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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 20, 2016 Decided December 9, 2016

No. 14-7197

WINSTON & STRAWN, LLP,

APPELLEE

v.

JAMES P. MCLEAN, JR.,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-00524)

Michael Skopets, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on 

the briefs were Anthony F. Shelley and Brian A. Hill, 

appointed by the court.

James P. McLean, Jr., pro se, filed the briefs for 

appellant.

Paul J. Maloney argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellee Winston & Strawn, LLP

Before: WILKINS, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: The Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure state that the District Court “shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

However, under its Local Rules, the District Court has 

discretion to treat a motion “as conceded” if the nonmoving 

party fails to timely file an opposition to the motion. D.D.C. 

Local R. 7(b). This appeal concerns the interplay between

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and the District Court’s 

Local Rule 7(b).

In April of 2013, Appellee Winston & Strawn, LLP 

(“Appellee” or “Winston & Strawn”) filed a lawsuit against 

James P. McLean, Jr. (“Appellant” or “McLean”) in the 

District Court. On July 28, 2014, Appellee filed a motion for 

summary judgment. The District Court informed Appellant

that he was required to respond by August 18, 2014, and 

advised him that if he did not the court might treat the motion 

as conceded. He mailed his response to the District Court on 

August 18, but it did not arrive until August 20. On August 

19, the court, relying solely on Local Rule 7(b), granted 

Appellee’s motion for summary judgment “as conceded.” The 

District Court thereafter denied Appellant’s motions for 

reconsideration. Appellant, acting pro se, filed a timely notice 

of appeal on December 11, 2014. This court subsequently 

appointed Miller & Chevalier amicus curiae to present 

arguments on behalf of McLean. 

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for 

summary judgment cannot be “conceded” for want of 

opposition. “The burden is always on the movant to 

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demonstrate why summary judgment is warranted. The 

nonmoving party’s failure to oppose summary judgment does 

not shift that burden.” Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 

F.3d 83, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Griffith, J., concurring). The 

District Court “must always determine for itself whether the 

record and any undisputed material facts justify granting 

summary judgment.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3)). In 

this case, the District Court relied solely on Local Rule 7(b) in 

granting summary judgment for Appellee “as conceded.” 

There is nothing to indicate that the District Court considered

whether Appellee’s assertions warranted judgment under Rule 

56. We therefore reverse and remand the case to the District 

Court so that it may reconsider Appellee’s motion for 

summary judgment in adherence with the applicable Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. Background

As noted above, Appellee filed a lawsuit against 

Appellant in April 2013. It moved for summary judgment on 

July 28, 2014. The District Court issued an order advising 

Appellant of the motion, informing him of his obligations, 

and warning him that the court might treat the motion as 

conceded if he failed to respond by August 18, 2014. On 

August 18, McLean e-mailed his opposition to counsel for 

Winston & Strawn, and mailed it to the District Court. His 

opposition did not reach the court until August 20, however, 

and so was not deemed filed until two days after the 

prescribed deadline. 

On August 19, the District Court sua sponte issued an 

order granting Winston & Strawn’s motion for summary 

judgment “as conceded as to” McLean. Appendix of Amicus

Curiae (“App.”) 18. The order did not analyze any of the 

substance of Winston & Strawn’s motion for summary 

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judgment, nor did it purport to apply the standards of Rule 56. 

Instead, the order focused solely on McLean’s failure to file a 

timely response as the basis for summary judgment against 

him. 

Between August 28 and November 13, 2014, McLean 

filed, and the District Court denied, via minute orders, three 

motions for reconsideration. In these orders, the court 

reiterated that it had granted Appellee’s motion “as 

conceded.” App. 20–23.

On appeal, amicus curiae, on behalf of Appellant and 

whose arguments we will hereinafter attribute to Appellant, 

principally argues that the District Court’s order granting 

summary judgment to Appellee should be reversed because

the court failed to follow the standards set forth in Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In particular, Appellant contends 

that the District Court’s reliance solely on Local Rule 7(b) 

cannot be squared with Rules 56(a) and 56(e). Appellant also 

argues that the District Court abused its discretion in granting 

summary judgment as a sanction for his late filing, because 

this was an excessive punishment and exceeded the court’s 

authority. Finally, Appellant argues that because his late filing 

was “excusable neglect,” the District Court abused its 

discretion in denying his motions for reconsideration.

We agree with Appellant that, contrary to Rule 56, the 

District Court erred in granting summary judgment without 

determining whether Appellee’s assertions warranted 

judgment. A court must always engage in the analysis 

required by Rule 56 before acting on a motion for summary 

judgment. Because the District Court did not purport to do 

this in granting Appellee’s motion, we reverse and remand 

this case for further consideration. Our holding on this point is 

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dispositive, so it is unnecessary for us to address Appellant’s 

remaining claims.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the legal question of whether the 

District Court improperly applied Local Rule 7(b) in place of 

the standards prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

56. See Texas v. United States, 798 F.3d 1108, 1113 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015) (“A district court abuses its discretion if it did not 

apply the correct legal standard . . . or if it misapprehended 

the underlying substantive law. We examine any such legal 

questions de novo.” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted; ellipsis in original)).

B. Under Rule 56, Motions for Summary Judgment May 

Not Be Granted “As Conceded” for Want of Opposition

It is undisputed that the District Court is authorized to 

promulgate local rules. Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1). However,

these rules “must be consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure.” Cohen v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of D.C., 819 

F.3d 476, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

83(a)(1)). The Federal Rules are “as binding as any statute 

duly enacted by Congress, and federal courts have no more 

discretion to disregard the . . . mandate [of a Federal Rule] 

than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory 

provisions.” Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S.

250, 255 (1988) (stating that “a federal court may not invoke 

supervisory power to circumvent” the dictates of a Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure, id. at 254).

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Local Rule 7(b) cannot be squared with Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56. The Local Rule states that: 

Within 14 days of the date of service [of a motion] 

or at such other time as the Court may direct, an 

opposing party shall serve and file a memorandum 

of points and authorities in opposition to the 

motion. If such a memorandum is not filed within 

the prescribed time, the Court may treat the motion 

as conceded.

D.D.C. Local R. 7(b) (emphasis added). As is clear from its 

terms, this rule allows the District Court to treat an unopposed 

motion for summary judgment as conceded. But this cannot 

be so because of the demands of Rules 56(a) and 56(e).

Rule 56(a) is clear in saying that a court may only enter 

summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[A] party seeking 

summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). And then

“a district court must always determine for itself whether the 

record and any undisputed material facts justify granting 

summary judgment.” Grimes, 794 F.3d at 95 (citation 

omitted). These standards cannot be satisfied if, as allowed by 

Local Rule 7(b), the District Court simply grants judgment 

“as conceded” when the nonmoving party fails to meet a 

deadline.

Furthermore, Local Rule 7(b) is entirely inconsistent with 

the commands of Rule 56(e). The Federal Rule states that:

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If a party fails . . . to properly address another 

party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),

the court may:

(1) give an opportunity to properly support or 

address the fact;

(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes 

of the motion;

(3) grant summary judgment if the motion 

and supporting materials—including the 

facts considered undisputed—show that 

the movant is entitled to it; or

(4) issue any other appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The rule does not in any way endorse an 

approach pursuant to which the District Court may grant 

judgment “as conceded” simply because a nonmoving party 

fails to respond. 

Rule 56(e)(1) empowers the District Court to “give a 

party who has failed to address a summary judgment 

movant’s assertion of fact ‘an opportunity to properly support 

or address’ the fact.” Grimes, 794 F.3d at 92 (quoting Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(e)(1)). Moreover, “[t]he 2010 Advisory 

Committee[’s] Note to Rule 56(e) states that ‘afford[ing] an 

opportunity to properly support or address [a] fact’ is ‘[i]n 

many circumstances . . . the court's preferred first step.’” Id.

(ellipsis in original).

The rule also allows the District Court to “consider [a] 

fact undisputed” if it has not been properly supported or 

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addressed as required by Rule 56(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 

“Indeed, for the evidentiary burden that Rule 56(c) places on 

nonmovant plaintiffs to function, a court must be able to 

evaluate an inadequately supported assertion of material fact 

and deem it not materially disputed, such that summary 

judgment is warranted in whole or in part.” Grimes, 794 F.3d 

at 92. However, as the rule makes clear, judgment is granted 

only after the District Court satisfies itself that the record and 

any undisputed material facts justify granting summary 

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3).

What is crucially important here is that Rule 56(e)(3)

plainly states that the District Court may enter summary 

judgment only if, after fully considering the merits of the 

motion, it finds that it is warranted. There is no room for a 

judgment “as conceded” as contemplated by Local Rule 7(b). 

Appellee argues that the court’s decision in FDIC v. 

Bender, 127 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1997), requires us to affirm 

the judgment of the District Court in this case. We disagree. 

In Bender, we held that “it was not an abuse of discretion for 

the district court, pursuant to [the predecessor to Local Rule 

7(b)], to treat the [movant's] motion for summary judgment as 

conceded.” Id. at 68. However, the decision in Bender has 

been displaced by the substantive revisions to Rule 56 that 

were adopted in 2010. The 2010 Advisory Committee’s Note 

to Rule 56 makes it plain that Local Rule 7(b) can no longer 

coexist with Rule 56. The Note says, inter alia, that:

Subdivision (a) . . . adds a new direction that the 

court should state on the record the reasons for 

granting or denying [a motion for summary 

judgment].

. . . .

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[S]ummary judgment cannot be granted by default 

even if there is a complete failure to respond to the 

motion, much less when an attempted response fails 

to comply with Rule 56(c) requirements. Nor should 

it be denied by default even if the movant 

completely fails to reply to a nonmovant’s response.

. . . .

Subdivision (e)(3) recognizes that the court may 

grant summary judgment only if the motion and 

supporting materials—including the facts 

considered undisputed under subdivision (e)(2)—

show that the movant is entitled to it. Considering 

some facts undisputed does not of itself allow 

summary judgment. If there is a proper response or 

reply as to some facts, the court cannot grant 

summary judgment without determining whether 

those facts can be genuinely disputed. Once the 

court has determined the set of facts—both those it 

has chosen to consider undisputed for want of a 

proper response or reply and any that cannot be 

genuinely disputed despite a procedurally proper 

response or reply—it must determine the legal 

consequences of these facts and permissible 

inferences from them.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee’s Note to 2010 

Amendment. In light of these amendments to Rule 56, our 

decision in Bender is of no moment here because it does not 

address the current version of Rule 56. And as we have 

explained, under the current version of Rule 56 a motion for 

summary judgment cannot be deemed “conceded” for want of 

opposition.

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C. Other Matters Regarding the Scope of this Decision 

Lest there be any confusion regarding our judgment in 

this case, there are three other matters that warrant comment.

First, we want to make it clear that nothing in this 

opinion is meant to address the scope or legality of Local 

Rule 7(h). That rule appears to be coterminous with Federal 

Rule 56(e)(2), but we offer no opinion on this point. The 

District Court in this case relied solely on Local Rule 7(b), not 

7(h), so our decision is limited to the issues raised by Local 

Rule 7(b). We also want to make it clear that nothing in this 

opinion is meant to address the applicability of Local Rule 

7(b) to motions other than motions for summary judgment.

Second, there is nothing in the record to indicate that

Appellee acted inappropriately in seeking summary judgment, 

and we do not mean to suggest otherwise. Nor do we mean to 

suggest that the District Court failed to scrutinize the motion 

for summary judgment and the supporting papers filed by 

Appellee. We simply hold that a District Court must 

determine for itself that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law, and then “should state on the record the reasons 

for granting or denying the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

That did not happen here. All that we know from the record in 

this case is that the District Court relied solely on Local Rule 

7(b) in granting summary judgment for Appellee “as 

conceded.”

Finally, Appellee’s counsel suggested that because we 

review summary judgments de novo, we can decide on our 

own whether the motion should be granted in this case. We 

decline the invitation. Given the nature of this case, it would 

be imprudent for us to act without allowing the District Court 

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to decide the matters in dispute in the first instance. Rule 

56(e) gives the District Court a number of options to weigh.

The trial judge, who has overseen the litigation, is in the best 

position at this point to consider these options and decide 

whether Appellant, who was acting pro se, should be given an 

opportunity to respond to Appellee’s motion for summary 

judgment after missing the deadline by only two days. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the grant of 

summary judgment and remand the case for further 

consideration.

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