Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01597/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01597-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

THEODORE A. GEORGE, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

. FILED 

vaw Stat~~ Court tJI AHtl::& 

Tilth Clrctdt 

AUG 0 71995 

PATRICK FISHER -- Clerk 

v. No. 94-1597 

W. A. PERRILL, Warden, 

FCI - Englewood; 

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 94-S-2105) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Theodore A. George, Littleton, Colorado, Pro Se. 

Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, and James W. Winchester, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for RespondentAppellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, MCKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-1597 Document: 01019276543 Date Filed: 08/07/1995 Page: 1 
Theodore George brought this habeas corpus petition under 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 alleging that his sentence is illegal under the Ex 

Post Facto Clause, that the Parole Commission abused its 

discretion in promulgating the regulations governing revocation of 

parole, and that he is being falsely imprisoned by the 

Commission's application of those regulations. The district court 

dismissed the petition, holding that Mr. George was abusing the 

writ by raising the same issues that he unsuccessfully asserted in 

a previous section 2241 action. Mr. George appeals and we 

affirm.l 

In his prior section 2241 petition, Mr. George asserted that 

the Parole Commission abused its discretion and violated the 

Separation of Powers Doctrine by promulgating regulations under 

which his street time was revoked upon his violation of parole. 

Mr. George alleged that as a result he was falsely imprisoned. 

See rec., vol. I, doc. 1, ex. Cat 1-2. In the instant 

proceeding, Mr. George's claims, although invoking slightly 

different legal theories, appear to rest on the same basic 

assertion that the Parole Commission could not legally revoke his 

street time. The government contended in district court that Mr. 

George's petition should therefore be dismissed as successive. 

Mr. George argues to the contrary that his claim alleges new 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 94-1597 Document: 01019276543 Date Filed: 08/07/1995 Page: 2 
grounds for relief. In response, the government points out that 

even if the issue is "new," it was properly dismissed as an abuse 

of the writ because Mr. George has not provided an acceptable 

reason for failing to raise the issue in his first writ. 

We begin by observing that this case arises under section 

2241 which permits challenges to official action affecting the 

execution of a sentence, and not under section 2255 which relates 

to the validity of a sentence. See United States v. Scott, 803 

F.2d 1095, 1096 (lOth Cir. 1986). Thus, the Rules Governing 

Section 2255 Proceedings do not apply.2 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), which governs here, a section 2241 

petition which presents no new grounds for relief is subject to 

dismissal as a successive petition unless the ends of justice 

require consideration of the merits: 

No circuit or district judge shall be required to 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to 

inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a 

judgment of a court of the United States if it appears 

that the legality of such detention has been determined 

by a judge or court of the United States on a prior 

application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition 

presents no new ground not heretofore presented and 

2 Rule 9(b) of the rules governing Section 2255 Proceedings 

provides for dismissal of successive and abusive writs as follows: 

A second or successive motion may be dismissed if 

the judge finds that it fails to allege new or 

different grounds for relief and the prior 

determination was on the merits or, if new and 

different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that 

the failure of the movant to assert those grounds 

in a prior motion constituted an abuse of the 

procedure governed by these rules. 

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Appellate Case: 94-1597 Document: 01019276543 Date Filed: 08/07/1995 Page: 3 
determined, and the judge or court is satisfied that the 

ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry. 

Section 2244(a) does not expressly mention the doctrine of abuse 

of the writ, where a court declines to hear a second or subsequent 

petition asserting new claims for relief on the ground that the 

issue should have been raised previously. The Supreme Court has 

said that the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine nevertheless applies to 

section 2241 petitions. Thus, in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 

483-84 (1991), the Court said: 

Because § 2244 allowed a district court to dismiss a 

successive petition that "present[ed] no new ground not 

theretofore presented and determined," one might have 

concluded, by negative implication, that Congress denied 

permission to dismiss any petition that alleged new 

grounds for relief. Such an interpretation would have 

superseded the judicial principles recognizing that 

claims not raised or litigated in a prior petition 

could, when raised in a later petition, constitute 

abuse. But the Reviser's Note to the 1948 statute made 

clear that as a general matter Congress did not intend 

the new section to disrupt the judicial evolution of 

habeas principles, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964 ed.) (Reviser's 

Note), and we confirmed in Sanders v. United States, 373 

U.S. at 11-12, that Congress' silence on the standard 

for abuse of the writ involving a new claim was "not 

intended to foreclose judicial application of the abuseof-writ principle as developed in Wong Doo [v. United 

States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924)] and Price [v. Johnston, 334 

u.s. 266 (1948)]. 

In Glumb v. Honsted, 891 F.2d 872, 873 (11th Cir. 1990) (per 

curiam), the court applied the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine to 

affirm the section 2244(a) dismissal of a section 2241 petition 

because it raised a new claim that could have been raised in a 

previous petition. 

We construe pro se pleadings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmen, 

935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (lOth Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, 

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Appellate Case: 94-1597 Document: 01019276543 Date Filed: 08/07/1995 Page: 4 
in abuse of the writ cases, the cause and prejudice 

standard applies to pro se petitioners just as it 

applies to petitioners represented by counsel. When a 

pro se petitioner presents a new claim in a second or 

subsequent federal habeas petition, the petitioner must 

show cause and prejudice, as those terms have been 

defined in procedural default cases. 

Rodriguez v. Maynard, 948 F.2d 684, 687 (lOth Cir. 1991). Absent 

such a showing, a court may not hear the claim unless the 

petitioner shows that the case implicates a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494-95. 

We need not decide whether Mr. George's petition asserts the 

same claims raised previously or states new grounds for relief. 

His failure to make any showing of cause, prejudice, or a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice3 is dispositive under either 

alternative. See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 862-65 (1995) 

(court may not reach merits of successive or abusive claims absent 

showing of cause and prejudice, or fundamental miscarriage of 

justice) . 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the petition. The 

mandate shall issue forthwith. 

3 In McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991), the Supreme 

Court equated the "ends of justice" inquiry set out in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(a) and the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" inquiry. See 

Parks v. Reynolds, 958 F.2d 989, 995 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

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