Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00631/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00631-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL E. RUFF, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

COUNTY OF KINGS, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-631 OWW/GSA

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 47)

AND GRANTING IN PART WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND, GRANTING IN

PART WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND,

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT (Doc. 73)

On January 3, 2007, Defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment or summary adjudication (Doc. 47). On January 31, 2008,

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint without prior leave of

court. After extensive and convoluted proceedings, Plaintiff

obtained leave to file the First Amended Complaint and a

continuance of the motion for summary judgment. The First

Amended Complaint was deemed filed as of April 8, 2008. By

Order filed on April 8, 2008, "the hearing on the Defendants'

anticipated motion challenging the First Amended Complaint and

their pending Motion for Summary Judgment shall be consolidated,

since the legal and factual issues will overlap." 

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On May 10, 2005, Plaintiff, then represented by Rafael Pio 1

Fonseca, filed a Complaint in which it was alleged:

8. Beginning on or about September 1, 2004,

Defendants began the practice of racial

discrimination against Plaintiff which

consists of the enforcement against Plaintiff

of General amendments to the Kings County

general plan targeted against Plaintiff as an

individual African American and designed with

the specific intent to prevent Plaintiff from

engaging the [sic] lawful of [sic] operation

of a recycling business on land purchased for

that purpose and Plaintiff further alleges

that on or about February 25, 2005 Defendants

continued their discrimination against

Plaintiff by selective enforcement against

Plaintiff as to similar business operations in

Armona, California situated in Kings county

[sic] under the color of official authority.

On information and belief Plaintiff further

alleges that other individuals similarly

situated have not been subjected to these

practices.

The Complaint alleged claims for injunctive and declaratory relief

based on the Equal Protection Clause of the California and United

States Constitutions; for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and

for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2.

2

A. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT.1

The First Amended Complaint (FAC) is brought by Plaintiff,

Eugene Ruff, alleged to be a 55 year-old African-American. 

Plaintiff is alleged to be the owner of property located at

11180-11252 S. 10 Avenue, Hanford, CA. Plaintiff alleges that th

he purchased this property in December 2003 for the purpose of

establishing a commercial recycling center. Defendants are the 

County of Kings; Kings County Planner Mark Sherman; Kings County

Assistant Zoning Administrator Sandy Roper; and Kings County

Director of Planning and Building Inspection William R. Zumwalt. 

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All individual defendants are sued in their individual capacities

for purposes of monetary damages and in their official capacities

for purposes of injunctive and declaratory relief. The FAC

alleges as the First Cause of Action violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1983; as the Second Cause of Action violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1985(3); as the Third Cause of Action violation of 15 U.S.C. §§

2, 15; and as the Fourth Cause of Action, declaratory judgment.

The FAC alleges the following facts in the First Cause of

Action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

8. By November 2003, Ruff had developed plans

for a recycling center on the subject

property, which he had by then agreed to

purchase in principle from Art Brieno

(“Brieno”). During November 2003, Ruff

confirmed that the subject property was zoned

service commercial and that his intended

recycling center as a permitted use under

that zoning classification. During this time

period, Ruff had direct contact and

communication with Sherman and another

planning commission employee, Charles Kinney.

Plaintiff was typically accompanied by others

when he had these contacts, which only

confirmed that he would be entitled to

proceed with his intended recycling center.

9. On December 2, 2003, Ruff finalized his

purchase of the property and recorded his

purchase on December 3, 2003.

10. Beginning in December 2003 and through

July 2004, Ruff repeatedly attempted to

submit his recycling center plan without

success, as he was intentionally,

discriminatorily and capriciously prevented

from doing so by the defendants and their

agents. On multiple occasions, although Ruff

had timely recorded his purchase, of the

subject property, he was told by Sherman and

others under his supervision that he could

not submit his plans because he was not

listed in Kings County’s computerized system

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as the principle owner of the subject

property. Ruff was repeatedly denied to even

submit his plan on this basis, even though he

was able to produce and indeed did produce a

recorded copy of the purchase agreement for

the subject property demonstrating he was the

sole owner. Yet, Ruff was repeatedly advised

that he would not be allowed to submit plans

for his recycling center because he was

allegedly not listed as the owner of the

property in the computer system relied upon

by the Kings County agencies dealing with

property and development issues. On these

multiple occasions, Ruff was accompanied by

another individual, either his son Hananiah

Ruff or Tammy Sanders and/or Brieno.

11. On or about July 14, 2004, Sherman

finally permitted Ruff to submit his

recycling center plan under protest, only to

be telephoned by Sherman shortly thereafter

and told that his plan “would not fly”

because the “law” did not allow it. Ruff

requested that this denial be provided in

writing.

12. On August 25, 2004, Ruff received a

letter from the Kings County Planning

Director, defendant Zumwalt, informing him

that his plan had been denied, The cited

reason why the plan was denied was page LV-3,

section II and page LU08, Policy LU 3.4a of

the Kings County General Plan, which by then

collectively provided that city fringe area

plan proposed for commercial or industrial

development required annexation to the city.

13. The provisions of the Kings County

General Plan upon which Ruff’s denial was

based were not in effect at the time he

purchased the subject property and first

submitted his plan for approval. Indeed, in

violation of LAFCO procedures and customary

practices, no public hearing or review was

provided for and instead the proposed plan

submitted to Board of Supervisors without

LAFCO review or approval by Zumwalt. 

Moreover, no notice was provided by any

agency of Kings County to Ruff, Brieno or

anyone associated with subject property.

Moreover, published notices were

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intentionally and impermissibly vague and did

not in any way indicate that the subject

property was under consideration to be

rezoned. The published notice and other

documents purporting to constitute notice

were drafted by defendant Roper, and they

were drafted in a way as to prevent Ruff from

receiving any actual notice of the proposed

rezoning.

14. Discovery has shown that the plan

amendment was promulgated, presented and

approved only after the defendants and their

agents became aware of Ruff’s proposed

recycling center. Indeed, the plan amendment

appears to have taken effect sometime between

January and April 2004, the time period

during which Ruff was being intentionally,

discriminatorily and capriciously denied the

right to submit plans for his proposed

recycling center and to have said proposal

acted upon. Ruff is informed and believes

that the purpose of these efforts was to hold

him off until the plan amendment could be

adopted and thereby provide a basis for

denying development that was previously

permissible.

15. The above actions could not have been

more intentionally and discriminatorily

directed at Ruff and the subject property.

Indeed, discovery has shown that the subject

property is the only piece of property that

was affected by the hastily promulgated,

presented and approved plan amendment.

Indeed, the defendants have been asked to

identify another property affected by this

amendment in discovery and have failed to do

so.

16. Ruff initiated an appeal of his denial by

Kings County but abandoned it after it became

clear that his proposed recycling center was

not a permitted use under the illicit plan

amendment and that he could only go forward

with such plans if the City of Hanford

discretionarily permitted him to do so. It

would have been futile to continue to appeal

to Kings County based on the 2004 plan

amendment, which was specifically drafted to

deny him the development rights he would have

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had prior to rezoning.

17. The intent of the defendants actions are

further borne out by their and their agents

intervening to contact the City of Hanford

planning authorities regarding Ruff’s

recycling center, even before he had

submitted any plans to the City of Hanford

and sought annexation to the City of Hanford,

as required by the plan amendment. In any

event, these potential efforts were

demonstrated to be futile, since Ruff was

told by Hanford officials shortly after that

illicit contact that his proposed recycling

center would never be permitted in Hanford

and that his property would never be annexed

by Hanford for that purpose. 

18. At all pertinent times, Ruff has been

ready, willing and able to proceed with his

proposed recycling center on the subject

property. Ruff has spent his working life in

the refuse and recycling industry and had the

experience to make his proposed recycling

center work. Further, the Kings County

recycling market at the time would have been

advantageous for the implementation of Ruff’s

proposed recycling center, as no equivalent

commercial recycling center existed in the

County and the nearest equivalent ones were

operating in Tulare and Fresno counties.

Those equivalent recycling centers had

multimillion dollar revenues, based on public

filings obtained by plaintiff.

19. Ruff’s proposed recycling center also

would have been in the public interest,

since, at all pertinent times, Kings County

has been the site of the dumping of more

recyclable refuse than any county in

California and, perhaps, the United States.

Indeed, other counties contract with Kings

County to dump their refuse within its

premises. Kings County also had state and

federal sponsored incentives to increase its

recycling efforts during the subject period.

However, Kings County itself runs the only

roughly equivalent recycling operation in

Kings County and has thus monopolized the

commercial recycling market, for its own

illicit benefit and to the plaintiff’s

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substantial detriment.

20. The defendants and their agents prevented

Ruff from proceeding with his proposed

recycling center not because they were acting

in the public interest or in accordance with

law but, rather, because they selectively,

discriminatorily and intentionally wanted to

thwart Ruff’s efforts. This is consistent

with a long line of selective, discriminatory

and intentional mistreatment that Ruff and

his family have sustained during their many

years of providing valuable refuse and

recycling services to Kings County. This

pattern rises to the level of County policy.

21. The foregoing demonstrates that Ruff’s

constitutional rights were intentionally,

selectively and discriminatorily denied by

the defendants, who acted jointly, in concert

and/or conspired to accomplish this denial.

The predatory plan amendment and the lack of

notice thereof was designed to prevent Ruff

from using his property as he saw fit and as

was then permissible under the law, without

any justifiable basis therefor. These actions

violate Ruff’s rights under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments, specifically his

rights not to be deprived of property rights

in violation of well recognized procedural

and substantive due process and takings

principles. These acts were also arbitrary

and capricious, and conscience shocking.

These actions subject the individual

defendants to liability, including punitive

damages, and subject Kings County to

liability as well. Plaintiff is also entitled

to additional relief, including attorney’s

fees and costs, as a result of these actions.

The Second Cause of Action in the FAC incorporates the preceding

allegations and alleges that Defendants conspired to deny

Plaintiff equal protection in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 

The Third Cause of Action alleges violations of the Sherman and

Clayton Antitrust Acts in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 15. 

The Fourth Cause of Action is for declaratory relief and seeks a

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declaration that Plaintiff’s rights were violated and “remedial

orders requiring the County of Kings to repeal the illicit plan

amendment, to permit Ruff to proceed with his recycling center

forthwith, and to prevent future such actions in this County by

its officials.” 

The FAC alleges a regulatory takings claim under the Fifth

Amendment, claims for violation of procedural and substantive due

process, and a Monell claim that were not alleged in the

Complaint. Because Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was

filed before the FAC was allowed to be filed, Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment does not specifically address these claims.

B. MOTION TO DISMISS.

1. GOVERNING STANDARDS.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Novarro v. Black, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9 Cir.2001). “A district court should grant a motion to th

dismiss if plaintiffs have not pled ‘enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Williams ex rel.

Tabiu v. Gerber Products Co., 523 F.3d 934, 938 (9 Cir.2008), th

quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 1974 (2007). “‘Factual allegations must be enough to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Id. “While a

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not

need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

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the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic,

id. at 1964-1965. Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is

appropriate only where “it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-

46 (1957). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or where the complaint

presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential

facts under that theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,

Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9 Cir.1984). In reviewing a motion to th

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of

all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from

them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9 Cir.2002). However, th

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they

are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock,

Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9 Cir.2003). th

Immunities and other affirmative defenses may be upheld on a

motion to dismiss only when they are established on the face of

the complaint. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th

Cir.1999); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th

Cir. 1980) When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may

consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached

to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the

complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of

which the court takes judicial notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146

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F.3d 699, 705-706 (9 Cir.1988). th

2. FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIM.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under the Fifth

Amendment on the ground that there are no allegations that

Plaintiff’s land has “absolutely no productive or economically

beneficial use”; the claim is not ripe for adjudication; and

Plaintiff has filed to plead an unconstitutional delay.

a. Productive or Economically Beneficial Use.

In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,

1019 (1992), the Supreme Court held that “when the owner of real

property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically

beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave

his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.” 

Defendants argue that, just because Plaintiff is not able to open

a recycling business on his property does not mean that the land

has no productive use. Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated a

claim upon which relief can be granted under the Fifth Amendment.

Plaintiff responds that Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, requires nothing more than a short and plain statement

that establishes a right to relief above the speculative level. 

Plaintiff argues:

Since the plaintiff does not even need to

allege the various elements of a taking in

his complaint under federal procedural law,

his complaint certainly cannot be subject to

dismissal for failing to allege one

alternative element of a takings claim, i.e.,

lack of any other viable uses of the subject

land.

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Plaintiff, citing Palazzalo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617

(2001), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-387 (1994),

and Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1429 (9th

Cir.1996), aff’d, 526 U.S. 687 (1999), further argues that “even

where some relatively minimal economic use of the land might

remain, a regulatory taking may nonetheless be found under a

three factor test: (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2)

the extent of interference with legitimate investment backed

expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action

involved.” Plaintiff asserts that the “defense argument thus

assumes the plaintiff is necessarily pursuing one of multiple

possible takings theories.” 

Defendants acknowledge the requirements of Rule 8, but argue

that, because of the pending motion for summary judgment,

Plaintiff should be required to do more than make an allegation. 

Defendants assert:

This is especially true in this case because

plaintiff’s deposition testimony established

that a business called Asadio’s Taco Truck

operates on the subject property. In

addition, there is an occupied four unit

apartment complex and single family

residences on the property for which

plaintiff charges and receives rent.

Plaintiff does not contend that the economic

impact of requiring annexation has taken or

damaged these pre-existing uses or that he

had made any investment other than the

installment purchase of the land. This is

especially important given the public

interest in assuring the fringe area

developments meet required building codes and

pay their fair share for services. 

Therefore, whether analyzed under Lucas v.

South Carolina Coastal Council ... or the

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three-part test mentioned in Palazzalo,

plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment takings claim

must be dismissed since he clearly has not

been deprived of all economically beneficial

uses of his land.

The standards governing pleading requirements and resolution

of a motion to dismiss are clear. Although the dilatoriness of

Plaintiff’s counsel caused this procedural morass, Plaintiff was

allowed by Court Order to file the FAC after the motion for

summary judgment. The Court cannot, under the law, dismiss this

cause of action on the ground asserted by Defendant, which, in

any case, raise questions of fact.

The motion to dismiss on this ground is DENIED.

b. Ripeness.

In Kinzi v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1453-1454

(9 Cir.), amended, 830 F.2d 968 (9 Cir.1987), cert. denied,

th th

484 U.S. 1043 (1988), the Ninth Circuit, citing MacDonald, Sommer

& Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986), and Williamson

County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.

172 (1985), explained:

Recently, in MacDonald, the Supreme Court

explained that to assert a regulatory takings

claim, a plaintiff must establish its two

components: (1) that the regulation has gone

so far that it has ‘taken’ plaintiff’s

property, and (2) that any compensation

tendered is not ‘just.’ ....

To establish this first component of a

regulatory takings claim, ‘an essential

prerequisite’ must be present: there must be

a final and authoritative

determination of the type and

intensity of development legally

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permitted on the subject property. 

A court cannot determine whether a

regulation has gone ‘too far’

unless it knows how far the

regulation goes.

... This ‘final and authoritative

determination’ must expose ‘the nature and

extent of permitted development.’ .... 

The Supreme Court has expounded the

requirements for a ‘final and authoritative

determination.’ In Hamilton Bank, the

Supreme Court not only set forth the

requirement that the plaintiff must first

have submitted a development plan which was

rejected, but also explained that the

plaintiff must seek variances which would

permit uses not allowed under the regulations

... Therefore, the ‘final decision’ which

inflicts a concrete injury on the plaintiff

and is ripe for adjudication as a claim of

regulatory taking, even if the claim is

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, requires at

least two decisions against the Kinzlis: (1)

a rejected development plan, and (2) a denial

of a variance ... The Kinzlis have not

secured or even attempted to secure either of

these two requisite decisions.

Defendants, referring to paragraph 16 of the FAC, contend

that Plaintiff admits that he did not appeal the denial of his

application nor did he seek any type of variance. Defendants

argue that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff is not entitled to

maintain a Fifth Amendment takings claim.

Plaintiff responds that dismissal on this ground is improper

because the FAC alleges facts in paragraphs 16-17 suggesting that

further appeal or seeking annexation to the City of Hanford would

have been futile. Plaintiff cites, inter alia, Herrington v.

Sonoma County, 834 F.2d 1488, 1496-1497 (9 Cir. 1987): th

The Herringtons did not apply for a variance. 

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Nevertheless, the second Kinzli factor -

application for a variance - need not be met

in this case because the testimony at trial

states that the only means of obtaining

approval of the 320-lot proposal after the

inconsistency determination was through a

General Plan amendment. This testimony finds

support in Cal.Govt. Code § 66474(a) ...,

which requires a county to reject a

development proposal which is inconsistent

with the general plan. Thus, section

66474(a) would appear to prohibit variances

for inconsistent developments. Application

for a variance was not an option for the

Herringtons.

In sum, we hold that the Herringtons have

satisfied the ‘final decision’ ripeness

requirement enunciated in Kinzli. The

Herringtons’ 32-lot development proposal was

conclusively rejected by the County. Efforts

to complete the development application, and

application for a variance, would have been

futile. In so holding, we emphasize that

mere allegations by a property owner that it

has done everything possible to obtain

acceptance of a development proposal will not

suffice to prove futility ... Our holding is

based upon repeated and uncontradicted

testimony by County officials that the

Herringtons’ 32-lot proposal could not have

obtained approval.

See also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, supra, 533 U.S. at 622:

In assessing the significance of petitioner’s

failure to submit applications to develop the

upland area it is important to bear in mind

the purpose that the final decision

requirement serves. Our ripeness

jurisprudence imposes obligations on

landowners because ‘[a] court cannot

determine whether a regulation goes “too far”

unless it knows how far the regulation goes.’ 

... Ripeness doctrine does not require a

landowner to submit applications for their

own sake. Petitioner is required to explore

development opportunities on his upland

parcel only if there is uncertainty as to the

land’s permitted use.

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Plaintiff argues that his takings claim is based in part on

the allegedly improper passage of the regulation itself. 

Plaintiff contends that “[a] takings or procedural due process

claim based on the improper passage of a zoning regulation

without appropriate notice is ripe for adjudication without

further administrative appeal.” 

Plaintiff cites Seguin v. City of Sterling Heights, 968 F.2d

584, 587-588 (9 Cir.1992). th

Seguin does not support Plaintiff’s contention. In the

section of the Seguin opinion discussing the plaintiff’s Fifth

Amendment takings claim, the Ninth Circuit did not even remotely

hold as Plaintiff Ruff contends; in fact, the Ninth Circuit held

that “Macene and Williamson demonstrate that plaintiffs’ fifth

amendment taking claim is not ripe in the present case, and that

they are precluded from pursuing their claim in federal court.” 

968 F.2d at 588. Seguin holds that in the context of the

plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim that they should have

received personal notice of the zoning ordinance, “this is the

type of injury that is instantly cognizable in federal court,

regardless of whether the city has reached a final decision on

the merits of their claim.” Id. at 589. Here, Defendants are

moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment takings claim, not

his procedural due process claim. 

Plaintiff also cites Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870

F.2d 529, 533-534 (9 Cir.1989). In Hoehne, a property owner th

had made an application to divide a 60-acre parcel of land into

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four lots, with one home to be placed on each. The local board

of supervisors denied the subdivision request, and immediately

rezoned the property to a zone having a minimum lot size of 40

acres. The Ninth Circuit held: 

It would have been futile for the Hoehnes to

seek a zoning variance to accommodate their

application because the supervisors, by

legislative act, changed the zoning

designation from a minimum lot size of five

acres to one of forty acres ....

It would have also been futile for the

Hoehnes to seek a conditional use permit or a

more favorable rezoning because in actually

rezoning the tract to further restrict

development, the supervisors themselves sent

a clear and, we believe, final signal

announcing their views as to the acceptable

use of the property. Finally, it would have

been futile for the Hoehnes to seek a General

Plan amendment in their favor, because the

supervisors had amended the General Plan in a

manner clearly and unambiguously adverse to

the application of the landowners.

870 F.2d at 534-535. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues, no appeal needs to be made to

governmental entities other than the one responsible for the

regulatory taking. Plaintiff cites Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,

supra, 533 U.S. at 622. Plaintiff asserts that “there is no

basis for finding plaintiff’s claim unripe for failing to request

annexation to the City of Hanford, a distinct governmental

entity.” 

No reference has been found in Palazzolo supporting the

Plaintiff’s contention. 

Defendants’ reply that Plaintiff’s arguments that dismissal

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of the Fifth Amendment takings claim for lack of ripeness should

be denied on the ground of futility are without merit.

First, Defendants argue, because Plaintiff withdrew his

permit application and obtained a refund of the filing fee,

Plaintiff “should be equitably estopped from coming into federal

court claiming futility especially since federal courts

traditionally abstain from deciding local land use matters.” 

Second, Defendants argue that, even if Plaintiff meets the

threshold requirement for pleading futility, because of the

pending motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must offer more

than a hearsay statement allegedly made by City of Hanford

employee Stowe:

Plaintiff must at least have tried to comply

with the annexation requirement. As noted in

Palazzolo at pg. 622, plaintiff is required

to explore development opportunities on his

property if there is uncertainty as to the

land’s permitted use. Plaintiff did not ask

Mr. Stowe if the City of Hanford would object

to a recycling plant on the subject property

if he did not seek annexation. (Ratliff

Decl., Exhibit M, pg. 44:12-25). As

established by the Zumwalt declaration, if

annexation was not feasible all plaintiff

would have to do to begin establishing a

recycling business is bring his property up

to the standards required by the City of

Hanford. (Zumwalt Decl., para. 4).

In the present case, a recycling business was

the only use for which plaintiff sought

approval and that application was withdrawn. 

Not a scintilla of evidence has been alleged

or offered to show that the recycling center

would not have been approved if the subject

property met the development standards

required by the City of Hanford. Further,

plaintiff has made no effort to demonstrate

that all or almost all development projects

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would not have been approved. Nor is there

any evidence to suggest that there was any

economic impact on pre-existing uses of

property. And, plaintiff cannot show that he

used and was denied just compensation under

the inverse condemnation procedures allowed

by California Civil Code Section 1245.260

[sic]. Williamson at pg. 195. 

Defendants move to dismiss the Fifth Amendment takings claim

for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). In fairness to

Defendants, Mr. Little’s dilatoriness in prosecuting this action

caused the motion for summary judgment to be filed before

Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint. Nonetheless,

because Defendants did not and have not moved for summary

judgment in connection with Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment takings

claim, the Court cannot dismiss this claim based on underlying

facts with respect to which Defendants did not move for summary

judgment.

The Supreme Court held in Williamson: “[B]ecause the

Constitution does not require pretaking compensation, and is

instead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate provision for

obtaining compensation after the taking, the State’s action here

is not ‘complete’ until the State fails to provide adequate

compensation for the taking.” 473 U.S. at 195. In United States

v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980), the Supreme Court explained

that inverse condemnation is “a shorthand description of the

manner in which a landowner receives just compensation for a

taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not

been instituted.” In Cassettari v. Nevada County, Cal., 824 F.2d

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735, 738 (9 Cir.1987), the Ninth Circuit held: th

California law permits a property owner to

bring an inverse condemnation action to

obtain just compensation for an alleged

taking of property. See Cal.Code Civ.P. §

1245.260 ... If the County did indeed take

these property interests from Cassettari

without payment, just compensation can be

obtained by using California’s inverse

condemnation procedures. Thus, an adequate

state compensation procedure is available to

Cassettari. Until Cassettari uses this

procedure, his taking claim is premature.

See also Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344

F.3d 959, 965-966 (9 Cir.2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 904 th

(2004):

‘Under our precedents, a facial takings claim

alleging the denial of the economically

viable use of one’s property is unripe until

the owner has sought, and been denied, just

compensation by the state.’ San Remo Hotel

v. City and County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d

1095, 1101 (9 Cir.1998). This th

jurisdictional predicate is grounded in the

text of the Fifth Amendment and in the

Supreme Court’s admonition that ‘no

constitutional violation occurs until just

compensation has been denied.’ Williamson

County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton

Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 n.13 ... (1985). As

the district court correctly pointed out,

nowhere in its pleading does the Association

aver that it has pursued state administrative

or judicial remedies to seek just

compensation. Accordingly, the takings

claim, insofar as it alleges denial of

economically viable use, is unripe for

review.

Defendants raised this contention for the first time in

their reply brief. Courts generally decline to consider

arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See United

States v. Bohn, 956 F.2d 208, 209 (9 Cir.1992); United States th

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v. Boyce, 148 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1085 (S.D.Cal.2001). However, this

is a ripeness issue going to jurisdiction, which can be raised at

any time.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fifth Amendment takings

claim on the ground of ripeness is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

c. Unconstitutional Delay.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment takings

claim should be dismissed to the extent that it is based on the

alleged delay in processing his application. Defendants cite

Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 803

(Fed.Cir.1993):

While Danforth and Agins leave open the

possibility that a taking may occur by reason

of ‘extraordinary delay’ in governmental

decisionmaking, nothing in case law suggests

that unreasonable delay converts the first

preliminary act into the date of the taking

....

See also Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1233

(9 Cir.1994): th

We have stated that for a delay to be

excessive, it must be substantial, ‘since the

Supreme Court has held a claim to be unripe

even where the application process covering a

development project required approximately

eight years.’ 

Plaintiff argues that his takings claim rests on delay in

accepting his application “for the purpose of enabling a

predatory intervening plan amendment.” Plaintiff contends that

the type of delay he has alleged is distinct from cases relied on

by Defendants discussing delay in completing the application

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process. 

However, the cases cited by Plaintiff do not address a Fifth

Amendment takings claim. Rather, they analyze First Amendment,

denial of equal protection, denial of due process claims, Fair

Housing Act violations. See Hampton Bays Connections, Inc. v.

Duffy, 127 F.Supp.2d 364 (E.D.N.Y.2001); Castle Hills First

Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, 2004 WL 546792

(W.D.Tex.2004); Summerchase Ltd. Partnership I. v. City of

Gonzales, 970 F.Supp. 522, 527 (M.D.La.1997); Valley Outdoor,

Inc. v. City of Riverside, 446 F.3d 948 (9 Cir.2006); th

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536

(11 Cir.1994). th

In their reply brief, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s

claim in the FAC and his opposition contradict his previous

deposition testimony. Further, Defendants argue, Plaintiff has

no evidence to support his contention that the acceptance of his

application was intentionally delayed in order to allow amendment

of the General Plan:

Even assuming plaintiff had submitted an

application the same day he acquired the

property, any claim based on delay would have

to be denied. Plaintiff admitted during

deposition that Sherman said he could not

submit a site plan application because he

only owned 40% of the property. The

Assessor’s office also told him that

installment purchases of real property are

not recorded as having conveyed full title. 

(Ratliff Declaration, Exhibit ‘M’, pg. 34:13-

35:22). Plaintiff has no evidence tending to

show Sherman’s alleged delay in accepting the

zoning permit application was motivated by

anything other than the requirement that the

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zoning permit application show the signature

of the owner, and plaintiff was not the legal

owner. (Ratliff Decl., Exhibit ‘N’, p.2:21). 

Further, at most only seven months elapsed

between acquisition of the property in

December of 2003 and the time Sherman

accepted plaintiff’s Zoning Permit

Application under protest in July of 2004

which is well within constitutional limits

....

Plaintiff’s failure to cite any cases involving a Fifth

Amendment takings claim based on a theory that a governmental

entity intentionally delayed in accepting an application so that

an adverse zoning amendment could be implemented is telling. All

of the cases cited by Plaintiff involve due process or equal

protection claims, both of which are alleged in the FAC. 

Plaintiff cannot base his Fifth Amendment takings claim solely on

the ground that Defendants delayed in accepting his application

to gain time to amend the General Plan.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fifth Amendment takings

claim to the extent that it is based on the alleged delay in

processing his application is GRANTED.

3. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.

Defendants move to dismiss the substantive due process claim

alleged in the FAC. 

a. Preempted by Takings Clause.

Defendants, citing Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 873-875

(9 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1240 (1997), which in turn th

cites Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1324 (9 Cir.1996), th

argue that Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim is preempted

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by the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause.

Plaintiff opposes this ground for dismissal, contending that

Patel v. Penman is no longer good law. Plaintiff cites Crown

Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851 (9th

Cir.2007).

In Crown Point Development, the Ninth Circuit recognized

that its precedent held that a regulation that does not

“substantially advance legitimate state interests” was a taking

under Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), and, if a

taking, the Fifth Amendment taking clause is the specific textual

source of protection against such conduct. The Ninth Circuit

held:

However, this understanding of the Agins

‘substantially advances’ language - i.e.,

that it is a ‘stand-alone regulatory takings

test’ - was rejected by the Supreme Court in

Lingle [v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528

(2005)]. The Court concluded ‘that this

formula proscribes an inquiry in the nature

of a due process, not a takings, test, and

that it has no proper place in our takings

jurisprudence.’ Id. [at 540]. As the Court

explained, the ‘substantially advances’ test

‘does not help to identify those regulations

whose effects are functionally comparable to

governmental appropriation or invasion of

private property; it is tethered neither to

the text of the Takings Clause nor to the

basic justification for allowing regulatory

actions to be challenged under the Clause.’ 

Id. at 542 ....

In this, Lingle pulls the rug out from under

our rationale for totally precluding

substantive due process claims based on

arbitrary or unreasonable conduct. As the

Court made clear, there is no specific

textual source in the Fifth Amendment for

protecting a property owner from conduct that

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furthers no legitimate governmental purpose. 

Thus, the Graham rationale no longer applies

to claims that a municipality’s actions were

arbitrary and unreasonable, lacking any

substantial relation to the public health,

safety, or general welfare.

506 F.3d at 854-855. See also Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc.

v. County of San Luis Obispo, 505 F.3d 860, 870 n.16 (9th

Cir.2007):

The parties dispute whether takings

jurisprudence governs this challenge, or

whether its merits turn only upon our due

process doctrine. The Supreme Court’s

decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,

544 U.S. 528, 537 ..., answers this question:

‘[The Takings Clause] “is designed not to

limit the governmental interference with

property rights per se, but rather to secure

compensation in the event of otherwise proper

interference ....”’ Due process violations

cannot be remedied under the Takings Clause,

because ‘if a government action is found to

be impermissible - for instance because it

fails to meet the “public use” requirement or

is so arbitrary as to violate due process -

that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of

compensation can authorize such action.’ Id.

at 543 .... 

Because the FAC alleges that the actions taken against him

were not in the public interest and were without any

justification, these allegations for violation of substantive due

process are not preempted by the Takings Clause. Defendants’

motion to dismiss on this ground is DENIED.

b. No Evidence of Substantive Due Process

Violation.

Here, Defendants seek dismissal for failure to state a claim

based on the evidence submitted in support of their motion for

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summary judgment:

In this case, the undisputed material facts

set forth in Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment demonstrate that GPA 3-01 was

modified to require that commercial and

industrial developments with [sic] the sphere

of influence of cities either annex to the

city or develop to city improvement

standards. See, Defs. UMF Nos. 1-5. As

noted above, GPA 3-01 clearly serves

legitimate public interest by, among other

things, making sure fringe area development

meets current building codes and assuring

that industrial and commercial projects pay

their fair share for City services. 

Therefore, it is abundantly clear that a

substantive due process claim is not

supported by the evidence, and the instant

motion should be granted.

Plaintiff does not respond to this aspect of the motion to

dismiss. Rather, in the section of his memorandum of points and

authorities in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, Plaintiff contends that the FAC and Plaintiff’s

evidence suffice to state a claim for violation of substantive

due process.

In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., supra, 544 U.S. at 542,

the Supreme Court held that an arbitrary and irrational

deprivation of real property, although it would no longer

constitute a taking, might be “so arbitrary or irrational that it

runs afoul of the [substantive] Due Process Clause.” In Action

Apartment Ass’n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020,

1026 (9 Cir.2007), the Ninth Circuit held: th

We see no difficulty in recognizing the

alleged deprivation of rights in real

property as a proper subject of substantive

due process analysis. We have long held that

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a substantive due process claim ‘must, as a

threshold matter, show a government

deprivation of life, liberty, or property.’ 

Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867,

871 (9 Cir.1998). In Squaw Valley, we th

specifically reaffirmed the principle that

landowners have ‘a constitutionally protected

property interest’ in their ‘right to devote

[their] land to any legitimate use.’ 375

F.3d at 949 ... An arbitrary deprivation of

that right, thus, may give rise to a viable

substantive due process claim in any case in

which the Takings Clause does not provide a

preclusive cause of action. 

The FAC alleges that the amendment of the general plan was

not in the public interest and was arbitrarily and irrationally

enacted to prevent Plaintiff from developing a recycling center

because of his race. These allegations suffice to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted as none of the alleged purposes

for the legislation were for a valid purpose. Factual disputes

preclude summary judgment for Defendants on the claimed violation

of substantive due process.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for summary

judgment are DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s alleged violation

of substantive due process.

4. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS.

Although Defendants move to dismiss these claims pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants specifically refer to the facts posited

by them in support of their motion for summary judgment. The

viability of these claims will be discussed in the section of

this Memorandum Decision dealing with Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. See discussion infra.

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It is well established in the Ninth Circuit that an 2

allegation based on nothing more than a bare averment that the

official’s conduct conformed to official policy, custom or practice

suffices to state a Monell claim under Section 1983. See Karim

Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988);

Shah v. County of L.A., 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986); Guillory

v. County of Orange, 731 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984).

27

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s procedural due

process and equal protection claims is DENIED.

5. Monell Liability.

Paragraph 4 of the FAC alleges that Kings County “is liable

as set forth herein under federal law based upon its

unconstitutional customs and policies, which will be specified at

a later point in this proceeding.” 

2

Defendants move to dismiss the claim in the FAC on the

ground that Monell liability may not be imposed absent an

underlying violation of the Plaintiff’s rights that is related to

the official policy or custom in question. See City of Los

Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)(“If a person has

suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual

police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might

have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is

quite beside the point.”). Contending that none of Plaintiff’s

constitutional claims have merit, Defendants assert that

Plaintiff’s Monell claim must be dismissed.

Because Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied on various

grounds, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim

is DENIED. 

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6. ANTITRUST CLAIM.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s antitrust claim.

In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943), the Supreme

Court held that Congress did not intend federal antitrust laws to

apply to the acts of States as “sovereigns.” In Community

Communications, Inc. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51 (1982), the

Supreme Court held that municipal acts are exempt from federal

antitrust standards only when they are done pursuant to a

“clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” state policy.

As explained in Boone v. Redevelopment Agency of City of San

Jose, 841 F.2d 886, 890 (9 Cir.1988): th

The basis of the state action exception is

that the free market principles embodied by

the Sherman Antitrust Act must give way to

the countervailing principles rooted in

federalism and state sovereignty that states

must be free to act upon local concerns, even

if these actions have anticompetitive results

... This exception was later expanded to

protect municipalities in Community

Communications Co. v. City of Boulder ... The

Court ruled in Boulder that anticompetitive

acts of a municipality that would normally

give rise to liability under the Sherman Act

are shielded if the municipality acted

pursuant to a ‘clearly articulated and

affirmatively expressed’ state policy to

displace competition with regulation ...

Pursuant to this test, we must undertake a

two-part inquiry to determine whether state

action immunity applies. We must first

determine whether the California legislature

authorized the challenged actions of the city

and the agency. Then we must determine

whether the legislature intended to displace

competition with regulation. Both elements

are prerequisites to proper application of

the state action exception to municipal

action. 

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Plaintiff cites California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v.

Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1980), for the

proposition that the test is two-part: (1) the challenged action

must be “one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as

state policy,” and (2) “the policy must be actively supervised by

the state itself.” 

However, in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S.

34, 47 (1985), the Supreme Court held that “active state

supervision is not a prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust

laws where the actor is a municipality rather than a private

party.” The Supreme Court explained:

[T]he requirement of active state supervision

serves essentially an evidentiary function:

it is one way of ensuring that the actor is

engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant

to state policy. In Midcal, we stated that

the active state supervision requirement was

necessary to prevent a State from

circumventing the Sherman Act’s proscriptions

‘by casting ... a gauzy cloak of state

involvement over what is essentially a

private price-fixing arrangement.’ ... Where

a private party is engaging in the

anticompetitive activity, there is a real

danger that he is acting to further his own

interests, rather than the governmental

interests of the State. Where the actor is a

municipality, there is little or no danger

that it is involved in a private price-fixing

arrangement. The only real danger is that it

will seek to further purely parochial public

interests at the expense of more overriding

state goals. This danger is minimal,

however, because of the requirement that the

municipality act pursuant to a clearly

articulated state policy. Once it is clear

that state authorization exists, there is no

need to require the State to supervise

actively the municipality’s execution of what

is a properly delegated function. 

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Id. at 46-47. 

Plaintiff, relying on Midcal, argued:

In contending that Kings County’s actions

pass this test, the defendants misconstrue

the First Amended Complaint to contend that

the anticompetitive action here was the mere

enactment of a land use regulation, which the

plaintiff would concede, if standing alone,

is an act to which state antitrust immunity

would apply. However, in this case, the

anticompetitive acts committed by Kings

County included its preventing plaintiff from

even submitting an application to develop a

recycling center on the subject property ...

Even if such a ministerial act is

tangentially related to the state law zoning

framework sufficient to satisfy the first of

the Midcal elements, it certainly is not an

aspect that is actively regulated by the

State of California, or even regulated at

all. 

The parties were ordered to address the effect of Town of

Hallie on Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss the

antitrust claim in the FAC at the August 4, 2008 hearing. At the

hearing, Plaintiff contended that “the second prong basically

just collapses into the first and basically becomes an

evidentiary requirement to show actual supervision is a way of

showing whether or not the state policy is clearly articulated or

not.” Plaintiff argued that actual supervision is not completely

irrelevant even for municipalities:

[O]ne example of that is whether, whereas

here the state acts not pursuant to but,

rather, in violation of state law, that

certainly is one way of showing whether or

not a municipality complies with the Midcal

test.

Plaintiff cites no authority supporting his contention that

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the “active supervision” component of the Midcal test has any

application to the acts of a municipality. In the absence of

such authority, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be analyzed

under the test set forth in Town of Hallie and Boone. 

At the hearing, Plaintiff argued that the antitrust

exception for municipalities articulated by the Supreme Court

does not apply to government officials. 

Plaintiff’s contention is without merit. In Columbia v.

Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991), the Supreme

Court rejected the argument that Parker v. Brown antitrust

immunity fails whenever the nature of the regulation is

substantively or procedurally defective. 499 U.S. at 371-372. 

In addition, the Supreme Court rejected any conspiracy exception

to the Parker v. Brown antitrust immunity. Id. at 374-379. See

also Traweek v. City and County of San Francisco, 920 F.2d 589,

592 (9 Cir.1990)(“[S]ubjective motivation plays no part at any th

point in determining whether state action immunity protects the

conduct of municipalities.”). Further, the Local Government

Antitrust Act of 1984 (“LGAA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36, provides in

Section 35(a) that “[n]o damages, interest on damages, costs, or

attorney’s fees may be recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of

the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, or 15c) from any local

government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official

capacity.” Section 36(a) provides that “[n]o damages, interest

on damages, costs or attorney’s fees may be recovered under

section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, or

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Although the Local Government Antitrust Act does not bar 3

injunctive or declaratory relief, Thatcher Enterprises v. Cache

County Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1477 (10 Cir.1990), the FAC does not th

seek injunctive or declaratory relief in connection with the Third

Cause of Action. 

32

15c) in any claim against a person based on any official action

directed by a local government, or official or employee thereof

acting in an official capacity.” The provisions of the Clayton 3

Act cited by the LGAA provide the private damages remedy for

violation of the Sherman Act. Crosby v. Hosp. Auth., 93 F.3d

1515, 1536 (11 Cir.1996). As explained in GF Gaming Corp. v. th

City of Black Hawk, Colo., 405 F.3d 876, 885 (10 Cir.2005): th

The legislative history of the LGAA ...

demonstrates that Congress intended the

phrase ‘acting in an official capacity’ to be

given broad meaning encompassing all ‘lawful

actions, undertaken in the course of a

defendant’s performance of his duties, that

reasonably can be construed to be within the

scope of his duties and consistent with the

general responsibilities and objectives of

his position.” Sandcrest Outpatient Svcs.,

P.A. v. Cumberland County Hosp. Svcs., Inc.,

853 F.2d 1139, 1145 (4 Cir.1988). In this th

case, plaintiffs do not allege that the city

officials lacked the authority to cause the

city of Black Hawk to sell the undivided

interests in the mining claims or to withhold

Winn’s certificate of occupancy. Their only

contention is that in exercising these

legitimate powers the city officials acted

pursuant to an illegitimate motive. The

LGAA, however, ‘makes no provision for

consideration of a defendant’s motives.’ Id.

at 1146 (rejecting the ‘argument that

allegations of a conspiracy convert otherwise

authorized conduct into unauthorized

conduct’); see also Cohn v. Bond, 953 F.2d

154, 159 (4 Cir.1991)(‘An allegation of th

conspiracy is akin to an allegation that

[defendants’ conduct] was done in bad faith

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or with malice,’ which is ‘clearly irrelevant

in determining the application of the

immunity.’ ...)); Thatcher Enters. v. Cache

County Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1477 (10th

Cir.1990).

Defendants argue that dismissal of the Third Cause of Action

is required because they are entitled to antitrust immunity under

the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test to determine whether a clearly

articulated state policy authorized the County’s anticompetitive

actions. Traweek, supra, 920 F.2d at 591. The Court must first

determine whether the legislature authorized the County’s

challenged action and, second, the Court must determine whether

the legislature intended to displace competition with regulation. 

Id. at 591-592.

California’s legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme

for land use planning, zoning and annexation. California

Government Code §§ 65300 et seq. provides authority for and scope

of general plans; Government Code §§ 65450 et seq. authorize

adoption of specific plans to implement general plans; Government

Code §§ 65750 et seq. authorizes actions or proceedings to

challenge general plans; Government Code §§ 65800 et seq.

authorize the adoption and administration of zoning laws,

ordinances, and rules and regulations; and Government Code §§

65940 et seq. authorize applications for development projects. 

These statutes authorize the County’s challenged action.

The California legislature intended to displace competition

with regulation. “The Supreme Court has made clear that an indepth substantive review of a statute to determine the

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legislature’s intent is not appropriate.” Traweek, supra, 920

F.2d at 593, citing Town of Hallie, supra, 471 U.S. at 41-42.

In Traweek, the owners of an apartment complex sued the city

and county and government officials, challenging an ordinance

restricting conversion of apartment units to condominiums. The

Ninth Circuit held:

The legislature is deemed to have intended

anticompetitive conduct as long as it may

foreseeably result from a broad authority to

regulate. [Town of Hallie], Id. at 42-43 ...

(finding legislative intent from state’s

specific authorization to cities to provide

sewage services and its delegation to cities

of express authority to take action which

could foreseeably result in anticompetitive

conduct); see also Southern Motor Carriers

Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471

U.S. 48, 64-65 ... (finding that state’s

failure to describe the implementation of its

policy in detail will not defeat protection

of the state action doctrine if legislature’s

intent to establish an anticompetitive

regulatory program is clear). Under this

non-substantive review of the statutory

scheme, the only instance in which the Court

will apparently deny a finding of legislative

intent to sanction the alleged

anticompetitive conduct is where the state

has given the municipality an exceedingly

broad and unspecific grant of power. See,

e.g., Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54-56 ... (holding

that a grant of home rule authority to the

city was not specific enough to warrant state

action immunity). The Court’s rejection of

substantive review of state statutes is

wholly consistent with the policies of

federalism and state sovereignty upon which

the state action doctrine is based. Once the

state decides to delegate its regulatory

authority to a city, that city enjoys the

same immunity from federal antitrust law that

the state would have enjoyed.

The relevant portions of the California

Government Code § 65300 et seq. ... delegate

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to the City the power to adopt a

comprehensive, long-term general plan for the

physical development of the county or city,

including waste disposal, conservation,

analysis of housing needs and regulation of

the housing market. We find that this

statute clearly delegates sufficient

regulatory authority to the City to uphold

state action immunity. The legality of the

1983 Ordinance under California law is

irrelevant for the purposes of this case. 

The relevant question is whether the state

intended the authorizing statute to have

anticompetitive effects. Thus, what the city

does to implement that statute, rightly or

wrongly, reveals nothing about the state’s

intent.

For the reasons stated above, we hold that

appellee has immunity from appellant’s

antitrust claim.

Id. at 593. 

Here the Court is alleged to have violated the law by

maintaining a recycling center and operation. Plaintiff refers

to no authority that prevents a local government from operating a

recycling center and related operations. To the contrary, local

governments are permitted by law to provide services for

recycling and trash disposal. Controlling Supreme Court and

Ninth Circuit authority establish as a matter of law that

Defendants are entitled to immunity from antitrust liability

alleged in the Third Cause of Action.

The Third Cause of Action of the FAC is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

C. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was filed before the

FAC was filed.

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1. GOVERNING STANDARDS.

Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A fact is “material” if it is relevant to an

element of a claim or a defense, the existence of which may

affect the outcome of the suit. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th

Cir.1987). Materiality is determined by the substantive law

governing a claim or a defense. Id. The evidence and all

inferences drawn from it must be construed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. 

The initial burden in a motion for summary judgment is on

the moving party. The moving party satisfies this initial burden

by identifying the parts of the materials on file it believes

demonstrate an “absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325

(1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to defeat

summary judgment. T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630. The nonmoving

party “may not rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings in

order to preclude summary judgment,” but must set forth by

affidavit or other appropriate evidence “specific facts showing

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The nonmoving party

may not simply state that it will discredit the moving party’s

evidence at trial; it must produce at least some “significant

probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Id. The

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question to be resolved is not whether the “evidence unmistakably

favors one side or the other, but whether a fair-minded jury

could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence

presented.” United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom, Inc.,

52 F.3d 810, 815 (9 Cir.1995). This requires more than the th

“mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the

plaintiff’s position”; there must be “evidence on which the jury

could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

judgment.” Id. As explained in Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.

Fritz Companies, 210 F.3d 1099 (9 Cir.2000): th

The vocabulary used for discussing summary

judgments is somewhat abstract. Because

either a plaintiff or a defendant can move

for summary judgment, we customarily refer to

the moving and nonmoving party rather than to

plaintiff and defendant. Further, because

either plaintiff or defendant can have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, we

refer to the party with and without the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial rather

than to plaintiff and defendant. Finally, we

distinguish among the initial burden of

production and two kinds of ultimate burdens

of persuasion: The initial burden of

production refers to the burden of producing

evidence, or showing the absence of evidence,

on the motion for summary judgment; the

ultimate burden of persuasion can refer

either to the burden of persuasion on the

motion or to the burden of persuasion at

trial.

A moving party without the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial - usually, but not

always, a defendant - has both the initial

burden of production and the ultimate burden

of persuasion on a motion for summary

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judgment ... In order to carry its burden of

production, the moving party must either

produce evidence negating an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s claim or

defense or show that the nonmoving party does

not have enough evidence of an essential

element to carry its ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial ... In order to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion,

the moving party must persuade the court that

there is no genuine issue of material fact

....

If a moving party fails to carry its initial

burden of production, the nonmoving party has

no obligation to produce anything, even if

the nonmoving party would have the ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial ... In such a

case, the nonmoving party may defeat the

motion for summary judgment without producing

anything ... If, however, a moving party

carries its burden of production, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence to

support its claim or defense ... If the

nonmoving party fails to produce enough

evidence to create a genuine issue of

material fact, the moving party wins the

motion for summary judgment ... But if the

nonmoving party produces enough evidence to

create a genuine issue of material fact, the

nonmoving party defeats the motion.

210 F.3d at 1102-1103. 

2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

Defendants Fact No.1. 

In October, 2003 the Kings County Planning Agency became

aware of development proposals for industrial and commercial

properties in the Hanford fringe area which needed to be

addressed. Supporting Evidence: Declaration of William Zumwalt 

(Zumwalt Decl.) para. 2.

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Plaintiff does not appear to have lodged a copy of his 4

deposition transcript, as required by Rules 5-134(j) and 56-260(e),

Local Rules of Practice, and has not attached copies of the

excerpts of the transcript to his opposition to the motion for

summary judgment. Further, evidence that Plaintiff’s son and a

tenant on Plaintiff’s property have been the subject of code

inspections by officials of Kings County is not relevant to

establish that Plaintiff was discriminated on the basis of his race

by the amendment to the General Plan, absent a showing that others

similarly situated to Plaintiff’s son and tenant were not the

subject of such code inspections. Plaintiff’s evidence that

property owned by him in Armona was inspected in late 2004/early

2005 in response to multiple public complaints is not relevant to

show racial discrimination in the amendment to the General Plan

absent a showing that no such public complaints were made to the

Kings County Planning Agency or that the items listed by the County

for correction or improvement were actually up to code standards at

the time the Armona property was inspected. No such evidence is

presented. See discussion infra.

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DUF 1 is DISPUTED. 

4

Defendants’ Fact No. 2: The development proposals revealed

weaknesses in the existing annexation policy contained in the

Land Use Element of the Kings County General Plan. Supporting

Evidence: Zumwalt Decl. para. 2.

DUF is DISPUTED.

Defendants’ Fact No. 3: One of the problems was that the

City of Hanford would provide various services to the fringe area

developments, the developers were not required to pay their fair

share of infrastructure costs, impact fees and connection fees

which were required by rate payers within the City of Hanford for

the same services. Supporting Evidence: Zumwalt Decl., para. 2.

DUF 3 is DISPUTED.

Defendants’ Fact No. 4: On December 1, 2003, the Kings

County Planning Commission held a duly noticed public hearing

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regarding General Plan Amendment No. 03-01 (hereinafter GPA 03-

01). The hearing was continued for a portion of the proposed

amendment to the January 5, 2004 meeting. A revised staff report

was presented to the Commission at that meeting. At the

conclusion of the hearing the Commission adopted Resolution No.

04-02 which recommended that the Board of Supervisors amend the

Land Use Element of the Kings County General Plan. Supporting

Evidence: Zumwalt Decl., para. 3.

DUF 4 is DISPUTED. However, Plaintiff’s assertion that

he was the owner of the property and that he had recorded his

interest on December 3, 2003 is not supported by the record. 

Plaintiff refers to Defendants’ Exhibit N to prove this. Exhibit

N is an “Agreement of Sale” between Arthur Briones, a married

man, and Emily Morales, a married woman, as sellers and Plaintiff

as buyer. The Agreement of Sale provided that the purchase price

was $170,000, payable by a down payment of $10,000, $20,000

within 6 months of the execution of the Agreement of Sale, and

the balance of $140,000 to be paid by monthly payments of $1,300,

commencing on January 3, 2004. The Agreement of Sale

specifically provides:

It is understood and agreed that the Sellers

shall retain title to the real estate and any

personal property covered by this Agreement

of Sale until the full balance of the

purchase price is paid in full, including

interest. When the full balance of the

purchase price is paid, including interest,

the Sellers agree to execute and deliver a

good and sufficient Grant Deed to the Buyers

[sic] covering said premises. Said deed will

convey title to the Buyers [sic] free from

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encumbrances made, suffered or done by

Sellers, excepting taxes herein agreed to be

paid by the Buyers [sic], rights of way of

records [sic] and liens placed on said

premises by the Buyers.

At the time of the execution of said deed,

the Sellers agree to pay for one-half (1⁄2) of

the policy of title insurance, for

documentary tax on the deed and for one-half

(1⁄2) of the escrow fees. [Emphasis added]/

Although Plaintiff asserts that he obtained a “Property Detail

Report” in September 2004 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 17) which states

that Plaintiff is the owner of the property, the “Property Detail

Report” is belied by the Agreement of Sale and the fact that

Plaintiff has not provided a Grant Deed evidencing any or all of

the fee title to the property to him. Under a land sale contract

he has an equitable right to enforce the conveyance of fee with

absolute title to him upon full payment of the purchase price.

Defendants’ Fact No. 5: As regards commercial and

industrial developments in the Hanford fringe area, the Planning

Commission recommended that all new developments or major

expansions of existing developments be required to annex to the

city or community services district which provides services.

However, if the annexation is not feasible, such commercial or

industrial developments shall develop to city improvement

standards. Supporting Evidence: Zumwalt Decl., para.. 4.

DUF 5 is UNDISPUTED. Plaintiff’s contentions that the 

subject plan amendment was pretextual and enacted in a way that

was arbitrary and capricious and intended to violate Plaintiff’s

equal protection and due process rights are legal arguments that

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do not prove what the Planning Commission recommended or

intended. 

Defendants’ Fact No. 6: Planning Director William Zumwalt

prepared and submitted an Agenda Item regarding GPA No. 03-01 to

the Board for its consideration because changes to the General

Plan must be adopted by the Kings County Board of Supervisors. 

Supporting Evidence: Zumwalt Decl., para. 5; See also Agenda

Item for the January 27, 2004 Board meeting is attached to

Zumwalt Decl. as Exhibit A.

DUF 6 is UNDISPUTED. Plaintiff’s contentions that the

combination of the facts described by Plaintiff in response to

DUF 1-4 raise an issue whether the subject plan amendment was

pretextual and enacted in a way that was arbitrary and capricious

and intended to violate Plaintiff’s equal protection and due

process rights does not dispute that Defendant Zumwalt prepared

and submitted the Agenda Item for action. 

Defendants’ Fact No. 7: On January 16, 2004 Clerk of the

Board, Catherine Venturella, caused the Notice of Public Hearing

for GPA 03-01, components 1, 3a and 7, to be published in the

Hanford Sentinel, a newspaper of general circulation within Kings

County for at least ten days prior to the public hearing which

was scheduled for January 27, 2004. Supporting Evidence: 

Zumwalt Decl., para. 6., 37:9-12; See also Notice of Public

Hearing and declaration of publication is attached to Zumwalt

Decl. as Exhibits B and C.

DUF 7 is DISPUTED. Defendants’ evidence pertains to

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different components of the amendments to the General Plan than

those at issue in this action, i.e. Component 2. 

Defendants’ Fact No. 8: On or about December 2, 2003 Daniel

Ruff entered into an agreement to purchase real property located

at 11180 S. 10th Avenue in Hanford, California. Supporting

Evidence: Exhibit N, Agreement of Sale, attached to Declaration

of Benjamin L. Ratliff (hereinafter Ratliff Decl.) See also

Ratliff Decl., Exhibit M, Deposition of Daniel Ruff, pg. 33:22-

34.

DUF 8 is UNDISPUTED. Plaintiff’s factual and 

argumentative contentions do not contradict that Plaintiff

entered into a written contract to purchase the property on

December 2, 2003. 

Defendants’ Fact No. 9: On January 27, 2004 a public

hearing was held and the Board adopted Resolution No. 04-007

approving components 1, 3a and 7 of GPA No. 03-01. Supporting

Evidence: Zumwalt Decl., para. 7; See also Board of Supervisors

Resolution attached as Exhibit D and Board minutes or Action

Summary attached as Exhibit E to Zumwalt Decl.

DUF 9 is DISPUTED. Defendants’ evidence pertains to

different components of the amendments to the General Plan than

that at issue in this action, i.e. Component 2. 

Defendants’ Fact No. 10: On July 14, 2004 Daniel Ruff

submitted a Uniform Application Form for Zoning Permit

Applications to the Kings County Planning Agency for a proposed

recycling center which was to accept material from the public.

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Mr. Ruff paid a processing fee of $490.00. The application was

received and assigned number 04-36. Supporting Evidence: 

Zumwalt Decl., para.8; See also Exhibits F and G attached to

Zumwalt Decl.

DUF 10 is UNDISPUTED. Plaintiff’s evidence and

argument that he had he attempted to submit the application in

early December 2003 but was improperly precluded from doing so

because of concerns whether Plaintiff was the owner of the

property, does not change the fact that his application was not

submitted until July 2004.

Defendants’ Fact No. 11: On July 21, 2004 Kings County

Planner Mark Sherman called Daniel Ruff and informed him that he

would have to annex to the City of Hanford in order to proceed

with his recycling project. Supporting Evidence: Sherman Decl.,

para. 2.

DUF 11 is UNDISPUTED. Plaintiff’s factual and 

argumentative contentions do not contradict that Sherman called

Plaintiff on July 21, 2004 and what Sherman told him. 

Defendants’ Fact No. 12; During the conversation on July

21, 2004 with Mark Sherman, Daniel Ruff was a little upset but

said “don’t think I’m against you”. He said he had checked with

the City of Hanford and was informed that the sewer nearest to

his property is 63" below ground, which was not deep enough to

serve his property. He also told Sherman not to send the check

until he called to check on the sewer. Supporting Evidence:

Sherman Decl.,para. 2.

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DUF 12 is DISPUTED. Plaintiff denies making the

statement attributed to him by Defendant Sherman.

Defendants’ Fact No. 13: Mark Sherman spoke with John Stowe

an employee of the City of Hanford Planning Department on July

22, 2004. He said the City would require annexation. He said the

subject property would need not only sewer, but fire and police,

among other services. He said that Mr. Ruff may be able to keep a

septic system rather than hook up to City sewer. Supporting

Evidence: Sherman Decl., para. 3.

DUF 13 is DISPUTED. Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Stowe 

told him that Plaintiff would not be allowed to build a recycling

center if his property were incorporated into the City of

Hanford. 

Defendants’ Fact No. 14: Later on July 22, 2004, Mark

Sherman spoke with Daniel Ruff by telephone. Mr. Sherman

explained that Mr. Ruff would need to annex and that he would be

returning Mr. Ruff’s fees. Mr. Sherman told Mr. Ruff what John

Stowe had said. Mr. Ruff was upset and insisted that his property

was in the county and said he would hire an attorney. After the

conversation, Mr. Sherman wrote a letter to Mr. Ruff to have a

record of our conversation. Supporting Evidence: Sherman

Decl.,para. 4; See also Exhibit I attached to Sherman Decl.

DUF 14 is UNDISPUTED. Plaintiff’s evidence and 

argument do not contradict that this conversation occurred and

what transpired. 

Defendants’ Fact No. 15: On August 25, 2004 William Zumwalt

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sent a letter to Daniel Ruff regarding his Site Plan Review

Application No. 04-06. Mr. Zumwalt determined that the

application should be denied because the proposed project was not

consistent and would conflict with the Kings County General Plan

and the applicable Kings County Zoning Ordinance. Mr. Sherman

informed Mr. Ruff that his proposed project was in the City of

Hanford fringe area and the property must be annexed to and

comply with the City of Hanford’s requirements in order for the

project to proceed. Supporting Evidence: Zumwalt Decl., para.9;

See also Exhibit H attached to Zumwalt Decl.

DUF 15 is UNDISPUTED. Plaintiff’s facts and argument

pertain to his contentions that Defendants’ actions were

pretextual and discriminatory. 

Defendants’ Fact No. 16: Daniel Ruff did not appeal the

denial of his Site Plan Review Application No. 04-06 to the Kings

County Planning Commission or the Kings County Board of

Supervisors. Supporting Evidence: Sherman Decl. paragraph 5;

See also Exhibit J attached to Sherman Decl.

DUF 16 is UNDISPUTED. Plaintiff’s contentions

pertain to legal arguments to excuse his failure to appeal but do

not contradict that Plaintiff did not file the appeal.

Defendants’ Fact No. 17: On or about September 1, 2004 the

Kings County Planning Agency received a letter from Daniel Ruff’s

attorney Daniel Fadenrecht withdrawing plaintiff’s application. 

Supporting Evidence: Sherman Decl. paragraph 5; See also Exhibit

J attached to Sherman Decl.

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DUF 17 is UNDISPUTED. Plaintiff withdrew the

application. Plaintiff’s contentions are legal arguments, not a

factual dispute of the action taken on his behalf by his then

attorney.

Defendants’ Fact No. 18: Plaintiff does not have any

evidence tending to show that any official actions taken herein

were motivated by plaintiff’s race. Supporting Evidence: 

Ratliff Decl, Exhibit L, Plaintiffs Answers to Interrogatories 1

and 2; See also Exhibit K attached to the Request for Judicial

Notice, Zumwalt Decl., para. 7, Board of Supervisors Resolution

attached as Exhibit D and Action Summary attached as Exhibit E to

Zumwalt Decl.

DUF 18 is UNDISPUTED. Plaintiff’s facts and argument 

to the contrary do not suffice to raise a genuine issue of

material fact that Defendants’ intentionally amended the General

Plan in order to discriminate against Plaintiff on the basis of

his race. No facts that demonstrate racial animus are provided. 

Defendants’ Fact No. 19: There is no evidence of an

unconstitutional policy, practice, or procedure on the part of

the Kings County Planning Department. Supporting Evidence:

Complaint para. 5; See also Ratliff Decl., Exhibit L, Plaintiffs

Answers to Interrogatories 1 and 2.

DUF 19 is DISPUTED.

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Defendants move for summary judgment in connection with the 5

allegation in the Complaint that “on or about February 25, 2005

Defendants continued their discrimination against Plaintiff by

selective enforcement against Plaintiff as to similar business

operations in Armona, California situated in Kings county [sic]

under the color of official authority.” Because the FAC contains

no allegations of discrimination in connection with Plaintiff’s

business operations in Armona, the motion for summary judgment on

this ground is moot. Whether evidence of other acts of alleged

racial discrimination against Plaintiff or his family members is

admissible at trial will be the subject of a motion in limine. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the antitrust claim

alleged in the Complaint. Because the antitrust claim alleged in

the FAC is dismissed with prejudice, the motion for summary

judgment on this ground is moot. 

48

3. MERITS OF MOTION.5

a. Lack of Discriminatory Intent.

Defendants move for summary judgment as to the First and

Fourth Causes of Action in the Complaint (now the First and

Second Causes of Action in the FAC) on the ground that Plaintiff

has provided no evidence of intent to discriminate against

Plaintiff on the basis of race. Defendants cite, inter alia,

Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1238-1239 (9th

Cir.1984):

‘Unless a classification trammels fundamental

personal rights or is drawn upon inherently

suspect distinctions such as race ...

[courts] presume the constitutionality of the

statutory discriminations and require only

that the classification challenged be

rationally related to a legitimate state

interest. New Orleans v. Dukes,, 427 U.S.

297, 303-04 ... (1976). Because zoning and

land use issues do not implicate fundamental

rights, Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. San

Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9 Cir.), th

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999 ... (1990), in

order to invoke strict scrutiny in this case

the Kawaokas must demonstrate that the City

intentionally discriminated on the basis of

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race. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan

Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-265 ...

(1977). Discriminatory intent may be proved

by direct or indirect evidence. Id. at 266

...; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson,

940 F.2d 465, 471 (9 Cir.1991). th

Defendants refer to Plaintiff’s July 2006 response to their

interrogatories requesting all facts supporting the allegations

made in paragraphs 2 and 8 of the Complaint:

The plaintiff was refused an opportunity to

timely record and, relatedly, submit

development plans for the subject property,

and, without adequate notice or process, plan

amendments were passed in the interim that

deprived plaintiff of the use of his

property. The defendants and tier [sic]

agents were aware of plaintiff’s AfricanAmerican heritage and the fact that he had

planned to develop a lucrative recycling

center business on the subject property and,

at least in part based on plaintiff’s

protected characteristics, capriciously

prevented him from proceeding prior to the

questionable plan amendment’s approval. 

Plaintiff is informed and believes that

discovery will reveal disparate treatment of

those outside of his protected class.

Defendants argue that “[n]oticeably absent from plaintiff’s

response are any facts tending to indicate that any official

action or decision by defendants William Zumwalt, Mark Sherman or

Sandy Roper were motivated by plaintiff’s race.” Defendants also

refer to Plaintiff’s deposition taken on December 6, 2006, where

Plaintiff testified that he had many conversations with Defendant

Mark Sherman and at no time did Mr. Sherman make any racially

derogatory comments to him. Defendants argue that, because

neither Defendant Zumwalt or Defendant Roper had any telephone

conversations or face to face communications with Plaintiff,

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there is no evidence that these Defendants were motivated by

racial animus.

In opposing this aspect of the motion for summary judgment,

Plaintiff limits his Section 1983 equal protection claim to a

“class of one” pursuant to Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528

U.S. 562 (2000).

In Olech, the plaintiff had asked the Village of Willowbrook

to connect her property to the municipal water supply. The

Village told her that it would provide her a connection if, but

only if, she granted the Village a 33-foot easement on her

property. Olech protested, noting that the Village had only

required her neighbors to provide 15-foot easements in exchange

for their connections. 528 U.S. at 563. Although the Village

eventually relented and connected Olech in return for a 15-foot

easement, Olech sued, alleging that the 33-foot easement demand

was irrational and wholly arbitrary and violated her right to

equal protection by deviating from the standard 15-foot easement. 

The district court dismissed her claim. The Supreme Court held: 

Our cases have recognized successful equal

protection claims brought by a ‘class of

one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she

has been intentionally treated differently

from others similarly situated and that there

is no rational basis for the difference in

treatment ... In so doing, we have explained

that ‘”[t]he purpose of the equal protection

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to

secure every person within the State’s

jurisdiction against intentional and

arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned

by express terms of a statute or by its

improper execution through duly constituted

agents.’ ....

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That reasoning is applicable to this case. 

Olech’s complaint can fairly be construed as

alleging that the Village intentionally

demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of

connecting her property to the municipal

water supply where the Village required only

a 15-foot easement from other similarly

situated property owners ... The complaint

also alleged that the Village’s demand was

‘irrational and wholly arbitrary’ and that

the Village ultimately connected her property

after receiving a clearly adequate 15-foot

easement. These allegations, quite apart

from the Village’s subjective motivation, are

sufficient to state a claim for relief under

traditional equal protection analysis. 

Id. at 564-565. 

“Where an equal protection claim is based on ‘selective

enforcement of valid laws,’ a plaintiff can show that the

defendants’ rational basis for selectively enforcing the law is a

pretext for ‘an impermissible motive.’” Squaw Valley Development

Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9 Cir.2004), overruled on th

other grounds, Action Apt. Ass’n v. Santa Monica Rent Control

Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9 Cir.2007). The Ninth Circuit th

explained:

Disparate government treatment will survive

rational basis scrutiny ‘as long as it bears

a rational relation to a legitimate state

interest.’ Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868,

875 (9 Cir.1996). Although ‘[s]elective th

enforcement of valid laws, without more, does

not make the defendants’ action irrational,’

Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1188, there is no

rational basis for state action ‘”that is

malicious, irrational or plainly arbitrary.”’

Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Lockary

v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1155 (9th

Cir.1990)(as amended)).

Squaw Valley Development Co., id. “In order to claim a violation

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of equal protection in a class of one case, the plaintiff must

establish that the City intentionally, and without rational

basis, treated the plaintiff differently from others similarly

situated ... A class of one plaintiff must show that the

discriminatory treatment ‘was intentionally directed just at him,

as opposed ... to being an accident or a random act.’” North

Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th

Cir.2008). In Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189

(11 Cir.2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2055 (2008), the th

Eleventh Circuit held:

We see no reason that a plaintiff in a ‘class

of one’ case should be subjected to a more

lenient ‘similarly situated’ requirement than

we have imposed in other contexts. Adjudging

equality necessarily requires comparison, and

‘class of one’ plaintiffs may (just like

other plaintiffs) fairly be required to show

that their professed comparison is

sufficiently apt. See Campbell, 434 F.3d at

1314; Purze v. Vill. of Winthrop Harbor, 286

F.2d 452, 455 (7 Cir.2002)(observing that th

plaintiffs in a ‘class of one’ case ‘must

demonstrate that they were treated

differently than someone who is prima facie

identical in all relevant respects’ ...);

Hicks v. Jackson County Comm’n, 374 F.Supp.2d

1084, 1096 (N.D.Ala.2006)(‘The burden of

identifying similarly situated individuals is

a heavy one.’); cf. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505

U.S. 1, 10 ... (1992)(‘The Equal Protection

Clause does not forbid classifications. It

simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from

treating differently persons who are in all

relevant respects alike.’) ... Accordingly,

when plaintiffs in ‘class of one’ cases

challenge the outcome of complex, multifactored government decisionmaking processes,

similarly situated entities ‘must be very

similar indeed.’ McDonald v. Vill of

Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1002 (7 Cir.2004). th

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With regard to the Second Cause of Action for violation of

Section 1985(3):

To prove a violation of § 1985(3),

[Plaintiff] must show ‘some racial, or

perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously

discriminatory animus behind the

conspirators’ action. The conspiracy, in

other words, must aim at a deprivation of the

equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law

to all.’ 

Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9 Cir.2001), quoting th

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).

Plaintiff argues that he has sufficient evidence from which

a discriminatory intent on the part of Defendants may be

inferred. He argues that Component 2 of the general plan

amendment was only devised after Plaintiff first inquired about

the proposed recycling center in October or November 2003 and

that Component 2 of the general plan amendment was not enacted

until December 23, 2003, after Plaintiff had attempted to submit

a site review application in early December 2003. Plaintiff

refers to evidence that Component 2 was devised in response to

inquiries, including his, regarding commercial development in the

Hanford fringe area. 

He contends that evidence demonstrates that Component 2

contemplated a fundamental amendment to the general plan and that

being referred to in the notice documents as a “clarification”

implies an attempt by Defendants to deny meaningful notice to

Plaintiff, who, Plaintiff asserts, was the only potentially

affected landowner who had made known his intent to develop a

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recycling center in the Hanford fringe area and who had attempted

to apply for such development. Plaintiff argues that the

evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff was not given actual or 

meaningful notice of Component 2, which deprived him of the

opportunity to oppose the amendment or submit a site plan review

before its enactment. 

Plaintiff argues that the property was zoned commercial and

that, as of December 2003, a recycling center was a permitted use

that would have been granted in no more than 15 days after the

submission of a compliant site review application. Plaintiff

argues that the evidence suggests that there was no legitimate

basis for Defendants’ refusal to accept Plaintiff’s site plan

application or, if it was non-compliant, to deny it pursuant to

site plan review procedures. Plaintiff suggests that there is no

evidence that any other property owner or site plan review

applicant was affected by the passage of Component 2 of the

general plan amendment. He argues that evidence demonstrates

that the stated basis for refusing to accept his site plan review

application, that he was not listed as the property owner, is

contrived because there is no such requirement and Plaintiff

produced documents which he contends establish that he was the

property owner. 

Plaintiff refers to evidence that Supervisor Barba told

Plaintiff that his application was denied because it was filed

too late, which Plaintiff argues confirms the purpose of the

arbitrary rejection of his application for eight months. He

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refers to evidence that Defendant Sherman contacted John Stowe of

the City of Hanford Planning Department before Plaintiff’s

application was denied, and that Stowe informed Plaintiff that

there had been a meeting about his application and that it would

not be permitted in the City of Hanford. Plaintiff refers to

evidence that his application, although first returned, was later

ruled upon by the Kings County Planning Agency. Plaintiff

suggests other fringe developments were permitted without

annexation even after passage of the general plan amendment. He

argues that his proposed recycling center was denied at a time

when Kings County had no other private commercial recycling

center and was under a state mandate to increase recycling. 

Plaintiff contends that this evidence is more than sufficient to

raise genuine issues of material fact regarding the

discriminatory nature of Defendants’ actions, whether for

purposes of Section 1983 or Section 1985(3).

What is entirely absent from this showing is any evidence

that Plaintiff’s race was in any way implicated. There is no

evidentiary support for a Section 1985(3) equal protection claim

based on alleged race discrimination. As explained in Freeman v.

City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9 Cir.1995): th

The first step in equal protection analysis

is to identify the [defendants’]

classification of groups.’ ... To accomplish

this, a plaintiff can show that the law is

applied in a discriminatory manner or imposes

different burdens on different classes of

people ... ‘The next step ... [is] to

determine the level of scrutiny.’ ...

Classifications based on fact or national

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origin, such as those alleged here, are

subject to strict scrutiny ....

One the plaintiff establishes governmental

classification, it is necessary to identify a

‘similarly situated’ class against which the

plaintiff’s class can be compared ... ‘The

goal of identifying a similarly situated

class ... is to isolate the fact allegedly

subject to impermissible discrimination. The

similarly situated group is the control

group.’ ....

... ‘To establish impermissible selective

prosecution, [Freeman] must show that others

similarly situated have not been prosecuted

and that the prosecution is based on an

impermissible motive.’ ....

See also Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 19

(1 Cir.1989): st

It is apodictic that evidence of past

treatment towards others similarly situated

can be used to demonstrate intent in a race

discrimination suit ... To put flesh upon the

bare bones of this theory, appellants’

obligation was to identify and relate

specific instances where persons similarly

situated ‘in all relevant respects’ were

treated differently, ... instances which have

the capacity to demonstrate that the Students

were ‘singled ... out for unlawful

oppression.’ ... In general, this requires

that the other incidents’ circumstances be

‘reasonably comparable’ to those surrounding

appellants’ suspensions, and that ‘the nature

of the infraction and knowledge of the

evidence by college officials [be]

sufficiently similar to support a finding of

facial inconsistency.’ ... The test is

whether a prudent person, looking objectively

at the incidents, would think them roughly

equivalent and the protagonists similarly

situated. Much as in the lawyer’s art of

distinguishing cases, the ‘relevant aspects’

are those factual elements which determine

whether reasoned analogy supports, or

demands, a like result. Exact correlation is

neither likely nor necessary, but the cases

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must be fair congeners. In other words,

apples should be compared to apples. 

As discussed supra, Plaintiff’s evidence that his son and a

tenant on Plaintiff’s property have been the subject of code

inspections by officials of Kings County does not establish that

Plaintiff was discriminated on the basis of his race by the

amendment to the General Plan, absent a showing that others

similarly situated to Plaintiff’s son and tenant were not the

subject of such code inspections. Plaintiff’s evidence that

property owned by him in Armona was inspected in late 2004/early

2005 in response to multiple public complaints is not relevant to

show racial discrimination in the amendment to the General Plan

absent a showing that no such public complaints were made to the

Kings County Planning Agency or that the items listed by the

County for correction or improvement were actually up to code

standards at the time the Armona property was inspected. No such

evidence is presented. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in connection with

Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied equal protection as a “class

of one” is DENIED. Because of the evidence that other fringe

area developments were allowed to proceed without annexation

after the amendment of the General Plan, there is evidence from

which it may be inferred that Plaintiff was intentionally treated

differently from others similarly situated. 

However, Plaintiff’s evidence that his son and a tenant were

discriminated against on the basis of race and his evidence

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concerning a building code inspection on other property owned by

Plaintiff are not relevant to establish Plaintiff’s equal

protection claim. Plaintiff presents no evidence from which it

may be inferred that Defendants intentionally discriminated

against Plaintiff on the basis of his race by amending the

General Plan. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in

connection with Plaintiff’s equal protection claim based on

racial discrimination is GRANTED. 

b. Procedural Due Process.

Defendants move for summary judgment in connection with

Plaintiff’s claim of denial of procedural due process alleged in

the First Cause of Action of the FAC.

“A claim for violation of procedural due process has two

components. First, plaintiff must show that a protected property

interest was taken. Second, it must show that the procedural

safeguards surrounding the deprivation were inadequate.” Sierra

Lake Reserve v. City of Rocklin, 938 F.2d 951, 957 (9th

Cir.1991), citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 568-569

(1972). “The fundamental component of due process is the

opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

California Government Code § 65353 provides in relevant

part:

(a) When the city or county has a planning

commission authorized by local ordinance or

resolution to review and recommend action on

... proposed amendments to the general plan,

the commission shall hold at least one public

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hearing before approving a recommendation on

the adoption or amendment of a general plan. 

Notice of the hearing shall be given pursuant

to Section 65090.

(b) If ... amendments to a general plan would

affect the permitted uses or intensity of

uses of real property, notice of the hearing

shall also be given pursuant to paragraphs

(1) and (2) of subdivision (a) of Section

65091.

Government Code § 65090(a) and (b) requires that notice of the

public hearing required by Section 65353 be published in at least

one local newspaper of general circulation within the

jurisdiction of the local agency at least 10 days prior to the

hearing, and that the notice shall include the information

specified in Section 65094. Section 65091(a) provides in

relevant part:

When a provision of this title requires

notice of a public hearing to be given

pursuant to this section, notice shall be

given in all of the following ways: 

(1) Notice of the hearing shall be

mailed or delivered at least 10 days prior to

the hearing to the owner of the subject real

property as shown on the latest equalized

assessment roll. Instead of using the

assessment roll, the local agency may use

records of the county assessor or tax

collector if those records contain more

recent information than the information

contained on the assessment roll. Notice

shall also be mailed to the owner’s duly

authorized agent, if any, and to the project

applicant. 

Government Code § 65094 provides:

As used in this title, ‘notice of a public

hearing’ means a notice that includes the

date, time, and place of a public hearing,

the identity of the hearing body or officer,

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a general description of the matter to be

considered, and a general description, in the

text or by diagram, of the location of the

real property, if any, that is the subject of

the hearing.

Plaintiff cannot withstand summary judgment on his

procedural due process claim. As established by Plaintiff’s

documents, Plaintiff was not the legal owner of the property at

the time notice was given and he presents no evidence he was

listed as the owner on the latest equalized assessment role or in

the records of the Kings County assessor or tax collector. The

evidence establishes that the notice was published and was sent

to the property address. Plaintiff has not raised a genuine

issue of fact that he was entitled to more notice than he

received. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED to the

extent Plaintiff’s claim of denial of procedural due process is

based on the failure to mail notice specifically to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also contends that the published and mailed notice

was constitutionally inadequate because the notices described 

Component 2 to the proposed amendment as a “clarification.” 

Plaintiff argues “[t]he evidence ... shows that Component 2 at

all times contemplated a fundamental amendment to the general

land use plan and that its being referred to in the notice as a

mere ‘clarification’ was a predatory effort to deny meaningful

notice to plaintiff, who, according to the evidence, was the only

potentially affected landowner [sic] who had made known

intentions to develop in the Hanford fringe area and had

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attempted to submit an application for such development prior to

the drafting of the notice documents.” 

The “Land Use Element of the Kings County General Plan”,

last revised on January 27, 2004, states in pertinent part:

GOAL LU 3: Direct future industrial and

commercial development to the cities and

rural communities.

...

Objective LU 3.4: Coordinate commercial and

industrial growth with the long-range capital

improvement plans of the County, cities, and

special districts.

Policy LU 3.4a: When a commercial

or industrial development, or major

expansion of an existing commercial

or industrial use, is proposed in a

city fringe area, require

annexation to the city ....

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4). Prior to the January 27, 2004 revision,

the Kings County General Plan Land Use Element provided:

GOAL 3: Direct future industrial and

commercial development to the cities and

rural communities.

...

Policy 3f: When public services are provided

to an existing developed commercial or

industrial area, encourage annexation to the

city or community services district providing

the service.

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6). 

The “Initial Study/Negative Declaration” concerning General

Plan Amendment No. 03-01, prepared by Defendants Zumwalt and

Roper on November 6, 2003, stated in pertinent part:

DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:

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General Plan Component: This project consists

of amendments to the Land Use Element of the

Kings County General Plan, and various other

technical changes as described below:

...

Component 2: Clarification of

annexation policy for

commercial/industrial development

in city fringe areas (See the

Project Summary for Component 2 on

Page 2 of the IS/ND).

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10).

The Notice of Public Hearing provided that the Board of

Supervisors will hold public hearings on December 23, 2003 to

consider:

1. General Plan Amendment No. 03-01 (Kings

County Planning Agency)

This project consists of amendments

to the Land Use Element of the

Kings County General Plan, and

various other technical changes as

described below:

Component 2: Clarification of

annexation policy for

commercial/industrial development

in city fringe areas as included in

GOAL 3 and its accompanying

objectives and policies.

....

This Notice of Public Hearing was published in the Hanford

Sentinel. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12).

The Agenda Item for the December 23, 2003 Kings County 

Board of Supervisors meeting submitted by Defendant Zumwalt is

captioned “General Plan Amendment No. 03-01 (Land Use Element)”

and states in pertinent part:

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Recommendation:

Hold a Public Hearing and take the following

actions concerning the General Plan Amendment

No. 03-01

1. ... General Plan Amendment No. 03-01

includes various technical and text

clarification changes concerning land use

policies associated with the development of

commercial and industrial land use in city

fringe areas, and other minor land use

designation changes in Stratford and the

Hanford fringe area ....

BACKGROUND

...

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS ...

Component 2 - Clarification of

commercial/industrial development

annexation policy:

Due to some recent development

proposals in the Hanford fringe

area for industrial and commercial

properties certain weaknesses in

the policies have become apparent. 

Although the city will provide

various services to these

developments now and in the future,

the developments are getting a free

ride at the expense of other

developments and rate payers within

the city. Changes to GOAL 3 and

its related policies (including two

new policies are intended to

require such fringe area

developments pay their fair share

of infrastructure costs in

development impact fees and

connection fees if it is not

feasible to annex the property to

the city before development permits

are issued (see Exhibit A of the

attached draft resolution).

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 8, pp. 1-2). Resolution No. 03-121, enacted

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by the Kings County Board of Supervisors on December 23, 2003,

provides:

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Board adopts

General Plan Amendment No. 03-01, Components

2 ..., that makes the following changes to

the Kings County General Plan as shown in

Exhibits A ... hereto:

Component 2. Clarification of

commercial/industrial development

annexation policy: That due to some

recent development proposals in the

Hanford fringe area for industrial

and commercial properties certain

weaknesses in the policies have

become apparent. Changes to Land

Use Element GOAL 3 of the Kings

County General Plan and its related

policies (including two new

policies) which require that such

fringe area development pay its

fair share of infrastructure costs

in development impact fees and

connection fees if it is not

feasible to annex the property to

the city before development permits

are issued (see Exhibit A).

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9).

“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in

any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice

reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise

interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them

an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). “The notice

must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required

information.” Id. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue is

DENIED. Plaintiff has presented evidence from which it may be

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inferred that the notice provided did not reasonably convey the

required information, i.e., that the General Plan was to be

amended to require annexation for fringe area development

projects which would burden county services, as opposed to

encouraging annexation.

Plaintiff contends that, where a “supposed legislative act

was taken without notice or hearing to plaintiff, and the act

affected only plaintiff’s property, the legislative action itself

can support a procedural due process claim.” Plaintiff cites

Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, supra, 344

F.3d at 965-966, 972-973, and Harris v. County of Riverside, 904

F.2d 497, 502 (9 Cir.1980). th

Plaintiff’s reliance on Hotel & Motel Ass’n to support his

claim for denial of procedural due process is misplaced. The

opinion discussed a Fifth Amendment Takings claim at pages 965-

966. It discusses an equal protection and vagueness challenge at

pages 972-973. 

In Harris v. County of Riverside, the Ninth Circuit

addressed a contention that the County was under no

constitutional due process constraints in promulgating the

disputed general plan amendment because the dictates of

procedural due process apply only to adjudicatory or

administrative government actions, not legislative

determinations. The Ninth Circuit held:

We find the present case to be more analogous

to Londoner than Bi-Metallic. The County’s

consideration of the vast area contemplated

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by the General Plan Amendment certainly

affected a large number of people and would

not ordinarily give rise to constitutional

procedural due process requirements. Within

the County’s amendment process, however, the

County specifically targeted Harris’ property

for a zoning change after notice had been

published for the General Plan Amendment. 

The district court made no factual findings

on this issue, but the record also supports

the conclusion that the County undeniably

knew the use Harris was making of his

property when it acted to change the zoning

on his land. Under the facts of this case,

the County’s decision to alter its proposed

General Plan Amendment specifically to rezone

Harris’ land constituted a decision which was

distinct from, rather than part of, approval

of the General Plan Amendment. This

decision, in contrast to approval of the

General Plan Amendment, concerned a

relatively small number of persons (Harris

and the immediately adjacent landowner)

rather than the entire population of the West

Coachella Valley. As the California Supreme

Court has expressly cautioned, ‘land use

planning decisions less extensive than

general rezoning c[an] not be insulated from

notice and hearing requirements by

application of the ‘legislative act’ doctrine

....

904 F.2d at 502. 

Here, Defendants are not seeking summary judgment on the

ground Plaintiff was not entitled to notice because the proposed

amendment was a legislative act. Notice was mailed to the

property and published in the newspaper. Further, as discussed

above, Plaintiff has not presented evidence from which it may be

inferred that he was the landowner of record of the property

entitled to notice under the Government Code.

Plaintiff contends that he can “attack the regulation on

procedural due process grounds on an as-applied basis so long as

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he has, as here, submitted one application and had it acted upon,

thereby being subject to an application of the challenged

regulation.” Plaintiff cites Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande,

supra, 17 F.3d at 1234, and Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City

of Carson, 37 F.3d 468, 474 (9 Cir.1994). th

Kawaoka at page 1234 addresses a substantive due process

claim, not a procedural due process claim. Carson Harbor Village

at 474 addresses an as-applied Fifth Amendment Takings claim, not

a procedural due process claim. Neither of these cases support

Plaintiff’s contention and it is disregarded for purposes of his

procedural due process claim. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim

for denial of procedural due process is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART as set forth above.

c. Liability under Monell.

Defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that

Plaintiff cannot establish municipal liability pursuant to 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

 Local government entities and local government officials

acting in their official capacity can be sued for monetary,

declaratory, or injunctive relief, but only if the allegedly

unconstitutional actions took place pursuant to some “policy

statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body's officers....” Monell, id. at 690-91. 

Alternatively, if no formal policy exists, plaintiffs may point

to “customs and usages” of the local government entity. Id. A

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local government entity cannot be held liable simply because it

employs someone who has acted unlawfully. Id. at 694. See also

Haugen, 351 F.3d at 393 (“Municipalities cannot be held liable

under a traditional respondeat superior theory. Rather, they may

be held liable only when "action pursuant to official municipal

policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.... [T]o

establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must prove the

existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy.”). 

To prevail in a civil rights claim against a local

government under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part

test: 

(1) The local government official(s) must have

intentionally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights;

(2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and

may not be an isolated incident; and

(3) There must be a link between the specific policy or

custom to the plaintiff’s injury.

Id. at 690-92. There are a number of ways to prove a policy or

custom of a municipality. A plaintiff may show (1) “a

longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard

operating procedure’ of the local government entity;” (2) “the

decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final

policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy in the area of decision;” or (3) “the

official with final policymaking authority either delegated that

authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.” 

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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The Ninth Circuit has held that a municipal policy “may be

inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated

constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers

were not discharged or reprimanded.” Id. 

A municipality may still be liable under Monell for a single

incident where: (1) the person causing the violation has “final

policymaking authority;” (2) the “final policymaker” “ratified” a

subordinate’s actions; or (3) the “final policymaker” acted with

deliberate indifference to a subordinate’s constitutional

violations. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 928 (1999).

Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is not appropriate

because of evidence that his site review application was denied

in part based on actions ratified by Defendant Zumwalt, the Kings

County Director of Planning and Building Inspection, and the

Kings County Board of Supervisors, indicating that the actions

were ratified as County policy. 

“To show ratification, a plaintiff must prove that the

‘authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the

basis for it.’” Christie v. Iopa, supra, 176 F.3d at 1239. 

“[R]atification requires, among other things, knowledge of the

alleged constitutional violation.” Id.

Here, because summary judgment is DENIED with regard to

certain of Plaintiff’s equal protection and procedural due

process claims, issues of fact as to the County’s past

implementation and application of its land use regulations,

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remain with regard to the County’s liability under Monell. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended

Complaint is GRANTED IN PART WITH PREJUDICE, GRANTED IN PART WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND, AND DENIED IN PART;

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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