Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01051/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01051-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254dp Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Death Penalty)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN M. BELL,

Petitioner,

v.

RONALD DAVIS, Warden of San Quentin 

State Prison

Respondent.

Case No.: 17cv1051 WQH (JLB)

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER ON EXHAUSTION STATUS 

OF CLAIMS IN PETITION; 

GRANTING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION FOR STAY AND 

ABEYANCE [ECF No. 21]; AND 

SETTING DEADLINES

On August 8, 2018, pursuant to the Court’s September 18, 2017 Order, the parties 

filed a Joint Statement Regarding Exhaustion. (ECF No. 20.) In the statement, the parties 

agree on the exhaustion status of all claims in the federal Petition except for one claim 

Petitioner argues should be deemed exhausted, which is addressed below. On September 

7, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Stay and Abeyance. (ECF No. 21.) On September 

19, 2018, Respondent filed an Opposition, and on September 28, 2018, Petitioner filed a 

Reply. (ECF Nos. 22-23.) The Court finds that the matters at issue here are suitable for 

decision without oral argument. 

///

///

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For the reasons discussed below, the Court FINDS that Claim Six of Section VI of 

the federal Petition is unexhausted, GRANTS Petitioner’s motion to stay the instant federal 

case pending the exhaustion of state remedies, and sets deadlines as outlined below. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In an Information filed August 12, 1992, Petitioner was charged with first degree 

murder in the death of Johnny Anderson in violation of California Penal Code § 187(a), 

first degree robbery in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 211 and 212.5(a), and residential 

burglary in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 459 and 460. (CT 15-16.) The Information 

also charged that Petitioner used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of 

each of the three counts within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 12022(b) and had inflicted 

great bodily injury on Anderson in the commission of the robbery and burglary, within the 

meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7. (CT 15-17.) Petitioner was also charged with the 

special circumstances of murder in the commission of a robbery and murder in the 

commission of a burglary under Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17). (CT 16.) Prior to trial, 

the California Court of Appeal granted a petition for a writ of prohibition to set aside the 

portions of the Information charging Petitioner with residential burglary and the special 

circumstance of murder in the course of a burglary. (CT 980-85.)

On November 22, 1993, after the guilt phase proceedings and deliberations, the jury 

found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder and first degree robbery, found that Petitioner 

used a deadly and dangerous weapon in both the murder and robbery, and found that 

Petitioner inflicted great bodily injury on Anderson in the commission of the robbery. (CT 

1835-36, 1838-39.) The jury also found true the special circumstance of murder in the 

course of a robbery. (CT 1837.) On December 17, 1993, after penalty phase proceedings 

and deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of death. (CT 1865.) On March 4, 1994, 

Petitioner was sentenced to death. (CT 1879-81.) 

On direct appeal of his conviction and judgment to the California Supreme Court, 

Petitioner filed an opening brief on June 12, 2003. (Lodgment No. 4.) Petitioner filed a 

reply brief on January 28, 2005. (Lodgment No. 6.) Petitioner also filed a supplemental 

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letter brief and response to Respondent’s letter brief on September 25, 2006 and October 

13, 2006, respectively. (Lodgment Nos. 7, 9.) The California Supreme Court affirmed 

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in a written decision issued on February 15, 2007. 

People v. Bell, 40 Cal. 4th 582 (2007), disapproved of by People v. Sanchez, 63 Cal. 4th 

665 (2016). The United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari 

on October 1, 2007. Bell v. California, 552 U.S. 826 (2007).

On March 29, 2007, Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the California Supreme 

Court. (Lodgment No. 17.) On June 22, 2009, Petitioner filed an amended petition. 

(Lodgment No. 18.) On September 28, 2010, Petitioner filed a reply. (Lodgment No. 20.) 

On January 21, 2014, the California Supreme Court issued an Order to Show Cause. 

(Lodgment No. 21.) On May 14, 2014, Respondent filed a Return and on September 25, 

2014, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (Lodgment Nos. 22-23.) On November 12, 2014, the 

California Supreme Court ordered an evidentiary hearing. (Lodgment No. 24.) After 

holding an evidentiary hearing, the Referee issued a Report on March 21, 2016. (Lodgment 

No. 26.) After filings including Petitioner’s exceptions to the Referee’s Report, 

Respondent’s response and Petitioner’s reply (Lodgment Nos. 27-29), the California 

Supreme Court issued an opinion discharging the Order to Show Cause on June 8, 2017. 

(Lodgment No. 30.) On July 26, 2017, the California Supreme Court denied the remaining 

claims in the habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 31.)

On August 1, 2017, the Court issued an Order appointing counsel to represent 

Petitioner in the instant proceedings. (ECF No. 5.) On September 13, 2017, pursuant to 

the Court’s direction, the parties filed a joint statement on a proposed schedule for lodging 

the state record, filing the petition, and for any proceedings on exhaustion and/or stay and 

abeyance. (ECF No. 10.) Thereafter, the Court issued a scheduling order setting out 

deadlines for lodging the record, filing the petition, filing a joint statement on exhaustion

and filings on any request for stay and abeyance. (ECF No. 11.) 

On July 25, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 

18.) On August 8, 2018, Petitioner and Respondent filed a Joint Statement Regarding 

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Exhaustion. (ECF No. 20.) On September 7, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Stay and 

Abeyance, along with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion, 

and the declaration of prior counsel as Exhibit A. (ECF No. 21.) On September 19, 2018, 

Respondent filed an Opposition and on September 28, 2018, Petitioner filed a Reply. (ECF 

Nos. 22-23.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion

“[A] state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a 

federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 

275 (1971); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b),(c). “[O]nce the federal claim has been fairly 

presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.” Picard, 404 U.S. at 

275. “In order to ‘fairly present’ an issue to a state court, a petitioner must ‘present the 

substance of his claim to the state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional 

guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.’” Gulbrandson v. 

Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013), quoting Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th 

Cir. 2009). 

In the joint statement, the parties agree on the exhaustion status of all but one of the 

claims raised in the federal petition. The parties state that “all of the claims contained in 

Sections IV and V of the petition are exhausted” and that “the claims contained in Sections 

VI and VII of the petition are unexhausted, although petitioner maintains that Claim Six of 

Section VI should be deemed exhausted and that the exhaustion issue may be clarified by 

the pending en banc decision in Andrews v. Davis, 866 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2017), reh’g 

granted, 888 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2018), set for oral argument in September 2018.” (ECF 

No. 20 at 1-2.) In the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion for 

Stay and Abeyance, Petitioner repeats his assertion that Claim Six of Section VI is 

exhausted and states that “[s]ection VII of the § 2254 petition raises a cumulative error 

claim as to all of the claims in the petition, and therefore it is unexhausted to the extent that 

it includes prejudice flowing from the unexhausted claims.” (ECF No. 21-1 at 2.)

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Claim Six in Section VI of the federal Petition is entitled “The Systemic Dysfunction 

Of California’s Death Penalty Regime Leads To Consequences, Including Delay In 

Imposition Of The Penalty, That Render Imposition Of That Penalty Unconstitutional,” 

and in the text of that claim Petitioner acknowledges he raised a claim in the state habeas 

petition under Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (mem.) (Stevens, J., respecting the 

denial of certiorari). (ECF No. 18 at 316.) Lackey “raise[d] the question whether executing 

a prisoner who has already spent some 17 years on death row violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.” Lackey, 514 U.S. at 

1045. Petitioner’s claim raised on state habeas was entitled “Execution Following A Long 

Period Of Confinement Under A Sentence of Death Would Violate Mr. Bell’s Right To Be 

Free From Cruel, Torturous, And Unusual Punishment.” (Lodgment No. 18 at 239.) With 

respect to that previously raised claim, Petitioner asserts he “has repeated that claim in this 

petition,” and “requests that the Court take judicial notice of the facts stated in District 

Judge Carney’s Jones opinion.” (ECF No. 18 at 316, citing Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 

3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014), reversed by Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).) 

As noted in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jones v. Davis, the original claim raised 

in that proceeding was “the same Lackey claim that the state court had rejected, arguing 

that the ‘excessive delay’ after his sentencing violates the Eighth Amendment.” Jones, 806 

F.3d at 542. Then, after “the district court issued an order expressing the view that 

California’s post-conviction system itself may be unconstitutional,” and ordered the filing 

of an amended petition and additional briefing, the amended claim “alleged that 

California’s post-conviction system itself violates the Eighth Amendment by creating 

excessive delay between sentencing and execution in capital cases generally.” Id.

In the federal Petition filed in this case, Petitioner notes “[t]here is ‘tension’ in Ninth 

Circuit case law regarding whether exhaustion of a Lackey claim, should Mr. Bell’s claim 

be characterized as limited to a Lackey claim, also serves to exhaust a Jones claim,” and 

posits that the issue may be decided by the en banc Ninth Circuit in Andrews. (ECF No. 

18 at 316-17, citing Rowland v. Chappell, 876 F.3d 1174, 1194 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2017) and 

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Andrews, 866 F.3d 994, rehearing granted, 888 F.3d 1020). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has 

acknowledged that:

There may be some tension in our case law regarding whether exhaustion of 

a Lackey claim- which asserts that delay in a defendant’s individual case 

between judgment and execution constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation, 

see Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421, 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1997) 

(Stevens, J., mem. op. respecting denial of cert.)- also serves to exhaust a

Jones claim. Compare Alfaro, 862 F.3d at 1184 (“The key distinguishing 

factor between Lackey and Jones claims is that the latter concern systemic

delay that creates arbitrariness in executions.”) and Jones, 806 F.3d at 554 

(Watford, J., concurring) (“Presenting the Lackey claim to the California 

Supreme Court . . . did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement.”) with Andrews

v. Davis, 866 F.3d 994, 1039 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the petitioner’s 

reference to Jones on appeal did not fundamentally alter his Lackey claim, and 

therefore exhaustion of his Lackey claim ‘likewise exhausted his current 

challenge.’)

Rowland, 876 F.3d at 1194 n.7.

Petitioner contends that “Mr. Bell’s Lackey claim in the state habeas corpus petition 

challenged the systemic delay in the administration of California’s death penalty, and 

therefore, he asserts, the Jones claim is exhausted.” (ECF No. 18 at 316.) Yet Petitioner’s 

claim appears centered on delays specific to his own case, rather than presenting any 

systemic challenge. In the state habeas petition, Petitioner contended that his “sentence of 

death and continued confinement are unlawful and unconstitutional,” citing the state and 

federal Constitutions, statutes, international and decisional law and numerous other rules 

and authorities, “because the California death penalty appellate and post-conviction 

procedures fail to provide Mr. Bell with a constitutionally full, fair, and timely review of 

his conviction and sentence.” (Lodgment No. 18 at 239.) Petitioner argued that the 

“[e]xecution of Mr. Bell following such confinement under a sentence of death for this 

lengthy period of time would constitute cruel and unusual punishment because the State’s 

ability to exact retribution and to deter other serious offenses by actually carrying out such 

a sentence is drastically diminished, such that this extraordinary sentence does not serve 

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any legitimate state interest.” (Id. at 242.) The claim raised in state court clearly appears 

to be a Lackey claim alone.

In the federal Petition, Petitioner contends that “[t]o the extent that Mr. Bell’s claim 

is characterized as limited to a Lackey claim, he contends that this Court should stay the 

exhaustion and stay-and-abey decisions pending Andrews.” (ECF No. 18 at 317.) 

Petitioner does not appear to reiterate this request in the instant motion. To the extent 

Petitioner requests a stay of the Court’s decision on the instant matters, the Court finds that 

course of action unnecessary. The parties agree that there are several unexhausted claims, 

as well as exhausted claims, in the instant Petition. Regardless of the exhaustion status of 

this particular claim, the stay and abeyance issue appears ripe for decision. Under current

Ninth Circuit authority it appears that the Lackey claim Petitioner presented to the 

California Supreme Court did not exhaust the Jones/Lackey claim in the present federal 

Petition. The Ninth Circuit, in ordering that Andrews would be reheard en banc, also 

ordered that “[t]he three-judge panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to any 

court of the Ninth Circuit.” Andrews v. Davis, 888 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.). At 

present, circuit authority supports a conclusion that exhausting a Lackey claim is not 

sufficient to exhaust a Jones claim. See e.g. Alfaro v. Johnson, 862 F.3d 1176, 1180-84 

(9th Cir. 2017).

Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties as outlined in the joint statement (see ECF 

No. 20), the Court finds that the claims in Sections VI and VII of the petition, with the 

exception of Claim Six of Section VI, are unexhausted, and all of the claims contained in 

Section IV and V of the petition are exhausted. For the reasons discussed above, the Court 

finds that Claim Six of Section VI is unexhausted. 

B. Stay and Abeyance

In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), the Supreme Court held “federal district 

courts may not adjudicate mixed petitions for habeas corpus, that is, petitions containing 

both exhausted and unexhausted claims,” in doing so “reason[ing] that the interests of 

comity and federalism dictate that state courts must have the first opportunity to decide a 

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petitioner’s claims.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273 (2005), citing Lundy, 455 U.S. 

at 518-19. At that time, the Supreme Court “imposed a requirement of ‘total exhaustion’ 

and directed federal courts to effectuate that requirement by dismissing mixed petitions 

without prejudice and allowing petitioners to return to state court to present the 

unexhausted claims to that court in the first instance.” Id. at 274, quoting Lundy, 455 U.S. 

at 522. The Rhines Court noted that “[t]he enactment of AEDPA in 1996 dramatically 

altered the landscape for federal habeas corpus petitions,” and while it “preserved Lundy’s 

total exhaustion requirement,” AEDPA “also imposed a 1-year statute of limitations on the 

filing of federal petitions,” and “[a]s a result of the interplay between AEDPA’s 1-year 

statute of limitations and Lundy’s dismissal requirement, petitioners who come to federal 

court with ‘mixed’ petitions run the risk of forever losing their opportunity for any federal 

review of their unexhausted claims.” Id. at 274-75. 

The Rhines Court stated that in “limited circumstances” a procedure was available 

under which “a district court might stay the petition and hold it in abeyance while the 

petitioner returns to state court to exhaust his previously unexhausted claims.” Id. at 275-

77. The Rhines Court held that stay and abeyance was appropriate where: (1) “there was 

good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court,” (2) the 

“unexhausted claims were potentially meritorious” and (3) “there is no indication that the 

petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at 277-78.

In this case, as discussed above, the parties agree that the federal petition contains 

both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Accordingly, the Court finds the instant motion 

is amenable to analysis under Rhines.

1. Good Cause For Failure to Exhaust

Petitioner asserts that he has good cause for his failure to exhaust, arguing first that 

state habeas counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the unexhausted claims and that “the 

Ninth Circuit held that ineffective assistance of habeas counsel constitutes good cause 

under the first prong of the Rhines test.” (ECF No. 21-1 at 2-3, citing Blake v. Baker, 745 

F.3d 977, 980-84 (9th Cir. 2014).) Petitioner attaches a declaration from Petitioner’s state 

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habeas counsel in support of his assertion. (See ECF No. 21-2.) Alternately, Petitioner 

argues that Claims One and Two of the unexhausted claims “demonstrate a miscarriage of 

justice because he is actually innocent of the capital murder allegations” and separately 

satisfies the good cause prong under Rhines. (ECF No. 21-1 at 4.)

As to Petitioner’s first assertion of good cause, “[i]n Blake, [the Ninth Circuit] 

concluded that the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel could constitute good 

cause for a Rhines stay, provided that the petitioner’s assertion of good cause ‘was not a 

bare allegation of state postconviction (ineffective assistance of counsel), but a concrete 

and reasonable excuse, supported by evidence.’” Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714, 721 (9th 

Cir. 2017), quoting Blake, 745 F.3d at 983. The Ninth Circuit stated that “the Rhines

standard for IAC-based cause is not any more demanding than the cause standard 

articulated in Martinez [v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012)].” Blake, 745 F.3d at 

984; see Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14 (“[A] prisoner may establish cause for a default of an 

ineffective-assistance claim . . . where appointed counsel in the initial-review collateral 

proceeding, where the claim should have been raised, was ineffective under the standards 

of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).”); see

also Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245-26 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (plurality opinion) 

(“We conclude, for the narrow purpose of satisfying the second Martinez requirement to 

establish ‘cause,’ that a prisoner need only show that his PCR counsel performed in a 

deficient manner. A prisoner need not show actual prejudice resulting from his PCR 

counsel’s deficient performance, over and above the required showing that the trial-counsel 

IAC claim be ‘substantial’ under the first Martinez requirement.”) 

With respect to the first five unexhausted claims, Claims One through Five in 

Section VI of the federal Petition, state habeas counsel’s declaration states that: “I and my 

team did not raise Claims One-Five listed in the preceding paragraph because we did not 

identify the legal grounds or evidence for presenting them. In other words, we did not spot 

the issues. We did not make a considered tactical decision to omit those claims from Mr. 

Bell’s state habeas corpus petition. Had we identified the legal bases and evidence 

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supporting these claims, we would have raised them.” (ECF No. 21-2 at 3.) With respect 

to Claim Six, which presents the Lackey/Jones claim discussed above, counsel states a 

belief that the claim was presented to the state court, and that: “[t]o the extent that the Court 

believes that the state habeas pleadings did not sufficiently raise a claim under Jones, it 

was a mistaken omission on our part and not the result of a tactical decision.” (Id.) With 

respect to the claim of cumulative error, prior counsel notes that state habeas petition raised 

a cumulative error claim and that “[w]e did not raise the prejudice flowing from the claims 

in Section VI because, as discussed above, we did not identify those claims. Had we 

identified the claims in Section VI, we would have included the prejudice flowing from 

those claims in the cumulative error claim that we did raise. We did not make a considered 

tactical decision to omit the prejudice flowing from the claims in Section VI from the 

cumulative error claim that we did raise.” (Id.)

Respondent maintains that Petitioner’s argument and the declaration of prior habeas 

counsel is insufficient to demonstrate good cause, citing the lack of “new evidence” 

supporting the unexhausted claims and the failure to identify actions by prior counsel that 

demonstrate a reasonable excuse for failing to exhaust those claims. (ECF No. 22 at 11.) 

Respondent also argues that counsel’s declaration is vague, “equally susceptible to the 

interpretation that [counsel] did not ‘identify the legal grounds or evidence’ for presenting 

these claims because the claims were not supportable,” and fails to demonstrate counsel 

was ineffective. (Id. at 12.) 

With respect to these contentions, the Court finds that most of the unexhausted

claims were of the type apparent from the trial and appellate record and did not appear to 

require additional evidentiary support to plead, and that prior counsel’s declaration is not 

vague in stating that had the claims been identified, they would have been raised. Upon 

review, the Court concludes that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that postconviction counsel may be deficient under Strickland. Petitioner’s allegations of 

ineffective assistance of counsel are sufficient to demonstrate good cause for his failure to 

exhaust the noted claims in state court. See Dixon, 847 F.3d at 721; Blake, 745 F.3d at 

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983-84. Because Petitioner has demonstrated good cause on this basis, it is unnecessary to 

address his contention that he can also demonstrate good cause for failing to raise Claims 

One and Two under a showing of miscarriage of justice/actual innocence.

2. Merit of Unexhausted Claims

“[E]ven if a petitioner had good cause for that failure, the district court would abuse 

its discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly 

meritless.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. “In determining whether a claim is ‘plainly meritless,’ 

principles of comity and federalism demand that the federal court refrain from ruling on 

the merits of the claim unless ‘it is perfectly clear that the petitioner has no hope of 

prevailing.’” Dixon, 847 F.3d at 722, quoting Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Upon review, the Court is unable to conclude that each of Petitioner’s 

unexhausted claims are “plainly meritless.” See Dixon, 847 F.3d at 722 (“A federal habeas 

petitioner must establish that at least one of his unexhausted claims is not ‘plainly 

meritless’ in order to obtain a stay under Rhines.”), quoting Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. 

For instance, in Claim Three of Section VI of the federal Petition, Petitioner alleges 

prosecutorial misconduct during penalty phase arguments and ineffective assistance of trial 

and appellate counsel in failing to challenge the asserted misconduct. (ECF No. 18 at 302.) 

Petitioner alleges that the misconduct included an “emotional plea to vengeance” that 

Petitioner should be shown the “same mercy” as the victim, the victim’s mother, and the 

victim of Petitioner’s prior crime. (Id. at 303, quoting RT 4428.) Petitioner also argues 

that the prosecutor “compared the fate of the victim to life imprisonment,” referencing 

privileges Petitioner would receive in prison, and called Petitioner “evil” and a “creature.” 

(Id. at 303-04, citing RT 4422, 4429, 4433.) Petitioner also asserts the prosecutor 

committed misconduct in “argu[ing] that religious and biblical authority supported the 

death penalty” and making societal and community based arguments for the death penalty. 

(Id. at 305-07, citing RT 4430-34.) 

The Supreme Court has held that prosecutorial misconduct in arguments to the jury 

may state a claim of constitutional error. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) 

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(“The relevant question is whether the prosecutors’ comments ‘so infected the trial with 

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’”), quoting Donnelly 

v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). Comments similar to the type identified in 

this claim have been found to constitute misconduct. See e.g. Darden, 477 U.S. at 180 nn. 

11-12 (comments found “improper” included referring to the perpetrator as an “animal” 

and stating that “[h]e shouldn’t be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him and a prison 

guard at the other end of that leash”); Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 777 (9th Cir. 

2000) (noting that “religious arguments have been condemned by virtually every federal 

and state court to consider their challenge”) (collecting cases); Trilo v. Biter, 769 F.3d 995, 

1001 (9th Cir. 2014) (“As we have recognized, ‘(a) prosecutor may not urge jurors to 

convict a criminal defendant in order to protect community values, preserve civil order, or 

deter future lawbreaking.’”), quoting United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1149 

(9th Cir. 2005). In light of the cited comments and the relevant authority, it possible that 

Petitioner could show a due process violation as a result of the alleged misconduct, and the 

Court cannot conclude “‘it is perfectly clear that the petitioner has no hope of prevailing.’” 

Dixon, 847 F.3d at 722, quoting Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624. 

The remainder of the unexhausted claims raise challenges that concern the 

sufficiency of the evidence concerning the robbery (Claim One), the use of juvenile 

conduct in aggravation at the penalty phase proceedings (Claim Two), the use of statements 

made to a probation officer concerning lack of remorse (Claim Four), the admission of 

evidence of jail misconduct in penalty phase rebuttal (Claim Five), the asserted dysfunction 

in the California capital system (Claim Six), and a claim of cumulative error (Section VII). 

(ECF No. 18 at 293-317.) In view of the arguments and authority presented, and given in 

particular that murder in the course of a robbery was the sole special circumstance 

considered by the jury and the true finding resulted in Petitioner’s eligibility for the death 

penalty, as well as that the prior juvenile conduct was a significant part of the prosecution’s 

penalty phase presentation in aggravation, the Court is unable to conclude those claims are 

“plainly meritless.”

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3. Dilatory tactics

The Rhines Court recognized that “[i]n particular, capital petitioners might 

deliberately engage in dilatory tactics to prolong their incarceration and avoid execution of 

the sentence of death,” and held that “if a petitioner engages in abusive litigation tactics or 

intentional delay, the district court should not grant him a stay at all.” Id., 544 U.S. at 277-

78. At the same time, the Supreme Court noted that “it likely would be an abuse of 

discretion for a district court to deny a stay and to dismiss a mixed petition if the petitioner 

had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially 

meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory 

litigation tactics.” Id. at 278.

Petitioner states he “timely filed his federal petition and has generally proceeded in 

a timely manner throughout the history of this case,” and “is unaware of any claims that he 

has engaged in abusive litigation tactics that would justify a denial of this motion.” (ECF 

No. 21-1 at 6.) Respondent, however, contends that “Bell has also been dilatory in 

presenting his unexhausted claims” and notes that “this Court appointed current federal 

habeas counsel on August 1, 2017, over fourteen months ago.” (ECF No. 22 at 17-18.) 

Respondent argues: “Bell has yet to file his exhaustion petition in a California state court. 

Instead, he is content to wait until this Court rules on the stay request and gives him further 

direction on when such a petition should be filed. There is absolutely no provision under 

California law requiring Bell to obtain permission, much less a stay, from this Court or any 

other federal court before filing a state habeas petition in the California courts.” (Id.)

While the record indeed reflects that counsel was appointed in August 2017, the 

federal Petition was filed in July 2018, and Petitioner does not indicate that he has yet filed 

an exhaustion petition in state court, the Court does not find that this constitutes evidence 

of dilatory tactics. Petitioner points out that in the September 13, 2017 joint statement, the 

parties agreed on the filing date for the petition, and also agreed that if a stay was granted, 

“‘Petitioner shall have 30 days to commence litigation of any unexhausted claims in state 

court.’” (ECF No. 23 at 7, quoting ECF No. 10.) A review of that joint statement confirms 

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that the parties indeed agreed to that proposed procedure in the event a stay was granted. 

(See ECF No. 10 at 2.) Moreover, Petitioner argued in the federal Petition, as well as in

the instant motion, that Claim Six should be deemed exhausted. (See ECF No. 18 at 316-

17, ECF No. 21-1 at 2.) In light of the parties’ prior agreement and because the Court’s 

determination on the exhaustion issue could impact the composition of any exhaustion 

petition, it appears reasonable for Petitioner to have awaited a decision on the instant 

motion prior to filing a state exhaustion petition. Under the circumstances presented, the 

Court does not find evidence of abusive tactics or intentional delay.

III. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court FINDS the claims in Sections VI and VII 

of the petition are unexhausted, and the claims contained in Section IV and V of the petition 

are exhausted, and GRANTS Petitioner’s motion for stay and abeyance (ECF No. 21).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner will commence exhaustion proceedings 

in the California Supreme Court and will file proof of that filing in this Court within 30 

days of the date of this Order. Petitioner will also file a report with this Court every 90 

days thereafter to inform the Court of the status of the state court proceedings. Proceedings 

on the federal Petition are stayed during the state court proceedings. Petitioner shall file a 

notice with the Court within 7 days of the state court’s resolution of the state habeas petition 

and shall file any amended federal petition within 30 days of the state court’s decision. In 

the event that Petitioner does not commence exhaustion proceedings in state court or file 

an amended petition within the time frames outlined in this Order, the stay and abeyance 

will be lifted, and proceedings will resume in this Court on the current federal Petition. 

Dated: November 1, 2018

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