Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01416/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01416-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES RUTHERFORD

Plaintiff,

v.

CESAR’S MEXICAN 

RESTAURANT, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv1416-LAB (JLB)

ORDER OF PARTIAL 

DISMISSAL

Plaintiff James Rutherford, through counsel, filed his complaint bringing 

claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and supplemental state 

claims. Because the complaint failed to establish Article III standing, the Court 

issued an order to show cause specifically pointing out the defects. (Docket no. 3.) 

Rutherford is a frequent litigant in this Court, and similar defects have been pointed 

out to him before. Among other things, the complaint suggested that Rutherford’s 

injury stemmed from conditions in Defendants’ restaurant parking lot that made it 

inaccessible for wheelchair users. He did not, however, allege that he ever used a 

wheelchair in the parking lot, or that he had any plans to do so in the future. 

According to the complaint, Rutherford at time uses a wheelchair, but at other 

times relies on a walker or a cane. The complaint did not mention how often he 

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uses any one of these. For example, it is unknown whether he uses a wheelchair 

most of the time, or only rarely. He did not allege any facts reasonably suggesting 

that he would likely be using a wheelchair or a walker when he returned to the 

restaurant. He also included some unclear allegations about a flared curb ramp, 

which he has been warned about before.

The Court is required to raise and address jurisdictional issues, such as 

standing. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 

2011) (en banc). Failure to plead facts showing a likelihood that a requested 

injunction would provide meaningful relief is a significant jurisdictional defect. 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (holding that “some day” 

intentions to return to a location where future injury was likely did not show actual, 

imminent injury required for standing); Chapman, 631 F.3d at 948–49 (9th Cir. 

2011) (holding that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate a sufficient 

likelihood of being injured again in a similar way). This is not a phantom concern; 

ADA plaintiffs have, in the past, attempted to bring claims concerning vanaccessible parking spaces in spite of the fact that they had never been to the 

premises in question in a van, and were unlikely to do so in the future. See, e.g.,

Strong v. Johnson, 2017 WL 3537746 (S.D.Cal., Aug. 17, 2017).1 Courts cannot 

guess at facts necessary to establish standing; the plaintiff must plead them. 

Chapman, 631 F.3d at 955. For example, an ADA plaintiff must plead facts rather 

than mere labels or conclusions showing which of the alleged violations deprives 

/ / /

 

1 This order dealt with the standing of plaintiffs in two separate cases bringing 

claims based on van-accessible parking spaces. At a jurisdictional hearing, the 

Court learned that one of the plaintiffs had never been to the premises in question 

in a van, and in fact had only ridden in a specially-equipped van once, when a 

friend who owned one gave her a ride. She usually rode public buses, and was 

unlikely ever to need a van-accessible parking space.

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him of full and equal access to facilities or how they deter him from visiting again 

due to his disability. Id at 955 and n.9 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).

Rutherford has now filed an amended complaint (the “FAC”), which does not 

correct most of the defects, and fails to show that the Court can exercise 

jurisdiction over most of his claims.

According to the FAC, Rutherford visited the restaurant once, and was using 

a cane on that occasion. The FAC does not allege that he arrived in a van, or that 

he needed or used a specially-equipped van when using his cane—or, for that 

matter, that he has ever used such a van. The only injury he alleges is that the 

conditions in the parking lot required him to ambulate across an inaccessible 

pathway to get to the restaurant’s entrance. (FAC, ¶ 21.) While he alleges he is 

deterred from returning while using his walker or wheelchair, he has never alleged 

facts suggesting he would be reasonably likely to be relying on either when he 

returns.

The FAC repeats garbled allegations about a flared curb ramp, without 

explaining how the flared ramp affects Rutherford or how it denied him access. 

Reading through the allegations, it is difficult to discern a clear picture of what the 

parking lot looked like, what Rutherford thought was wrong with it, and how it 

affected him. The FAC cites ADAAG Sections 406.5 and 406.3, which deal with 

the placement and slope of curb ramps and their flared sides. He alleges that the 

ramp projects into a parking space access aisle, and that the curb ramp’s flared 

sides exceeded 10%. But merely cataloguing violations is not enough. Chapman, 

631 F.3d at 954–55. For the most part, the FAC does not allege how these 

violations affected Rutherford, or denied him full and equal access to the facilities. 

For example, it does not allege that he needs an access aisle free from protruding 

curb ramps when using his cane, or that the excessively sloped flared sides 

affected him as he was ambulating up the ramp. See 2010 ADAAG Standard

/ / /

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402.2 (accessible route does not include flared sides of curb ramps).2 The only 

alleged fact that could give rise to an injury in fact is the FAC’s contention that the 

curb ramp slope exceeds 10%, and that this makes walking with his cane 

unnecessarily difficult and risky. (FAC, ¶¶ 14, 21.)

The FAC also conclusorily alleges the absence of any accessible route 

connecting the parking lot to “the main entrance or elements within the facility,” 

without explaining what is missing or wrong. (FAC, ¶ 14.) 

The FAC also claims Rutherford has standing as a “tester,” because he 

intends to return to the restaurant again to see if it is ADA-compliant. The Ninth 

Circuit has held that “testers” can have standing to bring ADA claims, see Civil 

Rights Educ. & Enforcement Ctr. v. Hospitality Properties Trust, 867 F.3d 1093, 

1101–02 (9th Cir. 2017), but not—as the FAC implies—that testers automatically

have standing. Testers are distinguished from a bona fide customer or patrons by 

their motivation; namely, testers visit a business or accommodation hoping to find 

violations. See id. at 1102 (explaining that a plaintiff’s motivation for encountering 

an invasion of legally-protected rights is irrelevant to the question of standing to 

bring an ADA claim). But simply being a tester does not automatically confer 

standing, any more than simply being a customer does. See Chapman, 631 F.3d 

at 953 (explaining how injury-in-fact requirement prevents the ADA from becoming 

an “open-ended private attorney general statute”). 

In short, even after the amendment, the Court still has little basis for 

concluding that Rutherford has standing to bring all his claims. With the exception 

of the claim based on an excessively sloped curb ramp, his attempt to remedy the 

 

2 The purpose of limiting the slope on the side flares is apparently to reduce the 

danger that pedestrians walking along a sidewalk will trip when encountering a 

steep ramp. See Norkunas v. Tar Heel Capital Wendy’s LLC, 2011 WL 2940722 

(W.D. N.C., July 19, 2011). 

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defects pointed out to him fall short. All other claims are therefore DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, for failure to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction. 

No later than September 16, 2019, Rutherford must file a second amended 

complaint. He may include the one claim for which he has shown standing, and 

may include dismissed claims only if he pleads facts showing he has standing to 

bring those claims. Because the jurisdictional pleading defects have been pointed 

out to him, the Court will not assume he can remedy these defects even if given 

an opportunity. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 3, 2019

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

Chief United States District Judge

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