Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00528/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00528-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 In his traverse, Petitioner contends that pursuant to his plea of guilty he was only convicted of one count 1

of kidnap for robbery. (Traverse, at 1.) Petitioner’s contention is without merit, as the abstract of judgment reflects

that Petitioner was convicted of the nine counts outlined above, with the sentences on Counts Two through Nine to

run concurrently with Count One. (Exhibit A, Judgment, attached to Answer.) 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS WRAY,

Petitioner,

v.

KEN CLARKE, WARDEN, et.al.,

Respondents.

 /

CV F 06-00528 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND

Petitioner is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, following a 1980 conviction in the Los Angeles County Superior Court for two

counts of kidnap for robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 209), three counts of robbery (Cal. Penal Code §

211), two counts of rape (Cal. Penal Code § 261(2)(3)), and two counts of oral copulation (Cal.

Penal Code § 288(a)(c).) (Exhibit A, Judgment, Los Angeles County, attached to Answer.) 1

Petitioner was sentenced to a term of life with the possibility of parole. (Id.) The life term was

ordered to be served consecutively to a sentence received out of Santa Cruz County, with the

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28 This statement of facts is derived from the Probation Officer’s Reports, attached as Exhibits C and E to 2

Answer.

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Santa Cruz sentence to be served first. (Id.) Petitioner’s life term began on May 7, 1990. 

(Exhibit B, CDC 112 Chronological History, entry date April 28, 1997, attached to Answer.) 

In the instant federal petition, Petitioner does not challenge the underlying conviction,

rather, he contends that the Board of Parole Hearings’ (BPH) decision finding him unsuitable for

parole at his October 9, 2003, hearing was not supported by the evidence.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles County Superior

Court challenging the BPH’s decision. The petition was denied because Petitioner failed to meet

his burden proving the factual allegations that served as the basis for his request for relief. 

(Exhibit G, attached to Answer.) 

Petitioner next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal,

Second Appellate District. The petition was denied on April 13, 2005. (Exhibit H, attached to

Answer.)

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. The

petition was denied on February 1, 2006. (Exhibit I, attached to Answer.)

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 20, 2006. 

Respondent filed an answer to petition on October 23, 2006, and Petitioner filed a traverse on

November 13, 2006. (Court Docs. 12, 13.) 

BACKGROUND OF FACTS2

On July 14, 1979, Petitioner went to the Sunshine Car Company pretending to be

interested in purchasing a car. Petitioner went for a test drive with a sixty-three year old Dick

Crabtree. During the test drive, Petitioner pulled out a .38 caliber revolver and demanded the

victim’s money and wallet. The victim gave Petitioner $230.00. As Petitioner took the money,

he shot the victim causing injury to both of his wrists. Petitioner fled in the car that he was test

driving. 

Then on July 17, 1979, driving the car that he had stolen just a few days prior, Petitioner

approached a fourteen-year-old girl, who was sitting on a corner street waiting for a bus, pointed

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a gun at her and demanded that she get into the car or he would kill her. As Petitioner drove to a

restricted fire road, he ordered her to get undressed and to put her clothes in the back seat. He

then forced her to orally copulate him and then to have intercourse with him. Petitioner then

ordered the girl to put on her shoes and get out of the car. As she did so, the girl grabbed her

underclothes and attempted to get her purse and dress. However, Petitioner pulled the dress

away from her and sped off. The girl put on her underclothes and was later picked up by

someone who took her to the police. 

On that same day, Petitioner kidnaped another young girl at gunpoint and raped her. This

victim, a nineteen-year-old, was walking when Petitioner pulled up next to her and used a gun to

force her into the car. Petitioner then ordered her to take off her clothes and put on one of his

shirts. Petitioner forced the victim to orally copulate him, then he took off all his clothes and had

intercourse with her. Petitioner also forced her to take off all her jewelry and give it to him. 

Petitioner forced her out of the car naked.

Petitioner’s prior 1979 conviction out of Santa Cruz County was for kidnaping (Cal.

Penal Code § 207), rape (Cal. Penal Code § 261(2)(3)), and oral copulation (Cal. Penal Code §

288a(c)). He was sentenced to a term of fourteen years and four months, which were to be

served before the life term began. (Exhibit D, Abstract of Judgment, Santa Cruz County,

attached to Answer.) The circumstances giving rise to this conviction were a similar

continuation of the crime spree that began in Los Angeles County.

On August 21, 1979, Petitioner kidnaped and repeatedly raped another victim. Petitioner

picked up victim and her boyfriend as they were hitchhiking to Santa Cruz. When they arrived to

Santa Cruz, the victim’s boyfriend got out of the car. Petitioner pointed a gun at him and hold

him to “get the hell out of here punk.” Petitioner then drove the victim to a secluded area where

he forced her to remove her clothing and have intercourse with him. Petitioner then forced her to

orally copulate him and again to have intercourse.

On August 22, 1979, Petitioner picked up another girl while she was waiting for a bus. 

Petitioner offered to give her a ride which she accepted. Petitioner then pulled out a gun and

ordered her to take off her clothes and put them in the back seat. The girl argued with Petitioner

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 Petitioner was first convicted and sentenced in Santa Cruz County and then transported back to Los 3

Angeles County where he had a hold based on the crimes occurring in July. Petitioner was sentenced to the life term

in Los Angeles County. 

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and pushed the gun away. When Petitioner momentarily looked away, the girl reached over and

put the car in park. She was able to grab the gun from Petitioner’s hand and throw it out the

window. After the car came to a stop, the girl jumped out and ran onto the highway yelling for

help. Several cars stopped to assist her. Petitioner was taken into custody on August 22, 1979.3

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 th th

Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its

provisions.

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a state

court judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state court conviction,

28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because he meets the

threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Sass v. California

Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9 Cir.2006), citing White v. Lambert, 370 th

F.3d 1002, 1006 (9 Cir.2004) (“Section 2254 ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a th

state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petition is not

challenging his underlying state court conviction.’”).

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless

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the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this

Court must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as

of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other

words, 'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

72, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 72. “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409. 

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 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the

states, Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a

state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9

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Cir.2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003).

II. Review of Claims

A parole release determination is not subject to all of the due process protections of an

adversary proceeding. Pedro v. Oregon Parole Board, 825 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (9 Cir. 1987); see th

also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979)

(explaining that due process is flexible and calls for procedural protections that particular

situations demand). "[S]ince the setting of a minimum term is not part of a criminal prosecution,

the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding is not constitutionally mandated,

even when a protected liberty interest exists." Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir.1987). At a state parole board proceeding, the only process

to which an inmate is entitled is: 1) the inmate must receive advance written notice of a hearing,

Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399; 2) the inmate must be afforded an "opportunity to be heard,"

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16; and 3) if the inmate is denied parole, the inmate must be told why

"he falls short of qualifying for parole.” Id.

“In Superintendent, Mass. Correc. Inst. v. Hill, the Supreme Court further held that

‘revocation of good time does not comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due

process,’ unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in

the record.’ 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).”

Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9 Cir.2006) (emphasis added). th

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Although Hill involved the accumulation of good time credits, the same standard applies to

parole, as both situations “directly affect the duration of the prison term.” Id., citing Jancsek v.

Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d at 1390; McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 904 (9th

Cir.2002), citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 456; Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th

Cir.1994), citing Perveler v. Estelle, 974 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir.1992). “The ‘some evidence’

standard is minimally stringent,” and a decision will be upheld if there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion reached by the factfinder. Powell, 33 F.3d at 40, citing

Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1987); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1105

(9th Cir.1986). However, "the evidence underlying the board's decision must have some indicia

of reliability." Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390; see also Perveler, 974 F.2d at 1134. In determining

whether the “some evidence” standard is met, the Court need not examine the entire record,

independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or re-weigh the evidence. Sass, 461 F.3d at

1128, Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1105.. 

With regard to the procedural protections outlined in Greenholtz, as Respondent submits,

Petitioner was provided all that is required. Petitioner was provided with advance notice of the

hearing, an opportunity to submit materials for the Board’s consideration, an opportunity to be

heard during the hearing, representation by his attorney, and a written decision explaining the

reasons that parole was denied. Petitioner, however, contends the Board’s decision was not

supported by the evidence and the BPH’s “gravity” regulations are unconstitutionally vague.

In denying Petitioner parole at the October 9, 2003, hearing, the BPH relied on several

factors including Petitioner’s commitment offense, his unstable social history, his history of prior

criminality, his lack of self-help therapy and programming, his inadequate parole plans, and the

district attorney’s opposition to parole, in denying parole. (Exhibit F, at 52-59, attached to

Answer.) The state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

The first factor the BPH relied on was the commitment offenses were carried out in a

dispassionate and calculated manner, there were multiple victims, and the motive was 

inexplicable in relation to the offense. (Exhibit F, 52-53, 57-58; Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, §

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 Pursuant to Title 15, of the California Code of Regulations, Section 2402(c)(1) sets forth circumstances 4

tending to demonstrate unsuitability for parole regarding the committed offense. The factors to be considered

include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an execution-style

murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.

15 Cal.Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E).

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2402(c)(1)(E).) As noted by the BPH, Petitioner “was armed with a deadly weapon, and he used

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it to threaten the victims, threaten the victims’ lives, if they did not follow through with these

sexual assaults that the prisoner put on them.” (Id. at 52-53.) In addition, Petitioner attacked and

shot a car dealer in the wrist. “The offenses were carried out in manners which demonstrate an

exceptionally insensitive disregard for human sufferings.” (Id. at 53.) “Some evidence” supports

the BPH’s finding. The BPH identified more than the minimum elements of kidnaping for rape

when it determined that Petitioner had threatened the victims with a gun to the victims while

raping them. In addition, Petitioner attacked and shot a car dealer during a robbery, as he was

taking the money from the victim. It was likely only by happenstance that the victim was not

killed. Accordingly, the BPH’s finding is supported by “some evidence” and Petitioner’s claim

to the contrary is not persuasive. 

Under California law, an inexplicable motive is “one that is unexplained or unintelligible,

as where the commitment offense does not appear to be related to the conduct of the victim and

has not other discernable purpose.” In re Scott, 119 Cal.App.4th 871, 892-893 (2004). In

finding that the motive was trivial in relationship to the offense, the BPH stated, “not only should

they not have happened, but they happened multiple times.” (Id. at 53.) The BPH further stated,

“[t]hese conclusions were drawn from the Statement of Facts, wherein [Petitioner] armed himself

with a handgun and committed a series of crimes involving multiple victims, as I mentioned, in

separate incidents; a crime spree, if you will, that included robberies, kidnap, sexual assaults,

including rape and oral copulation. At least one of the victims was a 14 year old young girl.” 

(Id.) Thus, “some evidence” supports the BPH’s finding that the motive was trivial in relation to

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the offense. 

The BPH further found that Petitioner has a record of violent, assaultive behavior, an

escalating pattern of criminal conduct and violence, including theft, petty theft, burglary, forgery

of credit cards, receiving stolen property, assault with to commit rape, assault with a deadly

weapon, unlawful taking of a vehicle, rape with force or threat, as well as oral copulation. (Id. at

53-54.) Section 2402(b) of California Code of Regulations, Title 15, allows the BPH to consider

“past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably

documented.” In addition, section 2402(b) states that “[a]ll relevant, reliable information

available to the panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole.” Thus, it was not

improper for the BPH to consider this evidence in its determination. 

The BPH stated that Petitioner had an unstable social history which may be properly

considered as a circumstance tending to indicate unsuitability for parole. See 15 C.C.R. §

2402(c)(3). Here, the BPH cited that he came from a dysfunctional family setting and dropped

out of school at an early age. “He was having problems in school, being suspended from school,

being caught stealing from school lockers. Subsequently, he dropped out of school.” (Exhibit F,

at 54.) 

The BPH also found that Petitioner has “not sufficiently participated in beneficial selfhelp and therapy programming at his time, to better understand the causative factors; what caused

the prisoner to have this vicious lifestyle where - - a cowardice lifestyle, that he would take out

and attack young women and kidnap and rob them and sexually assault them. The prisoner has

failed to demonstrate evidence of positive change.” (Id. at 54-55.) This finding is supported by

the evidence. The BPH noted that while incarcerated Petitioner had a total of twelve instances of

misconduct while incarcerated. (Id. at 55.) As stated by the BPH, Petitioner “needs therapy and

self-help in order to face, discuss, understand, and cope with stress in a non-destructive manner;

what caused this prisoner to have a lifestyle so notorious, if you will, where he would take and

kidnap and rob and rape young women, as well as shooting another - - an elderly man.” (Id. at

56.) Given the gravity of Petitioner’s prior criminal history and the crime spree he engaged in

during 1979, coupled with Petitioner’s unstable social history, support the BPH’s conclusion that

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Petitioner needs further self-help therapy. 

The BPH further stated that Petitioner lacked realistic and viable parole plans in the last

county of residence. Petitioner did not provide any viable, acceptable employment plan. (Id. at

55.) As Petitioner acknowledged at the hearing, he did not have any plans for Los Angeles

County. (Id. at 17.) In his traverse, Petitioner contends that the BPH ignored a letter

demonstrated that he had employment and a place to live, and cites Exhibit C. (Traverse, at 3.) 

However, there is no Exhibit C, attached to his traverse. Finally, the BPH considered the District

Attorney’s opposition to parole. This was properly considered pursuant to California Penal Code

section 3042(a) and (f)(3), and 15 C.C.R. § 2402(b). 

In addition, Petitioner’s contention that his sentence exceeds the uniform matrix term of

between eight to twelve years, is without merit. Title 15, of the California Administrative Code,

section 2403(a) applies only to inmates who have been found suitable for parole. 15 Cal. Admin.

Code § 2403(a). Additionally, in Dannenberg, the California Supreme Court held that the Board

is not required to refer to the sentencing matrices or other crimes of the same type in determining

whether the prisoner is suitable for parole. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1091 (2005). 

Petitioner’s contention that the BPH improperly relied on his commitment offense, is

without merit. The Ninth Circuit has held that serious questions involving a prisoner’s liberty

interest in parole would be raised if the Board continued to rely solely on the gravity of the

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment to justify denial of parole, despite a prisoner’s

continuing demonstration of exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation. Biggs, 334 F.3d

at 916. As discussed above, however, the circumstances of the offense, while significant, were

not the only reasons for the Board’s decision. Pursuant to 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402, the Board

must consider “[a]ll relevant, reliable information available to the panel.” In making its

determination, the Board “shall include the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past

and present mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal

misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including

behavior before, during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any

conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the

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prisoner may safely be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner's suitability for release.” Id. It is apparent the BPH did so in this case and carefully

balanced and assessed the various factors. Those findings were supported by at least “some

evidence.”

On balance, the BPH’s finding is supported by “some evidence” and it cannot be said that

the state court’s resolution of Petitioner’s claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court.” 

With regard to Petitioner’s claim that the “gravity” regulations used to find him

unsuitable for parole are unconstitutionally vague causing a fundamentally unfair result, is

without merit. First, Respondent argues that this claim is not exhausted because it was not

presented to the California Supreme Court for review. 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct.

1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair th

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal

basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133

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F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court

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violated his due process rights “he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court.”

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is

insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal claim to a state court. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance

that the "due process ramifications" of an argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) (“a claim for relief in habeas corpus

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the

facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). th

Here, as Respondent correctly argues the only claim that Petitioner presented to the

California Supreme Court was his claim that the BPH’s decision was not supported by “some

evidence” in violation of his due process rights. (See Exhibit I, attached to Answer.) Petitioner

is not precluded from exhausting this claim in the state courts, as the California Supreme Court

has original jurisdiction to review petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Although the Court has

the authority to hold the petition in abeyance, as Respondent submits, Petitioner has not

presented good cause for not exhausting this claim, and in any event, as discussed infra, the claim

is clearly without merit, and exhaustion would be futile. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269,

277 (2005). 

Notwithstanding Petitioner’s failure to exhaust this claim, the Court will recommend that

it be denied as it is clearly without merit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“[a]n application for a

writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to

exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State”); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624

(9 Cir. 2005) (a federal court considering a habeas petition may deny an unexhausted claim on th

the merits when it is perfectly clear that the claim is not “colorable”). 

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As Respondent submits, Petitioner does not cite to the specific regulation that he believes

is unconstitutionally vague, it is apparent that he contends the regulation which provides that the

Board may consider an inmate’s commitment offense as a circumstance tending to show

unsuitability for parole if the Board finds it was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1). 

In order for a regulation to survive a vagueness challenge, the regulation must be precise

enough to guide the Board and to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 1; Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988). A statute that may be

facially vague may be considered valid by limiting constructions that narrow the scope of the

statute and channels the discretion of the decision-maker. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,

255-56 (1976). Here, the Board’s regulations limit the terms “especially heinous, atrocious, or

cruel” with standards based on evidence that may be present in individual cases. For instance, a

crime may be considered “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” if multiple victims are

attacked, or the victim was abused, defiled, or mutilated. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

2502(c)(1)(A) - (E). Accordingly, because the regulations are precise enough to provide

guidance to the Board and are not arbitrary and discriminatory, Petitioner’s claim is clearly

without merit.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

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objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 24, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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