Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02718/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02718-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE DANIEL LOPEZ, )

 ) Case No. 09-2718 MMA (JMA)

Petitioner )

 ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

v. ) TO DENY HABEAS CORPUS PETITION

 )

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, et al. )

 )

Respondent )

____________________________ )

Petitioner Jose Daniel Lopez, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, was convicted

in California Superior Court of attempted murder (Cal. Penal Code §§ 187, 664 - count

1); robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 211 - count 2) and assault with a deadly weapon (Cal.

Penal Code § 245(a)(1) - count 3). The jury found each crime was committed for the

benefit of a criminal street gang (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)). The jury also found

that Petitioner inflicted great bodily injury in the attempted murder and assault (Cal

Penal Code §12022.7(a)). The jury further found Petitioner used a deadly and

dangerous weapon in the attempted murder (Cal. Penal Code § 12022(b)(1)) and used

a deadly weapon, a knife, in the assault (Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7(c)(23)). [Lodgment

1 at 5-7, 129-133.] The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 21 years in state prison on

March 14, 2008. [Lodgment 1 at 101; Lodgment 2 at 457.] The California Court of

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Appeal affirmed the judgment. [Lodgment 6 at 1.] The California Supreme Court

denied review. [Lodgment 7.]

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) on November

23, 2009. (Doc. No. 1.) Respondent filed an Answer (the “Answer”) on April 16, 2010

(Doc. No. 12) and Petitioner filed a Traverse (the “Traverse”) on April 22, 2010. (Doc.

No. 14.) The Court has reviewed the Petition, Answer, Traverse and all supporting

memoranda and lodgments. For the reasons discussed below, the Court

RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to

be correct. Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and

convincing evidence. (28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,

35-36 (1992)). The relevant facts of the case are taken from the California Court of

Appeal opinion:

Michele S. was working alone behind the counter of a convenience store in

Carlsbad when two juvenile Hispanic males came into the store. The juveniles were

wearing mechanic's gloves and hooded sweatshirts with the hoods up. They went

directly to the beer cooler and starting [sic] grabbing beer. Michele told the juveniles,

"Get away from there. You're not old enough." One of them responded that he had

identification.

Michele thought the juveniles would go away. However, the juveniles each

took two packs of beer and walked toward the front door. Michele moved over to the

front door by her friend, Dave Steinmetz, who had stopped by the store to buy

cigarettes. Steinmetz stood close by her to protect her and told her he would play

bodyguard for a moment. Around this time, a man, later determined to be Lopez

[Petitioner] entered the store. He was wearing military-style dog tags, bright

studded-style earrings, a shiny wristwatch, sunglasses, a white T-shirt, and a checkered

button-up shirt. He used his bottom to push Michele out of the store and then trapped

her between the front door and a trash can while he held the door open for the juveniles.

Steinmetz came to Michele's aid. He pulled her out from behind the door and

grabbed both the juveniles by the elbows of their sweatshirts. Lopez hit Steinmetz

from the side and stabbed Steinmetz three times: once in his right chest/armpit area,

once in his right flank, and once in his right mid-abdomen. Steinmetz let go of the

juvenile he held with his right hand. That juvenile and Lopez ran away. The juvenile

Steinmetz held with his left hand kept trying to get away. The juvenile turned around

and pushed Steinmetz into a car. Steinmetz lost his balance and the juvenile escaped.

Michele went back into the store and called 911. Steinmetz walked back into

the store, noticed he was bleeding, and realized he had been stabbed. He showed

Michele, who asked the 911 operator to send an ambulance. He then went back out

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of the store slid down in front of an ice machine, and passed out. A large amount of

blood pooled underneath his right armpit and rib area.

All of Steinmetz stab wounds were near major organs. One of the strikes

punctured his lung, causing part of it to collapse. Another strike hit his kidney,

cutting it 2.5 centimeters. The third strike went over, but missed his liver and spleen.

Steinmetz was hospitalized for four days and did not regain his strength for four to six

weeks. At the time of trial, he still had nerve damage from one of the wounds.

Carlsbad Police Detectives Mark Reyes and Bryan Hargett investigated the

incident. During the initial survey of the crime scene, Reyes found a silver

wristwatch with a broken clasp on the ground along the route Lopez and the juveniles

fled. A San Diego County Sheriff's Department criminalist found Lopez's DNA on

the watch. In addition, Oceanside Police Gang Detective John McKean viewed the

store's security video and identified Lopez as the stabber based on Lopez's "unique

nose" and the earrings he was wearing.

Reyes, Hargett and other members of the Carlsbad Police Department

subsequently executed a search warrant at Lopez's home. They found bright white

stone studded-style earrings, a multipurpose tool with a blade and other implements,

two metallic men's watches, and three button-up shirts similar to the one Lopez wore

on the night of the incident. They also found items with writing associated with

Oceanside's Varrio Mesa Locos street gang. They subsequently learned the two

juveniles with Lopez on the night of the incident were members of Varrio Mesa

Locos. Lopez had previously been contacted by police while in the company of the

brother of one of the juveniles and had previously been stopped in a vehicle registered

to the mother of the juvenile.

Hargett, the Carlsbad Police Department's gang detective, testified the

convenience store is located within the turf of Varrio Carlsbad Locos, a Hispanic

street gang. Hargett also testified Hispanic street gangs value "respect," which they

obtain by fear and intimidation tactics. Varrio Carlsbad Locos gang members tolerate

the presence of Varrio Mesa Locos gang members within their turf because a member

of Varrio Mesa Locos is dating the sister of an associate of Varrio Carlsbad Locos. In

addition, by aligning with one another, the two gangs engender more fear and,

therefore, more "respect."

McKean confirmed an alliance exists between the Varrio Carlsbad Locos and

Varrio Mesa Locos gangs. He testified Varrio Mesa Locos is a multi-generational

Hispanic street gang whose turf is located in the Mesa Margarita area of Oceanside

near the back gate of Camp Pendleton. He testified that younger gang members are

required to "put in work" for the gang by doing such things as tagging, fighting other

gang members, committing robberies, selling drugs, or carrying drugs from one place

to another. The "work" is often verified by older gang members who monitor the

younger gang member's activities. As the seriousness and violence of the younger

gang member's crimes increase, the more respect they garner inside and outside of

the gang. 

McKean further testified that a "beer run," where a minor walks into a store,

grabs beer, and runs out of the store, is not a crime exclusive to gang members.

However, it, along with other types of lower level thefts, is considered a starter crime

for younger gang members. Like other "work" done by younger gang members,

older gang members will supervise beer runs. If something goes wrong with a beer

run, an older gang member supervising the beer run would be expected to assist or

risk retaliation from the gang.

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In addition, McKean testified that, while Varrio Mesa Locos gang members

engage in social activities, this is not the gang's primary function. Rather, the gang's

primary function is to commit crimes such as murders, robberies, carjacking, assaults,

auto theft, and identity theft. He also testified about predicate offenses committed by

Varrio Mesa Locos gang members, including murder, attempted murder and shooting

at an occupied vehicle.

McKean opined that Lopez is a member of Varrio Mesa Locos because he met 

several Department of Justice criteria for documenting gang membership, including

admitting that he belonged to the gang. After being asked to assume the key facts, 

McKean also opined the crimes in this case were committed for the benefit of, at the

direction of, or in association with the Varrio Mesa Locos gang. He explained that

having two younger gang members shoplift beer while a more senior gang member

supervises or assists is consistent with the requirement for younger gang members to "put

in work" to benefit the gang. He also explained the crime increased the status of the gang

and each of the participants. Specifically, engaging in criminal activity in another gang's

territory increased the status of the gang, stealing the beer increased the status of the

younger gang members, and the violent attack increased the status of the senior gang

member.

[Lodgment 6 at 2-6, internal footnotes omitted].

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.A. §

2244, applies to all federal habeas petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). 

The AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a); see also Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez

v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 1991). Because this Petition was filed on June 29,

2009, the AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204.

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus.”

Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir. 1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect

to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

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determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state prisoner must

allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege that the

state court violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 719;

Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576,

579 (9th Cir. 1988).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state supreme court” with general

supervisory authority over the proper application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786

F.2d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)

(holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state court’s application of state law);

Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885 (explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas relief only to correct

errors of federal constitutional magnitude. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395,

1400 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of

state law unless they rise to level of a constitutional violation).

In Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that

the “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one methodology in

deciding the only question that matters under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court

decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). In other words, a federal court is not required

to review the state court decision de novo. Id. Rather, a federal court can proceed

directly to the reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

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The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir.

1996) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis added).

Section 2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the font of ‘clearly

established’ rules.” Id. “[A] state court decision may not be overturned on habeas

corpus review, for example, because of a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” Moore,

108 F.3d at 264. “[A] writ may issue only when the state court decision is ‘contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of,’ an authoritative decision of the Supreme

Court.” Id.; see also Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996); Childress v.

Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208

(7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial court, the

AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed

to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e).

ANALYSIS

Petitioner states three grounds for habeas relief. First, Petitioner contends the

evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted

murder. Second, Petitioner contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to

support the jury’s findings that the three crimes of conviction were committed for the

benefit of a criminal street gang. Third, Petitioner contends the trial judge’s denial of a

30-day continuance of the sentencing hearing violated his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel and his due process right to a fair sentence. Respondent contends the

California courts’ resolution of the claims was not contrary to, and did not involve an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Respondent further

contends the California courts’ resolution of the claims did not result in an unreasonable

determination of the facts based on the evidence before the California courts. (28

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U.S.C. § 22554(d)). Respondent contends that all of Petitioner’s claims are therefore

without merit and must be denied.

Ground One: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Attempted Murder Conviction

Respondent contends the jury was “amply justified in concluding that Petitioner

intended to kill ... when he repeatedly stabbed [the victim] in the area of vital organs.” 

[Doc. 12 -1 at 9.] Clearly established federal law regarding sufficiency of the evidence

is set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). That court held “the

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “Put another way, the dispositive question

under Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982-83 (9th Cir.

2004) (en banc) (quoting Jackson). 

The Jackson standard “must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive

elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Id. at 983. The jury in

Petitioner’s case was instructed under California law that Petitioner could be found guilty

of attempted murder if he “took at least one direct but ineffective step toward killing” and

“intended to kill that person.” (Lodgment 2 at 362; CALCRIM No. 600, Attempted

Murder). 

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim that there was

insufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder, holding, “[a] jury

may infer a defendant’s intent to kill from the defendant’s purposeful use of a lethal

weapon in a manner that could inflict a mortal wound had the weapon been on target.”

[Doc. 12 -1 at 9.] [Lodgment 6 at 9.] More specifically, the California Court of Appeal

rejected Petitioner’s claim that the evidence only showed that by stabbing the victim

repeatedly in the area of vital organs Petitioner intended merely to “assist the juveniles

in escaping from [the victim’s] grasp.” [Doc. No. 1 at 6.] That court held such intent

does not preclude an intent to kill when a defendant used a lethal weapon with lethal

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force, “even if the defendant used the lethal weapon without advance consideration and

only to eliminate a momentary obstacle or annoyance.” [Lodgment 6 at 9.] 

This Court finds under the Jackson standard that the record evidence reasonably

supports a finding of guilt of attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court

therefore RECOMMENDS that Ground One of Petitioner’s Petition be DENIED.

Ground Two: Sufficiency of Evidence To Support Gang Enhancement Findings

Respondent contends substantial evidence supported the gang enhancement

findings for all three of Petitioner’s convictions. [Doc. No. 12-1 at 10] Petitioner

contends “[t]he prosecution presented no solid or credible evidence this crime was

gang-related...” [Doc. No. 1 at 7.] To establish a criminal gang enhancement allegation

under California law “the prosecution must prove that the crime for which the defendant

was convicted had been ‘committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in

association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or

assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. The prosecution may meet this

burden by presenting testimony from a gang expert.’” [Lodgment 6 at 9; People v.

Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th 605, 616-620 (1996).] 

Under AEDPA, this court shall not grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court if the decision was based on

a reasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. (28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d). The California Court of Appeal held the evidence

presented in the state court proceedings, including the gang expert’s testimony, showed

the following: Petitioner was a gang member and committed the charged crimes with

juvenile members of the same gang for the benefit of the gang. [Doc. No. 12-1 at 10.] 

That court additionally held the evidence on record showed Petitioner actively helped

the juvenile gang members by stabbing the victim. Id. After examining the evidence

on record, the California Court of Appeal concluded “there is sufficient evidence to

support the jury’s true findings on the criminal street gang enhancement allegations.” 

[Lodgment 6 at 10.] 

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As the California Court of Appeal’s decision was based on a reasonable

determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the court proceedings, this

Court RECOMMENDS that Ground Two of Petitioner’s Petition be DENIED.

Ground Three: Denial of Continuance at Sentencing Hearing

Respondent contends Petitioner’s third ground for habeas relief should be

summarily rejected because it fails to provide a federal question or any basis for federal

habeas relief. Petitioner claims his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and due process

rights under the United States Constitution were violated when the trial court refused to

grant him a 30-day continuance of the sentencing hearing. “The matter of a

continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every

denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer

evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel... Contrariwise, a myopic insistence

upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to

defend with counsel an empty formality... There are no mechanical tests for deciding

when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer

must be found in the circumstances present in every case.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S.

575, 589 (1964); see also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (“broad discretion

must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and

arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’

violates the right to assistance of counsel”). Even if a request for continuance is

improperly denied, habeas relief is not available unless there is a showing of actual

prejudice to petitioner’s defense resulting from the refusal to grant a continuance. See

Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 1997).

In considering whether the denial of a continuance implicating a defendant’s right

to counsel is an abuse of discretion, the Ninth Circuit has applied these factors: (1)

whether the continuance would inconvenience witnesses, the court, counsel, or the

litigants; (2) whether other continuances have been granted; (3) whether legitimate

reasons exist for the delay; (4) whether the delay is the defendant’s fault; and (5)

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whether a denial would prejudice the defendant. See United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d

309, 314 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Garrett, 179 F.3d 1143, 1145-47

(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). A trial court requires “wide latitude in balancing the right to

counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and against the demands of its

calendar.” Miller v. Blacketter, 525 F.3d 890 895 (9th Cir. 2008).

The application of the factors identified by the Ninth Circuit to Petitioner’s claim

leads to the conclusion that this decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. On January 30, 2008, the day Petitioner

was convicted, the trial court granted Petitioner’s request to delay sentencing until

March 14, 2008. [Lodgment 2 at 444-445.] On March 14, 2008, Petitioner asked for a

30-day continuance to address the possibility he might have mental health problems.

[Lodgment 6 at 12; Doc. No. 12-1 at 13.] Defense counsel did not give prior notice

about the proposed continuance. [Lodgment 2 at 446.] Petitioner reportedly told his

defense counsel the night before the hearing he had been seeing not a psychologist or

psychiatrist, but a “psych tech.” [Lodgment 2 at 448.]. 

Defense counsel asked for additional time to “see what was done and what was

said at the time.” [Id.] The prosecutor opposed the continuance, pointing out the record

was void of any evidence of mental defect. [Lodgment 2 at 446-447.] In fact,

Petitioner’s own statement recorded in his Probation Report as regards mental illness

was that “he was examined once at Juvenile Hall and there was no evidence [of mental

illness] whatsoever.” [Lodgment 2 at 447.] Neither Petitioner nor his counsel disputed

the Probation Officer’s Report that the “defendant is in ‘good health’ and was last seen

by a psychologist in Juvenile Hall, however, there was no diagnosis.” [Lodgment 1 at

95-J.] The trial judge denied the requested continuance, and the California Court of

Appeal upheld the decision, holding that “at most, the record suggests there was a

possibility [Petitioner] might have mental health problems. Such speculation is

insufficient to establish a continuance would have been useful.” [Lodgment 6 at 11-12.]

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In reviewing the totality of circumstances, it is evident this was not a case of a

trial judge with a “myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable

request for delay.” Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589. The trial court could have reasonably

determined a continuance was unmerited because of the lack of any evidence of mental

health defects on record, and based upon Petitioner’s own statements he was in good

health and had no history of mental illness. The Court, therefore, agrees with the

California Court of Appeal’s decision that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the continuance. 

Even if the continuance was improperly denied, Petitioner fails to show any

actual prejudice resulting from the trial court’s decision. “Actual prejudice” is

demonstrated if the error in question had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). 

Petitioner’s verdict was already decided, and in denying the continuance, the trial judge

stated, “I really am unable to see how there’s going to be any type of mental health

issues that is going to assist the court in ...deciding what sentence is appropriate.”

[Lodgment 2 at 448.] Petitioner was represented by counsel, and failed to show that the

results of his trial or sentencing would be different had the continuance been granted. 

Petitioner therefore has not shown there was a due process violation or a violation of his

Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS Ground Three

of Petitioner’s Petition be DENIED.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned Magistrate Judge

recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED with prejudice and

that judgment be entered accordingly.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Janis L.

Sammartino, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

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IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 3, 2011, any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be served and

filed no later than January 13, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 148 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 13, 2010

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:09-cv-02718-MMA-JMA Document 16 Filed 12/13/10 Page 12 of 12