Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01489/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01489-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Sunita Patel, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Maricopa County, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV 11-01489-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

Before the Court is “Defendants’ (Maricopa County, Arpaio, Sands, Trombi, 

Brackman, and McGuire) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings” (Doc. 47). For the 

reasons stated below, the motion will be granted as to Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution 

cause of action and otherwise denied. 

I. LEGAL STANDARDS 

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) Standard 

“Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) are substantially identical.” Strigliabotti v. Franklin 

Resources, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2005). Rule 12(c) motions for 

judgment on the pleadings are therefore reviewed under the standard applicable to a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 

1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980). In ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court must “determine 

whether the facts alleged in the complaint, to be taken for [the purposes of a Rule 12(c) 

motion] as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Strigliabotti, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 

1097. “If the complaint fails to articulate a legally sufficient claim, the complaint should 

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be dismissed or judgment granted on the pleadings.” Id. A Rule 12(c) motion is thus 

properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the pleading as true, the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 

936, 939 (9th Cir. 2009). 

B. Arizona Notice of Claim Standard 

Arizona law requires that 

[p]ersons who have claims against a public entity or a public employee shall file claims with the person or persons authorized to accept service for the public entity or public employee as set forth in the Arizona rules of civil procedure 

within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues. The claim shall contain facts sufficient to permit the public entity or public employee to understand the basis upon which liability is claimed. The claim shall also contain a 

specific amount for which the claim can be settled and the 

facts supporting that amount. Any claim which is not filed within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues is barred and no action may be maintained thereon. 

A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). “For purposes of this section,” the statute continues, “a cause of 

action accrues when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows 

or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition 

which caused or contributed to the damage.” Id. § 12-821.01(B). Although this 

definition of accrual is “[f]or purposes of [§ 12-821.01],” Arizona courts have concluded 

that the state legislature intended this definition to mirror that of the typical “discovery 

rule” — or in other words, it does not differ from accrual of the cause of action for 

purposes of statutes of limitations. Stulce v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & 

Power Dist., 197 Ariz. 87, 90, 3 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 1999). 

II. ANALYSIS 

Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s notice of claim contained nothing about her 

causes of action for malicious prosecution, negligent training and supervision, respondeat 

superior, or state law violation of due process. 

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A. Settlement Demand 

Defendants’ first argument, directed at all four challenged causes of action, is that, 

“[u]nlike her other claims, for which she provided a [settlement] dollar amount, Plaintiff 

failed to specify a dollar amount for [the challenged claims]. This by itself is dispositive 

of this issue.” (Doc. 66 at 2.) Defendants rely on the notice of claim statute’s 

requirement that “[t]he claim shall also contain a specific amount for which the claim can 

be settled and the facts supporting that amount,” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A), but they 

otherwise cite no authority for their argument. If correct, Defendants’ argument would 

conflict with authority that claimants need not plead legal theories, but only facts. Yollin 

v. City of Glendale, 219 Ariz. 24, 32, 191 P.3d 1040, 1048 (Ct. App. 2008) (“the statute 

requires only facts, not theories, to support the claim”). In other words, if a claimant 

must make a settlement demand for each cause of action arising from the facts alleged in 

her notice of claim, to the exclusion of any lawsuit on a legal theory fairly discernible 

from those facts but not specifically stated in the notice of claim, then the claimant must 

indeed plead legal theories — contradicting Arizona authority. Absent some authority 

justifying an otherwise incongruous result, Defendants’ argument fails. 

B. Malicious Prosecution 

A malicious prosecution claim “accrues when the prior proceedings have 

terminated in [the plaintiff’s] favor.” Owen v. Shores, 24 Ariz. App. 250, 251, 537 P.2d 

978, 979 (1975). That is the earliest point at which “the damaged party [can] realize[] he 

or she has been damaged.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B). Here, that point did not arrive until 

after Plaintiff filed her notice of claim. She did not file a second notice of claim within 

180 days of successful termination of the prosecution against her. The malicious 

prosecution claim is therefore barred. 

C. Negligent Training and Supervision; Respondeat Superior; and State 

Law Violation of Due Process (Ariz. Const. art. II § 4) 

The remaining claims are adequately disclosed in Plaintiff’s notice of claim. 

Although she does not assert them specifically, each one is fairly implied by the conduct 

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she challenges. Her repeated invocation of “employment” in the “Legal Basis for 

Claims” section (see Doc. 47-1 at Part II) fairly discloses negligent training/supervision 

and respondeat superior (if such causes of action exist in this context). And the entire 

notice of claim, if believed, suggests a potential due process violation. Accordingly, 

these claims will not be dismissed. 

III. INTERNATIONAL LAW 

Defendants seek to dismiss any claim Plaintiff may be asserting based on 

international law. Plaintiff responds that she asserts no claim under international law, but 

only offers it for its analytical value. Thus clarified, there is nothing for the Court to 

dismiss. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that “Defendants’ (Maricopa County, Arpaio, 

Sands, Trombi, Brackman, and McGuire) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings” (Doc. 

47) is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution cause of action and 

otherwise DENIED. 

Dated this 27th day of February, 2012. 

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