Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02113/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02113-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISRAEL VARGAS CEJA,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-2113 LKK JFM P 

vs.

DAVE RUNNELS, Warden, et al.,,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with an application for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2000 conviction

on charges of engaging in three or more acts of lewd conduct upon a child under fourteen years

of age, twenty counts of forcible rape, one count of assault with a firearm, one felony count of

abusing or endangering the health of a child, with personal use of a firearm, and two

misdemeanor counts of abusing and endangering the health of a child. Petitioner was sentenced

to one hundred thirty-nine years in state prison. (CT 524.) Petitioner raises two claims in his

petition, filed October 7, 2003, that his prison sentence violates the Constitution. 

/////

/////

Case 2:03-cv-02113-LKK -JFM Document 7 Filed 05/18/07 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 1

Appellate District in People v. Ceja, No. C036920 (April 15, 2002), a copy of which is attached

as Exhibit C to Respondent’s Answer, filed March 4, 2004.

2

FACTS1

Monica E.G.C. met [petitioner] while she was working as a

prostitute. They later became boyfriend and girlfriend and began to

live together in 1992 with her two sons. Monica married

[petitioner] in 1997.

The victim R., was Monica’s child and was born in 1983. She had

been temporarily removed from Monica’s custody because of a

prior incident of molestation by Monica’s former fiancée. The

victim was reunited with Monica.

During the time Monica, [petitioner], the victim and her brothers

lived together, [petitioner] bathed the children. At the time, the

victim was eight years old, and her brothers were four and three. 

When [petitioner] bathed the victim, he would wash her vagina

with his fingers and took longer in that area than necessary. This

made the victim uncomfortable. She would pull away, and

[petitioner] would tell her it was “okay” and he was not doing

anything wrong. After about eight months, Monica asked

[petitioner] to stop bathing the children because the victim told her

mother the victim felt uncomfortable with [petitioner] bathing her

and the victim did not want him to do it anymore. [Petitioner]

complied with her request.

In 1994, Monica was hospitalized for two weeks. During the time

she was in the hospital, the [petitioner] took care of the children. 

During this period, [petitioner] asked the victim to help him find

something on the top shelf of a closet. [Petitioner] lifted the victim

up high to look for about a minute and a half. After she said she

could not find the object, [petitioner] put the victim on the ground

and climbed on top of her. [Petitioner] touched the victim all over

(including her vaginal area) and was moving on the victim like

they were having intercourse.

We omit the facts of [petitioner’s] remaining crimes as they are not

relevant to the issues on appeal. Generally, [petitioner] forced the

victim to have sexual intercourse with him after she turned 14. 

[Petitioner] impregnated the victim and tried to get her to miscarry

by forcing her to jump off a truck ramp to induce a miscarriage

(after she rejected his request that she jump off the roof). The

other charges arise out of an altercation during which [petitioner]

pulled out a gun and tried to shoot the victim in front of her

younger brothers.

When he was arrested, [petitioner] admitted to police officers he

Case 2:03-cv-02113-LKK -JFM Document 7 Filed 05/18/07 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

had sex with the victim. [Petitioner] also admitted he had touched

the victim’s vagina while he was washing her in the bath.

At trial, [petitioner] denied he picked up the victim to look in his

closet, or laid down on top of her afterwards. He admitted he

washed the victim’s private parts with his bare hand. He also

admitted to having had sex with the victim in February 1999. He

claimed this was the first time they ever had sex and denied forcing

the victim to have sex. He claimed to have had sex with the victim

a total of five to ten times. The [petitioner] denied pulling a gun on

the victim.

(People v. Ceja, slip op. at 2-4.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

Case 2:03-cv-02113-LKK -JFM Document 7 Filed 05/18/07 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 “The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all times during their deliberations,

2

conduct themselves as required by these instructions. Accordingly, should it occur that any juror

refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on

penalty or punishment, or any other improper basis, it is the obligation of other jurors to

immediately advise the court of the situation.

4

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Claim One

Petitioner’s first claim is that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court used

CALJIC No. 17.41.1. 

2

The last reasoned rejection of this claim is the decision of the California Court of

Appeal for the Third Appellate District on petitioner’s direct appeal. The state court rejected this

claim as follows:

Even assuming for the sake of argument that giving CALJIC No.

17.41.1 is federal constitutional error, it is not reversible per se;

rather, it is subject to harmless error analysis under the standard of

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. (People v. Molina

(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1335-1336 (review den. Nov. 29,

2000, S091788) (Molina).)

There is nothing in this record indicating [petitioner] was

prejudiced by the giving of CALJIC No. 17.41.1. In this case, as in

Molina, the jury deliberated only briefly. In Molina, deliberations

lasted less than an hour. (Molina, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p.

1336.) Here, after a trial during which three days of testimony was

presented, and in which the jury was asked to consider 28 counts,

the jury deliberated for a little longer than a day – from sometime

after 1:20 p.m. until the end of the day on September 27, all day

September 28 and returned unanimous verdicts on all the charges

Case 2:03-cv-02113-LKK -JFM Document 7 Filed 05/18/07 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

at 10:15 a.m. on September 29. None of the communications from

the jury to the court suggested a problem related to this jury

instruction. The jury sent no notes or questions to the court

indicating deadlock, holdout jurors, or problems of any kind in

deliberations. The record thus discloses no problems in the jury’s

deliberations.

“We will not infer that the jury instruction had any impact

prejudicing [petitioner].” We reject [petitioner’s] speculative

assumption that the instruction had a chilling effect on the jurors’

deliberations, inhibiting the kind of free expression and interaction

among jurors that is so important to the deliberative process. 

There is no warrant for that view on this record.” (Molina, supra,

82 Cal.4th at p. 1336.) Similarly, here, even assuming for the sake

of argument that instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1 was

error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

(People v. Ceja, slip op. at 9-10.)

In Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2004), the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there is no decision of the United States Supreme Court

establishing “that an instruction such as CALJIC 17.41.1 violates an existing constitutional

right.” Petitioner’s claim is foreclosed by the decision in Brewer and should be denied

B. Second Claim 

Petitioner’s second claim is that because the trial court refused to give a pinpoint

jury instruction on the theory of non-offensive touching, he was denied his right to a jury trial

and due process. Petitioner requested the following pinpoint jury instruction:

Whether the touching alleged in Counts 1 through 4, inclusive, is

lewd or lascivious and ‘lewdly’ performed depends upon the

sexual motivation and intent with which it is committed.

Inadvertent or casual non-offensive touching that is

unaccompanied by direct or circumstantial evidence of an intent to

arouse, appeal to, or gratify either the lusts, passions or sexual

desires of the [petitioner] or the child are insufficient to qualify as a

lewd and lascivious touching. If you have a reasonable doubt as to

whether Counts 1 through 4, inclusive, were committed with the

required sexual motivation and intent, you must resolve that doubt

in favor of the [petitioner] and return a verdict of not guilty.”

(People v. Ceja, slip op. at 4-5.)

/////

Case 2:03-cv-02113-LKK -JFM Document 7 Filed 05/18/07 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

The last reasoned rejection of this claim is the decision of the California Court of

Appeal for the Third Appellate District on petitioner’s direct appeal. The state court rejected this

claim as follows:

The trial court has a duty to instruct on the general principles of

law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Earp

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 885.) Upon request, a trial court must give

jury instructions that pinpoint the theory of the defense. (Id. at p.

886.) However, a trial court need not give special instructions,

even if legally correct, if they are duplicative of other properly

given instructions. (Id. at p. 901; People v. Jones (1998) 17

Cal.4th 279, 314.)

Here, the court properly instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos.

2.90, 3.31, and 10.42.6 which fully advised the jury as to the issues

contained in [petitioner’s] proposed instruction.

As given by the trial court, CALJIC No. 2.90 provides: “A

defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the

contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his

guilt is satisfactorily shown he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. 

This presumption places upon the People the burden of proving

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] Reasonable doubt is

defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt because

everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or

imaginary doubt. Reasonable doubt is that state of the case, which

after the entire . . . comparison and consideration of all the

evidence leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition they

cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the

charge.”

The court also read the jury CALJIC No. 3.31 as follows:

“In the crimes charged in Court One, engaging in three or more

acts of lewd of [sic] lascivious conduct upon a child under 14, . . . ,

there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct along

with a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator. Unless

this specific intent exists, the crime to which it relates is not

committed. [¶] The specific intent required is included in the

definitions of the crimes, and I’ll get to those in just a moment.”

Finally, the court read CALJIC No. 10.42.6 to the jury: “Mr. Ceja

is accused in Count One of the crime of continuous sexual abuse of

a child in violation of [section] 288.5, subdivision (a) of the Penal

Code. [¶] Every person who either resides in the same home with

a minor child or has recurring access to a child, who over a period

of time, not less than three months in duration, engages in three or

more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under the age

of 14 years at the time of the commission of the offense is guilty of

the crime of continuous sexual abuse of a child, which is a

Case 2:03-cv-02113-LKK -JFM Document 7 Filed 05/18/07 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

violation of Section 288.5. [¶] A ‘lewd or lascivious act’ means

any touching of the body of a child under the age of 14 with a

specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the sexual desires of

either party. To constitute a lewd or lascivious act, it is not

necessary that the bare skin be touched. The touching may be

through the clothing of the child. [¶] The law does not require that

the lust, passions, or sexual desires of either such persons be

actually aroused, appealed to, or gratified. It is no defense to this

charge that the child under the age of 14 years may have consented

to the lewd or lascivious conduct. [¶] In order to prove this crime,

each of the following elements must be proved: [¶] 1. A person

was a resident in the same house with a minor child; and [¶] 2. 

That person over a period of time, not less than three months in

duration, engaged in three or more acts of lewd or lascivious

conduct with the child under the age of 14 years at the time of the

commission of the lewd conduct. [¶] Evidence has been

introduced for the purpose of showing that there are more than

three acts of lewd or lascivious conduct upon which a conviction in

Count One may be based. [Petitioner] may be found guilty if the

proof shows beyond a reasonable doubt and you unanimously agree

that the [petitioner] committed three of these acts. It is not

necessary that you unanimously agree on which acts constitute the

required number.”

Taken together, these instructions given completely covered the

ground of the proposed pinpoint instruction. These instructions

informed the jury the lewd and lascivious conduct required a

simultaneous “specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the

sexual desires of either party.” These instructions listed each of the

elements of the crime and placed the burden of proof for all of the

elements of the crime on the prosecution and required proof of

each element, including the intent element, beyond a reasonable

doubt. If the jury had a reasonable doubt as to any element it was

required to find the [petitioner] not guilty. The court was not

required to give [petitioner’s] proposed duplicative instructions.

(People v. Ceja, slip op. at 5-8.)

In general, a challenge to jury instructions does not state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to

warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot be merely ‘undesirable,

erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due process right

guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir.

1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail on such a claim

Case 2:03-cv-02113-LKK -JFM Document 7 Filed 05/18/07 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

petitioner must demonstrate that the “ailing instruction . . . so infected the entire trial that the

resulting conviction violates due process.’” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004)

(quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)). In making its determination, this court

must evaluate the challenged jury instructions “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as

a component of the entire trial process.’” Prantil, 843 F. 2d at 317 (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730

F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1984)). See also Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437. Where, as here, the

challenge is to a refusal or failure to give an instruction, the petitioner’s burden is “especially

heavy,” because “[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than

a misstatement of the law.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). See also Villafuerte

v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Petitioner has failed to sustain his “heavy burden” of demonstrating a miscarriage

of justice based upon the trial court’s failure to give the requested pinpoint instruction. The state

court found that the trial court properly instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos. 2.90, 3.31 and

10.42.6 which fully advised the jury of the elements of the crimes, including those pinpointed by

petitioner’s proposed instruction. That state court ruling was neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. Moreover, a review of the record reflects

that petitioner’s trial counsel was able to fully develop petitioner’s theory of the defense that the

prosecution must find petitioner had the specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the sexual

desires of either party. Counsel argued this theory extensively to the jury in his closing

argument. (RT at 827-34; 836.) CALJIC Instruction Nos. 2.90, 3.31, and 10.42.6, along with the

evidence produced at trial, provided a basis for petitioner to argue that the prosecution failed to

prove specific intent. The lack of a pinpoint instruction did not prevent petitioner from

presenting his theory of defense or otherwise render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

For the foregoing reason, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

Case 2:03-cv-02113-LKK -JFM Document 7 Filed 05/18/07 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 17, 2007.

001;ceja2113.157

Case 2:03-cv-02113-LKK -JFM Document 7 Filed 05/18/07 Page 9 of 9