Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00397/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00397-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Recovery of IRS Tax

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CHRISTOPHER D. MOOREBACKMAN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Defendant. 

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No. CV 09-397-TUC-RCC (BPV)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is the Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. (Doc. No. 6). Plaintiff filed a response and

Defendant filed a reply.

Plaintiff, Christopher D. Moore-Backman, alleges that the application of his

federal income tax payments to military uses substantially burdens his exercise of

religion in violation of the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000bb, et seq., (“RFRA”). Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to the return of the

portion of his 2007 federal income tax refund that was allocated by the Internal

Revenue Service (“IRS”) and used to offset Plaintiff’s tax liabilities for the tax years

2001 and 2004. Plaintiff also demands a judgment directing the United States to

accommodate Plaintiff’s practice of religion and conscience by applying his taxes solely

to non-military purposes. 

The case has been referred to Magistrate Judge Velasco for all pretrial matters

pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2. Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the

District of Arizona.

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For reasons which follow, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court GRANT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are alleged in the complaint: 

Plaintiff is a member of the San Francisco Friends Meeting, which is part of

the Pacific Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends. (Doc. No. 1,

“Complaint”, ¶ 25) The Religious Society of Friends are also known as Quakers. 

(Id, ¶ 4) Plaintiff alleges that his faith in and witness of the Quaker peace testimony,

and his resulting refusal to pay federal income taxes applied to military purposes, is

in accordance with guidance provided by the Pacific Yearly Meeting. (Id. ¶ 27) 

Plaintiff filed his tax returns for tax years 2001 and 2004, but withheld the

amounts owing on the returns, informing the IRS that he refused to pay his federal

taxes, as such a large portion of federal taxes are used for military purposes which is

against his belief as a member of the Religious Society of Friends. (Id., ¶ 6, 8) 

Plaintiff notified the IRS that he had no opposition to taxation in principle, but,

having “no way of directing my contribution so as to avoid enriching the U.S.

military” withheld his payment entirely, contributing instead the amount of his

calculated tax returns to support humane efforts. (Id. ¶ 7, 9.) 

Plaintiff alleges that the application of his federal income tax payments to

military uses substantially burdens his exercise of religion, and his request for

accommodation is based on a sincere religious belief. (Id., ¶¶ 41-42.) Plaintiff

asserts that the federal government is readily able to administer a program to

accommodate his practice of religion, such as by segregating his tax payments for

use solely for nonmilitary purposes, accordingly, the refusal to accommodate his

religious beliefs is not the least restrictive means of furthering any compelling

governmental interest. (Id., ¶ 44.) Plaintiff claims that the failure and refusal of

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1 26 U.S.C. § 7421

2 28 U.S.C. § 2201

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the United States to accommodate his practice of his religion violates the RFRA, and

he is entitled to the return of his funds allocated by the IRS for the payment of 2001

and 2004 taxes, pending the enactment of appropriate legislation or regulations to

provide for the non-military use of such funds. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Defendant, United States of America, makes two primary arguments why

Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed: (1) Plaintiff cannot challenge the IRS’s right to

off-set, and (2) the relief Plaintiff seeks in the form of a declaratory judgment or

injunctive relief is barred. Defendant also asserts that the complaint fails to identify

a waiver of sovereign immunity or the statutory authority vesting this Court with

subject matter jurisdiction, and should therefore be dismissed. 

B. Plaintiff’s Position

Plaintiff asserts that the United States’ arguments that the Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims should be rejected because the United

States has waived its sovereign immunity for suits for a tax refund or an

accommodation under RFRA, and Plaintiff’s request for relief is not barred by either

the Anti-Injunction Act1

, or the Declaratory Judgment Act.2 

C. Discussion

1. Governing Standards

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal

is also appropriate when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1), the district court may review any evidence, such as affidavits and

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testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.

McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir.1988); See, e.g., Land v.

Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735, n.4 (1947) (“when a question of the District Court's

jurisdiction is raised ... the court may inquire by affidavits or otherwise, into the

facts as they exist.”). 

“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only that

power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by

Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S.

534, 541 (1986) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 173-180, 2

L.Ed. 60 (1803). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited

jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party

asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,

377 (1994) (citations omitted). 

As a sovereign, the United States “is immune from suit unless it has expressly

waived such immunity and consented to be sued.” Dunn & Black, P.S. v. United

States, 492 F.3d 1084, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2007)(quoting Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756

F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir.1985)) A waiver of sovereign immunity must be

unequivocally expressed, and “[w]here a suit has not been consented to by the

United States, dismissal of the action is required .... [because] the existence of such

consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” Id. 492 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Gilbert,

supra.). “The Supreme Court has ‘frequently held ... that a waiver of sovereign

immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the

sovereign.’” Id., 492 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525

U.S. 255, 261 (1999)). An action must be dismissed unless plaintiff satisfies the

burden of establishing that its action falls within an unequivocally expressed waiver

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of sovereign immunity by Congress. Id. (citing Cunningham v. United States, 786

F.2d 1445, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

In addition to these jurisdictional issues, a case may be dismissed if it fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a

motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory “factual content,” and reasonable inferences

from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to

relief. Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). The plausibility standard “asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a

complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it

‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” 

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 555

(2007)) (internal citations omitted). When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a

claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84

F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996)(citing Everest & Jennings v. American Motorists

Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, the Court must assume that

all general allegations “embrace whatever specific facts might be necessary to

support them.” Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir.

1994). Although “a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,”

Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008), the Court

will not assume that the plaintiff can prove facts different from those alleged in the

complaint, see Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983); Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v.

Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005). Similarly, legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of

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truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not

sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1998). 

2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that “[t]his Court has jurisdiction over this matter

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), as this is a claim for a refund of federal taxes.” 

(Complaint, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff seeks a refund in “the amount of $1509.69 for

overpayment of his 2007 taxes, pending the enactment of appropriate legislation or

regulations to provide for the non-military use of such funds.” (Id., p.17.) 

Because the case is one against the United States, the Plaintiff must identify a

statute that permits suits against the United States under the circumstances presented

here. Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(a)(1). Plaintiff argues in his response to the motion to dismiss that the

RFRA also provides jurisdiction over this action. 

Plaintiff is correct that § 1346(a)(1) waives the government's sovereign

immunity by authorizing federal district courts to hear “[a]ny civil action against the

United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been

erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been

collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any

manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.” 28 U.S.C. §

1346(a)(1); Dunn & Black, 492 F.3d at 1088. An express condition of Congress’s

waiver of sovereign immunity, however, is 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), which requires a

plaintiff to first file an administrative claim for refund or credit with the Secretary of

the Treasury before bringing suit to challenge the refund. The Treasury has no

power to waive this statutorily-imposed exhaustion requirement. Dunn &Black, 492

F.3d at 1091. Plaintiff has not alleged that he first filed an administrative claim for

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refund with the Secretary before bringing this suit. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to

establish a waiver of sovereign immunity under § 1346(a)(1) that would permit him

to proceed in this action for challenging the IRS’s deductions from his 2007 tax

refund to offset the Plaintiff’s tax liabilities for the years 2001 and 2004. 

Accordingly, this action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

3. Alternative Analysis - Religious Freedom Restoration Act

In addition to Plaintiff’s claim that he should be refunded the amount the IRS

used to offset his tax liabilities from previous years, Plaintiff also asserts that,

pursuant to the RFRA, the United States should be directed to “accommodate

plaintiff’s practice of religion and conscience by applying his taxes solely to nonmilitary purposes.” (Complaint, p. 17.) Although Plaintiff asserts in his Complaint

that this Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), to the

extent the District Court may recognize a separate claim directly under RFRA, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the claim be dismissed for failure to establish

standing to raise such a claim. 

In 1993, Congress passed RFRA in reaction to Employment Division v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872 (1990). The bill is “not a codification of the result reached in any prior

free exercise decision but rather the restoration of the legal standard that was applied

in those decision. Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 1999). The purposes of

the Act are:

(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.

Verner, 374 U.S. 398 ... (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205

... (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free

exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and

(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is

substantially burdened by government.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b). To meet these purposes, the Act provides that the

“Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if

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the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a),

and creates a judicial remedy: 

 A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of

this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial

proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c).

Though Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that jurisdiction over the action is

found pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), he argues in his response that no case

asserting RFRA claims have been dismissed on the ground that the United States

enjoyed sovereign immunity. Defendant contends, however, that Plaintiff’s request

for relief in the form of applying his taxes to non-military purposes is specifically

barred by the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and the Anti-Injunction

Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421. 

A general waiver of sovereign immunity in actions against the United States

for injunctive relief can be found in 5 U.S.C. § 702 of the Administrative Procedures

Act. Section 702 does not confer jurisdiction if a more specific statute, such as the

Declaratory Judgment Act or the Anti-Injunction Act, bars the requested relief. In

fact, both the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Anti-Injunction Act prohibit suits

brought “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” 

Contrary to the United States’ assertion, Plaintiff’s request for relief is not

barred by either act. Unlike most cases challenging military activities or spending,

asserting that religious objections form the basis for avoiding the payment of federal

taxes, see, e.g. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that the First

Amendment does not afford members of the Amish sect a right to avoid payment of

social security taxes); Browne v. United States, 176 F.3d 25 (2d Cir.1999) (rejecting

RFRA claim on the ground that “voluntary compliance is the least restrictive means

by which the IRS furthers the compelling governmental interest in uniform,

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mandatory participation in the federal income tax system”); Adams v. Comm'r, 170

F.3d 173 (3d Cir.1999) (holding that the government need not accommodate

taxpayers whose religious beliefs lead them to oppose military funding); United

States v. Ramsey, 992 F.2d 831, 833 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that the First

Amendment does not afford a right to avoid federal income taxes on religious

grounds); Jenney v. United States, 755 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir.1985) (holding that

taxpayers cannot withhold taxes based on conscientious objection to war); Lull v.

Comm'r, 602 F.2d 1166, 1169 (4th Cir.1979) (same), Jenkins v. Comm’r, 483 F.3d

90 (2nd Cir. 2007) (holding that the collection of tax revenues for expenditures that

offend the religious beliefs of individual taxpayers does not violate the Free Exercise

Clause of the First Amendment), Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to relief because

the “application of [Plaintiff’s] federal income tax payments to military uses

substantially burdens his exercise of religion.” (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 41)(emphasis added).

Plaintiff is, in essence, challenging congressional expenditures under the Taxing and

Spending Clause, Const., Article 1, Section 8, alleging a violation of the free

exercise clause of the First Amendment. Plaintiff’s request for relief in the form of

directing the United States to apply his taxes to non-military purposes is not a

challenge to the collection or assessment of taxes, and, as such, is not barred by the

prohibitions set out in the Declaratory Judgment and Anti-Injunction Acts. 

Plaintiff is not challenging, directly, a federal appropriations statute, and

would not have standing to do so. Federal court jurisdiction is “defined and limited

by Article III of the Constitution ... [and] is constitutionally restricted to ‘cases’ and

‘controversies’.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968). It is well established that

individuals do not generally have standing to challenge governmental spending,

either by the state or federal government, solely because they are taxpayers, because

"it is a complete fiction to argue that an unconstitutional federal expenditure causes

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an individual federal taxpayer any measurable economic harm." Winn v. Arizona

Christian School Tuition Organization, 562 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2009) cert.

granted — S.Ct. — , 2010 WL 621396 (2010) (citing Hein v. Freedom From

Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2559, 168 L.Ed.2d 424 (2007)

(plurality opinion); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342-49 (2006);

Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048, 1062-63 (9th Cir.2007)). 

Similarly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under RFRA or the Free Exercise

Clause by requesting relief in the form of segregating his tax contributions toward

non-military purposes. In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), the Supreme Court

addressed the individual’s right to compel the government to behave in ways that

further a particular individuals spiritual development. Id. at 699-701. The Supreme

Court stated that the “free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require

the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the

religious beliefs of particular citizens.” Id. at 699. “The Free Exercise Clause

affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it

does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government’s

internal procedure.” Id at 700. The Supreme Court further noted that, while the

plaintiff’s own personal views in that case might not distinguish between individual

and governmental conduct, it is “clear ... that the Free Exercise Clause, and the

Constitution generally, recognize such a distinction; for the adjudication of a

constitutional claim, the Constitution, rather than an individual’s religion, must

supply the frame of reference.” Id at 701. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under either the

Free Exercise Clause or the RFRA. 

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“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate

unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” 

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff’s complaint against the Federal Defendants Clearly cannot be saved by

amendment. Plaintiff has failed to show that this Court has subject matter

jurisdiction over any of his claims. The Magistrate Judge therefore recommends that

the District Court dismiss the claims against the United States with prejudice.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that

Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 6) be GRANTED.

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written

objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report

and Recommendation. A party may respond to another party's objections within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). 

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by

the District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

DATED this 28th day of June, 2010.

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