Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35872/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35872-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EXPERIENCE HENDRIX L.L.C., a

Washington Limited Liability

Company, and AUTHENTIC

HENDRIX L.L.C., a Washington

Limited Liability Company,

Plaintiffs-Appellants/

Cross-Appellees,

v.

HENDRIXLICENSING.COM LTD, a

Nevada Corporation, DBA

Hendrix Artwork, DBA

Hendrixartwork.com; ANDREW

PITSICALIS, an individual;

CHRISTINE RUTH FLAHERTY,

Defendants-Appellees/

Cross-Appellants.

Nos. 11-35858

11-35872

D.C. No.

2:09-CV-00285-

TSZ

ORDER AND

AMENDED

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Thomas Zilly, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 7, 2013—Seattle, Washington

Filed January 29, 2014

Amended August 8, 2014

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2 EXPERIENCE HENDRIX V. HENDRIXLICENSING.COM

Before: David M. Ebel,* William A. Fletcher,

and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges

Opinion by Judge Ebel;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge

Rawlinson

SUMMARY**

Trademark

The panel filed an order amending its previous opinion,

and in the amended opinion the panel affirmed in part,

reversed in part and vacated in part the district court’s

decision in trademark litigation concerning a dispute over

the commercial use of a deceased celebrity’s image, likeness,

and name.

Experience Hendrix, LLC, which owns trademarks that

it uses to sell and license products related to deceased

rock legend Jimi Hendrix, alleged that defendants were

licensing merchandise that infringed Experience Hendrix’s

trademarks.

The panel reversed the district court’s determination that

Washington’s PersonalityRights Act is unconstitutional, and

* The Honorable David M. Ebel, Senior Circuit Judge for the United

States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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EXPERIENCE HENDRIX V. HENDRIXLICENSING.COM 3

remanded defendant’s declaratory judgment claims

pertaining to the Act with instructions to enter summary

judgment on those claims in favor of Experience Hendrix. 

The panel affirmed the district court’s decision granting

Experience Hendrix partial summary judgment on its claim

that defendant’s use of “Hendrix” in its domain names

infringed Experience Hendrix’s mark “Hendrix.” The panel

vacated the permanent injunction and remanded so that the

district court could revise language in the injunction to clarify

what conduct is and is not enjoined. The panel reversed in its

entirety the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(3) decision

to strike most of the jury’s award of damages under both the

federal Lanham Act and Washington’s Consumer Protection

Act. The panel affirmed the district court’s order granting a

new trial on damages under both of these statutes and

remanded for a new trial on such damages. The panel

vacated the district court’s award of attorney’s fees under

Washington’s Consumer Protection Act and remanded the fee

request for further proceedings.

Judge Rawlinson concurred in part, and dissented in part. 

Judge Rawlinson concurred in much of the majority’s

opinion, but dissented from the majority’s holding that a new

trial is warranted on the issue of damages. Judge Rawlinson

would remand for reinstatement of the damages awarded by

the jury, and for an award of attorney’s fees to Experience

Hendrix as the prevailing party.

COUNSEL

John D. Wilson, Jr. and Alfred E. Donohue, Wilson Smith

Cochran Dickerson, Seattle, Washington; Michael Madden,

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Bennett Bigelow & Leedom, Seattle, Washington, for

Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Thomas T. Osinski, Jr., Osinski Law Offices, P.L.L.C.,

Tacoma, Washington, for Defendants-Appellees/CrossAppellants.

Duncan Crabtree-Ireland and Danielle Van Lier, Screen

Actors Guild, Inc., Los Angeles, California, for Amicus

Curiae Screen Actors Guild, Inc, American Federation of

Television &RadioArtists, AFL-CIO, LuminaryGroup LLC,

and the Estate of Marilyn Monroe, LLC.

ORDER

The Opinion filed January 29, 2014, appearing at

742 F.3d 377, is amended sua sponte to remove footnote 6.

A copy of the our amended decision and original

concurrence is attached to this Order and filed concurrently

with this Order.

With this amendment, the panel has voted unanimously

to DENY the petition for REHEARING and the petition for

REHEARING EN BANC. The full court has been advised of

the petition for rehearing en banc, and no judge has requested

a vote on whether to rehear the matter. Fed. R.App. P.35.

The petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing

en banc are DENIED. No further petitions for panel

rehearing or for rehearing en banc will be entertained.

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EXPERIENCE HENDRIX V. HENDRIXLICENSING.COM 5

OPINION

EBEL, Circuit Judge:

This litigation stems from a dispute over the commercial

use of a deceased celebrity’s image, likeness, and name. The

sole heir of deceased rock legend Jimi Hendrix formed two

companies, Plaintiffs Experience Hendrix, L.L.C., and its

wholly owned subsidiary, Authentic Hendrix, L.L.C.

(collectively “Experience Hendrix”). Among other things,

Experience Hendrix owns trademarks that it uses to sell and

license products related to Jimi Hendrix. In this litigation,

Experience Hendrix succeeded on its claims alleging that

Defendants Andrew Pitsicalis and his company,

Hendrixlicensing.com, L.L.C. (collectively “Pitsicalis”1),

were licensing Hendrix-related merchandise that infringed

Experience Hendrix’s trademarks. As a result, the district

court permanently enjoined Pitsicalis’s infringing conduct,

and a jury awarded Experience Hendrix damages under two

statutes, the federal Lanham Act and Washington’s Consumer

Protection Act. The district court, however, significantly

reduced the jury’s award and, alternatively, ordered a new

trial on damages. On the claims of Experience Hendrix, we

VACATE the district court’s permanent injunction so that

one paragraph in the injunction may be clarified and reissued. 

We REVERSE the court’s reduction of the damages award. 

We AFFIRM the district court’s decision to grant a new trial. 

Finally, we REMAND Experience Hendrix’s claims for

further proceedings.

1 Often we refer to Pitsicalis as an individual because he acted

individually during portions of the relevant time.

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For his part, Pitsicalis sought a declaratory judgment

declaringthat a third statute, Washington’s PersonalityRights

Act, does not afford the heir of Jimi Hendrix any postmortem publicity rights. The district court held that the Act

does purport to give the heir of Jimi Hendrix post-mortem

publicity rights, which Experience Hendrix would own. But

the district court went on to hold that those portions of the

Washington Personality Rights Act affording those publicity

rights are unconstitutional. We AFFIRM the district court’s

decision interpreting the Act to give post-mortem publicity

rights to Jimi Hendrix’s heir, but REVERSE and VACATE

the holding that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to

the narrow circumstances presented here. Thus, we

REMAND Pitsicalis’s claims as well for further proceedings. 

I. Background

Experience Hendrix holds a number of trademarks

associated with Jimi Hendrix, including the names “Hendrix”

and “Jimi Hendrix” and Jimi Hendrix’s signature, as well as

logos incorporating a “headshot” of Hendrix. Experience

Hendrix uses these trademarks to market, sell and license

Hendrix-related merchandise, including apparel, posters, and

artwork sold to the public through Internet websites and

brick-and-mortar retail stores throughout the United States,

including the state of Washington.

Pitsicalis has also used Jimi Hendrix’s celebrity status

commercially. Pitsicalis owns, or has licenses to use,

photographs and original pieces of art depicting Hendrix, as

well as visual artwork created by Hendrix himself. In 2008,

Pitsicalis began licensing the right to use these images to

produce and sell Hendrix-related merchandise, including

apparel, posters and household items. Like Experience

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EXPERIENCE HENDRIX V. HENDRIXLICENSING.COM 7

Hendrix, Pitsicalis’s licensees sold this merchandise over the

Internet and in brick-and-mortar stores. Pitsicalis placed

marks on his licensed products that used the names “Hendrix”

and “Jimi Hendrix,” as well as Jimi Hendrix’s signature and

a logo of Hendrix’s headshot with a guitar. In conducting his

business, Pitsicalis also used two websites with the domain

names hendrixlicensing.com and hendrixartwork.com.

In March 2009, Experience Hendrix sued Pitsicalis under

two statutes. First, Experience Hendrix alleged that Pitsicalis

was infringing Experience Hendrix’s trademarks in violation

of the federal Lanham Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127. 

Second, Experience Hendrix alleged that this trademark

infringement also amounted to an unfair or deceptive trade

practice proscribed by Washington’s Consumer Protection

Act (“WCPA”), see Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.86.010–

19.86.920. The district court granted Experience Hendrix

partial summary judgment on the federal Lanham Act claim,

concluding that Pitsicalis had infringed Experience Hendrix’s

trademarks. The court permanently enjoined Pitsicalis’s

infringing activity. At trial, a jury found that Pitsicalis’s

trademark infringement also amounted to an unfair or

deceptive trade practice under the WCPA. Although the jury

awarded Experience Hendrix damages under both statutes

totaling $1,723,300, the district court reduced the jury’s

award to $60,000.

Pitsicalis, in turn, asserted counterclaims against

Experience Hendrix, seeking a judgment declaring that a third

statute, Washington’s Personality Rights Act (“WPRA”),

Wash. Rev. Code §§ 63.60.010–63.60.080, does not provide

Experience Hendrix with Hendrix’s post-mortem publicity

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rights.2 The district court granted Pitsicalis summary

judgment on these counterclaims, concluding that, while the

WPRAdoes afford Jimi Hendrix post-mortem publicityrights

belonging to Experience Hendrix, those portions of the

WPRA providing those rights are unconstitutional. These

cross-appeals followed.

II. DISCUSSION

We address first Pitsicalis’s counterclaims regarding the

WPRA, before turning to Experience Hendrix’s claims.

A. JimiHendrix’s post-mortempublicity rights under the

WPRA

1. Standing

Through his counterclaims, Pitsicalis sought a judgment

declaring that 1) the WPRA “does not apply to publicity

rights in Jimi Hendrix” and, therefore, 2) “it is possible to

trade in original images and likenesses of Jimi Hendrix

without creating a per se infringement of Experience

[Hendrix’s] trademark rights.” As a threshold matter,

Experience Hendrix contends that Pitsicalis lacks Article III

standing to assert these declaratory judgment claims.

However, there is no doubt that an actual controversy

exists between Pitsicalis and Experience Hendrix under the

federal Lanham Act, in light of this ongoing litigation

Experience Hendrix initiated against Pitsicalis. As a result of

2 Pitsicalis’s wife, Christine Flaherty, is a party to Pitsicalis’s

counterclaims against Experience Hendrix, asserting the same claims as

Pitsicalis.

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EXPERIENCE HENDRIX V. HENDRIXLICENSING.COM 9

this litigation, Experience Hendrix has notified potential

customers of Pitsicalis-licensed products as to Experience

Hendrix’s trademark rights. And there is no question about

Experience Hendrix’s standing to assert its Lanham Act

claims against Pitsicalis for trademark infringement.

It is within this same litigation that Pitsicalis sought a

judgment declaring that, under the WPRA, Experience

Hendrix has acquired from Jimi Hendrix no post-mortem

publicity rights, which Experience Hendrix could use to sue

or threaten to sue Pitsicalis and his licensees, customers and

potential customers. Experience Hendrix has in fact

previously asserted Jimi Hendrix’s publicity rights, albeit

under an earlier version of the WPRA, in prior litigation

which resulted in a final ruling that the initial version of the

WPRA was inapplicable to Jimi Hendrix. That ruling was

based upon choice-of-law principles which required

application of New York law. New York was the domicile of

Jimi Hendrix at the time of his death and it did not recognize

these post-mortem rights. Experience Hendrix, LLC v.

Electric Hendrix, LLC, No. C07-0338 TSZ, 2008 WL

3243896, at *2–*4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2008) (unreported).

In 2008, however, the Washington legislature amended

the WPRA to apply it “to all individuals and personalities,

living and deceased, regardless of place of domicile or place

of domicile at time of death.” Wash. Rev. Code § 63.60.010. 

The amended WPRA recognizes that every person “has a

property right in the use of his or her name, voice, signature,

photograph, or likeness.” Id. That right existed or exists

“before, on, or after June 11, 1998,” the date the WPRA

originally took effect, and does not expire upon a person’s

death. Id. §§ 63.60.010, 63.60.030(3). The amended WPRA

recognizes such a right of publicity “regardless of whether the

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law of the domicile, residence, or citizenship of the individual

or personality at the time of death or otherwise recognizes a

similar or identical property right.” Id. § 63.60.010. The

WPRA protects such a right by providing, in part, that “[a]ny

person who uses or authorizes the use of a . . . deceased . . .

personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness,

on or in goods, merchandise, or products entered into

commerce in this state . . . without written or oral, express or

implied consent of the owner of the right, has infringed such

[personality] right.” Id. § 63.60.050. As amended, then, the

WPRA created a new possibility that Experience Hendrix

would renew its efforts to assert Jimi Hendrix’s post-mortem

publicity rights against Pitsicalis, his licensees, customers,

and potential customers.

The record here does not reveal any evidence that

Experience Hendrix has explicitly threatened Pitsicalis, or his

licensees, customers or potential customers with suit under

the amended WPRA. But Pitsicalis alleged that Experience

Hendrix, relying on rights that go beyond its federally

protected trademarks, interfered with the sale, by one of

Pitsicalis’s licensees to the retailer Spencer’s Gifts, of

Pitsicalis-licensed Hendrix-related merchandise that did not

infringe Experience Hendrix’s trademarks.3In light of all of

these circumstances, Pitsicalis has a sufficiently legitimate

concern that Experience Hendrix will renew its efforts to

assert rights under the amended WPRA against Pitsicalis and

related parties, given Experience Hendrix’s past aggressive

3 The district court ruled, at the summary judgment stage of this

litigation, that Pitsicalis had Article III standing to assert his declaratory

judgment counterclaims. Pitsicalis submitted adequate evidence to the

district court to support his allegationsthat Experience Hendrix interfered

with Pitsicalis’s licensee’s sale of non-infringing goods to Spencer’s Gifts.

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EXPERIENCE HENDRIX V. HENDRIXLICENSING.COM 11

assertion of its rights related to Jimi Hendrix, and given the

2008 amendment to the WPRA that removes the previous

impediment to Experience Hendrix’s judicial efforts to

enforce Jimi Hendrix’s post-mortem publicity rights under

that Act. See Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151,

1157–58 & 1157 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that, under the

Ninth Circuit’s “reasonable apprehension” test, concrete or

explicit threats of litigation are not necessary for a plaintiff to

have standing).

2. The WPRA is constitutional as applied to the

narrow set of non-speculative circumstances at

issue here

The parties do not dispute that the amended WPRA

recognizes post-mortem personality rights belonging to Jimi

Hendrix, notwithstanding that 1) he died in 1970, before

Washington originally enacted the WPRA; 2) he was

domiciled in New York at the time of his death; and 3) New

York law does not recognize a post-mortem right of publicity

that would survive Jimi Hendrix’s death and descend to his

heir. The parties also do not dispute that, under the WPRA,

Experience Hendrix owns Jimi Hendrix’s post-mortem

personality rights. Notwithstanding that the WPRA thus on

its face provides Experience Hendrix with Jimi Hendrix’s

post-mortem personality rights, the district court granted

Pitsicalis summary judgment, declaring that the provisions of

the WPRA that recognize those post-mortem personality

rights are unconstitutional. We review that decision de novo. 

See Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 719 F.3d 1054,

1059 (9th Cir. 2013). Under the narrow, non-speculative

circumstances presented by this case, we disagree with the

district court’s ruling and accordingly reverse.

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The narrow, non-speculative WPRA controversy before

us, as Pitsicalis has alleged it, involves only (1) Pitsicalis’s

“reasonable apprehension” that Experience Hendrix will use

the WPRA to stop his attempts to license unofficial Hendrixrelated products for sale in Washington, and (2) Pitsicalis’s

licensee’s unsuccessful attempt to introduce into Washington,

through his licensee’s dealings with Spencer’s Gifts,

Pitsicalis-licensed goods that bore Hendrix’s image and

likeness, but that did not carry marks that infringed

Experience Hendrix’s trademarks.

Washington’s approach to post-mortem personalityrights

raises difficult questions regardingwhether another state must

recognize the broad personality rights that Washington

provides. But we need not resolve that issue. Here, the

limited controversy before us, as Pitsicalis has alleged it,

involves onlyExperience Hendrix’s interference with the sale

in Washington of Pitsicalis-licensed, unofficial but

non-infringing goods bearing Hendrix’s likeness, as well as

Pitsicalis’s “reasonable apprehension” that Experience

Hendrix will attempt to stop such targeted sales in

Washington in the future.4

a. Due Process/Full Faith and Credit Clauses

The district court held that applyingWashington’s WPRA

here, instead of the law of New York, the state where Jimi

Hendrix was domiciled at the time of his death, violated

choice-of-law principles protected by the Due Process and

Full Faith and Credit Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Those

4 Pitsicalis argues that the WPRA has a much broader potential

application. But the actual, non-speculative controversy before this court

does not implicate those possible broader applications of the WPRA. 

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Clauses require that, “for a State’s substantive law to be

selected [and applied to a particular case] in a constitutionally

permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact

or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests,

such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor

fundamentally unfair.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.

302, 312–13 (1981).5

Washington has sufficiently significant contacts with the

actual, non-speculative controversy at issue here, which

involves the loss of sales in Washington of Pitsicalis-licensed

goods. Therefore, because these contacts are sufficient to

give Washington an interest in applying its own law to this

controversy, it is not arbitrary or unfair to apply the WPRA

here. See id.; see also AT & T Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics

Corp., 707 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that

“Allstate places only ‘modest restrictions on the application

of forum law,’ and most commentators have viewed Allstate

as setting a highly permissive standard” (internal citation

omitted)).

b. Dormant Commerce Clause

The district court also held that applying the WPRA to

this case would violate the dormant Commerce Clause, which

limits the power of states to enact laws imposing substantial

burdens on interstate commerce. See Nat’l Ass’n of

Optometrists &Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1148–50

5

In the choice-of-law context, the Supreme Court has directed courts to

apply this analysis regardless of whether the constitutional challenge is

brought under the Due Process or Full Faith and Credit Clause. See

Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308 n.10. Therefore, we treat the Due Process and

Full Faith and Credit arguments together.

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(9th Cir. 2012). The district court reasoned that, although the

WPRA does not discriminate against out-of-state interests, to

apply the WPRA to the controversy at issue here would,

nevertheless, give the WPRA an impermissible

extraterritorial reach, encompassing “a varietyof transactions

occurring ‘whollyoutside’Washington’s borders.” However,

the limited, non-speculative controversy at issue here, does

not affect transactions occurring wholly outside Washington.

Cf. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,

545 U.S. 429, 434 (2005) (holding Michigan’s flat tax on

activities taking place exclusively within that state did not

violate the dormant Commerce Clause). Nor does the record

suggest that the application of the WPRA to the limited,

non-speculative controversy at issue here would otherwise

impermissibly burden interstate commerce. See id. at

434–38.

3. Conclusion as to Pitsicalis’s declaratory judgment

claims

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the WPRA

can be applied constitutionally to the narrow controversy at

issue here. We, therefore, reverse the district court’s decision

to grant Pitsicalis summary judgment on his declaratory

judgment claims and we remand those claims to the district

court with instructions for the district court to enter summary

judgment in favor of Experience Hendrix. See Gospel

Missions of Am. v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 553

(9th Cir. 2003) (“Even when there has been no cross-motion

for summary judgment, a district court may enter summary

judgment sua sponte against a moving party if the losing

party has had a full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues

involved in the matter.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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B. Trademark infringement and deceptive tradepractices

We turn now to the claims Experience Hendrix asserted

against Pitsicalis. Experience Hendrix’s claims against

Pitsicalis are premised on allegations that Pitsicalis infringed

several of Experience Hendrix’s trademarks related to Jimi

Hendrix. Experience Hendrix asserted trademark

infringement claims under two different statutes. First,

Experience Hendrix brought a claim under the federal

Lanham Act specifically alleging trademark infringement. 

The district court ultimately ruled as a matter of law that

Pitsicalis had in fact infringed several of Experience

Hendrix’s trademarks.

Second, Experience Hendrix brought a claim against

Pitsicalis under the Washington Consumer Protection Act

(“WCPA”), which prohibits unfair or deceptive trade

practices. Under the WCPA, Experience Hendrix alleged that

Pitsicalis’s conduct in infringing Experience Hendrix’s

trademarks amounted to an unfair or deceptive trade practice

proscribed by the WCPA. A jury found that Pitsicalis had in

fact committed an unfair trade practice by infringing

Experience Hendrix’s trademarks.

On appeal, Pitsicalis challenges only one aspect of the

district court’s conclusion that he is liable for infringing

Experience Hendrix’s trademarks: Pitsicalis argues that his

domain names hendrixlicensing.comand hendrixartwork.com

did not violate the federal Lanham Act by infringing

Experience Hendrix’s trademark “Hendrix.” We uphold the

district court’s determination that the domain names did

infringe Experience Hendrix’s trademark “Hendrix.”

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Experience Hendrix sought several remedies to redress

Pitsicalis’s infringing conduct under both the federal Lanham

Act and WCPA. First, Experience Hendrix sought an

injunction permanently enjoining Pitsicalis from further

infringing Experience Hendrix’s trademarks. The district

court entered such a permanent injunction, but Experience

Hendrix, nevertheless, challenges language the court included

in that injunction. We conclude that one sentence of the

injunction is sufficiently unclear to require a remand so the

district court can clarify what conduct is and is not enjoined.

Experience Hendrix also sought damages, under both the

federal Lanham Act and the WCPA, to compensate

Experience Hendrix for Pitsicalis’s past infringement. The

jury awarded Experience Hendrix several different measures

of damages under both acts, totaling over $1.7 million. The

district court struck all but $60,000 of that award. On appeal,

Experience Hendrix seeks reinstatement of the jury’s entire

damages award. We agree with Experience Hendrix that it

was error for the district court, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(3),

to set aside all but $60,000 of the jury’s award. There was

legally sufficient evidence to support that award. However,

the district court, alternatively, ruled that, if our court

reinstated the jury’s damages award, as we do here, then a

new trial on damages is warranted under Rule 59. We

conclude that the district court’s alternative ruling for a new

trial was not an abuse of discretion and we, therefore, remand

for a new trial limited to the issue of damages.

Finally, Experience Hendrix requested an award of

attorney’s fees in the amount of over $500,000. The district

court awarded a much smaller amount, $50,000. Experience

Hendrix challenges the court’s denial of much of its attorney

fee request. We vacate the fee award and remand for the

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district court’s reconsideration because many of the factors

on which the district court based its attorney fee decision

have now changed.

1. Pitsicalis’s liability under the federal Lanham Act

for using domain names that infringed Experience

Hendrix’s trademark “Hendrix”

The district court granted Experience Hendrix partial

summary judgment, concluding Pitsicalis had infringed

several of Experience Hendrix’s trademarks. On appeal,

Pitsicalis challenges only one aspect of that ruling, arguing

that the district court erred in determining that his domain

names, hendrixlicensing.com and hendrixartwork.com,

infringed Experience Hendrix’s trademark “Hendrix.” We

review that determination de novo.6See Lopez-Valenzuela,

719 F.3d at 1059.

Pitsicalis defended his use of the trademark “Hendrix” in

his domain names only as nominative fair use. “Nominative

fair use applies where a defendant has used the plaintiff’s

mark to describe the plaintiff’s product.” Fortune Dynamic,

6 We reject Experience Hendrix’s contention that Pitsicalis waived this

argument. While Pitsicalis stopped using these domain names after

Experience Hendrix initiated this litigation, and he indicated in his

pleadings before the district court that he did not intend to resume using

these domain names, Pitsicalis expressly did not concede that his domain

names infringed Experience Hendrix’s trademarks, and he opposed

Experience Hendrix’s partial summary judgment motion by asserting

arguments in defense of his use of “Hendrix” in the domain names. Cf.

San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1174

n.7 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that litigant had abandoned claim

where opposing party’s summary judgment motion placed the issue before

the district court, the district court ruled on that issue, and the litigant

adequately raised the issue on appeal).

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Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d

1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The district court rejected Pitsicalis’s nominative

fair use defense, concluding that Pitsicalis used “Hendrix” in

his domain names to refer, not to Experience Hendrix’s

products (as is required for a nominative fair use defense), but

only to Pitsicalis’s own product or service, licensing and

marketing Hendrix-related goods (which is not protected

under the nominative fair use defense).7 On appeal, Pitsicalis

does not argue that his domain names refer to Experience

Hendrix’s products. Nor does he contend that Jimi Hendrix

is Experience Hendrix’s product. See Cairns v. Franklin

Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2002). We,

therefore, affirm the district court’s decision to enter partial

summary judgment for Experience Hendrix.

2. Paragraph 5 of the permanent injunction is

inadequate

After concluding that Pitsicalis infringed several of

Experience Hendrix’s trademarks, the district court issued

injunctive relief under the Lanham Act, permanently

enjoining Pitsicalis’s infringing conduct. Experience

Hendrix, the beneficiary of that injunction, argues that

Paragraph 5 of the injunction fails to state clearly the terms of

the injunction and does not describe in reasonable detail the

acts that are and are not restrained. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

65(d)(1). We agree with Experience Hendrix in part.

7 A defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s mark to describe only the defendant’s

goods is addressed by the “classic” fair use defense, but Pitsicalis did not

assert a classic fair use defense here.

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Briefly summarized, paragraph 1(iii)–(iv) of the

challenged injunction permanently enjoins Pitsicalis from

using Pitsicalis’s “‘guitar and headshot’ logo or any similar

mark, brand, or logo,” and from using the Jimi Hendrix

signature set forth in the injunction, “or any similar signature,

mark, brand, or logo.” But then, contrary to that provision,

the first sentence in the challenged Paragraph 5 states that

“[n]othing in this Permanent Injunction shall be construed as

enjoining, prohibiting, or otherwise inhibiting [Pitsicalis] or

any other entity or person from creating, reproducing,

advertising, distributing, selling, or otherwise commercially

trading in images or likenesses of Jimi Hendrix.” These two

provisions appear to be in some conflict or at least are

ambiguous when read together. Thus, in this particular, the

injunction does not clearly state what conduct is and is not

restrained. We, therefore, vacate the permanent injunction

and remand to the district court to revise the permanent

injunction in order to clarify what conduct is and is not

restrained.

We reject Experience Hendrix’s challenges to the rest of

Paragraph 5. The second sentence of Paragraph 5 states that

“[t]he Court makes no ruling concerning whether . . . images

or likenesses [of Jimi Hendrix] might be otherwise protected

by copyright laws.” The district court did not abuse its

discretion in including this language in the permanent

injunction, see Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d

1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), because this language only

clarified that the district court had not ruled on any possible

infringement of Experience Hendrix’s copyrights because

Experience Hendrix never alleged a copyright claim. See id.

at 1116 (“An injunction should be tailored to eliminate only

the specific harm alleged.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

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The third and final sentence of Paragraph 5 states that

“nothing in this Permanent Injunction shall be construed as

enjoining, prohibiting, or otherwise inhibiting Defendants or

any other entity or person from using the names or marks

‘Jimi Hendrix’ or ‘Hendrix’ to identify the subject of an

associated image or the author or creator of an associated

work of art.” This language does not conflict with the

injunction’s earlier language specificallyprecluding Pitsicalis

from using “Hendrix” in its business and domain names. Nor

does this third sentence, contrary to Experience Hendrix’s

argument, affirmatively permit Pitsicalis or anyone else to

infringe Experience Hendrix’s trademarks “Hendrix” and

“Jimi Hendrix.” Instead, this language accurately indicates

that the district court never ruled on Experience Hendrix’s

claims, abandoned in the district court, which alleged that

Pitsicalis’s use of the names “Hendrix” and “Jimi Hendrix”

to describe the images Pitsicalis used in his unofficial

Hendrix-related products infringed Experience Hendrix’s

trademarks “Hendrix” and “Jimi Hendrix.” In this regard, the

district court again properly limited the terms of the

injunction to the specific claims before it, and then only to

those claims on which Experience Hendrix prevailed. See

Skydive Ariz., 673 F.3d at 1116; see also Toyota Motor Sales,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010)

(noting that court must tailor injunction “to eliminate only the

specific harm alleged”) (quoting E. & J. Gallo Winery v.

Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297 (9th Cir. 1992)); cf.

Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d

1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting, in patent infringement

case, the frequent admonishment that district courts are “not

to issue sweeping injunctions against potentially infringing

activities . . . , but to restrict the scope of the injunction to the

particular adjudicated infringing activity”).

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In sum, the first sentence in Paragraph 5 of the permanent

injunction—stating that “[n]othing in this Permanent

Injunction shall be construed as enjoining, prohibiting, or

otherwise inhibiting Defendants or any other entity from

creating, reproducing, advertising, distributing, selling, or

otherwise commercially trading in images or likenesses of

Jimi Hendrix”—conflicts with the earlier provisions of the

injunction restraining Pitsicalis from using a Jimi Hendrix

“guitar and headshot” logo or any similar mark, brand or

logo. We, therefore, vacate the permanent injunction and

remand to the district court to clarify what conduct is and is

not enjoined.

3. Damages under both the federal Lanham Act and

the WCPA

In addition to seeking an injunction permanently

enjoining Pitsicalis from infringing Experience Hendrix’s

trademarks, Experience Hendrix also sought damages to

compensate it for Pitsicalis’s past infringement. There are

two related issues involving damages that we must address,

one involving the district court’s order entering a greatly

reduced damages award under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(3), and

the other involving the district court’s alternative order

granting a new trial on damages under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.8

8 During trial, Pitsicalis made a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a

matter of law. See EEOC v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961

(9th Cir. 2009). That motion was sufficient to preserve Pitsicalis’s

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, under Rule 50(b)(3),

made after the jury’s verdict. The district court granted that Rule 50(b)(3)

motion, striking most of the jury’s damages award. We refer to

Pitsicalis’s post-verdict motion, as well as the district court’s order

granting that motion, as being made under Rule 50(b)(3). In addition to

his Rule 50(b)(3) motion, Pitsicalis alternatively sought a new trial under

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As to the first damages issue, the jury awarded

Experience Hendrix a total of over $1.7 million, which

represented measures of damages under both the federal

Lanham Act and the WCPA. The district court, however,

struck most of that award under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(3) and

entered a substantially reduced damages award. Experience

Hendrix appeals that decision. As explained in greater detail

below, the legal standard applicable to Rule 50(b)(3) motions

requires that a court uphold the jury’s award if there is any

legally sufficient basis to do so. Application of that particular

standard here dictates that we reverse the district court and

reinstate the jury’s entire damages award.

The second issue regarding damages involves the same

damages awards, but this time under Rule 59’s new-trial

provisions. Rule 59 provides a different legal standard for

both the district court and for us. Regarding a Rule 59

motion, the district court can weigh the evidence, make

credibility determinations, and grant a new trial for any

reason necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The

appellate court reviews the district court’s determination of

these matters for an abuse of discretion. Those standards

require that we affirm here the district court’s grant of a new

trial under Rule 59, even though we reverse the district

court’s decision to grant Pitsicalis judgment as a matter of

law under Rule 50(b)(3).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Rule 50(c)(1) requires a court granting a Rule 50(b)(3)

motion for judgment as a matter of law, as the district court did here, to

rule conditionally on any Rule 59 new-trial motion. We refer to

Pitsicalis’s new trial motion, as well as the district court’s order

conditionally granting that motion, as being made under Rule 59.

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a. Overview of the jury’s award of damages

under the federal Lanham Act and the WCPA

Based on Pitsicalis’s infringing Experience Hendrix’s

trademarks in violation of the Lanham Act, the jury awarded

Experience Hendrix 1) $60,000, representing the profits

Pitsicalis made from licensing his infringing goods; and

2) $306,650 to compensate Experience Hendrix for the profits

Experience Hendrix lost because of Pitsicalis’s infringing

conduct.9See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (providing that party

establishing trademark infringement can recover the

“defendant’s profits” from infringing the trademark and “any

damages sustained by the plaintiff”).

Finding that this same trademark infringement also

amounted to an unfair or deceptive trade practice under the

WCPA, the jury further awarded Experience Hendrix a total

of $1,365,650 in damages under that statute. The WCPA

award represented apparently the same $306,650 in lost

profits for Experience Hendrix as a result of Pitsicalis’s unfair

trade practices, $750,000 for injury to Experience Hendrix’s

reputation, and $300,000 for Experience Hendrix’s loss of

goodwill.

After the jury’s verdict, the district court granted

Pitsicalis’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(3) motion and struck, as

unsupported by the evidence, all of the damages awarded

except the $60,000 award under the Lanham Act for the

profits Pitsicalis made from infringing Experience Hendrix’s

9

“[T]he recovery of both plaintiff’s lost profits and disgorgement of

defendant’s profits is generally considered a double recovery under the

Lanham Act.” Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int’l, 40 F.3d 1007,

1010 (9th Cir. 1994).

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trademarks.10 Alternatively, the district court conditionally

granted Pitsicalis a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, in the

event this court reinstated the jury’s damages award. Here,

we reinstate the damages award, but then affirm the district

court’s alternative ruling under Rule 59 that the award of

damages should be vacated and set for a new trial.

At first glance, our resolution—first reinstating the jury’s

damages award and then affirming the district court’s

decision to have a new trial on damages—may seem

contradictory. But our decision is consistent with the

differing standards that governed the district court’s

consideration of Pitsicalis’s Rule 50(b)(3) and Rule 59

motions, as well as the differing standards by which we

review the district court’s determination of those motions.

In considering a Rule 50(b)(3) motion for judgment as a

matter of law, the district court must uphold the jury’s award

if there was any “legally sufficient basis” to support it. Costa

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 859 (9th Cir. 2002). In

making that determination, the district court considers all of

the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable inferences

in favor of the nonmoving party, Experience Hendrix; the

court may not make any credibility determinations orreweigh

the evidence. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Because we review the district

court’s Rule 50(b)(3) decision de novo, we apply those same

legal standards on appeal. See Go Daddy Software, 581 F.3d

at 961.

10 The jury’s award of $60,000 for Pitsicalis’s profits earned by

infringing Experience Hendrix’s trademarks is not challenged on appeal.

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Unlike with a Rule 50 determination, the district court, in

considering a Rule 59 motion for new trial, is not required to

view the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict. Instead, the district court can weigh the evidence and

assess the credibility of the witnesses. See Kode v. Carlson,

596 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). The district

court also is not limited to the grounds a party asserts to

justify a new trial, but may sua sponte raise its own concerns

about the damages verdict. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(d). 

Ultimately, the district court can grant a new trial under Rule

59 on any ground necessary to prevent a miscarriage of

justice. See Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 187

(9th Cir. 1990). We afford considerable deference to the

district court’s new trial decision and will not overturn the

district court’s decision to grant a new trial absent an abuse

of discretion, meaning “only when the district court reaches

a result that is illogical, implausible, or without support in the

inferences that may be drawn from the record.” Kode,

596 F.3d at 612.

With these different legal standards in mind, we consider

first the district court’s Rule 50(b)(3) decision to vacate most

of the jury’s damages award, and then we address the district

court’s Rule 59 new trial decision.

b. The district court erred in striking under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 50(b)(3) most of the damages

awarded by the jury

To recap, the district court, acting under Rule 50(b)(3),

struck the jury’s award of lost profits under both the federal

Lanham Act and the WCPA, and it struck the damages

awards, made under the WCPA, for loss of goodwill and

reputation. We review the district court’s determination de

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novo, and we will uphold the jury’s award if there was any

“legally sufficient basis” to support it. Costa, 299 F.3d at

859.

i. The jury’s damages award for Experience

Hendrix’s lost profits

For the amount of profits Experience Hendrix lost as the

result of Pitsicalis’s infringing conduct, the jury returned two

identical awards of $306,650, one under the federal Lanham

Act and one under the WCPA.11 On appeal, no one contends

that a different analysis applies to the calculation of lost

profits under the WCPA than applies under the federal

Lanham Act. In fact, “the parties already stipulated that [lost

profits under the WCPA] are the same as the Lost Profits

under the Lanham Act for the purposes of awarding double

recovery.” Therefore, we address here the jury’s identical

awards for lost profits under the Lanham Act and the WCPA

together. In doing so, we conclude that, under the

circumstances of this case and in light of our standard of

review, the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable

jury to calculate the profits Experience Hendrix lost due to

Pitsicalis’s infringing conduct. See Skydive Ariz., 673 F.3d at

1112 (“In a trademark action, the nature of the proof required

to support a jury award depends on the circumstances of the

case . . . .”).12

11 The parties and the district court agreed before the jury’s verdict that

Experience Hendrix could not recover twice for its lost profits. We will

discuss this later in the opinion, as one of the bases for granting a new

trial.

12 Our review of the record does not reveal any evidence that would

support duplicative damages of $306,650 under both the Lanham Act and

the WCPA. Were that the only problem with the jury’s damages award,

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The district court instructed jurors that they were to

calculate profits “by deducting all expenses from gross

revenue.” It was Experience Hendrix’s burden to prove its

damages. See Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d

1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)). 

In striking the jury’s award for Experience Hendrix’s lost

profits, the district court held that, while Experience Hendrix

had presented evidence of its lost revenue, it had failed to

offer any evidence as to its expenses, which the jury was

required to deduct from the lost revenue in order to calculate

Experience Hendrix’s lost profits.

During the jury instruction conference, after the close of

evidence, Experience Hendrix acknowledged that it had not

presented the jury with any evidence of its expenses. This

was because Experience Hendrix mistakenly believed that it

bore the burden of proving only its lost revenue and that, once

it had made that showing, the burden shifted to Pitsicalis to

prove any expenses that jurors should deduct in order to

calculate Experience Hendrix’s lost profits. The Lanham Act

applies this burden-shifting framework to proof of the

defendant infringer’s lost profits. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 

But the burden remained with Experience Hendrix, as the

plaintiff, to prove its actual damages, including its own lost

profits. See Lindy Pen, 982 F.2d at 1407.

Notwithstanding Experience Hendrix’s confusion as to

the burdens of proof, there was sufficient evidence before the

jurors from which they could calculate the profits Experience

Hendrix lost due to Pitsicalis’s infringing conduct. That

it could be easily cured. But because the damages awarded are rife with

ambiguity and duplicity, we agree with the district court that the best

solution is simply to grant Rule 59 relief for a new trial on damages.

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evidence included the following: There was undisputed

evidence that, at the same time that Pitsicalis was licensing

his infringing goods, Experience Hendrix suffered a

significant decline in its own licensing revenue earned from

products similar to Pitsicalis’s infringingmerchandise. There

was also testimony describing the nature of licensing revenue

generally as a licensee’s payment to the licensor of a

percentage of the licensee’s revenue in return for the use of

the licensor’s intellectual property. In addition, the jury had

before it financial documents, including Exhibit 60, which

summarized and compared Experience Hendrix’s licensing

revenue from 2006 through 2009. Exhibit 60 referred to

Experience Hendrix’s licensing revenue as “total income,”

“gross profits,” “net ordinary income,” and “net income,”

without reflecting any deductions from the licensing revenue

for expenses. The terms “net income”and “net ordinary

income” in Exhibit 60 suffice to support the jury’s finding

that those figures were after adjustment for costs and were, as

represented, net income. Testimony describing licensing

revenues generally further suggested that there were no

incremental costs saved in connection with the loss of that

revenue attributed to Pitsicalis. From this evidence, then, a

reasonable jury could have found that, because much of

Experience Hendrix’s revenue was licensing revenue, there

were no incremental expenses that the jury had to deduct

from the relevant licensing revenue before jurors calculated

Experience Hendrix’s lost profits, or if there were

incremental costs, they had already been taken into account

in preparing Exhibit 60. Cf. DSPT Int’l, Inc. v. Nahum,

624 F.3d 1213, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that the

“nature of the proof” as to damages under 15 U.S.C.

§ 1117(a) “depends on the circumstances of the case,” and

upholding a jury’s award of actual damages, based in part on

testimony and financial statements indicating a decline in

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“gross profits”). There was, thus, sufficient evidence

presented at trial to enable the jury’s award of Experience

Hendrix’s lost profits to survive the Rule 50(b)(3) motion. So

we conclude that the district court erred in granting the Rule

50(b)(3) motion to vacate the damages of $306,650 in

Experience Hendrix’s lost profits.13

ii. The jury’s damages award for Experience

Hendrix’s loss of goodwill and reputation

The jury also awarded Experience Hendrix $750,000 in

damages for harm Pitsicalis caused to its reputation and

$300,000 for the loss of goodwill. The jury awarded these

measures of damages only under the WCPA. See Wash. State

Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d

13 The district court also granted Pitsicalis Rule 50(b)(3) relief from the

jury’s lost profits award for two other reasons. First, the district court held

that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Pitsicalis’s infringing

conduct had actually caused any of Experience Hendrix’s lost profits. 

Second, the district court held that, even if there was evidence to support

the jury’s finding that Pitsicalis’s infringing conduct caused some of the

drop in Experience Hendrix’s profits, there was insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s awarding Experience Hendrix the entire amount of

$306,650. Because, as we have already explained, the evidence presented

at trial provided a “legally sufficient basis” to support the jury’s damages

award for lost profits, Costa, 299 F.3d at 859, we also reject these other

grounds for the district court to grant Pitsicalis Rule 50(b)(3) relief from

the jury’s damages award for lost profits. Moreover, it does not appear

that the district court, in any event, had authority to grant Pitsicalis Rule

50(b)(3) relief on these alternate grounds because Pitsicalis did not raise

them in either his pre-verdict Rule 50(a) or his post-verdict Rule 50(b)(3)

motion. It appears that the district court sua sponte raised these two

alternative grounds for Rule 50(b)(3) relief. See Murphy, 914 F.2d at

185–86 (reversing entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, under

prior version of Rule 50(b), on a ground that the district court raised sua

sponte).

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1054, 1063 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (“[D]amage to business

reputation and loss of goodwill are [also] compensable

damages under the [W]CPA.”). The district court, in granting

Pitsicalis’s Rule 50(b) motion, struck these awards of

damages after concluding there was no evidence to support

them. Again, we reverse in light of the standards governing

Rule 50(b)(3).

There was significant evidence to support the jury’s

finding of the fact that Pitsicalis’s deceptive trade practices

injured Experience Hendrix’s reputation and goodwill. As to

the amount of that harm, the jury had evidence regarding the

total licensing revenue that ExperienceHendrix earned during

the period of time before and during Pitsicalis’s infringing

activity. From this information, jurors could have calculated

the amount of harm Pitsicalis caused to Experience Hendrix’s

business reputation and goodwill “with reasonable certainty.”

Lewis River Golf, Inc. v. O.M. Scott & Sons, 845 P.2d 987,

990 (Wash. 1993) (en banc); see Wash. State Physicians,

858 P.2d at 1071 (“Damages for loss of professional

reputation are not the type of damages which can be proved

with mathematical certainty and are usually best left as a

question of fact for the jury.”) Specifically, this evidence

indicated that ExperienceHendrix’s overall licensing revenue

declined by $1,022,351.70 during 2009, the period during

which Pitsicalis was infringing Experience Hendrix’s

trademarks. That information provided a legally sufficient

basis for the jury’s award of a total of $1,050,000 in damages

for harm to Experience Hendrix’s reputation and goodwill,14

14 An award based on Experience Hendrix’s decline in total licensing

revenue would seemingly duplicate, in part, the jury’s damages award for

the profits Experience Hendrix lost on licensing revenue specifically for

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and thus permitted these damage awards to survive

Pitsicalis’s Rule 50(b)(3) motion.15

c. The district court did not abuse its discretion

in conditionally granting Experience Hendrix

a new trial on damages

The district court conditionally granted Pitsicalis a new

trial on damages under both the federal Lanham Act and the

WCPA in the event, which has now occurred, that this court

reinstated the jury’s damages awards. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

50(c)(1), 59. We affirm the district court’s decision granting

a new trial, in light of the significant deference we owe the

district court’s determination that a new trial is warranted. 

See Kode, 596 F.3d at 612. Unlike with the district court’s

Rule 50(b) analysis, the district court, in considering

Pitsicalis’s motion for a new trial, was not required to draw

all inferences in favor of the verdict and could reweigh the

evidence and make credibility determinations. Id. The

district court also was not limited to the grounds Pitsicalis

raised in support of his new trial motion, but instead could

(and did) sua sponte raise its own concerns about the damages

award. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(d). And our standard of review

goods similar to Pitsicalis’s infringing goods. The parties do not argue

about this, but we discuss it as a basis for granting a new trial.

15 The district court, acting sua sponte, alternatively struck these

damages for loss of reputation and goodwill after concluding that the

jury’s verdict in this regard was contrary to the court’s supplemental

instruction to jurors that these two measures of damages were “essentially

the same thing.” That reason, however, cannot support Rule 50(b) relief

for Pitsicalis because he did not raise that ground in either his pre-verdict

Rule 50(a) motion or in his post-verdict motion for Rule 50(b) relief. See

Murphy, 914 F.2d at 186.

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of the district court’s ruling also differs from the de novo

standard governing our review of a district court’s Rule

50(b)(3) decision. The district court’s decision on a Rule 59

motion for a new trial “will be overturned on appeal only for

abuse of discretion.” Kode, 596 F.3d at 611.

The district court can grant a new trial under Rule 59 on

any ground necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. See

Murphy, 914 F.2d at 187. In this case, the district court

specifically concluded that a new trial was warranted because

the damages awards were “against the clear weight of the

evidence and the product of speculation, error, and disregard

of the Court’s instructions.” “We must uphold the district

court if any of its grounds for granting a new trial are

reasonable.” United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d

1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999). For the following reasons, we

conclude the district court’s reasons are sufficient to warrant

a new trial on both Experience Hendrix’s lost profits and

damages for its loss of reputation and goodwill.

i. New trial on damages for lost profits

The district court concluded that the jury’s damages

award of $306,650, representing the profits Experience

Hendrix lost as the result of Pitsicalis’s infringement of

Experience Hendrix’s trademarks, was against the clear

weight of the evidence. Briefly stated, the district court was

not convinced that the references on Experience Hendrix’s

Exhibit 60 to “total income,” “gross profits,” “net ordinary

income,” and “net income” should be equated to profits,

without further evidence indicating that there were, in fact, no

expenses that should be deducted from Experience Hendrix’s

licensing revenue before it is deemed a measure of lost

profits. This determination alone might not have been

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sufficient to support the district court’s decision to grant a

new trial on damages. See Ace v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,

139 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a more

stringent standard of review applies to grants of new trials

predicated on insufficiency of the evidence). But the district

court also disbelieved the testimony of one of Experience

Hendrix’s corporate officers, Robert Hendrix, that 77% of

Experience Hendrix’s drop in licensing revenues during the

relevant time period, 2009, was the result of Pitsicalis’s

infringing products and not attributable to the general market

economic downturn that occurred during this same time

period. The district court based its credibility determination

in part on the fact that Experience Hendrix’s licensing

revenues on its other products, which would not have been

affected by Pitsicalis’s infringing goods, fell by more than

23% during this same time. We cannot say that the district

judge, who heard the evidence presented at trial, abused its

discretion in ordering a new trial on lost profits on these

bases.16

16 In upholding the district court’s decision to grant a new trial in a

criminal case, the Ninth Circuit noted that an appellate court’s deference

to the district court’s new trial decision is appropriate because “[c]ircuit

judges, reading the dry pages of the record, do not experience the tenor of

the testimony at trial. The balance of proof is often close and may hinge

on personal evaluations of witness demeanor. And, because an order

directing a new trial leaves the final decision in the hands of the jury, it

does not usurp the jury’s function . . . .” United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d

1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 1992). Those reasons also bolster our deferring to

the district court’s new trial determination here.

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ii. New trial on damages for loss of reputation

and goodwill

As previously stated, the jury awarded Experience

Hendrix, under the WCPA, $750,000 for harm to its

reputation and $300,000 for the loss of goodwill. The district

court granted a new trial on these damages as well,

concluding that these damage awards were both contrary to

the clear weight of the evidence and contrary to the district

court’s instruction to the jury that these measures of damages

were “essentially the same thing.”

The evidence Experience Hendrix presented at trial to

support the amount of these damages, though sufficient to

provide a legal basis for the jury’s award, was minimal at

best. Further, the jury’s award of differing amounts of

damages for loss of reputation ($750,000) and for loss of

goodwill ($300,000) directly contradicted the court’s

supplemental instruction to jurors that these two measures of

damages are “essentially the same.” Cf. Jorgensen v.

Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (considering the

merits of an argument that the jury disobeyed trial court’s

instructions, before rejecting that argument, concluding that

“[t]he jury did not disobey the court’s instructions and did not

return a verdict that was unreasonable or unfair”).

Moreover, reading the court’s supplemental instruction in

light of the district court’s instructions as a whole, jury

confusion appears likely. See Overseas Private Inv. Corp. v.

Metro. Dade Cnty., 47 F.3d 1111, 1116 (11th Cir. 1995)

(granting new trial on damages where jury instructions were

confusing, resulting in a confusing damages award). The

court’s original instructions told jurors to consider these two

measures of damages separately, and the verdict form

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provided separate places to insert damages for loss of

reputation and damages for loss of goodwill. The court

further instructed jurors to award each measure of damages

to which they found Experience Hendrix was entitled,

without regard to whether any award was duplicative,

because the court would later correct any duplication of

damages. And when, during the jury’s deliberations, the

court told jurors that harm to reputation and loss of goodwill

were “essentially the same thing,” the court also reminded

jurors that all of the court’s previous instructions, including

the instruction to consider each measure of damages

separately, remained important. These instructions,

considered together, likely fostered confusion among jurors.

Based on the minimal evidence of the amount of harm

Pitsicalis’s infringing activitycaused to ExperienceHendrix’s

reputation and goodwill, the fact that the jury’s award of two

different amounts for these damages directly contradicted the

court’s supplemental jury instruction that these measures of

damages were “essentially the same,” and the confusion

likely created by the instructions as a whole, we cannot say

that the district court abused its discretion in granting a new

trial on these measures of damages.

iii. Duplication of damages awards

In addition to the district court’s concerns about the

damages awards, we also have concerns about the duplicative

nature of several of the awards. Those apparent duplicative

awards include damages, under the Lanham Act, for both

Pitsicalis’s profits earned from infringing Experience

Hendrix’s trademarks and Experience Hendrix’s profits lost

due to Pitsicalis’s infringing activity; an award of Experience

Hendrix’s lost profits under both the Lanham Act and the

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WCPA; and an award of lost licensing revenue specifically

for Experience Hendrix’s goods that are similar to Pitsicalis’s

infringing merchandise, which appears to have been doublecounted as part of the total award for lost reputation and

goodwill. The district court instructed jurors to consider and

award each measure of damages to which Experience

Hendrix was entitled, without regard to the duplicative nature

of any of the awards, because the trial court would later

eliminate any duplication. Here, however, other than the two

identical lost profit awards under the Lanham Act and the

WCPA, the district court did not address any possible

duplication of remedies. While we have discretion to remand

for the district court to correct duplicative awards, see Ace,

139 F.3d at 1248, we conclude that doing so here would still

not address all of the concerns about the damages awards that

the district court raised, and that we share. We, therefore,

defer to the district court’s determination that a new trial on

damages is warranted.

iv. Conclusion as to new trial

For the foregoing reasons, then, we uphold the district

court’s decision to order a new trial on damages, other than

the $60,000 in damages on Pitsicalis’s profits for trademark

infringement under the Lanham Act.17 Our decision is

bolstered by the conclusion that a new trial on these measures

of damages would be just under these circumstances. 

Experience Hendrix’s supporting evidence underlying each

of these measures of damages, while providing a legally

17 Because the district court did not strike the jury’s $60,000 award

under the Lanham Act for the profits Pitsicalis earned by infringing

Experience Hendrix’s trademarks, that damages award remains. That

measure of damages, then, is not included in the new trial on damages.

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sufficient basis to survive a Rule 50(b)(3) directed verdict,

was minimal and, in the eyes of the district court, not very

credible. Further, the jury’s award of damages for loss of

reputation and goodwill contradicted the court’ssupplemental

instruction that those measures of damages are “essentially

the same.” And the jury instructions, especially on the

damages for loss of reputation and goodwill, were likely

confusing. Finally, the apparent duplication of a number of

these damages awards, which the district court told jurors it

would correct, raises other concerns about the damages

awarded. In light of the numerous concerns that the district

court had with the damages award, which we share, we agree

that the just result is a new trial on these particular measures

of damages.

4. Attorney’s fees under the WCPA

Finally, the district court awarded Experience Hendrix

attorney’s fees under the WCPA, see Wash. Rev. Code

§ 19.86.090, but reduced that requested fee from $504,673 to

$50,000. The district court did so for several reasons,

including the following: The WCPA claim was only one of

six claims Experience Hendrix asserted against Pitsicalis, and

only one of two claims on which Experience Hendrix

prevailed; Experience Hendrix did not establish any damages

under the WCPA; and Experience Hendrix sought fees for

motions and pleadings on which it did not prevail or which

did not pertain to its WCPA claim. While no doubt some of

the district court’s reasons for reducing the requested fee

award remain valid, our decision here has changed several of

the factors on which the district court relied to reduce the fee

request. We, therefore, vacate the fee award in its entirety

and remand to permit the district court to reconsider

Experience Hendrix’s fee request in full. See Silver Sage

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Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814,

826 (9th Cir. 2001).18

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district

court’s determination that Washington’s Personality Rights

Act is unconstitutional and REMAND Pitsicalis’s declaratory

judgment claims pertaining to the WPRA with instructions to

enter summary judgment on those claims in favor of

Experience Hendrix. We AFFIRM the district court’s

decision granting Experience Hendrix partial summary

judgment on its claim that Pitsicalis’s use of “Hendrix” in its

domain names infringed Experience Hendrix’s mark

“Hendrix.” We VACATE the permanent injunction and

REMAND so the district court can revise language in the

injunction to clarify what conduct is and is not enjoined. We

REVERSE in its entirety the district court’s Rule 50(b)(3)

decision to strike most of the jury’s award of damages, under

both the federal Lanham Act and Washington’s Consumer

Protection Act. We AFFIRM the district court’s order

granting a new trial on damages under both of these statutes

and REMAND for a new trial on such damages. And we

VACATE the district court’s award of attorney’s fees under

the WCPA and REMAND the fee request for further

proceedings consistent with this decision. Each side shall

bear its own costs.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.

18 In its briefs, Experience Hendrix requests an award of appellate

attorney’s fees under the WCPA. Such a request must be made by

separate motion pursuant to 9th Cir. R. 39-1.6, and so we do not consider

that request here.

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RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

I concur in much of the majority’s opinion. I agree with

the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred when it

determined that the Washington Personality Rights Act

(WPRA) is unconstitutional. I also agree that the district

court correctly determined that Defendant Pitsicalis’s use of

“Hendrix” infringed Experience Hendrix’s “Hendrix” mark. 

I concur in the determination that the permanent injunction

should be vacated and remanded for clarification of precisely

what conduct is permanently enjoined. In addition, I join the

majority’s conclusion that the jury’s damages award was

improperly decreased by the district court. Finally, but for

different reasons as discussed below, I share the majority’s

view that the district court’s award of attorney’s fees should

be vacated and remanded.

Although there is much of the majority opinion with

which I agree, I absolutely and positively disagree with the

majority’s conclusion that a new trial is warranted on the

issue of damages. In my view, the majority opinion on this

point, like the district court decision, strays from the

appropriate standard of review and essentially re-tries the

case. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority

opinion.

It is helpful at the outset to outline the standard of review

that governed the district court’s decision and governs our

review of that decision. That standard of review authorizes

a new trial only if the record contains no evidence in support

of the jury’s verdict. See E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software,

Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2009). This standard

incorporates considerable deference to the jury’s

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determination. See Kode v. Carlson, 596 F.3d 608, 612 (9th

Cir. 2010) (per curiam). The majority opinion adheres to this

standard when resolving Pitsicalis’s motion for judgment as

a matter of law, but completely abandons this standard when

considering Pitsicalis’s motion for a new trial.

As the majority acknowledges, the determination that

sufficient evidence supported the jury verdict for the purposes

of Pitsicalis’s Rule 50(a) motion undermines the opposite

conclusion reached by the majority in resolving Pitsicalis’s

Rule 50(b) motion. See Majority Opinion, p. 24. See also Go

Daddy Software, 581 F.3d at 962 (instructing that a new trial

is warranted “only if the record contains no evidence in

support of the verdict”) (citation omitted).

It cannot be disputed that damages evidence was

presented for the jury’s consideration. Robert Hendrix, Chief

Operations Officer for Plaintiff Experience Hendrix testified

regarding the dramatic decrease in royalty payments in 2009,

at precisely the same time Pitsicalis was infringing the

“Hendrix” trademark by selling counterfeit Hendrix items. 

Robert described 2009 as the year “the bottom fell out.”

Referring to a trial exhibit, Robert pointed out the

dramatic decrease in royalties from one licensee in 2008–09

to demonstrate the extent of the damages caused by

Pitsicalis’s infringement. In 2006, Experience Hendrix

received $384,000 in royalties from the licensee. In 2007,

Experience Hendrix was paid $394,000 in royalties. 

Royalties decreased to $262,000 in 2008, and plummeted to

$40,000 in 2009. Robert also described decreased royalties

from five licensee companies in his testimony: “I did

$514,000 in 2008, and in 2009, I did $116,000 of licensing of

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merchandising from these five companies. That’s almost a

$400,000 drop in revenue.”

In response to the suggestion that the decreased royalties

were attributable to the recession, Robert noted that

historically Experience Hendrix had “maintained” its sales

numbers during the previous recession, when other licensors

of trademarked items were experiencing a decrease in sales

due to the recession. For that reason, Robert did not attribute

the dramatic decrease in royalties to the recession.

Robert also testified that its licensees were unable to sell

merchandise in brick and mortar stores such as J.C. Penney

in 2009, once Pitsicalis had flooded the store shelves with

infringing merchandise. This testimony was consistent with

the dramatic decrease in royalty payments in 2009, after

Experience Hendrix realized increased royalties “everysingle

year until 2008.” Robert Hendrix estimated that

approximately seventy-seven percent of the decrease in

royalties was attributable to Pitsicalis’s infringing activity.

Richard Hendrix’s testimony was corroborated by

Richard Yalch, Experience Hendrix’s expert witness, and a

thirty-seven-year Ph.D. professor of marketing at the

University of Washington. Dr. Yalch confirmed that lost

royalties due to Pitsicalis’s infringing sales constituted

damages to Experience Hendrix.

Despite this unrefuted testimony, the district court and the

majority have concluded that the jury’s award of damages

was against the weight of the evidence. Yet, the majority

acknowledges this undisputed evidence of the significant

decline in Experience Hendrix’s licensing revenue and

concedes that this evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to

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calculate Experience Hendrix’s lost profits. See Majority

Opinion, pp. 27–28. The majority’s acknowledgment simply

cannot be reconciled with the standard of review we must

apply to the district court’s ruling. See United States v. 4.0

Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting

that a district court abuses its discretion in granting a new

trial “if the jury’s verdict is not against the clear weight of the

evidence”) (citation omitted); see also Ace v. Aetna Life Ins.

Co., 139 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended

(explaining that a jury verdict may be set aside on the basis of

insufficient supporting evidence only if it “is against the great

weight of the evidence or it is quite clear that the jury has

reached a seriously erroneous result”) (citations omitted)

(emphases added). We have characterized this standard as

“stringent.” Id. (citation omitted).

According to the majority, the district court did not

believe Robert Hendrix’s testimony regarding Experience

Hendrix’s lost revenue. See Majority Opinion, p. 33. 

However, the district court did not rule that Robert Hendrix

lacked credibility. Rather, the district court interpreted his

testimony differently than the jury, which the court is not

permitted to do. See 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d at 1139

(“[A] district court may not grant . . . a new trial merely

because it would have arrived at a different verdict. . . .)

(citation omitted).

The majority also concludes that a new trial is warranted

due to the confusing jury instructions. See Majority Opinion,

pp. 34–35. The majority opinion focuses on the instruction

from the district court that damages for injury to reputation

and loss of goodwill “were essentially the same thing.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). But “essentially the same

thing” and “exactly the same thing” are different concepts. 

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And the jury could have reasonably awarded damages for

injury to reputation and loss of goodwill under the district

court’s instruction. See WMX Technologies v. Miller, Inc.,

197 F.3d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Reputation is not the

equivalent of the goodwill of a business. . . .”) (emphasis

added); id., (“[T]he goodwill of a business is its value as a

going concern . . .”). Robert Hendrix’s testimony established

that Pitsicalis’s infringement not only damaged Experience

Hendrix’s reputation for providing authentic Jimmy Hendrix

items, but also decreased the value of Experience Hendrix as

a going concern. See id.

The majority concludes that a new trial is warranted due

to “likely” jury confusion stemming from the district court’s

instructions. See Majority Opinion, pp. 34–35. However, as

discussed above, the jury’s verdict was supported by the

evidence and consistent with the court’s instruction. In any

event, as the majority recognizes, to the extent the damages

award is duplicative, we could remand for correction of the

award rather than requiring a new trial. See Majority

Opinion, p. 36.

In sum, applying the proper standard should result in

retention of the jury’s verdict, including the award of

damages. This might be a different case if Pitsicalis had

submitted some evidence to refute the damages evidence

submitted by Experience Hendrix. However, in the absence

of countervailing evidence from Pitsicalis, there was nothing

for the district court to weigh when deciding the motion for

a new trial. All the evidence was on Experience Hendrix’s

side of the scale, and supported the jury’s verdict. For that

reason, I would reverse the district court’s grant of a new

trial. See DSPT Int’l Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th

Cir. 2010) (“A district court may grant a new trial only if the

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jury verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the

evidence. . . . A jury’s verdict must be upheld if it is

supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence

adequate to support the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also

possible to draw a contrary conclusion. . . . A jury verdict

should be set aside only when the evidence permits only one

reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the

jury’s verdict.”) (footnote references and internal quotation

marks omitted).1

As for the attorney’s fees, I agree with the majority that

the fee award should be vacated and remanded, but not for the

reasons stated by the majority. Because I am of the view that

the jury’s verdict, including the damages award, should stand,

I would remand the attorney’s fee order for the district court

to award fees to Experience Hendrix as the prevailing party

on the matters tried to the jury and on the matters resolved in

its favor by the district court. See TrafficSchool.com v.

Edriver, Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 834 (9th Cir. 2011) (remanding

the denial of attorney fees).

CONCLUSION

I agree with the majority that we should reverse the

district court’s ruling that the WPRA is unconstitutional. I

also concur in the affirmance of the district court’s decision

granting summary judgment to Experience Hendrix on its

1 The majority cites Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400,

1407 (9th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that Experience Hendrix had to

present proof of its expenses as part of its evidence of damages. See

Majority Opinion, p. 27. However, Lindy contains no language to that

effect. In any event, Robert Hendrix’s testimony informed the jury of

Experience Hendrix’s lost profits, as contemplated in Lindy.

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infringement claims against Pitsicalis’s use of the “Hendrix”

marks. I concur in the vacatur and remand of the permanent

injunction. I join the majority in reversing the district court’s

decision to decrease the damages awarded by the jury. I also

join the majority’s vacatur of the attorney fee award. I differ

from the majority in that I would NOT remand for a new trial

on damages. I would remand for reinstatement of the

damages awarded by the jury, and for an award of attorney’s

fees to Experience Hendrix as the prevailing party. In short,

the district court should reinstate the jury’s verdict, award

attorney’s fees to Experience Hendrix, and let this case be

done.

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