Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_01-cv-00245/USCOURTS-azd-4_01-cv-00245-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jose Chavez, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

United States of America, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-01-00245-TUC-FRZ

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Report and Recommendation [Doc. 266] issued by 

United States Magistrate Judge Rateau that recommends the Court deny Defendant 

Hunt’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 235] and grant Defendants Demik, Rios, 

and Scharnweber’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 238]. The Court has conducted 

an independent review of the record, including review of Defendant Scharnweber’s 

Partial Objections to Summary Judgment Report and Recommendation [Doc. 269],

Objection to Report and Reccomendation (sic) to Deny Summary Judgment for 

Defendant Hunt [Doc. 271], Plaintiffs’ Objections to Magistrate’s Report and 

Recommendations (sic) [Doc. 272], Defendant Rios, Scharnweber, and Demik’s 

Objections to the Report and Recommendation [Doc. 273], Plaintiffs’ Response to 

Defendant Scharnweber’s Partial Objections to Summary Judgment Report and 

Recommendation [Doc. 274], and Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant Hunt’s Objection to 

Report and Recommendation to Deny Summary Judgment for Defendant Hunt [Doc. 

275]. As more fully set forth herein, the Court will adopt in part and reject in part the 

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recommendations of Magistrate Judge Rateau.1

Procedural Background2

Plaintiffs Jose and Maria Chavez initiated this case on May 25, 2001. Their First 

Amended Complaint [Doc. 12] (“FAC”) was filed on January 7, 2002. The FAC named 

as defendants the United States of America, the United States Immigration and 

Naturalization Service Commissioner James Ziglar, United States Border Patrol Sector 

Chief David Aguilar, and fifteen current and former Border Patrol agents. The FAC 

alleges: (1) assault; (2) battery; (3) false imprisonment/false arrest; (4) intentional 

infliction of emotional distress; (5) negligence; and (6) constitutional violations 

(monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief). Id. 

Defendants filed motions to dismiss or in the alternative motions for summary 

judgment seeking to dispose of the entire case. At the same time Plaintiffs filed their 

responsive briefs opposing dismissal, Plaintiffs filed their Rule 56(f) motion seeking 

deferment of any ruling on the alternative motion for summary judgment as Plaintiffs had 

not had any opportunity to conduct discovery. In 2002, the Honorable David C. Bury 

(who presided over the case at the time) ordered nearly all of the substantive claims 

dismissed whereby only a minor property damage claim remained. As the motion to 

dismiss was granted, the Rule 56(f) motion was denied as moot as well as the alternative 

motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, Judge Bury recused himself from the case, 

the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Marshall, and the parties proceeded to a 

bench trial before Magistrate Judge Marshall in 2005. Magistrate Judge Marshall found 

1 This Court reviews de novo the objection-to portions of the Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The Court reviews for 

clear error the unobjected-to portions of the Report and Recommendation. Johnson v. 

Zema Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Conley v. Crabtree, 14 

F.Supp.2d 1203, 1204 (D. Or. 1998).

2 This matter has been pending for 13 years and has been on appeal to the Ninth 

Circuit twice. The background is lengthy. Given that the current Report and Recommendation recommends granting summary judgment in favor of all but one of the 

Defendants (Defendant Hunt) thereby disposing of the entire case (except the Plaintiffs’ 

claim as to Hunt), a detailed history of the case is set forth. Some of the background is taken from this Court’s order of September 30, 2008 [Doc. 118] and from the pending 

Report and Recommendation [Doc. 266].

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in favor of Plaintiffs in the amount of $3,700.00. Thereafter, Plaintiffs appealed Judge 

Bury’s previous dismissal order. 

Chavez I

On March 27, 2007, the Ninth Circuit issued an order affirming in part and 

reversing in part Judge Bury’s decision and remanding for further proceedings. See 

Chavez v. U.S., 226 Fed. Appx. 732 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereinafter, Chavez I). The Ninth 

Circuit reversed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims as to Agents Rios, Demik3

, 

Scharnweber, Hunt, Obregon, Chavez, Campbell, Ziglar and Aguilar, and reinstated 

Plaintiffs’ claims for equitable relief under the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit 

found that the dismissal of these claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim was erroneous and also found that the previous denial of the Rule 56(f) motion and 

motion for summary judgment as moot was also error. The Ninth Circuit held, inter alia, 

We disagree, however, with the district court’s finding that the Chavezes

have failed to satisfy the notice pleading requirement with respect to the 

remaining defendants. First, the Chavezes bring claims against Agents, 

Rios, Demek, (sic) and Scharnweber. Unlike the vague and conclusory 

allegations regarding the other defendants discussed supra, the complaint 

alleged that Rios, Demek, (sic) and Scharnweber each stopped the shuttle 

on a specific occasion. Those allegations, coupled with the allegation that 

“[i]ndividual Defendants[‘] lacked consent, probably cause, and reasonable

suspicion, and warrants,” are sufficient to provide notice of the claims 

against Agents Rios, Demek, (sic) and Scharnweber. 

Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court for its consideration of the 

Rule 56(f) and summary judgment motions.

After remand to the District Court, the United States Supreme Court decided 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In light of 

Iqbal, the supervisory Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under 

Rule 12(c). This Court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the supervisory 

3

 Defendant Demik’s name is spelled differently throughout the case. Compare, Chavez v. U.S., 682 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2012) (Demek), with Doc. 272 (using both Demek 

and Demik), with Doc. 238 (Demik). The Court will use the spelling “Demik” as that is the spelling used by Defendant Demik’s counsel. See Doc. 238.

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defendants failed to provide a plausible nondiscriminatory explanation for the alleged 

stops. This Court also held that Plaintiffs did not need to allege that the supervisory 

defendants directly participated in constitutional violations. Id. Instead, relying upon 

Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991), this Court held Plaintiffs 

had plausibly alleged that the supervisory defendants had either knowingly refused to 

terminate a series of acts they reasonably should have known would cause constitutional 

violations, acquiesced in constitutional deprivations by subordinates, or displayed 

reckless or callous indifference to others’ rights. The supervisory defendants appealed.

Chavez II

On the supervisory defendants’ appeal, the Ninth Circuit held, inter alia, “taking 

qualified immunity into account, a supervisor faces liability under the Fourth Amendment 

only where ‘it would be clear to a reasonable supervisor that his conduct was unlawful in 

the situation he confronted.’” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2012) (hereinafter, Chavez II). Under this standard, the Ninth Circuit held Plaintiffs’ FAC 

failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim against any supervisory defendant except as to 

Defendant Hunt. Id. The Ninth Circuit further held that, in contrast to the other 

supervisory defendants, Hunt faces liability not only as a supervisor, but also for his 

direct participation in the stops. Id. at 1111. The Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer 

on roving patrol near the border from stopping a vehicle in the absence of an objectively 

“reasonable suspicion” that the “particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in 

the country” or is involved in some other criminal conduct. Id., quoting United States v. 

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct. 275, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). 

The Ninth Circuit held that the facts alleged in the FAC did not indicate that, when 

Hunt made the two stops, any observable characteristics other than race could have 

provided a basis for reasonable suspicion. Chavez II, 683 F.3d at 1112, citing BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. at 886, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (“At best the officers had only a fleeting glimpse 

of the persons in the moving car...”). Indeed, although the supervisory defendants argue

that Hunt’s knowledge that Plaintiffs’ shuttle had carried undocumented passengers on 

previous occasions would have supported reasonable suspicion, the FAC indicates that, 

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on one of the two occasions when Hunt stopped Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs drove a rental van 

because their usual shuttle was under repair. Chavez II, 683 F.3d at 1112. Based upon the 

facts set forth in the FAC, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Hunt stopped them based 

solely on their and their passengers’ “apparent Mexican ancestry,” a characteristic that a 

reasonable officer clearly would have known did not create reasonable suspicion. Id. 

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held the FAC adequately states a claim against Defendant 

Hunt for Fourth Amendment violations, and, at least on the facts alleged, qualified 

immunity does not shield Hunt from liability. Id. 

Post-Chavez II

The mandate in Chavez II was issued on August 15, 2012. Thereafter, the parties 

engaged in discovery relating to what was left of the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ 

FAC. On August 3, 2013, Defendants Scharnweber, Demik, and Rios filed a motion to 

amend their answer to add the defense of the statute of limitations. This Court entered an 

Order granting Defendants’ motion by adopting the conclusion of Magistrate Judge 

Rateau’s Report and Recommendation. On September 1, 2013, Defendant Hunt filed his 

Motion for Summary Judgment. On that same date, Defendants Scharnweber, Rios and 

Demik filed their Motion for Summary Judgment.

It is against this lengthy backdrop that the Court considers the current Report and 

Recommendation [Doc. 266] regarding the disposition of Defendants Hunt, Scharnweber, 

Rios, and Demik’s motions for summary judgment.

The Pending Report and Recommendation 

The Chavez Shuttle

Plaintiffs Jose and Maria Chavez operated a shuttle (the “Chavez Shuttle”) 

between Tucson and Sasabe, Arizona between the years 1998 and 2003. The Chavez 

Shuttle was usually driven by Plaintiff Jose Chavez although Maria Chavez would drive 

the Chavez Shuttle on an emergency basis. Initially, the Chavez Shuttle made three (3) 

daily trips between Tucson and Sasabe but later reduced the number of trips to two (2). 

Passengers were picked up by the Chavez Shuttle in Sasabe near the port of entry and at 

the general store. 

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During the time Plaintiffs operated the Chavez Shuttle there were approximately 

100 residents in Sasabe. There are approximately 10 pedestrian and 80 to 100 vehicle 

legal crossings per day from Mexico unto the United States at the Sasabe port of entry. 

Most of those crossing were thought to be bound for Tucson. During that time, the 

Chavez Shuttle was stopped by Border Patrol agents on almost a daily basis. Plaintiff 

Jose Chavez agrees with Border Patrol estimates that approximately 80 persons were 

removed from the Chavez Shuttle as undocumented aliens over a four year span. 

The Border Patrol Stops of the Chavez Shuttle

The remaining claims in the case arise out of five (5) border patrol stops of the 

Chavez Shuttle. The stops are as follows. First stop: Defendant Rios is alleged to have 

threatened to strike Plaintiff Jose Chavez. Second stop: On or about January 5, 1999, 

Defendant Scharnweber is alleged to have stopped the Chavez Shuttle while it was driven 

by Plaintiff Marie Chavez and removed six (6) undocumented passengers. Third stop: On 

August 24, 2000, Defendant Hunt is alleged to have stopped the Chavez Shuttle being 

driven by Plaintiff Jose Chavez and removed the keys from the van. Fourth stop: In the 

winter of 2000-2001 Defendant Hunt is alleged to have stopped the Chavez Shuttle as it 

was driven by Plaintiff Jose Chavez and told him (Jose Chavez) that he was under arrest.

Fifth stop: On March 6, 2001, Defendant Demik is alleged to have stopped Plaintiff Jose 

Chavez and taken pictures of the Chavez Shuttle. The issues arising out of each of these 

stops are taken in turn below.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, deposition, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavit, if any, show that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is not proper if

material factual issues exist for trial. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 318, 

322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating a 

motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the nonmoving party, and cannot make credibility determinations or perform any 

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weighing of the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 

150 (2000).

Defendant Rios (First Stop): Defendant Rios was a Border Patrol agent from 1993 until 

1998 and was a Border Patrol supervisor from 1998 until 2001. Plaintiff Jose Chavez 

does not recall the date that he was stopped by Defendant Rios. Defendant Rios cannot 

recall any specific encounter with Plaintiffs or anything that may have happened during 

an encounter. The sole record of a stop of the Chavez Shuttle initiated by Defendant Rios 

establishes the date of the stop as being September 8, 1997. 

Defendant Rios moved for entry of judgment in his favor on two grounds: (1) 

qualified immunity and (2) statute of limitations. Magistrate Judge Rateau recommends 

granting judgment in favor of Defendant Rios on statute of limitations grounds. In the 

alternative, Magistrate Judge Rateau recommends granting judgment in Defendant Rios’s 

favor on qualified immunity grounds. Magistrate Judge Rateau also concludes that, 

“Plaintiffs have not expressly alleged that Rios was involved in an illegal stop (as 

opposed to the activities that alleged occurred after the stop). (Emphasis added.) Because 

of this conclusion, Magistrate Judge Rateau did not analyze whether Defendant Rios’s 

stop of the Chavez Shuttle complied with the Fourth Amendment.4 As explained below, 

the Court will adopt the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Rateau that the claims 

against Defendant Rios are time barred. 

Statute of Limitations

The applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ Bivens5 claims is the two year 

4 Plaintiffs have lodged an objection to the Magistrate Judge’s “cursory elimination of the Fourth Amendment claims based on the illegality of the stops 

themselves.” Doc. 272 at p. 2, ll. 13-14. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the mandate 

of the Ninth Circuit in Chavez I largely compels the conclusion that Plaintiffs pled a claim against Defendants Rios and Demik for their respective stops of the Chavez 

Shuttle. However, since the Court concludes that Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Rios 

are time barred, any Fourth Amendment issue arising out of the stop initiated by Defendant Rios is moot. 

5 Plaintiffs’ claims arise under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal 

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-95 (1971). The basis of a Bivens action is some 

illegal or inappropriate conduct on the part of a federal officer or agent that violates a 

clearly established constitutional right. Balser v. Department of Justice, Office of the 

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period provided by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1). Border Patrol records that are not in 

dispute establish that Defendant Rios stopped the Chavez Shuttle on September 8, 1997, 

and discovered undocumented aliens. However, Plaintiff Jose Chavez does not recall 

whether the alleged threat by Defendant Rios occurred at this stop in 1997. Complicating 

matters for Plaintiffs Chavez is the fact that the Tucson sector of the Border Patrol does 

not keep records of stops where no illegal immigrants are located. Attempting to turn this 

complication into a benefit, Plaintiffs Chavez argue that they have put forth enough 

evidence to survive summary judgment because Plaintiffs Chavez assert that Defendant 

Rios could have stopped the Chavez Shuttle after September 8, 1997, since not every stop 

is documented.

However, once the defendant has established a prima facie case entitling him to 

summary judgment on a statute of limitations defense, the plaintiff has the burden of 

showing available, competent evidence that would justify a trial. Logerquist v. Danforth, 

188 ARiz. 16, 19, 932 P.2d 281, 284 (App. 1996) (quoting Ulibarri v. Gerstenberger, 178 

Ariz. 151, 156, 872 P.2d 698, 703 (App. 1993)). Here, Defendant Rios has put forth a

prima facie case that he initiated a stop of Plaintiff Jose Chavez driving the Chavez 

Shuttle on September 8, 1997. Indeed, this is the only Border Patrol record of Defendant 

Rios’ stop of the Chavez Shuttle. Fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim is the fact that Plaintiffs 

Chavez have not come forward with available, competent evidence from which a trier of 

fact could conclude that Defendant Rios’ alleged threat occurred at a stop after 

September 8, 1997, and within the 2 year statute of limitations period preceding the filing 

of their Complaint. 

Plaintiffs Chavez argue the decision in Nicacio v. United States I.N.S., 979 F.2d 

700, 706 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled in part on other grounds by Nodgers-Durgin, v. de la 

Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999), supports their argument that they have met 

their burden to come forward with competent, admissible evidence demonstrating a 

genuine issue of fact for trial. The language relied upon by Plaintiffs Chavez from 

Nicacio was used by the Court of Appeals after a verdict to describe the district court’s 

United States Trustee, 327 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003).

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“careful credibility findings” at trial. 979 F.2d at 706. Here, the Court is faced with a 

different situation in that Plaintiff Jose Chavez cannot even recall that the alleged Rios 

stop took place at a time within the statute of limitation. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will adopt the conclusion of Magistrate Judge 

Rateau that Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Rios are time barred.

Defendant Scharnweber (Second Stop): On January 5, 1999, Defendant Scharnweber

stopped the Chavez Shuttle as it was being driven by Maria Chavez. Defendant 

Scharnweber initiated the stop based on his observation that it was carrying passengers 

from Sasabe and had previously been found to be carrying aliens. After making the stop, 

Defendant Scharnweber opened the van door and demanded documentation from the 

passengers. All seven passengers on the Chavez Shuttle at the time were determined to 

lack documentation. Defendant Scharnweber seized the Shuttle, arrested Maria Chavez 

on suspicion of alien smuggling and transported her and the undocumented aliens to the 

Tucson Border Patrol station. 

Magistrate Judge Rateau recommends dismissing the claim against Defendant 

Scharnweber on statute of limitations grounds. Just as with Defendant Rios, the 

applicable statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ Bivens claims is two years. Plaintiffs 

alleged that Defendant Scharnweber stopped the Chavez Shuttle on January 5, 1999. As 

set forth above, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in May of 2001 and their FAC on January 

7, 2002. 

The Court will adopt the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that the claim 

against Defendant Scharnweber be dismissed as time barred.

Defendant Hunt (Third and Fourth Stops): The August 24, 2000, stop by Defendant 

Hunt: Around 9:00 p.m. on August 24, 2000, Defendant Hunt was observing traffic on 

Route 286 about 11 miles north of the border. Defendant Hunt saw a van occupied by 

only the driver heading south. About twenty minutes after he initially saw the van 

heading south, Defendant Hunt saw it heading north with two (2) passengers inside. 

Defendant Hunt then pulled the vehicle over. As Defendant Hunt approached the van he 

saw the van was being driven by Plaintiff Jose Chavez and that the passengers had 

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muddy shoes and pants. Defendant Hunt then decided to seize the van. The 00/01 Winter 

stop by Defendant Hunt: Defendant Hunt recalls the stop occurred at night, was very 

close to Sasabe, was after the port of entry had been closed for some time, and that 

Plaintiff Jose Chavez was driving the shuttle. 

Magistrate Judge Rateau recommends that the Court deny Defendant Hunt’s 

request for judgment in his favor as a matter of law that the two stops he conducted 

violated the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights and that he is entitled to qualified 

immunity. Defendant Hunt objects to the conclusion reached by Magistrate Judge Rateau 

that he did not have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when he made 

the August 24, 2000, stop and the 00/01 Winter stop. Defendant Hunt argues that the 

Magistrate Judge erred in not considering the stops through his lens of extensive Border 

Patrol experience (11 years). Defendant Hunt also argues that the Magistrate Judge did 

not give enough weight to the location and surrounding area of the stops in reaching her 

conclusion that he (Defendant Hunt) did not have reasonable suspicion to support the two 

stops. Plaintiffs Chavez assert that the Magistrate Judge reached the correct conclusion 

and point out that in the cases cited by Defendant Hunt, each court (in its own way), 

cautioned that innocent activity occurs in a high crime area and the area of the stop itself 

provides no basis for converting innocuous conduct into suspicious conduct. See United 

States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1973).6 Plaintiffs also point out that 

while the Court is to consider officer experience, with respect to the August 24, 2000 

stop, Defendant Hunt did not even know he was stopping the Chavez shuttle at the time 

he made the stop so Defendant Hunt could not possibly have relied upon his knowledge 

of the history of the Chavez Shuttle as part of the basis for the stop. As explained below, 

the Court will adopt the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Rateau. 

6 See also, United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2002) (Presence 

in a high-crime area cannot alone provide reasonable suspicion that he had committed or was about to commit a crime.); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 

(9th Cir. 2000) (We note initially that an individual’s presence in a high crime area is not enough to support reasonable, particularized suspicion that the individual in question has 

committed or is about to commit a crime.)

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Standards for Stops

Officers enforcing the immigration laws must comply with the Fourth 

Amendment. An investigatory stop is lawful if an officer “reasonably suspects that the 

person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal offense.” Arizona v. 

Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009). Stopping a vehicle is usually analogous to a so-called 

‘Terry stop’ and officers ordinarily may stop a vehicle based on reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity. Berkmer v. McCarty, 465 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). Such a stop is 

permitted where officers are “aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational 

inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain 

aliens who may be illegally in the county.” U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 

(1975).

Reasonable suspicion for a federal officer to stop a car to investigate the

immigration status of the occupants depends upon the “totality of the circumstances.” 

U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002). In considering the totality of the circumstances, 

however, “an officer cannot rely solely on generalizations that, if accepted, would cast 

suspicion on large segments of the law-abiding population.” U.S. v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 

F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2006). Hispanic appearance, for example, is “of such little 

probative value that it may not be considered as a relevant factor where particularized or 

individualized suspicion is required.” U.S. v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 

(9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, while an inability to speak English is probative of immigration 

status, it does not supply reasonable suspicion unless “other factors suggest that the 

individuals are present in this country illegally.” Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 937. 

The undisputed facts surrounding Defendant Hunt’s August 24, 2000, stop and his 

00/01 Winter stop of the Chavez Shuttle establish that there was little more than the 

presence of the Chavez Shuttle in an area close to the border at a time when the border 

had already closed in support of the argument that Defendant Hunt had reasonable 

suspicion to stop the Chavez Shuttle. Case law is clear that mere presence in a high crime 

area, without more, will not support a finding of reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., MonteroCamargo, 208 F.3d at 1138 (an individual’s presence in a high crime area is not enough 

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to support reasonable, particularized suspicion that the individual in question has 

committed or is about to commit a crime); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 

2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (holding that an investigatory stop was not justified when 

police officers detained two men walking away from each other in an alley in an area 

with a high rate of drug trafficking because “the appellant's activity was no different from 

the activity of other pedestrians in that neighborhood”). Moreover, although Defendant 

Hunt urges this Court to conclude that he had reasonable suspicion to support his two 

stops in light of his 11 years of experience, experience does not itself serve as an 

independent factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 

1131-32. While Defendant Hunt seeks to have the Court agree with him that his prior 

experience with the Chavez Shuttle supports a reasonable suspicion finding, with respect 

to the August 24, 2000 stop, Defendant Hunt did not even know he was stopping the 

Chavez Shuttle when he initially pulled it over. 

Accordingly, the Court cannot say, as a matter of law, that the stops initiated by 

Defendant Hunt were supported by reasonable suspicion.

Qualified Immunity – Defendant Hunt

To determine whether a government official sued in his individual capacity is 

entitled to qualified immunity, a court must first determine whether, when considered in 

the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the 

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2002). If a constitutional violation occurred, the court must determine whether the right 

was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. If the law did not put the 

defendant on notice that her conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment 

based upon qualified immunity is appropriate. Id. at 202.

The first Saucier prong has already been analyzed and the Court concludes that 

Defendant Hunt has not established that as a matter of law he had reasonable suspicion to 

stop the Chavez Shuttle. The second Saucier prong, whether the case law establishes that 

Defendant Hunt should have been aware that his conduct was unlawful, is also satisfied. 

As of 2000, the law that mere presence in a high crime area is not sufficient, in and of 

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itself, to establish reasonable suspicion was well established. See, e.g., MonteroCamargo, 208 F.3d at 1138 (holding, in 2000, that an individual’s presence in a high 

crime area is not enough to support reasonable, particularized suspicion that the 

individual in question has committed or is about to commit a crime); Brown v. Texas, 443 

U.S. at 52 (holding, in 1979, that an investigatory stop was not justified when police 

officers detained two men walking away from each other in an alley in an area with a 

high rate of drug trafficking because “the appellant's activity was no different from the 

activity of other pedestrians in that neighborhood”).

The Court will adopt the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Rateau that 

Defendant Hunt is not entitled to entry of judgment in his favor as a matter of law that:

(1) he had reasonable suspicion to support the stops of Plaintiff Jose Chavez and (2) he is 

entitled to qualified immunity.

Defendant Demik (Fifth Stop): Plaintiffs assert that on March 6, 2001, Defendant 

Demik stopped the Chavez Shuttle as it was being driven by Plaintiff Jose Chavez. 

Defendant Demik is alleged to have taken pictures of the Chavez Shuttle during this stop. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends granting judgment in Defendant Demik’s favor on the 

grounds that Plaintiffs Chavez have failed in their burden to establish that Defendant 

Demik’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment 

violation. Also, just as with Defendant Rios,7 the Magistrate Judge concluded that 

Plaintiffs Chavez did not adequately plead a claim against Defendant Demik based on the 

stop itself (as opposed to conduct that occurred during the stop). Plaintiffs Chavez

objected to this conclusion. Defendant Demik has asserted three arguments in support of 

his position that the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Plaintiffs Chavez did not 

state a claim against him for his stop of the Chavez Shuttle, namely: (1) in his deposition 

testimony Plaintiff Jose Chavez said he was not challenging the stop by Defendant 

Demik; (2) the mandate in Chavez I was issued prior to Ashcroft v. Iqbal and no longer 

relevant; and (3) even if Plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a Fourth Amendment claim 

7 (see n.3, supra)

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against Defendant Demik, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of 

material fact for trial. 

The Court does not agree with the conclusion that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently 

stated a claim against Defendant Demik for his stop of the Chavez Shuttle on March 6, 

2001. However, the Court will adopt the recommendation by Magistrate Judge Rateau 

that Defendant Demik is entitled to qualified immunity for his alleged conduct during the 

March 6, 2001, stop. 

The Claim Against Defendant Demik for His Stop of the Chavez Shuttle

The allegations in the Plaintiffs’ FAC against Defendant Demik expressly state, in 

relevant part, “On March 6, 2001, Plaintiff Jose Chavez was stopped by Defendant 

Demek (sic) during a regularly scheduled run. Defendant Demek (sic) took photographs 

of Plaintiffs’ shuttle...” See Doc. 12 at ¶ 37. This express allegation in the FAC, coupled 

with the mandate from Chavez I, is sufficient to support the conclusion that Plaintiffs 

Chavez pled a claim against Defendant Demik for his stop of the Chavez Shuttle. 

Defendants Demik’s citations to Plaintiff Jose Chavez’s deposition testimony for his 

argument that Plaintiff Jose Chavez testified that he is not stating a claim based on 

Defendant Demik’s stop of the Chavez Shuttle is not convincing. Based upon a reading 

of Plaintiff Jose Chavez’s testimony it is not clear that Plaintiff Jose Chavez understood 

the questioning by Defendants’ counsel regarding the stop by Defendant Demik. See Doc. 

248 at Ex. 2 at p. 71-72, ll. 16-14 (For instance, when asked whether he was challenging 

a stop, Plaintiff Jose Chavez testified, in part, “He’s a Border Patrol and he has to make a 

stop). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs Chavez did plead a Fourth 

Amendment claim against Defendant Demik based upon his March 6, 2001, stop of the 

Chavez Shuttle. 

In his summary judgment motion, Defendant Demik argues that he is entitled to 

qualified immunity for his alleged conduct during the March 6, 2001, stop and 

specifically stated, “[P]laintiffs do not allege that this specific stop by Defendant Demik 

violated the Fourth Amendment.” The Court concludes otherwise and determines that 

Defendant Demik has not met his burden of establishing that he is entitled to entry of 

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judgment as a matter of law regarding whether his stop of the Chavez Shuttle violated 

Plaintiff Jose Chavez’s Fourth Amendment rights and, if so, whether he is nevertheless 

protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity for his March 6, 2001, stop of the Chavez 

Shuttle. 

Qualified Immunity – Defendant Demik

Assuming the allegation that Defendant Demik photographed the Chavez Shuttle 

during the March 6, 2001, stop of the Chavez Shuttle to be true, the Magistrate Judge 

concluded that such conduct by Defendant Demik does not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation. The Magistrate Judge reasoned that, “[w]hen viewed as a 

discreet event, there is no authority suggesting that the photographing of a vehicle in a 

public place could amount to a constitutional violation.” See Dow Chemical Company v. 

United States, 476 U.S. 22 (1986) (taking aerial photographs of an industrial plan 

complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment). 

Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommends granting Defendant Demik’s request for 

qualified immunity for this alleged action. Plaintiffs offer no argument that the 

Magistrate Judge’s conclusion is incorrect and the Court concludes that the Magistrate 

Judge’s conclusion is, in fact, correct. 

The Court adopts the recommendation by the Magistrate Judge with respect to 

Defendant Demik’s alleged conduct during the March 6, 2001, stop. 

Conclusion 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants Rios and Scharnweber is granted.

2. Summary judgment in favor of Defendant Hunt is denied.

...

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3. Summary judgment in favor of Defendant Demik is granted with respect to Defendant 

Demik’s conduct during the March 6, 2001, stop and summary judgment is denied with 

respect to Defendant Demik’s stop of the Chavez Shuttle on March 6, 2001.

Dated this 3rd day of September 2014.

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