Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00184/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00184-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAKLA JOSEPH,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. S. WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-00184-REC-SMS-P

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Shakla Joseph (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (Religious

Freedom Restoration Act). Plaintiff filed this action on February 9, 2005. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395

U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at the California Substance Abuse

Treatment Facility and State Prison-Corcoran, where plaintiff is presently incarcerated. Plaintiff

names California Department of Corrections Director Jeanne S. Woodford and Warden Derral G.

Adams as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money damages and injunctive relief.

C. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Access to the Courts Claim

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that after being disciplined for refusing to cut his hair, he

filed an inmate appeal challenging the grooming standards policy. Plaintiff alleges that although the

second level response was dated August 20, 2004, he did not receive the response until September

13, 2004. Plaintiff’s appeal was thereafter rejected at the Director’s Level of review for being

untimely. Plaintiff alleges that because exhaustion is required, the handling and delay of his appeal

violated his right of access to the courts.

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right of access is merely the right to bring to court a grievance the inmate

wishes to present, and is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions.

Id. at 354. An inmate claiming interference with or denial of access to the courts must show that he

suffered an actual injury. Id. 

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“[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive

right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v.

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th

Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance

procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure

confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). With

respect to the mandatory exhaustion requirement set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), interference with

plaintiff’s attempts to exhaust via the appeals process would give rise to a cognizable access to the

courts claim only if and when plaintiff suffers an actual injury by having his claim or action

dismissed for failure to exhaust. Until such an injury actually occurs, it is pure speculation that

plaintiff’s inability to exhaust will result in the loss of his claim or action. See e.g., Ngo v.

Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 631 (9th Cir. 2005) (exhaustion occurred when appeals coordinator

exercised discretion to screen out appeal as untimely and no further process remained available to

the inmate); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that a remedy prison

officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing is not an available remedy); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736,

740 (8th Cir. 2001) (a remedy prison officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing is not an available

remedy). Accordingly, plaintiff’s allegations concerning his attempts to utilize the inmate appeals

process do not give rise to any claims for relief under section 1983 for denial of access to the courts

or for violation of any other constitutional right.

2. RFRA Claim

Plaintiff alleges that the grooming standards policy violates the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act by substantially burdening the exercise of plaintiff’s religion. The Religions

Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 provided in relevant part that the “[g]overnment shall not

substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general

applicability” unless the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is the

least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.

In 1997, RFRA was found to be unconstitutional. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536

(1997). Accordingly, plaintiff’s RFRA claim fails as a matter of law.

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3. Free Exercise and Equal Protection Claims

Plaintiff alleges that the grooming standards policy violates his rights under the Free Exercise

Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. In 2004, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the grooming standards policy regulating hair length is

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and is therefore constitutional. Henderson v.

Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, plaintiff’s free exercise and equal

protection claims fail as a matter of law. 

D. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief may

be granted. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. See Ellis v.

Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability unless there is some affirmative link or connection

between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976);

May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.

1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state any claims

upon which relief may be granted;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

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3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 31, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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