Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00472/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00472-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN SUTTON, GAIL SUTTON and

DANIELLE SUTTON,

Plaintiffs,

 v

KATHLEEN LLEWELLYN, Individually

and DBA HAWLEY AND LLEWELLYN,

LLC; ALBERT NICORA, Individually

and DBA NICORA AND MINOR, LLC;

JAVAID SHEIKH; LISA GALDOS,

Individually and in her official

capacity as Court Executive

Officer, 

Defendants. /

No C 06-0472 VRW

ORDER

Defendant Albert Nicora has moved for judgment on the

pleadings under FRCP 12(c). Doc #53. Also, plaintiffs have filed

six motions for leave of court to enforce subpoenas directed to (1)

Ann Sydes dba A&A Auction (Doc #54), (2) Ombudsman Alliance on

Aging (Doc #55), (3) Scarr Moving and Storage (Doc #59), (4) State

Farm Insurance Company (Doc #60), (5) Adult Protective Services

Department of Social Services (Doc #61) and (6) Monterey Transfer

and Storage (Doc #62). 

\\

Case 3:06-cv-00472-VRW Document 72 Filed 11/21/06 Page 1 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In addition, by the court’s order of October 10, 2006

(Doc #63), plaintiffs were given leave to amend their medical

malpractice and defamation claims against defendant Javaid Sheikh. 

Plaintiffs have notified the court that they do not intend to

amend. Doc #71. 

The court has reviewed memoranda from both sides on

Nicora’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and has considered

plaintiffs’ motions for leave of court to enforce subpoenas and

finds it appropriate for decision on the papers without oral

argument. For the reasons stated herein, Nicora’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED and plaintiffs motions for

leave to amend to enforce subpoenas are DENIED. 

I

The instant action is one of four cases filed in this

court arising from the conservatorship proceedings opened in 2003

in Monterey county concerning the late Letitia Breng Rose. See

also CAND No C-04-4176 (Rose v Hogan); CAND No C-05-4469 (Sutton v

Teets); CAND No C-06-6417 (Sutton v Sokotowski). Plaintiffs John,

Gail and Danielle Sutton are Rose’s son-in-law, daughter and

granddaughter respectively. Doc #1 ¶2. 

In January 2004, the Monterey county superior court

appointed Kathleen Llewellyn as counsel to Rose in her

conservatorship proceeding. Doc #1 ¶20. On April 30, 2004, the

superior court granted Llewellyn’s request to withdraw as counsel

and appointed Nicora as her replacement. Doc #1 ¶21. Nicora

remained Rose’s counsel until she passed away on October 16, 2005. 

Doc #67 at 2-3. 

Case 3:06-cv-00472-VRW Document 72 Filed 11/21/06 Page 2 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiffs claim that in a “devious [and] diabolical scam

to defraud Mrs Rose, the estate and [plaintiffs],” Nicora

bankrupted the estate and “cruelly kept [Rose] away from her own

home and family.” Doc #1 ¶¶2, 10, 65, 74, 78. 

Plaintiffs allege that as sole beneficiaries of Rose’s

estate, they suffered financial harm when Nicora sold Rose’s

furniture and other property and authorized the spending of

unnecessary amounts of money. Doc #1 ¶¶2, 28, 69-70, 75. For

example, plaintiffs allege that Nicora “let [Rose] pay out of

pocket $1,000 a month for dangerous drugs” when she “had a right to

an HMO medical plan that would have covered her drugs,” “allowed

[Rose] to pay huge fees to State Farm [Insurance Company] for

furniture that was worth $30,000 not $300,000,” and “forced [Rose]

to remain in an institution for $11,000 a month when she wanted

out.” Doc #1 ¶69-70, 75. 

In addition, plaintiffs allege they suffered emotional

harm when Nicora refused to allow them to associate freely with

Rose prior to her death. Doc #1 ¶¶27, 66. Specifically,

plaintiffs allege that Nicora demanded plaintiffs post a $100,000

bond before allowing Rose to visit them in New York and declined to

provide plaintiffs with airline tickets to visit her in California

(Doc #1 ¶¶ 25, 27, 65), and that Rose wanted to move to New York to

be with her family, but Nicora would not appoint plaintiffs as

conservators or allow her to move. Doc #1 ¶¶25, 27, 66. 

Following Rose’s death, plaintiffs, acting in propria

persona, brought this action on behalf of themselves and the estate

of Rose against Kathleen Llewellyn, individually and DBA Hawley and

Llewellyn, LLC; Albert Nicora, individually and DBA Nicora and

Case 3:06-cv-00472-VRW Document 72 Filed 11/21/06 Page 3 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Minor, LLC; Javaid Sheikh; and Lisa Galdos, individually and in her

official capacity as Court Executive Officer. Doc #1 ¶1-6. 

On August 11, 2006, the court granted Llewellyn and

Galdos’s separate motions to dismiss without leave to amend (Doc

#7, Doc #15), denied plaintiffs’ motion for entry of default

judgment against Sheikh and Nicora (Doc #18, Doc #25) and denied

plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief against Galdos. Doc #33. 

The court ruled, moreover, that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring

claims on behalf of Rose’s estate. Doc #42. 

On October 10, 2006, the court granted Sheikh’s motion to

dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against him. Doc #63. 

II

The court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs’

constitutional claim pursuant to 28 USC § 1331. And, since

plaintiffs’ tort claims arise out of the same conservatorship

proceedings as the federal claim, the court has subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC § 1367. Both federal common law

and California state law apply. 

III

The court turns first to Nicora’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings. 

A 

Despite plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary (Doc #56 at

5), Nicora’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is timely. Any

party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings

Case 3:06-cv-00472-VRW Document 72 Filed 11/21/06 Page 4 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial * * *.” 

FRCP 12(c). Pleadings are considered closed “when all required or

permitted pleadings [(as governed by FRCP 7(a))] have been served

and filed.” William W Schwarzer, A Wallace Tashima, and James M

Wagstaffe, California Practice Guide Federal Civil Procedure Before

Trial 9:323 (Rutter Group 2006). Nicora’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings was filed on September 14, 2006, (well after July 20,

2006, when the last required responsive pleading was filed) and a

trial date has not been set. Accordingly, Nicora’s motion is

timely. 

 “Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving

party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no

material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc v

Richard Feiner and Co, Inc, 896 F2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir 1990). For

the purposes of a Rule 12(c) motion, “all allegations of fact by

the party opposing the motion are accepted as true, and are

considered in the light most favorable to that party.” General

Conference Corporation of Seventh-Day Adventists v Seventh-Day

Advestist Congregational Church, 887 F2d 228, 230 (9th Cir 1989). 

B

Plaintiffs demand damages from Nicora for (1) breach of

fiduciary duty, (2) legal malpractice, (3) deprivation of due

process and fundamental rights, (4) defamation and (5) intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Doc #1 p 10-14, 17-18. 

Inexplicably, plaintiffs continue to assert they have

standing to sue on behalf of Rose’s estate. Doc #67 at 3. This

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United States District Court

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and another federal court have already adjudicated the issue and

found that plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims on behalf of

Rose or her estate. Doc #42 at 3-4. To the extent that

plaintiffs’ complaint seems to allege injury to plaintiffs

themselves, however, the court addresses each such claim in turn. 

1 

Plaintiffs’ purported claims for breach of fiduciary duty

and legal malpractice cannot survive because plaintiffs have not,

and, on the facts alleged, cannot establish that Nicora breached a

legal duty owed to them. 

Under California law, in order for a cause of action for

breach of fiduciary duty or legal malpractice to survive, plaintiff

must first allege defendant owed a legal duty to him. See

Slovensky v Friedman, 142 Cal App 4th 1518, 1528 (2006); Osornio v

Weingarten, 124 Cal App 4th 304, 319 (2004). Generally, an

attorney only owes a duty of care to his client. Osornio, 124 Cal

App 4th at 320, 330. A legal duty, however, may extend to a

nonclient when that person is the intended beneficiary of the

attorney’s work. Id. 

In determining whether a legal duty exists, the main

inquiry is “whether the principal purpose of the attorney's

retention [was] to provide legal services for the benefit of the

plaintiff.” Osornio, 124 Cal App 4th at 320, 330 (internal

quotations omitted). Try as they might to characterize them

otherwise, plaintiffs’ allegations arise entirely from Nicora’s 

performance of professional services as counsel for Rose in her

conservatorship proceeding. Nicora performed these legal services

to benefit Rose, not plaintiffs. 

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Plaintiffs claim, however, “[t]he minute that [Rose]

requested the right to live with her children, plaintiffs became

third party beneficiaries of the attorney client relationship to

provide legal services.” Doc #56 at 3. This argument, while

creative, is without support in case law. Most situations in which

an attorney’s liability is extended arise when the attorney has

prepared a will or trust for which the nonclient is the intended

beneficiary. See e g Osornio, 124 Cal App 4th 304; Garcia v

Borelli, 129 Cal App 3d 24 (1982); Bucquet v Livingston, 57 Cal App

3d 914 (1976). Finding a duty outside of the estate planning

context is rare. Osornio, 124 Cal App 4th at 326-327. 

Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to establish

that they were the intended beneficiaries of Nicora’s services. 

First, Rose’s will is not before the court and there is no trust at

issue. Moreover, Nicora was appointed counsel for Rose in her

conservatorship (Doc #1 ¶21), and “[t]he purpose of a

conservatorship is to enable a competent person to assist the

conservatee in the management of [her] property.” In re

Conservatorship of Estate of Hume, 139 Cal App 4th 393, 403 (2006)

(internal quotations omitted). Hence, the only intended

beneficiary of Nicora’s legal services was Rose. 

Because plaintiffs cannot establish the existence of a

legal duty owed by Nicora to them, the existence (or nonexistence)

of the other elements for a claim of professional negligence is

immaterial. Plaintiffs’ claims cannot survive as a matter of law.

2

Plaintiffs’ purported constitutional claim for

“deprivation of due process and fundamental rights” cannot survive

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as a matter of law because plaintiff did not, and, on the facts

alleged, cannot show Nicora was acting under color of state law. 

In a section 1983 civil action against a private party

for deprivation of constitutional rights, plaintiff must “show that

the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.” West v Atkins, 487 US 42, 48 (1988). If a

private party’s actions are fairly attributable to the government,

they can be subject to section 1983 liability. Kirtley v Rainey,

326 F3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir 2003). 

Plaintiffs allege that because Nicora was appointed by

the court, he acted under color of state law. Doc #1 ¶¶21, 88-94. 

A court-appointed guardian, however, is not necessarily a state

actor. See Kirtley v Rainey, 326 F3d at 1094 (state-appointed

guardian ad litem did not act under color of state law); Polk

County v Dodson, 454 US 312, 324 (1981) (public defender did not

act under color of state law when performing traditional functions

as counsel for defendant in a criminal proceeding). Here, the

Monterey county superior court appointed Nicora as private legal

counsel for Rose in her conservatorship (Doc #1 ¶21) in order to

assist in the management of her property. See Cal Prob Code §

1470(a); Estate of Hume, 139 Cal App 4th at 403. It cannot be said

that as a private attorney, Nicora’s actions are fairly

attributable to the state.

Accordingly, Nicora’s actions, no matter how offensive to

plaintiffs, were those of a private attorney — not of the state

itself — and are not subject to section 1983 liability.

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3 

Under a heading entitled “defamation,” plaintiffs claim

Nicora defamed them “to each attorney [they] attempted to hire to

do a conservatorship in NY.” Doc #1 ¶116. Defamation involves

“the intentional publication of a statement of fact that is false,

unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes

special damage.” Smith v Maldonado, 72 Cal App 4th 637, 645 (1999)

(citing Cal Civ Code §§ 45, 46). Plaintiffs allege that Nicora 

told others “he would not wish [p]laintiffs on his client.” Doc #1

¶116. This purported statement does not rise to the level of

defamation. It is at most an unflattering statement of opinion

that is not actionable as a matter of law.

4 

As with the other defendants, plaintiffs’ intentional

infliction of emotional distress allegations are grossly deficient

as a matter of law. See Orders of August 11 (Doc #42) and October

10 (Doc #63). Plaintiffs have not alleged — and cannot allege —

that Nicora directed his actions toward plaintiffs with the

intention of causing, or acted with reckless disregard of the

probability of causing, emotional distress. Id. 

IV

Because all of plaintiffs’ claims against each defendant

have now been dismissed, plaintiffs’ six motions to enforce

subpoenas (see supra at 1) are moot. Accordingly, plaintiffs’

motions to enforce subpoenas against Ann Sydes dba A&A Auction (Doc

#54), Ombudsman Alliance on Aging (Doc #55), Scarr Moving and

Storage (Doc #59), State Farm Insurance Company (Doc #60), Adult

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Protective Services Department of Social Services (Doc #61) and

Monterey Transfer and Storage (Doc #62) are DENIED. 

 V 

For the reasons stated above:

(1) plaintiffs’ medical malpractice and defamation claims

against Sheikh are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND;

(2) plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty, legal

malpractice, deprivation of due process and fundamental rights,

defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims

against Nicora are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; and

(3) plaintiffs’ motions to enforce subpoenas are DENIED. 

This order resolves all outstanding claims. The clerk is

directed to enter judgment for defendants and to close the file and

terminate all pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:06-cv-00472-VRW Document 72 Filed 11/21/06 Page 10 of 10