Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02137/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02137-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Libel,Assault,Slander

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael E. Tennenbaum, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Arizona City Sanitary District, a political 

subdivision of the State of Arizona; Francis 

J. Slavin PC, an Arizona corporation; 

Francis J. Slavin, husband; Carol J. Slavin, 

wife, 

Defendants.

No. CV-10-02137-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Defendant Arizona City Sanitary District (“ACSD”) has filed a Second Motion for 

Summary Judgment. (Doc. 169.) Defendants Francis J. Slavin PC, Francis J. Slavin, and 

Carol J. Slavin (collectively referred to in the singular as “Slavin”) have likewise filed a 

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 171.) The Court denies both Motions.1

 

BACKGROUND

 Throughout 2008 and 2009, ACSD was embroiled in litigation with Arizona City 

Golf, LLC, over a contract governing water rights at a golf course in Arizona City, 

Arizona. (Doc. 172 ¶¶ 2, 17; Doc. 181 ¶¶ 2, 17.) Slavin was one of the attorneys that 

represented ACSD in the suit. (Doc. 181 ¶ 40.) Plaintiff Michael Tennenbaum was not 

party to the golf course lawsuit, and claims no involvement in it. (Id. ¶¶ 44–45.) The 

 

1

 The Parties’ requests for oral argument are denied because they have had an adequate opportunity to discuss the law and evidence and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d 

724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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history of the contractual rights involving ACSD’s supply of effluent to the golf course 

and other facilities lies at the center of this case. 

 The long-simmering dispute about ACSD’s supply of effluent to the golf course 

coincided with a bitter disagreement regarding the composition of ACSD’s board of 

directors. (Doc. 183-3, Ex. 7-5.) Two separate recall efforts were made to unseat three of 

the five directors, one that began on January 7, 2009, and suffered from procedural 

defects, and another that was filed on October 8, 2009. (Id.; Doc. 183-4, Exs. 7-5, 7-14.) 

The recall efforts were motivated by dissatisfaction with ACSD’s conduct of the 

litigation. (Doc. 183 ¶¶ 63–81.) ACSD Board members challenged the second recall 

effort in court on December 21, 2009. (Doc. 183-8, Ex. 13.) 

 It was in this context that ACSD, with the assistance of Slavin, drafted a letter to 

be sent to all 4,500 ACSD customers on December 30, 2009. (Doc. 181 ¶ 101.) On its 

face, the letter’s purpose was “to clear up the misconception surrounding the current 

lawsuit between the Arizona City Sanitary District and Arizona City Golf.”2

 (Doc. 1-1, 

Ex. 1.) It then chronicled the history of the dispute. It asserted that Tennenbaum owned 

Arizona City Development Corporation (“ACDC”), an entity that owned the golf course, 

country club, Happy Days Park, Paradise Lake, and the Racquet Club. (Id.) According to 

the letter, ACDC entered into an agreement with ACSD in 1979 that provided that ACSD 

would provide effluent to ACDC to irrigate those facilities as long as ACDC maintained 

them for the use of Arizona City residents and taxpayers. (Id.) ACDC formed Arizona 

City Club, Inc. (ACCI), and deeded all amenities to it, subject to a restriction that “the 

amenities would continue for 99 years”, thus allowing Arizona City residents to enjoy the 

various attractions. (Id.) 

The letter continued: 

But beginning in 1994, Tennenbaum began taking those public amenities 

and selling them off for his own profit. Tennenbaum and his sons have sold 

2

 It is not clear what the status of the lawsuit was at that time—the last notable 

event in the record shows that ACSD had filed an amended complaint on August 7, 2009. (Doc. 183-7, Ex. 8.) 

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off every public amenity listed in the agreement, including Arizona City’s 

groundwater rights, for a profit of nearly $5 million. All of the amenities 

Tennenbaum agreed to maintain for public use are gone and now belong to 

private owners. The golf course has been privatized. Yet, it continues to use 

water intended for the benefit of all Arizona City residents and taxpayers. 

What began as a mutually beneficial agreement between the District, 

Tennenbaum and the Arizona City residents is now for the sole benefit of 

Tennenbaum and his partners. Tennenbaum owns approximately 40 percent 

of the golf course and is owed about $700,000 by Arizona City Golf, 

secured by a mortgage against the golf course. Tennenbaum claims that the 

District must provide free reclaimed water forever!! 

The District will continue to deliver water to the golf course during the 

lawsuit. At the end of this lawsuit, there will be a fair and balanced 

agreement put in place which will provide for Arizona City Golf to pay for 

reclaimed water. . . . The payment schedule will be phased in until such 

time when the Arizona City golf course owners will be paying for water the 

same as all other Arizona golf course owners and you will be relieved of 

this financial burden. 

The Board will continue to fight for your rights, ensuring they will not stay 

forever in the hands of golf course owners and out-of-state developers who 

have their own interests—and bank accounts—in mind. 

(Id.) 

 Tennenbaum claims that the letter contains a number of falsehoods. Specifically, 

he claims that the following statements were untrue: the nature of the contract between 

ACDC and ACSD, the formation of ACCI, that the Tennenbaums took the amenities and 

sold them for his own profit, that they sold all of the amenities for a profit of $5 million, 

that the amenities are no longer for public use, that the ACDC-ACSD agreement is now 

solely for the benefit of Tennenbaum, Tennenbaum’s ownership of the golf course, and 

Tennenbaum’s claim “that the District must provide free water forever.” (Doc. 172 ¶ 6; 

Doc. 181 ¶ 6.) According to Tennenbaum, those statements falsely accuse him of 

“profiteering” and “gouging.” (Doc. 172 ¶ 7; Doc. 181 ¶ 7.) 

 The letter appeared in the print and online versions of the Arizona City 

Independent TriValley newspaper, first on January 13, 2010, and again on January 20, 

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2010. (Doc. 172 ¶ 11; Doc. 181 ¶ 11.) ACSD held a regular public meeting on January 

20, 2010, where it discussed the history detailed in the customer letter. (Doc. 172 ¶ 9; 

Doc. 181 ¶ 9.) The Chairman introduced Slavin, who stated that “all we’re trying to do 

tonight is to tell you what we’re all about in terms of the lawsuit. We think it would be 

very important for you to know that, only because there’s been different versions 

explained out in the community as to what’s going on in this lawsuit.” (Doc. 172 ¶ 10; 

Doc. 181 ¶ 10.) Slavin then gave a presentation that, according to the Parties’ briefing, 

largely mirrored the statements made in the letters. 

 Tennenbaum brought this suit for defamation on October 6, 2010. (Doc. 1.) He 

claims that there were four separate defamatory statements, all with principally the same 

content: those made in the letter, the letter’s republication twice in the newspaper, and 

Slavin’s statements at the ACSD meeting. Defendants have moved for summary 

judgment. 

DISCUSSION

I. LEGAL STANDARD

 Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). Substantive law determines which facts are material and “[o]nly disputes over 

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly 

preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). “A fact issue is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 

1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Thus, the nonmoving 

party must show that the genuine factual issues “‘can be resolved only by a finder of fact 

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’” Cal. Architectural 

Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). 

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Substantive law determines which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over 

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly 

preclude the entry of summary judgment.”3 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In addition, the 

dispute must be genuine, that is, the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Because “[c]redibility determinations, the 

weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 

functions, not those of a judge, . . . [t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and 

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor” at the summary judgment stage. Id.

at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)); Harris v. 

Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Issues of credibility, including questions 

of intent, should be left to the jury.”) (citations omitted). 

Furthermore, the party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere 

allegations or denials of [the party’s] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose 

Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989); see also L.R.Civ. 1.10(l)(1) (“Any party opposing a motion for summary 

judgment must . . . set[ ] forth the specific facts, which the opposing party asserts, 

including those facts which establish a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary 

judgment in favor of the moving party.”). If the nonmoving party’s opposition fails to 

specifically cite to materials either in the court’s record or not in the record, the court is 

not required to either search the entire record for evidence establishing a genuine issue of 

material fact or obtain the missing materials. See Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 

F.3d 1026, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2001); Forsberg v. Pac. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 

1417–18 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 

3

 The Parties agree that Arizona law applies here. 

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II. ANALYSIS

 Defendants jointly raise two defenses that they assert entitle them to summary 

judgment: (1) the statements are not capable of defamatory meaning and (2) even if they 

are, the statements are protected by an absolute judicial privilege. ACSD asserts two 

additional defenses: (1) the statements made at the meeting are protected by the absolute 

legislative privilege, and (2) Tennenbaum has not produced sufficient evidence of malice 

to defeat summary judgment. Finally, Slavin has moved for summary judgment on 

Tennenbaum’s claim against him for the publication of the statements in the newspapers.4

 

A. Capability of Conveying Defamatory Meaning 

“‘To be defamatory, a publication must be false and must bring the defamed 

person into disrepute, contempt, or ridicule, or must impeach plaintiff’s honesty, 

integrity, virtue, or reputation.’” Turner v. Devlin, 174 Ariz. 201, 203–04, 848 P.2d 286, 

288–89 (1993) (quoting Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 341, 783 

P.2d 781, 787 (1989)). At this point in the litigation, the Parties are proceeding on the 

assumption that the statements challenged by Tennenbaum were in fact false. What 

Defendants contest is whether those statements were defamatory. 

 “The trial court decides, in the first instance, whether, under all the circumstances, 

a statement is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. The jury then decides whether 

the defamatory meaning of the statement was in fact conveyed.” Yetman v. English, 168 

Ariz. 71, 79, 811 P.2d 323, 331 (1991) (internal citation omitted). Insulting or offensive 

statements are typically insufficient. See W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on the 

Law of Torts § 111 (5th ed. 1984). Something beyond insult is required: “A judge and 

jury will probably require that a statement be derogatory, degrading, and somewhat 

shocking, and that it contain elements of personal disgrace; they will not waste their time 

 

4

 Tennenbaum has asserted both defamation and invasion of privacy claims based on the statements. No Party has differentiated between the two classes of claims for 

purposes of this Motion and the Court follows the Parties’ lead on this issue. The Court 

likewise follows the Parties’ practice of referring to both libel and slander claims as “defamation.” 

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with mere slights or insults.” 1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation § 2.4.1 at 2-18 (4th 

ed. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court is not required to strain and stretch 

the meaning of the statements in order to unearth some potential defamatory meaning. 

See Lawrence v. Evans, 573 So. 2d 695, 698 (Miss. 1990) (“If the reader must struggle to 

see how and whether they defame, by definition the words are not defamatory in law. 

Words which may be found defamatory only with the aid of ‘a most vivid imagination’ 

are not actionable.”). 

 Context matters. Isolated statements lifted from a longer communication will not 

do. “It is true that a defamatory meaning must be found, if at all, in a reading of the 

publication as a whole.” Kaelin v. Globe Commc’ns Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 

1998) (interpreting California law); Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 

2005) (“When evaluating the threshold question of whether a statement is reasonably 

capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning, we must interpret that statement from the 

standpoint of the average reader, judging the statement not in isolation, but within the 

context in which it is made.”). In addition, it is appropriate to examine the statements’ 

target audience. See Rudin v. Dow Jones & Co., 557 F. Supp. 535, 543–46 (S.D.N.Y. 

1983). 

 Defendants’ principal argument is that the statements Tennenbaum claims are 

defamatory are nothing more than simple recitations of beneficial commercial 

transactions. The letter describes how Tennenbaum molded a contract with ACSD to 

inure to his own benefit, and, while that may anger the public, statements that an 

individual aggressively pursued his financial self-interest are not likely to be defamatory. 

Cf. Wilkow v. Forbes, Inc., 241 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Although a reader might 

arch an eyebrow at Wilkow’s strategy, an allegation of greed is not defamatory; sedulous 

pursuit of self-interest is the engine that propels a market economy.”). If the statements in 

the letter were indeed mere recitations of advantageous dealing, they would not be 

capable of “bring[ing] the defamed person into disrepute, contempt, or ridicule, or . . . 

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impeach[ing] plaintiff’s honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.’” Turner, 174 Ariz. at 

203–04. 

 Yet the statements here go further. Read in context of the letter, the statements 

assert that Tennenbaum breached his contract with ACSD by privatizing supposedly 

public amenities (“Tennenbaum began taking those public amenities and selling them off 

. . . , Tennenbaum and his sons have sold off every public amenity listed in the 

agreement. . . . All of the amenities Tennenbaum agreed to maintain for public use are 

gone and now belong to private owners”), profited from that privatization (“selling them 

off for his own profit”, “for a profit of nearly $5 million”), and now seeks to force ACSD 

to continue to hold up its end of the bargain by providing those amenities at taxpayer 

expense (“Yet it continues to use water intended for the benefit of all Arizona City 

residents and taxpayers . . . . Tennenbaum claims that the District must provide free 

reclaimed water forever!!”). (Doc. 1-1, Ex. 1.) These accusations go beyond grumbles of 

dogged self-interest or economic savvy. A jury could find that the letter accuses 

Tennenbaum of being a promise-breaker, cheat, bully, deceiver, and a dishonest 

businessman. Those interpretations of the statements would go directly to Tennenbaum’s 

honesty, integrity, and reputation in the community. 

 Furthermore, the context in which these statements were made is relevant. Arizona 

City residents were concerned about the ACSD litigation and its effect on the golf course 

and their tax rates. (Doc. 170 ¶¶ 4–6; Doc. 183 ¶¶ 4–6.) One of the residents, Scott 

Waddle, a one-time owner of AM Golf, LLC (a previous owner of the golf course), stated 

that he was “concerned about what type of individual [Tennenbaum] was” after receiving 

the letter because “[t]hey painted him to be a shyster . . . . Somebody that takes advantage 

of the public, of the people, the Commonwealth. Bottom feeder, I guess.” (Doc. 181-7, 

Ex. 10 (Waddle Dep.) at 118:16–119:3.) The letter created doubts in Waddle’s mind as to 

whether he would do business with Tennenbaum in the future. (Id. at 121:15–20.) Others 

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mistakenly thought that Waddle was in business with Tennenbaum and refused to do 

business with Waddle on that basis.5

 (Id. at 121:24–122:12.) 

 Similarly, attendees of the ACSD meeting where Slavin rehearsed points similar to 

those in the letter thought the statements implied Tennenbaum was dishonest. Greg 

Mellum stated that “[Slavin] implied that, that he sold this and he sold that and he took all 

the money, you know. . . . By what he was implying through his presentation he kept 

saying that Tennenbaum took this, Tennenbaum took this, Tennenbaum took that, sold it 

for his own benefit.” (Doc. 181-9, Ex. 15 (Mellum Dep.) at 66:13–21.) While Mellum 

admitted to not understanding the “legalese”, he “remembered that [Slavin] went line by 

line why Tennenbaum took advantage of us taxpayers in Arizona City.” (Id. at 67:9–69:3, 

106:17–18.) The point conveyed was “[t]hat Tennenbaum came down here and raped this 

community by selling the racquet club, the park, and all this other stuff.” (Id. at 138:17–

25.) Monalisa Wilmot, another attendee of the meeting and active participant in the 

Arizona City community, said that she thought less of Tennenbaum after the meeting 

because “he would make a $4.5 million gain on the community. That didn’t appeal to me. 

And it made it sound like he was taking the community for everything he could get and 

then just getting out.” (Doc. 181-9, Ex. 16 (Wilmot Dep.) at 147:9–17.) 

 These statements provide further evidence that the statements in the letters 

(reprinted in the newspapers) and at the presentation were capable of bearing a 

defamatory meaning. Read together in the letter, the statements could paint a picture of 

Tennenbaum as a dishonest businessman who was trying to siphon off the tax dollars of 

Arizona City residents. Read or heard in the context of the public concern over the ACSD 

litigation, that meaning could further cement itself as the dominant message. Defendants 

apparently argue that “communications suggesting a plaintiff has profited or furthered his 

personal economic interests—whether through direct accusations, subjective opinions, or 

 

5

 Defendants object to Waddle’s comments as irrelevant to their Motions. But 

because context is a factor in deciding whether a statement was capable of defamatory effect, the Court will consider how the public perceived those comments. 

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mere innuendo—[are] not defamatory as a matter of law.” Perhaps the argument may be 

true as to legitimate gain of profits, but the statements at issue here have strong 

intimations that Tennenbaum’s claims were ill-gotten. Therefore, the Court concludes 

that the statements were capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. 

 B. Absolute Judicial Privilege 

 Even defamatory statements can nonetheless be “privileged,” and allow the 

speaker or writer to escape liability. One of these privileges is the judicial privilege. It 

protects defamatory publications that “relate to, bear on or [are] connected with the 

proceeding.” Green Acres Trust v. London, 141 Ariz. 609, 613, 688 P.2d 617, 621 

(1984). Traditional examples of protected defamatory publications include statements 

made in court filings. See id. (complaint, motions, lis pendens). “The defense is absolute 

in that the speaker’s motive, purpose or reasonableness in uttering a false statement do 

not affect the defense. Whether the privilege exists is a question of law for the court. . . .” 

Id. (internal citation omitted). Defendants argue that the statements made in the letters, 

newspaper publications, and at the presentation were absolutely privileged because they 

related to the lawsuit between ACSD and the golf course. 

 “We believe that both [1] content and [2] manner of extra-judicial 

communications must bear some relation to the proceeding.” Id. at 614 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). One of the key factors in analyzing the manner of the 

communication is the identity of the recipient. “[I]n our view the recipient must have had 

a close or direct relationship to the proceeding for the privilege to apply. Exactly how 

close or direct that relationship . . . can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.” 

Hall v. Smith, 214 Ariz. 309, 313, 152 P.3d 1192, 1196 (Ct. App. 2007). For example, 

comments made to a newspaper reporter lacked a sufficient connection to the litigation. 

Green Acres, 141 Ariz. at 614–15. 

In approaching these questions, courts should be guided by “the underlying 

principle that the privilege should be applied to promote candid and honest 

communication between the parties and their counsel in order to resolve disputes.” Hall, 

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214 Ariz. at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court 

has stressed that the statement “‘be made in furtherance of the litigation and to promote 

the interest of justice.’ Without that nexus, the defamation only serves to injure 

reputation.” Green Acres, 141 Ariz. at 613–14 (quoting Bradley v. Hartford Accident & 

Indem. Co., 106 Cal. Rptr. 718, 723 (1973) (emphasis in original)). “‘The salutary policy 

of allowing freedom of communication in judicial proceedings does not warrant or 

countenance the dissemination and distribution of defamatory accusations outside of the 

judicial proceeding.’” Id. at 614 (quoting Asay v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 594 F.2d 692 

(8th Cir. 1979)). 

The letter, and therefore the statements in the newspaper reprints, clearly related to 

a judicial proceeding. It was “intended to clear up the misconception surrounding the 

current lawsuit between the Arizona City Sanitary District and Arizona City Golf.” (Doc. 

1-1, Ex. 1.) It set forth ACSD’s version of the history of its contract and why subsequent 

events led ACSD to file a lawsuit. The content of the letter therefore bore “some relation 

to the proceeding.” Green Acres, 141 Ariz. at 614. Tennenbaum’s argument that the letter 

was not about the litigation and was in fact a disguised campaign communication relating 

to the recall misses the point. On its face, the letter addresses the ongoing litigation. The 

subjective motivations behind the statements are irrelevant. Id. at 613. There is no reason 

to believe that the statements made at the public meeting were any different in their 

content and relationship to the underlying litigation. 

Nevertheless, the manner of all three communications was not such that it 

furthered the litigation or the interests of justice. The letter was sent to all 4,500 ACSD 

customers. (Doc. 170 ¶ 1; Doc. 183 ¶ 1.) ACSD customers pay a monthly bill to ACSD 

for their water usage. They are also, apparently, allowed to elect or recall members of the 

ACSD Board. All Parties refer to these individuals as merely “customers” or “taxpayers.” 

It is difficult to ascertain how 4,500 ACSD customers or taxpayers would have a “close 

or direct relationship to the” litigation between their utility, ACSD, and Arizona City 

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Golf such that absolute judicial immunity should be imposed. Hall, 214 Ariz. at 313. 

ACSD customers are not parties, directly or indirectly, to that lawsuit. 

The lack of a sufficient relationship is even more apparent with regard to the 

statements in the newspapers and those made at the public meeting. The newspapers were 

circulated to all Arizona City citizens, some of whom may not be ACSD customers. The 

same principle applies to the presentation, which was open to the public due to the 

newspaper announcement but likely attended by ACSD customers. None of these groups 

had any involvement in or direct control over the litigation. Their relationship to the 

underlying litigation is therefore quite tenuous. 

Defendants argue that the recipients of the statements were interested in the 

litigation and could potentially be impacted by its outcome and that the community 

interest plus potential financial impact is sufficient to invoke the absolute judicial 

privilege. It is true that there is evidence that ACSD customers would be impacted 

indirectly by the outcome of the litigation and were indirectly funding it through their tax 

rates. (Doc. 172 ¶¶ 20–21; Doc. 181 ¶¶ 20–21.) But more is needed than general interest 

or indirect impact. Otherwise any statement made by a government entity to a taxpayer 

within its borders or a company or utility to its customers (or potential customers) on 

pending litigation might be privileged. That potential trickle-down financial impact (and 

resulting interest) is not enough. 

Defendants rely chiefly on Hall, and the case is instructive here. There, the 

defendant (CIGNA AZ) had published the allegedly defamatory statements to its parent 

company (CIGNA). To resolve the application of the absolute litigation privilege, the 

Court of Appeals looked “not on the relationship between CIGNA and CIGNA AZ, but 

on the relationship between CIGNA and the litigation between Smith and CIGNA AZ.” 

Hall, 214 Ariz. at 314. It turned out that the parent company was not only interested in 

the litigation, but was substantially involved in it. Id. (“[T]he record reflects that CIGNA 

was significantly involved in the Smith–CIGNA AZ litigation.”). For example, the parent 

company sent its own employees to investigate the claims, selected the attorneys who 

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would defend the case, and “orchestrated the defense” itself. Id. There, the potential 

financial impact was direct. Id. at 315. 

This case is not like Hall. The recipients of the allegedly defamatory statements 

had, at best, a tangential relationship to the litigation involving ACSD. Hall did not focus 

on the parent company’s trickle-up financial interest in the litigation; instead, the core 

question centered on the extent of the parent company’s involvement in the litigation. 

Financial interest was insufficient. Here, the customers or taxpayers who received the 

statements have, at most, an indirect financial interest. Hall does not direct application of 

the judicial privilege to the statements here. 

Nor do the other cases cited by Defendants lead to a different result. They cite a 

California case, but California has a statutory judicial privilege and interpretations of that 

statute are not very persuasive in Arizona. See id. at 313 (declining to examine California 

cases interpreting California’s judicial privilege statute). The same goes for the other 

state cases that applied different state standards. Notably, Defendants cite a Colorado 

Court of Appeals case where the judicial privilege applied to a homeowner’s association 

that wrote an allegedly defamatory statement to its members. See Club Valencia 

Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Valencia Assocs., 712 P.2d 1024 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985). 

Crucially, that letter asked the members to assign their individual causes of action to the 

association. Id. at 1025. The statement would then have a direct effect on the pending 

litigation—the members of the homeowners association were the holders of the cause of 

action—and therefore made the association’s members sufficiently interested in the 

litigation to justify imposing the absolute judicial privilege. 

The guiding fact here is that ACSD does not sufficiently identify how the 

communications “promoted candid and honest communication between the parties and 

their counsel in order to resolve disputes . . . .” Hall, 214 Ariz. at 313. None of the 

communication recipients were parties. Nor did the communications further “socially 

important interests . . . [like] the fearless prosecution and defense of claims which leads 

to complete exposure of pertinent information for a tribunal’s disposition.” Green Acres, 

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141 Ariz. at 613. It is true that the utility’s customers may have had a legitimate interest 

in understanding the position of the ACSD concerning the suit, but, under the 

circumstances, that interest was not so direct as to shield defamatory statements made to 

virtually an entire community under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Defendants seek a 

broad interpretation of the judicial privilege, but Arizona has “narrowly construed the 

requirement that the act raising the privilege have a close, direct relationship to such 

proceedings.” Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151 Ariz. 551, 558, 729 P.2d 905, 912 (1986). 

Because the Court concludes that the judicial privilege does not apply to the 

communications, it does not address Tennenbaum’s contention that any privilege may 

have been dispelled by excessive publication. 

C. Absolute Legislative Privilege 

ACSD claims that the absolute legislative privilege applies to the statements made 

by Slavin at the ACSD meeting held on January 20, 2010. “By constitutional mandate, an 

absolute legislative immunity protects statements made by federal and Arizona legislators 

during formal legislative meetings.” Sanchez v. Coxon, 175 Ariz. 93, 95–96, 854 P.2d 

126, 128–29 (1993) (citing U.S. Const. Art. I, § 6, cl. 1; Ariz. Const. Art. IV, pt. 2, § 7). 

The Arizona Supreme Court has also extended that protection to statements made by a 

city council member at a formal council meeting. Id. at 97. All of these bodies perform 

core legislative functions—passing laws and ordinances. 

 While the Arizona legislature has delegated legislative authority to ACSD to 

“[f]ormulate and adopt rules” governing various sewer and water functions, Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 48-2011, the ACSD does not identify how the meeting on January 20, 2010 related 

to any such functions. The entirety of that meeting was devoted to discussing a lawsuit 

that did not relate to the formulation or adoption of rules governing sewer and water 

functions. Nor is there evidence such action was contemplated by the meeting. Because 

the subject of the meeting was unrelated to ACSD’s delegated legislative powers, no 

legislative immunity attaches to the statements made at the meeting. 

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D. Need for Actual Malice 

ACSD claims that Tennenbaum must show actual malice in order to prevail on his 

defamation claim. It asserts two rationales. First, ACSD claims that its director, Miller, is 

entitled to qualified (as opposed to absolute) immunity for the statements. The Arizona 

Supreme Court has shielded public officials with qualified immunity in defamation cases 

“when officials are setting policy or performing an act that inherently requires judgment 

or discretion.” Chamberlain, 151 Ariz. at 555. The official can nevertheless forfeit that 

immunity if, among other things, “he . . . acted with malice in that he knew his statements 

regarding plaintiffs were false or acted in reckless disregard of the truth.” Id. at 560; see 

also Burns v. Davis, 196 Ariz. 155, 165, 993 P.2d 1119, 1129 (Ct. App. 1999) (“An 

abuse through actual malice occurs when the speaker makes a statement knowing it is 

false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false.”). Miller, however, is not a party to 

this case. His government employer, ACSD, is. Immunity only attaches to public 

officials, not to public agencies. See Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 

Ariz. 260, 263–68, 564 P.2d 1227–1235 (1977) (applying qualified immunity to board 

members); Portonova v. Wilkinson, 128, Ariz. 503–04, 627 P.2d 232–34 (1981) 

(recognizing availability of immunity for a police officer); Chamberlin, 151 Ariz. at 554–

60 (recognizing immunity for public officials). Qualified immunity, therefore, is not at 

issue in this suit and cannot justify a requirement that Tennenbaum show malice. 

ACSD’s second reason for why Tennenbaum must show malice is that he is a 

public figure and the speech in question was on a matter of public concern. And when a 

plaintiff is a public figure and the allegedly defamatory statements raise matters of public 

concern, he must establish actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. See Anderson 

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). That heightened standard affects how the 

Court evaluates the case at the summary judgment stage. See id. at 257 (“In sum, a court 

ruling on a motion for summary judgment must be guided by the New York Times ’clear 

and convincing’ evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual 

malice exists—that is, whether the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury 

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might find that actual malice had been shown with convincing clarity.”); New York Times 

v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 

Yet Tennenbaum did not address ACSD’s argument that he is a limited-purpose 

public figure, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974), and that the 

matter in question was a matter of public concern. He simply announced his opposition. 

The Court therefore assumes that ACSD is correct.6

 To succeed on his defamation claim, 

Tennenbaum must produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could 

conclude by clear and convincing evidence that ACSD acted with actual malice—that the 

statements were false and ACSD knew they were false at the time they were made. See 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255–56. Tennenbaum may prove malice through circumstantial 

evidence. See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 668 (1989).

Tennenbaum has carried his burden sufficient to defeat summary judgment. He 

chiefly relies on deposition evidence that Miller, ACSD’s director, allegedly knew that 

the letter (and therefore the presentation derived from the letter) contained numerous 

false statements.7

 The letter made the following claims. ACSD entered into a contract 

with ACDC, owned by Tennenbaum, for the provision of reclaimed water. (Doc. 1-1.) 

The agreement required ACDC to maintain certain amenities—such as a golf course, 

park, lake, and racquet club—for the use and enjoyment of Arizona City residents and 

taxpayers. (Id.) ACDC then formed ACCI, and deeded all the amenities to ACCI. (Id.) 

 

6 Gertz instructs a court “to reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.” 418 U.S. at 352. For example, a real estate developer was sufficiently involved in the public debate and negotiations surrounding several tracts of land to be considered a public figure for purposes of that litigation. See Greenbelt Co-op. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1970). 

Tennenbaum has disputed the extent of his involvement in the goings-on of Arizona City since the 1970s, but there is sufficient evidence at this stage to assume that he maintained 

involvement in the subsequent transactions to likely give rise to limited public figure status. In addition, the litigation between ACSD and the golf course appears to be a matter of public concern. There is evidence that many Arizona City residents were concerned and ACSD held a number of meetings and hearings on the subject. 

7

 While Miller’s statements may not function as legally binding admissions on behalf of ACSD, see Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14C, those statements are important evidence for purposes of evaluating motions for summary judgment. 

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That deed contained a restriction that “ensur[ed] that these amenities would continue for 

99 years.” (Id.) In 1994, however, Tennenbaum and his sons began selling the public 

amenities off for profit, eventually selling all of the amenities and the groundwater rights 

for a profit of $5 million. (Id.) Tennenbaum owns 40% of the golf course and is owed 

around $700,000 by the golf course, secured by a mortgage against the course. 

Tennenbaum claimed that ACSD must provide free water in perpetuity. (Id.) 

The Amended Complaint filed in the action between ACSD and the golf course 

that gave rise to this claim—and that Tennenbaum claims is much more accurate—lays 

out a different story. ACCI was incorporated in 1979 to hold, operate, and maintain the 

amenities. (Doc. 183-7, Ex. 8 ¶¶ 33–35; Doc. 181 ¶ 48.) ACDC conveyed the amenities 

to ACCI in 1979. (Doc. 183-7, Ex. 8 ¶ 36; Doc. 181 ¶ 48.) In 1994, ACCI sold the 

racquet club to ACDC, and ACDC sold it to a developer. (Doc. 183-7, Ex. 8 ¶ 43; Doc. 

181 ¶ 48.) In March 2001, ACCI transferred the park to Tennenbaum, who then conveyed 

it to School District No. 22. (Doc. 183-7, Ex. 8 ¶ 44; Doc. 181 ¶ 48.) ACCI transferred 

the lake to a small group of homeowners in July 2004. (Doc. 183-7, Ex. 8 ¶ 45; Doc. 181 

¶ 48.) Finally, the golf course and groundwater rights were conveyed to AM Golf, LLC, 

which then sold the golf course to Arizona City Golf, LLC, and the groundwater rights to 

Aqua Capital Management. (Doc. 183-7, Ex. 8 ¶¶ 46–48; Doc. 181 ¶ 48.) Important to 

this evaluation is the fact that the members of AM Golf are Andrew and Mark 

Tennenbaum, Tennenbaum’s sons, (Doc. 183-7, Ex. 8 ¶ 3; Doc. 181 ¶ 48), and 

Tennenbaum was the sole shareholder of ACDC until it dissolved around 1995 (Doc. 

181-1, Ex. 1 at 21:17–19, 75:19–25, 87:12–88:5; id., Ex. 3 at 170:17–24).

At his deposition, Miller stated that he did not know whether many of the 

statements made in the letter were untrue. (Doc. 183-2, Ex. 4 (Miller Dep.) at 131:12–20, 

159:11–20, 160:1–24.) A review of his deposition shows that he depended substantially 

on the work of Slavin, ACSD’s counsel, for research into the veracity of the statements. 

Miller also stated throughout his deposition that the letter likely omitted important 

information. Nevertheless, Miller directly admitted that the following statements were not 

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true: (1) Tennenbaum and his sons sold off all the amenities (ACCI, and not Tennenbaum 

or his sons, sold the lake) (id. at 167:16–23, 169:19–25); (2) Arizona City residents were 

somehow part of the initial agreement between ACSD and ACDC and owned the 

groundwater (they were not) (id. at 189:15–191:14); (3) the agreement is now for the sole 

benefit of Tennenbaum and his partners (it is not) (id.); (4) Tennenbaum owns some 

portion of the golf course (he does not) (id.); and (5) Tennenbaum is claiming that ACSD 

has to provide free water (the golf course owner is claiming that and Tennenbaum does 

not own any portion of the golf course) (id. at 192:18–193:18). These are core claims in 

the letter and presentation. 

Miller also conceded that the letter speaks of Tennenbaum and his sons acting 

when in fact they acted through entities that they owned—ACDC (Tennenbaum) and AM 

Golf (his sons). (Id. at 164:14–165:2, 166:22–167:23.) While this makes other statements 

in the letter technically untrue, e.g., ACDC, not Tennenbaum, bought and sold the 

racquet club; AM Golf, not Tennenbaum’s sons, bought and sold the golf course and 

groundwater rights, those inaccuracies do not show malice. (Id. at 171:7–12, 188:14–

189:7.) See Read v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 169 Ariz. 353, 355, 819 P.2d 939, 941 

(1991) (“Slight inaccuracies will not prevent a statement from being true in substance, as 

long as the ‘gist’ or ‘sting’ of the publication is justified.”) It is well-accepted to speak 

colloquially of Donald Trump or Warren Buffet purchasing or selling a company, even 

though they are acting through corporations they control. That same practice would apply 

to the statements made in the letter. 

Yet even taking that practice into account, Miller admitted that several crucial 

statements in the letter were untrue. To be proper evidence of malice, there must be 

evidence that ACSD knew those statements were untrue at the time they were made, in 

December 2009 and January 2010. See Chamberlain, 151 Ariz. at 560. While the tangle 

of ownership interests in play may create some level of confusion, there is substantial 

evidence that ACSD knew who owned, bought, and sold what. ACSD had copies of all 

the deeds. Indeed, its amended complaint in the lawsuit against Arizona City Golf lays 

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out a very different version of the events and shows that Tennenbaum was not involved 

in many of the transactions. (Doc. 183-7, Ex. 8.) In light of this evidence, it is difficult for 

ACSD to claim ignorance of what had happened to the Arizona City amenities. ACSD 

filed complaints, submitted declarations and statements, and produced a brochure that all 

relayed that different individuals or entities owned the properties ascribed to 

Tennenbaum in the letter. (Doc. 183-7, Ex. 8; Doc.183-8, Exs. 12-11, 13; Doc. 183-9, Ex. 

20.) Its attorney in the litigation performed extensive research, even producing a 77-page 

timeline.8

 (Doc. 170 ¶¶ 18–19, 21–22; Doc. 183 ¶¶ 18–19, 21–22.) Moreover, notes from 

a litigation meeting reveal that ACSD may have been using Tennenbaum as a lightning 

rod for its public relations battle. “Our job (the District)—there has to be a bad guy on the 

golf side—will that be Michael Tennenbaum and Mark Tennenbaum—Mark 

Tennenbaum is the typical arrogant rich kid.” (Doc. 183-8, Exs. 11–13.)

Because there is evidence from which a jury could conclude—even under the 

heightened standard—that ACSD acted with malice in making certain unprivileged 

statements in the letter, and those unprivileged statements were capable of conveying 

defamatory meaning, summary judgment is unwarranted on Tennenbaum’s claims 

against ACSD. 

 E. Slavin’s Involvement in Newspaper Publication 

Slavin alone asserts that he was not involved in the subsequent publication of the 

letter in the newspapers and asks the Court to grant summary judgment on Count Two 

(Libel/Libel Per Se—Newspaper Articles) against him. Slavin is correct that involvement 

in the publication of an article is a necessary element of any defamation claim. See, e.g., 

Dube v. Linkins, 216 Ariz. 406, 417, 167 P.3d 93, 104 (Ct. App. 2007). The issue here, 

however, is one of republication—Slavin does not contest his involvement in the original 

publication of the letter to ACSD customers. 

 

8

 Miller has both admitted and denied that he knew that certain statements were 

false at the time he made them. (Doc. 183-2, Ex. 4 (Miller Dep.) at 188:14–189:7; Doc. 170-3, Ex. 12 ¶ 10.) 

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 When it comes to the liability of an original publisher for subsequent publications 

of a defamatory statement, the Arizona Court of Appeals has relied on Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 576. Dube, 216 Ariz. at 420. Section 576 states that “[t]he 

publication of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its 

repetition by a third person if, but only if, (a) the third person was privileged to repeat it, 

or (b) the repetition was authorized or intended by the original defamer, or (c) the 

repetition was reasonably to be expected.” In other words, the original publisher can be 

liable for special damages (economic or pecuniary harm) arising from republication if 

one of the three criteria are met. 

None of the Parties argue that the newspaper was privileged to repeat the letter. 

The first criteria is therefore not at issue. As to the second, Slavin specifically instructed 

ACSD not to provide the letter to local newspapers. (Doc. 172-4, Ex. 8-12.) Tennenbaum 

has not produced any evidence that Slavin was involved in, encouraged, or otherwise 

facilitated the newspaper publication. Therefore, Tennenbaum has failed to raise a 

genuine issue of material fact as to the second criteria. Nevertheless, there is a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether Slavin, despite his specific instructions to ACSD not 

to give the letter to local newspapers, could reasonably expect subsequent publication. 

The events of the litigation were a matter of public concern, and the letter was widely 

circulated, which raises questions about whether Slavin should have known that the 

material would be published. Indeed, comment d to § 576 elaborates on this point: 

The originator is liable, although he did not intend the repetition, if he had 

reason to expect that it would be so repeated. In determining this, the 

known tendency of human beings to repeat discreditable statements about 

their neighbors is a factor to be considered. So too, if the originator has 

himself widely disseminated the defamation and thus intimated to those 

who heard it that he is not unwilling to have it known to a large number of 

people, the fact may be taken into account in determining whether there 

were grounds to expect the further dissemination of the slander. 

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Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Slavin should have known 

the letter would be republished, summary judgment for Slavin on Count Two is 

inappropriate. 

CONCLUSION

 The statements at issue in this case are capable of conveying defamatory meaning, 

and no absolute privilege attaches to them. Moreover, Tennenbaum has created a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether ACSD acted with malice in publishing the allegedly 

defamatory statements, even under the heightened evidentiary standard. And there 

remains a genuine issue of material fact as to Slavin’s liability for the newspaper 

publications. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that ACSD’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 169) is DENIED.

IF IS FURTHER ORDERED that Slavin’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 171) is DENIED.

 Dated this 3rd day of June, 2013. 

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