Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00046/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00046-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TIMOTHY PRICE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:15-cv-0046-KOB-JHE

 )

WARDEN CHERYL PRICE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

The magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation on October 9, 2015,

recommending that this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be dismissed under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

(Doc. 12). After requesting and receiving two extensions of time (docs. 13-16), the

plaintiff has filed objections to the report and recommendation. (Doc. 17). Having

considered those objections, the court finds as follows that the objections are due to

be overruled for the reasonsstated below, and that the report and recommendation are

due to be accepted. 

The plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge applying the standards mandated

by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the appropriate

standard of review is the “notice” pleading standard, citing to Dura Pharmaceuticals,

Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). (Doc. 17 at 2). As explained in the report and

FILED

 2016 Apr-18 PM 04:12

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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recommendation, the magistrate judge applied the standards mandated by the United

States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). In contrast, Dura Pharmaceuticals set forth

the requirement that plaintiffs must plead and prove causation and loss in pursuing

a “fraud-on-the-market” action in securities fraud litigation. Id. at 346. It does not

provide any requirements for the standard of review a court should apply in cases

brought within the framework of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §

1915A. Moreover, Dura Pharmaceuticals relied on Conely v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41

(1957), for the “notice” pleading standard. Dura Pharmaceuticals, 544 U.S. at 346. 

Twombly abrogated Conely v. Gibson . Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) . Thus, the

magistrate judge applied the more recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court on

the standardsto apply when reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint. Therefore, this

objection of the plaintiff is OVERRULED as lacking merit. 

The plaintiff next objectsto the magistrate judge’s finding that the non-medical

defendants did not violate the plaintiff’s rights to adequate medical care. (Doc. 17

at 2). The plaintiff asserts that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint

to state a failure to protect claim against these defendants.

1

(Id.). However, in the

report and recommendation, the magistrate judge considered whether the plaintiff

1At no time through today’s date has the plaintiff filed a motion to amend.

2

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alleged any set of facts that could be construed as a claim for cruel and unusual

punishment, such as a failure to protect claim or denial of medical care. (Doc. 12 at

5). In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that on December 8, 2013, while he was

walking through L-Dorm, he was attacked by two other inmates. (Doc. 1 at 5). The

correctional officer who witnessed the attack called a code over his radio. (Id.). Sgt.

Eaves and Lt. Gilbert “came to the scene and promptly restrained and secured the two

inmates...” (Id.).

Nothing in this set of facts suggests a failure to protect claim is possible. For

such a claim, the plaintiff would have to “produce sufficient evidence of (1) a

substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that

risk; and (3) causation.” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir.

2013). “To be deliberately indifferent a prison official must know of and disregard

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts

fromwhich the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harmexists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Purcell v. Toombs Co., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313,

1319-20 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). 

The plaintiff does not allege that any defendant had reason to believe that the

plaintiff was in danger of attack from the two inmates who attacked him. Rather,

after the plaintiff was attacked, he told prison officials that he had found and

3

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recovered his tennis shoes, which he previously had reported as stolen. (Doc. 1 at 5). 

While the plaintiff asserts the recovery of his tennis shoes was the impetus for the

attack, he does not allege that any defendant or other prison officials knew that, prior

to the attack, the plaintiff had recovered his shoes and, therefore, was in danger from

other inmates. See e.g., Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1102

(11th Cir. 2014) (“this Court already clarified that a prison guard violates a prisoner’s

Eighth Amendment right when that guard actually (objectively and subjectively)

knows that one prisoner poses a substantial risk of serious harm to another, yet fails

to take any action to investigate, mitigate, or monitor that substantial risk of serious

harm.”). 

Because nothing in the facts set forth by the plaintiff suggests that any prison

official knew, prior to the attack, that the plaintiff was atserious risk of the same, any

amendment to the plaintiff’s complaint to state a failure to protect claim would be

futile. Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Leave to amend

a complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still be properly

dismissed or be immediately subject to summary judgment for the defendant.”). 

Thus, to the extent the plaintiff is asserting an objection to the report and

recommendation based on the failure of the magistrate to allow the plaintiff, sua

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sponte, to amend his complaint to state a failure to protect claim, this objection is

OVERRULED. 

The plaintiff next objects to the report and recommendation based on the

magistrate judge’s failure to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint to set forth a

claim concerning a lack of medical care by Nurse Williams. (Doc. 17 at 3). The

plaintiff statesthe “Magistrate Judge did not make a single determination concerning

her lack of medical care.” (Id.). However, the plaintiff did not name Nurse Williams

as a defendant in his complaint. He alleged that

Nurse C. Williams performed the body chart, doctored me, cleaned all

the wounds. Nurse C. Williams L.P.N., then consulted the R.N. on duty

as to whether I needed stitches in my head wounds. The R.N. on duty

answered affirmatively, (yes), she then released me to A.D.O.C. Lt.

Gilbert and Sgt. Eaves then informed me to report back to pill call at

3:00 a.m. to pick up a pink slip . . . to have stitches put in the head

wound. When I reported to pill call at 3:00 a.m. Nurse C. Williams

failed to issue any pink slip, so as to allow me to see the doctor for

stitches, and instead informed me to keep checking back for a pink slip. 

Medical refused to issue the profile, or to treat the head wound . . . . 

 

(Doc. 1 at 5-6). 

Nothing in this allegation demonstrates deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs by Nurse Williams, even had the plaintiff named her as a defendant. 

At most, Nurse Williamsfailed to issue the plaintiff a pink slip immediately to see the

doctor specifically for the purpose of getting stitches, so the plaintiff did not see the

5

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doctor for eight days. The plaintiff does not explain how his wound healing without

stitches due to the delay demonstrates deliberate indifference by Nurse Williams to

hismedical needs. Rather, the plaintiff speculatesin his objectionsthat “Concussions

occur often when head injuries happen. This could be the reason why Plaintiff is

suffering pain.” (Doc. 17 at 4). The plaintiff does not allege that he suffered a

concussion, that stitches would somehow prevent or cure a concussion, or that–after

being attended to by Nurse Williams–a more rapid doctor referral would have

provided a more favorable outcome. 

To show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.

Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003), citing Taylor v. Adams, 221

F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000); Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir.

1995). First, a plaintiff must set forth evidence of an objectively serious medical

need. Id. Second, a plaintiff must prove that the prison official acted with an attitude

of “deliberate indifference” to that serious medical need. Id. An objectively serious

medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment

or that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for

a doctor’s attention.” Id. (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr, 40 F.3d 1176,

1187 (11th Cir. 1994). Alternatively, a plaintiff can establish an objectively serious

6

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need by demonstrating that a delay in treatment worsened the condition. Mann v.

Taser Intern., Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009). Such an allegation must

demonstrate (1) the seriousness of the medical need; (2) whether the delay worsened

the medical condition; and (3) the reason for the delay. Goebert v. Lee County, 510

F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007). 

In his objection, the plaintiff seemingly asserts that after having his medical

needs immediately attended to by Nurse Williams, she was then deliberately

indifferent to his needs because she did not issue a pink slip at the first possible

moment the plaintiff requested one. The plaintiff does not allege any facts as to why

Nurse Williams told the plaintiff to check back for a pink slip rather than issue one

right then, does not assert whether or to what degree the delay in issuing a pink slip

resulted in a delay in seeing a doctor, and does not state when the pink slip was

actually issued.

2 The plaintiff also does not assert that he was in any additional pain

for eight days due to the lack of stitches; that his head wound was bleeding,

continuously or otherwise, due to the lack of stitches; or any other manner in which

the eight-day delay in seeing a doctor for stitches caused additional or worsening

2As alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint, the inference may be made that Nurse Williams

did not issue the pink slip because “medical refused to issue the profile, or to treat the head

wound.” (Doc. 1 at 6). The plaintiff “filed a “complaint on medical concerning this matter. 

Then a second complaint to medical, where in the response was that medical would investigate

the matter.” (Id.).

7

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injury. Rather, he asserts that when he did see Dr. Butler on December 16, 2013, he

was told he did not need stitches because the wound had healed. (Doc. 1 at 6; doc.

17 at 5). Moreover, a CAT scan on February 28, 2014, was normal. (Doc. 1 at 6). 

Although the plaintiff cites Brennan v. Comissioner, Ala. Dept. ofCorr., – Fed.

App’x – , 2015 WL 5446933 (11th Cir. 2015), in support of his claim of a serious

medical condition, in Brennan the plaintiff did not see a doctor for a 34 day period

after falling and complaining of increasingly severe pain. Id., at *2. Here, the

plaintiff waited eight days to see a doctor, was told his wound healed without the

need for stitches, and had a normal CAT scan two monthslater. Because the plaintiff

fails to allege facts that demonstrate an objectively serious medical condition to

which any named defendant or Nurse Williams was deliberately indifferent, the

plaintiff’s objection on this ground is OVERRULED. Moreover, because any

amendment to include Nurse Williams as a defendant is futile for the reasons

discussed, the plaintiff’s objection to the magistrate judge failing to order the

plaintiff, sua sponte, to amend his complaint is OVERRULED. 

Having carefully reviewed and considered de novo all the materialsin the court

file, including the report and recommendation and the plaintiff’s objections, the court

finds that the magistrate judge’s report is due to be and is hereby is ADOPTED and

the recommendation is ACCEPTED. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s complaint is due

8

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to be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. A Final Judgment will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of April, 2016.

____________________________________

 KARON OWEN BOWDRE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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