Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01715/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01715-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN MICHAEL BALBO, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

JAMES TILTON, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

 )

____________________________________)

1:07-cv-01715-LJO-GSA-PC 

 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND WITHIN THIRTY

DAYS

ORDER FOR CLERK TO SEND § 1983

COMPLAINT FORM TO PLAINTIFF

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE TO FILE

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, John Michael Balbo ("plaintiff"), is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed the complaint commencing this action on August 16, 2007, at the

United States District Court for the Northern District of California. On October 23, 2007, the court

transferred this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, and the

case was received by this court on November 28, 2007. (Doc. 1.) 

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court

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must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous

or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any

filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time

if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions,”

none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512

(2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Such

a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear

that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.

Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is

entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that

a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d

1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the

claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal

pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements

of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th

Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The events at issue in the complaint allegedly occurred at the California Substance Abuse

Treatment Facility ("CSATF") in Corcoran, California, where plaintiff, a state prisoner, is currently

incarcerated. Plaintiff names as defendants James Tilton (Secretary of the California Department of

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Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR")), John Dovey (Director of Adult Inst.), and Robert Sillen

(Medical Receiver). 

Plaintiff alleges that his rights of access to the courts are being violated by defendants because

the photocopy services at CSATF and other prison facilities are inadequate. Plaintiff also makes general

allegations of oppressive conditions of confinement which adversely affect inmates’ rights to

successfully litigate actions. Plaintiff alleges that lockdowns at the prison prevent access to the law

library and the courts. Plaintiff alleges that appeals coordinators at the prison regularly refuse to assist

inmates or create delays, causing inmates to miss deadlines to file grievances. Plaintiff alleges that he

was assaulted by his cellmate with a food service tray until he was unconscious, and guards charged

plaintiff with being involved in “mutual combat.” Plaintiff alleges violations of hisrightsto due process

and equal protection, rights of access to the courts, and rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Plaintiff seeks as relief immediate emergency orders requiring the CDCR and all CDCR law

library officials to open every library and provide unrestricted, unlimited photocopy services to inmates.

He also seeks injunctive relief through the appointment of a receivership to supervise prison staff in

performing their work duties. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal Constitution

and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations

omitted). “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created

interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.”

Id. 

///

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A. Linkage Requirement

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of

the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person deprives

another of a constitutional right, where that person ‘does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the

deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, No. 03-56712, 2007 WL 2445998, *5

(9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he

‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal participation

in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or

reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson

at 743-44). 

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts linking any named defendant to an affirmative act or omission

to act which resulted in the deprivations he describes in the complaint. Therefore, the complaint must

be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983 against any of

the defendants. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing

the deficiencies identified by the court in this order. The court will also provide plaintiff with the law

that may or may not be relevant to the claims he is attempting to assert.

B. Supervisory Liability

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589

F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under

section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts that would

support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of

constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or

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“implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is

‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)

(internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal

pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

C. Right of Access to Courts

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 346 (1996). The right of access is merely the right to bring to court a grievance the inmate wishes

to present, and is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354.

The State is not required to enable the inmate to discover grievances or to litigate effectively once in

court. Id. Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a

litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a meritorious

suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15,

122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (2002). To prevail on his claim, plaintiff must show that he suffered an actual

injury by being shut out of court. Id. at 415; Lewis, 518 at 351. 

Inmates do not have the right to a law library or legal assistance. Id. at 351. Law libraries and

legal assistance programs are only the means of ensuring access to the courts. Id. Because inmates do

not have “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish

relevant actual injury by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar

in some theoretical sense.” Id. Rather, an inmate claiming interference with or denial of access to the

courts must show that he suffered an actual injury. Id.

D. Violations of Grievance Process

There is no constitutional right to an inmate appeals process. The Ninth Circuit has held that

prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1988). The non-existence of, or the failure of prison officials to properly implement, an

administrative appeals process within the prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. Id. See

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also, Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991);

Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F.Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.Ill. 1982)(”[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural

right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it does not give rise to a

protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment”).

Id.; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Actions in reviewing prisoner’s

administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d

at 495. 

E. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must

provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.;

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th

Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison

officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk

to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, a prison official

may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only

if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. Prison officials may avoid liability by presenting

evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting evidence of a reasonable, albeit

unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official is

not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 835;

Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. 

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“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The

objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive to contemporary

standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme deprivations are required

to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted).

With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal

offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.”

Id. (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-ofconfinement claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983

because plaintiff has not adequately linked the alleged constitutional violation to actions or omissions

of named defendants. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint

curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained of

have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th

Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There

can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between

a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 362; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. 

Plaintiff is reminded that liability may not be imposed under section 1983 on supervisory

personnel for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle, 607 F.2d at 862; Mosher, 589 F.2d at

441, cert. denied, 442 U.S. at 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory

liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in

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the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them;

or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646

(internal citations omitted); Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. 

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not for the

purposes of adding new defendants relating to issues arising after August 16, 2007. In addition, plaintiff

should take care to include only those claims that have been exhausted prior to the initiation of this suit

on August 16, 2007.

Finally, plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth

v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule

15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not

alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers &

Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; 

4. Plaintiff shall entitle the amended complaint clearly and boldly, “First Amended

Complaint” and shall refer to case number 1:07-cv-01715-LJO-GSA-PC;

5. If plaintiff failsto file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court will

recommend that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 11, 2008 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

60kij8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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