Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00821/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00821-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

1 Under the E-Government Act of 2002, this is a written opinion and therefore is

available electronically. However, it has been entered only to decide the motion or matter

addressed herein and is not intended for official publication or to serve as precedent.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

FELICIA M. PICKETT JOHNSON, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0821-WS-B

 )

MOBILE COUNTY SHERIFF )

DEPARTMENT, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Mobile County Sheriff’s Department’s Motion to

Dismiss (doc. 34), the Mobile County Personnel Board’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 38), and the

Mobile City Council Office’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 42). All three motions are ripe for

disposition at this time.1

I. Background.

Plaintiff Felicia M. Pickett Johnson, proceeding pro se, initiated this action on November

29, 2006 by filing a Complaint (doc. 1) against the Mobile County Sheriff’s Department, the

Mobile City Council Office, and the Mobile County Personnel Board. The Complaint couches

plaintiff’s claims as being for breach of contract, but also references a laundry list of conclusory

theories, to-wit: “civil violations, punitive damages, damages proximately caused by breach

damages, compensatory damages, lost property, incurred expenses, restitutionary obligations,

negligence, wantonness, fraud, purgury [sic], Quasi-Contract, discrimination, binding the

principle [sic], defense of prevention.” (Complaint, at 2.) The Complaint also makes passing,

jumbled mention of plainly irrelevant terminology, characterizing this action on one breath as

one of “Federal statutory interpleader” and in the next as being predicated on “Quasi in rem

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jurisdiction.” (Id.) The Complaint does not identify the contract at issue or describe how it was

breached, except to state that such contract was “between City of Mobile, Mobile County Sheriff

Office, The Mobile County Personnel Board, and State of Alabama.” (Id. at 1-2, 5.)

After stripping away the obviously inapplicable jargon, a plain reading of the Complaint

reflects that Johnson seeks relief for certain occurrences in 2000 and 2001 when she was

employed as a Records Specialist in the warrants division of the Mobile County Sheriff’s

Department in the old Mobile County Courthouse. Johnson alleges that she sustained

“[d]iscrimination in 2000” when a white co-worker was permitted to use the supervisors’

bathroom while Johnson (who is black) was not; that she was discriminated against in November

2000 when a white co-worker was provided better security on his shift than she was provided on

her shift; that she suffered from a hostile environment and that defendants were negligent in

November 2000 when two intruders entered her office without being escorted by security while

she was working alone; that she was subjected to a hostile environment and negligence when a

“black male suspect” trespassed into her office areas at 2:00 a.m. on November 21, 2001 while

she worked alone; that defendants profited from a “quasi-contract” by requiring her to work

eight-hour shifts without scheduled lunches or breaks; that defendants wantonly assigned

insufficient workers to her shift, causing injuries to her feet, hands and arms; that the Sheriff's

Department failed to act on her requests for resolution of discriminatory practices; and that

plaintiff was somehow harmed when defendants “purchased a new facility with cooling and

heating systems, and other amenities.” (Complaint, at 2-5.) In her ad damnum clause, Johnson

requests various categories of relief, including $2 million in damages and ownership of property

located at 109 Government Street in Mobile, Alabama (the former address of the old county

courthouse building, which was demolished in 2005). (Id. at 6.)

In a nutshell, then, Johnson contends that she was subjected to discriminatory treatment

while employed by the Mobile County Sheriff’s Department in 2000 and 2001 because there was

insufficient security in the building, she was not able to use the bathroom she wanted, and the

Sheriff’s Department failed to take sufficient corrective action in response to her complaints. 

Johnson also seeks relief for the security problems based on theories of negligence and

wantonness, and further asserts that she was not given sufficient work breaks and that staffing

was inadequate.

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2 See also Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The district

court generally must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment if it

considers materials outside the complaint.”); Bost v. Federal Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233,

1237 (11th Cir. 2004) (observing that district court was required to treat motion to dismiss as a

motion for summary judgment where both court and parties relied on documents outside

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II. Relevant Legal Standards.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the

Court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hill v. White, 321

F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, “when ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a

judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v.

Pardus, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). The rules of pleading require only that a

complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Rule 8(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. As the Supreme Court recently observed, while a complaint

attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion need not be buttressed by detailed factual allegations, the

plaintiff’s pleading obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ---

U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007). The rules of pleading do “not require heightened fact

pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id. at 1974. The Court’s inquiry at this stage focuses on whether the challenged pleadings “give

the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson,

127 S.Ct. at 2200 (quoting Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1964).

In their Rule 12(b)(6) Motions, two defendants (Mobile City Council and Mobile County

Personnel Board) submit affidavits and other evidentiary materials outside the scope of the

Complaint. Under Rule 12(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., whenever a defendant files a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, if “matters outside the pleading are

presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary

judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.” Id. Thus, “[w]henever a judge considers

matters outside the pleadings in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, that motion is thereby converted into a

Rule 56 Summary Judgment motion.” Trustmark Ins. Co. v. ESLU, Inc., 299 F.3d 1265, 1267

(11th Cir. 2002).2

 A court converting a Rule 12(b) motion into a Rule 56 motion in this fashion

Case 1:06-cv-00821-WS-B Document 55 Filed 07/09/07 Page 3 of 13
pleadings).

3 See, e.g., Moss v. W&A Cleaners, 111 F. Supp.2d 1181, 1185 (M.D. Ala. 2000)

(declining to convert Rule 12(b)(6) motion to Rule 56 motion based on finding that it would be

more appropriate to enter a scheduling order and allow the parties to conduct discovery); Grillo

v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 939 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D. Minn. 1996) (disregarding affidavits

submitted with motion to dismiss because “the court concludes that the parties are in no position

to present all material pertinent to a motion for summary judgment”); 701 NPB Associates v.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 1336, 1338 (S.D.Fla. 1991) (declining to consider

affidavit based on determination “that it is inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings to

convert Defendant's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment”); Griswold v.

Alabama Dept. of Indus. Relations, 903 F. Supp. 1492, 1494 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (declining to

convert motion to dismiss into motion for summary judgment).

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must give the parties 10 days notice of the contemplated conversion to allow them to supplement

the record. See Jones v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 917 F.2d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir.

1990); Trustmark, 299 F.3d at 1267 (“The district court is required to notify the parties that the

motion has been converted, and give the parties 10 days in which to supplement the record.”). 

The Eleventh Circuit has applied these requirements stringently, and has insisted on scrupulous

compliance by district courts. See Jones, 917 F.2d at 1533-35 (reversing district court for failure

to comply with notice requirement, and explaining that it is of “utmost importance” that litigants

be notified of transformation of motion to dismiss, and that notice requirement “serves as a

valuable procedural safeguard”); Trustmark, 299 F.3d at 1367 (“This Circuit has consistently

interpreted the notice rules strictly.”). After careful review, the Court excludes those extraneous

evidentiary submissions and declines to convert these Motions into motions for summary

judgment. At this time, it would be inappropriate to perform such a conversion, inasmuch as this

action is in its infancy and the parties are ill-equipped at this early stage of the proceedings to

present all the evidence that would be required for a proper Rule 56 review.3

Furthermore, the Court notes that Johnson appears herein without the representation of

counsel. The law is clear that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed ... and a pro

se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 127 S.Ct. at 2200; see also Trawinski v. United

Technologies, 313 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent

standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”)

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(citation omitted). That said, nothing in that leniency would excuse a plaintiff from compliance

with threshold requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Local Rule

83.9(b) (“All litigants proceeding pro se shall be bound by and comply with all local rules of this

Court, and the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, unless otherwise excused from

operation of the rules by court order.”); Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002)

(“Despite construction leniency afforded pro se litigants, we nevertheless have required them to

conform to procedural rules.”); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (a pro se

litigant “is subject to the relevant law and rules of court including the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure”). Moreover, the leniency to which pro se litigants are entitled “does not give a court

license to serve as de facto counsel for a party ... or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in

order to sustain an action.” GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359,

1369 (11th Cir. 1998). 

III. Analysis.

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims against Mobile City Council Office.

Nothing in the Complaint states any factual basis for Johnson’s claims against the Mobile

City Council Office. The Complaint does not allege that this entity employed her. The

Complaint does not allege facts suggesting or tending to show that the Mobile City Council

Office had control over, or was in any way responsible for, her working conditions or the

security arrangements during the evening or night shifts in the warrant division of the Mobile

County Sheriff’s Department in 2000 and 2001. The Complaint does not allege facts tending to

show the existence of any contract involving the Mobile City Council Office that would extend

enforceable rights or legal protections of any kind to her.

Furthermore, because the Complaint is confined to events that occurred in 2000 and

2001, and because there is no indication of any circumstances that might support equitable

tolling, Johnson’s claims against this defendant for employment discrimination, negligence, and

wantonness are time-barred even if the Mobile City Council Office did have some factual nexus

to the events described in the Complaint. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38)(l) (“All actions for any injury

to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in

this section must be brought within two years.”); Piazza v. Ebsco Industries, Inc., 273 F.3d 1341,

1347 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Under Alabama law, claims for negligence are subject to a two-year

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statute of limitations.”); Long v. Jefferson County, 623 So.2d 1130, 1137 (Ala. 1993) (“A

negligence cause of action accrues as soon as the plaintiff is entitled to maintain the action, i.e.,

at the time of the first legal injury, regardless of whether the full amount of damages is

apparent.”).

In response to Mobile City Council Office’s Motion to Dismiss pointing out these clear

defects, Johnson mounts three unsuccessful arguments. First, she contends that her claims are

subject to the six-year statute of limitations set forth in Ala. Code § 6-2-34(2) (applying to

claims for trespass on real or personal property), § 6-2-34(9) (applying to claims for breach of

contract), and § 6-2-34(7) (applying to actions against the sureties of any sheriff, coroner,

constable or any public officer). However, her Complaint does not allege that Mobile City

Council Office trespassed on property belonging to her, nor does it assert any cause of action

against a surety, so subsections (2) and (7) of § 6-2-34 are plainly inapplicable. Although the

Complaint purports to state a claim for breach of contract, as noted supra it does not allege facts

tending to show the existence of any contract involving the Mobile City Council Office that

would extend enforceable rights to her, nor is there any logical reason to believe that the Mobile

City Council would enter into a contract with a Sheriff’s Department employee guaranteeing her

a work environment free from discrimination and criminal intrusion. As such, her claims cannot

be saved by operation of § 6-2-34(9).

Second, Johnson invokes the “continuing violation” doctrine pursuant to National R.R.

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). Of

course, a critical feature of the continuing violation doctrine is that at least one wrongful act

must have occurred within the relevant statutory limitations period. See Chambless v.

Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 481 F.3d 1345, 1349-50 (11th Cir. 2007) (“the entire time period of the

hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability if an

act relating to the claim occurred within the filing period”); Center for Biological Diversity v.

Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The continuing violation doctrine permits a

plaintiff to sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when additional violations of the law occur

within the statutory period.”); see generally LaBauve v. Olin Corp., 231 F.R.D. 632, 655 (S.D.

Ala. 2005) (“When a tort is deemed continuous, the limitations period runs from the last date the

plaintiff was exposed to damages.”) (citation omitted). The Complaint is devoid of any such

Case 1:06-cv-00821-WS-B Document 55 Filed 07/09/07 Page 6 of 13
4 In finding that these new factual allegations are not sufficient to sustain plaintiff’s

claims against the City, the Court specifically declines to adopt the City’s argument that these

new allegations are factually incorrect in that Chief Collier does not work for the City and the

old courthouse is not the property of the City of Mobile. (City’s Rebuttal (doc. 52), at 2.) On a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion, of course, the plaintiff’s factual allegations are accepted as true, and this

Court is not empowered to look behind those allegations to ascertain their veracity. See, e.g.,

Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (on a motion to dismiss, 

“all facts set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint are to be accepted as true and the court limits its

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allegations, but merely alleges wrongdoing in 2000 and 2001, more than five years before

Johnson filed her Complaint. There being no indication of any wrongful activity occurring in or

after November 2004 (two years before the Complaint was filed), the continuing violation

doctrine cannot resuscitate her time-barred causes of action.

Third, in an unauthorized Sur-Reply (doc. 51) filed after the Motion to Dismiss had been

taken under submission, Johnson attempts to inject the following facts into this litigation for the

first time: (1) that the “old Mobile County Court House” where the allegedly discriminatory

activity took place belonged to the City of Mobile; (2) that the building lacked OSHA signs

stating that “trespassers would be redirected from the warrants divisions”; (3) that a City of

Mobile police department employee named Chief Collier “was aware of the continuous hostile

environment”; and (4) that a Mobile City Council member “was aware of damages plaintiff

suffered in losing her job.” (Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply (doc. 51), at 1.) These new facts are

insufficient to defeat the City’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion because a brief is not a proper mechanism

for amending the pleadings. Even if it were, the Court is unaware of any precedent (and plaintiff

has cited none) supporting the notion that a defendant may be held liable for a hostile work

environment sustained by someone who was not its employee, but who merely worked in a

building owned by the defendant. Simply because a plaintiff works in a building owned by the

defendant, simply because the defendant may have knowledge that the plaintiff’s employer is

subjecting her to a hostile work environment, and simply because the defendant may have

knowledge of the plaintiff’s injuries does not give rise to any actionable claim for discrimination,

nor does it create a breach of a duty of care that might support a claim of negligence. Even if it

did, such claims are still time-barred because they were brought far outside the requisite twoyear limitations period.4

Case 1:06-cv-00821-WS-B Document 55 Filed 07/09/07 Page 7 of 13
consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto”) (citation omitted).

5 The Personnel Board also seeks dismissal on grounds of res judicata based on

evidence that in April 2006, Johnson sued that entity in state court on grounds substantially

similar to those presented here (e.g., harsh working conditions, abusive managerial practices,

unsafe environment with unlawful intruders, unsecured hostile environment, discriminatory

restroom access, lack of scheduled breaks and lunches, lack of investigation of break-in). The

Personnel Board would show that the state court dismissed that lawsuit on July 28, 2006. Given

the Court’s determination, supra, that defendants’ motions would not be converted into Rule 56

motions and that matters outside the pleadings would not be considered, the undersigned will not

address the res judicata defense because it rests entirely on materials outside the pleadings. See,

e.g., Concordia v. Bendekovic, 693 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Res judicata, however, is

not a defense under 12(b); it is an affirmative defense that should be raised under Rule 8(c).”);

Moch v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 548 F.2d 594, 596 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Generally,

a party cannot base a 12(b)(6) motion on res judicata. That doctrine must be pleaded as an

affirmative defense.”). Simply put, “a party may raise a res judicata defense by motion rather

than by answer where the defense’s existence can be judged on the face of the complaint.” 

Concordia, 693 F.2d at 1075. Here, it cannot, so resolution of the res judicata defense is

premature at this time.

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For all of these reasons, the Mobile City Council Office’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 42) is

due to be, and the same hereby is, granted.

B. Plaintiff’s Claims against Mobile County Personnel Board.

Defendant Mobile County Personnel Board (the “Personnel Board”) has also filed a

Motion to Dismiss (doc. 38), predicated on grounds very similar to those identified by Mobile

City Council Office.5

 In particular, much like her claims against the Mobile City Council Office,

Johnson does not proffer any factual grounds in the Complaint to support her theory that the

Personnel Board might be liable to her in some way for events that occurred while she worked

the night shift in the warrant division of the Sheriff’s Department in 2000 and 2001. The

Complaint does not allege facts tending to show that plaintiff was ever employed by the

Personnel Board. Nor does the Complaint allege facts tending to show any contract involving

the Personnel Board that would extend enforceable rights or legal protections of any kind to her

and against the Personnel Board. Furthermore, the Complaint is limited to events occurring in

2000 and 2001, and no facts are pleaded that might support equitable tolling; therefore, her

claims against the Personnel Board for discrimination under Title VII, § 1981 or § 1983,

negligence and wantonness are time-barred by straightforward application of the two-year

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6 The applicable briefing schedule provided that plaintiff’s opposition to the

Personnel Board’s Motion to Dismiss must be filed on or before May 14, 2007. (See Order dated

April 25, 2007 (doc. 40).) Plaintiff neglected to file her opposition brief until July 2, 2007, more

than six weeks after the deadline. She proffered no excuse for her dilatory filing, much less a

motion for leave to accept her untimely filing. Notwithstanding these procedural defects, the

Court in its discretion will consider plaintiff’s July 2 opposition brief. Johnson is admonished,

however, that failure to comply strictly with Court orders, procedural rules and other deadlines in

the future may result in her filings being excluded, notwithstanding her pro se status. Plaintiff is

further reminded that simply mailing filings to opposing counsel is not sufficient to render them

filed with the Clerk of Court. Opposing parties are under no obligation to file plaintiff’s

documents for her; rather, it is plaintiff’s sole responsibility to take appropriate steps to ensure

proper filing of every motion, brief or other paper that she intends to file with the Clerk of Court.

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limitation set forth in Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l). These defects lie at the heart of the Personnel

Board’s Motion to Dismiss.

Faced with these grounds for dismissal, plaintiff filed an untimely opposition brief styled

“Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant, Mobile County Personnel Board” (doc. 53).6

 The basis for

plaintiff’s opposition is difficult to follow. First, she requests the Court’s indulgence because

she is suing defendants via “factitious names and will ask leave of court to amend this complaint

to show their true names or capacities” when they become known to her. (Doc. 53, at 1.) The

concept of fictitious party pleading has no bearing on this Complaint and is not generally

permitted in federal court, at any rate. See, e.g., Rule 10(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. (caption of complaint

“shall include the names of all the parties”); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Rommell v. Automobile Racing

Club of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 1090, 1098-99 n.14 (11th Cir. 1992); Collins v. Fingerhut

Companies, Inc., 117 F. Supp.2d 1283 n.1 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (“fictitious party pleading is not

generally recognized under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). Second, Johnson again

attempts to shoehorn the causes of action pleaded in the Complaint into the six-year limitations

period created by Alabama Code § 6-2-34 by simply setting forth all nine subsections of that

statute without showing how her causes of action against the Personnel Board could possibly

state a claim on any of those bases. Third, plaintiff again invokes the Morgan continuing

violation doctrine, even though her Complaint fails to allege a single wrongful act within the

relevant limitations periods, as is necessary to apply that doctrine.

Much of the remainder of plaintiff’s brief consists of discussion and rehash of her

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7 Among the injuries claimed by Johnson are the “[l]oss of self esteem and ability

to make contraceptive decisions thus birthing a second child out of wedlock,” and among the

damages she seeks are “the property and or building which ever one defendant will relinquish to

her for punitive damages,” apparently referring to the old (and since demolished) Mobile County

Courthouse. (Doc. 53, at 7-8.)

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different causes of action, including her belief that defendants violated Title VII, subjected her to

a hostile working environment and harassment (by, for example, spelling her name incorrectly

on office materials, mispronouncing her name, and preparing a marriage certificate that spelled

her name incorrectly and listed the wrong date), were negligent in making security arrangements

at her workplace, retaliated against her when she complained, defamed her character, behaved

wantonly, wrongfully terminated her, and (in the case of nonparty Mobile County Commission)

committed fraud, as well as a lengthy discussion of the types and amounts of damages sought.7

If plaintiff’s claims are time-barred, then none of this matters.

Plaintiff does not point to any wrongful activities by the Personnel Board that she

contends occurred in the two-year period preceding the filing of her Complaint. She does not

allege any facts or circumstances that might warrant equitable tolling of her claims against the

Personnel Board. As such, the only way these claims can withstand Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny is if

she states a cause of action that falls within the 6-year limitations period of Ala. Code § 6-2-34. 

Plaintiff attempts to do this by insisting that the Personnel Board breached a contract with her. 

The sole fact on which she relies is the unanimous decision by a Grievance Committee of the

Personnel Board on December 27, 2000 recommending that the Sheriff’s Department take

certain steps to improve working conditions for Johnson, such as furnishing employees with a

written policy statement concerning shift assignments, establishing a daily maintenance routine,

establishing security procedures for evening and night-shift employees, establishing procedures

for handling emergencies for night-shift employees, establishing a policy for distribution of

uniforms to employees, and ameliorating heating and cooling problems. (See Doc. 32, at Exh.

10.) But these facts are not set forth in the Complaint, so they are irrelevant for purposes of

determining whether the Complaint states a cognizable claim for breach of contract. Even if

they had been properly pleaded, these facts neither establish nor imply any contractual

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8 Indeed, Exhibit 10 cannot rationally be viewed as a contract at all. It contains

nothing more than the Grievance Committee’s recommendations of certain steps that the

Sheriff’s Department should take concerning safety and working conditions. Nothing in Exhibit

10 purports to obligate the Personnel Board (or, for that matter, the Sheriff’s Department) to do

or refrain from doing anything; rather, these are mere recommendations, which on their face can

have no binding effect on anyone.

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relationship between Johnson and the Personnel Board.8

 She has failed to satisfy the minimum

pleading threshold of stating facts in her Complaint sufficient to show that she has a breach of

contract claim against the Personnel Board that is plausible on its face. As the Complaint fails to

state a cognizable claim for breach of contract, she cannot rely on the six-year limitations period

for contract actions under Alabama law to save her claim. Alternatively, plaintiff attempts to

secure a six-year limitations claim by stating a claim against the Personnel Board for trespass. 

But she cannot sue the Personnel Board for trespass on the ground that “a white male and a black

male inmate, unknown to plaintiff, trespassed into the plaintiff’s office without permission” on

November 7, 2000. (Doc. 53, at 4.) The Court is aware of no legal theory under which plaintiff

could sue the Personnel Board for trespass based on two inmates (who are neither affiliated with

nor agents of the Personnel Board) engaging in the criminal act of breaking into the Sheriff’s

Department’s warrants division after hours while plaintiff was on duty. By plaintiff’s own

admission, the Personnel Board did not trespass, and no such trespass occurred on property

belonging to Johnson.

For all of these reasons, the Court concludes as follows: (1) plaintiff’s breach of contract

claim against the Personnel Board fails to satisfy minimum pleading standards because the

Complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract that is plausible on

its face; (2) plaintiff has not stated a cognizable trespass claim against the Personnel Board; and

(3) plaintiff’s remaining claims against the Personnel Board are subject to a two-year limitations

period and are plainly time-barred. The Personnel Board’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 38) is

granted.

C. Plaintiffs’ Claims against Mobile County Sheriff’s Department.

Finally, defendant Mobile County Sheriff’s Department filed a Motion to Dismiss (doc.

34) on the grounds, inter alia, that the Sheriff’s Department is not a legal entity subject to suit. 

Case 1:06-cv-00821-WS-B Document 55 Filed 07/09/07 Page 11 of 13
9 To the contrary, the Wagner court specifically declined to reach that issue. See

Wagner, 314 F.3d at 542 n.1 (“In this opinion, we decide and intimate nothing about a party

proceeding pro se.”). 

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Plaintiff has not responded to this argument, nor can she do so given the clarity of the law

supporting the Sheriff’s Department’s position on this point. See, e.g., Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d

1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Under Alabama law, a county sheriff’s department lacks the

capacity to be sued.”); accord White v. Birchfield, 582 So.2d 1085, 1087 (Ala. 1991) (“The

Chambers County Sheriff’s Department is not a legal entity subject to suit.”). This legal

principle is fatal to plaintiff’s claims against the Mobile County Sheriff’s Department, and that

entity’s Motion to Dismiss is properly granted.

D. Opportunity to Cure.

Having determined that all of defendants’ motions to dismiss are due to be granted, the

question becomes whether the dismissal should take effect at this time or whether Johnson

should be given an opportunity to replead her claims. The law in this Circuit is clear that

“[o]rdinarily, a party must be given at least one opportunity to amend before the district court

dismisses the complaint.” Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Johnson has not requested such an opportunity here. That omission would be fatal if plaintiff

were represented by counsel. See Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Industries America Corp., 314 F.3d

541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his

complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to

amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.”). However, the Eleventh Circuit

has never announced whether the Wagner rule applies to claims brought by a pro se plaintiff,

and the Court will assume for purposes of this Order that it does not.9

Even if Wagner does not apply and even if a pro se plaintiff is generally entitled to leave

to amend her complaint sua sponte, leave to amend need not be provided where any amendment

would be futile. See, e.g., Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1073 (11th Cir. 2005); O’Halloran v.

First Union Nat. Bank of Florida, 350 F.3d 1197, 1206 (11th Cir. 2003). In this case, it is evident

that any attempt by Johnson to replead her Complaint would be futile. Johnson is attempting to

bring obviously stale claims for employment-related discrimination against two defendants that

Case 1:06-cv-00821-WS-B Document 55 Filed 07/09/07 Page 12 of 13
10 Besides, where, as here, a plaintiff’s claims are dismissed without prejudice, any

harm to plaintiff by virtue of not granting her leave to amend her complaint sua sponte prior to

such dismissal is attenuated. See, e.g., Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054-55 (5th Cir. 1998)

(dismissal of pro se complaint without granting leave to amend was proper where dismissal was

without prejudice); Moawad v. Childs, 673 F.2d 850, 851-52 (5th Cir. 1982) (dismissal of pro se

plaintiff’s deficient complaint should be without prejudice to allow leave to refile).

11 On July 9, 2007, plaintiff filed a Motion for Permission to Enter Compulsory

Joinder (doc. 54), in which she apparently seeks to join perjury claims against the Mobile

County Commission and/or individual County Commissioners and to attribute a breach of duty

of care to the County Commission with respect to its hiring practices and prevention of a hostile

environment. Nothing in these new allegations would correct or mitigate the pleading defects

described herein; therefore the Motion for Permission to Enter Compulsory Joinder is denied.

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never employed her and a third that is not a legal entity subject to suit in Alabama. All of her

tort claims (discrimination, negligence, wantonness, etc.) are clearly time-barred by a period of

several years and nothing in the facts and circumstances described anywhere in the record

suggests any basis through which plaintiff might overcome that bar. She obviously cannot state

a cognizable trespass claim based on non-parties breaking into a Sheriff’s Department facility. 

To the extent that Johnson would bring breach of contract claims, her repeated efforts (both in

pleading her Complaint and filing her briefs) to identify a contract between herself and any of

the defendants that might give rise to any right of action have missed the mark by a wide margin. 

At most, plaintiff points to a grievance form in which a Grievance Committee of the Personnel

Board recommended that the Sheriff’s Department take certain actions to improve working

conditions and workplace safety in December 2000. But nothing in those recommendations

could plausibly be construed to create contractual rights for Johnson against any defendant in

this action. Accordingly, as any amendment would be futile, the Court declines to grant Johnson

an opportunity, sua sponte, to amend her Complaint.10

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Motions to Dismiss (doc. 34, 38, 42) are granted,

and the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. A separate judgment will enter.11

DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of July, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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