Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01365/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01365-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILL D 

APPEALJunited Stat.el Court of Appealr Tenth Circuit 

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE BLIND OF 

COLORADO, INC., a Colorado non-profit 

corporation; ROCKY MOUNTAIN FEDERATION 

OF HANDICAPPED ATHLETES, a division of 

Pegasus Foundation, Inc., a Colorado 

non-profit corporation, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

vs. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROY ROMER, Governor, State of Colorado; ) 

DUANE WOODARD, Attorney General, State ) 

of Colorado; NORMANS. EARLY, JR., ) 

District Attorney for the Second ) 

Judicial District, State of Colorado, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

APR 2 0 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1365 

ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 

D.C. NO. 88-Z-1015 

Robert c. Moest of Fleishman, Fisher & Moest, Los Angeles, 

· California (Barry A. Fisher, Los Angeles, California, and Edwin s. 

Kahn, Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief), for PlaintiffsAppellants. 

Nathan B. Coats, Chief Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Denver 

District Attorney's Office (Larry Tannenbaum, Assistant Attorney 

General, Colorado Attorney General 's Off ice, with him on the 

brief), Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before LOGAN and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and DAUGHERTY, District 

Judge* 

DAUGHERTY, District Judge* 

*Honorable Fred Daugherty, Senior United States District Judge for 

the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-1365 Document: 010110212813 Date Filed: 04/20/1993 Page: 1 
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari and 

remanded this case in light of its recent decision in Farrar v. 

Hobby, 506 U.S. __ , 113 s.ct. 566 (1992). 

In Farrar, it was held in a case in which judgment was entered 

on the merits that a one-dollar nominal damage award was sufficient 

to make the recipient a prevailing party and satisfied that prong 

of 42 u.s.c. §1988. In then considering the reasonable attorney's 

fee prong of §1988, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of any 

attorney's fee in the case in which there was a request for 

seventeen million dollars in damages with a recovery of one dollar. 

Farrar stated that "[i]n some circumstances, even a plaintiff who 

formally 'prevails' under §1988 should receive no attorney's fees 

at all." Farrar, 113 s.ct. at 575. 

Unlike Farrar, the case at bar did not involve a judicial 

determination on the merits of the claims asserted in Plaintiffs' 

lawsuit. In an earlier case of this kind, this Court adopted what 

may be known as the "catalyst rule" in Foremaster v. City of St. 

George, 882 F . 2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1989). 1 In Foremaster, it was 

announced that when no judgment on the merits had been entered on 

the controversy involved, a party may nonetheless be entitled to an 

attorney's fee2 but he "must show '(1) that [the] lawsuit is 

causally linked to securing the relief obtained, and that the 

defendant's conduct in response to the lawsuit was required by 

1The First Circuit employed this same rule in a nonjudgment 

termination in Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978). 

2Following Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 100 s.ct. 2570, 65 

L.Ed.2d 653 (1980). 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-1365 Document: 010110212813 Date Filed: 04/20/1993 Page: 2 
law.'" Foremaster, 882 F.2d 1485, 1488, citing J & J Anderson, 

Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1473 (10th Cir. 1985). 

In Foremaster, this Court applied the "catalyst rule" to the 

prevailing party prong of §1988. Applying the "catalyst rule" in 

the case at bar, this Court affirmed the decision of the district 

court, which found under the facts of the case that the Plaintiffs' 

lawsuit was not causally linked to the relief obtained in the 

matter of certain statutory amendments to the Colorado Charitable 

Solicitations Act (Act) and therefore Plaintiffs were not 

prevailing parties. We affirmed this factual decision as being 

supported by the record. In this affirmance, the court followed 

the clearly erroneous rule and found that such factual 

determination by the district court was not clearly erroneous. 

Post Office v. Portee, Inc., 913 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Upon reconsideration herein as directed by the United States 

Supreme Court, this Court is of the opinion that there is a 

significant distinction in considering an attorney's fee under 

§1988 as to the prevailing party prong between a case in which a 

judicial decision on the merits has been entered and a case in 

which there has been no such determination but some relief sought 

has been obtained. It does not appear that the decision in Farrar 

condemns the use of the "catalyst rule" in a nonjudgment on the 

merits situation. We therefore believe that it is appropriate to 

follow and apply this rule in this nonjudgment on the merits case, 

and we again conclude that the determination that Plaintiffs' 

lawsuit was not causally linked to the amendments made to the Act 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-1365 Document: 010110212813 Date Filed: 04/20/1993 Page: 3 
by the Colorado Legislature was not clearly erroneous under the 

record and again affirm the district court in its factual 

determination to this effect and its application of the "catalyst 

rule" to the prevailing party requirement of §1988. 

Perhaps it could be argued that in light of Farrar the 

"catalyst rule" should only be applied to the reasonable attorney's 

fee prong of §1988 and not to the prevailing party prong. If such 

should be the case and our adherence to and application of the 

"catalyst rule" in Foremaster is not acceptable in the 

determination of a prevailing party under §1988 in this nonjudgment 

environment and Plaintiffs must be considered under Farrar to be 

prevailing parties, we believe that the "catalyst rule" should then 

be applicable in both of its prongs to the reasonable attorney's 

fee prong of §1988 . In such application, Plaintiffs' lawsuit has 

been factually determined by the district court not to have been a 

causal link in the matter of the amendments made to the Act by the 

Colorado Legislature and we have affirmed. Thus, a reasonable 

attorney's fee would be no fee at all, for Plaintiffs' lawsuit did 

not cause the relief obtained. 

In addition, the district court found that the amendments 

which were made to the Act were technical in nature and deemed de 

minimis in that the relationship between professional fund raisers 

and the State of Colorado was not materially altered as a result of 

Plaintiffs' lawsuit. Again, a reasonable attorney's fee under the 

circumstances of 

otherwise would 

this case would be no fee at 

be an unjustified windfall 

4 

all. To hold 

to Plaintiffs• 

Appellate Case: 90-1365 Document: 010110212813 Date Filed: 04/20/1993 Page: 4 
attorneys. Farrar, 113 s.ct. 566, 575. 

on reconsideration, our previous opinion entered herein is 

reaffirmed. 

5 

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