Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00698/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00698-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH A. SOMERS, 

Petitioner, No. CIV-04-0698 RRB KJM P

vs.

TERESA SCHWARTZ, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2002 denial of parole. He contends that

the finding of unsuitability cannot be supported under the “some evidence” standard and that the

denial of parole violated his right to equal protection. 

I. Factual And Procedural Background

On November 15, 1992, petitioner was convicted of second degree murder, gross

vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, evasion of a police officer which caused bodily injury

and death, and driving while intoxicated, causing injury, after a prior driving while intoxicated. 

Answer, Ex. A.

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26 References to pages of Exhibit B are to the numbers provided at the top of the page. 1

2

The parole board relied on the facts of the offense as taken from the probation

report:

On November 15, 1982 [sic], at approximately 2:20 a.m., the

defendant was observed driving a late model Jaguar erratically at a

high rate of speed out of Roxbury Night Club parking lot on Sunset

Boulevard. Instead of exiting the driveway of the lot, the

defendant’s car jumped the curb causing several people to move

out of his path. The defendant’s vehicle struck a hot dog cart

parked in front of the club causing a man standing behind the cart

to leap backwards to avoid being struck. Two sheriff’s deputies in

a radio car observed the incident and pursued the defendant’s

vehicle which soon reached speeds of 70 to 80 miles per hour on

Sunset Boulevard. He weaved [sic] in and out of the west bound

lanes, passing on the right and entering the east bound lanes on

three separate occasions to get around stopped traffic. At Horn

Avenue and Sunset, the defendant’s vehicle failed to make the

curve and skidded into east bound traffic colliding with a Chevette

automobile being driven by Angel Lewis Ostrum . . . who was

killed upon being impaled with a portion of the steering wheel

which severed his aorta. Three passengers in the Chevette, a A.R.

Medina . . ., S. . . .Trikaa and William S. Clark . . . were also

injured. The momentum of the defendant’s vehicle caused it to

continue travelling in the east bound lane colliding with a taxi cab

causing minor injuries to Azatur . . . [Mkethech Topadzhikyan]. 

When deputies arrived moments later, they saw the defendant was

inside his stopped vehicle. When they told him to put his hands

where they could be seen, he kept reaching into the back of the car. 

He retrieved a cellular phone and made a phone call. When the

deputy was able to open the driver’s door of the defendant’s

vehicle . . ., he could instantly smell the strong odor of alcohol. 

The defendant was reportedly talking on the phone, telling

someone that he needed to be bailed out of jail. The defendant was

not seriously injured. He was finally freed from the car and taken

. . . to be treated for minor lacerations. His blood alcohol level at

3:50 a.m. was .14 percent and it was positive for cocaine. A.R.

Medina, a passenger in the victim’s vehicle, suffered serious

injuries, fractures and internal injuries. Passenger S. [Trikaa]

suffered minor injuries. Passenger William S. Clark suffered

minor injuries.

Answer, Ex. B at 15-17 ; see also Pet., Ex. C at 1. 1

Petitioner sought collateral review of the denial of parole first in Los Angeles

County Superior Court, then in the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District and finally

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 The petition attaches both Exhibits and Appendices. 2

 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 3

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court disagrees. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75.

3

in the California Supreme Court. Pet., Apps. B-D.

2

II. Standards Under The AEDPA

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief also is not available for any

claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA”). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore did

not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim). Courts are not required to 3

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

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courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief

by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law, if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court fails

to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial of a claim arising under Constitutional

or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court must perform an independent review of

the record to ascertain whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable. Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, the court assumes the state court

applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the decision of the state court was based on an

objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

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 Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5 establishes procedural requirements for Board hearings. 4

5

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). 

III. Parole In California

In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 11 (1979), the United

States Supreme Court found that an inmate has “no constitutional or inherent right” to parole,

even when a state establishes a system of conditional release from confinement. The Court

recognized, however, that the structure of parole statutes might give rise to a liberty interest in

parole that would, in turn, mean an inmate was entitled to certain procedural protections. Id. at

14-15. In Greenholtz, the Court found that the “mandatory language and the structure of the

Nebraska statute at issue” created such a liberty interest. Board of Pardons v. Allen (Allen), 482

U.S. 369, 371 (1987). 

In McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit used the

Greenholtz-Allen framework to determine whether California statutes created a liberty interest in

parole. The critical statute at issue in McQuillion is California Penal Code section 3041, which

provides in relevant part:

(a) In the case of any prisoner sentenced pursuant to any provision

of law, other than [the determinate sentencing law], the Board of

Prison Terms shall meet with each such inmate during the third

year of incarceration for the purposes of reviewing the inmate's

file, making recommendations, and documenting activities and

conduct pertinent to granting or withholding post-conviction credit.

One year prior to the inmate's minimum eligible parole release date

a panel consisting of at least two commissioners of the Board of

Prison Terms shall again meet with the inmate and shall normally

set a parole release date as provided in Section 3041.5. The release 4

date shall be set in a manner that will provide uniform terms for

offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat

to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that

the Judicial Council may issue and any sentencing information

relevant to the setting of parole release dates. The board shall

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establish criteria for the setting of parole release dates and in doing

so shall consider the number of victims of the crime for which the

prisoner was sentenced and other factors in mitigation or

aggravation of the crime....

(b) The panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines

that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the

timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses,

is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole

date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041. The Ninth Circuit found that subdivision (b) was like the statutes in

both Greenholtz and Allen: 

California's parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest

in release on parole. The scheme "'creates a presumption that

parole release will be granted'" unless the statutorily defined

determinations are made.

McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 901-02. Again in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003),

the Court of Appeals reiterated its holding that the California parole scheme created a liberty

interest in parole, noting that “California Penal Code § 3041(b) controls” the resolution of the

question because its “language clearly parallels the language” under consideration in Greenholtz

and Allen. See also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 654 (2002) (discussing § 3041(b), the

California Supreme Court noted “parole applicants . . . have an expectation that they will be

granted parole unless the Board finds . . . that they are unsuitable in light of the circumstances

specified by statute and regulation”). 

The existence of a liberty interest means that a decision to deny parole must be

supported by some evidence and not be otherwise arbitrary. Superintendent, Massachusetts

Correctional Institute, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985); Jancsek v. Oregon Board of

Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). The test is “not whether some evidence supports

the reasons . . . for denying parole, but whether some evidence indicates a parolee’s release

unreasonably endangers public safety.” In re Lee, 143 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1408 (2006) (emphasis

in original). The evidence must have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. The

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“some evidence” requirement is a “minimally stringent” standard and does not require the court

to reweigh the evidence or examine the entire record. Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir.

1994); Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.

[The] analysis is framed by the statutes and regulations governing

parole suitability determinations . . . . [W]e must look to California

law to determine the findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner

unsuitable for parole, and then must review the record in order to

determine whether the state court decision holding that these

findings were supported by “some evidence” . . . constituted an

unreasonable application of the “some evidence standard” principle

articulated in Hill. . . 

Irons v. Carey, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2027359, *3 (9th Cir. July 13, 2007). 

The Board's regulations for setting parole release dates are found in title 15 of the 

California Code of Regulations. Section 2401 of this title provides:

A life prisoner shall be considered for parole for the first time at

the initial parole consideration hearing scheduled as provided in

Section 2268. A parole date shall be denied if the prisoner is found

unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A parole date shall be

set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section

2402(d). A parole date set under this article shall be set in a manner

that provides uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and

magnitude with respect to the threat to the public.

In setting the parole date the panel shall consider the Sentencing

Rules for the Superior Courts. The panel shall also consider the

criteria and guidelines set forth in this article for determining the

suitability for parole and the setting of parole dates, considering the

number of victims of the crime for which the prisoner was

sentenced and any other circumstances in mitigation or

aggravation.

The terms in this article are guidelines only. The suggested terms

serve as the starting point for the board's consideration of each case

on an individual basis. The board may establish a term above or

below the guidelines when warranted and reasons are stated on the

record. A prisoner shall not be released before the minimum

eligible parole date.

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2401.

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Section 2402 provides:

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life

prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length

of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and

denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information

available to the panel shall be considered in determining suitability

for parole. Such information shall include the circumstances of the

prisoner's social history; past and present mental state; past

criminal history, including involvement in other criminal

misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other

commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after

the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any

conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special

conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the

community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone

may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to

a pattern which results in a finding of unsuitability.

(c) Circumstances Tending to Show Unsuitability. The following

circumstances each tend to indicate unsuitability for release. These

circumstances are set forth as general guidelines; the importance

attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a

particular case is left to the judgment of the panel. Circumstances

tending to indicate unsuitability include:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in

an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be

considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or

separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates

an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense.

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(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous

occasions inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a

victim, particularly if the prisoner demonstrated serious assaultive

behavior at an early age.

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable

or tumultuous relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually

assaulted another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or

fear upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of severe

mental problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious

misconduct in prison or jail.

(d) Circumstances Tending to Show Suitability. The following

circumstances each tend to show that the prisoner is suitable for

release. The circumstances are set forth as general guidelines; the

importance attached to any circumstance or combination of

circumstances in a particular case is left to the judgment of the

panel. Circumstances tending to indicate suitability include:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of

assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a

potential of personal harm to victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably

stable relationships with others.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to

indicate the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the

damage, seeking help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or

indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the

offense.

(4) Motivation for Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as the

result of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has

built over a long period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome. At the time of the commission of

the crime, the prisoner suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome,

as defined in section 2000(b), and it appears the criminal behavior

was the result of that victimization.

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant

history of violent crime.

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(7) Age. The prisoner's present age reduces the probability of

recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made

realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that

can be put to use upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release. 

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402.

Once the Board determines that an inmate is suitable for parole, it proceeds to set

a date for the inmate's release, based on numerous factors provided in sections 2403 through

2411. The paramount concern in determining parole suitability is public safety. In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061 (2005); see also id. at 1080, 1084, 1085, 1086 (“the overriding

statutory concern” is for public safety; purpose of the statutes is to “guarantee that the Board has

fully addressed the public safety implications” of the release determination).

IV. Liberty Interest In Parole

Respondent argues that because petitioner has no liberty interest in parole, the

denial of parole raises no federal question. The Ninth Circuit has found such an interest and has

reaffirmed this conclusion. Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th

Cir. 2006); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002).

V. The Board’s Decision And The State Courts’ Denials

The Board of Prison declined to set a parole date for petitioner on the following

grounds:

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER BORDONARO: We’re back on

the record in the case of Mr. Somers . . . . The Panel has reviewed

all the information received from the public and relied on the

following circumstances in concluding that the prisoner is not yet

suitable for parole and he would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from

prison. The commitment offense was carried out in an [e]specially

cruel manner. Multiple victims were injured or killed in the

incident. The incident was carried out in a manner which

demonstrates a callous disregard for human suffering. These

conclusions are drawn from the Statement of Facts wherein the

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inmate was driving his Jaguar erratically at a high rate of speed. It

was the early morning hours of November 15th, 1992. He had

struck a hot dog cart, continued on, was pursued by sheriff’s

deputies. He was weaving in and out of lanes, passing on the right. 

He failed to make a curve, skidded into traffic, collided with

another car and killed the victim, Angel Ostrum, who was killed

upon that impact. Three other passengers were also injured. His

previous record is not extensive. He did have one arrest, nothing

as a juvenile, first of all. His prior criminality consists of a

conviction for DUI and then a local ordinance of some sort when

he was originally arrested for having a loaded weapon in the car,

however, he did have a permit and pled to a lesser charge. There

was [sic] a couple of traffic citations that were also given to him. 

He did received [sic] probation for both of his convictions. While

institutionalized, he has done very well. He’s had only four 128s

[general disciplinary chrono], the last one of those in 1998 for

failure to comply with grooming standards. Those go back to ‘95. 

He has had no 115s [Rules Violation Reports]. He’s not yet fully

participated, however, in beneficial self-help and therapy

programming, but I will note a little bit later on that he is doing

extremely well. The psychiatric report, which is dated 12/7/2001,

authored by an E. Rueschenberg, indicates that at the present time,

the inmate’s overall risk for future violence in the community

appears to be within the low to moderate range and it appears to be

diminishing as time progresses. I believe this is generally

favorable, however, it is not totally supportive of release, but,

again, is a pretty good psychological evaluation. His parole plans,

he does, apparently, have a place to stay in the last county of legal

residence. He doesn’t have any specific job offer, per se, but he

does seem to have skills. He also has family in Pennsylvania

which are extremely supportive of his release. The Hearing Panel

does note that the responses to the 3042 Notices indicate there is an

opposition to a finding of suitability, specifically from the Los

Angeles District Attorney’s Office. The correctional counselor

writes that it’s not predictable, at this time, and did not make a

stand, if I can say it in that manner. The Panel does make the

following findings, that the prisoner does need self-help and

therapy programming in order to face, discuss, understand and

cope with stress in a non-destructive manner. Until progress is

made, he continues to be unpredictable and a threat to others. He

should be commended for not having any 115s during his entire

period of incarceration. He’s had extensive self-help, everything

from sign language to Yolk [sic] Fellows, Impact, Life Plan

seminars, it goes on, a lot of different Bible study course [sic],

fellowship ministry classes, peer education program concerning

infectious diseases and he’s been in AA and NA. He was in that,

apparently, since around ‘96. However, these positive aspects of

his behavior do not yet outweigh the factors of unsuitability. And

I’m going to do something I normally don’t do and that’s give you

a one year denial, Mr. Somers. In the next year, we ask that you

continue your good programming, that you remain disciplinary free

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and that, as it becomes available to you, to upgrade . . ., to continue

participating in self-help and therapy programming. . . .

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER MACKENBERG: I want to tell you

that we don’t consider you to be a person that’s going to spend all

of his life in prison. We think that you’ve done exceptionally well

with your program so far. You know you’re just not yet to that

date. You’re doing a hell of a job. One thing that is not necessarily

noted in these remarks, over and over, as you pointed out, you’ve

been in one on one therapy repeatedly, so you’ve got a

[indiscernible] of therapy. It’s just not revealed necessarily in all

the paperwork that we keep seeing, so it looks like it’s all self-help

and not something beyond that. But apparently, you’ve extended

yourself beyond that. I’m not quite sure what you’ll do. One on

one is about as good as it gets, unless you get into group therapy. 

But I think Mr. Bordonaro is pointing out to you that although

you’re in AA and you’ve participated in it extensively, we would

like to have seen a more organized program, but acknowledging at

the time that there aren’t any. So I don’t know what you do about

that next, unless there is something more that you can do. I think

you’ve done a whacking good program . . . .

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER BORDONARO: . . . This is your

initial, so we had a lot of options open to us on what to do,

including setting a parole date and considered that at this time,

however, again, it was a horrendous crime and that’s the main

reason. . . . . [Y]ou’ve been [at] CDC since ‘93 and you’ve done

more self-help than somebody I’ve seen that’s been down 20 years

. . . . I think you need a little more time in that recovery type of

program. Unfortunately, the only thing we have is AA and I’m not

trying to downplay AA, but as far as an intensive substance abuse

program, there’s just nothing available. 

Answer, Ex. B at 52-58. 

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The Superior Court denied petitioner’s application for habeas relief, citing to the

“pivotal consideration” of public safety:

Upon individualized consideration, the particular circumstances of

the inmate’s commitment offense may be a basis for finding the

inmate unsuitable for parole.

The Board took the entire record into consideration, including

petitioner’s offense, his laudatory chronos as well as the long list of

completed programs. The Board, however, denied petitioner’s

parole suitability and set the next suitability hearing in one year. 

There is no evidence that the Board made its decision in an

arbitrary or capricious manner.

Pet., App. B at 2 (internal citations omitted). The Court of Appeal denied the petition with

citations to In re Powell, 45 Cal.3d 894, 904 (1988) and Perveler v. Estelle, 974 F.2d 1132, 1134

(9th Cir. 1992); both cases discuss the “some evidence” standard. Pet., App. C. The Supreme

Court denied the petition without citation to authority. Pet., App. D. 

VI. The Denial Of Parole And Due Process

A. The Nature Of The Offense

In Dannenberg, the California Supreme Court recognized:

[T]he nature of the prisoner's offense, alone, can constitute a

sufficient basis for denying parole. While neither the Board nor

the Governor may adopt a blanket no-parole policy for particular

offenses, we said, the [parole] authority properly may weigh

heavily the degree of violence used and the amount of viciousness

shown by a defendant.

However, we cautioned, sole reliance on the commitment offense

might, in particular cases, violate section 3041, subdivision (a)'s

provision that a parole date “shall normally be set” under “uniform

term” principles, and might thus also contravene the inmate's

constitutionally protected expectation of parole. We explained that

such a violation could occur, for example[,] where no

circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more

aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a

conviction for that offense. We suggested that, in order to prevent

the parole authority's case-by-case suitability determinations from

swallowing the rule that parole should “normally” be granted, an

offense must be “particularly egregious” to justify the denial of

parole.

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 In People v. Watson, 30 Cal.3d 290, 300-01 (1981), the California Supreme Court held 5

that a defendant could be charged with second degree implied malice murder as the result of a

fatal accident; in this case, the jury found that petitioner acted with implied malice, not just gross

negligence, during his flight from the police.

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Our discussion, including our use of the phrase “particularly

egregious,” conveyed only that the violence or viciousness of the

inmate's crime must be more than minimally necessary to convict

him of the offense for which he is confined.

34 Cal. 4th at 1094-95 (internal citations & quotations omitted). 

The Board found petitioner’s offense heinous because multiple victims were

injured or killed during the incident and petitioner demonstrated a callous disregard for human

suffering. See 15 Cal.Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(A), (D). Petitioner argues that his offense was

not among the gravest of murders because he had not intended to kill anyone, did not

intentionally attack multiple victims, and acted with gross negligence. Pet., Supp. at 4.5

There is no evidence that petitioner demonstrated a callous disregard for human

suffering; it appears that the victim died on impact or shortly thereafter. In re Smith, 114

Cal.App.4th 343, 367 (2003) (second degree murder found not to be “callous” because there was

no evidence that the victim was tormented or terrorized). The state court applied federal law

unreasonably in finding that this factor was supported by some evidence.

There is no dispute that there were multiple victims of the accident: Angel Ostrum

was killed, the other three people in Ostrum’s car were injured, and a cab driver was injured

when the impact caused petitioner’s car to spin off the road and hit the cab. 

In In re Weider, 145 Cal.App.4th 570, 575 (2006), the defendant shot his wife’s

paramour in a restaurant and, during the struggle for the gun, wounded two other patrons. The

Court of Appeal considered the parole board’s reliance on the fact that the defendant had injured

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 In re Weider, 2005 WL 40042 (Cal.App. 6th Dist. 2005) (Weider I), an unpublished 6

decision, considered petitioner’s second parole hearing, after the petitioner had stipulated to a

two-year denial between the two hearings. 

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others during the crime as a reason to deny parole:

The existence of multiple victims in this case is the inadvertent

result of Weider’s perpetrating the crime in a restaurant during

business hours. As we held in Weider I, the fact that there were

multiple victims, which will never change, cannot be sufficient to

deny parole to Weider forever.

Id. at 589. The court did not suggest, however, that the existence of multiple victims, even

inadvertent victims, could not be a sufficient reason for an initial denial of parole.

6

In light of the deferential nature of the “some evidence” standard, this court does

not find that the state court unreasonably applied federal law in this instance. However, because

of the tenuous connection between danger and the fact that petitioner hit a car carrying four

people instead of one person and thereafter spun into another car, continuing reliance in the

future on this factor to show dangerousness may pose constitutional problems. Id.; see also

Answer, Ex. B at 56 (“. . . the distance between you and that crime is going to only play in your

favor as time goes by.”).

B. Petitioner’s Record

It is not entirely clear from the record whether the Board relied on petitioner’s

record in denying parole. In stating the reasons for denial, the presiding commissioner

mentioned petitioner’s record, but recognized that it was “not extensive.” Answer, Ex. B at 53. 

The regulations suggest that the lack of a juvenile record and the lack of a record of violent or

assaultive offenses are suitability factors. To the extent that the Board relied on petitioner’s

record to deny parole, this factor is not supported by the requisite some evidence. See id., Ex. B

at 56 (“it was a horrendous crime and that’s the main reason”). To the extent that the state court

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similarly relied on petitioner’s record in its determination, it unreasonably applied federal law. 

See Pet., App. B at 2 (“Significant factors are the gravity of the current convicted offense and the

timing and gravity of current and past convicted offenses.”). 

C. Psychological Factors

A psychological report prepared for the Board hearing contained the following

conclusion:

Mr. Somers does not appear to be an individual who is criminally

oriented or prone to violent behavior. The index offense was a

crime involving gross negligence and poor judgment, with Mr.

Somers consuming large quantities of alcohol, placing himself

behind the wheel of his car, and then exhibiting reckless and

irresponsible behavior, trying to evade police officers who were in

pursuit. As a result, Mr. Somers lost control of his car, collided

with another vehicle, and killed another individual. The main

contributing factors to the offense appear to have been problems

with substance abuse and a low-level of self-awareness and

maturity, with Mr. Somers not recognizing the severity of his

condition, or the possible consequences of his behavior.

During his incarceration in prison, Mr. Somers appears to be

making substantial progress, in terms of his level of maturity, his

recognition of flaws in his personality, and a recognition of his

need to maintain lifetime sobriety. At present time, his overall risk

for future violence in the community appears to be within the low

to moderate range of severity, and it appears to be diminishing as

time progresses.

Although Mr. Somers is a GP inmate and he is therefore not in

need of mental health treatment, he could benefit from selfimprovement programming, as available. Mr. Somers appears to

be highly motivated to program in the areas of self-improvement. 

His record indicates that he had received numerous laudatory

chronos for his participation in various group activities and

volunteer activities. It is also recommended that he continue his

participation in recovery programming.

Pet., Ex. B at 7. 

The Post-Conviction Progress Report prepared on October 12, 2001, also noted

that petitioner “does not suffer from any significant mental illness.” Id., Ex. C at 9. 

The Board recognized petitioner’s extensive participation in self-help programs;

indeed, as noted, presiding commissioner Bordonaro recognized that petitioner had participated

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in “more self-help than somebody . . . that’s been down 20 years . . . .” Answer, Ex. B at 57. He

added that, 

I think you need a little more time in that recovery type of a

program. Unfortunately, the only thing we have is AA and I’m not

trying to downplay AA, but as far as intensive substance abuse

program, there’s just nothing available. That’s out of the BPT’s

hands. That’s something that we would like to think more of

which, unfortunately, we don’t have control over CDC. And so

that puts you in a rock and a hard place, but I think you’re doing a

great job with what you’ve got.

Id., Ex. B at 58. As noted above as well, Deputy Commissioner Mackenberg observed:

One thing that is not necessarily noted in these remarks, over and

over, as you pointed out, you’ve been in one on one therapy, so

you’ve got a [indiscernible] of therapy. It’s just not revealed

necessarily in all the paperwork that we keep seeing, so it looks

like it’s all self-help and not something beyond that. But

apparently, you’ve extended yourself beyond that. I’m not quite

sure what you’ll do. One on one is about as good as it gets, unless

you get into group therapy. But I think Mr. Bordonaro is pointing

out to you that although you’re in AA and you’ve participated in it

extensively, we would like to have seen a more organized program,

but acknowledging at the same time that there aren’t any.

Id., Ex. B at 55-56. In a chrono from 1997, David Roy, L.C.S.W., noted that petitioner had been

attending outpatient sessions since 1994, has “worked consistently and hard on crisis situations

and overall stabilization,” and “would benefit by continuing this process.” Pet., Ex. D at 1. A

number of other chronos praise his participation in AA. Id., Ex. D at 2-8. 

Nevertheless, the Board found petitioner was not suitable for parole because “he’s

not yet fully participated . . . in beneficial self-help and therapy programming.” Answer, Ex. B at

53. 

In Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15, 16, the Supreme Court found that when there is a

liberty interest in parole, due process requires that the inmate eligible for parole be given an

opportunity to be heard and a statement of why “he falls short of qualifying for parole,” which

serves “as a guide to the inmate for his future behavior.” In this case, the Board denied petitioner

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parole in part because it felt he should pursue counseling, which it recognized was not available

to him. This reason for the denial cannot be a “guide . . . for his future behavior.”

In addition, in Superintendent, 472 U.S. at 457, the Supreme Court recognized

that a determination violates due process if it is without evidentiary support or is “otherwise

arbitrary.” Merriam-Webster defines “arbitrary,” in relevant part, as “depending on individual

discretion . . . based on or determined by individual preference or convenience rather than by

necessity or the intrinsic nature of something.” See <http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/arbitrary>

(accessed 7/27/07). A denial based on petitioner’s failure to pursue unavailable programming is

arbitrary because it is discretionary and a departure from the “intrinsic nature” of things in the

prison context. 

Accordingly, the California court unreasonably applied federal law in determining

that the denial of parole on this ground was not arbitrary and capricious.

D. Factors Favoring Suitability

Petitioner’s record contains many of the factors favoring suitability. He has no

juvenile record, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2042(d)(1); Pet., Ex. C (Life Prisoner Evaluation Report)

at 2; he comes from a stable family background and has, for the most part, maintained stable

relationships, 15 Cal. Code Regs § 2042(d)(2); Pet., Exs. B (Psychosocial Assessment) at 1 & C

at 2; Answer, Ex. B at 22 (married while incarcerated but now divorced), 25 (in touch with

family); he is remorseful about the crime, 15 Cal. Code Regs § 2042(d)(3); Pet., Ex. B at 6

(genuine feelings of regret and remorse); he has realistic plans for release, including a place to

live with a family friend, and the intent to get off of disability as soon as possible and return to

work using his established skills once his physical problems have been overcome, 15 Cal. Code

Regs § 2042(d)(8); Answer, Ex. B at 40-41; his institutional behavior shows an ability to

function within the law upon release, 15 Cal. Code Regs § 2042(d)(9); Answer, Ex. B at 29-33

(listing activities and certificates and noting petitioner had received no disciplinary write-ups);

Pet., Ex. D (chronos documenting petitioner’s participation). 

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VII. The Denial Of Parole And Equal Protection

Petitioner argues that his right to equal protection of the law was violated because

the Board applied the parole provisions “unevenly in a systematic and/or irrational manner.” 

The basis of this argument is not entirely clear, but it seems to be based on the irrationality of the

Board in determining that the murder in this case was more egregious than other second degree

murders and in otherwise determining that petitioner is not yet ready for parole, matters covered

in the preceding sections. 

VIII. Resolution

As the Supreme Court has recognized, the determination whether to parole an

inmate is a “discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what

a man is and what he may become rather than simply what he has done.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at

10 (internal citations, quotation omitted). In determining that the Board did not act in an

arbitrary and capricious manner, the state court noted that the Board had taken a number of

factors into account, all but one of which this court has found to be unsupported or to be

arbitrary. Thus this court must find that the state court applied federal law unreasonably in using

impermissible factors to determine that the Board had acted reasonably. 

When a court has found that some of the factors relied on by the Board are neither

supported nor supportable, a remand “with directions to proceed in accordance with due process”

may be appropriate. In re DeLuna, 126 Cal.App.4th 585, 598 (2005). In light of the number of

factors favoring petitioner’s suitability for parole, acknowledged by the Board itself, and the

determination that several of the factors favoring unsuitability were not supported or were

arbitrary, such a remand is appropriate.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Federal Defender’s Office be appointed to represent petitioner; and

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this order on David Porter,

Assistant Federal Defender. 

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a writ of

habeas corpus be granted to the extent that the Board of Prison Terms be directed to hold a new

hearing in accordance with due process. It is also recommended that this court retain jurisdiction

of any habeas petition, properly exhausted, stemming from this renewed hearing. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 27, 2007.

2/some0698.157

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