Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06222/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06222-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 “Lodged Doc.” refers to the documents lodged by Respondent on April 14, 2005. 1

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY L. WARD, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

RICHARD KIRKLAND, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:04-CV-06222 OWW NEW (DLB) HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Merced, following his conviction by jury

trial on May 3, 2001, of possession of a firearm by a felon (Cal. Penal Code § 12021(a)(1)),

possession of ammunition by a prohibited person (Cal. Penal Code § 12316(b)(1)), and possession of

cocaine base (Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11350). See Lodged Doc. No. 1. In addition, 1

Case 1:04-cv-06222-OWW -GSA Document 23 Filed 10/24/07 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

allegations that Petitioner possessed cocaine base while armed with a firearm (Cal. Health and Safety

Code § 11370.1(a)) and that Petitioner had suffered two prior serious felonies (Cal. Penal Code

§ 1170.12(c)(2)(A)) were found to be true. Id. On July 10, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to serve a

total indeterminate term of seventy-eight years to life in state prison. Id. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

(hereinafter “Fifth DCA”). On November 21, 2002, the Fifth DCA ordered the sentence stayed as to

Count Two and remanded the case to the sentencing court to prepare an amended abstract of

judgment. See Lodged Doc. No. 4. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. Id. On remand,

the sentencing court amended the abstract of judgment to correctly reflect the amended sentence of

fifty years to life. See Lodged Doc. No. 5. Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court on January 2, 2003. See Lodged Doc. No. 6. The petition was summarily denied on

February 11, 2003. Id.

On August 18, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. See Lodged Doc. No. 7. On April 14, 2004, the petition was summarily denied on

procedural grounds with citation to In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756 (1953), In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300,

304 (1949), People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995), and In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709 (1947).

On September 9, 2004, the Court received a federal habeas petition which Petitioner had filed

in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. On October 12, 2004,

Petitioner filed a motion to amend the petition and an amended petition naming a proper respondent.

The Court granted Petitioner’s motion on October 20, 2004. On the same date, the Court issued an

order dismissing the amended petition with leave to file a second amended petition, because the first

amended petition did not state cognizable claims for relief. On November 22, 2004, Petitioner filed

the instant second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner presented four claims for

relief. However after a review of the petition, on December 1, 2004, the Court issued a Findings and

Recommendation which recommended Grounds Three and Four be dismissed for failure to state

cognizable claims. The District Court adopted the Findings and Recommendation in full and

dismissed Grounds Three and Four on January 18, 2005. Respondent filed an answer to the second

amended petition on April 14, 2005. Petitioner did not file a traverse. 

Case 1:04-cv-06222-OWW -GSA Document 23 Filed 10/24/07 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The factual summary of the case is derived from the unpublished opinion of the Fifth DCA of November 21, 2002. 2

See Lodged Doc. No. 4.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 3

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Shortly after midnight on October 14, 2000, at the Trail’s End bar in Merced, California, a

patron told the doorman and bouncer, Billy Magar, that a man had been “flashing” a gun to others.

Magar told the owner to call the police, which she did. Merced Police Officers Richard Howard and

Don King responded to the call, and were informed that the man with the gun was wearing a

Pendleton shirt and a fishing hat. The officers found Petitioner’s sister, Collette Presley, standing in

the doorway to the men’s room yelling at someone inside the restroom. After Officer Howard moved

Presley out of the way, he found Petitioner and Lamel Winzer inside the restroom. They appeared to

be arguing. Petitioner was wearing a Pendleton shirt and a fishing hat. 

Officer Howard told Petitioner he was investigating a report that someone had a gun.

Petitioner told Howard that he had something and asked Howard to let him “get rid of it.” Officer

Howard found a .32-caliber semi-automatic handgun loaded with a nine-round clip tucked in the

waistband of Petitioner’s pants. He also found six foil-wrapped rocks of cocaine inside a pack of

Basic brand cigarettes in Petitioner’s shirt pocket. Officer Howard opined that the amount and

separate packaging of the cocaine indicated it was possessed for the purpose of sale.

Officer Howard further testified that Petitioner volunteered an explanation of why he

possessed the gun. He told Howard that he had argued with two men. Petitioner fished the gun out of

the restroom’s trash can after one of the men threw it there.

Defense Evidence

Petitioner and Presley testified regarding the events leading up to the charged incident.

Petitioner met up with his sister, his girlfriend, and another female friend. Presley bought two packs

of Newport brand cigarettes for herself and Petitioner. Petitioner testified he only smokes Newport

cigarettes, except when incarcerated. The group also had a few drinks before arriving at the Trail’s

End bar.

Presley testified that she had a gun in her purse because she had been harassed by a stalker in

Case 1:04-cv-06222-OWW -GSA Document 23 Filed 10/24/07 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

the previous months and she feared for her life. She encountered Winzer outside the bar and ended

up in a heated confrontation with him regarding an altercation Winzer had with Presley’s husband

several years ago. Presley held her gun at her side during the argument because she was fearful that

Winzer might hit her.

Someone in the bar told Petitioner that his sister was behaving foolishly outside the bar. He

went to investigate and found Presley with a gun in her hand, arguing with Winzer. He put the gun in

his waistband and took it to the bathroom to unload and get rid of it. Winzer did not see the gun.

Winzer walked to the bathroom with Petitioner, talking casually.

Petitioner and Winzer then heard Presley approaching the bathroom, yelling at Winzer.

Petitioner entered the restroom first, attempting to conceal the gun from Winzer. The clip was stuck

inside the weapon, so Petitioner put the gun back in his waistband. The police then arrived, searched

Petitioner, and found the gun. Petitioner did not know where the pack of Basic cigarettes came from.

He had left his pack of Newport cigarettes at the bar. Petitioner denied having told Officer Howard

that he retrieved the gun from a trash can.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Merced County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly,

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. th th

denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

Case 1:04-cv-06222-OWW -GSA Document 23 Filed 10/24/07 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 5

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70

(2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly

established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

Case 1:04-cv-06222-OWW -GSA Document 23 Filed 10/24/07 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court notes that Grounds Three and Four were dismissed by the District Court on January 18, 2005. 3

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 6

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims3

A. Ground One

At trial, Petitioner produced evidence that he took the gun from Presley and possessed it only

because he feared Presley would shoot Winzer. Petitioner testified he went directly to the men’s

room to dispose of the gun but was interrupted by the police officers. In his first claim for relief,

Petitioner argues the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the defense of

necessity. 

Generally, issues of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas. Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67, (1991) ("We have stated many times that 'federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for

Case 1:04-cv-06222-OWW -GSA Document 23 Filed 10/24/07 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 7

errors of state law.' "), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). In reviewing jury

instruction on federal habeas, the issue is “whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67, quoting Cupp

v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). The burden on the habeas petitioner is “especially heavy”

where, as here, the alleged error involves the failure to give an instruction. Hendricks v. Vasquez,

974 F.2d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.1992) (as amended), quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155

(1977); Reynolds v. Maddock, 1999 WL 354366, *3 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 

The Supreme Court has held due process mandates that criminal prosecutions comport with

prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).

Implicit in this standard of fairness is the requirement that “criminal defendants be afforded a

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Id. When habeas relief is sought under 28

U.S.C. § 2254, “[f]ailure to instruct on the defense theory of the case is reversible error if the theory

is legally sound and evidence in the case makes it applicable.” Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560,

577 (9th Cir.2004) (as amended); see also Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir.2002)

(“[T]he right to present a defense would be empty if it did not entail the further right to an instruction

that allowed the jury to consider the defense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Conde v. Henry,

198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.2000) (as amended) (“It is well established that a criminal defendant is

entitled to adequate instructions on the defense theory of the case.”). A habeas petitioner must show

that the alleged instructional error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (citation omitted); see also

Beardslee, 358 F.3d at 578.

This claim was first presented on direct appeal to the Fifth DCA. The Fifth DCA denied the

claim in a reasoned opinion. See Lodged Doc. No. 4. Petitioner then raised the claim in a petition for

review before the California Supreme Court, and the petition was summarily denied. See Lodged

Doc. No. 6. The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying review of the Fifth DCA’s

decision, is presumed to have denied the claims presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion

of the 5 DCA. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). th

In rejecting this claim, the Fifth DCA found the facts presented to the jury did not support a

Case 1:04-cv-06222-OWW -GSA Document 23 Filed 10/24/07 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript lodged by Respondent with the Court. 4

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 8

necessity claim because Petitioner did not establish that he had no reasonable legal alternative to

taking the gun from his sister and keeping it himself. Under California law, a defense of necessity

requires that the defendant show:

1) the defendant committed the criminal act to prevent a significant and imminent harm to

another; 2) there was no reasonable legal alternative to his act; 3) harm from the illegal act

was not disproportionate to the harm to be avoided; 4) his act was in good faith; and (5)

objectively reasonable; and (6) he did not substantially contribute to the creation of the

emergency. 

See Lodged Doc. No. 4. 

The appellate court stated:

While the defense did present evidence that [Petitioner] took the gun from Presley to 

prevent her from shooting Winzer, no evidence was presented that [Petitioner] had no

reasonable, legal alternative to taking and keeping the gun. [Petitioner] asserts that “there was

no evidence that [anyone] else present at the altercation would have been a more responsible

person to whom to give the weapon.” This assertion was soundly contradicted by evidence

that the owner as well as a bouncer were present. Magar, appropriately responded to news

that someone was showing a gun to other patrons by asking the bar owner to call the police.

The bar owner also responded to this dangerous situation by calling the police. Thus, there

were at least two individuals to whom [Petitioner] may have turned for assistance with a

dangerous situation.

Even if the evidence did show that the need to remove the gun from Presley was too

immediate to wait for help to be summoned, [Petitioner’s] continued possession of the gun

after he took it from Presley constituted a violation of the statute. Because [Petitioner’s]

evidence, even if believed by the jury, was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the

elements of the defense of necessity, the instruction was unnecessary. [Citations omitted.]

See Lodged Doc. No. 4.

As found by the appellate court, Petitioner has not shown error on the part of the trial court in

failing to instruct the jury on the necessity defense. Petitioner failed to present evidence that there

were no reasonable alternatives to his acts of taking the gun, concealing it on his person, retaining

possession of it until police arrived, and then relinquishing it only after the police forcibly seized it

from him. (RT 47, 192-193.) 4

The state court rejection of this claim was not unreasonable. It should be denied.

B. Ground Two

Petitioner next argues defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request instructions on the

defense of necessity.

Case 1:04-cv-06222-OWW -GSA Document 23 Filed 10/24/07 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 9

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe, 151

F.3d 1226, 1229 (9 Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance

th

of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must

th

show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so

serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were

not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United

States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9 Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's th

performance is highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9 Cir.1994). th

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different," 466 U.S., at 694. Petitioner

must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, one whose

result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court must evaluate whether the entire trial was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78

F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356, 1461 (9 Cir. 1994). th

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining

the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S.

668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2074 (1984). Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice, any

deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. However, there are certain instances

which are legally presumed to result in prejudice, e.g., where there has been an actual or constructive

denial of the assistance of counsel or where the State has interfered with counsel’s assistance. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S., at 659, and n. 25, 104 S.Ct., at

2046-2047, and n. 25 (1984). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the

Case 1:04-cv-06222-OWW -GSA Document 23 Filed 10/24/07 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 10

“unreasonable application” prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle,

215 F.3d 1058, 1062 (2000). 

This claim was also presented on direct appeal and rejected by the Fifth DCA. It was also

presented in the petition for review to the California Supreme Court where it was summarily denied.

In rejecting this claim, the appellate court applied the Strickland standard discussed above. 

The court found counsel did not perform deficiently, and in any case, Petitioner suffered no prejudice

resulting from the alleged error of omission. For the same reasons discussed above, this claim should

also be rejected. Petitioner did not produce sufficient evidence to merit an instruction on the defense

of necessity; thus, counsel cannot be faulted for his failure to request the instruction. And because

the evidence was legally insufficient, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice.

As with the first claim, the denial of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of controlling Supreme Court authority, and it too should be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Respondent. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304

of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Case 1:04-cv-06222-OWW -GSA Document 23 Filed 10/24/07 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 11

Dated: October 24, 2007 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

60kij8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06222-OWW -GSA Document 23 Filed 10/24/07 Page 11 of 11