Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-mc-80215/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-mc-80215-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ILLUMINA CAMBRIDGE LTD,

Applicant,

v.

COMPLETE GENOMICS, INC., et al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 19-mc-80215-WHO (TSH)

ORDER RE: MOTION TO VACATE 28 

U.S.C. § 1782 APPLICATION AND 

QUASH OR LIMIT SUBPOENAS 

PURSUANT TO § 1782

Re: Dkt. No. 17

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 6, 2019, Applicant Illumina Cambridge, Ltd. (“IC”) filed an ex parte 

application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for an order granting leave to obtain discovery from 

Respondents in connection with four separate patent infringement proceedings pending in four 

foreign jurisdictions. ECF No. 1. The Court granted the application on November 7, 2019. ECF 

No. 16. On December 2, 2019, Respondents moved to vacate the § 1782 application and quash or 

limit the subpoenas issued pursuant to the Court’s order. ECF No. 17. IC filed an Opposition 

(ECF No. 30) and Respondents filed a Reply (ECF No. 35). IC filed a Surreply with leave from 

the Court. ECF No. 39. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Respondents’ motion

to quash, but limits the subpoena served on BGI Americas. 

II. BACKGROUND

IC is a United Kingdom subsidiary of California-based Illumina Inc. (“Illumina”). Mem. 

of Law in Supp. of Ex Parte Appl. (“Appl.”) 1, ECF No. 2. Illumina is a developer, manufacturer, 

and marketer of DNA sequencing devices. Id. Its proprietary DNA sequencing technology 

involves the use of modified nucleotides with an azidomethyl blocking group and a detection 

buffer containing ascorbic acid. Id. 

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IC owns the following relevant patents:

1. European Patent No. EP 1 530 578 B1 (the “’578 Patent”), Danish 

Patent DK/EP 3 002 289 T3 (the “’289 Patent”), which is the Danish 

designation of a divisional of the ’578 Patent, and Turkish Patent No. 

TR 2018 04580 (the “’4580 Patent”), which is the Turkish validation 

of the ’289 Patent, all of which are titled “Modified nucleotides for 

polynucleotide sequencing.” These patents cover modified 

nucleotides with an azidomethyl blocking group, which are used in a 

method of DNA sequencing known as “sequencing-by-synthesis” or 

“SBS.” Mem. of Law in Supp. of Ex Parte Appl. 1 (“Appl.”), ECF 

No. 2.

2. European Patent No. EP 1 828 412 B2 (the “’412 Patent”), which 

is titled “Improved method of nucleotide detection.” This patent 

covers the use of a detection buffer containing ascorbic acid that may 

be used in SBS. 

Id. Respondents are affiliates of BGI Group (“BGI”), a Chinese biotech conglomerate. Appl. 2; 

Mot. to Vacate (“Mot.”) 2-3, ECF No. 17. CGI is a developer of DNA sequencing instruments, 

chemistry, and software. Mot. 2. It was acquired by BGI in 2013 and performs sequencingrelated R&D as part of BGI. Id. The technologies developed by CGI have been developed and 

commercialized outside the United States by MGI Tech Co., Ltd (“MGI Tech”), another BGI 

affiliate. Id. BGI Americas is an indirect subsidiary of BGI Genomics, which are both part of the 

services arm of BGI. Id. BGI Americas offers a variety of biotechnology services to customers 

in North and South America, including genomic sequencing, proteomics, mass spectrometry, and 

bioinformatics services. Id. MGI Americas, also an affiliate of BGI, is responsible for sales and 

marketing of systems and reagent kits in North and South America. Id. 

IC has brought several actions outside the United States, against other affiliates of BGI, 

asserting infringement of its various patents:

1. An action asserting infringement of the ’578 Patent in the Regional 

Court of Düsseldorf, Germany against Latvia MGI Tech SIA (“Latvia 

MGI”);

2. An action asserting infringement of the ’578 and ’412 Patents in 

the Federal Patent Court of Switzerland against Latvia MGI;

3. An action asserting infringement of the ’4580 Patent in the Istanbul 

Civil Court for Intellectual and Industrial Rights against Genoks 

Teknoloji Saglik Bilisim Turizm Hiz. Endustriyel Makine Elektrik 

Elektronik Ithalat Ihracat San. Tic. Ltd. Sti. (“Genoks”); and

4. An action asserting infringement of the ’289 Patent in the Maritime 

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and Commercial Court of Denmark against BGI Europe A/S.

Appl. 2. Latvia MGI, the defendant in the German and Swiss Actions, is a subsidiary of MGI 

Tech. Id. at 2-3. Genoks, the defendant in the Turkish Action, is a distributor for BGI in Turkey. 

Id. at 3. BGI Europe, located in Denmark and the defendant in the Danish Action, serves as BGI’s 

European headquarters. Id. BGI Europe provides laboratory services in the area of DNA 

sequencing primarily under the BGI brand. Id.

IC and Respondents also have between them two patent infringement suits in United States 

district courts: 

1. Illumina, Inc., et al. v. BGI Genomics Co., LTD., No. 3:19-CV03770-WHO in this District 

2. Complete Genomics, Inc. v. Illumina, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-00970-

MN in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware 

IC sought leave to serve subpoenas on Respondents to obtain documents and testimony for 

use in the foreign patent infringement actions. Respondents did not oppose IC’s Application and 

the Court granted IC leave to serve its subpoenas. After being served with the subpoenas, 

Respondents moved to quash or limit them. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Discovery Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782

Section 1782 provides, in pertinent part:

The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found 

may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a 

document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or 

international tribunal . . . . The order may be made . . . upon the 

application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony 

or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced . . 

. .

28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). That language “has been distilled to permit district courts to authorize 

discovery where three general requirements are satisfied: (1) the person from whom the discovery 

is sought ‘resides or is found’ in the district of the district court where the application is made; (2) 

the discovery is ‘for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal’; and (3) the 

application is made by a foreign or international tribunal or ‘any interested person.’” Khrapunov 

v. Prosyankin, 931 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting § 1782(a)). 

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Once those three statutory requirements are met, a district court has wide discretion to 

grant discovery under § 1782. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 260-61 

(2004); Four Pillars Enters. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 308 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(“But the magistrate judge in granting some of the relief requested . . . and denying the rest, was 

exercising the broad discretion traditionally conferred upon the trial courts in such discovery 

matters.”). In exercising its discretion, a district court should be guided by the following factors: 

(1) whether the “person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding;” 

(2) “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the 

receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal court judicial 

assistance;” (3) whether the request “conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering 

restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States;” and (4) whether the request

is “unduly intrusive or burdensome.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65. However, a district court need not 

explicitly address every factor, nor is it confined to the four Intel factors in deciding whether to 

exercise its broad discretion. See Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. v. Fibrogen, Inc., 793 F.3d 1108, 

1112 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The district court was not required to address explicitly every factor or 

argument, nor was it required to issue a written order.”) (citing United States v. Sealed 1, 235 F.3d 

1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the broad discretion afforded the district courts under § 1782). 

A district court’s discretion is to be exercised in view of the twin aims of § 1782, “providing 

efficient assistance to participants in international litigation and encouraging foreign countries by 

example to provide similar assistance to our courts.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 252 (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). 

B. Motion to Quash

On timely motion, a court must quash or modify a subpoena that:

(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply;

(ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits 

specified in Rule 45(c);

(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no 

exception or waiver applies; or

(iv) subjects a person to undue burden.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A). Additionally, a court must limit discovery if it is duplicative or could 

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be obtained from a more convenient or less burdensome source. See Free Stream Media Corp. v. 

Alphonso Inc., 2017 WL 6209309, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2017). The moving party bears the 

burden of persuasion under Rule 45(d)(3), but the party issuing the subpoena must demonstrate the 

discovery sought is relevant. Fujikura Ltd. v. Finisar Corp., 2015 WL 5782351, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Oct. 5, 2015) (quoting Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 2013 WL 4536808, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 

2013)). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Statutory Requirements

IC’s request satisfies the minimum requirements of § 1782. First, Respondents can be 

found in this District. A business entity is “found” in the judicial district where it is incorporated 

or headquartered. See In re Ex Parte Appl. of Qualcomm Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1036 (N.D. 

Cal. 2016) (defendants headquartered in the Northern District of California and thus found here); 

In re Ex Parte Appl. of Ontario Principals’ Council, 2013 WL 6073517, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 

2013) (Delaware corporation headquartered in Palo Alto was found in this district). Complete 

Genomics, Inc. (“CGI”) and MGI Americas are both Delaware corporations with headquarters in 

San Jose, California. Decl. of Minyao Wang in Supp. of Application of IC for Leave to Serve 

Subpoenas (“Wang Decl.”), ¶¶ 18-19, Exs. O, P, ECF No. 3. Additionally, the found-in test is 

also satisfied if the target of discovery has a presence in a district. In re Super Vitaminas, S.A., 

2017 WL 5571037, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017) (having an office in this District is sufficient); 

In re Ex Parte Application of TPK Touch Sols. (Xiamen) Inc., 2016 WL 6804600, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Nov. 17, 2016) (finding subpoenaed party was found within this District for purposes of § 1782 

because it maintained an office in it). BGI Americas is a Delaware corporation which holds itself 

out as having a research facility in San Jose, California. Wang Decl. ¶ 20, Ex. Q. Thus, it is also 

found in this District. 

Second, the patent infringement proceedings in the foreign jurisdictions, which are already 

pending, clearly meet the statutory requirement of a proceeding in a foreign tribunal. See, e.g., 

AIS GmbHAachen Innovative Sols. v. Thoratec LLC, 762 F. App’x 447, 448 (9th Cir. 2019) 

(German court in which a patent infringement case was pending was a foreign tribunal for 

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purposes of § 1782); IPCom GmbH v. Apple, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 3d 919, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 

(German patent infringement action qualified); In re Int’l Judicial Assistance from the Fourth 

Civil Court for Intell. and Indus. Property Rights In Istanbul, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81550, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. June 22, 2015) (Turkish trademark infringement proceeding); In re Request for Int’l 

Judicial Assistance from the Dist. Ct. of Kolding, Denmark, 2015 WL 13827074, at *1 (W.D.N.C. 

May 4, 2015) (Danish district court proceeding); In re Ex Parte Appl. of Jommi, 2013 

WL6058201, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2013) (Swiss court proceeding).

Third, a litigant in such foreign proceeding is an “interested person” for purposes of §

1782. Intel, 542 U.S. at 256-57. Illumina Cambridge is a plaintiff in all the foreign actions. It is

an interested person.

Finally, in moving to quash, Respondents do not challenge that the statutory requirements 

of § 1782 are met. Those standards having been met, the Court now considers the discretionary 

factors. 

B. Discretionary Intel Factors

Respondents’ objections to IC’s discovery mostly fall under the third and fourth Intel 

factors. They argue that IC’s request for discovery is an attempt to circumvent foreign proofgathering restrictions, and an attempt to skirt an unfavorable discovery ruling in the related case 

before this Court and the discovery timeline in the related Delaware matter. They argue that IC’s 

discovery requests are unduly burdensome, and that the foreign tribunals will not be able to 

protect their confidential, proprietary information once IC gets a hold of it. They argue that the 

documents or information IC seeks through the subpoenas are not within their control, and thus 

the subpoenas should be quashed. 

1. Respondents are not participants in the foreign actions.

The fact that Respondents are not parties to any of the foreign actions favors approval of 

IC’s application. “[N]onparticipants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the foreign 

tribunal’s jurisdictional reach; hence, their evidence, available in the United States, may be 

unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. Additionally, in each of the four 

foreign jurisdictions there is no right to pretrial discovery comparable to that in the United States. 

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Id. at 261 n.12. (“Most civil-law systems lack procedures analogous to the pretrial discovery 

regime operative under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Disclosure and exchange of 

evidence under the civil-law systems are generally more restricted, or nonexistent.”) (citations and 

internal quotations omitted). Thus, even if Respondents were participants, the discovery IC seeks 

might not be available in any event. This also weighs in favor of § 1782 discovery. See, e.g., In 

re Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 2017 WL 1246349, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2017) (finding the first 

factor weighed in favor of granting application because “even if the documents [and German 

defendant] are located in Germany, the German court will not order the documents to be produced 

if the applicant does not provide detailed information on the documents”); id. (“just because 

documents are located in Germany does not mean that the documents are accessible through 

German discovery”). 

2. The foreign courts are receptive to U.S. judicial assistance.

Under the second Intel factor, courts consider the nature of the foreign tribunal, the 

character of the proceedings abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or tribunal to 

U.S. federal-court judicial assistance. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264. The Supreme Court has noted 

that the absence of permissible discovery in a foreign jurisdiction—none of the four jurisdictions 

here allows discovery comparable to the United States—does not necessarily signal objection to 

aid from U.S. courts. Id. at 261 (“A foreign nation may limit discovery within its domain for 

reasons peculiar to its own legal practices, culture, or traditions--reasons that do not necessarily 

signal objection to the aid from United States federal courts.”) (citing Bayer, 146 F.3d at 194 

(“[T]here is no reason to assume that because a country has not adopted a particular discovery 

procedure, it would take offense at its use.”)). 

IC has submitted declarations from its foreign counsel, who are attorneys admitted to 

practice in each of the four foreign jurisdictions, which all assert that courts in each of those 

jurisdictions are or would be receptive to evidence obtained through § 1782. E.g., Decl. of Anders 

Valentin (“Valentin Decl.”) ¶ 21 (“Danish courts are receptive to evidence obtained through 

section 1782”), ECF No. 6; Decl. of Max Von Rospatt (“Rospatt Decl.”) ¶ 21 (“German courts are 

receptive”), ECF No. 4; Rebuttal Decl. of Andri Hess (“Hess Rebuttal Decl.”) ¶ 3 (“[T]he 

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discovery, if obtained in the U.S., would be fully allowable in the Swiss action and would not in 

any way offend a Swiss court.”), ECF No. 32; Decl. of Özge Atilgan (“Atilgan Decl.”) ¶ 25

(“Turkey courts should be receptive to evidence obtained through 28 U.S.C. § 1782 . . . . [A]ny 

order by this Court . . . would not, in my professional opinion, constitute an affront to the dignity 

of the Turkish legal system.”), ECF No. 7. Respondents’ foreign attorneys, through their 

declarations, do not dispute those assertions. And the Court is not aware of any clear directive 

from any of the foreign jurisdictions against the use of § 1782 evidence. See In re Appl. of Jt. 

Stock Co. Raiffeinsenbank, 2016 WL 6474224, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016) (“Absent this type 

of clear directive, however, a district court’s ruling should be informed by section 1782’s 

overarching interest in ‘providing equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals 

and litigants involved in litigation and international aspects.’”) (quoting Euromepa S.A. v. R. 

Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1995)); In re Kreke Immobilien KG, 2013 WL 

5966916, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2013) (“[W]hen the district court has no evidence suggesting 

opposition from the foreign tribunal, the second Intel prong should count as ‘neutral or slightly 

favoring’ the petitioner.”) (quoting In re Application of OOO Promnefstroy for an Order to 

Conduct Discovery for Use in a Foreign Proceeding, 2009 WL 3335608, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 

2009)). Lastly, federal courts have on other occasions found these same jurisdictions receptive to 

evidence obtained through § 1782. See, e.g., In re Dist. Ct. of Kolding, 2015 WL 13827074, at *1 

(Danish court sought evidence for use in judicial proceeding); Heraeus Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, 

Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Heraeus cannot obtain even remotely comparable 

discovery by utilizing German procedures and there is nothing to suggest that the German court 

would be affronted by Heraeus’s recourse to U.S. discovery or would refuse to admit any 

evidence, or at least any probative evidence (German judges can disregard evidence that would 

waste the court’s time), that the discovery produced.”); In re Jommi, 2013 WL 6058201, at *4 

(Switzerland); In re Fourth Civil Ct. for Intell. & Indus. Prop. Rights in Istanbul, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 81550, at *4 (Turkey). 

The Court is satisfied that the tribunals in each of the foreign proceedings would be 

receptive to discovery obtained through § 1782, and so this factor weighs in favor of upholding the 

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subpoenas. 

3. There is no circumvention of foreign discovery procedures.

The third Intel factor concerns whether the applicant is attempting to circumvent a foreign 

jurisdiction’s proof-gathering restrictions. Intel, 542 U.S. at 244-45. A petitioner seeks to 

circumvent foreign discovery restrictions when it seeks discovery “that cannot be obtained 

because the foreign jurisdiction prohibits the discovery of those documents.” In re Accent Delight 

Int’l, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 33785, at *8 (2d Cir.) (“[T]here is a difference between a § 1782(a) 

request that seeks documents that cannot be obtained . . . because the foreign jurisdiction does not 

provide a mechanism for such discovery, and one that seeks documents that cannot be obtained 

because the foreign jurisdiction prohibits the discovery of those documents.”) (citing Mees v. 

Buiter, 793 F.3d 291, 303 n.20 (2d Cir. 2015)). The fact that more evidence may be obtained via a

§ 1782 application than via the foreign discovery procedures does not amount to circumvention 

and does not militate against approval of the application. In re Nikon Corp., 2017 WL 4647753, at 

*4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2017); In re Raiffeinsenbank, 2016 WL 6474224, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 

2016); see also Appls. of Heraeus Kulzer, GmbHv. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(that an applicant “cannot obtain even remotely comparable discovery by utilizing German 

procedures” was not circumvention and was not a basis to deny an application under § 1782). 

There is no evidence that courts in any of the four foreign jurisdictions prohibit the discovery 

sought here. See, e.g., In re IPCom GMBH & Co., 2014 WL 12772090, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 

2014) (noting there is no circumvention because “U.S. courts have routinely granted applications 

under Section 1782 for discovery of evidence to be used in German proceedings.”); In re Jommi, 

2013 WL 6058201, at *4 (no circumvention of Swiss law); In re Dist. Ct. of Kolding, 2015 WL 

13827074, at *1 (W.D.N.C. May 4, 2015) (request for assistance from District Court of Kolding, 

Denmark); In re Fourth Civil Ct. for Intell. & Indus. Prop. Rights In Istanbul, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 81550, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2015) (no circumvention of Turkish discovery law).

Respondents counter by pointing to various discovery procedures that are available in each 

of the foreign jurisdictions. Mot. 11-13. They argue that IC is side-stepping those procedures by 

resorting to discovery through § 1782. However, the fact remains that none of those jurisdictions 

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allows discovery commensurate to that in the United States. For example, while the parties agree 

that German civil procedure allows for limited discovery of documents and for inspection of a 

potentially infringing device, they both also acknowledge that German law requires that a party 

identify with heightened particularity the documents a party seeks before a court will grant an 

order. See Rospatt Decl. ¶¶ 16-17; Decl. of Joachim Fledges ¶ 16, ECF No. 21. The same is true 

of Turkish and Swiss law. Atilgan Decl. ¶ 20; Hess Decl. ¶ 17. Several of IC’s foreign counsel 

assert that IC would not be able to identify with the required particularity documents that could be 

beneficial for its case. Rospatt Decl ¶ 17 (Germany); Hess Decl ¶ 18 (Switzerland); Atilgan Decl. 

¶ 20 (Turkey). Also, and particularly importantly here, the foreign discovery procedures generally 

reach only information and documents located in those jurisdictions. Rospatt Decl. ¶¶ 14-18; Hess 

Decl. ¶ 19; Atilgan Decl. ¶ 21; Valentin Decl. ¶ 19 (Denmark). And non-compliance by a party 

with a court order to provide documents does not trigger sanctions in Germany, Denmark, or 

Switzerland. Rospatt Decl. ¶ 15; Hess Decl. ¶ 17; see also Decl. of Nicolaj Bording in Supp. of 

Mot. to Quash (“Bording Decl.”) ¶ 13 (“There is no general right to pre-trial discovery under 

Danish law.”), ECF No. 18; id. ¶ 18 (“[T]he counterparty is not obligated to follow the Court’s 

order” to disclose documents, “and the Court cannot compel the counterparty to produce the 

documents.”). Finally, neither Danish, German, Swiss, nor Turkish civil procedure allows the 

taking of pre-trial depositions. Hess Decl. ¶ 15; Valentin Decl. ¶ 20; Atilgan Decl. ¶ 23; Rospatt 

Decl. ¶ 19. 

Additionally, whether or not those jurisdictions allow comparable discovery—which they 

do not—“[c]ourts need not determine that an applicant has exhausted its discovery attempts 

abroad.” In re: Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 183944, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 

17, 2013) (citing Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1098 (2d Cir.) (“Relying on the plain language of the 

statute, this Court has also refused to engraft a quasi-exhaustion requirement onto section 1782 

that would force litigants to seek information through the foreign or international tribunal before 

requesting discovery from the district court.”) (citations omitted)); Intel, 542 U.S. at 263 (“Section 

1782 is a provision for assistance to tribunals abroad. It does not direct United States courts to 

engage in comparative analysis to determine whether analogous proceedings exist here.”). 

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Therefore, even though IC came to this Court before going down those jurisdictions’ more limited 

discovery pathways, that doesn’t necessarily weigh against IC. Respondents’ complaints about 

the foreign proceedings being at a very early stage are noted, but they are without gravity. 

This factor is at least neutral regarding IC’s application. 

4. The requests do not conflict with discovery in the U.S. cases.

Respondents argue at length that IC is also attempting to circumvent the discovery timeline 

in the matter before the District of Delaware, and circumvent an unfavorable discovery ruling by 

Judge William H. Orrick in the related case before this Court. 

Regarding the case in the District of Delaware, Respondents argue that IC is trying to gain 

early access to documents that it agreed would not be produced until February 5, 2020. Even if 

that were true, it would have no weight, since that date has passed, and Respondents would not be 

unfairly impacted by this Court allowing the subpoenas to stand.

Regarding the related matter before this Court, Respondents argue that IC is trying to 

undermine an unfavorable discovery ruling. As a preliminary note, Respondents contend that in 

that matter, IC and Illumina “raced to this Court . . . with a motion for expedited discovery to 

support its barebone allegations. [Its] motion for expedited discovery was for the purpose of filing 

the gaps in its prefiling investigation so that it could augment what would otherwise undoubtably 

be a deficient infringement contention.” Mot. 16. However, in the minute order addressing IC’s 

motion for expedited discovery, Judge Orrick denied Respondents’ motion to dismiss the indirect 

infringement claims, finding there was “sufficient, plausible allegations regarding defendants’ sale 

or transfer of technology.” Dkt. No. 42. He also stated at the motion hearing that, “it seems to me 

that the plaintiffs’ claims are plausible with respect to indirect infringement.” Dkt. No. 46. So, 

Respondents’ characterization of what happened in that case is not entirely correct. 

Second, Judge Orrick granted in limited respect IC and Illumina’s motion, based on the 

“parties’ agreement to provide limited technical documents within 30 days,” and requiring that the 

defendants provided IC and Illumina “sixty days written notice before any phased or general 

commercial rollout begins in the United States.” Id. Neither in the minute order nor at the motion 

hearing did Judge Orrick express any strong reservations about IC and Illumina’s motion. He 

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explained at the hearing:

And then, finally, with respect to the expedited discovery regarding 

the rollout, I would grant that motion. . . . This discovery should be 

pretty limited. I think interrogatories and document production 

should probably do it, maybe a 30(b)(6) if some additional 

explanation is necessary; but I also think that the defendants could 

solve this problem just by saying what their intent is in a way that the 

plaintiff could rely on. But what I’m going to require is that at the 

end of this you go upstairs . . . and talk for an hour and then come 

back here and tell me how you’ve agreed to solve the discovery issue. 

Okay?

Id. (emphasis added). Judge Orrick ruled based on an agreement the parties worked out 

themselves that day. So, to the extent Judge Orrick limited the scope of discovery, that limiting 

was partially a result of the parties’ own agreement. The undersigned sees no reason why 

allowing the § 1782 subpoenas would necessarily circumvent Judge Orrick’s ruling. And to the 

extent Respondents have concern about being unfairly prejudiced in that matter, IC has indicated 

that it is willing to enter into an appropriate protective order limiting the use of discovery obtained 

through § 1782 in the related U.S. matter. See Opp’n 23. This should alleviate Respondents’

concerns (and could potentially have sooner, had Respondents engaged with IC in its earlier 

attempts to work out a protective order).

5. The requests are not unduly burdensome.

Once a court has determined that discovery through § 1782 is not being used to circumvent 

discovery restrictions in a foreign jurisdiction, “the ordinary tools of discovery management, 

including Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, come into play; and with objections based on the 

fact that discovery is being sought for use in a foreign court cleared away, section 1782 drops 

out.” Husayn v. Mitchell, 938 F.3d 1123, 1128 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2019). “In other words . . . the 

ordinary rules of civil procedure relating to discovery shift into place.” Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) 

(“The order may prescribe the practice and procedure . . . for taking the testimony or statement or 

producing the document or other thing. To the extent that [it] does not prescribe otherwise, the 

testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in accordance 

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding 

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any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 

needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 

controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the 

importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the 

proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. Discovery “is permitted if reasonably 

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Franklin v. Madden, 586 Fed. Appx. 

431, 432 (9th Cir. 2014). A subpoena must “command each person to whom it is directed to do 

the following at a specified time and place: attend and testify; produce designated documents, 

electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person’s possession, custody, or 

control; or permit the inspection of premises[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). 

a. IC’s Subpoenas for Documents

Respondents’ argument that IC’s subpoena requests are unduly burdensome really boils 

down to an assertion that they don’t have possession or control over relevant documents and 

cannot designate someone from CGI to testify. That assertion belies the record. 

First, Respondents assert that they lack legal control over many of the documents. They 

base this assertion on the fact that while CGI was the parent company of MGI Tech before 

October 14, 2019 (and thus had legal control over MGI Tech), since then the role has been 

reversed and CGI is now a wholly owned subsidiary of MGI Tech. It is true that the Ninth Circuit 

has defined “control” as “legal control,” or the “legal right to obtain documents upon demand,”

rather than the “practical-ability-to-obtain-documents.” In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 

1107-08 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Under that standard, a subsidiary generally would not 

have legal control over documents that a parent possesses. But that test applies only when 

deciding whether a party has documents or information in its “control.” The phrase “possession, 

custody or control” in Rule 45 “‘is in the disjunctive and only one of the numerated requirements 

need be met.’” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Cumis 

Ins. Society, Inc. v. South-Coast Bank, 610 F. Supp. 193, 196 (N.D. Ind. 1985)); see also In re 

Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[F]ederal courts have consistently held that 

documents are deemed to be within the ‘possession, custody or control’ for purposes of Rule 34 if 

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the party has actual possession, custody or control, or has the legal right to obtain the documents 

on demand. Thus, legal ownership of the document is not determinative.”) (citations omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit implicitly confirmed as much in In re Citric Acid Litig., writing, “[t]he 

documents in question are neither in the possession nor custody of C&L-US. Thus, the only 

question before us is whether C&L-US has ‘control’ over documents in the possession of [its 

association co-member].” 191 F.3d at 1107. In other words, it is sufficient for Respondents to

have possession or custody of documents or information for Respondents to have a duty to 

produce them.

1

 

As late as September 30, 2019, Respondents along with their co-defendants in the related 

matter before this Court represented in their initial disclosures that they were “in possession of the 

following categories of documents” (quoting from the disclosures):

- Information relating to the structure, characteristics, and operation 

of Defendants’ [Respondents’] products accused by Plaintiff [IC] 

of infringement. Such information may be located in one or more 

of the following locations: CGI and MGI Tech’s local servers, 

OneDrive cloud storage, Sharepoint sites, Wikis, and MGI Tech’s 

product lifecycle management (PLM) system.

- Information relating to the invalidity and unenforceability of 

Plaintiffs’ asserted patents. At this time, Defendants believe this 

information is publicly available, within Illumina’s custody, or 

within the custody of Illumina’s attorneys.

- Information relating to marketing of Defendants’ products and 

services. Such information may be located in one or more of the 

following locations: CGI’s local servers, OneDrive cloud storage, 

Sharepoint sites, and BGI Cloud storage.

- Information relating to revenues, profits, and costs (if any) 

associated with Defendants’ products accused by Plaintiff of 

infringement. With respect to MGI Tech, MGI Americas, and 

CGI, such information would be located in Oracle databases to 

the extent it exists. With respect to BGI Americas, to the extent 

such information exists, it is located in SAP databases or 

spreadsheets.

- Information relating to sales and potential sales of Defendants’ 

products accused by Plaintiff of infringement. Such information 

1 Respondents make the peculiar argument that they “do not control or maintain the limited 

technical documents and information they do possess.” Reply 9. Possession is sufficient, and 

Respondents do not support with case law the notion that a party is not in ‘legal possession’ of 

documents it possesses because it no longer has legal control over a related entity.

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is located in Salesforce databases.

- Information relating to the structure, characteristics, and operation 

of Plaintiffs’ products accused by Defendant-Counterclaim 

Plaintiff CGI of infringement. Defendants believe this 

information is within Illumina’s custody.

- Information relating to the validity and enforceability of CGI’s 

asserted patent. Such information may be publicly available or 

located in one or more of the following locations: CGI local 

servers and hard copy document storage in San Jose, California.

- Information relating to marketing of Illumina’s products and 

services. Aside from limited publicly available information, 

Defendants believe this information is within Illumina’s custody.

- Information relating to sales, revenues, profits, and costs 

associated with Illumina’s products accused by CGI of 

infringement. Aside from limited publicly available information, 

Defendants believe this information is within Illumina’s custody.

- Hard copy files, including laboratory notebooks stored at 2904 

Orchard Way, San Jose, California 95134.

Decl. of Minyao Wang in Supp. of Opp’n (“Wang Opp’n Decl.”) ¶ 12, Ex. E at 10-11, ECF No. 

30-6. According to the disclosures, as late as September 2019, multiple BGI entities including 

Respondents had access to shared servers, databases, or drives having documents or information

potentially responsive to IC’s subpoenas. There were also apparently documents in hard copy 

located within this District. And it bears repeating that, according to Respondents’ disclosures, 

before October 2019, MGI Tech was a wholly-owned subsidiary of BGI Complete Genomics 

Hong Kong, which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of CGI, meaning that CGI had legal control 

over both those entities and the documents and information they possessed. Respondents contend 

that “[a]fter CGI was acquired by BGI Shenzhen,” certain documents were transferred to affiliates 

of the BGI Group in China. But Respondents are in litigation and have been aware of IC’s § 1782 

application since September 2019, Wang Opp’n Decl. ¶ 5 Ex. A, so they were under an obligation 

to preserve those documents and cannot escape their duty to produce them by shipping them 

overseas or wiping them from their drives. Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 

1998) (“This obligation to preserve evidence arises when the party has notice that the evidence is 

relevant to litigation--most commonly when suit has already been filed, providing the party 

responsible for the destruction with express notice, but also on occasion in other circumstances, as 

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for example when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future 

litigation.”); Bank of New York v. Meridien Biao Bank Tanz., 171 F.R.D. 135, 149 (a party “cannot 

be permitted to circumvent the rules of discovery by engaging in conduct during the litigation that 

eliminates its responsibility to produce responsive documents to an opposing party”).

Additionally, Chongjun Xu, CGI’s Senior Director of Biochemistry stated that he has in 

his possession the Bill of Materials for certain of BGI’s sequencing reagent kits; “certain 

documents that describe the chemical structures of the nucleotides used in CGI’s sequencing 

reagent kits around the time of 2013-2014;” “some versions of the ‘recipe’ files used in certain of 

the MGI and BGI sequencers;” and “some documents . . . that describe the development of 

polymerases (and their amino acid sequences) for use in the BGI and MGI sequencing reagent kits 

since 2014.” Xu Decl. ¶¶ 8-11. He asserts that he cannot be certain the documents he has are the 

most up-to-date, and that he has no way of knowing which polymerases were used in kits sold in 

Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, or Turkey. Id. But the documents seem likely responsive to the

subpoenas; Xu essentially can’t be sure whether they would ultimately be admissible (or at least 

he claims he can’t), but that’s not the benchmark of discoverability. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) 

(“Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be 

discoverable.”). Also, Maria Hansen, Senior Manager, Financial Analyst and Costing for both

CGI and MGI Americas stated, “with respect to the documents identified in Request Nos. 1-2 in 

the subpoenas to CGI and MGI Americas,” that she has “access to MGI Tech financial data from 

June 2, 2016 to July 31, 2018 because MGI Tech shared the [CGI] Oracle database during this 

timeframe.” Decl. of Maria Hansen in Supp. of Mot. to Quash ¶ 10, ECF No. 23. Requests 

numbers 1 and 2 relate to the “sales of BGI Sequencers and Sequencing Reagent Kits in Denmark, 

Germany, Switzerland and Turkey,” and “the models of BGI Sequencers and Sequencing Reagent 

Kits” offered for sale in those countries. ECF No. 1. Hansen similarly asserts that she “could not 

attest to its accuracy or completeness” of that information, id., but again, that is not the standard 

for discovery. 

Also, looking again to Respondents’ initial disclosures, they listed among “individuals 

likely to have or discoverable information,” Avanindra Chaturvedi, “Chief Financial Officer, MGI 

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Tech, MGI Americas, and Complete Genomics,” as having knowledge of “financial information 

for MGI Tech, MGI Americas, and CGI.” ECF No. 30-6; see also Wang Decl. ¶¶ 18-19, Exs. O, 

P (Statements of Information filed with Secretary of State of California listing Chaturvedi as the 

Secretary and Chief Financial Officer for both CGI and MGI Americas). Respondents also listed 

Radoje Drmanan, Chief Scientific Officer, MGI Tech and CGI, who evidently invented one of 

Respondents’ patents, and who has knowledge on “research and development for MGI/BGI 

sequencers and reagent kits” and “technology claimed in Illumina’s asserted patents.” ECF No. 

30-6. And Roy Tan, who Respondents listed as General Manager for MGI Americas, said in an 

interview with GenomeWeb sometime in early 2019 that the company was “assembling 

commercialization teams in North America and Europe and [was aiming] to be ready to sell 

sequencing instrumentation in [those] markets” by the end of 2019. ECF No. 30-10.

Respondents’ concerns about producing documents located outside the United States is 

largely anachronistic, as Respondents themselves disclosed that documents and information are 

often located in electronic storage, which can be accessed with equal effort from any location. 

Also, Respondents contend that much of the information IC seeks is maintained by “European 

entities,” Mot. 17, so the burden concern is not pressing: if documents are maintained by different 

entities and Respondents don’t have control over those entities, Respondents don’t need to 

produce them. But for documents that are in Respondents’ possession, custody or control, the 

Court declines to limit production to documents physically located within the United States. See 

In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 2019) (“We hold that there is no per se bar to the 

extraterritorial application of § 1782, and the district court may exercise its discretion as to 

whether to allow such discovery.”); Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int’l Ltd., 834 F.3d 1194, 1200 (11th 

Cir. 2016) (because § 1782 says that discovery is to be produced pursuant to the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, and those rules allow for extraterritorial document productions, it follows that 

section 1782 allows for that too).

2

 

2 So far as the undersigned is aware, the Ninth Circuit has not ruled on whether a § 1782 

application may require extraterritorial document productions. See Four Pillars Enters. Co. v. 

Avery Dennison Corp., 308 F.3d 1075, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting the issue but not deciding 

it).

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To summarize, it may very well be true that Respondents do not have possession of, or 

access to, all documents or information IC seeks. But Respondents’ own disclosures and 

declarations, along with other evidence, suggest they have some of them. Their responsibility to 

produce documents and information in their possession didn’t end just because CGI and MGI 

Tech swapped places after this § 1782 application was filed and Respondents were on notice of it. 

Notwithstanding, declarations of BGI Americas employees, which Respondents have filed, 

see ECF Nos. 23-25, raise significant doubt that BGI Americas has documents or access to 

information responsive to Requests 1 through 3.

3

 BGI Americas was never a parent company of 

MGI Tech and is apparently just the U.S.-based counterpart of its European sister entities. The 

story is slightly different for CGI and MGI Americas: Hansen is employed by CGI and MGI 

Americas, and stated she has access to MGI Tech financial data for at least June 2, 2016 to July 

31, 2018, which she asserts is relevant to Requests 1 and 2; and Chaturvedi, CFO of MGI Tech, 

MGI Americas, and CGI is, according to Respondents’ disclosures, likely to have financial 

information for MGI Tech and CGI. The Court will limit the BGI Americas subpoena and quash 

Requests 1 through 3. 

b. IC’s Subpoena to CGI for Testimony

IC also seeks to take a deposition of CGI under Rule 30(b)(6). As a general matter, 

depositions of corporate officers are standard practice in U.S. civil litigation and are not 

burdensome. The Rules of Civil Procedure ensure that the length, time and place of the deposition 

do not impose an undue burden. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). Respondents argue that they should 

not have to designate a CGI witness to testify as to the sales or financial information of its 

European affiliates because that information is beyond its control. However, Respondents also 

acknowledge that CGI “does have technical information regarding the sequences and reagent kits 

it has worked on . . . .” Reply at 11. They assert that they “cannot verify whether this information 

is accurate, or reflects the sequencers or reagents kits” manufactured or sold in Denmark, 

Germany, Switzerland, or Turkey, id., but again, that is not the standard for discovery; the 

3 The Requests are the same across the subpoenas.

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question is whether the discovery is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 

evidence.” Also, Drmanac is or was Chief Scientific Officer of MGI Tech and CGI before MGI 

Tech and CGI swapped places, and Chaturvedi is or was Chief Financial Officer of both. CGI has 

failed to explain why it cannot designate those two as witnesses, other than to again assert that 

Drmanac can’t be sure if the information he has is accurate. Reply at 11. 

c. Respondents’ Confidential Information

Finally, Respondents object that the courts in the foreign jurisdictions are unable to protect 

their trade secrets and other confidential, proprietary information. Those jurisdictions are not 

without procedures for protecting confidential information. For example, Danish courts have 

discretion to grant a party’s request for in camera proceedings in order to address confidentiality 

concerns, including in relation to business secrets. Rebuttal Decl. of Anders Valentin (“Valentin 

Rebuttal Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 33. IC’s Danish counsel opined that, while there is not total 

certainty that a court will grant such a request, Danish courts are likely to grant a request made 

jointly when all parties agree. Id. ¶ 3. In Germany, court files are kept confidential and there is no 

general public right of access. Rospatt Decl. ¶ 27. A third party can request an inspection of 

records, id., but a German infringement court will not grant to third parties access to trade secrets 

if at least one party objects to the request, identifies a trade secret, and shows probable cause that 

there is a trade secret, Rebuttal Decl. of Max V. Rospatt ¶ 9, ECF No. 31. If all parties to an 

action oppose the inspection request, a court will only grant it if the third party has a “justified 

legal interest in knowing the contents of the file.” Rospatt Decl. ¶ 27. The Swiss Code of Civil 

Procedure provides that a court “shall take appropriate measures to ensure that taking evidence 

does not infringe the legitimate interests of any parties or third party, such as business secrets.” 

Decl. of Thierry Calame (“Calame Decl.”) ¶ 18, ECF No. 19 (Switzerland); Hess Rebuttal Decl. 

¶¶ 6-7. IC’s Swiss counsel, who is an elected associate judge on the Swiss Federal Patent Court, 

Hess Decl. ¶ 1, opined that the language “shall take” means “a court must order appropriate 

measures if the legitimate interests of a party so require[,]” Hess Rebuttal Decl. ¶ 6. Also, while a 

Swiss court has some discretion to decide on requests for protective measures and measures are 

not guaranteed, Calame Decl. ¶ 18, if the parties agree on certain measures, the Federal Patent 

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Court “would in all likelihood adopt those measures.” Hess Rebuttal Decl. ¶ 7. And a Turkish 

court has discretion to grant confidentiality protections upon the request of parties to the litigation. 

Decl. of Okan Çan ¶ 13, ECF No. 20; Rebuttal Decl. of Ozge Atilgan (“Atilgan Rebuttal Decl.”) ¶ 

5 (“a Turkish court is likely to grant confidentiality protection upon a joint request by the 

parties”), ECF No. 34. 

IC’s foreign counsel have all represented to this Court a willingness to cooperate in the 

foreign proceedings in requesting measures to ensure the confidentiality of information obtained 

through its § 1782 application. Valentin Rebuttal Decl. ¶ 3; Hess Rebuttal Decl. ¶ 7; Rospatt 

Rebuttal Decl. ¶ 9; Atilgan Rebuttal Decl ¶ 5. The Court orders IC to do so. The Court 

understands that it cannot guarantee the full protection of Respondents’ trade secrets and other 

confidential proprietary information. But the nature of § 1782 is that evidence produced by it

invariably ends up before a foreign proceeding; denying discovery because a foreign court does 

not have identical protections to a U.S. court would frequently defeat the purpose of § 1782. See 

Intel, 542 U.S. at 263 (“Section 1782 is a provision for assistance to tribunals abroad. It does not 

direct United States courts to engage in comparative analysis . . . . Comparisons of that order can 

be fraught with danger.”); id. at 263 n. 15 (“[C]omparisons of [different legal] systems is slippery 

business . . . .”). Finally, this Court presumes that courts in these foreign jurisdictions also regard 

with importance the proprietary interests of parties appearing before them and the integrity of the 

confidentiality of evidence submitted to them. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Respondents’ motion to quash the § 1782 

subpoenas. However, the Court limits the subpoena to BGI Americas to Requests 4 through 13. 

The Court orders IC to cooperate in making requests to the foreign tribunals, including, if 

necessary, requests for protective orders or for confidential proceedings, to ensure the 

confidentiality of information obtained through this application. 

Finally, the Court orders the parties to meet and confer concerning an appropriate 

protective order that will prevent IC from using in U.S. civil litigation the documents and 

information it obtains through this § 1782 application. Within seven days the parties shall submit 

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a jointly agreed proposed protective order or competing proposed protective orders and a fivepage joint discovery letter brief setting forth each side’s arguments.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 19, 2020

THOMAS S. HIXSON

United States Magistrate Judge

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