Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01853/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01853-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID PATRICK SILVA and CINDI

L. JONES,

 

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF TEHAMA, et al.

Defendants. 

 CIV-S-03-1853 DFL/CMK

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Plaintiffs bring federal and state law claims against

defendants based on a November 2002 search of plaintiffs’

residence. Defendants City of Corning (“Corning”), County of

Glenn (“Glenn”), and County of Tehama (“Tehama”) each move for

summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ claims against them. For the

reasons stated below, defendants’ motions are GRANTED. 

I.

On the morning of November 8, 2002, law enforcement officers

from the defendant counties and city executed a search warrant at

Case 2:03-cv-01853-DFL -CMK Document 32 Filed 10/21/05 Page 1 of 4
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 The officers were working together as a task force called 1

TAGMET (Tehama and Glenn Methamphetamine Enforcement Team), which

was directed by the State of California Department of Justice. 

(Compl. ¶ 14; Parker Decl. ¶ 2.)

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plaintiff Silva’s residence. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs allege 1

that the officers used excessive force by breaking down the door

to the residence and beating plaintiff Silva. (Id.) Plaintiffs

also allege that the officers physically assaulted plaintiff

Jones and forced her to undergo an unlawful strip search. (Id.

¶¶ 15, 54.) As to the moving defendants, plaintiffs allege that

Corning, Glenn, and Tehama have a policy or practice of

permitting the use of excessive force in searches. (Id. ¶¶ 22-

24.) In addition, plaintiffs allege that the moving defendants

failed to train their officers on how to conduct legal searches. 

(Id. ¶¶ 35-38.) 

In September 2003, plaintiffs filed a complaint making

federal claims against the moving defendants, alleging municipal

liability under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.,

436 U.S. 658 (1978). The complaint also makes various federal

and state law claims against the individual police officers,

named as “does” in the complaint. 

II. 

In their motions for summary judgment, defendants content

that the discovery taken over the past year-and-a-half, does not 

support a Monell claim. Defendant Corning specifically states

that plaintiffs, in response to written discovery requests and in

their deposition testimony, failed to point to a single fact

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showing that the alleged use of excessive force and unlawful

strip search were caused by “a municipal policy or custom,

deliberate or otherwise.” (Corning Mot. at 5.) Similarly,

Tehama states that “plaintiffs have failed to produce any

admissible evidence which would be sufficient” to show Monell

liability. (Tehama Mot. at 7.) 

In response, plaintiffs do not come forward with evidence

supporting their Monell claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) (holding that moving

party discharges its burden of production “by ‘showing’ -- that

is, pointing out to the district court -– that there is an

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case”). 

Therefore, plaintiffs have not carried their burden, and

defendants’ motions for summary judgment are GRANTED. 

As to the remaining claims, plaintiffs request the

opportunity to amend their pleadings to name the individual

defendants that are listed as “does.” (Opp’n at 3.) When a

request to amend the complaint is made after the scheduling order

is issued, plaintiffs must show good cause for the amendment

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 16. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d

1271, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,

Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992). The Rule 16(b)

standard focuses on the diligence of the party seeking the

amendment rather than prejudice to the other party, as under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 

In this case, plaintiffs conceded at oral argument that they

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knew the identity of the “doe” defendants by December 2003. 

Therefore, plaintiffs have not been diligent. They had over a

year-and-a half to amend their complaint to properly name the

individuals officers, but failed to do so. Moreover, they

provide no rationale for this oversight. Therefore, plaintiffs’

motion to amend the complaint is DENIED.

III.

For the reasons discussed above, defendants’ motions for

summary judgment are GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the

complaint is DENIED. Finally, the remaining federal and state 

law claims against the “doe” defendants are dismissed. The clerk

shall enter judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/20/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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