Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02000/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02000-89/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., a

Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

O2 MICRO INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, a

Cayman Island corporation,

Defendant.

 /

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS.

 /

O2 MICRO INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, a

Cayman Islands corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., a

California corporation, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

AND RELATED CROSS-CLAIMS AND

COUNTERCLAIMS.

 /

No. C 04-2000 CW

(consolidated with

No. C 06-2929 CW)

ORDER DENYING O2

MICRO'S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION OF

ORDER DENYING

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

AND CLARIFYING THAT

ORDER

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 870 Filed 04/11/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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102 Micro further contends that the Court should allow it

further discovery on whether Taiwan Sumida Electronics adequately

represented MPS' interests in the Texas litigation and whether MPS

controlled Taiwan Sumida's defense in that litigation. Its

objection to Judge Laporte's order regarding its motion to enforce

and to compel MPS to produce these documents, however, was denied. 

See Docket No. 839. 

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O2 Micro International Limited requests that the Court

reconsider its denial of O2 Micro's motion for summary judgment

based on collateral estoppel. It argues that the Court should

grant its motion for summary judgment based on the emergence of new

material facts and based on material facts and dispositive legal

arguments, previously presented to the Court, which the Court

allegedly failed to consider.1

 It states that, at the very least,

the Court should clarify that its denial of O2 Micro's motion was

based on the existence of genuine issues of material fact, noting

that, unlike other Defendants, Defendant Monolithic Power Systems

(MPS) did not cross-move for summary judgment of no collateral

estoppel. 

MPS opposes the motion. It notes that district courts

"possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long

as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with

all of her evidence." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326

(1986). The Court, however, did not sua sponte grant summary

judgment in MPS' favor. Therefore, its order should be interpreted

as only denying O2 Micro's motion for summary judgment, and not as

also finding that MPS is not collaterally estopped from litigating

the validity of the asserted claims and infringement of those

claims. See Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1573

(Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Denial of summary judgment 'is strictly a

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 870 Filed 04/11/07 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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pretrial order that decides only one thing -- that the case should

go to trial.'”) (quoting Switzerland Cheese Assoc., Inc. v. E.

Horne's Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966)).

O2 Micro's arguments that the Court should grant its motion

for summary judgment of collateral estoppel are unpersuasive. The

new facts that O2 Micro points to do not establish that there is no

dispute of fact concerning whether collateral estoppel is

appropriate. Nor did the Court manifestly fail to consider any

facts that O2 Micro presented in its papers for summary judgment. 

The Court considered, and rejected, O2 Micro's argument that an

indemnitor-indemnitee relationship is sufficient to establish

privity and thus the Court need not consider the adequacy of

representation. See, e.g., Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 996

(9th Cir. 2005) ("due process considerations make adequacy of

representation a prerequisite to privity"). 

Therefore, having considered the parties' papers, the Court

DENIES O2 Micro's motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 809), and,

as discussed above, clarifies that its order did not rule that MPS

is not collaterally estopped from litigating the validity of the

asserted claims and infringement of those claims. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 4/11/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-02000-CW Document 870 Filed 04/11/07 Page 3 of 3