Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_85-cv-00642/USCOURTS-alsd-1_85-cv-00642-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:9607 Real Property Tort to Land

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1 The Court’s July 18, 2006 Rule 16(b) scheduling order, while focusing on Phase I

written discovery, is the model form utilized by this Court in all civil actions and set the

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., :

Plaintiffs, :

vs. : CA 85-0642-CG-C

ALABAMA WOOD TREATING :

CORPORATION, et al.,

:

Defendants.

ORDER

This cause is before the Court on plaintiffs’ motion to quash and motion

for protective order (Doc. 441), defendant Illinois Central’s opposition (Doc.

442), and plaintiffs’ reply (Doc. 443).Upon consideration of the contents of

these pleadings, with attachments, and all other pertinent pleadings in this file,

this order is entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Rule

72.2(a) & (c)(1).

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On October 16, 2008, the undersigned entered a modified

scheduling order1

 which, in part, instructed the parties to complete Phase II

Case 1:85-cv-00642-CG-C Document 444 Filed 04/05/10 Page 1 of 16
scheduling plan to be followed in this case unless modified by the undersigned. (See Doc. 243)

Importantly, this order not only informed the parties that all discovery motions filed–including

for protective order and to compel– were to be “brought in a timely manner so as to allow

sufficient time for the completion of discovery according to the schedule set by the Court[,]” (id.

at ¶ 11.b.) but, as well, referenced this Court’s “Introduction to Civil Discovery Practice in the

Southern District of Alabama, Civil Discovery Committee (1998) (distributed by the Clerk with

the Local Rules and published on the Court’s website, http://www.als.uscourts.gov).” (Id. at ¶

11.e.) This Court’s local discovery practice booklet reads, in relevant part, as follows:

The parties may conduct discovery (primarily taking depositions) by

agreement after the discovery cut-off. Lawyers should be aware, however, that if

problems arise during the depositions (such as instructions not to answer

questions or failures to produce documents at the depositions) the Court may

refuse to resolve the disputes because the depositions are being taken after the

discovery cut-off, and without the Court’s permission. To ensure that the Court

will hear and resolve discovery disputes after the discovery cut-off, either party

(preferably both by joint motion) should file a motion with the Court and obtain

the Court’s approval to conduct discovery out of time. The motion should indicate

whether all parties agree to the additional discovery and should notify the Court

of the effect, if any, that the additional discovery will have on existing deadlines.

As a matter of practice, the Court does not favor discovery after the cut-off which

forces changes in other pretrial deadlines.

Even though the Court occasionally may allow additional discovery upon

motion, it is a serious mistake to count upon the likelihood of an extension. When

allowed, an extension is normally made upon a showing of good cause for the

extension of discovery (including due diligence in the pursuit of discovery prior

to cut-off date), specifying the additional discovery needed, its purposes, and the

time in which it can be completed.

Motions for extension of discovery time are normally treated with special

disfavor if they are filed after the discovery cut-off date.

Introduction to Civil Discovery Practice in the Southern District of Alabama, supra, at ¶ I.

2

fact witness depositions on or before June 30, 2009, unless additional time was

granted for good cause shown. (Doc. 357, at ¶ 2) 

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The parties will continue to make bi-monthly joint status reports

to the Court regarding their progress toward the completion of

Phase II discovery. This deadline shall not apply to depositions

necessarily taken to preserve testimony for trial purposes, and

the parties will be allowed until thirty days before the pretrial

conference to complete such depositions unless such time is

extended by agreement.

(Id.) This order recognized as Phase III discovery all discovery related to

expert witnesses. (See id. at ¶ 3) 

2. In the parties’ final joint status report regarding Phase II

discovery, filed June 18, 2009, the only mention made of the need for a

30(b)(6) deposition is for plaintiffs to take the 30(b)(6) deposition of defendant

Illinois Central Railroad. (Doc. 396, at ¶ 5) This final status report otherwise

reads, in relevant part, as follows:

The following depositions are currently scheduled to be taken on

the dates noted: Skeeter McClure, June 26; Roy Hampton, June

30; Charles McConnell, June 30 (tentative–awaiting

confirmation of service on this third-party witness); Joseph

Threadcraft, July 1; Robert Harris, July 2; Pete Dranka, July 7;

and John Craun, July 14. Document subpoenas remain

outstanding to the following third parties, and documents are

expected to be forthcoming but have not yet been received:

APM Terminals North America, Inc. and HPA, Inc.

4. Several deponents who may need to be deposed

present special scheduling difficulties: LaDon White, Moffatt &

Nichol, may need to be deposed when he can be located. He is

no longer employed by Moffatt & Nichol and his whereabouts

are currently unknown although efforts to locate him continue.

David Barger of American Bridge needs to be deposed with

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regard to certain significant issues, but he has reportedly been

working out of the country for some time and is understood to

remain out of the country for a month or more yet.

...

6. Additional depositions for witnesses scattered

around the country need to be scheduled or re-scheduled to firm

dates–specifically, Stan Gottlieb (Mobile); Mark Bell (Mobile);

Bill Paparis (New York City)[;] Manuel Garmilla (Charlotte,

NC)[;] Tom Shafer (Baltimore)[;] and Bob Bennett (Princeton,

NJ). All of the remaining witnesses listed in paragraphs 3-6 are

believed to be of importance to the claims and defenses made by

the parties in this case, and Reilly and IC further believe that the

inability to obtain discovery from these witnesses due to

scheduling conflicts or unworkable deadlines will be highly

prejudicial to their cases.

7. It is theoretically possible that there may be other

individuals who must be deposed as well based on testimony

given in the forthcoming depositions, but a significant number

of new deponents is not anticipated.

8. The parties have been making, and continue to

make, every effort to complete Phase II discovery as soon as

possible. If all goes smoothly, the parties believe that they may

be able to complete Phase II discovery on or before August 30

with the probable exception of the depositions of LaDon White

and David Barger, but it is impossible for the parties to

guarantee that all necessary Phase II depositions can be

completed by then.

(Id. at ¶¶ 3-4 & 6-8) 

3. Five days later, on June 23, 2009, the parties filed a joint motion

for extension of all scheduled deadlines based upon the same facts as set forth

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in the final status report. (Compare Doc. 397 with Doc. 396) “[T]he parties

jointly move the Court for a sixty-day extension of all currently scheduled

deadlines–except for the period between the dispositive motion deadline and

the pretrial conference, for which the parties request an extension of 75 days.

Attached to this motion, for clarity’s sake, is a timetable reflecting the

proposed new deadlines for the completion of discovery, including expert

discovery, for dispositive motions to be filed, and for pretrial and trial.” (Doc.

397, at ¶ 6) The undersigned granted the joint motion to extend all scheduled

deadlines and in doing so tracked the proposed timetable submitted by the

parties. (Compare Doc. 400 with Doc. 397, Attached Proposed New

Timetable) Neither the parties’ proposed timetable or the Court’s Order of July

8, 2009 specifically referenced a new date for the completion of Phase II

discovery (see id.); however, given the contents of the final joint status report,

the parties’ joint motion to extend all scheduled deadlines, and the

undersigned’s granting of the joint motion to extend all deadlines, the Court

implicitly extended the completion date of Phase II discovery to August 30,

2009 (compare Doc. 400, at 1 (“[T]he joint motion to extend deadlines is

GRANTED.”) and Doc. 397, at ¶ 6 (“[T]he parties jointly move the Court for

a sixty-day extension of all currently scheduled deadlines–except for the

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period between the dispositive motion deadline and the pretrial conference, for

which the parties request an extension of 75 days.”) with Doc. 357, at ¶ 2 (all

Phase II fact witness depositions to be completed by June 30, 2009)). 

4. In all motions filed since the Court’s July 8, 2009, the parties

have only sought clarification regarding issues related to expert discovery and

the timing of same (see Docs. 410, 414 & 439), as well as the time for the

filing of dispositive motions (see Doc. 414 & 439). While the parties, in their

joint motion for extension of certain scheduled deadlines filed October 9,

2009, indicated that the need for requesting extensions related to expert

discovery and submission of dispositive motions was necessitated, in part, to

the fact that Phase II fact witness discovery had not been completed (Doc. 414

at ¶ 3 (“Another impediment to production of defendants’ expert reports and

submission of dispositive motions in compliance with the current scheduling

order is the completion of Phase II fact witness discovery. The parties have

worked to complete Phase II discovery in a timely manner; however, several

fact witness depositions remain to be taken and documents continue to be

produced. Scheduling issues have prevented the completion of this phase of

discovery. Specifically, the trial schedule of plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Walter

Cook, precluded the scheduling of any depositions for several weeks. Plaintiffs

Case 1:85-cv-00642-CG-C Document 444 Filed 04/05/10 Page 6 of 16
2 In granting this motion, the undersigned determined that there was a need to more

the final pretrial conference and date set for trial. (See Doc. 415, at ¶¶ 3 & 4)

7

have indicated a desire to depose Jim Bratina and Bill Justin, both former

Reilly employees. Illinois Central has requested the depositions of Hal

Hudgins, Ken Barefield, and Gerald Kichler, all employees of the Alabama

State Port Authority. Reilly may also need to depose Charles Wyckoff, an

individual disclosed in Plaintiff’s Seventh Amended Initial Disclosures on July

31, 2009, and Lynn Melton of Safety Guidance Specialists, Inc. Defendants

may also need to re-open the deposition of Joseph Threadcraft based on

revisions to plaintiffs’ damages claim contained in the Seventh Revised

Exhibit A to Plaintiffs’ Seventh Amended Initial Disclosures served on August

13, 2009 – after Mr. Threadcraft’s deposition.”)),2

 the parties never sought this

Court’s further extension of the time for completing Phase II fact witness

discovery (see id.). Therefore, since at least August 31, 2009, the parties have

been engaging in Phase II fact witness discovery by consent, without the

official authorization, permission and protection of the Court. 

5. Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to quash and motion for

protective order on March 24, 2010. (Doc. 441) Therein, plaintiffs seek to

quash the notice of 30(b)(6) deposition of Alabama State Port

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3 It is clear that the defendants have taken the 30(b)(6) deposition of “the Alabama

State Port Authority, of which the Terminal Railway is a division.” (Doc. 441, at ¶ 5)

8

Authority–Terminal Railway Alabama State Docks3 served by defendant

Illinois Central on March 12, 2010, on the basis that the time for taking such

deposition has long since expired and plaintiffs never agreed to the taking of

said deposition outside the deadline set for the expiration of Phase II

discovery. (See id.) 

6. In its response in opposition, Illinois Central contends that “(1)

the deposition will not upset the [December, 2010] trial date; (2) fact discovery

has continued long after the deadline expired; (3) the plaintiffs’ claims have

repeatedly changed and expanded; and (4) [it] has requested this deposition

from the plaintiffs since October 2009 and have only now been informed that

the witness would not be produced.” (Doc. 442, at 1)

Because of the complexity of the case, fact discovery has

continued to take place with consent of the parties to the current

time. For this reason, the parties did not formally seek a change

in the originally scheduled Phase II fact discovery deadline,

which technically expired a year and a half prior to the currently

scheduled trial. The plaintiffs have actively participated in fact

discovery and continue to do so, but now seek to quash this

deposition based solely on the expired deadline. The plaintiffs

admit that they continue to depose fact witnesses by agreement

with other parties and have outstanding requests for dates of fact

witnesses whom they wish to depose; in fact, until the filing of

this motion, plaintiffs had delayed complying with IC’s requests

ostensibly for the stated reason that they required completion of

Case 1:85-cv-00642-CG-C Document 444 Filed 04/05/10 Page 8 of 16
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the depositions requested by plaintiffs before they would

produce their witnesses. Curiously, while plaintiffs refuse to

produce the representative of the Terminal Railway for

deposition on the basis of the expired deadline, they do not

oppose producing other ASPA employees whose depositions

were requested at the same time. The plaintiffs should not be

permitted to pick and choose which fact depositions they will

agree to produce and those they will not. 

The plaintiffs’ claims in this matter have repeatedly

changed and expanded since the inception of this litigation and

the filing of this Court’s original scheduling order. The plaintiffs

have amended their complaint six times to add new claims and

allegations against the defendants. Since September 2006, when

the plaintiffs filed their Initial Disclosures which included as

“Exhibit A” and “Exhibit B” setting forth their response costs to

date[,] [p]laintiffs have amended those disclosures six times and

have filed nine “Revised Exhibit As”; the plaintiffs’ most recent

Ninth Revised Exhibit A was produced in February 2010 and

increases the amount claimed in response costs 400% above the

claims asserted in September 2006. Amended and expanded

claims (includ[ing] belated claims that costs associated with the

construction of the Choctaw Point Connection Terminal should

be counted as response costs) have created issues which warrant

additional discovery. To prohibit discovery regarding those new

claims would result in undue prejudice to the defendants.

IC has requested the deposition of the Terminal Railway

from the plaintiffs since October 2009. Initially, IC designated

Mr. Barefield, who is believed to be the director of the Railway,

by name. After four months of being told by plaintiffs’ counsel

that the deponents required by IC would not be produced until

after fact depositions requested by plaintiffs had been taken in

February 2010, counsel for IC sent plaintiffs’ counsel a draft

copy of a Notice of 30(b)(6) Deposition to the Terminal Railway

and asked for dates to hold the deposition. Because of the

plaintiffs’ continued refusal to produce the requested witness, IC

noticed the deposition and served the notice upon the plaintiffs

Case 1:85-cv-00642-CG-C Document 444 Filed 04/05/10 Page 9 of 16
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on March 12, 2010.

(Id. at 2-3 (internal citation omitted; emphasis in original)) 

7. The reply of the plaintiffs to Illinois Central’s opposition reads,

in relevant part, as follows:

By Illinois Central’s own admission, Illinois Central asked for

the deposition of an individual, Ken Barefield, who Illinois

Central says it “believe[s] to be the director of the Railway”[].

Asking for the deposition of an individual is hardly the same as

asking for the deposition of an organization under Rule 30(b)(6).

Again[,] according to Illinois Central’s own filings, Illinois

Central first mentioned a 30(b)(6) deposition of the Terminal

Railway in an email dated February 24, 2010 []. Plaintiffs did

not and do not agree to any such deposition.

...

The topics in Illinois Central’s 30(b)(6) notice concern the

Terminal Railway’s transporting hazardous substances, its

activities at the contaminated site, economic benefit derived by

the Terminal Railway from operation of the site, the Terminal

Railway’s purchases of materials from companies that operated

the site, persons who have inspected or visited the site, and fees

on rail cars delivered to or pulled from the McDuffie Island

Terminal []. None of the topics concern Plaintiffs’ response

costs, as revised or otherwise.

As Plaintiffs pointed out in their motion to quash and for

protective order, the Defendants have already taken the 30(b)(6)

deposition of the Alabama State Port Authority of which the

Terminal Railway is a division. Illinois Central offers no

justification or authority to support deposing a division of an

organization that the party has already deposed. Illinois Central

is in effect attempting to take a second deposition of the Port

Authority without leave of Court. The fact is that when Illinois

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Central noticed the Port Authority’s deposition, it could have,

but failed to, include the topics now listed in its notice of the

Terminal Railway’s deposition.

Illinois Central seems to believe the Court’s Phase II

deadline is of no consequence. Illinois Central says the deadline

“technically expired” some[]time ago but that the parties have

continued to conduct fact-witness discovery. Plaintiffs

understand the parties were and are bound by the deadline and

that additional fact-witness depositions can only be taken by

agreement.

Illinois Central also gives the impression the parties have

conducted extensive fact-witness discovery after the deadline .

. . . To the contrary, the parties have not conducted any factwitness depositions since the August 29, 2009 Phase II deadline.

The only depositions taken since then have been those of the

parties’ experts, under Phase III discovery.

Over a month prior to the Phase II deadline, on July 23,

2009, Plaintiffs asked for the depositions of James Bratina and

W.A. Justin, who are current or former employees of Defendant

Vertellus Specialties, Inc. The parties were unable to schedule

or take these depositions by the deadline. Vertellus agreed to

allow Plaintiffs to depose them after the deadline. These are the

only fact-witness depositions Plaintiffs are seeking to take after

the deadline. Illinois Central, in addition to the Terminal

Railway’s deposition, noticed the depositions of Hal Hudgins

and Joseph Threadcraft (current or formed Port Authority

employees). Plaintiffs have agreed to allow Illinois Central to

take Hudgins and Threadcraft’s depositions after the deadline.

However, Plaintiffs did not and do not agree to any 30(b)(6)

deposition of the Terminal Railway.

(Doc. 443, at 1-2 & 3-5 (internal citations omitted)) 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Case 1:85-cv-00642-CG-C Document 444 Filed 04/05/10 Page 11 of 16
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1. “Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the

court to enter pretrial scheduling orders, which set dates for the completion of

discovery, the hearing of dispositive motions, trial, and other matters.” Matrix

Motor Co., Inc. v. Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha, 218 F.R.D. 667, 671 (C.

D. Cal. 2003). The broad discretion set forth in Rule 16 “is necessary to

preserve the integrity and purpose of the pretrial scheduling order and to allow

the trial judge qualitative and quantitative management over a judicial

proceeding from an early stage in order to reduce costs and delays.” Gavenda

v. Orleans County, 1996 WL 377091, *1 (W.D. N.Y. 1996) (footnotes

omitted); see Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080,

1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (“‘The district court is given broad discretion in

supervising the pretrial phase of litigation, and its decisions regarding the

preclusive effect of a pretrial order . . . will not be disturbed unless they

evidence a clear abuse of discretion.’”). 

2. The undersigned has set forth, perhaps ad nauseam, various

contents of the scheduling orders entered in this case, as well as the arguments

of plaintiffs’ counsel and counsel for Illinois Central regarding the instant

motion to quash and motion for protective order, in order to make clear that

this Court is decidedly not being asked to modify the scheduling order entered

Case 1:85-cv-00642-CG-C Document 444 Filed 04/05/10 Page 12 of 16
4 Presumably, this is because none of the parties, at this late date, could make the

good cause showing necessary to support such a modification. See Sosa v. Airprint Systems, Inc.,

133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998) (“This good cause standard [in Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4)]

precludes modification unless the schedule cannot ‘be met despite the diligence of the party

seeking the extension.’”).

13

in this case nunc pro tunc to August 30, 2009 (or June 30, 2009) to allow for

additional fact-witness discovery (i.e., depositions)4

 and, therefore, at this late

date, approximately seven months after the official close of fact-witness

discovery, the Court need decline to do as the moving parties request, that is,

quash the noticed 30(b)(6) deposition of the Railway Terminal, just as it would

decline to compel the attendance of the Railway Terminal’s 30(b)(6) deponent

upon a failure to appear. The parties have entered the realm of discovery by

consent with respect to all remaining fact-witness discovery and cannot look

to this Court to mediate any disputes arising with respect to such discovery.

Compare Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford,

2008 WL 2397606, *2 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (“The discovery cut-off date means

that all discovery must be completed by that date. Untimely discovery requests

are subject to objection on that basis. Although the parties, by agreement, may

conduct discovery after the completion date, the parties should not expect the

court to resolve discovery disputes arising after the discovery completion

date.” (internal citations omitted)); AB Diversified Enterprises, Inc. v. Global

Case 1:85-cv-00642-CG-C Document 444 Filed 04/05/10 Page 13 of 16
14

Transport Logistics, Inc., 2007 WL 1362632, *1 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“In the

event the parties agree among themselves to extend the discovery deadline,

and without Court approval as is the case here, they must do so with the clear

understanding that the Court will not mediate any resulting dispute. . . . In this

case, the discovery cutoff has long since passed. . . . The parties’ agreement,

written or not, to serve or respond to paper discovery after the discovery cutoff

will not be enforced by the Court so long after the Court’s cutoff date has

passed. And, a motion to compel filed more than two months after the

discovery cutoff is clearly untimely. Therefore, the Defendant’s pending

motion to compel filed is procedurally defective and must be denied on that

basis.”); and Tai-Pan, Inc. v. Keith Marine, Inc., 1997 WL 714898, *11 (M.D.

Fla. 1997) (“As it is stated in the Court’s Order, motions pertaining to

discovery shall be filed prior to the completion date of discovery. Plaintiff filed

the present motion over four months after the discovery deadline. Further,

although the parties had consented to an extension of discovery deadlines in

this case, those deadlines have long since passed, and even if the continuance

of discovery were still in effect, the Court will not hear discovery disputes

arising during the stipulated continuance.” (internal citations omitted;

emphasis in original)) with Doc. 243, ¶ 11.b. (“A motion for protective order

Case 1:85-cv-00642-CG-C Document 444 Filed 04/05/10 Page 14 of 16
15

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), a motion for physical and mental examination

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 35(a), a motion to determine sufficiency pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a), and a motion to compel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 shall

be brought in a timely manner so as to allow sufficient time for the completion

of discovery according to the schedule set by the Court.”) and Introduction to

Civil Discovery Practice in the Southern District of Alabama, ¶ I., Civil

Discovery Committee (1998) (“The parties may conduct discovery (primarily

taking depositions) by agreement after the discovery cut-off. Lawyers should

be aware, however, that if problems arise during the depositions (such as

instructions not to answer questions or failures to produce documents at the

depositions) the Court may refuse to resolve the disputes because the

depositions are being taken after the discovery cut-off, and without the Court’s

permission.”). 

3. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds plaintiffs’ motion to

quash and motion for protective order (Doc. 441) both untimely and

procedurally deficient. It is, therefore, MOOTED. 

Case 1:85-cv-00642-CG-C Document 444 Filed 04/05/10 Page 15 of 16
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CONCLUSION

The plaintiffs’ motion to quash and motion for protective order (Doc.

441) is determined to be MOOT.

DONE and ORDERED this the 5th day of April, 2010. 

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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