Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00127/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00127-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Paul Garcia, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-0127-PHX-DJH (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Paul Garcia filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court challenging 

his convictions and sentences arising out of his attack on two of his cousins and 

subsequent attempt to flee. Garcia alleges that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel and his due process rights were violated. Respondents argue that his claims were 

not exhausted in the state courts and are now subject to an implied procedural bar. As 

described below, the Court recommends that Garcia’s petition be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

 On May 17, 2012, at the conclusion of a seven day trial in Maricopa County 

Superior Court, a jury found Garcia guilty of one count of disorderly conduct, a 

dangerous offense; two counts of aggravated assault, both dangerous offenses; one count 

of theft of means of transportation; and one count of unlawful flight from a law 

enforcement vehicle. (Doc. 9, Exs. E, N) The following day, the Court conducted a 

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Blakely hearing and found that he had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived 

his right to have a jury find aggravating factors and accepted his admission of aggravated 

factors for the two counts of aggravated assault. (Doc. 9, Ex. O)

 The Court received presentencing memoranda from the State and from Garcia, 

including a report prepared by a mitigation specialist. (Doc. 9, Exs. P, Q) On July 9, 

2012, Garcia was sentenced to presumptive and aggravated sentences to run both 

concurrently and consecutively for a total sentence of 25.75 years. (Doc. 9, Exs. R, S) 

He received some presentence credit and, on appeal, argued he was entitled to more. 

(Doc. 9, Exs. T, U, V) The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed his sentences. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. W) 

 Garcia filed a notice of post-conviction relief.1

 (Doc. 9, Ex. Z) He was appointed 

counsel who reviewed the record and then notified the Superior Court that he could not 

find any meritorious grounds for a petition. (Doc. 9, Exs. AA, BB) Garcia filed a pro 

per Petition and argued that he should not have been convicted because there was no 

DNA evidence, he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when he was advised to 

waive his right to a hearing on the aggravated factors, and his sentence was excessive. 

(Doc. 9, Exs. CC, DD) In response, the State argued that Garcia’s petition should be 

dismissed because it was devoid of any supporting facts and, therefore, violated Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.5. (Doc. 9, Ex. EE) After Garcia replied, the Superior 

Court summarily dismissed Garcia’s petition for failure to comply with Rule 32.5. (Doc. 

9, Exs. FF, GG) Garcia’s subsequent motion for a rehearing was denied on March 3, 

2014. (Doc. 9, Exs. HH, II) 

 Garcia did not appeal the Superior Court’s dismissal of his Rule 32 proceedings. 

(Doc. 9, Exs. NN, OO) Instead, he filed a special action petition with the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (Doc. 9, Exs. JJ, OO) After the Court of Appeals declined jurisdiction, 

 

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 Because Garcia filed his first Notice of Post-Conviction Relief before his appeal, the Superior Court dismissed it without prejudice so he could refile at the conclusion of 

his direct appeal. (Doc. 9, Exs. X, Y) 

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Garcia petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review. (Doc. 9, Exs. LL, KK) On 

September 23, 2014, the Supreme Court denied his petition. (Doc. 9, Ex. MM) 

 On January 26, 2015, Garcia filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this 

Court arguing he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when his trial counsel 

failed to inform him that a jury could decide aggravated factors, failed to present 

mitigating evidence for sentencing, and failed to object to his excessive sentence. (Doc. 

1) He also argues that his due process rights were violated when the prosecutor failed to 

inform the trial court that a DNA test had never been conducted on a key piece of 

evidence. (Id.) Respondents argue that the claims in his Petition are unexhausted and 

procedurally defaulted without excuse. (Doc. 9) The Court concludes that the claims are 

not properly before the Court and recommends that this Petition be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. 

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

 Exhaustion of Remedies. A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court 

remedies before this Court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies 

by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To 

be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the 

specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 Procedural Default. A claim can also be subject to an express or implied 

procedural bar. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express 

procedural bar exists if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural 

bar “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis 

for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). Stewart v. Smith, 

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536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of 

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the 

merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist 

when a state strictly or regularly follows its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100. 

 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).

 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986);

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

GARCIA’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED 

Garcia did not exhaust the claims in his habeas petition and an implied procedural 

bar now exists to prevent him from doing so. To meet the exhaustion requirement, 

Garcia needed to fairly present his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals by providing 

the facts underlying his claim and its federal basis in a procedurally appropriate manner. 

However, Garcia did not appeal the Superior Court’s summary dismissal of his postconviction relief proceedings. Instead, he filed a petition for special action. This is not a 

procedurally appropriate manner for presenting his claims to the Court of Appeals. 

Accordingly, his claims were not exhausted. 

 In addition, Garcia’s claims are now subject to an implied procedural bar because 

they were not fairly presented in state court and no state remedies remain available to him 

because he is now precluded or time-barred from raising his claim in a successive and 

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untimely Rule 32 petition under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

& (b), or 32.4(a). 

Garcia has not demonstrated either cause for the default and actual prejudice to 

excuse the default, or a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the Court cannot review his 

claims.

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Paul Garcia’s petition for writ of 

habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

. . . 

. . . 

. . . 

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be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 1st day of October, 2015. 

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