Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00190/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00190-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM CECIL THORNTON,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFREY A. BEARD, Secretary of

the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

 

 

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Case No. 11-CV-190-LAB (JMA)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends the First

Amended Petition filed by Petitioner William Cecil Thornton (“Petitioner” or

“Thornton”) be DISMISSED with prejudice for lack of federal habeas

jurisdiction. 

I. Introduction

Petitioner, a former state prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this

action on January 27, 2011 by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1.) On February 4, 2011, the

Court issued an order construing the Petition as one filed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 4.) 

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On August 30, 2011, Respondent1 filed an Answer, and on October

24, 2011, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (Doc. Nos. 12, 29.) On September

12, 2011, prior to filing his Traverse, Petitioner filed a Motion for Joinder of

Claims to request that the Court consolidate the claims raised in various

petitions filed in this court, including the claims in case numbers 11cv1485-

BEN (WMc) and 10cv1583-RBB. (Doc. No. 22.) By Order dated October

17, 2011, the Court denied the motion, advising Petitioner that he could file

a request for leave to amend to add any claims not already raised in the

Petition. (Doc. No. 26.) On January 3, 2012, Petitioner filed a Motion for

Leave to Amend, which was granted on August 10, 2012. (Doc. Nos. 42,

58.) Petitioner’s First Amended Petition (“FAP”) was deemed filed that

same date. (Doc. No. 59.) 

On September 12, 2012, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss,

contending that six of the eight claims (claims three through eight) raised in

the FAP were untimely filed. (Doc. No. 60.) The Motion was granted on

March 1, 2013. (Doc. No. 62.) As a result of the March 1, 2013 Order, the

two remaining claims in the FAP included: (1) the requirement that

Petitioner register as a sex offender under California law is a violation of

due process, equal protection, the prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment, and double jeopardy because he was not required to register

in Tennessee as a sex offender for his 1987 conviction and (2) Petitioner

was denied access to courts because the San Diego District Attorney’s

Office refused to allow the filing of his request for a certificate of

rehabilitation with the San Diego Superior Court. (FAP at 7.) 

On May 3, 2013, Respondent filed an Answer relating to Petitioner’s

two remaining claims. (Doc. No. 64.) Petitioner did not file a Traverse. 

1

Jeffrey A. Beard is substituted for his predecessor, Matthew Cate, as Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 

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As discussed below, the Petition should be dismissed with prejudice

for lack of federal habeas jurisdiction. 

II. Background

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and

presumes them to be correct. Tilcock v. Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th

Cir. 2008). Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only

by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

The facts as found by the Superior Court of California, County of San

Diego, are as follows:

On January 27, 1987, petitioner William Cecil Thornton pleaded

guilty, in a Tennessee court, to sexual battery in case 86-

02052. On March 6, 1987, the Tennessee judge sentenced

petitioner to 90 days in the workhouse, with the sentence to be

served on weekends. On December 8, 1987, petitioner

contends the sexual battery conviction was amended to

“attempt felony.”

In 2004, petitioner was convicted in case SCE245274 of

violating [California] Vehicle Code sections 10851, subdivision

(a) and 2800.2, subdivision (a) in San Diego Superior Court,

East County Division. In August 2005, before petitioner’s

release from prison, he was notified by the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) that he

must register as a sex offender. Since 2005, petitioner states

he has complied with this condition.

On October 14, 2009, an information was filed against

defendant in the San Diego Superior Court, East County

Division, case SCE 295036. On January 22, 2010, petitioner

entered a guilty plea to robbery in violation of Penal Code § 211

and petty theft with a prior in violation of Penal Code §§

484/666. Petitioner also admitted he had suffered two prison

priors. Petitioner was immediately sentenced to the total term

of three years in state prison. . . .

(Lodgment No. 47.) 

Petitioner appealed the 2010 judgment to the California Court of

Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One (“California Court of

Appeal”). (Lodgment No. 3.) On December 8, 2010, in an unpublished

opinion, the California Court of Appeal affirmed that judgment. (Lodgment

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No. 10.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court, which was denied without comment on February 25, 2011. 

(Lodgment Nos. 11, 12.) 

Additionally, following the 2010 judgment, Petitioner filed the

following petitions in state court to challenge California’s sex offender

registration requirements:2

(1) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 28, 2010 in the

California Court of Appeal, which was denied on July 27, 2010

(Lodgment Nos. 18-19; FAP, App. F [Doc. No. 42-9]); 

(2) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 16, 2010 in the

San Diego Superior Court, which was denied on October 8,

2010 (FAP, App. K [Doc. No. 42-13]);

(3) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 30, 2010 in the

California Supreme Court, which was denied on February 2,

2011 (FAP, App. H [Doc. No. 42-10]); 

(4) a petition for review on August 30, 2010 in the California

Supreme Court, which was denied on October 13, 2010

(Lodgment Nos. 20-21); 

(5) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 13, 2010 in

San Diego Superior Court, which was denied on October 8,

2010 (FAP, App. L [Doc. No. 42-14]); 

(6) a petition for writ of mandate on an unknown date in San Diego

Superior Court, which was denied on October 8, 2010

(Lodgment Nos. 46-47); 

(7) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 25, 2011 in the

California Supreme Court, which was denied on September 28,

2

Excluded from this list are habeas petitions filed by Petitioner not relating to his challenge of California’s sex offender registration requirements.

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2011 (Lodgment Nos. 56-57 & FAP, App. I [Doc. No. 42-11]); 

(8) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 12, 2011 in

the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on September

30, 2011 (Lodgment Nos. 48-49 & FAP, App. N [Doc. No. 42-

16]);

(9) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 16, 2011 in

the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on September

30, 2011 (Lodgment Nos. 52-53 & FAP, App. O [Doc. No. 42-

17]); 

(10) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 6, 2011 in the

California Court of Appeal, which was denied on October 27,

2011 (Lodgment Nos. 54-55); 

(11) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 12, 2011 in the

California Supreme Court, which was denied on November 16,

2011 (Lodgment Nos. 58-59); 

(12) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 13, 2011 in the

California Court of Appeal, which was denied on October 27,

2011 (see Lodgment No. 61 at 5); 

(13) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 20, 2011 in the

California Supreme Court, which was denied on November 16,

2011 (Lodgment Nos. 50-51); 

(14) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 5, 2011 in the

San Diego Superior Court, which was denied on December 12,

2011 (Lodgment Nos. 60-61); and 

(15) a petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 28, 2011 in

the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on January

12, 2012 (Lodgment Nos. 62-63). 

//

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Petitioner has also filed numerous cases in this district, including the

following in which he challenged the sex offender registration requirement

conditions of his parole: Thornton v. Schwarzenegger, Case No.

10cv1583-RBB3

; Thornton v. Cavalin, Case No. 11cv108-BEN (CAB);

Thornton v. Cavalin, Case No. 11cv1484-IEG (POR); Thornton v. Cate,

Case No. 11cv1485-BEN (WMc); Thornton v. Cavalin, Case No. 11cv2309-

MMA (PCL); and Thornton v. Cate, Case No. 12cv118-JLS (RBB). All of

these cases, excluding the first-listed, are closed. 

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Habeas corpus is a "'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state

criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction

through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786

(2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)). A

federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only

on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas courts

may not "reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991); Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S.

74, 76 (2005) ("[A] state court’s interpretation of state law, including one

announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal

3

In this case, Thornton alleged, in a complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the CDCR violated his constitutional rights by imposing

Global Position System (“GPS”) monitoring and residency restrictions as parole

conditions. The district court found that Thornton’s claims were not cognizable

under § 1983 and dismissed his complaint. Petitioner appealed. The Ninth

Circuit recently issued an opinion holding that Thornton could proceed with his 

§ 1983 claim. See Thornton v. Brown, --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 7216368 (9th Cir. 2013). 

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court sitting in habeas corpus.") 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")

governs review of Petitioner's claims because he filed his federal habeas

petition after that statute's 1996 effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 322-23 (1997). AEDPA imposes a "'highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings,'” requiring "that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24

(2002) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7). "AEDPA prevents

defendants–and federal courts–from using federal habeas corpus review

as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." 

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). 

B. Petitioner Does Not Meet the “In Custody” Requirement of § 2254

Petitioner contends (1) the requirement that he register as a sex

offender under California law as a condition of his parole due to his 1987

conviction in Tennessee is a violation of due process, equal protection, the

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and double jeopardy,

and (2) he was denied access to courts because the San Diego District

Attorney’s Office refused to allow the filing of his request for a certificate of

rehabilitation with the San Diego Superior Court. (FAP at 7.) 

A federal court must consider its subject matter jurisdiction at all

stages of litigation. See Scholastic Entm’t, Inc. v. Fox Entm’t Group, Inc.,

336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Rule 12, Rules Governing §

2254 Cases (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be

applied to a § 2254 proceeding); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court

must dismiss the action.”). The “in custody” requirement is jurisdictional. 

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Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). As set forth

above, federal habeas relief is available only on the ground that an inmate

is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Although petitioners need

not be physically confined to challenge a sentence on habeas corpus, they

must establish that they are subject to conditions that “significantly restrain

. . . [their] liberty.” Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 717 (7th Cir. 2008)

(citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)); see also Hensley

v. Mun. Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) 

(“The custody requirement of the habeas corpus statute is designed to

preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on

individual liberty.”) The Supreme Court has interpreted the “in custody”

language as “requiring that the habeas petitioner be ‘in custody’ under the

conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.” Maleng

v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989) (emphasis added). 

At the time he filed his original petition in this case, Petitioner was

incarcerated, as a result of his 2010 guilty plea, in the California

Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, California (see Doc. No. 1), and was

later transferred to the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California

(see Doc. No. 10). Petitioner appears to have been released from custody

in or around April 2012. See Doc. No. 53 (reflecting change of address to

non-prison address in San Marcos, California); see also Doc. No. 52 at p.

18 (parole form reflecting May 1, 2012 release date).

Petitioner, however, does not challenge his 2010 conviction or

sentence. He challenges only the requirement that he register as a sex

offender under California law, which he is required to do as a consequence

of his 1987 Tennessee conviction, not as a result of his 2010 conviction

and sentence or, indeed, any of his California offenses. Although

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Petitioner was physically in custody for his 2010 conviction at the time he

initiated this habeas action, he was not “in custody” for the conviction or

sentence under attack, as his 2010 conviction and sentence bear no

relation to his sex offender registration requirement, and he served and

completed his 90 day sentence for his 1987 Tennessee conviction long

ago. See Lodgment No. 47. Although Petitioner was notified in 2005 and,

in anticipation of his release in 2012, that he would be subject to the

registration requirement upon his respective releases from prison (see

Lodgment Nos. 47, 63), he has been required to register as a sex offender

under California Penal Code § 290 since he became a resident of

California. See Cal. Penal Code § 290(b) (requiring sex offenders to

register as sex offenders so long as they reside, attend school, or work in

California). His California offenses, including his most recent offense in

2010, for which he was incarcerated at the time he filed his original petition

in this case, are not the events that triggered the requirement that

Petitioner register as a sex offender. Rather, Petitioner was simply placed

on notice before his releases from incarceration that he was required to

continue to comply with the registration requirement. In short, the claims

raised in his First Amended Petition are not related to Petitioner’s

underlying 2010 conviction or judgment, and though he was incarcerated at

the time he filed his petition, his incarceration had nothing to do with the

issues presented in the petition. Therefore, he does not meet the “in

custody” requirement, and the petition should be dismissed. 

In a case similar to the one at hand, the District Court of Arizona

found that the requirement that petitioner comply with Arizona’s sex

offender registration law was not a consequence of the conviction for which

he was then in custody, but rather was a consequence of an earlier

conviction in California. Cleveland v. Babeu, 2013 WL 2217496, at *2 (D.

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Ariz. 2013). The court determined that this did not satisfy the “in custody”

requirement of section 2254 and dismissed the petitioner’s constitutional

challenge to the requirement that he register as a sex offender under

Arizona law. See id.; see also Olmos v. Ryan, 2014 WL 922867, at *7 (D.

Ariz. 2014) (dismissing challenge to Arizona’s sex offender registration

program for lack of jurisdiction because the challenge lacked any nexus to

the petitioner’s custody). 

Moreover, that Petitioner is required to register as a sex offender

under the California sex offender registration act does not place Petitioner

“in custody” for purposes of federal habeas corpus. In Williamson v.

Gregoire, the Ninth Circuit held that a petitioner challenging Washington’s

sex offender registration law did not meet the “in custody” requirement

because the law did not impose a significant restraint on the petitioner’s

liberty, but was instead a collateral consequence of the petitioner’s

conviction. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1183-84. In Henry v. Lungren, the

Ninth Circuit, following Williamson, rejected the petitioner’s argument that

the lifetime sex offender registration requirement was tantamount to

“perpetual ‘custody’” and held that California’s sex offender registration

requirement does not render a petitioner “in custody” for habeas purposes

when a petition is filed after a prisoner’s release from prison and discharge

from probation or parole. Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th

Cir. 1999). The court found the registration requirement is “merely a

collateral consequence of conviction” that is not sufficient to satisfy the “in

custody” requirement of § 2254. Id. at 1242; cf. Fowler v. Sacramento

County Sheriff’s Dept., 421 F.3d 1027, 1033 n.5 (distinguishing Henry and

finding habeas jurisdiction when the petitioner was on probation for the

conviction under attack at the time he filed his habeas petition); see also

Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 523 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding petitioner’s

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challenge to sexual predator registration requirement not cognizable on

habeas corpus review because it did not present a restraint on the

petitioner’s movement); Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 722 (holding requirement

that petitioner register as a sex offender was a non-custodial component of

his sentence and was not a cognizable habeas claim); Maleng, 490 U.S. at

492 (“[O]nce the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely

expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves

sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody’ for purposes of a habeas

attack upon it.”). 

In sum, Petitioner was not “in custody” under the conviction or

sentence under attack at the time he filed his petition in this case, and the

requirement that he register as a sex offender under California law does

not place Petitioner “in custody” for purposes of federal habeas corpus. 

Because he was not “in custody,” the Court has no jurisdiction over the

entirety of the petition. Therefore, the First Amended Petition should be

dismissed for lack of habeas jurisdiction.4

 

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

magistrate judge finds that federal habeas jurisdiction does not exist. 

Therefore, the Court hereby recommends the First Amended Petition be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and that judgment be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Larry A. Burns, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not later

4

The Court notes that on June 2, 2014, Petitioner’s address was updated on the docket to reflect a change of address to the California Institute for Men in

Chino, California. That Petitioner has apparently been re-incarcerated does not

affect the Court’s analysis herein.

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than June 23, 2014, any party may file written objections with the Court

and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed not later than July

7, 2014. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.

1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: June 2, 2014

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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