Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01513/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01513-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ALLIANCE 

OF POTWS, et al., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL 

PROTECTION AGENCY, et al., 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-01513-MCE-DAD 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

On June 25, 2014, Plaintiffs Southern California Alliance of POTWs (“SCAP”) and 

Central Valley Clean Water Association (“CVCWA”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed this 

action alleging that Defendants United States Environmental Protection Agency (the 

“EPA”) and Jared Blumenfeld as the Regional Administrator of EPA Region IX 

(collectively “Defendants”) violated the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 551-559, and regulations implementing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the 

“Clean Water Act” or the “Act”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376. Compl., June 25, 2014, ECF 

No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants illegally and improperly approved 

the California State Water Resources Control Board's ("State Water Board") request to 

use a newly formulated methodology for conducting chronic whole effluent toxicity 

("WET") tests, known as the two-concentration Test of Significant Toxicity ("TST"), as an 

Case 2:14-cv-01513-MCE-DB Document 14 Filed 07/02/14 Page 1 of 8
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Alternate Test Procedure ("ATP"). Id. Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) filed on June 26, 2014. Mot., June 26, 2014, 

ECF No. 4. Plaintiffs ask that this Court enjoin Defendants from “giving any force and 

effect” to its approval of the two-concentration TST and from “requiring or mandating the 

use . . . [of] analytical results obtained through the two-concentration TST method.” ECF 

No. 4-7 at 2 (proposed order granting TRO). Defendants filed an Opposition, to which 

Plaintiffs responded. Opp’n, June 30, 2014, ECF No. 9; Reply, June 30, 2014, ECF 

No. 10. The Court held a hearing on the Motion on June 30, 2014. Upon consideration 

of the parties’ filings and after hearing argument, the Motion was DENIED; this written 

order follows.1

BACKGROUND2

The Clean Water Act is designed “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 

and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The Act prohibits 

the discharge of a pollutant from a point source into waters of the United States, except 

as in compliance with specific provisions in the statute, including provisions regarding 

permits issued under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) 

program. The Clean Water Act gives states “the primary responsibilit[y] and right[] . . . to 

prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution” and encourages states to “assume the major 

role in the operation of the NPDES program.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b); Boise Cascade 

Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 942 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 

585 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1978)). “California [is one of the states] that ha[s] been 

granted authority to administer NPDES programs [itself].” Boise Cascade Corp., 

942 F.2d at 1430 (citing 39 Fed. Reg. 26,061 (1973)). “The California State Water 

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 The Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion on the record. To the extent that this order materially differs 

from the Court’s ruling on June 30, 2014, the terms of this order control. 

2

 Unless otherwise indicated, the facts are taken, often verbatim, from Plaintiff’s TRO Motion. 

See ECF No. 4. 

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Resources Control Board . . . and its various Regional Water Quality Control Boards are 

responsible for the enforcement of the Act in California and for issuing NPDES permits.” 

Id. However, EPA itself “promulgate[s] guidelines establishing test procedures for the 

analysis of pollutants,” which are used for certification and permit applications. 

33 U.S.C. § 1314(h). 

Plaintiff SCAP is a trade association that represents its agency members, who 

treat and recycle municipal and industrial wastewater in Southern California. Plaintiff 

CVCWA is a non-profit industry trade association that represents municipalities and 

other public entities located within the Central Valley region of California who provide 

wastewater collection, treatment, and water recycling services. The discharges to 

surface waters from Plaintiffs' member agencies are regulated through NPDES permits 

issued by the California Regional Water Quality Control Boards, the State Water 

Resources Control Board, and sometimes the EPA. However, as explained above, it is 

the EPA that promulgates formal methods for determining whether discharged water is 

deemed "toxic" or not. 

Effluent limitations serve as the primary mechanism in NPDES permits for 

controlling discharges of pollutants from point sources to receiving waters. Water quality 

standards are used as the basis for deriving the specific effluent limitations in NPDES 

permits. According to Plaintiffs, for the last decade or so, SCAP and CVCWA members 

have been conducting WET testing of their discharges to make certain that the water 

discharged meets the relevant environmental standards. WET tests are designed to 

replicate the total effect and environmental exposure of aquatic life to toxic pollutants in 

a discharge without initially requiring the identification of the specific pollutants. 

Under limited circumstances and subject to specific regulatory requirements, a 

person may request to use an Alternative Test Procedure ("ATP") to measure the toxicity 

of the effluent not previously approved and formally promulgated by the EPA. See 

40 C.F.R. §§ 136.4, 136.5. “To be approved on a nationwide basis, an alternate test 

must go through rulemaking . . . and the regulations must be amended to add this 

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alternate test.” Opp’n at 9 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 136.4(c)). Alternatively, a different process 

is used for limited use requests. See 40 C.F.R. § 136.5. “Instead, the applicant submits 

its request to the EPA’s Regional Alternate Test Procedure Coordinator.” Opp’n at 9 

(citing 40 C.F.R. § 136.5). “The Regional Alternate Test Procedure Coordinator has the 

discretion to restrict the use of the alternate test procedure to a specific facility, or ‘to all 

discharger[s] or facilities (and their associated laboratories) specified in the approval for 

the Region.’” Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 136.5). 

 On February 12, 2014, the State Water Board requested Regional EPA approval 

of "the statewide Alternate Test Procedure use of a two-concentration test design when 

using the Test of Significant Toxicity (TST) hypothesis testing approach.” Compl. at 18. 

On March 17, 2014, EPA Region IX “determined that the State Water Board’s proposed 

use of the two-concentration toxicity test evaluated using the Test of Significant Toxicity 

(TST) is an acceptable equivalent under the ATP process . . .” Id. at 24. However, 

Plaintiffs allege that SCAP's members did not learn of the new ATP until May 8, 2014, 

when the NPDES permits for three of SCAP's members were reissued by the Regional 

Water Quality Control Board for the Los Angeles Region. According to Plaintiffs, these 

new permits, and others, include numeric effluent limitations for chronic toxicity, and 

require WET testing to determine compliance with these limitations using the improperly 

adopted two-concentration TST. 

Plaintiffs maintain that the EPA violated the APA and regulations implementing 

the Clean Water Act when it approved the State Water Board’s requested use of the twoconcentration toxicity test.3

 As a result and due to alleged flaws with this new method, 

Plaintiffs contend that their members will “suffer harm through the increased risk of non-

 3

 Plaintiffs maintain that “there is a much larger story to tell than is possible in the short 

turnaround time for a TRO, but [that] the approval of the ATP was done because [the EPA] was unable to 

get internal approval from headquarters to allow use of the two-concentration TST. As will be 

demonstrated in this case, the [EPA] came up with the idea to have the State request an ATP to avoid the 

need for rulemaking, provided extensive funding to the [EPA] for toxicity testing related activity, and [EPA] 

employees even edited the letter sent requesting ATP approval. Review of the letters alone does not tell 

the whole story and what might appear to be lawful when viewed in isolation may be unlawful when the 

entire story is told.” Reply at 6. 

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compliance, and the need to run additional tests to be able to statistically demonstrate 

compliance.” Mot. at 10. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that “[w]ithout injunctive relief, 

Plaintiffs' members whose permits currently or will soon contain requirements based on 

the two-concentration TST will be subject to enforcement and potentially liable for civil 

and criminal penalties and citizen suits for failure to consistently comply with the new 

final effluent limits and for undertaking more costly toxicity testing requirements based on 

the two-concentration TST.” Id. Plaintiffs allege that the first permits incorporating and 

adopting the new test go into effect on July 1, 2014. Plaintiffs explain that such an 

outcome will result in “economic loss in the form of additional testing required to try to 

ensure compliance, and damage in the form of penalties and reputational injury for 

noncompliance with permit requirements.” Id. In addition, Plaintiffs also allege that the 

State Water Board may be adopting the same mandate on July 2, 2014, and that without 

a TRO “there is no way to influence the State Water Board to adopt anything different 

than what the [EPA] has mandated.” Id. at 11. Accordingly, Plaintiffs initiated this action 

on June 25 and filed a Motion for TRO the following day. 

STANDARD 

The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo 

pending the complete briefing and thorough consideration contemplated by full 

proceedings pursuant to a preliminary injunction. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. 

Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1974) (temporary restraining orders “should be 

restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing 

irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer”); see also 

Reno Air Racing Ass’n., Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006); Dunn v. 

Cate, No. CIV 08-873-NVW, 2010 WL 1558562, at *1 (E.D. Cal. April 19, 2010). 

Issuance of a temporary restraining order, as a form of preliminary injunctive 

relief, is an extraordinary remedy, and Plaintiffs have the burden of proving the propriety 

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of such a remedy. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). In general, 

the showing required for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are 

the same. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 

n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The party requesting preliminary injunctive relief must show that “he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 

(2008); Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter). 

The propriety of a TRO hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury that must be 

imminent in nature. Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

Alternatively, under the so-called sliding scale approach, as long as the Plaintiffs 

demonstrate the requisite likelihood of irreparable harm and show that an injunction is in 

the public interest, a preliminary injunction can still issue so long as serious questions 

going to the merits are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in Plaintiffs’ 

favor. Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-36 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(concluding that the “serious questions” version of the sliding scale test for preliminary 

injunctions remains viable after Winter). 

ANALYSIS 

“Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that, among other things, they are likely to 

suffer irreparable injury and the injury must be imminent in nature.” Caribbean Marine, 

844 F.2d at 674. Reflecting this requirement, Local Rule 231(b), which governs the 

timing of motions for TROs, states in full: 

In considering a motion for a temporary restraining order, the 

Court will consider whether the applicant could have sought 

relief by motion for preliminary injunction at an earlier date 

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without the necessity for seeking last-minute relief by motion 

for temporary restraining order. Should the Court find that the 

applicant unduly delayed in seeking injunctive relief, the 

Court may conclude that the delay constitutes laches or 

contradicts the applicant's allegations of irreparable injury 

and may deny the motion solely on either ground. 

As alleged, Plaintiffs have been on notice of the EPA’s approval of the twoconcentration TST since at least May 8, 2014. See Mot. at 8 (explaining that “SCAP's 

members first learned of this ATP on May 8, 2014, when the NPDES permits for three 

(3) of SCAP's members were reissued by the Regional Water Quality Control Board for 

the Los Angeles Region”).4 Defendants therefore contend that Plaintiffs’ “long delay in 

seeking injunctive relief establishes ‘a lack of urgency and irreparable harm.’” Opp’n at 

16 (citing Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 

1985)). Defendants’ argument is well taken. 

Plaintiffs offer two justifications for their delay in seeking relief in this Court. First, 

Plaintiffs state that “[o]ne of the Plaintiffs did not even receive approval to join the 

litigation until its Board of Directors meeting held on [June 25, 2014].” Reply at 6. Next, 

Plaintiffs contend that before filing suit, “research had to be done to determine the issues 

to be raised in the case, including the sending of a Public Record Act request and a 

Freedom of Information Act . . . request.” Id. 

Given that a TRO is considered to be an extraordinary remedy and Plaintiffs have 

the burden of establishing its propriety, Plaintiffs’ explanation of the reasons for their 

delay in filing their Motion is inadequate. Despite becoming aware of the EPA’s approval 

of the two-concentration TST on May 8, 2014, Plaintiffs took no action in this Court for 

approximately seven weeks. Plaintiffs could have sought a preliminary injunction, 

without resorting to the extraordinary form of relief that is a TRO, in the interim period 

between May 8, 2014, and June 26, 2014. Instead, Plaintiffs waited until June 25, 2014, 

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 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs “actually learned of the Regional EPA’s approval of the 

alternate test procedure by May 1, 2014 when the Los Angeles Regional Water Board responded in writing 

to comments to its draft permit for the Camarillo Sanitation District, a member of Plaintiff SCAP.” Opp’n at 

10. 

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to file a Complaint and until June 26, 2014, to file the instant motion -- just two business 

days prior to the onset of alleged irreparable harm. Stated another way, the Court is of 

the view that the seven-week delay between Plaintiffs’ discovery of the EPA’s approval 

of the two-concentration TST and the filing of this Motion contradicts Plaintiffs' claims of 

irreparable injury. Under the circumstances here, seven weeks constitutes an “undue 

delay” under Local Rule 231(b). See Caribbean Marine, 844 F.2d at 674.5 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not made a compelling argument to explain 

why they could not “have sought relief by motion for preliminary injunction at an earlier 

date without the necessity for seeking last-minute relief by motion for temporary 

restraining order.” E.D. Cal. Local R. 231(b); see, e.g., Occupy Sacramento v. City of 

Sacramento, 2:11–CV–02873–MCE, 2011 WL 5374748 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011) 

(denying application for TRO for twenty-five day delay). Accordingly, the Court denies 

Plaintiffs' Motion on procedural grounds alone, and it is therefore unnecessary to 

address the substantive issues of Plaintiffs' Motion at this time. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons just stated, Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, 

ECF No. 4, is DENIED without prejudice. As explained on the record, Plaintiffs may 

seek a preliminary injunction through a properly noticed motion. See E.D. Cal. Local R. 

230; 231(d). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 2, 2014 

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 Despite Plaintiffs’ failure to take any action in this Court prior to June 25, 2014, on June 6, 2014, 

the Camarillo Sanitary District, a member of Plaintiff SCAP, filed a petition challenging its permit before the 

California State Water Resources Control Board. See Opp’n at 13; Request for Judicial Notice, June 30, 

2014, ECF No. 9-2. As Defendants point out, the Camarillo Sanitary District is represented by the same 

counsel as Plaintiffs in this action. See Opp’n at 13. 

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