Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00595/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00595-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Marvin A. Saunders, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV-08-595-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 

 In a memorandum decision dated May 12, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment affirming Defendant’s denial of social security 

benefits to Plaintiff. Doc. 31-1. The Court of Appeals held that the ALJ improperly 

discredited Plaintiff’s pain and symptom testimony and erred in determining his RFC, in 

part by erroneously rejecting the opinions of treating physicians in favor of a non-treating 

source. Id. at 2-9. The case has been remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 2, 5. 

 Plaintiff has filed a motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to 

Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Doc. 26. The motion is fully briefed. Docs. 

28, 32. Oral argument has not been requested. For reasons stated below, the motion will 

be denied. 

 The EAJA “authorizes federal courts to award attorneys’ fees, court costs, and 

other expenses when a party prevails against the United States, although fee-shifting is 

not mandatory.” Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff is a 

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prevailing party because this matter has been remanded for further proceedings. See 

Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court should award 

reasonable attorneys’ fees under the EAJA unless Defendant shows that his position in 

this case was “substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 

 To meet the “substantially justified” standard, Defendant’s position need not be 

“justified to a high degree.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Rather, it 

need only be “‘justified in substance or in the main’ – that is, justified to a degree that 

could satisfy a reasonable person.” Id. For reasons stated by Judge Murguia in affirming 

the ALJ’s decision (Doc. 20), and by Judge Bea in his dissent (Doc. 31-1 at 6-9), the 

Court finds Defendant’s position in this case, as a whole, to be substantially justified. 

Stated differently, although not correct, the position is such that “a reasonable person 

could think it correct[.]” Pierce, 478 U.S. at 566 n.2; see Le v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1200, 

1201 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 The Court recognizes that Defendant’s “string of successes” in this case is not 

dispositive of the substantial justification inquiry. Pierce, 478 U.S. at 569. But the 

opinions of Judges Murguia and Bea clearly constitute objective indicia of substantial 

justification. See id.; Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1231 (9th 

Cir. 1990); Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2002); Gonzales v. Free 

Speech Coalition, 408 F.3d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 2005). More importantly, the actual merits 

of Defendant’s position presented a “genuine dispute” as to whether Plaintiff was 

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Pierce, 478 U.S. at 565. 

 Plaintiff notes that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence 

(Doc. 32 at 2), but this does not mandate a fee award under the EAJA. In short, the Court 

finds Defendant’s “position as a whole substantially justified, albeit not ultimately 

adequate to sustain the agency’s decision.” Al-Harbi v. I.N.S., 284 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th 

Cir. 2002). The Court will exercise its discretion and deny the motion for attorneys’ fees. 

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See Pierce, 478 U.S. at 557-63. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees (Doc. 26) is denied. 

 Dated this 22nd day of July, 2011. 

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