Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00195/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00195-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNEST MERRILL and )

LILA MERRILL, )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

COUNTY OF MADERA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

1: 05 -CV- 0195 AWI SMS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND

TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

(Documents #293 and #298)

BACKGROUND

The complaint in this action alleged that Defendants’ citations and denial of several

permits deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. After several pre-trial motions, this

action proceeded to jury trial. On July 10, 2007, the jury returned a verdict in Defendants’ favor.

On July 22, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial and motion to alter or amend

judgment pursuant to Rule 59(a) and Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On

August 31, 2007, Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion. The court then vacated

any hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion and took Plaintiffs’ motion under submission. Having

reviewed the parties’ briefs and the file in this action, the court issues this memorandum opinion.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: “[A] new trial may be

granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in which there

has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted

in actions at law in the courts of the United States.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). Rule 59 does not

specify the grounds on which a motion for a new trial may be granted. Zhang v. Am. Gem

Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9 Cir. 2003). Rather, the court is “bound by those grounds th

that have been historically recognized.” Id. “Historically recognized grounds include, but are

not limited to, claims ‘that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are

excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.’” Molski v. M.J.

Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9 Cir. 2007) (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 th

U.S. 243, 251 (1940)). A new trial may be granted if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight

of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 

Molski, 481 F.3d at 729; Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 510

n. 15 (9 Cir. 2000). th

Rule 59(e) allows a party to file a motion to alter or amend judgment no later than 10

days after entry of judgment. Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the

interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of

Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9 Cir.2000). Amendment or alteration is appropriate under Rule th

59(e) if (1) the district court is presented with newly-discovered evidence, (2) the district court

committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an

intervening change in controlling law. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9

th

Cir. 2001); School Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9 Cir. th

1993). This showing is a “high hurdle.” Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9 Cir. 2001). th

A judgment is not properly reopened “absent highly unusual circumstances.” Id. 

The Ninth Circuit reviews a district court's denial of a Rule 59 motion for an abuse of

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discretion. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 728 (9 Cir. 2007); Far Out Productions,

th

Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9 Cir. 2001); Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, th

928-29 (9 Cir. 2000). A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an th

erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts. Coughlin v. Tailhook

Ass'n, 112 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9 Cir. 1997). “The district court's denial of a motion for a new th

trial is reversible only if the record contains no evidence in support of the verdict.” Molski, 481

F.3d at 729 (quoting Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 786 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9

th

Cir. 1985)). The Ninth Circuit will reverse the denial of a motion where the district court has

“made a mistake of law.” Molski, 481 F.3d at 729.

DISCUSSION

Preliminarily, the court notes, as does Defendants, that many of Plaintiffs’ contentions are

made under the wrong legal standard. For example, a Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial is not

available on claims or causes of action for which Plaintiffs never received a trial. Many courts

will construe a motion requesting the court alter or amend a judgment as a Rule 59(e) motion

even if it is not captioned as such. See, e.g., Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 885 F.2d

285, 288 (5 Cir. 1989); United States v. Gargano, 826 F.2d 610, 611 (7 Cir. 1987). But see

th th

Yniques v. Cabral, 985 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9 Cir. 1993) (refusing to construe motion captioned as

th

a Rule 60 motion as a Rule 59(e) motion). In the interests of justice, the court will construe

Plaintiffs’ relevant contentions under the appropriate legal standards.

The court also notes that Defendants have taken the position that Plaintiffs’ motion is not

timely as to several contentions. Specifically, Defendants argue that for claims or causes of

action that the court dismissed or granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor prior to the

end of trial, Plaintiffs’ Rule 59 motion should have been filed within ten days of the court’s

ruling. Contrary to Defendants’ position, a Rule 59 motion cannot be filed until after entry of

final judgment or a ruling from which an appeal can be taken. Hertz Corp. v. Alamo

Rent-A-Car, Inc., 16 F.3d 1126, 1132 (11 Cir. 1994). This is because Rule 54 defines a th

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judgment as “any order from which an appeal lies.” Because Plaintiffs could not have appealed

the court’s dismissals, grant of summary adjudication, or directed verdicts when these orders

were entered, the ten day time period found in Rule 59 did not begin to run prior to the entry of

final judgment. 

A. First Amendment Claims - Access to Building

The court dismissed Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims in which Plaintiffs contended

Defendants wrongfully denied them access to a public building. Plaintiffs contend the court

erred in dismissing their prior restraint speech claim and granting summary judgment on their

denial of access to a government building. Plaintiffs do not identify any newly discovered

evidence or an intervening change in law. Rather, Plaintiffs arguments appear to be that the

court somehow erred by resolving the First Amendment claims prior to trial.

1. Speech Claim

As explained in the court’s order dismissing the restraint of speech claim, a First

Amendment claim for restraining speech requires restraint of “speech” or “communication.” 

See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975). The complaint did not

allege facts that rose to the level of speech or communication. While Plaintiffs are correct that

the court dismissed this claim without leave to amend, Plaintiffs neither explained in their

opposition what speech or communication was at issue nor asked for reconsideration of that

decision. At any time prior to trial, Plaintiffs could have filed a motion to amend the complaint

to explain what speech or communication they were deprived of. Plaintiffs failed to do so. 

Even in this Rule 59 motion, Plaintiffs do not state the speech at issue other than to allude to

Plaintiffs wishing to discuss the denial of a permit with Defendant Basch. This is insufficient to

show the court committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust in

light of Plaintiffs’ failure to ever fully explain the speech at issue to the court and request leave to

amend.

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2. Access to a Government Building

Plaintiffs also claim the court was wrong to grant Defendants summary judgment on

Plaintiffs’ access to a government building claim. The right to petition the government for

redress of grievances in both judicial and administrative forums is fundamental to the very idea

of the republican form of government. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875),

abrogated on other grounds. The right to petition extends to administrative agencies, which are

both creatures of the legislature and arms of the executive. California Motor Transport Co. v.

Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). When granting Defendants summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s right to petition claim, the court found that this First Amendment right is limited to

situations in which a plaintiff’s associational or speech interests are also implicated. WMX

Technologies Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 372 (9 Cir. 1999) (citing McDonald v. Smith, 472 th

U.S. 479, 482-85 (1985), United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S.

217, 222-23 (1967), and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963)). In WMX, the Ninth

Circuit held that the plaintiff could not proceed on a civil rights violation based on the

defendants’ actions concerning the plaintiff’s application to obtain a use permit for a proposed

landfill. WMX, 197 F.3d at 373. Based on this reasoning, the court found that nothing in the

permits or applications at issue in this action implicated Plaintiffs’ associational or speech

interests. Plaintiffs’ motion under Rule 59(e) fails to allege new law, new facts, and has not

shown how this court’s decision was clear error or manifestly unjust. Thus, it must be denied.

3. Procedural Due Process

This action proceeded to trial on a Procedural Due Process claim concerning Defendants

refusing Plaintiffs access to the building. At the close of evidence, the court granted

Defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on this procedural due process claim. Plaintiffs’ Rule

59 motion appears to contend that the court erred by granting Defendants’ motion for a directed

verdict on this procedural due process claim. 

In Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1986),

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the United States Supreme Court found that a state official's failure to abide by constitutionally

adequate procedures does not give rise to a procedural due process violation if a meaningful

post-deprivation remedy is available. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540-42 (1986), overruled

on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

533 (1984). In Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990), the Supreme Court created an

exception to the Parratt doctrine to allow a former mental patient to file an action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against a mental hospital where state law prohibited involuntary admission

without due process, but did not provide for procedures to ensure that voluntary admissions were

truly made voluntarily by competent individuals. Based on Zinermon, Paratt applies if three

criteria are met: (1) The deprivation of property must be unpredictable, such as when the state

cannot predict precisely when the loss would occur; (2) The very nature of the deprivation made

predeprivation process impossible or absurd; and (3) The improper conduct was “unauthorized,”

such as an abuse of position. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 129, 136, 138; Zimmerman v. City of

Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 738-39 (9 2001). Conversely, Zinermon applies when: (1) The th

deprivation of liberty was predictable; (2) The creation of a pre-deprivation process was not

impossible; and (3) The deprivation was the result of an official's "abuse of his position" and

therefore was not "random and unauthorized.” Honey v. Distelrath, 195 F.3d 531, 533 (9 Cir. th

1999). 

In granting Defendants a directed verdict, the court found that Parratt applied to

Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Process claim alleging that Plaintiffs were denied access to a

government building. The facts supporting Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim involved

Defendant Basch refusing Plaintiff Ernest Merrill admission to a building. Based on the law

and evidence before the court, the court determined that not allowing a citizen access to a

government building (assuming a property or liberty interest in such access) would be an act no

one can precisely predict when it will occur. See Zimmerman, 255 F.3d at 738-39. The state

and county cannot know when an employee will refuse someone access to a building. Second,

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the very nature of the deprivation appears to make a predeprivation process impossible or absurd. 

Because it is impossible to know when an employee with bar someone from a building, it is

impossible to have a hearing prior to the action. Finally, such conduct would be unauthorized

and abuse of position. Based on this rational, the court found that Parratt precluded this due

process claim. Under Paratt, the availability of post-deprivation remedies will cure an

unconstitutional deprivation when an official has acted in "random, unpredictable, and

unauthorized ways." Zimmerman, 255 F.3d at 738. Plaintiffs’ Rule 59 motion fails to allege

new law or facts or even provide a discussion on why Parratt did not preclude this claim. 

Accordingly, no Rule 59 relief is available. 

B. Procedure Due Process Claim – Denial of Barn Permit

After summary judgment, Plaintiffs’ Procedure Due Process Claim proceeded to trial on

several different theories. Procedure Due Process Claim One alleged that Plaintiffs’ procedural

due process rights were violated when Defendants denied Plaintiffs’ permit to build a barn. The

court granted Defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on this claim because the court

determined that Plaintiffs did not have a property interest in a permit. Plaintiffs now request the

court amend judgment to reverse this finding. 

 Due process requires “an opportunity for some kind of hearing prior to the deprivation of

a significant property interest.” Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19

(1978). “Precisely what procedures the Due Process Clause requires in any given case is a

function of context.” Brewster v. Board of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified School Dist., 149 F.3d

971, 983 (9 Cir. 1998). What procedures satisfy due process in a given case are determined by th

the three-part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1979). See Brewster, 149

F.3d at 983. Mathews requires the court to consider:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the

risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and

the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and

finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal

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and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Mere negligence does not deprive an individual of a property interest

under the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring procedural due process protection. See Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1984).

The first requirement in a procedural due process claim is to show that the plaintiff has a

liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution. Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,

1029 (9 Cir. 1999); Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9

th th

Cir.1994) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)). Property interests are

not created by the Constitution, but by "existing rules or understandings that stem from an

independent source such as state law--rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that

support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S.

564, 577 (1972); Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9 Cir. 2005); Gallo v. th

U.S. Dist. Court For Dist. of Arizona, 349 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9 Cir. 2003). To have a property

th

interest in a government benefit “‘a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire

for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate

claim of entitlement to it.’” Thornton, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9 Cir. 2005) (quoting Roth, 408 th

U.S. at 577). “Whether a statute creates a property interest depends largely upon the extent to

which the statute limits an agency's discretion in denying a license to an applicant who meets the

minimum requirements.” Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 850 (9 Cir.2001). In other th

words, if the governing statute directs that a license shall be granted or renewed upon compliance

with certain criteria, none of which involve the exercise of discretion by the reviewing body,

there is a property interest in the license. See Thornton, 425 F.3d at 1165. When addressing a

plaintiff who is merely an applicant for a license, the critical inquiry becomes whether the

ordinance grants discretion to the decision-maker who approves or denies the license because no

constitutionally protected property interest can exist in the outcome of a decision unmistakably

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committed to the discretion of the government entity . Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco,

308 F.3d 968, 976 (9 Cir. 2002). th

In Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9 Cir.1988), the plaintiff submitted a minor th

preliminary plat application to divide a lot, which the City Council denied. Id. at 1302. The

applicable municipal ordinance authorized the City Council to approve, conditionally approve, or

reject a minor plat. Id. at 1305. The ordinance left the decision of how to handle a minor plat

application to the “unbridled discretion of an agency.” Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the

plaintiff did not have a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement to approval of his

minor plat application because of the lack of any significant substantive restrictions on the City

Council's powers. Id.

In this case, Plaintiffs never admitted a County Code concerning when a barn permit must

be granted. Without such an ordinance, it is impossible to determine if Plaintiffs had a property

interest in the permit. It was Plaintiffs’ burden to show that there is a County regulation that

requires the issuance of a barn permit once requirements are satisfied. Because Plaintiffs failed

in their burden, there was no evidence from which a trier of fact could find Plaintiffs had a

property interest in the barn permit. Plaintiffs offer no new law, evidence, or other reason why

they are entitled to relief under Rule 59. Thus, Plaintiffs’ motion must be denied. 

In both the opposition to the motion for a directed verdict and in the current motion,

Plaintiffs changed the very basis of this claim. Starting in their opposition to the directed verdict

motion, Plaintiffs contend that this procedural due process claim concerned Defendants keeping

the money they had paid for a barn permit for five years. During pretrial proceedings, there was

some confusion regarding the exact factual basis for Plaintiffs’ claims. In their opposition to

the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs specifically spelled out their theories. In this brief,

Plaintiffs described the first procedural due process violation as “though Ernest Merrill paid for a

permit to build the barn, the defendants wouldn’t give him a permit to build it and they won’t tell

him why. . . . Due process requires that the defendant County of Madera, at a minimum, tell him

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why it won’t issue him a permit to build the barn.” Based on this description of a failure to issue

a permit to build a barn, the court allowed a due process claim based on this theory to proceed to

trial. In the court’s March 15, 2006 order, the court defined the claims proceeding to trial. The

court found as follows: 

. . . . the alleged procedural due process violations that remain for trial are:

(1) Defendants’ denial of Plaintiffs’ permit to build a barn;

. . . . 

After the court’s orders listing the claims remaining for trial, Plaintiffs never informed the court

that the court had misunderstood the claim and Plaintiffs’ theory concerned Defendants keeping

Plaintiffs’ money for a permit for five years and not the denial of a permit. Because the theory

tried in this action concerned the denial of a permit, Plaintiffs’ failure to show how they had a

property interest in obtaining a barn permit remains dispositive of this claim. 

C. Procedural Due Process Claim – Permit to Grade Road

Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Process Claim Two alleged that Defendants required Plaintiffs

to obtain a grading permit to grade a road when none was allegedly required under the County’s

ordinances. While both sides had detailed arguments as to whether a permit was required, the

basic issue was whether Madera County Code 14.50.30 required Plaintiffs to have a permit to

grade the road or whether Plaintiffs fell within exceptions that allow for maintenance of a private

road and creating fire breaks. The court granted a directed verdict to Defendants on this claim. 

The court did not determine whether Plaintiffs were required to obtain a permit under the Madera

County Code. Rather, the court found that Plaintiffs’ allegations did not fall within the confines

of a procedural due process claim. 

Plaintiffs’ Rule 59 motion provides no new law, evidence, or other reason that the court

was incorrect in finding that Plaintiffs’ contentions were not a procedural due process violation

because Defendants’ procedures were not at issue. The court could not expect the jury to apply a

procedural due process analysis to this theory because this is not the type of claim ordinarily

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brought under procedural due process. Assuming Plaintiffs were correct and no permit was

required, Plaintiffs have never shown how they had a property interest in not being required to

obtain a permit when one was not required. In addition, by alleging they were “required” to get

a permit, it is unclear what process Plaintiffs allege was inadequate. These, and similar

problems, resulted in the court concluding that the facts at issue are simply not a procedural due

process violation.

At the hearing granting the directed verdict, the court stated that it was possible these

facts may support a substantive due process claim or a Takings Clause claim. In their Rule 59

motion, Plaintiffs now claim that the court should have let them amend the complaint in the

middle of trial to include a substantiative due process claim or Takings Clause claim. This

contention is discussed below concerning whether the court correctly denied Plaintiffs’ motion to

amend.

Finally, it appears that Plaintiffs may be contending that this fact pattern was present in

the original complaint as a Takings Clause claim, and the court wrongfully dismissed this claim

early in the proceedings. Plaintiffs cite no new law or evidence as to why this theory should have

proceeded as a Takings Clause claim. The court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Takings Clause claim

because such a claim was not ripe. Before a claim is ripe under the Takings Clause, the

property owner must take two steps. First, the property owner must obtain a final administrative

decision regarding application of the regulations to the property at issue. Williamson County

Reg’l Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985); Azul Pacifico, Inc. v.

Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 578-79 (9 1991). Second, the property owner must avail himself of th

the state’s judicial remedies in an effort to obtain just compensation. Williamson , 473 U.S. at

195; Azul Pacifico, Inc., 948 F.2d at 579; Sinaloa Lake Owner's Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley,

882 F.2d 1398, 1402 (9 Cir.1989). Because Plaintiffs have never provided allegations or th

evidence that they availed themselves of the state’s judicial remedies, no takings claim is

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 While not raised in the pending motion, the court notes that the court did dismiss

1

Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim because such a claim should have been brought as a

Takings Clause Claim, citing Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (9 Cir. 1996). th

The court recognizes that on November 1, 2007, the Ninth Circuit found that the Fifth

Amendment does not preempt all substantive due process claims concerning land use. Crown

Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, – F.3d –, 2007 WL 3197049, *4 (9 Cir. 2007). th

Because the Takings Clause claim was dismissed as being unripe, the court is not confident that

Crown Point applies to this action. Regardless, the burden on this Rule 59 motion is on

Plaintiffs, who have failed to either cite Crown Point or the cases and reasoning on which Crown

Point relies as a basis for reconsideration. In fact, this court’s reading of the Rule 59 motion

reveals that it does not even include a request for reconsideration of the court’s dismissal of the

substantive due process claim. 

12

available. Reconsideration of the dismissal of the Takings Clause claim is not warranted. 1

D. Procedure Due Process Claim - Cancellation of the Grading Permit

Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim Six alleged that Defendants impermissibly revoked their

permit to grade Site Two. This claim was given to the jury, and the jury returned a verdict in

Defendants’ favor. Plaintiffs now ask that the court enter a judgment in their favor on this

claim. Plaintiffs contend that the great weight of the evidence supported that Plaintiffs had a

valid permit to grade Site Two, Plaintiffs had an easement that required them to grade Site Two,

Plaintiffs spent about $150,000 in reliance on the permit, Defendants illegally revoked the permit

without notice or an opportunity to be heard, and Defendants refused Plaintiffs a hearing after the

permit was revoked. 

Plaintiffs have waived the right to request an amendment to the judgment that directs a

verdict in Plaintiffs’ favor on this claim. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 requires that a

motion for a directed verdict be made at the close of all the evidence in order for a directed

verdict to be given following entry of judgment. Zhang v. American Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339

F.3d 1020, 1029 (9 Cir. 2003); Janes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 279 F.3d 883, 886-87 (9 Cir. th th

2002). The Ninth Circuit strictly applies the rule that Rule 50 allows complete waiver if an

objection is not properly made. Janes, 279 F.3d at 887; Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail

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 “[T]o preserve the ability to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, a party

2

must [first] move for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) at

the close of all evidence.” Humetrix, Inc. v. Gemplus S. C.A., 268 F.3d 910, 923 (9 Cir. 2001). th

13

Transp. Co., 786 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9 Cir. Cir. 1986). In this action, Plaintiffs never requested

th 2

a directed verdict in their favor, pursuant to Rule 50, after the close of evidence and prior to the

case being given to the jury. Thus, the court may not grant a verdict in Plaintiffs’ favor now. 

Plaintiffs’ request for a directed verdict on this claim must be dismissed.

 

E. Defendants’ Closing Argument

In the conclusion section of Plaintiffs’ Rule 59 motion, Plaintiffs state that “during

closing, defense counsel told the jury that the funds for payment of an award would be coming

from the coffers of the County of Madera. . . .” Plaintiffs contend in their brief that this

argument was improper. This allegation is only made in the conclusion section of Plaintiffs’

brief, and Plaintiffs neither cite law concerning improper closing arguments nor provide any legal

analysis. Thus, Plaintiffs’ motion fails on its face because any possible request for a new trial

based on an improper closing argument is not properly before the court. 

Regardless, the court finds a new trial is not warranted. “A new trial is warranted on the

ground of attorney misconduct during the trial where the flavor of misconduct sufficiently

permeates an entire proceeding to provide conviction that the jury was influenced by passion and

prejudice in reaching its verdict.” Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distributors, 69

F.3d 337, 346 (9 Cir. 1995) (internal quotes omitted). A party should object to alleged th

instances of attorney misconduct before the jury deliberates to allow the district court “to

examine the alleged prejudice and to admonish . . . counsel or issue a curative instruction, if

warranted.” Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frank Coluccio Constr. Co., 785 F.2d 656, 658 (9 Cir.1986). th

Improper comments made by trial counsel during closing argument may be grounds for a new

trial. Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 351-52 (3 Cir. 2005); City of Cleveland v. Peter

rd

Kiewit Sons' Co., 624 F.2d 749, 755-56 (6 Cir. 1980). During a closing argument an attorney

th

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may not make reference to matters not in evidence. Trytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 727 (7th

Cir. 1994); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F .2d 848, 860 (9 Cir.1978) (as th

amended) (citation omitted). Prejudice resulting from misconduct may be remedied by a

curative instruction to the jury to disregard the misconduct. Smith v. Lightning Bolt Productions,

Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1988). In general, an improper argument to the jury does not

constitute reversible error unless it causes prejudice and is not remedied by the trial judge. 

McClaran v. Plastic Industries, Inc., 97 F.3d 347, 359 -60 (9 Cir.1996); United States v. th

Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 597-98 (9 Cir. 1992). th

During closing argument Defendants’ attorney referenced the County of Madera’s

obligation to pay any monetary award against the individual defendants. After the closing

arguments and prior to the jury being instructed, Plaintiffs brought up this improper comment to

the court. The court agreed that it was improper for counsel to state during closing argument

that another entity will indemnify a state actor for any damages assessed against him or her. 

Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513, 1520 (9 Cir. 1994). The court then informed Plaintiffs’

th

counsel that Plaintiffs could submit an appropriate jury instruction to cure this comment. 

Plaintiffs did not provide a curative instruction, and no instruction concerning Defendants’

specific comment regarding the County of Madera’s obligation to pay any monetary award was

given to the jury. 

The failure to object and seek a curative instruction or admonition generally waives the

right to contend a new trial is necessary because a counsel’s arguments were improper. Kaiser

Steel Corp. v. Frank Coluccio Constr. Co., 785 F.2d 656, 658 & n. 2 (9 Cir.1986); Brown v. th

Carey, 2007 WL 1946633, *7 (E.D.Cal. 2007). In this case, the court is presented with the

unique situation where counsel did object to an improper argument but never followed the

court’s instructions to submit a curative instruction. Because the court agreed to give a curative

instruction concerning the improper argument and Plaintiffs never followed the court’s order to

submit a curative instruction, the court finds Plaintiffs have waived this contention.

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Despite the fact the jury was never specifically advised to disregard Defendants’

attorney’s specific reference to the County of Madera being required to pay any judgment, any

prejudicial consequences of the remark were remedies by the jury instructions given. Here, the

court gave Model Ninth Circuit Jury Instruction 1.7, which instructs the jury that arguments and

statements by lawyers are not evidence because they are not witnesses and what they say in the

opening and closing statements is intended to help interpret the evidence, but it is not evidence. 

The Ninth Circuit has found that a judge’s instruction to a jury that the statements of counsel are

not evidence can cure improper statements. Barzelis v. Kulikowski, 418 F.2d 869, 871 (9 Cir. th

1969); 11 Wright & Miller: FEDERAL PRAC. & PROC. § 2809 & n.5 (2007). 

In addition, the jury’s verdict does not indicate that the jury returned a defense verdict out

of concern that a municipality would have to pay any damage award. As pointed out by

Defendants, the jury was instructed that if they found a constitutional violation, but found no

actual damages, they must award nominal damages. Had the jury really found a constitutional

violation but did not want the County of Madera to pay any damage award, the jury would have

answered “yes” to the questions asking whether a constitutional violation occurred and awarded

only nominal damages. By answering “no” to the questions asking whether constitutional

violations occurred, the jury focused on the constitutional violations rather than impermissibly

considering who would have to pay a damage award. In addition, given the evidence before the

court, the court does not believe that Defendants’ attorney’s one comment about who would pay

a damage award prejudiced the jury. The court denies a new trial based on this theory.

F. Motion to Amend 

At the close of the evidence, Plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint to add several

claims or causes of action. Finding that the relevant authority was found in Rule 15(b) and Rule

16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court denied Plaintiffs’ motion. At issue in

this motion for reconsideration is the court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ claim to add an equal protection

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claim based on a “secret meeting” and Plaintiffs’ request to add a Takings Clause claim based on

the grading of the road. 

Rule 15(b) provides in part that “[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by

express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been

raised in the pleadings.” “The purpose of Rule 15(b) is to allow an amendment of the pleadings

to bring them in line with the actual issues upon which the case was tried.” Campbell v. Board

of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 817 F.2d 499, 506 (9 Cir. 1987). This rule th

reflects the liberal policy favoring amendments of pleadings at any time. Consolidated Data

Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc., 708 F.2d 385, 396 (9 Cir. 1983). The Ninth th

Circuit reviews a district court’s order denying a Rule 15(b) motion to amend the complaint to

conform the pleadings to the evidence for an abuse of discretion. Madeja v. Olympic Packers,

LLC, 310 F.3d 628, 635 (9 Cir. 2002). th

To grant a Rule 15(b) amendment, the court must find that the parties either expressly or

impliedly consented for a trial of the issues not raised in the pleadings. Patelco Credit Union v.

Sahni, 262 F.3d 897, 907 (9 Cir. 2001); Campbell, 817 F.2d at 506. The court should not allow th

a Rule 15(b) amendment if the defendant would have been prejudiced by lack of notice. Madeja

v. Olympic Packers, LLC., 310 F.3d 628, 636 (9 Cir. 2002). To establish that an unpled issue th

was tried by implied consent of parties, the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant understood

that evidence introduced at trial was introduced to prove a new issue, and that the new issue was

directly addressed and not just inferentially raised by incidental evidence. In re Acequia, Inc.,34

F.3d 800, 814 (9 Cir.1994); La Londe v. Davis, 879 F.2d 665, 667 (9 Cir. 1989) (“To establish th th

implied consent, the Davises must demonstrate that LaLonde understood evidence had been

introduced to prove fraud . . .”)

While it is true that a party's failure to object to evidence regarding an unpled issue may

be evidence of implied consent to a trial of the issue, it must appear that the party understood the

evidence was introduced to prove the unplead issue. Patelco, 262 F.3d at 907; Campbell, 817

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F.2d at 506. Thus, the introduction of evidence that directly addresses a pleaded issue does not

put the opposing party on notice that an unled issue is being raised. Patelco, 262 F.3d at 906-07. 

“Where evidence alleged to have shown implied consent was also relevant to the other issues at

trial, it cannot be used to imply consent to try the unpleaded issue.” In re Acequia, 34 F.3d at

814 (quotations and brackets omitted). An adverse party cannot be expected to object to the

introduction of evidence that is only tangentially related to the issues actually pleaded prior to

trial unless the party has notice that the evidence is being introduced as proof on some other

unpleaded issue. Patelco, 262 F.3d at 907; Consolidated Data Terminals, 708 F.2d at 396. 

Rule 15(b) does not permit amendments to include issues which are only inferentially suggested

by incidental evidence in the record. Madeja, 310 F.3d at 636; Campbell, 817 F.2d at 506. 

Once the court has entered a pretrial scheduling order, the standards of Rule 16 also

govern amendments. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1295 (9 Cir.2000); th

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9 Cir.1992). Under Rule 16(b), th

Plaintiff must show “good cause” exists for extending the deadlines set out in the Scheduling

Order. Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1295. This standard “primarily considers the diligence of the party

seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-09 (9th

Cir.1992)). “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the

modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon

the moving party's reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry

should end.” Id. (citations omitted). 

The Court may allow a post-deadline amendment if the deadline could not

reasonably have been met despite the diligence of the moving party. To

demonstrate diligence, the moving party may be required to show: (1) that it was

diligent in assisting the Court in creating a workable Rule 16 scheduling order; (2)

that its noncompliance with the scheduling order's deadline occurred or will occur

notwithstanding diligent efforts to comply because of "the development of matters

which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the

Rule 16 scheduling conference;" and (3) that it was diligent in seeking amendment

of the scheduling order once it became apparent it could not comply with the

order. Finally, the Ninth Circuit has stated that carelessness is not compatible

with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.

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United States v. Boyce, 148 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1079 (S.D. Cal. 2001). 

1. “Secret Meeting”

Plaintiffs contend that the court erred by failing to allow Plaintiffs to amend the

complaint to allege claims surrounding a “secret meeting.” During trial, Defendant Gilbert’s

wife, Mrs. Gilbert, discussed a meeting set up by Defendant Gilbert with County officials and

neighbors who were concerned about Plaintiffs’ potential use of water. All parties agree that 

Plaintiffs did not know about this meeting. Plaintiffs contend that they should have been

allowed to amend the complaint to add at least an equal protection claim based on the neighbor’s

ability to have a meeting with Defendant Gilbert and County officials but Plaintiffs’ inability to

have meetings. Plaintiffs claim they never knew about this meeting until Mrs. Gilbert testified

during trial.

Based on Plaintiffs’ own position, no party tried this action on an equal protection claim

based upon a secret meeting. The issue of an equal protection claim stemming from a secret

meeting was not known until trial, thus it could not have been tried with the implied consent of

either side. Thus, this claim does not meet Rule 15(b)’s standards.

During the hearing on the motion to amend, the parties turned this issue into one of

allowing an amendment as a punishment for a discovery violation. Plaintiffs’ basic contention

was, and remains, that Defendant Gilbert and Mrs. Gilbert misled Plaintiffs during their

depositions so that Plaintiffs did not find out about the secret meeting until trial. Putting aside

the lack of authority from any party that a discovery violation can be grounds to add a new claim

or cause of action in the middle of trial, the court does not find such a great discovery violation in

this case as to mandate such a harsh remedy. When ruling on the motion to amend, the court

reviewed the deposition of Defendant Gilbert. Defendant Gilbert’s deposition informed

Plaintiffs about neighbors he did discuss Plaintiffs with, and Plaintiffs apparently never contacted

these neighbors. When denying the motion to amend, the court did not find Defendant Gilbert’s

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deposition contained any lie given the very specific questions Defendant Gilbert was asked. 

However, at the hearing on the motion to amend the court recognized that Mrs. Gilbert’s

testimony was misleading. When asked of anyone who made complaints against Plaintiff, Mrs.

Gilbert answered: “No”. The court found this was inconsistent with her testimony at trial. 

However, the court concluded that the discovery sanction of adding a new claim in the middle of

trial to punish a witness who had provided misleading deposition testimony was simply not

appropriate. Plaintiffs have cited no law or argument on how the court was wrong in this

conclusion. 

Moreover, if the court would have allowed Plaintiffs to amend the complaint to add in an

equal protection claim about a secret meeting, additional discovery would have been necessary. 

“A need to reopen discovery and therefore delay the proceedings supports a district court's

finding of prejudice from a delayed motion to amend the complaint.” Lockheed Martin Corp. v.

Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9 Cir.1999). The court did not abuse its discretion th

when it denied the motion to add a claim about a secret meeting. Plaintiffs remained free to

argue to the jury about any inconsistencies in testimony, but neither Rule 15, Rule 16, nor any

law concerning discovery violations brought to the court’s attention, allowed an amendment in

this situation.

2. Takings Claim

Plaintiffs also maintain that the court erred when it failed to allow Plaintiffs to amend the

complaint to add a Takings Clause claim concerning whether a permit was needed to grade the

road, which the court had found could not be maintained as a procedural due process claim. 

Plaintiffs appear to contend that there would have been no prejudice to Defendants because

whether the County Code required a permit was the mainstay of Plaintiffs’ case. Simply

because the facts surrounding whether a permit was necessary would have been admitted

regardless of whether the claim was a Takings Clause claim or a procedural due process claim

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 At the hearing on their motion to amend, Plaintiffs did ask the court to allow them to 3

change their procedural due process claim concerning grading the road to a substantive due

process claim. The pending motion does not ask the court to reconsider this finding. In

addition, Plaintiffs cite no new law or evidence that would allow this theory to proceed as a

substantive due process claim. The court does recognize that based on very recent Ninth Circuit

authority, a substantive due process claim may be available for some land use actions that lack

any substantial relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare. See Crown Point

Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, – F.3d –, 2007 WL 3197049, *4 (9 Cir. 2007). th

However, even assuming this new law would have assisted Plaintiffs at the time of trial,

Defendants clearly did not try this action as a substantive due process case. Defendants allowed

admission of evidence concerning the road grading to resolve the procedural due process claim.

20

does not mean that Defendants consented to a Takings Clause claim. The introduction of

evidence that directly addresses a pleaded issue does not put the opposing party on notice that an

unpleaded issue is being raised. Patelco, 262 F.3d at 906-07. Because the legal elements of the

two claims differ, Defendants may have chosen to defend the claim entirely differently had they

known a Takings Clause claim was at issue. Regardless, as found previously, no Takings Clause

claim was ripe because no state court requests for just compensation had been made.3

G. New Trial Without Reference to Grading Issues

Near the end of Plaintiffs’ brief, Plaintiffs state that this case was built around whether a

permit was needed to grade the road. Plaintiffs argue that they should be allowed a new trial in

which they can present only the four claims that the court let go to the jury. Plaintiffs imply that

by granting directed verdicts on so many claims, the jury was confused. Plaintiffs cite no

authority for allowing a new trial because a court’s directed verdict rulings resulted in the jury

hearing unnecessary evidence. The court could also find no such authority. 

Plaintiffs’ position seems to be that the court had some duty to take Plaintiffs’ factual

allegations and advise Plaintiffs prior to trial which potential constitutional issues were

implicated by Defendants’ alleged actions. Plaintiffs are not appearing in pro se, are not

proceeding in forma pauperis, and are not incarcerated. As such, this court is aware of no

authority requiring the court to “screen” Plaintiffs’ complaint and advise Plaintiffs as to the

“best” legal theories on which to advance their case. To the contrary, all authority indicate such

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legal advise is prohibited.

CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, based on the above memorandum opinion, Defendants motion for a new

trial and motion to alter or amend judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 10, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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