Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00529/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00529-33/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ETUATE SEKONA

Plaintiff,

v.

M. FRANCIS,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:19-cv-00529-ADA-HBK

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER1

(Doc. No. 114)

FOURTEEN DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, filed on 

October 12, 2023. (Doc. No. 114, “Motion”). For the reasons stated below, the undersigned 

recommends Plaintiff’s Motion be denied. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Etuate Sekona (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner confined within the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), is proceeding on his pro se civil rights 

complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff’s case is currently set for

trial on his remaining Eighth Amendment deliberate medical indifference claim against 

Defendant M. Francis. (See generally docket). Although labeled as seeking a temporary

1 The undersigned submits these factual findings and recommendations to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2019).

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restraining or protective order, Plaintiff essentially objects to the continuance of his trial date to 

March 16, 2024 and requests the Court order his two subpoenaed witnesses to keep the Court 

updated of their addresses in case either is no longer employed at CDCR at the time of trial.

(Doc. No. 114 at 1-2). To the extent discernible, Plaintiff argues that the continuance of his trial 

date violates his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and 14th amendment right to call 

witnesses. (Id.). In an abundance of caution and due to the label of pleading, the Court 

addresses whether Plaintiff is entitled to a temporary restraining order. 

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs injunctions and restraining orders, and 

requires that a motion for a temporary restraining order include “specific facts in an affidavit or a 

verified complaint [that] clearly show that immediate, and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 

result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition,” as well as written 

certification from the movant’s attorney stating “any efforts made to give notice and the reasons 

why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). This court’s Local Rules also set forth 

certain procedural mandates for a TRO to issue, including that the movant provide the following 

documents: (1) a complaint; (2) a motion for TRO; (3) a brief on the relevant legal issues; (4) an 

affidavit to support the existence of irreparable harm; (5) an affidavit detailing the notice or 

efforts undertaken or showing good cause why notice should not be given; (6) a proposed TRO 

and provision for bond; and (7) a proposed order with blank for fixing time and date for a hearing. 

Local Rule 231(c) (E.D. Cal. 2022). 

Temporary restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary 

injunctions, with the exception that preliminary injunctions require notice to the adverse party. 

See Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1126 

(E.D. Ca. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). Local Rule 231, however, requires notice for 

temporary restraining orders as well, “[e]xcept in the most extraordinary of circumstances,” and 

the court considers whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion for preliminary 

injunction at an earlier date. L.R 231 (a)-(b) (E.D. Ca. 2019). A temporary restraining order 

“should be restricted to serving [its] underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and 

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preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” 

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 

423, 439 (1974). 

A temporary restraining order is “an extraordinary remedy” and may be issued only if

plaintiff establishes: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in 

the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his/her favor; (4) that an 

injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

Plaintiff bears the burden of clearly satisfying all four prongs. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 

Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). A TRO will not issue if plaintiff merely shows 

irreparable harm is possible – a showing of likelihood is required. Id. at 1131.

The injunctive relief an applicant requests must relate to the claims brought in the 

complaint. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 

2015) (“When a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on claims not pled in the complaint, the 

court does not have the authority to issue an injunction.”). Absent a nexus between the injury 

claimed in the motion and the underlying complaint, the court lacks the authority to grant plaintiff 

any relief. Id. at 636.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) imposes additional requirements on prisoner 

litigants seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials. In such cases, 

“[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to 

correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means 

necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); Villery v. California Dep't of Corr., 

2016 WL 70326, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2016). As the Ninth Circuit has observed, the PLRA 

places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to inmates, 

and “operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of federal courts and to protect the 

bargaining power of prison administrators—no longer may courts grant or approve relief that 

binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional minimum.” Gilmore v. People of 

the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court’s jurisdiction is “limited 

to the parties in this action” and the pendency of an action “does not give the Court jurisdiction 

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over prison officials in general or over the conditions of an inmate’s confinement unrelated to the 

claims before it.” Beaton v. Miller, 2020 WL 5847014, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2020).

III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff’s Motion is procedurally deficient and facially fails to comport with Rule 65 or 

Local Rule 231. Putting aside the procedural deficiencies, the Motion nonetheless is without 

merit. “The Sixth Amendment guarantees that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 

enjoy the right to a speedy trial.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992) (emphasis 

added). Plaintiff’s is prosecuting a civil rights action against Defendant Francis for deliberate 

medical indifference under the Eighth Amendment, and thus is not the accused in a criminal 

action. Therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial does not apply. 

Further, Plaintiff does not show a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief. Plaintiff implies that the continuance of his trial date will hamper his ability to 

obtain a fair jury trial, and notes that he “losted [sic] of his 2 witnesses already.” (Doc. No. 114 

at 1). Plaintiff alleges no facts to indicate that a continuance of his trial from October 2023 to 

March 2024 will impede his ability to ensure the attendance of the two subpoenaed witnesses or 

set forth any other specific prejudice from the five-month continuance. The U.S. Marshals 

Service has been attempting to locate Plaintiff’s two other witnesses since June 2023; if anything, 

the delay will permit Plaintiff additional time to potentially locate the two witnesses that the 

Marshal has been unable to locate. Further “’[s]peculative injury does not constitute irreparable 

injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.’” Mester v. Dickinson, 2010 WL 

1658472, *2 (April 23, 2010) (citing Caribbean Marine Servc. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 

(9th Cir. 1988) (other citations omitted)).

Finally, district courts have “inherent power to control the disposition of the causes on its 

docket in a manner which will promote economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for 

litigants.” Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936). While the Court is 

sympathetic to Plaintiff’s frustrations due the continuances of his trial date, judges in the Eastern 

District of California carry the heaviest caseloads in the nation and must prioritize criminal and 

older civil cases. The Court presumes that since both current subpoenaed witnesses work for 

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CDCR, should they leave CDCR’s employ before Plaintiff’s trial commences, CDCR would 

likely have a forwarding address for their former employees. 

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:

Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 114) be DENIED.

NOTICE TO PARTIES

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, a party may file written 

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Dated: October 30, 2023 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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