Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00827/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00827-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Phillip Lee Carson,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn,

1 Attorney General of the State 

of Arizona,

Respondents.

No. CV 19-00827 PHX ROS (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:

Petitioner Phillip Carson, proceeding pro se, has filed a petition seeking a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents docketed a Limited Answer to 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 17), and Carson filed a reply. (ECF No. 25). 

I. Background

A grand jury indictment returned May 17, 1990, charged Carson with first-degree 

premeditated murder (Count 1); theft (Count 2); kidnapping (Count 3); five counts of 

aggravated assault (Count 4 and Counts 6 through 9); and two counts of sexual assault 

(Counts 5 and 10). (ECF No. 17-1 at 3-6). The following factual basis for the allegations

was found by the Arizona Court of Appeals:

Linda, the kidnapping and assault victim, was [Carson]’s spouse, 

although they had recently separated. On April 25, 1990, Linda and her exhusband Michael [Coatney] were in his truck stopped at a traffic light when 

[Carson] walked up and tried to speak with Linda and give her some jewelry. 

1 Effective October 21, 2019, David Shinn replaced Charles Ryan as Director of the 

Arizona Department of Corrections. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Shinn is 

automatically substituted as the party of record.

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When the light turned green, Michael drove away. [Carson] got back in his 

car and pursued until he caught up with Michael’s truck and forced it off the 

road. Both vehicles came to a stop . . . and Michael and [Carson] emerged 

from their vehicles and confronted one another. [Carson] was armed with a 

.357 handgun; Michael was not armed. As witnessed by several people, the 

confrontation ended when [Carson] fired one shot and killed Michael.

[Carson] then got into Michael’s truck and drove away with Linda. 

[Carson] threatened to shoot her if she tried to escape. He drove to . . . South 

Mountain Park, abandoned the truck and forced Linda to walk up the 

mountain with him . . . During the next few hours on South Mountain, 

[Carson] hit Linda numerous times . . . [Carson] forced Linda to perform oral 

sex on him, and he had vaginal intercourse with her. He put the barrel of the 

loaded gun in her mouth, into her rectum, into her vagina, then back into her 

mouth. . . .

After someone reported to police that a truck was parked in the 

mountain preserve, police checked the license plate and learned that it was 

Michael’s truck. Phoenix and Tempe police quickly converged on the scene, 

aided by a helicopter and a police dog. Officers found [Carson] behind a 

boulder, holding Linda at gunpoint and threatening to kill her and the 

officers. The ensuing standoff lasted about three hours, during which 

[Carson] admitted shooting Michael and claimed that he had acted in selfdefense. [Carson] eventually surrendered without further violence.

(ECF No. 17-1 at 43-44). Carson did not testify at his trial. (ECF No. 17-1 at 81).

Prior to trial, the defense noticed the decedent and Linda’s teen-aged son, Michael 

Coatney, Jr., as a potential witness, and a Rule 11 proceeding was conducted. (ECF No. 

17-1 at 8). With regard to Count 1, the jury was given the choice of finding Carson guilty 

of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide, or 

finding him not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. (ECF No. 17-1 at 11-20). The 

jury was also given the choice of finding Carson guilty of lesser-included crimes or not 

guilty by reason of insanity with regard to the other charges. (Id.). The jury found Carson 

guilty of first-degree murder and guilty on the other counts stated in the indictment. (ECF 

No. 17-1 at 11-20). On June 12, 1992, at the conclusion of a hearing, Carson was sentenced 

to life in prison on Count 1, with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. (ECF No. 

17-1 at 22-35). The trial court imposed an aggregate term of 7.5 years’ imprisonment on 

the other counts of conviction, to be served consecutively to the sentence on Count 1. (Id.).

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Defense counsel moved for a new trial, asserting Carson was incompetent during 

his trial due to “overmedication.” (ECF No. 17-1 at 90). The motion for a new trial was 

denied. (Id.). 

Carson took a direct appeal of his convictions, asserting:

1. The trial court erred by admitting statements Carson made during an

interrogation, in violation of his Miranda rights;

2. The trial court violated Carson’s Faretta rights;

3. The trial court erred by finding Carson was competent to waive his right to an 

attorney during the interrogation but not competent to represent himself at trial;

4. There was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on the charges of sexual 

assault of a spouse without consent;

5. There was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on the charge of

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon;

6. The trial court erred by finding Carson competent to stand trial;

7. The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to appoint a fourth Rule 11 

doctor;

8. Carson’s constitutional rights were violated by his forcible medication during 

trial;

9. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss the venire panel after a 

member of the panel stated he knew of Carson because his wife’s friend was dating Carson 

at the time of the offenses;

10. The trial court abused its discretion by denying severance;

11. The trial court abused its discretion by denying a change of venue; and

12. The trial court erred by denying defense counsel’s objections to the jury 

instructions on theft, sexual assault, and the insanity defense.

(ECF No. 1 at 93–94; ECF No. 17-1 at 44-45).

On April 18, 1995, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Carson’s assignments of 

error and affirmed his conviction and sentence. (ECF No. 17-1 at 42-68). The appellate 

court denied a motion for reconsideration on July 24, 1995. (ECF No. 17-1 at 40). Carson

did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court, nor did he seek a writ of certiorari.

Carson sought a state writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules 

of Criminal Procedure, filing his notice on May 13, 1995. In his Rule 32 action Carson

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asserted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and insufficient evidence to sustain 

his conviction for first-degree murder. (ECF No. 17-1 at 70-71; 77-84).

2 Carson alleged 

“the most he should have been found guilty of [was] manslaughter,” because he was 

. . . mentally and emotionally exhausted, when he unexpectedly found 

his wife with another man of which Defendant knew to be her paramour. 

Defendant shot the deceased in such a heat of passion, as to be guilty of at 

the most voluntary manslaughter where Defendant’s wife was having an 

affair which had extended over a considerable period of time.

(ECF No. 17-1 at 84). 

On December 13, 1995, the state trial court denied Rule 32 relief. See State v. 

Carson, 2017 WL 4171876, at *1-2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2017). Although Carson

asserts he sought review of this decision, (ECF No. 1 at 5), there is no indication in the 

record that Carson actually did seek review, and the state court docket provided by Carson 

indicates he did not seek appellate review in his first Rule 32 action. (ECF No. 1 at 88). 

[Approximately twenty years later,] [a]fter his parole hearing in 2015, 

Carson filed an untimely and successive notice for post-conviction relief, 

arguing newly discovered evidence obtained at the parole hearing likely 

would have affected his first-degree murder conviction and resulting life 

sentence. Specifically, Carson claimed he learned for the first time at the 

parole hearing that the murder victim had a “known reputation” for having 

two guns in the truck he was driving immediately before he exited the vehicle 

and was confronted and shot by Carson. According to Carson, this evidence 

2 Carson alleged his counsel was ineffective for “direct[ing] the Adult Probation Office not 

to interview Mr. Carson for the pre-[sentence] report.” (ECF No. 17-1 at 80). Attached to this 

pleading is a letter from Carson’s trial counsel to Carson stating: 

Remember, someone will be coming to visit you from the Probation Department. I 

do not want you to talk to that person, because we will be preparing an appeal on 

your behalf. I do not want you talking to the Probation Officer, as you have, 

obviously, given enough statements to last a lifetime in this case. In the event that 

you talk to the presentence writer, and you testify at your next trial, the State could 

use anything that you say in the presentence report against you. 

(ECF No. 17-1 at 82) (emphasis in original). Defense counsel also instructed the probation officer 

not to interview Carson for the presentence report. (ECF No. 17-1 at 90). In Carson’s Rule 32 

action the State allowed that, although counsel erred by telling Carson he should not talk to the 

probation officer, there was no prejudice because counsel did present mitigation evidence and 

Carson had not established the sentencing court “failed to consider any evidence that could have 

been weighed in mitigation.” (Id.). 

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of the victim’s guns would have supported his self-defense argument at trial. 

Carson also argued the State violated his due process rights and its 

obligations under Brady to disclose before trial evidence of the victim’s 

reputation regarding the guns. Finally, Carson alleged that witnesses at the 

parole hearing provided testimony that differed from their testimony at trial, 

resulting in his conviction and denial of parole.

The superior court summarily dismissed the notice. . . . the court 

correctly rejected Carson’s assertion that the successive notice was timely 

based on his pre-September 30, 1992, sentencing. See Moreno v. Gonzalez, 

192 Ariz. 131, 135 [] (1998) . . . The court also correctly found Carson failed 

to explain how evidence of the victim’s guns was newly discovered because 

Carson did not explain how the evidence could not have been produced at 

trial with reasonable diligence. See State v. Turner, 92 Ariz. 214, 221 []

(1962) . . . The court additionally, and correctly, determined Carson failed to 

establish the materiality of the evidence, a prerequisite to establish both a 

colorable claim of newly discovered evidence and a Brady violation. Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.1(e) (stating newly discovered facts must be material); State 

v. Bilke, 162 Ariz. 51, 52–53, 781 P.2d 28, 29-30 (1989) (providing the 

requirements for a colorable claim in a newly discovered evidence case); 

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 . . . Finally, the court correctly dismissed Carson’s 

concern about the variance in witness testimony, finding the alleged 

discrepancies would not have materially affected the trial’s outcome.

Carson, 2017 WL 4171876, at *1-2. See also ECF No. 17-1 at 111-14.

Carson appealed the trial court’s denial of relief in his second Rule 32 action. (ECF 

No. 17-1 at 116-32). The Arizona Court of Appeals found and concluded:

On review, Carson appears to challenge the superior court’s findings 

that Carson failed to establish the materiality of the “newly discovered 

evidence” . . . Carson speculates that, had the jury considered the evidence 

of the murder victim’s guns, it would have convicted him not of first-degree 

murder, but a lesser-included offense.

The superior court . . . clearly identified and correctly ruled upon the 

issues raised. Further, the court did so in a thorough, well-reasoned manner 

that will allow any future court to understand the court’s rulings. Under these 

circumstances, “No useful purpose would be served by this court rehashing 

the trial court’s correct ruling in a written decision.” State v. Whipple, 177 

Ariz. 272, 274 [] (App. 1993). Therefore, we adopt the superior court’s 

ruling.

Id. at *2. The Arizona Supreme Court denied Carson’s petition for review on February 14, 

2018. (ECF No. 17-1 at 140-76).

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In his petition for federal habeas relief, filed February 7, 2019, Carson asserts:

1. He was denied due process and equal protection of the law by the state trial court’s

denial of state habeas relief on the basis that his Rule 32 petition was successive;

2. He was denied due process and equal protection of the law by the state appellate 

court’s denial of habeas relief;

3. He was denied a fair trial because a State’s witness committed perjury;

4. A Brady claim, based on the State’s withholding of evidence that the victim 

possessed guns;

5. The Arizona Supreme Court violated his right to due process by denying review 

in his 2015 Rule 32 action;

6. He was denied due process and equal protection by the state courts’ refusal to 

allow him to fully brief his claims for state post-conviction relief.

Respondents assert the petition is not timely and that Carson’s claims are also 

procedurally defaulted and not cognizable. (ECF No. 17 at 2, 9, 15, 20-21).

II. Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). However, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) requires state prisoners to file a petition for habeas corpus within 

one year of the date that the petitioner’s conviction became final on direct appeal in state 

court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). State prisoners whose convictions became final prior to 

the enactment of the AEDPA, i.e., prior to April 24, 1996, had a one-year “grace period” 

in which to file a habeas petition, which began April 25, 1996, and ended April 24, 1997. 

See Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 468 (2012); Bryant v. Arizona Attorney Gen., 499 F.3d 

1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007). 

On April 18, 1995, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Carson’s convictions and 

sentences on direct appeal, and a motion for reconsideration was denied July 24, 1995. 

Accordingly, Carson’s conviction became “final” on or about August 8, 1995, when the 

time for seeking review by the Arizona Supreme Court expired. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

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31.21(b)(2)(A) (allowing a defendant fifteen days to seek review from a motion denying 

reconsideration); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (the 1-year limitations period runs from the 

date on which judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration 

of the time for seeking such review); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 154 (2012).

Because Carson’s conviction became final before the enactment of the AEDPA, the statute 

of limitations with regard to his federal habeas petition began to run the day after the 

AEDPA became effective, i.e., April 25, 1996, and expired April 24, 1997. See, e.g., Laws 

v. Lamarque, 351 F. 3d 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, his federal habeas petition, 

filed November 7, 2019 (pursuant to the prison mailbox rule), was filed 8231 days after 

the statute of limitations expired.

1. Statutory tolling

The limitations period is tolled during the time a “properly filed” state action for 

post-conviction relief is pending in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, at 

no time after the statute of limitations began to run on April 25, 1996, and when it expired 

on April 24, 1997, did Carson have a properly filed application for state post-conviction 

relief pending in the Arizona courts. The state trial court denied relief in Carson’s first 

Rule 32 action on December 13, 1995, and the deadline for seeking review of that decision 

expired January 12, 1996, prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, i.e., April 24, 1996, 

the first day of the one-year limitations period on Carson’s federal habeas action. Carson’s 

second action for Rule 32 relief, filed in 2015 (long after the AEDPA’s statute of limitations 

expired), did not revive or restart the limitations period with regard to his federal habeas 

petition. See Larson v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Additionally, Carson’s second Rule 32 action was not a “properly filed” action for state 

post-conviction relief. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005) (holding that a 

state petition that is not filed within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed.”). 

See also Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 5-7 (2007) (holding that the Pace rule applies even 

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where there are exceptions to the state-court filing deadlines, and reaffirming that a state 

court’s rejection of a petition as untimely is “the end of the matter.”).

2. Equitable tolling

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition may be 

equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control prevented 

them from filing their petition on time. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010); 

Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2014). To be entitled to equitable tolling,

the petitioner must establish that he diligently pursued his claims and that “some 

extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control prevented the timely filing of his habeas 

petition. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling is also 

available if the petitioner establishes their actual, factual innocence of the crimes of 

conviction. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013); Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 

929, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2014).3

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 

1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014); Waldon-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 

2009). It is Carson’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, 

e.g., Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldon-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 

1011; Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004). To be 

entitled to equitable tolling Carson must show “extraordinary circumstances were the cause

of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a 

petition on time.” Porter, 620 F.3d at 959 (emphasis added and internal quotations 

3 When an otherwise time-barred habeas petitioner “presents evidence of innocence 

so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the 

court is also satisfied that the trial was free of non-harmless constitutional error,” 

the Court may consider the petition on the merits. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

[] (1995). The Supreme Court has recently cautioned, however, that “tenable actualinnocence gateway pleas are rare.” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928. “[A] petitioner 

does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, 

in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find 

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2014).

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omitted). To the extent Carson asserts the State’s purported violation of Brady entitles him 

to equitable tolling, this argument fails because by his own admissions Carson knew the 

victim possessed and/or kept guns in his vehicle prior to the time of his trial and, as a matter 

of law, this exhibits his lack of “due diligence” in seeking federal habeas relief. See Ford 

v. Gonzalez, 683, 1230, 1237-38 (9th Cir. 2012), citing Daniels v. Uchtman, 421 F.3d 490, 

492 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that information supporting the petitioner’s Brady claim could 

have been discovered more than one year prior to petitioner’s filing of his federal habeas 

petition). See also Gallegos v. Ryan, 2017 WL 3822070, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2017). 

3. Section § 2244(d)(1)

With regard to Respondents’ contention that his claims are time-barred, Carson 

asserts the limitations period should be calculated from the date of discovery of the factual 

predicate of his claim, i.e., the date he acquired “newly discovered material facts [which] 

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence.” (ECF No. 25 at 12). Alternatively 

to the date the petitioner’s conviction becomes final, section 2244 provides the limitations 

period may begin to run from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(D). Carson asserts that prior to 2015 he had no knowledge of the “fact” that 

State’s witnesses could testify the victim kept guns in his vehicle, bolstering a claim of 

self-defense. However, in the attachments to his federal habeas petition, i.e., his pleadings 

in his state-court actions, Carson allows he knew the victim kept a gun in his truck at the 

time of his trial and one of the witnesses who spoke to this issue at the parole hearing, i.e., 

the victim’s son, was noticed by the defense as a potential witness at the trial. Furthermore, 

immediately after the crime Carson asserted he shot the victim in self-defense, and the 

limited trial transcript supplied to the Court indicates Carson’s counsel raised not only the 

issue of his mental health, but also the defenses of heat of passion and self-defense during 

counsel’s questioning of the State’s trial witnesses.

The “fact” that the victim possessed guns and that it was likely the victim had a gun 

in his truck at the time of the fatal confrontation was known to Carson prior to his trial and, 

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accordingly, the fact that others knew of this and so testified at his parole hearing was not 

new and could have been discovered through due diligence. Carson asserts in his reply:

. . . his state of mind was not right during the crime due to crime of 

passion and fear of his wife’s paramour, however, the state’s witnesses gave 

oath in their testimony that murder victim never-ever had weapons (guns) 

nor did he every carry them in his vehicle. . . .

Petitioner discovered material evidence on 5/14/15, at an Arizona 

State Parole Board Department Hearing, where above state’s witnesses gave 

testimony that murder victim did have guns in his vehicle when Petitioner 

shot him.

Petitioner diligently filed his “notice” of PCR R. 32.1(e) after 

discovery of new testimony that confirmed Petitioner’s statements in his 

interrogation with Tempe Police Detectives on 4/25/90, where Plaintiff 

confessed he shot victim out of fear, because Petitioner knew from personal 

observation that victim put a “sawed-off shotgun and a pistol” in his vehicle 

every day when he went to work. Victim was Petitioner’s duplex neighbor for 

nearly (3) years.

(ECF No. 25 at 13) (emphasis added).

As noted by the state trial court in Carson’s second Rule 32 action, Carson was 

certainly aware, at the time of the trial, whether or not he himself saw the victim brandish 

a gun at the time of the shooting. If any gun was in the truck and not brandished by the 

victim at the time of the shooting, Carson’s provocation of the confrontation by running 

the victim’s vehicle off the road and his shooting of an unarmed victim who did not pose 

a lethal threat was not likely to be found anything less than premeditated murder by the 

jury.

4 Furthermore, Michael Coatney, Jr., the victim’s son, who spoke at Carson’s parole 

4 Carson stated during his parole hearing that prior to the crime he knew the victim “always 

had a shotgun in his truck,” and that he had “a 38 shoved in the back of his pants,” but he further 

allowed that, on the date and time of the crime, he did not “ever see a weapon on [the victim’s]

person or about his body,” and that he exited his vehicle with his 357 in his hands and immediately 

cocked-back the hammer on his gun. (ECF No. 20). “The Arizona Supreme Court has held that a 

defendant arguing self-defense may introduce specific acts of violence or aggression by a victim 

that the defendant observed or knew about before the alleged crime to show that the defendant’s 

response was reasonable.” State v. Crandall, 2014 WL 1260858, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 

2014). Although “specific acts of violence” which are “known to the defendant” may be admissible 

to “prove the defendant’s state of mind,” the mere possession of a weapon is not a “specific act of 

violence.” State v. Santanna, 153 Ariz. 147, 149 (Ariz. 1987). Furthermore, “the privilege of selfdefense is not available to one who is at fault in provoking an encounter or difficulty that results 

in a homicide.” State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 104 (Ariz. 1983).

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hearing, was listed as a trial witness by the defense and was known to have been in the 

victim’s vehicle just prior to the crime. Therefore, with regard to his testimony at the parole 

hearing that the victim regularly kept a gun in his vehicle, this exact testimony could have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence and elicited at trial.5

As noted by the state trial court in rejecting Carson’s claim that he had newly 

discovered evidence:

It is at least arguable that the evidence that Mr. Coatney kept a gun in his truck would not 

be relevant to a finding of second-degree murder or manslaughter. Second-degree murder requires 

evidence of malice and excludes circumstances of mitigation, justification, or excuse. State v. 

Travis, 26 Ariz. App. 24, 26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). Malice may be proven by circumstantial 

evidence, including an inference to be drawn from the use of a deadly weapon. Id. To be considered 

manslaughter, the victim’s actions must be such that they would deprive a reasonable person of

self-control. Manslaughter is defined as “[c]ommitting second degree murder . . . upon a sudden 

quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 13-1103(A)(2) (emphasis added). Although evidence of an argument may be indicative of a 

sudden quarrel or heat of passion, under § 13–1103(A)(2) the sudden quarrel or heat of passion 

must result from adequate provocation by the victim. See State v. Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, 501 

(2005). It is entirely possible the defense purposefully did not bring-up the issue of Mr. Coatney’s 

possession of a weapon in his truck because, as noted in the parole hearing, Carson had made 

threats against Mr. Coatney as recently as a week prior to the crime, and Carson had committed 

prior assaults on Linda Coatney.

5 Carson asserts Michael Coatney, Jr. and Linda Coatney “lied under oath,” “hiding the 

fact that murder victim had a sawed-off shotgun and a 22 caliber pistol with him at time of 

shooting,” and “gave oath in their testimony that murder victim never-ever had weapons (guns) 

nor did he ever carry them in his vehicle.” (ECF No. 25 at 3, 13. See also ECF No. 1 at 13). He 

further alleges the police “never logged” “these weapons” into evidence.” (ECF No. 25 at 5).

However, Carson provides no evidence that the police failed to log any weapons found in Mr. 

Coatney’s truck into evidence. It is the petitioner’s burden to present support for his claims for 

habeas relief. E.g., Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The petitioner carries 

the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to habeas relief.”); 

Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 2002); Pappas v. Miller, 750 F. App’x 556, 566 

(9th Cir. 2018). Although Carson asserts trial transcripts are “unavailable” to him (ECF No. 1 

at 13), in his pleadings he quotes from trial transcripts and he produces more than a few pages of 

transcripts. (ECF No. 1 at 11-13, 193-219). At trial, Carson’s counsel focused his claim of selfdefense on the fact that Mr. Coatney was angry when he approached Carson after being run off the 

road, and that as Carson confronted Mr. Coatney with his weapon drawn he told Mr. Coatney, in 

effect, to “stay back” before he shot him. (ECF No. 1 at 210. See also ECF No. 1 at 99 (Carson’s 

appellate brief relaying Linda Coatney’s testimony that Carson “jumped from his car with a gun 

in his hands and told Michael Coatney to, ‘Stay away. Stay away from me, motherfucker.’”). 

Notably, the jury was instructed on self-defense, second-degree murder, and manslaughter, and 

found Carson guilty of first-degree murder. 

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According to the defendant, the prosecutor and a detective suppressed 

evidence that the driver victim had a “known reputation” for carrying a 22-

caliber gun and sawed off shotgun [i.e., that he] “carried handgun and sawed 

off shotgun on a regular basis,” [] and concealed weapons under or behind 

the truck’s front seat. [] The existence of the shotgun came out when the 

driver victim’s brother made statements during the defendant’s parole 

hearing. [] Defendant posits that Rule 32.1(e) applies because this evidence 

provided the basis for a self defense claim and could have resulted in a 

second-degree murder conviction. [] The Court disagrees. The defendant 

never explains why these facts could not have been produced with reasonable 

diligence at trial or on appeal. He also fails to establish the materiality of the 

evidence. The fact that the driver victim had a reputation for carrying 

weapons is not proof that he had them on the date of the crime. If Defendant 

was unaware of the alleged weapons, they could not have affected his mental 

state at the time of the crime. If there were weapons and the defendant was 

aware of them, then the evidence is not newly discovered and appears to be 

cumulative.

(ECF No. 17-1 at 113) (citations to the record omitted and emphasis added).

Because the “factual predicate” of Carson’s claim, i.e., that the victim carried a gun 

in his vehicle and that presumably Mr. Coatney’s son, Linda, or the police detective would 

have testified to this fact, could have been discovered through due diligence prior to or at 

trial or prior to the expiration of the limitations period, Carson is not entitled to the benefit 

of § 2244(d)(1)(D) with regard to the statute of limitations on his federal habeas petition.

4. Actual innocence

The Supreme Court announced an equitable exception to the AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations in McQuiggin. The Court held that the “actual innocence gateway” to federal 

habeas review, was applied to procedural bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) 

and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006), also extends to petitions that are time-barred under 

the AEDPA. See McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386, 392-93; Stewart, 757 F.3d at 937-38.

To be entitled to this exception to a finding that his habeas petition is time-barred, 

a petitioner must establish his factual innocence of the crime and not mere legal 

insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Morales v. Ornoski, 

439 F.3d 529, 533-34 (9th Cir. 2006); Jaramillo v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 

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2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires the petitioner to support his allegations of 

constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 324; see also McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399 (explaining the significance of an 

“[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). A petitioner “’must show that it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 

evidence.’” McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 399, quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. See also Jones 

v. Taylor, 763 F.3d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 2014). Because of “the rarity of such evidence, 

in virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.” 

Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Stewart, 757 F.3d at 938 

(“The Supreme Court has recently cautioned, however, that ‘tenable actual-innocence 

gateway pleas are rare.’ McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928.”). 

Carson fails to establish an actual innocence claim such that he is entitled to tolling 

of the statute of limitations. The record and pleadings in this case do not contain “evidence 

of innocence so strong that [the Court] cannot have confidence” in the outcome of the 

proceedings. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 401. As noted supra, the fact that the victim was 

known to have carried a gun in his vehicle and/or that he actually had a gun in his vehicle 

at the time of the shooting does not overcome the evidence of premeditation presented at

Carson’s trial: Carson pursued the victim in his vehicle, purposefully ran the victim off the 

road, and approached the victim, who did not have a gun in his hand or “about his body,”

with a .357 loaded with a hollow-point bullet, and shot the victim dead. Notably, Carson 

did not assert then and does not assert now that he saw the victim brandish a gun prior to 

shooting him. Carson’s conclusory arguments and speculation that the State “hid” any 

weapons found in the victim’s truck, simply do not satisfy the Schlup standard. See, e.g., 

Martinez v. Clark, 2009 WL 1788402 at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2009) (noting that in the 

few cases habeas petitioners have been able to meet the Schlup standard, the “new 

evidence” consisted of “credible evidence that the petitioner had a solid alibi for the time 

of the crime, numerous exonerating eyewitness accounts of the crime, DNA evidence 

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excluding petitioner and identifying another potential perpetrator, a credible confession by 

a likely suspect explaining that he had framed the petitioner, and/or evidence contradicting 

the very premise of the prosecutor’s case against the petitioner.”). Accordingly, Carson’s 

contention that the jury would have convicted him of less than first-degree murder had they 

known the victim carried a gun in his vehicle is not persuasive and should not deprive the 

Court of confidence in the outcome of the trial. 

B. Exhaustion and procedural default

Absent specific circumstances, the Court may only grant federal habeas relief on the 

merits of a claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the state courts. See O’Sullivan 

v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 

(1991). To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state 

courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim 

to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. E.g., Castille v. Peoples, 

489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). In noncapital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test is satisfied if the habeas petitioner 

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762-63 (D. Ariz. 2008). 

To fairly present a claim in the state courts, thereby exhausting the claim, the petitioner 

must present to the state courts the “substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal 

court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 

(9th Cir. 2009). Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of 

his claim to the state courts, including a reference to the operative federal constitutional 

guarantee relied on by the petitioner and a statement the facts supporting the claim. See 

Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 

(9th Cir. 2007). 

[The federal courts] recognize two types of procedural bars: express and 

implied. An express procedural bar occurs when the petitioner has presented 

his claim to the state courts and the state courts have relied on a state 

procedural rule to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied procedural bar, on 

the other hand, occurs when the petitioner has failed to fairly present his 

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claims to the highest state court and would now be barred by a state 

procedural rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, but the appellate court did not address the merits of the claim because it 

found the claim precluded by a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Atwood v. Ryan, 870 F.3d 

1033, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017); McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The 

doctrine of procedural default provides that a federal habeas court may not review 

constitutional claims when a state court has declined to consider their merits on the basis 

of an adequate and independent state procedural rule.”).

A petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still has the right to raise 

the claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

Accordingly, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred 

from pursuing a previously un-presented claim in the state’s “highest” court. See Woodford 

v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2006). Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar Carson from returning to the 

state courts to exhaust any unexhausted federal habeas claim, he has exhausted but 

procedurally defaulted any claim not previously properly presented to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. 

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). If a prisoner has procedurally defaulted a claim 

in the state courts he is not entitled to a review of the merits of the claim in a federal habeas 

action absent a showing of both cause and prejudice. E.g., Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 

627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court may also consider the merits of a procedurally 

defaulted claim if the failure to consider the merits of the claim will result in a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Atwood, 870 F.3d at 1059; Cooper v. 

Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011). “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s 

procedural default of the claim, i.e., an objective factor outside of his control, and 

“prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Cooper, 641 

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F.3d at 327. To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked 

to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions.” Id. It is the petitioner’s burden to establish both cause and 

prejudice with regard to their procedural default of a federal habeas claim in the state 

courts. Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415 (9th Cir. 1998).

As with the McQuiggin “gateway,” a petitioner meets the “fundamental miscarriage 

of justice” exception by “establish[ing] that under the probative evidence he has a colorable 

claim of factual innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333. 339 (1992) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” standard, a 

petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder 

could have found him guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 

393 (2004); Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

C. Carson’s claims for federal habeas relief

In his first, second, fifth, and sixth claim for relief Carson asserts his federal 

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law were violated in his 

state post-conviction proceedings. Carson did not raise these claims in the state courts and 

Arizona’s rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims prohibit him from returning 

to the state courts to exhaust the claims. Accordingly, the claims are procedurally defaulted. 

Carson fails to show any cause or prejudice arising from his procedural default of the 

claims, nor does he assert his factual innocence of the crimes of conviction. Furthermore, 

claims that the state courts improperly denied a habeas petitioner state post-conviction 

relief are not cognizable in a § 2254 action. See Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (holding error in post-conviction determinations are not cognizable in a federal 

habeas action); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Villafuerte v. 

Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997); Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (“[A] petition alleging errors in the state post-conviction review process is not 

addressable through habeas corpus proceedings.”); Ochoa v. Ontiveros, 2009 

WL 1125320, at *8 (D. Ariz. Apr. 27, 2009) (“Franzen and the cases it cites are based on 

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the fact that habeas proceedings are designed to attack the basis for the petitioner’s 

detention, and a petitioner is not detained as a result of post-conviction proceedings. 

Habeas relief, therefore, is not available to redress errors occurring in post-conviction 

proceedings.”). Carson cannot “transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by 

asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996).

In his third claim for federal habeas relief Carson asserts he was denied a fair trial 

because, he asserts, a State’s witness committed perjury, i.e., that the witness testified at 

his parole hearing contrary to the witness’s testimony at trial. Carson argues in his fourth 

claim for relief that the State withheld evidence that the victim possessed guns at the time 

of the crime, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Carson raised these 

claims in his second untimely Rule 32 action, and the state trial court denied these claims 

because they were procedurally precluded; the state court found Carson had not met the 

threshold for filing an untimely successive petition for Rule 32 relief because his “newly 

discovered evidence” was not, as that term is defined by state law, “newly discovered.”

The state court determined the purportedly “newly discovered” evidence was known to 

Carson at the time of trial and it was not material to the outcome of his trial. Pursuant to 

this decision Carson’s third and fourth claims for federal habeas relief were procedurally 

defaulted in the state courts because, when raised by Carson, the state court found the 

claims barred by the operation of an independent and adequate rule of state law. Carson 

fails to show any cause or prejudice arising from his procedural default of these claims, nor 

does he assert his factual innocence of the crimes of conviction.

D. Brady claim

Carson also fails to show any prejudice arising from his procedural default of his 

fourth claim because, inter alia, his Brady claim is without merit.

“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must 

be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; 

that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and 

prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). To 

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establish materiality, Carson must show that the State’s “’nondisclosure was so serious that 

there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a 

different verdict.’” Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2013), quoting Strickler, 

527 U.S. at 281. Additionally, the question of prejudice asks “whether the favorable 

evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 

undermine confidence in the verdict.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289 (internal quotations 

omitted). To show cognizable prejudice, Carson must establish “a reasonable probability 

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995). 

Furthermore, the evidence is not “suppressed” if the defense is aware of the evidence 

notwithstanding that the evidence is also available to the prosecution. Amado v. Gonzalez, 

758 F.3d 1119, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014); Cunningham v. Wong, 704 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir. 

2013) (holding that, because the defendant’s attorneys possessed the “salient facts” to 

access the alleged Brady evidence, “[t]here was no suppression of this easily attainable 

evidence”); Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that, where the 

defendant was aware of the essential facts regarding his medical records, enabling him to 

take advantage of any exculpatory evidence, the government does not commit a Brady

violation by not bringing the evidence to the attention of the defense); Bonnaudet v. Henry, 

303 F. App’x 375, 376 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that, because the defendant “took the van 

to the body shop herself and knew its condition,” she was “aware of the essential facts 

enabling her to take advantage of the exculpatory evidence,” i.e., the proposed testimony 

of body shop employees who cleaned the van (internal quotations and alterations omitted)). 

This doctrine regarding “suppression” applies where the alleged Brady evidence is a 

witness statement; if the defense is “on notice of the essential facts which would enable [it] 

to call the witness and thus take advantage of any exculpatory testimony that [the witness] 

might furnish,” Brady does not require the government “to make a [witness’] statement 

known” to the defense. United States v. Bond, 552 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Because Carson’s defense counsel knew, by virtue of Carson’s communication to them, 

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that the victim carried weapons in his vehicle, and knew the victim’s son was in the vehicle 

just prior to the crime, and noticed an intent to call the victim’s son as a witness, it cannot 

be said that the defense was not aware of the purported Brady evidence.

In his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his second Rule 32 

action Carson stated:

In interview with Tempe police defendant stated on recording that 

victim who was sleeping with defendants wife had a sawed off shotgun 

behind his seat and a 38 revolver that he carried behind his back. (which 

turned out to be a 22 pistol in parole hearing CD on 5-14-15). 

(Note: in trial Joe Caneira testified as a United States soldier that he 

had seen Michael Coatney wearing a revolver behind his back in wastline). 

. . .

[The State] lied about weapons being in victims vehicle, in order to 

make the defendant look like a cold-blooded killer when in fact defendant 

was scared to death he would be shot by the man trying to take his wife away.

(ECF No. 17-1 at 125). 

In his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court in his second Rule 32 action 

Carson asserted that, at the time of his first interview with the police detective, he told the 

detective

. . .that the above listed weapons of the murder victim were in murder 

victim’s truck at the time of the argument and murder, yet these weapons 

were never labeled, evidenced or given description in R. 15 discovery, nor 

did state admit to weapons being in “truck.” (ECF No. 17-1 at 141-42). 

(ECF No. 17-1 at 149).

Carson also asserted in his petition for review that he “knew” of the victim’s 

“reputation” and his possession of guns “prior to Petitioner shooting and killing victim,”

and that he “relayed” this information to his counsel, who “looked into” these allegations 

and “filed for self-defense rule.” ((ECF No. 17-1 at 149, 153). Carson asserted the “police 

more than probable just gave guns back to family or lost them in some inventory or 

destroyed them - which denied defendant his right to lay victims guns on table opposite of 

the Petitioner’s guns during trial.” (Id.).

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Carson has failed to show the evidence was “suppressed” or a reasonable probability 

that, had the testimony presented at the parole hearing regarding the victim’s possession of 

weapons been presented at his trial, the jury would have found him guilty of a lesser charge. 

Given the evidence of Carson’s guilt presented at trial, including the witnesses’ testimony 

and Carson’s statements after being placed in custody, there is no “reasonable likelihood” 

that presenting the actual guns Mr. Coatney allegedly carried in his truck but did not 

brandish at Carson could have “affected the judgment of the jury,” which was presented 

with the options of finding Carson guilty a lesser-included offense but rejected these 

options. Reis-Campos v. Biter, 832 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 2016); Jackson v. Brown, 513 

F.3d 1057, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no prejudice at trial from a Napue violation where 

the defendant’s own testimony and physical evidence “pointed to his guilt”). Accordingly, 

Carson’s Brady claim is without merit and he is unable to show prejudice arising from his 

procedural default of this claim. 

III. Conclusion

Carson’s federal habeas petition was not filed within the applicable statute of 

limitations, and he has not established he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of 

limitations. Furthermore, Carson procedurally defaulted all of his claims in the state courts 

by failing to present them to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally correct fashion. 

Additionally, Carson’s claims that he was denied his rights to due process and equal 

protection in his state post-conviction proceedings are not cognizable in a federal habeas 

action and his Brady claim may also be denied on the merits. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Carson’s petition seeking a federal 

writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which 

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to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) 

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of 

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections 

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations 

of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Carson seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should be 

denied because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

Dated this 5th day of March, 2020.

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