Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02762/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02762-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The parties submitted the matter before the Court by letter briefs dated 8/12/05 (Docket #38),

8/28/05 (Dockets #39), and 9/16/05 (Docket #41).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH STEVENS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-02762 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO COMPEL

Now before the Court is defendant County of San Mateo’s motion to compel discovery concerning

the medical/mental health condition of plaintiff’s daughter.1 Having carefully considered the papers submitted,

the Court hereby DENIES the motion to compel. 

In general, a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to any

claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Defendant claims that it needs the requested information to

establish that it did not violate plaintiff’s rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Plaintiff

claims that the information is irrelevant because he complied with the statute. 

FMLA provides employees with the right to take leave to care for a family member when the family

member suffers a “serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). When an employee requests this

type ofleave, an employer can require the employee to submit a certificationfromthe family member’s medical

provider, setting out the basis for the leave and whether the condition meets the statutory requirements. 29

U.S.C. § 2613(a), (b). Employers doubting the veracity of a certification may pursue a second opinion. 29

Case 3:04-cv-02762-SI Document 42 Filed 09/19/05 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

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U.S.C. § 2613(c), (d). When the second opinion conflicts with the first, employers can seek a third medical

opinion, which is final and binding. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(d)(1), (2).

Courts are split on whether an employer that does not seek a second opinion can litigate the validity

of an initial certificationthat establishes a serious health condition. Compare Sims v. Alameda-Contra Costa

Transit Dist., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1263 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that a valid certification shall be binding

where employer did not seek a subsequent medicalopinionwithin a reasonable time period), and Miller v. AT

& T, 60 F. Supp. 2d 574, 580 (S.D. W.Va. 1999)(same), withRhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 385-386

(4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the provision for subsequent medical opinions is merely permissive and creates

no prerequisite to challenging an initial certification), and Stekloff v. St. John’s Mercy Health Sys. 218 F.3d

858, 860 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); see also Marchisheck v. San Mateo County, 199 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th

Cir. 1999) (declining to reach issue because initial certification was improper).

The Court finds the former approach more convincing. FMLA was created, in part, to guard privacy

interests and “to allow doctors rather than courts to determine the medical condition of an employee.” Sims,

2 F. Supp. 2d at 1261. Repudiating the Sims approach would allow employers to deny FMLA leave without

availing themselves of the statutory solutions and to then later contest the certification. This would force

employees into seeking litigation, burdening privacy interests as well as immediate access to reasonable leave,

thereby subverting the purpose of the statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2); Sims, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1261

(summarizing legislative history). To allow employers to challenge a valid certification at litigation would “upset

the balance [within the provisions of FMLA ] between the eligible employee's right to swift and expeditious

coverage and the employer's right to ensure that the requested leave is needed.” Id. 

The Court finds the statutory system outlined above to be the sole mechanism for an employer to

challenge a certification from an employee’s medical provider. Whether plaintiff’s daughter actually suffered

from a “serious health condition” is therefore not relevant to plaintiff’s ability to prove a violation of FMLA.

Plaintiff also alleges, however, harmto both himself and his daughter stemming fromdefendant’s denial

of leave. For example, plaintiff claims that the denial of leave prevented him from providing care to his

daughter, which, coupled with his daughter’s deteriorating condition, caused him emotionaldistress. Through

these allegations, plaintiff has put his daughter’s medical condition at issue. Should plaintiff wish to introduce

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evidence in support of these allegations at trial, he must respond to defendant’s discovery; the Court will not

allow plaintiff to introduce such evidence if he continues to withhold it.

For the above reasons, the Court DENIES defendant’s motion to compel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/19/05

______________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-02762-SI Document 42 Filed 09/19/05 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The parties submitted the matter before the Court by letter briefs dated 8/12/05 (Docket #38),

8/28/05 (Dockets #39), and 9/16/05 (Docket #41).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH STEVENS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-02762 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO COMPEL

Now before the Court is defendant County of San Mateo’s motion to compel discovery concerning

the medical/mental health condition of plaintiff’s daughter.1 Having carefully considered the papers submitted,

the Court hereby DENIES the motion to compel. 

In general, a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to any

claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Defendant claims that it needs the requested information to

establish that it did not violate plaintiff’s rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Plaintiff

claims that the information is irrelevant because he complied with the statute. 

FMLA provides employees with the right to take leave to care for a family member when the family

member suffers a “serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). When an employee requests this

type ofleave, an employer can require the employee to submit a certificationfromthe family member’s medical

provider, setting out the basis for the leave and whether the condition meets the statutory requirements. 29

U.S.C. § 2613(a), (b). Employers doubting the veracity of a certification may pursue a second opinion. 29

Case 3:04-cv-02762-SI Document 42 Filed 09/19/05 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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U.S.C. § 2613(c), (d). When the second opinion conflicts with the first, employers can seek a third medical

opinion, which is final and binding. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(d)(1), (2).

Courts are split on whether an employer that does not seek a second opinion can litigate the validity

of an initial certificationthat establishes a serious health condition. Compare Sims v. Alameda-Contra Costa

Transit Dist., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1263 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that a valid certification shall be binding

where employer did not seek a subsequent medicalopinionwithin a reasonable time period), and Miller v. AT

& T, 60 F. Supp. 2d 574, 580 (S.D. W.Va. 1999)(same), withRhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 385-386

(4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the provision for subsequent medical opinions is merely permissive and creates

no prerequisite to challenging an initial certification), and Stekloff v. St. John’s Mercy Health Sys. 218 F.3d

858, 860 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); see also Marchisheck v. San Mateo County, 199 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th

Cir. 1999) (declining to reach issue because initial certification was improper).

The Court finds the former approach more convincing. FMLA was created, in part, to guard privacy

interests and “to allow doctors rather than courts to determine the medical condition of an employee.” Sims,

2 F. Supp. 2d at 1261. Repudiating the Sims approach would allow employers to deny FMLA leave without

availing themselves of the statutory solutions and to then later contest the certification. This would force

employees into seeking litigation, burdening privacy interests as well as immediate access to reasonable leave,

thereby subverting the purpose of the statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2); Sims, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1261

(summarizing legislative history). To allow employers to challenge a valid certification at litigation would “upset

the balance [within the provisions of FMLA ] between the eligible employee's right to swift and expeditious

coverage and the employer's right to ensure that the requested leave is needed.” Id. 

The Court finds the statutory system outlined above to be the sole mechanism for an employer to

challenge a certification from an employee’s medical provider. Whether plaintiff’s daughter actually suffered

from a “serious health condition” is therefore not relevant to plaintiff’s ability to prove a violation of FMLA.

Plaintiff also alleges, however, harmto both himself and his daughter stemming fromdefendant’s denial

of leave. For example, plaintiff claims that the denial of leave prevented him from providing care to his

daughter, which, coupled with his daughter’s deteriorating condition, caused him emotionaldistress. Through

these allegations, plaintiff has put his daughter’s medical condition at issue. Should plaintiff wish to introduce

Case 3:04-cv-02762-SI Document 42 Filed 09/19/05 Page 5 of 6
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For the Northern District of California

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evidence in support of these allegations at trial, he must respond to defendant’s discovery; the Court will not

allow plaintiff to introduce such evidence if he continues to withhold it.

For the above reasons, the Court DENIES defendant’s motion to compel.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/19/05

______________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-02762-SI Document 42 Filed 09/19/05 Page 6 of 6