Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_16-cv-00722/USCOURTS-ared-4_16-cv-00722-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

LATESHIA PATILLO PLAINTIFF

v. No. 4:16CV00722 JLH

SYSCO FOODS OF ARKANSAS, LLC DEFENDANT

OPINION AND ORDER

Lateshia Patillo commenced this action against her former employer, Sysco Foods of

Arkansas, LLC, on October 6, 2016, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title

VII. Patillo, who is black, alleges that she was constructively discharged because of her race and in

retaliation for complaining about discriminatory actions. Sysco has filed a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the

motion is granted.

According to the complaint, Patillo filed a Charge of Discrimination against Sysco with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on June 13, 2016. She complained that, starting in

May 2015, Sysco reduced her hours from 40 hours per week to 30 hours per week. Patillo resigned

on October 20, 2015, due to stressful working conditions. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move for dismissal based upon

a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. To prevail on such a motion, the challenging party must

successfully attack the complaint, either on its face or on the factual truthfulness of its averments.

Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6

(8th Cir. 1990). If a plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for a finding of subject-matter

jurisdiction, the complaint should be dismissed. Titus, 4 F.3d at 593. Sysco asserts that the Court

Case 4:16-cv-00722-JLH Document 23 Filed 12/16/16 Page 1 of 4
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action because Patillo failed to file a charge of

discrimination within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, as required by Title VII.. 

Before filing a lawsuit in federal court, Title VII requires aggrieved individuals to “(1) timely

file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC setting forth the facts and nature of the charge and (2)

receive notice of the right to sue.” Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th

Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Title VII’s enforcement provisions require that a charge be filed with

the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and that a civil

action be brought by the complaining party within 90 days after the EEOC gives notice of the right

to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1).

Patillo has filed two charges with the EEOC, the first on September 1, 2015, and the second

on June 13, 2016. The second charge underlies this action. Document #20-3 at 2. In that charge,

Patillo complained1

 that Sysco reduced her hours in May 2015, provided her an unqualified assistant

at an unspecified time,2 and forced her to resign because of her race and in retaliation for filing the

2015 charge. Id. Patillo stated that the date of her resignation—October 20, 2015—was the last date

that discrimination took place, but she did not file the 2016 charge within 180 days after the alleged

discrimination as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

1

 Patillo includes additional allegations of discrimination in the complaint, but the Court

cannot consider allegations that she did not include in the underlying EEOC charge. See Robinson

v. Am. Red Cross, 753 F.3d 749, 757 (8th Cir. 2014).

2

 The only other reference to this allegation is in the March 2016 intake questionnaire, in

which Patillo states that on October 15, 2015 reasonable accommodations were not made to provide

extra assistance for carrying out her job duties. Document #18 at 12. Patillo did not include this

allegation in the complaint. See Document #2.

2

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Patillo argues that the June 2016 charge was timely because she filed a charge in September

2015, alleging certain discriminatory actions, those actions “continued under an ongoing basis,” and

she updated those charges in March 2016 when she submitted an intake questionnaire to the EEOC. 

Patillo complained in the September 2015 charge that Sysco failed to promote her on two occasions,

and reduced her hours because of her race and in retaliation for complaints about discrimination. 

Document #18 at 8. The EEOC issued Patillo a notice of her right to sue on September 8, 2015, but

she did not bring suit within 90 days. Document #20-2. Therefore, any action based upon the

allegations of discrimination in the September 2015 charge is time-barred. See Spears v. Mo. Dept.

of Corr. and Human Res., 210 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2000). “[D]iscrete, discriminatory acts are

not actionable if time barred . . . . Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing

charges alleging that act.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S. Ct.

2016, 2072, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002).

Patillo argues that the discriminatory acts alleged in the September 2015 charge continued

on an ongoing basis and that she “updated” the allegations in an intake questionnaire submitted to

the EEOC in March 2016. Document #19 at 4. Though Patillo maintains that the discriminatory acts

continued “on an ongoing basis,” she makes no allegation in either the charges or the intake

questionnaire from which the Court could find that any alleged violations consisted of “an ongoing

pattern or practice of discrimination, rather than an amalgamation of discrete, isolated instances.” 

Kline v. Kansas City, Miss., Fire Dept., 175 F.3d 660, 665 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). Patillo submitted the March 2016 intake questionnaire within 180 days of her

constructive discharge. However, intake questionnaires are not typically viewed as EEOC “charges”

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 because they are not verified. See Schlueter v. Anheuser3

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Busch, Inc., 132 F.3d 455, 458 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314,

1318 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that Title VII mandates that a charge be verified). The intake

questionnaire Patillo submitted is no exception. See Document #18 at 11-14. Moreover, even if the

intake questionnaire were considered a charge and even if Patillo did “update” the allegations made

in the September 2015 charge,3

 the time-bar is not removed; No action can be based on the

allegations in the September 2015 charge. See Spears, 210 F.3d at 853.

The only new allegations in the complaint and the charge underlying the complaint are the

allegations that Patillo was constructively discharged because of her race and in retaliation for

complaining about prior acts of discrimination. But because Patillo failed to comply with Title VII’s

enforcement provisions requiring that an EEOC charge be filed within 180 days of the alleged

discriminatory action prior to bringing suit, the Court is without jurisdiction to hear the merits of her

claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Sysco’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Document #15. This

action is dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of December, 2016.

________________________________

J. LEON HOLMES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3

 The allegations in the intake questionnaire are primarily related to the Family Medical

Leave Act. Document #18 at 12.

4

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