Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

AMY McCONNELL and AMY

McCONNELL on behalf of her

four minor children, A.B.,

A.B. J.M. and J.M.,

NO. CIV. S-05-0909 FCD DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LASSEN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, 

et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendants Lassen

County (the “County”), Terry Chapman (“T. Chapman”), Loel

Griffith (“Griffith”), Jack Hanson (“Hanson”), Brian Dahle

(“Dahle”), Lloyd Keefer (“Keefer”), Bob Pyle (“Pyle”), James

Chapman (“J. Chapman”), and Environmental Alternative’s (“EA”)

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 1 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Defendants filed four separate motions for summary

judgment. However, the court addresses all motions for summary

judgment herein. 

2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

3 Unless otherwise noted, the facts herein are

undisputed. (See Pls.’ Am. Objection to Def. Board’s Stmt. of

Undisp. Facts (“BUF”), filed May 22, 2007; Pls.’ Am. Objection to

Def. Griffith’s Stmt. of Undisp. Facts (“GUF”), filed May 23,

2007; Pls.’ Am. Objection to Def. T. Chapman and Lassen County’s

Stmt. of Undisp. Facts (“TUF”), filed May 22, 2007; Def.’s Reply

to Pls.’ Am. Objection to Def. EA’s Stmt. of Undisp. Facts

(“EUF”), filed June 1, 2007). Where the facts are in dispute,

the court recounts plaintiffs’ version of the facts. Plaintiffs

have filed documents purporting to set forth undisputed facts in

support of her oppositions. The court construes these filings as

statements of disputed facts pursuant to Local Rule 56-260(b). 

(See Pls.’ Am. Stmt. of Undisp. Facts in Supp. of Pls.’ Objection

to Def. Board’s Mot. (“BDF”), filed May 22, 2007; Pls.’ Stmt. of

Undisp. Facts in Supp. of Pls.’ Objection to Def. T. Chapman and

Lassen County’s Mot. (“TDF”), filed May 21, 2007; Pls.’ Stmt. of

Undisp. Facts in Supp. of Pls.’ Objection to Def. EA’s Mot.

(“EDF”), filed May 22, 2007). 

Plaintiffs assert that many facts are disputed, but their

proffered evidence does not contradict defendants’ assertions. 

Therefore, where plaintiffs fail to point to any contrary

evidence or direct contradictions in defendants’ own statements,

the court will not consider such facts to be in dispute. 

Defendants object to various pieces of evidence that

plaintiffs present in support of their opposition. Much of the

evidence that defendants object to is immaterial to the court’s

analysis of the summary judgment motion. To the extent that the

evidence is relevant, the court will address those objections

infra.

2

motions1 for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below,2

defendants’ motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

BACKGROUND3

This case arises out of the placement of the minor

plaintiffs A.B., A.B., J.M., and J.M. in protective custody by

Lassen County Child Protective Services (“CPS”) and the

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 2 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 Plaintiffs object to this evidence as inadmissible

hearsay. However, this evidence is not offered for the truth of

the matter asserted, but rather, to demonstrate knowledge and the

effect on the listener, defendant T. Chapman. As such, this

evidence is not hearsay. To the extent that plaintiffs object to

similar statements and evidence, such objections are OVERRULED. 

3

subsequent alleged sexual abuse of female minor plaintiffs J.M.

and A.B. by Marion (“Hank”) Coy while in foster care at the Coy

home in Doyle, California. On May 5, 2003, the three youngest of

plaintiff Amy McConnell’s (“McConnell”) four minor children, ages

six, four, and nine months, were left alone at home without any

supervision. (BUF ¶ 1; GUF ¶ 2). McConnell left the house to go

to the propane company because she believed that there was a

propane leak in her house due to her extremely high gas bill and

the faint smell of gas. (TUF ¶ 22; Dep. of Amy McConnell

(“McConnell Dep.”) at 157:3-158:7). McConnell left the children

with her husband, James E. McConnell, who subsequently left the

house to make a telephone call. (TUF ¶ 22). McConnell’s father,

Ronald Durand (“Durand”), entered the McConnell’s residence and

found the three children by themselves. (BUF ¶ 2). Durand

immediately took the children to the offices of Lassen County

CPS. (BUF ¶ 3). Durand told T. Chapman that McConnell leaving

the children home alone was an ongoing problem and that he had

warned his daughter that he would take to the children to CPS if

she continued to leave them unattended. (TUF ¶ 8).4

 Durand also

told T. Chapman that he was afraid for the children’s safety. 

(TUF ¶ 8). T. Chapman attempted to contact James and Amy

McConnell by telephone four to five times, but could not reach

them. (TUF ¶ 10). James and Amy McConnell came to the CPS

///

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 3 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

office about one hour after Durand had dropped the children off

at CPS. (TUF ¶ 10). 

T. Chapman observed the children at CPS while Durand was

present. (TUF ¶ 11). He observed that they were dirty and

wearing dirty clothes; the nine month old child was fussy and

whining. (TUF ¶ 11). T. Chapman also observed that after the

children were left alone at CPS, they showed no signs of anxiety. 

(TUF ¶ 13). T. Chapman believed that the lack of anxiety around

strangers indicated a potential problem in the home of the

children. (TUF ¶ 14). Female plaintiff A.B. informed T. Chapman

that both her mother and father had left the children on the

morning of May 5, 2003, stating that they would be right back. 

(TUF ¶ 20). Both female minor plaintiffs, A.B. and J.M., told T.

Chapman that they had been told not to open the door for anyone

when left alone and to take the baby into the backroom so that he

could not be heard crying. (TUF ¶ 19). Female plaintiff A.B.

also told T. Chapman that her mother had told her that “what goes

on in the house, stays in the house.” (TUF ¶ 16). Female

plaintiff J.M. reported to T. Chapman that her parents always

left her alone and that she was very afraid during these

occasions. (TUF ¶ 21).

T. Chapman interview McConnell, who informed him that she

believed there was a propane leak in the house and that she had

left that morning to go to the propane company. (Decl. of Terry

Chapman in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“T. Chapman

Decl.”), filed May 8, 2007, ¶ 7). Subsequently, T. Chapman

interviewed James McConnell, who confirmed the existence of a

propane leak. (Id.) T. Chapman also conducted a history search

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 4 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 Plaintiffs “dispute” this fact, asserting that the

computer search was conducted after the detention of the minor

plaintiffs. However, plaintiffs fail to cite any evidence

supporting this proposition. Further, defendant T. Chapman

testified at his deposition that he conducted the computer search

prior to the detention. (Dep. of Terry Chapman (“T. Chapman

Dep.”) at 62:22-63:6).

5

in the child welfare computer system for any prior history of

interventions by other child protective service agencies

throughout the state. (TUF ¶ 32).5 The search showed that the

McConnell family had prior referrals. (TUF ¶ 32). The Kings

County records indicated that James E. McConnell had violated his

probation and been sent to prison for domestic violence. (TUF ¶

32). 

Defendant T. Chapman went to the male minor plaintiff A.B.’s

school and brought him to the CPS office for an interview. (TUF

¶ 15). While at the school, the principal showed T. Chapman

minor plaintiffs’ A.B. and A.B.’s attendance records, which

indicated numerous unexplained absences; male plaintiff A.B. had

been absent 10 days and tardy 15 days between September 2002 and

April 2003, and female plaintiff A.B. had been absent 25 days and

tardy 7 days in the same general time frame. (TUF ¶ 15). The

principal expressed concern to defendant T. Chapman about this

fact. (TUF ¶ 15).

Officer Stevenson-Hibbs of the Susanville Police Department

interviewed male plaintiff A.B., who was seven years old at the

time. (TUF ¶¶ 12, 23). T. Chapman was present during the

interview. (Decl. of Officer Amber Stevenson-Hibbs (“StevensonHibbs Decl.”), filed May 8, 2007, ¶ 3). The officer asked A.B.

whether he knew the difference between the truth and a lie, and

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 5 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 Plaintiffs “dispute” facts relating to statements made

by male plaintiff A.B. to Stevenson-Hibbs and T. Chapman,

asserting that A.B. later admitted that many things he said were

an exaggeration. (TUF ¶¶ 26-31). However, this later

(continued...)

6

plaintiff indicated that he did. (TUF ¶ 24). A.B. told

Stevenson-Hibbs that his mother left him alone with his brother

and sisters almost every day and that he was required to feed and

bathe them. (TUF ¶ 25). He stated that he did not know what to

do when left alone when his nine month old brother became fussy

and began to cry. (TUF ¶ 25). A.B. also told Stevenson-Hibbs

that his mother and father fought a lot. (TUF ¶ 26). He relayed

that one day when his mother was driving, she got into an

argument with James McConnell. (TUF ¶ 26). James McConnell

grabbed the steering wheel, and the car in which they were all

riding almost crashed. (TUF ¶ 26). A.B. also informed the

officer that James McConnell had dumped a bucket of water over

his head as punishment and that James McConnell had grabbed him

by the neck and threw him against the wall. (TUF ¶ 27). A.B.

stated that James McConnell had shown him a drill and told him he

was going to drill him to the wall. (TUF ¶ 28). A.B. reported

that he had been spanked by James McConnell and that the spanking

had left bruises. (TUF ¶ 29). Finally, A.B. reported that James

McConnell had struck him in the face on May 4, 2003. (TUF ¶ 30). 

Stevenson-Hibbs observed a cut by A.B.’s eye. (TUF ¶ 30). A.B.

stated that James McConnell wore a silver ring, which had cut his

face when he was slapped. (TUF ¶ 30). A.B. stated that

plaintiff McConnell rarely hit him. (Stevenson-Hibbs Decl. ¶

6).6

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 6 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6(...continued)

explanation does not does not contradict the asserted facts that

this was the information conveyed at the time the minor

plaintiffs were brought into Lassen County CPS. Moreover,

plaintiffs cite generally to male plaintiff A.B.’s deposition

testimony without providing any specific page or line numbers. 

Such citation fails to comply with Local Rule 56-260(b). 

Further, the court’s independent review of male plaintiff A.B.’s

deposition transcript does not reveal that plaintiff admitted to

exaggerating in the statements made to Stevenson-Hibbs and T.

Chapman. 

7 Defendants object to the Declaration of Amy McConnell,

filed May 22, 2007, on the grounds that it was submitted without

the assertion that it was made under penalty of perjury. On June

15, 2007, plaintiffs filed an amended declaration that was

substantively unchanged, but included the assertion that it was

made under penalty of perjury. Defendants object to the court

considering this belatedly filed amended declaration. Because

plaintiff McConnell’s declaration is substantively unmodified

from the declaration submitted in support of her opposition, 

(continued...)

7

On May 5, 2003, at approximately 1:15 p.m., plaintiffs A.B.,

A.B., J.M., and J.M. were detained and placed into protective

custody. (GUF ¶ 1; TUF ¶ 34). When Durand had first arrived at

CPS, T. Chapman asked him whether he and his wife, Sue Durand,

the biological grandparents of the minor plaintiffs, would be

willing to take the kids. (TUF ¶ 37). Durand responded that he

didn’t believe that they could handle all four children because

of his wife’s illness. (TUF ¶ 37). Subsequently, after Sue

Durand arrived at CPS, Ronald and Sue Durand offered to take the

kids. (TDF ¶ 13; Dep. of Ronald Durand (“R. Durand Dep.”) at

42:20-25). T. Chapman told Durand that they could not have the

children because of the closeness of the relationship between the

Durands and the McConnells. (R. Durand Dep. at 43:5-24). 

McConnell asserts that she told T. Chapman that James McConnell

would leave the household until CPS approved him to return. (Am.

Decl. of Amy McConnell (“McConnell Dep.”), filed June 15, 2007).7

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 7 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

(...continued)

defendants will not be prejudiced, and their objection is

overruled. 

8 Plaintiffs “dispute” this fact on the basis that

“[t]his is a common resolution of domestic abuse.” Plaintiffs

cite no evidence in support of this assertion, nor is it clear

how this statement raises a triable issue regarding defendants’

evidence.

8

T. Chapman cannot recall that James McConnell offered to leave

the family residence. (TUF ¶ 54). However, based upon the

information he had received regarding prior and current issues of

domestic violence involving Amy McConnell and male plaintiff A.B.

and that Amy McConnell continued to stay with her husband, T.

Chapman believes that this would not have been a reasonable

alternative to detention because there was no certainty that

James McConnell would stay away from the home. (TUF ¶ 54).8 T.

Chapman also felt that the McConnells would leave the children

alone in the home again, where there was the danger of an ongoing

gas leak. (TUF ¶ 55). T. Chapman and McConnell discussed the

possibility of placing the children with her brother in Alaska,

but both agreed that the location would prevent visitation and

hinder the reunification process. (TUF ¶ 38). T. Chapman also

discussed with McConnell the possibility of placing the children

with her aunt in Yuba City, but both agreed that the location was

too distant to foster the goals of visitation and reunification

and McConnell did not feel her aunt could properly care for her

children. (TUF ¶ 41). T. Chapman believed the optimal placement

was a home in Lassen County where the children could remain

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 8 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 Plaintiffs “dispute” this fact, asserting that T.

Chapman completely failed to consider relative placement. 

However, plaintiffs’ admission that, at the very least, McConnell

and T. Chapman considered placement with McConnell’s brother

belies this general and unsupported assertion.

9

together and be close enough to visit with one or both parents. 

(TUF ¶ 43).9

Lassen County does not license foster homes, but uses the

services of a Foster Family Agency. (TUF ¶ 44). T. Chapman

called two of these agencies, looking for a home that could care

for all four children. (TUF ¶ 44). He chose the Coy home in

Doyle, which had been certified through defendant EA. (TUF ¶

45). 

On May 8, 2003, the children were detained by order of a

Lassen County Superior Judge. (GUF ¶ 3). Plaintiff McConnell

and her husband James McConnell were represented by counsel, and

counsel was appointed for the children. (TDF ¶ 32). McConnell

asserts that she was not allowed to obtain separate counsel and

that the obvious conflict between her and her husband was ignored

at that time by the court and counsel. (TUF ¶ 48). On May 19,

2003, at the jurisdictional hearing, McConnell requested separate

counsel and the court appointed McConnell her own attorney. (GUF

¶ 4; TUF ¶ 50). McConnell contends that she was never given an

opportunity to confer with her counsel prior to the hearing, and

therefore, the appointment of counsel was ineffective. (GUF ¶

4). On June 23, 2003, McConnell pled no contest to one count of

child endangerment, a violation of Welfare and Institutions Code

§ 300(b). (GUF ¶ 5). McConnell asserts that she was coerced

into the plea. (GUF ¶ 5). On August 12, 2003, James McConnell

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 9 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 On May 14, 2007, the court filed a memorandum and

order, granting defendant Barbara Coy’s motion for summary

judgment as to plaintiffs’ sole claim against her for negligence. 

(Mem. & Order, Docket # 146, filed May 14, 2007). Hank Coy was

not named as a defendant in this action. 

10

pled no contest to violations of Welfare and Institutions Code §§

300 (a) and 300(b). (TUF ¶ 52). Jurisdiction was terminated on

December 6, 2004. (TUF ¶ 53). 

On August 12, 2003, T. Chapman prepared a case plan. (TUF ¶

57). McConnell and her husband signed the plan, acknowledging

that they had participated in the plan’s development and that

they agreed to participate in the services outlined in the plan. 

(TUF ¶ 57). McConnell contends that she was coerced into signing

the case plan because CPS threatened that if she did not sign the

case plan, she would never get her children back in her custody. 

(TUF ¶ 57). 

Plaintiffs A.B., A.B., J.M., and J.M. were placed at the

home of defendant Barbara Coy and Hank Coy10 on or about May 5,

2003 until September 29, 2003. (GUF ¶ 6). Defendant EA

certified the family home operated by the Coys from June 1, 1995

until November 11, 2003. (EUF ¶ 5). EA is a non-profit

corporation and foster family agency that recruits and certifies

foster family homes in Lassen County, conducts background checks

of prospective foster parents and verifies that homes are safe

and acceptable for the placement of foster children. (EUF ¶¶ 1,

3-4, 13). EA conducts training of its prospective foster parents

regarding how they should properly discharge their duties as

foster parents and provides professional support to foster

parents. (EUF ¶¶ 5, 12). EA also conducts visits to foster

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 10 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 Plaintiffs “dispute” defendant’s facts that are based

upon defendant Coy’s deposition testimony and declaration on the

grounds that such statements lack credibility. However,

plaintiffs cannot sufficiently raise a triable issue of fact

simply by raising issues regarding the credibility of defendant’s

evidence. See Nat’l Union Fire. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1983).

11

homes to ensure that the needs of the foster parents and the

foster children are met and to ensure that continued placement in

a particular home is in the best interests of the foster parents

and the foster children. (EUF ¶ 15). However, foster family

agencies such as EA do not provide daily care for foster

children. (EUF ¶ 11). The daily care and supervision of foster

children, such as the minor plaintiffs, is provided by foster

parents. (EUF ¶ 12).

The Coys had approximately 17 foster children in their home

during their tenure as foster parents. (EUF ¶ 63).11 EA’s

certification of the Coys as foster parents included a criminal

background check of both Barbara and Hank Coy; prior to Hank

Coy’s conviction for his conduct involving female plaintiff J.M.,

neither of the Coys had ever been convicted of a felony. (EUF ¶¶

64-65). In the year prior to her husband’s arrest, Barbara Coy

did not observe any conduct or behavior by her husband that

caused her to think that Hank Coy could endanger the safety of

the children. (EUF ¶ 66). Nor did she have any reason to

believe that her husband would engage in inappropriate sexual

acts toward a child. (EUF ¶ 67). None of the three oldest minor

plaintiffs ever told Barbara Coy that they did not want to be

left alone with Hank Coy or that he touched them in a way they

///

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 11 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 Plaintiffs “dispute” defendant’s facts that are based

upon defendant Coy’s deposition testimony and declaration on the

grounds that such statements lack credibility. However,

plaintiffs cannot sufficiently raise a triable issue of fact

simply by raising issues regarding the credibility of defendant’s

evidence. See Nat’l Union Fire. Ins. Co., 701 F.2d at 97. 

12

did not like. (EUF ¶ 72).12 Until the time that her husband

admitted to sexually molesting female plaintiff J.M. on or about

September 28, 2003, Barbara Coy never told anyone at EA or CPS

that she thought Hank Coy might be engaging in inappropriate

sexual activity toward any child. (EUF ¶ 68). Nor did Barbara

Coy inform EA that she thought her husband was developing early

symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease. (EUF ¶ 73). Plaintiffs are not

aware of any evidence that EA had knowledge of the propensity of

Hank Coy to engage in acts of sexual molestation or abuse prior

to the time that the minor plaintiffs were placed in the Coy

home. (EUF ¶ 78).

The EA social worker assigned to the Coy foster family

during the time that the minor plaintiffs resided there was Judie

Oliviera (“Oliviera”). (EUF ¶ 23). Oliviera received a

bachelor’s degree in child development and social work from

Humboldt University in June 1989. (EUF ¶ 29). From 1989 to

2001, Oliviera worked as a social worker for Lassen County CPS. 

(EUF ¶ 31). She commenced her employment with EA in 2001. (EUF

¶ 32). On May 7, 2003, Oliviera prepared Needs and Services

Plans for each of the four children. (EUF ¶ 26). Oliviera

documented ten visits and at least six telephone calls to the Coy

foster family home during the period of May 5, 2003 to September

29, 2003, as part of her duties. (EUF ¶ 24).

///

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 12 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

While Oliviera worked at EA, she looked for behaviors of a

child to determine whether that child was molested, such as

whether the child was overprotective or withdrawn. (EUF ¶ 37). 

Oliviera observed the McConnell children “act out” prior to being

informed that the female plaintiff J.M. had been molested, but

she did not believe the behavior was evidence of molestation

occurring in the Coy home. (EUF ¶ 38). Specifically, Barbara

Coy told Oliviera that J.M. had kicked Hank Coy. (EUF ¶ 41). 

Oliviera told Coy that this behavior sounded like symptoms of

child molestation and that she thought the children had probably

been molested before they were placed in foster care. (Dep. of

Barbara Coy (“Coy Dep.”) at 99:8-100:11). In response, Oliviera

went to the Coy home, observed the children, and talked to the

children. (EUF ¶ 42). Oliviera believed that J.M. struck Hank

Coy because she had been suspended from school because of her

behavior and was taking her frustration out on the foster parent. 

(EUF ¶ 46). Oliviera did not observe anything which caused her

to believe that any of the minor plaintiffs were being molested

at the Coy home. (EUF ¶ 47). Oliviera spoke to T. Chapman about

J.M.’s behavior. They discussed that when children start

visiting with their biological parents and then return to their

foster parent, children may begin to act out, no matter how good

the foster parent is. (EUF ¶ 45).

On or about September 29, 2003, Hank Coy confessed that he

molested female plaintiff J.M. (See EUF ¶ 27). Hank Coy was

arrested for the sexual abuse of J.M. and is currently

incarcerated on these charges. (See Mem. & Order, Docket # 146,

filed May 14, 2007, at 4). Female plaintiff A.B. also asserts

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 13 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

that Hank Coy molested her. (Dep. of female plaintiff A.B.

(“F.A.B. Dep.”) at 52:3-5).

On September 29, 2003, defendant Griffith became the CPS

social worker for McConnell and the minor plaintiffs. (GUF ¶ 9). 

Prior to this, Griffith had no involvement in plaintiffs’ CPS

case. (GUF ¶ 11). Upon assignment of the case, Griffith

reviewed the CPS file, which included the Case Plan signed by

McConnell. (GUF ¶¶ 12-13). On September 29, 2003, Griffith

placed the children in the home of their maternal grandparents,

the Durands. (GUF ¶ 14). She remained the social worker

assigned to the McConnell family until she was transferred to

another department on February 15, 2004. (GUF ¶ 15). While the

minor plaintiffs were at the Durand home, Griffith documented

that she saw the children in person on sixteen separate

occasions, and she spoke to the children and the Durands

regularly. (GUF ¶¶ 16-17). Griffith filed one court report

while she was plaintiffs’ social worker, a Six-Months Status

Review Report filed on January 5, 2004. (GUF ¶ 18).

Griffith also had regular contact with McConnell. (GUF ¶

19). She was kept apprised of McConnell’s progress in completing

her Case Plan through correspondence with and telephone calls

from staff from Lassen County Alcohol and Drug and Lassen County

Mental Health. (GUF ¶ 20). The completion of the

responsibilities outlined in the Case Plan determined whether

McConnell would be eligible to regain custody of her children. 

(GUF ¶ 21). Griffith asserts that on several occasions,

McConnell failed to attend her children’s mental health

appointments or school events after promising them that she would

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 14 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

attend. (GUF ¶ 24). Griffith asserts that McConnell also missed

some of her scheduled phone and in-person visits with her

children. (GUF ¶ 25). Further, Griffith contends that McConnell

frequently chose not to attend her Drug and Alcohol classes and

mental health appointments while Griffith was her social worker. 

(GUF ¶ 26). McConnell maintains that she only missed

appointments if she was at work and couldn’t leave or if CPS

didn’t give her notice of a last minute visit. (McConnell

Decl.).

On November 10, 2005, plaintiffs filed their Second Amended

Complaint, the operative pleading in this matter. Plaintiffs

bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations for their

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as state law

claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress,

negligence, and breach of contract. 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 15 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

id. at 251-52.

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 16 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation

to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224,

1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 17 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 It is undisputed that each member of the Board of

Supervisors is being sued in his personal capacity. (BUF ¶ 30). 

14 Plaintiffs clarified in their opposition that “[t]he

basis of the claims against the Board of Supervisors are

constitutional deprivations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Pls.’ Am.

Opp’n to Def. Board’s Mot. for Summ. J., filed May 22, 2007, at

10). In light of this clarification and plaintiffs’ failure to

address the merits of any state claims against these defendants,

to the extent that plaintiffs’ complaint alleged any state tort

claims, the Board defendants’ motion for summary judgment

regarding such claims is GRANTED. 

18

ANALYSIS

I. Defendant Board of Supervisors

Plaintiffs bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the

individual members of the Lassen County Board of Supervisors,

defendants Hanson, Dahle, Keefer, Pyle, and J. Chapman

(collectively, the “Board defendants”), in their personal

capacities13 for alleged violations of plaintiffs’ Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights.14 Plaintiffs assert that the Board

defendants had an official policy of deliberate indifference to

the constitutional rights of person whose children were taken

into custody by Child Protective Services. (Pls.’ Am. Opp’n to

Def. Board’s Mot. for Summ. J., filed May 22, 2007, at 3). 

Specifically, plaintiffs content that the Board defendants

“involved themselves in the affirmative rejection of the

recommendations of the Grand Jury and their refusal to set in

place those actions that would result in the compliance of the

CPS directly caused” plaintiffs’ injuries. (Id. at 4). The

Board defendants assert that they are entitled to absolute

legislative immunity for their actions. 

It is well settled that “state and regional legislators are

entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 18 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

their legislative activities.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S.

44, 49 (1998) (finding that the defendants were absolutely immune

from suit where the alleged unlawful conduct included voting for

an ordinance, introducing a budget, and signing an ordinance into

law). However, “[a]bsolute immunity applies only when

legislators act in their legislative capacities, not in their

administrative or executive capacities.” Chateaubriand v.

Gaspard, 97 F.3d 1218, 1220 (9th Cir. 1996). “Whether an act is

legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the

motive or intent of the official performing it.” Kaahumanu v.

County of Maui, 315 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Ninth Circuit has set out a four factor analysis for

determining whether an act is legislative for the purposes of

establishing absolute immunity. See id. at 1220. The court must

consider: 

“(1) whether the act involves ad hoc decisionmaking, or the

formulation of policy; (2) whether the act applies to a few

individuals, or to the public at large; (3) whether the act

is formally legislative in character; and (4) whether it

bears all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.” 

Id. at 1220 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “The

Supreme Court has generally been quite sparing in its recognition

of claims to absolute official immunity.” Id. at 1219-20

(internal quotations omitted).

The gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint against the Board

defendants is that their deliberate failure to act to remedy

deficiencies in Lassen County CPS, such as inadequately trained

social workers, amounted to an official policy of operating a

non-compliant CPS and of deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights. (See Amy McConnell’s Answers to Def.

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 19 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 The answers to numerous interrogatories provide:

As a Supervisor, [defendant] was required to vote and

make provision for the acts and omissions of CPS. He

is one of the persons who sets policy and adopts the

acts and failures to act of the employees of Lassen

County as policy by taking no action. He had knowledge

of the prior litigation involving CPS. He also had

prior knowledge of Grand Jury reports. His adoption of

policy because of actions or failure to act have a

direct relationship to the damages done to Amy

McConnell and her minor children.

Id. (emphasis added).

20

Board’s Interrogatories, Exs. C-G to Decl. of Kathleen J.

Williams in Supp. of Def. Board’s Mot. for Summ. J., filed May 8,

2007).15 As such, the conduct complained of by plaintiffs, by

their own allegations and argument, involve the formulation of

policy. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55-56 (holding that legislative

immunity applied because the local officials’ actions “reflected

a discretionary, policymaking decision implicating the city’s

budgetary interest”); cf. Kaahumanu, 315 F.3d at 1220 (finding

that the Council’s decision was ad hoc because it was based upon

the circumstances of the particular case); Trevino v. Gates, 23

F.3d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the Board’s

decision to indemnify specific punitive damages awards against

certain police officers did not involve the formulation of

policy). Moreover, by plaintiffs’ own assertions, the alleged

policy of inaction did not target a few specific individuals, but

rather, affected CPS, its employees, the children taken into

custody and parents of those children. See id. Therefore, the

policy at issue affected the public at large.

The remaining factors, whether the act was formally

legislative in character and whether it bears all the hallmarks

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 20 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

of traditional legislation, are difficult to apply in this case

because plaintiffs’ complaint arises out of the alleged

deliberate refusal of Board defendants to adopt policy. Thus,

the conduct complained of is a failure to act. However, if Board

defendants acted on the Grand Jury’s recommendation and attempted

to reform CPS by establishing new training, supervision, or

discipline requirements, such conduct would involve votes. Such

involvement is presumed since, as members of a legislative body,

Board defendants can only act through their votes. Hart v. Baca,

204 F.R.D. 456, 459 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Therefore, because any

affirmative conduct regarding policy changes to Lassen County CPS

would be formally legislative in nature, the deliberate choice

not to adopt such policies is considered likewise. See id.

(holding that defendant supervisors were entitled to absolute

legislative immunity for the actions they took or failed to take

regarding the failure to adequately train, supervise, and

discipline sheriff’s deputies). Further, defendants’ alleged

deliberate refusal to reform Lassen County CPS is a

discretionary, policymaking decision that has prospective

implications and implicates budgetary concerns. As such, the

alleged act (or failure to act) bears all the hallmarks of

traditional legislation. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55-56; cf.

Kaahumanu, 315 F.3d at 1223.

Because defendants’ alleged conduct in deliberately refusing

to set in place actions that would result in the creation of a

compliant Lassen County CPS was a policy decision that affected

the public at large and because such conduct was formally

legislative in nature and bears the hallmarks of traditional

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 21 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 Plaintiffs fail to present any evidence that Board

defendants’ administrative acts caused their alleged harm. On a

motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion

that acts are administrative, not legislative, is insufficient to

raise a triable issue of fact.

17 Defendant asserts that defendant Griffith was dismissed

from plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim pursuant to a motion to dismiss the First Amended

Complaint. Plaintiff does not contest this assertion. However,

for the sake of completeness, the court will address both of

plaintiffs’ state law claims against defendant Griffith. 

22

legislation, Board defendants are entitled to absolute

legislative immunity for their alleged conduct.16 Therefore,

Board defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is GRANTED. 

II. Defendant Loel Griffith

Plaintiff Amy McConnell brings a claim against defendant

Loel Griffith under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her

Fourteenth Amendment rights, and all plaintiffs bring claims

under California state law for negligence in failing to fulfil a

mandatory duty and intentional infliction of emotional

distress.17 Defendant Griffith contends that summary judgment

should be granted because none of the plaintiffs’ allegations of

wrongdoing or injury can be attributed to defendant’s actions.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In order to establish her claim under § 1983, plaintiff

McConnell must demonstrate that defendant Griffith (1) acted

under color of state law, and (2) deprived plaintiffs of a right

secured under the Constitution or federal statutes. Gibson v.

United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff McConnell asserts that defendant Griffith violated

her Fourteenth Amendment rights to familial association through

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 22 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18 Defendant Griffith objects to the submitted case plan

as not properly authenticated. The court does not address

defendant’s objection because even if the court considers such

evidence, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

23

the continued, unjustified detention of the children after

Griffith was appointed as the social worker for the McConnell

family. It is well-settled that the Fourteenth Amendment

protects the right of parents and children to live together

without governmental interference. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d

1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). As such, parents

and children cannot “be separated by the state without due

process of law except in an emergency.” Id. at 1136-37. 

Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Griffith violated her

constitutional rights by creating a case plan, failing to get the

signature and approval of McConnell, and then holding any

sessions that McConnell allegedly missed against McConnell. (Am.

Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. of Griffith, Docket # 170, filed May

23, 2007, at 2). The case plan identified by plaintiff as

problematic is a case plan dated March 15, 2004. (Id. at 2). It

is undisputed that Griffith was the social worker assigned to the

McConnell family until February 15, 2004. (GUF ¶ 15). As such,

defendant ceased to be the assigned social worker on the case one

month before the case plan was signed. Moreover, on the copy of

the case plan submitted by plaintiff,18 the social worker whose

name and signature appear on the document is Tamara Chandler, not

Loel Griffith. (Ex. 3 to Decl. of Treva J. Hearne in Opp’n to

Griffith’s Mot. (“G. Hearne Decl.”), filed May 23, 2007). 

Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to proffer any evidence that

///

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 23 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19 Plaintiff cites to Exhibit 1, which Treva J. Hearne

declared are the investigation reports and service logs found in

the court files of the Lassen County Superior Court. Citation to

this exhibit makes little sense in the context of plaintiff’s

argument. However, in the preceding paragraph of her opposition,

(Opp’n at 2), plaintiff mis-cited to the case plan as Exhibit 1,

although the case plan was filed as Exhibit 3 to the Declaration

of Treva J. Hearne. As such, the court assumes plaintiff was

attempting to cite to the case plan. 

24

defendant Griffith was responsible for any alleged conduct

relating to the case plan prepared on March 15, 2004. 

Plaintiff also asserts that the children were separated and

placed in two different foster homes. Plaintiff offers no

evidence in support of this assertion and fails to identify when

such separation occurred or how defendant Griffith was involved

in the separation. Plaintiff merely cites to the Case Plan

prepared on or about March 15, 2004, which was signed by another

social worker.19 Rather, the status report submitted to the

court by Loel Griffith, dated January 5, 2004, indicates that, at

that time, the minor plaintiffs were all placed with their

maternal grandparents, the Durands. (Status Report, Ex. B to

Decl. of Loel Griffith (“Griffith Decl.”), filed May 8, 2007).

Although plaintiff primarily references allegations relating

to the case plan and the separation of the children in her

opposition, the gravamen of plaintiff McConnell’s claim against

defendant Griffith is that Griffith violated her rights to

familial association through the continued, unjustified detention

of the children. However, at the time that Griffith became the

social worker for the McConnell family, the children were under

the jurisdiction of the Lassen County Juvenile Court, which on

May 8, 2003, in response to the Juvenile Dependency Petition, had

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 24 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

ordered detention of the children at a suitable place or home and

in the custody of Lassen County CPS. (See Lassen County Order of

Detention, Ex. A to Def. Griffith’s Request for Judicial Notice,

filed May 8, 2007); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300 (West 2007). 

Section 303 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code

provides that “[t]he court may retain jurisdiction over any

person who is found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court

until the ward or dependent child attains the age of 21 years.” 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 303. However, “[a] judge of the

juvenile court in which a petition was filed . . . may dismiss

the petition if the court finds that the interests of justice and

the welfare of the minor require the dismissal . . . .” Cal.

Welf. & Inst. Code § 390. As such, as a social worker, defendant

Griffith did not have the unilateral authority to return the

children to plaintiff McConnell. Further, “social workers enjoy

absolute, quasi-judicial immunity when making post-adjudication

custody decisions pursuant to valid court order.” Mabe v. San

Bernardino County, 237 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001). 

However, to the extent that plaintiff McConnell contends

that the one document Griffith submitted to the court during her

tenure as the family’s social worker violated her Fourteenth

Amendment rights, such argument also fails. In the status

report, dated January 5, 2004, Griffith recommends that the

reunification services to plaintiff Amy McConnell and James

McConnell be terminated. (Status Report at 1). This

recommendation was made on the basis that McConnell had current

criminal charges pending, she was being evicted from the family

house, and that many of the items in the case plan remained

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 25 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20 Defendant Griffith objects to the submitted records as

not properly authenticated and containing inadmissible hearsay. 

The court does not address defendant’s objection because even if

the court considers such evidence, plaintiff has failed to raise

a triable issue of fact. 

26

unfinished and in progress. (Status Report at 14). The report

also noted that McConnell had three positive drug screens with

Lassen County Children and Family Services: (1) on September 18,

2003, she tested positive for opiates, methamphetamine, and THC;

(2) on November 11, 2003, she tested positive for

methamphetamine; and (3) on November 21, 2003, she tested

positive for opiates and did not show proof of a prescription for

Vicodin. (Status Report at 11). 

Plaintiff argues that none of the drug tests performed on

McConnell by CPS or Lassen County was done properly.20 She

argues that defendant violated her constitutional rights by not

providing this exculpatory evidence. However, the testimony

cited to by plaintiffs does not support the broad assertion that

no drug test was done properly. The service logs, prepared by

Lassen County, provide that on September 18, the swab test was

invalid due to the lack of saliva, but showed positive for

methamphetamine. (Ex. 1 to G. Hearne Decl. at 8). On September

19, 2003, although the urine dip test was negated, an oral swab

showed that McConnell tested positive for opiates, amphetamines,

and THC. (Id. at 9). The last date covered by the status

reports referenced by plaintiff is September 15, 2003. (Id. at

10). As such, there is no evidence disputing the administration

of the November 2003 drug tests. Plaintiff’s assertion that the

drug tests were improperly performed is without evidentiary

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 26 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21 Further, even if such claims could be substantiated,

defendant Griffith would be entitled to absolute immunity from

the claim that she submitted false of incomplete documents to the

juvenile court. See e.g. Beltran v. Santa Clara County, – F.3d

–,No. 05-16976, 2007 WL 1805559 (9th Cir. Jun. 25, 2007) (holding

that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity for

verified statements in petitions filed with a dependency court,

including dependency and custody petitions); Doe v. Lebbos, 348

F.3d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 2003) (failure to investigate possible

exculpatory evidence and fabricated evidence); Mabe, 237 F.3d at

1109 (social worker alleged to have improperly conducted the

investigation and falsified evidence in juvenile court

proceedings); Hennessey v. State of Wash., Dep’t of Soc. & Health

Serv., 627 F. Supp. 137, 140 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (caseworker

allegedly divulged false and misleading information to county

prosecutor, prompting initiation of child dependency

proceedings). 

27

support. Therefore, her claims regarding defendant’s failure to

disclose this information are without merit.21 

Moreover, the court notes that plaintiff Amy McConnell

testified at her deposition that she had no complaints about

defendant Loel Griffith. (GUF ¶ 34). The court finds it

troubling that plaintiff continues to press claims against a

defendant that she testified, under penalty of perjury, she has

no complaints against. However, for the reasons set forth above,

defendant Griffith’s motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiff McConnell’s claims for violation of her Fourteenth

Amendment rights is GRANTED.

In her opposition, plaintiff asserts for the first time that

defendant Griffith delayed in getting J.M. medical care after she

was molested by Hank Coy. Plaintiff contends that this delay

prevented diagnosis of the extent of the sexual molestation. 

Even under liberal notice pleading standards, plaintiffs did not

allege a claim against Griffith in their complaint based upon the

failure to promptly provide medical service. Rather, the crux of

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 27 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22 See Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d

895, 910 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that when issues are raised in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment which are outside the

scope of the complaint, the court should construe the opposition

as a motion to amend the pleadings). 

28

plaintiff McConnell’s claim is that defendant failed to return

the children to her after defendant became the McConnell’s social

worker.

Even if the court construes plaintiff’s assertion of a new

theory as a motion to amend their complaint,22 plaintiff has not

shown “good cause” to amend the pleading under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 16(b), as is required by the court’s Pretrial

Scheduling Order. (Pretrial Scheduling Order, Docket # 59, filed

Apr. 18, 2006). The good cause requirement of Rule 16 primarily

considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. See

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th

Cir. 1992). When the proposed modification is an amendment to

the pleadings, the moving party may establish good cause by

showing “(1) that [he or she] was diligent in assisting the court

in creating a workable Rule 16 order; (2) that [his or her]

noncompliance with a rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur,

notwithstanding [his or her] diligent efforts to comply, because

of the development of matters which could not have been

reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16

scheduling conference; and (3) that [he or she] was diligent in

seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent

that [he or she] could not comply with the order.” Jackson v.

Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (citations

omitted). Whether or not defendant Griffith promptly obtained

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 28 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

medical care for J.M. after the sexual abuse is a fact that has

not changed since the filing of the complaint. To the extent

that facts were obtained in discovery which led to the assertion

of this theory, plaintiff does not identify when such facts were

obtained, nor does she contend that amendment of the complaint

was requested promptly after the plaintiff obtained such

knowledge. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate “good

cause” to add a claim based upon defendant Griffith’s alleged

failure to provide prompt medical care. 

Furthermore, even if such “good cause” could be

demonstrated, in order to successfully amend the complaint,

plaintiff would also have to show that leave to amend is

warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) which

states “leave [to amend] is to be freely given when justice so

requires.” Plaintiff has failed to proffer any argument that the

interests of justice require granting plaintiffs leave to amend

their complaint at this late stage in the proceedings when all

discovery has closed and the deadline for filing dispositive

motions has passed. Moreover, plaintiff McConnell has failed to

allege how defendant’s alleged failure to promptly provide

medical care to J.M. violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to

familial association. As such, the court does not consider the

merits of this claim. 

B. California State Law Claims

Plaintiffs allege that defendant Griffith was negligent in

her performance of mandatory duties and that she intentionally

inflicted emotional distress upon them. Defendant Griffith

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 29 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23 Plaintiffs utterly fail to respond to defendant

Griffith’s contention that they failed to timely comply with the

California Tort Claims Act. Such silence could be interpreted as

a non-opposition to defendant’s argument. However, for the sake

of completeness, the court will address the issue herein.

30

contends that plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed for failure to

comply with the California Tort Claims Act.23

In order to state a tort claim against a public entity, the

California Torts Claim Act requires “the timely presentation of a

written claim and the rejection of the claim in whole or in

part.” Mabe v. San Bernardino County, 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th

Cir. 2001) (quoting Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 67 F.3d

1470 (9th Cir. 1995)). Tort claims such as the instant claims

for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence

are not listed among the exceptions to § 905. Moreover, under

California Government Code § 945.4, 

no suit for money or damages may be brought against a

public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is

required to by presented in accordance with Chapter 1

(commencing with section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing

with section 910) of Part 3 of this division until a

written claim therefore has been presented to the

public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or

has been deemed to have been rejected by the board.

Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4 (West 2007). Finally, under California

Government Code § 950.2, any suit against a public employee is

barred in cases where a plaintiff’s action against the agency is

barred for failure to present a claim. Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2

(West 2007). The 1965 Amendment to § 950.2 makes it clear that

“the presentation of a claim to the employing public entity is a

prerequisite to suit against an employee.” Id. Claims relating

to personal injury must be filed no later than six months after

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 30 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24 Plaintiffs also allege that defendant did not provide

adequate reunification services. (Compl. ¶ 104). However,

plaintiffs do not argue the merits of this allegation in their

opposition or provide any evidence to support this claim. As

such the court deems this claim waived by plaintiffs.

31

the accrual of the cause of action. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2

(West 2007). 

Plaintiffs’ claims were filed on December 16, 2004 and

January 21, 2005, at least ten months after defendant Griffith

ceased to be plaintiffs’ social worker on February 15, 2004. 

Further, defendant Griffith was not named in any of the claims

filed by plaintiffs. As such, plaintiffs have failed to comply

with the California Tort Claims Act.

However, even if plaintiffs had complied with the procedural

prerequisites to bringing their tort claims, they have failed to

produce any evidence that defendant Griffith acted negligently or

intentionally inflicted emotional distress. In their complaint,

plaintiffs assert that defendant Griffith failed to prepare a

case plan within sixty days of the minor children being taken

into custody. (Compl. ¶¶ 97, 104). Defendant Griffith was not

the social worker for the McConnell family until September 29,

2003, five months after the children were detained. Therefore,

she had no duty to prepare the initial case plan for the

McConnell family.24 Plaintiffs also allege that defendant had a

mandatory duty to give preference to a family member who could

take care of the children. (Compl. ¶ 98). However, the evidence

produced by the parties indicate that the minor children were

placed with their maternal grandparents during defendant’s tenure

as their social worker. 

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 31 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25 Plaintiffs cite Parkes v. County of San Diego in

support of their argument that defendant Griffith violated § 309. 

345 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1084 (S.D. Cal. 2004). However, in Parkes, the court discussed § 309 in it analysis of the plaintiffs’

claims relating to the pre-hearing detention. In this case,

plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Griffith relate to the posthearing detention. Further, the court in Parkes found that

defendant social worker was entitled to immunity. 

26 Plaintiffs also allege that defendant Griffith failed

to perform a mandatory duty under § 387 of the Cal. Welf. & Inst.

Code, which relates to supplemental petitions to modify a

previous order removing a child from the physical custody of a

parent. (Compl. ¶ 104). As an initial matter, it is unclear

what duty this section allegedly imposed upon defendant Griffith. 

Moreover, plaintiffs do not argue the merits of this allegation

in their opposition or provide any evidence to support this

claim. 

32

Plaintiffs further allege that defendant Griffith failed to

comply with the provisions of § 309 of the California Welfare and

Institutions Code, requiring release of a detained child unless

there is an immediate and urgent need to continue the detention

and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be

protected at home.25 (Compl. ¶ 104); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §

309. However, § 309 imposes this duty upon the social worker of

a child who has been taken into temporary custody, i.e. detention

of a child without a warrant. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§

305, 309. At the time that defendant Griffith was the McConnell

family’s social worker, the Lassen County Juvenile Court had

ordered the detention of the minor plaintiffs. As such, § 309

does not apply to defendant Griffith.26 

Finally, for the reasons set forth above in the court’s

discussion of plaintiff McConnell’s Fourteenth Amendment claim

and plaintiffs’ negligence claim, plaintiffs have failed to set

forth any evidence of conduct by defendant Griffith that

intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon plaintiffs. The

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 32 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27 In her complaint, plaintiff McConnell makes numerous,

vague references to other conduct by defendants T. Chapman,

Lassen County, Loel Griffith, and Margaret Crosby that allegedly

deprived her of procedural and substantive due process. (See

e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 72-75). The court does not address these

allegations herein as plaintiff does not raise these theories in

her opposition to the motions, and therefore, the court deems

these claims waived. 

Moreover, the gravamen of plaintiff’s claims are that she

was deprived of here fundamental right to familial relations due

to the detention of her children. The court discusses these

claims infra. 

28 While plaintiff McConnell’s claim is brought pursuant

to the Fourteenth Amendment and the minor plaintiffs’ claims are

brought pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the standard under

which these claims must be assessed are the same, and thus the

court addresses them together. See Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 827 n.9.

33

court again notes that plaintiff testified that she has no

complaints against defendant Griffith. (GUF ¶ 34).

Therefore, defendant Griffith’s motion for summary judgment

regarding plaintiffs’ state law claims is GRANTED. 

III. Defendant Terry Chapman

Plaintiffs bring claims against defendant Terry Chapman

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights and under California state law for

negligence in failing to fulfil a mandatory duty and intentional

infliction of emotional distress.27

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendant T. Chapman contends that summary judgment should

be granted regarding plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims because there have

been no constitutional violations. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out

of the removal and detention of the minor children.28 

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 33 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

1. Pre-hearing Detention

Plaintiffs allege that defendant T. Chapman violated their

constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

because defendant T. Chapman detained the minor plaintiffs

without a warrant. It is well-established that parents and

children cannot “be separated by the state without due process of

law except in an emergency.” Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1136-37. 

“Officials may remove a child from the custody of its parent

without prior judicial authorization only if the information they

possess at the time of the seizure is such as provides reasonable

cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious

bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably

necessary to avert that specific injury.” Id. at 1138. 

Defendant T. Chapman asserts that the minor plaintiffs were

removed without a warrant because of exigent circumstances. 

Defendant also asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity

for his conduct.

a. Violation of a Constitutional Right 

Defendant’s initial contact with the children was made when

Durand brought the children into Lassen County CPS on May 5,

2003. Durand informed defendant that three of the children, ages

nine-months-old, six-years-old, and four-years-old, were left

unattended, and that this was an ongoing problem about which he

had confronted plaintiff McConnell previously. Durand also told

defendant that he was afraid for the children’s safety. T.

Chapman observed that the children were dirty and wearing dirty

clothes. Both minor female plaintiffs confirmed that they had

been left alone, and female plaintiff J.M. told defendant that

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 34 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35

her parents always left her alone and that she was afraid. When

T. Chapman interviewed McConnell, she informed him that there was

a propane leak in the house, a fact later confirmed by James

McConnell. A history search in the child welfare computer system

revealed that the McConnell family had prior referrals. T.

Chapman’s interview with A.B. and A.B’s principal revealed

numerous unexplained absences and tardiness within an eight month

period. Furthermore, male plaintiff A.B. stated in his interview

with Stevenson-Hibbs that James McConnell had previously poured a

bucket of water over his head, grabbed him by the neck, threw him

against the wall, threatened him with a drill, spanked him so

hard that it left bruises, and, the day before, struck him in the

face and left a cut around his eye. That same afternoon, the

minor plaintiffs were detained and taken into protective custody.

In support of their claims, plaintiffs attempt to offer as

evidence a memo, allegedly written by defendant T. Chapman to his

supervisor, in which defendant admits that he was negligent in

his removal of the children. (Ex. A to Ex. 16 to Hearne Decl.). 

Exhibit A purports to be this memo, dated and written on Lassen

County Health and Human Services Department letterhead, from T.

Chapman to Bill Jost. The memo identifies both the author and

recipient and contains a signature above T. Chapman’s name. 

However, this proffered evidence lacks foundation because

plaintiffs have failed to submit an affidavit from T. Chapman

stating that he wrote the memo. See Orr v. Bank of America, 285

F.3d 764, 777 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that a memo submitted in

support of summary judgment was inadmissible because plaintiff

had failed to submit an affidavit from the alleged author that he

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 35 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36

had in fact authored the document). Rather, plaintiffs attempt

to authenticate this memo through the declaration of Deborah

Henson, a CPS supervisor who was allegedly copied on the memo. 

(Ex. 16 to Hearne Decl.). Henson’s declaration does not lay a

foundation for Ex. A because Henson neither wrote the memo nor

witnessed T. Chapman do so. See id. Further, defendant T.

Chapman has submitted the declarations of two experts, both of

whom opine that the purported memo is not genuine. (Decl. of

David S. Moore, filed May 8, 2007; Decl. of Alan M. Perlman,

filed May 8, 2007). Plaintiffs offer no evidence that supports

the authenticity of this memo. Therefore, the purported memo is

not admissible evidence, and the court will not consider it in

ruling upon the motions for summary judgment.

Defendants contend that T. Chapman had reasonable cause to

believe that male plaintiff A.B. was being physically abused by

James McConnell. See Lebbos, 348 F.3d at 827 (finding that the

defendant social worker did not violate the plaintiffs’

constitutional rights by detaining the child prior to her

detention hearing based upon observation of redness, the child’s

complaints of pain, and her father’s alleged alcohol abuse and

general neglect). A.B. made numerous allegations of such abuse

to a Susanville police officer and defendant. A.B. also had a

cut around his eye that was consistent with his assertion that

James McConnell had slapped him the day before and cut him with

the silver ring he wore.

Plaintiffs contend that a professional should have

recognized that many of A.B.’s statements were exaggerations. 

However, plaintiffs provide no evidence to support this

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 36 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29 To the extent that plaintiffs seek to offer the

deposition testimony of Ann Burgess as support for this point,

Burgess testified that she was only offering her expert opinion

as to the impact of separation of a mother and her children, not

whether the removal was the appropriate decision. (Deposition of

Ann Wolbert Burgess (“Burgess Dep.”) at 27:22-28:17).

37

assertion.29 Moreover, the court finds problematic that

plaintiffs’ unsupported argument seems to imply that social

workers should not take allegations of physical abuse from a

seven-year-old seriously, but instead, should assume that he is

exaggerating. See Parkes, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (rejecting the

plaintiffs’ argument that defendant social worker should not have

believed the children’s allegations of sexual abuse). Plaintiffs

also contend that McConnell reported that A.B. had the scar for

some time. There is no evidence that this report was made to T.

Chapman prior to the detention; the evidence cited to by

plaintiffs were statements made by McConnell at the juvenile

court proceedings.

However, plaintiffs also contend that the allegations that

James McConnell was abusive did not justify removing the children

from plaintiff McConnell’s custody because he offered to leave

the residence so that the children could return home with their

mother. Defendant T. Chapman does not remember James McConnell

making this offer, but contends that exigent circumstances still

existed for the pre-hearing detention of the children. Defendant

asserts that the information regarding a propane leak in the

house, coupled with McConnell’s reported history of leaving the

children home unattended, demonstrated that the children were at

risk of an immediate threat of serious bodily injury if left in

their mother’s custody.

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 37 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30 Defendant T. Chapman asserts that McConnell’s plea of

no contest to a violation of § 300(b) precludes her § 1983

claims. However, plaintiff’s plea did not address the exigency

of the circumstances, the crux of plaintiffs’ claims arising out

of the pre-hearing detention of the minor plaintiffs. See Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1110 (finding a triable issue of fact regarding the

social worker’s pre-hearing removal, but granting defendant’s

motion for summary judgment regarding the post-hearing removal).

38

“[W]hether reasonable cause to believe exigent circumstances

existed is generally a question of fact for the jury.” Parkes,

345 F. Supp. 2d at 1089; see Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1108. As such,

“summary judgment in favor of the defendant[] is improper unless,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs, it is clear that no reasonable jury could conclude

that the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated.” Mabe,

237 F.3d at 1108 (quoting Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138). Based upon

the circumstances presented in this case, there exists a material

question of fact whether the minor plaintiffs were at a risk of

an immediate threat of serious bodily harm if left with their

mother and therefore, a triable issue regarding whether defendant

T. Chapman violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by

detaining the children without a warrant. See Parkes, 345 F.

Supp. 2d at 1088-89 (denying defendant social worker’s motion for

summary judgment where she detained the children based upon

allegations of sexual abuse against the father and because of her

concerns that the mother would not be protective and might put

pressure on the children before the evidentiary hearing).30 

b. Qualified Immunity

Defendant T. Chapman argues that even if there are triable

issues relating to whether a constitutional violation occurred,

he is entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 38 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

39

immunity protects from suit government officers who do not

knowingly violate the law. Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420,

1438 (9th Cir. 1994). “Qualified immunity shields a government

official from liability for civil damages if (1) the law

governing the official’s conduct was clearly established; and (2)

under that law, the official objectively could have believed that

her conduct was lawful. Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1106 (citing Ram v.

Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1997).

The question of immunity generally is not one for the jury. 

Qualified immunity “‘is an immunity from suit rather than a mere

defense to liability’ . . . . [Therefore,] [i]mmunity ordinarily

should be decided by the court long before trial.” Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (citation omitted). However, if

a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the

circumstances under which the officer acted, then the court

should make the determination after the facts have been developed

at trial. Act Up!\Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th

Cir. 1993). 

The initial inquiry that the court must make to determine

whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity is whether,

“[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated

a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). 

Based upon the court’s above analysis of defendant T. Chapman’s

potential liability, the court has found that plaintiffs have

presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that

a constitutional violation or violations did occur. 

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 39 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

40

If, as in this case, a violation could be made out on a

favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next inquiry is

whether the constitutional right was clearly established. Id.

This inquiry must be taken in the light of the specific context

of the case. The contours of the right must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right. Id. However, this does not mean that

an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the

very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but,

rather, in light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness must be

apparent. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (internal

citations omitted). The salient question is whether the law at

the time of the disputed conduct gave defendants “fair warning

that their alleged treatment of plaintiffs was unconstitutional.” 

See id. at 741. There must exist a clearly established rule so

that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct

was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 205-06.

The conduct in question surrounds the detention of the minor

plaintiffs on May 5, 2003. At this time, the law regarding the

fundamental right of parents and children to live together

without governmental interference was well established. Mabe,

237 F.3d at 1107 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753

(1982)). Parents and their children have a constitutional right

not to be separated without due process of law except in

emergencies. See id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,

651 (1972)). In this case, because there is a triable issue of

fact regarding whether a reasonable social worker would have

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 40 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

41

believed that there were exigent circumstances requiring the

warrantless removal of the minor plaintiffs from the custody of

plaintiff McConnell, and because the law regarding warrantless

detention of minor children was clear, the court cannot find that

defendant T. Chapman is entitled to qualified immunity at this

stage of the litigation. See Saucer, 533 U.S. at 205-06.

Therefore, defendant T. Chapman’s motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims arising out of the

pre-hearing detention of the minor children is DENIED.

2. Post-hearing Detention 

Plaintiffs also allege that defendant T. Chapman violated

their constitutional rights after the juvenile court hearing by

detaining the children pursuant to court order. Specifically,

plaintiffs assert that defendant T. Chapman did not conduct the

investigation properly and that he submitted false evidence to

the juvenile court.

“[S]ocial workers are entitled to absolute immunity for the

initiation and pursuit of dependency proceedings, including their

testimony offered in such proceedings.” Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1109

(holding that social workers were immune from plaintiff’s

allegations that they did not conduct the investigation properly

and were allowed to submit false evidence to the juvenile court);

see Beltran, – F.3d –, 2007 WL 1805559 at *4 (holding that social

workers are afforded absolute immunity for their actions that are

“closely connected to the judicial process,” including verified

statements in petitions files with a dependency court); Lebbos,

348 F.3d at 825-26 (holding that social worker was absolutely

immune for her actions in investigating and presenting evidence

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 41 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

42

to the dependency court). “Moreover, social workers ‘enjoy

absolute, quasi-judicial immunity when making post-adjudication

custody decisions pursuant to a valid court order.” Id. Because

defendant’s alleged conduct related to the initiation and pursuit

of dependancy proceedings and the subsequent decisions pursuant

to a valid court order, T. Chapman is entitled to absolute

immunity as to plaintiffs’ claims arising out of the post-hearing

detention of the minor children. 

Plaintiff McConnell also contends that the post-hearing

detention was unlawful because she was denied independent

competent counsel and coerced into her no contest plea. However,

plaintiff has failed to proffer any evidence that defendant T.

Chapman was responsible for the failure to appoint separate

counsel at the first detention hearing or for any alleged

coercion. Rather, plaintiff states that “[t]he obvious conflict

was ignored by the Court and counsel.” (TUF ¶ 48). This broad

contention, unsupported by any admissible evidence, fails to link

T. Chapman to plaintiff’s alleged deprivation of due process. 

Plaintiff also asserts that “the Court adopted the report of CPS

without comment . . . and without any requirement that the CPS

verify their findings and be cross examined regarding those

findings.” (Pls.’ Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. of T. Chapman and

Lassen County, filed May 21, 2007, at 23). Again, plaintiff has

failed to link any alleged unconstitutional conduct to defendant

T. Chapman.

Moreover, plaintiff’s ineffective assistance and coercion

claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In

Heck, the Supreme Court held that where a complaint for damages

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 42 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

43

under § 1983 implicates the validity of a conviction, the

complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate

that the conviction has already been invalidated. Id. at 486-87. 

Plaintiff McConnell pled no contest to violating California

Welfare and Institutions Code § 300(b). The California Supreme

Court has held that a plea of no contest under the California

Welfare and Institutions Code is equivalent to a defendant’s plea

of guilty or nolo contendere in a criminal proceeding. Troy Z.

v. San Diego County Dep’t of Social Servs., 3 Cal. 4th 1170, 1181

(1992); see also Nuno v. County of San Bernardino, 58 F. Supp. 2d

1127 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that fact that convictions were by

plea of nolo contendere did not affect application of rule of

preclusion). The issue of whether plaintiff McConnell was

effectively represented or coerced implicates the validity of her

no contest plea. As such, these claims are not cognizable under

§ 1983.

Therefore, defendant T. Chapman’s motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims arising out of the

post-hearing detention of the minor plaintiffs is GRANTED. 

B. California State Law Claims

Plaintiffs allege that defendant T. Chapman was negligent in

his performance of mandatory duties and that he intentionally

inflicted emotional distress upon them. Defendant T. Chapman

contends that plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed for failure to

timely comply with the California Tort Claims Act.

Claims relating to personal injury must be filed no later

than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. Cal.

Gov’t Code § 911.2. Plaintiff McConnell filed her tort claim on

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 43 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31 At best, plaintiffs assert that defendant T. Chapman

and CPS failed to prepare a case plan until August 2003 and that

this plan was updated. However, it is undisputed that T. Chapman

had nothing more to do with the McConnell family’s CPS case after

September 2003. (TUF ¶ 60). Therefore, defendant T. Chapman

cannot be held liable for the failure to update the case plan

after he was no longer the social worker for the McConnell

family. 

44

December 16, 2004, and the minor plaintiffs filed their claims on

January 21, 2005. All plaintiffs named defendant T. Chapman in

their claims. However, defendant T. Chapman had nothing more to

do with the McConnell family’s CPS case after September 29, 2003,

more than a year before plaintiffs’ claims were filed. As such,

plaintiffs failed to comply with the California Tort Claims Act.

Plaintiffs argue that the action against defendant T.

Chapman did not accrue until November 2004 when plaintiff

McConnell and the minor plaintiffs were reunited; plaintiffs

argue that the tortious conduct continued until they were

reunited. In essence, plaintiffs attempt to apply the continuing

violation doctrine to the timely filing requirement of the

California Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs cite no authority for the

application of this doctrine to the California Tort Claims Act. 

However, even if this doctrine could apply, plaintiffs have not

presented evidence that defendant T. Chapman continued to violate

their rights after September 29, 2003.31 The continuing

violation doctrine does not apply where the alleged defendant

responsible for the continuing offensive conduct was not the same

throughout. See Erickson v. West, 178 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1999)

(holding that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply

where the alleged discriminatory decisions were made by four

different supervisors).

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 44 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

45

Plaintiffs also assert that they were not required to submit

a claim for defendant T. Chapman’s breach of mandatory duties. 

In support of this contention, plaintiffs cite only to a

California Government Code section that does not exist,

California Government Code § 916. Furthermore, the court can

find no authority for plaintiff’s assertion that they were not

required to submit a claim. Cf. Tapia v. Alameida, 03-CV-5422,

2006 WL 3457214, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2006) (dismissing the

plaintiff’s claims for breach of a mandatory duty for failure to

comply with the California Tort Claims Act) (adopted by Tapia v.

Alameida, 03-CV-5422, 2007 WL 499637, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12,

2007)). 

Therefore, because plaintiffs have failed to comply with the

California Tort Claims Act, defendant T. Chapman’s motion for

summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ California state law

claims for breach of mandatory duties and intentional infliction

of emotional distress is GRANTED.

IV. Defendant Lassen County

Plaintiffs also bring claims against defendant Lassen County

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights and under California state law for

negligence in failing to fulfil a mandatory duty and intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Under Monell and its progeny, a plaintiff may hold a

municipality liable under section 1983 if his injury was

inflicted pursuant to a County’s policy, regulation, custom, or

usage. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 45 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

46

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 694

(1978)). To establish liability, a plaintiff must show

(1) she was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the

County had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to a

deliberate indifference to her constitutional right;

and (4) the policy was the “moving force behind the

constitutional violation.”

Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1110-1111 (quoting Van Ort v. Estate of

Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831. 835 (9th Cir. 1996)).

In their opposition, plaintiffs contend that defendant

Lassen County had a long standing policy of operating a noncompliant CPS as standard operating procedure. Specifically,

they assert that social workers failed to make face to face

contact with the children in foster care. In support of their

arguments, plaintiffs submit only inadmissible evidence.

First, plaintiffs attempt to submit Exhibit 10, which

purports to be true and correct copies of “pertinent parts of the

Grand Jury Reports of Lassen County, public documents published

by the Grand Jury of Lassen County, and a summary also published

by the Grand Jury of Lassen County.” (Hearne Decl. ¶ 13). The

courts review of the documents submitted in Exhibit 10 reveals at

least four different documents: (1) a document with the heading

“Consolidation of Grand Jury Reports from 1989 to 2003 in Regards

to Child Protective Services”; (2) a document with the heading

“Report of Findings, Lassen County, On-site Review, May 19 and

20, 2004"; (3) a document with the heading “California’s Child

and Family Services Review County Self-Assessment”; and (4) a

document with the heading “Review of Lassen County CWS by Gary

Kupfer.” Plaintiffs attempt to authenticate all of these

///

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 46 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

47

documents through the declaration of Treva J. Hearne (“Hearne”),

plaintiffs’ counsel.

Hearne cannot properly authenticate the documents in Exhibit

10. She does not attest that she wrote the documents or that she

witnessed who wrote the documents. Orr, 285 F.3d at 777. Nor

are any of the documents signed. Id. Further, Hearne has not

identified who produced the documents and defendant Lassen County

has not admitted to producing these documents. Id. 

To the extent that plaintiffs attempt to argue that these

documents are self-authenticating, plaintiffs are mistaken. See

Fed. R. Evid. 902 (West 2007). None of the documents are

certified copies of public records. See Fed. R. Evid. 902(4). 

However, plaintiffs implicitly argue that these documents are

“official publications” of the Grand Jury of Lassen County,

(Hearne Decl. ¶ 13), and thus self-authenticating pursuant to

Rule 902(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 902(5)

provides that “[b]ooks, pamphlets, or other publications

purporting to be issued by public authority” are selfauthenticating. However, there is no indication that these

documents were official publications or that they were even

published by the Lassen County Grand Jury. Cf. United States v.

Williams, 946 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that United

States Army Pay Tables were self-authenticating pursuant to Rule

902(5)); United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1452 (4th Cir.

1988) (official government statistics are self-authenticating);

Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins, -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2006 WL

3791986 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 26, 2006) (Federal Trade Commission Staff

Report is self-authenticating). None of these documents are

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 47 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

48

printed on letterhead or have any other identifying mark

demonstrating that they were produced by the Grand Jury. None of

these documents are signed. Two of these documents, the Report

of Findings from the On-site Review and the County SelfAssessment, are stamped “DRAFT.” As such, the court cannot find

that the documents submitted in Exhibit 10 are selfauthenticating. Therefore, they are inadmissible.

Moreover, even if the documents in Exhibit 10 were properly

authenticated, they are rank hearsay. While Grand Jury Reports

may be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), none of the documents submitted

in Exhibit 10 can be construed as a Grand Jury Report. At best,

plaintiffs produce evidence purporting to be a “Consolidation of

Grand Jury Reports.” This document does not contain any

information indicating who prepared it or for what purpose, nor

is this document signed by any member of the Grand Jury. The

other documents submitted by plaintiffs are a county selfassessment, a report submitted by Gary Kupfer, and report of the

on-site review conducted by Children’s Services Operation Bureau. 

Plaintiffs fail to offer any argument as to what hearsay

exception would allow these documents to be offered for the truth

of the matter asserted. Therefore, they are inadmissible.

Second, plaintiffs attempt to introduce as Exhibit 11 a

letter and an attached report purportedly from Barbara Eaton,

Chief of the Children’s Services Operations Bureau, to Mr. Thomas

Keefer of the Lassen County Department of Health. Plaintiffs

attempt to authenticate this document through the declaration of

Hearne. Again, Hearne does not attest that she wrote the

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 48 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

49

documents or that she witnessed the writing of the documents. 

Orr, 285 F.3d at 777. Nor does she attest that she is familiar

with Eaton’s signature. Id. Further, there is no argument by

plaintiffs that this document is self-authenticating. Therefore,

Exhibit 11 is inadmissible.

Furthermore, Exhibit 11 is also inadmissible hearsay. 

Plaintiffs implicitly contend that this letter falls within the

business record exception, as Hearne attests that the letter was

“prepared in the ordinary course of business.” (Hearne Decl. ¶

14). However, plaintiff’s counsel fails to proffer any

information that would lead this court to find that she has the

requisite personal knowledge to attest to what documents are

produced in the ordinary course of business at the Children’s

Services Operations Bureau.

Finally, plaintiffs attempt to offer Exhibit 12, which is

purportedly the Final Report on the Restructure of Lassen County

Health and Human Services, signed by Thomas D. Gauthier. 

Plaintiffs attempt to authenticate this document through the

declaration of Hearne. Again, Hearne does not attest that she

wrote the documents or that she witnessed who wrote the

documents. Orr, 285 F.3d at 777. Nor does she attest that she

is familiar with Gauthier’s signature. Id. Further, there is no

argument that this is document is self-authenticating. 

Therefore, Exhibit 12 is inadmissible.

Exhibit 12 is also inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiffs also

implicitly contend that this letter falls within the business

record exception, as Hearne attests that the letter was “prepared

in the ordinary course of business.” (Hearne Decl. ¶ 15). 

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 49 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

50

However, plaintiff’s counsel again fails to proffer any

information that would lead this court to find that she has the

requisite personal knowledge to attest to what documents are

produced in the ordinary course of business by the Chief

Administrative Officer.

Therefore, because plaintiffs have failed to adduce any

admissible evidence to substantiate their claims that defendant

had a policy of non-compliance, defendant Lassen County’s motion

for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs § 1983 claims is

GRANTED. 

B. California State Law Claims

Plaintiffs allege that defendant Lassen County was negligent

in its performance of mandatory duties and that it intentionally

inflicted emotional distress upon them. Defendant Lassen County

contends that plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed for failure to

timely comply with the California Tort Claims Act and because

there is no basis for defendant Lassen County’s liability.

Plaintiffs argue that the action against defendant Lassen

County did not accrue until November 2004 when plaintiff

McConnell and the minor plaintiffs were reunited; plaintiffs

argue that the tortious conduct continued until they were

reunited. In essence, plaintiffs attempt to apply the continuing

violation doctrine to the timely filing requirement of the

California Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs cite no authority for the

application of this doctrine to the California Tort Claims Act. 

However, even if this doctrine could theoretically apply to the

California Tort Claims Act, plaintiffs have not alleged

circumstances that would justify the application of the doctrine

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 50 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32 In their briefings, the parties fail to discuss with

any particularity the basis for plaintiffs’ tort claims. For the

sake of completeness, the court analyzes each statutory basis for

defendant Lassen County’s tort liability as set forth in

plaintiffs’ complaint. (See Compl. ¶¶ 83-106). 

51

in this case; rather, plaintiffs’ claims are based on discrete

instances of alleged misconduct. See Cherosky v. Henderson, 330

F.3d 1243, 1246 (“[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not

actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts

alleged in timely filed charges.”) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger

Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002)). In their complaint,

plaintiffs allege discrete mandatory duties that were allegedly

not fulfilled by defendant Lassen County. (See Compl. ¶104). 

Likewise, their allegations regarding intentional infliction of

emotional distress arise out of specific instances of misconduct. 

(See Compl. ¶¶ 85-88). As such, their claims are only timely

where such acts occurred during the limitations period. See

Cherosky, 330 F.3d at 1246. Because plaintiff McConnell filed

her claim on December 16, 2004, to be actionable, the conduct

giving rise to her state law claims must have occurred after June

16, 2004. Because the minor plaintiffs filed their claims on

January 21, 2005, the conduct giving rise to their state law

claims must have occurred after July 21, 2005.

Plaintiffs allege that defendant Lassen County violated §

309 of the Welfare and Institutions Code by failing to place the

minor plaintiffs with a relative after being taken into temporary

custody and that such violation caused emotional distress.32

Such a violation occurred in May 2003 when Lassen County CPS

detained the children without a warrant. After the juvenile

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 51 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33 The court previously found that § 16500.5 did not

create a mandatory duty. However, for the sake of completeness,

the court reincorporates its finding in this analysis.

52

court hearings in May and June 2003, in which the Lassen County

Juvenile Court ordered the detention of the minor plaintiffs, the

minor plaintiffs were no longer in temporary custody as set forth

in the statute. Therefore, this conduct falls outside the

limitations period and is not actionable.

Plaintiffs also allege that defendant Lassen County failed

to prepare a case plan within sixty days of the initial removal

of the children in May 2003 or by the date of the dispositional

hearing as required by Welfare and Institutions Code § 16501.1

and that such failure caused them emotional distress. It is

undisputed that the case plan was filed on August 12, 2003. As

such, any claim arising out of the alleged belatedly filed case

plan accrued in or around the summer of 2003. Therefore, this

conduct falls outside the limitations period and is not

actionable.

Plaintiffs further allege that defendant failed to fulfill a

duty under California Welfare and Institutions Code by failing to

provide family preservation services. As previously addressed in

ruling on defendant Lassen County’s motion to dismiss, to bring a

tort claim against a government entity in California, liability

must be based on statute. County of Los Angeles v. Superior

Court, 102 Cal. App. 4th 627, 637 (2002).33 Section 16500.5

provides that the Legislature “declares its intent to encourage

the continuity of the family unit” by providing family

preservation services, supportive services for children, and

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 52 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

53

counseling and family support services. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 16500.5 (West 2007). Even if the conduct of defendant occurred

during the limitations period, this declaration of legislative

intent does not impose a mandatory duty upon defendant Lassen

County. “An enactment does not create a mandatory duty if it

merely recites legislative goals and policies that must be

implemented through a public agency’s exercise of discretion.” 

County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 4th 627,

639 (2002) (citing Wilson v. County of San Diego, 91 Cal. App.

4th 974, 980 (2001)). Section 16500.5 merely sets out the intent

of the legislature to encourage the continuity of the family unit

by providing support services that the agency must implement

through its discretion. As such, this section does not impose a

mandatory duty upon defendant Lassen County and thus, there is no

basis for tort liability arising out of this section.

Finally, plaintiffs allege that Lassen County failed to

comply with Welfare and Institutions Code § 387. Section 387

imposes a duty to provide a noticed hearing before issuing “an

order changing or modifying a previous order by removing a child

from the physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative, or

friend and directing placement in a foster home, or commitment to

a private or county institution.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 387

(West 2007). This section does not dictate the ultimate result,

but merely imposes a mandatory duty to provide a noticed hearing

before issuing such an order. Further, at best, plaintiffs’

claim under § 387 is premised upon defendant Lassen County’s

failure to file a supplement petition seeking to modify the

juvenile court order that removed the minor children from

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 53 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34 In analyzing defendant Lassen County’s claim, the court

takes judicial notice of the motion for summary judgment filed by

defendant Loel Griffith and the exhibits submitted in support

thereof.

35 To the extent that plaintiffs seek to hold defendant

Lassen County liable on a theory of respondeat superior, for the

reasons set forth above in the court’s analysis of plaintiffs’

state law claims against defendant Loel Griffith and defendant

Terry Chapman, plaintiffs’ state claims against Lassen County

similarly fail.

54

plaintiff McConnell. Section 387 does not impose a duty upon the

county or social worker to file such a petition where a juvenile

court has ordered that the children be detained in the agency’s

custody and placed at a suitable place or home. In re Cynthia

C., 58 Cal. App. 4th 1479, 1490 (holding that the defendant

County Social Services Agency had no duty to file a § 387

petition where the juvenile court ordered that the agency remove

the child to a home it deemed safer and more suitable); see also

(Lassen County Order of Detention, Ex. A to Def. Griffith’s

Request for Judicial Notice, filed May 8, 2007) (ordering that

the minor plaintiffs be placed in the custody of Lassen County

CPS and detained at a suitable place or home).34 As such, under

the circumstances in this case, defendant Lassen County did not

have a mandatory duty to file a § 387 petition and obtain a court

order. Thus, there is no basis for liability pursuant to this

statute.

Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, defendant Lassen

County’s motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ state

law claims is GRANTED.35

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 54 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36 It is unclear from plaintiffs’ complaint whether they

also alleged a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress against defendant EA. The court does not address these

allegations herein as plaintiff does not raise this claim in her

opposition to the motions, and therefore, the court deems this

claim waived. 

37 Plaintiffs also assert that the court should not

consider defendant EA’s motions for summary judgment because the

Amended Memorandum of Points and Authorities was filed late. 

However, the only change to the amended briefing was the deletion

of one phrase and the insertion of a similar phrase as well as

reformatting of the document to comply with the court’s page

limits. Because no substantive changes were made to defendant’s

timely filed motion, plaintiffs’ request is DENIED.

55

V. Defendant Environmental Alternatives

Plaintiff bring claims against defendant Environmental

Alternatives (“EA”) under California state law for negligence and

breach of contract.36 Defendant EA contends that summary

judgment should be granted because it did not breach any of its

duties to plaintiffs.37

A. Negligence

In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendant EA was

negligent because it “knew or had reason to know that a prior

complaint had been made against the Defendant Barbara Coy for

failure to protect another minor child placed in her home as a

foster child against the physical and sexual abuse of her husband

against that minor child.” (Compl. ¶ 118). Defendants argue

that it did not have any knowledge that plaintiffs were at risk

of harm because it had no notice of Hank Coy’s deviant

propensities to molest children.

The gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim for negligence against

defendant EA is that it negligently continued to certify the Coy

home as a foster home in the face of foreseeable injury to the

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 55 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

38 In both their complaint and opposition to defendant

EA’s motion, plaintiffs’ allegations and arguments are most

accurately interpreted as asserting a claim for negligence based

upon a theory of misfeasance. As such, the court will only

address this theory of negligence. However, to the extent that

plaintiffs sought to argue a negligence claim based upon a theory

of non-feasance, such a claim would likely fail for the reasons

set forth, infra, regarding the foreseeability of the harm to

defendant EA.

56

minor plaintiffs by Hank Coy. (See Pls.’ Opp’n to Def. EA’s Mot.

for Summ. J., filed May 21, 2007, at 3). As such, plaintiffs

have adequately pled a claim for negligence based upon

defendant’s misfeasance, which “exists when the defendant is

responsible for making the plaintiff’s position worse, i.e.

defendant has created a risk.” Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal.

3d 40, 49 (1975); see also Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp.,

9 Cal. App. 4th 88, 114 n.16 (“Misfeasance is the improper

performance of an act that is otherwise proper and nonfeasance is

the nonperformance of an act that should be performed.”).38

“Where the act complained of is one of misfeasance, the

question of duty is governed by the standards of ordinary care.” 

Romero, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 1091 (quoting Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at

49). California courts have applied a “policy-driven,

multifactor weighing process for determining whether in a

particular case a defendant owed a tort duty to a given

plaintiff.” Id. (citing Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,

113 (1968)). These factors are non-exclusive and generally

include:

(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (2)

the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered

harm; (3) the closeness of the connection between the

defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (4) the

moral blame attached to defendant’s conduct; (5) the

policy of preventing future harm; (6) the extent of the

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 56 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

39 Plaintiffs contend that there is general liability

insurance policy that would cover this alleged negligence. 

However, plaintiffs fail to cite with any specificity what

provision applies. However, even if insurance is available, on

balance, for the reasons set forth infra, plaintiffs’ misfeasance

claim fails. 

57

burden to the defendant; (7) the consequences to the

community of imposing a duty to exercise care with

resulting potential liability for breach of that duty;

and (8) the availability, cost, and prevalence of

insurance for the risk involved.39

Id. (citing Parsons, 15 Cal. 4th at 472-73). However, “[t]he

most important factor remains foreseeability.” Margaret W., 139

Cal. App. 4th at 161.

Defendant EA argues that the harm to plaintiffs, the

physical and emotional injuries arising out of Hank Coy’s

molestation of female plaintiff J.M. and alleged molestation of

female plaintiff A.B., was not foreseeable to defendant. 

Defendant presents evidence that Barbara Coy did not observe any

conduct or behavior by her husband that caused her to think that

he could endanger the safety of the children or gave her reason

to believe that he would engage in inappropriate sexual acts

toward a child. Defendant also presents evidence that Barbara

Coy never informed anyone at EA or CPS that she thought her

husband might be engaging in inappropriate sexual activity toward

any child. Most importantly, plaintiffs admit that they are not

aware of any evidence that EA had knowledge of the propensity of

Hank Coy to engage in acts of sexual molestation or abuse of

minors prior to the time that the minor plaintiffs were placed at

the Coy home. (EUF ¶ 78). 

Plaintiffs argue that defendant EA was negligent in placing

the minor plaintiffs in the custody and care of a man and woman

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 57 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

58

over sixty who had physical and mental disabilities. Plaintiffs

contend that Barbara Coy had to use a walker and that Hank Coy

had begun experiencing some signs of Alzheimer’s disease, such as

lethargy, and did not hear very well. However, plaintiffs

present no evidence that plaintiffs’ alleged injuries arising out

of the molestation of female plaintiff J.M. and the alleged

molestation of female plaintiff A.B. can be attributed to the

Coys’ age or disabilities. Plaintiffs present no evidence that

age, Alzheimer’s disease, lethargy, or hearing loss are

predictors of child molestation such that defendant EA should

have known that certification of the Coy home and placement of

the minor plaintiffs with the Coys would lead to this type of

alleged injury.

Plaintiffs also argue that defendant EA was negligent

because it did not require the Coys to report their medical

issues. As set forth above, plaintiffs fail to proffer any

evidence that the Coys’ medical issues caused the alleged

injuries. As such, whether such issues were reported to EA is

irrelevant to this court’s inquiry into the negligence claim

asserted in this case. Moreover, plaintiffs fail to proffer

evidence that defendant EA did not require foster parents to

disclose such medical issues. Plaintiffs only point to the

absence of a requirement in the “Parent-EA Agreement” and the

“Agency-Group Home Agreement.” Neither of these one-page

documents purports to set forth an all-inclusive statement of

EA’s policies. Rather, the “Parent-EA Agreement” refers to other

training requirements, a child’s program plan, licensing

regulations, and state and federal laws and regulations, none of

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 58 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

59

which are set forth in the one-page agreement. Therefore, the

absence of a requirement in these two one-page documents is

insufficient evidence that defendant EA did not require foster

parents to disclose medical issues.

Plaintiffs further argue that the injury was foreseeable

because there were other alleged incidents of abuse by the Coys

as foster parents. Plaintiffs point to an allegation of spanking

at the Coy home in 2002. Plaintiffs contend that this allegation

was not reported to Community Care Licensing (“CCL”), the state

agency responsible for investigating allegations of potential

abuse in foster homes certified by private foster family

agencies. Plaintiffs fail to present any evidence to support

this assertion. Rather, they misstate the deposition testimony

of Dan Switzer, an investigator for CCL, who testified that due

to the way records are kept at CCL, he was not aware whether this

complaints were referred to investigation. (Dep. of Dan Switzer

(“Switzer Dep.”) at 45:7-46:7). He did not testify that it was

not reported to CCL by EA. Moreover, defendants present evidence

that EA reported the incident to CCL and Lassen County CPS and

that no disciplinary action was taken. (Decl. of Samuel James

Hardee in Supp. of Def. EA’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Hardee Decl.”),

filed May 8, 2007, ¶ 7). The Coys were subsequently counseled by

EA regarding this matter. (Id.) Defendants also present

evidence that such an incident did not warrant revocation of the

Coy foster family certification. (Id.) Finally, the spanking

incident did not involved any sexualized or criminal behavior by

Hank Coy. (Id.) Therefore, this reported allegation of a

spanking incident at the Coy home did not put EA on notice that

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 59 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

40 At best, plaintiffs cite to the deposition testimony of

Dan Switzer, who stated that bed-wetting could be indicative of

molestation. (Switzer Dep. at 66:3-15). Switzer did not testify

that bed-wetting was necessarily a “red flag” for sexual

molestation as argued by plaintiffs.

60

it should not certify the Coy home because of Hank Coy’s deviant

propensities towards children.

Plaintiffs also argue that defendant EA was negligent in its

certification of the Coy home in light of the fact that one or

more foster children at the Coy home in approximately 2002 had a

bed-wetting problem. Plaintiffs base their argument on the broad

assertion that bed-wetting is necessarily indicative of sexual

molestation, without any expert testimony to support that

assertion.40 There is no evidence that sexual abuse was the

cause of the childrens’ bed-wetting problem or that it was even

suspected. Moreover, there is no evidence that sexual abuse by

Hank Coy was the cause of the bed-wetting or even suspected. As

such, the fact that children who were in foster care at the Coy

home had bed-wetting problems did not put defendant EA on notice

that it should not certify the Coy home because of Hank Coy’s

deviant propensities.

Finally, plaintiffs argue that defendant EA failed to report

behavior changes in female plaintiff J.M., such as touching

another child inappropriately at school and kicking and spitting

at her foster father. Plaintiffs contend that EA was negligent

in failing to identify these behaviors as signs of sexual abuse. 

Plaintiffs present evidence that in September 2003, defendant Coy

spoke to Oliviera regarding J.M.’s behavior, such as striking and

spitting on Hank Coy. Oliviera never observed any of this

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 60 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

61

behavior. Oliviera informed defendant that these behaviors

sounded like what a child would do if they had been molested. 

Oliviera further informed defendant that she thought that the

children had probably been molested before they were placed in

defendant’s care. While this evidence may demonstrate that

defendant EA had notice that J.M. was exhibiting signs of

molestation, this information did not put defendant on notice of

when the molestation occurred or that Hank Coy was the

perpetrator. Therefore, the change in female plaintiff J.M.’s

behavior did not put EA on notice that Hank Coy was molesting any

of the minor children. 

 Under the circumstances in this case, the consideration and

balance of the Rowland factors militates against finding that

defendant EA owed a duty of care to plaintiffs under principles

of ordinary negligence. First, as set forth above, plaintiffs

have presented no evidence to support a reasonable inference that

defendant had notice that Hank Coy would sexually molest a child. 

As such, the risk of the harm that occurred in this case was not

reasonably foreseeable, a critical aspect of imposing a legal

duty on defendant that informs many of the following factors. 

See Romero, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 1092; see also Margaret W. v.

Kelley R., 139 Cal. App. 4th 141, 161 (2006) (finding that the

remaining Rowland factors could not overcome the lack of

foreseeability).

None of the parties dispute that at least one of the minor

plaintiffs was molested by Hank Coy. However, where there is no

evidence that defendant knew the Coy home would be unsafe due to

Hank Coy’s deviant propensities, there is only a tenuous

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 61 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

62

connection between defendant EA’s conduct in certifying the Coy

home for foster care and the subsequent abuse of a foster child

by Hank Coy. Further, because the conduct of Hank Coy was not

reasonably foreseeable, defendant’s certification of the Coy home

was not morally blameworthy. See id. at 1093. This is

particularly true where the undisputed evidence demonstrates that

Oliviera documented 10 visits and at least six calls to the Coy

home between May 5, 2003 and September 29, 2003. In response to

reports of changes in female plaintiff J.M.’s behavior, Oliviera

went to the Coy home and talked to the minor plaintiffs as she

had been trained to do. Oliviera believed that the reason female

plaintiff J.M. was angry with Hank Coy was because she had been

suspended from school and took out her frustration on Hank Coy. 

Oliviera also believed and discussed with T. Chapman that foster

children begin to act out after they start visiting their

biological parents and return to their foster parents. As such,

the undisputed evidence demonstrates that defendant EA responded

to J.M.’s changes in behavior, despite that fact that it had no

prior notice of Hank Coy’s deviant propensities. 

Moreover, the policy of preventing future harm would not be

served by imposing liability in this case, where the risk of harm

to the children was not reasonably foreseeable by defendant. See

id at 1093-94. If foster family agencies are required to file a

suspected child abuse report or terminate placement each and

every time a child in foster care acts out at school or against a

foster parent, the foster care system would be unmanageable. 

Children placed in the foster care system are inherently placed

in a highly stressful and emotional situation, arising out of

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 62 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

63

their removal from an equally stressful and likely dangerous

situation. These children may respond by acting out against

their foster parents. To require foster family agencies to

immediately terminate such placements would add more chaos and

instability to the lives of these children. To require foster

family agencies to submit vague and nonspecific suspected child

abuse reports based upon isolated instances of hitting and

kicking of a foster parent would substantially burden already

overburdened law enforcement agencies, CCL, and county child

protective agencies. Therefore, as in this case, where the only

indication of abuse that plaintiffs can point to are isolated

instances of acting out after the foster home had been certified

and without any prior knowledge of deviant propensities of a

foster parent, public policy dictates against imposing liability.

As such, after consideration of the Rowland factors in the

circumstances of this case, the court finds that defendant EA did

not owe plaintiffs a duty of care under general negligence

principles. Therefore, defendant EA’s motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiffs’ negligence claim is GRANTED. 

B. Negligence Per Se

In their opposition, plaintiffs for the first time contend

that defendant EA is liable for negligence per se for Oliviera’s

failure to report allegations of abuse pursuant to California

Penal Code § 11165.9. Even under liberal notice pleading

standards, plaintiffs did not allege a claim for negligence in

their complaint based upon defendant Oliviera’s failure to

report. Rather, the crux of plaintiffs’ claim is that defendant

had knowledge of Hank Coy’s propensity for abuse and continued to

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 63 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

41 It appears that defendant EA and Lassen County entered

into an “Agency-Group Home Agreement” despite the fact that the

minor plaintiffs were placed in foster care, not in a group home. 

As such, the terms of this contract are seemingly inapplicable. 

However, for the reasons set forth infra, plaintiffs’ breach of

contract claim fails for plaintiffs’ inability to proffer any

cognizable argument or evidence.

64

certify the Coy home for foster care, which led to plaintiffs’

injuries. Nowhere in plaintiffs’ complaint is there an

allegation regarding defendant EA’s failure to report. 

Whether or not defendant EA or Oliviera properly reported

suspected child abuse after receiving information from Barbara

Coy or after observing behaviors of the minor plaintiffs is a

fact that has not changed since the filing of the complaint. To

the extent that facts were obtained in discovery which led to the

assertion of this theory, plaintiffs do not identify when such

facts were obtained, nor do they contend that amendment of the

complaint was requested promptly after the plaintiffs obtained

such knowledge. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate

“good cause” to add a claim based upon defendant Coy’s alleged

failure to report. Furthermore, even if such “good cause” could

be demonstrated, plaintiffs have failed to proffer any argument

that the interests of justice require granting plaintiffs leave

to amend their complaint at this late stage in the proceedings. 

As such, the court does not consider the merits of plaintiffs’

negligence per se claim.

C. Breach of Contract

Finally, the minor plaintiffs contend that defendant EA

breached its contract with Lassen County CPS, to which they claim

they were intended third party beneficiaries.41 Plaintiffs’

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 64 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

42 The court also notes the irony that the one piece of

evidence plaintiffs cite to is the deposition of Barbara Coy,

which they have continuously sought to have stricken as wholly

lacking in credibility.

65

opposition completely fails to respond to defendant EA’s points

and authorities regarding the breach of contract claim. 

Plaintiffs also fail to articulate what contractual term EA

allegedly breached. (EUF ¶ 79). However, construing plaintiffs’

woefully inadequate briefing in the light most favorable to them,

plaintiffs contend that defendant EA breached the contract

because no EA representative reported female plaintiff J.M.’s

change in behavior to Lassen County CPS. Plaintiffs’ asserted

evidence in support of this claim, the deposition testimony of

Barbara Coy,42 does not support this contention. Further, it is

undisputed that Oliviera spoke to T. Chapman at Lassen County CPS

regarding the change in J.M.’s behavior. (EUF ¶ 45). Therefore,

because plaintiffs have failed to articulate any cogent argument

or proffer any evidence in support of their claim, defendant EA’s

motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ claim for

breach of contract is GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court makes the

following orders:

1. Defendants Hanson, Dahle, Keefer, Pyle, and J.

Chapman’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

2. Defendant Loel Griffith’s Motion for Summary Judgment

is GRANTED.

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 65 of 66
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

66

3. Defendant Terry Chapman’s Motion for Summary Judgment:

a. regarding plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims arising out of

the pre-hearing detention of the minor children is

DENIED.

b. regarding the remainder of plaintiffs’ claims is

GRANTED.

4. Defendant Lassen County’s Motion for Summary Judgment

is GRANTED.

5. Defendant Environmental Alternative’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 29, 2007 

Case 2:05-cv-00909-MCE-DAD Document 181 Filed 06/29/07 Page 66 of 66