Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00859/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00859-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GABRIEL GONZALEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

DERRAL G. ADAMS,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 07-00859 AWI DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 19]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND

Petitioner is in custody for a conviction of first degree murder with a firearm use

enhancement. Petitioner was sentenced to a life term with the possibility of parole, plus twentyfive years to life. (Lodged Doc. No. 1.) 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On April 16, 2004, the California Court of

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. (Lodged Doc. No. 2.) On June 23,

2004, the California Supreme Court denied review. (Lodged Doc. No. 3.)

Petitioner subsequently filed three pro se post-conviction collateral petitions challenging

his conviction. The first petition was filed in the Madera County Superior Court on November

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 Although the mailbox rule is applicable to filing of state habeas corpus petitions, as explained infra, 1

because the filing far exceeded the one-year statute of limitations period, the Court will apply the date the pleadings

were actually filed with the courts, as the mailbox rule does not benefit Petitioner in any way. 

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23, 2005, and denied on March 21, 2006. (Lodged Doc. Nos. 4, 5.) 1

The second petition was filed in the Fifth District Court of Appeal on May 4, 2006, and

denied on May 11, 2006. (Lodged Doc. Nos. 6, 7.)

The third petition was filed in the California Supreme Court on May 30, 2006, and denied

on January 17, 2007. (Lodged Doc. Nos. 8, 9.) 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 6, 2007. 

Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss on October 1, 2007. (Court Doc. 19.)

Petitioner filed an opposition on October 30, 2007, and Respondent filed a reply on November 7,

2007. (Court Docs. 23, 25.)

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of

the state’s procedural rules. See e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) th

(using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White

v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review th

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a

response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F.

Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)'s one-year limitations period. Therefore, the Court will review Respondent’s motion

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28 Cal. R. Ct. 24(a) providing that an order of the Supreme Court denying a petition for review of a decision 2

of a Court of Appeal becomes final when it is filed. 

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to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 th

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on October 14, 2004, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review

on June 23, 2004. Thus, direct review became final on September 21, 2004, when the ninety 2

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 See Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) 3

 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original 4

habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order

denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of

Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by

way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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(90) day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. 3

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999) th

(concluding period of "direct review" includes the period within which one can file a petition for

a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347

(8 Cir.1998). Petitioner would have one year from September 22, 2004, absent applicable th

tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Patterson v. Stewart,

251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9 Cir. 2001) (holding that Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

th

Procedure governs the calculation of statutory tolling applicable to the one year limitations

period.) Therefore, the statute was set to expire on September 21, 2005. Petitioner did not file

the instant petition until June 6, 2007.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is

tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 4

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999);

Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the

limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate

level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent the

premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period, however,

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will not toll for the time a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Petitioner did not file his first post-conviction collateral petition until November 23,

2005. By this time, 427 days had passed, exceeding the one-year statute of limitations under

AEDPA. Moreover, although the limitations period was statutorily tolled from November 23,

2005 (date first petition was filed) through January 17, 2007 (date petition denied by California

Supreme Court), another 140 days of the limitations lapsed before the petition was filed in this

Court on June 6, 2007. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9 Cir. 1999) (no tolling for th

the period between finality and the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral

review in federal court.) 

In his opposition, Petitioner initially contends that Respondent’s motion to dismiss is

untimely by two days. Petitioner is mistaken. The Court’s order of July 31, 2007, directed that a

motion to dismiss be filed within sixty (60) days from the date of service of that order. Sixty

days from July 31, 2007, was Saturday, September 29, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 6(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whenever the last day to file a document ends on a Saturday,

Sunday, or legal holiday, the deadline extends until the end of the next day which is not one of

the aforementioned days. Here, the deadline extended to Monday, October 1, 2007, the date

Respondent filed its motion to dismiss.

Petitioner further contends that his state habeas corpus petitions raised two new

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims, which could not have been raised on

direct appeal. Even if this is true, it does not excuse non-compliance with the one-year statute of

limitations deadline. Petitioner further contends that the Superior Court found his state petition

to have been plead with sufficient facts to warrant a response. The merits of an underlying

petition have no consequence on the limitations period. See e.g. Helton v. Secretary for Dept. of

Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (11 Cir. 2001). th

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations may be equitably tolled if Petitioner can show “‘(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and

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prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1085 (quoting Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Equitable tolling is generally unavailable in most

cases, and the prisoner “must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the cause of his

untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9 Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Indeed, th

“the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the

rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9 Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. th

Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7 Cir. 2000)). th

Petitioner has not presented any basis for the limitations period to be equitably tolled.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition as time-barred be GRANTED;

and

2. The instant petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for violating the limitations

period.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 15, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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