Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00566/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00566-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN SANTIAGO,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. CALDWELL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 1:19-cv-00566-SKO (PC)

SECOND SCREENING ORDER

(Doc. 11)

21-DAY DEADLINE

On December 11, 2019, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A and found that it states a cognizable excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment 

against Defendants Caldwell, Hurlbut, Medina, Perez, and Taylor. (Doc. 9 at 4-5.) The Court 

found that Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable retaliation claim and did not exhaust

administrative remedies with respect to Defendants Martinez and Tamayo. (Id. at 5-6.) The Court 

ordered Plaintiff to file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in the Court’s 

screening order or, alternatively, a notice to proceed only on the claims found cognizable. (Id. at 

7.)

On December 16, 2019, and January 1, 2020, Attorneys Kenneth Chike Odiwe and John 

L. Burris made appearances on behalf of Plaintiff, then filed a first amended complaint on his

behalf. (Docs. 10, 11.) In the amended complaint, Plaintiff raises excessive force claims against 

all defendants, (Doc. 11 at 5-6), but omits the retaliation claim from Plaintiff’s original complaint.

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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The requirement applies regardless of whether the prisoner is represented by counsel. See id. The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should 

dismiss a complaint if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to 

support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 

Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 

plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 

set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Furthermore, the “sheer possibility 

that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that 

are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Causation

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 

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rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 

section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection between the actions of the defendants and 

the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,

373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of 

a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, 

participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required 

to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 

743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

As in his original complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable excessive 

force claim against Defendants Caldwell, Hurlbut, Medina, Perez, and Taylor in his first amended 

complaint.

1 However, Plaintiff fails to provide a causal connection between the alleged violation 

and Defendants Martinez and Tamayo. In his factual allegations, Plaintiff does not once mention 

Correctional Officer Martinez or Psychiatric Technician Tamayo, (see Doc. 11 at 4-5), let alone

show that their actions are in any way related to the constitutional deprivation of which Plaintiff 

complains.

If he chooses to file a second amended complaint, Plaintiff must allege facts that show 

that each defendant subjected Plaintiff to the alleged Eighth Amendment violation. See Johnson, 

588 at 743. If no such facts exist with respect to any defendant, then Plaintiff should dismiss that 

defendant. Although detailed factual allegations are not required, Plaintiff must provide each 

defendant with fair notice of the claims against him or her and the grounds on which they rest. 

See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.

The Court also notes that plaintiffs may not seek damages under section 1983 against state 

actors in their official capacities. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 n.24 

(1997). However, plaintiffs may seek injunctive relief against state actors in official-capacity 

suits. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989).

 

1 The Court provided the legal standards for excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment in its first screening 

order, (Doc. 9 at 4-5), and declines to do so again here.

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In his first amended complaint, Plaintiff sues the defendants in both their official and 

personal capacities, (Doc. 11 at 1-4), and requests both damages and “other ... relief as the Court 

deems ... proper,” (id. 6-7). Because the catchall phrase “other relief” may include injunctive 

relief, the Court will not require Plaintiff to omit naming the defendants in their official

capacities. However, if Plaintiff will be seeking solely damages in this action, he should sue the 

defendants only in their personal capacities. See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 69 

n.24.

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS:

1. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended complaint; and,

2. Within 21 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a second 

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2020 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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