at 450-51.) This constitutes an

independent and adequate state law ground barring federal review. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802-

05. Because Petitioner presented claims (C),(D,E),(F) and (H) in a procedurally defective

manner, these five claims are procedurally defaulted. 

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The Magistrate Judge finds that the State court’s preclusionary ruling is an

independent and adequate procedural bar. Because the procedural bar is adequate and

independent, federal review of this claim is foreclosed unless Petitioner can demonstrate

cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

F. Cause and Prejudice

As discussed in detail above, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted the claims asserted

in Grounds One and Four. Additionally, while the Magistrate Judge finds that Petitioner fails

to raise a federal claim in Ground Three, as an alternative ruling, the Magistrate Judge finds

that Ground Three is also procedurally defaulted. 

Petitioner's status as an inmate and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute cause

for his failure to present any of his grounds for relief to the Arizona courts. Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.1986)(finding that an illiterate pro se

petitioner's lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default);

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.1988)(finding that petitioner's arguments

concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse lawyers did not constitute cause).

Petitioner asserts, as to Ground One, that it is a violation of Due Process to hold that

Petitioner is barred from exercising his Constitutional rights by holding that he is

procedurally barred because Arizona will not allow hybrid representation and has refused to

allow Petitioner to present his issues. (Doc. No. 13 at 1-2.) Petitioner asserts, as to Ground

Three, that trial counsel and appellate counsel failed to properly pursue this violation and

both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in their representation of Petitioner. (Id. at

4.) Petitioner asserts as to Ground Four, that Petitioner tried repeatedly to have these

constitutional issues heard by the courts to no avail. (Id.) Petitioner asserts that, Petitioner’s

motion, filed on July 31, 2003, for removal of counsel and appointment of new counsel, or

in the alternative allow Petitioner to proceed pro se, was denied by the Court of Appeals. (Id.

at 5.) 

If ineffective assistance of counsel is asserted as cause, it must have first been

presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause

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for a procedural default. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-53 (2000) Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 489-90; Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.1988). An

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that is itself procedurally defaulted cannot constitute

cause unless the petitioner establishes cause and prejudice for the default of the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. Carpenter, 529 U.S. at 453. 

Because Petitioner procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of counsel claims

in state court, Petitioner cannot now assert ineffective assistance of counsel to establish cause

for the default. Post-conviction counsel's action or inaction cannot be cause to excuse a

procedural default, because Petitioner has no right to effective assistance of post-conviction

counsel. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555 (1987); Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir.1993).

Furthermore, despite Petitioner’s assertion as to Ground Four, that Petitioner tried repeatedly

to have these constitutional issues heard by the courts to no avail, Petitioner, acting pro se,

was the cause for the procedural default by failing to raise more than a general claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel in his petition for post-conviction relief, resulting in the

appellate court’s ruling that Petitioner waived the more specific claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel by raising them for the first time in the petition for review. Petitioner

asserts that, Petitioner’s motion, filed on July 31, 2003, for removal of counsel and

appointment of new counsel, or in the alternative allow Petitioner to proceed pro se, was

denied by the Court of Appeals. (Doc. No. 13 at 5.) This argument is specious, however,

as Petitioner, acting pro se, filed both his petition for post-conviction relief and petition for

review in which he procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The

only thing preventing Petitioner from raising the ineffective assistance of counsel claims was

Petitioner’s failure to include them in his petitions. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause for the procedurally defaulted claims. 

Likewise, Petitioner has not satisfied the "fundamental miscarriage of justice"

standard. Additionally, Petitioner has not presented any new reliable evidence to support any

assertion of innocence which would allow this court to consider these claims as a ground for

a writ of habeas corpus in spite of the procedural default. Because petitioner has not

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presented any new reliable evidence that he is innocent of these crimes, a miscarriage of

justice will not occur if the court declined to review the procedurally defaulted claims on the

merits.

G. Supplemental Petition

Petitioner has also filed "Supplemental Filing of Points and Authorities in Support of

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254" (Doc. No. 8), and a second

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 18). The Court ordered both documents

stricken from the record, and allowed Petitioner an additional 30 days to file a motion to

amend and lodge a proposed amended petition with the Clerk of Court. No motion to amend

nor proposed amended petition was received by the Court. 

Petitioner filed a “Motion to Supplement and Clarify” arguing that Doc. No. 8 was not

an attempt to amend, but to address the issues in CA-98000345 “per Judge Bury’s order.”

This Court, in its order striking the supplement, recognized that Petitioner was attempting

to raise issues in the supplement that he had attempted to raise in CV 07-479-TUC-DCB.

(Doc. No. 19 at 2.) Accordingly, this Court informed Petitioner of how the Supplement,

more properly construed as an attempt to amend the Petition, failed to conform with the

Local Rules regarding amended petitions, and reproduced the Local Rule to Petitioner in the

order explaining to Petitioner how to file a motion for leave to amend and lodge a proposed

amended petition pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) and LRCiv 15.1. The Court further

explained in detail how the Supplement failed to conform to local rules requiring that

petitions for writs of habeas corpus be signed and submitted on forms approved by the Court.

(Doc. No. 19 at 3.) This Court further put petitioner on notice that a party who moves for

leave to amend a pleading must lodge with the Clerk of Court an original of the proposed

amended pleading, which is not to incorporate by reference any part of the preceding

pleading, and that, once amended, the original no longer performs any function as a pleading

and cannot be utilized to aid a defective amendment. (Id.) The Supplement was ordered

stricken and Petitioner was granted 30 days to file a motion to amend and lodge with the

Clerk of Court a proposed amended petition. (Id. at 4.) The Court further explained that the

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Second Petition would be stricken for failure to serve Respondents, and that, as an attempt

to amend the supplement or amend the pleading, after the answer was filed, it failed to

conform with Rule 15(a), requiring Petitioner to seek the written consent of the opposing

party or the court’s leave to amend its pleading. 

Petitioner now argues that he has no access to the Federal Rules, therefore “it is

impossible to know the rules, let alone follow them.” Petitioner also asserts that it was his

understanding of District Judge Bury’s order to allow both State convictions to be pursued

in this habeas and to “liberally consider petitioner’s filings, reinstate the supplemental filing,

or allow a new supplement to be filed, and as a last resort allow a new 28 U.S.C. § 54 be filed

challenging the retrial in CR 98000345 only.” (Doc. No. 22.) While this Court agrees with

Petitioner’s characterization of District Judge Bury’s order, the Magistrate Judge

acknowledged such purpose in its order (See Doc. No. 19 at 2), and further explained in

detail the reasons the Supplement and Second Petition were defective, and what Petitioner

needed to do to conform with both the Federal Rules and Local Rules. Additionally, the

Magistrate Judge directed the Clerk of Court to send Petitioner Instructions for Filing a

Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody

in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. (Doc. No. 19 at 5.) Petitioner

failed to comply with this Court’s order. Accordingly, this Court recommends that the relief

requested by Petitioner in his Motion to Supplement and Clarify be DENIED. This Court

recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of the record, dismiss this

action in its entirety. 

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IV. RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the relief requested by Petitioner in his Motion

to Supplement and Clarify be DENIED. 

The Magistrate Judge further recommends that the District Court, after its independent

review of the record, DISMISS this action in its entirety. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may

respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy thereof.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number:

CIV 07-0491-TUC-DCB.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir)(2003).

DATED this 27th day of October, 2009.

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