Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00008/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00008-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDGAR CHAN-SOSA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-00008-SI 

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 9

BACKGROUND

On January 13, 2013, plaintiff Edgar Chan-Sosa’s sister was driving him and his three 

friends home from a San Francisco 49ers game. Complaint ¶ 11. Plaintiff was seated in the front 

seat, his friends were in the back “cargo area.” Id. The vehicle was pulled over by California 

Highway Patrol (“CHP”) Officers Allen and Jorgenson for a traffic violation. Id. The officers 

observed that the three individuals in the back seat were not wearing seat belts and that there was 

an open container of beer in the vehicle. Id. Plaintiff was not observed to have committed any 

violations of law. Id. The three passengers in the rear exited at the officers’ request. Id. Allen 

directed one of them to sit down, placed his hands on his shoulder and back, pushed him into a 

concrete trash receptacle, knocking it over and falling on top of him. Id. In response plaintiff and 

his sister existed the car and expressed their disapproval of Officer Allen’s conduct. Id. Officer 

Jorgenson removed his taser, put his hand on plaintiff’s chest, and directed him to move away. Id. 

Plaintiff swatted Jorgenson’s hand; in response, Jorgenson deployed his taser which struck 

plaintiff’s left eye and right jacket sleeve, however the taser did not properly charge. Id. Plaintiff 

put his hands in the air, turned around and began to walk away. Id. With the taser still attached, 

Jorgenson employed a “stun drive” placing the taser unit into plaintiff’s back and sending a charge 

to his eye and arm, causing serious injury. Id. Plaintiff was transported to Marin General Hospital 

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where he underwent emergency surgery on his eye. Id. He is still receiving treatment for his 

injuries, and he may have to undergo additional surgeries to implant an artificial lens. Id. His left 

eye is currently unable to focus. Id. 

Plaintiff filed the present action in Marin County Superior Court on July 23, 2014; on 

January 2, 2015, defendants removed this case to federal court. Docket No. 1. Plaintiffs alleges 

causes of action for (1) violation of civil rights under § 1983 (against Jorgenson and Allen), (2) 

violation of civil rights under § 1983 Monell liability (against the State of California, CHP, 

Jorgenson, and Allen), (3) unlawful customs, policies, habits, or procedures under § 1983 (against 

State of California and CHP), (4) California Constitution, Article I § 13 (against Jorgen, Allen, 

and State of California), (5) violation of civil rights under California Civil Code § 52.1(b) (against 

Jorgenson, Allen, State of California), (6) assault (against Jorgenson, Allen, State of California), 

(7) battery (against State of California, Jorgenson, Allen), (8) false arrest (against the State of 

California, CHP, Jorgenson, and Allen), (9) false imprisonment (against Jorgenson, Allen, State of 

California), (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress (against the State of California, CHP, 

Jorgenson, and Allen), (11) negligence (against the State of California, CHP, Jorgenson, and 

Allen), (12) negligent training and supervision under § 1983 (against State of California and 

CHP), (13) conspiracy (against Jorgenson and Allen), (14) injunctive relief (against the State of 

California, CHP, Jorgenson, and Allen). Complaint ¶¶ 17-84. Now before the Court is defendants’ 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Docket No. 9. 

DISCUSSION

I. § 1983 Claims and Injunctive Relief

Defendants argue that (1) § 1983 only allows actions against “persons,” therefore 

plaintiff’s claims against state entities should be dismissed with prejudice; and (2) plaintiff’s claim 

for injunctive relief should be dismissed with prejudice for lack of Article III standing. Def. Mot. 

at 5-7. Plaintiff admits that defendants “ha[ve] pointed out several errors in th[ese] claims [as] set 

forth in the complaint,” and therefore requests leave to amend. Pl. Opp’n at 7. On May 4, 2015, 

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United States District Court

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the Court DISMISSED these claims with leave to amend. Docket No. 25. Any amended 

complaint must be filed no later than June 5, 2015.

II. State Law Claims

Defendants argue that Chan-Sosa’s state law claims must be dismissed with prejudice for 

failure to file this action within six months of the denial of his government claim. Def. Mot. at 8-

10. 

California Government Code Section 945.4 provides that “no suit for money or damages 

may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be 

presented in accordance with ... Section 910 ... until a written claim therefore has been presented 

to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been 

rejected by the board....” Section 910, in turn, requires that the claim state the “date, place, and 

other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted” and 

provide “[a] general description of the ... injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known 

at the time of presentation of the claim.” A claimant has six months from the date of claim denial 

to file a lawsuit. Cal. Gov't Code § 945.6(a)(1); see Castro v. Sacramento County. Fire Prot. Dist., 

47 Cal. App. 4th 927, 929 (1996) (affirming trial court’s dismissal of case filed 19 days after the 

6-month limitations period, despite attorney error being the cause). 

However, Cal. Gov't Code § 945.3 effectively tolls the six-month limitations period for 

individuals seeking to bring a civil suit for money damages against a peace officer or state entity 

while the individual is facing criminal charges which relate to the subject matter of the civil suit. 

Section 945.3 provides:

No person charged by indictment, information, complaint, or other 

accusatory pleading charging a criminal offense may bring a civil 

action for money or damages against a peace officer or the public 

entity employing a peace officer based upon conduct of the peace 

officer relating to the offense for which the accused is charged, 

including an act or omission in investigating or reporting the offense 

or arresting or detaining the accused, while the charges against the 

accused are pending before a superior court. 

Any applicable statute of limitations for filing and prosecuting these 

actions shall be tolled during the period that the charges are pending 

before a superior court. 

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On February 25, 2013, the government filed misdemeanor charges against plaintiff for 

battery against a peace officer and obstructing a peace officer, Cal. Penal Code §§ 148(a)(1), 

243(b), and also filed two petitions for revocation of probation. On October 7, 2013, the 

government dismissed the misdemeanor charges. See Docket No. 10, RJN Exh. A. The probation 

revocation petitions remained pending until January 23, 2014 when the court found insufficient 

evidence to find a violation. Pl. Opp’n at 4. Plaintiff filed this action six-months later on July 23, 

2014. See Compl. 

Plaintiff timely filed his claim in compliance with Cal. Gov't Code § 945.4 with assistance 

of counsel; his claim was denied on August 15, 2013, which triggered the six-month clock to file 

suit under section 945.6(a)(1). See RJN Exh. B. Under the heading “Warning,” the notice of denial 

advised plaintiff of the six-month limitations period. Id. Both parties agree that the criminal 

charges against plaintiff tolled the limitations period until October, 7, 2013; however the parties 

disagree as to whether the petition for revocation triggers the tolling provisions under section 

945.3. If the Court finds that it does not, than plaintiff’s state law claims must be dismissed with 

prejudice as untimely. 

In their briefs, the parties dispute whether a petition for probation revocation constitutes a 

“criminal charge” under Section 945.3. Neither party points to any controlling case law, preferring 

to reason by analogy. CHP argues that probation revocation proceedings do not constitute criminal 

charges, and cites cases holding that those facing probation revocation are not afforded the same 

protections as those charged with a criminal offense, such as double jeopardy, proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and the exclusionary rule. See Mot. at 9-10 (citing United States v. Winsett, 518 

F.2d 51(9th Cir. 1978); In re Coughlin, 16 Cal.3d 52 (Cal. 1976); People v. Rodriguez, 51 Cal.3d 

437 (Cal. 1990)). Plaintiff’s opposition cites to cases which elaborate upon the due process 

protections afforded to those facing revocation of probation, such as written notice, an opportunity 

to be heard, right to confrontation, and a neutral arbiter. See Pl. Opp’n at 5-6. 

However, the Court need not decide this issue in order to dispose of this motion. Neither

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party’s brief discusses Torres v. City of Santa Ana, 108 F.3d 224 (9th Cir. 1997).

1

In Torres, the 

plaintiff was arrested for two misdemeanors, and as a result, the government filed a petition for 

arraignment on probation violation. The plaintiff was on probation for robbery committed a few 

years prior to his arrest for committing misdemeanors. Torres filed a civil suit alleging excessive 

force during his arrest relating to the misdemeanors, and attempted to avail himself of section 

945.3’s tolling provision. The Ninth Circuit found that section 945.3 did not apply, and held that 

“Torres’s civil complaint is not related to the petition for arraignment because Torres's probation 

pertains to his 1991 robbery conviction, and not to his 1994 arrest...Although the petition was 

triggered by the arrest upon which Torres's civil complaint is based, it relates only to Torres's 

original conviction for robbery.”

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Torres 108 F.3d at 228; see also De Soet v. Cnty. of Los 

 

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In the Court’s May 4th order, it directed the parties to be prepared to address Torres at 

oral argument.

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In arriving at this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon dicta from Lucido v. 

Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 335 (1990). In Lucido, the California Supreme Court held that 

collateral estoppel did not bar the state from initiating a criminal charge against a defendant who 

had prevailed in a probation revocation hearing which was triggered by the same underlying 

conduct. The court reasoned that because a revocation hearing often does not involve presentation 

of all the relevant evidence, the state’s failure to satisfy the lower burden of proof does not 

necessarily “amount to an acquittal or demonstrate an inability to meet the higher criminal 

standard of proof.” Id. at 348. However, what truly animated the Lucido court was the 

fundamental public policy in favor of upholding the criminal trial as the exclusive forum for the 

determination of guilt as to a new charge. Id. at 349 (“Preemption of trial of a new charge by a 

revocation decision designed to perform a wholly independent social and legal task would 

undermine the function of the criminal trial process as the intended forum for ultimate 

determinations as to guilt or innocence of newly alleged crimes.”).

The policy that animated the California Legislature in enacting Section 945.3 was 

markedly different from the issues the Lucido court grappled with. “The purpose of [Section 

945.3] is to prevent criminal defendants from using civil lawsuits to gain leverage in criminal plea 

bargaining.” Damjanovic v. Ambrose, 3 Cal. App. 4th 503, 509 (1992). This logic would appear to 

apply with equal force whether a civil plaintiff is being charged in a criminal action or in a 

probation revocation proceeding. Regardless of the forum, the civil plaintiff may potentially gain 

an undue advantage by filing a civil complaint based on the same facts which gave rise to his 

prosecution by the state. The Court therefore questions whether it is appropriate to import the 

doctrines of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy to interpret a statute aimed at remedying an 

entirely unrelated problem. Nonetheless, the Court is bound to follow Torres and the state courts 

that have concurred with its reasoning. 

 

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Angeles, No. B201659, 2009 WL 1200875, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing Torres with 

approval).

The facts of this case are materially indistinguishable from Torres. Here too, plaintiff’s 

probation revocation petition was triggered by the arrest upon which his civil action is based, yet it 

“relates” to a prior unrelated offense. Therefore the limitations period was not tolled on account of 

the petition for probation revocation, and Chan-Sosa’s state law claims are therefore time barred. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims with 

prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 

state law claims with prejudice, and GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s federal 

claims, with leave to amend. Any amended complaint must be filed no later than June 5, 

2015. The initial Case Management Conference is rescheduled for July 24, 2015 at 3:00 p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 8, 2015

________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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