Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05321/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05321-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELODY McDANIEL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General 

Defendant. /

No. C 06-5321 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On November 16, 2007, the Court held a hearing on defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Having considered the arguments of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court GRANTS defendant’s

motion. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Melody McDaniel, an African-American female, began working for the United States

Postal Service (“USPS”) in December 1987. On May 20, 2004, the USPS promoted her from

Supervisor Maintenance Operations to Acting Manager of Maintenance at the Airport Mail Center,

Maintenance Division in South San Francisco, California. As Acting Manager, she worked Monday

through Friday with weekends off; however, defendant required that she be “on-call” at all times in case

her assistance was ever needed. See Walter Butler Decl. ¶ 4. 

On December 4, 2004, in order to prepare for the hectic holiday season, plaintiff’s supervisor,

Jerry Alabastro (“Alabastro”), informed all management employees that their days off were canceled.

Later that day, plaintiff spoke with Alabastro and expressed reservations about being able to come into

work all seven days each week. She asked Alabastro, “If [she] had to be in the building [seven days

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1

 Plaintiff’s cell phone records do not reveal the telephone numbers of incoming calls, and thus

this estimate assumes that all incoming calls were work-related. See Kim Decl., Ex. B. 

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each week]?” See McDaniel Dep., Ex. 5, 58:1-3. Per plaintiff’s recollection and a handwritten note she

claims to have written during the meeting, Alabastro responded that she did not have to physically report

to work on her normal days off, but only had to “make [herself] available.” Id. Plaintiff sent an email

to her staff on December 10, 2004 informing them of Alabastro’s instructions, and that he “just asked

[her] to be available at all times.” See McDaniel Dep., Ex. 7, 12/10/04 email.

Building access records show that plaintiff did not enter her work facility on December 5, 11,

12, 18, or 19, 2004. Alabastro Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff claims she worked off-site on those days, a practice

she had undertaken previously. McDaniel Dep., Ex. 2, 49:1-23, 65:25; Butler Decl. ¶ 4. She instructed

David Woo, Maintenance Supervisor, to enter eight hours of overtime for each of those five days and

defendant later paid her for those forty hours. Id. 

However, after discovering that plaintiff received overtime pay for days that she was not present

at work, defendant investigated the matter and interviewed plaintiff. A letter to plaintiff on February

28, 2005 updating her on the investigation described the interviews:

During the Investigative interview by Ms. Hilario on January 5, 2005, you were asked

if you reported to work on the above weekends. Instead of responding you requested to

be excused for a few minutes to check your calendar. When you returned you indicated

that you had been answering phone calls for maintenance and wanted to be sure

everything was going well. When informed by Ms. Hilario that the Building ACCESS

system revealed the absence of activities of your badge card on the dates in question, you

said that “you were out in the field working such as buying things for AMC”. [sic] You

also indicated that in the month of May you had been working extra hours without

getting any pay. This response is not acceptable as it has no relation to why you had

supervisor Woo enter time for you on dates you did not work.

On January 13, 2004 [sic], [Jerry Alabastro] asked if you recalled that [he] gave an order

that all days off in December were canceled; you indicated that “you were working at

home responding to calls”. [sic] Your response contradicted your previous response to

questions from Ms. Hilario, therefore, you were afforded a second day in court on

January 14, 2005. Instead of responding to the questions posed by Ms. Hilario you

simply indicated to her that: “You were contacting the [National Association of Postal

Supervisors] representative and asked permission to be excused”. [sic]

McDaniel Decl., Ex. 1. Plaintiff’s USPS cell phone records show at most approximately 159 minutes

of work-related calls1

 on the dates in issue and no charges appear on her USPS credit card during those

dates. Defendant’s Memorandum (“Mem.”) 4:25-28, n. 1; Alabastro Decl. ¶ 5. 

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On or about January 28, 2005, plaintiff received a letter from defendant removing her from her

position as Acting Manager of Maintenance. McDaniel Dep., Ex. 8, 134:23-25, 135:1-4. The letter did

not explain the reason for demoting her, but only stated that her services as Acting Manager were no

longer needed and it asked her to train her replacement. On January 31, 2005, plaintiff filed an Equal

Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Counseling Request alleging racial and sexual discrimination in her

demotion from Acting Manager. See Letitia R. Kim Decl., Ex. G at 13. On February 5, 2005, plaintiff

filed an EEO Complaint. See Kim Decl., Ex. B. 

Based on defendant’s internal investigation, defendant issued plaintiff a Notice of Proposed

Removal on February 28, 2005. The letter charged her with “Unacceptable Conduct” in violation of

the Employee and Labor Relations Manual (“ELM”). Specifically, defendant accused her of falsifying

her time records, receiving pay for days she did not work, and asking a subordinate to enter her hours.

See ELM § 661.21-22 (employees are to “[g]ive a full day’s labor for a full day’s pay”); § 666.84

(prohibiting falsification of time records and “recording time for another employee”).

On April 11, 2005, defendant issued its official disciplinary decision against plaintiff in a letter

that reduced the previously proposed discharge of plaintiff to a demotion from Supervisor of

Maintenance Support Operations to Maintenance Support Clerk. Kim Decl., Ex. 1, internal Ex. C. On

April 16, 2005, plaintiff appealed this decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), which

affirmed the decision after a hearing. Id. at Ex. 1, internal Ex. E, G. In May 2006, plaintiff appealed

the decision of the MSPB to the EEO Commission and attempted to file a formal complaint with the

EEO as well. Her appeal was denied. On August 29, 2006, plaintiff filed this action alleging claims

under Title VII based on race and sex discrimination and retaliation for her EEO activity.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party, however, has

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no burden to negate or disprove matters on which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof

at trial. The moving party need only point out to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to

support the non-moving party’s case. See id. at 325.

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury

could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252

(1986). 

In deciding a summary judgment motion, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255. “Credibility

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts

are jury functions, not those of a judge [when she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory,

speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and

defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

 

DISCUSSION

I. Unlawful Discrimination

Plaintiff sues under Title VII, which provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be an unlawful

employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise

to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1). Discrimination claims under Title VII are analyzed using the burden-shifting

framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). Under the

McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Id. Then the burden shifts to the employer to respond with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

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its actions. Id. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the employer’s articulated

reason was a “pretext” or cover-up for unlawful discrimination. Id.

A. Plaintiff’s prima facie case

Plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas

framework by showing that: (1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) plaintiff was qualified

for her position; (3) plaintiff experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated

individuals outside plaintiff’s protected class were treated more favorably. See Peterson v. HewlettPackard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that a

plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is “minimal.” Coghlan v. Am.

Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, as an African-American woman and an

employee who was twice demoted, plaintiff has met the first and third elements of her prima facie case,

and defendant does not argue otherwise. However, defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to satisfy

the second and fourth elements of her prima facie burden – showing that plaintiff performed her job

satisfactorily and that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. 

Plaintiff has demonstrated she was qualified for her job position. At the time of the incident,

plaintiff had worked for the USPS for seventeen years, been promoted on several occasions, and had

an unblemished disciplinary record. The former Manager of Maintenance at the Air Mail Center

recommended plaintiff as his replacement “due to her superior performance and her high level of

commitment and integrity.” Butler Decl. ¶ 2. The Air Mail Center Maintenance Manager Secretary,

who received training from plaintiff, stated that plaintiff “is a very hardworking, and trustworthy

person.” Kim Decl., Ex. 1, internal Ex. H. To dispute plaintiff’s qualifications, defendant relies solely

on the situation at issue. Absent more, such as negative job performance evaluations, the current

incident fails to outweigh plaintiff’s evidence demonstrating her qualifications. Thus, plaintiff has

satisfied this prong of her prima facie case. 

Plaintiff has also met her minimal burden of showing that similarly situated employees were

treated more favorably. “Individuals are similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display

similar conduct.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003) (addressing, in

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2 Plaintiffs also identifies five additional white male employees who she argues are similarly

situated. However, the only evidence she presents to support this proposition are her own deposition

statements in which she states her belief regarding the discipline that defendant levied on those five

employees. Plaintiff’s statements are inadmissible hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801. Plaintiff asserts

in her opposition brief that defendant frustrated discovery on this and other matters. The Court notes

that plaintiff did not move to compel further discovery, and that once plaintiff secured representation

in this case, the parties stipulated to extend discovery deadlines.

3

 In her declaration, plaintiff claims she later spoke with Mr. Higginbotham who informed her

that he ultimately received a fourteen-day suspension. See McDaniel Decl., Ex. 1. This evidence is

inadmissible, however, because it is hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801. Even if plaintiff’s statement was

admissible, the fact that Mr. Higginbotham received more serious discipline than what was stated in the

discipline letter submitted by plaintiff raises questions about the probative value, if any, of the two

letters submitted by plaintiff.

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a pretext analysis rather than a prima facie analsysis, whether plaintiff and other employees were

similarly situated); see also Bowden v. Potter, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“The

employees need not necessarily have the same supervisor, be subject to the same standards, and engage

in the same conduct. The relevance of such factors depends on the circumstances and nature of the

case.”). 

Here, plaintiff has submitted discipline letters issued to two individuals, both white males, who

plaintiff claims were similarly situated and treated more favorably than she: (1) Mr. Higginbotham and

(2) Mr. Dunn.2

 Like plaintiff, Mr. Higginbotham worked as an Acting Manager of Maintenance, only

at a different location than plaintiff, and faced charges of “Unacceptable Conduct” for working 696

hours of unauthorized straight time pay from August 17, 2002 to January 10, 2003. Defendant issued

Mr. Higginbotham a letter of warning in lieu of a fourteen day time-off suspension. See Opp’n, Ex. 14.3

Mr. Dunn, while working as the Supervisor Maintenance Operation at the International Service Center,

was also charged with “Unacceptable Conduct” for using his government credit card for personal use

in March 2005. Mr. Dunn also received a proposed letter of warning in lieu of a fourteen day time-off

suspension. See Opp’n, Ex. 17. Plaintiff has not submitted any other evidence regarding Mr.

Higginbotham or Mr. Dunn, and thus the Court does not have any information about their specific

offenses, work histories, or the details of the discipline issues. Although this is a close call given the

limited amount of evidence regarding the comparators, the Court finds plaintiff has met the minimal

burden to demonstrate this fourth prong of her prima facie case. 

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B. Defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason

Because plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, the burden

shifts to defendant to articulate a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment

action. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 354-55 (1981). Here, defendant

states that it demoted plaintiff because she recorded overtime hours for which she did not work,

collected pay for those hours, and improperly instructed another employee to enter her time – all

violations of the ELM. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence showing that she actually worked the

forty hours in question. She concedes she did not physically report for work on the days for which she

collected overtime pay. Plaintiff asserts that she worked from the field, but her USPS cell phone records

show, at best, that she made 159 minutes of work-related phone calls. Plaintiff’s work-issued credit card

shows that she made no purchases during the dates in question, disputing plaintiff’s initial statement that

she was making purchases on those dates. Plaintiff contends she was “on-call” during the dates in issue,

but has not submitted any evidence suggesting she is paid for being “on call.” Indeed, if such were the

case, plaintiff would be paid at all times since she admitted she “was required to be available twentyfour hours per day, seven days each week.” Opp’n at 2:28, 3:1. The Court finds that defendant

articulated a legitimate reason to demote plaintiff because she violated its policies by falsely reporting

her time, collecting pay for time not worked, and instructing a subordinate to enter her time. 

C. Plaintiff’s showing of pretext

Because defendant has articulated a legitimate reason, the presumption of discrimination created

by plaintiff’s prima facie case no longer exists. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-

11 (1993). Instead, in order to demonstrate discrimination in this step of McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff

must show a discriminatory pretext for the adverse action. See Aragon v. Repub. Silver State Disposal,

Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff may meet the burden to show pretext using either

direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is evidence that “if believed, proves the fact [of

discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption.” Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d

1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998). Direct evidence typically consists of clearly sexist, racist, or similarly

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discriminatory statements or actions by the employer. See, e.g., Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221 (supervisor

stated he “did not want to deal with [a] female”); Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124 F.3d 1145, 1149

(9th Cir. 1997) (manager called employee a “dumb Mexican” and stated he was hired only because he

was a minority). Circumstantial evidence includes evidence “showing that the employer’s proffered

explanation for the adverse action is ‘unworthy of credence.’” Coghlan, 413 F.3d at 1095 (quoting

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). “To show pretext using circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must put forward

specific and substantial evidence challenging the credibility of the employer’s motives.” Vasquez, 349

F.3d at 642. 

Plaintiff presents no evidence of any racial or sexist comments made by USPS decisionmakers

or any persons working with her at the USPS. At most, she presents the declaration of her former

supervisor, in which he states his opinion that “[i]t is not a coincidence that all but one of the [three]

African American managers/supervisors . . . were all removed, demoted or forced out while working

at the United States Postal Service Airmail facility.” See Butler Decl. ¶ 9. Such suspicion is not direct

evidence sufficient to show pretext. 

Instead, relying on circumstantial evidence, plaintiff contends that defendant departed from its

normal disciplinary practice in demoting her, and relatedly that defendant did not discipline Mr.

Higginbotham and Mr. Dunn, two white males, as harshly as it punished her. With respect to her first

argument, plaintiff asserts that defendant follows a progressive disciplinary model, beginning with a

verbal warning, followed by a letter of warning, a five-day suspension, a seven calendar day suspension,

a fourteen calendar day suspension, an emergency suspension and eventually a proposal to terminate.

See McDaniel Decl. ¶ 9. However, the ELM does not mandate that defendant take the disciplinary steps

described by plaintiff. See Alabastro Decl., Ex. 1. Specifically, in regards to violations of § 666.84, the

ELM states that an employee who falsifies time records “is subject to removal or other discipline.” 

Plaintiff provides no testimony from any employee in charge of deciding disciplinary matters

who corroborates plaintiff’s claim that defendant failed to follow the ordinary disciplinary procedures

here. Instead, plaintiff’s only evidence of this disciplinary practice is her own self-serving declaration,

the letters of warning received by Mr. Higginbotham and Mr. Dunn, and the declaration of her former

supervisor, Walter Butler. These three pieces of evidence fail to make a specific and substantial

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showing that defendant deviated from its disciplinary policy. In regards to plaintiff’s self-serving

declaration, the Court may not “find a ‘genuine issue’ where the only evidence presented is

‘uncorroborated and self-serving’ testimony.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding a

plaintiff’s uncorroborated and self-serving deposition testimony did not present a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). The

warning letters issued to Mr. Higginbotham and Mr. Dunn are not probative of defendant’s discipline

policy, particularly when plaintiff sets forth no other evidence about their cases but simply presents the

warning letters in a vacuum. Mr. Butler testified that “[i]n Ms. McDaniel’s situation, other employees

would have been given the opportunity to cure the behavior, given verbal warnings, written letters of

warning, suspension and then demotion or be fired. This was the pattern of discipline under the United

States Postal Service. Discipline was supposed to be corrective and not punitive in nature.” See Butler

Decl. ¶ 6. His testimony is entirely conclusory and is not enough to support plaintiff’s argument that

defendant followed a progressive disciplinary practice. 

Plaintiff also relies on the disciplinary treatment received by Mr. Higginbotham and Mr. Dunn

in comparison to the punishment she received from defendant. To support plaintiff’s similarly situated

argument in the pretext analysis context, plaintiff must present specific and substantial evidence

demonstrating similarly situated employees were treated more favorably, as opposed to the minimal

showing needed to support this argument during the prima facie stage of McDonnell Douglas. “The

ultimate question that is informed by the similarly situated analysis is whether there is a basis for

inferring discriminatory motive: Does the purported purpose of the challenged action require similar

treatment of the two employees or does it justify different treatment due to differences in their status or

situation rather than race?” Bowden, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. 

Here, the Court concludes that plaintiff has not submitted specific and substantial evidence to

find that plaintiff’s treatment differed from that of Mr. Higginbotham and Mr. Dunn because of

plaintiff’s race or gender. Plaintiff correctly observes that like herself both Mr. Higginbotham and Mr.

Dunn worked in supervisory positions and violated the ELM, although they violated different sections

of the ELM than plaintiff. However, plaintiff has not submitted any evidence regarding the specific

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details of Mr. Higginbotham or Mr. Dunn’s cases to enable the Court to make a meaningful

comparison. Furthermore, the limited information that is before the Court suggests that Mr.

Higginbotham and Mr. Dunn appear to have taken responsibility for their misconduct. The disciplinary

letter issued to plaintiff shows that plaintiff appeared to shy away from the truth when confronted with

questions of whether she worked the forty hours she reported working. See McDaniel Decl., Ex. 1. Her

story changed several times, adding support to defendant’s reason for demoting her – her deceptive

behavior could no longer be trusted in a supervisory position. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff

has not presented any “specific and substantive” evidence sufficient to demonstrate that there is a

genuine issue of material fact as to discriminatory pretext. 

II. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that her second demotion, from Supervisor of Maintenance Support Operations

to Maintenance Support Clerk, was in retaliation for EEO activity. Claims of retaliation under Title VII

are also analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. See Ray v. Henderson, 217

F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must show that

(1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) that defendant subjected her to an adverse employment action,

and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the employer’s action. Passantino v.

Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000). 

As to the prima facie case, defendant does not dispute whether plaintiff engaged in protected

activity or that a causal link exists, but only disputes that plaintiff has shown she suffered an adverse

employment action. Plaintiff claims her second demotion on April 11, 2005 was in retaliation for her

EEO activity. A demotion is the type of adverse action reasonably likely to deter an employee from

bringing forth a complaint of discrimination. See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1244 (finding that the plaintiff

suffered an adverse employment action by having his pay reduced). Thus, having demonstrated that she

suffered a demotion after engaging in protected activity, plaintiff has demonstrated this element of her

prima facie case and carried her burden in this stage of McDonnell Douglas. 

The parties advance the same arguments and evidence with respect to the remaining steps of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis for the retaliation claim as for the discrimination claim. For reasons stated

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supra, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that there

is a genuine issue of material fact as to discriminatory pretext or retaliation. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s

motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 46). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 20, 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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