Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01442/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01442-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCUS JAMES SMITH,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-04-1442 DFL GGH P

vs.

CLAUDE E. FINN, Warden, FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

Duel Vocational Institution,

Respondent.

 /

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner pled guilty on March 24, 1983 to one count of

second-degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187), and was sentenced April 21, 1983 to a term of

fifteen-years-to-life. This action is proceeding on the petition filed July 22, 2004, wherein

petitioner challenges his denial of parole on August 15, 2002, based on the following claims: (1)

the Board’s denial of parole breached plaintiff’s plea agreement, contravened Cal. Penal Code §

3041 and California’s “matrix system” under 15 Cal. Admin. Code § 2403, and was made

pursuant to an illegal state policy denying parole to all inmates convicted of murder, thus

violating due process, imposing cruel and unusual punishment, and effecting an ex post facto

law; and (2) petitioner’s sentence is disproportionately longer than sentences imposed on inmates

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 These assertions, made interchangeably in a petition that names without developing 1

multiple legal challenges, render petitioner’s contentions imprecise and difficult to construe,

despite exhaustion through the state courts. The court has reviewed petitioner’s state filings in

conjunction with the instant petition and has construed petitioner’s contentions as clearly as

possible. 

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in other states for the same crime, thus denying petitioner equal protection and constituting cruel

and unusual punishment.1

Respondent filed an answer on October 8, 2004. On October 28, 2004, petitioner

filed a traverse, wherein he also sought appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. After

carefully reviewing the record, the court recommends the petition be denied.

II. ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT (AEDPA)

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Buckley v.

Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2006), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27, 117

S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The AEDPA “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,”

establishing more deferential standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in

assessing a state court’s adjudication of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. 

Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

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“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25, 123 S. Ct. 357, 360 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.

Ct. 362, 365 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself

is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early, 123 S. Ct. at 366. 

“The state court need not cite or even be aware of the governing Supreme Court

cases, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradicts

them.’” Powell v. Galaza, 328 F.3d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 2003), quoting Packer, 537 U.S. at 8, 123

S. Ct. at 365. However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

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dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

In reviewing a state court’s summary denial of a habeas petition, the court “looks

through” the summary disposition to the last reasoned decision. Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234

F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.

Ct. 2590 (1991)). In the instant case, both the California Court of Appeal and the California

Supreme Court issued summary denials of petitioner’s petitions for review, which raised the

claims raised in the instant petition. Answer, Exhibits H, I; Petition, pp. 8, 9. Accordingly, the

court looks through to the March 3, 2003 reasoned decision of the San Bernardino County

Superior Court to determine whether its denial of petitioner’s claims was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court authority.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies 

The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). However, a petition may be denied

on the merits without exhaustion of state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). A petitioner

satisfies the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair

opportunity to consider all claims before presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 478

U.S. 1021 (1986). 

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 Following the Board’s denial of parole on August 15, 2002, petitioner filed a petition 2

for writ of habeas corpus in the San Bernardino County Superior Court on July 5, 2002, which

was denied on March 20, 2003. Answer, Exh. B, p. 15; Exh.G, as amended. (The Superior Court

order states the Board decision was heard and decided on September 5, 2002; however,

September 5, 2002 is the effective date of the Board’s August 15, 2002 decision.) Petitioner

thereafter filed a petition in California’s Fourth District Court of Appeal, which was summarily

denied on June 18, 2003. Answer, Exh. H; Petition, at p. 9. A petition for review filed

September 15, 2003 in the California Supreme Court was summarily denied on June 9, 2004. 

Answer, Exh. I; Petition, at p. 8, 10.

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Respondent concedes petitioner exhausted his state court remedies with respect to

the claims raised in his federal habeas petition. Answer, p. 3:6-7. 2

B. Successive Claim

Respondent asserts that petitioner’s equal protection claim should be dismissed as

“successive” because previously presented to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of

California, in Case No. CV 03-1004 GAF VBK. Petitioner asserts the matters are not successive

because Case. No. 03-1004 challenged petitioner’s 1983 plea bargain, while the instant petition

challenges petitioner’s 2002 denial of parole. Traverse, at p. 1. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), “[a] claim presented in a second or successive

habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be

dismissed.” For the reasons set forth below, petitioner’s equal protection claim is not successive.

The petition before the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 

was denied initially by the San Bernardino County Superior Court on July 8, 2002, the California

Court of Appeal on August 27, 2002, the California Supreme Court on June 18, 2003, then filed

in the Central District on September 4, 2003. Respondent moved to dismiss on the ground that

petitioner had filed in the Supreme Court, on September 15, 2003, a second habeas petition

asserting the same claims raised in the Central District petition. (Such “second” petition was

filed pursuant to the exhaustion of state court remedies underlying the instant habeas petition.) 

On October 31, 2003, the Central District found that petitioner had exhausted all claims before it

with the exception of petitioner’s “Ground Two” asserting denial of equal protection based on,

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 The court reasoned: “Smith indicated that he accepted a plea bargain because he would 3

be out in 7 1⁄2 years on a 15 years to life sentence, but would not be out for 12 1⁄2 years on a

sentence of 25 years to life for first degree murder. . . .[S]ince Smith appears to claim that he had

a deal for a seven and a half year release date, he knew or should have known when he was

denied release after seven and a half years in custody (somtime in 1990 or 1991) that the terms of

the alleged plea agreement had been violated. . . . [H]e certainly knew in 1995, when he reached

the 12 1⁄2 year mark, which is the time when he believed he would have been released on a first

degree murder conviction. [Since the statute of limitations under AEDPA commenced running

on April 24, 1996] . . .he would have had until April 24, 1997, or some date not long after that, to

file his petition. But he waited until September 2003, more than 20 years after the imposition of

sentence to seek habeas corpus relief. Under any theory, the delay is far beyond the expiration of

any limitations period and the motion to dismiss with prejudice should be granted.” March 8,

2005 Order, at p. 3 (Central District Case No. CV 03-1004 GAF VBK).

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“Sentence (length) is ‘statistical disparate [sic] from other sentences of inmates in other states,

who are similarly situated.” The Honorable Victor B. Kenton granted respondent’s motion to

dismiss and accorded petitioner several options. Petitioner moved to stay the petition and

dismiss the unexhausted claim pending a decision by the Supreme Court on the second habeas

petition, which the Central District granted on November 26, 2003. The Supreme Court

summarily denied the second petition (i.e., underlying the present action) on June 9, 2004. 

On July 12, 2004, petitioner filed in the Central District a First Amended Petition,

which was dismissed with prejudice in its entirety on March 8, 2005, on the ground it was timebarred under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. That petition raised similar legal claims

to those presented herein (see December 8, 2004 Findings and Recommendations, at pp. 3-4

(Central District Case No. CV 03-1004 GAF VBK)), but were limited to petitioner’s contention

his plea agreement had not been implemented; the court’s findings and order do not indicate that

petitioner challenged a specific decision of the Board but rather the failure of the Board to act. 

Applying AEDPA’s criteria for establishing the accrual date of a claim and commencement of 

running the statute of limitations (i.e., the date the factual predicate underlying the claim could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)), the

Central District found that petitioner’s claim accrued no later than 1995. The 2003 filing of 3

petitioner’s petition was well beyond the one-year statute of limitations imposed by AEDPA

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 See Ellingson v. Burlington Northern Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1330 n. 3 (9th Cir.1981) 4

(“[a] judgment based on the statute of limitations is ‘on the merits' ”); see also Plaut v.

Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995) (“The rules of finality, both statutory and judge

made, treat a dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds the same way they treat a dismissal for

failure to state a claim, for failure to prove substantive grounds the same way they treat a

dismissal for failure to state a claim, for failure to prove substantive liability, or for failure to

prosecute: as a judgment on the merits”).

 However, this does not mean that a challenge to a parole suitability determination may 5

be based on an alleged breach of a plea agreement. See infra.

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(viz., April 24, 1997, for claims that accrued prior to the April 24, 1996 effective date of the

AEDPA legislation). 

Petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability was denied by the Central

District on April 7, 2005, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on August 17, 2005. 

Respondent’s contention that petitioner’s present equal protection claim is

successive to that raised in the Central District is without merit. While dismissal based on statute

of limitations is an adjudication on the merits of the claim, thus rendering future petitions on the 4

same claim “successive,” petitioner’s challenge of the Board’s August 2002 decision challenges

an entirely different determination and is therefore not successive. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Parrott,

318 F.3d 387, 390 (2nd Cir. 2003) (“even a petition that has been finally adjudicated on the

merits will not count for purposes of the successive petition rule unless the second petition

attacks the same judgment that was attacked in the prior petition) (citation and internal quotations

omitted).”

The court therefore proceeds to petitioner’s contentions.5

C. Denial of Parole 

1. Background

On March 24, 1983, petitioner pled guilty to one count of second-degree murder

pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 187. On April 21, 1983, pursuant to a plea bargain, petitioner was

sentenced to a term of fifteen-years-to-life. Petitioner challenges his second denial of parole

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 Petitioner has subsequently filed two additional habeas actions in this court, both still 6

pending: Smith v. Finn, 05 CIV 2601 MCE EFB P (challenging denial of parole August 2003),

and Smith v. Finn, 06 CIV828 GEB EFB P (challenging denial of parole April 2005).

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 rendered August 15, 2002, in petitioner’s nineteenth year of incarceration. 6

California’s parole system provides that a panel of the Board of Parole Hearings,

previously the Board of Prison Terms (hereafter referred to interchangeably as the “Board”), shall 

meet with each inmate one year prior to his minimum eligible parole release date to “normally set

a parole release date.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). However, a release date shall not be set if the

Board “determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and

gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public

safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual.” Cal. Penal Code §

3041(b); see also, 15 Cal. Adm. Code § 2402(a) (relative to murders committed after 1978)

(“[r]egardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and

denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison”). Determination of parole suitability requires

consideration of “[a]ll relevant, reliable information” (15 Cal. Adm. Code § 2402(b)), including 

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 Section 2402(c) sets forth the circumstances tending to show unsuitability: 7

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate

incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style manner.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an 

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous occasions inflicted or 

attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the prisoner

demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age. 

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable or tumultuous

relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually assaulted 

another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental 

problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in 

prison or jail.

Section 2402(d) sets forth the circumstances tending to indicate suitability:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of assaulting others

as a juvenile or committing crimes with a potential of personal harm to the

victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably stable

relationships with others.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to indicate the

presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the damage, seeking help for or

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specific circumstances that indicate suitability and unsuitability for release (id., § 2402(c) and

(d)). Upon a finding of suitability, the Board’s determination of a release date must conform 7

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relieving suffering of the victim, or indicating that he understands the nature and

magnitude of the offense.

(4) Motivation for the Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as the result of

significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has built over a long period of

time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome. At the time of the commission of the crime, the

prisoner suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome, as defined in section 2000(b),

and it appears the criminal behavior was the result of that victimization.

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant history of violent

crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made realistic plans for

release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an enhanced ability to

function within the law upon release.

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with “uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to the

public,” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a), as provided by the “matrix” of base terms set forth in 15 Cal.

Adm. Code § 2403, as qualified by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in 15

Cal. Adm. Code § 2404. Procedures governing parole suitability hearings are set forth in Cal.

Penal Code § 3041.5 (requiring notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a written statement of

reasons if the panel decides against setting a parole date).

In the present case, the Board accorded petitioner advance notice of his August

15, 2002 parole hearing, including his right to attend the hearing and to an attorney; petitioner

waived both opportunities. Answer, Exhibits C, D, and E. After a hearing that included the

submission of information relevant to petitioner’s conviction, incarceration and parole plans

(Answer, Exh. B, pp. i-ii, 1-12), the Board concluded that petitioner posed an unreasonable risk

of danger to society if released from prison and denied parole for the following reasons (Answer,

Exh. B, pp. 13-15):

The Panel has reviewed all information from the public and relied on the

following circumstances in concluding that the prisoner is not suitable for parole

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and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison. 

The offense was carried out in an exceptionally cruel, callous, violent, brutal

manner. Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same incident. 

The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally

callous disregard for human suffering and life. These conclusions are drawn from

the Statement of Fact, wherein the inmate, on or about March 11th, 1980, after

seeing his estranged wife in the presence of another man in a vehicle, did shoot

the male, a Ron Anderson, in the jaw. He then returned to the vehicle and then

shot his wife four times, striking her three times in the head and once in the

shoulder, causing her death. Mr. Anderson survived. The inmate does have a

record of violence or assaultive behavior. He has numerous arrests. However, the

only conviction that he has was for battery and entering or remaining in a noncommercial dwelling. He plead guilty, was given three years probation. And

although he has other arrests for things–such things as robbery, attempted rape,

robbery, assault with a deadly weapon on two different occasions, those were

either not filed on or there was no disposition. The inmate has not sufficiently

participated in beneficial self-help and therapy programming. He has received

two 128 counseling chronos during his total incarceration. The last one was in

1987–or in 1988. He has received two 115s during his total incarceration, the last

one in 1991. And that was for force and violence. Psychological evaluation,

dated 4-20-01, by Eric Nelson, does appear to be supportive. Inmate lacks

realistic parole plans in that he does not have verifiable residential plans in any

county within the State of California, nor does he have acceptable employment

plans. The Hearing Panel notes that responses to 2034 Notices indicate

opposition to a finding of parole suitability, specifically the District Attorney of

San Bernardino County. The Panel makes the following findings. That the

inmate needs additional time in order to continue with his self-help, as previously

recommended. He should be, however, commended for receiving a GED in 2001,

have no 115s since 1991. The denial will be for a period of one year, at which

time we ask that the inmate remain disciplinary free, that he upgrade himself,

excuse me, that he participate in the self-help and therapy programming. 

Petitioner challenges the Board’s August 2002 denial of parole as a breach of his

plea agreement (continuing failure to parole petitioner after serving his minimum term of fifteen

years), failure to comply with state law (failure to fix a parole date pursuant to Cal. Penal Code §

3041 and the “matrix” set forth at 15 Cal. Admin. Code § 2403), and adherence to illegal state

policy (the alleged policy of former Governor Gray Davis that parole be denied to all inmates

convicted of murder).

2. Due Process

California inmates have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a parole

date and the deprivation of that interest must comply with the requirements of due process. Sass

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26 The parties’ briefing predates the Ninth Circuit’s Sass decision. 8

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v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006). Where parole statutes 8

give rise to a protected liberty interest, due process is satisfied in the context of a parole hearing

where a prisoner is afforded notice of the hearing, an opportunity to be heard and, if parole is

denied, a statement of the reasons demonstrating “some evidence” for the denial. Jancsek v.

Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska

Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 16, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2108 (1979)). This court’s review under the

“some evidence standard” “‘does not require examination of the entire record, independent

assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached

by the [] board,’” or, phrased differently, whether “‘the record is not so devoid of evidence’” that

the findings of the board are “‘without support or otherwise arbitrary.’” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129,

quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 2774 (1985); see also,

Morales v. California Dept. of Corrections, 16 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d on other grounds,

California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995); Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39,

40 (9th Cir. 1994) (“some evidence” test also applies to parole revocation).

Petitioner’s initial due process challenges – violation of his plea agreement,

failure to set a parole release date pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 3041 or the state’s “matrix” of

base terms – share petitioner’s contention that the Board erred in failing to set and implement a

specific parole release date. The San Bernardino County Superior Court addressed these matters

as follows (Exhibit G to Answer, filed September 29, 2006 (Document 10)):

Petitioner does not have a constitutional or statutory right to have a parole date

set. In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639 [646] [1972] [“the length of terms of

imprisonment and rights of parole shall be subject to redetermination from time to

time”]; Penal Code § 3041(b). Penal Code Section 3041 does provide for the

statutory right to a determination of suitability for parole and sets forth the

procedure for establishing that suitability. 

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As demonstrated below, this assessment is consistent with federal law and the 

requirements of federal due process.

a. Plea Agreement

The court first finds that alleging breach of a plea agreement fails to state a

cognizable claim when challenging a denial of parole. None of the factors which guide the

BPT’s decisions in parole suitability hearings include reference to enforcement of plea

agreements. If interpretation of plea agreements plays no part in the BPT decision, it should play

no part in the analysis of state courts reviewing the BPT decision, nor in the analysis of this

federal court ultimately reviewing a BPT decision as filtered through the state court system in

federal habeas. Rather, breach of plea agreements should be first directed as an attack on his

conviction and judgment per se to the state courts on direct review or habeas corpus which can

then adjudicate such a challenge, and later to a challenge in federal habeas regarding that state

court decision. Petitioner may challenge a state denial of his challenge to a plea agreement one

time in federal habeas, and successive challenges to his conviction and judgment will incur the

successive claim bar in federal habeas. 

Petitioner has made his one federal challenge to his conviction and judgment

based on an alleged breach of his plea agreement in the Central District. A federal habeas

challenge to his parole suitability determination based on an alleged breach of the plea agreement

fails to state a federal claim because none of the liberty interest in parole suitability hearings as

established by state law includes reference to enforcement of plea agreements. Nevertheless, in

an abundance of caution, the court will find, as an alternative, that the breach of plea agreement

would fail on its own merits even if reviewable here.

Petitioner asserts he was denied due process by the Board’s denial of parole

because petitioner has already served his minimum sentence of fifteen years. Petitioner

characterizes this contention as a breach of plea agreement or breach of contract. 

\\\\\

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 “‘Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are measured by contract law

standards.’ United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993). The terms of oral

plea agreements are enforceable, as are those of any other contracts, even though oral plea

agreements are not encouraged by reviewing courts. See, e.g., United States v. Monreal, 301

F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002).” Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003).

Petitioner has presented no evidence of a plea agreement other than the standard

term of fifteen-years-to-life, nor has he demonstrated entitlement to release upon reaching his

minimum sentence. In the absence of an agreement that can be specifically enforced, the Board

is not required to find petitioner eligible for parole upon completion of a minimum term. Rather,

consideration of parole suitability remains within the sound discretion of the Board. Cal. Penal

Code § 3041; accord, Williams v. Knowles, 2006 WL 1876897, *3 (E.D.Cal. 2006); accord,

McCauley v. Brown, 2006 WL 3020905 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 

Accordingly, the court finds no breach of contract or plea agreement. 

b. Cal. Penal Code § 3041

Petitioner contends he was denied due process by the Board’s failure to set a

parole date one year prior to his minimum eligible parole release date, pursuant to Cal. Penal

Code § 3041(a) (directing the Board to meet with each inmate one year prior to his minimum

eligible parole release date to “normally set a parole release date”), and continues to be denied

due process by the Board’s repeated failure to set a parole date, thus transforming his sentence to

“life without parole, special circumstances (death) or first degree murder (25 years to life).” 

Memorandum in Support of Petition, at p. 1. 

This contention, insofar as it challenges the Board’s actions when petitioner

reached his minimum eligible parole release date, is time-barred under AEDPA and successive

based upon petitioner’s Central District petition. To the extent petitioner challenges the Board’s

August 2002 failure to set a parole date, the California Supreme Court has found that section

3041 is not mandatory and does not create a presumption that parole will be granted. In re

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 Petitioner relies throughout his petition on the overruled decision in In re Dannenberg, 9

125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458 (1st Dist. 2002); the operative decision is In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th

1061, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417 (2005).

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Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1084, 1087-88 (2005). Rather, the Board is obligated to deny 9

parole where it determines, as here, that “public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b); Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1090-

1091. 

Accordingly, petitioner’s claim he was improperly denied parole under Cal. Penal

Code § 3041(a) is without merit.

c. “Matrix” of 15 Cal. Admin. Code § 2403

Petitioner contends he was denied due process by the Board’s failure to set his

release date within the sentencing guidelines established by the matrix of base terms set forth in

15 Cal. Admin. Code § 2403. 

By its terms, section 2403 applies only to inmates who have been found parole

suitable. See 15 Cal. Admin. Code § 2403(a) (“The panel shall set a base term for each life

prisoner who is found suitable for parole”). Consistently, the California Supreme Court recently

held in In re Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal. 4th at 1091, that the Board is not required to refer to its

sentencing matrices or other crimes of the same type in deciding whether a prisoner is suitable

for parole. No federal authority requires state parole boards, as a matter of course, to set a parole

date, thus triggering application of the “matrix,” notwithstanding a supported finding the prisoner

poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his “matrix” claim.

d. Ex Post Facto Law

Petitioner contends the Board’s August 2002 decision denying him parole was

made pursuant to an unlawful policy promulgated by former California Governor Gray Davis that

all prisoners serving life sentences for murder always be found unsuitable for parole. This

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 “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed [by Congress].” Art. I, § 9, 10

cl. 3. “‘No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the

Obligation of Contracts . . .” Art. I, § 10.

 Findings and Recommendations filed on December 22, 2004, were adopted by Judge 11

Karlton by Order filed on May 20, 2005, as amended on December 2, 2005.

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allegation – that a parole decision was made without individualized consideration – states a due

process claim. See Irons v. Warden of California State Prison-Solano, 358 F. Supp. 2d 936, 950

(E.D.Cal. 2005), citing McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004). 

While the Superior Court did not address this issue, petitioner’s articulation of the claim before

that court was vague; the claim has gained clarity as it has progressed through the courts. 

“The ex post facto prohibition forbids the Congress and the States to enact any

law ‘which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was

committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.’” Weaver v. Graham, 450

U.S. 24, 28, 101 S. Ct. 960, 964 (1981) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325-26

(1867)). For a law to be ex post facto, “it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, 10

and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.” Id. 450 U.S. at 29. To demonstrate an ex

post facto violation, petitioner must show the existence of a law that was retrospectively applied

and operated to his disadvantage. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29, 101 S. Ct. at 964. The authority of

the governor to review parole Board decisions is not itself an ex post facto law. Johnson v.

Gomez, 92 F. 3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 1996).

The California Supreme Court found no evidence of a gubernatorial “no parole”

policy under the facts presented in In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616 (2002). However, in this

district, Judge Karlton found in 2005 that such a policy existed under former Governors Wilson

and Davis, the latter serving until November 17, 2003. See Coleman v. Board of Prison Terms,

2005 WL 4629202 (CIV-S 96-0783 LKK PAN P), currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 11

Judge Karlton held that the petition for habeas corpus should be granted unless, within 60 days,

the respondent provided “a fair parole suitability hearing, conducted by a board free of any

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 “Complex issues abound insofar as Coleman is urged by petitioner as applicable to 12

his 1999 BPT hearing. Some of those issues are as follows: (1) was the holding in Coleman

applicable to all BPT panels or just the panel at issue in Coleman; (2) how does one reconcile

state court holdings contrary to Coleman, which are also entitled to res judicata/collateral

estoppel effect in federal court; (3) did petitioner waive his objection to a no parole policy

occasioned by biased BPT panel members when he expressly “temporarily” waived his bias

objection when proceeding before the panel; (4) what is the effect of Coleman in this case where

the BPT commissioners expressly disavowed that any “no parole” policy would motivate their

decision.” Williams v. Knowles, 2006 WL 1876897, *5 (E.D.Cal. 2006).

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prejudice stemming from a gubernatorial policy against parole for murderers.” Id., at *4.

With due recognition of the complexities presented by these conflicting state and

federal rulings, this court made the following analysis in Williams v. Knowles, 2006 WL 12

1876897, *5 (E.D.Cal. 2006), concluding that petitioner’s “no parole” argument was moot: even

if the petition were granted, the appropriate remedy would be a new hearing before an unbiased

panel (notwithstanding the petitioner’s request a parole date simply be set); since the Board had

already provided subsequent, presumptively nonbiased, parole eligibility hearings after Governor

Davis’ tenure, and in the normal course would provide yet another hearing prior to the time

Williams would reach finality, further hearing was unnecessary; in other words, petitioner had

already obtained his remedy. 

The facts of the present case are analogous. Were petitioner to be granted relief

under the reasoning of Coleman, the remedy would be a subsequent impartial parole eligibility

hearing. However, petitioner has had, since his August 2002 hearing, at least two subsequent

hearings resulting in a denial of parole. The most recent, in April 2005, was held during the

tenure of current Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. Petitioner does not assert Governor

Schwarzenegger has perpetuated a gubernatorial “no parole” policy; moreover, as this court

noted in Williams v. Schwarzenegger, 2006 WL 2548217, *13 (E.D. Cal. 2006), there is no

indication that any parole eligibility hearings during Governor Schwarzenegger’s tenure have

been or would “be affected by a historical ‘no parole’ policy assertedly instituted by two previous

governors.” Additionally, petitioner will have likely obtained yet another parole eligibility by the

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time this case reaches finality. That is, petitioner has already obtained his putative remedy.

Accordingly, petitioner has not demonstrated entitlement to relief pursuant to his

contention the Board denied him parole pursuant to a “no parole” policy. 

e. “Some Evidence” Review

The Board’s August 2002 hearing and decision finding petitioner unsuitable for

parole met the requirements of due process under the “some evidence” standard of review

articulated by the Supreme Court in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S. Ct. at 2774 . 

This standard requires that reliable evidence support the Board’s denial of parole, demonstrating

a reasoned, nonarbitrary decision specific to petitioner. Significantly, petitioner does not contend

the Board’s August 2002 decision failed to meet this standard. 

The Board’s August 2002 hearing satisfied the due process requirements of notice

and an opportunity to be heard. Jancsek, supra, 833 F.2d at 1390. Petitioner had advance written

notice of his parole hearing, an opportunity to submit materials for the Board’s consideration,

access to the materials submitted to the Board for its consideration by others, and an opportunity

to be heard. Petitioner chose not to attend the hearing but does not assert his decision was other

than voluntary.

Further, the Board’s decision was supported by reliable evidence without undue

reliance on unchanging factors (see, Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F. 3d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 2003); see

also, Irons, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 947 (“continuous reliance on unchanging circumstances

transforms an offense for which California law provides eligibility for parole into a de facto life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole”). Although the Board relied on unchanging

factors – the nature of the offense, the number of victims, and plaintiff’s criminal record – this

appears to have been the Board’s first parole eligibility determination as to petitioner and hence

such reliance cannot be found unduly continuous. These factors retained predictive value in

determining whether petitioner would be a risk to the public if released, and thus were

appropriately relied upon pursuant to the unsuitability-for-parole factors set forth in 15 Cal.

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 The Superior Court reasoned (Exhibit G to Answer, filed September 29, 2006 13

(Document 10):

California Code of Regulation, Title 15, Section 24002 [sic] sets forth the various

factors to be considered. 

The Board must consider all factors, both favorable and unfavorable, to satisfy

due process, and this consideration must be more than pro forma. The various

factors considered must be supported by “some evidence.” In re Powell, 45 Cal.

3d 894.

While in this case it is apparent from the Decision that the Board did consider the

various factors, it is also apparent that they relied primarily on the circumstances

of the commission of the crime as well as the petitioner’s criminal history and

performance while in prison. All of these factors are pertinent and are sufficient

to support a finding of unsuitability for parole. In re Seabock, 140 Cal. App. 3d

29.

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Admin. Code § 2402(c)(1)(A) (multiple victims), (c)(1)(D) (callous disregard for human

suffering), and (c)(2) (previous record of violence). The Board performed an individualized

assessment as demonstrated by its reliance on petitioner’s failure adequately to participate in selfhelp and therapy programs (see, e.g., 15 Cal. Admin. Code § 2402(c)(5) (psychological factors),

and (c)(6) (institutional behavior); see also, the suitability factors 15 Cal. Admin. Code §

2402(d)(9)(institutional behavior), and (d)(3) (signs of remorse)). Also important to the Board

and within petitioner’s control was his lack of realistic parole and employment plans. See, 15

Cal. Admin. Code § 2402(d)(8)). Consistently, while the Board commended petitioner for

receiving a GED in 2001, and no prison disciplinary record since 1991, it deferred further

consideration of parole for a period of one year, during which petitioner was encouraged to

remain disciplinary free, participate in self-help and therapy programming and, presumably,

make plans for parole including employment, all critical factors in assessing petitioner’s risk to

public safety. 

The San Bernardino County Superior Court upheld the Board’s decision based

almost exclusively on the immutable factors of the crime and petitioner’s criminal history, noting

only in passing petitioner’s “performance while in prison.” However, for the reasons set forth 13

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The nature of the crime committed alone can constitute a sufficient basis for

denying parole (In re Minnis, supra), and the Board may weigh the degree of

violence used and the amount of viciousness demonstrated. In re Seabock, supra. 

Here, the Decision related circumstances of the crime as demonstrating a

deliberate killing, which is more than enough to sustain a conviction for the

offense committed and for which the petitioner was convicted. 

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above, including petitioner’s failure to challenge the Board’s assessment, this court finds the

Board’s August 2002 decision denying petitioner parole satisfied all pertinent federal due process

requirements.

3. Equal Protection; Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner contends, without any factual support, that the Board’s denial of parole

has resulted in petitioner serving a longer sentence than that prescribed for other inmates

convicted of second degree murder, particularly those in other states, thus denying petitioner

equal protection of the laws. Petitioner also contends that his sentence is disproportionately

harsh and in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment.

The San Bernardino County Superior Court adequately addressed these

contentions as follows (Exhibit G to Answer, filed September 29, 2006 (Document 10)):

Petitioner contends his sentence is cruel and unusual in that is it is “statistically

disparate” (disproportionate) to sentences imposed from crimes of equal or greater

severity.

The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Eighth Amendment of the

Constitutional does not prohibit the imposition of a sentence that is grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the crime. The exception to this rule is capital

cases or particular sentences in which the years imposed are greatly or

unreasonably disproportionate to the crime committed. Rummell v. Estell[e], 45

U.S. 263, 272, 285. Petitioner’s fifteen years to life sentence is not one of those

exceptions.

Even if petitioner had submitted evidence in support of this contention, “mere

demonstration of inequality is not enough” to establish a violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment’s equal protection clause . McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir.

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1991). “[T]he Constitution does not require identical treatment. There must be an allegation of

invidiousness or illegitimacy in the statutory scheme before a cognizable claim arises.” Id. 

Further, “a sentence within the limits set by a valid statute may not be overturned on appeal as

cruel and unusual punishment unless the sentence is so ‘grossly out of proportion to the severity

of the crime ‘as to shock our sense of justice.’” United States v. Cupa-Guillen, 34 F.3d 860, 864

(9th Cir.1994). Only extreme sentences grossly disproportionate to the offense are forbidden by

the Eighth Amendment. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2704

(1991); United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In In re Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal. 4th at 1098, the California Supreme Court

held that the Board is not required, in deciding whether a prisoner is suitable for parole, to

compare that prisoner’s “crime to other second degree murders, to its base term matrices, or to

the minimum statutory prison term for that offense.” That is, “California’s parole statutes allow

the Board to find unsuitability without engaging in a comparative analysis of other offenses or

applying ‘uniform term’ principles.” Id., at 1098, n. 18; see also, Connor v. Estelle, 981 F.2d

1032, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 1992) (periodic parole suitability reviews of individual prisoners,

resulting in unequal sentences, violates neither equal protection nor due process). Further, the

length of time petitioner spent in prison as of August 2002 was within the statutory limits for

second degree murder and not so grossly disproportionate either to the nature of the crime or in

comparison with other sentences for second degree murder as to violate the Eighth Amendment’s

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303, 103

S. Ct. 3001, 3016 (1983) (only demonstrated significant disproportionality in sentencing warrants

Eighth Amendment review); U.S. v. Zavala-Serra, 853 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1988) (“the

proportionality requirement of the [E]ighth [A]mendment does not require that a defendant’s

sentence be harmonized with sentences imposed by other courts on other defendants”). Federal

due process requires only that the Board’s decision denying parole be based on sufficient reliable

evidence demonstrating the prisoner remains a danger to public safety. 

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Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his equal protection or Eighth

Amendment claims.

C. Appointment of Counsel and Evidentiary Hearing

In the concluding paragraph of his traverse, petitioner summarily requests

appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. 

There is no absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756-757, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2568 (1991); Nevius v. Sumner,

105 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). However, “[w]henever the United States magistrate or the

court determines that the interests of justice so require, representation may be provided for any

financially eligible person who . . . is seeking relief under section 2241, 2254, or 2255 of title

28.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). Unless an evidentiary hearing is necessary, the decision to

appoint counsel is discretionary. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir.1984), cert.

denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984); see also Rules Governing § 2254 Cases 8(c). In exercising this

discretion, the court must consider the likelihood of petitioner’s success on the merits and the

petitioner’s ability to articulate his claims in light of their legal complexity. Weygandt v. Look,

718 F.2d, 954 (9th Cir. 1983); see also, LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987) (no

abuse of discretion to deny counsel where petitioner demonstrated “a good understanding of the

issues and the ability to present forcefully and coherently his contentions”).

An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary to assess the merits of petitioner’s claims. 

An evidentiary hearing is unwarranted if petitioner “has failed to develop the factual basis of a

claim in State court proceedings,” unless the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law that

may be applied retroactively on a collateral claim or the factual predicate could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence, and “the facts underlying the claim

would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error,

no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Petitioner makes neither assertion. The state court record submitted by the

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combined efforts of petitioner and respondent does not establish adequate factual support to

support petitioner’s constitutional claims. “It has been explained by the United States Supreme

Court that a failure to develop in state court an adequate record for relief precludes an evidentiary

hearing in federal court in a habeas action when a petitioner has ‘neglected his [or her] rights in

state court.’” Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting Williams

(Terry), 529 U.S. at 435, 120 S. Ct. at 1490, and citing Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075,

1078-79 (9th Cir. 1999). Further, since petitioner has not demonstrated the necessity of

convening an evidentiary hearing, consideration of his request for appointed counsel is within

this court’s sound discretion based on the likelihood of petitioner’s success on the merits and his

ability to articulate his legal claims. Petitioner has adequately articulated his legal claims but the

court finds these claims to be without merit. 

Accordingly, petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel, as well as his

request for an evidentiary hearing, should be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds the rulings of the state courts to be

consistent with federal law. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus, filed July 22, 2004, be

denied; and

2. Petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing,

filed with his traverse on October 28, 2004, also be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to Honorable David F. Levi,

the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(l). Within twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations,

any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within ten days after

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service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 1/24/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

___________________________

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH5:Smith1442.hc.ggh

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