Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00378/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00378-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 12:2601 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) (findings &amp; purpose)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

U.S. BANK, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, As Trustee Under The 

Pooling And Servicing Agreement Dated 

As Of February 1, 2007, Gsamp Trust 

2007-NC1, Mortgage Pass-Through 

Certificates, Series 2007-NC1,

Plaintiff,

v.

TERI AVAKIAN-HUGHES, TIMOTHY 

WILLIAM HUGHES, And Does 1 

Through 5, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00378-AJB-KSC

ORDER DISMISSING 

DEFENDANTS’ COMPLAINT 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915 

AND DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS MOOT

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Teri Avakian-Hughes and Timothy 

Williams Hughes’ (“Defendants”) motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1(Doc. No. 2.) For the following reasons, the Court sua 

 

1 The named Plaintiff originated this case against Defendants as an unlawful detainer action in the

Superior Court of San Diego, Case No.: 37-2016-0041396-CL-UD-CTL, and the matter was 

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sponte DISMISSES Defendants’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted. As such, the Court DENIES Defendants’ IFP motion AS MOOT. 

LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) allows a court to authorize a lawsuit’s commencement without 

payment of the filing fee if the plaintiff submits an affidavit demonstrating his or her 

inability to pay the filing fee. Such affidavit must include a complete statement of the 

plaintiff’s personal assets. (Id.) An IFP action is subject to dismissal, however, if the Court 

determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages against a defendant who is immune from 

liability for such damages. Id. § 1915(e)(2). The Ninth Circuit has indicated that leave to 

proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is properly granted only when the plaintiff 

has demonstrated poverty and presented a claim that is not factually or legally frivolous. 

See Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, a court 

“may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the fact of the 

proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.” Id. (citing Reece v. 

Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 140 (9th Cir. 1962); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th 

Cir. 1965)). “It is the duty of the District Court to determine whether the proceeding has 

merit[,] and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, the court is bound to deny a 

motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.” Smart, 347 F.2d at 116 (citations 

omitted). 

//

 

subsequently removed to this Court on February 24, 2017. (Doc. No. 1.) However, the operative 

complaint now before the Court is Defendants’ Teri Avakian-Hughes and Timothy Williams Hughes’

action against Plaintiff U.S. Bank N.A. as Trustee, for violations of 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., or the 

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), (Doc. No. 1), and Defendants’ motion to proceed

IFP, (Doc. No. 2.) Notwithstanding the party information listed in the caption, the named Defendants in 

this action are to be treated as plaintiffs for purposes of analyzing their complaint and IFP motion. 

Accordingly, Defendants Teri Avakian-Hughes and Timothy Williams Hughes will be referred to as 

“Plaintiffs” for the remainder of this Order. 

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DISCUSSION

Because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court construes Plaintiffs’ pleadings 

liberally, see Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001), though Plaintiffs are 

still required to plead enough facts to provide notice of what they think Defendant did 

wrong, see Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, 

construing the complaint liberally does not entail adding “essential elements of the claim 

that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982). Upon review of Plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court concludes that it does 

not survive the mandatory screening under § 1915. 

Plaintiffs’ complaint alludes to U.S. Bank’s “disregard” of “the purchase of a 

property that was wrongfully foreclosed,” a “tainted trustee sale,” and an “unjust eviction.” 

(Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiffs contend that certain enumerated requirements of RESPA

were never met and cite to sections 2605(a), (b)(1), and (b)(3)(A)-(D). (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs

further allege that they “never received a notice, no correspondence and no response to 

[their] ‘status’ as a) resident, b) homeowner or c) occupier in the property” and that this 

conduct is violative of U.S. Bank’s duty as a lender and dealer pursuant to RESPA “to 

disclose their relationship to [them].” (Id. ¶ 9.)

Congress enacted RESPA in part to “insure that consumers throughout the Nation 

are provided with greater and more timely information on the nature and costs of the 

settlement process and are protected from unnecessarily high settlement charges by certain 

abusive practices.” 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a). RESPA creates a private right of action for three 

types of wrongful acts: “(1) payment of a kickback and unearned fees for real estate 

settlement services, 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a), (b); (2) requiring a buyer to use a title insurer 

selected by the seller, 12 U.S.C. § 2608(b); and (3) the failure by a loan servicer to give 

proper notice of a transfer of servicing rights or to respond to a qualified written request 

for information about a loan, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f).” Choudhuri v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 

No. C 11-00518 SBA, 2011 WL 5079480, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011) (citing Patague 

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v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 10-03460 SBA, 2010 WL 4695480, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Nov. 8, 2010)).

Even when liberally construed, Plaintiffs’ complaint falls far short of pleading 

sufficient facts to give Defendant notice of their claim. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts 

regarding their status in relation to the subject property, their relationship to U.S. Bank, or 

any detail regarding the circumstances of their grievance, including relevant dates and 

locations. Even though Plaintiffs cite to the specific provision in RESPA regarding the 

nondisclosure of loan transfers and allege Defendant is a lender, (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 8), it

remains difficult for the Court to construe exactly what alleged wrong occurred in light of 

such vague factual allegations. See Grant v. Shapiro & Burson, LLP, et al., 871 F. Supp.

2d 462, 471 (D. Md. 2012) (“beyond [plaintiff’s] legal conclusion that Defendants . . . 

failed to inform [her] of the actual transfer, she sets forth no information at all about this 

issue.”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. See e.g., Delino v. Platinum Comm. Bank, 628 F. Supp. 2d 

1226, 1231—32 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing a RESPA claim brought pursuant to section 

2605(b)(1) for failure to state a claim); Gutierrez v. PNC Mortg., No. 10cv01770-AJBRBB, 2012 WL 1033063, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (finding that a plaintiff alleging 

only that “Defendants failed to notify him when his loan was transferred for servicing” had 

failed to state a claim under section 2605(b)(1)). 

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ 

complaint, (Doc. No. 1), and DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis, (Doc. No. 2). See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(“It is also clear that [§] 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an 

in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”). Plaintiffs have sixty days from 

the date of this order’s issuance to submit a first amended complaint correcting the 

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deficiencies noted herein. At that time, Plaintiffs may resubmit their IFP motion. Failure 

to amend the complaint will result in the Court’s dismissal of this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 28, 2017

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