Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00328/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00328-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-0328 JSW (MEJ)

ORDER RE: DEPOSITION DISPUTE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case involves a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief by Plaintiffs regarding the Weldon

Amendment. Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 3163. The parties are now before the Court

regarding deposition notices served by Plaintiffs on Defendants. These deposition notices include the

following: 

Plaintiffs' Matter for Examination Number 2: 

The meaning of the Weldon Amendment, including, but not limited to, the

meaning of the word "discrimination," as used in the Weldon Amendment. 

Joint Letter at 3. 

Plaintiffs' Matter for Examination Number 7: 

The potential consequences, penalty or other ramifications that may be

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imposed by the United States on the State of California should the State be

deemed to have subjected any health care entity to discrimination on the

basis that the health care entity does not provide, pay for, provide coverage

of, or refer for abortions. 

Joint Letter at 3. 

Plaintiffs' Matter for Examination Number 13:

Whether HHS would deem the State of California to have subjected a

health care entity to discrimination on the basis that the health care entity

does not provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions, if the

State of California took disciplinary action against a hospital and/or doctor

or other health care entity for failing to provide abortion services in a

medical emergency. 

Joint Letter at 4. 

Plaintiffs' Matter for Examination Number 15: 

Communications by HHS or anyone acting on its behalf with private

individuals, organizations, members of Congress or their staff, or members

of the White House staff about the scope and meaning of the Weldon

Amendment. 

Joint Letter at 4. 

Plaintiffs' Matter for Examination Number 4:

The identification of each HHS employee, official, agent or other

representative authorized to enforce the provisions of the Weldon

Amendment on behalf of the United States, including but not limited to, any

such person authorized to determine whether any state or local government

entity has failed to comply with the provisions of the Weldon Amendment. 

Joint Letter at 3. 

Plaintiffs' Matter for Examination Number 5:

The identification of each HHS employee, official, agent or other

representative authorized to determine whether federal funds should be

withheld, and, if so, the amount of federal funds that should be withheld,

from any state or local government entity that has failed to comply with the

provisions of the Weldon Amendment. 

Joint Letter at 3. 

Plaintiffs' Matter for Examination Number 6:

How HHS will determine whether federal funds should be withheld, and, if

so, the amount of federal funds that should be withheld, from any state or

local government entity that has failed to comply with the provisions of the

Weldon Amendment. 

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Joint Letter at 3. 

Plaintiffs' Matter for Examination Number 10:

How, when and whether HHS will implement or enforce the Weldon

Amendment. 

Joint Letter at 3. 

Plaintiffs' Matter for Examination Number 11:

How HHS is complying, or will comply, with the Weldon Amendment. 

Joint Letter at 3. 

Plaintiffs' Matter for Examination Number 12:

Any efforts or attempts by HHS or the United States to implement the

Weldon Amendment, including but not limited to, any steps HHS has taken

to inform or educate recipients of federal funds about the provisions or

requirements of the Weldon Amendment and any actions HHS has taken to

determine whether any federal agency or program, or state or local

government has failed, or is failing, to comply with the Weldon Amendment. 

Joint Letter at 4. 

Plaintiffs' Matter for Examination Number 16: 

The following responses by HHS to Plaintiffs' discovery requests: 

a. Response of Defendants Department of Health and Human

Services and Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and

Human Services, to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories (Set No.

One); 

b. Response of Defendants Department of Health and Human

Services and Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and

Human Services, to Plaintiffs' Request for Production of

Documents (Set No. One); 

c. Response of Defendants Department of Health and Human

Services and Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and

Human Services, to Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions (Set

No. One); 

d. Response of Defendant United States of America to

Plaintiffs' Interrogatories (Set No. One); 

Joint Letter at 4. 

On November 28, 2005, the parties filed a Joint Meet and Confer Letter ("Joint Letter") regarding

these disputes. James J. Gilligan signed for Defendants. Tim Muscat signed for Plaintiffs. The parties' Joint

Letter details four distinct issues which are subject to dispute: (1) Defendants' response to Plaintiffs'

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Deposition Examination Matters 2, 7, 13, and 15; (2) Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' Deposition

Examination Matters 15; (3) Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' Deposition Examination Matters 4-6 and

10-12; and (4) Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' Deposition Examination Matter 16. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. California's Discovery Requests Regarding Examination Matters 2, 7, 13 and 15.

The first issue before the Court is whether to grant Defendants' request for a protective order

quashing Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) notices regarding examination matters 2, 7, 13 and 15. Defendants

object to Plaintiffs' examination matters, arguing that they "do not relate to fact" and "involve the meaning of

a federal statute" which amounts to "a pure question of law to be answered based on the statute's text and

legislative history." Joint Letter at 2. Defendants contend that "the meaning of a statute is a legal issue of

congressional intent to be determined by the court." Id. In response, Plaintiffs argue that these

examination matters are proper because they seek statements from those authorized to enforce the Weldon

Amendment regarding their understanding of the statute. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' understanding

of the Weldon Amendment is relevant to determine whether the statute will be used to penalize California, a

central issue in the case. Plaintiffs also maintain that their questions seek to "define and clarify the issues," 

which is a primary purpose of discovery. Id. at 3. 

"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or

defense of any party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). "Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if

the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id. Thus,

the scope of discovery under the Federal Rules is extremely broad. Soto v. Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603,

610 (N.D. Cal. 1995). A relevant matter is "any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to

other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in this case." Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v.

Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). 

"A party may in the party's notice and in a subpoena name as the deponent a public or private

corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency and describe with reasonable

particularity the matters on which examination is requested." Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). "The organization

so named shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent

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to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on which the person will

testify." Id. "The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the

organization. " Id. 

Here, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs' examination matters 2, 7, 13 and 15 call for

testimony on the meaning of the statute which is an issue to be determined by the court. Plaintiffs request

testimony on the meaning of the word "'discrimination" as used in the Weldon Amendment, the "potential

consequences" of violating the statute, whether California's enforcement of healthcare laws would violate

the statute, and communications about the statute's "scope and meaning". Joint Letter at 2. While

Plaintiffs argue that these questions are admissible because they call for "pointed responses as to a

particular text," the questions seek an interpretation of the meaning of the Weldon Amendment. Such

interpretations of statutes involve determinations of Congressional intent and meaning intended by Congress

is a legal issue within the province of the Court, not to be ascertained from Defendants' responses. 

LaForte v. Horner, 833 F.2d, 977 at 982 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, questions involving legal interpretations of statutes are not proper examination matters

for depositions. The Court finds that this case is similar to LaForte. In LaForte, the plaintiff federal

firefighter brought an action challenging a formula used by the Office of Personnel Management to calculate

overtime pay. LaForte, 833 F.2d at 977. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 5 U.S.C.A. Section 5404(b)

states the rate of overtime pay applicable to government employees and the plaintiffs served the defendant

with a request for admission based on the text of the statute. The court held that the defendant's response

to the request for admission seeking an interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act was not

determinative of the meaning intended by Congress. Id. at 982. The court reasoned that such a request

called for the meaning of the statute as intended by Congress and was "a legal issue which must be

determined...by the courts." Id. at 982. The ruling in LaForte is applicable here because Plaintiffs seek a

statement of "the enforcement agency's understanding of the meaning of the Weldon Amendment." Joint

Letter at 2. The Weldon Amendment, like the Fair Labor Standards Act, is a piece of legislation. 

Therefore, Plaintiffs' request requires Defendant to interpret Congress' intent in enacting legislation. 

Here, in support of its position, Plaintiffs cite Booth Oil Site Admin. Group v. Safety-Kleen

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Corp., 194 F.R.D. 76 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). In Booth, the plaintiffs sought reimbursement for costs incurred

in the removal of hazardous oil waste from the defendants' property. The plaintiff served the defendants

with requests for admissions based on the text of three agreements between the parties. The defendants

were asked to admit that the quoted material was, in fact, the text of each provision. Id. at 79. The

defendants objected to the requests on the grounds that they improperly sought an "admission to the

interpretation of the document." Id. The court held that "a statement of a party's understanding of the

meaning or intent of a document is therefore a statement of fact" and is admissible. Id. at 80. Yet the court

in Booth went on to differentiate admissions requesting the meaning and intent of a contract provision from

those involving a statute, as in LaForte. Id. at 81. The court held that an admission as to the statute's

meaning could not be "determinative as to congressional intent" because "such interpretation was a legal

conclusion for the court." Id. Booth is distinguishable from the present case because, here,

Plaintiffs seek a 

statement of "the enforcement agency's understanding of the meaning of the Weldon Amendment." Joint

Letter at 2. Unlike the contract at issue in Booth, the Weldon Amendment is a statute. Therefore, the

ruling in LaForte is more appropriate than the ruling in Booth. Plaintiffs' request testimony from

Defendants as to the meaning of the Weldon Amendment. Such questions seek a determination of

congressional intent which, as stated in LaForte, is a legal conclusion for the Court. Accordingly,

Defendants' request for a protective order quashing Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) notices regarding examination

matters 2, 7, 13 and 15 is GRANTED. 

///

B. California's Discovery Requests Regarding Examination Matter Number 15. 

The second issue before the Court is whether to grant Defendants' request for a protective order

quashing Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) notices regarding examination matter 15. The matter in question seeks

testimony on communications between Defendants and the White House, Congress or others regarding the

"scope and meaning" of the Weldon Amendment. Joint Letter at 3. Defendants object to Matter Number

15 on the grounds that such communication is irrelevant as well as privileged as a communication of the

Executive Branch. Plaintiffs argue that questions that are objectionable at trial are permitted during

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discovery because the purpose of a deposition is to re-evaluate the relevant and irrelevant facts in order to

gather relevant background facts. Joint Letter at 4. 

During deposition, "examination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at

trial under the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence except Rules 103 and 615." Fed. R. Civ. P.

30(c). Federal Rule of Evidence 103 states that "error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits

or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected" and a timely objection and offer of

proof is made. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1),(2). Federal Rule of Evidence 615 states that during trial "at the

request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other

witnesses." Fed. R. Evid. 615. "All objections made at the time of examination...shall be noted by the

officer upon the record of the deposition; but the examination shall proceed with the testimony being taken

subject to the objections." Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c). Therefore, the discovery rules permit broad latitude in

the taking of depositions. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, 346 F.Supp. 766, 789 (W.D. Mich

1971). "Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even permits the asking of questions which

might be objectionable at trial." Id. at 789. 

Here, the Court agrees with Defendants that examination matter number 15 seeks testimony that is

privileged as a communication of the Executive Branch. Plaintiffs argue that to the extent Defendants are

charged with enforcing the Weldon Amendment, they are entitled to inquire into Defendants'

communications with Congress or White House staff concerning the statute's meaning. However, while the

discovery rules permit broad latitude in matters for deposition, even permitting questions which might be

objectionable at trial, they do not supercede confidential Executive Branch communications. United

States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 at 715 (1974) .

 In Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S., 367 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the defendants,

including the Vice President and the National Energy Policy Development Group ("NEPDG"), were not

required to assert the executive privilege before considering separation of powers arguments in support of

confidential Executive Branch communications. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S., 367, 382 (2004). 

The President established the NEPDG to give him advice and make recommendations on energy policy,

assigning a number of federal agency heads and assistants to serve as Group members and authorizing the

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Vice President, as NEPDG chairman, to include other federal officers as appropriate. Id. at 374. Public

interest and environmental groups sued to enforce disclosure of the NEPDG meetings in compliance with

disclosure requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Court held that "special

considerations control when the Executive Branch's interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and

safeguarding the confidentiality of its communications are impacted" in the performance of its constitutional

duties. Id. at 387. These considerations are implied in the separation-of-powers: "public interest requires

that a coequal branch of Government 'afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest protection consistent

with the fair administration of justice.'" Id. at 382 (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. at 715). This confidentiality is

necessary to protect the "Executive Branch from litigation that might distract it from the energetic

performance of its constitutional duties." Id.

Here, Plaintiffs request testimony regarding communications between Defendants and members of

the White House staff. Like Cheney, Plaintiffs' examination matter requires disclosure of Defendants'

communications with the Executive Branch while in performance of their constitutional duties. Therefore,

Plaintiffs' subject matter for deposition is precluded because it intrudes upon confidential Executive Branch

communications. Accordingly, Defendants' request for a protective order quashing Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6)

notices regarding examination matter 15 is GRANTED.

C. California's Requests Regarding Examination Matter Numbers 4-6 and 10-12. 

The third issue before the Court is whether to grant Defendants' request for a protective order

quashing Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) notices regarding examination matters 4-6 and 10-12. Defendants argue

that they have already provided Plaintiffs with interrogatory answers sufficiently responding to these subject

matters and maintain that "further pursuit of these inquiries through deposition would be far outweighed by

the burden." Joint Letter at 4. Plaintiffs argue that they should not be denied their right to take depositions

because Defendants have already provided information on the same topic. Id. at 5. 

"Upon motion by a party...on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the

deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). However,

this "does not stand for the proposition that a court should review every 30(b)(6) deposition notice on a

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topic-by-topic basis...such a time consuming process should be...limited to extreme situations where the

right to take such a deposition is being abused." Tri-State Hospital Supply v. United States, 226 F.R.D.

118, 126 (D.D.C. 2005). Thus, while a court may grant a protective order to avoid undue burden, it must

be reserved for extreme circumstances. Id. 

Here, the Court finds no circumstance extreme enough to warrant a protective order quashing

Plaintiffs' topics for deposition. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they should not be precluded from

taking depositions simply because Defendants have previously provided information on the same topics in

response to other discovery. Joint Letter at 5. The Court finds this case similar to Tri-State Hospital

Supply. In Tri-State, the plaintiff sued the government for malicious prosecution when the U.S. Customs

Service brought an action against plaintiff for falsifying documents. Tri-State Hospital Supply, 226 F.R.D.

at 118. The plaintiff served deposition notices on the defendant that required duplicative information

previously sought via other discovery mechanisms. Id. at 125. The court held that no principle of law

precluded a party from pursuing a topic during deposition "about which it had already received information

via other discovery devices." Id. The court stated that the discovery process, by its very nature, "entails

asking witnesses questions about matters that have been the subject of other discovery." Id. at 126. While

courts may prevent a party from unduly burdensome lines of inquiry, the court held that it must do so only in

cases of extreme circumstances where the deposition right is being abused. Id. Thus, the court in TriState did not deem the duplicative questions to be an abuse of the deposition right, and held in favor of the

plaintiff. Id. Here, like in Tri- State, Plaintiffs served deposition notices on Defendants that required

duplicative information sought via other discovery mechanisms. Plaintiffs' deposition notices do not create

an extreme situation where the right to take such a deposition is being abused because they are not so

numerous or complex to qualify as unduly burdensome. 

In support of their position, Defendants cite McCormack-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne indus., Inc.,

134 F.R.D. (N.D. Cal. 1991). In McCormack-Morgan, the plaintiff brought an action for patent

infringement and the court held that there was "no reason to permit" the inquiry of information "through more

than one discovery device." McCormack-Morgan at 286-287. However, McCormack-Morgan, unlike

the case at hand, dealt with complex issues specific to patent litigation. Due to the complexity of the

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matters for discovery and the volume of discovery materials in McCormack-Morgan, such circumstances

were deemed "extreme," thus requiring the oversight of the court. Id. Therefore, to avoid annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, undue burden or expense, the court in McCormack-Morgan ordered both

parties to refrain from duplicative deposition notices. Id. at 288. Absent such "extreme" circumstances

and abuse here, the Court finds no reason to quash duplicative deposition notices. Accordingly,

Defendants' request for a protective order quashing Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) notices regarding examination

matters 4-6 and 10-12 is DENIED.

D. California's Discovery Requests Regarding Examination Matters Number 16. 

The fourth issue before the Court is whether to grant Defendants' request for a protective order

quashing Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) notices regarding examination matter 16, which seeks testimony regarding

Defendants' responses to Plaintiffs' document requests, interrogatories, and requests for admission. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' notice is unduly burdensome and overlaps with other designated matters for

examination. Additionally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' notice improperly trespasses into areas of

work product and attorney-client privilege. Joint Letter at 5. Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to

request clarification of the responses Defendants gave to their written discovery. Moreover, Plaintiffs

maintain that they do not intend to inquire into communications with counsel or other areas of privilege. Id. 

Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they are entitled to request testimony clarifying matters

which have been the subject of written discovery. Unlike Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,

2000WL 116082, 1 (N.D. Ill. Jan 24, 2000), the case cited by Defendants, this is not a patent infringement

case containing vast amounts of discovery material. Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,

2000WL 116082, 1 (N.D. Ill. Jan 24, 2000). Therefore, unlike Smithkline Beecham, Plaintiffs' request

does not pose an undue burden. Additionally, Plaintiffs have stated they do not intend to inquire into areas

of privilege. Given these facts and the Court's narrowing of the field of discovery, the notice properly

requests examination matter for deposition. Accordingly, Defendants' request for a protective order

quashing Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) notices regarding examination matter 16 is DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION

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Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 

1. Defendants' request for a protective order quashing Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) notices

regarding examination matter numbers 2, 7, 13 and 15 is GRANTED;

2. Defendants' request for a protective order quashing Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) notices

regarding examination matter number 15 is GRANTED;

3. Defendants' request for a protective order quashing Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) notices

regarding examination matter numbers 4-6 and 10-12 is DENIED; and

4. Defendants' request for a protective order quashing Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) notices

regarding examination matter number 16 is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2005 

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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