Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01820/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01820-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346pi Marine Personal Injury (or tort claim - personal injury / motor vehicle)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OCTAVIO LEON et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Case No.: 17-CV-1820-CAB-JLB

ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim. Plaintiffs have opposed the motion, and the Court deems it suitable for 

submission without oral argument. As discussed below, the motion is granted.

I. Allegations in the Complaint

On September 12, 2015, Plaintiffs Octavio Leon, Irma Mayorga, Maria Y. Mayorga, 

and Maria T. Mayorga were traveling in a car operated by Leon on Interstate 5 in 

Oceanside, California, when they were involved an automobile accident with Justin Brown. 

Plaintiffs’ car rolled over several times and they each suffered serious injuries as a result 

of the accident. At the time of the accident, Brown was an enlisted Marine, and he was 

racing with a Marine in another car when the accident occurred. Brown is not a party to 

this lawsuit, but Plaintiffs allege that Brown was acting in the course and scope of his 

employment as a Marine at the time of the accident. The complaint asserts one claim for 

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negligence against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 

U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq.

II. Legal Standards

The government asks the Court to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive such a motion, “a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, the Court “accept[s] factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 

1031 (9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 

factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive 

of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

“The FTCA provides a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United 

States for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their 

employment.” Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 28 

U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (stating that district courts “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil 

actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, . . . for injury or loss of 

property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission 

of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or 

employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be 

liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission 

occurred.”). “Whether a member of the armed services of the United States was acting 

within the scope of his employment at the time of an alleged negligent or wrongful act 

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depends on whether the individual was ‘acting in line of duty.’” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 

v. Liberatore, 408 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671). “The scope 

of employment inquiry, including, in the military context, whether the employee was 

‘acting in line of duty,’ is defined by the applicable state law of respondeat superior.” Id.

(quoting Lutz v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 944 F.2d 1477, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991)). Thus, under 

the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standards, to state a claim against the United States, Plaintiffs 

must allege facts from which it can be reasonably inferred that Brown was acting in the 

line of duty under California respondeat superior law at the time of the accident.

“Under California’s law of respondeat superior, employers are liable for acts of their 

employees occurring within the scope of their employment.” Nationwide, 408 F.3d at 

1163. In determining vicarious liability, “the inquiry should be whether the risk was one 

that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise undertaken 

by the employer.” Id. (quoting Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 

992 (1995)). The scope of employment includes “an employee’s acts of personal 

convenience during working hours, as well as acts of the employee that combine personal 

business with the business of the employer,” but not conduct that “substantially deviates 

from the employment duties for personal purposes.” Id. (citing Farmers Ins. Group, 11

Cal. 4th at 1004-05).

Here, Plaintiffs’ allegation that Brown was acting within the scope of his 

employment at the time of the accident is conclusory and not entitled to an assumption of 

truth on a motion to dismiss. Disregarding this conclusion, there are no factual allegations 

that plausibly suggest that Brown was acting within the scope of his employment as a 

Marine. Brown’s mere existence as a Marine is not sufficient to result in a waiver of 

sovereign immunity under the FTCA. To hold otherwise would render the scope of 

employment requirement meaningless. Cf. Hartzell v. United States, 786 F.2d 964, 969 

(9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not make the 

United States liable for any tort committed by a member of the armed services, regardless 

of whether they were on-duty, off-duty, or on leave at the time of the accident).

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IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the complaint 

is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint on 

or before April 6, 2018. To survive a second motion to dismiss, the amended complaint 

must contain specific factual allegations about what Brown was doing at the time of the 

accident that would support an inference that he was acting in the line of duty. Merely 

emphasizing or reiterating the allegations listed on pages four and five of the opposition 

brief will lead to dismissal of the amended complaint with prejudice upon a motion by the 

government.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2018

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