Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00939/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00939-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HILLEAL A. GRANT,

Petitioner,

v.

F.E. FIGUEROA, Warden,

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 12cv0939 MMA (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS AND ORDER

DENYING EVIDENTIARY HEARING

[ECF NO. 1]

Petitioner Hilleal A. Grant, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 16, 2012

[ECF No. 1]. There, he alleges that his rights to due process,

equal protection, and a fair trial were violated. (Pet. 17, ECF

No. 1.)1

 The Respondent, Warden F.E. Figueroa, filed an Answer and

Notice of Lodgment on July 24, 2012 [ECF Nos. 17, 18]. Figueroa

maintains that this Court is barred from reviewing Grant's Petition

because he fails to raise a federal claim. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 6, ECF No. 17.) Petitioner filed a Traverse which was

filed nunc pro tunc to December 20, 2012 [ECF No. 27]. In his

1 The Court will cite to all documents using the page numbers

assigned by the electronic case filing system.

1 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 1 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Traverse, he attempts to assert an additional claim pursuant to the

Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (Traverse 7-12, ECF

No. 27.)2

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 17, 2006, Petitioner sold a 1998 Chrysler Sebring

to undercover detective Paul Winslow. (Pet. 15, ECF No. 1.) Grant

sold a stolen Nissan pick-up truck and a stolen Saturn Ion to the

same undercover detective on October 25, 2006. (Id. at 15-16.) On

November 14, 2006,3 Petitioner sold Winslow a stolen silver Nissan

Pathfinder and a stolen maroon Nissan Pathfinder. (Id. at 16, 20.)

A thirty-six-count indictment was filed against Grant on

October 18, 2007, in case number SCD208452. (Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk's Tr. 139-151, Oct. 18, 2007.) Among other offenses,

Petitioner pleaded guilty on May 9, 2008, to five counts of

violating California Vehicle Code section 10851(a) for unlawfully

taking and driving the vehicle of another (counts one, three, five,

seven, and nine).4 (Lodgment No. 19, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 52,

2 Petitioner was allowed until November 16, 2012, to file a

traverse. (Mins., Oct. 3, 2013, ECF No. 25.) An untimely Traverse

was constructively filed on December 13, 2012. (Traverse 14, ECF

No. 27); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (deeming

petition filed on the date the petitioner handed it to prison

authorities for mailing). It appears that Petitioner attempted to

file an earlier, timely Traverse, but that document was never

filed. (See Traverse 15-16, ECF No. 27.) In light of Grant's pro

se status and attempts to file a timely Traverse, the Court will

consider the arguments in his untimely Traverse. 

3 At one point in the Petition, Grant states that the second

transaction occurred on November 15, 2006; at another point, he

claims that it occurred on November 14, 2006. (Compare id. at 16,

with id. at 19-20.) It appears that the correct date is November

14, 2006. (See id. Ex. C at 55-56.) 

4 All subsequent penal and vehicle code references are to the

California code. 

2 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 2 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

May 9, 2008.)5 For counts one, three, five, seven, and nine, Grant

was sentenced to five consecutive two-year terms, for a total of

ten years. (Id. vol. 5, 71, Aug. 8, 2008.)6 Petitioner was also

sentenced to additional time for charges stemming from three other

cases. (See Lodgment No. 9, People v. Grant, No. D053566, slip op.

at 2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2009).) In total, he was sentenced to

twenty years and eight months for all four cases. (Id.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Direct Appeal

On May 20, 2009, Grant appealed the convictions requesting

that the California Court of Appeal consider "[w]hether the

sentences for counts five and nine in case number SCD208452 should

be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654, or a concurrent term

imposed for those counts, because the offenses occurred on the same

day?" (Lodgment No. 4, Brief Submitted on Behalf of Appellant at

8-9, People v. Grant, No. D053566 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2009).) 

In connection with the appeal, Petitioner filed multiple

supplemental briefs where he raised additional claims. (See

Lodgment No. 6, Supplemental Brief, People v. Grant, No. D053566

(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2009); Lodgment No. 7, Preliminary

Statement, People v. Grant, [No. D053566] (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23,

2009); Lodgment No. 8, [Second] Supplemental Brief, People v.

5

 In the same case, Grant also pleaded guilty to counts two,

four, six, eight, and ten for "buying, receiving, concealing,

selling and/or withholding a stolen vehicle." (Id. at 53.) 

6

 Sentencing for counts two, four, six, eight, and ten was

stayed according to California Penal Code section 654. (Id. at

72.)

3 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 3 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Grant, [No. D053566] (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2009).)7 The

California Court of Appeal, on October 23, 2009, affirmed the

judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, finding no

sentencing error. (Lodgment No. 9, People v. Grant, No. D053566,

slip op. at 4.)

The court, id. at 3, explained:

[Grant] pleaded guilty to separate counts. Thus, there

was no reviewable factual dispute as to whether any of

the counts in Grant's cases were the "same act or

omission" for the purpose of [California Penal Code]

section 654's proscription on multiple punishment or

whether the crimes were not independent of each other so

as to warrant concurrent, rather than consecutive,

sentences under California Rules of Court, rule 4.425

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court on November 30, 2009. (Lodgment No. 10, Petition for

Review, People v. Grant, [No. S178362] (Cal. Jan. 13, 2010).) He

also filed a supplemental brief. (Lodgment No. 11, Supplemental

Brief, People v. Grant, [No. S178362] (Cal. Jan. 13, 2010).) On

January 13, 2010, the California Supreme Court denied Grant's

petition for review without citation or comment. (Lodgment No. 12,

People v. Grant, No. S178362, order at 1 (Cal. Jan. 13, 2010).) 

B. State Habeas Corpus Proceedings

Grant submitted a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

San Diego County Superior Court on January 19, 2010. (Lodgment No.

13, Grant v. State Attorney General, No. HC 19869 (Cal. Super. Ct.

Mar. 25, 2010) (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) There, he

complained that the failure to impose concurrent sentences violated

due process. (Id. (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 4).) On

7

 Because Lodgment Nos. 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 15, and 17 are not

consecutively paginated, the Court has paginated each document and

will cite to each document using the assigned page numbers.

4 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 4 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

March 25, 2010, Grant's petition was denied. (Lodgment No. 14, In

re Grant, No. HC 19869, order (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2010).) 

Next, Grant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with

the California Court of Appeal on May 21, 2010, which was denied on

June 11, 2010. (Lodgment No. 15, Grant v. State Attorney General,

No. D057378 (Cal. Ct. App. filed May 21, 2010) (petition for writ

of habeas corpus); Lodgment No. 16, In re Grant, No. D057378, order

at 2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 11, 2010).) Grant continued to assert

that he was sentenced to multiple punishment for a single offense. 

(Lodgment No. 15, Grant v. State Attorney General, No. D057378

(petition for writ of habeas corpus at 8-10).

On July 26, 2010, Grant filed a habeas corpus petition raising

the same claims with the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No.

17, Grant v. Busby, No. S184843 (Cal. filed July 26, 2010)

(petition for writ of habeas corpus).) The California Supreme

Court denied Grant's petition on April 27, 2011, without citation

or comment. (Lodgment No. 18, In re Grant, No. S184843, order

(Cal. Apr. 27, 2011).) On April 16, 2012, Grant filed his Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. (Pet. 1, ECF No. 1.) 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"),

28 U.S.C. § 2244, applies to all federal habeas petitions filed

after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204

(2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA

sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

5 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 5 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). Because Grant's Petition was filed on April 16, 2012,

AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204. 

In 1996, Congress "worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus." Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997), abrogated on other grounds, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000). As amended, section 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d). 

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege his conviction was obtained "in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at

719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt

v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

6 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 6 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A federal district court does "not sit as a 'super' state

supreme court" with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court's application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a

state's application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal habeas courts are not concerned with errors

of state law "unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation"). 

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that "AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law." Id. at 71. In other words, a federal court is not

required to review the state court decision de novo. Id. Rather,

a federal court can proceed directly to the reasonableness analysis

under § 2254(d)(1). Id. 

The "novelty in . . . § 2254(d)(1) is . . . the reference to

'Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.'" Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en

banc), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section

2254(d)(1) "explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of 'clearly established' rules." Id. "A state court decision

7 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 7 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

may not be overturned on habeas review, for example, because of a

conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law . . . ." Moore, 108 F.3d at

264. "[A] writ may issue only when the state court decision is

'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,' an

authoritative decision of the Supreme Court." Id. (citing

Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1224-26 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin

v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996); Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial

court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Parties' Arguments

1. Grant's Petition

Petitioner submits that counts three (taking of Nissan pick-up

truck) and five (taking of stolen Saturn Ion) occurred on the same

occasion. (Pet. 17, ECF No. 1.)8

 He alleges that he sold these

vehicles to Winslow during the same transaction on October 25,

2006. (Id. at 18-19.) Similarly, Grant asserts that counts seven

(taking of stolen silver Nissan Pathfinder) and nine (taking of

stolen maroon Nissan Pathfinder) also occurred on the same

occasion, that is, they were both sold during a transaction that

8

 The Court notes that it appears that pages twenty two and

twenty three of the Petition have been transposed. (Id. at 22-23.)

8 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 8 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

took place on November 14, 2006. (Id. at 17, 19-20.) As to each

transaction, Grant maintains that the "'criminal course of

conduct'" involved "a single and specific 'intent and objective.'" 

(Id. at 24.) Therefore, pursuant to Penal Code section 654, he

urges that sentencing on these counts should be stayed.9

 (Pet. 18,

24, ECF No. 1.) Appearing to also argue in the alternative,

Petitioner contends that sentencing on counts five and nine should

run concurrently under Penal Code section 667(c)(6).10 (Pet. 17,

ECF No. 1.) On these bases, Petitioner claims that his rights to

due process, equal protection, and a fair trial were violated. 

(Id.)

2. Respondent's Answer

In the Answer, Warden Figueroa contends that Grant's petition

"appears to be timely and exhausted." (Answer 3, ECF No. 17.)

Respondent insists that Grant does not raise any claims that are

cognizable under federal habeas review. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

9

 Penal Code section 654(a) provides:

An act or omission that is punishable in different

ways by different provisions of law shall be punished

under the provision that provides for the longest

potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the

act or omission be punished under more than one

provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under

any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission

under any other.

Cal. Penal Code § 654(a) (West 2010). The current version of this

statute is not materially different from the version that was in

effect at the time of Grant's sentencing. 

10 Penal Code section 667(c)(6) reads, "If there is a current

conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same

occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts, the

court shall sentence the defendant consecutively on each count

pursuant to subdivision (e)." Cal. Penal Code § 667(c)(6) (West

2010). The current version of this statute is not materially

different from the version in effect at the time of Grant's

sentencing. 

9 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 9 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. 6.) A violation of Penal Code section 654, Respondent alleges,

is not a federal question. (Id.) Figueroa also maintains that

whether consecutive sentences should have been imposed is not a

federal question. (Id.) Moreover, "the Sixth Amendment does not

prohibit a state court from imposing consecutive sentences based

upon additional facts not found by a jury." (Id.) 

3. Petitioner's Traverse

Grant raises a new claim in his Traverse. Specifically, he

asserts that counts three and five constituted a "single act," yet

he was sentenced for two separate violations of Vehicle Code

section 10851(a), contrary to the provisions of the Double Jeopardy

Clauses of both the California and United States Constitutions. 

(Traverse 7, ECF No. 27.) (Id. at 9, 11.) He advances the same

argument for counts seven and nine. (Id.)

B. Due Process Claim

When reviewing a state court decision, federal courts must

look to the last reasoned state court opinion as the basis of the

state judgment. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-06 (1991). 

In his habeas petitions to the California Court of Appeal and

Supreme Court, Petitioner raised a due process claim. (See

Lodgment No. 15, Grant v. State Attorney General, No. D057378 (Cal.

Ct. App. filed May 21, 2010) (petition for writ of habeas corpus at

8-10); Lodgment No. 17, Grant v. Busby, No. S184843 (petition for

writ of habeas corpus at 6-9).) The last state court to address

Grant's due process claim was the California Court of Appeal. (See

Lodgment No. 16, In re Grant, No. D057378, order at 2.) This Court

reviews that decision. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806. The court of appeal

held that Petitioner's claims were procedurally barred: "In this

10 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 10 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

state a defendant is not permitted to try out his contentions

piecemeal by successive proceedings attacking the validity of the

judgment against him.' The petition is procedurally barred because

it is repetitive and successive. Grant has not demonstrated an

exception to the procedural bar." (Lodgment No. 16, In re Grant,

No. D057378, order at 2 (citations omitted).) The court previously

addressed Grant's sentencing claim on direct appeal and found that

the trial court had not erred in applying California Penal Code

section 654 and imposing consecutive sentences. (Id.)

1. Procedural default

State courts may decline to review a claim because of a

procedural default, absent a showing of "cause" and "prejudice." 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977). "Just as in those

cases in which a state prisoner fails to exhaust state remedies, a

habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State's procedural

requirements for presenting his federal claims has deprived the

state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first

instance." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). A

habeas petitioner who has defaulted federal claims in state court

by not complying with rules to raise them meets the technical

requirements for exhaustion because there are no longer any state

remedies available. Id. at 732 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Engle

v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26 n.28 (1982)).

Nevertheless, "[a] federal habeas court will not review a

claim rejected by a state court 'if the decision of [the state]

court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the

federal question and adequate to support the judgment.'" Beard v.

Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 55 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting

11 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 11 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729). "In order to constitute adequate and

independent grounds sufficient to support a finding of procedural

default, a state rule must be clear, consistently applied, and

well-established at the time of the petitioner's purported

default." Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994)

(citing Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1991)).

Even if a basis for a state procedural bar exists, it "does

not prevent a federal court from resolving a federal claim unless

the state court actually relied on the state procedural bar 'as an

independent basis for its disposition of the case.'" Evans v.

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 206 (2006) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.

255, 261-62 (1989)). To preclude federal habeas review, "the last

state court rendering a judgment in the case [must] 'clearly and

expressly' state[] that its judgment rests on a state procedural

bar." Harris, 489 U.S. at 263 (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi,

472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985)). At the same time, "a state court need

not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative

holding." Id. at 264 n.10. If the state court explicitly invokes

a state procedural bar as a distinct basis for its decision, the

federal habeas court is required "to honor a state holding that is

a sufficient basis for the state court's judgment, even when the

state court also relies on federal law." Id. (citing Fox Film

Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935)).

The respondent has the initial burden of pleading an adequate

and independent procedural bar as an affirmative defense in a

habeas case. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665–66 (9th

Cir. 2005); Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 2003).

12 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 12 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, Warden Figueroa does not discuss the procedural bar. (See

Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5-6, ECF No. 17.)

The Ninth Circuit has indicated that "[p]rocedural bar issues

are not infrequently more complex than the merits issues presented

by the appeal, so it may well make sense in some instances to

proceed to the merits if the result will be the same." Franklin v.

Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Lambrix v.

Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997)). "We do not mean to suggest

that the procedural-bar issue must invariably be resolved first;

only that it ordinarily should be." Id. (quoting Lambrix, 520 U.S.

at 525). District courts have applied the same rationale. See

Levi v. Almager, No. CV 08–4261–PSG (CW), 2011 WL 2672351, at *3

n.1 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2011) (deciding merits of claim that delayed

access to law library violated defendant's right to selfrepresentation rather than resolving the procedural bar question

first).

Neither side has addressed whether the procedural bar applies

to Grant's due process claim. Absent any briefing from either

party, judicial economy counsels reaching the substance of Grant's

due process claim without a determination of whether the state

procedural bar applied in this case was clear, well-established,

and consistently applied by California courts. See id. Moreover,

by failing to raise procedural default as an affirmative defense,

Figueroa waived it. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 166

(1996); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 906 n.1

(9th Cir. 1986). 

13 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 13 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Merits

A petitioner may not "transform a state-law issue into a

federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process." 

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996); see also

Johnson v. Spearman, No. CV 13–3021 JVS (AJW), 2013 WL 3053043, at

*2 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2013) (holding that alleged misapplication

of state sentencing law could not be transformed into a due process

claim). "[I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that renders

a State's criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the

federal courts." Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 13,

16 (2010); see also Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct.

859, 861 (2011) ("[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for

errors of state law.") (citations omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted); Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 192, n.5

(2009) ("'[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to

reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.'")

(quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)). "The

decision whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively

is a matter of state criminal procedure and is not within the

purview of federal habeas corpus." Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37

F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Ramirez v. Arizona, 437 F.2d

119, 120 (9th Cir. 1971)); see also Watts v. Bonneville, 879 F.2d

685, 687-88 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that an alleged improper

application of California Penal Code section 654 did not state a

cognizable federal habeas claim). 

Yet, the misapplication of state sentencing law may violate

due process in limited circumstances if there is a showing of

fundamental unfairness. Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th

14 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 14 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cir. 1994) (citing Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir.

1993)). "[T]he federal, constitutional question is whether [the

error] is so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an

independent due process . . . violation." Richmond v. Lewis, 506

U.S. 40, 50 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lewis

v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 780).

Here, Grant simply claims that the trial court failed to

properly apply state sentencing law. (Pet. 24, ECF No. 1.) 

Despite Petitioner's passing reference to the Fourteenth Amendment,

his claim is not cognizable on habeas review. Moreover, in counts

three, five, seven, and nine, Grant was charged with four separate

criminal acts, that is, taking four different vehicles. See Watts,

879 F.2d at 688 (holding that due process was not implicated in

petitioner's claim based on state sentencing law error because he

was punished for two distinct criminal acts); Ramos v. Grounds, No.

EDCV 12–795 MWF (FFM), 2012 WL 5992275, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19,

2012) ("That rational arguments can be made for the trial court's

decision suggests that even if it were erroneous, it was neither

arbitrary nor capricious."). Petitioner's conclusory allegations

do not demonstrate that the trial court applied state sentencing

law in a fundamentally unfair, arbitrary, or capricious manner. 

See Christian, 41 F.3d at 469. Accordingly, the state courts'

rejection of Grant's challenge to his sentence was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the Supreme Court. For these reasons, Grant's

due process claim should be DENIED.

15 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 15 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. Sixth Amendment Claim

Next, Petitioner argues that the state's improper application

of Penal Code sections 654 and 667(c)(6) violated his Sixth

Amendment right to a fair trial. (Pet. 17-18, ECF No. 1.) Grant

did not pursue a similar claim on direct appeal to the California

Court of Appeal or in a petition for review to the California

Supreme Court. (See Lodgment No. 4, Brief Submitted on Behalf of

Appellant at 8-9, People v. Grant, No. D053566; Lodgment No. 6,

Supplemental Brief at 6-9, People v. Grant, No. D053566; Lodgment

No. 7, Preliminary Statement at 1-15, People v. Grant, [No.

D053566]; Lodgment No. 10, Petition for Review at 6-7, People v.

Grant, [No. S178362]; Lodgment No. 11, Supplemental Brief at 14-17,

People v. Grant, [No. S178362] (Cal. Jan. 13, 2010).)11 

Grant also did not raise a claim based on his Sixth Amendment

right to a fair trial with the California Court of Appeal in his

state habeas corpus petition. (See Lodgment No. 15, Grant v. State

Attorney General, No. D057378 (petition for writ of habeas corpus

at 6-19).) Petitioner brought this claim for the first time in his

habeas petition to the California Supreme Court. (See Lodgment No.

17, Grant v. Busby, No. S184843 (petition for writ of habeas corpus

at 6-9).) The California Supreme Court summarily denied the

petition without a reasoned opinion. (See Lodgment No. 18, In re

Grant, No. S184843, order at 1.)

11 Grant did, however, raise an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment to the California Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment No. 6, Supplemental Brief at 6-7, People v.

Grant, No. D053566; Lodgment No. 7, Preliminary Statement at 6-7,

11-15, People v. Grant, [No. D053566].) 

16 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 16 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

"[T]o exhaust a habeas claim, a petitioner must properly raise

it on every level of direct review." Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896,

916 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137

(9th Cir. 1992)). "Because California's 'established, normal

appellate review procedure is a two-tiered system,' [Grant] was

required to exhaust his habeas claims in a petition for review to

the California Supreme Court." Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882,

888 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838

(1999); Cal. R. Ct. 28(b) [now Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(b)] (describing

procedure for review of a decision of the court of appeal)). But

if a petitioner raises "his federal constitutional claims for the

first and only time to the state's highest court on discretionary

review, he did not fairly present them." Casey, 386 F.3d at 918;

see Reese v. Baldwin, 282 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd on

other grounds by Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004) ("For if the

federal claim was not presented to the Oregon Court of Appeals, the

Oregon Supreme Court need not have considered that federal claim no

matter how explicitly raised to it."). Accordingly, Petitioner's

Sixth Amendment claim is unexhausted. 

Because Grant's Petition contains both exhausted and

unexhausted claims, his Petition is "mixed." See Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). Typically, mixed petitions should be

dismissed. Id. at 522. Yet, "[a]n application for a writ of

habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2). Courts may only

deny unexhausted claims on the merits if it is "perfectly clear"

that the claim is not a "colorable federal claim." See Cassett v.

17 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 17 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). Unexhausted claims are

reviewed de novo where there is no reasoned state court decision

addressing that claim. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th

Cir. 2002). The Court therefore reviews this claim de novo. See

Tran v. Uribe, No. SACV 11–1865–JSL (JPR), 2012 WL 7832619, at *5,

11 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2012) (conducting de novo review under

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d at 623-24, where claim was presented

to the California Supreme Court, but not the court of appeal).

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords

numerous rights to the accused. Specifically, it provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an

impartial jury of the State and district wherein the

crime shall have been committed, which district shall

have been previously ascertained by law, and to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be

confronted with the witnesses against him; to have

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,

and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

Grant does not explain under which provision he raises his

Sixth Amendment claim. Rather, Petitioner provides a conclusory

allegation that the trial court's errors in sentencing him

constituted a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair

trial. (See Pet. 17, ECF No. 1; see also Lodgment No. 17, Grant v.

Busby, No. S184843 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 9)

(alleging that trial court violated Grant's right to a fair trial

when it failed to adhere to state sentencing laws).) Again,

Petitioner attempts to transform his state-law claim into a federal

claim by making conclusory allegations. But, "[i]t is well-settled

that '[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a

statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.'" Jones

18 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 18 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Borg,

24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)). Grant submits in his federal

petition that he has been denied his right to a fair trial, yet he

fails to develop a nexus between his right to a fair trial and the

facts of this case. (See Pet. 17-26, ECF No. 1.) For these

reasons, relief on this basis should be DENIED. See White v.

Neven, No. 2:09–cv–00400–KJD–LRL, 2010 WL 2539717, at *5 (D. Nev.

June 3, 2010) (dismissing petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a

fair trial claim as conclusory).

D. Equal Protection Claim

Next, Petitioner alleges a violation of his right to equal

protection, which is also presumably based on sentencing errors. 

(See Pet. 17, ECF No. 1.) While Grant vaguely alluded to an equal

protection claim in a supplemental brief in his direct appeal to

the California Court of Appeal, he did not include that claim in

his petition for review to the California Supreme Court. (See

Lodgment No. 7, Preliminary Statement at 11, People v. Grant, [No.

D053566]; Lodgment No. 10, Petition for Review at 6-7, People v.

Grant, [No. S178362]; Lodgment No. 11, Supplemental Brief at 14-17,

People v. Grant, [No. S178362].) 

Petitioner raised an equal protection claim in his state

habeas corpus petition to the California Supreme Court, but the

basis of that claim differs from the equal protection claim he

brings in his federal petition. (Compare Pet. 17, ECF No. 1

(alleging equal protection claim based in improper application of

state sentencing law), with Lodgment No. 17, Grant v. Busby, No.

S184843 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 3) (alleging equal

protection claim based on breach of plea agreement).) Accordingly,

19 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 19 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the equal protection claim pursued in his federal petition is

unexhausted. As noted above, when it is perfectly clear that a

petitioner does not raise a colorable federal claim, a federal

court may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits. See Cassett,

406 F.3d at 624. 

To bring a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a

petitioner must do more than allege inequality of treatment;

"[t]here must be an allegation of invidiousness or illegitimacy in

the statutory scheme . . . ." McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829,

835 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,

273 (1979)). This may be demonstrated by showing "that the law is

applied in a discriminatory manner or imposes different burdens on

different classes of people." Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68

F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). A petitioner

cannot establish an equal protection claim warranting habeas relief

by simply alleging the state court misapplied state law or departed

from past precedents. See Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1083

(9th Cir. 2006); see also Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 554-55

(1962) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause did not ensure

uniformity in judicial decision making). 

Petitioner's equal protection claim is conclusory and lacks

any specific fact or argument linking his sentencing to a violation

of his rights to equal protection. (Pet. 17-26, ECF No. 1); see

Jones, 66 F.3d at 204. Importantly, Grant does not allege that he

was the victim of any form of discrimination or that the sentencing

laws applied impose different burdens on different classes of

people. See Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1187. Therefore, this claim

should be DENIED. 

20 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 20 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

E. Double Jeopardy Claim

As noted, Petitioner also raises a double jeopardy claim in

his Traverse. (See Traverse 7-12, ECF No. 27.) Generally, a

traverse is not the proper pleading to raise an additional ground

for relief. See Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 507 ("In order for the state

to be properly advised of additional claims, they should be

presented in an amended petition, or . . . in a statement of

additional grounds."). Nonetheless, the Court has discretion to

consider a claim raised for the first time after the filing of a

habeas petition. See Williamson v. Virga, No. ED CV 12-1540-BRO

(PLA), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133034, at *25 n.8 (C.D. Cal. July 16,

2013) (citing Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d 742, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2002). 

It will exercise that discretion and address the merits of

Petitioner's double jeopardy claim.

Grant presented a Fifth Amendment claim to the California

Court of Appeal on direct appeal. (See Lodgment No. 7, Preliminary

Statement at 6-7, 11, People v. Grant, [No. D053566].) Yet, in his

petition for review to the California Supreme Court, Grant raised a

claim under the "Double Jeopardy clause of the California

Constitution, Articles 1 & 5." (Lodgment No. 11, Supplemental

Brief at 16-17, People v. Grant, [No. S178362].) Because there is

no federal basis for his appeal to the state supreme court, this

Court cannot conclude that the Supreme Court of California had been

alerted to a federal double jeopardy claim. See Duncan v. Henry,

513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) ("If state courts are to be given the

opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal

rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution.");

21 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 21 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Galvan v. Alaska Dep't of Corr., 397 F.3d 1198, 1205 (9th Cir.

2005) ("To exhaust a federal constitutional claim in state court, a

petitioner has to have, at the least, explicitly alerted the court

that she was making a federal constitutional claim."); Kouiyoth v.

Kramer, No. 2:04–cv–0662 MCE JFM (HC), 2009 WL 2868626, at *7, *9

n.5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2009) (holding that it was not clear

whether petition exhausted federal double jeopardy where the claim

presented to the state court was based on the California

Constitution). 

In his habeas corpus petition to the California Court of

Appeal, Grant stated in an argument heading that his "excessive

sentence" was in violation of the "Double Jeopardy Amendment." 

(See Lodgment No. 15, Grant v. State Attorney General, No. D057378

(petition for writ of habeas corpus at 8-9).) He did not, however,

raise a double jeopardy claim in his habeas corpus petition to the

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 17, Grant v. Busby, No.

S184843 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 3-18).) 

Accordingly, his Fifth Amendment claim is unexhausted. See Wooten

v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). As discussed

earlier, this Court may deny this unexhausted claim if it is

perfectly clear that it is not a colorable federal claim. See

Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624. 

The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause protects against

multiple punishments for the same offense. Monge v. California,

524 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1998) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395

U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). "A state may punish separate offenses

arising out of the same transaction without violating the double

jeopardy clause." Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.

22 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 22 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1987) (citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981)). The

test that determines whether convictions violate double jeopardy is

"whether there are two offenses or only one," which is established

by evaluating "whether each provision requires proof of a fact

which the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.

299, 304 (1932) (citations omitted); see also Dowling v. United

States, 493 U.S. 342, 355 (1990) (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. at

304) ("Two offenses are considered the 'same offense' for double

jeopardy purposes unless each offense requires proof of a fact that

the other does not."). "[The] analysis focuses on the statutory

elements of the offenses . . . ." United States v. Overton, 573

F.3d 679, 691 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Rhoden

v. Rowland, 10 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that there

was no violation of the Double Jeopardy clause where sentences were

imposed for distinct crimes).

The relevant part of Vehicle Code section 10851(a) provides: 

Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or

her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and

with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive

the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of

the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the

vehicle, or any person who is a party or an accessory to

or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or

stealing, is guilty of a public offense . . . . 

Cal. Veh. Code § 10851(a) (West 2000) (relevant version of id.),

amended by Cal. Veh. Code § 10851 (West. Supp. 2013). Here, Grant

contends that the violations of Vehicle Code section 10851(a) that

occurred on October 25, 2006 –- counts three and five –- does not

require proof of facts the other does not. (Traverse 9-10, ECF No.

27.) He maintains that both cars were sold in the same

23 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 23 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

"transaction." (Id. at 9.) He makes the same argument for counts

seven and nine. (Id. at 9-10.) 

Petitioner's focus on the sale of the vehicles is misplaced. 

Counts three, five, seven, and nine were for the unlawful taking

and driving of vehicles, not for the sale of stolen vehicles.

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. 140-42.) Grant pleaded guilty to

counts two, four, six, eight, and ten, and admitted that he "did

unlawfully buy, receive, conceal, sell, withhold and aid in

concealing, selling and withholding a motor vehicle." (Id. at 140-

42, 153.) Sentencing as to those counts was stayed. (Lodgment No.

19, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 5 at 72.) Accordingly, whether Grant

sold two cars in a single transaction is irrelevant to Petitioner's

current incarceration pursuant to counts three, five, seven, and

nine. 

Moreover, the indictment shows that count three was for the

taking of Dustin Gess's vehicle, while count five was for the

taking of a different vehicle belonging to Elton Pendleton. (See

Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. 140-41.) Thus, counts three and five

required proof of different facts, and constitute two separate

violations of section 10851(a). See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 

The same is true for counts seven and nine, which were for the

taking of vehicles belonging to Eduardo Pineda and Angelito Lucas,

respectively. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. 141-42.) For these

reasons, the trial court's determination that counts three, five,

seven, and nine constituted separate offenses was neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, Grant's

Double Jeopardy claim should be DENIED. 

24 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 24 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

F. Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing as to his

claims. (Pet. 1, ECF No. 1.) He does not present any facts that

would warrant an evidentiary hearing. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan,

403 F.3d at 670 (stating that the petitioner must demonstrate he

failed to develop the factual basis of his claims in state court). 

Grant's request for an evidentiary hearing is therefore DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United

States District Judge Michael M. Anello under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined

above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the district court issue an

Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation and

(2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 31, 2013, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned "Objections

to Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

November 14, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

25 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 25 of 26
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

those objections on appeal of the Court's order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 4, 2013 ________________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Anello

All parties of record

I:\Chambers Brooks\CASES\HABEAS\GRANT939\R&R.DenyPet.MG.wpd 26 12cv00939 MMA(RBB)

Case 3:12-cv-00939-MMA-RBB Document 29 Filed 10/04/13 Page 26 of 26