Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06619/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06619-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODNEY MURO and PANFILO M.

ZAMORA,

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

FRESNO COUNTY SHERIFF DEPUTY

JEFFREY SIMPSON; FRESNO POLICE

OFFICER R. CANCIO; FRESNO POLICE

OFFICER R. VILLALVAZO;

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL

OFFICER T. GATES; CALIFORNIA

HIGHWAY PATROL OFFICER J.

WATSON; CITY OF FRESNO; COUNTY

OF FRESNO; CALIFORNIA; and

UNKNOWN LAW ENFORCEMENT

OFFICERS,

 Defendants.

1:03-CV-6619 OWW SMS

ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, AND

DENYING, IN PART, MOTION OF

CITY OF FRESNO, RODNEY

CANCIO, AND RAY VILLALVAZO

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Fed.R.Civ.P. 56) 

1. INTRODUCTION

Defendants the City of Fresno (“City”), Fresno Police

Officer Rodney Cancio (“Cancio”), and Fresno Police Officer Ray

Villalvazo (“Villalvazo”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move for

summary judgment. Plaintiffs Rodney Muro (“Muro”) and Panfilo M.

Zamora (“Zamora”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) oppose the motion.

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The complaint was filed on November 18, 2003. Doc. 1,

Compl. The Defendants’ answer was filed on May 3, 2004. Doc. 8,

Answer. Defendants moved for summary judgment on April 28, 2006. 

Doc. 68, Mot. for Summ. J. Plaintiffs filed opposition on June

20, 2006. Doc. 77, Mem. in Opp. Defendants replied on June 29,

2006. Doc. 80, Reply. At the court’s invitation, Defendants

offered further briefing regarding qualified immunity, malicious

prosecution, and municipal liability issues raised in the August

7, 2006, oral argument. Doc. 87, Brief. Plaintiffs replied on

August 10, 2006. Doc. 89, Reply to Brief. 

III. BACKGROUND

A. Undisputed Facts

1. On November 20, 2002, Deputy Jeffrey Simpson (“Simpson”)

of the Fresno County Sheriff’s Department received information

that a day or two before, Sergeant Hansen from the Sheriff’s

Department had been to 4633 East Michigan Street (“the

residence”) in Fresno, to investigate charges against Javier

Ortega of receiving stolen property, resisting arrest, and

obstructing a peace officer. Doc. 78, Pls.’ Resp. to Statement

of Undisputed Facts [hereinafter, “RSUF”] #1 (see Dep. of Jeffrey

Simpson [hereinafter, “Simpson Dep.”], 9:2-12, 11:14-18).

2. Simpson believed that when Sergeant Hansen was there, he

was harassed by aggressive gang members from the residence and

neighboring houses. Id., RSUF #2 (see Simpson Dep., 9:15-22,

20:24-21:8. 

3. Based on this information, Simpson conducted a premises

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history to determine if any gang members were associated with the

residence and if there were any outstanding warrants for its

residents. Id., RSUF #3 (see Simpson Dep., 12:2-13). 

4. The premises history showed Javier Ortega (“Ortega”) and

Plaintiff Muro were associated with the residence. Id., RSUF #4

(see Simpson Dep., 12:19-20 and 17:1-7). 

5. Simpson’s subsequent search of the Records Management

System (“RMS”) database showed an outstanding warrant for

Ortega’s arrest. Id., RSUF #5 (see Simpson Dep., 17:8-22). 

6. The RMS listed several entries for Ortega, each listing

the East Michigan residence as his home address. Id., RSUF #6

(see Simpson Dep., 17:13-22). 

7. Simpson called his Department’s records unit and

confirmed that the Ortega arrest warrant was still active. Id.,

RSUF #7 (see Simpson Dep., 20:14-23). 

8. Simpson also ran Ortega’s driver’s license through his

Department’s computer automated dispatch, which showed Ortega’s

address was 4633 East Michigan. Id., RSUF #8 (see Simpson Dep.,

17:19-18:18).

9. Simpson then informed his superior in the Multi-Agency

Gang Enforcement Consortium (“MAGEC”) task force, Sergeant John

Jensen of the Fresno Police Department (“FPD”), that Simpson had

located a person with a $150,000 arrest warrant for possession of

stolen property and that Simpson wanted to serve the warrant. 

Id., RSUF #9 (see Simpson Dep., 20:24-21:12). 

10. Sergeant Jensen authorized Simpson to prepare a warrant

package and arrange a briefing with other members of the MAGEC

team in preparation for serving the warrant. Id., RSUF #10 (see

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Decl. of John Jensen [hereinafter, “Jensen Decl.”], ¶ 7).

11. Deputy Simpson held a briefing in the MAGEC office with

all members of the Metro MAGEC Tac Team who were going to serve

the arrest warrant. They included Sergeant Jensen, Defendant

Villalvazo of the FPD, Defendant Cancio, also of the FPD, Officer

James Watson (“Watson”) of the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”),

and Officer Tony Gates (“Gates”), also of the CHP. Id., RSUF #11

(see Simpson Dep., 30:5-7, 31:25-32:4). 

12. During this briefing, Simpson informed the MAGEC team

officers regarding the 4633 East Michigan Street residents’

harassment of Sergeant Hansen two days before and the active

warrant for Ortega. Id., RSUF #12 (see Simpson Dep., 31:4-13). 

13. Deputy Simpson gave each officer a package that included

a copy of Ortega’s felony arrest warrant and photograph. Id.,

RSUF #13 (see Simpson Dep., 37:17-21).

14. Around 6:10 p.m. on November 20, 2002, the MAGEC team

went to the East Michigan Street residence to arrest Ortega, a

possible Fresno Bulldog gang member. Id., RSUF #14 (see Simpson

Dep., 21:8-11). 

15. Upon arrival, Villalvazo and Gates covered the rear of

the residence. Id., RSUF #15. 

16. Defendant Cancio covered the southwest front window. 

Id., RSUF #16. 

17. Simpson, Watson, and Jensen made contact at the front

door. Id., RSUF #17. 

18. The front door of the residence had a main interior door

and a plexiglass security door. Id., RSUF #18. 

19. It was dark outside and the porch light was off. Id.,

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RSUF #19. 

20. Deputy Simpson rang the door bell and a Hispanic female

who appeared to be in her thirties, opened the interior door but

not the security door. Id., RSUF #20. 

21. A male, later identified as Plaintiff Muro, came to the

front door wearing a white Fresno State Bulldog jersey with red

lettering and jeans. Id., RSUF #21. 

22. Meanwhile, Gates and Villalvazo were in the backyard

when they looked through a window and saw an individual inside

the residence sitting on the couch whom they misidentified as

Ortega. See id., RSUF #22. 

23. The subject, later identified as Plaintiff Zamora, was 

wearing a red, long-sleeved, Fresno State Bulldog sweater and

blue jeans. Id., RSUF #23. 

24. Based on what Gates and Villalvazo observed, they

believed Plaintiff Zamora’s physical characteristics were

consistent with Ortega’s description. Id., RSUF #24 (see Gates

Dep., 8:21-9:9). 

25. Gates and Villalvazo then announced over the radio that

Ortega was inside the residence towards the back part of the

house in a red sweatshirt. Id., RSUF #25 (see Gates Dep., 27:3-

20). 

26. When Simpson saw Plaintiff Zamora, Simpson believed

Plaintiff Zamora looked like Ortega. Id., RSUF #27 (see Simpson

Dep., 53:3-54:2).

27. Plaintiff Muro understood Simpson thought Plaintiff

Zamora was Ortega. Id., RSUF #28 (see Muro Dep., 55:21-56:9). 

28. At or about the same time that Simpson saw Plaintiff

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Zamora, Gates communicated via radio to the other officers on the

scene Gates’ belief that Plaintiff Zamora was Ortega, was in the

back room, and was moving towards the front of the residence. 

Id., RSUF #29 (see Simpson Dep., 54:3-11).

29. Simpson believed Gates was referring to Ortega. Id.,

RSUF #30.

30. Once at the front of the house, Plaintiff Zamora was

shutting the door when he heard one of the officers identify him

as Ortega. Id., RSUF ##31-33 (see Zamora Dep., 54:16-25, 56:23-

57:5). 

31. Plaintiff Muro also heard another officer behind Simpson

say the officer thought Plaintiff Zamora was Ortega. Id., RSUF

#34 (see Muro Dep., 56:17-21, 57:23-58:10). 

32. Given Plaintiff Zamora’s actions at this point, Simpson

still suspected that he was Ortega. Id., RSUF #35 (“disputed as

irrelevant”).

33. Plaintiff Zamora then re-opened the interior front door. 

Id., RSUF #36 (“disputed as irrelevant”).

34. Plaintiff Zamora made no effort to communicate with the

officers through the screen door and did not tell the officers

that he was not Ortega or show them his ID at this time. Id.,

RSUF #37 (“[r]esponse: This asserted fact is disputed as

inaccurate. After being handcuffed, Zamora told the officers

that he was not Ortega.”) (emphasis added). 

35. Defendant Cancio did not see the initial interaction at

the front door. As this interaction was happening at the front

door between Simpson and the occupants of the home, Defendant

Cancio, who was positioned on the west side of the house near a

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window heard the commotion at the front door and heard Simpson

telling someone at the front door to move out of the way

otherwise he would have to arrest him. Id., RSUF #38 [JUDGE:

Plaintiffs “dispute this fact as inaccurate,” but their

explanation of why they dispute it doesn’t really contradict it.]

36. Defendant Cancio then moved closer to the front door,

where he saw Simpson standing approximately four feet from

Plaintiff Muro, whose back was towards the front door. Simpson

continued to tell Mr. Muro to move. Id., RSUF #39. 

37. Plaintiffs Muro and Zamora were charged with violation

of California Penal Code Sections 69, (resisting an executive

officer by threats or violence), 148(a) (obstructing or resisting

a peace officer), and 243(b) (battery on a peace officer). 

38. Both Plaintiff Muro and Plaintiff Zamora pled nolo

contendere to a violation of California Penal Code Section

148(a), a misdemeanor. Id., RSUF #68. 

39. Plaintiff Muro waived his constitutional rights by

writing his initials in several places on the Misdemeanor

Advisement, Waiver of Rights, and Plea Form. Id., RSUF #69. As

part of his plea bargain, Plaintiff Muro was given probation for

six months, after which the charges were dismissed. Id., RSUF

#70. 

40. Plaintiff Zamora also pled nolo contendere to a

violation of Section 148(a)(1). Id., RSUF #71. 

41. Plaintiff Zamora signed the waiver of constitutional

rights form acknowledging his plea had the same force and effect

as a guilty plea. Id., RSUF #72. 

42. If Plaintiffs had been arrested and/or convicted at any

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time during their probation period, the charges would not be

dismissed and the convictions would stand. Id., RSUF #73. 

43. Mr. Muro and Mr. Zamora freely and voluntarily waived

their Constitutional rights in exchange for probation of six

months at the end of which, the charges against then were

dismissed. Id., RSUF #74.

B. Disputed Facts

1. Defendant Cancio testified in deposition that Plaintiff

Muro was standing with his arms by his sides in a non-threatening

way when Defendant Cancio came to the front of the house. Id.,

RSUF #39 (reply). 

2. According to Cancio, Plaintiff Muro did not appear to

be preventing Simpson from entering the residence, that Simpson

could have walked past Plaintiff Muro into the residence, and

that although Simpson was ordering Plaintiff Muro to “move or I’m

going to arrest you,” Simpson did not tell Plaintiff where to

move on the narrow porch. Id. 

3. Plaintiffs deny Plaintiff Muro intentionally blocked

the doorway or obstructed the officers in any way. Id., RSUF #40

(reply). 

4. Defendants allege Simpson then tried to arrest

Plaintiff Muro by grasping Plaintiff Muro’s wrist to handcuff

him, but Plaintiff Muro violently resisted Simpson, slamming

Simpson several times against an exterior wall of the residence. 

Id., RSUF ##41-43. 

5. Plaintiffs deny Simpson ever attempted to arrest

Plaintiff Muro in this way: 

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6. To the contrary, [Plaintiff] Muro testified [] Simpson

pushed him towards the house’s entry door. Simpson tried to

punch [Plaintiff] Muro, but [Plaintiff] Muro moved his head. 

After [Defendant Cancio] . . . tasered [Plaintiff Muro], Simpson

dragged [Plaintiff] Muro off of the porch by his leg. Simpson

then turned [Plaintiff] Muro over and struck him on his back and

legs with a baton multiple times. 

7. At some point during the latter part of the incident,

[Plaintiff] Muro was also maced by an officer. [Plaintiff] Muro

was then handcuffed and taken to a patrol car. At no point

during this incident did [Plaintiff] Muro resist or attack

Simpson or another officer. 

Id., RSUF #42 (reply). 

8. Defendant Cancio noticed Plaintiff Zamora was wearing a

red Fresno State Bulldogs sweatshirt. Id., RSUF #47.

9. Defendants allege Defendant Cancio warned Plaintiff

Muro to quit resisting or Defendant Cancio would taser Plaintiff

Muro. Id., RSUF #48. 

10. Plaintiffs deny Plaintiff Muro was resisting. Id.,

RSUF #48 (reply). Plaintiffs also allege the only warning

Defendant Cancio gave Plaintiff Muro that Defendant Cancio was

about to taser Plaintiff Muro was shouting the word “taser.” Id.

11. Defendant Cancio conceded in deposition testimony that,

while this was enough to put a fellow officer on notice that a

taser was about to be deployed, a citizen might not understand

the significance of this shorthand pronouncement. Id., RSUF #50

(reply). 

12. Defendants allege “[Defendant] Cancio’s laser sight was

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directly pointed at [Plaintiff] Muro as he stood [] in a

fighting, bladed, and aggressive stance.” Id., RSUF #51. 

13. Plaintiffs deny Plaintiff Muro ever assumed such a

stance at any point. Id., RSUF #52. 

14. Defendants allege it was only after Plaintiff Muro

disobeyed Defendant Cancio’s orders to get down that Defendant

Cancio tasered Plaintiff Muro. Id., RSUF ##53-54. 

15. Plaintiffs deny Plaintiff Muro ever resisted the

officers. Id., RSUF #53. 

16. Defendants allege Plaintiff Muro did not fall to the

ground immediately after Defendant Cancio tasered Plaintiff Muro,

the usual reaction to being struck by taser darts and

electrocuted, but stood motionless and balled up his fists. Id.,

RSUF ##55, 57. 

17. This led Defendant Cancio to believe Plaintiff Muro was

preparing to start resisting again. Id., RSUF ##57, 59. 

18. Defendant Cancio warned Plaintiff Muro several more

times to get down, but Plaintiff Muro ignored his warnings, so

Defendant Cancio caused a second charge of electricity to be

applied to Plaintiff Muro. Id., RSUF ##58, 59. 

19. Plaintiffs deny Plaintiff Muro ever resisted any

officer during the incident. Id., RSUF #55 (reply). 

20. Plaintiffs allege Plaintiff Muro immediately fell to

his backside on the porch after being tasered, and Simpson

dragged him off the porch by his leg. Id., RSUF ##57, 58

(reply).

21. Defendants allege Plaintiff Muro continued to disobey

Defendant Cancio’s orders to lie down, leading Defendant Cancio

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to conclude the second charge was ineffective. Id., RSUF #61. 

22. Plaintiff Muro dropped to one knee after the second

charge, but tried to stand and balled his fists again. Id., RSUF

#60. 

23. Fearing Plaintiff Muro was going to attack him,

Defendant Cancio backed away and re-loaded his taser. Id., RSUF

#62.

24. Plaintiffs deny each of these allegations. Id., RSUF

##60–62 (replies). 

25. Meanwhile, Jensen and Watson brought Plaintiff Zamora

out of the residence. Id., RSUF #63. 

26. Defendants allege Defendant Villalvazo, having come

around to the front of the house from the back, saw and heard

Simpson tell Plaintiff Muro to lie down on his stomach, but

Plaintiff Muro kicked his leg out towards Simpson and tried to

rise to his feet. Id., RSUF #65.

27. Plaintiffs deny Plaintiff Muro ever resisted the

officers. Id., RSUF #65 (reply). 

28. With his baton, Simpson struck Plaintiff Muro on the

leg. Id., RSUF #66 (“[r]esponse: This fact is disputed only as

incomplete, since [Plaintiff] Muro was hit not only on the leg

but [on] his back as well”). 

29. Defendants allege: “[a]t that point, [Plaintiff] Muro

complied and la[y] down on his stomach and [Defendant] Villalvazo

placed handcuffs on him.” Id., RSUF #67. 

30. Plaintiffs deny Plaintiff Muro ever resisted the

officers. Id., RSUF #67 (reply). 

31. Plaintiffs respond to each of RSUF ##68-74 as follows:

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The primary factual flaw in the moving

[D]efendants’ argument is that [Plaintiffs] Muro

and Zamora were never convicted of the Penal Code

§ 148(a)(1) charges to which they pled no contest

on February 19, 2004. Instead, as part of a

conditional plea, which did not include any fine,

liberty restriction, or any other obligation, Muro

and Zamora were entitled to have their charges

dismissed after 6 months if they either were not

arrested or convicted of another charge in the

intervening time. In accordance with the

conditional plea, on August 20, 2004, Muro’s and

Zamora’s 148(a)(1) charges were dismissed. Thus,

Muro and Zamora were never convicted of any

criminal charge; no judgment of conviction was

ever issued in either of their cases. [citations] 

Id., RSUF ##68-74 (replies).

32. The arrest warrant was valid and the officers had the

legal authority to serve the warrant at the residence. Id., RSUF

#75 (reply: “denied as inaccurate. . . the officers only had the

right to serve the warrant if they had reliable information that

the subject actually lived there. Moreover, due to the Fresno

Police Department’s regrettable policies regarding validating

warrants and keeping more expansive records, repeated service

attempts are made to the same incorrect address.”) 

33. Ortega’s wanted persons photograph attached to the

Warrant Abstract and the post-incident photographs of Mr. Zamora

depict remarkable similarities between the two in terms of their

physical appearance. Id., RSUF #77 (reply: “disputed as

inaccurate”). 

34. A color representative of the Bulldog gang is red. 

Id., RSUF #78. 

35. Plaintiff Muro acknowledged the Fresno State Bulldog

jersey he was wearing is also worn by members of the Bulldog

gang. Id., RSUF #79.

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36. Defendants allege when Defendant Villalvazo approached

the front of the house, he observed a struggle between Simpson

and Plaintiff Muro; taser wires protruded from Plaintiff Muro. 

Id., RSUF #88. This reasonably led Defendant Villalvazo to

believe the officers were attempting to place [Plaintiff] Muro

into custody because he was under arrest and was resisting. Id.,

RSUF #89. 

37. Plaintiffs reply to both RSUF ##88-89 as follows:

This asserted fact is irrelevant, and inaccurate,

since neither [Plaintiff] Muro nor [Plaintiff]

Zamora resisted or [was] aggressive as to any

officer during the incident. Clearly, no force

can reasonably be used on such a person.

Id., RSUF ##88, 89 (replies). 

38. After Plaintiff Muro was on his stomach, Defendant

Villalvazo placed handcuffs on him. Id., RSUF #90 (“[r]esponse:

This fact is disputed as incomplete, since [Defendant] Villalvazo

also used OC spray on Muro at some point during the incident.”)

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Cal.

v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, to

defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must

show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists and (2) that this

factual issue is material. Id. A genuine issue of fact exists

when the non-moving party produces evidence on which a reasonable

trier of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a

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whole in light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that

party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216,

1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are “material” if they “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” 

Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The non-moving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th

Cir.2001). The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry

of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to the party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to

any material fact,” since a complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the non-moving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrell,

477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

The more implausible the claim or defense asserted by the

non-moving party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to

avoid summary judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N.

Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless,

the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on

summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

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Cir. 1996). 

V. ANALYSIS

Title 42, Section 1983, of the United States Code creates a

cause of action against a person who, acting under color of state

law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the

Constitution. Section 1983 does not create any substantive

rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge

actions by governmental officials. To prove a case under section

1983, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1) the action occurred

“under color of state law” and (2) the action resulted in the

deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right.

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9 Cir. 2002). th

A. First Amendment Claims

At oral argument, Plaintiffs conceded that they have no

compensable First amendment civil rights claim. The motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment

claim.

B. Malicious Prosecution

Plaintiffs allege under Title 42, Section 1983, of the

United States Code, that Defendants Cancio and Villalvazo falsely

reported Plaintiffs “resisted and attacked the officers” during

the November 20, 2002, incident. Doc. 77-1, Mem. in Opp., 15;

id., 2 (“[Plaintiffs] Muro and Zamora allege claims under

[Section] 1983 for . . . malicious prosecution based on the

Fourth Amendment”); see also id., 24 (“both [Defendants] Cancio

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and Villalvazo wrote reports that, under [Plaintiffs’] versions

of events, are false but yet were submitted as documentation of

the existence of probable cause”). Plaintiffs allege Defendants

submitted these reports to the Fresno County District Attorney

intending they be used to support criminal charges against

Plaintiffs, and they were in fact so used. Doc. 78, RSUF, 56. 

At oral argument conducted August 7, 2006, Plaintiffs

conceded neither Defendant Cancio nor Defendant Villalvazo wrote

reports of the incident which indicated Plaintiff Zamora resisted

the officers, and summary judgment was GRANTED in favor of

Defendants regarding Plaintiff Zamora’s malicious prosecution

claim. Plaintiff Muro’s Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim

against Defendants Cancio and Villalvazo is still before the

court. 

In a criminal context, the tort of malicious prosecution

consists of initiating or procuring the arrest and prosecution of

another under lawful process, but from malicious motives and

without probable cause, where the prosecution is terminated in

favor of the accused. 5 Witkin, Summ. of Cal. Law, Torts § 475.

Under California law, the elements of a malicious prosecution

claim are: the underlying prosecution, (1) was commenced by or at

the direction of the Defendants and was pursued to a legal

termination in Plaintiff’s favor; (2) was brought without

probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice. Conrad v.

United States, 447 F.3d 760, 767 (9 Cir. 2006) (citations and th

internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Whether Plaintiff Muro’s Malicious Prosecution Claim is

Cognizable under Section 1983

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A Section 1983 malicious prosecution plaintiff must prove

that defendants acted for the purpose of depriving him of a

specific constitutional right. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9 Cir. 2004). th

Plaintiff Muro alleges “malicious prosecution based on the

Fourth Amendment.” Doc. 77-1, Mem. in Opp., 2. Plaintiff Muro’s

malicious prosecution claim invokes the Fourth Amendment right

not to be arrested without probable cause and thereafter

wrongfully prosecuted. Because Plaintiff Muro was arrested

pursuant to the charges for which, he claims, he was later

maliciously prosecuted and required to hire a lawyer and go to

court to defend those charges. Plaintiff Muro was also required

to appear before the court to face the charges, and his failure

to do so would have resulted in his arrest. Both of these facts

implicate the Fourth Amendment sufficiently to render Plaintiff

Muro’s malicious prosecution claim cognizable under Section 1983. 

2. Plaintiff Muro’s Nolo Contendere Plea

Plaintiffs were charged with one violation each of

California Penal Code Section 69 (obstructing or resisting

executive officers in performance of their duties by threats or

violence) (felony); 148(a) (resisting, delaying, or obstructing

an officer) (misdemeanor); and 243(b) (battery on a peace

officer) (felony). Doc. 78, RSUF #68. Plaintiffs pled nolo

contendere to the Section 148(a) misdemeanor charges, id., and

the Section 69 and 243(b) felony charges were dismissed, Doc. 77,

Mem. in Opp., Ex. 3, p. 6. Because Plaintiffs were not arrested

or convicted for any charges in the following six months, they

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were then allowed to withdraw their nolo contendere plea to the

Section 148(a) charges, which were dismissed. Id.; Doc. 78, RSUF

#68 (reply). 

To be considered “favorable” for purposes of a malicious

prosecution claim, a termination in the underlying action must

reflect the merits of the action and plaintiff’s innocence of the

misconduct alleged in the lawsuit. The key is whether the

termination reflects on the underlying defendant’s innocence. If

the resolution of the underlying litigation leaves some doubt as

to the defendant’s innocence or liability, it is not a favorable

termination, and bars that party from bringing a malicious

prosecution action against the underlying plaintiff. Favorable

termination is an essential element of the tort of malicious

prosecution, and it is strictly enforced. StaffPro, Inc. v.

Elite Show Services, Inc., 136 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1399-1400

(Cal.App. 4 Dist.,2006) (emphasis added) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). See also Awabdy v. City of Adelanto,

368 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9 Cir. 2004) (“[a]n individual seeking to th

bring a malicious prosecution claim must generally establish that

the prior proceedings terminated in such a manner as to indicate

his innocence”).

a. The Section 69 and Section 243(b) Charges

Under California law, the favorable termination which is

essential to plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action cannot

be based on the dismissal of the criminal charges remaining after

the defendant in a criminal proceeding has entered a plea of nolo

contendere to one or more of the charges in the accusatory

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pleading pursuant to a plea bargain. Cote v. Henderson, 218

Cal.App.3d 796, 804 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,1990). Here, the

California Penal Code Section 69 and Section 243(b) charges

against Plaintiffs were dismissed outright based on the

Plaintiffs’ pleas of nolo contendere. The dismissals of these

charges arguably satisfy the favorable-termination element of

Plaintiff Muro’s malicious prosecution action. However, the

dismissals were part of a package deal as to all three charges. 

b. The Section 148(a) Charges

Under California law, a plea of nolo contendere is

considered the same as a plea of guilty. Upon a plea of nolo

contendere, the court shall find defendant guilty, and its legal

effect is the same as a plea of guilty for all purposes. It

negates the element of a favorable termination, which is a

prerequisite to stating a cause of action for malicious

prosecution. Cote, 218 Cal.App.3d at 803 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,1990)

(citing Cal. Pen. Code § 1016(3)); see also 5 Witkin, Summ. of

Cal. Law, Torts § 478 (10 ed. 2005). Here, Plaintiff Muro’s th

conditional nolo contendere plea is not inconsistent with his

guilt, and is not a favorable-termination. See Awabdy, 368 F.3d

at 1068. 

Plaintiffs argue:

because the record shows [] [Plaintiffs] were not

convicted, did not admit facts harmful to their

civil rights claims, and, at least arguably,

achieved a favorable termination to their criminal

cases, their . . . malicious prosecution cases

should proceed to trial.

Doc. 89, Pls.’ Further Briefing, 4-5. This is not accurate.

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A nolo contendere plea is equivalent to a guilty plea for

all purposes under California law. Cal. Pen. Code § 1016(3). A

guilty plea admits every element of the charged offense. People

v. Watts, 131 Cal.App.4th 589, 594-95 (Cal.App.5 Dist. 2005). 

Here, the plea forms show that each Defendant admitted facts in

the police report under People v. West to provide a factual basis

for their nolo pleas. For six months Plaintiffs stood convicted

of Pen. C. § 148(a). This is not a favorable termination. 

Plaintiffs could have negotiated to let the charges continue

against them for six months, whereafter the charges could have

been dismissed, but did not. Instead they admitted the truth of

the 148(a) charge. Plaintiff Muro cannot maintain a malicious

prosecution claim. 

c. Section 1192.5

Plaintiffs argue their nolo contendere pleas were withdrawn,

and California Penal Code Section 1192.5 bars introduction of

their pleas as evidence. Doc. 92, Withdrawal of Stipulation, 1-

2. 

The relevant portion of Section 1192.5 reads:

If the plea is withdrawn or deemed withdrawn, it

may not be received in evidence in any criminal,

civil, or special action or proceeding of any

nature, including proceedings before agencies,

commissions, boards, and tribunals.

Cal. Pen. Code § 1192.5. 

Plaintiffs were allowed to withdraw their pleas only after

satisfying the conditions of obeying the law for six months. 

Even if Muro was under a pre-existing duty to obey the law, he

accepted criminal responsibility for six months subject to a

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condition of good behavior, during which period he stood

convicted of Pen. C. § 148(a). This is not an unconditionally

favorable termination, totally consistent with innocence. 

3. Presumption of Prosecutorial Independence 

Even assuming, arguendo, Plaintiff Muro can assert a

malicious prosecution claim against Cancio and Villalvazo, he

still must overcome the presumption of prosecutorial

independence. The filing of a criminal complaint immunizes

investigating officers from damages suffered thereafter because

it is presumed the prosecutor who filed the complaint exercised

independent judgment in determining probable cause for an

accused’s arrest existed at that time. Newman v. County of

Orange, — F.3d —, 2006 WL 2241584, ------- (9 Cir. 2006) th

(citing Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9 Cir. 1981)). If th

charges are filed, Smiddy protects the officers unless evidence

shows that officers interfered with the prosecutor’s judgment in

some way, by omitting relevant information, by including false

information, or by pressuring the prosecutor to file charges. A

suspect’s account of an incident, by itself, is unlikely to

influence a prosecutor’s decision, and thus it cannot, by itself,

serve as evidence that officers interfered with the prosecutor’s

decision. Newman, — F.3d —, 2006 WL 2241584, -------:

We are hard-pressed to conceive of a malicious

prosecution case in which the plaintiff's version

of events would not conflict with the arresting

officer’s account. In virtually every case, then,

the presumption would be rebutted, and it would

never limit the liability of the officer, contrary

to its stated purpose.

Newman, — F.3d —, 2006 WL 2241584, -------. 

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Plaintiffs argue Hartman v. Moore, 126 S.Ct. 1695 (2006),

relieved Plaintiffs of the burden to produce evidence other than

their own account of events to avoid summary judgment. Doc. 89,

Pls.’ Further Briefing, 5. Plaintiffs misread Hartman. Hartman

only holds that absence of probable cause is an element of a

Bivens retaliatory prosecution claim that must be pleaded and

proved. Hartman, 126 S.Ct. at 1707 (a plaintiff . . . must show

that the nonprosecuting official acted in retaliation, and must

also show that he induced the prosecutor to bring charges that

would not have been initiated without his urging). Hartman did

not change the elements of malicious prosecution under California

law. This helps to explain why Newman “fail[ed] to even cite”

Hartman. Doc. 89, Pls.’ Further Briefing, 5. 

Plaintiffs argue:

Even if . . . Newman is construed to require a

plaintiff to present more than his own

contradictory testimony to overcome the

presumption of prosecutorial independence, the

record before the [c]ourt contains substantial

evidence in this regard. 

Id. Plaintiffs adduce “the testimony of Reyna Muro, their expert

witnesses, photographs of the incident scene indicating [] the

officers’ varied account[s] are implausible, and . . . the

contradictory accounts of the [D]efendant officers themselves” as

additional corroborating evidence. Id., 5-6.

a. The Defendant Officers’ Reports

Plaintiffs allege Cancio and Villalvazo submitted false

reports of the incident to the prosecutor to influence the

prosecutor to file criminal charges against Plaintiff Muro. Doc.

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77-1, Mem. in Opp., 33. Plaintiffs claim the false reports were

submitted to the prosecutor as part of the complaint filing

process. Technically, Plaintiffs do not refer to specific

evidence that confirms the Defendant officers’ reports were

relied on by the prosecutor who filed the complaints charging

Plaintiffs. 

 

b. The Defendant Officers’ Depositions

As evidence that Defendants Cancio and Villalvazo improperly

influenced the prosecutor to file criminal charges against

Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs adduce the deposition testimony of these

officers, which Plaintiffs allege “wildly diverg[es],” Doc. 78,

RSUF, 56, from their reports of the incident. Doc. 89, Pls.’

Further Briefing, 6 (“the contradictory accounts of the

[D]efendant officers themselves, not only in their reports, but

in their depositions”). 

The depositions could not have influenced the prosecutor to

file criminal charges against Plaintiffs, because they were not

taken until after the criminal charges were dismissed. They are

not by themselves evidence of improper influence by Cancio or

Villalvazo. Newman, — F.3d —, 2006 WL 2241584, ------- (citing

Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9 Cir. 1986)). If th

Cancio’s and Villalvazo’s deposition accounts of the incident

differ from their reports, this could constitute evidence that

they did not accurately describe the incident in the reports. 

See, e.g., Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1390 & n.6 (9th

Cir. 1988). These contradictory facts are enough to raise

question whether the information the prosecutor received was

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intentionally false, however, because the nolo pleas do not

unconditionally establish Muro’s innocence, Defendant Officers

are entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution

claim. 

C. Excessive Force

The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer’s

use of reasonable force during an arrest. The first inquiry in

analyzing excessive force claims is whether the officers’ actions

were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting them. The facts underlying an

excessive force claim are considered from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene, without regard to the arresting

officer’s subjective motivation for using force. Whether a

particular use of force was objectively reasonable depends on

several factors, including the severity of the crime that

prompted the use of force, the threat posed by a suspect to the

police or to others, and whether the suspect was resisting

arrest. Tatum v. City and County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d

1090, 1095 (9 Cir. 2006). th

1. Defendant Cancio 

a. Actions taken toward Plaintiff Muro

It is undisputed that Defendant Cancio tasered Plaintiff

Muro, temporarily paralyzing him and causing him to fall to the

ground. Doc. 78, RSUF ##48-54. 

According to Defendants, Plaintiff Muro obstructed Defendant

Simpson’s attempt to serve a lawful arrest warrant by blocking

the front doorway of the residence, preventing Defendant Simpson

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from entering. Doc. 68, Mot. for Summ. J., 4. Plaintiff Muro

refused Defendant Simpson’s request to allow Defendant Simpson

entry to the residence, and ignored Defendant Simpson’s warning

that he would arrest Plaintiff Muro if Plaintiff Muro did not

comply. Id. Plaintiff Muro violently resisted Defendant

Simpson’s subsequent attempt to arrest Plaintiff Muro. Id.

Defendant Cancio, coming to the aid of Defendant Simpson, warned

Plaintiff Muro to stop resisting or Defendant Cancio would taser

Plaintiff Muro. Id., 5. When Plaintiff Muro ignored Defendant

Cancio’s order to stop resisting, Defendant Cancio tasered

Plaintiff Muro. Id. 

Plaintiff Muro alleges he never resisted the officers; he

tried to comply with Defendant Simpson’s request to allow him

entry to the residence but the porch was too narrow to allow him

to do so; Defendant Simpson attacked him without reason; and

Defendant Cancio unreasonably tasered him when he was not

resisting. See Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9 Cir. th

2001) (“where there is no need for force, any force used is

constitutionally unreasonable”) (emphasis in original). Doc. 1,

Compl., ¶ 9; Doc. 78, RSUF ##39-45. 

There is a genuine issue of material fact whether Plaintiff

Muro was resisting arrest when Defendant Cancio tasered Plaintiff

Muro, and thus whether Defendant Cancio’s use of force against

Plaintiff Muro was necessary and reasonable under the

circumstances. Cancio’s motion as to Muro is DENIED.

b. Against Plaintiff Zamora

The complaint does not allege Defendant Cancio used any

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force against Plaintiff Zamora. Doc. 1, Compl., ¶¶ 11-12. The

complaint alleges while Defendant Cancio tasered Plaintiff Muro,

other MAGEC officers “yanked [Plaintiff Zamora] . . . out of the

house, off the porch, and thr[ew] [him] on to his knees. One of

the defendant officers then grabbed [P]laintiff Zamora’s arm and

twisted it behind his back and put him in a choke hold.” Id.,

¶ 11. The allegation that Defendant Cancio was present during

the alleged application of force against Plaintiff Zamora is not

sufficient to raise an issue of material fact regarding any

Section 1983 liability he may have for the application of force

on Plaintiff Zamora. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 939

(9 Cir. 2002) (“[w]e reject the idea that mere presence at a th

search or membership in a group, without personal involvement in

and a causal connection to the unlawful act, can create liability

under [S]ection 1983"). Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of

Defendant Cancio against Plaintiff Zamora regarding Section 1983

liability for excessive force. 

2. Defendant Villalvazo

a. Actions taken toward Plaintiff Muro

The complaint does not allege Defendant Villalvazo used any

force on Plaintiff Muro. Defendant Villalvazo conceded in

deposition testimony that he used his oleoresin capsicum spray on

Plaintiff Muro when Plaintiff Muro was prone on the ground after

being tasered by Defendant Cancio, but claims it malfunctioned. 

Doc. 77-1, Mem. in Opp., 16 (citing Villalvazo Dep., 25, 34); see

also Doc. 78, RSUF #90. Defendant Villalvazo also handcuffed

Plaintiff Muro. Id. (citing Villalvazo Dep., 31-32); see also

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Doc. 78, RSUF #90.

The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer’s

use of reasonable force during an arrest. The first inquiry in

analyzing excessive force claims is whether the officers’ actions

were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting them. The facts underlying an

excessive force claim are considered from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene, without regard to the arresting

officer’s subjective motivation for using force. Whether a

particular use of force was objectively reasonable depends on

several factors, including the severity of the crime that

prompted the use of force, the threat posed by a suspect to the

police or to others, and whether the suspect was resisting

arrest. Tatum v. City and County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d

1090, 1095 (9 Cir. 2006). th

LaLonde v. City of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947 (9 Cir. 2000), th

holds when an arrestee surrenders and is helpless, “any

reasonable officer would know that a continued use of [pepper

spray] . . . constitutes excessive force.” LaLonde, 204 F.3d at

960-61. 

Plaintiffs have raised an issue of material fact regarding

whether there was a necessity for Defendant Villalvazo to use

force and if he used reasonable force in spraying, handcuffing,

and arresting Plaintiff Muro. Plaintiffs claim Plaintiff Muro

never resisted the officers, and was rendered helpless by

Defendant Cancio’s taser when he was OC sprayed by Defendant

Villalvazo. Defendant Villalvazo’s motion for summary judgment 

against Plaintiff Muro on the excessive force claim is DENIED. 

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b. Actions taken toward Plaintiff Zamora

The complaint does not allege Defendant Villalvazo used any

force against Plaintiff Zamora. Doc. 1, Compl., ¶¶ 11-12. 

Plaintiffs argue:

[Defendants’] presence, acquiescence, and

proximity . . . when, according to Muro and

Zamora, blatantly unreasonable uses of force were

applied, i.e., Simpson’s baton strikes to a prone,

face down Muro and Watson’s choke hold on Zamora,

subjects them to liability for those uses of force

[citations].

Doc. 77-1, Mem. in Opp., 28. 

This argument has already been rejected. See Jones v.

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 939 (9 Cir. 2002) (“[w]e reject the th

idea that mere presence at a search or membership in a group,

without personal involvement in and a causal connection to the

unlawful act, can create liability under [S]ection 1983"). 

Summary judgment in favor of Defendant Villalvazo against

Plaintiff Zamora is GRANTED. 

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendant Officers Cancio and Villalvazo claim entitlement

to qualified immunity. A claim of qualified immunity ordinarily

involves a two-step inquiry: (1) the threshold question, taken in

the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do

the facts alleged show the Officers’ conduct violated a

constitutional right? Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001);

(2) if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the

parties’ submissions, the next sequential step is to ask whether

the right was clearly established.” Id. 

Defendants argue that in an excessive force case, a police

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officer is entitled to qualified immunity where, under the

totality of circumstances, the Officers’ actions were objectively

reasonable. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989). 

Objective reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene, allowing for the fact that

police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions

about the amount of force necessary in a particular situation. 

Id. at 387.

Here, if Mr. Muro’s version of the events is found true, and

the trier of fact finds that he did not resist, attempted to

cooperate, and was neither obstructive nor violent, the use of

force would be unreasonable and qualified immunity unavailable

under a theory of mistake. See, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at

205-206. The same analysis applies to Officer Villalvazo in

attempting to spray and handcuff Mr. Muro. The disputed facts do

not permit a reasonableness determination to be made as a matter

of law and whether Mr. Muro was combative is in dispute. 

The Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the basis of

qualified immunity are DENIED.

E. Monell Liability - City of Fresno

Plaintiffs assert two grounds of municipal liability against

the City:

First, the practices of the Fresno Police

Department permit a warrant containing inaccurate

address information to be repeatedly re-served at

the same location [citation], thus reflecting a

deliberate indifference to the privacy rights of

persons to be secure in their homes under the

Fourth Amendment. . . . [A] warrant service team

does not find out whether the address information

contained in a warrant is incorrect, even if

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multiple prior unsuccessful services have already

been attempted at the same location, until the

team actually makes yet another service attempt at

that residence. [citation]

Doc. 77-1, Mem. in Opp., 33-34. 

The second asserted ground of liability is Plaintiffs’ claim

that the City “does not prohibit or disapprove of choke holds as

part of its use-of-force policy.” Id., 34. “This lack of a

policy clearly contributed to and was a moving force behind the

Fresno police officers on scene condoning the choke hold applied

by [Defendant] Watson.” Id. (emphasis added). 

1. Lack of Warrant Updating System

Liability may attach to a municipality only where the

municipality itself causes the constitutional violation through

execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy. A municipal “policy” exists when a

deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among

various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for

establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in

question. There are three ways to show a policy or custom of a

municipality: (1) by showing a longstanding practice or custom

which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local

government entity; (2) by showing that the decision-making

official was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking

authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy in the area of decision; or (3) by showing that

an official with final policymaking authority either delegated

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that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate. A

municipal policy may be inferred from widespread practices or

evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the

errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded.

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9 Cir. 2005). th

Plaintiffs cite the deposition testimony of FPD Sgt. Jensen,

who testified the lack of a warrant updating system frequently

caused multiple warrant service attempts to be made at the wrong

residences. See Doc. 78, RSUF, 44-45. Sergeant Jensen’s

testimony raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether there existed a “longstanding practice or custom which

constitutes the standard operating procedure of” the City,

without which the warrant service on Ortega would not have been

attempted at the residence. Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1147.

2. City of Fresno - Choke-Hold Policy

Plaintiffs argue the City’s alleged failure to “prohibit or

disapprove of choke holds as part of its use of force policy . .

. clearly contributed to and was a moving force behind the Fresno

police officers on scene condoning the choke hold applied by

[Defendant] Watson.” Doc. 77-1, Mem. in Opp., 34. Plaintiff’s

expert testified that the City’s use of force policies meet

P.O.S.T. standards. There is no evidence the City has a separate

choke-hold policy.

It is undisputed that Defendant Watson is a CHP officer, not

a FPD officer. Doc. 78, RSUF #11; Doc. 1, Compl., ¶ 13. To

sustain a Section 1983 action against a municipality, Plaintiff

must demonstrate that a City policy or custom has caused him

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injury. Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 874 n.10

(9 Cir. 1998) (citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 th

U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978)). Plaintiffs do not allege how any

policy of the City could have prevented Defendant Watson, a CHP

officer, from applying a choke hold to Plaintiff Zamora. Nor do

Plaintiffs allege how the FPD officers’ alleged condonation of

Defendant Watson’s choke hold caused any part of Plaintiff

Zamora’s injury. 

Summary judgment regarding Plaintiffs’ Monell allegations

against the City concerning a lack of a policy for updating stale

or erroneous warrant information in the light of unsuccessful

service attempts is DENIED. Summary judgment regarding

Plaintiffs’ Monell claims regarding the lack of a choke-hold

policy is GRANTED in favor of Defendants against Plaintiffs. 

F. False Arrest

Plaintiffs allege Defendants “violated [P]laintiffs’ rights

under the Fourth Amendment to be free from . . . false arrests.” 

Doc. 1, Compl., ¶ 13.

False imprisonment involves the intentional confinement of

another against the person’s will. The elements are (1) nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without

lawful privilege, (3) for an appreciable period of time, however

brief. 5 Witkin, Summ. of Cal. Law, Torts § 426 (10 ed. 2005) th

(citing Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496

(Cal.App. 1 Dist. 2000)). False imprisonment and false arrest

are not separate torts. Id. 

A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant

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whenever (1) the officer has probable cause to believe the person

to be arrested has committed a public offense in the officer’s

presence, (2) the person arrested has committed a felony, though

not in the officer’s presence, (3) the officer has probable cause

to believe the person to be arrested has committed a felony,

whether or not a felony, in fact, has been committed. Cal. Pen.

Code Section 836(a)(1)-(3). 

Defendants argue:

[Defendant] Simpson initially arrested [Plaintiff]

Muro for a violation of [California Penal Code

Section] 148(a)(1) for willfully resisting,

delaying, or obstructing a peace officer in the

discharge or attempt to discharge [sic] his

duties. After [Defendant] Simpson informed

[Plaintiff] Muro [] he was under arrest,

[Defendant] Cancio observed [] [Defendant] Simpson

was having difficulty trying to handcuff

[Plaintiff] Muro to place him in custody.

[Defendant] Cancio saw [Plaintiff] Muro struggling

with [Defendant] Simpson and reasonably believed

[] [Plaintiff] Muro was resisting [Defendant]

Simpson in the performance of his duties by using

force and violence, a felony under [California

Penal Code Section] 69. During the course of this

struggle, [Defendant] Cancio reasonably believed

[Plaintiff] Muro committed a battery on

[Defendant] Simpson by slamming him into a wall,

in violation of [California Penal Code Section]

243(b). [Defendant] Cancio’s assistance in

effectuating the arrest occurred only after

[Defendant] Simpson had already instructed

[Plaintiff] Muro that he was under arrest. [¶]

Under [California Penal Code Section] 836(a)(1)-

(3), [Defendant] Cancio was reasonably in his

belief that based on his observations it was

probable [] [Plaintiff] Muro had committed a crime

in his presence. Specifically, it appeared []

[Plaintiff] Muro used violence against [Defendant]

Simpson, a felony, whether or not a felony had

actually been committed. [¶] [Defendant]

Villalvazo’s only participation in placing

[Plaintiff] Muro in custody was that he put

handcuffs on [Plaintiff] Muro. [When] [Defendant]

Villalvazo placed handcuffs on [Plaintiff] Muro,

[Defendant] Villalvazo reasonably believed []

[Plaintiff] Muro was lawfully under arrest. 

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Doc. 68, Mot. for Summ. J., 8. Defendants further state: “[i]t

is undisputed that neither [Defendant] Cancio nor [Defendant]

Villalvazo played any role in effectuating the arrest of

Plaintiff [] Zamora. Thus, neither officer . . . can be held

liable for the alleged wrongful arrest of [Plaintiff] Zamora.” 

Id. 

Given the dispute over the circumstances of Muro’s claimed

resistance (defendants) or cooperation with the Officers, the

material facts surrounding the probable cause for his arrest are

in dispute. Defendants’ motion as to Muro as to the false arrest

claim is DENIED. There is no evidence that either Defendant

participated in Zamora’s arrest. Defendants’ motion for the

alleged false arrest of Zamora is GRANTED.

G. Zamora Claims of Emotional Distress, Reputation Damages and

Impaired Familial and Interpersonal Relations

Plaintiff Zamora admitted in his deposition that he does not

claim emotional distress or related damages to reputation or

interpersonal or familial relations. Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment as to these damages claims is GRANTED.

 

VI. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated above, Defendant Cancio and

Defendant Villalvazo’s motions for summary judgment are:

1. As to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim, GRANTED;

2. As to the malicious prosecution claim, GRANTED as to

both Defendants against both Plaintiffs;

3. As to the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim of

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Plaintiff, Muro; DENIED as to Defendant Cancio; DENIED as to

Defendant Villalvazo;

4. As to the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim of

Plaintiff Zamora, GRANTED as to Defendant Cancio, GRANTED as to

Defendant Villalvazo;

5. As to Plaintiff Muro’s Fourth Amendment false arrest

claim, DENIED as to Officer Cancio, DENIED as to Defendant

Villalvazo;

6. As to Plaintiff Zamora’s Fourth Amendment false arrest

claim, GRANTED as to Officer Cancio, GRANTED as to Defendant

Villalvazo;

7. As to Plaintiffs’ qualified immunity claims, DENIED as

to Defendant Cancio, DENIED as to Defendant Villalvazo;

8. As to the Monell liability claims against the City of

Fresno: 

a. As to the lack of arrest warrant updating system,

DENIED as to the City of Fresno;

b. As to the alleged choke-hold policy, GRANTED as to

Defendant City;

9. As to Plaintiff Zamora’s claims of emotional distress,

reputation, damages and impaired familial and interpersonal

relations damages, GRANTED as to Defendant Cancio, GRANTED as to

Defendant Villalvazo.

SO ORDERED

DATED: August 30, 2006.

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

____________________________

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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