Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01237/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01237-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STA'l'ES COOR'l' OF APP~nitcd States Co~rt ~f Appeals Tenth C1ra11t 

TBlft'II CIRCUIT 

PETER J. PRYOR, and ) 

BARBARA J. PRYOR ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

FEB 19 1991 

:ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1237 

(D.C. No. 88-Z-183) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGHBRT* 

Before McKAY, SBYlfOUR, and BBBL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th 

Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered submitted without 

oral argument. 

Appellants ·attempted to take charitable deductions during 

the tax years 1980 through 1986 on the basis of donations to the 

Universal Life Church. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed 

these deductions. Appellants brought lawsuit in the District of 

Colorado. Thereafter, on the government's Motion To Dismiss Or 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1237 Document: 010110100004 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 1 
For Summary Judgement, Judge Weinshienk entered a judgment and 

order dismissing appellants claims which sought to "enjoin the 

United States from assessing and collecting federal taxes, to 

recover damages, to receive a refund of taxes paid, and to obtain 

a writ of mandamus." Pryor v. United States, Judgment and Order of 

Dismissal at 1, (D. Colo. March 14, 1990). This appeal follows. 

We see no error in the district court's pithy, yet careful, 

order. In addition, we also disagree with appellants' contention 

that there was an error in procedure below. The government made a 

Motion To Dismiss Or For Summary Judgement. There was no surprise 

on the part of the appellants. In fact, as is clear from the 

district court's order, the appellants responded with their own 

"Motion To Strike 'Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Or For Summary 

Judgment Under Rule 12(f) (Motion To Strike).'" Id. Here, the 

evidence is clear that appellants did not carry the burden of 

showing a genuine issue of material fact, nor that the law was in 

their favor. Therefore, summary judgment was proper either on the 

government's motion or; as appellants allege occurred, on the 

district court's sua sponte conversion of the government's motion. 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Nichols v. 

United States, 796 F.2d 361 (1986). 

The final issue that concerns us is the government's request 

for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. Appellants cite this court to Crain v. Commissioner, 

737 F.2d 1417, 1418 (5th Cir. 1984). We understand that it is our 

job to be "sensitive to the need for the courts to remain open to 

all who seek in good faith to invoke the protection of law. An 

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Appellate Case: 90-1237 Document: 010110100004 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 2 
appeal that lacks merit is not always -- or often -- frivolous." 

Id. We also take due notice of the government's citation to 

Dension v. Connnissioner, 751 F.2d 241, 242-43 (8th Cir. 1984), 

cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1069 (1985), citing Lukovsky v. Herstad, 

748 F.2d 499, 500 (8th Cir. 1984): 

The doors of this courthouse are of course open to good 

faith appeals of what are honestly thought to be errors 

of the lower courts. But we can no longer tolerate 

abuse of the judicial review process by irresponsible 

taxpayers who press stale and frivolous arguments, 

without hope of success on the merits, in order to delay 

or harass the collection of public revenues or for other 

nonworthy purposes. 

This appeal comes very close to being frivolous. However, we 

find that the appellant's claim of the unconstitutionality of the 

Sixteenth Amendment under the origination clause found in Article 

I Section 7 is novel enough to save this appeal from such a 

characterization. Although lacking in merit, it is not quite so 

frivolous as to be worthy of sanctions. See Dension at 242-43. 

In pertinent part, Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution 

reads: 

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the 

House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or 

concur with Amendments as on other Bills. 

We completely disagree with appellants that the genesis of the 

Sixteenth Amendment is in any way "repugnan[t] to Article I, 

section 7 of the Constitution." Reply Br. for Appellants, at 8. 

Article I clearly describes the method for enactment of bills, not 

constitutional amendments. Amendments to the Constitution are 

achieved through Article V, and even appellants admit that "it has 

been settled by the Supreme Court ... that the ratification of the 

16th Amendment by the states was in accord with the procedures set 

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Appellate Case: 90-1237 Document: 010110100004 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 3 
{ 

out in Article V of the Constitution and the validity of the 

ratification process is no longer subject to question." Id. 

Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court but deny the 

government's request for sanctions. Mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court, 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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