Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-00464/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-00464-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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NO. C 10-0464 RS

ORDER

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*E-Filed 1/3/2011* 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

KUANG-BAO OU-YOUNG, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

JOHN E. POTTER, UNITED STATES 

POSTMASTER GENERAL, 

 Defendant. 

____________________________________/

No. C 10-0464 RS 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

The United States Postal Service (“USPS”) moves to dismiss plaintiff Kuang-Bao OuYoung’s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) for failure to state a claim for relief. Pursuant to an 

Order issued by this Court on September 24, 2010 dismissing Ou-Young’s Second Amended 

Complaint (“SAC”) in its entirety, Ou-Young has narrowed his claims to just three. He alleges that 

his former employer, USPS, violated Title VII when it discriminated against him on the basis of 

race, retaliated against him for engaging in conduct protected under the statute, and fostered a 

working environment hostile to a person of his race. This matter is appropriate for resolution 

without oral argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and the hearing scheduled for January 6, 

2011 is vacated. Ou-Young has pleaded facts sufficient to support a plausible discrimination and 

JOSE

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retaliation claim and USPS’s motion must be denied. He has not, however, in this iteration of his 

complaint or in the three others preceding it, pleaded a hostile work environment claim that is 

plausible on its face. As it is clear at this stage that further amendment would be futile, Ou-Young’s 

hostile environment claim shall be dismissed without leave to amend. USPS’s contention that OuYoung’s TAC includes excessive and irrelevant facts, as well as allegations Ou-Young concedes he 

has abandoned, is a valid one. Accordingly, the facts and abandoned legal claims identified by 

defendant will be deemed stricken. 

II. RELEVANT FACTS 

Plaintiff Ou-Young was employed as a maintenance mechanic at the San Jose Post Office 

from April of 2007 until August 11, 2010. Ou-Young filed two formal complaints—the first in 

October of 2009 and the second in May of 2010—with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

(“EEO”) against his employer, detailing a series of interrelated events. Both were denied. The 

workplace conduct that informed those complaints is the subject of this lawsuit. The following 

factual description reflects a distillation of the Prior Order’s more detailed factual section and 

clarifications or additions contained in Ou-Young’s TAC. 

On October 6, 2009, Ou-Young filed a formal complaint with the EEO against his plant 

manager Grewal, operation supervisors Noseworthy and Jhaj, and a maintenance supervisor, Carlos 

Swanner. The complaint discussed an incident in May of 2009 where supervisor Jhaj shouted at 

Ou-Young after he failed to repair a machine, alleged that Ou-Young was unfairly blamed for the 

failed repair and downtime, and discussed questioning Ou-Young received from his supervisors as 

to his work habits and whereabouts. On May 4, 2010, Ou-Young filed a second complaint, where 

he advanced allegations of continued harassment from his supervisors, described various interviews 

he attended to discuss his allegations, and discussed a letter he received reprimanding him for 

failing to follow instructions or explain work absences. The work absences relate largely to sickleave Ou-Young took on various occasions due to the mental stress involved in working under 

specific supervisors. By the spring of 2010, Ou-Young’s supervisors had begun to condition 

approval of Ou-Young’s requests for sick or administrative leave on receipt of a physician’s note. 

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Ou-Young did not provide such a note, but claims the requirement was applied to him, but not to 

other employees. Encompassed within the timeframe covered by the second formal complaint are 

also two other occasions on which Ou-Young failed to make a timely, successful repair to a sorting 

machine and was blamed for the resulting downtime. He also asserts that on at least one of those 

occasions, another maintenance repair worker, Romy Pantaleon, also attempted but failed to make a 

repair. Ou-Young avers it was only he, and not Pantaleon, who was subsequently blamed. 

Ou-Young received a Notice of Removal from USPS employment on July 14, 2010. The 

notice explained that Ou-Young’s removal was based on extended absence without official leave, 

irregular and unsatisfactory attendance, failure to report for duty as scheduled, and failure to follow 

instructions. Although Ou-Young added this fact to his SAC, he had not yet pursued any 

administrative remedy to address his termination. In the Prior Order, this Court dismissed OuYoung’s SAC in its entirety, largely because it was not clear from the SAC whether or not OuYoung had exhausted his administrative remedies. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 

2001). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure further provides that to state a claim, a 

pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 

to relief.” The first part of this requirement—“a short and plain statement of the claim”—cannot be 

read without reference to the second part—“showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has made clear that while “showing” an 

entitlement to relief does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does “demand[] more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Thus, “[a] pleading 

that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

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 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), the Supreme Court articulated two 

“working principles” behind its approach to Rule 8 notice pleading. First, the tenet a court must 

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Id. 

“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of 

a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more 

than conclusions.” Id. at 1950. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief 

survives a motion to dismiss. Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. 

While a plaintiff in a Title VII employment discrimination case must comport with Rule 8’s 

pleading requirements as refined in Twombly and Iqbal, this does not mean the plaintiff must prove

its prima facie discrimination case at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (reversing dismissal of employment discrimination claim at pleading stage 

where district court found plaintiff failed to plead a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case). See also

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-70 (acknowledging that, in light of Swierkiewicz, “we do not require 

heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face”). This is because the McDonnell Douglas prima facie showing is an evidentiary 

standard, not a pleading requirement; it relates to an employee’s burden of presenting evidence that 

raises an inference of discrimination. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512-13. The question at the 

pleading stage is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether he or she is entitled to 

offer evidence to support the claims. What the plaintiff must do is “give the defendant fair notice of 

what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. See also Williams v. Boeing 

Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1130 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Even though heightened pleading is not required in 

discrimination cases, the complaint must still ‘give the defendant fair notice . . . .’” (quoting

Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512)). Even post Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff need not supply specific 

evidence adequate to withstand the four-part McDonnell Douglas test; what he or she must do is 

allege facts that state a facially plausible Title VII claim. 

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IV. DISCUSSION 

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

Although Ou-Young did aver that he filed frequent internal complaints alleging 

discriminatory harassment, retaliation, and a hostile work environment over the past two years, the 

Prior Order expressed concern over whether Ou-Young had properly exhausted his administrative 

remedies, particularly in light of his quite recent termination (which took place in July of 2010, 

several months after Ou-Young initiated this suit and mere weeks before he filed the SAC). As the 

exhaustion requirement affects subject matter jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the SAC and 

instructed Ou-Young to pursue the appropriate administrative channels or clarify whether he had 

already done so. “Under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust his or her administrative remedies by 

filing a timely charge with the EEOC, or the appropriate . . . agency, thereby affording the agency 

an opportunity to investigate the charge.” B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). “The administrative charge requirement serves the 

important purposes of giving the charged party notice of the claim and ‘narrow[ing] the issues for 

prompt adjudication and decision.’” Id. (quoting Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 

1995)). 

In the TAC, Ou-Young clarifies that he filed, and the EEO considered and rejected, two 

formal complaints. There is still, of course, no allegation in the TAC that Ou-Young has brought 

his termination to the agency’s attention. USPS suggests this means the Court is free only to 

consider the pre-termination conduct discussed in the two earlier complaints. As a practical matter, 

USPS points out that both complaints were denied before the termination took place and the agency 

could not have considered or investigated the circumstances surrounding it. In the Ninth Circuit, 

“[i]ncidents of discrimination not included in an EEOC [or EEO] charge may not be considered by a 

federal court unless the new claims are ‘like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the 

EEOC charge.’” Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 

(9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 

726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984)). When determining whether an allegation under Title VII is “like or 

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reasonably related” to allegations contained in a previous agency charge, “the court inquires whether 

the original EEOC investigation would have encompassed the additional charges.” Id. at 1476 

(citing Kaplan v. Int’l Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees and Motion Picture Machine 

Operators, 525 F.2d 1354, 1359 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975)). Moreover, where “closely related incidents 

occur after a charge has been filed, additional investigative and conciliative efforts would be 

redundant,” and “[t]o require a second ‘filing’ by the aggrieved party . . . would serve no purpose 

other than the creation of an additional procedural technicality.’” Brown, 732 F.2d at 729-30

(quoting Ramirez v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 586 F.2d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1978)). Finally, 

“[t]he remedial purpose of Title VII and the paucity of legal training among those whom it is 

designed to protect require charges filed before the EEOC to be construed liberally.” Id. (quoting 

Stache v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, 852 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

Ou-Young characterizes the termination as merely a final example of the same 

discriminatory or retaliatory conduct of which he complained in both formal complaints. Aside 

from the actual act of termination, he does not advance any new theory or broaden the scope of his 

general employment discrimination claims. The facts surrounding his termination, then, are indeed 

“like or reasonably related” to the claims raised in the EEO charges. B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 

276 F.3d at 1100. The termination fact is “new,” but it is so intimately related to Ou-Young’s 

theory of his case that it makes sense to consider it here, particularly where Ou-Young avers that the 

same conduct cited in his formal complaints caused or at least contributed to his termination. 

2. Unlawful Discrimination on the Basis of Race 

Defendant moves to dismiss Ou-Young’s discrimination claim because it asserts he has 

not—and cannot—plead a plausible claim for relief. Specifically, defendant focuses on the events at 

the heart of Ou-Young’s two formal EEO complaints.1

 As detailed above, the first complaint 

addressed the instance in May of 2009 where supervisor Jhaj shouted at Ou-Young after he failed to 

repair a machine, alleged that Ou-Young was unfairly blamed for the failed repair and downtime, 

 

1

 Ou-Young included in his TAC the Final Agency Decisions issued by the EEO, and they may be 

considered here. 

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and discussed the questioning Ou-Young received from his supervisors as to his work habits and 

whereabouts. The second complaint detailed the later events, including Ou-Young’s allegation of 

continued harassment from his supervisors, the interviews he attended to discuss his allegations, and 

a letter he received reprimanding him for failing to follow instructions or explain work absences. 

While USPS acknowledges that Ou-Young need not produce evidence to support a prima 

facie showing of discrimination, it insists that Ou-Young must at least plead facts that plausibly 

suggest he can ultimately do so. Four elements comprise a McDonnell Douglas prima facie 

discrimination case: (1) a plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) a plaintiff performed his or 

her job satisfactorily; (3) a plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) a plaintiff was 

treated less favorably than a similarly situated, non-protected employee. More specifically, 

defendant argues that Ou-Young has included facts in the TAC that make the second, third, and 

fourth elements implausible. 

With regard to whether Ou-Young performed his job satisfactorily, USPS points out how 

Ou-Young concedes he was on several occasions unable to fix machinery, that he took multiple sick 

leaves without medical documentation, and that he continued to request and then take leave even 

when he knew his supervisors would ask for a physician’s documentation. In this sense, defendant 

argues Ou-Young has actually included in his TAC a plausible explanation for why he was 

reprimanded and denied sick or administrative leave: he was an “idiosyncratic,” sometimes 

“demanding” employee. In other words, defendant suggests the TAC itself demonstrates that OuYoung had not performed his job satisfactorily. On the other hand, the TAC does not concede that 

the repair failures were Ou-Young’s fault; indeed, he alleges the contrary. Moreover, Ou-Young’s 

apparent refusal to provide a physician’s explanation, while potentially problematic for him, does 

not foreclose his ability to present a prima facie case. 

Next, USPS disputes whether or not Ou-Young suffered an adverse employment action. 

Because Ou-Young’s termination, as discussed above, may be considered in this action, defendant’s 

contention need not be addressed further. Moreover, even were termination not included, OuYoung’s averment that he was unfairly “blamed” for machinery beyond repair, and that his sick 

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leave was discriminatorily restricted may amount to a separate adverse employment action, 

depending upon the development of the factual record going forward. 

Finally, defendant attacks the “similarly situated” employees referenced in Ou-Young’s 

TAC as not similar at all. Individuals are similarly situated within the meaning of the McDonnell 

Douglas framework “when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.” Vasquez v. County 

of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). In his TAC, Ou-Young mentions Romy 

Pantaleon, who was also employed as a maintenance worker in the San Jose Post Office. On one 

occasion, both men were called to repair a machine, the repairs failed, and Ou-Young—but not 

Pantaleon—was blamed for the downtime. Defendant in its motion details certain facts that it 

suggests demonstrate why the singling out of Ou-Young was justified. Ou-Young in his opposition 

disagrees and offers an alternative factual explanation. As both are at least plausible, at the motion 

to dismiss phase, all inferences must flow to the benefit of the complaint. 

Defendant’s argument, in other words, would require a weighing of the facts to an extent 

appropriate only at a later procedural juncture, such as summary judgment or trial. While it may be 

true that Ou-Young’s discrimination claim ultimately lacks merit, and while it also may be true that 

a perfectly non-discriminatory reason underlies the USPS’ approach to this employee, these are 

issues for another day. Viewing the totality of the alleged circumstances in the light most favorable 

to Ou-Young, the complaint advances “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. See also Johnson Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 

1116, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Our notice pleading requirements do not require more. Indeed, it 

may appear on the face of the pleadings that recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the 

test.”) (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515). Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss OuYoung’s discrimination claim must be denied. 

3. Retaliation 

Next, defendant contends Ou-Young has failed to state a plausible retaliation claim. Title 

VII prohibits retaliation against an employee for opposing any practice made unlawful under the 

Title or for participating in any stage of administrative or judicial proceedings under the statute. 42 

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U.S.C. § 2000e-3; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.101(b). To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) 

that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the plaintiff suffered an adverse 

employment action; and (3) that a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse 

action. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002). Defendant does 

not dispute that Ou-Young engaged in a protected activity and that he filed multiple complaints 

alleging harassment, discrimination and retaliation, not merely with the EEO but also internally with 

the San Jose Post Office. It is instead with the latter two elements that USPS takes issue. As 

explained above, however, Ou-Young has alleged facts sufficient to suggest that he plausibly 

experienced an adverse employment action. Similarly, while USPS argues the reprimands and 

refusals to approve leave time have legitimate, alternative explanations (i.e., that Ou-Young 

deserved them), Ou-Young’s TAC supplies enough facts to make his averment of retaliation at least 

plausible. He points out, for example, that Swanner blamed Ou-Young for downtime on the very 

same day Ou-Young began his pre-complaint counseling process relating to the May, 2009 incident 

with Jhaj. The close timing could suggest a causal connection. At this juncture, the Court cannot 

adopt defendant’s analysis without making a decision that inevitably decides between two 

alternative interpretations of the same facts. Again, defendant’s points are better raised at a later 

procedural phase. 

4. Hostile Environment 

Finally, USPS insists Ou-Young has not pleaded a viable, racially based hostile working 

environment claim. Such a claim based on race requires that a plaintiff show: (1) that he or she was 

subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial nature; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and 

(3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the employee’s conditions of 

employment and create an abusive work environment. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 

502, 508 (1993). Although Ou-Young need not support his allegations with evidence at the 

pleading stage, his complaint must nonetheless allege sufficient facts to state the elements of a 

hostile work environment claim. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1122 

(9th Cir. 2008). Defendant argues that while Ou-Young may insist he suffered from unpleasant 

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workplace conduct on account of his job performance, he has utterly failed to plead facts that show 

he suffered abuse of a racial nature. As defendant correctly indicates, Rule 8 requires allegations 

plausibly suggestive of (not merely consistent with) racial animus. See Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1123 

n.4. Ou-Young has not done this here. While he alleges that his supervisors yelled at him and 

blamed him for downtime on at least three occasions, and while he insists he was unfairly denied 

leave, the TAC as currently constructed fails to draw a plausible connection—or any connection—

between his supervisors’ conduct and racial animus. The closest Ou-Young’s TAC comes is to 

mention his belief that, as a general matter, South-Asian employees received preferential treatment 

in the San Jose Post Office. That said, Ou-Young draws no other connection and includes no other 

facts from which the Court could plausibly connect his supervisors’ behavior or comments to racial 

animus. In fact, there is nothing in the TAC to suggest his supervisors made any reference—

inappropriate or innocuous—to race at all. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss Ou-Young’s 

hostile environment claim must be granted. As the TAC represents Ou-Young’s fourth attempt to 

state a claim for relief, it is apparent that further amendment would be futile. Accordingly, 

defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim is granted without leave to amend. 

5. Other Claims 

Defendant correctly points out that this Court in its Prior Order dismissed several claims 

raised in Ou-Young’s SAC. Because these claims focused on the exact same conduct at the heart of 

Ou-Young’s Title VII claim, the Order explained that Ou-Young is limited to bringing his claims 

under the latter statute. While Ou-Young affirms in both his TAC and his opposition motion that 

his are merely claims rising under Title VII, the TAC still contains these extraneous claims 

(although he does at least include them under headings that reference only Title VII). These include 

allegations of “false statements and concealment of evidence,” “conspiracy and cover up,” and any 

and all criminal allegations. Similarly, extraneous facts discussing the Postal Service’s “history of 

workplace violence” do nothing more than distract from Ou-Young’s Title VII claim. Accordingly, 

those averments as outlined in defendant’s motion shall be deemed stricken from the TAC. 

V. CONCLUSION 

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 As explained above, Ou-Young’s TAC states plausible claims of discrimination and 

retaliation. He has not pleaded facts plausibly supporting his hostile work environment claim and 

this claim shall therefore be dismissed with prejudice. All facts and legal claims extraneous to his 

Title VII claims shall be considered stricken from the TAC. USPS is instructed to answer OuYoung’s TAC within 21 days of this Order’s issuance. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 1/3/2011 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT A HARD COPY OF THIS ORDER WAS MAILED TO: 

Kuang-Bao P Ou-Young 

1362 Wright Avenue 

Sunnyvale, CA 94087 

DATED: 1/3/2011 

 /s/ Chambers Staff 

 Chambers of Judge Richard Seeborg 

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