Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00725/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00725-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

EDITH CARTWRIGHT,

NO. CIV. S 05-0725 MCE KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,

DAVIS, a public entity;

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, as

individuals and in their

official capacity; SAL GENITO,

as an individual and in his

official capacity; ALLEN

TOLLEFSON, as an individual

and in his official capacity;

DENNIS SHIMEK, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; DANIEL GRAY, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; HUMBERTO GARCIA, as

an individual and in his

official capacity; JULIE

MCNEAL, as an individual and

in hher official capacity,

LOUIE J. SLATYTON, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; DARRELL RALLS, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; AL MINNE, as an

individual and in his official

capacity; AND DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

Case 2:05-cv-00725-MCE -KJM Document 23 Filed 11/18/05 Page 1 of 9
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In addition to the University, Plaintiff named as 1

Defendants the University’s Regents as well as nine other

individuals associated with the University.

All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the 2

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

2

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Edith Cartwright (“Plaintiff”) instituted the

present action following her termination by Defendant University

of California, Davis (“University”) on or about November 11,

2003. Plaintiff alleges she was terminated in retaliation for

filing a state court action less than two weeks before, on

October 31, 2003. She asserts claims for violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, § 1985, and 42 U.S.C. § 20003, as well as a pendant state

law claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing. Plaintiff’s complaint in this matter was filed on

April 13, 2005, and all Defendants now specially appear to 1

request that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed because of her

failure to effectuate service within 120 days as required by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). In addition to opposing 2

that motion, Plaintiff has filed her own motion to extend the

time for proper service pursuant to Rule 6(b). As set forth

below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied, and Plaintiff’s

request for additional time to serve her complaint will be

granted.

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3

BACKGROUND

As indicated above, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on

April 13, 2005, claiming that she was terminated from her

position with the University in retaliation for her commencement

of an earlier action in state court. Discovery had apparently

been pursued in Plaintiff’s state court case, including responses

to interrogatories, document production requests, and Plaintiff’s

own deposition. According to Plaintiff, at least some of that

discovery was conducted after her termination, although it is

unclear whether discovery continued after institution of the

present lawsuit. At any rate, it appears uncontroverted that

Plaintiff’s counsel, Barzin Sabahat, made no effort to serve the

instant complaint until late July, 2005, more than three months

after it was filed. At that time, according to Mr. Sabahat, he

telephoned attorney Mark Posard to inquire whether Mr. Posard,

who already represented the University in Plaintiff’s state court

action, would accept service of the federal lawsuit on the

University’s behalf. (Sabahat Decl., ¶ 4). 

Attorney Posard does not dispute Barzin Sabahat’s allegation

that at the time of an August 10, 2005 telephone conversation

they spoke about the substance of Plaintiff’s federal complaint,

leading Mr. Sabahat to conclude that Posard had already obtained

a copy of the complaint. At that point, there is no dispute that

Mr. Posard agreed to accept service on behalf of the Regents of

the University of California, only. That agreement was

Case 2:05-cv-00725-MCE -KJM Document 23 Filed 11/18/05 Page 3 of 9
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4

memorialized in writing by letter from Attorney Sabahat dated

August 10, 2005 (See Ex. “A” to Sabahat Decl.). It appears,

however, that no agreement was reached to accept service on

behalf of any of the other Defendants named by Plaintiff in her

complaint.

As indicated previously, defendants filed the instant motion

to dismiss on September 23, 2005, on grounds that Plaintiff

failed to effectuate service on Defendants within 120 days of the

filing of her complaint, as required by Rule 4(m). Plaintiff

submitted opposition to that motion on October 5, 2005, and

concurrently filed her own motion to extend the time for proper

service under Rule 6(b).

STANDARD

Rule 4(m) provides that an action may be dismissed if not

served within 120 days after its filing, stating in pertinent

part as follows:

(m) Time Limit for Service. If service of the summons and

complaint is not made within 120 days after the filing of

the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own

initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the

action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that

service be effected with a specified time; provided that if

the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court

shall extend the time for service for an appropriate

period...

The time parameters established in Rule 4(m) are designed to

ensure that defendants will be promptly notified of pending

lawsuits so as to guard against possible prejudice resulting from

delay. See Electrical Specialty Co. v. Road & Ranch Supply,

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See also California Practice Guide, Federal Civil Procedure 3

Before Trial (2005), § 5:285.1, for a general discussion of the

factors to be considered in determining whether “good cause”

exists to extend the time for service under Rule 4(m).

5

Inc., 967 F.2d 309 (9 Cir. 1992). th

With respect to what constitutes “good cause” for purposes

of extending the 120 days permitted for timely service under Rule

4(m), a demonstration of good faith on the part of the party

seeking an enlargement of time is generally required, along with

some reasonable basis for noncompliance with the time limitations

set forth within Rule 4(m). MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.

Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3 Cir. 1995). Any rd

prejudice to the defendant from granting an extension is also

considered (see Feingold v. Hankin, 269 F. Supp. 2d 268, 275

(S.D. N.Y. 2003), as is the question of whether dismissal of the

action would prevent refiling due to the applicable statutes of

limitation. See Mann v. American Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088, 1090

(9 Cir. 2003). th 3

Rule 4(m)’s “good cause” standard is also typically equated

with “excusable neglect” under Rule 6(b)(2), which permits an

extension of any expired deadline mandated by the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure upon such showing. Some courts even consider

whether the party opposing a Rule 4(m) motion has moved for more

time under Rule 6(b) in deciding whether to grant dismissal under

Rule 4(m). See Television Signal Corp. v. City & County of San

Francisco, 193 F.R.D. 645, 646 (N.D. Cal. 2000). As stated

above, Plaintiff has concurrently moved for an enlargement of

time under Rule 6(b), along with opposing Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss under Rule 4(m).

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6

ANALYSIS

In determining whether Plaintiff has met the “good cause”

standard for justifying an extension of her time to serve the

summons and complaint in the instant action, the primary focus

should be her reason for not complying with the time constraints

of Rule 4(m) in the first place. Boley v. Kaymark, 123 F.3d 756,

758 (3 Cir. 1997). Plaintiff argues here that her counsel rd

relied upon defense counsel’s agreement to accept service. While

she claims that defense counsel never revoked that agreement

before filing the present motion to dismiss a little more than a

month later, there is no indication that Plaintiff’s counsel ever

attempted to serve any of the defendants before the August 10,

2005 agreement to accept service was reached (just three days

before expiration of the 120 day period), or that Plaintiff’s

counsel did anything to follow up on the defense’s agreement

before the motion to dismiss was filed. In addition, the

acceptance of service agreed to by the defense appears to have

been limited to the Regents of the University of California,

only, and did not extend to any of the other defendants.

Plaintiff’s efforts to effectuate service as outlined above

are, at best, questionable. She waited until the last minute to

secure an agreement to accept service and apparently did not try

to effectuate actual service beforehand. The agreement she did

reach was not as to all defendants. While this factor does not

bode well for satisfying the “good cause” prerequisite to

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affording relief under 4(m), at a minimum Plaintiff arguably has

“some reasonable basis for noncompliance” with the strictures of

Rule 4(m) (see MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Teleconcepts,

Inc., 71 F.3d at 1097), and may consequently still qualify for

relief if other relevant factors, as discussed above, militate in

her favor. 

Those factors must therefore be addressed. Turning first to

whether Defendants were prejudiced, the defense offers no

specifics to support a claim that they were actually prejudiced

by Plaintiff’s delay in service. While the defense states

generally that witnesses may lose “relevant memories” as time

passes, as indicated above it appears that defense counsel had

obtained an actual copy of the complaint before speaking with

Plaintiff’s counsel on or about August 10, 2005. One of Rule

4(m)’s objectives, as indicated above, is to assure timely

notification of pending lawsuits, and defense counsel does not

claim it failed to receive such notification. In short, no

credible argument for actual prejudice has been advanced.

Second, with respect to whether Plaintiff’s claims would be

barred by the applicable statute of limitations were she forced

to refile her action following a Rule 4(m) dismissal, it would

appear she would be confronted with time-barred claims. 

Plaintiff’s claims premised on alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§

1983 and 1985, for example (the second and fourth causes of

action Plaintiff has asserted, out of a total of four claims),

carry a statute of limitations equivalent to the applicable state

law period for personal injury torts. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.

261, 275, 276 (1985) (Section 1983); McDougal v. County of

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8

Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673, 674 (9 Cir. 1991) (actions under th

Section 1985 governed by Section 1983 limitations period). In

California, effective November 1, 2003, that period is two years. 

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1; see Krupnick v. Duke Energy Morro

Bay, LLC, 115 Cal. App. 4 1026, 1028 (Cal. App. 2004). Because th

Plaintiff’s complaint is premised on events that occurred prior

to the time she was terminated on November 11, 2003, both her

Section 1983 and Section 1985 claims would be time precluded if

refiled at this time.

Finally, Plaintiff has also filed her own request for

additional time under Rule 6(b). As indicated above, that is

another factor looked to by courts in determining the propriety

of a motion to dismiss under Rule 4(m). See Television Signal

Corp. v. City & County of San Francisco, 193 F.R.D. at 646.

Because these factors all mitigate in favor of denying

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court will deny that motion

despite the fact that Plaintiff’s effort to serve her complaint

within the requisite 120 day period was inadequate. After

considering all the relevant factors, the Court believes that

Plaintiff has demonstrated “good cause” within the meaning of

Rule 4(m) for an extension of time. The language of Rule 4(m)

makes it clear that an extension is mandatory upon that showing. 

See Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger GmBH

Ausdereitungsanlagen, 46 F.3d 1298, 1305 (3 Cir. 1995). rd

Moreover, even if “good cause” was not demonstrated, the Court

still has discretion to grant an extension and deny the motion to

dismiss, should it elect to do so. Id. 

//

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Because the Court’s denial of Defendants’ Rule 4(m) motion 4

makes it mandatory to afford Plaintiff additional time to

effectuate service in this matter, and because the Court has

accordingly extended Plaintiff’s time to do so, it is unnecessary

to specifically rule on Plaintiff’s concurrently filed Motion to

Extend Time under Rule 6(b). The Court hence declines to rule on

that motion.

9

 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

DENIED. Because Plaintiff has demonstrated that she is entitled

to relief under Rule 4(m), an extension of time will be granted.4

Plaintiff must serve all named defendants not later than ten (10)

days following the date of this order, and file proof of service

with the Court not later than ten (10) days after each service. 

No additional extension for effectuating service of process will

be permitted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 17, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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