Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01725/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01725-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 The Court will vacate the hearing scheduled for April 19, 2006, because the parties

have submitted memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence and the Court

concludes that oral argument will not aid its decisional process. See Mahon v. Credit Bur.

of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dwaine Winfrey, an individual, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Gilbert, a body politic of the

State of Arizona; City of Gilbert Police

Department; and Gilbert Police Officer

K. Hefner and Spouse Hefner, wife and

husband, 

Defendants.

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No. CV-04-1725-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendants Town of Gilbert and Kari Hefner’s motion

for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the

issue of probable cause. Docs. ##30, 34. The parties have filed responses to the motions and

Defendants have filed a reply. Docs. ##34, 40. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

will grant Defendants’ motion and deny Plaintiff’s cross-motion.1

Background

Plaintiff was arrested and charged with felony shoplifting. The charge was dismissed.

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Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint against Defendants in state court on

May 28, 2004. The complaint purports to state six causes of action: wrongful prosecution,

false arrest/false imprisonment, abuse of process, gross negligence/negligence, and violations

of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1981. The action was removed to this Court on

August 19, 2004. Doc. #1.

Discussion

I. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The disputed evidence must be

“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Summary

judgment may be entered against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

II. Analysis.

A. The Undisputed Facts.

The following facts are not disputed: 

On August 14, 2002, a black male entered a Safeway grocery store in Gilbert,

Arizona. He filled a shopping cart with various items and exited the store. The items in the

cart were not in any type of grocery bag.

The assistant manager of the store, Robert Blum, and an employee, Kellie Williams,

witnessed these events. Blum also witnessed the man placing the items into a white Cadillac

parked in the store’s parking lot. Blum was able to obtain the temporary license tag number

from the window of the Cadillac. Blum and Williams viewed a surveillance video of the

incident, which was consistent with their observations.

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Plaintiff notes that he is in fact 6’3” tall, not 6’2” tall as described by Blum.

Doc. #35 ¶ c.

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The same day, Gilbert police officer Kari Hefner was dispatched to the Safeway store

to investigate the incident. Officer Hefner interviewed Blum, who stated that he witnessed

a black male exit the store with a shopping cart full of items that consisted mostly of liquor

and beer. Blum further stated that the items were not in any type of grocery bag and that the

suspect exited the store without paying for them. Blum explained that he followed the

suspect to the parking lot and witnessed him placing the items into the backseat of an older

model white Cadillac. Blum provided Officer Hefner with the Cadillac’s temporary license

tag number, D3S212. Blum told Officer Hefner that the approximate value of the items taken

by the suspect was $256.00. Blum described the suspect as approximately 6’ to 6’2” tall and

weighing between 260 and 280 pounds.

Officer Hefner also interviewed Williams. Williams stated that she witnessed the

suspect exit through the front door of the store with a shopping cart full of items. Williams

stated that she did not see the suspect pay for any of the items.

Officer Hefner viewed the surveillance video. The video showed a black male

moving through the aisles of the store, placing items in his shopping cart. Blum told Officer

Hefner that the man on the tape was the same man Blum observed leave the store without

paying and place the items into a white Cadillac. Williams told Officer Hefner that she was

also able to identify the black male on the surveillance video as the suspect.

Officer Hefner ran the temporary license tag number provided by Blum and learned

that Plaintiff owned the white Cadillac. Officer Hefner then obtained a copy of Plaintiff’s

driver’s license photograph for a photographic line-up. The physical description of Plaintiff

on his driver’s license appeared to match the description given by Blum.2

Two days after the shoplifting event, Officer Hefner conducted separate photographic

line-ups with Blum and Williams. Prior to viewing the group of photographs, Blum and

Williams were read a standard admonition. They were informed that the group of

photographs they were about to view may or may not include a photograph of the suspect.

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They were asked to look at the group of photographs and indicate to Officer Hefner whether

any of the persons shown in the photographs resembled the suspect. They were cautioned

not to tell each other whether they had identified anyone. Blum and Williams each

independently circled Plaintiff’s photograph and indicated that it resembled the person who

stole the items from the store.

Based on this investigation, Officer Hefner requested that Plaintiff be charged with

shoplifting. Plaintiff was subsequently arrested and charged with shoplifting. The charge

was dismissed when it was discovered that the surveillance video of the incident was no

longer available. See Docs. ##31 ¶¶ 1-24, 35 ¶¶ b-e.

B. Did Officer Hefner Have Probable Cause?

Defendants argue that Officer Hefner had probable cause to seek a shoplifting charge

against Plaintiff. Doc. #30 at 7-11. Defendants further argue that because probable cause

existed, all of Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law. Id. Plaintiff contends that Officer

Hefner’s investigation was inadequate and that she did not have probable cause to seek a

shoplifting charge because neither Blum nor Williams “positively identified” Plaintiff as the

shoplifter. Doc. #34 at 3-6 (citing Watzek v. Walker, 485 P.2d 3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971)).

“Where there is no factual dispute, probable cause is always a question of law for the

[C]ourt.” Hansen v. Garcia, 713 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); see Gasho v. United

States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen there is no genuine issue of fact,

summary judgment is appropriate if no reasonable jury could find an absence of probable

cause under the facts.”). A police officer has probable cause to seek charges against a person

when the officer “has reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances

sufficient to lead a reasonable [person] to believe that an offense has been committed and the

person to be [charged] committed it.” Hansen, 713 P.2d at 1265; see Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1248

(“Probable cause exists when, ‘under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting

officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability’ that a

crime was committed.”) (citation omitted). Probable cause to seek charges “may exist

despite the fact that the charges are subsequently dismissed[.]” Hockett v. City of Tucson,

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678 P.2d 502, 505 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); see Cullison v. City of Peoria, 584 P.2d 1156, 1159

(Ariz. 1978) (“[W]hen the police make an arrest based upon probable cause, it is not material

that the person arrested may turn out to be innocent, and the arresting officer is not required

to conduct a trial before determining whether or not to make the arrest”).

The Court concludes that Officer Hefner had probable cause to seek a shoplifting

charge against Plaintiff. It is undisputed that Officer Hefner interviewed both eyewitnesses

at the scene, viewed the surveillance video herself, obtained the photograph of the person

who owned the white Cadillac, and conducted two independent photographic line-ups in

which both eyewitnesses identified Plaintiff as resembling the suspect. The results of this

investigation provided reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a reasonable

person to believe that Plaintiff had committed the offense of shoplifting. See Cullison, 584

P.2d at 1159 (“Based on the record in this case, we believe that the identification of the

eyewitness provided the police with sufficient probable cause upon which to make their

arrest.”); Walsh v. Eberlein, 560 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that photo

line-up identifications coupled with the plaintiff’s employment history with the business from

which blank checks were stolen was sufficient to provide probable cause that the plaintiff

was guilty of passing forged checks); see also Greve v. State, 285 P. 274, 331-32 (Ariz.

1930) (holding that eyewitness testimony that the defendant “resembled” the suspect was a

sufficient identification of the defendant).

The Court finds Plaintiff’s reliance on Watzek unpersuasive. Watzek “recognize[d]

that in the absence of further circumstances, an eyewitness identification of an individual

furnishes probable cause to assume the guilt of the party identified.” 485 P.2d at 6. The

“further circumstances” in Watzek consisted of expert testimony that the charging officer

failed to investigate a prime suspect and that the photographic line-up was unreliable. Id.

No such circumstances exist in this case. Plaintiff has presented no expert testimony

concerning the insufficiency of Officer Hefner’s investigation, and has identified no other

suspect that was disregarded in her investigation. The eyewitness identifications of Plaintiff,

combined with all of the other facts collected by Officer Hefner in the investigation, therefore

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were sufficient to establish probable cause. See Walsh, 560 P.2d at 1252 (“The decision in

Watzek . . . is readily distinguishable. . . . Unlike Watzek, this case lacks circumstances

sufficient to cast doubt on the information elicited from the witnesses.”).

Because the undisputed facts show that Officer Hefner had probable cause to seek

shoplifting charges against Plaintiff, all of Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law. See

Hansen, 713 P.2d at 1265-66 (holding that because probable cause existed to arrest the

plaintiff, summary judgment was appropriate on the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution, false

arrest, false imprisonment, gross negligence, negligence, and civil rights claims); Cullison,

584 P.2d at 1161 (same with respect to false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, gross

negligence, and negligence claims); Bird v. Rothman, 627 P.2d 1097, 1100-02 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1981) (same with respect to a malicious prosecution claim and holding that summary

judgment was appropriate on an abuse of process claim where there was no evidence of an

improper use of the judicial process). The Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment and deny Plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants Town of Gilbert’s and Kari Hefner’s motion for summary judgment

(Doc. #30) is granted.

2. Plaintiff Dwaine Winfrey’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment

(Doc. #34) is denied.

3. The fictitiously named defendants are dismissed.

4. Plaintiff shall, by April 28, 2006, show cause why Defendant City of Gilbert

Police Department should not be dismissed for lack of service of process.

DATED this 17th day of April, 2006.

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