Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01828/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01828-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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ORDER, page 1

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MERCY L. REYES,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

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Case No.: C 05-1828 PVT

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S

FEES UNDER THE EAJA

On June 26, 2007, the parties appeared before Magistrate Judge Patricia V. Trumbull for a

hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for award of attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice

Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. §2412(d). Both parties have consented to proceed before a United States

Magistrate Judge. Based on the briefs and arguments submitted,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs

is GRANTED in the amount of $5,769.91 and $266.79 respectively.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this action for Disability Insurance Benefits pursuant to section 205(g) of

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 On June 26, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Second Supplemental Declaration. According to Civil Local 1

Rule 7-3(d), in relevant part, “once a reply is filed, no additional memoranda, papers or letters may be

filed without prior Court approval.” Since Plaintiff’s counsel did not seek Court approval, Plaintiff’s

supplemental declaration will not be considered.

ORDER, page 2

the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §405(g), to obtain review of a final administrative decision of the

Defendant Commissioner of Social Security determining that the Plaintiff did not qualify for

disability benefits. On February 13, 2007 this Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment and remanded the matter for further clarification by the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”). Plaintiff brought the instant motion under the EAJA seeking an award of $5,769.91 in 

attorney’s fees and $266.79 in costs. Defendant opposed the motion on the grounds that his position 1

had been substantially justified and also that the amount of fees requested was unreasonable.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Plaintiff is entitled to fees if this motion was timely, Plaintiff is the prevailing party, and

Defendant’s position was not substantially justified. U.S. v. Rubin, 97 F.3d 373, 375 (9 Cir. 1996). th

A. Timeliness

Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that “[u]nless

otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, the motion must be filed and served no later than

14 days after entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B). In this case, “an EAJA application

may be filed until 30 days after a judgment becomes “not appealable”- i.e., 30 days after the time for

appeal has ended.” Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).

B. Prevailing Party Status

The remand Plaintiff obtained in this case is a sentence four remand under 42 U.S.C.

§405(g). Under the EAJA, a remand under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g) confers prevailing

party status. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300 (1993); Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562 (9 Cir. th

1995).

C. Substantial Justification

Defendant bears the burden of showing that his actions were substantially justified. “Under

the EAJA, courts are required to grant costs and attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party unless the

government can demonstrate that its position was substantially justified.” Andrew v. Bowen, 837

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ORDER, page 3

F.2d 875, 878 (9 Cir. 1988); see also Pacific Fisheries, Inc. v. U.S., 484 F.3d 1103 (9 Cir. 2007); th th

Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9 Cir. 1995). th

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff is Entitled to an Award of Attorney’s Fees

In this case, judgment was entered on March 21, 2007 and the present motion was filed on

April 12, 2007. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion was timely. There is no dispute that Plaintiff is the

prevailing party because Plaintiff obtained a sentence four remand under 42 U.S.C. §405(g). 

As a prevailing party, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees unless the Secretary shows that

his position with respect to the issue on which the court based its remand was “substantially

justified.” Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9 Cir. 1995). In Flores, the remand was based on th

the ALJ’s procedural error. The Ninth Circuit noted that the question of substantial justification

“should have been directed to that procedural error and not to the question of ultimate disability.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit found that “[t]he Secretary’s decision to defend [that] error was not substantially

justified.” Id. at 570. 

In the present case, the issue of substantial justification goes to the procedural error

committed by the ALJ in not articulating his reasons for his credibility findings, and not to the issue

of whether Defendant was substantially justified in denying benefits. Defendant was required to

show that his position in opposing the remand was substantially justified. Defendant did not meet

this burden.

Defendant argues he was substantially justified because: 1) there were inconsistencies in

Plaintiff’s application; 2) this case was remanded only for further specificity by the ALJ; and 3) the

ALJ identified discrepancies in the medical records. 

1. Inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s application were not substantial

justification for opposing remand.

Defendant argues he was substantially justified because there were inconsistencies in

Plaintiff’s application that support the ALJ’s conclusion and would “satisfy a reasonable person.” 

This argument addresses whether Defendant would be substantially justified in denying benefits,

which is not the issue. This argument does not address the question of whether Defendant was

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 Contrary to Defendant’s argument, it is not at all clear what conclusion the ALJ will reach when 2

he applies the correct standard. The court’s examples of evidence that might support the ALJ’s

credibility finding were only intended to be examples of why summary judgment for Plaintiff was not

warranted. The court expects that the ALJ on remand will not simply cut and paste the court’s examples

into his opinion. Instead, the court expects the ALJ to evaluate all the evidence in the record using the

proper standard and come to a well reasoned conclusion. It is premature at this stage to speculate

regarding what the ALJ will ultimately decide. 

ORDER, page 4

substantially justified in opposing remand. 

2. Discrepancies in the medical records were not substantial justification

for opposing remand.

Defendant also argues he was substantially justified based on several discrepancies in

Plaintiff’s medical records. Defendant argues that Plaintiff stopped working because the company

closed down, not because of her impairments. Defendant also lists additional discrepancies as to the

extent of treatment sought and obtained by Plaintiff, and reports of her treating and examining

physicians. Defendant argues that the ALJ’s reasoning, although not specific enough, was not

deficient enough to be unreasonable. Again, Defendant’s arguments address whether benefits should

be denied, not whether Defendant was substantially justified in opposing remand. 

3. The existence of evidence in the administrative record that might

support the ALJ’s credibility findings was not substantial justification

for opposing remand.

 Defendant argues that because this case was remanded only for further specificity, the

outcome will be the same and therefore, he was substantially justified because it is apparent that

benefits should be denied. This reasoning does not address the question of whether Defendant was

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substantially justified in opposing remand.

Defendant relies on Williams v. Bowen, 966 F.2d 1259 (9 Cir. 1991) in arguing that the th

government is substantially justified if there is conflicting evidence that must be weighed in order to

make credibility findings. In the Williams case, the Secretary was substantially justified because

Plaintiff’s psychiatric evidence was ambiguous. Defendant, citing Williams, argues that despite the

ALJ’s poor articulation of his reasons for denying benefits, there was enough evidence to support the

denial of benefits. However, the ambiguity of evidence in Williams is not analogous with the ALJ’s

inadequate articulation of his reasons in the present case. 

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ORDER, page 5

The present case is directly comparable to Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d at 562, in which the

Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary was not substantially justified in defending the ALJ’s

procedural error of not considering a “TEAM report” which would have aided in determining

whether or not the claimant had a disability. Similarly, in the present case, the Secretary was not

substantially justified in defending a procedural error that requires remand under clear Ninth Circuit

precedent. “[T]he court may not affirm an ALJ’s decision based on mere speculation as to the ALJ’s

specific reasons for his credibility finding.” See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9 Cir. th

1991). 

C. The Requested Fees Are Reasonable

Plaintiff requested $5,769.91 in fees representing 34.7 hours of work at $166.28 per hour as

well as costs in the amount of $266.79. The amount of time spent and the billing rate are both

reasonable under all the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, $5,769.91 is a reasonable award of

attorney’s fees and $266.79 is a reasonable award of costs.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

and Costs is GRANTED in the amount of $5,769.91 and $266.79 respectively.

Dated: 7/25/07

 

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

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