Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06396/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06396-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT LEE ROBINS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

L. ATCHUE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:01-CV-06396-AWI-SMS P

ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE WHY COST OF PERSONAL

SERVICE SHOULD NOT BE TAXED UNDER

RULE 4(D)(2)

(Doc. 113)

ORDER FINDING DEFENDANT CRAMER

ACTED IN BAD FAITH AND IMPOSING

MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT

OF $500.00 ON DEFENDANT CRAMER

(Doc. 113)

I. Order

This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Robert Lee Robins, Jr., a former

state prisoner. The action is proceeding on plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed August 4,

2003. Following screening by the Court and a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust by

defendants, this action is proceeding against defendants Atchue and Ritchie for retaliation; against

defendants Atchue, Ritchie, and White for excessive force; against defendant De Luna for denial of

medical treatment; and against defendants Jelleschitz, Johnson, and Cramer for violation of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments based on the strip searches.

Plaintiff Robins is proceeding in forma pauperis in this action and the Court is required to

appoint the United States Marshal to effect service in such cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 4(c)(2). On June 10, 2005, the Court issued an order directing the Marshal to initiate service of

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plaintiff’s second amended complaint on defendants. On December 2, 2005, the Court issued a

second order directing Marshal to initiate service on three defendants, includingCramer. On August

7, 2006, the Marshal returned the USM-285 form and summons for Cramer to the Court,

documenting the following events:

January 11, 2006: waiver mailed to Cramer at the California Correctional

Institution (CCI) in Tehachapi

February 24, 2006: per CCI, waiver was forwarded to new address but returned

as unclaimed

March 17, 2006: waiver forwarded to new address after obtaining assistance

from Legal Affairs Division

June 8, 2006: waiver not returned, case sent to Fresno for personal service

July 11, 2006: DUSM Richards attempts personal service at 320 miles & 3

hours travel time, round trip. Woman at residence states her

name is “Debra” and she is renting the house from Pamela

Cramer, who lives out of state. “Debra” claims to have no

contact information for Cramer. DUSM Richards leaves his

business card.

July 13, 2006: After gathering information and photos, Marshals conclude

that the woman named “Debra” who answered the door is

actually Pamela Cramer.

July 25, 2006: DUSMs Richards and Rodriguez again travel 320 miles/3

hours to Cramer’s residence. Marshals initially told by

Cramer’s significant other that he had never heard of Pamela

Cramer. He subsequently admitted Cramer was in the house

and brought Marshals to her, where she admitted to lying and

accepted process.

(Court Doc. 108.)

On September 13, 2006, Cramer answered the second amended complaint, and on September

22, 2006, based on the alleged events relating to the Marshals’ attempts to personally serve Cramer

as set forth in the USM-285 form, the Court issued an order requiring Cramer to show cause and set

a hearing to address the following two issues: (1) whether defendant Cramer should be taxed costs

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) for failing to waive service, and (2) whether monetary

sanctions should be assessed against defendant Cramer under the inherent authority of the Court for

lying to the Marshals during their attempts to effect personal service on her. 

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A. Order to Show Cause Why Costs Should Not be Taxed Against Defendant Cramer

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) for Failing to Waive Service

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

An individual, corporation, or association that is subject to service

under subdivision (e), (f), or (h) and that receives notice of an action

in the manner provided in this paragraph has a duty to avoid

unnecessary costs of serving the summons . . . .

If a defendant located within the United States fails to comply with

a request for waiver made by a plaintiff located within the United

States, the court shall impose the costs subsequently incurred in

effecting service on the defendant unless good cause for the failure be

shown.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2).

Based on the USM-285 form, it appeared Cramer was given the opportunity required by Rule

4(d)(2) to waive service, but failed to comply with the request. Pursuant to the Court’s order,

Cramer was directed to show good cause for failing to waive service.

In her declaration, Cramer attests she was not living at the address where the waiver was

mailed at the time it was mailed, and because her friend who was staying at the address never

forwarded the waiver to her, she did not have the opportunity to sign and return the waiver. Based

on this declaration, the order to show cause for failing to waive service is discharged and the costs

of service not be taxed under Rule 4(d)(2).

B. Order to Show Cause Why Monetary Sanctions Should Not be Imposed Against

Defendant Cramer Under the Court’s Inherent Authority for Acting in Bad Faith by

Lying to the Marshals During the Attempts to Effect Personal Service

The Court has inherent power to sanction parties or their attorneys for improper conduct.

Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,

766 (1980); Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001). The imposition of sanctions under

the Court’s inherent authority is discretionary. Air Separation, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of

London, 45 F.3d 288, 291 (9th Cir. 1995). A court’s inherent powers “are governed not by rule or

statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve

the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43. Such inherent power

“is not a broad reservoir of power, ready at an imperial hand, but a limited source; an implied power

squeezed from the need to make the court function.” Id. at 42. “Because inherent powers are

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shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion.”

Roadway Express, Inc., 447 U.S. at 764.

The Court’s “inherent power ‘extends to a full range of litigation abuses.’” Fink, 239 F.3d

at 992 (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46-47). However, in order to sanction a litigant under the

Court’s inherent powers, the Court must make a specific finding of “bad faith or conduct tantamount

to bad faith.” Fink, 239 F.3d at 994. Although mere recklessness is insufficient to support sanctions

under the Court’s inherent powers, “recklessness when combined with an additional factor such as

frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose” is sufficient. Id. at 993-94. A litigant may be

sanctioned for acting for an improper purpose, even if the act was “a truthful statement or nonfrivolous argument or objection.” Id. at 992. 

Pursuant to the Court’s order, Cramer was provided with the opportunity to show cause why

monetary sanctions should not be assessed against her under the Court’s inherent power for acting

in bad faith by allegedly lying to the United States Marshals. By the Court’s order, Cramer was

provided with notice of the form of sanction being considered by the Court and of the bad faith

conduct at issue. Cramer submitted a written response to the order on October 17, 2006, and a

hearing was held on November 7, 2006, during which Deputy United States Marshals Robin

Richards and Gil Rodriguez, and Pamela Carr, aka Pamela Cramer, testified. Cramer was 1

represented at the hearing by her attorney of record, Deputy Attorney General Grant Lien. Pursuant

to request by the United States Marshals Service in Washington, D.C., Mark Cullers, Chief Assistant

United States Attorney, Fresno Branch, was present during the hearing.

In her declaration, Cramer attests that on July 11, 2006, she was surprised and frightened by

the process server, who was wearing plain clothes, did not identify himself as a Marshal, and did not

say he was there to serve legal documents. (Doc. 117.) Cramer attests that she was previously

traumatized by an inmate assault and has a heightened fear of reprisals from inmates and former

inmates, and wanted to protect her privacy and safety. (Id.) Cramer attests she had no intention of

evading service and did not look at the Marshal’s business card until later. (Id.) 

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Pursuant to testimony during the hearing and the court record, DUSM Richards drove to

Cramer’s residence in Tehachapi to personally serve her on July 11, 2006. Cramer denied to DUSM

Richards that she was Pamela Cramer. On July 25, 2006, DUSMs Richards and Rodriguez went

back to the residence in Tehachapi, after Richards looked at Cramer’s license photograph in the

Marshals’ database and determined that Cramer was the woman he spoke with at the house on July

11, 2006. The windows and the door of the house were open, but the security screen door was shut.

Richards and Rodriguez could see through the house, and repeatedly called out who they were and

what they were there for. After receiving no answer, Richards and Rodriguez left to get something

to eat and returned approximately forty-five minutes later. At that time, the garage door was open

and a man was standing there. After initially stating Cramer was not there, the man led them to her

in the backyard after being shown the photo of Cramer obtained from the Marshals’ database. At

that time, Cramer admitted lying about her identity, apologized, and accepted service. 

Cramer testified that she had been employed by the California Department of Corrections for

ten years and took medical retirement after being assaulted by an inmate in 2002. Prior to July 11,

2006, Cramer’s car had been stolen, along with her registration and garage door opener. Cramer

testified that due to this combination of factors, she lied to DUSM Richards during his first visit

because she did not know who he was and was paranoid.

 Lying to a law enforcement officer is an action the Court takes very seriously. Although

plaintiff was not prejudiced in the matter, Cramer “‘engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the

orderly administration of justice.’” Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distrib., 69 F.3d 337,

348 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wyle v. R. J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir. 1983)).

In this instance, the Marshals were engaged in official duties at the direction of the Court, and

Cramer herself is a sworn peace officer. As Cramer acknowledged during the hearing, she is held

to a higher standard as a peace officer. The Court finds credible DUSM Richards’ testimony that

he identified himself to Cramer and told her why he was there. Cramer evaded service by denying

who she was, and although she testified she reviewed his business card on July 11, 2006, at no time

between July 11, 2006, and July 25, 2006, did Cramer contact DUSM Richards in an effort to rectify

the situation, a factor which is significant to the Court. Had Cramer truly not known what Richards

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wanted and lied out of fear, she could have and should have contacted him after reviewing his

business card, but did not do so. As a result, the Court finds Cramer’s position that she would have

accepted service had she known and would not intentionally or knowingly attempt to evade service

not to be credible. The Court finds that Cramer acted in bad faith in lying to DUSM Richards in the

course of his official duties as a process server acting on behalf of this Court, and that the imposition

of monetary sanctions is appropriate and necessary given the seriousness of the conduct. 

Cramer’s current sources of income are disability, medical retirement, and workers’

compensation, and Cramer has no dependants. The Court has taken Cramer’s income and situation

into consideration and determines that monetary sanctions in the amount of $500.00, payable at

$50.00 per month for ten months, is appropriate. The payments shall be made payable to the United

States District Court, 2500 Tulare Street, Fresno, California, 93721, and payment is due on or before

the 15th of each month, to commence in December of 2006. 

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The orderrequiring defendant Cramerto show cause why the cost of personal service

should not be taxed against her under Rule 4(d)(2) is DISCHARGED and the cost of

service shall not be taxed;

2. Defendant Cramer is assessed monetary sanctions in the amount of $500.00 for

acting in bad faith by lying to Deputy United States Marshal Richards;

3. The sanction amount shall be paid to the Court over the course of ten months at

$50.00 per month, and is due on or before the 15th of each month, to commence in

December of 2006; and

4. The failure to pay the sanction in accordance with this order will result in the

imposition of additional sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

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icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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