Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02873/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02873-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 20:1415 IDEA: Challenge decision re education for handicapped

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ESCONDIDO UNION SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SANGEETHA BUSSY 

CHANDRASEKAR and UPENDRA 

GOPIMATH KOTEN, on their own 

behalf and on behalf of minor student 

S.K., and S.K., a minor, 

Defendants. 

 Case No.: 18-cv-02873-JLB (NLS) 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

APPROVAL OF MINOR’S 

COMPROMISE 

[ECF No. 15] 

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM. 

 

Before the Court is a Motion for Approval of Minor’s Compromise filed by 

Defendants and Counter-Claimants Sangeetha Bussy Chandrasekar and Upendra Gopinath 

Koten (collectively, “Parents”), on their own behalf and on behalf of S.K., a minor 

(“Student” and collectively with Parents, “Defendants”). (ECF No. 15.) The Court held a 

hearing on the motion on August 20, 2019. (ECF No. 17.) Upon due consideration and 

for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion. 

/// 

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I. BACKGROUND 

 On December 23, 2018, Plaintiff Escondido Union School District (“Plaintiff” or 

“District”) commenced this action against Defendants pursuant to the Individuals with 

Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), appealing the final 

decision of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in an underlying state administrative 

proceeding. (ECF No. 1.) 

A. Complaint 

Plaintiff alleges the following in its Complaint: 

The Student and his family immigrated to the United States in 2009. (Id. at ¶ 9.) 

That same year, the Student was found eligible for special education under the IDEA by 

the Westwood Regional School District (“Westwood”) in New Jersey. (Id.) The Parents 

signed the Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) developed by Westwood. (Id.) In 

2014, Defendants moved to Pleasanton, California. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Although the Pleasanton 

Unified School District held an IEP meeting regarding the Student in 2014, the Parents did 

not consent to the IEP and began homeschooling the Student. (Id.) Defendants eventually 

moved to San Diego, California in 2015 and continued throughout this time to homeschool 

the Student. (Id.) 

On August 14, 2017, the Parents enrolled the Student in the District. (Id. at ¶ 11.) 

At that time, the Parents provided the District with a copy of the unsigned Pleasanton IEP 

but did not mention the Westwood IEP. (Id.) The Parents also did not mention that the 

Student had been receiving education services from Alternative Teaching Strategy Center 

(“ATSC”) in San Diego since March 23, 2016. (Id.) The District did not learn until 

February 2018 about the Student’s enrollment and attendance at ATSC. (Id.) 

 At the start of the 2017-2018 school year, the District generated a comprehensive 

assessment plan and presented it to the Parents for signature on August 17, 2017. (Id. at 

¶¶ 12-13.) Because the District did not have the Westwood IEP, District witnesses testified 

that they believed the Parents had revoked their consent to special education and related 

services in September 2014. (Id. at ¶ 14.) During an October 16, 2017 IEP team meeting, 

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the Student’s mother affirmed that she had revoked services in September 2014. (Id.) 

Based on the information provided by the Student’s mother, and because it only had the 

unsigned IEP from Pleasanton, the District offered an interim placement to the Student in 

a general education classroom with a 1:1 aide and a safety plan. (Id. at ¶ 15.) 

 On August 28, 2017, the Parents sent the District a unilateral placement letter written 

by their attorney stating that although they had enrolled the Student in the District they 

were unilaterally placing him, because a general education placement would not be 

appropriate for the Student and the District could not provide the Student with a free 

appropriate public education (“FAPE”). (Id. at ¶ 16.) The Parents further stated that they 

remained interested in District services and asked the District to generate an assessment 

plan. (Id.) 

 The District sent the Parents a letter on September 8, 2017, indicating its willingness 

to discuss a diagnostic placement in a special education program wherein the Student could 

be assessed, pending completion of the assessments. (Id. at ¶ 17.) The District also 

reiterated the behavior and safety plan offered through the interim placement. (Id.) The 

Parents did not respond to this correspondence or inquire about its content at subsequent 

encounters with District personnel. (Id.) 

 In September and October of 2017, the District comprehensively assessed the 

Student in the following areas: academic, cognitive, speech and language, fine motor, 

sensory, gross motor, adaptive skills, and augmentative and alternative communication. 

(Id. at ¶ 18.) The District also conducted a special circumstances instructional assistance 

(“SCIA”) assessment and a functional behavioral assessment (“FBA”). (Id.) Despite being 

asked several times by the District, the Parents did not disclose that the Student was 

receiving behavioral or academic support services from any non-public agency (“NPA”), 

including ATSC. (Id. at ¶ 19.) The Parents also did not disclose that the Student was 

purportedly able to communicate by typing or that English was not his primary language. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 20-22.) 

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 On October 16, 2017, the IEP team reviewed the results of the assessment and agreed 

that the Student was eligible under the category of Autism. (Id. at ¶ 22.) The Student’s 

mother attended the IEP meeting and had an opportunity to ask questions and provide input. 

(Id.) She did not state that she disagreed with the assessments. (Id.) The IEP team’s offer 

of FAPE included placement in a separate class program designed for students with 

moderate-to-severe disabilities at the Student’s school of residence, with the following 

services: specialized academic instruction for 393 minutes daily in a group setting; 

occupational therapy consultation in the amount of ten, 30-minute sessions annually in a 

group setting; APE for 200 minutes weekly in a group setting; psychological services for 

20 minutes weekly in an individual setting; and speech and language services in the amount 

of 50, 20-minute sessions in an individual or group setting. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Student was 

offered extended school year services. (Id.) Student was also offered numerous 

supplementary aids and accommodations including 1:1 aide assistance throughout the day, 

with 2:1 aide assistance during transitions and activities outside the classroom and as 

necessary to prevent elopement and a behavior intervention plan. (Id.) 

 In a letter to the District dated November 10, 2017, the Parents stated that they had 

concluded that the proposed placement could not provide the Student with a FAPE. (Id. at 

¶ 24.) The Parents further described their intent to unilaterally place the Student in an 

appropriate school. (Id.) The letter further stated the Parents’ intent to seek reimbursement 

from the District for placement in a non-public school (“NPS”). (Id.) 

 The District responded by letter on December 15, 2017 and denied the Parents’ 

request to fund the Student’s placement at an NPS, opining that such a placement would 

be too restrictive for the Student. (Id. at ¶ 25.) The District also indicated its intent to file 

for due process. (Id.) The Student’s mother responded by e-mail on January 9, 2018 and 

stated her disagreement with all parts of the IEP, except for the Student’s eligibility and 

APE services. (Id. at ¶ 26.) The e-mail included a signed and dated signature page to the 

October 16, 2017 IEP, which was signed and dated January 8, 2018, indicating the same 

partial consent. (Id.) 

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On January 22, 2018, the District received a written request from the Student’s 

mother for Independent Educational Evaluations (“IEE”) in academic achievement and 

speech and language, including assessments of receptive, expressive, and pragmatic 

language. (Id. at ¶ 27.) The District responded by letter on January 31, 2018 explaining 

that the District planned to file for due process to defend its assessments. (Id. at ¶ 28.) 

Throughout the assessment and IEP progress, the Student’s mother continued to 

homeschool the Student, with additional services from ATSC, which is an NPA. (Id. at ¶ 

29.) ATSC is not certified through the California Department of Education to provide 

specialized academic instruction (“SAI”) by a credentialed special education teacher. (Id.) 

In November 2017, the Student’s mother enrolled the Student in a different homeschool 

program linked to ATSC. (Id.) 

Throughout the assessment and IEP progress, the Parents continually and 

deliberately misled the District as to the Student’s abilities, needs, and current placement. 

(Id. at ¶ 30.) By knowingly withholding this information from the District’s evaluators, 

they hindered the assessment process and caused the assessments to be subject to challenge. 

(Id.) By knowingly withholding this information from the other IEP team members, they 

undermined the IEP process and the team’s ability to offer the Student a FAPE in the least 

restrictive environment (“LRE”). (Id.) The Parents also continually and deliberately 

misled the District as to their sincere intent to receive a FAPE from the District, when their 

ulterior motive was to entrap the District into to reimbursing them for wholly inappropriate 

programs operated directly and indirectly by ATSC. (Id. at ¶ 31.) 

On February 5, 2018, the District filed a due process complaint with the Office of 

Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) seeking an order that the District had appropriately 

assessed the Student in speech and academics and was therefore not obligated to fund a 

speech or academic IEE. (Id. at ¶ 32.) The District sought a further order that it could 

implement the Student’s entire October 16, 2017 IEP, despite the lack of full consent from 

the Parents, because the IEP offered a FAPE in the LRE. (Id.) On April 30, 2018, the 

Student filed a due process complaint alleging the District denied him a FAPE during the 

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2017-2018 school year and failed to properly assess him. (Id. at ¶ 33.) These two matters 

were consolidated by OAH on May 4, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 34.) On June 5, 2018, the District 

dismissed its complaint, without prejudice, because the Student was no longer a resident 

of the District. (Id. at ¶ 35) The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing over six 

days in August 2018. (Id. at ¶ 37.) 

 During the hearing, the Student, through his mother, claimed that the District’s 

assessments in the areas of academics, speech, language, and communication were 

inappropriate because, inter alia, the District did not assess the Student’s needs using 

typing and he was not assessed in his primary language, Saurashtra. (Id. at ¶¶ 38, 42.) The 

testimony unequivocally established that, even if the Student was able to communicate by 

typing, the District was not, and could not, reasonably have been on notice of any such 

ability at the time he was assessed. (Id. at ¶ 41.) The testimony also directly contradicted 

the enrollment paperwork completed by the Student’s mother stating that English was the 

primary language spoken, and the Parents’ representations to the District that English was 

the Student’s primary language. (Id. at ¶ 42.) There was also no indication during the 

assessments that the Student did not communicate in or understand English. (Id.) 

 The Student’s mother also testified that the Student was performing academically 

higher at ATSC than what the District’s assessment reports indicated, but the Student’s 

mother had never disclosed how the Student was performing at ATSC or provided the name 

of the NPS so that the District’s assessors could observe him in that setting. (Id. at ¶ 43.) 

During the hearing, none of the Student’s witnesses could testify that during the fall of 

2017, the Student was higher performing academically or physically than what the 

District’s assessors found. (Id.) 

 The ALJ issued her final decision on November 29, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 45, 48.) The 

ALJ held that Defendants had prevailed on several of the issues and awarded the remedy 

of reimbursement of the Student’s fees and enrollment at ATSC for the period of August 

16, 2017 through June 5, 2018, plus transportation in the amount of $3,018.40. (Id. at ¶¶ 

47, 48.) The ALJ further ordered reimbursement for independent evaluations in an amount 

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to be established through evidence, provided to the District by the Parents, within 60 days, 

not to exceed $1,500.00, and submitted before June 30, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 47.) The District 

remitted full reimbursement to the Parents. (Id. at ¶ 49.) 

 The District thereafter filed the present action appealing the decision of the ALJ. In 

the appeal, the District claims the following: 

Ultimately, the ALJ erred in first determining that the District had to make a 

FAPE available to the Student given that he was already placed by his Parents 

at ATSC. Next, she incorrectly found the District did not offer the Student a 

FAPE, despite the overwhelming evidence that Parents withheld critical 

information and misled the District in every instance during the assessment 

and IEP process, and relied on testimony from witnesses she often determined 

to not be credible. This error was compounded by the fact that the ALJ 

awarded reimbursement for a program that was wholly inappropriate because 

it was not certified to [] provide the services it allegedly provided to S.K., not 

to mention there was no proof the Student receive any benefit from ATSC. 

(Id. at ¶ 55.) Therefore, the District in its Complaint requested that the Court, after 

conducting a de novo review, reverse those portions of the decision that were found against 

the District. (Id. at ¶ 56.) 

 B. Counterclaim 

 On January 22, 2019, Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim against the 

District. (ECF No. 5.) Defendants brought the Counterclaim pursuant to the IDEA for the 

payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by the parents of a child with disabilities 

who are the prevailing party in an administrative due process hearing. (Id. at ¶ 1.) 

Specifically, Defendants rely on 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I), which provides as follows: 

“In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may 

award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party who is the parent 

of a child with a disability.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) Defendants claim that attorneys’ fees and expenses 

rendered in anticipation of a due process hearing fall within this authorization. (Id.) 

/// 

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 The following allegations are taken from Defendants’ Counterclaim: 

 Defendants raised the following issues in their due process complaint filed with the 

OAH: 

1. Whether the Escondido Union School District (“District”) denied

[S.K.] (“Student”) a free, appropriate, public, education (“FAPE”) for 

the 2017-2018 school year, from 8/16/17 through 10/15/17 by failing 

to have an IEP in effect for [Student] at the beginning of the school 

year. Cal. Educ. Code § 56344(b) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.342. 

2. Whether the District denied Student a FAPE for the 2017-2018 school 

year by failing to appropriately assess [Student] in all areas of suspected 

disability. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56381 and 56320(f).) Specifically, the 

District failed to appropriately assess [Student] in the areas of 

Academics and Speech, Language, and Communication. 

3. Whether the District denied Student a FAPE for the 2017-2018 school 

year and ESY by failing to develop accurate present levels of academic 

achievement and functional performance in the areas of Academics and 

Adapted Physical Education in [Student’s] IEP of 10/16/17. Cal. Educ. 

Code § 56345(a)(1). 

4. Whether the District denied Student a FAPE for the 2017-2018 school 

year and ESY by failing to make a specific, written offer of FAPE at 

the IEP team meeting of 10/16/17. Union School Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 

1519 (1994). 

5. Whether the District denied Student a FAPE for the 2017-2018 school 

year and ESY by failing to accurately identify his assistive technology 

needs and offer appropriate assistive technology supports in the IEP of 

10/16/17. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56020.5 and 56341.1(b)(5); M.C. v.

Antelope Valley Union High School Dist., 858 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 

2017). 

(Id. at ¶ 43.) 

 As remedies, Defendants sought a finding that the District had denied the Student a 

FAPE for the 2017-2018 school year; funding for IEEs in the areas of academics and 

speech and language; reimbursement for educational services from a California Certified 

NPA for the time period at issue; and related transportation reimbursement. (Id. at ¶ 44.) 

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 The ALJ held that Defendants prevailed fully on all issues, except for Issue 5, which 

was deemed moot. (Id. at ¶ 47.) The ALJ ordered the District to reimburse Defendants in 

the amount of $22,000.00 for educational services from a California-certified NPA ATSC, 

as well as $3,018.40 in reimbursement for transportation, and $1,500.00 for IEEs in the 

areas of academics and speech and language. (Id. at ¶ 48.) 

 As the prevailing party in the OAH case, Defendants claim they are entitled to their 

attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at ¶ 51.) Defendants incurred $125,530.00 in fees and costs. 

(Id.) On January 2, 2019, Defendants’ counsel provided the District’s counsel with a 

detailed invoice requesting payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees related to the OAH case. 

(Id. at ¶ 52.) The District did not respond and did not pay Defendants’ reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id.) 

 C. Settlement Conference 

 On January 23, 2019, the Court set an Early Neutral Evaluation Conference (“ENE”) 

before this Court. (ECF No. 6.) On February 11, 2019, the parties consented to have a 

United States magistrate judge conduct all proceedings in this case including trial, the entry 

of final judgment, and all post-trial proceedings. (ECF No. 7.) Accordingly, this case was 

referred to the Honorable Nita L. Stormes to conduct the ENE. (ECF Nos. 10, 12.) The 

ENE took place on April 8, 2019. (ECF No. 13.) The parties did not settle at that time, 

but Judge Stormes made a settlement recommendation and the parties were instructed to 

contact Judge Stormes’ Chambers by 5:00 p.m. on April 15, 2019 to advise whether they 

would accept the recommendation. (Id.) On April 15, 2019, the parties advised the Court 

that the parties had agreed to the Court’s recommendation. (ECF Nos. 14; 15-1 at 2.) 

 D. State Court Action 

 On March 5, 2019, the District filed a complaint for damages, fraud, and negligent 

misrepresentation against Defendants in the Superior Court of the State of California, 

County of San Diego, Case No. 37-2019-00012253-CU-FR-NC (“Fraud Complaint”). 

(ECF Nos. 15 at 4-5; 15-1 at 2.) The District served Defendants via a process server when 

they appeared at the April 8, 2019 ENE. (ECF Nos. 15 at 4-5.) 

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E. Settlement Agreement 

 On May 15, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion for Approval of Minor’s Compromise. 

(ECF No. 15.) The parties attached a copy of their Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”). 

(ECF No. 15-1.) In the Agreement, the District agreed to pay Defendants $50,000 “in full 

satisfaction of all disputes arising out of the OAH Case No. 2018041322 (Due Process 

Case), U.S. District Court case 3:18-cv-02873-[JLB-JLS] (Federal and Counter Federal 

Complaints) and Superior Court of the State of California Court case 37-2019-00012253-

CU-FR-NC (Fraud Action).” (Id. at 3.) The District agreed to make full payment via check 

made payable to “The Law Offices of Cara Lucier” within 60 calendar days of the effective 

date of the Agreement, and upon receipt by the District of a completed W-9 form from 

Defendants’ counsel. (Id.) If Defendants’ counsel is not timely paid, the Agreement 

becomes void. (Id.) 

 Pursuant to the Agreement, Defendants agreed “not to pursue a civil or any other 

type of action to recover the balance of their attorneys’ fees and costs relating to the Due 

Process Case, Federal Complaint, Counter Federal Complaint and Fraud Complaint, and 

any other fees and costs incurred subsequently thereto, including but not limited to 

communications to collect said fees and costs, seeking an order of judgment pursuant to 

Local Rule 17.1, and negotiating this Agreement.” (Id. at 3-4.) The parties also agreed to 

a general release of all past, present, and future claims against each other arising out of the 

Due Process Case, Federal Complaint, Counter Federal Complaint, and Fraud Complaint, 

and to a waiver of California Civil Code Section 1542. (Id. at 4-5.) 

 The effective date of the Agreement is the date that the Agreement, as signed by all 

parties, is approved by the District’s Board of Education and is approved by the Court per 

Local Civil Rule 17.1, whichever occurs later. (Id. at 8.) The Board was to consider the 

Agreement at its May 9, 2019 regular Board meeting, in closed session. (Id.)

1

 The parties 

                                               

1

 According to the motion, the Board approved the Agreement on May 9, 2019. 

(ECF No. 15 at 5.) 

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are responsible for their own legal fees and costs, except as otherwise provided for in the 

Agreement. (ECF No. 15-1 at 7.) 

 The parties represent in the Agreement that the District has met all its obligations 

under the ALJ’s decision and order with respect to reimbursement to the Parents for ATSC 

tuition and related transportation costs. (Id. at 2.)2

 Pursuant to the Agreement, the District 

may submit a copy of the Agreement to the California Department of Education in support 

of why it is not obligated to fund these IEEs. (ECF No. 15-1 at 4.) 

 In the Agreement, the District agreed to dismiss without prejudice the Fraud 

Complaint within one business day of receipt of the Parents’ initials and signatures, as well 

as their attorneys’ signatures, to this Agreement. (Id. at 4.) In consideration of this, the 

Parents agreed not to withdraw their consent to the Agreement before the Board. (Id.) The 

parties further agreed that the Student was to file the present motion within seven days after 

the Board approved or ratified the Agreement. (Id.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

This District’s Local Civil Rule 17.1 addresses settlements for minors and provides 

in pertinent part: 

Order of Judgment Required. No action by or on behalf of a minor or 

incompetent, or in which a minor or incompetent has an interest, will be 

settled, compromised, voluntarily discontinued, dismissed or terminated 

without court order or judgment. All settlements and compromises must be 

reviewed by a magistrate judge before any order of approval will issue. The 

parties may, with district judge approval[,] consent to magistrate judge 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for entry of an order approving the entire 

settlement or compromise. 

CivLR 17.1(a). 

                                               

2

 As of the date of the Agreement, the Parents had not submitted the paperwork 

necessary to entitle the Student to reimbursement for IEEs in the areas of academics and 

speech and language. (Id.) The parties updated the Court at the hearing on the present 

motion and clarified that the District has not approved reimbursement for IEEs in these 

areas and Defendants are no longer seeking that reimbursement. (See ECF No. 17.) 

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“District courts have a special duty, derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

17(c), to safeguard the interests of litigants who are minors.” Robidoux v. Rosengren, 638 

F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011). Rule 17(c) provides that a district court “must appoint a 

guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent 

person who is unrepresented in an action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c). “In the context of 

proposed settlements in suits involving minor plaintiffs, this special duty requires a district 

court to ‘conduct its own inquiry to determine whether the settlement serves the best 

interests of the minor.’” Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 1181 (quoting Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 

F.2d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also Salmeron v. United States, 724 F.2d 1357, 1363 

(9th Cir. 1983) (“[A] court must independently investigate and evaluate any compromise 

or settlement of a minor’s claims to assure itself that the minor’s interests are protected, 

even if the settlement has been recommended or negotiated by the minor’s parent or 

guardian ad litem.” (internal citation omitted)). 

 The Ninth Circuit in Robidoux established that district courts reviewing the 

settlement of a minor’s federal claim should “limit the scope of their review to the question 

whether the net amount distributed to each minor plaintiff in the settlement is fair and 

reasonable, in light of the facts of the case, the minor’s specific claim, and recovery in 

similar cases.” 638 F.3d at 1181-82. They should also “evaluate the fairness of each minor 

plaintiff’s net recovery without regard to the proportion of the total settlement value 

designated for adult co-plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ counsel—whose interests the district court 

has no special duty to safeguard.” Id. at 1182 (citing Dacanay, 573 F.2d at 1078). “So 

long as the net recovery to each minor plaintiff is fair and reasonable in light of their claims 

and average recovery in similar cases, the district court should approve the settlement as 

proposed by the parties.” Id. 

III. DISCUSSION 

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the settlement at issue is not a typical one 

as the Student is not directly receiving a net recovery from the settlement. Nevertheless, 

after reviewing the motion and Agreement, the Court finds that the agreed upon $50,000 

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settlement is fair and reasonable considering the facts of this case and serves in the best 

interest of the Student. Defendants incurred $125,530.000 in attorneys’ fees and costs in 

litigating the OAH case. (See ECF Nos. 5 at ¶ 51; 15 at 4.) Defendants claim the fees and 

costs incurred were “reasonable and necessary to prepare and present multiple claims 

during the 6-day trial and prevail at the administrative hearing level.” (ECF No. 15 at 4.) 

The judgment in the underlying OAH case provided for Defendants to be reimbursed 

in the amount of $22,000 for educational services from ATSC, as well as in the amount of 

$3,018.40 for transportation, and $1,500 for IEEs in the areas of academics and speech and 

language. (Id.) Defendants state that they have received the reimbursement funds from 

the District. (Id. at 5.) As the Agreement resolves the District’s appeal of the OAH 

judgment, Defendants will keep any funds they have already been reimbursed. 

Defendants’ Counterclaim sought only recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs, and not 

damages or injunctive relief. Therefore, the $50,000 settlement is to go directly to 

Defendants’ attorneys to pay the attorneys’ fees incurred in litigating the OAH matter. 

As such, the Student will not directly receive any of the money. The entire amount 

of the settlement will be applied towards the attorneys’ fees his family incurred in pursuing 

his rights. (ECF Nos. 15 at 6; 15-1 at 3.) The District has agreed to issue a check made 

payable to “The Law Offices of Cara Lucier.” (ECF No. 15-1 at 3.) The Lucier Law Group 

(formerly The Law Offices of Cara Lucier) has represented Defendants for the entirety of 

the litigation. (ECF No. 15 at 6.) The funds will be paid to a Client Trust Account 

maintained by the Lucier Law Group and then distributed to the Lucier Law Group. (Id.) 

In addition to the $50,000 settlement and $5,500 previously paid by Defendants in fees, 

Defendants will thereafter pay a “small portion of the remaining balance” owed to their 

attorneys. (Id.) Counsel has agreed to “courtesy” discount the remaining balance of the 

legal fees. (Id.) This method of disbursement of the $50,000 appears fair and reasonable 

and is within the bounds of applicable law and this District’s Local Civil Rules. See CivLR 

17.1(b)(1) (citing Cal. Prob. Code § 3600, et seq.). 

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The Court has considered whether Defendants would have ultimately recovered the 

full amount of fees and costs incurred in the OAH case, as well as any reasonable attorneys’ 

fees and costs incurred as the prevailing parties in this case. If this case had continued, 

there is no certainty that Defendants would have been the prevailing parties. If Defendants 

had not prevailed, they would not have recovered any of their attorneys’ fees; their award 

in the underlying case was also in jeopardy. Moreover, this Agreement settles a related 

action in state court the defense of which would have required Defendants to expend 

additional funds. The outcome of that action was also uncertain. In addition, as 

Defendants’ attorneys have agreed to discount their attorneys’ fees and costs, Defendants 

are no longer obligated to pay the full amount that they had sought in this matter. 

Lastly, the Court is required to consider the outcome of similar cases to determine 

whether the settlement on behalf of the Student is reasonable. Defendants’ motion does 

not identify any cases involving similar facts to those here. However, the Court has 

conducted its own review of the applicable case law and finds cases involving an award of 

attorney’s fees out of settlement proceeds to be instructive. For example, in A.S. v. 

Harrison Twp. Bd. of Educ. & E. Greenwich Sch. Dist., No. CV 14-147 (NLH/KMW), 

2017 WL 1362025 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2017), the district court reviewed an unopposed motion 

for approval of the parties’ settlement in an IDEA case. In doing so, the court stated that 

it “must carefully consider” whether the minor’s attorney’s fees are fair and reasonable 

“[s]ince . . . the settlement at issue is structured in such a way that every dollar [the minor’s 

attorney] recovers in fees is one less dollar that will be deposited into a trust account for 

[the minor].” Id. at *2; see also J.N. v. Penn-Delco Sch. Dist., No. CV 14-1618, 2017 WL 

395481, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2017) (quoting Sosenke v. Norwood, No. 91-2623, 1993 

WL 512824, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1993)) (“Especially where the attorneys’ fees affect 

the amount ultimately awarded to the minor, ‘[i]t is incumbent upon counsel to persuade 

the court that the attorneys’ fees and costs requested are reasonable and equitable.’”). Here, 

as discussed above, the attorneys’ fees being awarded are not reducing the amount that the 

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Student would otherwise receive. Accordingly, the Court finds the settlement to be fair 

and reasonable and in the best interest of the Student. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Approval of 

Minor’s Compromise. The parties shall implement the settlement in accordance with the 

terms of the Agreement (ECF No. 15-1), including the filing of a Joint Motion for 

Dismissal of this action within five (5) court days after the date of this Order (id. at 4). See 

CivLR 7.2. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 21, 2019 

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