Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02345/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02345-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAVALLE MARCELLE PORTER,

Petitioner,

v.

PATRICK COVELLO, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[ECF. No. 1]

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Lavelle Marcelle Porter (“Petitioner,” “Porter,” or “Lavalle”), a state 

prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his San Diego Superior Court 

conviction for assault with a deadly weapon and battery in case number SCD263061. 

(ECF No. 1 at 2 (“Petition”).)

1

 Respondent filed an answer, arguing that Petitioner’s 

petition fails on the merits, and lodged the court records. (ECF No. 9 (“Response”); ECF 

 

1 Due to discrepancies between original and imprinted page numbers, page numbers for 

docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those imprinted by 

the court’s electronic case filing system.

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 19
2

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

No. 10 (“Lodgment”).) Petitioner filed a traverse, and the Court took the matter under 

submission. (ECF No. 11 (“Traverse”).) After reviewing the parties’ submissions and 

the lodgments, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court RECOMMENDS the 

Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion:

2

R.D.3 was riding his bicycle on a San Diego trolley platform shortly 

after 5:00 a.m. on the morning of July 23, 2015. R.D. rode his bicycle past 

Porter, who had been standing by himself on the trolley platform.· As R.D. 

rode by Porter, Porter lunged toward R.D. Porter grabbed R.D. and caused 

him to fall off of his bicycle. Porter then repeatedly struck R.D. in the head 

with a metal object-multiple six-inch copper wires, braided together, covered 

in a hard plastic sheath. The object was approximately three quarters of an 

inch in diameter, weighed about one pound, and had “a little bit of sharpness 

to it.”

As Porter repeatedly struck R.D.’s head, R.D. said, “‘Stop. What the 

hell are you doing that for? I don’t even know you. Who are you?’” At 

some point, R.D. fell to his hands and knees, and Porter continued to strike 

R.D. 

The video surveillance system at the trolley station recorded the 

attack. In addition, a police officer who was in his patrol car nearby 

witnessed the attack and identified Porter as the aggressor. The officer 

quickly approached R.D., who was bleeding and appeared to be injured and 

in pain. R.D. pointed at Porter, who was standing nearby, and said to the 

officer, “‘That guy,’ . . . ‘Beat him up.’” The police officer called for 

medical assistance, waited for additional officers or paramedics to arrive, 

 

2 This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); Slovik v. Yates, 545 F.3d 

1181, 1183 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) 

(holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from those facts, 

are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). Here, Petitioner does not raise a 

challenge to any of these facts.

3 The appellate court used the initials “R.D.” to refer to the victim, Robert Duncan. He 

will also be referred to as Mr. Duncan in this order. 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 19
3

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and then went to speak with Porter.

The police officer who spoke with Porter initially found him to be not 

“very responsive.” The officer believed that Porter was either “under the 

influence of a controlled substance,” or possibly having “a psychotic break,”

such that the officer became somewhat concerned about his own safety. The 

officer saw that Porter was holding an object in his hand, and repeatedly 

asked Porter to put the object down. Porter did not respond and did not 

comply. The officer eventually returned to his car to retrieve his police dog 

because he continued to be concerned for his own safety. The officer then

approached Porter and “push[ed]” him, which seemed to “jog[] his 

memory.” After the officer pushed him, Porter began to comply. The officer 

was able to ascertain that Porter was holding a “six-inch copper wire, about 

three quarters [of an inch] in diameter, with a plastic sheathing around it.” 

The wire object appeared to be the instrument with which Porter had 

attacked R.D. The officer arrested appellant for assault with a deadly 

weapon.

As a result of the attack, R.D. suffered a deep laceration and a circular 

contusion on the top of his head. The wound on top of his head reached the 

deeper layers of connective tissue and muscle, and required a deep suture, 

which is a permanent suture underneath the skin. R.D. also suffered some 

bruising on his back, along his ribs.

(ECF No. 6 at 2-4.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Trial Court Proceedings

Petitioner was initially charged on July 27, 2015. (Lodgment No. 6 at 1-5.) 

Petitioner was subsequently charged by two amended informations, the latter of which 

charged him with assault with a deadly weapon (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1)) and battery 

with serious bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code § 243(D)). (Id. at 40-44.) The State also 

alleged that in the commission and attempted commission of the offenses, Petitioner 

personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon (within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code 

§ 1192.7(c)(23)), personally inflicted great bodily injury upon R.D. (within the meaning 

of Cal. Penal Code §§ 1192.7(c)(8), 12022.7(a)). (Id. at 41.) The State further alleged 

that Petitioner had been previously convicted of more than two felonies (within the 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 19
4

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 1203(e)(4)), and that he had a prior conviction which 

constituted a strike (under Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i), 668, 1170.12). (Id. at 42-44.) 

On January 12, 2016, a jury convicted Petitioner of both assault with a deadly 

weapon and the lesser included offense of battery, and found true the accompanying 

allegations. (Lodgment 8-1 at 412-14.) In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury also found 

that Petitioner served four prior prison terms, had a prior serious felony conviction, and 

had a prior strike conviction. (Lodgment 8-2 at 446-47.) 

On March 8, 2016, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 19 years in state prison. 

(Lodgment 8-3 at 461.) There, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to eight years for the 

assault with a deadly weapon (upper term of four years, doubled under the Three Strikes 

law for prior strike conviction), three years for the inflicting great bodily harm 

enhancement, five years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement, and an 

addition of three years for Petitioner’s prison priors.

4

 (Id.; see also Lodgment 6 at 214-

30.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

On September 28, 2016, Petitioner filed for appeal. (Lodgment No. 1 at 13.) In 

his direct appeal, Petitioner claimed that the trial court erred by excluding the recording 

of 911 calls that he had made on July 5, 2015, where he reported that he was being 

followed and threatened by men at the same trolley stop where the assault took place. 

(Id. at 21-40.) Petitioner argued that this evidence was relevant because it goes to his 

claim of self-defense and that his conviction should be reversed. (Id.) On May 8, 2017, 

the California Court of Appeals rejected the argument and affirmed the conviction. (ECF 

No. 6 at 45-57.) 

On June 15, 2017, Petitioner sought review from the California Supreme Court. 

 

4 Though the jury found that Petitioner sustained four prison priors, the Court exercised 

its discretion to strike one of the priors, which also served as the underlying conviction 

for the Three Strikes enhancement. (Lodgment 8-3 at 461.) Thus, the Court added three 

years—one for each of the remaining prison priors. (Id.) 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 19
5

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Lodgment No. 2.) There, he raised the same issue regarding the exclusion of the 911 

calls. (Id.) The California Supreme Court issued an order summarily denying review on 

July 26, 2017. (Lodgment No. 3.)

C. Federal Habeas Proceedings

On October 11, 2018, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in this Court. (Petition at 1.) 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Petitioner’s petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 

(1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted unless the adjudication: (1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

A federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s 

determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring 

only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). In 

order to grant relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “must be convinced that an 

appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably 

conclude that the finding is supported by the record.” See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 

992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court need 

not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 

U.S. at 8. As long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 19
6

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

contradicts Supreme Court precedent, the decision will not be “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). Clearly 

established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or 

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003)

The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state 

court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but 

unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Bell, 535 U.S. at 

694. The “unreasonable application” clause requires that the state court decision be more 

than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of 

clearly established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer, 538 

U.S. at 75. “[A] habeas court [must] determine what arguments or theories supported, or 

could have supported, the state-court decision and then . . . ask whether it is possible 

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with a 

prior decision of [the Supreme Court].” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88 (2011). 

This is an extremely deferential review, posing a heavy burden on the Petitioner: to prove 

that the state court’s ruling on the claim was “so lacking in justification that there was an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103. 

To determine if a decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented, the state court’s factual findings are presumed correct 

and this presumption will not be overturned on factual grounds unless this Court finds 

that the factual determinations were objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in state court. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see also 

Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) (the fact that “[r]easonable minds reviewing 

the record might disagree” does not render a decision objectively unreasonable). 

Petitioner may overcome that presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007). A state 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 19
7

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court decision is only considered objectively unreasonable when it is “more than 

incorrect or erroneous.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. If 

the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal 

habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the 

state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled 

on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

V. DISCUSSION

In this federal habeas petition, the only issue raised by Petitioner is the same issue 

previously raised regarding the exclusion of the 911 calls. 

a. Relevant Background

During trial, Petitioner’s counsel requested a court order so that she could obtain

Petitioner’s phone records during the month of July 2015 to check for 911 calls.

5

 

(Lodgment 8-1 at 188-190.) With the aid of the prosecution counsel, the parties 

uncovered several phone calls to 911 made in July 2015, three of which are relevant to 

the issues here.6 

The records showed that Petitioner made three calls to 911 on July 5, 2015, lasting 

 

5 This issue was raised by Petitioner in a discovery request prior to trial, but it appears he 

asked for 911 calls made from his phone number in April, May, and June of 2015. 

(Lodgment 8-1 at 196-97.) The prosecution counsel checked but none were recovered 

during that timeframe. (Id.) 

6 There is some discrepancy in the record on whether two calls or three calls were made 

on July 5, 2015, the relevant date. (Compare ECF No. 6 at 49 with Lodgment 8-1 at 

224.) The other call, made on July 9, 2015 appears to involve an unrelated domestic 

disturbance issue with Petitioner’s girlfriend. (Lodgment 8-1 at 198.) 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 19
8

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

about 11-12 minutes total. (Id. at 198.) The calls were played in court outside the 

presence of the jury. (Id. at 224.) The calls were not transcribed so the Court relies on 

the Court of Appeal’s factual description of the 911 calls, which were presented to that 

court for the appeal on a computer disk of audio recordings:

7

During the series of three calls, which occurred between 1:30 and 1:48 p.m.,

Porter told dispatchers that a group or groups of people were following

and/or bothering him. For example, in the first call, Porter reported that he 

was on a trolley that was stopped at the Santa Fe trolley station and that 

there were “a lot of males moving around me.” He continued, “Nah, they’re 

moving up on me in a stealthful manner as if they’re trying to ambush me. . . 

. They moving around me all weird.” The dispatcher asked if he needed 

police contact, to which he responded, “Yeah.” Porter indicated to the 

dispatcher that the men looked Hispanic, and said that he could not say how 

many there were. Porter became agitated with the dispatcher and continued 

to talk over her as she attempted to ask him questions. He told the 

dispatcher that he had not been drinking or using drugs that day, but then 

said that he had “been up all night,” and that he could not “even go to sleep.” 

The dispatcher ended the call after telling Porter that she would have 

someone contact him.

In a second call, recorded at 1:37 p.m., Porter can be heard saying, “There's 

people moving around me in a manner in which it look like they gonna try to 

put their hands on me.” He indicated that he was “at the C street trolley,” at 

“Fifth Avenue.” “They trying to creep on me.” He told the dispatcher that 

the people were “just trying to hurt me.” He explained that he knew this 

“because of how they’re moving around me.” Porter contended that there 

were approximately six people around him. When the dispatcher asked 

Porter whether the people had threatened him, he responded that they were

“moving around [him].” He said that he did not “let nobody get near [him],” 

even though they were “walking all around.” He contended that the people 

were “trying to hide behind a little thing right here the little metal thing.”

Porter told the dispatcher that the people “got weapons,” including “knives,”

“on their pockets.” The dispatcher told Porter that she would have someone 

“check the area.”

 

7 As previously noted, this Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and 

presumes them to be correct, particularly where they are unchallenged as here. Slovik, 

545 F.3d at 1183 n.1. 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 19
9

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

During the third call, at 1:48 p.m., Porter can be heard mumbling, but it is 

not clear what he is saying at the beginning of the call. When he· 

subsequently began speaking clearly, Porter said to the dispatcher, “Yes, I 

am being surrounded by people and look like they’re gonna to try to jump on 

me.” He continued, “And I’m not trying, I’m not trying to get into it with 

nobody, that’s all.” This time he told the dispatcher that approximately 20 

people were “trying to jump [him].” He asserted that the people were

“black, Hispanic, all colors, white.” Although he stated that he believed that 

the people were armed with knives, he conceded that no one had threatened 

him with a knife. The dispatcher told Porter that she would let “someone 

know” and said, “They’ll be out there as soon as they can.”

(ECF No. 6 at 49-51.) 

In addition, during trial, the prosecution attorney obtained the computer-aided 

dispatch (“C.A.D.”) which included notes stating “Trolley sec [security] has visual on 

camera. Male is sitting alone, looks paranoid, looking around, talking to himself/holding 

blk swtr [black sweater] in his hand. Poss in white t-shirt with lettering on the back. . . . 

On the back/other subjs [subjects] sitting far from male.” (Lodgment 8-1 at 198-99.) 

During trial, Petitioner’s counsel argued that the calls should be admitted as they 

go to his state of mind at the time the assault took place and would be a basis for his selfdefense claim. (Id. at 201, 224.) Prosecution counsel argued that the timing of the calls 

was too far removed and, regardless, that the content of the calls do not show that 

Petitioner was actually being threatened on that date. (Id. at 225-226.) After hearing the 

tapes and arguments, the Court reserved final ruling on the pending defense testimony, 

but tentatively ruled:

Well, at this juncture, the court is not going to be allowing the 911 tapes to 

come in. I don’t know if the defense is planning on present [sic] any 

witnesses. I don’t know if Mr. Porter is planning to testify. After the 

defense presents any other evidence it plans to present, then I’ll re-visit the 

issue if its seems – if the defense wants to. 

But at this juncture, there’s nothing that even links the July 5th calls to the 

events of July 23rd. So that’s my ruling at this time.

(Id. at 226-27.) 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 19
10

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Subsequently, after Petitioner testified and both sides rested, the Court made its final 

ruling:

So yesterday I ruled, when the request was originally made, that I would not 

allow the 911 but I would consider any requests after Mr. Porter testified to 

determine if I thought, at that point, it was relevant.

My ruling still remains the same in that based on his testimony, I feel that 

admission of the 911 tape relating to the July 5th incident is, no. 1, not 

relevant; and, no. 2, even if relevant under 352, would be confusing and 

engage in a consumption of undue time. 

So for those reasons, the ruling I previously made remains. 

(Id. at 398-99.) 

Petitioner appealed this issue to the California Court of Appeal and the California 

Supreme Court. Because the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition, 

the Court looks through to the last reasoned opinion, that of the California Court of 

Appeal. That court found that the exclusion of the 911 calls was not an abuse of 

discretion because they were not relevant:

The 911 calls that Porter sought to admit occurred 18 days prior to his 

unprovoked attack on R.D. Further, the prosecutor proffered that Porter’s 

911 calls would not provide evidence that Porter reasonably believed that he 

was actually in any danger, even at the time he made them, given the CAD 

notes indicating that at the time Porter placed the calls, he was “sitting alone 

. . . talking to himself,” and appeared to be “paranoid.”

5

 Thus, the fact that 

Porter made these 911 calls and may have unreasonably believed that he was 

being followed by a group of men on July 5th does not tend to demonstrate 

that he held a reasonable belief that he had to defend himself against the 

victim, who did not speak to or otherwise communicate with Porter, 18 days 

later. The trial court therefore acted well within its discretion in concluding 

that the 911 calls were not relevant to Porter’s self-defense theory.

. . . 

5 Porter’s responses to the 911 dispatcher also cast doubt on the existence of 

any real threat to him on the day he placed the calls. He acknowledged, 

when asked, that the group of men he was ostensibly calling in reference to 

had neither spoken to him nor threatened him.

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 19
11

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(ECF No. 6 at 55.) The court continued:

Further, even if one were to conclude that the 911 calls had some minimal

relevance, the trial court acted well within its discretion in excluding the 

calls under section 352. “Under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court 

enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether the probative value of 

particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion 

or consumption of time.” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 

1124.) As we have explained, we doubt that this evidence had any probative 

value, but even if one were to conclude otherwise, it is nevertheless clear

that any probative value would be exceedingly minimal. The trial court thus 

did not abuse its discretion in determining that any minimal probative value 

of this evidence would have been outweighed by the amount of time it 

would have taken to play the recordings of the calls and to present other 

evidence to provide further context, or to present evidence to challenge the 

weight to be given to the recordings, as well as the potential for juror

confusion arising from the introduction of the calls.

(Id. at 565-56.) 

b. Analysis

It is well-established that errors in state court evidentiary rulings cannot serve as a 

basis for habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“We have stated 

many times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”); 

Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (holding same). Rather, “a state court’s 

evidentiary ruling, even if erroneous, is grounds for federal habeas relief only if it renders 

the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process.” Spivey v. 

Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1999); Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (“The correctness of the trial court’s evidentiary ruling as a matter of state law 

is irrelevant to our review, because a federal court may entertain an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus ‘only on the ground that [the petitioner] is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”). Thus, Petitioner cannot be 

granted habeas relief simply by arguing that the trial court’s exclusion of the 911 calls 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 19
12

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was in violation of California Evidence Code § 352.8 

The Constitution does guarantee that a criminal defendant must have a meaningful 

opportunity to present evidence in his defense at trial. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 

U.S. 400, 408 (1988); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). This is not an

unfettered right, and states can place limits on what kind of evidence is permitted. 

Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410 (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer 

testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules 

of evidence.”); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (“The accused, as is 

required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence 

designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and 

innocence.”). 

Specifically, rules that balance the “probative value” against “other factors such as 

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury” generally do not 

offend the Constitution. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006) (noting that 

rules like the Federal Rule of Evidence 403, among other model rules, are wellestablished as constitutional and permit trial courts to perform balancing tests); see also 

Crane, 476 U.S. at 689-90 (“[T]he Constitution leaves to the judges who must make 

these decisions ‘wide latitude’ to exclude evidence that is ‘repetitive . . ., only marginally 

relevant’ or poses an undue risk of ‘harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues.’”)

(citation omitted); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (including Rule 403 as 

one of “any number of familiar and unquestionably constitutional evidentiary rules also 

authorize the exclusion of relevant evidence”). 

The Ninth Circuit in Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2009), analyzed a 

similar state evidence rule under this legal framework. There, the petitioner challenged 

 

8

“The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption 

of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of 

misleading the jury.” Cal. Evid. Code § 352. 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 19
13

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

on habeas petition the exclusion of evidence under Washington state evidence rule 702, 

which “admits expert testimony if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 

or fact at issue.” Id. at 756. First, the court considered the constitutionality of the Rule, 

on its face. After discussing several Supreme Court cases where evidentiary rules were 

struck down as constitutional violations, the court explained why the rule before it was 

different: “The evidentiary rules in those cases, by their terms, required the trial court to 

exclude crucial evidence that had a critical effect on the trial, with little or no rational

justification. In general, the rules precluded a defendant from testifying, excluded 

testimony from key percipient witnesses, or excluded the introduction of all evidence 

relating to a crucial defense. In contrast, Rule 702 does not require a trial court to 

exclude evidence. Rather, it authorizes a court to admit expert testimony ‘if it will assist 

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or a fact in issue.’” Id. at 758. Thus, the court 

concluded that its rule was more akin to those that were discussed with approval in 

Holmes. 

Next, in Moses, the Ninth Circuit considered the argument that the trial court’s 

exercise of discretion in applying the state evidence rule formed the basis of the habeas 

petition. 555 F.3d at 758. However, the court held that the Supreme Court cases have all 

“focused only on whether an evidentiary rule, by its own terms, violated a defendant’s 

right to present evidence” and did not “squarely address whether a court’s exercise of 

discretion to exclude expert testimony violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional right

to present relevant evidence.” Id. In addition, the court found that while there was a 

Ninth Circuit case outlining the test where a trial court’s exercise of discretion to exclude 

evidence under an otherwise valid evidentiary rule might violate a defendant’s rights, this 

does not serve to satisfy the “clearly established” federal law under AEDPA because it 

was not Supreme Court law. Id. (quoting Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.

2003)). Thus, under this scenario as well, the Moses court found that the habeas petition 

failed. 

The same holds true for California Evidence Code § 352. This rule is essentially 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 19
14

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the state rule counterpart to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. It does not require the 

exclusion of evidence but only permits the trial court to weigh the evidence against other 

factors that express legitimate state concerns. As such, various district courts have held 

that Rule 352 does not violate the Constitution on its face and cannot form the basis for 

habeas relief. See, e.g., Mendez v. Biter, No. C 10-5555 PJH PR, 2013 WL 843554, at 

*15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013) (“[P]etitioner’s impeachment evidence was excluded under 

section 352 of the California Evidence Code, a well-established rule of evidence that 

permits a court to exercise its discretion in admitting testimony. The rule does not, in and 

of itself, abridge a defendant’s right to present a defense. Because the Supreme Court has 

not squarely addressed the issue whether a trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this 

context violated a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense, petitioner is not 

entitled to federal habeas relief.”) (citation omitted); Smith v. Marshall, No. EDCV 09-

886 PSG FFM, 2012 WL 1440612, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (“Pursuant to 

California law, a decision to exclude evidence under California Evidence Code section 

352 necessarily involves the exercise of discretion. Indeed, it requires the trial court to 

balance the evidence’s probative value versus its potential to cause prejudice, confusion, 

and undue consumption of time. Because no Supreme Court case has squarely held that 

the exclusion of evidence under these circumstances violates a criminal defendant’s right 

to present a defense, the state court's holding could not have been an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.”); 

Balderrama v. Scribner, No. CV06-7401-PSG MAN, 2010 WL 1051110, at *6 (C.D. 

Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) (“Thus, a rule such as that set forth in California Evidence Code § 352 

may be applied, consistently with the Constitution, to exclude relevant evidence sought to 

be introduced as part of the defense case.”); Bonaparte v. Soto, No. 14CV2725-WQH 

(RBB), 2015 WL 11023216, at *9-10 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2015); Gutierrez v. Swarthout, 

No. 1:10-CV-01014-LJO, 2012 WL 5210107, at *27 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2012). 

However, even if the Supreme Court’s general due process standard were 

considered to be “clearly established” law governing trial court discretionary decisions 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 19
15

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

concerning the exclusion of testimony, Petitioner has not shown that the trial court's 

decision in the present case was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. See Spivey, 194 F.3d at 977-78 (“It is well settled that a state 

court’s evidentiary ruling, even if erroneous, is grounds for federal habeas relief only if it 

renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process”). The 

trial court did not apply Rule 352 in an arbitrary manner; rather, the trial court heard 

argument and testimony and concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to link the 

911 calls to the assault, taking place over two weeks later. Petitioner himself testified 

that he was not aware of the alleged link between Mr. Duncan to the prior incident on 

July 5 at the time of the July 23rd attack and only made the connection after the attack 

occurred. (See Lodgment 8-1 at 239 (“The first time that I became aware of actually who 

Mr. Duncan was after the incident, once I got the police report, and then I positively 

recognized Mr. Duncan as one of the individuals that has surrounded me and tried to 

attack me prior at the exact same bus stop.”); id. at 299 (“And I didn’t know it was him 

until after I reviewed the information in the discovery and seen a picture of him. I didn’t 

know who he was, but once I seen the gentleman, I positively identified him as one of the 

individuals.”); id. at 304 (“It didn’t become apparent to me until I became the attorney of 

record and then I got the discovery. Once I got the discovery, then I looked at the photos, 

and then I recognized him as the individual – one of the individuals who were there.”).)

In addition, while self-defense is to be considered from the viewpoint of the 

defendant and the danger to the defendant did not have to actually exist, that belief has to 

be “reasonable,” judging from the viewpoint of what “a reasonable person in a similar

situation with similar knowledge would have believed.” CALCRIM 3470. The state 

appellate court found that evidence surrounding 911 calls tended to show that Petitioner 

was alone, talking to himself and paranoid, and even admitted to 911 dispatch that the 

group of men had not talked to him or threatened him. Thus, the appellate court found 

that his belief about being in danger was “unreasonabl[e] and did “not tend to 

demonstrate that he held a reasonable belief that he had to defend himself against the 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 19
16

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

victim, who did not speak to or otherwise communicate with Porter, 18 days later.” 

(ECF No. 6 at 55.) Even if the calls may have had some minimal relevance, the appellate 

court held that whatever minimal relevance would be outweighed by the time it would 

take to play the calls and to present other evidence to provide further context or potential 

jury confusion caused by playing the calls. (Id. at 56.) Further, as Respondent points

out, there was other evidence presented going to Petitioner’s guilt, including Mr. 

Duncan’s testimony at trial and the video of the assault itself. Thus, this one decision 

regarding the 911 calls did not render the totality of the state proceedings fundamentally 

unfair, and was not a contrary or unreasonable application of federal law. 

Petitioner argues that the strength of the evidence against him only appears “great” 

because 911 calls were excluded. ECF No. 11 at 9-10. However, a review of the record 

indicates that even though the calls themselves were not admitted, the jury would have 

been aware of the 911 calls through Petitioner’s own testimony and attorney argument. 

Petitioner provided some testimony that was not stricken, alluding to the prior 911 calls 

being made on July 5 and his claim of self-defense. Petitioner testified that he believed 

Mr. Duncan had tried to attack him on a prior date. (Lodgment 8-1 at 239-40 (“Q: Okay. 

So you’re saying that Mr. Duncan, on a previous occasion previous to July 23rd, had tried 

to attack you? A: Yes, ma’am.”). Petitioner continued on to testify:

Q. . . . So let me ask you this: the very first time you saw Mr. Duncan as 

it relates to lights – was it when he was approaching you or was it a time 

prior to this on July 23rd?

A. The first time I seen Mr. Duncan was prior to this. I seen Mr. Duncan –

he was only of the individuals who has surround me that day on – I think it 

was the – the district attorney and you guys can keep me on point. I believe 

it was July 5th that I made the 911 call.

(Id. at 299.) This was followed by this next line of questioning:

Q. Okay. You’ve made mention a couple of times on cross-examination 

that you’ve made calls to the police –

A. Yes.

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 19
17

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Q. – from this same exact location? 

A. Yes, ma’am.

. . . 

Q. Have you ever felt that your life was in danger at 500 ‘C’ street as it 

relates to Mr. Duncan and anything he’s done? 

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. How so? 

A. Mr. Duncan was part of the group of individuals on, I believe, July 5th 

when I called 911. He was one of the people that I positively identified as 

being those ones who surrounded me and was whistling. They were trying 

to surround me and make – and basically they were trying to pin me and 

harm me. 

He was one of them. I remember him because of his beard. I 

remember – not the beard, but the mustache. He has a mustache. And I 

remember the mustache and also remember his fat little fingers. He has little 

fat fingers. He had on a red shirt and some black – a red shirt and some 

black shorts. 

And it was like 1:00 – 1:30, 2:00 in the afternoon, so I seem him 

clearly. It’s just at the time, I didn’t know who he was.

Q. Okay. And so this happened on July 5th with Mr. Duncan? 

A. Yes, ma’am.

(Id. at 303-04.) The trial court gave the self-defense jury instruction and Petitioner’s 

counsel argued this during closing arguments:

I would like for you to consider these words because they are also in the 

instruction and it is very important: When deciding whether the defendant’s 

beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known 

to and appeared to the defendant. That is Mr. Porter.

Everything that he relayed to us about being at 500 ‘C’ street, about being 

there previous times and calling 911, in fear of his life, in fear of something 

happening to him, and then just that very day, moments before this light is 

coming towards his, as he said, being blinded – he was just trailed and 

followed by a group of men – the circumstances as they were known to and 

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 19
18

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

appeared to him.

And then you consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with 

similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were 

reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed. That is 

something [prosecution counsel] did not discuss with you. 

Because even if the danger did not actually really exist but because of the 

circumstances and what Mr. Porter knew to be his reality, that is all that is 

necessary to carry the day for his right to defend himself. 

(Id. at 367.) Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s contentions, the jury heard this testimony and 

did have some opportunity to take it into consideration as part of his self-defense claim. 

Furthermore, upon review of the record, the state court’s factual findings are not 

objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in court, as discussed above. 

See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Court 

recommends that Petitioner’s habeas petition be DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of 

the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. In addition, IT IS 

HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting 

this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered DENYING

the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than April 3, 2019. 

The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

//

//

//

//

//

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 19
19

18cv2345-CAB (NLS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than April 17, 2019. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: March 12, 2019

Case 3:18-cv-02345-CAB-NLS Document 12 Filed 03/12/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

 19