Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02187/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02187-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Property Damage

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

IVY BRIDGE UNIVERSITY, LLC f/k/a 

Ivy Bridge College, LLC, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

HIGHER LEARNING COMMISSION, and 

Does 1 through 25, inclusive, 

 Defendants. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

Case No. 15-CV-02187-SC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

Now before the Court is Defendant Higher Learning Commission's 

("HLC") motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and 

improper venue. ECF No. 22 ("Mot."). In the alternative, HLC asks 

the Court to transfer venue to the Northern District of Illinois 

for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the 

interest of justice. Mot. at 15-21. The motion is fully briefed1

and suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant to 

Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's 

motion is GRANTED for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant's 

 

1

 ECF Nos. 33 ("Opp'n"), 34 ("Reply"). 

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 1 of 13
2 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

motion to dismiss for improper venue and motion to transfer venue 

are DENIED AS MOOT. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In 2007, Plaintiff Ivy Bridge, a California company, entered 

into a joint venture with Tiffin University, a 127-year-old 

accredited university based in Ohio, to create Ivy Bridge of 

Tiffin, an online degree program that integrated the faculty and 

coursework of Tiffin with an online environment created by Ivy 

Bridge. ECF No. 1 ("Compl.") ¶¶ 15-16. 

 Defendant HLC is an independent non-profit corporation 

recognized by the United States Department of Education as a 

regional accreditor. ECF No. 23 ("Lootens-White Decl.") ¶ 5. HLC 

accredits degree-granting post-secondary educational institutions, 

including Tiffin, in the North Central Region, which spans the 

following states: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, 

Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, 

North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia, 

Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. As Tiffin is located in Ohio, HLC is 

responsible for granting and renewing its accreditation. 

Importantly, however, HLC does not accredit any educational 

institutions that are based in California. Id. ¶ 7. Even so, some 

of its accredited institutions do have branch campuses in 

California that HLC visits on occasion. Id. ¶ 8. Between 2009 and 

2014, for example, HLC conducted approximately 40 site visits at 

branch campuses in California. Id. ¶ 9. 

 HLC conducts its accreditation work using "peer reviewers." 

These reviewers are comprised of volunteers from various member 

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 2 of 13
3 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

universities. The reviewers responsible for the actions at issue 

in this litigation are located at universities in Wisconsin, 

Indiana, West Virginia, Arizona, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Illinois. 

Id. ¶ 13. 

 When HLC conducted its ten year review of Tiffin in 2010, it 

praised Tiffin's partnership with Ivy Bridge, calling Ivy Bridge of 

Tiffin "an excellent strategic initiative." Compl. at 4. It was 

also at this time that Ivy Bridge disclosed to HLC that it would 

eventually request independent accreditation for Ivy Bridge of 

Tiffin as opposed to being accredited as a branch campus of Tiffin. 

 In early 2012, HLC required Tiffin to undergo a "change of 

control" review of Ivy Bridge of Tiffin, citing the fact that Ivy 

Bridge and Tiffin intended to eventually seek independent 

accreditation for the online program. Id. ¶ 23. After completing 

the review, HLC issued a very negative report regarding the Ivy 

Bridge Partnership.2 Id. ¶ 27. In response, Ivy Bridge and Tiffin 

agreed to abandon the plan to seek independent accreditation and to 

continue as a branch campus of Tiffin. Id. ¶ 30. HLC, however, 

rejected that plan and, according to Plaintiff, "threatened Tiffin 

with sanctions if it did not completely sever its ties with Ivy 

Bridge. . . . If Tiffin refused, then Tiffin itself faced the 

prospect of losing its accreditation." Id. ¶ 31. As a result, 

Plaintiff alleges that HLC forced Tiffin to break its agreements 

with Ivy Bridge and shutter the joint venture. Id. ¶ 32. 

/// 

 

2

 Plaintiff alleges that the negative review was a result of HLC 

"getting political pressure to punish any non-traditional form of 

higher education." Id. ¶ 29.

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 3 of 13
4 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

 Subsequently, Plaintiff claims that it sought to partner with 

Concordia University and Ohio Christian University. Id. ¶ 33. 

However, both schools, according to Plaintiff, were threatened by 

HLC with sanctions if they partnered with Ivy Bridge. Id. ¶ 33. 

As a result, Plaintiff claims that it was unable to continue as a 

business. Id. ¶ 35. 

 On May 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed its Complaint in this matter, 

alleging five claims for relief. Its first claim for relief 

alleges that HLC intentionally interfered with Tiffin's contract 

with Ivy Bridge. Its second claim for relief alleges that HLC 

intentionally interfered with Ivy Bridge's prospective business 

interests with Concordia University and Ohio Christian University. 

Its third claim for relief alleges that HLC negligently interfered 

with its prospective business interests with Tiffin. Its fourth 

claim for relief alleges that HLC induced Tiffin to breach its 

contract with Ivy Bridge. Finally, its fifth claim for relief 

alleges unfair competition under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et 

seq.. 

 In the instant motion, HLC moves the court under Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) for an order dismissing 

the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. 

Alternatively, HLC moves for an order transferring this action to 

the Northern District of Illinois on the grounds of forum non 

conveniens. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 A motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is 

governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), and a district court's 

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 4 of 13
5 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

determination whether to exercise personal jurisdiction is a 

question of law. Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 

F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002). "Where a defendant moves to 

dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, the 

plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is 

appropriate." Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 

797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Dole Food, Inc. V. Watts, 303 

F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002). Where, as here, the motion is 

based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, "the 

plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional 

facts." Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). A 

"prima facie" showing means that the plaintiff has produced 

admissible evidence which, if believed, would be sufficient to 

establish the existence of personal jurisdiction. See Harris 

Rutsky & Co. Ins. Services, Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 

1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003); Caruth v. International 

Psychoanalytical Ass'n, 59 F.3d 126, 128 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff's complaint must be 

taken as true. AT & T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 

588 (9th Cir. 1996). Although the plaintiff cannot simply rest on 

the bare allegations of the complaint, conflicts between parties 

over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the 

plaintiff's favor. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800. 

 Where, as here, there is no federal statute governing personal 

jurisdiction, the law of the state in which the Court sits applies. 

CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th 

Cir. 2011); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 

(9th Cir. 1998). California's long-arm statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 5 of 13
6 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

Code § 410.10, "is coextensive with federal due process 

requirements, [so] the jurisdictional analyses under state law and 

federal due process are the same." Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 

800–01. Federal due process requires that a nonresident defendant 

have "certain minimum contacts" with the forum state of such a 

nature that the exercise of personal jurisdiction "does not offend 

'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" 

International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of 

Unemployment Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) 

(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). This 

constitutional test may be satisfied by showing that (1) the 

defendant has "substantial" or "continuous and systematic" contacts 

with the forum state -- i.e., "general jurisdiction," -- or (2) 

there is a strong relationship between the defendant's forum 

contacts and the cause of action -- i.e., "specific jurisdiction." 

Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 839 (9th 

Cir. 1986). See also Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 

473 (9th Cir. 1995). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. General Jurisdiction 

 As the Supreme Court held in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 

only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will 

render a defendant amenable to all-purpose [i.e., 

general] jurisdiction there. For an individual, the 

paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction 

is the individual's domicile; for a corporation, it is an 

equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly 

regarded as at home. . . . With respect to a corporation, 

the place of incorporation and principal place of 

business are paradigm . . . bases for general 

jurisdiction. . . . These bases afford plaintiffs 

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 6 of 13
7 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in which 

a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all claims. 

134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (citations omitted). 

 The standard for establishing general jurisdiction outside of 

a defendant corporation's place of incorporation or principal place 

of business is "fairly high . . . and requires that the defendant's 

contacts be of the sort that approximate physical presence." 

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 

(9th Cir. 2000). "Factors to be taken into consideration are 

whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business 

in the state, serves the state's markets, designates an agent for 

service of process, holds a license, or is incorporated there." 

Id. 

 Here, neither HLC's place of incorporation nor its principal 

place of business are in California. While general jurisdiction 

can theoretically be established in other forums, it would require 

"affiliations . . . so continuous and systematic as to render [HLC] 

essentially at home." Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 760-61 (citations 

omitted). As explained below, HLC's activities in California 

plainly do not approach that level. 

 HLC has no offices or staff in California, is not registered 

to do business in the state, has no registered agent for service of 

process in the state, and pays no California state taxes. Further, 

HLC is not regulated by any California agency; none of its officers 

or directors are domiciled in California; and it does not conduct 

any corporate affairs in the state. Importantly, HLC does not 

accredit any schools that have main campuses in California. 

Although its volunteer reviewers from other universities 

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 7 of 13
8 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

occasionally visit branch campuses in California to verify that the 

locations exist and appear to be reasonable facilities in which to 

host classes, these occasional visits -- only 40 from 2009 to 2014 

-- do not "render [HLC] essentially at home" in California. Id. at 

760-61. 

 Accordingly, Ivy Bridge has failed to establish general 

jurisdiction over HLC. The Court now turns to whether Ivy Bridge 

can establish personal jurisdiction by means of specific 

jurisdiction. 

B. Specific Jurisdiction 

 A defendant who is not "at home" in the forum state and thus 

subject to general jurisdiction may still be subject to "specific" 

jurisdiction on claims related to its activities or contacts there. 

See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1121, n.6 (2014); 

International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. The Ninth Circuit employs a 

three-part test to assess whether a defendant has sufficient 

contacts with the forum state to be subject to specific personal 

jurisdiction: 

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct 

his activities or consummate some transaction with the 

forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which 

he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of 

conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the 

benefits and protections of its laws; 

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates 

to the defendant's forum-related activities; and 

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair 

play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be 

reasonable. 

Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211-12 (9th Cir. March 19, 2015). 

"The plaintiff has the burden of proving the first two prongs. If 

he does so, the burden shifts to the defendant to set forth a 

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 8 of 13
9 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be 

reasonable." Id. 

1. Purposeful Direction 

 As to the first prong, the Ninth Circuit applies a "three-part 

effects test" -- also called the "purposeful direction test" -- 

for claims sounding in tort "and look[s] to evidence that the 

defendant has directed its actions at the forum state, even if 

those actions took place elsewhere." Id. A defendant has 

purposefully directed its activities at the forum if it 

(1) committed an intentional act, 

(2) expressly aimed at the forum state, 

(3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be 

suffered in the forum state. 

 

Id. at 1214. In applying this test, a court "must 'look[ ] to the 

defendant's contacts with the forum State itself, not the 

defendant's contacts with persons who reside there.' Thus, a 'mere 

injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the 

forum.'" Id. (quoting Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1122). 

 As to the first prong of the effects test, the meaning of the 

term "intentional act" is essentially the same as in the context of 

intentional torts: "the defendant must act with the 'intent to 

perform an actual, physical act in the real world.'" Id. (quoting 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806). Here, Plaintiff satisfies the 

first prong of the effects test because it alleges intentional 

interference with a contract and prospective business interests. 

 The parties dispute whether the alleged acts caused harm that 

HLC knew was likely to be suffered in California. HLC claims that 

Ivy Bridge told it that it was based in Ohio. Ivy Bridge claims 

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 9 of 13
10 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

that HLC was aware that it was based in California. The Court need 

not resolve this dispute, however, because Ivy Bridge clearly 

cannot satisfy the second prong -- that HLC's alleged tortious acts 

were expressly aimed at California. 

 The second prong of the effects test, "express aiming," asks 

whether the defendant's allegedly tortious action "was expressly 

aimed at the forum." Id. at 1214. "The exact form of [the] 

analysis varies from case to case and depends, to a significant 

degree, on the specific type of tort or other wrongful conduct at 

issue." Id. 

 Ivy Bridge argues that "the defendant needs simply to have 

aimed its conduct at a known California resident." Opp'n at 8. 

Not so. In Walden, the Supreme Court held that personal 

jurisdiction analysis must focus on the defendant's contacts with 

the forum state, not the defendant's contacts with a resident of 

the forum. 134 S.Ct. at 1122; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 

v. Woodson, 44 US 286, 297 (1980) (holding that foreseeability of 

causing injury in the forum state is not enough by itself; rather, 

"the foreseeability that is critical . . . is that the defendant's 

conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should 

reasonably anticipate being haled into court there"). The Walden 

Court further found that there was not jurisdictionally sufficient 

contact where the plaintiff's injury was not "tethered to [the 

forum state] in any meaningful way" such that the plaintiff would 

have experienced the same injury regardless of where he lived or 

traveled. Id. at 1125. 

 Applying the principles of Walden and Picot, it is clear that 

HLC's allegedly tortious actions were not expressly aimed at 

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 10 of 13
11 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

California such that specific jurisdiction would be appropriate. 

The acts in question -- conducting accrediting activities at Tiffin 

and allegedly threatening to withdraw Tiffin's accreditation -- 

were conducted entirely in Illinois and Ohio, without entering 

California. Further, Ivy Bridge's alleged injury was not tied to 

California, as it would have occurred in any state in which Ivy 

Bridge chose to locate itself and conduct business. See id. at 

1125. 

 In sum, HLC's actions were not purposefully directed at 

California because they were not expressly aimed at California. As 

a result, Ivy Bridge has failed to make a prima facie showing of 

specific personal jurisdiction over HLC. Although this alone is 

sufficient to defeat specific jurisdiction, the Court addresses the 

second prong of the test for specific jurisdiction below. 

2. Arising Out Of Forum-Related Activities 

 "The Ninth Circuit applies a 'but-for' test to determine 

whether a particular claim arises out of or is related to forumrelated activities." BenQ Am. Corp. v. Forward Elecs. Co., Civ. A. 

No. 05-2409, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 38648, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 

2005) (citing Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 

1995)). Thus, Ivy Bridge must show that it would not have been 

injured "but for" HLC's contacts with California. See Glencore 

Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 

1123 (9th Cir. 2002); see also In re Wireless Facilities, Inc. 

Derivative Litig., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2008) 

(granting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 

where two defendants' visits to California were not causally 

related to the allegations). 

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 11 of 13
12 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

 From 2009 to 2014, HLC's volunteer reviewers from outside 

California made approximately 40 visits to CAlifornia to branch 

campuses of non-California-based universities. But for these 

visits, however, the claims against HLC in this case would still 

have arisen. HLC's alleged tortious conduct took place in Ohio 

where Tiffin was located and where HLC conducted various peer 

review visits, and in Illinois, where HLC's offices are located and 

where its decisions were made. Indeed, HLC's contacts with 

California (relating to its evaluation of branch campuses) have 

nothing to do with Ivy Bridge's claims. Thus, Ivy Bridge cannot 

show that it would not have been injured "but for" HLC's alleged 

contacts with California. 

 Plaintiff claims that its allegations pass the "but for" test 

because "[b]ut for all the various wrongful acts that Defendant 

aimed at Ivy Bridge, a known California resident, the claims in 

this suit would not have arisen." Mot. at 11. That is not the 

test. If it were, specific jurisdiction would turn solely on 

whether the Plaintiff is a resident of the forum state. 

 For these reasons, HLC's allegedly tortious conduct did not 

arise out of HLC's California-related activities. Thus, even if 

Ivy Bridge had carried its burden of establishing purposeful 

direction, it would nevertheless fail the second prong of the 

effects test. 

 In sum, Ivy Bridge has failed to make a prima facie showing of 

specific personal jurisdiction over HLC for two independent 

reasons: (1) HLC's allegedly tortious conduct was not purposefully 

directed at California, and (2) Ivy Bridge's claims did not arise 

out of HLC's California-related activities. Because Ivy Bridge has 

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 12 of 13
13 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

failed to carry its burden on the first two prongs, the burden has 

not shifted to HLC to establish that the forum is unreasonable. 

The Court therefore need not address it. Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS HLC's motion to dismiss for lack of specific jurisdiction. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the forgoing reasons, Defendant's 12(b)(2) motion to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. Defendant's 

motion to dismiss for improper venue and motion to transfer venue 

is DENIED AS MOOT. 

 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 Dated: October __, 2015 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

28

Case 3:15-cv-02187-SC Document 37 Filed 10/28/15 Page 13 of 13