Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02214/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02214-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM VAN BATENBURG,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO; B. SELF; R. 

OLIVARRIA; DEPUTY SHERIFF 

YORK; LUKASIC; ZUK; HERRERA,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-2214-BAS-KSC

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AND

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 

§§1915(e)(2) AND 1915A

On November 25, 2016, William Van Batenburg (“Plaintiff”), who was previously 

incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility1(“RJD”) in San Diego, 

California, proceeding pro se, and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), filed this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the Northern District of California. On April 6, 2017, 

United States District Judge William H. Orrick determined that the “bulk of [Plaintiff’s] 

allegations are based on events that occurred at [RJD].” (ECF No. 16 at 1.) Therefore, this 

 

1 Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the California Medical Facility located in Vacaville, 

California. (ECF No. 19.)

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matter was ordered to be transferred to the Southern District of California. (Id.) However, 

District Judge Orrick dismissed all the claims that were based on events which “occurred 

in the Northern District” prior to transferring this matter. (Id.) This Court received the

transferred action on October 31, 2017. (ECF No. 17.) The Court now considers Plaintiff’s 

motion to proceed IFP, his request for appointment of counsel, and conducts a mandatory 

screening of the Complaint.

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.2 See 28 U.S.C. §1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2); 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits 

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account 

for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

 

2

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of 

$50. See 28 U.S.C. §1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, 

§14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 

proceed IFP. Id.

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U.S.C. §1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his request to proceed IFP, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate 

authorized by an RJD accounting official and a copy of his CDCR Inmate Statement 

Report. See ECF No. 14 at 8–9; 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2); Civ. L.R. 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d 

at 1119. These documents show that Plaintiff had no monthly deposits in his account during 

the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, and an available 

balance of zero at the time of filing. See ECF No. 14 at 8–9. Based on this accounting, the 

Court grants Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, and will assess no initial partial filing fee 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no 

event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action 

or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which 

to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 

(finding that 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a 

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available 

to him when payment is ordered.”). The Court will further direct the Secretary of the 

CDCR, or his designee, to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 

U.S.C. §1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment 

payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). See id.

II. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff requests that the Court to appoint him counsel “to handle all court 

proceedings hereafter.” (Compl. at 15.) However, there is no constitutional right to counsel 

in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). While under 28 

U.S.C. §1915(e)(1), district courts have some limited discretion to “request” that an 

attorney represent an indigent civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 

1103 (9th Cir. 2004), this discretion is rarely exercised and only under “exceptional 

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circumstances.” Id.; see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A 

finding of exceptional circumstances requires “an evaluation of the likelihood of the 

plaintiff’s success on the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his 

claims ‘in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103

(quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). Applying these 

factors to Plaintiff’s case, the Court denies his request for appointment of counsel. The 

pleadings filed by Plaintiff to date demonstrate that while Plaintiff may not be trained in 

law, he is capable of legibly articulating the facts and circumstances relevant to his claims, 

which are typical, straightforward, and not legally “complex.” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103. 

Therefore, neither the interests of justice nor any exceptional circumstances warrant the 

appointment of counsel in this case at this time. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th 

Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

III. INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§1915(E)(2)(B) AND 1915A(B)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) and §1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Williams v. King, __ F.3d __, 2017 WL 5180205, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2017)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. §1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of 

frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 

762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 

689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint is “frivolous” if it “lacks an arguable basis 

either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to §1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The 

“mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me 

accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims he was sexually abused in 2008 by a cellmate while incarcerated at 

Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”).3(See Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff was “immediately 

transferred” to the California Medical Facility (“CMF”) in Vacaville following this 

incident. (Id.) Plaintiff submitted a grievance “concerning the incident” and claims that it 

was rejected because he had to raise the issue with PBSP where the incident occurred. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was returned to PBSP after being housed at CMF for one year. (See id. at 4.) Two 

months later, Plaintiff was transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). (See id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he “raised the issue again concerning his sexual abuse” to Defendant 

Herrera, his Correctional Counselor. (Id.) Plaintiff claims Herrera “made it very clear” that 

she was “squashing” Plaintiff’s concerns, “placing [him] in a very grievous state of anxiety 

 

3 The claims arising from periods of time when Plaintiff was housed at institutions located within 

the Northern District of California have been dismissed from this action. (See ECF No. 16 at 3.)

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and fear toward every cell mate [he] would then receive”. (Id.) 

Sometime in early 2010, Plaintiff was “attacked by his cellmate John Roberts.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims his cellmate “kicked [Plaintiff] in the face.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also claims 

he is disabled, uses a walker, and is “blind in one eye.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s cellmate was moved 

out of Plaintiff’s cell and Plaintiff claims he was traumatized “with renewed fears of any 

new cellmate he would receive next” as a result of this alleged attack. (Id.) On April 26, 

2012, Plaintiff was given a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) for “refusing to accept a cell 

mate” while housed at SVSP. (Id.) 

Plaintiff filed a grievance on May 24, 2012 seeking “single-cell status and 

accommodate his disabilities.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff was granted single-cell status on 

December 28, 2012. (See id.) In 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to RJD. (See id.) Plaintiff 

was “denied his single-cell housing” and “began to receive cell mates again.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

claims that as a result he suffered from “recurring psychological trauma and emotional 

distress.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he had “numerous cell mate conflicts” and was told to “deal 

with it” by correctional officers. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) double cell housing policy is actually an 

“underground regulation” which violates his constitutional rights. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff filed 

a grievance seeking a single cell on January 19, 2016. (See id. at 8.) Defendants Olivarria 

and Self “rejected” Plaintiff’s grievance “on the grounds of failing to complete the 

supervisor’s level review of CDCR-22 form.” (Id. at 8–9.) Plaintiff claims Defendant York 

failed to comply with the grievance regulations by “violating the 7-day supervisor response 

time.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff resubmitted the grievance with this explanation but it was also 

rejected by Olivarria and Self. (See id.) Plaintiff’s grievance was eventually “cancelled” 

for failure to comply with the time limits. (Id. at 10–11.) 

C. Failure to Protect claims

The Court construes Plaintiff’s request to reside in a single cell as a claim of failure 

to protect him from harm by other inmates arising under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff 

claims that the denial of single cell status, while housed at RJD, has caused him to have 

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“fears, paranoia, and anxiety.” (Compl. at 13.) The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.

Prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to avoid excessive risks

to inmate safety. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To state a claim 

under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must allege Defendants were “deliberate[ly] 

indifferen[t]” to “conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. Deliberate 

indifference is more than mere negligence, but less than purpose or knowledge. See id. at 

836. A prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he “knows of and disregards 

an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 

must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

The Complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim for which this Court can 

provide redress. As an initial matter, the only claims the Court can address in this matter 

involve the time period that Plaintiff was housed at RJD. All other claims have been 

dismissed without prejudice to be filed in a separate action in the Northern District of 

California. (See ECF No. 16 at 1.) To the extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the 

form of an order directing Defendants to house him in a single cell, the claims against RJD 

Defendants are moot in light of his transfer to a different institution. See Dilley v. Gunn, 

64 F.3rd 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995) (An inmate’s transfer to a different prison while 

conditions of confinement claims are pending moot any claims for injunctive relief.) The 

Complaint otherwise fails to show that Plaintiff is entitled to other relief for the conduct he 

alleges occurred at RJD. Plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages for a “mental or 

emotional injury” without a “prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a 

sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. §1997e(e). A review of the Complaint shows that Plaintiff does not

provide any factual allegations of suffering a physical injury while incarcerated at RJD. 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

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D. Improper Grievance Processing

Plaintiff alleges multiple failures to properly follow CDCR Title 15 prison 

regulations governing the processing of his inmate appeals. However, a prison official’s 

alleged improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or appeals, without more, cannot 

serve as a basis for Section 1983 liability. See generally Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 

860 (9th Cir. 2003) (prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a 

specific prison grievance procedure.”) (citation omitted); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 

640 (9th Cir. 1988) (due process not violated simply because defendant fails properly to 

process grievances submitted for consideration); see also Shallowhorn v. Molina, 572 Fed. 

App’x 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2014) (district court properly dismissed section 1983 claims 

against defendants who “were only involved in the appeals process”) (citing Ramirez, 334 

F.3d at 860). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims are

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

E. Leave to Amend

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s entire Complaint is dismissed for failure to state any claim 

upon which relief may be granted. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and the Court has

now provided him with “notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” the Court will also 

grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a) 

(ECF No. 14).

2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly 

payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding them to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in his 

account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST 

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BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS 

ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) for failure to state a claim 

upon which §1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

1915A(b)(1).

5. GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave from the date of this Order in which 

to file an Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies of pleading described above. Any

Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to the original 

complaint. See Civ. L.R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 

F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”).

Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint no later than January 29, 2018. Should Plaintiff 

elect not to proceed by filing an Amended Complaint within 30 days, the Court will enter 

a final Order of dismissal of this civil action for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and §1915A(b)(1), and for failure to prosecute in compliance 

with a court order requiring amendment. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 

(9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to prosecute permitted if plaintiff fails to respond to a 

court’s order requiring amendment of complaint); Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 

(9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his 

complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the 

entire action.”).

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a civil rights form complaint 

for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 2, 2018

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