Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00936/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00936-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON LEE WOLCOTT, 

Plaintiff,

v.

BOARD OF RABBIS OF NO. & SO. 

CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00936-DAD-JLT (PC)

ORDER WITHDRAWING THE 

NOVEMBER 9, 2015 FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS AND GRANTING 

LEAVE TO FILE A THIRD AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

(Doc. 18)

60-DAY DEADLINE

I. Background

The Court screened Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) and issued a findings 

and recommendation to dismiss it because it did not to state any cognizable claims. (Doc. 18.) In 

his objections, Plaintiff requested to be allowed to proceed on the claims the Court previously 

found to be cognizable in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

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 (Doc. 22.) However, once 

filed, the SAC superceded the FAC. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 

2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2012) (en banc).

Accordingly, the November 9, 2015 findings and recommendations will be vacated and 

Plaintiff is granted leave to file a third amended complaint, no more than 20 pages in length,

 

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Plaintiff’s arguments that he should be allowed to proceed on claims pertaining to his inability to convert to 

Judaism are addressed in concurrently issued findings and recommendations. 

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restricted solely to the claims in the FAC which the Court found to be cognizable. 

The legal standards are restated herein for Plaintiff’s use. Likewise, the Court provides a 

summary of Plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC upon which the Court relied in finding those earlier 

claims to be cognizable. This is absolutely the final opportunity for Plaintiff to amend his 

pleading in this case, which has been pending for nearly two years. 

A. Plaintiff=s Allegations

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleged that Warden Allison placed a substantial burden on his 

religious exercise violating Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)

and the First Amendment by not allowing him to possess the Tallit Katan and Tefillin. (Doc. 13, 

FAC, at 21:2-5.) Plaintiff further alleged that Associate Warden Reynoso partially granted his 

inmate appeal on this issue, stating that Tefillin and Tallit Katan were now authorized for chapel 

use. (Id., at 21:6-19.) Plaintiff also alleged that Associate Warden Reynoso substantially 

burdened Plaintiff's exercise of his religion in violation of RLUIPA and the First Amendment by 

not allowing inmates to possess Tefillin and Tallit Katan since chapel is only one day a week and 

takes place well after morning prayers, for which they are required. (Id.)

The Court found these allegations stated cognizable claims against Defendants Warden 

Allison and Associate Warden Reynoso for violation of Plaintiff's right to freely exercise his 

religion under the First Amendment and RLUIPA, but neither stated a cognizable claim under the 

Establishment Clause nor showed invidious discriminatory animus to support a claim under the 

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 15, p. 26.)

B. Legal Standards 

The below legal standards for the claims Plaintiff is attempting to state were specifically 

stated in the order that screened the FAC. (Doc. 15.) They are once again restated herein since 

pivotal to the dismissal of these claims with prejudice and in the hopes that by doing so, Plaintiff 

may be assisted in understanding why he cannot pursue claims under § 1983 from this no doubt 

heart-wrenching ordeal.

1. Religion 

Prisoners “do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and 

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confinement in prison.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). 

Inmates retain the protections afforded by the First Amendment, “including its directive that no 

law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 

(1987) (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam)). However, “ ‘[l]awful 

incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a 

retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.’ ” Id. (quoting Price v. 

Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).

As discussed in greater detail below, claims for violation of the Free Exercise Clause of 

the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and the Establishment Clause are used to challenge state or 

government statutes, regulations, and/or established policies. Thus, in order to state a cognizable 

claim for their violation, a plaintiff must identify an allegedly offending statute, regulation, or 

established policy. Claims regarding independent actions by state actors who are not following a 

statute, regulation, or established policy are not cognizable under § 1983 for violation of a 

plaintiff's rights under the Free Exercise Clause, RLUIPA, or the Establishment Clause. 

However, a cognizable claim may be stated for violation of a Plaintiff's rights under the Equal 

Protection Clause for discriminatory actions by individual state actors who are not following a 

statute, regulation, or established policy.

a. First Amendment -- Free Exercise 

The First Amendment, applicable to state action by incorporation through the Fourteenth 

Amendment, Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947), “prohibits government 

from making a law ‘prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].’ ” Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 (alteration 

in original). A prisoner's right to freely exercise his religion, however, is limited by institutional 

objectives and by the loss of freedom concomitant with incarceration. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348. 

A prison regulation may therefore impinge upon an inmate=s right to exercise his religion 

if the regulation is Areasonably related to legitimate penological interests.@ Shakur v. Schriro, 514 

F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). In contesting the validity of a prison regulation, 

an inmate must also show that his religious practice is Asincerely held@ and Arooted in religious 

belief." Id. at 884-85. For screening purposes, it is assumed that Plaintiff's Jewish belief is 

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sincerely held and the practices he desires are rooted in his Jewish beliefs.

b. RLUIPA 

A prisoner=s ability to freely exercise his religion is also protected by the RLUIPA. 42 

U.S.C. ' 2000cc-1. Section 3 of RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall impose a 

substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . 

. even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the government shows that 

the burden is “in furtherance of a compelling government interest” and “is the least restrictive 

means of furthering . . . that interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) (2012). “While [RLUIPA] adopts 

a compelling governmental interest standard, [c]ontext matters in the application of that 

standard.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722–23 (2005) (alteration in original) (internal 

quotation and citation omitted). Thus, “[c]ourts are expected to apply RLUIPA’s standard with 

due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing 

necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent 

with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & 

Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Under RLUIPA, plaintiffs bear the initial burden of persuasion on whether the Policy 

“substantially burdens” their “exercise of religion.” § 2000cc–2(b). RLUIPA defines “religious 

exercise” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a 

system of religious belief.” § 2000cc-5(7)(A). A "substantial burden" occurs “where the state ... 

denies [an important benefit] because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting 

substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Warsoldier 

v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir.2005) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

Damages claims are not available under the RLUIPA against prison officials in their 

individual capacity, Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2014); nor in their official capacity 

because of sovereign immunity, Sossamon v. Texas, --- U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct. 1651 (2011); Alvarez v. 

Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012). 

///

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(i.) Non-ceremonial artifacts

Plaintiff alleged in the FAC that prior to 2008, inmates were allowed to possess the 

Tefillin in their cells, but that sometime later, for unknown reasons, prison officials prohibited 

their possession. (Doc. 13, 20:8-23.) Since August of 2008, Kippahs were not allowed to be 

worn while in the Dining Hall and possession of the Tallit Katan and Tefillin were denied 

completely. (Id.) Kippah and Tallit Katan are to be worn at all times as a sign of respect and 

humility before God and as a reminder to obey God’s commandments. (Id.) Tefillin are worn 

during the weekdays in conjunction with the recitation of morning prayers. (Id.) Chaplin Sharon 

was asked to speak with the warden about their importance and he provided a copy of the 

memorandum that previously allowed inmates to possess Tefillin. (Id., at 20:24-27.) Warden 

Allison subsequently issued a memorandum that Jewish inmates may wear their Kippahs at all 

times, but inmates could not possess the Tallit Katan and Tefillin in their cells. (Id., at 20:27-

21:2.) Plaintiff alleged that Warden Allison placed a substantial burden on his religious exercise 

violating RLUIPA and the First Amendment by not allowing him to possess the Tallit Katan and 

Tefillin. (Id., at 21:2-5.) Plaintiff claimed that Associate Warden Reynoso partially granted his 

inmate appeal on this issue, stating that Tefillin and Tallit Katan were now authorized for chapel 

use. (Id., at 21:6-19.) Associate Warden Reynoso substantially burdened Plaintiff's exercise of 

his religion in violation of RLUIPA and the First Amendment by not allowing inmates to possess 

Tefillin and Tallit Katan since chapel is only one day a week and takes place well after morning 

prayers, for which they are required. 

The Court found these allegations in the FAC to state cognizable claims against 

Defendants Warden Allison and Associate Warden Reynoso for violation of Plaintiff's right to 

freely exercise his religion under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. However, the allegations 

did not state a cognizable claim under the Establishment Clause or demonstrate invidious 

discriminatory animus necessary to support a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. (See Doc. 15, 25:16-26:15.)

II. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff is given leave to file a third amended complaint restricted to his claims against 

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Defendants Warden Allison and Associate Warden Reynoso for violation of Plaintiff's right to 

freely exercise his religion under the First Amendment and RLUIPA regarding Plaintiff's ability 

to possess the Tefillin and the Tallit Katan. A third amended complaint must not exceed 20 

pages and must be filed within 30 days of the service of this order. 

Plaintiff is reminded that an amended complaint, must demonstrate how the conditions 

complained of resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). An amended complaint must also allege in specific terms how each 

named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some 

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Plaintiff's third amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and 

plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555

(2007) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff is further informed that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to [any] prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. However, Plaintiff would do well to either simply copy the FAC, 

draw a line through the word “First” and write the word “Third,” or copy his allegations against 

Defendants Warden Allison and Associate Warden Reynoso as stated in the FAC directly into his 

third amended complaint.

The Court provides Plaintiff with on final opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll 

v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this 

suit by adding new, unrelated claims or defendants in a third amended complaint. George v. 

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints). Any third amended 

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complaint, must be no more than 20 pages in length. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS: 

1. The Findings and Recommendation, that issued on November 9, 2015 (Doc. 18), to 

dismiss this action in its entirety are WITHDRAWN;

2. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a third amended complaint, restricted to the claims 

as discussed herein which were previously found cognizable in the First Amended 

Complaint; 

3. The Clerk's Office is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; 

4. Within 60 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either: 

a. file a third amended complaint; or 

b. file a notice of voluntary dismissal.

If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, a recommendation will issue for this action to be 

dismissed for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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