Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01576/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01576-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KARL VANDERVALL,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-09-1576 DAD P

vs.

J. FELTNER, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants

violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

On December 18, 2009, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on the

grounds that: (1) plaintiff’s claims are barred by the favorable termination rule announced in

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (2) plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim under the

Due Process Clause; (3) defendant Martel’s and Lackner’s actions furthered a legitimate

penological purpose; and (4) all defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff has filed

an opposition to the motion, and defendants have filed a reply. In addition, pursuant to court

order, defendants have filed a supplemental brief addressing issues raised by their argument

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26 The EOP program provides additional assistance to mentally ill prisoners who are in the 1

custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). (Compl. at 3.)

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seeking dismissal pursuant to Heck in light of plaintiff’s sentence. For the reasons set forth

below, the court recommends that defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in

part. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is proceeding on his original complaint against defendants Feltner,

Machado, Martel, and Lackner. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges as follows. On March 28,

2008, plaintiff was given a job assignment as an Enhanced Outpatient Program (EOP) aide and

mentor. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff noticed that two co-workers were subjecting EOP inmates 1

to physical, emotional, and financial abuse. He brought this to the attention of defendant Feltner,

who dismissed plaintiff’s concerns and told him to “mind [his] own business.” Moreover,

defendant Feltner indicated that one of the co-workers in question was his “inside man” who was

given extra leeway. (Compl. at 3-4.) 

Having little success with other correctional staff in halting the abuse of EOP

inmates, plaintiff sought the help of Recreation Therapist Dru Scott. Ms. Scott confirmed that

she had heard similar reports of abuse from other inmates and that she would take some form of

action. In late September or early October 2008, Ms. Scott issued an internal memo stating that

she was disturbed by EOP’s unhealthy environment and that remedial action should be taken. 

Ms. Scott’s memo was addressed to EOP staff members and administrators, including defendants

Feltner and Machado. (Compl. at 5, Ex. C.)

Defendant Feltner responded harshly to Ms. Scott’s memo, convening a meeting

where he threatened to fire all EOP aides and mentors if there was another “leak” about inmate

abuse. Defendant Feltner also called plaintiff into his office and alleged that plaintiff was the

main suspect behind the memo’s complaints. Thereafter, plaintiff experienced late releases from

his cell, repeated cell and body searches and verbal abuse from other correctional staff members. 

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 Mr. Keating serves as the special master in Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90- 2

0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (ordering California to reduce its

prison population because inmates were not receiving constitutionally sufficient levels of medical

and mental health care).

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(Compl. at 5-6.) 

Fearing for his safety, plaintiff resigned from his position as an EOP aide and

mentor on October 23, 2008. The following day, plaintiff filed a CDC-602 grievance form in

which he reiterated his complaints regarding EOP inmate abuse and indicated his intent to bring

the matter before J. Michael Keating. Plaintiff also mailed a letter detailing the inmate abuse to 2

attorneys at the Prison Law Office in San Quentin, California. (Compl. at 6-7; Ex. D1.) 

On November 9, 2008, defendant Feltner escorted plaintiff to the Program Office

to be questioned. Two documents, both authored by defendant Feltner, claimed that plaintiff had

been “pressuring lower functioning inmates to make false allegations on other inmates and staff

members.” After approximately forty-five minutes of questioning, plaintiff was handed a copy of

the lock-up order and was placed in administrative segregation. (Compl. at 7-8.) 

The following day, defendant Machado held plaintiff’s 114-D hearing to decide

whether plaintiff would be retained in administrative segregation. Defendant Machado did not

allow plaintiff to present any witnesses and stated, “Maybe if you hadn’t written that [CDC-602]

and contacted the judge about the EOP program, you wouldn’t be here.” Ultimately, defendant

Machado ruled that plaintiff should be retained in administrative segregation. (Compl. at 7-9.)

On November 13, 2008, plaintiff appeared before the Institutional Classification

board (ICC), which included defendants Lackner and Martel. During his ICC hearing, plaintiff

was again denied an investigative employee, the presence of witnesses, and the opportunity to

present evidence. The ICC concluded that plaintiff should be retained in administrative

segregation until a full investigation into the disciplinary charges could be completed. (Compl.

at 9, Ex. H.)

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On November 19, 2008, plaintiff filed another CDC-602 grievance, alleging that

defendant Feltner and other prison officials were retaliating against him for exercising his First

Amendment rights. (Compl. at 9, Ex. I.)

On November 24, 2008, plaintiff was released from administrative segregation. 

However on December 14, 2008, plaintiff was returned to administrative segregation on another

charge of pressuring fellow inmates. Although this charge was quickly dismissed, plaintiff was

found guilty of the original charges brought against him on November 9, 2008. Consequently,

prison officials recommended that plaintiff be transferred to another institution. (Compl. at 10-

11.) 

On December 27, 2008, plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant Martel reiterating his

innocence and requesting that he not to be transferred. On January 8, 2009, defendant Lackner

wrote in response indicating that “further review into the reasons for your Ad-Seg placement is

warranted . . . [and] you will be scheduled for ICC in the near future to determine your housing

and placement.” However, such a hearing was never held, and on February 26, 2009, plaintiff

was transferred to Pleasant Valley State Prison. (Compl. at 11; Ex. L.) 

Based upon these allegations, plaintiff claims that defendant Feltner violated his

rights under the First Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by

falsifying disciplinary charges against him and placing him in administrative segregation for the

purpose of retaliating against plaintiff for filing grievances. Plaintiff also claims that defendants

Machado, Lackner, and Martel similarly violated his First Amendment and due process rights by

furthering defendant Feltner’s retaliatory actions. In terms of relief, plaintiff seeks an injunction,

declaratory relief and monetary damages. (Compl. at 12-14.)

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

I. Defendants’ Motion

In moving to dismiss, defense counsel argues that plaintiff’s due process and

retaliation claims against defendants Feltner, Machado, Lackner, and Martel are barred by the

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favorable termination rule. Counsel asserts that the underlying basis for plaintiff’s claims is the

allegation that defendants falsified information in the rules violation report. Counsel argues that

plaintiff’s success on his claims would therefore imply the invalidity of the rules violation

conviction, pursuant to which plaintiff was assessed a sixty-day loss of behavioral credits. 

According to defense counsel, plaintiff must first successfully challenge his disciplinary

conviction by way of a habeas corpus petition and not in a § 1983 civil rights action. (Def.’s

Mot. to Dismiss at 4, 8-9.)

Defense counsel also contends that plaintiff fails to state a cognizable due process

claim against defendants Feltner, Machado, Martel and Lackner. In this regard, counsel argues

that placement in administrative segregation does not, in of itself, implicate a protected liberty

interest and that plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that his confinement constituted an

atypical and significant hardship. Counsel argues further that even if plaintiff has a protected

liberty interest, he has received all the process that he was due. Specifically, counsel emphasizes

that plaintiff was informed in writing of the reasons for his confinement in administrative

segregation and was given opportunities to present his views to a hearing committee. (Def.’s

Mot. to Dismiss at 5-7.)

Defense counsel also asserts that defendants Martel and Lackner did not violate

plaintiff’s First Amendment rights because their decision to retain him in administrative

segregation furthered a legitimate penological purpose. Counsel argues that under California

prison regulations, retention of a prisoner in administrative segregation while a rules violation

report is pending ensures prison safety and security. Moreover, counsel argues, the decisions

made by defendants Martel and Lackner were justifiable, especially in light of the fact that

plaintiff was ultimately found guilty of the rules violation. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 9-10.)

Lastly, defense counsel claims that all the defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity because they did not violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at

10-11.)

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II. Plaintiff’s Opposition

In opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff argues that his retaliation

and due process claims are not barred by the favorable termination rule because the disciplinary 

sanctions at issue do not affect the overall length of his imprisonment. Specifically, plaintiff

explains that he is serving two consecutive life sentences: one term of 17-years-to-life for second

degree murder and robbery, and another term of 25-years-to-life for possession of a weapon by a

state prisoner. According to plaintiff, life prisoners convicted of second degree murder, such as

himself, are not eligible to accrue time credits. Therefore, plaintiff argues that any forfeiture of

credits imposed by the disputed rules violation report is immaterial in his case and should not

operate so as to bar this civil rights action. (Opp’n at 9-10.)

Plaintiff also argues that he states a cognizable procedural due process claim

against the defendants. In plaintiff’s view, his placement in administrative segregation

implicates a protected liberty interest because it was imposed by prison officials relying on false

information. Plaintiff argues further that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest without

adequate procedural safeguards because under California prison regulations, prison officials are

required to provide him with a staff assistant, an investigative employee, and an opportunity to

present witnesses before placing him in administrative segregation. (Opp’n at 13-14.)

Moreover, plaintiff asserts for the first time that his complaint implicitly includes 

a substantive due process claim. Specifically, plaintiff maintains that the defendants violated his

substantive due process rights by engaging in “criminal misconduct and then attempting to shield

such misconduct under the mantle of ‘penological justification.’” (Opp’n at 12-13.) 

Plaintiff also contests defense counsel’s argument that defendants Lackner and

Martel did not violate his First Amendment rights to be free from retaliation because defendants’

decision to retain him in administrative segregation furthered a legitimate penological purpose. 

Specifically, plaintiff argues that once the second intimidation charge against him was dismissed,

he should have been released from administrative segregation. Instead, he was retained in

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administrative segregation thereafter without any penological justification. (Opp’n at 11.) 

Finally, plaintiff contends that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. 

Plaintiff argues that defendant Feltner violated clearly established law when he use falsified

disciplinary charges in retaliation against plaintiff for filing EOP-related grievances. Regarding 

the other defendants, plaintiff argues that they too violated clearly established law because they

were complicit in defendant Feltner’s retaliatory scheme. (Opp’n at 14-15.)

III. Defendants’ Reply

In reply, defense counsel reiterates many of the arguments made in the pending

motion to dismiss. In particular, counsel restates that placement in administrative segregation

based upon false information does not implicate a protected liberty interest and that, even if it

did, plaintiff was afforded all the process he was due. 

IV. Defendants’ Supplemental Brief

As noted above, on May 20, 2010, the court ordered defendants to file a

supplemental brief with respect to their argument that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the

favorable termination rule. Specifically, the court ordered defendants to explain: (1) whether

plaintiff is able to accrue time credits under California law; and (2) what effect any loss of time

credits has on the overall length of plaintiff’s sentence. On June 16, 2010, defendants filed a

timely supplemental brief. Therein, defense counsel concedes that although plaintiff is entitled to

earn time credits, any loss of credits by plaintiff has no effect on the overall length of his

sentence. (Supp. Br. at 2.)

ANALYSIS

I. Legal Standards Applicable to a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure tests the sufficiency of the complaint. North Star Int’l v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720

F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within it, “can be based

on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

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cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); 

see also Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). In order to

survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007).

In determining whether a pleading states a claim, the court accepts as true all

material allegations in the complaint and construes those allegations, as well as the reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v.

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.

738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). In the context of a

motion to dismiss, the court also resolves doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen,

395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations,

unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643

F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

In general, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted

by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409,

413 (9th Cir. 1988). The court has an obligation, particularly in civil rights actions, to construe

such pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985). However,

the court’s liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of the

claim that were not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982); see also Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992).

II. Discussion

A. The Favorable Termination Rule

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court set

forth what has become known as the “favorable termination” rule. Under Heck, when a §1983

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claim would necessarily implicate the validity of the prisoner’s conviction or sentence, “a §1983

plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged

by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or

called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87. This

is because suits challenging the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement fall within the

traditional scope of habeas corpus and not of a §1983 action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 500 (1973).

Application of the favorable termination rule “turns solely on whether a successful

§1983 action would necessarily render invalid a conviction, sentence, or administrative sanction

that affected the length of the prisoner’s confinement.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856

(9th Cir. 2003). See also Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A] § 1983 suit by

a prisoner . . . challenging the validity of a disciplinary or administrative sanction that does not

affect the overall length of the prisoner’s confinement is not barred by Heck.”) In this regard, a

prisoner challenging a prison disciplinary sanction involving the deprivation of credits generally

must, under the favorable termination rule, seek relief in an action for habeas corpus because the

loss of time credits typically lengthens the duration of a prisoner’s confinement. See Edwards v.

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). 

In this case, the court finds that plaintiff’s §1983 action is not barred by the

favorable termination rule. It is true that the disciplinary conviction at issue resulted in the

imposition of a sixty-day loss of credits upon plaintiff. If plaintiff was serving a sentence of a

term of specific years, such a sanction would necessarily lengthen the duration of his

confinement by sixty days and would required plaintiff, under the favorable termination rule, to

invalidate the disciplinary sanction in a habeas proceeding before bringing this §1983 action. 

See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 648. However, plaintiff is not serving a definite term. Rather, plaintiff

is serving two consecutive indeterminate life sentences. The loss of credits cannot extend

plaintiff’s maximum term, which is already life in prison. Finally, defense counsel concedes that

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 Nor will the loss of credits have any impact on plaintiff’s eligibility for release on 3

parole. Under California law, plaintiff’s earned credits may be applied to reduce his minimum

eligible parole date (MEPD). See In re Dayan, 231 Cal. App.3d 184, 188 (1991); see also Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3000; Cal. Penal. Code § 190(a). However, plaintiff’s MEPD does not set

an actual parole release date. Rather, the MEPD determines when plaintiff may appear before the

Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) for his first parole suitability hearing. The BPH, in turn, has the

exclusive authority to grant plaintiff parole and set any actual parole release date. Thus, as one

court has recently explained, 

[A]ny credits earned [by a prisoner] on his indeterminate life

sentences can only affect the ultimate establishment of a MEPD;

they can have no real impact on the actual sentence eventually set

for [the prisoner] or on his eventual release date on parole, should

that time ever come.

Burton v. Adams, 1:09-cv-0354 JLT HC, 2010 WL 703182, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2010).

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any loss of credits by plaintiff has no effect on the length of his sentence. Under these

circumstances, defendants cannot demonstrate that plaintiff’s forfeiture of sixty days of time

credits will affect the length of his confinement. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 858. 

3

Accordingly, because defendants have failed to demonstrate how the loss of time credits

imposed by the disciplinary conviction at issue can have any impact on the overall length of

plaintiff’s confinement, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint as barred by the

favorable termination rule should be denied. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 858 (“[W]here . . . a

successful § 1983 action would not necessarily result in an earlier release from incarceration . . .

the favorable termination rule of Heck and Edwards does not apply.”); Tucker v. Monroe, No.

2:06-cv-58, 2007 WL 839993, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 15, 2007) (rejecting a Heck bar argument

where the plaintiff asserted “that he is serving a parolable life sentence for second degree murder

and is not eligible to earn good time or disciplinary credits”); see also Thomas v. Wong, No. C

09-0733 JSW (PR), 2010 WL 1233909, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2010) (holding that habeas

jurisdiction was absent because the disputed rules violation, which imposed a 30-day loss of time

credits, did not inevitably affect the duration of petitioner’s indeterminate sentence; dismissing

the habeas action without prejudice to petitioner bringing his claims in a § 1983 action). 

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B. Due Process 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that

deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend

XIV. A plaintiff alleging a procedural due process violation must first demonstrate that he was

deprived of a liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that

the procedures attendant upon the deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Ky. Dep’t of

Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 900 (9th

Cir. 2002); Brewster v. Bd. of Education., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998). In the context of a

prison disciplinary action, a prisoner may be deprived of a protected liberty interest if the action

in dispute resulted in the imposition of an “atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). See also

Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-29 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In this case, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to allege facts establishing a

prima facie due process violation. In particular, plaintiff has not alleged facts in his complaint

demonstrating that his confinement in administrative segregation constituted “an atypical and

significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515

U.S. at 484. Plaintiff’s complaint does not present any facts showing that the conditions of his

confinement in administrative segregation amounted to “a major disruption in his environment”

or were more burdensome than the conditions faced by the general population. Id. at 486. At

most, plaintiff asserts that he was forced to spend four months in administrative segregation. 

However, spending four months in administrative segregation is insufficient, in of itself, to

establish “the type of atypical, significant deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty

interest.” Id. See also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that

placement in administrative segregation is insufficient to state a due process claim); Saenz v.

Spearman, No. 1:09-cv-0557 YNP PC, 2009 WL 3233799, at *9-11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2009)

(finding that one-year confinement in administrative segregation did not, in of itself, implicate a

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protected liberty interest); Del Rio v. Schwarzenegger, No. EDCV 09-214 TJH (MAN), 2009

WL 1657438, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2009) (same).

Even assuming plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation did implicate a

protected liberty interest, plaintiff was afforded all the process he was due. Plaintiff alleges in his

complaint that he was not provided with an investigative employee, witnesses, or the opportunity

to present evidence at his 114-D hearing on November 10, 2008 and at his ICC hearing three

days later. (Compl. at 9.) Such protections and procedures, however, are not required at the

identified stages of the prison disciplinary process. When prison officials are deciding whether

to place or retain a prisoner in administrative segregation pending an investigation into

disciplinary charges, due process requires only the following:

Prison officials must hold an informal nonadversary hearing within

a reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated. The prison

officials must inform the prisoner of the charges against the

prisoner or their reasons for considering segregation. Prison

officials must allow the prisoner to present his views.

We [the Ninth Circuit] specifically find that the due process clause

does not require detailed written notice of charges, representation 

by counsel or counsel-substitute, an opportunity to present

witnesses, or a written decision describing the reasons for placing

the prisoner in administrative segregation. We also find that due

process does not require disclosure of the identity of any person

providing information leading to the placement of a prisoner in

administrative segregation.

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Hewitt v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460, 476 (1983) (“[A]n informal, nonadversary evidentiary review is sufficient . . . to

confine an inmate to administrative segregation pending completion of [any] investigation into

misconduct charges against him.”). 

Here, plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation on November 9, 2008,

pending an investigation into accusations that he was pressuring inmates into making false

allegations against other inmates and staff members. (Compl. at 8.) At that point, due process

required only that prison officials hold an “informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable

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 Plaintiff does not appear to challenge the procedural adequacy of his actual disciplinary 4

hearing, at which time he would have been entitled to greater procedural protections than those

set forth in Toussaint. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-70 (1974). Nonetheless, had

plaintiff made such a claim, the court would have again concluded that he was afforded all the

process he was due. Specifically, according to his won complaint plaintiff was (1) provided

written notice of all the charges against him; (2) afforded more than 24 hours to prepare his

defense; (3) given a written statement regarding the evidence on which the factfinders relied on;

(4) allowed to request witnesses; and (5) deemed competent to understand the nature of the

charges against him. (Compl., Ex. K.) 

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time” to inform plaintiff of the charges and give him an opportunity to present his views. 

Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100-01. Such a hearing was held the following day when plaintiff

appeared for his 114-D hearing. (Compl. at 9.) At that time plaintiff was provided with the

reasons for his placement in administrative segregation and was given an opportunity to present

his views. (See id., Ex. G.) Moreover, three days later on November 13, 2008, plaintiff appeared

for another hearing before the ICC board to determine whether he should be retained in

administrative segregation. (Id. at 9.) At the ICC hearing, plaintiff was once again provided with

the reasons for his segregation and was given an opportunity to present his views. (Id., Ex. H.) 

Therefore, at those early stages of the prison disciplinary process, plaintiff was afforded all the

procedural protection he was entitled to under the Due Process Clause.4

Finally, to the extent that plaintiff’s complaint can be read as alleging a

substantive due process claim, such a claim is to be assessed under First Amendment standards. 

In this regard, where a particular Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides the explicit

textual source of a constitutional protection, that Amendment, and “not the mere generalized

notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing [those] claims.” Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). See also Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citations omitted). Here, the thrust of plaintiff’s allegations is that defendants have made false

accusations against him in retaliation for his filing of grievances and complaints regarding the

abuse of EOP inmates. Such a claim fall squarely within the protections of the First Amendment. 

See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (reaffirming that prisoners have

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cognizable claims under § 1983 and the First Amendment regarding retaliatory actions by prison

officials).

Accordingly, for all the reasons discussed above, defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s due process claims should be granted.

C. Retaliation

Under the First Amendment, prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners

for initiating litigation or filing administrative grievances. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,

568 (9th Cir. 2005). A viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements:

(1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3)

that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his

First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate penological

purpose. Id.; Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Although the court accepts as true plaintiff’s allegations on a motion to dismiss,

the court need not accept as true allegations that are conclusory or inferences that are

unreasonable. W. Mining Council, 643 F.2d at 624. Here, the court finds plaintiff’ allegations

against defendants Lackner and Martel to be wholly conclusory and insufficient to establish that

the actions of those defendants did not advance a legitimate penological purpose. In his

complaint, plaintiff merely alleges that the actions of defendant Martel were retaliatory and did

not advance any legitimate penological purpose because Martel had “misgivings about the

charges against plaintiff” yet decided to retain plaintiff in segregation nonetheless. (Compl. at 9.) 

In addition, plaintiff argues in his opposition to the pending motion to dismiss that defendant

Martel failed to release him from segregation immediately after he was found not guilty on the

second set of disciplinary charges. (Opp’n at 11.) Plaintiff’s allegations in this regard represent

no more than pure speculation that defendant Martel acted with a retaliatory motive and without

advancing a legitimate penological purpose. 

/////

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 In light of the recommendations that plaintiff’s due process claims against all 5

defendants and plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Lackner and

Martel be dismissed, the court will only address defendants’ qualified immunity argument as it

applies to plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims brought against defendants Feltner and

Machado. 

15

Plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Lackner are equally lacking. Plaintiff’s

only allegation against defendant Lackner is that she wrote him a letter, wherein she stated that

further review and an ICC hearing would be conducted into the reasons for plaintiff’s placement

in administrative segregation. (Compl. at 11.) According to plaintiff, however, such a hearing

was never conducted and his transfer to a different prison was not rescinded. (Id.) From this

alone, plaintiff concludes that defendant Lackner sought to retaliate against him for filing EOPrelated grievances. Again, without more, plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Lackner do not

rise above the purely speculative level. See Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (2007).

Accordingly, because plaintiff’s allegations against defendants Lackner and

Martel are wholly conclusory, the court recommends that plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation

claims against these defendants be dismissed.

D. Qualified Immunity 5

Determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity requires a twopart analysis. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Ramirez v. City of Buena Park,

560 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009). First, a court must decide whether the facts alleged, when

taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, demonstrate that the defendants’ conduct violated a

statutory or constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02. Second, the court must determine

whether the statutory or constitutional right alleged by plaintiff was “clearly established.” Id. at

201. A right is “clearly established” for the purpose of qualified immunity if “‘it would be clear

to a reasonable [prison official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted’ . . .

or whether the state of the law [at the time of the alleged violation] gave ‘fair warning’ to [him]

that [his] conduct was unconstitutional.” Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir. 2002)

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(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the

initial burden of proof lies with the prison official asserting the defense. See Houghton v. South,

965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Although it is often beneficial to approach the two-part inquiry in the sequence

prescribed above, it is not mandatory. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S. Ct. 808,

815 (2009). A district court has “discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified

immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Id. See also Ramirez, 560 F.3d at 1020. The

court may grant defendants qualified immunity at any point the court answers either prong of the

inquiry in the negative. See e.g., Tibbetts v. Kulongoski, 567 F.3d 529, 536-39 (9th Cir. 2009)

(bypassing the first prong and granting defendants qualified immunity because plaintiff’s due

process right was not clearly established at the time of alleged violation). 

In this case, plaintiff’s First Amendment right to file inmate grievances free from

prison official retaliation was clearly established by 2008, the year of the alleged violations. See

Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (“[T]he prohibition against retaliatory punishment is clearly established law

in the Ninth Circuit, for qualified immunity purposes.”). Thus, defendants Feltner and Machado

are entitled to qualified immunity only if plaintiff has failed to allege facts that, if proven, would

sufficiently demonstrate that defendants’ conduct violated his First Amendment rights. See

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

The court finds that plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Feltner, if proven to

be true, establish that his conduct violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Specifically, in his

complaint plaintiff alleges that defendant Feltner warned him not to complain about EOP inmate

abuse, especially because one of the individuals being accused by plaintiff was defendant

Feltner’s “inside man.” (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff further alleges that when Ms. Scott issued her

memo regarding EOP inmate abuse, defendant Feltner became outraged and immediately

suspected plaintiff of being behind all of the complaints. (Id. at 5.) According to plaintiff,

defendant Feltner warned plaintiff that he was “going to get burned very badly playing with fire.” 

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(Id. at 6.) Plaintiff has alleged that after he persisted in filing an inmate grievance regarding the

EOP inmate abuse, defendant Feltner issued false disciplinary charges against him and had him

placed in administrative segregation. (Id. at 8.) In plaintiff’s view, defendant Feltner’s

retaliatory actions were designed to chill plaintiff’s complaints and therefore did not serve any

legitimate penological purpose. (See id. at 13.)

Similarly, the court finds that plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Machado, if

proven to be true, also establish that his conduct violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. In

particular, plaintiff alleges in his complaint that defendant Machado knew that defendant Feltner

falsified the disciplinary charges against plaintiff. (Compl. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant

Machado nevertheless decided to retain him in administrative segregation. (Id.) According to

plaintiff, when he protested being retained in segregation, defendant Machado responded,

“Maybe if you hadn’t written that [CDC-602] and contacted the judge about the EOP program,

you wouldn’t be here.” (Id.) In plaintiff’s view, defendant Machado’s statement shows that his

actions were designed to further defendant Feltner’s retaliatory scheme and were not intended to

advance any legitimate penological purpose. (See id. at 12.)

Accordingly, because plaintiff’s rights were clearly established at the time and

because plaintiff’s allegations, if proven true, demonstrate that the conduct of defendants Feltner

and Machado violated his rights, these two defendants are not entitled to dismissal of plaintiff’s

First Amendment retaliation claims on qualified immunity grounds. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to

randomly assign a United States District Judge to this action.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ December 18, 2009 motion

to dismiss (Doc. No. 13) be granted in part and denied in part as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint as barred by the favorable

termination rule be denied;

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2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Clause claims against defendants Feltner, Machado, Lackner and Martel be granted;

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims

against defendants Lackner and Martel be granted; and

4. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims

against defendants Feltner and Machado on the grounds of qualified immunity be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 17, 2010.

DAD:sj

vand1576.56

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