Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-99016/USCOURTS-ca9-11-99016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE HERBERT WHARTON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-99016

D.C. No.

2:92-cv-03469-CJC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 15, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed August 27, 2014

Before: Susan P. Graber, William A. Fletcher,

and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber

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2 WHARTON V. CHAPPELL

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty

The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district

court’s judgment denying relief on George H. Wharton’s 28

U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his

conviction and capital sentence for first-degree murder, and

remanded for further proceedings.

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of

Wharton’s claims that his due process rights were violated

when jurors saw him shackled and that his trial lawyer

provided ineffective assistance during the guilt phase. The

panel held that the district court correctly held (1) that

although some jurors occasionally saw Wharton in shackles

while being transported through the halls of the courthouse,

those sporadic sightings outside the courtroom did not rise to

the level of a constitutional violation; and (2) that Wharton’s

trial lawyer chose a constitutionally permissible guilt-phase

strategy of forgoing certain defenses for fear of opening the

door to the jury’s learning about Wharton’s significant

criminal history, which included a prior murder and rape.

The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district

court’s denial of Wharton’s claim that his lawyer provided

ineffective assistance in investigating and presenting

mitigation evidence at the penalty phase. 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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WHARTON V. CHAPPELL 3

The panel held that Wharton did not overcome the strong

presumption that his lawyer provided constitutionally

adequate assistance in presenting evidence of his mental

illness or his positive adjustment to prison, or in failing to

present testimony by Wharton’s childhood friend and

neighbor.

Regarding Wharton’s claim that his lawyer was

ineffective in failing to investigate and present testimony by

Wharton’s half-brother, Gerald Crawford, the district court

held that there was no prejudice and, accordingly, declined to

decide – or make the necessary factual findings related to –

Wharton’s claim that his trial lawyer was ineffective. The

panel held that, if Crawford was available to testify or

otherwise provide evidence, and trial counsel was ineffective

in his investigation, then Wharton has demonstrated prejudice

because the totality of the evidence – especially Crawford’s

testimony about sexual abuse ubiquitous in Wharton’s family

– gives rise to a reasonable probability that the jury may not

have rendered a verdict of death. The panel therefore vacated

the district court’s decision on this claim and remanded for

further factual development and for the district court’s

assessment, in the first instance, of whether Wharton has

established deficient performance.

COUNSEL

Marcia A. Morrissey (argued), Santa Monica, California; and

Lynne S. Coffin, Los Angeles, California, for PetitionerAppellant.

Xiomara Costello (argued), Deputy Attorney General,

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Dane R.

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4 WHARTON V. CHAPPELL

Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon,

SupervisingDeputyAttorneyGeneral, Richard S. Moskowitz

and A. Scott Hayward, Deputy Attorneys General, Los

Angeles, California, for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner George H. Wharton appeals the district court’s

denial of habeas relief in this capital case. Police officers

arrested Petitioner after finding the body of his live-in

girlfriend stuffed in a barrel in their kitchen. Petitioner

admitted killing her but claimed at trial, in California state

court, that he had been provoked into the killing and,

therefore, was guilty only of second-degree murder. The jury

disagreed and convicted him of first-degree murder. In this

habeas proceeding, Petitioner asserts that his due process

rights were violated when jurors saw him shackled and that

his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance. We affirm

the district court’s denial of those claims. The district court

correctly held that, although some jurors occasionally saw

Petitioner in shackles while being transported through the

halls of the courthouse, those sporadic sightings outside the

courtroom did not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. The district court also correctly held that

Petitioner’s trial lawyer chose a constitutionally permissible

guilt-phase strategy of forgoing certain defenses for fear of

opening the door to the jury’s learning about Petitioner’s

significant criminal history, which included a prior murder

and rape.

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WHARTON V. CHAPPELL 5

At the penalty phase, the prosecutor introduced evidence

of Petitioner’s earlier convictions for both murder and rape,

and Petitioner introduced evidence of mental illness and of

his physically abusive and deprived childhood. The same

jury deliberated over the course of three days but ultimately

returned a verdict of death, which the trial judge imposed. 

Petitioner now claims that his lawyer provided ineffective

assistance in investigating and presenting the mitigation

evidence. We affirm in part and vacate in part the district

court’s denial of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim at the penalty phase. The district court held that no

prejudice resulted from the failure of Petitioner’s trial lawyer

to call Petitioner’s half-brother, Gerald Crawford, as a

witness. Accordingly, the court declined to decide—or make

the necessary factual findings related to—Petitioner’s claim

that his trial lawyer was ineffective in investigating what

Crawford knew. We hold that, if Crawford was available to

testify or otherwise provide evidence, and trial counsel was

ineffective in his investigation, then Petitioner has

demonstrated prejudice. We vacate that portion of the district

court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings,

including factual findings related to the investigation of

Crawford.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The California Supreme Court, whose factual findings are

“entitled to a presumption of correctness,” Rhoades v. Henry,

598 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks

omitted), described the evidence at the guilt phase as follows:

[On February 27, 1986, police officers

discovered Linda Smith’s body in a barrel in

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6 WHARTON V. CHAPPELL

the kitchen of the apartment shared by Smith

and Petitioner.]

. . . A search of the apartment uncovered,

among other things, several empty

prescription drug bottles and a note pad with

a note that began “Dear Dr. Hamilton.” While

most of the bottles bore the victim’s name,

one bore [Petitioner’s] name. In addition,

police found a toolbox in the garage.

An autopsy revealed the victim had been

struck three times on the head with a blunt

instrument, probably a hammer. The victim

received one direct blow and two glancing

blows. Any of the blows would have caused

instant unconsciousness. Although the victim

had no other broken bones or lacerations, the

presence or absence of defensive wounds such

as bruises could not be determined because of

the advanced state of decomposition of the

body. Dr. Failing, the pathologist in charge of

the autopsy, testified that in his opinion, the

victim died of asphyxia rather than the

cerebral contusions. Because of the condition

of the body, Dr. Failing could not pinpoint the

time of death but opined it was probably 10 to

14 days earlier.

[Police arrested Petitioner.]

[Petitioner] waived his Miranda rights and

agreed to speak with Officer Tonello. 

[Petitioner] stated that he lived with Smith

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WHARTON V. CHAPPELL 7

and that he spent the night of February 26th

with her in their home. He affirmed that

Smith was alive that night. He eventually

admitted, however, that they argued and that

he killed her. He explained that they had been

drinking heavily that night and began to

argue.1 She threw a book at him and he hit

her twice in the head. She may have hit her

head on a table, but he was not sure. He

admitted he was mentally aware he was

hitting her but stated that he was in a rage. He

eventually realized she was dead. He began

writing a letter to his psychotherapist, Dr.

Hamilton, and then took several pills and lay

down beside Smith. He tried to kill himself

by inhaling gas from the oven. He did not

know what he intended to do with the body,

moving it from room to room. He also stated

he lit a fire in the fireplace and brought

Smith’s body into the room to keep her

“warm.” At one point, he held Smith’s body

to his own. He eventually wrapped Smith’s

body in blankets and plastic bags and placed

it in the barrel, where it was found by police.

________________

1 There was evidence that both [Petitioner]

and the victim regularly abused alcohol,

marijuana, and cocaine.

_________________

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8 WHARTON V. CHAPPELL

Leighton Smith, the victim’s ex-husband,

was sorting through the victim’s belongings

after [Petitioner] was taken into custody. 

Although police had already searched the

house, Leighton Smith contacted police when

he discovered a hammer lying under a day

bed. He also noticed many of the victim’s

possessions were missing, including coins,

furs, jewelry, china, a television, a camera, a

microwave oven, and a stereo.

There was evidence that, in order to buy

cocaine, [Petitioner] sold the victim’s

property after, and possibly before, her death. 

He bartered away her car to Albert and

Americo Perez for a quarter gram of cocaine

plus a promise of more cocaine in the future. 

The Perez brothers sold the car in Mexico but

agreed to retrieve it and testify against

[Petitioner] in exchange for a grant of

immunity. Sandra Barney testified that she

helped [Petitioner] cash some of the victim’s

checks; on at least two occasions, she saw him

write the victim’s name on a check. She also

testified that they used the money from the

checks to buy drugs and alcohol and that

[Petitioner] tried to sell the victim’s jewelry. 

Jackie Dennis testified that [Petitioner] gave

her some women’s clothes and jewelry to sell

and asked if she knew anyone who wanted to

buy some dishes.

In addition, [Petitioner’s] two

psychotherapists testified and related various

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WHARTON V. CHAPPELL 9

inculpatory statements [Petitioner] made in

therapy. [Petitioner] did not present an

affirmative defense.

People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290, 299–301 (Cal. 1991)

(citations omitted).

In light of the overwhelming evidence that Petitioner

killed Smith, there was little hope of an acquittal on all

charges. Petitioner’s trial lawyer, William Duval, sought to

convince the jury that Petitioner was guilty of only seconddegree murder or manslaughter. Duval argued that Petitioner

lacked the malice required for a first-degree murder

conviction because Petitioner’s actions were the result of

provocation. See People v. Williams, 456 P.2d 633, 638 (Cal.

1969) (“Evidence of adequate provocation overcomes the

presumption of malice.”). The jury was unpersuaded and

returned a verdict of guilt on the first-degree murder charge

after deliberating for little more than a day.

The same jury then heard evidence in a separate penalty

phase. The jury had not learned during the guilt phase about

Petitioner’s 1975 crimes of murder and forcible rape. During

the penalty phase, those crimes were the focus of the

prosecutor’s case in aggravation. The California Supreme

Court described the penalty-phase evidence:

The prosecution’s case at the penalty

phase of the trial consisted of evidence of

[Petitioner’s] prior felony convictions. In

June 1975, 61-year-old Jane B. answered her

doorbell and found [Petitioner], a neighbor, on

her doorstep. He indicated he had been

fighting with his wife and asked to use Jane

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10 WHARTON V. CHAPPELL

B.’s telephone. She told him it was too late to

let him in but made up a package of cosmetics

to give to [Petitioner] for his wife, thinking it

would cheer her up. When she opened the

door to hand the package to him, [Petitioner]

forced his way in and, armed with a butcher

knife, forcibly raped her. During the crime,

[Petitioner] held the knife to her throat, told

her he would kill her if she screamed or made

any noise, and made several small, shallow

cuts on her neck. [Petitioner] told her that if

she reported the crime, he would return and

kill her. He also threatened to firebomb her

house. After [Petitioner] left, Jane B.

discovered some money, a small radio, and a

camera were missing. She testified at

[Petitioner’s] subsequent rape trial that the

ordeal was extremely painful and that it left

her vaginal area bloody.

After his arrest for rape, [Petitioner]

admitted he raped and robbed Jane B. but

denied making the cuts on her neck. During

his interrogation, [Petitioner] also admitted

killing Robert Pierce after the latter solicited

a homosexual act from him. [Petitioner] said

he kicked Pierce and continued to kick him

after he fell down. Before leaving the scene,

he took Pierce’s watch. The prosecution’s

evidence showed that in February 1975, Santa

Barbara police found the body of Pierce, a

university professor, lying in a doorway. 

Although they initially believed the death was

accidental, an autopsy revealed facial and

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WHARTON V. CHAPPELL 11

other injuries inconsistent with the accidental

death theory. [Petitioner] eventually pleaded

guilty to second degree murder and rape.

In addition to this evidence, the

prosecution introduced evidence of

[Petitioner’s] prior convictions for burglary

and receiving stolen property.

In the defense portion of the penalty

phase, [Petitioner] called Dr. Judith Hamilton

to the stand. She testified that [Petitioner]

voluntarily sought treatment from her because

of headaches, restlessness, and feelings of

nervousness around people. He also had a

fear of hurting his girlfriend, victim Linda

Smith. [Petitioner] reported he had abused

several drugs in the past, including cocaine,

amphetamines, marijuana, and alcohol. In

addition, he told her that he hated his father

and grandfather, that his grandfather beat him

with branches and scraps of wood, and that he

was sexually abused by his mother’s friend

when he was 11 years old. [Petitioner] also

revealed he had attempted suicide on three

different occasions, the most recent being a

month earlier. Dr. Hamilton diagnosed

[Petitioner] as suffering from atypical impulse

control disorder and multiple drug or

substance abuse. She could not determine on

the basis of her sessions with [Petitioner]

whether she could rule out paranoid

schizophrenia and organic personality

disorder as possible diagnoses.

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12 WHARTON V. CHAPPELL

Claudia Ann Wharton, [Petitioner’s]

sister, described his childhood. The family,

including [Petitioner], moved to his maternal

grandmother’s farm in Hammond, Louisiana,

after [Petitioner’s] parents separated. His

mother worked as a domestic and received

welfare benefits. David Lee, [Petitioner’s]

stepgrandfather, was a six-foot, five-inch,

three-hundred-pound man known as “Big

Daddy” and was the father figure on the farm. 

Lee did not like [Petitioner]. Lee would beat

[Petitioner] with a leather strap or an oak

branch whenever [Petitioner] displeased him. 

[Petitioner] carried a heavier share of the

chores than did the other children. 

[Petitioner’s] mother often quarreled with

Lee; when he became angry, Lee would

sometimes turn off the family’s water or

refuse them wood to burn in the winter. 

[Petitioner’s] mother had a drinking problem

during [Petitioner’s] childhood years. When

[Petitioner] was 16, he left home and entered

the Job Corps.

Claudia also testified that [Petitioner] was

a changed man after he was released from his

first term in prison. He was anxious in

crowds and had headaches. She stated that

[Petitioner] told her he did not kill Pierce or

rape Jane B. He also told her his wife had a

miscarriage the night Jane B. was raped.

Pearl Wharton, [Petitioner’s] mother,

testified that she left home at age 11 when Lee

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WHARTON V. CHAPPELL 13

tried to molest her. She married [Petitioner’s]

father, George Wharton, when she was 22

years old and their marriage lasted about 30

years [sic: 13 years]. [Petitioner’s] father

drank and occasionally physically abused her. 

After the family moved back to her mother’s

farm, Lee mistreated [Petitioner], beating him

with oak switches. On one occasion, she

argued with Lee after he whipped one of her

daughters with an extension cord. When Lee

struck [Petitioner’s] mother with a

broomstick, [Petitioner] picked up a stick to

defend her. Lee produced a gun and

[Petitioner] ran away.

Linda Wharton, another of [Petitioner’s]

sisters, essentially corroborated Claudia and

Pearl Wharton’s description of [Petitioner’s]

childhood years. She speculated that Lee

punished [Petitioner] because he looked like

his father, a man Lee disliked. She also

recalled that on one occasion, when

[Petitioner] was 12 or 13 years old, Lee

placed him in a burlap sack, dangled it from a

tree branch with a rope, and then set a

smoldering, smoky fire under the sack. 

[Petitioner] was left in the sack for hours.

Dr. Donald Patterson, a psychiatrist,

examined [Petitioner] at the request of the

defense. He concluded [Petitioner] suffered

from a personality disorder, a substance abuse

disorder, and possibly paranoid schizophrenia. 

In addition, he noted that at the time of the

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14 WHARTON V. CHAPPELL

crime, [Petitioner] was under severe stress

which may have led to a brief reactive

psychosis, i.e., a brief interruption of contact

with reality because of some significant event

or stress. This would explain [Petitioner’s]

unusual behavior following the slaying, that

is, moving the victim’s body from room to

room and building a fire to keep her “warm.” 

Patterson stated that although “atypical

impulse disorder” (Dr. Hamilton’s diagnosis)

was a possibility, he was less comfortable

with that diagnosis.

Dr. Patterson concluded by stating that, in

his opinion, [Petitioner] was under the

influence of extreme mental or emotional

disturbance at the time he committed the

crime because of the dysfunctional

relationship he had with the victim. In

addition, Patterson believed that [Petitioner]

reasonably believed there was moral

justification for his conduct and that he acted

under extreme duress or under the substantial

domination of another person. He reached

these latter conclusions in light of evidence

showing [Petitioner] suffered auditory

hallucinations and may have killed in

response to “voices” he heard inside his head.

Wharton, 809 P.2d at 301–02.

On the third day of deliberations, the jury returned its

verdict of death. The California Supreme Court affirmed the

conviction and sentence. Id. at 299. The United States

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WHARTON V. CHAPPELL 15

Supreme Court denied certiorari. Wharton v. California,

502 U.S. 1038 (1992).

Petitioner then filed this habeas action. The district court

stayed the case pending exhaustion of state remedies. The

California Supreme Court summarily denied habeas relief.

The district court then granted an evidentiary hearing on,

among other things, the claims now on appeal: Petitioner’s

shackling claim and his claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel at the guilt and penalty phases. After a lengthy

evidentiary hearing in 2006, the court issued an order in 2009

denying the claims addressed by the evidentiary hearing. The

court later denied all remaining claims in a separate order.

Petitioner’s shackling claim, labeled claim 18, arisesfrom

the fact that Petitioner was tried in the historic courthouse in

Santa Barbara, California. At the time of Petitioner’s trial,

the building’s design required less than optimal arrangements

for the transportation of prisoners. Petitioner arrived each

morning in a prison bus and was led, in what witnesses

described as a “chain gang,” to a holding facility in the

courthouse. Like the other prisoners brought to the

courthouse on the bus, Petitioner was shackled both

independently and to other prisoners while in transit. To

reach the holding facility, the chain gang walked through the

courthouse’s public hallways—within sight of the public,

including jurors who happened to arrive early for trial.

The district court found that, although some jurors

occasionally saw Petitioner being transported in the chain

gang, Petitioner was never shackled in the courtroom. The

court held that the jurors’ occasional sightings of Petitioner

in shackles, outside the courtroom and while being

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16 WHARTON V. CHAPPELL

transported with other prisoners, did not rise to the level of a

due process violation.

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at

the guilt phase, claim 41 subclaim 4,1concerns Duval’s trial

strategy of arguing the defense of provocation only and not

also pursuing the available defenses of intoxication and

mental health. Evidence of intoxication and mental disease

is admissible to demonstrate that a defendant did not form the

specific intent required for a first-degree murder conviction. 

See Cal. Penal Code § 29.4 (intoxication); id. § 28 (mental

health). The district court held that Duval’s trial strategy was

constitutionally adequate largely because Duval reasonably

feared that introducing evidence of intoxication and mental

illness would have opened the door to the jury’s learning

about Petitioner’s 1975 crimes of murder and rape.

Finally, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel at the penalty phase, encompassing claim 37 and

claim 41, subclaims 16, 17, 19, 20, and 22, challenges the

adequacy of Duval’s investigation and presentation of

Petitioner’s case in mitigation. With three exceptions, the

district court rejected Petitioner’s theories on those claims

because Duval’s performance was constitutionally adequate. 

On two of Petitioner’s subclaims—cultural mitigation and

Petitioner’s positive adjustment to prison—the court held that

Duval provided ineffective assistance but that the resulting

prejudice was very small and did not warrant relief. Finally,

the district court declined to decide whether Duval performed

deficiently in investigating the potential testimony of

1 Petitioner raised all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under

claim 41 and listed his separate theories as “subclaims.” We follow this

convention, used by the parties and the district court.

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WHARTON V. CHAPPELL 17

Petitioner’s half-brother, Gerald Crawford. Instead, the court

held that, even if Crawford had been available to testify, no

prejudice resulted from the fact that he did not testify.

Petitioner timely appeals. The district court granted a

certificate of appealability on the shackling claim. We

ordered supplemental briefing on the claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel mentioned above. Because the standard

in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) is met with respect to those claims, we

now grant a certificate of appealability on claim 37 and claim

41, subclaims 4, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 22.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“Because [Petitioner’s] first federal habeas petition was

filed before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (‘AEDPA’),

pre-AEDPA standards apply to his claims.” Hamilton v.

Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009). We review de

novo the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Arnold v.

Runnels, 421 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 2005). We review for

clear error the district court’s factual findings. Buckley v.

Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

DISCUSSION

A. Shackling While Being Transported

Petitioner argues that jurors’ viewing of him in shackles

while being transported deprived him of a fair trial under

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005). “[T]he Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical

restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination,

in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a

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18 WHARTON V. CHAPPELL

state interest specific to a particular trial.” Id. at 629. Three

reasons support that rule: the need for a defendant to assist

counsel, “[t]he courtroom’s formal dignity,” and the

presumption of innocence. Id. at 630–31. In the absence of

a particularized determination that shackling is justified,

visible shackling in the courtroom is “‘inherently

prejudicial.’” Id. at 635 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S.

560, 568 (1986)). That is, “where a court, without adequate

justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will

be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate

actual prejudice to make out a due process violation. The

State must prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the

shackling error . . . did not contribute to the verdict

obtained.’” Id. at 635 (brackets omitted) (quoting Chapman

v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

Deck concerned visible shackling in the courtroom. We

have held that visible shackling outside the courtroom—at

least when the viewing is brief and accidental—is not

inherently prejudicial; instead, a due process violation occurs

only if the criminal defendant demonstrates actual prejudice. 

See Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir. 2004)

(holding that one “juror’s viewing of Williams in handcuffs

with a coat draped over his handcuffed hands as he went to or

from the courtroom was not inherently or presumptively

prejudicial”); Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th

Cir. 2002) (holding that there was no inherent prejudice

where “a few jurors at most glimpsed Ghent in shackles in the

hallway and as he was entering the courtroom”); United

States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding

that “a jury’s brief or inadvertent glimpse of a defendant in

physical restraints is not inherently or presumptively

prejudicial” where, “on the sixth day of trial, the jury briefly

witnessed [the defendant] in handcuffs as he entered the

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WHARTON V. CHAPPELL 19

courtroom”); Castillo v. Stainer, 983 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir.

1992) (holding that, concerning “a brief and accidental

viewing of the defendant in a corridor, chained [at the

waist],” “[n]o harm that rises to a constitutional level is done

by such an unintended, out-of-court occurrence”); United

States v. Halliburton, 870 F.2d 557, 559–61 (9th Cir. 1989)

(holding that a “brief and inadvertent display of Halliburton

in handcuffs” when “he was observed handcuffed to a codefendant by at least two jurors as the elevator doors opened”

was not inherently prejudicial).

We explained long ago the reasons for the distinction

between shackling in open court and shackling during

transportation. “[E]ven the ‘most unsophisticated juror’

knows that defendants may have to post bail and that some

lack the resources to do this.” Halliburton, 870 F.2d at 561

(quoting Dupont v. Hall, 555 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1977)). 

“‘Under these circumstances we cannot think that the

emotional impact of seeing the defendant in custody is

necessarily hostile—it may be quite the reverse.’” Id.

(alteration omitted) (quoting Dupont, 555 F.2d at 17). “‘It is

a normal and regular as well as a highly desirable and

necessary practice to handcuff prisoners when they are being

taken from one place to another, and the jury is aware of

this.’” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v.

Leach, 429 F.2d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 1970)).

The distinction is also consistent with the Supreme

Court’s more recent reasoning in Deck, 544 U.S. at 630–31. 

Unlike shackling in the courtroom, shackling during transport

does not affect the defendant’s ability to assist counsel during

trial. Id. at 631. Nor does it have any effect on the dignity of

the courtroom; indeed, it could be perceived as increasing the

dignity of the courtroom because a prisoner’s shackles are

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removed for open-court proceedings. Id. Admittedly, visible

shackling during transportation might affect the jury’s

perception of the presumption of innocence, id. at 630, but

that concern is mitigated greatly by the reasons discussed

above—jurors know that, as a matter of routine, some

defendants are in custody during trial and that security needs

during transport demand restraints. In this case, too,

Petitioner was part of a group of prisoners being moved

through the courthouse; he was not singled out.

Here, after conducting a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the

district court found that “Petitioner was not visibly restrained

while in the courtroom” but that “at least some of the jurors

observed Petitioner being transported through the

courthouse’s public areas while in visible restraints.” At the

evidentiary hearing, almost everyone testified that Petitioner

did not appear in shackles in the courtroom in front of the

jury: Petitioner’s lawyer, William Duval; Petitioner’s

investigator, Craig Stewart; the bailiff; the state-court trial

judge; the prosecutor; and Juror Reginald C.

Only two jurors contradicted that observation, both with

ambivalent testimony. Juror George B testified that he saw

Petitioner shackled in some form or another in the

courtroom—suggesting at times that Petitioner’s hands were

chained to a table or to his waist, or that his legs were

shackled. At other times, however, George B contradicted

that testimony or hedged: “[I]t may be that I saw the actual

chains in the hall and not in the courtroom and just assumed. 

I can’t guarantee you I saw the chains in the courtroom.” 

George B confirmed at the evidentiary hearing that his

memory was “a little hazy.”

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Juror Shelley T testified that she saw Petitioner once in

handcuffs. She generally testified that this occurred in the

courtroom, as Petitioner was led either into or out of the

courtroom. When pressed, however, she also hedged: “I

could be wrong.” Her memory of the trial was “pretty bad.”

In light of the overwhelming testimony in support of the

district court’s factual finding and only weak testimony to the

contrary, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err

in finding that Petitioner was not shackled in the courtroom. 

See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1176 (9th Cir.

2012) (“Although an appellate court or other reviewing body

may find clear error in a fact-finder’s credibility

determination if a witness’s story is contradicted by the

evidence or is internally inconsistent or implausible, a

factfinder may nevertheless credit one witness’s testimony

over another’s if both have related coherent and facially

plausible stories that are not contradicted by extrinsic

evidence.”).

The district court likewise did not clearly err in finding

that “at least some of the jurors observed Petitioner being

transported through the courthouse’s public areas while in

visible restraints.” The witnesses testified consistently that

prisoners arrived each morning in a bus and were

led—shackled—through the courthouse’s public hallways in

a “noisy” chain gang. Because the courthouse is open and

lacks separate hallways for transporting prisoners, jurors

arriving early for trial easily could see a defendant in

shackles. The presiding judge testified that the lack of

separate hallways was an “ongoing problem.” According to

the prosecutor, the problem was “endemic” at the time. 

Additionally, two of the three testifying jurors stated that they

saw Petitioner in shackles in the hallway. Juror Reginald C

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saw Petitioner in leg shackles “maybe once or twice” in the

hallway in the mornings before trial started for the day, and

Juror George B testified with confidence that he saw

Petitioner shackled in the hallway.

The legal question that we confront, then, is whether

some jurors’ viewing of Petitioner being transported in

shackles through the courthouse’s public areas deprived him

of a fair trial in violation of his due process rights.2 We agree

with the district court that Petitioner’s due process rights were

not violated.

Because jurors saw Petitioner shackled only occasionally

and onlywhile being transported,Petitioner must demonstrate

actual prejudice. See, e.g., Ghent, 279 F.3d at 1132–33

(requiring that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice where the

petitioner “was transported to and from the courtroom in

shackles and . . . on some of these occasions jurors observed

him under restraint”). Only three out of the twelve jurors

testified. Shelley T testified that she saw Petitioner in

shackles once. Reginald C saw Petitioner in leg shackles

“[m]aybe once or twice.” (Emphasis added.) George B

testified that he saw Petitioner in shackles an unspecified

number of times: “Between one and 20. I have no

recollection.” Those jurors saw Petitioner in shackles only

while being transported in a group, outside the courtroom.3

2 We reject the Warden’s argument that Petitioner waived this issue by

raising it with inadequate specificity in his habeas petition.

3 Petitioner also cites Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 748 (9th Cir.

1995), and Rhoden v. Rowland, 10 F.3d 1457, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993), for

support. But those cases involved in-courtroom shackling. See Duckett,

67 F.3d at 746 (“Duckett appeared for his sentencing hearing dressed in

prison clothes and wearing handcuffs and a security chain.”); Rhoden,

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The jurors’ sightings of Petitioner were not so pervasive or

harmful that we must presume inherent prejudice.

Nor has Petitioner demonstrated actual prejudice. As the

district court found, “[t]here is no testimony indicating

prejudice.” Petitioner clearly was implicated in the death of

Linda Smith; jurors likely understood that the transportation

shackling was a regular part of his custody—just as it was for

all the other prisoners being transported. Moreover, the fact

that Petitioner was not shackled in the courtroom, even

though he was shackled entering and exiting the courthouse,

suggested that Petitioner was not a dangerous person. We

agree with the district court that “Petitioner was not singled

out for special treatment, hence he suffered no particular

prejudice as a result of his treatment.”

Petitioner makes much of a statement by one juror, while

explaining his inability to remember precisely where he saw

Petitioner shackled, that “[s]ince you’ve seen it [Petitioner in

shackles] in the hallways, it’s not going to make a major

impression when you see the same thing in the courtroom.”4

Petitioner reads this statement as somehow proving that the

out-of-courtroom viewing was as prejudicial as an incourtroom viewing would have been. Read most naturally,

however, the statement amounts to the reverse: the juror

speculated that an in-courtroom viewing would have had only

10 F.3d at 1458 (“Rhoden’s legs were shackled throughout the trial . . . .”). 

They do not apply here, where Petitioner was seen in shackles only

outside the courtroom.

4 The Warden argues, in the alternative, that the statement was

inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). We need not, and

do not, reach that argument. For the reasons stated in text, even if the

statement was admissible, it does not change our conclusion.

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the same minimal effect as the out-of-courtroom viewing. In

any event, the statement is pure speculation. As the district

court found, jurors actually saw Petitioner shackled only

outside the courtroom. We decline to upend established

caselaw that recognizes legally significant differences in the

effect on jurors of in-courtroom shackling versus out-ofcourtroom shackling simply because of one juror’s personal,

hypothetical speculation. That juror’s speculation falls well

short of demonstrating actual prejudice.

We thus agree with the district court that Petitioner’s

shackling claim fails.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Guilt Phase

Petitioner next argues that his trial lawyer, Duval, was

ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984), by choosing to present the provocation defense only

and choosing not to present evidence of intoxication and

mental illness. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, Petitioner must establish both deficient

performance and prejudice. Id. at 687. We undertake a

“highly deferential” assessment of Duval’s performance. Id.

at 689. Duval “is strongly presumed to have rendered

adequate assistance.” Id. at 690. “[S]trategic choices made

after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic

choices made after less than complete investigation are

reasonable preciselyto the extent that reasonable professional

judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at

690–91.

Duval investigated the intoxication and mental-health

defenses by consulting with many experts. At Duval’s

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request, Drs. Donald Patterson, Michael Stulberg, Richard

Steinberg, Robert Sbordone, and William Rack evaluated

Petitioner. Duval also consulted with Dr. Ronald Siegel, who

had met with Petitioner and gathered hair samples at the

request of Duval’s predecessor. He reviewed a copy of a

report by Dr. James Wells, who had examined Petitioner at

the request of the prosecution. Because Petitioner’s memory

was unclear concerning the murder, he arranged for the

administration of sodium amytal, or “truth serum.”

The investigation into the cocaine intoxication defense

yielded little support for that theory. The district court found

“a substantial hole” in the intoxication defense because “the

exact date of the murder cannot be fixed” and a “taped

jailhouse interview with Petitioner provides no support for

it.” See also Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 931 n.17

(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[J]uries are unlikely to favor

defenses based on abuse of dangerous drugs in evaluating a

defendant’s culpability for violent behavior.”). The district

court concluded that there was “no value in pursuing an

intoxication defense.” We agree. Duval’s decision not to

present the intoxication defense passes scrutiny under

Strickland, particularly in light of the fact, discussed in detail

below, that pursuing the defense likely would have opened

the door to evidence of Petitioner’s past crimes.

By contrast to the intoxication defense, the investigation

did yield some support for the mental-health defense,

although the results were far from conclusive. Duval had

available to him several medical experts who could have

testified about Petitioner’s mental health at the time of the

murder. Petitioner had a long history of mental illness, and

the psychiatrists concluded that Petitioner suffered from a

variety of mental conditions, including schizophrenia,

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atypical impulse disorder, hallucinations, delusions, and

paranoia.

Some of the mental-health evidence was in tension with

the defense of provocation. For example, evidence that

Petitioner had atypical impulse control tended to undermine

Duval’s strategy of showing that Petitioner’s response to

provocation was objectively reasonable. But we need not

dwell on the merits of presenting a mental-health defense

versus the strength of presenting the provocation defense

alone. As the district court found, Duval had an independent

and very strong reason not to introduce testimony by the

mental-health experts: Duval was concerned that introducing

their testimony would lead to the jury’s learning about

Petitioner’s prior convictions for rape and murder.

Duval’s concern was justified. Under well-established

California law, a mental-health expert maybe cross-examined

about a patient’s criminal history in order to impeach the

expert. People v. Doolin, 198 P.3d 11, 45 (Cal. 2009); People

v. Panah, 107 P.3d 790, 853–54 (Cal. 2005); People v.

Osband, 919 P.2d 640, 698 (Cal. 1996); People v. Hendricks,

749 P.2d 836, 838–39 (Cal. 1988); People v. Nye, 455 P.2d

395, 405–08 (Cal. 1969)); see, e.g., Hendricks, 749 P.2d at

838 (“Other-crimes evidence may be used to impeach the

testimony of an expert witness.”); Nye, 455 P.2d at 406

(holding that cross-examination of an expert witness,

including concerning the defendant’s prior crimes, is

permissible on “the extent of his knowledge, the reasons for

his opinion including facts and other matters upon which it is

based, and which he took into consideration” (citation and

emphasis omitted)). Given that Petitioner’s prior crimes

involved heinous acts, it was eminently reasonable for Duval

to choose a trial strategy that avoided the serious risk that the

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jury would learn about those past crimes. See Mickey v.

Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that

the decision by the petitioner’s lawyer not to introduce

evidence of a mental-health defense was adequate in part

because it “was likely to open the door to evidence of

Mickey’s deviant sexual behaviors”); Hendricks v. Calderon,

70 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding the same because

“the jury would have learned, during [the experts’] crossexamination, of Hendricks’ other murders for which he was

tried separately”).

We reject Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary. At the

evidentiary hearing, Duval testified repeatedly—both in

general and with respect to specific doctors—that he decided

to forego a mental-health defense out of concern for exposing

the jury to Petitioner’s past crimes. He testified in general

that “I wanted to defend [the case] in a manner that kept that

[prior] murder and the rape, by the way, from the jury.” 

Petitioner’s prior murder conviction “posed some very

serious problems in defending him,” as Duval described:

Q. Why?

A. Well, I have a defendant I’m

defending on a murder case involving

apparently a beating and he has a prior murder

that was a result of a beating. I don’t want a

jury to hear that.

Q. Why wouldn’t you want a jury to hear

that?

A. It’s pretty basic stuff. Why wouldn’t

I want a jury to hear that? It just seems

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reasonable not to have a jury hear that. . . . I

think it would be a concern that the jury

would say once a killer, why not again.

The rape also troubled Duval: “[I]t was a brutal crime

involving a . . . 63-year old [sic: 61-year-old] woman. And

to me it was almost as bad as the jury learning about the prior

murder.” Duval had recently defended a client at whose trial

the jury learned that the defendant had committed a prior

murder, so Duval “was real leery about that as a possibility.” 

He believed that there was a “decent chance” of a seconddegree murder verdict if he could “keep[] the jury from

learning about the prior convictions.”

Duval also testified repeatedly that, because of

Petitioner’s prior convictions, Duval feared calling as

witnesses many of the specific doctors—Drs. Stulberg,

Steinberg, Sbordone, and Patterson—who could testify about

Petitioner’s mental health: “Q. Why? A. Because that

would be a way to get what I was most fearful of in front of

the jury, or a possible way to get it there[, his prior

convictions].” Indeed, Duval interrupted the line of

questioning about Dr. Sbordone to clarify that the prior

murder and rape were an overarching concern throughout the

trial: “Look, the 1975 priors, the prior murder and the prior

rape, were always on the table as far as I was concerned in

defending this case. It made it a difficult case to defend

because of those priors . . . .” The district court was well

within its parameters as a fact-finder to credit Duval’s

testimony, and Petitioner is plainly mistaken in asserting that

Duval’s strategic decision had nothing to do with the 1975

crimes.

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Petitioner next arguesthat Duval conducted an inadequate

investigation into mental-health issues and that, accordingly,

counsel’s decision to forego a mental-health defense is not

entitled to deference. We disagree. As noted above, Duval

hired many experts to assess Petitioner’s mental health, and

he reviewed additional reports and medical records. With the

benefit of hindsight and the absence of the time pressure of

preparing for trial, Petitioner points to many ways in which

Duval could have followed up on alleged leads, provided

more records to certain experts, or asked experts to conduct

additional testing or analysis.

But “the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right

to perfect counsel.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 18 (2013). 

Duval’s trial preparation was limited by time and resources. 

Given that a mental-health defense carried with it the

considerable detriment of opening the door to Petitioner’s

prior convictions, Duval’s already extensive investigation of

that defense was more than adequate. Even if we considered

his investigation “less than complete,” we would conclude

that “reasonable professional judgments” supported his

decision not to investigate further. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

690–91.

Finally, Petitioner argues that Duval could have filed an

“in limine motion,” before trial, to seek to exclude

Petitioner’s past crimes from evidence. But Petitioner has

provided no authority at all suggesting that the trial court

actually would have granted such a motion. Indeed, all the

cases that we have found, cited above, point in the opposite

direction: the trial court likely would have denied the motion

to the extent that Duval sought to introduce testimony by

mental-health experts. Similarly, Petitioner has not pointed

to any evidence in the record suggesting that the trial judge

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here would have granted the motion.5 Given the exceedingly

low likelihood of success, it was a reasonable decision for

Duval to focus his limited time and resources on strategies

with a greater likelihood of success than to file a motion that

almost certainly would have been denied.

In sum, the district court correctly denied relief on

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the

guilt phase.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty Phase

Petitioner argues that Duval did not provide

constitutionally adequate assistance at the penalty phase. “To

perform effectively in the penalty phase of a capital case,

counsel must conduct sufficient investigation and engage in

sufficient preparation to be able to present and explain the

significance of all the available mitigating evidence.” Correll

v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation

marks and alterations omitted). Duval had “an obligation to

present and explain to the jury all available mitigating

evidence.” Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1113. He also “had a duty

to conduct ‘a thorough investigation of the defendant’s

background.’” Id. (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

396 (2000)). “It is imperative that all relevant mitigating

5

If anything, the record suggests that the trial judge would not have

ruled on an in limine motion in a way that was definitively favorable to

Petitioner. Before trial, Duval filed a motion to exclude certain other

testimony that was prejudicial to Petitioner. The trial judge granted the

motion “without prejudice to changed circumstances,” which Duval

interpreted to mean that the judge might change his mind during trial. 

That ruling worried Duval because, he said, “I would have to be thinking

about not entering any area where the circumstances changed so I’d end

up having that testimony in front of the jury.”

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information be unearthed for consideration at the capital

sentencing phase.” Caro v. Calderon (“Caro I”), 165 F.3d

1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1999). “To that end, trial counsel must

inquire into a defendant’s social background, family abuse,

mental impairment, physical health history, and substance

abuse history; obtain and examine mental and physical health

records, school records, and criminal records; consult with

appropriate medical experts; and pursue relevant leads.” 

Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1113 (citations, internal quotation

marks, and alteration omitted). “[S]trategic choices made

after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic

choices made after less than complete investigation are

reasonable preciselyto the extent that reasonable professional

judgments support the limitations on investigation.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91. “In any ineffectiveness case,

a particular decision not to investigate must be directly

assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying

a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Id. at

691.

In addition to showing unprofessional judgment,

Petitioner also must establish prejudice, by demonstrating

“that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedingwould have

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at

694.

[I]n assessing prejudice, we must compare the

evidence that actually was presented to the

jury with the evidence that might have been

presented had counsel acted differently and

evaluate whether the difference between what

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was presented and what could have been

presented is sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. 

This requires us to evaluate the totality of the

available mitigation evidence—both that

adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in

the habeas proceeding[—]and reweigh it

against the evidence in aggravation. Prejudice

is established if there is a reasonable

probability that at least one juror would have

struck a different balance between life and

death.

Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1131 (citations, internal quotation

marks, and brackets omitted).

“A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective

assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that

are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. In the

certified claims on appeal, Petitioner asserts that Duval: 

(1) failed to investigate and present evidence of Petitioner’s

mental illness; (2) failed to present evidence of Petitioner’s

positive adjustment to prison; (3) failed to present testimony

by potential mitigation witness Robert Short; and (4) failed to

investigate and present testimony by potential mitigation

witness Gerald Crawford.6

6 We address all arguments raised by Petitioner on appeal, regardless of

the heading under which we find those arguments. Accordingly, we reject

the Warden’ssuggestion that Petitioner has waived arguments that appear

in his briefs. At the same time, we do not revive arguments made before

the district court that Petitioner declined to brief on appeal.

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1. Failure to Investigate and Present Evidence of

Petitioner’s Mental Health

As discussed above, Duval made a strategic decision not

to introduce evidence of Petitioner’s mental health at the guilt

phase in order to shield the jury from learning about

Petitioner’s prior convictions. But that consideration became

moot at the penalty phase, because the prosecutor could—and

did—introduce evidence of Petitioner’s prior convictions as

aggravating circumstances supporting the death penalty. As

part of Petitioner’s mitigation case, Duval introduced

evidence of Petitioner’s mental health through expert

testimony by Dr. Patterson and Dr. Hamilton.7

Dr. Patterson saw Petitioner several times before the

penalty phase and reviewed many reports by other treating

and examining doctors over the span of a decade. He testified

that Petitioner presented a “very complex” psychiatric case. 

Dr. Patterson found support for “a number of diagnostic

possibilities,” including “mental disorder,” “personality

disorder . . . with a marked potential for aggressive behavior,”

“thought disorder or a more serious mental illness in the form

of a schizophrenia,” “schizophrenia” as evidenced by

“auditory hallucinations,” and “atypical impulse disorder.”

Petitioner argues that Duval provided inadequate

assistance at the penalty phase because Duval should have

presented better evidence of Petitioner’s mental illness. At

the evidentiary hearing in district court, Petitioner presented

7 Dr. Hamilton treated Petitioner in the weeks before the murder, without

the benefit of his full mental and medical history. At the penalty phase,

she provided only tentative mental-health diagnoses. Like the parties, we

focus on Dr. Patterson’s testimony.

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testimony by Dr. Patterson, via a 2002 video deposition, and

testimony by Dr. Richard Dudley, Jr., an expert hired by

Petitioner in 1993. Dr. Patterson testified that, even though

he requested all background information related to Petitioner,

Duval did not provide him with several important reports and

pieces of information, including doctors’ reports, jail records,

and background information about Petitioner. Had Dr.

Patterson seen that information before his penalty-phase

testimony, he would have testified that Petitioner had even

more severe mental-health issues.

Dr. Dudley is a professor at New York University School

of Law and also a practicing physician whose specialty is

psychiatry. He examined a wide range of reports and

information in preparation for the evidentiary hearing. He

concluded that, at the time of the 1986 murder, Petitioner was

“suffering from a major psychiatric disorder.” The district

court found, and the parties do not challenge, that, “[i]n Dr.

Dudley’s view, Petitioner suffered from ‘a borderline

personality disorder’ with cognitive defects.” “As he passed

through adolescence, he acquired a ‘schizoaffective disorder’

with which he attempted to cope through substance abuse.”

In assessing Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, the district court carefully compared Dr. Patterson’s

testimony at the penalty phase with the habeas testimony by

Drs. Patterson and Dudley. The court held:

At its heart, Petitioner is resting his claim

for relief on the assertion that Dr. Dudley’s

testimony would have been so much better

than that presented by Dr. Patterson. 

Petitioner asserts that Dr. Dudley was more

understandable, clearer, internally consistent,

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and gave a better historical context to the

events of Petitioner’s life. Those statements

are almost definitely true, although due in part

to Dr. Dudley having had the luxury of

relying upon extensive work done in habeas

and being insulated from the pressures of a

capital trial. However, Dr. Dudley’s “ideal”

testimony is not so significantly different

from the testimony that was delivered in

mitigation as to mandate relief.

Both experts concluded that Petitioner

suffered from long-standing mental and

emotional problems compounded by

substance abuse. Dr. Dudley drew a more

definite connection between Petitioner’s

childhood abuse and his later mental

problems, and introduced new elements into

Petitioner’s background such as his father’s

family history of mental illness and

characterizing his mother as suffering from

depression. Similarly, Dr. Dudley had some

new specifics to support his diagnosis, such as

the stories of Petitioner’s childhood behavior

and seizures and a passing reference to sexual

abuse by [Big Daddy]. However, the two

experts reach a similar conclusion of longstanding mental illness with a similarly

persuasive historical basis. . . . Because

Petitioner’s proposed expert testimony is only

better than that which was actually presented

and not significantly different in kind, the

Court does not find that Mr. Duval failed to

render competent representation through his

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presentation of mitigating evidence

concerning mental disease or defect.

We have conducted our own review, and we agree with

the district court’s analysis. All of the doctors who examined

or treated Petitioner concluded that he suffered from severe

mental illness; they just disagreed on the precise diagnosis. 

Petitioner has not explained how the specific diagnosis byDr.

Dudley in 2006 (or by Dr. Patterson in 2002) differed in any

material way from Dr. Patterson’s original diagnosis in 1987. 

Cf. Miles v. Ryan, 713 F.3d 477, 493–94 (9th Cir.) (“The

newly uncovered portion of Petitioner’s social history simply

does not have significant mitigating value in view of what

was already available to the sentencing judge.”), cert. denied,

134 S. Ct. 519 (2013). We agree with the district court that

“Petitioner’s proposed expert testimony is only better than

that which was actually presented and not significantly

different in kind.”

Petitioner’s finer-grained arguments fail for the same

reason. For example, Dr. Patterson may not have been the

wisest choice for an expert witness; Duval likely could have

provided Dr. Patterson with better supporting documentation;

and Duval possibly could have done a better job of eliciting

testimony from Dr. Patterson tying Petitioner’s mental health

more directly to the 1975 murder and rape. But Petitioner has

not shown how a more diligent lawyer would have produced

materiallydifferent expert testimony. Accordingly, Petitioner

has not overcome the strong presumption that Duval provided

constitutionally adequate assistance in presenting evidence of

Petitioner’s mental health.

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2. Positive Adjustment to Prison

Petitioner next argues that Duval was ineffective by

failing to introduce evidence of Petitioner’s allegedly positive

adjustment to prison, such as his history of only minor, nonviolent disciplinary violations while in prison. Petitioner’s

argument fails for the simple reason that Duval did introduce

evidence of his positive adjustment to prison.

A custodian of prison records, Lucy Bross, testified that

Petitioner was housed at Vacaville, a psychiatric treatment

facility, from 1976 to 1980. On cross-examination, she

testified that Petitioner had eight disciplinary violations while

he was in prison: one for possession of marijuana and seven

for failing to appear for work assignments and disobeying

orders. On redirect, in response to questioning by Duval, she

explained that the violations were minor and non-violent. 

From this evidence of only occasional, minor, and nonviolent offenses while in prison, the jury could infer that

Petitioner would pose little risk of future dangerousness in

prison.

On appeal, Petitioner does not argue that there were

additional details that should have been brought to light or

additional records that were not mentioned. Nor does he

argue that introduction of the records themselves—as

opposed to the custodian’s description of them—would have

aided his case. In any event, even if Duval could have

introduced slightly better evidence, such as a mental-health

expert’s testimony of Petitioner’s allegedly positive

adjustment to prison, we fail to see how Duval was

constitutionally ineffective for not dwelling on this aspect of

the case: we agree with the district court that the evidence

was “at best weakly positive.”

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3. Failure to Present Testimony by Robert Short

Petitioner argues that Duval provided ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to present testimony by

Robert Short. Short was a childhood friend and neighbor of

Petitioner’s and, for a time, was married to Petitioner’s sister

Claudia. Petitioner told Investigator Craig Stewart, whom

Duval had hired to investigate Petitioner’s background, that

Short might have helpful information. Stewart successfully

contacted Short, interviewed him, and prepared a nine-page

report for Duval.

The report contained information that was helpful to

Petitioner’s mitigation case. For example, the district court

found that the report “supported the other witnesses’

testimony about the chaos and abuse present in Petitioner’s

childhood home and added new details about Petitioner’s

mother.” Those new details included that Petitioner’s mother

had a boyfriend approximately the same age as Petitioner,

which Petitioner resented, and that she had a sexual

relationship with a woman, which upset Petitioner. But the

report also contained information that was harmful to

Petitioner’s mitigation case. The district court found that the

report “added uncomfortable details about Petitioner’s thefts

from Mr. Short’s clients, how he would frequent gay bars to

prostitute himself, and about how, prior to his arrest,

Petitioner told him that Linda Smith had died suddenly due to

a concussion or a brain tumor.” Additionally, “Short would

have contradicted witnesses who stated that Petitioner drank

and used drugs as a youngster.”

After receiving the report from Stewart, Duval wrote on

the top: “Great reading, but a disaster.” At the evidentiary

hearing, Duval explained—and the district court

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credited—that he made a strategic decision not to call Short

because of the potential for testimony harmful to Petitioner’s

case. We conclude that Duval’s strategic decision did not run

afoul of Strickland. “[S]trategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable . . . .” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690;

see, e.g., Toliver v. McCaughtry, 539 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir.

2008) (“After conducting an investigation (or making a

reasonable decision that investigation is unnecessary),

counsel may make a legitimate strategic decision not to call

a witness if he makes a determination that the testimony the

witness would give might on balance harm rather than help

the defendant.” (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted)).

On appeal, Petitioner argues that the harmful testimony

may not have come out during cross-examination and that the

helpful testimony was very helpful. As an initial matter, even

if we agreed with Petitioner’s assessment that perhaps Short

may have done more good than harm, Strickland demands

more: Duval’s strategic choice is “virtually

unchallengeable.” 466 U.S. at 690. In any event, Petitioner’s

arguments fail on their own terms.

Petitioner makes much of the fact that Duval had no duty

to give the report to the prosecution and therefore had no

reason to think that the harmful testimony would come out. 

But Duval reasonably feared that the harmful testimony

would come out through ordinary cross-examination. This is

not a situation in which the harmful testimony concerned

some subject far afield from the witness’ testimony or the

crime itself, such that it was unreasonable for Duval to seek

to avoid the harmful testimony. The harmful subject areas

related directly to either the basis of Short’s testimony—his

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childhood and adult friendship with Petitioner—or the crime

itself—the murder of Linda Smith. Cross-examination easily

could have uncovered the harmful topics.

As for the helpful testimony, Short would have provided

testimony, for example, about the sexual activity of

Petitioner’s mother and its effect on Petitioner. But Duval

already introduced extensive testimony about Petitioner’s

family background and history. The helpful testimony would

not have framed a new perspective on a critical issue in the

case. Cf., e.g., Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1135–36 (“It is difficult

to imagine a more significant discrepancy than that between

the portrait painted at the penalty phase of a man whose

childhood was ‘unfortunate’ but largely unmarred, and that of

a child who was raised in the presence of incest, rape, and

violence, suffered from mental illness, and was shuffled from

home to home.”); Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1177–78

(9th Cir. 2005) (finding ineffective assistance at the penalty

phase where the evidence suggested that the petitioner “had

a normal, non-violent childhood” when, in fact, he had been

“violently abused” and exposed to “physical and sexual abuse

by [his] mother and stepfather”).

Accordingly, Duval’s decision not to call Short as a

witness was “a judgment call within the range of competent

counsel.” Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir.

2000).

4. Failure to Investigate and Present Testimony by

Gerald Crawford

Petitioner argues that Duval provided ineffective

assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and present

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testimony by Petitioner’s half-brother, Gerald Crawford.8

Petitioner argues that Crawford would have testified about

facts not otherwise presented, most notably, sexual abuse by

Petitioner’s father and step-grandfather of many victims,

including Petitioner himself, his grandmother, his sisters, and

the family’s pet dog.

The district court declined to decide whether Duval

performed deficiently9

because, in the court’s view, Petitioner

had not established prejudice. If we agree with the district

court’s assessment of prejudice then we, too, need not reach

the performance prong. For that reason, we begin by

analyzing prejudice. To do so, we must weigh the evidence

actually presented along with the evidence that Petitioner

asserts a competent lawyer would have presented. Hamilton,

583 F.3d at 1131. “Prejudice is established if there is a

reasonable probability that at least one juror would have

struck a different balance between life and death.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

As detailed by the California Supreme Court, Wharton,

809 P.2d at 301–02, and quoted in the factual background

section above, both parties submitted extensive evidence at

the penalty phase. The prosecution’s focus was evidence of

8 Although the potentially ineffective investigation was performed by

investigator Stewart, counsel remained responsible for effective

representation, including the development and presentation of mitigating

evidence. Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2007)

(per curiam). The Warden does not argue to the contrary.

 

9

 We reject the Warden’s contrary reading of the district court’s order. 

A fair reading of the order demonstrates that the court declined to make

any factual findings or legal conclusions related to the performance prong,

which was entirely proper in light of its views on the prejudice prong.

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the 1975 murder and the separate 1975 forcible rape. Duval’s

primary mitigation evidence concerned the abysmal

childhood that Petitioner had suffered, which was caused by,

among other things, extreme poverty and repeated physical

abuse by his step-grandfather, Big Daddy.

At the evidentiary hearing, the district court admitted

Crawford’s testimony from his 2002 video deposition. Some

of Crawford’s testimony merely repeated or added a few

inconsequential detailsto the penalty-phase testimonyalready

introduced by Duval. For example, Crawford could have

verified, and possibly added a few details concerning, the

poverty and physical abuse that Petitioner endured. Because

those topics were adequately covered by the penalty-phase

witnesses, we agree with the district court that Crawford’s

testimony on those subjects was “cumulative” and that its

exclusion did not prejudice Petitioner’s mitigation case. See,

e.g., Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“Every weakness or discrepancy that Pizzuto now says

should have been cited and argued at sentencing was already

before the court.”), amended, 385 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2004).

But some of Crawford’s testimony was not cumulative. 

Crawford testified about three subjects that differed

materially from the penalty-phase testimony: (1) Petitioner’s

cultural background;10(2) his odd personal behavior and

10 Petitioner raised the “cultural mitigation” argument as a subclaim

separate from the subclaim concerning Crawford. The district court held

that unspecified “witnesses” were available to testify about cultural

mitigation, but neither the district court nor Petitioner has named any

available witness, other than Crawford. Petitioner bears the burden of

establishing what evidence a constitutionally adequate lawyer would have

submitted. Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Accordingly, we collapse our analysis of “cultural mitigation” and

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medical symptoms as a child and, most importantly;

(3) extensive sexual abuse by Petitioner’s father and stepgrandfather.

Crawford testified at his 2002 video deposition that the

Ku Klux Klan regularly set up burning crosses in Hammond,

where he and Petitioner grew up. He testified that an

African-American “wasn’t nothing during that time.” The

police would not respond to calls by an African-American;

reporting crimes to the police was ineffective, even in the

case of a murder: “You know, if a black person got killed,

he’s just killed.” No penalty-phase witness testified on the

general subject of cultural oppression that African-Americans

experienced in Louisiana at the time of Petitioner’s

childhood, so Crawford’s testimony on this subject was not

cumulative.11 We nevertheless agree with the district court’s

assessment that the mitigating value of this testimony is

“slight.”

Crawford also testified that Petitioner occasionally had

trance-like spells, would talk to himself in what sounded like

a foreign language, had bad headaches and dizzy spells, and

sometimes cut himself on purpose. No penalty-phase witness

Crawford’s testimony. In any event, as we explain in text, we agree with

the district court that the “cultural mitigation” evidence is slight and that

Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice on that ground alone. Petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase turns on

whether Duval adequately investigated Crawford.

11 Duval certainly presented much evidence of Petitioner’s tragic

upbringing and many specifics about his particular family. But he

presented no evidence of systemic racism against African-Americans and

how those factors affected Petitioner. That evidence is different in kind

from individualized evidence about Petitioner’s home life.

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testified on these topics, so the testimony would not have

been cumulative. But we find the mitigating value of this

testimony, standing alone, to be small. There was ample

evidence of Petitioner’s long-standing mental illness. 

Crawford’s testimony does suggest that the mental illness

arose early in Petitioner’s life rather than, for example, solely

from Petitioner’s later abuse of drugs. So it is possible that

the jury would have viewed Petitioner in a slightly more

sympathetic light. But we are unpersuaded that Petitioner’s

odd childhood behavior, on its own, would have played more

than a small role in the jury’s deliberations.

The prejudicial effect of the two topics just

discussed—cultural mitigation and Petitioner’s childhood

medical problems—was modest. But we reach a very

different conclusion with respect to Crawford’s testimony of

sexual abuse. Crawford testified about sexual abuse

ubiquitous in Petitioner’s family. He testified that both

Petitioner’s father and step-grandfather raped Petitioner at a

very young age.12 He also testified that Big Daddy molested

two of Petitioner’s sisters; beat and raped his wife when she

was dying of cancer; and had sex with the pet dog, Lassie.

The jury did not hear any evidence of that extensive

sexual abuse. Indeed, the only evidence of sexual abuse

admitted during the penalty phase was the attempted

molestation of Petitioner’s mother by Big Daddy when she

12 The Warden challenges the admissibility of some of Crawford’s

testimony of sexual abuse on the ground of hearsay. It is true that

Crawford did not personally witness the actual assaults. But Crawford

testified to witnessing, firsthand, the physical injuries that Petitioner

suffered—such as anal bleeding—and circumstantial evidence that would

have permitted a jury to find that Petitioner’s father and step-grandfather

committed the assaults.

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was a child—well before Petitioner was born—and an

isolated instance of sexual abuse of Petitioner by a nonfamily member when he was 11 years old. The jury knew

that Petitioner grew up in a poor family and had been

physically abused. But they did not know that Petitioner had

been raped—first by his father, then by his stepgrandfather—and that his step-grandfather had raped

Petitioner’s sisters, grandmother, and pet dog.

Childhood sexual abuse can be powerful evidence in

mitigation, particularly when it is not an isolated event. 

See Boyde, 404 F.3d at 1176 (holding that “the family history

of sexual abuse [the petitioner] had known about growing

up[] is the sort of evidence that could persuade a jury to be

lenient”); cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534–35 (2003)

(describing as “powerful” the mitigating evidence that

counsel failed to find, which included “repeated rape during

his . . . years in foster care”). But see Schurz v. Ryan, 730

F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the mitigating value

of a bare allegation that the petitioner was “likely sexually

abused by a priest”), petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___

(U.S. June 6, 2014) (No. 13-10596); Samayoa v. Ayers,

649 F.3d 919, 929 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that failure to

present evidence of a one-time possible childhood sexual

abuse by an uncle did not prejudice the defendant, in light of

the more powerful mitigating evidence actually presented to

the jury). Evidence that Petitioner had been raped by both his

father and his step-grandfather—the two father figures during

his childhood—“could have engendered sympathy” from the

jury. Boyde, 404 F.3d at 1180. Although the jury heard

evidence that Petitioner grew up in a poor family and suffered

physical abuse, the jury would have had no reason to think

that intra-family sexual abuse had occurred—in stark contrast

to Crawford’s testimony about extensive sexual abuse not

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only of Petitioner himself but also of other family members. 

See id. at 1178 (“But the evidence [counsel] elicited from the

parents suggested—in stark contrast to what [competent

counsel could have presented]—that Boyde had a normal,

non-violent childhood.”).

Nor is sexual abuse unrelated to the crimes before the

jury. Both of Petitioner’s 1975 crimes—the aggravating

factors presented by the prosecution—concerned sex. The

1975 forcible rape of Petitioner’s 61-year-old neighbor

clearly concerns sexual abuse, and the 1975 murder of Pierce

occurred after Pierce propositioned Petitionerfor homosexual

sex, enraging Petitioner. See Wharton, 809 P.2d at 301

(noting that Petitioner “admitted killing Robert Pierce after

the latter solicited a homosexual act from him”). Obviously,

the childhood sexual abuse that Petitioner suffered in no way

excuses those crimes. But the evidence of childhood sexual

abuse may have cast those past crimes in a different light. A

juror may have seen the 1975 murder as stemming from

repressed anger about the homosexual rapes of Petitioner by

his father and step-grandfather. A juror also may have seen

the 1975 rape—of a 61-year-old woman by a much younger

Petitioner—as stemming from a childhood filled with rape

and sexual abuse across generations, committed with

impunity. Yet from the evidence actually presented at the

evidentiary hearing, the jury had no information from which

to consider those possibilities.

Even without the evidence of sexual abuse, and with the

knowledge of Petitioner’s terrible past acts, the jury struggled

to reach a unanimous verdict. On the first day of

deliberations, the jury sent the following note to the judge: 

“If the jury does not reach unanimous concurrence on any of

the three verdicts—what will be the verdict?” The court

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responded that “there will be no verdict.” At the end of the

second day of deliberations, the jury sent the following note

to the judge: “Judge Dodds: It appears we are at an

impass[e] on reaching a unaminous [sic] decision as to the

penalty in this case. What are your directions to us at this

time?” The judge declined to respond to the note, after being

informed by the bailiff that the jury wanted to continue

deliberating. The jury returned its verdict shortly before

11:00 a.m. on the third day of deliberations. The jury’s notes

and the fact that it deliberated over the course of three days

suggest that the verdict was not an easy one to reach. See

Thomas v. Chappell, 678 F.3d 1086, 1103 (9th Cir. 2012)

(holding that deliberations lasting almost five days, in

combination with the jury’s requests for readbacks of

testimony, “strongly suggest that the case was close”).

In the final analysis, we conclude that, had Crawford

testified, “‘there is a reasonable probability that at least one

juror would have struck a different balance’ between life and

death.” Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Wiggins,

539 U.S. at 537). Although evidence of sexual abuse is

sometimes not enough to tip the scales, e.g., Schurz, 730 F.3d

at 815; Samayoa, 649 F.3d at 929, the sexual abuse at issue

here was personal to Petitioner, from more than one source

(his father and step-grandfather), and extensive throughout

Petitioner’s family (rapes of Petitioner, his sisters,

grandmother, and pet dog). Moreover, the jury did not reach

its verdict easily, possibly out of recognition that, although

his crimes were heinous, Petitioner himself clearly suffers

from serious mental illness and came from a disadvantaged

and abusive home. The totality of the evidence discussed

above—cultural mitigation, childhood behavior, and sexual

abuse—gives rise to a reasonable probability that the jury

may not have rendered a verdict of death.

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It is true that the aggravating factors against Petitioner

were strong. But the missing sexual-abuse testimony could

have mitigated those factors. Moreover, we have emphasized

that relief must be granted “‘even in the face of . . . strong

aggravating evidence’ . . . ‘if we cannot conclude with

confidence that the jury would unanimously have’” reached

the same decision, had it heard the evidence that competent

counsel would have presented. Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d

1247, 1257 (9th Cir. 2002) (brackets omitted) (quoting

Mayfield, 270 F.3d at 929). Accordingly, we conclude that,

if Duval performed deficiently by failing to investigate and

present testimony by Crawford, then Petitioner has

established prejudice. We turn, then, to the question of

performance.

Duval “had a duty to conduct ‘a thorough investigation of

[Petitioner’s] background.’” Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1113

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 396). “It is imperative that all

relevant mitigating information be unearthed for

consideration at the capital sentencing phase.” Caro I,

165 F.3d at 1227. The sexual abuse described by Crawford

is plainly relevant information that competent counsel would

want to discover during a background investigation. See

Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1113 (listing general categories of

inquiry for a penalty-phase investigation, including “family

abuse,” required by Strickland).

As noted above, Duval had hired Investigator Craig

Stewart to investigate Petitioner’s background. Stewart

visited Louisiana in order to interview Petitioner’s family

members and acquaintances. Consistent with Petitioner’s

right to a thorough investigation, Stewart wrote at the

beginning of his notes a list of topics to ask Petitioner’s

family members, and the list included an entry for inquiring

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about sexual, as well as physical, abuse of Petitioner. At the

evidentiary hearing, Stewart confirmed that sexual abuse, if

any, was one of the topics he sought to learn about while in

Louisiana.

On his trip, Stewart successfully interviewed many

people. He often tape-recorded the interviews and,

afterwards, either wrote a written report summarizing the

interview or had the interview transcribed. For example, as

noted above, Stewart wrote a nine-page, single-spaced report

summarizing his interview with Robert Short, which he

provided to Duval.

The record does not provide a clear answer to why

Stewart’s otherwise thorough investigation failed to uncover

Crawford’s highly relevant accounts of sexual abuse. 

Crawford was one of the family members whom Stewart

sought to interview, in part because Petitioner had asked

specifically that Stewart contact Crawford. Indeed, Stewart

testified at the evidentiary hearing that “Gerald [Crawford] is

very important. It was his brother. George asked me over

and over, ‘Did you get in touch with Gerald?’”

Yet Stewart did not interview Crawford. The record

contains neither a written report concerning Crawford nor a

transcript from an interview with Crawford. And Stewart

confirmed at the evidentiary hearing that he did not, in fact,

interview Crawford.

The reasons why Stewart did not interview Crawford and

the extent of Stewart’s contacts with Crawford are the subject

of a clear factual dispute. In the 2002 video deposition of

Crawford, admitted at the evidentiary hearing, Crawford

stated definitively that Stewart had never contacted him and

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that he would remember if he had. He further stated that, had

someone contacted him about Petitioner’s childhood, he

would have provided the same information that he provided

in the deposition. By contrast, Stewart’s notes from the

Louisiana trip contain a few sparse entries suggesting that

Stewart did contact Crawford and that Crawford told Stewart

that prison officials had used Petitioner as a “guinea pig” in

drug tests while he was incarcerated. Stewart’s notes are

otherwise silent about Crawford. The notes do not reveal

whether Stewart asked Crawford about topics such as sexual

abuse, and they do not explain why Stewart failed to

interview Crawford.

At the evidentiary hearing, Stewart testified that the gap

in his investigative records concerned him: “It bothered me,

both the state public defender and the state attorney general

said it looks like you create memos and reports, and how

come nothing was written on this. That bothered me.” A few

months before the evidentiary hearing in 2006, Stewart

awoke one morning with a vague memory of having phoned

Crawford. According to Stewart’s early morning revelation,

Stewart now remembered contacting Crawford: Crawford

told him that he moved away from the family home at an

early age, is older than Petitioner, had nothing to share about

Petitioner’s childhood, did not have any present-day contact

with Petitioner, and knew only about Petitioner’s having been

used as a “guinea pig.” Stewart “didn’t know if [his

recollection] was a dream or if it was whatever.” So he called

one of the lawyers on the case and told him that “I have some

information that I woke up with. I know it sounds crazy.” 

The lawyer confirmed that Crawford was indeed older than

Petitioner and that Crawford had moved out of the house. 

Stewart testified that the lawyer’s confirmation “prove[d] in

my mind” that what he “seemed to recall” was not “fantasy

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or dream.” The record also contains evidence that Crawford

had reasons to dismiss Stewart’s inquiries: Stewart recalls

that there were outstanding warrants for Crawford’s arrest in

California, where Petitioner’s trial took place, and Crawford

had health problems that could have made it difficult for him

to fly to California to testify.

Without factual findings on the extent of Stewart’s efforts

to contact Crawford and Crawford’s availability to testify or

otherwise supply evidence or leads to evidence, we cannot

determine whether Petitioner has established deficient

performance. For example, if Stewart never contacted

Crawford at all, as Crawford testified, then Petitioner almost

certainly has established deficient performance. The Warden

has not offered any reason—strategic or otherwise—that

would justify a decision simply not to contact Petitioner’s

half-brother. See, e.g., Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1123 (“Counsel

also acted deficiently in not contacting Hamilton’s other

sister, Carolyn, who could have provided the most poignant

and revealing mitigating evidence, as her declaration

demonstrates.”); Correll, 539 F.3d at 946 (holding that

defense counsel’s investigation was deficient where he “was

aware that a chaplain . . . , Reverend Curry, might have been

willing to testify on Correll’s behalf, but the attorney never

even attempted to contact Reverend Curry”).

Even if Stewart did contact Crawford, as Stewart’s notes

suggest, the inquiry becomes whether there was a

constitutionally sufficient effort to learn relevant information

about Petitioner’s upbringing. In this regard, it is important

that Crawford is not a passing acquaintance—Crawford is

Petitioner’s half-brother and lived in the same house as

Petitioner for many years when they were young. Moreover,

Petitioner emphasized the importance of Crawford’s

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testimony by repeatedly questioning Stewart as to whether he

had interviewed Crawford yet. Stewart himself testified that

Crawford was a “very important” person to the background

investigation.

At this procedural stage, we cannot engage in depth with

Petitioner’s claim. The district court declined to make the

preliminary factual findings necessary to evaluate this issue. 

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s decision on this

claim and remand for further factual development and for the

court’s assessment, in the first instance, of whether Petitioner

has established deficient performance. See, e.g., Reyes v.

Brown, 399 F.3d 964, 965 (9th Cir. 2005) (remanding for

further fact-finding by the district court); see also United

States v. Prieto-Villa, 910 F.2d 601, 602 (9th Cir. 1990)

(“Since the findings which would permit review of this

determination are absent here, we remand for factual findings

by the district court.”). In particular, the district court should

determine on remand whether Stewart contacted Crawford;

and, if so, whether Stewart made sufficient efforts to find out

what Crawford could say about Petitioner’s childhood,

whether Crawford denied having useful information, and

whether Crawford would have made himself available as a

witness or otherwise available to provide evidence or leads to

evidence. In making those determinations, the court maytake

additional evidence at its discretion. If the court rules that

Petitioner has established deficient performance and finds

that Crawford would have made himself available to testify,

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the court should grant the writ with respect to the sentence.13

Otherwise, the court should deny relief.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s denial of relief on

Petitioner’s shackling claim (claim 18), his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase (claim 41,

subclaim 4), and most subclaims of his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel at the penalty phase (claim 41,

subclaims 16, 17, 20, and the Robert Short portion of

subclaim 19). We vacate the denial of relief on Petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the

alleged failure to investigate and present testimony by Gerald

Crawford (claim 37 and claim 41, subclaim 22 and the

Crawford portion of subclaim 19). We remand to the district

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and

REMANDED. The parties shall bear their own costs on

appeal.

13 At that point, “[i]f the State opts against pursuing further penalty

phase proceedings, [Petitioner] will automatically receive a sentence of

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” Hamilton, 583 F.3d

at 1102 n.1 (citing Cal. Penal Code § 190.2).

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