Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02666/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02666-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANNA M. PIATZ,

 Plaintiff, No. CIV S-08-2666 JAM EFB

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Defendant. 

 /

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). For the

reasons that follow, the court recommends that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be

DENIED and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born February 2, 1961, alleged she was unable to work due to arm, shoulder,

neck and back pain, dizziness, headaches, fibryomyaglia and depression. Pl.’s Reply at 4;

Administrative Record (“AR”) at 40. Plaintiff protectively filed a Title II and Title XVI

application for SSI on April 21, 2005. AR at 17. The claims were denied initially on September

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1

 Plaintiff also filed prior applications under Title II and Title XVI in 2004 that were

denied and plaintiff did not appeal. AR at 17. Plaintiff also filed prior applications for Titles II

and XVI in 1990, that were denied and plaintiff did not appeal. Id.

2

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability,

in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.

137, 140-142 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt.

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

2

22, 2005, and upon reconsideration on February 16, 2006. Id.

1

 On March 21, 2006, plaintiff

requested a hearing. Id. A hearing was held before ALJ Charles D. Reite via video conference

on June 14, 2007. Id. In a decision dated October 11, 2007, the ALJ denied the claim, making

the following findings:2

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of

Social Security through March 31, 2007.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since January 15, 2003, the alleged onset date. (20 CFR

404.1520(b), 404.1571 et seq., 416.920(b) and 416.971 et

seq.). 

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments:

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3

multiple myalgias of undetermined etiology (Exhibits 4F,

9F, 14F); and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)

(Exhibit 5F) (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination

of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the

listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that

the claimant has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to

perform light work with frequent use of the bilateral upper

extremities for reaching handling, fingering and feeling; no

power grasping; mild limitation in concentration,

persistence and pace; and limited public contact.

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work

(20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

7. The claimant was born on February 2, 1961 and was 41

years old, which is defined as younger individual age 18-

49, on the alleged disability onset date. (20 CFR 404.1563

and 416.963).

8. The claimant has a limited education and is able to

communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the

determination of disability because using the MedicalVocational Rules as framework supports a finding that the

claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has

transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy

that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1560(c),

404.1566, 416.960(c), and 416.966).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in

the Social Security Act, from January 15, 2003, through the

date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

AR at 19-24.

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4

ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff has raised the following issues: 

A. The Appeal Council’s “no reason to review” order must be revered and remanded for

redecision by the Appeals Council.

B. The ALJ erred in failing to make findings as to the degree of limitations of plaintiff’s

physical impairments including failure to discuss plaintiff’s fibromyalgia and PTSD.

C. The ALJ failed to properly weigh Dr. Murphy’s opinion.

D. The ALJ failed to properly weigh LCSW Cervantes’ opinion.

E. The ALJ failed to provide specific rationale for rejecting plaintiff’s testimony.

F. The weight of all of the medical evidence fails to support the ALJ’s finding regarding

plaintiff’s RFC.

Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 5.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ

is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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3

 Although a decision by the Appeals Council to reject the ALJ’s credibility findings

requires a careful review of the Council’s explanation for doing so, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d

1484, 1487 (9th Cir.1986), that was not the case here.

5

ANALYSIS

A. Appeals Council

Plaintiff contends that the Appeal Council’s “no reason to review” order must be

reversed and remanded for redecision by the Appeals Council.

Plaintiff argues that pursuant to Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1993), the

district court has the authority to review the Appeals Council’s denial of review, and to remand

for a rehearing by the Appeals Council. The court disagrees with plaintiff’s reading of Ramirez. 

Federal courts only have jurisdiction to review the final decisions of Commissioner.3 See 42

U.S.C. § 405(g); See Razey v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1426, 1427-1429 (9th Cir.1986), modified, 794

F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986). When the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, it

made that decision final. Ramirez, at 1451. Thus, the court reviews the ALJ’s decision, not the

decision of the Appeal’s Council. Ramirez does provide for the district court to consider the

additional materials that were presented to the Appeals Council. Id. Accordingly, the additional

materials submitted to the Council are consider and addressed in the discussion below.

B. Fibromyalgia and PTSD

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to make specific findings with respect to

plaintiff’s fibromyalgia and PTSD. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 10, 13.

Fibromyalgia

Plaintiff points to a few pages of doctors notes where fibromyalgia is included in the

assessment in February 2007. AR at 357-58. While the ALJ did not reference fibromyalgia in

the decision, he found that plaintiff had a severe impairment of multiple myalgias of

undetermined etiology that caused significant limitations on plaintiff’s ability to perform basic

work functions. AR at 20. The ALJ also considered this in finding that plaintiff could only

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perform light work in the RFC. AR at 21. While not using the term ‘fibromyalgia’, the ALJ

referenced the associated symptoms of fibromyalgia, most notable the issue of pain. To the

extent that plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in the step 2 analysis, any error, if there was one, was

harmless, as it was found that the multiple myalgias was a severe impairment. Curry v. Sullivan,

925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991) (harmless error rule applies to review of administrative

decisions regarding disability). 

The ALJ also properly assessed plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ cited to the internal medicine

consultative examination of Dr. Garfinkel, on August 2, 2005, that found little impairment. AR

at 21, 190. Dr. Garfinkel identified low back pain, multiple pain in joints and probably

secondary to mild osteoarthritis, but still felt that plaintiff could lift or carry 50 pounds

occasionally and 25 pounds regularly, stand, walk or sit 6 hours in an 8 hour day and can climb,

stoop, kneel or crouch occasionally. AR at 190. Despite this finding, the ALJ still concluded that

plaintiff it limited to less than the full range of light work. AR at 21.

The ALJ also noted that despite all of plaintiff’s complaints regarding pain, there was

very little objective findings in the medical records. Id. Plaintiff cites to medical records that

show mild degenerative changes anterior spurring in the lumbar spine and a CT scan that

revealed annular bulging, however, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of these findings

are in conflict with the beneficial RFC found by the ALJ. Thus, the ALJ’s specific findings were

supported by substantial evidence in the record.

PTSD

Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s findings regarding plaintiff’s PTSD alleging that the

ALJ failed to discuss the severity of the impairment. Pl.’s Mot. at 13. Plaintiff states that the

ALJ ignored the psychiatric consultative examiner’s findings of Dr. Andrews and failed to

reference the state agency reports of Dr. Rosen and Dr. McAuley. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 13;

Pl.’s Reply at 11.

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Dr. Andrews found that plaintiff can follow simple commands but complex commands

may be more difficult and she has the ability to interact socially with co-workers and supervisors

but she would be more anxious around the public. AR at 195. Dr. Andrews also found that

plaintiff has limited math skills but can manage her own funds. Id.

Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ did not reference Dr. Andrew’s report in the decision. 

However, the ALJ found that plaintiff had mild difficulties with respect to social functioning and

she had mild difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence and pace. AR at 20. The ALJ

reflected these findings in the RFC and stated that plaintiff should have limited public contact. 

AR at 21.

While the ALJ did not specifically cite Dr. Andrew’s report, Dr. Andrews findings were

essentially adopted by the ALJ. The ALJ also did not reference the state agency reports of Dr.

Rosen and Dr. McAuley. These reports assessed plaintiff with mild to moderate limitations. AR

at 204-09. As with Dr. Andrew’s report, the ALJ reflected these assessments in the decision and

in the RFC. Thus, any error by the ALJ was harmless.

C. Dr. Murphy’s Opinion

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly weigh Dr. Murphy’s opinion. Pl.’s Mot.

for Summ. J. at 14. Dr. Murphy was one of plaintiff’s treating doctors prior to the ALJ issuing

the decision and Dr. Murphy issued a report after the ALJ decision that stated plaintiff had a

permanent disability that prevented her from working. AR at 537. Defendant argues that Dr.

Murphy’s opinion supports the ALJ’s RFC finding. Def.’s Opp’n at 10.

The ALJ must make fairly detailed findings in support of his decision to permit courts to

review those decisions intelligently. See Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1981).

The ALJ, however, need not discuss all evidence presented. Rather, the ALJ must explain why

“significant probative evidence has been rejected.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir.

1981). Here, the evidence which the ALJ ignored was neither significant nor probative.

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4

 There are also additional entries from other of plaintiff’s treating doctors at Shasta

Community Health.

8

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is silent with respect to various of Dr. Murphy’s

notes that discussed, peripheral neuropathy, AR at 220, possible Reynaud’s syndrome, AR at

241, fibromyalgia, AR at 357, and cervical spine DJD and possible thoracic outlet syndrome, AR 

at 432.

The transcript in the instant case is nearly 600 pages, the majority containing medical

records. There are more than 15 such entries from Dr. Murphy concerning a wide range of

medical ailments, similar to those stated by plaintiff above, and the ALJ did not reference every

single report. AR at 220, 224, 232, 235, 273, 280, 282, 354, 357, 358, 364, 376, 381, 389, 398,

401.4

 However, there is no indication that any of the ailments mentioned by plaintiff were

significant, as many are mentioned only once or twice and then the record is silent. A finding of

disability involves an impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuos period

of no less than 12 months. Moreover, plaintiff has the burden of proving that she has a severe

impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation process. An impairment is severe if it

significantly limits one’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c),

416.920(c).

Plaintiff has failed to show that any of these ailments were a severe impairment or were

not related to the severe impairments found by the ALJ, such as the fibromyalgia discussed in the

prior section. The records show that plaintiff was being treated by Dr. Murphy for all these

problems and there is no indication that the treatment was not effective. With respect to

depression, plaintiff was being provided with anti-depressants with reports that she was feeling

better. AR at 224, 232, 280. If any of these ailments were more severe, the record does not

reflect concern from plaintiff’s doctors. Most importantly, despite plaintiff’s medical problems,

Dr. Murphy encouraged plaintiff to seek employment in May 2006, saying she would be good at

a caregiving job. AR at 439. Furthermore, “the ALJ is the final arbiter with respect to resolving

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 The court will also address in this section, plaintiff’s argument in Section F that the

ALJ’s light work RFC was unsupported by Dr. Murphy’s report submitted after the ALJ

decision.

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ambiguities in the medical evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.

2008). 

Plaintiff also faults the Appeals Council for failing to give proper weight to Dr. Murphy’s

opinion, provided after the ALJ decision, that plaintiff is disable and cannot work.5

 Dr. Murphy

indicated on a form that plaintiff has a physical and mental incapacity that prevents or

substantially reduces her ability to work. Tr. at 537. Dr. Murphy attributed this to fibromyalgia

and depression and indicated that this would be permanent. Id. Also included with this opinion

were approximately a dozen pages of doctors notes and test results. Most of the doctors notes

are difficult to read and there is no indication what circumstances changed in the prior year when

Dr. Murphy initially recommended that plaintiff should obtain employment and then stated that

plaintiff was unable to work. Plaintiff’s depression was being treated with positive results and

the ALJ acknowledged that plaintiff’s pain issues constituted a severe impairment. AR at 20,

224, 232, 280. A single report stating that plaintiff is disabled without proper supporting

evidence is insufficient.

Furthermore, Dr. Murphy’s post ALJ decision report may be “less persuasive since it was

obtained by [plaintiff] only after the ALJ issued an adverse determination.” Weetman v.

Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 23 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1550 (9th Cir.

1985) (refusing to remand for reconsideration of “new” evidence because when the claimant

“failed to succeed on his disability claim in the agency and district court hearings, he sought out

a new expert witness who might better support his position”); see also Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d

540, 544 (9th Cir.1996) (noting that “because Dr. Hanbery's 1993 reports were issued after the

Commissioner's decision . . . they are less than persuasive.”).

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 The following section describes in detail the ALJ’s reasoning for not crediting

plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

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Ultimately, many of Dr. Murphy’s findings were incorporated into the RFC and the

report issued after the ALJ’s decision is insufficient.

D. LCSW Cervantes’ opinion

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ did not properly weigh the opinion of the LCSW that

treated plaintiff.

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195,

1201 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the regulations differentiate between opinions from “acceptable

medical sources” and “other sources.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), (e); 416.913(a), (e). For

example, licensed psychologists are considered “acceptable medical sources,” and social workers

are considered “other sources.” Id. Medical opinions from “acceptable medical sources,” have

the same status when assessing weight. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), (d); 416.927(a)(2), (d). 

No specific regulations exist for weighing opinions from “other sources.” Opinions from “other

sources” accordingly are given less weight than opinions from “acceptable medical sources.”

Ernesto Cervantes, the LCSW, found that plaintiff was unable to meet competitive

standards with respect to mental abilities and aptitude needed for particular jobs. AR at 330. 

Cervantes issued this report on January 22, 2006. AR at 331. Cervantes only first met with

plaintiff on June 8, 2006. AR at 327. Despite Cervantes’ findings that plaintiff could not work,

he assigned her a GAF of 60, which indicates only moderate symptoms. AR at 327. The ALJ

specifically noted that Cervantes’ report was based primarily on plaintiff’s subjective complaints

as opposed to objective findings. AR at 21. In the decision, the ALJ specifically described

various reasons for not crediting plaintiff’s subjective complaints, both physical and mental

complaints.6

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To demonstrate that she is disabled due to depression, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to

submit medically acceptable clinical and/or laboratory findings from an acceptable medical

source. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.908, 416.912(c), 416.913(a), 416.928. Cervantes’ report is not an 

acceptable source of medical evidence, as Cervantes is neither a physician nor a licensed

psychologist. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a) (listing acceptable medical sources). As the ALJ

properly discussed his reasons for not crediting the report, plaintiff’s claim is meritless.

E. Plaintiff’s testimony

Plaintiff next alleges that the ALJ erred by not providing specific rationale for rejecting

her testimony.

The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the

ALJ who used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d

520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the ALJ must make an explicit credibility

finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d

1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring explicit credibility finding to be supported by “a specific,

cogent reason for the disbelief”).

In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586,

591 (9th Cir. July 8, 2009); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). The

ALJ may not find subjective complaints incredible solely because objective medical evidence

does not quantify them. Bunnell, at 345-46. If the record contains objective medical evidence of

an impairment reasonably expected to cause pain, the ALJ then considers the nature of the alleged

symptoms, including aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and functional restrictions. See

Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591. The ALJ also may consider the applicant’s: (1) reputation for

truthfulness or prior inconsistent statements; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to

seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) daily activities. Smolen v.

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7P, 61 FR 34483-01; SSR

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95-5P, 60 FR 55406-01; SSR 88-13. Work records, physician and third party testimony about

nature, severity, and effect of symptoms, and inconsistencies between testimony and conduct,

may also be relevant. Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The ALJ may rely, in part, on his or her own observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882

F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1989), which cannot substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v.

Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177, n.6 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff is required to show only that her

impairment “could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” Vasquez, 572 F.3d at

591 (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)); Smolen, 80 F.3d at

1282. Absent affirmative evidence demonstrating malingering, the reasons for rejecting applicant

testimony must be specific, clear and convincing. Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591. 

In this case, the ALJ properly analyzed the evidence and provided clear and convincing

reasons for discounting plaintiff’s credibility. Most importantly, the ALJ noted the lack of

objective medical findings in the treatment record compared to plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

AR at 21. An internal medicine consultative examination in August 2005, found plaintiff had a

medium RFC, yet the ALJ still assessed plaintiff’s RFC to less than the full range of light work. 

AR at 21, 186-91. The ALJ discussed how plaintiff received an extensive workup of studies, labs

and imaging studies in September 2005. AR at 21, 237. The results found generalized myalgias

but no other findings. Id. The ALJ cited to MRI’s and x-rays of plaintiff conducted by Shasta

Community Health Center in 2006 that were normal with no problems. AR at 21, 505-12. 

The ALJ also mentioned plaintiff’s noncompliance with medical treatment when plaintiff

increased the dosage of her Cymbalta medication without consulting her treating physician. AR

at 22. Plaintiff also continued to smoke against the medical advice of several doctors. AR at 21.

The ALJ also described how plaintiff’s stories and subjective complaints were confusing,

uncorroborated and did not make much sense. AR at 21. Plaintiff described unusual

circumstances involving a hurricane in Florida, a stolen van, stolen medicine, losing her mining

claim and shoveling gravel. Id. During the hearing before the ALJ, plaintiff had difficulty

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recalling what years she worked certain jobs and even plaintiff’s attorney seemed confused by

plaintiff’s answers. AR at 553.

While plaintiff does not agree with the ALJ’s findings, it is clear that the ALJ used the

proper process and provided proper reasons for discounting plaintiff’s testimony. Courts give

deference to the ALJ's assessment of plaintiff's testimony, as “[c]redibility determinations are the

province of the ALJ.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995). Despite not fully

crediting plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ still found that plaintiff had severe

impairments and issued her RFC to include only light work. Thus, the ALJ’s analysis was proper

and this claim must be denied.

F. Weight of the medical evidence does not support the RFC

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s light work RFC is not supported by the report of

Dr. Murphy submitted after the ALJ decision. For the same reasons discussed above in Section C

when previously discussing Dr. Murphy’s report, this claim must be denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment be granted; and 

3. Judgment be entered for the Commissioner.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 12, 2010.

Case 2:08-cv-02666-JAM-EFB Document 27 Filed 02/12/10 Page 13 of 13