Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04347/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04347-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MALINKA TACUMA WADE MOYE,

Plaintiff,

v.

MAGISTRATE SBA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-04347-YGR (PR)

ORDER PARTIALLY VACATING 

OCTOBER 7, 2014 ORDER OF 

RECUSAL; AND ORDERING 

PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 

PAUPER STATUS SHOULD NOT BE 

DENIED AND ACTION SHOULD NOT 

BE DISMISSED

BACKGROUND

Malinka Tacuma Wade Moye, a pre-trial detainee, filed the instant pro se civil rights 

action. He is currently being detained at Napa State Hospital, and there appears to be pending 

criminal charges against him in state court. Plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. 15.

The following background, taken from an Order issued by Judge Edward M. Chen, 

explains Plaintiff’s vexatious litigant status in this Court and in state court:

Mr. Moye is no stranger to this Court or the state courts. In 2006, he 

was declared a vexatious litigant under state law by the San 

Francisco County Superior Court and ordered not to file any new 

actions in state court without first obtaining leave of court do so. 

See Moye v. Baca, San Francisco County Superior Court Case No. 

CGC-06-450461 (August 11, 2006 order). Mr. Moye then became 

quite active in the federal court. After he had filed about 20 

meritless actions in this Court, Judge Alsup declared him to be a 

vexatious litigant on December 21, 2009 and subjected him to prefiling review in future cases. See Docket # 30 in Moye v. City and 

County of San Francisco, N.D. Cal. Case No. C 09-3892 WHA. 

Judge Alsup’s pre-filing review order mentioned that Mr. Moye was 

listed as a party in about 80 actions of various types in the San 

Francisco County Superior Court, most of which were filed by Mr. 

Moye and many of which had defendants with the same names as 

the defendants filed in federal court. Id. at 3. That pre-filing review 

order was later modified to exclude from pre-filing review the 

actions Moye filed while in custody because prisoner cases already 

are subject to a separate screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

Docket # 2 in In re: Moye, N.D. Cal. Case No. C 14-80177 RS.

Dkt. 13 in Case No. C 14-2533 EMD (PR) at 1-2. The Court notes that recently, during a sixweek span from June to July 2014, Plaintiff filed eighteen actions from the confines of the San 

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Francisco County Jail. In reviewing seventeen of these actions,1Judge Chen noted that each 

complaint was “a rambling jumble of ideas that is largely incomprehensible.” Id. at 3. Judge 

Chen added that Plaintiff had alleged a “grab-bag of legal claims against the defendants in each 

action, mentioning numerous constitutional provisions, statutes and torts, but fail[ed] to allege an 

understandable set of facts to go with any of those constitutional provisions, statutes and torts.” 

Id. These seventeen complaints were then dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, but leave to amend was granted so that Plaintiff could file an amended complaint 

in each action that cured the several deficiencies addressed by Judge Chen. Id. All seventeen 

actions have since been dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff has appealed 

these dismissals to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Most of his appeals have been dismissed 

and mandates have been issued, but there are some appeals that are still pending in the Ninth 

Circuit. Abusive filings by prisoners are subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which generally 

disallows pauper status for a prisoner who has had three or more actions dismissed on the grounds 

that they were frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim. However, at that time, section 

1915(g) did not yet apply to Plaintiff because he had not yet accumulative enough dismissals in 

non-habeas actions2that were filed while he was a prisoner and have become final judgments.3 As 

further explained below, section 1915(g) may now apply to Plaintiff.

 

1

The eighteenth action filed during that six-week period, Moye v. Napa State Hospital, 

No. C 14-3121 EMC (PR), alleged that Plaintiff had been admitted improperly to Napa State 

Hospital. That action has been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted and because the Younger abstention is required as to the claims arising from the state court 

criminal case against Plaintiff. Dkt. 21 in Case No. C 14-3121 EMC (PR) (citing Younger v. 

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971) (Under principles of comity and federalism, a federal court 

should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory 

relief absent extraordinary circumstances.)).

2 A dismissal of a habeas petition does not count as a strike under section 1915(g). 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Andrews I”). However, if the habeas 

petition was actually a challenge to prison conditions (such that it was really a mislabeled section 

1983 action), the district court may determine that the dismissal of the habeas petition does in fact 

count as a strike for purposes of section 1915(g). See id. at 1123 n.12.

3 A district court’s dismissal of case does not count as a strike under section 1915(g) until 

the dismissal becomes final, that is, until the prisoner has waived or exhausted his opportunity to 

appeal. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011). This means that a dismissal 

ripens into a strike for section 1915(g) purposes on the date of the Supreme Court’s denial or 

dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari, if the prisoner filed one, or from the date when the 

time to file a petition for writ of certiorari expired, if he did not (which is usually ninety days after

entry of the order denying discretionary review). Id.

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Before the Court is Plaintiff’s twenty-page handwritten complaint, which names the 

following Defendants: “Magistrate SBA,” “Magistrate JL,” “Magistrate EMC,” “Magistrate PJH,”

and “Magistrate WHA.” Dkt. 1 at 1, 3-5.

On October 6, 2014, Judge Chen issued an order of recusal and for reassignment, and on 

the same date, this case was assigned to Judge Beth Labson Freeman. Dkts. 3, 4.

On October 7, 2014, Judge Freeman issued an order of recusal and for reassignment. Dkt. 

5. In that October 7, 2014 Order, Judge Freeman stated: “Given that judges of this District are 

named Defendants in this matter, the Clerk of Court shall notify the Executive Committee for 

further reassignment of this case outside of this District.” Id. at 1.

Even though Judge Freeman gave the directive above, this case was inadvertently 

reassigned to the undersigned Judge. Dkt. 6. This Court now reconsiders Judge Freeman’s 

October 7, 2014 Order, finds that reassignment of this case outside this District is unwarranted,

and VACATES that portion of her Order. 

The instant complaint is now before this Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In 

addition, Plaintiff has filed the following motions, entitled: “Motion for Trial for Damages . . .”

and “Ex Parte Application for Trial by Jury . . . .” Dkts. 12, 14.

DISCUSSION

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

In the instant matter, Plaintiff has submitted another civil rights action that contains 

conclusory allegations and is largely incomprehensible. Although the Court has difficulty 

deciphering Plaintiff’s handwriting and does not understand a majority of his allegations, it 

appears that he may be trying to complain about court rulings by federal judges and adverse 

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decisions in earlier cases. However, any claim against an individual judge for his or her rulings 

would have to be dismissed because judges have absolute judicial immunity for their actions taken 

in their judicial capacity. See Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996), superseded 

by statute on other grounds as stated in Cobb v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2012 WL 5335309, 

at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2012); Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 

1987). Plaintiff could be given an opportunity to amend his complaint, but the record shows that 

his past efforts to do so in his previous cases have been unsuccessful. In any event, before the 

Court decides whether or not to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, it seems that he may 

not be eligible for pauper status in order to proceed with this action because section 1915(g) may 

now apply to him.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) was enacted, and became effective, 

on April 26, 1996. To elaborate on what the Court mentioned above, the PLRA provides that a 

prisoner may not bring a civil action IFP under section 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more 

prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a 

court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Section 1915(g) requires that this Court consider 

prisoner actions dismissed before, as well as after, the statute’s 1996 enactment. Tierney v. 

Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1997). Section 1915(g) is commonly referred to as the 

“three strikes rule,” which “requires so-called ‘frequent filer’ prisoners to prepay the entire filing 

fee before federal courts may consider their civil actions and appeals.” Kinnell v. Graves, 265 

F.3d 1125, 1127 (10th Cir. 2001).

For purposes of a dismissal that may be counted under section 1915(g), the phrase “fails to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted” parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) and carries the same interpretation, the word “frivolous” refers to a case that is 

“of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact,” and the word “malicious” refers to 

a case “filed with the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1121 (citation 

omitted). Only cases within one of these three categories can be counted as strikes for section

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1915(g) purposes; therefore, the mere fact that Plaintiff has filed many other cases in this Court 

and the Ninth Circuit does not alone warrant dismissal under section 1915(g). See id. Dismissal 

of an action under section 1915(g) should only occur when, “after careful evaluation of the order 

dismissing an [earlier] action, and other relevant information, the district court determines that the 

action was dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim.” Id. 

Andrews I requires that the prisoner be given notice of the potential applicability of section

1915(g), by either the district court or the defendants, but also requires the prisoner to bear the 

ultimate burden of persuasion that section 1915(g) does not bar pauper status for him. Id. 

A dismissal under section 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot proceed with his action as 

a pauper, but he still may pursue his claims if he pays the full filing fee at the outset of the action. 

See Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s denial of 

IFP status and dismissing complaint without prejudice under section 1915(g)).

A review of the dismissal orders in Plaintiff’s many prior prisoner actions and appeals 

reveals that he has had at least three such actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds that they 

were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff is 

now given notice that the Court believes the following dismissals may be counted as dismissals for 

purposes of section 1915(g): (1) Moye v. City & Cnty. of S.F., No. C 13-1240 EMC (PR) (N.D. 

Cal. Nov. 25, 2013) (civil rights action dismissed as frivolous); (2) Moye v. Gascon, No. C 13-

1821 PJH (PR) (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2013) (civil rights action filed using habeas petition form4and 

dismissed as duplicative5); (3) Moye v. United States Gov’t, No. C 13-2173 EMC (PR) (N.D. Cal.

Dec. 20, 2013) (civil rights action dismissed for failure to state a claim); and (4) Moye v. People of 

the State of Cal., No. 13-5624 PJH (PR) (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2013) (civil rights action removed 

from state court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443, and dismissed as duplicative). In addition, there 

will be another one that may be counted as a dismissal for purposes of section 1915(g), as of May 

 

4

See supra note 2.

5

See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (complaint with the 

same allegations as in an earlier complaint that had been dismissed was properly dismissed under 

section 1915 as frivolous or malicious); Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) 

(duplicative or repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action is subject to dismissal 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as malicious). 

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27, 2015, when the dismissal becomes final in Moye v. Lang, No. C 14-2791 EMC (PR) (N.D. 

Cal. Oct. 8, 2014) (civil rights action dismissed for failure to state a claim). Plaintiff therefore 

may proceed in forma pauperis only if he is seeking relief from a danger of serious physical injury 

which is “imminent” at the time of filing. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d 

Cir. 2001) (en banc); Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 1999); Ashley v. 

Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998); Banos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1998). 

Upon reviewing the complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not appear to be under imminent 

danger of serious physical injury when he filed the complaint. Accordingly, in light of these 

dismissals, and because the imminent danger exception does not apply, Plaintiff is ORDERED TO 

SHOW CAUSE in writing, why pauper status should not be denied and this action should not be 

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), as explained below. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined below, the Court orders as follows:

1. Reassignment of this case outside this District is unwarranted; therefore, the Court

reconsiders and VACATES that portion of Judge Freeman’s October 7, 2014 Order. Dkt. 5.

2. Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing filed no later than twentyeight (28) days from the date of this Order, why pauper status should not be denied and this action 

should not be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Although the Court has listed more than 

three dismissals, only three prior dismissals need qualify under section 1915(g). In the alternative 

to showing cause why this action should not be dismissed, Plaintiff may avoid dismissal by paying 

the full $400.00 filing fee by the deadline.

3. In light of the fact that this action could be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g), Plaintiff’s aforementioned pending motions are DENIED without prejudice to re-filing 

if he survives dismissal. Dkts. 12, 14.

4. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 12 and 14.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: ______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

May 4, 2015

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