Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01988/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-01988-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEWAYNE R. THOMPSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. W. BRADBURY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-01988-HSG (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

ON PLAINTIFF’S REMAINING DUE 

PROCESS CLAIM

Re: Dkt. No. 27

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at California State Prison, 

Sacramento, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against staff and officials 

at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), where Plaintiff was previously incarcerated. The operative 

pleading is Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which the Court screened on September 

15, 2014. The Court found that, liberally construed, the FAC stated a cognizable claim that 

Plaintiff was denied his right to due process in connection with Rules Violation Report (“RVR”)

hearings and Internal Classification Committee (“ICC” or “committee”) hearings. The Court 

ordered service on Defendant Bradbury, PBSP deputy warden and chief disciplinary officer, and

Defendants Flowers, Diggle and Short, PBSP correctional officers.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s RVR-based due process claims on 

February 13, 2015. On June 2, 2015, the Court issued its Order Granting in Part and Denying in 

Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, which granted summary judgment to 

Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s RVR-based claims and terminated Defendants Diggle and Short

from the action. 

The Court did not terminate proceedings as to the un-briefed claim against Defendants 

Bradbury and Flowers arising out of the ICC hearings, but instead directed Defendants Bradbury 

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and Flowers to file a second motion for summary judgment addressing it. Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining due process claim is now before the Court. Plaintiff 

has filed an opposition, and Defendants have filed a reply. For the reasons that follow, the motion 

will be granted.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted:

I. Disciplinary Write-Up Resulting in Referral to the ICC

As discussed in the Court’s prior summary judgment order, in December 2012, Plaintiff 

received a disciplinary write-up—RVR number B12-12-0010—charging him with battery on a 

peace officer. Plaintiff was found guilty of the charge following an August 8, 2013 disciplinary 

hearing, which was held after the disposition of two earlier hearings had been vacated.

Based on this offense, the hearing officer imposed a 150-day credit forfeiture and referred 

Plaintiff to PBSP’s ICC for consideration of a possible 12-month determinate term in the security 

housing unit (“SHU”). See Bradbury Decl. ¶ 9. On August 23, 2013, Plaintiff received a final 

copy of the RVR-hearing disposition related to his battery charge, which referred him to the ICC. 

Dkt. No. 16-32 at 5.

On August 29, 2013, Plaintiff received notice that at the hearing, the ICC would determine 

whether to retain him in administrative segregation and whether to impose a 12-month SHU term 

for his battery on a peace officer. Bradbury Decl. ¶ 14 & Ex. D. On September 3, 2013, Plaintiff 

was further informed that at the hearing, the committee would also consider the possible 

imposition of an indeterminate SHU term. Bradbury Decl. ¶ 15 & Ex. E.

II. September Committee Hearing

On September 4, 2013, Plaintiff attended the committee hearing on his classification

status. Bradbury Decl. ¶ 16 & Ex. F. The hearing was presided over by Defendants Bradbury and 

Flowers. The notes from the meeting state that Plaintiff “expressed his understanding of the basis 

for the ICC action and agreed with the action.” Id. The committee noted that Plaintiff was found 

guilty of battery on a peace officer and that the “offense warrant[ed] a SHU term.” Id. Giving 

Plaintiff credit for time he already served in the administrative segregation unit while his battery 

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charge was pending, the committee recommended Plaintiff’s continued retention in administrative 

segregation pending the expiration of the 12-month SHU term he was already serving. That term

was due to expire on September 10, 2013, just 6 days after the hearing. Id. Next, the committee 

deemed Plaintiff a threat to institutional security based on his “extensive disciplinary history”—

including four previously imposed SHU terms for violence and indecent exposure. Id. Noting 

that it was unsafe to release Plaintiff to the general population, the committee recommended 

Plaintiff’s continued retention in administrative segregation on indeterminate SHU status pending 

his transfer to the SHU at California State Prison, Sacramento. Id. The committee’s

recommendations were then transmitted to the Classification Service Unit of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) for review and approval. Bradbury Decl.

¶¶ 12, 16-17.

Plaintiff challenged the indefinite SHU term imposed by the committee through inmate

appeal number PBSP-13-02873. See Dkt. No. 16-19. While Plaintiff’s appeal was pending, on 

October 2, 2013, a CDCR official endorsed him for transfer to the California State Prison, 

Sacramento SHU. Bradbury Decl. ¶¶ 17, 19 & Ex. G.

On October 8, 2013, appeal number PBSP-13-02873 was partially granted at the second

level of review on grounds that the committee failed to give Plaintiff the notice or staff assistance 

required by state law. Dkt. No. 16-19 at 3. In its appeal decision, the second-level reviewer also 

vacated the September hearing recommendations and ordered the committee to hold a new hearing 

on Plaintiff’s indeterminate SHU term. Dkt. No. 16-19 at 4.

III. October Committee Hearing

On October 18, 2013, Plaintiff received notice of his upcoming classification hearing, its

scheduled date, and the committee actions under consideration. See Bradbury Decl. ¶ 21 & Ex. H.

The notice informed Plaintiff that he met the criteria for an indeterminate SHU term based on

enumerated disciplinary offenses that demonstrated Plaintiff was a threat to institutional security. 

See id. Plaintiff was assigned a staff assistant on October 21, 2013, two days before the 

committee hearing. See Bradbury Decl. ¶ 22 & Ex. I.

On October 23, 2013, the committee held a hearing on Plaintiff’s housing and custody

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status. See Bradbury Decl. ¶ 21 & Ex. I. The hearing was again presided over by Defendants 

Bradbury and Flowers. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing, expressed his understanding of the 

proceedings, and gave a statement on his own behalf. Bradbury Decl. ¶ 23 & Ex. I. After the 

committee reviewed Plaintiff’s “extensive disciplinary history,” it concluded that Plaintiff’s 

release into the general population would be “unsafe at this time.” Id. The committee then 

reaffirmed Plaintiff’s indeterminate SHU term as well as his retention in administrative 

segregation pending his transfer to the California State Prison, Sacramento SHU. Id. Plaintiff

was transferred to California State Prison, Sacramento on October 24, 2013. Bradbury Decl. ¶ 24 

& Ex. J. Once there, he challenged the committee’s actions during the October hearing in an 

unsuccessful inmate appeal. See Dkt. No. 16-21.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show there is 

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. 

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is 

genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party. See id.

A court shall grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial[,] . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial 

burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact. Id. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings 

and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 

file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See id. at 324 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (amended 2010)). 

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For purposes of summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth of the evidence 

submitted by the nonmoving party. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or 

weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. 

Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is 

based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder 

v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff's verified complaint 

as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, 

plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct, and allegations were 

not based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). Here, Plaintiff’s verified FAC is 

considered along with the evidence in his opposition (dkt. no. 31) in evaluating the second motion 

for summary judgment.

II. Analysis

As noted above, the Court has already addressed the issue of whether Plaintiff was 

afforded due process in connection with his disciplinary hearings. The question currently before 

the Court is whether Defendants complied with due process in the ICC hearings that followed. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that California statutes and prison regulations create a liberty 

interest in freedom from administrative segregation and has spelled out the process due before a 

prisoner may be segregated for administrative reasons. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 

1080, 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472 (1995). Toussaint requires prison officials to comply with the following procedures 

when they initially determine whether a prisoner is to be segregated for administrative reasons:

(1) they must hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner is 

segregated, (2) the prisoner must be informed of the charges against him or the reasons 

segregation is being considered, and (3) the prisoner must be allowed to present his views. See 

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Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100. Due process does not require detailed written notice of charges, 

representation by counsel or counsel-substitute, an opportunity to present witnesses, a written 

decision describing the reasons for placing the prisoner in administrative segregation or disclosure 

of the identity of any person providing information leading to placement of a prisoner in 

administrative segregation. See id. at 1100-01. Accord Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228-29 

(2005) (determining that prisoners are constitutionally entitled only to the informal, non-adversary 

procedures set forth in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 

(1979), and Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)1, prior to assignment to “supermax” facility).

In Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), the Supreme Court held that 

disciplinary proceedings do not satisfy due process requirements unless there is “some evidence”

in the record to support the findings of the prison disciplinary board. The Ninth Circuit requires 

that “some evidence” also support a decision to place an inmate in segregation for administrative 

reasons. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104. The standard is met if there was some evidence from 

which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. Id. at 1105 (citing Hill, 472 

U.S. at 455). Ascertaining whether the standard is satisfied does not require examination of the 

entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. 

See id. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could 

support the conclusion reached. See id. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue as to whether Defendants 

violated his right to due process in imposing an indeterminate SHU term. To survive a summary 

judgment motion, Plaintiff must raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendants denied him 

the procedural protections under Toussaint. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff, there is no triable issue because Defendants did not deprive him of any of the 

constitutional protections under Toussaint.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants imposed an indeterminate SHU term without meeting “the 

five requirements under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).” Dkt. No. 31 at 2.

 

1

overruled in part by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 

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Specifically, Plaintiff argues that he was deprived of his right to call witnesses or present evidence 

in his defense. Id. at 3. It appears that Plaintiff is confusing the greater procedural protections to 

which he would be entitled for a disciplinary matter with the minimum protections under 

Toussaint for administrative segregation.2 The hearings at issue here were not for a disciplinary 

matter, but were non-adversarial hearings for the purposes of determining if administrative 

segregation was appropriate. As such, Toussaint requires that Defendants hold the hearing within 

a reasonable time; that Plaintiff be informed of the charges against him or the reasons segregation 

is being considered; and that Plaintiff be allowed to present his views. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 

1100. With respect to the first requirement, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was given notice and a 

hearing prior to being placed in the SHU. Bradbury Decl., Exs. D, H. Second, Plaintiff was 

clearly informed of the reasons that segregation was being considered: the August 29, 2013 and 

October 18, 2013 notices informed him that he met the criteria for a SHU term based on his 

disciplinary history, which included four prior SHU terms for rules violations. Bradbury Decl., 

Exs. D, E, H. Last, Plaintiff was permitted to present his views at the hearing, and he was 

informed of his right to do so in advance. Bradbury Decl., Exs. D, E, F, H, I.

Furthermore, there is no dispute with respect to the sufficiency of the record supporting the 

decision of the ICC to retain Plaintiff in the SHU for an indeterminate term. Plaintiff does not 

challenge the fact that he suffered the four specific rules violations upon which the ICC based their 

decision. See id. Consequently, there was clearly “some evidence” to support the ICC’s decision. 

See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104.

Accordingly, Defendants Bradbury and Flowers are entitled to summary judgment as a 

matter of law on Plaintiff’s remaining due process claim.3

 

2 Disciplinary segregation cannot be imposed without due process, i.e., without the procedural 

requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Wolff established five constitutionallymandated procedural requirements for disciplinary proceedings: (1) a written notice of the charges 

to enable the inmate to prepare a defense, id. at 564; (2) at least 24 hours after the notice to allow 

the inmate to prepare for the hearing, id.; (3) a written statement as to the evidence relied on and 

reasons for the disciplinary action, id.; (4) the right to call witnesses and present documentary 

evidence in his or her defense, id. at 566; and (5) assistance of a fellow inmate or staff where 

inmate is illiterate or the issues are complex, id. at 570.

3 Defendants also claim they are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (dkt. no. 27) on 

Plaintiff’s remaining due process claim is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of 

Defendants and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

 

but, because the Court has found no constitutional violation, a qualified immunity analysis is not 

necessary.

6/6/2016

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