Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01454/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01454-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1454

___________

Rickey L. Jackson, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri.

United States of America, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 13, 2007

Filed: May 21, 2008

___________

Before RILEY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Rickey L. Jackson appeals the district court’s (partial) denial of his motion for

return of property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). Having

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms in part, reverses in part, and

remands. 

On May 22, 1998, federal and state agents arrested Jackson with a federal

warrant. He was driving a Ford Expedition equipped with post-factory stereo\video

equipment and wheel rims. From his person, officers seized a gold bracelet, a Nike

cap, two driver’s licenses, two pagers, two shoestrings, and $1,510 in cash. The

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vehicle was towed to a private lot, where clothing, a Nintendo 64, compact discs, and

$7,000 were discovered inside. 

The Expedition was leased by Ford Motor Company to Cameka Tousant,

Jackson’s girlfriend. On June 2, 1998, the clothing was released to Tousant’s

grandmother and “representative.” On June 11, 1998, upon default of the lease, Ford

repossessed the Expedition. Before the repossession, some of the stereo\video

equipment was stolen. Tousant received insurance proceeds for the loss. 

Jackson was convicted of drug-related offenses and sentenced to life

imprisonment. Pictures of the Expedition, stereo\video equipment, and wheel rims

were introduced at trial. The pagers were introduced as well, and then delivered to

Jackson.

After trial, in 2003, Jackson filed the motion for return of property seized at the

time of arrest. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied some of

Jackson’s claims, finding that the $8,510 currency was lawfully forfeited, the clothing

was lawfully transferred, and that Jackson had abandoned any claims to the

stereo\video equipment, wheel rims, and Nintendo. The district court ruled, however,

that Jackson was entitled to the gold bracelet, Nike cap, licenses, and shoestrings –

totaling about $18,552.00 – but that they were either lost or unlawfully appropriated

by the government. Finding no jurisdiction to award money damages, the district

court severed the meritorious claims and transferred them to the Court of Federal

Claims. See United States v. Hall, 269 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 2001); 28 U.S.C. §

1346(a)(2). The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the action as premature. See 28

U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(B). Jackson appeals, seeking a declaration that he is entitled to

possession of the stereo\video equipment, clothing, and wheel rims.

This court reviews “the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its

findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Felici, 208 F.3d 667, 669-70 (8th

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On December 1, 2002, Rule 41(e) was redesignated Rule 41(g) without

substantive changes. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 Advisory Committee Note to the

2002 amendments. This opinion refers to the rule as 41(g).

-3-

Cir. 2000). Rule 41(g) authorizes a person whose property is seized by the

government to petition the district court for its return. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g).

1

The movant must establish lawful entitlement to the property. See United States v.

Clymore, 245 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). The court should afford

the movant an opportunity to meet this burden, which may include, but does not

require, an evidentiary hearing. Felici, 208 F.3d at 670. This burden is often satisfied

by showing that the property was seized from the movant’s possession, as a person

from whom property is seized is presumed to have a right to its return. See Bailey v.

United States, 508 F.3d 736, 739 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Kaczynski, 416

F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d 1310, 1314

(11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 377 (3rd Cir. 1999). 

The government must then establish a legitimate reason to retain the property,

which may be satisfied by showing a cognizable claim of ownership or right to

possession adverse to the movant’s. See Kaczynski, 416 F.3d at 974; Chambers, 192

F.3d at 377. A Rule 41(g) motion “is properly denied if the defendant is not entitled

to lawful possession of the seized property, the property is contraband or subject to

forfeiture or the government’s need for the property as evidence continues.” United

States v. Vanhorn, 296 F.3d 713, 719 (8th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). 

Jackson asserts that the district court erred in determining that he was not

entitled to the stereo\video equipment, clothing, and wheel rims. Because the property

was seized from Jackson’s possession, he satisfied his initial burden and is presumed

to have a right to its return unless the government can show a legitimate reason

otherwise. 

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The government met its burden as to the stereo\video equipment. The purchase

receipts were in the name of Tousant, and when part of it was stolen, she filed an

insurance claim and recovered for the loss. This evidence is sufficient to prove that

Tousant had a claim of ownership adverse to that of Jackson. The judgment of the

district court regarding the stereo\video equipment is affirmed.

As to the clothing, the government also met its burden. The district court found

“that at the time of his arrest, there was clothing seized from the Expedition which has

not been returned to Jackson, but was released to Mary Tousant, grandmother of

Cameka Tousant, lessee of the Ford Expedition,” and “Mary Tousant, acting on behalf

of Cameka Tousant, lessee of the 1997 Ford Expedition, signed a receipt for the

clothing.” The receipts for the clothing state the purpose as: “Return to Owner/Mary

Tousant.” This phrasing – commonly used in the abbreviation “c/o” for “in care of”

– means “temporary charge.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 338

(Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 1961). This evidence is sufficient to prove that

Tousant, acting through her grandmother, asserted a claim of ownership adverse to

that of Jackson. The judgment of the district court regarding the clothing is affirmed.

As for the wheel rims, the government did not satisfy its burden. In addition

to proving the wheel rims were seized from his possession, Jackson introduced

evidence that he purchased them and installed them on the Expedition. The district

court relied on an abandonment theory. “Abandonment is the voluntary

relinquishment of ownership so that the property ceases to be the property of any

person and becomes the subject of appropriation by the first taker. Abandonment of

property requires intent plus an act.” Herron v. Whiteside, 782 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo.

Ct. App. 1989) (internal citation omitted). Here, there was no act of voluntary

relinquishment. The property was seized from Jackson and shortly transferred to

Ford. The district court reasoned that Jackson acted by placing the wheel rims on a

vehicle leased by Tousant. However, this did not manifest “a conscious purpose and

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intention of [Jackson] neither to use nor to retake the property into his possession.”

Id. Jackson was using and possessing the wheel rims at the time they were seized. 

On appeal, the government additionally claims that Jackson had no rights to the

wheel rims because he either gave them to Tousant or attached them to the Expedition.

The government offered no evidence that Jackson intended to gift the wheel rims to

Tousant. See Clippard v. Pfefferkorn, 168 S.W.3d 616, 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)

(essential element of an inter vivos gift is the donor’s present intent to make a gift).

Moreover, in Missouri, “an accessory to an automobile does not become an integral

permanent part of the automobile by being attached thereto.” Goodrich Silvertown

Stores v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 198 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946).

The doctrine of accession does not cover this situation. 

On this record, Jackson is entitled to the return of the wheel rims. The

government does not have possession of them. While Rule 41(g) waives sovereign

immunity to allow the return of property, sovereign immunity is not waived to allow

monetary damages. Hall, 269 F.3d at 943. However, another statute, such as the

Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), and the

Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-81, may waive sovereign immunity to

permit money damages. Id. This is a matter for remand. The district court “should

grant the movant . . . an opportunity to assert an alternative claim for money damages.

The court also retains equitable jurisdiction under Rule 41[g] to resolve issues of fact

that may help to determine whether such an alternative claim is cognizable.” Id. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and

remanded.

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