Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04495/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04495-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 15:2(a) Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TARA SHAIA, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. C 14-4495 PJH

v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

EQUITABLE TOLLING

HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Before the court is plaintiffs' motion for an order equitably tolling the running of the

statute of limitations on the collective action claim brought under the Fair Labor Standards

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. ("FLSA") Having read the parties' papers and carefully

considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, the court hereby DENIES the

motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Tara Shaia ("Shaia") filed the original complaint in this action on October 8,

2014. At that time, the court scheduled the initial case management conference ("CMC")

for January 22, 2015. Plaintiff served defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC, d/b/a

Holiday Retirement ("Holiday") with the summons and complaint on October 9, 2014. On

October 29, 2014, the parties stipulated to extend the time for defendant Harvest

Management Sub LLC, d/b/a Holiday Retirement ("Holiday") to respond to the complaint

approximately 32 days, to December 1, 2014.

Also on October 29, 2014, plaintiffs' counsel wrote to counsel for Holiday requesting

contact information for all potential collective plaintiffs, or, in the alternative, an agreement

to toll the statute of limitations. According to plaintiffs' counsel, counsel for Holiday did not

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respond to the letter, or to plaintiffs' subsequent requests. 

On October 31, 2014, Shaia filed a notice of consent to join the FLSA collective

action. On November 12, 2014, well before Holiday's response to the complaint was due,

per the parties' agreement, Shaia filed a motion for conditional certification of an FLSA

collective action, noticing the hearing for December 17, 2014. On November 13, 2014, the

court stayed further briefing of the motion and vacated the noticed hearing date, because

the parties had not yet appeared for the initial CMC and no pretrial schedule had been set. 

On December 1, 2014, the date its response to the complaint was due, Holiday filed

a motion to dismiss. On December 3, 2014, Shaia filed a request that the pending

certification motion be heard on shortened time, on December 24, 2014, at the same time

as Holiday's motion to dismiss (which had previously been noticed for hearing on January

21, 2015). 

On December 10, 2014, the court denied the motion to shorten time, noting that the

original reason for staying the briefing on the certification motion still held, but also noting

that Shaia had filed the motion prematurely (before Holiday's response to the complaint

was due, and before the initial CMC), and that in response to Holiday's motion to dismiss,

Shaia had filed a motion seeking a hearing five days after her proposed due date for filing

the reply brief, and also apparently seeking to modify the briefing schedule for Holiday's

motion to dismiss. 

On December 15, 2014, Shaia filed a consent-to-join form for Eric Parker ("Parker"),

and on the same date, filed the first amended complaint ("FAC"), joining Parker as a named

plaintiff. In the FAC, plaintiffs assert an FLSA claim on behalf of a nationwide class, four

causes of action alleging violations of the California Labor Code and Wage Orders on

behalf of a California class, and a claim under California Business & Professions Code §

17200. 

Holiday withdrew the motion to dismiss the original complaint, and filed an answer

on January 2, 2015. At the January 22, 2015, CMC, the court set a briefing/hearing

schedule for the motion for certification of the collective action, setting the motion for

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hearing on April 1, 2015. On March 17, 2015, plaintiffs filed the present motion seeking

equitable tolling of the running of the statute of limitations. The certification motion was

heard on April 1, 2015 as scheduled, and on April 13, 2015, the court issued an order

granting conditional certification. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The statute of limitations for filing a claim under the FLSA is two years, or three

years if the violation is "willful," 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), and continues to run on each

individual's claim until his/her consent to joinder is filed with the court. 29 U.S.C. § 256;

see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action

unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in

the court in which such action is brought.”) 

Courts have held that § 256 is a procedural limitation that may be tolled when equity

warrants. See Partlow v. Jewish Orphans' Home of So. Cal., Inc., 645 F.2d 757, 761 (9th

Cir. 1981), abrogated on other grounds by Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S.

165, 167 (1989). In general, “[e]quitable tolling applies when the plaintiff is prevented from

asserting a claim by wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, or when extraordinary

circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control made it impossible to file a claim on time.” Stoll

v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999).

B. Plaintiffs' Motion

Shaia and Parker seek an order equitably tolling the running of the statute of

limitations as to those putative members of the collective action who have not yet opted into

the action, for the time period from December 17, 2014 (the date originally noticed for the

hearing on plaintiff's conditional certification motion), to the date of the granting of the

certification motion. 

Plaintiffs contend that good cause is shown because, through no fault of their own,

the hearing and decision on their motion for conditional certification have been delayed for

several months. Specifically, they assert that they noticed the certification motion for

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hearing on December 17, 2014, but because the court stayed the briefing and continued

the hearing date, the motion was not actually heard until April 1, 2015. They argue that

courts have repeatedly held that equitable tolling is particularly warranted where there has

been a delay in the court hearing a motion for conditional certification or where there has

been a delay in ruling on the motion. 

Plaintiffs also contend that equitable tolling is appropriate to "counter the advantage

Harvest has gained" by withholding contact information for potential members of the

collective action, referring to the fact that plaintiffs' counsel first asked counsel for Holiday

for the contact information on October 29, 2014. They claim that potential plaintiffs have

not been given notice of this lawsuit and have therefore been prevented from asserting

their rights. 

Holiday opposes the motion, arguing that plaintiffs have not shown good cause, and

that they have not pointed to anything other than ordinary litigation events as a reason for

equitable relief. Holiday argues that any delay between the filing of a conditional motion

and the ruling on that motion resulting from ordinary procedural events does not justify

tolling the statute of limitations, nor does the fact that some delay results from a

defendant's opposing a motion for conditional certification. Holiday contends that plaintiffs

have made no showing that it has engaged in any wrongful conduct, and that refusing to

provide class member information prior to certification is not wrongful conduct. 

Holiday also argues that the cases cited by plaintiffs do not support the application of

equitable tolling. Holiday asserts that in this case (unlike in the cases granting equitable

tolling), there has been no order staying the case, there have been no delays to allow time

for extra discovery, there has been no order directing the parties to arbitration or a

mandatory settlement conference before plaintiff could file a motion for conditional

certification, there is no similar matter pending in another court which might warrant a stay

or delay in this case, and there has been no lengthy delay in the court's issuance of a ruling

with regard to the conditional certification motion.

The court finds that the motion must be DENIED. Plaintiffs have not shown that they

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were prevented from asserting a claim by wrongful conduct on the part of Holiday, or that

extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control made it impossible to file a claim

on time. See Stoll, 165 F.3d at 1242. Courts have routinely denied requests for equitable

tolling in FLSA cases, where the plaintiffs have failed to show that the defendant engaged

in any wrongful conduct, and/or failed to show that "extraordinary circumstances" beyond

the plaintiffs' control made it impossible to file the claim on time. See, e.g., Woods v.

Vector Marketing Corp., 2015 WL 1198593 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015); Ash v. Bayside

Solutions, Inc., 2015 WL 427731 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2015); Cranney v. Carriage

Servs., Inc., 559 F.Supp. 2d 1106, 1109 (D. Nev. 2008). 

When Congress enacted § 256 of the FLSA, it was aware that “time would lapse

between the filing of the collective action complaint by the named plaintiff and the filing of

written consents by the opt-in plaintiffs, yet it chose not to provide for tolling of the

limitations period.” Woodard v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., 250 F.R.D. 178, 194 (M.D. Pa.

2008), quoted in Woods, 2015 WL 1198593 at *7. Thus, courts in this district have held

that, consistent with Congressional design, good faith motion practice by a defendant does

not amount to wrongful conduct warranting equitable tolling of FLSA claims. See, e.g.,

Ash, 2015 WL 427731 at *5 (citing MacGregor v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2011 WL 2731227

(D.S.C. July 13, 2011) (“Congress could have avoided the foreseeable delay of good faith

motions and judicial decision-making by patterning the statute of limitations for the FLSA

after that of Rule 23 for class actions; however, they did not do so.”)). 

Holiday's refusal to provide potential plaintiffs' contact information to plaintiffs'

counsel also does constitute wrongful conduct sufficient to support equitable tolling, as

there is no requirement in the FLSA that a defendant provide contact information for

potential plaintiffs until after the court certifies a collective action. See AdedapoidleTyehinba v. Crunch LLC, 2013 WL 4082137 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013); Gilbert v.

Citigroup, Inc., 2009 WL 424320 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2009); Prentice v. Fund for Pub.

Intereset Res. Inc., 2007 WL 2729187 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007).

Plaintiffs assert that courts have repeatedly held that equitable tolling is particularly

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warranted where there has been a delay in the court hearing a motion for conditional

certification or where there has been a delay in ruling on the motion. However, the cases

cited by plaintiffs are distinguishable, as they involved delays resulting from, e.g., a courtordered stay, see Cilluffo v. Cent. Refrigerated Servs., Inc., 2012 WL 8523474 at *3 (C.D.

Cal. Nov. 8, 2012); Koval v. Pacific Bell Tel. Co., 2012 WL 3283428 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug.

10, 2012); Castle v. Wells Fargo Fin., Inc., 2007 WL 1105118 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10,

2007); a court-ordered referral to a mandatory settlement conference, see Helton v. Factor

5, Inc., 2011 WL 5925078 at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011); a prior agreement by the

parties to toll the running of the statute of limitations, see Misra v. Decision One Mortgage

Co., LLC, 673 F.Supp. 2d 987, 999 (C.D. Cal. 2008); or a substantial delay in issuing the

order once the certification motion was ripe, see Warren v. Twin Islands, LLC, 2012 WL

346681 at *3-4 (D. Idaho Feb. 2, 2012).

In Warren, the complaint was filed on March 11, 2011, and defendants filed an

answer on April 4, 2011. On August 9, 2011, three months after the CMC, plaintiffs filed a

motion for conditional certification, and also requested equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations for future opt-in class members effective as of the date the certification motion

was filed. They claimed that they had requested defendants at the Rule 26(f) conference in

April 2011 to stipulate to conditional certification, but defendants had not responded. 

As here, the Warren plaintiffs cited Adams v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., 242 F.R.D.

530, 543 (N.D. Cal. 2007) for the proposition that equitable tolling is appropriate where

potential plaintiffs have not yet received notice through no fault of their own, as where the

defendants refuse to provide contact information until ordered to do so by the court. 

However, the Warren court found Adams "not directly applicable" and emphasized that it

was "not persuaded by its reasoning." Id., 2012 WL 346681 at *4 (citing Goudie v. Cable

Comms., Inc., 2008 WL 4861649 at *3 (D.Or. 2008) for the proposition that "Adams is an

anomaly"). The Warren court added that the FLSA does not require defendants to provide

contact information to plaintiffs until after the court certifies the collective action, and found

that the defendants had thus not engaged in any conduct that justified equitable tolling. Id.,

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2012 WL 346681 at *4.

Nevertheless, the Warren court did find that the plaintiffs' certification motion had

remained pending for an unusually long time. Accordingly, the court agreed to toll the

statute of limitations from October 9, 2011 (30 days following the date the motion was "ripe

for decision") until the date of entry of the order granting conditional certification (February

2, 2012). 

Thus, while the plaintiffs requested equitable tolling from the date they had filed the

motion for conditional certification, the motion had been filed more than four months after

the date the original complaint was filed. By that time, the defendants had answered the

complaint and the case was at issue. Moreover, the court rejected the approach taken by

the Adams court, and found that the fact that defendants refused to provide contact

information until ordered to do so by the court did not warrant equitable tolling. The sole

basis for the court's decision to toll the statute of limitations was that the court did not issue

the ruling for approximately five months after the motion was fully briefed, whereas it

"aspire[d]" to rule on all motions within 30-45 days of their becoming ripe.

In none of the cased cited by plaintiffs are the procedural facts comparable to the

facts in the present case. There has been no stay of proceedings in this case, and no

order to the parties to participate in a settlement conference or to arbitrate their clams

before proceeding with the conditional certification motion. In no case (with the exception

of the Cranney case discussed below) did the plaintiffs file their certification motion before

the case was at issue. In most cases, a period of some months separated the filing of the

complaint and the filing of the certification motion. 

Here, plaintiffs filed their motion before Holiday had even responded to the

complaint, and then, when Holiday responded with a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs filed an

amended complaint. The court's decision to stay the briefing and hearing on plaintiffs'

certification motion until after Holiday had responded to the complaint and the court had

conducted the initial CMC was entirely proper, and does not provide a basis for equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. Once the case was at issue, the court set a briefing

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schedule and an April 1, 2015 hearing date. The hearing on the motion was not unduly

delayed, and was in fact held on April 1, 2015. Nor is there any question of the court

unduly delaying in issuing a decision on the motion, as the written decision was issued

fewer than 14 days after the hearing. 

Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish Ash, Woods, and Cranney – cases on which Holiday

relies – is unpersuasive. While it is true that there was not a significant delay between the

filing of the certification motion and the hearing in Ash and Woods, the plaintiffs in those

cases did not did not file the motions prior to the date each case was at issue. 

Moreover, the reasoning in those cases applies equally to this case. In Ash, the

court denied the motion for equitable tolling, finding that defendants had not acted

improperly (or in "bad faith") in opposing the motion for conditional certification. See id.,

2015 WL 427731 at *5. In Woods, the court also denied the request, noting that the statute

of limitations had already been tolled pursuant to stipulation, and that plaintiffs had made

no showing that defendant's counsel had engaged in misconduct or misrepresentations

reflecting bad faith of the type that justifies equitable tolling, and had made no showing that

the time that had elapsed was not of the kind that Congress anticipated would pass when it

enacted § 256. Id., 2015 WL 1198593 at *7. Similarly, in this case, plaintiffs have made no

showing of any bad faith or wrongful conduct on the part of Holiday.

In Cranney, a case that in some respects resembles this one, the complaint was

filed on November 28, 2007. That same day, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking authorization

to send notice of the collective action to defendants' employees, and a motion for an order

shortening time for defendants' response to the plaintiffs' motion. At defendants' request,

the court extended the time to respond to the motion (and to the complaint) to January 28,

2008. Plaintiffs requested that the statute of limitations for the filing of FLSA claims be

tolled from November 28, 2007, to January 28, 2008, claiming that tolling was warranted by

delays in the case outside their control – specifically, delays resulting from defendants'

requesting additional time to respond to the complaint and the motion seeking authorization

for collective action notification. See id., 559 F.Supp. 2d at 1107-08.

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The court granted the motion for collective action notification, but denied the motion

for equitable tolling. The court noted that equitable tolling applies only in rare situations,

and found, under the circumstances presented, that equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations would eviscerate the purpose of the statute of limitations; that defendants'

request for a 45-day extension to respond to the complaint and motion was not a basis for

exercising the extraordinary relief of equitable tolling; that the defendants had engaged in

no wrongful conduct supporting a substantial policy reason for equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations; and that plaintiffs had not shown that extraordinary circumstances

outside their control had made it impossible to file the claims earlier. Id. at 1108-09. 

Similarly, in the present case, the gist of plaintiffs' argument is that the statute of

limitations should be tolled from the date plaintiffs originally noticed for the hearing on the

certification motion, notwithstanding that they filed the motion two and a half weeks before

Holiday's response to the original complaint was due, and that the motion was set for

hearing more than a month before the date scheduled for the initial CMC. However,

plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that defendants engaged in any wrongful conduct

or that extraordinary circumstances warrant equitable tolling.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, plaintiffs' motion for equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations is DENIED. The date for the hearing, previously noticed for April 23, 2015, is

VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 15, 2015 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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