Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01555/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01555-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kathryn A. Milun, a married woman,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Arizona Board of Regents, a political

subdivision of the State of Arizona, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV07-1555 PHX DGC

ORDER SETTING TRIAL

A Final Pretrial Conference was held on July 17, 2009. Counsel appeared on behalf

of Plaintiff and Defendant. On the basis of the parties’ written submissions and the hearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Trial in this matter shall begin on November 17, 2009, at 9:00 a.m.

2. The trial shall last 5 days (November 17-20, 24, 2009). Plaintiffs shall be

allotted 12 hours of trial time and Defendants shall be allotted 12 hours of trial time. The

Court will keep track of each side’s time. Opening and closing statements, direct

examination, and cross-examination shall be counted against the parties’ allotted time.

3. A final conference shall be held on November 12, 2009, at 4:00 p.m. in

Courtroom 603, Sandra Day O’Connor Federal Courthouse, 401 West Washington Street,

Phoenix, Arizona 85003. Out-of-state counsel may participate by telephone.

4. The parties’ proposed final pretrial order was approved by the Court as the

final pretrial order in this case. The order shall govern the presentation of evidence and other

trial issues, and, pursuant to Rule 16(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, shall be

modified only to prevent manifest injustice. Evidence, objections, legal arguments, and relief

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not requested or identified in the order shall not be available at trial, except to prevent

manifest injustice. 

5. The Court addressed Defendant’s motion in limine number 1. Dkt. #82. The

motion seeks to exclude Plaintiff’s annual reviews from evidence. For reasons stated on the

record, the Court cannot at this time conclude that the reviews are irrelevant or confusing,

and therefore denied the motion.

6. The Court addressed Defendant’s motion in limine number 2. Dkt. #83. For

reasons stated on the record, the Court granted the motion on hearsay grounds.

7. The Court addressed Defendant’s motion in limine number 3. Dkt. #92. The

Court denied the motion with respect to evidence that Plaintiff was denied a final year of

employment after she did not receive tenure. The Court granted the motion with respect to

evidence that Dr. Young made errors in the application submitted by Plaintiff’s husband.

8. The Court addressed Defendant’s motion in limine number 4. Dkt. #84. The

motion concerned a sexual harassment claim made by Ms. Webb against Mr. Lester. For

reasons stated on the record, the Court granted the motion.

9. The Court addressed Defendant’s motion in limine number 5. Dkt. #85. 

Because Plaintiff stated she does not intend to use the statements concerning her performance

during trial, the Court denied the motion as moot. If Plaintiff decides during trial that the

statements become relevant, she should raise the issue with defense counsel before

mentioning the statements in front of the jury. 

10. The Court addressed Defendant’s motion in limine number 6. Dkt. #86. For

reasons stated on the record, the Court granted the motion and concluded that the EEOC

determination letter is admissible, but that references to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim should

be redacted from the letter. Following the hearing, the reviewed Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons

Import, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488 (1986). Gilchrist does not control because the determination

letter in this case finds “that there is reasonable cause to believe” that a violation has

occurred. Dkt. #86-2. The letter is therefore akin to the probable cause findings deemed

admissible under Plummer v. Western Int’l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, (9th Cir. 1981). The

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parties are instructed to agree on a redacted form of the EEOC letter. The parties should also

agree on a limiting instruction. In crafting the instruction, the parties should consider the

instruction given in Gilchrist. See 803 F.2d at 1500-01.

11. The Court addressed Defendant’s motion in limine number 7. Dkt. #87.

Because the motion did not identify specific damages evidence, the Court denied the motion.

The parties are instructed to confer about Plaintiff’s damages claims. If Plaintiff intends to

make damages claims that Defendant believes to be inappropriate, Defendant should raise

this issue at the final conference.

12. The Court addressed Defendant’s motion in limine number 8. Dkt. #88. For

reasons stated on the record, the Court concluded that the exhibit with handwritten notes is

admissible and denied the motion. This ruling is based on Plaintiff’s assertion that she does

not seek to admit the handwritten statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted in those

statements. The parties are instructed to redact Plaintiff’s handwritten statements from the

document. The other handwritten statements may be submitted as part of this exhibit to the

jury. The parties should remind the Court of the need to provide a limiting instruction when

this exhibit is admitted.

13. The Court addressed Defendant’s motion in limine number 9. Dkt. #89.

Because Plaintiff does not intend to present evidence concerning statements made by the

ASU ombudsman, the Court denied the motion as moot. If Plaintiff decides that such

statements become relevant during trial, she should raise that issue with Defendant before

mentioning the statements in front of the jury. 

14. The Court addressed Defendant’s motion in limine number 10. Dkt. #91. The

parties agree that the motion is moot with respect to witnesses Barbara Kerr, Steven Wirkus,

Anne Klein, and Nan Ellin because Plaintiff does not intends to call them as witnesses. The

Court will deny the motion with respect to David Rhoads, Mary Romero, Nancy Armstrong,

and Sharon Crowley. Mr. Rhoads was disclosed in Plaintiff’s initial disclosure statement as

a person with information about discriminatory and retaliatory treatment of Plaintiff. Ms.

Romero was disclosed in Plaintiff’s initial disclosure statement as a person with knowledge

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regarding the soundness of Plaintiff’s scholarship, her contribution to the school of justice

studies as a teacher and scholar, and as a witness “to meetings Plaintiff had with Zatz and

Provine.” Ms. Romero was also disclosed in Plaintiff’s ninth supplemental disclosure

statement as a person expected to testify regarding Plaintiff’s reputation as a respected

teacher and scholar in the school of justice studies, and to testify that Plaintiff complained

to her about Dean Young’s discrimination in her fourth year review. Ms. Armstrong was

disclosed in Plaintiff’s initial disclosure statement as a person who can testify to the strength

of Plaintiff’s tenure case, and as a person familiar with Plaintiff’s scholarship. The

disclosure also noted that Ms. Armstrong was an outside reviewer for the Plaintiff’s tenure

case. Ms. Crowley was disclosed in Plaintiff’s ninth supplemental disclosure statement as

a person who served on the personnel committee during Plaintiff’s fourth year review. The

disclosure stated that Ms. Crowley was expected to testify about Plaintiff’s reputation as a

teacher and scholar in the department of English, about the difficult work climate in the

department, and that Plaintiff had conversations with her during the course of her

employment at ASU concerning discrimination in the process of Plaintiff’s review. The

Court concludes that these are sufficient disclosures for purposes of Rule 26(a). If Defendant

sought to obtain additional information regarding the knowledge or potential testimony of

these individuals, Defendant could have served additional discovery or deposed them. If

Defendant thought the disclosures made by Plaintiff were too cryptic, Defendant could have

raised that issue with the Court. 

15. The Court addressed Defendant’s motion in limine number 11. Dkt. #90. For

reasons stated on the record, the Court denied the motion.

16. The Court provided the parties with proposed preliminary jury instructions and

voir dire questions. Dkt. #107. These will be addressed at the final conference to be held

on November 12, 2009. 

17. The Court also directed the parties to engage in settlement talks before

September 11, 2009. Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan has been chosen by random draw

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for the purpose of a settlement conference. The parties are directed to contact Magistrate

Judge Duncan’s chambers to schedule a hearing date and time.

DATED this 24th day of July, 2009.

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