Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-03434/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-03434-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD LONDON,

Petitioner,

v.

JOE A. LIZARRAGA, Warden,

Respondents.

Case No. 13-cv-03434-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER 

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL 

PROCEDURE 60(B)

This is a pro se habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which Petitioner Richard London

filed a federal habeas petition challenging his 1978 judgment of conviction from the San Francisco 

County Superior Court and asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea 

bargaining process.

On March 17, 2015, the Court, upon motion of Respondent, previously dismissed the 

action on the grounds that the petition was not filed within the one-year limitations period 

prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Dkt. 17. 

On the same date, judgment was entered in Respondent’s favor, and the case was closed. Dkt. 16. 

On October 18, 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s request for a 

certificate of appealability. Dkt. 20.

On February 19, 2016, Petitioner filed the present Motion for Relief from Judgment of 

Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Dkt. 21. 

Having read and considered the papers submitted in the matter, the Court hereby DENIES 

the motion. 

DISCUSSION

Rule 60(b) provides for reconsideration where one or more of the following is shown: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that by 

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United States District Court

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due diligence could not have been discovered before the court’s decision; (3) fraud by the adverse 

party; (4) voiding of the judgment; (5) satisfaction of the judgment; (6) any other reason justifying 

relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); School Dist. 1J v. ACandS Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th 

Cir.1993). Although couched in broad terms, subparagraph (6) requires a showing that the 

grounds justifying relief are extraordinary. Twentieth Century - Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 

F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981). Motions for reconsideration should not be frequently made or 

freely granted; they are not a substitute for appeal or a means of attacking some perceived error of 

the court. Id. 

The Court notes that Petitioner does not indicate which of the provisions of Rule 60(b) 

applies to his case. See Dkt. 21. Plaintiff makes no showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 

excusable neglect, he does not set forth any newly discovered evidence, fraud, or any grounds for 

finding that the judgment is void or has been satisfied, nor does he set forth any other reason 

justifying relief. See id. In the present motion, though not entirely clear, it appears that Petitioner

reiterates the same unsuccessful argument raised in his petition as well as in his opposition to 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss, namely that he is entitled to a delayed commencement of the 

limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). However, the Court has already rejected 

Petitioner’s argument in its Order granting Respondent’s motion to dismiss, stating as follows:

. . . [U]nder section 2244(d)(1)(C), the one-year limitation period 

starts on the date on which “the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review.” In interpreting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255(f)(3), an analogous provision for federal prisoners seeking to 

file under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the Supreme Court has held that the 

one-year limitation period begins to run on the date on which the 

Supreme Court recognized the new right being asserted, not the date 

on which that right was made retroactive. See Dodd v. United 

States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005). Petitioner argues that he is 

entitled to a later start date of the statute of limitations due to the 

Supreme Court’s decisions in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 

(2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), which he 

contends established a new constitutional rule. Frye and Lafler

concerned the defense counsel’s failure to communicate to the 

defendant a formal plea offer from the prosecution regarding a plea 

with favorable terms and conditions and allowing that offer to lapse. 

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Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383. The Supreme 

Court found this constituted deficient performance. Id. However, 

Petitioner’s contention—that Frye and Lafler established a new 

constitutional rule—has been directly rejected by the Ninth Circuit. 

In Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012), 

the Ninth Circuit held that neither Frye nor Lafler decided a new 

constitutional rule but rather applied the Sixth Amendment right to 

effective assistance of counsel according to the test articulated in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), and extended it 

to the plea-bargaining context in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 

(1985). “Because the Court in Frye and Lafler repeatedly noted its 

application of an established rule to the underlying facts, these cases 

did not break new ground or impose a new obligation on the State or 

Federal Government.” Buenrostro, 697 F.3d at 1140. Therefore, 

Petitioner is not entitled to a delayed commencement of the

limitations period under section 2244(d)(1)(C). 

Dkt. 17 at 4.1Therefore, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Court addressed in detail, in its

Order granting the motion to dismiss the petition as untimely, and eventually rejected Petitioner’s 

argument that he is entitled to a delayed commencement of the limitations period. See id.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

This Order terminates Docket No. 21.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

 

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The Court also found that Petitioner was not entitled to a delayed commencement of the 

limitations period under either section 2244(d)(1)(B) or 2244(d)(1)(D). Dkt. 14 at 3-4. 

Specifically, the Court found that Petitioner failed to present any evidence or argument suggesting 

there existed unconstitutional state action that created an impediment to his filing the petition

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). Id. at 3. The Court also determined that Petitioner failed

to show that he could not have discovered the factual basis for his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim despite due diligence. See id. at 4 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)).

September 7, 2016

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