Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01310/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01310-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 In accordance with the Court’s September 19, 2012 Order, Respondents filed an answer

limited to affirmative defenses. (Doc. 9.) 

2

 Citations to “Respondents’ Ex.” refer to exhibits supporting Respondents’ Limited

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 13). The procedural history of this case

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jeremy Dean Garcia,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-1310-PHX-SRB (BSB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Jeremy Dean Garcia has filed a timely Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

raising six grounds for relief. (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed a Limited Answer asserting that

Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review or

are not cognizable on habeas corpus review.1

 (Doc. 13.) Petitioner has filed a reply arguing

“cause” to excuse his procedural default. (Doc. 17.) For the reasons below, the Petition should

be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On June 28, 2007, Petitioner was charged in a twenty-six count indictment with various

counts of sexual abuse, attempted child molestation, child molestation, and sexual conduct with

a minor. (Respondents’ Ex. A at 4; Ex. H at 1.)2

 The indictment alleged that between

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is derived from the Arizona Court of Appeal January 15, 2009 decision. (Respondents’ Ex. A.)

Petitioner does not challenge the appellate court’s discussion of the procedural history of this

case or its factual determinations. The state court’s factual determinations are “presumed to be

correct” and Petitioner has not “rebut[ted] the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

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September 2000 and April 2006 Petitioner engaged in sexual behavior with five minors — his

two daughters (A and B), two of his daughters’ friends (K and T), and his daughters’ former

babysitter (J). (Respondents’ Ex. A at 2.) Following a trial, the jury acquitted Petitioner of

three counts of sexual molestation of K and three counts of sexual abuse of K. (Id. at 4.) The

jury found Petitioner guilty of the remaining counts. (Id.) At the sentencing hearing, the court

entered a judgment of acquittal as to an additional count of sexual abuse of K. (Id.) The trial

court imposed a combination of concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 132 years’

imprisonment. (Id.) 

A. Direct Appeal

Petitioner filed a direct appeal asserting that there was insufficient evidence to support

ten of his convictions. (Respondents’ Exs. A and B.) He also argued that his sentences on the

attempt charges against victim A in counts three, five, and six were not statutorily authorized

by the Dangerous Crimes Against Children Act (DCAC), Arizona Revised Statute § 13-705,

former Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01, because the victim was under the age of twelve.

(Respondents’ Ex. B at 20-23.) 

The appellate court found that Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claims and his

challenges to his sentences on counts three and five lacked merit. (Respondents’ Ex. A.) The

court granted relief on Petitioner’s claim that his sentence on count six was improper because

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-705 only encompassed sexual conduct with a minor who is “twelve,

thirteen or fourteen years of age.” (Respondents’ Ex. A at 17.) The court remanded to the trial

court for the State to establish the victim’s age and for resentencing on count six “if necessary.”

(Id. at 18.) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. On April 15, 2009,

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3

 Arizona v. Willits, 393 P.2d 274 (Ariz. 1964).

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the trial court resentenced Petitioner on count six to three-and-a-half years’ imprisonment to run

consecutively to his sentences on counts one, two, and twenty-six, and to run concurrently with

his sentences on counts three, four, and five. (Respondents’ Ex. F.) 

B. Post-Conviction Review

While his direct appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief

in the trial court pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. (Respondents’ Exs. G, H.)

Petitioner was appointed counsel and moved to stay the filing deadline for the post-conviction

relief petition pending the resolution of the appeal. (Respondents’ Ex. H.) The trial court

stayed the post-conviction proceeding pending completion of his direct appeal and resentencing.

(Id.) After the stay was lifted, on May 10, 2010, post-conviction counsel filed a notice pursuant

to Rule 32.4(c) informing the court that she had reviewed the record and found no colorable

claim for relief. (Respondents’ Ex. I.) 

On August 25, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief raising

five grounds for relief. (Respondents’ Ex. J.) Specifically, Petitioner argued that his sentences

were not authorized by the DCAC statute because he was a first time offender. He also argued

that trial counsel was ineffective for dissuading him from testifying, failing to request a Willits3

instruction based on the inadvertent erasure of a recording of a victim interview, and for failing

to call certain character witnesses on his behalf. (Id.) He further argued that trial and appellate

counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge his sentences. (Id.) 

The trial court found that Petitioner’s challenge to his sentences was precluded pursuant

to Rule 32.2(a), and because he had raised the issue of his sentences on direct appeal.

(Respondents’ Ex. H at 2.) The court further found that none of Petitioner’s claims of

ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel presented a material issue of fact or law

warranting post-conviction relief. (Id. at 1-2.) Accordingly, the trial court denied postconviction relief. (Id.) 

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On March 2, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals

arguing the claims he had presented to the trial court and arguing for the first time that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert witness. (Respondents’ Ex. M at 21.) 

On June 30, 2011, the appellate court denied relief, affirmed the trial court’s rulings, and

found that the newly-raised claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was precluded pursuant

to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c). (Respondents’ Ex. N at 5 n.3.) Petitioner did

not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Respondents’ Ex. O.) 

C. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On June 12, 2012, Petitioner filed the pending petition for writ of habeas corpus raising

the following grounds for relief: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions

on several counts; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for pressuring him not to testify at trial;

(3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call character witnesses; (4) trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to request a Willits instruction; (5) the trial court should have sentenced

Petitioner pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-702(C) and § 13-702(A), rather than pursuant to

former § 13-604.01, because he had no prior felony convictions; and, (6) trial and appellate

counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge his sentences and appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise Petitioner’s claim regarding “wanting to testify at trial.” (Doc. 1.)

As set forth below, Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review, lack

merit, or are procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review. 

II. Federal Court Review of State Court Decisions 

This Court’s review of Petitioner’s claims is constrained by the applicable standard of

review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). If a habeas corpus petition includes a claim that has

been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), federal

habeas relief is not available unless petitioner shows that the state court’s decision: (1) “was

contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the United States Supreme

Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43

(2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or

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4

 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court”

requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of

Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. Crowell v.

Knowles , 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

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(3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record

before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct.

770, 785 (2011). 

To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable

application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court that

existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 44. A state court’s

decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that contradicts the governing

law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result

different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003)

(citations omitted). A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the

court identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s determination that

a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree

on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Court will apply this standard to

review the merits Petitioner’s claims that are properly presented for federal habeas review.

III. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the

petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To exhaust state

remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of his

federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” court4

 in a procedurally

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appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“[t]o provide the State with the

necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate state

court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489

U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

A claim has been “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described both the operative facts

and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33. A “state

prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition

or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such

as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and

fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if

he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by

providing the proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d

657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes comity

by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged violations of a state

prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001); Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also require federal courts to respect

state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32.

Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review

in two situations. 

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus

review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but returning to

state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such as waiver or

preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See Teague v. Lane, 489

U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). If no state

remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, but procedurally defaulted.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

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 Arizona courts have consistently applied Arizona’s procedural rules to bar further

review of claims that were not raised on direct appeal or in prior Rule 32 post-conviction

proceedings. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that Rule 32.2(a) is an

adequate and independent procedural bar); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“[p]reclusion of issues for failure to present them at an earlier proceeding under Ariz. R. Crim.

P. 32.2(a)(3) ‘are independent of federal law because they do not depend upon a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits’”); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998)

(rejecting argument that Arizona courts have not “strictly or regularly” followed Rule 32). 

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Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raises a claim in state court,

but the state court finds the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See Beard v. Kindler, 558

U.S. 53, 130 S. Ct. 612, 614-19 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State’s

procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state courts of an

opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. In this

situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court opinion relies on a

procedural ground “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an

‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). 

A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not depend

on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856,

860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s application of the

procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.”5

 See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally excuses non-compliance with a

procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489

U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that

the States’ interest in correcting their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.”

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter

of comity, the federal court will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32.

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction,

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. See Reed

v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will not review the merits of a

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 Respondents argue that this state law claim in unexhausted and procedurally barred.

Contrary to Respondents’ assertion, Petitioner presented this state law claim to Arizona Court

of Appeals, and thus, exhausted available state remedies on this state law claim. However,

Petitioner’s exhaustion of this state law claim is irrelevant because federal habeas corpus relief

is only available for federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

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procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates “cause” for the failure to properly

exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from the alleged constitutional violation, or

shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” would result if the claim were not heard on

the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the

court may dismiss plainly meritless claims regardless of whether the claim was properly

exhausted in state court. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is

inappropriate in federal court to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to

dismissal under § 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

IV. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claims

 A. Ground One — Sufficiency of the Evidence 

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his

convictions on counts three, four, five, six, seven, nine, eleven, thirteen, and fifteen under

Arizona law. (Doc. 1 at 5 and 11.) Petitioner presented this state law claim to the Arizona Court

of Appeals on direct review and based his claim solely on state law grounds. (Respondents’

Ex. B.) In his pending habeas petition, he again bases his sufficiency of the evidence claim

solely on state law grounds. 

A state prisoner can obtain federal habeas relief only if his conviction violates the

Constitution or the laws and treaties of the United States. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119

(1982). Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for alleged violations of state law or for

alleged error in the interpretation of state law.6

 Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).

Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence claim is based solely on the application of Arizona state

law, which is not subject to review by this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-

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68 (explaining that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus

relief based on the sufficiency of the evidence should be denied.

B. Grounds Two, Three, Four, and Six — Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Grounds Two, Three, Four, and Six Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective

for dissuading him from testifying at trial, failing to present character witnesses, failing to

request a Willits instruction, and for failing to challenge his sentences. In Ground Six, Petitioner

also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge his sentences and for

failing to challenge the denial of Petitioner’s right to testify at trial. The Court addresses these

claims separately after setting forth the applicable standard of review. 

1. Standard of Review

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner must show that

counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside

the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s

performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance

and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance

requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct

the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is “extremely limited.”

Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S.

141 (1998). Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a petitioner must also establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

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unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694; Hart

v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir.

1998). The prejudice component “focuses on the question whether counsel’s deficient

performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.”

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). The court may proceed directly to the prejudice

prong. Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697). The court, however, may not assume prejudice solely from counsel’s allegedly

deficient performance. Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155.

 “‘Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never . . . easy.’” Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786

(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)). Establishing that a state court’s application

of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is even more difficult, because both standards

are “highly deferential,” and because Strickland’s general standard has a substantial range of

reasonable applications. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (citations omitted). The issue under §

2254(d) is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, but “whether there is any reasonable

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.

2. Ground Two 

In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because she applied

overbearing pressure to prevent him from testifying at trial. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner argues that

considering the “nature of the allegations and lack of other contravening evidence, [his]

testimony was essential to defending the charges against him.” (Id.) 

Petitioner does not cite Strickland or the Sixth Amendment in support of this claim. Thus,

Respondents argue that this claim is not properly before the Court because it is a “non-federal

claim.” (Doc. 13 at 7 n.3.) Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for state law claims and

the Court could deny relief based on Plaintiff’s failure to invoke the Sixth Amendment or

Strickland. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution and because

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Petitioner exhausted this same claim based on federal law on post-conviction review, the Court

will consider it on the merits. (Respondents’ Exs. J at 4, Ex. L, Ex. M at 3, 19.) 

When Petitioner raised this claim on post-conviction review, the trial court found that it

was “not supported by the trial transcript,” which showed that the court had reviewed with

Petitioner his right to testify and advised him that it was his decision whether to testify, not his

counsel’s. (Respondents’ Ex. J at 4, Ex. H at 2, Ex. K.) Thereafter, “Petitioner advised the court

that he did not wish to testify on his own behalf.” (Id.) Accordingly, the court rejected this

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.)

The appellate court affirmed that decision. (Respondents’ Ex. N.) The appellate court

found Petitioner’s claim failed because, other than generalized accusations, he did not explain

how counsel prevented him from testifying. (Id. at 4.) The appellate court further noted that

other than asserting that he would have given “his version of the events” and “possible motives

behind his accusers’ allegations,” Petitioner had not provided any information about how he

would have testified at trial. (Id.) Accordingly, Petitioner had not established that but for

counsel’s deficient performance — pressuring Petitioner not to testify — there was a reasonable

probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. (Id.); see Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. 

In the pending Petition, Petitioner does not challenge the post-conviction court’s

conclusion that the trial transcript reflected that he had waived his right to testify after a colloquy

with the trial court. (Doc. 1 at 7; Ex. K.) Additionally, as on post-conviction review, Petitioner

has not provided any specific information regarding the substance of the testimony he would

have given at trial. Petitioner’s generalized assertion that his “testimony was essential to

defending the allegations against him” fails to show that he was prejudiced as a result of

counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. (Doc. 1 at 6); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (a court

cannot grant relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim unless petitioner establishes

prejudice); United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 1991) (conclusory allegations are

insufficient to show prejudice). 

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 As with Ground Two, Petitioner does not cite Strickland or the Sixth Amendment in

support of this claim and Respondents argue that Ground Three is a “non-federal” claim that

is not properly before the Court. (Doc. 13 at 7 n.3.) For the reasons set forth above in the

discussion of Ground Two, in Section IV.B.2, the Court will consider the merits of this claim.

(Respondents’ Ex. J at 4-6, 13; Ex. L at 2, Ex. M at 3, 19-21; Ex. N.)

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Petitioner has not shown that the post-conviction court’s decision was contrary to clearly

established federal law, was based on an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts considering the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief on his claim that counsel was ineffective for pressuring him not to testify.

3. Ground Three 

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present

several unidentified character witnesses on Petitioner’s behalf.7

 (Doc. 1 at 7.) On postconviction review, the trial court found that Petitioner had failed to show that counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (Respondents’ Ex. N at 5.) The

court also found that by failing to specify how the character witnesses would have testified,

Petitioner failed to show that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable

likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different. (Id.) 

Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s resolution of this claim is contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, Strickland. “The power to decide questions of trial strategy and

tactics rests with counsel and the decision as to what witnesses to call is a tactical, strategic

decision.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). “There are a number of reasons why an

attorney may choose not to call a witness, including a concern that . . . his participation in the

defense may harm the defendant more that his testimony . . . will aid him.” State v. Goswick,

691 P.2d 673, 677 (Ariz. 1984). “[C]omplaints of uncalled witnesses are not favored in federal

habeas corpus review because allegations of what the witness would have testified are largely

speculative . . . . In addition, for [petitioner] to demonstrate the requisite Strickland prejudice,

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8

 Petitioner states that “witnesses” would have testified that J, his daughters’ former

babysitter, was manipulating the system to keep Petitioner in jail and that she and her children

had never had any problems staying overnight with Petitioner. (Doc. 1 at 7.) Petitioner states

that “other witnesses” would have testified that they stayed overnight with Petitioner numerous

times without incident, and that they never observed or heard of Petitioner acting

inappropriately. (Id.) 

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[he] must show not only that [the] testimony would have been favorable, but also that the witness

would have testified at trial.” Evans v. Cockrell, 285 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations

omitted); see also United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting

claim of ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to call a witness who would have taken

responsibility for a gun found in defendant’s possession because “[t]here is no evidence in the

record which establishes that [the witness] would testify in [petitioner’s] trial.”).

Here, although Petitioner has provided some information regarding the testimony the

character witnesses would have given at trial, he has not specifically identified any character

witness or established that any of the unidentified character witnesses would have been available

and willing to testify at trial.8

 Thus, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of

his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to call “character

witnesses” was contrary to clearly established federal law, was based on an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts considering the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Petitioner is not

entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

4. Ground Four

In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request

a Willits instruction regarding a victim’s tape recorded interview “which was overwritten and

not preserved for disclosure.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Respondents argue that this claim is not cognizable

on federal habeas corpus review because, although a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective

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9

 Respondents do not argue, as they did in opposition to the claims of ineffective

assistance asserted in Grounds Two and Three, that Ground Four is a not cognizable based on

Petitioner’s failure to cite the Sixth Amendment or Strickland. Because Petitioner exhausted

this same claim based on federal law on post-conviction review, the Court will consider the

merits of this claim. (Respondents’ Ex. J at 6, 13; Ex. L at 9, Ex. M at 3, 21; Ex. N.) 

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assistance of counsel is a federal claim, this particular claim turns on a state law issue — whether

the trial court should have given a Willits instruction.9

 (Doc. 13 at 7.) 

Respondents do not cite any authority in support of the proposition that an otherwise

federal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel becomes a state law claim if counsel’s alleged

deficient performance is based on a state law issue. The Court has found no authority supporting

this proposition, which if accepted would preclude federal habeas corpus review of numerous

claims of ineffective assistance. Instead, the court has found numerous cases in which counsel’s

alleged ineffectiveness involved a matter of state law, including the failure to request a Willits

instruction. See e.g. Pinkoson v. Davenport, 2009 WL 2219285, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jul. 24, 2009)

(because petitioner was not entitled to a Willits instruction, any deficiency in counsel’s

performance that resulted in the failure to give the instruction was not prejudicial); Micklus v.

Schriro, 2009 WL 4056790, at *8-9 (D. Ariz. Jul. 8, 2008) (discussing claim that counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the admission of certain evidence, failing to object to the trial

court’s denial of a Willits instruction, and failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper closing

argument); Luckett v. Schriro, 2006 WL 1516004, at *8 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2006) (discussing the

merits of claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of

evidence, failing to request a Willits instruction, and for failing to investigate or raise an

identification defense). Accordingly, the Court considers the merits of Petitioner’s claim that

counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Willits instruction. 

“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate

the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466

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U.S. at 687. “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than

complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional

judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 690–91. Counsel’s decisions

regarding jury instructions are fairly construed as a strategic decision. See Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d

598, 607 (6th Cir. 2002). 

“A Willits instruction is appropriate when the state destroys or loses evidence potentially

helpful to the defendant.” State v. Lopez, 786 P.2d 959, 964 (Ariz. 1990); State v. Willits, 393

P.2d 274, 277-79 (Ariz. 1964). Destruction or non-retention of evidence does not automatically

entitle a defendant to a Willits instruction. “[A] defendant must show (1) that the state failed to

preserve material and reasonably accessible evidence having a tendency to exonerate him, and

(2) that this failure resulted in prejudice.” State v. Henry, 863 P.2d 861, 875 (Ariz. 1993). 

On post-conviction review, the state court found that Petitioner was not entitled to a

Willits instruction because other than “speculating that the jury might have been able to assess

the witness’s credibility during the interview based on the recording, [Petitioner] failed to

explain how the recording would have been exculpatory.” (Respondents’ Ex. N at 31.)

Accordingly, the court found that trial counsel had not been ineffective for failing to request a

Willits instruction or for not objecting to the trial court’s failure to give a Willits instruction.

(Respondents’ Ex. N at 5.) 

In the pending Petition, Petitioner argues that he could not assert the exculpatory nature

of the destroyed evidence because he never had an opportunity to review the recorded interview

and a transcript does not “allow one to measure the veracity or behavioral cues.” (Doc. 1 at 8.)

Although Petitioner or his counsel apparently had access to “notes” and “summaries” of the

recorded interview, he still does not describe how the recording would have been exculpatory

or how the State’s failure to preserve the recording prejudiced him. (Respondents’ Ex. L at 10.)

Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of this claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel was contrary to clearly established federal law, was based on an unreasonable

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10 Respondents do not argue, as they did in opposition to the claims of ineffective

assistance asserted in Grounds Two and Three, that Ground Six is a not cognizable based on

Petitioner’s failure to cite the Sixth Amendment or Strickland. Because Petitioner exhausted

this same claim based on federal law on post-conviction review, the Court will consider the

merits of this claim. (Respondents’ Ex. J at 4-6, 13; Ex. L at 2, Ex. M at 3, 19-21; Ex. N.) 

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application of clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts considering the evidence presented in the state court proceeding, and thus Petitioner

is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

5. Ground Six

In Ground Six, Petitioner argues that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for

failing to challenge “the manner in which defendant was sentenced.” (Doc. 1 at 12.) Although

Petitioner does not specifically identify the aspect of his sentences to which counsel should have

objected, it appears that this claim is based on the trial court sentencing him under the Dangerous

Crimes Against Children Act. Petitioner argues that he should have been sentenced under Ariz.

Rev. Stat. § 13-701 and § 13-702 as a first-time offender. (Doc. 1 at 11.) Petitioner also asserts

that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise “defendant’s claim relating to [his]

wanting to testify at trial.” (Id.) As discussed below, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus

relief on Ground Six. 

a. Failure to Challenge Petitioner’s Sentences

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on

trial and appellate counsel’s failure to challenge his sentences is not cognizable on federal habeas

corpus review because, although a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

is a federal claim, this particular claim turns on a state law issue — whether the trial court

properly sentenced Petitioner under Arizona law.10 (Doc. 13 at 8.) Again, Respondents do not

cite any authority for the proposition that a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel becomes a state law claim when counsel’s alleged deficient performance is based on a

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state law issue. For the reason discussed in Section IV.B.4, supra, the Court rejects this

argument and considers the merits of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim. 

On post-conviction review, Petitioner argued that because he had no prior felony

convictions, he should have been sentenced under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-701(C) and § 13-702(A)

and because those statutes do not refer to § 13-604.01, it does not apply to his sentences.

(Respondents’ Ex. J at 12, Ex. N at 5-6.) Petitioner argued that trial and appellate counsel were

ineffective for failing to raise this argument. (Id.) The post-conviction court found that the trial

court properly sentenced Petitioner under the Arizona Dangerous Crimes Against Children Act,

and thus trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing to challenge his sentences on

that basis. (Respondents’ Ex. H at 2, Ex. N at 5-6.) 

In the pending habeas petition, Petitioner asserts that “trial and appellate counsel should

have briefed and argued the unconstitutionality of the manner in which defendant was

sentenced.” (Doc. 1 at 12.) This conclusory assertion is not sufficient to show that the state

court’s decision was contrary to clearly established federal law, was based on an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts considering the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, Petitioner

is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that he was deprived of the effective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel based on their failure to object to “the manner in which

[he] was sentenced.” (Id.) 

b. Failure to Challenge the Denial of Petitioner’s Right to Testify

In Ground Six, Petitioner also asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise the issue of Petitioner “wanting to testify at trial.” (Doc. 1 at 12.) However, Petitioner did

not exhaust available state remedies with respect to this claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel and, pursuant to the Arizona procedural rules, a return to state court to present

this claim would be futile See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.2(a) and (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303

F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) (a state post-conviction action is futile when it is time-barred);

State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (Ariz. 1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (relief is

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11 Moreover, even if this claim were properly before the Court, it would fail on the

merits. The post-conviction court found that Petitioner waived his right to testify after the trial

court advised him that whether to testify was his decision, not counsel’s. (Respondents’ Ex. N,

Ex. K.) Petitioner does not challenge that determination. Additionally, as the post-conviction

court found, Petitioner has not offered any information regarding the substance of the testimony

he would have given at trial. Thus, Petitioner cannot establish prejudice and even if Petitioner

had raised this issue on appeal, it would have been rejected. See Bauman v. United States, 692

F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 

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precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); Ariz.

R. Crim. P. 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (petition for review must be filed within thirty days

of trial court’s decision). Accordingly, although this claim is technically exhausted, it is

procedurally barred.11 See Johnson v. Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir.1991). 

Thus, unless Petitioner can show “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage

of justice”to overcome the procedural bar, this claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel is precluded from federal habeas corpus review. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50;

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989). Petitioner does not argue that failure to consider

the merits of this claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” (Doc. 17.) 

Instead, to establish “cause” to overcome the procedural bar to this claims, Petitioner

argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on post-conviction review.

(Doc. 17 at 2.) Petitioner relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S.

___, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), which held that ineffective assistance of post-conviction

counsel can be sufficient “cause” to excuse defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel when a post-conviction proceeding represents the first opportunity under state law for

a convicted state defendant to litigate claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Here,

Petitioner seeks to establish cause to excuse the default of a claim on ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. Martinez does not apply to that situation. See id. at 1319-20 (explaining that

the holding in Martinez does “not extend to attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings beyond

the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial”).

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Petitioner further argues “cause” based on his limited access to legal materials due to his

status as an inmate. (Doc. 17 at 2.) Petitioner’s status as an inmate and limited legal resources

do not constitute cause to excuse the procedural bar. See Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr.,

800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not

amount to cause to excuse a procedural default); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th

Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s arguments concerning his mental health and reliance upon jailhouse

lawyers did not constitute cause). Because Petitioner offers no legitimate “cause” that precluded

him from properly exhausting his state remedies, the Court need not reach the prejudice issue.

See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986)

(when petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, the court need not consider

whether he has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged violation). 

 C. Ground Five — Improper Sentence

In Ground Five, Petitioner asserts that the trial court imposed an improper sentence and

that he should have been sentenced in accordance with Arizona Revised Statute § 13-701(C) and

§ 13-702(A). (Doc. 1 at 11.) Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

Although Petitioner raised this claim during post-conviction proceedings (Respondents’

Ex. L at 10-14, Ex. M at 7-17), the court found review precluded pursuant to Arizona Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32.2(a). (Respondents’ Ex. N at 5 n.4.); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2)

(stating that a defendant is “precluded from relief under [Rule 32] based upon any ground . . .

[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding”). Rule

32 is an adequate state procedural rule that is independent from the merits of the claim.

Accordingly, this claim is procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review. See Coleman,

501 U.S. at 537; Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 97 (federal court is barred from considering a claim

that state court denied on an adequate state law ground independent of the merits of the federal

claim). The state court’s alternative ruling on the merits of the sentencing claim does not vitiate

the procedural bar. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10. 

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Moreover, even if Petitioner had properly exhausted this claim in state court, it is not

cognizable on federal habeas corpus review because it alleges a violation of state law. A

violation of state law is not grounds for habeas relief. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68 (it is not

the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law

questions; a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States). Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this

state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

V. Conclusion

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because his claims are either procedurally

barred from federal habeas corpus review, not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review, or

lack merit.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1)

be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave to

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the procedural ruling

debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1),

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties have fourteen days

from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written

objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely

objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District

Court’s acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United

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States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 15th day of July, 2013.

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