Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00233/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00233-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 Plaintiff appears to have omitted his surname in filing and proceeding in this action. 

The Clerk of the Court will be directed to correct his name on the certificate of service and the

case caption to include plaintiff’s full name.

2

 Defendants were granted an extension of time to file their opposition by order filed on

December 13, 2004.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAS ADISA GAMBA OLUWA,1

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-0233 MCE GGH P

vs.

DIRECTOR OF CALIFORNIA 

DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, et al. ORDER and

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is 1) defendants’ September 13, 2004

motion to dismiss to which plaintiff filed an opposition on September 27, 2004; and 2) plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment filed on October 12, 2004 (apparently re-served on November 19,

2004), to which defendant filed an opposition on December 21, 20042; plaintiff filed his putative

reply on January 3, 2005, which unserved document the court, by order filed on February 2,

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

 Plaintiff seeks money damages from defendant Alameida. The court substituted in the

name of current CDC Director Woodford to the extent that plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive

relief. See Order, filed on May 28, 2004.

2

2005, directed plaintiff to serve upon defendants within 15 days; instead, on March 7, 2005,

petitioner, averring that he did not have a copy of his January 3, 2005 reply, re-served his January

12, 2004 notice of appeal to the district judge. Plaintiff was cautioned by the court in the

February 2, 2005 order that failure to serve defendants his opposition might result in the

imposition of sanctions. Although plaintiff’s response to the court order was timely because, by

application of the mailbox rule the March 7, 2005 filing was filed on February 15, 2005,

plaintiff’s re-service of a document other than the reply filed was unresponsive and no

explanation was set forth as to why he did not have a copy of the reply filed; thus, the January 3,

2005 reply will be stricken from the record. 

Complaint

Plaintiff is proceeding against former CDC Director Edward Alameida in his

individual capacity and current CDC Director Jeanne S. Woodford in her official capacity.3

Plaintiff alleges that defendant CDC Director has failed to follow state law in keeping accurate

and updated records as to his sentence and has thus been unable or failed to transmit accurate

records to the Board of Prison Terms, the only agency authorized to release plaintiff from

defendant CDC Director’s custody, resulting in his “false imprisonment.” Complaint, pp. 3-3(a). 

Plaintiff alleges that, as an indeterminately sentenced inmate, he is entitled, if an accurate records

review were conducted, to a term-setting hearing pursuant to state law and directives. 

Complaint, p. 3(a). Plaintiff alleges that defendant Alameida (and his agents) conducted a

computation review hearing at the third level of an inmate appeal and failed to abide by

“Chairman R.K. Procunier’s 75/30 Directive,” such that plaintiff was not scheduled for a termsetting hearing and the Board of Prison Terms was not convened. Id. Plaintiff seeks money

damages and injunctive relief.

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 4

 Defendant sets forth this ground twice. MTD, pp. 1-2. 

3

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move for dismissal on several grounds, pursuant to nonenumerated

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), as well as Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defendants contend that 1) plaintiff

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies;4 2) that neither defendant is a proper defendant; 3)

that the federal court lacks jurisdiction to enforce state law; 4) that the relief sought must be

obtained through a petition for writ of habeas corpus; defendants also assert, but do not list as

separate grounds in their notice of motion, that plaintiff has made only conclusory allegations

and that plaintiff has failed to allege the personal involvement of either defendant in the alleged

violations. MTD, pp. 1-2, 4-5. 

Legal Standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts consistent with his allegations which

would entitle him to relief. NOW, Inc. v. Schiedler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803 

(1994); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984), citing Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957), Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d

1273, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1993). Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within it, “can be based

on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990);

see also Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.

Ct. 1848, 1850 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421,

89 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). The court will “‘presume that general

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’” NOW, 510

U.S. at 256; 114 S. Ct. at 803, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.555, 561, 112 S.

Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972). A

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond

doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to

relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984), citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may disregard

allegations in the complaint if they are contradicted by facts established by exhibits attached to

the complaint. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Furthermore, the court is not required to accept as true allegations that contradict facts which

may be judicially noticed. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir.

1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988). The court need not accept as true conclusory

allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). The court

need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981). 

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

\\\\\

\\\\\

\\\\\

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

Failure to Exhaust

Legal Standard under Non-Enumerated Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)

In a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under nonenumerated Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants “have the burden of

raising and proving exhaustion.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). The

parties may go outside the pleadings, submitting affidavits or declarations under penalty of

perjury, but plaintiff must be provided with notice of his opportunity to develop a record. Wyatt

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. The court provided plaintiff with such fair notice by order

filed on July 9, 2004. 

Should defendants submit declarations and/or other documentation demonstrating

an absence of exhaustion, making a prima facie showing, plaintiff must refute that showing. 

Plaintiff may rely upon statements made under the penalty of perjury in the complaint if the

complaint shows that plaintiff has personal knowledge of the matters stated and plaintiff calls to

the court’s attention those parts of the complaint upon which plaintiff relies. If the court

determines that plaintiff has failed to exhaust, dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate

remedy for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d at 1120.

Defendants concede that plaintiff filed an administrative appeal on November 6,

2003, alleging that he had served more than 21 years on his sentence which, in the matrix of the

Board of Prison Terms (BPT), is the usual base term for second degree murder. MTD, p. 6 &

Exhibit A. Defendants also note that plaintiff contended that his period of parole was required to

be reduced. Id. Plaintiff’s appeal was denied, defendants argue, because it had not been filed

with the appropriate agency, the BPT, but plaintiff did not thereafter file an appeal to the BPT,

but instead brought this lawsuit. Id. 

A review of defendants’ exhibit demonstrates that plaintiff sought access to his

CDC records because he had been informed by the BPT that they use CDC records to make their

determinations. MTD, Exhibit A. While plaintiff was directed to address the issue of the length

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

of his parole to the BPT, plaintiff was also directed to file a separate 602 appeal with respect to

his request for a computation review, in a document dated as signed on December 4, 2003, but

also separately stamped with two other dates, December 30, 2003 and January 2, 2004. 

Thereafter, in a CDC screening document initialed on January 7, 2004, but separately stamped

both on January 16, 2004 and January 28, 2004, it appears that plaintiff sent a subsequent 602

appeal which was rejected because a “request for computation hearing is a separate issue and

must be sent to case records.” Id. On January 22, 2004, plaintiff wrote a letter, separately filestamped January 28, 2004, asking if he was being denied a computation review hearing at the

second level of appeal. Id. His letter expresses confusion because he had submitted his appeal to

the records office, following which he was instructed to request a computation review hearing,

which he did to the second level, after which, despite having been notified that a computation

review hearing would be conducted at the second level, no computation review hearing was

scheduled. Id.

Defendants’ exhibit also shows that plaintiff had signed a notice of his right to

request a computation review hearing and of computation review hearing rights on November 21,

2003; such a hearing would be conducted at the second level of review and would afford due

process protections. Defendants produce an undated supplemental page to the second level

appeal response in which plaintiff’s appeal is deemed partially granted and states that a

correctional case records supervisor, on February 23, 2004, had attempted to interview plaintiff

to provide him with a Haygood Computation Review Hearing, but plaintiff had refused to speak

with that individual. At that time, the records supervisor had explained to plaintiff that only the

BPT could change the length or terms of parole. 

In opposition, plaintiff has attached a third level appeal decision, dated February

21, 2002, while plaintiff was at CSP-Sacramento, which obviously predates the 602 inmate

appeal filed on November 6, 2003 at plaintiff’s CSP-Lancaster address. In that appeal, plaintiff

argued that his life sentence should be converted to a determinate term. It was noted that the

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

Salinas Valley State Prison records supervisor had “attempted to conduct a Haygood hearing with

the appellant but due to his argumentative behavior it was terminated.” The appeal decision went

on to state the CDC could not convert plaintiff’s life term and that [t]he Board of Prison Terms

shall determine what length of imprisonment the appellant will serve.” Opp., Exhibit A. 

On the face of it on this record, it is difficult to discern whether plaintiff has

administratively exhausted the issue of whether or not CDC has kept accurate records with regard

to plaintiff’s sentence and has been unable to transmit accurate records to the BPT, resulting in a

longer sentence for plaintiff. However, within his complaint plaintiff plainly references a third

level appeal decision wherein no computation review was conducted. Averring that plaintiff’s

argumentative behavior was the cause of an attempted review being terminated, that February

2002 decision, the one plaintiff has produced with his opposition, goes on to assert that a review

of plaintiff’s case revealed that CDC could not determine the length of plaintiff’s sentence but

that only BPT could do so. Opp., Exhibit A. It is plaintiff’s position herein, however, that he has

not asked the CDC to convert his life sentence but that the BPT cannot go forward without

proper computation of his sentence by the CDC and the transmittal of his properly kept records to

the BPT to serve as notification to them that a term-setting hearing should be convened. Opp., p.

3. In support of plaintiff’s position, he cites a letter from the BPT’s executive officer indicating

that prisoner records are maintained by the CDC “at the institutional level” and a certification

from CDC’s custodian of records that the Director of the CDC is the legal custodian of the

records of state prisoners. Opp., p. 3, Exhibits B & C. 

The third level decision, upon which plaintiff predicates his claim of

administrative exhaustion, obviously predates the 602 appeal filed in November of 2003. While

defendants touch only on the administrative appeal initially filed in November of 2003 and argue

that plaintiff should have gone on to appeal administratively to the BPT, the existence of the

earlier third level decision by CDC is sufficient to meet the exhaustion requirements of the

PLRA. Even assuming that the November 2003 appeal, which was apparently never exhausted

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

to third level, is the governing appeal for purposes of this action, defendants do not assert that

plaintiff failed to exhaust at the administrative level within CDC but that plaintiff did not

proceed to exhaust his grievance through another entity, the BPT. Defendants do not cite

applicable authority for such a requirement. The court finds that plaintiff has exhausted his

administrative remedies, despite his having apparently refused to cooperate in efforts to conduct

the computation review he sought, because in either grievance at issue, the appeal response did

not indicate that any such lack of cooperation kept the grievance process from going forward. 

Defendants’ motion on this ground should be denied.

Proper Defendant/No Personal Involvement 

Defendants’ argument that plaintiff has not named the proper defendant is not

well-taken. Plaintiff concedes that it is the BPT who ultimately determines the length of his

sentence or parole but alleges that defendant CDC Directors have failed to compute his sentence

properly and transmit accurate records, records of which each defendant (a former and current

CDC Director) was, respectively, the legal custodian, and without which the BPT is unable to

act. On this ground, defendants’ motion fails.

Defendants’ contention that plaintiff has failed to allege the personal involvement

of either defendant Alameida or defendant Woodford is accurate; however, only defendant

Alameida, the former CDC director, is being sued in his individual capacity for money damages,

while defendant Woodford, the current CDC director, has been substituted in only in her official

capacity, on the basis of the prospective injunctive relief sought by plaintiff. See Order, filed on

May 28, 2004; Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 5

 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).

9

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). 

However, just as it is not necessary to allege Monell5 policy grounds when suing a

state or municipal official in his or her official capacity for injunctive relief related to a procedure

of a state entity, Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1989), it follows that it is not

necessary to allege the personal involvement of a state official when plaintiffs are attacking a

state procedure on federal grounds that relates in some way to the job duties of the named

defendant. All that is required is that the complaint name an official who could appropriately

respond to a court order on injunctive relief should one ever be issued. Harrington v. Grayson,

764 F. Supp. 464, 475-477 (E.D.Mich. 1991); Malik v. Tanner, 697 F. Supp. 1294, 1304

(S.D.N.Y. 1988). (“Furthermore, a claim for injunctive relief, as opposed to monetary relief,

may be made on a theory of respondeat superior in a § 1983 action.”); Fox Valley Reproductive

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

Health Care v. Arft, 454 F. Supp. 784, 786 (E.D. Wis. 1978). See also, Hoptowit v. Spellman,

753 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985), permitting an injunctive relief suit to continue against an official’s

successors despite objection that the successors had not personally engaged in the same practice

that had led to the suit. 

Therefore, while defendants are correct that defendant Alameida, sued only in his

individual capacity, should be dismissed, defendant Woodford is the official who could

appropriately respond to a court order requiring injunctive relief. This action, therefore, should

proceed only against defendant Woodford who is sued only in her official capacity. Defendants’

motion to dismiss on this ground should be granted as to defendant Alameida but denied as to

defendant Woodford.

Jurisdiction

Defendants contend that this federal court does not have jurisdiction to require a

state official or state agency to abide by state law because it is barred from doing so by the

Eleventh Amendment. MTD, p. 4. It is true that the Eleventh Amendment does not permit

federal courts to enjoin state officials in their enforcement of state law. Pennhurst v. Halderman,

465 U.S. 89, 104, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). However, if the state law creates a federal liberty

interest, federal courts may enjoin state actors to comply with the federal parameters.

Defendants concede that the complaint is framed “in terms of violations of due

process both substantive and procedural, and of equal protection.” MTD, p. 4. Defendants also

concede that it could be “argued that [plaintiff] has a liberty interest in being paroled.” Id. 

Narrowly construing plaintiff’s claims, however, defendants assert that plaintiff’s “real

objective” is to have this court require state officials to perform their state law duties and to

compel the state to follow state law. Id. In opposition, plaintiff claims that his due process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment have been violated as well as the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Opp., pp. 1-2.

\\\\\

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

 State regulations give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the

federal constitution only if those regulations pertain to “freedom from restraint” that “imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). 

11

The state procedure at issue requires that prison terms be set in accordance with

uniform guidelines. Defendants do not dispute that there is any such applicable state mandate or

otherwise challenge the applicability of the state procedure to plaintiff’s sentence. Thus, they

have failed to provide a sufficient basis for this court to dismiss this action. “State law may

create a liberty interest when it protects an individual against arbitrary action of government.” 

Chaney v. Stewart, 156 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

558, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974); Picray v. Sealock, 138 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir.1998). While

acknowledging that the analysis in Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.

454, 109 S. Ct. 1904, (1989), may have been disapproved by the decision in Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995), the Ninth Circuit nevertheless discussed the

Thompson approach because that analysis did not result in the court’s having to draw the

“negative inferences” disfavored in Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480, 115 S. Ct. at 2299.6 Neal v.

Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997). Quoting Thompson, at 463, 109 S. Ct. at 1909, the

Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]n sum, the use of ‘explicitly mandatory language,’ in connection

with the establishment of ‘specified substantive predicates’ to limit discretion, forces a

conclusion that the state has created a liberty interest.” Neal v. Shimoda, supra, at 829-830. 

While Sandin did eliminate the “mandatory language” approach, the Ninth Circuit

has found that holding to be limited to internal disciplinary regulations, not affecting the creation

of liberty interests, for example, in parole. Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003), citing McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895,

903 (9th Cir, 2002) [citations omitted]. The liberty interest created by the California parole

scheme “is created ...upon the incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs, supra, at 914. While it is not

clear that the procedure at issue herein falls under the mantle of Biggs, defendants have made no

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 7

 The court, of course, makes no finding here that the liberty interest has been violated.

12

showing that such a liberty interest is not implicated. The motion should be denied on this

ground.7

Habeas

Defendants maintain that the “crux of plaintiff’s claim is that he is serving a

longer term because defendants have not set the length of his term.” MTD, p. 7. For this reason,

they argue, plaintiff may not seek relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. 

Generally,

§ 1983 must yield to the more specific federal habeas statute with

its attendant procedural and exhaustion requirements, where an

inmate seeks injunctive relief challenging the fact of his conviction

or the duration of his sentence. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 489, 93 S. Ct. 1827 [] (1973). Such claims fall within the

‘core’ of habeas corpus and are thus not cognizable when brought

pursuant to § 1983. Ibid. By contrast constitutional claims that

merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement,

whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside

of that core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first

instance. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S.749 ----, 124 S.Ct.

1303, 1304 [] (2004) (per curiam); Preiser, supra, at 498-499, 93 S.

Ct. 1827.

Nelson v. Campbell, 541U.S. 637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004).

However, a more recent Supreme Court case clarifies and reaffirms that where, as

here, a plaintiff challenges as unconstitutional a state procedure, or as in this case, the omission

to perform such a procedure, “§ 1983 remains available for procedural challenges where success

in the action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner [emphasis

in original].” Wilkinson v. Dotson, __ U.S.__, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1247 (2005). In Wilkinson,

success for one of the inmate plaintiffs meant “at most [a] new eligibility review, which at most

will speed consideration of a new parole application”; success for the other plaintiff meant “at

most, a new parole hearing at which ...parole authorities may, in their discretion, decline to

shorten his prison term.” Id., at 1248. The relief sought here is for the court to direct the

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

defendant to provide accurate records related to plaintiff’s sentence to the BPT. While the

ultimate result of such action may be that plaintiff is released from prison earlier than he would

be if such action did not occur, it is relief, as in Wilkinson, sufficiently attenuated from his

ultimate release such that he may proceed through the vehicle of an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Defendant’s motion should be denied on this ground.

Conclusory Allegations

Defendants’ contention that plaintiff’s allegations are insufficiently specific in

failing to set forth any putative wrongdoing by defendants is not well-supported given the liberal

pleading rules of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and that this action proceeds with a pro se plaintiff. Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. at 520, 92 S. Ct. at 596. The motion on this ground should be denied.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment but has failed to comply with Local Rule

56-260(a), which, in relevant part, requires the following:

Each motion for summary judgment ...shall be accompanied by a

“Statement of Undisputed Facts” that shall enumerate discretely

each of the specific material facts relied upon in support of the

motion and cite the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit,

deposition, interrogatory answer, admission or other document

relied upon to establish that fact.

Because, as a threshold matter, plaintiff has not submitted a separate statement of undisputed

facts upon which he predicates his motion, the court finds that the motion is improperly filed and

must recommend denial without prejudice of plaintiff’s motion.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk of the Court is directed to modify plaintiff’s name in this case and

on future certificates of service to include plaintiff’s surname, “Oluwa,” so that plaintiff’s name

is recorded as being Ras Adisa Gamba Oluwa.

2. Plaintiff’s unserved January 3, 2005 reply to defendants’ December 21, 2004

opposition to plaintiff’s October 12, 2004 motion for summary judgment (which motion plaintiff

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

re-served on November 19, 2004) is stricken from the record.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ September 13, 2004 motion to dismiss be granted as to defendant

Alameida and he be dismissed from this action and that the motion be denied as to all other

grounds;

2. This action proceed only against defendant Woodford, in her official capacity,

for prospective injunctive relief only; and 

3. Plaintiff’s October 12, 2004 (apparently re-served on November 19, 2004), 

motion for summary judgment be denied without prejudice for plaintiff’s failure to file the

motion in compliance with Local Rule 56-260(a).

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 7/6/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

oluw0233.mtd

Case 2:04-cv-00233-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 07/07/05 Page 14 of 14