Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01239/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01239-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESUS MARTINEZ,

Reg. No. A095-795-978,

Civil No. 14CV1239 JLS (JLB)

Plaintiff, ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION

TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS; (2) DENYING MOTION

TO APPOINT COUNSEL; AND (3)

DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO

EFFECT SERVICE OF SUMMONS

AND COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3)

(ECF Nos. 2 and 3.)

vs.

C/O NOBLAZA; C/O REID;

C/O HAYNES; C/O KITCHEN;

C/O PABLO; C/O VALLES;

C/O BURCIAGA; C/O FUENTES,

Defendants.

Jesus Martinez (“Plaintiff”), a former immigration detainee at the San Diego

Correctional Facility (“CCA”) in San Diego, and proceeding pro se, initiated this civil

action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Names Agents of the Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 42 U.S.C. § 1983/1985(3), and the Equal Access to

Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1), while he was detained at CCA. (Complaint 1, ECF 

No. 1.)

Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee required to commence a civil action; instead,

he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) He also filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). (ECF No. 3.) 

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus must pay a filing fee of

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 1

prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).

However, “[u]nlike other indigent litigants, prisoners proceeding IFP must pay the

full amount of filing fees in civil actions and appeals” pursuant to the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”). Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2002). As defined

by the PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is

accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). Under this definition, “an alien detained

by the INS pending deportation is not a ‘prisoner’ within the meaning of the PLRA,”

because deportation proceedings are civil, rather than criminal in nature, and an alien

detained pending deportation has not necessarily been “accused of, convicted of,

sentenced or adjudicated delinquent for, a violation of criminal law.” Agyeman, 296

F.3d at 886. 

When he filed his Complaint, Plaintiff was an “immigration detainee in civil

proceedings” and detained at the CCA. See Compl. at 2, 5. Therefore, because Plaintiff

is not a “prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), the filing fee provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b) do not apply to him. See Agyeman, 296 F.3d 885-86 (finding that

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after

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May 1, 2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

(Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule) (eff. May 1,

2013). However, the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is

granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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PLRA’s filing fee requirements “do not apply to an alien detainee who proceeds in forma

pauperis . . . , so long as he does not also face criminal charges.”).

Accordingly, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets and finds it is

sufficient to show that he is unable to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain

this action. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP.

MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

Plaintiff also requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this

civil action because he is indigent, was in custody at the time his case was filed, and

therefore had limited access to the law library. (Mot. to Appt. Counsel 1, ECF No. 3.)

Plaintiff also alleges he requireslegal assistance conducting discovery, and that his case

“will likely involve conflicting testimony,” and that trained counsel would be better

equipped to cross-examine his witnesses. (Id. at 2.) 

There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. of

Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),

district courts have discretion to “request” that an attorney represent an indigent civil

litigant. Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). This

discretion is generally exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see also

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional

circumstances requires “an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the

merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn

v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

At this preliminary stage of the proceedings, the Court declines to exercise its

discretion under § 1915(e)(1), and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion without prejudice. As

explained below, Plaintiff appears capable of articulating the factual basis for his claims

and the legal basis for them does not appear particularly complex. Id. Moreover, while

the Court finds his Complaint sufficient to survive the mandatory screening required by

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the likelihood of Plaintiff’s ultimate success on the merits is not

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yet clear. Id. Finally, Plaintiff’s release from custody has relieved him from some of the

obstacles of litigation which are necessarily inherent in a custodial setting. See, e.g.,

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting the “unique

handicaps of incarceration” faced by pro se prisoner litigants). 

Therefore, the Court finds that neither the interests of justice nor any exceptional

circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d

622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

1. Standard of Review

A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP issubject to sua sponte dismissal

if it contains claims which are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or if it “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845,

845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to

dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claimshowing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

2. Analysis

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges eight CCA correctional officers, employed by

the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division of the U.S. Department of

Homeland Security (“ICE”), failed to intervene as he was “physically assaulted and

brutalized” by two fellow inmates in their presence on September 9, 2013. (Complaint

4, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff further claims Defendants used excessive force while cuffing

him after the attack, conspired to charge him with wrongdoing, and otherwise retaliated

against him by denying him medical treatment, food, a shower, and access to the library

based on his sexual orientation and because he exercised his First Amendment right to

petition for redress via the “prison grievance system.” (Id. at 4–8.) Plaintiff seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 2

9.)

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficient to state

claims for relief which are “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Therefore, because Plaintiff has been granted leave to

proceed IFP, it will order U.S. Marshal service upon Defendants on Plaintiff’s behalf. 

See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall

issue and serve all process, and performall dutiesin [IFP] cases.”); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3)

(providing that “service be effected by a United States marshal, deputy United States

Because Plaintiff has filed a change of address indicating he is no longer in 2

custody at CCA (ECF Doc. No. 5.), his claims for injunctive relief may be moot. See

Hartmann v. Cal. Dept. of Corrs. and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1119 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013).

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marshal, or other officer specially appointed by the court . . . when the plaintiff is

authorized to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED

without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue a

summons asto Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1.) upon the Defendants and will forward

it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each Defendant. In 3

addition, the Clerk shall provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order and a

certified copy of his Complaint and summons so that he may serve each Defendant. 

Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff is directed to complete the Form 285s as

completely and accurately as possible, and to return them to the United States Marshal

according to the instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP

package. The U.S. Marshal is thereafter directed to serve a copy of the Complaint and

summons upon Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s. All costs of

service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(c)(3).

Defendants are thereafter ORDERED to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint within the

time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a).4

See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to “waive

Because Plaintiff alleges Defendants are federal officers employed by ICE, see

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Compl. at 2-4, he must also serve the United States. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1), (3). The

Clerk is hereby directed to include in Plaintiff’s IFP package two separate copies of this

Order, summons, Plaintiff’s Complaint, and additional blank USM Form 285s for

Plaintiff’s use in serving the United States via the United States Attorney for the

Southern District of California and the Attorney General of the United States in

Washington, D.C. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(A)(i), (B).

Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is 4

cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a

defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D.

Cal. 2007). 

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the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and thus, has made a preliminary

determination based on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a “reasonable

opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant is required to respond). 

Plaintiff must serve upon the Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by

counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document

submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiff must also include with the original

paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in which a

true and correct copy of any document filed was also served on Defendants, or counsel

for Defendants, and the date ofsuch service. Any paper received by the Court which has

not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a Certificate of Service will be

disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 7, 2014

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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