Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00048/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00048-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jan C. Rust, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Tucson; et. al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-48-TUC-HCE

ORDER

On March 5, 2009, the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915: (1) granted Plaintiff’s

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis; and (2) dismissed the complaint with leave to amend.

(Doc. No. 5). Now pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s: (1) “Request to File Amended

Complaint Two Days Late” (Doc. No. 7); and (2) Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 8). 

Plaintiff has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. No. 6).

I. Extension of Time

 Plaintiff’s two-day delay in filing her Amended Complaint was caused, in part, by

computer problems due to a computer virus. Under the instant circumstances, Plaintiff’s

request for extension is granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1)(B).

II. Screening the Amended Complaint

When dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court advised that: “Once Plaintiff files

her amended complaint, the Court will screen the amended complaint in light of 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2)(B).” (Doc. No. 5, p. 14). Pursuant to the in forma pauperis statute, the court

must dismiss any complaint filed in forma pauperis if the court determines that the complaint

is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or seeks

monetary relief from an individual who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

Case 4:09-cv-00048-HCE Document 11 Filed 07/06/09 Page 1 of 12
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§1915(e)(2)(B)(I)-(iii); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226-1227 (9th Cir.

1984).

A. Standard

A complaint is to contain:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction...;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled

to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the

alternative or different types of relief.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Moreover,

it is a well-settled tenet that a complaint must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what

the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007).

When deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim, the court must construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; accept all well-pleaded factual

allegations as true; and determine whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support

a claim that would merit relief. See Cervantes v. United States, 330 F.3d 1186, 1187 (9th Cir.

2003); Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). See also

SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal. Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996)

(a claim may be dismissed because it lacks “a cognizable legal theory” or because it fails to

allege sufficient facts to support a claim). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim

under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Ashcroft, __ U.S.

__, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

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Ashcroft, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. See also Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, at 555 (“‘[T]he

pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.’”) (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure §1216, pp. 235-236 (3rd ed. 2004); Williams v. Gerber

Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008)(the factual allegation pled “‘must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” ) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully....Where a complaint pleads facts

that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of to relief.’” Ashcroft, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at

1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557). Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific

allegations may be consistent with the claim for relief, a court must assess whether there are

other “more likely explanations...” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at __, 129 S.Ct. at

1951.“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]...a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its own judicial experience and

common sense.” Ashcroft, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.

The court is not “‘bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.’” Ashcroft, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556); see also Western Mining Council, 643 F.2d at 624 (although the complaint is generally

construed favorably to the pleader, the court does not accept as true unreasonable inferences

or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations). “Nor does a complaint

suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft,

__ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Furthermore, the

complaint must contain a statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief

“rather than a blanket assertion[] of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3. 

 Additionally, a complaint will be dismissed under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as

frivolous where there is no arguable basis for relief either in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), superseded on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. §1915. See also

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Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992). Factual frivolousness includes allegations that

are clearly baseless, fanciful, fantastic, or delusional. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33 (citing

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327, 328). Furthermore, complaints “‘that merely repeat[] pending

or previously litigated claims’” may be dismissed as frivolous. Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103,

1105 n.2 (quoting Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988)). Legal

frivolousness justifies dismissal under section 1915 where a complaint is based on “an

indisputably meritless legal theory...[such as] claims against which it is clear that the

defendants are immune from suit, and claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly

does not exist....” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (internal citation omitted).

A complaint is deemed to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex defendants or

abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims decided in prior cases. Crisafi v. Holland,

655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Phillips v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207, 209 (10th Cir. 1981);

see also Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F.Supp. 458, 463 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff’d, 826 F.2d 1059 (4th

Cir. 1987); Sitanggang v. Indymac Bank, 2009 WL 1286484, *6 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2009).

When determining whether an action is malicious, the Court need not look only to the

complaint before it, but may also look to the plaintiff’s prior litigious conduct. Cochran v.

Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996). However, “a complaint filed in forma pauperis

is not subject to dismissal simply because the plaintiff is litigious. The number of complaints

a poor person files does not alone justify peremptory dismissal. In each instance, the

substance of the impoverished person’s claim is the appropriate measure.” Crisafi , 655 F.2d

at 1310.

When the plaintiff is pro se, the complaint must be liberally construed in the interests

of justice. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (pro se pleadings are held to “less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers...”); Johnson v. Reagan, 524

F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Pleadings should be liberally construed in the interests of justice,

particularly when a pleader is not learned in the law.”). However, "[p]ro se litigants must

follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants." King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

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567 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52 (9th Cir. 1995) ("pro se litigants

are bound by the rules of procedure."). 

If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts,

a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court

should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of advice “would

undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225,

231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to decide whether the court was

required to inform a litigant of deficiencies).

The Court has previously advised Plaintiff that an amended pleading supersedes the

original and, thus, all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged

in any amended complaint are waived. (See Doc. No.5, p. 14 (citing Hal Roach Studios v.

Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990); King, 814 F.2d 565). 

B. Plaintiffs’ Allegations

1. Introduction

Plaintiff has filed her Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1984, and

1986. (Doc. No. 8, p. 3). She names the following Defendants: (1) City of Tucson and (2)

Southwestern Intervention Services “As Agent for City of Tucson.” (Id. at p.1).

Plaintiff alleges that on January 18, 2009, she was arrested “for violating Arizona

Revised Statute 13-3601, Domestic Violence and 13-2810 Interfering with a Judicial Order

without warrant, summons and/or probable cause.” (Doc. No. 8, p.1) Plaintiff alleges that

on December 29, 2008 Tucson Police Department Detectives Cheek and Dowling, without

an arrest warrant or summons, attempted to arrest her for “the same charge” at her residence.

 (Id. at pp. 1-2). Plaintiff alleges that no facts supported the charges against her and, instead,

officers relied upon “false statements made by...Michael Chamberlin.” (Id. at p.2) Plaintiff

further alleges that the charges were ultimately dismissed for lack of evidence and lack of

probable cause. (Id.).

Plaintiff also states that she 

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believes based on evidence she has obtained through subpoena and other

legitimate disclosure that T[ucson] P[olice] D[epartment] conspired to falsely

arrest her because of a conflict she had with her neighbor Tucson Police

Department Lt. Edward Schlitz that resulted in her arrest and charge of a

felony that was reduced to a misdemeanor on December 29, 2008. Lt. Schlitz

had an Order for Injunction Against Harassment issued against Plaintiff and

had her arrested for violating it by making false complaints to the police.

(Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Schlitz was “directly involved in the matter...” that resulted

in Plaintiff’s arrest although “physical evidence discovered by the reporting officer indicated

that Mr. Chamberlin had lied to the Police regarding the Plaintiff.” (Id.). According to

Plaintiff, Tucson Police Department did not obtain copies of court orders or other evidence

before making the arrest. (Id. at p.3).

Plaintiff alleges that she had obtained “an injunction against harassment [sic] Mr.

Chamberlin for an assault he plead guilty to committing and was on supervised probation.”

(Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that she informed Defendant Southwestern Intervention

Services and the Tucson Police Department “regarding Mr. Chamberlin’s harassment of her

to no avail.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

believes that evidence will show Tucson Police and Southwestern Western

[sic] Intervention Services conspired to intentionally violate Plaintiff’s civil

rights, that under the same circumstances the police gave preferential treatment

to a police offic [sic] and then retaliated against the Plaintiff by falsely

arresting her in order to deter the court from reducing her felony charge.

(Id.). Plaintiff also “believes that if not for the fact that she was female she would have been

treated differently.” (Id.). 

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1984

The United States Code reflects that no such statute exists at this time. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1984 (reflecting statute has been “omitted”). Thus, Plaintiff is unable to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1984.

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1986

In the March 5, 2009 Order, the Court explained to Plaintiff that a claim can be stated

under section 1986 only if the complaint contains a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

(Doc. No. 5, p. 9 (citing McCalden v. California Library Assoc., 955 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th

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See e.g., Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing cause

of action for a section 1983 claim based on a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 

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Cir. 1992); Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1040 (9th Cir. 1990)). In her

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that her causes of action are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1983, 1984, and1986. (Doc. No. 8, p.3) She has not alleged a claim pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1985. Because Plaintiff has not filed a claim pursuant to section 1985, she is

precluded from seeking relief under section 1986. McCalden, 955 F.2d at 1223. Thus,

Plaintiff’s section 1986 claim must be dismissed. Id.

4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Under section 1983 “[e]very person who, under color of...[state] statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage...[deprives] any citizen of the United States...of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured....” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under section 1983, the plaintiff must allege:

(1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and

(2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The plaintiff must

show an affirmative link between an injury (the claimed deprivation) and the conduct of the

defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-372 (1976).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants City of Tucson and Southwestern Intervention

Services “conspired to and did in fact violate [her] constitutionally guaranteed rights....”

(Doc. No. 8, p.3) Plaintiff does not identify the specific rights allegedly violated. Even if

the Court were to liberally construe Plaintiff’s allegations to allege arrest without probable

cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment1

 and a conspiracy regarding same, for the

reasons set forth below, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. 

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2

To violate a plaintiff’s right to due process, the plaintiff must allege that the

defendant denied the plaintiff a specific right protected by the federal constitution , without

procedures ensuring fairness (procedural due process), or deliberately abused its power

without any reasonable justification in aid of any government interest or objection and only

to oppress in a way that shocks the conscience. (substantive due process). Sandin v. Connor,

515 U.S. 472, 483-484 (1995); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Substantive due

process rights are those not otherwise constitutionally protected but which are deeply rooted

in this country’s history and tradition and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such

that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed....” Washington v.

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). (See

also Doc.No. 5, pp.11-13 (advising Plaintiff of such standard)).

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A plaintiff may state a civil cause of action under section 1983 for conspiracy to

deprive him or her of civil rights without due process of law.2 Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24

(9th Cir. 1962). See also Rundle v. Madigan, 356 F.Supp. 1048 (N.D. Cal., 1982). However,

the mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient to state a claim.

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff

must allege sufficient facts to show an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate the

plaintiff’s civil rights. Woodrum v. Woodward County, Okl., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.

1989); (see also Doc. No. 5, p. 10 (informing Plaintiff of such standard)).

Plaintiff’s alleges a conspiracy involving Defendant Southwestern Intervention

Services and “Tucson Police...to intentionally violate Plaintiff’s civil rights, that under the

same circumstances the police gave preferential treatment to a police offic [sic] and then

retaliated against the Plaintiff by falsely arresting her in order to deter the court from

reducing her felony charge.” (Doc. No. 8, p.3). A liberal reading of Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint leads to the conclusion that Plaintiff’s reference to “under the same

circumstances” means her allegations that she was arrested on January 18, 2009 based upon

alleged false statements made by Mr. Chamberlin and without probable cause. Plaintiff’s also

alleges that she complained about Mr. Chamberlin to Defendant Southwestern Intervention

Services and to the Tucson Police Department to no avail. 

Although “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,

code-pleading regime of a prior era,...it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff

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armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Ashcroft, __U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.

Moreover, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must

be supported by factual allegations.” Id. Even assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations

that she complained about Mr. Chamberlin to Defendant Southwestern Intervention Services

and to the Tucson Police Department to no avail, the facts alleged herein do not lead to the

inference that there was a meeting of the minds between Defendant Southwestern

Intervention Services and the Tucson Police Department to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights.

See Id. at __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.”).

Nor does Plaintiff allege sufficient facts that would, if true, establish a meeting of the minds

between Defendant Southwestern Intervention Services and police officers to give

preferential treatment to a police officer and/or to allegedly retaliate against Plaintiff by

allegedly “falsely arresting...” Plaintiff without probable cause based in part on alleged lies

supplied by Mr. Chamberlin. (Id.). See Woodrum, 866 F.2d at 1126 (dismissing conspiracy

claim where plaintiffs’ allegations showed that one defendant “deceived the social workers

by filing false reports against the [plaintiffs], but that the [plaintiffs] could allege no specific

facts to show any agreement between [that defendant] and any of the [other] named

defendants.”). Under such circumstances, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Southwestern

Intervention Services fails.

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant City of Tucson also fail. As explained to Plaintiff

in the Court’s previous Order, a municipality may not be held liable under section 1983

unless its policy or custom caused the constitutional injury. (Doc. No. 5 at p. 12 (citing

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,

166 (1993); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Thus, a

municipality may not be sued solely because an injury was inflicted by one of its employees

or agents. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2005); see also

Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 (section 1983 does not impose liability vicariously on governing

bodies solely on the basis of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor). Rather,

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the municipality is liable only when the execution of its policy or custom inflicts the

constitutional injury. Id.; Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 868 (9th Cir. 2005).

A section 1983 claim against a municipal defendant “cannot succeed as a matter of law...”

unless the plaintiff: (1) contends that the municipal defendant maintains a policy or custom

pertinent to the plaintiff’s alleged injury; and (2) explains how such policy or custom caused

the plaintiff’s injury. Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming

dismissal of municipal defendant for failure to state a claim). A policy is a deliberate choice

to follow a course of action made from among various alternatives by an official or officials

responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question. Long,

442 F.3d at 1185. Thus, a suit is allowed under section 1983 against local governments

where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that

body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691. Additionally, a policy can be one of inaction

as well. See Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 2004). A policy of inaction must be

more than mere negligence; it must be a conscious or deliberate choice among various

alternatives. Id. Moreover, “in addition to official policy, a municipality may be sued for

‘constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such

custom has not received formal approval through the [governmental] body’s official

decisionmaking channels.’” Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691 and citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-

482 (1986)). Allowing “custom as a basis for section 1983 liability ensures that

municipalities are held responsible for widespread abuses or practices that cannot be

affirmatively attributed to the decisions or ratification of an official policy-maker ‘but are so

pervasive as to have the force of law.’” Id. at 715 n.3 (quoting Thompson v. City of Los

Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989)). However, “[p]roof of random acts or isolated

events is insufficient to establish custom. Id. at 714 (citing Thompson 885 F.2d at 1444 (9th

Cir. 1989)). Instead, a plaintiff may prove “‘the existence of a custom or informal policy

with evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officials

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“A Magistrate Judge may not deny an application to proceed in forma pauperis or

issue an Order dismissing a case [under the in forma pauperis statute] without the consent

of plaintiff.” Recht v. Templin, 2007 WL 2572210, n.1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2007) (citing

Tripati v. Rison, 847 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also LR Civ. 72.2(a)(4), Rules of Practice

of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona (“Subject to the Constitution and laws

of the United States, Magistrate Judges in the District of Arizona shall...[m]ake

determinations and enter appropriate orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 with respect to any

suit, action, or proceedings in which a request is made to proceed in forma pauperis

consistent with federal law except that a Magistrate Judge may not deny a request for in

forma pauperis status unless the person requesting such status has expressly consented in

writing to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).”). Consent from

defendants who have not been served is unnecessary in this case because unserved

defendants are not deemed to be “parties” under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Neals v. Norwood, 59

F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss action as frivolous

without consent of defendants because defendants had not been served yet and therefore were

not parties); see also Walters v. Astrue, 2008 WL 618933 * 2 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2008)

(granting motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) where plaintiff consented to magistrate judge, and noting that consent

of unserved defendants was not required under such circumstances); Trujillo v. Tally, 2007

WL 4261928 (D. Idaho Nov. 30, 2007) (“The Court does not need to obtain consent from

defendants who have not been served because they are not ‘parties’ under the meaning of 28

U.S.C. § 636(c).”); 12 Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3071.2 (2d.

ed.).

4

See CV 01-431-TUC-ACM; 01-432-TUC-CKJ; CV 01-433-TUC-ACM; CV 02-440-

TUC-JMR; CV 02-441-TUC-CKJ; CV 03-573-TUC-WDB; CV 03-584-TUC-CKJ; CV 04-

136-TUC-CKJ; CV 04-652-TUC-DCB; CV 04-653-TUC-DCB; CV 07-022-TUC-DCB. 

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were not discharged or reprimanded.’” Id. (quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348

(9th Cir. 1992)). 

Herein, Plaintiff alleges seemingly unrelated events particularized to her and has not

alleged that Defendant City of Tucson’s alleged action and/or inaction of which she

complains was the result of any policy or custom. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to state

a claim against Defendant City of Tucson. 

C. Dismissal3

The public record for the District Court for the District of Arizona reflects that

Plaintiff, although appearing pro se, is not an inexperienced litigant.4

 The Court has

previously granted Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint to state a claim

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upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons set forth above and having afforded

Plaintiff the benefit of a liberal construction entitled to pro se litigants, Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the named

Defendants. Moreover, on the instant record, further attempts at amendment to state a claim

against Defendants herein would be futile. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; Noll v. Carlson, 809

F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.

1980)). 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Request to File Amended Complaint Two Days

Late” (Doc. No. 7) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 8) and

this action are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED

to enter judgment accordingly and to close the file in this matter.

DATED this 2nd day of July, 2009.

Case 4:09-cv-00048-HCE Document 11 Filed 07/06/09 Page 12 of 12