Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-00517/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-00517-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILLIP PULLUM,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANTA RITA JAIL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-00517-YGR (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, who recently was released from Santa Rita Jail, has filed the instant pro se civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will 

be granted in a separate order. 

In his complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants: Santa Rita Jail; the Dublin 

California Police Department; and the City of Dublin California. Dkt. 1 at 1. Plaintiff seeks 

monetary damages. Id. at 3.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” To comport with Rule 8, “[s]pecific facts are 

not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 

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Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 

proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The United 

States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal 

conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must be supported by factual 

allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity 

and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of personal involvement in 

the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful 

conduct and the constitutional violation. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 

(9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation omitted). A supervisor therefore generally “is only liable for 

constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the 

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). This includes evidence that a supervisor implemented “a policy so 

deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of 

the constitutional violation.” Redman, 942 F.2d at 1446; see Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 917 

(9th Cir. 2001). 

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B. Legal Claims

Plaintiff presents a variety of allegations that occurred at a hospital on October 19, 2017. 

Dkt. 1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to leave the hospital by “officers (unknown at this 

time),” and he was subject to police brutality, falsely accused with assault, and arrested without 

being read his Miranda rights. Id. at 3-4. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint must be 

dismissed with leave to amend. 

First, to be sure, the use of excessive force by a law enforcement officer in effectuating an 

arrest states a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 

(1989). Here, however, Plaintiff has failed to allege even the most basic facts regarding the 

alleged use of force, such as the location of the use of force, i.e., the name of the hospital. Most 

importantly, he has failed to name individual defendants and to allege what each defendant did 

individually to contribute to the alleged use of excessive force. To state a cognizable claim 

against individual defendants, Plaintiff must “set forth specific facts as to each individual 

defendant’s” role in depriving Plaintiff of his protected rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 

634 (9th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, liability may be imposed only if Plaintiff can allege and show 

that the defendant actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. 

See id. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend the complaint to set forth additional facts regarding 

the alleged use of force, and to set forth specific facts showing that each individual defendant’s 

actions proximately caused a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, provided he can do so in 

good faith. 

Second, Plaintiff will likely be naming Doe Defendants because, as mentioned above, the 

officers’ names are “unknown at this time.” Dkt. 1 at 3. The use of “Jane Doe” or “John Doe” to 

identify a defendant is not favored in the Ninth Circuit, see Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 

642 (9th Cir. 1980), but sometimes is necessary when a plaintiff cannot discover the identity of the 

defendant before filing the complaint. Although the use of a Doe Defendant designation is 

acceptable to withstand dismissal of a complaint at the initial review stage, using a Doe Defendant 

designation creates its own problem: that person cannot be served with process until he or she is 

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identified by his or her real name. Plaintiff must take steps promptly to discover the full name 

(i.e., first and last name) of each of the Doe Defendants and provide that information to the Court 

in his amended complaint. The burden remains on the plaintiff; the Court will not undertake to 

investigate the names and identities of unnamed defendants. If Plaintiff is unable to discover the 

names of certain Doe Defendants by the deadline to file his amended complaint, he may use Doe 

Defendant designations to refer to these Doe Defendants. However, he must number them, e.g., 

John Doe #1, John Doe # 2, etc. so that each numbered John Doe refers to a different person. 

Third, Plaintiff names Santa Rita Jail, the Dublin Police Department, and the City of 

Dublin as Defendants. However, Plaintiff does not allege that these Defendants’ policies or 

customs caused him harm, as is required to state a claim against local governments. See Ybarra v. 

Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 681 (9th Cir. 1984). While local 

governments are “persons” subject to liability under section 1983 where official policy or custom 

causes a constitutional tort, see Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), in 

order to impose municipal liability against these Defendants under section 1983 for a violation of 

constitutional rights resulting from governmental inaction or omission, a plaintiff must show: 

(1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which he or she was deprived; (2) that the 

municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. 

See Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff 

has not done so here. Therefore, Defendants Santa Rita Jail, the Dublin Police Department, and 

the City of Dublin are DISMISSED pursuant to the Court’s power to screen a complaint that “is 

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a), (b).

Fourth, the record is unclear as to whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies 

before filing his federal complaint. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-

134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (“PLRA”), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action 

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shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal 

law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under this 

section, an action must be dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his available administrative 

remedies before he filed suit, even if the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending. See 

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other 

wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion of all “available” remedies is 

mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be “plain, speedy and 

effective.” Id. at 524; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40 & n.5 (2001). Even when the 

prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion 

is a prerequisite to suit. Id. at 741. The purposes of the exhaustion requirement include allowing 

the prison, or the jail in this case, to take responsive action, filtering out frivolous cases and 

creating an administrative record. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 525. A prisoner’s concession to 

nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal, so long as no exception to exhaustion applies. 

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 810 (2003). Therefore, a 

claim may be dismissed without prejudice if it is clear from the record that the plaintiff has 

conceded that he did not exhaust administrative remedies. Id. Here, on his civil rights complaint 

form, Plaintiff simply states that he has not appealed to the highest level of appeal available, and 

that he did not present his claim for review through the jail’s grievance procedure because it was 

“no[t] applicable.” Dkt. 1 at 2. Without any further details regarding his administrative appeal 

process, or any obstacles he may have encountered, there is no showing that Plaintiff has 

exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Therefore, his 

complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in order to prove that he exhausted all of his claims 

before he filed this action. If Plaintiff did exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to any 

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or all of those claims before filing this action, he may amend his complaint to so allege, as set 

forth below.

In sum, even when Plaintiff’s claims are liberally construed, he has failed to provide 

adequate information for the Court to determine whether the allegations in the complaint state 

cognizable claims for relief with respect to each of the defendants who were responsible for the 

alleged constitutional violations. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to allege that he has properly 

exhausted his claims and that they meet proper joinder requirements. Accordingly, Plaintiff will 

be given leave to file an amended complaint in which he clearly links each defendant to the 

alleged injuries for which that defendant is alleged to be responsible. While Plaintiff must, in 

filing his amended complaint, provide sufficient information to give the defendants fair notice of 

the nature of the claims against them, Plaintiff need not provide a lengthy narrative with respect to 

each defendant to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8. Instead, Plaintiff should provide a 

concise statement identifying each defendant and the specific action or actions the defendant took, 

or failed to take, that allegedly caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, as well as 

the injury resulting therefrom. If Plaintiff is unable to discover the names of the “unknown” 

officers by the deadline to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff may use Doe Defendant 

designations to refer to them but he must number them, e.g., John Doe #1, John Doe # 2, etc. so 

that each numbered John Doe refers to a different person. Additionally, Plaintiff should not name 

any defendant who is linked solely in his respondent superior capacity or against whom Plaintiff 

cannot allege facts that would establish supervisorial liability.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in order to give him the 

opportunity to file a simple, concise and direct Amended Complaint which:

a. States clearly and simply each claim he seeks to bring in federal court as 

required under Rule 8, and he should:

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i. Set forth each claim in a separate numbered paragraph;

ii. Identify each defendant and the specific action or actions 

each defendant took, or failed to take, that allegedly 

caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and

iii. Identify the injury resulting from each claim;

b. Explains how he has exhausted his administrative remedies as to each 

claim as against each defendant before he filed this action; 

c. Does not make conclusory allegations linking each defendant without 

specifying how each defendant was linked through their actions;

d. Names each of the Doe Defendants, but if Plaintiff is unable to discover the 

names of certain Doe Defendants by the deadline to file his amended complaint, he may use Doe 

Defendant designations but he must number them, e.g., John Doe #1, John Doe # 2, etc. so that 

each numbered John Doe refers to a different person; and 

e. Does not name any defendant who did not act but is linked solely in his or 

her respondent superior capacity or against whom Plaintiff cannot allege facts that would establish 

either supervisorial or municipal liability.

2. Within twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall file his 

Amended Complaint as set forth above. Plaintiff must use the attached civil rights form, write the 

case number for this action—Case No. C 18-00517 YGR (PR)—on the form, clearly label the 

complaint “Amended Complaint,” and complete all sections of the form. Because the Amended 

Complaint completely replaces the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he 

wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 

915 (1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. If Plaintiff 

wishes to attach any additional pages to the civil rights form, he shall maintain the same format as 

the form, i.e., answer only the questions asked in the “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies”

section without including a narrative explanation of each grievance filed. 

Plaintiff’s failure to file his Amended Complaint by the twenty-eight-day deadline or 

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to correct the aforementioned deficiencies outlined above will result in the dismissal of this 

action without prejudice.

3. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 

while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 

address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 

directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and 

(2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 

se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 

4. The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a blank civil rights form along with a 

copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

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