Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03823/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03823-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Airline Crash

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LIN-CHUNG YANG, and MIAOTANG WANG

YANG, 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

SWISSPORT USA, INC., et al.,

Defendants. /

NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff-in-Intervention,

 v.

SWISSPORT USA, INC., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-03823 SI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND

REMANDING CASE TO THE SUPERIOR

COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO

Plaintiffs have filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and to remand this

case to the Superior Court for the County of San Francisco. The motion is set for a hearing on July 9,

2010. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds the matter appropriate for resolution without

oral argument and hereby VACATES the hearing. The Court also VACATES the case management

conference scheduled for July 9, 2010. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’

motion to amend the complaint and REMANDS this case to the Superior Court for the County of San

Francisco.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of an accident at San Francisco International Airport (“SFO”), in which

plaintiff Lin-Chung Yang, a California citizen and a ramp mechanic for EVA Airways Corporation

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 The amended complaint contains little detail regarding the accident. The factual allegations

are taken from the proposed second amended complaint. 

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(“EVA Air”), became pinned beneath an aircraft and lost one of his legs. Plaintiffs allege that on

August 18, 2008, shortly before 1:54 a.m. at SFO, employees of defendant Swissport USA, Inc.

(“Swissport”) were conducting a “pushback operation” for an EVA Air Boeing 777. Proposed Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 11.1

 “Pushback” is the action of moving the aircraft from its position

at the gate onto a taxi lane or taxiway in order for the aircraft to proceed under its own power. Id. The

pushback procedure generally involves a motorized vehicle called a “paymover,” and a “towbar,” a

mechanical device that attaches to the paymover to allow it to connect to the aircraft. Id. Plaintiffs

allege that Swissport owned and maintained both the paymover and towbar. Id.

At the time of the accident, plaintiff Lin-Chung Yang was an EVA Air ramp mechanic, and he

was responsible for ensuring that the airline’s aircraft were fit for flight and protecting them from

damage. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiffs allege that at some point, Swissport employees were having difficulty

dislodging the towbar from the plane’s nose gear, and that as the EVA Air employee responsible for

ensuring that no damage occurred to the plane in the course of the pushback, Yang proceeded to assist

the Swissport employees. Id. 

According to plaintiffs, Swissport ground crew employees were under pressure for an on time

departure. Id. ¶ 13. As a result of this pressure, the Swissport ground crew employees removed the

aircraft’s wheel locks in order to straighten the aircraft out before making another attempt at dislodging

the towbar. Swissport employee Frank Todaro was the “headset operator” responsible for

communicating with the EVA Air flight crew, and he allegedly instructed the crew to release the plane’s

parking brakes to allow towing. Id. After the plane was repositioned by Ben Banzon, the paymover

operator, plaintiff resumed his efforts to assist in dislodging the towbar. Id. However, plaintiffs allege

that unbeknownst to Yang at the time, Todaro negligently omitted to instruct the flight crew to reapply

the parking brakes as required by Swissport’s safety manual. Id. According to plaintiffs, as a result of

Todaro and Banzon’s negligence, when the towbar subsequently detached from the nose gear and fell

to the ground, the plane’s wheel lurched forward, pinning plaintiff underneath, amputating his leg above

the knee. Id. 

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On July 1, 2009, Yang and his wife, Miaotang Wang Yang, both California residents, filed an

amended complaint in San Francisco Superior Court alleging claims for negligence and loss of

consortium against Swissport. Swissport, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business

in Virginia, timely removed the case to this Court, asserting jurisdiction based on diversity of

citizenship. On May 4, 2010, the Court granted an unopposed motion filed by EVA Air’s workers’

compensation insurer, New Hampshire Insurance Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, to intervene

as a plaintiff. The amended complaint also named “Doe defendants 1-10,” and stated that the Doe

defendants were the agents or employees of Swissport and that their “capacities are unknown to

plaintiff.” Amend. Compl. ¶ 6. 

Plaintiffs now seek to amend the complaint to add Todaro and Banzon as defendants. Plaintiffs

assert that when they filed the amended complaint, “plaintiffs were aware only that Swissport employees

negligently handled the pushback operation; accordingly they named Swissport as the defendant.

However, Plaintiffs recently learned the full extent of the additional defendants’ reckless conduct” after

reviewing more than 2,000 pages of discovery documents. Motion at 5:16-19. Plaintiffs assert that

minutes of an August 22, 2008 meeting between EVA Air and Swissport representatives describe

Todaro and Banzon’s roles in the accident and their violation of Swissport’s standard safety and

operating procedures. Plaintiffs also rely on National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) records

documenting a Swissport station manager’s admission that the handling of the pushback operation was

“not in accordance with established operation procedures.” Label Decl. ¶ 6. In addition, plaintiffs assert

that the OSHA investigative report that followed the accident indicated greater recklessness on the part

of Todaro and Banzon than plaintiffs had previously been aware. 

Plaintiffs also seek to add Hall Industries, Inc. and Clyde Machines, Inc., as defendants.

Plaintiffs’ motion to amend states that plaintiffs have learned that the towbar mechanism that plaintiff

was attempting to dislodge at the time of his accident became stuck as a result of defects in its

manufacture, design, instructions, warnings, testing, and/or installation, and that the towbar was

manufactured by Hall Industries, Inc. See Label Reply Decl. Ex. A (photograph of towbar with “Hall

Industries, Inc.” printed on it). In opposition to the motion, Swissport has submitted the declarations

of two Swissport employees who state that the towbar involved in the accident was manufactured by

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 In response to the photograph of the towbar submitted in connection with plaintiffs’ reply,

defendant filed an administrative motion to submit the rebuttal declaration of Patricia Carr. The Court

GRANTS defendant’s motion for administrative relief and has considered the Carr declaration in

deciding the instant motion. (Docket No. 44).

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Clyde Machines, Inc. (“Clyde Machines”), not Hall Industries. See Geddes Decl. ¶ 4; Carr Decl. ¶ 2.2

As a result of the factual dispute surrounding the manufacturer’s identity, plaintiffs now seek to join as

defendants both Hall Industries, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, and Clyde Machines, a Minnesota

corporation. 

Plaintiffs seek to allege claims for negligence and willful and wanton conduct against Todaro

and Banzon, and claims for negligent and strict products liability against Hall Industries and Clyde

Machines. As the joinder of Todaro, Banzon, or Hall Industries would destroy diversity jurisdiction,

plaintiffs have also moved the Court to remand this case to the San Francisco County Superior Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). Defendant Swissport opposes plaintiffs’ motion, while plaintiff-inintervention New Hampshire Insurance Company has filed a notice of non-opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) provides, “If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants

whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder

and remand the action to the State court.” “Congress added subsection (e) to § 1447 with the purpose

of taking advantage of the opportunity opened by removal from a state court to permit remand if a

plaintiff seeks to join a diversity-destroying defendant after removal.” IBC Aviation Servs., Inc. v.

Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing

H.R. Rep. No. 100-889, at 72-73). 

Whether to permit joinder under § 1447(e) remains an issue of sound discretion for the Court.

Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998); IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1011; Clinco

v. Roberts, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (C.D. Cal.1999). Generally, however, when weighing whether

to permit joinder, a court should consider (1) whether the party plaintiff seeks to join is required for just

adjudication and would be joined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); (2) whether the statute of limitations

would bar an action against defendant in state court; (3) whether the joinder is untimely, or there has

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 The arguments and issues regarding joinder of Todaro and Banzon differ somewhat from those

related to the joinder of Hall Industries and Clyde Machines, and thus Court separately analyzes the

joinder of the two sets of defendants.

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been an unexplained delay in its request; (4) whether joinder is intended solely to destroy diversity

jurisdiction, (5) whether the claims against the new defendants appear valid; and (6) whether denial of

joinder will prejudice the plaintiff. IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 (citing Palestini, 193 F.R.D. 654, 658

(S.D. Cal. 2000)). Any of the factors might prove decisive, and none is an absolutely necessary

condition for joinder. 

DISCUSSION

I. Joinder of Todaro and Banzon3

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)

Defendant contends that Todaro and Banzon should not be joined as defendants because they

are not necessary parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). Rule 19(a) requires joinder of

persons whose absence would preclude the grant of complete relief, impede their ability to protect their

interests, or subject a party to the risk of incurring inconsistent obligations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); IBC,

125 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. A necessary party is one having an interest in the controversy, and who ought

to be made party to the action to enable the court to do complete justice and adjudicate the rights of

parties accordingly. “This standard is met when failure to join will lead to separate and redundant

actions [in different forums].” IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (citing CP Nat’l Corp. v. Bonneville Power

Admin., 928 F.2d 905, 912 (9th Cir. 1991)). “Although courts consider whether a party would meet Fed.

R. Civ. Proc. 19's standard for a necessary party, amendment under § 1447(e) is a less restrictive

standard than for joinder under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 19.” IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1011-12. Courts will

prevent joinder of non-diverse defendants where the proposed defendants “are only tangentially related

to the cause of action or would not prevent complete relief.” Id. at 1012 (citing Red Buttons v. Nat’l

Broad. Co., 858 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (C.D. Cal. 1994)). 

Here, plaintiffs allege that Todaro and Banzon’s negligence and reckless disregard of company

safety procedures caused, in part, plaintiffs’ injuries. Thus, the claims against Todaro and Banzon are

more than just tangentially related to those pending against Swissport, and accordingly weigh in favor

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of joinder. In addition, plaintiffs argue that if Swissport is not subjected to punitive damages, joinder

of Todaro and Banzon is necessary to ensure a full recovery.

B. Statute of limitations 

Defendant also contends that joinder is unnecessary because the statute of limitations on

plaintiffs’ claims against Todaro and Banzon has not yet expired, and therefore plaintiffs can file a

separate action against those defendants in state court. Generally, if a statute of limitations does not bar

a plaintiff from filing suit in state court, a federal court may be less inclined to permit joinder of a nondiverse defendant because the plaintiff could still theoretically seek relief from state court. See Clinco,

41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. But where, as here, a plaintiff would be required to litigate essentially

duplicative federal and state lawsuits arising out of the same facts, the interest in conserving judicial

resources and the risk of inconsistent results weighs in favor of allowing joinder. See IBC, 125 F. Supp.

2d at 1012. 

C. Untimely joinder 

Defendant also contends that joinder is untimely because plaintiffs’ motion to amend was filed

nine months after removal. Defendant relies on Lopez v. General Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.

1983), in which the Ninth Circuit found untimely a motion to amend the complaint and join a nondiverse defendant that was filed six month after removal. However, in Lopez, the Ninth Circuit held that

the motion was untimely because “[c]ounsel here says that he did try to identify the [non-diverse] dealer

who sold the truck, but he never told that to the court, or mentioned the unidentified dealer in his

complaint or otherwise until more than six months after the action was removed and just four days

before the [defendant’s successful] motion for summary judgment was to be heard.” Id. at 1332. 

Lopez is distinguishable in several respects. Unlike the plaintiff in Lopez, here plaintiffs

identified Doe defendants in the first amended complaint, and plaintiffs have provided a reasonable

explanation for the delay in seeking to amend. Moreover, in Lopez it appeared that the plaintiff sought

to amend and remand in order to avoid an adverse summary judgment ruling. In contrast, aside from

the instant motion to amend, the only other motion practice in this case has been the unopposed motion

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to intervene filed by New Hampshire Insurance Company. Defendant contends that litigation has

proceeded considerably because discovery has been underway for more than six months and a mediation

is scheduled for September 2010. However, no dispositive motions have been filed, and the discovery

completed thus far will be relevant whether the case is litigated in this court or state court. In addition,

plaintiffs filed their motion to amend before the May 28, 2010 deadline for such motions set in the

Court’s March 31, 2010 pretrial order.

D. Motive for joinder

The motive of a plaintiff in seeking joinder of a non-diverse defendant is relevant to a court’s

decision as to whether to grant leave to amend his original complaint. Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co.

of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1980) (superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (1996)); IBC, 125

F. Supp. 2d at 1012. The joinder of non-diverse defendants for the sole purpose of divesting a federal

court of diversity jurisdiction is improper. IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. However, “[s]uspicion of

diversity destroying amendments is not as important now that § 1447(e) gives courts more flexibility

in dealing with the addition of such defendants.” Id.

Here, plaintiffs have provided facially legitimate grounds for amendment, and the Court finds

nothing in the record to suggest that plaintiffs have an improper motive in seeking to add additional

defendants. 

E. Merit of claims

Defendant contends that plaintiff does not have any valid claims against Todaro and Banzon.

In analyzing joinder of Todaro and Banzon, the Court must determine “whether the claim[s] sought to

be added seem[] meritorious.” IBC, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012; see also Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083;

Goodman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 1111, 1113-14 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Plaintiffs seek to allege

claims against Todaro and Banzon for negligence and willful and wanton conduct. Under California

law, the elements of a negligence claim are: “(1) defendant’s obligation to conform to a certain standard

of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risks (duty); (2) failure to conform to that

standard (breach of duty); (3) a reasonably close connection between the defendant's conduct and

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resulting injuries (proximate cause); and (4) actual loss (damages).” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554,

572 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting McGarry v. Sax, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 519, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)) (internal

quotations omitted). 

Plaintiffs allege that as employees of Swissport, Todaro and Banzon owed plaintiffs a duty to

adhere strictly to Swissport’s safety procedures for pushback operations; that Todaro and Banzon

breached this duty by failing to instruct the EVA Air flight crew to re-apply the Boeing 777's breaks;

and that this omission proximately caused the amputation of plaintiff’s leg. Plaintiffs also claim to have

obtained evidence through discovery that corroborates their allegations. On this record, the Court finds

that plaintiffs may have valid negligence claims against Todaro and Banzon. The Court finds it

unnecessary to decide whether plaintiffs may have a valid claim for willful and wanton conduct. 

F. Prejudice to plaintiff 

Finally, a court must consider whether significant prejudice to plaintiff would result from the

denial of joinder. Courts have found significant prejudice where claims against proposed non-diverse

defendants are so intimately connected to those against an original defendant that denial of joinder

would force a plaintiff to choose whether to pursue redundant litigation in another forum at the risk of

inconsistent results, or forego valid claims against the non-diverse defendants. See IBC, 125 F. Supp.

2d at 1013. The Court finds that these circumstances are present here, and that plaintiffs would be

prejudiced by the denial of joinder. 

Weighing the six factors collectively, the Court finds that permitting the diversity-destroying

joinder of Todaro and Banzon is appropriate. The issues arising out of plaintiffs’ claims against Todaro

and Banzon are identical to those against Swissport, and joinder would thus conserve judicial resources

and avoid the risk of inconsistent results in different forums. Plaintiffs’ motion to amend was not

unreasonably delayed or untimely and was filed before the deadline set by the Court. In addition, as

plaintiffs’ negligence claims against Todaro and Banzon appear meritorious, and there is no evidence

of an improper motive on the part of plaintiffs. 

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 The parties have submitted conflicting evidence regarding whether Hall Industries or Clyde

Machines manufactured the towbar involved in the accident. At this stage of the litigation, the Court

cannot resolve factual disputes, and any such disputes can be litigated in state court.

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II. Joinder of Hall Industries, Inc. and Clyde Machines, Inc. 

Plaintiffs also seek to join Hall Industries, Inc. and Clyde Machines, Inc., and allege claims for

strict and negligent products liability against them. While Clyde Machines is diverse, Hall Industries

is non-diverse to plaintiff-intervener New Hampshire Insurance. As the Court has already determined

that the diversity-destroying joinder of Todaro and Banzon is appropriate, the Court need only weigh

the propriety of permissive joinder under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20. See Diaz v. Allstate, 185 F.R.D. 581, 587,

595-96 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Under Rule 20, defendants may be joined if: (1) a right to relief relating to

or arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences is asserted;

and (2) some question of law or fact common to all parties arises in the action. Desert Empire, 623 F.2d

at 1375. “Courts have shown a strong liberality in allowing parties to amend their pleadings when such

amendments have satisfied the explicit requirements of [Rule 20].” Id. at 1375-76. 

Under California law, a plaintiff states a valid claim for strict products liability if he alleges that

a defect in the manufacture or design of a product “causes injury while the product is being used in a

reasonably foreseeable way.” Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607, 612 (Cal.1994).

Plaintiffs assert that Yang was injured as a proximate result of Hall Industries and/or Clyde Machines’

negligent design and manufacture of the towbar; that the towbar was being used in a foreseeable way;

and that Yang was unaware of any defect. Plaintiffs therefore asserts a valid claim for relief. In

addition, because plaintiffs allege that Hall Industries, Clyde Machines, Swissport, Todaro and Banzon

are all liable for the same injury, the claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, thereby

satisfying the first prong of Rule 20. Finally, Hall Industries and/or Clyde Machines’ alleged

responsibility for the accident with Swissport and its employees introduces common questions of law

and fact amongst all the defendants. For this reason, the Court grants plaintiffs’ motion to amend their

complaint to join Hall Industries and Clyde Machinery.4

 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs’

motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. With the addition of non-diverse defendants, this

Court lacks jurisdiction over this case, and accordingly this case is REMANDED to the San Francisco

County Superior Court. (Docket No. 31, 44).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2010 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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