Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03318/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03318-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-3318

JOCELYN CHATHAM, Administrator of 

the Estate of Marvin T. McDonald,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RANDY DAVIS, Warden, 

Pinckneyville Correctional Center, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 11-cv-00650 — Stephen C. Williams, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2015 — DECIDED OCTOBER 17, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and SYKES, Circuit 

Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Marvin McDonald died after suffering an asthma attack while he was an inmate at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, an Illinois prison. His estate, 

administered by Jocelyn Chatham, sued the prison’s warden,

Case: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13
2 No. 14-3318

Wexford Health Services (a private corporation contracted to 

run the prison’s healthcare unit), a prison doctor and nurse, 

and several prison guards under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chatham

claimed that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to 

McDonald’s serious medical needs, violating his rights 

under the Eighth Amendment. A magistrate judge entered

summary judgment for the warden and Wexford. The other 

claims went to trial, and a jury found for the remaining 

defendants. Chatham now appeals, challenging the order 

granting summary judgment for the warden and Wexford. 

She also challenges the denial of her motions for leave to 

amend her complaint, for discovery sanctions, and for a new 

trial.

We affirm. The magistrate judge was right to enter summary judgment for the warden and Wexford. Chatham did 

not produce evidence to support a reasonable inference that 

the warden consciously disregarded a substantial risk of 

harm to McDonald. Nor did she have evidence showing that 

a Wexford policy, practice, or custom caused a constitutional 

injury. Finally, the judge did not abuse his discretion in 

declining to allow leave to amend, impose a discovery 

sanction, or grant a new trial.

I. Background

McDonald was an inmate at Pinckneyville Correctional 

Center, an Illinois prison, and was housed in the segregation 

unit. At about 5 p.m. on May 26, 2010, he began to suffer an 

asthma attack in his cell. His symptoms persisted, and after a

few hours, he told his cellmate about his situation. Unlike 

certain other units in the prison, the segregation cells did not 

have emergency call buttons, so his cellmate banged on the 

cell door to alert the guards. A guard eventually responded 

Case: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13
No. 14-3318 3

and escorted McDonald to the prison’s healthcare unit. By 

that time it was approximately 12:15 a.m.

Pinckneyville’s healthcare unit is run by Wexford, a private company under contract with the Illinois Department of 

Corrections (“IDOC”). The healthcare unit was supposed to 

be managed by a permanent medical director, but the post

had been vacant for more than a year. To cover the position,

two Wexford doctors split the medical director’s responsibilities: Dr. Jill Wahl, a traveling medical director, and 

Dr. Dennis Larson, a regional medical director.

When McDonald arrived at the healthcare unit, he was 

wheezing and using his accessory muscles to breathe. Nurse 

Rhonda Reuter checked his vital signs, assessed the oxygen 

saturation in his blood, and measured his peak expiratory 

flow rate, which was extremely low. Nurse Reuter started 

him on oxygen and administered an albuterol nebulizer and 

epinephrine. She then phoned Dr. Larson for a consult.

Dr. Larson was on call for about a dozen IDOC facilities

that evening, although he was only the backup on-call 

doctor for most of these facilities. He slept through Nurse 

Reuter’s call. At about 2 a.m. he finally returned her call and 

was briefed on McDonald’s situation. He continued the

oxygen, prescribed more albuterol, and added prednisone, a 

steroid. Dr. Larson called back again about a half hour later 

to check on McDonald’s status and was told that he was still 

using his accessory muscles to breathe. At that point 

Dr. Larson ordered McDonald transferred to Pinckneyville 

Community Hospital via ambulance, calling ahead to alert

the emergency-room staff of his condition.

Case: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13
4 No. 14-3318

In the ambulance McDonald was given more albuterol 

and another asthma medication. He arrived at the hospital at 

3:45 a.m. and was seen by a Dr. Reyes 15 minutes later.

Dr. Reyes treated him with more albuterol, still another 

medication to aid in breathing, and more epinephrine. These 

treatments continued throughout the early morning hours. 

At 5:20 a.m. McDonald was still having difficulty breathing, 

so Dr. Reyes inserted a breathing tube. The initial attempt to 

insert the tube failed, but by 5:44 a.m. intubation was 

achieved. It was too late. A Code Blue was called at 5:53 a.m.

McDonald died at 6:09 a.m.

Chatham, the administrator of McDonald’s estate, filed 

this § 1983 suit alleging that various prison officials and 

Wexford were deliberately indifferent to McDonald’s serious 

medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to 

be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In addition to 

Wexford, the named defendants included Randy Davis, the 

Pinckneyville warden; Dr. Larson and Nurse Reuter; and the

guards who were responsible for monitoring McDonald on 

the date in question. The claims against the warden and 

Wexford focused on the lack of a permanent medical director in the healthcare unit and the lack of emergency call 

buttons in the segregation-unit cells. The complaint also 

alleged that Wexford failed to adequately train Nurse Reuter 

in 911 protocols specific to asthma-related emergencies like 

McDonald’s. A magistrate judge entered summary judgment 

for Warden Davis and Wexford on these claims.

The claims against the remaining defendants—Dr. Larson, Nurse Reuter, and the prison guards—were allowed to 

proceed. Before trial but after the expiration of the court’s 

deadline to amend the pleadings, Chatham sought leave to 

Case: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13
No. 14-3318 5

file a third amended complaint to add state-law claims 

against Nurse Reuter and Dr. Larson. The magistrate judge 

denied the motion. Chatham also moved for discovery 

sanctions against Wexford for dragging its feet in disclosing 

its treatment protocols relating to asthma. That motion, too, 

was denied. The remaining claims were tried to a jury, 

which returned a defense verdict. After an unsuccessful 

motion for a new trial, Chatham appealed.

II. Analysis

Chatham seeks review of four separate orders: (1) the 

magistrate judge’s order granting summary judgment for

Warden Davis and Wexford; (2) the denial of leave to file a 

third amended complaint; (3) the denial of discovery sanctions; and (4) the denial of her motion for a new trial.

A. Summary Judgment

We review the magistrate judge’s summary-judgment 

order de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Chatham and drawing all reasonable inferences in her 

favor. Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 2015). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

Chatham alleged that Warden Davis and Wexford violated McDonald’s rights under the Eighth Amendment by 

deliberately failing to mitigate risks to the health and safety 

of inmates in the Pinckneyville prison in several respects. 

“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 

Case: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13
6 No. 14-3318

428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). A prison official may be liable for 

deliberate indifference only if he “knows of and disregards 

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A medical deliberateindifference claim requires proof that the prisoner suffered 

from “(1) an objectively serious medical condition to which 

(2) a state official was deliberately, that is subjectively, 

indifferent.” Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 

2008).

McDonald’s asthma attack, which ultimately proved fatal, plainly qualifies as an objectively serious medical condition. The question here is whether Chatham produced 

sufficient evidence on the state-of-mind element of the claim. 

The inquiry is a subjective one: “[T]he official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that 

a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 

draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Petties v. 

Carter, No. 14-2674, 2016 WL 4631679, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 

2016) (en banc) (“[T]he Supreme Court has instructed us that 

a plaintiff must provide evidence that an official actually

knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm.”). “The 

requirement of subjective awareness tethers the deliberateindifference cause of action to the Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment ... .” Whiting v. 

Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 15-1647, slip op. at 6 (7th 

Cir. Oct. 12, 2016).

Chatham argues that Warden Davis was deliberately indifferent in two respects: (1) He failed to install emergency 

call buttons in the segregation unit and (2) he failed to 

ensure that the position of permanent medical director was 

Case: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13
No. 14-3318 7

filled in a timely fashion. The evidence doesn’t support 

either contention.

Nothing in the record suggests that Warden Davis had 

actual knowledge of specific facts that would support an 

inference that the absence of emergency call buttons created 

a substantial risk of harm. There’s no evidence, for example, 

that he ignored recommendations to install such a system or 

that he was aware of previous emergencies in the segregation unit that the presence of call buttons would have averted. Cf. Petties, 2016 WL 4631679, at *4 (discussing the types of 

evidence that can show a prison doctor’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical need).

The closest thing Chatham has offered is the fact that certain other units in the prison are equipped with emergency 

call buttons. But the presence of call buttons in other parts of 

the prison does not establish that Warden Davis actually 

knew that the failure to have such a system in the segregation unit created a substantial risk of harm. It might be

considered weakly probative of negligence, but that’s not the

standard; it’s well established that “showing mere negligence is not enough” for a deliberate-indifference claim. Id. 

at *3; see also Steidl v. Gramley, 151 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 

1998) (A warden does not violate “the Eighth Amendment 

when he might have known of a risk of harm, or in any 

event should have known.”).

Nor does Chatham have any evidence to show that Davis 

knew that the failure to have a permanent medical director 

in place would put inmates at substantial risk of harm. 

Indeed, no evidence suggests that the lack of a permanent 

medical director had any effect on inmate health and safety 

at all. Drs. Larson and Wahl were covering these duties until 

Case: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13
8 No. 14-3318

a permanent medical director could be hired. Although the 

position remained unfilled for a long time, Chatham has

offered no evidence to show that this situation caused an 

increased risk to inmate health and safety. Summary judgment for Warden Davis was appropriate.

The claim against Wexford proceeds under the theory of 

municipal liability announced in Monell v. Department of 

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which we’ve held applies 

in § 1983 claims brought against private companies acting 

under color of state law. Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 

782, 795–96 (7th Cir. 2014). To prevail, Chatham needed to 

present evidence that a Wexford policy, practice, or custom

caused a constitutional violation. Whiting, slip op. at 10;

Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 

2009) (discussing municipal liability for Eighth Amendment 

violations). She did not do so.

Chatham focuses on Wexford’s failure to fill the permanent medical-director position and its failure to train Nurse 

Reuter in 911 protocols specific to emergencies like 

McDonald’s. As we’ve already noted, however, no evidence 

suggests that the failure to promptly fill the permanent 

medical-director position created a substantial risk of harm. 

Nor is there evidence showing that Wexford was aware of 

such a risk, assuming it existed. Monell claims based on 

allegations of an unconstitutional municipal practice or 

custom—as distinct from an official policy—normally require evidence that the identified practice or custom caused 

multiple injuries. Id. (“[T]here is no clear consensus as to 

how frequently [an injury] must occur to impose Monell 

liability, except that it must be more than one ... or even 

three [times].”) (citation and quotation marks omitted);

Case: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13
No. 14-3318 9

Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating 

that a custom or practice claim “requires more evidence than 

a single incident to establish liability”). No such evidence 

exists here.

Chatham insists that she didn’t need this kind of evidence because the possibility of harm was obvious. It’s true 

that in a “narrow range of circumstances,” the possibility of 

harm from a custom or practice may be so obvious that 

evidence of a series of prior injuries is not needed to support 

an inference of deliberate indifference. Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 

381 (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409

(1997)); Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 

929 (7th Cir. 2004). This isn’t one of those rare cases. 

Chatham’s sole evidentiary support for this claim is that 

Dr. Larson was on call for about a dozen facilities the night 

of McDonald’s asthma attack. (Recall, however, that he was 

the backup on-call doctor for most of those facilities.)

Chatham suggests that a permanent medical director 

wouldn’t have slept through Nurse Reuter’s emergency call

as Dr. Larson did. But the record doesn’t tell us why Larson 

slept through the call or what nightly on-call duties a permanent medical director would be required to carry. 

Chatham’s argument rests entirely on speculation and was 

rightly rejected.

Chatham also argues that Wexford failed to train Nurse 

Reuter in 911 protocols specific to emergencies like 

McDonald’s, and this amounts to a “practice” or “custom” 

sufficient to support Monell liability. Here too she offers no 

evidence that the lack of asthma-specific 911 training created 

a substantial risk of harm, that Wexford knew of such a risk 

(if it existed), or that this “practice” or “custom” caused 

Case: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13
10 No. 14-3318

McDonald’s injury. To the contrary, the only evidence on 

this point comes from Cheri Laurant, Wexford’s Rule 

30(b)(6) designee. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). She testified 

that Wexford’s nurses are trained—indeed, they already 

know, based on their professional education—to call 911 in a 

life-threatening emergency; they need not wait for a physician referral. This argument too was rightly rejected. Summary judgment for Wexford was entirely appropriate.

B. Chatham’s Three Other Motions

With the challenge to the summary-judgment order out 

of the way, we proceed to the other orders Chatham asks us 

to review.

1. Motion to Amend the Complaint

Two months after the deadline for amending the pleadings expired, Chatham moved for leave to file a third 

amended complaint to add nursing-negligence and wrongful-death claims against Nurse Reuter and Dr. Larson. The 

magistrate judge denied the motion because Chatham didn’t

provide a reasonable explanation for her delay and the latestage amendment would have caused undue prejudice to 

Reuter and Larson.

We review the denial of a motion to amend a complaint 

for abuse of discretion. Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 698 

(7th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff may amend his complaint once as 

a matter of course, but subsequent amendments require 

either the consent of an opposing party or the court’s leave. 

See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). While a judge should “freely give 

leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” RULE 15(a)(2), 

refusal to allow an amendment is appropriate where, as 

here, a plaintiff has unjustifiably delayed or when an opposCase: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13
No. 14-3318 11

ing party would suffer undue prejudice, Barry Aviation Inc. v. 

Land O'Lakes Mun. Airport Comm'n, 377 F.3d 682, 687 (7th 

Cir. 2004).

Chatham asserts that the magistrate judge abused his 

discretion but she does not explain how. She argues only 

that her proposed new state-law claims were factually 

related to the § 1983 claims, so little additional discovery 

would be required. The magistrate judge reasonably rejected 

that argument and found the delay both unexcused and 

prejudicial. Chatham has given us no good reason to disturb 

that ruling, and we see none ourselves.

2. Motion for Discovery Sanction

During discovery, Wexford was late in disclosing its 

nursing treatment protocols relating to asthma. Chatham 

moved to sanction Wexford for this error, but the magistrate 

judge denied the motion after determining that the tardy 

disclosure was not made for tactical advantage and was not 

prejudicial.

We review this decision too for abuse of discretion. 

Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 614 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A 

trial court has broad discretion concerning the imposition of 

discovery sanctions.”). Little discussion is needed. Chatham 

hasn’t pointed to any evidence of bad faith and doesn’t 

explain how the delayed disclosure could possibly have 

prejudiced her. We find no abuse of discretion.

3. Motion for a New Trial

After the jury returned its verdict in favor of Dr. Larson, 

Nurse Reuter, and the prison guards, Chatham moved for a 

new trial. The magistrate judge denied the motion, and 

Case: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13
12 No. 14-3318

again our review is for abuse of discretion. See Kapelanski v. 

Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2004).

Chatham argues that a new trial is warranted because the 

magistrate judge improperly limited the testimony of her 

expert witness. She claims that her experts were required to 

closely hew to their expert reports during their testimony, 

while the defendants’ experts were allowed to “deviate 

substantially from their reports” and to “opine at will on the 

standard of care.”

This claim of unequal treatment is simply not borne out 

by the record. The judge’s pretrial order equally—and 

explicitly—limited both sides’ expert testimony to matters 

covered in the experts’ reports. Chatham hasn’t identified 

any particular testimony from the defense experts that 

should have been excluded, nor has she sufficiently explained what her experts were unfairly precluded from 

saying. There’s no basis in the record to conclude that the 

limits on expert testimony were unevenly enforced.

Chatham also argues that the magistrate judge improperly admitted evidence of McDonald’s arrest history in violation of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Character 

evidence of this sort is usually inadmissible. See FED. R.

EVID. 404(a)(1). But part of Chatham’s claim for damages 

relied on the lost relationship between McDonald and his 

son. Attaching a value to this loss required proving “the 

quality of advice and support that [McDonald] could have 

supplied” to his child, thus putting McDonald’s character 

squarely at issue. Cobige v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 780, 785 

(7th Cir. 2011). 

Case: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13
No. 14-3318 13

Of course relevant evidence may still be excluded “if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by ... unfair 

prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. Chatham argues that this 

evidence flunks the Rule 403 balancing test because 

McDonald’s arrests occurred before his son was born. The 

magistrate judge was entitled to see things differently and 

strike the balance accordingly. But even if we agreed that an 

evidentiary error occurred, the judge was well within his 

discretion to refuse to grant a new trial in the face of this 

claim of error. See Shick v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 307 F.3d 

605, 611 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A new trial may be granted in the 

event of an error in the admission of evidence in extraordinary situations.”). McDonald’s arrest history was admitted 

on the question of damages, but the jury returned a noliability verdict and never reached that question. Chatham’s 

motion for a new trial was properly denied.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-3318 Document: 49 Filed: 10/17/2016 Pages: 13