Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06256/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06256-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY ATTERBURY, 

Plaintiff,

v.

ED FOULK; et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-6256 MHP (pr)

ORDER OF SERVICE 

INTRODUCTION

Danny Atterbury, currently in custody at the Napa State Hospital pursuant to a

determination that he was not guilty by reason of insanity of criminal charges brought against

him, filed a pro se civil right complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He applied to proceed as a

pauper in this action.

BACKGROUND

Atterbury alleged the following in his complaint regarding acts and omissions at Napa

State Hospital:

On April 23, 2007, defendant Katie Cooper caused him to be transferred from ward T4 to the less favorable ward T-7. Ward T-4 is a more agreeable place to be housed because it

is calmer and less violent, has vending machines and other privileges available, and the

inmates are allowed to have $40.00 cash in their possession each week. Defendant Cooper

told Atterbury he was being transferred to ward T-7 because he had asked to be moved to an

honor unit and he was going to ward T-7 to wait for bed space to open on an honor unit. 

Atterbury explained that he did not want to be on ward T-7 because of his age and old spinal

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injury, ward T-7 was more dangerous, and moving someone to that ward was not the

procedure to get to an honor unit. Nonetheless, Cooper had Atterbury moved. He was

separated from his legal materials and papers for about a week. 

Atterbury was "violently attacked and threatened with violence several times since [he

was] housed on ward T-7." Complaint, p. 4. He alleged that one day, when he was talking to

staff, another patient hit him in the side of the face; staff told the patient to go watch

television and did not examine Atterbury for injury (although he does not allege that he was

injured or required any care). Atterbury also alleged that staff occasionally made comments

to cause other patients to become irritated with him. For example, on December 3, 2007,

defendant Gwen [lnu] announced to the ward that no one could go out to the courtyard and

smoke because Atterbury had not taken his medication. Some patients yelled at him for

delaying their smoking time. 

Atterbury alleged that he made several requests to defendant Ed Foulk to be moved to

a "safer ward and a ward where [he] can take it easy with [his] spinal injury, but he will not

move" Atterbury. Complaint p. 5. Atterbury's friend outside the hospital also made requests

to Foulk and defendant Mike Stolp to move Atterbury, but they refused. 

Atterbury also alleged that he complained to the patients' rights specialist, Mike

Hansen, asking for help getting moved to a safer ward. Hansen wrote a letter – the one

attached to the complaint is dated two days before the complaint was signed – in which

Hansen mentioned that hospital staff members reportedly were planning to lock patients out

of their rooms during the day to coerce them to attend groups and accept psychiatric and

psychological services. Atterbury apparently does not want to participate because he does

not believe there is a legitimate scientific basis for psychiatry and psychology.

DISCUSSION

The court must dismiss an in forma pauperis action at any time if the court determines

that the allegation of poverty is untrue, the action is frivolous or malicious, the action fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Pro se pleadings must be liberally

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construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Liberally construed, the complaint appears to allege a cognizable claim for a failure to

protect Atterbury. Atterbury alleged that defendant Cooper put him in a ward with other

dangerous people, defendant Gwen exacerbated the danger by telling other dangerous

inmates that Atterbury's actions were the cause of the delay in their release to the smoking

area one day, and defendants Foulk and Stolp refused to move him out of that dangerous

ward after he complained about the danger and/or being attacked. At this point, it is not clear

whether the failure-to-protect claim should be analyzed as if the plaintiff is a prisoner or as a

civilly committed person or as having some other status. That determination is relevant to

the constitutional provision under which the claim arises: a convict's claims arise under the

Eighth Amendment, whereas the claims of a pretrial detainee or person civilly committed

arise under the Fourteenth Amendment. Giving the pro se complaint the liberal construction

that is required, it appears that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to allege a

cognizable failure-to-protect claim against defendant Cooper, Gwen, Foulk, and Stolp. See

generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (Eighth Amendment requires that

prison officials take reasonable measures to protect safety of prisoners); Youngberg v.

Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (Due Process Clause requires state to provide involuntarily

committed mental patients with services necessary to ensure reasonable safety); Redman v.

County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S.

1074 (1992) (“deliberate indifference is the level of culpability that pretrial detainees must

establish for a violation of their personal security interests under the [F]ourteenth

[A]mendment”). 

The other features that made ward T-7 less agreeable than ward T-4 (e.g., the lack of a

calm atmosphere and the lack of vending machines and other privileges) are legally

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inconsequential. The due process or Eighth Amendment issue raised by the complaint

concerns the failure to protect plaintiff from harm by other persons at the hospital, and not

the relative amenities available in the different wards at a mental hospital. 

The separation of Atterbury from his legal materials for a week does not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation. There is no allegation that the problem caused any actual

injury, which is necessary to state a claim for violation of the right of access to the courts. 

See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996). 

The complaint does not state a claim for a First Amendment violation. Atterbury

asserted in his complaint that the First Amendment prohibits the government "from forcing

any person to accept, adhere to, or financially support any ideology, religion, or any body of

beliefs, including psychiatric [sic]." Complaint, p. 5. The facts alleged – that hospital

officials reportedly might take steps to try to encourage patients to participate in psychiatric

and psychological programs – do not amount to an infringement on plaintiff's First

Amendment rights. The claim is dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. Plaintiff has stated a cognizable § 1983 claim against defendants Ed Foulk,

Katie Cooper, Mike Stolp, and psychiatric technician Gwen [last name unknown] for failing

to protect him/deliberate indifference to his safety. All other claims are dismissed. 

2. The clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve,

without prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint and this order upon the following

persons who apparently are employed at Napa State Hospital: 

- Ed Foulk (executive director)

- Katie Cooper (former Program 2 director)

- Mike Stolp (former Program 1 director)

- psychiatric technician Gwen [last name unknown] 3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the following briefing schedule

for dispositive motions is set:

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a. No later than September 19, 2008, defendants must file and serve a

motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If defendants are of the opinion

that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they must so inform the court prior

to the date the motion is due.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive

motion must be filed with the court and served upon defendants no later than October 31,

2008. Plaintiff must bear in mind the following notice and warning regarding summary

judgment as he prepares his opposition to any summary judgment motion:

The defendants may make a motion for summary judgment by which

they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case.

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for

summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when

there is no genuine issue of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute

about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for

summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end

your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment

that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you

cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or

authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts

shown in the defendants' declarations and documents and show that there is a

genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence

in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be

no trial. (See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998). 

c. If defendants wish to file a reply brief, they must file and serve the reply

brief no later than November 14, 2008.

4. All communications by plaintiff with the court must be served on a defendant's

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendant's counsel. The court may

disregard any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until

a defendant's counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document

directly to defendant, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be

mailed to counsel rather than directly to that defendant. 

5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local

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Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

6. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep

the court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court's orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff is cautioned that he

must include the case name and case number for this case on any document he submits to this

court for consideration in this case.

7. Plaintiff's motion to serve process and the request for process to issue are 

DISMISSED as unnecessary. (Docket # 6, # 7.) The court addresses service of process

issues when it conducts the initial review, as it has done in this order. 

8. The in forma pauperis application is GRANTED. (Docket # 3.) However,

plaintiff must pay a partial filing fee of $5.00 no later than August 1, 2008, because he does

have some regular income and some funds available to him in his hospital trust account. 

Failure to pay the partial filing fee by the deadline will result in the dismissal of this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 8, 2008 ______________________

 Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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