Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02565/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02565-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1361 Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed all claims against non-Federal Defendants, and all

claims based upon Defendants’ failure to enforce a security zone pursuant to 33 C.F.R.

§ 165.1108(b)(2). [Doc. No. 31 (dismissing non-Federal Defendants) and Doc. No. 44 (Second

Amended Complaint, deleting causes of action).]

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN DIEGO NAVY BROADWAY

COMPLEX COALITION,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10cv2565-IEG(RBB)

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment

vs.

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD;

CAPTAIN THOMAS M. FARRIS, in his

official capacity as the United States Coast

Guard Captain of the Port, San Diego;

Defendants.

Plaintiff San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coalition (“SDNBCC”) has filed a Second

Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Mandamus Relief, alleging that Defendants,

the U.S. Coast Guard and Captain Thomas Farris violated the Administrative Procedures Act

(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 706.1

 Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment on its claims. 

Following oral argument, and upon consideration of the parties’ arguments, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion.

Background

Plaintiff commenced this action on December 15, 2010, challenging the Defendants’

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failure to enforce the 100-yard on-shore security zone described in 33 C.F.R. § 165.1108(b)(2). 

On December 17, 2010, Plaintiff applied for a temporary restraining order, asking that the Court

enforce the security zone, including excluding all persons from the Broadway Pier and other areas

within 100 yards on-shore of any cruise ship berthed at the Pier unless such individual applied for

and received an exemption from the Captain of the Port (“COTP”). [Application for Temporary

Restraining Order, Doc. 4, p.2.] 

After they were served with the Complaint and Application for TRO, but before the

hearing on Plaintiff’s application, on December 20, 2010, Defendants issued a Temporary Final

Rule (“TFR”), Docket No. USCG-2010-1129, suspending paragraph (b)(2) of § 165.1108, thus

eliminating the 100-yard on-shore security zone. [Declaration of Commander Leon Guerrero in

Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for TRO (“Guerrero Decl.”), Doc.

No. 20-1, Exhibit 4.] The TFR was issued without prior notice and opportunity for public

comment based upon the Coast Guard’s finding that such procedures would be “contrary to the

public interest ... due to the opening of the Broadway cruise ship terminal and the anticipated

arrival of cruise ships immediately thereafter, including on December 22, 2010.” The Coast Guard

further found “[i]t is in the public interest to avoid the potential disruption that could be caused to

major roadways just onshore” and “security interests can continue to be maintained during the

ensuing notice and comment rulemaking to amend Section 165.1108(b)(2).” 

The Court denied Plaintiff’s application for a TRO, finding Plaintiff had not shown a

likelihood of success on the merits of its claim for mandamus and injunctive relief. In particular,

the Court concluded Plaintiff had not shown that the Coast Guard had a mandatory duty to enforce

the on-shore security zone in any particular manner which could be directed by the Court. [Doc.

No. 32.] Plaintiff thereafter amended its complaint to challenge the validity of the TFR. [Doc.

No. 33.] After the Coast Guard issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (“NPRM”) for the longterm revision of 33 C.F.R. § 165.1108(b)(2), Plaintiff dismissed its claims for enforcement of the

on-shore security zone. [Second Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 44.] Therefore, the only

remaining claims in this case are Plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of the TFR. 

The Coast Guard filed the NPRM for public inspection on January 26, 2011, and the notice

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was published the following day. The comment period ran through February 28, 2011. The Coast

Guard received no comments on the NPRM. [Declaration of Commander Kevin F. Bruen, USCG

(“Bruen Decl.”), ¶ 13.] At the hearing, counsel for Defendants indicated the final rule will be

available at the Office of the Federal Register for inclusion in the Federal Register on March 16,

2011. The rule will be published on March 20, 2011, and will become effective 30 days later, on

April 20, 2011.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings and materials demonstrate “there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). However, because

the court is not generally called upon to resolve questions of fact in reviewing an agency action,

the ordinary summary judgment standard set forth in Rule 56(c) does not apply. Nehemiah Corp.

v. Jackson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 830, (E.D. Cal. 2008); Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Hurst,

604 F. Supp. 2d 860, 879 (S.D. W. Va. 2009). The court’s role in reviewing agency actions under

the APA is “not to resolve facts, but to ‘determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence

in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did’.” The Save the

Peaks Coalition v. U.S. Forest Service, 2010 WL 4961417 at *6 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2010) (quoting

Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

A district court reviewing an agency decision under the APA is ordinarily limited to the

administrative record. Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 499

F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007). Evidence outside the administrative record is admissible only

where it falls under one of the following four “narrow” exceptions:

(1) if admission is necessary to determine whether the agency has considered all

relevant factors and has explained its decision, (2) if the agency has relied on

documents not in the record, (3) when supplementing the record is necessary to

explain technical terms or complex subject matter, or (4) when plaintiffs make a

showing of agency bad faith.

Id. (citing Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Service, 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th

Cir. 1996)). 

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2

In its moving papers, Plaintiff sets forth the bases upon which it has standing to challenge

Defendants’ actions. Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s standing in opposition to the current

motion.

3

There is a conceptual difference between the “good cause” exception to the notice and

comment requirements, and the “good cause” exception to the 30-day delay requirement. 

Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1485 (9th Cir. 1992). It is much easier to

demonstrate good cause for the failure to provide a 30-day waiting period, so long as affected

parties have time to adjust their behavior before the final rule takes effect. Id. In their papers, both

parties here focus on the “good cause” standard applicable where an agency has failed to provide

notice and a comment period. The Court finds the Coast Guard meets the higher “good cause”

standard required where an agency dispenses with the notice and comment period. Thus, the Court

need not discuss the alternative and more lenient standard with regard to the failure to delay

enactment of the rule for 30-days.

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Discussion

Plaintiff argues it is entitled to summary judgment on its claims under the APA because

(A) there was no “good cause” excusing the Defendants from complying with the notice-andcomment procedures required by the APA, and (B) there is no evidence supporting Defendants’

decision to promulgate the TFR.2

A. Good Cause Excusing Compliance with Notice-and-Comment Procedures

Plaintiff first argues that the undisputed evidence shows there was no good cause excusing

Defendants from utilizing the notice-and-comment procedures called for by the APA. As a

general rule, administrative agencies must give public notice, and provide an opportunity for

comment, before engaging in rule-making. “The ‘principal purpose’ of section 553 of the APA is

‘to provide that the legislative functions of administrative agencies shall so far as possible be

exercised only upon public participation’.” San Diego Air Sports Center, Inc. v. FAA, 887 F.2d

966, 969 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1946)). The agency

may dispense with the ordinary notice-and-comment procedures where “the agency for good cause

finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued)

that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public

interest.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B). The rule should be published at least 30 days before its

effective date absent good cause. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3). 

The “good cause” exception is to be narrowly construed.3 San Diego Air Sports Center,

887 F.2d at 969. The APA’s notice and comment procedures should be waived “only when ‘delay

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4

Plaintiff appears to argue the Court should apply a heightened “good cause” standard,

because the TFR suspended a portion of a rule initially promulgated using the ordinary notice and

comment procedures. The cases cited by Plaintiff, however, address the line between

“substantive” rules subject to APA rulemaking procedures, and “procedural” rules that an agency

may alter without providing notice and comment. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Yeutter, 973 F.2d 752,

757 (9th Cir. 1992); Arlington Oil Mills, Inc. v. Knebel, 543 F.2d 1092, 1100 (5th Cir. 1976)). In

those cases, the courts found the decision to alter procedures was in fact substantive, and subject to

APA procedures, because the original rule was adopted after a notice and comment period. Here,

there is no dispute that the APA notice and comment mechanism applies in the absence of good

cause. To be certain, an agency has a duty to explain a departure from precedent. See Atchison,

Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973). The Court will

consider this rule when analyzing whether the Coast Guard abused its discretion in suspending

paragraph (b)(2). However, there is no heightened “good cause” standard.

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would do real harm’.” Hawaii Helicopter Operators Ass’n v. FAA, 51 F.3d 212, 214 (9th Cir.

1995) (quoting Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 352, 357 (9th Cir. 1982)). On review, courts

examine the asserted good cause on a case-by-case basis, “sensitive to the totality of the factors at

play.” Id. (citing Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 612 (9th Cir. 1984)). “It is antithetical to the

structure and purpose of the APA for an agency to implement a rule first, and then seek comment

later.” Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 2005).4

Here, the TFR stated it was issued without public notice and opportunity to comment

because “it is contrary to the public interest not to issue a rule that is effective by December 21,

2010.” The TFR cited the following three reasons why delay would be contrary to the public

interest: (1) “the opening of the Broadway cruise ship terminal and the anticipated arrival of cruise

ships immediately thereafter, including on December 22, 2010"; (2) “to avoid the potential

disruption that could be caused to major roadways just onshore”; and (3) to “relieve an

unnecessary burden imposed by varying interpretations of 33 CFR 165.1108(b)(2) while providing

an effective security zone regulation in its place during a notice-and-comment rulemaking.” 

[Guerrero Decl., Exhibit 4, pp. 22-23.] The TFR was made effective through June 20, 2011, and

noted that “the Coast Guard will initiate a separate, notice-and-comment rulemaking proposing to

amend 33 CFR 165.1108(b)(2) while this temporary rule is in effect.” [Id., p.23.]

Plaintiff argues that neither the opening of the Broadway cruise ship terminal, nor the

potential disruption to major roadways, constituted good cause to dispense with the notice-andcomment period. Plaintiff also argues there was no uncertainty regarding the interpretation of

§ 165.1108(b)(2). By way of background, shortly after 33 C.F.R. § 165.1108 was enacted,

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Congress passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act, and the Coast Guard issued regulations

requiring all Maritime Transportation Facilities (“MTFs”) to prepare Facility Security Plans

(“FSPs”). [Bruen Decl., ¶ 5 (citing 33 C.F.R. 105.400-415).] San Diego’s B Street Pier has been

operating as a MTF, under a FSP approved by the Coast Guard in November of 2004. With the

approval of the B Street Pier FSP, the Coast Guard determined it was no longer necessary for the

security zone described in § 165.1108(b)(2) to extend on-shore. [Bruen Decl., ¶ 6-7.] The Coast

Guard, however, took no action to amend the regulation.

On December 8, 2010, Plaintiff sent a letter to the COTP San Diego requesting a meeting

regarding the Coast Guard’s enforcement of the regulation. [Bruen Decl., ¶ 8.] Once the COTP

received Plaintiff’s letter, he consulted with the Coast Guard’s Prevention and Legal Division,

which determined the on-shore security zone was no longer necessary because the existing FSP

addressed shore side security concerns. [Bruen Decl., ¶ 8.] Therefore, on December 13, 2010, the

Coast Guard Legal and Prevention division decided to initiate NPRMs to amend the regulation. 

[Id.] Before the Coast Guard could undertake to initiate that process, however, Plaintiff filed the

current action and sought a TRO. 

Plaintiff argues the lapse in time between the passage of the Maritime Transportation

Security Act and the Coast Guard’s enactment of the TFR suspending § 165.1108(b)(2) belies

Defendants’ good cause argument. Plaintiff argues the Coast Guard had many years to recognize

and address the purported overlap between the FSP for the B Street Pier and the on-shore security

zone established by § 165.1108(b)(2). In addition, Plaintiff argues cruise ships have been arriving

at the Port of San Diego for many years, at both the Broadway Pier and the B Street Pier, and there

is no evidence of a single previous traffic problem caused by the 100-yard on-shore security zone. 

Defendants should have recognized that when a large cruise ship was moored at the new

Broadway cruise ship terminal, the on-shore security zone would extend to and through the Harbor

Drive and Broadway intersection. Therefore, the urgency was created by Defendants’ own lagging

and failure to amend the regulation through ordinary procedures. Plaintiff contends this urgency,

created by Defendants’ own failure to act, does not constitute good cause.

The Court disagrees. As Defendants point out in opposition, for many years the Coast

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Guard had interpreted § 165.1108(b)(2) so as not to require complete exclusion of persons from

the on-shore security zone, believing on-shore security around cruise ships at the Port of San

Diego was within the scope of the governing FSP. Plaintiff sought to change the status quo by

seeking a TRO enforcing the security zone and closing the on-shore area within 100 yards of any

cruise ship berthed at the Broadway Pier. If the Holland America Line’s Oosterdam was moored

at the Broadway Pier, as it was expected to be on December 22, 2010, this on-shore security zone

would have encompassed the esplanade along San Diego Bay, the boardwalk in front of Broadway

Pier, and the entire intersection of Broadway and Harbor Drive. Plaintiff argued in its application

that the Captain of the Port was required to “issue specific exemptions to the persons entering the

zone” and could not grant blanket permission for unknown persons to drive or walk past

Broadway Pier along the public right-of-way. Thus, although the regulation had previously caused

no traffic problems on-shore, the Coast Guard reasonably believed the TRO requested by Plaintiff

would have resulted in a substantial disruption and diversion of Coast Guard resources. The Coast

Guard attempted to mitigate the effects of the TFR by limiting its temporal effect through June 20,

2011. The Coast Guard also explicitly indicated its intent to initiate a formal noticed rulemaking

process during which the public could submit comments. Based thereon, the Court concludes the

Coast Guard properly invoked the “good cause” exception to the APA’s notice and comment

requirements under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) and (d)(3). 

Even if the Coast Guard did not have good cause to excuse its compliance with the notice

and comment requirements, the Court further concludes such error was harmless. The APA

provides that when a court reviews a challenged agency action, “due account shall be taken of the

rule of prejudicial error.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. “[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful

normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, __ U.S.

__, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1706 (2009). Where an agency erroneously fails to comply with the APA’s

procedural requirements, “the failure to provide notice and comment is harmless only where the

agency’s mistake ‘clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of decision

reached’.” California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1090 (9th Cir.

2011). 

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In this case, it is difficult to see how the “procedure used or the substance of the decision

reached” would have been different if the Coast Guard had proceeded through the ordinary notice

and comment procedures required by the APA. Plaintiff points to the declarations filed by its

members, Diane Coombs and Ian Trowbridge, both of whom state they are concerned about the

Defendants’ suspension of the on-shore security zone and would have expressed those concerns if

they had been given an opportunity prior to enactment of the TFR. [Declaration of Diane Coombs,

Doc. No. 34-4, ¶¶ 4 & 7; Declaration of Ian Trowbridge, Doc. No. 34-5, ¶ 4.] Plaintiff further

argues that if had been given opportunity to submit comments, it would have retained a security

expert to write a report in response to the NPRM, refuting the Coast Guard’s claim that the onshore security zone around cruise ships is no longer necessary. However, neither Plaintiff nor any

of its individual members actually participated in the rulemaking process once they were given an

opportunity to do so. In addition, neither Plaintiff nor the individual members indicate what

comments they would have made or demonstrate how those comments would have contributed to

the Coast Guard’s decision whether to suspend the on-shore security zone. Therefore, the Court

finds any error flowing from the Coast Guard’s enactment of the TFR without the ordinary notice

and comment period was harmless. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on count one of its

Second Amended Complaint is DENIED.

B. Evidence Supporting the TFR

Plaintiff argues it is also entitled to summary judgment on its claim under § 706(2) of the

APA because the Defendants’ decision to promulgate the TFR is not supported by any evidence in

the record. An agency’s action in promulgating regulations may be set aside if found to be

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983). 

Under such standard, an agency “must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory

explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice

made’.” Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). The

agency need only give a “cogent explanation” for its action. Humane Society v. Locke, 626 F.3d

1040, 1054 (9th Cir. 2010). Judicial review of the agency’s decision is highly deferential, and the

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agency action is presumed to be valid. Buckingham v. Secretary of the U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture,

603 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “an agency changing its course by rescinding a

rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required

when an agency does not act in the first instance.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 42. 

Here, Plaintiff argues there is no documentation in the agency’s docket regarding the

reason for rescinding the on-shore security zone. In addition, the TFR itself contains only a

conclusory statement that the on-shore security zone is no longer necessary notwithstanding the

fact the regulation was originally enacted based on serious concerns for national security. When

the on-shore security zone was established in 2002, the Coast Guard found the “security zone is

needed for national security reasons to protect the public and ports from potential subversive acts.” 

67 Fed. Reg. 6648 (Feb. 13, 2002). In issuing the rule, the Coast Guard pointed to the September

11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the FBI’s multiple warnings concerning the potential for additional

terrorist attacks within the United States, ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan and growing tensions

in Iraq, and the desire to put U.S. ports on a higher state of alert because the Al-Qaeda and other

organizations had declared an ongoing intention to conduct armed attacks on United States

interests. 68 Fed. Reg. 1006 (Jan. 8, 2003). By contrast, the TFR states only that “[t]he COTP has

determined the security zones for moored cruise ships in San Diego Harbor need not include any

land.” [Guerrero Decl., Exhibit 4, p. 24.] This conclusion is “[b]ased on experience with actual

security zone enforcement operations.” [Id., p. 23.] Although the Coast Guard had determined

that the FSP provided sufficient protection for the on-shore areas previously covered by

§ 165.1108(b)(2), the TFR does not in any way refer to the FSP or otherwise alert the public that

some alternative provision is already in place for securing the area on-shore around cruise ships at

the Port of San Diego.

At the time of the hearing, counsel for Defendants urged the Court to look outside of the

administrative record, to the declaration of Commander Bruen, for an explanation of why the

Coast Guard acted as it did. An agency need not provide all explanation for its action within the

Federal Register notice or the rule itself. Midwater Trawlers Co-operative v. Department of

Commerce, 393 F.3d 994, 1006 (9th Cir. 2004). Nothing within the APA or case law requires an

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agency to provide the explanation for its action in the Federal Register. Id. (noting that “courts are

not free to impose upon agencies specific procedural requirements that have no basis in the

APA.”). The court may allow supplementation of the record where “necessary to explain agency

decisions.” Id. at 1006. In considering extra-record evidence, the court must refrain from de novo

review of the agency’s action, and should “focus instead on the agency’s decision-making

process.” Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 499 F.3d 1108,

1117 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the TFR contains a bare minimum explanation that “[b]ased on experience with

actual security zone enforcement operations, the COTP San Diego has concluded that a security

zone encompassing all navigable waters, extending from the surface to the sea floor, within a 100

yard radius around any cruise ship that is moored at any berth with the San Diego port area ...

would provide for the safety of the cruise ship, vessels, and users of the waterway.” [Guerrero

Decl., Exhibit 4, p. 23.] The TFR suspends the on-shore security zone because “[t]he COTP has

determined the security zones for moored cruise ships in San Diego Harbor need not include any

land.” [Id., p. 24.] This explanation is, itself, not the type of “cogent explanation” or “reasoned

explanation” required where an agency reverses course and rescinds a rule. Humane Society v.

Locke, 626 F.3d at 1054; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 42. 

The declaration of Commander Bruen, however, explains why the Coast Guard’s prior

experience with actual security zone enforcement operations lead the agency to conclude the onshore security zone is no longer necessary. In particular, Commander Bruen explains that under

33 C.F.R. Part 105, all Marine Transportation Facilities (“MTF”) are required to conduct a Facility

Security Assessment (“MSA”) and submit a Facility Security Plan (“FSP”). [Bruen Decl., ¶ 5.] 

Therefore, with the approval of a FSP for the B Street Pier, there was no longer a need for the

security zone to extend over shore. [Id., ¶ 7.] The COTP and the Coast Guard determined that

only the San Diego and Los Angeles cruise ship security zones contained language extending the

zones to “shore areas.” No other cruise ship security zones in the United States extended onshore. [Id., ¶ 8.] There was also an FSP in place with respect to the Broadway cruise ship

terminal as of December 17, 2010, which addressed shore side security concerns. [Id., ¶ 11.]

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Commander Bruen’s declaration demonstrates the Coast Guard did not act arbitrarily, but instead

acted to rescind the on-shore security zone contained in 33 C.F.R. § 165.1108(b)(2) after a

reasoned analysis of the current need for an on-shore security zone. 

In hindsight, the Coast Guard would have been wise to include in the TFR a more detailed

explanation of the rationale for its action. The Court notes that the Coast Guard explicitly

included this analysis in both the NPRM and in the sections discussing the basis, purpose, and

background of the new rule. [NPRM, Docket No. USCG-2011-0038; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,

15216-17 (Mar. 21, 2011).] However, the APA does not require such explanation be fully

contained within the administrative record. Midwater Trawlers Co-operative, 393 F.3d at 1006. 

Upon review, the Court concludes the Coast Guard did not abuse its discretion in suspending the

on-shore security zone contained in subparagraph (b)(2). Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

on this claim is DENIED.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 30, 2011

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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