Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00416/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00416-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Travis Eugene Keesee, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Craig Apker, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 10-416-TUC-AWT (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se: (1) Motion Clarifying Summary

Judgment of April 1, 2011 (Doc. 21); and (2) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §2241 (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed a Return and Answer (hereinafter

“Answer”) (Doc. 11) and Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 14). Pursuant to Rules of Practice

of this Court, this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and

Recommendation. For the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court deny Petitioner’s Motion Clarifying Summary Judgment of April 1, 2011, and

deny and dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

I. DISCUSSION

Petitioner is an inmate currently incarcerated at the Federal Satellite Prison Camp, in

Tucson, Arizona. (Answer, p. 2 & Att. 6, ¶2). In June 2002, Petitioner was sentenced to a

term of 180 months of imprisonment, 60 months of Supervised Release, and a $100 Special

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Assessment for violation of 18 U.S.C. §§922(g)(1) and 924(e), Felon/Armed Career Criminal

Possession of a Firearm. (Answer, Att. 2). Petitioner currently has a Good Conduct Time

release date of August 11, 2013, and a full term release date of July 15, 2015. (Answer, p.2).

Petitioner claims that the Bureau of Prisons (hereinafter “BOP”) failed to properly

assess his eligibility for admission to a Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program

(hereinafter “RDAP”), the successful completion of which would entitle Petitioner to

consideration in the discretion of the BOP for a sentence reduction of up to twelve months.

Petitioner also claims that he received improper notice about the early release procedure, and

that the BOP’s review procedures constitute venue shopping. Petitioner requests that the

Court “[i]nstruct the BOP to reconsider...[his] eligibility for early release under [18 U.S.C.

§] 3621(e)(2)(B) without regard to BOP’s Rules effective 3/16/2009, instead, with the Early

Release Procedures pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3621(e) PREVIOUS (before) 3/16/2009.”

(Petition, p. 9) (emphasis in original). 

Respondent argues that this matter should be dismissed because Petitioner failed to

exhaust administrative remedies. Alternatively, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claims

fail on the merits.

A. Jurisdiction

“Federal courts are always ‘under an independent obligation to examine their own

jurisdiction,’...and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no

jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting FW/PBS,

Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by City

of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004)). With regard to habeas

petitions, federal jurisdiction is dependent upon a proper characterization of the petition.

Gay v. Winn, 2009 WL 275324, *2 (D.Ariz. Feb. 5, 2009). 

Generally, an action to contest the legality of a sentence must be filed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §2255, whereas an action to challenge the execution of a sentence must be filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864. Petitioner does not claim that

the sentencing court imposed an illegal sentence. Instead, he challenges the manner,

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location, or condition of the execution of his sentence. See e.g. Gay, 2009 WL 275324 at *

2 (citing Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349 (1st Cir. 1999)). Petitioner’s claims regarding

denial of his participation in the RDAP which, in turn, could have resulted in his early release

from prison, falls under section 2241. See e.g. Close v. Thomas, __ F.3d. __, 2011 WL

3319547 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2011) (considering, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenge of

procedure for RDAP eligibility); Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).

Further, because Petitioner is incarcerated at the Federal Satellite Prison Camp in Tucson,

Arizona, this Court has jurisdiction over this matter. Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir.

1990); Gay, 2009 WL 275324 at * 2. 

B. Motion Clarifying Summary Judgment (Doc. 21)

On February 9, 2009, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Stipulate to Consent [sic] Exercise

of Jurisdiction by United States Magistrate Judge Hector C. Estrada Pursuant [sic] Title 28

U.S.C. §636(c)(1).” (Doc. 16). The Government objected (Doc. 18). Thereafter, Petitioner

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19), which the Court construed as a response

to the Government’s objection to proceed under 28 U.S.C. §636(c). (Doc. 20). The Court

ultimately denied Petitioner’s Motion to stipulate to proceed pursuant to section 636(c).

(Id.). Petitioner now contends that his Motion for Summary Judgment also requested entry

of summary judgment because Respondent did not appropriately respond to Petitioner’s

habeas petition. (Doc. 21). Petitioner’s current motion primarily addresses his

dissatisfaction with Respondent’s decision not to consent to the Court’s exercise of

jurisdiction pursuant to section 636(c). Upon review of the record, as discussed within this

Report and Recommendation, Respondent has addressed Petitioner’s claims on the merits

and the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims are without merit. Thus, Petitioner has not

demonstrated that he is entitled to summary judgment.

C. Exhaustion

Federal prisoners are generally required to exhaust available administrative remedies

before filing a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. See Tucker v. Carlson,

925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1991); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986).

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The failure to satisfy the exhaustion requirement applicable to section 2241 proceedings is

not jurisdictional. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990) overruled on other

grounds by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995). Thus, where a federal prisoner fails

to properly exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a section 2241 petition, “the

district court must determine whether to excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the merits,

or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in court.”

Id. The district court may exercise its discretion to excuse the exhaustion requirement if the

administrative remedy is inadequate, ineffective, or if attempting to exhaust would be futile

or cause irreparable injury. Fraley v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th

Cir. 1993); United Farm Workers of America v. Arizona Agr. Emp’t. Relations Bd., 669 F.2d

1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1983). Factors weighing in favor of requiring exhaustion include

whether (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper

record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the

deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to

allow the agency to correct is own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.

Noreiga-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Montes v.

Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 1990)). See also Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844,

845 (9th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies “will

aid judicial review by allowing the appropriate development of a factual record in an expert

forum; conserve the court's time because of the possibility that the relief applied for may be

granted at the administrative level; and allow the administrative agency an opportunity to

correct errors occurring in the course of administrative proceedings.”). 

The BOP has established an Administrative Remedy Program which requires the

prisoner to proceed through a four-tier review process comprised of: (1) an informal

resolution process with institutional staff, see 28 C.F.R. §542.13; (2) a formal written

Administrative Remedy Request to the warden, see 28 C.F.R. §542.14; (3) an appeal to the

BOP Regional Director, see 28 C.F.R. §542.15; and (4) an appeal to the BOP General

Counsel, see id. (“Appeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal.”).

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Additionally, effective June 18, 2010, 

formal administrative remedy requests regarding initial decisions that did not

originate with the Warden, or his/her staff, may be initially filed with the

Bureau office which made the original decision, and appealed directly to the

General Counsel.

28 C.F.R. §542.14(d)(5); (see also Reply, Att. 1).. The regulation is clear that “[t]he purpose

of the Administrative Remedy Program is to allow an inmate to seek formal review of an

issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28 C.F.R. §542.10(a).

Respondent points out that “Petitioner bypassed the administrative remedy system and

filed his habeas corpus petition on July 19, 2010. After filing with the District Court,

Petitioner bypassed the informal resolution stage and institutional grievance...” and instead

filed an appeal with the Regional Director’s Office. (Answer p. 3 (citing Answer, Att. 6

Internal Exh. 3)).

Petitioner claims that “he filed his administrative remedy directly with...” the

Designation and Sentence Computation Center (hereinafter “DSCC”) because the decision

at issue was made at that location and not by the Warden. (Reply, pp. 5-6). Petitioner further

asserts that his administrative remedy request was returned to him with directions to submit

it to the Warden, but Petitioner instead filed with the Regional Director’s Office. (Reply, pp.

5-6). Petitioner does not specify the dates of such filings or responses. (See id.). Petitioner

argues that his attempt to exhaust administrative remedies was correct pursuant to 28 C.F.R.

§ 542.14(d)(5), because section 542.14 was amended effective June 18, 2010 to permit

requests for formal review of decisions not originating from the Warden to be initially filed

with the Bureau office which made the original decision, and appealed directly to the General

Counsel. (Id. at p.6 & Exh. A). 

The decision denying Petitioner’s participation in the RDAP was issued on May 21,

2010. (See Answer, Att.3). Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §542.14(a), “[t]he deadline for completion

of informal resolution and submission of a formal written Administrative Remedy Request,

on the appropriate form (BP–9), is 20 calendar days following the date on which the basis

for the Request occurred[]” unless an extension is granted. Because section 542.14(d)(5) was

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not yet effective 20 calendar days after the May 21, 2010 decision, Petitioner was bound by

the exhaustion procedures in effect at the time. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he

followed the appropriate procedure to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

Petitioner also argues that exhaustion is futile given the time frame required for

exhaustion and in light of the fact that a decision must be made in time for Petitioner to be

transferred to a facility offering an RDAP facility. (See Petitioner’s Brief in Support of

Petition (Doc. 1), pp. 3-4). Petitioner points out that “[a]t best (the least amount of time

required) to become eligible for §3621(e) consideration is 16 months which ends November

2011. This precludes BOP’s RRC [sic] placement consideration within the prescribed 17-19

months from Statutory Projected Release Date. Hence, any attempt to exhaust would make

all these efforts VOID and the underlying purpose of the exhaustion requirement would no

longer be served.” (Id. at p. 4) (emphasis in original).

Respondent is correct that Petitioner has failed to properly exhaust the required

administrative remedies. However, Respondent has submitted pertinent records and

argument to support his position that Petitioner’s claim is meritless. Upon review of

Respondent’s Answer, there is no possibility that the relief applied for may be granted at the

administrative level. Nor is there need to provide the administrative agency an opportunity

to correct errors in hope of precluding the need for judicial review given that Respondent

herein asserts no error was made and as discussed infra, Respondent is correct that

Petitioner’s claims are meritless. Although the Court does not condone Petitioner’s bypass

of the administrative exhaustion requirements, given the time concerns at issue, the Court

will review the merits of Petitioner’s claim despite Petitioner’s failure to exhaust. See

Fraley, 1 F.3d at 925. See also Parsons v. Sanders, 2010 WL 5676523, *1 (D. Ariz. Dec.

20, 2010) (court need not address exhaustion where claim is without merit). 

D. Statutory Background

“After a district court sentences a federal offender, the Attorney General, through the

BOP, has the responsibility for administering the sentence.” United States v. Wilson, 503

U.S. 329, 335 (1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. §3621(a)). “Congress has outlined the terms of

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1

In deciding in Lopez that the BOP has discretion to narrow the class of prisoners

eligible for early release under section 3621(e), “the [Supreme] Court did not consider an

A[dministrative] P[rocedures] A[ct] challenge to the validity of the Bureau’s...rule.”

Arrington, 516 F.3d at 1115.

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federal imprisonment in 18 U.S.C. § 3621.” Mora-Meraz v. Thomas, 601 F.3d 933 (9th Cir.

2010). In 1990, Congress amended section 3621 “‘to make available appropriate substance

abuse treatment for each prisoner the Bureau determines has a treatable condition of the

substance addiction or abuse.’” (Id.) (quoting Pub.L. No. 101-647, §2903, 104 Stat. 4789,

4913 (1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §3621(b)). The BOP created the RDAP to satisfy this

mandate. Chatman v. Thomas, 2011 WL 2198296, *1 (D. Or. June 7, 2011). “Four years

later, in response to under utilization of treatment programs, Congress again amended the

statute to provide an early release incentive to encourage prisoner participation.” Arrington,

516 F.3d at 1109 (citing Pub.L. No. 103-322, §32001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1896-97 (codified at

18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(5), (e)). Under, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), the BOP 

may reduce by up to one year the sentence of a prisoner who (1) was convicted

of a nonviolent offense and (2) successfully completes a program of residential

substance abuse treatment.

Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §3621(e)(2)(B)). The Supreme Court has held that the BOP has

discretion to narrow the class of prisoners eligible for this credit. See Lopez v. Davis, 531

U.S. 230 (2001).1

“In May 1995, the BOP promulgated its first rule and corresponding regulation

detailing procedures to determine eligibility for early release under section 3621(e).”

Arrington, 516 F.3d at 1109 (citing 60 Fed. Reg. 27692 (May 25, 1995); 28 C.F.R. §550.58

(1995)). These regulations and guidelines, in pertinent part, excluded prisoners convicted

of a felony involving the use of a firearm, including convictions for being a felon in

possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §922(g), from eligibility for early release under

section 3621(e)(2). See Id. at 1109-10.

In 1997, the Ninth Circuit held that the BOP “must consider eligible for early release

as nonviolent offenders those with convictions under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)...” because such crime

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did not qualify as a crime of violence. Id. at 1110 (citing Davis v. Crabtree, 109 F.3d 566,

668-70 (9th Cir. 1997)(“the BOP may not interpret the term ‘nonviolent offense’ to exclude

the offense of felon in possession a firearm.”)). 

Thereafter, the BOP promulgated an interim rule, which the Ninth Circuit struck down

in 2005 on procedural grounds, holding that the BOP failed to comply with the notice and

comment provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter “APA”). Id., 516

F.3d at 1110 (citing Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

In December 2000, the BOP promulgated a final rule that was “identical to the 1997

interim rule, [and] relied on the Bureau’s discretion to narrow the class of prisoners eligible

for early release by excluding those convicted of offenses involving the carrying, possession,

or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives.” Id. (citing 65 Fed.Reg. 80745,

80747-748 (Dec. 22, 2000)). However, the Ninth Circuit subsequently invalidated the rule

under the APA. Id. at 1112-16.

“As a result of the Davis and Arrington decisions, the BOP promulgated new interim

rules governing early release eligibility. In January 2009, the BOP promulgated a final rule”,

28 C.F.R. §550.55(b)(5). Chatman, 2011 WL 2198296 at * 3 & n.5 (citing 74 Fed.Reg.

1892-01 (Jan. 14, 2009)). “On March 16, 2009, BOP issued a Program Statement titled

‘Early Release Procedures Under 18 U.S.C. §3621(e). The purpose of the document is to

[]re-establish criteria and procedures when considering an inmate for early release pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. §3621(e)(2)(B) for the successful completion of the Residential Drug Abuse

Program.[]” Close, __ F.3d __ 2011 WL 3319547 at *1 n.1. “The 2009 rules are applicable

to all inmates applying to RDAP after March 16, 2009.” Chatman, 2011 WL 2198296 at *3

n.5. Also effective March 16, 2009 is BOP’s Program Statement P5162.05 titled

“Categorization of Offenses.” (See Answer, Att. 1).

Under these current regulations and Program Statement P5162.05, in pertinent part,

the BOP may preclude a prisoner from receiving early release under section 3621(e)(2)(B)

if the prisoner has a current felony conviction of an offense that involved carrying,

possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives (including any

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Program Statement P5162.05 is Attached to Respondent’s Answer at Att.1.

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explosive material or explosive device). See 28 C.F.R. §550.55(b)(5)(ii); Program Statement

P5162.05.2

To successfully complete the RDAP, a prisoner must complete a unit-based

component of a minimum 500 hours, follow-up services, and a transitional drug abuse

treatment component. (Answer, p.4 (citing 28 C.F.R. §550.53, Program Statement

P5330.11)).

 E. Petitioner’s Claims

It is undisputed that the BOP applied the rule and pertinent program statements

effective March 16, 2009 in concluding in May 2010 that Petitioner was precluded from

eligibility for section 3621(e)(2)(B) early release. (See Answer, Atts. 3, 5) The offense

review requests reflects, inter alia, that Petitioner is currently imprisoned for being a

Felon/Armed Career Criminal in Possession of a Firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§922(g)(1) and 924(e). (Answer, Att. 3). Petitioner contends that the March 2009 rules

should not apply to him because he applied for RDAP consideration before March 2009, he

was not given fair notice about the rules, and because the BOP’s review procedures

constitute forum shopping.

Respondent points out that for a prisoner to be evaluated under the Arrington decision:

(1) The inmate must currently be housed in a Ninth Circuit institution,

AND have been determined to meet the qualifications to participate in

the BOP’s RDAP; or

(2) The inmate must have completed the unit-based portion of RDAP in a

Ninth Circuit institution, regardless of his or her current place of

incarceration.

(Answer, p.7 (citing Att. 5, ¶7)) (capitalization in original). According to Respondent,

Petitioner did not fall within the Arrington decision because Petitioner did not request to

participate in RDAP prior to March 16, 2009 while confined in a Ninth Circuit institution

and Petitioner did not complete the unit based portion of RDAP while confined in a Ninth

Circuit institution. (Id.). Further according to Respondent, Petitioner’s previous designated

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place of confinement was in Florence, Colorado, in the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit Court

of Appeals. (Id.). 

1. Claim 1: Effect of Request Made Prior to March 16, 2009

Petitioner alleges in his Petition that prior to March 16, 2009, “he requested from

SPC-Tucson Psychology Staff to be...” considered for RDAP participation. (Petition, p.4

(citing Petitioner’s Affidavit, attached to Doc. 1)). According to Petitioner, BOP staff

informed him that he could not be considered for RDAP participation because he was more

than three years from his projected statutory release date. (Id.). 

Petitioner’s affidavit reflects that he has been incarcerated at the Satellite Prison Camp

in Tucson, Arizona, since June 24, 2009. (Affidavit, ¶1). Petitioner avers in his Affidavit

that prior to March 16, 2009: “I arranged a meeting with my Florence (Colorado) Prison

Camp- Unit Team to discuss my request for immediate consideration for the RDAP

Program.” (Id. at ¶3). Thus, Petitioner’s sworn statement does not support the allegation in

his Petition that prior to March 16, 2009, he requested that BOP staff at the Tucson facility

consider him for RDAP placement. Instead, given that Petitioner concedes that he was not

transferred to the facility in Tucson until June 24, 2009, the record supports Respondent’s

position that Petitioner was ineligible for application of the Arrington decision because

Petitioner had not requested RDAP consideration prior to March 16, 2009 while confined at

an institution within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Moreover, prior to March 16, 2009, Program Statement P5330.10 was in effect and

provided the policy and procedural guidelines for inmates’ early release eligibility after

participation in the RDAP. See Parsons, 2010 WL 5676523 at *2. “One of the eligibility

requirements for RDAP was that the inmate generally had to be within 36 months of his

release date.” (Id. (citing Program Statement P5330.10)). Petitioner avers in his Affidavit

that he was informed by the BOP staff in Florence, Colorado, that to be eligible for RDAP

consideration, Petitioner’s projected statutory release date had to be no more than 36 months

from the date of his request. (Petitioner’s Affidavit, ¶4). Petitioner acknowledges that “BOP

policy and practice was clear, unless an inmate was within THREE [3] years of his projected

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Petitioner argues that in Parsons, Respondent only argued that the inmate was more

than 36 months away from his projected release date. (Reply, p. 3). According to Petitioner,

the fact that Respondent raises a different argument herein, i.e. that Petitioner was ineligible

because he did “not request to participate in RDAP prior to March 16, 2009 in a Ninth

Circuit institution”, renders Respondent’s argument disingenuous and results in a due process

violation. (Id.). Like the inmate in Parsons, Petitioner had more than 36 months of

imprisonment left before his projected statutory release date at the time of any purported

request predating March 2009. However, Petitioner was also housed at a facility outside the

Ninth Circuit prior to March 2009 and Respondent was entitled to argue that factor as well.

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statutory release date...BOP categorically refused to consider any request for RDAP

consideration.” (Petition, p.4).

On the instant record, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was confined within the

jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit when he alleges he requested to be considered for RDAP

placement prior to March 2009. Instead, Petitioner’s Affidavit reflects that he did not arrive

at a facility within the Ninth Circuit until June 2009. Moreover, even if Petitioner somehow

fell under the Arrington decision regarding the offense for which he stands convicted, he

concedes that BOP policy required that he be within 36 months of his statutory release date

for RDAP consideration. He did not satisfy that criteria prior to March 2009. “Thus, prior

to March 2009, Petitioner was ineligible for participation in a RDAP and, therefore, not

eligible for the accompanying sentence reduction.” Parsons, 2010 WL 567523 at *2. Since

March 2009, when the new rules came into effect, Petitioner has been ineligible for sentence

reduction due to his conviction for being a felon/armed career criminal in possession of a

firearm. Thus, Petitioner has not established entitlement to a sentence reduction under 18

U.S.C. §3621(e). See id.3

2. Claim 2: Notice

On March 28, 2008, all BOP Chief Executive Officers were instructed to post a Notice

to the inmate population entitled “IMPORTANT NOTICE TO INMATES: Reconsideration

of §3621(e)(2)(B) Early Release Eligibility After Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Arrington v.

Daniels”. (Answer, pp. 7-8 & Atts. 3, 5) (capitalization in original) (emphasis omitted).

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Petitioner alleges that BOP provided inadequate notice of the March 16, 2009 eligibility

changes for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. §3631(e), thus violating his due process

rights. (Petition, p.5). He argues that had the notice clearly advised that: “ALL currently

sentenced inmates, regardless of time remaining to be served, in order to preserve early

release procedures pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3621(e), should immediately request consideration

BEFORE 3/16/2009–he would have undougtedly [sic] done so.” (Brief in Support of

Petition, p.8) (emphasis in original). However, as discussed supra, Petitioner was not

eligible for participation in a RDAP prior to March 16, 2009, because he was not within 36

months of release. In a case similar to Petitioner’s on this issue, the District Court for the

District of Arizona has concluded that:

even if Petitioner had been provided additional notice of the impending

changes to the eligibility requirements for sentence reduction and had made a

request for RDAP participation prior to the change, he was not eligible for the

program at that time. Regardless of any alleged notice violation, Petitioner

was not harmed and is not entitled to relief.

Parsons, 2010 WL 5676523 at *2. That reasoning is sound and equally applicable to

Petitioner herein. Likewise, Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits.

3. Claim 3: Venue Shopping

Under Program Statement, P5331.02, effective March 16, 2009, inmate eligibility

shall be determined by BOP staff at the national DSCC in Grand Prairie, Texas. See

P5331.02. (See also Answer, p. 8)(“The BOP created the DSCC in Grand Prairie, Texas, in

order to centralize the functions of inmate designation and inmate sentence computation,

including eligibility reviews pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [§] 3621(e)(2)(B) for early release. All

inmate designations and sentence computation functions for the BOP are performed at the

DSCC.”). Thus, offense reviews are no longer conducted in the regional and institution legal

offices. See P5331.02. Petitioner claims that BOP’s procedure, which requires that all

inmate requests for sentence reduction shall be determined by the national DSCC, constitutes

impermissible forum shopping. Petitioner contends that, because the DSCC is located within

the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and not the Ninth Circuit where the

Arrington decision applies, no BOP staff at the DSCC would have authority to find eligibility

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Petitioner also argues that BOP staff would not have authority to apply the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Crickon v. Thomas, 579 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2009). However, as

Respondent correctly points out, Crickon is inapplicable to Petitioner because that decision

involved consideration of inmates’ prior convictions when determining eligibility for RDAP

placement. (See Answer, p. 7). Here, Petitioner was not found ineligible for RDAP

placement based on his prior convictions.

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under Arrington.4

 (Petition, p.6). Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that when

BOP staff at the DSCC review an inmate’s eligibility for RDAP placement, Ninth Circuit

precedent is not considered with regard to inmates to whom such precedent applies. To the

contrary, the BOP staff member who reviewed Petitioner’s case states that he expressly

considered whether the Arrington decision applied to Petitioner and he stated the reasons

why he found the decision inapplicable to Petitioner. (See Answer, Att. 5, ¶¶1,5-7; see also

Answer, Att. 3 (Petitioner’s May 2010 request for offense review specifically noting why the

Arrington decision did not apply to Petitioner)). “Regardless of where the BOP decision

regarding Petitioner’s ineligibility for §3621(e) sentence reduction was made, neither

Respondent nor this Court contends that venue is not proper in this district. Additionally,

appeal from this Court’s decision is to the Ninth Circuit. Thus, this claim is without a factual

basis and has no merit.” Parsons, 2010 WL 5676523 at *2.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to summary judgment and his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is without merit.

III. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court: (1)

deny Petitioner’s Motion Clarifying Summary Judgment of April 1, 2011 (Doc. 21); and (2)

deny and dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case

number: CV 10-416-TUC-AWT.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003).

DATED this 21st day of September, 2011.

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