Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00214/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00214-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

Edwards sought to challenge actions barred by the applicable statute of limitations, did not identify 1

adequately the individuals purportedly culpable for violations of his constitutional rights, and did not clarify

sufficiently either his factual allegations or requested relief. 

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

SCOTTY J. EDWARDS, #207067, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

) 2:06-CV-214-WKW

FLORALA, AL. POLICE DEPT., et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to the findings and conclusions which follow, the Magistrate Judge

recommends the entry of summary judgment in favor of all defendants and the dismissal of

this action with prejudice.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Deficiencies in the original complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 on March 6,

2006, required the court to order the pro se plaintiff, Scotty J. Edwards, an Alabama prisoner

(“Edwards”), to file the Amended Complaint submitted on March 30, 2006. Edwards alleges

1

that prior to his confinement the defendants harassed him unconstitutionally through traffic

stops and searches because of his reputation as a drug dealer. 

 For good cause, the court dismissed with prejudice, and prior to service of process,

Case 2:06-cv-00214-WKW-DRB Document 36 Filed 12/04/06 Page 1 of 15
See Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (Doc.6, April 10, 2006) and ORDER overruling 2

objection and Adopting Recommendation (Doc. 19, May 25, 2006). 

See Order filed June 8, 2006 (Doc. 22) and July 13, 2006 Order (Doc. 27), wherein the court 3

chronicled the failed service attempts on these defendants as follows:

No service has been perfected on five individuals: Paul Dean, James Perry, Perry

William, Tim Snow, Derrick Walters, and James Perry. In the initial scheduling

order filed April 10, 2006 (Doc.7) and again in the Order entered June 8 (Doc. 22)

the court specifically advised Plaintiff concerning his responsibilities to perfect

service, available options for perfecting service, time limits for perfecting service, and

the consequences of not perfecting service on these individuals. The docket reflects

(a) another failed attempt to serve Walters and Perry at the address provided by

Plaintiff; (b) no address supplied for Paul Dean by the June 26 deadline set; and ( c

) no effort by Plaintiff to use another method for service on William and Snow.

Consequently, this action will proceed against only the persons who have been duly

served, and absent any timely service on these five individuals, they will not be partydefendants in this lawsuit.

Doc. 27, n.1 at 1. 

The complaint incorrectly identified Defendant Sutherland as “Southerland”, and the Clerk is 4

instructed to correct the spelling of this defendant’s last name on the official record.

2

the five governmental entities designated as defendants: the Florala, Alabama Police

Department; the Opp, Alabama Police Department; the Covington County Sheriff

Department; the Walton County, Florida Sheriff Department; and the Covington County

Drug Task Force. Notwithstanding notice and reasonable extensions of time, Edwards failed 2

to perfect service on five of the nine remaining defendants: Perry William, Tim Snow, Paul

Dean, James Perry, and Derrick Walters.

3

The sole defendants now are Jason Sutherland and Keith Wise, officers with the 4

Opp Police Department, along with Greg Jackson and Chris Inabinett, deputies with the

Covington County Sheriff’s Department. The procedural order entered in response to the

complaint instructed defendants to file “a written report ...containing the sworn statements

Case 2:06-cv-00214-WKW-DRB Document 36 Filed 12/04/06 Page 2 of 15
Thus, in preparing a response to the special reports filed by the defendants the plaintiff should

5

refer to the requirements of Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

An affidavit is a sworn statement in writing made under oath or on affirmation before a notary 6

public or other authorized officer. The affidavit must be made on personal knowledge, set forth such facts

as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated in the affidavit.

3

of all persons having knowledge of the subject matter of the complaint”, and to include any

immunity defenses as well as any relevant documents, records, and regulations. (Doc. 7).

Defendants Jackson and Inabinett duly filed their Answer and Special Report on June 5, 2006

(Docs. 20, 21), and Defendants Wise and Sutherland responded similarly on July 10, 2006

(Doc. 26). On July 13, 2006, the court set an August 7, 2006 deadline for Edwards to

respond to Defendants’ special reports and further advised:

If the plaintiff fails to file a response as required by this order, the

court will treat the plaintiff's failure to respond as an abandonment of the

claims set forth in the complaint and as a failure to prosecute this action.

Moreover, the plaintiff is specifically cautioned that if he fails to file a

response in compliance with the directives of this order the undersigned

will recommend that this case be dismissed for such failure. In addition,

if the plaintiff fails to respond to the written reports with respect to each

of the claims raised in his complaint, the court will treat this failure as an

abandonment of these claims and shall proceed as justice requires. 

As indicated herein, at some time in the future the court may treat

the defendants' reports and the plaintiff's response as a dispositive motion

and response. Thus, in filing a response to the defendants' reports the 5

plaintiff should not rely only on his or her unsworn pleadings but should

respond by filing sworn affidavits, or other evidentiary materials developed 6

through discovery or other appropriate means and which set forth specific facts

demonstrating there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial in this case.

Failure to file sworn affidavits or other evidentiary materials may result in this

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If the plaintiff is unable to present, by affidavit, facts essential to justify his opposition to the 7

defendants' reports, then plaintiff must file a sworn statement as to why he or she is unable to do so.

4

court accepting the defendants’ evidence as the truth. If documents are

7

referred to in the opposing affidavits and have not been previously filed with

the court, sworn or certified copies of those papers must be attached to the

affidavits or served with them. 

The parties are hereby notified that, unless within fifteen (15) days

from the date of this order a party files a response in opposition which

presents sufficient legal cause why such action should not be undertaken,

upon the expiration of the time for the plaintiff to file a response as allowed by

this order, the court may at any time thereafter and without further notice to

the parties (1) treat the special reports and any supporting evidentiary

materials as a motion for summary judgment and (2) after considering any

response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary judgment in

accordance with the law. 

(Doc. 27).

In response to Edwards’ motions, albeit untimely, the court has twice extended his

August 7 deadline to file responses to Defendants’ submissions: to September 12 (Doc. 31)

and to November 22 (Doc. 34). In granting the last extension, the court pointedly

questioned Edwards’ diligence and underscored, as follows, its unwillingness to continue

extending his deadline in the absence of compelling cause:

The court is bound to consider “prejudice” not just to the parties but also to

the court in connection with its duty to make orderly and timely dispositions

of actions. The law enforcement officers designated as defendants have an

independent and valid interest in securing as readily as possible final

adjudication of claims asserted against them individually arising from the

performance of their official duties. The responsive pleadings by these officers

include the assertion of immunity defenses which warrant evaluation prior to

discovery along with other affirmative defenses which, if established, would bar

this action altogether.

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Aside from the question of prejudice to the court and parties by granting

continuances which unduly protract resolution of the litigation, the court is

bound to consider, in the first instance, the merits of a motion for relief from

any reasonable deadline. The first deadline, August 7, gave Edwards almost

60 days to digest and respond to the submissions filed June 5 by Defendants

Jackson and Inabinett, and almost 30 days to respond to submissions not filed

until July 10; the submissions rest on substantially similar facts and legal

arguments. Delays in receiving and docketing Edwards’ first motion for

continuance allowed him additional time – between the missed August 7

deadline and the court’s August 18 order, while the new deadline ordered –

September 12, extended about three more weeks. When this Order is

docketed, Edwards will have had the benefit of another 30 days to prepare any

Response.

While incarcerated citizens have a right of access to federal courts, they

do not enjoy – any more so than “free-world” citizens – any privilege to

prosecute claims they choose to file at their leisure or convenience. The claims

asserted by Edwards do not relate to his conviction or the conditions of his

confinement in state prison; instead, they relate to generalized claims of

police/sheriff harassment by traffic stops occurring between 2003 and 2004, for

which Edwards seeks millions of dollars in damages. His stated difficulties in

meeting the court’s deadlines arise wholly from the fact of his incarceration,

and he alone must assume responsibility for the underlying convictions. As

long as he remains incarcerated, it is reasonable to project the continuation of

the limitations about which he complains: restrictions on use of the law

library, dependence on inmates more learned in the law; transfers from facilities

or job assignments which further restrict use of law libraries; and limited

supplies. 

Edwards also faces formidable difficulties in prosecuting a federal civil

action fraught with nuances and legal complexities which deter even some

seasoned lawyers, and his pending motion acknowledges his need, and stated

search, for a lawyer to advance this claim. He is advised that the court cannot

provide counsel to him. He is further advised that if he chooses to pursue this

action without counsel, the court will not be obliged to, and will not, act as his

counsel, or grant automatically motions to continue other deadlines which may

govern this lawsuit. The court also deems it necessary to repeat this

cautionary note included in its Order filed July 13, 2006:

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“If the plaintiff fails to file a response as required by this order, the

court will treat the plaintiff's failure to respond as an abandonment of the

claims set forth in the complaint and as a failure to prosecute this action.

Moreover, the plaintiff is specifically cautioned that if he fails to file a

response in compliance with the directives of this order the undersigned

will recommend that this case be dismissed for such failure. In addition,

if the plaintiff fails to respond to the written reports with respect to each

of the claims raised in his complaint, the court will treat this failure as an

abandonment of these claims and shall proceed as justice requires.”

In the same Order the court advised that “at some time in the future

the court may treat the defendants' reports and the plaintiff's response as

a dispositive motion and response.” The parties are NOW ADVISED

THAT THE DEFENDANTS’ reports will be treated as motions for

summary judgment. 

(Doc. 34).

Edwards has not filed any response at all to the defendants’ summary judgment

submissions.

 II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

In order to survive Defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment,

Edwards is required to produce some evidence supporting his constitutional claims. See

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). He must “go beyond the pleadings and . . .

designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. A

plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not provide adequate evidence to oppose a motion for

summary judgment. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11 Cir. 1995); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 th

F.2d 553, 556-57 (11 Cir. 1984). Consequently, when a plaintiff fails to make a showing th

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, and on which he will

Case 2:06-cv-00214-WKW-DRB Document 36 Filed 12/04/06 Page 6 of 15
7

bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the

moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Barnes v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607

(11 Cir. 1987). Where all the evidentiary materials before the court indicate that there is th

no genuine issue of material fact and that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled

to it as a matter of law, entry of summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322;

Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11 Cir. 1987). Although factual inferences must th

be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and pro se complaints are

entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden

of establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th

Cir. 1990). 

III. DISCUSSION

To the extent that Edwards intended to assert claims against these officers in their

official capacities, such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States

Constitution and thus fail to invoke this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Parker v. Williams,

862 F.2d 1471, 1476 (11 Cir. 1989); Carr v. City of Florence, 918 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11 Cir. th th

1990). Nor are these deputies considered “persons” for the purpose of Section 1983 liability.

See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). As now discussed, Edwards

fails to state any constitutional violation by these officers in their individual capacities, and

that failure makes unnecessary any discussion of other defenses asserted.

Case 2:06-cv-00214-WKW-DRB Document 36 Filed 12/04/06 Page 7 of 15
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A. Plaintiff’s factual allegations

Edwards’ amended complaint pinpoints “March 5, 2004 until June 23, 2004" as the

date for Defendants’ alleged violation of his constitutional rights, described generally on the

form complaint as follows:

GROUND ONE: (Cov. County officers) harassment by all of them because

of hearsay evidence that I was selling and trafficing [sic] drugs. 

 I would get pulled over everytime I turned around in Cov. County. Sometime

for speeding and most times for nothing. But everytime my car would be search

[sic] and/or the dog would be brung [sic] out so they could trap me with the so

call drugs I was suppose to be caring [sic]. But I never was caring any. 

GROUND TWO: The threat Opp, Al. Police said when they arrested my

cousin, Tim Edwards, when they arrested him for possession of marijuana.

The officers told my cousin they believed he was selling drugs for me and if I

ever came through Opp that night they was going to pull me over and search

my car and take me to jail also for illegal drugs.

B. Defendants Wise and Sutherland

Edwards’ hand-written attachment to his complaint, at pages 5-15, is a rambling,

single-spaced narrative account of his interactions with law enforcement officers commencing

in March 2004; he relates a single interaction with Defendants Wise and Sutherland,

purportedly during a “traffic stop” at 12:30 a.m. on April 6, 2004. He refused a requested

consent of his car, and described as follows the defendants’ alleged violation of his rights:

The officers said we know you are selling drugs and that you got some in that

car tonight. I told them to call for a K-9 dog and if he alert[ed] on my car they

could search it or they could get a search warrant. So the police went in the

truck of the police car. They came back to me in the front seat of the police

car where they had me sitting and asked why I didn’t want them searching my

car and they got a call saying I was [carrying] illegal drugs. So I told them that

I also had received a phone all tell[ing] me they said if I came through Opp

that night they was going to pull me over and search my car and take me to jail

Case 2:06-cv-00214-WKW-DRB Document 36 Filed 12/04/06 Page 8 of 15
See K. Wise Aff. at 1, ¶5; G. Ezell Aff. at 1,¶ 15, and at 3, ¶20. Edwards may have intended to sue 8

Defendant Wise’s brother, Kevin, but he did not work for the department on the date alleged, having been hired

on September 15, 2000 and left on January 15, 2003, returning for part-time work from January 5 to 28, 2005.

(See G.Ezell Aff. at 3, ¶ ¶18-19). 

9

for illegal drugs. An[d] that was the only reason I came to Opp to see if they

was crazy enough to tell my cousin that then really try to do it. I unclipped my

phone from my side and put it to my ear and asked the probation officer and

Al Smith, a lawyer, did they hear the conversation and they said yes. So I told

them I would talk to them later, then hung the phone up. The two officers was

like who was that and I told them it was the lawyer I called before I left home

and told him what my cousin had to[ld] me. Also the lawyer told me to call

him back and let him hear the conversation if they pulled me over. But not to

let them go into my car without a dog alerting on it first. So I told them they

would be hearing from my lawyer about the harassment and tr[y]ing to set me

up. So I left because they said they was finished with me.

(Doc. 5 at 7-8). 

These allegations patently fail to state any violation of constitutional rights by

Defendants Wise and Sutherland. Even if they could be construed otherwise, these

defendants’ sworn and undisputed submissions establish their entitlement to judgment as a

matter of law. Whether the events described occurred on the April 2004 date alleged, or

on December 16-17, 2002, a period outside the applicable statute of limitations, the record

is undisputed that Defendant Wise was not involved at all as he did not work for the Opp

Police Department on either date and was not present at all. The City of Opp hired him as

a police officer on September 1, 2000, he resigned on November 2002, was rehired on

January 5, 2005, and remains employed. 

8

With respect to Defendant Sutherland, certified time records establish his off-duty

status on April 4 and 5, 2004. (See Def.’s Ex. 1; G. Ezell Aff. at 2, ¶8; J. Sutherland Aff. at 2,

Case 2:06-cv-00214-WKW-DRB Document 36 Filed 12/04/06 Page 9 of 15
See Defs.’ Exs.2,3,4,6,7,8; Sutherland Aff.; K. Wise Aff; C. Kelley Aff.; G. Ezell Aff.. Ex. 6 is a 9

DVD of the traffic encounter, recorded from Officer Kevin Wise’s car camera video.

10

¶13). Moreover, the Opp Police Department records do not show any traffic stop of Edwards,

or of his named cousin, occurring on the dates alleged. (See Def’s Ex. 2; C. Kelley Aff. at 2,

¶8). Instead, those records establish (a) December 16, 2002, as the date for the cousin’s

arrest by Opp police officers Kevin Wise (not a defendant in this action) and Defendant

Sutherland, and (b) December 17, 2002, as the date for the traffic stop about which Edwards

complains, and officer Kevin Wise as the officer making the stop, with Defendant Sutherland

arriving within minutes. 

9

To the extent that Edwards’ conclusory allegations could be interpreted as stating

sufficiently any wrongful act implicating a constitutional right, his claims are barred by the

statute of limitations. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989); Lufkin v. McCallum,

956 F.2d 1104, 1105 (11 Cir. 1992); Ala. Code §6-2-38 (1975). Edwards’ failure to allege

th

anything remotely akin to specific facts demonstrating Defendant Sutherland’s violation of

clearly established rights makes unnecessary any further analysis of his qualified immunity

defense. Defendants Wise and Sutherland are entitled to summary judgment. 

C. Defendants Jackson and Inabinett

Edwards’ handwritten attachment to his complaint pinpoints 3 dates in 2004 for

allegedly unconstitutional infringements by Defendants Jackson and Inabinett during the

course of their activities as Covington County sheriff’s deputies: March 13, April 8, and

around April 12. The March 13 incident involved Defendant Jackson at a “license

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checkpoint” as Edwards “was coming into Florala” and the only conduct particularized to

Jackson are statements, highlighted as follows from the complaint:

I was coming into Florala and Florala Police and the Sheriff deputy’s [sic] had

a road block checking license but as I made it to them and gave them my

license. They told me to pull over so I did. They all approached my car and

stopped checking license. Told me to exit my car as I did they placed me

against my car and searched me down. The deputy (Greg Jackson) said yeah I

believe we got him today. I asked what was going on and he said they was told I

had went to make a big drug pick up. I told them it was a lie because I didn’t sell

drugs. They went all through my car, in the trunk, and under the hood. But

I wasn’t car[rying] anything again.

(Doc. 5 at 5). 

Edwards makes the following allegations against Defendant Inabinett after he stopped

him for speeding on April 8 “as [he] was leaving out of Florala”:

But I was pulled out and handcuffed and my car was searched for drugs. They

[Defendants Inabinett and Florala Policeman Perry Williams] looked in my

trunk, pull out my pool stick case and saying yeah we got you now. Even

before they looked in the case to only find my pool stick and check for my

stick. That they seen me put into the bag from somewhere they was sitting at

tr[y]ing to watch my house. So they said I was free to go.

(Doc. 5 at 8-9). Edwards’ second encounter with Defendant Inabinett occurred a few days

after an April 12 traffic stop by Florala policeman P. Williams as Edwards headed to the

Florida state line; he describes the encounter, in relevant part, as follows:

I was pulled over by the Florala Police and Deputy Chris Inabinett and my car

was searched for drugs again. I asked them why won’t they leave me alone and

stop harassing me with that hearsay, and just because of the way I had my car

fixed up. They said because we believe you is selling and transporting drugs.

(Doc. 5 at 10).

Case 2:06-cv-00214-WKW-DRB Document 36 Filed 12/04/06 Page 11 of 15
See Jackson Aff., ¶¶5-6, and Inabinett Aff.,¶¶7-8. Pursuant to a guilty plea for cocaine distribution, 10

Edwardsreceived a splitsentence on a 15-year term(one year of incarceration and probation for the remaining

years), concurrently with sentences imposed for possession of controlled substances and giving a false

statement to an officer. (See Defs.’ Exs. C , D, Special Report for Defendants Jackson and Inabinett).

12

The court has carefully scrutinized all of Edwards’ narrative and finds no other factual

allegations which attribute to Defendants Jackson and Inabinett any other specific acts or

statements. Construed liberally in deference to Edwards’ status as a non-lawyer prisoner

representing himself, the allegations made fall woefully short of any Section 1983 claim for

which relief can be given. Because Edwards has not responded at all to these defendants’

evidentiary submission for summary judgment, the court accepts the officers’ sworn testimony

as true. While both defendants admit knowledge of Edwards’ reputation as a drug dealer,

they deny that they harassed him through traffic stops and searches on account of that

reputation and in an effort to find controlled substances.

10

Defendant Jackson denies altogether the encounter attributed to him, testifying in

pertinent part:

In my capacity as a law enforcement officer, I have had no involvement

whatsoever with the Plaintiff since March 5, 2004. In fact, the only

interaction I ever had with the Plaintiff occurred in 2001 or 2002 when the

Plaintiff was stopped at a drivers’ license checkpoint. The Plaintiff had a

passenger in his car who was a known drug dealer. I obtained consent to search

the Plaintiff’s car. When nothing was found in the search the Plaintiff was

released. I was not involved in any of the incidents described by the Plaintiff

in his Complaint.

(Jackson Aff.,¶¶ 7-9, Doc.21-2). To the extent Edwards’ complaint can be construed – in

deference to his pro se status– as an intended reference to the checkpoint stop occurring in

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13

2001 or 2002, any claims against Jackson would be barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. 

Defendant Inabinett testifies similarly: “ At no time did I ever search the Plaintiff’s car

or pull him over at a traffic stop. None of the traffic stops reflected in the logs attached to

the Special Report were of the Plaintiff.” (Inabinett Aff., ¶ 9, Doc. 21-3). He acknowledges

participation in a Drug Task Force which searched Edwards’ home pursuant to a search

warrant on June 23, 2004; because Edwards included the incident in his handwritten

complaint albeit without specifying any misconduct by Defendant Inabinett, the court

carefully reviewed his allegations (Doc. 5 at 13-14) and the officer’s sworn account of the

incident (Inabinett Aff., ¶¶ 10-19) and cannot find any basis for attributing to the Defendant

any violation of Edwards’ constitutional rights. 

In sum, Edwards fails utterly to satisfy his burden first to allege facts for which any

relief can be granted against these officers. Construing his pro se complaint, the court cannot

excuse his failure to demonstrate any genuine issue of dispute fact in opposition to the

summary judgment submissions by Defendants Jackson and Inabinett. They are clearly

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, based on the evidentiary record, it is now the RECOMMENDATION

of the Magistrate Judge that the motions for summary judgment filed on behalf of Defendants

Jackson and Inabinett (Doc. 21) and Defendants Wise and Sutherland (Doc. 26), each be

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14

GRANTED, that final judgment be entered in favor of these defendants and against the

Plaintiff, and that this action be dismissed with prejudice. 

It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this

Recommendation on or before December 18, 2006. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District

Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court

and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright,

677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir.

1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting

as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Case 2:06-cv-00214-WKW-DRB Document 36 Filed 12/04/06 Page 14 of 15
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The Clerk is hereby reminded to transmit this Recommendation to the Plaintiff

at his free-world address. 

Done this 4 day of December , 2006. TH

/s/ Delores R. Boyd

DELORES R. BOYD 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-00214-WKW-DRB Document 36 Filed 12/04/06 Page 15 of 15