Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02919/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02919-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HEIDE MARIE VELARDE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF UNION CITY, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 06-02919 JSW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS 

Now before the Court are the motions to dismiss Plaintiff Heide Velarde’s claims for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by the City of Union City, Randy Ulibarri, Chief of Union City Police

Department, Al Guzman, former Union City Police Chief, Sergeant Rod Romano, Lieutenant G.

Stewart, and Union City Police Officer Bruce Vance (collectively, “Union City”), the City of

Fremont and Graig T. Steckler, Chief of the Fremont Police Department (collectively,

“Fremont”), Gustavo Samaniego, Principal of Banard White Middle School, Judy Silver, former

Principal of Barnard White Middle School, Dr. Patricia Juarequi, Superintendent of New Haven

Unified School District, Guy Emanuele, former Superintendent of the New Haven Unified

School District, Barbara Aro-Valle, President of New Haven Unified School District, Jonas

Dino, Gwen Estes, Jenn Stringer, and Kevin Harper, members of the New Haven School

District Board, Pat Gacoscos, Cathie Kelly, Jim Navarro, and Linda Fernandes, former

members of the New Haven School District Board (collectively, “the District”), and defense

attorney, Allan Gorelick.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Having reviewed the parties’ papers and considered their arguments and the relevant

legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motions to

dismiss as to all claims. 

BACKGROUND

According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, on October 4, 1996, Plaintiff

attended a parent-teacher conference at Barnard White Middle School (“BMWS”), a school in

the New Haven Unified School District located in Union City, California. (Compl. ¶ 26.) After

a discussion with former Assistant Principal Gustavo Samaniego and former Principal Judy

Silver, Union City Police Officer Bruce Vance escorted Plaintiff out of the principal’s office

and informed Plaintiff that if she returned to the school, he would arrest her for trespassing. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 27, 30.) Outside the office, Plaintiff spit on the ground in view of Officer Vance

and seven male students. (Compl. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Vance accused her of

spitting on him and arrested her. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Officer Vance then took

Plaintiff to a deserted grass area where he subjected her to “inappropriate conduct” and physical

abuse. (Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff further contends that in addition to handcuffs, Officer Vance

restrained Plaintiff’s arms with what she later discovered to be a closeting chain and secured a

self-made harness attached with a long black chord to Plaintiff’s back. (Compl. ¶ 106.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Officer Vance used the black chord to drag Plaintiff from one site to

another and eventually, threw her against the squad car in the parking lot with excessive force. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 92, 106.) Plaintiff further alleges that Assistant Principal Samaniego witnessed

Officer Vance dragging Plaintiff away and that he placed her sandal, which came off during the

dragging, into the squad car’s trunk. (Compl. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Vance later

put Plaintiff in the squad car, conversed with Samaniego, and drove her to the Union City

Police Department (“UCPD”), where she was locked in a holding cell and allegedly threatened

not to tell anyone about what happened. (Compl. ¶¶ 34, 36, 37.) 

Plaintiff was subsequently transferred to the Fremont Police Department (“FPD”), where

she was frisked, booked, fingerprinted, and released. (Compl. ¶ 38.) The next morning,

Plaintiff received medical treatment at Kaiser Permanente Hospital, where she reported to the 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Admittance Clerk that Officer Vance caused her injuries by dragging her. (Compl. ¶ 39.) 

Plaintiff alleges that she suffered “blunt force injuries” consisting of a “contusion” on the left

side of her back, multiple abrasions on her hands and wrists due to the handcuffs, scrapes and

friction burns on her forearm, elbows, shoulder, knees, and toes. (Compl. ¶ 40.) In addition,

Plaintiff alleges that she suffered mental and emotional distress and psychological trauma that

resulted in amnesia, which caused her to forget the type of physical restraints used on her

person. (Compl. ¶¶ 40, 42.)

Based on the October 4, 1996 incident, a criminal action was filed against Plaintiff, in

which she retained defendant Allan Gorelick to defend her. (Compl. ¶ 50.) Subsequently, she

pled nolo contendre to a lesser charge of disturbing the peace. (Compl. ¶¶ 129, 130.) Plaintiff

then hired a new attorney to withdraw her plea and filed a complaint against Gorelick with the

California State Bar. (Compl. ¶¶ 52, 53.) 

In February 1997, Plaintiff alleges that she filed an administrative claim, but does not

specify in her complaint against whom. (Compl. ¶ 42.) Between November 14, 1997 and

January 8, 1998, Plaintiff wrote letters to the UCPD requesting an investigation into the October

4, 1996 incident. (Compl. ¶ 54.) The UCPD responded that it had found no reason to conduct

any further investigation. (Id.) Plaintiff further contends that she “continued to exercise

reasonable care and diligence by communicating through e-mail and letters with Defendant

Randy Ulibarri, Police Chief of UCPD” regarding the incident until 2002. (Id.) In September

2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Officer Vance. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff published a

book based on the October 4, 1996 incident. (Compl. ¶ 10.) 

On April 28, 2006, Plaintiff filed suit against Union City, Fremont, the District,

Gorelick, and 25 unnamed individuals (“Does”) asserting a number of claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and state tort claims. All defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff’s

claims are either barred by the statute of limitations or are not cognizable under Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Union City, the District, and Gorelick moved in the

alternative for a more definite statement. On October 27, 2006, this Court held a hearing on the

parties’ motions. The parties were duly notified of the hearing; all defendants were present, but

Plaintiff failed to appear. 

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I. Motion to Dismiss.

A. Legal Standard.

A motion to dismiss is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) where the pleadings fail to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Motions to dismiss are

viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted. Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th

Cir. 1986). A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) “unless it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Dismissal is proper only where there

is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable

legal theory. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). All allegations of material

fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill

v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). When a motion to dismiss is

based on the running of the statute of limitations, it can only be granted only if the assertions of

the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the

statute was tolled. Jablon v. Dean Witter, 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). 

B. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims and State Tort Claims Are Barred by the

Applicable Statute of Limitations or Are Not Cognizable.

Plaintiff asserts six claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that her civil rights

were violated by: (1) false arrest (Compl. ¶¶ 67-72); (2) false imprisonment (Compl. ¶¶ 77-84);

(3) police brutality (Compl. ¶¶ 85-99) ; (4) discrimination based on race, ancestry, national

origin, sex, and age (Compl. ¶¶ 109-11); (5) deprivation of rights under color of state (Compl.

¶¶ 146-49); and, (6) violation of due process (Compl. ¶¶ 150-53). In addition, Plaintiff asserts

various state law claims: (1) unlawful search and seizure in violation of Article 1, § 13 of the

California Constitution; (2) assault and battery; (3) discrimination based on based on race,

ancestry, national origin, sex, and age in violation of Article 1, § 7 of the California

Constitution; (4) violation of California Civil Code section 52.1(b); (5) fraudulent concealment;

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 Plaintiff’s fifth claim (kidnaping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201), seventh claim (reckless endangerment

under “Article 134”), twelfth claim (equitable estoppel); seventeenth claim (obstruction of justice under 18

U.S.C. § 1512) and twenty-first claim (declaratory relief) are not cognizable for the following reasons: Plaintiff

lacks authority to prosecute violations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201and 1512; Plaintiff’s claims for equitable

estoppel and declaratory relief will be construed by this Court as prayers for relief; and Plaintiff’s Seventh claim

citing “Article 134” appears to correlate to Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, under which

Plaintiff does not have authority to prosecute. See United States v. Deloso, 55 M.J. 712, 713 (2001) (reckless

endangerment is a violation of Article 134, UCMJ). To the extent that these claims can be construed as Section

1983 claims or state tort claims, they are also barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

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(6) negligent misrepresentation; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; (8) negligence; (9) intentional

infliction of emotional distress; and, (10) negligent infliction of emotional distress.1

Union City and Fremont contend that these claims are barred by the statute of

limitations because Plaintiff’s injuries, if any, accrued on October 4, 1996. Fremont further

contends that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims based on false arrest and false imprisonment are

barred under Heck. The District contends that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed based on

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirement that she first file a written claim with the

District, a public entity, pursuant to California Government Code §§ 905, 905.2 and 945.4. The

District further contends that these claims are, in any event, barred by the statute of limitations

and that the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against the District. 

Similarly, Gorelick contends that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations and

in addition, that the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for which relief

could be granted against him.

State statute of limitations and the coordinate tolling rules govern the statute of

limitations for Section 1983 claims. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989); Cabrera v.

City of Huntington Beach, 159 F.3d 374, 379-380 (9th Cir. 1998). Section 1983 actions are best

characterized as actions for injuries to personal rights, and thus the state statute of limitations

for personal injuries applies to Section 1983 claims. McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d

668, 672 (9th Cir. 1991). Under California law, “action[s] for libel, slander, assault, battery,

false imprisonment, seduction of a person below the age of legal consent, or for injury to or for

death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another” have a one-year statute of

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2 Civil Procedure Code § 340(3) prescribes the statute of limitations period for

injuries accruing before January 1, 2003. For injuries accruing after January 1, 2003, Civil

Procedure Code § 335.1 controls, which provides that the statute of limitations is two years

for actions for personal injuries, except false imprisonment. False imprisonment retains its

one-year statute of limitations pursuant to Civil Procedure Code § 340(c), effective January

1, 2003. 

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limitations period. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 340(3).2

 Although state law prescribes the statute of

limitations applicable to Section 1983 claims, federal law governs the time of accrual. Gibson

v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1986.) Under federal law, a claim generally

accrues when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of an injury which is the basis of the

action.” Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 379. That is, under federal law, a cause of action accrues when

the plaintiff is aware of the wrong and can successfully bring a cause of action. Acri v. Int’l

Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986). 

1. Claims Arising Out of the October 4, 1996 Incident Are Barred. 

Here, all of Plaintiff’s federal and state claims against Union City, Fremont, and the

District, except the malicious prosecution claim, are time-barred. On October 4, 1996, the day

the alleged injuries occurred, Plaintiff had knowledge that: (1) Officer Vance arrested her and

took her to a deserted grassy area; (2) he allegedly subjected her to “inappropriate conduct” and

physical abuse (Compl. ¶ 32); (3) the officer used “physical restraints” to secure and drag her

from one place to another in the deserted area (Compl. ¶ 40); (4) the scrapes and abrasions she

suffered on various parts of her body resulted from being dragged from one site to another

(Compl. ¶ 33); (5) Officer Vance used excessive force in throwing Plaintiff against the squad

car (Compl. ¶ 92); and, (6) after being held at the UCPD, she was transferred to the FPD where

she was booked and released (Compl. ¶ 38).

Under these facts, Plaintiff was well aware of any alleged wrongdoing committed by

Officer Vance. Particularly, she was aware on October 4, 1996 of the alleged injuries that now

serve as the bases for her causes of action. Because Plaintiff’s claims accrued on October 4,

1996, her civil rights claims under Section 1983 based on police brutality, deprivation of rights

under color of state, violation of due process, and state law claims for assault and battery,

fraudulent concealment, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent

infliction of emotional distress are barred under California’s one-year personal injury statute of

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limitations. See e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 340(3); Tucker v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 158 F.3d

1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The cause of action accrues on the date of the injury unless the

discovery rule applies.”).

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, however, are not

barred by the statute of limitations, but are dismissed as not cognizable under Section 1983.

Under Heck, when a plaintiff seeks damages under Section 1983 based on an allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for harm caused by the actions surrounding the

conviction or imprisonment, the court must determine whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. If it

would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction

has already been invalidated. Id. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction

or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under Section 1983. Id. Here,

Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, if successful, would necessarily imply

the invalidity of her conviction for disturbing the peace. See Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 380 (where a

defendant was convicted of disturbing the peace, his Section 1983 based on false arrest and

false imprisonment would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction). Thus, for these

claims to be cognizable under Section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that her conviction was

invalidated. Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate or even allege that her conviction has been

invalidated. Therefore, her Section 1983 claims based on false arrest and false imprisonment

are not cognizable and are barred under Heck. 

With respect to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim based on discrimination, Plaintiff alleges

that the UPCD discriminated against her based on race, ancestry, national origin, sex, and age

when it failed to investigate her complaint against Officer Vance. (Compl. ¶ 110.) Here,

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the UCPD in September 2002. (Compl. ¶ 54.) Thus, this claim

accrued in 2002. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1982) (holding that

the proper focus, for purposes of the statute of limitations, is on the time the discriminatory acts

occurred, not on the time the discriminatory effects are felt). Under the one-year statute of

limitations for Section 1983 claims, this claim is also barred as late-filed. 

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 Plaintiff’s tenth claim asserts a violation of California Civil Code section 52.1(b). Because section

52.1(b) is an implementing statute, the Court need not address this claim independently of her constitutional

violation claims. See City of Simi Valley v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1085 (2003) (“[California

Civil Code section 52.1] permits an individual to sue for damages when his or her constitutional rights are

violated”). 

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Lastly, Plaintiff’s state claims alleging violations of rights secured by the California

Constitution are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleges

claims for unlawful search and seizure in violation of Article 1, § 13 of the California

Constitution and discrimination based on race, ancestry, national origin, sex, and age in

violation of Article 1, § 7 of the California Constitution.3

 Under California Civil Code section

52.1(b), “[a]ny individual whose exercise and enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States, or rights secured by the Constitution or laws of [California], has

been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, . . . may institute or prosecute in his or

her own name and on his or her own behalf a civil action for damages.” Cal. Civ. Code §

52.1(b). Because Plaintiff alleges that her rights under the California Constitution were

violated, the Court construes her state claims to be brought under Civil Code section 52.1(b). 

See Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820, 841-48 (2004) (provisions of section

52.1 extend to state constitutional and statutory rights; claim for unreasonable search and

seizure under California Constitution properly brought under California Civil Code section

52.1). As, such, any liability on the part of the defendants is created by section 52.1. Under the

California Civil Procedure Code, “action[s] upon a liability created by statute, other than a

penalty or forfeiture” must be commenced “within three years.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(a). 

Thus, Plaintiff’s state constitutional claims are governed by the three-year statute of limitations

prescribed by California Civil Code section 338(a). Here, Plaintiff’s state claims accrued in

1996 and are therefore barred as late-filed. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims under

section 52.1(b) are based on violations of federal law or the United States Constitution, they are

also barred as late-filed pursuant to section 338(a). 

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 Plaintiff does not allege that Gorelick committed actual fraud against her. (See Compl. ¶¶ 127-28,

133-180.) 

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2. Claims against Defendant Gorelick.

Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Gorelick include fraudulent concealment, negligent

misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff retained Gorelick to defend her

during her prosecution for the October 4, 1996 incident with Officer Vance. She alleges that on

November 5, 1996, Gorelick failed to appear on her behalf at a court hearing, resulting in a

bench warrant for her arrest. (Compl. ¶ 50.) Plaintiff further alleges that Gorelick failed to

advise her of her constitutional rights, failed to investigate her case, and engaged in a secret

arrangement with the presiding judge to cause her to accept a plea agreement in which she

agreed to plead nolo contendre to a charge of disturbing the peace. (Compl. ¶¶ 51, 52, 142-43.) 

The statute of limitations for claims against an attorney for wrongful acts or omissions arising

from the performance of professional services, other than actual fraud, is governed by

California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, which prescribes a statute of limitations

period of “one year from the date a plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable

diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four

years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first.” Cal. Civ. Code.

Proc. § 340.6 (emphasis added).4

Plaintiff admits that she “exercised reasonable care and diligence within the statute of

limitations to discover the facts constituting the wrongful act” allegedly committed by Gorelick

by hiring a new attorney to withdraw her guilty plea. (Compl. ¶ 53) (emphasis added). Thus,

Plaintiff had a suspicion of any wrongdoing committed by Gorelick during the statute of

limitations period. Consequently, any claims that she had against him accrued at that time. 

Although she knew of Gorelick’s alleged wrongdoing within the statute of limitations period,

Plaintiff failed to file suit within the one-year or four-year statute of limitations period. 

Accordingly, these claims are barred as late-filed. Similarly, her state tort claims against

Gorelick are barred by the personal injury statute of limitations. See Cal. Civ. Code § 340(3)

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(“An action . . . for injury to or for death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of

another” has a one-year statute of limitations).

C. Tolling of the Statute of Limitations.

Plaintiff contends that her claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. She offers

three arguments in support of her contention that the statute of limitation should be tolled:

California’s discovery rule, fraudulent concealment, and equitable estoppel. None of these

arguments is persuasive. 

1. The Delayed Discovery Rule.

Plaintiff contends that she did not discover the cause of her injuries until May 22, 2005,

when a flashback of the incident revealed that a long black chord was one of the physical

restraints allegedly used by Officer Vance to injure her. Plaintiff further argues that her claims

did not accrue until December 2005 when another flashback revealed that the other physical

restraint used was a closeting chain. (Compl. ¶¶ 43-45.) Thus, Plaintiff argues, it was not until

December 2005 that Plaintiff knew the cause of her injuries, namely the long black chord and

the closeting chain, and therefore the statute of limitations should be tolled until that time. 

(Compl. ¶ 45.) 

Under California law, the statute of limitations can be tolled by the discovery rule which

delays the accrual of the date of a cause of action until the plaintiff is aware of her injury and its

negligent cause. Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing

Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1109 (1988)). Under the discovery rule, the statute of

limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was

caused by wrongdoing. Jolly, 44 Cal. 3d at 1110. “A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific

‘facts’ necessary to establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery. 

Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must

decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights.” Id. at 1111 (emphasis added). 

Here, according to her own allegations, Plaintiff knew on October 4, 1996 that her

injuries were caused by alleged wrongdoing by Officer Vance. Plaintiff knew that Officer

Vance allegedly “caused” her injuries by twisting her arm, dragging her, and throwing her

against the squad car. (Compl. ¶¶ 32, 87-92.) This is evidenced by the fact that on October 5,

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1996 she informed the Admittance Clerk at the emergency room that her injuries resulted from

being dragged while handcuffed by Officer Vance. Plaintiff’s knowledge of the cause of her

injuries is further evidenced by her ongoing correspondence with the UCPD from November 14,

1997 to September 2002, in which she repeatedly requested the UCPD to investigate Officer

Vance’s conduct during the incident. Finally, in September 2002, Plaintiff filed a formal

complaint with the UCPD, further demonstrating her awareness of any wrongdoing committed

by Officer Vance. Thus, Plaintiff was aware of the allegedly wrongdoing and its negligent

cause. Plaintiff’s knowledge of wrongdoing and its cause was sufficient to trigger the running

of the statute of limitations. See Ward v. Westinghouse, 32 F.3d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994)

(“the California Supreme Court explained that: Under the discovery rule, the statute of

limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was

caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her”) (emphasis in original)

(internal citations omitted); accord Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 807

(2005) (citing Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal. 4th 383, 398 (1999) (“A plaintiff has reason to

discover the cause of action when he or she ‘has reason to suspect a factual basis for its

elements.’”)). Plaintiff’s contention that her claims had not accrued until 2005 because she did

not know the “cause” of her injuries, i.e., the exact devices used to restrain her, finds no support

in the case law. Thus, Plaintiff’s failure to recall the exact devices used to restrain her does not

delay the accrual of her claims under the discovery rule. See Jolly, 44 Cal. 3d at 1110 (“A

plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’ necessary to establish the claim”). 

2. Fraudulent Concealment.

Plaintiff further contends that the statute of limitations should be tolled because Officer

Vance allegedly concealed the “physical evidence he used to torture plaintiff” by fraudulently

concealing the “facts [sic] of the use of the physical restraints” in his police report. (Compl. 

¶¶ 47, 49.) In order to toll the statute of limitations because of fraudulent concealment, a

plaintiff must “plead with particularity the circumstances surrounding the concealment and state

facts showing due diligence in trying to uncover the facts. Additionally, plaintiff must allege

facts showing affirmative conduct upon the part of the defendant which would, under the

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 Plaintiff does not contend that her claims should be equitably tolled. (See Compl. ¶ 57.)

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circumstances of the case, lead a reasonable person to believe that he did not have a claim for

relief.” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1345 (9th Cir. 1986.) 

Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated how Officer Vance’s alleged false police report led

her to believe that she did not have a cause of action based on the harm he allegedly inflicted on

her. Plaintiff has consistently maintained that Officer Vance unlawfully subjected her to

“inappropriate conduct” and abuse from the time she told the Admittance Clerk at the

emergency room about it and throughout her correspondence with the UCPD from 1997 to

2002. Given Plaintiff’s persistent claim that Officer Vance tortured and dragged her, this Court

concludes that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any affirmative conduct on the part of any of

the defendants that would lead a reasonable person to believe that Plaintiff did not have a claim

for relief. Thus, there was no fraudulent concealment to warrant tolling of the statute of

limitations.

3. Equitable Estoppel.

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that all of the defendants should be estopped from raising the

statute of limitations as a defense because each of them “induced her to forbear filing suit

within the statute of limitations period.”5

 (Compl. ¶ 57.) This argument is without merit. 

Equitable estoppel is available “where the delay in commencing action is induced by the

conduct of the defendant.” Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 384 (2003). Estoppel is

based on the equitable principle that no man should profit from his own wrongdoing. Id. at 383. 

Aside from conclusory allegations that defendants induced Plaintiff to delay commencing suit

within the statute of limitations, Plaintiff fails to allege what conduct on the part of any of the

defendants she relied upon to induce her to delay filing suit. See Associated Gen. Contractors

of America v. Metro. Water Dist. of So. Cal., 159 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 1998) (conclusory

allegations are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss). On the contrary, the complaint

establishes that nothing the defendants did induced Plaintiff to delay pursuing a remedy for the

alleged wrong done to her, including filing an administrative claim in 1997, filing a complaint

with the UCPD in 2002, filing a complaint with the State Bar, and writing a book about the

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incident. (See Compl. ¶¶ 10, 42, 52, 54.) Thus, the Court finds that equitable estoppel is not

warranted in this case. 

D. Plaintiff’s Malicious Prosecution Claim is Dismissed for Failure to State a

Claim Against These Defendants.

In her twentieth claim for relief, Plaintiff preserves a claim for malicious prosecution

against Union City, Fremont, the District, and Gorelick. Although the limitations period for a

malicious prosecution claim does not begin to run until reversal of plaintiff’s conviction,

Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983), none of these defendants prosecuted

Plaintiff for the crime for which she pled nolo contendre. (See Compl. ¶ 50.) Plaintiff fails to

allege sufficient facts to state a claim against defendants for malicious prosecution. Therefore,

this claim is dismissed on the merits. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motions to dismiss

with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:October 30, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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