Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02612/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02612-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE PHILLIPI aka

ROBERT MICHAEL RAY,

CDCR # K-79951,

Civil No. 11-2612 DMS (RBB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) DENYING MOTION FOR

EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE

AMENDED COMPLAINT AS MOOT

[ECF No. 5]; and 

(2) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT 

FOR FAILING TO STATE 

A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) 

vs.

JOHN/JANE DOES; D. FOSTON; 

M. JIMENEZ; M. HODGES;

G.J. JANDA,

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

On November 9, 2011, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff filed a certified copy of his inmate trust

account statement which the Court construed as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2].

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On December 20, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but sua

sponte dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b). See Dec. 20, 2011 Order at 5-6. Plaintiff

was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading

identified in the Court’s Order. Id. Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Extension of Time to Amend

Complaint” but then filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) before the Court ruled on his

Motion. Thus, in light of the filing of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension

of Time is DENIED as moot. 

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also

obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A;Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir.

2000) (§ 1915A).

A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims1

Plaintiff, once again, alleges that his due process rights were violated during his

disciplinary hearing. (See FAC at 3.) “The requirements of procedural due process apply only

to the deprivation of interests encomppassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty

1

 Plaintiff alleges violation of his due process rights during his disciplinary hearing but he also

refers to “freedom from cruel and unusual punishment” arising from the same set of facts. (See FAC

at 3.) However, where a particular provision of the Constitution “‘provides an explicit source of

constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior,” that provision must be the

guide for analyzing Plaintiff’s claims. Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1994)). Accordingly the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s claim

relating to his disciplinary hearing as arising under the Fourteenth Amendment.

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and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison

regulations may grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protections. 

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has significantly

limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement that imposes an “atypical and

significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations

omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution

because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or

consequences of disciplinary hearing which show “the type of atypical, significant deprivation

[that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. For example, in Sandin, the

Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty

interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary versus discretionary nature of

the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the prisoner’s confinement and whether they

amounted to a “major disruption in his environment” when compared to those shared by

prisoners in the general population; and (3) the possibility of whether the prisoner’s sentence

was lengthened by his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the deprivation

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the

Court could find there were atypical and significant hardships imposed upon him as a result of

the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions”

of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim violation of due

process. Id. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege a liberty interest in remaining free of Ad-seg, and thus, has failed to state a due process

claim. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (holding that placing an inmmate in administrative segregation

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for thirty days “did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might

conceivably create a liberty interest.”).

B. Equal Protection claims

In addition, Plaintiff appears to claim that prison officials have also violated his right to

equal protection under the law. (See FAC at 3.) The “Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should

be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 

In order to state a claim under § 1983 alleging violations of the equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must allege facts which demonstrate that he is a member of a

protected class. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (indigents); see also City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (listing suspect classes). In this

matter, Plaintiff has not sufficiently plead that he is a member of a protected class nor has he

plead any facts to demonstrate that Defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate

against him based upon his membership in a protected class. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999). Moreover, Plaintiff has also

failed to allege sufficient facts which may prove invidious discrim inatory intent. Village of

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. , 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a

section 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an

opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that

if his amended complaint fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be

dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to Amend Complaint [ECF No. 5] is

DENIED as moot.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

2. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A(b).

3. Plaintiff is GRANTED sixty (60) days leave from the date this Order is filed in

which to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his

original Complaint. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 60 days, this action

shall remain dismissed without further Order by the Court.

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a Court approved § 1983 form to Plaintiff.

DATED: April 16, 2012

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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