Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00970/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00970-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATHLEEN BALL, 2:04-cv-0970-MCE-EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LOS RIOS COMMUNITY COLLEGE

DISTRICT, Educational

subdivision of Sacramento;

EUNYOUNG HWANG, both

individually and in her

capacity as acting Head of the

Los Rios Community College

District Art Department;

MARISSA SAYAGO, both

individually and in her

capacity as Alternate Head of

the Los Rios Community College

District Art Department;

RICHARD BOOTH, both

individually and in his

capacity as Dean of

Instruction for Los Rios

Community College District;

BRUCE WERNER, both

individually and in his

capacity as Vice President of

the Folsom Lake/El Dorado and

Rancho Cordova Centers for Los

Rios Community College

District, and DOES 1 to 1000,

inclusive;

Defendants.

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

Through the present action, Plaintiff Kathleen Ball alleges

Defendants Los Rios Community College District (“LRCCD”),

Eunyoung Hwang, Marissa Sayago, Richard Booth, and Bruce Werner

(“Defendants”) violated her rights under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), and

the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal.

Gov’t Code § 12900 et seq. A number of Plaintiff’s original 1

claims have been dismissed through earlier proceedings. 

Plaintiff’s ADA claim against LRCCD, her Section 1983 claims

against the individual defendants in their individual capacities,

and her FEHA claim against all Defendants remain. Presently

before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on

those remaining claims. For the reasons set forth below,

Defendants’ Motion is denied in part and granted in part. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Kathleen Ball, was diagnosed with Hepatitis-C in

December 1997. Despite her condition, Plaintiff pursued and

earned a Master of Fine Arts degree by December 1999. 

Immediately thereafter, she sought and received a position with

Los Rios Community College District as an adjunct art professor.

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3

While Plaintiff was able to perform her duties and received

favorable evaluations, both in the Spring and Fall semesters of

2001, one of the two classes she was assigned to teach was

cancelled due to low enrollment. Similarly, in the Spring 2002

semester, both of her assigned classes were cancelled due to low

enrollment. By Fall 2002, enrollment in art courses showed an

increase prompting LRCCD to reassign Plaintiff to again teach

several art courses. This arrangement continued until November

2003, when LRCCD terminated Plaintiff’s employment. 

During the years between her initial hire and ultimate

termination, Plaintiff’s medical condition worsened. This

progression caused her to undergo increasing grades of drug

therapy which, in turn, caused Plaintiff’s energy and stamina to

deteriorate. During the Fall semester of 2003, Plaintiff failed

to attend over one-quarter of her assigned classes prompting

complaints from students. Plaintiff alleges these absences were

due to her illness and that she had notified the campus in

advance that she would be absent for instruction, albeit not in

accord with LRCCD’s notice procedure.

In late October 2003, LRCCD concluded that it would not

offer Plaintiff any further classes. LRCCD alleges its decision

was based on Plaintiff’s failure to give proper notice of her

numerous absences; her decision to teach an Introduction to

Drawing class without a textbook; an allegedly false claim that

she had audited a class taught by Defendant Hwang; an alleged

misrepresentation regarding her background and suitability to

teach an Art History class; and her tendency to create hostility

and tension in Art Department meetings.

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4

Plaintiff denies the foregoing are the reasons for her

termination and instead contends her termination was based on

discrimination. Plaintiff further contends she requested

accommodations which LRCCD denied including: 1) storage space

for art supplies, 2) authorization to teach all classes at one

campus, 3) to be informed of all required meetings by telephone,

4) no Saturday and evening teaching requirements, and 5)

appropriate time off as required by her medical condition. LRCCD

disputes Plaintiff requested the foregoing accommodations and, to

the extent requests for accommodation were made, LRCCD states

that all of the requests were met.

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on January 26, 2004, alleging

discrimination based on her medical condition. Plaintiff then

received a Notice of Right to Sue from the United States

Department of Justice dated February 20, 2004. That same EEOC

complaint was then referred to the California Department of Fair

Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) which issued an additional Notice

of Right to Sue letter based on California law.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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5

One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of

factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Twp. of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

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6

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20

L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the

moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its

opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact

to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

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7

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985).

ANALYSIS

1. Americans with Disabilities Act

The ADA’s general rule against disability discrimination is

found in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) wherein the statute provides: 

No covered entity shall discriminate against a

qualified individual with a disability because of the

disability of such individual in regard to job

application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or

discharge of employees, employee compensation, job

training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges

of employment.

The term “Discriminate” is given definition in 42 U.S.C. §

12112(b)(5)(A) wherein the statute provides: 

not making reasonable accommodations to the known

physical or mental limitations of an otherwise

qualified individual with a disability who is an

applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can

demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an

undue hardship on the operation of the business of such

covered entity.

See also Sanders v. Arneson Prods., 91 F.3d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir.

1996).

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8

Plaintiff alleges both that she was treated disparately and that

LRCCD refused to make the reasonable accommodations she requested

in violation of the ADA.

In a disparate treatment case under the ADA, the Court is to

apply the burden shifting analysis set forth in the McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green case. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.

Ed. 2d 668 (1973); see also Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins.

Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at

801. Specifically, a plaintiff must show that she: (1) is

disabled; (2) is qualified; and (3) suffered an adverse

employment action because of her disability. Snead, 237 F.3d at

1087. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. 

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer meets this

burden, the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears,

but the plaintiff can still prove disparate treatment by, for

instance, offering evidence demonstrating that the employer’s

explanation is pretextual. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105, 120 S. Ct.

2097 (2000).

In the present action, LRCCD first seeks summary judgment on

the ground that all claims arising from conduct occurring more

than one hundred and eighty (180) days in advance of Plaintiff’s

EEOC filing should be dismissed as time barred. LCRRD further

moves on the ground that Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie

showing of discrimination entitling them to summary judgment.

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Because the ADA adopts the procedural requirements of Title 2

VII, including the EEOC filing requirement, the principles

governing Title VII claims hold equally true for ADA suits when

the EEOC charge is filed outside the prescribed period. See 42

U.S.C. § 12117(a). See Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170,

1176 (9th Cir. 2000).

9

a. Time Bar

A plaintiff must file a timely charge of discrimination with

the EEOC as a prerequisite to maintaining an ADA action. See 42

U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating the enforcement procedures set

forth at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires 2

that a complainant file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of

the last act of alleged discrimination, unless the complainant

initially institutes proceedings with a state or local agency, in

which case the EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days.

Plaintiff originally brought her charges of discrimination with

the EEOC, consequently, the 180-day time limit applies in this

case. 

 Plaintiff alleges discrimination based on numerous acts

occurring from March 2001, through her ultimate termination in

December 2003. If a plaintiff, as is the case here, chooses to

seek relief based on a series of discrete acts flowing from a

systematic, discriminatory practice, the plaintiff cannot succeed

in establishing an employer’s liability for acts occurring

outside the limitations period. Specifically, the Supreme Court

has determined that each incident of discrimination, whether or

not related, constitutes a separate actionable unlawful

employment practice. See AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 112

(2002); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002).

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LRCCD does not challenge the veracity of Plaintiff’s prima 3

facie case. This election shall not be construed by the Court as

an admission. Nonetheless, the Court will not address the issue

of Plaintiff’s prima facie case as that issue is not before us.

10

The Court further held that “discrete discriminatory acts are not

actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts

alleged in timely filed charges.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 112.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed her claim with the

EEOC on January 26, 2004. Given the 180 day filing time limit,

all acts of alleged discrimination arising before July 30, 2003,

are time barred. Accordingly, LRCCD’s Motion for Summary

Judgment as to all claims grounded in events occurring prior to

July 30, 2003, is granted.

b. Pretext3

LRCCD alleges Plaintiff cannot show that its proffered

reasons for terminating Plaintiff are pretext. In fact,

Plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that her disability “actually played a role in [LRCCD’s

decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the

outcome.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141 (citations omitted); see also

Snead, 237 F.3d at 1093 (holding that the traditional framework

for analyzing Title VII cases applies in ADA cases). Plaintiff

may meet her burden by “showing that [LRCCD’s] proffered

explanation,” here that she was terminated based on absenteeism,

failure to assign a textbook, false statements, misrepresentation 

and hostility, is “unworthy of credence.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at

143.

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11

Plaintiff can prove pretext indirectly, by showing a

defendant’s proffered explanation is internally inconsistent or

otherwise not believable, or directly, by showing that unlawful

discrimination more likely motivated the employer. Raad v.

Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th

Cir. 2003)(quoting Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115,

1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court should consider all of this

evidence, whether direct or indirect, cumulatively. Chuang, 225

F.3d at 1127. When the only evidence challenging the veracity of

the employer’s proffered motives is circumstantial, however, the

plaintiff must produce “specific, substantial evidence of

pretext” to create a triable issue of fact. Godwin v. Hunt

Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff concedes that she missed a number of her scheduled

classes in the Fall 2003 school semester. See Plf.s’ Decl., ¶

14. Plaintiff does not point to any evidence, either general or

specific, that LRCCD’s proffered explanation that her termination

was, in fact, due to her medical condition as opposed to her

absences. Rather, Plaintiff merely declares that “[n]othing said

in the first paragraph of page 6 of the defendants’ memorandum of

points and authorities i[s] true. All of the facts stated in my

second amended complaint [are] true and correct.” Id. at ¶ 10-

11. Such a general and conclusory statement does not raise an

issue of material fact as to whether LRCCD’s proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence. As noted above, Plaintiff

carries the burden of production in showing either that LRCCD’s

statements regarding her termination are inconsistent or that her

termination was more likely than not due to her disability.

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The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden. 

Plaintiff does not show any inconsistency in LRCCD’s statements

nor does she present any facts from which the Court could

conclude that she was terminated because she was ill. Instead,

LRCCD terminated Plaintiff less than a month after learning from

a student that Plaintiff had repeatedly failed to appear to teach

her assigned class. Given Plaintiff’s failure to meet her

burden, LRCCD’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s

claim of disparate treatment in violation of the ADA is proper

and hereby granted. 

2. California Fair Employment and Housing Act

California’s FEHA prohibits discrimination based on a

person’s physical disability. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). 

Specifically, FEHA explains that it shall be an unlawful

employment practice for an employer, because of physical or

mental disability, to discriminate against a person in

compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment. See id.

a. Time Bar

A prima facie case for discrimination under FEHA requires a

showing that: (1) plaintiff suffers from a disability; (2)

plaintiff is a qualified individual; and (3) plaintiff was

subjected to an adverse employment action because of the

disability.

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13

Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 85 Cal. App. 4th 245, 254, 102 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 55 (2000) (citing Brundage v. Hahn, 57 Cal. App. 4th

228, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830 (1997)). 

Plaintiff has alleged LRCCD engaged in disparate treatment

discrimination when they terminated her employment based on her

medical condition. LRCCD again responds that any claims for

injury occurring more than a year prior to the filing of her DFEH

complaint are time barred. Indeed, employees who believe they

have suffered discrimination under FEHA may file complaints with

the DFEH within a one-year period. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960; see

also Schifando v. City of L.A., 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1081-1082 (Cal.

2003). For the reasons set forth in section 1.a. above,

Plaintiff’s claims arising as a result of events occurring

outside this one year limitations period, are time barred. 

Accordingly, LRCCD’s Motion for Summary Judgment for claims based

on events occurring before January 26, 2003, is granted.

 

b. Failure to Accommodate

Under California’s FEHA section 12940(m), it is an unlawful

employment practice “[f]or an employer ... to fail to engage in a

timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee or

applicant to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if

any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an

employee or applicant with a known physical ... disability.” The

statute provides a failure to accommodate as an independent basis

for liability. Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 140 Cal. App. 4th

34, 61 (2006).

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Indeed, an employer’s duty to accommodate is inextricably linked

to its obligation to engage in a timely, good faith discussion

with an applicant or employee whom it knows is disabled, and who

has requested an accommodation, to determine the extent of the

individual’s limitations. Id.

Plaintiff has alleged that she began requesting

accommodations from LRCCD in July 2001, as confirmed in her DEFH

application. See Plf.s’ Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff further alleges

LRCCD failed entirely in its’ duty to accommodate her based on

her medical disability. LRCCD rebuts that it was not informed of

the existence of Plaintiff’s medical condition nor were

accommodations sought until after the date Plaintiff was notified

of her termination.

Plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence to create a

material issue of fact regarding whether LRCCD was aware of her

disability and whether LRCCD met its statutory duty to engage in

a timely, good faith discussion with Plaintiff regarding

accommodations. Consequently, LRCCD’s Motion for Summary

Judgment on this claim is denied to the extent it alleges acts

occurring within the one year statutory period that evidence a

failure to accommodate under California law. 

3. Section 1983

Plaintiff claims that LRCCD’s termination of her employment

violated her property rights in her position as an adjunct art

professor. She brings this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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To have a property interest protected under § 1983, a person

clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. 

She must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. She

must, instead, have “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”

Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).

Plaintiff alleges the collective bargaining agreement

(“CBA”) between LRCCD and the Los Rios College Federation of

Teachers, Local 2279, creates her entitlement to continued

employment. As support for this position, Plaintiff cites

Article 27, 27.1.1 of the CBA wherein it states: “A faculty

member shall not be dismissed, suspended or reprimanded without

just cause.” LRCCD clarifies, however, that Section 4.8.1

expressly provides otherwise. In fact, Section 4.8.1 provides:

“Adjunct faculty are ‘temporary employees’ in accordance with the

California Education Code. Nothing contained in this section nor

in any article of this Agreement places a legal obligation on the

District to provide continuing employment for adjunct

faculty....” CBA, § 4.8.1 (emphasis added). 

Given that this section clearly limits Plaintiff’s

entitlement to continued employment, she fails to meet her burden

and summary judgment is appropriate. Accordingly, LRCCD’s Motion

for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is granted.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, LRCCD’s Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Plaintiff’s ADA claim is granted in its entirety. 

LRCCD’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s FEHA claim

for discrimination is granted in its entirety. LRCCD’s Motion

for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s FEHA claim for failure to

accommodate is denied for acts occurring within the one year

statutory period. LRCCD’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim is granted in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 8, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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