Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-99026/USCOURTS-ca9-07-99026-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SEAN BERNARD RUNNINGEAGLE, 

Petitioner-Appellant, No. 07-99026

v. D.C. No.  CV-98-01903-PGR CHARLES L. RYAN, Arizona

Department of Corrections, OPINION

Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Paul G. Rosenblatt, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 10, 2011—Pasadena, California

Filed July 18, 2012

Before: Harry Pregerson, Kim McLane Wardlaw, and

Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Pregerson

8233

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 1 of 54
COUNSEL

Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, and Jennifer Y. Garcia and Ashley J. McDonald, Assistant Federal Public

Defenders, Phoenix, Arizona, for petitioner-appellant Sean

Bernard Runningeagle.

Terry Goddard, Attorney General; Kent Cattani, Chief Counsel, Capital Litigation Section; and Jon G. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona, for respondentsappellees Charles L. Ryan et al.

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8237

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 2 of 54
OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

Sean Bernard Runningeagle and his cousin Corey Tilden

were convicted of murdering Herbert and Jacqueline Williams

after they pursued the Williamses into their home in the early

morning of December 6, 1987. The state trial court imposed

a sentence of death upon Runningeagle, but not upon Tilden.

Runningeagle’s direct and collateral appeals were rejected by

the state courts. Runningeagle now appeals the district court’s

denial of his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We

affirm the district court’s decision to deny the petition.

I.

We take the facts as recited by the Arizona Supreme Court

in its 1993 opinion, State v. Runningeagle, 859 P.2d 169

(Ariz. 1993), affirming Runningeagle’s conviction and sentence and denying Runningeagle’s petition for post-conviction

relief:1

In the early morning of December 6, 1987, Run1Because this statement of facts is drawn from the Arizona Supreme

Court’s decision, we afford it a presumption of correctness that may be

rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009). Runningeagle argues against this presumption, citing the Arizona courts’

repeated statements that its recitation of facts in criminal appellate opinions presents the facts “in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.” See, e.g., State v. Dann, 74 P.3d 231, 236 n.1 (Ariz. 2003) (citing

State v. Gallegos, 870 P.2d 1097, 1105 (Ariz. 1994)). Runningeagle’s contention is not supported by any federal case law—and in any event, the

Arizona standard is equivalent to the standard for sufficiency of the evidence federal courts apply on habeas review. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (“[T]he relevant question is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 

8238 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 3 of 54
ningeagle, Tilden, and their two friends Orva and

Milford Antone, were driving around Phoenix. Runningeagle wanted parts for his car, so the foursome

stopped at the Davis house, which had a car parked

outside. Runningeagle, Tilden and Orva got out of

the car, while Milford remained passed out drunk in

the back seat. Runningeagle used his large hunting

knife to remove two carburetors from the Davis car.

Orva put them and an air scoop in the trunk of Runningeagle’s car. Tilden and Runningeagle also stole

a floor jack and tool box. Orva took a bicycle from

the open garage.

Herbert and Jacqueline Williams, an elderly couple,

lived next door to the Davises. Mr. Williams came

out of his house and told the young men to leave or

he would call the police. Orva returned to the car,

but Runningeagle and Tilden approached Mr. Williams. Runningeagle concealed his knife by his side.

Tilden carried a large, black flashlight. Runningeagle

then began to tease and scare Mr. Williams with the

knife. Mr. Williams retreated and told Runningeagle

to put the knife away. Mrs. Williams then came out

of the house and yelled at them. Tilden confronted

Mrs. Williams, argued with her, and then hit her on

the side of the head with the flashlight. Mr. Williams

told them to leave his wife alone, and helped her

back into the house. Runningeagle broke through the

Williams’ door with a tire iron, and he and Tilden

barged in.

The noise awakened a neighbor, who heard Mrs.

Williams crying and the words “bring him in” spoken by a tall, young man he saw standing in the Williams carport. The neighbor called “911,” but by the

time the police arrived, Mr. and Mrs. Williams were

dead. Mr. Williams suffered several head injuries

and five stab wounds, three of which were fatal. Mrs.

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8239

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 4 of 54
Williams also suffered several head injuries, one of

which fractured her skull and was possibly fatal, in

addition to four stab wounds, three of which were

fatal.

The police searched the Williams home. The drawer

in which Mrs. Williams stored her jewelry was open

and some jewelry was missing. They found an empty

purse, blood drops and two bloody shoe print patterns. They discovered Runningeagle’s palm print on

the clothes dryer next to the bodies.

Runningeagle discussed the crimes on several occasions before his arrest. He told his girlfriend that he

had been in a fight with two people and had hit them

“full-force.” He showed her his car trunk full of the

stolen property. He showed the hood scoop and carburetors to another friend. Tilden, too, spoke about

the crimes and informed Runningeagle that an

account of the burglary was on the radio and that

“they got there an hour after we left.”

When the defendants were arrested, the police found,

among other things, the Davis air scoop with Runningeagle’s prints on it, two carburetors, the tool

box, Mrs. Williams’ wallet and college pin, a large

black flashlight with Tilden’s prints on it, and the

Davis bicycle with Runningeagle’s prints on the

wheel rim. A Phoenix Police Department criminalist

matched Runningeagle’s shoes with the bloody shoe

prints found at the Williams house, and also found

that an inked print of Tilden’s shoes made a pattern

similar to other shoe prints at the house.

Runningeagle, Tilden, and Orva Antone were

indicted on two counts of first degree murder, and

one count each of first degree burglary of a residence, second degree burglary of a residence, third

8240 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 5 of 54
degree burglary of a car, theft of property valued

between $500 and $1000, and theft of property valued between $250 and $500. Orva Antone pleaded

guilty to burglary and testified for the state at the

joint trial.

Runningeagle, 859 P.2d at 171-72. 

After a five-week trial, Runningeagle and Tilden were convicted on July 27, 1988. Runningeagle was found guilty of

two counts of first degree murder, two counts of theft, and

one count each of first degree burglary, second degree burglary, and third degree burglary. Id. at 171. Tilden was convicted of the same charges except for third degree burglary.

Id. After several joint sentencing hearings, Runningeagle was

sentenced to death on the murder convictions and to prison

terms on the non-capital convictions. Id. Tilden was sentenced

to life terms on the murder charges and to additional prison

terms, to be served consecutively, on the remaining counts.

Id.

The procedural history of this appeal is both lengthy and

complicated by the many claims asserted in the numerous

state proceedings. However, the district court accurately set

forth the procedural background, and we see no need to replow the same ground:

While [Runningeagle’s] direct appeal was pending

he filed, pro se, a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

[PCR] pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. The Arizona Supreme Court

revested jurisdiction in the trial court to resolve the

PCR. The trial court appointed counsel, who filed a

Supplemental PCR and a Second Supplemental

PCR. The trial court summarily denied postconviction relief. Petitioner moved for rehearing,

which also was denied. Petitioner then sought review

in the Arizona Supreme Court. The Arizona

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8241

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 6 of 54
Supreme Court granted review and consolidated

Petitioner’s PCR claims with his direct appeal

claims. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences and denied postconviction relief. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied.

Petitioner, pro se, moved the Arizona Supreme Court

to discharge his counsel and proceed pro se. The

supreme court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw

and granted Petitioner’s motion to proceed pro se. A

pro se writ of certiorari was filed and denied.

Thereafter, the Arizona Supreme Court issued its

mandate and filed in the trial court a Notice of PCR

on Petitioner’s behalf. The trial court allowed Petitioner to continue to proceed pro se. Petitioner did

not comply with the deadline for filing a second

PCR petition, and the trial court summarily dismissed the post-conviction proceedings.

Next, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of

habeas corpus in [the District] Court. The Court

appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition.

The Court dismissed the amended petition without

prejudice, finding that it presented both exhausted

and unexhausted claims and concluding that it was

not clear whether state post-conviction remedies

remained available.

Meanwhile, Petitioner initiated his third PCR proceeding in state court. His third PCR petition ultimately raised forty claims. The PCR court

summarily dismissed the petition. Petitioner moved

for rehearing, which was denied. Petitioner sought

review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which also

was denied. 

8242 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 7 of 54
Petitioner commenced the instant action by moving

for appointment of counsel. The Court appointed

counsel and Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus. Respondents filed an

Answer limited to the procedural status of Petitioner’s claims.

While the procedural status of Petitioner’s claims

was under advisement, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals issued Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191 (9th

Cir. 2001), calling into question Arizona’s doctrine

of procedural default. This Court deferred its ruling

on the procedural status of Petitioner’s claims pending further review of Smith. The United States

Supreme Court reversed. Contemporaneously, the

Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.

584 (2002), which found Arizona’s death penalty

sentencing scheme unconstitutional because judges

rather than juries determined the factual existence of

the statutory aggravating circumstances that rendered a defendant eligible for the death penalty. In

response, Petitioner moved this Court for a stay of

these habeas proceedings so that he could return to

state court and pursue post-conviction relief based

upon Ring. The Court granted the stay with respect

to Petitioner’s sentencing claims but denied Petitioner’s request to stay his conviction-related claims.

Subsequently, in an interim Order, the [District]

Court ruled on the procedural status of Petitioner’s

conviction-related claims. In 2004, the United States

Supreme Court held that Ring does not apply retroactively. Thereafter [the District] Court vacated its

stay of the sentencing-related claims, issued an

Order resolving their procedural status, and ordered

merits briefing.

On November 27, 2007, the district court denied Runningeagle’s remaining claims on the merits, and concluded

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8243

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 8 of 54
that Runningeagle was not entitled to evidentiary development on any claim. The district court also denied a certificate

of appealability, concluding that “reasonable jurists applying

the standard of review set forth in [its decision] could not

debate its resolution of the merits” of Runningeagle’s claims.

Runningeagle appealed, and on February 24, 2009, a Ninth

Circuit judge, citing “the low standard for granting a certificate of appealability,” certified five issues for appeal. Runningeagle then filed his timely opening brief, addressing four

of those five certified issues.

II.

We review the district court’s denial of the habeas petition

de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Thompson v.

Runnel, 621 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2010). Runningeagle

filed his amended petition after the effective date of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA). Accordingly, the provisions of AEDPA govern

consideration of his claims. Under AEDPA,

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

8244 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 9 of 54
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Federal habeas relief may not be granted

for claims subject to § 2254(d) “unless it is shown that the

earlier state court’s decision ‘was contrary to’ federal law

then clearly established in the holdings of [the Supreme]

Court; or that it ‘involved an unreasonable application of’

such law; or that it ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts’ in light of the record before the state court.”

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citations

omitted).

III.

Runningeagle argues that prosecutors withheld evidence

obtained from Manuel Melendez, a former cell-mate of Tilden’s, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

Relying on Melendez’s testimony at a hearing in a separate

criminal prosecution against Melendez and a note Runningeagle’s first habeas lawyer reportedly found in the state’s

criminal file,2 Runningeagle maintains that Melendez may

have told prosecutors that Tilden committed the murders

alone. Runningeagle cannot make out a Brady claim because

he can only speculate as to what Melendez, who is now

deceased, told prosecutors, and so cannot demonstrate that

2On July 19, 2006, Kyle Marie Wesendorf, an attorney who worked on

Runningeagle’s first habeas petition, signed an affidavit stating that in

early 1995 she found an unsigned note reading “TILDEN THE KILLER”

in the criminal file maintained by the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office.

Runningeagle asked the district court to expand the record to include the

affidavit, which was never presented to the state courts. The district court

refused, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Apart from the evidentiary

concerns—the note, if it existed, was unsigned and ambiguous, and is

linked to prosecutors only by Wesendorf’s speculation—the affidavit is

not relevant because it was not presented to the state courts. Runningeagle

concedes that the note is not itself Brady material, and so does not comprise the basis for a separate Brady claim, but argues that it might support

his claim about Melendez’s statements. However, where, as here, the state

courts adjudicated a claim on the merits, review under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) “is limited to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). 

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8245

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 10 of 54
any withheld evidence would have been favorable or material.

The Arizona courts’ denial of this claim was therefore not an

unreasonable application of or contrary to clearly established

law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

A.

The facts relevant to Runningeagle’s Brady claim are as

follows: Runningeagle, Tilden, and Orva Antone were

arrested on December 19, 1987. While awaiting trial, Tilden,

who was represented by the Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, was housed in a cell with Melendez, who was represented by both the public defender’s office and outside

counsel. Through his public defender, Melendez communicated with prosecutors about the murders of Herbert and Jacqueline Williams, and offered to testify in exchange for a plea

agreement in his own criminal case. After prosecutors had

spoken with Melendez repeatedly, however, Antone agreed to

testify against his co-defendants, and prosecutors told

Melendez that they did not need his testimony.

Because Melendez was a potential witness against Tilden

and both were represented by different counsel from the same

public defender’s office, Tilden’s public defense counsel, on

April 20, 1988, filed a “motion to determine counsel” to

ascertain whether he was required to withdraw from representation of Tilden given the conflict between the public defenders that arose from inmate Melendez’s discussions with

Tilden’s prosecutors. Tilden’s attorney served the motion

upon Runningeagle’s counsel. The motion papers recounted

that prosecutors had been investigating whether Melendez

“had knowledge of information concerning the allegations

against [Tilden] . . . [and] would be in a position to testify

. . . .” Further, the trial judge assigned to Melendez’s criminal

case had ordered Melendez’s outside counsel to take over

Melendez’s representation to screen out the public defender’s

office. However, Tilden’s counsel had been subsequently

informed that the prosecution no longer intended to call

8246 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 11 of 54
Melendez at Tilden’s trial. The trial judge ruled that there was

no conflict of interest because the prosecution had decided not

to call Melendez as a witness. 

Melendez subsequently entered into a plea agreement in his

case, but, following Runningeagle’s and Tilden’s convictions,

moved to withdraw his guilty plea. At a July 29, 1988, hearing on this motion, Melendez testified that he had gained

information about the murders from Tilden and that he had

shared that information during three meetings with homicide

detectives and prosecutors. However, Melendez never testified precisely as to what information Tilden had shared with

him or what information he shared with prosecutors. In April

of 1988, around the time Antone agreed to testify, prosecutors

stopped meeting with Melendez. Melendez testified that “it

was specifically expressed to me by the prosecution and

homicide detectives that they wanted to make the three people

—they didn’t want any one of them to turn over on any one

person” and that “they wanted to convict all three of the

charges.”

Although prosecutors told Tilden’s attorneys about their

meetings with Melendez, they never directly informed Runningeagle’s counsel and they never provided Runningeagle

with any information about what Melendez said. Runningeagle’s attorney received a copy of the motion to determine counsel from Tilden. Therefore, Runningeagle’s counsel

was on notice that Melendez had been communicating with

the prosecutors and was a potential witness against Tilden.

However, he did not investigate further by contacting or interviewing Melendez or attempting to obtain any Brady material

specifically regarding Melendez from the detectives and prosecutors.

B.

As an initial matter, we must determine whether the Arizona courts denied this claim on the merits, or instead deterRUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8247

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 12 of 54
mined that the claim was procedurally defaulted under state

law because Runningeagle failed to raise it until his third state

PCR. We review a denial on the merits under AEDPA to

determine whether it was an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785.

However, we would not be able to review the state court’s

conclusion that this claim was procedurally defaulted under

Arizona law. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801

(1991) (“When a state-law default prevents the state court

from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can

ordinarily not be reviewed in federal court.”). 

In ruling on Runningeagle’s third PCR, the Arizona Superior Court found that the Brady claim was “precluded pursuant to [Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure] 32.2(a)(3),”

which precludes relief based on any ground that “has been

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.” While this ruling was clearly on procedural default

grounds, “[s]tate procedural bars are not immortal . . . [and]

may expire because of later actions by state courts.” Ylst, 501

U.S. at 801. Ruling on Runningeagle’s subsequent request for

clarification, the court did not adhere to its procedural-default

ruling, but instead stated that the Brady claim did not satisfy

the requirements of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure

32.1(e). Rule 32.1(e) provides grounds for post-conviction

relief if “[n]ewly discovered material facts probably exist and

such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence.” Facts are “newly discovered” and “material” if: (1)

they were discovered after trial; (2) the defendant exercised

due diligence in securing them; and (3) they “are not merely

cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony

which was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict or the sentence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e). The court then summarily

dismissed the claim “pursuant to [Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure] 32.6(c),” which requires courts considering postconviction relief petitions to first “identify all claims that are

8248 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 13 of 54
procedurally precluded under this rule,” and then, “after identifying all precluded claims,” dismiss any petition if the court

“determines that no remaining claim presents a material issue

of fact or law which would entitle the defendant to relief

under this rule and that no purpose would be served by any

further proceedings.”

The state court decisions are ambiguous, and so whether

the Arizona courts denied this claim on the merits is a close

question. The Arizona Superior Court’s initial dismissal relying on the procedural default rule of Rule 32.2(a)(3) was followed by a holding relying on Rule 32.1(e), which functions

as a procedural-default rule, but which also addresses the relevant merits of facts discovered after trial. The court then summarily dismissed the claim under Rule 32.6, which addresses

both claims that are procedurally defaulted and claims that do

not succeed on the merits. We rely on the “presumption of a

merits determination when it is unclear whether a decision

appearing to rest on federal grounds was decided on another

basis.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85 (citing Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989)). Accordingly, we presume that the

Arizona Superior Court denied this claim on the merits, and

review that denial to determine whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law.3

Id.

C.

[1] In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused

upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good

faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. Brady

violations have three components: “The evidence at issue

must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpa3We may deny the Brady claim on the merits “notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the

State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8249

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 14 of 54
tory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have

been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently;

and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527

U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). As we have observed, “[t]he terms

‘material’ and ‘prejudicial’ are used interchangeably in Brady

cases.” Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1053 n.9 (9th Cir.

2002) (“Evidence is not ‘material’ unless it is ‘prejudicial,’

and not ‘prejudicial’ unless it is ‘material.’ Thus, for Brady

purposes, the two terms have come to have the same meaning.”). Evidence is material under Brady “when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Cone v.

Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 (2009) (citing United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).

Thus, Runningeagle must demonstrate that Melendez’s

statements were both favorable and material. Strickler, 527

U.S. at 281-82. However, to state a Brady claim, he is

required to do more than “merely speculate” about what

Melendez told prosecutors. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516

U.S. 1, 6, 8 (1995) (“[W]here, as in this case, a federal appellate court . . . grants habeas relief on the basis of little more

than speculation with slight support, the proper delicate balance between the federal courts and the States is upset to a

degree that requires correction.”); see also Barker v. Fleming,

423 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The mere possibility

that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the

defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does

not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.”) (quoting United States v. Croft, 124 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir.

1997)); Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2000)

(rejecting a Brady claim in part because the petitioner’s arguments were speculative); United States v. Abonce-Barrera,

257 F.3d 959, 970 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that evidence was

not material under Brady where the defendant had only “a

hunch” that the evidence would be useful).

[2] While evidence that Tilden alone killed the Williamses

would have been favorable and material, ultimately Run8250 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 15 of 54
ningeagle’s claim that Melendez pointed the finger solely at

Tilden is based only on speculation. The transcript of

Melendez’s hearing on his request to withdraw his guilty plea

shows only that he provided prosecutors with information

obtained from Tilden, and that the government declined to use

him as a witness once Antone, a co-defendant, turned on the

other two defendants. As Runningeagle acknowledges in his

reply brief, “it remains difficult . . . to develop the exact contours of the Brady claim because the State has still never disclosed any of the evidence provided by Melendez . . . .” In

attempting to demonstrate that Melendez’s statements were

favorable, or even admissible, Runningeagle therefore resorts

to inference and supposition. To demonstrate that Melendez’s

statements would have been exculpatory, for example, Runningeagle argues that prosecutors would not have met with

Melendez repeatedly if the statements were useless. Even if

Runningeagle is correct that Melendez’s statements were

valuable, however, Runningeagle still cannot prove what

Melendez actually said. 

[3] While we can infer that Melendez would have implicated Tilden, we have no way of knowing that his testimony

would exculpate Runningeagle—and even if Melendez’s testimony did tend to exculpate, such testimony by a jailhouse

informant, a notoriously unreliable source, was unlikely to

have changed the outcome of the proceedings, either at trial

or, particularly, during sentencing by the judge. See Cone,

129 S. Ct. at 1783; Hon. Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning

for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 Hastings

L.J. 1381, 1383-85 (1996) (discussing the perils of witness

testimony at trial from criminals who “are likely to say and

do almost anything to get what they want, especially when

what they want is to get out of trouble with the law”). The

evidence against Runningeagle was substantial: the police

found Runningeagle’s palm print on the clothes dryer next to

the victims’ bodies and matched Runningeagle’s shoes with

the bloody shoe prints found at the house. Runningeagle, 859

P.2d at 171-72. Runningeagle discussed the crimes several

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8251

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 16 of 54
times before his arrest and told his girlfriend—who testified

at trial, and to whom he showed his car trunk full of the property stolen from the Williamses—that “he had been in a fight

with two people and had hit them ‘full-force.’ ” Id. When the

police arrested Runningeagle, they found the Williamses’

stolen property. Id. The evidence is even stronger in light of

Antone’s testimony that Runningeagle taunted and threatened

the Williamses with his knife, waved the knife at them as they

retreated, and then broke through the Williamses’ door with

a tire iron after the Williamses tried to get away. Id.

4

 There

was more than sufficient evidence upon which a rational trier

of fact could have concluded that Runningeagle was guilty of

the murders. Assuming that Melendez’s statements implicated

Tilden, those statements would have added to the evidence

supporting Tilden’s conviction, and not materially detracted

from the overwhelming evidence of Runningeagle’s guilt.

[4] The failure of Runningeagle’s counsel to investigate

after receiving a copy of Tilden’s motion for determination of

counsel and learning about the existence of an informant who

was willing to testify against Tilden may well have been both

deficient and prejudicial. That said, Runningeagle does not

make a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his

attorney’s decision not to investigate after receiving that

motion, so we do not consider this claim. However, we note

that the government has an independent obligation to provide

Brady material if it exists, and trial counsel did make a

request for all Brady material. At this point in a long procedural history, however, as counsel for Runningeagle concedes, it cannot be known whether exculpatory or impeaching

material exists, or whether it ever existed. As Runningeagle

4Runningeagle argues that in weighing the evidence, we should disregard Antone’s testimony, because the prosecutor’s statement during opening that Antone would testify truthfully constituted improper vouching.

This vouching claim, which the Arizona state court found procedurally

defaulted, was not certified for appeal, and so is not before us. See 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Accordingly, there is no reason for us to disregard

Antone’s testimony. 

8252 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 17 of 54
can only speculate as to what Melendez told prosecutors,

Runningeagle cannot demonstrate that Melendez’s statements

were exculpatory or useful for impeachment, or that there is

a reasonable probability that had Melendez’s statements been

disclosed, the outcome of the trial or of the sentencing would

have been different. Because Runningeagle cannot make out

a Brady claim, the state court’s denial of his claim was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82.

D.

Even if we were to conduct de novo review of the Brady

claim, limited to the sentencing phase,5 we could not agree on

this record that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Cone, 129 S. Ct. at 1783 (citing United

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).

5

Judge Pregerson, in his dissent, agrees that the evidence of Runningeagle’s guilt was overwhelming. With regard to sentencing, he argues

that the Arizona Superior Court applied an erroneous materiality standard

to the Brady claim and that the habeas denial was thus contrary to clearly

established federal law. With respect for Judge Pregerson’s views, however, we are required to use a “highly deferential standard for evaluating

state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the

benefit of the doubt.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. The Arizona court

could have found that no material facts were “newly discovered” under

Rule 32.1(e), and denied the claim on that ground. Runningeagle’s counsel

had contemporaneous notice that Melendez was a potential witness against

Tilden from the motion to determine counsel. Therefore, “the Government

d[id] not commit a Brady violation by not bringing the evidence to the

attention of the defense.” Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quotation omitted). Melendez was alive and available at that time and

Runningeagle could have, through the exercise of minimal diligence,

secured an interview or testimony from him. Any post-trial facts averred

here are thus not “newly discovered” under Rule 32.1; therefore, regardless of the correctness of the materiality standard, under Arizona law, the

Brady claim lacked merit. 

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8253

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 18 of 54
[5] Assuming the existence of a “Melendez file” that contains evidence that Melendez was prepared to testify that Tilden stabbed the Williamses, the trial court’s detailed Special

Verdict makes clear that the likely result of further inculpation of Tilden was a death sentence for Tilden and not a life

sentence for Runningeagle.6 The sentencing judge assumed

that Tilden and Runningeagle were equally responsible for the

murders, but distinguished Tilden’s individual character and

propensity from Runningeagle’s, finding that Tilden had more

mitigating factors in his favor. The lighter sentence meted out

to Tilden was not based solely on Runningeagle’s role as the

stabber. Nothing that Melendez said could have blunted the

overwhelming evidence that Runningeagle did the stabbing,

that he possessed the stolen goods and that he was undeserving of mitigation. The dissent’s view that it may have been

Tilden who did the stabbing has no basis in the evidence.

The judge conducted an individual sentencing determination, considered mitigating factors and “set forth her findings

6At oral argument, when asked about the “Melendez file,” the Warden’s

counsel indicated that “I assume there must be [one], I have no idea . . . .

I’ve never looked through the Melendez file.” Counsel also stated that “we

don’t know what the material was, we don’t know if there was a Brady

violation.” After a criminal conviction is final on direct appeal, prosecutors have no further duty under Brady to produce exculpatory evidence to

a defendant. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320

(2009). However, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that in postconviction proceedings, the State has a continuing duty to produce Brady

material in its files. See Canion v. Cole, 115 P.3d 1261, 1264 (Ariz. 2005)

(“[W]e affirm that the State must disclose clearly exculpatory evidence

that comes to its attention after a trial has concluded.”). Ethical duties

beyond those imposed by Brady and the Due Process Clause may also

compel prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence at any time they

become aware of it. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25

(1976) (“[A]fter a conviction the prosecutor is also bound by the ethics of

his office to inform the appropriate authority of after-acquired or other

information that casts doubt upon the correctness of the conviction.”).

Therefore, if a “Melendez file” exists and contains exculpatory evidence,

the State is ethically required to produce it, whether or not a further evidentiary hearing is held. 

8254 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 19 of 54
separately as to each defendant.” As to Runningeagle, she

found three aggravating factors. First, she found that his conduct before and after the crimes showed that he “clearly was

at the location to rob; he expected pecuniary gain.” Second,

she found that the murders were especially cruel, heinous and

depraved for numerous reasons, including the fact that the

victims both suffered tremendous and horrific “mental and

physical pain” before their deaths, that “Runningeagle first

taunted both victims with his knife,” that “both defendants

laughed as they came back to the car” after killing the Williamses and that Runningeagle “bragged to his girlfriend

about having been in a ‘good fight.’ ” Third, she found that

the offense involved multiple homicides.

As to Tilden, the judge found only two aggravating factors.

First, she found, for the same reasons stated for Runningeagle,

that the murders were especially cruel, heinous and depraved

and that “the force used to beat these two elderly small people

was senseless and gratuitous.” She noted that Tilden did not

relish the murders to the same degree as Runningeagle, who

“on two occasions made reference to a good fight.” Second,

she found that the offense involved multiple homicides. However, the judge specifically found that the State failed to prove

that Tilden sought pecuniary gain from the crimes because the

items stolen from the Williamses were found only in Runningeagle’s car and bedroom.

The judge also addressed the mitigating factors for each of

the defendants, finding “significant and considerable differences” in their “characters, backgrounds and propensities.”

She found that Runningeagle’s age was the only mitigating

factor in his favor, but not one “sufficient to call for leniency.” The judge explained that “based on the evidence presented, it is clear that [Runningeagle] is a highly intelligent

young man, that he was much the leader, the initiator of

events that occurred that evening.” She found that his family

history and mental health history were not mitigating factors,

explaining that Runningeagle “is in touch with reality, [and]

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8255

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 20 of 54
is not suffering from any type of [mitigating] mental disorder

or disease.”

In contrast, the judge found that Tilden’s age and history of

family problems were mitigating factors in his favor. She

found that “unlike defendant Runningeagle, defendant Tilden

has a conscience and the ability to feel remorse and sympathy.” Also unlike Runningeagle, Tilden’s “personality disorder is treatable, he is capable of rehabilitation.” The judge

found that Tilden followed Runningeagle’s lead, both in the

initial theft of car parts and in the subsequent confrontation

and murders. Finally, the judge discussed the lack of any evidence that “Tilden inflicted any of the horrendous stab

wounds.”

[6] The trial judge, before addressing Tilden’s mitigating

circumstances, stated that “[i]n a case such as this where two

people have been convicted of the same brutal murders, it is

natural to want to impose the same sentence, imposing the

same responsibility.” She then explained that her decision not

to impose a death sentence upon Tilden was warranted by the

“significant and considerable differences” in “their characters,

backgrounds and propensities.” She noted that defendant Runningeagle was found by two independent psychologists as

lacking a conscience and extremely dangerous; whereas “Tilden had a conscience, the ability to feel remorse and sympathy.” Most significantly, the trial judge noted that her

comparison of the two defendants’ circumstances and characteristics served “not . . . in aggravation of Runningeagle’s sentence,” but only in mitigation of Tilden’s. Therefore, if

Melendez’s testimony had been used to further aggravate Tilden’s responsibility, only the outcome of Tilden’s sentencing

is likely to have been different. There is thus no “reasonable

probability that, had the [hypothetical] evidence been disclosed, the result of the [sentencing] would have been different.”

8256 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 21 of 54
E.

[7] In pursuing this Brady claim, Runningeagle has at various times asked for additional discovery, expansion of the

record before the district court, and an evidentiary hearing to

determine what Melendez said to prosecutors. The district

court denied those requests under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) after

concluding that Runningeagle failed to exercise due diligence

in developing the facts before the state courts. Runningeagle

renews those requests and argues that the district court erred

because he in fact sought to develop the record but was prevented by the state courts from doing so. Regardless of

whether Runningeagle acted diligently, however, or of

whether he was entitled to a hearing in state court, he is not

entitled to an evidentiary hearing or additional discovery in

federal court because his claim is governed by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). As the Supreme Court has recently held, review

of such claims “is limited to the record that was before the

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. Even if the Arizona courts had not

denied this claim on the merits, but had found the claim procedurally defaulted under state law, Runningeagle would not

be entitled to a hearing, because the state court’s decision

would not be reviewable in federal court. See Ylst, 501 U.S.

at 801. Accordingly, we deny Runningeagle’s request.

IV.

Next, Runningeagle argues that his trial attorney rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to join Tilden’s

motion to sever their trials. The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that trial counsel was not deficient, because the two

defendants did not assert mutually antagonistic defenses. As

there is no clearly established federal law requiring severance

of criminal trials in state court even when the defendants

assert mutually antagonistic defenses, and as Tilden’s and

Runningeagle’s defenses were not in fact mutually exclusive

or antagonistic, the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding was not

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8257

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 22 of 54
an unreasonable application of the standard established in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

A.

On April 22, 1988, Tilden’s counsel filed a motion for severance, arguing that: (1) evidence might be introduced that

would be admissible against one defendant but not against

another; (2) Tilden would be prejudiced by the “much stronger” scientific and physical evidence demonstrating that Runningeagle was guilty; and (3) the co-defendants’ defenses

were “antagonistic, irreconcilable and mutually exclusive to

an extent that in order to believe the core of the evidence

offered on behalf of [Tilden], a jury must disbelieve the core

of the evidence offered on behalf of [Runningeagle].” At a

May 26, 1988 hearing, Runningeagle’s attorney told the judge

that he did not join the motion, and “take[s] no position to

sever.” On June 3, 1988, the trial court denied the motion

after finding “that the evidence expected to be presented at

trial is not ‘so drastically disproportionate nor do the defenses

appear to be so antagonistic,’ if at all antagonistic, to require

severance.”

On July 7, 1988, Tilden’s attorney renewed his motion to

sever, explaining that his cross-examination would “go right

back through, only in more detail, every item taken and every

item where it was found,” and so “effectively assist[ ] the

prosecutor against the co-defendant in my case.” Runningeagle’s attorney again took no position on the motion.

The trial court denied the renewed motion, reasoning, “I don’t

think it’s a situation where you would have to disbelieve one

defense to believe the other. I think you could believe both or

disbelieve both.”

Denying Runningeagle’s petition for post-conviction relief,

the Arizona Supreme Court rejected Runningeagle’s ineffective assistance claim after concluding that the co-defendants’

defenses “were not antagonistic to the point of being mutually

8258 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 23 of 54
exclusive.” Runningeagle, 859 P.2d at 173. Because severance was not required, trial counsel’s “failure to take a position on the motion to sever was not deficient.” Id. Addressing

Tilden’s contention that the trial court erred by denying the

motion, the court further explained:

Tilden’s “alibi of non-presence” defense is not

antagonistic to Runningeagle’s “insufficiency of

state’s evidence” defense. In State v. Cruz, this court

held that:

a defendant seeking severance based on

antagonistic defenses must demonstrate that

his or her defense is so antagonistic to the

co-defendants that the defenses are mutually exclusive. Moreover, defenses are

mutually exclusive within the meaning of

this rule if the jury, in order to believe the

core of the evidence offered on behalf of

one defendant, must disbelieve the core of

the evidence offered on behalf of the codefendant.

See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993)

(holding that mutually antagonistic defenses are not

prejudicial per se). Tilden claimed that he was not

guilty because he was at home on the morning of the

murder. Runningeagle argued that the state’s evidence was insufficient to convict him. The defenses

are unrelated. The jury could have believed both,

one, the other, or neither. The court did not err in

denying the motion to sever.

Runningeagle, 859 P.2d at 178-79.

B.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “a defendant

must show both deficient performance by counsel and prejuRUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8259

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 24 of 54
dice.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1413 (2009).

To establish deficient performance, Runningeagle must show

that his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To

establish prejudice, he must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome.” Id. at 694. “Surmounting Strickland’s high

bar is never an easy task,” Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct.

1473, 1485 (2010), especially in a habeas petition. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 778. In addressing ineffective assistance

claims under § 2254(d), “[t]he pivotal question is whether the

state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking whether defense counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” Id. at

785. 

[8] Runningeagle maintains that the Arizona Supreme

Court correctly identified the controlling legal precedent by

citing to Zafiro, but unreasonably applied that precedent

because the co-defendants’ defenses were in fact mutually

exclusive. Runningeagle, however, “can satisfy the ‘unreasonable application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1) only by showing that

‘there was no reasonable basis’ for the [state] Supreme

Court’s decision.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1402. The

Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a per se rule requiring

severance where two defendants present mutually antagonistic

defenses. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39. Moreover, the

record supports the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion that

the defenses were not in fact mutually antagonistic. 

Runningeagle agrees with the Arizona Supreme Court’s

characterization of the defenses: Tilden claimed he was not

guilty because he had an alibi, and Runningeagle claimed that

the state’s evidence was insufficient to convict. Runningeagle,

859 P.2d at 178-79. When arguing that his client was at home

asleep at the time of the murders, however, Tilden’s attorney

8260 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 25 of 54
highlighted the evidence against Runningeagle—and so, Runningeagle argues, effectively mounted an antagonistic defense.

During his opening, for example, Tilden’s counsel stated:

I don’t represent Mr. Running Eagle.7 And my client’s guilt or innocence does not rest upon his guilt

or innocence. As you can see through my opening

statement, I have used him as a control for my client.

We may become greater adversaries throughout this

process, but it’s not a joint defense.

I represent Corey Tilden, not Sean Running Eagle.

And I am going to show you that the State doesn’t

have the evidence against my client. And my client

is going to get up here and tell you that he was home

sleeping the night that this occurred. And the only

reason he is here is because he lived with his first

cousin and his mother, and that is it. It’s the only

thing that the government has against my client.

During closing arguments, Tilden’s attorney stated that his

client was guilty under the prosecution’s theory “because he

associates with a human-being by the name of Sean Running

Eagle.” He argued that all of the physical evidence linked

Runningeagle to the murders, and none of it pointed to Tilden:

They have nothing, ladies and gentlemen, in terms of

physical evidence [from Tilden] at the scene. They

have Sean’s print on the outside, in the kitchen, in

the utility room, and on the door. Interesting comparison. If this is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, ladies

and gentlemen, what is this? Reasonable doubt?

Lack of sufficient evidence to prove my client

guilty?

7The court reporter misspelled Runningeagle’s name throughout the

trial transcript as “Running Eagle.” 

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8261

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 26 of 54
Tilden’s attorney repeatedly compared the evidence against

Tilden to the evidence against Runningeagle: “[L]et’s compare Sean Running Eagle, Corey Tilden. [The prosecutor] has

stood up here and told you that he has a case of guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt against Sean Running Eagle. The real

question he says is, does he have one against Corey Tilden?

So it works a nice comparison.”

Runningeagle attempts to support his argument that the trial

court was required to sever the co-defendants’ trials by pointing to two decisions in which the Supreme Court has

addressed when or whether federal (rather than, as here, state)

criminal trials of co-defendants should or must be severed. In

United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986), the Court

observed that, with regard to federal defendants, “[i]mproper

joinder does not, in itself, violate the Constitution. Rather,

misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional violation

only if it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant

his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.” In Zafiro, 506 U.S.

at 538-39, the Court held that, under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 14(a), severance is not automatically necessary

even where co-defendants present mutually antagonistic

defenses, because “[m]utually antagonistic defenses are not

prejudicial per se.” A court should grant a severance under

Rule 14 “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would

compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or

prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt

or innocence.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39.

There are two critical problems with Runningeagle’s argument. The first is that, even if he is correct that the codefendants presented mutually antagonistic defenses, we have

explicitly concluded that Zafiro and Lane do not “establish a

constitutional standard binding on the states and requiring

severance in cases where defendants present mutually antagonistic defenses.” Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th

Cir. 2010). In reaching that holding, we found that the statement in Lane regarding when misjoinder rises to the level of

8262 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 27 of 54
constitutional violation was dicta and that Zafiro is not binding on the state courts because it addresses the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 1131-33. Neither decision is

“clearly established Federal law” sufficient to support a

habeas challenge under § 2254. Id.

[9] The second problem with Runningeagle’s argument is

that the Arizona Supreme Court correctly found that Runningeagle’s and Tilden’s defenses were not in fact mutually

antagonistic. As the Court concluded, the jury could have

believed both Tilden’s alibi argument and Runningeagle’s

insufficiency of the evidence argument. Tilden’s defense was

that he was innocent; Runningeagle’s defense rested on the

theory that the state failed to meet its burden of proof. See

Runningeagle, 859 P.2d at 178-79. That Tilden highlighted

the state’s paucity of evidence as to his guilt by focusing on

the physical evidence implicating Runningeagle does nothing

to change this fact. As the jury was explicitly instructed, the

arguments of counsel are not evidence.8 Moreover, any juror

confusion was cured by the trial court’s instruction that

“[e]ach defendant is entitled to have his guilt or innocence as

to each of the crimes charged determined from his own conduct and from the evidence which applies to him if he were

being tried alone.” Id. at 178 (citing Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540-

41). 

[10] Runningeagle, moreover, does not challenge the Arizona court’s conclusion that where severance is not required,

counsel’s choice against taking a position on the severance

motion is not deficient performance. See Runningeagle, 859

P.2d at 173. The Arizona Supreme Court’s determination that

8The jury was instructed: “In the opening statements and closing arguments the lawyers have talked to you about the law and evidence. What

the lawyers said is not evidence but it may help you to understand the law

and the evidence.” 

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8263

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 28 of 54
Runningeagle’s attorney’s performance was not deficient was

not unreasonable.9

V.

Runningeagle also asserts ineffective assistance of counsel

for failure to seek a separate sentencing hearing. He argues

that the joint sentencing proceedings allowed Tilden to

emphasize Runningeagle’s guilt relative to his own, which

prevented the trial court from making the individualized sentencing determination required in a capital case. See Zant v.

Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983).10 The record, however,

demonstrates that Tilden’s attorney, instead of attacking Runningeagle, in fact presented mitigating evidence, and that the

9Runningeagle’s trial attorney later told an investigator that he had not

attempted to sever Runningeagle’s case because he believed that he and

Tilden’s attorney were acting as a team. Runningeagle argues that this

belief was so unreasonable as to render his attorney’s performance deficient. However, attorneys must have “wide latitude” in making “tactical

decisions.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Moreover, even if Runningeagle’s counsel made a poor strategic choice, his performance was

still not deficient, because severance was not required. Because we find

that the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding as to deficiency was not unreasonable, we need not reach the question of whether Runningeagle’s counsel’s choice prejudiced his client. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

10The parties disagree as to whether this claim was procedurally

defaulted; the district court found that it was not, and denied it on the merits. We review procedural default rulings by the district court de novo.

See, e.g., La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001). Runningeagle raised this argument in his first supplemental petition for state

post-conviction relief, but the trial court declined to address it because the

issue of severance was then pending on appeal. Thereafter, Runningeagle

did not clearly raise the argument before the state courts; the Arizona

Supreme Court did not explicitly address the issue. However, we need not

determine whether this claim was procedurally defaulted, because it was

addressed by the district court and has been fully briefed, and we may

therefore exercise our discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) to deny the

claim on the merits, “notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to

exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” See also Gatlin

v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999). 

8264 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 29 of 54
trial court imposed individualized sentences after explicitly

and separately considering the mitigating and aggravating evidence for and against each defendant. 

The district court reviewed this claim de novo because the

Arizona Supreme Court failed to resolve it on the merits,

leaving no state court decision to which to defer. It is not

entirely clear whether we should follow suit, or instead conduct the more deferential AEDPA review. Compare Richter,

131 S. Ct. at 784-85 (“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it

may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on

the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”), with Pirtle v. Morgan, 313

F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002) (federal courts review properly raised claims that were not decided by state courts on the

merits de novo), with Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 991

n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Even when there is no reasoned state

court opinion explaining the denial of a defendant’s claim in

any respect, we ‘must assume that the state court has decided

all the issues and ‘perform an independent review of the

record to ascertain whether the state court decision was objectively reasonable.” ”) (quoting Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d

1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006)). We need not decide this question

on the convoluted procedural history here, however, because

the claim fails under either standard.

[11] “The right to effective assistance of counsel applies

not just to the guilt phase, but ‘with equal force at the penalty

phase of a bifurcated capital trial.’ ” Silva v. Woodford, 279

F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Clabourne v. Lewis, 64

F.3d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir. 1995)). Again, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “a defendant must show both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice.” Knowles, 129 S.

Ct. at 1413. The crux of Runningeagle’s deficiency argument

is that an effective attorney would have recognized that a joint

sentencing proceeding could result in prejudice.11 See Strick11Runningeagle also raises and conflates numerous other claims which

were not certified for appeal and are thus not before us. For example, RunRUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8265

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 30 of 54
land, 466 U.S. at 688 (“[T]he performance inquiry must be

whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all

the circumstances.”).

[12] Ordinarily, defendants have no constitutional or statutory right to separate sentencing proceedings. Instead,

“[g]iven that the imposition of death by public authority is so

profoundly different from all other penalties,” the Supreme

Court has held that the defendants have a right to “an individualized decision . . . in capital cases.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438

U.S. 586, 605 (1978). This means “that the sentencing decision [must] be based on the facts and circumstances of the

defendant, his background, and his crime.” Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 748 (1990). Runningeagle argues that,

because Tilden was able to argue that Runningeagle was the

more culpable party in the jointly held sentencing proceedings, Runningeagle did not receive an individualized sentencing determination, and hence the trial court violated his

Eighth Amendment rights.

[13] Runningeagle’s argument relies on a mischaracterization of the sentencing proceedings. While it is true that Tilden’s attorney suggested that only Runningeagle could be

linked to the stabbing wounds, Tilden’s strategy on the whole

was to present his own mitigation evidence rather than to

blame Runningeagle. Thus, contrary to Runningeagle’s contentions, Tilden’s counsel did not act as a “second prosecutor”

of Runningeagle during sentencing. As the district court accurately recounted:

At sentencing, Tilden presented the testimony of

psychologist Donald Tatro, who opined that Tilden

suffered from a personality disorder but not an antiningeagle argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain

arguments at sentencing, and suggests that the trial court violated his

Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide an individualized sentence.

8266 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 31 of 54
social personality disorder. . . . Following Dr.

Tatro’s testimony, Tilden presented a number of

family and friends who testified about his difficult

family background, his efforts to complete his education, and their opinion that the circumstances of

the crime were out of character for him. During closing argument, Tilden argued that his age — eighteen

— was a statutory mitigating factor, and that other

mitigating circumstances, including his difficult family background, personality disorder, love of family,

and lingering doubt about how much Tilden participated in the murders, called for a lenient sentence.

During closing argument, Tilden focused on his own

mitigation; he did not attack [Runningeagle] by

arguing that he had the more prominent role in the

crimes. 

Moreover, even had Tilden’s attorney sought to place all

the blame on Runningeagle, he was not denied an individualized sentencing determination. The trial court issued a carefully reasoned Special Verdict that separately addressed

Runningeagle’s conduct and background. That court presided

over the trial of the case and heard all of the evidence, held

sentencing hearings, and took additional evidence in the form

of letters from the victims’ family and friends, letters from the

defendants’ family and friends, letters from Runningeagle

himself, three psychological reports from three separate psychologists, the State and defense sentencing memoranda, and

the Pre-Sentence Report by the Probation Office. Had severance been granted, there is no indication that the trial court

would have considered any different evidence or reached any

other decision. 

Moreover, the sentencing court was fully aware of its

responsibility to impose individualized sentences. At the sentencing hearings, the trial court stated it was “very mindful of

the constitutional requirement to individualize and to individually determine all sentencings,” noting that this was particuRUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8267

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 32 of 54
larly true in capital cases. After sentencing Runningeagle and

turning to Tilden, the court again mentioned that it was

“mindful of the need to individualize the sentences.” Shortly

thereafter, declining to impose death upon Tilden, the court

observed that it had been “reminded over and over by the

death penalty cases” it had reviewed that it was “bound and

mandated by our Constitution and by justice to individualize

the sentences and to consider and take into account not only

the circumstances of the offense, but the character and propensities of each of the offenders.” The court added that “this

required not only a comparison of the actions and degree of

participation of each defendant, but a comparison of their

characters, backgrounds, and propensities. In making this

comparison I find significant and considerable differences.”

Both the hearing transcripts and the Special Verdict demonstrate that the trial court understood the different levels of culpability of, and separately considered the aggravating and

mitigating evidence for, each defendant. The trial court found

that Runningeagle played the lead role in the murders and was

incapable of feelings such as remorse. Runningeagle may disagree with these findings, but having a separate sentencing

proceeding would not have changed them. Moreover, the

court took great pains to explain why she imposed only a sentence of life imprisonment upon Tilden, instead of the death

sentence imposed upon Runningeagle. Noting that there were

“significant and considerable differences” in the characters,

backgrounds, and propensities of the two defendants, the trial

court stated that it had “not used these differences in aggravating circumstances against Defendant Running Eagle, but have

only used them in considering the mitigating circumstances”

relevant to Tilden. The judge further explained the differing

roles they played in the murders:

The Court must consider the degree of participation

by Defendant Tilden in these brutal murders. There

is no doubt that Defendant Tilden acted brutally in

the manner and strength with which he struck Mrs.

8268 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 33 of 54
Williams, and there is also no doubt that he struck

Mr. Williams. However, there is no evidence to indicate Defendant Tilden inflicted any of the horrendous stab wounds. All of the evidence presented

pointed to Defendant Running Eagle who owned the

survival knife, whose palmprint was found in the

laundry room above the bloody bodies. It was the

Defendant Running Eagle who initiated the cruising,

was involved in the removal of the scoop and the

carburetors when Mr. Williams first confronted the

defendants. The evidence points to Defendant Running Eagle as the intelligent, charismatic leader that

younger cousin Defendant Tilden followed.

[14] Addressing a similar ineffective assistance claim by

an Indiana defendant who argued that his counsel should have

moved for severed sentencing proceedings, the Seventh Circuit found that there was no prejudice where, despite the

habeas petitioner’s “contentions, there is no evidence that in

a separate proceeding, the . . . judge would have balanced the

aggravating and mitigating factors differently.” Rastafari v.

Anderson, 278 F.3d 673, 691 (7th Cir. 2002). We agree with

this approach, and similarly find that there is no evidence that

the sentencing court would have balanced the aggravating and

mitigating factors differently had the defendants been

afforded separate sentencing proceedings.

VI.

Runningeagle argues that the Arizona Supreme Court

unreasonably rejected his claim that statements made by the

prosecution violated his right to due process. In his opening

statement, the prosecutor declared: 

What happened in the next 10, 15, 20 minutes [after

Runningeagle began stealing pieces of the car] can

only be described as unspeakable horror. It was evil.

What happened in that next 10, 15, 20 minutes ended

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8269

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 34 of 54
everything for Jackie and Herbert Williams. And the

cause and the reason that it ended is right here in the

courtroom. The evil is among us. 

Runningeagle, 859 P.2d at 173-74. Runningeagle objected to

these statements, and the trial court sustained the objection,

but denied Runningeagle’s subsequent motion for a mistrial.

Id. In his petition for post-conviction relief, Runningeagle

argued that these statements were “an appeal to passion and

prejudice,” and that he was entitled to a new trial. Id. Denying

Runningeagle’s petition, the Arizona Supreme Court held that

while the prosecutor’s words constituted argument, and thus

were objectionable, the argument was “merely a characterization of the evidence” rather than an appeal to passion or prejudice. Id. Runningeagle contends that, contrary to the Arizona

Supreme Court’s conclusion, these comments were directed

toward his character rather than to the nature of the crimes,

and therefore infected his trial with unfairness, as the jury

heard these comments before hearing the evidence. 

Runningeagle might well be correct about the true import

of the prosecutor’s comments. But see Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974) (“[A] court should not lightly

infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have

its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through

lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora

of less damaging interpretations.”). Even if the Arizona

Supreme Court unreasonably viewed all of the prosecutor’s

comments as characterizations of the evidence rather than

characterizations of the defendants, however, to prevail on

habeas review under Richter, Runningeagle must demonstrate

that any “arguments or theories . . . [that] could have supported” the state court’s ultimate decision—here, its determination that the prosecutor’s remarks did not violate

Runningeagle’s due process right to a fair trial—would have

been an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Because the trial court

sustained Runningeagle’s objection and repeatedly instructed

8270 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 35 of 54
the jury that the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence, and

because the weight of the evidence against Runningeagle was

substantial, Runningeagle cannot do so. 

[15] “Improper argument does not, per se, violate a defendant’s constitutional rights.” Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d

1095, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Thompson v. Borg, 74

F.3d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1996)). “[I]t is not enough that the

prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally

condemned.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181

(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[t]he relevant question is whether the prosecutors’ comments ‘so

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ” Id. (quoting Donnelly, 416

U.S. at 643). In Darden, during closing, the prosecutor

referred to Darden as an “animal,” and said that he should not

be allowed out of a cell unless he was on a leash and that he

wished that he could see Darden “sitting here with no face,

blown away by a shotgun.” Id. at 181-83 nn.11 & 12. Nevertheless, the Court found that these improper statements did

not deprive Darden of a fair trial, in part because of the substantial evidence against Darden, and because the trial court

instructed the jury that the arguments made by counsel were

not evidence. See id. at 181-83; see also Donnelly, 416 U.S.

at 645 (finding that an improper statement by a prosecutor

during closing argument did not amount to a due process violation in part because the judge instructed the jury that the

remark was not evidence); Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979,

998 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that prosecutorial misconduct did

not amount to a due process violation where the trial court

gave an instruction that the attorneys’ statements were not

evidence and where the prosecutors presented substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt). 

[16] The trial judge sustained Runningeagle’s objection to

the improper statements. Just as in Donnelly and Darden,

moreover, the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury regarding the nature of the attorneys’ arguments. Both before openRUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8271

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 36 of 54
ing statements and after the close of the trial, the court

instructed the jurors that what the attorneys said in opening

was not evidence, that they should decide the case only on the

evidence, and that they should not be influenced by sympathy

or prejudice. Again as in Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-83, the evidence against Runningeagle was substantial, and included,

among other things, his palm print on the clothes dryer next

to the Williamses’ bodies and his own statements about the

crimes. Runningeagle, 859 P.2d at 171-72. The Arizona

Supreme Court’s determination that the prosecutor’s comments, while improper, did not amount to a due process violation, was therefore not an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). That the

Arizona Supreme Court did not cite to either Donnelly or

Darden, the most relevant Supreme Court opinions, is immaterial. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784 (“And as this Court has

observed, a state court need not cite or even be aware of our

cases under § 2254(d).”) (citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3,

8 (2002) (per curiam)). 

VII.

We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Runningeagle’s habeas petition and request for an evidentiary

hearing.

AFFIRMED.12

12We address Runningeagle’s March 26, 2012 motion for a limited

remand of issues not before us in an order filed concurrently with this

opinion. 

8272 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 37 of 54
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

“A rule . . . declaring ‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must

seek,’ is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to

accord defendants due process.”

Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004).

In the early morning hours of December 6, 1987, in Phoenix, Arizona, two teenagers committed a horrible and senseless crime. Petitioner Sean Bernard Runningeagle and his codefendant, Corey Tilden, burglarized the home of Herbert and

Jacqueline Williams. Herbert and Jacqueline Williams were

present at the time of the burglary, and, in the course of the

burglary, one of these two teenagers stabbed and killed the

Williamses. 

Runningeagle and Tilden were tried together in Maricopa

County Superior Court. Both were convicted of two counts of

first degree murder. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge

sentenced Tilden to life imprisonment but sentenced Runningeagle to death.1

 The judge’s decision to spare Tilden’s life

was based primarily on the judge’s view that it was Runningeagle who stabbed the victims. What the trial judge did

not have before her, and indeed no court has ever had before

it, are the statements Tilden made about his role in the murders to his cellmate, Manuel Melendez. Prosecutors and

police spoke with Melendez five times in the weeks leading up

to Runningeagle’s trial, but never provided Melendez’s potentially exculpatory statements to Runningeagle. 

1Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, trial judges

in Arizona determined mitigating and aggravating circumstances and

decided whether a death sentence should be imposed. 536 U.S. 584, 589

(2002). In Ring, the Supreme Court held that this procedure violated the

Sixth Amendment’s Right to a Trial by Jury. Id. Ring, however, is not

retroactive to cases on federal habeas review. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542

U.S. 348, 358 (2007). 

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8273

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 38 of 54
Runningeagle has diligently sought this information from

prosecutors for more than twenty years, to no avail. On April

18, 1988, three months before trial, Runningeagle’s counsel

filed a motion requesting that prosecutors provide “all material or information which tends to mitigate or negate [Runningeagle’s] guilt as to the offense charged, or which would

tend to reduce [his] punishment therefor . . . .” Despite this

request, the prosecution failed to provide Melendez’s statements to Runningeagle. 

In his state post-conviction review (“PCR”) proceedings,

Runningeagle raised a Brady claim and asked for access to the

court’s subpoena power and for an evidentiary hearing, so he

could finally obtain Melendez’s statements. But the state PCR

court summarily denied Runningeagle’s Brady claim, without

first requiring prosecutors to disclose Melendez’s statements.

The court based its denial on Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(e), which requires the petitioner to establish that

“[n]ewly discovered material facts probably exist and such

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence.”

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e) (emphasis added).

In his federal habeas proceedings, Runningeagle asked for

discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Like the state PCR

court, the district court denied Runningeagle’s Brady claim

without first requiring prosecutors to disclose Melendez’s statements.2

 Runningeagle then appealed the district court’s denial

of habeas relief to our court.

2

In the district court, Runningeagle made discovery requests for documents containing Melendez’s statements from the police department, the

county attorney’s office, the sheriff’s office, and the county jail. Runningeagle also requested that the court afford him the opportunity to

depose investigators and detectives who had spoken with Melendez. The

district court denied all of Runningeagle’s discovery requests on the

ground that Runningeagle was not “diligent” in attempting to develop the

facts of his claim in state court, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). The

district court’s ruling was incorrect. Runningeagle was diligent in attempting to develop the factual basis of his claim in state court. Before the state

8274 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 39 of 54
During oral argument before our court, counsel for the government acknowledged there may be a “Melendez File” containing exculpatory evidence that, to this day, has still not

been disclosed to Runningeagle. Oral Argument Audio at

33:40-34:01; 36:28-37:44. The government attorney, however, took the remarkable position that Runningeagle was not

entitled to this exculpatory information. Oral Argument Audio

at 33:40-34:01; 36:28-37:44. 

The majority opinion, like every court to have adjudicated

Runningeagle’s claims, denies Runningeagle’s Brady claim

without first requiring prosecutors to disclose Melendez’s

statements. Maj. Op. at 8257. In so holding, the majority

opinion concludes that the state PCR court’s denial of Runningeagle’s Brady claim, without any discovery or evidentiary

development, was not “contrary to” or an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Maj. Op. at 8245-46. The majority opinion further concludes that, under Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.

Ct. 1388 (2011), Runningeagle is not entitled to discovery of

Melendez’s statements. Maj. Op. at 8257. 

In my view, the state PCR court’s use of “probably would

have changed the verdict or sentence” as a standard for Brady

materiality was “contrary to” clearly established Supreme

Court case law. Under clearly established Supreme Court case

law, the standard for materiality under Brady is whether

PCR court, Runningeagle raised a Brady claim and requested an evidentiary hearing. He also asked for access to the PCR court’s subpoena power,

and attached supporting documents to his PCR Petition. Runningeagle’s

attempts to develop the record before the state PCR court were more than

sufficient to satisfy 2254(e)(2)’s diligence requirement. See Stanley v.

Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 624 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A petitioner who has previously sought and been denied an evidentiary hearing has not failed to

develop the factual basis of his claim and therefore satisfies

§ 2254(e)(2).”); West v. Ryan, 608 F.3d 477, 484-85 (9th Cir. 2010)

(same). 

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8275

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 40 of 54
“there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,

682 (1985). A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, but is less than

the preponderance more-likely-than-not standard. Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). 

Because Runningeagle has satisfied § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause, we must review Runningeagle’s Brady claim

“without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires.” Panetti

v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007). Under this de novo

review, I would remand to the district court for discovery on

Runningeagle’s sentencing-phase Brady claim. In my view,

Runningeagle has established “good cause” for discovery

under Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.3

AEDPA’s FRAMEWORK

Because Runningeagle is a state prisoner challenging his

conviction and death sentence in federal court, the strictures

of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) apply to his claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Lindh

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). The AEDPA provides, in

pertinent part, that a state prisoner may not obtain federal

habeas relief for any claim “adjudicated on the merits” by a

state court unless he can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim:

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

3Like the majority, I would affirm the district court’s denial of habeas

relief on Runningeagle’s guilt-phase Brady claim. The evidence of Runningeagle’s guilt was overwhelming. Accordingly, Runningeagle cannot

establish “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed

to the defense, the result of the [guilt-phase] would have been different.”

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). I also concur in the

majority’s resolution of Runningeagle’s non-Brady claims. 

8276 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 41 of 54
established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States . . . 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). This section contains two independent clauses: a “contrary to” clause and an

“unreasonable application” clause. See Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). A state prisoner is not required

to satisfy both clauses of Section 2254(d)(1). Terry Williams,

529 U.S. at 404-05. He need only show that the state court’s

decision was “contrary to” federal law, or, an “unreasonable

application” of federal law. Id.

A. The “Contrary To” Clause

A state court’s “use of the wrong legal rule or framework

[ ] constitute[s] error under the ‘contrary to’ prong of

§ 2254(d)(1).” Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 734 (9th Cir.

2008) (en banc); see also Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640

(2003) (holding that a state court decision is “contrary to”

clearly established federal law if the state court “applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme

Court] cases.”) (internal marks omitted). In Terry Williams,

the Supreme Court gave the following example of a state

court decision that would be “contrary to” clearly established

federal law:

A state court decision will certainly be contrary to

our clearly established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in our cases. Take, for example, our decision in

Strickland v. Washington. If a state court were to

reject a prisoner’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not

established by a preponderance of the evidence that

the result of his criminal proceeding would have

been different, that decision would be [contrary to]

our clearly established precedent because we held in

Strickland that the prisoner need only demonstrate a

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8277

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 42 of 54
“reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

529 U.S. at 405-06 (internal citations omitted). In the context

of a Brady claim, our court has held that a state court’s use

of the wrong standard for assessing materiality will result in

a decision that is “contrary to” clearly established federal law.

See Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the state court’s use of a “probably change the result”

standard for materiality was “contrary to” clearly established

federal law).

B. The “Unreasonable Application” Clause

A state court’s decision will constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if the “state court’s

application of clearly established federal law was objectively

unreasonable.” Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.

In Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), the

Supreme Court discussed use of the “unreasonable application” clause when a state court issues a summary denial on the

merits. The Court explained that, when a state court issues a

summary denial on the merits, the “unreasonable application”

clause requires that:

[A federal habeas court] determine what arguments

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must

ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could

disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this

Court.

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. The Court then held that, if fairminded jurists could disagree with the hypothetical arguments

generated by the federal habeas court, then the state court’s

8278 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 43 of 54
summary denial will not be an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established federal law. Id.

C. De Novo Review in Federal Court

If a state prisoner is able to satisfy Section 2254(d)(1)’s

“contrary to” clause or its “unreasonable application” clause,

the federal habeas court must then review the state prisoner’s

claim de novo. Frantz, 533 F.3d at 735; see also Lafler v.

Cooper, No. 10-209, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 932019, at *11

(2012) (reviewing habeas petitioner’s ineffective assistance

claim de novo after finding that state court’s adjudication of

the claim was “contrary to” clearly established federal law);

Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (holding

that, when the requirement set forth in § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied, “[a] federal court must then resolve the claim without the

deference AEDPA otherwise requires.”).

With AEDPA’s framework in mind, and with an understanding that this framework was designed to limit and restrict

a federal court’s ability to issue the Great Writ in criminal

matters originating in state courts, it is time to consider

whether Runningeagle is entitled to discovery on his Brady

claim.

DISCUSSION

I. The State PCR Court’s Denial of Runningeagle’s

Brady Claim Was “Contrary To” Clearly Established

Federal Law Because the State PCR Court Applied

the Wrong Standard for Assessing Materiality Under

Brady

Under Section 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause, a state

court’s “use of the wrong legal rule or framework [ ] constitute[s] error . . . .” Frantz, 533 F.3d at 734; see also Price,

538 U.S. at 640. Here, the state court’s use of the wrong legal

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8279

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 44 of 54
standard for assessing materiality under Brady was “contrary

to” clearly established federal law. 

Under clearly established Supreme Court case law, the

standard for materiality under Brady is whether “there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed

to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).

A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, but is less than the preponderance more-likely-than-not standard. Kyles v. Whitley, 514

U.S. 419, 434 (1995); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. This

“reasonable probability” standard was not the standard

employed by the state PCR court. 

The state PCR court denied Runningeagle relief on his

Brady claim, as well as further evidentiary development on

the Brady claim, based on Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(e). Rule 32.1(e) provides for relief when “newly

discovered material facts probably exist and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence.” (emphasis

added). This standard mirrors the standard under Rule 33 of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for granting a new

trial based on newly discovered evidence. See United States

v. George, 420 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that a

new trial under Rule 33 requires that the new evidence

“would probably result in acquittal”) (emphasis added).4

4The majority takes inconsistent positions on whether the state PCR

court reached the merits of Runningeagle’s Brady claim. First, the majority contends that Runningeagle’s Brady claim is not procedurally

defaulted because the state PCR court reached the merits of Runningeagle’s Brady claim and denied Runningeagle relief on Brady materiality grounds rather than on one of the state law procedural grounds listed

in Rule 32.1(e). Maj. Op. at 8249. Several pages later, however, the majority contends that the state PCR court’s use of an erroneous materiality

standard was not “contrary to” clearly established federal law because the

state PCR court could have denied Runningeagle relief based on one of the

state law procedural grounds listed in Rule 32.1(e). Maj. Op. at 8253 n.5

8280 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 45 of 54
The state PCR court’s use of a “probably would have

changed the verdict or sentence” standard for determining

materiality under Brady was contrary to clearly established

Supreme Court case law. The Supreme Court has explained

time and time again that the test for materiality under Brady

is less onerous than the standard for obtaining a new trial

under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme

Court held that, under Brady:

[T]he defendant should not have to satisfy the severe

burden of demonstrating that newly discovered evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal. If

the standard applied to the usual motion for a new

trial based on newly discovered evidence were the

same when the evidence was in the State’s possession as when it was found in a neutral source, there

would be no special significance to the prosecutor’s

obligation to serve the cause of justice. 

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111 (emphasis added). See also Bagley,

473 U.S. at 680-81 (“The standard of materiality applicable in

the absence of a specific Brady request is therefore stricter

than the harmless-error standard but more lenient to the

(contending that the state PCR court could have denied relief based on

Rule 32.1(e)’s procedural requirement that evidence be “newly discovered”). I agree with the first proposition put forth by the majority: that the

state PCR court reached the merits of the Brady claim and denied relief

on the merits rather than one of the state law procedural grounds listed in

Rule 32.1(e). Where, as here, a state court decision is interwoven with federal law and “the adequacy and independence of any possible state law

ground is not clear from the face of the [state court] opinion, [the federal

court] will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court

decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law

required it to do so.” Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1201-02 (2010)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.

1032, 1040-41 (1983)). 

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8281

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 46 of 54
defense than the newly-discovered-evidence standard.”)

(emphasis added).

Our court has previously held that a state court’s use of the

wrong standard for assessing materiality under Brady will

result in a state court decision that is “contrary to” clearly

established federal law. In Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107 (9th

Cir. 2003), our court reviewed a state court denial of a Brady

claim where the state court required the petitioner to show the

evidence suppressed “be such as will probably change the

result if a new trial is granted.” Id. at 1118 (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks omitted). In finding that the state

court decision was “contrary to” clearly established Supreme

Court case law, our court explained that:

The steep hurdle set by the state court runs contrary

to the materiality test that has been set out by the

Supreme Court. In Bagley, the Court explained that

evidence is material if there is a “reasonable probability” that a different outcome would have occurred

had the evidence been disclosed, meaning that there

was a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” The Court, in arriving at the

standard, made a point of distinguishing the stricter

“newly discovered evidence” standard of the type

applied by the Oregon state court. 

Id. (internal citations omitted). Here, as in Bailey, the steep

hurdle set by the state PCR court runs “contrary to” clearly

established federal law. See also Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at

405-06 (noting that a state court’s use of the wrong standard

in assessing prejudice under Strickland would be an example

of a state decision “contrary to” clearly established Supreme

Court case law).5

5The Supreme Court’s decision in Richter does not affect analysis under

the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1). Richter concerned § 2254(d)(1)’s

“unreasonable application” clause, not the “contrary to” clause. See Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785 (“The court of appeals lengthy opinion [ ] discloses

an improper understanding of § 2254(d)’s unreasonableness standard

. . . .”) (emphasis added). 

8282 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 47 of 54
II. Because Runningeagle has Satisfied Section

2254(d)(1)’s “Contrary To” Clause, Runningeagle’s

Brady Claim is Subject to De Novo Review in Federal

Court

Once a state prisoner satisfies Section 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause or its “unreasonable application” clause, the

state prisoner’s habeas claim is subject to de novo review in

federal court. See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 953; Frantz, 533 F.3d

at 735. Here, the state PCR court’s denial of Runningeagle’s

Brady claim was “contrary to” clearly established federal law

because the state PCR court applied the wrong standard for

assessing materiality under Brady. Accordingly, Runningeagle’s claim is subject to de novo review because he has

satisfied Section 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause. 

III. Pinholster Does Not Bar Further Evidentiary 

Development for Habeas Claims Subject to De Novo

Review 

The majority relies on the Supreme Court’s recent decision

in Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), for the proposition that Runningeagle is not entitled to discovery in federal

court. Maj. Op. at 8257. Pinholster, however, does not apply

to Runningeagle’s Brady claim because Runningeagle’s

Brady claim is subject to de novo review.

In Pinholster, the Supreme Court held that a federal habeas

court’s “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record

that was before the state court . . . .” 131 S. Ct. at 1398. Pinholster, however, did not address what happens after a habeas

petitioner has overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1).

Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that, once a petitioner has

satisfied § 2254(d)(1) “[a] federal court must then resolve the

claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires.”

Panetti, 551 U.S. at 953; see also Frantz, 533 F.3d at 735.

Here, as discussed above, Runningeagle’s claim is subject

to de novo review because he has satisfied Section

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8283

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 48 of 54
2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause. It is under this de novo

review that a state prisoner can receive discovery in federal

court.

IV. Runningeagle is Entitled to Discovery on his

Sentencing-Phase Brady Claim

The majority concludes that discovery of Melendez’s

potentially exculpatory statements is unnecessary because

there is no “reasonable probability” that Runningeagle would

have received a life sentence had Melendez implicated Tilden

as the stabber. Maj. Op. at 8253. This is so, the majority contends, because “the likely result of further inculpation of Tilden was a death sentence for Tilden and not a life sentence for

Runningeagle.” Maj. Op. at 8254 (emphasis added). I respectfully disagree for the following reasons.

A. The Majority Incorrectly Applies the Standard for a

Ruling on the Merits Instead of the Standard for Discovery Under Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254

Habeas Cases

First, the majority does not address the relevant legal standard for granting discovery in a habeas proceeding. Under the

applicable standard, a habeas petitioner is entitled to discovery under Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases

when “specific allegations before the court show reason to

believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief

. . . .” Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09 (1997)).

Our court has also held that discovery should be authorized

under Rule 6(a) “when discovery [is] essential for the habeas

petitioner to develop fully his underlying claim.” Pham, 400

F.3d at 743 (internal marks omitted); see also Jones v. Wood,

114 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997) (authorizing discovery

because it was “essential” for the habeas petitioner to “develop fully” his underlying claim). Thus, to obtain discovery,

8284 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 49 of 54
a habeas petitioner is not required to conclusively establish

entitlement to relief. To obtain discovery, the habeas petitioner need only show that he “may, if the facts are fully

developed, be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief,”

Pham, 400 F.3d at 743 (internal marks omitted), or that discovery is “essential” to develop the underlying claim. Id.

Here, there is reason to believe that Runningeagle may, if

the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he

is entitled to relief on his sentencing-phase Brady claim.

Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09. Runningeagle has alleged that the

prosecution withheld documents detailing statements codefendant Tilden made to Melendez about Tilden’s role in the

murders. The trial judge’s decision to spare co-defendant Tilden from a death sentence was based, in large part, on the trial

judge’s view that Runningeagle was the one who inflicted the

stab wounds. Thus, statements from Melendez that implicated

Tilden as the stabber would be crucial mitigating evidence for

Runningeagle.

Moreover, the government did acknowledge during oral

argument before our court that there may be a “Melendez

File” containing exculpatory evidence that was never turned

over to the defense. Oral Argument Audio at 33:40-34:01;

36:28-37:44. In these circumstances, discovery of exculpatory

information in the “Melendez File” is “essential” for Runningeagle to “develop fully” his sentencing-phase Brady

claim. See Pham, 400 F.3d at 743.

B. The Evidence that Runningeagle was the Stabber Was

Not “Overwhelming” 

Next, the majority contends that Runningeagle is not entitled to discovery of Melendez’s statements because “[n]othing

that Melendez said could have blunted the overwhelming evidence that Runningeagle did the stabbing” and that there is

“no basis in the evidence” to conclude that Tilden may have

been the stabber. Maj. Op. 8254. I agree with the majority

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8285

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 50 of 54
insofar as there was “overwhelming” evidence that Runningeagle and Tilden entered the Williams’ home, that Runningeagle and Tilden committed first-degree burglary, and

that Runningeagle and Tilden were guilty of first-degree murder. But I disagree that there was “overwhelming” evidence

that it was Runningeagle, and not Tilden, who stabbed the

victims. The evidence that Runningeagle was the stabber was

far from compelling. 

The trial judge’s view that it was Runningeagle, and not

Tilden, who stabbed the victims, apparently came from three

items of evidence: 

1. The Palmprint: Runningeagle’s palmprint was

found on a dryer inside the Williams’ home.

2. The Knife: Runningeagle owned a large survival knife that was similar to the type of knife used

to kill the victims.

3. Co-Defendant Orva Antone’s Testimony: CoDefendant Orva Antone struck a deal with the prosecution and agreed to testify for the prosecution in

exchange for the prosecution dismissing murder

charges against him. On direct examination, Antone

testified that he witnessed Tilden strike Ms. Williams

with a flashlight and observed Runningeagle “tease”

Mr. Williams with a knife. Antone, however, also

testified that both Tilden and Runningeagle entered

the Williams’ home, and that he did not see whether

it was Tilden or Runningeagle who inflicted the stab

wounds. On cross-examination, Antone admitted

that he was intoxicated at the time of the murders,

that he originally told police that he didn’t remember

anything about the murders because he was drunk,

that he only knew that the Williamses were stabbed

because police detectives told him, and that detectives told him that Runningeagle was the stabber.

8286 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 51 of 54
Given this record, statements from Melendez that implicated

Tilden as the stabber could have raised enough doubt in the

trial judge’s mind about the identity of the stabber so as to

warrant sparing Runningeagle’s life.

To be sure, Melendez, like Antone, had credibility problems. Melendez was a jailhouse informant and Antone was an

accomplice in the murders. See Hon. Stephen S. Trott, Words

of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47

Hastings L.J. 1381, 1383-85 (1996) (noting that accomplices,

co-conspirators, snitches, and informers make for a “not-soreliable” witness). But there is no reason to think that the trial

judge would give greater weight to the testimony of a murder

accomplice who struck a deal with the prosecution than the

testimony of a jailhouse informant. 

Indeed, perhaps the most perplexing aspect of the majority

opinion is its inconsistent treatment of Melendez’s credibility.

First, the majority opinion contends that, had Melendez testified that Tilden was the stabber, such testimony was unlikely

to be believed because a jailhouse informant is a “notoriously

unreliable source.” Maj. Op. at 8251. But three paragraphs

later, the majority opinion contends that the trial judge would

have sentenced Tilden to death based on Melendez’s testimony. Maj. Op. at 8254. Which is it? Was Melendez, as the

majority opinion claims, so reliable and trustworthy that the

trial judge would have sentenced Tilden to death based on

Melendez’s statements? Or was Melendez, as the majority

opinion also claims, so unreliable that his testimony could not

have affected Runningeagle’s sentence?

C. The Majority Misapplies Brady’s Materiality Standard

Finally, the majority mischaracterizes the relevant inquiry

for determining materiality under Brady. The majority mistakenly presumes that there is not a “reasonable probability”

of a life sentence for Runningeagle because evidence showing

that Tilden was the stabber would have only resulted in a

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8287

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 52 of 54
death sentence for Tilden. Maj. Op. at 8254. While it is certainly possible that testimony implicating Tilden as the stabber could have resulted in a death sentence for Tilden, it is

also reasonably probable that such testimony could have

resulted in a life sentence for Runningeagle. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005) (“[A]lthough we

suppose it is possible that [the sentencer] could have heard it

all and still have decided on the death penalty, that is not the

test.”). Under Brady’s materiality standard, the relevant

inquiry is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, had

the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at

682. A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome, but is less than the preponderance more-likely-than-not standard. Kyles, 514 U.S. at

434. 

Testimony from Melendez implicating Tilden as the stabber would be just the sort of powerful “lingering doubt” evidence that we have repeatedly described as an “extremely

effective argument” for defendants in the sentencing phase of

a capital case. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 181 (1986);

see also Cox v. Ayers, 613 F.3d 883, 898 (9th Cir. 2010)

(same); Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 624 (9th Cir.

2004) (same). Indeed, we have repeatedly relied on a comprehensive study of opinions of jurors in death penalty cases that

concluded that “ ‘the best thing a capital defendant can do to

improve his chances of receiving a life sentence has nothing

to do with mitigating evidence . . . . The best thing he can do,

all else being equal, is to raise doubt about his guilt.’ ” Williams, 384 F.3d at 624 (quoting Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors

Think?, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1538, 1563 (1998)). See also Cox,

613 F.3d at 898 (noting significance of defense counsel’s

penalty-phase “non-shooter” theory). Here, statements from

Melendez that implicated Tilden as the stabber could have

raised enough doubt in the trial judge’s mind about the identity of the stabber so as to warrant sparing Runningeagle’s

8288 RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 53 of 54
life. At a minimum, the question is close enough that Runningeagle is entitled to discovery of Melendez’s statements.

See Pham, 400 F.3d at 743.

CONCLUSION

The majority is content to resolve Runningeagle’s

sentencing-phase Brady claim without first requiring prosecutors to disclose Melendez’s statements. Because I would

require the prosecution to turn over all exculpatory material

to Runningeagle, I respectfully dissent.

RUNNINGEAGLE v. RYAN 8289

 Case: 07-99026, 07/18/2012, ID: 8254265, DktEntry: 58-1, Page 54 of 54