Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01303/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01303-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM J. AUSTIN,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 05CV1303-LAB (CAB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION; AND

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

JAMES TILTON, Acting Director,

Respondent.

I. Background

Petitioner, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 27, 2005. Petitioner is currently serving a 13-year sentence for assault

in connection with a fight in a San Diego restaurant. Respondent then moved to dismiss the petition.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rule 72.1, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge

Nita Stormes. On December 8, 2005, Judge Stormes issued her report and recommendations,

recommending, among other things, that Respondent’s motion to dismiss certain claims as

unexhausted be denied. No objections were filed to this report and recommendation, which the Court

adopted on January 23, 2006. 

Respondent then filed his answer, and Petitioner filed his traverse. Judge Stormes denied

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing and issued her report and recommendation (the “R&R”)

on June 22, 2007, recommending the petition be denied in full. Petitioner filed his objections (the 

/ / /

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“Objections”) to the R&R. Petitioner thereafter twice filed applications requesting leave to file a

supplemental petition, both of which were denied.

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision” on a dispositive

matter prepared by a magistrate judge proceeding without the consent of the parties for all purposes.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). “The court shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.

§636(b)(1). The “statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s

findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Petitioner does not object to any of the R&R’s factual findings, which are therefore

ADOPTED. Petitioner, however, objects to certain portions of the R&R’s analysis and legal

conclusions. The Court has reviewed all portions of the R&R not objected to and finds them to be

correct.

II. Objections to the R&R, and Additional Requests

Petitioner makes three main objections. He attempts to show that: 1) the evidence at trial was

insufficient to support his conviction, 2) the testimony of Detective Eric Stafford should not have been

admitted, and 3) the R&R should not have determined that certain of his claims were procedurally

defaulted. He also renews requests made earlier in the proceedings for appointment of counsel, and

requests an evidentiary hearing and oral argument.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner focuses most of his attention on his objection concerning the sufficiency of the

evidence, which bears on his first claim for relief. Petitioner’s main argument is set forth in his

Objections at 1:24–26, where he asserts the Court must respect his “right to a fair trial with truth in

evidence, free from lie[]s and false testimony.” Petitioner argues certain witnesses committed perjury,

and that the prosecution nevertheless presented their testimony. He points to a substantial portion of

the R&R (R&R at 9:22–11:6) as explaining the unreliability of these witnesses.

The portion of the R&R Petitioner cites shows he is objecting to the testimony of David Ulloa,

a waiter; Shannon Conley, a restaurant patron; Mallory Meyer, a disc jockey; and Guillermo Ybarra

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and Jose Luis Manzo, security guards. The same portion of the R&R refers to alibi evidence Petitioner

presented at trial to show he was at a practice for a hair show when the assault took place. Petitioner

was identified at trial by a number of witnesses as being present in the restaurant and being involved

in several altercations, one of which resulted in Ulloa suffering a compound fracture of his arm and

being taken away in an ambulance and another of which resulted in a head wound to Manzo.

Petitioner argues that these four witnesses’ in-court testimony and identification of Petitioner

as the attacker are contradicted by their earlier statements. Ulloa, for example, just before being taken

away in an ambulance, gave only a vague description of the man who broke his arm, saying he did not

get a good look at the man. (R&R at 9:25–28.) Conley reportedly did not give a description of the

attacker. (Id. at 10:3–4.) At the hospital, Manzo was not able to describe his attacker in any great

detail and did not mention recognizing him. (Id. at 10:5–7.) Meyer told police he saw the fight but

did not get a good look at anyone. (Id. at 10:24–28.) Officer Jason Aguilar’s statement, which was

admitted by stipulation, said Ybarra told him about the attack but did not describe the attacker. (Id.

at 10:28–11:6.) Petitioner therefore argues these witnesses’ later identifications of him as the attacker

could not be credited.

The R&R has set forth the evidentiary standards and standards for review, which Petitioner

does not challenge and which the Court finds correct. (R&R at 16:20–17:26, 18:10–20). The R&R

also explains why the witnesses’ in-court identification was sufficiently reliable. For example, Manzo

testified he was under anesthesia when he was interviewed at the hospital and could not remember

giving a description to police. (See id. at 20:17–19.) Ulloa, similarly, was suffering extreme pain from

a compound fracture and waiting to be taken to the hospital in an ambulance at the time he gave his

initial statement to police. (Id. at 9:24–28.) The officer who questioned Conley merely testified he

did not remember her giving a description of the attacker or saying she had seen him before; he was

not able to say with certainty that she did not do so. (Id. at 20:21–23.) Conley, by contrast, testified

she described the attacker, and “might have” said she had seen him at the bar before. (Id. at 20:19–21.)

Ybarra testified at trial and said he gave a description of the men involved in the fight. (R&R

at 21:1–3.) He testified he recognized the attacker from a previous altercation at the restaurant. (Id.)

While the parties stipulated Officer Aguilar would have testified Ybarra gave no such description to

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him, Ybarra spoke to two officers the night of the incident and could not remember which officer he

gave the description to. (Id. at 21:5–8.) 

The incident occurred on June 13, 2001, a Wednesday, at around 11:40 p.m. in a Mexican

restaurant located in the Mission Valley area of San Diego. Petitioner’s alibi evidence was offered to

show he was at a practice for a hair show in the Del Cerro area of San Diego. Petitioner was present

for practices on June 13 and 14, which lasted until 11:30 or midnight, although he left practice early

on the 14th. One of the witnesses initially thought Petitioner left early on Wednesday, June 13, but

changed her statement after speaking with her sister and two others. (R&R at 11:12–15.)

While the evidence is open to more than one interpretation, it is the jury’s province to

determine the credibility of witnesses, to resolve evidentiary conflicts, and to draw reasonable

inferences from the evidence. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Because Petitioner has

already been convicted, the Court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.”

Id. 

While the jury might have accepted Petitioner’s alibi evidence and rejected prosecution

witnesses’ testimony as unreliable, they were not required to do so. The testimony of a number of

eyewitnesses, some of whom said they had seen Petitioner at the restaurant before, was sufficient to

identify him as the attacker. The jury need not have accepted the testimony of Petitioner’s two alibi

witnesses, one of whom was a good friend of Petitioner and the other of whom was initially unsure

of the date Petitioner left practice early. Even if Petitioner had presented more alibi witnesses, as he

wished to do (R&R at 41:9–11), the jury was not bound to accept their testimony as to which day

Petitioner left practice early and exactly when Petitioner left the practice on June 13.

While he addressed it at earlier stages, Petitioner has not objected to the R&R’s discussion of

the testimony of Manzo; Jennifer Brown, a waitress; or Raul Mondaca, the manager, each of whom

identified Petitioner in court as the attacker. (See R&R at 6:21–24; 7:26–28, 20:13–14.) Therefore,

even if the Court were to sustain Petitioner’s first objection, these witnesses’ identification of

Petitioner would be sufficientto support a conviction. Petitioner’s objections regarding the sufficiency

of the evidence are therefore OVERRULED.

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B. Testimony of Detective Stafford

TheR&RspecificallyaddressesStafford’s testimony. (R&R at 24:13–26:6.) Plaintiff included

only generalized objections to the R&R’s recommendation. (Objections at 2:12–17, 2:26–3:7.) This

objection primarily speculates that Stafford testified falsely and charges that he and the prosecution

rushed to judgment. Petitioner, apparently referring to a photographic lineup, suggests that none of

the witnesses actually identified him as the attacker and that Stafford lied when he said they did. (Id.

at 3:2–4.) 

This objection is unsupported by any reference to the record. The identifications Petitioner

challenged, examined under the standards set forth in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)

were reliable and admissible, and Petitioner offers no evidence or argument other than his own

speculation to show they were otherwise. In addition, evidence was presented at trial regarding the

photographic lineup and the manner in which the photographic identifications were made. (R&R at

19:5–17.) Witnesses identified Petitioner at trial, and there is no indication their identifications were

based on earlier photographic identifications. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)

(“[C]onvictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by

photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so

impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification.”)

Petitioner’s objection regarding Detective Stafford’s testimony is therefore OVERRULED.

C. Procedurally Defaulted Claims

While the Court had held in its order adopting the first report and recommendation that certain

claimswere technically exhausted, Respondent expressed his intention to show they were procedurally

defaulted. In his answer,Respondent specifically mentioned Petitioner’s claims that his attorney failed

to interview or call certain witnesses and failed to object to a question regarding a previous fight at the

restaurant. (Answer at 17:25–18:5.) Respondent argued becausePetitioner had failed to mention these

claims in either his petition for review or petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with the California

Supreme Court, these claims were procedurally defaulted and unreviewable by this Court. (Id. at

18:5–19:4.) 

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Petitioner objects to the R&R, not with any argument against the R&R’s recommendation, but

to express his surprise that the R&R entertained and agreed with this argument; he contends he

therefore did not need to address this argument. (Objections at 3:8–18.)

Addressing Petitioner’s objection, the first report and recommendation issued December 8,

2005, which the Court then adopted on January 23, 2006, explained that although these claims were

“technically exhausted,” Respondent intended to argue these claims were procedural defaulted.

(Report and Recommendation issued Dec. 8, 2005, at 8 n.5.) The Court explained it was obligated

to consider whether review was precluded under the procedural default doctrine based on his failure

to properly raise his claims in the state courts. (Id. (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848

(1999); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996)).)

Even if Petitioner were reasonable in believing this issue had previously been decided, he was

not free to ignore Respondent’s briefing or fail to explain why he believed the R&R’s recommendation

was wrong. The Court has authority to reconsider its own orders before they become final to correct

any mistakes. United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000). Having reviewed the

R&R, the Court agrees with its analysis, and determines the three claims at issue were procedurally

defaulted because he failed to the California Supreme Court. Coleman v. Thompson, 510 U.S. at 735

n.1.

Furthermore, the R&R considered the question ofwhether denying review of Petitioner’s claim

it would not him and concluded it would not. (R&R at 39:2–42:20.) For reasons set forth there, the

Court finds even if Petitioner could show his claims were not procedurally defaulted, those claims

would not support issuance of the writ.

D. Request for Appointment of Counsel, Evidentiary Hearing and Oral Argument

The R&R recommended denying Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner

included in his objections a renewed request for an evidentiary hearing, which the Court construes as

his objection to the R&R’s recommendation.

Petitioner believes, if offered the opportunity to present the testimony of the prosecutor at his

trial and of Detective Stafford, he can prove the prosecution knowingly offered Stafford’s false

testimony and Stafford assisted the prosecution in obtaining a tainted conviction. Petitioner’s request

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is not based on any evidence he now has, but on speculation that examining Stafford and the

prosecutor about the police reports would show the witnesses against him perjured themselves and that

prosecutors knew this. (Objections at 2:12–17, 2:25–27.) Thus, although Petitioner characterizes this

as a hearing, what he is actually seeking additional discovery. He also requests appointment of counsel

to assist him with the hearing, argument, and additional briefing.

“A habeas petitioner does not enjoy the presumptive entitlement to discovery of a traditional

civil litigant.” Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S.

899, 903–05 (1997)). Discovery is available in the discretion of the Court, for good cause shown. Id.

(citation omitted). “An evidentiary hearing on a claim is required where it is clear from the petition

that: (1) the allegations, if established, would entitle the petitioner to relief; and (2) the state court trier

of fact has not reliably found the relevant facts.” Id. (citation omitted). While the first prong of this

test is met, Petitioner has not and cannot establish the second. This issue was discussed at length in

the R&R (R&R at 22:27–26:6), and as explained there, this issue was thoroughly addressed at trial.

The question of whether habeas relief is appropriate can be resolved without an evidentiary

hearing or oral argument. See Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding no

evidentiary hearing is required where issues can be resolved on the record); Civ. Loc. R. 7.1(d)(1)

(assigned judge has discretion whether to hold oral argument). The Court concludes, therefore, no

evidentiary hearing or oral argument is necessary.

There is likewise no Constitutional right to appointment of counsel for a federal habeas corpus

proceeding. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). It is clear from Petitioner’s pleadings

he is capable of fairly presenting his claims. The facts and evidence are well-known to Petitioner, and

he has shown himself capable of bringing to the Court’s attention facts and evidence helpful to his

case. The most complex portion of these proceedings relates to procedural default, but even this turns

on the question of whether Petitioner presented his claims to the California Supreme Court, and

Petitioner is capable of explaining this based on the record, without the assistance of counsel. 

The Court therefore concludes denial of appointed counsel would not amount to a denial of due

process and the interests of justice do not require it in this case. See Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191,

1196 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that appointment of counsel is not required in habeas cases unless

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necessary to prevent due process violations, but that the district court may appoint counsel when the

interests of justice so require).

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Petition is DENIED. Petitioner’s requests for an

evidentiary hearing, oral argument, and appointment of counsel are likewise DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 29, 2008

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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