Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01964/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01964-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD PAUL RODDY, II,

Booking #16113441,

Plaintiff,

vs.

OFFICE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY; 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH 

DISTRICT; APPELLATE DEFENDERS, 

INC.; JUDGE ROBERT F. O'NEIL,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-1964-LAB-PCL

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 4]; AND 

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

AND SEEKING MONETARY 

DAMAGES AGAINST IMMUNE 

DEFEDANTS PURSUANT TO 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND § 1915A(b)

Richard Paul Roddy, II, (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at the George Bailey 

Detention Facility (“GBDF”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a 

a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff has also filed 

a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF 

No. 4).

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1

 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 

2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate authorized 

by a GBDF administrative lieutenant attesting to his trust account activity. See ECF No. 4

at 4; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These 

statements show Plaintiff has had no monthly deposits to his account, has carried no 

balance over the six month period preceding the filing of his Complaint, and that his 

current available balance is zero. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no 

event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action 

or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by 

which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 

850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of 

a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds 

available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 4), 

declines to “exact” any initial filing fee because his trust account statement shows he “has 

no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Watch Commander at 

GBDF to instead collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment 

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

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Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges San Diego Deputy District Attorneys Christina Eastman, 

Jacqueline Vasquez and Christopher Moon “refuse[d] to give Plaintiff discovery.” 

(Compl. at 2.) He further alleges that Defendant, San Diego Superior Court Judge Robert 

F. O’Neil, “refused to acknowledge that Prosecutors’ office” had refused to give Plaintiff 

discovery. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that both the Appellate Defenders and the Court of 

Appeals also refused to acknowledge the alleged denial of discovery. (Id.) Plaintiff 

requests $50,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 5.)

/ / /

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C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

D. Criminal Proceedings

First, to the extent that Plaintiff is alleging that the actions of the Defendants 

resulted in his criminal conviction, he may not pursue those claims in a civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without first showing those convictions have already been 

invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions 

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determination, or called into question by a federal 

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A 

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or 

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under 

§ 1983.

Id. at 486-87. 

“Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within 

‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state 

prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but 

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not to the fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 

2003), quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-99 (1973) (holding that a writ of 

habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the 

“exclusive” means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court).

Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on his criminal conviction, his claims 

amount to an attack on the validity of his underlying criminal conviction, and may not 

proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless his conviction has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 

U.S. at 486-87; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner 

who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983.’”), 

quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. 

E. Judicial and Prosecutorial Immunity

Second, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against Judge O’Neil and any Justice 

with the California Court of Appeals, for either presiding over his criminal proceedings 

or denying him relief in his appeal, his claims are legally frivolous, for “[j]udges are 

absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities.”

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). As prosecutors Eastman, 

Vasquez, and Moon are likewise entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Id. at 1076 

(“Where a prosecutor acts as an advocate ‘in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the 

state’s case,’ absolute immunity applies.” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,

431 (1976)); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012)

(“Prosecutors performing their official prosecutorial functions are entitled to absolute 

immunity against constitutional torts.”).

Thus, for all these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a 

claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted and for seeking monetary relief against 

immune defendants, and that it therefore must be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at

1121.

/ / /

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IV. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons explained the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 4).

2. DIRECTS the Watch Commander of GBDF, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on the Watch 

Commander, George Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Road, Ste. 5300, San Diego, 

California, 92158.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) for failing to state a claim 

upon which § 1983 relief can be granted and for seeking monetary damages against 

immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A.

5. GRANTS him thirty (30) days leave from the date of this Order in which to 

file an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original 

pleading, and must comply with S.D. CAL. CIVLR 8.2(a). 

Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint 

will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

/ / /

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6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved blank civil 

rights form for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 28, 2017

HON. LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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