Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03305/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03305-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Terrell Artist Donald,

Petitioner,

v. 

Attorney General of the State of Arizona,

David Shinn,

Respondents.

No. CV 19-03305 PHX JJT (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI:

Petitioner Terrell Donald, who proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a 

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 17, 2019. 

(ECF No. 1). Respondents filed an answer to the petition on July 24, 2019, and Donald 

has filed a reply. Donald challenges his conviction, pursuant to a plea agreement, on one 

count of sexual assault and two counts of attempted sexual assault. Donald contends he is 

entitled to federal habeas relief because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel 

in his criminal proceedings. 

I. Background

A grand jury indictment returned January 31, 2017, charged Donald and a 

codefendant with three counts of sexual assault, one count of aggravated assault, one 

count of unlawfully administering intoxicating liquor to an adult, and one count of 

kidnapping. (ECF No. 7-1 at 4-6). A settlement conference was conducted May 12, 2017, 

at which Donald, who was represented by counsel, was informed of the range of 

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sentences that could be imposed should he proceed to trial and be convicted. (ECF No. 7-

1 at 9-10). 

Donald signed a written plea agreement on June 12, 2017. (ECF No. 7-1 at 15-18). 

The written plea agreement provided:

I [defendant] have read and understand the provisions of . . . this

agreement. I have discussed the case and my constitutional rights with my 

lawyer. My lawyer has explained the nature of the charge(s) and the 

elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading. I understand that by 

pleading GUILTY I will be waiving and giving up my right to a 

determination of probable cause, to a trial by jury to determine guilt and to 

determine any fact used to impose a sentence within the range stated [in the 

plea agreement], to confront, cross-examine, compel the attendance of 

witnesses, to present evidence in my behalf, my right to remain silent, my 

privilege against self-incrimination, presumption of innocence and right to 

appeal. . . .

I [defendant] have personally and voluntarily placed my initials

beside each of the above paragraphs and signed the signature line below to 

indicate that I read, or had read to me, understood and approved all of the 

previous paragraphs in this agreement, both individually and as a total 

binding agreement. My plea is voluntary and not the result of force, or 

threat, or promises other than those contained in the plea agreement.

(ECF No. 7-1 at 16-17). The written plea agreement noted the presumptive, minimum, 

and maximum sentences Donald could receive pursuant to his guilty pleas. (ECF No. 7-1 

at 15). The plea agreement further provided that, with regard to his conviction on 

Count 1, “Defendant shall be sentenced to the Department of Corrections for a period of 

8 years,” and that he would be placed on lifetime probation pursuant to his conviction on 

the amended Counts 2 and 3. (Id.). In return for Donald’s guilty plea the State agreed to 

dismiss Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the indictment, and the allegation that Donald was on 

probation when he committed the instant offenses, and the allegation of prior felony 

convictions. (ECF No. 7-1 at 16). 

The written plea agreement included a factual basis for the guilty pleas. (ECF No. 

7-1 at 19):

. . . [Donald], and Co-Defendant, [Mr. Talton], invited Victim A to 

Defendant’s apartment. Victim A tried to leave Defendant’s apartment 

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several times after arriving, but was physically prevented from leaving by 

both Defendant and Co-Defendant. Victim A was then also forced to drink 

vodka before both Defendant and Co-Defendant took Victim A’s pants off. 

Both Defendant and Co-Defendant forced Victim A to perform [specific 

sex acts, and had intercourse with Victim A]. Victim A at points during the 

incident pleaded with Defendant and Co-Defendant to stop and screamed 

for help. She did not consent to these sexual acts at any time, and [she was] 

stopped from leaving till the sexual acts were complete. . . . 

(ECF No. 7-1 at 19).1

At a plea hearing conducted July 25, 2017, the state trial court confirmed no one 

had forced or threatened Donald “in any way” to enter the plea agreement. (ECF No. 7-1 

at 114-16).

2 The state trial court also advised Donald in detail of the possible sentencing 

range for each count to which he was pleading guilty; discussed and explained the terms 

of the plea agreement; advised him specifically that, by pleading guilty, he was giving up

various constitutional rights; and confirmed that he agreed with the facts of the crimes as 

stated in the plea agreement. (ECF No. 7-1 at 118-24). Donald verbally indicated that he 

understood and agreed to the terms of the plea agreement and had no questions about the

plea agreement. (ECF No. 7-1 at 118–25). Donald subsequently pled guilty to the charges 

1 The written plea agreement further acknowledged Donald had prior felony convictions 

and that he was serving a term of probation when he committed the instant offense. (ECF No 7-1 

at 16). At the plea hearing the court noted: “So it does look like in that earlier plea agreement 

that [Donald] was sentenced to prison on Count 7, but he was placed on terms of lifetime 

probation on the other two counts.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 122). The public record indicates that 

Donald was charged by a grand jury indictment returned December 18, 2014, in Maricopa 

County Superior Court case number CR2014-158117, with five counts of sexual conduct with a 

minor and three counts of “child/vulnerable adult abuse,” and he entered a guilty plea on three 

reduced charges on or about March 4, 2016. 

2 Specifically, the following colloquy occurred at the plea hearing:

THE COURT: Has anyone forced you or threatened you in any way to get you to 

enter into this plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

(ECF No. 7-1 at 116-17). Additionally, the Court also advised Donald:

THE COURT: . . .[O]nce these pleas have been accepted by the Court, you cannot 

withdraw from them unless it’s necessary to correct what we would call manifest 

injustice, okay?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(ECF No. 7-1 at 118).

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stated in the plea agreement. (Id.). The court accepted the guilty pleas after finding that, 

“[o]n the basis of the record,” Donald had entered the pleas knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily. (ECF No. 7-1 at 126-27).

On September 1, 2017, prior to sentencing, Donald filed a pro per motion asking 

for a change of counsel, alleging his counsel had been ineffective. (ECF No. 7-1 at 22-

24). Donald alleged he had not been provided with “full discovery;” counsel failed to hire 

a private investigator to “create any form of defense;” counsel failed to speak to Donald’s 

mother about the case; counsel had advised him that he would lose at trial and would face 

46 years in prison; and counsel failed to “provide any form of penalty time grid which 

calculates the time [he] could be facing.” (Id.).

3

A sentencing hearing was conducted September 14, 2017. (ECF No. 7-1 at 130).

The sentencing hearing also encompassed Donald’s violation of probation in the 2014 

case. (Id.). At that time the court construed Donald’s pro se motion to change counsel as 

a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement, and allowed Donald to argue his motion. 

(ECF No. 7-1 at 35, 130-40). When addressing Donald’s motion the court noted it was 

not inclined to grant his request because the guilty plea had already been entered and 

accepted, stating: 

. . . It would be rather unusual for me to give you a new attorney at a 

point where you’ve signed a plea agreement that stipulates to a precise 

amount of time in the Department of Corrections.

I’ll let you know, I’m not inclined to — on your probation cases, I’m 

not inclined to stack any additional time on those cases. So my view is you 

signed an eight-year agreement and that’s what I was inclined to follow 

through on.

3 Respondents assert:

Donald’s mother made her own allegations as to what she considered to be the 

ineffective assistance of Donald’s trial counsel, claiming the attorney’s 

performance left Donald feeling confused and unable to ask for more 

“help/support” while in court. (Exh. F, at 1.) In addition, she alleged that, 

according to Donald, “during the last court appearance”—presumably referring to 

the change-of-plea hearing—his trial counsel “ha[d] asked [him] to sign the 

paperwork to expedite the process . . . versus fully explaining to him in a way 

where [Donald] knows what he is signing [sic].” (Id.)

(ECF No. 7 at 4 n.2. See also ECF No. 7-1 at 28-29).

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So noting that there’s really no wiggle room in the plea and given 

that it’s already been entered and accepted, I wasn’t really inclined to 

change your attorney, but if you wanted to be heard on that I’m happy to 

hear you out.

(ECF No. 7-1 at 132-33). Donald then told the court:

Yes, I mean, I signed a plea out of fright and pretty much not really 

knowing my case; I know from the police report and everything, but other 

than that, I have no full discovery on my case. And I just signed it because 

pretty much I had my settlement conference and pretty much all I was 

hearing from the settlement judge and from the prosecutor and everything 

is that pretty much if I go to trial, I’m going to lose regardless of the fact if 

I’m innocent or not [sic]. So that pretty much is the reason why I signed, 

because I’m — thinking about a daughter that I have, a family that I have, 

and I didn’t commit this crime that I was accused of at all, nothing like that.

(ECF No. 7-1 at 133). The court responded: “Sir, you stood in front of a judge and said 

you were guilty, and you were also . . . told just as importantly that you couldn’t change 

your mind at a later date really for the reasons that you’re telling me now. . . .” (ECF No. 

7-1 at 133-34). The following interchange occurred:

THE DEFENDANT: I understand, but I just wasn’t in the right set of mind 

to actually — to sign that. Like, it’s just a lot of stuff I was going through at 

the time. I just lost my brother. It’s —

THE COURT: Anything that either counsel wanted to say in terms of — I 

don’t know if we’re really addressing the counsel issue.

THE DEFENDANT: I mean —

THE COURT: You’re asking to withdraw from the plea.

THE DEFENDANT: I got — I mean, the reasons is in the motion that I put, 

but I haven’t — I never received any legal correspondence from my case.

The attorney failed to provide my full discovery on my case. He 

failed to use a private investigator to provide evidence to help with my 

case.

When presented my plea, I was pretty much manipulated to sign, 

stating that if I go to trial and lose, I would be looking at 46 years 

regardless.

(ECF No. 7-1 at 134).

The court acknowledged that Donald was scared when he pled guilty, but

explained to him:

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THE COURT: Sir, you know, the attorneys and your settlement conference 

judge, whoever that was, are supposed to give you their best legal opinion 

on the case. They’re not supposed to blow smoke or give you opinions that 

they don’t believe to be true or tell you what you want to hear.

So if people were telling you that — you know, legal professionals 

were telling you they thought you’d lose — look, nobody has a crystal ball. 

Nobody knows how this would have played out at trial, but, you know, the 

people in those positions are there to give you their best legal opinion.

There are a lot of things you don’t have control over in terms of the 

trial strategy, but the one most important thing you have control over is 

whether you stand in front of a judge and you admit you’re guilty or not, 

and you did that.

THE DEFENDANT: I’m not guilty of that.

THE COURT: Well, it wouldn’t be the first time that somebody entered a 

guilty plea and then talked to the probation department and told them they 

weren’t guilty, especially knowing that a presentence report is going to 

follow you to the Department of Corrections, and that’s not a flattering 

thing to be in a presentence report to the Department of Corrections, and, 

candidly, that’s something we see all the time.

But, you know, in terms of the motion to withdraw, do you want to 

be heard on that Mr. Cooke?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You Honor, I’ve had a chance to talk to [Donald] 

just briefly this morning about the motion and I — you, know, personally I 

disagree. I did not know that he and I had any type of communication 

problem. I thought — when I visited him, we talked. I did not realize there 

was any kind of issue.

I gave him — he says, you know about this full discovery. The 

police reports are the full discovery, and I think I’ve explained it to him —

as a matter of fact, I think he gave them back to me for reasons that a lot of 

people in DOC don’t want to have . . . that type of discovery around.

I do believe that the plea offer — the plea is in his best interest; it’s 

even more in his best interest now that we’ve had a co-defendant who made 

a factual basis that is not favorable to us. . . . 

(ECF No. 7-1 at 134-36). Donald then reiterated that he had only admitted his guilt “[o]ut

of fright. Out of fright.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 137). The court responded:

I understand that. I understand that this is a scary situation for you. If 

being afraid was a reason to reject the plea, I’d rip up dozens of pleas every 

week, and I’m not going to do that, sir.

. . . I see [your trial counsel] here on a very regular basis. He’s very 

diligent, hardworking, conscientious, and acts in the best interest of his 

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clients, but, as he said, his clients ultimately make their best decisions, and 

you made yours.

I believe that plea was entered in front of me and I asked you if you 

were doing that of your own free will, intelligently, knowingly, and 

voluntarily, and you agreed with all of that. So I understand that you feel 

differently now than you felt then, but that doesn’t constitute a reason for 

me to reject the plea.

(ECF No. 7-1 at 137-38). The motion requesting a change of counsel, which the state trial 

court construed as a motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea, was denied. (ECF No. 7-1 

at 31-32, 140) (“so just specifically for the record, any request for Mr. Donald to 

withdraw from the plea is denied. His request for new counsel is similarly denied 

respectfully.”).

Accordingly, on September 14, 2017, “[a]s stipulated in the plea agreement,” 

Donald was sentenced to a “slightly aggravated term of 8 years’ imprisonment, followed 

by lifetime probation with sex offender terms.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 77).

Donald filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure on October 5, 2017. (ECF No. 7-1 at 38-40). Donald was 

appointed counsel, who advised the state court they could find no meritorious claims to 

raise on Donald’s behalf. (ECF No. 7-1 at 42-43). Donald filed a pro se petition for state 

habeas relief, summarily asserting he was eligible for relief because of the “introduction 

at trial of an identification obtained in violation of constitutional rights;” the 

“introduction at trial of a coerced confession;” “[an] infringement of the right against

self-incrimination;” the “denial of the constitutional right to representation by a

competent lawyer at every critical stage of the proceeding;” the “unconstitutional use by 

the state of perjured testimony;” “[v]iolation of the right not to be placed twice in 

jeopardy for the same offense;” the “abridgment of any other” guaranteed right under 

federal or state law; and the “failure of petitioner’s attorney to file a timely notice of 

appeal after being instructed to do so.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 45-46). The only factual support 

proffered for his claims was Donald’s allegation that “[t]he court would not sever the 

case from his co-defendant.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 47). Donald did not seek to have his 

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convictions vacated, instead requesting: “Without overturning the conviction Defendant 

is requesting a sentence reduction and reduced lifetime.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 48).

Donald filed a second Rule 32 notice on May 18, 2018, during the pendency of his 

first Rule 32 petition. (ECF No. 7-1 at 50-52). In that notice he asserted an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, contending counsel “fail[ed] to sever” his case from his codefendant, “who has multi-sex crimes.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 52). As with his previous 

petition Donald sought only a reduction in his sentence, “with the attempt to sever two 

lifetime probations to two standard probations.” (Id.). The trial court construed the 

second notice as an amendment to the first petition rather than as a second or successive 

Rule 32 petition. (ECF No. 7-1 at 54). The State filed a response and Donald asserted in 

“rebuttal” that: his counsel did not, as requested, sever Donald’s case from his codefendant’s case; trial counsel “never requested” information about the victim’s 

“changed” story; the victim changed her story to escape prosecution; Donald signed the 

plea agreement under duress because he was operating under the “assumption” that his 

trial counsel had “done everything in order to defend [his] case” and he then understood

“that was not the case;” “[w]hen it comes to coerced confession even though [he] entered

the plea agreement [his] defense counsel was informed of the situation but yield to do 

nothing;” and “[m]aterial facts show if defense counsel would have done the least basic 

standard performance then there would have been a chance that the outcome of [his] case 

might have been different.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 64-66).

The state habeas trial court summarily denied relief in an order entered August 15, 

2018, agreeing with “the arguments set forth in the State’s Response” to the Rule 32 

petition. (ECF No. 7-1 at 69). The state court concluded: that Donald had “expressly 

waived his claims as to any lack of probable cause, prosecutorial misconduct, preindictment delay, etc.” by pleading guilty; that he had failed to raise “any colorable 

claims that might warrant an evidentiary hearing;” and that there were no “material issues 

of fact or law that would entitle Defendant to relief.” (Id.).

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Donald petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review. (ECF No. 7-1 at 71-

74). The only issue presented in his pro per petition for review was a claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel: “Defense Counsel in this case failed to produce any acceptable 

standard of reasonableness. There was no what so ever [sic] defensive strategy or plan as 

to help the Defendant in this case.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 72). Donald asserted: “Let it be 

known that for the ill advice of the Defense Counsel, Defendant entered into a plea 

agreement under duress. Defendant also claims that due to the Defense Counsel he felt 

coerced by not only the Defense Counsel but by the Prosecution as well.” (Id.). He 

further alleged that

. . . due to the sex crimes of the Co-Defendant there was no reason 

that his case should [not] have been severed and administered to the court 

on its own merits.

Defendant whole heartedly believes that due to the nature that his 

case was handled it is absolutely obvious that if the Defense Counsel would 

have performed his ethic duty [t]he outcome of the case most likely would 

have been in favor of the Defendant. If nothing else there surely would 

have been a different outcome.

(ECF No. 7-1 at 73).

The state appellate court interpreted the petition for review as asserting: Donald’s 

case should have been severed from that of his co-defendant; Donald received ineffective 

assistance of counsel; and he was coerced into signing the plea agreement. State v. 

Donald, 2019 WL 1219616, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2019). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals granted review but denied relief in a decision entered March 14, 2019, finding 

and concluding: 

. . . By entering a plea agreement, Donald waived “all nonjurisdictional defenses, errors, and defects” which occurred prior to the 

plea. State v. Moreno, 134 Ariz. 199, 200 (App. 1982). The waiver of nonjurisdictional defects includes alleged constitutional rights violations, 

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), and claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel not directly related to the entry of the plea, State v. 

Quick, 177 Ariz. 314, 316 (App. 1993). Thus, Donald waived any claims 

associated with the severance of his case from that of his co-defendant.

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To the extent the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is directly 

related to the plea agreement, Donald failed to show that counsel’s 

performance fell below objectively reasonable standards or that counsel’s 

deficient performance caused him prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 (1985). Donald 

provides little detail regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, merely alleging that counsel provided deficient advice and forced 

him to enter the plea agreement. First, the record shows that Donald 

voluntarily entered a favorable, legally sound plea agreement. Second, a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be supported by more than 

generalizations and unsubstantiated allegations. State v. Borbon, 146 Ariz. 

392, 399 (1985). Donald’s assertions are not supported by the record, he 

failed to present a colorable claim for relief, and an evidentiary hearing was

not warranted. See State v. D’Ambrosio, 156 Ariz. 71, 73 (1988).

Donald’s contention that he entered the plea agreement “under

duress” similarly fails. To be valid, a plea agreement must not be the “result 

of force, threats or promises.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.3(a)(1)–(2), 17.4(c); 

State v. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19, 27, ¶ 33 (2004). Donald provides no 

supporting facts for this claim, nor does the record show that any parties 

forced or coerced Donald to enter the plea agreement. The record does 

show, however, that at the change of plea hearing, Donald specifically 

agreed that he was not impaired in any way, he understood the terms of the 

plea agreement, and he was not forced or threatened into entering the plea 

agreement. Donald has not demonstrated that his guilty plea was the result 

of duress.

Lastly, Donald presented additional claims in the superior court not 

specifically raised in the petition for review. A petition for review may not 

present issues or arguments through mere incorporation by reference. See 

Ariz. R. Crim. P.32.9(c)(4)(B). Accordingly, we decline to address any 

claims not directly presented in the petition for review.

(Id. at *1-2).

Donald did not seek review of the denial of Rule 32 relief by the Arizona Supreme 

Court.

In his federal habeas petition Donald asserts he was denied the effective assistance 

of counsel because:

1. He was coerced into signing the plea agreement;

2. “[H]e did not voluntarily enter into the plea agreement with the understanding 

that his case should have been severed from his codefendant [sic];”

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3. Counsel “never brought up” severance to the trial court;

4. Counsel “never brought up” his co-defendant’s history as a “longtime (pimp)” 

and his co-defendant’s arrests for “prostitution and drugs;”

5. Counsel “failed to provide a strategic defense but only went through the 

motions;”

6. Counsel rejected his suggestion to pursue a strategy of “provid[ing] the lack of 

requisite intent in a sexual assault case;”

7. Counsel did not “call[] important witnesses,” and “neglected to call his codefendant on his behalf;”

8. Counsel “failed to use competent defense instructions when it came to 

mitigating evidence;”

9. Counsel “fail[ed] to fully investigate and present mitigating evidence;” and

10. The victim had a history of prostitution arrests and lied about the sexual acts

being non-consensual, and Donald’s counsel did not “present” this information to the 

state court. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7). Donald does not ask the Court to vacate his convictions, 

but instead seeks a reduction in his sentence. (ECF No. 1 at 11). Respondents assert 

“some” of Donald’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are procedurally defaulted 

and the claims that were properly exhausted were correctly rejected by the state courts. 

(ECF No. 7).

II. Analysis

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Absent specific circumstances, the Court may only grant federal habeas relief on 

the merits of a claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the state courts. See 

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

729-30 (1991). To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim the petitioner must afford the 

state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the 

claim to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. E.g., Castille v. 

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 

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2005). In non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test is satisfied if the 

habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. 

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762-

63 (D. Ariz. 2008). To fairly present a claim in the state courts, thereby exhausting the 

claim, the petitioner must present to the state courts the “substantial equivalent” of the 

claim presented in federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Libberton 

v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Full and fair presentation requires a 

petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the state courts, including a reference to 

the operative federal constitutional guarantee relied on by the petitioner and a statement 

the facts supporting the claim. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). 

A petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still has the right to 

raise the claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

Accordingly, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally 

barred from pursuing a previously un-presented claim in the state’s “highest” court. See 

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2006). Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar Donald from 

returning to the state courts to exhaust any unexhausted federal habeas claim, he has 

exhausted but procedurally defaulted any claim not previously properly presented to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 

2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

If a prisoner has procedurally defaulted a claim in the state courts he is not entitled 

to a review of the merits of the claim in a federal habeas action absent a showing of both 

cause and prejudice. E.g., Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000). The 

Court may also consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the failure to 

consider the merits of the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011). “Cause” 

is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural default of the claim, i.e., an objective 

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factor outside of his control, and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violation. Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. To establish prejudice, the petitioner 

must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Id. It is the petitioner’s 

burden to establish both cause and prejudice with regard to their procedural default of a 

federal habeas claim in the state courts. Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415 (9th Cir. 

1998).

A petitioner meets the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception by 

“establish[ing] that under the probative evidence he has a colorable claim of factual 

innocence.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333. 339 (1992) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have 

found him guilty of the charged offense. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004); 

Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

However, although relief may not be granted on an unexhausted claim absent a 

showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a claim may be 

denied “on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies 

available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). See also Kirkpatrick v. 

Chappell, 926 F.3d 1157, 1166 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 

769 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012). All of Donald’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 

without merit and, therefore, regardless of any failure to properly exhaust all of his 

habeas claims in the state courts, his petition for habeas relief must be denied. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims in cases involving a pleading defendant 

are governed by the doctrine of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 

succeed on a Strickland claim the petitioner must establish that their counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and “a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

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would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. It is the petitioner’s burden to 

demonstrate both prongs of the Strickland test. Vega v. Ryan, 757 F.3d 960, 969 (9th Cir. 

2014). In the context of a case involving a guilty plea, the petitioner satisfies the 

“deficient performance” prong of the relevant test by establishing that the advice he 

received from counsel as to the terms and potential benefits of the plea agreement was 

unconstitutionally deficient. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985). See also Premo

v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 126-27 (2011); Fairbanks v. Ayers, 650 F.3d 1243, 1254-55 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (also holding a pleading petitioner’s Strickland claim “must be limited to the 

contention that trial counsel was ineffective only in advising petitioner to plead guilty”).

[A] defendant has the right to make a reasonably informed decision whether 

to accept a plea offer. In McMann v. Richardson, the seminal decision on 

ineffectiveness of counsel in plea situations, the Court described the 

question as not whether “counsel’s advice [was] right or wrong, but . . . 

whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 []. . . . to establish a 

claim of ineffective assistance, [the defendant] “must demonstrate gross 

error on the part of counsel. . . .” Id. at 772 []. 

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) (some internal citations and 

quotations omitted). “The Third Circuit has interpreted this standard as requiring a 

defendant to demonstrate that the advice he received was so incorrect and so insufficient 

that it undermined his ability to make an intelligent decision about whether to accept the 

plea offer.” Id., citing United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992). 

Additionally, in the context of a pleading defendant, the prejudice prong of the 

Strickland test is modified; the habeas petitioner must establish “a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 

on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. The Court must assess the circumstances

surrounding the case to determine if the petitioner’s allegation that he would have 

proceeded to trial is plausible. See, e.g., Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 990 (9th Cir. 

2010) (finding no Strickland prejudice where the petitioner had “little to no chance of 

prevailing on an affirmative defense”); Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 

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2006) (finding no Strickland prejudice where the petitioner’s proposed defense “would 

have been unlikely to succeed”). Notably, Donald does not now assert that he wishes to 

have his guilty plea vacated and proceed to trial and, therefore, he fails to establish the 

second prong of the Hill analysis. Additionally, it is implausible that, had counsel utilized 

the strategy advocated by Donald, i.e., to have severed his trial from that of his codefendant or to pursue a trial defense that the victim consented to the sexual contact, the 

outcome of a trial would have been an acquittal. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (“[W]here the 

alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative 

defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely 

on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.”).

Donald has not established that his counsel’s advice with regard to the plea 

agreement was deficient. Given the weight of the evidence against Donald, and the 

sentence he faced if he proceeded to trial and was found guilty, counsel’s advice to plead 

guilty and counsel’s negotiation of a plea agreement providing for an eight-year sentence

did not constitute “gross error,” and counsel’s advice was “within the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann, 397 U.S. at 771-72. 

Because the plea agreement was advantageous to Donald and there was substantial 

evidence of his guilt, i.e., the statements of the victim and his co-defendant, his counsel’s 

performance was not deficient nor coercive for advising him to accept the plea 

agreement. See, e.g., Weaver, 455 F.3d at 967. A lawyer’s advice to plead guilty in the 

face of strong inculpatory evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 

See Lambert, 393 F.3d at 984 (finding no Strickland prejudice from counsel’s alleged 

failure to uncover evidence supporting the proposed defense prior to the entry of a guilty 

plea where there was “overwhelming evidence of guilt” and “little chance” that defense 

would have succeeded at trial); Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 870-71 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (finding no Strickland prejudice where the petitioner’s assertion that he would 

have rejected the plea offer and gone to trial had he been properly advised was not 

credible in light of the substantial evidence of his guilt and much higher potential 

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sentence at trial). Therefore, Donald has not satisfied the first prong of the Strickland or 

Hill test which requires he show his counsel’s advice with regard to the plea agreement 

and the consequences he faced as a result of entering a guilty plea, or refusing the plea 

agreement, was incorrect.

Furthermore, Donald fails to establish that his guilty plea was coerced. “A habeas 

petitioner bears the burden of establishing that [their] guilty plea was not voluntary and 

knowing.” Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006), citing Parke v. Raley, 

506 U.S. 20, 31-34 (1992). The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is 

“whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative 

courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 

(1970). A plea is “involuntary” if it is the result of threats, improper promises, or other 

forms of wrongful coercion. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (“[A] plea 

of guilty . . . must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper 

harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or 

perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to 

the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).”). 

Nothing in the record indicates that Donald’s guilty plea was the product of 

threats, bribes, duress, or coercion, and accepting a plea agreement providing for an 

eight-year sentence was an intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action 

open to Donald. Furthermore, at the time he entered his plea, Donald told the court he 

was voluntarily pleading guilty. Donald’s statements, contemporaneous with his entry of 

a guilty plea pursuant to a signed plea agreement in which he also professed he was 

voluntarily pleading guilty, are a “formidable barrier” to this Court now finding Donald’s

guilty plea was made under duress. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 62, 74 (1977); Muth 

v. Fondren, 676 F.3d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Petitioner’s statements at the plea 

colloquy carry a strong presumption of truth.”). See also United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 

310, 313 (9th Cir. 1991) (reaching this holding in a section 2255 case). “The subsequent 

presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary 

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dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” 

Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74. Accordingly, because Donald fails to provide any evidence 

contradicting his statements at his plea hearing, his claim that his guilty plea was coerced

must be denied.

III. Conclusion

Donald fails to demonstrate that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel 

in his state criminal proceedings, nor has he demonstrated that his guilty plea was 

coerced or made under duress.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Donald’s petition seeking a 

federal writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Donald seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should be 

denied because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.

Dated this 29th day of April, 2020.

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