Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01655/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01655-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLIFFORD J. BOURGEOIS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 15cv1655-GPC(BLM)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Dkt. Nos. 6, 8.) 

v.

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC,

et al.,

Defendants.

Before the Court are Defendants Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”);

Western Progressive, LLC (“Western”); Ahmad Ansari (“Ansari”); Amit Mishra

(“Mishra”), and Tammy Versluis’ (“Versluis”) motion to dismiss the complaint, (Dkt.

No. 6), and Defendant The Law Offices of Les Zieve’s (“LOLZ”) motion to dismiss the

complaint, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement. (Dkt. No. 13.) Plaintiff

Clifford Bourgeois (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed an opposition. (Dkt. No. 10.) 

A reply was filed by all Defendants. (Dkt. Nos. 12, 13.) After a review of the briefs,

the pleading, and applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Background

According to the complaint, on April 17, 2012, Plaintiffreceived a dunning letter

from Ocwen demanding payment for an alleged debt of $139,142.25. (Dkt. No. 1,

Compl. ¶ 20.) On April 27, 2012, Plaintiff sent a dispute/debt validation letter to

Ocwen which it received on April 30, 2012. (Id. ¶ 21.) Since April 30, 2012, Plaintiff

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claims Ocwen has not validated the alleged debt amount. (Id. ¶ 22.) In the past twelve

months, Plaintiff claims that Ocwen sent at least six letters demanding payment and

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reported to all three credit reporting agencies. (Id. ¶ 23.) Therefore, Plaintiff alleges

Ocwen is collecting on a debt without properly validating the alleged debt violating 15

U.S.C. § 1692g(b). (Id.) 

On March 3, 2015, Plaintiff received a demand letter from Defendant Mishra

disguised as a loan modification application. (Id. ¶ 24.) On May 17, 19 and 26, 2015,

Plaintiff received three demand letters from Defendant Ansari. (Id. ¶ 25.) On June 10,

2015, Plaintiff received a demand letter from Defendant Versluis. (Id. ¶ 26.) 

In January 2013, Plaintiff sent a dispute/debt validating letter to Defendants

LOLZ and Western. (Id. ¶ 27.) On July 15, 2015, Plaintiff received a demand letter

from LOLZ and Western. (Id.) 

In addition, in late 2012, Plaintiff disputed Ocwen’s trade lines with the three

major credit reporting agencies. (Id. ¶ 30.) In December 2014, Ocwen removed the

dispute noting that it had been “resolved” but Ocwen never provided Plaintiff with the

results of any investigation and Plaintiff and Ocwen never agreed to resolve the

dispute. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he continues to dispute Ocwen’s trade line since it

has never been “resolved.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Ocwen failed to perform a

reasonable reinvestigation and improperly removed a consumer initiated dispute on the

trade lines and “knowingly and willfully continued to furnish unverified,

unauthenticated and inaccurate information to the credit reporting agenciesfor the past

24 months” in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2(b). (Id. ¶ 31.) 

Plaintiff alleges causes of action for violation of the Fair Debt Collection

Practices (“FDCPA”) and California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“RFDCPA”), California Civil Code section 1788.30b as to all Defendants, and

violation of the Federal Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) as to Defendant Ocwen only.

It is not clear whether Plaintiff is referencing the past twelve months since the

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complaint was filed or the twelve months after he sent the dispute letter. 

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(Id. at 9-10.) 

Discussion

A. Legal Standard on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory

orsufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Under Rule 8(a)(2), the plaintiff is required

only to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief,” and “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). 

A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if, taking all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true, it contains enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “In sum, for

a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and

reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim

entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

2009) (quotations omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as

true all facts alleged in the complaint, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of

the plaintiff. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standards than those drafted by

attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). However, pro se litigants are

not excused from knowing the most basic pleading requirements.” American Assoc.

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of Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless

the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,

957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well

Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to

amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See Desoto, 957 F.2d at

658; Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401. 

B. Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

All Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that they are “debt

collectors” as defined under the FDCPA. Second, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff

has not sufficiently presented allegations concerning the alleged debt dispute. Third,

Defendants contend that the claims alleged as to 2012 and 2013 are barred by the one

year statute of limitations. Lastly, Defendants Ansari, Mishra and Ocwen argue that

the claims under § 1692e(9) fail. Plaintiff opposes arguing the pleading standard

should be more relaxed since he is proceeding pro se. 

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First, Defendants argue that the complaint fails to properly allege that they are

“debt collectors” subject to the FDCPA. Plaintiff does not directly address whether

each Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined under the FDCPA. 

The Ninth Circuit has interpreted “debt collector” to mean “1) ‘any person who

uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the

principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts,’ and (2) any person ‘who

regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or

asserted to be owed or due another.’” Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 720 F.3d

In his opposition, Plaintiff also attached documentsin support of his opposition. 

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However, on a motion to dismiss the court considers only the allegations in the

“pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters properly subject to judicial

notice.” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1040 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Akhtar

v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)). Therefore, the Court declines to

consider the attached documents as part of Plaintiff’s opposition. 

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1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)). In Schlegel, the Ninth

Circuit concluded that a complaint must provide a factual basis from which a court can

plausibly infer that the principal purpose of the defendant’s businessis debt collection. 

Id. (allegation that debt collection was some part of the defendant’s business is

insufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA). 

In this case, the complaint merely asserts the each of the Defendant is a “debt

collector” without any additional facts. (Dtk. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 10-15.) This allegation

does not sufficiently allege that Defendants’ principal purpose is collecting debts or

that they regularly engage in debt collection owed to another. See Schlegel, 720 F.3d

at 1208. 

The complaint also alleges that Ocwen is a debt collector since it fails the “loan

servicer exception” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). (Dkt. No. 1, Comp. ¶ 18.) 

Debt collector does not include “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt

owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity . . . (iii)

concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person. .

. .” 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6)(F)(iii). 

However, as Defendant Ocwen argues, Plaintiff does not plead any facts that his

debt was in default when Ocwen obtained the debt. See Cochran v. The Bank of New

York Mellon Trust Company N.A., CV 15-3209-GHK (JCx), 2015 WL 4573890, at *3

(C.D. Cal. July 29, 2015) (Ocwen does not quality for the § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) exemption

because Plaintiff alleged that at the time the deeds of trust were transferred over to the

Defendants, they were in default). Here, absent any allegation that the debt was in

default at the time it was obtained by Ocwen, Plaintiff cannot sufficiently claim that

Ocwen is a “debt collector.” The Court concludes that the complaint fails to allege

facts to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that Defendants are debt

collectors. See Schlegel, 720 F.3d at 1208. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failing to properly allege that Defendants are “debt

collectors” as defined under the FDCPA. 

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Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege facts

regarding the alleged debt dispute for several reasons. Plaintiff does not address this

argument. 

The complaint alleges Defendants Ocwen, LOLZ and Western violated 15

U.S.C. § 1692g(b). That section provides, 

If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the

thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the

debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests

the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall

cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the

debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment,

or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such

verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor,

is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. Collection activities

and communications that do not otherwise violate this subchapter may

continue during the 30-day period referred to in subsection (a) of this

section unless the consumer has notified the debt collector in writing

that the debt, or any portion of the debt, is disputed or that the

consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor.

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). In addition, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the debt is a

consumer debt. Bloom v. I.C. Sys, Inc., 972 F.2d 1067, 1068 (9th Cir. 1992); see also

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 

Defendants assert the complaint does not alleged debt dispute is consumer debt

subject to the statute. The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not alleged that the alleged

debt is a consumer debt. 

Next, Defendants contend that the Plaintiff’s use of the word “validated” fails

to meet the Twonbly/Iqbal standard since the word “validated” is not in the language

of § 1692g(b). However, Plaintiff also uses the word “dispute” letter which is

contained in the statute. Moreover, in liberally construing his pro se complaint, it can

be plausibly inferred that Plaintiff’s use of the word “Dispute/Debt Validation” letter,

(Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 21, 27), is referencing the dispute and verification provisions

in § 1692g(b). Defendants’ argument concerning Plaintiff’s use of “validation” is

without merit. 

Furthermore, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not provided facts to explain

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what happened and what specifically Ocwen failed to do under the statute. See Chavez

v. Access Capital Servs., Inc., No. 13cv1037 AWI-GSA, 2014 WL 2716876, at *5

(E.D. Cal. June 16, 2014) (dismissing allegation for violation of §1692g(b) because

complaint only alleged that Plaintiff sent Defendant’s office a debt validation letter,

and that Plaintiff subsequently received a phone message from Defendant that it was

a debtor collector who was attempting to collect a debt). In this case, the complaint

fails to describe the nature of the alleged debt, and other details surrounding Ocwen

and Western’s failure to comply with § 1692g(b). Based on these reasons, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failing to provide sufficient facts

concerning the alleged debt. 

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Third, Defendants contend that the claims are barred by the statute oflimitations. 

Plaintiff does not address this argument. The FDCPA has a one year statute of

limitations from “the date on which the violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). 

Plaintiff asserts that in response to a dunning letter dated April 11, 2012, he sent his

validation dispute letters to Ocwen on April 27, 2012, (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 21), and

sent a dispute/debt validation letter to LOLZ and Western in January 2013. (Id. ¶ 27.)

These allegations concerning events that occurred in 2012 and 2013 may be

barred by the one year statute of limitations. However, Plaintiff also makes allegations

asto allegedly improper letters sent by Defendants Ocwen, Amit, Ahmad, and Tammy

in 2015. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 23-26.) Since the complaint will be dismissed and

Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint to provide additional facts,

the Court declines to rule on the issue of the statute of limitations at this time.

Lastly, the complaint alleges that the demand letters from Defendants Ocwen,

Amit and Ahmad included the logo, motto and web address of the “Making Home

Western also argues that it should be dismissed because courts have routinely

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found that Western does not qualify as a “debt collector” and cites to Tapang v. Well

Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 WL 3778965, at *1, 5 (N.D. Cal. 2012). However, the Tanang

case does not state the proposition advanced by Defendants. In Tanang, the district

court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FDCPA claim because Plaintiff had

not sufficiently alleged the Defendants, including Western, were debt collectors.

Accordingly, Western’s argument is without merit. 

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Affordable Program” which gives the least sophisticated consumerthe false impression

that the U.S. government has authorized and approved the requirement of paying an

unvalidated debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(9). (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 28.)

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(9) states that the “use or distribution of any written

communication which simulates or isfalsely represented to be a document authorized,

issued, or approved by any court, official, or agency of the United States or any State,

or which creates a false impression as to its source, authorization, or approval” is a

violation of the false or misleading representations section. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(9). 

Defendants Ocwen, Amit and Ahmad argue that the complaint, as a threshold

matter, fails to sufficiently allege that they are debt collectors and fails to assert facts

that Plaintiff’s debt was “invalidated.” The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not

sufficiently alleged that Defendants are “debt collectors” and to provide sufficient facts

surrounding the failure of Defendants to “validate” the alleged debt. Therefore, a cause

of action under § 1692e(9) fails. 

Based on the above, the Court GRANTS all Defendants’ motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim on the FDCPA cause of action. 

C. Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

All Defendants argue that since Plaintiff alleges that his claim is based wholly

on the FDCPA claim, the Rosenthal state cause of action must also fail. Plaintiff does

not address this claim. 

The complaint states that “[b]ecause all Defendants violated portions of the

FDCPA and as these portions are incorporated by reference in the Rosenthal Act, all

Defendants are in violation of CCC 1788.17.” (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 29.) Since

Plaintiff’s RFDCPA claims are based on the same allegations asthe FDCPA, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Rosenthal Act cause of action. See

Cochran, 2015 WL 4573890 at *5 (dismissing RFDCPA claim because the plaintiff

failed to properly plead a FDCPA claim); Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097,

1100 (9th Cir. 2012) (the Rosenthal Act “mimics or incorporates by reference the

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FDCPA’s requirements”). 

D. Federal Credit Reporting Act

Defendant Ocwen argues that there are numerousreasons why Plaintiff has failed

to state a claim against Ocwen. Specifically, Ocwen assertsthat Plaintiff does not state

what the nature of the dispute was and what information was inaccurate, there are no

allegations that the provisions of §1681s-2(b) were triggered, and there is no

requirement that Ocwen report back to the consumer concerning any investigation. 

Plaintiff does not address this claim in his opposition. 

The complaint cites to 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) which states, 

(b) Duties of furnishers of information upon notice of dispute

(1) In general

After receiving notice pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title of a

dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information

provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency, the person shall

– . . . .

(E) if an item of information disputed by a consumer is found to be

inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified after any

reinvestigation under paragraph (1), for purposes of reporting to a

consumer reporting agency only, as appropriate, based on the results

of the reinvestigation promptly-- 

(i) modify that item of information;

(ii) delete that item of information; or 

(iii) permanently block the reporting of that item of information. 

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) (emphasis in original). 

Plaintiff asserts that in late 2012, he disputed Ocwen’s “trade lines with the 3

major credit reporting agencies.” (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 30.) “In December 2014,

Ocwen removed my disputes noting my dispute has been ‘resolved’ but never provided

the results of any investigation to Plaintiff and both parties never agreed to resolve the

dispute.” (Id.) In addition, Ocwen failed to perform a reasonable investigation and

improperly removed a consumer initiated dispute on the trade line. (Id. ¶ 31.) He

further alleges that “they have knowingly and willfully continued to furnish unverified,

unauthenticated and inaccurate information to the credit reporting agenciesfor the past

24 months.” (Id.) 

First, Ocwen alleges that the complaint does not provide facts to explain why the

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information reported by it was “inaccurate”. The Court agreesthat Defendant does not

have notice regarding the reasons why Plaintiff disputed the trade lines. Accordingly,

the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failing to provide sufficient

facts to demonstrate Plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

Second, Defendants argue that the provisions of § 1681s-2(b) are not triggered

until the credit reporting agencies notify the furnisher that a consumer disputes

information about a debt. See Wang v. Asset Acceptance, No. C 09-4797 SI, 2010 WL

2985503, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2010). The duties under 1681s-2(b)(2) arises “only

after the furnisher [sourcesthat provide credit information to creditreporting agencies]

receives notice of dispute from a CRA; notice of a dispute received directly from the

consumer does nottrigger furnishers’ duties under subsection (b).” Gorman v. Wolpoff

& Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The complaint does not allege that Ocwen was notified by any credit reporting

agency of the dispute. See Kilcullen v. Select Portfolio Serv., Inc., No. 11cv2657-

BEN(DHB), 2012 WL 1667150, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 2012) (granting Defendant’s

motion to dismiss because complaint did not allege facts whether defendant received

a notice of dispute from a credit reporting agency to trigger its obligations under

subsection (b)). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Ocwen’s motion to

dismiss on this ground. 

Lastly, Defendants argue that § 1681s-2(b) does not require furnishers of credit

information, such as Ocwen, to report back to the consumer but all reporting

requirements flow to the consumer reporting agency. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(2)

(a “person shall complete all investigations . . . to the consumer reporting agency. . .

.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(C) (“report the results of the investigation to the consumer

reporting agency”). Therefore, any allegation that Ocwen was required to provide the

results of any investigation to Plaintiff does not support a cause of action under the

FCRA. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Ocwen’s motion to dismiss the

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FCRA cause of action. 

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court GRANTS all Defendants’ motion to dismiss with

leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before November 4,

2015. The hearing set for October 16, 2015 shall be vacated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 14, 2015

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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