Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02345/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02345-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 625
Nature of Suit: Drug Related Seizure of Property
Cause of Action: 21:881 Forfeiture Property-Drugs

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 03-2345 PHX VAM

)

$493,850.00 in U.S. Currency and) O R D E R

One 1993 Ford F350 Truck, )

)

 Defendants, )

)

Roy Bruno and Miguel Camacho, )

)

 Claimants. )

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 26, 2003, plaintiff filed this forfeiture action. 

The Complaint alleges that the currency is subject to forfeiture

because it represents money furnished or intended to be furnished

by any person in exchange for a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. 

§ 881(a)(1)(A) and (B). (Doc. 1 at p. 1). The Complaint also

alleges the currency is subject to forfeiture as it was involved

in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 1956 or 1957. (Id.) The Complaint alleges the vehicle

was used and intended to be used to transport and facilitate the

transportation, sale, receipt, possession and concealment of a

controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. 

(Id. at p. 2.) Claimants Bruno and Camacho filed a Judicial Claim

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1

Claimants have the burden of proving standing at each stage

of this proceeding. At summary judgment, claimants have the burden

of showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. United

States v. $57,790.00, 263 F.Supp.2d 1239, 1241-2 (S.D.Cal.

2003)(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

(1992). Claimant Bruno filed a claim under penalty of perjury

stating the money is his. The admissions indicate the money is

Camacho's. 

2

on December 22, 2003. Claimant Bruno alleges he is the owner and

possessor of the currency and claimant Camacho the owner and

possessor of the vehicle. (Doc. 4). Claimants also filed an

Answer on that same date. (Doc. 5). The parties consented to

proceed before a Magistrate Judge to trial and judgment. (Doc.

6). On April 27, 2004, a new claim was filed. The only

difference between the new claim and the old claim is that the new

claim is signed by the claimants themselves rather than their

attorney. (Doc. 23). 

On September 2, 2004, the Court granted a Motion to Suppress

filed by claimants. (Doc. 27). In the Order, the Court

suppressed ". . .the evidence gained after Officer McFarland

determined there was no impairment of the driver, handed him a

warning and told him he was free to go. . ." (Id. at pp. 13-14).

In the Order granting the Motion to Suppress, the Court

denied Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 27). In its

Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff challenged claimants'

standing. The Court ruled, on the information available at that

time, the claimants had standing.1

 (Doc. 27 at p. 16). The Court

pointed out that the granting of the Motion to Suppress did not

result in automatic summary judgment for claimants so long as the

Government could prove the forfeiture through untainted evidence. 

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United States v. Real Property Known as 22249 Dolorosa Street, 167

F.3d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1999). (Doc. 27 at p. 16). In support of

its summary judgment, plaintiff argued that claimants refusal to

answer discovery requests, by claiming the Fifth Amendment

privilege, automatically resulted in admissions which would

support forfeiture. Plaintiff sent each of the claimants a series

of requests for admissions. Rather than respond to the requests

for admissions, claimants' attorney sent a letter indicating they

would be invoking the Fifth Amendment to all discovery requests. 

Plaintiff took the position that Rule 36, F.R.Civ.P.,

automatically resulted in admissions. The Court pointed out that

Rule 36(a), F.R.Civ.P., leaves it to the Court as to whether or

not the answers or objections in response to requests for

admissions are sufficient and, whether the matter should be deemed

admitted or an amended answer be required. (Doc. 27 at p. 18). 

The Court denied the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment indicating

it was unclear whether the Government had untainted evidence which

would support forfeiture. (Doc. 27 at p. 19). 

Shortly after this Order, claimants and plaintiff again filed

Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 28-31). Claimants

filed a Motion to Compel Disclosure. (Doc. 38). In response, the

Government filed a Motion to Stay the Proceedings pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 981(g)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(i). (Doc. 39). The

Government also filed a Motion to Reargue the Suppression Issue

based on a new Supreme Court ruling. (Doc. 43). All these

Motions were set for oral argument. In the interim, the Court

granted the Motion to Stay until further Order of the Court. 

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(Doc. 47). 

At the argument on the Motions for Summary Judgment, the

Court denied the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and denied

without prejudice claimants' Motion to Compel Disclosure and

Strike All Post-Deadline Information. (Doc. 50). The Court also

denied plaintiff's Motion to Re-Argue the Suppression Issue. The

Court entered a stay based on plaintiff's Motion to Stay. (Doc.

50). The Court then required the Government to file a status

report or notice of disclosure by June 17, 2005. (Id.). The

Government filed its status report, indicated that previous

affidavits filed under seal could be disclosed and that recording

of intercepted telephone calls and investigative reports would be

provided to claimants in response to their discovery requests. 

(Doc. 52). Plaintiff also asked that the stay be removed so that

discovery could be provided and the Court could consider

appropriate motions by the parties. (Id.). On June 20, 2005, the

Court granted the Motion to unseal, removed the stay and ordered

the Government to provide discovery to claimants. The Court also

indicated it would "entertain appropriate motions, based upon the

release of discovery material described in plaintiff's Motion." 

(Doc. 53). Plaintiff then responded to claimants' discovery

demands. (Docs. 54, 56). 

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Plaintiff's Statement of

Facts and Second Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 59). 

Claimants have not opposed the Motion to Amend and it will be

granted. Therefore, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

57) will be considered with claimants' Opposition. (Doc. 61).

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B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows "there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), 

F.R.Civ.P.; California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v.

Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988). "Summary judgment will not

lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of

demonstrating that there is no material fact precluding summary

judgment. Adickes v. S.H. Cress and Company, 398 U.S. 144, 157

(1970). 

Substantive law determines which facts are material. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Jesinger v. Nevada

Federal Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). "Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who "fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Citadel Holding Corporation v.

Roven, 26 F.2d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Furthermore, the party opposing summary judgment "may not

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rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the [party's]

pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e), F.R.Civ.P.;

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Lind Rose Joint

Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). There is no genuine

issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

non-moving party. If the evidence is merely colorable or if not

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. However, "the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be

drawn in his favor." Id. at 255.

C. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment arguing that untainted

evidence in the form of evidence obtained before the illegal

search, evidence of a Miami investigation and claimants' claim of

Fifth Amendment to requests for admissions (which plaintiff argues

should be deemed admissions) support the forfeiture of both

defendants. (Docs. 57, 58). Claimants oppose the Motion for

Summary Judgment by arguing (1) the Motion for Summary Judgment is

untimely and should not be considered, (2) the Miami information

should be barred as a violation of the disclosure deadline under

Rule 26, F.R.Civ.P., (3) the Miami information and the requests

for admissions should be barred as exploitations of the illegal

search, and (4) there is no untainted evidence to support the

Government's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 60, 61). 

Claimants did not file an opposing statement of facts or

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affidavits under Rule 56(e),F.R.Civ.P. See LRCiv. 56.1(a). 

1. Timeliness of the Motion for Summary Judgment

Claimants argue this Motion for Summary Judgment is untimely

as it is well beyond the deadline for filing dispositive motions. 

Because of the problems of responding to claimants' discovery

requests, in light of an ongoing criminal investigation in Miami,

this case was stayed by the Court. When the Court lifted the

stay, it indicated it would entertain appropriate motions based on

the evidence obtained and disclosed in discovery. (Doc. 53). It

is not unusual for parallel civil and criminal proceedings to

involve stays and disruption of the discovery process on both

sides. As a result of the stay and ongoing proceedings in Miami,

discovery was disclosed late but with the Court's approval. The

Court can see no prejudice to the claimants as a result of the

stay and the delay in the disclosure of the information from

Miami. The Motion for Summary Judgment will be considered.

2. Use of the Miami Information

Claimants argue the Miami information should not be allowed

as it is tainted by the illegal search. Claimants argue that but

for the illegal search, the authorities in Arizona would never

have obtained information from Miami regarding claimant Camacho. 

In proceeding with this forfeiture, plaintiff may use

evidence gathered after the filing of the Complaint to prove

forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)-(2). In addition, the granting

of a motion to suppress does not end a forfeiture proceeding. The

Government may proceed as long as it can prove the forfeiture

through untainted evidence. United States v. Real Property Known

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as 22249 Dolorosa Street, 167 F.3d at 513. If claimants' argument

were correct, the Government would never be able to use afteracquired evidence in a forfeiture where the Court suppressed

evidence. 

The Miami investigation began long before the authorities in

Arizona obtained the truck and money which are the subject of this

forfeiture. The fact that the Miami investigation was proceeding

completely independent of the Arizona forfeiture led to the need

for the stay. (Doc. 40). If the Miami investigation had begun as

a result of this illegal search, claimants' argument would have

some force. However, it is clear from plaintiff's Statement of

Facts and the information relied upon in that Statement of Facts,

the actual occurrences which are relied upon by the United States

to support its forfeiture occurred before the stop and illegal

search. This information is clearly from an independent source

and is completely attenuated. There is some information in the

affidavit of Chris Jacobson (Doc. 58, Ex. H at par. 3) which was

developed after the seizure. However, this information will be

disregarded.

The Court finds the affidavits by cooperating individuals and

paragraphs 1, 2, 4-7 of Agent Jacobsen's affidavit are untainted

and may be considered in support of the Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Doc. 58, Exs. G, H, and I). The information provided

in affidavits of the cooperating individuals concerns events which

occurred and are corroborated as occurring prior to the illegal

search. The fact that this information is set forth in affidavits

prepared after the illegal search does not mean that the

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information must be disregarded as tainted by an illegal search.

Claimants also argue that even if the Court considers the

Miami information, it only raises genuine issues of material fact

which preclude summary judgment. However, claimants have failed

to file anything to rebut the Statement of Facts and supporting

affidavits. 

3. Plaintiff's Reliance on the Requests for Admissions

Claimants argue the requests for admissions are also tainted

by the illegal search and cannot be considered by the Court. In

fact, claimants argue that based on the Court's earlier

suppression ruling, nothing that occurred after the illegal search

can be considered by the Court. Claimants do not cite any case in

support of this proposition but simply argue but for the illegal

search there would be no forfeiture. As pointed out earlier, a

forfeiture may proceed after an illegal search and after-acquired

evidence may be used to support a forfeiture. United States v.

$191,910 In U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1994);

18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(2). Given these two principles, claimants'

argument must fail. 

4. Plaintiff's Burden of Proof and Evidence

18 U.S.C. § 983(c) states:

 (c) Burden of proof.--In a suit or action brought

under any civil forfeiture statute for the civil

forfeiture of any property--

 (1) the burden of proof is on the Government to

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

property is subject to forfeiture;

 (2) the Government may use evidence gathered after

the filing of a complaint for forfeiture to establish,

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by a preponderance of the evidence, that property is

subject to forfeiture; and

 (3) if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that

the property was used to commit or facilitate the

commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the

commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall

establish that there was a substantial connection

between the property and the offense.

If the Government is successful in establishing by a preponderance

of evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture, then

claimants must come forward and satisfy the requirement under 18

U.S.C. § 983(d), i.e. that they are innocent owners.

Plaintiff relies on three types of evidence to carry its

burden of proving the defendants are subject to forfeiture. 

Plaintiff relies on evidence acquired prior to the illegal search,

evidence of the Miami, Florida investigation and the requests for

admissions sent by plaintiff to claimants and to which the

claimants took the Fifth Amendment. Claimants argue plaintiff has

not carried its burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence

that the defendants are subject to forfeiture. Claimants argue

there is no evidence before the Court. The Court has already

ruled that evidence prior to the illegal search may be considered;

the Miami information is not tainted by the illegal search and

evidence obtained by plaintiff during discovery is not tainted.

Claimants argue the Court may not even acknowledge that one

of the defendants is money but rather must deal with the defendant

money as if it were a "widget." (Doc. 60 at p. 14). Claimants'

argument is based on United States v. $191,910 In U.S. Currency,

16 F.3d at 1062-1065. In this case, the Court held that once the

Court grants a motion to suppress, ". . .illegally seized property

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2

As explained below, from the uncontested Statement of Facts

in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court has

11

could not be introduced as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding:

Any evidence which is the product of an illegal search or seizure

must be excluded in the forfeiture hearing. . .We must hold that

the district court was correct in excluding the illegally seized

money." (Id. at 1063). The Court's holding that the illegally

seized money may not be entered in evidence during a forfeiture

proceeding would obviously prevent plaintiff from bringing the

cash, which is the subject of this forfeiture, into court and

putting it in evidence. 

However, the Court does not believe that exclusion of the

cash means the Court must consider the defendant cash as a

"widget." The Court believes it can still take notice of the fact

that the defendant is cash. This is obviously stated in the

caption of the case. Perhaps the denominations making up the

amount and the actual money itself cannot be put into evidence. 

However, there is no way for the Government to show that a

"widget" is the product of a drug transaction and, therefore, the

Court does not believe it has to disregard the fact that one of

the defendants is cash. As to the truck, the Court knows from

untainted evidence prior to the seizure that it is a white Ford

truck, with dual rear wheels, with a Florida license plate,

registered to claimant Miguel Camacho who resides in Florida. The

Court also knows from untainted evidence that claimant Bruno was

traveling south on I-17 outside of Phoenix with claimant Camacho

in the Ford truck.2

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additional information about the defendants.

12

The Court's task is to determine whether the untainted

evidence shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

defendant currency is subject to forfeiture because it represents

money furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in

exchange for a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1)) or it

is subject to forfeiture as it was involved in a transaction or

attempted transaction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 or 1957. 

(Doc. 1 at p. 1). The Court must make a determination with regard

to the truck as to whether it was used or intended to be used to

transport and facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,

possession or concealment of a controlled substance in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. (Doc. 1 at p. 2).

The Miami evidence, in the form of affidavits from associates

of claimant Camacho and a drug agent in Florida, is material,

relevant and uncontradicted by claimants. A party opposing a

motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of the party's pleadings, but. . .must set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial." Rule 56(e), F.R.Civ.P.; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 342;

Matsushita v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 and Brinson v.

Lind Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d at 1049. There is no issue for

trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving

party. Because claimants have not submitted any disputed facts in

opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the relevant and

admissible evidence from Florida is unrebutted. A claimant cannot

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avoid his burden, in a forfeiture action, under Rule 56,

F.R.Civ.P., by invoking the Fifth Amendment. Baker v. United

States, 722 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Certain

Real Property 566 Hendrickson Blvd., 986 F.2d 990, 995-6 (6th Cir.

1993). 

The Miami evidence establishes that:

1. An individual known as Jairo Hernandez, during 2002 and

2003, worked for a Columbian cocaine dealer by the name of Roberto

Guillo. Roberto Guillo wanted to sell cocaine to claimant Miguel

Camacho in Miami, Florida. At Mr. Guillo's direction, Jairo

Hernandez traveled to Miami, Florida and met with claimant Camacho

in June, 2002. Mr. Hernandez was picked up at the airport by Mr.

Camacho driving a white, dual rear wheeled pickup truck. Mr.

Jairo Hernandez was taken to claimant Camacho's house where he saw

cocaine and a hidden storage facility large enough to accommodate

1000 kilograms of cocaine. During this visit, claimant Camacho

told Mr. Hernandez he was in the business of selling cocaine and

sold approximately 1000 kilograms of cocaine in the Miami area

every 15-20 days. The two negotiated for the purchase of cocaine

from Mr. Guillo but Mr. Camacho thought the price was too high. 

(Doc. 58 at Exs. G, H).

2. Mr. Jairo Hernandez met with claimant Camacho at his home

in Miami, Florida again in May or July, 2003. At that time,

claimant Camacho told Mr. Hernandez that his cocaine business was

doing well and he was transporting cocaine from Mexico to Miami. 

While at claimant Camacho's house, Mr. Hernandez met claimant

Bruno. Claimant Bruno was introduced to Mr. Hernandez as the

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husband of claimant Camacho's niece. Mr. Hernandez did not know

the name of the husband of the niece. (Doc. 58 at Exs. G, H).

3. Leonardo Maya-Martinez, Sr. was introduced to claimant

Camacho in approximately March, 2002 by cocaine dealer Alfredo

Navarro. Claimant Camacho visited Mr. Maya-Martinez' home in

Miami, Florida for the purpose of discussing the importation of

cocaine from Columbia to the United States for sale. Mr. MayaMartinez met with claimant Camacho three to five times. The last

meeting was in approximately February or March of 2003. During

these meetings, claimant Camacho told Mr. Maya-Martinez he is in

the business of selling cocaine and his source is in Columbia. 

Claimant Camacho stated the cocaine was transported through Mexico

and into the United States where it was sold in Florida and New

York. Although Mr. Maya-Martinez and claimant Camacho agreed on a

price of $16,000.00 per kilogram for cocaine delivered to Miami,

claimant Camacho never delivered any cocaine to Maya-Martinez. 

Claimant Camacho told Mr. Maya-Martinez he imports 2,000-3,000

kilograms of cocaine every three months and the cocaine is stored

on a ranch near the United States/Mexico border. Claimant Camacho

told Mr. Maya-Martinez he utilizes several types of vehicles to

transport his drugs and currency. Claimant Camacho told Mr. MayaMartinez that he personally drives large amounts of cash to Mexico

to make payments to the transportation organizations. (Emphasis

added). (Doc. 58 at Ex. I).

4. The Ford F-350 truck which is the subject of this

forfeiture action was seen by drug agents while they were

conducting surveillance in the Miami, Florida case. Both Jairo

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Hernandez and Leonardo Maya-Martinez, Sr. were charged, arrested

and plead guilty to drug charges arising from the investigation in

Miami, Florida. They provided the affidavits in this case as part

of a cooperation agreement in Miami, Florida.

5. The Requests for Admissions

The requests for admissions sent to claimants Bruno and

Camacho are set forth in plaintiff's Amended Statement of Facts at

paragraphs 65-76. (Doc. 58 at pp. 11 and 12). Claimants decided

to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege and not respond to these

discovery requests. (Doc. 58 at Ex. B). 

Plaintiff argues the requests for admissions may be

considered in determining whether the Government has carried its

burden of proof. The requests for admissions to claimant Camacho

asked him to admit (1) he concealed or caused to be concealed the

money in the Ford truck, (2) he altered the defendant Ford truck

so drugs and cash could be concealed in one of the two fuel tanks,

(3) the defendant Ford truck was used in drug trafficking, (4) the

defendant money is his, (5) he knew the money was concealed in the

defendant truck on June 3, 2003 and (6) he knew the money was to

be used to acquire controlled substances.

The requests for admissions to claimant Bruno asked him to

admit (1) he concealed or caused the money to be concealed in the

defendant truck, (2) the money was to be used to purchase

controlled substances or was the proceeds from the sale of

controlled substances, (3) the money was acquired by claimant

Camacho and (4) claimant Camacho acquired the funds from the

"illegal exchange of controlled substances." 

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3

In addition, by not submitting any evidence in opposition to

plaintiff's Statement of Facts and the Court finding those

statements supported by evidence, claimants have failed to raise a

genuine issue of material fact as to those assertions found in

claimants' Statement of Facts. 

16

As pointed out above, both claimants asserted the Fifth

Amendment to all discovery requests by plaintiff. A blanket

assertion of the Fifth Amendment is no defense to a forfeiture. 

United States v. Certain Real Property, 986 F.2d at 996. 

Plaintiff now asks the Court to determine the sufficiency of

claimants' blanket invocation of the Fifth Amendment in response

to the requests for admissions. Rule 36(a), F.R.Civ.P. The Court

cannot conclude that invoking the Fifth Amendment as to all of the

requests for admissions is proper. Clearly some of the requests

could provide a link to proof of criminal activity but some of the

requests are not facially incriminating. This is the problem with

a claimant's blanket invocation of the Fifth Amendment. For

example, claimant Bruno filed a claim to the money. However, he

took the Fifth Amendment rather than deny the money was Camacho's. 

The Court finds the blanket invocation of the Fifth Amendment is

an insufficient response under Rule 36, F.R.Civ.P., and the

requests for admissions must be deemed admitted.3 

Further, even if the Court were to find the blanket Fifth

Amendment assertion proper under Rule 36, F.R.Civ.P., and the

requests not deemed admitted, the Court may draw a negative

inference from the invocation of the Fifth Amendment in this civil

proceeding. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-20 (1976);

United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983); LiButti v.

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United States, 107 F.3d 110, 121-125 (2nd Cir. 1997); United

States v. Stelmokas, 100 F.3d 302, 310-311 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert.

denied, 520 U.S. 1242 (1999); Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York,

717 F.2d 700 (2nd Cir. 1983); United States v. A Single Family

Residence and Real Property Located at 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803

F.2d 625, 629 at n.4 (11th Cir. 1986).

Some courts have held the negative inference cannot be the

sole basis for ruling against the party invoking the privilege. 

Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin School District, 172 F.Supp.2d 1102,

1126 (E.D.Wisc. 2001); Kontos v. Kontos, 968 F.Supp. 400, 408

(S.D.Ind. 997). Many courts have held the negative inference

applies to those matters on which the party invoking the privilege

has the burden of proof/production. SEC v. Navin, 97 F.3d 1460

(9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished opinion); United States v. All Assets

and Equipment of Westside Building Corp., 843 F.Supp. 377

(N.D.Ill. 1994); United States v. One 1985 Plymouth Colt, 644

F.Supp. 1546 (N.D.Ill. 1986).

In this forfeiture, plaintiff has produced untainted,

uncontested evidence which proves by a preponderance of the

evidence a substantial connection between the defendants and

cocaine purchases and sales, i.e. that the defendant money is

proceeds of cocaine sales and/or intended to be furnished to buy

additional cocaine and that the defendant Ford truck was used and

intended to be used to transport cocaine and money derived from

cocaine sales. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (6). In short,

plaintiff has carried its burden even without considering the

requests for admissions. The Court comes to this conclusion based

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on the untainted evidence obtained prior to the illegal search and

the information specifically referenced above regarding the Miami

investigation (i.e. affidavits of two drug dealers and portions of

the affidavit of the drug agent). 

Since plaintiff has fulfilled its burden of proof, claimants

have the burden of producing evidence that they are "innocent

owners." Claimants have not produced any evidence that they are

"innocent owners." In addition, the negative inference which may

be drawn from invoking the Fifth Amendment precludes such a

finding. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. at 318-20; United States

v. Rylander, 460 U.S. at 758; United States v. A Single Family

Residence, 803 F.2d at 629 n. 4; United States v. Stelmokas, 100

F.3d at 310-311; LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d at 121-125;

United States v. All Assets and Equipment, 843 F.Supp. at 377;

United States v. One 1985 Plymouth Colt, 644 F. Supp. at 1546.

Because plaintiff has come forward with untainted and

uncontested evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that the defendants are subject to forfeiture and claimants have

come forward with no evidence they are innocent owners, there is

no genuine issue of material fact and plaintiff is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting plaintiff's uncontested

Motion to Supplement or Amend Plaintiff's Statement of Facts and

Second Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 59).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting plaintiff's Second Motion for

Summary Judgment. (Doc. 57). The defendants are forfeited to the

United States.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment for

plaintiff.

DATED this 23rd day of January, 2006.

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