Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01366/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01366-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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1

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1366

___________

Michael H. Brown, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Mike Peterson; Wanda LaCour; Denis *

Agniel; Robert Holden, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: November 28, 2005

Filed: December 8, 2005 

___________

Before MELLOY, MAGILL, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Michael Brown appeals the district court’s1

 order dismissing his 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 suit against three Missouri Parole and Probation Board employees and former

Missouri Governor Robert Holden. Brown claimed due process violations and slander

stemming from the refusal to grant his fiancée, whom he married during the course of

the litigation, a parole transfer from Texas to Missouri. In an attempt to amend his

complaint, Brown claimed a violation of his right to marry and loss of consortium.

Appellate Case: 05-1366 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/08/2005 Entry ID: 1983523
-2-

Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ submissions on appeal, we

conclude the judgment of the district court was correct. See Morstad v. Dep’t of Corr.

and Rehab., 147 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1998) (de novo review).

First, Brown lacked standing to bring a claim challenging the refusal to grant

Ryan a parole transfer, and his claims did not fall within the narrow exception for

third-party standing. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (to have

standing plaintiff must assert his own legal rights and interests); see also Kowalski v.

Tesmer, 125 S. Ct. 564, 567 (2004) (there may be circumstances where it is necessary

to grant a third party standing to assert rights of another; to claim exception, party

must show a “close” relationship with person who possesses right and that there is a

“hindrance” to possessor’s ability to protect own interests). 

Second, the court was within its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Brown’s remaining state-law slander claim. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3) (federal district court has discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction

over supplemental claims when it has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction). 

Third, the district court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly denying

Brown’s motion for leave to amend his complaint. See Roberson v. Hayti Police

Dep’t, 241 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2001) (denial of leave to amend is reviewed for

abuse of discretion; denial is appropriate when amendment is futile); TorontoDominion Bank v. Cent. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 753 F.2d 66, 68 n.5 (8th Cir. 1985)

(denial of pending motion may be implied from entry of final judgment). Brown’s

own allegations that he and Ryan had in fact married defeated his proposed right-tomarry claim, and the court was not required to exercise jurisdiction over his proposed

loss-of-consortium claim. 

Accordingly, we affirm. We also deny the pending motion.

 ______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-1366 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/08/2005 Entry ID: 1983523