Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-10-16392/USCOURTS-ca9-10-16392-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEPHANIE ENYART, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

No. 10-15286

v.  D.C. No.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR 3:09-cv-05191-CRB

EXAMINERS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant. 

STEPHANIE ENYART, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 10-16392

v. D.C. No.  3:09-cv-05191-CRB NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR

EXAMINERS, INC., OPINION

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 6, 2010—San Francisco, California

Filed January 4, 2011

Before: Robert E. Cowen*, A. Wallace Tashima, and

Barry G. Silverman, Circuit Judges.

*The Honorable Robert E. Cowen, Senior United States Circuit Judge

for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation. 

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Opinion by Judge Silverman

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COUNSEL

Gregory C. Tenhoff, Lori R.E. Ploeger, Wendy J. Brenner,

and Laura A. Terlouw of Cooley LLP (Palo Alto, California)

for the appellant.

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Robert A. Burgoyne (argued) of Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.

(Washington, DC) for the appellant.

Laurence W. Paradis, Anna Levine, and Kara Gilbride of Disability Rights Advocates (Berkeley, California) for the appellee.

Daniel F. Goldstein (argued) of Brown, Goldstein & Levy,

LLP (Baltimore, Maryland) for the appellee.

Scott C. LaBarre of LaBarre Law Offices, P.C. (Denver, Colorado) for the appellee.

OPINION

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:

Stephanie Enyart, a legally blind law school graduate,

sought to take the Multistate Professional Responsibility

Exam and the Multistate Bar Exam using a computer

equipped with assistive technology software known as JAWS

and ZoomText. The State Bar of California had no problem

with Enyart’s request but the National Conference of Bar

Examiners refused to grant this particular accommodation.

Enyart sued NCBE under the Americans with Disabilities Act

seeking injunctive relief. The district court issued preliminary

injunctions requiring NCBE to allow Enyart to take the exams

using the assistive software, and NCBE appealed. We hold

that in granting the injunctions, the district court did not abuse

its discretion. We affirm.

I. Background

Enyart suffers from Stargardt’s Disease, a form of juvenile

macular degeneration that causes her to experience a large

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tivity to light. Her disease has progressively worsened since

she became legally blind at age fifteen. Enyart relies on assistive technology to read.

Enyart graduated from UCLA School of Law in 2009.

Before she could be admitted to practice law in California,

Enyart needed to pass two exams: the Multistate Professional

Responsibility Exam, a 60-question, multiple-choice exam

testing applicants’ knowledge of the standards governing lawyers’ professional conduct; and the California Bar Exam. The

Bar Exam spans three days, on one of which the Multistate

Bar Exam is administered. The MBE is a six-hour, 200-

question, multiple-choice exam that tests applicants’ knowledge of the law in a number of subject areas. NCBE develops

both the MPRE and the MBE. NCBE contracts with another

testing company, ACT, to administer the MPRE and licenses

the MBE to the California Committee of Bar Examiners for

use in the Bar Exam.

Enyart registered to take the March 2009 administration of

the MPRE and wrote to ACT requesting a number of accommodations for her disability: extra time, a private room,

hourly breaks, permission to bring and use her own lamp, digital clock, sunglasses, yoga mat, and migraine medication during the exam, and permission to take the exam on a laptop

equipped with JAWS and ZoomText software. JAWS is an

assistive screen-reader program that reads aloud text on a

computer screen. ZoomText is a screen-magnification program that allows the user to adjust the font, size, and color of

text and to control a high-visibility cursor. 

ACT granted all of Enyart’s requests with the exception of

the computer equipped with JAWS and ZoomText. ACT

explained that it was unable to offer this accommodation

because NCBE would not make the MPRE available in electronic format. In lieu of Enyart’s requested accommodation,

ACT offered her a choice between a live reader or an audio

CD of the exam, along with use of closed-circuit television

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for text magnification. Enyart sought reconsideration of

ACT’s denial of her request to use JAWS and ZoomText,

asserting that the options offered would be ineffective because

they would not allow her to synchronize the auditory and

visual imputs. After ACT denied Enyart’s request for reconsideration, Enyart cancelled her registration for the March

2009 MPRE.

In April 2009, Enyart applied to take the July 2009 California Bar Exam, requesting the same accommodations she

asked for on the MPRE. The California Committee of Bar

Examiners granted all of Enyart’s requested accommodations

with the exception of her request to take the MBE portion of

the test using a computer equipped with ZoomText and

JAWS. The Committee denied this request because NCBE

would not provide the MBE in electronic format. Because of

this denial, Enyart cancelled her registration for the July 2009

Bar Exam.

Enyart registered for the November 2009 MPRE and

requested the same accommodations she previously sought

for the March 2009 administration. NCBE again declined to

allow Enyart to take the MPRE using a computer equipped

with ZoomText and JAWS. Instead, they offered to provide

a human reader, an audio CD of the test questions, a braille

version of the test, and/or a CCTV with a hard-copy version

in large font with white letters printed on a black background.

Because of NCBE’s denial of her request to use a computer

with ZoomText and JAWS, Enyart cancelled her registration

for the November 2009 MPRE.

After these repeated denials of her requests to take the

MPRE and MBE using assistive technology software, Enyart

filed this action against NCBE, ACT, and the State Bar of

California, alleging violations of the ADA and the Uhruh Act,

California’s civil rights law. Enyart sought declaratory and

injunctive relief.

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Enyart moved for a preliminary injunction, asking the district court to order NCBE to allow Enyart to use a computer

equipped with ZoomText and JAWS on the February 2010

MBE and the March 2010 MPRE. After hearing oral argument, the court granted Enyart’s motion, addressing the factors for deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction in

a well-reasoned order:

Because the accommodations provided by NCBE

will not permit Enyart to take the exam without

severe discomfort and disadvantage, she has demonstrated the test is not “accessible” to her, and that the

accommodations [offered by NCBE] therefore are

not “reasonable.” Therefore, this Court concludes,

based on the current record and moving papers, that

it is more likely than not that Enyart will succeed on

the merits at trial. . . . 

. . . .

NCBE spends a good portion of its brief disputing

Enyart’s factual claims that the accommodations

offered by NCBE will not permit her to comfortably

complete the exam. NCBE points out that in the past

Enyart has “successfully utilized a number of different accommodations.” Opp. at 2. She used readers

and audiotapes during her undergraduate years at

Stanford, and used CCTV while working as an

administrative assistant before law school. Id. Further, NCBE points out that Enyart used a reader to

help her complete her LSAT prep program, and used

audiotapes and the services of a human reader on her

examinations. Id.

These factual claims, however, are somewhat

beside the point. First, Enyart avers that hers is a

progressive condition, so there is no reason to

believe an accommodation that may or may not have

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been sufficient during Enyart’s undergraduate coursework would be sufficient. Second, none of those

examinations compare to the bar exam, which is a

multi-day, eight hour per day examination. Hence,

an accommodation that might be sufficient for a law

school examination is not necessarily sufficient for

the bar exam. Third, the relevant question is not

whether Enyart would be able, despite extreme discomfort and disability-related disadvantage, to pass

the relevant exams. NCBE points to no authority to

support the position that an accommodation which

results in “eye fatigue, disorientation and nausea

within five minutes, which become fully developed

several minutes after that” is “reasonable.”

. . . .

The facts as outlined in the attachments to Plaintiff’s motion therefore strongly suggest that the

accommodations offered by NCBE would either

result in extreme discomfort and nausea, or would

not permit Enyart to sufficiently comprehend and

retain the language used on the test. This would

result in Enyart’s disability severely limiting her performance on the exam, which is clearly forbidden

both by the statute [42 U.S.C. § 12189] and the corresponding regulation [28 C.F.R. § 36. 309].

NCBE’s citation to other regulations and cases

does not overcome this factual presentation. . . .

[T]he examples [of auxiliary aids] offered in the regulation and the statute cannot be read as exclusive,

nor do those examples support the conclusion that

such accommodations are reasonable even where

they do not permit effective communication. On the

contrary, the statute and relevant regulations all

emphasize access and effective communication. The

statute itself illustrates that the central question is

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whether the disabled individual is able to employ an

“effective method[ ] of making visually delivered

materials available.” The evidence submitted by

Plaintiff strongly suggests that the only auxiliary aid

that meets this criteria is a computer with JAWS and

ZoomText. While NCBE may be successful at trial

in establishing that this is not the case, the record

presently before this Court more strongly supports

the conclusion that only ZoomText and JAWS make

the test “accessible” to Enyart. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12189.

Order Granting Prelim. Inj. 5-9, Feb. 4, 2010 (footnotes omitted). The district court required Enyart to post a $5,000

injunction bond. NCBE immediately appealed the preliminary

injunction.

Meanwhile, while NCBE’s appeal of the preliminary

injunction was pending, Enyart learned that her score on the

March 2010 MPRE was not high enough to allow her to qualify for admission to the California Bar. She moved for a second preliminary injunction, asking the court to order NCBE

to provide her requested accommodations on the August 2010

MPRE and “any other administration to Ms. Enyart of the

California Bar Exam, the Multistate Bar Exam (‘MBE’)

and/or the MPRE.” After filing her motion, Enyart learned

that she did not pass the July 2009 Bar Exam. The district

court granted a second preliminary injunction ordering NCBE

to allow Enyart to take the July 2010 MBE and the August

2010 MPRE on a computer equipped with ZoomText and

JAWS, stating:

The relevant question here is whether the auxiliary

aids offered by NCBE make the test’s “visually

delivered materials available” to Enyart. As this

Court has previously concluded, they do not. . . .

NCBE continues to argue that Enyart is not entitled

to her preferred accommodations, and in so doing

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continues to miss the point. She does not argue that

she simply “prefers” to use JAWS and ZoomText.

On the contrary, she has presented evidence that the

accommodations offered by NCBE do not permit her

to fully understand the test material, and that some

of the offered accommodations result in serious

physical discomfort. CCTV makes her nauseous and

results in eye strain, and the use of human readers is

not suited to the kind of test where on must re-read

both questions and answers, and continually shift

back and forth between different passages of text.

. . . Such accommodations do not make the test

accessible to Enyart, and so do not satisfy the standard under the ADA.

Order Granting Prelim. Inj. 5-6, June 22, 2010. The court

required Enyart to post an additional $5,000 injunction bond.

NCBE immediately appealed, and the appeal was consolidated with NCBE’s appeal of the first preliminary injunction.

Enyart has since learned that she received a high enough

score on the August 2010 MPRE to qualify for admission to

the California Bar but that she did not pass the July 2010 California Bar Exam.1

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s orders

granting these preliminary injunctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1). Our review is for an abuse of discretion. Does

1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996). “[I]n the

context of a trial court’s factual findings, as applied to legal

rules,” to determine whether a district court has abused its dis1The MBE constitutes only a portion of the California Bar Exam. Enyart

does not know what her score was on the MBE portion of the exam. 

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cretion, “the first step of our abuse of discretion test is to

determine de novo whether the trial court identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief requested. If the trial court

failed to do so, we must conclude it abused its discretion.”

United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1259, 1261-62 (9th

Cir. 2009) (en banc) (footnote omitted). If the trial court identified the correct legal rule, “the second step . . . is to determine whether the trial court’s application of the correct legal

standard was (1) ‘illogical,’ (2) ‘implausible,’ or (3) without

‘support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the

record.’ ” Id. at 1262 (footnote and citation omitted). We may

affirm the district court on any ground supported by the

record. Canyon County v. Sygenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969,

975 (9th Cir. 2008).

B. Mootness

[1] As an initial matter, we hold that even though the

injunctions only related to the March and August 2010 MPRE

exams and the February and July 2010 California Bar Exams,

which have since come and gone, NCBE’s appeals are not

moot because the situation is capable of repetition, yet evading review. “The test for mootness of an appeal is whether the

appellate court can give the appellant any effective relief in

the event that it decides the matter on the merits in his favor.

If it can grant such relief, the matter is not moot.” Garcia v.

Lawn, 805 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1986). An established

exception to mootness applies where “(1) the challenged

action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to

cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the

same action again.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to

Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

There is a reasonable expectation that NCBE will be subject to another preliminary injunction in this case. After failing to achieve a passing score on the February 2010

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California Bar Exam, Enyart took the test again in July 2010.

Now that she failed the July 2010 exam, it is reasonable to

expect that she will sign up for a future administration and

that she will seek another preliminary injunction. The situation is capable of repetition, satisfying the first prong of the

capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness. 

These preliminary injunctions also evade review. On February 4, 2010, the district court issued the first preliminary

injunction in this case, which required NCBE to allow Enyart

to use JAWS and ZoomText for the February 2010 MBE and

the March 2010 MPRE. Once Enyart took these two exams,

the terms of the preliminary injunction were fully and irrevocably carried out. The second injunction issued June 22, 2010,

and required NCBE to allow Enyart to use JAWS and

ZoomText for the July 2010 MBE and the August 2010

MPRE. Again, once Enyart took these exams, the terms of the

second preliminary injunction were fully and irrevocably carried out. Due to the limited duration of these injunctions—

little more than a month passed between the issuance of the

injunctions and the final execution of their terms—NCBE

could not practically obtain appellate review of the district

court’s orders until after the administration of the exams.

Because the duration of these injunctions is too short to allow

full litigation prior to their expiration, they meet the “evading

review” prong of the capable-of-repetition-yet-evadingreview exception to mootness. 

C. Preliminary Injunctions

[2] A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show

that: (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) she is likely

to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,

(3) the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (citations omitted). The

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district court correctly identified the Winter standard as controlling in this case. 

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Congress enacted the ADA in order to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101(b). The ADA furthers Congress’s goal regarding

individuals with disabilities: “to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency for such individuals[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).

The ADA contains four substantive titles: Title I relates to

employment; Title II relates to state and local governments;

Title III relates to public accommodations and services operated by private entities; and Title IV relates to telecommunications and common carriers. See generally Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 and 47

U.S.C. §§ 225, 611.

[3] 42 U.S.C. § 12189, which falls within Title III of the

ADA, governs professional licensing examinations. This section requires entities that offer examinations “related to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for . . .

professional, or trade purposes” to “offer such examinations

. . . in a place and manner accessible to persons with disabilities or offer alternative accessible arrangements for such individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 12189 (emphasis added). The purpose

of this section is “to assure that persons with disabilities are

not foreclosed from educational, professional, or trade opportunities because an examination or course is conducted in an

inaccessible site or without an accommodation.” H.R. Rep.

No. 101-485 (III), at 68-69 (1990), reprinted in 1990

U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 491-92. 

The Attorney General is charged with carrying out many of

the provisions of the ADA and issuing such regulations as he

deems necessary. Relevant here, the Attorney General is

responsible for issuing regulations carrying out all non162 ENYART v. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS

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transportation provisions of Title III, including issuing accessibility standards. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). 

[4] Pursuant to its authority to issue regulations carrying

out the provisions of Title III, the Department of Justice has

adopted a regulation interpreting § 12189. This regulation

defines the obligations of testing entities:

Any private entity offering an examination covered

by this section must assure that . . . [t]he examination

is selected and administered so as to best ensure that,

when the examination is administered to an individual with a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or

speaking skills, the examination results accurately

reflect the individual’s aptitude or achievement level

or whatever other factor the examination purports to

measure, rather than reflecting the individual’s

impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills . . . [.]

28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(1)(i) (emphasis added). The regulation

continues:

A private entity offering an examination covered by

this section shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids

for persons with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills, unless that entity can demonstrate that

offering a particular auxiliary aid would fundamentally alter the measurement of the skills or knowledge the examination is intended to test or would

result in an undue burden.

Id. § 36.309(b)(3).

Enyart argues that DOJ’s regulation requires NCBE to

administer the MBE and MPRE “so as to best ensure” that her

results on the tests accurately reflect her aptitude, rather than

her disability. NCBE argues that the regulation is invalid and

asks this court to apply a reasonableness standard in lieu of

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the regulation’s “best ensure” standard. The district court

declined to rule on the validity of 28 C.F.R. § 36.309, and

instead held that “even assuming NCBE’s more defendantfriendly standard applies,” Enyart had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

We defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is

charged with administering if the statute “is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” and the agency’s interpretation is “based upon a permissible construction of the

statute.” Contract Mgmt., Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 434 F.3d 1145,

1146-47 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). We

hold that 28 C.F.R. § 36.309 is entitled to Chevron deference.

[5] Section 12189 requires entities like NCBE to offer

licensing exams in a manner “accessible” to disabled people

or to offer “alternative accessible arrangements.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12189. Congress’s use of the phrases “accessible” and “alternative accessible arrangements” is ambiguous in the context of licensing exams.2

 Nowhere in § 12189, in Title III

more broadly, or in the entire ADA did Congress define these

terms. The phrase “readily accessible” appears in Titles II and

III, but only with respect to physical spaces, i.e., facilities,

vehicles, and rail cars. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12142-12148, 12162-

12165, 12182-12184. The phrase is not defined; instead, the

Act directs the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations establishing accessibility standards for public transportation facilities, vehicles, and rail cars, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12149,

12163-12164, and 12186(a), and directs the Attorney General

2

“Accessible” can mean “capable of being used as an entrance;” “capable of being reached or easily approached;” “easy to get along with, talk

to, or deal with;” “capable of being influenced or affected;” or “capable

of being used, seen, known, or experienced.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 11 (2002). The last definition, “capable

of being used, seen, known, or experienced,” is most relevant here. This

definition alone does not provide guidance as to what an entity must do

to administer an exam in an “accessible” manner. 

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to issue regulations establishing accessibility standards for

new construction and alterations in public accommodations

and commercial facilities, 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). The text of

these other ADA provisions does not resolve the ambiguity in

§ 12189’s use of term “accessible” because an examination is

not equivalent to a physical space.3

[6] Because § 12189 is ambiguous with respect to its

requirement that entities administer licencing exams in a manner “accessible” to individuals with disabilities, we defer to

DOJ’s interpretation of the statute so long as that interpretation is based upon a permissible construction of the statute.

See Contract Mgmt., Inc., 434 F.3d at 1146-47. NCBE seeks

to invalidate 28 C.F.R. § 36.309, arguing that the regulation

imposes an obligation beyond the statutory mandate. Instead

of the regulation’s requirement that entities administer licensing exams in a manner “so as to best ensure” that the results

reflect whatever skill or aptitude the exam purports to measure, NCBE argues that the ADA only requires such entities

to provide “reasonable accommodations.”

The “reasonable accommodation” standard advocated by

NCBE originated in the Department of Health and Human

Services’ regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act of

1973. See 45 C.F.R. 84.12(a) (requiring employers to make

“reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental

limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or

employee unless the [employer] can demonstrate that the

accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program or activity.”). When Congress enacted the

ADA, it incorporated 45 C.F.R. 84.12’s “reasonable accommodation” standard into Title I, which applies in the employ3Of course an exam takes place in a physical location, and § 12189

requires entities such as NCBE to offer the exams in a “place” accessible

to people with disabilities. 28 U.S.C. § 12189. But the statute also requires

exams to be administered in a “manner” accessible to people with disabilities, and that is where the term “accessible” becomes ambiguous. 

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ment context. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 2 (1990),

reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304 (“Title I of the

ADA . . . incorporates many of the standards of discrimination set out in regulations implementing section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations unless it would result in an

undue hardship on the operation of the business.”).

[7] Notably, Congress did not incorporate 45 C.F.R.

84.12’s “reasonable accommodation” standard into § 12189.

Instead, § 12189 states that entities offering licensing exams

“shall offer such examinations . . . in a place and manner

accessible to persons with disabilities or offer alternative

arrangements for such individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 12189. One

reasonable reading of § 12189’s requirement that entities

make licensing exams “accessible” is that such entities must

provide disabled people with an equal opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge or abilities to the same degree as nondisabled people taking the exam—in other words, the entities

must administer the exam “so as to best ensure” that exam

results accurately reflect aptitude rather than disabilities.

DOJ’s regulation is not based upon an impermissible construction of § 12189, so this court affords Chevron deference

to 28 C.F.R. § 36.309 and applies the regulation’s “best

ensure” standard. 

[8] Applying 28 C.F.R. § 36.309’s “best ensure” standard,

we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

by holding that Enyart demonstrated a likelihood of success

on the merits. The district court found that the accommodations offered by NCBE did not make the MBE and MPRE

accessible to Enyart. This finding is supported by evidence

that Enyart would suffer eye fatigue, disorientation, and nausea if she used a CCTV, so CCTV does not best ensure that

the exams are accessible to her; that auditory input alone is

insufficient to allow Enyart to effectively comprehend and

retain the language used on the exam; and that, according to

Enyart’s ophthalmologist, the combination of ZoomText and

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JAWS is the only way she can fully comprehend the material

she reads.

NCBE argues that because Enyart has taken other standardized tests using accommodations comparable to those offered

by NCBE, the district court erred in finding that those accommodations did not make the MPRE and MBE accessible to

her. In support of this argument, NCBE points out that Enyart

took the SAT college admissions test using large-print exam

booklets; that she used CCTV for her Advanced Placement

tests; and that she relied on a human reader and scribe during

the LSAT. Although Enyart’s prior experiences with the

accommodations offered by NCBE may be relevant to establishing whether those accommodations make the MPRE and

MBE accessible, they are not conclusive, especially as to

whether those accommodations best ensure that the exams are

accessible. Enyart graduated from college more than a decade

ago, and took the LSAT six years ago. Enyart’s disability is

a progressive one, and as the district court noted, an accommodation that may or may not have been sufficient years ago

is not necessarily sufficient today. Moreover, assistive technology is not frozen in time: as technology advances, testing

accommodations should advance as well.4

NCBE also argues that because it offered to provide auxiliary aids expressly identified in the ADA, the regulations, a

DOJ settlement agreement, and a Resolution of the National

Federation for the Blind, courts should not require it do more.

We do not find this argument persuasive. The issue in this

case is not what might or might not accommodate other people with vision impairments, but what is necessary to make

the MPRE and MBE accessible to Enyart given her specific

impairment and the specific nature of these exams. 

4The record does not even indicate when the ZoomText and JAWS software programs became available. 

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As NCBE concedes, the lists of auxiliary aids contained at

42 U.S.C. § 12103 and at 28 C.F.R. § 36.309 are not exhaustive. See 42 U.S.C. § 12103(1) (“the term ‘auxiliary aids and

services’ includes (A) qualified interpreters or other effective

methods of making aurally delivered materials available to

individuals with hearing impairments; (B) qualified readers,

taped texts, or other effective methods of making visually

delivered materials available to individuals with visual

impairments; . . . and (D) other similar services and actions.”)

(emphases added); 28 C.F.R. § 309(b)(3) (“Auxiliary aids and

services required by this section may include taped texts,

interpreters or other effective methods of making orally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impairments, Brailled or large print texts or qualified readers for

individuals with visual impairments . . . and other similar services and actions.”) (emphases added). To hold that, as a matter of law, an entity fulfills its obligation to administer an

exam in an accessible manner so long as it offers some or all

of the auxiliary aids enumerated in the statute or regulation

would be inconsistent with Congressional intent:

The Committee wishes to make it clear that technological advances can be expected to further enhance

options for making meaningful and effective opportunities available to individuals with disabilities.

Such advances may require public accommodations

to provide auxiliary aids and services in the future

which today they would not be required because they

would be held to impose undue burdens on such

entities.

Indeed, the Committee intends that the types of

accommodations and services provided to individuals with disabilities, under all of the titles of this bill,

should keep pace with the rapidly changing technology of the times.

H.R. Rep. 101-485(II), at 108 (1990), reprinted in 1990

U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 391.

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NCBE points next to a July 2000 settlement between DOJ

and the American Association of State Social Work Boards in

which the AASSWB agreed to adopt a policy allowing visionimpaired candidates to choose among a list of available

accommodations for the social work licensing exam. The list

included an audiotaped version of the exam, a large print test

book, a Braille version of the exam, extra time, a private

room, a qualified reader, and a flexible start time. NCBE

argues that because it offered Enyart the accommodations

listed in the AASSWB settlement, the court should conclude

that the accommodations offered satisfied NCBE’s obligations under § 12189 as a matter of law. We find this argument

unpersuasive. There is no reason that this decade-old settlement agreement should define the maximum NCBE can be

required to do in order to meet its obligation to make the

MBE and MPRE accessible to Enyart.5

Finally, NCBE makes much of a Resolution of the National

Federation for the Blind from 2000 that called upon the

American Council on Education to ensure that it administered

the GED exam in “the four standard media routinely used by

blind persons to access standardized tests: large print, Braille,

tape, and live reader.” This NFB Resolution appears to have

been written to address a specific problem identified in the

administration of the GED exam, namely the prohibition on

the use of live readers. Moreover, the NFB has no power to

define testing entities’ obligations under the ADA. The fact

that the NFB ten years ago urged the American Council on

Education to allow test-takers to choose among large print,

Braille, tape, and live reader accommodations does not lead

to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, the accommodations

offered by NCBE made the MBE and MPRE accessible to

Enyart.

5Moreover, a settlement is, by definition, a compromise and does not

necessarily embrace the maximum reach of the statute. 

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The sources described above—the lists of auxiliary aids

contained in the statute and regulation, the AASSWB settlement agreement, and the NFB’s Resolution—possibly support

a conclusion that the accommodations offered by NCBE are

sufficient to meet their obligations with respect to many blind

people in many situations. As we have tried to make clear

already, accommodations that make an exam accessible to

many blind people may not make the exam accessible to

Enyart, and our analysis depends on the individual circumstances of each case, requiring a “fact-specific, individualized

analysis of the disabled individual’s circumstances.” Wong v.

Regents of Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1999).

Enyart provided the district court with evidence that the

accommodations offered by NCBE will put her at a disadvantage by making her nauseated or by preventing her from comprehending the test material. Enyart presented evidence that

she used JAWS and ZoomText for all but one of her law

school examinations; that a combination of JAWS and

ZoomText is the only way she can effectively access the

exam; and that use of a CCTV causes her to suffer nausea and

eye fatigue. In a sworn statement, Enyart’s ophthalmologist

stated that the only way Enyart can fully comprehend the

material she reads is if she is able to simultaneously listen to

and see magnified test material, as JAWS and ZoomText

allow.

The district court reviewed the evidence of Enyart’s disability and her history of using auxiliary aids including JAWS

and ZoomText, and concluded that “the accommodations

offered by NCBE would either result in extreme discomfort

and nausea, or would not permit Enyart to sufficiently comprehend and retain the language used on the text. This would

result in Enyart’s disability severely limiting her performance

on the exam, which is clearly forbidden both by the statute

and the corresponding regulation.” The court compared

Enyart’s evidence to that offered by NCBE, and found that

the balance “more strongly supports the conclusion that only

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ZoomText and JAWS make the text ‘accessible’ to Enyart.”

This is a logical conclusion, supported by the evidence, and

therefore we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in holding that Enyart demonstrated a likelihood of

success on the merits.

2. Irreparable Harm

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of preliminary relief. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375. Mere possibility of

harm is not enough. Id. The district court correctly identified

this legal rule and concluded that Enyart had established a

likelihood of irreparable harm. Because the court “got the law

right,” this court should not reverse unless the district court

clearly erred in its factual determinations. Earth Island Institute v. Carlton, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 4399138, at *2 (9th

Cir. 2010). 

The district court found that, in the absence of preliminary

relief, Enyart would likely suffer irreparable harm in the form

of (1) the loss of the chance to engage in normal life activity,

i.e., pursuing her chosen profession, and (2) professional

stigma. Enyart additionally argues that, as a matter of law, she

faced irreparable injury from the fact of NCBE’s violation of

the ADA. We need not decide whether discrimination in violation of the ADA constitutes irreparable harm per se, or

whether irreparable harm can be presumed based on such a

statutory violation, because we agree with the district court’s

conclusion that Enyart demonstrated irreparable harm in the

form of the loss of opportunity to pursue her chosen profession. 

In her declaration in support of her first preliminary injunction motion, Enyart stated that she would not be able to complete a lengthy exam using NCBE’s proposed

accommodations, even with extended time. The district court

was entitled to give credence to that declaration. If Enyart

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cannot complete the MPRE or the MBE using NCBE’s proposed accommodations—and the evidence suggests that she

can only use CCTV for about five minutes before becoming

nauseated and disoriented, and that without simultaneous

visual and auditory input, she cannot comprehend lengthy

written material—then those proposed accommodations do

not comply with the ADA, when other technology is readily

available that will make the exam accessible. 

The district court further inferred that, as a result of her

likely failure, Enyart would probably suffer professional

stigma and the loss of the opportunity to pursue her chosen

profession. NCBE is correct that no evidence in the record

supports a finding that, in the absence of preliminary relief,

Enyart would likely suffer professional stigma. But the district

court did not err in concluding that Enyart would likely lose

the chance to pursue her chosen profession. If she fails the

Bar Exam or scores too low on the MPRE to qualify for

admission, Enyart cannot be licensed to practice law in California. This conclusion is not speculative, but rather is prescribed by California law. See State Bar Act, Cal. Bus. &

Prof. Code § 6060(f) and (g) (requiring passage of general bar

exam and professional responsibility exam to qualify for

admission and licence to practice law). 

[9] NCBE argues that Enyart can pursue her chosen profession without admission to the bar, because California Rule

of Court 9.42 allows Enyart to represent clients before passing

the bar exam so long as she is supervised by a licensed attorney. Even if Enyart is eligible to represent clients under Rule

9.42, the rule only allows her to undertake limited activities

under the supervision of an attorney. She is not allowed to

hold herself out as an attorney or appear on behalf of a client

in court without having a supervisor physically present, and

she must obtain a signed consent from all clients acknowledging her status as a “certified law student.” Cal. R. Court

9.42(d); see also Ninth Cir. R. 46-4 (permitting law students

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ing clients as a certified law student is simply not the same as

practicing law as an attorney. Enyart claims she is unable to

take advantage of the opportunity afforded by her two-year,

public-interest fellowship as a result of her inability to practice law. Because the fellowship is of limited duration, “[a]

delay, even if only a few months, pending trial represents precious, productive time irretrievably lost” to Enyart. See Chalk

v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that

teacher suffered irreparable harm when he was transferred

from classroom position to administrative role because of

AIDS diagnosis). Because the district court’s finding of irreparable harm in the form of Enyart’s likely loss of the ability

to pursue her chosen profession is supported by facts in the

record, it does not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1261.

3. Balance of Equities

[10] The district court compared the harm Enyart would

suffer in the absence of preliminary relief to the harm an

injunction would cause NCBE, and concluded that the equities weighed in Enyart’s favor. The district court rejected

NCBE’s argument that the injunction would cause NCBE

harm that cannot be undone. NCBE argues that providing

Enyart’s requested accommodations is expensive6 and poses

a security concern; however, as the district court noted,

Enyart posted two $5,000 injunction bonds that will cover

NCBE’s costs in the event it prevails on the merits at trial,

and the injunction minimized security risks by requiring

Enyart to use NCBE’s laptop rather than her own. Compared

to the likelihood that Enyart would suffer irreparable harm by

losing the chance to pursue her chosen profession in the

absence of an injunction, the potential harm to NCBE resulting from injunctive relief was minimal. The district court did

6NCBE has conceded, however, that the accommodations requested by

Enyart would not cause an undue burden on NCBE. 

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not abuse its discretion in holding that the balance of equities

favored Enyart.

4. Public Interest

The district court held that “the public clearly has an interest in the enforcement of its statutes,” and concluded that the

public interest weighed in favor of granting the injunctions.

NCBE argues that the public’s interest in having statutes

enforced is not sufficient to support a grant of a preliminary

injunction.

[11] In enacting the ADA, Congress demonstrated its view

that the public has an interest in ensuring the eradication of

discrimination on the basis of disabilities. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101(a)(9) (finding that “the continuing existence of unfair

and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice . . . costs the

United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses

resulting from dependency and nonproductivity”). This public

interest is served by requiring entities to take steps to “assure

equality of opportunity” for people with disabilities. See id.

§ 12101(a)(8). Although it is true that the public also has an

interest in ensuring the integrity of licensing exams, NCBE

never argued that allowing Enyart to take the MPRE and

MBE using a computer equipped with JAWS and ZoomText

would result in unreliable or unfair exam results. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the issuance of these preliminary injunctions served the public’s

interest in enforcement of the ADA and in elimination of discrimination on the basis of disability.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

February 4, 2010 and June 22, 2010 orders issuing preliminary injunctions requiring NCBE to permit Enyart to take the

MBE and MPRE using a laptop equipped with JAWS and

ZoomText.

AFFIRMED.

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