Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07875/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07875-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWN KARL MOONEY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

LOUIS ALEXANDER BOLI, a/k/a MICHAEL

BOLI, BOLI & CASPARI, VICTORIA B.

HENLEY, AND DOES 1-10,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-7875 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITHOUT

LEAVE TO AMEND

Defendants Louis Alexander Boli, a/k/a Michael Boli, and Victoria B. Henley separately move

to dismiss plaintiff Shawn Karl Mooney’s pro se first amended complaint. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule

7-1(b), the Court determines that the matters are suitable for resolution without oral argument and

VACATES the May 25, 2007 hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS defendants’

motions to dismiss the first amended complaint without leave to amend.

LEGAL STANDARD

A federal district court does not have the authority to adjudicate the case before it when subject

matter jurisdiction is lacking. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). Under

what is known as the “Rooker-Feldman” doctrine, the United States District Court has no authority to

review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings. See District of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16

(1923) (holding district courts may not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state courts). Instead, the

proper court in which to obtain such review is the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257;

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United States District Court

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Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes not only review of decisions of the

state’s highest court, but also those of its lower courts. See Dubinka v. Judges of Superior Court, 23

F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1994). A challenge under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a challenge for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction and may be raised at any time by either party or sua sponte by the Court.

Moccio v. Office of Court Administration, 95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1996); Olson Farms, Inc. v.

Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Rooker-Feldman is a jurisdictional doctrine, rather than

a res judicata doctrine.”).

DISCUSSION

The Court incorporates the factual background set forth in the March 13, 2007 Order Granting

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss with Leave to Amend. In that order, the Court found that this case,

“Mooney II,” was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the federal complaint largely

challenged a state court’s reversal of a judgment in plaintiff’s favor in Mooney v. Caspari et al.,

(Alameda Sup. Ct. No. 835676-1) (“Mooney I”); in Mooney I, the California Court of Appeal reversed

the judgment on the ground that Mooney I was barred by a judgment in an earlier malpractice action,

Praxis v. Richman, because plaintiff was in privity with one of the parties in the Praxis case. 

This Court dismissed plaintiff’s federal action because the complaint did not contain any specific

facts regarding an alleged conspiracy between defendants and Justice Swager, the author of the state

court decision reversing Mooney I. The Court instructed plaintiff that if he wished to amend the 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim, he must “allege, with specificity, how defendants conspired with the state court

judge to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights.” Order at 6. The Court also instructed plaintiff that if he

wished to pursue a § 1983 claim against defendants in their capacities as private parties, he “must allege

specific facts showing that the private parties were ‘willful participants in joint action with the State or

its agents.’” Id. at 8 (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)).

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on March 26, 2007, alleging a single claim under § 1983

against defendants. The amended complaint differs only slightly from the original complaint; plaintiff

has added the following factual allegations: (1) in 1992 defendant Henley co-authored a book titled

“Making a Summary Judgment Motion” with Justice Lambden; Justice Lambden authored the Praxis

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 The Court does not have any information about this investigation, or the Gray cases referenced

in the complaint. However, defendants assert – and plaintiff does not contend otherwise – that the

investigation was completely unrelated to plaintiff’s various lawsuits, and that as a result of the

investigation, defendant Henley was “completely exonerated.” Henley’s Reply at 2.

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v. Richman malpractice decision; (2) in 2001, Judge Legge conducted some type of investigation

regarding defendant Henley and reported to the California Supreme Court that “Ms. Henley’s work on

the Gray cases described above did present an appearance of impropriety”1; and (3) defendant Boli’s

lawyer wrote a letter in October 2003 which stated that Boli had been financially harmed as a result of

Mooney I. First Amended Complaint ¶ 16. The amended complaint also alleges,

Based upon information and belief, sometime between January 1, 2005 and April 13,

2006, Victoria B. Henley, as a private party, either directly communicated to Justice

Swager, a state actor, or indirectly communicated through Justice Lambden, that her

husband was the “Boli” in the Mooney v. Boli & Caspari case, and she requested that

Justice Swager support a reversal, and Justice Swager agreed to support a reversal. The

precise language used is within the peculiar knowledge of Victoria B. Henley, Justice

Swager and/or Justice Lambden.

Justice Swager fabricated evidence, and then told his fellow Justices that such evidence

existed in the record of the three week jury trial, for the purpose of attempting to justify

reversal of the Mooney v. Boli & Caspari judgment. Specifically, he falsely claimed and

wrote that Mooney vigorously participated in the Praxis v. Richman case Mooney v. Boli

& Caspari [sic], when he knew that no such evidence existed, and including no evidence

that Mooney participated in the critical summary judgment proceedings that resulted in

a summary judgment, which Justice Swager then gave collateral estoppel effect to in

order to support reversal of Mooney’s final judgment.

The Court of Appeal should have, and was likely to, affirm the final judgment in Mooney

v. Boli & Caspari, but for the fabricated evidence.

Id. ¶¶ 17-19. 

The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to cure the deficiencies identified in the Court’s March

13, 2007 order, and that the complaint remains barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This federal

case is a de facto appeal of the adverse state court decision. Plaintiff challenges the California Court

of Appeal’s decision that plaintiff’s state court malpractice action was barred by the judgment in Praxis

v. Richman. Plaintiff sought rehearing of the Court of Appeal’s decision, and unsuccessfully sought

review with the California Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal was mistaken in its

application of collateral estoppel, and that there was no “evidence” that plaintiff was in privity with the

party in Praxis v. Richman. 

Plaintiff cannot avoid the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by framing his challenge as a constitutional

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one. As the Ninth Circuit has stated,

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction

over any claim that is “inextricably intertwined” with the decision of a state court, even

where the party does not directly challenge the merits of the state court’s decision but

rather brings an indirect challenge based on constitutional principle. Thus,

Rooker-Feldman bars federal adjudication of any suit in which a plaintiff alleges an

injury based on a state court judgment and seeks relief from that judgment, not only

direct appeals from a state court’s decision.

Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). Here, plaintiff

alleges an injury based on the state court judgment: the reversal of the trial court’s monetary judgment

in his favor. In order for the Court to entertain plaintiff’s challenge and grant relief, the Court would

be required to review and invalidate the state court decision, an exercise precluded by the RookerFeldman doctrine. 

Plaintiff also cannot escape the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by making vague allegations regarding

“fabricated evidence.” The Court notes that this claim – that there was no evidence in the record to

support the California Court of Appeal’s determination that Mooney I was barred by the Praxis

judgment – was presented to the California Court of Appeal when plaintiff sought rehearing, and to the

California Supreme Court. Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not allege any specific facts regarding

how defendants conspired and acted jointly with state actors to deprive plaintiff of his federal civil

rights. Plaintiff’s general allegation “based on information and belief,” that sometime during a year and

a half period defendant Henley – or Justice Lambden – somehow communicated with Justice Swager

regarding “fabricating evidence” is insufficient. See Cottle v. Astrella & Rice, P.C., 442 F. Supp. 2d

829, 836-37 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (dismissing complaint on Rooker-Feldman grounds where complaint “is

devoid of any facts supporting the existence of an agreement between Judge Haden and the Attorney

Defendants [to conspire to deprive the plaintiff of his rights], nor do the facts plead reasonably support

the inference of an agreement.”); Ricotta v. State of California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 984-85 (S.D. Cal.

1998). 

Because the Court has already given plaintiff an opportunity to cure the defects noted above, the

Court finds that further amendment would be futile, and accordingly DISMISSES the complaint

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) .

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions to dismiss. (Docket Nos.

25 & 26).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 21, 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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