Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00172/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00172-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carlos Mendez Alvarez,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-0172-PHX-SLG (JFM)

Order

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on January 25, 2013 (Doc. 1). On June 21, 2013 Respondents filed their Response

(“Limited Answer”) (Doc. 12). Petitioner has not filed a reply.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

This case arises out of an Indictment (Exhibit B) filed in Maricopa County 

Superior Court in July, 2001. In disposing of Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals summarized the case as follows:

The defendant was indicted on four counts of sexual conduct 

with a minor and one count of kidnapping. The indictment arose out 

of sexual assaults alleged to have been committed by the defendant 

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against a young boy with whom he resided at the time.

The case proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted the

defendant of a lesser included offense of attempted sexual conduct

with a minor (Count 1); kidnapping (Count 4); and sexual conduct

with a minor (Count 5). The jury acquitted the defendant of the

remaining counts. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life in 

prison for Count 5, seventeen years in prison for Count 4, and ten 

years in prison for Count 1. The court ordered all sentences to run 

consecutively and credited the defendant with 598 days of

presentence incarceration.

(Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. 3/25/03.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 12, are referenced herein 

as “Exhibit ___.”) Petitioner was sentenced on April 19, 2002. (Exhibit D, Sentence.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal challenging the admission of expert testimony, his 

presentence incarceration credits, and the imposition of consecutive sentences. (Exhibit 

E, Opening Brief.) The Arizona Court of Appeals, in a Memorandum Decision issued 

March 25, 2003, granted relief as to the presentence incarceration credits, and ordered 

the sentences on Counts 1 and 4 be served concurrently. (Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. 3/25/3.) 

The net result was a life sentence, to be followed by concurrent sentences of 17 and 10 

years.

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Exhibit I, Order & Mandate, 5/9/03.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

In June, 2002, during the pendency of his direct appeal, Petitioner filed a Notice 

of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit S), and eventually a pro per Petition for PostConviction Relief (Exhibit L). The PCR court dismissed the Petition on April 9, 2003, in 

a minute entry filed April 10, 2003 (Exhibit L) on the basis that Petitioner “failed to 

provide any facts on which any relief can be granted.” 

Petitioner did not seek further review on this petition.

D. PROCEEDINGS ON SECOND POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On July 10, 2003, Petitioner filed a second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, 

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with a supporting affidavit dated July 3, 2003. (Exhibit T.) Counsel was appointed, and 

on January 26, 2004 filed a revised Petition (Exhibit M) asserting ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel in failing to make an opening argument, inadequately cross-examining 

the victim, and failing to impeach the victim’s credibility. On April 8, 2004, the PCR 

court dismissed the Petition, finding it “does not state a colorable claim.” (Exhibit O, 

M.E. 4/8/04.)

Petitioner did not seek further review.

E. PROCEEDINGS ON THIRD POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On December 24, 2008, Petitioner filed a third Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

(Exhibit P), dated December 19, 2008, purportedly asserting newly discovered evidence. 

The PCR court summarized the claims as follows:

Defendant claims counsel did not fully explain the consequences of 

withdrawing from his plea agreement and proceeding to trial. 

Defendant further asserts that he was denied his right to a speedy 

trial, and that the trial court erred in allowing testimony by one of 

the detectives involved in the case. Finally, the defendant argues 

that the state's expert, Robert Emerick, supplanted his expert 

opinion for the fact-finding function of the jury.

(Exhibit Q, M.E. 1/23/09.) On January 23, 2009, the PCR court dismissed the petition as 

untimely on the basis that claims were untimely and “either were or could have been 

raised on appeal or in a prior Rule 32 proceeding.” (Id.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review, which was summarily denied. (Exhibit R, 

Order 3/29/10.)

F. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, dated January 23, 2013 on January 25, 

2013 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel because he withdrew from a plea agreement 

based on his attorney’s “persist[e]nce to go to trial” and because his 

attorney did not raise mitigating circumstances, object to the

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duplicity of the charges, or object to the sentence enhancement.

In Ground Two, Petitioner claims his Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. He asserts that he 

withdrew from the plea agreement and ultimately received the 

maximum sentence because of his attorney’s “misadvice” and threat 

to withdraw from the case if Petitioner did not withdraw from the 

plea agreement. Petitioner asserts that he was “forcibly coerced by 

duress to withdraw his plea agreement.”

In Ground Three, Petitioner contends he received ineffective 

assistance of appellate and post-conviction-relief counsel because 

they failed to communicate with Petitioner and failed to develop a 

claim regarding Petitioner’s reason for withdrawing from the plea 

agreement.

In Ground Four, he asserts that his due process and equal 

protection rights were violated. He claims that “both appellant 

defense counsel rejecting the argu[]ment Petitioner presented that 

neither one pursue[d] to follow was compelled by jurisprudence

pertaining to cause excusable procedural default. Failing to raise a 

claim on direct appeal and in P.C.R. proceeding, as was instructed 

by defendant.” (citation omitted).

(Order 5/9/13, Doc. 7 at 2.) 

Petitioner alleges he has not presented any of his claims to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Id.) As for his failure to timely file, Petitioner argues that he was unaware of 

his rights and the statute of limitations, and was not properly represented by counsel or 

provided other assistance. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.)

Response - On June 21, 2013, Respondents filed their Response (“Limited 

Answer”) (Doc. 12). Respondents argue that the petition is barred by the habeas statute 

of limitations, that Petitioner has failed to show cause for equitable tolling, and the 

Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.

Reply – Petitioner was given thirty days from service of the answer to reply. 

(Order 5/9/13 at 4.) Petitioner has not replied and the time to do so has passed.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on 

"the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1 Here, 

Petitioner’s direct appeal was denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals on March 25, 

2003. Petitioner had thirty days thereafter to seek further review by the Arizona 

Supreme Court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a). He did not seek such review. (Exhibit I, 

Order and Mandate.) Thus his conviction became final on April 24, 2003.

Therefore, Petitioner’s one year began running on April 25, 2003, and without 

any tolling expired on April 24, 2004, making his January 25, 2013 Petition almost nine 

years delinquent.

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was instituted in June 2002, when Petitioner 

filed his PCR notice (Exhibit S), while his direct appeal was pending. The PCR 

proceeding remained pending until April 10, 2003 when the PCR court dismissed the 

petition (Exhibit L, M.E. 4/10/03), some 15 days before his time to seek further review 

on direct appeal expired. At that time, Petitioner’s conviction was not yet final and his 

limitations period had not begun to run. Accordingly, his first PCR petition did not 

 

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Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Petitioner proffers no argument that any of these apply.

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result in any tolling.

Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding was instituted on July 10, 2003. Under the 

prison mailbox rule, a prisoner’s state filings are deemed “filed” when they are delivered 

to prison officials for mailing. See Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Here, Petitioner’s second PCR petition was undated, but contained a supporting affidavit 

dated July 3, 2003. (Exhibit T.) Because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned 

presumes that the prison mailbox rule applies, and that Petitioner delivered his second 

PCR petition to prison authorities on July 3, 2003. As of that date, Petitioner had used 

76 days (from April 25, 2003 to July 10, 2003) of his one year and had 289 days 

remaining.

The second petition remained pending until May 6, 2004, when the PCR court 

filed its order dismissing the Petition, finding it “does not state a colorable claim.” 

(Exhibit O, M.E. 4/8/04.) Petitioner did not seek further review, and his remaining 289 

days began running again on May 7, 2004. Accordingly, without further tolling, 

Petitioner’s one year expired on Tuesday, February 22, 2005.

Petitioner’s third PCR proceeding was not commenced until December 24, 2008, 

when Petitioner filed his third Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit P). Again, 

because it does not make a difference, the undersigned presumes the prison mailbox rule 

applies, and that the petition should be deemed filed as of its date, December 19, 2008. 

At that time, Petitioner’s limitations period had been expired for almost four years. Once 

the statute has run, a subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief filing does not reset 

the running of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Petitioner has 

no statutory tolling resulting from his third PCR proceeding, and his limitations period 

expired on February 22, 2005.

The undersigned again presumes that Petitioner is entitled to application of the 

prison mailbox rule, and that his federal habeas Petition was delivered to prison officials 

for mailing on the signature date of January 23, 2013. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 1.) Thus, 

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Petitioner’s habeas Petition was almost eight years delinquent.

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

Petitioner proffers three bases for equitable tolling: (1) he was unaware of the 

statute of limitations; (2) he was not properly represented by counsel; and (3) he did not 

have other assistance and was thus unaware of his rights. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.)

Notice of Statute of Limitations - With regard to Petitioner’s notice of the 

statute, “it is well established that ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se 

petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 

1220 (10th Cir.2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (as cited in Raspberry, 448 

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F.3d at 1154). Cf. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) 

(per curiam) (lack of access to AEDPA, as opposed to knowledge of it, might be cause 

for equitable tolling). 

Ineffective Assistance – Although an attorney's behavior can establish the 

extraordinary circumstances required for equitable tolling, mere negligence or 

professional malpractice is insufficient. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th 

Cir.2001). A “garden variety claim of excusable neglect,’ such as a simple 

‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline does not warrant equitable 

tolling.’ ” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. ____, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010). Rather, the 

attorney’s misconduct must rise to the level of extraordinary circumstances. Id. For 

example, an unadorned failure to advise about a limitations period would, at best, be 

simple negligence. Cf. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing 

equitable tolling where petitioner's counsel was hired almost a year in advance, failed to 

do anything to prepare the petition or to respond to numerous letters and phone calls, and 

withheld petitioner's file for over two months after the limitations period expired); 

Holland, supra (discussing potential for finding of extraordinary circumstances where 

counsel misinformed petitioner about filing deadline, failed to communicate conclusion 

of state appeals, and failed to communicate with petitioner at all over a period of years, 

all despite repeated requests by petitioner). 

Here Petitioner offers no particulars of his counsel’s misdeeds, but simply alleges 

he “was not represented proper[ly].” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.) That is not sufficient to 

meet Petitioner’s burden of establishing extraordinary circumstances.

Pro Se Status – Finally, Petitioner argues that he “had no one to aide me in law,” 

and was “not aware what were my rights.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11) “It is clear that pro 

se status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 

F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). A prisoner's “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and 

exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder 

v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). See also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

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1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by 

itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling”).

Summary – Petitioner has failed to show that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

5. Actual Innocence

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the habeas statute of limitations is subject to 

an exception for claims of actual innocence. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 

2011). Petitioner makes no such claim in this proceeding.

6. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Petitioner’s one year habeas limitations period commenced running on April 25, 

2003, and was tolled during his second PCR proceeding from July 10, 2003 through May 

6, 2004. Thereafter, it expired on February 22, 2005, making his January, 2013 Petition 

almost eight years delinquent. Petitioner has shown no basis for equitable tolling or 

actual innocence to avoid the effects of his delay. Consequently, the Petition must be 

dismissed with prejudice.

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Respondents assert that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his state remedies 

on his claims. Because the undersigned finds the petition plainly barred under the statute 

of limitations, these other defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

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U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that 

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth 

herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the 

extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a 

certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed January 25, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

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PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report and Recommendation is accepted, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: August 2, 2013

13-0172o Order 13 07 26 re RR on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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