Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04050/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04050-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED TACTICAL SYSTEMS LLC,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

REAL ACTION PAINTBALL, INC., et al.,

 Defendants.

REAL ACTION PAINTBALL, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ADVANCED TACTICAL ORDNANCE 

SYSTEMS, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-04050-MEJ 

[REDACTED VERSION]*

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

ORDER CONSOLIDATING RELATED 

ACTIONS AND DENYING MOTIONS 

TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS TO 

STRIKE AS MOOT

Case No. 14-cv-02435-MEJ 

INTRODUCTION

Real Action Paintball, Inc. (“Real Action”) and United Tactical Ordnance Systems LLC 

(“UTS”) are competitors in the irritant projectile market. They have sued and counter-sued one 

another as well as related parties in the above-captioned actions over disputes involving the 

“PepperBall” trademark, unfair competition claims, and other issues. Pending before the Court are 

Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or Lack of Venue by Perfect Circle 

Projectiles LLC, Gary Gibson, Michael Blumenthal, and David Piell (the “Moving Parties”). 

ATO Dkt. Nos. 13 & 39; UTS Dkt. No. 96.1

 Real Action has also recently filed a Motion to 

Amend its Complaint. ATO Dkt. No. 153. Having considered the parties’ positions, relevant 

legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court DENIES the Motions for the reasons set 

forth below.

 1 Citations referring to “ATO Dkt. No.” are found in the 14-2435 case, whereas citations referring 

to “UTS Dkt. No.” are found in the 14-4050 case.

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Additionally, in the process of reviewing the parties’ motions, pleadings, and related 

materials, the Court has determined that the above captioned actions involve common questions of 

law and fact. Separate consideration of the claims in these cases wastes time and effort by the 

Court and the parties. Consequently, the Court consolidates these actions pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 42(a)(2) (“If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, 

the court may: . . . consolidate the actions”). Although the case first filed in this District was Real 

Action Paintball, Inc. v. Advanced Tactical Ordnance Systems, LLC et al., Case No. 14-2435-MEJ 

(N.D. Cal.) (the “ATO Case”), the Court will consolidate the actions under United Tactical 

Systems, LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc. et al., Case No. 14-4050-MEJ (N.D. Cal.) (the “UTS 

Case”). The UTS Case effectively represents the earliest filed action as UTS advances the 

interests of Advanced Tactical Ordinance Systems, LLC (“ATO”), which filed the first action 

pertaining to the issues arising in these cases: Advanced Tactical Ordinance Systems, LLC v. Real 

Action Paintball, Inc., et al., Case No. 12-00296-JVB-RBC (N.D. Ind.) (the “Indiana Action”). 

The above captioned cases are thus CONSOLIDATED for pretrial proceedings before this Court. 

The consolidated case will continue to be referred to as United Tactical Systems, LLC v. 

Real Action Paintball, Inc., Case No. 14-4050-MEJ (N.D. Cal.). All documents shall be filed in 

Case No. 14-4050. Additionally, in light of this consolidation, the Court DENIES Real Action’s 

Motion to Amend its Complaint, and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the remaining pending 

Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Strike.2 That said, the Court will grant all parties leave to 

amend their pleadings should they choose to do so. UTS will have until May 27, 2015 to file any 

amended complaint, and Real Action will have until June 17, 2015 to file any amended 

counterclaims. Any motions pursuant to Rule 12 shall be filed by July 9, 2015. Additionally, the 

Court welcomes the parties to agree to a more expedited schedule and will consider such a 

stipulation if they are able to agree to an alternative timetable.

The Court now turns to the substance of the Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 

Jurisdiction and Venue.

 2 These Motions include the following: ATO Dkt. No. 49 (Motion to Dismiss); ATO Dkt. No. 50 

(Motion to Strike); UTS Dkt. No. 93 (Motion to Strike Counterclaim); and UTS Dkt. No. 101 

(Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim).

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BACKGROUND

UTS and Real Action sell irritant filled projectiles. Real Action’s Compl. (“RAP Compl.”) 

¶ 13, ATO Dkt. No. 1; UTS Compl. ¶ 2, UTS Dkt. No. 1. Typically used by law enforcement or 

military, these projectiles are non-lethal capsules that contain a pepper substance and can be shot 

like paintballs. RAP Compl. ¶ 12. UTS’s predecessor in interest, ATO, an Indiana corporation, 

previously brought suit against Real Action,3 a California Company, in the Indiana Action, 

alleging that Real Action infringed on its “PepperBall” trademark by making statements implying 

that Real Action sold PepperBall projectiles, among other things. RAP Compl. ¶¶ 18-19; UTS 

Compl. ¶ 36. ATO obtained a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction to 

stop Real Action’s use of the PepperBall mark and related acts by Real Action. RAP Compl. ¶ 24; 

UTS Compl. ¶ 36. 

ATO also sued Conrad Sun, Sun LLC, and Apon in the Indiana Action. RAP Compl. ¶¶ 

68-69. Apon manufactured irritant projectiles, while Conrad Sun and his company Sun LLC had 

previously helped broker a deal for the sale of irritant filled projectiles from Apon to Real Action. 

UTS Compl. ¶ 11, RAP Compl. ¶ 16. ATO settled with these defendants in the Indiana Action, 

based on terms discussed more thoroughly within this Order. RAP Compl. ¶ 29. Specifically, 

Real Action alleges that Sun, Sun LLC, and Apon settled the Indiana Action “on abusive terms,” 

which made it so that Real Action was unable to acquire the irritant projectiles contracted for from 

Sun LLC and Apon, and consequently harmed Real Action’s position in the market place. Id. ¶ 

72. Meanwhile, Real Action challenged the Northern District of Indiana’s jurisdiction, arguing 

that Indiana did not have personal jurisdiction over it. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 

Circuit agreed, and the suit was dismissed. See Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real 

Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2014).

Real Action then filed suit in this Court (the ATO Case). It asserts 17 claims against ATO, 

including claims for wrongful injunction, declaratory relief, unfair competition, and restraint of 

trade. Real Action also sues attorneys Michael Blumenthal and David Piell, who represented 

 3 When referring to Real Action, the Court also generally refers to its co-Plaintiff and co- Defendant, K.T. Tran. 

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ATO in the Indiana Action. RAP Compl. ¶ 18; Piell Decl. ¶ 5, ATO Dkt. No. 42, UTS Dkt. No. 

98. Blumenthal and Piell are both residents of Illinois and have offices in Illinois. Blumenthal 

Decl. ¶ 3, ATO Dkt. No. 41, UTS Dkt. No. 99; Piell Decl. ¶ 3. Real Action alleges claims against 

these attorneys for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and conspiracy, among other things. 

Additionally, Real Action sues Gary Gibson and Perfect Circle Projectiles LLC. Perfect 

Circle is an Illinois limited liability company with its principal place of business in Lake Forest, 

Illinois. RAP Compl. ¶ 3; ATO Dkt. No. 13 (Gibson and Perfect Circle’s Motion, “PC & Gibson 

Mot.”) at 2, 5, ATO Dkt. No. 13; Gibson Decl. ¶ 3, ATO Dkt. No. 15. It owns 50% of ATO and 

once supplied irritant projectiles to Pepperball Technologies, Inc., a California company that ATO 

purportedly acquired in 2012. Gibson Decl. ¶ 10; Gibson Dep. at 63:13-16, ATO Dkt. No. 159-

16. In turn, Gibson owns Perfect Circle. Gibson Dep. at 63:5-9. Gibson likewise is a resident of 

Illinois who lives in Riverwoods, Illinois. RAP Compl. ¶ 4; Gibson Decl. ¶ 2. Gibson is not 

personally a shareholder in ATO. Gibson Decl. ¶ 10. Real Action brings numerous claims against 

Perfect Circle, including claims for monopoly and restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, 

combination in restraint of trade under California’s Cartwright Act, unfair competition under 

California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 and 17500, and conspiracy. Real Action 

asserts claims against Gary Gibson for intentional interference with contractual relations, 

intentional or negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, and conspiracy, among 

other claims.

After Real Action originally filed suit in this Court, UTS was formed and purchased ATO 

and the PepperBall mark. UTS Compl. ¶ 2. UTS then filed a lawsuit against Real Action in this 

Court (the UTS Case) and moved for an ex parte temporary restraining order. UTS Dkt. No. 27. 

The Court denied that motion but construed it as a motion for a preliminary injunction. UTS Dkt. 

No. 34. The Court ultimately granted in part and denied in part UTS’s motion for a preliminary 

injunction, which, among other things, enjoined Real Action from using the PepperBall name to 

refer to its irritant projectiles. UTS Dkt. No. 85 at 41. Real Action subsequently counter-sued 

UTS for various claims (many of which are similar to those asserted against ATO) as well as 

Blumenthal and Piell for misappropriation of trade secrets related to information published with 

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the filing of UTS’s motion for a temporary restraining order. UTS Dkt. No. 51. Real Action 

served both attorneys in California while they attended UTS’s preliminary injunction hearing. 

UTS Dkt. No. 73 (Blumenthal served in San Francisco, California) & UTS Dkt. No. 74 (Piell 

served in San Francisco, California). 

The Moving Parties filed their motions challenging the Court’s personal jurisdiction over 

them several months ago. ATO Dkt. No. 13, PC & Gibson Mot.; ATO Dkt. No. 39 (Blumenthal 

and Piell’s Motion, “ATO B&P Mot.”); UTS Dkt. No. 96 (Blumenthal and Piell’s Motion, “UTS 

B&P Mot.”). During that time, the Court has permitted Real Action the opportunity to conduct 

targeted discovery on the jurisdictional issue. ATO Dkt. No. 80. The Court also invited the 

parties’ input on whether to consolidate these actions. ATO Dkt. No. 126; UTS Dkt. No. 87. The 

Court consolidated the personal jurisdiction motions on January 7, 2015 and set a schedule for 

Real Action’s Opposition and the Moving Parties’ Reply. ATO Dkt. No. 130; UTS Dkt. No. 117; 

see also Modified Order, ATO Dkt. No. 138; UTS Dkt. No. 127. At a subsequent case 

management hearing, the parties agreed to keep the actions separated pending the Court’s order on 

the personal jurisdiction motions. See ATO Dkt. Nos. 135-36; 137; UTS Dkt. Nos. 125-27. 

Following numerous discovery disputes, Real Action has now filed its Opposition (ATO Dkt. No. 

159; UTS Dkt. No. 131), and the Moving Parties have filed their Reply4 (ATO Dkt. No. 163). The 

Moving Parties contend that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over them; alternatively, 

they argue that venue is not proper in this District and that the claims against them should be 

dismissed or transferred. The Court has considered each of these challenges below, starting first 

with the matter of personal jurisdiction, and following with the Moving Parties’ venue challenge.

LEGAL STANDARD – PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction 

over a defendant when the defendant moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(2). Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). “[U]ncontroverted 

allegations in the complaint must be taken as true,” and conflicts between facts contained within 

 4 Blumenthal and Piell did not file their Reply in the UTS Case; this appears to be a mere filing 

error. The Court will consider their arguments as set forth in the Reply filed in the ATO Case.

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the declarations or affidavits submitted by the parties are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Mattel, 

Inc. v. Greiner & Hausser GmbH, 354 F.3d 857, 861-62 (9th Cir. 2003).

Courts properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant “if it is permitted by a 

long-arm statute and if the exercise of jurisdiction does not violate federal due process.” Pebble 

Beach Co., 453 F.3d at 1154. Where there is no applicable federal statute governing personal 

jurisdiction, courts apply the law of the state in which the court sits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); 

Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). In California, a court 

“may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the 

United States.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10; Daimler AG v. Bauman, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 

746, 753 (2014) (“California’s long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the 

full extent permissible under the U.S. Constitution.”). As such, “the jurisdictional analyses under 

state law and federal due process are the same.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801.

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires that an out-of-state defendant 

have “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction “does not 

offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 

U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotation omitted). “In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses 

on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” Calder v. Jones, 465 

U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). Courts distinguish 

between general and specific jurisdiction. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 

U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 

DISCUSSION – PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A. Jurisdiction over Michael Blumenthal and David Piell

Real Action served Blumenthal and Piell with process in the UTS Case while they were 

physically present in California. See UTS Dkt. Nos. 73-74 (proofs of service). Real Action 

contends that this establishes personal jurisdiction over them in California. 

Personal jurisdiction protections are rooted in due process concerns. See Burnham v. 

Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality op.). But in considering due 

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process concerns, the United States Supreme Court in Burnham held that “the Due Process Clause 

does not prohibit the California courts from exercising jurisdiction over petitioner based on the 

fact of in-state service of process.” Id. at 628. The defendant in Burnham was a New Jersey 

resident personally served with a divorce petition while visiting his children in California. Id. at 

608. Although no part of the divorce proceedings arose out of the defendant’s California contacts, 

the Court nevertheless held that California’s courts could exercise general personal jurisdiction 

over the defendant. Id. The Court reaffirmed the long-standing rule that “personal service upon a 

physically present defendant suffice[s] to confer jurisdiction, without regard to whether the 

defendant was only briefly in the State or whether the cause of action was related to his activities 

there.” Id. at 612. This kind of jurisdiction is referred to as “tag jurisdiction.” Martinez v. Aero 

Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Bourassa v. Desrochers, 938 F.2d 1056, 

1058 (9th Cir. 1991) (referring to “[j]urisdiction obtained through service of a person temporarily 

in a forum and engaged in activity unrelated to the litigation” as “transient jurisdiction.”). Since 

Burnham, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[i]n-state personal service . . . serves as a basis 

for personal jurisdiction.” Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 

819 (9th Cir. 2011); see Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(“Personal jurisdiction over a defendant may be acquired in one of two ways: by personal service 

of that defendant or by means of a defendant’s ‘minimum contacts’ with the jurisdiction.”). 

While jurisdiction based on in-state service of process is well-established, the matter here 

involves a number of unique variables. The first of those variables is the reason for Blumenthal 

and Piell’s presence in California. Blumenthal was present in California while representing his 

client, UTS, at the hearing on its preliminary injunction motion. Opp’n at 10; Reply at 4. While 

Piell has not appeared as a named attorney in either the UTS or ATO Case, he was at any rate 

previously an attorney for ATO in the Indiana Action and attended the preliminary injunction 

hearing in the UTS case. Opp’n at 10, 13; Reply at 4; see UTS Dkt. Nos. 72-74. Blumenthal and 

Piell maintain that their presence in California would not have been necessary but for Real Action 

initiating the current litigation and contend that “[w]here a plaintiff uses fraud or deceit to serve a 

plaintiff in a given forum, the in-forum service is ineffective to establish jurisdiction over the 

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defendant.” Reply at 4 (quoting Voice Sys. Mktg. Co., L.P. v. Appropriate Tech. Corp., 153 

F.R.D. 117, 119 (E.D. Mich. 1994)). They contend “Real Action essentially used the November 

hearing to surprise [them] with summonses in the UTS action.” Id. 

Although Blumenthal and Piell may have been surprised by the summonses, these 

attorneys were aware that Real Action filed counterclaims against them in the UTS Case prior to 

the hearing on the preliminary injunction. UTS Counterclaim, UTS Dkt. No. 51; Hr’g Tr. at 

80:15-16, UTS Dkt. No. 84. Additionally, their argument that Real Action fraudulently induced 

them to attend the hearing is unsupported. The November hearing was in consideration of UTS’s

preliminary injunction motion, and there is no evidence that Real Action used “fraud” or “deceit” 

to draw these attorneys to California. This case is thus distinguishable from Voice Systems 

Marketing, where—according to Blumenthal and Piell—“plaintiff induced defendant to attend a 

business meeting in the forum, but the meeting was merely a pretext to serve the defendant.” 

Reply at 4 (citing Voice Sys. Mktg., 153 F.R.D. at 119). UTS’s preliminary injunction hearing was 

not a pretext for Real Action to serve Blumenthal and Piell; Real Action only took advantage of 

the situation presented. As in Burnham, the fact that these attorneys did not purposefully avail 

themselves of California’s laws and protections does not necessarily mean they are protected from 

litigation here if tag or transient jurisdiction is established. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 

(reaffirming transient jurisdiction as “[a]mong the most firmly established principles of personal 

jurisdiction in American tradition”)5; Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1067.

The second variable is that Real Action only served these attorneys in California in the 

UTS Case, not the ATO Case. In the ATO Case, Real Action served Piell in Buffalo Grove, 

Illinois, and Blumenthal agreed to service through his attorney, John Kirke. ATO Dkt. Nos. 21, 

30. Two issues arise from this situation: first, whether the attorneys are subject to transient 

jurisdiction while representing their client in the forum state; and second, whether the fact that the 

attorneys were served in one case makes them subject to jurisdiction in the related case. 

 5 “The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due 

process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due 

process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ That standard was 

developed by analogy to ‘physical presence,’ and it would be perverse to say it could now be 

turned against that touchstone of jurisdiction.” Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619.

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In Lamb v. Schmitt, the Supreme Court considered the situation where counsel for a party 

in a pending action was served with process in an action related to the principal action. 285 U.S. 

222 (1932). The Court first noted “[t]he general rule [is] that witnesses, suitors, and their 

attorneys, while in attendance in connection with the conduct of one suit, are immune from service 

of process in another[.]” Id. at 225; see also Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 129 (1916) 

(“[S]uitors, . . . coming from another jurisdiction, are exempt from service of civil process during 

the period required for their attendance in court and for a reasonable period of time in coming and 

going.”). This “privilege,” however, “is the privilege of the court, rather than of the defendant. It 

is founded in the necessities of the judicial administration, which would be often embarrassed, and 

sometimes interrupted, if the suitor might be vexed with process while attending upon the court 

for the protection of his rights, or the witness while attending to testify.” Lamb, 285 U.S. at 225 

(citation omitted). 

The Court then considered the question of “[w]hether, despite any effect of the immunity 

in encouraging voluntary attendance at the trial, it should be withheld from one who, while in 

attendance, is served with process commanding his continued presence and aid to facilitate the 

pending litigation, and to carry it to its final conclusion?” Id. at 226. The test applied by the 

Court was “whether the immunity itself, if allowed, would so obstruct judicial administration in 

the very cause for the protection of which it is invoked as to justify withholding it.” Id. at 228. 

The Court concluded that where the two proceedings are related, the intrusion of service of 

process in the second suit does not obstruct the principal proceeding and immunity is not 

necessary for the convenience of the courts. Id.; see also 4 Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1080 at 511 (“There is generally no immunity from 

service of process when the suit in which immunity is sought is part of, or a continuation of, the 

suit for which the person claiming immunity is in the jurisdiction.”).

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Lamb, “the extension of the privilege has been 

limited by the majority of courts to cases in which the party or witness was participating in an

unrelated litigation at the time that he was served with process in the forum state.” N. Light Tech., 

Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir. 2001) (collecting cases; emphasis in original), 

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cert. denied, 533 U.S. 911 (2001). As the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

The rationale for the differing-lawsuit prerequisite to process 

immunity in this context is relatively straightforward: while a court 

can, in cases before it, choose to protect the jurisdictional status of a 

party or witness who is reluctant to come to the forum state by 

issuing protective orders or subpoenas, it cannot wield such power 

in other cases. The process-immunity exception therefore fills the 

gap only where it needs to be filled that is, in cases where a district 

court wishes to shield an individual from service of process to 

encourage his or her travel to the forum state, but would be unable 

to do so absent the power to grant immunity.

Id. at 63. 

In Northern Lights, the First Circuit found the defendant was not entitled to process 

immunity when he entered the forum to attend a personal jurisdiction and preliminary injunction 

hearing. Id. The court refused to adopt “a broad, per se rule precluding the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction whenever the served individual is in the jurisdiction to attend litigation-related 

proceedings that pertain to him or her.” Id. The court instead considered the circumstances and 

found particularly important the fact the defendant never asked the district court for such 

immunity, either prior to or following the hearing which had prompted the defendant’s presence in 

the forum. Id. at 63. In addition, the court noted the defendant had entered the forum voluntarily 

to attend the hearing as a spectator and to make himself available as a witness in the same case in 

which he was served with process, not an unrelated litigation. Id. The First Circuit noted that 

these sorts of voluntary circumstances “are not those that would ordinarily favor a finding of 

immunity even in a case where it had been timely requested.” Id.; see also St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc. 

v. Janssen-Counotte, 2014 WL 7237411, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2014) (finding no immunity 

where a litigant voluntarily choose to go to Texas to attend a hearing in the same litigation for 

which she was served, and noting that the Court did not order her to appear and that she could 

have earlier requested immunity or waived service).

The Ninth Circuit has not yet considered whether an attorney is subject to personal 

jurisdiction in a state where the attorney has been served while attending a hearing in which they 

are representing clients. But see Moylan v. AMF Overseas Corp., S.A., 354 F.2d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 

1965) (finding defendant exempt from service where he went to Guam for the sole purpose of 

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testifying in the action on behalf of his employer). Other courts, however, have held that there is 

no immunity if the service is made in a case related to the one in which the attorney is making an 

appearance. See United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734, 751 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (“[A]ssuming 

that the defendant was, at the time, of the service of the subpoena, acting as counsel for Bennette, 

and was on the military premises for that purpose, he was not immune from service, because the 

inquiry was so closely related to the Bennette court-martial conviction as to bring the principles 

declared in the case just cited into full play.”); LaCroix v. Am. Horse Show Ass’n, 853 F. Supp. 

992, 994 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (jurisdiction established over attorney defendant where “service was 

made in the case in which the attorney was making an appearance.”); Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 

92 F. Supp. 868, 870-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (attorney attending the taking of a deposition was not 

immune from service of process in the same action); see also Lifelast, Inc. v. Coldwater Grp., Inc., 

2005 WL 2454191, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2005) (“Because he was served in the same case as 

the one in which he was giving a deposition, service immunity does not apply[.]”); U. S. Nat’l 

Bank of Or. v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co., 54 F.R.D. 498, 499 (D. Or. 1971) (no immunity where 

corporation’s president served after testifying at hearing in Oregon; “[i]mmunity in this case 

would serve the purpose of forum shopping, but that is not a sufficient basis for defeating the 

service of process[.]”).

In this case, there are several considerations that lead the Court to conclude that immunity 

is not warranted. First, these Defendants have not requested such immunity—in this motion or 

otherwise. Nowhere in their briefing or in all their appearances before this Court have they

indicated that they seek immunity. Nor did they request immunity prior to attending the hearing 

on their client’s Motion. Second—and somewhat compounded by the first consideration—is the 

fact that these Defendants are attorneys with knowledge of the potential jurisdictional issues that 

arise when entering another jurisdiction. While they suggest that they should be in some way 

protected by their status as attorneys representing a client in this matter, they fail to acknowledge 

the longstanding precedent of Lamb, which establishes that attorneys are not always protected in 

such situations. Third, both of these Defendants voluntarily entered the forum, despite having 

California counsel and without asking the Court for some advanced immunity from process. 

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Finally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) permits a defendant to waive jurisdiction, with no 

impact on later objecting to personal jurisdiction or to venue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d). These 

Defendants did not waive service before attending the hearing; nothing prevented them from doing 

so. Given the foregoing, the Court cannot find immunity is warranted and finds that Blumenthal 

and Piell are subject to personal jurisdiction based on transient jurisdiction in the UTS Case.

As to the ATO case, given that the Court has consolidated that case with the UTS Case, 

personal service in the UTS Case also establishes jurisdiction over these defendants in the newly 

consolidated case. Even after Blumenthal and Piell were served in California, UTS argued that the

cases should be consolidated under the UTS case number, see UTS Dkt. No. 111 at 2, and there is 

no indication that Blumenthal or Piell objected to consolidating the cases under the UTS case 

number. Furthermore, even if the Court had not consolidated these actions, the Court would have 

found personal jurisdiction established. First, at base, personal jurisdiction rests on due process 

concerns, and the practicalities of the relationship between these two cases significantly reduces 

these concerns. Among other things, both attorneys would have already been here in the UTS 

Case, which the Court kept on the same schedule, and otherwise intended to keep on the same 

schedule, as the ATO Case. Practically, the relationship between the two cases and the overlap of 

claims asserted and sought to be asserted against these attorneys would have supported jurisdiction 

in the ATO case through the California service of process. Additionally, as discussed below, these 

attorneys’ own actions in and directed at California would likely lead the Court to conclude 

specific jurisdiction is established over them. In sum, the Court finds it has personal jurisdiction 

over Blumenthal and Piell in the consolidated case. 

B. Jurisdiction over Perfect Circle & Gary Gibson

Neither Perfect Circle nor Gary Gibson was served in California, and therefore the issue is 

whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over these Defendants by some other means. Real 

Action asserts two primary arguments. 

1. Real Action’s Jurisdictional Arguments

First, Real Action argues that personal jurisdiction over Gibson and Perfect Circle is 

proper because “ATO’s conduct may be ascribed to [Perfect Circle] and Gibson.” Opp’n at 14. 

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ATO has not challenged personal jurisdiction. Real Action contends that, as ATO has “engaged in 

extensive conduct in California, and even had an office in California,” ATO’s conduct may be 

attributed to both Gibson and Perfect Circle. Opp’n at 14. 

Second, Real Action contends that “[o]ne critical activity” of Perfect Circle and Gibson 

subjects them to jurisdiction in California. Id. That one critical activity is related to a settlement 

agreement between ATO and Conrad Sun and Sun LLC in the Indiana Action. Specifically, Real 

Action alleges that Gary Gibson, on behalf of Perfect Circle, signed a guaranty, in which Perfect 

Circle agreed to guarantee terms of the settlement agreement to effectuate that agreement in the 

Indiana Action. Opp’n at 14-15; see Guaranty, Dkt. No. 159-5; Settlement, Dkt. No. 159-4. In 

particular, the settlement agreement required 

. Settlement ¶¶ 1-2. 

. Id. ¶ 2. The settlement agreement 

also required 

. Id. ¶ 3. 

. Guaranty at 1. Gibson, as a “managing member,” signed the agreement on behalf of 

Perfect Circle. Id. at 4. Real Action contends that these acts and transactions targeted at 

California subject both Gibson and Perfect Circle to jurisdiction in California. 

Because, as discussed below, the Court finds it has specific jurisdiction over Perfect Circle 

and Gibson based on Perfect Circle’s guaranty of the settlement agreement and Gary Gibson’s 

actions in securing that guaranty, the Court does not address Real Action’s first argument. 

2. Specific Jurisdiction over Gibson & Perfect Circle 

“Unless a defendant’s contacts with a forum are so substantial, continuous, and systematic 

that the defendant can be deemed to be ‘present’ in that forum for all purposes, a forum may 

exercise only ‘specific’ jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction based on the relationship between the 

defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme 

Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). “Under specific jurisdiction, a 

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court may assert jurisdiction for a cause of action that arises out of the defendant’s forum-related 

activities.” Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 1993), as amended (Mar. 24, 

1993). The Ninth Circuit employs a three-part test to determine whether a defendant has sufficient 

contacts with the forum state such that the forum may exercise specific jurisdiction: 

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his 

activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or 

resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully 

avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the 

forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its 

laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 

defendant’s forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The plaintiff has the burden of proving the first two prongs. 

CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011). If the plaintiff 

satisfies the first two parts of the test, the burden shifts to the defendant to “to set forth a 

‘compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (quoting Burger 

King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985)). While all three requirements must be met, in 

considering the first two prongs, “[a] strong showing on one axis will permit a lesser showing on 

the other.” Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1210.

“The exact form of [the] jurisdictional inquiry depends on the nature of the claim at issue.” 

Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2015). “When a plaintiff relies on specific 

jurisdiction, he must establish that jurisdiction is proper for ‘each claim asserted against a 

defendant.’” Id. at 1211 (quoting Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 

1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004)). The plaintiff must prove that the defendant either purposefully 

availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in California or purposefully directed his 

activities toward California under the first prong of the specific jurisdiction test. Schwarzenegger, 

374 F.3d at 802. Courts apply a purposeful direction analysis in suits sounding in tort, whereas a 

purposeful availment analysis is used in suits sounding in contract. Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206. 

Real Action made no effort to establish that jurisdiction is proper for each claim asserted 

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against Perfect Circle or Gibson, instead relying on allegations about how their actions were 

generally directed at California entities. Nonetheless, in a case such as this where all of Real 

Action’s claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts, if personal jurisdiction exists on 

one claim, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over all the other claims. See Wash. Shoe Co. v. AZ Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 2012); Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211 (“If personal 

jurisdiction exists over one claim, but not others, the district court may exercise pendent personal 

jurisdiction over any remaining claims that arise out of the same ‘common nucleus of operative 

facts’ as the claim for which jurisdiction exists.” (citing Action Embroidery, 368 F.3d at 1181)). 

a. Claims against Perfect Circle & Gibson sound in tort

Real Action alleges five claims against Perfect Circle: (1) monopoly and restraint of trade 

under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2; (2) combination in restraint of trade under 

California’s Cartwright Act; (3) unfair competition and false advertising under California Business 

& Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500; (4) unjust enrichment under Indiana law; and (5) 

conspiracy under Indiana and California laws. See RAP Compl. ¶¶ 100-19; 128-39. Several of 

Real Action’s claims against Perfect Circle, including its allegations of monopoly, restraint of 

trade, and unfair competition, generally sound in tort, and thus the Court applies the purposeful 

direction test. See In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 743-44 

(9th Cir. 2013) (applying the purposeful direction test where pleadings alleged defendants engaged 

in “‘intentional acts’ in the form of anticompetitive behavior” including price manipulation 

through agreements to control market prices), aff’d on other ground sub nom. Oneok, Inc. v. 

Learjet, Inc., __ S. Ct.__, 2015 WL 1780926 (Apr. 15, 2015); Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc. v. 

Analog Devices, Inc., 79 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion; “In order to prove the 

tort of attempted monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must show (1) that 

the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to 

monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2; 

Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454 (1993)); see also Glenn K. Jackson Inc. v. 

Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1203 (9th Cir. 2001) (California Business & Professions Code section 17200 

is a “tort [that] encompasses practices which offend established public policy or that are immoral, 

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unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.”). 

Likewise, Real Action asserts a claim against Gary Gibson for intentional interference with 

contractual relations, based in part on Real Action’s contention that the Settlement with Sun and 

Sun LLC was conditioned on the Guaranty, which Gibson, in his capacity as a “managing 

member,” signed on Perfect Circle’s behalf. Opp’n at 14. Because of this action, Real Action 

argues that Gibson intentionally interfered with contractual relations in California and thus is 

subjected to jurisdiction in California. Id. As with the claims against Perfect Circle, the Court 

applies the purposeful direction test when analyzing personal jurisdiction over a claim of 

intentional interference with contractual relations. See Picot, 780 F.3d at 1213-14 (applying 

purposeful direction test to allegations based on tortious inference of contract). 

b. Purposeful direction

Courts evaluate purposeful direction for tort-related conduct under the three-part “effects” 

test set forth in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); see Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803. 

“Calder stands for the proposition that purposeful availment is satisfied even by a defendant 

whose only ‘contact’ with the forum state is the ‘purposeful direction’ of a foreign act having 

effect in the forum state.” Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation 

omitted). As such, “the ‘effects’ test requires that the defendant allegedly have (1) committed an 

intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows 

is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Id.

As to the first prong of the test, the Court finds that Perfect Circle committed an intentional 

act by entering into the guaranty. See Guaranty. Real Action argues that by signing the guaranty, 

Perfect Circle interfered with the contract between Sun LLC and Real Action and caused Sun LLC 

to restrain trade with Real Action. Opp’n at 15. Real Action contends that Perfect Circle’s actions 

were directed at California, as Sun, Sun LLC, and Real Action are located in California. Id. 

Additionally, the settlement agreement provides that Perfect Circle guarantee financial 

transactions aimed at California. Settlement ¶ 3. 

Likewise, by signing the guaranty, the Court finds that Gibson committed an intentional 

act. While Gibson signed the guaranty in his official capacity as a “managing member” of Perfect 

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Circle, he cannot avoid jurisdiction merely because of his status as an employee or officer. See 

Calder, 465 U.S. at 790 (defendant’s “status as employee[] does not somehow insulate [him] from 

jurisdiction.”). Corporate officers may be held personally liable for their actions when they are the 

“guiding spirit” behind the allegedly tortious conduct. Davis v. Metro Prods., Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 

524 n.10 (9th Cir. 1989); Comm. for Idaho’s High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 823 (9th Cir. 

1996) (“[A] corporate officer or director is, in general, personally liable for all torts which he 

authorizes or directs or in which he participates, notwithstanding that he acted as an agent of the 

corporation and not on his own behalf.” (quoting Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 

768 F.2d 1001, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985)). Real Action contends that by signing the guaranty, Gibson 

participated in the commission of the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations 

because the guaranty effectuated the settlement agreement, which impacted both Real Action, Sun 

and Sun LLC. Opp’n at 15; see ATO Compl. ¶ 68. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that 

the first prong of the Calder effects test is satisfied against both Perfect Circle and Gary Gibson. 

With regard to the second prong, the Court finds that Perfect Circle expressly aimed its 

intentional act at California because Perfect Circle targeted Sun, Sun LLC, and Real Action, all of 

which are located in California. Opp’n at 15; see Guaranty at 1. Perfect Circle entered into a 

Guaranty Agreement with Sun LLC, a California corporation. Opp’n at 14; see Guaranty. The 

settlement agreement also requires financial transactions within California. Opp’n at 14; 

Settlement ¶¶ 1-3. Furthermore, the settlement agreement provided that 

 

Settlement ¶ 2. Such action may impact California’s market for irritant projectiles as well as Real 

Action’s business. See Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 

1398 (9th Cir. 1986) (personal jurisdiction established where “the effect [of a contract] in 

California was not only foreseeable, it was contemplated and bargained for.”). 

Likewise, as Real Action has alleged that Gibson intentionally interfered with a contract by 

signing the Guaranty, the Court finds that Gibson “expressly aimed such interference at 

California.” Picot, 780 F.3d at 1214. The Ninth Circuit recently examined a similar personal 

jurisdiction issue regarding a claim of intentional interference with a contract in Picot v. Westin. 

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In Picot, the defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct involved making statements to an Ohio 

resident that caused a Delaware corporation to cease making payments into trusts located in 

Wyoming and Australia. Id. at 1215. The defendant never entered California or reached out to a 

California resident in the course of his conduct. Id. As such, the Ninth Circuit held that the 

defendant’s actions did not sufficiently connect him to California to support the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction over him. Id. 

This case is different. Gibson’s intentional act of signing the guaranty was expressly 

aimed at California. Specifically, Real Action alleges that the guaranty led to the execution of the 

settlement agreement between ATO and Sun LLC, a California corporation, involving financial 

transactions within California. See Guaranty at 1; Settlement ¶ 3. The settlement also impacted 

Sun’s business in California, as noted above. Id. ¶ 2. This agreement thus affected business 

between Sun LLC and Real Action, another California corporation and altered their contractual 

arrangement. While the Supreme Court has made it clear that “a defendant’s relationship with a 

plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction[,]” Walden v. Fiore, 

134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014), in this case, Gibson’s actions created contacts beyond his 

relationships with Real Action and Sun LLC. By signing the guaranty and 

, including in the California market. 

Accordingly, the Court finds the express aiming requirement is satisfied. 

The third prong of the effects test requires the plaintiff to show that “a jurisdictionally 

sufficient amount of harm is suffered in the forum state.” Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1207. “A 

corporation incurs economic loss, for jurisdictional purposes, in the forum of its principal place of 

business.” CollegeSource, 653 F.3d at 1079. Real Action alleges that by signing the Guaranty, 

Perfect Circle and Gibson “effectuated the interference with the Sun-Real Action contract[,]” 

causing it harm in California. Opp’n at 15. Because of that agreement, Real Action contends it 

was unable to supply irritant projectiles to its customers and lost profits as a result. RAP Compl. 

¶¶ 72-73. As Real Action is a California corporation, such a loss is a sufficient injury to satisfy 

the third prong of the effects test. See Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1114 (“[W]hen a forum in which a 

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plaintiff corporation has its principal place of business is in the same forum toward which 

defendants expressly aim their acts, the ‘effects’ test permits that forum to exercise personal 

jurisdiction.”). 

Accordingly, the tort claims related to restraint of trade and unfair competition satisfy the 

“purposeful direction” part of the test. “When a defendant must appear in a forum to defend 

against one claim, it is often reasonable to compel that defendant to answer other claims in the 

same suit arising out of a common nucleus of operative facts.” Action Embroidery, 368 F.3d at 

1181. All of Real Action’s claims against Gibson and Perfect Circle are based on common factual 

predicates, namely these Defendants’ alleged involvement in using various litigation related 

mechanisms to oust Real Action from the irritant projectile market. The Court therefore exercises 

its discretion to find pendent jurisdiction over the remaining claims. See Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211. 

c. Defendant’s forum-related activities

After purposeful direction, the second requirement for specific jurisdiction is that the claim 

“arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 

802. This prong is satisfied if the plaintiff would not have been injured “but for” the defendant’s 

conduct directed toward the forum state. See Panavision Int’l, 141 F.3d at 1322 (considering 

whether plaintiff would have been injured but for defendant’s conduct directed toward plaintiff in 

California); Mattel, 354 F.3d at 864 (asking but for defendant’s contacts with California, would 

plaintiff’s claims against defendant have arisen). Here, without the guaranty executed by Perfect 

Circle and signed by Gary Gibson, it is plausible that Real Action would not have been injured 

because the settlement agreement may not have been possible without that guaranty. Real Action 

presented evidence that the guaranty secured the execution of the settlement agreement, which had 

the effect of injuring Real Action in California, as Real Action contends that its business was 

harmed as a result of this settlement. See RAP Compl. ¶¶ 70, 72-73, 79. As such, Real Action’s 

claim arises out of Perfect Circle and Gibson’s California-related activities. The second element 

of the specific jurisdiction test is met.

d. Reasonableness

Because Real Action satisfies the first two parts of the test, the burden shifts to Gibson and 

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Perfect Circle to “set forth a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be 

reasonable.” CollegeSource, 653 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477). Courts 

consider seven factors, none of which is dispositive: 

(1) the extent of a defendant’s purposeful interjection; (2) the burden 

on the defendant in defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict 

with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s 

interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial 

resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the 

plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the 

existence of an alternative forum.

Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1114. 

Gibson and Perfect Circle focus on the first, second, fifth, and seventh factors. First, they 

argue that the extent of interjection into the forum state is a factor distinct from the purposeful 

availment test. PC & Gibson Mot. at 10. They contend that even if their contacts show purposeful 

availment, they maintain no presence in California and any prior contact they had with this forum 

is unrelated to the action and too attenuated to show purposeful interjection. Id. at 10-11. They

also argue that it would be unduly burdensome to defend this suit in California when they reside in 

Illinois. Id. at 11. They cite the inconvenience and expense of travel, as well as “the inherent 

hardship in being absent from work, home, family, and children.” Id. Finally, they contend that 

California is not the most efficient forum for this litigation, as Defendants are located in either 

Illinois or Indiana, whereas only Real Action is a California citizen. Id. Additionally, they assert 

that Defendants’ records are not likely to be in California. Id.

The Court finds that Perfect Circle and Gibson have not met their burden of showing that 

exercising personal jurisdiction over them would be unreasonable. They do not address some of 

the important factors identified by the Ninth Circuit, and their arguments on the other factors are 

unpersuasive. While some of the Moving Parties’ arguments may have more pull in a different 

context, the Court cannot look at the claims against them in a vacuum. UTS, ATO’s successor, 

has brought claims against Real Action in the UTS Case, and Real Action’s claims and 

counterclaims arise out of related events. Furthermore, neither ATO nor Tiberius or Tiberius 

Arms challenged personal jurisdiction—on reasonableness grounds or otherwise—meaning they 

would remain in this forum to litigate the same claims that Perfect Circle and Gibson seek to have 

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litigated elsewhere. To arbitrarily sever these claims for adjudication in different districts risks 

incongruous results as well as problems with judicial economy. Judicial economy favors this 

forum at this point, and the fact that UTS brought its claims in this forum further imbues 

California with an interest in the resolution of these claims. The Court also notes that there are 

potentially numerous witnesses in California, including persons connected with Sun LLC, Apon, 

and the former Pepperball Technologies, which was located in California. UTS Compl. ¶ 2. 

Ultimately, Perfect Circle and Gibson have not shown that they would be unduly burdened by 

litigating in California such that jurisdiction in this district would be unreasonable. 

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that personal jurisdiction over Perfect Circle and 

Gibson in California is reasonable and satisfies due process concerns. The Court thus turns to the 

Moving Parties’ venue challenge. 

LEGAL STANDARD - VENUE

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), a defendant may move to dismiss a 

complaint for improper venue. Venue of civil actions is generally governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 

Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 577 (2013). A civil 

action may be filed in 

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all 

defendants are residents of the State in which the district is 

located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or 

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part 

of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be 

brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which 

any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with 

respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Supreme Court has indicated “[t]he first two paragraphs of § 1391(b) 

define the preferred judicial districts for venue in a typical case” whereas “the third paragraph 

provides a fallback option.” Atl. Marine Const., 134 S. Ct. at 578. Once a defendant has 

challenged venue, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that venue is proper in the chosen 

district. Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979). A 

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plaintiff who asserts multiple claims must establish that venue is proper as to each one. Kaia 

Foods, Inc. v. Bellafiore, 2014 WL 4966036, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2014) (citing Adobe Sys., 

Inc. v. Childers, 2011 WL 566812, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011)). If the Court determines 

venue is improper, the Court must dismiss the action or transfer it to a district or division where it 

could have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); Atl. Marine Const., 134 S. Ct. at 577. 

A plaintiff’s choice of venue is generally given substantial weight and a defendant 

normally “must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the plaintiff’s 

choice of forum.” Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 

1986); see also Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(“[U]nless the balance of factors is strongly in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff’s choice of 

forum should rarely be disturbed.”). However, “where the forum lacks any significant contact 

with the activities alleged in the complaint, plaintiff’s choice of forum is given considerably less 

weight, even if the plaintiff is a resident of the forum.” Cohen v. State Farm & Cas. Co., 2009 

WL 2500729, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009) (quoting Knapp v. Wachovia Corp., 2008 WL 

2037611 at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2008); Amazon.com v. Cendant Corp., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 

1261 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Hernandez v. Graebel Van Lines, 761 F. Supp. 983, 990 (E.D.N.Y. 

1991)); Pac. Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1968) (“If the operative 

facts have not occurred within the forum of original selection and that forum has no particular 

interest in the parties or the subject matter, the plaintiff’s choice is entitled only to minimal 

consideration.”).

DISCUSSION - VENUE

“In distinguishing between the principles of jurisdiction and venue,” the Ninth Circuit has 

noted that “‘[j]urisdiction is the power to adjudicate, while venue, which relates to the place where 

judicial authority may be exercised, is intended for the convenience of the litigants.’” Action 

Embroidery, 368 F.3d at 1179 (citations omitted; emphases in original). The Moving Parties have 

all challenged the propriety of venue in this district. Initially, the Moving Parties only asked that 

the Court dismiss for lack of venue, but in their Reply, the Moving Parties alternatively requested 

that the Court transfer the action to another district where they argue venue is proper. Reply at 8-

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9. Notably, ATO, UTS, Tiberius Arms, and Tyler Tiberius do not challenge venue in this district. 

Real Action contends that venue is proper in this district under § 1391(b)(2) because a 

“substantial part of the events or omissions” on which its claims are based occurred in this 

District, as well as because a “substantial part of the property” that is the subject of these actions is 

located in this District. RAP Compl. ¶ 11; UTS Counterclaim ¶ 13.6 

Under § 1391(b)(2), “[t]o determine whether a substantial part of the events giving rise to 

the claim occurred in the forum, the court first considers what acts or omissions by the defendants 

give rise to the plaintiffs’ claims.” Alliance for Multilingual Multicultural Educ. v. Garcia, 2011 

WL 2532478, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2011) (citing Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 

F.3d 408, 432 (2d Cir. 2005)). The statute “does not require that a majority of the events have 

occurred in the district where suit is filed, nor does it require that the events in that district 

predominate.” Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 

Instead, “for venue to be proper, significant events or omissions material to the plaintiff’s claim 

must have occurred in the district in question, even if other material events occurred elsewhere.” 

Richmond Techs., Inc. v. Aumtech Bus. Solutions, 2011 WL 2607158, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 

2011) (citation omitted; emphasis in original).

Real Action has alleged 17 claims in total in the ATO Case. Against the Moving Parties, 

Real Action has alleged the following claims:

1. Abuse of process (under Indiana law) – Blumenthal, Piell, 

Gibson 

2. Malicious prosecution (under Indiana law) – Blumenthal, Piell, 

 6 Despite alleging that Perfect Circle violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (Compl. ¶¶ 

100-17), Real Action does not argue that venue is proper under the Sherman Act’s broad venue 

provision, which provides “[a]ny suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a 

corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in 

any district wherein it may be found or transacts business.” 15 U.S.C. § 22. This provision was 

adopted “to broaden venue in antitrust cases and to further the sound remedial policy of allowing 

an aggrieved party a larger number of available forums in which to litigate.” Adachi v. 

Carlyle/Galaxy San Pedro L.P., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1150 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted).

Nonetheless, this provision coexists with the general venue statute. Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. 

Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1989). And as such, a court may examine whether the plaintiff 

has pleaded facts to satisfy either the general or the antitrust-specific venue statute. Id. As Real 

Action has only asserted venue under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), the Court 

will only consider the requirements under that statute.

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Gibson

3. Intentional interference with contractual relations (under Indiana 

and California laws) – Gibson, Blumenthal

4. Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage 

(under Indiana and California laws) – Gibson, Blumenthal

5. Tortious conversion (under Indiana and California laws) – Gibson, Blumenthal

6. Criminal conversion (under Indiana law) – Gibson, Blumenthal

7. False designation of origin (15 U.S.C. § 1125) – Gibson

8. Violation of the Sherman Act – Perfect Circle

9. Violation of California’s Cartwright Act – Perfect Circle

10. Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 – Perfect Circle

11. Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17500 

– Perfect Circle

12. Unjust enrichment (under Indiana law) – Perfect Circle

13. Conspiracy (under Indiana and California laws) – Blumenthal, 

Piell, Gibson, Perfect Circle

In the UTS Case, Real Action also alleges a counterclaim of misappropriation of trade secrets 

against both Blumenthal and Piell under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Cal. Civ. Code 

§§ 3426-3426.11. UTS Counterclaim ¶¶ 47-59. Real Action has also recently moved to amend its 

Complaint in the ATO Case to include a substantially similar misappropriate of trade secrets claim 

against Piell. See ATO Dkt. No. 153-1, ¶¶ 162-74. 

A. Venue over Claims Asserted in the ATO Case

Real Action’s claims are not all based on substantial parts of events occurring in this 

District. For instance, in the ATO Case, venue is inappropriate for Real Action’s abuse of process 

and malicious prosecution claims. These claims are based on events that occurred in the Northern 

District of Indiana, where the Indiana Action took place. RAP Compl. ¶¶ 57-58, 62. While Real 

Action argues the service of process on Real Action in California gives rise to the abuse of process 

and malicious prosecution claims (Opp’n at 19), the act of serving process is insufficient to 

constitute a “substantial part” of Real Action’s claims. See Engel v. CBS, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 728, 

732 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding venue in the Central District of California improper under § 

1391(b)(2) where “[t]he events giving rise to the claim for malicious prosecution involve[d] the 

filing and handling of the New York lawsuit, a series of events occurring solely in New York.”). 

The Court cannot find that this District is a proper venue for these claims standing alone. 

Nonetheless, having reviewed Real Actions’ 13 claims against the Moving Parties, the 

Court finds that it may exercise pendent venue over the claims that are not otherwise subject to 

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venue here on the basis of Real Action’s conspiracy claim, which is alleged against all Moving 

Parties (the Seventeenth Cause of Action, Compl. ¶¶ 134-39). Once a court has determined that 

venue is proper as to one claim, it may exercise pendent venue to adjudicate closely related claims. 

Martenson v. Koch, 942 F. Supp. 2d 983, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Legal Additions LLC v. 

Kowalski, 2009 WL 1226957, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2009); McNeary-Calloway v. JP Morgan 

Chase Bank, N.A., 863 F. Supp. 2d 928, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2012)). None of the Moving Parties 

specifically challenge venue in this district for Real Action’s conspiracy claim, and, as discussed 

below, based on the Real Action’s allegations, a substantial part of the events giving rise to Real 

Action’s conspiracy claim occurred in California.

“Under California law, there is no separate and distinct tort cause of action for civil 

conspiracy.” Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1228 (9th 

Cir. 1997). Civil conspiracy “is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on 

persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate 

tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.” Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi 

Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 510-11 (1994) (citing Wyatt v. Union Mortg. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 784 

(1979)). “Standing alone, a conspiracy does no harm and engenders no tort liability. It must be 

activated by the commission of an actual tort.” Id. at 511. The elements of civil conspiracy are 

(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) the wrongful act or acts done in furtherance 

of the common design, and (3) the damage resulting from such act or acts. Id.

Real Action’s conspiracy claim alleges that “ATO, Perfect Circle, Gibson, Tiberius Arms, 

Tiberius, Blumenthal, and Piell agreed among themselves to engineer a strategy whereby they 

would be able to remove Real Action from the irritant projectile marketplace.” RAP Compl. ¶ 

136. As part of this strategy, Real Action alleges that these Defendants conspired to file a lawsuit 

that “would likely either deter Real Action from further engaging in sales of irritant projectiles or 

result in a settlement agreement which would largely neuter Real Action’s ability to operate in the 

market place.” Id. Among other things, Real Action alleges that Defendants’ strategy in the 

Indiana Action was to use specific litigation techniques, which Real Action challenges in its 

malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims, that “would allow ATO to maintain its 

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position in the irritant projectile market and might impose sufficient costs and attorneys fees in 

defending the action so as to result in chasing Real Action out of that market.” Id. ¶ 137. 

Real Action’s conspiracy claim essentially alleges that through the mechanisms of abuse of 

process and malicious prosecution in the Indiana Action, the Moving Parties were able to commit 

the torts related to unfair competition and restraint of trade, and those torts are based on events 

substantially occurring in California.7 Specifically, although the events giving rise to the 

malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims occurred in the Northern District of Indiana, 

Real Action alleged that the settlement agreement arising out of the Indiana Action interfered with 

a California contract between Real Action, located in this District, and Sun LLC, located in 

Southern California. That contract provided for commerce between Real Action and Sun and 

Apon in California, and Real Action asserts that the impact of the Settlement Agreement in the 

Indiana Action was that “California trade was restrained[.]” Opp’n at 19. Additionally, Real 

Action alleges that its ability to compete in the irritant projectile market was “significantly 

impaired,” that it lost “significant profits from sales of irritant projectiles,” and that it suffered 

damage to its “good name and reputation in the business.” RAP Compl. ¶¶ 70, 73. Real Action 

felt this harm in the Northern District of California, where it is located. See Myers v. Bennett Law 

Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]n a tort action, the locus of the injury [is] a 

relevant factor.”). This general argument is the basis for Real Action’s tort claims for intentional 

interference with contractual relations, intentional or negligent interference with prospective 

economic advantage, monopoly and combination in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, 

combination in restraint of trade under California’s Cartwright Act, and unfair competition claims 

under California Business and Professions Code § 17200. 

The Court agrees that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the foregoing claims 

occurred in California. And because Real Action alleges that those claims and the related 

 7 Additionally, some of the other mechanisms Real Action alleges were used to achieve the 

conspiracy occurred in this District. Specifically, Real Action contends Gibson and Blumenthal 

unlawfully seized and converted over 180,000 irritant and training projectiles from Real Action in 

California. Opp’n at 19; RAP Compl. ¶¶ 85-86. See Prou v. Giarla, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2014 WL 

6725213 at *9-10 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2014) (venue proper in district where harm arose as a result 

of alleged conversion, thus constituting a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim). 

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conspiracy are based on actions achieved through the commission of malicious prosecution and 

abuse of process torts, the Court finds those claims, although occurring mostly in Indiana, are 

closely related to the claims that are properly venued in this District. As such, pendent venue is 

properly exercised over them.8 

Finally, the Court notes that while Real Action named other Defendants in these claims, 

those Defendants have not challenged venue. As such, any future venue challenge is waived as to 

ATO, Tiberius, and Tiberius Arms. Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A] 

defendant must object to venue by motion or in his answer to the complaint or else his objection is 

waived.” (citations omitted)); see also Misch on Behalf of Estate of Misch v. Zee Enters., Inc., 879 

F.2d 628, 631 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Although a party may assert the defense of improper venue either 

as part of his responsive pleading or by separate motion, . . . he waives the defense if not timely 

and properly raised.” (citations omitted)). For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that venue 

is proper in this District on all claims presently asserted in the ATO Case. 

B. Venue over Claim Asserted in the UTS Case

Finally, in the UTS Case, Real Action currently asserts a claim against Blumenthal and 

Piell for misappropriation of trade secrets. UTS Counterclaim ¶¶ 42-46. Real Action alleges that 

Blumenthal and Piell violated a protective order issued in the Indiana Action by the Northern 

District of Indiana. Id. ¶¶ 48, 54. That protective order stated that “highly confidential business 

information” would be designated as for “attorneys’ eyes only” and thus only be disclosed to 

 8 Importantly, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the idea that a conspirator’s in-forum acts can be 

attributed to his co-conspirators for venue purposes. See Piedmont, 598 F.2d at 492. In Piedmont,

the Ninth Circuit considered whether venue in an antitrust action could be based “solely on 

allegations that a defendant was a member of a conspiracy and that a co-conspirator performed 

acts in the forum district.” Id. The plaintiff argued that because a conspirator committed acts in 

the venue and a conspirator acts as his co-conspirator’s agent, a defendant who otherwise had not 

conducted business in the forum could be said to have an agent and “transacted business” there 

under the relevant venue statutes. Id. at 492-93. The Ninth Circuit concluded that deeming a 

conspirator an agent of his co-conspirators would expand the venue statute beyond what Congress 

contemplated. Id. at 494-95. 

While Piedmont sets limits on the use of a conspiracy claim to establish venue, the Court finds it 

distinguishable here: the Moving Defendants’ own acts establish venue in this District. As noted 

above, Real Action alleges that the Moving Defendants conspired “to remove Real Action from 

the irritant projectile marketplace” (RAP Compl. ¶ 136) by committing torts, including 

interference with Real Action’s contract and the impact on trade in this District. 

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attorneys for the parties in the action, experts, and the court. UTS Dkt. No. 51-2, ¶¶ 10, 15. 

“Highly confidential business information” included “data quantifying sales.” Id. ¶ 10. 

According to Real Action, it produced documents that contained “data quantifying sales” and 

properly designated them as for “attorneys’ eyes only.” UTS Counterclaim ¶ 53. Real Action 

argues venue is proper in the Northern District of California under § 1391(b)(2), because it alleges 

Piell and Blumenthal’s misappropriation damaged Real Action when UTS filed its Motion for 

Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) with this Court, which allegedly disclosed the “data 

quantifying sales” that Real Action had designated as for “attorneys’ eyes only” in the Indiana 

Action. Id. ¶ 56. Real Action thus contends that a substantial part of the events giving rise to its 

claim occurred in this District. Opp’n at 19. Real Action also argues that its “trade secrets are 

located where Real Action is located.” Id. As Real Action’s principal place of business is in 

Gilroy, California, “a substantial part of the property that is the subject of this action” is located in 

this District. Id. (quoting § 1391(b)(2)); RAP Compl. ¶ 1. Piell and Blumenthal’s Reply does not 

address the issue of venue for Real Action’s misappropriation claim.

The Court finds that venue is proper over Real Action’s misappropriation of trade secret 

claims against Piell and Blumenthal. In California, to prevail on a claim for misappropriation of 

trade secrets, a plaintiff must show that (1) it owned a trade secret; (2) the defendant acquired, 

disclosed, or used that trade secret through improper means; and (3) the defendant’s actions 

damaged the plaintiff. Cytodyn, Inc. v. Amerimmune Pharm., Inc., 160 Cal. App. 4th 288, 297 

(2008). Given these elements, a substantial part of the events giving rise to Real Action’s trade 

secret misappropriation claim occurred here as Real Action alleges that it owns trade secrets in 

California, Blumenthal and Piell assisted UTS in disclosing and using that trade secret in UTS’s 

TRO motion, and Real Action was harmed in California. See Myers, 238 F.3d at 1076; Integrated 

Practice Solutions, Inc. v. Wilson, 2013 WL 3946061, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 31, 2013) (venue in 

the Southern District of California proper under § 1391(b)(2), where alleged misappropriation of 

customer lists took place). 

Venue is therefore appropriate in the UTS Case as well as the ATO Case.

//

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CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES the Moving Parties’ Motions for Lack of 

Personal Jurisdiction and alternatively their Motions to Dismiss or Transfer for Lack of Venue. 

The above captioned cases are now CONSOLIDATED into United Tactical Systems, LLC v. Real 

Action Paintball, Inc., Case No. 14-4050-MEJ (N.D. Cal.). All documents shall be filed in Case 

No. 14-4050. Additionally, in light of this consolidation, the Court DENIES Real Action’s 

Motion to Amend its Complaint, as well as DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the pending 

Motions to Dismiss and Motions to Strike. The Court GRANTS all parties leave to amend their 

pleadings should they choose to do so. UTS will have until May 27, 2015 to file any amended 

complaint, and Real Action will have until June 17, 2015 to file any amended counterclaims. Any 

motions pursuant to Rule 12 shall be filed by July 9, 2015. As noted above, the Court welcomes 

the parties to agree to a more expedited schedule and will consider such a stipulation if they are 

able to agree to an alternative timetable.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 11, 2015

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

 

* This Order was originally filed on May 6, 2015 (see ATO Dkt. No. 138 and UTS Dkt. No. 174) 

but has been amended to correct the caption title and internal redactions. It is the public version of 

the privately filed Order found at ATO Dkt. No. 139 and UTS Dkt. No. 175. 

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