Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00307/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00307-40/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHELDON RAY NEWSOME,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. LOTERSZTAIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:19-cv-0307-DAD-JDP (P)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, brought this action under section 1983 alleging that defendant

M. Lotersztain violated his Eighth Amendment rights by removing him from the Out-Patient 

Housing Unit (“OHU”), and his First Amendment rights by doing so in retaliation for his reports 

about another provider’s misconduct. ECF No. 18 at 5, 14-15. Plaintiff has filed a motion for 

summary judgment, ECF No. 165, and defendant Lotersztain has filed a cross motion for 

summary judgment, ECF No. 173. Defendant’s motion should be granted and plaintiff’s denied.

Legal Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Washington 

Mutual Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). An issue of fact is genuine 

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only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, 

while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 

F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, also known as partial summary 

judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a claim or a portion of that claim. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 

56 authorizes a summary adjudication that will often fall short of a final determination, even of a 

single claim . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The standards that apply on a 

motion for summary judgment and a motion for summary adjudication are the same. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56 (a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

Each party’s position must be supported by (1) citations to particular portions of materials 

in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or 

(2) argument showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a 

genuine factual dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 

its position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The court may consider 

other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 

2001); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

“The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet its burden, “the 

moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 

party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an 

essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. 

Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets this 

initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party “to designate specific facts 

demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 

376, 387 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The non-moving party must “show more than 

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the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). However, the non-moving party is not required to establish a material 

issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to 

require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. 

Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving 

party has demonstrated there to be no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment is 

appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 

“[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility 

determinations or the weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 

2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 

198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

Background

Plaintiff alleges that in 2017, while plaintiff was incarcerated at the California Medical 

Facility (“CMF”), defendant Lotersztain, a physician, removed him from the OHU in retaliation 

for complaints he had filed against another provider. ECF No. 18 at 3-10. He further alleges that 

Lotersztain removed him from the care of specialists in the University of California San 

Francisco (“UCSF”) neurology department.1Id. at 10-11. 

Between July and December 2017, defendant Lotersztain was a physician and surgeon at 

CMF. ECF No. 173-3 at 2, ¶ 3. She was plaintiff’s primary care provider between August 10 

and September 28, 2017. Id. at 2, ¶ 4. At the outset of that period, plaintiff was housed in the 

OHU, an area similar to an assisted living facility, where patients received assistance with basic 

activities of living like dressing, bathing, and eating. Id. Defendant states that space in the OHU 

is always in high demand, and discharges occur when and if a patient’s required level of care 

1 The second amended complaint also brought other claims, but those were previously 

dismissed. ECF Nos. 90 & 109. 

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changes. Id. at 2-3, ¶¶ 4-5. 

Plaintiff suffers from three conditions: Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia, Syringomyelia with 

Chiari I Malformation, and Chronic Myelopathy. Id. at 3 ¶ 6. His Syringomyelia, a condition in 

which cysts form in the spinal cord, worsened in 2014 and led to his placement in the OHU. Id. 

at 3 ¶ 8. Plaintiff had surgery for the condition in 2015. He had annual appointments with UCSF 

in 2016 and 2017 so that he could receive imaging of the shunt that was placed during that 

procedure. Id. at 3-4 ¶ 8. 

Plaintiff alleges that in July 2017, while he was still in the OHU, a nursing assistant 

named Dirisu developed an antagonism towards him and sought to have him removed from the 

unit. ECF No. 18 at 3-4. 2 Dirisu allegedly became verbally abusive of plaintiff, causing the 

latter to file a grievance against him. Id. After the grievance was filed, plaintiff alleges that 

Lotersztain used her authority on Dirisu’s behalf and had plaintiff removed from the OHU. Id. at 

4-5. Lotersztain also allegedly terminated the care he had been prescribed by the UCSF 

neurology department, including future follow-up care at that institution. Id. at 12. Days after 

his removal from the OHU, plaintiff was transferred to the RJ Donovan Correctional Facility. Id.

at 19. He claims that, as a result of removal of OHU and Lotersztain’s discontinuation of the 

UCSF-recommended care, he suffered headaches, pain to his neck and hands, and psychological 

problems. Id. at 7, 20.

Analysis

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be granted because the evidence 

establishes that defendant was not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. 

The retaliation claim against defendant also fails because the evidence shows that her actions 

were motivated by a legitimate penological purpose. 

I. Deliberate Indifference

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s removal from the OHU was medically justified. I agree. 

She notes that by April 2016, following his Syringomyelia surgery in 2015 and his ensuing 

2 Dirisu was previously a defendant in this action but was dismissed based on plaintiff’s 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies against him. ECF Nos. 90 & 109. 

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physical therapy, he made a substantial recovery. ECF No. 173-4 at 18. A letter dated April 21, 

2016, from Dr. Jacques at the UCSF department of neurology noted that “[plaintiff] has made an 

excellent recovery and may be discharged from physical therapy.” Id. at 19. Plaintiff saw Dr. 

Jacques again in May 2017, and the record reflects that his balance was improved, he had a 

normal walking pattern, good strength in most of his muscles, and was “doing well” overall. Id.

at 24. Plaintiff was discharged from physical therapy on August 3, 2017. Id. at 29. He saw 

defendant for the first time on August 17, 2017, and she noted that he was independent in the 

activities of daily life and able to exercise vigorously. Id. at 30-32. At a follow-up in September 

2017, defendant determined that transfer to Specialized Outpatient housing was appropriate. Id. 

That level of housing still provided plaintiff with supportive nursing care, ground floor housing, 

and a lower bunk. ECF No. 173-3 at 5 ¶¶ 14, 22. The transfer also provided for yearly followups at UCSF. Id. at 22. 

Based on the evidence, no reasonable finder of fact could find that defendant acted with 

deliberate indifference. It bears emphasis that deliberate indifference is more than negligence or 

medical malpractice; it requires a showing that the treatment defendant chose was medically 

unacceptable under the circumstances and undertaken in conscious disregard of an excessive risk 

to the patient’s health. See Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1081-82 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (“[T]he indifference to [a prisoner’s] medical needs must be substantial. Mere 

‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this [claim].” Even gross 

negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”) (internal 

citations omitted); Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1092, 2016 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]o show 

deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was 

medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the defendants chose this course in 

conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2012)). Here, there was 

substantial medical evidence that plaintiff did not require the higher level of care offered in the 

OHU. That assessment was based not only defendant’s observations and review of the data, but 

also that of the providers at UCSF. And plaintiff’s transfer to Specialized Outpatient housing 

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recognized that he still had limitations that necessitated a level of care beyond that which was 

afforded to inmates in the general population. 

Further, the evidence shows that defendant did not restrict or curtail plaintiff’s access to 

care at UCSF. As noted above, her decision to transfer him from the OHU still allowed for an 

annual follow-up at UCSF. ECF No. 173-3 at 22. The discontinuation of that care in 2018 came 

after defendant was no longer plaintiff’s provider and after the contract between UCSF and the 

California Medical Facility had ended. Id. at 6 ¶ 17; ECF No. 173-4 at 11-12 ¶ 45. 

Plaintiff argues that almost immediately after defendant removed him from OHU, a fall 

necessitated re-entry to that level of care. ECF No. 180 at 2-3. This is not necessarily indicative 

of deliberate indifference, however. At the time of the alleged fall, plaintiff was no longer in 

defendant’s care, having been transferred from the California Medical Facility to another 

institution. ECF No. 173-4 at 7 ¶¶ 27-29. At most, this occurrence might indicate that defendant 

erred in her medical judgment, but that is not sufficient to sustain a finding of deliberate 

indifference. 

Plaintiff also argues that his condition was insidious, that his hands were useless, and his 

legs were getting progressively weaker at the time defendant transferred him from the OHU. 

ECF No. 180 at 2. As noted above, the medical evidence, both from defendant’s observations 

and from physicians at UCSF, suggests that, while plaintiff may have had issues with his grip, he 

was otherwise doing well. 

Based on the foregoing, I find that defendant is entitled to summary judgment on 

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against her. 

II. Retaliation

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim also fails. In order to succeed on a retaliation claim, a prisoner 

must establish five elements: “(1) [a]n assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action 

(4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Here, plaintiff’s transfer from the OHU reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional 

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goal. As noted above, the medical evidence indicated that plaintiff did not require the higher 

level of care provided by the OHU. That level of care is limited to those patients who require it,

because it is staff-intensive and expensive. ECF No. 173-3 at 2-3 ¶ 4. Courts have held that a 

prison’s regulation of healthcare is a legitimate penological goal. See Hicks v. Dotson, 73 F.

Supp. 3d 1296, 1303 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 22, 2014). Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary 

judgment on this claim as well. 

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF 

No. 173, be GRANTED, judgment entered in her favor, and plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment, ECF No. 165, be necessarily DENIED. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days of 

service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 

court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 

within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2024 

JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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