Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02718/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02718-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rick Lee Ray, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-2718 PHX EHC (VAM)

)

Lane Blair, et al., ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Respondents. )

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Rick Lee Ray ("petitioner") filed a pro se Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner raises

11 grounds for relief in the petition. (Doc. 1 at pp. 5-15 and

Attachments). Respondents filed an answer opposing the granting

of habeas relief. (Doc. 11). Petitioner filed a reply to the

answer. (Doc. 17).

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in July,

1998, and was sentenced to 16 years in prison. (Doc. 1 at p. 1;

Doc. 11, Exhibit KK at pp. 1, 7). Petitioner appealed raising the

following claims:

A. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR AND MANIFEST ERROR

WHEN IT ALLOWED THE JURY TO HEAR APPELLANT'S INHERENTLY

UNRELIABLE STATEMENTS.

B. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR AND MANIFEST ERROR

WHEN IT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

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AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.

C. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR AND MANIFEST ERROR

WHEN IT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.

D. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR AND MANIFEST ERROR

WHEN IT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.

E. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ALLOWED

MS. KRABBE TO GIVE THE JURY THE NOTES FOR HER CLOSING

ARGUMENT.

F. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR

RULE 404(a)(2) EVIDENCE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A

FAIR TRIAL AND HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION.

G. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR

RULE 404(a)(2) EVIDENCE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A

FAIR TRIAL AND HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION.

(Doc. 11, Exhibit HH at pp. 2-3).

In a memorandum decision filed on June 24, 2000, the Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence. 

(Doc. 11, Exhibit KK at p. 24). 

On November 21, 2000, after receiving continuances,

petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 in the trial court. (Doc. 11 at

Exhibit MM). Petitioner raised the following claims:

A. Trial Counsel was Ineffective in Violation of Sixth

Amendment Within the Meaning of Strickland.

1. Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Consult

and Call a Pathologist, Ballistics Expert and Crime

Scene Reconstructionist.

2. Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to

Adequately Advise Petitioner Regarding the Risks

Associated with Going to Trial Relative to Accepting the

Plea

3. Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Object

to Repeated Prosecutorial Misconduct During Trial,

Limiting the Appellate Court's Review to a Fundamental

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Error Analysis.

B. Appellate Counsel was Clearly Rendered Ineffective

Within the Meaning of Strickland because the Transcript

of the Voluntariness Hearing was (and Still is)

Unavailable, so that Appellate Counsel was Unable to

Fully Support the Voluntariness Claim on Direct Appeal

The trial court denied the petition in an order filed on

November 27, 2003. (Doc. 11 at Exhibit RR). Petitioner filed for

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals raising the following

claims:

A. Was trial counsel ineffective within the meaning of

the Sixth Amendment for failing to consult and call a

pathologist, ballistics expert and crime scene

reconstructionist?

B. Was trial counsel ineffective within the meaning of

the Sixth Amendment for failing to adequately advise

Petitioner of the risks associated with going to trial

relative to accepting the plea offer?

C. Was trial counsel ineffective within the meaning of

the Sixth Amendment for failing to object to repeated

instances of prosecutorial misconduct occurring

throughout his trial, limiting this Court's review on

direct appeal to a fundamental error analysis?

D. Was appellate counsel rendered ineffective within the

meaning of the Sixth Amendment because the transcript of

the voluntariness hearing was (and still is)

unavailable, making counsel unable to support the

voluntariness claim?

E. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying

Petitioner's request for leave to present the additional

information in support of Petitioner's claims?

(Doc. 11, Exhibit SS at p. 2).

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief without comment on

June 2, 2005. (Id. at Exhibit TT). On September 6, 2005,

petitioner filed a federal habeas petition raising the following

grounds for relief:

GROUND I: In violation of the 6th Amendment of the United

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States Constitution.

[Defense] counsel's performance prior to and during

trial from opening statement through closing argument

was deficient, in that it fell below the standard

competency for criminal attorneys in Az ....

GROUND II: In violation of petitioner's 6th Amendment

Right of the United States Constitution.

 Trial counsel's performance prior to and during the

trial from opening statement through closing argument

was deficient in that it fell below the standard

competency for criminal attorneys in Arizona, ...

GROUND III: In violation of petitioner's 6th Amendment

of the United States Constitution.

 If defense counsel had retained the service of a

Forensic Pathologist to review the records .... Trial

counsel would [have] also been provided with crucial

facts ... to properly refute the state's false evidence

....

GROUND IV: In violation of Petitioner's 6th Amendment of

the United States Constitution.

 Trial Counsel was ineffective within the meaning of

the sixth amendment for failing to adequately advise

petitioner of the risk associated with going to trial

relative to accepting the plea offer ....

GROUND V: In violation of 5th and 6th Amendment of the

United States Constitution.

... The lower court abused it's discretion in denying

petitioner's request for leave to submit additional

information and material in support of his petition that

would be used to impeach medical examiner Dr. Keen's

trial testimony that [the victim] was shot 4 or 5 times,

and to show that the trial testimony was inconsistent

with his original autopsy of [the victim] only being

shot 2 times ....

GROUND VI: In violation of petitioner's 5th, 6th and

14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.

 The lower court committed reversible [error] for

not granting petitioner a new trial on the grounds that

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to

repeated instances of prosecutorial misconduct occurring

throughout his trial, limiting Arizona Appeals court's

review on direct appeal to a fundamental error analysis

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....

GROUND VII: In violation of petitioner's 6th and 14th

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The lower court committed reversible [error] in denying

Petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was rendered

ineffective by not being able to support the

voluntariness claim on direct appeal with transcripts of

the voluntariness hearing, violating the 6th Amendment

....

The police also violated petitioners Constitutional

Protection against self-incrimination ...

GROUND VIII: In violation of Petitioner's 5th and 14th

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Trial Court violation Petitioner's ... due process

rights when it refused to allow petitioner to show that

Wendy Danley had a prior history of violence and

suicide, and however, allowed the State to present

evidence that Danley was nonviolent and not physically

violent towards others ....

GROUND IX: In violation of Petitioner's 6th and 14th

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

 Prosecution knowingly presented false evidence in a

404(b) hearing to the tribunial [sic] in order to over

come hearsay issues with Derek Hicks and Vance Matthews. 

Resulting in unreliable hearsay being admitted by the

court at petitioner's trial. Due to defense counsel's

failure to object and refute prosecutions false

misleading evidence ....

GROUND X: In violation of Petitioner's 6th and 14th

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Prosecution knowingly presented false information to the

tribunal in a 404(b) hearing by presenting false

evidence through Allan Johnson, which prosecution knew

to be false. [W]hich violated petitioner's due process

[rights] to a fair trial, as the judge admitted this

false information to be used against petitioner at

trial, due to being misled by prosecution with this

false information ....

GROUND XI: In violation of petitioner's 6th and 14th

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

 Petitioner's sentencing mitigation hearing was

unconstitutional, due to the trial Judge himself

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considering the minimum sentence up to the maximum

sentence in my case because the State was requesting for

a[n] aggravated sentence in this case. Petitioner

contends his sentence was fundamentally unfair as the

judge should have only been deciding the sentencing

range ranging from the minimum sentence to the

presumptive 10 years to 16 years. However the judge

improperly considered the range form [sic] the minimum

sentence to the maximum sentence, which ranges from a

minimum sentence of 10 years, presumptive sentence of 16

years and a maximum sentence of 22 years. Petitioner

was sentenced to the presumptive term at sentencing. 

The judge decided the case right down the middle of the

Minimum sentence petitioner was requesting for and the

maximum sentence prosecution was requesting for. 

Petitioner, however, contends this sentencing range was

improper due to the Higher courts recent ruling in

Blakely v. Washington, where the most a judge can

sentence petitioner to without a jury first finding

aggravating circumstances, is the presumptive sentence

....

(Doc. 1 at pp. 5-15 and Attachments). 

DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, respondents contend that all of

petitioner's claims are procedurally barred because he failed to

present them to the Arizona Supreme Court. Respondents contend

that Grounds V, VI, VIII, IX, X and XI are procedurally barred on

other grounds as well. 

I. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the following standard for

granting a federal habeas petition originating from a state court

conviction applies:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

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Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

The Act also codifies a presumption of correctness of state

court findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) states that "a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct" and the petitioner has the burden of proof

to rebut the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." As

discussed more fully below, these provisions of the Act set the

standard for the Court’s evaluation of the merits.

The Act limits the district court’s discretion to hold

evidentiary hearings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) states:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis

of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall

not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that

was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense.

A petition may be denied on the merits even though it

contains unexhausted claims, and the state does not waive

exhaustion except by an express waiver on the record. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(2) and (3).

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II. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A. Law Generally

A federal court has authority to review a federal

constitutional claim presented by a state prisoner if available

state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454

U.S. 1, 3 (1981)(per curiam); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829,

833 (9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in

case law and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, now states:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that--

 (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available

in the courts of the State; or

 (B)(i) there is an absence of available state

corrective process; or

 (ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

.......

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted

the remedies available in the courts of the State,

within the meaning of this section, if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available

procedure, the question presented.

The exhaustion requirement can be satisfied in one of two

ways. First, a petitioner can fairly present his or her claims to

the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through

either the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Only one of these avenues of relief must be

exhausted before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. 

This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

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constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown

v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy,

827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059

(1989).

Claims presented in habeas petitions are considered exhausted

if they have been ruled upon by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

However, if the sentence received is life imprisonment, the claims

must be presented to the Arizona Supreme Court. Swoopes, 196 F.3d

at 1010. Although a federal habeas petitioner may reformulate

somewhat the claims made in state court, Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796

F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d in part on other grounds by

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 1995), the substance of the federal

claim must have been "fairly presented" in state court. Anderson

v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam); Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971). While the petitioner need not recite

"book and verse on the federal constitution," Picard, 404 U.S. at

277-78 (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir.

1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support

the federal claim were before the state courts or that a "somewhat

similar state law claim was made." Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6.

As an alternative to presenting his claims to the highest

state court, a petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement

by demonstrating that no state remedies remained available at the

time the federal habeas petition was filed. Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 125 (n. 28)(1982); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602

(9th Cir. 1989). However, this path is fraught with danger:

If state remedies are not available because the

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petitioner failed to comply with state procedures and

thereby prevented the highest state court from reaching

the merits of his claim, then a federal court may refuse

to reach the merits of that claim as a matter of comity.

Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988); see also

Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010 (determining that the exhaustion

requirement is satisfied if a petitioner presented a claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct review or via a petition

for post-conviction relief). This failure to comply with

reasonable state procedures is usually characterized as

"procedural default," "procedural bar," or a "waiver." As

discussed, exhausting state remedies by means of a procedural

default is risky. The burden is on the petitioner to show that he

or she has properly exhausted each claim. Dismissal of the

petition is proper when the record does not show that the

exhaustion requirement is met. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103,

1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023

(1982). If the unavailability of state remedies is in no way the

fault of the petitioner or his or her counsel, the exhaustion

requirement will likely be satisfied and a federal court may reach

the merits of the petitioner’s habeas claims.

In many cases, however, the lack of available state remedies

is a direct result of the petitioner’s failure to avail himself of

the state remedies in a timely or procedurally correct manner. In

such instances, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted, and may

not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of

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1

Appellate defaults are examined under the same standards that

apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim during trial.

Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

11

"cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse the default.1

 Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-

91 (1977); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989);

Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). "Cause"

is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). "Prejudice" is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Id.

"Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a

procedural default can occur, the Supreme Court ‘has not given the

term "cause" precise content.’" Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268,

1274 (11th Cir.)(quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that

cause should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to

petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a

claim was not reasonably available to counsel, (citation

omitted), or that "some interference by officials,"

(citation omitted), made compliance impracticable, would

constitute cause under this standard.

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Harmon, 894

F.2d at 1275; Allen v. Risley, 817 F.2d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1987).

The standard is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). The

"cause and prejudice" standard is equally applicable to pro se

litigants, Harmon, 894 F.2d at 1274; Hughes, 800 F.2d at 908,

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whether literate and assisted by "jailhouse lawyers," Tacho, 862

F.2d at 1381; illiterate and unaided, Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909, or

non-English speaking. Vasquez v. Lockhart, 867 F.2d 1056, 1058

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1100 (1989).

Finally, if a claim has been found to be procedurally

defaulted, the failure to establish cause for the default may be

excused under exceptional circumstances. For instance:

... in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ even in the absence of showing cause for

the procedural default.

Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

327 (1995)(to meet the Murray standard, "the petitioner must show

that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him in the light of the new evidence").

B. Application of Law to Facts of the Case

Respondents first contend petitioner's habeas claims are

procedurally barred because he failed to properly exhaust his

state court remedies by failing to present these claims to the

Arizona Supreme Court. 

In O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999), the U.S.

Supreme Court held that in order to properly exhaust state court

remedies for purposes of federal habeas review, a petitioner was

required to file petitions for discretionary review in state

supreme courts "when that review is part of the ordinary appellate

review procedure in the State ..." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847. 

The Court qualified this requirement, however, by stating "nothing

in our decision today requires the exhaustion of any specific

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state remedy when a State has provided that that remedy is

unavailable." Id.

Following up on O'Sullivan, in Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

1008 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that

under Arizona law a habeas applicant need not seek review in the

Arizona Supreme Court to fully exhaust state remedies unless the

applicant has been sentenced to death or life in prison. For

state prisoners given sentences less than death or life in prison,

appeal or review by the Arizona Supreme Court is "unavailable,"

within the meaning of O'Sullivan. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. 

Respondents appear to argue that Swoopes was wrongly decided,

especially in light of the subsequently decided U.S. Supreme Court

case of Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004). They contend that

petitioner's failure to seek review of his habeas claims in the

Arizona Supreme Court either on direct appeal or in a Rule 32

proceeding renders the claim unexhausted and, ultimately,

procedurally defaulted. 

Upon review, nothing in Baldwin either explicitly or

implicitly overrules the Ninth Circuit's holding in Swoopes. 

Nothing in Baldwin contradicts the statement in O'Sullivan to the

effect that "nothing in our decision today requires the exhaustion

of any specific state remedy when a State has provided that that

remedy is unavailable." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847. Swoopes

picked up on this passage from O'Sullivan and held that Arizona

has provided that appeal or review to the Arizona Supreme Court is

not "available" to inmates who have not been sentenced to death or

life in prison. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. As a result, for

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purposes of federal habeas exhaustion, Arizona inmates challenging

their state court convictions on federal habeas review, who have

not been sentenced to death or life in prison, properly exhaust

state remedies when they either appeal or seek post-conviction

review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Swoopes is still good law

and the Court is bound by it. As a result, respondents'

contention that petitioner's habeas claims are unexhausted and now

procedurally defaulted because petitioner failed to raise these

claims before the Arizona Supreme Court is without merit. 

Alternatively, respondents argue that Grounds V, VI, VIII,

IX, X and XI are procedurally barred for other reasons. 

With respect to Ground V (alleging his 5th and 6th Amendment

rights were violated when the trial court denied his request for

leave to submit additional information and material to impeach the

medical examiner's testimony that the victim was shot 4 or 5

times), respondents assert the claim is not cognizable on habeas

review because the claim was not presented in state court as a

violation of federal law or petitioner's federal constitutional

rights. Upon review, petitioner presented this issue in his brief

in support of his Rule 32 in the Arizona Court of Appeals only as

a question of state law. (See Doc. 11, Exhibit SS at pp. 18-20). 

Petitioner never raised this issue as a violation of his federal

constitutional rights. As a result, the federal nature of the

claim raised in Ground V was not exhausted in state court. 

Because the time to raise this claim has long since passed the

claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has presented no

cause for the default nor has he presented evidence of actual

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innocence which might support considering the claim despite the

default. This claim should be denied. 

In Ground VI, petitioner alleges his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance when he failed to object to "repeated"

instances of prosecutorial misconduct during closing. (Doc. 1 at

p. 10 and Attachments). Respondents assert the Arizona trial

court found this claim precluded pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2(a) and, thus, it is now procedurally defaulted.

Review of petitioner's brief in support of his Rule 32

petition filed in the trial court and his petition for review

filed in the Arizona Court of Appeals indicates he did raise a

claim of ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to

challenge "prosecutorial misconduct set forth in the direct

appeal, ..." (Doc. 11, Exhibits MM at p. 20; SS at pp. 14-15). 

The trial court rejected this claim as precluded pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(2). The trial court appears to have

predicated this conclusion on its finding that the underlying

claim of prosecutorial misconduct was "fully litigated on [direct]

appeal." Alternatively, the trial court concluded the claim was

without merit. (See Doc. 11, Exhibit RR at p. 1). The Arizona

Court of Appeals denied review without comment. (Id. at Exhibit

TT). 

Upon review, the Court believes petitioner has properly

exhausted this claim for purposes of federal habeas review. 

Irrespective of the trial court's finding that the claim was

precluded, petitioner was required by Arizona law to raise any

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a Rule 32 proceeding

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and not on direct appeal. State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d 525, 527

(Ariz. 2002) ("ineffective assistance of counsel claims are to be

brought in Rule 32 proceedings. Any such claims improvidently

raised in direct appeal, henceforth, will not be addressed by

appellate courts regardless of merit."). In light of this

specific holding by the Arizona Supreme Court, petitioner's

presentation of this claim in his Rule 32 proceeding rather than

on direct appeal constituted proper exhaustion for purposes of

federal habeas review.

In Ground VIII, petitioner raises several issues alleging

violations of his federal constitutional rights, including: (1)

the trial court violated his due process rights when it refused to

allow him to present evidence that Wendy Danley, petitioner's

fiancé and the victim who was shot and killed, had a prior history

of violence and suicide, while permitting the prosecution to

present evidence she was not violent; (2) trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to use papers

from Wendy Danley's divorce to her first husband to impeach

another witness, William Boehme, who testified Danley was not

violent toward others; (3) the trial court prevented petitioner

from presenting evidence that he killed Wendy Danley in selfdefense. (Doc. 1 at pp. 12 and Attached p. 12-1). Issues (1) and

(3) as presented in petitioner's brief are essentially the same

claim.

With respect to that portion of Ground VIII alleging

petitioner's due process rights were violated when he was

prevented from presenting evidence of the victim's violence and

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her suicide attempts to support his claim of self-defense, the

Arizona Court of Appeals refused to consider this claim on the

merits on direct appeal because petitioner failed to cite any

portion of the record that actually showed the trial court

prevented him from presenting such evidence. (See Doc. 11,

Exhibit KK at pp. 22-23). The Court of Appeals noted that

"petitioner has a duty to cite the record to support his

arguments" and that [b]ecause he has failed to do so, we decline

to address this argument." (Id. at p. 23). 

Petitioner has not properly exhausted a habeas claim unless

he has fairly presented it in state court. Petitioner did not

fairly present this claim in state court. See Copeland v.

Roettgen, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Submitting a new claim

... in a procedural context in which its merits will not be

considered absent special circumstances does not constitute fair

presentation."). As a result, because the time to properly

present this issue in state court has long passed, the claim has

been procedurally defaulted. For this reason, and because

petitioner has not presented a colorable claim of actual

innocence, the claim should be procedurally barred from federal

habeas review.

With regard to the other issue raised in Ground VIII, that

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by

failing to introduce at trial the victim's divorce papers from her

first marriage to impeach a prosecution witness who testified the

victim was not violent, respondents assert this issue was not

raised in state court. Review of the record shows that no claims

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of ineffective assistance of counsel were raised on direct appeal

and that no specific claim concerning impeaching William Boehme's

testimony with the victim's divorce papers was raised in the Rule

32. Petitioner has presented no cause for failing to raise this

claim of ineffective assistance in state court and the claim is

procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has presented no colorable

evidence of actual innocence which would permit the Court to

ignore the procedural default and the claim should be denied.

Respondents next assert that Grounds IX, X and XI are

procedurally defaulted because petitioner acknowledges he never

presented the substance of these claims in state court. Review of

the habeas petition reveals petitioner did not indicate he

presented these claims in state court. Petitioner argues in his

reply that these claims are not procedurally defaulted because he

did present the substance of these issues to his post-conviction

review attorney. (Doc. 17 at p. 16). Even if true, this is not a

basis to excuse the default. Petitioner has no constitutional

right to counsel in a post-conviction relief proceeding and, thus,

any allegation of misconduct cannot provide a basis for cause. 

See Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1993).

III. MERITS OF PROPERLY EXHAUSTED CLAIMS

 Grounds I-IV and VI-VII have been properly exhausted and will

be considered on the merits.

A. Habeas Standard of Review

 Under the AEDPA the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is

limited to circumstances in which the state court adjudication

"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved and

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unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States ... or

resulted in a decision that was an unreasonable determination of

the facts ..." 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) and (2). "[A] state court

decision applies 'clearly established' Supreme Court law under the

AEDPA when it 'applies a rule dictated by [Supreme Court]

precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became

final." Campbell v. Rice, 265 F.3d 878, 889 (9th Cir.

2001)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 376 (2001)). As

stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the 'reasonable

application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court's decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner's case.

...

[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is

different from an incorrect application of federal law

...a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, the application must also be unreasonable.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring in

part, and concurring in the judgment). "In order for a state

court's application of federal law to be unreasonable, it must

have been clearly erroneous." Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143,

1152-54 (9th Cir. 2000). "Petitioner cannot meet his burden by

simply convincing the federal court that he has the better of two

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reasonable legal arguments." Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832,

837 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1154)).

B. Merits of Petitioner's Remaining Claims

1. Trial Evidence

Before addressing petitioner's properly exhausted claims, the

Magistrate Judge will summarize the gist of the evidence presented

at trial. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the evidence

presented at trial in its decision on appeal. Upon review of the

record, the Magistrate Judge believes the summary accurately

reflects the trial record. The Court summarized the evidence as

follows:

[Petitioner] and [Wendy Danley] were engaged to be

married. Although the couple had a history of arguing

... they continued to live together with Wendy's father

and her two children. While living in the house,

[petitioner] owned two handguns, a .22 Beretta and a .22 

Jennings, the first of which he customarily kept loaded

under his pillow while he slept.

 In the early morning hours of May 1, 1997, each gun

was fired. Wendy was shot five times, three times in

the head, once in the shoulder and once in the neck.

[Petitioner] suffered a gunshot wound to his head and

passed out. Neither the neighbors nor the other members

of the household were awakened by this commotion.

 Approximately two hours after the shooting, at 3:30

a.m., [petitioner] awoke, washed his hands, held a sock

to his forehead to stop the bleeding and called 9-1-1. 

While noticing that Wendy was making gurgling sounds, he

never alerted the members of Wendy's family of her

condition. He told the 9-1-1 operator he did not know

who had shot him and Wendy.

 Within minutes of receiving the telephone call,

police officers and paramedics arrived. [Petitioner] was

calm and responsive. Although he subsequently altered

his explanation of the shooting, [petitioner] initially

told police officers he did not know who had shot him. 

Specifically, Officer Stephen Laird asked [petitioner]

what had happened, and [petitioner] stated he did not

know who had shot him and Wendy but that this person was

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no longer in the house. He later repeated these

statements to Officer John Ferris, another officer at

the scene, and added that he must have been shot with a

small-caliber gun.

 Both Wendy and [petitioner] were transported to a

hospital for treatment. While preparing to go to the

hospital, Officer Laird asked [petitioner] about two

holsters found on the bed. [Petitioner] stated that he

had owned two guns but that he lost his Jennings in the

desert.

 [Petitioner] was examined in the emergency room. 

He told hospital personnel that he had consumed ten to

twelve beers that night, and, when tested, his bloodalcohol content was .231. Nonetheless, according to

hospital personnel, he answered questions appropriately,

...

 [Petitioner] was questioned by several police

officers at the hospital. At 5:45 a.m., Officer Jeff

Kendall arrived there and located [petitioner] ...

[Petitioner] appeared awake and coherent. Officer

Kendell swabbed [petitioner's] hands, and, although

[petitioner] was not in custody, the officer informed

[him] of his Miranda rights before asking him any

questions. [Petitioner] indicated that he understood his

rights and reiterated that he did not remember what had

happened. Specifically he did not recall arguing with

Wendy that evening. He admitted that he owned a .22

caliber Beretta and a rifle, and that he had handled the

Beretta that evening, but he did not remember why. When

[petitioner] said that he did not want to talk anymore,

Officer Kendell left.

 Meanwhile, investigating officers found in the

house three casings from the Beretta and two from the

Jennings. A third casing had jammed in the Jennings

after firing.

 Prior to undergoing surgery, [petitioner] again

spoke to Officers Ferris and Kendell. During a ten - to

twenty-minute conversation with Officer Ferris,

[petitioner] repeated that he did not know who had shot

him and Wendy. He said that he was walking to the

bathroom when he was shot but that he had not seen

anyone. He also stated that he did not remember arguing

with anyone that night.

 Some time later, while [petitioner] still was

awaiting surgery, Officer Kendell spoke with [him] and

told him that Wendy had said that [petitioner] had shot

her. [Petitioner] replied, "No way, no way." When asked

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why Wendy would have said that, he said, "I don't know

... I will deal with it later" ....

 [Petitioner] was in surgery from about 10:30 a.m.

to 12:30 p.m. By 3:30 p.m., he was alert, and he

subsequently was interviewed by Detective Lawrence Baggs

and then Detective Allen Reed.

 Detective Baggs first spoke with [petitioner] in

intensive care at approximately 5:30 p.m. [Petitioner]

repeated that he did not know who had shot him and

Wendy. The detective asked him whether he owned a

Jennings, and [petitioner] said that he used to own one

but that he had lost it in the desert six months before. 

When Detective Baggs then told [him] that police

officers had found the Jennings under his bathroom

carpet, [petitioner] had no explanation.

 Several hours later, Detective Reed spoke with

[petitioner]. [Petitioner] again denied having argued

with Wendy the night before.

 [Petitioner] was discharged from the hospital on

May 3, [1997]. Wendy, however, died on May 12, [1997],

from one of the gun shot wounds to her head.

 Unaware Wendy had died earlier that day, on May 12,

[petitioner] and his father went to the police station

to reclaim some personal items seized during the

investigation. While there, [petitioner] asked to speak

to Detective Baggs. The detective explained that

[petitioner] was not under arrest and that he could

leave at any time. [Petitioner] repeated the story that

he did not know who had shot him and Wendy, and he

provided additional details about having lost his

Jennings in the desert. He suggested that, perhaps, the

Jennings he had lost in the desert was a different one

than the one that matched the receipt found under his

bed. After [he] was informed that Wendy had died, he

maintained that he had told everything he knew about the

incident and then left.

 [Petitioner] was arrested on May 19, 1997, and

charged with Wendy's murder. At trial, he conceded that

he had in fact killed Wendy, but he claimed it was in

self-defense. [Petitioner] testified that Wendy had shot

him, but that he had lied to police officers, friends

and family in order to protect her.

 According to [petitioner], on the evening of April

30, 1997, he had been drinking after returning home from

work. He and Wendy began arguing about their

relationship. During this fight, [petitioner]

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threatened to leave Wendy and asked her to return the

engagement ring. The argument later ended and both of

them went to bed.

 He contended that he was shot in the head while he

was sleeping, that he had jumped up, grabbed his Beretta

from under his pillow and rolled off the bed. He said

that another shot had hit a pillow on the bed as he

crawled around it and that he then had stood and fired

his Beretta three or four times at the unknown

assailant. It was only after he turned on the light

that he had discovered that he had shot Wendy and thrown

the Beretta on the bed. He denied shooting the Jennings

that evening but, rather, claimed that he found it on

the floor in front of Wendy. He admitted, however, that

he must have hidden it under the carpet behind the

toilet although he denied remembering having done so.

 [Petitioner] testified that he then had become

unconscious and fallen to the floor. When he later

awakened, lying on the bed, he noticed that the Jennings

was missing and that Wendy had not moved. He proceeded

to wipe the blood off himself before checking Wendy, who

was making a gurgling sound. He washed and went in the

living room to call 9-1-1.

 The jury found [petitioner] guilty of second degree 

murder. He was sentenced to the presumptive term of 16

years, ...

(Doc. 11, Exhibit KK at pp. 2-7).

2. Petitioner's Grounds for Relief

Grounds I-IV raise various claims of ineffective assistance

of trial counsel. 

a. Law Generally

Claims of ineffective assistance are analyzed pursuant to

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1994). In order to

prevail on such a claim, petitioner must show:

1. Counsel's representation fell below the objective

standard for reasonableness; and

2. There is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.

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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694; see also United States v.

Thornton, 23 F.3d 1532, 1533 (9th Cir. 1994)(per curiam); United

States v. Solomon, 795 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986).

 This two-pronged test "deficient performance and prejudice"

poses a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

698; Thompson v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 1509, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The court hearing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must

consider the totality of the evidence with an eye toward the

ultimate issue of whether counsel's conduct so undermined the

functioning of the adversarial process that the proceeding lacked

fundamental fairness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Card v.

Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1990)(observing that counsel

cannot be labeled ineffective for failing to raise issues which

have no merit). Reasonableness is judged from counsel's

perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986);

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

 Deficient performance is one in which counsel's errors were

so great he or she was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed

by the Sixth Amendment. Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864 (9th Cir.

1986). To prove such ineffectiveness, a petitioner must

demonstrate that counsel's actions were "outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." United States v. Houtchens,

926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687-90). There is a strong presumption counsel's conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and

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that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be

considered sound trial strategy. United States v. QuinterroBarraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519

U.S. 848 (1996); United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th

Cir. 1991).

 When assessing prejudice, the court should not focus solely

upon the outcome. Rather, the governing legal standard in

determining prejudice is "whether counsel's deficient performance

renders the result of the trial unreliable or fundamentally

unfair." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).

 In short, the court's scrutiny is highly deferential and

every effort should be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381; United States v. Natanel,

938 F.2d 302, 309-10 (1st Cir. 1991)("The performance standard is

to be applied not in hindsight, but based on what the lawyer knew,

or should have known, at the time his tactical choices were made

and implemented."), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1079 (1992); Diaz v.

United States, 930 F.2d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1991). Moreover,

cursory allegations that are purely speculative cannot support a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Shah v. United

States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869

(1989).

b. Petitioner's Claims of Ineffective Assistance

GROUNDS I, II AND III

In Grounds I, II and III, petitioner raises claims alleging

that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

call various experts to refute prosecution evidence. In Ground I,

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petitioner contends defense counsel knew petitioner's defense was

self-defense and yet "was unable to capatalize [sic] ... as he

never offered any expert testimony to show how [petitioner's]

defense was prejudiced as a result of this one sided investigation

by unprofessional detectives." (Doc. 1 at p. 5 and 5-1). He

contends counsel should have brought in a crime-scene

reconstructionist. In Ground II, petitioner asserts counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call a ballistics

expert to refute the testimony of the State's experts that the

victim was shot five times. (Doc. 1 at p. 6 - 6-3). In Ground

III, petitioner contends counsel was ineffective for not calling a

forensic pathologist to counter the two pathologists called by the

State. (Doc. 1 at pp. 7 - 7-2). 

The trial court denied relief with respect to the claim that

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call these experts. 

The court stated in its denial of Rule 32 relief:

[Petitioner] argues that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to consult or call a

pathologist, ballistics experts, and crime scene

reconstructionist .... [Petitioner] has failed to

establish a colorable claim that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to rebut the State's witnesses

with experts testimony. In fact, [petitioner's] trial

counsel was able to effectively exploit the odd

circumstances of the crime, the investigation by law

enforcement authorities, and the medical examiner's

testimony and admission of error. The expert opinions

would not have given the jury a reason to reach a

different verdict ....

(Doc. 11, Exhibit RR at p. 2). The trial court did not cite

federal law or the federal constitution in reaching its decision. 

Nevertheless, its determination must be upheld unless it is

contrary to federal law or its application of the facts is

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unreasonable in light of the evidence presented. 

GROUND I

With respect to Ground I (failure to call an expert in crime

scene reconstruction), petitioner asserts that counsel failed to

"collect" evidence to support his claim of self-defense and failed

to investigate whether anyone besides petitioner could have killed

Wendy. (Doc. 1 at p. 5). This claim is without merit.

As noted by both petitioner and respondents, the record shows

that counsel argued extensively the angle of an improper

investigation by police which failed to preserve critical

evidence. (See Doc.11, Exhibit R at pp. 38-42). In addition, the

defense obtained an instruction pursuant to State v. Willits, 393

P.2d 274, 279 (Ariz. 1964) instructing the jury:

If you find that the State has lost, destroyed, or, in

this case, failed to preserve evidence - ... whose

contents or quality are important to the issues in this

case, then you should weigh the explanation, if any,

given for the loss or unavailability of the evidence. 

If you find such explanation is inadequate, then you may

draw an inference unfavorable to the State, which in

itself may create a reasonable doubt as to the

defendant's guilty.

(Doc. 11, Exhibit R at pp. 42 and 89). This Willits instruction,

petitioner's own lengthy testimony at trial, and counsel's closing

argument, as well as counsel's extensive cross-examination of

police who investigated the crime scene, belie petitioner's claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel argued that

numerous errors by police made their findings questionable. For

instance, he highlighted the fact that investigators failed to bag

Wendy's hands so they could later check and see if tests could

show whether she had discharged a firearm. He argued they also

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failed to take photographs of her wounds, failed to test Wendy's

blood alcohol content and failed to question the state's forensic

experts, Drs. Carrion and Keen, early on in the investigation. 

(See id. at pp. 38-39). 

Further, as noted by respondents, if counsel had called a

crime scene reconstructionist, the expert would have been subject

to cross-examination by the prosecution as to those things police

did well and this could have hurt petitioner's defense. Under

these circumstances, and in light of the arguments, crossexamination and the Willits instruction, counsel's decision not to

call a crime scene reconstructionist was within the bounds of

reasonable judgment and does not constitute ineffective assistance

of counsel.

GROUND II

In Ground II, petitioner contends counsel was ineffective in

failing "to properly investigate through ballistics whether [the]

prosecution's theory of [the victim] being shot 5 times had any

merit." (Doc. 1 at p. 6). In particular, petitioner cites

counsel's failure to retain the services of a ballistics expert

"to review all scientific evidence and develop crucial facts to be

used at trial." (Id.). 

Petitioner argues that a ballistics expert could have aided

him in refuting the State's expert testimony that the victim was

shot five times. (Doc. 1 at p. 6). In particular he cites a

report prepared by Ed Love for his state Rule 32 that he claims

refutes the State's contention that five shots were fired at the

victim. (See id.). 

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Petitioner's arguments amount to pure speculation. 

Petitioner merely re-argues the quantum of the ballistics evidence

presented at trial to support the prosecution's theory that the

victim was shot five times. (See Doc. 11 at Exhibit OO). The

Magistrate Judge has reviewed the report of Ed Love cited by

petitioner. Although, the report by Love does question some of

the evidence of the prosecution experts on this point, such as

noting the fact that the victim suffered only three wounds, this

does not directly contradict the five-bullet theory. 

As noted by respondents, Love's report does not directly

challenge the prosecution's theory that five bullets or five

separate bullet fragments entered the victim. (See Doc. 11 at

Exhibit OO). Petitioner's claims are speculative, unsubstantiated

and insufficient to support a claim that defense counsel was

ineffective for not calling a ballistics expert.

GROUND III

In Ground III, petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective for

failing to call a forensic pathologist to testify on his behalf at

trial. (Doc. 1 at p. 7 and Attachments). Specifically, he

contends that defense counsel should have called a forensic expert

to refute testimony by two prosecution experts, Drs. Carrion and

Keen. (See id.). 

Dr. Carrion testified he treated the victim, Wendy Lou

Danley, the day she was brought to the hospital. He testified he

observed six wounds to Wendy's head, but that only one actually

penetrated into the brain. (Doc. 11, Exhibit E at p. 19). Dr.

Carrion testified Wendy received three separate gunshot wounds to

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the head and two separate gunshot wounds to the neck and shoulder. 

(Id. at p. 42). Dr. Carrion opined that these five separate

gunshot wounds were inflicted from different angles of entry. 

(Id. at p. 46). 

Dr. Carrion also testified that he treated petitioner for one

gunshot wound to his forehead. (Doc. 11, Exhibit E at p. 51). 

Dr. Carrion testified the bullet went down into the area behind

his nose, lodging in a sinus. (Id.). Dr. Carrion noted evidence

of stripling (gunpowder residue) to the area of petitioner's

wound, which he opined meant the gun was fired within 12 inches of

the wound. (Id. at pp. 53-54). He noted that petitioner was

released within two days and suffered no lasting injury from the

gunshot wound. (Id. at p. 58). 

On cross-examination, petitioner's counsel questioned Dr.

Carrion about his opinions. Dr. Carrion stated that he could not

state with certainty that the two wounds to the neck and shoulder

were gunshot wounds. He also conceded that he did not factor in

the potential for ricochet as the cause of the three separate

gunshot wounds to the head (thus creating the possibility that

less than three shots were fired into Wendy's head). Dr. Carrion

stated he thought ricochet was unlikely given the caliber of the

bullets (.22) but noted he was not a ballistics expert. (Doc. 11,

Exhibit E at pp. 61-91). In addition, Dr. Carrion opined that the

gunshot wound to petitioner was not likely self-inflicted. 

However, on re-direct he stated that it is possible that the wound

was self-inflicted. (Id. at p. 94). Dr. Carrion further stated

that if petitioner inflicted this gunshot wound on himself in this

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manner, it is not a very "efficient" way to commit suicide. 

(Id.). 

The State also called Dr. Philip Keen, the then-Chief Medical

Examiner for Maricopa and Yavapai Counties. Dr. Keen stated he

performed the autopsy on Wendy on May 13, 1997, the day after she

died. (Doc. 11, Exhibit H at pp. 5-7). Dr. Keen's conclusions

were consistent with Dr. Carrion's as to the likely number of

gunshots fired at Wendy. He stated he believed Wendy was shot at

least twice, and very likely three times in the head. He also

believed she received at least one gunshot wound in the neck and

shoulder, but was not certain if one of the bullets that inflicted

one of the head wounds (only one of the three bullets that went

into the head remained in the head) could also have caused the

injury to the shoulder. (See id. at pp. 14-16). He believed at

least four and possibly five shots hit Wendy. (Id. at p. 16). 

Dr. Keen also examined X-rays of the wound sustained by

petitioner. He opined that it was possible the wound was selfinflicted, but more likely the wound was indicative of being shot

by someone else. Dr. Keen stated that if the wound was selfinflicted, it was done in a manner that is unusual for someone

wishing to commit suicide. (Doc. 11, Exhibit H at pp. 30-39).

Petitioner asserts that a defense expert in forensics, such

as Dr. Bux, an expert petitioner states he retained for his Rule

32, should have been called at trial. He contends that had such

an expert been called he or she could have refuted the conclusions

of Drs. Carrion and Keen, particularly with respect to their

opinions that at least four and likely five bullets hit Wendy. 

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Petitioner's claim is without merit. Petitioner merely

engages in self-serving speculation as to whether calling Dr. Bux

or any other defense expert in forensics would have made a

difference. Trial counsel vigorously cross-examined Dr. Carrion. 

Although counsel did not cross-examine Dr. Keen, Dr. Keen, like

Dr. Carrion, made statements favorable to petitioner, particularly

in regards to their belief that it is unlikely the wound he

sustained was self-inflicted (thus, supporting his claim he shot

Wendy in self-defense). Under these circumstances, petitioner has

not presented enough evidence to support a finding that counsel

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to call a

defense expert in forensics.

GROUND IV

In Ground IV, petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective for

not "adequately advis[ing] [him] of the risks associated with

going to trial relative to accepting the plea offer." (Doc. 1 at

p. 8). According to petitioner, the State offered him a plea to

negligent homicide which he turned down on counsel's advice. To

prevail on this claim, petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would

not have gone to trial, but rather would have insisted on pleading

guilty. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

In an affidavit filed in support of his Rule 32 on this

issue, petitioner states that "[h]ad I known the State's position

and evidence, it might have impacted my decision on whether to

accept the plea offer." (Doc. 11, Exhibit QQ at p. 2 (para. 5)). 

Petitioner states only that had he known more about the State's

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position and evidence, it "might" have impacted his decision. 

However, to support a viable claim, petitioner must show a

reasonable probability his greater knowledge of the State's

position and evidence would have caused him to accept the plea. 

See Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001) (The

prejudice prong in Strickland "requires showing more than the

possibility that [petitioner] was prejudiced by counsel's errors;

he must demonstrate that the errors actually prejudiced him."). 

Petitioner has not made such a showing. 

In his habeas petition, petitioner states that "[h]ad [he]

known of the limited defense counsel intended to offer, the states

false evidence and position prior to trial theres [sic] a good

probability that [he] would have accepted the plea offer." This

statement is self-serving and conclusory. Petitioner fails to

support his claim that counsel presented a limited defense. The

record belies this. Counsel vigorously cross-examined witnesses,

including experts, obtained a Willits instruction, and petitioner

testified extensively in support of his claim that he acted in

self-defense. 

In addition, if petitioner believes that the evidence

presented by the prosecution is false, and that he really acted in

self-defense in shooting Wendy, it is not reasonable to assume he

would have pleaded guilty to negligent homicide. Petitioner is

merely seeking a second bite at the apple. He does not say he was

coerced into rejecting the plea. He merely argues that if certain

unspecified evidence had been made known to him, he might have

taken the plea. The evidence and petitioner's vigorous defense of

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his actions at trial, as well as the issues raised on appeal and

in his Rule 32 contradict this. This claim should be denied.

GROUND VI

In Ground VI, petitioner asserts trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to "repeated instances of

prosecutorial misconduct occurring throughout his trial ..." 

(Doc. 1 at p. 10). In particular, petitioner cites the

prosecutors "personal attack on opposing counsel." Petitioner

argues the prosecutor accused defense counsel of engaging in

speculation about whether Wendy shot a round as she was falling

down (after she was shot), as well as accusing defense counsel and

petitioner of fabricating a self-defense defense, and challenging

the defense claims concerning the number of bullets fired. (See

Doc. 1 at p. 10). 

This claim is without merit. Closing argument is the time to

frame the evidence in the light most favorable to a party. The

Court has reviewed the prosecutor's closing argument and finds no

constitutional violations from any of counsel's closing arguments. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed this issue on appeal and

found the closing arguments made by the prosecutor to be either

proper argument or, if not strictly proper, lacking in prejudice. 

(Doc. 11, Exhibit KK at pp. 9-22). 

Upon review, the Magistrate Judge believes that the Arizona

Court of Appeals conclusions were not contrary to federal law or

an unreasonable determination of the facts and should be upheld on

habeas review. Petitioner's claims are without merit.

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GROUND VII

In this ground, petitioner contends his appellate counsel

rendered ineffective assistance because he was unable to obtain a

transcript of a pre-trial "voluntariness" hearing held on May 29,

1998, to challenge the trial court's determination that his

statements to police at the hospital on the night of the incident

were voluntary and, thus, constitutionally proper. (See Doc. 1 at

p. 11). 

Petitioner contends he was interrogated by police while

receiving treatment at the hospital and argues that these

statements were involuntary and the questioning was not in

compliance with the standards outlined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (1966). (See Doc. 11 at pp. pp. 11 - 11-4). 

Specifically, petitioner asserts that the totality of the

circumstances surrounding his hospital questioning support a

"prima [facie] case that [his] pre-arrest statements were

involuntary." (Id. at p. 11-1). He contends that the answers he

gave in response to questioning by officers at the hospital on May

1, 1997 (the day of the incident), while awaiting surgery and

later that day after surgery, were not voluntary because he "was

seriously injured, medicated, awaiting brain surgery and

intoxicated when police repeatedly questioned him without advising

him of his [M]iranda rights." (Id.). 

Petitioner also alleges that police improperly tried to

deceive him by telling him that the victim identified him as the

person who shot her. He contends "police deceit, [his] physical

and mental incapacity, and influence of pain medication render[ed]

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[his] statements involuntary," especially when considered under

the totality of the circumstances. (Doc. 1 at p. 11-2).

Petitioner raised his claim that appellate counsel was

ineffective for not providing a transcript of the voluntariness

hearing in his Rule 32 petition. (See Doc. 11, Exhibit MM at pp.

21-22; Exhibit SS at pp. 15-18). He argued counsel's failure to

obtain a transcript of the voluntariness hearing prevented him

from prevailing on the claim on direct appeal that his statements

at the hospital were made in violation of Miranda. (Doc. 11,

Exhibit KK at p. 8).

The Strickland standard applies to claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel, although the prejudice prong is

modified to require a showing that "but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, [petitioner] would have prevailed on

appeal." Crockett v. Ray, 333 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied petitioner's freestanding Miranda claim on direct appeal, noting the trial court

found the statements "legally obtained and admissible." (Doc. 11,

Exhibit KK at p. 8). The state Court of Appeals did base its

denial on the fact that petitioner "failed to provide a transcript

of the May 29, 1998, [voluntariness] hearing for this court to

consider .... [and] by failing to provide a sufficient record on

appeal, the defendant has waived review of this issue, and we

uphold the trial court's decision to admit the statements." (Id.

at p. 9). 

In denying Rule 32 relief, the trial court stated:

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While [petitioner] argues that his appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to provide a transcript of the

May 29, 1998 hearing for the appellate court to consider

the issue of voluntariness, [petitioner] has failed to

show that any deficiency prejudiced him. The [trial

court] held a hearing to determine whether

[petitioner's] statements were voluntary and in

compliance with Miranda. The Court ruled that the

statements were legally obtained and admissible. The

witnesses who testified at the voluntariness hearing

also testified at trial. At trial [petitioner] had the

opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and emphasize

any inconsistencies in the testimony at the

voluntariness hearing and at trial. Therefore, the

trial testimony and any variance with the voluntariness

hearing testimony are part of the record. Finally, the

jury was properly instructed as follows:

 You must not consider any statements made by the

defendant to a law enforcement officer unless you

determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

made the statement voluntarily.

 A defendant's statement was not voluntary if it

resulted from the defendant's will being overcome by a

law enforcement officer's use of any sort of violence,

coercion, or threats or by any direct or implied

promise, however slight.

 You must give such weight to the defendant's

statement as you feel it deserves under all the

circumstances.

(Doc. 11, Exhibit RR at pp. 2-3) (emphasis in original). The

Arizona Court of Appeals denied a petition for review without

comment. (Doc. 11 at Exhibit TT).

Review of the record shows that petitioner's post-conviction

counsel sought, but could not obtain, a record of the

voluntariness hearing. (Doc. 11, Exhibit LL and Exhibit MM at p.

21). However, both parties agree that a voluntariness hearing was

held prior to trial (May 29, 1998), and that a number of witnesses

testified. (Doc. 11, Exhibit MM at p. 21; Exhibit R at p. 2). 

The trial court in denying Rule 32 relief noted, and petitioner

has not contested, that all of the witnesses who testified at the

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2

Petitioner was also questioned that day (after his surgery)

by Detective Allen Reed. (Doc. 11, Exhibit KK at p. 5).

38

voluntariness hearing also testified at trial. (Doc. 11, Exhibit

RR at p. 2). 

Appellate counsel did not obtain a copy of the transcript of

the hearing to support the Miranda claim. (See Doc. 11, Exhibit

KK at p. 9) It is not clear if he, like post-conviction counsel,

tried but failed to obtain a transcript or simply did not attempt

to obtain a transcript. 

In his habeas petition, petitioner cites as involuntary only

statements he made on May 1, 1997 (the day of the incident),

during questioning by police officers at the hospital emergency

room while awaiting treatment for his gunshot wound to the head

and later that day after he came out of surgery. (Doc. 1 at p.

11-1). In particular, he cites questioning by Detectives Lawrence

Baggs and Jeff Kendall, as well as Officer John Ferris as

improper.2 (See id.). 

Although petitioner does not recount the content of the

questioning at the hospital in his habeas petition, the gist of

the answers he gave, which were used against him at trial via the

testimony of these officers, were his claims that both he and

Wendy were shot by someone he did not know and that he had nothing

to do with Wendy's being shot. Later at trial, he completely

changed this story and argued that he did shoot Wendy, but in

self-defense. He claimed he perpetuated the lie to police and

others because he wanted to protect both himself and Wendy from

getting into trouble. (See Doc. 11, Exhibit N at p. 63).

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Upon review of the record, even assuming appellate counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to submit a copy of the

voluntariness hearing in support of the Miranda claim on direct

appeal, this claim must fail because petitioner cannot show

prejudice. As noted by respondents in their answer, even if the

statements petitioner made to police at the hospital (concerning

either being shot by an intruder or failing to remember what

happened to him), which petitioner admitted at trial were lies (he

knew he shot Wendy and claimed self-defense), had been excluded,

such statements were cumulative of similar statements made to

police and other witnesses at other times.

For instance, petitioner told the 9-1-1 operator that an

armed intruder shot him and Wendy. (Doc. 11, Exhibit P at pp. 1-

4). He also told a police officer at the scene the same story. 

(Doc. 11, Exhibit G at p. 27 (testimony of Officer Stephen Laird)) 

Later, on May 12, 1997, more than 10 days after the incident,

petitioner agreed to an interview with Detective Baggs when he

came to police headquarters on his own initiative to retrieve some

property and reiterated the armed intruder/third party shooter

story. (Doc. 11, Exhibit F at pp. 63-65). In fact, petitioner

maintained this story, or that he simply did not recall what

happened, to various individuals for nearly a year, up through

April of 1998. (Doc. 11, Exhibit N at pp. 57-58; Exhibit Z at pp.

91-95 and 98-107 (testimony of Debra Zentner and Donna Carpenter);

Exhibit AA at pp. 8-25 (testimony of petitioner's mother that he

told her he did not know how the shooting occurred). 

As a result, even if petitioner had been successful in

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barring admission at trial of any statements he made to police at

the hospital on May 1, 1997, ample additional evidence of the

false story (the armed intruder shooter) was available to the

prosecution from a number of witnesses. Petitioner admitted at

trial that he lied about a third-party shooter to protect himself

and, he claims, Wendy. In light of this additional evidence, any

statements made at the hospital were cumulative and, thus, their

admission at trial was harmless. Based on other evidence and

testimony, petitioner would still have had to admit during his

testimony that his initial story (that someone, not him, shot

Wendy) was a lie, especially to support his claim of self-defense. 

For these reasons, counsel's failure to obtain a transcript

of the voluntariness hearing was harmless and petitioner cannot

show that but for this error he would have prevailed on appeal. 

The trial court's determination at the Rule 32 (upheld without

comment on review) that petitioner was not prejudiced by any

failure to produce a transcript is neither contrary to or an

unreasonable determination of federal law as determined by the

U.S. Supreme Court. This claim should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be denied.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any

notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the

district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of this Report and

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Recommendation within which to file specific written objections

with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely

file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver

of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in

an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

Report and Recommendation. 

DATED this 8th day of May, 2006.

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