Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01556/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01556-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS HAUSCHILD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF RICHMOND AND

CHRISTOPHER MAGNUS,

Defendants. /

No. C 15-01556 WHA

ORDER DENYING MOTION

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this wrongful termination action, defendants move for partial summary judgment on

one of plaintiff’s claims. For the reasons stated herein, defendants’ motion is DENIED. 

Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Thomas Hauschild began working as a police officer for defendant City of

Richmond in 2005. He served as a detective, a member of the SWAT team, and as a firearms

instructor. Between 2006 and 2012, plaintiff’s wife, who also worked for the City of

Richmond, made several domestic abuse complaints against plaintiff. In response, plaintiff

notified the City of these complaints and the City took no action (Hauschild Decl. at ¶¶ 3–4).

On September 23, 2012 a physical altercation between plaintiff and his wife occurred. 

Both plaintiff and his wife suffered injuries to their faces and bodies. The Alameda County

Case 3:15-cv-01556-WHA Document 50 Filed 11/20/15 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 * A Skelly hearing allows an employee to respond to allegations prior to the imposition of any

actual disciplinary action. See Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975).

2

Sheriff’s Department responded to the scene and opened an investigation, but eventually

declined to press charges (id. at ¶5).

As a result of this altercation, the City initiated an internal affairs investigation of

plaintiff. The investigation delved into many past incidents occurring between 2006 and 2012

and investigators questioned plaintiff about these incidents in the investigatory interview. The

investigation concluded on September 18, 2013 (less than one year after the incident) and

plaintiff received a Skelly hearing notice regarding the termination of his employment on

September 24.*

 Defendant Police Chief Christopher Magnus was appointed as the hearing

officer (id. at ¶6; Dickerson Decl. at Exh. E). 

After the hearing, Magnus recommended plaintiff’s employment be terminated based on

the following four conclusions: (1) plaintiff had been the “primary aggressor” in the September

2012 domestic violence incident; (2) plaintiff placed a condom on his wife’s door the day after

the incident, in order to humiliate and intimidate her; (3) plaintiff had possession of eight

unregistered firearms at the time of the incident; and (4) plaintiff lied to investigators when he

insisted his wife had been the primary aggressor during the incident. Magnus’ recommendation

stated that each of these incidents, standing alone, warranted plaintiff’s dismissal. Moreover,

his conclusion stated (Dickerson Decl., Exh. E at 3):

the evidence collected regarding the September 23, 2012 incident,

six years of domestic abuse of [plaintiff’s wife] leading up to this

incident, and Officer Hauschild’s defacement of [plaintiff’s wife’s]

property after the incident, conclusively proved that Officer

Hauschild was the primary aggressor on September 23, 2012, and

battered [plaintiff’s wife] in a jealous rage after finding text

messages from another officer on her mobile phone.

The recommendation also stated that the evidence showed plaintiff to be the primary aggressor

during the September 2012 incident, “even without any consideration of the prior allegations of

domestic abuse” (id. at 7). The City terminated plaintiff’s employment two days after Magnus

issued his report.

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For the Northern District of California

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3

Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint in May of this year, alleging six separate

claims related to the termination of his employment. Shortly thereafter, and before any

discovery had taken place, defendant moved for partial summary judgment on three of

plaintiff’s claims. In response, the parties agreed that plaintiff would drop two of his claims

(related to FEHA and California Constitution violations) and would be allowed ninety days to

take discovery regarding his Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights claim (the only

claim at issue in this motion). This order follows full briefing and oral argument.

ANALYSIS

1. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show that

there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Plaintiff asserts four claims in this action, including a federal claim under Section 1983. 

The instant motion for partial summary judgment only implicates one of plaintiff’s state law

claims. The Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights provides that “no punitive action .

. . shall be undertaken for any act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct if the

investigation of the allegation is not completed within one year of the public agency's

discovery.” Cal. Govt. Code Section 3304(d)(1). Section 3304(d)(2)(A) tolls the one-year

statute of limitations during the pendency of a criminal investigation. The California Supreme

Court has held that the purpose of this statute is “to ensure that an officer will not be faced with

the uncertainty of a lingering investigation, but will know within one year of the agency’s

discovery of the officer's act or omission that it may be necessary for the officer to respond in

the event he or she wishes to defend against possible discipline.” Mays v. City of Los Angeles,

43 Cal. 4th 313, 322 (2008).

Here, both sides agree that the central issue in this motion is whether defendants took

punitive action against plaintiff for alleged misconduct that took place beyond POBR’s oneyear statute of limitations. This order holds that an issue of material exists as to this question. 

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4

During the investigative interview of plaintiff, internal affairs investigator Walle asked

numerous questions about incidents that occurred well beyond the one-year statute of

limitations. These included inquiries into domestic incidents which occurred in 2007, 2009,

2010, and 2011 (Wilkinson Decl, Exh. A at 29–48). Moreover, defendant Magnus’

recommendation following the Skelly hearing made several references to these previous

incidents. Specifically, Magnus’ memorandum stated that, among other things, plaintiff’s “six

years of domestic abuse of [plaintiff’s wife] . . . conclusively proved that Officer Hauschild was

the primary aggressor on September 23, 2012” (Dickerson Decl., Exh. E at 3). Magnus also

considered that plaintiff “was able to provide detailed accounts of the September 23, 2012

domestic violence incident and other domestic violence incidents dating back several years”

(ibid). From the way in which defendants conducted the investigation, and from the sections of

the Magnus memorandum discussing past allegations against plaintiff, a reasonable jury could

find that defendants took punitive action against plaintiff for events occurring beyond the

POBR’s one-year statute of limitations.

Defendants argue that all evidence points to the conclusion that the punitive action

against plaintiff arose solely from the September 23, 2012 incident. Defendants contend that

the above quoted passages from the Magnus memorandum were contained in the “Summary of

Charges” section and were not mentioned in the “Discussion” section, which supposedly

contained the analysis and recommendation. Specifically, defendants point out that in the

“Discussion” section, Magnus stated (id. at 7): 

The evidence collected during the investigation supports the

investigator’s finding that Officer Hauschild was the primary

aggressor during the incident on September 23, 2012, even without

any consideration of the prior allegations of domestic abuse by

[plaintiff’s wife] against Officer Hauschild.

Moreover, in discussing the four separate charges — the domestic violence incident, the

placement of the condom on the door handle, the unregistered firearms, and lying to

investigators — Magnus determined that each of these charges, standing alone, warranted

termination of employment. 

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Thus, defendants argue, because the discussion of the “six years of domestic abuse” only

appeared in the “Summary of Charges” section and because Magnus explicitly stated that the

incident on September 23, 2012, had been sufficient (in and of itself) without consideration of

prior incidents, no issue of material fact exists as to whether defendants took punitive action

based on old misconduct. Not so. Defendants’ assertion, that the old conduct played no role in

the termination decision, may very well be true. That, however, must be determined by the

jury. A reasonable jury could find that based on the several references to past events in the

Magnus memorandum, and based on the questions regarding old incidents raised in the

investigatory interview, that the City actually gave weight to these old events in making its

termination decision. While Magnus explicitly stated that events prior to 2012 did not factor

into his recommendation, the recurring reference to those events throughout the process raises

an inference that plaintiff’s past came back to haunt him. From the facts that a substantial

portion of the investigation focused on plaintiff’s conduct from 2006–2011, along with the fact

that Magnus’ memorandum discussed the prior instances multiple times, a reasonable jury could

find that defendants’ punitive actions were based on conduct that occurred beyond POBR’s oneyear statute of limitations. 

2. PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS.

In his opposition, plaintiff made two objections to the declarations defendants appended

to their motion for partial summary judgment. First, plaintiff objects to the inclusion

Lieutenant Brian Dickerson’s declaration because defendants failed to list him as a witness in

their initial Rule 26 disclosures. Under Rule 37, however, exclusion is not warranted when the

failure to disclose a witness is harmless. Here, defendants filed their summary judgment

motion, with the Dickerson declaration included, eleven days before the Rule 26 disclosures

were even due. In addition, plaintiff included Dickerson as a potential witness in his own Rule

26 disclosures. Thus, any assertion that plaintiff has been harmed by defendants’ failure to

include Dickerson in their own Rule 26 disclosures is baseless.

Second, in the alternative, plaintiff objects to paragraph 12 of Dickerson’s declaration,

which states that the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department’s investigation of the September

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23, 2012, incident “concluded sometime in October 2012.” Plaintiff argues this is hearsay and

not based on Dickerson’s personal knowledge. Dickerson, however, stated in his declaration

that this conclusion had been “[b]ased upon [his] personal participation of the investigation of

the four Personnel Complaint charges brought against Detective Hauschild.” Plaintiff could

have deposed Dickerson and delved into his personal knowledge of this subject. He chose not

to. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Dickerson did not have personal knowledge of

the end date of the Sheriff’s investigation, as he swore to in his declaration, other than

plaintiff’s bare assertion in his brief. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment

regarding the POBR claim against the City of Richmond is DENIED. Plaintiff’s evidentiary

objections are OVERRULED. As the parties stipulated to at the hearing, plaintiff’s POBR claim

against defendant Magnus is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 20, 2015. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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