Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03618/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03618-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCO HEYWARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

HAYWARD POLICE DEPARTMENT and 

OFFICER CLARK,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03618-MEJ 

ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR 

FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

INTRODUCTION

On August 11, 2014, Plaintiff Marco Heyward (“Plaintiff”) brought this case under 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging that Defendants Hayward Police Department and Police 

Officer Clark (“Defendants”) “contacted [him] without probable cause, search[ed], frisked, and 

detained [him] when [he] was breaking no law(s),” and thereafter “collectively decided and 

collaborated to falsify prepared documentations to seek a false conviction.” Compl. at 2, Dkt. No. 

1. Plaintiff represents himself in this matter, and the Court granted his Application to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis on August 14, 2014. Dkt. No. 4. Since that time, Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to 

comply with court orders and failed to communicate with opposing counsel regarding his

discovery obligations. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DISMISSES this case for failure 

to prosecute.

BACKGROUND

On April 10, 2014, Plaintiff was walking westbound on Jackson Avenue in the City of 

Hayward. Compl. at 2. Plaintiff states that he “experienced leg difficulties” while walking due to 

his disability. Id. Officer Clark saw Plaintiff and searched, frisked, and detained him. Id. 

Plaintiff informed Officer Clark that he walked a lot throughout the city to strengthen his knees as 

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he had recently had surgery on both knees and was having complications with his left knee. 

Officer Clark took Plaintiff into custody. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was detained illegally and 

searched without probable cause. Id. 

Defendants maintain that Officer Clark observed Plaintiff staggering while walking near a 

busy intersection, after which he conducted a welfare check and ascertained that Plaintiff was 

intoxicated and posed a danger to himself. Defs.’ Case Mgmt. Stmt. at 2. Plaintiff was 

transported to the Hayward Police Department Jail for detention, and released upon sobriety. Id. 

Plaintiff attributes no injuries to the incident and he did not seek medical treatment. Defs.’ Mot. 

for Sanctions (“Mot.”), Dkt. No. 23, Ex. 2 (Pl.’s Resps. to Defs.’ Interrogs.), Nos. 13-14, 

On November 3, 2014, the Court issued a Case Management Order, referring the parties to 

Early Neutral Evaluation and setting April 14, 2015 as the discovery deadline. Dkt. No. 17. 

Defendants sent Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on December 8, 2014, 

and received Plaintiff’s responses on January 20, 2015. Defs.’ Mot. for Sanctions, Exs. 2, 3. 

Defendants attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff on January 21 regarding his responses, but 

Plaintiff did not respond. Mot. at 3; Nishioka Decl. (attached as Ex. 1 to Mot.) ¶ 6 & Attach. A. 

Defendants attempted to contact Plaintiff several more times, but Plaintiff still did not respond. 

Nishioka Decl. ¶¶ 7-11; Attachs. B-F. 

On March 9, 2015, Defendants filed a request to enforce the Court’s meet and confer 

requirement regarding outstanding discovery disputes. Dkt. No. 20. Based on Defendants’ 

request, the Court ordered Defendants to file their portion of a draft joint letter, after which 

Plaintiff was to file any response within seven days. Dkt. No. 21. Although Defendants filed their 

letter on March 16, 2015 (Dkt. No. 22), Plaintiff failed to respond. 

On March 24, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Sanctions, seeking 

sanctions for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with his discovery obligations and failure to abide by the 

Court’s orders, including the undersigned’s Discovery Standing Order. Mot. at 1-2. On March 

25, 2015, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause by April 7, 2015, why this case should not be 

dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court deadlines. Dkt. No. 24. The 

Court provided notice to Plaintiff that it may dismiss the case if he failed to respond by the 

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deadline. As of the date of this Order, Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants’ Motion or the 

Court’s Order to Show Cause. Further, although the Court referred the parties to the ADR Unit, 

Plaintiff did not appear for the Early Neutral Evaluation hearing, which the ADR Unit scheduled 

for March 26, 2015. See Dkt. Nos. 17, 19. Based on this procedural history, the Court finds it 

appropriate to dismiss this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 41(b), “the district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any 

order of the court.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Oliva v. 

Sullivan, 958 F.2d 272, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court may dismiss sua sponte for failure to 

meet court deadline). “[T]he district court must weigh the following factors in determining 

whether a Rule 41(b) dismissal is warranted: ‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 

litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) 

the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less 

drastic sanctions.’” Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). “These factors are ‘not a series of 

conditions precedent before the judge can do anything,’ but a ‘way for a district judge to think 

about what to do.’” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig. (“In re PPA”), 460 F.3d 

1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Valley Eng’rs Inc. v. Elec. Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 

(9th Cir. 1998)). Dismissal is appropriate “where at least four factors support dismissal . . . or 

where at least three factors ‘strongly’ support dismissal.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 

F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998).

DISCUSSION

The Court finds that the Henderson factors support dismissal of this case. First, “the 

public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” Yourish v. Cal. 

Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff delayed adjudication of the claims in this 

case by failing to respond to Defendants’ discovery requests, the pending Motion for Sanctions, 

and the Court’s show cause order.

Second, the Court’s need to manage its docket also weighs in favor of dismissal. NonCase 3:14-cv-03618-MEJ Document 25 Filed 04/13/15 Page 3 of 6
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compliance with procedural rules and the Court’s orders wastes “valuable time that [the Court] 

could have devoted to other . . . criminal and civil cases on its docket.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261.

As for the third Henderson factor, the mere pendency of a lawsuit cannot constitute 

sufficient prejudice to require dismissal. Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991. However, “prejudice . . . may 

. . . consist of costs or burdens of litigation.” In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1228. Moreover, “a 

presumption of prejudice arises from a plaintiff’s unexplained failure to prosecute.” Laurino v. 

Syringa Gen. Hosp., 279 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff has the burden of 

demonstrating a non-frivolous reason for failing to meet a court deadline. Id.; see also Yourish, 

191 F.3d at 991. Here, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’ Motion and the Court’s Order to 

Show Cause, offered no explanation for the failure to respond (and did not request an extension of 

the filing deadline), and did not appear for the early neutral evaluation hearing. Therefore, the 

Court concludes that the third Henderson factor also supports dismissal.

The fourth Henderson factor, that public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits, 

normally weighs strongly against dismissal. See, e.g., Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 399. “At the same 

time, a case that is stalled or unreasonably delayed by a party’s failure to comply with deadlines 

. . . cannot move forward toward resolution on the merits.” In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1228. The 

Ninth Circuit has “recognized that this factor ‘lends little support’ to a party whose responsibility 

it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that 

direction.” Id. (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1996)). Thus, if the 

fourth Henderson factor weighs against dismissal here, it does so very weakly. 

Finally, the Court has already attempted less drastic sanctions, without success, and 

therefore determines that trying them again would be inadequate or inappropriate. “Though there 

are a wide variety of sanctions short of dismissal available, the district court need not exhaust 

them all before finally dismissing a case.” Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 

(9th Cir. 1981). The Court provided Plaintiff the opportunity to deviate from the undersigned’s 

Discovery Standing Order requirements by permitting him to file a separate discovery letter in 

response to Defendants’ requests. Plaintiff did not respond. The Court also attempted the lesser 

sanction of issuing an Order to Show Cause and giving Plaintiff an opportunity to explain his 

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failure to prosecute. As Plaintiff failed to respond, another order requiring him to do so is likely to 

be futile. See, e.g., Gleason v. World Sav. Bank, FSB, 2013 WL 3927799, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 

26, 2013) (finding dismissal under Rule 41(b) appropriate where the court previously attempted 

the lesser sanction of issuing an Order to Show Cause and giving the plaintiff an additional 

opportunity to re-plead). Further, the Order to Show Cause warned Plaintiff of the risk of 

dismissal; thus he cannot maintain that the Court has failed in its “obligation to warn the plaintiff 

that dismissal is imminent.” Oliva, 958 F.2d at 274. Accordingly, the Court finds that the fifth 

factor also weighs in favor of dismissal. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, the Court finds that at least four of the five Henderson factors 

weigh in favor of dismissal. Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to Defendants’ Motion and failed 

to respond to the March 25, 2015 Order to Show Cause. Thus, Plaintiff failed to prosecute this 

case and dismissal is appropriate. However, a less drastic alternative is to dismiss without 

prejudice. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Dismissal will minimize prejudice to Defendants, but 

dismissing the case without prejudice will preserve the ability of Plaintiff to seek relief. Thus, 

“[i]n an abundance—perhaps overabundance—of caution,” the Court finds that dismissal without 

prejudice is appropriate. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(remanding to the district court in order to consider whether dismissal should have been without 

prejudice). 

Accordingly, this case is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to 

prosecute and failure to comply with the Court’s deadlines and orders. As Plaintiff appeared pro 

se in this matter and the case remained in the early stages of litigation, the Court finds monetary 

sanctions unnecessary and therefore DENIES Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2015

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCO HEYWARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

HAYWARD POLICE DEPARTMENT 

OFFICER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03618-MEJ 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on 4/13/2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said 

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing 

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle 

located in the Clerk's office.

Marco Heyward

P.O. Box 466

Hayward, CA 94543 

Dated: 4/13/2015

Richard W. Wieking

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Chris Nathan, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable MARIA-ELENA JAMES

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