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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH F l LBb 

'Jnited S~at~t; Courr of Ap~a.b 

T emh Ci::-cuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

A.E., by and through her next 

friends, DANIEL and MARGARET 

EVANS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 

NO. 25, OF ADAIR COUNTY, 

OKLAHOMA, a/k/a STILWELL 

PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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~J UN 1 0 1g91 

KOBERT L. HOE~R 

Clerk 

No. 90-7018 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 89-25-C) 

Louis D. Bullock (Patricia w. Bullock with him on the brief) of 

Bullock and Bullock, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Gene L. Mortensen of Rosenstein, Fist and Ringold, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and FINESILVER, District 

Judge. 1 

.. 

FINESILVER, Chief District Judge. 

1 The Honorable Sherman G. Finesilver, Chief United States 

District Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-7018 Document: 01019297909 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 1 
This case is an appeal by plaintiff A.E., by and through her 

parents, Daniel and Margaret Evans, under Public Law 94-142, the 

Education for All Handicapped Children's Act, codified at 20 u.s.c. 

§ 1400, et. ~ The Evanses seek to have their daughter 

classified as seriously emotionally disturbed, and thereby entitled 

to benefits under the Act. The trial court upheld the hearing 

officer's determination that A. E. 

disturbed. Appellant challenges 

is not seriously emotionally 

this decision. The issues 

presented on appeal are: (a) whether Congress intended to exclude 

children who were socially maladjusted, but not seriously 

emotionally disturbed, from coverage under the Act; (b) whether 

A.E. is seriously emotionally disturbed; and (c) whether the trial 

court improperly admitted and considered the expert testimony of 

Dr. Bevan Todd Graybill, an expert in child psychology. For the 

reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

I. 

The material facts in the case are not in dispute. A.E. is a 

minor child, who was born on September 25, 1973. She is a student 

in the stilwell, Oklahoma, Public Schools. It is agreed that A.E. 

is learning disabled in math. She has also experienced problems 

with peer interaction, impulse control, and excessive anxiety while 

in school. In November 1987, she was suspended from school for 

theft, fighting, tardiness, smoking, disruptions of class, and use 

of improper language. The school determined that these behavioral 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-7018 Document: 01019297909 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 2 
problems were not related to her learning disability. In reaction 

to news of the suspension, A.E. made a suicidal gesture by cutting 

herself on the arm with a broken bottle. 

A.E. was admitted to the Children's Medical Center psychiatric 

unit on December 17, 1987. She was diagnosed as having a conduct 

disorder related to emotional problems and a borderline personality 

disorder. Her psychologist recommended that she remain in a homebased program until the fall, when she could be placed in a class 

for seriously emotionally disturbed students and then slowly 

returned to regular classes. A.E. was discharged from the 

Children's Medical Center on April 25, 1988. 

In the fall of that year, the parents of A.E. requested that 

the school district develop an Individualized Education Plan (IEP} 

for A. E., and classify her as seriously emotionally disturbed 

rather than merely learning disabled. 2 The IEP team determined 

that A.E. was categorically not covered by the Act. The team 

concluded that A.E.'s behavioral problems were not related to her 

learning disability. Further, the team refused to classify her as 

2 An IEP is an individualized education program developed 

annually by a team of professionals, including teachers and 

therapists who have contact with the child, and school district 

special education administrators, in consultation with the child's 

parents. The IEP specifies the desired goals for the child, the 

means of reaching those goals, and the method of evaluation. 

Johnson v. Independent School Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 

(lOth Cir. 1990), cert den., 1991 u.s. Lexis 2436 (1991). 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-7018 Document: 01019297909 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 3 
seriously emotionally disturbed. 3 Although the team determined 

that A.E. was not handicapped within the scope of the Act, an IEP 

was prepared to assist A.E. 's progress in a mainstream classroom. 

After receiving notification of this determination, the 

Evanses requested a due process hearing. The hearing was held on 

September 15, 1988. The Hearing Officer concluded that A.E. was 

not emotionally disturbed, but was properly categorized as learning 

disabled with a deficiency in mathematics. The Hearing Officer 

noted the difficulties faced by the parents in representing 

themselves at the hearing. The Hearing Decision was appealed on 

3 Seriously Emotionally Disturbed is defined as follows: 

I. The term means a condition exhibiting one or more of the 

following characteristics over a long period of time and to a 

marked degree, which adversely affects educational performance: 

(a) An inability to learn which cannot be explained by 

intellectual, sensory or health factors; 

(b) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory 

interpersonal relationships with peers or teachers; 

(c) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal 

circumstances; 

(d) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; or 

(e) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears 

associated with personal or school problems. 

II. The term includes children who are schizophrenic. The 

term does not include children who are socially mal-adjusted, 

unless it is determined that they are seriously emotionally 

disturbed. 

34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b) (8). The state of Oklahoma has adopted this 

federal definition. 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-7018 Document: 01019297909 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 4 
November 25, 1988. The Appeal Officer agreed that A.E. was not 

seriously emotionally disturbed. The United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Oklahoma affirmed. At issue is whether 

seriously emotionally disturbed children who are diagnosed as 

having a conduct disorder are properly excluded from the coverage 

of Public Law 94-142 by the language in 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b) (8). 

II. 

Under Public Law 94-142, the public school system must provide 

a free and appropriate education to all handicapped children. See 

Honig v. Doe, 484 u.s. 305, 309 {1988); Johnson v. Independent 

School Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 {lOth Cir. 1990), cert 

den., 1991 u.s. Lexis 2436 {1991); Timothy w. v. Rochester, N.H .. 

School Dist., 875 F.2d 954, 959-60 (1st Cir.), cert den., 1989 U.S. 

Lexis 5494 (1989); Wexler v. Westfield Bd. of Educ., 784 F.2d 176, 

178 (3d Cir.), cert den., 479 u.s. 825 {1986); Cain v. Yukon Public 

Schools. Dist. I-27, 775 F.2d 15, 16 {lOth Cir. 1985); School Bd. 

v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1213 (4th cir. 1985); Kaelin v. Grubbs, 

682 F.2d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 1982); Kruelle v. New castle county 

School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 690 (3d Cir. 1981); Carroll v. Capalbo, 

563 F.Supp. 1053, 1056 (D.R.I. 1983). Handicapped children are 

those children who are " ... menta 11 y retarded, hard of hearing, 

deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally 

disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other · health impaired 

children, or children with specific learning disabilities who by 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-7018 Document: 01019297909 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 5 
reason thereof require special education and related services." 2 0 

u.s.c. § 1401(1). See Marvin H. v. Austin Independent School 

Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1354 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1983). It is not the 

goal of the Act to provide the best conceivable education for each 

child in terms of maximizing that child's potential. Rather, the 

Act was designed to furnish to each child the basic opportunity for 

an individually structured education. Gregory K. v. Longview 

School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). 4 The Act 

encourages placement of each child in the least restrictive 

environment possible. Honig, 484 U.S. at 311; Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 

695; Malone, 762 F.2d at 1213; North v. District of Columbia Bd. of 

Educ., 471 F.Supp. 136, 139 n. 4 (D.D.C. 1979); Mills v. Board of 

Educ., 348 F.Supp. 866, 880 (D.D.c. 1972). See also s. Rep. No. 

168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33, reprinted in 1975 u.s. Code Cong. & 

Admin. News 1425, 1457. 

In evaluating compliance with the Act, the appellate court is 

to " ... make 'independent decision(s] based on a preponderance of 

the evidence. ' " Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 u.s. 176, 205 

(1982); 20 u.s.c. S 1415(e) (2). Appellate review must include 

" ... de novo factual analysis based on that administrative record, 

as well as de novo legal analysis of the issues presented." 

Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1026. Two determinations must be made. 

4 • The stated purpose of the Act was to assure all 

handicapped children ". . a free appropriate public education 

which emphasizes special education and related services designed to 

meet their unique needs .... " 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-7018 Document: 01019297909 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 6 
First, have the procedures outlined in the Act been followed. 

"(A]dequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most 

cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of 

substantive content in an IEP." Id. at 206. Second, is the IEP 

developed through the procedures reasonably calculated to enable 

the child to receive educational benefits. Id. at 207. 

Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1026; Cain, 775 F.2d at 19. In answering 

these questions, due weight must be given to the expertise of 

school officials responsible for the child's education. McKenzie 

v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (O.C.Cir. 1985). See generally, 

Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1311; McNair v. Cardimone, 676 F.Supp. 

1361, 1363 (S.O.Ohio 1987), aff'd, 872 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1989). 

The burden of proof rests upon the party attacking the child's IEP. 

Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1026. 

Appellant does not contend that the procedures outlined in the 

Act were disregarded. Rather, the determination that A.E. is not 

seriously emotionally disturbed is challenged. Seriously 

emotionally disturbed children are clearly included within the 

Education for All Handicapped Children Act. 20 u.s.c. S 1401(1); 

Clevenger v. Oak Ridge School Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 

1984). See North, 471 F.Supp. at 140-42; Mills, 348 F.Supp. 866. 

The Supreme court has noted: 

Among the most poorly served of disabled students were 

emotionally disturbed children: Congressional statistics 

revealed that for the school year immediately preceding 

passage of the Act, the educational needs of 82 percent 

of all children with emotional disabilities went unmet. 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-7018 Document: 01019297909 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 7 
Honig, 484 u.s. at 309. 

The legislative history confirms this proposition. 

This program is designed to assist state and local 

educational agencies in improving the education and 

training of severely handicapped children and youth, .. 

In general, this group of children includes those 

who are classified as seriously emotionally disturbed, 

autistic, profoundly and severely mentally retarded, and 

those with multiple handicapping conditions. 

Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1983: Report of Mr. 

Hatch to Accompany S. 1341, Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 

S.Rep. No. 191, 98th Congress, 1st Sess. 7 (1983); See also s. 

Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 u.s. Code 

Cong. & Admin. News 1425, 1432 Table I (During 1974-75 only 230,000 

of 1,310,000 emotionally disturbed children received educational 

services). 

In drafting Public Law 94-142, Congress was concerned with the 

emotional trauma and educational difficulties inherent in 

misclassification of children as handicapped or not handicapped. 

Sees. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1975 u.s. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 1425. For that reason, Congress attempted 

to develop concise definitional regulations and a due process 

procedure that would allow review of any classification decision. 

See generally, 121 Cong. Rec. 246 (1975) (statement of Sen. 

Williams). The school district does not dispute that A. E. is 

properly classified as learning disabled in math; however, the 

district declined to reclassify A.E. based on the definition of 

seriously emotionally disturbed found in 34 C.F.R. S 300.5(b) (8). 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-7018 Document: 01019297909 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 8 
The language of 34 C.F.R. S JOO.S(b) (8) excludes children who are 

socially maladjusted from coverage under the Act, unless they are 

also seriously emotionally disturbed. That a child is socially 

maladjusted is not by itself conclusive evidence that he or she is 

seriously emotionally disturbed. The evidence before us clearly 

supports the trial court's decision that A.E. was not seriously 

emotionally disturbed within the purview of the Act. In reviewing 

the district court decision, we find no error of law or 

unsupportable findings of fact. The testimony supports the finding 

that A.E. suffered from a conduct disorder, but was not seriously 

emotionally disturbed within the federal definition. There is no 

evidence of bad faith on the part of the Stilwell Public Schools. 

Although A.E.'s IEP team refused to reclassify her as seriously 

emotionally disturbed, the team did prepare an IEP designed to 

combat her learning disability and behavioral problems. The school 

district has made every effort to assure that A.E. can be educated 

in the least restrictive environment possible. 

III. 

Appellant also challenges the testimony of Dr. Bevan Todd 

Graybill, an expert in child psychology. Appellant contends that 

the trial court improperly allowed Dr. Graybill to state legal 

conclusions based on his interpretation of the governing law. Fed. 

R. Evid. 704(a) allows an expert witness to testify in the form of 

an opinion or inference even if that opinion or inference embraces 

9 

Appellate Case: 90-7018 Document: 01019297909 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 9 
an ultimate issue to be determined by the trier of fact. See Karns 

v. Emerson Elec. co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1459 (lOth Cir. 1987); United 

Telecommunications. Inc. v. American Television and Communications 

Corp., 536 F.2d 1310, 1318 n. 6 (lOth Cir. 1976); Bosse v. Ideco 

Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc., 412 F.2d 567, 570 (lOth Cir. 1969). 

However, an expert may not state legal conclusions drawn by 

applying the law to the facts. United States v. Jensen, 608 F.2d 

1349, 1356 (lOth Cir. 1979); Frase v. Henry, 444 F.2d 1228, 1231 

(lOth Cir. 1971). An expert may, however, refer to the law in 

expressing his or her opinion. Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 809 

(lOth cir. 1988). "[Q]uestions of law are the subject of the 

court's instructions and not the subject of expert testimony. " 

United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085, 1091 (lOth Cir. 1986), 

cert. den., 479 u.s. 1067 {1987). A district court's admission of 

expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Karns, 

817 F.2d at 1459; Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing co., 

738 F.2d 1509, 1523 (lOth Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 585 {1985). 

In order for an error of this nature to be reversible, the error 

must affect substantial rights and must result in actual prejudice. 

Error which does not rise to this magnitude is harmless. Vreeken, 

803 F.2d at 1090. 

Dr. Graybill was called as a witness for the plaintiff. Dr. 

Graybill has been employed by numerous school districts to evaluate 

students for serious emotional disturbance and evaluated A.E. on 

behalf of the school district. See Record on Appeal, Volume II, 

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Appellate Case: 90-7018 Document: 01019297909 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 10 
Transcript of Proceedings, page 183. He diagnosed A.E. as having 

a conduct disorder with related emotional disturbance. Record on 

Appeal, Volume II, Transcript of Proceedings, page 182. The 

challenged testimony arose due to confusion over the psychological, 

lay, and legal definitions of the terms used in the federal 

regulation. While Dr. Graybill admitted that A.E. had emotional 

problems, he did not feel that her problems were of such a 

magnitude as to meet the federal definition of seriously 

emotionally disturbed. On redirect, he was directly asked whether 

A.E. fit within the definitions of the Act. Record on Appeal, 

Volume II, Transcript of Proceedings, page 209. 5 Plaintiff5 Q. When you say that because she's socially maladjusted 

that she doesn't get--that she's excluded from the law, I take it 

that where (sic) talking about is that part of the regulation, of 

the federal regulation there which is under Roman Numeral II; am I 

not correct? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Okay. Let me read that to you and ask you if, 

that doesn't leave [A.E.] covered by the act. 

"The term does not include children who are 

maladjusted unless it is determined that they are 

emotionally disturbed." 

Okay? Correct? 

A. That's a correct reading of this, yes. 

in fact, 

socially 

seriously 

Q. All right. Now, have you not just told me that this girl 

is seriously socially maladjusted and seriously emotionally 

disturbed? 

A. I was not speaking of seriously emotionally disturbed as 

it is used in this sentence. 

* * * 

Q. Right. Now, you're giving it a different twist, though, 

when you switch over to the law? 

11 

Appellate Case: 90-7018 Document: 01019297909 Date Filed: 06/10/1991 Page: 11 
Appellant now seeks to challenge the testimony. 

invited by the questioning and is harmless. 

Any error was 

Accordingly, the Judgment of the district court in favor of 

Defendant-Appellee Stilwell Public Schools is AFFIRMED. 

A. Right. Because seriously emotionally disturbed is in 

quotations and means something different than you and I were 

talking about. 

Record on Appeal, Volume II, Transcript of Proceedings, pages 209-

10. 

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