Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02042/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02042-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTATE OF STEPHEN E. CRAWLEY, 

NORMA CRAWLEY AND JOHNNY 

CRAWLEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF 

THE ESTATE OF STEPHEN E. 

CRAWLEY, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

DAVE ROBINSON, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL 

AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS KINGS 

COUNTY SHERIFF; SHAWN MCRAE, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS 

CAPACITY AS SERGEANT FOR KINGS 

COUNTY SHERIFF; MARIUS 

BARSTECEANU, INDIVIDUALLY AND 

IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENIOR DEPUTY 

FOR KINGS COUNTY SHERIFF,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-CV-02042-LJO-SAB

ORDER DENYING MOVANTS’ MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION.

(Docs. 56, 58)

On May 6, 2015, the Magistrate Judge rendered his Order (Doc. 51), granting Plaintiff’s 

motion to compel and ordering sanctions against Defense counsel. Before the Court in the abovestyled and numbered cause of action is the City of Lemoore and Lemoore Police Department’s 

Motion for Reconsideration by the District Court of the Magistrate Judge’s Ruling, filed May 20, 

2015 (Docs. 56 & 58). The matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Local 

Rule 230(g). Having carefully considered the record in this case, the parties’ briefing, and the 

relevant case law, the Court will deny the motion.

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I. BACKGROUND

On April 8, 2015, Plaintiffs The Estate of Stephen E. Crawley, Norma Crawley, and Jonny 

Crawley (“Plaintiffs”) filed a motion to compel (Doc. 37), seeking to compel responses to certain 

deposition questions and the production of documents from third party witness Michael Kendall 

(“Kendall”), a police officer with the Lemoore Police Department. Kendall, the City of Lemoore, 

and the Lemoore Police Department filed an opposition on May 1, 2015.

On May 6, 2015, the Magistrate Judge rendered his Order granting Plaintiffs’ motion to 

compel and issuing sanctions against defense counsel. (Doc. 51).

On May 20, 2015, the City of Lemoore and Lemoore Police Department filed their 

respective requests for reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s Order. (Docs. 56 & 58). Plaintiffs 

timely filed an opposition to the request for reconsideration on May 22, 2015 (Doc. 61). 

The matter is ripe for review. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Reconsideration motions are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Rodgers v. Watt,

722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 

(D.C.Cir. 1987). A party seeking reconsideration must set forth facts or law of a strongly 

convincing nature to induce the court to reverse a prior decision. See e.g., Kern–Tulare Water Dist. 

v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on 

other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987).

“A motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, 

unless the . . . court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there 

is an intervening change in the controlling law,” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma 

GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009), and “‘[a] party seeking reconsideration must show 

more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision, and ‘recapitulation . . .’” of that which was 

already considered by the court in rendering its decision. U.S. v. Westlands Water Dist. ., 134 

F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D.Cal. 2001) (quoting Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of Am., Inc., 820 

F.Supp. 834, 856 (D.N.J. 1992)).

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This Court reviews a motion to reconsider a Magistrate Judge’s ruling under the “clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 

72(a). As such, the court may only set aside those portions of a Magistrate Judge’s order that are 

either clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); see also Grimes v. City and County 

of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1991) (discovery sanctions are non-dispositive 

pretrial matters that are reviewed for clear error under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a)).

The “‘clearly erroneous’ standard is significantly deferential.” Concrete Pipe and Products 

of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 

623 (1993). A district court may find a magistrate judge’s factual findings “clearly erroneous”

when the court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. 

Security Farms v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997); Green v. 

Baca, 219 F.R.D. 485, 489 (C.D.Cal. 2003). The “contrary to law” standard allows independent, 

plenary review of purely legal determinations by the magistrate judge. See Haines v. Liggett Group, 

Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3rd Cir. 1992); Green, 219 F.R.D. at 489; see also Osband v. Woodford, 290 

F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2002). “An order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies 

relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Knutson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn.,

254 F.R.D. 553, 556 (D.Minn. 2008); Rathgaber v. Town of Oyster Bay, 492 F.Supp.2d 130, 137 

(E.D.N.Y. 2007); Surles v. Air France, 210 F.Supp.2d 501, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see Adolph Coors 

Co. v. Wallace, 570 F.Supp. 202, 205 (N.D.Cal. 1983).

“Pretrial orders of a magistrate under § 636(b)(1)(A) . . . are not subject to a de novo

determination....” Merritt v. International Bro. of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013, 1017 (5th Cir.

1981). “The reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the deciding court.”

Grimes, 951 F.2d at 241; see Phoenix Engineering & Supply v. Universal Elec., 104 F.3d 1137, 

1141 (9th Cir. 1997) (“the clearly erroneous standard allows [for] great deference”). A district court 

is able to overturn a magistrate judge’s ruling “‘only if the district court is left with the definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’” Computer Economics, Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc.,

50 F.Supp.2d 980, 983 (S.D.Cal. 1999) (quoting Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126

F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997)). Moreover, “[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored, however, 

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and are not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their original briefs.” Hendon 

v. Baroya, 2012 WL 995757, at *1 (E.D.Cal. 2012) (citing Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 

F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. ANALYSIS

Distilling their requests for reconsideration, the movants seek reconsideration on the basis 

of mere disagreement with the decision on the pretrial order relevant to the witness fees, the 

compelled document production and answers to certain deposition questions, and recapitulation of 

that which was already considered by the Magistrate Judge. Motions for reconsideration are not 

available to dissatisfied litigants as a vehicle for another bite at the apple in front of a different 

judge. Plainly, the movants disagree with the Magistrate Judge’s assessment and determination that 

Defendant’s discovery response was legally insufficient, their objections not substantially justified, 

and their conduct related to drafting the joint statement on the discovery dispute particularly 

egregious and in bad faith. But the movants presented their arguments to the Magistrate Judge and 

rehashing those arguments provides no basis for reconsideration. See Miller v. Akanno, No. 1:12-

CV-01013-LJO, 2014 WL 6612041, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014) reconsideration denied, No. 

1:12-CV-01013-LJO-SK, 2015 WL 566304 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2015); see also U.S. v. Westlands 

Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D.Cal. 2001) (finding that a party seeking 

reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision, and recapitulation

...” of that which was already considered by the Court in rendering its decision) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted)). 

Although a de novo review is not required, this Court carefully considered the relevant case 

law and the record before it, and finds no error. The requests for reconsideration do not otherwise 

raise new facts, circumstances, or change in the law which would warrant reconsideration of the 

Magistrate Judge’s May 6, 2015 Order. 

A. Witness Fee 

First, the witness fee dispute was previously before the Magistrate Judge, and the parties 

present the same arguments again. 

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Relative to the witness fees, movants argue that California Government Code Section 

68096.1 should control. The contention is incorrect. As this is a federal action, federal law controls. 

See Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 1995) (federal law controls over 

conflict law with respect to reimbursement of expert witness fees). 

Under federal law, reimbursement of witness fees is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1821, which 

states, in pertinent part: 

(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a witness in attendance at any court of 

the United States, or before a United States Magistrate Judge, or before any person 

authorized to take his deposition pursuant to any rule or order of a court of the 

United States, shall be paid the fees and allowances provided by this section. 

. . .

(b) A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $40 per day for each day’s 

attendance. A witness shall also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily 

occupied in going to and returning from the place of attendance at the beginning and 

end of such attendance or at any time during such attendance. ...

Because the basis for the movants’ reconsideration request is, in legal error, based on the 

proposed use of California law, the Court declines to reconsider the matter. Even should the Court 

entertain the request, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs tendered a check for $275, but that 

Defendants returned it. Reasoning that because Plaintiffs’ counsel attempted to tender witness fees 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1821, but “Defendants’ counsel rejected the tender under the false belief that fees 

should be calculated under California law,” the Magistrate Judge found that any defect related to 

the witness fees was the fault of Defendants’ counsel. Doc. 51, at 11. Counsel cannot now complain 

about their own legal errors, impute those errors to the Magistrate Judge, or leverage the legal error 

to advantage. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion on this issue is not clearly 

erroneous or contrary to law.

B. Requests for Production 

Central to the parties’ discovery dispute is whether Kendall has possession, custody, and 

control of the documents requested. The Magistrate Judge in the underlying order granted 

Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, finding that the phrase “possession, custody or control” is “in the 

disjunctive, therefore, only one of the numerated requirements need be met.” Doc. 51, at 11-12 

(quoting Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Cumis Ins. Society, 

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Inc. v. South-Coast Bank, 610 F. Supp. 193, 196 (N.D. Ind. 1985))). Considering the term 

“control,” the Magistrate Judge correctly acknowledged that its definition includes the “legal right 

of the producing party to obtain documents from other sources upon demand.” Id. On the record 

relevant to the discovery dispute, the Magistrate Judge found that counsel’s claim that Kendall 

effectively lacked possession, custody, and control was merely a strategic tactic in order to 

withhold relevant documents in discovery. He indicated zero tolerance for such conduct, and stated 

that evasive manoeuvers, especially in the busy Eastern District of California, are “unnecessarily 

wasteful and only serve to stonewall and cause delayed responses to otherwise valid discovery 

requests,” and cited to an analogous case. See Zackery v. Stockton Police Dep’t, No. CIV S-05-

2315 MCE DAD P, 2007 WL 1655634 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 7, 2007) (ordering individual police officers 

to produce responsive documents where separate subpoena directed at police department “would 

unnecessarily consume even more time in dealing with this relatively routine request for 

discovery.”). The Magistrate Judge admonished Defendants’ counsel “for wasting public resources 

playing unproductive and wasteful games before this Court.” See Doc. 51, at 12. 

The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiffs satisfied their burden in the motion to compel. 

Turning to the party in opposition, the Magistrate Judge concluded that even if Kendall’s access to 

the requested documents did not constitute “possession, custody, or control,” it is undisputed that 

he shared counsel with the City of Lemoore and the City of Lemoore Police Department – the 

source of the requested documents. In other words, the Magistrate Judge concluded that, for all 

practical purposes, this effectively constitutes “possession, custody, or control” over the responsive 

documents. 

This Court finds no legal error. There is no dispute that in responding to discovery requests 

for production of documents, a party must produce documents which are in their “possession, 

custody or control.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a). The movant argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in 

finding that access equates control. This he did not do. Rather, he acknowledged that actual 

possession, custody or control is not required, and that “[a] party may be ordered to produce a 

document in the possession of a non-party entity if that party has a legal right to obtain the 

document or has control over the entity who is in possession of the document.” Soto v. City of 

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Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 620 (N.D.Cal. 1995). Moreover, such documents also include documents 

under the control of the party’s attorney. Meeks v. Parson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 90283, 2009 

WL 3303718 (E.D.Cal. September 18, 2009) (involving a subpoena to the CDCR); Axler v. 

Scientific Ecology Group, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 210, 212 (D.Mass. 2000) (A “party must produce 

otherwise discoverable documents that are in his attorneys’ possession, custody or control.”); Gray

v. Faulkner, 148 F.R.D. 220, 223 (N.D.Ill. 1992). Notwithstanding a possible split in the legal 

authority, sufficient case law exists which is substantively consistent with the Magistrate Judge’s 

conclusion such that the Court is not compelled to find it contrary to law or clearly erroneous.

Subsequent to the request for reconsideration, the movant filed a notice (Doc. 66) arguing 

that the documents requested are relevant only to claims against the former defendants and, as a 

result, the motion to compel is moot. Not so. The argument to revisit the relevancy finding is 

unpersuasive because dismissal of a certain party does not necessarily impact the underlying factual 

dispute. Simply put, the parties may have changed, but the factual dispute surrounding the 

standards controlling an officers’ training and standards has not. It is on that issue that the 

Magistrate Judge has previously evaluated the parties’ positions and ordered production. The 

discovery may not ultimately be admissible, but it need not be. “Parties may obtain discovery 

regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party .... 

Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably 

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).

C. Sanctions

Counsel asks this Court to reconsider the sanctions ordered by the Magistrate Judge. During 

the process of drafting a joint statement, then-Defense counsel deleted Plaintiffs’ section on certain 

proposed deposition questions, then, only provided revisions in a non-editable PDF format – and 

late – ostensibly to frustrate Plaintiffs opportunity to ask unwelcome questions at the deposition. 

The Magistrate Judge found then-Defense counsel’s conduct egregious and their efforts to draft the 

joint statement not performed in good faith. For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge concluded that 

counsel’s conduct violated Local Rule 251 and issued sanctions in accord with his findings. This 

Court likewise looks on such tactics with extreme disfavor. In the absence of clear legal error, the

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Court will not second guess the Magistrate Judge’s order for sanctions, as it is not contrary to law. 

As sanctions stand, the Court leaves to the Magistrate Judge to review the reasonableness of the 

Plaintiffs’ relevant fees and expenses.

D. Other Objections

The movant also complains about the Magistrate Judge’s order compelling Kendall’s 

answers to certain deposition questions over their objections. The Magistrate considered each of 

these contentions and rejected them as not being substantially justified. To the extent that counsel 

asks the Court to reconsider, the Court declines. That the Magistrate Judge allowed such discovery 

is within his discretion, and his conclusions are not legal error. Indeed, the Court is vested with 

broad discretion to manage discovery, Hunt v. County of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir.

2012); Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Productions, 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005); Hallett v. 

Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002), and “where the discovery request seeks information 

which, based on the record, is clearly within the scope of discovery and the objection lacks merit, 

the Court may elect to exercise its discretion to reach the merits of the dispute, the moving party’s 

initial burden notwithstanding.” Cooper v. Sely, No. 1:11-CV-00544-AWI, 2013 WL 146428, at *2 

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013); see, e.g., Marti v. Baires, No. 1:08-cv-00653-AWI-SKO PC, 2012 WL 

2029720, at *3 (E.D.Cal. Jun.5, 2012); Williams v. Adams, No. 1:05-cv-00124-AWI-SMS PC, 2009 

WL 1220311, at *1 (E.D.Cal. May 4, 2009).

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In sum, Plaintiff has not shown clear error or other meritorious grounds for relief. Distilled, 

the movants’ requests for reconsideration are mere disagreement with the Magistrate Judge’s order 

issuing sanctions and granting Plaintiff’s motion to compel. For the foregoing reasons, IT IS 

HEREBY ORDERED that the requests for reconsideration (Doc. 56 & 58) are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 22, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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