Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00101/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-00101-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY HOWARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. L. DeAZEVEDO, P. PAZ, 

B. STEPHENS, and D. JAMES,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:11-cv-00101-AWI-SKO (PC)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

ATTENDANCE OF INCARCERATED 

WITNESSES BLAKE, COVINGTON, AND 

MCCOY

(Doc. 83)

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Timothy Howard (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 20, 2011. This 

action for damages is set for jury trial on April 21, 2015, on Plaintiff’s First Amendment 

retaliation claims against Defendants DeAzevedo, Paz, and Stephens and Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment due process claim against Defendant James. On January 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed a 

timely motion seeking the attendance of incarcerated witnesses Garrod Blake, CDCR #H19751, 

Salinas Valley State Prison; Marcus Covington, CDCR #V00834, CSP-Corcoran; and Davon 

McCoy, CDCR #H67575, CSP-Sacramento. (Doc. 77, Second Sched. Order.) Defendants 

DeAzevedo, Paz, Stephens, and James (“Defendants”) jointly filed a timely opposition on March 

10, 2015.1 (Id.)

 

1 Defendants Paz, Stephens, and James and Defendant DeAzevedo have separate counsel.

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II. Discussion2

A. Legal Standard

As set forth in the second scheduling order, an incarcerated witness who agrees to attend 

trial voluntarily to give testimony cannot come to court unless the Court orders the warden or 

other custodian to permit the witness to be transported to court, and the Court will not issue such 

an order unless it is satisfied that the prospective witness has actual knowledge of relevant facts.

In addition, in determining whether to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 

directing the production of an inmate witness for trial, the district court must consider the 

following factors: (1) whether the prisoner’s presence will substantially further the resolution of 

the case; (2) security risks presented by the prisoner’s presence; (3) the expense of the prisoner’s 

transportation and safekeeping; and (4) whether the suit can be stayed until the prisoner is released 

without prejudice to the cause asserted.3 Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F.2d 466, 468 n.1 

(9th Cir. 1983) (citing Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1977)); Walker v. Sumner, 

14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994). 

B. Willingness to Testify Voluntarily

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion regarding his inmate witnesses’ 

willingness to testify does not suffice to demonstrate that they still consent and are willing to 

testify, given that they provided declarations in 2010 and that attendance at trial will result in 

disruption for them due to their transfer for trial. However, any argument that Plaintiff should be 

penalized for not having more current or specific information is untenable. Inmates’ ability to 

correspond with one another is restricted by prison regulations, and Plaintiff attested that he 

repeatedly sought permission to communicate with his inmate witnesses, without success. Cal. 

Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3139(a), (b). (Doc. 83, Motion, Howard Dec., ¶¶3, 4.) Moreover, the Court 

 

2 The issues raised by Defendants are limited to whether the witnesses are willing to testify voluntarily, whether the 

proposed testimony will substantially further resolution of the case, and whether the proposed testimony of inmates 

Covington and McCoy is cumulative. Defendants also object to some of the proposed testimony as impermissible 

hearsay and character evidence.

3 There is no evidence in the record which weighs against transporting Plaintiff’s inmate witnesses due to heightened 

security risks, undue expense, or anticipated release from custody in the near future, and those factors are not 

addressed further.

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has the discretion to grant Plaintiff’s motion even in the absence of express consent if it finds, as it 

does in this case, that the witnesses have relevant information and their presence will substantially 

further resolution of the case. (2nd Sched. Order, n.1, citing Wiggins, 717 F.2d at 468 n.1.) 

C. Whether Proposed Testimony Substantially Furthers Resolution of Case

1. Summary of Parties’ Positions

Inmate Blake allegedly saw Defendants DeAzevedo, Paz, and Stephens searching cells on 

March 9, 2010, including Plaintiff’s cell. Inmate Covington will allegedly testify that Defendants 

DeAzevedo, Paz, and Stephens tried to get him to exit his cell on March 9, 2010, so they could 

take his property, and that Defendants searched Plaintiff’s cell. Inmates Covington and McCoy 

will also allegedly testify that on March 8, 2010, they, along with Plaintiff and other inmates, 

complained to Sgt. Plunkett and Lt. Childs about second watch staff. 

Defendants argue inmate Blake’s testimony will not substantially further resolution of the 

case because he could not have seen inside Plaintiff’s cell, given his location, and that Plaintiff 

fails to indicate that inmates Covington and McCoy complained about any of the defendants.

2. Inmate Blake

Whether inmate Blake was able to see Plaintiff’s cell being searched is an issue for trial, 

and regardless of whether he saw that cell search, Defendants contend that they did not conduct 

any cell searches on March 9, 2010. Inmate Blake attested that he saw Defendants Paz and 

Stephens kicking inmates’ property down the tier; that he saw Defendant DeAzevedo standing 

outside the window as Plaintiff’s cell was searched; and that Defendants Paz and Stephens tried to 

get him to exit his cell. Whether or not Defendants were present and involved in cell searches on 

March 9, 2010, is relevant to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim and as a result, inmate Blake’s proposed 

testimony placing them at the scene has the potential to substantially further resolution of 

Plaintiff’s claim. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 602, 701.

3. Inmates Covington and McCoy

Inmate Covington will purportedly testify that Defendants DeAzevedo, Paz, and Stephens 

tried to get him to exit his cell on March 9, 2010, so they could take his property. As with inmate 

Blake, this proposed testimony is relevant to Plaintiff’s claim that his cell was searched on March 

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9, 2010, and given Defendants’ denial that they were present and involved in searching cells, the 

proposed testimony has the potential to substantially further resolution of Plaintiff’s claim. Fed. 

R. Evid. 401, 402, 602, 701.

Finally, Plaintiff represents that inmates Covington and McCoy will testify that they, along 

with Plaintiff, Nava, Jimenez, and others, complained to Sgt. Plunkett and Lt. Childs about second 

watch staff on March 8, 2010, which is the protected conduct Plaintiff alleges led Defendants 

DeAzevedo, Paz, and Stephens to retaliate against him. At trial, Plaintiff must prove that he was 

engaged in protected conduct and that his engagement in the protected conduct motivated the 

retaliatory acts complained of. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). As a 

result, the proposed testimony is relevant and has the potential to substantially further the 

resolution of Plaintiff’s claim.4 Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 602, 701.

4. Hearsay and Character Evidence Objections

Defendants’ hearsay and character evidence objections to inmates Covington and McCoy’s 

proposed testimony, made pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 801, 802, and 404(b), are 

rejected as premature. Whether the testimony is offered for the truth of the matter asserted or 

whether it is offered, for example, as evidence that a complaint was made is dependent upon 

context at trial, Fed. R. Civ. P. 801(c), and Defendants’ character evidence objection is not 

persuasive; as far as the Court can discern at this juncture, the proposed testimony directly relates 

to the cell searches which occurred on March 9, 2010, and is not offered as evidence of character 

or a character trait used to prove conformity therewith, Fed. R. Evid. 404. While such objections 

may have merit at trial, they present no grounds for precluding Plaintiff’s witnesses, pre-trial.

D. Cumulative Testimony by Inmates Covington and McCoy

Finally, Defendants argue that inmate Covington and McCoy’s testimony regarding the 

complaint they made on March 8, 2010, to Sgt. Plunkett and Lt. Childs is cumulative. 

 

4 Defendants’ argument that inmates Covington and McCoy did not specifically identify them as the subject of the 

inmates’ complaint is unpersuasive. Plaintiff alleged that they complained as a group about Defendants, along with 

other staff, and regardless, Plaintiff must show only that Defendants retaliated against him because he complained. 

(Doc. 9, Amend. Comp., ¶13.)

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District courts have broad discretion “to limit the number of witnesses on a particular point 

to avoid cumulative evidence,” Lutz v. Glendale Union High School, 403 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th 

Cir. 2005), but they must not “sacrifice justice in the name of efficiency,” Navellier v. Sletten, 262 

F.3d 923, 941 (9th Cir. 2001). “As a general rule, evidence may not be excluded solely to avoid 

delay.” General Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1509 (9th Cir. 

1995). Rather, “[u]nder Rule 403, the court should consider the probative value of the proffered 

evidence and balance it against the harm of delay.” General Signal Corp., 66 F.3d at 1509-10. 

This case largely hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and given that Plaintiff is 

necessarily disadvantaged because he is a prisoner and he is proceeding pro se, the exclusion of 

any of his witnesses based on cumulative testimony should be handled with due care. The 

appearance to two witnesses is simply not so excessive as to support a limiting order, even if they 

witnessed the same event and their proposed testimony relates to that same event. See e.g., Loux 

v. U.S., 389 F.2d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1968) (no abuse of discretion in criminal case where district 

court limited the number of inmate witnesses to five, from ten proposed inmate witnesses). Given 

that Plaintiff has sought and been denied the appointment of counsel on multiple occasions and 

that the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed the principal that pro litigants are entitled 

leniency, particularly in civil rights cases, granting Plaintiff latitude with respect to the two 

witnesses he seeks to use to establish the same fact is more than amply justified. See e.g., 

Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Courts in this circuit have an 

obligation to give a liberal construction to the filings of pro se litigants, especially when they are 

civil rights claims filed by inmates.”); Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 574-75 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(construing pro se complaints liberally protects the rights of pro se litigants to self-representation 

and meaningful access to the courts, which is particularly important in civil rights cases), cert. 

denied, 134 S.Ct. 76 (2013); Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 938-40 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing 

hardships faced by prisoners proceeding pro se); Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, (9th Cir. 2009) 

(recognizing, in affirming the district court’s denial of counsel, that the “district court was 

sensitive to [inmate’s] predicament” in trying his civil rights case pro se). In addition, the trial 

will likely only take two or three days and therefore, there are no time constraint concerns at issue.

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III. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for the attendance of inmates Blake, Covington, 

and McCoy is GRANTED, and writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum will be issued following 

the telephonic trial confirmation hearing on March 24, 2015.

5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

 

5 The Court did not address Plaintiff’s argument regarding his own transportation because Plaintiff’s transportation for 

trial is a non-issue. The writ directing the transportation of Plaintiff will also be issued following the telephonic trial 

confirmation hearing.

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