Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06417/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06417-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAIL SUTTON and DANIELLE SUTTON,

Plaintiffs,

 v

WALTER HOLZ, JR and VICTORIAN

CARE HOMES OF THE MONTEREY

PENINSULA, INC, 

Defendants.

 /

No C 06-6417 VRW

ORDER

This action involves claims relating to the death of

Letitia Breng Rose, mother of plaintiff Gail Sutton and grandmother

of plaintiff Danielle Sutton. Defendant Walter Holz, Jr moves

under FRCP 12(f) to strike plaintiffs first amended complaint

(FAC). Doc # 113. Defendant Victorian Care Homes of the Monterey

Peninsula, Inc (Victorian) joins Holz’s motion to strike the FAC. 

Doc # 115. Plaintiffs oppose the motion and, in the alternative,

seek leave to amend. In his reply brief, Holz strenuously opposes

plaintiffs’ proposed amendments. Doc # 121.

Because plaintiffs neither obtained leave of court nor

written consent of the defendants as required by FRCP 15(a) before

filing their first amended complaint, The court GRANTS Holz’s

Case 3:06-cv-06417-VRW Document 130 Filed 10/15/07 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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motion to strike. Having considered the arguments presented in

favor of and in opposition to plaintiffs’ proposed amendment, the

court DENIES leave to file the proposed FAC.

I

Gail Sutton, Danielle Sutton and John Sutton were the

original plaintiffs in this matter. Gail Sutton is the daughter of

now-deceased Letitia Breng Rose, Danielle Sutton is Gail’s daughter

and John Sutton is Gail’s husband. Plaintiffs maintained pro se

status in the initial stages of their suit. Plaintiffs’ original

complaint included claims for wrongful death (count I), elder abuse

(count II), wrongful and willful dissipation of the estate (count

III) and wrongful dissipation of the estate and failure to notice

(count IV). Doc #1. All defendants except Victorian (which had

not then been properly served with the complaint) individually

filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint. The court issued

an order that: dismissed defendant Leslie Foote without prejudice

for improper service; dismissed all claims against defendants

Roberta Sokotowski and Richard Bishop with prejudice; dismissed all

claims against defendant Ann Sydes with prejudice; dismissed

plaintiff John Sutton from the action with prejudice; and allowed

Danielle Sutton to remain a plaintiff in the suit only as to the

claim for elder abuse. Doc #72.

In conclusion, the court’s order stated:

The only causes of action that remain in this

lawsuit are those for wrongful death (claim #1)

and elder abuse (claim #2) and the only remaining

defendants are Holz and Victorian.

Case 3:06-cv-06417-VRW Document 130 Filed 10/15/07 Page 2 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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John Sutton is no longer a plaintiff in this

action as he has been dismissed from the remaining

claims for wrongful death and elder abuse. 

Danielle Sutton remains only as a plaintiff to the

second cause of action for elder abuse.

Id.

On April 27, 2007, Holz filed an amended answer reflecting

the rulings in the court’s April 18 order. Doc # 73.

After plaintiffs did not properly serve their first

complaint on Victorian and instead unsuccessfully sought entry of

default against this entity, Mr William Ginsburg, attorney for

Victorian, offered to answer plaintiffs complaint without service on

the condition that plaintiffs first amend their complaint to comport

with the courts order of April 13, 2007. Doc # 81. On July 16,

2007, the court ordered plaintiffs to amend their complaint and to

send it by mail to Mr Ginsburg by July 27, 2007. Doc # 91.

Soon after, plaintiffs obtained counsel and, on July 26,

2007, filed their FAC. Doc #96. In addition to amending the claims

for elder abuse and wrongful death and removing John Sutton from the

suit, plaintiffs added seven new claims —— for negligence,

intentional infliction of emotional distress against Rose (IIED),

fraud, breach of contract, violation of California Penal Code § 368,

violation of California Business & Professional Code § 17200 and

negligent infliction of emotional distress against plaintiffs

personally (NIED) —— and added new defendants Margaret Conners and

Does 1 to 100. Id. The factual allegations against Holz are

slightly expanded, but are not appreciably more detailed than in the

original complaint. In addition, the FAC names as the sole

plaintiff “Letitia Rose, Deceased, by and through her successors in

interest, Gail Sutton & Danielle Sutton.” Id.

Case 3:06-cv-06417-VRW Document 130 Filed 10/15/07 Page 3 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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After defendants filed the instant motion to strike, the

parties stipulated to a three-month extension of the discovery

cut-off, to January 8, 2008, which the court approved. Doc # 116.

Then, shortly after Holz filed his reply brief herein and

before the noticed hearing date, plaintiffs’ counsel, who first

appeared in this matter on July 25, 2007, moved to withdraw from

their representation of plaintiffs on the ground that “[t]he

relationship has become acrimonious to the point where it would be

best if plaintiffs sought other counsel.” Doc ## 122-26. On

October 9, 2007, the court granted the motion to withdraw. Doc #

127. Plaintiffs are once again proceeding pro se.

II

When an answer to a complaint has already been served,

FRCP 15(a) requires a party to obtain leave of court or written

consent of the adverse party before amending the complaint. “In

general, if an amendment that cannot be made as of right is served

without obtaining the court’s leave or the opposing party’s consent,

it is without legal effect and any new matter it contains will not

be considered unless the amendment is resubmitted for the court’s

approval.” Alan Wright, Arthur R Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, 6 Federal

Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d 1484 (West 2007).

III

Holz contends that plaintiffs’ FAC should be stricken

since plaintiffs did not obtain leave of court as required by FRCP

15(a). Doc #113. Victorian has joined Holz’s motion to strike on

the same grounds as asserted by Holz. Doc #115.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiffs argue that the court granted them leave to

amend through its July 16, 2007 scheduling order (Doc #118),

specifically asserting that the court ordered plaintiffs to amend

their complaint but did not impose any restrictions on the amendment

other than directing them to remove John Sutton from the complaint. 

Plaintiffs also assert that Victorian provided written consent

allowing the FAC in the form of a letter addressed to both the court

and plaintiffs stating that Victorian agreed to answer the complaint

if plaintiffs amended their complaint (see Doc #81).

In addition to opposing the motion to strike, plaintiffs

request leave to amend in the alternative.

The court agrees with the moving parties that plaintiffs

did not obtain leave of court or written consent of the adverse

party as required by FRCP 15(a) before filing their amended

complaint. First, the court’s scheduling order of July 16, 2007 did

not grant plaintiffs carte blanche to add new claims and parties. 

Rather, the July 16, 2007 order instructed plaintiffs to amend their

complaint to comply with the April 18, 2007 order which specifically

concerned: (1) the dismissal of defendant Foote from the case; (2)

the dismissal of all claims against defendants Sokotowski and

Bishop; (3) the dismissal of all claims against defendant Sydes; (4)

the dismissal of plaintiff John Sutton from the case and (5)

allowing Danielle Sutton to remain a plaintiff in the case only asto

the claim for elder abuse. Second, the court does not read the

Ginsburg letter as providing written consent to plaintiffs on behalf

of Victorian to amend the complaint to add many new claims to the

matter, but rather to amend to comply with the April 18, 2007 order.

\\

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Because plaintiffs did not obtain leave to amend or

written consent of the adverse party before filing their amended

complaint containing additional claims and defendants, the motion to

strike the amended pleading is GRANTED.

IV

The court now turns to plaintiffs’ request for leave to

amend. Defendant Holz’s reply brief sets forth detailed arguments

in opposition to the proposed amendments (Doc # 121); the court

treats the reply brief as an opposition to the motion to amend. 

Because Victorian did not submit a reply brief, the court will limit

its discussion to the points advanced by Holz.

Holz first contends that plaintiffs’ fourth cause of

action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is

unavailable to plaintiffs because emotional distress damages fall

within the definition of pain and suffering damages in California’s

survivorship statute, California Code of Civil Procedure section

377.34, which excludes damages for pain, suffering or disfigurement

from damages recoverable. Holz correctly cites Armbruster v

Monument 3: Realty Fund VIII Ltd, 963 F Supp 862 (N D Cal

1997)(Williams, J) for the proposition that emotional distress

damages were held to be encompassed within non-recoverable pain and

suffering damages in an earlier, similar version of the statute.

Holz next asserts that plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action

for fraud is directed at Victorian and does not allege any facts

purporting to establish fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent

concealment against Holz. The court’s review of the FAC is in

accord.

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Holz next contends the plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action

for breach of contract appears to be directed at Victorian Care

Homes and not at Holz. Holz argues that (1) plaintiffs have not

alleged any facts establishing that Holz entered into a written

contract with Rose promising a particular outcome of medical care as

is required to state a claim for breach of contract in the context

of a physician-patient relationship; and (2) the pleadings do not

set forth any contract terms to support plaintiffs claim for breach

of contract against Holz.

Holz next argues that plaintiffs do not have standing to

assert their seventh cause of action for violation of California

Penal Code section 368, a criminal statute providing for criminal

penalties for elder abuse. Holz asserts that the section 368 does

not provide for a private right of action; the court’s review of

Penal Code section 368 is in accord.

Further, Holz contends that plaintiffs’ eighth cause of

action for unfair business practices does not pertain to him because

it contains no factual allegations relevant to him. In addition,

Holz contends that the 2004 amendment to California Business and

Professions Code section 17200 et seq introduced standing criteria

that plaintiffs cannot satisfy, i e, injury in fact and lost money

or property as a result of such unfair competition. Cal Bus & Prof

Code § 17204. Indeed, plaintiffs do not, and almost certainly

cannot, allege that they entered into a professional, business or

commercial relationship with either Victorian or Holz. Holz also

asserts without citation that the unfair business practice claim

cannot survive Roses death; if true, this would bar an unfair

business practices suit in its entirety.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Holz correctly asserts, citing Thing v LaChusa, 48 Cal 3d

644, 667-68 (1989), that plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action for NIED

is fatally flawed since plaintiffs have not alleged and cannot

allege one fact essential to maintaining such an action: that they

were present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time

of its occurrence. In fact, plaintiffs admit in the FAC that they

lived in New York and that they did not visit or have any contact

with Mrs Rose, Doc # 96, and therefore could not have been present

at the scene of the injury-producing event. The court further notes

that the caption and introductory paragraphs of the FAC in no way

indicate that the complaint contains any claims on plaintiffs’ own

behalf, a fact inconsistent with the inclusion of a NIED claim.

Given the obvious flaws in the FAC and that the attorneys

who drafted it on behalf of plaintiffs are no longer involved in the

case, the court concludes that it would be contrary to the interests

of efficiency and fairness in the administration of justice to allow

the FAC to be filed.

The motion to amend is DENIED. Plaintiffs may serve and

file, within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, an amended

pleading that comports with the April 18, 2007 order. Any amendment

beyond the scope of the amendments permitted by that order may only

be made by motion or by stipulation in accordance with FRCP 15(a).

The court notes that a hearing was noticed on these

motions at which defendants appeared by their counsel and at which

plaintiff Gail Sutton appeared by telephone. Various scheduling and

discovery matters were discussed, but the telephone connection to Ms

Sutton was lost before the court turned to the instant motion. The

court therefore took the matter under submission without oral

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argument. The case management and discovery matters discussed will

be the subject of a separate order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:06-cv-06417-VRW Document 130 Filed 10/15/07 Page 9 of 9