Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05337/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05337-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 6, 1997 Decided July 15, 1997 

No. 96-5337

CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA, ON BEHALF OF ITS MEMBERS,

APPELLANT

v.

BRUCE BABBITT,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF INTERIOR OF THE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND 

ADA E. DEER, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cv02284)

James Hamilton argued the cause for appellant, with 

whom William J. Mertens and Robert V. Zener were on the 

briefs.

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Edward J. Shawaker, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees, with whom Lois J. 

Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert L. Klarquist, Attorney, were on the brief.

Jill E. Grant argued the cause and filed the brief for 

amicus curiae Delaware Tribe of Indians.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma 

appeals from the dismissal, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b), 

of its complaint challenging a Final Decision by the Department of the Interior extending formal recognition to the 

Delaware Tribe of Indians. It contends that the district 

court erred in ruling that the Delaware Tribe is a necessary 

and indispensable party that cannot be joined because it has 

sovereign immunity. The Cherokee Nation maintains that 

the Delawares do not have sovereign immunity because they 

were "incorporated" into the Cherokee Nation pursuant to an 

1866 treaty and a subsequent agreement between the two 

tribes. We hold that the district court erred in concluding 

that the Delawares can assert sovereign immunity in this 

lawsuit, and reverse.

I.

The history of the migration of the Delawares from what is 

now the northeastern part of the United States to the State of 

Oklahoma is set forth in Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. 

Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 75-77 (1977). For our purposes, it 

suffices to observe that over time the Delawares were repeatedly forced westward and fragmented into separate 

groups. The main body of the tribe settled in Kansas under 

the terms of an 1829 treaty between the Delawares and the 

United States. Treaty of 1829, 7 Stat. 327; Weeks, 430 U.S. 

at 76. Although that Treaty contemplated the establishment 

of a "permanent residence" for the Delawares to be "forever 

secured" by the United States, the Delawares were soon 

forced to move again. In 1866, the Delawares entered into a 

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1 Congress passed several statutes naturalizing particular 

classes of Indians beginning in the 1870s. See, e.g., General Allotment Act of 1887 ("Dawes Act"), § 6, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 390, 

codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349. However, Congress did 

not extend citizenship to all native-born Indians until 1924. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1401(b); see generally FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF 

FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 639-42 (1982). 

2 Like the Delawares, the "Five Civilized Tribes" (the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole) are not native to 

Oklahoma. The Five Civilized Tribes originated in what is now the 

southeastern portion of the United States, but were forced westward and settled in Oklahoma in the 1830s. See generally MURIEL 

H. WRIGHT, A GUIDE TO THE INDIAN TRIBES OF OKLAHOMA 4, 58-65 (9th 

prtg. 1986). 

new treaty under which their land in Kansas would be sold to 

a railroad company and the United States would find new 

land for them in the Indian Territory, which is now the State 

of Oklahoma. Treaty of 1866, 7 Stat. 793, 794; Weeks, 430 

U.S. at 77. This Treaty of 1866 also permitted any Delawares who wished to remain in Kansas to sever their relations with the tribe and become citizens of the United States.1

7 Stat. 794. It is the legal status of the Delawares who 

moved to Oklahoma pursuant to the 1866 treaty (and their 

descendants) that is at issue in this litigation.

Shortly after the Treaty of 1866 with the Delawares was 

concluded, the United States entered into a Treaty with the 

Cherokee Nation, which resided in the Indian Territory.2

Treaty of 1866, 14 Stat. 799 (1866). Article 15 of this second 

Treaty of 1866 provided that:

The United States may settle any civilized Indians, 

friendly with the Cherokees and adjacent tribes, within 

the Cherokee country, on unoccupied lands east of 96E, 

on such terms as may be agreed upon by any such tribe 

and the Cherokees, subject to the approval of the President of the United States, which shall be consistent with 

the following provisions, viz: [FIRST:] Should any such 

tribe or band of Indians settling in said country abandon 

their tribal organization, there being first paid into the 

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Cherokee national fund a sum of money which shall 

sustain the same proportion to the then existing national 

fund that the number of Indians sustain to the whole 

number of Cherokees then residing in the Cherokee 

country, they shall be incorporated into and ever after 

remain a part of the Cherokee Nation, on equal terms in 

every respect with native citizens. [SECOND:] And 

should any such tribe, thus settling in said country, 

decide to preserve their tribal organizations, and to 

maintain their tribal laws, customs, and usages, not 

inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the Cherokee Nation, they shall have a district of country set off 

for their use by metes and bounds equal to one hundred 

and sixty acres, if they should so decide, for each man, 

woman, and child of said tribe, and shall pay [1] for the 

same into the national fund such price as may be agreed 

on by them and the Cherokee Nation, subject to the 

approval of the President of the United States, and in 

cases of disagreement the price to be fixed by the 

President.

And the said tribe thus settled shall also pay [2] into 

the national fund a sum of money, to be agreed on by the 

respective parties, not greater in proportion to the whole 

existing national fund ... than their numbers bear to the 

whole number of Cherokees then residing in said country, and thence afterwards they shall enjoy all the rights 

of native Cherokees....

Id. at 803-804.

In 1867, the Delawares entered into an Agreement with the 

Cherokee Nation. Under that Agreement the Cherokee Nation agreed to "sell to the Delawares, for their occupancy, a 

quantity of land ... in the aggregate equal to 160 acres for 

each individual of the Delaware tribe" who moved to Oklahoma. The Delawares, in turn, agreed to pay the Cherokee 

Nation $1 per acre for this land, and "a sum of money which 

shall sustain the same proportion to the existing Cherokee 

national fund that the number of Delawares ... removing to 

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3 The Delawares who moved to Cherokee territory, whom we 

refer to as "Delawares" are sometimes referred to as the "Cherokee 

Delawares," see Weeks, 430 U.S. at 77, or the "Registered Delawares," see Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 193 U.S. 127, 143 

(1904). 

kees residing in the Cherokee Nation." In addition, the 

Cherokee Nation and the Delawares agreed that:

On the fulfillment by the Delawares of the foregoing 

stipulations, all the members of the tribe registered, as 

above provided, shall become members of the Cherokee 

Nation with the same rights and immunities, and the 

same participation (and no other) in the national funds, 

as native Cherokees save as hereinbefore provided.

And the children hereafter born of such Delawares so 

incorporated into the Cherokee Nation shall in all respects be regarded as native Cherokees.

Pursuant to the two Treaties of 1866 and the 1867 Agreement, most of the Delawares moved to Cherokee territory 

"where they were gradually assimilated for most purposes 

into the Cherokee Nation...." Weeks, 430 U.S. at 77.3

Although the 1867 Agreement provided that the Delawares 

would be "incorporated into the Cherokee Nation" and enjoy 

"the same rights and immunities ... as native Cherokees," 

conflicts developed between the two groups. In 1890, the 

Delawares sued the Cherokee Nation for a share of the 

proceeds from the rental of certain Cherokee land. In Cherokee Nation v. Journeycake, 155 U.S. 196 (1894), the Supreme 

Court reviewed the 1867 Agreement and Article 15 of the 

1866 Treaty with the Cherokee Nation, concluding that the 

Delawares had "become incorporated into the Cherokee Nation and are members and citizens thereof," and that it 

"follow[ed] necessarily that they are, equally with the native 

Cherokees, the owners of, and entitled to share in the profits 

and proceeds of, [Cherokee] lands." Id. at 211. The Court 

did not expressly rule on whether the Delawares had settled 

in Cherokee territory under the first or the second provision 

of Article 15, but it did state that the 1867 Agreement made 

"no provision for the setting apart of a distinct body of land in 

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4 Act of June 28, 1898, § 25, 30 Stat. 495. 

5

For ease of reference, we refer hereinafter to the Department 

of Interior, and any official or subdivision, including the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs, as "the Department." 

any portion of the reservation for the Delaware Tribe...." 

Id. at 205. In 1904, the Delawares again sued the Cherokee 

Nation, pursuant to a special Act of Congress,4seeking a 

declaration of their rights in the land they acquired under the 

1867 Agreement. In Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation,

193 U.S. 127 (1904), the Supreme Court held that the Delawares did not acquire any permanent interest in these lands 

that could be passed on to their descendants, but only the 

right to use and occupy these lands during their lifetimes; 

any children of the Delawares born after the move to Oklahoma "took only the rights of other citizens of the Cherokee 

Nation, as the same are regulated by its laws." Id. at 143.

Notwithstanding the 1867 Agreement and the Supreme 

Court decisions, the Delawares continued to maintain a distinct group identity separate from the Cherokee Nation. See 

Weeks, 430 U.S. at 77. In 1940, the Department of the 

Interior acknowledged that the Delawares were entitled to 

organize as a tribe under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 

concluding that "although for certain administrative purposes, 

the Cherokee Nation in which the Delawares ... and others 

were amalgamated was recognized as of [sic] a single tribe, 

the national or tribal character of the Delaware-Cherokees 

was never lost or completely merged into that of the Cherokees."5

In 1958 the Department convened a general meeting 

at which the Delawares elected a business committee and 

adopted formal bylaws, which the Department approved in 

1962. Yet, according to an affidavit filed by the Cherokee 

Nation, the Delawares also continued to participate in the 

Cherokee government, voting in Cherokee elections and holding office on the Council of the Cherokee Nation.

On at least two occasions, Congress has recognized the 

Delawares as a distinct tribal entity, separate from the Cherokee Nation, for the purpose of distributing funds to compensate the tribe for injuries suffered prior to 1867. In 1904, 

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6 The formal name of the "Absentee Delawares" is the Delaware Tribe of Western Oklahoma. 

Congress appropriated $150,000 to "the Delaware Tribe of 

Indians residing in the Cherokee Nation, as said tribe in 

council shall direct" as full payment of "all claims and demands of said tribe against the United States." Act of April 

21, 1904, § 21, 33 Stat. 189, 222. In 1972, Congress enacted a 

formula for the distribution of approximately $9 million 

awarded by the Indian Claims Commission to the Delaware 

tribe for the United States' breach of an 1854 treaty. 25 

U.S.C. §§ 1291-97. Under the statutory formula, the only 

Delawares eligible to share in the award were the "Cherokee 

Delawares," the descendants of those Delawares who had 

moved to Cherokee territory in 1867, and the "Absentee 

Delawares," a separate band of Delawares recognized by the 

Department as a distinct tribe.6Id. § 1292. In Weeks, the 

Kansas Delawares, descendants of those Delawares who remained in Kansas in 1867, challenged their exclusion under 

the statutory formula on the grounds that it denied them 

equal protection of the laws in violation of the Due Process 

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 430 U.S. at 75. The 

Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that Congress had a rational basis for the exclusion because the 

Kansas Delawares were not a recognized tribal entity and had 

previously severed their ties to the tribe, Congress had 

previously distinguished between the Kansas Delawares and 

the Cherokee-Delawares in the 1904 statute, and Congress 

was concerned with the administrative difficulty of including 

the Kansas Delawares. Id. at 85-89. In reviewing the 

history of the Delawares, the Court observed that the 

Cherokee-Delawares "are today [in 1977] a federally recognized tribe." Id. at 77.

In 1979, the Department repudiated the position, noted in 

Weeks, that the Delawares were an independent tribe, and 

advised that henceforth the Department would not maintain 

any government-to-government relationship with the Delawares. By letter of May 24, 1979, the Department stated 

that:

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1. Based on the 1867 Agreement and related statutes, 

the Cherokee Delawares are a tribe within the Cherokee 

Nation. They are Cherokee citizens with the same responsibilities and privileges as other citizens of the Cherokee Nation.

2. The Cherokee Delawares may deal with their judgment awards and preserve their Delaware heritage and 

identity. For governmental purposes, however, they 

must look to the Cherokee Nation, of which they are an 

integral part.

Thus, from 1979 until the Final Decision of September 27, 

1996, the Department declined to recognize the Delawares as 

a separate tribe.

In 1992, the Delawares advised the Department of their 

intent to petition for recognition as an Indian tribe pursuant 

to 25 C.F.R. Part 83, which sets forth "departmental procedures and policies for acknowledging that certain American 

Indian groups exist as tribes." 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (1996); see 

also id. §§ 83.4, 83.6. In 1994, the Department responded 

that it would not consider such a petition because Congress 

had already defined the relationship between the Delawares 

and the Cherokee Nation. Based on the language of the 1867 

Agreement, the relevant treaties, and the Supreme Court's 

decisions in Journeycake and Delaware Indians, the Department stated, "[i]t is the position of the Department of the 

Interior that the Cherokee Delawares have not existed as an 

independent political entity since 1867, and have been absorbed into the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma for general 

governmental purposes since that time."

The Delawares requested reconsideration and retraction of 

the 1979 letter, and after reviewing its relationships with the 

Delawares since 1867, the Department published a Notice of 

Intent to retract the 1979 letter. 61 Fed. Reg. 33,534, 

33,534-35 (1996). Following comment by the Delawares and 

the Cherokee Nation, the Department issued a Final Decision 

on September 27, 1996, retracting the 1979 letter and recognizing the Delawares as a "separate sovereign" with "the 

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7 The complaint also alleged that the Final Decision diminished 

the privileges and immunities of the Cherokee Nation in violation of 

25 U.S.C. § 1212(4); violated the Interior and Related Agencies 

Appropriation Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-154, 105 Stat. 990 (1991); 

impaired the Cherokee Constitution; and violated the United 

States' fiduciary and trust obligations to protect Cherokee sovereignty and tribal property. 

same legal rights and responsibilities as other tribes, consistent with federal law, both as to jurisdiction and as to its 

right to define its membership." 61 Fed. Reg. 50,862, 50,863 

(1996). Thereafter, the Department included the Delawares 

on the list of federally recognized tribes published in the 

Federal Register. 61 Fed. Reg. 58,212 (1996).

The Cherokee Nation filed the instant lawsuit, seeking 

review of the Final Decision under the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-99 (1996). The complaint alleged 

that the Final Decision was arbitrary and capricious because 

the Department failed to follow the Part 83 regulations 

governing tribal recognition, and was contrary to applicable 

law, including the Treaty of 1866 with the Cherokee Nation, 

the 1867 Agreement between the Cherokee Nation and the 

Delawares, and the Supreme Court's decisions in Journeycake and Delaware Indians.7 The named defendants, the 

Secretary of the Interior and the Assistant Secretary for 

Indian Affairs, moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 

FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b) for failure to join an indispensable party, 

the Delaware Tribe. The district court granted the motion, 

ruling that the Delawares had sovereign immunity and that 

they were a necessary and indispensable party. Although the 

district court concluded, based on Journeycake and Delaware 

Indians, that the Delawares had settled in Cherokee territory 

pursuant to the first provision of Article 15 of the 1866 Treaty 

with the Cherokee Nation, the court rejected the argument 

that the 1867 Agreement waived the Delawares' sovereign 

immunity. Interpreting the Supreme Court in Weeks to have 

"found" that the Delawares were a distinct Indian tribe, the 

district court further concluded that the Delawares are still a 

"tribe" that, in the absence of an express waiver, was entitled 

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8

FED. R. CIV. P. 19 provides, in relevant part:

(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject 

to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court 

of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined 

as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete 

relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the 

person claims an interest in the subject of the action and is so 

situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence 

may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability 

to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already 

parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, 

or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed 

interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall 

order that the person be made a party....

(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible.

If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be 

made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and 

good conscience the action should proceed among the parties 

before it, or should be dismissed, the absent party being regarded 

as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court 

include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's 

absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already 

parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in 

the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the 

prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment 

rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whethto assert sovereign immunity. The Cherokee Nation appeals 

the dismissal of the complaint; the Delawares appear as 

amicus curiae in support of the Department.

II.

Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes 

a two-step procedure for determining whether an action must 

be dismissed because of the absence of a party needed for a 

just adjudication.8 First, the court must determine whether 

the absent party is "necessary" to the litigation according to 

factors enumerated in Rule 19(a); if so, the court must order 

that the absent party be joined. If a necessary party cannot 

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er the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is 

dismissed for nonjoinder. 

9 The Department suggests that the Cherokee Nation lacks 

prudential standing to challenge the department's failure to apply 

the Part 83 regulations on tribal recognition because it does not fall 

within the "zone of interests" protected by the regulations. See 

Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). The 

regulations define an "interested party" as:

any person, organization or other entity who can establish a 

legal, factual, or other property interest in an acknowledgment 

determination and who requests an opportunity to submit 

comments or evidence or to be kept informed of general actions 

regarding a specific petitioner. "Interested party" ... may 

include, but is not limited to ... any recognized Indian tribes 

and unrecognized Indian groups that might be affected by an 

acknowledgment determination.

25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (1996). The Cherokee Nation has Article III 

standing because the Final Decision affects the authority of the 

Cherokee Nation over the Delawares and may affect its eligibility 

for certain federal funds. Thus, the Cherokee Nation has suffered an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the Department's 

action and that can be redressed by an order invalidating the 

Final Decision. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560-61 (1992). Because the Cherokee Nation is also an 

"interested party" within the meaning of the Part 83 regulations, 

it has prudential standing, at least as to its claim that the 

Department acted contrary to law by failing to follow the regulations. 

be joined, the court must turn to the second step, examining 

the factors in Rule 19(b) to "determine whether in equity and 

good conscience, the action should proceed among the parties 

before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being 

regarded as indispensable." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). The 

district court concluded that the Delawares were a necessary 

party, that they had sovereign immunity and could not be 

joined, and that the lawsuit could not proceed in their absence.9 The Cherokee Nation contends that the Delawares 

cannot assert sovereign immunity in this lawsuit, that the 

Delawares are not indispensable because the Department can 

adequately represent their interest in defending the Final 

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Decision, and that, in any event, the public interest exception 

to Rule 19 applies.

Whether a group constitutes a "tribe" is a matter that is 

ordinarily committed to the discretion of Congress and the 

Executive Branch, and courts will defer to their judgment. 

United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1865); 

James v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Serv.,

824 F.2d 1132, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Although the principle 

of deference does not require a court to avoid the question of 

sovereignty, "a proper respect both for tribal sovereignty 

itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area 

cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,

436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978). For reasons consistent with our 

recognition in James that the expertise on tribal recognition 

resides elsewhere, 824 F.2d at 1138, we examine first whether 

other grounds exist to resolve the instant appeal, without 

reaching the question of whether the Delawares are a tribe 

with an identity and sovereignty separate from that of the 

Cherokee Nation. Treating the Cherokee Nation's contentions in reverse order, we conclude first that Rule 19 cannot 

itself be avoided by applying the public interest exception, 

described in Kickapoo Tribe v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1500 

(D.C. Cir. 1995). The issues presented, although of considerable importance to the Delawares and the Cherokee Nation, 

and to a lesser extent to the Department, do not require the 

joinder of a large number of persons whom it is infeasible to 

join in the lawsuit. The particular issues do not involve a 

matter of the type of "transcending importance" for which the 

exception has previously been invoked. Id. (citations omitted). Essentially, the dispute involves rights to federal benefits, or, more expansively, the relationship between two 

groups and their respective relationships with the federal 

government. While issues of sovereignty are fundamental in 

nature, as narrowly posed here between two groups, there is 

simply no necessity requiring invocation of an exception to 

Rule 19.

Turning to the first step in the Rule 19 analysis, we 

conclude second, that the Department cannot adequately 

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represent the Delawares. Although the Ninth Circuit has 

held that "[i]n disputes involving intertribal conflicts, the 

United States cannot properly represent any of the tribes 

without compromising its trust obligation to all tribes," Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 

1994); see also Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian 

Reservation v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1500 (9th Cir. 1990); 

Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 

1990), this court has looked to whether there are additional 

indications that the United States' interests might diverge 

from those of the absent tribe or tribes. In Wichita &

Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the 

court concluded that the United States could not adequately 

represent two absent tribes where there was a potential 

conflict between the tribes and the United States was "apparently willing to concede a large portion of [one tribe's] claim 

for retroactive relief." Id. at 775 & n.11. Here, although the 

Delawares and the Department currently take the same 

position regarding the Delawares' sovereignty, and to that 

extent their interests are the same, the Department has twice 

reversed its position regarding the Delawares since 1940. 

Given the procedure used to reach the Final Decision at issue, 

the Department may reverse itself again. Moreover, even 

were the Department vigorously to represent the Delawares 

vis-a-vis the Cherokee Nation in the district court, the Department might decide not to appeal any unfavorable decision. As a non-party, the Delawares would have no right to 

appeal, regardless of whether the Department's decision was 

based on its view of the merits or on other considerations. 

Id. at 775. The Delawares' ability to participate as an amicus 

curiae is thus insufficient to protect their interests. Id.

The Cherokee Nation's reliance on Ramah Navajo School 

Bd. v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1996), is misplaced 

inasmuch as there was nothing in that case to indicate that 

the United States would to any degree abandon the position 

of the absent tribes as a group in favor of the position taken 

by the tribes before the court on the other side of the lawsuit. 

Cf. Wichita and Affiliated Tribes, 788 F.2d at 775 & n.11. In 

Ramah, the absent Indian tribes were not necessary parties 

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to a lawsuit challenging the Department's allocation of certain 

funds not only because they had no legally protected interest 

in the funds, 87 F.3d at 1351, but also because even if they 

had such an interest, the Department had no authority to give 

one of the absent tribes a greater share of the funds than 

another, id. at 1352, and thus had no conflicting obligations to 

the nonparty tribes. Absent such a convergence of interests 

between the Department and an absent tribe, particularly 

where the absent tribe's sovereignty is challenged, we find no 

abuse of discretion by the district court in concluding that the 

Delawares are indispensable.

Consequently, we must decide whether the district court 

erred in concluding that the Delawares are entitled to assert 

sovereign immunity. This is a question of law that the court 

reviews de novo. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 

1121 (1995). It is well established that "Indian tribes are 

'distinct, independent political communities, retaining their 

original natural rights' in matters of local self-government." 

Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55 (quoting Worcester v. 

Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)); FELIX S. COHEN'S 

HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 232 (1982). As sovereign 

entities that predate the establishment of the United States, 

they are immune from suit without their consent. Santa 

Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58; see also Oklahoma Tax 

Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 

505, 510 (1991). Tribal sovereign immunity does not derive 

from an act of Congress, but rather is one of the "inherent 

powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) 

(citation omitted); see also Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy 

Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061, 1065 (1st Cir. 1979). Unlike the sovereignty possessed by states and foreign nations, however, the 

sovereignty of Indian tribes is subject to the control of 

Congress, which has plenary authority to limit, modify, or 

eliminate tribal sovereign immunity. Santa Clara Pueblo,

436 U.S. at 58; see generally U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 

Any waiver of a tribe's sovereign immunity, whether by 

Congress or by the tribe itself, "cannot be implied but must 

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10 Although Part 83 regulations require that the list be published no less frequently than every three years, 25 C.F.R. § 83.5(a) 

(1996), the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, 25 

U.S.C. § 479a-1 (1994), requires the list to be published annually. 

be unequivocally expressed." Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 

at 58 (citations omitted); Wichita and Affiliated Tribes, 788 

F.2d at 773.

Not all groups, however, are "tribes" that are entitled to 

claim sovereign immunity or exercise the other prerogatives 

of sovereign powers. As noted, this is generally a matter for 

the other two branches of government to determine. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 419; James, 824 F.2d at 1137. 

Whatever difficulty courts may have encountered in determining whether Congress or the Executive Branch has recognized a group as a tribe was substantially reduced in 1978 

when the Department promulgated procedures governing federal recognition of Indian tribes. See 25 C.F.R. Part 83 

(1996). The Part 83 regulations provide that:

Acknowledgment of tribal existence by the Department 

is a prerequisite to the protection, services, and benefits 

of the Federal government available to Indian tribes by 

virtue of their status as tribes. Acknowledgment shall 

also mean that the tribe is entitled to the immunities and 

privileges available to other federally acknowledged Indian tribes by virtue of their government-to-government 

relationship with the United States as well as the responsibilities, powers, limitations and obligations of such 

tribes.

Id. § 83.2. Pursuant to these regulations, the Department 

periodically publishes in the Federal Register a list of all 

federally acknowledged tribes. Id. § 83.5(a).10

This court considered the effect of the Part 83 regulations 

in James. In that case, a group of Indians sued the Department, seeking an order that they be placed on the list of 

federally recognized tribes. 824 F.2d at 1135. A rival group 

of members from the same tribe had previously received 

federal recognition under the Part 83 regulations. Id. at 

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1136. The unrecognized group contended that it was not 

required to use the procedures under the Part 83 regulations 

because the federal government had previously recognized 

the tribe by including it in certain nineteenth-century lists. 

The court rejected this argument, holding that "[t]he purpose 

of the regulatory scheme ... would be frustrated if the 

Judicial Branch made initial determinations of whether 

groups have been recognized previously or whether conditions for recognition currently exist." Id. at 1137. Noting 

that the Department's special expertise in the area of tribal 

recognition "weighs in favor of giving deference to the agency," id. at 1138, the court held that it would require the 

unrecognized group to exhaust its administrative remedies. 

Id. at 1139.

Consistent with James, the inclusion of a group of Indians 

on the Federal Register list of recognized tribes would ordinarily suffice to establish that the group is a sovereign power 

entitled to immunity from suit. Cf. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 

Wall.) at 419. However, because the Delawares have been 

included on the most recent list as a result of the Final 

Decision now challenged by the Cherokee Nation, we conclude for several reasons that the Department's determination cannot be dispositive of the sovereign immunity issue in 

the instant appeal.

First, the Department did not follow the Part 83 regulations, but recognized the Delawares through the procedural 

device of retracting the May 24, 1979, non-recognition letter. 

An agency is required to follow its own regulations. Service 

v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957); Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 

976, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See Western Shoshone Business 

Council v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing 

Edwards, McCoy & Kennedy v. Acting Phoenix Area Director, 18 I.B.I.A. 454, 457 (1990)). The notice and comment 

procedures used by the Department to retract the 1979 letter 

are not the same as Part 83 procedures, which, among other 

things, allow reconsideration by the Interior Board of Indian 

Appeals. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11 (1996). Nothing in the record 

reveals a finding by the Department pursuant to 25 C.F.R. 

§ 1.2 (1996), whereby the regulations were waived "in the 

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11 By letter of August 5, 1994, the Department, after responding to the Delawares' notice of intent to file a petition for recognition under Part 83, advised the Delawares, that they could file a 

"documented petition." 

best interest of the Indians." Because the Delawares gave 

only notice of an intent to file a petition, moreover, use of 

Part 83 is not barred under 25 C.F.R. § 83.10(p) (1996), which 

precludes repetitioning after a denial of recognition.11 See 

also 25 C.F.R. § 83.3(f) (1996).

Second, even assuming that the Part 83 regulations are not 

the exclusive means by which the Department may recognize 

tribes, the Final Decision on which the recent listing of the 

Delawares is based cannot itself be used to block review. 

The Cherokee Nation's complaint alleges that recognition of 

the Delawares is contrary to federal law, namely Article 15 of 

the Treaty of 1866 with the Cherokee Nation and the Supreme Court's decisions in Journeycake and Cherokee Nation. If the Department acted contrary to law, the Final 

Decision would be owed no deference. Finally, were the 

court to decline to review the district court's sovereign immunity ruling, then the Department's recognition decisions 

would be unreviewable, contrary to the presumption in favor 

of judicial review of agency action. See, e.g., Bowen v. 

Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 

(1986). While this presumption must sometimes give way 

where tribal sovereign immunity is at issue because "society 

has consciously opted to shield Indian tribes from suit without 

congressional or tribal consent," Wichita and Affiliated 

Tribes, 788 F.2d at 777; see also Kickapoo Tribe, 43 F.3d at 

1499, that shield is available only when a group of Indians has 

been recognized as a sovereign by Congress, the Executive 

Branch, or the courts, and it is thus inappropriately invoked 

when tribal sovereignty is the ultimate issue. Cf. Native 

Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 

1992).

Because reliance cannot be placed on the Department's 

recognition of the Delawares pursuant to the Final Decision, 

the court must itself decide whether the Delawares constitute 

a sovereign tribe. The Supreme Court has defined a "tribe" 

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12 That the present-day Delawares are a "tribe" in the sense of 

being a distinct ethnic group sharing a common language, culture, 

and institutions, is not necessarily controlling because "Congress 

and the Executive have often departed from ethnological principles 

to determine tribes with which the United States would carry on 

political relations." COHEN, supra, at 5-6. 

as "a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in 

a community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory...." 

Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901). The 

parties do not appear to dispute that prior to 1867 the 

Delawares were a tribe by this definition, or that they were 

recognized as such by the United States.12 The question is 

whether the 1867 Agreement effectively consolidated the 

Delawares into the Cherokee Nation and thereby ended their 

existence as a separate entity with respect to the Cherokee 

Nation. In answering this question, the court is bound by the 

Supreme Court's interpretation of that Agreement in Journeycake and Delaware Indians.

In Journeycake, the Supreme Court viewed a proper understanding of the 1867 Agreement to require reference to 

Article 15 of the Treaty of 1866 with the Cherokee Nation. 

155 U.S. at 204. As described by the Court, Article 15:

contemplated the settlement of other Indians within the 

limits of the Cherokee country east of the ninety-sixth 

degree of longitude, and provided for such settlement in 

two ways: One, in which the Indians settled should 

abandon their tribal organization, in which case, as expressed, they were to be "incorporated into, and ever 

after remain a part of, the Cherokee Nation on equal 

terms in every respect with native citizens." The other 

was where removal of the tribe to the Cherokee country 

should involve no abandonment of the tribal organization, 

in which case a distinct territory was to be set off, by 

metes and bounds, to the tribe removed. The one contemplated an absorption of individual Indians into the 

Cherokee Nation; the other a mere location of a tribe 

within the limits of the Cherokee reservation. If the 

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removed Indians were to be absorbed into the Cherokee 

Nation, they were to be absorbed on equal terms in 

every respect with other citizens.

Id. at 204-05. Neither Journeycake nor Delaware Indians

explicitly addressed whether the Delawares settled in Cherokee territory pursuant to the first or the second provision of 

Article 15. The district court, however, relying on those 

cases, concluded that the Delawares settled in Cherokee 

territory pursuant to the first provision.

On its face, the language of the 1867 Agreement provides 

no clear indication as to which of the two Article 15 provisions 

applies. On the one hand, as noted in Journeycake, 155 U.S. 

at 205, the 1867 Agreement did not require the Cherokees to 

set aside a distinct "district of country" for the Delawares to 

occupy. Instead, the Agreement referred to a "quantity of 

land ... in the aggregate equal to 160 acres for each member 

of the Delaware tribe ...." (emphasis added). Furthermore, 

the last two clauses of the 1867 Agreement provided that the 

Delawares would "become members of the Cherokee nation" 

and that the "children hereafter born of such Delawares so 

incorporated" would "be regarded as native Cherokees." 

Both considerations suggest that the Agreement was governed by the first provision of Article 15, whereby the settling 

tribe would lose its separate identity and be incorporated into 

the Cherokee Nation. On the other hand, as both the Delawares and the Department note, the Agreement also required 

the Delawares to make two payments to the Cherokees: one 

based on their population and a second for their land. This 

suggests that the parties intended the Agreement to be 

governed by the second provision of Article 15, whereby the 

settling tribe would maintain its separate identity.

Although the evidence of the Delawares' two payments is 

consistent with the second provision of Article 15, it turns out 

that there is reason to think that the two payments are not 

necessarily inconsistent with the first provision of Article 15. 

Simply put, the Delawares may have intended to give up their 

separate tribal existence, as required by the first provision, 

but negotiated a side agreement to ensure that they would 

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have the same rights of occupancy in Cherokee land as native 

Cherokees. At the time, Cherokee land was not held by 

individual tribal members, but by the tribe as a whole. 

Journeycake, 155 U.S. at 207. Cherokee law, however, permitted individual Cherokee to use certain lands for their 

personal occupation. Id. at 212. Thus, the Delawares' second payment may have purchased a guarantee that they 

would receive an equal entitlement to the use of Cherokee 

land during their lifetimes, and not a right to maintain a 

separate existence as a tribe. The Supreme Court's language 

in Journeycake suggests that it viewed the second payment in 

this manner:

So far as the provision in the [A]greement for the 

purchase of homes is concerned, it will be perceived that 

no absolute title to these homes was granted. We may 

take notice of the fact that the Cherokees, in their long 

occupation of this reservation, had generally secured 

homes for themselves; that the laws of the Cherokee 

Nation provided for the appropriation by the several 

Cherokees of lands for personal occupation, and that this 

purchase by the Delawares was with the view of securing 

to the individual Delawares the like homes; that the 

lands thus purchased and paid for still remained a part of 

the Cherokee Reservation. And, as a further consideration for the payment of this sum for the purchase of 

homes, the Delawares were guaranteed not merely the 

continued occupancy thereof, but also that, in case of a 

subsequent allotment in severalty of the entire body of 

lands among the members of the Cherokee Nation, they 

should receive an aggregate amount equal to that which 

they had purchased, and such a distribution as would 

secure to them the homes upon which they had settled, 

together with their improvements....

155 U.S. at 212-213; see also Delaware Indians, 193 U.S. at 

139. That the Delawares received only a lifetime entitlement 

to use and occupy the lands acquired under the 1867 Agreement, id. at 143, also suggests that the second payment was 

not intended to guarantee a separate tribal existence. Hence, 

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the fact of the second payment may be a doubtful basis from 

which to infer that the parties intended to be governed by the 

second provision of Article 15.

What is clear from the face of the 1867 Agreement and 

from Journeycake and Delaware Indians, however, is that 

the parties intended that the Delawares would be "incorporated" into the Cherokee Nation, and that their descendants 

would be regarded as Cherokee citizens. The ordinary meaning of "incorporate" is "to unite with ... something already 

existent ... so as to form an indistinguishable whole that 

cannot be restored to the previously separate elements...." 

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1145 (1981). 

Although nothing in the Agreement prevented the Delawares 

from maintaining a separate cultural identity, "incorporation" 

is incompatible with the notion that they were to retain a 

separate governmental identity from the Cherokee Nation. 

The use of the term "incorporated" in the 1867 Agreement is 

sufficiently unambiguous to constitute an express relinquishment of the Delawares' status as a separate sovereign.

The alternative interpretations of the 1867 Agreement offered by the Delawares are unpersuasive. First, the Delawares note that the preamble to the 1867 Agreement refers to 

"a location of the Delawares upon the Cherokee lands, and 

their consolidation with the Cherokee Nation." They contend 

that the word "consolidation" suggests an alliance between 

two tribes, rather than the abandonment of one tribe's existence by incorporating into the other. In ordinary usage, 

however, "consolidate" means "to join together (as two or 

more items into one unit, or whole)." WEBSTER'S THIRD, 

supra, at 484. It is, therefore, quite similar in meaning to 

"incorporate." Second, the Delawares contend that the grant 

of Cherokee citizenship to the Delawares and their children is 

not inconsistent with the maintenance of a separate tribal 

existence. They maintain that these provisions were merely 

intended to prevent the Cherokees from discriminating 

against the Delawares. As the facts in Journeycake demonstrate, the Delawares may have had reason to fear that the 

Cherokee might not treat them as equal members of their 

society. But the Delawares point to nothing in the 1867 

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13 By contrast, Congress has only permitted an "Indian tribe or 

band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the 

Interior" to assert federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362. 

Agreement to suggest that the "incorporation" language was 

intended solely as an anti-discrimination clause. The Agreement contains no such language, but instead provides that the 

children of the Delawares "shall in all respects be regarded as 

native Cherokees." The plain meaning of this language is 

that the two tribes were to be consolidated into a single unit.

The fact that a tribe's sovereign immunity continues even 

after it has dissolved or abandoned its tribal government, 

United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 

506, 512 (1940), is, for our purposes, beside the point. The 

question of whether the district court erred does not turn on 

the abandonment of tribal institutions. As the Department 

notes, it does not appear that the Delawares ever abandoned 

their tribal institutions as a matter of practice. But the 1867 

Agreement called for incorporation of one tribe into another. 

This represents a more radical disavowal of tribal identity 

than mere dissolution of governmental institutions, as was 

discussed in Fidelity. The parties have cited no authority to 

suggest that a sovereign tribe cannot, pursuant to authorization by Congress, relinquish its sovereignty and merge with 

another tribe, and it would be anomalous to hold that the two 

tribes each retained a separate governmental existence after 

such a merger. 

Nor can we conclude that Congress' treatment of the 

Delawares after 1867 constituted recognition of the tribe as a 

distinct sovereign entity. Congress has recognized the Delawares as a distinct people on at least two occasions, in 1904 

and 1972, for the purposes of distributing funds to redress the 

tribe for pre-1867 claims against the United States. Recognition of a tribe for the purpose of redressing historical 

claims, however, does not necessarily imply recognition of 

that tribe as separate political entity for other purposes. 

Congress has permitted any "identifiable group" to assert 

claims against the United States regardless of whether such a 

group constitutes a "tribe" or "band."13 28 U.S.C. § 1505; 

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see Indian Claims Commission Act, Pub. L. 70-726, § 2, 60 

Stat. 1049, 1050 (1946); see also Menominee Tribe of Indians 

v. United States, 388 F.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.Cl. 1967), aff'd, 391 

U.S. 404 (1968); COHEN, supra, at 12.

In concluding that the Delawares did retain sovereign 

immunity, the district court relied on the Supreme Court's 

statement in Weeks that the Delawares "are today a federally 

recognized tribe." 430 U.S. at 77. Yet Weeks cannot be so 

broadly read as to resolve the issue in the instant appeal. 

Nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that it was revisiting 

its earlier conclusion in Delaware Indians and Journeycake

that the Delawares had been "incorporated" into the Cherokee Nation. Rather, the Court simply summarized what it 

understood to be the government's position in that case. Nor 

does the holding in Weeks require the conclusion that the 

Supreme Court has recognized the Delawares as a sovereign 

tribe. Weeks was an equal protection case, addressing pre1867 claims, in which the issue was whether Congress had a 

rational basis for excluding the Kansas Delawares from a 

distribution formula. Id. at 82, 85. So long as the government could articulate some reasoned explanation for the 

exclusion, the Court was required to uphold it. See Heller v. 

Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993); see also FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). The Court concluded that the exclusion was reasonable, based on historical 

practice, administrative convenience, and the fact that the 

Kansas Delawares chose to sever their relations with the 

tribe. Because it was not relevant, the Court did not address 

whether the Cherokee Delawares retained their separate 

existence as a sovereign tribe after 1867.

Even were the court to conclude that the Delawares settled 

in Cherokee territory pursuant to the second provision of 

Article 15 of the 1866 Treaty with the Cherokee Nation and 

retained their separate existence as a tribe, it would still be 

doubtful whether the Delawares could assert sovereign immunity against the Cherokee Nation. The second provision of 

Article 15 permitted a settling tribe to retain its "tribal laws, 

customs, and usages" only insofar as they were "not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the Cherokee Nation." 

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14 Article 16 of the 1866 Treaty with the Cherokee Nation:

provided for taking a body of land out of this part of the 

Cherokee Reservation and removing it wholly from the jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation, making a new reservation for 

the occupancy of the tribe to which it was conveyed; while in 

the case of Indians removed under the provisions of article 15, 

even though the tribal organization was preserved, the general 

jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation over the territory occupied 

by the removed tribe was not disturbed.

Journeycake, 155 U.S. at 205. 

Thus, the Cherokee Nation was to retain "general jurisdiction 

... over the territory occupied by the removed tribe." Journeycake, 155 U.S. at 205. The Supreme Court distinguished 

this arrangement from Article 16, 14 Stat. 804, which provided for the settlement of tribes in Cherokee country west of 

96E of longitude and the termination of Cherokee Nation 

jurisdiction.14 Journeycake, 155 U.S. at 205. The Department suggests that the relationship between the Cherokee 

Nation and the Delawares is analogous to the relationship 

between the United States and the individual States, which 

retain their sovereign status even though they are part of a 

greater whole. The Cherokee Nation responds that just as a 

State cannot assert sovereign immunity against the United 

States, United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965), 

the Delawares cannot assert sovereign immunity against the 

Cherokee Nation, of which they are a part. Whatever the 

merits of this argument, the principles governing the relationship between the federal government and the States do not 

automatically translate to other contexts. See, e.g., Reynolds 

v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 571-77 (1964). In any event, the fact 

that the Delawares are part of the Cherokee Nation supports 

the conclusion that they cannot, at the very least, assert 

sovereign immunity in a lawsuit brought by the Cherokee 

Nation. A contrary interpretation would render the Cherokee "jurisdiction" over the Delawares illusory.

For these reasons, underscoring the doubts about the 

sovereign status of the Delawares in the face of agreement to 

incorporate the two tribes, we conclude that by entering into 

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15 See generally Reid Payton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement 

of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 

1213 (1975). 

quished its tribal identity or sovereignty in relation to the 

Cherokee Nation. It is true that Congress has the authority 

to restore to the Delawares the separate sovereignty that the 

1867 Agreement eliminated, and may delegate that authority 

to the Executive Branch. Federal policy has shifted over 

time,15 and changes in the past 130 years might justify federal 

recognition of the Delawares, either by means of the Final 

Decision, the Part 83 regulations, or another method. It 

remains for the district court to determine the Cherokee 

Nation's challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act to 

the Final Decision of September 27, 1996, including whether 

the Delawares' tribal identity was properly revived by the 

Department in its Final Decision. Accordingly, we reverse 

the order dismissing the complaint and remand the case to 

the district court.

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