Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00161/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00161-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

08cv00161-H (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, 

Plaintiff,

v.

T. CATLETT, et al., 

Defendants. 

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 08cv00161-H (BLM)

(1) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS and (2)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

and DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR

JUDICIAL NOTICE

[Doc. Nos. 32 and 38]

 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge Marilyn L. Huff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local

Civil Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California.

On January 25, 2008, Plaintiff Nehemiah Robinson, a state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights suit

against several defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), and the

Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) (29 U.S.C. § 794). Defendants filed a motion

to dismiss the Complaint on June 10, 2008. Doc. No. 25. 

On July 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 1 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Doc. No. 26. In four counts, Plaintiff alleges that between February

2006 and August 2007, Defendants violated his First, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as his rights under and the ADA and

RA when they (1) assigned him to an upper bunk; (2) made false

statements that resulted in his walking cane being confiscated;

(3) otherwise denied him use of a walking cane; and (4) failed to

provide him with prescribed pain medication. He seeks compensatory,

nominal, and punitive damages in addition to declaratory and injunctive

relief to redress these alleged violations. Id. 

Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that

Plaintiff failed to state any claims upon which relief can be granted.

Doc. No. 32. Alternatively, Defendants request that they be dismissed

in their official capacities and that Plaintiff’s requests for

injunctive relief be dismissed. Id. at 22-24. Defendants also ask the

Court to take judicial notice of Exhibits 1 through 4 attached to D.

Bell’s Declaration in support of their motion. Id.; see Bell’s Decl.,

Defs.’ Exs. 1-4. Plaintiff filed an opposition and a request for

judicial notice on August 11, 2008 (Doc. No. 38), and, Defendants filed

their reply on August 19, 2008 (Doc. No. 39). This Court found the

issues appropriate for decision on the papers and without oral argument

pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).

This Court has considered the FAC, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

(“Defs.’ Mem.”), Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (“Defs.’

Req.”), the Declaration of D. Bell in Support of Defendants’ Request for

Judicial Notice (“Bell’s Decl.”) and attached Exhibits 1 through 4

(“Defs.’ Exs. ___”), Plaintiff’s Opposition (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Plaintiff’s

Request for Judicial Notice (“Pl.’s Req.”), the Declaration of Nehemiah

Robinson in Support of Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice (“Pl.’s

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 2 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1A physician completes a comprehensive accommodation chrono “if an inmate

requires an accommodation due to a medical condition.” See Pl.’s Ex. 1 and Defs.’ Ex.

1 (attaching comprehensive accommodation chrono). 

3 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Decl.”), and attached Exhibits 1 through 4 (“Pl.’s Exs. ___”),

Defendants’ Reply (“Defs.’ Reply”), and all supporting documents

submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part as outlined below. 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s FAC

unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff suffers from severe arthritis of many

major joints and diffuse joint disease. FAC at ¶ 1. Due to these

conditions, medical personnel issued several comprehensive accommodation

chronos (“chronos”)1 requiring that Plaintiff be housed in a ground

floor cell, assigned a bottom bunk, and issued a walking cane. Id. at

¶ 3. 

A. Count 1

On February 6, 2006, Plaintiff was assigned to an upper bunk. Id.

at ¶ 4. His cell mate who was assigned to the lower bunk had a bad back

and bad knee and weighed well over 230 pounds. Id. On that day,

Plaintiff informed Defendant Catlett, a Correctional Sergeant, that his

chrono entitled him to a lower bunk. Id. On March 17, 2006, Plaintiff

challenged his upper bunk assignment by submitting an inmate appeal

(“602") with attached chronos to Defendant Garrett, a Correctional Floor

Officer. Id. at ¶ 5. In the 602, Plaintiff requested placement in a

vacant cell with a lower bunk. Id. Defendant Garrett told Plaintiff

he did not have time to look into the issue and returned the 602 to

Plaintiff and directed him to give it to another Correctional Floor

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 3 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Officer, Defendant Arvizu, who would forward it to Defendant Catlett.

Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff followed the instructions and, on March 18, 2006,

asked Defendant Arvizu if he had given the 602 to Defendant Catlett.

Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. Defendant Arvizu said that he had but that he did not

know if Defendant Catlett was going to move Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 8.

Thereafter, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Catlett regarding the cell

move on two occasions. Id. at ¶ 9. Defendant Catlett said he was going

to talk to Defendant Garrett. Id. Plaintiff asked Defendant Catlett

if he had the 602 in his possession and Defendant Catlett responded that

he received it but he could not recall where he placed it. Id.

On March 22, 2006, while at the medical facility, Plaintiff spoke

with the doctor and another staff member about the issue. Id. at ¶ 10.

They stated that due to the seriousness of Plaintiff’s medical

condition, they were going to talk to Defendant Catlett about assigning

Plaintiff to a lower bunk. Id. Subsequently, Officer Horta, who was

present during this conversation, spoke with Defendant Garrett and

personally gave him a copy of the chrono reflecting Plaintiff’s need for

a lower bunk. Id. Defendant Garrett stated that he would talk to

Defendant Arvizu about the issue. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Garrett, Arvizu and Catlett were

“repeatedly made aware” of his serious medical condition and the need

to move him to a bottom bunk. Id. at ¶ 11. As a result of being placed

on a top bunk, Plaintiff allegedly suffered severe pain and swelling of

his right knee. Id.

On March 29, 2006, Plaintiff submitted another 602 to the appeals

coordinator requesting, among other things, that he be housed in a

vacant cell and assigned to a lower bunk. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15; Pl.’s Ex.

1; Defs.’ Ex. 1. Plaintiff alleges generally that Defendants Catlett,

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 4 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2Because Plaintiff and Defendants did not number their exhibits consequently, the

Court uses the page numbers affixed to the top of the pages by the electronic filing

system for citing purposes. 

5 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Price, and Bourland denied or partially granted his requests. FAC at

¶ 16. The actual 602 documents reflect that Defendants granted

Plaintiff’s request for a lower bunk but denied his request for a vacant

cell on the basis that his medical chrono required the first

accommodation but not the second. Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 14-16; Defs.’ Ex. 1

at 11-13.2 On June 28, 2006, Petitioner’s appeal was affirmed at the

Director level, that is the order denied Plaintiff’s request for a

single cell but affirmed the prior reassignment to a lower bunk on a

lower tier. Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 17; Defs.’ Ex. 1 at 14. 

B. Count 2

On February 14, 2007, the chief medical officer renewed the chrono

allowing Plaintiff to possess a walking cane. FAC at ¶ 26. Plaintiff

alleges that on August 17, 2007 he was falsely accused of using his cane

to commit “battery on an inmate,” removed from general population, and

placed in administrative segregation. Id. at ¶ 27. He further alleges

that on May 30, 2008, Plaintiff was found not guilty of the offense due

to insufficient evidence, and this finding was affirmed on June 11,

2008. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29. 

Plaintiff states that on August 17, 2007, Defendant Catlett

generated and signed a “falsified” general chrono authorizing the

confiscation of Plaintiff’s cane. Id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Catlett “knowingly and intentionally” lied in that chrono when

he wrote that “[Plaintiff] was observed...striking the other inmate

numerous times with the cane.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that

Defendant Catlett falsified the information to prevent Plaintiff from

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 5 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 08cv00161-H (BLM)

ever being able to possess a walking cane. Id. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Johnson, a Correctional Lieutenant, aided in this criminal act

by “knowingly and intentionally” misstating that “inmate Clark received

a blow to his head[. T]his injury was clearly a result of inmate

Robinson striking inmate Clark on the head with a cane...” Id. at ¶ 31.

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants’ knowing and

intentional false statements, he was denied the use of a walking cane in

violation of his constitutional rights and suffered severe pain and

swelling of his right knee. Id. at ¶ 31-33. 

On September 12, 2007, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal requesting,

among other things, that Defendant Catlett’s report be inspected and the

false statements corrected. Id. at ¶ 34; Pl.’s Ex. 4 and Defs.’ Ex. 4

(attaching inmate/parolee appeal form). On October 16, 2007, Defendant

Johnson “partially granted” Plaintiff’s appeal at the first level,

stating that the report was being reviewed and Plaintiff had been

provided a replacement cane. FAC at ¶ 34; Pl.’s Ex. 4 at 64; Defs.’ Ex.

4 at 27. On November 14, 2007, Defendant Ochoa, a Chief Deputy Warden,

“partially granted” Plaintiff’s appeal at the second level, stating that

the report “has been revised to accurately reflect the circumstances

that led to [Plaintiff’s] cane being confiscated.” FAC at ¶ 34; Pl.’s

Ex. 4 at 65-66; Defs.’ Ex. 4 at 28-29. A copy of the revised report was

attached to the second level response. Pl.’s Ex. 4 at 67; Defs.’ Ex. 4

at 30. On March 5, 2008, Plaintiff’s appeal was denied at the

director’s level with a finding that no relief other than the revised

report was warranted. Pl.’s Ex. 4 at 68-69; Defs.’ Ex. 4 at 31-32. 

C. Count 3

On August 23, 2007, Plaintiff appeared before the Institutional

Classification Committee (“ICC”) and was forced by Defendant Widmann, a

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 6 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Correctional Floor Officer, to walk the distance to the hearing without

his cane. FAC at ¶¶ 42-43. Defendant Janda, the Chairman of the ICC

and the Associate Warden, noticed that Plaintiff was limping, and asked

Plaintiff what was wrong with his leg. Id. at ¶ 44. Plaintiff informed

Defendant Janda his cane was unjustly confiscated on August 17, 2007.

Id. He expressed in great detail the seriousness of his medical

conditions, that he had been in severe pain, and that his right knee had

been swelling as a result of the unjust confiscation of his walking

cane. Id. at ¶¶ 44-45. Defendant Janda instructed Defendant Widmann to

get Plaintiff a cane. Id. at ¶ 46. Unbeknownst to Defendant Janda,

Defendant Widmann did not get Plaintiff a cane. Id. at ¶¶ 47-48.

Instead, he issued Plaintiff a Health Care Services Request form and

instructed Plaintiff to fill it out and submit it to medical. Id. at 

¶ 47. 

After the hearing, Defendant Widmann forced Plaintiff to walk the

distance back to his cell without a cane. Id. at ¶ 48. For a least a

month after this incident, Plaintiff was escorted to the showers, the

medical facility, and the exercise yard without a cane, despite his

repeated verbal and written requests to Defendant Widmann and the health

care services department for a cane. Id. at ¶¶ 49-51. He experienced

severe pain and swelling in his right knee during these escorts. Id. at

¶ 50. 

On August 27, 2007, and August 29, 2007, medical personnel told

Plaintiff that “custody officers/officials” were preventing him from

receiving a cane. Id. at ¶ 52. On September 11, 2007, Plaintiff filed

a reasonable modification or accommodation request for a cane. Id. at

¶ 53. On September 20, 2007, Defendant Nelson, a Correctional

Lieutenant, reviewed and granted Plaintiff’s request. Id.; Pl.’s Ex.

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 7 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 08cv00161-H (BLM)

3 at 29; Defs.’ Ex. 3 at 3. On September 25, 2007, Defendant Janda

approved the disposition. Id. 

D. Count 4 

In May of 2007, Plaintiff was taken to an outside hospital where a

doctor prescribed him the pain medication Tramadol Hydochloride. Id. at

¶ 62. On June 17, 2007, Defendant Noriega, a Licensed Vocational Nurse,

gave Plaintiff his pain medication for the first time. Id. at ¶ 63.

She stated that she did not know why Plaintiff had not been receiving

the pain medication, and that she did not know when the pain medication

had been approved. Id. She promised that she “[would] let Plaintiff

know tomorrow.” Id. The next day, when Defendant Noriega was passing

out pain medication, Plaintiff requested his pain medication but

Defendant Noriega did not have it. Id. at ¶ 64. She did not recall

having given Plaintiff pain medication the day before, nor could she

give Plaintiff the date of approval of the pain medication. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Noriega wrote his name down and said

she would look into the matter, but never responded to him. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Noriega and other medical personnel

were aware Plaintiff was in severe pain when he was denied his pain

medication. Id. at ¶ 65. 

On June 18, 2007, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal regarding the

pain medication. Id. at ¶ 66. On July 20, 2007, Defendant Salgado, a

Registered Nurse, “partially granted” his appeal at the first level.

Id.; Defs.’ Ex. 2 at 5. He specifically noted that: 1)Plaintiff’s

medication was ordered on May 23, 2007, but was never noted; 2)

Plaintiff should have received his medication that day or the next day;

and, 3)he would discuss this issue with “B” yard medical staff to

prevent future problems. Id. On July 24, 2007, Defendant Correa, the

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 8 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Supervising Registered Nurse II, approved the first level decision. Id.

On August 30, 2007, Defendant Correa “partially granted” the appeal

at the second level “in that [Plaintiff] is receiving the Tramadol

ordered by the specialist and his [Primary Care Provider].” FAC at ¶

66; Pl.’s Ex. 2 at 23-24; Defs.’ Ex. 2 at 6-7. Defendant Ball, the

Chief Physician/Surgeon, approved the second level decision that same

day. Id. On December 14, 2007, the appeal was denied at the director’s

level by Defendant O’Shaughnessy, an Appeals Examiner, who reviewed the

matter for the Secretary and/or Director of CDCR. Id. at 8-9. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Failure to State Claim

Defendants move to dismiss the FAC under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defs.’ Mem.

at 2. A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim can only be dismissed if the

plaintiff is unable to articulate “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

-- U.S. --, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (abrogating Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 78 (1957)). For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the

court must accept as true all material factual allegations in the

complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, and

must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. See Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th

Cir. 2004). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately

prevail, but whether he has properly stated a claim upon which relief

could be granted. See Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir.

2003).

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 9 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Accordingly, the “focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider v. California Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194,

1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). When reviewing such a motion, the court may

consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents properly attached

to the complaint, and matters over which the court may take judicial

notice. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d

1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). The court also may consider documents

the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies on and “whose authenticity

no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the

[plaintiff’s] pleading.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir.

2005); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001).

On the other hand, the court “may not look beyond the complaint to a

plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a

defendant’s motion to dismiss.” See Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1

(emphasis in original).

When a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must be careful to

construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the plaintiff any benefit

of the doubt. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002);

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.

1988). This rule of liberal construction is “particularly important” in

civil rights cases. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.

1992). When giving liberal construction to a pro se civil rights

complaint, however, the court is not permitted to “supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of

Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

“Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil

rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.”

Id.

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 10 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 08cv00161-H (BLM)

The court should grant a pro se plaintiff leave to amend his

complaint “unless the pleading ‘could not possibly be cured by the

allegation of other facts.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th

Cir. 2003) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc)). Moreover, before dismissing a pro se civil rights

complaint for failure to state a claim, the court must provide the

plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies, without

which the pro se plaintiff will inevitably repeat previous errors. See

Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. Where amendment of a pro se

plaintiff’s complaint would be futile, however, denial of leave to amend

is appropriate. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339

(9th Cir. 1996).

1. Judicial Notice

Defendants and Plaintiff ask this Court to take judicial notice of

the documents related to Plaintiff’s challenges to the Defendants’

actions at issue in this case. Doc Nos. 32 and 38. In their request,

Defendants submit four sets of documents: those related to Plaintiff’s

request for a lower bunk and vacant cell (Exhibit 1 to Bell’s

Declaration), those related to Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiff

with prescribed medication (Exhibit 2 to Bell’s Declaration), those

related to Defendants’ alleged failure to provide Plaintiff with a cane

(Exhibit 3 to Bell’s Declaration), and those related to Plaintiff’s loss

of his cane due to his alleged use of it to harm another inmate (Exhibit

4 to Bell’s Declaration). Doc. No. 32; Bell’s Decl.; Defs.’ Exs. 1-4.

While Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ request on the grounds that the

attached documents “are not true copies of records as stated by D.

Bell,” Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of essentially

the same documents attached to his Declaration in Support of Judicial

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 11 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3The Court reviewed the Exhibits and found Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1, 2 and 4 to be

identical to Defendants’ Exhibit 1, 2, and 4 except that Plaintiff’s Exhibits include

Plaintiff’s response to the second level reviewer’s action which he sent directly to

Sacramento (i.e. section H) and the “Received” stamp from Sacramento. See Pl.’s Exs.

1-4; Defs.’ Exs. 1-4. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 is identical to Defendants’ Exhibit 3.

Id.

12 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Notice.3 Pl.’s Req.; Pl.’s Exs. 1-4. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to take judicial

notice of two types of facts: (1) those that are generally known within

the court’s territorial jurisdiction, and (2) those that are capable of

accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned, such as an almanac, dictionary,

calendar, or other similar source. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Judicial

notice may be taken of records of state agencies and other undisputed

matters of public record. Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas

Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lee v. City

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001)). But the Court

should not take judicial notice of agency records when the facts

contained in these are subject to reasonable dispute. Brown v. Valoff,

422 F.3d 926, 931 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Sausalito v.

O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1124 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004); Lee, 250 F.3d at 689.

Also, the Court should only take judicial notice of facts contained in

agency records that bear “sufficient indicia of reliability...” United

States v. Perez-Corona, 295 F.3d 996, 1001 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, the proposed documents are true and correct copies of records

maintained by the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) in the ordinary course of its business. Bell

Decl. at ¶ 3. In addition, many of the documents are signed and dated

by Plaintiff or Defendants, and they bear log number stamps indicating

they were received and processed by prison administrators. See Defs.’

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 12 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4Additionally, as mentioned above, when ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court

may consider “documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose

authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the

pleading.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other

grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.2002); Stone v.

Writer's Guild of Am. W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir.1996). Although not

attached to Plaintiff’s FAC, Plaintiff references and relies on the documents that

comprise Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1 through 4 and Defendants’ Exhibits 1 through 4 in his

FAC. Therefore, the Court considers the Exhibits on this ground as well. 

13 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Exs. 1-4; Pl.’s Exs. 1-4. Finally, while Plaintiff states that

Defendants exhibits are not “true copies,” Plaintiff does not support

that allegation and Plaintiff and Defendants submit essentially the same

documents and argue that they are authentic and reliable. See Pl.’s

Req.; Pl.’s Decl.; Defs.’ Req.; Bell’s Decl. Accordingly, the Court

concludes that the documents are authentic, reliable, and undisputed

CDCR records and takes judicial notice of them. Perez-Corona, 295 F.3d

at 1001 n.4 (judicial notice appropriate where document contents bear

“sufficient indicia of reliability”).4

 Therefore, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ requests for judicial notice. 

2. Eighth Amendment (Cruel and Unusual Punishment)

In his four counts, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the

Eighth Amendment’s bar against cruel and unusual punishment by denying

him access to a lower bunk, a walking cane and his prescribed

medication. FAC. A public official’s “deliberate indifference to a

prisoner’s serious illness or injury” violates the Eighth Amendment’s

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). To state a claim, the prisoner must allege

facts which demonstrate that he was confined under conditions posing an

objective risk of “sufficiently serious” harm, and that prison officials

had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying him proper

medical care. Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995)

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 13 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5Tilton was not mentioned by name in Plaintiff’s first two counts but was instead

identified as the Secretary and/or Director of CDCR. FAC at ¶¶ 23, 39. In Count Four,

Plaintiff named Tilton as the Director and/or Secretary of CDCR. Id. at ¶ 73.

Defendants also identify Tilton as the “former Director/Secretary of CDCR.” Defs.’

14 08cv00161-H (BLM)

(internal quotations omitted). Thus, there is both an objective and a

subjective component to an actionable Eighth Amendment violation. See

Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). The objective

component generally is satisfied so long as the prisoner alleges facts

to show that his medical need is sufficiently “serious” such that the

“failure to treat [that] condition could result in further significant

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 904

(internal quotations omitted); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d

540, 546 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (“serious” medical conditions are those a

reasonable doctor would think worthy of comment or treatment, those

which significantly affect the prisoner’s daily activities, and those

which are chronic and accompanied by substantial pain). 

In contrast, the subjective component requires the prisoner to

allege facts which demonstrate that the officials had a culpable mental

state, specifically, “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).

“Deliberate indifference” is evidenced only when “the official knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the

official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must

also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. 

a. Count 1

In Count One, Plaintiff sues Defendants Catlett, Garrett, Arvizu,

Price, Bourland, and Tilton5

 in their individual and official capacities

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 14 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 Mem. at 10. 

15 08cv00161-H (BLM)

alleging that they denied him a lower bunk in violation of the Eighth

Amendment’s bar against cruel and unusual punishment. FAC at 2-3, ¶ 17.

Defendants identify three defects in the FAC which they allege are fatal

to this cause of action. Defs.’ Mem. at 12-13. First, Defendants claim

that Plaintiff does not meet the objective component of an Eighth

Amendment claim because he was assigned to an upper bunk for only three

months and “he could have relied on parts of his body other than his

right leg to get up and down from an upper bunk.” Id. at 12. Defendants

argue that this mere “inconvenience...was hardly a deprivation of the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. Second,

Defendants claim that Plaintiff fails to meet the subjective element of

an Eighth Amendment claim because Plaintiff’s cell mate suffered from a

bad back, a bad knee, and weighed well over 230 pounds. Id. Therefore,

assigning Plaintiff the upper bunk instead of his cell mate was not

“deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff; but rather, a simple and

reasonable assessment of which inmate would have a more difficult time

with the upper bunk.” Id. Lastly, Defendants argue that, even if

Plaintiff has sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment claim, this claim

can only stand against Defendant Catlett because Plaintiff fails to

establish an affirmative link between the other Defendants’ actions and

the claimed deprivations as is required under Section 1983. Id. at 13.

1. Defendants Catlett, Arvizu, and Garrett

According to the FAC, as described in detail above, Plaintiff was

assigned to an upper bunk on or about February 6, 2006. FAC at ¶ 4. On

that day, and for weeks thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly

informed Defendants Catlett, Arvizu, and Garrett that he had a serious

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 15 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 08cv00161-H (BLM)

medical condition and a chrono entitling him to a lower bunk and asked

that they move him to a cell with an available lower bunk but they

refused to do so. Id. at ¶¶ 4-24. 

Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this

Court finds these allegations sufficient to support both the objective

and subjective aspects of an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

claim against Defendants Catlett, Arvizu, and Garrett. See Clement, 298

F.3d at 904. First, Plaintiff has alleged he has a medical condition

serious enough for a prison doctor to issue him a medical chrono

instructing that he be given a bottom bunk. See Doty, 37 F.3d at 546 n.3

(“serious” medical conditions are those a reasonable doctor would think

worthy of comment or treatment, those which significantly affect the

prisoner’s daily activities, and those which are chronic and accompanied

by substantial pain). Second, Plaintiff has alleged that prison

officials, including Defendants Catlett, Arvizu, and Garrett, personally

or in concert with each other, ignored the doctors’ instructions in the

medical chrono by placing him on a top bunk or by not overruling other

officials’ orders placing him on a top bunk. FAC at ¶ 11 (alleging

Defendants Catlett, Arvizu and Garrett were “repeatedly made aware of

Plaintiff’s serious medical condition and the need to move him to a

bottom bunk.”); see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (prison officials act

with deliberate indifference when they “intentionally interfer[ed] with

. . . treatment once prescribed.”); Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160,

1165 (9th Cir. 1999) (“allegations that a prison official has ignored the

instructions of a prisoner’s treating physician are sufficient to state

a claim for deliberate indifference.”). Thus, Plaintiff has successfully

stated a claim for cruel and unusual punishment in Count One under the

Eighth Amendment against Defendants Catlett, Arvizu, and Garrett.

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 16 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 In Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740 (9th Cir.1978), the Ninth Circuit explained

the nature of liability under § 1983, and held that “personal participation is not the

only predicate for section 1983 liability. Anyone who ‘causes’ any citizen to be

subjected to a constitutional deprivation is also liable.” Id. at 743; see also

Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 854 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court further

explained that the “requisite causal connection can be established not only by some

kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion

a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause

others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Id. at 743-44; Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at

854.

17 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Catlett, Arvizu, and Garrett

be DENIED. 

2. Defendants Price, Bourland, and Tilton

 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Price, Bourland,

and Tilton violated his constitutional rights by participating in the

prison appeal system. FAC at ¶ 16. He does not allege any misconduct

by these individuals outside of the review process. Id.

Generally there is no respondeat superior liability under section

1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of the City of New York, 436 U.S.

658, 691-94 (1978); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Rather, a person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in

another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the

plaintiff complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.

1978).6 Thus, the prisoner must allege a causal connection between the

prison official’s acts or omissions and the alleged violation. Rodriguez

v. Secretary for Dep’t of Corrections, 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir.

2007). If there is no affirmative link between a defendant’s conduct and

the alleged injury, there is no deprivation of the plaintiff’s

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 17 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18 08cv00161-H (BLM)

constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370 (1976).

“Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not

cause or contribute to the violation” as the prison official had no role

in the “completed act of misconduct.” Newton v. Johnson, 2008 WL

4490026, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2008) (quoting George v. Smith, 507

F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotations omitted); see also

Martin v. Roche, 2008 WL 4382676, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2008)(“...a

prisoner [may not] hold the officials who processed his grievances liable

for violations that were the subject matter of his administrative

appeals.”). Because Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendants

Price, Bourland, and Tilton is that they participated in the grievance

process, and not that they engaged in any conduct which caused his

injury, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against these Defendants.

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Defendants Price, Bourland, and Tilton from all of the Count One claims

be GRANTED. Because the record does not establish that Plaintiff “could

not possibly” cure this deficiency by alleging additional facts, the

Court RECOMMENDS that the dismissal be without prejudice. Ramirez, 334

F.3d at 861. 

b. Count 2

In Count Two, Plaintiff sues Defendants Catlett, Johnson, Ochoa, and

Tilton in their individual and official capacities alleging that they

violated the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment by making false statements about Plaintiff’s conduct, which

caused him to lose the right to use his cane. FAC at 3-4, ¶ 35.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Defs.’ Mem. at 16-17. 

///

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 18 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19 08cv00161-H (BLM)

1. Defendants Johnson and Catlett

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against

Defendants Johnson and Catlett because their improper characterization

of Plaintiff’s conduct, as detailed above, did not cause Plaintiff’s

alleged injury. Defs.’ Mem. at 17. They maintain that the actual

observations made by the prison officers were “more than adequate to have

Plaintiff’s cane taken away” so, even if Defendants Johnson and Catlett

had reported Plaintiff’s actions accurately, his cane still would have

been confiscated by prison officials. Id. 

Because a doctor prescribed a cane for Plaintiff’s medical condition

and Plaintiff alleges Defendants deprived him of his cane (FAC at ¶¶ 26,

35), Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the objective prong of an Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendants Johnson and Catlett. See Doty, 37

F.3d at 546 n.3 (“serious” medical conditions are those a reasonable

doctor would think worthy of comment or treatment, those which

significantly affect the prisoner’s daily activities, and those which are

chronic and accompanied by substantial pain). With respect to the

subjective “deliberate indifference” element, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants Johnson and Catlett were aware of his serious medical

condition and need for a walking cane. FAC at ¶ 32. He further alleges

that they “knowingly and intentionally” misstated his actions and

“falsified and fabricated statements,” causing the confiscation of his

cane. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. Consequently, Plaintiff experienced severe pain

and swelling in his right knee. Id. at ¶ 33. As Defendants suggest,

Plaintiff’s alleged misuse of the cane, as observed by the prison

officials, may well have been sufficient to confiscate his cane.

However, at this stage of the proceedings, taking Plaintiff’s allegations

as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged a cognizable

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 19 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7Defendants acknowledge there were statements or inaccuracies in the report but

argue that the inaccuracies were irrelevant. Defs.’ Mem. at 17. While this may be

true, there is no evidence, other than argument by counsel, that Plaintiff’s cane would

have been confiscated in any case. Such argument is improper at this stage. 

20 08cv00161-H (BLM)

deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Johnson and Catlett.7

See Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (stating that a prison official acts in a

deliberately indifferent manner when he “knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”); McClain v. Arnold, 2007 WL

1394496, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2007)(allegations that defendant “took

away [plaintiff’s] cane and lied that [p]laintiff's medical chrono

authorizing his cane was rescinded, when in fact it was still valid,”

were sufficient to state a cognizable deliberate indifference claim

against defendant). Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’

motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Johnson

and Catlett be DENIED.

2. Defendants Ochoa and Tilton

The only allegations against Defendants Ochoa and Tilton relate to

their role in the review of Plaintiff’s appeal. As set forth above, such

conduct cannot establish section 1983 liability. See Newton, 2008 WL

4490028, at *8 (finding that a prison official’s involvement and actions

in reviewing a prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis

for liability under a § 1983 action). Because Plaintiff fails to allege

the requisite casual connection between these Defendants’ actions and the

claimed deprivations in Count Two of the FAC, this Court RECOMMENDS that

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Defendants Ochoa and Tilton from all of the

Count Two claims be GRANTED without prejudice. 

c. Count 3 

In Count Three, Plaintiff sues Defendants Widmann, Nelson, and Janda

in their individual and official capacities and alleges that they

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 20 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21 08cv00161-H (BLM)

violated his constitutional right by denying him access to a walking

cane. FAC at 4-5, ¶ 54. 

1. Defendant Widmann

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment

claim against Defendant Widmann, but in their argument, dispute the

veracity of the facts asserted by Plaintiff. Defs.’ Mem. at 19. At this

stage of the proceedings, the Court merely is authorized to evaluate

whether Plaintiff has articulated “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1974.

He has.

As discussed in the prior section, Plaintiff’s allegations about his

medical condition and need for a cane satisfy the objective prong of the

claim. See Doty, 37 F.3d at 546 n.3 (“serious” medical conditions are

those a reasonable doctor would think worthy of comment or treatment,

those which significantly affect the prisoner’s daily activities, and

those which are chronic and accompanied by substantial pain).

Plaintiff’s allegations also support the subjective element of an Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendant Widmann. Plaintiff alleges that, as

of the August 23, 2007 ICC hearing, Defendant Widmann was aware of

Plaintiff’s serious medical condition and need for a walking cane. FAC

at ¶¶ 43-50. Plaintiff also alleges that, despite this knowledge,

Defendant Widmann ignored Defendant Janda’s order to give Plaintiff a

cane and for more than one month failed to provide the required and

authorized cane. Id. Plaintiff alleges that during this period, he

repeatedly asked Defendant Widmann for a cane, Defendant Widmann failed

to provide the cane, and Plaintiff was forced to walk to the showers,

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 21 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Widmann knew of, and, as a subordinate,

had a duty to act on Defendant Janda’s order. FAC at ¶¶ 46-50, 55. As a result of

Defendant Widmann’s “insubordination,” Plaintiff was forced to walk a distance to his

cell without a cane, which damaged his knee. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 55. 

22 08cv00161-H (BLM)

medical facilities, and exercise yard without a cane.8 Id. at ¶¶ 47-50.

Plaintiff claims that as a result, he experienced severe pain and

swelling in his right knee. Id. at ¶ 50. These allegations are

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See Farmer, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (stating that a prison official acts in a deliberately indifferent

manner when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety.”); See Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1165 (“[A] prison

official acts with deliberate indifference when he ignores the

instructions of the prisoner’s treating physician.”); McGuckin v. Smith,

974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs.,

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“A defendant

must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner's pain or

possible medical need in order for deliberate indifference to be

established.”); see also Tabarez v. Butler, 2008 WL 564821, at *14-16

(E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2008) (denying summary judgement after finding that

a jury could reasonably determine that disobeying a superior’s order

regarding the safety of inmates during a “controlled unlock” constituted

deliberate indifference). Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendant Widmann be DENIED. 

2. Defendants Nelson and Janda

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Nelson or Janda engaged

in any improper conduct. Rather, Plaintiff states that Defendant Nelson

reviewed and granted Plaintiff’s request for a walking cane (FAC at ¶ 53)

and that Defendant Janda told Defendant Widmann to give Plaintiff a

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 22 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9Defendant also labels this claim an “interfer[ence] with and/or deni[al] [of]

medical treatment and/or deni[al] [of] medication” in violation of the First Amendment.

FAC at 25. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants frustrated his access to redress

within the prison grievance system, retaliated against him, or otherwise infringed his

First Amendment rights. Therefore, the Court will analyze Count Four solely under the

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard and, thus, RECOMMENDS that the First

Amendment claim be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

23 08cv00161-H (BLM)

walking cane (Id. at ¶ 46). While Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Widmann failed to comply with Defendant Janda’s order, he acknowledges

that Defendant Janda did not know about Defendant Widmann’s noncompliance. Id. at ¶¶ 47-48. Therefore, Plaintiff has not plead the

required affirmative link between these Defendants’ actions and the

claimed deprivations in Count Three of the FAC as they clearly had no

role in the “completed act of misconduct.” Newton, 2008 WL 4490028, at

*8 (finding that a prison official’s involvement and actions in reviewing

a prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for

liability under a § 1983 action). Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS

that Defendants’ motion to dismiss all of the Count Three claims against

Defendants Nelson and Janda be GRANTED without prejudice. 

d. Count 4

In Count Four, Plaintiff sues Defendants Noriega, Salgado, Correa,

Ball, O’Shaughnessy, and Tilton in their individual and official

capacities alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by

refusing to give him his prescribed pain medication.9 FAC at 5-6, ¶ 67.

1. Defendant Noriega

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant

Noriega are not sufficient to satisfy the subjective prong of an Eighth

Amendment violation. Defs.’ Mem. at 21. As an initial matter,

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant failed to give him his prescribed

medication, satisfies the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment claim.

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 23 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10Although the Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment governed the civilly

committed plaintiff’s claims, the Court applied the Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference standard. Id. at 1265-66. 

24 08cv00161-H (BLM)

See Doty, 37 F.3d at 546 n.3 (“serious” medical conditions are those a

reasonable doctor would think worthy of comment or treatment, those which

significantly affect the prisoner’s daily activities, and those which are

chronic and accompanied by substantial pain). According to the FAC, as

described in detail above, an outside physician prescribed Plaintiff pain

medication. FAC at ¶ 62. Plaintiff alleges that although he requested

the pain medication from Defendant Noreiga, she “deliberately...denied

[him] pain medication for months.” Id. at ¶¶ 64, 68. Even though a

delay in providing a prisoner with pain medication, standing alone, does

not constitute an eighth amendment violation, see Shapley v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985), Plaintiff

alleges that, as a result of this denial, “[ he] was in severe pain” and

Defendant Noreiga “was made aware of [that] fact.” Id. at ¶ 65. These

allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See

Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1165 (allegations that prison official failed to

provide prisoner with prescribed medications upon his release sufficient

to support claim of deliberate indifference to prisoner's medical needs);

Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 459-60 (9th Cir. 1980)

(delay of six days in treating hepatitis may constitute deliberate

indifference); Hubbs v. County of San Bernardino, CA, 538 F.Supp.2d 1254,

1256 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (civilly committed Plaintiff’s allegations that he

was not provided with prescribed medications, causing him severe pain and

suffering, sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim

against defendants);10 see also Fields v. Gander, 734 F.2d 1313, 1315 (8th

Cir. 1984) (finding that plaintiff’s claim that jailor knew of prisoner's

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 24 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25 08cv00161-H (BLM)

pain from infected tooth but refused to provide dental care for up to

three weeks could support an eighth amendment deliberate indifference

claim). Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Noriega be DENIED.

2. Defendants Salgado, Correa, Ball, O’Shaughnessy

and Tilton

Defendants argue that there is no affirmative link or connection

between Defendants Salgado, Correa, Ball, O’Shaughnessy, and Tilton’s

actions and the claimed deprivations. Defs.’ Mem. at 21. Plaintiff’s

allegations against these Defendants rest solely on their role in

reviewing Plaintiff’s pain medication appeal. FAC at ¶ 66. As discussed

above, a prison official’s involvement and actions in reviewing a

prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability

under a section 1983 action. See Newton, 2008 WL 4490028, at *8.

Therefore, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss all

of the Count Four claims against Defendants Salgado, Correa, Ball,

O’Shaughnessy, and Tilton be GRANTED without prejudice. 

3. Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process)

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that

no person may be deprived “of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” U.S. Const. XIV, § 1. A person asserting a violation

of the right to due process must allege facts showing that he was

deprived of an interest cognizable under the Due Process Clause. See

Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989);

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972). Liberty interests

in the prison context are generally limited to freedom from restraints

that “impose atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 25 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11The proper inquiry for post-trial detainees is under the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff has asserted deliberate indifference claims in Counts One, Two, and Three

under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Because Plaintiff is a convicted

prisoner, his conditions of confinement claims arise solely under the Eighth Amendment.

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). In contrast, claims of failure to provide

adequate care for serious medical needs, when brought by a detainee who has been

neither charged nor convicted of a crime, are analyzed under the substantive due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410,

418-19 (9th Cir. 2003); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185-86 (9th Cir.

2002.).

26 08cv00161-H (BLM)

472, 484 (1995). Even severe hardship does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation unless it is both atypical and significant. Id.

Reading the FAC liberally, in Counts One, Two, and Three, Plaintiff

broadly claims that his due process rights were violated when Defendants

denied him a lower bunk and a walking cane. FAC at ¶¶ 17, 35, 54. These

denials allegedly caused Plaintiff physical, mental, and emotional

injury. Id. Essentially, Plaintiff’s allegations boil down to a claim

that Defendants were indifferent to his serious medical needs in that

they failed to provide him with adequate medical care, i.e. a lower bunk

and a walking cane. These claims are squarely covered under the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and are properly

evaluated by the pertinent law set forth above.11 County of Sacramento

v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520

U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)) (finding that substantive due process analysis

is inappropriate when the claim is already “ ‘covered by a specific

constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment ....’

”); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (holding that when a

broad substantive due process violation is alleged, the court should look

to constitutional amendment that most closely provides an explicit source

of constitutional protection). 

 To the extent that Plaintiff alleges due process violations in

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 26 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27 08cv00161-H (BLM)

connection with the processing of his inmate appeals, Plaintiff fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A prisoner cannot assert

a due process claim based on the handling of his grievances. See Ramirez

v. Galaza, 334 F. 3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in

processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance

procedure); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (“There is

no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure.”). The

inmate appeals process “does not confer any substantive right upon”

Plaintiff and does not serve as a basis for the imposition of liability

under section 1983. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)

(citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see

also Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of

grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner). This

Court, therefore, RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Court

One, Two, and Three due process claims be GRANTED and because any

amendment would be futile, the dismissal should be with prejudice.

Cahill, 80 F.3d at 339 (leave to amend should not be granted where to do

so would be futile). 

4. Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection)

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates

that all similarly situated persons be treated alike. City of Cleburne,

Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state an

equal protection claim, a prisoner must allege the defendants

intentionally discriminated against him because of membership in a

protected class. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-87

(9th Cir. 2001). Under this theory of equal protection, the plaintiff

must show that the defendants’ actions were a result of the plaintiff’s

membership in a suspect class. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 27 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28 08cv00161-H (BLM)

3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). If the action in question does not

involve a suspect classification, the plaintiff may establish an equal

protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were

intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a

legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,

564 (2000); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1(1972);

Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir.

2004). 

Defendants claim that Plaintiff does not allege an equal protection

violation because he does not claim that he was denied a lower bunk and

a walking cane “because of” his alleged disability. Defs.’ Mem. at 14.

Instead, Defendants argue, Plaintiff claims that he should have been

singled out for different treatment because of his alleged disability.

Id. 

Other than broadly alleging discrimination based on his medical

disability, which the Court considers, for purposes of this motion,

sufficient to qualify Plaintiff as a member of a protected class,

Plaintiff has nonetheless failed to plead facts which would suggest that

any Defendant singled him out for disparate treatment from others

similarly situated or otherwise acted to intentionally discriminate

against him “because of” his disability. See Ventura Mobilehome

Communities Owners Ass'n v. City of San Buenaventura, 371 F.3d 1046, 1055

(9th Cir. 2004) (conclusory allegations of Equal Protection violation,

unaccompanied by allegations identifying others similarly situated or

alleging how they are treated differently from plaintiff, insufficient

to withstand motion to dismiss); see generally Ivey v. Board of Regents

of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (conclusory

allegations insufficient to state claim for relief). Therefore, this

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 28 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Count One, Two,

and Three equal protection claims be GRANTED with prejudice. 

5. ADA and RA

In Counts One, Two, and Three, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

Catlett, Garrett, Arvizu, Price, Bourland, Johnson, Ochoa, Widmann,

Nelson, Janda, and Tilton “discriminat[ed] against him on the basis of

disability” (FAC at ¶¶ 23, 40, 57) in violation of the ADA and the RA

when they denied him a lower bunk and use of a cane. He sues all

Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Id. at 2-5.

Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the RA “both prohibit discrimination on

the basis of disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th

Cir. 2002).

Defendants argue that none of the Defendants are public entities

thereby precluding an ADA claim against them. Defs.’ Mem. at 16. State

prisons fall within the statutory definition of “public entity” and both

the ADA and RA apply to inmates within state prisons. See 42 U.S.C. §

12131(1)(B); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,

209-10 (1998) (holding that state prisons fall squarely within the ADA's

Title II's statutory definition of “public entity,” which includes “any

... instrumentality of a State ... or local government.”); Bonner v.

Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1988) (RA applies to state prisons);

see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997); Duffy

v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 453-56 (9th Cir. 1996). However, neither Title

II of the ADA nor section 504 of the RA provides a damage remedy against

individual public officials in their individual capacities. Vinson v.

Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1104

(2003) (plaintiff could not sue public official in his or her individual

capacity under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violations of either the ADA

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 29 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30 08cv00161-H (BLM)

or the RA); see also Green v. Adams, 2008 WL 1766737, at *5 (E.D. Cal.

Apr. 16, 2008); Curry v. Tilton, 2007 WL 2778363, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept.

21, 2007); Thomas v. Nakatani, 128 F.Supp.2d 684, 691-92 (D. Hawai'i

2000), aff'd on other grounds, 309 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore,

Plaintiff may not sue the individual Defendants in their individual

capacities for violations of Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’

motion to dismiss the Court One, Two, and Three ADA and RA claims against

Defendants in their individual capacities be GRANTED with prejudice. 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff still may pursue an ADA and a RA claim

against Defendants in their official capacities. Clark v. State of

California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1269-71 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the

Eleventh Amendment does not provide the state or state officials with

immunity from ADA and RA claims); Dare v. State of California, 191 F.3d

1167, 1173-76 (9th Cir. 1999) (following Clark); Tunstall v. Veal, 2007

WL 1080590, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2007)(“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does

not bar an ADA suit against state officials in their official capacities

for injunctive relief or damages.”); see also Pennsylvania Dep’t of

Corrs., 524 U.S. at 210 (1998) (suing defendants in their official

capacities is an alternative way of pleading an action against the

entity); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“As long as the

government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an

official-capacity suit is, in all other respects than in name, to be

treated as a suit against the entity.”); Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328

F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003) (“ ‘[A] suit against a state official in

his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but

rather is a suit against the official's office.’ ”).

///

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 30 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31 08cv00161-H (BLM)

a. ADA

 Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such

entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “To establish a violation of Title II of

the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1)[he] is a qualified individual

with a disability; (2)[he] was excluded from participation in or

otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public entity's

services, programs, or activities; and (3) such exclusion or

discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at

1052. 

Damages are not available under Title II of the ADA absent a showing

of discriminatory intent. Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674

(9th Cir. 1998). The test for intentional discrimination under the ADA

is deliberate indifference. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124,

1138 (9th Cir. 2001). Deliberate indifference requires: (1) knowledge

that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely; and

(2) failure to act upon that likelihood. Id. at 1139. The first prong

of the deliberate indifference test is satisfied when the plaintiff has

alerted the entity to his need for an accommodation, or where the need

for accommodation is obvious. Id. The second prong requires a failure

to act that is more than negligent and involves an element of

deliberateness. Id.

Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff could sue Defendants,

Plaintiff’s ADA claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff “must prove

intentional discrimination, the standard for which is deliberate

indifference.” Defs.’ Mem. at 16. Therefore, they argue, that

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 31 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Plaintiff’s ADA claims should be dismissed for the same reason his Eighth

Amendment claims should be dismissed. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that he has severe arthritis and diffuse joint

disease, which causes him “severe chronic pain” and “debilitates and

impairs [his] ability of function normal [sic].” FAC at ¶¶ 1-2. At the

pleading level, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that he has a

disability. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants failed to provide him

with a bottom bunk and a walking cane. Id. at ¶¶ 17, 35, 54. Depending

on the circumstances, refusal to accommodate a disabled inmate with a

bottom bunk may provide a basis for an ADA claim. See Kiman v. New

Hampshire Dep’t of Corrs., 451 F.3d 274, 284, 289-90 (1st Cir. 2006)

(summary judgment on ADA claim not proper when inmate with amyotrophic

lateral sclerosis and a bottom bunk pass was placed in a top bunk);

Patterson v. Kerr County, 2007 WL 2086671, at *8 (W.D. Tex. July 18,

2007) (denying summary judgment on ADA claim when jail officials did not

provide epileptic inmate with a bottom bunk). By the same reasoning, so

too may refusal to accommodate an inmate with a walking cane. However,

unless the inmate's need for the bottom bunk and walking cane is obvious,

he must put the prison on notice by requesting it. Kiman, 451 F.3d at

290-91; Kiman v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Corrs., 2007 WL 2247843, at *12

(D.N.H. Aug. 1, 2007) ( “Kiman II”) (upon remand from Kiman ); see also

Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139. 

Here, throughout the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly

notified Defendants that he had a disability requiring a lower bunk and

walking cane, that he had a medical chrono for a lower bunk and walking

cane, and that he requested placement in a cell with an available lower

bunk and a walking cane. Plaintiff also has alleged that he filed

grievances or otherwise complained to Defendants but they took no action.

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 32 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12With respect to these Defendants, this Court found that Plaintiff failed to

allege the required affirmative link between these Defendants’ actions and the claimed

deprivations. 

33 08cv00161-H (BLM)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that he put prison

officials on notice of his need for a lower bunk and a walking cane, and

thus put the prison on notice of his request for an accommodation or

modification.

Furthermore, as determined above, Plaintiff has adequately alleged

deliberate indifference against Defendants Catlett, Arvizu, Garrett,

Johnson and Widmann in Counts One, Two, and Three to support an Eighth

Amendment claim. The Court’s analysis of the subjective, “deliberate

indifference” component of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims above

applies identically here. Therefore, the Court finds that, in Counts

One, Two, and Three Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an ADA claim

against these Defendants in their official capacities. See Duvall, 260

F.3d at 1138-39; see also Brown v. Woodford, 2007 WL 735768, at *2 (N.D.

Cal. Mar. 7, 2007) (inmate sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference

under the ADA when prison officials refused to provide orthopedic shoes

for his club feet). However, for the reasons set forth in the deliberate

indifference analysis above, Defendant fails to allege an ADA claim

against Defendants Price, Bourland, Ochoa, Nelson, Janda, and Tilton in

Counts One, Two, and Three.12 Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS

Defendants' motion to dismiss the ADA claims in Counts One, Two, and

Three against Defendants Catlett, Arvizu, Garrett, Johnson, and Widmann

in their official capacities be DENIED, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss

the ADA claims in Counts One, Two, and Three against Defendants Price,

Bourland, Ochoa, Nelson, Janda, and Tilton be GRANTED without prejudice.

///

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 33 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34 08cv00161-H (BLM)

b. RA

Section 504 of the RA provides that “no otherwise qualified

individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his

disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits

of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance ....” 29 U.S.C. § 794. “To

establish a violation of § 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must show that

(1)[he] is handicapped within the meaning of the RA; (2)[he] is otherwise

qualified for the benefit or services sought; (3)[he] was denied the

benefit or services solely by reason of [his] handicap; and (4) the

program providing the benefit or services receives federal financial

assistance.” Id.

Apart from the additional requirement that the “program or activity”

must be receiving financial assistance, “[t]here is no significant

difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created by the ADA

and the [RA].” Armstrong, 124 F.3d at 1023 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12134

(b)), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (“The

remedies, procedures and rights set forth in [the RA] shall be the

remedies, procedures, and rights [applicable to ADA claims].”); Zukle v.

Regents of the Univ. of California, 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir.

1999). Therefore, Plaintiff must, in order to prove a violation of the

RA, make the additional showing that the he was involved in a program

that received federal financial assistance. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not, and cannot allege that

Defendants are programs that receive federal financial assistance,

thereby precluding the RA claim. Defs.’ Mem. at 16. Plaintiff did not

specifically allege that the Calipatria State Prison receives federal

funds for its programs and services. However, Ninth Circuit case law

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 34 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35 08cv00161-H (BLM)

suggests that by asserting a claim under Section 504 of the RA, such an

allegation is implicit and is a question of fact for the district court

to resolve. Bonner, 857 F.2d at 563; Armstrong v. Wilson, 942

F.Supp.1242, 1258 (holding that the RA applies to California state

prisons, as some of those prisons receive federal financial assistance),

aff’d, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court finds that Plaintiff may

pursue an RA claim against Defendants in their official capacities.

Defendants further contend that Plaintiff's RA claim fails for the

same reason as his ADA claim. Defs.’ Mem. at 16. Since the Court has

concluded that Plaintiff's ADA claims in Counts One, Two, and Three

against Defendants Catlett, Arvizu, Garrett, Johnson, and Widmann

withstand Defendants' motion to dismiss, their motion to dismiss

Plaintiff's RA claims against these Defendants in their official

capacities should be DENIED. In the same vein, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s RA claims against Defendants Price, Bourland, Ochoa,

Nelson, Janda, and Tilton should be GRANTED without prejudice. 

B. Plaintiff’s Official Capacity Claims and Requests for Injunctive and

Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff sues all defendants in their official as well as

individual capacities. FAC at 2-6. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s

official capacity claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s requests

for injunctive relief are “not well taken.” Defs.’ Mem. at 22.

Therefore, Defendants also argue, that Plaintiff’s requests for

injunctive relief should be dismissed. Id. at 24. Official capacity

claims against state officials are merely another way of pleading an

action against the state itself. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his

or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 35 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13As discussed above, the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude Plaintiff from

asserting ADA and RA claims against Defendants in their official capacities. See supra

pp. 30-31. In fact, ADA and RA claims may not be asserted against individual

defendants in their individual capacities. Vinson, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156.

36 08cv00161-H (BLM)

is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different

from a suit against the State itself.” (internal citation omitted)). The

Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal jurisdiction over damage claims

against a state without its consent or if Congress has abrogated the

state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The State of California has not

consented to be sued under Section 1983 in federal court, and the Supreme

Court has held that Section 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State's

Eleventh Amendment immunity. Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,

1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999); see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169

(1985). Thus, official capacity claims for damages are barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1026 (“The Eleventh Amendment

bars actions for damages against state officials who are sued in their

official capacities in federal court.”). In addition, the Supreme Court

has held that a state official sued in his official capacity is not “a

person” subject to suit under Section 1983 for purposes of a suit for

damages. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10. Therefore, to the extent that

Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages against Defendants acting in their

official capacities, this relief is barred. Accordingly, with the

exception of the ADA and RA claims properly asserted against Defendants

Catlett, Arvizu, Garrett, Johnson, and Widmann in their official

capacities,13 this Court RECOMMENDS the monetary damages claims against

Defendants in their official capacities be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

However, Plaintiff is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment from

bringing a claim for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief against

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 36 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

37 08cv00161-H (BLM)

state officials. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161-62 (1908); see Doe

v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997);

Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247, 252 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff seeks

the following declaratory and injunctive relief: (1) A declaratory

judgment that Defendants’ acts and practices alleged in the FAC violated

Plaintiff’s rights under the United States Constitution; and (2) a

preliminary and permanent injunction which: 

(a)prohibits Defendants from harassing, threatening, punishing,

or retaliating in any way against Plaintiff because he filed this action

or against any prisoner because that prisoner submitted affidavits in

this case on behalf of the Plaintiff;

(b)requires Defendants Ochoa, Janda, and Tilton from

transferring Plaintiff to any other institution, without Plaintiff’s

express consent, during the pendency of this action;

(c)requires Defendants Ochoa and Tilton to remove any

references from Plaintiff’s prison files and records to any events

described in the FAC or to the fact that Plaintiff filed this suit;

(d)requires Defendants Ochoa, Janda, and Tilton to transfer and

permanently house Plaintiff at either California Men’s Colony or

California Medical Facility to receive adequate and effective physical

therapy; and

(e)requires Defendants Ochoa, Janda, and Tilton to expunge any

and all false and retaliatory rule violation reports from Plaintiff’s

prison files. FAC at 29-30. 

While Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief

against Defendants in their official capacities are not barred by the

Eleventh Amendment, the Court finds such requests for relief

inappropriate. First, Plaintiff has not alleged any ongoing or

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 37 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

38 08cv00161-H (BLM)

continuing violation which this relief would remedy. See Verizon Md.,

Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., et al., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002);

Idaho v. Coueur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997) (stating

that the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies

where an “on-going violation” of the Constitution or federal law is

alleged). Second, he has not alleged that there is a “real or immediate

threat that [he] will be wronged again.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); see Jones v. Dovery, 2008 WL 733468, at *10

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2008) (adopting the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation recommending dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for

injunctive relief after finding that “Plaintiff has not alleged that an

irreparable injury is threatened, or provided any proof that Defendants

have engaged in a persistent pattern of misconduct.”). Third, other than

generally claiming that “the harm is part of a pattern of officially

sanctioned...behavior,” Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing a

pattern, plan or policy to harass, threaten, punish or retaliate against

Plaintiff in connection with his requests for relief. Thomas v. County

of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[P]laintiff’s

eventual burden in obtaining a permanent injunction...is to establish

more than repeated incidents of misconduct...[Plantiff must establish]

not merely misconduct, but a pervasive pattern of misconduct reflecting

departmental policy.”); see also Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d

752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he court is not required to accept legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions

cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.”). Finally, the

alleged wrongs - refusal to grant Plaintiff a cell with an available

lower bunk, confiscation of Plaintiff’s cane, and denial of pain

medication - have already taken place and were remedied more than a year

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 38 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14See supra note 12. 

39 08cv00161-H (BLM)

ago. See Pl.’s Exs. 1-4; Defs.’ Exs. 1-4. For these reasons, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and declaratory

relief be DISMISSED without prejudice. Consequently, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official

capacities be DISMISSED without prejudice with the exception of the ADA

and RA claims properly asserted against Defendants Catlett, Arvizu,

Garrett, Johnson, and Widmann in their official capacities.14 See Teahan

v. Wilhelm, 2007 WL 5041440, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21,

2007)(recommending dismissal of all claims against Defendants in their

official capacities after finding declaratory relief inappropriate). 

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

District Court (1) DENY Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claims against Defendants Catlett, Arvizu, Garrett, Johnson,

Widmann, and Noreiga and Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims against Defendants

Catlett, Arvizu, Garrett, Johnson, and Widmann; (2) GRANT without

prejudice Defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against Defendants

Price, Bourland, Ochoa, Nelson, Janda, Salgado, Correa, Ball,

O’Shaughnessy, and Tilton; (3) GRANT with prejudice Defendants’ motion

to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim; (4) GRANT with prejudice

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s due process and equal

protection claims; (5) GRANT with prejudice Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims against all Defendants in their individual

capacities; (6) GRANT with prejudice Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

monetary damages claims against Defendants in their official capacities,

with the exception of Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims against Defendants

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 39 of 40
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

40 08cv00161-H (BLM)

Catlett, Arvizu, Garrett, Johnson, and Widmann in their official

capacities; (7) GRANT without prejudice Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief; and (8) GRANT

without prejudice Defendants’ motion to dismiss all Defendants in their

official capacities, with the exception of Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims

against Defendants Catlett, Arvizu, Garrett, Johnson, and Widmann in

their official capacities. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than December

29, 2008. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than January 12,

2009. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal

of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.

2007). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: December 12, 2008

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

COPY TO:

HONORABLE MARILYN L. HUFF

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL

Case 3:08-cv-00161-H-BLM Document 47 Filed 12/12/08 Page 40 of 40