Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02300/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02300-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAUL ARELLANO,

Plaintiff,

v.

B. SELF; G. STRATTON; K.J. ALLEN; 

M. VOONG; JOHN DOES 1-6,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-02300-AJB-JMA

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

I. Procedural History

On October 13, 2015, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard 

J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”), filed a civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. (ECF No. 1.) In addition, Plaintiff filed certified copies of his inmate trust 

account statements which the Court liberally construed as a request to proceed in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF Nos. 2, 3.) The Court granted Plaintiff IFP status and sua sponte 

dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff was granted 

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leave to file an amended pleading. (Id.) 

Plaintiff then filed two motions for extension of time to file his amended pleading, 

along with a motion to appoint counsel. (ECF Nos. 6, 8.) On March 21, 2016, Plaintiff 

filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 9.) However, once again, the 

Court found that Plaintiff failed to state a claim and dismissed his FAC but he was given 

leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff then filed another motion 

for extension of time, as well as another motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF Nos. 

12, 15.) The Court denied Plaintiff’s request for counsel but granted him an extension of 

time to file his amended pleading. (ECF Nos. 13, 16.) On July 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed 

his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 17.) 

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his SAC requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

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12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Property claims

Plaintiff argues that prison officials are depriving him of the right to due process 

by charging his trust account for photocopies and other debts. (See SAC at 5-8.) 

However, where a plaintiff alleges to have been deprived of a of property interest caused 

by the unauthorized negligent or intentional acts of state officials, he cannot state a 

constitutional claim where the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See 

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129-32 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 

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(1984). The California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”) provides an adequate post-deprivation 

state remedy for the random and unauthorized taking of property. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 

F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, because Plaintiff appears to challenge several 

deprivations of funds from his trust account, the CTCA provides him with an adequate 

state post-deprivation remedy, and these claims may not proceed in a § 1983 action. Id.

C. Due Process claims

Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for the manner in which they processed 

and responded to his administrative grievances. To the extent Plaintiff intends to base a 

claim on Defendants’ failure to follow state law or prison regulations governing inmate 

appeals as set forth in Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084, et seq., such violations cannot be 

remedied under § 1983 unless they also violate a federal constitutional or statutory right. 

See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 (1984). There is no independent cause of action 

under § 1983 for a violation of Title 15 regulations. See, e.g., Chappell v. Newbarth, 2009 

WL 1211372, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2009) (holding that there is no private right of 

action under Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations); Parra v. Hernandez, 2009 

WL 3818376, at 2, 8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009) (same). “To the extent that the violation 

of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond 

that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, [s]ection 1983 offers no redress.” Sweaney v. 

Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In addition, while the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . 

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. 

amend. XIV, § 1, “[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the 

deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of 

liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes 

and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty or property interests sufficient to 

invoke due process protection. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). 

However, to state a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must allege: “(1) a liberty or 

property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the 

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government; [and] (3) lack of process.” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no protected property interest in an 

inmate grievance procedure arising directly from the Due Process Clause. See Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional 

entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure”) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 

639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment creates “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance 

procedure”)). Even the non-existence of, or the failure of prison officials to properly 

implement, an administrative appeals process within the prison system does not raise 

constitutional concerns. Mann, 855 F.2d at 640. See also Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 

494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that any Defendant prison 

official deprived him of a protected liberty interest by allegedly failing to respond to any 

particular prison grievance in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty interest can arise 

from state law or prison regulations, Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-27, due process 

protections are implicated only if Plaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants: (1) 

restrained his freedom in a manner not expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d] 

atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 

life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Here, Plaintiff pleads insufficient facts 

that would demonstrate how Defendants’ allegedly inadequate review or failure to 

consider inmate grievances restrained his freedom in any way, or subjected him to any 

“atypical” and “significant hardship.” Id. at 483-84. Plaintiff claims that he has not been 

able to purchase items from the canteen, as well as being unable to “enjoy buying items 

from outside catalogs not found in institution canteen.” (SAC at 8.) However, there is no 

constitutional right to canteen items. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996).

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s due process allegations also fail to support a 

plausible claim upon which relief may be granted and therefore, must be dismissed 

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). 

D. Access to Courts

Plaintiff also maintains that Defendants have “interfered with my access to courts 

guarantee.” (SAC at 9.) Prisoners have a constitutional right to access to the courts. 

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to the filing of direct 

criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of 

access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating 

opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a suit 

that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 

403, 412-15 (2002); see also Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2011). 

(differentiating “between two types of access to court claims: those involving prisoners’ 

right to affirmative assistance and those involving prisoners’ rights to litigate without 

active interference.”).

However, Plaintiff must allege “actual injury” as the threshold requirement to any 

access to courts claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. An “actual 

injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the 

inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see also 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining actual injury as the 

“inability to file a complaint or defend against a charge”). The failure to allege an actual 

injury is “fatal.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Failure to 

show that a ‘non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated’ is fatal.”) (quoting Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 353 & n.4). 

In addition, Plaintiff must allege the loss of a “non-frivolous” or “arguable” 

underlying claim. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14. The nature and description of the 

underlying claim must be set forth in the pleading “as if it were being independently 

pursued.” Id. at 417. Finally, Plaintiff must specifically allege the “remedy that may be 

awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be 

brought.” Id. at 415.

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Here, Plaintiff’s only claims are that he has “fallen behind” in litigating his habeas 

corpus petition and several § 1983 actions that he has brought. (SAC at 9.) Plaintiff’s 

SAC fails to allege facts which sufficiently address the underlying claims he is bringing 

in those actions and how the Defendants actions have resulted in an “actual injury”

required to state an access to courts claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d 

at 1104. Thus, because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Plaintiff 

suffered any “actual injury” with respect to any of those actions, or any other nonfrivolous direct criminal appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights action he may have filed, 

see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354, the Court finds Plaintiff’s access to courts claims must be 

dismissed for failing to state a plausible claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. 

E. Telephone access

Plaintiff also argues that his “First Amendment right to telephone calls” is being 

violated because his family has to pay money to receive phone calls from him. (SAC at 

10.) “Although prisoners have a First Amendment right to telephone access, this right is 

subject to reasonable limitations arising from the legitimate penological and 

administrative interests of the prison system.” Johnson v. State of California, 207 F.3d 

650, 656 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted.) In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit stated “there is 

no authority for the proposition that prisoners are entitled to a specific rate for their 

telephone calls.” Id. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s allegations for failing 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

For all the above stated reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983, and must be dismissed 

sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 

1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. Because the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims “could not 

possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts,” see Williams v. California, 764 F.3d 

1002, 1018 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127), leave to amend is denied 

as futile. Carrico v. City & Cnty of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(court may dismiss a complaint without leave to amend if “amendment would be futile.”).

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IIII. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

DISMISSES this civil action without leave to amend based on Plaintiff’s failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 

and 1915A(b)(1).

The Clerk of Court is directed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 19, 2016

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