Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00198/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00198-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dorothy O’Connell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

David R. Smith, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-0198-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court are the Motions for Sanctions filed by Plaintiff

(Doc. 47) and Defendant (Doc. 33). The motions have been fully briefed and are now ripe

for adjudication. 

Arizona’s Rules of Professional Conduct apply to attorneys admitted to practice

before the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. A district court judge

“may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law . . . and local rules of the

district.” L.R.Civ. 83.2(d); Fed.R.Civ.P. 83(b). The district court not only has inherent

powers to regulate the conduct of the attorneys who appear before it, but the “primary

responsibility for controlling the conduct of lawyers practicing before the district court rests

with that court.” Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 3, 1997, Dorothy O’Connell (“Plaintiff”) was hired by Dr. Phillip Keen,

the duly authorized Maricopa County Medical Examiner, as the Deputy Director of the

Office of Medical Examiner of Maricopa County. (Doc. 7, ¶1.) On February 12, 1997,

Plaintiff’s appointment by Dr. Keen as Deputy Director of the Office of Medical Examiner

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(OME) was approved by the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors. (Id., ¶2.) On October

27, 2005, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave by Defendant Smith, County

Manager, and terminated effective June 30, 2006, as part of the reorganization of the Office

of Medical Examiner. (Id., ¶3.) Plaintiff’s termination as Deputy Director of the Office of

Medical Examiner was allegedly “against [the] wishes” of Dr. Keen. (Id., ¶4 and Ex. 2, ¶6.)

In June of 2006, Dr. Keen filed suit against defendant Maricopa County and defendant

Smith in Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa County. In his complaint, Dr. Keen sought

a Declaratory Judgment resembling Count I of the Complaint in this case. Plaintiff’s tried

to intervene in Dr. Keen’s case on August 10, 2006. At the time, the attorneys for Maricopa

County and defendant Smith opposed Plaintiff’s Motion to Intervene.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions Against Defendant (Doc. 47)

Plaintiff filed her Motion for Sanctions on June 8, 2007, and served it on Defendants’

counsel that same day. (Dkt. 47). Although Plaintiff notified Defendants of her intention to

file a Rule 11 motion for sanctions, and forwarded to Defendants what Plaintiff described as

a “draft” of that motion, Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to comply with the

requirements of the Federal Rules by not previously serving Defendants with the actual

Motion for Sanctions that was filed with the Court on June 8, 2007. Instead, Plaintiff’s

Motion for Sanctions was served on Defendants on June 8, 2007, the same day she filed it.

Rule 11 explicitly requires that a party filing a Rule 11 motion must serve the motion

on the opposing party 21 days before filing the motion with the Court. Fed.R.Civ.P.

11(c)(1)(A)) (“A motion for sanctions under this rule . . . shall be served as provided in Rule

5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of

the motion . . . the challenged paper . . . is not withdrawn or appropriately

corrected”)(emphasis added). Failure to serve the motion 21 days before filing it violates the

express “safe harbor” provision of Rule 11. Retail Flooring Dealers of America, Inc. v.

Beaulieu of America, LLC, 339 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003).

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 1The Court is not certain as to the exact inclusions and exclusions of the draft

motion as it is not included in the docket.

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Defendants contend that the Motion for Sanctions Plaintiff filed on June 8th is not the

same document as the “draft” previously provided to Defendants and, instead, differs from

it in numerous instances, many of which are substantive. Plaintiff however asserts that every

issue raised in the June 8, 2007 motion was raised in the draft sent to Defendants on May 11,

2007. After combing the record, the Court was unable to determine whether the two

documents were in fact identical because the “draft” was not filed with the Court. Despite

the fact that the letter dated May 11, 2007, addressed to Defendants’ counsel (Doc. 47, Ex.

7) and containing a notice of Plaintiff’s intent to file a motion for sanctions was filed as an

attachment to the motion for sanctions by Plaintiff, Plaintiff neglected to attach the actual

document in dispute. Furthermore, the letter of notice, which originally included the draft

of a motion, although conspicuous as to its nature and intent, is unequivocally not the motion

for sanctions filed on June 8, 2007.1

 Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998)

(recognizing that previous warnings “were not motions, however, and the Rule requires

service of a motion”). The requirement that the actual motion be served “was deliberately

imposed, with a recognition of the likelihood of other warnings” to ensure that the moving

party understands the “seriousness of a motion” and will “define precisely the conduct

claimed to violate the rule.” Id. Thus, it is well established in the Ninth Circuit that, “[i]t

would therefore wrench both the language and purpose of [Rule 11] to permit an informal

warning to substitute for service of a motion.” Id.

Moreover, the Court finds that there exists no basis for an award of sanctions under

28 U.S.C. § 1927. Although the standard for sanctions under section 1927 entails a similar

threshold of misconduct as that required under Rule 11 sanctions, section 1927 is in fact a

higher threshold in that it requires a finding of recklessness or bad faith. Compare Goehring

v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996) (“imposition of sanctions under section 1927

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 2Although Plaintiff is represented by two counsel from the same firm, the Court

need only address the conduct of the signing counsel who is the target of defense

counsel’s motion.

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requires a finding that the attorney acted recklessly or in bad faith”) with In re DeVille, 361

F.3d 539, 548 (9th Cir. 2004) (“imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, on the other hand, requires

only a showing of objectively unreasonable conduct”). Section 1927 is intended to prevent

dilatory litigation practices which intentionally and unnecessarily delay proceedings. 28

U.S.C. § 1927 (“Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case

unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess

. . . [costs and fees] . . . incurred because of such conduct”); see also United States v.

International Broth. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2nd Cir. 1991) (finding that the

purpose of the statute is “to deter unnecessary delays in litigation”) (quoting H.R.Conf.Rep.

No. 1234, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8). “The statute is indifferent to the equities of a dispute and

to the values advanced by the substantive law. It is concerned only with limiting the abuse

of court processes.” Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762 (1980). 

The Court finds that Defendants’ filing of a motion to resolve issues created by

Plaintiff’s counsel’s own conduct was not done in bad faith or with the intention of delaying

the proceedings. Plaintiff acknowledges that there is a legal dispute as to the contact between

her counsel and Mr. Keen, and such a dispute requires resolution through motion practice.

Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants intentionally or unnecessarily delayed the

court process in a reckless manner, or exhibited bad faith by filing motions to resolve

pending matters.

Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions Against Plaintiff’s Counsel (Doc. 41)

The Court now addresses Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions against Plaintiff’s

counsel2 for a violation of Arizona Ethical Rule of Conduct 4.2, which is binding upon this

Court.

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 3See Hearing Transcript at p. 29, ll. 14-24.

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The facts leading up to the gravamen of this case are undisputed. Dr. Keen, the

Maricopa County Examiner, hired the Plaintiff; remained her supervisor during her tenure

with the Maricopa County Medical Examiner’s Office; opposed Plaintiff’s termination; is

a material witness in this case; and was an employee of Maricopa County at all times relevant

to this case. Moreover, Dr. Keen filed a separate suit against Maricopa County that

ostensibly has been settled during the litigation of this case. Dr. Keen was represented in his

private litigation by his own counsel. With regard to the present case, however, Dr. Keen is

a material witness who was employed by Maricopa County. Plaintiff’s Counsel sought

permission to contact Dr. Keen from Defendants’ Counsel, which permission was declined.

Defense Counsel offered, however, to participate in a deposition of Dr. Keen, a procedure

that the Court endorsed3

. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s counsel contacted Dr. Keen’s private

counsel, who readily gave Plaintiff’s counsel permission to contact Dr. Keen and obtain the

requisite affidavit. Consequently, Plaintiff’s counsel contacted Dr. Keen and said contact

resulted in the affidavit at issue.

Defendants request that the Court impose sanctions by disqualifying Plaintiff’s

counsel and striking Dr. Keen’s affidavit procured by Plaintiff’s counsel without the

permission of Defense counsel. The Court finds that disqualification of counsel would be

unnecessarily harsh and could result in unjust prejudice to the Plaintiff herself. As to the

affidavit, the Court finds that it is not necessary to strike from the record the affidavit as its

existence will not adversely effect Defendants in this case. After carefully considering the

affidavit, the Court concludes that it is comprised of undisputed, innocuous facts with no

evidentiary value as it relates to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment or the

Certification of Questions to the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court need not strike the

affidavit. Furthermore, because the affidavit adds no substantive value to the Plaintiff’s case,

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 4That discussion may be continued before a different forum should the parties

choose to do so.

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the Court finds that it need not determine whether Plaintiff’s Counsel’s conduct reached the

level of violating E.R. 4.2.4

To avoid any misunderstanding, however, the Court will order stricken from the

affidavit, and therefore stricken from the docket, paragraphs 4 and 6 of the affidavit as they

are not based on Dr. Keen’s personal knowledge, rather they are based on the interpretation

of Maricopa County rules and policies that remain in dispute.

CONCLUSION

The resolution of these dueling motions for sanctions are but two in a long series of

acrimonious conduct between counsel in this case. Counsel are reminded that cooperation

with opposing counsel, as well as compliance with the Federal and Local Rules leads to the

most efficient and economical resolution of cases.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED DENYING Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions against

Defendants (Doc. 47).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions

against Plaintiff’s counsel (Doc. 33).

DATED this 19th day of February, 2008.

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