Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01873/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01873-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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26 See Pet. at 3-4; Resp’t’s Answer at 2-3; Exs. 3 through 10. 1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY BARAZZA,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-1873 FCD CMK P

vs.

JILL BROWN,

Respondent.

 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a 1998 judgment of conviction

entered in the Sacramento County Superior Court after a jury found him guilty of kidnaping

(Cal. Penal Code § 207) and sexual battery (Cal. Penal Code § 243.4) with a prior strike under

California Three Strikes law (Cal. Pen. Code § 667(b)-(I)). Petitioner was sentenced to 15 years

in state prison. 

For the reasons stated below, this court has determined that the petition for habeas

corpus should be denied.

Procedural History1

On May 20, 1999, and June 7, 1999, respectively, petitioner filed his Opening

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 The facts of petitioner’s crime are not in dispute. The summary of facts contained in 2

the unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeals are set forth as background to the

discussion of petitioner’s jury instruction claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). For convenience the

word “defendant” is substituted with the word “petitioner.”

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Brief on Appeal and his Supplemental Brief. On January 22, 2001, the California Court of

Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed petitioner’s conviction and sentence. 

On March 5, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court. The court denied review on April 11, 2001.

On August 15, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

Sacramento County Superior Court. The Superior Court denied the petition as procedurally

barred for untimeliness, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 797 (1993).

On October 1, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal. On October 4, 2001, the court denied the petition without opinion.

On December 10, 2001, petitioner petitioned for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. The court denied the petition without opinion.

Petitioner’s petition is timely under AEDPA.

Factual Background2

The petitioner and the victim, Lorna B., had lived together

for about two years, ending in December 1995. The petitioner was

possessive, jealous, and physically abusive. After she moved out,

he wanted her to come back, but she demanded that he get

counseling to control himself. They continued to see each other,

and the petitioner continued his physical abuse.

During the early morning hours of April 14, 1996, Lorna

attended a party at her friend’s house. After most of the others left

the house to get something to eat, she and Hermes Ezrre went into

a back room, where they kissed. Francisco Daniel was the only

other person in the house, and he was in the living room. Lorna

and Hermes laid down on a couch and went to sleep.

While Francisco was watching television in the living

room, the petitioner entered the house without knocking. He asked

where Lorna was, and Francisco told him she was in the back

room. The petitioner went into the room where Lorna and Hermes

were asleep. He kicked Hermes in the head, until Hermes fled. 

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 The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 apply to all federal habeas

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corpus actions filed after April 26, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).

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The petitioner grabbed Lorna by the head and the hair, pulled her

to the ground, punched her several times in the face, and dragged

her out into the hallway.

The petitioner picked up Lorna and carried her to a waiting

car. They were driven to the petitioner’s residence at the time,

where Lorna had never been. As she was being carried, Lorna lost

consciousness and then regained consciousness in the car during

the trip to the petitioner’s home. She cried and asked to be taken

home. When they arrived at the petitioner’s home, he carried her

into the house and into his bedroom.

After the petitioner put Lorna on his bed, he told her he was

sorry and just wanted to be with her. The petitioner forcibly

removed Lorna’s clothes, while she repeatedly told him to stop. 

The petitioner kissed and fondled her breasts and vagina and

inserted his finger and then his penis into her vagina.

Eventually, the house was surrounded by police officers. 

Lorna fled the house, and the petitioner was arrested.

The petitioner was tried by jury on charges of burglary,

kidnaping, penetration with a foreign object, forcible oral

copulation, and rape. The jury found the petitioner not guilty of

burglary, and guilty of kidnaping and sexual battery (a lesser

offense of the sexual offenses charged). The trial court found true

the allegation that the petitioner had suffered a prior conviction for

assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury and

sentenced the petitioner to a total state prison term of 15 years.

(Resp’t Answer at 6-7 and Exh. 4.)

Standard of Review

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119

(1982); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). A federal writ is not available

for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 67-68 (1991); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986).

Sections 2254 as amended in 1996 sets forth the following standards of review 3

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to be applied by federal courts to state court decisions:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-96 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

Analysis

I. Procedural Default

Counts one, two, and four, are each procedurally barred from review in federal

court. “In a federal habeas action brought by a state prisoner, federal courts ‘will not review a

question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that courts rests on state law

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’” La

Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 729 (1991)). Where the application of a state procedural rule provides an adequate and

independent state law basis on which the state court can deny relief and the rule prevents the

state court from reaching the merits of a federal claim, the prisoner is procedurally barred from

pursuing the claim in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30; Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S.

918 (2000). The procedural default rule may apply even if the state court applies a procedural

rule and also rejects the merits of the defaulted claim. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264

n.10 (1989); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991).

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First, the government must adequately plead the existence of an independent and

adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573,

586 (9th Cir. 2002). Then, the petitioner has the burden to place that defense in issue. Id. To

satisfy his burden, the petitioner may allege facts that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state

procedure. Id. However, the ultimate burden is on the government. Id. The court should

ordinarily consider any procedural bar issues first. Lambrix v. Singletary, Jr., 520 U.S. 518, 525

(9th Cir. 1997). 

In the present case, the Sacramento County Superior Court denied the petition as

unjustifiably untimely under In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993). In this petition, petitioner

claimed insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict, jury misconduct, perjury, insufficient

evidence of his guilt of a prior serious conviction, and ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas in the Court of Appeal. The appellate

court denied the petition without explanation. Petitioner then filed a petition in the California

Supreme Court which was also denied the petition without explanation. 

The court will presume “[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same

rest upon the same ground.” Sandgathe v. F. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 377 (9th Cir. 2002)(quoting

Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). The court will “look through” the unexplained

decisions to the court’s reasoned decisions absent “strong evidence” that this process would be

improper. Id. “The maxim is that silence implies consent, not the opposite...” Y1st v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). Thus, this court will look-through the California

Supreme Court and Appellate Court’s silent denial to the California Superior Court’s judgment.

Next, the respondent must establish that the bar under In re Clark is both adequate

and independent of federal law. Federal courts concerned with comity and federalism, will

refuse to review a habeas petition if the state court decision denying relief rests on a state law

ground that is independent of federal law and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. 

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Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997); Poland v.

Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1999).

To be independent the state law ground must not be interwoven with federal law. 

 The Bennett Court prospectively held that the Robbins/Clark timeliness rule was not interwoven

with federal law and, as a result, independent. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir.

2003).

Next, the issue is whether the Robbins/Clark timeliness rule is an adequate state

law ground. To determine if a state ground is adequate the court looks to the time at which the

petitioner had an opportunity to bring his claims on direct appeal. Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d

757, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1997). To foreclose federal judicial review, the state procedural rule must

be “well-established and consistently applied.” Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir.

1999).

In Bennett, the court could not conclude whether denial based on Robbins/Clark

untimeliness constituted an adequate state law ground. Respondent contends that the petitioner

should still be procedurally barred because he has not met his burden of proof. As support,

respondent cites to the Tenth Circuit opinion adopted by the Bennett court; Hooks v. Ward, 184

F.3d 1206, 1217 (10th Cir. 1999). In describing which party bears the burden, the Hooks court

held the following: 

Once the state pleads the affirmative defense of an independent

and adequate state procedural ground, the burden to place that

defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. This must be done at a

minimum, by specific allegations by the petitioner as to the

inadequacy of the state procedure. The scope of the state’s burden

of proof thereafter will be measured by specific claims of

inadequacy put forth by the petitioner.

Id. at 1216.

In his traverse, petitioner simply concludes none of the cases cited by the

California Supreme Court are state procedural bars to the instant petition. The court is not

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 On appeal, petitioner raised only state law to support his jury misconduct claims. Thus,

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any federal aspects of his jury misconduct claims are not exhausted under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1) and will not be considered by this court. 

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persuaded that the petitioner, by this simple allegation, has met his burden of placing the

respondent’s affirmative defense in issue. 

II. Merits

Petitioner’s petition should also be denied on the merits.

Count One: Insufficient Evidence/Jury Misconduct

Petitioner insufficiency of the evidence claim should also be denied because

insufficient evidence should not be raised in a state court habeas action. In re Lindley, 29 Cal.

2d 709, 723 (1947); In re Adams, 14 Cal. 3d 629, 635 (1975). Simply put, this claim would have

been denied on procedural grounds, even if it had been raised in a timely fashion. 

The petitioner’s jury misconduct claim also fails on the merits. Petitioner’s jury 4

misconduct claim is based on three juror declarations. Juror number five did not believe

defendant was guilty of kidnaping but changed his vote to guilty after the foreman stated that a

hung jury would result in an expensive new trial. Jury number six claimed that she changed her

vote to guilty also as a result of the foreman’s statements, but also because that the other jurors

yelled at her, and that she felt “belittled and brow beaten.” The foreman also declared that he

would “sit here until hell freezes over.” Juror number ten declared that another juror was

pounding on the table and yelling about a prepaid vacation she had the next day. Juror number

ten also confirmed the foreman’s statement regarding the expense of a new trial.

The California Court of Appeal found the fact that there was yelling and pounding

on the table, the foreman’s statements, and the juror’s statement regarding her prepaid vacation,

admissible to determine whether there was juror misconduct. The court based this finding on

California Evidence Code § 1150(a) and In re Stakewitz 40 Cal.3d 391, 398 (1985).

California Evidence Code § 1150(a) states:

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Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise

admissible evidence may be received as to statements made, or

conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or without

the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced

the verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the

effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror

either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or

concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.

Cal. Evid. Code § 1550(a). Jurors may testify to “overt acts” but not “subjective reasoning

processes of an individual juror.” In re Stakewitz, 40 Cal.3d 391, 398 (1985). “[O]vert acts”

include statements, conduct, conditions, and events that are obvious to the senses. Id.

In the present case, the appellate court found the fact that jurors felt pressure, or

believed the defendant was not guilty of kidnaping, or changed their vote for certain reasons,

was not admissible. The yelling and pounding on the table, the foreman’s statement regarding

staying there until a guilty verdict was reached, the juror’s statement regarding her prepaid trip,

all are insufficient to require the guilty verdict to be set aside. See People v. Keenan, 45 Cal.3d

478, 541-542 (1988). The appellate court even upheld the trial court’s determination that the

foreman’s statement regarding the expense of a new trial was insufficient to impeach the verdict. 

Specifically, the appellate court held that the trial court properly concluded the jury was not

likely to be influenced by the foreman’s statement because the jurors were given an oath and the

pertinent jury instructions. (See Resp’t’s Answer Exs. 3 at 5-8.) The state court’s decision

denying petitioner’s jury misconduct claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of federal law as decided by the United States Supreme Court. 

Thus, for the foregoing reasons, count one should be denied.

Count Two: Perjury

Petitioner’s perjury claim can also be denied on the merits. In order to prevail on

a perjury claim, petitioner must allege that the prosecution knowingly introduced the perjured

testimony. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th

Cir. 2002); Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 959 (9 Cir. 2001). In the present case, th

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petitioner only makes an allegation that the prosecutor knew of the officer’s alleged perjury. 

(See Petitioner’s Traverse 19-21.) Petitioner provides nothing to support such allegation. (Id.)

Petitioner must also demonstrate that the statement made, was false. Inconsistent

statements do not constitute a knowing use of perjured testimony. U.S. v. Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d

1420, 1423 (9 Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1280 (9 Cir. 1993). th th

In the present case, Officer Leon’s testified regarding the victim’s inability to

leave petitioner’s home. Officer Leon’s testimony recounted a conversation between the victim

and her friend. Officer Leon testified that he heard the victim state that the petitioner was not

letting her leave his home. (RT 495-496.) Petitioner contends that Officer Leon’s testimony is

false because she did not include the victim’s statement in her report. However, the victim also

testified that she stated she was not okay and requested that her friend come pick her up. 

Moreover, the victim testified that she asked the petitioner to take her home on at least two

different occasions. Petitioner refused both requests. (RT 205, 210.) At one point, petitioner

told the victim that she could go home in the morning. (RT 210.) Therefore, Officer Leon’s

testimony was not false, nor inconsistent with the testimony of the victim. For the foregoing

reasons, Count Two should also be denied.

Count Three: Prior Serious Conviction

Petitioner contends that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that his

prior conviction qualified as a “strike” under California’s Three Strikes Law. Assault with a

deadly weapon does not constitute a “serious” felony for three strike purposes, unless the

perpetrator used a firearm or personally inflicted great bodily injury. See Cal. Pen. Code §

1192.7(c).

In the present case, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court finding

petitioner’s prior conviction “serious.” A witness for the prosecution testified that because

petitioner struck her, she had a broken jaw, was unconscious, and airlifted to the hospital. (RT

1858-1859, 1897; 1906.) The trial court noted that the petitioner pled guilty to assault with great

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bodily injury. (RT 11979-11981.) Thus, Count three should be denied as meritless. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 575-78 (1980).

Count Four: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel should also be

denied on the merits. 

 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The

United States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that,

considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To this end, petitioner must identify the acts or

omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at

690. The federal court must then determine whether in light of all the circumstances, the

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. 

Id. “We strongly presume that counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable

assistance, and that he exercised acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions

made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.;

see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir.

2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient

before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . .

If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice. .

. that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

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The Strickland standards apply to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith

v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v.

Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). However, an indigent defendant “does not have a

constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the

client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to present those points.” 

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Counsel “must be allowed to decide what issues are

to be pressed.” Id. Otherwise, the ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with

counsel’s professional evaluation would be “seriously undermined.” Id. See also Smith v.

Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274 n.4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 929 (1998) (counsel not

required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary, and is not even particularly

good appellate advocacy.”) Further, there is, of course, no obligation to raise meritless arguments

on a client’s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (requiring a showing of deficient

performance as well as prejudice). Thus, counsel is not deficient for failing to raise a weak issue. 

See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In order to demonstrate prejudice in this context, petitioner must

demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors, he probably would have prevailed on appeal. Miller,

882 F.2d at 1434 n.9. 

Here, petitioner contends his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

his insufficient evidence claim regarding his “strike” conviction. As previously stated, there was

sufficient evidence to find petitioner guilty of a “strike.” Therefore, petitioner’s fourth claim

fails because it would have been futile for appellate counsel to raise this claim.

Conclusion 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT the petitioner’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus be DENIED.

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

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days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: August 15, 2005.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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