Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01886/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01886-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL LEE WALLACH,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUSAN MELANSON, et al.,

Defendants. 

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Case No. 12CV1886-AJB (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT

[ECF No. 34]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Anthony

J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California.

On July 13, 2012, Plaintiff, Joel Lee Wallach, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this

civil rights suit against Defendants Susan Melanson, Frank Mitchell, and Martin Hoshimo

(“Defendants”). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on September 25,

2012 against the same Defendants. ECF No. 5 (“FAC”). On December 5, 2012, Defendants filed

a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC [ECF No. 11 (“MTD”)] and the Court issued a briefing schedule

that same day. Defendants included a Request for Judicial Notice as part of their MTD. ECF No.

11-2. Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Dismiss on January 22, 2013 [ECF No. 13 (“Oppo.”)] and

Defendants filed their Reply on January 29, 2013 with another Request for Judicial Notice. ECF

No. 14 (“Reply”).

This Court finds the issue appropriate for decision on the papers and without oral

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argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1 (d)(1). ECF No. 12. The Court has considered

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Opposition,

Defendants’ Reply, Defendants’ Requests for Judicial Notice, and all supporting documents

submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) Plaintiff's FAC be GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

Because this case comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept

as true all material allegations in the complaint, and must construe the complaint and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Thompson

v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). According to the complaint, Plaintiff accepted a plea

bargain agreement in February 1984 for a crime that he committed on September 26, 1983. FAC

at 3. As part of the agreement, if Plaintiff was found unsuitable for parole, his maximum parole

deferral was two years. Id. However, at Plaintiff’s last parole hearing, on September 30, 2010,

he “was given a 7 year denial by [Defendants] Susan Melanson and Frank [M]i[t]chell.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that the seven year deferral was a result of the passing of Proposition 9, Marsy’s

Law1, which went into effect on November 5, 20082. Id. Defendant Martin Hoshimo was the

1“Marsy's Law, which was enacted by the voters in November 2008, was named after a young woman who

was murdered in 1983. According to the measure's uncodified findings and declarations, following the arrest of

Marsy's murderer, ‘Marsy's mother was shocked to meet him at a local supermarket’ after he was released on bail

without Marcy's family's receiving notice or opportunity to express opposition to his release. ‘Several years after his

conviction and sentence to ‘life in prison,’ the parole hearings for his release began. In the first parole hearing,

Marsy's mother suffered a heart attack fighting against his release. Since then Marsy's family has endured the trauma

of frequent parole hearings and constant anxiety that Marsy's killer would be released.’ The law was ‘written on

behalf of [Marsy's family], who were often treated as though they had no rights, and inspired by hundreds of

thousands of victims of crime who have experienced the additional pain and frustration of a criminal justice system

that too often fails to afford victims even the most basic of rights’.” In Re Vicks, — P.3d ----, 2013 WL 781496,

*3 (Cal. March 4, 2013)(citations omitted). 

2“As amended in 2008 by Marsy's Law, section 3041.5 establishes longer deferral periods following the denial

of parole than did the statute in 1983. The deferral periods range from a default period of 15 years to a minimum

of three years. More specifically, the next hearing is to occur in 15 years, ‘unless the board finds by clear and

convincing evidence that the criteria relevant to the setting of parole release dates ... are such that consideration of

the public and victim's safety does not require a more lengthy period of incarceration for the prisoner than 10

additional years.’ If the Board makes such a finding, the next hearing shall be in 10 years, unless the Board finds,

again by clear and convincing evidence and considering the same criteria and considerations, that a period of more

than seven years is not required. In that event, the next hearing shall be in three, five, or seven years. The Board

is required to ‘consider[ ] the views and interests of the victim’ before selecting the appropriate deferral period.” In

Re Vicks, — P.3d ----, 2013 WL 781496 at *4 (citations omitted). 

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Executive Director of the Board of Parole Hearings at the time of Plaintiff’s parole hearing. Id.

Plaintiff is seeking an injunction preventing Defendants “from imposing more than a 2 year

denial at [his] parole consideration hearings if [he] is found unsuitable for release,” court costs,

and “[d]eclaratory relief ordering the BPH to honor plea agreement deferral periods that are

annexed to the plea at the time of its formation and [to] conduct a new hearing to re-set [his]

deferral date not to exceed 2 years.” Id. at 5.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s FAC should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. MTD at 2. Specifically, Defendants explain that

Plaintiff’s claim cannot be litigated in this case because it is the same as the claim being raised

in a pending class action lawsuit, Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, et al., CIV-S-05-0830 LKK GGH3

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Id. at 2. Since “Plaintiff’s claims are subsumed by the class action[,] his FAC should be

dismissed.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ claims and argues that his “claims are ‘not’

covered by the claims in Gilman” and, as such, can be litigated here. Oppo at 1. Plaintiff

explains that he is relying on contract principles and the Due Process clause to require the Board

to comply with the terms of his written plea agreement, which required a parole review every

two years. FAC at 3-10; Oppo at 1-6. In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Due Process

claim also is without merit as the parole denial timeline was not a material aspect of the plea

agreement. Reply at 5-6.

A. LEGAL STANDARD 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. MTD at 2. Pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief ..." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "[T]he pleading standard Rule

3Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion and takes

judicial notice of the docket and records in Gilman v. Schwarzenneger, which is now pending in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of California, Case No. Civ. S 05–830–LKK (GGH). 

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8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The issue is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but whether

he has properly stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d

750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff must set forth

"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’" Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). If the facts alleged in the complaint are

"merely consistent with" the defendant’s liability, the plaintiff has not satisfied the plausibility

standard. Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, "[a] claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556).

When a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must be careful to construe the pleadings

liberally and to afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). This rule of liberal

construction is “particularly important” in civil rights cases. Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F. Supp. 2d

1058, 1063 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2007) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.

1992)); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that because “Iqbal

incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and Twombly did not alter the Court’s treatment

of pro se filings; accordingly we continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” This is particularly

important where the Petitioner is a pro se prisoner litigant in a civil rights matter). When giving

liberal construction to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court is not permitted to

“supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Easter v. CDC, 694 F.

Supp.2d 1177, 1183 (S.D. Cal. March 9, 2010) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

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(quoting Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268).

The court should allow a pro se plaintiff leave to amend his or her complaint "unless the

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334

F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, "before dismissing a pro

se complaint the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his

complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively." Wayne

v. Leal, 2009 WL 2406299, *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (quoting Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261).

B. PLAINTIFF’S EX POST FACTO CLAIM FALLS WITHIN THE GILMAN CLASS

ACTION

Plaintiff argues that because he agreed to a maximum two year parole deferral if he was

found unsuitable for parole when he accepted his plea bargain in 1983, the seven year deferral

that he was given after his last parole hearing due to Marsy’s law, violated the terms of his plea

agreement. FAC at 3. In support Plaintiff argues that his plea agreement constituted a binding

contract, the terms of which could not be unilaterally changed by the passing of Marsy’s law. 

Id. Plaintiff emphasizes that he is not challenging the fact that he was denied parole, but only

that he is entitled to a maximum wait of two years in between parole hearings. Id. Plaintiff

argues that his case should not be a part of the Gilman class action because his case concerns

his “plea-agreement contract” and does not concern “Board or Governor bias, nor reasons given

by Board or Governor to defer or delay parole, nor any of the other grounds used in Gilman.” 

Oppo at 1. Finally, Plaintiff states that “[t]he Gilman action does not address this singular focus. 

It does not deal with plea agreement and it does not address Plaintiff’s impairment of contract

issue. This makes Plaintiff’s case ‘unique’ and ‘different from’ the Gilman action.” Id. at 6

(emphasis in original). Defendants contend that the plaintiff class in the Gilman action “consists

of state prisoners who: (i) have been sentenced to a term that includes life; (ii) are serving

sentences that include the possibility of parole; (iii) are eligible for parole; and (iv) have been

denied parole on one or more occasions” and that Plaintiff fits squarely into this class. MTD at

3. Since Plaintiff has not been permitted to opt out of the class, his FAC should be dismissed. 

Id. at 4. 

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Although Plaintiff identifies only the Due Process clause as the constitutional basis for his

claim [FAC at 3], he repeatedly mentions the Ex Post Facto clause and relies upon its principles

for some of his arguments. FAC at 10; Oppo at 5-6. To the extent Plaintiff is asserting an Ex

Post Facto violation, his claim falls within the parameters of the Gilman action and, therefore,

should be dismissed. The plaintiffs in Gilman “are eight California life-term prisoners who

represent a class of similarly situated California prisoners. They allege that Proposition 9, the

‘Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy’s Law,’ which modifies the availability and frequency

of parole hearings, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.” Gilman

v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F. 3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Johnson v. Parole Bd., 2012

WL 3104867, *2 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2012) (finding that "an ex post facto challenge to the

frequency of hearings provisions of Marsy's Law, is currently at issue in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class

action ongoing in the Eastern District of California [Gilman v. Schwarzenegger], and Petitioner

is a member of that class and noting that "[a]lthough defendants in that matter have recently

been granted judgment on the pleadings as to several of the claims raised, the ex post facto

challenge to the application of Marsy's Law is proceeding); Aremu v. California Bd. Of Parole

Hearings, 2012 WL 3432291, *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010) (stating that "[a] class action pending

in this district, Gilman v. Davis, No. Civ. S–05–0830 LKK GGH,FN1 also challenges Proposition 9

as violating the Ex Post Facto and Due Process clauses”); and Reese v. Brazelton, 2013 WL

268703 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013) (same). In addition, Plaintiff “is serving a life-term maximum

sentence,” is eligible for parole, and has been denied parole on one or more occasions. Reply

at 4., FAC at 3.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Ex Post Facto claim be DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See Hall v. Martell, 2011 WL 7005465, at *8 (C.D. Cal. December 7,

2011) (dismissing petitioner's Proposition 9 ex post facto claim without prejudice in light of

Gilman class litigation), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 94331 (C.D. Cal. Jan.

9, 2012); Campbell v. Ochoa, 2011 WL 5436233, at *4–7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2011) (same), Report

and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5515486 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011); and Jung v.

Gonzalez, 2011 WL 4477328, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2011) (dismissing Proposition 9 ex post

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facto claim in part because petitioner was member of Gilman class and “[i]t is contrary to the

efficient and orderly administration of justice for a court to proceed with an action that would

possibly conflict with or interfere with the determination of relief in another pending action”).

C. PLAINTIFF’S DUE PROCESS CLAIM FAILS

Plaintiff also argues that his rights under the Due Process Clause were violated when the

Board chose not to conduct his parole reviews every two years as set forth in his written plea

agreement, which he argues is a binding contract. FAC at 3-10; Oppo at 1-6. In support,

Plaintiff argues that the laws that were in place at the time of his plea agreement concerning

parole deferral periods were incorporated into his plea agreement and cannot be changed by

subsequent laws without violating contract law and his Due Process rights. Id. In response,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a Due Process claim because the timing of the parole

hearing was not a material aspect of the plea agreement as it was not a negotiated term. Reply

at 5-6.

A criminal defendant has a due process right to enforce the terms of his plea agreement

and promises from the prosecution set forth in a plea agreement must be fulfilled if they are

significant inducements to enter into a plea. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262

(1971); see also Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2006). “The construction of

a state court plea agreement is a matter of state law, and federal courts will defer to a state

court's reasonable construction of a plea agreement.” Foster v. Harley, 2011 WL 2470510, *8

(E.D. Cal. June 20, 2011)(citing Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 6 n. 3 (1987); and Buckley, 441

F.3d at 695. “In California, ‘[a] negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is

interpreted according to general contract principles,’ and ‘according to the same rules as other

contracts.’” Buckley, 441 F.3d at 695 (quoting People v. Shelton, 37 Cal.4th 759, 767 (2006) and

People v. Toscano, 124 Cal. App.4th 340, 344 (2004). This means that first, the plain meaning

of the agreement’s language has to be considered and, if ambiguous, must be interpreted “by

ascertaining the objectively reasonable expectations of the promisee at the time the contract was

made.” Foster, 2011 WL 2470510 at *8 (citing Buckley, 441 F.3d at 695). Any remaining

ambiguity should be interpreted in favor of the criminal defendant. Id.

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Here, the documentation that Plaintiff has provided relating to his plea agreement does

not support his claim4

 and there is no transcript describing any advisements or colloquies that

Plaintiff likely received or participated in when entering his change of plea that support his claim. 

FAC at Exhibit 1; ECF No. 1. at Exhibit 1. The plea agreement shows that Plaintiff entered his

plea to "avoid potentially more serious consequences of life without the possibility of parole if

convicted," that Plaintiff's decision to change his plea to guilty was "made freely and voluntarily,

without threat or fear to him or to anyone closely related to or associated with him," and that

“he has not been induced to plead guilty by any promise or representation of a lesser sentence,

probation, reward, immunity or anything else.” Report and Recommendation, Exhibit 1. 

Nowhere in his complaint does Plaintiff allege that he accepted the plea agreement in exchange

for parole deferral periods of two years or less or that this alleged term was a significant

inducement to enter his plea and the plea agreement does not support such an assertion. 

Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261. Similarly, as the agreement shows and as Plaintiff acknowledges5,

the timing of his future parole deferral hearings was not included as a separate term of his plea

agreement. FAC at 3. Plaintiff does not allege that he was told or promised that the status of

parole hearing law at the time of his plea agreement would remain the same throughout his

incarceration and the plea agreement does not support such an allegation. FAC; Report and

Recommendation, Exhibit 1. Instead, Plaintiff merely repeats that the laws at the time of his

agreement were "fixed" and could not be changed. Id. at 3-10. That, however, is not a correct

statement of the law. While Courts recognize that in California, plea bargains are deemed to

incorporate and contemplate the existing law, Courts also recognize that plea bargains

incorporate “the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws.” Davis

v. Woodford, 446 F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir. 2006)(quoting People v. Gipson (In re Gipson), 117 Cal.

App.4th 1065, (2004)). Here, while the law on parole hearings at the time of Plaintiff’s

4The change of plea form attached to the FAC is completely blacked out and the change of plea form attached

to his original complaint is partially blacked out and very difficult to read. However, the Court obtained a legible copy

of the two page plea agreement from the state court and has used that copy to evaluate Plaintiff's claims. The legible

copy of the plea agreement is attached to this Report and Recommendation as Exhibit 1.

5Plaintiff states that it was his understanding that the laws concerning parole deferral hearings at the time

he entered his plea were "annexed" to the plea and were not written into the plea agreement. FAC at 3. 

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agreement was attached to his plea agreement, the state maintained its power to amend the

law, which it did by enacting Marsy’s law. 

Finally, Plaintiff does not cite to and the Court has not found any authority finding that

a Due Process violation arises when the parole Board defers parole hearings for more than the

period of time stated in the statutes in effect at the time of the guilty plea. See Williams v. Finn,

2011 WL 1342999, * 8 (E.D. Cal. April 7, 2011) (finding that Petitioner failed to cite any "federal

authority for the proposition that a due process violation automatically results if a state parole

board defers parole suitability hearings beyond a one year period or even beyond the time set

forth in state regulations" and noting that "[e]ven if the Board lacked authority under state

regulations to continue petitioner's next parole suitability hearing for three years, a violation of

state mandated procedures will constitute a due process violation only if the violation brings

about a fundamentally unfair result") (citing Asgari v. Cullen, 2010 WL 4916589, *4 (C.D. Cal.

Oct. 25, 2010) (because no case has held that a multi-year deferral by the Board is a violation

of federal due process rights, at best a challenge to a multi-year denial of parole alleges only a

violation of state law); and Edwards v. Curry, 2009 WL 1883739, *8 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2009)).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s due process claim be DISMISSED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

6

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation and (2)

GRANTING Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's FAC. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than April 19, 2013. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than May 10, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to

6The Court RECOMMENDS that the dismissal be without leave to amend because the Court does not find

that there are any facts or law that Plaintiff can plead in support of his Due Process claim.

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file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal

of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

DATED: March 22, 2013

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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EXHIBIT 1

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