Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08113/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08113-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Hedges Industrial Enterprises, Inc., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Rio Tinto PLC; Rio Tinto Limited; Rio

Tinto America Inc., and Kennecott Utah

Copper LLC,

Defendants. 

Kennecott Utah Copper LLC,

Counter-Plaintiff,

vs.

Hedges Industrial Enterprises, Inc.

Counter-Defendant,

and 

Michael Hedges,

Third-Party Defendant.

Hedges Industrial Enterprises, Inc., 

Third-Party Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Motion Industries

Third-Party Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-09-8113-PCT-GMS

ORDER

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The parties’ requests for oral argument are denied because oral argument will not aid

the Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933

F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991).

- 2 -

Pending before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction filed by Defendants Rio Tinto PLC and Rio Tinto America (Dkt. # 71) and the

Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Kennecott Utah Copper LLC (“Kennecott”) (Dkt. #

73). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants both Motions with leave to amend.1

BACKGROUND

In 2002, Hedges Industrial Enterprises, Inc. (“Hedges”) and Defendants entered into

an contract pursuant to which Hedges agreed to perform maintenance on Kennecott’s

hydraulic jacks and to provide Kennecott with a safety inspection program at the Bingham

Canyon mine in Utah. (Dkt. # 72 Ex. 2 at ¶ 2, # 55 at ¶ 6.) According to Hedges, Defendants

allegedly breached that agreement, made defaming statements regarding Hedges’s

performance of the contract, and then misappropriated certain of Hedges’s trade secrets.

(Dkt. # 55.)

Rio Tinto PLC and Rio Tinto America now move to dismiss the claims against them

for lack of personal jurisdiction. Kennecott moves to dismiss the defamation claim pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

DISCUSSION

I. Rio Tinto’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

A. Legal Standard—Rule 12(b)(2)

When the parties dispute whether personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant

is proper, “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists.” Rio Props.,

Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002). This is so, even though the

defendant is the moving party on a 12(b)(2) motion. Id. In the absence of an evidentiary

hearing, however, the plaintiff need only make “a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts

to withstand the motion to dismiss.” Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, ___ F.3d

___, 2010 WL 2135302, at *2 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

1151 (9thCir. 2002)).In considering the motion, a court may “assume the truth of allegations

in a pleading” to the extent thatsuch allegations are not “contradicted by affidavit.” See Data

Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9thCir. 1977)(citing Taylor v. Portland

Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1967));see also Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1019

(observing that only “uncontroverted allegations in [the] complaint must be taken as true”).

Where there are “conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits,” depositions,

and other filings, those conflicts “must be resolved in [the plaintiff’s]favor.”Am. Tel. & Tel.,

Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations

omitted).In cases where a plaintiffsurvivesthe motion to dismiss under a prima facie burden

of proof, the plaintiff still must prove the jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the

evidence at a preliminary hearing or at trial. Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1285 n. 2.

To establish that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) the state’s long arm statute confers jurisdiction over that defendant; and

(2) that “the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the constitutional principles of Due

Process.” See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1019 (citation omitted). Because Arizona’s long-arm

statute extends jurisdiction “to the maximum extent permitted by the . . . Constitution of the

United States,” the Court’s personal jurisdiction inquiry largely collapsesinto an analysis of

Due Process. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); Davis v. Metro Prods., Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 520 (9th

Cir. 1989); Williams v. Lakeview Co., 199 Ariz. 1, 5, 13 P.3d 280, 282 (2000). 

B. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Defendants Rio Tinto PLC and Rio

Tinto America.

Based on the current record, the exercise of jurisdiction over either Rio Tinto PLC or

Rio Tinto America does not comport with principles of Due Process. Under the Due Process

Clause, a defendant must have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state so that

subjecting the defendant to itsjurisdiction will not “offend traditional notions offair play and

substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal

quotationmarks omitted). Under this standard, “the defendant’s conduct and connection with

the forum State [must be]such that he [or she]should reasonably anticipate being haled into

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). In

accord with the Due Process Clause, the “minimum contacts” standard may be satisfied in

two ways. First, a court may exercise general jurisdiction when the defendant’s contacts with

the forumstate are “continuous and systematic.” HelicopterosNacionales deColombia, S.A.

v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984). Second, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction if a

defendant “has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum . . . and the

litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” Burger

KingCorp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)(internal quotation omitted). “In addition

to establishing the requisite contacts, the assertion of jurisdiction must be found reasonable.”

In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA)Prods. Liab. Litig., 344 F. Supp.2d 686, 690 (W.D.Wash.

2003) (citation omitted). 

In cases where a defendant has a wholly-owned subsidiary that possesses minimum

contacts, the subsidiary’s contacts may be imputed to the defendant if the plaintiff

demonstrates that the subsidiary acted as an alter-ego or general agent of the defendant. See

Davis, 885 F.2d at 520. The subsidiary’s contacts can also be imputed when the parties

engage in a joint venture in the relevantforum. Bensmiller v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co.,

47 F.3d 79, 84 (2nd Cir. 1995). 

(1) Rio Tinto Is Not Subject to General Jurisdiction in Arizona.

First, a court may assert general jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant’s

activities in the state are substantial or continuous and systematic, even if the cause of action

is unrelated to those activities. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415; Haisten v. Grass Valley Med.

Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986); Data Disc, 557 F.2d at

1287 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446–47 (1952)).

Hedges fails to provide an adequate legal basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction

over either Rio Tinto PLC or Rio Tinto America. According to uncontroverted affidavit

evidence, Rio Tinto PLC is a parent holding company incorporated in England with its

principal place of business in London, England (see Dkt. # 72, Ex. 1 at ¶ 4), and Defendant

Rio Tinto America is a Delaware corporation that owns and manages a number of different

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

companies in various industries (id. at ¶ 13). Additionally, neither Rio Tinto PLC nor Rio

Tinto America is licensed to do business in Arizona, has any employees in Arizona, owns

any real or tangible property in Arizona, sells goods or services in Arizona, or has ever paid

income or property tax in Arizona. (Dkt. # 72 Ex. 1 at ¶ 5–9.) The uncontroverted affidavit

evidence further provides that neither company engages or operates mining or processing

facilities within Arizona. (Id. at ¶ 10.) 

The Court rejects Hedges argument that the Rio Tinto entities are subject to general

jurisdiction based on their fifty-five percent ownership stake in Resolution Copper. While

it appears that Resolution Copper is an Arizona company, Resolution Copper is not a

defendant, and insofar as this Court can surmise from Hedges’s Amended Complaint,

Resolution Copper has nothing to do with the wrongdoings alleged in this case. To the extent

that Resolution Copper’s contacts might be a basis for general jurisdiction under the alterego, agency, or joint venture theories, Hedges has not set forth any facts or allegations in its

AmendedComplaint, or elsewhere, that justify imputing Resolution Copper’s contacts to Rio

Tinto PLC or Rio Tinto America. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001)

(setting forth the parameters for imputing a subsidiary’s contacts to its parent); Patterson v.

Home Depot, USA, Inc., 684 F. Supp.2d 1170 (D. Ariz. 2010) (same). Instead, the Rio Tinto

entities’ uncontroverted affidavit precludes the application of the alter-ego, agency, and joint

venture theories to the facts of this case. For example, the affidavit indicates that Resolution

and the Rio Tinto entities do not share the unity of control that is required to find jurisdiction

under the alter-ego or joint-venture theories. See Gatecliff v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co.,

170 Ariz. 34,37, 821 P.2d 725, 728 (outlining the factors in establishing a “unity of control”

under an alter-ego theory); Tanner Cos. v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 141, 143, 696 P.2d 693,

695 (1985) (setting forth the requirements, including “an equal right to control,” for finding

jurisdiction under a joint-venture theory). Additionally, the affidavit asserts that Rio Tinto

America’s interest in Resolution is limited to that of a holding company. See Doe, 248 F.3d

at 929 (holding that the agency theory does not apply where a parent holding company takes

actions that are merely consistent with the parent’s status as an investor). 

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

(2) Rio Tinto Is Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction in Arizona.

A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant when the cause of action

arises directly from the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. See Sher v. Johnson, 911

F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit employs a three-part test to determine

whether the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient to subject it to specific

jurisdiction. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). Under this three-part

inquiry, specific jurisdiction exists only if: (1) the defendant purposefully availed itself of the

privileges of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections

of its laws, or purposely directs conduct at the forum that has effects in the forum; (2) the

claim arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of

jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it is reasonable. Id.; see

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing

Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 417 (9th Cir. 1997)). Under this three-step

analysis, the Court finds that neither Rio Tinto PLC nor Rio Tinto America is subject to

specific jurisdiction in Arizona. 

(a)(i) Purposeful Availment

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] purposeful availment analysis is most often used

in suits sounding in contract.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802

(9th Cir. 2002). A defendant has purposefully availed itself of a forum when it “has taken

deliberate action within the forum state or . . . has created continuing obligations to forum

residents.” Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1498. Although contacts must be more than random,

fortuitous, or attenuated, contacts that are “isolated” or “sporadic” may support specific

jurisdiction if they create a “substantial connection” with the forum. Burger King, 471 U.S.

at 472–73, 75. This is so, even if a defendant has no physical presence within the forum. Id.

Hedges has failed to set forth facts indicating that either Rio Tinto PLC or Rio Tinto

America purposefully availed itself of an Arizona forum. According to Hedges, the Rio Tinto

entities subjected themselves to jurisdiction in Arizona by “specifically contract[ing] with

Hedges.” (Dkt. # 76.) Nevertheless, while it appears that Hedges contracted with Kennecott

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

to perform jack maintenance services for Kennecott’s Utah operation, the fact that Hedges

may have removed some of the jacks and performed some of that maintenance in Arizona

does not suggest that either Rio Tinto America or Rio Tinto PLC purposely availed

themselves of the privileges of conducting business in Arizona. Even assuming that one or

both of the Rio Tinto entities are parties to this agreement, the mere presence of a contract

with an out-of-state party is insufficient to establish minimum contacts for personal

jurisdiction. See Doe, 248 F.3d at 924 (citing McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d

802, 816 n.9 (9th Cir. 1988)). Instead, the “prior negotiations and contemplated future

consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing,”

are the proper factors to be considered in evaluating whether a contract establishes sufficient

minimum contacts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478–79. Hedges’s complaint pleads no facts

pertaining to the test set out in Burger King. The Court, therefore, rejects Hedges’s argument

that its contract with the Defendants provides a basis for specific jurisdiction. 

Hedges’s reliance on Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328

F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003), to the contrary, is misplaced. In Harris Rutsky, the Ninth

Circuit held that purposeful availment existed because the defendants had intentionally

directed action towards residents of California by actively seeking contracts with residents

of that state. Id. Hedges’s allegations demonstrate no such affirmative conduct on the part

of Rio Tinto America or Rio Tinto PLC. 

The Court also rejects Hedges’s argument that the purposeful availment test is

satisfied by Resolution Copper’s contacts with Arizona. Again, Resolution Copper is not a

defendant in this action and there is no allegation that Resolution Copper had anything to do

with the wrongdoings alleged in this case. Similarly, while the Rio Tinto entities allegedly

made periodic business trips to Arizona, there is no allegation that the misconduct at issue

has anything to do with those contacts. See Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1498 (noting that purposeful

availment requires that the claim be related to the contacts at issue).

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

(a)(ii) Purposeful Direction

In cases sounding in tort, the Ninth Circuit employs a purposeful direction analysis.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. This three part test for purposeful direction provides:

Calder stands for the proposition that purposeful availment is satisfied even

by a defendant “whose only ‘contact’ with the forum state is the ‘purposeful

direction’ of a foreign act having effect in the forum state.” . . . [Under]

Calder, the “effects” test requires that the defendant allegedly have (1)

committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3)

causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum

state.

Id. at 803 (citing Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)). Applying

this test to Hedges’s tort claims, Rio Tinto PLC and Rio Tinto America are not subject to

personal jurisdiction on the facts alleged. 

There are simply no allegations that Rio Tinto PLC or Rio Tinto America intentionally

directed tortious conduct at Arizona. In its Amended Complaint, Hedges refers specifically

to the five individuals who were involved with the alleged tortious conduct: (1) Green, (2)

Lund, (3) Withers, (4) White, and (5) Ridge. (Dkt. # 55.) The Amended Complaint indicates

that all of these individuals, with the exception of Withers, are employed by Kennecott,

rather than any Rio Tinto entity. (Id. at ¶ 10–15.) And while Hedges alleges that Withers is

an employee of an undisclosed Rio Tinto entity, (see id. at ¶ 13), the Amended Complaint

does not plead any facts suggesting that Withers was employed in Arizona or that he

purposefully directed tortious conduct at Arizona. The only misconduct asserted against

Withers is his allegedly defamatory email. There is no allegation, however, that the email

was circulated in Arizona—a prerequisite for jurisdiction based on a claim of defamation.

See Casualty Assur. Risk Ins. Brokerage Co. v. Dillon, 976 F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 1992)

(holding that “circulation of the libel in the forum jurisdiction is a key factor in determining

whether a nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum”). Accordingly,

Hedges has failed to plead sufficient facts that either Rio Tinto PLC or Rio Tinto America

purposefully directed any tortious conduct at Arizona. 

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

(b) Arising Out Of Forum Related Contacts

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a “but for” test for determining whether a plaintiff’s

cause of action arises out of a defendant’s forum related activities. See Omeluk v. Langsten

Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1995). The “arising out of” requirement

is met if but for the contacts between the defendant and the forum state, the cause of action

would not have arisen. See Terracom v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1995).

In Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that: 

The “but for” test is consistent with the basic function of the “arising out of”

requirement—it preserves the essential distinction between general and

specific jurisdiction. Under this test, a defendant cannot be haled into court for

activities unrelated to the cause of action in the absence of a showing of

substantial and continuous contacts sufficient to establish general jurisdiction.

. . . The “but for” test preserves the requirement that there be some nexus

between the cause of action and the defendant’s activities in the forum.

 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).

The Court rejects Hedges’s contention that the “but for” requirement has been

satisfied. According to Hedges, the Rio Tinto entities’ payment agreement demonstratesthat

personal jurisdiction is appropriate. (Dkt. # 76.) However, the facts alleged in the Amended

Complaint indicate only that some unidentified Rio Tinto entity agreed to pay Hedges for

services performed at the Kennecott mining operation in Utah. (Dkt. # 76 Ex. 13–14.) The

fact that those payments may have been deposited into an Arizona bank account does not

create jurisdiction in Arizona. Furthermore, Hedges has not adequately demonstrated that the

payment agreement is the “but for” cause of any of its claims. Even Hedges’s breach of

contract claim does not appear to relate to the payment agreement. Instead, that claim seems

to be premised on Kennecott’s decision to stop using Hedges’s services for jack maintenance

and repair. 

Hedges, therefore, hasfailed to allege facts demonstrating that his claimsrelate to the

Rio Tinto entities’ Arizona contacts. Because the Amended Complaint does not set forth

facts that meet the “purposeful availment” and “arising out of ” requirements, Hedges fails

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

According to the Ninth Circuit, jurisdictional discovery should “ordinarily be granted

where pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more

satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.” Butcher’s Union Local No. 498 v. SDC

Invest., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Because Hedges has not

made a substantial showing that any of the pertinent facts are controverted as to Rio Tinto

PLC or Rio Tinto America, jurisdictional discovery is not appropriate at this time. See

Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a request

jurisdictional discovery should be denied where the request is premised merely on a hunch

or a belief that such discovery will result in relevant evidence). Prior to receiving

jurisdictional discovery against either of these Defendants, Hedges would have to establish

a more specific basis on which to believe there may be jurisdiction as to either. 

3

This Court need not address at this time whether Arizona or Utah law applies to the

defamation claim because Hedges fails to plead adequate facts for the purposes of either law.

- 10 -

to provide a basis for exercising specific jurisdiction over Rio Tinto PLC or Rio Tinto

America in Arizona.2

II. Kennecott’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

A. Legal Standard: Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim under to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint

must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[;]” it must

contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). And while “[a]ll allegations of

material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable” to the non-moving

party, Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996), “conclusory allegations of law

and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim.” In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations

marks omitted). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion

to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 

B. Hedges Has Failed to State a Claim for Defamation Under Rule 12(b)(6).

Hedges has not plead sufficient facts to state a claim for either defamation or

defamation per se.

3

 Under Arizona law governing simple defamation, “one who publishes

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

a false and defamatory communication concerning a private person . . . is subject to liability,

if, but only if, he (a) knows that the statement is false and it defames the other, (b) acts in

reckless disregard for these matters, or (c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.” Dube

v. Likins, 216 Ariz. 406, 417, 167 P.3d 93, 104 (Ct. App. 2007). Publication as it pertains to

defamation is communication of defamatory statements to a third party. Id. Similarly under

Utah law, a claimant must show that “defendants published the statements concerning him,

that the statements were false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege, that the

statements were published with the requisite degree of fault, and that their publication

resulted in damage.” West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1007–08 (Utah 1994). To

state a claim for defamation per se, the statements must “on their face falsely tend to impeach

one’s honesty, integrity or reputation.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, 152 Ariz. 1, 6, 730

P.2d 178, 183 n.4 (Ct. App. 1985) (citation omitted); see also Larson v. SYSCO Corp., 767

P.2d 557, 560 (Utah 1989) (holding that under Utah law, statements are defamatory per se

when they are “false and allege criminal conduct on the part of the plaintiff or impute the

contracting of some loathsome disease, unchaste behavior (on the part of a woman) or

conduct which is incongruous with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession or

office.”). 

With respect to his defamation claim, Hedges has done nothing more than plead

conclusory allegations of law that are insufficient to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Hedges alleges

four defamatory statements in his complaint; however, each of these statements fails to meet

the pleading requirements set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.

First, Hedges alleges that Kennecott made defamatory statements when an employee

sent emails indicating that Hedges would have to go on welfare soon. (Dkt. # 55 at ¶ 10.) It

is unclear, however, whether these emails were published to some third party. From the face

of the Amended Complaint, it appears that the allegedly harassing emails were merely

“responses” to Hedges’s requests for payment from Kennecott.

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

Hedges next points to statements from Kennecott personnel implying that he was

responsible for too many jacks needing repair. (Dkt. # 77.) According to the Amended

Complaint, Hedges was once asked “why so many jacks were going out for repair?” On

another occasion two Kennecott employees voiced displeasure about the number of jacks

going out. (Dkt. # 55 at ¶ 12.) These facts alone, however, are insufficient to state a claim for

defamation. These statements appear to be little more than an opinion, for which a claim for

defamation does not lie. See Burns v. Davis, 196 Ariz. 155, 165, 993 P.2d 1119, 1130 (Ct.

App. 1999) (“We reiterate that mere opinion, hyperbole, and political invective are protected

speech and as such do not constitute defamation.”); West, 872 P.2d at 1015 (“Because

expressions of pure opinion . . . are incapable of being verified, they cannot serve as the basis

for defamation liability.”). 

Third, Hedges asserts that he received a defamatory email from Withers reprimanding

him for removing Kennecott property without permission. Again, Hedges fails to plead any

facts suggesting that the email was ever published. To the contrary, the Amended Complaint

implies that the email exchange occured solely between Hedges and Withers. 

Finally, Hedges points to the “Jack # 4 Report” and alleges that it contained

“numerous defamatory statements.” (Dkt. # 77.) Hedges’s Amended Complaint, however,

fails to set forth facts suggesting that any information published in the “Jack # 4 Report” was

defamatory in nature. Without any additional facts pertaining to the contents of “Jack # 4

Report,” this Court cannot assess whether the statements therein are defamatory or

defamatory per se.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Hedges has failed to assert a prima

facie case for exercising personal jurisdiction over Rio Tinto PLC or Rio Tinto America in

Arizona. The Court also finds that Hedges has failed to state a claim for defamation against

Kennecott. 

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) The Rio Tinto entities’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Dkt.

# 71) and Kennecott’s Motion to Dismiss Hedges’s defamation claim (Dkt. # 73) are

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

(2) Hedges shall have thirty days (30) or until July 29, 2010 to file its Second

Amended Complaint. Hedges shall also file with the Court and all Defendants a redline

version indicating all changes from the Amended Complaint and the Second Amended

Complaint.

(3) Should Hedges fail to file its Second Amended Complaint in the requisite time

frame, the Clerk of the Court is directed to TERMINATE Rio Tinto PLC and Rio Tinto

America from this action. 

DATED this 30th day of June, 2010.

Case 3:09-cv-08113-GMS Document 92 Filed 07/01/10 Page 13 of 13