Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02755/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02755-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kenneth Reed, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora D. Schriro; et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 04-2755-PHX-JAT

ORDER

On December 3, 2004, Petitioner filed the currently pending Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. #1). On April 18, 2006, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and

Recommendation recommending that the Petition be denied ("R&R") (Doc. #21).

Petitioner, through his counsel, filed objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc.

#24) and a Notice of Supplementation Authority (Doc. #25). 

This Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is "clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made, but not otherwise." United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ("the court

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [report and recommendation] to

which objection is made."). Because Petitioner filed objections in this case, the Court will

review the objected-to portions of the R&R de novo.

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1

 Further, in applying "Federal law" the state courts need to act in accordance with only

Supreme Court case law. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003)("In

attempting to answer [whether the state court applied Federal law in an objectively

reasonable manner], the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under

AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Williams [v. Taylor], 529 U.S. [362], 412 [(2000)]. While circuit law

may be "persuasive authority" for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597,

600-01 (9th Cir.1999), only the Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and

only those holdings need be reasonably applied. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 ("The ...

statutory language makes clear ... that § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established

law to this Court's jurisprudence.")."

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The Petition in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Petitioner is

incarcerated based on a state conviction. With respect to any claims that Petitioner exhausted

before the state courts, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) this Court must deny the

Petition on those claims unless "a state court decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law"1

 or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003).

Further, this Court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings

regarding a petitioner's claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936

(9th Cir. 1998). 

In this case, Petitioner raised nine claims. Petitioner objected to the Magistrate

Judge's recommendation on each of the nine claims. The procedural history of Petitioner's

case is recounted in the R&R. R&R at 1-7. The objections add additional information to

those facts, but the Court finds the objections do not materially alter the facts and hereby

accepts the factual and procedural history as recounted in the R&R.

Claim 1 - Speedy Trial

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recounts the law of exhaustion in habeas cases,

dismissal without prejudice, procedural default, and excusing procedural default (cause and

prejudice or actual innocence). R&R at 8-15. Petitioner does not dispute this recounting of

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the law governing habeas petitions in Federal court; and this Court hereby accepts this legal

analysis. 

Claim 1 - Speedy Trial

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner's speedy trial claim was

not exhausted before the state courts, is procedurally defaulted, and that Petitioner has not

shown cause and prejudice or actual innocence. R&R at 15-19. Petitioner objects and argues

that he did exhaust this claim in state court. Objections at 5. Petitioner further argues that

the state court's factual conclusions regarding this claim were so inaccurate that this Court

should hold an evidentiary hearing and reach its own conclusions. Objections at 7.

As noted in the R&R, to exhaust in state court, the Petitioner must have raised his

speedy trial claim as a federal claim, and not as, "a state claim that is analogous or closely

similar to a federal claim." Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2005).

Petitioner argues he has met the requirements of exhaustion because in his Anders brief,

Petitioner's counsel asked the Court of Appeals, "to search the record for fundamental error"

and the Court of Appeals said, "[a]nd we have done so." Objections at 5. Castillo makes

clear that the filing of a global request to review the record is insufficient for exhaustion. 399

F.3d at 999 ("Mere 'general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process,

equal protection, and the right to a fair trial,' do not establish exhaustion. Hiivala v. Wood,

195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999).") Therefore, the Court does not find the above quoted

language of the objections to be sufficient to find Plaintiff's speedy trial claim exhausted.

Next, Petitioner argues that because the Court of Appeals discussed the speedy trial

issue in three paragraphs of its opinion, the claim must be exhausted. Objections at 5. This

argument fails to address the conclusion of the R&R that the speedy trial issue was raised

before the state courts and decided by the state court under state (not federal) law. R&R at

9. The Court agrees with the R&R that the speedy trial issue was presented under state law;

and, therefore, any federal speedy trial issue was not exhausted before the state courts.

Further, the Court agrees with the conclusion of the R&R that this claim is procedurally

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2

 In the objections, Petitioner attempts to dispute the conclusion of the R&R wherein the

R&R says, "Petitioner makes no argument that his procedural defaults should be excused on

the basis of actual innocence." R&R at 19. Petitioner states that during his trial, he

repeatedly proclaimed his innocence. Objections at 8 (lines 8-18). The Court finds that

arguing during trial that one is innocent is insufficient to sustain an actual innocence

exception in a habeas case.

3

 "An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding

the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

4

 There were additional continuances beyond this date, but they were all at Petitioner's

request. Because these additional continuances were all at Petitioner's request, the Court

finds they do not show a speedy trial violation. Moreover, even considering these

continuances, the R&R concluded the pretrial delay did not result in a speedy trial violation.

R&R at 14-18. The objections do not dispute this conclusion, but only the veracity of the

government's reason for the continuance. The Court agrees with the conclusion of the R&R

that applying the factors in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), there was no Sixth

Amendment speedy trial violation.

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defaulted and Petitioner has failed to show cause and prejudice or actual innocence.2

Therefore, Petitioner's request for habeas relief based on his speedy trial claim will be denied.

Alternatively, even if the Court of Appeals treatment of the speedy trial issue was

sufficient for this claim to have been exhausted, the claim fails on the merits.3

 Specifically,

Petitioner was indicted on September 5, 1996, arraigned on October 18, 1996, and set for trial

on December 18, 1996. The government moved for and received a continuance to January

9, 1997.4

 The trial court granted this continuance over Petitioner's objection. Petitioner's

objection in this case is that the trial court and the court of appeals were both mistaken in

accepting the government's proffered reasons for the continuance.

As indicated above, the Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual

findings regarding Petitioner's claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d

923, 936 (9th Cir. 1998). This presumption of correctness can be overcome if the state court's

determination of the facts was unreasonable. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71

(2003). 

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In his objections, Petitioner argues that the government's stated reason for a

continuance, to give defendant/Petitioner more time to prepare for trial, is not credible.

Objections at 6-8. Nonetheless, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals accepted this

reason as true. Given Petitioner's repeated complaints alleging his lack of access to

materials, this Court cannot say it was an unreasonable determination of the facts for the trial

court to find that Defendant needed more than to prepare for trial. Trial courts are in difficult

positions when a person who chooses to represent himself claims that they have not been

given access to sufficient materials to represent themselves. In this case, the Government

moved, and the trial court agreed, that Petitioner needed more time to prepared for trial. This

Court cannot substitute it's judgment for the state court's judgment. 

Finally, even if this Court were to hold an evidentiary hearing as Petitioner has

requested and find that the Government, trial court, and state Court of Appeals were all in

error in finding Defendant needed additional time to prepare for trial, this claim fails on the

merits. As discussed in the R&R and in footnote 4 above, there was no speedy trial violation

in this case. As noted in the R&R, there are four factors the court should consider in

determining whether there has been a speedy trial violation. R&R at 14-15; Barker v. Wingo,

407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). The Court must consider: 1) the length of the pretrial delay; 2)

the reason for the delay; 3) whether defendant asserted his speedy trial right; and 4) prejudice

to the defendant. Id.

First, as to the length of the delay, between the indictment and the trial, approximately

9 months elapsed. Of that time, six months of continuances were at Petitioner's request.

Petitioner argues all of that time should, nonetheless, be charged against the government

because the government disclosed additional materials between the first trial date and the

second trial date that caused Petitioner to move for the subsequent continuances. The Court

disagrees with Petitioner that all of Petitioner's continuances should weigh in Petitioner's

favor in a speedy trial analysis. However, even if such continuances could count against the

government, the Court does not find the length of delay in this case to be long enough to

weigh in Petitioner's favor. See e.g. Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992) (8.5 year

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5

 Notably, as discussed above, this issue was not framed in terms of a Federal Sixth

Amendment speedy trial claim.

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delay); U.S. v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003) (22 month delay not excessively

long); U.S. v. Tahn Huu Lam, 251 F.3d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (15 month delay only

weighted slightly in defendant's favor). Therefore, this factor does not weigh in Petitioner's

favor.

Second, as to the reason for the delay, it is undisputed that the majority of the time

was at Petitioner's request to give Petitioner time to prepare for trial. While Petitioner claims

this time was all necessitated by the government's first continuance, as indicated above, the

Court disagrees that Petitioner can move for repeated continuances and then argue that the

granting of the continuances he sought violated his speedy trial rights. Thus, accepting

Petitioner's objection to the government's reason for the one month continuance, only one

month of continuance would count against the government. The Court does not find such

one month continuance to cause this factor to weigh in Petitioner's favor.

Third, Petitioner asserted his desire to go to trial by objecting to the first continuance

and filing a motion on this issue on January 6, 1997.5

 Thereafter, all the continuance were

at Petitioner's request. Thus, the Court does not find that Petitioner asserted his right

sufficiently for this factor to weigh in his favor.

Fourth, Petitioner claims he can show actual prejudice from the continuance because

during the period of the first continuance the government took additional steps to prepare its

case. This Court cannot conclude that, had there been no continuance, the Defendant would

have been acquitted due to the government's lack of prior preparation. Therefore, the Court

finds this factor also does not weigh in Petitioner's favor.

Thus, the Court agrees with the R&R that a habeas court cannot reach this claim

because it has not been exhausted. Alternatively, the Court finds that even if this claim had

been exhausted, the state court's determination of the facts was not unreasonable, and this

Court must defer to those findings. And, as a second alternative, even if this Court reached

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the merits of this claim, Petitioner cannot show a speedy trial violation. Accordingly, habeas

relief on this claim will be denied.

Claim 2 - Right to Self-Representation

Petitioner raises a claim of the denial of the right to self-representation in terms of his

lack of access to materials. In other words, Petitioner did proceed at trial representing

himself, but claimed that he could not fully represent himself because he did not have

adequate legal materials, lighting, supplies, or copying. The R&R concluded that the selfrepresentation claim (as presented in the Petition) was exhausted before the state court. No

one objected to this conclusion and the Court hereby accepts conclusion that Petitioner

exhausted the self-representation claim.

Petitioner's claim regarding self-representation has two sub-parts. His first claim is

under the Sixth Amendment. In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge concludes that while the law

is clearly established that a defendant can represent himself, the law is not clearly established

as to whether the right of self-representation includes a form of library access. R&R at 20-21

(citing Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, - - -, 126 S.Ct. 407, 408 (2005)). Petitioner

objects and argues that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d

1443 (9th Cir. 1985) "should be, and will be, clearly established federal law." Objections at

15.

As indicated in footnote 1, this Court looks to only Supreme Court case law to

determine clearly established federal law. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

Therefore, the Court agrees with the R&R that whether self-representation includes library

access is an unsettled question of federal law. Kane, 546 U.S. at - - -, 126 S.Ct. at 408.

Similarly, the is no established federal law as to all of the parameters of self-representation.

As a result, this Court cannot say that the state court of appeals incorrectly applied clearly

established federal law. Accordingly, habeas relief on Petitioner's Sixth Amendment theory

will be denied.

In his objections, Petitioner reformulates this claim and argues for the first time that

the essence of this claim is that Petitioner's waiver of counsel was not knowing and voluntary

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6

 Petitioner offers no citation for his theory that a defendant must be able to do independent

legal research before deciding whether to accept or decline counsel, and if the defendant

cannot do this research, the defendant should be forced to accept counsel.

7

 Additionally, the Court accepts the conclusion of the R&R that Petitioner cannot show

actual injury as required under Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). R&R at 21-22.

Notably, however, because Lewis was a case involving a prisoner civil rights complaint, it

did not establish any federal law in a circumstance where appointment of counsel and/or

advisory counsel were available.

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due to his lack of access to legal materials. Objections, page 11, n.3.6

 First, the Court finds

it procedurally improper to raise a theory of habeas relief for the first time in the objections

to the report and recommendation. Second, the Court has reviewed the record and cannot

find that this claim was ever exhausted before the state courts. Further, at this time, this

claim is procedurally defaulted. In the objections, Petitioner has not shown cause and

prejudice or actual innocence; therefore, the Court will not reach the merits of this claim.

As the second sub-part of the self-representation claim, Petitioner argues that his Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated by his lack of access to

materials. This claim arises from the fact that for incarcerated persons to access to the courts,

the inmates must have access to either adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from

persons trained in the law. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). Relying on state

law, the State Court of Appeals held that the access to advisory counsel or counsel satisfies

the access to the courts requirement of Bounds with or without library access. Answer to

habeas petition, Exhibit C, page 10 (Court of Appeals memorandum decision citing State v.

Murray, 906 P.2d 546, 561 (1995)).

In his objections, Petitioner has failed to show how the Court of Appeals application

of Murray was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Further, it is undisputed that Petition had advisory counsel throughout his case.7

 Thus, the

Court finds that habeas relief on this basis will also be denied.

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Claim 3 - Prior Bad Acts Evidence

Petitioner's third ground for habeas relief is that evidence of his prior acts was

improperly admitted at trial. The R&R concludes that this claim was exhausted before the

state court. No one objected to this conclusion and the Court hereby accepts the conclusion

that Petitioner exhausted his prior bad acts claim.

Petitioner claims error due to the fact that evidence of his assault on his wife and his

robbery of a Best Buy store were admitted in his trial that is the subject of this habeas

petition (robbery of the Loomis truck). The R&R assumes without deciding that the

admission of the evidence was an error of constitutional magnitude, but concludes that (if

error) it was harmless. R&R at 23-24. In his objections, Petitioner does not dispute that

harmless error review is the correct legal framework, but argues that the error was not

harmless. Objections at 15-16.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the any error in the admission of the prior bad

acts evidence was harmless because there was otherwise strong evidence of Petitioner's guilt.

Petitioner argues that there was not strong evidence of guilt, or that there would not have

been had an alibi witness been called by the defense. This Court finds that the states court's

analysis was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Therefore, habeas relief on this claim will be denied.

Count 4 - Impeachment by a Prior Conviction

Next Petitioner claims that he did not testify at trial due to his fear of being impeached

by his prior convictions. The R&R concludes that this issue was exhausted before the state

courts. There being no objections, the Court accepts this conclusion.

Petitioner did not testify at trial, so these convictions were never actually used to

impeach him. However, Petitioner moved the trial court to have a hearing in which

Petitioner would attack these convictions, and, if Petitioner prevailed in such hearing, he

would then testify. The Court of Appeals determined that any error of the trial court in this

regard was harmless. This Court finds that the Court of Appeals's determination was not

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8

 Additionally, on the merits, to preserve a claim of improper impeachment, the defendant

must testify. See Luce v. U.S., 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984). In this case, Petitioner did not testify

at his state trial, so this claim was not preserved. 

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contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.8

 Therefore,

habeas relief on this claim will be denied.

In his objections, Petitioner cites to reasons why the convictions might not have been

admissible under state law. Objections at 16-18. The Supreme Court has "stated many times

that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law." Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, to the extent that

Petitioner asserts errors of state law or procedure, his objections are overruled.

Claim 5 - Sentencing

In claim 5, Petitioner argues that his sentence is excessive because his consecutive

sentences are for the same activity (conspiring to commit armed robbery and committing

armed robbery). Petitioner exhausted this claim before the state courts. In its memorandum

decision, citing state law, the Court of Appeals concluded that consecutive sentences for

conspiracy and the offense itself were not improper. Answer to habeas petition, Exhibit C,

page 16, (Court of Appeals memorandum decision). In his objections, Petitioner fails to

show (or argue) that the Court or Appeals decision was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. Therefore, this Court accepts the

recommendation of the R&R that habeas relief on this theory be denied.

With regard to his sentencing, Petitioner also argues that his sentencing (in which the

trial judge found certain aggravating factors) violated Apprendi (v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,

490 (2000)). The R&R concludes and Petitioner concedes that Apprendi and its progeny do

not apply retroactively to cases that were not on direct appeal at the time Apprendi was

decided. 

However, in his objections, and his notice of supplemental authority, Petitioner argues

that Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) was decided while Petitioner's case was still

on direct appeal and that Jones, not Apprendi, is the case that announced the rule that factors

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that affect sentencing must be sent to the jury. Thus, Petitioner argues, he should be entitled

to re-sentencing based on Jones.

In Cunningham v. California, 2007 WL 135687 (January 22, 2007), the Supreme

Court stated, 

In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311

(1999), we examined the Sixth Amendment's historical and doctrinal

foundations, and recognized that judicial factfinding operating to increase a

defendant's otherwise maximum punishment posed a grave constitutional

question. Id., at 239-252, 119 S.Ct. 1215. While the Court construed the statute

at issue to avoid the question, the Jones opinion presaged our decision, some

15 months later, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147

L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

Cummingham, 2007 WL 135687 *7.

Petitioner argues that based on this language, Jones is the relevant case and date to

look to in determining which defendants fall under the change in sentencing without the

change being considered retroactive. By the Supreme Court's own language in Cunningham,

however, the Court made clear that this issue was not decided in the Jones case.

Cummingham, 2007 WL 135687 *7. Therefore, this Court continues to find the decision in

the Apprendi case to be the date after which the direct appeal must still be pending for the

challenge to not be considered to be collateral. Further, because Petitioner's direct appeal

was not pending when Apprendi was decided, this Court finds Petitioner's challenge to be a

collateral challenge. Finally, this Court agrees with the conclusion of the R&R that Apprendi

challenges are not available on habeas review. R&R at 26. Therefore, relief on this claim

will be denied.

Claim 6 - Pre-Indictment Delay

Petitioner's sixth claim for habeas relief is that he suffered pre-indictment delay in this

case that should entitle him to habeas relief. The R&R concludes that this claim was

exhausted before the state court, and, there being no objections, this Court accepts this

conclusion. The R&R then discusses that there is a split in the circuits as to whether a

claimant seeking relief for pre-indictment delay (that does not violate the applicable statute

of limitations) must show an improper motivation of the part of the government. R&R at 27-

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29. The R&R notes that the Ninth Circuit does not have improper motivation as an element.

Id. at 28 citing U.S. v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 676-78 (9th Cir. 1997).

The R&R further notes that in Petitioner's case, the Arizona Court of Appeals applied

a test for pre-indictment delay which required a showing of a harassing motive on the

government's part before relief under the Due Process cause would be appropriate. Id. at 27-

28. This test, requiring some improper motivation for the delay by the government, is similar

to the test in the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 28-29 (citing U.S. v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1510 (5th

Cir. 1996)). Finally, the R&R notes that the Supreme Court has specifically declined to

formulate a test for when pre-indictment delay violates the due process clause. Id. at 28

(citing U.S. v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 797 (1977)).

Applying the test requiring bad motivation from the government, the Arizona Court

of Appeals concluded that there was no evidence of a harassing motive in Petitioner's case,

and, therefore, found no due process violation. The R&R concludes that the Arizona court's

decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by

the Supreme Court because the Supreme Court has not set forth a test in this area.

In his objections, Petitioner suggests that this Court create some clearly established

federal law in this area. Objections at 24. ("The magistrate judge further goes on to state that

in U.S. v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977), the Supreme Court noted that few courts had

yet reached the question of, 'the constitutional significance of various reasons for delay,' and

thus left it to the lower courts to resolve those issues over time. Well, that time is now.")

Petitioner's suggestion, however, is procedurally improper in a habeas case. On habeas, this

Court is not a court of first impression, and must defer to the state court's ruling unless such

ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). Therefore, this Court will not consider the

merits of Petitioner's claim under current Ninth Circuit standards to determine whether the

claim has merit. Accordingly, because this Court agrees with the R&R that the state court's

decision did not rule afoul of federal law as clearly established by the Supreme Court, habeas

relief on this claim will be denied.

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In his objections, Petitioner appears to offer an alternative argument that, even if this

Court is to apply the law as announced by the Arizona Court of Appeals (specifically

requiring a harassing motive for delay on the part of the government), this Court should

conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the state court's conclusion that there

was no harassing motive was an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Objections at

25. In Williams, the Supreme Court held that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), a petitioner is

entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he presents a "meritorious claim" and he exercised

reasonable diligence in developing the factual record in the state proceedings. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 434-37 (2000). A petitioner exercises the diligence necessary to

preserve a claim if "the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information

available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court." Id. at 435.

 Thus, in order to qualify for an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner must both: "(1) allege

facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief, and (2) show that he did not receive a full

and fair hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding."

Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005) (rev'd on other grounds Ayers v.

Belmontes, 127 S.Ct. 469 (2006)). Having reviewed the state court record, this Court has

not located, nor has Petitioner cited, any point wherein Petitioner sought to litigate the

government's motivation for delay before the state courts. In fact, in his post-trial motion on

pre-indictment delay, Petitioner submitted the motion to the court "on a stipulated set of

facts." Answer to habeas petition, Exhibit N, page 9. Therefore, this Court cannot conclude

that Petitioner exercised reasonable diligence to obtain an evidentiary hearing in state court

and preserve this claim. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 435. Therefore, this Court will not

conduct an evidentiary hearing on this claim and relief as to this claim will be denied.

Claim 7 - Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner's seventh claim for relief is that his appellate counsel was ineffective

because he filed an Anders brief without fully reviewing the record. Because there are no

objections, this Court accepts the R&R's conclusion that this claim was exhausted before the

state courts. The R&R, after discussing the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel

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under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), concludes that Petitioner has failed to

show that his appellate counsel was ineffective. R&R at 30-31.

In his objections, Petitioner suggest that filing an Anders brief was insufficient

because there were issues in the record that could have been argued on appeal and that

appellate counsel did not review the entire record. This argument is insufficient to meet

Petitioner's burden of showing both that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the

deficiency prejudiced the defense. Accordingly, the state court's determination that appellate

counsel was not ineffective was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.

See Answer to Habeas Petition, Exhibit N, pages 10-11.

Additionally, Petitioner argues that had appellate counsel moved for continuances he

may have been able to push back the ultimate ruling on Petitioner's case until after Apprendi

was decided. The Court does not find counsel failing to seek what counsel deemed to be

unnecessary continuances to delay the case proper, much less to meet the Strickland standard

for ineffective assistance.9

 Therefore, habeas relief on this claim will be denied.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Arraignment

The R&R concludes, and no one objects, that the ineffective assistance of counsel at

arraignment claim has been exhausted. Thus, this Court accepts this conclusion. The state

court found that this claim lacked merit because Petitioner could not show prejudice as

required by Strickland. Answer to habeas petition, Exhibit N, pages 8-9. Petitioner claims

he suffered prejudice because his counsel made an appearance for him at arraignment without

speaking with him in advance and counsel waived the reading of the indictment and the

reading of Petitioner's rights. Petitioner did not wish to waive these rights, so he discharged

counsel. Petitioner argues that these actions by counsel forced Petitioner to forgo counsel.

The state court found no prejudice because, even after arraignment, Petitioner was repeatedly

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offered counsel and chose to proceed in representing himself; thus, the state court concluded

that Petitioner was not forced to proceed without counsel. Id.

This Court finds that the state court's ruling is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. Moreover, the Court agrees that because

Petitioner could have changed his mind and accepted counsel at any time, his disagreement

with counsel at arraignment did not force him to proceed through the entire case without

counsel.

In his objections, Petitioner also argues that counsel was ineffective for not demanding

to go to trial immediately. Objections at 28. This Court agrees with the R&R that whether

counsel, if counsel would have stayed, would have been prepared to or chosen to go forward

with an "immediate" trial date is a tactical decision and such tactical decisions cannot form

the basis of habeas relief for ineffective assistance. R&R at 33. Accordingly, this objection

is also overruled and habeas relief on this claim will be denied.

Claim 9 - Record on Appeal

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals did not have a full record before it during

Petitioner's direct appeal and that the lack of a record is grounds for habeas relief. In the

R&R, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner raised this claim in his post-conviction

relief petition, that the trial judge found that this claim was required to be raised before the

State Supreme Court, that the claim was defaulted by not raising it to the State Supreme

Court, and that the trial court denied relief on that basis. R&R at 33-35. The R&R then

concludes that the state's procedural rule used to find the claim defaulted was adequate and

independent, therefore, the claim is procedurally defaulted in this Court. Id. Finally, the

R&R addressed Petitioner's contention that the failure to raise this issue to the state supreme

court was ineffective assistance of counsel, and the R&R concludes that there was no right

to counsel in a petition to the supreme court, therefore, there could not be ineffective

assistance of counsel in this phase of the case. Id. Further, the R&R concludes that this

particular theory of ineffective assistance of counsel has never been exhausted before the

state courts, is procedurally defaulted, and is not properly before this Court. Id.

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In his objections, Petitioner does not object to any of these conclusions. This Court

agrees with the conclusions of the R&R and accepts the recommendation that habeas relief

be denied on this claim. In the objections on this claim, Petitioner reargues his theory of

ineffective assistance of counsel before the state court of appeals. This Court has already

addressed that theory of ineffective assistance of counsel above, and continues to find that

any alleged errors of appellate counsel do not met the Strickland standard for granting relief.

Therefore, habeas relief on this basis will be denied.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. #21) is accepted and

adopted as specified above, the objections (Doc. #24) as supplemented (Doc. #25) are

overruled; the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied, with prejudice, and the Clerk of

the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 14th day of February, 2007.

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