Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00076/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00076-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

VAN BERNARD BRANCH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-00076 PHX SMM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. McNAMEE:

Petitioner filed a pro se petition seeking a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254 on January 3, 2008,

and an amended petition (Docket No. 7) on June 8, 2008.

Petitioner contends he is entitled to relief pursuant to the

United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Blakely v. Washington.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 15) on November 12, 2008.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

I Procedural History

A grand jury indictment filed April 6, 2001, charged

Petitioner with one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices,

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one count of theft, one count of trafficking in stolen property,

three counts of identity theft, one count of conspiracy to

commit fraudulent schemes, and one count of telecommunications

fraud. See Answer, Exh. A. The grand jury indictment alleged

the criminal acts occurred between January 9, 1997, and March 8,

2001. See id., Exh. A. 

On April 24, 2001, the state alleged Petitioner had

previously been convicted on seven felony charges including

burglary, resisting arrest, robbery, possession of marijuana,

and, in 1983, murder. Id., Exh. C. The most recent of the

seven alleged prior felonies occurred in 1993. Id., Exh. C.

However, the state also alleged Petitioner committed the

offenses stated in the indictment while on release in a 2000

case in which Petitioner was convicted of burglary, i.e.,

CR2000-005913. Id., Exh. C, Exh. D, Exh. E. 

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, on August 2,

2002, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of the grand jury

indictment, i.e., fraudulent schemes, and admitted one prior

felony conviction for burglary. Id., Exh. F. & Exh. G. The

written plea agreement provided, inter alia, that the

presumptive sentence for the fraudulent schemes conviction was

9.25 years and “THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE SENTENCED TO THE

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS FOR NO LESS THAN THE PRESUMPTIVE TERM

OF 9.25 YEARS, AND NO MORE THAN 15 YEARS...” Id., Exh. F

(emphasis in original). The plea agreement also provided the

other counts against Petitioner would be dismissed, the

allegation of a second prior felony conviction would be

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dismissed, the allegation that Petitioner was on parole at the

time of his offense would be dismissed. Id., Exh. F. The plea

agreement also stated that, by pleading guilty, Petitioner was

waiving his right to a jury trial on the charges against him.

Id., Exh. F. 

At the change of plea hearing, Petitioner confirmed

that he had read and understood the plea agreement. Id., Exh.

G. Petitioner was then advised by the trial court that, under

the agreement, he would be sentenced to the Department of

Corrections “for not less than presumptive term of nine and

quarter years, not more than 15 years.” Id., Exh. G at 8–9.

Petitioner confirmed to the court that he had seven prior felony

convictions and that he was on probation or parole when the

subject offense occurred. Id., Exh. G. Petitioner also stated

that he understood that his plea could result in an “automatic

violation” of his parole status in CR2000-005913, and that he

could be sent back to prison for the “remainder” of his prison

sentence in CR2000-005913. Id., Exh. G. Petitioner also

acknowledged that he had been convicted in 1993 of burglary in

the third degree, a class four felony. Id., Exh. G.

Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to his fraudulent

schemes conviction five months later, on January 8, 2002. Id.,

Exh. H. At the sentencing hearing Petitioner’s counsel informed

the trial court that Petitioner had, in the interim, been

accused of another multi-count fraudulent schemes crime. Id.,

Exh. H. At that time Petitioner sought to withdraw his guilty

plea, stating that he did not understand the plea when he signed

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the plea agreement “or whatever, so that’s what I want to do.”

Id., Exh. H. Petitioner averred he had not been told that the

sentencing range was 9.25 to 15 years and that he might be

ordered to serve the sentence consecutively to his sentence in

CR2000-005913. The state trial court denied Petitioner’s

request to withdraw his guilty plea, finding Petitioner had not

shown manifest injustice. Id., Exh. H at 6. Petitioner was

then sentenced to an aggravated term of 15 years imprisonment,

which sentence was imposed consecutive to the sentence imposed

in CR2000-005913 upon Petitioner’s violation of the terms of

release in that matter by his conviction in the 2001 case. 

Petitioner waived a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentence by pleading guilty. Petitioner filed a timely state

action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure on January 11, 2002. See id., Exh.

I. Petitioner was appointed counsel, who declared to the state

court that she was unable to find any meritorious claims to

raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. K. 

Petitioner filed a pro per petition in his Rule 32

action in the state trial court on September 4, 2002. Id., Exh.

L. Petitioner asserted he was entitled to relief because he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id.,

Exh. L. Petitioner alleged his counsel was ineffective because

he failed to investigate and raise Petitioner’s “mental health

issues” during Petitioner’s plea and sentencing proceedings and

because counsel did not inform Petitioner he would receive a

concurrent sentence to any other imposed sentence. Id., Exh. L.

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The state trial court denied post-conviction relief in

a decision issued January 9, 2003. Id., Exh. M. The state

trial court concluded Petitioner had not stated a colorable

claim that he was denied his right to the effective assistance

of counsel. Id., Exh. M. The trial court concluded

Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was not deficient as defined

by prevailing professional standards. Id., Exh. M.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals. However, his petition for review of

the trial court’s decision denying Rule 32 relief was not

timely, being filed February 25, 2003, more than thirty days

after the trial court’s decision was filed. See id., Exh. N &

Exh. O. Petitioner asked the Court of Appeals to accept his

belated petition for review. id., Exh. O. The Court of Appeals

denied leave to file a delayed petition for review, “without

prejudice to filing a motion to allow late filing in the trial

court.” Id., Exh. P. Petitioner did not, however, ask the

trial court for leave to pursue a delayed petition for review of

its decision denying Rule 32 relief. Id. at 6. Therefore, on

March 19, 2004, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied the petition

for review of the trial court’s decision denying Rule 32 relief

because the petition for review was not timely filed. See id.,

Exh. Q.

Petitioner filed a second action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, on July 24, 2004. Petitioner alleged the same

ineffective assistance of counsel claims as in his first Rule 32

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action. See id., Exh. R. The action was dismissed by the state

trial court on August 30, 2004. Id., Exh. S. The state trial

court concluded Petitioner was precluded from reasserting claims

raised in his first Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. S. Petitioner

did not seek review of this order. Id. at 7.

Petitioner filed a third action for state postconviction relief in the Arizona trial court on March 15, 2005.

Id., Exh. T. Petitioner asserted he was entitled to relief

pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s 2004 opinion in

Blakely v. Washington. Id., Exh. T. Petitioner argued that,

because Blakely was a further interpretation of Apprendi v. New

Jersey, a 2000 case, Blakely applied to all cases decided after

Apprendi. Id., Exh. T. 

The Arizona trial court dismissed Petitioner’s third

action for state post-conviction relief on April 27, 2005. Id.,

Exh. U. The state court concluded Petitioner’s claims became

final on January 6, 2003, at the conclusion of his Rule 32 “as

of right” proceedings, i.e., when the time expired for seeking

review of the trial court’s decision denying relief.

Accordingly, the state court determined, because Blakely did not

apply to cases which were final before the opinion was announced

in 2004, Petitioner was not entitled to relief. Id., Exh. U.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court

of Appeals, which denied review on March 3, 2006. Id., Exh. AA.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme

Court, which denied review on October 4, 2006. Id., Exh. CC. 

 

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 II. Analysis

A. The petition is barred by the statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th

Cir. 2002). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled to

tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a

“properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 & Supp. 2008). See also

Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000);

Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Because Petitioner pled guilty and thereby waived his

right to a direct appeal, Petitioner’s convictions and sentences

became final at the conclusion of his first action for state

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711

(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, in Arizona, the statute of

limitations began to run upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32

of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.”).

Petitioner’s first Rule 32 proceedings concluded on March 19,

2004, when the Arizona Court of Appeals denied the petition for

review of the trial court’s decision denying Rule 32 relief

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because the petition for review was not timely filed.

Petitioner had one year from that date, i.e., until March 19,

2005, to seek federal habeas relief, not counting any time

during which the statute of limitations was statutorily tolled

by the pendency of any properly-filed state action for postconviction relief. See Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974

(9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner’s second and third state post-conviction

proceedings did not toll the statute of limitations because they

were not “properly filed” actions. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 413, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1811-12 (2005). Additionally,

even tolling all of the time during and in-between the pendency

of all three state Rule 32 actions, the last action concluded on

October 4, 2006, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of

dismissal of the third Rule 32 action. Even if the Court were

to use this date as the beginning of the one-year statute of

limitations, the habeas petition, filed January 3, 2008, was

filed more than three months too late. 

B. Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations

Petitioner is not entitled to the equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. A petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15 (2005).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

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petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 397 (2008); Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003), modified on other

grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See Jones

v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219

F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding this remedy is

“typically applied sparingly”). The petitioner must establish

a causal connection between the alleged roadblock to their

timely filing of their federal habeas petition and the actual

failure to file the petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at

1034; Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir.

2005). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

tolling is warranted in his case. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of representation during the applicable filing period do

not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

tolling because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.”

See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable

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tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence “throughout

the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111,

113 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969

(9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir.

1999). 

Petitioner has not filed a reply to the answer to his

habeas petition explaining why he might be entitled to equitable

tolling. Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition, or that any state action was the “but for” cause for

his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See Brown

v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding the

petitioner has a strong burden to plead specific facts

supporting their claim of extraordinary circumstances). See

also Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19, 125 S. Ct. at 1815 (concluding

that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling

because he was not misled or confused about the exhaustion of

his state remedies and filing his federal habeas petition).

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that there

were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made

it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition.

Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333 (2006). Additionally,

Petitioner did not act with reasonable diligence throughout the

time period he seeks to toll. See Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976,

978 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a claim to equitable tolling

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1

Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. [] Here, only the existence of

a prior conviction is at issue, and Petitioner

has no federal right to have a jury decide that

-11-

where the petitioner “provided no specificity regarding the

alleged lack of access and the steps he took to diligently

pursue his federal claims”). Compare Roy, 465 F.3d at 969-72.

Blakely claim

Section 2244 provides the statute of limitations

regarding a federal habeas claim may begin to run on the “date

on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review.” § 2244(d)(1)(). 

The United States Supreme Court announced a new

constitutional rule regarding criminal procedure in Blakely v.

Washington on June 24, 2004. See 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531.

However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has conclusively

held the Supreme Court’s Blakely decision does not apply

retroactively to a state conviction which was final before June

24, 2004. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th Cir.

2005).

 Additionally, the fact that Petitioner’s sentence was

aggravated by a “prior” conviction and that he admitted this

conviction removes his circumstance from the umbrella of both

Apprendi and Blakely.1 See Hughes v. Harrison, 129 Fed. App.

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question. .... The Constitution permits prior

convictions to be used to enhance a sentence,

without being submitted to a jury, so long as the

convictions were themselves obtained in

proceedings that required the right to a jury

trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S. Ct. 2348 [].

There is no suggestion that Petitioner’s []

conviction was obtained without the requisite

procedural safeguards. Thus, we reject

Petitioner’s claim that his sentence violated

Apprendi. Davis v. Woodford, 446 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 2006).

-12-

340, 341 (9th Cir. 2005); Stevenson v. Lewis, 116 Fed. App. 814,

815 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Apprendi carved out a “narrow exception”

for sentence enhancements based on “the fact of a prior

conviction.”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s case is excepted from

the rule stated in Blakely, which does not apply to a sentence

aggravated by a “prior” felony conviction.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Branch’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

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parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

 Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2008.

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