Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-03424/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-03424-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

D. L. TAYLOR, C-05467, 

Plaintiff(s),

 vs.

M. J. JOHNSON, Correctional Officer,

Defendant(s). 

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No. C 12-3424 CRB (PR)

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Dkt. #81-1 at 5-71)

On June 29, 2012, while Plaintiff D. L. Taylor was incarcerated at Pelican

Bay State Prison (PBSP), he filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

challenging various conditions of his confinement. After several rounds of

dismissals with leave to amend and amended complaints (and a transfer to

California State Prison, Corcoran), plaintiff filed a verified Fifth Amended

Complaint (FAC) for damages under § 1983 alleging that on February 29, 2012,

while he was at PBSP, Correctional Officer M. J. Johnson used excessive force

against him. Plaintiff specifically alleges that, while he was on the floor of his

cell talking to a female correctional officer thru the gap at the bottom of the

closed cell door, Johnson ordered him to stop talking and “repeatedly kick[ed]

the cell door with all of his might . . . causing the cell door to hit me in my

mouth, knocking out a tooth and to chip one on my partial.” Docket #29 (FAC)

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at 4.

Per order filed on April 25, 2014, the court screened the FAC under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A and found that, liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations that

“Johnson kicked plaintiff’s cell door so hard that it caused the cell door to hit

plaintiff in the mouth and knock out a tooth and chip one on his partial appear to

state an arguably cognizable claim for damages under § 1983 for use of excessive

force,” and ordered the claim served on Johnson. Dkt. #31 (Order) at 2. 

Defendant Johnson moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the operative FAC fails to allege facts

sufficient to state a claim for use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth

Amendment and for summary judgment under Rule 56 on the ground that

plaintiff failed to properly exhaust available administrative remedies before filing

suit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. But per order filed on

April 29, 2015, the court denied the motions. The court found that, “[t]aken as

true, plaintiff’s factual allegations are enough ‘to state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face,” dkt. #75 (order) at 4 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and that, “[u]nder the law of the circuit,

plaintiff’s sworn statements that he was thwarted from filing a 602 staff

complaint-appeal concerning the excessive force claim at issue” precludes

summary judgment for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies, id. at

9 (citing Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2015)). 

 Defendant now moves for summary judgment under Rule 56 on the

merits of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim on the ground that

there are no material facts in dispute and that he is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Defendant also claims that he is entitled to qualified immunity

from damages. Plaintiff has filed an opposition essentially reiterating the

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allegations in the FAC and defendant has filed a reply. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and

affidavits show that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

[moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case under

governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute as to a material fact is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248-49. 

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of

identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden

of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable

trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which

the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the

moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support

the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must

go beyond the pleadings to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of

material fact by “citing to specific parts of materials in the record” or “showing

that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine

dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). If the nonmoving party fails to make this

showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex,

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477 U.S. at 323.

/

B. Analysis

It is well established that the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). In the context of a prison official 

accused of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core

judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). In determining whether the use of force was

wanton and unnecessary, a court may evaluate the need for application of force,

the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of any

injury inflicted, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and

any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id. at 7. 

Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

claim that defendant used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment

because, even if one assumes that defendant kicked plaintiff’s cell door (which

defendant denies he did), there is no evidence on the record that plaintiff suffered

any physical injury or that defendant knew that plaintiff had placed his mouth so

close to the bottom of the inside surface of his closed cell door that a kick to the

outside surface of the closed cell door would cause plaintiff injury. On this

record, defendant argues that no reasonable jury could find that he kicked

plaintiff’s closed cell door maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of

causing harm to plaintiff. 

1. Injury

Although plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC indicate that defendant

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kicked plaintiff’s closed cell door so hard that it caused the cell door to hit

plaintiff in the mouth, knock out one of his natural teeth and chip an artificial

tooth on his partial dental plate, plaintiff now concedes that he did not lose a

natural tooth but rather lost an artificial tooth on his partial dental plate and

suffered a chip on another artificial tooth on his dental plate. Dkt. #87 (Opp’n) at

1 (“Nothing was/is ever claimed to be natural.”). Plaintiff does not assert or set

forth any evidence of any physical injury he suffered as a result of the February

29, 2012 incident. Defendant on the other hand sets forth uncontroverted

evidence showing that there are no medical or dental records indicating that

plaintiff suffered any injury to his mouth or natural teeth on February 29, 2012 or

any time thereafter. Dkt. #81-1 (Dr. Hanna Decl.) at 25. Defendant’s

uncontroverted evidence further shows that plaintiff did not report that his partial

dental plate had been damaged and that he needed a new one until June 12, 2012,

more than three months after the alleged February 29, 2012 incident. Id. 

It is not clear whether a physical injury is a threshold requirement for an

excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, but it is very clear that a

significant injury is not. “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use

force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . .

whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment

would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman,

inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. But

this does not mean that the “absence of serious injury” is irrelevant to the Eighth

Amendment inquiry. Id. at 7. The extent of injury suffered may provide some

indication of the amount of force applied. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37

(2010). As the Court noted in Hudson, not “every malevolent touch by a prison

guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. The Eight

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Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments “necessarily

excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force,

provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the consciousness of

mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An inmate

who complains of a push or a shove that causes no discernable injury almost

certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38.

In Hudson, the Court concluded that the supposedly “minor” nature of the

injuries “provide[d] no basis for dismissal of [Hudson’s] § 1983 claim” because

“the blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises, swelling, loosed teeth, and

a cracked dental plate, are not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes.”

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10. But the only “injury” plaintiff suffered in this case was 

damage to his partial dental plate. He suffered no injury to his body. When

viewed together with the uncontroverted fact that plaintiff did not bother to report

that his partial dental plate had been damaged and that he needed a new one until

more than three months after the alleged February 29, 2012 incident, it cannot be

said that the force used was more than de minimis or that it was used maliciously

and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm to plaintiff. See Wilkins,

559 U.S. at 1178-79 (noting that injury and force are only imperfectly correlated

and that it is the latter that ultimately counts); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628

(9th Cir. 2002) (same). 

2. Wantonness

Defendant argues that there is no evidence that he knew, when he

allegedly kicked plaintiff’s closed cell door, that plaintiff had placed his mouth so

close to the bottom of the inside surface of the closed cell door that a kick would

cause plaintiff harm. In support, defendant submits photographs of the cell door

at issue which show that defendant could not have seen plaintiff on the floor of

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his cell talking to defendant or another officer when the cell door was closed, and

that defendant reasonably could have assumed that plaintiff was talking through

the air holes on the lower portion of the cell door (covered on the outside of the

door by downward facing vents that prevent inmates from throwing materials

through the vent holes) rather than through the small gap at the bottom of the cell

door with his mouth so close to the inside surface of the closed cell door and

ground that a kick to the outside surface of the closed cell door would hurt

plaintiff. See Dkt. #81-1 (Johnson Decl. Ex. A) at 58 & 59. 

The Supreme Court has made clear that an excessive force claim under the

Eighth Amendment should not go to the jury unless the plaintiff sets forth

evidence which supports a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of

pain. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. Plaintiff does not do so here. When viewed

in conjunction with the other evidence now in the record, plaintiff’s allegations in

his verified FAC and in his sworn opposition papers – defendant must have, or

should have, known that plaintiff would be injured when he kicked the outside of

surface of plaintiff’s closed cell door – support no more than a claim for

negligence or gross negligence not cognizable under § 1983 in the prison context. 

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 & n.4 (1994). They do not support

a reliable inference that defendant used force maliciously and sadistically for the

very purpose of causing harm to plaintiff. See Hudson, 508 U.S. at 6-7.

In sum, the undisputed evidence shows (1) that the only harm plaintiff

suffered as a result of the alleged February 29, 2012 incident was damage to his

partial dental plate, and (2) that plaintiff did not report that his partial dental plate

had been damaged and that he needed a new one until more than three months

later. And even if defendant kicked the outside surface of plaintiff’s closed cell

door, there is no evidence that defendant knew that plaintiff had placed his mouth

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so close to the bottom of the inside surface of the closed cell door and ground that

a kick to the outside surface of the closed cell door would cause plaintiff harm. 

Under the circumstances, no reasonable jury could find that defendant used force

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm to plaintiff in violation of the Eighth

Amendment when defendant allegedly kicked plaintiff’s closed cell door. 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. 

At minimum, defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from damages

because a reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct was lawful

under the circumstances. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). A

reasonable officer could have believed that kicking the outside surface of

plaintiff’s closed cell door would not cause plaintiff harm in violation of the

Eighth Amendment because a reasonable officer could have believed that

plaintiff had not positioned himself in such a way on the other side of the closed

cell door that a kick to the outside surface of the door would hurt him.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment (dkt.

#81-1 at 5-71) is GRANTED.

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendant and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: Nov. 2, 2015 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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