Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-00401/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-00401-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

YSIDRO HERNANDEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CDCR, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 19-00401 BLF (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND; DENYING 

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 

COUNSEL 

(Docket No. 2) 

Plaintiff, a California inmate, filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against an employee at the Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”) in 

Soledad. Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (Docket No. 2.) 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be addressed in a separate 

order. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 

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governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 

cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally 

construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Plaintiff’s Claims 

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Chavez “went beyond his work duties and just to 

impress a nurse, he lifted me, bent me in half and hurt my already hurt back.” (Compl. at 

3.) Plaintiff claims he had a severe injury and needed various treatments. (Id.) Plaintiff 

claims deliberate indifference, malicious conduct, and negligence. (Id.) Plaintiff wants 

Defendant Chavez to be fired or disciplined for his conduct, and damages for “pain and 

suffering, mental stress, [and] depression.” (Id.) 

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992). A 

determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the 

seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to 

that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. A “serious” medical need exists if the failure 

to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 1059 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). A prison 

official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of 

serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

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It is not clear from the pleadings whether Defendant Chavez applied some sort of 

medical procedure on Plaintiff that resulted in harm or applied unnecessary force. If it was 

a medical procedure and assuming Plaintiff had a sufficiently serious medical need to 

establish the first element, he has alleged no specific facts to satisfy the second element, 

i.e., that Defendant Chavez acted knowing that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious 

harm and disregarded that risk. Id. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant Chavez 

acted “just to impress a nurse,” which indicates negligence; indeed, Plaintiff specifically 

alleges negligence later on the paragraph. See supra at 2. However, a claim of medical 

malpractice or negligence is insufficient to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 

732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981); see, 

e.g., Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no merit in claims 

stemming from alleged delays in administering pain medication, treating broken nose and 

providing replacement crutch, because claims did not amount to more than negligence); 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical 

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s 8th Amendment rights). 

Accordingly, any negligence claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff 

shall be granted leave to amend to attempt to state sufficient facts to establish a deliberate 

indifference claim against Defendant Chavez. 

On the other hand, if Plaintiff is alleging unnecessary force, the deliberate 

indifference standard is inappropriate. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992).

Instead, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to 

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Id. at 6-7; 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). Plaintiff must explain the context of 

Defendant Chavez’s use of force and set forth sufficient factual allegations showing that it 

was objectively, sufficiently serious and that Defendant Chavez possessed a sufficiently 

culpable state of mind, i.e., the offending conduct was wanton. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

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834; LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993). 

In amending, Plaintiff must also provide sufficient information to put Defendant on 

notice as to when and where the underlying incident took place. Lastly, Plaintiff fails to 

provide a first name initial for Defendant Chavez. He must provide sufficient 

identification information for this defendant to avoid service problems should the matter 

proceed on the merits. 

Plaintiff also names the CDCR as a defendant but makes no factual allegations 

against this entity. (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff may attempt to state a § 1983 claim against the 

CDCR in the amended complaint by describing what act or failure to act by the CDCR 

resulted in the violation of a specific constitutional right. 

C. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a motion requesting appointment of counsel based on indigency. 

(Docket No. 2.) 

There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case unless an indigent litigant 

may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social 

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(no constitutional right to counsel in § 1983 action), withdrawn in part on other grounds 

on reh’g en banc, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The decision to request counsel 

to represent an indigent litigant under § 1915 is within “the sound discretion of the trial 

court and is granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 

1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED without prejudice 

for lack of exceptional circumstances. See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 

F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (9th Cir. 1997); Terrell v. 

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 

(9th Cir. 1986). This denial is without prejudice to the Court’s sua sponte appointment of 

counsel at a future date should the circumstances of this case warrant such appointment. 

/// 

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CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED without prejudice. 

(Docket No. 2.) 

 2. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within twenty-eight 

(28) days of the date this order is filed, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint to correct 

the deficiencies discussed above. The amended complaint must include the caption and 

civil case number used in this order, Case No. C 19-00401 BLF (PR), and the words 

“AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. If using the court form complaint, Plaintiff 

must answer all the questions on the form in order for the action to proceed. 

 The amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as 

non-existent. Ramirez v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Consequently, claims not included in an amended complaint are no longer claims and 

defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.1992). 

Failure to respond in accordance with this order in the time provided will 

result in the dismissal of this action without prejudice and without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

The Clerk shall include two copies of the court’s complaint with a copy of this 

order to Plaintiff. 

This order terminates Docket No. 2. 

IT IS SO ORDERED 

Dated: _____________________ ________________________ 

BETH LABSON FREEMAN 

United States District Judge 

Order of Dismissal with Leave to Amend 

PRO-SE\BLF\CR.19\00401Hernandez_dwlta 

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