Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-07370/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-07370-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

---

1

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND AMENDED SETTLEMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RAY DELGADO,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARKETSOURCE, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND 

AMENDED SETTLEMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 84

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for approval of the second amended settlement. On 

August 15, 2019, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion. On August 26, 2019, Plaintiff 

filed a supplemental brief and the parties’ amended settlement. On August 27, 2019, Plaintiff 

filed a second supplemental brief and the parties’ second amended settlement. Having considered 

the parties’ submissions, the arguments at the August 15, 2019 hearing, the relevant law, and the 

record in this case, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for approval of the second amended 

settlement. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Defendant “provide[s] outsource sales and marketing for other companies.” ECF No. 37-

Case 5:17-cv-07370-LHK Document 104 Filed 08/28/19 Page 1 of 12
2

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND AMENDED SETTLEMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1, Ex. D (“Wiley Depo.”), 25:16–18. Defendant employed Plaintiff as a district manager from 

April 2013 until April 18, 2017. ECF No. 37-5 (“Delgado Decl.”), ¶ 2. Plaintiff supervised 

employees who sold cellular phones inside Target stores. Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff “was responsible for 

staffing these sales departments, as well as managing inventory and tracking supplies.” Id. 

Plaintiff terminated at least three of Defendant’s employees during Plaintiff’s employment with 

Defendant. ECF No. 42-1, Ex. E (“Delgado Depo.”), 112:21–117:20; 134:10–22.

1. Defendant’s Policies and Practices for Paying Final Wage Statements

Defendant pays its employees their wages via either electronic direct deposit or a paper 

check. Wiley Depo. 32:11–12. When Defendant fires an employee, Defendant distributes the 

employee’s final paycheck through similar means, via either direct deposit or a paper check sent 

overnight with Federal Express (“FedEx”). Id. at 162:23–25. According to Defendant’s policies, 

Defendant pays fired employees their final wages “in accordance with state law.” ECF No. 42-1, 

Ex. B; see also Wiley Depo. 135:2–15 (testifying that Defendant’s practice is for a fired employee 

to “have a check that day”). California law requires Defendant to pay fired employees their final 

wages “immediately.” Cal. Labor Code § 201. 

In order to comply with California law, Defendant maintains the following policies and 

practices. Before a manager decides to terminate an employee, Defendant requires the manager to 

receive approval from Defendant’s human resources department. ECF No. 42-4 (“Wiley Decl.”), 

¶ 9. Then, the manager must complete an Employee Status Form (“ESF”), which documents the 

employee’s name, termination date, and reason for termination. Wiley Depo. at 149:1–18. 

Defendant’s human resources department must authorize the ESF. Id. at 149:23–25. Eventually, 

the ESF is sent to Defendant’s payroll department to prepare the employee’s final paycheck. Id. at 

150:2–6. When Defendant pays final wages by direct deposit, the “final wages are typically . . . 

processed the day before the termination date such that the funds are in the employee’s bank 

account on the last day of employment.” Wiley Decl. ¶ 11. If using direct deposit might delay an 

employee’s receipt of final wages, or if the employee receives her regular wages by paper check, 

Defendant issues a paper check and sends it to the fired employee via overnight FedEx. Id. 

Case 5:17-cv-07370-LHK Document 104 Filed 08/28/19 Page 2 of 12
3

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND AMENDED SETTLEMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Defendant’s Managers Guide to Paying Hourly Employees also includes instructions 

regarding the payment of final wages. ECF No. 42-3, Ex. A. The Managers Guide informs 

managers that “in some states”—including California—“an employee is due his or her final wages 

immediately upon termination.” Id. at 1, 4. As a result, the Managers Guide instructs managers to 

contact human resources “as soon as possible . . . when the manager makes the decision to 

terminate an employee.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff received an email from a payroll specialist reminding 

him to approve timecards for to-be-fired employees when submitting the ESF for those employees 

because “CA is immediate payout state.” ECF No. 42-1, Ex. G. Finally, Defendant’s payroll 

department maintains an internal document that lists “immediately” as the payout date for 

involuntarily terminated employees in California. ECF No. 42-4, Ex. C. 

2. Plaintiff’s Termination

On April 18, 2017, Plaintiff had a meeting with his supervisor, Gary Slate, at which Slate 

informed Plaintiff of his termination. Delgado Decl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff was fired for misconduct. ECF 

No. 37-1, Ex. A. Plaintiff did not receive his final wage statement until April 19, 2017. Delgado 

Decl. ¶ 7; see also id., Ex. A (Plaintiff’s bank records). 

At this point, the parties’ accounts of Plaintiff’s termination diverge. Plaintiff asserts that 

Plaintiff’s termination was effective April 18, 2017. Plaintiff points to the ESF for Plaintiff’s 

termination, which lists April 18, 2017 in the “effectiveDate” field. ECF No. 37-1, Ex. A. 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff was terminated effective Wednesday, April 19, 2017. In 

an email sent before Plaintiff’s termination, Plaintiff’s manager, Gary Slate, stated that “[t]he ESF 

and plan was for Wednesday.” ECF No. 42-3, Ex. C. Slate had originally planned to meet with 

Plaintiff on Wednesday, but Plaintiff was unavailable that day, so Slate and Plaintiff instead met 

on Tuesday. Id. Slate believes that he informed Plaintiff that Defendant was terminated effective 

April 19, 2017. ECF No. 42-3 (“Slate Decl.”), ¶ 10. Defendant also points to a confirmation 

email Slate received when first submitting Plaintiff’s ESF on April 12, 2017, in which the 

effective date for Plaintiff’s termination was listed as April 19, 2017. Id., Ex. D. The email 

confirmation containing Plaintiff’s ESF includes, as part of a “Termination Checklist,” the 

Case 5:17-cv-07370-LHK Document 104 Filed 08/28/19 Page 3 of 12
4

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND AMENDED SETTLEMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

instruction that “timely timecards are required so that we can ensure the processing of payroll 

remains compliant” for immediate payout states, including California. Id. (emphasis omitted).

B. Procedural History 

On November 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint against Defendant 

in California Superior Court for the County of Santa Clara. ECF No. 1, Ex. 1 (“Compl.”). 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged claims for (1) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements in 

violation of California Labor Code § 226(a); (2) failure to pay all wages owed immediately upon 

termination in violation of California Labor Code §§ 201, 203; and (3) civil penalties pursuant to 

California’s Private Attorney General’s Act (“PAGA”). Id. ¶¶ 29–40. 

On December 29, 2017, Defendant removed Plaintiff’s complaint to federal court pursuant 

to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1453. ECF No. 1. 

On August 1, 2018, the parties stipulated to strike those portions of Plaintiff’s complaint 

alleging that Defendant violated California Labor Code § 226(a). ECF No. 26. In addition, the 

parties stipulated to strike Plaintiff’s § 226(a) allegations as a basis for Plaintiff’s PAGA claim. 

Id. at 2. Then, on September 5, 2018, the parties stipulated to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 226(a) claim 

and to strike Plaintiff’s §226(a) allegations from Plaintiff’s PAGA claim. ECF No. 33. 

On December 20, 2018, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. ECF 

No. 46. 

On April 29, 2019, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s PAGA claim. 

ECF No. 66. 

On May 9, 2019, the parties filed a notice that the parties had resolved this action in its 

entirety. ECF No. 77. On May 10, 2019, the parties stated that the parties intended to file a 

stipulation to approve the parties’ PAGA settlement. ECF No. 79. 

On June 24, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for settlement approval. ECF No. 84

(“Mot.”). On August 15, 2019, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for settlement 

approval. ECF No. 98. At the hearing, the Court expressed concern that the release in the 

settlement appears to release PAGA claims not predicated on a violation of California Labor Code 

Case 5:17-cv-07370-LHK Document 104 Filed 08/28/19 Page 4 of 12
5

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND AMENDED SETTLEMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

§ 201. ECF No. 97 at 1–2. The parties agreed that clarification of the scope of the release would 

be helpful. Id. at 2. The parties also agreed to revise how the settlement allocates the settlement 

funds as between PAGA penalties and attorney’s fees and costs. Id. 

On August 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed an amended settlement, supplemental brief, receipts or 

invoices for all expenses, and Plaintiff’s attorney Kristin Agnew’s contemporaneous billing 

records. ECF No. 99. On August 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed a second amended settlement and 

second supplemental brief. ECF Nos. 101 & 102. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Settlement Approval

“An employee bringing a PAGA action does so as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor 

law enforcement agencies, . . . who are the real parties in interest.” Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. 

Am. Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 435 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). Thus, “[a]n action 

brought under the PAGA is a type of qui tam action.” Id. at 429. Because a PAGA action is 

brought as a proxy for law enforcement agencies, “[t]here is no requirement that the Court certify 

a PAGA claim for representative treatment like in Rule 23 . . . .” Villalobos v. Calandri Sonrise 

Farm LP, 2015 WL 12732709, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2015). However, because a settlement of 

PAGA claims compromises a claim that could otherwise be brought by the state, the PAGA 

provides that “court[s] shall review and approve any settlement of any civil action filed pursuant 

to [PAGA].” Cal. Labor Code § 2699(l)(2). 

A party seeking approval of a PAGA settlement must simultaneously submit the proposed 

settlement to the LWDA to allow the LWDA to comment on the settlement if the LWDA so 

desires. The PAGA also states that courts may exercise their discretion to lower the amount of 

civil penalties awarded “if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do 

otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.” Cal. 

Labor Code § 2699(e)(2). Because state law enforcement agencies are the “real parties in interest” 

for PAGA claims, the Court’s task in reviewing the settlement is to ensure that the state’s interest 

in enforcing the law is upheld. Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 435.

Case 5:17-cv-07370-LHK Document 104 Filed 08/28/19 Page 5 of 12
6

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND AMENDED SETTLEMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Other than the provisions discussed above, the PAGA does not establish a standard for 

evaluating PAGA settlements. Indeed, the LWDA has stated that “[t]he LWDA is not aware of 

any existing case law establishing a specific benchmark for PAGA settlements, either on their own 

terms or in relation to the recovery on other claims in the action.” Ramirez v. Benito Valley 

Farms, LLC, 2017 WL 3670794, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) (quoting LWDA Response at 3, 

O’Connor v. Uber Techs., No. 13-CV-03826-EMC, Docket No. 736 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2016)). 

Ultimately, “neither the California Supreme Court, nor the California Courts of Appeal, nor the 

[LWDA] has provided any definitive answer as to what the appropriate standard is for approval of 

a PAGA settlement.” Haralson v. U.S. Aviation Servs. Corp., 383 F. Supp. 3d 959, 971 (N.D. Cal. 

2019) (quoting Jordan v. NCI Grp., Inc., 2018 WL 1409590, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018)). 

Given the lack of an express standard, several courts, including this Court, have applied 

several of the factors in Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998), to 

evaluate a PAGA settlement. Ramirez, 2017 WL 3670794, at *3; see O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 

201 F. Supp. 3d. 1110, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (applying Hanlon factors to parties’ PAGA 

settlement); Rodriguez v. RCO Reforesting, Inc., 2019 WL 331159, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2019) 

(same); Patel v. Nike Retail Servs., Inc., 2019 WL 2029061, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2019) (same). 

The Hanlon factors, which are used to evaluate class action settlements, include (1) the 

strength of the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further 

litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered 

in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed; (6) the expertise and views of counsel; (7) the 

presence of government participation; and (8) the reaction of class members to the proposed 

settlement. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. Many of these factors are not unique to class action 

lawsuits and bear on whether a settlement is fair and has been reached through an adequate 

adversarial process. Thus, the Court finds that these factors are useful in evaluating a PAGA 

settlement. However, three of the Hanlon factors—risk of maintaining class action status, 

presence of a governmental participant, and reaction of class members—are not relevant to a 

PAGA settlement that is not a class action and in which the LWDA is not involved. 

Case 5:17-cv-07370-LHK Document 104 Filed 08/28/19 Page 6 of 12
7

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND AMENDED SETTLEMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

For these reasons, the Court evaluates the second amended settlement in light of the PAGA 

requirement that the award not be “unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.” Cal. Labor 

Code § 2699(e)(2). The Court also considers the five relevant Hanlon factors. 

1. “Unjust, Arbitrary and Oppressive, or Confiscatory” as to Defendant

This factor favors approval of the second amended settlement. There is no indication that 

the second amended settlement would be “unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.” Cal. 

Labor Code § 2699(e)(2). To the contrary, in the mediation process and the resulting second 

amended settlement, the parties recognized the potential burden of additional litigation. Defendant 

settled rather than continue litigating what Defendant views as an “exceedingly small matter.” See

ECF No. 88 at 2. 

2. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case 

This factor favors approval. Courts have noted that legal uncertainty favors approval of a 

settlement. See, e.g., Browning v. Yahoo! Inc., 2007 WL 4105971, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 

2007) (“[L]egal uncertainties at the time of settlement—particularly those which go to 

fundamental legal issues—favor approval.”). The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for class 

certification and Defendant’s motion to strike the PAGA claim, but the merits of Plaintiff’s final 

wage allegations have not been tested. Moreover, the parties continue to dispute the 

circumstances of Plaintiff’s termination. See Mot. at 13. 

3. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

This factor favors approval. Although the parties have engaged in motion practice to date, 

the parties settled before more expansive discovery occurred and, specifically, before Defendant 

was to provide PAGA-related discovery related to 25 employees terminated during the PAGA 

period. See ECF No. 71. Even if Plaintiff were to prove his PAGA claim for all employees, there 

is a risk that the Court could reduce PAGA penalties under California Labor Code § 2699(e)(2). 

Plaintiff could also fail to recover any penalties for eligible employees or the LWDA. See Agnew 

Decl. ¶¶ 18–21. For both parties, because the maximum value of the PAGA claim is $96,300, as 

explained in more detail below, continued litigation presents an expense not commensurate with

Case 5:17-cv-07370-LHK Document 104 Filed 08/28/19 Page 7 of 12
8

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND AMENDED SETTLEMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the potential recovery. ECF No. 88 at 2. Thus, the second amended settlement provides a timely, 

certain, and meaningful recovery. 

4. Amount of Second Amended Settlement

This factor favors approval. In a declaration, Plaintiff’s attorney explains that the total 

valuation of Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is $96,300. Agnew Decl. ¶ 17. There are a maximum of 963 

employees eligible for PAGA penalties. Second Amended Settlement ¶ 1. Under PAGA, 

employees are eligible to recover $100 for an initial violation and $200 for a subsequent violation. 

Cal. Labor Code § 2699(f)(2). However, because the alleged violation in this case relates to 

payment of final wages, each employee was likely terminated only once and is entitled to penalties 

for only one violation. See Mot. at 14. Therefore, the maximum recovery per employee is $100, 

for a total of $96,300. 

Pursuant to the second amended settlement, Defendant will pay a total of $83,075, of 

which at least $45,252.98 are allocated to PAGA penalties. Thus, the second amended settlement 

provides for approximately $46.99 in PAGA penalties per employee, or a recovery equivalent to

almost 47% of the PAGA claim’s total valuation. 

The Court also approves up to $4,000 for settlement administration costs. The second

amended settlement provides that if settlement administration costs fall below $4,000, any residual 

funds will be paid toward PAGA penalties. Second Amended Settlement ¶ 5.5. Thus, the amount 

of PAGA penalties could be even higher. 

Courts have “raised concerns about settlements of less than 1% of the total value of a 

PAGA claim.” Haralson, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 973 (quoting Jennings v. Open Door Mktg., LLC, 

2018 WL 4773057, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018)). Nonetheless, some courts have approved 

PAGA recoveries in that range. See, e.g., McLeod v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2018 WL 5982863, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2018) (approving PAGA settlement totaling 1.1% of total value). By contrast, 

the second amended settlement provides for penalties of almost 47% of Plaintiff’s total valuation

for the PAGA claim, and that amount could be even higher if settlement administration costs fall 

below $4,000. Moreover, although courts have raised concerns about PAGA settlements where 

Case 5:17-cv-07370-LHK Document 104 Filed 08/28/19 Page 8 of 12
9

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND AMENDED SETTLEMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the LWDA filed objections, see O’Connor, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1135, Plaintiff filed his proposed 

settlement with the LWDA, and the LWDA has not filed any response. Therefore, the amount of 

the second amended settlement weighs in favor of approval.

5. Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of the Proceedings

This factor weighs in favor of approval. The parties have completed significant discovery 

and litigated both a motion for class certification and a motion to strike the PAGA claim. See ECF 

Nos. 46, 56. Thus, both sides had a well-developed sense of the risks and benefits of continued

litigation.

6. Experience and Views of Counsel

This factor favors approval. The parties here are represented by competent and 

experienced counsel who favor settlement. Plaintiff’s primary attorney has litigated employment 

cases for 10 years and favors settlement because there are “legitimate open questions as to several 

issues” in the litigation. Agnew Decl. ¶ 18. Defendant favors settlement because the case is an 

“exceedingly small matter,” in Defendant’s view. ECF No. 88 at 2. Therefore, the views of 

counsel favor settlement. 

7. Conclusion

Thus, each of the six relevant factors discussed above favors approval. The settlement of 

the PAGA claim in the instant case for a total of $83,075 was reached only after multiple rounds 

of motion practice, substantial discovery, and negotiations involving counsel with significant 

experience in employment cases. Additionally, the $45,252.98 allocated to PAGA penalties

represents a significant percentage of the employees’ possible recovery and vindicates California 

state law enforcement agencies’ interest in enforcing the law. Moreover, the amount of PAGA 

penalties could be even higher if settlement administration costs fall below $4,000. For these 

reasons, the Court finds that the second amended settlement is fair and reasonable and promotes 

the purposes of PAGA. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for approval of the 

second amended settlement.

B. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Case 5:17-cv-07370-LHK Document 104 Filed 08/28/19 Page 9 of 12
10

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND AMENDED SETTLEMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The Court also finds that an award of $20,768 for attorney’s fees and $8,053.27 for costs is 

warranted. The PAGA provides that “[a]ny employee who prevails in any action shall be entitled 

to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Cal. Labor Code § 2699(g)(1). PAGA does 

not provide a specific standard for evaluating attorney’s fees in connection with a PAGA 

settlement. However, the lodestar method is a well-established method for determining the 

reasonableness of an attorney’s fee award. See, e.g., Nitsch v. DreamWorks Animation SKG Inc., 

2017 WL 2423161, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2017); Ramirez, 2017 WL 3670794, at *6 (applying 

lodestar approach to parties’ request for attorney’s fees in PAGA settlement).

Therefore, the Court applies the lodestar method in determining whether the requested 

attorney’s fees are reasonable in the instant case. Under the lodestar method, a “lodestar figure is 

calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the 

litigation (as supported by adequate documentation) by a reasonable hourly rate for the region and 

for the experience of the lawyer.” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 965 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Under the Civil Local Rules for United States District Court for the Northern District of 

California, a motion for attorney’s fees and costs must include (1) the number of hours spent on 

the litigation by each biller, (2) detailed billing records showing how much time was spent on each 

task, and (3) each biller’s billable rate and justification for such rate. Civ. L. R. 54-5(b). 

Plaintiff requests an award of $20,768.75 in attorney’s fees or 25% of the total settlement 

fund, which is $83,075. ECF No. 99 at 3. Plaintiff’s counsel reports a lodestar of $104,975 for 

161.7 hours worked by a single attorney, Kristin Agnew. Agnew Decl. ¶ 32. Plaintiff’s counsel 

represents that although other attorneys, legal clerks, and paralegals spent “dozens of hours” on 

the case, Plaintiff’s counsel does not include those hours in the lodestar calculation “because the 

lodestar of just myself [Ms. Agnew] comprises enough billable time as to reach a lodestar crosscheck amount roughly equivalent to the amount of attorney’s fees being requested.” Id. at n.1. 

Plaintiff has provided information regarding Ms. Agnew’s education and experience. 

Agnew Decl. ¶¶ 24–30. Having reviewed this information, the Court finds that Ms. Agnew’s 

Case 5:17-cv-07370-LHK Document 104 Filed 08/28/19 Page 10 of 12
11

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND AMENDED SETTLEMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

education and experience justifies her billing rate. Plaintiff has also provided detailed billing 

records for Ms. Agnew that indicate that the hours spent on the instant litigation were justified. 

Agnew Supp. Decl., Ex. C. In addition, Ms. Agnew’s lodestar alone is sufficient to make the 

requested $20,768.75 in attorney’s fees reasonable. Specifically, Ms. Agnew’s lodestar totals 

$104,975. Thus, the requested $20,768.75 represents a negative multiplier of 19.8%, and 

represents a significant discount from Plaintiff’s lodestar. Furthermore, Ms. Agnew’s lodestar 

does not account for work performed after Plaintiff filed the motion for preliminary approval or 

for the “dozens of hours” that other attorneys and staff spent working on the instant case. 

Therefore, the Court finds that the requested attorney’s fees award is justified. 

Plaintiff’s counsel also requests reimbursement for $9,105.05 in costs, which Plaintiff 

contends are justified by receipts and invoices attached to Ms. Agnew’s supplemental declaration. 

Agnew Supp. Decl. ¶ 6; see id., Exs. E & F. Although most of Plaintiff’s costs are justified, the 

Court will not approve reimbursement of Plaintiff’s counsel’s business class airplane ticket from 

Los Angeles to San Jose, which cost $493.96. The Court will also not approve reimbursement of 

Plaintiff’s counsel’s August 15, 2018 stay at The Fairmont San Jose, which is perhaps the most 

expensive hotel in San Jose. The base rate for Plaintiff’s counsel’s one-night stay was $479 and 

the total charges for one night were $558.28. See Agnew Supp. Decl., Ex. F. Although the Court 

will approve reimbursement of Plaintiff’s counsel’s September 17, 2018 stay at The Fairmont San 

Jose, which cost a base rate of $336, the Court encourages Plaintiff’s counsel to seek more 

reasonably priced accommodations in San Jose in the future. With the above deductions, the 

Court approves reimbursement to Plaintiff’s counsel for $8,053.27 in costs. 

Plaintiff has achieved a result that vindicates the state’s interest in enforcing wage and hour 

laws, as Defendant has agreed to pay a total of $83,075, with at least $45,252.98 paid as civil 

penalties under PAGA. The amount of PAGA penalties could be even higher if settlement 

administration costs fall below $4,000. Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel devoted significant 

resources to the task of litigating this case. For these reasons, the Court finds that an award of 

$20,768.75 for attorney’s fees and $8,053.27 for costs is reasonable within the meaning of 

Case 5:17-cv-07370-LHK Document 104 Filed 08/28/19 Page 11 of 12
12

Case No. 17-CV-07370-LHK 

ORDER APPROVING SECOND AMENDED SETTLEMENT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

California Labor Code § 2699(g)(1). Therefore, the Court awards Plaintiff’s counsel a total of 

$28,822.02 for attorney’s fees and costs. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for approval of the 

second amended settlement. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 28, 2019

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:17-cv-07370-LHK Document 104 Filed 08/28/19 Page 12 of 12