Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01996/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01996-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

---

1

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MCKENZIE HUFFAKER, personally and 

as personal representative of the ESTATE 

OF PERRY HUFFAKER AND SARAH

HUFFAKER; JERILY MARTIN, as

guardian of AUBREE HUFFAKER;

JAXSON HUFFAKER; CADEN

HUFFAKER; LEROY HUFFAKER;

KATHRYN HUFFAKER; GREG 

PAYNE and CLAUDIA PAYNE ,

Plaintiff,

v.

EAGLE FUEL CELLS, INC. aka EAGLE 

FUEL CELLS-ETC. INC. aka/dba 

EAGLE TECHNOLOGIES CO. and 

DOES 1 through 100,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE AND GRANTING 

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR 

LIMITED JURISDICTIONAL 

DISCOVERY

[ECF No. 8]

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 14
2

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Before the Court is Eagle Fuel Cells, Inc. aka Eagle Fuel Cells-Etc, Inc. aka/dba 

Eagle Technologies’ (“Defendant” or “Eagle”) motion to dismiss the first amended 

complaint, filed on November 27, 2019. ECF No. 8. The motion has been fully briefed. 

ECF Nos. 10, 11. The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss and additionally GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion for jurisdictional discovery.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiffs first filed suit against Defendant Eagle in Utah on July 23, 2019. ECF 

No. 6 (“First Amended Complaint” or “FAC”) ¶ 19. Eagle moved to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiffs filed a notice of non-opposition on September 

18, 2019. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiffs then filed suit in the San Diego Superior Court on 

September 18, 2019, and the suit was removed to this Court on October 16, 2019. ECF 

No. 1. Plaintiffs allege claims of strict products liability, negligence, and breach of 

warranty against all defendants. FAC ¶¶ 22-35. 

II. Factual Background

Plaintiffs are the family members of two individuals who died as a result of 

injuries sustained in an airplane crash. Id. ¶¶ 1-5. The airplane (“Subject Airplane”) 

crashed on July 26, 2017 in Utah. Id. ¶ 9. The decedents were residents of Utah when 

they died; Plaintiffs are also residents of Utah.1 Id. ¶¶ 1-5. 

Defendant Eagle provides, among things, replacement fuel drain valves for 

aircrafts. Id. ¶ 6. Eagle is incorporated in Wisconsin and has its principal place of 

 

1 One Plaintiff is currently living in Brazil. FAC ¶ 2.

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 14
3

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

business in Wisconsin. Id. ¶ 6; Declaration of Kurt Hartwig (ECF No. 8-2) (“Hartwig 

Decl.”) ¶ 4. Plaintiffs also name as defendants Does 1 through 100, as agents, servants, 

employees and/or joint venturers of their codefendants. Id. ¶ 8.

Eagle designed, manufactured, overhauled, inspected, and distributed a fuel drain 

valve (“Subject Valve”) that was “sold in and sent” to Borrego Springs, California where 

it was ultimately installed in the Subject Aircraft. Id. ¶ 11. Allegedly, the Subject Valve 

failed to properly drain water from the fuel system in the fuel system; as a result, the 

Subject Aircraft lost power at the time of the crash. Id. ¶¶ 12, 13. No alterations were 

made to the Subject Valve between the time that Eagle shipped it and the time of its 

installation. Id. ¶ 14.

The Subject Valve was shipped pursuant to a purchase agreement executed on 

November 20, 2007. ECF No. 8-3 at 3. The seller is listed as Eagle Fuel Cells, 617 

Skylane Taxiway, Eagle River, Wisconsin 54521, and the recipient of the Subject Valve 

is listed as Tom Pantich, 4643 Mesquite Lane, Borrego Springs, CA 92004. Id. Tom 

Pantich is not a party in this action. 

On or around June 20, 2019, Plaintiffs learned, through their experts’ analysis of 

the crash wreckage, that there was water in the fuel system and the defects with the 

Subject Valve at the time of the crash. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs’ experts had previously 

inspected the wreckage on January 25, 2019 and April 19, 2019. Id. ¶ 18.

III. Legal Standard 

Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

(“Rule”) 12(b)(2).

“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their 

jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014). Under 

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 14
4

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

California’s long-arm statute, California state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction 

“on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 410.10 (West 2004). California’s long-arm statute is 

coextensive with federal due process requirements; accordingly, “the jurisdictional

analyses under state law and federal due process are the same.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred 

Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2004). To satisfy due process, a 

defendant must have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state that 

“maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The two recognized 

bases for exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant are “general” and 

“specific.” Doe v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 1997). When there 

has been no evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need only make out a prima facie showing of 

jurisdictional facts. See Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 

1127 (9th Cir. 2010); Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th 

Cir. 1977). “It is only if the court takes evidence on the issue or rules on the personal 

jurisdiction question in the context of a trial that a heightened, preponderance of the 

evidence standard applies.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless 

the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 

957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 

Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to amend would 

be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See Desoto, 957 F.2d at 658; Schreiber, 

806 F.2d at 1401. 

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 14
5

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. Discussion

Defendant argues that this Court lacks both general and specific jurisdiction. The 

Court addresses each in turn. 

A. General Jurisdiction

Defendant argues that general jurisdiction is inappropriate since it is a Wisconsin 

corporation with its principal place of business in Wisconsin and has insufficient contacts 

with California. Plaintiffs do not oppose. 

“With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of 

business are paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 

117, 137 (2014) (citations omitted). “General jurisdiction does not exist simply because 

of the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.” Wright & Miller, 4 Fed. Prac. & 

Proc. Civ. § 1067.5 (4th ed.) (citations omitted). It is insufficient to prove that a “foreign 

corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense continuous and 

systematic,” rather, the corporation’s affiliations with the forum state must be “so 

continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.” 

Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138–39 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “General 

jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, 

nationwide and worldwide.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20. “A corporation that 

operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Id. 

For Eagle, both of the paradigm bases for general jurisdiction (i.e., the principal 

place of business and place of incorporation) are located in Wisconsin. Therefore, the 

only remaining basis for exercising general jurisdiction would be Defendant’s contacts 

with California. 

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 14
6

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant argues that it does not transact or solicit business, maintain offices or 

any other places of business, own real property, or have any clients or employees in 

California. ECF No. 8-1 at 18. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege 

sufficient facts to show that Eagle’s contacts with California are so continuous and 

systematic to render it “at home” in California. Accordingly, the Court declines to 

exercise general jurisdiction over Eagle. 

B. Specific Jurisdiction

Defendant argues that the Court lacks specific jurisdiction since it has not 

purposefully directed its activities or otherwise purposefully availed itself of California; 

Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of any of Defendant’s forum related activities; and the 

exercise of jurisdiction in California would be unreasonable. Plaintiffs oppose. 

1. Legal Standard

Although the Supreme Court has drawn clear and narrow constraints on general 

jurisdiction, the jurisprudence on specific jurisdiction has grown in a different direction. 

“[W]hile specific jurisdiction has been cut loose from Pennoyer’s sway,” – i.e., “the idea 

that jurisdiction was necessarily limited to the geographic bounds of the forum” –

“general jurisdiction has not been stretched beyond limits traditionally recognized.” 

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 117 (2014) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 

(1877)).

The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being 

subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 

“contacts, ties, or relations.” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S., at 319. By 

requiring that individuals have “fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] 

to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign,” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) 

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 14
7

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Stevens, J., concurring), the Due Process Clause “gives a degree of predictability to the 

legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some 

minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit,” 

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant 

who has not consented to suit there, this “fair warning” requirement is satisfied if the 

defendant has “purposefully directed” his activities at residents of the forum, Keeton v. 

Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984), and the litigation results from alleged 

injuries that “arise out of or relate to” those activities, Helicopteros Nacionales de 

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).

In California, the reach of state long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with 

federal due process, which requires that a nonresident defendant have “minimum 

contacts” with the forum “such that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend 

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at

800-01 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code § 410.10. The Ninth Circuit applies the following three-prong test for determining 

specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant: 

(1) the non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 

consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some 

act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting 

activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; 

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and 

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, 

i.e., it must be reasonable. 

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 14
8

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

See Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802). 

While a plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs, on the third 

prong, “the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the 

exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 

(citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985)).

2. Purposeful Direction and Availment

The first prong of the specific jurisdiction test refers to both purposeful direction 

and purposeful availment. Defendant argues that the act at issue – i.e., the sale of the fuel 

drain valve – was not aimed at the forum state since Defendant manufactured the Subject 

Valve in Wisconsin and executed the purchase agreement in Wisconsin. Plaintiffs 

counter that Eagle purposefully directed its activities towards and availed itself of the

privilege of conducting activities in the forum state through its sale of the Subject Valve.

Purposeful Direction 

Evidence of purposeful direction generally consists of action taking place outside 

the forum that is directed at the forum. Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155 

(9th Cir. 2006). A forum legitimately may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 

nonresident who “purposefully directs” his activities toward forum residents because a

State generally has a “manifest interest” in providing its residents with a convenient 

forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors. Burger King Corp., 471 

U.S. at 473-474. “Harm suffered in the forum state is a necessary element in 

establishing purposeful direction.” Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th 

Cir. 2017). 

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 14
9

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, California has no apparent “manifest interest” in providing its residents with 

a convenient forum for redressing injuries because no California residents are party to 

this suit. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant sold the Subject Valve to a known California 

resident; however, Plaintiffs do not claim that this recipient suffered any harm in 

California, let alone had any connection to the Subject Aircraft at the time of the crash. 

Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Plaintiffs fail to allege that any harm that 

gives rise to this litigation was sustained in California. Thus, Plaintiffs have not shown 

that Defendant directed its activities towards California to justify specific jurisdiction

over the Defendant. 

Purposeful Availment 

Where a nonresident defendant “deliberately” has engaged in significant activities 

within a State, or has created “continuing obligations” between himself and residents of 

the forum, he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business 

there, and because his activities are shielded by “the benefits and protections” of the 

forum’s laws, it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the 

burdens of litigation in that forum as well. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475–76

(citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984); Travelers Health 

Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950)). The nonresident defendant’s “conduct and 

connection with the forum State” must be such that “he should reasonably anticipate 

being haled into court there, and therefore cannot be solely the result of some random, 

fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” Id. at 474-475. The Supreme Court has explained:

When a corporation ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities within the forum State,’ it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, 

and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, 

passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing 

its connection with the State. Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or 

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 14
10

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

distributor . . . is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of 

the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its 

product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those 

States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to 

its owner or to others.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297. While territorial presence in a state will 

frequently “enhance a potential defendant’s affiliation with a State and reinforce the 

reasonable foreseeability of suit there,” it is not a necessary component if a “substantial 

amount of business is transacted by mail and wire communications . . . thus obviating the 

need for physical presence within a State.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476. 

Here, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Defendant transacted a substantial 

amount of business in the state or has created any continuing obligations with any 

California residents. Plaintiffs only allege the following: Eagle maintains a 1-800 

number, which CA residents can call without incurring charges; Eagle allows customers 

to request a quote online; Eagle performs services across North America and around the 

country; and Eagle sold a defective drain valve to a California resident. ECF No. 10 at 9. 

Eagle’s sale of the Subject Valve to a California resident is the strongest connection to 

the forum state, but as mentioned, the recipient of the valves is not a party in this action, 

and Plaintiffs do not claim that the recipient of the valves suffered any harm or had any 

connection to the Subject Aircraft at the time of the crash. 

While Defendant’s lack of presence in California is not wholly determinative, the 

facts show that Eagle is not registered to do business in California, has never had a 

registered agent in California, owns no real property in California, does not maintain any 

offices in California, does not keep any officers or directors in California, does not hold 

any bank accounts or have any telephone listings in California, and does not maintain any 

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 14
11

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

corporate books in California. Hartwig Decl. ¶ 6. Plaintiffs only alleges a single instance 

of Defendant mailing a product to a non-party California resident in 2007, ten years 

before the aircraft crash occurred. Cf. DIRECTV, Inc. v. EQ Stuff, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 

1077 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (defendants purposefully directed activities at forum state by 

filling orders for over 2,500 products that they knew were bound for California and 

conducting business relationships with several California companies that provide ongoing 

services necessary for operation of defendants’ website). Plaintiffs have thus failed to 

show that Defendant had contacts with California that would provide “clear notice” that 

Defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in California. 

The cases that Plaintiffs cite – Patterson v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 

2d 1170 (D. Ariz. 2010) and Dillard v. Fed. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 3d 752 (W.D. Tex. 

2018) – are unhelpful. In Patterson, plaintiffs were actually injured in Arizona by a 

product that was sold in Arizona, the forum state. The Patterson court held that a foreign 

corporate defendant purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities 

in the forum state because the Company placed its design for the defective ladder into the 

“stream of commerce” and directed that design toward U.S. consumers by establishing an 

American subsidiary and giving that subsidiary a license to disseminate products 

manufactured in accordance with an allegedly defective design. Patterson, 684 F. Supp. 

2d at 1183; cf. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) 

(plurality opinion) (a defective or negligent design may be sufficient to establish specific 

jurisdiction when a defendant designs the product for the market in the forum state). 

Unlike in Patterson, there is no indication that Defendant similarly directed its design of 

the Subject Valve towards California so as to cause harm in California. 

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 14
12

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In Dillard, the Texas district court rejected Asahi’s plurality opinion which 

applied a “stream of commerce plus test” to specific jurisdiction determinations and,

instead, followed a “looser test” as articulated by the Fifth Circuit, requiring only “mere 

foreseeability or awareness” that the end product would be purchased by or used by 

consumers in the forum state. Dillard, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 756. The Ninth Circuit has not 

adopted this “looser test.” Consequentially, Dillard has no precedential weight or effect 

in the present case. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the first

prong of the three-prong test and that an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over 

Defendant would offend due process. Thus, it is unnecessary to address the final two 

prongs. 

C. Jurisdictional Discovery

Plaintiffs request permission to conduct jurisdictional discovery in the event that 

the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case for personal 

jurisdiction. Defendant counters that that jurisdictional discovery is unnecessary and that 

Plaintiffs have failed to move for a continuance.

“[T]he question of whether to allow discovery is generally within the discretion of 

the trial judge.” Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Grp., Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 801 (9th Cir. 

1989). A decision “to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest 

showing that the denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the 

complaining litigant.” Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 

2003) (internal citations omitted). While “purely speculative allegations of attenuated 

jurisdictional contacts” are insufficient to warrant jurisdictional discovery, Getz v. Boeing 

Co., 654 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011), “discovery should ordinarily be granted where 

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 14
13

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more 

satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.” Laub, 342 F.3d at 1093 (citing Butcher’s 

Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1986); Boschetto v. 

Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

In their request for jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiffs argue that discovery may 

show the extent to which Defendant has sent its products to California and provided fuel 

system services to California residents, noting that it is “extremely unlikely that the 

subject drain is the only product or service Eagles [sic] has provided to California 

residents.” ECF No. 10 at 15. Defendant counters that it is a “Wisconsin Corporation 

that has no significant connection to California at all.” ECF No. 11 at 13. Defendant 

additionally denies any further involvement with the individual who purchased the fuel 

drain valve in 2007 after the purchase was concluded. See Hartwig Decl. ¶¶ 6, 10.

However, Plaintiffs have established that Defendant has completed at least one sale to a 

California resident. Cf. Crafty Prods., Inc. v. Fuqing Sanxing Crafts Co., 2016 WL 

5464552, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2016) (jurisdictional discovery denied where 

plaintiff failed to establish any prior instance of defendant directing infringing activity at 

the forum state). Plaintiffs allege that they may be able to find more sales by Defendant 

to other California residents and have shown that Eagle performs services across North 

America and around the country and maintains a 1-800 number, which California 

residents can call without incurring charges, in order to obtain products and services. 

Plaintiffs have also shown that Defendant allows customers to request a quote on 

Defendant’s website. While it is a close question, the Court will permit limited 

jurisdictional discovery so that Plaintiffs may determine the extent of Defendant’s sales 

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 14
14

19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of their products and services in California. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for 

jurisdictional discovery is GRANTED.

V. Conclusion 

In sum, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the FAC is GRANTED without prejudice. 

Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery is GRANTED and Plaintiffs will be given 

45 days from the date of this order to conduct jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiffs are 

further granted leave to amend within 20 days of the conclusion of jurisdictional 

discovery.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 31, 2020

Case 3:19-cv-01996-GPC-AHG Document 13 Filed 01/31/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 14