Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01929/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01929-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Airline Crash

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re DEEP VEIN THROMBOSIS

LITIGATION

This Document Relates To:

Vincent v American Airlines, Inc,

No 07-1604

Richelet v Lufthansa German

Airlines, No 04-3831

Rietchel v US Airways, Inc, No

01-3444

Dabulis v Singapore Airlines,

Inc, No 03-1929

 /

MDL Docket No 04-1606 VRW

ORDER

On June 25, 2004, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict

Litigation centralized pre-trial proceedings in cases involving

“complex core questions concerning whether various aspects of

airline travel cause, or contribute to, the development of deep

vein thrombosis in airline passengers.” Doc #1 at 2. In total,

some 78 actions were filed and transferred to this district. 

Ultimately, all transferred actions were assigned to the

Case 3:03-cv-01929-VRW Document 56 Filed 10/30/07 Page 1 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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undersigned. Deep vein thrombosis (DVT) is a medical condition

that occurs when a thrombus (a blood clot) forms in a deep vein,

usually in the extremities of the leg. DVT can lead to serious

injury or death if the thrombus breaks off and lodges in the brain,

lungs or heart, thereby causing a heart attack, stroke or other

debilitating effects. Studies indicate a link between air travel

and DVT, which can be attributed to relatively prolonged periods of

immobility coupled with low cabin pressure and poor oxygenation

(technically, “hypobaric hypoxia”). Plaintiffs in this litigation

suffered (or sue on behalf of an individual who suffered) from DVTrelated injuries during or after travel aboard commercial aircraft.

On February 14, 2005, the court granted summary judgment

in favor of Boeing in its capacity as manufacturer of the aircraft

in question in 17 cases. Doc #144, 356 F Supp 2d 1055 (ND Cal

2005). All claims against airline defendants arising from domestic

flights (“non-Warsaw cases”) were dismissed pursuant to the federal

preemption rationale announced in the court’s order of March 11,

2005. Doc #151, 2005 WL 591241 (ND Cal Mar 11, 2005). Plaintiffs

appealed. On October 4, 2007, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part,

finding that the failure to warn claims were preempted by the

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 USC § 40103. Montalvo v Spirit

Airlines, –- F3d –-, 2007 WL 2874401 (9th Cir 2007). But the Ninth

Circuit remanded plaintiffs’ seating configuration claim for

further factual development. Specifically, the panel found

insufficient evidence on which to evaluate whether a seat

reconfiguration would materially affect federal deregulation, which

is a prerequisite for preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act

of 1978, 49 USC § 41713(b)(1). Montalvo, 2007 WL 2874401 at 7-9.

Case 3:03-cv-01929-VRW Document 56 Filed 10/30/07 Page 2 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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MDL 1606 included approximately 50 cases in which

plaintiffs alleged that they suffered from DVT-related injuries

during or after international flights (“Warsaw cases”). On August

21, 2006, the court granted summary judgment in 37 Warsaw cases in

which plaintiffs alleged liability based on asserted failure to

warn regarding DVT. Doc #469, 2006 WL 2547459 (ND Cal Aug 21,

2006). See also Caman v Continental Airlines, 455 F3d 1087 (9th

Cir 2006). The court directed entry of summary judgment under FRCP

54(b) in favor of any airline defendant against which the only

Warsaw Convention accidents alleged were “the onset of DVT or the

absence or insufficiency of a warning regarding DVT or policy level

decisions regarding the same.” Doc #469.

The following Warsaw Convention DVT cases remain in MDL

1606: 

Rietchel v US Airways, Inc, No 01-3444

Dabulis v Singapore Airlines, Inc, No 03-1929

Richelet v Lufthansa German Airlines, No 04-3831

Vincent v American Airlines, Inc, No 07-1604

These are cases in which plaintiffs make other claims in addition

to “failure to warn” claims. On December 4, 2006, the court

granted partial summary judgment for the airline defendants on the

failure to warn claims for the reasons announced in the court’s

August 21, 2006 order. Doc #528. On October 12, 2007, the court

denied the airline defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the

remaining claims in 01-3444 (Rietchel) and 03-1929 (Dabulis). Doc

#699. 

Regarding 04-3831 (Richelet), the court set a dispositive

motion hearing date of October 18, 2007. Doc #566. No summary

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Case 3:03-cv-01929-VRW Document 56 Filed 10/30/07 Page 3 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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judgment motions have been filed. The case is currently set for a

pretrial conference on November 27, 2007 at 9:00am. 

Presently before the court is defendant American

Airlines, Inc’s (“American Airlines”) motion for summary judgment

in 07-1604 (Vincent). Doc #690. Because the court finds this

matter suitable for determination without oral argument, the

hearing scheduled for November 1, 2007, is VACATED. See Civ LR

7-1(b).

 I 

A

“Once a properly documented motion has engaged the gears

of Rule 56, the party to whom the motion is directed can shut down

the machinery only by showing that a trialworthy issue exists.” 

McCarthy v Northwest Airlines, Inc, 56 F3d 313, 315 (1st Cir 1995).

That is, the court must determine whether genuine issues of

material fact exist, resolving any doubt in favor of the party

opposing the motion. “Only disputes over facts that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v Liberty Lobby,

Inc, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). Further, “summary judgment will not

lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 US at 248. And the burden

of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317,

322-23 (1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,

however, but must produce significant probative evidence, by

affidavit or as otherwise provided in FRCP 56, supporting its claim

that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec Serv, Inc v

Pacific Elec Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir 1987). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party “fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex at 322. The evidence

presented by the nonmoving party “is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson,

477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not himself to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 US at

249.

The evidence presented by both parties must be

admissible. FRCP 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in

affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publishing

Co, Inc v GTE Corp, 594 F2d 730, 738 (9th Cir 1979). Hearsay

statements in affidavits are inadmissible. Japan Telecom, Inc v

Japan Telecom America Inc, 287 F3d 866, 875 n 1 (9th Cir 2004).

B

The United States adheres to the Convention for the

Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International

Transportation by Air, concluded at Warsaw, Poland, October 12,

1929, popularly referred to as the “Warsaw Convention.” 49 Stat

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3000, reprinted in note following 49 USC § 40105. The purposes of

the Warsaw Convention are two-fold: “providing uniformity in

respect to documentation and certain procedural matters, and

imposing limitations on liability.” In re Aircrash in Bali,

Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir 1982). 

See also Maugnie v Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F2d 1256,

1259 (9th Cir 1977) (“[T]he Convention functions to protect

passengers from the hazards of air travel and also spreads the

accident cost of air transportation among all passengers.”)

“[R]ecovery for a personal injury suffered on board an

aircraft or in the course of embarking or disembarking, if not

allowed under the Convention, is not available at all.” El Al

Israel Airlines, Ltd v Tseng, 525 US 155, 161 (1999) (quotations

and citation omitted). The remaining MDL plaintiffs do not dispute

that the injuries they sustained (DVT and resultant complications)

were triggered during “international transportation” for purposes

of Article 1(2). Nor do plaintiffs dispute that the Warsaw

Convention applies and preempts all claims arising under local law. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs can recover from the airline defendants, if

at all, only within the framework established by the Warsaw

Convention.

Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides:

The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in

the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or

any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if

the accident which caused the damage so sustained

took place on board the aircraft or in the course of

any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.

49 Stat 3018 (emphasis added).

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Case 3:03-cv-01929-VRW Document 56 Filed 10/30/07 Page 6 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In other words, as explained by the Supreme Court in Air

France v Saks, 470 US 392 (1985), a carrier “is liable to a

passenger under the terms of the Warsaw Convention only if the

passenger proves that an ‘accident’ was the cause of her injury.”

Saks, 470 US at 396. In Saks, the Supreme Court defined “accident”

for purposes of Article 17 as “an unexpected or unusual event or

happening that is external to the passenger.” Saks, 470 US at 405. 

“This definition should be flexibly applied after assessment of all

the circumstances surrounding a passenger’s injuries.” Saks, 470

US at 405. And because any injury “is the product of a chain of

causes,” a plaintiff need only show that “some link in the chain

was an unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger.” 

Saks, 470 US at 406. 

When, however, “the injury indisputably results from the

passenger’s own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and

expected operation of the aircraft, it has not been caused by an

accident, and Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention cannot apply.” 

Saks, 470 US at 406. And because DVT “clearly is the type of

internal reaction to the normal operation of the aircraft, with no

unusual external event,” the development of DVT is not itself an

accident within the meaning of Article 17. Rodriguez v Ansett

Australia Ltd, 383 F3d 914, 917 (9th Cir 2004), cert denied, 544 US

922 (2005). But DVT-related injuries may be compensable under the

Warsaw Convention if caused by an Article 17 accident. With these

principles in mind, the court proceeds to American Airlines’ motion

for summary judgment in 07-1604 (Vincent). 

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Case 3:03-cv-01929-VRW Document 56 Filed 10/30/07 Page 7 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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II

A

Plaintiff Mair Vincent (Ms Vincent) is a citizen of the

United Kingdom and a resident of both Abergavenny, Monmouthshire,

United Kingdom and Almeria, Spain. Doc #1 in 07-1604 (Compl), ¶1. 

According to Ms Vincent’s complaint, on April 12, 2005, Ms Vincent

was traveling as a fare paying passenger on an international air

ticket, and boarded American Airlines Flight 69 from Madrid, Spain

to Miami, Florida, a flight of almost 10 hours. Doc #1 ¶8. After

a five hour layover, Ms Vincent boarded American Airlines Flight

4944 from Miami, Florida to Freeport, Bahamas, her ultimate

destination. Doc #1 ¶8. Ms Vincent alleges that the seating on

her flights was “very cramped” and that approximately halfway into

the first flight, she “began to feel stiffness and tenderness in

the calf of her left leg which was also swollen and warm to the

touch.” Doc #1 ¶9. Ms Vincent continued to suffer from pain in

her left calf during the remainder of the plane trip. Doc #1 ¶9. 

Ms Vincent filed her complaint in this action on March

21, 2007 alleging that an event or accident onboard her flight

caused her to develop DVT. Doc #1 in 07-1604. In addition to

failure to warn clams, which have already been dismissed, Vincent

alleges that she experienced “unreasonably prolonged periods of

immobility, irregular altitude, inadequate air circulation and

oxygenation, inadequate pressurization within the cabin due to a

faulty and abnormal pressurization system[s], low humidity, unusual

delay due to bad weather or any other reason, turbulence, cramped

seating, inadequate hydration, and/or other unexpected and/or

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unusual event associated with Defendant’s aircraft and/or said

flight * * *.” Doc #1 ¶10. 

B

In its motion, American Airlines argues that there was no

unusual or unexpected event external to Ms Vincent on Flight 69 or

on Flight 4944 on April 12, 2005. Doc #690 at 6. American

Airlines represents that there were no incident reports or reports

of aircraft malfunction for these flights and that Ms Vincent has

been unable to produce any evidence to support her accident

allegations. Doc #690 at 6, 13-14.

In her opposition, Ms Vincent fails to address American

Airlines’ arguments and fails to submit evidence of an accident

onboard her flights. Rather, Ms Vincent states that she needs more

discovery in order to respond to American Airlines’ motion. 

Before addressing Ms Vincent’s request, some background

on discovery in this MDL is necessary. Following disposition of

the failure to warn claims, the court permitted plaintiffs limited

discovery in those remaining Warsaw cases in which plaintiffs made

other claims in addition to and apart from “failure to warn.” 

Specifically, the court allowed plaintiffs to serve interrogatories

regarding the operation of flights and document retention policies

of the airline defendants. The court also allowed depositions of

flight crew members in those cases where the passenger was

deceased. All other discovery was stayed. These parameters were

established during the case management conferences held on October

24, 2006 and January 16, 2007. While plaintiffs requested

additional discovery, the court proceeded to set dispositive motion

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hearing dates and directed plaintiffs to utilize FRCP 56(f), in

they event they believed that additional discovery was necessary. 

The court created some confusion over the scope of

discovery in an order entered on July 10, 2007 granting an airline

defendant’s motion for summary judgment in 04-3953 (Halterman). 

Doc #628. Therein the court denied plaintiff Halterman’s FRCP

56(f) request stating, in part: 

Moreover, Halterman has had ample opportunity to pursue

discovery relating to his theory of the case. Counsel for

Qantas represents that Halterman has never served an

interrogatory requesting that Qantas identify the flight crew

of QF94 and that Halterman never noticed depositions of the

flight crew. Doc #39 at 17. Halterman submits copies of his

interrogatories and requests for production (doc #616, exs AD), which confirm that Halterman propounded minimal discovery. 

Finally, as noted above, Halterman has never made a motion to

compel or motion for continuance to conduct further discovery.

Doc #41 at 22:27-23:8.

Counsel for Mr Halterman promptly filed a motion for

clarification of the court’s denial of Mr Halterman’s FRCP 56(f)

request. Doc #629. Counsel reminded the court that plaintiffs’

discovery had been limited and specifically, that the court had

denied plaintiffs’ requests to depose flight crew. Doc #629. 

The court noted the mistake and amended the Halterman

order to delete the above language on October 12, 2007. Doc ##699,

700. The court made clear that the Halterman order was not

intended to lift the partial discovery stay. Doc #699.

Ms Vincent’s opposition brief in this case was filed on

October 11, 2007, without the benefit of the court’s clarification

on the scope of discovery. Accordingly, Ms Vincent mistakenly

proceeded on the assumption that she should be afforded full

discovery before responding to American Airlines’ summary judgment

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motion. Although the court’s clarification was entered the next

day, Ms Vincent has not submitted any further briefing addressing

the merits of her claims and has not requested an opportunity to do

so. American Airline represents and Ms Vincent does not dispute

that American Airlines has produced those categories of discovery

ordered by the court. Finally, the court notes that Ms Vincent has

not appeared for deposition. While American Airlines noticed her

deposition, Ms Vincent objected based on her belief that the

airline was wrongfully withholding flight crew depositions. Doc

#697 at 4.

Because Ms Vincent fails to address American Airlines’

argument that no accident occurred onboard Flights 69 and 4944, and

instead focuses on a purported need for further discovery, the

court construes Ms Vincent’s entire opposition as an FRCP 56(f)

request. But the court need not rule on the merits of Ms Vincent’s

request. This is because American Airlines submits a copy of Ms

Vincent’s verified interrogatory responses. Doc #23, Ex C. 

Therein, Ms Vincent states:

The economy class allocated seating was very cramped

especially when the passenger in front had his seat fully

reclined backwards throughout the whole of the 10 hour flight. 

No footrest was provided in order to keep the Plaintiff’s

thigh from continual contact with the edge of the seat. * * *

The Plaintiff was continually feeling dehydrated and requests

for water were slow in arriving and very small in quantity

(approximately 100 milliliters or 4 fluid ounces). Plaintiff

suffered a shortness of breath and felt the need to relax. 

During the 5 hour layover in Miami Airport the Plaintiff

continued to suffer from pain and swollen calf of her left leg

and was unable to walk normally other than visits to the

lavatory or be [sic] reseated. The seating on the flight to

Freeport was very cramped and the Plaintiff’s allocated

seating was in seat B on the forward facing left hand side of

the aircraft. This seating arrangement did not permit the

Plaintiff to obtain any movement whatsoever of her left leg. 

A request was made to the flight attendant to change seating

to the opposite side but was told [sic] that the flight was

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less than one hour in duration and refused [sic] reseating

based on that ground. The amount of leg room in the seating

well of Flight AA69 was unexpectedly more cramped than the

seating in the economy cabins of other international carriers

recently flown with.

Doc #23, Ex C at 3.

Ms Vincent goes on to state that the continuous pressure

to the back of her knee resulted in the development of DVT. Doc

#23, Ex C at 5. Ms Vincent’s pain continued throughout her first

day in the Bahamas. And on the morning of April 14, 2005, she was

examined by a physician after which she started DVT treatment that

lasted until December 2006. Doc #23, Ex C at 5-6.

American Airlines correctly points out that sitting in an

uncomfortable position does not qualify as an Article 17 accident. 

See Margrave v British Airways, 643 F Supp 510, 512 (SDNY

1986)(“[E]xtended sitting in an airplane, even in an uncomfortable

position, cannot properly be characterized as the sort of

‘accident’ that triggers an airline’s liability under the Warsaw

Convention.”) But as this court has previously noted, an

airline’s refusal to reseat a passenger may constitute an Article

17 accident when the passenger requests to be moved for medical

reasons. See October 12, 2007 ruling denying defendant airline’s

motion for summary judgment in 03-1929 (Dabulis). Doc #699. Such

was the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Olympic Airways v Husain, 316

F3d 829 (9th Cir 2002).

Husain involved a passenger’s fatal reaction to cigarette

smoke in the aircraft cabin. Upon boarding the flight, Dr Hanson

and his wife, plaintiff Rubina Husain, realized their seats were

located near the economy-class smoking section. Given Hanson’s

history of recurrent anaphylactic reactions to cigarette smoke,

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Husain notified a flight attendant that Hanson was allergic to

smoke and requested that Hanson be reseated further away from the

smoking area. Husain repeated her request several times to no

avail. Hanson died in flight, apparently due to a reaction to the

ambient cigarette smoke. Husain’s lawsuit followed.

Judge Breyer of this district held that the flight

attendant’s refusal to reseat Hanson constituted an Article 17

accident because it was in “blatant disregard of industry standards

and airline policies” and therefore “unexpected or unusual” under

Saks. 116 F Supp 2d 1121, 1134 (ND Cal 2000). The Ninth Circuit

affirmed, agreeing that the refusal to reseat Hanson “was

unexpected and unusual in light of industry standards, Olympic

policy, and the simple nature of Dr Hanson’s requested

accommodation.” 316 F3d 829, 837 (9th Cir 2002). 

While the factual record here is not as developed as that

in the Dabulis case addressed in the court’s October 12, 2007

order, Ms Vincent’s verified interrogatory responses show that she

requested to be reseated at least once during her American Airlines

flight and that Ms Vincent made the request for medical reasons. 

The discovery responses also show that American Airlines denied the

request. Accordingly, drawing all inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party, the court is unable to find an absence of disputed

fact whether an Article 17 accident occurred onboard Ms Vincent’s

flight. Accordingly, based on the current record, the court DENIES

American Airlines’ motion for summary judgment. The denial is

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Given the still early pendency of this case and

the confusion over the scope of discovery, the court finds that

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further factual development is warranted. Accordingly, Ms Vincent

is ORDERED to appear for deposition. The court will also permit Ms

Vincent to make an inspection of the subject aircrafts. Ms Vincent

may also propound further interrogatories regarding the

availability of alternate seats on those flights for which she

requested reseating. All discovery should be completed by February

29, 2008. The dispositive motion hearing date is continued to

April 10, 2008. The pretrial conference currently set for December

11, 2007 is VACATED and continued to June 12, 2008. Because the

court does not rely on any of the exhibits addressed in American

Airlines’ evidentiary objections, Doc #703, the objections are MOOT

and DENIED.

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III

For reasons given above, American Airlines’ motion for

summary judgment in 07-1604 (Vincent) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The schedule in the case is as set forth above.

The parties in 04-3831 (Richelet) shall appear for the

pretrial conference currently scheduled for November 27, 2007 at

9:00am.

As noted above, the court denied the airline defendants’

motions for summary judgment in 01-3444 (Rietschel) and 03-1929

(Dabulis) on October 12, 2007. Doc #699. Accordingly, the parties

in 01-3444 and 03-1929 shall appear for a pretrial conference on

January 17, 2007 at 3:30 pm. 

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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