Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00991/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00991-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

14 RICARDO GARCIA-VASQUEZ, 

15 Movant, 

16 v. 

17 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

18 Respondent. 

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Case No.: 16CV0991-BEN 

15CR0217-BEN 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR 

CORRECT A SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

20 Movant, RICARDO GARCIA-VASQUEZ, proceeding pro se, filed a Motion to 

21 Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Respondent, 

22 the United States of America, filed a response and Movant filed a Traverse. The motion 

23 is denied. 

24 BACKGROUND 

25 On January 29, 2015, the Government filed a one-count information charging 

26 Movant with violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b), Removed Alien Found in the 

27 United States. Movant entered into a plea agreement with the government, in which he 

28 waived, to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to collaterally attack the 

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1 conviction and sentence. Movant thereafter pleaded guilty and came before this Court for 

2 sentencing. The Court sentenced Movant to 37 months in custody and a term of 

3 supervised release of three years. 

4 By his motion, Movant essentially argues that he is entitled to a reduced sentence 

5 pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 

6 (2015). 

7 LEGAL STANDARD 

8 Under§ 2255, a movant is entitled to relief if the sentence: (1) was imposed in 

9 violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States; (2) was given by a court 

10 without jurisdiction to do so; (3) was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by 

11 law; or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. 

12 Speelman, 431 F.3d 1226, 1230 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005). If it is clear the movant has failed to 

13 state a claim, or has "no more than conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts and 

14 refuted by the record," a district court may deny a§ 2255 motion without an evidentiary 

15 hearing. United States v. Quan, 789 F.2d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Where a prisoner's 

16 motion presents no more than conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts and refuted by 

17 the record, an evidentiary hearing is not required."). Here, none is needed. 

18 DISCUSSION 

19 Because Movant is a deported alien no longer in custody, and for which no 

20 sentencing relief is now possible, the motion is moot. Cf, United States v. Castro21 Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065, 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Finally, once the 

22 Defendant was removed from the country ... any attempt to correct the [sentencing] 

23 error likely would have been denied as moot .... As long as Defendant was in Mexico, 

24 the imposition of probation, albeit illegal, was moot and the case or controversy 

25 requirement could not have been satisfied where, as here, the Defendant does not 

26 continue to suffer actual collateral consequences.") (citations omitted); Abdala v. INS, 

27 488 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[W]here the grounds for habeas relief will not 

28 redress collateral consequences, a habeas petition does not continue to present a live 

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1 controversy once the petitioner is released from custody. For example, a petitioner 

2 subject to the collateral consequences of a ten-year bar to reentry did not present a 

3 cognizable claim where the petitioner was also permanently barred from reentry on a 

4 wholly separate ground."). Here, Movant was already subject to a lifetime bar of reentry 

5 by virtue of his previous deportations. No change in his sentence now would afford any 

6 relief. 

7 If the motion were not moot, it would fail because Movant validly waived his right 

8 to collaterally attack his sentence. Courts enforce plea agreements containing knowing 

9 and voluntary waivers of statutory rights of appeal or collateral attack because such 

10 "waivers usefully preserve the finality of judgments and sentences imposed pursuant to 

11 valid plea agreements." United States v. Anglin, 215 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000); 

12 United States v. Lo, 839 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2016) ("We will enforce a valid waiver even 

13 ifthe claims that could have been made on appeal absent that waiver appear meritorious, 

14 because the whole point of a waiver is the relinquishment of claims regardless of their 

15 merit."); United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2000) (courts enforce a 

16 waiver of appeal, as long as the waiver is knowingly and voluntary and encompasses the 

17 defendant's right to appeal on the grounds claimed on appeal). The Ninth Circuit 

18 recognizes that strong public policy considerations justify the enforcement of a 

19 defendant's waiver of his right to appeal or to collaterally attack a judgment. United 

20 States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990). Waivers play an important 

21 role in the plea bargaining process and help ensure finality. Id. at 322. The finality of 

22 judgments benefits both the government and the courts. Id. In exchange for the 

23 defendant's guilty plea and waiver of rights to appeal and collaterally attack, the 

24 government and the courts need not spend resources on litigation after the sentencing. Id. 

25 The defendant gets a lower sentencing recommendation and the court is more willing to 

26 agree to a lower sentence than would be the case absent the waivers. "Collateral attack 

27 pursuant to a statutory provision is also subject to a knowing and voluntary waiver." 

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1 United States v. Leniear, 574 F.3d 668, 672 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abarca, 

2 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993). 

3 Here, the Plea Agreement provides that Movant expressly waived, to the full extent 

4 of the law, any right to appeal or to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence, except 

5 a post-conviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

6 unless the Court imposes a custodial sentence above the high end of the guideline range 

7 recommended by the Government pursuant to this agreement at the time of sentencing. 

8 The Court imposed a sentence within the guideline range recommended by the 

9 Government. Under the plain language of the Plea Agreement, Movant waived his right 

10 to collaterally attack his sentence. In addition, Movant entered into the waiver knowingly 

11 and voluntarily. The waiver is clearly stated in the Plea Agreement. In the Plea 

12 Agreement, Movant certified that he knowingly and voluntarily entered into the Plea 

13 Agreement, read it, discussed its terms with his attorney, and fully understood its 

14 meaning and effect. This Court advised Movant of the rights he was giving up by 

15 pleading guilty. Movant affirmed that he had discussed the Plea Agreement with his 

16 attorneys, understood it, and did not have any questions. Finally, at the conclusion of 

17 sentencing, Movant and his attorney both acknowledged verbally that Movant had given 

18 up his right to collaterally attack. Accordingly, Movant' s waiver was valid and will be 

19 enforced. 

20 Additionally, contrary to his contentions, Movant's sentence was not 

21 unconstitutionally enhanced under Johnson. In Johnson, the Supreme Court considered 

22 language in the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"). The ACCA imposes a 

23 mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for a defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 

24 922(g) and "has three previous convictions by any court ... for a violent felony or 

25 serious drug offense, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l). The Supreme Court examined the 

26 definition of"violent felony" and held that a portion of that definition known as the 

27 "residual clause" is void for vagueness. Imposing an increased sentence under the 

28 residual clause of the ACCA's definition of"violent felony" violates the Constitution's 

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1 guarantee of due process. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The Supreme Court expressly 

2 confined its holding to this particular portion of the statute and confirmed that its holding 

3 does not apply to the "serious drug offense" clause or the remainder of the "violent 

4 felony" definition. Id. 

5 Johnson is inapplicable here because Movant was not sentenced under the residual 

6 clause of the violent felony definition of the ACCA. See United States v. Ruiz-Diaz, 668 

7 F. App'x 289, 290 (9th Cir. 2016) ("Because the [sentencing] enhancement was not 

8 predicated on a residual clause like the one struck down in Johnson, there is no arguable 

9 issue as to whether [defendant's] sentence is illegal."). Rather, he was sentenced 

10 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which was not implicated by Johnson. See United States v. 

11 Padilla, Case No. 2:10CR-00454-CAS, 2017 WL 962756, at *3, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

12 35650, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2017) (finding Johnson inapplicable to petitioner's § 

13 2255 petition because petitioner's "sentence was not based upon any guidelines that 

14 might have been implicated by Johnson."). Movant's motion may be construed as 

15 challenging the Sentencing Guidelines as unconstitutionally vague based on the same 

16 reasoning as Johnson. However, the Supreme Court rejected that argument in Beckles v. 

17 United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), holding that the federal Sentencing Guidelines are 

18 not subject to vagueness challenges under the due process clause. Id. at 890, 892, 895. 

19 As there are no arguable grounds to collaterally attack Movant's sentence as 

20 illegal, the Court enforces the collateral attack waiver. Ruiz-Diaz, 668 F. App'x at 290 

21 (citing United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2009)). Alternatively, 

22 Movant's motion is denied on the merits. 

23 CONCLUSION 

24 The Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence is DENIED. 

25 A court may issue a certificate of appealability where the movant has made a 

26 "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," and reasonable jurists could 

27 debate whether the motion should have been resolved differently, or that the issues 

28 presented deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

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1 322, 335 (2003). This Court finds that Movant has not made the necessary showing. A 

2 certificate of appealability is therefore DENIED. 

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