Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-03147/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-03147-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICOLA CHRISTOPHER BUCCI,

Petitioner,

v.

TIMOTHY E. BUSBY,

Respondent.

No. 2:11-cv-3147 GEB KJN P

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding through counsel, with a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2009 conviction for two 

counts of second degree murder. He is serving a sentence of 23 years to life. 

This action proceeds on the second amended petition filed November 24, 2014. (ECF No. 

32.) Petitioner raises three claims: 1) trial court erred in admitting evidence of his 1994 collision 

(identified as “claim 1”); 2) prosecutorial misconduct (identified as “claim 2”); and 3) ineffective 

assistance of counsel (identified as “claim 4”).1

 

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 Claims 3, 5, 6 and 8, raised in the first amended petition, were previously dismissed on 

grounds that they were barred by the statute of limitations and procedurally barred. (ECF No. 

31.) Claim 7, raised in the first amended petition, was found to be subsumed by claim 4. (Id.) 

Therefore, the second amended petition raises the claims that were not previously dismissed, i.e., 

claims 1, 2 and 4 raised in the first amended petition. As indicated above, in the second amended 

petition, petitioner continues to identify these claims as claims 1, 2 and 4. 

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After carefully reviewing the record, the undersigned recommends that the petition be 

denied.

Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 

202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state 

court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established United 

States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in 

Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different result. Early v. Packer, 537 

U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court 

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the 

Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s 

case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because 

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (it is “not enough 

that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm 

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conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) (internal citations omitted). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded 

jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 

131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). If there is no reasoned decision, 

“and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the 

claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the 

contrary.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. That presumption may be overcome by a showing 

that “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely.” 

Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). 

“When a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a 

federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits – but that 

presumption can in some limited circumstances be rebutted.” Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 

1088, 1096 (2013). “When the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that a federal claim 

was inadvertently overlooked in state court, § 2254(d) entitles the prisoner to” de novo review of 

the claim. Id., at 1097.

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, the federal court conducts an independent review of the record. 

“Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the 

only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively 

unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). Where no reasoned 

decision is available, the habeas petitioner has the burden of “showing there was no reasonable 

basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784. “[A] habeas court must 

determine what arguments or theories supported or, . . . could have supported, the state court’s 

decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those 

arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id. at 

786.

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Factual Background

The opinion of the California Court of Appeal contains a factual summary. After 

independently reviewing the record, the undersigned finds this summary to be accurate and 

adopts it herein: 

A. Prosecution Case

1. Eye witnesses Johnson and Fender

Witness Kim Johnson testified that around 6:30 p.m. on November 

17, 2006, she was driving eastbound on Highway 12, a two lane 

highway. Traffic was heavy in both the eastbound and westbound 

lanes. Johnson was driving at the 55 mile per hour speed limit. She 

looked in her rear view mirror and saw a silver SUV pass her 

vehicle in the westbound lane, then pull in front of her vehicle in 

the eastbound lane. The silver SUV was “driving really fast.” 

Johnson estimated its speed at 65 to 70 miles per hour.

Passing was prohibited in this section of Highway 12. Nevertheless, 

the silver SUV pulled back into the westbound lane and accelerated 

up a hill, attempting to pass more vehicles. At the crest of the hill, 

the SUV collided head on with a small red car in the westbound 

lane. The SUV flipped in the air and landed in a field. The small car 

was severely damaged and burning in the westbound lane.

Johnson pulled over and ran to the small red car. The driver was 

screaming, and Johnson said she would get her out of the vehicle. A 

man (whom Johnson identified at trial as Bucci) also approached 

the small vehicle, and Johnson asked him “to go check the SUV to 

see if anybody was in the SUV was okay [ sic ].” Bucci responded, 

“It was me, I was driving.” Johnson asked Bucci to help her extract 

the driver from the burning vehicle. Bucci threw up his hands and 

said, “Oh, my God. What I have done [ sic ]?” When Johnson 

again asked Bucci to help her, Bucci responded, “I can’t,” and 

walked away. Another person at the scene (Jerry Fender) helped 

Johnson remove the driver from the burning red car.

Jerry Fender testified that he was driving eastbound on Highway 12 

around 6:30 p.m. on November 17, 2006. He confirmed that 

Highway 12 is a two lane highway with one eastbound lane and one 

westbound lane, with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour. Fender 

was travelling about 50 miles per hour behind two “semi tractor 

trail[e]rs.” An SUV passed his vehicle at about 70-80 miles per 

hour, even though there was a solid yellow line on the east bound 

lane indicating no passing. FN2 The SUV did not veer or move 

erratically, but proceeded in a “straight ahead, aggressive passing 

maneuver like you would normally do on a flat stretch of road.” 

The SUV accelerated eastbound in the westbound lane, passing one 

of the semi trailers and attempting to pass the second. When the 

SUV reached the crest of a hill, it collided head on with a red 

Toyota.

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FN2. On the night of the accident, Fender told the police he 

believed that Bucci’s vehicle was traveling 65 to 70 miles per hour. 

By either account, it was at least 10 miles per hour over the posted 

speed limit.

After passing the collision, Fender made a U turn, stopped his 

vehicle, and turned on his hazard lights to prevent other vehicles 

from colliding with the wrecked Toyota, which had come to a stop 

in the westbound lane. The SUV ended up in a field. When Fender 

saw that the Toyota was on fire, he retrieved a fire extinguisher 

from his vehicle and approached the Toyota, where he saw a 

woman and three young children inside.

2. Victim Jackson

Victim Regina Jackson testified that, around 6:30 p.m. on 

November 17, 2006, she was returning home to Fairfield from Rio 

Vista in her red Toyota Corolla. In the car with her were three 

passengers: her children Jordan and Immanuel; and Demari H., the 

child of a friend.

As Jackson drove westbound on Highway 12, she suddenly saw a 

“car coming head-on into us passing two diesel trucks -- trying to 

pass two diesel trucks coming over a hill.” Jackson testified, “I tried 

to go over to the right, but I couldn’t. There was nowhere I could 

go.” There was a head on collision just as she crested the hill.

As a result of the collision, Jackson suffered debilitating injuries, 

including a broken femur, knee, hip, and foot, with additional 

injuries to her forehead, eye, and mouth. She remained in the 

hospital for over two months. Imannuel and Demari H. died as the 

result of the injuries they suffered in the accident; Jordan became 

paralyzed from the waist down.

3. Investigation

Jason Bryant, an emergency medical technician, responded to the 

scene. Bryant contacted Bucci and found him to be uninjured 

except for pain in his elbow and back. Bucci stated he was the 

driver of one of the vehicles in the collision. He told Bryant that he 

believed he “fell asleep at the wheel.” Bucci appeared emotionally 

upset and in tears, but was “cogent and responsive” to questions 

and gave “logical, reasonable answers.”

California Highway Patrol Officer Patricia Rodriguez conducted an 

accident investigation at the scene. She confirmed there was a solid 

yellow line indicating a no passing zone for eastbound traffic going 

up the hill where the collision occurred. She concluded that the red 

Toyota was going westbound and was struck head on by the SUV 

that was travelling eastbound in the westbound lane.

California Highway Patrol Officer Michael Ervin also responded to 

the scene. Ervin contacted Bucci, who was cogent and lucid and 

admitted he was the owner and driver of the SUV. According to the 

officer’s report, Bucci told the officer: He “momentarily fell asleep, 

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dozed off, realized he was traveling in the wrong lane. Tried to 

speed up to pass a truck that was alongside of him. Saw the victim 

vehicle coming towards him. And swerved to the left, and the 

impact took place.”

Officer Ervin asked Bucci if he had any health problems that might 

have contributed to the accident. Bucci replied that he had sleep 

apnea, but he denied being tired at the time of the accident. He did 

not claim to have been exposed to any substance that could cause 

him to lose consciousness.

Based upon witness interviews and investigation of the scene, 

Officer Ervin concluded that Bucci had violated the Vehicle Code 

by crossing over a solid yellow roadway line that prohibited passing 

and by attempting to pass while going up a hill. In short, Ervin 

asserted, Bucci was “attempting to pass a passenger vehicle and two 

semi trucks uphill going the wrong way.” The officer 

acknowledged that it was highly dangerous to drive well in excess 

of the posted speed limit in order to pass multiple vehicles 

approaching the crest of the hill.

It was stipulated that testing found no drugs or alcohol in Bucci’s 

system. There were no skid marks on the road indicating that Bucci

tried to apply his brakes before the collision.

4. Bucci’s Prior Fatal Collision in 1994

The prosecutor introduced evidence that Bucci was involved in a 

head on collision on Highway 80 in January 1994. Travelling 

westbound, Bucci’s pickup truck proceeded on the right shoulder 

for over one thousand feet, then veered across the two westbound 

lanes and the dirt center median before colliding head on with a 

Cadillac sedan in the eastbound lane. The occupants of the Cadillac 

died as a result of the collision. At the scene, Bucci told California 

Highway Patrol Officer Ty Brown that he had been up all night 

gambling at casinos in Reno. He also admitted drinking alcohol and 

smoking marijuana. Bucci stated that he apparently fell asleep or 

blacked out while driving and awoke just before the collision. 

Officer Brown concluded that the circumstances of the accident 

were consistent with Bucci’s claim.

B. Defense Case

1. Bucci

As to the 1994 traffic accident, Bucci explained that he had been 

awake for over 30 hours and fell asleep at the wheel; when he woke 

up, his car was out of control and he collided with another car.

As to the charged crimes, Bucci testified that on Friday, November 

17, 2006, he was working as a sous chef at Google’s main 

headquarters in Mountain View. Over the weekend Google was 

going to conduct tests related to transferring from electrical power 

to solar power, and during those tests, the electrical energy would 

be shut off. Therefore, 150 pounds of dry ice had been placed in a 

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10 foot by 20 foot walk in freezer. Bucci was not warned of any 

hazards of exposure to dry ice.

On November 17, Bucci inspected the food inventory of the walk in 

freezer containing the dry ice. After 10-15 minutes inside the 

freezer, he became dizzy and short of breath. He left the freezer 

and, when he went back in to complete his work, experienced the 

same thing. He testified, “I really don’t remember a lot of stuff after 

that second time.” He had never experienced any adverse effects 

after being in the walk in freezer before.FN3

FN3. Other Google employees confirmed at trial that dry ice was 

placed in the refrigerators and freezers and no safety instructions or 

information concerning the proper handling of dry ice were given to 

Bucci. One employee testified that Bucci had appeared healthy and 

normal at work, but later in the day he appeared drawn, pale, and 

ill. Bucci told him that while in one of the walk in freezers, he 

experienced dizziness that caused him to fall on a rack and hurt his 

arm. He also complained of a severe headache.

Around 3:00 p.m., Bucci left work and began driving from 

Mountain View to Lodi. He testified that he could recall only “bits 

and pieces” of the evening. He did not know how he found his 

vehicle in the parking lot. He did not know how he got to Highway 

12, which was not his intended route. He denied any recollection of 

driving up an incline or trying to pass a truck. He remembered “a 

Jack in the Box and, uh, a tractor trailer [to the right of him] and 

then, uh, lights, and I, uh I had swerved, I swerved to the left and I 

saw the lights.” Then the collision occurred. The next thing he 

remembered was being in an ambulance.

On cross examination, Bucci acknowledged that he learned from 

the 1994 incident that you can likely kill someone if you fall asleep 

at the wheel. Bucci denied any recollection of telling EMT Bryant, 

at the scene of the 2006 accident, that he fell asleep at the wheel. 

Bucci also acknowledged knowing, as of November 2006, that 

passing on a two lane highway could be dangerous, and passing in 

the wrong lane on a two lane highway can be extremely dangerous 

to oncoming traffic. He was also aware that “passing uphill over a 

solid no pass line towards the crest of a hill where you can't see is 

life endangering,” and “passing multiple vehicles at night uphill in 

excess of a speed limit over the solid line is likely to kill 

somebody.” Bucci asserted that he would never pass uphill in a no 

passing zone and could not remember it happening.

2. Expert Witnesses

Bucci presented medical experts who testified that exposure to large 

amounts of carbon dioxide can result in hypoxia, or oxygen 

deprivation to the brain. Hypoxia can cause mental impairment and 

loss of cognitive function. Specific symptoms could include loss of 

memory and difficulties in attention and concentration. It might 

affect a person’s ability to perform complex tasks such as driving 

an automobile at night and passing other motor vehicles.

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Neuropsychologist Darcy Cox opined that Bucci’s actions after 

being exposed to dry ice were consistent with his having a severe 

hypoxic episode: his lack of memory, changes in vision, feeling 

tired, feeling dizzy and confused, and driving out of his way. Dr. 

Cox also opined that Bucci was clinically depressed and was 

suffering from post traumatic stress disorder based on his 

involvement in the previous fatal accident in 1994. Because of this 

disorder, she reasoned, Bucci must have assumed that the second 

accident in 2006 was caused because he fell asleep at the wheel 

again, and this may have been the reason he stated at the scene of 

the 2006 accident that he believed he fell asleep.

People v. Bucci, 2010 WL 2512732 at *1-5 (2010). 

Procedural Background

On August 27, 2014, the undersigned recommended that respondent’s motion to dismiss 

the first amended petition be granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 30.) The undersigned 

recommended that respondent’s motion to dismiss claims 3, 5, 6 and 8 be granted on the grounds 

that these claims were barred by the statute of limitations and procedurally barred. (Id.) The 

undersigned recommended that the motion to dismiss claim 7 be denied on the grounds that claim 

7 was subsumed by claim 2. (Id.) The undersigned recommended that petitioner be ordered to 

file a second amended petition raising claims 1, 2 and 4 only. (Id.)

On October 20, 2014, the Honorable Garland E. Burrell adopted the August 27, 2014 

findings and recommendations. (ECF No. 31.)

On November 24, 2014, petitioner filed the second amended petition. (ECF No. 32.) On 

January 12, 2015, respondent filed an answer. (ECF No. 34.) On February 6, 2015, petitioner 

filed a reply to the answer. (ECF No. 35.)

Discussion—Evidentiary Errors (Claim 1)

Exhaustion

Respondent argues that claim one is not exhausted. A state prisoner must exhaust his or 

her state court remedies before a federal court may consider granting habeas corpus relief. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). To satisfy the 

exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner must fairly present his or her federal claims in the 

state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations 

of the prisoner’s federal rights. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, (1995) ( per curiam). For a 

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petitioner in California state custody, this generally means the petitioner must have fairly 

presented his or her claims in a petition to the California Supreme Court. See O’Sullivan, 526 

U.S. at 845 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)); Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882,888 (9th Cir. 

1999) (applying O’Sullivan to California).

In the second amended petition, petitioner describes claim one as follows. Petitioner 

alleges that his right to due process was violated when the 2006 trial court admitted evidence of 

the 1994 collision. (ECF No. 32 at 14.) Petitioner states that the trial court instructed the jury 

that evidence of the 1994 collision could only be considered to prove his knowledge that driving 

while sleeping was dangerous. (Id. at 16-17.) Petitioner argues that during the trial, he admitted

that he knew that driving while sleeping was dangerous. (Id.) Petitioner argues that because 

there was no material dispute regarding whether he knew that driving while sleeping was 

dangerous, evidence of the 1994 collision should not have been admitted. (Id. at 16-17.) 

Respondent argues that, in the original petition, petitioner argued in claim one that 

evidence of the 1994 collision should not have been admitted because it was too dissimilar from 

the charged offense. In other words, respondent argues that claim one raised in the original 

petition is different from claim one raised in the second amended petition. Respondent argues 

that petitioner exhausted claim one, as raised in the original petition, in his first petition for 

review filed in the California Supreme Court. (Id.) Respondent argues that petitioner did not 

exhaust the claim one he now raises in the second amended petition. 

In the reply to the answer, petitioner appears to conflate the claims identified as claim one 

in the original petition and claim one in the second amended petition. Accordingly, in an 

abundance of caution, the undersigned finds that petitioner is raising both of these claims. The 

parties do not dispute that petitioner has exhausted the claim identified as claim one in the 

original petition.

For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned finds that the claim identified as claim one 

in the second amended petition is exhausted, but most likely procedurally defaulted. Petitioner 

raised this claim in a habeas corpus petition filed in the California Court of Appeal. (ECF No. 

32-4.) In this state habeas petition, petitioner identified this claim as claim G. (Id. at 59-62.)

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The California Court of Appeal denied claim G on the grounds that it was untimely or 

successive, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 774-75, 782-99 (1993), In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 

770, 780-81 (1998), In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 303-04 (1949), and In re Reno, 55 Cal.4th 428, 

472-74 (2012). (ECF No. 32-3 at 1.) The California Court of Appeal also denied claim G on the 

grounds that it should have been raised on direct appeal, citing In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 

(1953.) (Id.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review raising claim G

without comment or citation. (ECF No. 32-1 at 1.) This petition for review is designated as case 

no. S211701. (Id)

The California Supreme Court dismissed claim G on procedural grounds. See Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) (when a higher state court has denied a petitioner’s claim 

without substantive comment, a federal habeas court “looks through” the denial to the last 

reasoned decision from a lower state court to determine the rationale for the state courts’ denials 

of the claim). Thus, claim one raised in the second amended petition is exhausted but most likely 

subject to a procedural bar. 

In his reply to the answer, petitioner argues that he also raised the claim identified as 

claim one in the second amended petition in the petition for review filed in the California 

Supreme Court on direct appeal, case no. S184817. (ECF No. 35.) In this petition for review, 

petitioner argued that evidence regarding the 1994 collision should not have been admitted 

because the 1994 accident was not sufficiently similar to the 2006 accident to make it relevant on 

the issue of intent, i.e., claim one raised in the original federal petition. (Petition for Review, p. 

32, Respondent’s Exhibit F filed January 14, 2015.) Therefore, this petition for review did not 

raise the claim now identified as claim one in the second amended petition. 

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that the claim identified as claim 

one in the second amended petition is exhausted but most likely subject to a procedural bar. 

However, in the interests of judicial economy, the undersigned declines to order further briefing 

on the issue of procedural bar, and instead addresses the merits of this claim herein. See Franklin 

v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 

(1997). Accordingly, the undersigned addresses the merits of both of petitioner’s claims 

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challenging admission of evidence regarding the 1994 collision. 

Legal Standard for Evaluating Petitioner’s Claims Challenging Admission of Evidence re: 

1994 Accident

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific 

constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of 

the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 

1031 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of 

irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant 

issuance of the writ.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that 

trial court’s admission of irrelevant pornographic materials was “fundamentally unfair” under 

Ninth Circuit precedent but not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law under § 2254(d)).

Failure to comply with state rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis 

for granting federal habeas relief on due process grounds. See Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; Jammal 

v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). The due process inquiry in federal habeas 

review is whether the admission of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the 

trial fundamentally unfair. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995).

The United States Supreme Court has left open the question of whether admission of 

propensity evidence violates due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991). Based 

on the Supreme Court’s reservation of this issue as an “open question,” the Ninth Circuit has held 

that a petitioner’s due process right concerning the admission of propensity evidence is not 

clearly established as required by AEDPA. Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866–67 (9th Cir.

2006); see,e.g., Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (because the Supreme 

Court expressly reserved the question of whether using evidence of prior crimes to show 

propensity for criminal activity could ever violate due process, state court’s rejection of claim did 

not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law).

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Legal Background Regarding Petitioner’s Conviction

To assist the analysis of petitioner’s claims challenging admission of evidence of the 1994 

collision, the undersigned herein discusses the relevant legal background regarding petitioner’s 

current conviction and admission of evidence of the 1994 collision.

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder based on a theory of implied malice. 

“Second degree murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 

aforethought, but without the additional elements—i.e., willfulness, premeditation, and 

deliberation—that would support a conviction of first degree murder.” People v. Nieto Benitez, 4 

Cal.4th 91, 102 (1992). Malice may be express or implied. “It is express when there is 

manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. 

[Citation.].” Id.

“[S]econd degree murder with implied malice has been committed ‘when a person does an 

act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately 

performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts 

with conscious disregard for life....’ [Citations.] Phrased in a different way, malice may be 

implied when defendant does an act with a high probability that it will result in death and does it 

with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disregard for human life. [Citation.]” Id. at 104.

In the instant case, the prosecutor proceeded on two theories of implied malice. The 

prosecutor first argued that petitioner drove while he was tired, despite knowing the dangers of 

driving while sleepy. (See RT at 829-30 (prosecutor’s closing argument). This theory was based 

on petitioner’s statements to law enforcement officials and the EMT officer following the 

collision that he had dozed off. (Id.) The prosecutor argued that evidence of the 1994 collision 

demonstrated petitioner’s knowledge of the danger of driving while sleeping. (Id.) The 

prosecutor’s second theory of implied malice was that petitioner intentionally engaged in passing 

under dangerous conditions, i.e, petitioner was not sleeping. (Id. at 831-32.) 

The jury was instructed that it could consider evidence of petitioner’s 1994 collision for 

the limited purpose of determining whether petitioner knew that falling asleep while driving was 

dangerous to human life. (CT at 395.) 

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Petitioner was convicted of vehicular manslaughter as a result of the 1994 collision. See

People v. Bucci, 2010 WL 2512732, at *11 (2010). However, the jury in petitioner’s 2006 trial 

did not learn about petitioner’s conviction and sentence as a result of the 1994 collision. (Id.) 

On direct appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court erred by precluding him from testifying that 

he had been convicted and sentenced for vehicular manslaughter as a result of the 1994 collision. 

(Id.) The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim, finding that the trial court did not issue 

an order precluding petitioner from explaining to the jury that he had been convicted and 

sentenced for the 1994 fatalities. (Id.) 

Analysis—Did Admission of Evidence re: 1994 Collision Violate Due Process Because 

Petitioner Admitted Knowledge of Danger of Driving While Sleeping?

As discussed above, evidence of the 1994 collision was admitted to demonstrate that 

petitioner knew that driving while sleeping was dangerous. Petitioner argues that he agreed in his 

testimony that driving while sleeping is dangerous. Petitioner argues that evidence of the 1994 

collision should not have been admitted because his knowledge of the dangers of driving while 

sleeping was not in dispute, i.e., he stipulated to this fact through his testimony. In support of this 

argument, petitioner cites a quotation which he attributes to People v. Schader, 71 Cal.2d 761, 

775-76 n.13 (1969). As noted by respondent, this quote, set forth herein, is actually from People 

v. Thompson, 27 Cal.3d 303, 316 (1980): 

In order to satisfy the requirement of materiality, the fact sought to 

be proved may be either an ultimate fact in the proceeding [FN13] 

or an intermediate fact “from which such ultimate fact( ) may be 

presumed or inferred.” [FN14] (See Law Revision Com. comment 

to Evid.Code, s 210.) Further, the ultimate fact to be proved must 

be “actually in dispute.” (See Law Revision Com. comment to 

Evid.Code, § 210.) If an accused has not “actually placed that 

(ultimate fact) in issue,” evidence of uncharged offenses may not be 

admitted to prove it. (People v. Thomas (1978) 20 Cal.3d 457, 467, 

143 Cal.Rptr. 215; see also People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 

93; Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (1972) § 21.3, p. 264.) The 

fact that an accused has pleaded not guilty is not sufficient to place 

the elements of the crimes charged against him “in issue.” (People 

v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 775-776, fn.13.)

People v. Thompson, 27 Cal.3d at 316.

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As noted by respondent in the answer, the California Supreme Court has since expressly 

overruled the passage from Thompson quoted above:

Defendant’s reliance on People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 

(Thompson), is misplaced. In People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 

238, we disapproved the Thompson passage on which he relies. 

“Defendant also argues that the challenged ‘other crimes’ evidence 

cannot be deemed ‘relevant’ under Evidence Code section 210 to 

the broad issue of his intent in the incident as a whole. For support, 

he asserts that such intent was not a ‘disputed fact’ within the 

meaning of the statutory provision. It was. He relies essentially on 

language in People v. Thompson [, supra,] 27 Cal.3d 303, that ‘The 

fact that an accused has pleaded not guilty is not sufficient to place 

the elements of the crimes charged against him “in issue.”’ But in 

People v. Williams [ (1988) ] 44 Cal.3d [883,] 907, footnote 7, we 

all but expressly disapproved Thompson’s language and held to the 

contrary. Therefore, a fact—like defendant’s intent—generally 

becomes ‘disputed’ when it is raised by a plea of not guilty or a 

denial of an allegation. (Pen.Code, § 1019 [‘The plea of not guilty 

puts in issue every material allegation of the accusatory pleading, 

except those allegations regarding previous convictions of the 

defendant to which an answer is required by [Penal Code] Section 

1025.’].) Such a fact remains ‘disputed’ until it is resolved.” 

(Rowland, at p. 260.)

People v. Scott, 52 Cal.4th 452, 470-71 (2011). 

In People v. Scott, the California Supreme Court went on to state that a defendant may 

seek to limit the admissibility of other crimes evidence by stipulating to certain issues. See 52

Cal.4th at 471. The California Supreme Court went on to state that “[t]he general rule is that the 

prosecution in a criminal case cannot be compelled to accept a stipulation if the effect would be to 

deprive the state’s case of its persuasiveness and forcefulness. [Citations.]” Id. “[A] criminal 

defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the 

Government chooses to present it.” People v. Rogers, 57 Cal.4th 296, 329 (2013). 

As noted by respondent in the answer, numerous California courts have upheld the use of 

evidence of prior driving conduct to show implied malice in vehicular second degree murder 

cases. See People v. Ortiz, 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 116 (2003); People v. Brogna, 202 Cal.App.3d 

700, 706-10 (1988); People v. McCarnes, 179 Cal.App.3d 525, 532-33 (1986); People v. Eagles, 

133 Cal.App.3d 330, 340 (1982).

“[C]ourts have recognized repeatedly that a motor vehicle driver’s previous encounters 

with the consequences of recklessness on the highway - whether provoked by the use of alcohol, 

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of another intoxicant, by rage, or some other motivator - sensitizes him to the dangerousness of 

such life-threatening conduct.” People v. Ortiz, 109 Cal.App.4th at 112. “Here, the evidence of 

prior driving conduct was offered to prove an intermediate fact (knowledge that conduct is life 

threatening) necessary to the establishment of the ultimate fact of implied malice, an element in 

the charges of second degree murder.” Eagles, 133 Cal.App.3d at 340. 

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that admission of evidence of the 

1994 collision, despite petitioner’s admission of his knowledge of the dangers associated with 

driving while sleeping, did not violate fundamental fairness and his right to due process. The 

evidence was properly admitted under California law in support of one of the prosecutor’s 

theories of implied malice. 

Analysis: Did Admission of Evidence of 1994 Collision Violate Due Process Because It 

Was Not Sufficiently Similar to 2006 Incident?

The California Court of Appeal denied the instant claim for the reasons stated herein:

A. Admission of 1994 Fatal Traffic Collision

Bucci contends the court erred in granting the prosecutor's motion 

to admit evidence of the 1994 fatal collision that was caused when 

Bucci fell asleep, for the limited purpose of showing that Bucci 

knew in 2006 that falling asleep while driving on a highway is 

dangerous to life. FN4 We disagree.

FN4. The prosecutor had also sought to introduce evidence of 

Bucci’s prior convictions for vehicular manslaughter, which 

resulted from the incident. The prior convictions themselves were 

not specifically addressed at the hearing on the in limine motion. 

No evidence of the convictions or disposition was introduced at 

trial.

1. The Law

Evidence of uncharged misconduct is inadmissible to prove a 

defendant’s criminal disposition to commit the charged crime. 

(Evid.Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) However, such evidence may be 

admissible if offered to prove other facts such as motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence 

of mistake or accident, or consent. (Evid.Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)

In vehicular murder cases, as here, the prosecutor must prove that 

the defendant acted with implied malice. (People v. Watson (1981) 

30 Cal.3d 290, 300.) Implied malice may be established by prior 

crimes evidence admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, 

subdivision (b). (People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 111–

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113 (Ortiz).) “[C]ourts have recognized repeatedly that a motor 

vehicle driver’s previous encounters with the consequences of 

recklessness on the highway—whether provoked by the use of 

alcohol, of another intoxicant, by rage, or some other motivator—

sensitizes him to the dangerousness of such life-threatening 

conduct.” (Id. at p. 112.) “Here, the evidence of prior driving 

conduct was offered to prove an intermediate fact (knowledge that 

conduct is life threatening) necessary to the establishment of the 

ultimate fact of implied malice, an element in the charges of second 

degree murder.” (People v. Eagles (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 330, 340 

[evidence of excessive speed resulting in a near collision is relevant 

to knowledge of the great risk of harm of excessive speed].)

For uncharged misconduct to be admissible, it must be sufficiently 

similar to the charged offenses, and the probative value of the 

evidence must be both substantial and not largely outweighed by 

the probability that its admission would create a serious danger of 

undue prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. 

(People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369, 371.) We review the 

court’s admission of the evidence for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)

2. Analysis

The court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that evidence of the 

1994 fatal collision could be offered to show Bucci’s knowledge of 

the dangers of falling asleep while driving. (Evid.Code, § 1101, 

subd. (b).) The 1994 collision was caused when he fell asleep, and 

two people died in the resulting collision. According to Bucci’s 

statements at the scene to both Officer Ervin and EMT Bryant, the 

2006 collision was also caused when he fell asleep. If the jury 

believed Bucci’s statements that he fell asleep at the wheel in 

November 2006, it could reasonably infer that Bucci had driven 

even though he was sleepy or fatigued, and his knowledge of the 

consequences of falling asleep would be germane to the issue of 

implied malice.

Bucci argues that, by the time of trial (and the motion in limine), he 

denied that he fell asleep and claimed instead that he had 

succumbed to the effects of carbon dioxide to which he was 

exposed at work. The jury, however, was not obligated to accept 

Bucci’s dry ice theory or reject his prior statements to the 

authorities that he fell asleep. Accordingly, what Bucci learned 

from falling asleep at the wheel in 1994 remained relevant and 

admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).

Bucci also points out that the prosecutor told the jury in his rebuttal 

argument that Bucci had not fallen asleep, but deliberately passed in 

the wrong lane up a hill. Therefore, Bucci urges, evidence of his 

knowledge from 1994 of the dangers of falling asleep was 

immaterial. We disagree. In the first place, what the prosecutor 

asserted in his rebuttal argument cannot render the court’s prior in 

limine ruling erroneous, since the propriety of that ruling must be 

evaluated in light of what had been presented to the court at the 

time of the motion. In any event, although the prosecutor argued 

that Bucci acted with implied malice because he passed in the 

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wrong lane uphill deliberately, the prosecutor also contended in his 

closing argument that Bucci acted with implied malice if, indeed, 

he had fallen asleep. It remained possible for the jury to conclude 

from the evidence that Bucci had fallen asleep while driving in 

2006, and the evidence of the 1994 fatalities was therefore 

substantially relevant to Bucci’s knowledge at the time of the 

charged crimes.FN5

FN5. We also note that, while the prosecutor ultimately argued to 

the jury that Bucci deliberately passed cars in the wrong lane while 

approaching the crest of a hill, the evidence of Bucci’s 1994 

collision would have been admissible to establish implied malice 

given those facts as well: to show Bucci’s knowledge of the danger 

of driving into oncoming traffic—that is, the likely effects of a 

collision that could occur if one drives eastbound in a westbound 

lane deliberately. The experience of a prior head-on collision that 

left two people dead would have been relevant to whether Bucci 

knew that driving towards on-coming traffic was likely to kill 

someone.

We turn next to whether the probative value of the evidence was 

largely outweighed by the probability the evidence would create 

undue prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. (Kipp, 

supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 371.) Among the factors considered in 

weighing potential prejudice are whether the defendant was 

convicted of the prior crimes, thus removing any temptation for the 

jury to punish him for the uncharged offenses, and whether the 

prior offenses were of a more serious nature than the currently 

charged crimes, thereby posing a risk of inflaming the jury. (See

People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404–405.)

Here, the 1994 incident resulted in Bucci's conviction for 

misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter. Contrary to his suggestion 

(which we discuss post ), Bucci was free to introduce evidence of 

this conviction and punishment to minimize any possibility that the 

jury might convict him of the charged crimes just to punish him for 

the 1994 incident. Furthermore, while the 1994 deaths of two 

people caused by Bucci falling asleep at the wheel are certainly 

tragic, they are no more inflammatory than the 2006 deaths of two 

people and injuries to two others caused by Bucci either falling 

asleep at the wheel again, driving after feeling the disorienting 

effects of carbon dioxide exposure, or deliberately speeding uphill 

in the lane of oncoming traffic in order to pass other vehicles. The 

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence of 

the 1994 incident was admissible. (See Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 

372 .)

Lastly, any error in the admission of the evidence pertaining to the 

1994 fatal accident was harmless, since there is no reasonable 

probability that Bucci would have obtained a more favorable 

verdict if the evidence had not been admitted. (People v. Scheer

(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018–1019.) The jury was expressly 

instructed, in accordance with CALCRIM No. 375, that it could not 

consider the evidence for any purpose other than deciding whether 

Bucci knew that falling asleep while driving is dangerous to human 

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life: “The People presented evidence that the defendant fell asleep 

while driving and collided with another vehicle causing the deaths 

of two people in 1994.... [¶] If you decide that the defendant 

committed the act, you may, but are not required to, consider that 

evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether or not: [¶] The 

defendant knew that falling asleep while driving is dangerous to 

human life. [¶] Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose 

except for the limited purpose of determining the defendant's 

knowledge that falling asleep while driving is dangerous to human 

life.” (Italics added.) The jury is presumed to have followed this 

instruction. (See People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 574.) Bucci 

fails to establish reversible error.

People v. Bucci, 2010 WL 2512732, at *6-7 (2010). 

For the reasons stated by the California Court of Appeal, the undersigned finds that 

admission of evidence regarding the 1994 collision did not violate fundamental fairness. 

Evidence of the collision was relevant to the issue of petitioner’s knowledge of the dangers of 

driving while sleeping, on which one of the prosecutor’s theories of implied malice was based. 

The undersigned agrees with the state appellate court that the probative value of the 1994 

collision did not outweigh the probability of prejudice. The evidence regarding the 1994 collision 

was no more inflammatory than the evidence regarding the 2006 collision. 

Moreover, as noted by the California Court of Appeal, the jury was instructed that it could 

consider evidence of the 1994 collision only for the purpose of determining whether petitioner 

knew that falling asleep while driving was dangerous to human life. A jury is presumed to follow 

its instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). Thus, it is presumed that the jury 

did not consider evidence for any other improper purpose. 

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that admission of evidence of the 

1994 collision did not violate fundamental fairness. 

Discussion—Prosecutorial Misconduct (Claim 2)

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument 

when he argued that there are, “4 dead bodies...he’s killed before...it’s time to accept 

responsibility ... he got away with it before ... and he used the same excuse again.” (ECF No. 31 

at 19.) Petitioner also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he argued to the 

jury that evidence of the 1994 accident could be used for the improper purpose of demonstrating 

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conformity. (Id. at 21.) 

Legal Standard

To obtain federal habeas relief for prosecutorial misconduct on due process grounds, “it is

not enough that the prosecutor’s remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.” 

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Prosecutorial misconduct merits habeas relief only where the misconduct “so infected the trial 

with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id. (internal citation 

and quotation marks omitted); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 843 (9th Cir. 1995) (“To 

constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be so severe as to result in 

the denial of [the petitioner’s] right to a fair trial.”). “[A] criminal conviction is not to be lightly 

overturned on the basis of a prosecutor’s comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct 

must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor’s 

conduct affected the fairness of the trial.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). “In 

fashioning closing arguments, prosecutors are allowed reasonably wide latitude and are free to 

argue reasonable inferences from the evidence.” United States v. McChristian, 47 F.3d 1499, 

1507 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). “The arguments of counsel are generally 

accorded less weight by the jury than the court’s instructions and must be judged in the context of 

the entire argument and the instructions.” Ortiz–Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 898 (9th Cir. 

1996) (citing Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384–85 (1990)).

To grant habeas relief on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, the misconduct must have 

been prejudicial: that is, it must have “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see Karis v. 

Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1128 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is 

analyzed under the prejudice standard set forth in Brecht). Under Brecht, a reviewing court must

grant relief if “in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of the error.” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 

432, 436 (1995). In assessing prejudice arising from prosecutorial misconduct, the court must 

consider a number of factors: (1) whether a curative jury instruction was given, see Greer v. 

Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987); (2) the weight of evidence of guilt, see Young, 470 U.S. at 

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19 (finding “overwhelming evidence” of guilt); (3) whether the misconduct was isolated or part 

of an ongoing pattern, see Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987); (4) whether the 

prosecutorial misconduct related to a critical aspect of the case, see Giglio v. United States, 405 

U.S. 150, 154 (1972); and (5) whether the challenged comment of the prosecutor misstated or 

manipulated the evidence. Darden, 477 U.S. at 181–82.

Analysis—Did Prosecutor Commit Misconduct By Arguing that Petitioner Had Previously 

“Gotten Away With It”?

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he made the following 

closing argument:

He’s trying to escalate this, to make it look like, well, I think I must 

have fallen asleep. I really don’t know. That’s my best 

explanation, and try and make it consistent with this exposure 

defense. That’s not what he said. He didn’t say, I was confused. I 

don’t know. He said, “I dozed off.” I submit to you he got away 

with it before, when he dozed off, and he used the same excuse 

again. 

(RT at 876 (emphasis added).)

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim for the reasons stated herein:

In his rebuttal argument to the jury, the prosecutor honed in on an 

assertion defense counsel made in closing argument that Bucci had 

told EMT Bryant “ ‘I must have dozed off’ “ rather than “[I] dozed 

off.” (Italics added.) The prosecutor argued: “He's trying to escalate 

this, to make it look like, well, [']I think I must have fallen asleep. I 

really don't know. That's my best explanation['] and try and make it 

consistent with his exposure defense. That's not what [Bucci] said. 

He didn't say, [']I was confused. I don't know.['] He said, ‘I dozed 

off.’ I submit to you he got away with it before, when he dozed off, 

and he used the same excuse again .” (Italics added.)

Defense counsel did not object, and the prosecutor finished his 

rebuttal argument. Bucci now contends the prosecutor perpetrated 

prosecutorial misconduct by saying “he got away with it before.”

1. Waiver

A defendant may generally not complain on appeal of prosecutorial 

misconduct unless he timely objected and requested that the jury be 

admonished to disregard the impropriety. (People v. Berryman

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072, overruled on other grounds in People 

v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.)

Here, Bucci did not object to the prosecutor's statement during 

closing argument. Instead, the day after closing arguments were 

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concluded, defense counsel stated (outside the presence of the jury): 

“Yesterday, in the closing, [the prosecutor] referred to ... the idea 

that [Bucci] fell asleep in 1994 is determinative that he got away 

with it,” and “the representation that he got away with it is 

completely false, because he was, of course, convicted of a crime 

and did jail time in 1994.” Counsel concluded: “So I just—I don't 

know what Your Honor would like to do about that, but I did think 

it was appropriate to make an objection on the record, because that 

certainly mischaracterizes what happened in 1994 as a result.”

Bucci does not contend this objection was timely. Instead, he 

argues that he should be excused from the requirement of a timely 

objection because it would have been futile. (People v. Hill, supra, 

17 Cal.4th at p. 820; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 

1184, fn. 27.) In this case, he insists, it would have been futile to 

object to the prosecutor's statement during closing argument, 

because the court did not take action when defense counsel raised 

the issue the next day.

We are not persuaded. The fact that a trial court denies relief in 

response to an untimely objection does not in itself mean that a 

timely objection would have been futile. Furthermore, at the point 

in this case when defense counsel finally mentioned the matter, he 

appears to have been merely making a record of his concern, and 

never actually asked the trial court to do anything—not even to 

admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comment. So the 

court responded: “All right. I'm just going to leave it there. I'm 

not—I have no further input at this time.” Nothing in the record 

suggests that Bucci should be excused from the requirement of 

making a timely objection to the prosecutor's purported misconduct.

Nonetheless, we need not rely on the doctrine of waiver or 

forfeiture to resolve the issue of the prosecutor's comment, since 

Bucci's argument also fails on the merits.

2. Merits

Bucci contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing 

that Bucci got away with killing two people in 1994, even though 

he knew that Bucci was convicted and sentenced. Bucci 

mischaracterizes the prosecutor's statement. The prosecutor did not 

tell the jury in closing argument that Bucci got away with killing 

two people in 1994. Nor did he ever state that Bucci had not been 

convicted or punished for the 1994 fatalities, let alone urge the jury 

to punish Bucci for the 2006 collision because he got away with 

killing people in 1994.

Rather, the prosecutor stated: “I submit to you he got away with it 

before, when he dozed off, and he used the same excuse again.” In 

context, a reasonable interpretation of the prosecutor's point is that 

Bucci's claim of falling asleep in the 2006 incident was bogus and 

should not be believed. In other words, the prosecutor's argument 

was conceivably to the effect that: Bucci got away with claiming he 

dozed off in 1994, so he claimed it again in 2006, but in this case it 

was not true.

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In any event—even if a reasonable juror could interpret the 

prosecutor's argument in the way Bucci now casts it—Bucci has not 

established reversible error. “Prosecutorial misconduct is cause for 

reversal only when it is ‘reasonably probable that a result more 

favorable to the defendant would have occurred had the district 

attorney refrained from the comment attacked by the defendant.’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 245.)

Here, there is no reasonable probability that Bucci would have 

obtained a more favorable verdict if the prosecutor had not made 

the subject remark. The prosecutor's statement was not an obvious 

plea to convict or punish Bucci because of the 1994 fatalities, it 

constituted a tiny fraction of the prosecutor's overall closing and 

rebuttal arguments, and it was apparently not so inflammatory or 

noteworthy as to cause any contemporaneous expression of concern 

by either defense counsel or the trial court. Furthermore, the trial 

court instructed the jury that it could not use the evidence of the 

1994 fatalities for any purpose other than to determine “the 

defendant's knowledge that falling asleep while driving is 

dangerous to human life.” Given this instruction pursuant to 

CALCRIM No. 375, as well as the presumption that the jury 

followed the instruction, the context and circumstances of the 

prosecutor's statement, and the strong evidence of implied malice 

discussed ante, Bucci fails to show that the prosecutor's statement 

compels reversal.

People v. Bucci, 2010 WL 2512732, at *12-13.

In the answer, respondent first argues that the instant claim is procedurally defaulted 

based on trial counsel’s failure to object, as noted by the California Court of Appeal. 

In order for a claim to be procedurally defaulted for federal habeas corpus purposes, the 

opinion of the last state court rendering a judgment in the case must clearly and expressly state 

that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). 

“A claim in a federal habeas petition may be procedurally defaulted if it was actually raised in 

state court but found to be defaulted on an adequate and independent state procedural ground.” 

Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012). This rule applies even where the state court 

reached the merits of the claim even after finding the claim procedurally barred. See,e.g., Harris 

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 n.10 (1989).

This action has been pending since November 2011. (ECF No. 1.) On December 7, 2011, 

the undersigned ordered the original petition served on respondent. (ECF No. 6.) On May 20, 

2014, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that several claims were either not 

exhausted or procedurally barred. (ECF No. 27.) Respondent has not waived the issue of 

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procedural default with respect to the instant claim by failing to raise it in the motion to dismiss. 

See Morrison v. Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005) (motion to dismiss in habeas is 

not a responsive pleading that required the state to raise or waive all of its defenses). However, in 

the interests of judicial economy, the undersigned declines to address respondent’s procedural 

default argument with respect to this claim, as the court has already spent considerable time 

addressing procedural default in this action. See Lambrix, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997).

Turning to the merits of the instant claim, petitioner is not entitled to relief because, under 

either interpretation of the argument as discussed by the state appellate court, there is no 

reasonable probability that the argument had an impact on the outcome of the trial. As noted by 

the California Court of Appeal, the jury was instructed that it could consider evidence of the 1994 

collision only for the purpose of determining whether petitioner had knowledge that driving while 

sleeping was dangerous to human life. A jury is presumed to follow its instructions. See Weeks 

v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000).

Moreover, because the evidence against petitioner was strong, it is not likely that the 

alleged misconduct had a substantial impact on the verdict. The California Court of Appeal 

found that there was substantial evidence that petitioner knowingly put people’s lives in jeopardy 

when it rejected his claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of implied malice:

In the matter before us, substantial evidence supported a finding of 

implied malice. Bucci was speeding up a hill going the wrong 

direction in a no-passing zone on a highway, where he could not see 

oncoming traffic on the other side of the crest of the hill and could 

not return to his correct lane because of the semi-trailers he was 

trying to pass. Certainly a reasonable juror could conclude that the 

natural consequences of his conduct were dangerous to life and that 

his conduct endangered the lives of others—such as the occupants 

of any vehicle approaching from the other side of the crest of the 

hill. Indeed, at trial Bucci himself admitted that “passing uphill over 

a solid no-pass line towards the crest of a hill where you can't see is 

life-endangering,” and “passing multiple vehicles at night uphill in 

excess of a speed limit over the solid line is likely to kill 

somebody.” Bucci also conceded he knew the danger of such 

actions as of November 17, 2006.

Furthermore, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that 

Bucci was conscious and aware that he was putting people's lives in 

jeopardy at the time of the collision. There was, for example, 

evidence that Bucci was not asleep or under the influence of any 

intoxicating substance when the accident occurred. According to 

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eye-witnesses, he was not driving erratically when he pulled into 

the westbound lane to pass Johnson, returned to the eastbound lane 

in front of her, maneuvered back into the westbound lane, 

accelerated past Fender and one of the semi-trailers in a no-passing 

zone, and attempted to pass the second semi-trailer until he struck 

Jackson head-on. Immediately after the collision, Bucci did not 

complain of confusion, dizziness, or any effect of dry ice or any 

other substance, but was instead cogent and responsive to questions 

and logical in his answers. From this evidence the jury could 

reasonably conclude that Bucci attempted to pass the semi-trailers 

going uphill deliberately, in conscious disregard for the risk of life.

Even if the jury accepted Bucci's claim at the scene that he fell 

asleep, it could reasonably conclude that Bucci acted with implied 

malice. From his statement to EMT Bryant and Officer Ervin that 

he dozed off, it could reasonably be inferred that he felt sleepy or 

fatigued and, notwithstanding his knowledge from the 1994 

fatalities of the dangers of falling asleep while driving, continued to 

drive.

2010 WL 2512732 at *8.

The undersigned has independently reviewed the record and finds the state appellate 

court’s findings regarding the evidence to be accurate. The undersigned also observes that, 

although not required, the prosecutor, through defense witnesses, made a good case for motive. 

Evidence was presented that prior to leaving work on November 17, 2006, petitioner, with the 

help of co-worker Stephen Martin, loaded his car with Google food and utensils to take to a 

private catering job. (See RT at 413, 420, 423-24, 510-11.) The event was in Lodi, about 1 1⁄2 

hours away. (Id. at 510-11.) Petitioner left work at approximately 3:30 p.m. The accident 

occurred at approximately 6:30. The prosecutor persuasively argued that petitioner was late for 

the catering event, which is what caused him to make the unsafe lane change which led to the 

collision.

While petitioner’s defense was that he suffered from involuntary intoxication as a result of 

exposure to dry ice, the evidence demonstrated that petitioner was able to function quite 

competently despite this exposure. The evidence demonstrated that he was able to load his car 

with food from Google with the help of his friend, start his car, drive it out of the Google parking 

lot, and then drive for at least 40 to 50 miles, without incident, until the collision occurred. In 

other words, the dry ice did not appear to have an impact on petitioner’s ability to competently 

function until the collision.

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Witnesses who interacted with petitioner just before he left work on November 17 

testified that petitioner appeared cogent. For example, shipping and receiving clerk Joaquin Ortiz 

testified that he spoke with petitioner as he was standing next to his truck, and the food was

already loaded into his car. (RT at 510.) Petitioner told Ortiz that he was on his way to a 

catering event at a winery. (Id. at 511.) Ortiz testified that while petitioner looked tired, he was 

cogent and did not mention being ill. (Id. at 512.) 

Stephen Martin testified that petitioner asked him to help him load the food into his car for 

the catering event. (Id. at 413.) Martin testified that he and petitioner loaded the food on to 

wheeled carts. (Id. at 423-24.) Martin testified that petitioner did not appear to be confused 

about the items he was loading. (Id.)

The evidence that petitioner consciously made the lane change that resulted in the 

collision was, as the state appellate court found, substantial.2 For this reason, it is not likely that 

the prosecutor’s argument that petitioner had “got away with it before” had a substantial impact 

on the jury. Accordingly, this claim of prosecutorial misconduct is without merit. 

////

////

 

2

Evidence was also presented which undermined the opinion of petitioner’s expert, Dr. Rutchik. 

Dr. Rutchik testified that his opinion regarding petitioner’s exposure to dry ice was based on 

information he received from petitioner, including that 150 pounds of dry ice was placed in a 

refrigerator approximately one day earlier. (Id. at 556.) However, defense witness Joaquin Ortiz 

provided testimony regarding the condition of the dry ice, of which Dr. Rutchik was not aware. 

Ortiz testified that the dry ice was left on the loading dock for two to three hours before it was 

refrigerated. (Id. at 504.) In addition, the ice was not in pellet form, as testified to by petitioner, 

but in slab form. (Id. at 502.) Ortiz also testified that he split the 150 pounds of dry ice up and 

put it into two refrigerators and one freezer on the loading dock, i.e., not all 150 pounds of dry ice 

was in one freezer or one refrigerator. (Id. at 507.) Ortiz also testified that the plan was to move 

the dry ice to the upstairs refrigerators. (Id. at 515.) Ortiz testified that he did not know whether 

the dry ice had been moved upstairs by the afternoon of November 17. (Id. at 515-16.) 

On cross-examination, Dr. Rutchik testified that his opinion regarding the effect of the dry 

ice on petitioner would change if he knew that petitioner had been exposed to less than 150 

pounds of dry ice. (Id. at 632.) Dr. Rutchik also testified that his opinion would change if he 

knew that the dry ice had been left on the loading dock, unrefrigerated for three to four hours the 

morning it was delivered the day before. (Id. at 634.) Dr. Rutchik also testified that it “made 

sense” that dry ice in the form of pellets would sublimate at a rate faster than slabs of dry ice. (Id.

at 638.)

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Analysis—Did Prosecutor Commit Misconduct by Arguing That Petitioner Acted in 

Conformity with Character?

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor improperly argued that the jury could consider 

evidence of the 1994 collision as evidence that, in 2006, petitioner acted in conformity with his 

character. In support of this claim, petitioner cites a portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument 

which, as noted by respondent, contains redactions. The second amended petition describes the 

at-issue argument as follows:

What more do you need than four dead bodies and two people who 

are ruined as a result of his driving...at this point in time. Do you 

think he wasn’t a dangerous driving in 1994, when he killed these 

people ...[s]o he was dangerous back then ... you have to understand 

...I didn’t put on the ’94 evidence, nor did the Court allow it in, to 

show some type of character in conformity with this additional 

evidence. I’m not allowed to do that. That evidence came in to 

show that he knew that cars were dangerous, that they can kill, that 

if you get over in another lane and hit somebody head-on, that 

you’re going to have an accident, to show knowledge --- show that 

he had knowledge of malice ... People act out of conformity with 

character all the time. And if you realistically look at the 

evidence in this case, he’s acting within his character as, 

unfortunately, some people do...

(Second Amended Petition citing RT at 881-82, ECF No. 32 at 19 (emphasis in second amended 

petition).)

The undersigned herein sets forth the entire, unredacted and unedited portion of the 

argument referenced by petitioner:

One thing I want to touch on, [defense counsel] said, in between 

’94, when he killed two people, and 2006, he didn’t have a ticket or 

something like that, no other accidents, and, therefore, you know 

he’s not a bad driver or person who is a danger. What more do you 

need than four dead bodies and two people are ruined as a result of 

his driving at this point in this case, at this point in time. Do you 

think that he wasn’t a dangerous driver in 1994, when he killed 

these people, when he had been up for 35 hours gambling and using 

dope and drinking and just drives anyway? He said, “Well, I didn’t 

realize I could fall asleep. How many of you guys have driven 

when you’re sleepy, and you have to pull over and get a cup of 

coffee?

That’s [defense counsel’s] fault, my diagram fell.

So he was dangerous back then.

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The other thing you have to understand is I didn’t put on the ’94 

evidence, nor did the Court allow it in, to show some type of 

character in conformity with this additional evidence. I’m not 

allowed to do that. That evidence came in to show that he knew that 

cars were dangerous, that they can kill, that if you get over in 

another lane and hit somebody head-on, that you’re going to have 

an accident, to show knowledge – show that he had knowledge of 

malice.

The other thing is there’s a problem with character evidence, and 

the problem goes to your common sense. We all know that people 

can and do and often do act out of conformity with character. How 

many times have you read something and said, Oh, I knew that guy. 

I don’t believe he could ever do that. He was great in high school. 

People act out of conformity with character all the time. And if you 

realistically look at the evidence in this case, he’s acting within 

character as, unfortunately, some people do. He’s got to get 

somewhere. He’s late, and it torpedoes. He’s just going to get 

where he wants to go and drive how he wants to drive. He’s got to 

choose to make a decision to pass, to accelerate – accelerate as he’s 

passing, get in somebody else’s lane, over the double line, go 

uphill, and try and get by all in one fell swoop, and the cars are 

moving, too. He’s got to get up enough speed in time to get around 

them, but that’s the trouble with character evidence. People don’t 

act in conformity with character.

A first time murderer, he’s never murdered before. He acts out of 

character. It’s just not that probative as to what occurred in this 

case. If you want to know what occurred in this case, look at the 

facts and circumstances surrounding this. 

(RT at 881-82.)

As noted by respondent, the full transcript quoted above shows that the prosecutor did not 

attempt to argue that petitioner had a criminal propensity, particularly based on evidence of the 

1994 collision. Instead, the prosecutor argued that propensity evidence was not reliable in this 

case. The undersigned agrees with respondent that the argument quoted above was not unlawful.

In any event, as discussed above, the evidence of petitioner’s guilt was strong. For this 

reason, the argument quoted above did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s 

verdict. Accordingly, this claim of prosecutorial misconduct is without merit. 

Discussion—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Claim 4)

Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an accident 

reconstruction expert. Petitioner argues that “[b]y accepting the accuracy of the prosecution’s 

factual conclusions, the defense was not focused on whether petitioner crossed a double-yellow 

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line when initiating his passing maneuvers, but rather on why petitioner crossed the double-solid 

line.” (ECF No. 32 at 23.)

Procedural Default

In the answer, respondent argues that petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 

procedurally defaulted because the superior court denied this claim as successive, citing In re 

Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 774-75 (1993). As discussed above, respondent has not waived the issue of 

procedural default with respect to this claim by failing to raise it in the initial motion to dismiss. 

See Morrison v. Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005) (motion to dismiss in habeas is 

not a responsive pleading that required the state to raise or waive all of its defenses). However, in 

the interests of judicial economy, the undersigned declines to address respondent’s procedural 

argument with respect to this claim. See Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525.

Legal Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

The Sixth Amendment guarantees “the right to effective assistance of counsel.” McMann 

v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 

analyzed under the framework set out by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that there are two components to an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim: “deficient performance” and “prejudice.” 466 U.S. at 

694. Establishing “deficient performance” requires the movant to show that counsel made errors 

so serious that she was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id.

at 687. “Deficient performance” means representation that “fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness.” Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 862 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 688). 

To demonstrate prejudice, the movant must show that “there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “It is not enough ‘to show that the errors had some 

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 

(2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). A court need not determine whether counsel’s 

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the movant as a result of 

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the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

Analysis

Petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to hire an accident 

reconstruction expert. (ECF No. 32 at 26.) Petitioner alleges that there is reasonable probability,

that had an expert testified that petitioner’s passing maneuvers 

began with a lawful crossing of the centerline, the evidence of the 

passing zone deficiencies (length and line-of sight, as stated at Dkt. 

17, p. 8) would have then been relevant and admissible; that, at the 

very least, petitioner’s culpability would have been found by the 

jury to be less than that required to find guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt of the implied malice counts.

(Id.) 

The background to this claim is discussed, in part, in the March 13, 2012 findings and 

recommendations addressing petitioner’s motion to stay this action pending exhaustion of 

additional claims. (ECF No. 17.) In relevant part, the findings and recommendations state, 

A civil wrongful death action was filed against petitioner and the 

State of California regarding the incident on which his conviction is 

based. (Dkt. No. 10-6 at 2.) The trial in the case was held in June 

and July of 2011. (Id. at 5.) The jury assessed damages of 29 

million dollars. (Id.)

In late September 2011, petitioner’s family retained the lawyer who 

is representing petitioner in the instant action, Mr. William L. 

Schmidt, to assess whether grounds existed to prosecute a habeas 

action. (Dkt. No. 10-5 at 2.) Mr. Schmidt reviewed documents 

from the civil action, including depositions taken of expert 

witnesses in June 2011. (Id.) According to Mr. Schmidt, the expert 

testimony revealed that petitioner had not committed an illegal act 

by crossing a double-yellow line when he initiated his passing

maneuver, but also that Highway 12 was defective in its design, 

construction and maintenance, and that the State of California was 

aware of those deficiencies for several years preceding the 

November 2006 incident on which petitioner’s conviction is based. 

(Id.) According to Mr. Schmidt, the evidence in the civil trial 

established, as conceded by the State of California, that an adequate 

line-of-sight in the area of the collision for a two-lane highway at 

55 mph was at least 1,950 feet, but on Highway 12 it was only 300-

350 feet; that the shoulders on either side of the roadway should 

have been at least 8 feet wide, but in fact did not exist on Highway 

12. (Id.)

(ECF No. 17 at 8.)

Turning to the merits of the instant claim, the undersigned first observes that evidence 

regarding whether petitioner began his lane change while still in a legal passing zone was not 

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relevant to his defense. As discussed above, petitioner’s defense was that he was involuntarily 

intoxicated as a result of being exposed to dry ice. Based on this exposure to dry ice, petitioner’s 

defense was that he did not knowingly make the dangerous pass which led to the collision. Based 

on this defense, petitioner’s knowledge of whether the line was striped or solid when he began his 

lane change was not relevant to his defense. Therefore, petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective 

for failing to pursue an inconsistent defense that was contrary to petitioner’s testimony. See Turk 

v. White, 116 F.3d 1264, 1266–67 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that once counsel reasonably 

selects a defense, failing to present an alternative and inconsistent defense is not ineffective 

assistance of counsel). On this ground, petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim should 

be denied.

For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned further finds that testimony from an 

accident reconstruction expert would not have changed the outcome of the trial. 

In support of his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call an accident 

reconstruction expert, petitioner argues that the testimony of witnesses Fender and Johnson that 

petitioner passed Fender in a no passing zone was false. (ECF No. 32 at 27.) Petitioner argues 

that the uncontroverted opinions of the 3 accident reconstruction experts presented during the 

civil case demonstrated that petitioner began his pass in a legal passing zone. (Id. at 28.) 

Petitioner argues that this evidence “works to diminish petitioner’s culpability for the accident, he 

reasonably assumed that the passing area was of sufficient distance to safely pass, thereby 

negating the implied malice element, if not an estoppel by entrapment defense.” (Id.) Petitioner 

argues that by “permitting/inviting vehicles to pass, the State was in effect telling drivers that 

there was sufficient distance and line-of-sight to do so, such that petitioner may not be prosecuted 

for relying on that reasonable inference.” (Id.) 

The undersigned summarizes the relevant testimony of these witnesses herein. 

Johnson testified that on November 17, 2006, she was driving eastbound on Highway 12. 

(RT at 123-24.) Highway 12 is a two lane highway. (Id.) Johnson testified that she was driving 

the speed limit, 55 miles per hour. (Id. at 126.) Johnson testified that there was a lot of traffic on 

the highway that evening going both ways. (Id.) She saw a car, later identified as being driven 

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by petitioner, pass her car. (Id. 125.) She testified that after passing her, petitioner’s car did not 

stay in front of her for very long and made another pass. (Id. at 129.) She estimated that 

petitioner was driving about 65 to 70 miles per hour. (Id.) 

Johnson testified that at the time petitioner initiated his second pass, the control lines on 

the road were solid. (Id. at 131.) Johnson testified that when petitioner made his second pass, the 

road was going up a hill. (Id.at 132.) Johnson testified that petitioner was trying to pass multiple 

vehicles going up the hill. (Id. at 133.) Johnson testified that she could not see over the crest of 

the hill. (Id.) 

Fender testified that on November 17, 2006, he was driving eastbound on Highway 12. 

(Id. at 98.) There were two tractor-trailer box vans driving in front of Fender at the time of the 

collision. (Id. at 99.) Fender testified that there were five or six car lengths between him and the 

truck in front of him. (Id.) Fender testified that he was driving approximately 50 miles per hour. 

(Id. at 100.) Fender testified that a car, later identified as being driven by petitioner, attempted to 

pass him as he drove up a hill. (Id.) Fender testified that the area of the road going up the hill 

was a no passing zone. (Id. at 101.) 

The deposition transcripts of accident reconstruction experts Mark Shattuck and James 

Barry, from the civil trial, are attached as exhibits to the second amended petition. (ECF Nos. 32-

9, 32-10.) As described herein, Shattuck and Barry testified that while petitioner began his pass 

of Fender in a passing zone, he was in a no-passing zone by the time he was actually passing 

Fender.

Shattuck based his estimate on when petitioner passed Fender on Fender’s statement to the 

police. (ECF No. 32-9 at 29-30.) Shattuck testified that he accepted Fender’s estimate as 

accurate because he had no reason to discount it, “[a]nd it was measured shortly after the accident 

by the police officers. So I think it might be the best state of evidence we have.” (Id. at 30.) 

Shattuck testified that there was no evidence to the contrary. (Id.)

Shattuck testified that petitioner started passing Fender in a passing zone, but “as he’s 

passing Fender’s vehicle that’s about where the single yellow line would have started...” (Id. at 

35.) Shattuck testified that at some point during the pass, the solid yellow line ought to have been 

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visible to petitioner. (Id. at 37.) Shattuck testified that petitioner drove 65 to 70 miles per hour 

during the pass. (Id. at 31.) Shattuck also testified that the distance between petitioner and Ms. 

Jackson at the speeds they were driving was 300 to 350 feet. (Id. at 15-16). This distance 

translated into approximately 1 1⁄2 to 2 second of time between them before the impact. (Id. at

16.) 

Expert Barry testified that petitioner began his pass of Fender approximately 209 feet 

from the beginning of the solid yellow line. (ECF No. 32-10 at 16.) Barry testified that at the 

time petitioner’s car was directly next to Fender’s car, petitioner was approximately 126 feet into 

the solid line area. (Id. at 16.) Barry testified that his opinion regarding when petitioner began 

his pass of Fender was very close to the opinions of accident reconstruction experts Blythe and 

Shattuck. (Id. at 16.) Barry also testified that petitioner drove approximately 70 miles per hour 

when he passed Fender. (Id. at 18.) Barry testified that given the vertical curve of the road where 

the accident occurred, he estimated that petitioner saw victim Jackson approximately two seconds

before the impact. (Id. at 28.) 

Petitioner has also provided a letter sent to him by the attorney, Ian Gordon, who 

represented him in the civil trial summarizing the testimony of the experts and discussing the 

evidence from the civil trial. This letter states, in relevant part, 

Deposition of Mark Shattuck, PhD—he was the plaintiff’s accident 

reconstruction expert, and was the witness who performed the video 

re-enactment of the accident and the video re-enactment of what 

would have occurred if you and Ms. Jackson had just one additional 

second to see each other. Both of you would have missed each 

other. I am including with this deposition the CD which should 

have the re-enactments on it. It is in the sleeve attached to the back 

of his transcript.

As I have indicated to you previously, the sight distance at the area 

of the collision for eastbound vehicles (your direction) was only 

300 to 350 feet, which is substandard. The road needed at least 

1950 feet of sight distance for a two lane highway with a speed 

limit of 55 mph. The State of California admitted at trial, as it had 

to, that the sight distance was substandard. The road shoulders at 

the area of your accident were substandard. There were none, and 

there should have been shoulders 8 feet wide. The State also 

admitted at trial that the shoulders were substandard. The effect of 

these substandard conditions were magnified in your case because 

where you began passing of Mr. Fender’s vehicle was a legal 

passing zone.

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Kirk Barry—Mr. Barry was my accident reconstruction expert. His 

position transcript is also enclosed. He testified that you in fact 

began your pass in a legal passing area, but continued into an illegal 

zone; however, when you began the legal passing maneuver, there 

was only 300-350 feet of sight distance to allow you to see an 

oncoming motorist, which as we know as not sufficient for you to 

see the Jackson vehicle.

These two experts testimony taken together established that you 

began a legal pass, did not have sufficient sight distance to be able 

to see oncoming vehicles (due to the vertical, hilly, curves in the 

road which reduced the sight distance to substandard levels), and 

once you entered the non-passing zone, had no recovery area due to 

lack of road shoulders. That is why, if you had one additional 

second of sight distance for you and Ms. Jackson to have seen each 

other, the accident would not have occurred, and that is why 

Shattuck did the second video re-enactment.

Harry Krueper and Weston Pringle – these are plaintiffs and my 

highway design experts. They each testified that Highway 12 was 

in a dangerous condition due to the substandard conditions 

discussed above, and each concluded that a median barrier should 

have been installed at the area of this accident no later than the mid 

to late 1990s. Their conclusions were based on the fact the State of 

California was aware through its own documents that from 1991 

through the date of your accident there had been 125 cross center 

line head-on collisions on Highway 12 between Suisun and Rio 

Vista, which caused 47 motor deaths. These experts also testified 

that the State was aware during this time frame that motorists 

passed on the highway due to the vast amounts of large truck 

traffic, which was exactly the situation you found yourself in on the 

evening of the incident; yet, the State did nothing to correct this 

dangerous situation.

(ECF No. 32-17 at 3-4.)

To summarize the relevant testimony, Johnson testified that petitioner initiated the pass in 

a no-passing zone. Fender testified that petitioner passed him in a no-passing zone, although he 

did not specifically testify that petitioner initiated the pass in a no-passing zone. Shattuck and 

Barry clarified that petitioner initiated the pass in a passing zone, but was in a no-passing zone 

when he actually passed Fender. Shattuck and Barry also testified that petitioner and Jackson 

had only a few seconds to see each before the accident. According to Mr. Gordon, the State of 

California admitted that this line of sight was substandard. 

Even if the jury had heard the testimony of accident reconstruction experts that petitioner 

initiated the pass of Fender in a no-passing zone, and that the line of sight was substandard, it is 

extremely unlikely that the outcome of the trial would have been different. As noted by the 

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Superior Court, which also denied the instant claim on procedural grounds, testimony from 

accident reconstruction experts did not “point unerringly to petitioner’s reduced culpability, nor 

does it undermine the prosecution’s entire case.” (Respondent’s Lodged Document H at 3.)

Petitioner’s alleged new evidence consists of the depositions of 

accident reconstruction experts Shattuck and Barry who opine that 

petitioner began his first lane change to pass the Fender vehicle 

about 209 feet before the solid median line. (Deposition of James 

Barry, June 17, 2011, pp. 13-14; Deposition of Mark Shattuck, June 

8, 2011, pp. 31-32.) Petitioner also includes a declaration from 

Stacy Nygard, a juror in his criminal case, and argues that Ms. 

Nygard’s declaration supports that his culpability turned on the fact 

that he crossed the solid median line.

However, petitioner’s culpability in this case did not hinge on 

where exactly petitioner changed lanes and passed the Fender 

vehicle, it hinged on the evidence that, after that point petitioner 

was driving in a dangerous manner and knew the manner in which 

he was driving could have fatal consequences. (See People v. 

Bucci (June 23, 2010, A124228 ) [nonpubl. Opn.] at p. 12.) The 

alleged new evidence does not change the fact that after the solid 

median line began, petitioner continued to speed eastbound uphill at 

night in the westbound lane trying to pass a car and two semi 

trucks. The new evidence shows that, after the solid median line 

began, petitioner drove for about 1050 to 1100 feet and for about 

ten to thirteen seconds until the point of impact. (Depositon of 

Mark Shattuck, June 8, 2011, pp. 35-36; Deposition of James 

Barry, June 17, 2011, p. 20.) Ms. Nygard’s declaration does not 

support that she or any other juror would not have found petitioner 

guilty if the alleged new evidence had been presented. On balance, 

the new evidence does not point unerringly to petitioner’s reduced 

culpability or undermine the prosecution’s entire case as is required 

for habeas relief.

Moreover, with regard to his related claim that trial counsel 

performed deficiently by failing to properly investigate the collision 

and hire accident reconstruction experts to establish that he never 

crossed a solid median line, petitioner fails to show that trial 

counsel performed in an objectively deficient manner. (Strickland 

v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) Petitioner’s defense at 

trial was that he was involuntarily intoxicated due to dry ice 

exposure. He testified that he was exposed to dry ice at work and 

could not remember how he got onto Highway 12 or trying to pass 

a truck. He presented medical experts to testify about dry ice 

exposure and the effects of hypoxia. 

Considering petitioner’s testimony and his dry ice defense, it cannot 

be said that counsel’s failure to further investigate where petitioner 

exactly changed lanes was unreasonable. (Strickland, supra, 466 

U.S. at p. 691.) It would have been inconsistent with petitioner’s 

testimony and dry ice defense to argue that petitioner was less 

culpable because he intentionally began and completed a lane 

change at a specific point before the solid median line, such that he 

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was purposefully driving. Trial counsel’s failure to investigate and 

present evidence regarding where precisely petitioner began his 

lane change could easily be considered a reasonable strategic 

choice, particularly in light of the fact that petitioner claimed “new 

evidence” confirms that petitioner either regained the westbound 

lane while travelling eastbound after the solid line began or 

continued travelling eastbound in the westbound lane after that. 

(Ibid.)

Moreover, petitioner fails to show prejudice because it is not 

reasonably probable that the result of the trial would have been 

different had the jury considered the new evidence provided by 

experts Shattuck and Barry. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) 

Whether or not petitioner began his lane change before or after the 

solid yellow median does not change the fact that he was driving in 

a dangerous manner. It is highly unlikely that the result of the trial 

would have been different had the jury considered the new evidence 

that petitioner now relies on.

(Id.at 3-5 (emphasis added).)

The undersigned agrees with the reasoning of the Superior Court that whether or not 

petitioner began his lane change before or after the solid yellow line began does not change the 

fact that he drove in a dangerous manner.3 As noted by the Superior Court, the evidence 

presented at petitioner’s criminal trial demonstrated that after the solid median line began, 

petitioner continued to speed eastbound uphill at night in the westbound lane trying to pass a car 

 

3

 The declaration of juror Stacy Nygard is attached as an exhibit to petitioner’s second amended 

petition. (ECF No. 32-8.) Nygard states, in relevant part, 

Later, after the state court of appeal affirmed the judgment of 

conviction, our local newspaper, the Daily Republic, reported that 

the accident had occurred as a result of Mr. Bucci falling asleep at 

the wheel. I wrote a letter to the editor of the newspaper, which 

was published on July 15, 2010, in which I attempted to correct the 

erroneous news report. I wrote, ‘In fact, we convicted him for 

willfully and intentionally crossing the double yellow line in an 

effort to get around two big rigs and a passenger vehicle. He did 

fall asleep at the wheel in his accident in Reno, NV., but his most 

recent “accident” on Highway 12 wasn’t a case of falling asleep at 

the wheel. At least we jurors didn’t believe his excuse.”

(Id. at 2.)

The undersigned agrees with the Superior Court that juror Nygard’s declaration does not 

support petitioner’s claim that she or any other juror would not have found petitioner guilty if 

accident reconstruction experts had testified that petitioner initiated his pass of Fender in a 

passing zone. 

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and two semi-trucks. Johnson also testified that there was a lot of traffic on Highway 12 that 

evening, going in both directions. The Superior Court noted that the new evidence shows that, 

after the solid median line began, petitioner drove for about 1050 to 1100 feet and for about ten to 

thirteen seconds until the point of impact. That petitioner continued to drive in this dangerous 

and reckless manner for this period of time was not exonerating. In addition, expert Shattuck 

testified at his deposition that the solid yellow line was “available” for petitioner to see after he 

began his pass of Fender. 

Petitioner also suggests that the accident reconstruction experts testified in their 

depositions that petitioner should have reasonably assumed that he had a sufficient distance to 

safely pass based on where the no-passing zone began. This argument is without merit. As 

discussed above, expert Shattuck testified that the solid yellow line was “available” for petitioner 

to see when he made his pass. (ECF No. 36 at 50.) Expert Barry testified that petitioner traveled 

in the westbound lane 13 for thirteen seconds before the collision. (ECF No. 32-10 at 22.) At 

trial, petitioner himself admitted that “passing uphill over a solid no-pass line towards the crest of 

a hill where you can’t see is life endangering.” (RT at 355.) Petitioner also agreed that “passing 

multiple vehicles at night uphill in excess of a speed limit over the solid line is likely to kill 

somebody.” (Id.) Petitioner’s claim that the accident reconstruction experts would have testified 

that he was somehow falsely lured into thinking that he could make a safe pass based on the 

conditions of the road is without merit.4

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that petitioner was not prejudiced 

by trial counsel’s failure to call an accident reconstruction expert. Accordingly, petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit and should be denied. 

 

4

 In support of his motion to stay this action pending exhaustion of additional claims, petitioner 

included a letter addressed to his federal habeas counsel from the lawyer who represented the 

plaintiff’s in the state civil action, Thomas Brandi. (ECF No. 10-6.) In this letter, Mr. Brandi 

stated that the collision involving petitioner would have been prevented if the state had installed a 

median barrier. (Id. at 5.) Mr. Brandi summarized the evidence but also wrote that, “In doing so, 

[petitioner] was like countless others before him who passed improperly.” (Id. at 14.) Evidence 

that the State of California should have installed a median barrier also would not have exonerated 

petitioner in his criminal trial. 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of 

habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” If petitioner files objections, 

he shall also address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why and as to 

which issues. A certificate of appealability may issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(3). Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after 

service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: September 23, 2015

Bucci.157(2)

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