Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05423/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05423-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACK LEE OSBORNE,

Plaintiff,

v.

TULARE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPT, et.

al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 03 5423 REC SMS P 

ORDER DISMISSING WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND (Doc. 18.) 

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT

TO SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK CIVIL RIGHTS

FORM 

 Jack Lee Osborne (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff filed the instant action on April 11, 2003. On May 19, 2003, the Court

dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend because it did not state any claims on which relief

could be granted. (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on July 16, 2003. (Doc. 13.) 

The Court dismissed the Complaint again on August 5, 2004, because the Complaint still did not

state any claims for relief and also was sufficiently lengthy to violate Rule 8(a). (Doc. 7.) 

Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on September 18, 2004. (Doc. 18.) The Second

Amended Complaint is currently pending before the Court. Plaintiff names Kevin Hice, Anthony

Jones, Deputy Whaley and Deputy Bruce as Defendants 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that on November 4, 2002, Defendant Hice “assaulted him with force.” 

Sergeant Jones retaliated against him by subjecting him to indifference by placing him into an

“affiliated cell” after knowing he was in protective housing. Deputy Whaley assisted Deputy

Hice during the assault and failed to restrain Hice. Deputy Bruce was part of the plot to retaliate

against him by placing him in an environment he knew was detrimental to his safety. 

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

As in the previous cases, the Court has provided the Plaintiff with law it believed to be

relevant to assist Plaintiff in formulating his claims for relief. However, Plaintiff, as in the case

before, has not provided sufficient facts that state a cognizable claim for relief. The Complaint

consists of merely conclusions and in no way remedies the defects outlined in the previous orders

issued by the Court. Plaintiff complains that the Court is delaying his case, however, as noted

above, if a Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to state a claim for relief, it must be

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dismissed. This is the Court’s duty. It is not the Court’s duty to proceed with an action just

because the Plaintiff says so or because Plaintiff believes he has provided sufficient information. 

The law requires that each claim state specific facts to demonstrate a plausible claim for relief. 

This means that if Plaintiff merely provides conclusions like “Defendant Hice assaulted me”

without more facts that demonstrate that the act was in retaliation or was excessive under the

circumstances, it does not state a claim for relief. This does not mean that Plaintiff can merely

say that the force used was “excessive” because this would again be a conclusion. Plaintiff must

relate the circumstances (facts) surrounding the events that constitute the claim for relief. When

the Court asks for more facts, this does not mean that Plaintiff should write a book of

unnecessary information because the Court will not read the entire narrative and pick out which

facts may or may not support the claim that the assault was excessive. This is Plaintiff’s

responsibility. The Court understands Plaintiff’s frustration with the Court’s requiring him to

amend his Complaint. However, if Plaintiff fails to amend to cure the defects, dismissal is

required. Again, it is not the Court’s or the opposing party’s responsibility to try to guess at the

background facts that support his claims for relief. Although the Court informed Plaintiff that

the last order was the final time it would allow him to amend, the Court will provide Plaintiff

with one last attempt to cure the deficiencies. Should Plaintiff fail to do so, the Court will have

no choice but to recommend dismissal. The Court will further try to make more clear why the

claim for relief is deficient. Plaintiff should pay particular attention to the law provided as it

details what elements (or requirements) must be met by Plaintiff to not only prove his case, but

more importantly, to state a claim for relief. 

1. Excessive Force

When a prison official stands accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the

cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, the question turns on whether

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (citing

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). In determining whether the use of force was

wanton and unnecessary, it is proper to consider factors such as the need for application of force,

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the relationship between the need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived

by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The extent of a prisoner’s injury is also a factor that may suggest whether

the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation. Id. 

Although the absence of serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, it is not

determinative. Id. That is, use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel

and unusual punishment even though the prisoner does not suffer serious injury. Id. at 9. 

Although an inmate need not have suffered serious injury to bring an excessive force claim

against a prison official, “. . . [not] every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a

federal cause of action.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later

seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”

Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.)(cert. denied sub nom. Johnson, 414

U.S. 1033 (1973)). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimus uses of physical force. Id. at 9-

10.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hice “assaulted him with excessive force.” As

discussed above, this is a conclusion. Plaintiff should attempt to provide a brief statement of

facts as to what was going on when the force was used or why, if he knows that. This may aid

him in providing sufficient information to determine whether a cognizable claim for relief is

stated. Again, Plaintiff should be brief but state enough information as to the background

circumstances (facts) without providing irrelevant information or making the Complaint

excessively lengthy. 

2. Failure to Protect

Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

abuse. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 833 (1994). To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison

officials were “deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the inmates’s safety.” Farmer at 834. 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

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alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer at 834 (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must “know of and

disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was a protected custody inmate and was

improperly housed with other inmates placing his safety at risk. 

Plaintiff’s allegation fails to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation for failure

to protect. Plaintiff has not alleged facts that demonstrate he was subjected to an objectively

serious risk of harm. 

Under the relevant case law, fear of assault does not constitute a

‘sufficiently serious’ injury sufficient to state a claim under the

Eighth Amendment. See Dawes, 239 F.3d at 494 (dismissal of a

failure to protect claim affirmed, where plaintiff did not allege he

was assaulted by other inmates); Hudson v. Greiner, No. 99 Ci.

12339, 2000 WL 1838324 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13 2000)

(plaintiff’s allegation that the prison administration knew that

placing plaintiff in the general population could lead to his being

injured, without an allegation of physical injury, was insufficient to

state an Eighth Amendment claim); Bolton v. Goord, 992 F.Supp.

604, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (evidence that plaintiffs ‘lived in fear of

assault from their cellmates is not an objectively serious enough

injury to support an Eighth Amendment violation); see also Doe v.

Welborn, 110 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 1997) (fear of assault was not ‘the

kind of extreme and officially sanctioned psychological harm that

[supports] a claim for damages under the Eighth Amendment”);

Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[h]owever

legitimate [the plaintiff prisoner’s] fears may have been, ... it is the

reasonably preventable assault itself, rather than any fear of assault,

that gives rise to a compensable claim under the Eighth

Amendment”).

Cruz v. Hillman, No. 01 CIV. 4169 DABDF, 2002 WL 31045864 *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Plaintiff

allegations demonstrate that he housed with proactive inmates for only a few hours. Plaintiff’s

allegations demonstrate nothing other than a generalized fear of other inmates, which does not

state a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment. 

C. Retaliation

In his complaint, plaintiff merely alleges that he was subjected to retaliation. However,

this is yet again a conclusion. Plaintiff must state the reasons why he believes he was retaliated

against and also provide sufficient facts as to how he was retaliated against. 

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Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights to speech or to

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). To establish a prima facie case, plaintiff must allege

and show that defendants acted to retaliate for his exercise of a protected activity, and defendants'

actions did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816

(9th Cir. 1994); Pratt 65 F.3d at 807. A plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim must demonstrate a

"but-for" causal nexus between the alleged retaliation and plaintiff's protected activity (i.e., filing

a legal action). McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1979); see Mt. Healthy City School

Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The prisoner must submit evidence, either

direct or circumstantial, to establish a link between the exercise of constitutional rights and the

allegedly retaliatory action. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806. Timing of the events surrounding the alleged

retaliation may constitute circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent. See Pratt 65 F.3d at 808;

Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1989). The injury asserted in

retaliation cases is the retaliatory conduct’s chilling effect on the plaintiff’s First Amendment

rights. See Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,

449 (9th Cir. 2000).

D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief

can be granted under § 1983 against any of the Defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with

time to file a THIRD Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified above should he

wish to do so. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Amended Complaint how the conditions complained of

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 

1980). The Amended Complaint must specifically state how each Defendant is involved. 

Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423,

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

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F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an Amended

Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 

1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original Complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The Amended

Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference

the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

E. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. WITHIN

THIRTY (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL: 

a. File a THIRD Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by

the Court in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an Amended

Complaint and pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary dismiss

the case. 

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 8, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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