Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_98-cv-02111/USCOURTS-caed-2_98-cv-02111-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

 Docket 227.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW R. LOPEZ,

Case No. 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC)

Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs. [Re: Motions at Dockets 234 and 251]

D. PETERSON, et al.

Defendants.

I. MOTIONS PRESENTED

At docket 234 plaintiff Andrew R. Lopez (“Lopez”) has moved for summary judgment in

his favor. At docket 239 defendant S. Minnick (“Minnick”) filed her opposition to plaintiff’s

motion. At docket 241 Lopez filed his reply to defendant’s opposition. At docket 251 Minnick

has moved for summary judgment in her favor. At docket 253 Lopez has filed his opposition

thereto and again requests the appointment of counsel. Minnick has not replied to the

opposition. The court, having reviewed the moving papers and oppositions, has determined that

oral argument would not be of assistance in deciding the motions.

II. BACKGROUND/FACTS

Lopez, having been convicted of a crime in the California State courts, is incarcerated by

the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”). At the time of the incidents alleged in his

complaint, Lopez was held at the High Desert State Prison. In his complaint Lopez alleged three

claims against several defendants based upon: (1) a nine-month period in which he alleges he

was denied adequate footwear; (2) a 45-day period in which he was denied adequate footwear;

and (3) failure to provide surgery for a deviated septum. Upon motion of the defendants, the

Court in an earlier order dismissed all of the claims except the claim against Minnick.1

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 1 of 13
2 Id.

3

 Docket 251-5, p. 6 [Declaration of S. Minnick in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (“Minnick Declaration”), Attachment A].

4 Id.

5 The Court notes that the “Stick-Em” referred to is not included as part of the document

submitted to the Court.

6

 Docket 251-5, p. 6 [Minnick Declaration, Attachment A].

ORDER [Re: Motion at Dockets 234 & 251]

Lopez v. Peterson, 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC) 2

The amended complaint alleges defendant Minnick deliberately and intentionally refused,

after repeated requests, to provide or order doctor-prescribed “special shoes.” Lopez further

alleges that he has suffered permanent scarring and extreme pain because proper size shoes were

not provided. In its prior order, the Court held that the Lopez’ allegations were sufficient to

survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) or (c).2

The records of the institution reveal the following facts.

In his initial internal appeal dated April 17, 1997, filed with the CDC, Lopez complained

that:3

In my medical file it is noted that my feet require special require special shoes. I

arrived at HDSR on 1-14-97. It was re-confirmed by Dr. Beams on

approximately 1-30-97. However, more than three months have passed and I

have not received the medically authorized shoes. I have inquired about them

several times. I suffer pain and discomfort and my feet are permanently scarred. 

The laundry supervisor’s gross negligence serves no justification and is

tantamount to being deliberately indifferent to my serious medical needs. This is

aggravated by HDSP’s policy regarding footwear. I am forced to wear ill fitting

shoes which are, either, too big, or, too small.

The undated informal level response was:4

REFUSED TO PROPERLY ADDRESS.

Keep the stapled “Stick-em” as a permanent attachment.5

In his first formal level appeal dated April 25, 1997, Lopez responded:6

The attached (stapled) “Stick-em” is not responsive. I have clearly stated in the

base report that Dr. Beams, at HDSP, has reconfirmed my feet irregularities. Per

Dr. Beams orders, the MTA called the clothing room and instructed that special

shoes be ordered. The clothing room supervisor has failed to comply with

medical necessities.

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 2 of 13
7 Id., p. 7

8 Id.

9 Id., p. 8

10 Docket 251-4, pp. 5, 6 [Declaration of J. Klarich, M.D. in Support of Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (“Klarich Declaration”), Attachment A].

11 Docket 251-5, pp. 10–11 [Minnick Declaration].

ORDER [Re: Motion at Dockets 234 & 251]

Lopez v. Peterson, 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC) 3

The reviewer’s action, approved May 29, 1997:7

Partially granted. As we discussed during our interview, our laundry at C-facility

has 9E boots, which you have and state are too small. I contacted the laundry

Supervisor and we will attempt to get a pair of 9EE boots. (Your actual size is

81⁄2 EEE).

Lopez, expressed his continued dissatisfaction on June 1, 1997.8

I am dissatisfied. Intentionally delaying to correct this situation is a deliberate

indifference to my serious medical needs, and tantamount to a knowing

willingness that further suffering will occur. I also want pictures taken of my feet

to preserve the record.

Lopez’s Second Level appeal was denied June 25, 1997, with the following response:9

You have been seen for this problem and the problems addressed. Your request

for $500 pain and suffering is denied. Shoe size is a clothing issue and not a

medical issue. You will however, be issued a chrono for EEE shoes and be

ducated for evaluation for our pilot boot program.

A medical chrono was issued June 25, 1997.10

Lopez’s appeal to the director level was also denied on September 19, 1997, with the

following findings:11

I

The appellant states that he is inappropriately being denied proper footwear. 

Appellant states his health care record will confirm that he requires special shoes,

however, the institution is failing to provide him with the medically necessary

shoes. Appellant states he requested photographs be taken of his feet to preserve

the record, but Dr. Hooper denied the appeal and passed the buck to the laundry

department stating it wasa clothing issue, not a medical issue. Appellant states

his feet are permanent scarred, his toenails are rotting, he has acquired corns and

calluses, he suffers from Metatarsalgia and Hammertoe, and is in constant pain. 

Appellant requests he be provided the necessary footwear, monetary

compensation and that pictures be taken of his feet.

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 3 of 13
12 Docket 251-4, pp. 2–3 (Klarich Declaration).

ORDER [Re: Motion at Dockets 234 & 251]

Lopez v. Peterson, 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC) 4

II

The institution takes the position that the appellant is not being denied proper

footwear. The institution states that the shoe size is a clothing issue and not a

medical issue. The institution states that the appellant will be issued a chrono for

“EEE” shoes and be ducated for evaluation for the facility’s pilot Boot Program.

III

[Recitation of Department Rules omitted]

The documentation and arguments presented are persuasive that the appellant is

not inappropriately being denied proper fitting footwear. The institution states the

institution will issue the appellant a medical chrono for “EEE” width shoes and he

will be evaluated for their pilot Boot Program. The institution is attempting to

secure a pair of shoes the appellant claims are the right size. The Clothing Room

Supervisor, S. Minnick, was contacted and stated the appellant accepted and

signed for a pair of size 9-1/2 EE shoes on September 5, 1997, and that a pair of

8-1/2 EEE shoes will be sought for appellant.

J. Klarich, M.D., the Health Care Manager for California State Prison, Corcoran, states in

his declaration with respect to the “medical necessity” for the proper size footwear:12

6. I found an entry dated June 25, 1997[,] by Dr. Hooper indicating that

Mr. Lopez was seen for complaints relating to his feet. Mr. Lopez was seen by

Dr. Hooper in regards to a CDC 602 Inmate Appeal concerning foot wear. Dr.

Hooper examined Mr. Lopez and noted that he complained of permanently

scarred feet. Dr. Hooper’s note indicates “feet o minor pressure points noted

dorsum both feet.” Dr. Hooper’s assessment was “minimal pressure points –

feet.” Minimal pressure points is equivalent to when an individual comes home

from a long day at work, takes off his shoes, and he has red markings on the feet

from wearing the shoes all day.

7. In addition, Dr. Hooper issued a chrono indicating that Mr. Lopez was

to be issued a pair of EEE state issued boots. There is no indication in the file

that the issuance of the chrono was based on a medical necessity, but rather for

comfort.

8. A review of Mr. Lopez’ medical file shows that Mr. Lopez was not

seen again after June 1997 for complaints of foot pain relating to the size of his

feet until around September 2002. There is no medical evidence to support that

Mr. Lopez has suffered permanent injury or scars, scrapes, blisters, deformities,

or pain as a result of any delay in obtaining the correct size shoes. In fact, there is

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 4 of 13
13 Docket 251-5, p. 2 [Minnick Declaration].

14 Id., p. 4.

ORDER [Re: Motion at Dockets 234 & 251]

Lopez v. Peterson, 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC) 5

no medical evidence to indicate that Mr. Lopez was suffering from any serious

medical ailment or pain as a result of any delay in obtaining proper fitting shoes.

9. In sum, there is no medical evidence demonstrating that Mr. Lopez

suffered a severe medical condition requiring the immediate issuance of EEE size

shoes in 1997. Furthermore, there is no medical evidence demonstrating that Mr.

Lopez suffered any serious or permanent injury as a result of any delay in

obtaining the correct shoe size in 1997.

10. Presently, there is nothing wrong with Mr. Lopez’ feet. Mr. Lopez

has been seen by a podiatrist and the recommendation is simply that he wear extra

wide shoes.

In her declaration, Minnick states with respect to obtaining off-size shoes:13

4. I do not specifically recall Plaintiff or the incidents he complains of in

his complaint as this occurred approximately 8 years ago. Nonetheless, it an

inmate needed a special order shoe, it was my custom and practice to to

accommodate the inmate’s needs when necessary.

5. Inmates were given shoes through their Facility Clothing Room. 

Plaintiff was housed in Facility C, therefore, he would go to the Facility C

Clothing Room and request the shoes he needed from the staff. If Facility C did

not have the size Plaintiff needed, then the Supervisor I would submit a request to

me for the correct size shoes. In the event that the warehouse did not have the

size in stock, then I would add a request for the specific size in the next order to

the Prison Industry Authority (PIA). I generally placed orders to PIA every 90

days.

6. In situations where I was required to order special shoe sizes, I was

required to order them from the PIA. The turn-around time for a shoe order

depended largely on the availability of the shoes. Generally, it took the PIA

anywhere from 3 to 6 months to fill an order.

With respect to her knowledge of the alleged “medical necessity,” Minnick states.14

17. I am not a medical doctor and I was not aware at that time whether

Plaintiff suffered from a serious medical condition which required that he be

given the correct size shoes immediately. Based upon my review of the

documentation, neither I nor my staff had any reason to believe that Plaintiff had

a medical condition which required that he be given a pair of boots size 8 1⁄2 EEE

immediately.

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 5 of 13
15 Docket 253, pp. 32–33 [Declaration of Andrew R. Lopez (Plaintiff) In Support of: Request for

Counsel; and, In Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Its Attachment].

16 In his Request for Director’s Level Review, Lopez stated: “The informal level (laundry)

refused to answer my complaint, and attached a note directing me to file on medical.” Docket 251-5, p. 9

[Minnick Declaration, Attachment A].

17 Docket 10, pp. 3(f)–3(g) [Amended Complaint Under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983].

ORDER [Re: Motion at Dockets 234 & 251]

Lopez v. Peterson, 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC) 6

In rebuttal, Lopez stated in his Declaration opposing Minnick’s motion:15

11. Minnick refused to order my EEE shoes when Nurse Brennan and myself

spoke to Minnick at the C Yard Laundry.

12. Doctor C. Hooper never examined my feet. I have reviewed my prison

medical file thoroughly several times since January 1997 and have never seen a

CDC 7254 authored by Dr. Hooper for June 1997.

16. Defendant Minnick refused verbally and in writing my requests to be

provided shoes as prescribed by Dr. Beams. I spoke to Minnick while alone then

with Nurse Brennan when Minnick was here at the C Yard laundry at High

Desert, and Minnick was the one who signed the “Stick Em” that has been

removed from CDC 602 No. C-97-02028. My Director’s Level Attachment

clearly states “the note from laundry was removed.”16

In addition in his verified amended complaint, Lopez stated:17

42) In March 1997, H.D.S.P.’s, Dr. Beams examined plaintiff’s feet and

prescribed that plaintiff is to be given special shoes to accommodate plaintiff’s

extra wide feet.

43) H.D.S.P.’s C Yard laundry staff person, defendant Minnick, was responsible

for ordering the shoes prescribed by Dr. Beams and providing them to plaintiff.

44) Defendant Minick refused to provide plaintiff’s special shoes.

45) Plaintiff complained of the pain in his feet and showed the doctor and

registered nurse Brennan (“R.N. Brennan”) that his feet were suffering serious

injury scrapes, blisters, and being squashed; and informed them that defendant

Minnick refused to order the shoes as prescribed by the doctor.

46) At that time, R.N. Brennan walked with plaintiff to the laundry room to

speak with defendant Minnick about providing plaintiff’s shoes. Defendant

Minnick refused.

47) R.N. Brennan and plaintiff returned to the facility infirmary, where R.N.

Brennan informed the doctor of Minnick’s refusal to provide plaintiff’s special

shoes.

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 6 of 13
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1989).

19 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

ORDER [Re: Motion at Dockets 234 & 251]

Lopez v. Peterson, 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC) 7

48) For nine (9) months, from January 1997 through September, [sic] 1997,

plaintiff suffered extreme pain caused by defendant Minnick deliberate refusal to

follow the doctor’s prescription and provide the shoes; and, plaintiff also suffered

permanent scars to his feet.

III. ISSUES

The issue presented to the court on the cross-motions for summary judgment at bar is a

relatively narrow one: Did Minnick act with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs

of plaintiff Lopez, i.e., interfere with a prescribed treatment? Determination of that issue rests

on the determination of two underlying issues: (1) was the providing of size EEE work boots a

matter of medical necessity; and (2) was the fact of the medical necessity communicated to

defendant Minnick?

Although the parties in their respective motions have presented this case in the context of

an interference with prescribed medical treatment, the case presents a mixed issue. At both the

Second Level and Director Level appeals it was noted that shoe size was a clothing, not a

medical, issue. As discussed further in Part V below, the Court agrees with that characterization. 

It is essentially a clothing issue necessitated by a medical situation engendered by the physical

characteristics of Lopez, his extra wide feet. Minnick may be liable if it is established that she:

(1) acted with deliberate indifference in failing to provide Lopez with adequate clothing, i.e.,

properly fitting shoes; and (2) that failure resulted in serious pain or medical problems.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if, when viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving

party is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.18 "Credibility determinations, the

weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

functions, not those of a judge, [when] he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment."19 In

response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must set

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 7 of 13
20 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Henderson v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1055-56 (9th Cir.

2002).

21 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1132 n. 14.

22 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

23 429 U.S. 97, 104–105 (1976) (footnotes, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).

24 Id., at 106.

25 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

ORDER [Re: Motion at Dockets 234 & 251]

Lopez v. Peterson, 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC) 8

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.20 A verified complaint serves

as an affidavit for summary judgment purposes.21 The issue of material fact required to be

present to entitle a party to proceed to trial is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of

the party asserting its existence; all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a fact-finder to resolve the parties' differing versions

of the truth at trial. There is no genuine issue of fact if, on the record taken as a whole, a rational

trier of fact could not find in favor of the party opposing the motion.22

V. DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court, holding that the infliction of unnecessary suffering on prisoners

violated the Eighth Amendment, stated in Estelle v. Gamble:

23

[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.

This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their

response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or

delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment

once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a

prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.

In Estelle the Supreme Court distinguished “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

prisoners,” from “negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical condition,” holding that only

the former violates the Constitution.24 In short, Eighth Amendment liability requires “more than

ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.”25

In determining deliberate indifference, the court scrutinizes the particular facts and looks

for substantial indifference in the individual case, indicating more than mere negligence or

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 8 of 13
26 Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).

27 Jett v. Penner, 429 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

28 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, (1994); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th

Cir. 1996); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); Wright v. Rushen., 642 F.2d 1129,

1132–1133 (9th Cir. 1981).

29 Walker v. Summer, 14 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1994).

ORDER [Re: Motion at Dockets 234 & 251]

Lopez v. Peterson, 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC) 9

isolated occurrences of neglect.26 The Ninth Circuit recently spoke to the subject of the

appropriate test under Estelle.

27

In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. 

First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure

to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the plaintiff must show the

defendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This second

prong—defendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent—is satisfied

by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or

possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Indifference may

appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical

treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide

medical care. Yet, an inadvertent [or negligent] failure to provide adequate

medical care alone does not state a claim under § 1983. A prisoner need not show

his harm was substantial; however, such would provide additional support for the

inmate's claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs. If the

harm is an isolated exception to the defendant's overall treatment of the prisoner

[it] ordinarily militates against a finding of deliberate indifference.

As noted above, this case presents primarily a clothing issue, a prison condition. It is

clearly established that prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to provide

inmates with the necessities of life, including adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation,

medical care, and personal safety.28 Moreover, it is clearly recognized that the denial of

adequate clothing under some circumstances could inflict pain.29 As with medical necessity

claims, prison condition claims have both an objective and subjective element. The objective

element is based on the severity of the deprivation and the subjective on the prison official’s

knowledge of the risk of serious injury or pain being inflicted by consciously ignoring the

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 9 of 13
30 See, e.g., Collins v. State, 2006 WL 1587467, Slip Op. *2 (W.D. Va. June 6, 2006); Lavender

v. Lampert, 242 F.Supp.2d 821, 845–846 (D. Or. 2002); ASHANN-RA v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 112

F.Supp.2d 559, 562–63 (W.D. Va. 2000).

31 Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000), citing Hopowit, 682 F.2d at 1259 (“[t]he

more basic the need, the shorter the time it may be withheld”).

32 The Court finds the reasoning in Lavender persuasive: “a reasonable official who observed, or

who was notified about, plaintiff’s injuries sustained from inappropriate footwear, would know that

delays or failure to mitigate or prevent further pain and damage would constitute ‘unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain,’ and would therefore violate an established constitutional right.” The ultimate

findings in Collins and ASHANN-RA are distinguishable from this case and Lavender. In neither case was

there any evidence that the prisoner had suffered any serious pain, injury or other deleterious effect from

the denial of properly fitting shoes.

33 Herbert only included the first three lines, the final lines were added later by unknown hands.

34 See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131–1132.

ORDER [Re: Motion at Dockets 234 & 251]

Lopez v. Peterson, 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC) 10

prisoner’s needs.30 The circumstances, nature, and duration of a deprivation of a necessity must

be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred.31 Thus, Minnick

may be liable for the failure to provide proper fitting shoes even if there is no clearly defined

immediate medical necessity.32

This case brings to mind the often quoted current colloquial adaptation of the age-old

verse by George Herbert (Jacula Prudentum (Outlandish Proverbs), circa 1625):33

For want of a nail, the shoe was lost,

for want of a shoe, the horse was lost,

for want of a horse, the knight was lost,

for want of a knight, the battle was lost,

for want of a battle the kingdom was lost,

all for the want of a nail.

It appears undisputed, indeed, probably indisputable, that ill-filling shoes cause pain and

discomfort. It is also undisputed that a period of more than eight months lapsed between the

time it was first noted in Physician’s Orders that Lopez needed a EEE shoe size and the time he

received properly fitting shoes. Thus, it cannot be said that satisfactory resolution of Lopez’

needs was not delayed. However, to rise to the dimension of a Constitutional violation, the

“need” must be related to a serious condition, i.e., one that adversely affects the person’s daily

activities or causes chronic and serious pain.34 In addition, a defendant must purposely ignore or

fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or medical need in order for deliberate indifference to be

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 10 of 13
35 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX

Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

36 Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 437 F.3d 1027, 1035–36 (9th Cir.2005); see

Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 742 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[i]n other words, the factfinder's general duty

to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant does not require that the court make a

credibility determination on the [movant's] evidence at the summary judgment stage, even if it has reason

to disbelieve that evidence); see also Williams v. Calderon, 48 F.Supp.2d 979, 989 (C.D.Cal. 1998)

(noting in the context of a habeas claim “[t]he Court is not to determine issues of credibility on a motion

for summary judgment; instead, the truth of each party's affidavits is assumed”), aff'd sub nom. Williams

v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2004).

37 Although Lopez alleges he suffered permanent scarring, Metatarsalgia, and Hammertoe, the 

medical records submitted by the parties do not establish that those conditions were either observed or

diagnosed by the medical professionals responsible for his treatment.

38 Lopez attacks the credibility of the Declaration of Dr. Klarich on this issue and points to what

he terms as being either false or incorrect statements and requests the Court either strike or disregard

them. As noted above, however, it would be improper for the Court to so do.

39 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993).

ORDER [Re: Motion at Dockets 234 & 251]

Lopez v. Peterson, 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC) 11

established. Where the claim is based upon delay in providing a specified treatment, a prisoner

has no claim for deliberate medical indifference unless the delay was harmful.35

For the purposes of ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment the Court may not

weigh credibility but must accept as true the statements contained in the affidavits.36 The

evidence must also be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Applying

those principles to the case at bar, the Court finds that there are genuine triable issues of fact.

Lopez’ testimony is that he suffered serious pain and injury from the failure to provide

him properly fitting shoes. This testimony, if accepted, establishes the seriousness of the

condition.37 On the other hand, Minnick has submitted evidence that Lopez did not suffer any

serious injury or pain as a result of the failure to provide him with the proper size footwear.38

This evidence, if accepted, would negate the “serious medical condition” prong as well as any

harm from the delay. Thus, credibility is an issue presenting a triable issue of fact. In addition,

Minnick has submitted evidence that tends to establish that the physicians did not view Lopez’

situation as constituting a serious medical condition. Minnick, who is not a doctor, cannot be

said to be acting with deliberate indifference to a serious medical problem that the physicians

who either examined Lopez or reviewed his medical records do not view as existing.39

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 11 of 13
40 533 U.S. 194 (2001).

41 Id. at 201.

42 Id.

ORDER [Re: Motion at Dockets 234 & 251]

Lopez v. Peterson, 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC) 12

Lopez testifies that Minnick was the person who refused to provide the footwear. 

Minnick on the other hand disputes this, albeit somewhat obliquely, on the basis that she was not

normally the person in laundry room. This conflicting evidence also presents a triable issue of

fact.

Lopez also asserts that Minnick not only refused to provide him the shoes as prescribed

but that she refused to even order them. While the fact Lopez was not provided shoes of a

correct size is uncontested, Minnick counters that under standard procedures: (1) she routinely

submitted special orders to the Prison Industrial Authority once every 90 days; (2) she was

required to order through the PIA; and (3) it took PIA anywhere from three to six months to fill

an order. This creates a triable issue of fact of whether Minnick deliberately refused to provide

the shoes or was, as a practical matter, unable to so do.

Lopez testifies that Minnick was made aware of the fact that the size EEE shoes were

medically necessary by a member of the institution’s medical staff. Minnick submits evidence

that, if accepted, would tend to establish that Minnick not only did not receive but could not

possibly have received any such notice because there was no medical necessity for immediately

furnishing shoes of a proper size. This creates a triable issue of fact on whether Minnick had the

requisite knowledge that a failure to provide properly fitting shoes would cause Lopez serious

pain or injury.

Minnick has also claimed she is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is

analyzed using the two-step inquiry set forth in Saucier v. Katz.

40 The first step of the Saucier

analysis requires the court to decide whether the refusal to provide Lopez with the proper fitting

shoes violated his constitutional rights.41 If so, “the next, sequential step is to ask whether the

right was clearly established.”42 For a right to be clearly established, its contours “‘must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 12 of 13
43 Id. at 202. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1997)).

44 Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1998);

(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

ORDER [Re: Motion at Dockets 234 & 251]

Lopez v. Peterson, 2:98-cv-02111-JKS (PC) 13

right.’”43 The protection afforded by qualified immunity “safeguards ‘all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”44

As noted above, it was clearly established in 1997 that Lopez had a constitutional right to

adequate clothing, including shoes. The flaw in Minnick’s position is that it presupposes that the

facts are as she has presented them. However, the court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to Lopez, the non-moving party. So viewed the facts show: (1) Lopez required size

EEE shoes; (2) this fact was confirmed by a prison physician; (3) Minnick was apprised of both

the need for size EEE shoes and that it had been medically verified; (4) Minnick refused to order

proper size shoes; (5) this caused Lopez to suffer pain and injury; and (6) this condition persisted

for an appreciable period of time. Under these facts, if proven, Minnick is not entitled to

qualified immunity. On the other hand, if these facts are not proven, Minnick is not only entitled

to qualified immunity but, in addition, there is no Eighth Amendment violation.

VI. CONCLUSION/ORDER

Based upon the foregoing,

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at docket 234 is DENIED, and

2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at docket 251 is DENIED.

Dated June 22, 2006

s/ James K. Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:98-cv-02111-MCE-EFB Document 254 Filed 06/22/06 Page 13 of 13