Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-07149/USCOURTS-caDC-00-07149-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 16, 2001 Decided May 1, 2001

No. 00-7149

Robert Louis Stevenson,

Appellant

v.

District of Columbia Metropolitan

Police Department, et al.,

Appellees

United States of America,

Intervenor

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv00093)

Daryl L. Joseffer argued the cause for the appellant.

Elizabeth Petrela was on brief.

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Edward E. Schwab, Assistant Corporation Counsel, the

District of Columbia, argued the cause for the appellees.

Robert R. Rigsby, Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel,

Deputy Corporation Counsel, Lutz Alexander Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Thomas L. Koger,

Assistant Corporation Counsel, were on brief.

Lisa Wilson Edwards, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for the intervenor. William R. Yeomans, Acting Assistant Attorney General, was on

brief.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Williams and Henderson,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: The appellant,

Robert L. Stevenson, brought a section 1983 action, 42 U.S.C.

s 1983, against the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police

Department (MPD); Sergeant Albert Gonzalez; Officers

Demetrius Cole, Alan Hill and Lewis Hagler; Reserve Officer

Johnny Gay; and the District of Columbia (collectively, the

District) alleging violations of his rights under the Fourth,

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution as well as several state law claims. After the

district court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants on some of the claims,1 the case was tried to a jury

which found in favor of the defendants on all remaining

counts. The district court entered judgment on the jury

verdict.

Stevenson contends the district court erred during the trial

by (1) revealing its view of the facts to the jury, (2) admitting

irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence and (3) excluding

important impeachment evidence.2 For the reasons set forth

below, we affirm.

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1 Stevenson does not challenge the district court's summary judgment ruling.

2 In his opening brief, Stevenson also challenged the district

court's denial of discovery of certain sealed documents prepared by

I. BACKGROUND

The case arises from events that occurred on March 7,

1996. According to Stevenson's trial testimony, he and his

friend Larry Wallace borrowed a Chrysler New Yorker from

a friend and, after running some errands, stopped at the

McDonald's restaurant located at 4301 Nannie Helen Burroughs Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C., to pick up something

to eat before returning the borrowed car. After waiting in

the drive-through line, they obtained their food and were

about to drive away. Before they could, however, they found

themselves surrounded by police officers who, with guns

drawn, were "hollering" at them. Joint Appendix (JA) 206.

Instead of stopping, Stevenson became scared, put the car in

reverse, backed up until he bumped into the car behind him,

drove forward, backed up again and finally managed to turn

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the car around heading back toward the entry of the drivethrough lane. At this point, he heard a police officer yell

"shoot, shoot, shoot," JA 207, and the Chrysler he was driving

became the target of 63 gun shots. Stevenson and Wallace

were wounded. Stevenson spent one month in the hospital

having been hit in the chest, left arm, right hand and left leg.

He now suffers permanent nerve damage, loss of mobility in

his left arm and other physical disabilities.

The police officers testifying at trial told a different story.

On March 7 Officer Demetrius Cole was working (off-duty

but in uniform) as a security officer at the McDonald's

restaurant. He observed Stevenson's vehicle enter the drivethrough line and suspected it might be stolen because the

passenger side window was broken. Cole placed a call to the

MPD to check the license plates. After learning the plates

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the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). See Brief for

Appellant at 33-36. After the DOJ filed its intervenor brief,

Stevenson modified his position, conceding that if, as the DOJ

represented, the documents at issue consisted only of factual material provided by the District or comments by DOJ experts, the

district court's decision was proper and "there is no dispute here."

Reply Brief at 26. On review, we conclude the DOJ's representations were accurate and therefore need not address the discovery

issue further.

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had been reported stolen, he requested back-up and instructed the McDonald's clerk who was processing Stevenson's

order to stall him. Within minutes, Officers Alan Hill and

Lewis Hagler arrived at the restaurant with their sirens on.

They pulled into the exit of the drive-through lane to prevent

the car from leaving. Sergeant Albert Gonzalez and Reserve

Officer Johnny Gay approached from the back of the line in

an attempt to cut off the suspect's means of escape. The

officers, who were wearing their police uniforms, ordered

Stevenson and his friend to stop the car and show their

hands. Instead of complying, Stevenson drove first in reverse and then forward, hitting Officer Hill. Hill landed on

the hood but was thrown back when the car went in reverse

the second time. Then, the car moved forward in the direction of Cole. Considering themselves and each other in

danger, the officers began shooting until the car had come to

a stop.

In January 1997 Stevenson brought this action. He now

appeals the district court's entry of judgment in favor of the

District.

II. DISCUSSION

Stevenson raises three arguments on appeal. We address

each in turn.

A. The District Court's Revelation of Its View of the

Facts to the Jury

Stevenson's first challenge arises from a hypothetical question the district court asked a defense expert witness. After

defense counsel had asked the witness several hypothetical

questions, the district court interjected its own hypothetical.

At a bench conference, Stevenson objected, claiming the

court's hypothetical assumed as true the defendants' version

of the facts. He requested that the court "issue some sort of

instruction to the jury [that] they're not to assume that's your

opinion of the facts or those are the facts," JA 386, and also

asked the court to ask the expert a hypothetical using Stevenson's version of the facts. The district court agreed to the

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structed Stevenson to provide in writing the question he

wanted asked. Immediately after the bench conference, the

court charged the jury that hypotheticals assumed facts that

"may or may not be the facts of this case," that deciding the

facts was the jury's task and "what the lawyers say are the

facts, what [the judge says] are the facts, is immaterial to

your decision." JA 387-88. At the end of the expert's crossexamination, Stevenson failed to provide the court with any

hypothetical questions. In fact, when the court inquired

whether he wanted the court to give an additional instruction,

Stevenson replied "Your jury instructions were fine." JA

398. Now Stevenson contends the district court's questioning

of the expert witness was reversible error.

We review the judicial questioning of a witness for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Tilghman, 134 F.3d 414, 417

(D.C. Cir. 1998). Rule 614(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly permits judges to question witnesses.3

Tilghman, 134 F.3d at 416. "Judges may do so repeatedly

and aggressively to clear up confusion and manage trials or

where testimony is inarticulately or reluctantly given." Id.

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,

" '[t]he precepts of fair trial and judicial objectivity do not

require a judge to be inert. The trial judge is properly

governed by the interest of justice and truth[ ] and is not

compelled to act as if he were merely presiding at a sporting

match.' " United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d 1519, 1526 (D.C.

Cir.) (quoting United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 438 (D.C.

Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911 (1975)), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 835 (1989).

Although, as we have noted before, "[d]istrict court authority to question witnesses and manage trials ... has limits,"

Tilghman, 134 F.3d at 416 (citing United States v. Wyatt, 442

F.2d 858, 859-61 (D.C. Cir. 1971)), our review of the record

here convinces us the district court acted well within its

discretion. Stevenson received the jury instruction he requested. Moreover, despite the district court's willingness to

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3 Rule 614 provides: "The court may interrogate witnesses,

whether called by itself or by a party." Fed. R. Evid. 614(b).

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consider asking a hypothetical question on Stevenson's behalf,

Stevenson failed to provide the court with such a question.

Under these circumstances, we find no fault with the district

court's action.

B. Admissibility of the Gun

Stevenson's second claim involves the district court's ruling

on the admissibility of a Cobray MAC 11 semiautomatic

weapon taken from Wallace when he was arrested. In a

motion in limine Stevenson argued the gun was irrelevant

because the police officers did not know before the shooting

that Wallace was armed and therefore the reasonableness vel

non of their actions was not dependent on the gun's existence.

Moreover, Stevenson argued that admitting the gun would be

unfairly prejudicial because it would inflame the jury against

him. The District countered that the MAC 11 was relevant

to show "plaintiff's motivations and intent to escape at all

costs," JA 57, and to contradict his assertion that he tried to

flee only because "he panicked when he saw the police." JA

63. The district court concluded Wallace's possession of the

gun was "more probative than prejudicial as evidence of the

plaintiff's desperation, as a convicted felon on parole ... in

the presence of a firearm, to avoid arrest and his intention to

use his vehicle as a weapon." JA 114.

Stevenson presses before us the same arguments he advanced before the district court. Reviewing the district

court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, United

States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1994), we

conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.

The Federal Rules of Evidence define "relevant evidence"

as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401. Under this definition, the gun is relevant because, as the District argued

below, it tends to support the proposition that Stevenson was

intent on escaping at all costs and in so doing placed the

officers at risk. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record

that the district court "gravely" abused its discretion in

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declining to exclude the gun under Rule 403. See Clarke, 24

F.3d at 265 ("We review the district court's Rule 403 determinations 'with great deference, reversing only for "grave

abuse" of discretion.' " (quoting United States v. Johnson, 970

F.2d 907, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.

Payne, 805 F.2d 1062, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1986)))). Although

admission of the gun no doubt worked against Stevenson's

interest, the risk of undue prejudice to Stevenson, we conclude, did not substantially outweigh the evidence's probative

value. Finally, Stevenson's reliance on Carter v. District of

Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986), is misplaced. There

the court held that the district court abused its discretion in

allowing counsel to read lengthy and detailed allegations of

police misconduct contained in administrative complaints,

pleadings in lawsuits and newspaper articles when the sole

purpose of the exercise was to test whether the witnesses

were familiar with the allegations. The same result, the

court noted, could have been achieved in a less prejudicial

manner. The facts here are far different. The allegedly

prejudicial evidence introduced was not extensive, as it was in

Carter. See id. at 126-28. Moreover, unlike the challenged

evidence in Carter, the gun was probative of an important

issue in the case, namely which version of events-Stevenson's

or the officers'-was true. Accordingly, Carter does not win

the day for Stevenson.

C. Exclusion of Impeachment Testimony

Stevenson's third argument involves another evidentiary

ruling. At the conclusion of Officer Hill's testimony, Stevenson's counsel sought to cross-examine Hill about an incident

in which Hill "submitted a false report and was subsequently

suspended from the D.C. Police Department for 20 days."

JA 375. The District objected, asserting that the incident

had to do with Hill's failure to comply with a superior's orders

and was irrelevant. The District requested that the court

examine the report and determine its admissibility. After

doing so, the court sustained the District's objection. Stevenson's counsel did not renew any attempt to cross-examine Hill

about the incident. Stevenson contends the court's ruling

was error.

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Although the transcript reflects the exchange described

above, the challenged report was not proffered into evidence.

Nor does the record manifest that Stevenson was improperly

barred from pursuing cross-examination and therefore we

cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in

sustaining the District's objection. See Palmer v. Hoffman,

318 U.S. 109, 116 (1943) ("Mere 'technical errors' which do not

'affect the substantial rights of the parties' are not sufficient

to set aside a jury verdict in an appellate court. 40 Stat.

1181, 28 U.S.C. s 391. He who seeks to have a judgment set

aside because of an erroneous ruling carries the burden of

showing that prejudice resulted."). Accordingly, the district

court's decision on this point stands.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is

Affirmed.

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