Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00286/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00286-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cuprite Mine Partners, LLC, an Arizona limited

liability company,

Plaintiff,

v.

John H. Anderson, a married man acting in is

sole and separate capacity, et al.,

Defendants.

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CV 12-286-TUC-DCB

ORDER

The Court grants summary judgment for the Plaintiffs, grants dismissal of the Thirdparty Complaint, and denies the Defendants’ motion for an advisory jury. The Court

appoints a commissioner to sell the mining claims and deposit the proceeds with the Court to

be divided between the persons entitled thereto according to their interests. A.R.S. § 12-

1218(B) and (C).

This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman on July 16, 2012,

pursuant to the Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, District of Arizona

(Local Rules), Rule (Civil) 72.1(a). On December 3, 2012, this Court issued an Order

adopting her Report and Recommendation (R&R) to deny five motions to dismiss the

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint which were urged pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The

Court found the Amended Complaint states a claim for partition under A.R.S. § 12-1211. 

Thereafter, the matter remained referred to Judge Bowman. 

The Magistrate Judge succinctly describes the case as an action, pursuant to A.R.S. §

12-1211 and 12-1218, for partition of 16 patented mining claims. Plaintiffs want to sell the

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 mining claims to the owner of an open-pit copper mine, Freeport McMoRan Copper &

Gold, operating on adjacent property. Defendants do not want to sell. The question is

whether the property may be physically partitioned or must be partitioned by sale. 

The mining claims at issue were acquired in the early 20th century by Guy Anderson,

who passed them to his six children upon his death. Each child was given a one-sixth

interest in each claim. When the action began, five of the siblings formed the Plaintiff entity

Cuprite Mine Partners, LLC (Cuprite) and sued the sixth sibling, John H. Anderson (JH

Anderson). Then, Defendant JH Anderson gave twelve of his interests to his four children

by giving three claims to each child, and kept four claims for himself. JH Anderson

apportioned these one-sixth interests in the 12 claims between his children so they were not

contiguous to each other. 

Plaintiffs amended the Complaint to add the new JH Anderson Defendants: the JH

Anderson children. Defendants argued that Arizona’s partition statute refers to contiguous

square footage within an owners’ group, which did not exist subsequent to ownership being

passed to the JH Anderson children. The Court rejected this argument when it denied

Defendants motions to dismiss. (Order (Doc. 88) (adopting R&R (Doc. 65) at 2-4.) 

Defendants JH Andersons filed a “Cross-Complaint” against Cuprite that alleges George and

Mark Anderson breached fiduciary duties, which Cuprite adopted and ratified. The

Magistrate Judge referred to this as a Third-Party Complaint, and George and Mark

Anderson are Third-Party Defendants. 

On October 18, 2012, the Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, pursuant to ARS 12-

1218, asking the Court to direct the appointment of a commissioner to sell the property, with

distribution of the proceeds to the parties. 

On January 28, 2013, Third-Party Defendants George and Mark Anderson filed a

Motion to Dismiss the Third-Party Complaint for breach of fiduciary duty.

On February 5, 2013, the Defendants filed a Motion for the Court to Try the Partition

Issues to an Advisory Jury. 

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Magistrate Judge Bowman issued two R&Rs. She recommends granting Cuprite’s

Motion for Summary Judgment and Third-party Defendants Mark and George’s Motion to

Dismiss, and she recommends denying Defendants JH Andersons’ motion for an advisory

jury trial. The Court accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s R&Rs as the findings of fact

and conclusions of law of this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Where the parties object to a R&R, “‘[a] judge of the [district] court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is made.’” Thomas v. Arn,

474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). To the extent that no

objection is made, arguments to the contrary have been waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (objections are waived if they are not filed within fourteen days of

service of the R&R), see also McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980)

(failure to object to Magistrate's report waives right to do so on appeal); Advisory

Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (citing Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501

F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974) (when no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy

itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the

recommendation)).

The parties were sent copies of the R&R and instructed that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1), they had 14 days to file written objections. See also, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (party

objecting to the recommended disposition has fourteen (14) days to file specific, written

objections). The Defendants filed objections. The Plaintiffs did not respond, except to move

to strike a supplemental objection filed by the Defendants. The R&R is ready for

consideration by the Court, which considers it in light of the Objection filed by the

Defendants and the parties’ briefs considered by the Magistrate Judge.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: OBJECTIONS

1. Order of Partition by Sale

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The Magistrate Judge recommends granting summary judgment because there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and partition by sale is required as a matter of law. 

(R&R at 2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). The Magistrate Judge bases her recommendation

on Arizona’s partition statute, which provides for an owner or claimant of real property,

such as the Plaintiffs, to file an action to compel a partition of property between him and

other owners or claimants, A.R.S. § 12-1211(A), with each claimant receiving a share in

proportion to his interest in the property, A.R.S. § 12-1216, but if it appears that fair

partition of the property cannot be made without depreciating the value of the property or

that for any reason a sale is more beneficial to the parties or any of them, then the first

choice for the Court is to enter judgment directing that the property be sold and proceeds

distributed accordingly, A.R.S. § 1218(B). 

The Magistrate Judge found several reasons why in-kind partition is not possible and a

sale is more beneficial. Defendants complain the Magistrate Judge applied old law,

applicable to lode mining claims, which should not be applied, here, because the value of

these claims is for surface mining. Lode mining claims generally refer to underground veins

of ore, which are not easily partitioned because there is no way, without extensive

investigation, to know where the vein runs on the property. In Manley v. Boone, 159 F.3d

633 (9th Cir. 1908), the case relied on by the Magistrate Judge, the court explained the nature

of a mining claim makes physical division difficult because it is difficult to know the

quantity, quality, or location of ore beneath the surface. (R&R (Doc 110) at 4.)

The Defendants argue that, here, the value of the mining claims is for surface, ie., strip,

mining, making each mining claim equal in value, except for the variable of proximity to the

Freeport mining operations. The Magistrate Judge considered this argument. The Court

agrees with her conclusion that the nature of strip mining, which takes two feet on the

surface for every foot of ground mined underneath, makes in-kind partition of one-sixth of

each claim impossible and that in-kind partition of one-sixth of each claim would seriously

depreciate the value of the mining claims. It would be impossible to strip mine only fiveCase 4:12-cv-00286-DCB-LAB Document 122 Filed 08/02/13 Page 4 of 9
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 1The Court is aware that Plaintiff Cuprite holds five-sixths of the interests in the mining

claims and Defendants JH Andersons, together, hold one-sixth.

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sixths of each mining claim. Perhaps for different reasons, it remains true that mining

claims, generally, and these claims specifically are not easily partitioned.

The Court rejects the Defendants’ argument that if partition is ordered some claims

should be afforded more value than others because some are closer to the Freeport strip

mining operation. The Court finds this is a distinction without a difference. Gus Anderson

gave each of his children a one-sixth undivided interest in each claim so the sale of each or

all the claims amounts to a distribution in equal shares: one sixth.1

 These siblings had equal

interests in all 16 claims until JH Anderson divested himself of his interests in 12 of the

claims. Any dispute between JH Anderson’s four children regarding unequal values

between themselves falls outside this action. And, such potential discord is another reason

to partition these claims now rather than later when what was once six interests, which is

now ten, grows further.

The Court rejects the Defendants’ assertion that the most equitable decision from this

Court would be to order “No partition.” (Objection (Doc 111) at 7-8.) The Court notes that

two of the six Gus Anderson siblings have passed away during the pendency of this fight:

Sue Marie Young died in 2009 and Jeanne Anderson Hubbard died in November 2012. 

Arizona’s partition statute provides for partition in precisely these circumstances where

parties cannot agree regarding use of a property, which will often be, as it is here, because

they cannot agree to the value or sale price for the property. The Court notes that five of

Gus Anderson’s children would like to sell the property to Freeport McMoRan, the strip

mining company operating on adjacent land, which has made them an offer. Only JH

Anderson does not want to sell at the price being offered by Freeport, but even he agrees that

Freeport is the logical buyer. When parties cannot agree on how to voluntarily partition

property, the statute applies. McCready v. McCready, 810 P.2d 624, 623 (Ariz. App. 1991).

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It is undisputed that the value of the claims is for strip mining. This finding of fact

alone is sufficient to support the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that this Court find

partition by sale to be beneficial in this case. The Court so finds and enters summary

judgment for Plaintiffs as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

Additionally, the record reflects that even if one-sixth of each claim could be partitioned

in-kind, the parties are so at odds with each other that in-kind partition would be impossible. 

For example, the Defendants assert they will establish such uses as a wild-life refuge on

some of their holdings, which would be entirely incompatible with mining the other fivesixths of a claim. The Court is convinced that the parties are incapable of cooperating even

for the most basic things such as access, and the Court finds for this reason partition by sale

is more beneficial than in-kind partition. (R&R (Doc. 110) at 4 (citing Arnold v. Cesare,

668 P.2d 891, 896 (Ariz. App. 1983)).

The Court agrees with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the

Magistrate Judge in her R&R for determining the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. 

For the reasons stated in the R&R, the Court grants the Motion for Summary. Because the

Court is satisfied from the evidence before it that the property cannot be fairly divided inkind, it may order, “without the aid of commissioners, the sale of the property on its own

motion.” Bledso v. Hood, 36 P.2d 564, 565-66 (Ariz. 1934). The Court orders the

appointment of a commissioner to sell the property, and denies the Defendants’ request for

an advisory jury trial. 

2. Dismissal of Third-party Complaint

There are simply no facts nor any case law to support the Defendants’ assertion that any

fiduciary relationship exists between JH Anderson and George and Mark Anderson. The

relationship between the parties is as tenants in common. As a matter of law, no fiduciary

relationship or duties exist. (R&R (Doc. 113)). Because there is no breach of fiduciary duty

by George and Mark Anderson, the Third-party Complaint fails against Cuprite. The Court

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adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law as set out in the Magistrate Judge’s R&R. 

The Court grants the Third-party Motion to Dismiss.

3. Oral Argument

Defendants seek oral argument, which the Court denies. Under a de novo standard, the

Court reviews the case anew. The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), provides for a de novo

determination by the Court, not a de novo hearing, and the Court may in its discretion afford

a degree of deference to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.

667, 676 (1980). Nevertheless, the Court is obligated to arrive at its own independent

conclusion about those portions of the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendation to

which the party objects. United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1989).

Here, the parties have submitted memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and

evidence in support of their positions, and the Court has reviewed the motion briefs

considered by the Magistrate Judge. The Court finds that oral argument will not aid the

Court's decisional process. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197,

1200 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that if the parties provided the district court with complete

memoranda of the law and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral argument

would not be required). As is evidenced by the Defendants Objections and multiple

supplemental objecting memorandum, the arguments in this case have been made and

remade. This truly is a case were further argument will not aid the Court in its decisional

process.

CONCLUSION

After de novo review of the issues raised in Defendants’ objections, this Court agrees

with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Magistrate Judge in her R&Rs

for determining the pending motions. The Court adopts both R&Rs, and for the reasons

stated in them, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and orders

partition by sale; the Court grants the Third-Party Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and

denies the Defendants’ Motion for an Advisory Jury Trial.

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the motions for hearings (Docs. 112, 115) are DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike Supplement (Doc. 119) is

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

(Doc. 110) is accepted and adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law of this

Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

(Doc. 113) is accepted and adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law of this

Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

66) for partition by sale is GRANTED for the appointment of a commissioner to sell the

property and deposit the proceeds into the Court for distribution to be made by the Court to

the parties.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within ten days of the filing date of this Order, the

Plaintiffs shall file a Notice giving the name of the commissioner to be appointed by the

Court to conduct the sale of the property.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Third-party Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 103) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for an Advisory Jury (Doc. 106) is

DENIED.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter a Judgment of

partition by sale.

DATED this 1st day of August, 2013.

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