Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00456/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00456-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL MENDOZA,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN J. SOLIS,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-0456 AWI WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Section 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is confined pursuant to judgment entered against him in Fresno County Superior Court

on September 21, 1998. The court imposed a state prison term of 17 years for violation of Penal Code

section 666 plus prior convictions within the meaning of Penal Code Sections 666(b)-(I), 1170.12(a)-(e),

and 667.5(b).

On March 30, 1999, Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal for the

Fifth Appellate District (“Court of Appeal”). The Court of Appeal issued its opinion on January 28,

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2000, and struck a five year prior conviction and a one year prior conviction. The Court of Appeal

remanded the case back to Superior Court to determine whether to impose or strike a one-year prior and

prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the ordered modifications. Petitioner did not file

a petition for review and the remititur was issued on March 29, 2000.

On June 1, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Fresno County

Superior Court. The court denied the petition on June 21, 2004, deciding the petition on the merits but

noting that Petitioner had not acted with diligence.

On August 2, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal,

which denied the petition on August 12, 2004. On September 23, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court. The court denied the petition on February

16, 2005. Petitioner filed the present petition on March 25, 2005. On March 22, 2007, the court denied

Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504

fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Fresno County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the

court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997);

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 th

(5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh th

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after

statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA, thus it is

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governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with respect

to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless

the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123

S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d

1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may th

not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174

(citations omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id.(citations omitted).

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal conviction

is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual determinations must be presumed

correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made by the state court unless the petitioner

can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct.

457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

//

//

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DISCUSSION

Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of effective assistance of trial counsel, alleging

generally that trial counsel failed to subject the prosecution’s case in chief to any semblance of an

adversarial test, and raising eight specific claims. 

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the purposes

of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226,

1229 (9 Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, th

the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064

(1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that counsel's th

performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he or she was

not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The

petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,

and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional

judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344,

1348 (9 Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. A court indulges

th

a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d

1446, 1456 (9 Cir.1994). th

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different," 466 U.S., at 694. Petitioner

must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, one whose result

is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must evaluate whether the entire trial was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d

at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356, 1461 (9 Cir. 1994). th

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the

prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 697,

104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice, any deficiency

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that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. However, there are certain instances which are

legally presumed to result in prejudice, e.g., where there has been an actual or constructive denial of the

assistance of counsel or where the State has interfered with counsel’s assistance. See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 692; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S., at 659, and n. 25, 104 S.Ct., at 2046-2047, and n. 25

(1984).

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable application” prong

of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d 1058, 1062 (2000). “Under

the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [United States Supreme Court] decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. The

habeas corpus applicant bears the burden to show that the state court applied United States Supreme

Court precedent in an objectively unreasonable manner. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003).

Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to testify, which resulted

in evidence of his prior convictions being used for impeachment. As Respondent argues, Petitioner has

failed to show any prejudice resulting from counsel’s advice to testify. Petitioner was identified by two

witnesses as acting as a look out while Jeanne Cintron stuffed stolen merchandise into a J.C. Penny bag.

Petitioner told the store’s loss prevention officer he that knew Cintron. Without explanation for his

unusual behavior in the store, a jury could have easily convicted Petitioner. Having Petitioner testify

was the only way to present Petitioner’s explanation to the jury, and was a classic tactical decision by

counsel. A difference in opinion as to trial tactics does not constitute denial of effective assistance,

United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., Dondich v. United States,

454 U.S. 1127 (1981), and tactical decisions are not ineffective assistance simply because in retrospect

better tactics are known to have been available. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984).

Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to stipulate to his prior theft

convictions. Stipulating to the existence of Petitioner’s seven charged prior convictions under Court 1

kept them from being admitted into evidence for the truth of the matter in the guilt phase of the trial.

The prosecution did later prove the prior convictions were true in the second part of the bifurcated trial.

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Thus, as Respondent argues, Petitioner cannot show any prejudice to him by the stipulation. Further,

Petitioner clearly benefitted from the stipulation. While evidence of some of the prior convictions was

admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment when Petitioner testified, the court instructed the jury

that this evidence could only be considered for the purpose of determining Petitioner’s credibility. 

Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s

questioning of the store’s loss prevention officer regarding suspicious activity . The court finds nothing

objectionable in the prosecution’s questioning of the officer’s personal observations regarding activity

in the store. Failure to make meritless objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

See, James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9 Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 935, 115 S.Ct. 333 (1994) th

(holding that an attorney's failure to make a futile motion is not ineffective assistance of counsel); Shah

v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9 Cir. 1989) (Counsel’s failure to raise meritless legal argument th

does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). Petitioner’s counsel’s failure to object to the

prosecution’s questioning of the store’s loss prevention officer regarding suspicious activity did not

amount to ineffective assistance. 

Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s leading

questioning of the store’s loss prevention officer about observing Petitioner “looking around.” Again,

there was nothing objectionable in this questioning of the officer’s personal observations, and

Petitioner’s failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine the People’s

witnesses. As demonstrated by the record in this case, trial counsel did cross examine the prosecution

witnesses and there is no basis for Petitioner’s claim that he failed to do so. Further, Petitioner has failed

to demonstrate that the result of the trial would have been different with further cross-examination and

so has failed to demonstrate prejudice.

Petitioner claims that his trial attorney was ineffective for advising him to bifurcate the trial and

waive the jury as to the truth of the prior convictions. As stated above, the record shows that the

prosecution had proof of the prior convictions, and the jury would have found the prior conviction

allegations to be true. Further, the record shows that the trial court properly advised Petitioner of his

right to a jury trial, and that he waived that right. This court therefore finds that Petitioner cannot

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demonstrate prejudice.

In light of the above, the court concludes that Petitioner cannot carry his burden in regard to his

contention that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, because he cannot demonstrate that

the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, this claim

presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, arguing that

counsel raised none of the issues Petitioner instructed him to raise. Petitioner also claims that appellate

counsel failed to raise any arguable issues.

Effective assistance of appellate counsel is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to Strickland 's two-pronged test. Miller v.

Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9 Cir.1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9 Cir.1986); th th

See, also, Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 353-54 (1988) (holding that where a defendant

has been actually or constructively denied the assistance of appellate counsel altogether, the Strickland

standard does not apply and prejudice is presumed; the implication is that Strickland does apply where

counsel is present but ineffective).

To prevail, a petitioner must show two things. First, he must establish that appellate counsel's

deficient performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional

norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Second, a

petitioner must establish that he suffered prejudice in that there was a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's unprofessional errors, she would have prevailed on appeal. Id. at 694. A "reasonable

probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The relevant inquiry

is not what counsel could have done; rather, it is whether the choices made by counsel were reasonable.

Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9 Cir.1998). The presumption of reasonableness is even th

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stronger for appellate counsel because he has wider discretion than trial counsel in weeding out weaker

issues; doing so is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate assistance. Miller v.

Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9 Cir.1989). th

Appealing every arguable issue would do disservice to a petitioner because it would draw an

appellate judge's attention away from stronger issues and reduce appellate counsel's credibility before

the appellate court. Id. Appellate counsel has no constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue

requested by a petitioner. Id at 1434 n10 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54, 103 S.Ct. 3308

(1983)). Here, Petitioner lists several issues he believes appellate counsel should have raised, but does

not in any way demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failure to raise these issues,

he would have prevailed on appeal. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Petitioner has therefore not met

his burden on habeas corpus and this contention provides no basis for relief.

Admission of Hearsay Statements and Right to Confrontation

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements at the preliminary

hearing through the testimony of Fresno Police Officer Medina and that his right to confront witnesses

was violated. Petitioner also contends that his right to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36 (2004) was violated when the court permitted the officer to testify at trial concerning the

statements of Cintron.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right “to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.” “[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an opportunity for

effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever

extent, the defense might wish.’”Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658 (1987) (quoting

Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292 (1985). “The Confrontation Clause includes no

guarantee that every witness called by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is marred

by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied

when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through crossexamination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the

witness’ testimony.” Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 21-22, 106 S.Ct. 292. 

There is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing to determine whether a case should

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proceed to trial. Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 677 (9 Cir. 1981). The Crawford decision, which th

overruled prior Supreme Court case governing admission of hearsay statements in criminal trials over

Confrontation Clause objection , does not effect the admissibility of evidence at a preliminary hearing.

Further, Crawford does not apply retroactively on collateral review. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S.Ct.

1173 (2007). Finally, although the prosecutor attempted to keep the hearsay evidence out based on

hearsay, Petitioner actually moved to have the hearsay statements admitted, knowing that he would not

have the opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable witness. 

In light of the above, the court finds that Petitioner cannot carry his burden and that this petition

presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Use of Prior Convictions

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had suffered prior serious

felonies, and erred in using the prior convictions for enhancing his sentence. The question of whether

Petitioner’s prior convictions amounted to serious felonies under California’s Three Strikes Law is a

matter of state law. A determination of state law by a state appellate court is binding in a federal habeas

action, Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988), unless the interpretation is an “obvious subterfuge

to evade consideration of a federal issue.” Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684, 691 n. 11 (1975); see

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (federal habeas court must respect a state court’s application

of its own law and must not engage in de novo review); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 739-40

(1990) (a federal court has no basis for disputing a state’s interpretation of its own law). The court finds

that Petitioner has not demonstrated any such obvious subterfuge in regard to his prior felony

convictions. Accordingly, the court concludes that this claim presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:

1) that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED;

2) that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this case.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District Court

Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules

of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days

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after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on

all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus

three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The court will then review the Magistrate

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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