Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01401/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01401-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 490
Nature of Suit: Cable/ Satellite TV
Cause of Action: 47:553 Unauthorized Reception of Cable Service

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOE HAND PROMOTIONS, INC., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AARON SCOTT TOTO, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-01401-KJM-CKD 

ORDER 

Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. (JH) moves to reopen this case, which the Clerk’s 

Office closed after the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal. The matter was submitted without a 

hearing. The motion is denied. 

I. BACKGROUND 

JH filed a complaint in this court in July 2015. It alleged the defendants had 

intercepted and displayed the “Ultimate Fighting Championship 175: Chris Weidman v. Lyoto 

Machida,” without a license in violation of 47 U.S.C. §§ 605, 553, and California law. ECF 

No. 1. In March of this year, JH filed a notice of settlement, ECF No. 31, and the parties filed a 

stipulation of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii), ECF No. 33. In light 

of this dismissal, the Clerk’s Office closed the case on April 1, 2016. ECF No. 34. 

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About a month later, JH moved to reopen the case and enforce the settlement 

agreement. ECF No. 35. Counsel explained in a declaration that the defendants have not 

complied with the terms of the settlement agreement, but does not explain the nature of the 

alleged breach. The defendants oppose the motion to re-open, ECF No. 36, and JH replied, ECF 

No. 37. 

II. DISCUSSION 

The words of the Supreme Court in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.

apply here with full force: 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only 

that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to 

be expanded by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a cause 

lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing 

the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. 

The dismissal in this case issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii), which provides for dismissal “by filing a 

stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in 

the action,” and causes that dismissal to be with prejudice if (as 

here) the stipulation so specifies. Neither the Rule nor any 

provision of law provides for jurisdiction of the court over disputes 

arising out of an agreement that produces the stipulation. 

. . . 

The short of the matter is this: The suit involves a claim for breach 

of a contract, part of the consideration for which was dismissal of 

an earlier federal suit. No federal statute makes that connection (if 

it constitutionally could) the basis for federal-court jurisdiction over 

the contract dispute. 

511 U.S. 375, 377–78, 381 (1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

It is true that “the trial court has power to summarily enforce on motion a 

settlement agreement entered into by the litigants while the litigation is pending before it.” In re 

City Equities Anaheim, Ltd., 22 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Autera v. Robinson, 419 

F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). But here the case is not pending, but closed. The court 

therefore lacks jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement. 

JH argues correctly in its reply brief that the court may grant a motion to re-open 

settled litigation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) if one of the parties repudiates the 

settlement agreement. Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 n.11 (9th Cir. 2007); Keeling v. 

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Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local Union 162, 937 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1991). The 

decision is discretionary. Keeling, 937 F.2d at 410. Yet JH has not demonstrated the defendants 

here have repudiated the settlement agreement. See, e.g., Menefield v. Yates, No. 10-2406, 2012 

WL 5288796, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2012) (denying a motion to re-open settled litigation under 

Rule 60(b) where the evidence did not establish repudiation), aff’d, 551 F. App’x 364 (9th Cir. 

2014). Rather JH’s motion is supported by a one-page declaration with one bare statement: 

“Defendants have not complied with the terms of the settlement agreement . . . .” Riley Decl. ¶ 5, 

ECF No. 35-1. 

“In the usual course upon repudiation of a settlement agreement, the frustrated 

party may sue anew for breach of the agreement and may not, as here, reopen the underlying 

litigation after dismissal.” Keeling, 937 F.2d at 410. Only “extraordinary circumstances” justify 

the reopening of a settled case due to repudiation. See id. No extraordinary circumstances here 

warrant a departure from the ordinary rule, enforcement of contract under state law in a separate 

action. 

III. CONCLUSION 

The motion to re-open this case is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 20, 2016. 

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