Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02184/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02184-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY RASHAD JOHNSON,

CDCR #F-39513, Civil No. 10cv2184 MMA (AJB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

[Doc. No. 2];

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

DEFENDANT CALIFORNIA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

AND

(3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO

EFFECT SERVICE UPON

REMAINING DEFENDANTS

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) 

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF

CORRECTIONS; 

E.J. PIMENTAL, Correctional Officer; 

KULODROVIC, Correctional Sergeant; 

SANCHEZ, Correctional Officer,

Defendants.

Anthony Rashad Johnson (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility located in San Diego, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) [Doc. No. 2]. 

Case 3:10-cv-02184-MMA-MDD Document 4 Filed 11/24/10 Page 1 of 6
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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited

from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor,

281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion

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to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must

subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening

and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.

2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not

only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that

fails to state a claim). 

Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, as

amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to

the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing

the U.S. Marshal to effect service pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at

845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir.

1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of

process is made on the opposing parties”).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194

(noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”);

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s

pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988),

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which is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261

(9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the

court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122

(2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

First, to the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against the “California Department of

Corrections,” (Compl. at 1-2), the Court finds the claims against this Defendant must be

dismissed for failing to state a claim and for seeking damages against a defendant who is

immune pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii). The State of California and the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, an agency of the State of California,

are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983 and are instead, entitled to absolute immunity from

monetary damages actions under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v.

Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1996); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.

89, 106 (1984); see also Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993)

(holding that a state department of corrections is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the “California Department of Corrections” are hereby

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii) without leave to amend.

In order to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must identify a “person” who, acting

under color of state law, deprived him of a right guaranteed under the Constitution or a federal

statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To that end, however, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s remaining

claims against the individual correctional officers named in his pleading are sufficient to survive

the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and that Plaintiff is therefore

entitled to U.S. Marshal service upon these Defendants on his behalf. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at

1126-27; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and

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perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service

be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal ... if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed

in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”). 

However, Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure

is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant]

may choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Defendant “California Department of Corrections” is DISMISSED pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & § 1915A.

5. The Clerk shall issue a summons upon Defendants Pimental, Kulodrovic and

Sanchez, and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each of these

Defendants. In addition, the Clerk shall provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order, and

certified copies of his Complaint and the summons for purposes of serving each Defendant.

Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff is directed to complete the Form 285s as

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completely and accurately as possible, and to return them to the United States Marshal according

to the instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP package. Thereafter,

the U.S. Marshal shall serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon each Defendant as

directed by Plaintiff on each Form 285. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United

States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3).

6. Defendants are thereafter ORDERED to reply to the Complaint within the time

provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(g)(2) (while Defendants may occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to reply to

any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under

section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) and/or § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the

face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,”

Defendants are required to respond). 

7. Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by

counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document

submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be

filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy

of any document was served on Defendants, or counsel for Defendants, and the date of service.

Any paper received by the Court which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to

include a Certificate of Service will be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 24, 2010

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

Case 3:10-cv-02184-MMA-MDD Document 4 Filed 11/24/10 Page 6 of 6