Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02210/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02210-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, )

)

Plaintiff/Respondent, )

) CR 06-00464 PHX SRB

v. ) CV 12-02210 PHX SRB MEA

) 

Ira W. Gentry, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Defendant/Movant. )

________________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

On October 16, 2012, Mr. Ira Gentry (“Movant”), filed

a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On May 6, 2013, Respondent filed

a response to the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Response”) (Doc. 12).

Movant filed a reply to the response to his motion on June 7,

2013. See Doc. 14. 

I Procedural History

A federal grand jury indictment returned May 3, 2006,

charged Movant and a co-defendant with 59 criminal counts,

including conspiracy, securities fraud, wire fraud, tax evasion,

and money laundering; the indictment also sought forfeiture of

real property. Movant was charged with these crimes in

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connection with a corporate entity, of which he was CEO from the

end of 1997 through mid-2001. See Criminal Doc. 1 & Criminal

Doc. 3. The government alleged Movant was involved in a “pump

and dump” stock manipulation scheme. See Doc. 12 at 1. In a

published order entered October 5, 2006, after numerous

continuances and a hearing, the Court found the government had

sustained its burden of showing Movant was a flight risk and

ordered him detained pending trial. See Criminal Doc. 106;

United States v. Gentry, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D. Ariz. 2006).

On August 12, 2008, the government moved to dismiss

fourteen counts of the indictment, which motion was granted.

See Criminal Doc. 432. At the conclusion of a sixteen-day

trial, on September 12, 2008, Movant was convicted on 33 felony

offenses, comprised of one count of conspiracy, nine counts of

securities fraud, five counts of wire fraud, one count of tax

evasion, eleven counts of international concealment money

laundering, three counts of concealment of money laundering, and

three counts of transactional money laundering. See Criminal

Doc. 506. Judgments and convictions were entered on March 17,

2009, and Movant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 180

months imprisonment. See Criminal Doc. 598.

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Movant’s

convictions and sentences on direct appeal in a published

opinion. See United States v. Jenkins, 633 F.3d 788 (9th Cir.),

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1

This case arises out of a “pump and dump” scheme

during which Randy Jenkins and Ira Gentry

conspired to secretly acquire millions of shares

of UniDyn Corporation stock, artificially inflate

its value, sell it for significant profit, and

launder the proceeds. After a sixteen-day trial,

a jury convicted Jenkins and Gentry

(“Appellants”) of multiple counts of securities

fraud (15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff, 78j(b)); wire fraud (18

U.S.C. § 1343); international concealment money

laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i));

concealment money laundering (18 U.S.C. §

1956(a)(1)(B)(i)); and transactional money

laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1957(a)). The jury also

convicted each appellant of one count of tax

evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201) and for conspiracy to

defraud the United States and commit wire fraud,

securities fraud, and mail fraud (18 U.S.C. §

371).

United States v. Jenkins, 633 F.3d 788, 793 (9th Cir.), cert. denied

132 S. Ct. 257 & 453 (2011).

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cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 453 (2011).1 In denying relief the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the merits of, inter

alia, Movant’s claim regarding the statute of limitations:

 The principal legal issue we face is whether

18 U.S.C. § 3292 suspended the running of the

statute of limitations for all counts.

Section 3292 permits the district court to

suspend the statute upon finding that the

government reasonably believes evidence of a

crime under investigation by a grand jury is

in a foreign country and has requested that

evidence. Subject to defined outer limits,

the suspension period lasts until the foreign

government has taken “final action” on the

official request.

 Appellants argue that an application to

suspend the running of the statute of

limitations must be supported by a sworn

affidavit or other material of evidentiary

value and that § 3292 does not permit the

district court to suspend the statute of

limitations if the government applies after

the statute has expired. The fact that the

government submitted its official request for

evidence to a foreign government before the

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expiration of the statute is irrelevant, they

argue. Consequently, they contend that even

though the government submitted a sworn

affidavit in support of its § 3292

application on June 20, 2005, the district

court could not suspend any of the pertinent

statutes of limitation that expired before

that date. Finally, appellants argue that

Canada took “final action” on or before July

5, 2005, ending the suspension period and

rendering several counts of the indictment

untimely. We agree only with appellants’

first contention and conclude that the

statute of limitations had not expired on any

counts before the grand jury returned its

indictment.

 In addition, both appellants contend (1)

there was insufficient evidence to support

conviction on many counts; (2) the jury’s

instructions on money laundering were

reversible error; and, (3) the district court

erred at sentencing in calculating the amount

of loss and number of victims. Jenkins also

argues that his sentence was substantively

unreasonable. Gentry argues that the district

court wrongly denied his motion to sever his

trial from Jenkins’s, and that the district

court erred in denying his motion for

additional cross examination of a government

witness. We reject each of these claims and

affirm the convictions and sentences.

Id. at 793-94.

The Supreme Court denied Movant’s petition for a writ

of certiorari on October 17, 2011.

On April 22, 2010, while his direct appeal was pending,

Movant sought a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 33(a) and (b)(1). Movant challenged his convictions

on counts 35–45, claiming, among other things, that “[n]ewly

obtained evidence from the receiving bank Wells Fargo verifies

that the wires were domestic, originated in New York and were

not international transfers.” See Criminal Doc. 748 at 4. On

June 8, 2010, the District Court denied relief, treating the

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2

 This evidence was allegedly obtained in September 2008,

May 2008, and April 2010. See Criminal Doc. 757 at 7–8. 

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motion as a substantive motion for new trial and finding that

“[t]he alleged newly discovered evidence is not newly discovered

as it could have been obtained through due diligence...” and

that “this ‘new’ evidence is part of an argument Defendant made

at trial which the Court rejected.” Criminal Doc. 753.

Defendant did not seek appellate review of this ruling.

Subsequently, again while his direct appeal was still

pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on September 2,

2010, Movant moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33, Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Criminal Doc. 757. Movant again

claimed that allegedly newly discovered evidence and Brady

violations warranted a new trial. Movant’s arguments concerning

newly discovered evidence on the issue of international

concealment money laundering were the same as those advanced in

a prior motion. Compare Criminal Doc. 748, with Criminal Doc.

757. Movant also claimed he possessed newly discovered evidence

pertinent to the testimony of witnesses and the viability of

what he claimed to be his invention, the “Sterling.” See

Criminal Doc. 757 at 6–7.2 On October 6, 2010, the District

Court denied the motion for new trial “For the same reasons

expressed in this Court’s June 8, 2010 Order [Doc 753].”

Criminal Doc. 763. Movant did not appeal this order.

More than eight months later, on June 30, 2011, Movant

filed a pleading captioned as a “Motion for New Trial II.”

Criminal Doc. 770. In this pleading Movant advanced the same

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claims for relief proffered in his September 2010 motion for a

new trial. Movant did not produce evidence significantly or

materially different from that presented in the September 2010

motion for new trial. On September 19, 2011, the District Court

denied the “Motion for New Trial II,” once again finding “that

there is no newly discovered evidence and that this motion is

essentially the same as Defendant Gentry’s April 2010 [Doc. 748]

and September 2010 [Doc. 757] Motions.” Criminal Doc. 779.

Movant appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals on September 28, 2011. See Criminal Doc. 782.

Movant raised eight bases for relief in his appeal from the

District Court’s denial of his request for a new trial. Movant

asserted that:

(1) alleged newly discovered evidence

established that his international money

laundering convictions were invalid because

no funds crossed international borders; 

(2) alleged newly discovered evidence proved

that the Government committed Brady

violations regarding wire transfer documents

related to the international money laundering

convictions; 

(3) a chart utilized at trial by the United

States was misleading; 

(4) alleged newly discovered evidence (which

was also allegedly withheld by the United

States in violation of Brady) impeaches the

testimony of Hiroshi Tsuriya; 

(5) alleged newly discovered evidence proves

that three prosecution witnesses gave false

and misleading testimony; 

(6) alleged newly discovered evidence

demonstrates that the Sterling was “not a

fraud”; and 

(7) foreign records were improperly admitted

at trial.

Civil Doc. 12 at 4-5, citing Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Docket No. 11-10495.

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In a decision entered July 13, 2012, the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals found each of Movant’s arguments “so

insubstantial as to not require further argument” and summarily

affirmed the District Court’s denial of Movant’s motion for new

trial. Criminal Doc. 791.

In his section 2255 motion, Movant contends:

1. He was denied his right to due process of law and

his right to a fair trial because he was not appointed different

counsel.

2. All but five counts charged in the 2006 indictment

were invalid because the statute of limitations had expired.

3. The government withheld material evidence, in

violation of Brady v. Maryland.

4. He was improperly convicted of international money

laundering when no funds crossed international boundaries.

5. Five of the government’s witnesses committed

perjury, altering the outcome of his criminal proceedings.

6. He was improperly sentenced because the District

Court improperly calculated “loss, victims, and forfeiture,” and

because the District Court erred by not applying the 2000

version of the United States Sentencing Guideline rather than

the 2002 version.

7. “Foreign evidence admitted at trial through

certification did not meet the required indicia of reliability

as required pursuant to 18 USC §3505 and Ninth Circuit case

law.” 

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8. His conviction on Count I must be reversed because

the latest act alleged was not one of conspiracy and was outside

the statute of limitations. 

9. The District Court improperly instructed the jury

with regard to money laundering.

10. The government presented unlawfully obtained

evidence at trial; Movant asserts his counsel was ineffective in

presenting his Fourth Amendment claim and that he is actually

innocent of the charges against him.

11. The indictment charged some funds were the result

of illegal activity and subject to forfeiture. Accordingly,

Movant contends, the government is estopped from asserting

Movant should have declared this income as capital gains or

lawful income. 

12. “Counts 39, 40, 44, and 45 are essential payments

and as such are not money laundering.”

13. Counts 2 through 11 and 12 through 17 should have

been dismissed on the same basis as 18 through 22 because “they

rely upon a conviction for the trading of stock.”

14. His counsel’s representation was so ineffective at

every step of his criminal proceedings that he was essentially

not represented by counsel.

15. Venue in the District of Arizona was improper with

regard to Counts 39 and 40.

Respondent allows that the motion is timely.

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II Analysis

A. Defaulted claims

Because “[h]abeas review is an extraordinary remedy and

will not be allowed to do service for an appeal,” Bousley v.

United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610 (1998),

absent a showing of cause and prejudice a section 2255 movant

procedurally defaults all claims which were not raised in his

direct appeal, other than claims asserting that the movant was

deprived of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 102 S. Ct.

1584, 1594 (1982); United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 964

(9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945

(9th Cir. 1993). 

“[T]o obtain collateral relief based on trial errors to

which no contemporaneous objection was made, a convicted

defendant must show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his double

procedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from

the errors of which he complains.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68,

102 S. Ct. at 1594. See also Ratigan, 351 F.3d at 964. A

section 2255 movant who fails to show cause and prejudice can

still obtain review of a claim on collateral attack by

demonstrating the likelihood of his “actual,” i.e., factual,

innocence. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S. Ct. at 1611-12;

United States v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007).

To establish actual innocence the movant must demonstrate that,

in light of all the evidence, including new evidence that might

be introduced by both sides, it is more likely than not that no

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reasonable juror would have convicted him. See Ratigan, 351

F.3d at 964, quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S. Ct. at

1611. 

Movant has not shown cause nor prejudice with regard to

any defaulted claim. Although Movant asserts his actual

innocence, he has not established any likelihood of his factual

innocence. Accordingly, any claim other than an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim which Movant did not assert in his

direct appeal has been procedurally defaulted and should not be

considered by the Court.

Additionally, as a general rule, “[i]ssues disposed of

on a previous direct appeal are not reviewable in a subsequent

§ 2255 proceeding.” United States v. Currie, 589 F.2d 993, 995

(9th Cir. 1979). A section 2255 petitioner may, in limited

circumstances, raise claims of trial court error that were

previously raised and decided on direct appeal. See Feldman v.

Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added),

citing Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8, 89 S.

Ct. 1068, 1074 n.8 (1969).

The scope of this exception has been

clarified by Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit

case law. The guiding principles may be

summarized as follows: When a district court

is confronted by a repetitive claim in a §

2255 Motion, the court may refuse to consider

the claim and may give controlling weight to

the court of appeals’ determination if (1)

the “same ground” presented in the § 2255

Motion was previously determined adversely to

the petitioner; (2) the prior determination

was “on the merits;” and (3) the “ends of

justice” would not be served by reaching the

merits of the claim in the subsequent § 2255

Motion. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1,

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15, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077, [] (1963); Molina v.

Rison, 886 F.2d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989);

Polizzi v. United States, 550 F.2d 1133, 1135

(9th Cir. 1976).

United States v. Olmos-Esparza, 974 F. Supp. 1311, 1317 (S.D.

Cal. 1997).

Movant’s claims regarding the statute of limitations,

insufficient evidence to support his convictions, allegedly

impropriety in the jury instruction on money laundering, Brady

violations, the alleged perjury of government witnesses, the

improper admission of evidence, and error at sentencing in

calculating the amount of loss and number of victims, were all

brought before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and rejected

by the appellate court on the merits of those claims.

Additionally, the prior determinations were on the merits of the

claims and the ends of justice would not be served by analyzing

the claims. Therefore, the Court should not re-visit these

claims.

Movant has not established cause for nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of any habeas claims other

than ineffective assistance of counsel. Although Movant asserts

his actual innocence of the crimes of conviction, Movant is

actually asserting that his actions do not constitute crimes for

which he may be punished. Movant has not established a basis

for the Court to reconsider claims previously denied on the

merits by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the

Court should not consider the merits of any claims other than

Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

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B. Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal

defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984).... To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner

must show 1) his attorney’s performance was

unreasonable under prevailing professional

standards; and 2) there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the results would have

been different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). “Strickland defines a reasonable

probability as ‘a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996).

See also United States v. Thomas, 417 F. 3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir.

2005).

Counsel’s performance is deficient when it is

unreasonable, or not “within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104

S. Ct. at 2054. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must

be “highly deferential.” Id., 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at

2065. There is a “strong presumption” that trial counsel’s

conduct and strategy falls “within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Id. To establish that his counsel’s

conduct was unconstitutionally substandard, a section 2255

petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have

acted as his counsel acted, i.e., that his counsel’s acts were

unreasonable. United States v. Fredman, 390 F.3d 1153, 1156

(9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d

1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[r]eview of counsel’s performance

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is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable

representation.”); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176-77

(11th Cir. 2001). 

It is Movant’s burden to provide the Court with

sufficient evidence from which the Court can conclude his

counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally ineffective. See

United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1066-67 (9th Cir.

2011). With regard to the prejudice prong of the Strickland

analysis, the probability of prejudice may not be based merely

upon conjecture or speculation. See Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S.

Ct. 1237, 1246 (2002) (Kennedy, J. concurrence) (regarding

speculation as having no place in a Strickland analysis); Horton

v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 577 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Movant asserts, inter alia, that he “was denied due

process” and “forced into an unfair trial” because “[the Court]

made no inquiry into the serious conflicts that arose between

Gentry and Court appointed counsel.” The record reveals

Movant’s counsel’s representation of Movant was not below an

objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel challenged the

evidence and the government’s case against Movant. 

Movant’s claims regarding the alleged deficient

performance of his counsel are premised primarily on Movant’s

contention that counsel should have pressed particular issues

which counsel did not raise, such as Movant’s contention

regarding venue. Many of these issues were raised by Movant in

his direct appeal or his other post-conviction proceedings and

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relief was denied. Accordingly, with regard to these assertions

of error, Movant has not established that his counsel’s

performance was unreasonably unprofessional, or that Movant was

prejudiced by any alleged failure of counsel to press these

issues. United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir.

1991) (“it is not professionally unreasonable to decide not to

file a motion so clearly lacking in merit.”).

III Conclusion

Movant is not entitled to relief on the merits of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Movant has not

established that his counsel’s performance was deficient or that

he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency in performance. 

Most of Movant’s section 2255 claims were denied on the

merits by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the

Court should not re-consider the merits of the claim. Movant’s

other claims were procedurally defaulted by his failure to raise

them in his direct appeal. Movant has not show cause for, nor

prejudice arising from his procedural default of section 2255

claims, nor his actual innocense. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Gentry’s motion

for relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to

section 2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

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Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. 

DATED this 2nd day of July, 2013.

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