Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-05373/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-05373-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT TREVINO, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

E. DOTSON, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No.15-cv-05373-PJH 

ORDER OF SERVICE 

Re: Dkt. No. 20 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. The first amended complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff has 

filed a second amended complaint. 

DISCUSSION 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners 

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and 

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not 

necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim 

is and the grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) 

Case 4:15-cv-05373-PJH Document 21 Filed 09/22/16 Page 1 of 10
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

(citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed 

factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] 

to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme 

Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal 

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 

allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

LEGAL CLAIMS 

Plaintiff was found guilty of a prison disciplinary violation for assault on another 

inmate with a weapon capable of causing serious physical injury. The disciplinary finding 

arose from a July 15, 2011, incident where plaintiff fought with another inmate. Plaintiff 

admits that he fought with the other inmate but denies using a weapon. He presents four 

causes of action. He argues that 1) his due process rights were violated with respect to 

the disciplinary hearing; 2) defendants engaged in a conspiracy to frame him and find him 

guilty; 3) several defendants framed him in retaliation for a previously filed civil rights 

action; and 4) his inmate appeals were improperly denied and he was denied access to 

the courts. Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) at ¶¶ 62-117. 

1. Due Process 

Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources: the 

Case 4:15-cv-05373-PJH Document 21 Filed 09/22/16 Page 2 of 10
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 

223-27 (1976). Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an 

unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are 

authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations 

authorized by state law that are less severe or more closely related to the expected terms 

of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty 

interest, provided that (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly restrict the power of 

prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give the inmate a kind of right to avoid it, 

and (2) the liberty in question is one of "real substance." See id. at 477-87. 

Allegations by a prisoner that he was denied due process in conjunction with a 

disciplinary proceeding do not present a constitutionally cognizable claim, however, 

unless the deprivation suffered is one of "real substance" as defined in Sandin. "Real 

substance" will generally be limited to freedom from (1) restraint that imposes "atypical 

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," 

id. at 484 or (2) state action that "will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence," id. at 

487. In determining whether a restraint is an “atypical and significant hardship,” Sandin

suggests that courts should consider whether the challenged condition mirrored the 

conditions imposed on inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody, and 

thus comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; the duration of the condition; the 

degree of restraint imposed; and whether the discipline will invariably affect the duration 

of the prisoner's sentence. See Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Prisoners retain their right to due process subject to the restrictions imposed by 

the nature of the penal system. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Thus 

although prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full 

panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply, where serious 

rules violations are alleged and the sanctions to be applied implicate state statutes or 

regulations which narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the sanctions 

and the sanctions are severe, the Due Process Clause requires certain minimum 

Case 4:15-cv-05373-PJH Document 21 Filed 09/22/16 Page 3 of 10
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

procedural protections. See id. at 556-57, 571-72 n.19. 

Wolff established five procedural requirements. First, "written notice of the 

charges must be given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the 

charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense." Wolff, 418 U.S. 

at 564. Second, "[a]t least a brief period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, 

should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the [disciplinary 

committee]." Id. Third, "there must be a 'written statement by the factfinders as to the 

evidence relied on and reasons' for the disciplinary action." Id. (quoting Morrissey v. 

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). Fourth, "the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings 

should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense 

when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or 

correctional goals." Id. at 566; Fifth, "[w]here an illiterate inmate is involved . . . or 

[where] the complexity of the issue makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect 

and present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case, he 

should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or . . . to have adequate substitute aid . . 

. from the staff or from a[n] . . . inmate designated by the staff." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Hopkins, Lord and Waterman violated his due 

process rights with respect to the disciplinary hearing. SAC at ¶ 62. Liberally construed, 

his allegations are sufficient to proceed against Hopkins, Lord and Waterman. 

2. Conspiracy 

A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons who, by some 

concerted action, intend to accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of 

harming another which results in damage. Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 

856 (9th Cir. 1999). To prove a civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must show that the 

conspiring parties reached a unity of purpose or common design and understanding, or a 

meeting of the minds in an unlawful agreement. Id. To be liable, each participant in the 

conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least 

share the common objective of the conspiracy. Id. A defendant's knowledge of and 

Case 4:15-cv-05373-PJH Document 21 Filed 09/22/16 Page 4 of 10
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and from 

evidence of the defendant's actions. Id. at 856-57. 

Plaintiff argues that prison officials planted the weapon as part of a conspiracy, 

falsified records and fingerprints, and medical staff falsified injuries on the other inmate 

and corresponding medical reports. Liberally construed, this claim is sufficient to proceed 

against defendants Dotson, Ambriz, Vega, Augiana, Collier, Elias, Mendoza, Milenewicz, 

Perez, Lord, Waterman, Keku, Sevier, Hopkins, Doss and Medina. SAC at ¶¶ 72-73. 

3. Retaliation 

"Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five 

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an 

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). Accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison officials under § 1983 for retaliation must allege that he 

was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action 

did not advance legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and 

discipline); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (same). 

Plaintiff states that several defendants engaged in their actions in retaliation for a 

previously filed civil rights complaint. The fight in this case occurred on July 15, 2011, 

and the disciplinary hearing occurred on March 21, 2012, both at Salinas Valley State 

Prison. Plaintiff argues that the retaliation originated in 2005 at the Substance Abuse 

Treatment Facility when he was set up by prison officials and assaulted by his cellmate. 

SAC at ¶ 36. He filed a federal civil rights action in 2005. Plaintiff also describes 

retaliation that occurred at other prisons outside this district in 2005 to 2006 and 2008 to 

2010. Id. at ¶¶ 37-45. 

Despite being provided leave to amend on multiple occasions, plaintiff has still 

failed to describe how defendants in this case retaliated against him. He states that the 

Case 4:15-cv-05373-PJH Document 21 Filed 09/22/16 Page 5 of 10
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

weapon was planted on him and he was illegally found guilty all in retaliation. However, 

plaintiff has failed to present allegations that these actions were because of his prior civil 

rights actions. Nor has he described how the disciplinary finding did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal, especially as plaintiff admits he was fighting 

another inmate. Plaintiff presents no allegations that any of the defendants were even 

aware of plaintiff’s civil rights actions involving other prisons in different district that were 

filed many years before. While he has presented allegations of due process violations 

and conspiracy, which the court will serve, he has failed to present plausible allegations 

that the acts were in retaliation for any protected conduct. His conclusory allegations are 

insufficient. Because plaintiff has already been provided several opportunities to amend, 

this claim is dismissed with prejudice. 

4. Inmate Appeals 

 There is no constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal or grievance 

system. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s claim that his inmate appeals were improperly 

denied was dismissed with prejudice in the prior screening order. 

5. Access to the Courts 

 Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 

518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). To establish a 

claim for any violation of the right of access to the courts, the prisoner must prove that 

there was an inadequacy in the prison's legal access program that caused him an actual 

injury. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350-55. To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show 

that the inadequacy in the prison's program hindered his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous 

claim concerning his conviction or conditions of confinement. See id. at 354-55 

Plaintiff argues that he was denied access to the courts with respect to inmate 

appeals and state and federal cases. Liberally construed, this claim is sufficient to 

proceed against defendant Medina with respect to denial of access to the courts for his 

cases concerning his conviction or conditions of confinement. SAC at ¶ 97. 

Case 4:15-cv-05373-PJH Document 21 Filed 09/22/16 Page 6 of 10
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

CONCLUSION 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to file a lengthy amended complaint (Docket No. 20) is 

GRANTED and the court has considered the second amended complaint. Plaintiff’s 

claims regarding retaliation and the denial of inmate appeals are dismissed with prejudice 

for the reasons set forth above. The remaining claims continue as described above. 

2. The clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, 

without prepayment of fees, copies of the second amended complaint with attachments 

and copies of this order on the following defendants at Salinas Valley State Prison: B. 

Hopkins, P. Lord, W. Waterman, E. Medina, E. Dotson, D. Ambriz, D. Vega, D. Aguiano, 

G. Collier, E. Elias, A. Mendoza, S. Milenewicz, M. Perez, W. Keku, C. Sevier and Doss. 

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the court orders as follows: 

 a. No later than sixty days from the date of service, defendants shall file a 

motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported 

by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56, and shall include as exhibits all records and incident reports 

stemming from the events at issue. If defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be 

resolved by summary judgment, she shall so inform the court prior to the date her 

summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the court shall be promptly served 

on the plaintiff. 

 b. At the time the dispositive motion is served, defendants shall also serve, 

on a separate paper, the appropriate notice or notices required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 

F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 

n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003). See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940-941 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rand

and Wyatt notices must be given at the time motion for summary judgment or motion to 

dismiss for nonexhaustion is filed, not earlier); Rand at 960 (separate paper requirement). 

 c. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, shall be filed with 

the court and served upon defendants no later than thirty days from the date the motion 

was served upon him. Plaintiff must read the attached page headed "NOTICE -- 

Case 4:15-cv-05373-PJH Document 21 Filed 09/22/16 Page 7 of 10
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WA

95

19

exh

pla

(EX

11

fifte

du

def

do

Pro

req

info

“No

fas

pu

Da

\\can

ARNING," w

4 (9th Cir. 1

88). 

If defen

haust his a

aintiff should

XHAUSTIO

08, 1120 n

een days a

e. No hear

4. All c

fendant’s c

cument to d

5. Disc

ocedure. N

quired befo

6. It is

ormed of a

otice of Cha

shion. Failu

rsuant to F

IT IS S

ated: Septe

ndoak.cand.circ9

which is pro

1998) (en b

ndants file a

vailable ad

d take note

ON)," which 

. 4 (9th Cir.

d. If defen

after the opp

e. The mo

ring will be 

communica

counsel onc

defendants

covery may

No further c

re the parti

s plaintiff's r

ny change 

ange of Ad

ure to do so

ederal Rule

SO ORDER

mber 22, 20

9.dcn\data\users

ovided to hi

banc), and K

a motion fo

ministrative

e of the atta

is provided

. 2003). 

dant wishe

position is s

otion shall b

held on the

ations by pla

ce counsel h

s or defenda

y be taken i

ourt order u

es may con

responsibilit

of address 

dress.” He

o may resul

e of Civil Pr

RED. 

016 

\PJHALL\_psp\2

8

im pursuan

Klingele v. 

or summary

e remedies 

ached page 

d to him as 

es to file a re

served upon

be deemed 

e motion un

aintiff with t

has been d

ants' couns

in accordan

under Fede

nduct disco

ty to prosec

by filing a s

e also must 

lt in the dism

rocedure 41

2015\2015_05373

nt to Rand v

Eikenberry

y judgment 

as required

 headed "N

required by

eply brief, h

n her. 

submitted a

nless the co

the court m

designated, 

sel. 

nce with the

eral Rule of

overy. 

cute this ca

separate pa

comply wit

missal of th

1(b). 

PH

Un

3_Trevino_v_Do

v. Rowland,

y, 849 F.2d 

claiming th

d by 42 U.S

NOTICE -- W

y Wyatt v. T

he shall do 

as of the da

ourt so orde

must be serv

by mailing 

e Federal R

f Civil Proce

ase. Plainti

aper with th

th the court

his action fo

HYLLIS J. H

nited States

otson_(PSP)\15-c

, 154 F.3d 9

409, 411-1

at plaintiff f

S.C. § 1997

WARNING 

Terhune, 3

so no later

ate the repl

ers at a late

ved on defe

 a true copy

Rules of Civ

edure 30(a)

ff must kee

he clerk hea

t's orders in

or failure to 

HAMILTON

s District Ju

cv-05373-PJH-se

952, 953-

2 (9th Cir. 

failed to 

7e(a), 

15 F.3d 

r than 

ly brief is 

er date. 

endant, or 

y of the 

vil 

)(2) is 

ep the court

aded 

n a timely 

prosecute 

N

udge 

erve.docx 

t

Case 4:15-cv-05373-PJH Document 21 Filed 09/22/16 Page 8 of 10
9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

NOTICE -- WARNING (SUMMARY JUDGMENT) 

 If defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to have your case 

dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

 Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary 

judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue 

of material fact--that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the 

result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion 

for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set 

out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated 

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendant’s 

declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for 

trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if 

appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will 

be dismissed and there will be no trial. 

NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION) 

If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust, they are 

seeking to have your case dismissed. If the motion is granted it will end your case. 

You have the right to present any evidence you may have which tends to show that you 

did exhaust your administrative remedies. Such evidence may be in the form of 

declarations (statements signed under penalty of perjury) or authenticated documents, 

that is, documents accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and 

why they are authentic, or other sworn papers, such as answers to interrogatories or 

depositions. If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust and it 

is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. 

Case 4:15-cv-05373-PJH Document 21 Filed 09/22/16 Page 9 of 10
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

R

E

Dis

pla

dep

rec

Ro

Sal

P.O

Sol

Da

OBERT TR

v. 

. DOTSON, 

I, the un

strict Court, 

That on

acing said co

positing said

ceptacle loca

bert Trevin

linas Valley

O. Box 1050

ledad, CA 9

ated: Septem

REVINO, 

Plaintiff, 

et al., 

Defendants

ndersigned, 

Northern Di

n September 

opy(ies) in a 

d envelope in

ated in the Cl

o ID: J-6436

State Prison

0

3960 

mber 22, 2016

 

UNITED

NORTHER

s. 

hereby certi

istrict of Cal

22, 2016, I 

postage paid

n the U.S. M

lerk's office.

67 

n D4-#130L

6

10

D STATES D

RN DISTRIC

fy that I am 

lifornia. 

SERVED a 

d envelope a

Mail, or by pla

.

Su

Cl

By

N

H

0

DISTRICT C

CT OF CALI

Case No. 1

CERTIFIC

an employe

true and cor

addressed to 

acing said co

usan Y. Soon

lerk, United

y:_________

Nichole Peric

Honorable PH

COURT 

IFORNIA 

15-cv-05373

CATE OF S

ee in the Offi

rrect copy(ie

the person(s

opy(ies) into

ng 

d States Distr

___________

c, Deputy Cle

HYLLIS J. H

3-PJH 

SERVICE 

ice of the Cl

es) of the atta

s) hereinafte

o an inter-off

rict Court 

_______ 

erk to the 

HAMILTON

erk, U.S. 

ached, by 

er listed, by 

ffice delivery

N

y

Case 4:15-cv-05373-PJH Document 21 Filed 09/22/16 Page 10 of 10