Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00055/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00055-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANET KAREN WORSHAM,

Plaintiff, 

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. 

Case No.: 15cv55-WQH-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No. 

12] and DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [ECF No. 11]

Plaintiff Janet Karen Worsham (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s 

application for disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of 

the Social Security Act. Plaintiff moves the Court for summary judgment 

reversing the Commissioner and ordering an award of benefits (ECF No. 

11). Defendant has moved for summary judgment affirming the denial of 

benefits. (ECF No. 12).

For the reasons expressed herein, the Court recommends that 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s 

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motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

Background

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff alleges that she became disabled on May 1, 2006, due to 

several medical conditions, including bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome, 

spondylolisthesis, and fibromyalgia. (A.R. at 22-23). Plaintiff’s allegation of 

depression and anxiety was determined nonsevere by the ALJ because she 

experienced no more than minimal limitations on her ability to perform 

basic mental work activities. (A.R. at 23). Plaintiff’s date of birth of June

28, 1960, categorizes her as an individual defined as closely approaching 

advanced age at the time of filing. 

II. Procedural History

On October 5, 2010, Plaintiff protectively filed for supplemental social 

security disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security 

Act. (A.R. at 20). Her claim was denied initially on January 1, 2011, and

denied upon reconsideration on June 2, 2011. (Id.). Plaintiff requested a 

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and a hearing was 

held February 21, 2013, before ALJ Robert Iafe (A.R. at 29). Plaintiff 

appeared and was represented by counsel. (Id.). Plaintiff, impartial 

vocational expert Gloria J. Lasoff, and impartial medical expert Robert S. 

Karsh, M.D. testified at the hearing. (A.R. at 20). 

On May 31, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Plaintiff 

not disabled. (A.R. at 20-29). Plaintiff appealed and the Appeals Council 

denied Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision. (A.R. at 1-3). 

Consequently, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner. 

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On January 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court 

seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 1). On 

April 3, 2015, Defendant answered and lodged the administrative record 

with the Court. (ECF Nos. 7, 8). On May 6, 2015, Plaintiff moved for 

summary judgment. (ECF No. 11). On June 5, 2015, the Commissioner 

cross-moved for summary judgment and responded in opposition to 

Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF Nos. 12). Plaintiff did not file a Reply to 

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

Discussion

I. Legal Standard

The supplemental security income program provides benefits to 

disabled persons without substantial resources and little income. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1383. To qualify, a claimant must establish an inability to engage in 

“substantial gainful activity” because of a “medically determinable physical 

or mental impairment” that “has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A). 

The disabling impairment must be so severe that, considering age, 

education, and work experience, the claimant cannot engage in any kind of 

substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 

1382(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner makes this assessment through a process of up to 

five-steps. First, the claimant must not be engaged in substantial, gainful 

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Second, the claimant must have a “severe” 

impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, the medical evidence of the 

claimant’s impairment is compared to a list of impairments that are 

presumed severe enough to preclude work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the 

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claimant’s impairment meets or is equivalent to the requirements for one of 

the listed impairments, benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the 

claimant’s impairment does not meet or is not equivalent to the 

requirements of a listed impairment, the analysis continues to a fourth and 

possibly fifth step and considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity. 

At the fourth step, the claimant’s relevant work history is considered along 

with the claimant’s residual functional capacity. If the claimant can 

perform the claimant’s past relevant work, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(e). At the fifth step, reached if the claimant is found not able to 

perform the claimant’s past relevant work, the issue is whether claimant 

can perform any other work that exists in the national economy, considering 

the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity. If claimant cannot do other work that exists in the national 

economy, benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). 

 Section 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, through Section 405(g) of 

the Act, allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of a final 

agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3), 405(g). The 

scope of judicial review is limited, however, and the Commissioner’s denial 

of benefits “will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Brawner v. Secretary of Health and 

Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Green v. 

Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than 

a preponderance. Sandqathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“[I]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

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1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from the 

Commissioner’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Human 

Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). If the evidence supports more 

than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. 

Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). When the evidence is 

inconclusive, “questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the 

testimony are functions solely of the Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 

F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). 

The ALJ has a special duty in social security cases to fully and fairly 

develop the record in order to make an informed decision on a claimant’s 

entitlement to disability benefits. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 

(9th Cir. 1991). Because disability hearings are not adversarial in nature, 

the ALJ must “inform himself about the facts relevant to his decision,” even 

if the claimant is represented by counsel. Id. (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 

461 U.S. 458, 471 n.1 (1983)).

Even if a reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s conclusions, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to 

apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and reaching his 

or her decision. Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing 

court may also remand the matter to the Social Security Administration for 

further proceedings. Id.

II. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined in the 

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Social Security Act, from October 5, 2010, through the date of the ALJ’s 

decision of May 13, 2013, pursuant to §§ 216(1) and 223(d) of the Social 

Security Act. (A.R. at 29). The ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that meets or is medically 

equivalent to the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 

404.1526). (A.R. at 24). Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 

medically determinable mental impairment of depression and anxiety “did 

not cause more than minimal limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to perform 

basic mental work activities. (A.R. at 23). The ALJ found Plaintiff had only 

mild restriction in activities of daily living, mild difficulties in maintaining 

social functioning, mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, 

persistence or pace as to detailed or complex tasks, and no episodes of 

decompensation of extended duration. (Id.). 

In addition, the ALJ found Plaintiff had bilateral carpel tunnel 

syndrome with no finding of any motor function impairment. (A.R. at 25). 

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had spondylothesis/osteoarthritis but 

showed no evidence of nerve root compression, motor problems, atrophy, 

muscle weakness, or straight leg raising. (Id.). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff 

had full range of motion of the hips with only one reported examination 

finding decreased lumber flexion. The ALJ also noted Plaintiff had been 

diagnosed with fibromyalgia and prescribed medication. Based on these 

limitations, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of 

one of the listed impairments. (Id.). 

Citing to the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found that 

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Plaintiff could perform past work, and therefore did not meet the final step 

of the evaluation process. The ALJ also found Plaintiff could perform other 

jobs available in both the local and national economy. (A.R. at 28). The ALJ 

specifically noted the following medical history to be of particular relevance:

2001: Plaintiff’s nerve conduction test in August showed some 

sensation in impairment but the medical expert testified that there was no 

evidence of functional impairment. (A.R. at 26, 608-610).

2001, 2005, and 2007 MRI results: Plaintiff’s 2001 MRI showed no 

nerve root impingement, thecal sac compression, or spinal stenosis. (A.R. at 

611-616). Plaintiff’s 2005 MRI showed only minimal bulges in the lumbar 

spine without significant protrusion or stenosis. (Id.). Plaintiff’s 2007 MRI 

showed no nerve root compression, no motor problems, atrophy, muscle 

weakness or straight leg raising issues. Her hips had full range of motion 

on examination but some decreased lumbar flexion was reported at one 

examination. (Id.).

2011: Plaintiff underwent a complete psychiatric evaluation by Dr. 

Glassman, M.D., a board certified psychiatrist. (A.R. at 555-572). Dr. 

Glassman reported that Plaintiff “suffers from a pain disorder with medical 

and psychological factors, generalized anxiety disorder, borderline 

personality features and has a GAF of 70.” 1 Dr. Glassman noted that 

Plaintiff appeared clean, neat and well groomed. She had a “well put 

 

1 A GAF score is a rough estimate of an individual’s psychological, social, and 

occupational functioning used to reflect the individual’s need for treatment.” Vargas v. 

Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1998). According to the DSM-IV, a GAF 

score between 61 and 70 describes “mild symptoms. . .but generally functioning pretty 

well. . . .” DSM-IV-TR, p.34. 

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together” physical presentation. She was well engaged and maintained good 

eye contact and showed mild to moderate anxiety, but did not present as sad 

or depressed. (A.R. at 27, 558). Dr. Glassman opined that Plaintiff 

appeared to have above average intellectual functioning and her thought 

processes were coherent, relevant and goal directed. (A.R. at 559). 

According to Dr. Glassman, Plaintiff told him that she had worked 

throughout 2010 looking for real estate deals. (A.R. at 557). 

The ALJ also considered the testimony of vocational expert, Gloria 

Lasoff, (VE). Based upon the vocational profile and hypotheticals provided 

by the ALJ at that time, VE Lasoff testified that the title and 

characteristics of Plaintiff’s past employment translated to positions of sales 

representative and financial services, also sales agent real estate. (A.R. at 

79). These positions involve a light level of exertion, ability to stand and 

walk for about six out of an eight hour day, sitting for about six out of an 

eight hour day, with normal breaks, never climbing ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolding.

The VE further testified, that if the ability to stand and walk was 

limited to four out of eight hours, and sit for six out of eight hours, and 

move to limiting work to simple tasks with frequent but not constant 

interaction with others, her prior employment would be precluded but she 

would be able to perform other work in the national/local economy. (A.R. at 

80). For example, VE Lasoff testified that with the additional restrictions 

as noted above Plaintiff could perform the work of garment folder, 789.687-

066, storage facility rental clerk, 295.367-026, or production worker, 

706.687-010. (A.R. at 80). Lastly, the ALJ posited the additional restriction 

to the second hypothetical of a change in mental “skill” where the worker 

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would be off task for 15 minutes per hour. VE Lasoff testified that, as 

described, that person would be unable to sustain full time employment. 

(A.R. at 81). 

During the Administrative Hearing, Plaintiff testified she works only 

on a part time basis as a realtor. She takes referrals and works at her own 

pace and rest[s] in between. (A.R. at 40). Plaintiff testified she has back 

pain, fatigue, anxiety and carpel tunnel in both wrists. (Id.). According to 

Plaintiff’s testimony, she could not sit for more than 15-20 minutes because 

of pain in her hips and her feet go numb. Her back sometimes felt like “it’s 

broken,” “like separated from [her] spine,” she has a really bad bunion on 

her right foot and sometimes “can’t hardly walk. . . .” (A.R. at 49). Plaintiff 

also testified that if she is working on something for a while and gets 

uncomfortable she “gets up to stretch, walk...go back and forth to the desk 

and walk around, do something standing up” and eventually gets it done. 

(A.R. at 51-52). The ALJ considered and found not credible Plaintiff’s 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her 

symptoms to the extent they conflict with the residual functional capacity 

assessment as found by the ALJ. (A.R. at 25 -28).

III. Plaintiff’s Argument in Support of Summary Judgment

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discredited her testimony 

about symptoms and pain. (ECF No. 11). According to Plaintiff, the pain 

and physical limitations she experiences as a result of her physical and 

mental impairments were sufficiently proven by the evidence presented to 

be severe. The underlying argument put forth by Plaintiff to support her 

allegation of error is that “[t]he ALJ’s credibility determination is indicative 

of an extreme lack of medical understanding of the debilitating effects of 

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fibromyalgia.” (P. at ECF 11, pg. 6, citing Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 

721, 723 (9th Cir. 1998)). Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ failed to 

“properly analyze” her case under Social Security Ruling 12-2p.2 

Defendant contends “no matter how sincere or genuine Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints, the complaints must be reasonable in relation to the 

objective medical evidence.” (ECF No. 12 at pg. 3). Defendant also contends 

that the ALJ had an opportunity to observe Plaintiff’s demeanor at the 

hearing and “[w]hile not a deciding factor, demeanor is still some evidence 

of Plaintiff’s ability to function.” (Id. at pg. 8, citing Fanale v. Astrue, 322 F. 

App’x 566, 567 (9th Cir. 2009) (claimant’s demeanor at the hearing amounts 

to clear and convincing reasons for discrediting her subjective complaint). 

According to Defendant, “[t]he ALJ’s credibility determination was 

sufficiently specific to show the court that the ALJ did not arbitrarily 

disregard Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.” (Id.)

Social Security Ruling 12-2p explains that “as with any claim. . .we 

use a 5-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an adult 

with an MDI (medically determinable impairment) of FM (fibromyalgia) is 

disabled.” (Id. at 5). As noted herein, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the 

following severe impairments: bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, 

spondylolisthesis, and fibromyalgia. (A.R. at 23). SSR 12-2p provides that 

at step 2, a fibromyalgia impairment will be considered severe if it causes a 

limitation or restriction that has more than a minimal effect on the ability 

 

2 The Social Security Administration issues rulings that interpret Social Security 

statutes and regulations. Paulson v. Bowen, 836 F.2d 1249, 1252 n 2 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Although the rulings do not have the force of law, courts defer to them unless they are 

plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the Social Security Act or regulations. Quang Van 

Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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to perform basic work activities. Further, SSR 12-2p explains that at step 3 

“because FM is not a listed impairment” a disability finding cannot rest 

solely on Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia impairment. (Id. at 6). Thus, the ALJ must 

determine whether Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia “medically equals a listing (e.g.

inflammatory arthritis) or whether it medically equals a listing in 

combination with at least one other medically determinable impairment.” 

(Id.). 

As noted herein, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe 

impairments: bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, spondylolisthesis, and 

fibromyalgia. (A.R. at 23). Thus, the ALJ made his step 2 finding. At step 

3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the 

listed impairments.” (A.R. at 24). Therefore, based on the record presented, 

the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s claim of fibromyalgia within the sequential 

evaluation process as discussed in SSR 12-2p. The ALJ then went on to 

address Plaintiff’s credibility regarding her subjective pain/symptoms 

pursuant to the two-step analysis in accordance with the applicable 

authority. 

 An ALJ is not “required to believe every allegation of disabling pain” 

or other impairment. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“[Q]uestions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are 

functions solely of the Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 

(9th Cir. 1982). The factors that an ALJ may consider in deciding whether 

to reject a claimant’s testimony are specified in the Social Security 

Administration rules. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635-37 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Those reasons include “reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies in the 

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testimony or between testimony and conduct, daily activities, and 

unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or follow a 

prescribed course of treatment.” Id. at 636 (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 603). 

However, the reasons provided by the ALJ must be “sufficiently specific to 

permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit a 

claimant’s testimony. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278, F3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 

2002). To meet this burden, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. 

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). The first step requires 

the ALJ to determine whether Plaintiff has presented objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment “which could reasonably be expected 

to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 

F.3d 1028 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). If the ALJ determines that Plaintiff meets 

the first step and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only then 

reject Plaintiff’s testimony by offering “clear and convincing reasons to 

reject a claimant’s subjective testimony, by specifically identifying “what 

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s 

complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In this case, the ALJ cited to the objective medical evidence in the 

record; Plaintiff’s daily activities; evidence regarding Plaintiff’s medical 

treatment; and inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s testimony. 

1) Objective Medical Evidence

Where the ALJ has found that medically determinable impairments 

could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, the ALJ may 

not reject a claimant’s statements regarding the intensity or severity of pain 

or its effect on the ability to work solely because it is not supported by the 

objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2). “The ALJ must 

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specifically identify what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints” 

Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of 1) 

bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; 2) spondylolisthesis; and 3) fibromyalgia. 

(A.R. at 23). The ALJ considered the evidence of Plaintiff’s medical history 

and physical limitations, but found the evidence insufficient to adequately 

support Plaintiff’s claims of disabling pain to the degree alleged. (A.R. at 

25). The ALJ provided several clear and convincing reasons for rejecting 

Plaintiff’s allegations as not credible. Although Plaintiff testified she had 

disabling carpel tunnel syndrome with impaired motor function, the ALJ 

noted that even though the nerve conduction test of August 22, 2001, 

revealed some impairment, Dr. Robert Karsh, M.D., the medical expert, 

testified that there was no evidence in the medical record of functional 

impairment. (A.R. at 26). Indeed, Dr. Karsh specifically stated “[n]obody 

has found impaired motor function.” (A.R. at 25, 45). 

Regarding Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling back pain, the ALJ relied 

on the testimony of Dr. Karsh, who stated at Plaintiff’s hearing that her 

medical records did not show any root impingement or thecal sac 

compression, nor central spinal stenosis or root endema. (A.R. at 612). The 

2005 MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine showed normal height of the lumbar 

vertebral bodies, mild circumferential bulges, no significant protrusion or 

stenosis. (A.R. at 26, 616). The ALJ concluded that both the 2001 and 2005 

MRI of Plaintiff’s back showed no or only minimal abnormalities. (Id.). 

Here, the ALJ did not rely on the lack of medical evidence alone to discredit 

Plaintiff’s statements, therefore, it was not error for the ALJ to consider it 

along with other clearly stated reasons.

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2) Daily Activities

The Social Security regulations explicitly instruct an ALJ to evaluate 

the claimant’s daily activities when determining the claimant’s credibility. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(I); Social Security Ruling 96-7p, (SSA July 2, 

1996). An ALJ is permitted to use “ordinary techniques of credibility 

evaluation” such as inconsistent prior statements when determining 

credibility. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Consistency is “[o]ne strong indication of the credibility of an individual’s 

statements. . . .” Social Sec. Ruling, 96-7p, (SSA July 2, 1996). 

Reviewing the evidence, the ALJ found the Plaintiff’s relatively intact 

self-reported daily activities appeared to demonstrate greater functional 

capacity than Plaintiff alleged. (A.R. at 26-27). For example, Plaintiff 

reported she works at home or her employer’s home and stays for several 

hours. She is able to drive herself there and she also is able to drive her 

daughter to school. (A.R. at 26). Plaintiff reported she cooks simple meals 

and performs household chores. (Id.). In contrast, at the review hearing, 

Plaintiff testified she has a lot of back pain, fatigue, anxiety, “both wrists 

have carpal tunnel and go numb a lot . . . . . just from sitting and writing 

even a note at Christmas time. . . .” (A.R. at 43). According to Plaintiff,

“oftentimes” when she wakes up in the morning her back feels like it’s 

broken. (A.R. at 49).

It is well settled that “[d]isability does not mean that a claimant must 

vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms of human and social 

activity.” Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal 

citations omitted). An ALJ may, however, discredit a claimant’s testimony 

when the claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating 

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capacities that are transferable to a work setting. See Morgan v. Cmm’r 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999); Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. 

Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be 

grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they 

contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment. See Valentine v. 

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F. 3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009). After 

considering the relevant evidence in the record, the ALJ found insufficient

support for the level of limitations alleged by the Plaintiff. (A.R. at 27). 

Consequently, the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling 

physical limitations was not error.

3) Medical Treatment

Evidence that a claimant only received conservative treatment is a 

valid ground for questioning claimant’s statements regarding severity of 

pain or symptoms. Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Additionally, the ALJ is permitted to consider the effectiveness of 

medication in treating Plaintiff’s symptoms. Social Security Ruling 88-13. 

Here, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff has not undergone any surgery for her 

carpel tunnel syndrome “and she did not testify that any surgery was 

planned.” (A.R. at 25). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff was “not taking 

the type of pain medication associated with severe, disabling pain.” (Id.). 

The ALJ also addressed Plaintiff’s claims of mental impairment, 

which he found “did not cause more than a minimal limitation in [her] 

ability to perform basic mental work activities and was therefore 

nonsevere.” (A.R. at 23). Specifically, the ALJ cited to Plaintiff’s 

psychiatric evaluation performed in 2001 by Dr. Jaga Glassman, M.D., a 

board certified psychiatrist, who found that Plaintiff is depressed and 

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anxious but not pervasively depressed, sad or dysphoric (A.R. at 26, 556). 

Dr. Glassman reported that Plaintiff was well put together, engaging, polite 

and respectful in attitude and demeanor. (A.R. at 26, 558). Dr. Glassman 

noted that Plaintiff ambulated without difficulty and sat through the 

interview without obvious pain. Dr. Glassman assessed her GAF at 70, 

with mild impairment in her capacity to maintain concentration, 

persistence and pace due to anxiety. (A.R. at 26, 559). Dr. Glassman 

speculated that with psychiatric/mental health treatment she could see 

improvement of symptoms. (Id.). 

As noted herein, the ALJ has identified several contradictions between 

Plaintiff’s claims of disability and the medical evidence presented in the 

record. Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d at 642 (“In reaching his findings, the 

administrative law judge is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing 

from the evidence.”). The ALJ’s citations to the record represent clear and 

convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff less than credible regarding her 

functional limitations. 

The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s husband’s third party adult 

functioning report of January 2, 2011. An ALJ may consider third party 

statements as evidence regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s impairment. See 

20 C.F.R. § 416.913. “If the ALJ wishes to discount the testimony of the lay 

witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each witness.” Dodrill 

v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993); Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F3d 1113 

(9th Cir. 2009). Here, the ALJ considered the third party adult function 

report from Herbert Worsham, III (Plaintiff’s husband) and opined Mr. 

Worsham’s report was understandably “biased in the [Plaintiff’s] behalf.” 

(A.R. at 27, 291). Thus, the ALJ accorded less weight to Mr. Worsham’s 

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report than the weight given to the reports of the medical expert and 

consultative examiner. (Id.). 

As Plaintiff points out “[i]n evaluating [Plaintiff’s] complaints of 

limitation, the ALJ and this Court are obligated to consider the testimony 

not in a vacuum but in consideration of the record has a whole.” (ECF No. 

11 at 5). Here, the ALJ has made specific findings justifying his decision to 

disbelieve an allegation of excess pain. The ALJ discussed the evidence and 

provided clear and convincing reasons upon which his adverse 

determination of Plaintiff’s credibility was based. Treichler v. 

Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014). 

“Credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ” and are entitled to 

deference if sufficiently supported by the record. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 

597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Russell v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 

1988)). “Where, as here, the ALJ has made specific findings justifying a 

decision to disbelieve an allegation of excess pain, and those findings are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record, our role is not to secondguess that decision.” Id.

IV. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Decision

A review of the record presented, demonstrates that substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision finding Plaintiff not disabled with the 

residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work as a real 

estate sales agent. (A.R. at 28). In this case, the ALJ relied on the opinion 

of Dr. Karsh, M.D., the testifying medical expert, who testified that 

Plaintiff’s medical record repeatedly found Plaintiff in no apparent distress 

with her physical status unremarkable. (A.R. at 46-47). Likewise the 

consultative examiner’s report prepared by Dr. Glassman, M.D., the 

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examining psychiatrist, was given great weight by the ALJ. According to 

the ALJ “[t]his doctor’s report is specific, detailed, and persuasive and the 

conclusions are based on the objective findings.” (A.R. at 27). With the 

exception of Plaintiff’s own allegations, all opinion evidence in the record 

supports the ALJ’s decision. 

The ALJ clearly relied on the findings of the treatment record and 

reports cited in the administrative record. The ALJ’s findings are 

consistent with the record as a whole. Title 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b states 

“after the [ALJ] review[s] all of the evidence relevant to your claim, 

including medical opinions [the ALJ] make[s] findings about what the 

evidence shows.” (Id.). Further, Title 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(6)(d)(1) states in 

part, “[the ALJ is] responsible for making the determination or decision 

about whether [a claimant] meet[s] the statutory definition of disability.” 

The court’s review revealed no ambiguity or error indicating that the 

ALJ’s decision was based on less than substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Accordingly, the court finds the ALJ’s findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, including Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, is 

supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. For these reasons, 

it is recommended Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on her claim 

that the ALJ committed error for failing to fully credit her allegations of 

disabling limitations be DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion for 

summary judgment be GRANTED.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, and in consideration of the record as a 

whole, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be 

denied and that Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment be 

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granted and the ALJ’s decision be upheld. 

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge 

is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, 

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report 

must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than January 

26, 2016. The document should be captioned “Objections to the Report and 

Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be 

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than February 2, 

2016. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: January 12, 2016

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