Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00888/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00888-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Herbert Knauss, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Phoenix, Neighborhood

Preservation Division, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 06-00888-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Herbert Knauss's Amended Motion for

Summary Judgment (doc. #19) and Defendant City of Phoenix's Motion for Judgment of

Dismissal on the Pleadings (doc. #16). The Court now rules on the motions.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Herbert Knauss is a resident of Phoenix who, in his own words, "has been an active

volunteer and financial contributor to several private and church programs helping the

needy." (Compl. ¶3). Mr. Knauss volunteered with the Ecumenical Chaplaincy for the

Homeless (the "Chaplaincy") in August of 1988. The Chaplaincy provided services to the

homeless out of the First Presbyterian Church in downtown Phoenix. The Chaplaincy and

First Presbyterian provided refreshments to the homeless waiting outside on the patio for the

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Plaintiff attached three notices of ordinance violations as exhibits to his Complaint.

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services. On August 11, 1998, the City cited First Presbyterian for violating Phoenix Zoning

Code 41-646-D-4.1

 

That ordinance provides in pertinent part:

Prohibited Uses. Land in the CMO district

shall not be used for the following uses,

whether principal or accessory, unless

such use was established in conformance

with the City's regulations in effect

immediately prior to the effective date of

this section, or was a legally

nonconforming use under the regulations

in effect immediately prior to the effective

date of this section . . . . 4. Unscreened

charitable outdoor food serving.

The notice of ordinance violation instructed First Presbyterian to cease the unscreened

outdoor charitable food service. The notice advised that to continue charitable food service,

First Presbyterian must screen the outdoor area with a solid wall or apply for a special use

permit to serve the food inside the church. First Presbyterian opted to end its outdoor food

service to the waiting homeless. 

On January 27, 1999, the City issued a notice of ordinance violation to Beacon Light

SDA Church. Beacon Light served free lunches to the public. The notice instructed Beacon

Light to stop serving the lunches because the service violated Phoenix Zoning Code P.C.C.

41-608-C. That ordinance prevents the serving of lunches in a residential area.

Mr. Knauss believes these ordinances, and others like them, target the homeless and

deprive them of their constitutional rights. Mr. Knauss filed the present suit on March 28,

2006, alleging: Count I - violations of the First Amendment; Count II - violations of the due

process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment; Count III - cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; Count IV - violations of "Certain Rights

Retained by the People Ninth Amendment" (Compl. p. 14); Count V - violations of the due

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process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; and Count VI - violation

of the Arizona State Constitution. 

Mr. Knauss moved for summary judgment on his claims on August 23, 2006 (doc.

#15). On November 13, 2006, the City moved for Judgment on the Pleadings (doc. #16). 

The Court denied Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, without prejudice to refile, for

failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1 on November 16, 2006 (doc. #17). Mr. Knauss filed

his Amended Motion for Summary Judgment on December 8, 2006 (doc. #19).

II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(c), "is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the pleadings as true, the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d

1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 1998). In other words, dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c) is inappropriate in circumstances in which, if the facts were as pleaded, they

would entitle the plaintiff to a remedy. Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Hall & Co.,

50 F.3d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir.1995).

In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court cannot consider

evidence outside the pleadings unless the Court treats the motion as one pursuant to Rule 56.

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c). If the Court treats the motion as having been brought under Rule 56,

the Court must give all parties the opportunity to present all material pertinent to such

motion. Id. However, the Court may consider facts that are contained in materials of which

the court may take judicial notice. See Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir.1994).

A. Standing

The City argues Mr. Knauss does not have standing to bring this suit. If Mr. Knauss

does not have standing, then this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case

and must dismiss. Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir.

2006). The Court considers standing on a claim-by-claim basis. Valley Outdoor, Inc. v. City

of Riverside, 446 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Standing encompasses a blend of constitutional requirements and prudential

considerations. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of

Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498

(1975)). To establish constitutional standing, Plaintiff must show: "(1) that there is an actual

or imminent injury, which is concrete and particularized, not hypothetical or conjectural; (2)

that the injury is fairly traceable to the City's actions; and (3) that it is likely, not merely

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Valley Outdoor, 446

F.3d at 953 (internal citations omitted). 

Article III standing requires that the plaintiff personally suffer an actual or threatened

injury. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. Courts should not entertain cases that would convert

the judicial process into "no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of

concerned bystanders." Id. at 473 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687

(1973)). Courts cannot act as publicly funded forums for the "ventilation of public

grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential understanding." Id. 

Beyond constitutional requirements, federal courts have also adopted a set of

prudential principles regarding standing. Id. at 474. Courts have held that a plaintiff

generally must assert his own legal rights and interests and cannot rest his claim to relief on

the legal rights and interests of third parties. Id. (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 499).

Additionally, even if the plaintiff has alleged sufficient redressable injury to satisfy Article

III requirements, the Supreme Court has refrained from adjudicating "abstract questions of

wide significance" that amount to "generalized grievances." Id. at 475 (quoting Warth, 422

U.S. at 499-500).

The Court commends Mr. Knauss for his dedication to helping the homeless. He

obviously cares very deeply about their plight. But caring about the treatment of the

homeless does not give Mr. Knauss standing to defend their rights or pursue remedies on

their behalf. Nor does he have the right to pursue remedies on behalf of First Presbyterian,

Beacon Church, or the Chaplaincy. This suit exemplifies the sort of case the Supreme Court

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has cautioned against, a case that amounts to "no more than a vehicle for the vindication of

the value interests of [a] concerned bystander[]." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473.

In Count II of his Complaint, Mr. Knauss complains that the City has enforced its

zoning ordinances unequally against churches inside the Capitol Mall Overlay district. He

further alleges the City has enforced the zoning ordinances in a dehumanizing manner.

These allegations relate to injuries to the churches and to the homeless. Mr. Knauss has not

stated an equal protection claim in his own right. Mr. Knauss therefore does not have

standing to pursue this claim.

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that enforcement of the zoning laws amounts to cruel

and unusual punishment because it punishes the homeless for their mere status. Plaintiff has

not argued that the zoning ordinances punish his status. Plaintiff is not homeless. Plaintiff

has not alleged that he personally suffered cruel and unusual punishment at the hands of the

City. Consequently, Mr. Knauss does not have standing on the Eighth Amendment claim.

Count IV is a claim for violation of "Certain Rights Retained By the People Ninth

Amendment." Compl. p.14. The Court cannot discern for certain which 9th Amendment

rights Mr. Knauss claims the City has violated, but the Count clearly addresses the rights of

the homeless. Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue claims on behalf of the homeless.

The last sentence of County IV, however, states that the City has deprived Plaintiff of his

requirement for spiritual redemption. Even if this allegation somehow confers standing on

Plaintiff, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim. Plaintiff does not have a constitutional

right to spiritual redemption. The Court therefore grants the City judgment on the pleadings

on that allegation.

Count V is another equal protection claim, this time under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff merely restates his allegations from County II. For the same reasons listed above,

Mr. Knauss has no standing on this claim.

Plaintiff labeled Count VI "Arizona Constitution Claims." Compl. p. 15. Under that

heading, Plaintiff merely recites portions of the Arizona constitution. The Court cannot

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The Court has dismissed for failure to state a claim any allegations in these Counts

on which Plaintiff might have standing.

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determine whether Plaintiff has standing from these bare recitations. In any case, Plaintiff

has failed to articulate a claim under the Arizona constitution. The Court therefore grants the

City judgment on the pleadings on Count VI.

In the counts discussed above, with a couple of possible exceptions,2

 Plaintiff has

failed to allege an injury to himself and his interests. Instead, he has alleged injuries to the

homeless and to the church. Plaintiff cannot meet the constitutional requirements for

standing in this case without alleging a personal injury. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472;

Valley Outdoor, 446 F.3d at 953.

B. Freedom of Religion Claim

Although Plaintiff does not have standing on his other claims, Plaintiff has sufficiently

alleged a personal injury in certain allegations of Count I. Considered in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, he alleges that charity is an essential part of his religious worship and

that the City's ordinance prevented him from extending charity at First Presbyterian and

thereby prevented him from freely practicing his religion. Plaintiff has standing to pursue

his freedom of religion claim.

Plaintiff also mentions his freedom of speech and association rights, but does not

explain how the ordinances violate those rights. Plaintiff therefore has failed to state a claim

for violation of his rights to freedom of speech and assembly. Plaintiff also attempts to state

various First Amendment claims on behalf of others. Plaintiff does not have standing to

assert defamation, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, or freedom of religion claims

on behalf of the homeless or First Presbyterian. 

Although Plaintiff has standing on his freedom of religion claim, it cannot survive the

City's motion for judgment on the pleadings. If a zoning law only incidentally burdens the

free exercise of religion, "with the law being both neutral and generally applicable, it passes

constitutional muster unless the law is not rationally related to a legitimate government

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The Court will not apply strict scrutiny analysis to the ordinances because Plaintiff

has not submitted a viable "hybrid" rights claim. San Jose Christian College, 360 F.3d. at

1031, 1032-33. Plaintiff merely mentions his freedom of speech and assembly rights, but

does not state how the ordinances violate his rights. Mr. Knauss does explain why he thinks

the ordinances violate others' rights of free speech and assembly, but he does not have

standing to seek remedies on the behalf of the homeless.

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interest."3

 San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir.

2004). The zoning ordinance prevents Mr. Knauss from serving refreshments to homeless

individuals outdoors without a screen in the Capitol Mall Overlay District. The ordinances

therefore only incidentally burden his right to freely practice the charitable tenets of his

religion. Mr. Knauss has many other available opportunities to serve the homeless.

Because the ordinances only incidentally burden Mr. Knauss's free exercise of

religion, the Court applies rational basis scrutiny if the ordinances are of general application

and do not target religion. Id. at 1031. A law is neutral and of general applicability if it does

not aim to "infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation and if it

does not in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious

belief." Id. (internal citations omitted). The zoning ordinances challenged here fall within

these parameters. 

The ordinances apply equally to religious and non-religious organizations. Further,

the ordinances do not aim to impose burdens on religious belief and practices. Rather, the

City has adopted the ordinances to "assure compatibility of uses" within the Capitol Mall

Overlay District. Municipalities have strong interests in maintaining the integrity of its

zoning scheme and in protecting its neighborhoods. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S.

100, 127 (1981). The challenged ordinances rationally relate to furthering those interests.

Because the ordinances are neutral and only incidentally burden Mr. Knauss's right to

practice his religion, the ordinances satisfy the rational basis test. See Miller v. Reed, 176

F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999). The ordinances therefore are constitutional and the City is

entitled to judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff's freedom of religion claim.

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Dismissal on the

Pleadings (doc. #16).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. #19).

DATED this 6th day of June, 2007.

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