Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02254/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02254-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Krystal Lee Slonski, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-02254-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue are Plaintiff Krystal Lee Slonski’s Opening Brief (Doc. 15), Defendant 

Commissioner of Social Security’s responsive brief requesting remand (Doc. 26), and 

Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 27). 

 An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s Application for a Period 

of Disability and Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act 

(“the Act”) on February 28, 2014 (Doc. 12, R. at 14-29), and the Appeals Council upheld 

that decision on August 13, 2014 (R. at 1-4). After Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision 

to this Court and filed an Opening Brief (Doc. 15, Pl.’s Br.), Defendant filed a motion to 

remand for further proceedings, stating that a report to which the ALJ gave significant 

weight in making his determination was missing from the record (Doc. 26, Mot. at 5-6). 

Plaintiff opposes a remand for further proceedings, arguing in essence that the missing 

report would not change the outcome and substantial evidence shows Plaintiff is disabled 

under the Act. (Doc. 27, Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. at 2-8.) Plaintiff thus requests that the Court 

remand this case for a payment of benefits. (Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. at 1.) Plaintiff also argues 

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that, if the Court remands this case for further proceedings, Plaintiff should be permitted 

to cross-examine the examining physicians. (Pl.’s Br. at 23-24.) 

 Plaintiff asks that the Court apply the “credit-as-true” rule, which would result in 

remand of Plaintiff’s case for payment of benefits rather than further proceedings. (Pl.’s 

Resp. to Mot. at 1.) The credit-as-true rule only applies in cases that raise “rare 

circumstances” that permit the Court to depart from the ordinary remand rule under 

which the case is remanded for additional investigation or explanation. Treichler v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099–102 (9th Cir. 2014). These rare 

circumstances arise when three elements are present. First, the ALJ must fail to provide 

legally sufficient reasons for rejecting medical evidence. Id. at 1100. Second, the record 

must be fully developed, there must be no outstanding issues that must be resolved before 

a determination of disability can be made, and further administrative proceedings would 

not be useful. Id. at 1101. Further proceedings are considered useful when there are 

conflicts and ambiguities that must be resolved. Id. Third, if the above elements are met, 

the Court may “find[] the relevant testimony credible as a matter of law . . . and then 

determine whether the record, taken as a whole, leaves ‘not the slightest uncertainty as to 

the outcome of [the] proceeding.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

 The Court has reviewed the record in its entirety and agrees with Defendant that 

the record is not fully developed and that uncertainty remains as to whether Plaintiff is 

disabled under the Act. In his decision, the ALJ gave “significant weight” to the findings 

of consultive psychological examiner Dr. Adriana Tarazon Weyer in discounting certain 

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians (R. at 26), but the critical part of Dr. Weyer’s 

report—the residual functional capacity assessment and conclusions—are now missing 

from the record. This Court therefore cannot complete its duty of evaluating the ALJ’s 

decision and, more precisely, evaluating whether substantial evidence in the record 

before the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for the ALJ to reject certain 

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. See Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 533 

F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not shown how the 

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missing evidence will change the outcome and that an evaluation of the remaining 

evidence shows an absence of specific and legitimate reasons to reject the treating 

physicians’ opinions. (Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. at 3-5.) But a lack of substantial evidence is 

different from missing evidence that may or may not be sufficient to support the ALJ’s 

rejection of treating physicians’ opinions. Because the ALJ gave significant weight to a 

report, the key part of which is now missing, the Court must find that the record is not 

fully developed, requiring remand for further proceedings. 

 On remand, Plaintiff asks that Defendant be required to subpoena the examining 

physicians for cross-examination—a request the ALJ denied in his discretion without 

further explanation. (Pl.’s Br. at 23-24.) Because Defendant does not object to Plaintiff’s 

request in its motion to remand and it is uncertain whether the missing record will be 

recovered, the Court will require Defendant to subpoena the examining physicians so that 

they are available to Plaintiff for cross-examination as part of the proceedings on remand. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.950; Copeland v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 536, 539 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 In sum, because of the uncertainty left by a gap in the record, uncertainty also 

remains as to whether Plaintiff is disabled under the Act. As Defendant points out, on 

remand, the ALJ must order Defendant to try to obtain the missing opinion and, as 

necessary, reassess the severity of Plaintiff’s impairments, consider all of the medical 

opinions of record, articulate the weight given to the medical opinions and the reasons 

therefor in a detailed and thorough manner, reassess Plaintiff’s testimony and credibility, 

and draw conclusions as to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity and her resulting 

ability to perform past relevant work or other work in the national economy, taking 

additional vocational expert testimony if needed. (See Mot. at 9-10.) 

 For all the foregoing reasons, the Court will remand this matter to the ALJ for 

further development of the record and a disability determination. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Defendant Commissioner of Social 

Security’s Motion for Remand for Further Proceedings (Doc. 26). The Court remands this 

matter for further proceedings consistent with this Order and requires Defendant to 

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subpoena the examining physicians so that they are available to Plaintiff for crossexamination. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment 

accordingly and close this case. 

 Dated this 30th day of March, 2016. 

 

 Honorable John J. Tuchi 

 United States District Judge 

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