Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03026/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03026-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE RAMIREZ, 

Petitioner,

 v.

WARDEN S. FRAVENHEIM, 

Respondent. 

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No. C 14-3026 RMW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the petition

should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer addressing the merits of the petition. 

Petitioner has filed a traverse. Having reviewed the briefs and the underlying record, the court

concludes that petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the claims presented and DENIES the

petition.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged and convicted by a jury of two counts of rape and two counts of

simple kidnapping. The trial court sentenced petitioner to a total term of 30 years to life in state

prison, and stayed a separate term of 16 years for the simple kidnapping convictions. On appeal,

the California Court of Appeal reversed one kidnapping conviction, and otherwise affirmed the

(),/('

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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judgment. The California Supreme Court denied a petition for review. Petitioner filed the

instant federal habeas petition on July 2, 2014.

At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that the victim, Maria Doe, and petitioner

dated for a few years before Doe decided to end the relationship. (Resp. Ex. C3 (“Op.”) at 2.) 

Sometime thereafter, Doe was at a party in Redwood City, and petitioner was also in attendance. 

(Id.) Petitioner physically forced Doe into a truck, and petitioner instructed the driver, Daniel

Moreno, to “take off fast.” (Id.) They drove to a secluded location near Pleasanton, and

petitioner and Doe argued. (Id.) Petitioner also hit Doe and pulled her hair. (Id.) When the

truck finally stopped, it was around 10:00 p.m. (Id.) Petitioner and Doe got out of the truck and

petitioner told Moreno to leave. (Id.) Petitioner dragged Doe from the roadside and raped her. 

(Id.) Petitioner called Moreno to return to pick them up. (Id.) Moreno drove them to his house

in Palo Alto. (Id.) While Doe was crying in the back seat, Moreno and petitioner laughed and

turned up the volume on the music. (Id.) Petitioner told Moreno that Doe was paying for what

she did to him. (Id.) After Moreno went home, petitioner told Doe he would take her back

home. (Id.) Instead, petitioner raped Doe again. (Id.) The truck eventually ran out of gas and

Doe asked petitioner to call an ambulance because she felt unwell. (Id. at 2-3.) When

emergency personnel arrived, Doe told them what happened. (Id. at 3.) 

Petitioner testified at trial that Doe voluntarily accompanied him in the truck and they

engaged in consensual sex. (Id.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a district court

may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that

was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

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clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong

applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 384-86 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an

“unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of

§ 2254(d)(1), if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court's decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's

case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. 

In determining whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision

of the highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. 

LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, that decision is the California

Court of Appeal.

B. Petitioner’s Claims

As grounds for federal habeas relief petitioner claims that: (1) the trial court violated

petitioner’s rights by limiting defense counsel’s argument to the jury, and (2) there was

insufficient evidence to support one of the two convictions of simple kidnapping. 

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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As an initial matter, respondent points out that petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence regarding one of the counts of simple kidnapping was raised on direct appeal to the

California Court of Appeal. As a result, the California Court of Appeal reversed that conviction

and thus, petitioner’s current challenge is moot. Petitioner does not dispute that his sufficiency

of the evidence claim is moot. Accordingly, the court DENIES the sufficiency of the evidence

as moot and addresses the remaining claim on the merits.

Petitioner argues that the trial court impermissibly cut short defense counsel’s closing

argument, thereby depriving petitioner the opportunity to be heard through counsel and present

his defense. Specifically, defense counsel was presenting to the jury a story about an unrelated

news event in Florida that involved a false accusation.

The California Court of Appeal summarized these events from trial as follows:

During closing argument, defense counsel attacked Doe’s credibility by

arguing her testimony was not believable; she was testifying against appellant

out of jealousy and a desire for revenge over his relationship with his ex-wife;

she was testifying to obtain a U visa [FN7]; and she was not credible because of

a prior theft conviction. Defense counsel highlighted testimony by a peace

officer testifying for the prosecution, who “to some degree . . . agreed that many

times victims themselves will make false reports of a crime.”

 FN7. The parties stipulated that a U visa is a temporary visa, granted to

allow victims of certain crimes to remain in the United States while their

court cases are pending, which may be converted to legal permanent

residency after three years.

Defense counsel then turned to the following: “In fact, just a few weeks

ago, about three weeks ago, in Tamarac, Florida, the father of a three-year-old

went to his mother-in-law’s home for child visitation. She shot him, but she

called 911 to say that he shot her, and I don’t know how many of you saw this

in the news or heard about it[.]” At that point, the prosecutor asked to approach

the bench and a sidebar was held. Although the sidebar was not reported, the

prosecutor later put on the record her concern with “the recitation of a specific

case that was out of Florida that was in the papers. It’s not within the general

knowledge of the public,” and the trial court stated it had “agree[d] that it was

not permissible, and told [defense counsel] to move on.”

After this sidebar, defense counsel continued his closing statement: “A

certain percentage of rape complaints are classified as unfounded by the police

and excluded from FBI statistics. [¶] In 1995, eight percent of all forcible rape

cases were closed as unfounded as were fifteen percent in 1996 according to

FBI reports. [¶] According to the FBI a report should only be considered

unfounded when investigations reveal that the elements of the crime are not met

or that the report was false. [¶] People do falsely report crimes.”

(Op. at 4.)

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The California Court of Appeal, relying on state law, rejected petitioner’s claim. (Op. at

5-6.) The court noted that petitioner’s complaint in fact was that defense counsel was not

permitted to finish his point about the significance of the Florida case to petitioner’s case. (Id. at

5.) However, the state appellate court noted that the trial court did not strike defense counsel’s

statements, and defense counsel was permitted to make the argument that he intended, which

was that people sometimes falsely report crimes. (Id.) Ultimately, the state appellate court

concluded that the trial court has the discretion to allow attorneys to present information during

closing statements that LV not in evidence to a certain degree, but the court has to be mindful

that such information does not confuse the jury and contain irrelevant facts or unrelated specific

crimes. (Id.)

“[C]losing argument for the defense is a basic element of the adversary factfinding

process in a criminal trial.” Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975). The preclusion of

closing argument in a criminal defense trial violates the defendant’s constitutional rights to

counsel and to present a defense, and constitutes structural constitutional error. Id. at 858, 862-

63, 864-65. But Herring held that the complete denial of summation amounts to structural error;

it did not hold that a restriction on counsel’s closing argument constitutes structural error. Glebe

v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 430-31 (2014) (per curiam) (reversing 9th Circuit because no clearly

established federal law held that structural error exists where petitioner had two legitimate

defenses to criminal charges, but the state trial court only permitted his counsel to argue one

theory in closing) (emphasis added).

Here, although petitioner cites to Herring as the “clearly established Supreme Court law,”

Herring does not address the question of whether a trial court’s restriction, as opposed to a

complete denial, of defense counsel’s closing argument is structural or constitutional error. In

addition, this court cannot find any clearly established Supreme Court law which addresses the

question. Thus, the state court’s decision rejecting petitioner’s argument cannot be contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, see Carey v. Musladin, 549

U.S. 70, 77 (2006), and petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

Alternatively, even assuming that the restriction of counsel’s closing argument was

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constitutional error, petitioner cannot demonstrate that such an error had a substantial or

injurious effect on the verdict. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795-96 (2001) (quoting Brecht

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). As the state appellate court noted, although the trial

court prohibited defense counsel to go into detail about the unrelated Florida case, the trial court

did allow defense counsel to make his point that sometimes people falsely report crimes. 

Defense counsel was able to give statistics about the number of falsely reported rapes cases

according to the FBI, and highlighted a police officer’s testimony who stated that sometimes,

victims make false reports of a crime. Based on the fact that defense counsel was able to present

this theory to the jury, any error in restricting counsel from discussing the unrelated Florida case

further could not have had a substantial or injurious effect on the verdict.

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. 

CONCLUSION 

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district

court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate of appealability (“COA”) in its

ruling. Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that his claims amounted to a denial

of his constitutional rights, or demonstrate that a reasonable jurist would find the denial of his

claims debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a COA

is DENIED.

The clerk shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: _______________ RONALD M. WHYTE 

United States District Judge

Case 5:14-cv-03026-RMW Document 23 Filed 06/02/15 Page 6 of 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

S FRAVENHEIM et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV14-03026 RMW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on June 2, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Jose Ramirez AK-9279

Pleasent Valley State Prison

PO Box 8500

Coalinga, CA 93210

Dated: June 2, 2015

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jackie Lynn Garcia, Deputy Clerk

Case 5:14-cv-03026-RMW Document 23 Filed 06/02/15 Page 7 of 7