Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00453/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00453-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARVIN K. LOCKE,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 17cv0453-JLS(JMA)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

RE: DENIAL OF PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Marvin K. Locke (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted by jury in San Diego Superior Court 

case number SCD160776 for second degree murder, Cal. Penal Code § 187(a), 

and assault with a firearm, Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(2). Petitioner contends his 

conviction for second-degree murder is invalid under Johnson v. United States, 

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).

The Court has considered the Petition and Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in support thereof, Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of Points 

and Authorities, Petitioner’s Traverse, and all the supporting documents 

submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence presented in 

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this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends the Petition 

be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the California Court of 

Appeal opinion, People v. Marvin Locke, No. D042063, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. 

April 20, 2004). (Lodgment No. 7.) This Court gives deference to state court 

findings of fact and presumes them to be correct. Tilcock v. Budge, 538 F.2d 

1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, 

but only by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

The facts as found by the state appellate court are as follows:

A. The People’s Case

On May 15, 1999, between 7:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m., 

Sheila Jones dropped off her 22-year-old son Fred Jones 

(Fred), the victim, at Seaport Village in San Diego. She 

testified she had never seen him in possession of a gun 

or any other weapon, and he was not affiliated with any 

gangs.

Robin Waters, then age 16, was walking around in the 

area of Horton Plaza that night. She noticed a group of 

about 20 people at the corner of Fifth Avenue and 

Broadway. She knew that some of the people wearing 

red attire in that group were members of the Bloods gang. 

Red was the gang color of the Bloods. While attending 

Point Loma High School, Waters had become acquainted 

with various individuals who were affiliated with the 

Bloods and Crips gangs.

Waters noticed an individual was “disrespecting” the 

congregated group. He seemed to be chanting some 

kind of battle cry, and he made a “C” gesture with his 

hand, which Waters knew was a symbol typically thrown 

up by members of the Crips gang. Crips are rivals of the 

Bloods. Waters did not see the person who had flashed 

the “C” symbol in possession of any weapons. The 

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lighting in the area was good.

Almost immediately after the person made the gesture 

with his hands, Waters heard gunshots. She was 

between the shooter and the person the shooter was 

firing at (the person who had made the gesture). Waters 

recalled that three or four shots were fired.

Maria Palma, who was waiting for a bus not far away from 

the shooter and the group, was struck in the buttocks by 

one of the bullets. She was hospitalized and the bullet 

was removed.

Police officers who responded to the shooting found Fred 

sitting on a bus bench in the 700 block of Broadway. At 

the time he was shot, Fred had not bumped into anybody 

and had not reached for any weapon. He was 

transported to the hospital where he was pronounced 

dead. The cause of death was loss of blood as a result of 

two gunshot wounds to the back. No alcohol or illicit 

drugs were found in Fred’s blood. No weapons were 

found on his person.

Locke’s father testified he had placed a .38-caliber 

handgun in his dresser drawer sometime during the early 

months of 1999. In May or June, he discovered that the 

handgun was missing. He also discovered that a second 

(.22-caliber) handgun he owned was also missing. Locke 

initially denied taking the firearms, but later admitted to 

his father that he had taken the .38-caliber handgun. 

Although the handgun that was used to shoot Fred and 

Palma was never recovered, a criminalist determined that 

all three bullets fired at the scene were fired from the 

same .38-caliber handgun.

Detective Joseph Howie of the San Diego Police 

Department testified that when he interviewed Locke on 

May 15, 1999 (the day of the shooting), Locke claimed he 

was a member of the Lincoln Park Bloods gang. Locke 

denied knowing who the shooter was. Detective Howie 

also interviewed McKinley, who also admitted he was a 

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member of the Lincoln Park Bloods gang.

In the latter part of May 1999, Locke went to Oklahoma 

and stayed with his maternal grandmother.

Detective Bruce Pendleton testified as a gang expert. He 

stated that Locke and McKinley were both Lincoln Park 

gang members on the day of the shooting. He opined 

that the killing of Fred was done for the purpose of 

enhancing the reputation of the Lincoln Park Bloods, and 

also for the purpose of enhancing Locke’s reputation.

May 22, 2002 Interview and Locke’s Waiver of His 

Miranda Rights

On May 22, 2002, after they traveled to Oklahoma and 

transported Locke back to San Diego, Detectives Howie 

and Robert Donaldson interviewed Locke. The interview 

(the May 22 interview) was videotaped and the videotape 

was played to the jury.

Before Locke was questioned about the shooting incident, 

he was given Miranda warnings. Locke stated he 

understood each of his Miranda rights and waived those 

rights by agreeing to answer the questions. Detective 

Howie testified that prior to the May 22 interview, he 

advised Locke that he had been charged with murder.

During the May 22 interview, Locke stated he was a 

member of the Lincoln Park Bloods at the time of the 

shooting. Locke admitted he shot Fred. He did so 

because he saw Fred with a gun. He stated that he fired 

his gun when Fred turned around. Fred had come 

through the Bloods group, “cussing” and “disrespecting,” 

and had reached for a gun in his waistband. Locke was 

accompanied by his fellow gang members McKinley and 

Andre Luster. Locke admitted that he took his father’s 

.38-caliber handgun. Locke had purchased bullets for the 

gun.

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May 24, 2002 Interview and Locke’s Waiver of His 

Miranda Rights and His Sixth Amendment Right to 

Counsel

Detective Donaldson testified about a second recorded 

interview of Locke on May 24, 2002 (the May 24 

interview). Detective Donaldson was present, but the 

questioning was conducted by Deputy District Attorney 

(D.A.) Mark Amador. The videotape of the May 24 

interview was played to the jury.

At the beginning of the May 24 interview, Deputy D.A. 

Amador gave Locke the Miranda warnings. Locke stated 

he understood each of his Miranda rights and waived 

those rights by agreeing to answer the questions.

Immediately thereafter, Deputy D.A. Amador asked 

Locke, “[Y]ou know that you’ve been charged in this case, 

that’s why they extradited you from Oklahoma, right?” 

(Italics added.) When Locke replied, “Yes,” Deputy D.A. 

Amador immediately advised him that since he had been 

charged, under the Sixth Amendment he had the right to 

an attorney. Deputy D.A. Amador then asked Locke, “Do 

you waive that right?” Locke replied, “Yeah.”

After Waiving his Miranda rights and his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, Locke again admitted that 

he shot Fred. He stated he was the only one in his group 

with a gun. It was a .38-caliber revolver. He again 

testified he had seen a gun on Fred. Fred was claiming 

to be a Crip. Locke stated he remembered firing the gun 

three times. He believed killing a Crip was a “badge of 

honor” that would increase his reputation with the Bloods. 

After the killing, other Bloods gang members began 

calling Locke “Killer” and giving him more respect. He 

stated he went to Oklahoma after the killing to avoid being 

arrested by the police, but he had planned the trip before 

the killing. When confronted with the fact that Fred had 

been shot twice in the back, Locke stated that Fred “could 

have been running away,” but Locke did not remember.

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B. The Defense

Locke testified at trial and recanted much of what he 

stated during the May 22 and May 24 interviews. He 

stated that although he “used to be” a Lincoln Park Blood, 

he was not a Lincoln Park Blood at the time of the 

shooting and that McKinley was the shooter. He also 

testified that he moved to Oklahoma a week or two after 

the shooting not to run away from the police, but because 

his relatives and fiancé were there. He did not tell the 

police that McKinley was the shooter because he feared 

for his father’s safety if he did so.

Locke also stated that just before the May 22 interview 

occurred, Detective Howie told him the shooting of Fred 

was not a first degree or second degree murder and 

suggested that some type of manslaughter charge was 

probably appropriate.

C. The People’s Rebuttal Case

Sharay Jones testified that Locke called her from 

Oklahoma about a month after the shooting. Locke told 

her, “I’m running from the police” and “I did something 

real bad.”

Detective Donaldson testified that he never heard 

Detective Howie say anything to Locke about what level 

of homicide charge was appropriate for this case. He 

never heard Detective Howie imply that the district 

attorney would be lenient if Locke admitted he was the 

shooter.

Detective Howie testified that when he interviewed Locke 

in Oklahoma on February 27, 2001, Locke denied that he 

was the shooter and also denied that McKinley was the 

shooter. During that interview, Locke also denied he had 

a gun on the night of the shooting. Detective Howie 

denied discussing levels of homicide with Locke and

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denied telling Locke that he might receive lenient 

treatment.

(Lodgment No. 7 at 2-7.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury found Petitioner Marvin Locke guilty of second-degree murder, Cal. 

Penal Code § 187(a), and assault with a firearm, Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(2). 

True findings were made by the jury that in the murder, Petitioner personally 

used a firearm, Cal. Penal Code §§ 12022.5(a)(1) and12022(b)-(d), and 

Petitioner committed the offense for the benefit of a street gang, Cal. Penal Code 

§ 186.22(b)(1). In regard to the assault, true findings were made that Petitioner 

personally used a firearm, Cal. Penal Code § 12022.5(a)(1). The trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to prison for 41 years to life. (Lodgment No. 7 at 1-2.)

Thereafter, Petitioner initiated a direct appeal of his conviction, challenging 

statements he made to officers as unconstitutional under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

U.S. 436 (1966). (Lodgment No. 4.) The California Court of Appeal rejected the 

claim. (Lodgment No. 7.) The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s 

petition for review without comment on June 23, 2004. (Lodgment No. 9.)

On June 21, 2016, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the San Diego 

County Superior Court, claiming his conviction was invalid because Johnson v. 

United States, 135 S .Ct. 2551 (2015) applies retroactively to his conviction for 

second-degree murder. (Lodgment No. 10.) Although this petition was filed 

more than 13 years after sentencing, the Superior Court found it to be timely to 

the extent it relied on Johnson, which was not decided until 2015, and denied the 

claim on the merits. (Lodgment No. 11.) Petitioner then filed a habeas petition in 

the California Court of Appeal, raising the same claim. (Lodgment No. 12.) The 

Court of Appeal denied the claim on the merits. (Lodgment No. 13.) Petitioner

then filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, raising the same

/ /

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claim. (Lodgment No. 14.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition 

without comment on November 16, 2016. (Lodgment No. 15.)

On February 12, 2017, Petitioner filed his Petition in this Court. 

Respondent filed an answer on May 8, 2017, and Petitioner filed a traverse on 

June 16, 2017.

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises two claims in this petition. First, Petitioner claims a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus is an “appropriate vehicle for second or 

successive petition.” (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Second, Petitioner claims his conviction 

for second-degree murder is invalid under Johnson. (Id. at 7.)

A. Standard of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a) sets forth the following scope of 

review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The current Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As 

amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as

follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached 

by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case 

differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable 

facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas 

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct 

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably 

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 

538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the 

Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order 

does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct 

an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s 

decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); Himes v. Thompson, 

336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme 

Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 

U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent],” the state court decision 

will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

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B. Claim 1

Petitioner first claims, without any explanation as to how this proposition 

applies to his case, a petition for habeas corpus is an appropriate vehicle for a 

second or successive petition. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) This Petition, however, is the 

first Federal habeas petition Petitioner has filed. Because this is his first federal 

habeas petition, the issue is moot.

1

C. Claim 2

Petitioner claims next that his conviction for second degree murder is 

invalid under Johnson. Specifically, Petitioner claims his conviction is invalid

because California’s “inherently dangerous felony murder rule” is 

unconstitutionally vague under Johnson and, therefore, the decision of the 

California Court of Appeal is contrary to clearly established U.S. Supreme Court 

precedent. (See Doc. No. 12 at 8-10.)

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any 

claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of evidence 

presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). Petitioner’s claim here arises under § 2254(d)(1). Clearly 

established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d)(1), means “the governing 

principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court 

renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

 

1 Respondent theorizes Petitioner’s first claim may be a preemptive argument regarding the timeliness of his 

Petition. (Doc. No. 5 at 4.) Because 13 years had passed since his sentencing when Petitioner first presented 

his Johnson-based habeas claim to the state courts, timeliness was an issue there. The Superior Court 

concluded that as far as his petition concerned the ruling in Johnson, the 13 year delay between sentencing and 

the filing of his petition was justified, because Johnson was not decided until 2015. (Lodgment No. 11 at 3.) 

Here, however, no issue has been raised, and there does not appear to be one, with respect to the timeliness of 

Petitioner’s federal habeas Petition.

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The Supreme Court precedent on which Petitioner relies is Johnson, which 

held imposing an increased sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 

(“ACCA”) “residual clause” violated due process. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2554. In 

Johnson, the petitioner pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in 

violation of federal law, namely 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Id. at 2556. Under the ACCA, 

a person convicted under § 922(g) could face an enhanced sentence with a 

minimum of 15 years if that offender had three or more earlier convictions for a 

“serious drug offense” or a “violent felony.” Id. at 2555. In Johnson, the petitioner

was given this enhanced minimum sentence under the ACCA based upon prior 

convictions for “violent felonies.” Id. at 2556. The petitioner took issue with 

whether possession of a short-barreled shotgun qualifed as a violent felony under 

the ACCA’s definition of violent felonies. Id. The specific question before the 

Supreme Court was whether this offense qualified as a violent felony under the 

ACCA’s definition of violent felony in the statute’s residual clause: “(ii) is burglary, 

arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. at 2555-56 

(residual clause italicized). The Court decided the residual clause was

unconstitutionally vague for two reasons: (1) the residual clause left grave 

uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime and (2) the residual 

clause also left uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a 

violent felony. Id. at 2558. Petitioner contends this principle should similarly apply 

to California’s second degree felony murder rule. (See Doc. No. 12 at 9-10.) 

Petitioner’s claim rests on the assumption he was convicted for second 

degree murder, specifically under California’s second degree felony murder rule. 

Petitioner claims the language “inherently dangerous to human life” in the second 

degree felony murder rule is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson. In order

for Petitioner to have standing to bring such a claim, however, he would have to

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have been convicted under the second degree felony murder rule, which he was 

not.

As discussed by the Court of Appeal, Petitioner was convicted for second 

degree murder, assault with a firearm, plus several enhancements. (Lodgment 

No. 13.) He personally shot and killed Fred Jones, because, he said, Jones 

made gang-related comments and gestures and because Petitioner believed

Jones was armed. (Lodgment No. 7 at 2-6.) As the California Court of Appeal 

observed, the record is devoid of any crime that would trigger the felony murder 

rule. (Lodgment No. 13 at 1.)

There also is no evidence the jury was given any sort of instruction as to a 

felony murder charge. In both his Petition and his Traverse, Petitioner 

references an appendix which contains all the jury instructions given to the jury at 

his trial. (See Doc. No. 1-3; Doc. No. 12.; Cf. Lodgment No. 2 at 77-160.) 

Nowhere in these jury instructions is there any instruction about the second 

degree felony murder rule. (See Lodgment No. 2 at 77-160.) There were two 

instructions given relating directly to second degree murder: CALJIC No. 8.30 

and 8.31, with adaptations. (Id. at 114-15.) These instructions read as follows:

CALJIC 8.30: UNPREMEDITATED MURDER OF THE 

SECOND DEGREE

Murder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of 

a human being with malice aforethought when the 

perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being but 

the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and 

premeditation.

CALJIC 8.31: SECOND DEGREE MURDER—KILLING 

RESULTING FROM UNLAWFUL ACT DANGEROUS TO 

LIFE

Murder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of 

a human being when:

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1. The killing resulted from an intentional act,

2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to 

human life, and

3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of 

the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human 

life

When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not 

necessary to prove that the defendant intended that the 

act would result in the death of a human being.

(Id.) The phrases “inherently dangerous” and “inherently dangerous to human 

life” appear nowhere in the jury instructions regarding second degree murder. 

(Id.) In fact, neither of these phrases appears in any of the jury instructions –

there simply is no mention of the felony murder rule anywhere in the jury 

instructions. (See Id. at 77-160.) Neither the facts of his conviction nor the jury 

instructions at trial indicate Petitioner was convicted under California’s second 

degree felony murder rule. The issue of whether California’s second degree 

felony murder rule is unconstitutional under Johnson is, thus, immaterial to 

Petitioner’s case. Accordingly, this Court recommends Petitioner’s claim be 

denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned 

magistrate judge finds Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to federal 

habeas relief under the applicable legal standards and, accordingly, the 

undersigned magistrate judge hereby recommends that the Petition be DENIED 

WITH PREJUDICE and that judgment be entered accordingly.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Janis L. 

Sammartino, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not later than August 

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23, 2017, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy 

on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed not later than August 31, 2017. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right 

to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 

158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 4, 2017

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