Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01684/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01684-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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1

 This action is proceeding on the amended petition filed January 11, 2002.

2

 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth

Appellate District in People v. Peña, No. F028021 (July 26, 1999), a copy of which is attached as

Exhibit D to Respondent’s Answer, filed May 8, 2003.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO PEÑA,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-01-1684 FCD JFM P 

vs.

ANA RAMIREZ PALMER, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1997 conviction on

charges of committing battery a spouse/cohabitor with great bodily injury. Petitioner claims that

his constitutional rights were violated by prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of

counsel, and a conflict of interest.

1

FACTS2

 Consuelo Zapata was married to [petitioner] and he was the

father of three of her children. Zapata divorced [petitioner] in

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 A neighbor, Kelly Sturges, was watching the assault through a window as she talked to

the 911 emergency operator. A transcript of the recording of the telephone conversation was

admitted into evidence when Sturges testified at trial. In relevant part, the transcript states:

“[Sturges]: He’s beatin’ the shit out of her!

“911: We’re on our way.

“[Sturges]: Oh, my God, she’s like lying on the ground. He’s kicking her.

“911: We’re on our way.

“[Sturges]: He’s kicking her in the head!

“911: We’re on our way. OK?

“[Sturges]: OK.”

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1994. In May of 1996, Zapata and [petitioner] began seeing each

other again. On May 31, 1996, [petitioner] went to Zapata’s home

to ask her to let him move in with the family. Zapata rejected the

offer; she told [petitioner] she just wanted “to be friends and just

date each other.”

 [Petitioner] became upset. He told Zapata, “Before I leave, I

have one thing to do.” With a steel-toed shoe [petitioner] then

kicked Zapata “really hard” in the buttock. [Petitioner] tried to

kick Zapata in the stomach but she blocked the blow with her right

hand; the blow to her hand dislocated her finger.

 After pushing Zapata against a fence, [petitioner] pulled a

folding knife from his pocket. As [petitioner] opened the knife,

Zapata grabbed it and threw it over the fence. Zapata tried to

escape but [petitioner] threw her to the ground. He began kicking

her in the torso, arm, face, and head.3 Zapata lost consciousness.

 When Zapata regained consciousness, [petitioner] was crying

and embracing her. He told her, “We’ve got to get back together

for the sake of the children.” Zapata again refused. [Petitioner]

grabbed her by the hair and held her head against the top of a metal

fence. A police officer, Jason Stewart, arrived and ordered

[petitioner] to release Zapata. He did.

 Stewart called for an ambulance for Zapata and arrested

[petitioner]. At the police station, Stewart admonished [petitioner]

pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. [Petitioner]

told Stewart that Zapata attacked him and he pushed her away. He 

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3

said he did not hit Zapata; he said she had the knife and he never

had possession of it.

(People v. Peña, slip op. at 2-3.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

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123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner’s first claim for relief is that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

showing a slide backwards, thereby giving the impression that the victim had sustained injury to

her left upper lip when in fact she had not. This claim was rejected by the Stanislaus Superior

Court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the court did not find evidence of

prosecutorial misconduct, (Respondent’s Ex. N), and summarily denied by the California Court

of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District and the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Exs.

K, L, O and P.) 

At trial, the prosecution offered into evidence People’s Number 14, a slide

showing injuries to the victim’s face. (Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings (RT), at 57.) The

victim testified that the slide showed the appearance of her face after the beating. (Id. at 58.) 

Subsequently, the defense called as a witness Dr. Jose Rodriguez. During cross-examination, the

prosecutor showed Dr. Rodriguez People’s 14 and asked if he had an independent recollection of

the victim’s face after the beating. (Id. at 242-243.) Dr. Rodriguez testified that the victim’s face

had been swollen on the right side, while the exhibit showed swelling on the left side of her face,

at which point the prosecutor noted that the slide was “probably backwards.” (Id. at 243.) At the

court’s direction, the slide was turned around. (Id.)

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Success on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct requires a showing that the

conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987). The conduct must be examined to determine

“whether, considered in the context of the entire trial, that conduct appears likely to have affected

the jury’s discharge of its duty to judge the evidence fairly.” United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d

799, 806 (9th Cir. 1990). Generally, if an error of constitutional magnitude is determined, a

harmless error analysis ensues. Error is considered harmless if the court, after reviewing the

entire trial record, decides that the alleged error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). 

Error is deemed harmless unless it “is of such a character that its natural effect is to prejudice a

litigant's substantial rights.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760-761 (1946). 

The error in showing People’s 14 backwards did not rise to the level of

prosecutorial misconduct. After the error was noticed by petitioner’s witness, Dr. Rodriguez, the

prosecutor apologized and promptly replaced the slide in the correct position. Given the

immediate correction, as well as the extent of the victim’s injuries, there is no possibility that the

misplacement of the slide had any improper effect on the jury’s verdict. Petitioner’s first claim

for relief should be denied. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner’s second claim for relief is that he received constitutionally ineffective

assistance of counsel in connection with testimony concerning where the knife was found. 

Specifically, petitioner contends that his defense counsel failed to object to or otherwise take

steps to discredit the victim’s testimony that she threw the knife over the fence into the street and

that counsel allowed petitioner to perjure himself in his testimony about the knife. This claim

was rejected by the Stanislaus Superior Court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the

ground that the court did not find evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, (Respondent’s Ex. N),

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4

 Respondent asserts that the claim was also summarily rejected by the California

Supreme Court, citing to her Exhibits K and L. The court has reviewed respondent’s Exhibit K

and does not find the present ineffective assistance of counsel claim contained therein. Even if

the claim was not presented to the California Supreme Court, however, it may be denied on the

merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

5

 Petitioner speculates that the jurors might have drawn the conclusion that he was gangaffiliated 

6

 Unexhausted aspects of the claim may be denied on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2).

6

and summarily denied by the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District. 

(Respondent’s Exs. O and P.)4 

Petitioner’s third claim for relief, though styled “Conflict of Interest,” is also a

claim that his counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to object to exhibits offered by the

prosecution; (2) failing to offer a photo exhibit of the left profile of petitioner’s face to

corroborate petitioner’s testimony concerning the extent of his injuries from the fight with the

victim; (3) failing to recall any prosecution witnesses after People’s 14 was found to be

backwards; (4) failing to move for a mistrial; and (5) failing to inform petitioner that several

jurors had seen his mother, who testified at trial, sitting with petitioner’s brother and cousin, who

appeared to be gang members, and had complained to the prosecutor about the appearance of

petitioner’s brother and cousin.5 This claim was summarily denied by the California Court of

Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District. (Respondent’s Exs. O and P.) At least part of the claim

was also summarily denied by the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Exs. K and L.)6 

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must

show two things, an unreasonable error and prejudice flowing from that error. First petitioner

must show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). The court must

determine whether in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside

the wide range of professional competent assistance. Id. at 690. “Review of counsel’s

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performance is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell

within the wide range of reasonable representation.” United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815

F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1986).

Second, petitioner must prove prejudice. Strickland at 693. To demonstrate

prejudice, petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

The focus of the prejudice analysis is on “whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the

result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506

U.S. 364, 372 (1993).

With respect to petitioner’s first contention, the record reflects that Officer

Stewart testified for the prosecution that he had found a knife inside the yard where the victim

was attacked. (RT at 187.) The victim testified that she had taken the knife from petitioner and

thrown it. (Id. at 121-22.) Defense counsel cross-examined the victim concerning discrepancies

between her trial testimony and testimony she had given at the preliminary hearing about what

she had done with the knife. (Id. at 121-123.) Petitioner later testified in his defense that the

victim had “grabbed the knife from [his] hand” and thrown it over the fence. (Id. at 211.) 

Petitioner’s claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to take adequate steps

to discredit the victim based on discrepancies in her testimony about what happened to the knife,

and in allowing petitioner to testify that the victim had thrown the knife over the fence, is without

merit. The alleged acts and omissions did not fall outside the bounds of reasonably competent

professional assistance, nor has petitioner shown any prejudice therefrom. Petitioner’s second

claim for relief should be denied.

With respect to petitioner’s remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,

this court finds that petitioner has failed to show any reasonable probability that the outcome of

his trial would have been different had counsel objected to the prosecutor’s exhibits, offered

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corroborating photographs of petitioner’s injuries, recalled any government witnesses or moved

for a mistrial after People’s 14 was found to be backwards, or taken any steps based on the

alleged juror complaints concerning the appearance of petitioner’s brother and cousin. The

evidence that petitioner caused great bodily injury to his ex-wife during the altercation was

overwhelming and petitioner has not shown that the outcome of his trial would have been

different had counsel’s performance been different in connection with any of the circumstances

cited by petitioner. Petitioner’s third claim for relief should be denied. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 31, 2005.

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pena1684.157

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