Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02468/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02468-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTATE OF JESSIE P. CONTRERAS,

by and through his Special 

Administrator LEONOR CONTRERAS; 

and LEONOR CONTRERAS, 

individual, mother of JESSIE 

CONTRERAS, deceased,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF GLENN; GLENN COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; LARRY 

JONES, individually and in his 

official capacity as GLENN 

COUNTRY SHERIFF; LT. TIM 

ASBURY, LT. REVOLINSKI, LT. 

WARREN, SGT. WHITE, 

individually and in their 

official capacities as 

COMMANDERS, SUPERVISORS, AND/OR 

SUPERVISORS OF PERSONNEL OF 

GLENN COUNTY JAIL; DEE DEE 

NELSON, individually and in her 

official capacity as GLENN 

COUNTY CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; E. 

CHAVEZ, individually and in his 

official capacity as GLENN 

COUNTY CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; 

GLENN MEDICAL CENTER INC; 

J.A.L.A. a Minor, daughter of 

Case No. 09-cv-02468-JAM-EFB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

COUNTY OF GLENN,GLENN COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,AND 

SHERIFF LARRY JONES’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

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JESSIE CONTRERAS, and DOES 1-

50, Inclusive; 

 Defendants.

______________________________/

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ County of 

Glenn, Glenn County Sheriff’s Department, and Sheriff Larry 

Jones’ (“Defendants’”) Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 10), Plaintiffs’ 

Estate of Jessie P. Contreras, Leonor Contreras and Jessie 

Contreras’ (“Plaintiff’s”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

(Doc. 6). Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ fourth claim 

for relief for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants ask the court to strike 

or dismiss Leonor Contreras as a plaintiff in the first and 

second claims for relief, and in the survival action portion of 

the fifth through eighth claims for relief. Defendants further 

request an order for a more definite statement pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) with regard to certain 

claims and factual issues. Lastly, Defendants move to strike all 

allegations of decedent’s pre-death pain, suffering or 

disfigurement, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(f). 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Decedent Jessie P. Contreras (“Decedent”) was an inmate in 

Glenn County Jail (“the jail”) at the time of his death on 

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August 6, 2008. Decedent was admitted to the jail for 

misdemeanor offenses on July 30, 2008. Plaintiffs allege that 

Decedent indicated at the time of his intake at the jail, and 

thereafter, that he was mentally unstable and suicidal. Decedent 

was placed in a single cell with sheets and a bed, and no video 

camera for monitoring the cell. Plaintiffs allege that a jail 

officer noted in a computer log that Decedent had advised he was 

suicidal, yet no mental health or other health care was 

provided, Decedent was not placed in a safety or isolation cell, 

and he was not monitored on a suicide watch program. On August 

4, 2008, Decedent was found in his cell, hanging from a bed 

sheet. He was taken to the hospital and died in the hospital on 

August 6, 2008. Plaintiffs bring survivor claims for civil 

rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and pendent state law 

survivor claims. Additionally, Plaintiffs ask for leave to amend 

the FAC to include Decedent’s minor daughter, J.A.L.A., as a 

plaintiff. 

OPINION

I. Legal Standard

 A. Motion to Dismiss

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In considering a 

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motion to dismiss, the court must accept the allegations in the 

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1975), 

overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 

(1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Assertions that 

are mere “legal conclusions,” however, are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 

(2009), citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to 

plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Dismissal is 

appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim 

supportable by a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim, the court has discretion to allow leave to amend the 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 

“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 

appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could 

not be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, 

Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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B. Motion to Strike

“Rule 12(f) provides in pertinent part that the Court may 

order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. . . 

Motions to strike are disfavored an infrequently granted. A 

motion to strike should not be granted unless it is clear that 

the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the 

subject matter of the litigation.” Bassett v. Ruggles et al., 

2009 WL 2982895 at *24(E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009)(internal 

citations omitted).

II. Standing for Survival Claims

Defendants argue that Leonor Contreras, in her individual 

capacity, does not have standing to sue as a survivor, and 

should be dismissed as a plaintiff from the survivor claims (the 

first, second, and survival action portions of the fifth, sixth, 

seventh, and eighth claims for relief). Plaintiffs agree, and 

ask the Court for leave to amend these claims for relief in the 

FAC to clarify that Leonor Contreras brings these claims only in 

her capacity as the Personal Administrator of the Estate of 

Jessie P. Contreras, and not in her individual capacity as his 

mother. Plaintiff also requests leave to amend these claims to 

add Decedent’s minor daughter as a claimant and to conform the 

claims with the applicable law in the California Code of Civil 

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Procedure § 377.11, § 377.30 and California Probate Code § 6402.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Leonor Contreras as a plaintiff 

in her individual capacity from the first, second, and survival 

action portions of the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims 

for relief, and grants leave to amend these claims.

III. Federal Claims

Plaintiffs bring four federal claims for relief under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants seek dismissal of the fourth claim for 

relief. The fourth claim is entitled “42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

Municipal/Supervisory Liability.” In this claim, Plaintiffs 

allege that the acts or omissions of defendants violated 

plaintiffs’ civil rights and were the direct and proximate 

result of policies, procedures and practices/customs of 

defendants. The claim is brought by all plaintiffs, and 

Plaintiffs ask to add Decedent’s minor daughter as a claimant.

Defendants argue that it is unclear whether the claim is 

intended as a direct action or a survivor action, and further 

argue that there is no basis for a direct claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 by the estate or Decedent’s mother. 

The Court agrees with Defendants that it is unclear whether 

Plaintiffs bring the claim as a survival action based on 

injuries to Decedent, or as a direct action based on their own 

injuries. It is also unclear what law Plaintiffs allege as the 

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basis for the claim. In the FAC, the fourth claim for relief 

mentions a policy of indifference to medical needs, but in 

Plaintiffs’ opposition brief, Plaintiffs reference interference 

with familial association and substantive due process for the 

fourth claim for relief (which is also set out as the basis for 

the third claim for relief). As Plaintiffs’ allegations are 

unclear, and at this early stage the Court cannot determine 

whether amendment would be futile, the Court therefore dismisses

the fourth claim for relief, with leave to amend. 

IV. State law claims

Defendants request that Plaintiffs submit a more definite 

statement regarding their fifth through eighth claims for 

relief. The fifth through eighth claims are state law survivor 

and wrongful death claims. Specifically, Defendants submit that 

they are not able to determine the plaintiffs for each portion 

of the claims, nor what damages are requested for each portion 

of the claims, because the claims are combined survivor/wrongful 

death claims. As discussed above, the Court is granting leave to 

amend the fifth through eighth claims for relief, so that 

Plaintiffs may clarify the nature of the claims and the identity 

of the claimants for each claim for relief. Thus, Defendants’ 

motion for a more definite statement is moot. In amending the 

fifth through eighth claims for relief, Plaintiffs are advised 

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to set forth as clearly as possible the claimants and their 

claims. 

V. Damages for Pain and Suffering

Defendants move to strike all allegations related to 

Decedent’s pain and suffering, and to strike Plaintiffs’ request 

for damages based on Decedent’s pain and suffering. Defendants 

argue that such damages are not permitted in the Eastern 

District. 

“Section 1983 does not address survivor claims or any 

appropriate remedies.” Provencio v. Vazquez, 2008 WL 3982063, 

at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008). If a civil rights statute is 

“deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable 

remedies,” courts must look to applicable state law. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1988(a). However, state law may not be applied when it is 

“inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United 

States.” Id.; see Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590 

(1978). The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose behind 

the Federal Civil Rights Act is to: (1) prevent official 

illegality, see Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592, and (2) “compensate 

persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional 

rights.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978). In 

survivor actions in California, “the damages recoverable are 

limited to the loss or damage that the decedent sustained or 

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incurred before death, . . . and do not include damages for 

pain, suffering, or disfigurement.” Cal. Civ. Proc. § 377.34. 

There is a split of authority on the issue of the 

applicability of Cal. Civ. Proc. § 377.34., among the District 

Courts of California. The Eastern District has consistently 

held that § 377.34 is not inconsistent with Section 1983, and

has thus barred survivor claims for pain and suffering damages

under Section 1983. Conversely, courts in the Southern, Central, 

and Northern Districts have opted not to apply § 377.34, finding 

it inconsistent with the purposes of Section 1983. See e.g.

Hirschfield v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 2009 WL 3248101, at 

*4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2009); Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 

230, 233 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. 

Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Despite the differing opinions of 

the district courts, the Ninth Circuit has not expressed an 

opinion on the issue. See Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, 593 F.3d 

1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that “The Ninth 

Circuit has not addressed the question of what damages are 

available under a Section 1983 wrongful death claim”). 

The trend in the Eastern District, beginning with Venerable 

v. City of Sacramento, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2002), 

has been to bar survivor claims for such damages. Reviewing the 

legislative history of Cal. Civ. P. Code § 377.34, the Court in 

Venerable noted, “The legislature could well conclude that 

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recovery for the decedent’s pain and suffering is not the better 

rule given: (1) the uncertainty of testimony about how someone, 

now dead, suffered; (2) the provision for compensation to family 

survivors under the wrongful death statute for their own 

damages, including loss of companionship, and a natural 

reluctance to add as “compensation” the injury actually suffered 

by another; and (3) the adequacy of deterrence already provided 

by the possible array of damages for negligent conduct leading 

to death whether those damages are sought under the survival 

statute or by way of a wrongful death action.” Id. at 1132. The 

Court declined to adopt the cynical view that officers would 

chose to kill, rather than injure, a victim if only required to 

pay pain and suffering damages when victims survived. Id. at 

1133. Thus, the Court held that “In light of the damages that 

are provided by the California survival and wrongful death 

statutes, the court finds that state law is not inconsistent 

with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Id. 

In the instant case, Defendants cite to a line of cases 

from the Eastern District following Venerable which consistently 

hold that damages for a decedent’s pain and suffering are not 

recoverable in survival actions under § 1983: Provencio v. 

Vazquez, 2008 WL 3982063, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008) 

(holding that pain and suffering claims are precluded because 

“the statutory scheme for survivors in California still provides 

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compensatory damages for the remaining injured parties, i.e. the 

survivors”); Rosales v. City of Bakersfield, 2007 WL 1847628 

(E.D. Cal. June 27, 2007); Whitfield v. State of California, 

2007 WL 496342 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007); Moore ex rel Moore v. 

County of Kern, 2006 WL 2190753 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2006); 

Peacock v. Terhune, 2002 WL 459810 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2002).

Plaintiffs concede that Defendants are “correct in stating that 

the recovery of pain and suffering damages in a survival action 

has been disallowed in cases that have considered this issue in 

the Eastern District.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 5:18-19.) However, 

Plaintiffs argue that other federal courts do not adopt this 

position.

This Court finds the Court’s reasoning in Venerable to be 

persuasive, and declines to permit a survival action for damages 

for Decedent’s pain and suffering. Therefore, the Court grants 

Defendants’ motion to strike the allegations in the FAC alleging

Decedent’s pain and suffering (¶29, ¶35, and ¶39), as damages 

for Decedent’s pain and suffering are not recoverable. 

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the fourth claim for relief 

is GRANTED, Without Prejudice. 

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Defendants’ Motion to Strike Leonor Contreras as a 

plaintiff, in her individual capacity as the mother of 

Decedent, from the First, Second, and survival action 

portions of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth claims for 

relief is GRANTED, With Prejudice. 

Defendants’ Motion to Strike allegations of Decedent’s pain 

and suffering is GRANTED, with Prejudice. 

Plaintiffs’ request to add Decedents’ minor daughter, 

J.A.L.A., as a plaintiff is GRANTED. 

Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to file a Second Amended 

Complaint consistent with the Court’s directions herein within 

twenty (20) days of the Court’s order on the Motion to Dismiss 

by Glenn Medical Center (Doc. #28), scheduled to be heard on 

August 18, 2010.

Dated: July 15, 2010 

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