Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01048/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01048-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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 Plaintiff has not yet filed a formal motion to withdraw Count III.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Deborah L Pierson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV10-1048-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint pursuant to this Court’s order dated

December 29, 2010 (Doc. 14). Doc. 15. Defendant now moves to dismiss Counts II (sex

discrimination), III (age discrimination), and IV (retaliation) with prejudice under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. 16. Plaintiff opposes as to Count II and the genderdiscrimination retaliation portion of Count IV, but expresses the intent to withdraw

Count III.1

 Doc. 17. The motion has been fully briefed. Docs. 16, 17, 18. For the reasons

stated below, the Court will grant the motion in part and dismiss Counts II-IV without

prejudice.

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim to relief under Rule 12(b)(6),

the well-pled factual allegations “‘are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party.’” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation

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omitted). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations “are not entitled to the

assumption of truth,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), and therefore “‘are

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,’” In re Cutera Sec.

Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This plausibility

standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not

‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2)). At a minimum a plaintiff must plead allegations that are “sufficiently detailed to

give fair notice to the opposing party of the nature of the claim so that the party may

effectively defend against it,” and the “allegations must be sufficiently plausible that it is not

unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery.” Starr v.

Baca, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 477094, *14 (9th Cir. 2011).

The Court’s December 29 order suggested that Plaintiff’s earlier attempted amended

complaint (Doc. 11), which was stricken on procedural grounds, “does not adequately set

forth the basis for her age discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation claims.”

Doc. 14 at 2:4-5. Plaintiff’s properly-amended complaint (Doc. 15) contains allegations that

are not materially different from those in the stricken complaint with respect to the genderdiscrimination, age-discrimination, and retaliation claims. Compare Doc. 15 with Doc. 11.

Moreover, Plaintiff no longer defends her claims related to age discrimination. Doc. 17. 

The Court finds that the allegations in the amended complaint do not give fair notice

of the nature of Plaintiff’s gender-discrimination, age-discrimination, and retaliation claims.

As an example, Plaintiff does not allege which, if any, of Defendant’s acts were taken

because of Plaintiff’s gender or age, and does not establish a causal link between her

administrative claims and any alleged retaliatory conduct. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)

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(declaring as unlawful discrimination with respect to certain aspects of employment “because

of,” inter alia, an individual’s gender); Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir.

2011) (“To establish a prima facie case [for retaliation], the employee must show that [s]he

engaged in a protected activity, [s]he was subsequently subjected to an adverse employment

action, and that a causal link exists between the two.”); Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit

Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006) (listing the following among the prima facie

elements of Title VII “disparate treatment” claims: “that the plaintiff performed his or her

job satisfactorily; . . . [and] that the plaintiff’s employer treated the plaintiff differently than

a similarly situated employee who does not belong to the same protected class as the

plaintiff”) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).

Plaintiff argues that her agency file contains sufficient facts to give Defendant notice

of the claim. See Doc. 17 at 2. Plaintiff has cited no law for the proposition that the presence

of factual allegations in an agency file obviates the need for Plaintiff’s complaint to allege

the facts required by her causes of action. Counts II, III, and IV will be dismissed without

prejudice. 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) is granted in part

as stated above.

DATED this 8th day of March, 2011.

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