Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00840/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00840-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

AMERICAN ECONOMY INSURANCE )

COMPANY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:05cv840-MHT

) (WO)

JONATHAN RUTLEDGE, d/b/a )

JONATHAN’S DELI, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

In this civil action, plaintiff American Economy

Insurance Company (AEI) seeks a declaratory judgment that

would relieve it from owing coverage to defendant

Jonathan Rutledge, who has already been convicted in

state court of burning down the insured property. This

cause is set for trial on January 16, 2007. Now before

the court is AEI’s motion to use former testimony from

Rutledge’s criminal trial pursuant to the hearsay

exception for unavailable witnesses. Having considered

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said motion and Rutledge’s objection thereto, the court,

for the following reasons, will grant the motion in part.

I.

Federal Rule of Evidence 804 provides that, under

certain circumstances, the former sworn testimony of an

unavailable witness can be used in a civil trial. First,

the declarant must be unavailable: “‘Unavailability as a

witness’ includes situations in which the declarant ...

is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a

statement has been unable to procure the declarant’s

attendance ... by process or other reasonable means.”

Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(5). Second, the party against whom

the former testimony is offered must have had “an

opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony

by direct, cross, or redirect examination.” Fed. R.

Evid. 804(b)(1).

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II.

In this case, AEI has moved to admit former testimony

from three witnesses. One witness, Edward Caldwell, is

not under subpoena because AEI was unable to locate him.

It is therefore fairly clear that he will not be present

at trial. Two other witnesses, Tim Anderson and

Priscilla Jones, are in the custody of the Alabama

Department of Corrections. They have been placed under

subpoena and the court has issued an order commanding

their attendance at trial. AEI informs the court that

the United States Marshal Service cannot guarantee their

attendance and consequently has moved for the admission

of their former testimony in the event that they do not

appear.

Because Caldwell’s attendance is unlikely, the court

will rule now on AEI’s motion as it pertains to

Caldwell’s former testimony. The court will not rule on

the motion as it pertains to Anderson’s and Jones’s

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testimony because their attendance at trial is more

likely and would render the motion moot.

III.

A.

The first question is whether Caldwell meets the

definition of “unavailability as a witness.” Fed. R.

Evid. 804(a). Counsel for AEI has described in detail,

in a sworn statement, AEI’s extensive, but unsuccessful,

efforts to locate Caldwell. The court is satisfied that

AEI has made a thorough and good-faith effort to procure

Caldwell’s attendance at trial by all reasonable means.

Therefore, in the event that Caldwell is absent from

trial, Caldwell will meet the criteria for unavailability

under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

B.

The next question is whether Rutledge had an

opportunity and similar motive to develop Caldwell’s

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former testimony. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). A threshold

requirement of Rule 804(b)(1)’s “opportunity” guarantee

is that the party against whom former testimony is

offered be the same party against whom it was offered in

the former proceeding. Cotchett, Federal Courtroom

Evidence § 804.3.1, at 22-78 (5th ed. 2006). That

requirement is satisfied in this case, as Caldwell’s

former testimony comes from Rutledge’s criminal trial.

Rutledge’s objection is based on two arguments.

First, Rutledge argues that he did not have an

opportunity to cross-examine Caldwell because Caldwell’s

testimony at the criminal trial was not live--it was a

transcript of a telephone deposition that was read aloud

to the jury. While it is true that Caldwell’s testimony

at trial was by deposition, that deposition was attended

by the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the trial judge.

Defense counsel was able to make objections, which were

immediately ruled upon by the trial judge. And after

Caldwell’s direct examination, Rutledge’s counsel

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undertook a complete cross-examination of Caldwell.

Therefore, Rutledge did have an opportunity to crossexamine Caldwell. That Caldwell’s former testimony

occurred by deposition is immaterial to the “opportunity”

guarantee of Rule 804(b)(1).

Second, Rutledge argues that he lacked the

opportunity to confront Caldwell because his Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was

violated at his criminal trial. As far as the court

knows, postconviction review of Rutledge’s criminal case

has not yet reached the stage where an ineffectiveassistance claim has been ruled upon. However, this

court has reviewed the trial testimony of Caldwell,

including the cross-examination of Caldwell by Rutledge’s

criminal-trial counsel. Without making any findings as

to the overall effectiveness of the representation

Rutledge received, this court is satisfied that

Rutledge’s trial counsel undertook an effective crossexamination of Caldwell within the meaning of Rule

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804(b)(1). See United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 630

(11th Cir. 1983). Therefore, the “opportunity” guarantee

of Rule 804(b)(1) is met in this case.

C.

Lastly, Rule 804(b)(1) requires that Rutledge have

had a “similar motive” to develop Caldwell’s former

testimony. “Similar motive” does not mean “identical

motive,” and the similar-motive inquiry is inherently

factual. United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 326

(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); United States v.

Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2002); Cotchett,

Federal Courtroom Evidence § 804.3.1, at 22-80. Rather,

the court must consider the similarity of the issue for

which the testimony is offered, as well the similarity of

Rutledge’s degree of interest in that issue. See United

States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 912-13 (2d Cir. 1993) (en

banc). Although this case is a civil action by an

insurance company seeking a declaratory judgment and the

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former testimony comes from a criminal trial where

Rutledge was charged with arson, the testimony is offered

for the same issue in both cases: whether Rutledge burned

down his own store. Furthermore, Rutledge’s interest in

his position on that issue (which is that he did not burn

down his own store) was at least as intense in his

criminal trial as it is in this civil action. Therefore,

the court has no trouble in finding that the “similar

motive” guarantee of Rule 804(b)(1) is met in this case.

* * *

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Plaintiff American Economy Insurance Company’s

motion to use former testimony of unavailable witnesses

(doc. no. 61) is granted as to witness Edward Caldwell.

(2) Plaintiff American Economy Insurance Company’s

motion remains under submission as to witnesses Priscilla

Jones and Tim Anderson.

DONE, this the 12th day of January, 2007.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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