Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00889/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00889-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WENDELL HARPER,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-00889-EMC (DMR) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE: PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND 

SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT 

UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Re: Dkt. No. 2

Plaintiff Wendell Harper (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint [Docket No. 1] and Application to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”) [Docket No. 2] on February 26, 2015. The 

presiding judge has referred this matter to this court for consideration of the IFP Application. For 

the reasons stated below, the court recommends that the IFP Application be granted and the 

complaint be dismissed with leave to amend.

I. IFP APPLICATION

Having evaluated Plaintiff’s financial affidavit, the court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied 

the economic eligibility requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and therefore recommends that the 

IFP Application be granted. 

II. REVIEW OF COMPLAINT

A. Legal Standards

In reviewing an application to proceed in forma pauperis, courts may dismiss a case if the 

party applying for in forma pauperis status files a frivolous action or fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To make this determination, courts 

assess whether there is a factual and legal basis for the asserted wrong, “however inartfully 

pleaded.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). District courts have the 

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authority to dismiss complaints founded on “wholly fanciful” factual allegations for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1228. As such, “[a] court may dismiss as frivolous complaints 

reciting bare legal conclusions with no suggestion of supporting facts, or postulating events and 

circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 717 (5th Cir. 

1976)). 

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than 

those drafted by lawyers, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), a complaint, or any 

portion of it, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails to set forth “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 

(2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint 

without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not 

be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotations 

omitted). 

B. Sufficiency of Complaint

It is difficult to understand the specific allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff 

alleges that he and his spouse own property located on Miflin Court in El Sobrante (the 

“Property”). Compl. at 5. It is unclear whether Plaintiff and/or his spouse live in the Property. It 

is also unclear whether Plaintiff remains in possession of the Property.

It appears that Defendant Deutsche Bank “with its accomplices in [Defendant] Ocwen 

Loans and [Defendant] Colony Financial, Inc.” may have initiated or even completed foreclosure 

proceedings on the Property. See Compl. at ¶ 4 (“Deutsche Bank National Trust Company 

Knowingly and willingly failed to disclose to Plaintiff and his Spouse, their Notarized Title. In 

lieu of full disclosure, Defendant Deutsche Bank decided to impose an illegal lien, steal the assets 

and perpetrate an Unlawful Foreclosure on the [Property]”); ¶¶ 7-8 (“Defendants violated the 

Truth in Lending Act by submitting a forged Promissory Note, Deed of Trust, wrongfully 

imposing a lien on the property of Plaintiff and his spouse, demanding by ‘Notice of Trustee Sale’ 

and suing in Federal Court to gain blanket authority to possess the Trust, although illegally.”). 

The Complaint also does not clearly allege whether any foreclosure sale was completed, 

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although there is some suggestion that it was. See id. at ¶ 26 (“Ocwen Loans engineered an 

unlawful foreclosure on the home of Plaintiff and his Spouse on January 22, 2013”); ¶ 27 

(“Colony Financial and Ocwen Loans conducted an illegal purchase and sale contract on January 

22, 2013, by forging a Trust Deed Upon Sale, and refusing or being unable to produce receipts of 

the sale Proof of ownership upon the demand of Plaintiff and his spouse.”). Furthermore,

Defendants’ relationships to Plaintiff, to each other, and to the Property are unclear. 

The Complaint also references a “federal court” and “federal judge,” apparently referring 

to possible bankruptcy proceedings involving Plaintiff and/or his spouse, but does not offer any 

further details about the judge or court or proceeding involved. See id. at ¶ 7; ¶¶ 8-9 (“Defendant 

Deutsche Bank conceived Three Allonge Notes dated June 23, 2006. The Defendant cashed these 

notes for $475,000 each. The Plaintiff and his Spouse allegedly owed only $475,000. On April 

21, 2011, Deutsche Bank re-used These same Allonge Notes during the Bankruptcy Process; the 

bank Then conducted a ‘Purchase and Sale’ contract arrangement with an unnamed Party 

Deutsche Bank lied to a Federal Judge, and to Federal Regulators while Depositing all three 

Notes, and attributing the Purchase and Sale to Plaintiff and Spouse.”). There is also a reference

to a state court case. Id. at ¶ 36 (“Colony Financial filed an Unlawful Detainer in Richmond 

Superior Court . . . . Plaintiff and his Spouse were forced to pay for defending our property right in 

court, and to spend money for court costs in Richmond Superior Court and in US Bankruptcy 

Chapter 7 Court.”).

The Complaint lists seven causes of action: (1) violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1641; (2) violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1956; (3) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; (4) violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; (5) 

violation of the “Uniform Trust Code”; (6) violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 

1601 and 1204; and (7) violation of Rhode Island Business & Professions Code § 5-20.8-2 and § 

5-20.8-5, governing real estate sales disclosures.

The second and third causes of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1341 are plainly 

inappropriate, as they allege violations of criminal statutes and do not provide for a civil lawsuit. 

The fifth cause of action is also inappropriate, as the “Uniform Trust Code” is a model for 

codifying the law on trusts, not an actual law on which a claim can be based. Likewise the 

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seventh cause of action is insufficiently stated, because Plaintiff has offered no allegations 

suggesting that the law of Rhode Island should apply.

1

 Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to the 

remaining causes of action appear to raise the Truth in Lending Act (first and sixth causes of 

action) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (fourth cause of action). These claims are also 

deficient, as they fail to address the basic issues of fact noted above. For example, Plaintiff alleges 

that Deutsche Bank “lied to a federal Judge” and made false or misleading representations “to 

Federal and State Regulators and to a Judge” but does not specify to whom or in what context the 

representations were made, the content of those representations, or support for the allegation that 

they were false or misleading. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 34. To the extent that Plaintiff’s allegations can be 

understood to allege that the three Defendants did not have the right or authority to foreclose on 

the Property, the Complaint’s failure to clearly allege the ownership of the Property and any 

related loans renders these allegations insufficient to state a claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court recommends that Plaintiff’s IFP application be 

granted and that the Complaint be dismissed. However, because it is not clear that the deficiencies 

in the Complaint cannot be cured with amendment, the court recommends that dismissal be 

entered without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an amended Complaint within three weeks of the date 

of the presiding judge’s order.

Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district judge 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 

N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72-2.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 19, 2015 _____________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

 

1

 The Complaint states that “all defendants do business in California and . . . reside in California, 

while violations giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in California.” Compl. at ¶ 2.

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