Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00490/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00490-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN C. APPLEGATE,

Plaintiff,

v.

PHILIP NKWOCHA, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE No. 1:16-cv-00490-MJS (PC)

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 

EITHER FILE A FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY COURT OF 

WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ONLY ON 

COGNIZABLE CLAIMS

(ECF No. 1)

THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. 

No other parties have appeared in the action.

Plaintiff‟s complaint is now before the Court for screening.

I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. Pleading Standard

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison but complains of acts that 

occurred at California Correctional Institution (“CCI”) in Tehachapi, California. He names 

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

the following defendants: (1) Philip Nkwocha, (2) the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, and (3) California Correctional Health Care Services

(“CCHCS”).

Plaintiff‟s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows:

On December 19, 2015, Plaintiff was en route from the pill line to his cell when 

Defendant Nkwocha asked Plaintiff why he was not wearing his disability vest. Plaintiff 

ignored Nkwocha and continued walking. According to Plaintiff, his vest had been 

confiscated the day before and Nkwocha was aware of this fact. Plaintiff believed 

Nkwocha was baiting Plaintiff into a conflict due to Nkwocha‟s frustration with an inmate 

appeal Plaintiff had filed regarding a cell search conducted by Nkwocha and his partner, 

non-party Bragdon.1

Nkwocha ordered Plaintiff to come over and Plaintiff complied. Nkwocha berated 

Plaintiff, calling him, amongst other things, a “legal beagle” and a “silly Jew.” Nkwocha 

told Plaintiff to do what Nkwocha said and then told Plaintiff to go home. When Plaintiff 

arrived to his cell door, Nkwocha stated, “now everybody got to see you break it down.” 

Plaintiff replied “whatever you say man.” Nkwocha sprinted at Plaintiff and Plaintiff 

stepped inside his cell and closed the door.

Nkwocha ordered Plaintiff to cuff up and Plaintiff complied. Nkwocha took Plaintiff 

to the shower and told him to strip; Plaintiff again complied. Nkwocha sprayed Plaintiff‟s 

entire body with pepper spray. Non-party Garcia had turned the water off from the tower, 

preventing Plaintiff from decontaminating. About an hour later, Nkwocha took Plaintiff 

from the shower to his cell and stated, “file one of your dumb 602s and next time you‟ll 

get the boot motherfucker.” The water also was off in Plaintiff‟s cell and Plaintiff was 

unable to decontaminate until the next morning. Plaintiff tried to decontaminate with toilet 

water and Nkwocha mocked him. Plaintiff experienced pain for several days as a result 

of the inadequate decontamination.

 

1

That search is the subject of a separate action, Case No. 1:16-cv-515-MJS (PC).

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

As a result of Nkwocha‟s threats, Plaintiff feared leaving his cell. Plaintiff regularly 

refused to leave his cell during Nkwocha‟s watch and therefore missed his medication.

CDCR, Nkwocha and Garcia covered up the incident with Nkwocha by not 

documenting it.

Plaintiff filed a 602 and a mandamus action in state court regarding the 

processing (or lack thereof) of his inmate appeals at CCI. At some point, Nkwocha told 

him, “I saw your legal mail crybaby Jew.”

Plaintiff alleges claims for “impeding” the exercise of his First and Eighth 

Amendment rights, retaliation, inadequate medical care, Equal Protection, and state law 

claims for violation of the Bane Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, 

battery, “criminal/terrorist threat,” and failure to summon medical care.

He seeks money damages, unspecified declaratory relief, and an injunction 

requiring the use of body cameras on CDCR officers and the processing of his 602s. He 

asks the Court to take judicial notice of his mandamus petition in the Sacramento 

Superior Court regarding processing of his 602s.

IV. Analysis

A. Judicial Notice

Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of pending matters in the Superior 

Court of California, County of Sacramento. The Court may take judicial notice of court 

records in other cases. United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). 

However, no such records have been submitted to the Court and the Court will not 

search the dockets of other courts to find documents that support Plaintiff‟s case. Fed. R. 

Evid. 201(c)(2) (“The court . . . must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the 

court is supplied with the necessary information.”). Plaintiff‟s request for judicial notice 

will be denied without prejudice.

B. Allegations against Non-Party Garcia

Defendant Nkwocha is the only individual named in this action. However, 

Plaintiff‟s complaint contains allegations against non-party Garcia.

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that each defendant 

be named in the caption of the complaint. A complaint is subject to dismissal if “one 

cannot determine from the complaint who is being sued, [and] for what relief. . . .” 

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996). As Garcia is not named in the 

caption, the Court is unable to determine whether Plaintiff intends to proceed against 

him or her. 

Accordingly, the Court will not herein address allegations against non-party 

Garcia. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue such allegations, he may amend his complaint and 

include Garcia in the caption.

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff names the CDCR and CCHCS as defendants. Plaintiff‟s attempt to name 

these state entities as defendants is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. E.g., 

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (suits against 

the state or its agencies are absolutely barred, regardless of the form of relief sought).

Plaintiff cannot state a claim against CDCR or California Correctional Health Care 

Services. Leave to amend such claims is futile and will be denied.

D. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of 

punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 

F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006).

1. Use of Pepper Spray

. “In its prohibition of „cruel and unusual punishments,‟ the Eighth Amendment 

places restraints on prison officials, who may not . . . use excessive physical force 

against prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 

(1992)). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in 

violation of the [Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is ... whether force was 

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

312 (1986)).

When determining whether the force was excessive, the court looks to the “extent 

of the injury suffered by an inmate . . . , the need for application of force, the relationship 

between that need and the amount of force used, the threat „reasonably perceived by 

the responsible officials,‟ and „any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful 

response.‟” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). While de minimis 

uses of physical force generally do not implicate the Eighth Amendment, significant 

injury need not be evident in the context of an excessive force claim, because “[w]hen 

prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary 

standards of decency always are violated.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (citing Whitley, 475 

U.S. at 327).

The extent of injury suffered by the plaintiff may indicate the amount of force 

applied. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “[N]ot „every malevolent touch by a 

prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.‟” Id. (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9).

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of „cruel and unusual‟ 

punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional 

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that 

the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience 

of mankind. An inmate who complains of a „push or shove‟ 

that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state 

a valid excessive force claim. Injury and force, however, are 

only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately 

counts.”

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38 (internal citations and some internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff here accuses Defendant Nkwocha of attacking him with pepper spray 

without provocation. This allegation is sufficient to state a claim.

2. Decontamination

Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must 

provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal 

safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994). “[A] prison official may be held 

liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if 

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by 

failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 

(1994).

A conditions of confinement claim has both an objective and a subjective 

component. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “First, the deprivation alleged must be . . . 

sufficiently serious,” and must “result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of 

life‟s necessities.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) “[E]xtreme 

deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

Second, the prison official must have acted with “deliberate indifference” to inmate 

health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “Mere negligence is not sufficient to establish 

liability.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Rather, a plaintiff must 

show that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, “the official must both be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 

must also draw the inference.” Id.

Delays in providing showers and medical attention for inmates suffering from 

harmful effects of pepper spray may violate the Eighth Amendment. Clement v. Gomez, 

298 F.3d 898, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff alleges that he had no means to decontaminate in the hour following the 

deployment of pepper spray, and thereafter had access only to dirty toilet water. 

Defendant Nkwocha was aware that Plaitniff had insufficient means to decontaminate. 

This is sufficient to allege a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

E. Fourteenth Amendment

1. Equal Protection

Plaintiff alleges that he Defendant‟s conduct was motivated by discrimination

against Plaintiff on the basis of his Jewish religion.

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be 

treated alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 

(1985). An equal protection claim may be established by showing that the defendant 

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff's membership in a 

protected class, Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of 

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly situated individuals were 

intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state 

purpose, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Lazy Y 

Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of 

Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Nkwocha attacked Plaintiff with pepper spray 

because Plaintiff is Jewish. In support, Plaintiff alleges that Nkwocha made derogatory 

remarks regarding Plaintiff‟s religion prior to the attack. These facts are sufficient to state 

an Equal Protection claim.

2. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff may intend to allege a procedural due process claim based on 

Defendant‟s interference, or attempted interference, with Plaintiff‟s grievances. 

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty 

without the procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. 

Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). However, Plaintiff has no stand-alone due process 

rights related to the administrative grievance process. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 

860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Failing to 

properly process a grievance does not constitute a due process violation. See, e.g., 

Wright v. Shannon, No. 1:05-cv-01485-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 2, 2010) (plaintiff's allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate 

appeals failed to state a cognizable claim under the First Amendment); Williams v. Cate, 

No. 1:09-cv-00468-OWW-YNP PC, 2009 WL 3789597, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) 

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

(“Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in the vindication of his administrative 

claims.”).

Accordingly, this allegation fails to state a claim.

F. First Amendment Retaliation

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner‟s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

The second element focuses on causation and motive. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 

F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was a 

“„substantial‟ or „motivating‟ factor behind the defendant‟s conduct.” Id. (quoting 

Sorrano‟s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Although it can 

be difficult to establish the motive or intent of the defendant, a plaintiff may rely on 

circumstantial evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that 

a prisoner established a triable issue of fact regarding prison officials‟ retaliatory motives 

by raising issues of suspect timing, evidence, and statements); Hines v. Gomez, 108 

F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(“timing can properly be considered as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent”).

In terms of the third prerequisite, filing a grievance is a protected action under the 

First Amendment. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). 

With respect to the fourth prong, “[it] would be unjust to allow a defendant to 

escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined 

plaintiff persists in his protected activity . . . .” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 

192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). The correct inquiry is to determine whether an 

official‟s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First 

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Amendment activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (citing Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 

F.3d at 1300).

With respect to the fifth prong, a prisoner must affirmatively allege that “„the prison 

authorities‟ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional 

institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo v. Dawson, 

778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff alleges that he filed a grievance against Defendant Nkwocha in relation to 

a cell search and, shortly thereafter, Nkwocha taunted him and attacked him with pepper 

spray. Additionally, Nkwocha threatened to give Plaintiff “the boot” if Plaintiff filed further 

grievances. Plaintiff alleges that Nkwocha was aware of his grievances and other 

litigation and made derogatory comments regarding Plaintiff being a “legal beagle.”

These allegations are sufficient to state a retaliation claim.

G. State Law

1. Supplemental Jurisdiction

The Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims in any civil 

action in which it has original jurisdiction, if the state law claims form part of the same 

case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “The district courts may decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has 

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The 

Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . 

the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 

U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged cognizable federal claims. Accordingly, the Court may 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising out of the same case or 

controversy.

2. California Tort Claims Act

Plaintiff alleges that he presented his state law claims to the Victims 

Compensation and Government Claims Board as required under the California Tort 

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Claims Act. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 905, 911.2(a), 945.4 & 950.2; Mangold v. California Pub. 

Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995).

3. California Civil Code 

Plaintiff alleges a claim for “criminal/terrorist threat.” Presumably, this is a 

reference to California Civil Code Section 51.7, also known as the Ralph Civil Rights Act. 

This provision protects persons from violence or intimidation by threat of violence 

committed against them because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, 

political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, or disability. Plaintiff alleges that he is 

Jewish, that Defendant knew he was Jewish, and that Defendant‟s attack on Plaintiff was 

motivated by his Jewish religion. Plaintiff has alleged a cognizable claim under the Ralph 

Civil Rights Act.

.Plaintiff also alleges a claim under the Bane Act. Section 52.1 authorizes a claim 

for relief “against anyone who interferes, or tries to do so, by threats, intimidation, or 

coercion, with an individual‟s exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by federal or state 

law.” Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 331 (1998). A Bane Act Plaintiff must show

“(1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal 

constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by 

threats, intimidation or coercion.” Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal App. 4th 41, 67 

(2015) (citing Jones, 17 Cal 4th at 334). The conduct constituting “coercion” must be 

“intentionally coercive and wrongful, i.e., a knowing and blameworthy interference with 

the plaintiffs‟ constitutional rights.” Gant v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 623–24 

(9th Cir. 2014) (citing Shoyoye v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 961 

(2012)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant interfered with his First Amendment right to 

file a grievance by threatening to give him “the boot.” As a result, Plaintiff feared leaving 

his cell and did not leave his cell for medication pass. This is sufficient to allege a Bane 

Act claim.

.

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

4. California Government Code § 845.6

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant‟s conduct violated California Government Code § 

845.6. That section provides:

Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for 

injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to 

furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; 

but . . . a public employee, and the public entity where the 

employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is 

liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the 

prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to 

take reasonable action to summon such medical care.

In order to state a claim under section 845.6 a prisoner must establish three 

elements: (1) the public employee knew or had reason to know of the need, (2) for 

immediate medical care, and (3) failed to reasonably summon such care. Jett, 439 F.3d 

at 1099. “Liability under section 845.6 is limited to serious and obvious medical 

conditions requiring immediate care.” Id. (citing Watson v. State, 21 Cal. App. 4th 836

(Ct. App. 1993)).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant pepper sprayed his entire body and knowingly left 

Plaintiff with the inability to decontaminate without summoning other medical attention.

This is sufficient to allege a claim under section 845.6.

5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Under California law, the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress 

are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, 

or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff‟s 

suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation 

of the emotional distress by the defendant‟s outrageous conduct. Corales, 567 F.3d at

571. Conduct is outrageous if it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually 

tolerated in a civilized community. Id. In addition to the requirement that the conduct be 

intentional and outrageous, the conduct must have been directed at Plaintiff or occur in 

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

the presence of Plaintiff of whom Defendant was aware. Simo v. Union of Needletrades, 

Industrial & Textile Employees, 322 F.3d 602, 622 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Nkwocha pepper sprayed him and threatened him 

without provocation resulting in Plaintiff suffering severe emotional distress. Plaintiff 

feared leaving his cell and began suffering PTSD. This is sufficient to allege a claim of 

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

6. Assault and Battery

For an assault claim under California law, a plaintiff must show that (1) the 

defendant threatened to touch him in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) it reasonably 

appeared to the plaintiff that the defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) the 

plaintiff did not consent to the conduct; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the 

defendant‟s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. Tekle v. U.S., 511 

F.3d 839, 855 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). For battery, a plaintiff must show that 

(1) the defendant intentionally did an act that resulted in harmful or offensive contact with 

the plaintiff‟s person; (2) the plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and (3) the contact 

caused injury, damage, loss, or harm to the plaintiff. Id. (citation omitted).

Plaintiff has alleged cognizable assault and battery claims against Defendant

Nkwocha.

H. Remedies

1. Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff seeks unspecified declaratory relief. To the extent his claims for damages 

necessarily entail a determination of whether his rights were violated, his separate 

request for declaratory relief is subsumed by those claims. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 

F.3d 559, 566 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must state the form of 

declaratory relief. Otherwise, the Court will assume that the action properly proceeds as 

one for damages only, and his claim for declaratory relief will be dismissed.

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

2. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks various forms of injunctive relief. However, his only cognizable 

cause of action is against Defendant Nkwocha. Plaintiff has been transferred to a 

different institution and is no longer under the custody of Defendant Nkwocha. Absent 

facts to suggest that Plaintiff will be transferred back to the custody of Defendant 

Nkwocha, any requests for injunctive relief against Nkwocha appear to be moot. See

Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1975); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 

(9th Cir. 1991); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007).

With regard to Plaintiff‟s claim for injunctive relief against CDCR or CCHCS, the 

Court does not have jurisdiction to order injunctive relief which would require directing 

parties not before the Court to take action. Zepeda v. United States Immigration & 

Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court may issue an 

injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction 

over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the 

court.”). Because CDCR and CCHCS must be dismissed, the Court cannot order 

injunctive relief against them. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for injunctive relief.

V. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff‟s complaint states the following cognizable claims for damages against 

Defendant Nkwocha: Eighth Amendment excessive force, Eighth Amendment conditions 

of confinement, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection, First Amendment retaliation,

violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act, violation of the Bane Act, violation of California 

Government Code § 845.6, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and 

battery. The complaint states no other cognizable claims. 

The Court will grant Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure 

noted defects, to the extent he believes in good faith he can do so. Noll v. Carlson, 809 

F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that 

the alleged acts resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

677-78. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to „state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.‟” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff should 

note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not for the purposes 

of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” 

complaints). Plaintiff should carefully read this screening order and focus his efforts on 

curing the deficiencies set forth above.

If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint, and he is agreeable to 

proceeding only on the claims found to be cognizable, he may file a notice informing the 

Court that he does not intend to amend, and he is willing to proceed only on his 

cognizable claims. The other Defendants then will be dismissed, and the Court will 

provide Plaintiff with the requisite forms to complete and return so that service of process 

may be initiated.

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it 

must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff‟s 

constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual 

allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint, see Loux v. Rhay, 

375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967), and it must be “complete in itself without reference to the 

prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the 

Court in this order, or

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and he is willing to proceed only on the claims found to be 

cognizable in this order; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the undersigned will recommend 

that this action be dismissed for failure to obey a court order and failure to 

prosecute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-00490-MJS Document 9 Filed 08/03/16 Page 16 of 16