Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56836/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56836-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE;

TIFFANY T. ADAMS; DUSTI ROSE

BACON; MICHELLE DELORES

BARRETT; JUANA BUSH; ANGELA

CARRILLO; JOHN DEVILLA; WACO

ESCOBAR; MARK ESWONIA;

EMMANUEL EVANS; TONY FIXEL;

RIKKI HARPER; JESSE SEYMORE

GORDON; LEONA GORDON; JOHN W.

HERNANDEZ; HOPE HINMAN;

EVANGELINA HOOVER; ANGELA

MARIE JONES; SHARON MELISSA

KASEMAN; BRIAN KELLYWOOD;

JOSEPH ALAN LUSCH, JR.; STEVEN

DALE MADEROS; RAMON CAMPASS

MARTINEZ; MICHELLE MENDOZA;

HOWARD IRVING PEACH; SIERRA

PENCILLE; RAMONA MADALENE

POWELL; CHRISTINA RAY; RICHARD

SANDATE, JR.; ROBERTA SESTIAGA;

TITO KATTS SMITH; ADAM

TRUJILLO, JR.; ADAM STEVEN

TRUJILLO, SR.; SAMIYAH WHITE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

No. 12-56836

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-04437-

SVW-DTB

OPINION

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2 CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the

United States Department of the

Interior,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 7, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed September 17, 2014

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Thomas

SUMMARY*

Tribal Affairs

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of the Secretary of the United States Department of

the Interior in an action brought by the Chemehuevi Indian

Tribe alleging that the Secretary violated the Administrative

Procedure Act by determining that the Department of the

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL 3

Interior was not authorized to approve the Tribe’s

assignments of land to certain of its members.

The Tribe issued land assignment deeds to some of its

members, which the Tribe submitted to the Bureau of Indian

Affairs Western Regional Director, seeking approval under

25 U.S.C. § 81 (2000) (“Section 81”). The Interior Board of

Indian Appeals concluded that the deeds could not be

approved under Section 81 because doing so would violate 25

U.S.C. § 177 (“Section 177”).

The panel applied Chevron analysis, and at step one of the

analysis, held that the plain language of Section 81 and

Section 177 revealed that Congress did not intend for the

Secretary of the Interior to approve agreements under Section

81 that would otherwise be prohibited by Section 177. The

panel held that Section 177 prohibited the conveyance of land

from an Indian Tribe unless approved by Congress, and

Congress had not approved the transaction at issue here. The

panel concluded that the Secretary of the Interior properly

denied approval of the deeds under Section 81 because such

conveyances would violate federal law.

COUNSEL

Lester J. Marston (argued) and Scott Johnson, Rapport and

Marston, Ukiah, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

William B. Lazarus, Elizabeth A. Peterson, and Thekla

Hansen-Young (argued),United States Department of Justice,

Environment & Natural Resources Division, Washington,

D.C., for Defendants-Appellees.

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4 CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL

OPINION

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

The Chemehuevi Indian Tribe and thirty-four of its

members (collectively the “Tribe”) appeal from the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary

of the United States Department of the Interior (“Interior” or

“Secretary”). The Tribe alleges that the Secretary, acting

through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), violated the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by determining that

Interior was not authorized to approve the Tribe’s

assignments of land to certain of its members. We affirm.

I

The Chemeheuvi Reservation (“Reservation”) sits on

32,000 acres in San Bernardino County, California. Title to

the Tribe’s Reservation lands is owned and held in trust by

the United States government. The Reservation’s beautiful

location belies a more turbulent history.

In the early 1940s, in order to provide water to

burgeoning communities in California and nearby states,

Congress condemned the bottom land of the Reservation—

where all the members lived—in order to construct Parker

Dam and create Lake Havasu. The Dam left the Reservation

flooded, and all but one of the tribal families were forced to

relocate off reservation. Many of the displaced members

resettled in locations not far from the Reservation, including

Burbank, Los Angeles, and Phoenix.

Eventually, the flooding subsided and the land became

hospitable. As a result, in 1970, members of the Tribe sought

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CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL 5

to reorganize the tribal government and provide incentives for

its members to move back to the Reservation. Specifically,

the Tribe has attempted over the past ten years to convey

exclusive rights of use and possession of land to certain of its

members, having concluded that many members who had

resettled owned homes in their new communities and would

likely need a large incentive before selling their existing

homes and relocating to build new homes on the Reservation.

To that end, in 2001 the Tribe adopted Ordinance 01-08-

25-1-A, which established procedures under which the Tribal

Council can approve land assignment deeds to tribal

members. Pursuant to the Ordinance and deeds, tribal

members would “be allowed to occupy unassigned tribal trust

lands for residential purposes . . . in a manner similar to [fee

simple ownership] in land off the Reservation.” The

Ordinance describes the assignments as “formal exclusive

right[s] to use and possess tribal land.” The Tribe itself

described the assignments as “interest[s]in the parcel of tribal

land . . . that [were] as close to fee simple absolute as

possible.”

Pursuant to the Ordinance, the Tribe issued deeds to some

of its members, which the Tribe then submitted to the BIA’s

Western Regional Director, seeking their approval under

25 U.S.C. § 81 (2000) (“Section 81”). The Regional Director

declined to approve the deeds, and the Tribe appealed to the

Interior Board of Indian Appeals (“IBIA”).1

1 This litigation has a somewhat complicated procedural history. The

Tribe initially submitted a set of land assignments to the BIA for approval

under Section 81. While that application was pending, the Tribe filed suit

in federal district court to compel approval ofthe deeds. The district court

eventually dismissed the suit in 2006 for failure to exhaust administrative

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6 CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL

Reaching the merits of the appeal, the IBIA concluded

that the deeds cannot be approved under Section 81 because

doing so would violate 25 U.S.C. § 177 (“Section 177”). 

Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. W. Reg’l Dir., 52 IBIA 192,

192–93 (2010). Section 81(b) provides that “[n]o agreement

or contract with an Indian tribe that encumbers Indian lands

for a period of 7 or more years shall be valid unless that

agreement or contract bears the approval of the Secretary.”

25 U.S.C. § 81. Section 81(d)(1) requires the Secretary to

reject agreements that “violate[] Federal law.” Id.

The IBIA determined that the deeds are encumbrances

under Section 81, and no party disputes this conclusion. As

the IBIA explained, “[t]he Tribe’s land assignment deeds

meet this criteria because they grant to third parties (the

assignees) a right of entry on, a claim to, and nearly exclusive

proprietary control over a parcel of the Tribe’s trust land to

the exclusion of all others, including the Tribe.” Chemehuevi

Indian Tribe, 52 IBIA at 203.

The IBIA also concluded that the deeds are conveyances

under 25 U.S.C. § 177. Section 177 provides that “[n]o

purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any

title or claim thereto” from an Indian tribe is valid unless it is

approved by Congress. Thus, the IBIA concluded that while

remedies. Casanova v. Norton, No. CV 05-1273-PHX-ROS, 2006 WL

2683514 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2006). Before the district court ruled, the BIA

issued its 2005 decision in which it declined to approve the land

assignments. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Acting W. Reg’l Dir., 45 IBIA

81, 83 (2007). The Tribe appealed that decision to the IBIA, and the IBIA

dismissed. The Tribe then submitted additional land assignments for BIA

approval. The Regional Director declined to approve themin two separate

letters. The Tribe then appealed to the IBIA from each of the two

decisions.

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CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL 7

the deeds encumber lands pursuant to Section 81—and

therefore would otherwise be eligible for approval under that

section—they also “convey an exclusive possessory interest

that is intended to be perpetual” under Section 177. 

Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 52 IBIA at 193. Reading the two

sections together, and noting that Congress has not approved

these types of assignments under Section 177, the IBIA

determined that the Secretary could not approve the

assignments. Id. at 211.

The Tribe then filed this action in District Court for the

Central District of California, alleging that the Secretary

violated the APA by not approving the deeds. The Tribe

contended that the Secretary’s final decision was erroneous

because the deeds do not completely extinguish the Tribe’s

interest in the land—and thus do not violate Section 177. The

Tribe also contended that Congress amended Section 81 so

that assignments falling under that statute are no longer

subject to Section 177.

Upon considering multiple motions, the district court

granted summary judgment to the Secretary, concluding that

the IBIA’s interpretation of the relevant statutes and

regulations was reasonable under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

843–44 (1984). This timely appeal followed.

II

“We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment.” Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth,

515 F.3d 883, 912 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

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8 CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). No

material facts are disputed.

The Tribe asks the court to set aside the Secretary’s

decision under the APA. We may overturn an agency’s

determination under the APA only if it is “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). We may

review only those actions that have “adversely affected or

aggrieved” someone, id. § 702, and that are final and without

“other adequate remedy in a court.” Id. § 704. We will not

upset an agency’s decision if “the agency’s path may

reasonably be discerned.” Alaska Dep’t of Envtl.

Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

We review the IBIA’s interpretation of federal statutes

under the methodology described in Chevron and its progeny. 

In reviewing the IBIA’s decision, we first address “whether

Congress has directlyspoken to the precise question at issue.” 

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. “If the intent of Congress is clear,

that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the

agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed

intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–43. If, employing the

“traditional tools of statutory construction,” we determine

that Congress has directly and unambiguously spoken to the

precise question at issue, then the “unambiguously expressed

intent of Congress” controls. Id. at 843 & n.9. In

determining congressional intent, we not only examine the

precise statutory section in question but also analyze the

provision in the context of the governing statute as a whole,

presuming a congressional intent to create a “symmetrical

and coherent regulatory scheme.” FDA v. Brown &

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CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL 9

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (2000).

Thus, at the first step of the Chevron analysis, if we

conclude that Congress has directly spoken to the question,

then we “must give effect to Congress’s clearly expressed

intent.” Adams v. U.S. Forest Serv., 671 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th

Cir. 2012); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (“If the intent

of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.”).

However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, we proceed

to step two and defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is

“based on a permissible construction of the statute.”

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Because we conclude that the

intent of Congress is clear as to the statutes at issue in this

appeal, we need not proceed to step two.2

III

This case turns on the interpretation of two federal

statutes: Section 81 and Section 177. Section 177 is part of

the Indian Nonintercourse Act, whose “overriding purpose is

the protection of Indian lands. It acknowledges and

guarantees the Indian tribes’ right of possession and imposes

on the federal government a fiduciary duty to protect the

lands covered by the Act.” United States for and on Behalf

of Santa Ana Indian Pueblo v. Univ. of New Mexico, 731 F.2d

703, 706 (10th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). The goal of the

statute is to ensure that tribal lands remain in tribal hands.

 

2 As a result, we also need not address whether deference is warranted

under the Indian Cannons of Statutory Construction or Auer v. Robbins,

519 U.S. 452 (1997).

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10 CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL

See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,

362 U.S. 99, 119 (1960).

Section 177 provides that:

No purchase, grant, lease, or other

conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim

thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of

Indians, shall be of any validity in law or

equity, unless the same be made by treaty or

convention entered into pursuant to the

Constitution.

25 U.S.C. § 177.

Section 177 has been interpreted as prohibiting a great

deal of transactions absent Congressional authorization. See,

e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty. of N.Y.,

414 U.S. 661, 667–68 (1974) (holding that tribe prohibited

from giving land to state without federal government’s

approval); United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d

417, 422 (4th Cir. 1938) (holding that Indian land may not be

taken from tribe via adverse possession without government’s

approval); Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp.

940, 948 (D. Mass. 1978) (holding that agreements between

tribe and its members not exempt).

As originally enacted in 1872, Section 81 provided for a

restraint on alienation designed to protect Indians from

“improvident and unconscionable contracts [because][a]t the

time of the law’s enactment, Indians apparently were being

swindled by dishonest lawyers and claims agents.” Altheimer

& Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 805 (7th Cir.

1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “In

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CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL 11

1872, when Congress passed § 81, federal law provided that

Indian tribes enjoyed the right to possess and occupy lands

but not to alienate these lands without the federal

government’s approval.” Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key

Bank of Maine, 112 F.3d 538, 548 (1st Cir. 1997).

Prior to the 2000 amendments, Section 81 provided that:

No agreement shall be made by any person

with any tribe of Indians, or individual Indians

not citizens of the United States, for the

payment or delivery of any money or other

thing of value, in present or in prospective, or

for the granting or procuring any privilege to

him, or any other person, in consideration of

services for said Indians relative to their lands

. . . unless such contract or agreement . . . bear

the approval of the Secretary . . . and the

Commissioner of Indian Affairs indorsed

upon it.

25 U.S.C. § 81 (prior to March 14, 2000 amendments).

However, the former Section 81’s language proved to be

untenably broad. Because it required the Secretary’s

approval to contract for “services for Indians relative to their

lands,” the former Section 81 was “susceptible to the

interpretation that any contract that ‘touches or concerns’

Indian lands must be approved.” S. Rep. No. 106-150, at 8

(1999) (emphasis added). Indeed, “neither tribes, their

partners nor the BIA could predict with any certainty whether

a court might ultimately conclude that a transaction was void

because it was not approved pursuant to Section 81.” Id. at

5. As a result of this uncertainty over the statute’s language,

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12 CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL

and the “draconian” penalties that could be meted out for

violating it, the Secretary received applications for approval

of such commonplace contracts as sales of vehicles. Id. at 7,

9.

This confusion led Congress to clarify which agreements

require federal approval. Id. at 1. Congress did so by

amending Section 81 in two important ways: it limited the

section to apply to only agreements concerning a duration of

7 or more years, and it replaced “relative to Indian lands”

with “encumbering Indian lands.” Section 81 as amended in

2000 provides that

(b) No agreement or contract with an Indian

tribe that encumbers Indian lands for a period

of 7 or more years shall be valid unless that

agreement or contract bears the approval of

the Secretary.

. . . .

(d) The Secretary (or a designee of the

Secretary) shall refuse to approve an

agreement or contract that is covered under

subsection (b) of this section if the Secretary

(or a designee of the Secretary) determines

that the agreement or contract–

(1) violates Federal law

25 U.S.C. § 81.

The 2000 amendments to Section 81 also granted

authority to the Secretary to promulgate regulations

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CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL 13

implementing the statute. 25 U.S.C. § 81(e). The regulations

most relevant to this appeal include 25 C.F.R. § 84.003,

which provides that “[u]nless otherwise provided in this part,

contracts and agreements entered into by an Indian tribe that

encumber tribal lands for a period of seven or more years

require Secretarial approval under this part.” 25 C.F.R.

§ 84.003.

25 C.F.R. § 84.002 provides that:

Encumber means to attach a claim, lien,

charge, right of entry or liability to real

property (referred to generally as

encumbrances). Encumbrances covered by

this part may include leasehold mortgages,

easements, and other contracts or agreements

that by their terms could give to a third party

exclusive or nearly exclusive proprietary

control over tribal land.

25 C.F.R. § 84.002.

The regulations further explain which agreements are

exempt from the Secretary’s review, including those “that

convey to tribal members any rights for temporary use of

tribal lands, assigned by Indian tribes in accordance with

tribal laws or customs.” 25 C.F.R. § 84.004(d). Finally, the

Secretary clarified that “[t]he Secretary will disapprove a

contract or agreement that requires Secretarial approval under

this part if the Secretary determines that such contract or

agreement . . . [v]iolates federal law.” 25 C.F.R. § 84.006.

We conclude that Congressional intent is clear. Section

177 prohibits the “grant, lease, or other conveyence of lands,

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14 CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL

or of any title thereto” from an Indian tribe unless approved

by Congress. Congress has not approved the transactions at

issue here. Therefore, the Secretary properly denied approval

of the deeds under Section 81 because such conveyences

would violate federal law.

IV

A

The Tribe first contends that the assignments do not

violate Section 177 under the Fifth Circuit’s Tonkawa Tribe

of Oklahoma v. Richards, 75 F.3d 1039 (5th Cir. 1996). The

Tribe asserts that, under Tonkawa, only conveyances that

completely extinguish a tribe’s interests must be approved

under Section 177. Because the deeds do not completely

extinguish the Tribe’s title to the land, the Tribe argues that

they do not require Congressional approval.

As an out of circuit case, Tonkawa does not bind us. 

However, even if it did, it would not alter the outcome

because it applies to situations in which a tribe loses all

possible rights to the land, which is not the case here. In

Tonkawa, the tribe asserted that the State of Texas had

completely divested tribal title to the land. Id. The court held

that a tribe, to prevail on a claim of a violation of Section

177, must show, among other things, that “the [t]ribe’s title

or claim to the interest in land has been extinguished without

express consent of the United States.” Id. at 1044. Thus,

Tonkawa explains what is necessary for a tribe to succeed on

a Section 177 claim when the right to the land has been

completely extinguished. As the IBIA put it, “[i]t is beyond

cavil that § 177 applies to such conveyances.” Chemehuevi

Indian Tribe, 52 IBIA at 207.

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CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL 15

The statutory language of Section 177 confirms our

reading of Tonkawa. Section 177 requires congressional

approval of leases, grants, “or other conveyance[s] of lands,

or of any title or claim thereto.” 25 U.S.C. § 177 (emphasis

added). In other words, Section 177 by its very language

applies to conveyances of less than complete divestment,

which is how the section has been interpreted by other bodies

as well. See, e.g., Lease of Indian Lands for Grazing

Purposes, 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 235, 237 (1885); Solicitor’s

Opinion, M-31724, I Op. Solic. 1178 (Nov. 21, 1942)

(explaining that Section 177 applies whether or not a

transaction attempts to convey complete title); United States

v. S. Pac. Trans., 543 F.2d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 1976)

(easements granting railroad rights of way on Tribal land are

subject to Section 177, and thus invalid without

Congressional authorization).

B

The tribe also asserts that even if the deeds are subject to

Section 177, they may nevertheless be approved by the

Secretary under Section 81. The Tribe contends that the

deeds may be approved under the present Section 81 because

Congress’s amendments expanded the scope of the

Secretary’s authorityto approve these types of encumbrances. 

In other words, the Tribe asserts that Congress, by amending

Section 81, authorized the Secretary to approve conveyances

of land that Section 177 would otherwise prohibit.

The plain language of Section 81 does not support the

Tribe’s reading. As explained above, Section 81 as amended

explicitly prohibits approval of an agreement that is subject

to its approval requirements if “the agreement or contract . . .

violates Federal law.” 25 U.S.C. § 81(d)(1). Section 177 is

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16 CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL

part of federal law and prohibits any “purchase, grant, lease,

or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto,

from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians” that is not

authorized by Congress. 25 U.S.C. § 177.

Without the support of the plain language of the statutes,

the Tribe’s argument instead becomes an argument that the

amendments impliedly repealed Section 177. But “repeal by

implication is disfavored,” Ahlmeyer v. Nevada System of

Higher Education, 555 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and nothing

in the statute’s language suggests that Congress intended to

give the Secretary the authority to approve an agreement that

otherwise falls within the scope of Section 177.

In fact, other of Congress’s actions regarding tribal land

reveals that it did not intend to repeal Section 177 by

implication. As we have explained, the Secretary may

approve transactions that fall within the scope of Section 177

only if a law grants the agency the power to approve the

transactions. Lease of Indian Lands for Grazing Purposes,

18 Op. Att’y Gen. at 238. Since enacting Section 177,

Congress has explicitly approved many such transactions,

thereby allowing them to go forward subject only to Interior’s

approval. Of note, the statutes explicitly grant the Secretary

the authority to approve the transactions. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C.

§ 415 (“Any restricted Indian lands, whether tribally, or

individually owned, may be leased by the Indian owners, with

the approval of the Secretary of the Interior . . . . ); 25 U.S.C.

§ 323 (“The Secretary . . . is empowered to grant rights-ofway for all purposes” through lands held by the United States

in trust for Indians.); 25 U.S.C. § 311 (“The Secretary . . . is

authorized to grant permission . . . to the proper State or local

authorities for the opening and establishment of public

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CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL 17

highways.”). Thus, when Congress intends to vest in the

Secretary the power to approve a particular type of

transaction, it has expressly stated its intention to do so. 

Moreover, and unlike Section 81, when Congress does grant

this authority it has inserted no language indicating that

approval would be subject to the agreements not “violating

Federal law.”

Tellingly, Congress has not made an exception for

assignments, like the deeds here, that convey an exclusive

possessory interest in perpetuity. Thus, Congress’s decision

to give the Secretary authority to approve a range of different

types of assignments, while leaving alone land assignments

of the kind at issue here, indicates that Congress did not

intend to take those assignments outside of the scope of

Section 177.

The relevant legislative history confirms that Congress, in

amending Section 81, did not intend to alter that section’s

application vis-a-vis Section 177. As we have noted, former

Section 81 was enacted to protect tribal land from alienation,

and it did not authorize the Secretary to approve agreements

that convey Indian land. However, the language of former

Section 81 made it unclear which contracts required approval,

and so Congress attempted to clarify the ambiguity.

One solution Congress considered was outright

elimination of Section 81, which would have removed

Interior from the equation and given tribes more autonomy

over their lands. S. Rep. No. 106-150, at 9. However, that

proposal was rejected in favor of the more modest

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18 CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL

amendments that were ultimately adopted.3 As we have

discussed, the amendments replaced the phrase “relative to

Indian lands” with the phrase “encumbering Indian lands”

and specified that approval was needed for only contracts

“that encumber[] Indian lands for a period of seven or more

years . . . .” 25 U.S.C. § 81(b).

In rejecting the proposal to outright eliminate Section 81,

Congress explained that it intended to “leave[] the [amended]

provision in place to address a limited number of transactions

that could place tribal lands beyond the tribe’s ability to

control the lands in its role as proprietor.” S. Rep. No. 106-

150, at 9. In doing this, Congress narrowed the scope of

those transactions that require approval. “Section 81 [as

amended] will no longer apply to a broad range of

commercial transactions. Instead, it will only apply to those

transactions where the contract between the tribe and a third

party could allow that party to exercise exclusive or nearly

exclusive proprietary control over the Indian lands.” Id. If

Congress’s intent could not be any more clear, one of the

bill’s proponents, Senator Campbell, summed it up: “All

other federal laws will still apply to the agreement[s] . . . .

[Amended Section 81 still] authorize[s] [the Secretary] to

reject any contract that violates federal law.” 145 Cong. Rec.

S2648-03 at S2666-67 (145 Cong. Rec. 4441) (1990).

3 The Tribe contends that amended Section 81 was part of a major

iniative to promote tribal self-government and allow certain tribes the

authority to determine under what conditions their lands can be

encumbered. However, as we have explained, Congress explicitly

rejected a proposal to eliminate Section 81 altogether. Rather, Congress

simply reduced the number of transactions that require Secretarial

approval. Amended Section 81 still requires Secretarial approval for

assignments that encumber land for more than seven years, and prohibits

the Secretary from approving assignments that violate federal law.

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CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL 19

As a final matter, we note that the IBIA correctly

determined that the deeds assigned sufficient of the Tribe’s

interests that they are conveyances under Section 177. The

deeds assign “a formal exclusive right to use and possess

tribal lands,” and the assignments may be transferred to,

exchanged with, or leased to other individuals. If the

assignee dies intestate, the land will descend to the assignee’s

survivors except in limited circumstances. An assigned plot

can be canceled and returned to the tribe in only limited

situations, such as if the assignee makes a transfer without

tribal approval or commits a crime on the property. As the

IBIA put it, most of these situations “are within the exclusive

control of the assignees and none of which allow[s] the Tribe

to revoke the assignment at will.” Chemehuevi Indian Tribe,

52 IBIA at 196. In order for the Tribe to recover assigned

property, it must pay fair market value for it and any

improvements on its land. Additionally, the deeds waive the

Tribe’s sovereign immunity to suits by assignees to enforce

the terms of the deeds.

The Solicitor’s Office of the Department of the Interior

has previously determined that these types of land

assignments cannot be approved under Section 81 because

they violate Section 177. In a 1942 opinion, the Solicitor of

the Interior addressed a proposal by the Colville Tribe to sell

to its members the exclusive use of tribal lands together with

the right to devise or convey the property to another tribal

member with the tribal council’s consent. Solicitor’s

Opinion, M-31724, I Op. Solic. 1178 (Nov. 21, 1942). The

deeds provided that “the lands and improvements . . . are held

in trust for the tribe for the exclusive use and occupancy by

the Indian purchaser during his lifetime.” Id. The Solicitor

determined that the proposed land assignments violated

Section 177 because “[t]he element of purchase plus the

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incidents of descent and alienation stamp the transaction as

one designed to individualize the tribal title and create in the

individual an enforceable vested interest.” Id. at 1179–80.

As the IBIA explained, the same is true for the deeds

here. According to the terms of the Ordinance, the Tribe

would lose its right to use and possess the lands, the Tribe

could reclaim the land in only limited and unintended

circumstances, and the assignments convey rights of descent

and alienation. Individuals would also have the rights to

transfer, lease, and exchange the property with other tribal

members. Therefore, the deeds fall within Section 177’s

prohibition.

In response, the Tribe argues that the IBIA’s

interpretation of Section 81 would render that section a

nullity because the Secretary would be prohibited from

approving any encumbrance that violates Section 177. But

Section 81 “encumbrances” and Section 177 “conveyances”

are not synonymous. In other words, agreements can

“encumber” land under Section 81 without “conveying” lands

under Section 177.

As the IBIA explained, “[t]hrough regulation, the

Department has interpreted [Section] 81 to apply to

encumbrances not governed by or subject to other statutes

and regulations, such as leasing statutes or [Section] 177.” 

Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 52 IBIA at 193. The IBIA

provided one example of an “encumbrance” that is not also a

“conveyance”: assignments of life estates to tribal members. 

Id. at 193 (citing Rogers v. Acting Deputy Assistant Sec’y -

Indian Affairs (Operations), 15 IBIA 13, 17 (1986)). There

are others. As the district court pointed out, the commentary

to the regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 81(e)

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CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL 21

reveals other arrangements that could “encumber” Indian land

without extinguishing a tribe’s title to it:

[A] restrictive covenant or conservation

easement may encumber tribal land within the

meaning of Section 81, while an agreement

that does not restrict all economic use of tribal

land may not. An agreement whereby a tribe

agrees not to interfere with the relationship

between a tribal entity and a lender, including

an agreement not to request cancellation of

the lease, may encumber tribal land,

depending on the contents of the agreement. 

Similarly, a right of entry to recover

improvements or fixtures mayencumber tribal

land, whereas a right of entry to recover

personal property may not.

66 Fed. Reg. 38,918, 38,920–21 (July 26, 2001); see also S.

Rep. No. 106-150, at 9 (noting, for example, a lenderfinanced transaction in which the lender “receive[s] an

interest in tribal lands as part of that transaction.”).

To be sure, determining what constitutes an encumbrance

can be difficult, in part because there is clearly some overlap

between Section 81 “conveyances” that are prohibited by

Section 177 and “encumbrances” that would be permissible

under Section 81 if not for Section 177. But this ambiguity

has existed since the statutes became law over one hundred

years ago. In fact, by amending Section 81, and thereby

narrowing the range of assignments that require the

Secretary’s approval, Congress has actually reduced the

overlap. Moreover, Interior has also acknowledged the

difficulty of determining what constitutes an encumbrance

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22 CHEMEHUEVI INDIAN TRIBE V. JEWELL

and has stated that such determinations are made on a “caseby-case basis.” 6 Fed. Reg. at 38,920–21 (July 26 2001).4

V

In sum, we conclude that the plain language of Section 81

and Section 177 reveals that Congress did not intend for the

Secretary to approve agreements under Section 81 that would

otherwise be prohibited by Section 177. Therefore, we “stop

the music at step one,” and “give effect to [Congress’s]

unambiguously expressed intent.” Gila River Indian Cmty.

v. United States, 729 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.3d 145, 151

(D.C. Cir. 2005). We therefore affirm the judgment of the

district court.

In closing, we acknowledge that our holding today does

not aid the Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, which has taken

reasonable steps to return its members to the Reservation and

restore the Tribe. However, the solution to ensuring the

Tribe’s future lies in Congress, not the courts.

AFFIRMED.

4 The Tribe further contends that the IBIA’s interpretation of Section 81

conflicts with the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (“IRA”). 

The Tribe points out that the IRA gave tribes “authority to determine the

terms and conditions under which encumbrance[s] take place.” But that

section allows tribal constitutions to adopt provisions by which tribes can

prevent the assignments of lands. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (proving that tribal

constitutions may “prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of

tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of

the tribe”). Thus, the IRA is consistent with Congress’s general intention

to restrict alienation of Indian lands.

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