Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04764/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04764-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEVINE, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHUCK CONNER, Acting Secretary, United

States Department of Agriculture,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

No. C 05-04764 MHP

OPINION

Re: Cross-Motions for Summary

Judgment

Plaintiffs are: 1) poultry eaters concerned about food-borne illnesses; and 2) organizations

representing poultry slaughterhouse workers concerned about working conditions. On November

21, 2005 plaintiffs filed the instant case against the United States Department of Agriculture

(“USDA”) challenging the USDA’s interpretive rule excluding chickens, turkeys and other poultry

species from the Humane Methods Slaughter Act (“HMSA”) of 1958, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. Now

before the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. The court has considered the

parties’ arguments fully, and for the reasons set forth below, the court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

In 1958, Congress enacted the HMSA with the goal of “prevent[ing] needless suffering” of

animals killed for food and because humanitarian killing “results in safer and better working

conditions for persons engaged in the slaughtering industry . . . and produces other benefits for

producers, processors, and consumers.” 7 U.S.C. § 1901. The Act establishes that it is “the policy

of the United States that the slaughtering of livestock and the handling of livestock in connection

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with slaughter shall be carried out only by humane methods.” Id. The Act found that with respect to

“cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock” a method that renders them

“insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid

and effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut” is humane. Id. § 1902(a). The

HMSA then directed the Secretary of the USDA (the “Secretary”) to intermittently designate

humane methods of slaughter, with reference to other existing methods and then-current scientific

knowledge, for each species of livestock. Id. § 1904(b). In 1959, pursuant to Congress’ directive,

the Secretary prescribed humane methods of slaughter for cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine,

and goats. Designation of Methods, 24 Fed. Reg. 1549–53 (Mar. 3, 1959).

In 1978, Congress amended the Federal Meat Inspection Act (“FMIA”) of 1907, which

covered “cattle, sheep, swine, goats, horses, mules, and other equines.” 21 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.

The 1978 amendment added a provision to the FMIA requiring the USDA to ensure that animals

covered by the FMIA are also slaughtered in accordance with the HMSA of 1958. Pub. L. No.

95-445, 92 Stat. 1069 (Oct. 10, 1978). It concurrently repealed the HMSA’s enforcement provisions

and provided for criminal and civil penalties under the FMIA for slaughter conducted inhumanely. 

See id.; 21 U.S.C. § 676.

On September 28, 2005 the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service issued a notice

entitled “Treatment of Live Poultry Before Slaughter.” 70 Fed. Reg. 56,624 (Sept. 28, 2005)

(hereinafter “Notice”). The Notice was in response to “considerable congressional and public

interest in the humane treatment of animals, including poultry.” Id. at 56,624. The notice reiterated

that “there is no specific federal humane handling and slaughter statute for poultry” and stated that

adherence to the agency’s Poultry Products Inspection Act (“PPIA”) promotes humane slaughter. 

Id.

Later in 2005, Congress amended the FMIA to replace all references to “cattle, sheep, swine,

goats, horses, mules, and other equines” with “amenable species.” Pub. L. No. 109-97, 119 Stat.

2120 (Nov. 10, 2005). The amendment defines “amenable species” to include cattle, sheep, swine,

goats, horses, mules, and other equines, 21 U.S.C. § 601(w)(1), as well as “any additional species of

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livestock that the Secretary considers appropriate,” id. § 601(w)(2).

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is

“no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the

case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is

genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. Id. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those portions

of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On an issue for which the opposing party

will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence

of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Mere allegations or denials do not defeat a moving

party’s allegations. Id.; Gasaway v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1994). The

court may not make credibility determinations, and inferences to be drawn from the facts must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Masson v. New Yorker

Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

DISCUSSION

The Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) governs judicial review of administrative

decisions. 5 U.S.C. § 706. Under the APA, a court must set aside any agency action that is

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id.

§ 706(2)(A). The Supreme Court has laid out a two-part test to determine whether an agency has

acted “not in accordance with law.” See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

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467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). The court must first look to the statute’s language to determine

“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is

clear, that is the end of matter; for the Court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. The reading of the statute must be the “only

plausible interpretation.” Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 460 (1998). “If, however, the

court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue . . . the question

for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. If the construction is permissible, the court must defer to the agency, but

the court need not defer to agency regulations “if [the agency] construe[s] a statute in a way that is

contrary to congressional intent or that frustrates congressional policy.” Akhtar v. Burzynski, 384

F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiffs argue that under Chevron step one, the USDA’s interpretation excluding poultry

from livestock violates the plain language of the HMSA since livestock, by definition, includes

poultry. They then argue that the USDA’s unexplained interpretive rule fails Chevron step two and

this action must therefore be remanded to the USDA for a more cogent rationale. Defendant argues

that the statute is unambiguous in its intent to exclude poultry. Alternatively, it argues that the

USDA’s interpretation of livestock is permissible. The court discusses each Chevron prong in turn.

I. Unambiguous Congressional Intent

Under step one of the Chevron analysis, the court employs “traditional tools of statutory

construction” to determine whether the meaning of a statute is unambiguous. Chevron, 467 U.S. at

843 n.9.

A. Plain Language

In determining whether a statute’s language is unambiguous, words are to be given their

“ordinary and natural meaning” and courts are to “follow the common practice of consulting

dictionary definitions to clarify the [word’s] ordinary meaning and look to how the terms were

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defined at the time the statute of was adopted.” United States v. TRW Rifle, 447 F.3d 686, 689 (9th

Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). The court must first look to the language of the statute itself

which, in this case, in prescribing the methods of “slaughter and handling” includes only “cattle,

calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock.” 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a). The terms “other

livestock” or “livestock” are not defined in the Act.

Plaintiffs contend that when the HMSA was enacted, livestock was defined by one definitive

source as “domestic animals used or raised on a farm – especially those kept for profit.” Webster’s

Int’l Dictionary of the English Language 1446 (2d ed. 1957). There do not seem to be any

dictionary definitions from the 1950’s that explicitly include poultry as livestock.1

 Defendant’s

proffered definitions define livestock as a category of animals including “horses, cattle, sheep and

other useful animals kept or raised on a firm or ranch.” The American College Dictionary 713

(1957); see also Def.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11.2

 The precise metes and bounds of the

category, however, are not given. The category of animals could thus be limited to a narrow group

of quadrupeds like cattle and other bovine creatures or alternatively, it could be all-encompassing, as

the plaintiffs contend. Indeed, the scope of domestic animals used or raised on a farm can

potentially extend to guinea pigs, cats, dogs, fish, ants, and bees. Under plaintiffs’ proffered

definition, it is unclear which domestic animals are to be included if they are not kept for profit, and

under defendant’s definition above, it is unclear which farm animals are useful.

Defendant provides other sources that purportedly provide an exhaustive list of animals

considered to be livestock, but which neglect to list poultry. See I. L. Mason, A World Dictionary of

Breeds Types and Varieties of Livestock 9 (1951); Hilton M. Briggs, Modern Breeds of Livestock

ix-x (1949); Henry W. Vaughn, Breeds of Live Stock in America 9–11 (1931). The preceding

sources do not provide an explanation for their exclusion of poultry, but do provide a closed set

definition that does not include poultry.3

 Nevertheless, these arcane sources are not enough to

conclusively resolve the ambiguity created by general dictionary definitions of livestock.

Plaintiffs argue that common parlance dictates that livestock include poultry. The USDA

itself has used the term livestock to include poultry. See Report on Changes in Farm Production and

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Efficiency, USDA Statistical Bulletin No. 233 (August 1958) (report included information about

poultry when discussing livestock data).4 Plaintiffs cite to the facts section of Robinson v. Solano

County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002), in which plaintiff raised “livestock including cattle,

ducks, turkeys, geese, and chickens.” The flip side of this coin, however, is that other courts have

found the meaning of livestock to be uncertain, and have then construed livestock to exclude

poultry. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 499 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).

Furthermore, the fact that Congress frequently vacillates between treating livestock and

poultry as distinct concepts informs this court’s decision. Specifically, the terms are used distinctly

in numerous chapters of Title VII of the United States Code, the same Title that includes the HMSA. 

See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 182(4) (Chapter 9, entitled Packers and Stockyards and enacted in 1921, defines

livestock as “cattle, sheep, swine, horses, mules, or goats.”). Numerous other chapters under Title

VII do the same.5 Congress, however, sometimes includes poultry under the definition of livestock. 

See 7 U.S.C. § 1523(b)(1) (the Federal Crop Insurance Act defines livestock to include “cattle,

sheep, swine, goats, and poultry.”). Numerous other chapters under Title VII do the same.6 Since

the term livestock includes poultry in some sections, but not in others, the term standing alone is

necessarily ambiguous. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343–44 (1997). Nevertheless,

this Congressional vacillation cuts in favor of excluding poultry from the definition of livestock

because holding otherwise would render Congress’ repeated uses of the term poultry in the same

statutes as livestock superfluous—a construction which goes against accepted canons of statutory

interpretation. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir.

1991).

In sum, the plain meaning of the word livestock is ambiguous. The court now turns to other

indicators of Congressional intent to determine whether Congress intended to exclude poultry when

it used the term livestock.

B. Legislative History

The HMSA was not written on a clean slate. There is ample prior history of Congress acting

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to protect the public from unsafe meat and poultry products. As early as 1907, Congress enacted the

FMIA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., to regulate the production and distribution of meat and meat food

products. This statute also included a provision for the examination and inspection of the

slaughtering of livestock, which it described as pertaining to “cattle, sheep, swine, horses and mules,

and other equines.” 21 U.S.C. § 603(b). The statute makes no mention of poultry or any animals

within the ordinary meaning of poultry. Id. §§ 601 et seq.

On August 28, 1957—exactly one year before the enactment of the HMSA—Congress

enacted the PPIA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451 et seq., to provide an elaborate system for the inspection,

processing and regulation of poultry and poultry products. Poultry is defined as “any domesticated

bird, whether live or dead.” Id. In addition to prescribing sanitary procedures, labeling, inspection,

distribution and a number of other practices, the PPIA provides in part: “[N]o person shall - (1)

slaughter any poultry or process any poultry parts . . . except in compliance with the requirements of

this chapter . . . .” Id. § 458(a). Section 464(a) of the PPIA, however, exempts certain slaughtering

and processing from the statutory requirements. Although the PPIA is short on methods of

slaughter, it is noteworthy that this comprehensive statute was adopted just one year before the

HMSA. The enactment of the PPIA and the HMSA by the same Congress, the 85th, suggests that

Congress understood there to be a distinction between livestock and poultry.

In 1967, Congress amended FMIA subsection 603(b), entitled “Humane Methods of

Slaughter,” to reference the “Act of August 27, 1958”—the HMSA—to ensure that methods of

slaughter complied with the HMSA. A number of other provisions of the 1907 Act were amended in

1967 and 1978. The HMSA was also amended in 1978 by the same statute that amended the 1907

Act. See Pub. L. 95-445, 92 Stat. 1069 (Oct. 10, 1978). In none of these amendments is poultry

mentioned.

The court also notes that when the 1907 Act and its 1967 and 1978 amendments refer to the

product of livestock they use the term “meat.” In contrast, the 1957 PPIA—which was also

amended in 1978—does not use the term “meat” and refers only to “poultry products.” 

Furthermore, in 1996, Congress amended both the FMIA and PPIA to add sections 679a and 471

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respectively, which provided for the establishment of the “Safe Meat and Poultry Inspection Panel.” 

Pub. L. 104-127, § 918(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), 110 Stat. 1188–90 (April 4, 1996). In yet another section of

this 1996 enactment, relating to the regulation of commercial transportation of equine for slaughter,

Congress states that the provision does not purport to regulate the transportation “to slaughter or

elsewhere, of - (1) livestock other than equine; or (2) poultry.” Id. at § 904, 110 Stat. 1185. Thus,

once again, Congress distinguished between livestock and poultry. See also id. at Title IX, subtitle

A, 110 Stat. 1184 (entitled “Commercial Transportation of Equine for Slaughter.”).7

Congress also intended a limited definition for livestock because the HMSA, as originally

enacted, did not include the PPIA, but did include the FMIA, which provided inspection authority

for “cattle, sheep, swine, and goats” and “live horses.” See Pub. L. 85-765, § 4(c), 72 Stat. 863

(Aug. 27, 1958); 59 Pub. L. 59-242, 34 Stat. 1256, 1259–60 (Mar. 4, 1907). The FMIA does not

include all the animals Congress specifically listed in the HMSA. Thus, Congress could not have

intended to limit the animals covered by the HMSA to be limited to those in the FMIA. However,

since it was the same Congress that enacted the PPIA and the HMSA, it would behoove them to

include the PPIA if they intended poultry to be included.8

Plaintiffs argue that the congressional debate surrounding the enactment of the HMSA

demonstrates ambiguity. During the floor debate in the House of Representatives on H.R.

8308—the bill that eventually became the HMSA—Representative Hoffman read into the record the

above quoted Webster’s dictionary definition and then declared, “[n]ow, chickens and turkeys are

livestock.” 104 Cong. Rec. H1659 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1958). To the contrary, the author of the bill,

Representative Poage, stated that “[c]hickens are not livestock under the terms of this bill.” Id. at

H1655. Though neither of the statements demonstrates the intent of the legislature as a whole, the

court affords greater weight to the statements made by the author of the bill than those of other

representatives. See Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1974).

The belief that the bill did not apply to poultry was reflected by some Senate members as

well. For instance, Senator Hickenlooper stated that H.R. 8308 “apparently does not touch the

killing or market preparation of fowl of various kinds.” Humane Slaughtering of Livestock:

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Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Agr. and Forestry, 85th Cong. 243 (1958). The Assistant

Secretary of Agriculture replied that “[he] believe[s] not.” Id. (statement of Mr. Peterson). During

the floor debate, however, some Senate members believed otherwise. When Senator Young asked

“[w]hy does not the bill apply to poultry?,” Senator Humphrey, a member of the Agriculture

Committee, replied that “[i]t can, under section 4, if the Secretary of Agriculture so designates.” 

104 Cong. Rec. S15,376 (daily ed. July 29, 1958). When asked why the bill was not more precise,

Senator Humphrey replied, “[W]e do not go that far. This is a peculiar situation. The proponents of

what I call an effective bill are accused, on the one hand, of going too far, and, on the other hand, of

not going far enough. The bill is a mild and modest beginning in the field of humane slaughter.”9

Id. The Senate eventually passed a bill substantially similar to the House Resolution even though

they had concurrently discussed a study bill that deemed livestock to include poultry. Id. at S15368. 

These statements by individual senators are not conclusive; however, the Senate’s concurrent

rejection of a bill that explicitly defined livestock to include poultry suggests that livestock, standing

alone, did not include poultry.

Indeed, the HMSA only refers to enumerated animals and other livestock even though when

Congress was discussing this matter, they concurrently discussed eight separate bills, one of which

explicitly distinguished between livestock and poultry. See H.R. 6509, 85th Cong. (1st Sess. 1957);

S. 1497, 85th Cong. (1st Sess. 1957) (both defining livestock and poultry separately). The other

bills concurrently discussed also make a distinction between poultry and livestock. See H.R. 176,

85th Cong. (1st Sess. 1957); H.R. 2880, 85th Cong. (1st Sess. 1957); H.R. 3029, 85th Cong. (1st

Sess. 1957); H.R. 3049, 85th Cong. (1st Sess. 1957); H.R. 5671, 85th Cong. (1st Sess. 1957); H.R.

6422, 85th Cong. (1st Sess. 1957) (all covering animals “susceptible of use for the preparation of

meat or meat products” but all also distinguishing between poultry products and meat products). In

sum, Congress distinguished between livestock and poultry amongst the many bills it considered,

but ultimately decided on a bill that included livestock only. See Immigration & Naturalization

Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442–43 (1987) (“Few principles of statutory construction

are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silento to enact statutory

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language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.”) (internal quotations omitted). The

plain language of these bills indicates that Congress intended to exclude poultry from the definition

of livestock when it enacted H.R. 8308, the bill that eventually became the HMSA.

Finally, plaintiffs argue that poultry was intended to be included because the advisory

committee created in conjunction with passage of the HMSA included a representative from the

poultry industry. Pub. L. No. 85-765, § 5, 72 Stat. 863 (Aug. 27, 1958). The inclusion of the

poultry representative, however, was in addition to two representatives from the “livestock”

industry. This argument cuts against plaintiffs as it demonstrates that Congress intended a

distinction between poultry and livestock. The inclusion of the poultry representative could have

been because there had been discussion of the HMSA applying to poultry. See 104 Cong. Rec.

H1655 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1958) (statement of Rep. Poage). Indeed, a more persuasive reason for the

presence of a member of the poultry industry on the committee may have been the industry’s interest

in protecting itself from regulation by the Act, particularly since it had been the subject of statutory

regulation under the PPIA during the preceding year.

The court thus finds the legislative history strongly demonstrates unambiguous

Congressional intent that livestock, as used in the HMSA, does not include poultry. Nevertheless,

the court analyzes certain canons of statutory construction in order to ensure the Congressional

intent found above has not been negated.

C. Canons of Statutory Construction

Defendant argues that the traditional canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis apply

to this situation because the term “other livestock” follows a list of enumerated animals. The former

canon provides that when a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the

rest of the statute. The latter provides that where general words follow an enumeration of specific

items, the general words are read as applying to other items akin to those specifically enumerated. 

See Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371,

384 (2003). These canons lend support to defendant’s argument that Congress intended to limit

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livestock to “other quadrupeds traditionally considered to be livestock.” See, e.g., McBoyle v.

United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931) (holding that “any other self-propelled vehicle,” when preceded

by “automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, and motorcycle” did not include aircraft).

Defendant’s categorical and self-referential definition, however, is not unique. Other

categorical descriptions that take into account all of the unifying characteristics of the enumerated

animals also exist. For example, the canons also provide evidence that Congress meant to include

animals that are kept or raised on a farm. Thus, the unifying characteristic may be quadrupeds or

animals raised on a farm. In this respect, this case is distinguishable from James v. United States,

127 S. Ct. 1586, 1592 (2007), where the list “burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another” did not evidence an intent to limit the residual clause to completed offenses only. As the

Supreme Court held, the unifying characteristic, as repeated in the residual provision, was those acts

that “create significant risks of bodily injury or confrontation that might result in bodily injury.” Id.

In contrast, a broad definition for the residual phrase here has the potential to render the enumerated

animals superfluous whereas a narrow definition has the potential to render the residual phrase

superfluous. Despite plaintiffs’ contentions, Congress has provided no evidence that the former is

the preferred reading.

Plaintiffs claim that when specific terms conclude with the phrase “or other,” Congress

“intended the [list and the ‘other’ term] to mean two separate things.” United States v. 144,774

Pounds of Blue King Crab, 410 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2005). This argument too, cuts both ways. 

The list enumerated by Congress was clearly meant to be partial and illustrative, see Haviland v.

Butz, 543 F.2d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1976), but since the USDA has already concluded that livestock

includes goats—an animal not listed in the statute—this argument does not support plaintiffs’

position that poultry ought to be included as well. The enumerated list and the “other livestock”

language already mean two separate things.

Plaintiffs further argue that the USDA has only included goats under the definition of “other

livestock” and that if only goats were meant to be included, then the statute would have simply listed

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goats. This argument proves too much. If the USDA had designated two non-enumerated animals

as livestock, then plaintiffs would have argued that Congress could just as easily have listed two

more animals instead of using the catch-all phrase. The same argument could be used if the USDA

designated ten non-enumerated animals. Plaintiffs do not present any cogent argument as to why

listing only one non-enumerated animal is not enough. Listing goats certainly eliminates the

possibility that certain parts of the statute are not being given effect. Furthermore, the USDA’s

definition of livestock is malleable. Congress explicitly gave the USDA authority to regularly

designate methods of humane slaughter for livestock. 7 U.S.C. § 1904(b). The USDA may

therefore add to the list of “other livestock” as it sees fit. Indeed, that is exactly what plaintiffs

desire. Even if the court was to agree that Congress intended to have “other livestock” include more

than just goats, plaintiffs’ argument does not demonstrate how inclusion of poultry is compelled.

On balance, these canons do not negate the Congressional intent found above.

II. Permissible Agency Interpretation

The court finds that Congress intended to exclude poultry from the categorical word

“livestock.” Accordingly, the court need not address the second prong of Chevron.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2008 _______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. Plaintiffs cite to dictionary definitions from the twenty-first century that include poultry in

the definition of livestock. Dictionary definitions, however, change over time. Compare Black’s

Law Dictionary 1083 (4th ed. 1951) (defining livestock as “[d]omestic animals used or raised on a

farm”) with Black’s Law Dictionary 953 (8th ed. 2004) (defining livestock as “[d]omestic animals

and fowls that are kept for profit or pleasure”).

2. Defendant references other dictionaries that provide categorical definitions as well. See, e.g.,

Grosset Webster Dictionary 352 (1957); Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).

3. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, this situation is unlike a book on musicians neglecting to

discuss Miles Davis. An appropriate parallel would be a book purporting to discuss all the great jazz

musicians neglecting to discuss Miles Davis. Miles Davis would still nevertheless be a musician,

just not a great jazz musician according to the book’s author. Similarly, a book on livestock

neglecting to mention poultry may mean that the book’s author does not consider poultry to be

livestock, but does not mean that poultry, e.g. chickens, are not animals.

4. Plaintiffs claim that the USDA’s interpretation excludes 98% of animals slaughtered, which

violates the broad mandates of the HMSA. This statistic undercuts plaintiffs’ argument because the

court is unconvinced that Congress would decline to explicitly list the vast majority of the

beneficiaries of a statute when specifically listing some beneficiaries.

5. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 451; 608c(2); 1301(b)(5), (6)(A); 1942(a)(2); 2132(g); 2274;

3154(b)(2); 6982(a)(4); 7412(1)(B), (C); 7627(b)(3); 7702(10); 8320(a)(4)(A), (B)(i).

6. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1631(c)(5); 8302(10); 1471(2); 6502(11); 5602(1).

7. Plaintiffs contend that the longstanding USDA interpretation is of no consequence since

“Congressional acquiescence can only be inferred when there is ‘overwhelming evidence’ that

Congress explicitly considered the ‘precise issue’ presented to the court.” Morales-Izquierdo v.

Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Here, however, there is ample

evidence that Congress considers poultry and livestock to be distinct concepts.

8. Defendant argues that without an inspection and identification process with respect to

poultry, the USDA would not have been able to ensure compliance. This argument falls flat because

Congress amended the FMIA in 1978 to provide for civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance

regarding animals covered by the HMSA.

9. Defendant claims an expansive interpretation would ignore that the HMSA sought to “strike

a middle course between a number of essentially irreconcilable points of view and, therefore, like

most compromises, is probably not entirely satisfactory to any of the protagonists in this matter.” 

H.R. Rep. No. 85-706, at 1 (1957). This argument is unpersuasive as the compromise could just as

easily have included poultry or excluded poultry from the definition of livestock.

ENDNOTES

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