Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01583/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01583-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

____________

No. 15-1583

____________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Rakesh Vasant Hirani

a/k/a Rakeshkumar Vasantlal Patel

Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska

____________

Submitted: February 11, 2016

Filed: May 31, 2016

____________

Before SMITH and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and GRITZNER, District Judge. 1

____________

GRITZNER, District Judge.

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the

1

Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

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The United States brought an action against Rakesh Hirani, also known as

Rakeshkumar Patel (Appellant), pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), seeking revocation

of Appellant’s citizenship and cancellation of his certificate of naturalization. The

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States. This appeal 2

followed. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant was born in India in 1972 and was named Rakeshkumar Vasantlal

Patel. After arriving in the United Statesin 1991, Appellant applied for asylum using

his birth year, 1972, and his given name, Rakeshkumar Vasantlal Patel. Prior to

coming to the United States, Appellant also used the family name Rakesh Hirani, but

never attempted to change his legal name. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization

Service (INS) denied Appellant’s request for asylum and notified Appellant by U.S.

mail of the denial on October 13, 1993, and again on February 24, 1994.

Following the denial of Appellant’s asylumrequest, a deportation hearing was

held on November 22, 1995. Appellant did not appear and now contends he did not

receive notice of that hearing. After the hearing, the INS issued a decision and order

finding Appellant deportable from the United States. A warrant of deportation was

issued against him on March 18, 1996. On April 5, 1996, the INS sent a letter to

Appellant informing him that he had been found deportable and instructed him to

report to a U.S. Immigration Officer on April 16, 1996, to complete his deportation.

Appellant did not report asinstructed. Appellant argues he did not receive the notice

until August 1996. Nonetheless, Appellant voluntarily left the country on the advice

of an attorney in 1997.

The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the

2

District of Nebraska.

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In 1998, Appellant’s wife filed a petition with the INS on Appellant’s behalf

for permanent residency using the name Rakesh Hirani and a false date of birth in

1968. According to Appellant, the same attorney who advised him to leave the

country in 1997 prepared the 1998 petition for permanent residency. The INS

approved Appellant’s petition on October 18, 1999, and admitted Appellant as a

permanent resident on April 11, 2000.

On January 15, 2003, Appellant filed an application for naturalization, Form

N-400, again using the name Rakesh Hirani and a false date of birth in 1968.

Appellant testified that he did not fill out the Form N-400, but could not remember

who would have completed it for him. The answers to the questions on the Form N400 certified that Appellant had never used another name, had never given false

information to attain an immigration benefit, and had never been deported from the

United States. Appellant signed and dated the Form N-400, affirming its contents

under penalty of perjury. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

3

approved Appellant’s application for naturalization on May 29, 2003.

On January 28, 2014, the United States filed an action to revoke Appellant’s

naturalization. On January 16, 2015, the United Statesmoved for summaryjudgment,

arguing that Appellant procured his naturalization illegally, or alternatively, that

Appellant procured naturalization bymaterial misrepresentation or concealment. The

district court granted the motion on the basis of material misrepresentation or

concealment. This appeal followed.

The INS ceased to exist in 2003 and its functions were transferred to the

3

Department of Homeland Security. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 251, 552, 557. USCIS is a

division within the Department of Homeland Security.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s grant ofsummary judgment de novo, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Castillo v. Ridge, 445

F.3d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir. 2006). “Summary judgment is proper when no genuine

issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fezard v. United Cerebral Palsy of Cent. Ark., 809 F.3d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir.

2016) (quoting Neb. Beef, Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Bus. Credit, Inc., 470 F.3d 1249, 1251

(8th Cir. 2006)). “This court may affirm on any basis supported by the record.” 

Hasenwinkel v. Mosaic, 809 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 2015).

“[T]he Government ‘carries a heavy burden of proof in a proceeding to divest

a naturalized citizen of his citizenship’” because the loss of American citizenship can

have “severe and unsettling consequences.” Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S.

490, 505 (1981) (quoting Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 269 (1961)); see

also United States v. Hansl, 439 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2006). Due to the importance

of the rights at stake, “[t]he evidence justifying revocation of citizenship must be

‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ and not leave ‘the issue in doubt.’” Fedorenko,

449 U.S. at 505 (quoting Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943)).

The Supreme Court has analogized the government’s burden of proof in

denaturalization proceedings to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of criminal

cases. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949) (“This burden is

substantially identical with thatrequired in criminal cases–proof beyond a reasonable

doubt.”); see also Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 795 (1988) (Stevens, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he factors that support the imposition of so heavy

a burden are largely the same in both contexts.”).

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B. Revocation of Citizenship pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451

The United States shall institute proceedings to revoke citizenship if

naturalization was “illegally procured” or “procured by concealment of a materialfact

or by willful misrepresentation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).

Appellant argues the district court erred by considering circumstantial evidence

to conclude that Appellant had willfully misrepresented or concealed a material fact. 

Citing Espinoza-Espinoza v. INS, 554 F.2d 921, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1977), the district

court explained that a misrepresentation or concealment is willful if it is deliberate

and voluntary, and that circumstantial evidence can demonstrate willfulness. 

Appellant does not dispute the district court’s interpretation of willfulness, but rather

argues it was error to consider circumstantial evidence when the government was

required to produce evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and convincing.

Appellant’s argument assumes that circumstantial evidence is inherently less

probative or reliable than direct evidence and is therefore unable to satisfy high

evidentiary burdens. Yet Appellant’s distinction between the probative value of

direct and circumstantial evidence has no basis in the law, which treats both types of

evidence alike. “The reason for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is

both clear and deep rooted: ‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may

also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’” Desert Palace,

Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S.

500, 508 n.17 (1957)). “The adequacy of circumstantial evidence also extends

beyond civil cases; we have never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial

evidence in support of a criminal conviction, even though proof beyond a reasonable

doubt is required.” Id.; see United States v. Crumley, 528 F.3d 1053, 1065 (8th Cir.

2008) (“[C]ircumstantial evidence is just as probative as any other type of

evidence.”); United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 1985)

(“Circumstantial evidence is ‘intrinsically as probative as direct evidence’ and may

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be the sole support for a conviction.” (quoting United States v. Two Eagle, 633 F.2d

93, 97 (8th Cir. 1980))).

In both civil and criminal cases, circumstantial evidence is considered just as

probative as direct evidence, and for that reason, circumstantial evidence may

constitute evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and convincing. Because

circumstantial evidence is compatible with the evidentiary standard applicable to

denaturalization proceedings, the district court did not err by considering

circumstantial evidence to find Appellant had willfully concealed or misrepresented

material facts.

C. Appellant’s Two Names

Appellant also claims the district court erred by considering Appellant’s use

of the name Rakeshkumar Patel in his 1991 asylum application, as well as on bills

and tax returns dated from 2011 through 2014, to determine that Appellant procured

naturalization by willful misrepresentation. Arguing that such evidence does not

“relate to Appellant’s naturalization in 2003,” Appellant’s Br. 19, as required by the

four-factor test established by the Supreme Court in Kungys, Appellant asserts that

only alleged concealments relating to Appellant’s naturalization process are to be

considered for this inquiry.

Section 1451(a) covers only concealments or misrepresentations that procure

an order and certificate of naturalization. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 773 (plurality

opinion). “Procurement of other benefits, including visas, is not covered.” Id.; see

also United States v. Ciurinskas, 976 F. Supp. 1167, 1189 (N.D. Ind. 1997)

(“Naturalization that was procured by ‘concealment of a material fact or by willful

misrepresentation’ in the naturalization, as opposed to immigration, process, may be

revoked and canceled.” (quoting § 1451(a) (citing Kungys, 485 U.S. at 773 (plurality

opinion)))). Appellant argues that his use of the names Rakeshkumar Patel and

Rakesh Hirani outside the naturalization context may not be considered at all under

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Kungys because his prior use of those names does not relate to his naturalization. We

disagree.

Kungys makes clear that misrepresentations made outside the naturalization

context are not grounds for denaturalization under § 1451(a). But Kungys did not

hold that a court may not consider statements made outside the naturalization context

to determine whether statements made in the naturalization process were true orfalse. 

Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the district court did not view Appellant’s past use

of the names Rakeshkumar Patel and Rakesh Hirani to be actionable

misrepresentations themselves. Rather, the district court properly considered

Appellant’s prior use of those namesto determine whether Appellant waslying when

he wrote on the Form N-400 that his legal name and only name was Rakesh Hirani. 

Appellant’s habitual use of the name Rakeshkumar Patel throughout his life clearly

relates to whether Appellant’s true and only name was Rakesh Hirani. See

Misrepresentation, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“an incorrect, unfair, or

false statement; an assertion that does not accord with the facts”); Shipley v. Ark.

Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 333 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2003) (“A misrepresentation

is a statement of fact that is untrue or a failure to disclose a fact in response to a

specific question.”). It was entirely proper for the district court to consider

Appellant’s use of the names Rakesh Hirani and Rakeshkumar Patel to determine

Appellant’s name. Therefore, the district court did not err by considering Appellant’s

prior use of the names Rakeshkumar Patel and Rakesh Hirani outside the

naturalization context. 

D. Sufficiency of Evidence

Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the district

court’s judgment. There are four requirements for revoking naturalization on the

basis of a misrepresentation: (1) the naturalized citizen must have misrepresented or

concealed some fact; (2) the misrepresentation or concealment must have been

willful; (3) the fact must have been material; and (4) the naturalized citizen must have

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procured his citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation or concealment. Kungys,

485 U.S. at 767 (citing Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 507 n.28). Summary judgment is

warranted “if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the naturalized

citizen, there is no genuine issue of materialfact asto whether clear, unequivocal, and

convincing evidence supports denaturalization.” United States v. Arango, 670 F.3d

988, 992 (9th Cir. 2012).

1. Misrepresentation or Concealment

Appellant’s FormN-400 stated that Appellant’s legal name and only name was

Rakesh Hirani, that he was born in 1968, and that he had never been ordered

deported. Appellant argues there are genuine issues of fact as to whether Appellant

himself misrepresented or concealed any information to secure naturalization,

contending that someone other than Appellant completed Appellant’s Form N-400.

Although Appellant testified that he cannot identify who prepared the application for

him, the Form N-400 states that Appellant prepared the form himself. Furthermore,

Appellant admits he signed the Form N-400, certifying its contents were correct. 

That certification issufficient to show, clearly, unequivocally, and convincingly, that

Appellant made the misrepresentations. See Injeti v. U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Servs., 737 F.3d 311, 318 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Sadig,

271 F. App’x 290, 295 (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“The applicant imposes a

requirement on himself to be forthcoming by swearing under penalty of perjury that

the information in the application istrue as of the date of the interview.” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)). Appellant’s lack of recall regarding who

transcribed the answers onto the FormN-400 does not undermine the undisputed facts

that Appellant admittedly provided the answers to the questions on the Form N-400

and that he signed the Form N-400 attesting the accuracy of those answers under

penalty of perjury. See Frevert v. Ford Motor Co., 614 F.3d 466, 473 (8th Cir. 2010)

(“[A] properly supported motion for summary judgment is not defeated by selfserving affidavits.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). While Appellantmakes

much of a factual dispute surrounding the preparation ofthe FormN-400, that dispute

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is ultimately neither genuine nor material. See Gazal v. Boehringer Ingelheim

Pharm., Inc., 647 F.3d 833, 837-38 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A dispute is genuine if the

evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either

party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case.” (citing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986))). The district court

did not err in finding undisputed and unequivocal evidence that Appellant

misrepresented or concealed some fact.

2. Willfulness of Misrepresentation

Appellant does not dispute the willfulness of Appellant’s misrepresentation or

concealment during the naturalization proceedings, and in any event the district court

did not err in concluding that Appellant’s misrepresentation or concealment was

deliberate and voluntary. The government is not required to prove intent to deceive,

but rather must demonstrate only that an applicant willfully made a representation

that does not accord with the facts. See Espinoza-Espinoza, 554 F.2d at 925. 

Appellant’s signature under penalty of perjury affirming that his name, and only

name, was Rakesh Hirani demonstrates that the misrepresentation was willful. The

district court did not err in finding undisputed and unequivocal evidence that this

requirement had been met.

3. Materiality

A concealment or misrepresentation is material if it has that “natural tendency

to influence the decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.” Kungys,

485 U.S. at 772. “[T]he test more specifically is whether the misrepresentation or

concealment had a natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the applicant was

qualified.” Id. at 771-72. A misrepresentation or concealment has such a tendency

“if the true [representation] would predictably have disclosed other facts relevant to

[the applicant’s] qualifications.” Id. at 774. The issue of materiality is a legal

question for the court. Id. at 772. “[W]hat is relevant is what would have ensued

from official knowledge of the misrepresented fact.” Id. at 775.

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Appellant’s legal name Rakeshkumar Patel, his true date of birth, and his

deportation history are material facts under Kungys. The misrepresentation and

concealment of Appellant’s identity had the natural tendency to affect his

naturalization because, had the USCIS known Appellant was named Rakeshkumar

Patel, Appellant’s immigration history and qualifications to naturalize could have

been revealed. Thus, these misrepresentations and concealments clearly would tend

to impede the inquiry into Appellant’s naturalization eligibility. See Monter v.

Gonzales, 430 F.3d 546, 557 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a misrepresentation made

to procure a visa or entry into the United States is material if it “tends to shut off a

line of inquiry” relevant to eligibility) (quoting Matter of S- and B- C-, 9 I. & N. Dec.

436, 447 (BIA 1961), abrogated on other grounds by Matter of Ng, 17 I. & N. Dec.

536, 537 (BIA 1980)); Kulle v. INS, 825 F.2d 1188, 1196 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding

that a misrepresentation in the immigration context was material “insofar as it closed

off a relevant line of inquiry” as to eligibility). Moreover, Appellant’s identity as

Rakeshkumar Patel was material because a deportation order had been filed against

him under that name, which bore directly on his eligibility to naturalize. For these

reasons, the district court properly concluded Appellant’s misrepresentations were

material.

4. Procurement

Although we have concluded that Appellant’s misrepresentations were

material, we must still determine whether Appellant procured his naturalization as a

result. An applicant “procures” naturalization on the basis of a misrepresentation if

there is a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the acquisition of

citizenship. See United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A]t

a minimum, the procurement requirement ‘demands . . . that citizenship be obtained

as a result of the application process in which the misrepresentations or concealments

were made.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Kungys, 485 U.S. at 776

(plurality))). In Kungys, a majority of the Court agreed that the procurement

requirement wasseparate frommateriality. Those justices divided, however, asto the

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required nexus between an applicant’s misrepresentation and the acquisition of

citizenship. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 776-84. The Seventh Circuit has aptly summarized

that division:

Justice Stevens, speaking for two others, advocated what amounts to a

“but for” test-that the government has to establish that citizenship would

not have been conferred but for the misrepresentation. Justice Scalia,

joined by two others, rejected this construction because it would make

the materiality requirement meaningless, “requiring, in addition to

distortion of the decision [(procurement)], a natural tendency to distort

the decision [(materiality)].” [Kungys, 485 U.S.] at 776. But Justice

Scalia and company did agree that procurement requires more than just

obtaining citizenship “as a result of the application process in which the

misrepresentations or concealments were made.” To them, proof of a

material misrepresentation created a presumption that citizenship was

procured on that basis. However, the citizen could rebut that

presumption by showing that she was actually eligible for citizenship. 

Justice Brennan wrote a separate concurrence joining in Justice Scalia’s

opinion to make a controlling plurality. Justice Brennan’s controlling

opinion stressed that citizenship is a “most precious right” and added a

more restrictive gloss to Justice Scalia’s view. Id. at 783 (Brennan, J.,

concurring). Although Justice Brennan agreed that a material falsehood

can raise a presumption of ineligibility, he said that presumption does

not arise unless the government produces evidence sufficient to raise a

“fair inference of ineligibility.” Id. at 783 (Brennan, J., concurring). At

the end of the day, then, the government only wins if it shows that the

citizen misrepresented a material fact and it is “fair to infer that the

citizen was actually ineligible.” Id. at 784 (Brennan J., concurring).

Latchin, 554 F.3d at 713-14 (first and second alterations in original) (footnote

omitted); accord United States v. Mensah, 737 F.3d 789, 808 (1st Cir. 2013); United

States v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Puerta, 982

F.2d 1297, 1302-04 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Agunbiade, 172 F.3d 864, 1999

WL 26937, at *2-3 (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 1999) (unpublished per curiam).

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Applying the Latchin court’s rationale, Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion

in Kungys controls. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When

a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys

the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position

taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest

grounds.’”) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of

Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Although Justice Brennan agreed with Justice

Scalia’s opinion for the Court that a presumption of disqualification should arise once

materiality is proved, Justice Brennan added that such a presumption should arise

only where there is a fair inference that the applicant was actually disqualified. 

Kungys, 485 U.S. at 783 (Brennan, J., concurring). In joining the Court’s opinion,

Justice Brennan remarked that “nothing in the Court’s opinion is inconsistent with

this standard . . . .” Id.; see also Puerta, 982 F.2d at 1304 (“Justice Brennan’s

construction may be taken as the holding.”).

In the present case, the district court found that Appellant had procured his

naturalization by misrepresenting or concealing his true name. The district court

reasoned that had Appellant disclosed his true name, the USCIS would have realized

Appellant was statutorily ineligible to naturalize. On appeal, the government argues

Appellant was statutorily ineligible to naturalize because following his deportation,

Appellant was subject to a ten-year bar on reentering the United States pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii), and therefore could not lawfully naturalize during that

period. The government did not raise this basis for Appellant’s ineligibility with the

district court.

Ordinarily, we will not consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. 

Hartman v. Workman, 476 F.3d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 2007). However, we may consider

a newly raised argument “if it is purely legal and requires no additional factual

development, or if a manifest injustice would otherwise result.” Peter Kiewit Sons’,

Inc. v. Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc., 809 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Orr

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v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 2002)). We have addressed new

arguments raised on appeal where the new issue is encompassed in a more general

argument previously raised and no new evidence is presented on appeal. See, e.g.,

PCTV Gold, Inc. v. SpeedNet, LLC., 508 F.3d 1137, 1144 n.5 (8th Cir. 2007); Sexton

v. Martin, 210 F.3d 905, 914 n.8 (8th Cir. 2000); Stockmen’s Livestock Mkt., Inc. v.

Norwest Bank of Sioux City, 135 F.3d 1236, 1243 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998).

Moreover, we may affirm the district court’s grant of a motion for summary

judgment on any basis supported by the record. Haukereid v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger

Corp., 816 F.3d 527, 531 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hohn v. BNSF Ry. Co., 707 F.3d

995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2013)); see also Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 911, 921 n.9 (8th Cir.

1999) (affirming the grant of summary judgment on grounds not considered by the

district court); United States v. Sager, 743 F.2d 1261, 1263 n.4 (8th Cir. 1984) (“We

review judgments, not opinions, and we may affirm a judgment on any ground

supported by the record, whether or not that ground was urged below or passed on by

the District Court.”).

It is appropriate that we consider the government’s newly raised argument that

Appellant was disqualified from naturalizing due to a ten-year reentry bar following

his deportation because it is a purely legal argument, requires no further factual

development, and is encompassed by the government’s more general argument before

the district court. As previously noted, the government argued on summary judgment

that Appellant’s deportation history rendered him ineligible to become a lawful

permanent resident and therefore ineligible to become a United States citizen. The

government’s new reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) as a specific legal basis

for that argument is merely a citation germane to Appellant’s ability to naturalize

lawfully, and is therefore properly before this court.

To be eligible to naturalize, an alien must be a lawful permanent resident.

§ 1429. Under § 1255(a), an alien may become a lawful permanent resident only if

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he is admissible to the United States and eligible for an immigrant visa. An alien who

“departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who

seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal . .

. is inadmissible.” § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). Taken together, these statutory provisions

entail that an alien who is barred from admission to the United States for a period of

years following deportation is ineligible to naturalize during that period.

The evidence is clear, unequivocal, and convincing that Appellant left the

United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and that Appellant sought

admission to the United States within ten years of his departure. Appellant was thus

inadmissible under § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii), ineligible to become a lawful permanent

resident under § 1255(a), and therefore statutorily ineligible to naturalize under

§ 1429. Because Appellant’s material misrepresentations concealed his statutory

ineligibility to naturalize, Appellant procured his naturalization on the basis of those

misrepresentations.

For the above reasons, the undisputed facts established clear, unequivocal, and

convincing evidence to revoke Appellant’s citizenship and to cancel Appellant’s

certificate of naturalization on the basis ofrepresentation or concealment of a material

fact.

E. Collateral Attack on Underlying Deportation Order

Appellant contends that even if we consider the statutory bar on reentry

following Appellant’s deportation, summary judgment was nonetheless inappropriate

because Appellant has disputed the validity of the 1995 deportation order.

Specifically, Appellant contends he never received adequate notice of his deportation

hearing, and that the deportation order was therefore invalid for failure of due

process.

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“A court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted

all administrative remedies available . . . as of right.” § 1252(d)(1). “A ‘petitioner

has not exhausted administrative remedies with respect to’ a particular issue if he

‘fails to raise [it] when he appeals to the Board.’” Martinez Carcamo v. Holder, 713

F.3d 916, 925 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Ateka v. Ashcroft, 384

F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2004)). Although this Court does have jurisdiction to review

certain unexhausted constitutional claims, we will not consider claims that concern

procedural errors correctable by the administrative tribunal. Bracic v. Holder, 603

F.3d 1027, 1032 (8th Cir. 2010). Moreover, even if we were to entertain a due

process challenge to Appellant’s 1995 deportation order, Appellant could onlymount

such a challenge by showing he was functionally deprived of the right to judicial

review. Appellant cannot make that showing.

The statute provides that an order of removal entered in absentia may be

rescinded “upon a motion to reopen filed at any time if the alien demonstratesthat the

alien did not receive notice” of the hearing. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). 

Even if Appellant’s claimed notice issue were not a correctable procedural error

under Bracic, Appellant would nonetheless be barred from disputing the validity of

the 1995 deportation order because, in the intervening twenty years, he never filed a

motion to reopen the removal proceedings. It is also significant that Appellant

admittedly obtained and acted on the advice of an attorney when he left the country

in 1997, and yet did not pursue the notice issue, further demonstrating that Appellant

was not functionally denied judicial review of the 1995 removal order. Because

Appellant acted on advice of counsel at the time, and because § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)

does not set out any time limit for motions to reopen, Appellant was not denied the

right to judicial review of the 1995 deportation order, and Appellant has not

exhausted the administrative remedies available to him by statute. For these reasons,

we will not now consider a collateral challenge to the 1995 deportation order.

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III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the district court did not err by considering circumstantial

evidence to conclude Appellant’s misrepresentations or concealments were willful.

Nor did the district court err by considering Appellant’s habitual use of the name

RakeshkumarPatel outside the naturalization process to determine whether Appellant

had misrepresented his name. Appellant may not collaterally attack the 1995

deportation order entered against him in this proceeding. In light of the foregoing,

the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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Appellate Case: 15-1583 Page: 16 Date Filed: 05/31/2016 Entry ID: 4404687