Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00262/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00262-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Scott Falater, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 07-0262-PHX-PGR (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Scott Falater has filed, through counsel, a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges his state court conviction for

murder. Doc. #1.

BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in Maricopa County Superior Court in 1999, Petitioner was

convicted of first degree murder. Doc. #12, Exh. U at 2. He was subsequently sentenced to

prison for the remainder of his natural life. Doc. #12, Exh. V at 23. Petitioner appealed the

conviction by filing a direct appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Doc. #12, Exh. W, X.

On January 17, 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence in a

Memorandum Decision. Doc. #12, Exh. Y. A Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme

Court was denied on June 28, 2002. Doc. #12, Exh. AA. 

Case 2:07-cv-00262-PGR Document 15 Filed 05/13/08 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

On August 5, 2002, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. Doc. #12,

Exh. BB. A year later, on August 11, 2003, he filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

Doc. #12, Exh. CC. The trial court denied the petition in a Minute Entry filed on May 6,

2004. Doc. #12, Exh. DD. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review to the Arizona Court

of Appeals, which was denied on June 17, 2005. Doc. #12, Exh. EE. Petitioner's subsequent

Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court was denied on February 8, 2006. Doc.

#12, Exh. FF, GG.

Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal court on February

2, 2007, along with a Memorandum in Support and other supporting documents. Doc. #1 -

#5. Petitioner alleges three grounds for relief. In ground one, Petitioner alleges that his right

to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was denied when the trial court

refused to give a jury instruction regarding somnambulistic automatism (sleepwalking). In

ground two, Petitioner alleges that numerous acts of prosecutorial misconduct pervaded the

trial, denying Petitioner his right to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause. In ground

three, Petitioner alleges that his right to due process was denied when the state court, on postconviction relief, denied his claim of newly discovered evidence without ordering additional

testing or granting an evidentiary hearing. On April 23, 2007, Respondents filed an Answer

to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. #12. Petitioner filed a Reply in support of his

petition on May 23, 2008. Doc. #14.

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:

At about 10:15 p.m. on January 16, 1997, defendant stabbed his wife,

Yarmilla (“victim”), forty-four times. He used a hunting knife that had a fiveand-a-half inch blade.

Defendant stabbed and cut the victim all over the upper part of her body

– in her chest, back, head, ears, and neck. He also inflicted several

“defensive” wounds to her hands. 

Defendant’s next door neighbor, Greg Koons (“Koons”), was about to

go to sleep when his girlfriend told him that she had just heard a woman

screaming. Koons went out to his backyard and heard moaning coming from

defendant’s backyard. Then he heard someone walk into defendant’s garage.

Koons went to the six foot high wall that separated the two yards, stood

on a planter made of railroad ties, and looked over. He saw a woman lying on

Case 2:07-cv-00262-PGR Document 15 Filed 05/13/08 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

the ground, with her head towards the house and her feet towards the

swimming pool. As he watched, the woman rolled onto her left side, put her

right arm over the top of her head, moved her legs a bit, then laid on her back

again. Koons’ initial impression was that the woman, who turned out to be the

victim, was probably drunk. 

Koons then saw lights go on in the upstairs master bedroom and

bathroom of defendant’s house. He saw defendant, wearing a white T-shirt,

walk past the bedroom window and go into the bathroom. After a few

minutes, defendant turned off the upstairs light and went downstairs into the

kitchen, where he appeared to be wringing his hands as if he had just washed

them. Defendant then opened a sliding glass door that led to his backyard and

motioned for the dog to lie down, which it did.

Defendant then walked within two or three feet of the victim and looked

down at her as though he was “wondering what to do with her.” After about

30 seconds, defendant walked back inside the house and shut the sliding glass

door.

Koons next saw defendant walk out of his garage, putting on canvas

work gloves. Defendant walked up to the victim, stepped over her, and

dragged her towards the pool. Defendant then knelt down beside the victim,

pushed her into the pool and held her head under water. Koons then left to call

911.

Police subsequently found the murder weapon, bloody jeans, gloves,

boots, undergarments, and similar items inside a Tupperware container and a

garbage bag that were hidden in the spare tire well of defendant’s vehicle.

Dr. Keen, the chief medical examiner, testified that because the stab

wounds in victim’s chest had bled more than those in the back, the chest

wounds had probably been inflicted first. Dr. Keen agreed that the upward

trajectory of the frontal wounds was consistent with the taller defendant having

approached the victim from behind, reaching around and stabbing her in the

chest. Dr. Keen also testified that the victim had possibly died before being

pushed into the pool, but that the facts were a “little ambiguous.” Because

liquid of an undetermined type, possibly water, had been found in the victim’s

left lung and water had been found in her sinuses, Dr. Keen opined that “she

may have been alive” when she was put in the pool.

The death certificate, executed by Dr. Ann Bucholtz, the pathologist

who actually performed the autopsy, listed “multiple stab wounds with

drowning” as the cause of death.

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that ground one should be dismissed because it raises a state law

question that is not cognizable on habeas review. Alternatively, Respondents argue that the

standard for habeas relief on the merits has not been satisfied. Regarding ground two,

Respondents also argue that the habeas standard has not been satisfied. Regarding ground

Case 2:07-cv-00262-PGR Document 15 Filed 05/13/08 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

- 4 -

three, Respondents contend that the claim is procedurally defaulted and not a cognizable

federal claim.

1. AEDPA Standard of Review

Under the AEDPA1

, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless the State court

decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or (2)

"if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent."

Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an 'unreasonable

application' of Federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then

applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the

“unreasonable application” clause requires the state court’s application of Supreme Court law

to be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). "When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the 'last reasoned decision' by a state court ...." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

///

///

Case 2:07-cv-00262-PGR Document 15 Filed 05/13/08 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

2. Ground One

Petitioner claims in ground one that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the

defense of somnambulistic automatism impermissibly shifted the burden of proof in violation

of the Due Process Clause and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Petitioner claims that

the defense of sleepwalking was a direct challenge to the voluntary act element that the

prosecution was required to prove and, consequently, the jury should have been instructed

that the prosecution had the burden to disprove the sleepwalking defense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Petitioner, however, did not properly raise this issue as a federal claim in

the state court. 

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state's highest court

in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). In

Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by

properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of

Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v.

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895,

898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). "Our rule is that a state prisoner has not 'fairly presented' (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that

those claims were based on federal law." Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.

2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). "If a petitioner fails to alert

the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is

unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court." Johnson v. Zenon,

Case 2:07-cv-00262-PGR Document 15 Filed 05/13/08 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). “Moreover, general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient

to establish exhaustion.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)).

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the federal

court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may

dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id.

However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); see also Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002) (a

defendant's claim is procedurally defaulted when it is clear that the state court would hold

the claim procedurally barred). The federal court will not consider these claims unless the

petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Dretke v. Haley, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 1851-52

(2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

In the opening brief of his direct appeal, Petitioner claimed that the trial court erred

by refusing to give a sleepwalking instruction but he did not argue that such refusal violated

the Due Process Clause. Doc. #12, Exh. W at 18-23. In a supplemental opening brief,

Petitioner again raised the jury instruction issue. Doc. #12, Exh. X at 1-7. In the second to

last sentence of the argument, Petitioner asserted that he “was denied his right to a fair trial

and due process of law.” Doc. #12, Exh. X at 6. He presented no other argument or analysis

to support a violation of the Due Process Clause. Similarly, in his petition for review to the

Arizona Supreme Court on direct review, Petitioner’s only reference to a violation of “due

process rights” was in the last sentence of the argument. Doc. #12, Exh. Z at 5-8. These

Case 2:07-cv-00262-PGR Document 15 Filed 05/13/08 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state court under Rule 32.4(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Petitioner has not shown that any of the

exceptions to the time limits under Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) apply to him.

- 7 -

general appeals to due process and the right to a fair trial do not establish a fair presentation

of the claim in the state court. 

By failing to fairly present the claim in the state court, Petitioner has failed to exhaust

his state court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if he returned

to the state court.2 As a result, the claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not alleged

cause for the default and actual prejudice, nor has he shown a miscarriage of justice to

overcome the procedural default. The court will therefore recommend that ground one be

denied.

In light of the fact that Respondent did not argue procedural default as a defense to

ground one, the court will also address the merits. For Petitioner to establish under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) that the state court's decision was "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court," he must

show that there is clearly established Supreme Court law on the issue presented. Davis v.

Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court case cited by Petitioner in

support of his claim is In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Court in that case held that

“the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond

a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”

Id. at 364. The court further held that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard also

applies during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Id. at 368. 

Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that Petitioner’s proposed instructions on

somnambulistic automatism amounted to improper comments on the evidence. Doc. #12,

Exh. Y at 7. The court further ruled that a separate sleepwalking instruction was not required

because the trial court gave an instruction requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Petitioner committed a voluntary act. Doc. #12, Exh. Y at 9-10. The

instruction defined what constitutes a voluntary act. Doc. #12, Exh. Y at 10. The court

Case 2:07-cv-00262-PGR Document 15 Filed 05/13/08 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

found that the instructions given by the trial court adequately explained the applicable law

and did not mislead the jury about the burden of proof. Id.

Petitioner cites Winship for the proposition that the prosecution was required to prove

voluntariness and disprove Petitioner’s sleepwalking defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

There is no dispute that the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Petitioner committed a voluntary act, and, as stated, the jury was given an instruction

explaining that requirement. Petitioner, however, has not shown that Winship or any other

Supreme Court case law, required the court to instruct the jury that the prosecution must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was not in a state of somnambulistic

automatism when he committed the offense. Nor has Petitioner shown that Winship or any

other Supreme Court case law required the trial court to give one of his proposed

instructions, or any instruction, on somnambulistic automatism. Winship is not a case

involving an affirmative defense and nothing in that case requires the kind of instruction that

Petitioner sought here. As a result, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Arizona Court

of Appeals decision on this issue is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court law. Moreover, Petitioner has not even alleged that the decision was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. Having failed to meet the standard for habeas relief, the court will recommend

that Petitioner’s claim in ground one be denied.

3. Ground Two

Petitioner claims in ground two that several instances of prosecutorial misconduct

denied him his right to a fair trial in violation of the Due Process Clause. Petitioner claims

that the state court’s disposition of this claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law.

Petitioner cites Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974), in which the

Court asked whether the prosecutor’s conduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to

make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” The Arizona Court of Appeals

addressed the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct in its Memorandum Decision and

Case 2:07-cv-00262-PGR Document 15 Filed 05/13/08 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

applied the DeChristoforo standard. Doc. #12, Exh. Y at 16-17. The court found the

allegations of misconduct to be without merit. It ruled that the prosecutor’s arguments were

reasonable inferences from the evidence and that the prosecutor’s questions on crossexamination were not so argumentative as to render the trial unfair.

Beyond merely citing the clearly established Supreme Court law, Petitioner fails to

satisfy the standard for federal habeas relief. As explained above, a state court's decision is

"contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state court applies a rule that contradicts

the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or (2) "if the state court confronts a

set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent." Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06.

Petitioner does not argue that the state court applied a rule that contradicts DeChristoforo,

nor could he given the state court’s citation to and application of that standard. Petitioner

also does not argue that the state court confronted a set of facts indistinguishable from

DeChristoforo or another Supreme Court case and reached a different result. Thus, Petitioner

has not demonstrated that the state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal

law as determined by the Supreme Court.

Petitioner also fails to demonstrate that the state court decision involves an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. As explained above, to meet this

standard, Petitioner must show that the state court applied the governing rule, or failed to

extend it, in a way that is objectively unreasonable, not merely in a way that was incorrect

or erroneous. See Hernandez, 282 F.3d at 1142. Petitioner does not argue and has in no way

demonstrated that the state court decision regarding prosecutorial misconduct is objectively

unreasonable. 

Finally, with regard to the second element of the habeas standard under 28 U.S.C. §

2254, Petitioner does not argue that the state court’s decision is based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

As a result, Petitioner has not met the standard for habeas relief with respect to his claims of

Case 2:07-cv-00262-PGR Document 15 Filed 05/13/08 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

prosecutorial misconduct in ground two, and the court will therefore recommend that the

claims be denied.

4. Ground Three

Lastly, in ground three of his habeas petition, Petitioner claims that his rights under

the Due Process Clause were denied when the state court denied him an evidentiary hearing

and additional testing based on new information supporting the sleepwalking defense he

presented at trial. In his state petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner argued that newly

discovered evidence supported his defense theory that he killed his wife while in a

sleepwalking state. Doc. #12, Exh. CC. After the state trial court denied the petition, the

Arizona Court of Appeals denied a petition for review filed by Petitioner. Doc. #12, Exh.

EE. Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court. Doc.

#12, Exh. FF. As Respondents argue, Petitioner failed to allege a violation of the Due

Process Clause in that petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

For whatever reason, however, Respondents have not provided the court with a copy

of the petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals and do not argue that Petitioner

failed to raise a Due Process Clause claim in that petition for review. Thus, it’s not clear to

the court whether such a claim was raised in the petition for review to the Court of Appeals.

Notably, Petitioner fails to address the procedural default issue in his Reply to Respondents’

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner does not argue that in fact he did

raise a Due Process Clause claim in the petition for review to the Court of Appeals, which

suggests no such claim was raised. The claim therefore appears to be procedurally defaulted.

However, because the information provided to the court does not definitively establish

procedural default, the court will not reject the claim on that basis.

Alternatively, Respondents argue that the state court’s refusal to set an evidentiary

hearing or allow additional testing on post-conviction relief is not a cognizable federal claim.

Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in state post-conviction proceedings.

Carriger v. Stewart, 95 F.3d 755, 762-763 (9th Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, 132 F.3d

463 (1997). A petitioner's claim that his right to due process was violated during state postCase 2:07-cv-00262-PGR Document 15 Filed 05/13/08 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

conviction proceedings may not considered on federal habeas review. See Villafuerte v.

Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) (denial of due process during state habeas

proceedings not addressable in federal habeas petition); Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26

(9th Cir. 1989) (petitioner's alleged due process violation based on a delay in deciding his

state petition for post-conviction relief may not be considered on federal habeas review). 

In his reply, Petitioner does not address the argument that federal courts are without

authority to address alleged errors in state post-conviction proceedings. Rather, he argues

that the new information about testing for sleepwalking constitutes newly discovered

evidence that provides affirmative proof of his actual innocence. The court disagrees with

Petitioner’s characterization of the information. As the trial court stated when it denied

Petitioner’s request to present new evidence:

The Court finds the new sleep studies may expand on the expert testimony

presented at trial, but just by presenting new methods of scoring and recent

studied on sleepwalking. However, the Court finds all of this far too

speculative. Defendant may well have been a sleepwalker, but none of the

studies can demonstrate whether he was sleepwalking on the night of the

homicide.

Based on the above authority, this court may not consider on habeas review

Petitioner’s claim that the trial court violated his right to due process by refusing to set an

evidentiary hearing or permit additional sleep testing. Petitioner has not demonstrated

otherwise. Accordingly, the court will recommend that the claim in ground three be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

Case 2:07-cv-00262-PGR Document 15 Filed 05/13/08 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 9th day of May, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-00262-PGR Document 15 Filed 05/13/08 Page 12 of 12