Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01379/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01379-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUMPKIN WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. SALAHUDDIN, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-01379-AWI-YNP PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THIS

ACTION

(Doc. 15)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN 30 DAYS

Plaintiff Lumpkin Williams (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is in the custody of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and was incarcerated at Pleasant

ValleyState Prison (“PVSP”) in Coalinga, California at the time of the events described in Plaintiff’s

complaint. Plaintiff is suing under section 1983 for the violation of his rights under the Eighth

Amendment. Plaintiff names Dr. Salahuddin (dentist), C. Lebo (dental assistant), Hansen (warden),

Mattingly (warden), and Beels (warden) as defendants. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any claims for which relief can be granted under section

1983. The Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading

standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as true all factual

allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. 

Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

II. Background

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action on September 20, 2007. (Doc. #1.) On

April 11, 2008, the Court screened Plaintiff’s original complaint. (Doc. #11.) The Court found that

Plaintiff’s original complaint failed to state any claims under section 1983. Plaintiff was informed

of the deficiencies in his claims and given leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff filed his first

amended complaint on July 15, 2008. (Doc. #15.) This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s first amended

complaint.

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B. Factual Background

Plaintiff filed an emergency request to have a dentist pull a tooth that was hurting him. 

Plaintiff demanded that the dentist only pull the single tooth that was hurting him. The dentist and

his assistant diagnosed Plaintiff’s tooth and disagreed with Plaintiff’s assessment. The dentist told 1

Plaintiff that they would pull the hurting tooth along with two other teeth. Plaintiff was told that the

two other teeth could not be filled and saved. The dentist requested Plaintiff’s consent to pull the

three teeth. Plaintiff refused and none of Plaintiff’s teeth were pulled. Plaintiff claims that the

dentist’s diagnosis was erroneous because the two teeth were filled and saved later by another

dentist.

III. Discussion

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth Amendment by

refusing Plaintiff’s demand to pull only one tooth. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition

of cruel and unusual punishments and “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized

standards, humanity and decency.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson

v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

when two requirements are met: (1) the objective requirement that the deprivation is “sufficiently

serious”, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298

(1991), and (2) the subjective requirement that the prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state

of mind”, Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). The objective requirement that the deprivation be

“sufficiently serious” is met where the prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”. Id. (quotingRhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

(1981)). The subjective requirement that the prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind” is met where the prison official acts with “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. 

Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-303). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when

he/she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”. Id. at 837. “[T]he

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The dentist and his assistant are presumably Defendants Salahuddin and Lebo, though Plaintiff does not

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specifically identify the dentist and his assistant.

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official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

“[D]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action

under § 1983.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. In order to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on

deficient medical treatment, a plaintiff must show: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) a deliberately

indifferent response by the defendant. Conn v. City of Reno, 572 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). A serious medical need is shown by

alleging that the failure to treat the plaintiff’s condition could result in further significant injury, or

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Id. A deliberately indifferent response by the

defendant is shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical

need and harm caused by the indifference. Id. In order to constitute deliberate indifference, there

must be an objective risk of harm and the defendant must have subjective awareness of that harm. 

Id. However, “a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. 

Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a

prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Isolated occurrences of neglect do not

constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096

(9th Cir. 2006); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920

F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Even assuming that

Plaintiff’s own evaluation of his tooth was correct and the dentist was wrong, Plaintiff has at most

alleged that the dentist was negligent. Defendants’ refusal to acquiesce to Plaintiff’s demands and

only pull a single tooth when their own evaluation determined that three teeth needed to be pulled

does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that Defendants

deliberatelyrefused to acquiesce to Plaintiff’s demands in orderto cause the unnecessaryand wanton

infliction of pain. Plaintiff’s allegations that another dentist was able to fill and save the two teeth

are not sufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Plaintiff has at most alleged that Defendants

made an incorrect diagnosis. An incorrect diagnosis in itself does not constitute deliberate

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indifference to serious medical needs. Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims for the violation

of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff does not allege how Defendants Hansen, Mattingly, or Beels violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Plaintiff only alleges that they are wardens at PVSP and are responsible for the

supervision of their employees. Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983

for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a

named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th

Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). 

To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisoryliability, plaintiff must

allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to

act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is

a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff has not alleged that Hansen, Mattingly, or Beels

personally participated in Plaintiff’s dental care, knew about it and failed to intervene, or

implemented a policy that was so deficient that it constituted a repudiation of constitutional rights

and was the moving force of any alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff fails to state any

cognizable claims against Defendants Hansen, Mattingly, or Beels.

Plaintiff was previously informed of the deficiencies in his complaint. (Order Dismissing

Compl. With Leave to File an Amend. Compl. 2:1-4:7.) Plaintiff was specifically told that alleging

a difference of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff is not sufficient to give rise to

a section 1983 claim. Plaintiff was told that he must allege facts that show that Defendants knew

and disregarded as serious risk to Plaintiff’s health, resulting in injury to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was also

informed of the deficiencies in his claims against supervisory personnel. Plaintiff has failed to

amend his claims in any way that meaningfully address the deficiencies identified by the Court. As

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such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaints are not capable of being cured by granting further

leave to amend. The Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed with prejudice.

IV. Conclusion and Order

The Court has screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and finds that it does not state

any claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. Plaintiff was previously informed

of the deficiencies in his Eighth Amendment dental care claims and provided with the appropriate

legal standards for stating a cognizable claim. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to

meaningfully address the deficiencies previously identified by the Court. As such, the Court finds

that the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s claims are not capable of being cured by granting further leave to

amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (“district court should grant leave

to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts”); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-

49 (9th Cir. 1987) (pro se litigant entitled to an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome any

deficiencies unless it clearly appears from the complaint that the deficiency cannot be overcome by

amendment).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint

be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state any claims upon which relief can be granted under

section 1983.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty days

after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any partymay file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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Dated: March 18, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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