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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FIL 

United States Co1.u-t of Ap_pt!ds 

Tenth Circuit 

NOV 14 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

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v. 

LARRY D. PLESS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 90-3118 

(D.C. No. 85-10057-01) 

(D. Kan.) 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Mr. Pless appeals, prose, the denial by the district court 

of his prose petition for relief filed under 28 u.s.c. § 2255. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-3118 Document: 010110047981 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 1 
Mr. Pless, in 1986, entered guilty pleas to two federal drug 

offenses. The thrust of Mr. Pless' petition for relief was 

ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, he asserts that he 

was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the district court 

regarding this claim. Specifically, he says that he was entitled 

to be told he could plead not guilty and defend against the 

government's charges by asserting that he was entrapped. 1 

"Appeal from denial of a§ 2255 motion permits review only of 

the refusal to vacate and not, except to the extent that the 

refusal to vacate it was error, the validity of the original 

judgment and sentence." 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure 

§ 601 (1982) (footnotes omitted). "The lower court's findings of 

fact on a§ 2255 motion must be accepted unless clearly or plainly 

erroneous and not supported by substantial evidence." Semet v. 

United States, 422 F.2d 1269, 1271 (10th Cir. 1970). 

The district court, in a thorough eight-page memorandum and 

order, analyzed Mr. Pless' contentions and denied relief. The 

district court's reasons may be generally summarized by stating 

that his challenges were insufficient under the tests established 

1 Petitioner made other assertions in the trial court which he 

has not repeated here. Accordingly, those assertions are waived 

on appeal. United States v. Burroughs, 650 F.2d 595, 598 (5th 

Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037 (1981) (allegations not 

expressly argued on appeal are abandoned); Puckett v. United 

States, 314 F.2d 298, 301 (10th Cir. 1963) (''Other points raised 

by appellant's motion have been neither briefed nor argued in this 

Court and therefore are deemed waived."). 

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Appellate Case: 90-3118 Document: 010110047981 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 2 
by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1934). Having 

determined that counsel's peformance was not defective under 

Strickland, the district court noted that Mr. Pless pled guilty. 

As the district court recognized, "(a] plea of guilty constitutes 

an admission of all material facts well pleaded in the indictment 

(or information], and is itself a conviction on the charges stated 

therein." United States v. Crockett, 812 F.2d 626, 629 (10th Cir. 

1987) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Broce, 488 

U.S. 563, , 109 S. Ct. 757, 762 (1989). 

Mr. Pless fails to show that his counsel's performance was 

objectively unreasonable and that his counsel's alleged deficient 

performance resulted in actual prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687. As the district court noted in its Memorandum and Order 

denying relief: "(P]etitioner's lengthy criminal history, 

including convictions for crimes more serious than the present 

offense, likely would have been admissible at trial to refute his 

claim of entrapment. Given these weighty considerations, the 

Court cannot say that counsel's failure to consider a defense of 

entrapment, or to discuss the possibility of this defense with 

petitioner, was unreasonable." 

We agree. Our review of the record convinces us that the 

lower court's findings are not clearly or plainly erroneous. 

There is substantial evidence in the record to support the 

decision of the district court. If the record shows that 

petitioner is entitled to no relief under§ 2255, no hearing is 

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Appellate Case: 90-3118 Document: 010110047981 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 3 
necessary in the district court. Howell v. United States, 355 

F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir. 1966). 

We grant Mr. Pless' request to proceed in forma pauperis. 

Having done this we AFFIRM the decision of the district court for 

substantially the same reasons enunciated by it in its Memorandum 

and Order, a copy thereof being attached. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 90-3118 Document: 010110047981 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 4 
•· '- '- FILED 

U.S. DISTRI CT C:;URT 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICTU ::otJR'i'! C- :- :: ~:::;1\S 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAL~ -is 

rllR L 9 47 AH '90 

LARRY D. PLESS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent. 

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______________________ ) 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

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CRIMINAL ACTION 

NO. 85-10057-01 

CIVIL ACTION 

NO. 89-3499-T 

This matter comes before the Court upon the prose motion of 

Larry Pless to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2255. In 

July 1986, Pless entered a plea of guilty to Counts I and IV of a 

four count indictment. Count I charged Pless conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a) (1) and 846. Count IV charged defendant with possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a) (1) and 18 u.s.c. § 2. 

Petitioner first challenges his conviction on the grounds of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The two-prong standard governing 

claims of ineffective assistance is well established. The 

petitioner must establish, first, that his representation was 

objectively unreasonable, and second, that his counsel's deficient 

representation resulted in actual prejudice to his defense. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In the context of 

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Appellate Case: 90-3118 Document: 010110047981 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 5 
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guilty pleas, the prejudice prong of Strickland is satisfied if the 

petitioner can show "that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel's errors, he 1 would not have pleaded guilty and 

would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 

52 I 59 ( 1985) • 

Pless raises several arguments in support of his claim. 

First, he argues that his counsel failed to inform him that his 

indictment had been filed after expiration of the thirty day period 

prescribed under the Speedy Trial Act. 

provides: 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) 

Any information or indictment charging an individual with 

the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty 

days from the date on which such individual was arrested 

or served with a summons in connection with such charges. 

Pless was arrested on August 29, 1985. An information charging him 

with possession under 18 u.s.c. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 was 

filed the same day. The indictment, which repeats the possession 

charge and adds the charge of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, was 

not filed until October 8, 1985, thirty-seven days after his 

arrest. Thus, petitioner argues that he would not have pled guilty 

had his counsel informed him that the indictment had been filed out 

of time. 

The Court first notes that under 18 U.S.C. § 3162 (a) (2), 

petitioner's guilty plea waives any claim to direct relief for the 

government's failure to file an information or indictment within 

the prescribed period of time. The specific issue presented by 

petitioner's argument is whether his plea of guilty also waives any 

claim to collateral relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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A guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects in a 

proceeding. United States v. Fairchild, 803 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th 

Cir. 1986); United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 54~, 552 (9th Cir. 

1989) ("Claims that 'the applicable statute is unconstitutional or 

that the indictment fails to state an offense' are jurisdictional 

claims not waived by the guilty plea.") ; see also O'Leary v. United 

States, 856 F.2d 1142, 1143 (8th Cir. 1988). The defect alleged 

by petitioner is non-jurisdictional. It is true that dismissal is 

mandatory for the government's failure to comply with the thirty 

day requirement of§ 3161(b). United States v. Antonio, 705 F.2d 

1483, 1486 (9th Cir. 1983). Such a dismissal, however, does not 

necessarily deprive a court of jurisdiction. First, the court has 

considerable discretion in excluding periods of delay in the 

computation of time within which an indictment or information must 

be filed. 18 u.s.c. § 3161(h). Second, even if the court orders 

dismissal as mandated by the statute, it still retains discretion 

as to whether to dismiss with prejudice. Id. § 3162 (a) (1); 

Antonio, 705 F.2d at 1486. Finally, the non-jurisdictional nature 

of the statute is evinced by the fact that a guilty plea waives the 

right to dismissal for failure to comply with the thirty day 

requirement. Id. § 3162(a) (2). See also United States v. Jackson, 

659 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 

1003 (1982) (constitutional right to a speedy trial is nonjurisdictional in nature and is waived by guilty plea). Because 

the allegation concerns a non-jurisdictional defect, petitioner has 

waived this defense. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3118 Document: 010110047981 Date Filed: 11/14/1990 Page: 7 
In any event, petitioner's claim would fail on the merits. 

Although the indictment was filed outside of the thirty day time 

limit, an information was filed on the day of Pless' arrest. The 

statute requires only that the information or indictment be filed 

within thirty days of the arrest. With the exception of the 

conspiracy charge, the indictment charges Pless with the same 

offense arising from the same conduct. In the Court's view, the 

indictment merely expands upon the information, and is thus 

analogous to a superseding indictment. There is no requirement 

that a superseding indictment be filed within the time period 

prescribed under§ 3161(b) for the original indictment. United 

States v. Wilks, 629 F.2d 669, 673 (10th Cir. 1980). Petitioner's 

counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to inform his client 

of a defense that lacked merit. 

Pless next claims that his counsel failed to inform him of 

allegedly exculpatory evidence until he learned of its existence 

during sentencing. According to petitioner, the confidential 

informer who assisted law enforcement officials in this case had 

contacted Pless' attorney and informed him that Pless had been 

"entrapped." The Court does not have a copy of the transcript of 

the plea proceeding, nor does petitioner support his claim with 

any documentation. An evidentiary hearing on this matter, however, 

is unnecessary. 

The United States Supreme Court recently held that a guilty 

plea is not only an admission of the acts described in the 

indictment, but is also an admission of the legal consequences of 

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these acts. United States v. Broce, 109 S. Ct. 757 (1989). In 

other words, "[b]y entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not 

simply stating that he did the -discrete acts described in the 

indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime." Id. at 

762. Petitioner's guilty plea thus waives any claim of entrapment 

and may not be raised by collateral attack. 

Assuming Pless had not waived the defense of entrapment, his 

claim would fail on the merits. Allegations of entrapment are 

common but are rarely successful. United States v. Gamble, 737 

F.2d 853, 857 (10th Cir. 1984). Although the pre-sentence report 

discloses that undercover agents were used in the operation leading 

to petitioner's arrest, "mere assistance by government undercover 

agents in the commission of a crime does not constitute 

entrapment." United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1433 (10th 

cir. 1988) • Moreover, petitioner's lengthy criminal history, 

including convictions for crimes more serious than the present 

offense, likely would have been admissible at trial to refute his 

claim of entrapment. Fadel, 844 F.2d at 1433. Given these weighty 

considerations, the Court cannot say that counsel's failure to 

consider a defense of entrapment, or to discuss the possibility of 

this defense with petitioner, was unreasonable. 

Petitioner's third allegation is that his attorney misinformed 

him of the consequences of his plea. According to Pless, his 

appointed counsel told him he would receive the same sentence 

regardless of the charges to which he pled guilty. Pless 

characterizes the offenses charged in Counts II and III-- which 

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were dismissed under the plea agreement-- as II lesser charges, 11 

presumably because they involved only 4 grams and 21. 1 grams, 

respectively, of cocaine. Counts I and IV-- to which petitioner 

pled guilty-- charge Pless with conspiracy to distribute and 

possession of 403 grams of cocaine. 

Assuming the truth of petitioner's factual allegations, the 

Court can discern no error in the advice given by counsel. Under 

the version of 21 U.S.C. § 841 in effect at the time of 

petitioner's offense and sentencing, the imprisonment penalties 

provided for each count charged in the indictment were identical. 

For repeat offenders such as petitioner, convictions involving less 

than one kilogram of cocaine authorized the court to impose a 

maximum sentence of 30 years. See 21 U. s. c. S. app. § 841 (b) ( 1) (B), 

at 50 (Supp. 1989). Counsel correctly informed Pless that 

regardless of the counts to which he pled guilty, the same sentence 

was authorized under each count. 

Although it is unclear from his pleading, Pless appears to 

make an allegation that his plea of guilty to the counts involving 

the greater amount of cocaine has adversely affected his 

classification by the Bureau of Prisons. The argument implied by 

this allegation is that his counsel's failure to inform him of this 

consequence amounts to ineffective assistance and resulted in an 

unknowing, involuntary plea. 

The Court must also reject this argument. A plea is not 

involuntary merely because a defendant was not advised of every 

collateral consequence that might flow from a guilty plea. United 

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States v. Lott, 630 F. Supp. 611, 612 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 795 F.2d 

82 (4th cir. 1986); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 

(1985) (court's failure to supply defendant with parole information 

does not render a guilty _ plea involuntary) ; United States v. 

Gutierrez, 839 F.2d 648, 652 (10th Cir. 1988) (same); Hutchison v. 

United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir. 1971). Nor can the 

Court say that counsel acted unreasonably by not discussing with 

his client the possible effect that a guilty plea might have on his 

prison classification. Given the alternative of proceeding to 

trial and the significant possibility of conviction under all four 

counts of the indictment, the Court views counsel's advice to his 

client to be well "within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 

771 (1970); see also United States v. Estrada, 849 F.2d 1304, 1307 

(10th Cir. 1988) (counsel did not act unreasonably by assuring 

client he would not receive "much of a sentence" if he pled guilty, 

even though client subsequently was sentenced to 12 years). 

Finally, petitioner alleges that his counsel's performance at 

sentencing was deficient because counsel did not attempt to raise 

any mitigating circumstances. Pless does not specify what 

"mitigating" circumstances counsel failed to address, and the Court 

deems this conclusory allegation to be frivolous. Indeed, the 

Court's imposition of a 7 year sentence, where a 30 year sentence 

was authorized, indicates that counsel more than adequately 

represented his client's interests at sentencing. Pless also 

makes these identical allegations under a theory of an unknowing 

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and involuntary plea. The foregoing analysis applies with equal 

force to this theory, and the Court denies relief based on this 

allegation. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56 (voluntariness of plea depends 

on whether counsel has provided competent advice) (quoting McMann, 

397 U.S. at 771). Because the record amply demonstrates the lack 

of merit to each of petitioner's claims, the Court also denies the 

motion for production of transcript. 

IT IS BY THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner's motion 

to vacate sentence be denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner's motion for production 

of transcript be denied. 

At Wichita, Kansas, this 27th day of March, 1990. 

Eran . Theis _;;-- - ::::=-

~ United States District Judge 

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