Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00296/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00296-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL )

ASSOCIATION )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:11cv296-MHT

) (WO)

WILLIAM B. BLOUNT, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank filed this breach-ofcontract action against defendant William B. Blount,

alleging that Blount defaulted on a $ 300,000 loan. The

court previously granted summary judgment for Wells

Fargo, entitling it to, among other things, the

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs that it incurred

pursuing this action. Currently before the court is

Wells Fargo’s motion to amend this court’s previous

judgment to include a specific amount of attorneys’ fees

and costs. For the reasons that follow, the court will

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modify its judgment and award $ 18,261 in fees and costs

to Wells Fargo.

I. Background

This straightforward contract dispute arose from

Blount’s default on a promissory note and subsequent

modification agreement. Wells Fargo filed a five-page

complaint on April 18, 2011. No discovery took place,

and Blount filed no motions with this court. On

September 9, 2011, Wells Fargo moved for summary

judgment. Blount’s cursory reply to that motion admitted

liability and consented to this court awarding damages,

including $ 121,641.08 in principal plus interest and the

reasonable costs of collection, to Wells Fargo. Wells

Fargo subsequently submitted a four-page reply asking

this court to enter judgment in its favor without delay.

That request was granted and judgment was entered in

favor of Wells Fargo on January 27, 2012. 

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1. Blount did not specifically challenge the fee

amount that Wells Fargo attributes to his default on the

promissory note and the subsequent creation of the

modification agreement. Instead, he requested only a

more definite statement as to how the amount was

calculated. Wells Fargo provided such documentation and

Blount raised no further challenge. Having reviewed

Wells Fargo’s submissions, the court does not find

$ 7,825.50 to be an unreasonable amount for the work

provided, which included the drafting and negotiation of

the modification agreement. 

3

In its motion to amend that judgment, Wells Fargo

submits that it accrued legal fees totaling $ 25,999.92

and court costs of $ 441.58, for a total of $ 26,441.50.

Approximately one quarter of that total, or $ 7,825.50,

constitutes expenses incurred when Blount initially

defaulted on the promissory note and the rest, or

$ 18,616.00, is attributed to this litigation.1

 The

$ 18,616.00 is at issue.

 

II. Legal Standard

In calculating attorneys’ fees, the court is required

to determine the “lodestar” figure or “the product of the

number of hours reasonably expended to prosecute the

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2. In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th

Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the

close of business on September 30, 1981.

3. These 12 factors are: (1) the time and labor

required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the

questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal

(continued...)

4

lawsuit and the reasonable hourly rate for work performed

by similarly situated attorneys in the community.”

Simpleville Music v. Mizell, 511 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1161

(M.D. Ala. 2007) (Thompson, J.) (citing Norman v. Hous.

Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir.

1988)). In determining the lodestar, the court applies

the 12-factor test set forth in Johnson v. Ga. Highway

Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)

(abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489

U.S. 87 (1989)),2

 and then proceeds to analyze “whether

any portion of this fee should be adjusted upwards or

downwards.” Simpleville Music, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 1161

(citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19).3

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(...continued)

services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment

by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the

customary fee in the community; (6) whether the fee is

fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the

client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the

results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and

ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of

the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar

cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.

5

The fee applicant bears the burden of “establishing

entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and

hourly rates.” Id. at 1162 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at

1303). The applicant may meet this burden by producing

either direct evidence of the rates charged under similar

circumstances or by opinion evidence as to the reasonable

rate. However, the court “is itself an expert on [this

issue] and may consider its own knowledge and experience

concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an

independent judgment ... as to value.” Norman, 836 F.2d

at 1303 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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III. Discussion

The court is somewhat surprised that neither party

brought to its attention Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.

Southern Boys Investment Group, LLC, 2011 WL 2446594

(M.D. Fla. May 26, 2011) (Richardson, M.J.), adopted by

2011 WL 2436062 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2011) (Dalton, J.),

which considered the appropriate amount of attorneys’

fees in a materially similar dispute between Wells Fargo

and a debtor. In that case, Wells Fargo, which was

represented by the same firm and, indeed, some of the

same lawyers representing it in this court, requested

$ 16,836.00 in attorneys’ fees and $ 2,715.02 in

expenses. The court noted that Wells Fargo failed to

explain its fee request in terms of the Johnson factors

and therefore “used its own judgment regarding the

attorneys’ fee award.” Id. at *4. Since “the Defendants

made no appearance, there were no hearings, and no

discovery was conducted,” the court concluded that,

“absent special circumstances and without any evidence as

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to the Johnson factors, a fee over $ 10,000.00 would not

be reasonable.” Id. (citing Textron Fin. Corp. v.

Longstreet, 2010 WL 331901, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 28,

2010) (Antoon, J.) (holding that attorneys’ fees should

be limited to $ 10,000 in a simple contract dispute where

the plaintiff failed to provide the court with an

itemization of the tasks performed)). It therefore

awarded Wells Fargo $ 10,000 in legal fees and $ 2,715.02

in expenses.

A similar approach is warranted in this case. As in

Southern Boys Investment Group, this is a straightforward

breach-of-contract claim in which there was no discovery,

no hearing, and no substantive disagreement about

liability. The court can therefore see no reason why

attorney’s fees related to this litigation should exceed

$ 10,000, and Wells Fargo has submitted no documentation

that would justify a higher award. 

Blount, in his response to Wells Fargo’s motion to

amend the judgment, made precisely this point when he

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stated that “without an itemization of time and expenses,

it is impossible to determine if the requested time and

expenses are reasonable and necessary.” Opp’n to Fees

(Doc. No. 42) at 2. In its reply to that brief, Wells

Fargo again failed to provide any itemized justification

for its expenses. Moreover, it has failed to explain

whether this case was any more novel or difficult than

other similar cases; the customary fee for similar work;

or anything else about this case that might justify an

award significantly higher than the one it received in

Southern Boys. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19

(identifying factors this court should consider when

determining an appropriate fee). The court therefore

concludes, based on its own experiences handling similar

disputes, that, while Blount is liable for the reasonable

attorneys’ fees associated with this litigation, he is

not liable for the full amount requested by Wells Fargo.

It would be unreasonable for those fees to exceed

$ 10,000. 

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***

It is therefore the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of

the court as follows: 

(1) Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank’s motion to amend

judgment (doc. no. 40) is granted.

(2) Defendant William B. Blount is to pay $ 7,825.50

in fees and costs associated with plaintiff Wells Fargo

Bank’s attempts to collect on the promissory note and the

subsequent creation of the loan modification agreement.

(3) In addition to the $ 7,825.50 detailed above,

defendant Blount is to pay $ 10,435.58 in fees and costs

associated with this litigation. That total is comprised

of $ 10,000 in attorneys’ fees and $ 435.58 in legal

costs. 

DONE, this the 3rd day of April, 2012.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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