Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02302/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02302-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Dawn Young, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Liberty Mutual Group, Inc.; et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-2302-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant Mike Dumas’s Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Complaint against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

(Doc. 5). 

I. Background 

 Plaintiff Dawn Young suffered an on-the-job injury and filed a claim with 

Defendant Liberty Mutual Group, Inc. (“Liberty Mutual”) for worker’s compensation 

benefits. Defendant Mike Dumas handled Ms. Young’s worker’s compensation claim as 

Liberty Mutual’s claims adjuster. Although she eventually received at least some of the 

compensation to which she was entitled, Ms. Young experienced a great deal of difficulty 

working with Liberty Mutual. 

 Ms. Young brought this action in Arizona state court alleging a breach of the duty 

of good faith and fair dealing that resulted in wrongfully denied and unreasonably 

delayed benefit payments. (Doc. 1-1). She named Liberty Mutual and Mike Dumas as 

defendants, as well as several fictitious John Does and XYZ Corporations. (Id. at 2). Mr. 

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Dumas removed the action to this Court based on diversity of the parties. (Doc. 1). 

 The Complaint alleges three claims for relief. The first claim is alleged only 

against Liberty Mutual for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. (Doc. 1-1 at 

8–10). The second claim is alleged only against Mr. Dumas for aiding and abetting 

Liberty Mutual’s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. (Id. at 10–11). The 

third claim1

 alleges both Defendants are liable for punitive damages. (Id. at 11–12). The 

Complaint alleges Liberty Mutual is vicariously liable for the acts of its employees or 

agents such as Mr. Dumas, and that Liberty Mutual is directly liable for a breach of the 

duty of good faith and fair dealing. (Id. at 3–4). As for Mr. Dumas, the Complaint 

alleges only that he is “personally liable for his own acts and omissions insofar as he 

aided and abetted Defendant LIBERTY MUTUAL in its violations of the Arizona 

Worker’ [sic] Compensation Act and the duties of good faith and fair dealing owed to 

Ms. Young.” (Id. at 4). The only factual allegations in the Complaint are that an 

adequate investigation was not conducted and that Ms. Young’s claims for payment were 

delayed and denied without any reasonable basis. (Id. at 6–7). 

 Mr. Dumas filed the present Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 5). Mr. 

Dumas argues he should be dismissed from this lawsuit because his actions are the sole 

basis for Plaintiff’s claims against Liberty Mutual, and he took those actions as Liberty 

Mutual’s agent. Even if Liberty Mutual breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing 

via Mr. Dumas’s actions, he argues, one actor performing one set of actions cannot 

simultaneously form the basis for both primary and secondary liability. In other words, 

Mr. Dumas argues one cannot aid and abet one’s self. 

II. Federal Pleading Requirements 

The Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or 

 

1

 In the Complaint, the three claims are labeled “First Claim,” “Second Claim,” 

and “Fourth Claim.” (Doc. 1-1 at 8, 10, 11). Because there are only three claims, the Court will refer to the claim labeled “Fourth Claim” as the third claim. 

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(2) insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to 

state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

 Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed 

factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Rule 

8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. 

Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could 

satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but 

also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure §1202, pp. 94, 95 (3d ed. 2004)). Thus, Rule 8’s pleading 

standard demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555). 

 In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the 

facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint 

and the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. 

United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the Court does not have 

to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). 

III. A Secondary Act is Required to Aid and Abet a Primary Act 

 In her first claim, Plaintiff alleges Liberty Mutual breached its duty of good faith 

and fair dealing via the actions of Mr. Dumas, who was acting as Liberty Mutual’s claims 

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adjuster. For purposes of this Motion, the Court accepts that allegation as true. Her 

second claim alleges that Mr. Dumas, in his individual capacity, aided and abetted 

Liberty Mutual in breaching its duty of good faith and fair dealing to Ms. Young. In 

order to state a claim against Mr. Dumas, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show 

that Mr. Dumas, as an individual, met the legal elements of aiding and abetting. 

 As a federal court sitting in diversity, this Court is bound to apply Arizona 

substantive law. McClaran v. Plastic Indus., 97 F.3d 347, 356 (9th Cir.1996); Kabatoff v. 

Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 627 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir.1980) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. 

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)); Yazzie v. Olney, Levy, Kaplan & Tenner, 593 F.2d 

100, 103 n. 4 (9th Cir.1979). “Arizona recognizes aiding and abetting as embodied in 

Restatement [(Second) of Torts] § 876(b), that a person who aids and abets a tortfeasor is 

himself liable for the resulting harm to a third person.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. 

Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 

23 (Ariz. 2002). In order for there to be harm to a “third person,” there must be at least 

two tortfeasors. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. a (1977) (“Whenever two 

or more persons commit tortious acts in concert, each becomes subject to liability for the 

acts of the others, as well as for his own acts.”); see also Gibson-Jones v. Berkel & Co. 

Contractors, Inc., 2008 WL 782568 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[A] single actor (as a matter of 

legal tautology) cannot aid and abet (or conspire with) itself.”). 

 The Complaint alleges two “persons” are tortfeasors: Liberty Mutual and Mr. 

Dumas. The only factual allegations in the Complaint are that an adequate investigation 

was not conducted and that Ms. Young’s claims for payment were delayed and denied 

without any reasonable basis. (Doc. 1-1 at 6–7). Taken as true, these facts could amount 

to a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, which is a “tortious act.” See

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. a. Plaintiff explicitly alleges this tortious act 

was committed by Liberty Mutual—not by Mr. Dumas. (Doc. 1-1 at 8) (first claim for 

relief alleged only against Liberty Mutual); (Doc. 11 at 2) (“The only cause of action 

alleged against Dumas is for aiding and abetting Liberty Mutual’s breach of the duty of 

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good faith and fair dealing.”). In order for Mr. Dumas and Liberty Mutual to have 

committed “tortious acts in concert,” there must be some factual allegation showing a 

separate tortious act was committed by Mr. Dumas. Because the Complaint alleges no 

such facts, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Mr. Dumas. 

 In her Response, Plaintiff relies on Morrow v. Boston Mutual Life Insurance 

Company, CIV. 06-2635PHXSMM, 2007 WL 3287585 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2007), for the 

proposition that an insurer’s agent may be held liable for aiding and abetting the insurer. 

Although Morrow supports that proposition, that proposition does not support Plaintiff’s 

claim against Mr. Dumas. The plaintiff in Morrow was receiving monthly disability 

payments from his insurer. Id. at *1. The Morrow plaintiff claimed his insurer 

committed the tort of bad faith by purposefully hiring a biased medical examiner as part 

of a “claim termination scheme.” Id. The Morrow plaintiff alleged the medical examiner 

committed the tort of aiding and abetting “by providing a biased and unsubstantiated 

opinion” of the plaintiff’s health. Id. at *5. Thus, in Morrow, there were two tortious 

acts alleged: (1) purposefully hiring a biased examiner in bad faith; and (2) aiding and 

abetting the bad faith by providing a biased and unsubstantiated medical opinion. Each 

act was alleged against a different defendant. Here, Plaintiff alleges only one tortious act: 

failing, in bad faith, to conduct an adequate investigation and make timely benefits 

payments. 

 Plaintiff additionally relies on Warner v. Southwest Desert Images, LLC, 180 P.3d 

986 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008), for the proposition that an agent is not excused from 

responsibility for a tort merely because he is acting on behalf of his employer. Again, 

that proposition does not support Plaintiff’s claim against Mr. Dumas. In Warner, a pest 

control company’s employee sprayed chemicals that caused injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 

991. On summary judgment, the trial court found the employee was negligent and the 

pest control company was vicariously liable under respondeat superior. Id. The issue of 

damages went to trial. Before the end of the trial, the trial court entered a directed verdict 

in favor of the employee on the basis that the company was clearly liable for the 

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employee’s actions. Id. at 991–92. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial 

court’s directed verdict against the employee, holding that respondeat superior liability is 

joint and several. Id. at 992; see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2506(D)(2); Restatement (Third) of 

Agency § 7.01 (2006). Unlike respondeat superior, which is a theory of vicarious 

liability, aiding and abetting is a theory of secondary liability. The Warner plaintiff 

claimed both the employer and the employee were liable for the employee’s negligence. 

Plaintiff here claims only Liberty Mutual is liable for breach of the duty of good faith and 

fair dealing. Plaintiff’s separate aiding and abetting claim against Mr. Dumas requires 

Plaintiff to allege Mr. Dumas took separate action “in concert” with the actions giving 

rise to Plaintiff’s claim against Liberty Mutual. Plaintiff alleges no such action. 

 Finally, Plaintiff alleges Liberty Mutual has a “non-delegable duty of good faith 

and fair dealing,” (Doc. 1-1 at 3–4), and suggests that “under Arizona law it is unlikely 

that Dumas could commit violations of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.” (Doc. 11 

at 3) (emphasis in original). It is true that, under Arizona law, an insurance carrier may 

not “escape liability” by delegating its duty of good faith and fair dealing to another. 

Walter v. Simmons, 818 P.2d 214, 223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). However, it does not 

follow that Mr. Dumas must have committed the separate tort of aiding and abetting 

merely because he was the agent through which Liberty Mutual breached its duty. 

Indeed, Plaintiff argues that “[w]ithout Dumas’s inadequate investigation and his refusal 

to make the required payments, Liberty Mutual would not have” committed a tort against 

Plaintiff. (Doc. 11 at 4). Thus, under Arizona law, Mr. Dumas and Liberty Mutual were 

acting as a single legal entity. See, e.g., Perry v. Apache Junction Elementary Sch. Dist. 

No. 43 Bd. of Trustees, 514 P.2d 514, 517 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (“[A]gents and 

employees of a corporation cannot conspire with their corporate principal or employer 

when acting in their official capacities on behalf of the corporation and not as individuals 

for their individual advantage.”). Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to allege Mr. 

Dumas took any actions in his individual capacity “in concert” with the actions giving 

rise to Plaintiff’s claim against Liberty Mutual, her aiding and abetting claim against Mr. 

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Dumas will be dismissed. 

 Alternatively, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the elements 

of aiding and abetting. In Arizona, “a person who aids and abets a tortfeasor is himself 

liable for the resulting harm to a third person” when three elements are met: (1) the 

primary tortfeasor commits a tort that causes injury to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant 

knows that the primary tortfeasor’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty; and (3) the 

defendant substantially assists or encourages the primary tortfeasor in the achievement of 

the breach. Wells Fargo, 38 P.3d at 23. Because Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the duty 

of good faith and fair dealing is based entirely on Mr. Dumas’s conduct—not Liberty 

Mutual’s—Mr. Dumas could not have known that the primary tortfeasor’s conduct 

constituted a breach of duty. Mr. Dumas could not have known about conduct that did 

not exist. 

IV. Punitive Damages Require an Underlying Tort 

 Plaintiff alleges Liberty Mutual and Mr. Dumas are liable for punitive damages. 

(Doc. 1-1 at 11–12). Mr. Dumas argues that he cannot be liable for punitive damages if, 

as the Court has found, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a tort against him. (Doc. 5 at 

6–7). Plaintiff does not dispute this contention. 

 In Arizona, “before a jury may award punitive damages there must be evidence of 

an ‘evil mind’ and aggravated and outrageous conduct.” Linthicum v. Nationwide Life 

Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 680 (Ariz. 1986). Punitive damages require evidence of 

“‘something more’ than the conduct necessary to establish the tort.” Rawlings v. 

Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 577 (Ariz. 1986). Here, the only “conduct” alleged is against 

Liberty Mutual. Mr. Dumas cannot be liable for punitive damages unless he committed 

an underlying tort. Because Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a tort against Mr. 

Dumas, her claim for punitive damages against him must be dismissed as well. 

V. Conclusion 

/// 

///

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 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Mike Dumas’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is 

granted. 

 Dated this 6th day of March, 2013. 

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