Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01353/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01353-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID CHAVEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

STELLAR MANAGEMENT GROUP VII, 

LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01353-JCS 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

Re: Dkt. No. 9

The Court previously denied a motion by Defendants Stellar Management Group, Inc. 

(“Stellar Inc.”) and The Vincit Company, LLC (“Vincit”) to dismiss Plaintiff David Chavez’s 

claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Order Denying Renewed Mot. to 

Dismiss (dkt. 63). Among other reasons for denying the motion, the Court declined to afford 

preclusive effect to a state court order finding that those companies were not subject to personal 

jurisdiction in a separate action brought by Chavez on behalf of the State of California under the 

Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). Id. at 9–10. The Court relied in part on Chavez’s 

counsel’s declaration stating that the California Superior Court granted Chavez leave to seek 

amendment or reconsideration of its order based on the discovery that Chavez was pursuing in this 

action, and also on the “serious questions of comity regarding this Court’s ability to manage its 

case schedules” that would raised by deferring to a contrary ruling issued while the discovery 

allowed by this Court was pending. Id. The Court did not reach Chavez’s remaining arguments 

against preclusion, including the question of whether Chavez is himself a “party” bound by prior 

decisions in the PAGA action, which courts have generally treated as a form of qui tam claim

brought on behalf of state law enforcement agencies. See id. at 10; Pl.’s Sur-Sur-Reply (dkt. 57)

Case 3:19-cv-01353-JCS Document 73 Filed 04/01/20 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

at 6–8.1

Stellar Inc. and Vincit’s present motion for reconsideration addresses only the finality of 

the state court’s order, attaching a newly-obtained transcript showing that the state court did not 

broadly invite a request for reconsideration based on discovery obtained in this case, but rather 

denied a request to issue its ruling “without prejudice,” and contemplated reconsideration only to 

the extent it might normally be allowed under California law based on “information through which 

the exercise of due diligence could not have been previously produced, change in the law or 

something along that nature.” Mot. for Reconsideration (dkt. 64) at 5 (quoting the state court 

transcript). 

The discrepancy between the transcript and Chavez’s counsel’s previous characterization 

of the state court’s decision is somewhat troubling. Even so, Stellar Inc. and Vincit have not 

addressed this Court’s separate reason for declining to apply issue preclusion—the “serious 

questions of comity” raised by deferring to an order issued while the discovery that this Court 

previously allowed was pending. To place that concern within the context of the test for issue 

preclusion, the Court cannot say that Chavez had “a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in 

the previous action” where Chavez was not granted the opportunity to conduct discovery that this 

Court already determined was appropriate. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th 

Cir. 2010). Accordingly, even assuming for the sake of argument that Stellar Inc. and Vincit can 

now show that the state court’s decision was “final,” the outcome of the motion to dismiss would 

not change. The motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration is therefore DENIED. The 

Court once again does not reach Chavez’s argument that his status as a representative of the state 

in the PAGA action insulates him from any preclusive effect in this case.

While not directly relevant to the issue at hand, the Court further notes that even if Chavez 

were precluded from bringing a claim against these defendants, other potential members of this 

purported class and collective action—including the three individuals who have thus far filed their 

consent to join the collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act—would not be affected by 

1 The parties have consented to the undersigned magistrate judge presiding over the case for all 

purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Case 3:19-cv-01353-JCS Document 73 Filed 04/01/20 Page 2 of 3
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

the state court’s decision because they were not parties to that case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1, 2020

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

Case 3:19-cv-01353-JCS Document 73 Filed 04/01/20 Page 3 of 3