Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01610/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01610-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROLDOLFO GUERERRO ALVAREZ,

Petitioner,

v.

D. K. SISTO,

Respondent.

 /

1: 06 CV 01610 AWI WMW HC

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER RE

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[Doc.15]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 16, 1996, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of second degree murder. The jury

found true the allegations that Petitioner had personally used a firearm during the commission of the

murders. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an indeterminate state prison term of 32 years to life.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal and on March 3, 1992, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District (“Court of Appeal”), affirmed the judgment. Petitioner filed a petition for review

with the California Supreme Court, which the court denied on April 29, 1992.

Petitioner subsequently filed the following three state post-conviction collateral challenges:

First Petition

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February 4, 1994: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court

April 27, 1994: Petition denied.

Second Petition

November 4, 2005: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Fresno County Superior

Court

November 18, 2005: Petition denied.

Third Petition

December 22, 2005: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court

September 13, 2006: Petition denied, citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998)

Petitioner filed the present petition on October 10, 2006.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Fresno 

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

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determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on the ground it is untimely and barred by the

statute of limitations. Petitioner has not responded to Respondent’s motion.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

Petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5

of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may be

raised by the Attorney General, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.” 

The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss as a request for the court to

dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 th

F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and

case law, the court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule

4.

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment)

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

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subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct review

became final. The AEDPA, however, is silent on how the one year limitation period affects cases

where direct review concluded before the enactment of the AEDPA. The Ninth Circuit has held that

if a petitioner whose review ended before the enactment of the AEDPA filed a habeas corpus petition

within one year of the AEDPA’s enactment, the Court should not dismiss the petition pursuant to

§ 2244(d)(1). Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1286 (9 Cir.), cert. th

denied, 118 S.Ct. 899 (1998); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 127 F.3d 782, 784 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1395 (1998). In such circumstances, the limitations period would

begin to run on April 25, 1996. See, Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9 Cir. 2001). th

Petitioner was convicted on May 16, 1990, and his judgment became final before the

effective date of the AEDPA in 1996. Accordingly, the limitations began running on April 25, 1996,

and absent tolling, expired on April 24, 1997.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See, Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9 Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus th

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See, id. 

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 1 th

(2000); see, also, Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321,

1323 (10 Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a th

petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all

claims to the state courts first and will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern

that the limitation period will end before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id.

at 1005. 

In this case, Petitioner filed his first state post-conviction collateral action on February 4,

1994. Because this petition was filed and concluded before the effective date of the statute of

limitations, it had no tolling effect. See Hill v. Keane, 948 F.Supp. 157, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling based on his first petition. Because his

second and third petitions were filed after the expiration of the statute, they also had no tolling effect.

See Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000) (petitioner is not entitled to tolling where

the limitations period has already run). Thus, no statutory tolling applies in this case. 

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 th

F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60, 139 (1997); Calderon v. th

United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1288 (9 Cir.), overruled in part on other grounds th

by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9 Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that th

"[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if

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'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir.1999), citing Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541; Beeler, 128 F.3d at th

1288-1289.

In this case, Petitioner did not respond to the motion to dismiss, and therefore has not utilized

that opportunity to claim a basis for equitable tolling. The court has reviewed the petition and finds

no basis for equitable tolling stated in the petition. Accordingly, the court concludes that equitable

tolling is not warranted in this case.

In conclusion, the court finds that the statute of limitations began running on April 25, 1996,

and expired on April 24, 1997. The present petition, filed October 10, 2006, is therefore barred by

the statute of limitations.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2) This petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED as barred by the statute of limitations;

3) The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2008 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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