Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00408/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00408-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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-1- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM JOHN DAUGHTERY, CDCR #F79985,

Plaintiff,

v.

DENNIS WILSON, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 08cv0408-WQH (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT [AND AMENDED

MOTION]

[Doc. Nos. 128 & 129]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge

William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f)

of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On March 3, 2008, Plaintiff William John Daughtery, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights suit against Officers Wilson, Tagaban, Griffin

and Lemus (collectively “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. No. 1. This Court

issued a scheduling order on April 17, 2008. Doc. No. 11. Thereafter, the Court granted

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint [Doc. No. 24] and Plaintiff filed his

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on June 19, 2008 [Doc. No. 25]. In his FAC, Plaintiff

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1 Later the same day, Defendants filed an amended motion to dismiss the SAC, which corrected a

typographical error in the hearing date. Doc. No. 129.

-2- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

added a claim entitled “Claim 5" against the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police

Department. Doc. No. 25. These defendants moved to dismiss the FAC and, on October

23, 2008, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the

motion be granted. Doc. No. 61. On January 16, 2009, the district judge adopted this

Court’s R&R in its entirety and dismissed Claim 5 and the City of San Diego and the San

Diego Police Department. Doc. No. 86. 

In the meantime, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining

claims against the four officers. Doc. No. 65. Defendant Lemus also separately filed a

second motion for summary judgment. Doc. No. 82. On June 15, 2009, this Court issued

an R&R recommending that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted and

Defendant Lemus’ motion be denied. Doc. No. 109. The district judge adopted the R&R

in its entirety on August 18, 2009. Doc. No. 118. However, in the same order, the district

judge allowed Plaintiff leave to revive his case by filing a motion to amend his complaint

to raise a claim against the four individual Defendants that was similar to a portion of Claim

5 that had been dismissed as to the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police

Department. Id.

Plaintiff filed his motion to amend and, subsequently, filed a proposed second

amended complaint and then an “alternate proposed Second Amended Complaint.” Doc.

Nos. 124 & 125. The alternate proposed Second Amended Complaint contained a second,

entirely new claim. Doc. No. 125. On October 26, 2009, the district judge granted

Plaintiff’s motion and deemed the alternate proposed Second Amended Complaint

(hereinafter “SAC”) to be the operative pleading. Doc. No. 126. 

On December 2, 2009, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the SAC.1 Doc. No. 128.

Plaintiff opposed the motion [Doc. No. 133], Defendants filed a reply [Doc. No. 134], and

this Court took the matter under submission [Doc. No. 135]. 

///

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-3- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

B. Factual Background

This case stems from a March 9, 2006 “buy bust” operation by the San Diego Police

Department. As Plaintiff relays the facts in his SAC, he was walking down the street when

Wilson pulled his car across Plaintiff’s path, walked up to Plaintiff, grabbed him by the

throat, choked him, and then kicked Plaintiff’s legs out from under him and tripped him to

the ground. SAC at 3. Plaintiff landed on his back, but claims Wilson then banged

Plaintiff’s forehead on the concrete sidewalk. Id. At that point, Tagaban arrived and beat

Plaintiff in the head and left shoulder approximately twelve times with a large metal

flashlight. Id. at 4. Thereafter, Plaintiff lost consciousness and awoke to find himself in

Wilson’s squad car. Id. Plaintiff asserts that Lemus and Griffin witnessed the beating but

did nothing to halt it. Id. 

Plaintiff “complained of injuries and was refused medical attention to conceal the

abuse” and instead taken to the County Mental Health Hospital for a psychiatric evaluation.

Id. At the hospital, he complained of his injuries and was given “a cursory exam” by a

nurse, who discovered bruising. Id. at 5. The psychiatric doctor did not physically examine

him but promised pain medication if Plaintiff signed a contract not to commit suicide. Id.

Plaintiff did so, but did not receive treatment. Id. He then was transported to county jail,

where he told the intake nurse that he was injured and needed help. Id. He did not see

a medical doctor until five or six days later. Id. 

Plaintiff claims Wilson and Tagaban’s beating resulted in a crushed scrotum, damage

to his third cervical vertebra, a fracture in his left lamina papyracea (a skull fracture), a torn

left rotator cuff and labrum, bruising of several internal organs, and nerve damage in his

neck. Id. He also claims additional residual injuries stemming from the beating. Id. at 6.

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief ...” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not

require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, theCase 3:08-cv-00408-WQH-BLM Document 136 Filed 04/14/10 Page 3 of 15
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-4- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s

claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The issue is not whether the plaintiff ultimately will

prevail, but whether he has properly stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to survive a motion to

dismiss, a Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570). If the facts alleged in the complaint are “merely consistent with” the defendant’s

liability, the plaintiff has not satisfied the plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557). Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

When the plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court must construe the pleadings

liberally, Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002), and afford the plaintiff any

benefit of doubt, Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.

1988). This rule of liberal construction “is particularly important in civil rights cases.”

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to

a pro se civil rights complaint the court is not, however, permitted to “supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.”

Id.

DISCUSSION

In his SAC, Plaintiff raises the following claims: 

Claim 1: “Right to medical care, due process 4th, 5th, 14th Amendment, Cal. Gov.

Code § 845.6, C.C.C. 1714.”

Claim 2: “Perjury, false police reports, fabricating evidence, 4th, 5th, 6th

Amendments + 14 Amendment.”

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2

 Defendants add that to the extent many of Plaintiff’s allegations are directed to the staff of the

mental hospital and the prison medical staff, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the four officers. 

3 The Court declines to address Defendants’ fifth basis for dismissal as the issue is moot. See Doc.

No. 118 (order allowing Plaintiff to file SAC) and Doc. No. 126 (order deeming “alternate proposed Second

Amended Complaint” as operative pleading in this action). 

-5- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

SAC at 3-11. Defendants have moved to dismiss Claim One on the grounds that:

(1) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial of medical care since he was taken to a hospital

and then seen by a nurse at the jail2, (2) Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims fail

because his allegations do not invoke the protections of these amendments, (3) Plaintiff’s

claim is barred by the statute of limitations, (4) Plaintiff failed to present his pendent state

claims to the City of San Diego in accordance with the requirements of California’s Tort

Claims Act, and (5) Plaintiff waived any viable claims which could have been presented at

the time he filed his First Amended Complaint (citing Doc. No. 24).3 Mem. P. & A. Supp.

Mot. to Dismiss SAC (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 7-18. Defendants argue that Claim Two is barred

by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Id. at 6-7. 

A. Claim One

In his first claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges he was denied his right to medical care

in violation of “due process, [the] 4th, 5th, [and] 14th Amendment[s], Cal. Gov. Code

§ 845.6, [and] C.C.C. 1714.” SAC at 3. More specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendants had

knowledge of his injuries and need for aid, but were “deliberately indifferent” and

“objectively unreasonable” in their “failure to provide medical assistance for Plaintiff.” Id.

at 7. 

1. Plaintiff has Stated a Claim for Relief

Defendants argue that the SAC fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference or any

other claim for failure to provide medical care because the SAC alleges that Plaintiff was

taken to a hospital after his arrest and before his admission to jail. Defs.’ Mem. at 8.

Plaintiff responds that it was not reasonable for the officers to take him to the County

Mental Health Hospital because the due process clause requires adequate care, which he

contends was not available at the County Mental Health Hospital. Pl.’s Opp’n at 8-12.

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4 To the extent Plaintiff attempts to extend the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against

unreasonable searches and seizures to fit his “failure to obtain medical assistance” claim, SAC at 3, the Court

notes that the district judge already has granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment claim. Doc. No. 118. The Court finds no basis in Plaintiff’s SAC for a Fifth Amendment

violation claim since Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim is directed at state, not federal, officers. See

Dusenbery v. U.S., 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the

United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving

any person of property without ‘due process of law’”); Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.

2008) (finding Fifth Amendment claim against local law enforcement official in section 1983 action foreclosed

by the Constitution because “the Fifth Amendment's due process clause only applies to the federal

government”).

-6- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

Though Plaintiff cites the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as bases for his

claim, only the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable.4 “Claims of failure to provide care for

serious medical needs, when brought by a detainee ... who has been neither charged nor

convicted of a crime, are analyzed under the substantive due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418-419 (9th Cir. 2003).

The due process rights of someone injured in the process of being apprehended by the

police “are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted

prisoner.” City of Revere v. Mass. General Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Conn v. City

of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Although courts have borrowed from Eighth

Amendment jurisprudence in giving shape to pretrial detainees' substantive due process

rights, that amendment establishes only ‘a minimum standard of care.’” (emphasis in

original)). “Jail personnel violate a prisoner's eighth amendment rights if they are

deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs.” Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d

769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)). In order

to show that the medical need was “serious,” the plaintiff must demonstrate that “failure

to treat [the] prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.

2006) (internal citation omitted). Proving that the defendants’ response was deliberately

indifferent requires a showing of “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's

pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. “Deliberate

indifference thus requires an objective risk of harm and a subjective awareness of that

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-7- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

harm.” Conn, 591 F.3d at 1095 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837(1994)).

Here, construing the pleadings liberally as the Court is required to do, Thompson,

295 F.3d at 895, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged a Fourteenth Amendment claim

that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In his SAC, Plaintiff states that he

informed Defendants that he was injured and needed medical attention, that Defendants

took him to County Mental Health Hospital where he was not physically examined by a

medical doctor, and that, as a result, he has sustained ongoing injuries including, among

other things, chronic migraine headaches, backaches, limited use of his left arm, chronic

testicular pain, and depression. SAC at 3-6. These facts allege the threshold “serious”

medical need and allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants were

deliberately indifferent in responding to Plaintiff’s alleged pain. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

The Court, therefore, RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on this basis be

DENIED. 

2. The Statute of Limitations Does Not Bar Plaintiff’s Claim

Defendants contend that since Plaintiff’s allegations arise from his arrest on March

9, 2006, and Plaintiff did not add this claim until October 26, 2009, this claim is barred by

the two-year statute of limitations set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure section

335.1. Defs.’ Mem. at 10-11. As explained in this Court’s October 23, 2008 R&R [Doc. No.

61], and as adopted by the district judge on January 16, 2009 [Doc. No. 86], because 42

U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a specific statute of limitations, the Court looks to the

applicable statute of limitations in the forum state. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954

(9th Cir. 2004). Because the “gravamen” of Plaintiff’s claim is that he was injured, and

remains injured, as a result of Wilson and Tagaban’s beating, see Marin Healthcare Dist.

v. Sutter Health, 103 Cal. App. 4th 861, 874-875 (3rd Dist. 2002) (quoting Hensler v. City

of Glendale, 8 Cal. 4th 1, 22-23 (1994)) (“To determine the statute of limitations which

applies to a cause of action it is necessary to identify the nature of the cause of action, i.e.,

the ‘gravamen’ of the cause of action”), California Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1's

two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies. Here, Plaintiff brings his

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5

 Plaintiff highlights the phrase “refused medical attention to conceal the abuse.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 14.

6 Notably, Plaintiff cites to facts from the section of his FAC alleging claims against the individual

officers, as opposed to the entity defendants (i.e. not Claim 5). This section appeared in his Complaint as

well and was not under the Claim 5 heading “negligence in failure to provide medical assistance...” Pl.’s

Opp’n at 14 (citing FAC at 5, line 13). This appears in keeping with Plaintiff now seeking by way of his SAC

to allege a claim under the deliberate indifference standard instead of arguing that Defendants were negligent

-8- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

claim over two years after he knew or should have known of the injury. Thus, absent

application of the relation back doctrine, Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred.

Plaintiff argues his SAC does relate back to his original complaint. Pl.’s Opp’n at 14.

Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an amendment to a pleading

may relate back to the date of the original pleading when “the law that provides the

applicable statute of limitations allows relation back.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(A). In this

case, California law provides the applicable statute of limitations, so this Court looks to

California’s policy regarding relation back. Under California law, in order for an amended

complaint to relate back to the original complaint, the amended complaint “must (1) rest

on the same general set of facts, (2) involve the same injury, and (3) refer to the same

instrumentality, as the original one.” Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal. 4th 383, 408-409

(1999) (emphasis in original); Massey v. Mercy Med. Center Redding, 180 Cal. App. 4th

690, 698 (3d Dist. 2009). California has a “well-established policy of liberally allowing

amendments to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations where the recovery sought in

both pleadings is based on the same general set of facts.” Rowland v. Superior Court, 171

Cal. App. 3d 1214, 1216 (4th Dist. 1985).

Though Plaintiff presents a new cause of action in Claim One, his SAC does relate

back. First, Plaintiff’s claim rests on the same general set of facts. See Norgart, 21 Cal. 4th

at 408-409. While Plaintiff cites in his Opposition to factual allegations from his FAC (dated

June 16, 2008 and filed June 19, 2008)5, which also was filed after the two-year statute of

limitations expired, the same factual allegations also appear in Plaintiff’s original complaint

(dated February 25, 2008 and filed March 3, 2008), which he filed a few days before the

limitations period expired.6 Second, though Plaintiff elaborated in his SAC as to the nature

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in taking him to a mental hospital as opposed to an emergency room. Given that the Supreme Court

unequivocally has concluded that “liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold

of constitutional due process,” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) (citations omitted);

see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d

1411, 1418 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“[T]the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of

an official ...” ) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), Plaintiff would not have succeeded on a

negligence claim in this section 1983 action.

7 In so concluding, the Court also notes that the district judge’s August 18, 2009 Order appears to

indicate his view that the claim relates back. See Doc. No. 118 at 7-8.

8

 Defendants note in their motion to dismiss that some of Plaintiff’s allegations are directed not at

the officer Defendants but at staff of the County Jail and County Mental Health Hospital. Defs.’ Mem. at 9.

To the extent Plaintiff views this as an invitation to amend his complaint yet again to add claims against the

county, the Court refers Plaintiff back to its October 23, 2008 R&R [Doc. No. 61], wherein the Court explained

that under California law, “[t]he general rule is that an amended complaint that adds a new defendant does

not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied as of the

date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed.” Woo v. Superior Court, 75

Cal. App. 4th 169, 176 (4th Dist. 1999) (citing Liberty Transport, Inc. v. Harry W. Gorst Co., 229 Cal. App.

3d 417, 428 (2nd Dist. 1991), disapproved on other grounds in Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal. 3d 105, 115-116

(1991)). “A recognized exception to the general rule is the substitution under [California Code of Civil

Procedure] section 474 of a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant named in the original complaint as

to whom a cause of action was stated in the original complaint.” Id. Only if the requirements of section 474

are satisfied can the amended complaint substituting a new defendant for a fictitious Doe defendant and filed

after the statute of limitations has expired be deemed filed as of the date the original complaint. Id. (citing

Austin v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 56 Cal. 2d 596, 599 (1961)). Because Plaintiff did not list any Doe

defendants in his original complaint, this option is unavailable to him. 

-9- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

of his injuries (in his Complaint, he mentioned only having “complained of injuries”

following the beating), both pleadings and both claims allege physical injuries as a result

of the officers’ actions on March 9, 2006. Finally, the “instrumentality” in this case would

be the officers, all of whom were described in the original complaint as well as the SAC as

the source of Plaintiff’s injuries and ongoing injuries (i.e. those that resulted from their

failure to obtain adequate medical care for him). As such, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff’s SAC is not barred by the statute of limitations7 and, therefore, RECOMMENDS

that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on this basis be DENIED.

8

 

3. The California Tort Claims Act Bars Plaintiff’s Pendant State Claims

As a further grounds for dismissal, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims under

California Government Code § 845.6 and California Civil Code § 1714 are barred as a matter

of law because Plaintiff failed to comply with the California Government Code’s claim

presentation requirement. Defs.’ Mem. at 11-18. 

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-10- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

This Court discussed the California Tort Claims Act and its impact on Plaintiff’s claims

extensively in its October 23, 2008 R&R. See Doc. No. 61. In short, the California Tort

Claims Act provides that “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public

entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented ... until a written

claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the

board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board...” Cal. Gov’t Code §

945.4; Ovando v. County of Los Angeles, 159 Cal. App. 4th 42, 62-63 (2nd Dist. 2008)

(confirming continued applicability of claim presentation requirement to those seeking

money or damages from a local public entity); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 905 (imposing

presentation requirement and listing limited exceptions, none of which are applicable to the

facts of this case). A plaintiff also must file a claim against the public-entity employer

before the plaintiff can sue an individual public employee on the basis of acts or omissions

within the scope of his employment. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 950.2, 950.6; Briggs v. Lawrence,

230 Cal. App. 3d 605, 613 (6th Dist. 1991). In determining whether an act falls within “the

scope of his employment,” “[t]he proper inquiry is not ‘whether the wrongful act itself was

authorized but whether it was committed in the course of a series of acts of the [employee]

which were authorized by the [employer.]’” Fowler v. Howell, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1746, 1750-

1751 (2nd Dist. 1996) (quoting Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 Cal. 3d 962, 970

(1986)). California courts “view ‘scope of employment’ broadly to include willful and

malicious torts as well as negligence.” Id. at 1751 (citing John R. v. Oakland Unified School

Dist., 48 Cal. 3d 438, 447 (1989)).

As the foregoing makes clear, Plaintiff was required to present his claims against the

four Defendants under California Government Code § 845.6 and California Civil Code § 1714

to the appropriate state entity before filing suit in this Court. He did not do so. He also has

not presented any evidence that he timely applied for leave to present a late claim. See

Doc. No. 61 (describing procedure and requirements for presenting a late claim). Because

it now is too late for Plaintiff to file a claim or apply for leave to present a late claim, see

id., Plaintiff could not possibly cure his SAC by alleging other facts. See Lopez v. Smith,

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9 This analysis applies to Claims One and Two. However, as this Court explains supra, Claim Two

also is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

-11- 08cv0408-WQH (BLM) 

203 F.3d 1122, 1127, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Therefore, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s state law claims under California Government Code § 845.6

and California Civil Code § 1714 be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

4. The Eleventh Amendment Bars Plaintiff’s Official Capacity Claims

In his SAC, Plaintiff checked boxes indicating that he is suing Defendants in both

their individual and official capacities. SAC at 2. To the extent Plaintiff sues Defendants

in their official capacities, Defendants are immune from liability for damages under the

Eleventh Amendment. While Defendants did not address the applicability of Eleventh

Amendment immunity, federal courts can raise the issue sua sponte. In re Jackson, 184

F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity limits the

jurisdiction of the federal courts and can be raised by a party at any time during judicial

proceedings or by the court sua sponte”).

“The Eleventh Amendment bars actions for damages against state officials who are

sued in their official capacities in federal court.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1026

(9th Cir. 1999); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (a

suit for damages against a state official in his or her official capacity is a really a suit against

the state itself, which is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment). The only exception to

this rule lies when a plaintiff sues official actors for prospective injunctive relief. Flint v.

Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, Plaintiff requests only monetary damages, not injunctive relief. SAC at 14.

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their

official capacities be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.9

B. Claim Two

In his second claim for relief, Plaintiff contends that the officers created false police

reports and perjured themselves at trial in order to obtain his conviction. SAC at 8-11.

Plaintiff further claims that Tagaban fabricated evidence when she claimed to have

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28 10 The Court notes that Lemus is the officer to whom Plaintiff sold the cocaine base.

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recovered marked money from Plaintiff’s hand since no money was entered into police

custody or presented at trial. Id. at 8. And, though the Court in its R&R addressing

Defendants’ summary judgment motions already addressed to some degree Plaintiff’s

allegations about what Lemus did or did not see, Plaintiff alleges that Lemus mistakenly

identified Plaintiff (because Plaintiff notes that Lemus lost track of the drug suspect).10 Id.

at 11. In a similar vein, Plaintiff also contends that Griffin erred by directing Wilson to

detain Plaintiff since Griffin did not personally witness the drug deal and could not identify

the subject. Id.

Defendants respond that Count Two is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

486-87 (1994) since “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction and sentence.” Defs.’ Mem. at 6-7.

Defendants are correct that Heck bars Plaintiff’s second claim. The Supreme Court

confirmed in Heck that:

...in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ

of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that

relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is

not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in

a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor

of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487 (emphasis in original). Subsequently, the Supreme Court also

confirmed that even a section 1983 complaint challenging procedural aspects of the criminal

case against the plaintiff may be barred by Heck if “the nature of the challenge to the

procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment.” Edwards

v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997). For example, in Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 703

(9th Cir. 2006), Guerrero brought a section 1983 action against police officers alleging

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11 Both Plaintiff and Defendants ask this Court to take judicial notice, pursuant to Rule 201 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence, of documents from Plaintiff’s underlying criminal proceeding. See SAC at 6, 11;

Defs.’ Request for Judicial Notice Supp. Mot. to Dismiss SAC [Doc. No. 128-8] at 1-2; Pl.’s Request for Judicial

Notice Supp. Opp’n [Doc. No. 133-1] at 1-2. In support of Defendants’ request, Defendants filed a Notice

of Lodgment. Doc. No. 128-2. Lodged as Exhibit C are the two verdict forms from Plaintiff’s criminal trial,

which list the code sections Plaintiff violated. Doc. No. 128-2, Ex. C. 

Rule 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of two types of facts: (1) those that are generally

known within the court’s territorial jurisdiction, and (2) those that are “capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

In applying this rule, courts “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan,

508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n. 2 (9th Cir.

2002) (quotation omitted)). Here, the verdict forms contain an original signed certification from the superior

court indicating that they are “full, true, and correct cop[ies] of the original [] on file in [the superior court

clerk’s] office.” Doc. No. 128-2, Ex. C. Because these are court records and this Court has assurances of

their accuracy, and because this Court already took judicial notice of these documents in its June 15, 2009

R&R (see Doc. No. 109 at 9), the Court GRANTS both parties’ request to take judicial notice of the verdict

forms. The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the parties’ requests to take judicial notice of other

documents in these proceedings because the Court does not find them necessary to its determination of the

issues presented.

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wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy to bring false charges against him.

The Ninth Circuit confirmed that Guerrero’s section 1983 claims were barred by Heck,

explaining that his success “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his two convictions for

possession of narcotics.” Guerrero, 442 F.3d at 703. 

As in Guerrero, Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants committed perjury, falsified police

reports, and fabricated evidence necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions for

selling/furnishing cocaine base in violation of California Health and Safety Code (“CHSC”)

§ 11352(a) and possession/purchase of cocaine base for sale in violation of CHSC

§ 11351.5.11 The elements of CHSC § 11352(a) are (a) selling or furnishing and (b) a

controlled substance. Cocaine base is a controlled substance under California law. CHSC

§ 11054(f)(1) (West 2003). CHSC § 11351.5 requires a showing that Plaintiff “possesse[d]

for sale or purchase[d] for purposes of sale cocaine base.” Plaintiff claims the officers

falsified their police reports and lied under oath in saying that they recovered a bindle of

rock cocaine and a marked $20 bill from Plaintiff at the scene. SAC at 8-11. If that were

true, it would undermine the government’s proof at trial of all of the elements of CHSC

§§ 11352(a) and 11351.5. As Plaintiff’s conviction under these code sections has not been

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12 Similarly, Plaintiff’s claims involving Lemus and Griffin are barred by Heck since the erroneous

identification and arrest of Plaintiff, if proven true, necessarily would imply the invalidity of the conviction.

In his Opposition, Plaintiff tries to distinguish Heck, arguing that the bar does not apply because he has not

alleged an injury of conviction or imprisonment. Pl.’s Opp’n at 7. Instead, Plaintiff claims he is “alleging the

constitution wrong of denial of a fair trial.” Id. But again, if this Court were to find that Plaintiff was denied

a fair trial, it necessarily would “imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

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invalidated, Plaintiff’s claim necessarily is barred by Heck.

12 Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487.

The Court, therefore, RECOMMENDS that Claim Two be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants committed perjury, falsified police reports, and

fabricated evidence in relation to their use of excessive force. SAC at 8-11. While these

allegations related to excessive force may not be barred by Heck, see Guerrero, 442 F.3d

at 703, this Court nonetheless RECOMMENDS that they be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. In his order dated August 18, 2009, the district judge granted Defendants’

motion for summary judgment and dismissed “Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

‘excessive use of force’ and ‘unreasonable search and seizure’ claims.” Doc. No. 118 at 5-6.

Moreover, the district judge agreed with this Court that issue preclusion and claim

preclusion barred relitigation of these claims in federal court. Thus, Plaintiff has no federal

remedy for the allegations in this portion of his SAC. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, (2) denying

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim One as to Defendants in their individual capacities,

(3) granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim Two, and (4) sua sponte dismissing the

claims as to Defendants in their official capacities.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed

with the Court and served on all parties no later than May 5, 2010. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

///

///

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than May 26, 2010. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 14, 2010

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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