Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05349/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05349-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided May 18, 2012 

No. 11-5349 

STEPHEN LAROQUE, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED 

STATES, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:10-cv-00561) 

Michael A. Carvin, Hashim M. Mooppan, and Michael E. 

Rosman were on the briefs for the appellants. 

Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Diana K. 

Flynn, Linda F. Thorne, and Sarah E. Harrington, Attorneys, 

U.S. Department of Justice, were on the brief for appellees. 

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an 

appearance. 

J. Gerald Hebert and Arthur B. Spitzer were on the briefs 

for intervenors-appellees. 

USCA Case #11-5349 Document #1374376 Filed: 05/18/2012 Page 1 of 7
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Before: TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: In November 2008 the 

citizens of Kinston, North Carolina approved a referendum 

making local elections nonpartisan. Because Kinston is 

located in Lenoir County, one of several North Carolina 

counties covered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), 

see 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 (Aug. 7, 1965), the city had to seek 

preclearance from the Department of Justice before the law 

could take effect. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. On August 17, 

2009 the Attorney General interposed an objection on the 

grounds that the proposed law would have discriminatory 

effects on Kinston’s black population—specifically that it 

would tend to deny black candidates the benefit of partisan 

Democratic white “crossover” votes. Letter from Loretta 

King to James P. Cauley III, Joint Appendix 46. 

Appellants, a group of private individuals and a 

membership organization that supported the law, then brought 

this suit, challenging the constitutionality of § 5 and arguing 

that, as amended by the VRA’s 2006 reauthorization, § 5 

exceeded the powers granted to Congress by the 

Reconstruction Amendments and violated the Fifth 

Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. The district court 

initially dismissed the suit for lack of standing, see LaRoque 

v. Holder, 755 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159, 168 (D.D.C. 2010), but 

we reversed and remanded based on the standing of plaintiff 

John Nix, who had announced his intention to run for the 

Kinston City Council in the 2011 elections and had provided 

sufficient evidence that partisan elections increased his ballotaccess costs and decreased his likelihood of victory. See 

LaRoque v. Holder, 650 F.3d 777, 785-87 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

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On remand the district court granted summary judgment for 

the government, holding § 5 constitutional. See LaRoque v. 

Holder, -- F.Supp.2d --, 2011 WL 6413850 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 

2011). This appeal followed. 

While the appeal was pending before this court, and 

before oral argument could take place, the Justice Department 

changed its mind in light of some new evidence that it 

received in a separate preclearance proceeding. After 

requesting some additional information from Lenoir County, 

the Department informed the court and the parties that the 

Attorney General was withdrawing his objection to the 

proposed change. Letter from Thomas E. Perez to James P. 

Cauley III (Feb. 10, 2012). Three days later, the government 

filed its merits brief arguing in part that the case had been 

mooted by the Attorney General’s actions. See Appellees’ Br. 

18-23. After considering the supplemental briefing from both 

parties, we agree with the government and therefore vacate 

the judgment and remand the case to the district court with 

instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

* * * 

 Article III limits our authority to “actual, ongoing 

controversies.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988). 

“Even where litigation poses a live controversy when filed, 

the [mootness] doctrine requires a federal court to refrain from 

deciding it if events have so transpired that the decision will 

neither presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a morethan-speculative chance of affecting them in the future.” 

Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 

(en banc). At first blush, it would seem that, thanks to 

withdrawal of the objection, Kinston can implement the 

referendum and hold nonpartisan elections, and the injury on 

which we originally found standing—the extra burden a 

partisan system placed on Nix’s chance to get elected—has 

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effectively disappeared. Appellants, however, offer three 

arguments why the Attorney General’s actions have not 

rendered their claims moot. We take each in turn. 

Appellants’ primary contention is that the VRA does not 

grant the Attorney General the power to withdraw a § 5 

objection once made, and that therefore the Justice 

Department’s February 10th letter is without legal effect. See 

Appellants’ Response to the Attorney General’s Mot. to 

Dismiss as Moot (“Appellants’ Response”) 3. In an earlier 

case we assumed without deciding that the Department had 

authority to withdraw an objection. Harris v. Bell, 562 F.2d 

772, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Now we must decide. 

The statute itself indeed makes no mention of withdrawal 

or reconsideration of § 5 objections. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 

The Attorney General claims that direct authority for his 

action is to be found in regulations promulgated by the Justice 

Department over four decades ago. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.46; 36 

Fed. Reg. 18,186, 18,190 (Sept. 10, 1971). Although § 5 does 

not explicitly grant the Department power to promulgate 

implementing regulations, such authority has long been 

recognized, see Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 536-

37 (1973), and the Supreme Court has accorded such 

regulations “substantial deference,” Lopez v. Monterey 

County, 525 U.S. 266, 281 (1999). 

Appellants offer no reason—and we can imagine none—

why the Department should be unable to withdraw an 

objection. The Department argues that absent such authority 

it would “be unable to correct errors in preclearance decisions 

or take account of changes in law or facts without asking the 

jurisdiction to resubmit the proposed change.” Appellees’ 

Reply in Support of the Attorney General’s Mot. to Dismiss 3. 

Of course this argument itself assumes that such resubmission 

and approval automatically overrides a prior objection. And 

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that assumption is clearly well-founded; otherwise the 

jurisdiction could obtain clearance for laws erroneously 

objected to only by launching a wholly unnecessary lawsuit. 

Neither the text nor the purpose of § 5 provides any reason to 

require either of these pointless exercises, and we therefore 

have no trouble finding the Department’s assertion of 

authority to withdraw objections to be reasonable and 

consistent with the statutory scheme. 

Second, appellants argue that § 5 might still injure them 

in the future. One of the appellants, Stephen LaRoque, 

informs us that as a state legislator, he intends to propose two 

“local bills” that would change voting practices in Lenoir 

County, and that these proposals will soon require 

preclearance. See Appellants’ Response 9; id., Attach. A. Of 

course they would require preclearance only if they are passed 

into law and implemented. 

And that’s a big “if.” LaRoque tells us that “[b]y custom 

and practice,” other members of the North Carolina General 

Assembly “defer to the members whose districts are affected 

by a local bill.” Id., Attach. A. LaRoque acknowledges that 

he represents only “parts” of Lenoir County and the City of 

Kinston. Id. Indeed, according to the North Carolina General 

Assembly’s website, the other part of Lenoir County is 

represented by an African-American Democrat named 

William Wainwright. See Lenoir County Representation, 

North Carolina General Assembly, http://www.ncleg.net/gascr

ipts/counties/counties.pl?county=Lenoir (last visited May 9, 

2012). LaRoque does not even claim that Mr. Wainwright 

agrees with his proposal, or that in the event of a split between 

Lenoir County’s representatives the other members of the 

Assembly would still “defer” to him. 

Even assuming those gaps were filled, appellants offer us 

no evidence that the Department would object to either of the 

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proposed changes, or, apart from a conclusory assertion, that 

the failure to implement either change would cause them any 

cognizable injury. We thus agree with the government that 

such hypothetical legislation is far too speculative to 

constitute a continuing “personal stake” in the validity of § 5. 

Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 478 (1990). 

Finally, appellants argue that invalidating § 5 would give 

Nix a “strong argument” that the North Carolina State Board 

of Elections should order a new election for the Kinston City 

Council. See Appellants’ Response 10. Although North 

Carolina law does make provision for new elections in certain 

conditions, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-182.13(a), North 

Carolina courts have held that “[t]here is [still] no statutory 

authority vesting the State Board with the power to revoke a 

certificate of election” once it has issued and once the elected 

officials have been sworn in. In re Caldwell County Election 

Protests of Hutchings, 600 S.E.2d 901 (table), 2004 WL 

1610347, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). The prospect of a new 

election in the event of § 5’s invalidation is thus too 

speculative to give appellants a continued stake in the 

litigation. 

* * * 

Due to the Attorney General’s withdrawal of his 

objection, nothing will hinder appellant Nix from running in a 

nonpartisan election during the next cycle. Given this, and 

appellants’ inability to present us with any other cognizable 

injury caused by § 5, we hold that appellants have “obtained 

everything that [they] could recover” from this lawsuit, Better 

Gov’t Ass’n v. Dep’t of State, 780 F.2d 86, 91 (D.C. Cir. 

1986), and that the case is thus moot. 

We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand 

the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

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So ordered. 

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