Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04689/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04689-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT THELANDER,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTHONY KANE, Warden, and

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor,

Respondents.

 /

No. C 05-4689 CW

ORDER GRANTING

PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Scott Thelander, a state prisoner incarcerated at

the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California, has

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 alleging that his right to due process was violated when he

was denied parole for the eighth time. Respondent Anthony Kane

opposes the petition. Having considered all the papers filed by

the parties, the Court GRANTS the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus.

BACKGROUND

Unless stated otherwise, the following facts are from the

record of Petitioner's September 18, 2003 parole consideration

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hearing (Pet.'s Ex. A), the May 6, 1981 report of Chief Probation

Officer W.A. Herring (Resp.'s Ex. B), or the petition.

In the months preceding the commitment offense, Petitioner was

twenty-one years old and had been dating Tamara England, his

seventeen-year-old next-door neighbor. Although Petitioner

anticipated that they would marry, England ended the relationship

towards the end of May, 1979 due to Petitioner's possessiveness and

jealousy. England immediately began dating the victim, David

Lewis, who had previously been Petitioner's roommate. Petitioner

began staying up every night waiting for Lewis and England to

return to her home after dates. Once they returned, Lewis would

soon leave. 

On the evening of June 30, 1979, Lewis and England returned to

her home from a date. Upon observing their arrival and hearing

England "say something to the effect that she was not ready for

sex," Petitioner became very upset and began crying. Around

midnight, Petitioner's roommate, Steve Higgins, drove Petitioner 

to Lewis' home in Petitioner's car so that Petitioner could engage

in a fistfight over Lewis' refusal to stop dating England. Because

Petitioner and Higgins thought that Lewis might not open his front

door, they decided to park Petitioner's car so that Lewis could not

see it from his home. Petitioner did not recall bringing the

murder weapon, a .44-caliber cap-and-ball type handgun, to Lewis'

house nor carrying it to Lewis' front door. The weapon had been

loaned to Petitioner by his friend Michael John Foster. Petitioner

had previously told Foster that he had been thinking about killing

Lewis, but Foster did not think Petitioner was serious. 

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Lewis opened his front door, but upon recognizing Petitioner,

he attempted to close it. Petitioner forced himself into Lewis'

doorway and began confronting Lewis about his relationship with

England. The record is not clear as to whether punches were

thrown. When Lewis stated that Petitioner "would never know about

me and Tammy," Petitioner shot at Lewis, hitting him in the thigh

and head. Petitioner indicated that the crime was not

premeditated. (Pet.'s Ex. B at 64, June 2003 Parole Hearing

Report.) Higgins took the weapon from Petitioner and disposed of

it. Petitioner and Higgins left town for one and a half days. 

On July 1, 1979, England found Lewis' body lying in his front

door. On July 11, 1979 Petitioner was arrested and charged with

first-degree murder. On May 27, 1981, after a jury trial,

Petitioner was acquitted of first-degree murder and convicted of

second-degree murder. The jury further found that Petitioner used

a firearm in the commission of the offense and that the complaint's

allegation that Petitioner was lying in wait for Lewis was

unfounded. Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to life in

prison with an additional two years for the gun enhancement. 

Petitioner has been in continuous custody for twenty-eight

years; he will be fifty years old on August 13, 2007. At the time

of his incarceration, Petitioner had completed high school and one

year of college. Petitioner has no history of developmental

problems, social problems, or substance abuse, and has no other

juvenile or adult arrests, convictions, or incidents of violence. 

Petitioner's family continues to be supportive of him. If

released, Petitioner plans to reside with his mother in Oroville

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1 Self-help programs Petitioner has completed include a selfesteem group, Anger Control Therapy, Category T live-in

psychological treatment program, Process Group Therapy,

Responsibility and Decision-Making, Alternatives to Violence,

Breaking Barriers, Conflict Resolution, the Muslim Development

Center's Anger Management seminar, an independent self-help course

in which Petitioner reads books and writes a report, and IMPACT

Victim Awareness which he helped establish at the facility. 

4

and has a job offer as a production helper in a wood products

company there. 

During his incarceration, Petitioner has improved his

education and vocational skills and has participated in self-help

programs. Petitioner is taking courses in Spanish and college

courses in counseling. He also completed forty-five assignments

from televised classes supervised by the education department. 

(Pet.'s Ex. A at 28.) Petitioner received an auto mechanic

certification in 1994 and has worked in a variety of jobs while

incarcerated, consistently receiving above average or exceptional

ratings. Petitioner has completed several self-help courses, one

of which he helped establish at the facility.1 His 1999

psychological report by Dr. Steven Terrini states, "If released to

the community, his violence potential is estimated to be no more

than the average citizen in the community, and perhaps even lower." 

(Pet.'s Ex. D at 145.) Dr. Terrini also wrote that Petitioner has

expressed remorse which "did appear to be genuine and authentic"

and agreed with Dr. W.J. White's 1995 evaluation "that Petitioner

has 'a well developed and authentic sense of personal

responsibility, guilt and remorse for his murder offense.'" Id. at

144.

Petitioner has been disciplined four times during his twentyCase 4:05-cv-04689-CW Document 23 Filed 08/01/07 Page 4 of 19
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2 The record is not clear regarding what Petitioner possessed

and exchanged. In its September 18, 2003 hearing, the Board stated

that Petitioner's December 9 1987 discipline was for "possession

and exchange of, maybe, contraband." (Pet.'s Ex. A at 32.) 

3

 The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1,

2005, and replaced with the Board of Parole hearings. Cal. Penal

Code § 5075(a).

5

eight years of incarceration: on August 11, 1984 for possession of

a home brew in a cell, on January 6, 1986 for attempting to

circumvent procedure on searches, on December 9, 1987 for

possession and exchange,2

 and, most seriously, on January 27, 1988

for attempted escape without force when he and another inmate were

caught attempting to cut through a prison fence. Petitioner has

been discipline-free for nineteen years. His classification score

is at the lowest possible security rating for a term-to-life

inmate. 

The Board of Parole Hearings3 (the Board) denied Petitioner a

parole release date seven times on the following dates: June 22,

1990, April 15, 1992, April 19, 1994, July 5, 1995, July 1, 1997,

June 5, 2001, and June 7, 2002. On September 18, 2003, the Board

denied Petitioner a parole release date for the eighth time,

concluding that Petitioner "would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from

prison." The Board relied on three factors: (1) the nature of the

commitment offense, stating that it was "carried out in a manner

that clearly shows lack of regard for the life and suffering of

another" with a "very trivial" motive, (2) that Petitioner had "not

sufficiently participated in beneficial self-help programs," and

(3) Petitioner's escape attempt in 1988. Although the Board also

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4

 The Board had stated eleven years earlier that Petitioner

was "getting close." (Pet.'s Ex. D at 211.) 

5

 It does not appear that Petitioner had filed any previous

habeas corpus petitions. 

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mentioned in its decision that the Butte County District Attorney's

Office and Lewis' next of kin opposed a finding of parole

suitability, the Board did not cite this as a reason for its denial

of parole. The Board acknowledged that Petitioner was "darned

close" to being suitable for parole4 and paradoxically commended

his involvement in self-help programs, his above-average work

reports, and his discipline-free record since 1988. 

Nevertheless, Petitioner was again denied parole at his April,

25, 2005 and August 15, 2006 hearings. 

Petitioner challenged the September 18, 2003 parole denial in

a habeas corpus petition filed in the Butte County superior court,

which denied it on December 30, 2004 in a pre-printed form with

checkmarks. (Pet.'s Ex. F at 327.) The checkmarks in the superior

court decision indicate only that the petition was denied because

"Petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case for relief

on habeas corpus," and that "[b]ecause it has not been adequately

established in the moving papers that there has been a change in

the applicable law or the facts, the court will not consider

repeated applications for habeas corpus presenting claims

previously rejected."5

 Id. Petitioner again challenged the parole

denial by filing a habeas corpus petition in the state court of

appeal, which summarily denied it on May 19, 2005. (Pet.'s Ex. H

at 330.) On August 17, 2005, the State Supreme Court summarily

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denied his petition for review. (Pet.'s Ex. I at 331.) 

On November 15, 2005, Petitioner filed the present habeas

corpus petition in which he claims that the Board's September 18,

2003 denial of parole violates his liberty interest in being

released on parole, an interest protected by the federal

constitutional right to due process. 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard 

A. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA), a district court may grant a petition challenging a

state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state

court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). 

Challenges to purely legal questions resolved by the state

court are reviewed under § 2254(d)(1); the question on review is

(a) whether the state court’s decision contradicts a holding of the

Supreme Court or reaches a different result on a set of facts

materially indistinguishable from those at issue in a decision of

the Supreme Court; or (b) whether the state court, after

identifying the correct governing Supreme Court holding, then

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unreasonably applied that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the

“last reasoned decision” of the state court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991). Where the state court gives no

reasoned explanation of its decision on a petitioner's federal

claim and there is no reasoned lower court decision on the claim, a

review of the record is the only means of deciding whether the

state court's decision was objectively reasonable. Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). When confronted with

such a decision, a federal court should conduct “an independent

review of the record” to determine whether the state court’s

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. Id.

B. California Standard for Parole

California Penal Code § 3041 requires that a parole date

normally be set for prisoners unless various factors exist. 

Specifically, one year prior to a prisoner's minimum eligible

release date, a panel of the Board shall normally set a parole

release date "unless it determines that the gravity of the current

convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current

or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration

of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration for this individual." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

California Code of Regulations, title 15, § 2402 sets forth

the criteria for determining whether an inmate is suitable for

release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life

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prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the

judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk

of danger to society if released from prison. Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 2402(a). California Code of Regulations, title 15, 

§ 2402(c)-(d) list the factors that tend to show unsuitability or

suitability for parole. The circumstances tending to show

unsuitability include: (1) whether the commitment offense was

committed in "an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner";

(2) the prisoner's previous record of violence; (3) "a history of

unstable or tumultuous relationships with others"; (4) commission

of "sadistic sexual offenses"; (5) "a lengthy history of severe

mental problems related to the offense"; and (6) "serious

misconduct in prison or jail." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c). 

Circumstances tending to show suitability include: (1) the prisoner

has no juvenile record; (2) the prisoner has experienced reasonably

stable relationships with others; (3) the prisoner has shown

remorse; (4) the prisoner committed his crime as the result of

significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has built

over a long period of time; (6) the prisoner lacks any significant

history of violent crime; (7) the prisoner's present age reduces

the probability of recidivism; (8) the prisoner "has made realistic

plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be

put to use upon release"; (9) "[i]nstitutional activities indicate

an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release." Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(d).

In In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1094 (2005), the

California Supreme Court interpreted California Penal Code § 3041

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and held that the Board may rely solely on the commitment offense

to deny parole by heavily weighing the degree of violence used and

the amount of viciousness shown by the prisoner. However, the

court stated that sole reliance on the commitment offense may

violate section 3041(a)'s provision that a parole date “shall

normally be set,” and thus may also contravene the inmate's

constitutionally protected expectation of parole. Id. Such a

violation could occur where no circumstances of the offense

reasonably could be considered more aggravated or violent than the

minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense. Id. at

1094-95. An offense must be “particularly egregious” to justify

the denial of parole. Id. at 1095 (citations omitted). 

C. Federally Protected Interest in Parole Release 

Under California Penal Code § 3041, state prisoners whose

sentences allow for the possibility of parole have an interest

protected by the Due Process Clause in a parole release date. 

Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) 

The Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole

board's decision deprives a prisoner of due process with respect to

his constitutionally protected liberty interest in a parole release

date if the board's decision is not supported by "some evidence in

the record," or is "otherwise arbitrary." Id. When assessing

whether a state parole board's suitability determination was

supported by "some evidence," the court's analysis is framed by the

statutes and regulations governing parole suitability

determinations in the relevant State. Id. Accordingly, in

California, the court must look to California law to determine the

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findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for

parole, and then must review the record to determine whether the

state court decision holding that these findings were supported by

"some evidence" constituted an unreasonable application of the

"some evidence" principle. Id.

Additionally, the evidence underlying the board's decision

must have some indicia of reliability. McQuillion v. Duncan, 306

F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). The court may consider the parole

board's decision-making process over time: "The Parole Board's

decision is one of ‘equity' and requires a careful balancing and

assessment of the factors considered. . . A continued reliance in

the future on an unchanging factor . . . runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result

in a due process violation." Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910,

916-17 (9th Cir. 2003). In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the

initial denial of a parole release date based solely on the nature

of the crime and the prisoner's conduct before incarceration, but

cautioned that "[o]ver time . . . , should Biggs continue to

demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation,

denying him a parole date simply because of the nature of Biggs'

offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions involving

his liberty interest in parole." Id.

In Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123,

1129 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit upheld a denial of parole

based on the commitment offense but reiterated that continued

reliance on an unchanging factor could result in a due process

violation. Like Biggs, Sass had not yet completed serving his

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minimum term at the time of the parole denial. Sass, 461 F.3d at

1125; Biggs, 332 F.3d at 912-13. 

Citing Sass, the Ninth Circuit in Irons, 479 F.3d at 664-65

found that relief for Irons was precluded because his offense was

more callous and cruel than Sass's. However, the Ninth Circuit

emphasized that in all the cases in which it had held that a parole

denial based solely on the commitment offense comported with due

process, the denial had occurred before the inmate had served his

minimum sentence. Id. at 665. The court stated, "All we held in

those cases and all we hold today, therefore, is that, given the

particular circumstances of the offenses in these cases, due

process was not violated when these prisoners were deemed

unsuitable for parole prior to the expiration of their minimum

terms." Id. The Ninth Circuit also reiterated Biggs' warning that

in some cases, indefinite detention based solely on the commitment

offense, regardless of the extent of the prisoner's rehabilitation,

will at some point violate due process. Id.

Some district courts have found that continued incarceration

based solely on the commitment offense violates due process. In

Martin v. Marshall, (Martin I) 431 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal.

2006), the district court granted the habeas corpus petition of a

prisoner whose grant of parole by the Board had been reversed by

Governor Gray Davis. The Board had granted parole after the

prisoner had completed his minimum sentence and the Governor relied

solely on the offense to reverse the grant of parole. The court

did not require a new parole hearing because it concluded that the

Board had subsequently adopted the Governor's policy of relying on

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6

 Respondent cites no authority for its contention that the

superior court's decision using checkmarks qualifies as a reasoned

decision.

13

the commitment offense to deny parole. Martin v. Marshall, (Martin

II) 448 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 

Similarly, in Brown v. Kane, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35123, at

*16-17 (N.D. Cal.) and Thomas v. Brown, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

94460, at *31-32 (N.D. Cal.), the district court found that the

Governor violated due process by relying on the commitment offenses

to reverse the Board's grants of parole to prisoners who had

completed their minimum sentences.

II. Analysis

As stated in this Court's September 19, 2006 Order Denying

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner has a federally

protected liberty interest in being released on parole. See Irons,

479 F.3d at 662. Therefore, this Court has subject matter

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to decide whether the state

court unreasonably concluded that the Board's denial of parole was

supported by some evidence and thus comported with due process.

Because the state court denial of the habeas petition was a

preprinted form with checkmarks and thus completely lacked any

reasoned explanation,6 this Court must independently review the

record to decide whether this decision was a reasonable application

of clearly established federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. In

denying the state habeas petition, the state court did not identify

the "some evidence" standard as the proper standard for reviewing

the Board's parole denial and erroneously stated that Petitioner

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had filed repeated habeas petitions. (Pet.'s Ex. F at 327-28.)

Citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr.

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979), Respondent argues that because due

process only entitles Petitioner to an opportunity to present his

case and an explanation of why the Board denied parole, Petitioner

received all process due in the parole context under federal law. 

This argument is unpersuasive. Greenholtz predates Sass and Biggs,

and the Ninth Circuit was aware of Greenholtz when it stated that

continued denials of parole based on an unchanging factor may

violate due process. 

Respondent argues next that the state court decision upholding

the denial of parole was a reasonable interpretation of the facts

and was supported by some evidence. As noted above, the Board

relied on three factors to deny parole: the nature of the

commitment offense, Petitioner's insufficient participation in

self-help programs, and Petitioner's attempted escape. Although

Respondent states that the Board also cited the opposition of the

Butte County District Attorney's Office and the victim's next of

kin as reasons for the denial, the record shows that the Board

merely mentioned this opposition and did not rely on it. The

opposition does not demonstrate Petitioner's unsuitability for

parole because it is not probative of the risk of harm Petitioner

currently poses to society. 

Addressing the nature of the offense, the Board cited its

trivial motive and lack of regard for the life and suffering of

another. That the offense showed a lack of regard for the life and

suffering of another is not a factor demonstrating unsuitability

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for parole under California Code of Regulations, title 15 

§ 2402(c); lack of regard for the life of another is common to all

murders. Rather, section 2402(c) evaluates whether the offense was

committed in an "especially" heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. 

Two of the factors listed under § 2402(c) do not apply to

Petitioner's offense because there was a single victim, and the

victim was not defiled. Three factors under § 2402(c) could show

Petitioner committed the offense in an especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel manner: whether the offense was calculated or

dispassionate; whether the offense was carried out in a manner

demonstrating an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering; and whether the motive was trivial.

Respondent argues that the fact that Petitioner borrowed the

murder weapon from a friend, told his friend that he wanted to kill

Lewis, and hid his car outside Lewis' home shows that the crime

involved planning and calculation. This interpretation of the

facts conflicts with the jury's determination that Petitioner did

not lie in wait for Lewis and did not commit first-degree murder,

an offense which requires premeditation and deliberation. The

record suggests that Petitioner's decision to confront Lewis only

occurred shortly after Petitioner overheard England, and that

Petitioner went to Lewis' home to confront him, but did not plan to

kill him. The Board did not characterize the offense as planned or

calculated and did not cite this as a reason for denying parole. 

Respondent also argues that the fact that Petitioner sneaked

into Lewis' building, forced his way into his door, and shot him

demonstrates an "exceptionally" callous disregard for human

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suffering. These circumstances do not demonstrate more callousness

than is minimally necessary for a second-degree murder conviction. 

Compared to other second-degree murders, Petitioner's offense was

not "exceptionally" callous, and neither the Board nor the state

court cited any facts to show otherwise. 

Although a trivial motive is a factor tending to support a

determination that the offense was committed in an especially

heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner, they are not synonymous. 

Thomas, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94460, at *19. Respondent does not

show that jealousy, betrayal, and unrequited love are more trivial

than the usual motives for murder. Petitioner's motive was trivial

in relation to the offense, but this alone does not establish that

the offense was especially heinous.

Respondent cites Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1095 in support of

his argument that the Board can deny parole based solely on the

commitment offense or other static factors without violating due

process. Respondent also notes that the statement in Biggs 334

F.3d at 917, that parole denial based on an unchanging factor could

violate due process, is dicta and therefore does not bind this

Court. 

Although under Dannenberg the Board may rely on the commitment

offense to deny parole by heavily weighing its degree of violence

and viciousness, the offense must be “particularly egregious” to

justify parole denial. In this case, the circumstances of the

offense were not more aggravated or violent than the minimum

necessary to sustain a conviction for second-degree murder. 

Although he committed the murder by shooting Lewis, Petitioner did

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not inflict additional violence on him.7 

Moreover, unlike the inmates in Sass, Irons, and Biggs where

the Ninth Circuit upheld the denial of parole, and like the inmates

in Martin I, Thomas, and Brown where the district courts reversed

the denials of parole, Petitioner had served substantially more

than his minimum term at the time of the Board's denial of parole. 

At some point after an inmate has served his minimum sentence the

probative value of his commitment offense as an indicator of

"unreasonable risk of danger to society" recedes below the "some

evidence" required by due process to support a denial of parole. 

Brown, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35123, at *18-19. The eleven years

that Petitioner has served above his minimum term, along with his

low security rating, participation in self-help programs, and

favorable psychological reports, reduce the predictive value of the

commitment offense. He has served more than the aggravated matrix

for second-degree murders. Petitioner's commitment offense carries

a maximum penalty of life with the possibility of parole. The

Board's decisions threaten to increase this sentence to one of life

without parole. After twenty-eight years, Petitioner's offense

alone does not satisfy the "some evidence" standard. Because

Petitioner's commitment offense no longer indicates a risk of

danger to society, it is an insufficient basis to deny parole and

the superior court unreasonably applied federal law in finding

otherwise. 

For the same reasons, the Board's reliance on Petitioner's

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attempt to escape without force nineteen years ago does not support

denial of parole. Like the commitment offense, the escape attempt

is an unchanging factor whose probative value has greatly

diminished. 

Although the Board also based its denial of parole on a

finding that Petitioner had "not sufficiently participated in

beneficial self-help programs," it repeatedly commended Petitioner

for his completion of numerous self-help programs. The Board noted

that Petitioner "has really excelled when it comes to self-help"

and that he "has been involved heavily in self-help programs,

taking it upon himself to get in programs that are not generally

offered." (Pet.'s Ex. A at 58.) No evidence supports the Board's

finding that Petitioner has not sufficiently participated in selfhelp programs. 

Further, the other factors under California Code of

Regulations, title 15 § 2402(c) tending to show unsuitability for

parole do not present "some evidence" to support denial of

Petitioner's parole: Petitioner does not have a previous record of

violence, unstable relationships, sadistic sexual offenses, mental

problems, or serious misconduct in prison. Instead, many of the 

§ 2402(d) factors show that Petitioner is suitable for parole. 

Petitioner has no other juvenile or adult criminal history, has

stable relationships with his family, has demonstrated remorse, is

at an age that reduces the probability of recidivism, has

marketable skills and realistic plans for release, and has

participated in institutional activities, such as working in a

variety of jobs and completing many self-help programs, that

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indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon

release. Petitioner's last psychological evaluation stated that he

"is an excellent candidate for parole consideration" and has a

violence potential "estimated to be no more than the average

citizen in the community, and perhaps even lower." (Pet.'s Ex. D

at 145.) 

By relying on the commitment offense, the escape attempt, and

the erroneous statement that Petitioner has not participated in

self-help programs to deny parole an eighth time, the Board

violated Petitioner's right to due process. The state court

unreasonably applied clearly established federal law to determine

that some evidence in the record supported the Board's decision. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court GRANTS the petition for

a writ of habeas corpus. The Board is ordered to hold a new parole

hearing within forty-five days of the date of this order. If no

new information is presented at the hearing that establishes that

Petitioner poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society, the

Board is ordered to find Petitioner suitable for parole and set a

release date. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 8/1/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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