Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-05527/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-05527-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

LARRY LATIMORE, 

 Petitioner, 

 vs. 

RONALD BARNES1, Warden, California 

State Prison, California Men’s Colony, High 

Desert State Prison, 

 Respondent. 

Case No: C 11-5527 SBA 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Through counsel, Larry Latimore (“Petitioner”), a California state prisoner, has filed 

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge his state felony 

conviction for robbery, aggravated kidnapping and other charges. Having read and 

considered the papers submitted, and being fully informed, the Court DENIES the petition. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 27, 2007, the Alameda County District Attorney charged Petitioner in 

an information with kidnapping to commit robbery (i.e., aggravated kidnapping), Cal. Pen. 

Code § 209(b)(1); second degree robbery, id. § 211; and assault with a semi-automatic 

firearm, id. § 245(b). The information also alleged firearm enhancements, id. 

 1 The Court grants Petitioner’s request to substitute Ronald Barnes, the current 

warden at High Desert State Prison, in place of Clark Ducart, as respondent. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 25(d); Rule 2, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 1 of 17
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

§ 12022.5(a)(1), in connection with all three counts, and firearm enhancements, id. 

§ 12022.53(b) & (c), as to counts 1 and 2. 

Petitioner’s case was tried before a jury in the Alameda County Superior Court. On 

December 11, 2008, the jury found Petitioner guilty on all three counts, and found true all 

enhancements, except the § 12022.53(c) enhancement as to count 1. On February 9, 2009, 

the trial court sentenced petitioner to life plus ten years in state prison. 

On April 29, 2010, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in a 

reasoned, unpublished opinion. Ex. 6. On August 18, 2010, the California Supreme Court 

denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Ex. 8. 

Upon exhausting his state court appeals, Petitioner filed the instant action seeking 

federal habeas review of the underlying judgment. 

B. FACTUAL SUMMARY

The factual background is taken verbatim from the state appellate court’s decision 

on direct appeal. See People v. Latimore, No. A124063, 2010 WL 1719299 (Apr. 29. 

2010). 

On the morning of November 25, 2006, Edward Harris took his 

pickup truck to the 1-Stop Auto Service (smog shop) for a smog 

check. Norak Van, an employee at the smog shop, told Harris how 

long he (Harris) would have to wait, and Harris filled out some 

paperwork. At some point people came into the smog shop selling 

gift items. Harris purchased some “Raiders-type” gloves and two 

“Looney Tune balloon gift sets” for $10 or $15. Harris put the 

gloves in his pocket and the balloon sets in his truck. He then 

walked outside to the sidewalk area and read an advertisement 

while waiting for his truck to be finished. 

Harris then walked to the end of the street and around to the 

back of a closed building where he urinated. As he started walking 

back toward the sidewalk, he noticed two men walking toward the 

BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit) station. Harris identified one of 

the men as appellant. The two men “suddenly B-lined across to the 

direction [Harris] was going.” Appellant’s confederate, the taller of 

the two men, asked Harris for a cigarette; Harris gave him one. The 

taller man took the cigarette and appeared to walk toward the 

BART station. Appellant then approached Harris and asked for a 

cigarette. After Harris gave appellant a cigarette, appellant 

mumbled something and Harris said, “What?” Appellant stared at 

Harris and said, “Give me all your shit now. I’m not kiddin.’” 

Harris responded, “You’ve got to be kidding me.” At that point 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 2 of 17
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

appellant pulled out a gun, pointed it at Harris, said, “You think 

I’m kidding?” or “You think I’m joking?” and fired the gun at the 

ground. Harris said the gun looked like a .22 target pistol. Harris 

immediately threw everything in his pockets onto the ground, 

including his keys, the gloves and money. 

Harris then looked around to see if anyone noticed the gun had 

been fired. When he looked back he saw appellant standing up 

from a kneeling position in the area where Harris had dropped the 

gloves, money and keys. The gloves were still on the ground, but 

the money was not. Appellant then told Harris that Harris “had to 

have more stuff than that,” and directed him to walk back behind 

the building. Because Harris did not want to be shot he, instead, 

tried to walk toward “Alvarado Niles.” Appellant told Harris he 

was going to “pop” Harris, which Harris understood to mean shoot 

him. Appellant’s confederate stayed away from Harris and 

appellant, appearing to act as a lookout. 

Appellant insisted that Harris must have “more money or credit 

cards or something.” Harris said the only thing he had was at his 

truck. Appellant told Harris they were going to go to Harris’s truck 

and Harris was going to take appellant to an ATM (automated teller 

machine) or “go buy things.” At that point, appellant’s confederate 

was closer, about 15 or 20 feet away. Appellant directed Harris to 

walk the 200 yards toward the smog shop; Harris complied out of 

fear of being shot. Harris wanted to get to where there were other 

people, not necessarily to the smog shop. At that point he did not 

voluntarily go to the smog shop. Appellant walked five feet behind 

Harris with the gun trained on him. Appellant’s confederate walked 

in the same direction, a little farther away. The confederate did not 

appear to be armed and appellant seemed to be “in charge.” 

Harris, appellant and appellant’s confederate entered the smog 

shop and went to Harris’s truck. Harris told Van not to remove his 

truck from the shop. Harris leaned into the truck, grabbed the 

“Looney Tunes thing” and gave it to appellant. Van heard Harris 

say to appellant, “This is all I got.” Van told the three men they 

could not be in the repair area, so Harris and appellant walked into 

the smog shop’s waiting room. Appellant’s confederate stayed out 

in front of the smog shop. Van told Harris his truck would be 

finished in a few minutes. Harris told the technician not to close 

the hood on his truck and leave it where it was. Harris was afraid 

that if the truck got outside, appellant and his confederate would 

get into the truck and Harris “wouldn’t have any choice.” 

Harris walked over to his truck, reached in and turned on the 

motor, jumped into the truck and put it in gear. He asked appellant 

if he was going to get in, wanting appellant to walk around to the 

other side of the truck while Harris drove out of the smog shop. 

Appellant turned and called for his confederate; Harris “gunned it” 

and drove out of the smog shop. When Harris looked back, he saw 

appellant and his confederate running toward Harris, so Harris 

turned right onto Alvarado. Harris called 911 and described 

appellant and his confederate. Harris agreed to meet police at the 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 3 of 17
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

smog shop since he had not paid his bill. Meanwhile, after Harris 

sped out of the smog shop without paying, Van drove around for 10 

or 15 minutes unsuccessfully trying to find Harris and then called 

911. 

Union City Police Officers Mace and Graetz responded to an 

armed robbery dispatch. They spotted two people matching the 

description of the suspects near the Skylark Drive apartments. As 

the officers approached, the suspects turned their backs. Mace 

noticed a large bulge in the pocket of one of the suspects. Mace got 

out of his patrol car and that suspect took off running; Mace 

unsuccessfully gave chase. Graetz detained and handcuffed the 

other suspect, identified at trial as appellant. Appellant was 

unarmed, but a .22-caliber bullet was found on him at the time of 

his arrest. Appellant was brought to an “in-field lineup” where 

Harris identified him as “the guy that shot at me.” Appellant was 

later transported to the police station by Officer Gannam. 

Subsequently, a resident of the Skylard Drive apartments 

reported finding a handgun in a carport. Mace and Graetz 

recovered the gun, which had six bullets in the magazine and one in 

the chamber. Graetz described the gun as a .22-caliber 

semiautomatic. The letter “C” was embossed at the bottom of each 

shell removed from the gun. The recovered shells matched the 

bullet found on appellant. No shell casing was recovered from the 

robbery scene. A cell phone recovered from appellant contained a 

video which depicted appellant holding a gun like that recovered 

from the carport. 

Latimore, 2010 WL 171929, *1-*3. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The instant Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under AEDPA, a federal court cannot grant 

habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in a state-court proceeding 

unless: (1) the proceeding “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States”; or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

The first prong of § 2254 applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of 

law and fact. See Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-409 (2000). A state court 

decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court applies a rule that 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 4 of 17
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if the state court 

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 

Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Lockyer 

v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When there is no 

clearly established federal law on an issue, a state court cannot be said to have 

unreasonably applied the law as to that issue.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1098 

(9th Cir. 2009) (citing Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76-77 (2006)). 

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause is appropriate “if the state court 

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. The federal 

court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established 

federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 411. Rather, the 

petitioner must show that the application of Supreme Court law was “objectively 

unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam). 

The second prong of § 2254 applies to decisions based on factual determinations. 

See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state 

court decision “based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court 

proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 

(9th Cir. 2000). 

In determining whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or involves an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, courts in this Circuit look to 

the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of the petitioner’s claim in a 

reasoned decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-804 (1991); LaJoie v. 

Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, “a determination of a factual 

issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” and the petitioner “shall have 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 5 of 17
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

On federal habeas review, AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for 

evaluating state-court rulings” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit 

of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In applying the above standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the “last reasoned 

decision” by the state court. See Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The last reasoned decision in this case is the California Court of Appeal’s unpublished 

disposition issued on April 29, 2010. Latimore, 2010 WL 171929. 

III. DISCUSSION 

The Petition alleges two claims of instructional error based on alleged deficiencies in 

CALCRIM No. 1203 and CALCRIM No. 220. Petitioner contends that these instructions 

allowed the jury to convict him on the aggravated kidnapping charge without a showing of 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner also claims that there was insufficient evidence 

to support a conviction for aggravated kidnapping. The Court discusses these claims in 

turn. 

A. INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR

To obtain federal habeas relief based on instructional error, the petitioner must 

demonstrate “that an erroneous instruction so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

conviction violates due process.” Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1993). The 

court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a 

component of the entire trial process. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 

(1982). If instructional error is shown, the court must then determine whether there was 

prejudice; that is, whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict within the meaning of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 

637 (1993). See Pulido v. Chrones, 629 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Fry v. 

Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007)). 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 6 of 17
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

On federal habeas review, federal courts are bound to presume that state courts know 

and follow the law, and to give state-court decisions “the benefit of the doubt.” See 

Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 838 n.6 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). The deference afforded to state court decisions “applies with 

even greater force when a state court is analyzing a jury instruction developed under state 

law,” as in the case here. Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855, 861-862 (9th Cir. 2009). 

1. CALCRIM No. 1203 

The crime of kidnapping to commit robbery is established only “if the movement of 

the victim is beyond that merely incidental to the commission of, and increases the risk of 

harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in, the intended [robbery].” Cal. 

Pen. Code § 209(b)(1)-(2). “As to whether the movement increased a victim’s risk of harm, 

the jury considers such factors as the decreased likelihood of detection, the danger inherent 

in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape, and the attacker’s enhanced opportunity to 

commit additional crimes. The fact that these dangers do not in fact materialize does not, 

of course, mean that the risk of harm was not increased.” People v. Simmons, 233 

Cal.App.4th 1458, 1471 (2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

The court instructed the jury on the elements of kidnapping for purpose of robbery 

by giving CALCRIM No. 1203, which “is a correct statement” of the elements of 

kidnapping for robbery. People v. Curry, 158 Cal.App.4th 766, 781 (2007). The trial 

court’s instruction read as follows: 

The defendant is charged in Count 1 with kidnapping for the 

purpose of robbery in violation of ... section 209(b). 

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must 

prove that: 

1. The defendant intended to commit robbery; 

2. Acting with that intent, the defendant took, held, or 

detained another person by using force or by instilling a 

reasonable fear; 

3. Using that force or fear, the defendant moved the other 

person or made the other person move a substantial 

distance; 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 7 of 17
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4. The other person was moved or made to move a distance 

beyond that merely incidental to the commission of a 

robbery; 

5. When that movement began, the defendant already 

intended to commit robbery; 

6. The other person did not consent to the movement; 

AND 

7. The defendant did not actually and reasonably believe 

that the other person consented to the movement. 

As used here, substantial distance means more than a slight or 

trivial distance. The movement must have substantially increased 

the risk of physical or psychological harm to the person beyond 

that necessarily present in the robbery. In deciding whether the 

movement was sufficient, consider all the circumstances relating to 

the movement. 

In order to consent, a person must act freely and voluntarily and 

know the nature of the act. 

To be guilty of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, the 

defendant does not actually have to commit the robbery. 

To decide whether the defendant intended to commit robbery, 

please refer to the separate instructions that I will give you on that 

crime. 

The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if he reasonably and 

actually believed that the other person consented to the movement. 

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant did not reasonably and actually believe that the 

other person consented to the movement. If the People have not 

met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this 

crime. 

The defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if the other person 

consented to go with the defendant. The other person consented if 

he (1) freely and voluntarily agreed to go with or be moved by the 

defendant, (2) was aware of the movement, and (3) had sufficient 

mental capacity to choose to go with the defendant. The People 

have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

other person did not consent to go with the defendant. If the People 

have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of 

this crime. 

CT 205-206 (emphasis added). 

On appeal, Petitioner alleged that the foregoing instruction was erroneous, ostensibly 

because it failed to make clear that “risk of harm” is an element of the offense that must be 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 8 of 17
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The state appellate court rejected this claim, finding 

that the jury would have understood from the instructions as a whole that the prosecution 

had to prove the risk of harm element beyond a reasonable doubt. The state court of appeal 

explained as follows: 

Appellant contends the CALCRIM No. 1203 instruction 

erroneously fails to describe the “risk of harm term” as an essential 

element which the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Instead, he asserts that the risk of harm element is described “as a 

factor to be considered among all the circumstances relating to the 

sufficiency of the movement.” Appellant further asserts that the 

CALCRIM No. 1203 instruction omits the essential risk of harm 

element from its “proof list” and instead, “relegates it to a separate 

paragraph lacking the key phrase” “the People must prove. . . .” He 

argues that by presenting increased risk of harm merely as one of 

“the circumstance[s] relating to the movement,” the jury was 

permitted to convict him of aggravated kidnapping without finding 

that the People proved the increased risk of harm element beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Appellant further argues that the instructional 

error was not cured with any of the instructions given, including 

CALCRIM No. 220, or by any explanation by the prosecution 

during argument. 

 A person is guilty of simple kidnapping if he or she “forcibly, 

or by any other means of instilling fear, steals or takes, or holds, 

detains, or arrests any person in this state, and carries the person 

into another country, state, or county, or into another part of the 

same county ....” (§ 207, subd. (a).) 

 The Legislature has specified greater punishment for aggravated 

kidnapping, where the accused “kidnaps or carries away any 

individual to commit robbery ....“ (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)); People v. 

Curry (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 766, 779, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 257 

(Curry).) Section 209, subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part: 

“(1) Any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to 

commit robbery ... shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 

prison for life with the possibility of parole. [¶] (2) This 

subdivision shall only apply if the movement of the victim is 

beyond that merely incidental to the commission of, and increases 

the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily 

present in the intended underlying offense.” 

 “[F]or aggravated kidnapping, the victim must be forced to 

move a substantial distance, the movement cannot be merely 

incidental to the target crime, and the movement must substantially 

increase the risk of harm to the victim.” (People v. Dominguez 

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1153, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 140 P.3d 866 

(Dominguez).) “The essence of aggravated kidnapping is the 

increase in the risk of harm to the victim caused by the forced 

movement. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1152, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 140 

P.3d 866.) In assessing the increased risk of harm, a jury should 

consider “whether the movement decreases the likelihood of 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 9 of 17
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

detection, increases the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable 

attempts to escape, or enhances the attacker’s opportunity to 

commit additional crimes.” (Ibid.) 

 The CALCRIM No. 1203 instruction informed the jury that 

appellant could not be convicted of kidnapping for the purpose of 

robbery unless the People proved that Harris was moved or made to 

move a substantial distance. The instruction defined “substantial 

distance” as movement that “must have substantially increased the 

risk of physical or psychological harm to the person beyond that 

necessarily present in the robbery.” The instruction then directed 

the jury to consider “all the circumstances relating to the 

movement” in deciding whether the movement was sufficient. 

Since the instruction specified that the People were required to 

prove the movement was a “substantial distance,” the jury 

necessarily understood that the portion of the instruction defining 

substantial distance was also subject to proof by the People. 

Moreover, the CALCRIM No. 220 instruction on reasonable doubt 

instructed the jury that “[w]henever I tell you the People must 

prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Because the jury was instructed that proof by the People 

had to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it necessarily 

understood the CALCRIM No. 1203 instruction as requiring proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of the “substantial distance” of the 

movement, i.e. movement that “must have substantially increased 

the risk of physical or psychological harm to the person.” No 

instructional error is shown. 

Latimore, 2010 WL 1719299, at *4-5 (emphasis added). 

The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state appellate 

court’s decision upholding the trial court’s use of CALCRIM No. 1203 was objectively 

unreasonable. Pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1203, the jury was expressly instructed that in 

order to find Petitioner guilty of aggravated kidnapping, it had to find: (1) that Petitioner 

used force or fear to move another person a “substantial distance”; (2) that the distance was 

beyond that incidental to the robbery; and, (3) that the “movement must have substantially 

increased the risk of physical or psychological harm to the person beyond that necessarily 

present in the robbery.” CT 205-206 (emphasis added). Thus, it is readily apparent that 

risk of harm was expressed as an essential element of aggravated kidnapping, and not 

merely a “factor” to be considered, as Petitioner has alleged. 

Moreover, CALCRIM No. 1203 must be construed with CALCRIM No. 220, which 

instructed jurors that whenever other instructions informed them that the prosecution “must 

prove something,” the prosecution bears the burden of proving it beyond a reasonable 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 10 of 17
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

doubt. See Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (“‘[A] single instruction to a 

jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the 

overall charge.’”) (citation omitted, brackets in original). As the state court found, when 

read in conjunction with CALCRIM No. 1203—which informed the jury that the 

prosecution had to prove a risk of harm to the victim in order to prove aggravated 

kidnapping—the jury would have understood that the prosecution’s burden of proving such 

risk of harm was beyond a reasonable doubt. Giving appropriate deference to the state 

appellate court’s decision, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show that there 

was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the 

state of its burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380-81 (1990); see also Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437-38. 

2. CALCRIM No. 220 

Much like his claim regarding CALCRIM No. 1203, Petitioner argues that the use of 

CALCRIM No. 220 was improper because the instruction allowed the jury to convict him 

by applying a lesser standard of proof as to the risk of harm element. The trial court 

instructed as follows: 

The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the 

defendant is not evidence that the charge is true. You must not 

be biased against the defendant just because he has been 

arrested, charged with a crime, or brought to trial. 

A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This 

presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People 

must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with 

an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence 

need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life 

is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. 

In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a 

reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider 

all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. 

Unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal and you must 

find him not guilty. 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 11 of 17
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

CT 184 (emphasis added). 

On appeal, the state court of appeal rejected Petitioner’s contention CALCRIM No. 

203 reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof: 

Next, appellant contends the CALCRIM No. 220 

instruction given by the trial court failed to inform the jury that 

the People were required to prove him guilty of every element 

of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

particular, he argues that the instruction omits the “‘every fact’ 

component of the Winship standard” (In re Winship (1970) 397 

U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (Winship)). 

 . . . . 

 Under the due process clause of the federal Constitution, 

the government “bears the burden of proving all elements of the 

offense charged [citations], and must persuade the factfinder 

‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ of the facts necessary to establish 

each of those elements [citations].” (Sullivan v. Louisiana 

(1993) 508 U.S. 275, 277-278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 

182.) In reviewing the correctness of the reasonable doubt 

instructions given, the proper inquiry is “whether there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions 

to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the 

Winship standard.” (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 6, 

114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583.) As we noted previously, we 

must consider appellant’s challenge to the CALCRIM No. 220 

instruction in light of the jury instructions as a whole. 

(Galloway, supra, 100 Cal.App.3d at pp. 567-568, 160 Cal.Rptr. 

914.) 

 Appellant acknowledges that in People v. Ramos (2008) 

163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088-1089, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 

(Ramos), Division One of this court rejected the same argument 

appellant makes. In Ramos, the trial judge enumerated each of 

the elements of the charged crime (second degree murder) and 

the special allegation, and stated that the People were obligated 

to prove each of those elements in order for the defendant to be 

found guilty. Thus, it concluded that taken as a whole, the 

instructions adequately informed the jury that the prosecution 

was required to prove each element of the charged crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 1089, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 186.) 

 Appellant repeats his argument that the risk of harm 

element is not contained within the “proof list” in CALCRIM 

No. 1203, and therefore argues that Ramos does not apply 

because taken together, CALCRIM No. 1203 and CALCRIM 

No. 220 do not inform the jury that each element of the charged 

aggravated kidnapping must be proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Again, we disagree. The CALCRIM No. 220 instruction 

on reasonable doubt instructed the jury that “Whenever I tell 

you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove 

it beyond a reasonable doubt.” Taken together with CALCRIM 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 12 of 17
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

No. 220, the jury necessarily understood the CALCRIM No. 

1203 instruction as requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt 

of the “substantial distance” of the movement, i.e., movement 

that “must have substantially increased the risk of physical or 

psychological harm to the person.” No instructional error is 

shown. 

Latimore, 2010 WL 1719299, at *5-6 (emphasis added). 

The Court finds that the state court of appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim of 

instructional error regarding CALCRIM No. 220 was not objectively unreasonable. The 

instruction explicitly states that whenever “the People must prove something, . . . they must 

prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.” CT 184 (emphasis added). As discussed above, 

CALCRIM No. 1203 informed jurors that an aggravated kidnapping conviction requires the 

jury to find the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the 

victim. Considered in tandem, these instructions accurately informed the jury that the 

prosecution “must” prove that Petitioner moved Harris in a manner that “substantially 

increased the risk of physical or psychological harm to the person beyond that necessarily 

present in the robbery.” CT 205. The jury was also given CALCRIM No. 200, which 

instructed: “Pay careful attention to all of these instructions and consider them together.” 

CT 181. The jury is presumed to have followed these instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 

528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). 

Considering the challenged instructions in their entirety and in the context of other 

instructions setting forth the prosecution’s burden of proof, the Court finds that there is no 

reasonable likelihood that the jury applied these instructions in such a way as to shift the 

burden of proof to the defense. See Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437-38; Boyde, 494 U.S. at 

380-81. 

B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Petitioner contends there was insufficient evidence of an increased risk of harm to 

the victim to support a conviction for aggravated kidnapping. “Insufficient evidence claims 

are reviewed by looking at the elements of the offense under state law.” Emery v. Clark, 

643 F.3d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). “[T]he relevant question” in a 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 13 of 17
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

sufficiency of the evidence claim “is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979). 

Habeas claims predicated upon the alleged insufficiency of evidence “face a high bar 

in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference.” 

Coleman v. Johnson, – U.S. –––, ––, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (per curiam). First, “[a] 

reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only 

if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” Id. Second, “a federal court 

may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge 

simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead 

may do so only if the state court decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations 

omitted). 

The state appellate court rejected Petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, finding as follows: 

Finally, appellant contends there was insufficient 

evidence of asportation to support his kidnapping for robbery 

conviction. He asserts that he moved Harris “on foot from a 

deserted place with no observers into the [smog] shop, where 

everything he did and said was under the direct observation of 

two witnesses.” He argues that any risk of harm was not caused 

by the movement. He concludes there was no evidence that his 

movement of Harris increased Harris’s risk of harm, and, 

instead, the evidence showed that the movement decreased 

Harris’s risk of harm. 

 “When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence, the reviewing court ‘must determine “whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

[Citation.] “[T]he court must review the whole record in the 

light most favorable to the judgment below to determine 

whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence 

which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a 

reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘Substantial evidence 

includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences 

drawn from that evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Indeed, we 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 14 of 17
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

‘“‘presume in support of the judgment the existence of every 

fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’” 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Curry, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 

778, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 257.) 

 After appellant robbed Harris at gunpoint of the contents 

of Harris’s pockets, he insisted that Harris must have “more 

stuff than that.” When Harris responded that what he had was in 

his truck, appellant moved Harris at gunpoint the 200 yards 

from the robbery scene to the smog shop with the intent of 

forcing Harris to drive appellant to an ATM or “go buy things.” 

At the smog shop, appellant robbed Harris of additional items. 

Thus, appellant’s movement of Harris was not merely incidental 

to the first robbery; it was intended to facilitate a further 

robbery. 

 In addition, the movement increased the risk of harm to 

Harris. Whether the movement subjects the victim to a 

substantial increase in risk of harm above and beyond that 

inherent in robbery “includes consideration of such factors as 

the decreased likelihood of detection, the danger inherent in a 

victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape, and the attacker’s 

enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes.” (People v. 

Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 13-14, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 

P.2d 1369 (Rayford), and cases cited therein; see also 

Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1152, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 

140 P.3d 866.) Appellant’s movement of Harris at gunpoint 

from the scene of the first robbery to the smog shop may not 

have “decreased [the] likelihood of detection.” However, it 

certainly increased the dangers inherent in an escape attempt. 

As Harris’s actual escape demonstrates, there was a risk that 

appellant might fire his weapon to abort the escape or some 

third party could be injured as Harris drove rapidly out of the 

shop. “The fact that these dangers do not in fact materialize 

does not, of course, mean that the risk of harm was not 

increased. [Citations.]” (Rayford, at p. 14, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 

884 P.2d 1369.) The evidence was sufficient to permit a 

reasonable jury to find the requisite asportation element of 

kidnapping for robbery. 

Latimore, 2010 WL 1719299, at *6-7. 

The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to habeas 

relief under the standard articulated in Coleman. There is ample evidence to support the 

jury’s conclusion that Petitioner’s movement of Harris increased the risk of harm. After 

initially robbing Harris on the grassy knoll of his gloves, money and keys, Petitioner 

insisted that Harris must have other property. Harris responded that the only other property 

he had was in his truck. Petitioner then forced Harris to walk 200 yards from the grassy 

knoll to the smog shop in order to commit additional crimes; to wit, to force Harris “to take 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 15 of 17
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

him to an ATM machine or go buy things.” Thus, Petitioner’s movement of Harris 

presented an increased danger that Harris would be further victimized. See Simmons, 233 

Cal.App.4th at 1471 (noting that actual harm need not materialize in order to show an 

increased risk of harm). 

The movement to Harris’s truck in the smog shop also presented an increased danger 

inherent in Harris’s foreseeable attempt to escape. Petitioner was armed with a loaded gun, 

which he had already fired once in order to instill fear in and obtain compliance from 

Harris. With Petitioner in close proximity to him, Harris entered his truck and sped out of 

the smog shop, understandably fearing Petitioner would shoot him—as Petitioner had 

previously threatened. Though Harris escaped unharmed, there was an increased risk that 

Harris may have been injured. As noted by the state appellate court, Harris, still fearing 

that he could be shot by Petitioner, easily could have crashed the car or prompted Petitioner 

to fire his gun a second time in his attempt to escape. 

There also was an increased risk of psychological harm to Harris.2

 Prior to forcing 

Petitioner to move from the grass knoll to the garage, Petitioner had already fired his gun as 

a warning to Harris and had threatened to shoot him. In addition, Petitioner revealed that 

his intention upon reaching the smog shop was to force Harris to drive to the ATM. In 

view of Petitioner’s conduct and threats, Harris undoubtedly feared that he would be robbed 

again at the ATM and later killed. As such, a reasonable jury could conclude that 

Petitioner’s act of moving Harris involved an increased risk of psychological harm to 

Harris. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and resolving 

any conflicting inferences in the prosecution’s favor, the Court finds that a rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, 

including that the movement of Harris increased the risk of harm to him. See Payne, 982 

 2 The prosecution argued: “[Y]ou saw what that did to Mr. Harris on the stand when 

he was telling you about what happened to him and how he was moved and what he was 

feeling, what he was thinking when he was moved. It increased psychological harm to 

him.” RT 605. 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 16 of 17
- 17 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

F.2d at 338. Petitioner’s claim thus fails to satisfy the first part of the Coleman test. 

Moreover, Petitioner has otherwise failed to demonstrate the second prong of the Coleman 

test; namely, that the state appellate court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See 

Coleman, 132 S.Ct. at 2062; Emery, 643 F.3d at 1213-14. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Court finds no merit to any of Petitioner’s claims. No certificate of 

appealability is warranted in this case. For the reasons set forth above, no jurist of reason 

would find this Court’s denial of Petitioner’s claims “debatable or wrong.” See Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. Petitioner’s request to substitute Ronald Barnes as Respondent is GRANTED. 

 2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED as to all claims, and a 

certificate of appealability will not issue. 

3. The Clerk shall close the file and terminate all pending matters. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 3/27/15 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

United States District Judge 

Case 4:11-cv-05527-SBA Document 18 Filed 03/27/15 Page 17 of 17