Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01767/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01767-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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07cv1767

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

D. BRADLEY CROW,

Plaintiff,

v.

JUDY WALSH, JAMES SHAW, and

LOIS GOROSPE,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 07CV1767 JAH(WMc)

ORDER SUA SPONTE

DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE

GRANTED AND DENYING

MOTION TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS AS MOOT

Plaintiff, a non-prisoner appearing pro se, has a filed a civil rights complain, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging defendants Judy Walsh, James Shaw, and Louis Gorospe,

employees of Time Warner Cable, violated his constitutional rights when they terminated

his cable television and internet service without notice. Plaintiff also filed a motion to

proceed in forma pauperis concurrently with his complaint. All parties instituting any civil

action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for

writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action

may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is

granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez

v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaint filed by

any person seeking to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject

to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent it is

Case 3:07-cv-01767-JAH-WMC Document 3 Filed 09/11/07 Page 1 of 4
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“frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking

monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);

Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the Court reviewing a

complaint filed pursuant to the in forma pauperis provisions of Section 1915 make and rule

on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the U.S.

Marshal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege facts to show:

(1) the violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and

(2) that the alleged violations were committed by persons acting under the color of state

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police

Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Private citizens may be held liable under § 1983 only for acts which are alleged to

have been taken under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981),

overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Haygood v.

Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). A private individual generally

does not act “under color” of state law, an essential element of a § 1983 action. Gomez

v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). “[P]urely private conduct, no matter how wrongful,

is not within the protective orbit of section 1983.” Ouzts v. Maryland Nat’l Ins. Co., 505

F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir.

1991).

 “The under color of law requirement of § 1983 has been treated as the equivalent

of the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Adams v. So. Cal. First

Nat’l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing United States v. Price, 383 U.S.

787, 794-795 n.7 (1966); Green v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624, 628 (9th Cir. 1973); but cf.

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 188 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and

dissenting). “Under these concepts, the Supreme Court has frequently held that action

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taken by what would otherwise be considered to be private individuals or organizations

is within the state action definition.” Adams, 492 F.2d at 329 (footnote omitted).

Nevertheless, a plaintiff may seek to hold a private actor liable under section 1983;

however, he must allege facts that show some “state involvement which directly or

indirectly promoted the challenged conduct.” Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 553; West, 457 U.S. at

54; Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1118-1120 (9th Cir. 1997). “Whether a private

party engaged in state action is a highly factual question.” Brunette v. Humane Society

of Ventura County, 294 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Howerton v. Gabica, 708

F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

“Several tests have emerged to evaluate whether a private actor has engaged in state

action.” Id. at 1210. They are: (1) the “joint action” test which examines whether private

actors are willful participants in joint action with government agents, see Dennis v. Sparks,

449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980); (2) the “symbiotic relationship” test which asks whether the

government has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with a private

entity that the private entity must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged

activity, see Rendell Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842-43 (1982); and (3) the “public

functions” test which inquires whether the private actor performs functions traditionally

and exclusively reserved to the States, see Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978).

Id.

Here, plaintiff alleges only that three private persons acting on behalf of a private

entity, Time Warner Cable, violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights to due process and

equal protection under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution by

terminating his cable television and internet services without notice. Plaintiff does not

allege that the actions at issue are traditionally or exclusively reserved to the states, the

individual defendants participated jointly with the government regarding the acts at bar,

or the government insinuated itself into any portion of the acts complained of herein, or

there is any nexus between the state and the individual defendants’ actions. Thus, this

Court finds that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the individual defendants acted under

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color of state law. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838;

Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28. Therefore, this Court finds that the instant complaint fails to

state a claim under section 1983 and must be sua sponte dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at 845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27. 

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the

instant complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Because this Court dismisses the

complaint, plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED as moot.

Dated: September 10, 2007

HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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