Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00428/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-00428-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Daimen Joseph Irizarry, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

 Respondents.

No. CV-16-0428-PHX-JAT (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Daimen Joseph Irizarry filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his 

convictions and sentences in Maricopa County Superior Court for his role in the death of 

Gilbert Police Lieutenant Eric Shuhandler. As explained below, the Court recommends 

that his Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

Background 

 Irizarry was indicted on multiple counts of aggravated assault, drive by shooting, 

and unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle. (Doc. 10-3) These charges all 

stemmed from the January 28, 2010 death of Gilbert Police Lieutenant Eric Shuhandler. 

(Id.) 

 At trial, the jury heard evidence that while Irizarry was pulled over for a traffic 

violation, his passenger, Christopher Redondo, shot and killed Lt. Shuhandler. Irizarry 

then sped away and he was arrested after an hour-long high-speed chase and a brief 

shootout. (Doc. 10-8 at ¶ 2) Irizarry argued that he was under the influence of 

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methamphetamine, panicked when he heard the gun shot, and drove off because he was 

scared that Redondo would kill him too. (Doc. 9, Ex. C at 60-66) 

 As part of the State’s case-in-chief, Melissa Kingsley, a radio dispatcher, testified 

about her conversation with Lt. Shuhandler during the traffic stop. (Doc. 9, Ex. A at 74-

83) Through her testimony, the State introduced Exhibit 121, a recording of her 

conversation with Lt. Shuhandler, and played it for the jury. (Id. at 80) Kingsley 

testified that Lt. Shuhandler had called at 10:42 and they had switched communication 

channels at 10:49. (Id. at 77-78) Then, the State asked her several questions about 

whether Exhibit 121 was complete: 

Q: And does [the recording] also include everything or the clip that we have here up until the time that you no longer corresponded with him; 

correct? 

A: Yes 

Q: And does include the time on there? [sic] From your memory, does it include at least real time from the time he called at 10:49 with you until the communication ended is real time on the time; correct? [sic] 

A: Yes 

Q: That will give us a definite or exact time as to when things happened; correct? 

A: Yes. 

(Id. at 79) Irizarry’s counsel did not object to the introduction of Exhibit 121 and he did 

not cross examine Kingsley. (Id. at 80, 83) 

 Irizarry recalled Kingsley to testify. (Doc. 9, Ex. B at 33-44) The second time she 

testified, Kingsley stated that she did not edit Exhibit 121, acknowledged that someone 

had edited out her contemporaneous communication with other officers, and 

acknowledged that Exhibit 121 would have been longer if those communications had 

been left in the recording. (Id. at 34-40) During cross-examination with the State, 

Kingsley agreed that she had “previously told us that the whole conversation took [sic] 

and the times are 10:47 to 10:53” and that she had previously testified that the tape was 

six minutes. (Id. at 41-42) On redirect, Kingsley stated that she did not remember 

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whether she had originally testified about 10:47 and 10:53 and that she did not remember 

whether or not the tape should be six minutes. (Id. at 43-44) 

 After six days of trial, the jury found Irizarry guilty of all the charged counts and, 

subsequently, the Court sentenced him to 107.5 years. (Doc. 1 at 1) Irizarry moved to 

vacate the judgment arguing that the State had intentionally used false evidence when it 

introduced Exhibit 121 and that the State had intentionally used perjured evidence from 

Kingsley and from law enforcement officers. (Docs. 1-2, 1-3, 10-11) The Court denied 

the motion. (Doc. 1-11; Doc. 9, Ex. P) 

 On direct appeal, Irizarry argued that the Court should not have denied his motion 

to vacate. (Doc. 9, Exs. D, E) The Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed his 

convictions and sentences. (Doc. 1-12, Doc. 9, Ex. F) Specifically, the Court of Appeals 

found that Kingsley’s “testimony about the brief traffic stop before Redondo shot the 

office was less prejudicial than other evidence presented during trial” and that her 

testimony “did not have a material effect on the verdict.” (Id. at ¶ 9) The Arizona 

Supreme Court denied Irizarry’s petition for review. (Doc. 1-1; Doc. 9, Exs. G, H) 

 Irizarry timely initiated post-conviction proceedings and argued that his appellate 

counsel was ineffective for failing to argue prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. 1-4) The 

Superior Court denied relief. (Doc. 1-9) Irizarry appealed this denial and the Arizona 

Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief. (Docs. 1-5, 1-6, 1-7) The Arizona 

Supreme Court denied his petition for review. (Docs. 1-10) 

 Irizarry timely filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court and 

argues that (1) the “prosecutor intentionally introduced false evidence for the sole 

purpose of impeaching Mr. Irizarry’s trial testimony,” (2) the “prosecutor, after getting 

caught introducing false evidence, purposefully used factually false questions to try and 

cover it up”, and (3) the “[s]ix testifying law enforcement officers intentionally 

committed perjury to help obtain the convictions against Mr. Irizarry.” (Doc. 1) 

Respondents argue that Claims One and Two fail on the merits and Claim Three is 

unexhausted and subject to a procedural bar. (Doc. 9) In reply, Irizarry argues that his 

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testimony about what happened during the traffic stop accounted for the entire seven or 

so minutes of the full dispatcher call and that the State shortened the dispatcher recording 

so that the jury would question Irizarry’s credibility: “[i]f the prosecutor could get the 

jury to question Mr. Irizarry’s testimony regarding what happened leading up to the 

shooting of Lt. Shuhandler, then the jury would also have to question Mr. Irizarry’s 

testimony that he was acting under duress when he drove from the scene towards Globe.” 

(Doc. 10 at 12) 

Analysis 

Claim Three: law enforcement testimony. In Claim Three, Irizarry claims that six 

of the law enforcement officers who testified at his trial committed perjury. (Doc. 1 at 8) 

Irizarry raised this claim in his Motion to Vacate and the Superior Court found it 

unpersuasive because each of the six had been impeached at trial for the same 

inconsistent testimony. (Doc. 9, Ex P at 1). On direct appeal and again in postconviction relief proceedings, Irizarry did not raise this issue. (Doc. 1-9; Doc. 9. Ex. D) 

 Exhaustion of Remedies. A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court 

remedies before this Court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies 

by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To 

be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the 

specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 Here, Irizarry did not present this argument to the Arizona Court of Appeals and 

so this claim is not exhausted for purposes of this Court’s habeas review. 

 Procedural Default. A claim can also be subject to an express or implied 

procedural bar. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express 

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procedural bar exists if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural 

bar “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis 

for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of 

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the 

merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist 

when a state strictly or regularly follows its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100. An implied 

procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court and no state 

remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 

(1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 

(9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. Lewis, 874 

F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 Here, Claim Three is subject to a procedural bar because it was not fairly 

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals and it is now too late to do so.

 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986);

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

 Irizarry claims that he is actually innocent because he acted under duress and the 

law enforcement officers’ testimony was important to show accomplice liability. (Doc. 

10 at 15) This argument is unpersuasive. As the Court of Appeals noted, “[t]he jury 

could have believed that he was under the influence of earlier methamphetamine use, 

panicked when he heard the gun shot, drove away, and kept driving because he was 

afraid that Redondo would use the gun against him, and still [have] convicted him.” 

(Doc. 9, Ex. F at ¶9) 

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Claims One and Two: Exhibit 121. 

 On habeas review of a timely petition with exhausted arguments, this Court can 

only grant relief if the petitioner has demonstrated prejudice from the adjudication of a 

claim that either “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d). Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970, n.16 

(9th Cir. 2004); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000). This review is 

further limited because “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine 

state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-

68 (1991). Accordingly, “alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable 

in federal habeas corpus.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Under clearly established Supreme Court precedent, a habeas claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct is “the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of 

supervisory power.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly 

v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)). Relief is only available if the alleged 

misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a 

denial of due process.” Id. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642). “A prosecutor’s 

knowing use of false testimony to get a conviction violates due process.” Jones v. Ryan, 

691 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). 

Such a claim requires a habeas petitioner to show “that (1) the testimony (or evidence) 

was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was 

actually false, and (3) ... the false testimony was material.” Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 

972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Zuno–Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 

889 (9th Cir. 2003)). To establish that false testimony was material, the petitioner must 

show a “reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment 

of the jury.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 

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L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). “Under this materiality standard, [t]he question is not whether the 

defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, 

but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a 

verdict worthy of confidence.” Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation omitted). 

 Assuming without deciding that the testimony at issue was, in fact, false and that 

the State knew or should have known this, the Court cannot find that the false testimony 

was material. First, as Irizarry acknowledges, the dispatch record was irrelevant to the 

charged crimes.1

 (Doc. 10 at ¶ 23) 

 Second, and crucially, Irizarry, through counsel, timely understood the potential 

issues with Exhibit 121 and recalled Kingsley to the stand. In front of the jury, Irizarry’s 

counsel questioned Kingsley and the jury heard her answer follow-up questions about 

Exhibit 121: who created it, what was missing from it, and inconsistencies in her 

timeline. In other words, any concerns about Exhibit 121 were disclosed to the jury 

during Irizarry’s case in chief. See Soto v. Ryan, 760 F.3d 947, 961 (9th Cir. 2014) (state 

court’s decision to deny Napue claim was not “unreasonable because the evidence 

Petitioner claims reveals the deception in Godoy’s direct examination testimony was in 

fact disclosed to the jury during trial”). Moreover, “defense counsel effectively crossexamined the witness, so that it was obvious to the jury that” her testimony contained 

inconsistencies. Mata v. Sherman, 2016 WL 1642642, *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016). 

See also Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 585-86 (6th Cir. 2009) (collateral review 

does not lie when defense focused jury on inconsistent statements during crossexamination). 

 

1

 Arguably, irrelevant evidence should not have been admitted. However, habeas 

relief does not lie for review of whether a state evidentiary ruling violated state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). And, arguably, it should have been the State and 

not Irizarry who clarified for the jury that Exhibit 121 was an edited version of the 

recording. U.S. v. LaPage, 231 F.3d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Where the prosecutor knows that his witness has lied, he has a constitutional duty to correct the false impression of the facts.”). However, that is a question for the State Bar of Arizona and 

not this Court. 

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 Nevertheless, Irizarry argues that Exhibit 121 was an attempt to “make the jury 

question Mr. Irizarry’s credibility” because Irizarry’s testimony about what happened 

during the traffic stop would only be credible if the stop was longer than the recording in 

Exhibit 121. (Doc. 10 at 11-12) Thus, if the jury questioned Irizarry’s testimony about 

the traffic stop, “then the jury would also have to question Mr. Irizarry’s testimony that 

he was acting under duress when he drove from the scene.” (Doc. 10 at 12) This 

argument is too far removed from the elements of the crimes with which Irizarry was 

charged and convicted. The conversation with the dispatcher occurred before Lt. 

Shuhandler was shot and before Irizarry drove away. Thus, “[e]ven assuming the 

prosecution’s failure to correct this testimony at trial implicated [Irizarry’s constitutional 

rights], there does not appear to be any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony 

could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1111 

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Daimen Joseph Irizarry’s petition 

for writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

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further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 20th day of June, 2016. 

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