Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-16-01575/USCOURTS-ca6-16-01575-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 16a0293p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

MARK BROWN; CHERYL BROWN, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

BATTLE CREEK POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., 

Defendants, 

JEFFREY CASE; CITY OF BATTLE CREEK; CHRISTOF 

KLEIN, DAMON YOUNG, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 16-1575 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids. 

No. 1:15-cv-00283—Robert J. Jonker, Chief District Judge. 

Argued: December 1, 2016 

Decided and Filed: December 19, 2016 

Before: MOORE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.*

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Brian T. Keck, MORGAN & MEYERS, PLC, Dearborn, Michigan, for Appellants. 

Saura J. Sahu, CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Battle Creek, Michigan, for Appellees. ON 

BRIEF: Brian T. Keck, Courtney E. Morgan, Jr., MORGAN & MEYERS, PLC, Dearborn, 

Michigan, for Appellants. Saura J. Sahu, CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Battle Creek, 

Michigan, for Appellees. 

 *

The Honorable Joseph M. Hood, Senior District Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Kentucky, sitting by designation. 

>

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_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

CLAY, Circuit Judge. In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Plaintiffs Mark Brown and Cheryl 

Brown (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek to hold Officers Christof Klein, Damon Young, and 

Jeffrey Case (collectively, “Individual Officers” or “officers”) of the City of Battle Creek Police 

Department (“BCPD”) and the City of Battle Creek (“City”) (collectively, “Defendants”) liable 

for unlawfully seizing their property in violation of the Fourth Amendment when the officers 

shot and killed their two dogs while executing a search warrant. The district court granted 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Defendants. 

Plaintiffs appeal the judgment. 

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. 

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

A. Factual Background 

i. Trash Pull, Warrant, and Briefing Prior to Raid 

 On April 16, 2013, the BCPD conducted a trash pull at the residence of Danielle Nesbitt 

(“residence”). The trash pull recovered baggies with residue of marijuana and cocaine, a small 

amount of loose marijuana, and mail addressed to Plaintiffs and Vincent Jones, the father of Ms. 

Nesbitt’s child. 

 On April 17, 2013, the BCPD obtained a warrant to search the residence. The evidence 

recovered from the trash pull and information from a confidential informant were the bases for 

the search warrant. The affiant stated that he had received information indicating that Vincent 

Jones lived at the residence and was distributing controlled substances from inside the residence. 

Ms. Nesbitt, the daughter of Cheryl Brown, owned the home and allowed her mother and Mark 

Brown to stay in the basement of the residence. 

 That same day, the officers executed the search warrant. Prior to execution of the 

warrant, the officers and members of the City’s Emergency Response Team (“ERT”) met to 

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discuss the details related to the case, including Jones’ criminal history, Jones’ known gang 

affiliations and gang associates, whether there were children or dogs present at the residence, and 

any other issues or concerns they may have had prior to the search. Defendants decided to 

involve the ERT for this search because of the threat the subject, Vincent Jones, posed given his 

criminal history, known gang affiliations, possession and use of firearms, and possible 

possession of cocaine and heroin he was alleged to be distributing out of the residence. Officer 

Case testified that Vincent Jones was a member of the north side gang in Battle Creek, and that 

this gang was one of the reasons why the BCPD created the gang unit. He stated that “Vincent 

Jones, many of [the officers] kn[e]w him very, very well, his gang history, his drug history, his 

gun history, the foot chases, the car chases, the shootings. He [was] a bad guy. Very rarely 

[wa]s he alone.” (R. 61-5, Officer Jeffrey Case Dep., PageID# 53−54.) 

Officer Case went on to state that “Vincent Jones was a primary target when the gang 

unit started because of many of the activities that we’re talking about, and that gang . . . was 

fairly large, very tight. Many of them carried guns, shot people, sold drugs. So any time 

Vincent was associated with something, it was highly likely that there would be others involved 

or close.” (Id. at 54−55.) He then testified that, “whether [Vincent Jones] got stopped or not, the 

risk [that others were in the residence] would still be high.” (Id. at 55−56.) The officers were 

informed during the briefing that Vincent Jones had just been released from prison after maxing 

out his time at state prison a month prior to the raid. During the briefing, the officers and ERT 

had no information about whether there were dogs in the residence. 

 After the briefing, the officers and the ERT headed to the residence. On the way to the 

residence, the officers, including Officers Klein and Young, received information that Vincent 

Jones had left the residence and had been detained by police with heroin on his person. They 

were also informed that there was a dog in the backyard and another subject in the residence, 

later identified as Mark Brown. Mark Brown testified that he came to the residence during his 

lunch break that day to let the dogs out around 1:00 p.m., and was on his way out of the 

residence around 2:00 p.m. to go back to work when he was detained by Officer Sutherland. 

 Mark Brown was walking on the front lawn of the residence toward his car, which was 

parked on the street, when Officer Sutherland pulled up behind Mark Brown’s car. Officer 

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Sutherland placed Mark Brown in handcuffs and informed him that officers would soon be 

executing a search warrant for the residence. Mark Brown was standing behind his car with a 

view of the residence’s front door and front window. 

 A few minutes after Mark Brown was detained, the officers, including Officers Case, 

Klein, and Young, and the ERT pulled up to the residence. Officers Klein and Case testified that 

this was when they first saw the “Beware of Dog” sign outside the residence. (Case Dep. at 44; 

R. 61-2, Officer Christof Klein Dep., PageID# 104.) The officers, with the exception of Officer 

Case, proceeded directly to the front door. Mark Brown testified that when the officers and ERT 

arrived, he told Officer Sutherland that he had a key to the front door, that there was no one else 

in the residence, and that his two dogs were in the residence. Officer Sutherland tried telling the 

officers this information before they breached the front door. Officer Klein testified that he did 

not hear about Mark Brown’s comments to Officer Sutherland prior to breaching the front door. 

ii. Execution of the Search Warrant 

1. Forced Entry Through Front Door 

 Officer Klein led the group of officers and ERT to the front door, where he saw two dogs 

through the front window standing on a couch. Officer Klein testified that as the officers 

approached the front door, he could see the dogs barking aggressively, “digging and pawing,” 

and “jumping” at the window. (Klein Dep. at 79.) The first dog was a large, brown pit bull, 

weighing about 97 pounds, and the second dog was a smaller white pit bull, weighing about 53 

pounds. Officer Klein knocked on the front door, announced their presence, and “less than 

fifteen seconds” later, breached the door with a ram, which is a large metal object used by law 

enforcement to open doors. (Klein Dep. at 70−71.) After the door was breached, Officer Klein 

was the first of the search warrant team to enter the residence. 

 Mark Brown testified that he was able to see the two dogs in the window standing on the 

couch before the door was breached. Mark Brown testified that, as the officers were 

approaching the residence, the dogs were not barking. Mark Brown also stated that the second 

dog did not bark at all, and that he had the second dog almost a year at that point and “she [had] 

never barked a day in her life.” (R. 61-8, Mark Brown Dep., PageID# 54.) 

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2. Entryway and Kitchen Sweep 

 Officer Klein testified that when he entered the house, the first dog jumped off the couch, 

was aggressively barking at the officers, and lunged at him. He also noted that when the officers 

entered the residence, the second pit bull jumped off the couch, went through the kitchen and 

down into the basement. He further testified that when the first pit bull lunged at him in the 

entryway, he fired his first shot. Officer Klein explained that the first pit bull “had only moved a 

few inches” between the time when he entered the residence and when he shot her, and that this 

movement was what he considered to be a “lunge.” (See Klein Dep. at 73−75, 77.) Klein 

testified that he “hit” the first dog with a non-lethal shot, but that he was “aiming at its head.” 

(Id. at 80.) 

3. Basement Sweep 

 Officer Klein stated that after he struck the first pit bull in the entryway, the dog moved 

away from the officers and towards the kitchen, then down the stairs and into the basement. 

Officer Klein noted that this first dog was not running, as it “look[ed]” injured. (Id. at 82.) As 

the officers were descending the stairs to clear the basement, they noted that the first pit bull was 

at the bottom of the stairs. Klein testified that the first pit bull obstructed the path to the 

basement, and that he “did not feel [the officers] could safely clear the basement with those dogs 

down there.” (Id. at 95−96.) The officers’ “priority w[as] [ ] to secure the basement if there 

w[ere] any people down there.” (Id. at 97.) When the officers were halfway down the stairs, the 

first dog, who was at the bottom of the staircase, turned towards them and started barking again. 

From the staircase, Officer Klein fired two fatal rounds at the first pit bull. (Id.) 

 When the officers got down to the basement, they noted that the “basement was loaded. 

You've gotta look under beds, you've gotta do everything, and [the dogs] basically prevented us 

from doing that, and they were protecting that basement.” (Case Dep. at 86.) 

 Officer Klein testified that after he shot and killed the first dog, he noticed the second dog 

standing about halfway across the basement. The second dog was not moving towards the 

officers when they discovered her in the basement, but rather she was “just standing there,” 

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barking and was turned sideways to the officers. (Klein Dep. at 87.) Klein then fired the first 

two rounds at the second dog. 

After being shot by Officer Klein, the second dog ran to the back corner of the basement. 

The second pit bull was in this corner when Officer Young, who was also clearing the basement, 

shot her because she was “moving” out of the corner and in his direction. (Id. at 92.) After 

being shot by Officers Klein and Young, the second pit bull ran to the back of the furnace in the 

back corner of the basement. Officer Case saw that “[t]here was blood coming out of numerous 

holes in the dog, and . . . [Officer Case] didn't want to see it suffer” so he put her out of her 

misery and fired the last shot. (Id. at 93−94; Case Dep. at 79.) 

iii. City of Battle Creek Police Department’s Relevant Policy 

 The BCPD has the following policies with regard to the use of firearms when responding 

to resistance in various law enforcement situations: 

It is the policy of the Battle Creek Police Department that officers may use 

response to resistance when the officer reasonably believes that the action is in 

defense of human life, including the officers own life, or in defense of any person 

in imminent danger or serious physical injury. 

Justification for the use of response to resistance is to be limited to what 

reasonably appears to be the facts known or perceived by an officer at the time 

he/she decides to use response to resistance. . . . The authority to use this force 

carries with it the responsibility that only the level of force necessary to 

accomplish lawful objectives is used. 

Dangerous Animal, defined: An animal that bites or attacks a person or another 

animal. 

Vicious Dog, defined: An animal of the Canis familaris species which, when 

either unmuzzled or unleashed, or when not confined to the premises of the 

owner, menaces a person in a manner which an ordinary and reasonable person 

would conclude to be an apparent attitude of attack. 

(R. 61-3, Policy on Response to Resistance and Firearms, PageID# 1−2.) 

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B. Procedural History 

 On March 17, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the action against Defendants, claiming violations of 

their constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged 

Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and 

seizure when the officers unconstitutionally seized their dogs and unreasonably forced entry into 

the residence. Plaintiffs also alleged that the City was municipally liable under Monell v. Dep’t 

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) because the BCPD failed to provide training to address the 

known risk of constitutional violations arising from dog shootings. 

 On January 26, 2016, Defendants moved the district court for summary judgment on the 

basis that there was no genuine dispute of a material fact as to any of Plaintiffs’ claims. 

Defendants argued that the officers were protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, and in 

any event, the seizure of the dogs was reasonable. Next, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs failed 

to make a proper showing under Monell, and that the damage to the front door was reasonable 

given the circumstances of the search. On January 5, 2016, Plaintiffs responded, arguing that 

they have a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure of their dogs and from 

unreasonable destruction of the residence’s front door, and that the officers’ seizure and 

destruction in this case were unreasonable. 

 On March 28, 2016, the district court heard oral argument on the motion and orally 

granted the motion in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims. The district 

court held that Plaintiffs presented no evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to 

their Fourth Amendment claims of unreasonable seizure of their two dogs and the front door. 

The district court also held that Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the City’s inadequate 

training policy was the cause of the alleged constitutional violations in this case. On March 29, 

2016, the district court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Qualified Immunity 

Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court erred in granting the officers qualified 

immunity and determining that the officers’ seizure of Plaintiffs’ dogs was reasonable. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that: (1) it is clearly established that a government official’s 

unreasonable killing of a dog is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the seizure of the 

dogs was unreasonable. 

 Conversely, Defendants argue that the district court correctly concluded that the officers 

are immune from this action under the qualified immunity doctrine and that, in any event, they 

did not violate a clearly established right pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, 

Defendants assert that: (1) Plaintiffs have no constitutional right to be free from the 

unreasonable seizure of a dog because this Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States 

have not held that such a right exists; and (2) if the Court determines that Plaintiffs have this 

right, then the officers did not violate this right because the shootings were reasonable inasmuch 

as the Court’s review of the excessive force claim is limited to the moments preceding the 

shootings. 

 We find that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the officers on 

their qualified immunity claim given Plaintiffs’ failure to show the existence of a genuine issue 

of material fact as to the reasonableness of the seizures. 

i. Standard of Review 

A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Mullins v. Cyranek, 

805 F.3d 760, 764 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “Summary judgment is appropriate where 

the evidence in the record, viewed in its entirety, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 

764−65. This Court “must assume the truth of the non-moving party’s evidence and construe all 

inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Ciminillo v. 

Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Such a genuine issue of material 

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fact exists when there is sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. 

Id. Furthermore, a “mere scintilla” of evidence will not be enough for Plaintiffs to withstand 

summary judgment. Id. (citation omitted). 

ii. Relevant Legal Principles 

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil 

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity 

provides government officials “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and 

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Messerschmidt 

v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an 

allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the 

action . . . assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was 

taken.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (citation omitted). 

To determine whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity, this Court applies 

a two-prong test: “(1) whether the facts, when taken in the light most favorable to the party 

asserting the injury, show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether 

the right violated was clearly established such ‘that a reasonable official would understand that 

what he is doing violates that right.’” Mullins, 805 F.3d at 765 (citation omitted). 

iii. Analysis 

1. Violation of a Constitutional Right 

The threshold issue this Court must determine is whether the killing of a dog constitutes a 

“seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In line with every other circuit that has 

addressed this issue, we hold that a dog is property, and the unreasonable seizure of that property 

is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

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The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 

violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some 

meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United States 

v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). As the Ninth Circuit reasoned, “[t]he emotional 

attachment to a family’s dog is not comparable to a possessory interest in furniture.” San Jose 

Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 975 (9th Cir. 

2005) (“Hells Angels”). 

A large number of this Court’s sister circuits have already concluded that, “‘the use of 

deadly force against a household pet is reasonable only if the pet poses an [imminent] danger and 

the use of force is unavoidable.’” Robinson v. Pezzat, 818 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting 

Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the unreasonable killing of a 

companion dog constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment). See also Mayfield v. 

Bethards, 826 F.3d 1252, 1256 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that killing a dog constitutes a violation 

of the dog owner’s Fourth Amendment rights absent a warrant or some exception to the warrant 

requirement); Carroll v. Cty. of Monroe, 712 F.3d 649, 651 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the 

unreasonable killing of a companion animal constitutes an unconstitutional seizure of personal 

property under the Fourth Amendment); Hells Angels, 402 F.3d at 975−78 (holding that the 

killing of guard dogs was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment where “the officers were 

not presented with exigent circumstances that necessitated killing the dogs”); Brown v. 

Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); cf. Altman v. City of High Point, 

330 F.3d 194, 204−05 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that privately owned dogs were effects subject to 

the protections of the Fourth Amendment but officers’ actions of shooting and killing the dog 

were objectively reasonable). 

Based on the precedent set forth by a large number of this Court’s sister circuits, we hold 

that as a matter of first impression there is a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to 

not have one’s dog unreasonably seized. 

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2. Clearly Established Right in 2013 

As to Defendants’ argument that it was not clearly established in 2013 that the seizure of 

a dog was a Fourth Amendment event, we hold that Defendants had reasonable notice that 

unreasonably shooting Plaintiffs’ dogs would constitute the “seizure” of an “effect” within the 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See also Viilo, 547 F.3d at 710 (holding that this right was 

clearly established in 2004 since the Third Circuit decided Brown in 2001 and the Ninth Circuit 

held in 2005 in Hells Angels that this right was established in 1998). 

“In inquiring whether a constitutional right is clearly established, we must ‘look first to 

decisions of the Supreme Court, then to decisions of this court and other courts within our 

circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits.’” Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 

1336 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Daugherty v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1991)). “[A] 

right must be specific to the relevant factual context of a cited case and not generalized with 

respect to the Amendment that is the basis of the claim.” Viilo, 547 F.3d at 710 (citing Brosseau 

v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198−99 (2004)). In Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), the Supreme 

Court recognized that previous cases do not have to be “fundamentally similar” and that 

government officials can still be on notice “even in novel factual circumstances.” 536 U.S. at 

740−41. 

Every circuit that has considered this issue has concluded that the unreasonable killing of 

a dog constitutes an unconstitutional “seizure” of personal property under the Fourth 

Amendment. Likewise, the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Michigan, in 

an unreported opinion, stated that “the federal courts ‘have consistently recognized that a law 

enforcement officer’s killing of a pet dog constitutes a destruction of property and therefore a 

seizure under the Fourth Amendment.’” Bateman v. Driggett, No. 11-13142, 2012 WL 2564839, 

at *7 (E.D. Mich. July 2, 2012) (quoting Dziekan v. Gaynor, 376 F. Supp. 2d 267, 279 (D. Conn. 

2005) (citing cases)); see also Preston v. City of St. Clair Shores, Mich., No. 14-12751, 2015 WL 

12516687, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 31, 2015) (same). 

The Supreme Court and this Circuit have yet to decide this issue. Nevertheless, given the 

fact that every sister circuit that has confronted this issue has concluded that an individual has a 

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property right in their dog, and that a district court within this Circuit has concluded the same, 

we hold that this right was clearly established in 2013 when the conduct in this action occurred. 

Therefore, we must next determine whether the seizures of the two dogs in the instant case were 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 

3. Reasonableness of Seizures 

“Reasonableness is the touchstone of any seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Hells 

Angels, 402 F.3d at 975. The District of Columbia Circuit recently stated that, “[a]s in any 

Fourth Amendment case, ‘[w]e analyze [the] question [of whether a pet constitutes an imminent 

threat] from the perspective [ ]of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 

20/20 vision of hindsight.’” Robinson, 818 F.3d at 8 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. –––

–, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989))). 

“Imminent danger” is defined as “[a]n immediate, real threat to one’s safety that justifies the use 

of force in self-defense,” or “[t]he danger resulting from an immediate threatened injury 

sufficient to cause a reasonable and prudent person to defend himself or herself.”1

 Imminent 

Danger, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 

“This analysis allow[s] for the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the 

amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Robinson, 818 F.3d at 8 (quoting 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396−97) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The task of this [C]ourt is to 

put itself into the shoes of the officers at the time the actions took place and to ask whether the 

actions taken by the officers were objectively unreasonable.” Altman, 330 F.3d at 205. Thus, 

the standard we set out today is that a police officer’s use of deadly force against a dog while 

executing a warrant to search a home for illegal drug activity is reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment when, given the totality of the circumstances and viewed from the perspective of an 

objectively reasonable officer, the dog poses an imminent threat to the officer’s safety. 

 1

The BCPD’s policy stated that “officers may use response to resistance when the officer reasonably 

believes that the action is in defense of human life, including the officers own life, or in defense of any person in 

imminent danger or serious physical injury.” (R. 61-3 at 1−2 (emphasis added).) 

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To determine whether the seizures of the two dogs were reasonable, “a court must 

‘balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 

against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion’ and 

determine whether ‘the totality of the circumstances justified [the] particular sort of . . . 

seizure.’” Carroll, 712 F.3d at 651 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8−9 (1985) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that the seizure was 

unreasonable. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A seizure becomes unlawful when it is 

more intrusive than necessary. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504 (1983). 

There is no dispute that the shooting of Plaintiffs’ dogs were severe intrusions given the 

emotional attachment between a dog and an owner. See Hells Angels, 402 F.3d at 975. On the 

other hand, insuring officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence are particularly 

important governmental interests that the courts must strive to protect. Therefore, the question 

before the district court was whether, given all of the circumstances and viewed from the 

perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, the two pit bulls posed imminent threats to the 

officers. Because the City and the officers moved for summary judgment, Plaintiffs must point 

to admissible evidence that creates a genuine dispute of material fact—“a dispute that would 

allow ‘a reasonable jury [to] return a verdict’ in [their] favor—on this precise question.” 

Robinson, 818 F.3d at 8 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 

We find that Plaintiffs have not pointed to admissible evidence that creates a genuine dispute that 

would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in their favor. 

Vincent Jones posed a serious threat to the officers’ safety given his criminal history, 

known gang affiliations, possession and use of firearms, and the fact that he was known to be 

actively distributing cocaine and heroin from the residence. Given the high-risk nature of the 

raid and the serious threat posed by Jones, the officers decided to involve the ERT in the raid. 

About a month prior to the raid, Vincent Jones was released from the Michigan Department of 

Corrections (“MDOC”) after serving his maximum time. The district court noted at the hearing 

that most prisoners do not serve their maximum time at MDOC, and that this, by itself, was an 

indication of risk posed by Jones since it implied that Jones had behavior problems at MDOC. 

Officer Case testified that Vincent Jones was a member of the north side gang in Battle Creek, 

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and that this gang was one of the reasons why the City’s police department created the gang unit. 

He stated that “Vincent Jones, many of [the officers] kn[e]w him very, very well, his gang 

history, his drug history, his gun history, the foot chases, the car chases, the shootings. He [was] 

a bad guy. Very rarely [wa]s he alone.” (Case Dep. at 53−54.) Officer Case went on to state 

that “Vincent Jones was a primary target when the gang unit started . . . and . . . the north side 

gang . . . was fairly large, very tight. Many of them carried guns, shot people, sold drugs. So 

any time Vincent was associated with something, it was highly likely that there would be others 

involved or close.” (Id. at 54−55.) He then testified that, “whether [Vincent Jones] got stopped 

or not, the risk [that others were in the residence] would still be high.” (Id. at 55−56.) The 

district court reasoned that these facts “bespeak danger and risk.” (R. 72, Tr. Hr’g Mot. for 

Summ. J., PageID# 43.) 

Although the officers found out that Jones had been detained as they were en route to the 

residence, the officers knew that it was highly likely that other members of the gang could be in 

the residence at the time of the raid, or at least close by. Based on the information above, the 

officers were on high alert going into the raid that other members of the gang could be in the 

residence and that they could be armed and dangerous. 

As the officers approached the front door, Officer Klein testified that he could see the two 

pit bulls both barking aggressively, “digging and pawing,” and “jumping” at the window. (Klein 

Dep. at 79.) At his deposition, Officer Klein was asked what were the “aggressive behaviors 

displayed by the dogs, specifically, that indicated to you that yourself or other members of your 

ERT group were in immediate danger of harm, serious injury, or death?” (Klein Dep. at 97.) 

Officer Klein answered that: 

[it was the] [d]eep aggressive barking, consistent barking, not just one or two 

barks, but steady, aggressive. Lunging towards the windows as we made our 

approach. The dog moving from the couch directly to the front door after it was 

breached. The fact that the same dog even after it was shot stood at the bottom of 

the stairs and turned towards me, continuing to bark aggressively in the same 

manner, and then the second dog, even after that happened, after firing three 

rounds at the first dog, the second dog turning, pausing as it was moving across 

the basement, it stopped and turned and was barking. 

(Id. at 97−98.) 

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Likewise, Officer Case testified that, “[a]s soon as the door came open, the amount of 

time between the door coming open and the shot was extremely small. I can't even tell you how 

much but, I don't know, maybe a second or less. It was very fast. . . . A door is getting breached, 

dogs are barking, a ton of crap is going on.” (Case Dep. at 68−69.) 

Mark Brown testified that, as the officers were approaching the residence, he could see 

the two dogs standing on the couch looking out the window. (Brown Dep. at 37.) Mark Brown 

stated that the dogs were not barking as the officers approached the residence. Mark Brown also 

stated that the smaller pit bull did not bark, and that he had it almost a year at that point and “she 

[had] never barked a day in her life.” (Id. at 54.) Mark Brown further testified that, “from the 

time [the officers] knocked in the door until the time [he] heard the gunshots . . . [was] [t]hree to 

four minutes. [He] d[id]n't know exactly.” (Brown Dep. at 38−39.) The district court concluded 

that despite the discrepancy between the testimony of Mark Brown and the officers, “[t]here 

[wa]s nothing on the record that contradict[ed] [Officer Klein’s] description of what happened,” 

and that in “taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s] . . . unrebutted facts [ ] 

happen to favor the other side.” (R. 72 at 45.) We agree with the district court and conclude that 

a thorough review of the record demonstrates that Plaintiffs failed to rebut material facts. The 

disputes as to the timing of the first shots and the barking of the dogs are immaterial to the issue 

of whether the officers’ use of force was reasonable because the testimony that the dogs 

threatened the officers’ safety was unrebutted. 

At the hearing, the district court held that, even if it did take the facts in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiffs, the unrebutted fact that Officer Klein said the large brown pit bull lunged 

at him before he shot her would still establish that his actions were reasonable. (R. 72 at 24, 45.) 

A jury could reasonably conclude that a 97-pound pit bull, barking and lunging at the officers as 

they breached the entryway, posed a threat to the officers’ safety and it was necessary to shoot 

the dog in order for them to safely sweep the residence and insure that there were no other gang 

members in the residence and that evidence was not being destroyed. 

After Officer Klein shot the first dog, the dog went through the kitchen and into the 

basement. As the officers were moving down the stairs to clear the basement, they noticed that 

the wounded dog was at the bottom of the stairs. When the officers were halfway down the 

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stairs, the first dog turned towards them and started barking again from the bottom of the stairs. 

Officer Klein reasonably fired two fatal rounds at the pit bull. The officers testified that the 

basement was filled with various objects and it was difficult to determine if there was anybody in 

the basement hiding behind one of the large objects. The officers had to sweep the basement, 

and the wounded animal was preventing them from entering the basement and safely sweeping 

it. Therefore, the seizure of the first dog was reasonable. 

With regard to the second pit bull, the question before the district court was whether 

Plaintiffs presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it posed an imminent threat to 

the officers’ safety. The dog was not present in the entryway and was not standing at the bottom 

of the basement stairs as the officers descended. The second pit bull was in the basement when 

they descended the stairs and was barking as the officers were attempting to enter and clear the 

basement. Officer Klein testified that the dog, a 53-pound unleashed pit bull, was standing in the 

middle of the basement, barking, when he fired the first two rounds. The officers testified that 

they were unable to safely clear the basement with both dogs there. Therefore, we find that it 

was reasonable for Officer Klein to shoot the second dog. 

After being shot by Officer Klein, the second dog ran to the back corner of the basement 

and was in the corner when Officer Young shot her. Officer Young testified that he was unable 

to clear that corner of the basement with a 53-pound unleashed pit bull moving in his direction. 

We find that Officer Young’s shooting of the second dog was reasonable. Officer Case then 

fired the fatal shot at the second dog when he found it bleeding profusely behind the furnace. As 

with Officers Klein and Young, we find Officer Case’s actions reasonable. 

These specific facts distinguish this case from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hells 

Angels and from parts of the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in Robinson. In Hells 

Angels, the Ninth Circuit found that the killing of the guard dogs was unreasonable, in part, 

because the officers were put on notice a week in advance of the raid that there were dogs at the 

place to be searched. Unlike Hells Angels, the officers here were informed on the way to the raid 

that there was at least one dog in the residence. The officers had no meaningful time to 

formulate a plan on how to deal with the dog. Although here the officers did not have notice, 

even had they been given more advance notice, it is not clear that they would have been able to 

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make arrangements for the protection of the dogs. Any such arrangements may have raised 

suspicion or alerted the criminal suspects that something was amiss. It may have given the 

suspects an opportunity to depart the premises, destroy evidence, or formulate plans for an attack 

against the officers. Because of such possibilities, the officers’ actions here—in failing to make 

advance arrangements for the protection of the dogs—were reasonable. 

The Robinson case is especially illustrative because the District of Columbia Circuit 

found one officer’s actions in shooting a dog reasonable and another officer’s actions in shooting 

that dog unreasonable. In Robinson, the police obtained a warrant to search the dog owner’s 

home after her grandson was arrested for possession of marijuana. 818 F.3d at 4. A police 

squad knocked on the front door and identified themselves. Id. The dog owner asked the lead 

officer if she could put her dog, a thirteen-year-old female pit bull/German shepherd mix, in the 

bathroom while they executed the warrant. Id. The officer allowed her to do this, so the dog 

owner, with the screen door closed but in view of the officers, put the dog in the bathroom. Id. 

The officers then entered the house and the lead officer yelled to the rest of the squad that there 

was a dog in the bathroom. Id. Pezzat, the officer that first shot the dog, testified that she did 

not hear such warnings. Id. 

The dog owner testified that she saw Pezzat shoot the dog while the dog was lying on the 

floor in the bathroom and not posing a threat to the officers. Id. Pezzat stated that she first shot 

the dog after the dog bit her, right outside the bathroom door. Id. at 5. Two other officers 

testified that they heard barking and saw the dog biting Pezzat right outside the bathroom door 

prior to Pezzat firing the first shot. Id. The district court held that the uncorroborated nature of 

the dog owner’s testimony failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the 

dog posed an imminent threat to the officers such that shooting the dog was reasonable. Id. at 

8−10. The District of Columbia Circuit found that the district court erred because it made a 

credibility determination as to the dog owner’s uncorroborated testimony. Id. at 9. The District 

of Columbia Circuit held that the discrepancy between the dog owner’s version of events and the 

officers’ testimony went directly to whether the dog was an imminent threat to the safety of the 

officers. Id. at 9−10. 

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Conversely, the District of Columbia Circuit found that Officer McLeod, the second 

officer to shoot the dog, acted reasonably. Id. at 11. There was undisputed evidence that 

McLeod shot the dog after it bit Pezzat. Id. The Robinson court held that, “[g]iven that [the dog] 

bit [ ] Pezzat hard enough to puncture her leather boots, McLeod’s belief—just seconds later—

that the dog continued to pose an imminent threat even absent additional aggressive behavior 

was hardly unreasonable.” Id. at 12. 

Similar to the lack of rebuttal evidence presented as to Officer McLeod in Robinson, 

Plaintiffs provided no evidence rebutting the officers’ testimony that the first dog lunged at the 

officers in the entryway, or testimony rebutting the fact that it prevented the officers from 

entering and sweeping the basement safely. Likewise, Plaintiffs failed to present evidence 

rebutting that fact that the second dog was barking aggressively at the officers in the basement 

and was preventing them from safely sweeping the basement. Mark Brown’s testimony about 

the timing of when he heard the shots and the lack of barking he heard when the officers 

approached the residence is not material to whether, once inside the residence and out of Mark 

Brown’s viewpoint, the dogs posed an imminent threat to the officers’ safety. 

Although the factual background in Altman is somewhat different than the background of 

this case, the Fourth Circuit similarly held that privately owned dogs were property protected by 

the Fourth Amendment, and that the officers did not violate the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment 

rights because the seizures of those dogs were reasonable. Altman, 330 F.3d at 196. In Altman, 

animal control officers shot and killed several dogs that were running at large in the city. Id. It 

was undisputed that the dogs were running at large with regard to each dog shooting. Id. at 206. 

In most of the incidents, the dogs had already attacked people in the city. Id. at 206−07. In one 

instance involving a pit bull, “a dangerous breed of dog,” while it had not attacked any person, 

the pit bull’s “behavior toward the meter reader was sufficiently aggressive to cause [the witness] 

to call the police. Responding to that call, [the animal control officer] was immediately 

confronted with a fleeing dog.” Id. at 206. The Altman court stated that “[i]t was not 

unreasonable for [the animal control officer] to conclude, in that split second as [the pit bull] 

sped away, that he could not safely capture the animal.” Id. The Fourth Circuit ultimately held 

that the officers acted reasonably in seizing the dogs. Id. at 207. It further noted that: 

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[W]e are not saying the officers’ responses in these cases were the best possible 

responses. We are only saying that, under the circumstances existing at the time 

the officers took the actions and in light of the facts known by the officers, their 

actions were objectively reasonable. . . . Even dog owners can find their pets to 

be unpredictable at times. How much more so a person who is not intimately 

familiar with the behavior of the particular animal (as neither Officers Perdue nor 

Moxley were in any of these cases) and who is forced to confront the dog for the 

first time in an unsupervised, unenclosed environment. 

Id. 

Similar to Altman, the officers here confronted two large pit bulls for the first time in an 

unsupervised environment where they were unleashed and in an enclosed space with the officers. 

Given Jones’ criminal history, gang affiliations, the types of drugs he was suspected of 

distributing, the fact that the officers had no time to plan for the dogs, in addition to the officers’ 

unrebutted testimony that the dogs either lunged or were barking aggressively at the officers, the 

nature and size of the dogs, the fact that the dogs were unleashed and loose in a small residence, 

all culminate into a finding that the officers acted reasonably when they shot and killed the two 

dogs. 

Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, 

we find that a jury would conclude that Officer Klein, Officer Young, and Officer Case acted 

reasonably in shooting and killing Plaintiffs’ dogs. Summary judgment was therefore 

appropriate. 

B. Municipal Liability 

Plaintiffs next argue that the district court erred in granting the City’s motion for 

summary judgment because the City’s failure to train officers on how to recognize whether a dog 

is dangerous and how to use non-deadly methods to restrain dogs during search warrant 

executions amounted to deliberate indifference that resulted in the death of their dogs. 

Defendants argue that the district court did not err in granting the City’s motion because: (1) the 

City cannot be municipally liable because there was no constitutional violation by the individual 

officers; and (2) even if there was a constitutional violation, the City is not liable because 

Plaintiffs failed to present evidence that the City’s failure to act amounted to deliberate 

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indifference. We find that the district court did not err in granting judgment on Plaintiffs’ 

Monell claim. 

To succeed on a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must establish that his or her 

constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom of the municipality was the 

“moving force” behind the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Powers v. 

Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 606−07 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 

at 694). “A systematic failure to train police officers adequately is a custom or policy which can 

lead to municipal liability.” Miller v. Sanilac Cty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations 

omitted). “The inadequacy of police training only serves as a basis for § 1983 liability ‘where 

the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the 

police come into contact.’” Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 457 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting City of 

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). To establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff 

“must show prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [City] has ignored 

a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient 

and likely to cause injury.” Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir.2005). 

Because a finding of liability in the context of a failure to train amounts to a judicial 

determination that “the city itself [decided] to violate the Constitution,” the Supreme Court has 

imposed “a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a 

known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61–62 (2011) 

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations 

by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for 

purposes of failure to train,” although there are rare circumstances in which “the unconstitutional 

consequences of failing to train could be so patently obvious that a city could be liable under § 

1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.” Id. at 62, 64 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

The Supreme Court stated, that in the case of police officers, it will not: 

suffice to prove that an injury or accident could have been avoided if an officer 

had had better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular 

injury-causing conduct. Such a claim could be made about almost any encounter 

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resulting in injury, yet not condemn the adequacy of the program to enable 

officers to respond properly to the usual and recurring situations with which they 

must deal. 

Harris, 489 U.S. at 391. 

 In this case, the district court found that the Resistance and General Firearms Policy 

defined dangerous animals and vicious dogs, and discussed when the use of a firearm may be 

drawn. The court stated that the resistance policy “is consistent with protecting the officers from 

hostile animals.” (R. 72 at 49.) The court held that the events that transpired in this case were 

not a direct result of the resistance policy, and on this ground, there is no “basis for municipal 

liability.” (Id.) We agree. 

 On the claim that the BCPD did not have a policy on how to treat dogs in the search of a 

house, “despite a recurring problem that amounts to deliberate indifference,” the court stated that 

it is “something that may well become a viable claim as we move forward, but . . . on the present 

record the one thing that’s clear is that there isn’t much of a policy, practice, not just in Battle 

Creek but throughout the country, on how to deal with this beyond the general statements of how 

officers are supposed to respond to resistance.” (Id. at 49.) The court then held that based on the 

“present record, even crediting everything that’s in the record, there’s no history, credible history 

at least, that leads to needless killing of animals in the course of searches in Battle Creek . . . and 

. . . under those circumstances the fairly stringent standards for municipal liability by inattention 

could [not] be met here.” (Id. at 49−50.) 

 We find that Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence establishing deliberate indifference, in 

other words, that there were prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the 

City ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area 

was deficient and likely to cause injury. 

Plaintiffs argue that the City did not have a policy instructing officers on when and in 

what circumstances they should use deadly force against animals. They further claim that there 

was an unofficial tally system wherein officers would keep a running list of the animals they shot 

by putting stickers on their lockers to “brag[ ]” about it, and that it was not uncommon for 

officers to encounter animals during searches or in the scope of their duties. (R. 61-14, Officer 

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Angel Rivera Dep., PageID# 11−13, 20−22, 30−33.) With regard to the tally system, Plaintiffs 

presented evidence from Officers Angel Rivera, Brad Palmer, Joseph Wilder, and Scott 

Marshall. Officer Rivera testified that “it was very common that officers would talk about [how 

many animals they shot],” and that he could not identify individual officers who did this because 

“there were so many of them just bragging about it.” (Rivera Dep. 30−31.) With regard to the 

frequency with which the City’s officers encounter animals during searches, Officer Klein 

testified that “[m]any of the search warrants [he and his team] have executed [have] [involved] 

aggressive dogs,” and that it was “not uncommon” when he was “working road patrol” and when 

he was on the ERT. (Klein Dep. 56−57.) 

Despite this evidence, we find that Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence showing that “the 

need” for a specific policy and/or training “was so obvious and the likelihood that the 

inadequacy would result in the violation of constitutional rights was so great that the [City] as an 

entity can be held liable here for the extent of [Plaintiffs’] determined damages.” Leach v. 

Shelby Cty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1248 (6th Cir. 1989). This is largely because there was no 

evidence indicating that participation in the tally system was systematic or widespread, and there 

was no evidence that the police department’s supervisory personnel sanctioned such a system or 

even knew of its existence. 

For one, Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were not violated. The seizures of the dogs in 

this case were reasonable given the specific circumstances surrounding the raid. This finding 

alone is fatal to their municipal liability claim. See Powers, 501 F.3d at 606−07 (stating that in 

order to succeed on a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must establish that his or her 

constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom of the municipality was the 

“moving force” behind the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights) (citation omitted). 

Second, Plaintiffs did not provide any evidence demonstrating prior instances of 

unconstitutional dog shootings by the City’s police officers. Plaintiffs appear to generally claim 

that because there have been numerous instances of animal deaths resulting from officer 

shootings during searches and that officers face animals frequently, these facts demonstrate prior 

instances of unconstitutional conduct. Plaintiffs do not show how these prior animal shootings 

were unconstitutional. See Miller, 606 F.3d at 255 (affirming the district court’s grant of 

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summary judgment in favor of the county-defendant because the plaintiff did not show “that 

there was deliberate indifference based on prior instances of unconstitutional conduct”). 

Third, this case does not present one of those rare circumstances in which “the 

unconstitutional consequences of failing to train could be so patently obvious that a city could be 

liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 

62, 64 (internal quotation marks omitted). The tally system Plaintiffs mention, while not an 

example of model police behavior, does not provide proof of a pre-existing pattern of similar 

constitutional violations by police officers. Plaintiffs were unable to provide information as to 

the number of officers that participated in this tally system, the number of shootings that were 

tallied, or the number of shootings that were unreasonable exercises of force. Unsubstantiated 

testimony from a few officers generally describing the tally system while not providing details 

about the number of officers participating in it or the number of shootings tallied is neither 

persuasive nor meaningful. Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs provided no evidence that this tally 

system was sanctioned or encouraged by the BCPD, or that BCPD knew about it and knowingly 

disregarded it. 

As the district court stated, based on the “present record, even crediting everything that’s 

in the record, there’s no history, credible history at least, that leads to needless killing of animals 

in the course of searches in Battle Creek . . . and . . . under those circumstances the fairly 

stringent standards for municipal liability by inattention could [not] be met here.” (R. 72 at 

49−50.) Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in granting the City’s motion for 

summary judgment. 

C. Excessive Force 

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in granting Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment as to the officers’ use of force in breaching the front door. Cheryl Brown 

stated in her deposition that it would cost $240 to replace the front door. (R. 61-7, Cheryl Brown 

Dep., PageID# 75.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the use of the ram to breach the door was 

unreasonable because Mark Brown offered the front door key to the officers prior to the breach, 

and there was no objective evidence at the scene requiring immediate breach of the door since 

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(1) Vincent Jones, the subject of the search, was in custody, and (2) there was no evidence that 

the home was occupied. Defendants argue that the district court did not err because it was 

reasonable for the officers to force entry because they had information that Jones used the 

residence to distribute cocaine and heroin, and they did not know whether gang members would 

be in the residence armed and ready to fire at the officers. 

The Supreme Court has explained: “[O]fficers executing search warrants on occasion 

must damage property in order to perform their duty.” Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 

(1979). Like other Fourth Amendments inquiries, “the manner in which a warrant is 

executed”—including the damage of property—“is subject to later judicial review as to its 

reasonableness.” Id. “The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth 

Amendment analysis . . . governs the method of execution of the warrant.” United States v. 

Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (internal citation omitted). 

 Several facts support the conclusion that the officers in this case acted reasonably in 

breaching the front door without devising a method of entry that would not damage the door. 

First, Vincent Jones, although detained when the raid occurred, was identified as dangerous, 

known to carry firearms while distributing drugs, and known to be accompanied by other gang 

members. Second, the officers had information that Jones was distributing drugs out of the 

residence and they did not want anybody inside the residence to destroy evidence of drug 

distribution. Third, as Defendants’ counsel stated during oral argument, the officers would not 

have used the keys Mark Brown offered to give them because the officers would not have had 

any idea whether those keys were the correct keys. Defendants’ counsel persuasively argued that 

Mark Brown could have given the officers the wrong set of keys, and the resulting delay could 

have given somebody in the house the opportunity to destroy the drugs or time to prepare to 

attack or shoot the officers as they entered the residence. See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 

31, 40 (2003) (“[W]hen circumstances are exigent because a pusher may be near the point of 

putting his drugs beyond reach, it is imminent disposal . . . that governs when the police may 

reasonably enter”). Finally, the damage to the front door was “slight.” See United States v. 

Whisnant, 391 F. App’x 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that officers acted reasonably in 

cutting hole in the wall, in part, because the damage to the defendant’s property was “slight”). 

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III. CONCLUSION 

For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the district court did not err in granting 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s 

judgment. 

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