Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05325/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05325-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 5, 2004 Decided June 3, 2005

No. 03-5325

WILLIAM E. SHEA,

APPELLANT

v.

CONDOLEEZA RICE,

 IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE ONLY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv00577)

William E. Shea, pro se, argued the cause for the appellant.

Darrell C. Valdez, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellee. Kenneth L. Wainstein, United States

Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant United States

Attorney, were on brief. R. Craig Lawrence and Robert E.

Leidenheimer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys, entered

appearances.

Before: HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 1 of 19
2

1

 Shea sued Powell in his official capacity as Secretary of State. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Powell has since resigned and his successor,

Condoleezza Rice, is automatically substituted pursuant to FEDERAL

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 43(c)(2).

 

2 Shea’s complaint was dismissed pursuant to FEDERAL RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 12(b)(6). See Gilvin v. Fire, 259 F.3d 749,

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

Separate opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: William Shea appeals the district

court’s dismissal of his employment discrimination lawsuit

against Colin Powell, the former Secretary of the United States

Department of State1(State Department), in the same capacity

that he litigated it below—pro se. While the district court

dismissed all of his allegations on the pleadings—finding none

stated a viable claim—Shea seeks review of only one: i.e., that

his pay and benefits are discriminatorily low because the State

Department set his pay grade pursuant to a diversity program

that disadvantaged him on account of his race (white) and

ethnicity (Irish), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Equal Protection

component of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend V.

The district court erred in finding the claim time-barred, he

maintains, because each paycheck that he received within the

statute of limitations period and thereafter constitutes a discrete

discriminatory act. We agree and, for the reasons set forth

below, reverse the district court and remand for further

proceedings. 

I.

For the purpose of Shea’s appeal, we assume the truth of the

factual allegations contained in his complaint,2the salient

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 2 of 19
3

756 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“In considering the claims dismissed pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6), we must treat the complaint’s factual allegations as

true, must grant plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences from

the facts alleged, and may uphold the dismissal only if it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

his claim which would entitle him to relief.” (internal quotation marks

& citations omitted)).

aspects of which we briefly summarize. Shea is a Foreign

Service Officer (FSO) employed by the State Department and

has been so since May 1992. He is also white and of Irish

heritage. In the portion of his complaint he seeks to revive, he

alleged that, at the time of his hiring, he was assigned a lower

pay grade than similarly-situated minority hires pursuant to a

State Department program aimed at achieving diversity in its

workforce. As Shea alleged in his complaint:

[A]t the time I applied for a position as an FSO

in 1991 and started in 1992, the Department was

giving higher starting paygrades to minorities

with the same qualifications I had, and lower

starting paygrades to non-minorities. I was not

eligible to start at a higher grade only because of

my race/ethnicity. I would have started two

paygrades higher than I did, but for my nonminority race/ethnicity status. The government

interest being advanced by this racially

discriminatory program was, again, achieving

racial balancing (diversity) in the workforce. 

Joint Appendix (J.A.) 15. Shea further alleged that, as a result

of this “racially discriminatory program,” he “receiv[es] less pay

with each paycheck than [he] would . . . if [he] had not been

discriminated[] against.” Id. According to his complaint:

At an absolute minimum, even in the unlikely

event that I had never been promoted, if I had

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 3 of 19
4

started in 1992 at FS-3 I would today be

receiving pay at no less than the rate of an FS-3

step nine ($68,684 per year) rather than my

current FS-3 step 5 ($61,025). If I had started at

FS-3 and been promoted at about an average

rate, I would now be paid at about the grade of

FS-2 [sic] step 4 ($73,119). If promoted at a

faster-than-average rate, I would be receiving

higher pay than $73,119.

Id. Shea alleged that the receipt of each paycheck constitutes a

“recurring violation of Title VII.” Id. 

Shea initially filed a grievance with the State Department, as

required by statute. See 22 U.S.C. § 4134(a). When the State

Department failed to act on his discrimination claims within 90

days, Shea filed his grievance with the Foreign Service

Grievance Board (Board). See id. § 4134(b). The Board

dismissed his grievance, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to

entertain it. Shea then filed suit in federal district court to obtain

review of the Board’s decision, as permitted by statute. See id.

§ 4140.

On September 30, 2003, the district court granted the

Secretary’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Shea’s complaint.

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). As to the pay grade discrimination

claim, the district court concluded that “the allegedly

discriminatory act—the assignment of a pay grade two levels

below that of similarly qualified minority hires—did not occur

within the period covered by his administrative complaint.” J.A.

8. The district court first observed that, because a grievance

under the Foreign Service Act is statutorily time-barred if filed

later than 180 days “after the occurrence giving rise to the

grievance,” 22 U.S.C. § 4134(a) & (c)(1), Shea could not

recover on all of the paychecks he received since he was hired

in May 1992 but, at most, only on those received after January

12, 2001, or 180 days before he filed his grievance with the

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 4 of 19
5

State Department on July 11, 2001. It then concluded that Shea

could not recover on paychecks received after January 12, 2001

either. Relying on Neidermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F.

Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 2001), the district court explained that

Shea “did not allege that a discriminatory system akin to those

inBazemore [v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986),] and Anderson [v.

Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1999),] was in place when he

filed suit” and thus his “complaint amounted to no more than

allegations of discrimination in May 1992, when he started at a

lower pay grade.” J.A. 8-9. 

Shea now appeals. 

II.

Our review is de novo. Gilvin v. Fire, 259 F.3d 749, 756

(D.C. Cir. 2001). Construing Shea’s factual allegations and all

reasonable inferences therefrom in his favor, we reverse the

district court’s dismissal of the one claim Shea appeals because

it does not appear “beyond doubt” that he cannot prove a “set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”

Id. 

Shea waited until July 11, 2001, to file an administrative

grievance with the State Department, alleging that he had

received discriminatorily low pay and benefits since he was

hired in May 1992. The rub, as the district court recognized, is

that the Foreign Service Act “forever” bars any grievance based

on alleged discrimination if the grievance is filed more than 180

days “after the occurrence giving rise to the grievance.” 22

U.S.C. § 4134(a) & (c)(1). The question, then, is whether Shea

can state a claim for relief regarding the allegedly discriminatory

paychecks he received both within the limitations period and

thereafter or whether, as the district court concluded, his entire

claim is time-barred. 

The Secretary, relying on the holding in Nat’l R.R. Passenger

Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), insists that Shea’s entire

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 5 of 19
6

claim is time-barred. In Morgan, the Court foreclosed the use

of the “continuing violation” doctrine to restore an untimely

claim involving a separate act of discrimination “such as

termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to

hire.” Id. at 113-14. It held that “discrete discriminatory acts

are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to

acts alleged in timely filed charges.” Id. at 113. “Each discrete

discriminatory act,” the Court explained, “starts a new clock for

filing charges alleging that act.” Id. Morgan dooms any hope

Shea entertained that his current (and allegedly discriminatory)

paychecks can resurrect his otherwise untimely challenges to the

paychecks he received before January 12, 2001—or 180 days

before he filed his grievance. Whether it also precludes him

from challenging the allegedly discriminatory paychecks

received thereafter is not as clear. 

The Secretary contends that Shea merely complains about the

present effects of a past act—namely, the State Department’s

assignment of an allegedly discriminatorily low pay grade in

1992—and therefore even the post-January 12, 2001, claim is

barred. The district court accepted this argument, concluding

that “the allegedly discriminatory act—the assignment of a pay

grade two levels below that of similarly qualified minority

hires—did not occur within the period covered by his

administrative complaint.” J.A. 8. If Shea were complaining of

the assignment of a discriminatorily low pay grade only, we

would agree under a clear line of Supreme Court cases—United

Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), Delaware State

College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) and Lorance v. AT&T

Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989)—that “bars claims where the

relevant aspect of the employment system (such as a promotion,

seniority, or termination) is facially neutral, and any discrete

discriminatory conduct took place and ceased outside the period

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 6 of 19
7

3

 In Evans, the plaintiff was forced to resign in 1968 because a

United Air Lines policy barred female flight attendants who were

married. See 431 U.S. at 554. Following litigation that held United’s

“no marriage” policy violated Title VII—litigation to which she was

not a party—the plaintiff was rehired in 1972. See id. at 554-55.

When United gave her no seniority based on her earlier service,

however, she sued. See id. at 555-56. While she conceded that any

discrimination claim based on her forced resignation was untimely,

she alleged that the seniority system gave present effect to a past

discriminatory act and “therefore perpetuate[d] the consequences of

forbidden discrimination.” See id. at 557. The Supreme Court

rejected her claim, holding that, notwithstanding the fact that United’s

seniority system perpetuated a past discriminatory act by discounting

her prior service, she had failed to allege any current violation because

the seniority system itself was facially neutral and operated in a nondiscriminatory manner. Id. at 558. “[A] challenge to a neutral

system,” it explained, “may not be predicated on the mere fact that a

past event which has no present legal signific ance has affected the

calculation of seniority credit, even if the past event might at one time

have justified a valid claim against the employer.” Id. at 560. 

In Ricks, the plaintiff, a junior professor, alleged that Delaware State

College discriminated against him based on his national origin when

it denied him tenure and instead gave him a one-year “ ‘terminal

contract.’ ” See 449 U.S. at 253. Relying on the continuing violation

doctrine, the plaintiff alleged that the limitations period did not

commence with the College’s tenure decision but with the expiration

of his terminal contract. Id. at 557. The Court disagreed, explaining

that because “the only alleged discrimination occurred–and the filing

limitations periods therefore commenced–at the time the tenure

decision was made and communicated to [the plaintiff],” the “[m]ere

continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the

life of a cause of action for employment discrimination.” Id. at 557-

58. “That is so,” said the Court, “even though one of the effects of the

denial of tenure–the eventual loss of a teaching position–did not occur

until later.” Id. at 258 (emphasis in Ricks). “The emphasis is not upon

of limitations.”3 Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251,

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 7 of 19
8

the effects of earlier employment decisions; rather it ‘is [upon]

whether any present violation exists.’ ” Id. (quoting Evans, 431 U.S.

at 558) (alteration in Ricks). 

Finally, in Lorance, the three female plaintiffs alleged that they were

demoted under a seniority system that “ha[d] its genesis in [sex]

discrimination.” 490 U.S. at 905 (internal quotation marks omitted &

alterations in Lorance). Because the seniority system was adopted

outside the limitations period and the plaintiffs alleged neither that it

“treat[ed] similarly situated employees differently [n]or that it [was]

operated in an intentionally discriminatory manner,” the Court, once

again refusing to apply the continuing violation doctrine, found their

challenge untimely. Id. “There is no doubt,” the Court explained,

“that a facially discriminatory seniority system (one that treats

similarly situated employees differently) can be challenged at any

time, and that even a facially neutral system, if it is adopted with

unlawful discriminatory motive, can be challenged within the

prescribed period after adoption.” Id. at 912. But, the Court held,

“[b]ecause the claimed invalidity of the facially nondiscriminatory and

neutrally applied tester seniority system is wholly dependent on the

alleged illegality of signing the underlying agreement, it is the date of

that signing which governs the limitations period.” Id. at 911.

256 (3d Cir. 2001). 

Shea’s complaint, however, is not simply that the State

Department discriminated against him in assigning him a lower

pay grade than similarly-situated minority hires in 1992 but that,

as a consequence of the “racially discriminatory” diversity

program it then operated, he “receiv[es] less pay with each

paycheck than [he] would be [receiving] if [he] had not been

discriminated[] against.” J.A. 15 (emphasis added). We

believe this allegation is properly analyzed not under the EvansRicks-Lorance line of precedent, which treats discriminatory

acts under a facially-neutral employment system, but instead

under the holding in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).

In Bazemore, the Court unanimously declared that the employer

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 8 of 19
9

committed a separate unlawful employment practice each time

he paid one employee less than another for a discriminatory

reason. See id. at 396 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by all

other Members of the Court). “Each week’s paycheck that

delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a

wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this

pattern was begun prior to” the limitations period. Id. at 395-

96.

This is not the first time our Circuit has recognized the

distinction between the Evans-Ricks-Lorance line, on the one

hand, and Bazemore, onthe other. See Anderson v. Zubieta, 180

F.3d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In Anderson, we said that “Bazemore

was a case in which [the] plaintiffs contended not just that the

pay system was originally adopted for discriminatory reasons,

but that it continued to discriminate unlawfully each time it was

applied,” concluding that the Anderson plaintiffs landed on the

Bazemore “side of the line.” Id. at 336. In Anderson, the

plaintiffs alleged that they received substantially less pay and

fewer benefits than other employees performing the same jobs

because the Panama Canal Commission (PCC) denied them

three types of employee benefits on account of their race and

national origin. See id. at 332. The PCC dismissed the

plaintiffs’ administrative complaint as untimely, concluding that

they had failed to complain within 45 days of both the date on

which the PCC amended the benefit policies as well as the date

they received notice of their exclusion. See id. at 335. We

disagreed, concluding that their complaints were timely because

they “allege continuing violations of Title VII, actionable upon

receipt of each paycheck.” See id. at 336. Relying on

Bazemore, we said that the plaintiffs “do not seek relief for the

PCC’s initial announcement of its discriminatory policies, but

rather for their continued application.” See id. Accordingly, we

held that the plaintiffs’ claim survived summary judgment

because “[i]f plaintiffs’ claim of a present violation is ultimately

proven, it will justify their request to be made whole for those

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 9 of 19
10

4 Anderson, which we decided three years before the Morgan

decision, also allowed the plaintiffs to rely on the “continuing

violation” theory to recover for the paychecks they received before the

45-day limitations period. See 180 F.3d at 337. 

paychecks received during the 45-day window and for all

paychecks issued thereafter.”4Id. at 337. The same goes here

because, unlike the dismissal in United Air Lines v. Evans, Inc.,

431 U.S. 553 (1977), or the failure to promote in Law v.

Continental Airlines Corp., 399 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2005), both

of which involved isolated discriminatory acts that had

continuing consequences under neutral salary systems, Shea

alleges a persistent discriminatory salary structure. See

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 112.

The Secretary nevertheless maintains that the BazemoreAnderson analysis was put to pasture in Morgan. Not so.

Granted, Morgan restricted the “continuing violation doctrine”

in holding that, while “a hostile work environment claim . . . will

not be time barred so long as all acts which constitute the claim

are part of the same unlawful employment practice and at least

one act falls within the time period,” 536 U.S. at 122, “discrete

discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when

they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges,” id. at

113. But Bazemore survives Morgan; indeed, Morgan expressly

relied on Bazemore. See id. at 112. In Morgan, the Court

offered the Bazemore scenario—paychecks delivering less to

one group of employees than another—as an example of the

type of “discrete act” that is actionable under Title VII. See id.

at 111-12. It therefore comes as no surprise that, while several

sister Circuits have recognized that Morgan scuttled the

continuing violation doctrine, none has suggested that, in doing

so, the Court abandoned its holding in Bazemore. See, e.g.,

Williams v. Giant Food, Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 429 (4th Cir. 2004)

(relying on Bazemore to hold failures to promote constituted

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 10 of 19
11

discrete acts of discrimination); Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Nat’l

Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Court in

Morgan reaffirmed the Bazemore statement that each

discriminatory paycheck was a separate discriminatory act that

could give rise to a Title VII action.”); Reese v. Ice Cream

Specialties, Inc., 347 F.3d 1007, 1013 (7th Cir. 2003) (“In light

of the fact that the Supreme Court itself is not yet ready to give

up on Bazemore, we conclude that we are obliged to follow its

rule . . . .”); Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1186

(10th Cir. 2003) (noting Morgan cited Bazemore “[a]s an

example”); Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 318 F.3d 130,

134 (2nd Cir. 2003) (noting Bazemore provides “considerable

guidance”); cf. Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1247

(9th Cir. 2003) (relying on Bazemore to support conclusion that

“discriminatory policy claim does not extend the statute of

limitations”). Nor do we do so here.

The Secretary then responds that, even if Bazemore survives

Morgan, its rationale does not extend to Shea’s case. But the

precedent she relies on to support her assertion—Williams, 370

F.3d 423, and Elmenayer, 318 F.3d 130—in fact does not. In

Williams, the plaintiff alleged that her employer, Giant Food,

failed to promote her based on her age, gender and race, see 370

F.3d at 427, and, in Elmenayer, the plaintiff alleged that his

employer refused his one-time request to accommodate his

religious observance requirements, see 318 F.3d at 133.

Because in each case the complained-of act occurred outside the

limitations period covered by the administrative charge each

plaintiff filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC), however, each sought to proceed under

the continuing violation doctrine. See Williams, 370 F.3d at

428; Elmenayer, 318 F.3d at 134. Both the Williams and the

Elmenayer courts acknowledged the Bazemore rule but both

held that Bazemore did not make their respective plaintiff’s

discrimination claim timely. See 370 F.3d at 429; 318 F.3d at

135. The Fourth Circuit explained that even if Williams’s

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 11 of 19
12

allegation that the defendant’s failures to promote her were part

of a larger pattern of discrimination, each failure to promote

nonetheless remained a discrete act of discrimination and none

had occurred within the limitations period. See Williams, 370

F.3d at 429. The Second Circuit similarly concluded that

“[o]nce the employer . . . rejected the proposed accommodation,

no periodic implementation of that decision occurs, comparable

to the weekly cutting of a payroll check in Bazemore.”

Elmenayer, 318 F.3d at 135. “Although the effect of the

employer’s rejection continues to be felt by the employee for as

long as he remains employed,” it explained, “that continued

effect is similar to the continued effect of being denied a

promotion or denied a transfer, denials that Morgan offered as

examples of a discrete act.” Id. (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at

114) (emphasis in Elmenayer). But Shea did not attempt to

breathe new life into discriminatory acts that occurred outside

the limitations period by alleging they were part of a broader

pattern of discrimination, as did Williams, 370 F.3d at 429, or

by relying on their lingering effects in the present, as did

Elmenayer, 318 F.3d at 135. Rather, Shea alleged that the State

Department discriminated against him within the limitations

period (and thereafter) by issuing him discriminatory payroll

checks—or, as the Second Circuit stated, by its “periodic

implementation” of its allegedly discriminatory diversity policy.

Id. 

The Secretary, as did the district court, finds support in the

dicta contained in Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. Supp.

2d 23 (D.D.C. 2001). We do not. In Niedermeier, the court

posited that Bazemore and Anderson “stand for the proposition

that when a discriminatory system is in place, each

discriminatory act pursuant to that system is a new act of

discrimination.” Id. at 29. It found the rule inapplicable,

however, because Niedermeier did not “state a current violation”

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 12 of 19
13

5 Before the district court offered this analysis, it concluded that

“neither of these cases is new law and thus plaintiff’s attempt to raise

this argument post-judgment is not a sufficient ground for

reconsideration.” Niedermeier, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 29. The court thus

underlined the fact that what followed was dictum, noting that “even

considering the merits of plaintiff’s new legal argument, her claim

would fail.” Id. (emphasis added). 

arising from a “discriminatory system.”5 Id. Applying this

formulation of the rule, the district court here concluded that

Shea’s claim likewise failed because his “complaint amounted

to no more than allegations of discrimination in May 1992,

when he started at a lower pay grade” and did not “allege that a

discriminatory system akin to those in Bazemore and Anderson

was in place when he filed suit.” J.A. 8-9. As we noted earlier,

however, Shea’s claim is explicitly premised on the existence of

such a “discriminatory system.” He alleged that he was hired at

a lower pay grade and continues to receive discriminatory pay

pursuant to the State Department’s discriminatory diversity

program. See J.A. 15. Shea’s allegation is thus just like the

Anderson plaintiffs’ claim that the PCC’s discriminatory system,

by its “continued application,” “ ‘currently treats similarly

situated employees differently.’ ” 180 F.3d at 336 (quoting

Lorance, 490 U.S. at 912); see also Law, 399 F.3d at 334. 

Nor do we agree with the Secretary that our reading of

Bazemore “eviscerate[s] Morgan as well as the time

requirements of Title VII.” Appellee’s Br. at 10. Given that the

holding in Morgan relies on the holding in Bazemore, it is

difficult to see how the application of the latter holding could

“eviscerate” the former. The two decisions dovetail: Bazemore

holds that an employee may recover for discriminatorily low pay

received within the limitations period because each paycheck

constitutes a discrete discriminatory act, see 478 U.S. at 396,

and Morgan rejects the continuing violation theory because

“discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred,

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 13 of 19
14

even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed

charges,” 536 U.S. at 113.

We likewise cannot accept the Secretary’s related contention

that allowing Shea’s claim to proceed would “severely prejudice

[the Department] by forcing it to defend stale charges based on

actions that allegedly occurred long ago.” Appellee’s Br. at 9.

The Secretary is undoubtedly correct that “[s]tatutes of

limitation are statutes of repose; their purpose is to quiet stale

controversies, the evidence as to which may be eroded by time.”

Fox-Greenwald Sheet Metal Co. v. Markowitz Bros., 452 F.2d

1346, 1356 (1970). These statutes, the Supreme Court tells us,

strike a balance between important but competing interests:

“ ‘[T]he period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a

value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in

favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests

in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.’ ” Ricks, 449 U.S.

at 259-60 (quoting Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421

U.S. 454, 463-64 (1973)); see also Lorance, 490 U.S. at 912.

But Shea’s challenge to the allegedly discriminatory paychecks

he received within the limitations period and thereafter has not

reached that point because Bazemore and Anderson tell us that

his challenge presents a claim that is protected. It is protected

because the current application of a discriminatory

system—here involving discriminatorily low paychecks—does

not present a stale claim. 

Finally, the Secretary asserts that the Bazemore rule is

unavailable to Shea because it is limited to private class actions

and to suits brought by the government ex relatione on a patternor-practice theory only. Bazemore is a pattern-or-practice case

but we find nothing in Bazemore to suggest that its holding is so

limited. See 478 U.S. at 395-96. Indeed, Morgan signals that it

was not so limited: the Court in Morgan had no trouble relying

on Bazemore’s holding despite the fact that Morgan made no

pattern-or-practice allegation. See 536 U.S. at 112, 114 n.7.

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 14 of 19
15

6 On this point, the Secretary cites two cases but neither supports her

position. In a parenthetical, she claims that the Ninth Circuit in

Cherosky “refus[ed] to allow non-class private plaintiffs to use

Bazemore to revive [an] action time-barred under Morgan.”

Appellee’s Br. at 7. That the plaintiffs were not class members played

no part in the decision and the court in fact relied on Bazemore in

concluding that “a discriminatory policy claim does not extend the

statute of limitations.” See Cherosky, 330 F.3d at 1247-48. The

Secretary also relies on Haynie v. Veneman, 272 F. Supp. 2d 10

(D.D.C. 2003), claiming that the district court there “declined to

permit a plaintiff to use Bazemore to evade the limitations period,

reasoning that ‘although plaintiff alleges that defendant engaged in a

‘pattern of racial discrimination’ . . . directed against [plaintiff] and

members of his family . . . this is not the type of claim intended by the

[Morgan] Court’s reference to ‘pattern-and-practice’ claims.”

Appellee’s Br. at 8. But the district court did not mention any

Bazemore limitation in observing that the plaintiff’s claim that the

defendant engaged in a “pattern of racial discrimination” likely did not

fall within the exception the Court alluded to in Morgan for

“allegations of systematic discrimination against a protected class of

individuals where the alleged acts reflect an intent to discriminate

against all persons in the class.” Haynie, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 17 n.4

(emphasis in Haynie). 

Circuit courts have similarly rejected the Secretary’s suggested

limitation. See, e.g., Hildebrandt, 347 F.3d at 1028 (holding

plaintiff who did not allege pattern-or-practice discrimination

could recover under Bazemore for “discriminatory pay received

within the statute of limitations period”); Reese, 347 F.3d at

1013 (same); Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 256-58 (same).6 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

granting the Secretary of State’s motion to dismiss is reversed

and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance

with this opinion. 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 15 of 19
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: I write 

separately to underscore the precise distinction that we draw, 

following the Supreme Court to the best of our ability, 

between cases where a plaintiff can recover for the current 

consequences of a discrete discriminatory act in a time-barred 

period and cases where he or she may not. The distinction 

turns, as I see it, on whether one may reasonably characterize 

the defendant employer as applying a discriminatory salary 

structure in the unbarred period. See Maj. Op. at 9-10. 

First, of course, we put aside hostile environment claims, 

which under National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 

536 U.S. 101, 113-15 (2002), are treated as continuing 

violations because they involve “repeated conduct” that 

“cannot be said to occur on any particular day.” Id. at 115. 

Further, because of their cumulative character the plaintiff 

may not even have a claim until the behavior has persisted for 

some time. See Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 765 (D.C. Cir. 

1997) (citing Dasgupta v. University of Wisconsin Board of 

Regents, 121 F.3d 1138, 1139 (7th Cir. 1997)).

 Among cases of discrete acts, those allowing recovery 

include Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), and 

Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In 

Bazemore the state agency employers had integrated 

previously separate black and white agricultural extension 

services, but made only partial equalizing pay adjustments. 

478 U.S. at 391. The Court regarded their recent conduct as 

persistence in a discriminatory system, as it made clear in 

contrasting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 

(1977). There the plaintiff flight attendant had been fired 

years before because she had married; after being rehired she 

complained that the resulting gap in her employment history 

was currently affecting her seniority. The Bazemore Court 

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 16 of 19
2

said that in Evans the “employer was not engaged in 

discriminatory practices at the time the respondent . . . brought 

suit,” 478 U.S. at 396 n.6, thus implying that the Bazemore

defendants were “engaged in discriminatory practices” in the 

unbarred period. And in Anderson the employer, the Panama 

Canal Commission, had started its complex and 

discriminatory classification system in the barred period and 

was applying precisely that system to plaintiffs in the 

unbarred period. 180 F.3d at 334-35. 

 On the other side are cases where a plaintiff cannot 

recover for a pay discrepancy in the unbarred period arising 

from an employer’s act of alleged discrimination in a barred 

period. The clearest example is Evans itself. At least in 

ordinary language, it seems impossible to describe the airline 

as currently applying a seniority policy that itself 

discriminated on the basis of marital status. The Court, after 

all, declared the system to be “neutral in its operation.” 431 

U.S. at 558. 

 In Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989), 

the Court applied the Evans model. Plaintiffs claimed that the 

employer’s one-time change in its method of computing 

seniority (moving from service at a plant to service in a 

specific type of work) had a disparate impact on female 

employees, affecting their promotion and demotion (and thus 

their pay) in the present. Id. at 902-03. Although plaintiffs 

alleged that the shift had been intentionally discriminatory, the 

Court found their claims barred because plaintiffs failed to 

show, as required under the Court’s cases for a successful 

challenge to a seniority system under § 703(h) of Title VII, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), a “discriminatory intent” in the unbarred 

period. See Lorance, 490 U.S. at 908-09. Again, without 

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 17 of 19
3

linguistic contortions it would be difficult to describe the 

employer’s ongoing system as discriminatory. 

 Most recently in Law v. Continental Airlines Corp., Inc., 

399 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2005), retired pilots requested “pay 

protection”—seniority-based compensation awarded pilots 

who were promoted to fly certain classes of aircraft but were 

not actually flying them—that they would have received had 

they not been (we assumed arguendo) discriminatorily denied 

promotion in a barred period. We found the pilots’ claims 

barred in light of Evans. Id. at 334. 

 Morgan, the district court’s main ground for barring 

Shea’s claim, explicitly preserves Bazemore, which Morgan

described as addressing “a discriminatory salary structure.” 

536 U.S. at 112. See also Maj. Op. at 10. It would be very 

odd to use such a term for the facts in Evans, Lorance or Law. 

The alleged wrong to each plaintiff or set of plaintiffs was an 

isolated act—dismissal in Evans, revision of seniority 

computation in Lorance, failure to promote in Law. The acts 

had consequences under the employer’s non-discriminatory 

seniority system, to be sure, but they could hardly be 

described as launching a two-class pay structure based on a 

forbidden criterion. 

 Shea, however, alleges just such a structure. See 

Complaint at ¶ 6(b) (“[A]t the time I applied for a position . . . 

the Department was giving higher starting paygrades to 

minorities with the same qualifications I had, and lower 

starting paygrades to non-minorities.”); ¶ 6(c) (“Because of 

the . . . discrimination noted [earlier], I am today receiving 

less pay with each paycheck than I would be if I had not been 

discriminated against . . . . This is a recurring violation of 

Title VII with the receipt of each paycheck.”). We can grasp 

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 18 of 19
4

the allegation most easily if we imagine Shea’s situation in a 

world with no inflation and no “time in grade” pay increases. 

In such a world, it appears from his complaint, the State 

Department’s current pay policy could reasonably be 

described as follows: “Everyone will be paid $XX,XXX 

except that (1) employees who have received special merit 

promotions or demotions will also receive whatever 

increments or decrements were prescribed at the relevant 

times, and (2) white employees hired in 1992 will receive five 

per cent less than they would otherwise.” This would look 

very much like Bazemore and Anderson. It is hard to 

construct a similar sentence to describe the policies being 

applied in Evans, Lorance or Law. 

 Distinguishing currently discriminatory pay structures 

from other, related employer policies is hardly an exact 

science. Were we to start from scratch, we might find more 

transparent criteria. But the distinction advanced above 

appears to reconcile the cases. We therefore follow it here. 

USCA Case #03-5325 Document #897954 Filed: 06/03/2005 Page 19 of 19