Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05105/USCOURTS-ca10-95-05105-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

KATHRYN SOLIZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 95-5105 

SHIRLEY S. CHA TER, Commissioner of 

Social Security; 

Defendant-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 90-C-841-E) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Nathan E. Barnard of Adams, Stanley & Associates, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney, Phil Pinnell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Joseph B. 

Liken, Acting Chief Counsel, Tina M. Waddell, Acting Deputy Chief Counsel, Randall 

• Effective March 31, 1995, the functions ofthe Secretary ofHealth and Human 

Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of 

Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human 

Services, as the defendant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner 

for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she 

was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision. 

Appellate Case: 95-5105 Document: 01019279384 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 1 
Halford, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, Dallas, Texas, for 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Before KELLY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, •• Senior District Judge. 

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff appeals the district court's order affirming the decision of the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services denying plaintiffs applications for disability insurance benefits 

and supplemental security income. We exercise jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 1 

Plaintiff claims to have been disabled since December 1987 as a result of chronic back 

pain, hepatitis, and depression. After conducting two hearings and reviewing the record de 

novo, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that plaintiff "retains the residual physical 

and mental ~bilities to perform non stressful, supervised work of a sedentary or light nature 

not requiring lifting weights in excess of 20 pounds, or requiring frequent bending or lifting, 

and work which would enable her to sit for 50 percent of the work day." Appellant's App., 

•• Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. 

~Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted 

without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-5105 Document: 01019279384 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 2 
Vol. II at 334. Because plaintiffs past relevant work had required "prolonged standing and 

walking, and was stressful r~quiring an ability to deal with the general public," the ALJ 

determined that plaintiff could not return to that work . .til.. at 332. 

Based on the testimony of a vocational expert (VE), however, the ALJ concluded that 

plaintiff could perform a number of light and sedentary jobs that exist in the national 

economy in significant numbers and, therefore, that plaintiff was not disabled. When the 

Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review, the ALJ's decision became the final 

decision of the Secretary. 

"We review the Secretary's decision to determine whether it is supported by 

substantial evidence and whether the Secretary applied the correct legal standards." 

Washin~on v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (lOth Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is "'such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."' 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,401 (197l)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 u.s. 197, 229 (1938)). 

Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal. First, she argues that the Secretary failed to 

apply Social Security Ruling 83-12 as it relates to her need to alternate periods of sitting and 

standing. Second, she contends that the Secretary failed to consider her combined physical 

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Appellate Case: 95-5105 Document: 01019279384 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 3 
and mental impairments in determining her residual functional capacity. Finally, plaintiff 

argues that the Secretary failed to assess her allegations of chronic pain properly .2 

Plaintiff's first argument is based on an incomplete reading of Social Security Ruling 

83-12 and is legally frivolous. Plaintiff contends that, given her need to alternate periods of 

sitting and standing, none of the jobs identified by the VE constitute substantial evidence 

supporting a conclusion of no disability, because none of those jobs were managerial or 

professional, and most of them were unskilled. In support of this contention, plaintiff cites 

to the statement in Social Security Ruling 82-13 that, while professional and managerial jobs 

often permit a person to alternate between sitting and standing, most jobs require a person 

to be in a certain place or posture for a certain length of time, and "[u]nskilled types of jobs 

are particularly structured so that a person cannot ordinarily sit or stand at will." S.S.R. 

83-12, 1983-1991 Rulings, Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 36,40 (West 1992). 

Plaintiff neglects, however, to mention the very next sentence in the ruling, which 

states: "In cases of unusual limitation of ability to sit or stand, a VS [vocational specialist] 

should be consulted to clarify the implications for the occupational base." ld.. As this is 

precisely the procedure the ALJ followed here, there was no legal error. & Kelley v. 

Chater,62 F.3d 335, 338 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

2 We note that plaintiffs brief does not comply with lOth Cir. R. 28.2, which 

requires that the appellant's brief contain, "with respect to each issue raised on appeal, a 

statement as to where in the record the issue was raised and ruled upon." 

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Appellate Case: 95-5105 Document: 01019279384 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 4 
.. 

Our review of the record reveals that plaintiff did not raise either of the remaining 

issues in her objections to the magistrate's report and recommendation in the district court. 

Our opinion in United States y. One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (lOth Cir. 

1996), holds that "a party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation 

must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for ... appellate review." Plaintiff's 

general objection that "[t]he Findings of the Secretary ofHealth and Human Services are not 

based on substantial evidence," Appellant's App., Vol. III at 19, is not sufficient to preserve 

the more specific issues plaintiff attempts to raise on appeal. Based upon our review of the 

record, we conclude that the interests of justice do not dictate lifting the bar of appellate 

review here. ~One Parcel ofReal Pnwerty, 73 F.3d at 1060-61; Moore v. United States, 

950 F.2d 656,659 (lOth Cir. 1991). Therefore, we will deem plaintiff's remaining arguments 

waived and will not address them. ~ Keatini v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 848 

F.2d 271, 275 (1st Cir. 1988)(holding that claimant's objections to two issues addressed by 

magistrate judge did not preserve other issues sought to be raised on appeal). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Oklahoma is AFFIRl\ffiD. 

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Appellate Case: 95-5105 Document: 01019279384 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 5