Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_05-cv-00497/USCOURTS-alsd-2_05-cv-00497-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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On January 20, 2007, Linda S. McMahon became the Acting Commissioner of

Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Linda S. McMahon has been substituted, therefore, for Commissioner

Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the Defendant in this suit. No further action need be

taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g)

of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

PRISCILLA JONES, *

 * 

Plaintiff, *

*

vs. * CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-00497-CG-B

*

LINDA S. McMAHON,1 *

Commissioner of *

Social Security, *

*

Defendant. *

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Priscilla Jones (“Plaintiff”) brings this action seeking

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying her claim for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. and 1381 et seq. The parties

waived oral argument on February 6, 2007. (Doc. 17). Upon careful

consideration of the administrative record and the memoranda of the

parties, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the decision of the Commissioner

is due to be AFFIRMED.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for disability insurance

benefits and supplemental security income on June 16, 2003. (Tr. 12, 76-

78, 84, 188-192). She alleged that she has been disabled since May 8,

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2003, due to diabetes, bullets in her legs, foot swelling and numbness,

and poor vision. (Id.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and

upon reconsideration. (Id. at 55-61, 191-197). Plaintiff filed a timely

Request for Hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at

62). On January 31, 2005, Administrative Law Judge Frances P. Kuperman

(“ALJ Kuperman”) held an administrative hearing which was attended by

Plaintiff, her representative and a vocational expert. (Id. at 26-54).

On May 25, 2005, ALJ Kuperman entered an unfavorable decision wherein he

concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled because she retains the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light and sedentary work, and can

perform her past relevant work (“PRW”). (Id. at 8-24). Plaintiff’s

request for review was denied by the Appeals Council (“AC”) on August 2,

2005, thereby making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the

Commissioner under 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. (Tr. 4-6). The parties agree

that this case is now ripe for judicial review and is properly before

this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).

II. Issues On Appeal

A. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to obtain a residual functional

capacity assessment from a treating or examining physician in

determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, and by failing

to include all of her severe impairments in his determination?

B. Whether the ALJ erred by failing to include all of Plaintiff’s

severe impairments in the hypothetical posed to the vocational

expert?

C. Whether the ALJ erred by failing to consider the impact of her

obesity?

D. Whether the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff does not meet

Listing 12.05C?

III. Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on February 22, 1951, and was 53 years old at the

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time of the hearing. (Tr. 76). She has a 10th grade education and last

worked as a cashier. (Id. at 29, 87-89, 100, 105). According to

Plaintiff, she was laid off in 2003, and received unemployment benefits

for one year. (Id. at 36-37, 44-48). At the January 31, 2005

administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she is 5'11" and

currently weighs 260 pounds. (Id. at 29-30, 40). Plaintiff testified

that 10 years ago, she weighed 170 pounds. (Id.) She testified that

she can no longer walk or stand like she used to, due to her weight.

(Id. at 40). She testified that she has diabetes for which she takes

insulin everyday. (Tr. 31, 33-34, 41-44). Plaintiff testified that her

diabetes causes numbness in her feet and hands and makes it difficult for

her to work because she cannot sit or stand for long periods of time, and

the toes on her left foot go numb. (Id.) Plaintiff also testified that

she was shot in her left leg in 1985, that she had to learn to walk again

and is now unable to stand for long periods of time. (Id. at 34-35, 38-

39). Plaintiff testified further, that she has trouble sleeping, and

that she has been depressed a lot but has not seen anyone about it due

to a lack of money and insurance. (Id. at 33, 41-42). Regarding daily

activities, Plaintiff testified that her daughter performs her household

chores, such as sweeping and cooking, for her, but she sometimes goes to

the store to shop. (Id. at 33-34). According to Plaintiff, she spends

most days sitting or laying down watching television. (Id. at 32, 35).

Plaintiff testified that she cannot return to her past work because she

cannot “handle” her hands, see well or concentrate. (Tr. 38). She also

noted problems standing due to feet and leg pain, as well as an inability

to lift. (Id. at 38-39). Plaintiff testified that she takes Motrin,

which helps “[a] little bit.” (Id. at 43-44). Her other reported

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This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal

principles is plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

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medications have included Novolin, Insulin, Tylenol Arthritis, Advil,

Benadryl, Glucotrol and HCTZ. (Id. at 113, 117, 118, 122-123). 

IV. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s role is a

limited one. The Court’s review is limited to determining: 1) whether

the decision of the Secretary is supported by substantial evidence; and

2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. Martin v. Sullivan,

894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).2 A court may not decide the facts

anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986). The

Commissioner’s findings of fact must be affirmed if they are based upon

substantial evidence. Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir.

1991); Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)

(holding that substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla

but less than a preponderance” and consists of “such relevant evidence

as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a

conclusion[]”). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, a

court must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence

favorable, as well as unfavorable, to the Commissioner’s decision.

Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986); Short v. Apfel,

1999 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 10163 (S.D. Ala. 1999).

B. Discussion

An individual who applies for Social Security disability benefits

must prove her disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912. Disability

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The claimant must first prove that he or she has not engaged in

substantial gainful activity. The second step requires the claimant to prove

that he or she has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. If, at

the third step, the claimant proves that the impairment or combination of

impairments meets or equals a listed impairment, then the claimant is

automatically found disabled regardless of age, education, or work experience. 

If the claimant cannot prevail at the third step, he or she must proceed to

the fourth step where the claimant must prove an inability to perform their

past relevant work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In

evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden, the examiner must

consider the following four factors: (1) objective medical facts and clinical

findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; (4) the

claimant’s age, education and work history. Id. at 1005. Once a claimant

meets this burden, it becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove at the fifth

step that the claimant is capable of engaging in another kind of substantial

gainful employment which exists in significant numbers in the national

economy, given the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education,

and work history. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834 (11th Cir. 1985). If the

Commissioner can demonstrate that there are such jobs the claimant can

perform, the claimant must prove inability to perform those jobs in order to

be found disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). See

also Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Francis v.

Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

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is defined as the “inability to do any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42

U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The Social Security

regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for

determining if a claimant has proven her disability. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520, 416.920.3

In case sub judice, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date.

(Tr. 11-24). The ALJ concluded that while Plaintiff has the severe

impairments of insulin dependent diabetes mellitus (“IDDM”), obesity,

tendinitis/bursitis of the shoulders and mild arthritis of the left foot,

and the nonsevere impairment of depression, these impairments do not meet

or medically equal the criteria for any of the impairments listed in 20

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While other records relating to Plaintiff’s treatment have been

reviewed, only those records relating specifically to her claims on appeal

will be discussed herein.

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C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Regulations No. 4. (Id.) The ALJ

found Plaintiff’s allegations of pain and functional limitations not

fully credible and adopted Dr. Nayeem’s functional assessment as her

residual functional capacity (“RFC”), to then conclude that she retains

the RFC to perform a range of light and sedentary work and is able to

perform her past relevant work (“PRW”) as a cashier, such that she is not

disabled. (Id.)

The undersigned finds that substantial evidence of record supports

the ALJ’s decision. Relevant4 evidence reveals that Plaintiff was treated

for obesity and diabetes mellitus (“DM”) by Arlene Moskovich, M.D. (“Dr.

Moskovich”), as follows (Tr. 119-124):

• June 18, 1996: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

had been shot in her left leg in 1987 and that her left

foot swells and is painful when she works and stands on

it. Upon exam, she had left foot tenderness and edema.

She was assessed with edema, probably secondary to the

old injury. She was advised to elevate her leg and was

given HCTZ.

• September 24, 1997: Treatment notes reflect that

Plaintiff complained of feeling dizzy. She was assessed

with diabetes poor control and obesity. She was

prescribed a 1,500 calorie ADA diet, Glucotrol, Diabetic

teaching and was advised to return in 2 weeks.

• October 8, 1997: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

appeared for a follow-up visit for diabetes. RBS 144.

• March 11, 1998: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

appeared for a follow-up for diabetes and indicated that

she needed a prescription. RBS was noted. She was

assessed with diabetes, hyperlipidemia and obesity. She

was advised to follow a 1,500 calorie low fat diet and

was placed back on Glucotrol.

• June 16, 1998: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

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appeared for a follow-up exam for diabetes. She was

assessed with diabetes and her Glucotrol was increased.

Plaintiff was treated at the Vaughan Regional Medical Center in July

1999. (Id. at 148-152). Treatment records reveal that Plaintiff was

“somewhat obese” at 268 pounds, and that she was being treated with

Glucotrol to control her blood sugar levels. (Id.) Plaintiff was

treated by Frank Dozier, M.D. (“Dr. Dozier”) of the Family Medical Center

as follows (Id. at 143-147, 160-163, 177-178, 185-187):

• March 10, 1999: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

was out of her diabetes medication. She indicated that

she felt well, but it was noted that her blood sugar

level was slightly elevated. 

• November 18, 1999: Treatment notes reflect that

Plaintiff’s blood sugar level was 228 and that she

weighed 2661⁄2 pounds. She was assessed with uncontrolled

DM, her insulin was increased and it was recommended

that she use a Glucometer at home. 

• September 18, 2000: Treatment notes reflect that

Plaintiff presented for a blood sugar level check. It

was noted that she was using her Glucometer

infrequently. Her exam revealed that she weighed 286

pounds and that her blood sugar level was 288. She was

assessed with uncontrolled DM and her insulin was

increased. 

• October 3, 2000: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

weighed 271 pounds and that her blood sugar level was

262. Her diabetes was not controlled. It was

recommended that she start walking and her insulin was

increased. 

• June 6, 2001: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

weighed 266 pounds and reported that her feet hurt.

• June 11, 2001: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

reported that her feet hurt and that she felt badly.

Her exam revealed that she was in no acute distress.

She weighed 268 pounds and her blood sugar level was

223. She had good peripheral perfusion and pulses and

had minimal edema. She was noncompliant, and was

assessed with Type II diabetes, non-compliant diabetic

neuropathy. She was advised to continue on Humulin and

to add Glucophage. 

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• November 27, 2001: Treatment notes reflect that

Plaintiff complained of pain in her left shoulder. She

reported that she had been out of Glucophage for a “good

while” and that her blood sugar levels had been good

when taking her medication. Her exam revealed mild

crepitus of the left paraspinal area in the left scapula

area and a blood sugar level of 289. She weighed 261

pounds. She was assessed with probable bursitis and

uncontrolled diabetes mellitus. It was recommended that

Plaintiff check her blood sugar routinely.

• February 8, 2002: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

reported that her blood sugar levels had been 231 at

home and were fluctuating. She weighed 261 pounds. It

was noted that she was becoming dependent on Insulin, so

she could discontinue Glucophage, as it “doesn’t seem to

have made any difference.”

• October 29, 2002: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

reported pain in her right arm and shoulder over the

last four days. Her exam revealed that she was

neurologically intact with good distal pulses and

shoulder tenderness with no swelling. Her x-rays were

negative. She was assessed with probable inflammation

of the right shoulder and prescribed medication for

discomfort and given Ultram for ulcers.

• March 21, 2003: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

weighed 263 pounds and that her insulin was increased.

 

• October 21, 2003: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff

complained of mild tenderness of the right arm and that

her blood sugar level was in the 200s. She was assessed

with uncontrolled diabetes and probable tendinitis of

the right shoulder and arm. Her Humulin dosage was

changed, and she was advised to take Aleve for the

tendinitis.

• October 28, 2003: Treatment notes reflect that

Plaintiff’s lab results were discussed with her. She

was also advised regarding exercise and diet. Her

insulin was increased. 

• July 14, 2004: Treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff’s

diabetes was in “fair control,” and that she weighed 264

pounds.

On August 15, 2003, Plaintiff presented to Mohammed A. Nayeem, M.D.

(“Dr. Nayeem”) for a consultative exam. (Tr. 164-167). Upon

examination: 1) her upper extremities showed normal peripheral pulses,

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normal skin with no vascular changes, normal muscle tone with no wasting,

intact sensation to pain, touch and temperature, normal and symmetric

deep tendon reflexes, normal muscle coordination, normal joint inspection

and normal range of motion of the shoulders, elbows, wrists and fingers;

2) her lower extremities showed normal muscle strength with no wasting,

intact sensations for pain, touch and temperature, normal and symmetric

deep tendon reflexes, normal vibration and joint sense, normal muscle

coordination, normal peripheral pulses, no edema, varicose veins or

vascular changes, and normal range of motion of hips, knees and ankles;

and 3) her spinal exam revealed no tenderness, no scoliosis, normal

musculature, full range of motion, and negative straight leg raising at

80 degrees. (Id.) She had no arthritis, no breathing problems, no chest

pain or shortness of breath, and a normal appetite. (Id. at 165). Her

mental state was normal, she was oriented to time and space, and she had

an intact memory. (Id.) She could not perform the heel to toe walk due

to extreme obesity and could not squat more than half of the way down due

to obesity; however, she could dress herself, climb on and off of the

exam table, and had a normal gait. (Id. at 167). Plaintiff’s L-spine

X-rays revealed degenerative disc disease (“DDD”) with degenerative joint

disease (“DJD”) of the lower lumbar spine, and left foot x-rays revealed

mild degenerative disease of the tarsal joints of the left foot. (Id.)

Dr. Nayeem diagnosed Plaintiff with gross obesity exogenous; adult

onset IDDM under poor control, possibly due to excessive eating and no

diet program; DJD and DDD of the lower back, asymptomatic at the present

time, noting that she has normal back movements and walks with normal

gait; and DJD of the left foot with episodes of occasional pain, noting

that she walks with normal gait. (Tr. 167). Dr. Nayeem concluded that

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Plaintiff infers that the individual who completed this evaluation is

not a physician as the signature is illegible and does not indicate a medical

degree.

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Plaintiff needed to lose some weight, and that weight loss would get her

diabetes under good control and prevent her arthritis from getting worse.

(Id.) He opined that she could not perform strenuous physical activity

or heavy manual labor due to extreme obesity, but that she could take

part in mild to moderate activities. (Id.) He further opined that with

proper amount of weight loss, Plaintiff could be fully functional. (Id.)

On September 12, 2003, a State Agency medical consultant (Identified

by Code number “19")5 completed a Residual Physical Functional Capacity

Assessment, noting Plaintiff’s diagnoses of exogenous obesity, diabetes

and DJD in the lower back and left foot (per Dr. Nayeem’s findings).

(Id. at 168-175). The consultant concluded that Plaintiff can

occasionally lift/carry up to 50 pounds; frequently lift/carry up to 25

pounds; stand/walk/sit for 6 hours per 8 hour workday; has unlimited

push/pull abilities; frequently climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes and

scaffolds, as well as balance, stoop and crawl; occasionally kneel and

crouch; and has no manipulative, visual, communicative or environmental

limitations. (Id.) 

On April 29, 2004, Donald W. Blanton, Ph.D. (“Dr. Blanton”)

performed a psychological evaluation. (Tr. 179-182). Dr. Blanton found

that Plaintiff was “a simple, open woman whose mental retardation was

obvious[].” (Id. at 180). Her mental examination revealed that she had

normal thoughts and conversation; intact associations; a flat but

appropriate and labile affect; no confusion; a depressed mood; poor

sleep; a fair appetite; stable weight with low energy; no psychomotor

retardation or agitation; no suicidal ideation; limited insight; no

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evidence of hallucinations, delusions or persecutory type fears; no

phobias or obsessive compulsive traits; she was alert; her intelligence

was “below[;]” and her judgment was fair for work and financial type

decisions. (Id. at 179-182). WAIS-III test scores revealed a verbal IQ

69, performance IQ 69 and full scale IQ 66, placing her in the mild range

of mental retardation. (Id. at 181). WRAT-III testing revealed that she

received a reading score of 70, spelling score of 72 and arithmetic score

of 75 (5th grade level). (Id.) MMPI testing was attempted but the

results were “invalidated” by “a combination of poor intellect and poor

reading ability.” (Id.) Beck Depression Inventory II testing placed

Plaintiff in the moderately depressed range. (Tr. 181). In conclusion,

Dr. Blanton assessed Plaintiff with anxiety and a moderate level of

depression since the onset of her diabetes and chronic pain (Axis I);

mild mental retardation (Axis II); leg pain, diabetes and obesity (Axis

III); financial problems (Axis IV); and a GAF of 50 (Axis V). (Id. at

182). 

Also on this date, Dr. Blanton completed a Mental Medical Source

Opinion Form, in which he concluded that Plaintiff has mild limitations

in her abilities to maintain activities of daily living, understand,

remember and carry out simple instructions, respond appropriately to

supervision and co-workers, deal with changes in a routine work setting,

respond appropriately to customers or other members of the general

public, and use judgment in simple one or two step work-related

decisions; and marked limitations in her abilities to understand,

remember and carry out detailed or complex instructions, respond to

customary work pressures, use judgment in detailed or complex workrelated decisions, and maintain attention, concentration or pace for

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periods of at least two hours. (Id. at 183). It was also noted that she

had a mild degree of deterioration in personal habits and a mild degree

of constriction of interests. (Id. at 184). Dr. Blanton opined that

these limitations would last for 12 months or longer and have existed at

their severity levels for 1 year; that her pain allegations are

consistent with clinical findings; that her condition is likely to

deteriorate if placed under stress, especially that of a job; and that

“[r]ehabilitation will be very difficult due to the combination of MR,

poor academic skills, physical and emotional problems.” (Id.) 

A. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to obtain a residual functional

capacity assessment from a treating or examining physician in

determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, and by failing

to include all of her severe impairments in his determination?

Plaintiff contends that in determining her RFC, the ALJ erred by

failing to obtain an RFC assessment from “a treating physician or

examining physician,” and instead relying upon the findings of Dr. Nayeem

and a State Agency physician. In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ

stated as follows:

. . . . In [evaluating the claimant’s residual functional

capacity], I have considered the revised criteria for residual

functional capacity assessment . . . . In addition, I have

considered the claimant’s subjective complaints, including

those regarding pain . . . Medical opinions as to the

claimant’s work capacity, including those of Disability

Determination Services (DDS) consultants, have been evaluated

. . . .

(Tr. 19).

It is the task of the ALJ to determine a claimant’s RFC. See, e.g,

Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1238-1239 (11th Cir. 2004). RFC is

what the claimant is still able to do despite her impairments, and is

based on all relevant medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.

An RFC can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations.

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For the reasons discussed infra, Plaintiff’s additional claim that the

ALJ failed to include all of her severe impairments in his RFC determination 

– because he relied on Dr. Nayeem’s functional assessment which she argues

failed to include her severe impairment of shoulder bursitis/tendonitis – 

also lacks merit, because Dr. Nayeem did examine her shoulder and complaints

with regard to same.

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Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1242-1243. These limitations include a restriction

to a particular physical exertion level (sedentary, light, medium or

heavy) and a particular skill level (unskilled, semi-skilled or skilled).

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567, 404.1568. Each level is defined by regulation.

Id. The RFC determination is used both to determine whether the

claimant: 1) can return to her PRW under the fourth step; and 2) can

adjust to other work under the fifth step. Id. Thus, in determining

whether Plaintiff can return to her PRW, the ALJ must determine her RFC

using all relevant medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1545. That is, the ALJ must determine if she is limited to a

particular work level. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567, 404.1568. Once the ALJ

assesses Plaintiff’s RFC, if it is determined that she cannot return to

her PRW, the ALJ moves on to the fifth step to determine if there are

other jobs in the economy that she can perform.

In this case, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is

flawed because he failed to obtain an RFC assessment from “a treating or

examining physician.”6 Contrary to Plaintiff’s claim, however, the ALJ

did rely on the functional findings of an examining physician, namely, Dr.

Nayeem, in determining her RFC. (Tr. 15-16, 19, 21-23). While Plaintiff

claims that Dr. Nayeem’s findings – that she cannot perform strenuous

physical activity or heavy manual labor – are “vague and insufficient”

because he failed to identify her abilities on a function-by-function

basis, and failed to address her severe impairment of tendonitis/bursitis

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 13 of 27
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of the left shoulder, the record reveals that Dr. Nayeem conducted a

proper examination and made appropriate findings. For instance, Dr.

Nayeem specifically recognized Plaintiff’s left arm complaints and

assessed her upper extremities during his exam, as well as assessed her

functionality, by noting the following: 

• she complained of pain in both arms particularly near the

shoulder area; 

• she reported being able to lift up to 20 pounds; 

• she has full forward bending of her back; 

• the examination of her upper extremities revealed normal

peripheral pulses, normal skin with no vascular changes,

normal muscle tone with no wasting, intact sensation to

pain, touch and temperature, normal and symmetric dep

tendon reflexes, normal muscle coordination, normal joint

inspection, normal palpitation and a normal range of

motion in her shoulders, elbows, wrists and fingers;

• she had DJD and DDD of her lower back, asymptomatic at

the present time with back movements normal; and

• she can take part in mild to moderate activities.

See supra. Thus, Dr. Nayeem did assess Plaintiff’s functional abilities

although he did not complete a formal RFC assessment. Additionally,

Plaintiff has failed to point to any requirement in the Eleventh Circuit

or in Social Security Regulations, that requires an ALJ to obtain a formal

RFC assessment from either a treating or examining physician in order to

render an RFC determination. See, e.g., Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d

1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (providing that it is the claimant’s

responsibility to provide evidence in support of her claim); 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1545, 404.1512, 404.1545(a)(3) (same).

Moreover, it is noteworthy that in addition to Dr. Nayeem’s

functional assessment, the ALJ also relied upon the September 12, 2003

findings of a State Agency physician, as contained in a Residual Physical

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Pursuant to the Social Security Administration website, which provides

public access to the Program Operation Manual System (“POMS”), Identification

Code Number 19 is the Medical Specialty Code for “Internal Medicine.” See,

e.g., https://s044a90.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0426510090!opendocument

(last visited February 12, 2007). See also POMS Section DI26510.090. 

15

Functional Capacity Assessment, to determine Plaintiff’s RFC. See supra.

Specifically, a State Agency medical consultant (Identified by Code number

“19") completed a Residual Physical Functional Capacity Assessment –

assessing Plaintiff’s diagnoses of exogenous obesity and diabetes and DJD

in the lower back and left foot (after reviewing both Drs. Dozier and

Nayeem’s findings) – in which it was concluded that: she can occasionally

lift/carry up to 50 pounds; can frequently lift/carry up to 25 pounds; can

stand/walk/sit for 6 hours per 8 hour workday; has unlimited push/pull

abilities; can frequently climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes and

scaffolds, as well as balance, stoop and crawl; can occasionally kneel and

crouch; and has no manipulative, visual, communicative or environmental

limitations. (Tr. 168-175). Plaintiff, however, disputes the validity

of this formal RFC assessment on the grounds that it is an RFC from a nonexamining, reviewing medical consultant, whose signature is illegible and

whose credentials are not contained in the record. Notwithstanding

Plaintiff’s claim, the opinions of State Agency physicians are expert

opinions which the ALJ must consider. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f)(2)(i); SSR

96-6p. See also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 408 (1971).

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s suggestion, that the individual who completed the

RFC assessment was not a physician due to the inability to read the

signature, is without merit. The physician was identified by Code Number

“19," a medical speciality code which signifies a speciality in internal

medicine.7 Accordingly, it can be reasonably inferred that the individual

who completed the RFC not only holds a medical degree, but has a

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 15 of 27
8

As noted infra, RFC is an assessment rendered by the ALJ and which is

based upon all of the relevant evidence of a claimant’s remaining ability to

do work despite her impairments. See, e.g., Beech v. Apfel, 100 F. Supp. 2d

1323, 1330 (S.D. Ala. 2000); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 1546.

16

speciality in internal medicine. 

B. Whether the ALJ erred by failing to include all severe impairments

in the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert?

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to include all of her severe

impairments in the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert

(“VE”) because the hypothetical posed, was based upon Dr. Nayeem’s

functional assessment which did not address her tendonitis/bursitis. This

case was decided at the fourth step of the sequential evaluation process.

At this step, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC8 and measures whether

she can perform her PRW despite her impairments. See, e.g., Wilson v.

Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f);

SSR 82-61. To the extent the ALJ determines at step four that a claimant

can return to her PRW, the inquiry ends. See, e.g., Wilson, 284 F.3d at

1227. Indeed, the “testimony of a vocational expert is only required to

determine whether the claimant’s residual functional capacity permits

[her] to do other work after the claimant has met [her] initial burden of

showing that [she] cannot do past work.” Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578,

582 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Chester v. Brown, 792 F.2d 129, 132 (11th Cir.

1986)). See also Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 703-704 (11th Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, in the case at hand, once the ALJ determined that Plaintiff

could perform her PRW as a cashier, the sequential evaluation process

terminated. As a result, VE testimony was not required, such that any

error on the part of the ALJ in failing to include all of Plaintiff’s

severe impairments in a hypothetical question, is harmless. See, e.g.,

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 16 of 27
9

Listing 1.00Q, regarding obesity, provides as follows:

Effects of obesity. Obesity is a medically determinable impairment

that is often associated with disturbance of the musculoskeletal,

respiratory or cardiovascular system, and disturbance of this system

can be a major cause of disability in individuals with obesity. The

17

French v. Massanari, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1338-1339 (M.D. Fla. 2001).

C. Whether the ALJ erred by failing to consider the impact of her

obesity?

Plaintiff contends that even though the ALJ found her obesity to be

a severe impairment, he failed to properly assess whether it impacts her

alleged impairments and abilities to perform work-related functions under

SSR 02-1p because he ignored Dr. Nayeem’s findings and based his decision

on what she would be capable of doing if she lost weight, rather than what

she is capable of doing at her present weight. In support of same,

Plaintiff references: 1) Dr. Nayeem’s diagnosis of exogenous obesity as

well as his findings that weight loss would get her diabetes under good

control and keep her arthritis from worsening, and that with a proper

amount of weight loss, she can be fully functional; and 2) the fact that

her BMI range is 36 to 39 (Level II obesity). (Tr. 21, 167). 

Social Security Regulation (“SSR”) 02-1p provides that an ALJ must

explain how conclusions regarding a claimant’s obesity are reached. SSR

02-1p, 2000 WL 628049, *6 (S.S.A). The regulation requires the ALJ to

consider the effects of obesity at steps three and four when combined with

other impairments. Id. Section 1.00Q of the Listing of Impairments

provides that when determining whether an individual with obesity has a

listing-level impairment or combination of impairments, and when assessing

a claim at other steps, including when assessing an individual's RFC,

adjudicators must consider any additional and cumulative effects of

obesity.9 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523.

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 17 of 27
combined effects of obesity with musculoskeletal, respiratory or

cardiovascular impairments can be greater than the effects of each

of the impairments considered separately. Therefore, when

determining whether an individual with obesity has a listing-level

impairment or combination of impairments, and when assessing a claim

at other steps of the sequential evaluation process, including when

assessing an individual's residual functional capacity, adjudicators

must consider any additional and cumulative effects of obesity.

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt P. App. 1, Listing 1.00Q.

18

SSR 02-1p also provides that an ALJ must determine whether obesity

prevents an individual from working in the national economy at step five.

Id.; SSR 02-1p, 2000 WL 628049. 

In his decision, the ALJ specifically noted that Plaintiff was

obese, found that her obesity was a severe impairment, assigned

substantial weight to Dr. Nayeem’s findings regarding her limitations, and

properly considered her limitations in light of same. The undersigned’s

review of the record reveals further, that while Plaintiff has been

diagnsosed as obese since 1997, the majority of her physical examinations

have resulted in normal findings, and the most that any physician has

recommended is for her to follow a 1,500 calorie low fat diet and to lose

weight. See supra. At Dr. Nayeem’s August 15, 2003 physical examination,

Plaintiff was found to be 5'8" and weighed 252 pounds. (Tr. 164-167).

Dr. Nayeem diagnosed her with gross obesity exogenous. (Id.) Plaintiff’s

physical examination, however, revealed normal upper extremities, normal

lower extremities, a walk with a normal gait, negative straight leg

raising test at 80 degree lying down and 60 degrees sitting, full forward

bending of the back, no atrophy and normal muscle strength; indeed, the

only obesity-related problems included a finding of adult onset IDDM under

poor control possibly due to excessive eating and no diet and that she

could not perform heel/toe walking or fully squat due to extreme obesity,

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 18 of 27
19

even though she could climb on/off the examination table normally and

dress/undress normally. (Id.) Dr. Nayeem opined that Plaintiff needed

to lose weight in order to get her diabetes under control and to prevent

her arthritis from worsening, adding that with a proper amount of weight

loss, she could be fully functional. (Id.) Dr. Nayeem further opined

that Plaintiff can presently take part in mild to moderate activities and

that she cannot perform strenuous physical activity or heavy manual labor,

due to extreme obesity. (Id.) 

In his decision, the ALJ relied upon Dr. Nayeem’s functional

assessment of Plaintiff. (Id. at 15-17, 19-23). In so doing, the ALJ

noted that weight loss would improve her status to be “fully functional;”

however, he did not render his conclusions – as Plaintiff contends – based

upon what she would be capable of doing if she lost weight or weighed

less. (Tr. 15-17, 19-23). Rather, the ALJ determined his functional

assessment based on her weight, or obese status, as it existed. (Id.)

In sum, rather than “dismiss” her obesity as Plaintiff alleges, the ALJ’s

decision clearly reveals that in accordance with SSR 02-1p, he fully

analyzed her obesity with regard to all of her impairments and

sufficiently articulated his assessment of the relevant evidence –

including assigning substantial weight to Dr. Nayeem’s functional

assessment – such that this Court can trace the path of his reasoning as

it relates to that issue. (Id. at 15-17, 19-23). Thus, the ALJ properly

evaluated Plaintiff’s obesity. 

D. Whether the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff does not meet

Listing 12.05C?

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred at step three of the sequential

evaluation process by failing to find that she is disabled under Listing

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 19 of 27
10See also Cobb v. Barnhart, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (N.D. Ala. 2003);

Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528 (11th Cir. 1993)(quoting Listing 12.05C).

11A claimant need not present evidence that she manifested deficits in

adaptive functioning prior to the age of twenty-two, when she presents

evidence of low IQ test results after the age of twenty-two. Hodges v.

Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1265, 1268-1269 (11th Cir. 2001). Indeed, absent evidence

of sudden trauma that can cause retardation, the IQ scores create a rebuttable

presumption of a fairly constant IQ through the claimant’s life. Id.

However, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a valid IQ score is not conclusive

of mental retardation if the score is “inconsistent with other evidence in the

record on the claimant’s daily activities and behavior.” Lowery v. Sullivan,

979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992); Popp v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1497, 1499 (11th

Cir. 1986). For instance, in Popp, the plaintiff had a two year college

associate’s degree and was enrolled in his third year of college as a history

major. Id. at 1498. He had previously taught algebra at a private school.

Id. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit held that the listings for mental

retardation did not require the Commissioner to make a finding of mental

retardation based upon the results of an IQ test alone. Id. at 1499-1500. 

However, the test results must be considered in conjunction with other medical

evidence including the daily activities and behavior of the claimant. Id.

20

12.05C, based upon Dr. Blanton’s April 29, 2004 findings and because the

ALJ improperly discounted her testimony. Plaintiff contends that she

meets the first prong of the Listing based on Dr. Blanton’s findings of

a full IQ score of 66 and adaptive deficits in academic, work, health and

self-care, and that she meets the second prong of the Listing due to her

diabetes, obesity, tendonitis/bursitis and arthritis. 

Listing 12.05C falls under § 12.00 MENTAL DISORDERS and provides as

follows regarding mental retardation:

Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general

intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning

initially manifested during the developmental period; i.e., the

evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment

before age 22. The required level of severity for this

disorder is met when the requirements in A, B, C, or D are

satisfied ···· C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale

IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment

imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation

of function. 

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.05.10 A claimant meets the

criteria for presumptive disability under Listing 12.05(c) when the

claimant presents a valid IQ score of 60-70,11 an onset of impairment

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 20 of 27
12See, e.g., Wilkinson on behalf of Wilkinson v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 660,

662 (11th Cir. 1987); Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 229 (11th Cir. 1991);

Berryman v. Massanari, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1186-1187 (N.D. Ala. 2001); Cobb,

296 F. Supp. at 1296-1297. 

21

before age 22 and evidence of an additional and significant mental or

physical impairment (i.e., having more than “minimal effect” on the

claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities). See, e.g., Edwards

by Edwards v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1513, 1516 (11th Cir. 1985).12 Claimant

bears this burden. Id. 

In his decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was only mildly

limited in her activities of daily living, social functioning, ability to

maintain concentration, persistence or pace, and that she had no

documented episodes of decompensation. (Tr. 8-24). Specifically, the ALJ

addressed Listing 12.05C for Mental Retardation and Dr. Blanton’s findings

as follows:

Under the third step, I must determine whether these

impairments meet or equal in severity any impairment listed in

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. No treating or

examining source or medical expert has so concluded. In

addition, I have examined the record, and I find that the

evidence does not support such a conclusion. In particular, I

have considered listings in 12.05 for mental retardation.

Recent IQ scores of 69 and 66 would meet one criteria of these

listings, and there is a diagnosis by Dr. Blanton of mental

retardation. However, I reject such diagnosis and find that the

claimant is not mentally retarded because of her higher

adaptive functioning. These listings, as well as the criteria

for mental retardation set forth in Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders, require limitations in adaptive

functioning initially manifested during the developmental

period. [ ]

In the present case, I find that the claimant has functioned

during her lifetime in an age-appropriate manner . . . .

* * *

I give little weight to Dr. Blanton’s opinion regarding

claimant’s mental functional abilities . . . . First, this was

a one-time evaluation which relies heavily upon the reports and

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 21 of 27
22

subjective allegations of the claimant. 

* * *

Second, his opinions are inconsistent with his own evaluation

and the record as a whole. For example, Dr. Blanton assessed

a global assessment of functioning score of 50, which,

according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders, represents serious impairment in social,

occupational or school functioning. And yet, in his Medical

Source Opinion form, he indicated that the claimant has only

“mild” impairment in her ability to understand, remember and

carry out simple instructions, “mild” impairment in her social

functioning within a work setting, “mild” activities of daily

living, “mild” deterioration in personal habits, and “mild”

constriction of interests. While he indicated that she has

marked limitation in concentration, persistence and pace, he

performed no cognitive and sensorium testing . . . during the

mental status exam to confirm this. On the other hand, the

claimant demonstrated the ability to complete several formal

tests during the evaluation without distraction. Dr. Blanton

also opined that the claimant has marked limitation in her

ability to respond to customary work pressures, but the record

is absent any episodes of decompensation at home or in the work

place . . . .

(Tr. 18-19) (footnote and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

As noted supra, a claimant meets the criteria for presumptive

disability under Listing 12.05(c) when she satisfies two prongs: 1) a

valid IQ score of 60-70 and onset of impairment before age 22; and 2)

evidence of an additional and significant mental or physical impairment

(i.e., having more than “minimal effect” on the claimant’s ability to

perform basic work activities). See, e.g., Edwards, 755 F.2d at 1516.

Regarding the first prong of Listing 12.05C, Plaintiff has presented

evidence of a low IQ scores which the ALJ accepted as valid; however, such

scores, standing alone, are insufficient to prove that she meets Listing

12.05C, particularly given the ALJ’s finding of an absence of deficits in

adaptive behavior and that her scores were inconsistent with other

evidence of record. See supra. 

Case law provides that a claimant need not present evidence that she

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 22 of 27
23

manifested deficits in adaptive functioning prior to the age of twentytwo, when she presents evidence of low IQ test results after the age of

twenty-two. Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). Absent

evidence of sudden trauma that can cause retardation, the IQ scores create

a rebuttable presumption of a fairly constant IQ through the claimant’s

life. Id at 1268-1269. However, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a

valid IQ score is not conclusive of mental retardation if the score is

“inconsistent with other evidence in the record on the claimant’s daily

activities and behavior.” Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.

1992); Popp v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1497, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). 

In this case, the record reflects that based on his April 29, 2004

evaluation of Plaintiff, Dr. Blanton concluded that her mental retardation

was “obvious” due to her full scale IQ score of 66 and achievement test

scores at the 5th grade level; as such, he diagnosed her with mild mental

retardation and assigned a GAF score of 50 (indicating serious symptoms

or any serious impairment in social, occupational or school functioning).

(Tr. 179-182). Dr. Blanton also completed a Medical Source Opinion in

which he found that Plaintiff has mild limitations in her abilities to

maintain activities of daily living, understand, remember and carry out

simple instructions, respond appropriately to supervision and co-workers,

deal with changes in a routine work setting, respond appropriately to

customers or other members of the general public, and use judgment in

simple one or two step work-related decisions; and marked limitations in

her abilities to understand, remember and carry out detailed or complex

instructions, respond to customary work pressures, use judgment in

detailed or complex work-related decisions, and maintain attention,

concentration or pace for periods of at least two hours. (Id. at 183-

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 23 of 27
13See, e.g., Lowery, 979 F.2d at 837 (finding that a valid IQ test score

is not conclusive of mental retardation if the score is inconsistent with

other evidence of record as to a claimant daily’s activities and behavior);

24

184). It was also noted that she had a mild degree of deterioration in

personal habits and a mild degree of constriction of interests. (Id. at

184). Dr. Blanton opined that these limitations would last for 12 months

or longer and have existed at their severity levels for 1 year, that her

pain allegations are consistent with clinical findings, and that her

condition is likely to deteriorate if placed under stress, especially that

of a job; however, he found that she can manage benefits in her best

interests. (Id. at 184). Dr. Blanton stated also, that “[r]ehabilitation

will be very difficult due to the combination of MR, poor academic skills,

physical and emotional problems.” (Id.)

In his decision, the ALJ rejected Dr. Blanton’s findings, stating

that while Plaintiff had low IQ scores, she achieved adaptive functioning

above the level required for such a diagnosis, due, in part, to the

following: 1) she testified that she was not placed in special education

classes; 2) while unmarried, she raised seven children without the

assistance of a spouse; 3) she takes care of her personal needs, health

problems, makes doctors appointments, monitors her blood sugar daily and

injects insulin on a daily basis; 4) she took and passed a written

driver’s test on the first attempt; and 5) she worked for 8 years as a

cashier; and 6) she filed for, and received, unemployment benefits. (Tr.

18-19, 22). In sum, the ALJ determined that while Dr. Blanton’s IQ scores

for Plaintiff were valid, the scores were not conclusive of mental

retardation, and his diagnosis of such was due to be rejected because the

scores and diagnosis were inconsistent with other evidence of record

regarding her daily activities and behavior.13 (Id.) 

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 24 of 27
Popp, 779 F.2d at 1499-1500 (holding that an IQ test score alone does not

establish a finding of mental retardation as the ALJ is to evaluate the IQ

score in conjunction with the medical report and test results to ensure that

they correspond with daily activities and behavior). 

14While the undersigned notes Plaintiff’s argument that her uncontrolled

diabetes translates into an inability to adequately take care of her health

needs – and thus mental retardation meeting Listing 12.05C – she has presented

no evidence to support this link, and moreover, the ALJ found this to be due,

at least in part, to medical noncompliance.

25

The undersigned’s review of the record reveals that substantial

evidence of record supports the ALJ’s decision. At the outset, Plaintiff

did not allege mental retardation as a disabling condition in her benefits

application, did not testify as to any mental retardation at the

administrative hearing, and did not stop working due to any alleged

inability to perform the mental requirements of her semi-skilled job as

a cashier. See supra. Additionally, a review of Plaintiff’s daily

activities and behavior undermine the validity of her mental impairment

claim. Id. Plaintiff attended regular education classes through the 10th

grade, was married twice, raised a large family of seven children, worked

for 8 years at the semi-skilled job of cashier, has a driver’s license and

can drive, attends church, watches television, visits with friends,

obtained unemployment benefits, and is able to take care of her personal

needs.14 Id. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence of

record showing any deficits in adaptive behavior before age 22. Further,

Dr. Blanton’s one-time mental examination and resulting mental retardation

diagnosis were properly rejected by the ALJ not only because he relied

heavily upon Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, but also because his

evaluation is internally inconsistent (e.g., while stating that Plaintiff

did not drive thus suggesting she could not, he failed to acknowledge that

she had taken and passed a written driver’s license test, and while he

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 25 of 27
26

found she only had “mild” impairments in social functioning, activities

of daily living, personal habit deterioration, constriction of interests

and in her abilities to understand, remember and carry out simple

instructions, he inexplicably assigned her a GAF of 50 indicating that she

was seriously impaired). 

As such, Plaintiff’s low IQ scores are not conclusive of mental

retardation. See, e.g., Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.

1992); Popp v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (11th Cir. 1986); Sellers

v. Barnhart, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (M.D. Ala. 2002); House v. Apfel,

2000 WL 1368012, *8 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 6, 2000). Accordingly, substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff did not meet the first

prong of Listing 12.05C. Id. Thus, because Plaintiff did not meet the

first prong of Listing 12.05C, it was not necessary for the ALJ to

determine whether she met the second prong. 

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth, and upon careful consideration of the

administrative record and memoranda of the parties, it is hereby

RECOMMENDED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security,

denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income, be AFFIRMED. 

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to this Report and Recommendation.

DONE this 12th day of February, 2007.

 /s/SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 26 of 27
27

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything

in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this document, file

specific written objections with the clerk of court. Failure to do so

will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of anything in the

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings

of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Lewis v. Smith,

855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for challenging the

findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more

detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a “Statement of Objection

to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation” within ten days after

being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.

The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the

time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the party’s

arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is

insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and incorporated

into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit

a brief in support of the objection may be deemed an

abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of

Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing party may

submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10) days of being served

with a copy of the statement of objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; SD ALA LR

72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate judge finds

that the tapes and original records in this action are adequate for

purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this recommendation,

but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the

United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

 /s/SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00497-CG-B Document 20 Filed 02/12/07 Page 27 of 27