Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02210/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02210-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Elmer Levi Klink, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Craig Fizer, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 08-2210-PHX-ROS (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Petitioner Elmer Levi Klink. Doc. #1. Following a jury trial in

Maricopa County Superior Court in 2003, Petitioner was convicted of three counts of

molestation of a child, three counts of sexual abuse, one count of sexual conduct with a

minor and one count of attempted child molestation. Doc. #10, Exh. C. On November 13,

2003, Petitioner was sentenced to a total of 86 years in prison for the convictions. Doc. #10,

Exh. D; Doc. #1 at 2.

Petitioner sought direct review, and on May 10, 2004, through counsel, filed an

Opening Brief in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Doc. #10, Exh. E. Petitioner raised one

issue: that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for mistrial based on

prosecutorial misconduct. Id. On November 26, 2004, in a Memorandum Decision, the

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Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err when it denied the motion for a

mistrial, and it affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Doc. #10, Exh. G. On

January 20, 2005, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court.

Doc. #10, Exh. H. The Court denied review on June 6, 2005. Doc. #10, Exh. I.

Following the completion of direct review, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief

under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. He initially filed a Notice of

Post-Conviction Relief on December 27, 2004, but he later moved to dismiss it because his

direct appeal was still pending. Doc. #10, Exh. J, K. The trial court granted his motion and

dismissed the Rule 32 proceeding. Doc. #10, Exh. L. Petitioner filed a Motion to Reinstate

Post-Conviction Relief Petition on July 29, 2005. Doc. #10, Exh. M. The trial court granted

the motion on September 14, 2005, and appointed counsel to represent Petitioner. Doc. #10,

Exh. N. On April 17, 2006, Petitioner’s counsel filed a Notice of Completion of PostConviction Review by Counsel; Request for Extension of Time to Allow Defendant to File

Pro Per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Doc. #10, Exh. O. In the notice, Petitioner’s

counsel indicated that she could find no grounds for relief to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id.

On November 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate Sentence and Dismiss Charges

with Prejudice Post Conviction Relief, which the trial court construed as a pro per Petition

for Post-Conviction Relief. Doc. #10, Exh. P, Q. On August 23, 2007, the trial court, after

reviewing the motion/petition, response and reply, found that Petitioner raised no material

issues of fact or law which would entitle him to relief. Doc. #10, Exh. Q. The court

therefore denied the relief requested in Petitioner’s motion and dismissed the request for

post-conviction relief. Id. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court

of Appeals which was denied on July 28, 2006. Doc. #10, Exh. R, S. Petitioner did not seek

review in the Arizona Supreme Court. Doc. #10, Exh. T.

On December 3, 2008, Petitioner filed his habeas petition in this court. Petitioner

alleges four grounds for relief: 1) that as a result of prosecutorial misconduct, he was denied

the right to due process of law; 2) that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of

counsel; 3) that his direct appeal attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel; and 4)

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that mistakes made in state court proceedings violated his right to due process. The District

Court Judge screened the petition and directed Respondents to file an answer. Doc. #4.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 12, 2009.

Doc. #10. Petitioner filed a Reply to Respondents’ Answer on April 13, 2009. Doc. #13. 

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted.

Alternatively, they argue that the claims fail on the merits. Petitioner’s reply fails to directly

address the procedural default defense. For the reasons that follow, the court finds that most

of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, and the remaining claims fail on the merits.

A. Procedural Default 

1. Legal Standards

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court

in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). A

petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues

by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Id. at

845. In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals

by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of

Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v.

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895,

898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). "Our rule is that a state prisoner has not 'fairly presented' (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that

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those claims were based on federal law." Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.

2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). "If a petitioner fails to alert

the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is

unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court." Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). “Moreover, general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient

to establish exhaustion.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)).

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may

dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); see also Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002) (a

defendant's claim is procedurally defaulted when it is clear that the state court would hold

the claim procedurally barred). The federal court will not consider these claims unless the

petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Dretke v. Haley, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 1851-52

(2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

2. Ground One

Petitioner alleges in ground one that as a result of prosecutorial misconduct, he was

denied the right to due process of law. He refers to the claim he raised in his direct appeal

and argues that the information in his appeal brief shows that the prosecutor’s misconduct

influenced the jury’s verdict.

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1

 The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state court under Rule 32.4(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Petitioner has not shown that any of the

exceptions to the time limits under Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) apply to him.

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In the direct appeal brief, Petitioner identified his claim as whether the trial court erred

when it failed to grant his motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. Doc. #10,

Exh. E. The claim makes no mention of the Due Process Clause. Nor does the table of

citations in his brief reference the Due Process Clause or any other federal constitutional

provision. 

In the argument section of the brief, Petitioner makes no mention of a federal due

process claim. Doc. #10, Exh.E at 7-11. He cites only state cases, with the exception of one

United States Supreme Court case. Id. That case, however, United States v. Young, 470

U.S. 1 (1985), was not a due process case and contained no analysis of whether prosecutorial

misconduct violates the Due Process Clause. The only mention of due process in Petitioner’s

entire opening brief is in the conclusion section where he states that “the Appellant was

denied his rights to due process of law, and as a result the judgment of guilt and sentence

should be set aside.” Doc. #10, Exh. E at 12. Moreover, in his petition for review to the

Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner did not allege a violation of the Due Process Clause or

any other federal constitutional provision. Doc. #10, Exh. H. 

The general appeal to a due process violation in the conclusion section of his opening

brief on direct appeal without any supporting authority or specific analysis is insufficient to

establish exhaustion. Petitioner failed to raise a due process violation in the state courts in

a way that gave the courts an opportunity to address that claim.

By failing to fairly present a due process claim in the state court, Petitioner has failed

to exhaust his state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if

he returned to the state court.1

 As a result, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has

not alleged cause for the default and actual prejudice, nor has he shown a miscarriage of

justice to overcome the procedural default. The court will therefore recommend that ground

one be denied.

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2

 Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to present these claims in a procedurally

appropriate manner because, according to the trial court, he failed “to provide specific

arguments, facts or citations to the record which support his request for relief.” Doc. #10,

Exh. Q. Respondents therefore argue Petitioner failed to exhaust these claims because they

weren’t “fairly presented” in the state court. Respondents provide no authority for the

proposition that without specific citations to the record, the claims are not “fairly presented,”

and the court is aware of none. The court finds this argument to be without merit. 

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3. Ground Two

In ground two, Petitioner alleges that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance

of counsel in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. He alleges six

claims of ineffective assistance: 1) the attorney failed to call witnesses from a list provided

to support Petitioner; 2) Petitioner was not allowed to testify in his own behalf; 3) the

attorney failed to raise objections to preserve Petitioner’s rights on appeal; 4) the attorney

had a tape that recanted accusations; 5) the attorney allowed the prosecutor to force

Petitioner’s wife to testify in violation of the spousal privilege; and 6) the attorney failed to

pursue the issue of the jury conversing in the hallway about the outcome of the case before

the verdict.

In his petition for post-conviction relief in state court, Petitioner alleged 15 claims of

ineffective assistance by his trial attorney. Doc. #10, Exh. P. Among those were the claims

Petitioner now raises as claims 1, 2, 3 and 6 in ground two of his habeas petition. Each of

these four claims was also raised in his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Doc. #10, Exh. R. Accordingly, these claims are properly exhausted and will be addressed

on the merits.2

Regarding the claims Petitioner now identifies as claims 4 and 5 of ground two of his

habeas petition, although Petitioner raised them in his petition for review to the Arizona

Court of Appeals, he did not raise them in his post-conviction petition to the trial court. By

not first presenting the claims in his petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner failed to

give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve the claims, and thus failed to exhaust his

state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if he returned to

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3

A petitioner who presents an ineffective assistance claim in the state court cannot

later add unrelated ineffective assistance claims on habeas review that were not presented in

the state court Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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the state court. As a result, the claims are procedurally defaulted. Furthermore, Petitioner

has not alleged cause for the default and actual prejudice, nor has he shown a miscarriage of

justice to overcome the procedural default. Accordingly, the court will recommend that

claims 4 and 5 of ground two be dismissed as procedurally defaulted.

4. Ground Three 

In ground three, Petitioner alleges that his direct appeal attorney provided ineffective

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. He

enumerates twelve separate allegations of ineffective assistance against his appellate lawyer.

However, his post-conviction petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals contained

only one specific allegation of ineffective assistance on the part of his appellate lawyer. Doc.

#10, Exh. R. Petitioner identified “ineffective counsel at appeal” as one of the issues

presented in his petition for review, but presented almost no argument or facts to further

explain the issue. Id. The only elaboration of the issue came on the third from the last page

(the pages of the petition for review are not numbered) where he stated:

Also, at direct appeal, appellate counsel has shown deliberate

indifference toward Defendant and this case, by not addressing any of

Defendant’s questions or points or letters, nor did he accept any advice that

trial counsel had to offer.

Doc. #10, Exh. R. Petitioner presented nothing else to support his ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim.3

With respect to the twelve allegations presented here in his habeas petition, the only

one that relates at all to what he argued in the petition for review is claim 2. He contends in

that claim that his appellate lawyer would not communicate with him about the trial, despite

numerous requests by mail. Thus, in an abundance of caution, the court finds that this claim

was fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals and was, therefore, exhausted. The

court will address this claim on the merits.

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Because the other 11 claims of ineffective assistance in ground three were not raised

in the petition for review, the state court remedies have not been exhausted. Petitioner failed

to give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve the claims. Moreover, Petitioner

would no longer have a remedy if he returned to the state court. As a result, the claims are

procedurally defaulted. Furthermore, Petitioner has not alleged cause for the default and

actual prejudice, nor has he shown a miscarriage of justice to overcome the procedural

default. Accordingly, the court will recommend that all of the claims in ground three, except

claim 2, be dismissed as procedurally defaulted.

5. Ground Four 

In ground four, Petitioner alleges that many of his petitions and motions in the state

court have gone unanswered and unaddressed. He contends that his right to due process of

law was violated by the state.

Petitioner failed to raise this claim, or anything close to it, in his direct appeal or his

petition for post-conviction relief. Doc. #10, Exh. E, P. In his petition for review to the

Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued that he had filed many motions that were never

addressed and suggested that the state court was a “circus.” Doc. #10, Exh. R (last paragraph

before conclusion). But, he failed to raise the claim as a due process violation. 

By failing to raise the claim on direct appeal or properly raise it in post-conviction

proceedings, Petitioner failed to give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve the

claim, and thus failed to exhaust his state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no

longer have a remedy if he returned to the state court. As a result, the claim is procedurally

defaulted. Furthermore, Petitioner has not alleged cause for the default and actual prejudice,

nor has he shown a miscarriage of justice to overcome the procedural default. Accordingly,

the court will recommend that ground four be dismissed as procedurally defaulted.

B. Merits Analysis

1. AEDPA Standard of Review

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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Under the AEDPA4

, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the State court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or (2)

"if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent."

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an 'unreasonable

application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then

applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the

“unreasonable application” clause requires the state court’s application of Supreme Court law

to be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). "When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the 'last reasoned decision' by a state court ...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Legal Standard for Ineffective Assistance Claims

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established

by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show: (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a

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reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

3. Ground Two

As set forth above, Petitioner properly exhausted four of the six claims of ineffective

assistance of trial alleged in ground two. In claim 1, Petitioner alleges that the attorney failed

to call witnesses from a list supplied to him. He further contends that the testimony from

these witnesses probably could have changed the verdict. Petitioner, however, provides

nothing more to support this claim. He fails to say who was on the list and what they would

have said. He fails to explain how their testimony would have changed the outcome.

Petitioner provides no factual support for his claim to show that his lawyer fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness or that but for counsel’s error the result of the

proceeding would have been different.

In claim 2, Petitioner contends that he was not allowed to testify in his own behalf.

Petitioner offers nothing more in the way of factual support to show how this constituted

ineffective assistance of counsel. He says nothing about how his lawyer prevented him from

testifying, nor does he explain what he would have said that would have changed the

outcome. Plaintiff has not satisfied either prong of the Strickland standard with regard to

claim 2. 

In claim 3, Petitioner alleges that his attorney failed to raise objections to preserve his

rights on appeal. Again, he offers no further factual support for his claim. He doesn’t

explain what objections his lawyer failed to raise or how raising those objections would have

changed the outcome of the case. Plaintiff has failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland

standard with regard to claim 3.

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In claim 6, Petitioner alleges that his attorney failed to pursue the issue of the jury

conversing in the hallway about the outcome of the case before the verdict. Petitioner claims

that his lawyer and the bailiff observed the jury talking about the case “with any interested

party.” He contends that the judge simply told them not to do it again. Petitioner, however,

fails to explain how his lawyer’s failure to further pursue this issue constituted deficient

performance. He also fails to allege that the result of the proceeding would have been

different if his lawyer had done more on this issue. Thus, Petitioner has again failed to

satisfy the standard for ineffective assistance set forth in Strickland. Because none of

Petitioner’s exhausted ineffective assistance claims in ground two have merit, the court will

recommend that they be dismissed.

4. Ground Three

As explained above, of the 12 claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel set

forth in ground three, only one, claim 2, was properly exhausted. In that claim, Petitioner

alleges that his appellate lawyer would not communicate with him about the trial despite

numerous requests from Petitioner by mail. Petitioner presents no additional factual support

for his claim. He fails to explain what he wanted to communicate with his appellate lawyer

about. He also fails to allege that the result of the appeal would have been different if his

lawyer had communicated with him more. Petitioner has failed to satisfy either prong of the

Strickland standard for ineffective assistance. The court will therefore recommend that claim

2 of ground three be denied on its merits.

C. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court finds that grounds one and four are

procedurally defaulted and recommends that they be dismissed on that basis. The court

further finds that claims 4 and 5 of ground two, and claims 1 and 3-12 of ground three, are

procedurally defaulted and recommends that they be dismissed on that basis.

Regarding the exhausted claims, the court finds that claims 1-3 and 6 of ground two,

and claim 2 of ground three, are without merit and recommends that they be dismissed on

that basis.

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Having found that all of Petitioner’s claims should be dismissed, the court will

recommend that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed.

`IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

 That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and

jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has

not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right..

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 4th day of February, 2010.

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