Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08321/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08321-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ngoc Lam Pham,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-08321-PCT-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 

1). The Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. (Doc. 10). Petitioner filed objections to the R&R (Doc. 11); Respondents filed a 

reply to the objections (Doc. 12).

I. Review of R&R

This Court “may accept, reject or modify in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court 

must review the Magistrate Judge’s findings de novo only if a party objects to the 

Magistrate Judge’s findings or recommendations. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). However, if no party objects to any fact or issue, the 

district court is not required to engage in “any review at all ....” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 

140, 149 (1985). Accordingly, the Court will review de novo the portions of the R&R to 

which Petitioner has objected.

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II. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

In his habeas petition, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief: (1) ineffective 

assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment due to his attorney’s “fail[ure] to 

investigate Heather Crawford and her job as an informant for the police . . . and to obtain 

dashcam video of [his] interaction with [the] police”; (2) prosecutorial misconduct due to 

the prosecution’s “charge of money laundering [that] should never have been brought 

forward”; and (3) the prosecution’s refusal to disclose evidence favorable to him as 

required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 6–8). 

The Magistrate Judge found that each of these grounds were procedurally barred 

because Petitioner had not fairly presented them in state court. (Doc. 10 at 8–10). 

Additionally, the Magistrate Judge rejected Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim 

because Petitioner relied on an incorrect interpretation of the Arizona statute for money 

laundering. (Id. at 9). Finally, the Magistrate Judge found no excuse for Petitioner’s 

procedural defaults. (Id. at 10). 

III. Procedural Background

On September 28, 2015, a jury found Petitioner guilty of four counts: (1) first degree 

money laundering; (2) sale of a dangerous drug (methamphetamine); (3) use of wire or 

electronic communication in a drug-related transaction; and (4) possession or use of drug 

paraphernalia (methamphetamine). (Doc. 8-1 at 115, 118). Petitioner’s attorney filed notice 

of appeal, requesting that the Arizona Court of Appeals “search the record for reversible 

error” despite having not found any “error or [] arguable question of law” himself. (Id. at 

140, 143–49). Petitioner received the opportunity to file a pro se brief stating his own issues

for appeal, but he did not. (Id. at 155). On June 14, 2016, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

affirmed his convictions. (Id. at 154–58). Petitioner neither filed a timely motion for 

rehearing nor a timely petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id. at 153). 

On August 8, 2016, Petitioner filed notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 8-2 at 

3). Petitioner was appointed counsel who, despite finding no “claims for relief,” requested 

that the court search the record for “clearly apparent,” “fundamental error.” (Id. at 3–4). 

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Counsel also requested that Petitioner be allowed to file a pro se petition. On January 10, 

2017, Petitioner timely filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Id. at 8–21). He 

raised five grounds for relief: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) lack of facts establishing the 

“second prong” of his money laundering count; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

who failed to object to the money laundering count; (4) ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel who refused to assert a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness; and (5) violation of 

his equal protection rights due to a “fundamentally deficient” trial. (Id. at 8–21). The 

Yavapai County Superior Court, finding no “basis for post-conviction relief,” denied his 

petition on May 11, 2017. (Id. at 31–32). The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed that

decision, finding no abuse of discretion. (Doc. 8-3 at 37–38) (“we grant review and deny 

relief”). The Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. (Doc. 1 at 3).

IV. Legal Standard 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless it appears that 

“the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the [s]tate,” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1)(A), giving the state full “opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged 

violations of the petitioner’s federal rights, Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). This 

means that the petitioner must “fairly present” his claims to the state’s courts, or else he 

will be procedurally barred from relief in federal court. Id. “Where a defendant has 

procedurally defaulted a claim [by failing to exhaust state court remedies], the claim may 

be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual 

‘prejudice’ or that he is ‘actually innocent.’” U.S. v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998)). 

A showing of “cause” ordinarily requires the petitioner to show that some external 

factor prevented him from exhausting state court remedies. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 

F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). However, a valid cause to overcome procedural default 

may include attorney error if such error “amounted to a depravation of the constitutional 

right to counsel.” Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2065 (2017). Such an ineffective 

assistance claim “requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 

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not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment . . . 

[and] that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A court may excuse procedural default of an ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel claim if such claim is “substantial” and if such claim was not 

exhausted in state court due to ineffective assistance of counsel in an initial-review 

collateral proceeding by failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Martinez v. 

Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 14 (2012). The heightened stakes at trial and high degree of deference 

that appellate courts give to trial findings justify increased scrutiny of the trial stage to 

ensure that no trial error “will escape review altogether.” Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2066–67. 

Here, Petitioner failed to exhaust his claims in state court as found by the R&R. 

Petitioner does not object to this conclusion. However, he attempts to recast his claims as 

effective assistance of trial counsel claims in an effort to obtain an evidentiary hearing to 

attempt to excuse his failure to exhaust under Martinez. 

For Petitioner to rely on ineffective assistance of counsel to excuse his failure to 

exhaust, he must make three showings. Specifically, “Martinez made clear that a reviewing 

court must determine whether the petitioner’s attorney in the first collateral proceeding was 

ineffective under Strickland, whether the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel is substantial, and whether there is prejudice.” Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 

1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

750 (1991). The Sexton court went on to explain:

To establish that PCR counsel was ineffective, Sexton must show that trial 

counsel was likewise ineffective, and that PCR counsel’s failure to raise trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness in the PCR proceeding fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness. If trial counsel was not ineffective, then Sexton 

would not be able to show that PCR counsel’s failure to raise claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel was such a serious error that PCR 

counsel “was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed” by the Sixth 

Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Sexton, 679 F.3d at 1159.

Under the first of the three showings (that post-conviction relief counsel was 

ineffective) Sexton holds, 

To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, [Petitioner] must 

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show: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient 

performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Ben–

Sholom v. Ayers, 674 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012). “To establish deficient 

performance,” as the Supreme Court recently summarized in Premo v. 

Moore, “a person challenging a conviction must show that counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” ––– U.S. 

––––, 131 S.Ct. 733, 739 (2011) (internal citation and quotation marks 

omitted). We strongly presume “that counsel’s representation was within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. To establish 

“prejudice,” a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id.

Sexton, 679 F.3d at 1159-60.

To make the second of the three showings, to establish cause to overcome his 

procedural default, Petitioner must show that his ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

claim is substantial. Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14 (“To overcome the default, a prisoner must 

also demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a 

substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some 

merit. Cf. Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (describing standards for certificates 

of appealability to issue).”). 

Finally, to make the last showing, “[t]o demonstrate “prejudice,” a habeas petitioner 

must establish that the constitutional errors worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. Schneider, 

674 F.3d at 1153.” Sexton, 679 F.3d 1158 (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted).

Typically, following Sexton’s guidance, the Court would first consider whether the 

ineffective assistance of post-conviction relief counsel claim survives Strickland. And, as 

Sexton notes, post-conviction relief counsel would not be ineffective for failing to raise a 

meritless ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Sexton, 679 F.3d at 1159. Thus, the 

most pragmatic approach is to determine whether there was a worthwhile ineffectiveassistance-of trial counsel claim for post-conviction-relief counsel to raise. See 

Runningeagle v. Ryan, 825 F.3d 970, 982 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Although the prejudice at issue 

is that in PCR proceedings, this is a recursive standard. It requires the reviewing court to 

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assess trial counsel’s as well as PCR counsel’s performance. This is because, for us to find 

a reasonable probability that PCR counsel prejudiced a petitioner by failing to raise a triallevel IAC claim, we must also find a reasonable probability that the trial-level IAC claim 

would have succeeded had it been raised.”)

However, in Ramirez, the Court of Appeals criticized this approach; stating that it 

is incorrect to consider the merits of the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in 

some cases without evidentiary development. Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F.3d 1230, 1242 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (“The district court erred by conducting a full merits review of Mr. Ramirez’s 

underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on an undeveloped record. The 

district court skipped to a conclusion on the merits of the ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claim, thereby holding Ramirez to a higher burden than required in the Martinez

procedural default context.”). Specifically, the Court of Appeals was critical of this Court 

for not requiring only a substantial showing of ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel. 

The Court of Appeals set forth the test as follows:

Thus, to establish “cause” under Martinez—the first part of 

establishing “cause and prejudice” to excuse a procedural default—Ramirez 

must demonstrate that post-conviction counsel was ineffective under 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 

362, 377 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by McKinney, 813 F.3d 

at 819. In turn, Strickland requires demonstrating “that both (a) postconviction counsel’s performance was deficient, and (b) there was a 

reasonable probability that, absent the deficient performance, the result of 

the post-conviction proceedings would have been different.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Determining whether there was a reasonable probability that the 

result of the post-conviction proceedings would be different “is necessarily 

connected to the strength of the argument that trial counsel’s assistance was 

ineffective.” Id.

To establish “prejudice” under Martinez’s second prong of the “cause 

and prejudice” analysis, Ramirez must demonstrate that his underlying 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is “substantial.” Id. In Martinez, 

the Supreme Court defined substantial to be a “claim that has some merit,” 

and explained the procedural default of a claim will not be excused if the 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim “is insubstantial, i.e., it does not have 

any merit or [ ] it is wholly without factual support.” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 

14–16.

...

The analysis of whether both cause and prejudice are established 

under Martinez will necessarily overlap, “since each considers the strength 

and validity of the underlying ineffective assistance claim.” Djerf v. Ryan, 

931 F.3d 870, 880 (9th Cir. 2019). However, the requirements remain 

distinct. Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377 (a finding of “ ‘prejudice’ for purposes 

of the ‘cause and prejudice’ analysis which requires only a showing that the 

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trial-level ineffective assistance of counsel claim was ‘substantial’—does not 

diminish the requirement... that petitioner satisfy the ‘prejudice’ prong under 

Strickland in establishing ineffective assistance by post-conviction 

counsel”).

Thus, to establish cause and prejudice in order to excuse the 

procedural default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, 

Ramirez must demonstrate the following: (1) post-conviction counsel 

performed deficiently; (2) “there was a reasonable probability that, absent 

the deficient performance, the result of the post-conviction proceedings 

would have been different,” Id.; and (3) the “underlying ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the 

prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Martinez, 566 

U.S. at 14.

Ramirez, 937 F.3d at 1241-42.

Thus, Ramirez in its summary of the required showing a petitioner must make seems 

to have reached a different result than Sexton. Specifically, Ramirez seemingly eliminated 

the “prejudice” prong of “cause and prejudice.” Previously, under Coleman, prejudice 

required a showing that constitutional errors worked to a petitioner’s actual and substantial 

disadvantage. Now, under Ramirez, cause and prejudice requires only a showing that the 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is “substantial.” Thus, seemingly Coleman 

“prejudice” is no longer required to qualify for the Martinez exception to procedural 

default. 

Further, in Ramirez, when the Court of Appeals considered whether postconviction-relief-counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a “substantial” claim of 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel, the Court seemed to presume prejudice was present 

under Strickland. Specifically, the Court stated: 

As the foregoing discussion indicates, we conclude that Ramirez’s 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is “substantial.” The underlying 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is strong enough to support a 

conclusion that, had post-conviction counsel performed effectively and 

raised the claim, “there [is] a reasonable probability that, absent the deficient 

performance, the result of the post-conviction proceedings would have been 

different.”

Ramirez, 937 F.3d at 1247.

Thus, it would appear that the Ramirez court’s holding is that if a substantial claim 

of ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel is “strong enough,” prejudice under Strickland

premised on post-conviction-relief-counsel’s failure to raise the claim is presumed. 

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However, the Court of Appeals also noted, “a finding of ‘prejudice’ for purposes of the 

‘cause and prejudice’ analysis which requires only a showing that the trial-level ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim was ‘substantial’—does not diminish the requirement... that 

petitioner satisfy the ‘prejudice’ prong under Strickland in establishing ineffective 

assistance by post-conviction counsel.” Ramirez, 937 F.3d at 1242 (internal quotations and 

citation omitted). Thus, some showing of prejudice under Strickland is required; although 

it appears that in some “strong” cases it can be presumed.

V. Analysis

A. Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner’s first ground for relief in his habeas petition alleges “ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 1 at 6). More specifically, he claims that his trial attorney 

“failed to investigate Heather Crawford and her job as an informant for the police 

department” and “failed to obtain dashcam video of [his] interaction with [the] police [and] 

body cam video/audio material.” (Id.). Therefore, he claims that his “counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and . . . result[ed] in an 

unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome.” (Id.). The Magistrate Judge found that 

Petitioner failed to raise this claim in state court and recommended that this Court dismiss 

the claim as procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 10 at 12). In his petition, Petitioner did not argue 

a basis to overcome this procedural default. (Doc. 10 at 12).

Petitioner does not challenge the finding that he failed to exhaust state court 

remedies. (See generally Doc. 11). However, he generally alludes to a theory that he can 

overcome such failure to exhaust because of ineffective assistance of counsel (presumably 

this would be the ineffective assistance of post-conviction relief counsel for failing to raise 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel). (Doc. 11 at 6). For example, Petitioner says 

“Petitioner can demonstrate cause for default and actual prejudice to excuse the default.” 

(Doc. 11 at 3). However, he provides no factual support for this legal conclusion. Instead, 

he focuses on obtaining an evidentiary hearing to seemingly discover the facts that will 

underlie this conclusion. (Doc. 11 at 4 (“Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing into 

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thes[e] matters [citation omitted]. [P]etitioner is entitled to [an] evidentiary hearing despite 

[the] failure to develop facts in post-conviction relief petition.”)). As discussed above, to 

show cause to overcome Petitioner’s failure to exhaust this claim in state court, Petitioner 

must show that the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is substantial. Martinez,

566 U.S. at 14.

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is not substantial because, 

even though his attorney had the option to request more information from the prosecution, 

his attorney had no legal duty to actively pursue evidence that the attorney did not 

strategically believe would aid the defense. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432-33

(1995). The prosecution had a duty to disclose any material evidence that would aid the 

defendant. Id. (“The prosecution’s affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a 

defendant can trace its origins to . . . this Court’s decision1. . . [where] it became clear that 

a defendant’s failure to request favorable evidence did not leave the Government free of 

all obligation.”). Thus, because neither the prosecution nor Petitioner’s trial counsel 

deemed this evidence to be favorable to Petitioner such that it was affirmatively disclosed 

by the State or sought by defense counsel, Petitioner has failed to make a substantial 

showing that his trial counsel was ineffective by allegedly failing to pursue this evidence.2 

See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (trial counsel has no obligation to 

pursue futile evidence).

Thus, because Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not 

substantial, to the extent Petitioner argues that his post-conviction relief counsel was 

1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

2 Further, although Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing generally on all his theories, 

no evidentiary development as envisioned by Ramirez is required on this claim because 

Petitioner’s assertions that there is unidentified-potentially-beneficial material either 

regarding Ms. Crawford or in the allegedly unviewed video(s) is belied by the record. 

Specifically, neither the prosecutor’s, nor Petitioner’s attorney’s, actions suggest any such 

evidence actually exists, or if it exists that both Petitioner’s attorney did not have it and 

that it was beneficial to the defense in some way. Because the record is inconsistent with 

Petitioner’s assertions, no evidentiary hearing is required. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 

465, 474 (2007) (“[I]f the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise 

precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.”).

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ineffective for not raising it, post-conviction-relief counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness cannot 

be cause to overcome his procedural default of this claim.3 See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14. 

Thus, following a de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that this Court 

deny relief on Petitioner’s first claim, to which Petitioner objects, this Court accepts the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

B. Ground Two: Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner’s second ground for relief in his habeas petition alleges misconduct by 

the prosecution in wrongly charging him with money laundering. (Doc. 1 at 7). He claims 

that this charge was incorrect because his “lack of understanding of English,” “ma[d]e the 

resulting conviction a denial of due process.” (Id.). The Magistrate Judge found that 

Petitioner failed to properly exhaust this claim in state court and is now precluded from 

doing so based on a plain procedural bar; thus, the R&R recommended this claim be 

dismissed as procedurally defaulted without excuse. (Doc. 10 at 10-12). Petitioner does 

not object to this recommendation of the R&R, and accordingly, the Court accepts and 

adopt it.

Petitioner, again very generally, suggests that his failure to exhaust all claims in his 

Petition in state court was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 11 at 6). 

However, in discussing ground two in his objections, Petitioner revises his argument on 

this theory. Specifically, in his objections, Petitioner alleges that the prosecution failed to 

meet the “second prong” of the statutory test for money laundering. (Doc. 11 at 5).4

3 For purposes of this Order, the Court has assumed that Petitioner can still rely on Martinez

to argue that his post-conviction relief counsel was ineffective for failing to exhaust his 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim even though Petitioner, pro se, filed a 

substantive post-conviction relief petition and had the opportunity, therefore, to exhaust 

this claim notwithstanding post-conviction relief counsel’s actions. The Court notes that 

in their Reply, Defendants rely on Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 609-10 (9th Cir. 2012) to 

argue that because Petitioner represented himself, he cannot complain about ineffective 

assistance of counsel. (Doc. 12 at 3). In Cook, however, petitioner chose to be pro se. In 

this case, Petitioner was pro se only after his counsel filed a brief saying there were no 

claims to raise. The Court is unclear whether that is the same as if Petitioner had chosen 

to not have counsel. Accordingly, the Court has considered whether post-conviction 

counsel was ineffective even though Petitioner could have exhausted this claim himself.

4

 This theory of ground two was raised in Petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition in 

state court. The state court considered this claim on the merits and alternatively found it 

to be procedurally barred.

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The relevant statute says that:

A. A person is guilty of money laundering in the first degree if the person 

does any of the following: 

1. Knowingly initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, 

supervises or is in the business of money laundering in violation of 

subsection B of this section. 

2. Violates subsection B of this section in the course of or for the purpose of 

facilitating terrorism or murder. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2317 (emphasis added). 

The statute, as correctly noted by the Magistrate Judge, requires the prosecution 

either to meet the first criterion or the second criterion to establish money laundering. (Doc. 

10 at 9-10). Although Petitioner claims that he did not “facilitate terrorism or murder,” 

(Doc. 11 at 5), a finding under A.R.S. § 13-2317(A)(1), was sufficient to support a 

conviction. (See Doc. 10 at 9 (quoting the Arizona Superior Court decision from 

Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceedings, “[m]oney laundering in the first degree can 

be committed by violating A.R.S. § 13-2317(A)(1) or (A)(2). While subsection (A)(2) does 

involve facilitating terrorism or murder, subsection (A)(1) does not. The Court finds this 

claim is also precluded as it could have been raised on direct appeal.” (Doc. 8-2 at 31)).

Regardless of whether this Court concludes that the state court’s decision was not 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,

5 or considers 

the merits of Petitioner’s not properly exhausted statutory construction claim de novo,

6

Petitioner’s trial counsel did not act “deficient[ly]” by not asserting a meritless claim based 

on Petitioner’s misunderstanding of the law. See Rupe, 93 F.3d at 1445. Thus, Petitioner’s 

claim that the prosecution unlawfully charged him with money laundering lacks merit. As 

a result, this claim, as cast in Petitioner’s objections, does not entitle him to relief. 

Because this is an issue of statutory construction, it does not require evidentiary 

development. See generally Ramirez, 937 F.3d at 1243.

5 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003).

6

 “An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding 

the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

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Accordingly, the R&R is accepted as to the theory of ground two raised in the 

Petitioner and relief is denied. Relief is also denied on Petitioner’s theory of ground two 

raised in his objections.

C. Ground Three: Due Process

Petitioner’s third ground for relief in his habeas petition alleges a violation of his 

due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 at 8). He 

specifically claims that the prosecution unlawfully withheld evidence favorable to him such 

as “Crawford’s criminal past and her employment as an informant,” and that this 

“prejudice[d]” the proceedings (Id.). Petitioner also generally, without factual support,

argues the legal conclusion that there was Brady material that was not disclosed.

The Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner failed to raise this claim in state court; 

thus, the R&R recommends its dismissal as procedurally defaulted without excuse. (Doc. 

10 at 12). Petitioner does not challenge the finding that he failed to exhaust state court 

remedies, but he, again very generally, suggests that his failure to exhaust in state court 

was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 11 at 6).

Taking Ramirez’s guidance that the Court should first decide whether the ineffective 

assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is substantial, the Court finds that as to this claim, it is 

not. Specifically, Martinez noted that for a claim to be substantial, it must have factual 

support. Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14–16 (a claim “is insubstantial [when] it is wholly without 

factual support.”). Here, because the state filed only a limited answer on the issue of 

exhaustion, the state did not address any of the factual allegations substantively. And this

claim was never raised in state court; thus, the state court also never addressed it. So, 

beyond Petitioner’s allegations, the Court has no evidence that Ms. Crawford actually was 

a police informant. Further, the Court has no evidence that, assuming she was a police 

informant, this information was indeed withheld from Petitioner’s trial counsel. Consistent 

with Ramirez, Petitioner repeatedly seeks evidentiary development of this claim in federal 

court. However, there are many Ninth Circuit cases that hold that an evidentiary hearing 

cannot be used as a fishing expedition to find out if there are any facts that might support 

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a claim. Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1999) (Habeas, “was never 

meant to be a fishing expedition for habeas petitioners to explore their case in search of its 

existence.” (internal quotations omitted)). Thus, “[i]n deciding whether to grant an 

evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an 

applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the 

applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).

In this case, Petitioner makes legal conclusions, for example that his attorney failed 

to obtain Brady material; but offers no factual support for such conclusion. Further, 

Petitioner does not even offer his own affidavit attesting to any of the facts he now argues. 

Additionally, the Court is not even sure that Petitioner wrote his own objections and 

himself believes these allegations. (Doc. 11 at 5) (Petitioner’s objections state, “[It] Should 

be duly noted that the Petitioner can not read or write English and does not understand the 

legal process or terminology until help has been sought....”). It would be an inefficient 

use of time and resources to appoint counsel (see Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases 

Under Section 2254 6(a) and 8(c)) and have an evidentiary hearing only to learn Petitioner 

himself will not testify to these facts. Thus, Petitioner has offered no evidence that there 

was “Brady material” or that Ms. Crawford was a government informant and that his 

attorney did not have that information. Accordingly, the Court finds that the allegations in 

ground three fall short of the factual basis required by Martinez for a claim to be substantial. 

Thus, the Court finds Petitioner has not presented a substantial claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel.

Moreover, Petitioner underlying claim is that the State violated Brady. Petitioner, 

after reading the R&R, has attempted to recast a Brady claim as an ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim to overcome his default of this claim in state court. But assuming there 

was in fact evidence withheld, and that such evidence would have qualified as Brady 

material, trial counsel was not ineffective for not obtaining evidence that by Petitioner’s 

own version of the facts, counsel did not know about due to “prosecutorial suppression”.

Further, if Sexton is still good law, Petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong of 

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Coleman. As discussed above, Coleman prejudice requires a showing that there were

constitutional errors that worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. Petitioner’s vague and speculative 

assertion that there may be some unidentified, undisclosed Brady material in existence does 

not show that a constitutional error worked to his actual disadvantage.

Finally, to whatever degree Petitioner must still show Strickland prejudice as to his 

post-conviction relief counsel’s performance, Petitioner cannot show Strickland prejudice 

on his ineffective assistance of post-conviction-relief-counsel claim for failing to raise the 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. This is because even if post-conviction relief 

counsel had raised an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, the overwhelming 

evidence of Petitioner’s guilt undercuts any theory that Petitioner was prejudiced, under 

Strickland, by post-conviction relief counsel’s failure to raise this claim. In other words, 

post-conviction relief counsel would not have been able to show Petitioner was prejudiced 

by trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (prejudice 

requires a showing that but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different).

Specifically, Heather Crawford’s testimony (which Petitioner alleges can be 

discredited) was far from the only basis for Petitioner’s convictions. The trial court heard 

from various other witnesses, among them Detective Carl Smith and Deputy Eric Lopez 

who both testified to finding contraband in the car with Petitioner and Crawford, Deputy 

Brandon Collins who testified to removing fifty-six grams of methamphetamine from the 

car, and Amanda Hobbs who testified to purchasing the illicit drugs with Crawford from 

Petitioner. (Doc. 8-1 at 13–19, 47–64). Furthermore, if any uncertainty remained, 

photographic evidence of a text message exchange between Crawford and Petitioner 

supported her testimony regarding his role as her drug supplier. (Id. at 34–37). Given all 

of this evidence, the jury’s failure to hear testimony that Crawford served as a police 

informant (assuming such allegation is true) did not prejudice the trial’s outcome. Indeed, 

the jury could have discounted Crawford’s testimony in its entirety and reached the same 

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verdict.

As a result, the Court adopts the R&R’s conclusion that Petitioner did not exhaust 

ground three in state court and that his failure to exhaust is without excuse. Accordingly, 

after reviewing the R&R and Petitioner’s objections de novo, the Court accepts the 

recommendation of the R&R that relief on this claim be denied.

VI. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the R&R (Doc. 10) is accepted; the objections (Doc. 11) are 

overruled as specified above; the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is denied 

with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability is denied because 

jurists of reason would not find this Court’s procedural rulings debatable. See Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Dated this 2nd day of March, 2020.

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