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Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 23, 2016*

Decided June 24, 2016

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 16‐1078

PAUL ANDRESS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

DAUBERT LAW FIRM, LLC, and

MICHAEL A. STUELAND,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 15‐CV‐423‐JPS

J.P. Stadtmueller,

Judge.

O R D E R

Paul Andress brought this suit against lawyer Michael Stueland and

Daubert Law Firm claiming that the defendants violated several provisions of the Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a–1692l, during state‐court litigation

to collect a defaulted car loan. The district court dismissed some of the claims under the

Rooker–Feldman doctrine for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction, see D.C. Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and the rest

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 16‐1078    Page 2

for noncompliance with the pleading standards in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.

We agree with the court’s application of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine and also conclude

that Andress has waived any challenge to the dismissal of his other claims.

Andress borrowed $33,120 from a bank to buy a pickup truck in 2011. Two years

later the bank, asserting that Andress had fallen behind in his payments, sued him in

Wisconsin state court to collect the debt. Andress did not defend the lawsuit, and in

April 2014 the state court entered a default judgment in the amount of $32,019. Andress

did not appeal that judgment or the denial of his later request to reopen the case. The

bank, represented by Stueland, an attorney at Daubert Law Firm, then sought to enforce

the judgment by securing two garnishment orders against Andress.   

Andress responded with this suit in federal court asserting that the defendants

had violated the FDCPA by (1) failing to serve him properly in the state‐court action,

(2) initiating collection activities in state court despite knowing that evidence of a debt

to the bank was lacking, (3) concealing the “true identity of the real party in interest” by

not disclosing that the bank had been made whole through “default insurance” and

reassignment of the loan, (4) calling him at his home and calling his employer despite

his contrary instructions, and (5) yelling, screaming, and trying to intimidate him

during telephone discussions about the defaulted loan.   

The district court concluded that, because of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, it

lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction over the first three claims. Those claims, the court

reasoned, essentially challenged the Wisconsin court’s judgment and garnishment

orders. And the two remaining claims concerning unauthorized or abusive telephone

calls, the court added, were too vague to satisfy the minimum pleading requirements of

Rule 8. The court further noted that Stueland had not been properly served. The court

gave Andress 30 days to amend his complaint to include greater detail and also to

perfect service of process on Stueland, but Andress declined. Instead he moved for

reconsideration, which was denied. The district court later dismissed the action after its

deadline for amending the complaint had passed without further action by Andress.   

On appeal Andress argues that his first three claims should not have been

dismissed under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine because, he says, the injuries he asserts are

independent of the state‐court judgment. The Rooker–Feldman doctrine deprives the

lower federal courts of subject‐matter jurisdiction to review judgments entered by state

courts in civil litigation. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006); Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92 (2005). Thus, only the Supreme Court may

hear “cases brought by state‐court losers complaining of injuries caused by state‐court

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judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. at 464 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284).

To the extent that Andress’s first three claims even allege violations of the FDCPA, the

district court correctly concluded that Rooker–Feldman divests it of jurisdiction to hear

them. None of the alleged violations—that service in the state‐court proceeding was

defective, that the defendants must have known that they would have lost the collection

action (had Andress not defaulted), and that in the state court the defendants concealed

the identity of the real party in interest—could have resulted in injury independent of

the judgment or the subsequent garnishment orders. See Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884,

885 (7th Cir. 2014) (“No injury occurred until the state judge ruled against him.”); Kelley

v. Med‐1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that Rooker–Feldman

applies when injuries alleged—attorney fees—could not be analyzed without

determining whether state court erred in granting fees). The district court thus correctly

concluded that it did not have subject‐matter jurisdiction over his claims.   

The last two counts in Andress’s complaint were dismissed as deficient under

Rule 8 and for defective service on Stueland. Although Andress asks that this court

allow him to reassert those claims in the district court, he has not challenged the district

court’s reasons for dismissing them. Defendants argue that Andress has thus waived

any argument that the district court erred in dismissing the claims, and Andress did not

file a reply brief contesting that position. We agree with defendants that Andress has

waived any contention that the dismissal of these two claims was improper.   

AFFIRMED.

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