Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01620/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01620-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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1 These facts are taken from the Overview, Adverse Credibility Findings, and Conclusions of

Law sections in the Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [Docket No. 145 at 1-2, 6-34,

56-66], attached hereto as Exhibit “A.”

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

SHAWN LEE HILLER and STACEY

HILLER,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and

DOES 1 to 20,

Defendant. 

No. C 05-01620 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 154]

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is defendant United States of America’s unopposed Motion for Review of

Clerk’s Taxation of Costs [Docket No. 154] (the “Motion”). As the Motion is unopposed, it is

appropriate for resolution without a hearing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b), and the Court GRANTS it

and denies the Hillers all the costs sought in their Bill of Costs [Docket No. 147]. In addition, the

Court had the Hillers opposed the Motion, the Court would have determined costs under the Equal

Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a), and would have reached the same conclusion.

BACKGROUND

1. The 2004 Motor Vehicle Accident1

This personal injury lawsuit arose from a motor vehicle accident on February 24, 2004

between a United States Postal Service vehicle and a 2004 Jeep Rubicon owned and driven by

plaintiff Shawn Hiller, who at the time was a California Highway Patrol (CHP) patrolman driving

his personal vehicle to a training class for his work for the CHP (hereinafter, “the accident”). As a

result of the accident, Mr. Hiller sought medical treatment over the following three-year period

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2 See supra note 2.

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leading up to trial, and he applied for a retirement from the CHP based on a finding of permanent

disability made by his treating physician. In May 2006, the CHP granted Mr. Hiller’s request for

disability retirement.

2. The 2007 Bench Trial2

At trial, Mr. Hiller sought damages for medical expenses of $12,550. He also sought lost

wages covering a 25-year period, until 2029, based on his doctor’s finding of permanent disability

from his job at the CHP and a lost service-connected pension that would have accrued if he worked

as a CHP patrolman for those 25 years. He also sought substantial general damages, and his spouse,

Stacey Hiller, sought damages for loss of consortium.

After the close of evidence, the Court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

[Docket No. 145]. The Court found Mr. Hiller was not credible, when he provided pertinent

information to the doctors, at his deposition and at trial. The Court found he exaggerated the extent

of his physical limitations, his complaints of pain, and the circumstances of the accident to the

doctors he had seen over the prior three years. The Court found he also minimized or failed to

inform them of his preexisting degenerative back condition, his previous symptoms of low back

pain, and the x-rays from 2002 showing such condition. The Court found these doctors relied on the

erroneous information provided to them by Mr. Hiller and the incorrect assumption that

abnormalities in the 2004 MRI of his back were not present before the accident, in reaching their

conclusions about his condition and treatment. As a result, their conclusions, predicated as they

were on inaccurate information Mr. Hiller provided about the accident’s severity and his physical

condition before and after the accident, were not persuasive. His lack of credibility weighed heavily

against all claims made at trial by plaintiffs.

With regards to Mr. Hiller’s credibility, the Court made five adverse findings. First, it found

he did not produce his writings about the accident, his condition, or his activities after the accident,

as requested, during discovery. Second, he did not produce photographs of his Jeep on unpaved

trails, in violation of the Court’s order to do so. Third, he did not disclose his off-road driving

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28 3 These facts are taken, in part, from movant’s Motion for Review of Clerk’s Taxation of

Costs [Docket No. 154].

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activities. Fourth, he exaggerated his injury, his condition, and his pertinent medical history to the

doctors he saw after the accident. Fifth, he gave incredible testimony regarding his ability to work,

including light duty issues with the CHP and failing to disclose his work for Jeepers and Creepers.

The Court awarded the following damages: (1) Medical Expenses of $12,550 based on the

parties’ stipulation this was the total amount of such expenses. (2) Lost Past Wages: Mr. Hiller

claimed lost wages from the date of the accident to the trial. For lack of evidence, the Court

awarded him $7125, or $4750 per month for 1.5 months. (3) Lost Future Wages: Mr. Hiller

claimed $1.3 to $1.6 million, covering 25 years beyond trial. Due to a lack of evidence and

credibility, the Court awarded him nothing. (4) Lost Future Pension: The Court awarded him

nothing, based on the same deficiencies in his lost future wages claim. (5) General Damages: Mr.

Hiller sought $2 million. The Court awarded him $37,650, or three times the stipulated medical

expenses. (6) Loss of Consortium: Ms. Hiller sought $200,000 for loss of consortium. The Court

awarded her $18,750, or roughly one-half of Mr. Hiller’s general damages. (7) Future Medical

Expenses: Due to a lack of evidence, the Court awarded him nothing.

The Court entered judgment on October 11, 2007. [Docket No. 146.] 

3. Post-Trial Pleadings3

After trial, on October 23, 2007, the Hillers filed a Bill of Costs in the amount of $22,269.18,

with a supporting declaration from J. Kevin Morrison, Esq. [Docket Nos. 147-48.] Following meetand-confer discussions, the United States submitted on, November 1, 2007, its Objections to Bill of

Costs [Docket No. 149], pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Civil Local Rule 54-2. On

November 20, 2007, the Clerk filed and entered its statement of taxed costs in the amount of

$14,739.68. [Docket No. 151.] On November 20, 2007, the United States filed a Motion for

Review of Clerk’s Taxation of Costs [Docket No. 154], which is now before the Court. The Hillers

filed no opposition.

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Because the Court denies the Hillers all costs sought in their Bill of Costs, the Court does not

address the United States’ request to tax $536.48 for a Colour Drop invoice, $5.28 for color copies,

$15.84 for photograph exhibits, or $30.70 for Dr. Gary Isaacson’s records. See Mot. at 8-9.

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ANALYSIS

1. The Court grants the motion as it is unopposed.

A. Legal Standard

In regards to oppositions, Northern District Civil Local Rule 7-3(a) states, “Any opposition

to a motion must be served and filed not less than 21 days before the hearing date.” Further, the

Court’s Standing Civil Order warns parties that the failure to oppose a motion, is deemed a consent

to the granting of that motion.

B. Analysis

In its motion, the United States requests the Court deny the Hillers all their costs. Mot.

at 2:27-3:1, 7:2-3, 9:10. Alternatively, it requests the Court tax certain costs. Id. at 8-9. Here, the

Hillers have never filed an opposition. The Court thus grants the United States’ unopposed Motion

to deny the Hillers all their costs.4

2. Had the Motion been opposed, the Court would have denied costs under the Equal

Access to Justice Act.

A. Legal Standard

Costs are awarded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), which states:

Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs--other

than attorney’s fees--should be allowed to the prevailing party. But costs against the

United States, its officers, and its agencies may be imposed only to the extent allowed

by law. The clerk may tax costs on 1 day’s notice. On motion served within the next

5 days, the court may review the clerk’s action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (emphasis added).

In actions by or against the United States of America, there is a federal statute that “provides

otherwise.” The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a), states:

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Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as

enumerated in section 1920 of this title, but not including the fees and expenses of

attorneys, may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or

against the United States ... in any court having jurisdiction of such action....

28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (emphasis added); Neal & Co., Inc. v. U.S., 121 F.3d 683, 685 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

In comparing the two provisions, “[c]ourts following Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1) have

acknowledged in its language a presumption in favor of costs to the prevailing party and an

obligation for a trial court to explain its variance from the presumption.” Neal & Co., Inc., 121 F.3d

at 686 (emphasis added). 

In contrast, based on its language and the fact it is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity,

which thus must be strictly construed, the “EAJA does not create a presumption in favor of an

award of costs to the prevailing party.” Id. at 687 (emphasis added). “Rather [the] EAJA vests the

trial court with considerable discretion to award costs. This discretion authorizes the trial court to

consider a wide variety of factors, including the conduct of the parties during trial, in reaching its

costs decision.” Id. As a result, a court:

is under no obligation to explain a deviation from the norm. Rather a standard of

wide discretion presupposes that the trial court may weigh many different factors

without an explanation of its full decisional process. Indeed, the impressions created

during lengthy litigation may defy accurate cataloguing.

Id. (emphasis added).

In fact, “the statute envisions that the trial court may choose to award costs or not in its full

discretion” without explanation. Id.

In cases not involving the United States, when a party challenges a clerk’s determination of

costs, “Under the well-established Rule 54(d)(1) case law, the district court is charged with making

a de novo review of the clerk’s determination of the costs issue.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB

Litigation, 221 F.3d 449, 461 (3d Cir. 2000) (clerk’s task is ministerial, and court is not bound by

clerk’s reasons or limited to evidence it considered).

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Although Rule 54 does create a presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing

party, Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators v. State of Calif., 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), a

trial court has considerable discretion in awarding or denying costs, Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,

379 U.S. 227, 233 (1964).

If a court refuses to award costs, it must specify the reasons for the refusal. Ass’n of Mex.-

Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 591-92. In other words, the court must “explain why a case is not

‘ordinary’ and why, in the circumstances, it would be inappropriate or inequitable to award costs.” 

Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003); Save Our

Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A district court deviates from normal

practice when it refuses to tax costs to the losing party, and that deviation triggers the requirement to

‘specify reasons.’”).

The Ninth Circuit has listed the following as reasons that may justify denial of costs: (1) a

losing party’s limited financial resources; (2) misconduct by the prevailing party; (3) the chilling

effect of imposing high costs on civil rights litigants; (4) the issues in the case were close and

difficult; (5) the prevailing party’s recovery was nominal, partial, or substantially less than that

sought; (6) the losing party litigated in good faith; and (7) the case presented a landmark issue of

national importance. Champion Produce, Inc., 342 F.3d at 1022-23.

B. Legal Analysis

i. Were the Court to determine costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act,

it would deny them to the Hillers.

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, there is no presumption

for the Hillers, as prevailing parties, to receive their costs. If the Court were to determine costs

under the EAJA, then for the reasons discussed below in part 2.B.ii, touching on the Hiller’s

misconduct and their rather low recovery, the Court would deny them their costs. Although the

EAJA does not require a Court to explain its ruling, the Court would likely consider the Champion

factors, as discussed below.

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ii. Were the Court to determine costs under Rule 54(d)(1), it would deny

them to the Hillers.

If the Court were to determine costs under the lower standard of discretion provided by

Rule 54(d)(1), it would still deny the Hillers all their costs. Given the facts of this matter, the only

Champion factors relevant here would be (1) misconduct by the prevailing party and (2) that the

prevailing party’s recovery was nominal, partial, or substantially less than that sought.

a. Misconduct by the Prevailing Party

“A district court ... generally must award costs unless the prevailing party is guilty of some

fault, misconduct, or default worthy of punishment.” National Info. Servs., Inc. v. TRW, Inc., 51

F.3d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators v.

State of Calif., 231 F.3d 572, 591-92 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (courts may consider more than just

misconduct in denying fees). As detailed in the Background section, supra, the Court found Mr.

Hiller not credible at trial, making five adverse findings, and found he significantly misled his expert

witnesses. This misconduct unnecessarily delayed and complicated discovery and trial, and were the

Court to determine costs under Rule 54(d)(1), this Champion factor would weigh heavily in favor of

denying the Hillers all of their costs.

b. The prevailing party’s recovery was nominal, partial, or

substantially less than that sought.

Under a Rule 54(d)(1) analysis, where a prevailing party’s recovery is nominal, partial, or

substantially less than that sought, a court may consider denying costs to them. Here, comparing the

Hillers’ demands to their recovery, Mr. Hiller obtained nothing for future medical expenses, about

2.3% for lost past wages, nothing for lost future wages, nothing for future pension benefits, and

about 1.9% for general damages. Ms. Hiller obtain about 9.4% of what she sought for loss of

consortium.

In Richmond v. Southwire Co., 980 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1992), the Appellate Court

affirmed the district court denying costs to a prevailing party, who only recovered one dollar, against

a claim for $13,900, after having taken 24 depositions. Although the Hillers might argue they

recovered a greater percentage than the prevailing party in Richmond, who only recovered .007% of

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Also, this matter appears to have involved 21 depositions. See Docket No. 148 at 2-3 (Decl. of J.

Kevin Morrison in Supp. of Bill of Costs).

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what they sought, this ignores the fact that the Hillers recovered nothing in three categories of

damages.5

 

Further, the underlying policy in Richmond would apply here: a court may consider a

disparity, especially a staggering or astronomical difference between an amount sought, and an

amount obtained, as a factor to determine whether to deny costs to a prevailing party. This is

because a substantial disparity may suggest a case unsuited for trial or that a plaintiff excessively

exaggerated or inflated his or her claims. Thus, were the Court to determine costs under a

Rule 54(d)(1) analysis, this Champion factor would also weigh heavily in favor of denying the

Hillers all of their costs.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the United States’ motion and denies the Hillers all the

costs sought in their Bill of Costs [Docket No. 147]. The amount of costs awarded by the Clerk to

the Hillers, of $14,739.68, [see Docket No. 151] is hereby reduced to zero.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

February 14, 2008 _________________________________

Saundra Brown Armstrong 

United States District Judge

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