Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-00477/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-00477-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1

 Since the plaintiff expressly withdrew her age discrimination claim (Third Claim), her

Title VII disparate treatment claim (Fourth Claim), and her intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim (Sixth Claim) at the oral argument on the summary judgment motion, thereby

conceding that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to those claims, the Court will

not discuss those claims.

As to the claims still in dispute, the Court generally notes that it discusses only those

issues raised by the parties that the Court deems minimally necessary to the resolution of the

summary judgment motion.

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lisa Burris, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CV-04-0477-PCT-PGR

)

vs. )

) OPINION AND ORDER

Safeway, Inc., )

)

Defendant. ) )

Pending before the Court is defendant Safeway, Inc.'s Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. #54), wherein it seeks judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 as

to all six claims of the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (FAC).1

 Having

considered the parties' memoranda in light of the evidence of record and the oral

Case 3:04-cv-00477-PGR Document 71 Filed 09/25/06 Page 1 of 17
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2

 Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, the Court references the

facts only as they are necessary to explain its resolution of the defendant's motion.

3

 The First Claim of the FAC states:

24. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 23 as set

forth above.

25. Plaintiff was regularly subjected by a coworker to verbal and physical conduct of a 

sexual nature toward her, which a reasonable woman would find abusive or

hostile.

26. Plaintiff did, in fact, find the environment to be abusive and hostile.

27. The coworker's conduct was unwelcome.

28. The coworker's conduct was sufficiently severe and/or widespread to alter

the conditions of Plaintiff's employment and created an abusive working

environment.

29. Plaintiff complained to Defendant on several occasions, but Defendant failed

to take remedial action to address the hostile work environment.

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argument of counsel, the Court finds that the motion should be granted in part 

and denied in part.2

 THIS OPINION AND ORDER IS NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

Sexual Harassment Claim

The First Claim of the FAC raises a Title VII sex discrimination claim based

upon the existence of a sexually hostile work environment.3

 The Court

concludes that summary judgment in the defendant's favor is appropriate as to

this claim because the evidence of record, together with all justifiable inferences

supported by that evidence, all construed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, is insufficient to allow a fair-minded jury to conclude that the plaintiff was

the victim of actionable sexual harassment.

One of the elements that the plaintiff must establish in order to prevail on

her hostile work environment claim is that she was subjected to verbal or physical

conduct of a sexual nature, Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958,

966 (9th Cir. 2002), i.e., she must demonstrate that she was targeted for

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4

 Since this is the only element of the plaintiff's prima facie sexual harassment case

that the defendant disputes, the Court does not consider the plaintiff's arguments contained in

her response and made during the oral argument directed at the other elements of the her prima

facie case, i.e., that the allegedly harassing conduct was not welcome and was sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment.

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harassment because of her gender and not merely that she was subjected to

nonactionable offensive behavior by co-workers.4

 This dispositive distinction

exists because Title VII is not a general civility code for the workplace and does

not prohibit all employment-related verbal or physical harassment. Oncale v.

Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 1002 (1998);

see also, Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[N]ot all

workplace conduct that may be described as harassment affects a terms,

condition, or privilege of employment within the meaning of Title VII.") 

As set forth in the FAC, the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim is

predicated upon co-worker Teri Haynes' penchant for constantly telling

offensively graphic and profane stories about her sex life. What is missing from

the plaintiff's case is any significant probative evidence establishing that Haynes'

behavior was motivated by the plaintiff's gender as opposed to Haynes' own poor

taste and lack of professionalism. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. at 1002

(Supreme Court noted that it had "never held that workplace harassment ... is

automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have

sexual content or connotations."); see also, Penry v. Federal Home Loan Bank of

Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1039 (1998)

(Court, in affirming summary judgment for the employer on a sexual harassment

claim, noted that "[i]f the nature of an employee's environment, however

unpleasant, is not due to her gender, she has not been the victim of sex

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5

 The plaintiff's testimony clearly supports the defendant's contention. See e.g.,

plaintiff's deposition at 69 and 71:

 Q. Now, who is she [Haynes] talking to when she would be telling these [sex]

 stories?

 A. It didn't matter. Whoever was there. Whoever was available

for conversation, she would tell them.

* * *

Q. ... Where would she be when she would be talking about this

kind of thing?

A. Outside in front of the store, on the side of the store break

room, back room, produce, sales floor, Bob [Nicol's] office,

huddles. It didn't matter. Anywhere she was, she said what she

wanted to say.

* * *

A. We would have huddles in the back room for service huddles. 

All the managers from each department would go into the back to

discuss service and Teri would start tell[ing] her little sexual

stories during huddles.

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discrimination as a result of that environment.") The plaintiff has not shown, as

required, that "members of one sex [were] exposed to disadvantageous terms or

conditions of employment to which members of the other sex [were] not

exposed." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. at 1002; see also, Porter v, Calif.

Sept. of Corrections, 419 F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 2005) (Court noted that certain

insults directed at the plaintiff did not constitute sexual harassment in part

because there has nothing to suggest that the insults would not have been

directed at the plaintiff had she been a man.) As the defendant correctly argues,

without contravention from the plaintiff, "[n]o witnesses, including Plaintiff, has

given any indication that there was any difference in the stories that Haynes told

to wom[e]n versus men or any differences in how she treated men and women in

the workplace. Haynes, according to Plaintiff's evidence, told graphic stories

about her sex life almost every day to men and women, to managers and coworkers, to anyone and everyone."5

 

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6

 Because the Court concludes that Teri Haynes' conduct did not amount to actionable

sexual harassment, the Court need not reach the issue of the plaintiff's harassment charges

against co-workers Brad Miller and Greg Wagley. The gender-based harassing conduct alleged

against Miller and Wagley is not relevant to the Court's resolution of the defendant's motion

given that the alleged conduct occurred more than 300 days before the plaintiff filed her initial

E.E.C.O. charge and is not part of the same unlawful employment practice arising from Haynes'

conduct. See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061

(2002). While those incidents may be relevant to the plaintiff's contention that the defendant's

management failed to properly respond to her complaints about Haynes' conduct, the

defendant's liability in that regard is no longer an issue.

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In her summary judgment response, the plaintiff in effect raises a sexual

harassment claim that is different from that set forth in the FAC. The plaintiff

asserts that the defendant's defense to the sexual harassment claim is flawed

because it focuses only on Haynes' conduct, whereas the basis for her hostile

work environment claim is instead the failure of the defendant's management,

particularly store manager Bob Nicol, to react at all to her complaints about

Haynes' conduct, i.e. the unlawful sexual harassment she is alleging that affects

women more than men is management's failure to react to her complaints related

to Haynes and that failure is what polluted the plaintiff's workplace and made her

work life miserable.

The Court is unpersuaded. While the plaintiff is correct that an employer

may be liable under Title VII if it tolerates an employee's sexual harassment of

another employee, given that an employer's liability is direct and not derivative of

the harasser's conduct, Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2001),

the crucial principle here is that the defendant cannot be liable under Title VII,

regardless of its response or lack of response to the plaintiff's complaints about

Haynes, if there was no actionable sexual harassment by Haynes.6

 Brooks v. City

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7

 The Fifth Claim states:

44. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 43 as set

forth above.

45. Plaintiff has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.

46. Plaintiff was a qualified individual.

47. Plaintiff's disability was a motivating factor in the decision to demote and

transfer the plaintiff. 

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of San Mateo, 229 F.3d at 927 n.10 (Court, in rejecting the plaintiff's claim that

the employer city was liable for its failure to take remedial steps once it knew of

the sexual harassment of the plaintiff by a co-worker, noted that "[a]s there was

no actionable sexual harassment [by the co-worker], there is no liability to assign

to the city.") 

The plaintiff also argues that summary judgment is inappropriate on her

sexual harassment claim because she has presented evidence raising a factual

issue as to whether Nicol's failure to properly resolve Haynes' harassment of her

and Nicol's discipline of her for conduct that male department managers were not

similarly disciplined for was due to her gender. The Court disagrees because this

argument is in effect an allegation of disparate treatment, not sexual harassment,

and the plaintiff has expressly dropped the only disparate treatment claim she

raised in the FAC.

Disability Discrimination

The plaintiff alleges in the Fifth Claim of the FAC that the defendant

violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) because the plaintiff's

disability was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to demote her from

her position as the produce manager of the defendant's Sedona store and

transfer her to a non-supervisory position at the defendant's Cottonwood store.7

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8

 The Court concludes that it need not consider the issue of whether the plaintiff

actually suffered from a ADA-recognized disability at the time of her demotion and transfer in

order to resolve the defendant's summary judgment motion because the only ADA-related issue

upon which the plaintiff has presented sufficient substantive argument in support is the issue of

whether the defendant regarded her as suffering from an impairment that was substantially

limiting and significant.

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The defendant argues in part that it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim

because the plaintiff has not established one of the elements of her prima facie

case, i.e. that she was disabled for ADA purposes at the time of her demotion

and transfer. See Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir.

1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997) (In order to establish a prima facie

case of disability discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must show that she is

a qualified individual with a disability who suffered an adverse employment action

because of her disability.) 

The plaintiff's position is that she was so disabled because the defendant,

through Nicol, regarded her as having a mental impairment that substantially

limited her ability to engage in the major life activity of working as a produce

manager.8

 Even if an impairment does not substantially limit a major life activity,

a plaintiff is protected by the ADA if an employer regards her as having an

impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Coons v. Secretary of

U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004). In this context,

"regarded as" means either that the employer mistakenly believes that the

employee has an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life

activities, or mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment

substantially limits one or more major life activities. Sutton v. United Air Lines,

Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2149-50 (1999).

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The threshold issue regarding the plaintiff's prima facie case is the parties'

dispute as to whether the plaintiff's contention underlying her alleged inability to

work is legally sufficient for ADA purposes. The issue is that while "working" is

recognized as a major life activity under the ADA, Thornton v. McClatchy

Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 2001), an impairment substantially

limits a person's ability to work only if that person is "significantly restricted in the

ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes

as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and

abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a

substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.") Id. at 794-95 (quoting

from 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).); see also, Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527

U.S. at 492, 119 S.Ct. at 2151 (An individual must be precluded from engaging in

more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice in order

to be substantially limited in working.)

The defendant's position is that there cannot be any ADA violation as a

matter of law even if it perceived the plaintiff as being unable to work as a

produce manager because of her psychiatric disability inasmuch as any such

perception related solely to a single, particular job. While the plaintiff's response

to the summary judgment motion certainly lends itself to such an argument, the

Court is ultimately unpersuaded by the defendant's argument because the

plaintiff asserted for the first time at the oral argument, albeit very conclusorily

and without citation to any supporting case law, that she was disabled for ADA

purposes because she was perceived by Nicol as being disabled from performing

a class of jobs, i.e., the class of produce managerial jobs. The Court accepts this

contention as being legally sufficient because there is some support in the law for

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the proposition that a substantial limitation in the ability to perform a class of

supervisory jobs suffices to establish a perceived disability based upon the

inability to work. See e.g., Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 303-04

(4th Cir. 1998) (Court, noting that the plaintiff's field of employment for ADA

purposes was maintenance supervisory work as opposed to maintenance work in

general, concluded that the plaintiff, who had been demoted from being a

maintenance supervisor to being a maintenance worker following his return to

work from sick leave, had established that he was perceived by his employer as

being too disabled to perform a class of supervisory jobs.); see also, E.E.O.C. v.

Automatic Systems Co., 169 F.Supp.2d 1001, 1007 (D.Minn. 2001) (Court, in

denying summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff's ADA claim,

concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that the employer perceived the

plaintiff's heart condition as rendering him unable to work in any job with

supervisory or managerial duties.); Zakaras v. United Airlines, Inc., 121

F.Supp.2d 1196, 1217 (N.D.Ill. 2000) (Court denied summary judgment for the

employer on the plaintiff's ADA claim because there was evidence showing that

the employer's demotion of the plaintiff from his supervisory job was based on its

perception that the plaintiff's alcoholism prevented him from continuing to

supervise other employees.) 

Viewing the evidence of record and the legitimate inferences therefrom in

the plaintiff's favor, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has established her

prima facie case because she has produced the very little evidence necessary for

a reasonable jury to infer that the defendant demoted and transferred her at least

in part because she was perceived by management personnel as no longer being

able to be an effective manager due to her psychiatric condition. See Head v.

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Glacier Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e hold that ADA

outlaws adverse employment decisions motivated, even in part, by animus based

on a plaintiff's disability[.]") This evidence, for example, includes sarcastic

comments made to the plaintiff by Nicol, prior to her demotion and transfer, about

her need to take psychiatric medications and being under stress, and referring to

the produce department as the "mental ward", Nicol's lowering of the plaintiff's

scores on her annual performance evaluation in areas related to her supervisory

abilities after he discovered that she was taking psychiatric medication, and the

action taken at the meeting on May 20, 2003 whereby the plaintiff was asked to

turn over her produce knife and was transferred to another store based on a fear

that she might be capable of violent retaliation.

The Court further concludes that the defendant has met its burden of

producing evidence sufficiently establishing that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's demotion and transfer, e.g., Nicol's

testimony that the reasons for the adverse employment action were the problems

within the produce department caused by the plaintiff's leadership style and the

animosity towards her by her subordinates, with the culminating factor being the

complaints by produce clerk Lindsey Bassett and her boyfriend, Bruce Jurecki,

about the plaintiff pressuring Bassett to have an abortion. That being the case,

the issue becomes whether the plaintiff has raised a genuine factual issue as to

whether the defendant's articulated reasons were a pretext for disability

discrimination. See Snead v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 237 F.3d

1080, 1093 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 888 (2001) (Court concluded that the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to ADA discrimination

cases.)

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The plaintiff may meet her pretext-related burden in part by indirectly

showing that the defendant's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Cf.

Stegall v. Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). While 

circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial in order to

defeat summary judgment, Id., the standard for raising a raising a triable issue as

to whether the plaintiff's demotion and transfer was influenced by improper

motives is relative low. Id. at 1972. Evidence discrediting the reasons put

forward by the defendant together with the elements of the plaintiff's prima facie

case may suffice to show intentional discrimination. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile

Systems Co., 362 F.3d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 2004). Viewing the evidence and

legitimate inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, the Court concludes that

the plaintiff has provided some limited evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue

of material fact regarding the truth of the defendant's proffered non-discriminatory

reasons or that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the defendant to

demote and transfer her. See Strother v. Southern Calif. Permanente Medical

Group, 79 F.3d 859, 870 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[A] plaintiff need produce very little

evidence of discriminatory motive to raise a genuine issue of fact as to pretext.")

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff has, for example, submitted

evidence that Nicol's averse views as to her ability to be an effective manager

commenced after he found out that she was taking medication for a psychiatric

impairment, and that the decision to demote and transfer was made prior to the

time the defendant's investigation into her alleged improper conduct towards

Lindsey Bassett was completed, which was in violation of the defendant's policy.

Disability Harassment

The plaintiff, in her response to the summary judgment motion and at oral

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9

 Paragraph 9 of the FAC states:

Almost immediately upon his arrival [as store manager], Nicole [sic]

engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination and harassment against the

Plaintiff on the basis of a disability. Plaintiff suffers from psychiatric conditions,

including schizophrenia, mood disorder, and depression, which is ordinarily

controlled by medication. Nicole [sic] would routinely berate her for her condition,

and would encourage other employees to do the same. Nicole [sic] would

consistently refer to the produce department managed by the plaintiff as the

"mental ward". He would constantly make sarcastic comments. For instance,

when she would approach him requesting assistance with an insubordinate

employee, he would dismiss her request by suggesting that she, "take her

medication." Nicole's [sic] consistent berating of Plaintiff on the basis of her

disability severely interfered with Plaintiff's ability to perform her duties as

Produce Manager.

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argument, raised the claim that she was subjected to a hostile work environment

based upon her disability in violation of the ADA. Although this claim was not

formally raised as a separate claim in the FAC, the Court will allow the plaintiff to

pursue it because the issue of disability-based harassment was raised in

paragraph 9 of the FAC9

, and because the defendant has not formally objected to

the plaintiff raising it. The Court assumes, without deciding, that an ADA-based

hostile work environment claim is actionable in this circuit. 

The Court concludes it need not dwell on this claim because the defendant,

by not discussing the merits of the claim in its memoranda or at oral argument,

has not met its burden of pointing to the absence of facts supporting the plaintiff's

prima facie case. At best, the defendant argues only that the plaintiff has not

established one of the elements of her prima facie case, i.e., that she belonged to

a protected group, which under the facts of this case means that she was

regarded at the relevant time as being a qualified individual with a disability. This

is insufficient given the Court's determination that there is a triable issue of

material fact as to whether the defendant perceived the plaintiff as being disabled

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10

 The allegations of the Second Claim state:

30. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 29 as set

forth above.

31. Plaintiff engaged in or was engaging in an activity protected under federal

law; that is she reporting [sic] unlawful employment practices and took leave

under the Family Medical Leave Act.

32. Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action following her reporting of

unlawful employment practices and taking medical leave.

33. Plaintiff would not have suffered the adverse employment action but for her

engagement in protected activities.

11

 Since the plaintiff does not even mention the FMLA in her response to the summary

judgment motion, the Court concludes that the FMLA no longer has any significance to the

plaintiff's case.

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from working in a class of jobs.

Retaliation

The plaintiff alleges in her Second Claim in the FAC that the defendant

retaliated against her by subjecting her to an adverse employment action

because she reported unlawful employment practices and because she took

leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).10 In her response to

the summary judgment motion, the plaintiff argues that she was retaliated against

in violation of both Title VII and the ADA.11 

Retaliation claims under both Title VII and the ADA are analyzed under the

same framework. Pardi v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 389 F.3d 840, 850 n.5

(9th Cir. 2004). In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff

must demonstrate that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) that the

defendant thereafter subjected her to an adverse employment action, and (3) a

causal link exists between her protected activity and the adverse employment

action. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production

shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

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12

 The Court rejects the defendant's contention in its motion that the plaintiff's

retaliation claim is predicated solely on post-transfer events at the defendant's Cottonwood

store.

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the adverse employment action. If the defendant carries that burden, then the

plaintiff must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

reason advanced by the defendant for the adverse employment action was

pretextual. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d at 928.

In its summary judgment motion, the defendant only challenges the second

element of the plaintiff's prima facie case in that it argues that the plaintiff cannot

establish the existence of an adverse employment action as a matter of law. The

Supreme Court has recently clarified that an adverse employment action for

purposes of a retaliation claim is one that is materially adverse from the

perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, i.e. one that might

dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, U.S. ,

126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). The Court concludes that the plaintiff has satisfied

this element of her prima facie case at the very least by her submission of

significant probative evidence establishing that she was demoted and transferred

from her day-shift produce manager's job at the defendant's Sedona store to a

night-shift produce clerk's job at the defendant's Cottonwood store.12

In it reply memorandum, the defendant argued for the first time that the

plaintiff had also failed to establish the causation element of her prima facie case. 

Although the Court need not consider this argument given that it was not initially

raised in the defendant's motion, cf. United States v. Patterson, 230 F.3d 1168,

1172 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are

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waived), the Court concludes that the plaintiff has produced the very little

evidence needed to satisfy this element of her prima facie retaliation claim. The

plaintiff has, for example, submitted evidence showing that the evaluation of her

performance by Nicol, who played a significant role in her demotion and transfer,

became significantly more negative after she started complaining to him about

Teri Haynes' inappropriate sexual conversations and after he learned that she

was taking psychiatric medication, and that the defendant did not give her the

corrective action letter stemming from her alleged pressuring of Lindsey Bassett

to have an abortion until June 2, 2003, which was after the defendant was aware

that she had filed her initial charge of discrimination with the E.E.O.C.

Given the Court's conclusion that the defendant has produced a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse actions against the plaintiff, the issue is

whether the plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence of pretext to survive

summary judgment. The Court concludes that she has, for some of the reasons

supporting her prima facie case. The plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of

material fact because a rational jury could infer from the evidence of record that

an illegitimate reason was at least a motivating factor for the adverse actions

taken against her, both before and after her demotion and transfer. The plaintiff

has, for example, submitted significant probative evidence from which a

reasonable jury could infer a relationship between both her worsening

performance evaluations, which the defendant assert formed a basis for her

demotion and transfer, and the increasingly hostile environment in which she had

to work, and Nicol's knowledge of her sexual harassment complaints and her

taking of psychiatric medications. See Winarto v. Toshiba America Electronics

Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001) ("An unwarranted

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 The Court rejects the defendant's contention that there is no evidence in the record

showing that Jerry Butterbrodt knew of the plaintiff's discrimination charge. While the plaintiff

does not in fact cite to any such evidence in her response or in her statement of facts, her

submitted deposition testimony provides support for Butterbrodt having such knowledge. See

plaintiff's deposition at 372.

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 The parties shall review paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Scheduling Order (doc. #13)

entered on August 10, 2004. As the Court noted in its Amended Scheduling Order (doc. #39),

paragraph 5 of the Scheduling Order is no longer applicable.

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reduction in performance review scores can constitute evidence of pretext in

retaliation cases.) The plaintiff has also submitted significant probative evidence

establishing that Cottonwood store manager Butterbrodt refused to take her off

the night shift despite her numerous requests that he do so, and otherwise

subjected her to harassing conduct, after learning that she had filed a

discrimination charge with the E.E.O.C.13 Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Safeway's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. #54)

is granted to the extent that the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Claims of the First

Amended Complaint are dismissed and is denied as to the remaining claims of

the First Amended Complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall file their Joint Pretrial

Statement and any motions in limine no later than November 30, 2006.

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 The parties shall review paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Scheduling Order.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the final Pretrial Conference shall be held

on Monday, January 8, 2007 at 3:00 p.m. in Courtroom 601.15

DATED this 25th day of September, 2006.

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