Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00386/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00386-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY McCLELLAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

KERN COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, 

et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:10-cv-0386-LJO-MJS (PC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(ECF NO. 128)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action 

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the time that he filed suit on March 4, 2010, 

Plaintiff was incarcerated and had accrued three strikes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Although he was initially granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4), the

order to that effect was revoked on September 28, 2015 after it was determined that 

Plaintiff’s complaint did not satisfy the “imminent danger” exception outlined in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). (ECF No. 124.) Plaintiff was thus directed to pay the filing fee of $400 or his 

case would be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. 

In response to the Court’s September 28, 2015, order, and in light of his recent 

release from prison, Plaintiff has now filed a second motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis. (ECF No. 128.) Plaintiff contends that since he has been released from prison, 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) is no longer applicable to him, and he should therefore be granted 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1). Defendant 

opposes the motion.

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The in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, distinguishes unincarcerated 

indigent people from incarcerated ones. Under § 1915(a)(1), a non-prisoner plaintiff may

file suit without prepaying fees, provided he or she submits an affidavit demonstrating 

“that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” Escobedo v. 

Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2015); Ingle v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 

1165, 1177 (9th Cir. 2003). An indigent prisoner, by contrast, is not exempt from 

prepayment. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Instead, the prisoner must submit a copy of his or 

her trust account statement, make an initial upfront payment, followed by subsequent 

monthly installments, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)-(2). An 

indigent prisoner is also subject to the limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which 

provides that:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a 

judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if 

the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on 

the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner 

is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Plaintiff, as a “three-striker,” is subject to this latter provision. 

Plaintiff’s argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) does not apply to him because he is 

no longer incarcerated is unavailing. Whether or not he is incarcerated now is immaterial 

since the relevant inquiry is whether he was incarcerated at the time that he filed this 

action. 

In a related context, the Ninth Circuit was asked to consider the availability of 28 

U.S.C. §1915(g)’s “imminent danger” exception to a plaintiff who was released from 

prison after filing suit: 

The PLRA provides that a prisoner with three strikes cannot 

use IFP status to “bring a civil action ... unless the prisoner is

under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) (emphases added). The exception's use of the 

present tense, combined with its concern only with the initial 

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act of “bring[ing]” the lawsuit, indicates to us that the 

exception applies if the danger existed at the time the 

prisoner filed the complaint. See United States v. Jackson, 

480 F.3d 1014, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the use of 

tenses in statutes generally is significant and “one would not 

refer in the present tense to something that had already 

happened” (citing The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1)). In other 

words, the availability of the exception turns on the conditions 

a prisoner faced at the time the complaint was filed, not at 

some earlier or later time. Andrews's removal from the 

California prison system after filing the complaint is 

therefore irrelevant to our § 1915(g) analysis.

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added.) As 

the court noted, “it is the circumstances at the time of the filing of the complaint that 

matters for purposes of the ‘imminent danger’ exception to § 1915(g).” Id. at 1053. In the 

absence of controlling authority holding otherwise, the undersigned sees no reason to 

impose a different standard for the rule than for the exception. Plaintiffs’ subsequent 

release from prison, therefore, does not alter the Court’s analysis regarding his inability 

to proceed in forma pauperis in light of his three-striker status and his failure to satisfy 

the “imminent danger” exception. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 128) is DENIED; and

2. Pursuant to the September 28, 2015, Order, Plaintiff is directed to pay the 

filing fee of $400.00 within fourteen (14) days of service of this order; Plaintiff 

is again warned that failure to pay the filing fee will result in dismissal without 

prejudice for failure to prosecute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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