Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01821/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01821-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 22, 2015*

Decided September 23, 2015

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

Nos. 14-3251 & 15-1821

GREGORY H. LITTLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF 

REVENUE,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 11 C 748

Manish Shah,

Judge.

GREGORY H. LITTLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF 

REVENUE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 10 C 4928

Sharon Johnson Coleman,

Judge.

 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. Thus the appeals are submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Nos. 14-3251 & 15-1821 Page 2

O R D E R

Gregory Little, who is black, was fired by the Illinois Department of Revenue 

after working there for 25 years. He brought successive suits against the Department, 

asserting, in the first suit (10 C 4928), claims of race and sex discrimination and 

retaliation, and in the second (11 C 748) only retaliation. In both suits the district court 

granted summary judgment for the Department on grounds that Little’s claims were 

precluded by a prior state-court judgment. We have consolidated both appeals for 

disposition and affirm.

About a year before Little was discharged, he began having problems with 

Barbara Bruno, his supervisor who had recently been hired into a newly created 

position. He made several complaints of race and sex discrimination to the 

Department’s Equal Employment Officer. At the same time Bruno made her own 

complaints to the Department’s Office of Internal Affairs, alleging that Little’s behavior 

towards her was unprofessional and disrespectful. The Internal Affairs investigation 

found that Little was not working his approved schedule, that he was using his state 

vehicle for personal business, and that he had falsified his timesheet. As a result of the 

investigation, Little was fired. Meanwhile Little filed successive charges with the EEOC 

alleging race and sex discrimination and retaliation because he was fired, had his job 

description and supervisor changed, was excluded from important strategy meetings, 

and was subjected to unreasonable timelines. Little sought review of his discharge 

before the Illinois Civil Service Commission. 

After receiving right-to-sue letters from the EEOC, Little filed two federal 

lawsuits. In his first federal lawsuit (10 C 4928), he asserted discrimination and 

retaliation claims against the Department and several of its employees under Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This suit, filed shortly before 

his discharge, focused on his claims about the changes in his job description and 

supervisor, his exclusion from important strategy meetings, and the unreasonable 

timelines he was subjected to. His second federal lawsuit (11 C 748), filed during his 

proceedings before the Commission, claimed that his discharge was retaliatory under 

Title VII. Both federal lawsuits were stayed during the Commission’s proceedings. 

An administrative law judge for the Commission determined that Little had 

falsified time records and that discharge was the proper sanction; the Commission 

adopted the ALJ’s ruling. Little then sought judicial review in Illinois state court. The 

state trial court affirmed the Commission’s decision, and the appellate court in turn 

affirmed.

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Nos. 14-3251 & 15-1821 Page 3

In late 2014 Judge Shah, in case no. 11 C 748, granted summary judgment for the 

defendants on grounds of claim preclusion. Judge Shah determined that there was an 

identity of causes of action because both the state-court case and his federal suit dealt 

with his discharge, and Little had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his retaliation 

claim when he sought review of the Commission’s ruling in state court. 

Several months later Judge Coleman, in case no. 10 C 4928, granted summary 

judgment to the Department similarly based on claim preclusion. Judge Coleman 

determined that there was an identity of causes of action because Little’s federal suit 

had at its core the investigation and events leading to his discharge—the same set of 

facts that were at issue in his state court case. She also determined that Little had a full 

and fair opportunity to litigate his discrimination and retaliation claims in the state 

court.

Little appealed both judgments, and we consolidated the appeals for disposition. 

On appeal Little challenges the application of claim preclusion because, he says, 

no identity in the causes of action exists between the state and federal litigation. The 

state litigation, he maintains, focused on his discharge, whereas the claims in case 

no. 10 C 4928 address other instances of discrimination and retaliation—the changed job 

description and supervisor, the investigation, the exclusion from meetings, and the 

unreasonable timelines.

Under the “transactional test” in Illinois, however, separate claims are 

considered the same cause of action for claim preclusion purposes if they arise from a 

single group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of 

relief. See Walczak v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 739 F.3d 1013, 1016–17 (7th Cir. 2014) (applying 

Illinois law). In determining whether the facts arise from the same transaction or series 

of transactions, we look to whether they “are related in time, space, origin, or 

motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit.” Hayes v. City of Chicago, 670 F.3d 

810, 813 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 

893 (Ill. 1998)). As both judges determined, Little’s discrimination and retaliation claims 

arise out of the same core of operative facts as his state litigation: his discharge and the 

circumstances that led to it. In his telling, in the year after Bruno became his supervisor, 

he suffered a series of discriminatory acts and retaliation for his discrimination 

complaints—Bruno excluded him from meetings, changed his job description and chain 

of command, and caused Internal Affairs to launch a baseless investigation against him 

that led to his discharge. Little relied on this same series of events in his state suit. 

See Huon v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 757 F.3d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 2014) (state-court judgment 

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Nos. 14-3251 & 15-1821 Page 4

precluded federal suit even though federal suit added allegations because the 

additional allegations arose out of the same facts regarding job conditions and 

discharge).

Little also contends that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate his 

discrimination and retaliation claims because he was not permitted to raise them before 

the Commission. But Little did in fact allege before the Commission that his discharge 

was discriminatory and retaliatory. In any event, for claim preclusion purposes, what

matters is only whether Little could have raised these claims before the state court, not 

the Commission, because it is the state-court judgment that is given preclusive effect. 

See Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 796 (1986); Hayes, 670 F.3d at 815–16. As both 

district courts correctly determined, Little had the opportunity, but did not use it, to join 

his discrimination and retaliation claims as independent causes of action when he 

sought administrative review of the Commission’s decision in state court. See Dookeran 

v. County of Cook, Ill., 719 F.3d 570, 576–78 (7th Cir. 2013); Garcia v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 

360 F.3d 630, 639–44 (7th Cir. 2004). Therefore, Little had a full and fair opportunity to 

litigate his discrimination and retaliation claims. 

AFFIRMED. 

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