Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00336/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00336-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY GAINES, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-0336 FCD GGH P 

vs.

K. PROSPER, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 29, 2005, the court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. 

Pending before the court is the amended complaint filed April 22, 2005. Named as defendants

are K. Prosper, J. Briddle, J. Schores, D. Salzman, D. Granlees, B. Hall, W. Tyler, J. Crawford,

C. Griffith, S. Ransdell and Dr. Pomazol.

Plaintiff alleges that in October 2004 he was placed at the Arnold Unit Minimum

Support Facility. At that time, defendant Salzman told plaintiff that he did not allow inmates

with lower bunk chronos at the Arnold Unit. Plaintiff was sent to the two yard gym.

Plaintiff filed an ADA grievance claiming that he should be housed at the Arnold

Unit. Defendant Schores granted the grievance and plaintiff returned to the Arnold Unit. Upon

his return, defendant Salzman telephoned defendant Briddle and told him that plaintiff could not

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be at the Arnold Unit because he used a C-Pap machine which required a back-up generator. 

Defendant Briddle transferred plaintiff to the infirmary even though he knew the Arnold Unit had

a back-up generator. Plaintiff filed another ADA grievance, which defendant Schores again

granted. 

On November 10, 2004, plaintiff returned to the Arnold Unit. On November 25,

2004, defendant Tyler woke plaintiff up at 11:25 p.m. and took plaintiff to the office. Defendant

Crawford arrived and put handcuffs on plaintiff then told him that he was charged with a serious

rules violation, possession of an inmate manufactured weapon. Plaintiff was then placed in

administrative segregation (ad seg).

Defendant Granless found plaintiff guilty of the rules violation after denying

plaintiff’s request for a witness. Defendant Granless also stated that he did not need to see the

weapon because of how the reporting employee described it. Defendant Granless assessed

plaintiff 360 days of time credits and ordered him to spend time in the Security Housing Unit

(SHU). 

On February 10, 2005, plaintiff appeared before a classification committee which

included defendants Prosper and Schores. At the hearing, defendant Schores stated that the

weapon plaintiff was found guilty of possessing was just a fingernail file. Defendant Schores

asked that the plaintiff’s SHU term be suspended. 

Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal regarding the rules violation. Defendant

Ransdall did not timely respond to the appeal. Plaintiff filed an appeal addressed to the Warden,

defendant Prosper. This appeal was returned with the signature of the associate warden. 

While serving his SHU term, defendant Pomazol issued a chrono stating that

plaintiff could not be at the Arnold Unit, apparently for medical reasons. Plaintiff alleges that

defendant Pomazol falsified documents in support of the chrono. 

As legal claims, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. 

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The court first considers plaintiff’s ADA claim. The ADA forbids discrimination

against disabled individuals in major areas of public life, among them employment (Title I),

public services (Title II), and public accommodations (Title III). PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532

U.S. 661, 674, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). The court construes plaintiff’s ADA claim as having

been made pursuant to Title II. 

Title II prohibits a public entity from discriminating against a qualified individual

with a disability on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a claim of disability

discrimination under Title II, the plaintiff must allege four elements: 1) the plaintiff is an

individual with a disability; 2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the

benefit of some public entity’s service, programs or activities; 3) the plaintiff was either excluded

from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities,

or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and 4) such exclusion, denial of

benefits or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability. Weinreich v. L.A. County

Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff’s ADA claim is apparently based on defendants’ refusal to house him at

the Arnold Unit. Plaintiff does not allege what programs at the Arnold Unit he was excluded

from that he could not receive at other sections of the prison. Without this information, the court

cannot determine whether plaintiff has stated a colorable ADA claim. If plaintiff wanted to be

housed at the Arnold Unit based on reasons unrelated to his access to programs, such as the

Arnold Unit had better food, then he would not state an ADA claim. Accordingly, the ADA

claim is dismissed with leave to amend.

Plaintiff also appears to claim that he was denied due process at his disciplinary

hearing when he was not permitted to call witnesses. Plaintiff also suggests that the guilty

finding was not supported by sufficient evidence.

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), an Indiana state

prisoner brought a civil rights action under § 1983 for damages. Claiming that state and county

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officials violated his constitutional rights, he sought damages for improprieties in the

investigation leading to his arrest, for the destruction of evidence, and for conduct during his trial

(“illegal and unlawful voice identification procedure”). Convicted on voluntary manslaughter

charges, and serving a fifteen year term, plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief or release from

custody. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the

complaint and held that:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,

a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages

bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not

been so invalidated is not cognizable under 1983.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. The Court expressly held that a cause of action for

damages under § 1983 concerning a criminal conviction or sentence cannot exist unless the

conviction or sentence has been invalidated, expunged or reversed. Id.

In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997), the Supreme Court

held that Heck applies to challenges to prison disciplinary hearings when the nature of the

challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment. 

Edwards rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir.

1995) that a claim challenging only the procedures employed in a disciplinary hearing is not

barred by Heck.

Plaintiff’s claims regarding the disciplinary hearing implicate the validity of the

guilty finding, for which he was assessed time credits. These claims are barred unless the guilty

finding has been invalidated, expunged or reversed. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed

with leave to amend. Plaintiff should include these claims in an amended complaint only if they

are not barred by Heck and Edwards.

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Plaintiff also suggests that his transfer away from the Arnold Unit was retaliatory.

In order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plead facts which suggest that retaliation for

the exercise of protected conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the

defendant’s conduct. Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989);

Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff must also plead facts which

suggest an absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct he contends was retaliatory. 

Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995)(citing Rizzo at 532). Verbal harassment alone

is insufficient to state a claim. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, even threats of bodily injury are insufficient to state a claim, because a mere naked

threat is not the equivalent of doing the act itself. See Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir.

1987). Mere conclusions of hypothetical retaliation will not suffice, a prisoner must “allege

specific facts showing retaliation because of the exercise of the prisoner’s constitutional rights.” 

Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (n.1) (10th Cir. 1990). 

In Pratt, the Ninth Circuit concluded that in evaluating retaliation claims, courts

should defer “to prison officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for

conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995)). 

While plaintiff claims that he was transferred away from the Arnold Unit for false

reasons, he does not allege why defendants were motivated to remove him from the Arnold Unit

in the first place. That defendants removed him from the Arnold Unit for unmeritorious medical

reasons does not, standing alone, state a retaliation claim. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed

with leave to amend. In the second amended complaint, if plaintiff is stating a retaliation claim

against defendant Salzman for example, he must allege what protected conduct he was engaged

in that motivated defendant Salzman to have him removed from the Arnold Unit on false medical

grounds.

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Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Ransdell and Prosper did not properly

process his administrative grievances. Inmates lack a constitutional entitlement to a specific

grievance procedure. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the

due process claims against defendants Ransdell and Prosper based on their processing of his

administrative grievances are without merit.

Plaintiff may also be claiming that he was denied due process when he was

transferred away from the Arnold Unit. Due process is limited to conduct that amounts to an

“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995). Plaintiff does not allege that

his transfer to the two yard gym or the infirmary resulted in him suffering atypical and significant

hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, and the court doubts that plaintiff

could state such a claim. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by charging him

with a false rules violation report, placing him in ad seg and assessing him 360 days of time

credits. The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, imposes a duty

on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement and to take reasonable measures

to guarantee the safety of the inmates. Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Plaintiff’s claims do not implicate the Eighth Amendment.

The legal basis of plaintiff’s claim against defendant Pomazol is unclear. That

defendant Pomazol prepared a chrono falsely stating that plaintiff was not medically eligible to

be housed at the Arnold Unit does not state an Eighth Amendment claim. Nor does plaintiff

allege that defendant was motivated by retaliation. Accordingly, the claims against defendant

Pomazol are dismissed with leave to amend.

Plaintiff has requested the appointment of counsel. The United States Supreme

Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent

prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In

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certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991);

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). In the present case, the court

does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of

counsel will therefore be denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint filed April 22, 2005, is dismissed with thirty

days to file a second amended complaint; 

2. Plaintiff’s April 22, 2005 motion for the appointment of counsel is denied.

DATED: 5/23/05

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:bb

gai336.ame

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