Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02404/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02404-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY D. McDONALD,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-2404 MCE GGH P

vs.

ROSEANNE CAMPBELL, et al., 

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

By concurrently filed order, the court has found plaintiff’s amended complaint

appropriate for service upon several defendants. As plaintiff has been previously informed,

the court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

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490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also

Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing

a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

The defects of plaintiff’s claims against defendant Lewis have not been cured in

the amended complaint. As to those claims, the court has previously stated:

As to plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment by defendant

Lewis for his highly offensive sexually oriented language directed

toward plaintiff, such verbal abuse is not enough to state a

violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, where plaintiff

does not allege that the language was not intended to do more than

simply taunt plaintiff. Plaintiff has not alleged, for example, that

the verbal abuse was intended to incite an attack upon him or

resulted in such an attack. “Although prisoners have a right to be

free from sexual abuse, whether at the hands of fellow inmates or

prison guards, see Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th

Cir.2000), the Eighth Amendment’s protections do not necessarily

extend to mere verbal sexual harassment. See e.g., Blueford v.

Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 254-55 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that prison

guard who engaged in ‘vulgar same-sex trash talk’ with inmates

was entitled to qualified immunity); Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d

614, 624 (9th Cir.1997).” Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171

(9th Cir. 2004). Even plaintiff’s allegations that the “vulgar

homosexual comments” were occasionally accompanied by threats

does not rise to a constitutional violation because even threats of

bodily injury are insufficient to state a claim, as a mere naked

threat is not the equivalent of doing the act itself. See Gaut v.

Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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To the extent that plaintiff intends to allege a cell search conducted

by defendant Lewis was retaliatory, plaintiff is informed that in

order to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plead facts which

suggest that retaliation for the exercise of protected conduct was

the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the defendant’s

conduct. See Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310,

1314 (9th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff must also plead facts which

suggest an absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct

he contends was retaliatory. Pratt at 806 (citing Rizzo at 532). As

noted, verbal harassment alone is insufficient to state a claim. See

Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, even threats of bodily injury are insufficient to state a

claim, because a mere naked threat is not the equivalent of doing

the act itself. See Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Mere conclusions of hypothetical retaliation will not suffice, a

prisoner must “allege specific facts showing retaliation because of

the exercise of the prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Frazier v.

Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562 (n. 1) (10th Cir. 1990). 

Order, filed on April 12, 2007, pp. 3-4.

Plaintiff has failed to frame colorable claims against this defendant in his

amended complaint and the court will now recommend dismissal of defendant Lewis from this

action.

Plaintiff has also been previously cautioned that:

[a]s to defendant Campbell, to the extent that plaintiff seeks money

damages, the Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed

provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . .

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States . . . to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured

in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell

v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983,

if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do

that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson

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v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the 

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior

and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial

position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.

Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld,

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941

(1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the

involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). Plaintiff has failed to link defendant Campbell to any

affirmative act resulting in a constitutional deprivation suffered by

plaintiff. 

Id., at 4.

Once again plaintiff has not sufficiently ameliorated his allegations as to this

defendant to proceed against her in her individual capacity and the court, having provided

plaintiff with an opportunity to amend, will now recommend dismissal of defendant Campbell in

her individual capacity only.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant C/O Lewis and

defendant Campbell, in her individual capacity only, be dismissed from this action. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 03/26/08 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

mcdo2404.fr

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