Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02573/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02573-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ELIZABETH SANCHEZ, for herself 

and on behalf of those 

similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

WAL-MART STORES INC., DOREL 

JUVENILLE GROUP, INC., and DOES 

1 through 25, inclusive, 

 Defendants. /

No. Civ. S-06-2573 DFL KJM 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Plaintiff Elizabeth Sanchez filed a class action against 

Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc. and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 

(“defendants”). Sanchez advances three causes of action 

alleging that Dorel and Wal-Mart designed and sold defective 

strollers. Defendants filed a motion for a more definite 

statement of claim one and a motion to dismiss claims two and 

three. For the reasons below, the court DENIES both motions. 

Case 2:06-cv-02573-JAM -KJN Document 33 Filed 06/15/07 Page 1 of 5
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I. 

In June 2005, Sanchez bought a Dorel model 01-834 PGH 

stroller from Wal-Mart in Sacramento, California. Sanchez 

alleges that, despite defendants’ representation that the 

stroller was safe, it included a “dangerous, unguarded and 

unmitigated pinch point” that created “an unreasonable potential 

for harm.” Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on March 

3, 2007, alleging (1) unfair business practices under California 

Business & Professions Code § 17200, (2) violation of the 

Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), and (3) breach of implied 

warranty of merchantability (against Wal-Mart only). Defendants 

seek a more definite statement of claim one and dismissal of 

claims two and three. 

II. 

A. Motion for More Definite Statement

Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to provide a 

sufficiently definite statement of claim one, alleging unfair 

business practices under California Business & Professions Code 

§ 17200. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) requires a 

plaintiff to correct a pleading if it “is so vague or ambiguous 

that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive 

pleading.” Defendants argue that plaintiff does not make it 

sufficiently clear what type of conduct prohibited by § 17200 

the claim addresses. Defendants also argue that, despite 

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plaintiff’s captioning of claim one as a § 17200 claim, it is 

unclear whether it also pleads a violation of § 17500 due to 

plaintiff’s citation of the latter section. These arguments 

lack merit. 

The complaint provides a sufficient explanation of the 

claim’s factual and statutory grounds for plaintiff to file a 

responsive pleading. Compl. ¶¶ 20-21. Given liberal pleading 

requirements, no further elaboration is necessary. See Fed. R. 

Civ. Pro. 12(e). The claim’s citation to § 17500 is not 

impermissibly confusing given that § 17200 incorporates it by 

reference. The court DENIES the motion for a more definite 

statement. 

B. Motion to Dismiss

The CLRA requires plaintiffs to provide defendants with 

notice of the alleged violation and a demand for a remedy at 

least thirty days before an action is filed. Cal. Civ. Code § 

1782(a). “The clear intent of the act is to provide and 

facilitate pre-complaint settlements of consumer actions 

wherever possible and to establish a limited period during which 

such settlement may be accomplished.” Outboard Marine Corp. v. 

Superior Court, 52 Cal.App.3d 30, 40-41 (1975). The court 

previously held that a November 2, 2005 letter, although not 

sent by the named plaintiff, satisfied § 1782(a)’s notice 

requirement and included a class allegation. Sanchez v. WalCase 2:06-cv-02573-JAM -KJN Document 33 Filed 06/15/07 Page 3 of 5
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Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ. S-06-2573, 2007 WL 1345706, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. May 8, 2007). 

Defendants now argue that § 1782(a) requires “literal 

compliance” with notice provisions and that the November 2 

letter provided insufficient notice because no class existed at 

the time of its mailing. These arguments lack merit. 

Defendants received the November 2 letter more than thirty days 

before plaintiff filed the action and could ascertain the nature 

of the alleged violation from the notice. See Kagan v. 

Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 35 Cal.3d 582, 594-95 (1984). As 

for the absence of a certified class, Dorel and Wal-Mart argue 

unpersuasively for a defendant’s nirvana where notice cannot be 

given until a claim is filed and a claim cannot be filed until 

notice is given. The court DENIES the motion to dismiss as to 

claim two. 

Defendants argue that claim three, alleging breach of the 

implied warranty of merchantability, similarly fails due to 

insufficient notice. Notice in breach of warranty claims must 

identify the breach and apprise “the seller that the buyer 

intends to look to him for damages.” Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 

Cal.2d 826, 830 (1948). As explained above, the November 2 

letter provided defendants with sufficient notice of the breach 

and the threat of legal action. Contrary to defendants’ 

argument, plaintiff’s allegations regarding notice were 

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incorporated into the third claim by reference to earlier parts 

of the complaint. The court DENIES the motion to dismiss as to 

claim three. 

III. 

For these reasons, the court DENIES the motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 14, 2007 

 /s/ David F. Levi___________

 DAVID F. LEVI 

United States District Judge 

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