Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00377/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00377-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Property Damage

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LINDA PEACOCK, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 05-0377-BH-C

BURNEY H. MERRILL, et al., :

Defendants.

ORDER

This cause is before the Court on the Merrill defendants’ motion to

compel as to Disk #2 (Doc. 390), plaintiff’s reply (Doc. 397), the Merrill

defendants’ rebuttal (Doc. 408), plaintiff’s surreply (Doc. 411), and the Merrill

defendants’ notice of supplemental authority (Doc. 443). Having considered

the contents of these pleadings, and the attachments thereto, this order is

entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Rule 72.2(a).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. On May 18, 2007, the Merrill defendants filed a motion to

compel production of plaintiff’s most recent tax returns as well as electronic

information, specifically “a full and complete inspection of electronic

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 1 of 26
1 Peacock 20441 has been referred to as Disk 1. (See Doc. 242, at 1) 

2 This agreement reads, in relevant part, as follows:

The examination of the disk will take several steps:

First, our office will make the disk available to you for your examination

in our office only. The examination of the disk will be conducted either by nondestructive measures, or will be solely conducted on a copy of the “original” disk,

in order to protect the data on the “original” disk.

Second, you will provide counsel for Linda Peacock all data recovered

from the disk in a hard copy form (if possible and, if not, in an electronic form).

In the event the data can be printed, each page will be printed, and marked with a

Bates labeled with the prefix “Peacock” and numbered sequentially, in the

previously established order. The total number of pages will be reported to

counsel for both parties.

Third, counsel for Linda Peacock will conduct a privilege review of the

data. Any and all privileged data will be identified for you, and for counsel to the

Merrills by counsel for Linda Peacock. In addition, counsel for Linda Peacock

will also identify any confidential or irrelevant information, as well as

information protected by the Attorney Work Product Doctrine.

Fourth, you agree not to disclose, either directly or indirectly, to anyone

other than counsel for Linda Peacock any data identified as privileged,

2

information contained on a certain disk bate-stamp number ‘Peacock 20441'”1

and “‘Disk #2.’” (Doc. 242, at 1) Plaintiff responded on June 5, 2007 that the

motion to compel was moot. (Doc. 307)

3. First, a floppy disk-The Merrill Defendants have

demanded access to the data on a damaged floppy disk.

4. The floppy disk, by agreement, had been

examined previously by a local computer service company, The

Computer Broker (renamed the Computer Professional). The

Agreement is attached.2

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 2 of 26
confidential, irrelevant or protected by the Attorney Work Product Doctrine.

Fifth, counsel for Linda Peacock will provide to counsel for the Merrills

all data not withheld as confidential, irrelevant, privileged, or protected by the

Attorney Work Product Doctrine. Documents withheld from production will be

identified on a privilege log in a form consistent with the requirements of Court in

this matter.

(Doc. 307, Exhibit A) 

3

5. The floppy disk held Quick Books data or

Quicken data (which could not be opened, read or printed) and

pages of text (which were printed and produced).

6. The Computer Professional suggested that perhaps

Quick Books or Quicken could open the data files. 

7. After a diligent search, counsel for Linda Peacock

was not able to engage the Data Recovery Services of Intuit, the

owner of the Quick Books and Quicken software. As a result,

counsel for Linda Peacock engaged The Computer Professional

to do so. 

8. Documents recovered by Intuit, if any, will be

produced pursuant to the written Agreement. 

9. Second, a second computer disk-The computer

disk has been located and the responsive documents have been

produced or listed on a privilege log.

10. Linda Peacock objects to the production of the

computer disk itself on the following grounds:

A. Hard-copy documents of all responsive

documents have been produced or have been listed on a

privilege log. As a practical matter, it appears that this hardcopy production is a duplication of previous hard-copy

production in material respects.

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 3 of 26
4

B. The disk itself contains documents which

are privileged, are confidential, are not relevant, and will not

lead to the introduction of relevant evidence.

C. Linda Peacock objected to the production

of privileged and confidential information.

D. Rule 26(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, limits discovery to relevant information or

information which is reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence. The production of the disk

itself violates the limitation of Rule 26(b).

...

11. Third, Linda Peacock’s tax returns for 2004, 2005

and 2006-The tax returns for 2004 and 2005 have been

produced. There is no tax return for 2006.

(Id. at 1-3 & 5 (internal footnote and citations omitted; footnote added))

2. At a hearing held in this case on June 7, 2007, counsel for the

Merrill defendants agreed that its motion to compel production of plaintiff’s

tax return information was moot, same having been provided. Moreover,

counsel for the Merrill defendants informed the Court that its motion to

compel Disk 1 data was not ripe for review in light of the fact that a copy of

the damaged disk had been forwarded to Intuit, the owner of the Quick Books

software, for recovery of electronic data. However, counsel for the Merrill

defendants would not agree that the motion to compel electronic data from

Disk 2 was moot; in fact, counsel stated the Merrill defendants wanted

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 4 of 26
3 Counsel for plaintiff argued that the motion to compel production of Disk 2 was

due to be denied because plaintiff had produced, in hard copy form, all relevant, non-privileged

documents on the disk.

5

production of Disk 2. After hearing the arguments by counsel for plaintiff3 and

the Merrill defendants, the undersigned ordered plaintiff to extract from Disk

2 all relevant, non-privileged information and produce it to the Merrill

defendants in electronic form. (See Doc. 310, at 2 (“The parties agreed to a

plan to have the relevant and non-privileged information that is stored on the

single disc at issue produced in a usuable electronic format.”)) Plaintiff

supplied the Merrill defendants with what she considered to be the relevant,

non-privileged documents off of Disk 2, on June 28, 2007, in appropriate

electronic format. (See Doc. 356, at ¶ 4)

3. On August 2, 2007, the Merrill defendants filed a motion to

compel production by Peacock of the Disk 2 directory of documents. (Doc.

356) Counsel for the Merrill defendants were concerned that relevant

documents might have been erased from the heavily edited copy of Disk 2

produced to them. (See id.) Following an evidentiary hearing on August 30,

2007, during which the relevant parties argued this motion, the Court, on

September 6, 2007 granted the Merrill defendants’ motion to compel the disk

directory. (See Doc. 377) “This production will allow the other parties, and

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 5 of 26
4 Prior to the filing of this most recent motion to compel, counsel for the relevant

parties exchanged letters. (See Doc. 390, Exhibits E & M) Counsel for the Merrill defendants

wrote to plaintiff’s counsel on September 7, 2007 the following letter:

I have reviewed the “hard copy” of the disk directory. Now that I have

reviewed the titles, and learned that documents you deleted included “Quicken”

accounting files as well as “Word” files, I am particularly concerned that you and

I have different ideas as to what is relevant or potentially relevant. As we have

discussed before, and as supported by authorities cited in my briefing to the

Court, I do not believe it is appropriate for you to make the decision as to which

documents are relevant or potentially relevant. You cannot be expected to know

all of my theories of the case; nor am I obligated to reveal to you my mental

impressions as to all of my theories.

Given these facts, I ask that you provide us with an exact electronic copy

of the CD-ROM Disk #2 that includes all documents in electronic form except

those 10 documents on which you have claimed privilege. As with all discovery,

objections as to admissibility and relevancy are reserved, and you can argue lack

of relevancy should we list a document you believe to be irrelevant on our exhibit

list.

If there is a document that is of particular “privacy,” please highlight that

document on the disk printout when producing to us the unedited (with exception

of privilege) CD-ROM. If we disagree with you that the document is private and

has no relevance, we can submit that issue to the Court. If we agree, we will

promptly delete the document from the disk, and verify to you in writing that it

has been deleted. I am confident we can agree on those issues once we have had

an opportunity to review the document.

6

possibly the Court, to determine if all relevant and nonprivileged documents

have been produced as required by previous order.” (Id.)

4. Based upon the number of documents listed on the disk directory

in comparison to the number of documents electronically produced, the Merrill

defendants, on September 25, 2007, filed the instant motion to compel

production of Disk 2. (Doc. 390)4

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 6 of 26
There are some documents, however, that may be “private” and totally

lacking in relevance in part (such as a “love letter” between Ms. Peacock and her

ex-husband), that has a sentence or two that discusses the Floragon stock, or some

other issue that does have potential relevance. We are in the best position to make

that determination, as only we know our “theories of the case.” 

Please let me know if you will comply with our request for production of a

true and accurate electronic copy of the CD-ROM disk we have referred to as

Disk #2, the disk from which the 54-page “hard copy” of the index was printed. If

you will not, I request a telephone conference to discuss this issue in an attempt to

reach an agreement. I would suggest 2 p.m. on Tuesday, September 11, 2007. If

that is not a convenient time for you, please suggest an alternate date and time,

and I will be glad to accommodate your schedule.

(Doc. 390, Exhibit M) Thereafter, counsel for the Merrill defendants penned the following letter

to plaintiff’s counsel on September 10, 2007:

I am in receipt of your letter of September 10th, 2007. . . .

I would note the proposals outlined in your letter were not discussed in

our “meet and confer” conference held earlier today at your request versus the

time I had scheduled for Tuesday. Although none of your proposals are

acceptable, it would have been helpful to have [been] presented [them] either

before or during our “meet and confer” conferences. A primary reason for this

request is I have spent much of the morning drafting our Motion to Compel,

devoting time to that task after and only after an impasse was reached. Had any of

your proposals been satisfactory, the time spent in drafting the Motion to Compel

would have been an unnecessary expense for our clients.

None of your three suggestions for settlement are acceptable. Based on

titles alone, there are non-privileged documents you have intentionally deleted

from a disk the Court ordered produced that are, at a very minimum, potentially

relevant or may contain information that could lead to relevant evidence. The

Merrill Defendants should not have to pay for the right to review those documents

themselves versus relying on your unilateral determination that the documents are

not relevant, potentially relevant, nor reasonably calculated to lead to relevant

evidence. Nor should the Merrills be required to delegate that task to an attorney

other than their attorneys, the ones most familiar with the facts of this case,

including their theories of the case.

7

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 7 of 26
There is no burden on you to produce an exact copy of Disk #2 less

privileged documents. You have rejected a resolution that had been acceptable to

you for handling even privileged documents produced by third parties. Any

legitimate claims of “personal” can be accommodated, as outlined in my letter of

September 7th. I would note your client’s threshold for “personal” must be fairly

high, as she produced several “love letters” from her ex-husband in prior

document productions. Even those letters may have contained discovery

information. For example, they could be used as evidence of lack of animosity

between the Plaintiff and Mr. Uter at the time they were written. Even today, I

could not rule out their potential relevance. You may have some other potentially

relevant uses for those letters I am not aware of, and do not have a “right” to be

aware of, as this would infringe on “mental impressions of counsel.” My point is

one made repeatedly by federal courts; relevancy for discovery purposes is

extremely broad.

You have gone to great effort, causing the Merrill Defendants great

expense, to delete hundreds of documents from a disk you were ordered by the

Court to produce. Your claim of “irrelevant” has a hollow ring given your claim

that computer records we have subpoenaed that relate or may relate to your

client’s claim of a hard drive “crash” were “irrelevant” for discovery purposes. It

is apparent we have fundamental differences on what is or may be relevant

evidence in this case, and we are not comfortable with trusting you to unilaterally

make that determination.

I would note you have produced hundreds (if not thousands) of irrelevant

documents in earlier productions. We, also, have produced hundreds if not

thousands of pages of documents we believed were irrelevant – but we recognized

your right to review and make that determination. I’m sure only a small number

of the thousands of pages of documents you have obtained from Floragon will,

ultimately, be deemed relevant by any party to this action. The point is, whether a

document is or is not potentially relevant is not a decision to be unilaterally made

by opposing counsel when the document is clearly only that (sic) has been

requested in discovery. Disk #2 has clearly been requested during discovery.

The fact that complex commercial cases typically involve thousand[s] of

pages of document production, only a small portion of which are introduced as

evidence at trial, demonstrates that most of the documents produced are

determined, ultimately, to be irrelevant for trial purposes. That determination is

typically not made, as contemplated by the Court’s scheduling orders, until the

very end of the case as to which documents are relevant for purposes of trial.

8

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 8 of 26
(Doc. 390, Exhibit E) The September 10, 2007 letter from plaintiff’s counsel referenced in the

foregoing letter reads, in relevant part, as follows:

I object to the production of such irrelevant documents. The law is clear.

No party is required to produce irrelevant documents. Contrary to Ed’s position,

the cases he cites do not stand for the proposition that the requesting party is

allowed to look at all documents of the defendant (relevant, irrelevant, personal

and confidential) in order for the requesting party to decide which may be helpful.

Nevertheless, in an effort to resolve this dispute informally without the

intervention of the Court, I propose three alternatives:

1. Irrelevancy Log: In satisfaction of your request, I propose an

agreement whereby I prepare a log of the irrelevant documents that briefly

describes each document on the index. In that the law does not require a party to

prepare an “Irrelevancy Log”, the Merrills will agree to pay our fees for its

preparation. Alternately, I would be willing to produce a log of only the

documents you select from the index, but again, at your expense.

2. Submittal to the Court: As a second alternative, I propose an

agreement whereby I submit the irrelevant documents to the Court for the Court

to determine which are relevant and which are not relevant. There will be no

agreement regarding the apportionment of costs.

3. Submittal to a Neutral: As a third alternative . . . I will submit the

irrelevant documents to a Court-appointed Neutral. The Neutral will follow the

procedure like the one that I outlined in my prior Motion for Appointment of a

Neutral, including the apportionment of costs between the parties.

(Doc. 408, Exhibit L)

 

9

The Plaintiff does not claim these 1,318 deleted documents are

duplicates of previously produced documents; nor that they are

privileged. Plaintiff now claims these documents, by Plaintiff’s

unilateral determination, have no relevance or potential

relevance, and contain no information reasonably calculated to

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 9 of 26
10

lead to relevant evidence. As discussed in more detail below,

that is not a decision for Plaintiff’s counsel to make when “the

document” (i.e., the CD-ROM as the electronic storage medium

on which clearly relevant documents were stored) was

responsive to the production request.

The Plaintiff deleted all 60 of the Quicken files from

Disk #2 despite the fact these files contained “modification

dates” ranging from February 2002, the month before the

alleged stock sale, through September of 2005, the year this

lawsuit was filed. Obviously, a document has to exist before it

can be modified; therefore, the deleted files include records that

existed as of 3/21/02, the date of the $60,000 entry on Exhibit

18 to Peacock’s deposition. These files were omitted despite

Plaintiff’s knowledge that the Merrill Defendants considered the

electronic version of those check register records extremely

relevant to this case.

...

There can be no doubt that “Disk #2,” as the electronic

medium on which clearly relevant documents were stored, is

responsive to a production request dated July 7, 2006. The Court

has rejected the Plaintiff’s arguments that the electronic storage

medium need not be produced as “duplicative” of the “hard

copy” of documents (Doc. 307) in view of clear evidence that

information is contained on the disk that is not found on

printouts from that disk. Such electronically stored data includes

dates a document was created and/or last modified. 

The issue before the Court can be summarized as follows:

Must counsel for the Defendants in a multimillion dollar claim by the Plaintiff rely on

opposing counsel’s unilateral determination that

a “document” (i.e., the electronic medium on

which clearly relevant documents were stored)

has no relevance or potential relevance, and does

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 10 of 26
11

not contains (sic) facts or assertions that might

lead to relevant evidence?

. . . 

[T]here can be little doubt that “Quicken” files that include the

critical March, 2002, time period are relevant, potentially

relevant, or may reasonably lead to discovery of relevant

evidence. March of 2002 is, of course, the time period in which

the Plaintiff alleges paying $100,000 as consideration for stock

she claims to own. The Plaintiff has produced a “hard copy”

printout of a Quicken document . . . as alleged evidence of

partial payment ($60,000) of this amount. This document shows

an entry dated March 21, 2002, which Plaintiff has alleged

demonstrates the source of funds used for a portion of the

consideration she paid. Yet, the Plaintiff has failed to produce,

as of the date of this Motion, the electronic version of that

computer record. It is unknown whether the electronic copy of

this document was on one of the 1,318 files the Plaintiff erased

from Disk #2 as produced. . . . [T]he Merrill Defendants “may

find a beneficial use” for the accounting records and other nonprivileged files on Disk #2 “which escapes” Plaintiff’s counsel.

...

The Merrill Defendants, in an attempt to accommodate

any legitimate concerns the Plaintiff might have, agreed to use

the same “pull back” of documents procedure the parties agreed

would apply to non-party production. . . . The Plaintiff rejected

that compromise offer, leaving the Merrill Defendants with two

options:

1. Move to compel production of Disk

#2, unedited, except for the Plaintiff deleting only

those documents listed on its privilege log.

2. Accept the opinion of the Plaintiff’s

attorney that none of the approximately 1,308

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 11 of 26
12

non-privileged files erased from the disk were

relevant, potentially relevant, or contained facts,

assertions or information that might lead to

relevant information when it is apparent the

documents withheld include accounting records

from the critical time period in which Plaintiff

says she paid $100,000 for stock.

...

The Plaintiff has refused to produce a Copy of Disk #2 (less

privileged documents) even under the “pull back” agreement the

parties had previously adopted regarding production of

documents that may be private, confidential, and not relevant,

potentially relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to relevant

evidence.

It should be noted the Plaintiff can hardly claim that

production of a true and accurate copy of Disk #2 would be

unduly burdensome. It would have been less burdensome on all

concerned to have copied the disk in its entirely (sic) with the

exception of the files for which the Plaintiff has claimed

privilege.

Unfortunately, intervention of the Court is required to

assure the previous order of this Court has been complied with

by the Plaintiff, and that all documents that are relevant,

potentially relevant, or reasonably calculated to lead to

discovery of relevant evidence, have been produced.

(Id. at 5-6, 11-12, 13, 14 & 15 (internal footnotes omitted; emphasis in

original))

5. In her reply, filed October 5, 2007, plaintiff contends not only

that “[a]ll relevant and responsive documents from Disk #2 have been

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 12 of 26
5 Plaintiff’s counsel sent to counsel for the Merrill defendants several letters

penned in late September of 2007, and one dated October 5, 2007, regarding Disk #2 which she

13

produced[]” but also that all “non-responsive documents which have not been

produced have been made available for inspection.” (Doc. 397, at ¶ 8; see also

id. at ¶ 9 (“[T]o cut off the cost of Plaintiff’s right to oppose the production of

non-responsive documents, Plaintiff has offered the Defendants access to the

non-responsive documents under a proposal of confidentiality. [] The

Defendants have ignored the offer.”))

To be clear, Plaintiff has:

a. Produced responsive and relevant

documents in electronic form (including a number

of duplicates) and in hard copy form (including a

number of duplicates).

b. Produced all inadvertently omitted

Quicken and QuickBooks documents, many in

both hard copy form as well as electronic files

associated with the Quicken and QuickBooks.

c. Offered the Defendants an

opportunity to read all non-responsive documents,

but this offer has been ignored by Defendants.

The twelve (12) documents listed by the

Defendants in their Motion to Compel are nonresponsive. However, the twelve (12) documents

are included in the non-responsive documents and

Defendants have been invited to read them,

subject to a reasonable confidentiality agreement.

(Id. at ¶ 13 (footnote omitted))5

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 13 of 26
has attached to her reply. Plaintiff’s counsel’s letter of September 27, 2007 reads, in relevant

part, as follows:

I am enclosing two CDs of the Quicken files from the CD marked

“Peacock 26851". The CDs were created by Bridge City Legal Services in

Portland, Oregon.

One CD contains eleven (11) Quicken files in their native format. . . .

The second CD contains (2) Quicken files in their native format which

Bridge City is not able to open.

...

For the most part, the Quicken files appear to be duplicates of each other. .

. .

Also, the Quicken files are duplicates of hard documents previously

produced, at least for the relevant period of this lawsuit. . . .

As background, prior to Ed Fleming’s letter of September 7, 2007, we

were not able to open or print the Quicken data on the CD marked Peacock26851. As a result, unknowingly we were not dealing with the universe of

documents when we produced the hard copies or the electronic copies.

As a result of Ed Fleming’s letter, we retraced our steps, and engaged the

services of the forensic specialists at Bridge City Legal Services. 

Bridge City identified thirteen (13) Quicken files, eleven (11) of which

Bridge City was able to open. Bridge City could not open two (2) Quicken files,

which they assume are damaged.

Using recently acquired software, we could only open three (3) of the

Quicken files in our office.

To accommodate our lack of familiarity with Quicken, and our inability to

open and read most of the files, Bridge City “converted” the data from Quicken to

an Excel format, using a conversion software proprietary to Bridge City. The

conversion software cannot be purchased.

14

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 14 of 26
The metadata of the Quicken files is not preserved when the Quicken files

are converted to the Excel format. As I understand it, you are only interested in

the Quicken files in their “native format.” Accordingly, that Excel format is not

useful to you, and I have not included a CD of the Excel format.

However, you may have difficulty opening and reading the Quicken files

in their “native state.” If so, I will be happy to share with you the data in an Excel

format (so both of us will be using the data in the same format), based on a

limited waiver of the protections of the attorney work product doctrine and a

possible sharing of the cost of the creation of the Excel format.

(Doc. 397, Exhibit D) Plaintiff’s letter of September 28, 2007, reads as follows:

The CD marked “Peacock 26851” has a number of documents which are

very personal to Linda Peacock, or even personal to her family. Some of the emails relate to personal relationships with her immediate family, and other

documents appear to be school papers of her children. The documents are

irrelevant to this lawsuit, and are not subject to production.

Despite this, you continue to insist on access to both privileged documents

and irrelevant documents, including a demand that you read the highly personal

and irrelevant documents of Linda Peacock in order for you to decide for yourself

if the documents are or are not relevant.

Your Motion to Compel the CD Peacock 2685[1] would require the

production of privileged and irrelevant documents. Again, we stand by our

position that discovery is limited to relevant documents and non-privileged

documents. We further stand by our position there is no accommodation in the

law allowing the requesting party to review all documents, including privileged

and irrelevant documents.

In an attempt to reach an informal agreement, and to avoid the continuing

expense of a dispute over the production of irrelevant documents, I am offering to

allow you to read the documents which have been withheld as irrelevant. Our

allowing this review would be contingent on your agreement that the review is

not a waiver of our claim that these documents are irrelevant and need not be

produced. The documents are marked “Peacock-irlvt-1” through “Peacock-irlvt490”. For any document that you agree is irrelevant or is ultimately deemed

irrelevant by the Court, we must agree that you will maintain the confidentiality

of the content of these documents.

15

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 15 of 26
This review will give you an opportunity to identify which documents you

believe are irrelevant and which documents you believe are relevant. You will

have an opportunity to agree or disagree with our claim of lack of relevancy. We

ask that you identify by Bates number any document you believe is relevant. If we

agree to waive the claim of lack of relevancy, the document will be included in

production. If we disagree, the document will be submitted to the Court to

determine relevancy.

As a second alternative, I propose that all of the documents withheld as

irrelevant be tendered to Judge Cassady for him to decide if they are relevant.

Please give me a call if you agree to either proposal.

(Doc. 397, Exhibit A) Finally, on October 5, 2007, plaintiff’s counsel penned the following letter

to counsel for the Merrill defendants:

With belts and suspenders in mind (and without full knowledge of either

the data or the software) I am enclosing a CD of all Quicken data, including the

“associated” files, from the CD marked “Peacock-26851.”

The CD’s I have delivered to you on September 27, 2007 did not include

the “associated” files of Quicken. Again, with an eye toward completeness, but

without any understanding of the usefulness of “associated” files, I am enclosing

all files related to Quicken, including the “associated” files.

The files were retrieved from the CD Peacock-26851 by Bridge City, emailed to our firm, and copied onto a disk by our firm.

If you have questions, I will do what I can to answer them.

(Doc. 397, Exhibit C)

16

6. The Merrill defendants’ rebuttal to the plaintiff’s reply, filed on

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 16 of 26
6 On October 19, 2007, plaintiff’s counsel penned a letter to counsel for the Merrill

defendants, therein noting that he was opposing the defendants’ motion for additional time to file

a reply, in part, because he had “produced or have agreed to make available all documents on

Disk #2, with the exception of the privileged documents.” (Doc. 408, Exhibit Q, at 2; see also id.

(“For all practical purposes, I have done what you had asked in your motion. With that in mind,

it seems to me that discovery efforts would be better served looking at the documents we have

offered instead of filing additional briefs to the Court.”))

17

October 23, 2007,6 reads, in relevant part, as follows:

Up until her most recent filing, the Plaintiff argued that

Disk 2 was not produced because it contained information that

was “irrelevant”. The Plaintiff now claims, for the first time, that

the Quicken files were not produced because “our staff had not

been able to open or print the Quicken or QuickBooks data on

CD-ROM Peacock-26581. Plaintiff further claims that they have

been able to retrieve some of this data, but only through

“converting” it into a format that deletes [] the “metadata”

information showing the dates of creation and modification of

the documents. That is evidence the Plaintiff knows Defendants

have been seeking.

Of course, whether the Quicken accounting information

could be opened provides no excuse for Plaintiff’s failure to

disclose its existence. Plaintiff knew or should have known from

a cursory investigation of the disk that the Quicken accounting

information existed, yet it has taken three motions to compel for

the Merrill Defendants to even learn of the existence of those

files.

The Plaintiff’s actions have, at a minimum, delayed the

Defendants’ right to discover this evidence.

...

What we do know is that neither the original of Disk 1,

nor the original of Disk 2, have been made available for viewing

by the Merrill Defendants. What we do know is that metadata is

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 17 of 26
18

effectively lost through making copies of the originals. What we

do know is that the Plaintiff has made multiple copies, and has

“converted” data to a format that effectively deletes creation and

modification date evidence.

...

The Plaintiff has represented to the Court that she has

“offered the Defendants access to the non-responsive

documents” under a “proposal of confidentiality.” In a letter

dated October 19, 2007, the Plaintiff’s counsel states he has

“produced or agreed to make available all documents on Disk

#2, with the exception of the privileged documents.” These are

fundamentally inaccurate and/or misleading characterizations of

the Plaintiff’s “offer.” Several points need to be made on this

issue:

1. Prior to the Merrill Defendants filing the Motion

to Compel production of the disk directory of Disk 2, no offer

to produce hundreds of files omitted from the copy of the

electronic media requested (Disk 2) had been made. In fact, the

Plaintiff effectively concealed the existence of the Quicken files

on Disk 2, having testified in her deposition that she was aware

of only one disk (Disk 1) that contained Quicken files. The

Merrill Defendants learned of these previously concealed

Quicken files after and only after a directory of Disk 2,

produced only upon an order from this Court, revealed their

existence. It should be noted that a previous directory produced

by Plaintiff’s counsel showed only MS-Word files, and made no

indication that it was only a partial directory.

2. The actual proposal by the Plaintiff required the

Merrill Defendants, who have already incurred thousand[s] of

dollars in attorney’s fees seeking production of two disks that

should have been produced last year, to pay the Plaintiff’s

attorney’s fees to develop a list of electronic documents deleted

from the heavily redacted disks that the Plaintiff eventually

produced. No provision was made for payment of the attorney’s

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 18 of 26
19

fees incurred by the Merrill Defendants, an issue now pending

before this Court.

The Plaintiff proposed alternatives that would have the

omitted documents submitted to the Court for a “relevancy”

review (although no timely objection was made to production of

the disks), or submission to a “special master” at the expense of

[the] Merrill Defendants for a “relevancy” review. As has been

pointed out in previous briefings, it would not be possible for

the Court or a special master to know whether a document

contains information that may be relevant to a defense theory of

defense counsel absent a complete disclosure of the mental

impressions of counsel. Discovery “relevancy” is extremely

broad . . . . None of the proposals addressed the pending motion

for sanctions against the Plaintiff for her repeated discovery

abuses.

3. Last[,] but not least, this “offer” was not made

until after the “meet and confer” attempts by the Merrill

Defendants resulted in no offers by the Plaintiff on this issue,

and was made after and only after the Merrill Defendants were

required to incur additional fees and costs in preparing and filing

their 15 page Motion to Compel. Once again, the Plaintiff’s

offer does not include reimbursement of those fees and costs

It is respectfully submitted that the time to settle a

discovery dispute is before or during the “meet and confer”

conference(s); not after a party is required to incur substantial

fees and costs preparing and filing a detailed motion and

memorandum to compel what should have been done without

the necessity of a motion. Thus, even had the Plaintiff made the

offer represented, and she did not, the Merrill Defendants would

be entitled to recovery of fees and costs incurred to force the

Plaintiff to do what it (sic) should have done last year[,] i.e.,

produce the requested, un[-]objected “documents[.]”

(Doc. 408, at 14-15 & 24-27 (internal citations omitted)) In their rebuttal, the

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20

Merrill defendants seek to compel the production not only of Disk 2 but also

Disk 1. (Doc. 408, at 28) 

7. The surreply of plaintiff, filed October 30, 2007, reads, in

relevant part, as follows: 

13. Disk #2 was copied and processed by Bridge City

Legal, Inc.

14. First, the relevant Word documents on Disk #2

were produced in electronic form with perfectly preserved

metadata, as well as hard copies.

15. Second, Bridge City’s forensic experts identified

Quicken/QuickBooks files on Disk #2. As an initial step, Bridge

City created “mirror image” copies of the Quicken/QuickBooks

files, preserving all metadata. Unfortunately, those “mirror

image” copies are not readable.

16. To accommodate a privilege review and

production, Bridge City processed the data. More specifically:

A. First, some of the Quicken/QuickBooks

files were password protected. As a result, a number of the

“mirror image” copies of the Quicken/QuickBooks files were

not readable without removal of the passwords. Accordingly,

Bridge City removed the passwords to accommodate a privilege

review and meaningful production. Copies of

Quicken/QuickBooks files without passwords were produced to

the Merrill Defendants.

B. Second, some of the Quicken/QuickBooks files

were corrupted. Bridge City’s forensic experts were able to

access these files to recover data. The processed

Quicken/QuickBooks files were produced to the Merrills.

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 20 of 26
21

C. In a third category, some of the files were

corrupted. Bridge City was not able to retrieve the data. The

corrupted Quicken/QuickBooks files were produced to the

Merrill Defendants.

17. In summary, Plaintiff has produced electronic

versions of the Quicken/QuickBooks files which have been

processed to remove passwords, and to allow the data to be read

by the Defendants. Without the processing, the files could not

have been read by the Merrill Defendants.

18. Bridge City Legal reports that the removal of the

passwords and other processing may have altered some

metadata. The processing and alterations were unavoidable to

make the data readable. However, there are no alterations to the

content data.

19. To accommodate verification by the Merrill

Defendants of the preservation of the data, Plaintiff is today

hand delivering the “mirror image” Quicken/QuickBooks files,

as unprocessed in any way. These “mirror image” files are exact

duplicates of the original source data (including all metadata),

but generally are not readable.

(Doc. 411, at 4-5 (emphasis in original; internal citation omitted))

DISPOSITION OF THE MOTION TO COMPEL

1. Before addressing the Merrill defendants’ motion to compel

production of Disk #2 (Doc. 390), the undersigned finds it necessary to first

address these defendants’ request, set forth for the initial time in their rebuttal

to plaintiff’s reply, that this Court compel the plaintiff to produce an exact

duplicate of Disk 1 (See Doc. 408, at 28). This request is DENIED inasmuch

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22

as the motion to compel under consideration by this Court, as aforesaid, is

directed solely to Disk 2 (Doc. 390 (“MERRILL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO COMPEL AS TO DISK #2")), not Disk 1. As the undersigned read and

understood the motion to compel (Doc. 390), reference to Disk 1 was made

only to set the proper context for the Merrill defendants’ request that the Court

compel production of Disk 2. Without a motion directed to its production, the

undersigned considers the production of the badly-damaged Disk 1 to be a

dead issue. Certainly, this Court will not give any credence or force to a

moving party’s request, made for the first time in a rebuttal to a reply to a

motion to compel, to compel production of electronically stored information

that was not encompassed within the motion to compel presently before this

Court for a ruling. If the Merrill defendants desire to inspect this badlydamaged disk they must either file another motion to compel or coordinate

with plaintiff’s counsel an inspection of same when they are at the office of

plaintiff’s counsel inspecting Disk 2, as explained more fully infra.

2. In moving to compel an exact duplicate of Disk 2, save for the

ten or so documents identified by plaintiff as privileged, the Merrill defendants

ignore the Court’s instructions to plaintiff, following the hearing on June 7,

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 22 of 26
7 These instructions were not modified in any manner when the Court ordered

plaintiff to produce the disk directory.

8 The exception, however, is with respect to the Quicken/QuickBooks documents.

The Merrill defendants have established that these documents are relevant under the broad

concept of discovery relevancy. West, supra, at *2. Following the filing of the instant motion to

23

2007,7 to produce all “relevant” non-privileged information from Disk 2 in a

usable electronic form. The Merrill defendants now make the argument that it

is not for plaintiff to decide what is relevant information; instead, the

defendants contend that this is a task only they can perform. The obvious

problem with this argument, of course, is that it is clearly implicit within the

Court’s instructions during and following the June 7, 2007 hearing that

relevancy was to be determined by the producing party, that is, the plaintiff.

Moreover, this stance runs contrary to legal authority which provides that “‘the

proponent of a motion to compel discovery [still] bears the initial burden of

proving that the information sought is relevant.’” West v. Miller, 2006 WL

2349988, *2 (2006) (citations omitted), aff’d, 2007 WL 541943 (N.D. Ill.

2007); see also Alexander v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 186 F.R.D. 154,

159 (D. D.C. 1999) (“[T]he proponent of a motion to compel discovery bears

the initial burden of proving that the information sought is relevant.”). To a

fairly large extent, the Merrill defendants have not established that the

information contained on Disk 2 is relevant to these proceedings;8

 rather, this

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compel, the Merrill defendants were provided with copies of these Quicken documents in

electronic form, albeit apparently not in the form which they seek in their motion. It appears to

the Court that most, if not all, of these documents were actually provided to the Merrill

defendants in “hard” form prior to their production electronically. 

9 In addition, it is clear to the undersigned that a number of “documents” on the

directory of Disk 2 are, in actuality, not documents at all.

24

Court must agree with plaintiff that hundreds of documents contained on the

disk are irrelevant and confidential, related as they are to homework

assignments completed by plaintiff’s children, personal communications

among family members, and the like.9

 Despite their apparent irrelevancy,

plaintiff has agreed to allow the Merrill defendants access to Disk 2 for their

inspection and review of these documents. Moreover, the undersigned would

be remiss in not ordering plaintiff to produce the Quicken documents in their

native electronic format in light of plaintiff’s discovery of same after the Court

initially ordered production of all relevant, non-privileged information on June

7, 2007.

3. In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Merrill

defendants’ motion to compel as set forth hereinafter. Consistent with the

provisions of Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff is to

make available to counsel for the Merrill defendants--as well as any

technology consultants/experts retained by the Merrill defendants--for their

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 24 of 26
10 The Court understands that it may be impossible for counsel for the Merrill

defendants, and these defendants’ computer expert(s), to access the metadata associated with

some of the Quicken files/documents. 

11 The Merrill defendants are cautioned to be circumspect when tagging documents

on Disk 2. It cannot be gainsaid that homework completed by plaintiff’s children, poems written

by plaintiff’s children, and other personal documents generated by plaintiff and/or her children

are entirely IRRELEVANT to this litigation; therefore, those documents are not to be “tagged”

and copied or downloaded by the Merrill defendants.

25

review and inspection, at the office of plaintiff’s counsel, an exact copy of

Disk 2, except for those ten documents previously identified as privileged on

or before January 25, 2008. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b)(i)-(iii) (“Unless the

parties otherwise agree, or the court otherwise orders: (i) a party who produces

documents for inspection shall produce them as they are kept in the usual

course of business or shall organize and label them to correspond with the

categories in the request; (ii) if a request does not specify the form or forms for

producing electronically stored information, a responding party must produce

the information in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a

form or forms that are reasonably usable; and (iii) a party need not produce the

same electronically stored information in more than one form.”). All electronic

information shall be submitted for inspection in its native electronic format so

that defense counsel and their computer expert(s) can access all metadata.10 All

documents deemed by counsel for the Merrill defendants to be relevant to

these proceedings should be “tagged”;11 those documents not tagged by

Case 1:05-cv-00377-KD-C Document 447 Filed 01/17/08 Page 25 of 26
12 The Court does not expect plaintiff’s counsel to necessarily agree with counsel for

the Merrill defendants that all “tagged” documents are relevant. Nonetheless, for purposes of

laying this issue to rest, plaintiff is ordered to allow the copying and downloading of all

documents in electronic form whether relevant or not. The undersigned reiterates that counsel for

the Merrill defendants should not “tag” for copying and downloading any of those documents

previously identified as clearly irrelevant. See, supra, Footnote 11.

26

counsel are not to be copied or downloaded by the Merrill defendants’

computer expert(s) or counsel for these defendants. The “tagged” documents

can be copied and downloaded by defendants’ counsel and computer expert(s)

to another disk which may be taken by counsel and/or the computer expert(s)

to defense counsel’s office. 12

4. Given the circumscribed manner in which the undersigned has

ordered production of (perhaps irrelevant) information contained on Disk 2,

the Court declines to award the moving parties attorneys’ fees.

CONCLUSION

The Merrill defendants’ motion to compel as to Disk #2 (Doc. 390) is

GRANTED in the limited manner set forth hereinabove. The request for an

award of attorneys’ fees is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this the 17th day of January, 2008.

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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