Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02404/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02404-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARBARA BARRON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv2404-LAB (WMc)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS;

ORDER SCREENING

COMPLAINT; AND

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

vs.

PALOMAR HEALTH,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Barbara Barron, proceeding pro se, filed her complaint in this action, along

with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The complaint alleges Barron was

discriminated against in employment because of her age, in violation of federal law. It also

brings supplemental state law claims. 

The Court has reviewed the IFP motion, finds Barron is without funds to pay the filing

fee, and GRANTS the motion.

The Court is required to screen the complaint of a plaintiff proceeding IFP, and to

dismiss it to the extent it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary

relief from an immune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

/ / /

- 1 - 12cv2404

Case 3:12-cv-02404-LAB-WMC Document 4 Filed 01/14/13 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court’s jurisdiction over Barron’s claims depends on the existence of a federal

question. The complaint alleges Barron was discriminated against because of her age. in 1

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But Title VII reaches only discrimination

by covered employers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Because

Barron is proceeding pro se, however, the Court liberally construes her complaint. See

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court therefore construes the

complaint as bringing a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).

The complaint alleges Barron suffered age-based discrimination by Palomar, leading

her initially to file a discrimination complaint with the EEOC, but that after mediation, she

withdrew it. The allegations imply that the mediation was conducted and the agreement was

reached under the auspices of the EEOC. Among the terms of the agreement, the complaint

alleges, were a provision that Defendant Palomar Health would not engage in any more agebased discrimination. But after the agreement was entered into, Palomar Health allegedly

resumed its age-based discrimination by taking Barron off the work schedule, retaliating

against her for having complained about the discrimination, and hiring a new employee to

do her work. (Compl., ¶¶ 22–23.) Her employment was terminated December 31, 2010,

approximately six months after she had first initiated the complaint process. (Id., ¶ 21.)

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is required under the ADEA. Sanchez v. Pac.

Powder Co., 147 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9 Cir. 1998). Although the complaint doesn’t mention th

exhaustion, Barron on January 9, 2013 filed a motion for appointment of counsel and

attached to the motion a right-to-sue letter issued July 12, 2012 and referencing Defendant

Palomar. The Court infers that after Palomar allegedly breached the mediation agreement,

Barron asked the EEOC to reinstate the complaint. See Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 862

(9 Cir. 2010) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a)) (noting that employee alleging breach of th

settlement agreement can ask the EEOC either for specific performance or for reinstatement

of the original discrimination complaint). It therefore appears, at this stage, that Barron has 

/ / /

The complaint doesn’t identify Barron’s age, but the IFP motion gives her age as 66. 1

- 2 - 12cv2404

Case 3:12-cv-02404-LAB-WMC Document 4 Filed 01/14/13 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

exhausted her administrative remedies as required. The Court has reviewed the remainder

of the complaint and finds it sufficient to survive screening.

Because Barron is proceeding IFP, she is entitled to have his complaint and

summons served by the U.S. Marshals Service. It is therefore ORDERED that the United

States Marshal shall serve a copy of the complaint, summons and this order granting

Barron leave to proceed IFP upon Defendant as directed by Barron on U.S. Marshal

Form 285. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States.

As noted, Barron has also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. Although there

is no constitutional right to counsel in most civil cases, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the

Court has discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. But the Court may do so only

under “exceptional circumstances.” See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9 Cir. th

1991). This requires evaluating both the likelihood of success on the merits, and the

plaintiff’s ability to articulate her claims pro se in light of the legal issues involved. Id. The

Court finds Barron is very able to articulate her claims pro se, and the “exceptional

circumstances” required for appointment of counsel are not present here. The motion is

therefore DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 12, 2013

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

- 3 - 12cv2404

Case 3:12-cv-02404-LAB-WMC Document 4 Filed 01/14/13 Page 3 of 3