Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01388/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01388-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Owen Arvie Thompson, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-05-01388-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus (doc. 1),

respondent's answer (doc.12), petitioner's reply (doc. 18), the report and recommendation of

the United States Magistrate Judge ("R & R") (doc. 27) and petitioner's objections (doc. 32).

Respondents did not respond to the objections, and the time for filing a response has expired.

For the reasons stated below, we adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommendation in full.

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief from his 2000 state court

conviction because it violated both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

and his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. See

Petition at 5, 6. The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal of the Due Process claim

because petitioner did not exhaust his state remedies, and alternatively because the claim

lacks merit. The Magistrate Judge concludes that petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim lacks

merit because the conduct petitioner complains of was not prejudicial. 

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I.

Petitioner first objects to the R & R's recommendation that the due process ground be

dismissed by contending that the claim was exhausted in the Arizona state courts.

Specifically, he alleges that "[p]etitioner has already set forth in some detail" the reasons why

the R & R's exhaustion conclusion is "incorrect." Objections at 2 (citing Reply at 11).

Citation to a previously filed brief, which the Magistrate Judge has already considered, is not

an objection or a request for review that requires us to engage in de novo review of the R &

R. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (interpreting 28

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C)). Therefore, we adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that

ground one of the petition be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. However, we

reach the same conclusion even if we review the Magistrate Judge's merits-based

recommendation that ground one be dismissed. 

The Magistrate Judge concludes that admission of prior crimes as propensity evidence

does not violate the Due Process Clause. See R & R at 12. We first address petitioner's

argument that the Magistrate Judge erred by relying on Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75

n.5, 112 S. Ct. 475, 484 n.5 (1991), in reaching its propensity evidence conclusion. See

Objections at 3, 4 ("The footnote in Estelle does not represent the actual holding of the

Supreme Court in that case and is mere dicta.").

We may not grant habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits

in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) "resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Importantly, the "as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States" clause expressly limits the source of doctrine on which

we may rely in addressing a habeas petition. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381, 120 S.

Ct. 1495, 1506 (2000). "A rule that 'breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the

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States or the Federal Government,' " falls outside the universe of "clearly established law."

Id. (citation omitted). 

The Supreme Court has not held that a state law that permits the use of prior crimes

as propensity evidence violates the Due Process Clause. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5, 112

S. Ct. at 484 n.5 ("Because we need not reach the issue, we express no opinion on whether

a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of 'prior crimes'

evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime."). Therefore, consideration of

petitioner's prior crimes as propensity evidence was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States. It is of no import that the R & R cited to dicta in a footnote to establish that

the rule petitioner favors does not exist. To show a due process violation, petitioner had to

first establish the existence of clearly established law forbidding the challenged practice.

Petitioner has failed to do so, and we therefore reject this objection to the R & R. 

Petitioner also objects to the R & R's propensity evidence finding by arguing that the

Ninth Circuit has held that prior acts introduced for purposes other than propensity violate

due process unless "the jury is given a limiting instruction that it should not consider the

other crimes evidence as evidence of the defendant's guilt on the charge on which he is

currently being tried." Objections at 3 (citing Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918 (9th

Cir. 1991), McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1993) and United States v. LeMay,

260 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001)). For the reasons stated above, we conclude that prior

acts may be introduced for purposes of propensity. However, we also reject petitioner's

objection because Jammal and McKinney are distinguishable; they addressed the

introduction of prior acts evidence not in a sex-offense case like petitioner's, but in cases in

which the prior acts may not be relied upon to establish propensity. "[C]ourts have routinely

allowed propensity evidence in sex-offense cases, even while disallowing it in other criminal

prosecutions." LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1025. 

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Even if we construe petitioner's argument as an attack on the manner in which prior

acts evidence was admitted in petitioner's state court trial, our conclusion is not altered. The

prior acts in this case were admitted pursuant to both Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b) (prior acts

admissible to show, among other things, "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident") and 404(c) ("evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted by the court if relevant to show that the defendant

had a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the offense

charged"). See Trial Transcript ("Tr.") at 6, 77, Respondent's Answer Exhibit P. 

We address the constitutionality of Rule 404(c), Ariz. R. Evid., below. With regard

to 404(b), the trial court admitted evidence of prior acts of "touching young boys" to show

that petitioner "knew what he was doing and there was a lack of mistake" in the charged case,

but "not to show conformity" with the character trait of "touching young boys." Id. at 6. The

corresponding jury instruction limited consideration of those prior acts to determination of

"the defendant's intent or absence of mistake or accident." Final Jury Instructions at 16. The

jury was also instructed that "[y]ou must not consider these acts to determine the defendant's

character or character trait or to determine that the defendant acted in conformity with the

defendant's character or character trait and therefore committed the charged offense." Id.

Therefore, introduction of the prior acts evidence pursuant to 404(b) did not violate

petitioner's construction of the applicable Ninth Circuit standard because it included a

limiting instruction.

Petitioner next objects to the R & R's propensity conclusion by contending that the

Ninth Circuit has held that "the introduction of propensity evidence may amount to a

constitutional violation if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value."

Id. See Objections at 3 (citing LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1024). Although the holding in Estelle

controls our determination of this issue, we note that even LeMay supports the state court's

actions. 

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1

 Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid. provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste

of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 

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The propensity evidence in this case was admitted pursuant to Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c),

see Tr. at 77, which provides that "[i]n a criminal case in which a defendant is charged with

having committed a sexual offense . . . evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be

admitted by the court if relevant to show that the defendant had a character trait giving rise

to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the offense charged." This rule is similar in form

and function to Rule 414(a), Fed. R. Evid., which states that "[i]n a criminal case in which

the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's

commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be

considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." In LeMay, the Ninth Circuit

noted that Rule 414, Fed. R. Evid., allows for the admission of propensity evidence in

particular criminal cases, creating an exception to Rule 404(b), Fed. R. Evid.'s ban on

propensity evidence. 260 F.3d at 1024. However, LeMay held that "there is nothing

fundamentally unfair about the allowance of propensity evidence under Rule 414" because

"[a]s long as the protections of Rule 403 remain in place to ensure that potentially

devastating evidence of little probative value will not reach the jury, the right to a fair trial

remains adequately safeguarded." Id. at 1026.1

 

Rule 404(c), Ariz. R. Evid., requires that if a court admits 404(c) propensity evidence,

it must also determine that "[t]he evidentiary value of proof of the other act is not

substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or other factors

mentioned in Rule 403." Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c)(1)(C). The state trial court here admitted

prior acts evidence pursuant to Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c), stating that the "the commission of [the

prior] offenses provides a reasonable basis to infer the defendant had a character trait giving

rise to the aberrant sexual propensity to commit the crime charged." Tr. at 77. The trial court

also adhered to Rule 404(c)(1)(C), Ariz. R. Evid., stating that "having weighed and balanced

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2

 Petitioner's criticism of the trial court's introduction of propensity evidence, which

so obviously mirrors the practice sanctioned in LeMay, is unpersuasive. Indeed, his

objection walks a fine line between zealous advocacy and deliberate misrepresentation of

precedent. 

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the probative value of this evidence, compared to the prejudice that might be there to the jury

. . . the probative value substantially outweighs the prejudice, so therefore it is going to be

allowed to come in." Id. at 78. Finally, the trial court noted that the issue of remoteness was

addressed in prior proceedings, the acts "are similar" and "the strength of the evidence that

the defendant committed the other acts is very strong and the surrounding circumstances

compared in this case to those in the previous acts is similar." Id. 

The state trial court admitted evidence pursuant to a rule whose federal equivalent has

been upheld as constitutional. Also, the court safeguarded the fairness of the trial by taking

into account the considerations of Rule 403, Ariz. R. Evid., a rule that incorporates verbatim

the language of Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid. Therefore, the procedure petitioner complains of is

the very kind the Ninth Circuit has already endorsed as constitutional.2

Petitioner also contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that the jury

instruction regarding prior acts did not violate the Due Process Clause. See Objections at 4-

5. Petitioner alleges that here, the instruction at issue "suggests that the jury can rely on the

defendant's prior offenses as the sole basis of convicting him of the current offenses, even

though they are not convinced by the evidence that he is guilty of the current offenses beyond

a reasonable doubt, so long as they find the prior offenses true by clear and convincing

evidence." Objections at 5 (emphasis in original).

"[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970). A jury instruction

that reduces the level of proof necessary for the government to carry its burden violates due

process. See Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104, 93 S. Ct. 354, 357 (1972). However,

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"not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of

a due process violation." Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437, 124 S. Ct. 1830, 1832

(2004). Also, a challenged instruction " 'may not be judged in artificial isolation,' but must

be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole." Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S.

Ct. at 482 (citation omitted). The determining factor in reviewing an ambiguous instruction

is " 'whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged

instruction in a way' that violates the Constitution." Id.

In Estelle, the challenged prior acts instruction informed the jury that the evidence

could only be considered "for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show . . . a

clear connection between the other two offense[s] and the one of which the Defendant is

accused, so that it may be logically concluded that if the Defendant committed other

offenses, he also committed the crime charged in this case." Id. at 71, 112 S. Ct. at 481.

Also, the jury was instructed that the evidence "was not received, and may not be considered

by you" to prove that the defendant "is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition

to commit crimes." Id. at 67, 112 S. Ct. at 479. The Court held that the challenged

instruction was not a propensity instruction that violated the Constitution. Id. at 75, 112 S.

Ct. at 483. Rather, the jury likely understood the instruction to mean "that if it found a 'clear

connection' between the prior injuries and the instant injuries, and if it found that [the

defendant] had committed the prior injuries, then it could use that fact in determining that

[the defendant] committed the crime charged." Id. That use of evidence was "parallel to the

familiar use of evidence of prior acts for the purpose of showing intent, identity, motive, or

plan." Id. Further, the limiting instruction guarded against possible misuse of the evidence.

Id. 

Here, the prior acts evidence in this case was admitted pursuant to both Rules 404(b)

and 404(c), Ariz. R. Evid. However, petitioner only challenges the 404(b) instruction, which

provided that:

Evidence of prior acts has been presented. You may consider these acts only

if you find that the State has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the

defendant committed these acts. You may only consider these acts to establish

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3

 We do note, however, that the Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b) instruction given in this case

tasked the jury with the judge's threshold admissibility inquiry. The instruction did not

reduce the level of proof necessary for the prosecution to carry its burden. However, "[i]t

is analytically unsound to transpose a proof standard to an admissibility setting," see State

v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 590, 944 P.2d 1194, 1204 (1997) (Martone, J., dissenting), and

it is equally unsound to transpose an admissibility standard to a proof setting. Yet petitioner

raises a very different objection to the instruction at issue. He concludes that "the

prosecutor's constitutionally required burden to prove the defendant guilty of the current

offenses beyond a reasonable doubt . . . is undermined and reduced." See Objections at 5.

He does not support that contention with any citation to clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. In fact, what petitioner describes as

the challenged instruction's "fundamental problem" (that the jury could rely only on the

defendant's prior offenses as the sole basis of convicting him of the current offenses) is

contradicted by the wording of the instruction itself. 

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the defendant's intent or absence of mistake or accident. You must not consider

these acts to determine the defendant's character or character trait, or to

determine that the defendant acted in conformity with the defendant's character

or character trait and therefore committed the charged offense. 

Final Jury Instructions at 16. This instruction does not permit the jury to rely on petitioner's

prior acts as the sole basis of convicting him on the charged offenses. Rather, as in Estelle,

it indicates that the evidence could be used for a limited purpose of establishing intent or lack

of mistake or accident, and expressly forbids the use of such evidence for propensity

purposes. Indeed, additional instructions stated that "[y]ou must start with the presumption

that the defendant is innocent . . . [t]he State must then prove the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt . . . [which] means that the State must prove each element of the charges

beyond a reasonable doubt" and"[i]f you conclude that the State had not met its burden of

proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty of those

charges." Final Jury Instructions at 4. We conclude that viewed in the context of the

instructions as a whole, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged

instruction in a way that violates due process.3

However, even if we construed the instruction as one that permitted propensity

evidence, we would reach the same conclusion. The jury was entitled to consider the prior

acts as evidence of propensity pursuant to Rule 404(c), Ariz. R. Evid.

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II. 

Petitioner objects to the R & R's finding regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim by arguing that the Magistrate Judge did not conclude that the petitioner failed to

exhaust that claim. See Objections at 2. However, petitioner does not object to the

Magistrate Judge's finding that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be

dismissed on the merits. As such, resolution of the exhaustion issue is not dispositive.

Because petitioner has failed to object to the R & R finding that his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim lacked merit, we adopt the recommendation that ground two of the petition be

dismissed. See Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED DENYING the petition for writ of habeas corpus

(doc. 1). 

DATED this 30th day of April, 2007.

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