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Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

Nos. 15-1177/15-1428

___________________________

Evelyn Garrison, et al.

Appellants/Cross-Appellees

v.

ConAgra Foods Packaged Foods, LLC, d/b/a ConAgra Foods

Appellee/Cross-Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Arkansas

____________

Submitted: April 12, 2016

Filed: August 15, 2016

____________

Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges, and BOUGH,1 District Judge.

_____________

BOUGH, District Judge.

Evelyn Garrison and ten opt-in Plaintiffs brought this suit against ConAgra

Foods Packaged Foods, LLC, d/b/a ConAgra Foods, under the Arkansas Minimum 

Wage Act (“AMWA”), Ark. Code Ann. § 11-4-201, et seq., and the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, alleging misclassification as 

 1 The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

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exempt employees and unpaid overtime. Plaintiff Garrison and nine of the opt-in

Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s2 grant of summary judgment. One Plaintiff, 

Ruben Garcia, was dismissed prior to the grant of summary judgment. ConAgra

cross-appeals the district court’s denial of costs. We conclude that ConAgra is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both the federal and state law claims and 

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. A prevailing FLSA defendant 

is not precluded from recovering costs as a result of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

54(d) and the silence in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Therefore, we vacate the district court’s 

denial of ConAgra’s motion for costs. This case is remanded to the district court to 

consider whether ConAgra’s costs should be awarded pursuant to Rule 54(d) and 

whether costs should be assessed against Plaintiff Garrison and ten opt-in Plaintiffs 

jointly and severally.

I.

Evelyn Garrison brought this action against her former employer, ConAgra, 

seeking to recover unpaid overtime under the FLSA and the AMWA. Garrison 

asserted a collective action under the FLSA and a class action under the AMWA. 

The district court conditionally certified the collective action, and ten other 

employees – Elbie Cannon, Aidet Elias, Tracy Emery, Ruben Garcia, David B. 

George, Christopher Johnson, Kyle Moss, Tonia Orndorff, Lane A. Scott, and Chris 

A. Williams – opted in to the action. Plaintiff Garrison and the ten opt-in Plaintiffs

alleged ConAgra failed to properly compensate them for work performed as a result 

of ConAgra’s classification of them as exempt from the minimum wage and 

overtime provisions of the FLSA and the AMWA.

The parties concede that the first three prongs of the four-prong executive 

exemption were met. With respect to the fourth prong, the parties also concede 

Plaintiffs did not have authority to hire or fire employees. Thus, to qualify for an 

executive exemption, ConAgra must show, in accordance with the second clause of 

 2 The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of Arkansas.

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the fourth prong, that Plaintiffs’ “suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, 

firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other employees 

[were] given particular weight.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(4). The parties agree that 

the standards for executive exemption are the same under both the FLSA and the 

AMWA. See Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, 805 F. Supp. 2d 655, 663 n.8 (E.D. Ark. 

2011).

ConAgra sought summary judgment on its claim that Plaintiff Garrison and 

the nine opt-in Plaintiffs were employed in a bona fide executive capacity and not 

entitled to overtime compensation. The district court found Plaintiffs were each 

employed by ConAgra in a salaried position as a “Team Leader” and were tasked 

with monitoring the performance and behavior of the hourly employees, and 

identifying rules violations and poor work performance. The district court further 

found Plaintiffs had authority to reassign or recommend temporary reassignment of 

employees and to recommend discipline which, if agreed to by management, 

resulted in a change of status. The district court granted summary judgment in favor 

of ConAgra and found the executive exemption to the FLSA and the AMWA applied 

to Plaintiffs. 

ConAgra timely filed its motion for costs totaling $15,684.35 to be assessed 

against Plaintiff Garrison and all ten opt-in Plaintiffs jointly and severally. Plaintiffs 

argued the FLSA does not authorize an award of costs to a prevailing defendant, and

even if it did, the FLSA’s broad remedial purpose justified a district court’s exercise 

of discretion to deny an award of costs. The district court reasoned that due to the 

uncertainty within the federal district courts in Arkansas as to awards of costs to 

prevailing FLSA defendants, ConAgra’s motion for costs should be denied. The 

district court explained, “ConAgra has not cited any binding authority on the 

question of whether a prevailing defendant can recover costs under the FLSA and 

the parties’ joint proposed notice that was approved by the Court did not include 

language informing potential opt-in plaintiffs that they may be liable for costs should 

ConAgra prevail.” The district court concluded, “Given these circumstances, the 

Court will not assess costs against the plaintiffs.” Alternatively, the district court 

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held that if the Eighth Circuit determined ConAgra was entitled to an award of costs, 

the amount of $15,684.35 sought by ConAgra was necessarily incurred and should 

be assessed against Plaintiff Garrison and ten opt-in Plaintiffs jointly and severally.

II.

Plaintiff Garrison and nine of the opt-in Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment on appeal, arguing a genuine issue of material fact 

existed regarding the applicability of the fourth prong of the executive exemption to 

the FLSA and the AMWA. “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo.” Beauford v. ActionLink, LLC, 781 F.3d 396, 401 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing 

Copeland v. ABB, Inc., 521 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2008)). Summary judgment 

is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 

538 (1986). Although we view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable 

to Plaintiffs, the non-moving parties, they have the obligation to come forward with 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. 

at 586–87.

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1), the FLSA’s overtime pay requirements 

“shall not apply with respect to ... any employee employed in a bona fide executive, 

administrative, or professional capacity[.]” The Court “determine[s] whether an 

employee meets the executive exemption by applying Department of Labor 

regulations.” Madden v. Lumber One Home Ctr., Inc., 745 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir. 

2014) (citing Fife v. Bosley, 100 F.3d 87, 89 (8th Cir. 1996)). An executive 

employee is defined by the Department of Labor as follows:

(a) The term ‘employee employed in a bona fide executive capacity’ in section 

[2]13(a)(1) of the Act shall mean any employee:

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(1)Compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week 

(or $380 per week, if employed in American Samoa by employers other 

than the Federal Government), exclusive of board, lodging or other 

facilities;

(2)Whose primary duty is management of the enterprise in which the 

employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or 

subdivision thereof;

(3)Who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other 

employees; and

(4)Who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose 

suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, 

promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given 

particular weight.

29 C.F.R. § 541.100; see also Madden, 745 F.3d at 903. The parties do not dispute 

that the first three factors were satisfied. At issue in this case is whether Plaintiff 

Garrison and the nine opt-in Plaintiffs were employees “whose suggestions and

recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other 

change of status of other employees are given particular weight.” Id. 

The Department of Labor defines “particular weight”:

To determine whether an employee’s suggestions and recommendations are 

given “particular weight,” factors to be considered include, but are not limited 

to, whether it is part of the employee’s job duties to make such suggestions 

and recommendations; the frequency with which such suggestions and 

recommendations are made or requested; and the frequency with which the 

employee’s suggestions and recommendations are relied upon. Generally, an 

executive’s suggestions and recommendations must pertain to employees 

whom the executive customarily and regularly directs. It does not include an 

occasional suggestion with regard to the change in status of a co-worker. An 

employee’s suggestions and recommendations may still be deemed to have 

“particular weight” even if a higher level manager’s recommendation has 

more importance and even if the employee does not have authority to make 

the ultimate decision as to the employee’s change in status.

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29 C.F.R. § 541.105. In Madden, this Court found that “[a]fter looking at the 

different factors [other] courts used to find the fourth element satisfied, including 

the offering of personnel recommendations that were acted upon by managers, 

involvement in screening applicants for interviews, and participation in interviews, 

among others, it is apparent that many different employee duties and levels of 

involvement can work to satisfy this fourth element.” 745 F.3d at 904. 

Demonstrating that the purported executives’ input into personnel decisions were 

given particular weight can be established by showing “that the purported 

executives’ input had more influence than hourly employee’[s] input.” Id. at 906.

In this case, according to Plaintiff George’s deposition testimony, Plaintiffs’ 

recommendations regarding whether to discharge or retain a probationary employee 

were given particular weight because Plaintiffs were told to appraise performance 

and report good or poor performance from a probationary employee to a manager. 

The evidence showed that Plaintiffs Garrison and Moss recommended the discharge 

of probationary employee, Robert French, and French was not retained. Regarding 

promotions and demotions, Plaintiff Elias testified that Team Leaders would 

evaluate employees and give feedback as to whether they could do their job, and if 

not, they would be demoted to their former positions. Plaintiffs Cannon and Moss 

testified similarly. Specifically, as noted by the district court, Plaintiffs Elias, Moss, 

and Orndorff each disqualified employees that were subsequently demoted as a 

result. Plaintiff George testified that Team Leaders were able to fill temporary 

vacancies by moving someone from one classification to another and by managing 

the scheduling of hourly employees within their areas. Lastly, each Plaintiff testified 

that she/he recommended discipline, and management followed those 

recommendations. Each of the Plaintiffs testified that management followed the 

recommendations most, if not all, of the time. 

We conclude that the undisputed facts regarding Plaintiff Garrison’s and the 

nine opt-in Plaintiffs’ involvement “in at least one personnel decision,” if not more, 

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show that these employees were working in an executive capacity and are exempt 

from the FLSA overtime pay requirements. See Madden, 745 F.3d at 908. The Court 

agrees with the district court’s conclusion, based on the evidence presented and 

without consideration of contradictory declarations or affidavits,

3 that Plaintiffs

were employed in a bona fide executive capacity and are exempt from the FLSA and 

the AMWA overtime pay requirements. Plaintiffs failed to satisfy their obligation to 

create a genuine issue of material fact for a jury. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586–

87. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed.

III.

ConAgra challenges the district court’s order denying its motion for costs

pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. ConAgra asserts that the district 

court erred in its conclusion that costs are not available to prevailing FLSA 

defendants and in its denial of ConAgra’s motion for costs. “We review the district 

court’s decision [whether] to award costs for abuse of discretion.” Martin v. 

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 251 F.3d 691, 695 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Greaser v. Mo. 

Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 979, 985 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1056, 119 

S. Ct. 620, 142 L.Ed.2d 559 (1998)). “As this case presents an issue of statutory 

interpretation, our review is de novo.” In re Raynor, 617 F.3d 1065, 1069 (8th Cir. 

2010) (citing U.S. v. Templeton, 378 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2004)).

 3 The district court notes Plaintiffs provided declarations that were 

contradictory to earlier deposition testimony. Specifically, Plaintiff George’s 

declaration testimony regarding the ability to identify the need for employees to 

work overtime and to schedule hourly employees for an increase or decrease in 

hours, Plaintiff George’s testimony concerning which employee handled the 

scheduling for the sanitation department, and testimony from several other Plaintiffs 

regarding probationary employees were found to be contradictory evidence. The 

district court, citing Lykken v. Brady, held that “a party cannot defeat summary 

judgment by submitting an affidavit or declaration contradicting his or her earlier 

deposition testimony[.]” 622 F.3d 925, 933 (8th Cir. 2010). We agree with the 

district court’s conclusion and will not consider any testimony presented in an effort 

to contradict earlier testimony.

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We recently held in Lochridge v. Lindsey Mgmt. Co., Inc., that a prevailing 

FLSA defendant is not precluded from recovering costs under Rule 54(d) because § 

216(b) is silent on the issue of prevailing FLSA defendants. 14-3799, 2016 WL 

3094020, at *2 (8th Cir. June 2, 2016). We find the Lochridge holding applies

equally to this matter. “Because § 216(b) addresses only an award of costs to a 

prevailing plaintiff and neither § 216(b) nor any other provision of the FLSA 

precludes an award of costs to a prevailing defendant,” we conclude ConAgra is not 

precluded from collecting its costs incurred. Id.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is 

affirmed, and the district court’s order denying ConAgra’s motion for costs is 

vacated. This case is remanded to the district court for consideration of whether costs 

should be awarded under Rule 54(d)(1) against Plaintiff Garrison and the ten opt-in 

Plaintiffs jointly and severally.

______________________________

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