Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_98-cv-01333/USCOURTS-caed-2_98-cv-01333-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONEY R. NUNES,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-98-1333 DFL KJM P

vs.

ANA RAMIREZ-PALMER, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a California prisoner proceeding with counsel with an application for

a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his 1995 Santa Clara County

conviction for petty theft with a prior and his twenty-five-years-to-life “three strikes” sentence. 

Petitioner raises four claims of error: (1) his 25-years-to-life sentence constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment; (2) petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the trial

court denied petitioner’s motion to recuse prosecutor, and vindictive prosecution; (3) petitioner’s

due process were violated when the trial court used petitioner’s unconstitutional priors to

enhance petitioner’s sentence and denied petitioner’s motion for a Sumstine hearing; and (4)

petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the trial court failed to instruct on the

definition of reasonable doubt during the sentence enhancement phase of the trial. Respondent

has filed an answer, and petitioner a traverse. 

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I. Factual And Procedural Background

On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal summarized the facts elicited at

petitioner’s jury trial as follows:

Just before closing time on March 12, 1995, defendant attempted

to leave a Home Depot store through the entrance, and an alarm

went off. Home Depot places “Sensormatic” tags on some of its

merchandise. Unless the “Sensormatic” tag is deactivated at a

cash register, it will set off the alarm at the exit or entrance.

Defendant was the only person near the entrance when the alarm

went off. A Home Depot employee asked him if he was returning

an item, and defendant said he was not. He told the Home Depot

employee that his pacemaker had set off the alarm. Jimmy Torres,

Home Depot’s plainclothed loss prevention officer, observed this

encounter and began watching defendant. Defendant sat down on a

bench by the entrance for a couple of minutes. He then proceeded

to another part of the store. Torres noticed that defendant was

“walking funny.”

Defendant went part of the way down one of the aisles and

stopped. He began removing Home Depot merchandise from

underneath his sweater. After removing these items from his

clothing and placing them on a shelf, defendant took one of the

items, a tool set, and removed part of the packaging, including the

Sensormatic tag, from the tool set. He concealed the removed

packaging behind a display. Defendant proceeded to again conceal

all of the items under his sweater. Defendant walked to the back of

the store and then went to the front of the store. He walked past

the cash registers without stopping and exited the store. Torres

detained defendant and identified himself as “Home Depot

Security.” Defendant responded that “I’m going to pay for it” and

“I’m just looking for my wife.” Torres told defendant he was

under arrest and escorted him back into the store. Upon reentering

the store, defendant began removing items from his clothing and

throwing them. He ignored Torres’s request that he stop doing

this. Torres tried to handcuff defendant, but defendant resisted and

it was necessary for Torres and another Home Depot employee to

take defendant “to the ground” in order to successfully handcuff

defendant. The Home Depot merchandise found in defendant’s

possession was worth $114.40. Torres turned defendant over to

the police.

Answer, Ex. F at 2-3.

Petitioner’s appeal, in which petitioner asserted the Eighth Amendment claim for

cruel and unusual punishment presented in this action as claim 1, was denied by the Court of

Appeal. Id., Ex. F at 12-15, 23. The California Supreme Court denied a petition for review. Id.,

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1

 Petitioner does appear to have made the different claim in his state court petition, that

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely challenge petitioner’s priors. Am. Pet. at

15:2-10. Despite the failure to exhaust claim 4 as presented here, the court is able to reach the

claim for reasons discussed below.

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Ex. H. On February 27, 2002, petitioner filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court in which petitioner presented his due process claims based on denial of

his motion to recuse the prosecutor and vindictive prosecution, as well as failure to instruct on

the definition of reasonable doubt, denominated in this petition as claims 2 and 5. Corrected

Fourth Am. Pet. (Am. Pet.) at 13:15-18. The application was denied. Id. at 16:5-10. Original

claim 3, regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, has been withdrawn. Traverse at 38. It does

not appear that petitioner raised claim 4, denial of due process based on denial of a hearing on the

constitutionality of priors, in state court. Am. Pet. at 13:10-20; Answer, Ex. G.1 

This action currently is proceeding on petitioner’s November 1, 2002 “Corrected

Fourth Amended Petition” filed on November 1, 2002. Respondent’s answer was filed March

11, 2003. Petitioner filed a traverse on February 18, 2005. 

II. Standards For Habeas Corpus Relief

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief also is not available for any

claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

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2

 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court disagrees. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

4

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore did

not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim).2 Courts are not required to

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief

by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law, if the state court simply

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fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial

of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court

must perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other

words, the court assumes the state court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the

decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). 

III. Arguments And Analysis

A. Cruel And Unusual Punishment (Claim 1)

Petitioner argues that his sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life imprisonment

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Am. Pet. at

18-22. For reasons that follow, petitioner’s claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The California Court of Appeal issued a reasoned opinion with respect to

petitioner’s claim on direct review and denied the claim through application of state law. 

Answer, Ex. F at 12-15. The California Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s claim without

explanation. Id., Ex. H. 

1. The “Contrary To” Prong

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the court first examines whether the California

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Court of Appeal’s opinion regarding petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim resulted in a decision

that was contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States. 

In Lockyer, the Supreme Court identified what constituted clearly established law

with respect to petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim at the time the claim in that case was before

California’s courts: a sentence for a term of years to state prison cannot be “grossly

disproportionate” to the offense. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. The precise contours of the gross

disproportionality principle are unclear and “applicable only in the exceedingly rare and extreme

case.” Id. at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted). In petitioner’s case, the Court of Appeal

correctly identified the gross disproportionality principle, noting that its job was to “consider

whether a life sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate on the facts of this case.” 

Answer, Ex. F at 12. 

The Court of Appeal went on to analyze petitioner’s claim under the case it relied

on, In re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410 (1972):

In Lynch, the California Supreme Court offered three “techniques”

for evaluating whether a particular punishment is excessive. The

first of these techniques involves an examination of “the nature of

the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree

of danger both present to society.” (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at

p. 425.) The second technique requires a comparison of the

punishment prescribed here with that prescribed for more serious

offenses. (Lynch at p. 426.) The reasoning behind this technique

is that, because “the Legislature may be depended upon to act with

due and deliberate regard for constitutional restraints in prescribing

the vast majority of punishments set forth in our statutes,” the

existence of “more serious crimes punished less severely than the

offense in question” may make the challenged penalty appear

suspect. (Id. at p. 426.) The third technique involves a comparison

of the penalty prescribed in California with the penalty prescribed

in other jurisdictions. Again, the purpose of this inquiry is to see if

the challenged penalty is disparate in comparison to “the

punishments decreed for the offense in a significant number of

those [other] jurisdictions . . . .” (Lynch at p. 427.) 

Answer, Ex. F at 13. The standard for determining gross disproportionality identified in the

Court of Appeal’s decision is equivalent to the one set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,

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3

 As noted by petitioner in his traverse, petitioner’s 1984 conviction for the 1982 rape

was reversed on direct appeal. Traverse, Ex. 1. However, upon remand, petitioner pled guilty to

the 1982 rape. See February 18, 2005 Stipulation To Expand The Record, Ex. A at 1-3. 

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290-92 (1983), and urged by petitioner. See Am. Pet. at 18; Traverse at 4, 14-17. Solem

requires that a court’s proportionality analysis be guided by a consideration of: “(i) the gravity of

the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the

same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other

jurisdictions.” Id. at 292. Because Solem was decided well before the California Court of

Appeal issued its decision with respect to petitioner’s appeal, and because Solem has not been

overruled, the Court of Appeal’s reliance in this case on the Lynch standard, and its application

in particular of Lynch’s first prong, was not contrary to clearly established law. Cf. Ewing v.

California, 538 U.S. 11, 28-30 (2003) (declining to proceed to the second and third prongs of the

Solem inquiry because the “threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence

imposed [did not] lead[] to an inference of gross disproportionality.”). 

As noted above, a state court opinion also may be contrary to “clearly established

law” if the state court decides a case differently than has the Supreme Court on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. The California Court of Appeal summarized petitioner’s criminal history

as follows:

This history includes prior misdemeanor theft convictions in 1967,

1976 and 1983. Defendant’s extensive history also includes not

only a host of other misdemeanor convictions and felony theft

convictions but numerous serious and violent felony convictions. 

In 1945, when defendant was 20 years old, he was convicted of

rape. Less than two years later, he was convicted of burglary and

theft. In 1965, defendant was convicted of first degree burglary.[fn]

Defendant was convicted of robbery, first degree burglary and

felony theft in 1968 and committed to state prison. He was paroled

in 1971 and discharged from parole in 1974. However, apparently

during his parole period, defendant was convicted of a

misdemeanor count of receiving stolen property in 1972 and served

time in county jail. In 1980, he was convicted of felony theft and

granted probation. A 1982 offense led to a rape conviction for

which defendant served a state prison commitment.3 He was

released from prison without parole in 1992. In 1993, he was

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convicted of failing to register as a sex offender and sent to jail. It

appears that he was released from jail in early 1994.

-----------------------------------------

[fn] While it might appear that defendant was relatively law-abiding

in the 1950's, his lawfulness was apparently due to his

incarceration from 1954 to 1964 in Illinois for a conviction which

was subsequently reversed.

Answer, Ex. F at 11-12.

In Lockyer, the Supreme Court compared the facts underlying petitioner

Andrade’s Eighth Amendment claim with those presented in Solem, where the Court found that a

sentence did violate the Eighth Amendment. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73-74. In Solem, the

petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under a South Dakota recidivist

statute based upon the following criminal record: 

By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respondent Jerry

Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 1969 Helm

was convicted of third-degree burglary. [Footnote omitted.] In

1972 he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 

[Footnote omitted.] In 1973 he was convicted of Grand Larceny. 

[Footnote omitted.] And in 1975 he was convicted of third-offense

driving while intoxicated. [Footnote omitted.] The record contains

no details about any of these offenses except that they were all

nonviolent, none was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a

contributing factor in each case.

In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a “no account” check for

$100. [Footnote omitted.] The only details we have of the crime

are those given by Helm to the state trial court:

“‘I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that day,

was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid city with more

money than I had when I started. I knew I had done

something I didn’t know exactly what. If I would have

known this, I would have picked the check up. I was 

drinking and didn’t remember, stopped several places.’”

[Citation omitted.]

After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty.

Solem, 463 U.S. at 279-81. 

In Lockyer, the petitioner Andrade’s sentence of fifty-years-to-life following his

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convictions on two counts of grand theft stemming from two incidents of shoplifting, and the

finding he had suffered three prior convictions for residential burglary, was upheld. The Court

ultimately found that because the facts surrounding Andrade’s Eighth Amendment claim were

not materially indistinguishable from the facts surrounding Solem’s, the state court that decided

Andrade’s claim did not “confront a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrive at a result different from [Supreme

Court] precedent.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73. 

It is clear from reviewing the record in this case that petitioner’s criminal history

is more substantial than that of Mr. Solem, because the crimes for which petitioner has been

convicted are more serious overall, and include prior convictions for crimes against persons,

giving rise to petitioner’s sex offender status. Furthermore, petitioner’s sentence is not as severe

as that rejected in Solem in that petitioner is eligible for parole, whereas Solem would never have

been eligible for parole. As in Lockyer, then, the facts underlying petitioner’s Eighth

Amendment claim are not materially indistinguishable from those found in Solem.

Because the California Court of Appeal did not apply a rule different from the

governing law set forth in the United States Supreme Court cases applicable to petitioner’s

Eighth Amendment claim, or decide his claim differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts, petitioner has not shown that the rejection of his Eighth

Amendment claim by California courts was contrary to clearly established federal law. 

2. The “Unreasonable Application” Prong

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the court also must decide whether the California

Court of Appeal’s opinion with respect to petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States.

In Lockyer, as noted above, petitioner Andrade presented a criminal history

including convictions for misdemeanor theft, first degree residential burglary, transportation of

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marijuana, petty theft and escape. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66-67. His third strike offense was petty

theft with a prior conviction. Id. at 68. With respect to whether the California Court of Appeal

unreasonably applied clearly established law in affirming Andrade’s sentence, the Supreme Court

found as follows:

[T]he governing legal principle gives legislatures broad discretion

to fashion a sentence that fits within the scope of the

proportionality principle–the “precise contours” of which “are

unclear.” [Citation omitted.] And it was not objectively

unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to conclude that

these “contours” permitted an affirmance of Andrade’s sentence. 

Id. at 76.

Petitioner’s criminal past also is more serious than Andrade’s, in light of his prior

convictions for crimes against persons, including the two priors for rape. In light of the Supreme

Court’s decision in Lockyer, the court cannot find that the California Court of Appeal breached

the contours of the “gross disproportionality” principle, or unreasonably applied Solem by

affirming petitioner’s sentence. 

3. Unreasonable Determination Of The Facts

Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim still can overcome the hurdles erected by 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) if petitioner can show that the Court of Appeal’s opinion with respect to his

Eighth Amendment Claim resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Petitioner claims that, when viewing

petitioner’s criminal history, “[t]he state court failed to recognize that the majority of the

convictions it considered were invalid or overstated.” See Traverse at 10:19-19:8. 

Petitioner fails to point to anything indicating that a single conviction mentioned

by the Court of Appeal in its review of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim has been deemed

“invalid.” Rather, petitioner points to the rap sheet apparently relied on by the state court, see CT

636-647, and the purported misleading nature of the sheet, taken alone on its face. 

/////

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4

 Petitioner claims he made a request for recusal prior to trial. Traverse at 19:13-14. The

portions of the record cited by petitioner in support of this assertion refer to a hearing where

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When characterizing petitioner’s criminal past, the Court of Appeal stated as

follows: 

[Petitioner] has repeatedly committed serious criminal conduct and

numerous thefts, and, notwithstanding numerous stays in jail and

prison over five decades, defendant has never reformed his

conduct.

Answer, Ex. F at 14. In his traverse, petitioner attempts to minimize his criminal past by

pointing to a lack of detailed support for certain convictions and arguing from the length of

certain sentences or their concurrent service that the underlying crimes themselves either were

not that serious or somehow do not count. Traverse at 11-14. Even if this court were to accept

petitioner’s characterizations of his criminal history, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion with

respect to that history is consistent with the record that was before that court, and that record was

not fatally flawed. Petitioner has not shown that the Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s

Eighth Amendment claim was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts before it.

For all the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim should be

rejected.

B. Refusal to Recuse Prosecutor Hanford and Vindictive Prosecution (Claim 2)

In his second claim, petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his right to due

process by denying petitioner’s request that prosecutor, Thomas Hanford, be recused for

vindictiveness and that his right to due process also was violated because he was subjected to

vindictive prosecution. Am. Pet. at 23. Petitioner asserted claim 2 in his application for writ of

habeas corpus presented to the California Supreme Court. Id. at 13:10-18. The California

Supreme Court rejected claim 2 without explanation. Id. at 16:5-10. In the underlying

proceeding, the trial court did not explain its reasoning in denying petitioner’s request for

recusal.4 RT 678:25-679:4. 

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petitioner sought a new attorney. Petitioner complained about the prosecutor during this hearing,

but the court does not construe this as an adequate request for recusal; Mr. Hanford was not

present at the hearing, and no objection was made when the trial court indicated it would only

rule on whether petitioner’s attorney should continue to represent petitioner. See RT 3-16. 

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The Supreme Court has found that, so long as a prosecutor has probable cause to

believe that an accused has committed an offense defined by a statute, whether or not to

prosecute and what charge to file generally rests entirely in the prosecutor’s discretion. 

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). However, the decision to prosecute and what

to charge cannot be based upon an unjustifiable classification, like race, religion or other

arbitrary classification. Id. Further, the Court has held, “to punish a person because he has done

what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation. . .” Id. at 363. 

To establish actual prosecutorial vindictiveness, a defendant must show, through

objective evidence, that the prosecutor acted with genuine animus toward the defendant and the

defendant would not have been prosecuted but for that animus. See United States v. Goodwin,

457 U.S. 368, 380 n.12 (1982). In order to make the required showing, a defendant must

demonstrate that additional charges were brought solely to penalize the defendant and could not

be justified as a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Id.

If a defendant is unable to prove an improper motive with direct evidence, he may

present circumstances from which an improper vindictive motive may be presumed. Blackledge

v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974). However, to invoke such a presumption, the circumstances

must “pose a realistic likelihood of ‘vindictiveness.’” Id. A presumption of vindictiveness is

rarely applied to a prosecutor’s pretrial decisions because “a prosecutor should remain free before

trial to exercise [that] broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal

interest in prosecution.” Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382. Indeed, a prosecutor’s charging decision is

presumptively lawful. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364; United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.

456, 464 (1996). Accordingly, “a change in the charging decision made after an initial trial is

completed is much more likely to be improperly motivated than a pretrial decision.” Goodwin,

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 The law reviewed here was clearly established when petitioner was charged with

respect to the conviction at issue in this case, and remains so today.

6

 In his traverse, petitioner recounts an article that appeared in The San Jose Mercury

News concerning Mr. Hanford. Hanford was honored as the “Outstanding Prosecutor of the

Year:” 

In his current position, Hanford oversees the career gang unit and

career criminal unit, which prosecutes “three-strikes” cases. 

Asked about memorable cases, Hanford smiled with satisfaction as

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457 U.S. at 381. See also Blackledge 417 U.S. at 24-29 (vindictiveness presumed where charges

were increased following successful appeal without change in facts supporting the charges). 

When a presumption of vindictiveness is established, the burden shifts to the government to

present objective evidence justifying its conduct. Id. at 374.5

Petitioner claims he was prosecuted for the following unlawful reasons:

(1) petitioner successfully appealed a 1984 rape conviction Hanford obtained (Traverse at 22:19-

23); (2) petitioner had asserted with respect to that case that Hanford committed prosecutorial

misconduct (id. at 27:8-12, 28:12-24 ); (3) at the time charges were filed in the case underlying

this petition, petitioner was pursuing a federal case against Hanford for violation of civil rights

(id. at 31:24-32:26 ); and (4) petitioner had obtained an acquittal with respect to a rape charge in

the 1970s, which Hanford felt was unjustified (id. at 34:14-17). Petitioner asserts Hanford was

motivated by other reasons as well in charging petitioner as he did, but none of the other reasons

suggested are Constitutionally impermissible under the clearly established law identified above. 

See Traverse at 25:2-27:7 (Hanford’s belief that alleged victim in 1984 rape case lost her sanity

based on rape by petitioner; Hanford’s extremely vivid recollection of same case twenty years

later without having reviewed file in interim). 

There is no direct evidence in the record to support a finding that Hanford was

retaliating against petitioner for the exercise of a protected right when he filed the Home Depot

theft charges against petitioner, including the allegations regarding petitioner’s prior offenses

making him “three strikes” eligible.6 The court also cannot presume vindictiveness. As noted

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he related the recent “three strikes” conviction he won against a

career criminal who had eluded him once before.

The defendant’s 1984 rape conviction had been reversed on appeal

[petitioner pled guilty in exchange for time-served on remand

(Traverse, Ex. A. at 1-4)] , and the man was released from a 28-

year prison sentence. This year, Hanford prosecuted him again, for

the far less serious crime of petty theft. But because of the “threestrikes law, the defendant now faces 25 years to life. “There’s

justice out there,” Hanford said.

Traverse at 29:21-26; see also id. at 29:27-31:3. The closest petitioner comes in presenting direct

evidence of vindictiveness is with this passage. But this passage does not lead to the conclusion

that Hanford prosecuted petitioner in the manner he did because petitioner appealed his 1984

rape conviction. At best, it can be said that Hanford believed petitioner should have received a

more lengthy sentence than he ultimately did for the rape and he took satisfaction in the fact that

petitioner received twenty-five-to-life based on petty theft and his priors. 

7

 Petitioner argues that the deference given to pretrial charging decisions is not warranted

here, where the petitioner’s exercise of his appeal rights and the pretrial decision occurred in

different cases. Traverse at 22:13-26. Petitioner cites no authority for the proposition,

suggesting that it is not a statement of clearly established law. 

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above, courts are unlikely to find a presumption of vindictiveness with respect to actions taken

prior to a first trial on a particular set of facts. There is no cause to deviate from that rule here.7

There is nothing suggesting that the decision to charge petitioner under California’s “Three

Strikes Law” was atypical, and there is simply no other evidence indicating Hanford

singlehandedly dictate the initial charges against petitioner, with the primary motivation of

charging petitioner to retaliate against him for the exercise of a protected right in a prior case. 

See, e.g., Traverse at 37-38 (pointing only to broad patterns of charging in the district attorney’s

office where Hanford worked).

In light of the above, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of claim 2 was not

contrary to, nor based on an unreasonable application of, clearly established law as determined by

the Supreme Court. Claim 2 should be rejected. 

C. Use of Unconstitutional Priors And Denial Of Hearing On Constitutionality Of Prior

 Convictions (Claim 4)

After trial, petitioner moved to strike his prior convictions on grounds that those

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convictions were unlawfully obtained. The motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing. 

RT 630-674. Petitioner claims that he had a right to an evidentiary hearing under People v.

Sumstine, 36 Cal.3d 909 (1984) and that the denial of a “Sumstine Hearing” was a “violation of

federal due process, either directly guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

U.S. Constitution, or because California has a state created liberty interest which is protected by

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Am. Pet. at 33:6-10.

Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing during a state post-conviction

proceeding under the Constitution itself because there is no Constitutional right to postconviction review. See Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss , 532 U.S. 394, 402-03

(2001). As noted above, habeas corpus relief is not available for violations of state law. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). If a state law creates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause,

relief can be granted if the constitutionally required process was not administered. See Hicks v.

Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980). Sumstine does not create a liberty interest, i.e., anything

that guarantees freedom from confinement or a certain type of confinement; it merely creates a

process by which a criminal defendant can challenge prior convictions. 

The court notes that this claim has not been presented to the California Supreme

Court. See Am. Pet. at 13:10-20; Answer, Ex. G. The exhaustion of state court remedies is a

prerequisite to the granting of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A

petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and

fair opportunity to consider all claims before presenting them to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985). 

The court generally would dismiss an unexhausted claim but the court may deny such a claim if it

is “perfectly clear [petitioner] does not raise . . . a colorable federal claim.” Cassett v. Stewart,

406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Petitioner’s claim 4 is not

colorable and therefore should be denied.

/////

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8

 In his traverse, petitioner also claims that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by

the trial court’s failure to define “beyond a reasonable doubt” at the sentence enhancement phase. 

Traverse at 17-20. This claim was not made in petitioner’s “Corrected Fourth Amended

Petition” and cannot be raised for the first time in a traverse. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37

F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). In any case, for the reasons that follow, petitioner’s claim has no

merit. 

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D. Failure To Instruct On The Definition Of Reasonable Doubt In Sentence

 Enhancement Phase (Claim 5)

After trial, the truth of petitioner’s prior convictions was tried to the jury. Jurors

were informed that, in order for them to find that petitioner did in fact sustain the prior

convictions charged, they would have to so find “beyond a reasonable doubt.” RT 482-483. 

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right to due process by not sua sponte defining

the concept of “beyond a reasonable doubt” for the jury.8 Am. Pet. at 33-37. This claim was not

presented on direct appeal; the California Supreme Court rejected the claim without explanation

when denying petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus. 

In Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994), the Supreme Court found that, while

jurors must be informed that they may only find guilt if guilt has been proven to them “beyond a

reasonable doubt,” the Constitution does not demand that the term “beyond a reasonable doubt”

itself be defined for jurors. The Fourteenth Amendment only requires that the trial court instruct

the jury that the defendant’s guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. No specific words

are required, but, taken as a whole, the jury instructions must “correctly convey the concept of

reasonable doubt to the jury.” Id. Petitioner asserts “beyond a reasonable doubt” should have

been defined for jurors at a sentence enhancement hearing, while Victor concerns a determination

of guilt. But there is nothing to suggest the distinction matters, and petitioner cites to no

controlling authority to support his argument. 

The trial judge gave the jury an explicit definition of reasonable doubt in the guilt

phase instructions to the jury. RT 447. In instructions at the enhancement phase, the judge

repeatedly stated that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner had previous

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felony convictions and that he served a prison term. RT 480-483. The judge also made the

written instruction on the definition of reasonable doubt available to the jury upon request. RT

480. Taken as a whole, the jury instructions for the enhancement phase correctly conveyed the

concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. 

In light of Victor, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of petitioner’s fifth

claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable

application thereof.

IV. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus

should be denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas

corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may filed

written objections with the court and serve a copy of all parties. Such a documents should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties

are advised the failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal

the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 2, 2005.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1/ja nune1333.157

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