Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_08-cv-00175/USCOURTS-alsd-1_08-cv-00175-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JEANETTE GARRETT, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 08-0175-WS-M

 )

CEONIA STANTON, JR., et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER 

This closed matter comes before the Court on plaintiff Jeanette Garrett’s Motion to Alter

or Amend Judgment (doc. 64).

I. Background.

 This lawsuit stems from a sequence of events in which defendant, Ceonia Stanton, Jr.,

then an officer with the City of Daphne Police Department assigned to the Baldwin County

Sheriff’s Office Drug Task Force, misidentified plaintiff, Jeanette Garrett, as a person from

whom undercover task force agents purchased crack cocaine. Stanton performed minimal

investigation before pegging Garrett (a wheelchair-bound stroke victim whose physical

appearance and patterns of speech are markedly different from those of the offender, as shown

on a video of the drug buy) as the suspect. Based solely on Stanton’s incorrect identification,

Garrett was indicted on several charges, including unlawful distribution of a controlled

substance. Garrett turned herself in and was promptly released on bond. The charges against her

were dismissed when one of the undercover agents who had participated in the drug buy saw

Garrett in person, at which time it was “obvious” to him that Garrett was not the offender.

Based on these facts and circumstances, Garrett filed suit against Stanton, alleging causes

of action for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, as well as state-law

claims of outrage, wantonness and civil conspiracy. This Court granted summary judgment to

Stanton on all claims via Order (doc. 62) dated November 19, 2009. With respect to Garrett’s §

1983 malicious prosecution claim, the Court found that it was barred by well-established

principles of absolute immunity. See, e.g., Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir.

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2005) (“witnesses in criminal trials and grand jury proceedings are afforded absolute

immunity”); Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Police officers have

the same absolute immunity as lay witnesses in testifying at trial or before a grand jury.”). 

Meanwhile, the Court found that all of plaintiff’s state-law claims were barred by sovereign

immunity based on Stanton’s status as a Baldwin County deputy sheriff. See, e.g., Ex parte

Davis, 930 So.2d 497, 501 (Ala. 2005) (“In general, the acts of the deputy sheriff are the acts of

the sheriff. ... Thus, it is logical that those acts should enjoy the same immunity covering the

sheriff’s own acts.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Ex parte Haralson, 853

So.2d 928, 932 (Ala. 2003) (recognizing that (1) Alabama sheriffs are executive officers immune

from being sued in execution of the duties of office, and (2) deputy sheriffs are the sheriff’s alter

ego and are therefore immune to the same extent that sheriffs are).

Plaintiff now seeks alteration or amendment of the summary judgment ruling. In

particular, plaintiff contends that summary judgment should be denied because the Eleventh

Circuit decisions animating the absolute immunity determination conflict with Supreme Court

guidance, and because a jury question exists as to Stanton’s deputy status for sovereign

immunity purposes.

II. Analysis.

Although the Motion makes fleeting reference to Rule 59, Fed.R.Civ.P., plaintiff fails to

recite the applicable legal standard for alteration or amendment of judgment under Rule 59,

much less to explain why that standard is satisfied here. This omission is as regrettable as it is

commonplace. Far too often, litigants operate under the flawed assumption that any adverse

ruling on a dispositive motion confers upon them license to move for reconsideration, vacatur,

alteration or amendment as a matter of course, and to utilize that motion as a platform to criticize

the judge’s reasoning, to relitigate issues that have already been decided, to champion new

arguments that could have been made before, and otherwise to attempt a “do-over” to erase a

disappointing outcome. This is improper. Lamentably, the frequency of such “knee-jerk” Rule

59(e) motions in this District Court appears to have risen of late, to the point where such filings

by summary judgment losers have become virtually automatic. To be clear, the undersigned

views the pro forma filing of Rule 59(e) motions, in derogation of applicable legal standards, as

an abusive practice that wastes considerable judicial and litigant resources, and implicates Rule

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1 The pragmatic policy considerations underlying these principles are that “if every

question once considered and decided remained open for reexamination in subsequent

proceedings in that same case, [a district] court could not efficiently or satisfactorily perform its

duties.” Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Auto Transp., S.A., 763 F.2d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 1985). Imagine

how a district court’s workload would multiply if it was obliged to rule twice on the same

arguments by the same party upon request. It is thus improper to utilize a motion to reconsider

to ask a district court to rethink a decision once made, merely because a litigant disagrees.

2 See also Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009)

(motions for reconsideration “cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present

evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment”) (citation omitted); Arthur v.

King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (same); Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington,

Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005) (similar); American Home Assur. Co. v. Glenn Estess &

Associates, Inc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985) (cautioning against use of motion to

reconsider to afford a litigant “two bites at the apple”).

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11. Garrett’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment falls squarely within this category.

“In the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources, reconsideration

of an order is an extraordinary remedy and is employed sparingly.” Gougler v. Sirius Products,

Inc., 370 F. Supp.2d 1185, 1189 (S.D. Ala. 2005); see also Spellman v. Haley, 2004 WL 866837,

*2 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 22, 2002) (“litigants should not use motions to reconsider as a knee-jerk

reaction to an adverse ruling”).1 A motion to reconsider is not a vehicle “to relitigate old

matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry

of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, --- U.S. ----, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2617 n.5, 171 L.Ed.2d

570 (2008) (citation omitted).2 The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “a motion to reconsider

should not be used by the parties to set forth new theories of law.” Mays v. U.S. Postal Service,

122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Russell Petroleum Corp. v. Environ Products, Inc., 333

F. Supp.2d 1228, 1234 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (relying on Mays to deny motion to reconsider based on

new arguments). Rather, the law of this Circuit is unambiguous that “[t]he only grounds for

granting a Rule 59 motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” 

United States v. Marion, 562 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Arthur

v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (similar). Simply put, “[a] motion to reconsider is

only available when a party presents the court with evidence of an intervening change in

controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct clear error or manifest

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3 Even if this Court were to consider plaintiff’s argument on the merits, the result

would be the same. Plaintiff concedes, as she must, that the Eleventh Circuit has found with

unambiguous clarity that police officers enjoy absolute immunity for their testimony before a

grand jury. See, e.g., Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Police officers

receive absolute immunity for their testimony as witnesses at trial and in grand jury

proceedings.”); Holmes, 418 F.3d at 1258 (citing rule that grand jury witnesses receive absolute

immunity, and extending that principle to grant absolute immunity to parole officer testifying at

parole revocation hearing in scope of official duties); Scarbrough, 245 F.3d at 1305 & n.12

(“[p]olice officers have the same absolute immunity as lay witnesses in testifying at trial or

before a grand jury,” based on policy considerations of preserving integrity of judicial process,

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injustice.” Gipson v. Mattox, 511 F. Supp.2d 1182, 1185 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (citation omitted).

Garrett’s Motion does not come close to meeting these stringent standards for relief. 

Plaintiff offers no newly-discovered evidence and alludes to no intervening change in controlling

law. Rather than invoking manifest errors of law or fact, Garrett rolls out a new legal argument

concerning the absolute immunity doctrine as it applies to law enforcement officers’ testimony

before a grand jury. In particular, Garrett maintains that binding Eleventh Circuit precedent on

this issue runs afoul of long-standing Supreme Court guidance. Of course, plaintiff could and

should have developed that contention in underlying summary judgment briefs. Yet she chose

not to do so. In light of that fact, plaintiff cannot come back now, under the guise of Rule 59(e),

to urge this Court to revisit its summary judgment ruling on that basis.

“A party cannot readily complain about the entry of a summary judgment order that did

not consider an argument they chose not to develop for the district court at the time of the

summary judgment motions.” Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that Rule 59

motions “should not be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before

the judgment was issued,” and that denial of such a motion “is especially soundly exercised

when the party has failed to articulate any reason for the failure to raise the issue at an earlier

stage in the litigation.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555

F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) (similar). Garrett has failed to identify any reason why she did not

present this argument on the absolute immunity defense during the summary judgment briefing

process, when she had a full and fair opportunity to do so; therefore, she cannot properly air that

contention now under the mantle of Rule 59(e).3

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minimizing intimidation of witnesses, and preventing police officer’s energy and attention from

being diverted away from law enforcement responsibilities every time a disgruntled defendant

accuses him of perjury); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Police officers

enjoy the same absolute immunity as lay witnesses for their testimony at trial ... or in front of the

grand jury.”) (citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has shown no signs of discomfort with

this rule, and has expressly contrasted and distinguished it from Supreme Court decisions such as

Van de Kamp, Kalina, and Malley, the very authorities that, according to Garrett, invalidate that

rule. See Hart, 587 F.3d at 1296 (re-affirming absolute immunity for police officers’ testimony

in grand jury proceedings, and simultaneously recognizing limitations on prosecutorial immunity

pursuant to Van de Kamp and Kalina); Jones, 174 F.3d at 1281-82 (reciting absolute immunity

rule while also identifying holdings of Malley and Kalina). Likewise, it is clear that, in this

Circuit, police officers enjoy absolute immunity for grand jury testimony, but not for affidavits

submitted in connection with arrest warrants. See Hart, 587 F.3d at 1296; Jones, 174 F.3d at

1286 (“While immunity does not shield Powers from liability for ... a false arrest affidavit,

Detective Powers is absolutely immune from a § 1983 civil action for his testimony, even if

false, before the grand jury.”). Garrett may have a problem with the co-existence of these

principles, but the Eleventh Circuit plainly does not. And Jones forbids in the clearest of terms

the “complaining witness” exception sought by plaintiff, stating as follows: “we expressly reject

carving out an exception to absolute immunity for grand jury testimony, even if false and even if

[the police officer] were construed to be a complaining witness.” 174 F.3d at 1287 n.10. 

Plaintiff identifies neither Supreme Court decisions nor post-Jones Eleventh Circuit rulings that

negate, conflict with, or undermine that result. Therefore, this Court remains bound by the

Jones line of authorities, and declines plaintiff’s invitation to discard the unambiguous, blackletter absolute immunity principles set forth therein. See generally Swann v. Southern Health

Partners, Inc., 388 F.3d 834, 837 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining prior panel rule, under which

appellate court is bound by holdings of earlier panels until “they are clearly overruled en banc or

by the Supreme Court”); Florida League of Professional Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457,

462 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e are not at liberty to disregard binding case law that is so closely on

point and has been only weakened, rather than directly overruled, by the Supreme Court.”).

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Nor does plaintiff further her cause under Rule 59 by reiterating her belief that there are

genuine issues of material fact as to whether Stanton was acting as a deputy sheriff of the

Baldwin County Sheriff’s Office. The summary judgment order addressed this issue

extensively. (Doc. 62, at 17-21.) In particular, the Court examined the record in the light most

favorable to plaintiff and found that “the uncontroverted summary judgment evidence shows that

Stanton was working in the line and scope of his duties as a deputy sheriff assigned to the

Baldwin County Sheriff’s Office Drug Task Force at all times relevant to these proceedings.” 

(Id. at 20.) The Court rejected plaintiff’s contention that Stanton was merely a Daphne police

officer with an expanded jurisdiction, explaining that “[p]laintiff offers no evidence and

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4 Even if the Court were to consider the merits of this stated ground for altering or

amending judgment, it would not succeed. The list of facts that plaintiff rattles off (some of

them inaccurately) in the Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment reflects that Stanton had

employment ties with the Daphne Police Department during the period in question. But this

misses the point. Irrespective of the fact that he was nominally employed and paid by the

Daphne Police Department, it is uncontroverted that Stanton was a duly deputized, badgecarrying deputy of the Baldwin County Sheriff’s Office during the events in question. It is

likewise undisputed that the full measure of his assigned job duties during that time period was

to engage in BCSO task force investigation of drug activity in Daphne and throughout Baldwin

County (including areas beyond Daphne Police Department jurisdiction). The record is also

clear that this lawsuit arises out of a BCSO task force investigation on which Stanton worked

with other BCSO task force agents (who were in no way affiliated with the Daphne Police

Department). In light of these clear record facts, plaintiff cannot credibly argue (and no

reasonable jury could find) that Stanton was acting solely as a Daphne police officer (and not as

a BCSO deputy) during the events giving rise to this lawsuit. Nor can she show on this record

that Stanton’s deputy status was a mere sham or ruse to avoid liability. At most, plaintiff’s

evidence is that Stanton was wearing two hats, that of BCSO deputy and that of Daphne Police

Department officer, during the time period in question. But plaintiff has never proffered any

legal or logical argument, and the Court perceives no basis for concluding, that Section 14

sovereign immunity under Alabama law does not reach a bona fide sheriff’s deputy performing

sheriff’s office duties if that deputy holds a “dual role” with a municipal police department. (See

doc. 62, at 20.)

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formulates no argument that Stanton was not in fact acting in his role as BCSO deputy sheriff

during the events in question.” (Id. at 20 n.28.)

Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) Motion seeks to re-plow this ground, arguing that a jury question is

created by record evidence that Stanton was a Daphne police officer during the relevant times. 

This is improper, inasmuch as Rule 59(e) motions cannot be used to renew arguments that were

previously considered and rejected. See, e.g., Gipson, 511 F. Supp.2d at 1185 (“Nor may a party

properly utilize a motion to reconsider as a vehicle for rehashing arguments considered and

rejected in the underlying order.”); Gougler, 370 F. Supp.2d at 1189 n.1 (“motions to reconsider

are not a platform to relitigate arguments previously considered and rejected”). Plaintiff argued

this very point on summary judgment, and lost. She does not get to re-litigate this issue before

this Court merely because she disagrees with the ruling and wants to expand on her previously

rejected argument.4

III. Conclusion.

Simply put, plaintiff has identified no basis for placing this case within the narrowly

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circumscribed scope of Rule 59(e). Garrett filed her Motion to Alter or Amend because she

thought of a new (but previously available) argument on absolute immunity, and because she

disagreed with the Court’s sovereign immunity analysis. That is not sufficient under Rule 59. 

Even if it were, the Court finds that the stated grounds for relief are not well-taken on the merits. 

Eleventh Circuit precedent on the doctrine of absolute immunity for grand jury testimony is

clear, and has not been reversed by subsequent Supreme Court or en banc rulings; therefore, the

previous order correctly adhered to that precedent in entering judgment for defendant on the §

1983 malicious prosecution claim arising from defendant’s grand jury testimony. And the Court

remains convinced that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Stanton was

acting as a sheriff’s deputy at the relevant times. He clearly was, and is therefore entitled to

sovereign immunity on the state law claims.

The Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (doc. 64) is denied.

 

DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of January, 2010.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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