Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01675/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01675-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARIA GUADALUPE RODELO, an 

individual, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF TULARE, a municipality; 

COUNTY OF TULARE, a municipality; 

and DOES 1-10, 

Defendants. 

No. 1:15-cv-01675-KJM-BAM 

ORDER 

This action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises out of the arrest and subsequent 

detention of plaintiff Maria Guadalupe Rodelo by Tulare Police Department officers on May 20, 

2015. Before the court is defendant City of Tulare’s (“City”) motion to dismiss the complaint 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 17. Plaintiff opposed the motion, ECF 

No. 20, and City replied, ECF No. 24. The court submitted the matter pursuant to Local Rule 

230(g). As explained below, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 

municipal liability claims against City. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Allegations Against Does 1-10 

On November 4, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint, which makes the following 

allegations. On May 20, 2015, plaintiff was pulled over by a Tulare Police Department officer for 

operating her vehicle while talking on her cell phone. Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 1. The officer 

instructed plaintiff to step outside of her vehicle and proceeded to handcuff and arrest plaintiff. 

Id. ¶¶ 18–19. The officer told plaintiff she was being arrested because there were outstanding 

felony and misdemeanor warrants for her arrest. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff explained to the officer that 

she had never been in trouble with the law, but the officer placed her in the back seat of a patrol 

vehicle and drove her to the police station. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. 

Plaintiff was then detained at the Bob Wiley Detention Facility for three days. Id. 

¶¶ 2–3, 23. During her time at the facility, she was repeatedly ridiculed and mocked by County 

staff. Id. ¶¶ 2, 23. Plaintiff was released from the facility on May 22, 2015. Id. ¶¶ 3, 23. There 

were in fact no outstanding warrants for plaintiff’s arrest. Id. ¶¶ 3, 24. 

The complaint asserts claims against the individual officers (Does 1-10) for 

arresting and detaining plaintiff in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, battery, false arrest/false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, and negligence. 

B. Allegations Against City 

The complaint asserts municipal liability claims against defendants City and 

County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for ratifying the officers’ unconstitutional acts, inadequately 

training the officers, and maintaining unconstitutional customs, practices, and policies. 

The complaint alleges a final policymaker “knew of and specifically approved of 

(or will specifically approve of)1” the unconstitutional acts of Does 1-10 as being “within policy.” 

Id. ¶¶ 44–47. The complaint alleges “[t]he training policies of City were not adequate to train its 

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 While noting that any claim based on a speculative future act is likely not ripe, the court 

does not need to reach the merits of any such issue at this time. 

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officers to handle the usual and recurring situation with which they must deal, including without 

limitation looking up outstanding warrants, verifying the identity of subjects, detaining subjects, 

and placing subjects under arrest.” Id. ¶ 54. The failure of City to provide adequate training 

allegedly caused the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights by Does 1-5. Id. ¶ 55. The complaint alleges 

Does 1-10 acted pursuant to “an expressly adopted official policy or a longstanding practice or 

custom of City.” Id. ¶¶ 63, 65. City allegedly provided inadequate training, employed police 

officers who City knew or reasonably should have known had dangerous propensities, 

inadequately supervised and disciplined police officers, maintained inadequate procedures for 

reporting and investigating misconduct, and maintained a policy of inaction towards police 

officers who wrongfully detain and arrest individuals. Id. ¶ 67. The complaint alleges City acted 

with intentional, reckless, and callous disregard for plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and City’s 

unconstitutional policies were a significantly influential force behind plaintiff’s injuries. Id. ¶ 69. 

Plaintiff concedes two of the allegations mistakenly mention plaintiff was sexually assaulted, 

when she was never sexually assaulted by the defendant officers. Opp’n at 4, ECF No. 20. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to 

dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Although a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in order to survive a motion 

to dismiss, this short and plain statement “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include something 

more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” or “‘labels and 

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss 

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for failure to state a claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 

In making this context-specific evaluation, this court must construe the complaint 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true the factual allegations of the 

complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). This rule does not apply to “a 

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) 

quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, nor to “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to 

judicial notice” or to material attached to or incorporated by reference into the complaint. 

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2001). A court’s 

consideration of documents attached to a complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the 

complaint, or matters of judicial notice will not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2003); Parks Sch. of 

Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); compare Van Buskirk v. Cable News 

Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that even though court may look beyond 

pleadings on motion to dismiss, generally court is limited to face of the complaint on 12(b)(6) 

motion). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Municipal Liability 

Section 1983 imposes liability on “persons” who, under color of law, deprive 

others of a constitutional right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipalities may be held liable as “persons” 

under § 1983, but not for the unconstitutional acts of their employees based solely on a 

respondeat superior theory. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690–95 

(1978). Rather, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 is required 

“to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of Cnty. 

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). To sufficiently plead a Monell claim and 

withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite 

the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to 

give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. 

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Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 

1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). Thus, the court considers a motion to dismiss a claim of municipal 

liability under a heightened pleading standard. See Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 

1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“Iqbal has made clear that conclusory, ‘threadbare’ allegations that 

merely recite the elements of a cause of action will not defeat a motion to dismiss . . . In light of 

Iqbal, it would seem that the prior Ninth Circuit pleading standard for Monell claims (i.e. ‘bare 

allegations’) is no longer viable.”); Jarreau-Griffin v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:12-CV-02979-KJM, 

2013 WL 6423379, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2013).

A Monell claim may be stated under three theories of municipal liability: (1) when 

official policies or established customs inflict a constitutional injury; (2) when omissions or 

failures to act amount to a local government policy of deliberate indifference to constitutional 

rights; or (3) when a local government official with final policy-making authority ratifies a 

subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 

1249–50 (9th Cir. 2010). To state a claim under Monell, a party must identify the challenged 

policy or custom, explain how it was deficient, explain how it caused the plaintiff harm, and 

reflect how it “amounted to deliberate indifference, i.e. explain[ ] how the deficiency involved 

was obvious and the constitutional injury was likely to occur.” Young, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 

(examining Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001)); see Knanishu v. 

McGinness, 478 F. App’x 432, 433 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s dismissal of claims 

against County of Sacramento where plaintiff failed to “allege that his injuries were proximately 

caused by defendants’ conduct under an official county policy, custom, practice, or procedure”); 

Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal where 

plaintiff failed to allege “any facts demonstrating that his constitutional depravation was the result 

of a custom or practice of the [defendant city] or that the custom or practice was the ‘moving 

force’ behind his constitutional deprivation”). 

B. Ratification 

A plaintiff may claim Monell liability where an “official with final policy-making 

authority ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Gillette 

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v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992). “A policymaker’s knowledge of an 

unconstitutional act does not, by itself, constitute ratification.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 

1239 (9th Cir. 1999). “[A] policymaker’s mere refusal to overrule a subordinate’s completed act 

does not constitute approval.” Id. Rather, ratification requires the authorized policymaker to 

make a “conscious, affirmative choice.” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1347. Ratification “and thus the 

existence of a de facto policy or custom, can be shown by a municipality’s post-event conduct, 

including its conduct in an investigation of the incident.” Dorger v. City of Napa, No. 12-440, 

2012 WL 3791447, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012) (citing Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 

512, 518 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Here, the complaint merely recites the elements of the claim without providing any 

factual allegations. The complaint alleges “a final policymaker . . . knew of and specifically 

approved of (or will specifically approve of)” the unconstitutional acts of Does 1-10 as being 

“within policy.” Compl. ¶¶ 44–47. Though plaintiff need not prove her case at this stage, 

“conclusory, ‘threadbare’ allegations that merely recite the elements of a cause of action will not 

defeat a motion to dismiss.” Young, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (discussing Iqbal’s effect on claims 

for municipal liability). The complaint does not identify an affirmative choice by city officials to 

approve the defendant officers’ actions. Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim for 

municipal liability premised on ratification. 

C. Failure to Train 

In limited circumstances, a municipality’s failure to train its officers may amount 

to a policy of deliberate indifference. See Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 973 (9th Cir. 2008). To 

state a claim for failure to train, a plaintiff must show (1) “the existing training program” is 

inadequate “in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform”; (2) the officials have 

been deliberately indifferent “to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact”; 

and (3) the inadequacy of the training “actually caused the constitutional deprivation at issue.” 

Merritt v. Cnty. of L.A., 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

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Here, the complaint again provides conclusory allegations that merely track the 

elements of a claim for municipal liability. The complaint alleges “[t]he training policies of City 

were not adequate to train its officers to handle the usual and recurring situation with which they 

must deal, including without limitation looking up outstanding warrants, verifying the identity of 

subjects, detaining subjects, and placing subjects under arrest.” Compl. ¶ 54. 

In Jarreau-Griffin v. City of Vallejo, the plaintiffs alleged defendant City had a 

“duty of care to hire, train, supervise and discipline peace officers so as to avoid unreasonable 

risk of harm to detainees and care for those shot by officers”; “defendant City failed to train 

defendant Tribble in providing emergency medical care”; decedent’s “death was a foreseeable 

harm resulting from defendants’ failure to exercise the duty of care owed to [decedent], and due 

to defendant Tribble’s lack of training by defendant City regarding the use of deadly force”; and 

decedent’s injuries resulting from the defendant police officer’s conduct were the “factual and 

proximate cause of [decedent’s] death and plaintiffs’ damages.” 2013 WL 6423379, at *6. In 

Jarreau-Griffin, this court concluded these allegations were “conclusory and d[id] not adequately 

plead municipal liability,” because they “d[id] not plead with specificity the inadequacies of 

City’s training practices.” Id. 

The allegations in the complaint here are even more conclusory than those in 

Jarreau-Griffin. And as in Jarreau-Griffin, the complaint here does not plead the inadequacies of 

City’s training practices. As a result, the court finds plaintiff’s allegations insufficient to state a 

claim for municipal liability premised on failure to train. 

D. Unconstitutional Custom, Practice, or Policy 

Finally, a plaintiff may establish municipal liability by demonstrating “the 

constitutional tort was the result of a ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the 

standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’” Price, 513 F.3d at 966 (quoting 

Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2002)). To establish liability for 

governmental entities under this theory, a plaintiff must show (1) that the plaintiff “possessed a 

constitutional right of which [he or she] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; 

(3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, 

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(4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. 

No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

Plaintiff’s allegations of an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy suffer the 

same defects as plaintiff’s allegations of ratification and inadequate training. Plaintiff’s 

conclusory allegations do not identify any specific policies or customs, explain how those policies 

or customs were deficient, or explain how they specifically caused plaintiff harm. As a result, the 

complaint does not state a claim for municipal liability premised on an unconstitutional custom, 

practice, or policy. See Jarreau-Griffin v. City of Vallejo, supra; Canas v. City of Sunnyvale, No. 

08-5771, 2011 WL 1743910 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011); Mong Kim Tran v. City of Garden Grove, 

11-1236, 2012 WL 405088 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2012). Here as well, plaintiff’s threadbare 

assertions in the complaint are not sufficient to satisfy Iqbal. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss the 

municipal liability claims against City, but with leave to amend if plaintiff can do so consonant 

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. An amended complaint shall be filed within 21 days of 

the date this order is filed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 11, 2016. 

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