Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01168/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-01168-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANNA KIHAGI, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, 

CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01168-KAW 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

STAY

Re: Dkt. No. 19

Defendant City and County of San Francisco moves to stay the above-captioned case. 

Plaintiffs oppose the motion. The Court deems the matter suitable for disposition without hearing 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and VACATES the hearing currently set for January 21, 2016. 

Having considered the papers filed by the parties and the relevant legal authority, the Court 

GRANTS the motion, for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

Anna Kihagi, an "African-American immigrant," is the managing member of Xelan Prop 

1, LLC, Renka Prop, LLC, and Zoriall LLC (collectively, "Plaintiffs"),

1

three companies that own 

rental properties in San Francisco. (1st Am. Compl. ("FAC") ¶¶ 7-10, 32, Dkt. No. 18.) Kihagi 

alleges that only some of the properties are subject to the City's rent control ordinance. (Id. ¶ 33.) 

In 2014, Kihagi learned that some of her tenants were subletting their rent-controlled units 

at market rates without her consent and in violation of their lease agreements. (Id. ¶¶ 35-38.) 

When Kihagi evicted the tenants who were illegally subletting their apartments, they complained 

 

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For ease of reference, the Court will refer to all Plaintiffs as "Kihagi."

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to the City. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39.) This prompted a "full-fledged attack on Kihagi vis-à-vis the City's 

handling of applications for construction and remodelling [sic] permits and virtually anything else 

that required City approval even and especially concerning matters having nothing to do with the 

tenant disputes." (Id. ¶ 40.) She claims the City has discriminated against her based on her race, 

and that it has selectively enforced the laws in an arbitrary and capricious manner. (Id. ¶¶ 73, 78.)

Kihagi offers several examples of the City's purported selective enforcement.2 She alleges 

that when she applied for a permit to demolish an illegal unit, the City revised its original position 

that the unit was illegal and worked with the tenant to revoke the valid demolition permit. (Id. ¶ 

42.) When she "applied for a permit . . . to demolish a termite damaged storage room and replace 

[sic] with pressure treated wood," the City, upon learning that Kihagi was the applicant, "issued a 

permit on the condition that it be completed within an unreasonably short period of time." (Id.) 

When "Kihagi applied for a permit for one of the units at 1137 Guerrero Street to build 

windows in the rear of the building, not visible to the street," the City allegedly denied application

based on a letter from the City Attorney's Office, in which it demanded permission to inspect 

buildings located at 3927 18th Street, 1135-1139 Guerrero Street, 69-85 Hill Street, 195 Eureka 

Street, and 1000-1022 Filbert Street in San Francisco. (Id. ¶ 45.) Kihagi describes the letter "as a 

pre-text to unreasonably deny [her] right to seek the issuance of permits for the Guerrero and 

Eureka properties."3 (Id. ¶ 47.)

On March 3, 2015, Kihagi denied the City permission to enter her properties. (Id. ¶ 49.) 

The next day, "eight City employees and law enforcement personnel entered the common area of 

Kihagi's buildings." (Id. ¶ 50.) At some point, a deputy city attorney reassured Kihagi that "no 

other property which she owned or managed would be improperly searched because the City did 

not have consent and that the City was done with their investigation for the day." (Id. ¶ 53.) 

Twenty minutes later, the same City employees, accompanied by a different police officer, 

 

2

The Court does not describe every example here.

3

The allegations in the operative complaint do not make clear which permit application concerns 

the Eureka property.

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illegally searched another one of Kihagi's properties, including common areas and various units. 

(Id. ¶¶ 54-56.) 

According to Kihagi:

Security were able to locate a document in plain view in the vehicles of a City 

inspector written and signed by Deputy City Attorney Weatherford which accused 

Kihagi of having "a practice of evicting long-standing, rent-controlled tenants, 

illegally housing day laborers in unfinished apartments, performing construction 

work without permits, or beyond the scope of permits, and re-renting the units to 

new tenants at market rents."

(Id. ¶ 58.) Kihagi asserts that she is the only person whose properties have been raided by a task 

force, despite their being in good condition. (Id. ¶ 65.) She also alleges that when she applies for 

a permit, "the various planning department and building divisions see a message on their screen 

which states, 'DO NOT issue permits per DA Michael Weis and DBI Sr. Inspector Patrick 

Orieden.'" (Id. ¶ 72.) Kihagi claims that she "is the only person to receive such an automatic 

block on the issuance of permits." (Id. ¶ 73.)

B. Procedural background

Based on the City's alleged conduct, Kihagi commenced this action on March 12, 2015. 

(Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) On stipulation of the parties, Kihagi filed a first amended complaint on May 

18, 2015. (FAC; April 16, 2015 Stip., Dkt. No. 14; April 30, 2015 Stip., Dkt. No. 15.) Kihagi 

alleges that the City, Deputy City Attorneys Victoria L. Weatherford and Michael Weiss, and 

Housing Inspectors Marico Hernandez and Tony Pelea denied her equal protection, violated her 

due process rights, retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment right to petition 

government, and conspired to do so. (FAC ¶¶ 11-27, 77-80, 81-83, 84-88, 89-93.) She prays for 

an award of damages, costs of suit, and attorney's fees. (FAC ¶¶ 1-4.)

On June 4, 2015, the City filed a lawsuit against Kihagi in the Superior Court for the 

County of San Francisco. (Req. for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Ex. 1, State Court Complaint, Dkt. 

No. 21.) In the state court action, the City alleges that Kihagi has been "rampantly violating the 

letter and spirit of the Rent Ordinance, and in particular, Section 37.10B, by harassing, retaliating, 

and intimidating their tenants into surrendering their rent-controlled units." (Id. ¶ 6.) According 

to the City, once Kihagi's tactics succeed, she quickly renovates units, often without necessary 

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permits, inspections, or licensed contractors, and relets them at substantially increased rents. (Id. ¶ 

8.)

The City asserts four claims in its state court complaint. The first cause of action is for 

violation of San Francisco Administrative Code section 37.10B et seq. (Id. ¶¶ 128-135.) The 

second cause of action is for violation of California Health and Safety Code sections 17920-

17980.9. (Id. ¶¶ 136-147.) The third cause of action is for general public nuisance under 

California Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480. (Id. ¶¶ 148-154.) The fourth cause of action is for 

unfair and unlawful business practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code 

sections 17200-17210. (Id. ¶¶ 155-165.) The City seeks a variety of declaratory and injunctive 

relief, payment of statutory fines, civil penalties, and restitution, authorization to place a lien on 

Kihagi's property, reimbursement of costs of enforcement, and payment of reasonable attorney's 

fees and costs. (Id. ¶¶ 1-16.) 

On June 30, 2015, the City filed a motion to stay this federal case, along with a request for 

judicial notice.4 (Defs.' Mot., Dkt. No. 19; RJN.) The Court approved the parties' stipulations to 

modify the briefing schedule on the motion. (Stip. & Order, Dkt. No. 26; Stip. & Order, Dkt. No. 

28.) In accordance with the revised briefing schedule, Kihagi filed her opposition on August 17, 

2015, and the City filed its reply on August 24, 2015. (Pls.' Opp'n, Dkt. No. 29; Defs.' Reply, Dkt. 

No. 30.) Kihagi has not filed an opposition to the City's request for judicial notice.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Request for judicial notice

A district court may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute that are 

"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal–Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 

333 (9th Cir. 1993). A court may, therefore, take judicial notice of matters of public record.

 

4

The motion was originally noticed for hearing on August 6, 2015. Because Plaintiffs had not 

filed a certificate of service showing that the individual employee defendants had been served, the 

Court continued the hearing. After the Court issued an order to show cause, Plaintiffs filed 

certificates of service, though they did not file a written response as ordered by the Court. Dkt. 

Nos. 38-40.

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United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

B. Motion to stay

Subject to exceptions not claimed here, Younger abstention is appropriate where (1) there 

are ongoing state judicial proceedings, (2) those proceedings implicate important state interests, 

and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. 

Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Once these 

three threshold elements are met, a court may properly abstain "if the court's action would enjoin, 

or have the practical effect of enjoining, ongoing state court proceedings." AmerisourceBergen 

Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and footnote omitted); see 

Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Younger principles apply to actions at 

law as well as for injunctive or declaratory relief because a determination that the federal 

plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated would have the same practical effect as a 

declaration or injunction on pending state proceedings.").

III. DISCUSSION

A. Request for judicial notice

The City asks that the Court take judicial notice of the docket and complaint in the parallel 

state court case. (See RJN, Exs. 1 & 2.) Kihagi does not oppose the request. The Court finds that 

the documents are true and correct copies of documents filed in state court and grants the City's

request for judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); Wilson, 631 F.2d at 119 ("[A] court may 

take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as the records of an inferior court in 

other cases.").

B. Motion to stay

The City moves for a stay on the grounds that all elements for Younger abstention are met 

in this case. (Def.'s Br. in Support of Mot. to Stay ("Def.'s Br."), Dkt. No. 20.) It argues that the 

state action, though it was filed after Kihagi commenced this federal case, constitutes ongoing 

state judicial proceedings. (Id. at 2.) The City asserts that the state has a strong interest in 

enforcing the rent ordinance, protecting tenants' rights, and ensuring fair business practices, all of 

which are at issue in the ongoing state court case. (Id. at 2-3.) The City also argues that Kihagi 

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can raise her federal claims in state court, either as counter-claims against the City or as defenses 

to the City's allegations. (Id. at 4.) The City further contends that a ruling by this Court would 

effectively enjoin the state court proceedings. (Id.)

In opposition, Kihagi argues that Younger abstention is an exception to the general rule 

that federal courts must exercise jurisdiction and decide cases brought before them. (Pls.' Opp'n 

3.) She urges the Court to adhere to the general rule in this case, as Younger abstention is not 

appropriate where "there exists only a prospect that the federal court decision may, through claim 

or issue preclusion, influence the result in state court." (Id.) Plaintiff argues that this action would 

not interfere with the state court lawsuit because different issues are presented in each. (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff's position is unavailing. The threshold elements for Younger abstention are met in 

this case. The first element for Younger abstention—ongoing state judicial proceedings—is 

satisfied because the city's civil enforcement action is currently pending in state court. (See RJN, 

Exs. 1 & 2.) While the City did not file its state court complaint until June 4, 2015, after Plaintiff 

filed her action in this Court on March 12, 2015, the state court action was nonetheless 

commenced before any proceedings of substance took place in the federal case. See M&A Gabaee 

v. The Cmty. Redev. Agency of the City of Los Angeles, 419 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005). In 

fact, Plaintiff filed the operative complaint just weeks before the City commenced the state court 

case. The second element is also met because the issues raised in the state court litigation 

implicate important state interests. See, e.g., Mission Oaks Mobile Home Park v. City of Hollister, 

989 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1993) (proceedings related to rental rate ordinances implicate 

important state interests) overruled on other grounds by Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 

1093 (9th Cir. 2001). The third element is also met, as Kihagi is free to raise her constitutional 

claims in state court. 

Having found that the threshold requirements for Younger abstention are met, the Court 

also finds that this proceeding would have the practical effect of enjoining the state code 

enforcement action. Where, as here, "a person is the target of an ongoing state action involving 

important state interests, the state defendant cannot interfere with the pending state action by 

maintaining a parallel federal action involving claims that could have been raised in the state 

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case." Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1074-75 (6th Cir. 1998); see also

Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 980 n. 15 (citing Carroll, 139 F.3d at 1075-76). In the event the state 

defendant commences such an action, "Younger abstention requires the federal court to defer to 

the state proceeding." Carroll, 139 F.3d at 1074-75. Kihagi has commenced such an action here. 

She is the target of an ongoing state code enforcement proceeding, and this federal case interferes 

with that proceeding to the extent she brings claims that not only may be brought in state court but 

that generally concern the same subject matter, i.e., the condition of her properties, her compliance 

with applicable laws, and whether the City's enforcement actions were appropriate. Under these 

circumstances, the progression of this action must yield to the state court proceedings. See 

Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 965 ("We conclude that Younger principles apply to actions at law as well 

as for injunctive or declaratory relief because a determination that the federal plaintiff's 

constitutional rights have been violated would have the same practical effect as a declaration or 

injunction on pending state proceedings.").

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the City's motion to stay is GRANTED. The currently 

scheduled case management conference is CONTINUED to June 28, 2016. The parties shall file a 

joint case management conference statement seven days before. Depending on the status of the 

state court proceedings at that time, the parties may stipulate to continuing the case management 

conference in lieu of filing a joint case management conference statement. If the parties elect to 

do so, they must update the Court on the status of the state court proceedings and propose a 

continued case management conference date.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 01/15/16

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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