Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00940/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00940-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW T. THOMASSON, REBECCA J.

THOMASSON, MACDONALD P.

TAYLOR JR., and CHENOA R. TAYLOR,

on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 05cv0940-LAB (CAB)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'

EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR

LEAVE TO FILE MOTIONS FOR

RECONSIDERATION, WITH

ADMONITION

[Dkt No. 196]

vs.

GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

By Order entered July 16, 2007 in this Fair Debt Collection Practices Act putative class action,

this court granted defendant GC Services Limited Partnership's ("GC Services") Motion For Summary

Judgment and denied as moot both defendant's Motion For Limitation On Communications With

Putative Class and plaintiffs' Motion To Certify Class. Dkt No. 192. A Clerk's Judgment was entered

in GC Services' favor the same day. Dkt No. 193. On July 30, 2007, plaintiffs filed this Ex Parte

Application For Leave To File After Judgment And Pursuant To FRCP 59(e) A Motion To Reconsider

Orders: (1) Denying Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Complaint; (2) Granting Defendant's

Motion For Summary Judgment; and (3) Denying As Moot Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class

("Application"). Dkt No. 196. The Application seeks reconsideration of the enumerated Orders on

purported grounds of "newly discovered evidence" or alternatively "facts and circumstances not

previously shown," clear error committed by the court, "manifest injustice" to Plaintiffs and others,

and "unusual circumstances discernable from the record. . . . " Appl. 3:16-21. 

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1

 Plaintiffs overstate the testimony. Mr. Thomasson asked Ashley if someone was listening in on the

conversation. He testified she said she did not know, but someone might be. Shroth Decl. Exh. A, A.

Thomasson Depo. foll. p. 32, ll. 8-13; see also FAC ¶¶ 26-28. He also testified he thought Ashley said in

the course of that conversation "they record or monitor all of them or . . . something to that effect, that, you

know, they have a policy of doing that." Id. 34:2-5; see Order Dkt No. 192, pp. 5-6.

2

 GC Services also requested leave to oppose the Application on the merits should the court consider

granting leave to move for reconsideration of the challenged Orders.

3

 The Standing Order alerts the parties reconsideration motions are disfavored absent a showing of

"new evidence, a change in controlling law, or establishes that the Court committed clear error in the earlier

ruling." Standing Order ¶ 4.j. "No motion for reconsideration will be filed without leave of Court." Id. Leave

of court is obtained as follows: "[T]he party desiring to move for reconsideration shall file an ex parte

application for leave to file a motion to reconsider. The ex parte application shall be accompanied by a

declaration as required by Civil Local Rule 7.1(i)(1). The ex parte application shall contain a brief summary

of the argument the party intends to present in a motion for reconsideration and shall not exceed five

pages in length. Upon review of the ex parte application, the Court will either issue an order granting leave

to file a motion for reconsideration, including a briefing schedule, or an order denying leave." Standing Order

¶ 4.j (emphasis added). 

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The Application summarizes plaintiffs' arguments for reconsideration with the aim of setting

aside the Judgement pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. ("Rule") 59(e): (1) discovery disputes prevented the

timely presentation of certain deposition testimony from two managers of GC Services' credit

collection departments and constitutes "newly discovered" evidence; (2) the court committed "clear

error" in denying on November 2, 2006 leave to add two additional putative class representative

plaintiffs in a Second Amended Complaint who, the two named plaintiffs contend, could have saved

the case from dismissal on standing grounds; (3) if the court determines upon reconsideration it clearly

erred in denying the Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Complaint, "then it necessarily was

also error for the Court to deny as moot Plaintiffs' Motion For Class Certification;" (4) Mr.

Thomasson's deposition testimony that "'Ashley' admitted to him during a telephone conversation that

said conversation was being monitored by an unknown third auditor" created a triable issue of material

fact adequate to prevent summary judgment;1 and (5) "The proceedings were so infected with

irregularity reconsideration is warranted on that basis alone." Appl. pp. 3-5.

GC Services filed procedural Opposition to the Ex Parte Application, urging the court to deny

the Application on untimeliness grounds.2 Defendant argues any Rule 59(e) motion would be

untimely, as the Ex Parte Application required under this court's Standing Order3 to obtain prior

authorization to file a motion for reconsideration is the only filing that technically can meet the 10-day

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4

 Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule") provides: "(e) Motion To Alter Or

Amend Judgment. Any motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of

the judgment."

5

 A local requirement that leave of court be obtained before motions for reconsideration may be filed

"need not be read to conflict with any other rule of civil procedure." Hinton v. Pacific Enterprises, 5 F.3d 391,

395 (9th Cir. 1993). The Application expressly invokes Rule 59(e), and the court declines to construe local

rules regarding motions for reconsideration to conflict with or to foreclose that relief. See Hinton, 5 F.3d at

395. "A motion filed within the ten-day period set by Federal Rule 59 may be construed as a Rule 59 motion

though labeled according to another federal rule [citation]; to a local rule, see Bestran Corp. v. Eagle

Comtronics, Inc., 720 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983); or not labeled at all [citation]." Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d

803, 805 (9th Cir. 1989).

6

 The Standing Order limits to a total of 5-pages any application for reconsideration of an Order.

Standing Order ¶ 4.j. Plaintiffs' Application totals 27 pages comprised of a 5-page Application summarizing

plaintiffs' positions, Mr. Schroth's 8-page Declaration, and Mr. Arleo's 14-page Declaration. Plaintiffs' counsel

represents plaintiffs' Application was purportedly kept short to avoid the court's prior criticism that

multiplication of proceedings has plagued their presentation of their case. Schroth Decl. ¶ 19. However, the

excuse of length control does not excuse the vagueness of the asserted bases for the reconsideration requests.

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deadline prescribed by Rule 59(e) under which plaintiffs seek to proceed.4 The court OVERRULES

the untimeliness argument and construes the Application, filed within 10 days of the entry of

Judgment, as a timely preservation of a Rule 59(e) motion with respect to the summary judgment

ruling.5 See Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1989). GC Services also objected plaintiffs'

Application violates the Standing Order's restrictions as to the maximum length of requests for leave

to file for reconsideration. The 5-page Application was accompanied by an 8-page Declaration Of

Robert E. Schroth, Jr., Esq. and the 14-page Arleo Declaration. GC Services asks the court to strike

the 14-page Arleo Declaration on that basis.6 The court DENIES GC Services request to strike the

Arleo Declaration because its oratorical excess informs the disposition of the Application. 

As a threshold matter, the court denied plaintiffs Motion For Leave To File Second Amended

Complaint by Order entered November 2. 2006. Dkt No. 154. To be timely, any request for

reconsideration of that Order had to be filed no later than 30-days after it was entered. See Civ. L. R.

7.1(i)(2) (imposing time limits for reconsideration of prejudgment motions). The court declines to

entertain so belated a request, and DENIES reconsideration. 

Similarly, the court finds the dismissal of plaintiffs' Motion To Certify Class on

March 16, 2007 in connection with the resetting of case management dates to be untimely challenged

at this late date, and in consideration of the summary judgment ruling disposing of the putative class

action in its entirety, any class certification motion has been mooted. In addition, the March 16, 2007

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7

 The court also stated at that time a new class certification motion hearing and briefing schedule

would be set in due course if appropriate. Dkt No. 186. The grant of summary judgment on July 13, 2007

terminated the putative class action. Moreover, plaintiffs are disingenuous in purporting now to belatedly have

the court reconsider denial of that motion because plaintiffs did not move to file the Second Amended

Complaint until several days after they filed the Motion To Certify Class. Leave to file the Second Amended

Complaint was denied, rendering the motion content immaterial in the actual procedural posture of the case.

Plaintiffs also disingenuously suggest the court acted solely on its own initiative, whereas the parties in fact

acknowledged any class certification motion would have to be reworked to conform to the operative pleading,

hence the court's denial without prejudice to the bringing of a future motion should the case survive summary

judgment for defendant. See fn 10, below.

8

 Plaintiffs contend that had they been granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, they would

have added two other named plaintiffs who would have had standing to represent a class certifiable in this

litigation. The court does not deal in hypotheticals about what might have been.

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Order dismissing the class certification motion was particularly appropriate as that motion was

predicated on class definitions from the rejected Second Amended Complaint, and the denial was

without prejudice.7 Finally, the court also declines to "reconsider" the rejection of class certification

within the scope of the First Amended Complaint's surviving definitions because one basis for the

granting of summary judgment was the court's finding these named plaintiffs lack standing to pursue

the claims presented, on their on behalf or on behalf of anyone else.8 The court accordingly evaluates

plaintiffs' Application under Rule 59(e) only as it pertains to the summary judgment ruling, even

though the court need not have reached issues other than the standing issue.

 "A district court may reconsider its grant of summary judgment under [Rule 59(e)], (motion

to alter or amend a judgment) . . . ." School Dist. No. 1J, Multonomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d

1255, 1266 (9th Cir. 1993).

While Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and

amend a previous order, the rule offers an "extraordinary remedy, to be

used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial

resources." [Citation.]. . . . Indeed, "a motion for reconsideration

should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the

district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed

clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling

law." [Citation].

Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (Rule 59(e) motions intended

to alter a Judgment may not be used to present for the first time arguments or evidence that could

reasonably have been presented earlier in the litigation); Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop,

229 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 2000); School Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1266 (motions to alter or amend

judgments are warranted only where: (1) newly discovered evidence is presented; (2) the court

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9

 Plaintiffs note the court rejected their February 13, 2007 ex parte request to supplement their

opposition to summary judgment -- after the motion was fully briefed and under submission -- with new points

and authorities, additional authority, and additional evidence from deposition testimony of two former GC

Services managers and a Mr. Mike Nelson, identified in the request as a San Diego resident who had recently

contacted plaintiffs' counsel to complain about GC Services' practices and who provided counsel with a

declaration about call recording. The court denied the request for the reasons state in its February 21, 2007

Order (Dkt No. 183), and declines post-judgment to revisit the exercise of that discretion. 

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"committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust;" or (3) there is an intervening

change in controlling law); see Sissoko v. Rocha, 440 F.3d 1145, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Plaintiffs' Application identifies no change in controlling law. They do not convince the court

they can demonstrate "manifest injustice" occurred in the granting of summary judgment, despite the

invective in counsel Robert L.Arleo's supporting Declaration. The only remaining ground that could

support granting these plaintiffs leave to set aside or modify the Judgment is "clear error." However,

rather than succinctly identify any discrete mistakes, plaintiffs' arguments instead advance vague

contentions of sweeping, wholesale, and generalized error. The Application foreshadows that were

leave granted to file motions to reconsider, plaintiffs would reargue the entire breadth of their

previously rejected contentions based solely on their disagreement with outcome. The Schroth

Declaration identifies ten general areas and theories he states plaintiffs "will discuss" in their postjudgment reconsideration motions if the Application were granted: 

(1) Upon review in a "fully briefed motion for reconsideration" of plaintiffs' facts and analysis,

plaintiffs argue "the Court would be compelled to reach a different conclusion in ruling upon the

Defendant's motion for summary judgment." Schroth Decl. ¶ 9. However, their proposed "facts and

analysis" would take the court beyond "reconsideration" of its summary judgment ruling to admit

different evidence and argument than was before the court in reaching the challenged result, a

proposition the court REJECTS.

9

 If the court erred, it must be demonstrated based on the matters

properly presented in reaching the result, not on a modified set of facts. 

(2) Plaintiffs propose to demonstrate on reconsideration of the denial of their motion to file

a Second Amended Complaint that the proposed new plaintiffs "undeniably had standing" to pursue

this putative class action. As noted above, the court REJECTS as untimely any attempt now to revisit

that nine-month-old ruling and to retroactively alter the posture of the case from its circumstances

when defendant was granted summary judgment.

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10

 The procedural history of this case is revealing. Excerpting pertinent history fromamong the 200

docket entries in this case: Plaintiffs filed their complaint May 4, 2005. They filed their First Amended

Complaint August 17, 2005, adding and dropping named plaintiffs. The Early Neutral Evaluation was held

December 2, 2005. The January 9, 2006 Case Management Order, among other things, set discovery cut-off

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(3) "If leave to file a motion to reconsider [the summary judgment ruling] is granted, Plaintiffs

will also discuss whether the Court's rulings on standing were correct. Plaintiffs aver they were not

and clear error is present." Schroth Decl. ¶ 11. Such a bare assertion of "clear error" does not inform

the court of the nature of its purported error on what authority. A party's mere disagreement is

insufficient to convince the court it would probably reach a different result on reconsideration.

(4) Similarly, the bootstrapped argument that "[b]ecause the Court's rulings on standing were

[purportedly] incorrect, it was clear error to use those rulings as a basis to deny as moot Plaintiffs'

motion for class certification" (Schroth Decl. ¶ 10) merely begs the question. Even had the court not

rejected reconsideration of denial of the class certification motion for the reasons discussed above,

plaintiffs offer no insight into the manner in which they would demonstrate how the court may have

erred in the standing rulings, and the court finds they simply disagree with the result.

(5) Plaintiffs want to re-argue their position disputed material facts purportedly should have

precluded summary judgment in a reconsiderationmotion "discuss[ing] whether the Court[] incorrectly

ruled there existed no genuine disputes of material fact. . . ." Schroth Decl. ¶ 13. If plaintiffs believe

they are entitled to a de novo review of the summary judgment motion in its entirety, as their unfocused

criticism of the result suggests, they may present their contentions to a higher court. Moreover, the time

for plaintiffs to have isolate and directed the court's attention to discrete material facts in dispute

supported by the evidence was in their initial opposition to summary judgment, not on reconsideration.

Plaintiffs are mistaken to suggest the mere volume of material somehow establishes the existence of

triable issues of discrete material fact. The court declines to revisit every ground and page of the

parties' voluminous filings. De novo review of district court rulings are reserved for courts of appeals.

(6) Plaintiffs also seek to "present argument that the Court committed clear error by refusing

to suspend the proceedings until after the assigned Magistrate Judge resolved discovery issues put

before the Court by Plaintiffs." Schroth Decl. ¶ 14. However, motions for summary judgment may be

filed and granted at any time in the litigation after a reasonable period for discovery.10 GC Services

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for October 5, 2006. On May 30, 2006, the court denied defendant's Motion For Partial Judgment On The

Pleadings. Numerous discovery disputes have peppered this case, causing the Magistrate Judge to devise

procedures for bringing such disputes to the court's attention as memorialized in her June 2, 2006 Order,

including warnings to plaintiff's pro hac vice counsel, Mr. Arleo, to discontinue discourteous and disrespectful

behavior before the court or else face sanctions. Contentious discovery disputes continued. A Protective Order

issued in the case, resulting in am extraordinarily broad portion of the evidentiary record presented under seal.

Plaintiffs moved for class certification on June 30, 2006 as if new named plaintiffs sought to be added via a

Second Amended Complaint were already part of the action. They did not file their Motion For Leave To File

Second Amended Complaint until July 5, 2006. On August 23, 2006, the court denied plaintiffs' ex parte

application for leave to supplement their briefing in support of the Class Certification motion, vacating the

September 11, 2006 hearing of that motion. On November 2, 2006, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for leave

to file a Second Amended Complaint as untimely, but elaborated in the 7-page Order the reasons leave would

also be denied on the merits. GC Services moved for summary judgment on October 26, 2006. By Order

entered February 21, 2007, after that motion was fully briefed and had been under submission for three months

for decision on the (voluminous) papers (replete with acrimonious and unprofessional characterizations

between opposing counsel as noted in the November 14, 2006 Order taking the matter under submission), the

court denied plaintiffs' ex parte application to augment its opposition points and authorities and its evidence,

admonishing plaintiffs to desist their "piecemeal" briefing approach. By Order entered March 16, 2007, the

court continued pre-trial dates and denied without prejudice plaintiffs' pending Class Certification Motion "in

consideration of the parties' acknowledgment additional briefing of the putative class issues will likely

be needed," and indicating a new class certification motion hearing and briefing schedule would be addressed

in due course, noting the Class Certification Motion being denied was predicated on a Second Amended

Complaint rather than on the operative pleading, the First Amended Complaint. Dkt No. 186. Any class

certification motion became a moot issue as stated in the July 16, 2007 Order granting summary judgment for

GC Services. Dkt No. 192 (emphasis added).

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filed its Motion For Summary Judgment on October 26, 2006, nearly 18 months after plaintiffs initiated

this litigation. The court acknowledges from the case docket much time was expended in acrimonious

disputes and motions to compel, and case management deadlines were modified accordingly.

Nevertheless, the contentiousnessofthe discovery process does not foreclose any party from attempting

a Rule 56 showing this far into the litigation. Plaintiffs sought not to stay the proceedings, but rather

to augment the briefing incrementally with respect to their own positions alone.

(7) Plaintiffs aver they would use an opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration to "discuss

whether the Court's rulings so misconstrued the law that they amount to clear error." Schroth Decl. ¶

15. They sweepingly identify as the alleged errors of law "the California Invasion of Privacy Act and

the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act," purportedly causing "in turn, misappli[cation of] the

law to the facts in this case." Id. No such generality offers the court any principled basis to entertain

yet more imprecise argument in a second-bite-at-the-apple attempt to oppose summary judgment in the

guise of reconsideration briefing with a goal to have the Judgment set aside.

(8) Plaintiffs contend they would "discuss whether the Court's ruling on evidence and

evidentiary objections were correct," averring "that many of the [unspecified] rulings contain clear

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11

 Taking a few of the multiple examples from the Arleo Declaration, he accuses the court, inter alia

of: "prejudice;" "bias;" going to "shocking lengths. . . to rid its calendar of an unwanted case;" the construing

of plaintiff's actual contention they were entitled to summary judgment in their favor, as stated in their

opposition papers, as "patently ridiculous and simply further clear and unmistakable evidence of the Court's

consistent pattern of bias levied against the Plaintiffs;" "the Court is undeniably biased against the Plaintiffs

herein;" contrary to the court's assertion in the Order signed July 13, 2007, any professional or lay person or

"high school student, or the parent of a newborn infant" hoping the child becomes "a pre-law student" would

conclude fromOrder pages 29 through 39 "the Court herein absolutely, unequivocally, and undeniably assessed

the credibility of the testimony provided by the Defendant's managers;" the court purportedly manifested "clear

and undeniable disdain . . . for the Plaintiffs;" certain of the court's conclusions are "unfathomable" and

"especially ridiculous;" and "recklessness."

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error and therefore rise to the level of an abuse of discretion." Schroth Decl. ¶ 16 (emphasis added).

Considering over eleven pages of the 52-page Order at issue addresses each of the multitude of

evidentiary objections presented by the parties before reaching the merits of the summary judgment

motion, so vague and vast a challenge again suggests no principled basis on which to reopen

consideration of any discrete portion of the record on grounds supportive of Rule 59 relief.

(9) Plaintiffs want the opportunity to argue open-endedly that "manifest injustice to Plaintiffs"

resulted from the "irregularities" of the "proceedings conducted before this Court." Schroth Decl. ¶ 17.

The intemperate content of the Arleo Declaration foreshadows and provides the court with considerable

insight into the likely content of the filings it might expect were leave to file Motions For

Reconsideration granted. He expounds at length, among other things, his opinion of this court's

purported incompetence, further obfuscating any argument on the merits. For example, Mr. Arleo

disrespectfully excoriates the court's reasoning, results, and process. He repeatedly, most vehemently,

and quite mistakenly accuses this court of bias and prejudice against his clients, as well as judicial

misconduct in the manner of its rulings, blatant and intentional misapplication of legal standards, and

the like.11 Mr. Arleo summarizes:

[T]he Friday the 13th Order is patently baseless, unjust and without any

merit in fact or law. As set forth above, it is my contention that the

Court herein is absolutely and undeniably biased against the Plaintiffs

and views each as debtors who should simply shut up and pay up.

. . .

Unfortunately, the degree of bias and prejudice evidenced in the

Friday the 13th Order has compelled me to advise this Court that the

Plaintiffs herein have authorized me to request that: (a) the Court herein

sua sponte vacate its Friday the 13th Order; and (b) Your Honor recuse

himself from the herein action and direct the Clerk of Court herein to

randomly assign this case to another district judge. 

Arleo Decl. ¶¶ 35, 36.

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 The court denies both of Mr. Arleo's requests as wholly improper and unwarranted. 

(10) Plaintiffs finally assert they would also discuss in a motion for reconsideration "whether

the proceedings conducted before this Court were so irregular and filled with error as to constitute

cumulative error requiring that the disputed orders be vacated as they comprise in aggregate a manifest

injustice to Plaintiffs." Schroth Decl. ¶ 18. The court disagrees and finds allegations of that nature

must be addressed to and assessed by a reviewing court. If reversible error occurred, this court

respectfully awaits corrective instructions from that court. 

 For the reasons set forth above, and in consideration of plaintiffs' extravagant attack on this

court's integrity, misstatements of portions of the court's rulings, and misrepresentations of the record

advanced in support of their Ex Parte Application, the Application for leave to move for

reconsideration in the hope of vacating the Judgment is DENIED. In particular, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application for reconsideration of the November 2, 2006 Order

denying Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Complaint is DENIED AS UNTIMELY.

2. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the motion

for class certification without prejudice is DENIED AS UNTIMELY, MOOT, AND

UNMERITORIOUS because predicated on an amended pleading never authorized for filing, with any

renewed Motion To Certify Class necessarily foreclosed by the summary judgment result.

3. Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application for reconsideration of the Order Granting Summary

Judgment is DENIED. 

4. The "requests" in the Arleo Declaration are DENIED. The undersigned District Judge

need not "recuse" himself. Judgment has been entered, the case is closed, no further proceedings are

contemplated here, and accusations this court is biased or harbors prejudice against these plaintiffs or

any others similarly situated is wholly unfounded.

5. Robert L. Arleo, Esq., a New York attorney, was granted pro hac vice status to represent

plaintiffs in this action. He has exhibited extraordinary disrespect to the undersigned District Judge as

well as to the Magistrate Judge assigned to this case during the conduct of this litigation. Mr. Arleo

is hereby admonished, should he make any future application to appear pro hac vice in any matter

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which may be assigned to the undersigned District Judge, he shall accompany the application with a

copy of this Order and shall inform the Clerk of Court prior authorization of this court is required

before Mr. Arleo will be granted any future pro hac vice privileges.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 9, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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