Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01143/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01143-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLAUDIO BERNARDINO,

CDCR #AG-9485,

Plaintiff,

vs. 

SANDOVAL, Correctional Officer;

MOSLEY, Correctional Officer;

GOODSON, Correctional Sergeant,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-1143-H-BGS

ORDER DISMISSING THIRD 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) AND 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)(1) WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND

Claudio Bernardino (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at the California 

Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis, but has dismissed his original, first, and second amended complaints for failure

to state a claim, each time with leave to amend. (Doc. Nos. 6, 16, 27.) After Plaintiff 

requested, and was granted four separate extensions of time, see Doc. Nos. 31, 34, 37, 40,

but still failed to timely amend, the Court denied his fifth request for more time, as well as 

his subsequent motion to re-open the case. (Doc. Nos. 43, 46.) Despite the Court’s order, 

Plaintiff submitted a third amended complaint on August 29, 2017 (Doc. No. 48). 

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Because he claimed prison officials prevented its timely filing, the Court 

provisionally granted Plaintiff leave to file his third amended complaint, but cautioned that 

it might, like his previous pleadings, be dismissed during screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) if it still failed to state a claim, or for violating the 

Court’s orders. (Doc. Nos. 43, 46, 49.) 

Because the Court finds Plaintiff’s third amended complaint suffers from the same 

pleading deficiencies as his previous complaints, despite his having been notified three

times of those pleading problems, it now finds further amendment would be futile, and 

dismisses the case in its entirety.

Background

Plaintiff continues to contend, as he did in both his original, first, and second

amended complaints, that Calipatria State Prison Correctional Officers Sandoval and 

Mosley, under the supervision and direction of Correctional Sergeant Goodson, took longer 

than necessary to conduct a search of his cell on August 8, 2014, and confiscated and 

damaged some of his belongings, including his eyeglasses, magazines, and legal 

documents. (See Doc. No. 50, Third Amend. Compl. (“TAC”) at 4-7, 9-11, 13-15.) 

Plaintiff, incarcerated for murder and kidnapping, states the Defendants did so because of 

a false rumor that he was a “child molester,” and in “retaliation” for his having filed an 

“appeal” in a habeas corpus action pending in the Central District of California. (Id. at 4-

5, 7, 12, 18; Bernardino v. People of the State of California, C.D. Cal. Case No. 2:13-cv08447-BRO-JPR (Nov. 15, 2013 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus) (Doc. No. 1 at 2).)

Discussion

A. Legal Standards for Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff remains a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his TAC requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). “The purpose of 

§ 1915A is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the

expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

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“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 

1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in 

the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to review complaints filed by 

all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained 

in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary 

program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 

1915A(b). Under these screening statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, 

or any portions of them, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek 

damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010), but it “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.”

Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations 

omitted). 

B. Rumor and Harassment Claims

Plaintiff continues to attribute Defendants’ actions on August 8, 2014 to “derogatory 

remarks,” and a “hidden agenda” based on “a false rumor” that he was convicted of a sex 

offense, and is a “child molester (not true for the record).” (Doc. No. 50 at 5; cf. Doc. No. 

23 at 6.) 

The Court has twice advised Plaintiff that allegations of verbal harassment and abuse 

by themselves fail to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doc. No. 16 at 

4; Doc. No. 27 at 3-4 (citing Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997); Keenan 

v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(disrespectful and assaultive comments by prison guard not enough to implicate Eighth 

Amendment); Martin v. Thompson, 145 F. App’x 613 (9th Cir. 2005)). And as the Court 

has also previously noted, while the Ninth Circuit has held that a prisoner’s classification 

as a sex offender may implicate a liberty interest subject to due process protection in some 

circumstances, see Doc. No. 27 at 4 (citing Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828 (9th Cir.

1997); Guess v. Lopez, No. 2:13-CV-2652 AC P, 2014 WL 1883875, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 

12, 2014)), Plaintiff still does not claim to have been wrongfully classified by prison 

administrators as a “sex offender” pursuant to CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3377.1(b).

1

 

1 Pursuant to CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3377.1(b), “[a]n “R” suffix shall be affixed to an inmate’s custody 

designation to ensure the safety of inmates, correctional personnel, and the general public by identifying 

inmates who have a history of specific sex offenses as outlined in Penal Code (PC) Section 290.” These 

designations determine “where an inmate shall be housed and assigned, and the level of staff supervision 

required to ensure institutional security and public safety.” Id. § 3377.1(a).

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Instead, he simply continues to contend Defendants “trashed” his cell because “were 

convinced that the false rumors must be true.” See Doc. No. 50 at 10; cf. Doc. No. 23 at 5-

6, 8. Therefore, these allegations still fail to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be 

granted, and must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

§ 1915A(b)(1).

C. Fourteenth Amendment Deprivation of Property Claims

Plaintiff also continues to claim, as he did in all of his previous complaints, (Doc. 

No. 1 at 3-4; Doc. No. 13 at 7-8, 13-14; Doc. No. 23 at 7, 14, 16), that Defendants violated 

his right to due process by taking “legal transcripts,” a “collection of 10 magazines,” and 

by breaking the arm of his eyeglasses during the August 8, 2014 cell search. (See Doc. No. 

50 at 4-8, 13-15.) 

The Court’s August 27, 2015, February 2, 2016, and August 26, 2016 orders (Doc. 

No. 6 at 6; Doc. No. 16 at 6-7; Doc. No. 27 at 6), all made clear that where a prisoner 

alleges to have been deprived of a property interest caused by the unauthorized negligent 

or intentional acts of state officials, as Plaintiff continues to claim in his TAC, he cannot 

state a constitutional claim so long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation 

remedy. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129-32 (1990); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 

(1984); Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Roberts v. Apker, 

570 F. App’x 646, 649 (9th Cir. 2014) (if post-deprivation remedy in prison mail context 

is sufficient then no pre-deprivation procedures need be afforded). 

Because the California Tort Claims Act provides an adequate post-deprivation state 

remedy for the random and unauthorized taking of personal property, and Plaintiff 

continues to allege his legal paperwork, magazines, and eyeglasses were either stolen or 

damaged as the result of Defendants Sandoval and Mosley’s negligent or intentional acts, 

he still fails to state a due process claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994); O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 

1148 (9th Cir. 2008).

///

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D. Inadequate Medical Care / Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claims

Plaintiff again claims Defendants violated his “right to medical care and medical 

appliances” when they allegedly the arm of his eyeglasses during the August 8, 2014 cell 

search. (Doc. No. 50 at 9; cf. Doc. No. 23 at 12.)

“The government has an ‘obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is 

punishing by incarceration,’ and failure to meet that obligation can constitute an Eighth 

Amendment violation cognizable under § 1983.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976)). “In order to 

prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must show 

‘deliberate indifference’ to his ‘serious medical needs.’” Id. 

“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner ‘must satisfy both the

objective and subjective components of a two-part test.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d

1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). “To meet the objective element of the standard, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate the existence of a serious medical need.” Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066. “Such a 

need exists if failure to treat the injury or condition ‘could result in further significant 

injury’ or cause ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Id. To meet the subjective 

element of the standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(a) a purposeful act or failure to 

respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “A prison official is 

deliberately indifferent under the subjective element of the test only if the official ‘knows 

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’” Colwell, 763 F.3d at

1066.

Plaintiff continues to fail to allege facts sufficient to plausibly show that Defendants 

Sandoval, Mosely, or Goodson caused him any “injury that a reasonable doctor or patient 

would find important and worthy of comment or treatment,” with respect to his glasses, or 

that his vision was so impaired that the broken arm of his eyeglasses “significantly 

affect[ed] [his] daily activities,” or caused him “chronic and substantial pain.” Id. (citing 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on other 

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grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). And as 

the Court noted in its August 26, 2016 order, “[w]hile severe eye injuries or legal blindness 

may constitute a serious medical need,” the same is not true, for example, with regard to 

“reading glasses.” Canell v. Multnomah County, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1057 (D. Or. 2001), 

citing Franklin v. State of Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981); McMillen v. Fairman, 

1997 WL 603853 *3 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (some discomfort suffered as a result of broken 

eyeglasses not being replaced insufficient to demonstrate a serious medical need); see also

Morales v. California Forensic Med. Grp., Inc., No. CIV S 09-3610 GGH P, 2010 WL 

1404762, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2010) (dismissing prisoner’s claims of “blurry vision and

irritation of un-focused sight” due to lack of corrective eyewear for failing to state an

Eighth Amendment claim under § 1915A(b)).

Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s medical care claims, as alleged in his TAC, 

continue to fail to state an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); § 1915A(b)(1).

E. First Amendment Access to Courts Claims

Plaintiff also re-asserts claims that Mosley and Sandoval “stole” his “legal 

transcripts” including a respondent’s brief, reply brief, and a copy of a California Court of 

Appeal opinion in “Case No. B231949,” which had been lodged as part of the record in a 

habeas corpus proceeding Plaintiff was litigating pro se in the Central District of California, 

and identified as Case No. 2:13-cv-8447-BRO-JPR, and through which he was “trying to 

enforce his right on a ‘Chui’ claim.” (Doc. No. 50 at 4-5, 12.) Plaintiff claims Defendants 

confiscated these legal documents on August 8, 2014, in an effort to “prevent [him] from 

prosecuting [his] appeal, research the law library, [and to] prepar[e] all legal papers for 

filing with the courts.” Id. at 10, 16; cf. Doc. No. 23 at 6, 8-11.2

 

2

 In People v. Chiu, the California Supreme Court held: “[An] aider and abettor may not be convicted of 

first degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Rather, his or her 

liability for that crime must be based on direct aiding and abetting principles.” 59 Cal.4th 155 at 158-59 

(Cal. 2014). 

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As the Court noted in all three of its previous orders, (Doc. No. 6 at 7-8; Doc. No. 

16 at 7-8; Doc. No. 23 at 8-10), Plaintiff is correct to note he enjoys a constitutional right 

to access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). This right is limited to 

the filing of direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. 

Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a 

litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of 

a suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 

403, 412-15 (2002).

However, as the Court also explained in its August 27, 2015, February 2, 2016, and 

August 26, 2016 orders (Doc. No. 6 at 7-8; Doc. No. 16 at 7-8; Doc. No. 23 at 8-10),

Plaintiff must allege an “actual injury” as a threshold requirement to any access to courts 

claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 

2011). An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing 

litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 348; see also Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining actual 

injury as the “inability to file a complaint or defend against a charge”). The failure to allege 

an actual injury is “fatal.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Failure 

to show that a ‘non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated’ is fatal.”) (quoting Lewis, 

518 U.S. at 353).

Plaintiff’s TAC, like his original, first, and second amended complaints, still fails to 

allege the actual injury required to state an access to courts claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 

351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to include any “factual matter” 

to show how or why the loss of his transcripts resulted in any “actual prejudice with respect 

to [his] existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a 

claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see also Jones, 393 F.3d at 936; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The Court again takes judicial notice of the docket in Bernardino v. People of the 

State of California, C.D. Cal. Case No. 2:13-cv-08447-BRO-JPR, the habeas corpus 

proceeding upon which Plaintiff’s access to courts claim is based, (see Doc. No. 50 at 4; 

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Doc. No. 23 at 6), and which he first filed in the Central District, while proceeding pro se 

in November 2013, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 

1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (a court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both 

within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation 

to matters at issue.’”) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 

2002)). That proceeding was still pending before the Central District on February 2, 2016, 

and on August 26, 2016, when this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s first and second amended 

complaints (Doc. No. 16 at 8; Doc. No. 23 at 9-10), and it remains pending in the Central 

District today. 

In fact, the Central District’s docket shows that the court appointed counsel for 

Plaintiff in his habeas case and ordered the matter stayed so that he could exhaust state 

court judicial remedies in light of the California Supreme Court’s intervening decision in 

People v. Chiu, 59 Cal. 4th 155 (2014).3 See Bernardino v. California, C.D. Cal. Case No. 

2:13-cv-08447-BRO-JPR (May 22, 2015 Order Granting Petitioner’s Alternative Request 

for Appointment of Counsel) (Doc. No. 33); (Aug. 5, 2015 Order Staying Proceedings 

Until Resolution of State Habeas Petition Exhausting Chiu Claim) (Doc. No. 38); (July 1, 

2016 Status Update Regarding Filing of Petition in State Court) (Doc. No. 46 at 2) (“On 

November 4, 2015, Bernardino, through counsel, filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in the California Supreme Court, raising his claim based upon that Court’s decision in 

People v. Chiu, 59 Cal. 4th 144 (2014). On January 27, 2016, the California Supreme Court 

ordered respondent to file an informal response. Respondent filed his informal response on 

 

3 In fact, the Central District appointed counsel in Plaintiff’s habeas proceedings after granting him two 

extensions of time in which to file a Response to Respondent’s Motion to Stay the case in light of People 

v. Chiu, and after he claimed he lacked access to his “legal transcripts.” See Bernardino v. People of the 

State of California, C.D. Cal. Case No. 2:13-cv-08447-BRO-JPR (Doc. Nos. 20, 25, 29, 32, 33). This 

appointment was, of course, within the discretion of the court, for there is no constitutional right to counsel 

in a habeas case. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991); Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 429 

(9th Cir. 1993) (“Clearly, there is no constitutional right to counsel [i]n habeas [proceedings].”); Gant v. 

Barnes, No. CV 14-2618-CJC (SP), 2017 WL 3822063, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2017), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. CV 14-2618-CJC (SP), 2017 WL 3738384 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2017). 

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April 11, 2016. Petitioner filed his reply to the informal response on June 29, 2016.”); see 

also (August 17, 2017 Status Update Regarding Petition Filed in States Court) (Doc. No. 

62 at 2) (“The state-court petition remains pending.”).

Because proceedings in Plaintiff’s federal habeas action in Bernardino v. People of 

the State of California, C.D. Cal. Case No. 2:13-cv-08447-BRO-JPR have been and remain 

stayed in the Central District pending exhaustion of his Chui claims at the California 

Supreme Court, he still fails to allege any injury related to the loss of his legal transcripts 

or any “actual prejudice with respect to [his] existing litigation, such as the inability to 

meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348. Thus, the Court again 

dismisses Plaintiff’s access to courts claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

§ 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

F. Defendant Goodson

Finally, the Court notes that while Plaintiff’s claims against Sergeant Goodson were 

initially dismissed on respondeat superior grounds, (Doc. No. 16 at 4-6), and later 

dismissed because Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Goodson engaged 

in any conspiracy with Defendants Sandoval and Mosley to violate his First, Eighth, or 

Fourteenth Amendment rights, see Doc. No. 27 at 10-11, the TAC fails to include Goodson 

in his list of intended parties altogether. See Doc. No. 50 at 1-3. In fact, Plaintiff’s TAC 

mentions Goodson only once: Plaintiff claims he spoke with “Sgt. Goodson to show him 

the condition of [his] glasses as well as the shape of [his] cell.” (Doc. No. 50 at 9). 

This allegation by itself, however, clearly fails to support any plausible claim for 

relief as to Sgt. Goodson upon which § 1983 relief may be granted. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

676 (“[A] plaintiff [in a § 1983 action] must plead that each Government-official 

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); 

Paine v. City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2001) (whether or not each defendant 

“is a participant in the incidents that could give rise to liability” is a necessary element of 

the § 1983 claim); see also Singleton v. Kernan, No. 3:16-CV-2462-BAS-NLS, 2017 WL 

4021536, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2017) (“Even a pro se plaintiff must ‘allege with at 

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least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in’ in order to state 

a claim) (quoting Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 

733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s third amended complaint 

in its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), denies leave to further amend, see Hartmann 

v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend 

when amendment would be futile.”), and directs the Clerk of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 3, 2017

Hon. Marilyn L. Huff

United States District Judge

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