Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-00466/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-00466-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

JOHN MICHAEL MAYER,

Petitioner,

v.

DEWAYNE D. ESTES, et al.,

Respondents.

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Case No.: 4:15-cv-00466-SLB-SGC

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254 by John Michael Mayer, a state prisoner proceeding with the assistance of counsel. An 

initial review of the petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 

revealed Mayer challenges his 2010 sodomy and sexual abuse convictions in the Circuit Court of 

Etowah County, Alabama. The undersigned ordered Mayer to show cause why his petition 

should not be dismissed as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. 3). Mayer 

responded with a variety of allegations that do not save his petition from the time bar codified at 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Doc. 4). Accordingly, and for the reasons discussed below, the 

undersigned recommends Mayer’s petition be dismissed as time-barred pursuant to § 2244(d).

I. Background

In May 2010, Mayer was convicted of two counts of first-degree sodomy and one count 

of first-degree sexual abuse in the Circuit Court of Etowah County, Alabama. (Doc. 1 at 1; Doc. 

1-1 at ¶ 3); State v. Mayer, 31-CC-2007-001010.02; State v. Mayer, 31-CC-2007-001010.03; 

State v. Mayer, 31-CC-2009-000367.00.

1 On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal 

 

1 A district court may take judicial notice of its own records and records of inferior courts. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)-

(d); Keith v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034, 1041 n.18 (11th Cir. 2014); Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 

1244, 1259 n.7 (11th Cir. 2009).

FILED

 2015 Oct-28 PM 04:19

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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Appeals affirmed Mayer’s convictions and denied his application for rehearing. (Doc. 1 at 2; 

Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 5); Mayer v. State, 107 So. 3d 233 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). The Alabama Supreme 

Court denied Mayer’s petition for a writ of certiorari on June 10, 2011. (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 1-1 at 

¶ 5); Ex parte Mayer, 111 So. 3d 777 (Ala. 2011). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 

issued a certificate of judgment on that same date. State v. Mayer, 31-CC-2007-001010.02 at 

Doc. 2; State v. Mayer, 31-CC-2007-001010.03 at Doc. 1; State v. Mayer, 31-CC-2009-

000367.00 at Doc. 1.

On June 11, 2012, Mayer filed a petition pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of 

Criminal Procedure in the Circuit Court of Etowah County, Alabama, seeking to collaterally 

attack his convictions. (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 6); State v. Mayer, 31-CC-2007-001010.60 at 

Doc. 3; State v. Mayer, 31-CC-2009-000367.60 at Doc. 3. The state trial court dismissed the 

Rule 32 petition, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal and denied 

Mayer’s application for rehearing. (Doc. 1 at 3, 6; Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 10); State v. Mayer, 31-CC2007-001010.60 at Doc. 7; State v. Mayer, 31-CC-2009-000367.60 at Docs. 7, 21 & 22. The 

Alabama Supreme Court denied Mayer’s petition for a writ of certiorari on July 11, 2014. (Doc. 

1 at 7; Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 10).2 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a certificate of 

judgment on that same date. State v. Mayer, 31-CC-2009-000367.60 at Doc. 23. 

Mayer executed the § 2254 petition he submitted to this district court on March 19, 2015, 

and, therefore, it is deemed filed on that date. See McCloud v. Hooks, 560 F.3d at 1223, 1227 

(11th Cir. 2009) (“A pro se petitioner’s collateral action is deemed filed in federal court on the 

 

2 Although Mayer claims he petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for review of his Rule 32 petition, the electronic 

record of Mayer’s Rule 32 proceedings does not make it clear he did so or that, as he claims, the Alabama Supreme 

Court denied review on July 11, 2014. For purposes of this report and recommendation, the undersigned accepts 

Mayer’s allegation as true, as it makes no difference to the recommendation Mayer’s § 2254 petition be dismissed as 

time-barred.

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date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing, and absent state-presented evidence to the 

contrary, we will presume that the petition was delivered on the date the petition was signed.”).3 

II. Discussion

A federal district court is authorized to entertain an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus filed by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court where the petitioner 

alleges he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. § 

2254(a). After a § 2254 petition is properly filed, a district court must examine it. Rule 4, Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. “If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits 

that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition 

and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Id. Furthermore, a district court may consider sua 

sponte the timeliness of a § 2254 petition, provided the petitioner is afforded fair notice and an 

opportunity to respond prior to dismissal of his petition as time-barred. Day v. McDonough, 547 

U.S. 198, 207-10 (2006).

The statute of limitations applicable to a § 2254 petition provides as follows:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 

limitation shall run from the latest of –

(A)the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

 

3 Counsel of record for Mayer did not enter an appearance in this action until after Mayer filed his § 2254 petition 

pro se. (See Doc. 2).

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(D)the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Once the statute of limitations is triggered and begins to run, it can be tolled statutorily or 

equitably. Brown v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008). Section 2244(d)(2) tolls the 

one-year limitation period during the pendency of “a properly filed application for [s]tate postconviction or other collateral review” of the underlying judgment. § 2244(d)(2); see also 

McCloud, 560 F.3d at 1227. “However, the pendency of properly filed state post-conviction 

proceedings only pauses § 2244(d)(1)’s one-year clock; it does not reset it.” Roby v. Mitchem,

2012 WL 1745529 at * 3 (N.D. Ala. May 1, 2012) (emphasis in original) (citing Trapp v. 

Spencer, 479 F.3d 53, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2007); Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 

2003); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2nd Cir. 2000)), report and recommendation adopted, 

2012 WL 1745758 (N.D. Ala. May 14, 2012). “State review ends [for purposes of § 2244(d)(2)] 

when the state courts have finally resolved an application for state postconviction relief. After 

the [s]tate’s highest court has issued its mandate or denied review, no other state avenues for 

relief remain open.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 332 (2007). 

Equitable tolling is available only where a petitioner “shows (1) that he has been pursuing 

his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and 

prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Helton v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 259 F.3d 1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001). 

Equitable tolling is “an extraordinary remedy which is [ ] applied sparingly” and “is limited to 

rare and exceptional circumstances.” Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005), 

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aff’d, 549 U.S. 327 (2007). Moreover, “[t]he petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

equitable tolling is warranted.” Hunter v. Ferrell, 587 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009). 

Finally, in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013), the Supreme Court held a 

showing of “actual innocence” as applied in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), and House v. 

Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006), can overcome the statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). The Court cautioned, however, “tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare: 

‘[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court 

that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

329) (citing House, 547 U.S. at 538). “ ‘[T]o be credible’ a gateway claim requires ‘new reliable 

evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or 

critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.’” House, 547 U.S. at 537 (quoting 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).

Neither in his § 2254 petition nor his response to the order to show cause does Mayer 

allege facts which would support the triggering of the statute of limitations applicable to his 

petition by § 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), or (D). Rather, § 2244(d)(1)(A) triggered that statute of 

limitations. That is, the limitations period began to run on the date Mayer’s convictions and 

sentence became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking 

that review. See § 2244(d)(1)(A). Where a defendant appeals his conviction to the Alabama 

Court of Criminal Appeals and seeks review in the Alabama Supreme Court but does not seek 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States, his conviction becomes final for purposes of § 

2244(d)(1)(A) on the 90th day after the Alabama Supreme Court denies review. See McCloud, 

560 F.3d at 1227. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Mayer’s petition for certiorari on June

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10, 2011. Mayer does not allege he sought review in the United States Supreme Court. (See

Doc. 1). Therefore, it appears Mayer’s convictions and sentence became final and the statute of 

limitations applicable to his § 2254 petition began to run on September 8, 2011, which was 90 

days after the Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari. See McCloud, 560 F.3d at 1227. 

When Mayer filed a Rule 32 petition in the state trial court on June 11, 2012, it tolled the 

§ 2244(d)(1) limitations period, assuming it was properly filed. See id. At that time, 277 days 

had passed since Mayer’s convictions became final. After the Alabama Supreme Court denied 

Mayer’s petition for a writ of certiorari on July 11, 2014, the limitations period resumed; July 12, 

2014 was the 278th day of that period. Therefore, Mayer should have filed his § 2254 petition on 

or before October 7, 2014. Because he did not file his petition until March 19, 2015, the petition 

is untimely, absent equitable tolling or a showing of actual innocence. 

Although Mayer does not argue he is actually innocent, he does argue he is entitled to 

equitable tolling. In his response to the order to show cause, Mayer alleges the statute of 

limitations applicable to his § 2254 petition was not tolled because his former attorney did not 

file his Rule 32 petition properly. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 8). He further alleges that during the pendency of 

his Rule 32 proceedings, his former attorney committed suicide, leaving him without counsel 

when the state trial court dismissed his Rule 32 petition. (Id. at ¶ 9). According to Mayer, the 

receiver appointed to wind down his former attorney’s practice obtained an out-of-time appeal 

from the state trial court’s dismissal of his Rule 32 petition and permission from the Alabama 

State Bar to retain his present attorney to file that appeal. (Id. at ¶ 10). Finally, Mayer alleges 

that by the time he retained counsel to seek federal habeas corpus relief on his behalf after 

exhausting his Rule 32 claims, the limitations period for filing a § 2254 petition had run. (Id.). 

Mayer argues his former attorney’s suicide, which left him without representation, rose to the 

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level of serious attorney misconduct entitling him to equitable tolling. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12) (citing 

Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2008)).

Mayer has failed to demonstrate his entitlement to equitable tolling. First, in calculating 

the statute of limitations applicable to Mayer’s § 2254 petition, the undersigned has assumed the 

Rule 32 petition filed by Mayer’s former attorney on Mayer’s behalf in the state trial court on 

June 11, 2012, was filed properly so as to toll the limitations period. The propriety of the Rule 

32 filing is not at issue here. Therefore, any alleged error by Mayer’s former attorney in filing 

the Rule 32 petition is a red herring.

Second, to the extent the suicide of Mayer’s former attorney had an effect on his Rule 32 

proceedings, Mayer admittedly obtained relief by way of an out-of-time appeal from the state 

trial court’s dismissal of his Rule 32 petition. The suicide of his former attorney during the 

pendency of his Rule 32 proceedings, at a time when the limitations period applicable to his § 

2254 petition was tolled already, does not excuse his failure to file his § 2254 petition timely 

after the limitations period resumed.

Third, Mayer’s pro se status at the time he filed his § 2254 does not entitle him to 

equitable tolling. See Rich v. Dep’t of Corr. State of Fla., 317 Fed. App’x 881, 883 (11th Cir. 

2008) (petitioner’s pro se status was not extraordinary circumstance that could have prevented 

him from filing federal § 2254 petition timely); Perez v. Florida, 519 Fed. App’x 995, 997 (11th

Cir. 2013) (“[W]e have not accepted a lack of a legal education and related confusion or 

ignorance about the law as excuses for a failure to file in a timely fashion.” (citing Rivers v. 

United States, 416 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005)). Finally, any delay Mayer experienced in 

obtaining representation with respect to this action does not entitle him to equitable tolling, 

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either. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (no constitutional right to counsel 

in post-conviction proceeding).

Because Mayer did not file his § 2254 petition until March 19, 2015, approximately five 

months after expiration of the limitations period, and does not allege any facts which would 

entitle him to equitable tolling or support a showing of actual innocence, his § 2254 petition is 

due to be dismissed as time-barred. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Mayer’s § 2254 petition be 

denied as barred by the statute of limitations set out in § 2244(d)(1).

Finally, in accordance with Rule 11 of the Rules Governing 2254 Proceedings, the 

undersigned RECOMMENDS a certificate of appealability be DENIED. A certificate of 

appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, a “petitioner must 

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims debatable or wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), or that “the issues 

presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (internal quotation omitted). Based on the foregoing discussion, the 

undersigned is of the opinion Mayer has failed to make the requisite showing.

IV. Notice of Right to Object

Any party who objects to this report and recommendation must, within fourteen (14) days 

of the date on which it is entered, file specific written objections with the clerk of this court. 

Any objections to the failure of the magistrate judge to address any contention raised in the 

petition also must be included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the 

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factual findings of the magistrate judge, except for plain error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); 

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); Dupree v. Warden, 

715 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2013). 

To challenge the findings of the magistrate judge, a party must file with the clerk of the 

court written objections specifically identifying portions of the proposed findings and 

recommendation to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection. The filing of 

objections is not a proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or present additional 

evidence. Furthermore, it is not necessary for a party to repeat legal arguments in objections. A 

copy of the objections must be served on all other parties to the action.

On receipt of objections meeting the foregoing specificity requirement set out above, a 

district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed 

findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in 

whole or in part the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The district 

judge, however, need conduct a hearing only in his or her discretion or if required by law, and 

may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own 

determination on the basis of that record. The district judge may also receive further evidence, 

recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Objections not 

meeting the foregoing specificity requirement will not be considered by a district judge.

A party may not appeal a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation directly to the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final 

judgment entered by or at the direction of a district judge. 

DONE this 28th day of October, 2015.

 ______________________________

STACI G. CORNELIUS

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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