Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02062/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02062-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1

 The Court will deny the request for oral argument because the parties have submitted

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence and the Court concludes that oral

argument will not aid its decisional process. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County,

Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Go Daddy Software, Inc., 

Defendant.

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No. CV-04-2062-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and motion

to strike. Docs. ##94, 117. Also pending are Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary

judgment, motion for leave to amend complaint, and motions to strike. Docs. ##96-97, 107,

115. The Court will grant in part Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. #94),

grant in part Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. #97), deny Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to amend complaint (Doc. #96), and deny the parties’ motions to strike

(Docs. ##107, 115, 117).1

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2

 With respect to national origin, Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that Mr. Bouamama

was discriminated against on the basis of his “Moroccan/Middle Eastern” national origin.

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I. Background.

In September 2001, Youssef Bouamama, a Muslim born in Morocco, began working

for Defendant Go Daddy Software, Inc. through a temporary agency as a technical support

representative. Docs. ##95, 109. On December 13, 2001, Defendant officially hired Mr.

Bouamama as one of its employees. Id. Mr. Bouamama subsequently assumed a supervisory

position in Defendant’s call center and was eventually promoted to inbound sales manager

by Brett Villeneuve, Defendant’s Operations Manager. Id. During Mr. Bouamama’s tenure

at Defendant, Mr. Villeneuve served either as his immediate or second-line supervisor.

Doc. #95. 

In April 2003, Defendant hired Craig Franklin as its Director of Call Center

Operations. Id. Mr. Franklin decided, as a part of a reorganization plan, to eliminate fifteen

management positions, including the one held by Mr. Bouamama, and to create four Sales

Supervisor positions. Docs. ##95, 109. The plan was subsequently modified to allow for six

Sales Supervisors. Doc. #97. Defendant assembled a panel of three employees – Mr.

Franklin, Mr. Villeneuve, and Ms. Heather Slezak, Defendant’s Director of Human

Resources – to interview candidates for the six newly created positions. Id. Mr. Bouamama

was interviewed on April 9, 2003, but was not selected. Id. 

Thereafter, Robert Parsons, founder and chief executive of Defendant, indicated to

Mr. Bouamama that he may be able to perform “some statistical analysis” for the company.

Docs. ##95 at 8, 109 at 20. This opportunity never materialized and Mr. Bouamama’s

employment relationship with Defendant ended on or around April 17, 2003. Doc. #95. 

On April 29, 2003, Mr. Bouamama filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Doc. #108. On September 30, 2004, the

EEOC filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging that Mr. Bouamama was discriminated

against on the basis of his religion (Muslim) and national origin (Moroccan). Doc. #1.2

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Doc. #1 at 1. In its subsequent materials, Plaintiff appears to have abandoned its claim that

Mr. Bouamama was discriminated against because he was Middle Eastern. Accordingly, the

Court will not evaluate the national origin claims to the extent they are based on Mr.

Bouamama’s Middle Eastern descent. 

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Plaintiff specifically contends that Defendant failed to promote Mr. Bouamama to a Sales

Supervisor position, terminated him, and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Id. Plaintiff’s

complaint seeks to correct Defendant’s unlawful employment practices and obtain

appropriate relief for Mr. Bouamama. Id.

On December 13, 2004, Defendant filed an answer denying that it engaged in any

unlawful conduct with respect to Mr. Bouamama. Doc. #6. Defendant seeks summary

judgment on the discrimination and retaliation claims asserted by Plaintiff. Doc. #94.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking the Court to rule as a matter

of law that Defendant violated Title VII’s record-keeping requirements, that the claims

complied with the applicable statute of limitations, and that Mr. Bouamama exhausted his

administrative remedies. Doc. #97.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The disputed evidence must be

“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.

Summary judgment may be entered against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

/ / /

/ / /

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II. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

A. Failure to Promote.

The legal framework for a case of employment discrimination under Title VII is the

burden-shifting regime of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See

Docs. ##94, 108. To establish a prima facie failure to promote claim, Plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) Mr. Bouamama belongs to a protected class, (2) he applied and was

qualified for the position he was denied, (3) he was rejected despite his qualifications, and

(4) Defendant filled the position in question with employees not of his class. See

Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). 

If Plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts

to Defendant “to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [Mr. Bouamama’s]

rejection.” Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir.1995); see Lyons v.

England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1117 (9th Cir. 2002). If Defendant articulates such a reason,

Plaintiff must produce evidence that the reason was pretextual. See Godwin v. Hunt Wesson,

Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890

(9th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff may do so by presenting either direct or indirect evidence of

pretext. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Defendant appears to concede that Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case with

respect to this claim. See Doc. #94. According to Defendant, the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons why Mr. Bouamama was not selected for a Sales Supervisor position

are Mr. Bouamama’s “poor interview and [his] difficulties interacting with other employees

and customers, as compared to the successful candidates.” Doc. #95 ¶45 at 7. Defendant

argues that Plaintiff is unable to rebut these reasons in part because comments uttered by Mr.

Franklin and Mr. Villeneuve are insufficient to establish pretext. Doc. #94. 

1. Comment by Mr. Franklin.

Mr. Bouamama declared the following under oath: 

Right before the interviews, Craig Franklin walked into my office and asked

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me where I was from and if my religion was Muslim. When I replied that I

was Moroccan and Muslim, Mr. Franklin responded, “You’re lucky that I like

you” and walked away.

Doc. #109, Ex. A ¶13 at 2-3. 

“Direct evidence typically consists of clearly sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory

statements or actions by the employer.” Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1038 (quoting

Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005)). Mr. Franklin’s

comment, construed in Plaintiff’s favor, reveals a discriminatory attitude towards Moroccans

and/or Muslims. As the Ninth Circuit noted of other implicitly discriminatory comments:

There are no talismanic expressions which must be invoked as a conditionprecedent to the application of laws designed to protect against discrimination.

The words themselves are only relevant for what they reveal – the intent of the

speaker. A reasonable jury could find that statements like the ones allegedly

made in this case send a clear message and carry the distinct tone of racial

motivations and implications. They could be seen as conveying the message

that members of a particular race are disfavored and that members of that

[protected class] are, therefore, not full and equal members of the workplace.

McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Aman v. Cort

Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir. 1996)).

Mr. Franklin’s question was not provoked by some other circumstance, such as Mr.

Bouamama’s speaking French with a customer, or by a business purpose, such as an inquiry

into whether Mr. Bouamama’s language skills could be useful in reviewing Arabic-language

web sites. See Doc. #95. Mr. Franklin asked about Mr. Bouamama’s religion and national

origin without any related conversation, and then walked away. In addition, the question was

asked shortly before Plaintiff’s interview for the Sales Supervisor position, suggesting that

it might be related in some way to the interview. And of the three panelists serving on the

interview committee, Mr. Franklin had, in the words of Mr. Villeneuve, the “ultimate

authority” to hire the Sales Supervisors. Doc. #109, Ex. C at 138. Thus, Mr. Franklin’s

views of Moroccans and/or Muslims could have influenced the ultimate determination

regarding Mr. Bouamama’s candidacy. 

Defendant argues that Mr. Franklin’s comment is “ambiguous” and “unrelated” to

employment decisions concerning Mr. Bouamama. Doc. #112 at 2-3. At this stage,

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however, the Court must view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences in favor of

Plaintiff. Given Mr. Franklin’s authority on the panel and the proximity in time to the

interviews, as well as the negative religious and national-origin nature of his comment, the

Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that this statement reflected a

discriminatory animus that influenced the panel’s decision. See Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d

at 1038 (“Where a decisionmaker makes a discriminatory remark against a member of the

plaintiff’s class, a reasonable factfinder may conclude that discriminatory animus played a

role in the challenged decision.”). 

2. Comments by Mr. Villeneuve.

Comments made by Mr. Villeneuve are also relevant. Mr. Bouamama’s former coworker testified that Mr. Villeneuve said, in the context of a discussion of terrorism, that

“[w]e should bomb all the Rag Heads[.]” Doc. #109, Ex. L at 64. The use of the term “rag

head” is probative of discriminatory treatment. See Bains LLC v. Arco Prods. Co., 405 F.3d

764, 774 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition, Mr. Bouamama testified that Mr. Villeneuve said

“Muslims deserve to die” and that a “Muslim bastard needs to die.” Doc. #109, Ex. B at 99.

The Court finds these remarks to be analogous to several Ninth Circuit cases in which the

court identified direct evidence of discriminatory animus from an employer’s comments and

reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the employer. See, e.g., Chuang

v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a decisionmaker’s

remark that “‘two Chinks’ in the department were more than enough” served as “strong

evidence of discriminatory animus on the basis of national origin”); Cordova v. State Farm

Ins. Cos., 124 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding direct evidence of race discrimination

where employer called a Mexican-American employee a “dumb Mexican”); SischoNownejad v. Merced Cmty. Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding direct

evidence of sex stereotyping where employer called female instructor “an old warhorse”).

Defendant argues that the “rag head” statement was not heard by Mr. Bouamama and

was made “after-hours, away from the workplace at a party[.]” Doc. #112 at 3. The fact that

Mr. Villeneuve’s comment was made outside the presence of Mr. Bouamama might be

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relevant to whether it created a hostile work environment – which is not asserted by Plaintiff

in this case – but it does not defeat its relevance to discriminatory animus. See Coghlan, 413

F.3d at 1095 n.6 (stating that even if an employer does not target his remarks directly at the

plaintiff, “when evidence establishes the employer’s animus toward the class to which the

plaintiff belongs, the inference to the fact of discrimination against the plaintiff is sufficiently

small that we have treated the evidence as direct”) (quoted in Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d

at 1038). Moreover, Mr. Villeneuve, as a member of the interview panel, was in a position

where his discriminatory attitude could have influenced the employment decision, even if it

ultimately rested with Mr. Franklin. See Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1040 (“Where, as

here, the person who exhibited discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the

decisionmaking process, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the animus affected the

employment decision.”). This is true even if Mr. Villeneuve did not share his comment with

other panel members. Id. (citing Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1560 (9th Cir.1994)

(finding that the a hiring process is “not insulated from the illegitimate biases of faculty

members” and that on a panel of fifteen decisionmakers “even a single person’s biases may

be relatively influential”)). 

The record includes contradictory evidence as to whether Mr. Villeneuve knew or had

reason to know that Mr. Bouamama was a Muslim. On one hand, “[s]hortly after he was

hired,” Mr. Bouamama informed Mr. Villeneuve that he was Moroccan and Muslim.

Doc. #95 at 3. On the other, Mr. Villeneuve testified that he could not say whether, at the

time of the Sales Supervisor hiring process, he knew that Mr. Bouamama was Muslim.

Doc. #109, Ex. C. This factual dispute must be resolved by the jury. 

In summary, the Court concludes that the evidence of discriminatory statements by

Franklin and Villeneuve is sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Dominguez-Curry,

424 F.3d at 1039 (noting that the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that a single

discriminatory comment by a plaintiff’s supervisor or decisionmaker is sufficient to preclude

summary judgment for the employer”); Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.

1991) (“[B]ecause of the inherently factual nature of the inquiry, the plaintiff need produce

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3

 Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim.

Plaintiff has abandoned this claim. Doc. #108 at 13 n.7. Defendant’s motion on this issue

will therefore be granted.

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very little evidence of discriminatory motive to raise a genuine issue of fact.”).

B. Termination.3

To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory termination, Plaintiff must

demonstrate that Mr. Bouamama was (1) a member of a protected class, (2) performing his

job satisfactorily, (3) terminated, and (4) replaced with employees not of his class with equal

or inferior qualifications. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir.

2000) (citing Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1997)).

1. Similarly Situated Individuals.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish the final element of its prima facie

case. Doc. #94 at 13. Fourteen candidates applied for the Sales Supervisor position,

including Mr. Bouamama. Doc. #95. Six were selected (Stroh, MacNevin, DeStefano,

Morgan, Wong, and Baumgartner). Doc. #109. Plaintiff has presented evidence that none

of the six was Moroccan or Muslim. Id. This evidence is sufficient to survive summary

judgment. See Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889 (noting that for purposes of summary judgment, “the

requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case . . . is minimal[.]”).

Defendant additionally argues that Mr. Bouamama was offered more opportunities

than other unsuccessful candidates. Doc. #94. To the extent Defendant contends that the

sales representative position serves as an additional opportunity, according to Defendant each

of the unsuccessful candidates, including Mr. Bouamama, was offered this position. Id. To

the extent Defendant claims that the statistical analyst position represents an additional

opportunity, Mr. Bouamama declared that this position was not offered to him and Mr.

Parsons testified that the position as well as the business intelligence department housing it

did not even exist at the time. Doc. #109, Exs. A, O. Construing the evidence in Plaintiff’s

favor, the Court cannot conclude that these positions provided Mr. Bouamama with

additional opportunities such that Plaintiff is unable to establish its prima facie case.

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2. Pretext.

Defendant states that its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for “firing” Mr.

Bouamama is that the interview “panel reasonably believed that Bouamama had rejected the

offer of returning to a sales representative position.” Doc. #94 at 10. Relying on Villiarimo,

Defendant argues that for Plaintiff to rebut this reason, it “must do more than argue that

Bouamama did not actually reject the sales representative position,” but must specifically

show that “the panel did not honestly believe that Bouamama had rejected the offered sales

representative position.” Id. (emphasis omitted). For the reasons described above, however,

the evidence viewed in Plaintiff’s favor raises questions of fact as to whether the view the

of interview panel, which included Mr. Franklin and Mr. Villeneuve, was held in good faith

or reflected discriminatory animus. 

C. Retaliation. 

Title VII “prohibits retaliation against an employee ‘because he has opposed any

practice made an unlawful employment practice’” by Title VII. Nelson v. Pima Cmty.

College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). To make a

prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, Plaintiff must produce evidence that (1) Mr.

Bouamama engaged in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) Defendant subjected him to a

to a material adverse action, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity

and the adverse action. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, No. 05-259, 2006

WL 1698953, *10 (S. Ct. June 22, 2006); see also Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634,

642 (9th Cir. 2004); Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1118.

1. Protected Activity.

Defendant argues that Mr. Bouamama did not engage in a protected activity.

Doc. #94. According to Defendant, while Mr. Bouamama informed Ms. Slezak about

conversations in which Mr. Franklin inquired into Mr. Bouamama’s national origin and

religion, Mr. Bouamama “did not tell Slezak that he felt he had been discriminated against

or express any fear that Franklin would discriminate against him in the future.” Id. at 12. 

In the Ninth Circuit, opposition to discriminatory conduct is to be liberally construed

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to effectuate the purpose of Title VII. See Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 932

(9th Cir. 1988); see also Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889. Mr. Bouamama testified that he told Ms.

Slezak – Defendant’s Director of Human Resources – that he objected to the repeated

questions regarding his race, religion, accent, and where he was from. Doc. #109, Ex. B at

126, 189-190. He further testified that “I let her [Ms. Slezak] know that . . . this is not right,”

that “I did not feel . . . [it was] appropriate,” and that “I felt that somebody should know

about it.” Id. at 126, 189. Viewed in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could conclude from

this evidence that Defendant knew Mr. Bouamama objected to repeated inquiries about his

race, religion, and national origin. 

Defendant claims that this case is analogous to Pool v. Vanrheen, 297 F.3d 899 (9th

Cir. 2002), and that the same result should obtain here. Pool, however, concerned a letter

to a newspaper editor that complained of a “good old boy” atmosphere in a sheriff’s office

and discussed the need for diversity in that office. The Ninth Circuit held that “[a]lthough

it is a close call, the letter is more aptly characterized as addressing a matter of public

concern than as a personal employment grievance.” Id. at 907. Here, Mr. Bouamama did not

assert a public complaint in a newspaper. He addressed a matter of discriminatory concern

internally, to Defendant’s Director of Human Resources. 

2. Causal Link.

Defendant further argues that the causal link between the protected activity and Mr.

Bouamama’s termination was severed by the “opportunity to apply for another position after

he unsuccessfully bid for the Sales Supervisor position.” Doc. #94 at 13 (emphasis omitted).

As noted above, however, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statistical

analyst position was offered and available to Mr. Bouamama. 

3. Per Se Retaliation.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s presentation of a severance package that contained

“a waiver of the right to file a charge of discrimination constitutes a per se violation of the

prohibition against retaliation created by Title VII and inherent in public policy.” Doc. #108

at 11. But Plaintiff has failed to provide any authority indicating that per se retaliation is

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4

 Defendant appears to suggest that Plaintiff must disprove good faith as an element

of its claim for punitive damages. Doc. #94 at 16. But the existence of good faith efforts is

an affirmative defense, not an element of a plaintiff’s case. See Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc.,

285 F.3d 1174, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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recognized in this circuit. Doc. #94. In the absence of such controlling authority, and in

light of the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to establish a different per se rule in Title VII retaliation

claims, see Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2003), the Court

declines Plaintiff’s invitation to establish a per se rule in this specific context.

D. Punitive Damages.

For Defendant to be liable for punitive damages under Title VII, Plaintiff must show

that it acted “with ‘malice or with reckless indifference to [Mr. Bouamama’s] federally

protected rights.’” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n., 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999) (emphasis in

original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)). “The terms ‘malice’ or ‘reckless indifference’

pertain to [Defendant’s] knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its

awareness that it is engaging in discrimination.” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535; see Ngo v. Reno

Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]o be entitled to an award of

punitive damages, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant ‘almost certainly knew

that what [it] was doing was wrongful and subject to punishment.’”) (citation omitted).

Defendant moves for summary judgment with respect to its “affirmative defense that

it made good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.” Doc. #94 at 16. The Supreme Court

has stated that “[w]here an employer has undertaken . . . good faith efforts at Title VII

compliance, it ‘demonstrat[es] that it never acted in reckless disregard of federally protected

rights.’” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544 (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 139 F.3d 958, 947

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting)).4

As evidence of its good faith efforts, Defendant claims that it adopted an equal

employment opportunity (“EEO”) policy that existed before February 13, 2003. Docs. ##94,

112. When asked whether Defendant had an EEO policy before this date, however,

Defendant’s Director of Human Resources testified that she did not believe so. Doc. #109,

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Ex. U. There is a dispute, therefore, as to whether Defendant, founded in 1997 (Doc. #95),

was without an EEO policy for the first six years of its existence. This information is

relevant in determining whether Defendant has acted in good faith to comply with Title VII.

Moreover, Defendant appears to have instituted several education and training

programs after the termination of Mr. Bouamama. Id. Plaintiff argues that post-termination

efforts are “without relevance” (Doc. #108 at 16), while Defendant, citing Swinton v.

Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2001), claims “an employer’s post-litigation efforts

are relevant in the Kolstad analysis” (Doc. #112 at 11). 

The Ninth Circuit in Swinton took neither approach advanced by the parties: “We

decline to endorse here, in the context of an employment discrimination suit, either the view

that such evidence is always relevant, or that it is always irrelevant.” 270 F.3d at 814. The

court instead held that district courts have the discretion to allow post-occurrence evidence.

Id. In addition, the court noted that a jury may “determine whether the remedial conduct is

nothing more than window dressing” or “the jury might also find that such remedial actions

were indeed bona fide efforts to repent and to prevent the reoccurrence of similar harassment

in the future, thus lessening the need for additional deterrence in the form of punitive

damages.” Id. at 815. The Court concludes that a jury must decide whether Defendant

engaged in good faith efforts to comply with Title VII. 

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

A. Record-Keeping Violation.

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on its claim that Defendant violated the recordkeeping requirements of Title VII. Doc. #97 at 2. The records in question are (1) notes taken

during the interview process by Mr. Franklin and Mr. Villeneuve, (2) interview

questionnaires given to each of the candidates, (3) an interview schedule which ranked the

candidates, and (4) resumes submitted by the candidates. Docs. ##97, 114. 

Because Plaintiff did not raise the issue of the questionnaires until its reply brief

(see Docs. ##97, 114), the Court will not address the issue. Parties may not raise issues for

the first time in reply briefs. See Ellingson v. Burlington N., Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1332

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(9th Cir. 1981). As to the remaining documents, the schedule and resumes were ultimately

produced to Plaintiff by Defendant. Doc. #114. The Court’s discussion of records is

therefore limited to the interview notes.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s record-keeping claim is a motion for discovery

sanctions that violates the Court’s Case Management Order. Doc. #105 at 7. The Court does

not agree. Plaintiff asserted the record-keeping violation as a claim in its complaint (Doc. #1

¶ 9), and now seeks summary judgment on that claim. 

Plaintiff asks the Court to draw an adverse inference about the contents of the missing

notes, arguing that destruction of the notes implies that they were not favorable to

Defendant’s position. The Court concludes, however, that there is genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether the notes were destroyed or simply misplaced. Ms. Slezak, the

custodian of the notes, testified that she was aware of the obligation to retain records and that

she did in fact retain the notes in a locked file cabinet in her office. She further testified,

however, that she has been unable to find them following a move of her office. Plaintiff

asserts several reasons why the Court should disbelieve this testimony, but these assertions

serve only to demonstrate that there is a factual dispute concerning the fate of the notes.

“When relevant evidence is lost accidentally or for an innocent reason, an adverse

evidentiary inference from the loss may be rejected.” Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am.

Broad. Corp., 306 F.3d 806, 824 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the Court cannot conclude as a

matter of undisputed fact that the notes were destroyed intentionally rather than lost

accidentally, the Court will not grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for an adverse

inference. Nor, in light of this factual dispute, will the Court schedule a hearing to address

other remedies that should be imposed for the alleged destruction of the notes. In preparing

their proposed final pretrial order, the parties should address the role of this record-keeping

issue at trial.

B. Statute of Limitations and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment with respect to Defendant’s affirmative

defenses related to the statute of limitations and the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

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Doc. #94. Defendant moves for summary judgment to the extent Plaintiff brings claims that

are time-barred.

Defendant appears to admit that its statute of limitations and exhaustion claims are one

and the same: “the 300-day administrative exhaustion requirement has been described as a

statute of limitations.” Doc. #105 at 16 (citations omitted). Defendant further states that

these affirmative defenses apply to the extent that Plaintiff is alleging discriminatory conduct

that occurred prior to the 300-day period, or July 3, 2002. Id. n.12. Plaintiff admits that it

“has not brought suit on the basis of any discriminatory incidents occurring prior to July 3,

2002[.]” Doc. #114 at 10. The Court will grant summary judgment for Defendant on any

claims arising before July 3, 2002, and for Plaintiff on the time-bar defense for any claims

arising after that date. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint.

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend its complaint to “add the words ‘Arab,’ ‘non-Arab,’

[and] ‘non-Moroccan’” to sections related to the “national origin allegation.” Doc. #96 at 1.

The Case Management Order governing this case set forth the deadline for amending the

pleadings, which has passed. Doc. #10. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 provides that

a scheduling order “shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause[.]” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 16(b); see Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“Courts set [pretrial] schedules to permit the court and the parties to deal with cases in a

thorough and orderly manner, and they must be allowed to enforce them, unless there are

good reasons not to.”). Good cause exists when a deadline “cannot reasonably be met despite

the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 Advisory Comm.’s

Notes (1983 Am.); see Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.

1992) (“Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party

seeking the amendment.”).

In arguing that the motion to amend was made for good cause, Plaintiff contends that

the “omission of the word ‘Arab’ from its complaint . . . is due in part to the lack of clear

consensus with respect to the meaning of the terms ‘Arab’ and ‘Middle Eastern,’ and the fact

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that they are frequently used interchangeably.” Doc. #102 at 2. Plaintiff further contends

that “for all practical purposes the allegation that Mr. Bouamama was discriminated against

because he was an Arab is substantially similar to existing allegations that he was

discriminated against because he was Middle Eastern or Moroccan.” Id. at 4. 

Any confusion regarding the meaning and use of the terms “Arab” and “Middle

Eastern” existed well before the deadline for amending the pleadings in the Case

Management Order. Plaintiff’s own intake questionnaire and United States v. Dunn, 564

F.2d 348, 355 n.17 (9th Cir. 1977), among other items cited by Plaintiff, should have put the

EEOC on notice that the terms “Arab” and “Middle Eastern” may be associated with each

other, and that therefore “Arab” should have been included in the original complaint. 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that its inability to appreciate the confusion regarding

these terms should be excused on account of its diligence. Indeed, in its motion, Plaintiff

states candidly (and without any reference to Rule 16(b)) that it “inadvertently omitted the

words ‘Arab,’ ‘non-Arab,’ [and] ‘non-Moroccan’ from its initial complaint.” Doc. #96 at 3.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not made an adequate showing of good cause to justify

the modification of the Case Management Order. 

V. The Parties’ Motions to Strike.

Defendant moves to strike two exhibits from Plaintiff’s reply to Defendant’s

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend complaint. Doc. #117. Plaintiff asks the

Court to strike exhibit H to Defendant’s statement of facts in support of its motion for

summary judgment. Doc. #107. Plaintiff additionally asks the Court to strike new evidence

in Defendant’s reply in support of its motion for summary judgment. Doc. #115. Because

the Court did not rely on these exhibits in resolving the issues addressed in this order, the

motions to strike will be denied as moot.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. #94) is granted with respect

to Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim and any claims arising before July 3, 2002, but

otherwise is denied.

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2. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. #97) is granted with

respect to Defendant’s time-bar defense concerning claims arising after July 3, 2002, but

otherwise is denied.

3. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (Doc. #96) is denied.

4. Defendant’s motion to strike (Doc. #117) is denied.

5. Plaintiff’s motions to strike (Docs. ##107, 115) are denied.

6. The Court will set a final pretrial conference by separate order.

DATED this 27th day of June, 2006.

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