Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02564/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02564-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO RP

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Timothy P. Olmos, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

David Stokes, II, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 10-2564-PHX-GMS (MEA)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s “Motion For Enlargement Of Time To File

First Amended Complaint” (Doc. 19), “Motion For Order To Return Of Documents Not

Filed By Clerk” (Doc. 20), First Amended Complaint (Doc. 21), “Affidavit In Support Of

Complaint (Vol. II, §§ 47-85)” (Doc. 22), “Motion For Leave To Suspend Enforcement Of

Local Rules Upon Pro Se Litigant” (Doc. 23), “Memorandum In Support Of Motion For

Leave To Suspend Enforcement Of Local Rules Upon Pro Se Litigant” (Doc. 24), and

“Motion For Assistance In Locating Select Defendants For Service Of Pleadings” (Doc. 25).

I. Procedural Background

On November 28, 2010, Plaintiff Timothy P. Olmos, who is confined in the Arizona

State Prison Complex-Florence (ASPC-Florence), filed “Plaintiffs’ Motion For Leave To File

Lengthy Complaint And Related Pleadings” (Doc. 1). In conjunction with his Motion,

Plaintiff Olmos submitted the following documents which were lodged in this case by the

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Clerk of Court: a pro se “Civil Rights Complaint By A Prisoner” (Doc. 2), which included

a “Complaint Addendum” (Docs. 2 [part] and 3); a “Notice Of Appearance As Lead

Plaintiff” (Doc. 4); an “Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis By A Prisoner Civil (NonHabeas)” (Doc. 5); a certified “Inmate Bank Account” statement (Doc. 6); an “Affidavit In

Support Of Complaint” (Doc. 7); a “Memorandum Establishing Conformance With 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a)” (Doc. 8), which included “Appendices To Memorandum Establishing

Conformance With 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)”; and an “Ex Parte Motion To Modify

Requirements For Service Of Process” (Doc. 10). 

By Order filed February 9, 2011 (Doc. 11), the Court granted “Plaintiffs’ Motion For

Leave To File Lengthy Complaint And Related Pleadings” (Doc. 1) in part, to the extent that

the Court directed the Clerk of Court to file Plaintiff’s lodged “Civil Rights Complaint By

A Prisoner” (Doc. 2); “Notice Of Appearance As Lead Plaintiff” (Doc. 4); “Application to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis By A Prisoner Civil (Non-Habeas)” (Doc. 5); certified “Inmate

Bank Account” statement (Doc. 6); “Affidavit In Support Of Complaint” (Doc. 7); and “Ex

Parte Motion To Modify Requirements For Service Of Process” (Doc. 10). “Plaintiffs’

Motion For Leave To File Lengthy Complaint And Related Pleadings” (Doc. 1) was denied

in part, to the extent that the Court directed the Clerk of Court not to file Plaintiffs’ lodged

556-page “Complaint Addendum” (Docs. 2 [part] and 3) and “Memorandum Establishing

Conformance With 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)” (Doc. 8).

The Court’s Order also directed that this action may not proceed as a class action,

denied as moot the “Notice Of Appearance As Lead Plaintiff” and “Ex Parte Motion To

Modify Requirements For Service Of Process,” granted the “Application to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis By A Prisoner Civil (Non-Habeas),” assessed an initial partial filing fee, 

dismissed the “Civil Rights Complaint By A Prisoner” for failure to comply with Rule 8 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and gave Plaintiff Olmos 30 days from the filing date

of the Order to file a first amended complaint in compliance with the Order. Lastly, the

Order dismissed Plaintiffs David Stokes, II; James Walker; Jose Ulloa; Roger Clark; William

McEnany; and “all others similarly situated” from this action.

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II. Motion for Enlargement of Time to File First Amended Complaint

On February 22, 2011, Plaintiff filed a “Motion For Enlargement Of Time To File

First Amended Complaint” (Doc. 19), in which Plaintiff seeks a 30-day enlargement of time

to file his First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s Motion will be granted and Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint (Doc. 21), which was filed on March 14, 2011, will be accepted as

being timely filed.

III. Motion for Order to Suspend Enforcement of Local Rules

On March 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed a “Motion For Leave To Suspend Enforcement Of

Local Rules Upon Pro Se Litigant” (Doc. 23) and “Memorandum In Support Of Motion For

Leave To Suspend Enforcement Of Local Rules Upon Pro Se Litigant” (Doc. 24). In his

Motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court accept his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 21) with

“a slight modification to the original forms provided by the Clerk.” Plaintiff’s Motion will

be granted to the extent that Court will accept Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint in the

form that it was filed.

IV. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).

V. First Amended Complaint 

Plaintiff should take notice that all causes of action alleged in an original complaint

which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard

Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (“an amended pleading supersedes the

original”); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the Court will

consider only those claims specifically asserted in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

(Doc. 21) with respect to only those Defendants specifically named in the First Amended

Complaint.

Named as Defendants in the First Amended Complaint are: (1) Charles L. Ryan,

Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC); (2) GEO Group, Inc. (GEO),

Private Prison Contractor – Operator at the Central Arizona Correctional Facility (CACF);

(3) Compass Group – North America Division, d.b.a. Canteen Correctional Services

(Canteen), Food Services Contractor at all ADC-run prison units; (4) Keefe Group, d.b.a.

Keefe Commissary Network (Keefe), Inmate Store Contractor at every prison unit housing

ADC inmates; (5) Janice K. Brewer, Governor of Arizona; (6) Ferris D. Ahee, Dentist at the

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Winchester Unit of the Arizona State Prison Complex-Tucson (ASPC-Tucson); (7) Daniel

Cardoza, Lieutenant at the North Unit of ASPC-Florence; (8) “Unknown ADC Security

Officer(s)” at the Mail Room of the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis (ASPC-Lewis)

and/or the Morey Unit of ASPC-Lewis; (9) “Unknown ADC Administrator(s)”; (10) Eric

Hall, Correctional Officer (CO) IV at the Winchester Unit of ASPC-Tucson; (11) Thomas

C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General; (12) Allen Ortega, CO II/SSU Officer at ASPCFlorence Complex Administration; and (13) Timothy Brockman, Captain at ASPC-Florence

Complex Administration. 

Plaintiff alleges 15 counts in the First Amended Complaint and seeks a jury trial,

declaratory and injunctive relief, appointment of a special master, all fees and costs, and

compensatory and punitive monetary damages, with compound interest. 

VI. Discussion

A. Count I

In Count I, Plaintiff claims that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated by Defendant GEO’s practice of operating “CACF with constantly-illuminated

dorms, including the dorm that Plaintiff was housed in.” In support of his claim, Plaintiff

contends that “constantly-illuminated dorms impose physical and psychological harm with

no legitimate penological justification.” Plaintiff alleges that the actions of Defendant GEO

“posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to Plaintiff Olmos’ future health.”

“‘An Eighth Amendment claim that a prison official has deprived inmates of humane

conditions must meet two requirements, one objective and one subjective.’ ‘Under the

objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an inmate of the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132-33

(9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations and citations omitted). The subjective prong requires the

inmate to demonstrate that the deprivation was a product of “deliberate indifference” by

prison personnel. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991). Such indifference can only

occur if “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

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substantial risk of serious harm exits, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v.

Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further,

a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the

claim that were not initially pled. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

Plaintiff’s allegations in Count I are too conclusory and vague to state a claim for

relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. While subjecting an inmate to constant

illumination may, under certain circumstances, rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation, see Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff alleged “that

large florescent lights directly in front of and behind his cell shone into his cell 24 hours a

day”), Plaintiff has not alleged enough facts for his claim to rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. Plaintiff does not describe the type of illumination at issue and does

not explain how he was specifically harmed by the constant illumination. 

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count I for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

B. Count II

In Count II, Plaintiff claims that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to

“constitutionally sufficient medical care” and to “freedom from cruel and unusual

punishment” were violated by Defendants Ryan, Brewer, Ahee, and Horne. 

Plaintiff alleges that the policies of Defendant Ryan “served to deny medical care to

Plaintiff Olmos when ADC medical staff enforced those policies by (a) refusing to process

medical request forms . . . , (b) refusing to provide Plaintiff Olmos medical care with overthe-counter medications and medical remedies . . . and, (c) refusing to treat his flu and the

pandemic at Winchester per CDC outlines for prisons.” Plaintiff further alleges that

“Defendant Ryan’s systemwide understaffing of ADC’s medical and health care system led

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to delays in care for Plaintiff.” Plaintiff also alleges that “Defendant Ryan’s medical

prescription policies led to Plaintiff Olmos being prescribed ineffective allergy medicine as

part of the inappropriate treatment he received.” 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Ryan in Count II are too conclusory and

vague to state a claim for relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ryan’s policies served to deny medical care to Plaintiff and

led to being prescribed ineffective allergy medicine, Plaintiff has not described the policies

at all. Also, Plaintiff’s allegation of systemwide understaffing is not only vague but also

insufficient because a mere delay in medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a

claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. See

Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ahee “provided Plaintiff Olmos with insufficient pain

medication (according to prevailing professional standards) after performing oral surgery on

him for an impacted wisdom tooth.” 

Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a

violation of the Eighth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show

that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v.

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure

to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d

at 1096 (quotations omitted).

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know

of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate indifference in the

medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain

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or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a violation. Toguchi,

391 F.3d at 1060. Thus, mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a condition does not

violate the Eighth Amendment. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057. Also, an inadvertent failure to

provide adequate medical care alone does not rise to the Eighth Amendment level. Jett, 429

F.3d at 1096. A difference in medical opinion also does not amount to deliberate

indifference. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058.

Plaintiff’s allegation against Defendant Ahee is insufficient to state an Eighth

Amendment claim for inadequate medical care. Plaintiff’s allegation is conclusory and

vague because Plaintiff does not allege what medication he was given and show how it was

“insufficient.” Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege deliberate indifference on the part of

Defendant Ahee.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Brewer and Horne “are responsible for [state

legislation that] served to diminish the medical and health services available to Plaintiff

Olmos.” Plaintiff further alleges that this state legislation mandated “the privatization of

ADC’s medical and health care system” at lower funding levels and “a 5% reduction in force

for all state departments.” Plaintiff asserts that “Defendant Brewer, in her official capacity

as head of Arizona’s Executive Branch of Government, is responsible for the implementation

of these laws” and that “Defendant Horne, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the

State of Arizona, is responsible for the enforcement of the foregoing laws.” 

The roles that Defendants Brewer and Horne play in implementing and enforcing state

law in general are simply too attenuated to personally link them to the denial of

constitutionally sufficient medical care to Plaintiff in prison. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,

371-72 (1976). To state a claim against a state official, the civil rights complainant must

allege that the official personally participated in the constitutional deprivation, or that a state

supervisory official was aware of the widespread abuses and with deliberate indifference to

the inmate's constitutional rights failed to take action to prevent further misconduct. King,

814 F.2d at 568; see also Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

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658, 691 (1978); Williams v. Cash, 836 F.2d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has done

neither.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count II for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. 

C. Count III

In Count III, Plaintiff claims that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated by Defendant Ryan when he failed to provide Plaintiff with basic necessities at state

expense and by Defendant Canteen when it provided him with constitutionally insufficient

food. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ryan fails to provide Plaintiff with “sufficient

(a) nutrition that meets the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s latest Dietary Guidelines for

Americans, (b) clothing between launderings, (c) hygiene products . . . ,

(d) cleaning/sanitation supplies, and (e) living facilities.” Plaintiff also alleges that

Defendant Ryan “continues to house inmates in overcrowded dorms” and “fails to provide

sufficient numbers of security staff” and “a working system at Winchester and South to

notify staff of emergencies after all doors are locked.” Plaintiff asserts that the “combination

of overcrowding and understaffing has led to large increases in violence among inmates.”

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated an Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claim

in Count III against Defendant Ryan. Accordingly, the Court will required Defendants Ryan

to answer Count III.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Canteen “continues its practice of underfeeding

Plaintiff Olmos by either watering down food or serving smaller portions than the contract

calls for” and “has also served expired food.” Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant

Canteen do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. Simply failing “to provide food

pursuant to its food service contract” or occasionally serving “expired food” is not sufficient

to state a claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims in Count III against Defendant

Canteen for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

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D. Count IV

In Count IV, Plaintiff claims that his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated by Defendant Ryan when he “violated Plaintiff Olmos’ right to adequate,

meaningful access to the courts” by continuing “ADC’s longstanding policy of not providing

the generalized legal research tools needed by inmates in order to attack their sentences,

directly or collaterally, or to challenge the conditions of their confinement.”

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 346 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Coronet v. Donovan, 51 F.3d

894, 897 (9th Cir. 1995). The constitutional source of the right of access to the courts is not

settled. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 366-67 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Supreme Court in

Bounds appears to consider the source to be the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bounds, 430

U.S. at 818. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “[t]he right of access is

grounded in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.” Coronet, 51 F.3d at 897. In any

event, the right of access to the courts is a “fundamental constitutional right.” Bounds, 430

U.S. at 828. 

To establish that he was denied meaningful access to the courts, a plaintiff must

submit evidence showing that he suffered an “actual injury” as a result of the defendants’

actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. However, “the injury requirement is not satisfied by just

any type of frustrated legal claim.” Id. at 354. The legal claim must be “an actionable claim”

challenging “sentences or conditions of confinement.” Id. at 356. “Impairment of any other

litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences

of conviction and incarceration.” Id. at 355. Also, “the constitutional right of access requires

a state to provide a law library or legal assistance only during the pleading stage of a habeas

or civil rights action.” Coronet, 894 F.3d at 898.

“[A]n inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his

prison’s law library or legal assistance program is sub-par in some theoretical sense.” Lewis,

518 U.S. at 351. “[T]he Constitution does not require that prisoners (literate or illiterate) be

able to conduct generalized research, but only that they be able to present their grievances

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to the courts – a more limited capability that can be produced by a much more limited degree

of legal assistance.” Id. at 360. 

Plaintiff has failed to show in Count IV that he has suffered actual injury by being

prevented from filing an actionable claim. Plaintiff’s conclusory and vague claim that he has

“suffered the loss of legal cases at the federal and state courts” is insufficient. 

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count IV for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

E. Count V

In Count V, Plaintiff claims that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated by Defendant Keefe, who operates the “inmate store,” when Defendant Keefe

violated a state statute by “(1) charging inmate store prices that were and still are higher than

the prices of similar retail products; and (2) continuing to raise prices on inmate store

products after the authorized time frame to do so had expired.”

Inmates do not have a constitutional right to “canteen products.” Keenan, 83 F.3d at

1092. Because Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to purchase items from the

“inmate store,” it follows that he does not have a constitutional right to lower prices. 

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count V for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. 

F. Count VI

In Count VI, Plaintiff claims that his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights,

as well as his rights under “federal OSHA regulations (codified as 29 CFR §§ 1903, -1904,

-1910, -1990),” were violated by Defendants Ryan and Canteen when they failed to provide

him with a “safe working environment as an inmate kitchen worker.”

The Court will treat Count VI as being brought solely under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments because Plaintiff has not explained how any of the actions he complains about

in Count VI violated his Fifth Amendment rights and the Court is unable to ascertain a Fifth

Amendment right that may be implicated by Plaintiff’s allegations..

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ryan’s “facilities at Winchester violated OSHA

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requirements via an undersized workspace that placed Plaintiff Olmos at constant risk of

being burned or suffering injuries” and also “violated OSHA requirements by not providing

the required number of toilets for the total number of inmates from all shifts that worked

there.” 

 As previously noted, the subjective prong needed to show a violation of the Eighth

Amendment relating to the denial of humane conditions requires that the inmate demonstrate

that the deprivation was a product of “deliberate indifference” by prison personnel. Wilson,

501 U.S. at 302-03. Such indifference can only occur if “the official knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exits, and he must

also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. However, Plaintiff has failed to show

that Defendant Ryan personally knew of the conditions about which Plaintiff complains in

Count VI. It is insufficient to allege that these conditions existed at one of “Defendant

Ryan’s facilities.” 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Canteen “violated OSHA requirements by

promulgating a rule that excludes inmates from drinking water while working.” This claim

against Defendant Canteen must fail because Plaintiff does not allege any injury from this

rule. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that the “water prohibition did not inflict any physical injuries

outside of the attempted imposition of this illegal rule, for Plaintiff Olmos disregarded the

rule by sneaking drinks of water anyway.” Moreover, the Court notes that “complete

compliance with the numerous OSHA regulations” has not been found to be required under

the Eighth Amendment. French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1985); see also

Sampson v. King, 693 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted) (“In operating a

prison, . . . the state is not constitutionally required to observe all the safety and health

standards applicable to private industry.”). 

Plaintiff also alleges that while he was “working at the kitchen facilities at Morey and

Winchester” he “was not provided proper personal protection equipment for the hands, face,

body, and feet,” and “he witnessed that the vermin control program for the Winchester

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Kitchen was inadequate to control its problem with mice and roaches.” Plaintiff further

alleges that he “does not know whether it is the responsibility of Defendant Ryan or

Defendant Canteen” to “fulfill personal protection equipment requirements” or “to control

kitchen vermin.” These allegations fail to state claim under the Eighth Amendment because

the are conclusory and vague and not only has Plaintiff failed to link them to the actions of

either Defendant Ryan or Defendant Canteen, but also Plaintiff has failed to allege any

deliberate indifference by either Defendant.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count VI for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

G. Count VII

In Count VII, Plaintiff claims that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to “due

process, equal protection, and freedom from unconstitutional takings” were violated by

Defendants Ryan, Brewer, and Horne when “illegal deductions” were made from Plaintiff’s

“prisoner spendable account.”

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ryan “violated Plaintiff Olmos’ right to be free from

paying assessments and fees that have not been authorized by the legislature via a properly

enacted statute,” as required by the Arizona Constitution, by “promulgating ADC policies

that charge inmates for photocopies, legal phone calls, legal supplies (paper, pens, etc.), legal

mail postage, repayment for positive urinalysis tests, uneaten special diets, follow-up visits

and prescription renewals for chronic diseases in violation of A.R.S. § 31-201.01(I)(12),

replacement ID cards and ID clips, and GED testing.” Plaintiff alleges that none of these

charges is “grounded by a properly-enacted statute.” 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a due process against Defendant Ryan.

Accordingly, the Court will required Defendant Ryan to answer Plaintiff’s due process claim

in Count VII. However, the Court will not require Defendant Ryan to answer Plaintiff’s

equal protection and “unconstitutional takings” claims in Count VII. 

Generally, “[t]o state a claim . . . for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . [,]

a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate

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against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Barren v. Harrington, 152

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has not alleged he is a member of a protected

class.

The United States Supreme Court has also recognized “successful equal protection

claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that [he] has been intentionally

treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the

difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see

also SeaRiver Maritime Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir.

2002). Even under this standard, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Plaintiff has failed to

allege that he is being treated differently than other similarly situated individuals and that

there was no rational basis for treating him differently. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state

an equal protection claim against Defendant Ryan in Count VII.

The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause prohibits the taking of private property for

public use without just compensation. “In order to state a claim under the Takings Clause,

a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he possesses a ‘property interest’ that is constitutionally

protected.” Schneider v. California Dept. of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir.

1998). Additionally, a prisoner cannot establish a taking under the Fifth Amendment absent

a showing that his property was taken for public use. Allen v. Wood, 970 F. Supp. 824, 831

(E.D. Wash. 1997). Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Ryan took his property and

converted it for public use. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a Takings Clause claim

against Defendant Ryan in Count VII. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brewer is “responsible for the implementation” of

state laws “to fund a transition program” and that Defendant Horne “is responsible for the

enforcement” of the these laws. Plaintiff further alleges that these state laws “order[] a 5%

deduction from an inmate’s gross wages to fund a transition program, even if the inmate is

statutorily excluded form participating in said program.” Plaintiff asserts that Defendants

Brewer and Horn have violated his constitutional rights “by the implementation and

enforcement of statutes that serve to make illegal deductions from Plaintiff Olmos’ prisoner

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spendable account, for Plaintiff Olmos is statutorily excluded from participating in the

transition program.”

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Brewer and Horn are conclusory and vague.

Plaintiff does not allege how the statute requiring a 5% deduction from his wages is “illegal.”

Moreover, the roles that Defendants Brewer and Horne play in implementing and enforcing

state law in general are too attenuated to personally link them to the denial of any

constitutional rights Plaintiff may have in not having deductions made from his wages in

prison. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-72.

As previously noted, to state a claim against a state official, the civil rights

complainant must allege that the official personally participated in the constitutional

deprivation, or that a state supervisory official was aware of the widespread abuses and with

deliberate indifference to the inmate's constitutional rights failed to take action to prevent

further misconduct. King, 814 F.2d 5at 568; see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Williams, 836

F.2d at 1320. Plaintiff has done neither. 

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims in Count VII against Defendants

Brewer and Horne for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

H. Count VIII

In Count VIII, Plaintiff claims that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated by Defendant Ryan when he “failed to pay either actual or constructive interest on

moneys that have been held in Plaintiff Olmos’ prisoner spendable account and dedicated

discharge account.” Plaintiff alleges that this amounts to “an unconstitutional taking of his

property.” 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claim in

Count VIII. See Schneider v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(despite California statute to the contrary, inmate possesses constitutionally cognizable

property interest in interest earned on funds in inmate’s personal account); see also Tellis v.

Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1993) (under provisions of Nevada statute, inmates had

property interest in interest earned on funds in inmate’s personal account). 

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Accordingly, the Court will required Defendant Ryan to answer Count VIII.

I. Count IX

In Count IX, Plaintiff claims that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to “due

process, equal protection, and freedom from unconstitutional takings” were violated by

Defendants Ryan and Hall when they abridged his “state-created property interests.” 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ryan “violated the inmate compensation

requirements of A.R.S. § 31-254(A) and A.R.S. § 41-1624.01(A)-(B),” that he “downgraded

the skill level of education aides . . . from skilled to semi-skilled when an automated system

(called TOSS) was rolled out without changing any of the duties of the position to reflect the

lowered skill level, resulting in a 5¢ per hour decrease in compensation,” and that he has

“continued the ADC’s policy of not paying kitchen and inmate store workers (who perform

labor or services for Defendants Canteen and Keefe, who are private contractors) a minimum

of $2.00 per hour.” Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Ryan “financially injured” him

“by underpaying him 5¢/hour in his current position as an education aide.” 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a due process against Defendant Ryan. See

Piatt v. MacDougall, 773 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (where state statute provides

inmates right to compensation, state cannot deny compensation without due process).

Accordingly, the Court will required Defendant Ryan to answer Plaintiff’s due process

claim in Count IX. However, as explained in more detail below, the Court will not require

Defendant Ryan to answer Plaintiff’s equal protection and “unconstitutional takings” claims

in Count IX. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hall “refused to pay Winchester inmates pursuant to

ADC’s pay scale outlined in DO 903, in violation of his duties as the inmate pay

coordinator.” Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Hall “financially injured” him “by

underpaying him for his past work as a Winchester kitchen worker.” 

A state employee who intentionally and without authorization deprives a person of his

property does not violate the Due Process Clause if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy

for the loss is available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). A prison grievance

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procedure for property loss claims can provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See

Al-Ra’id v. Ingle, 69 F.3d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905,

918 (9th Cir. 2000) (prisoners in Washington have adequate post-deprivation remedies to

challenge deductions from inmate accounts by utilizing the prison grievance procedure or by

filing a state tort action).

The ADC provides a grievance procedure for property claims. See Department Order

909.12. Arizona prison inmates can use the inmate grievance system to file claims seeking

reimbursement for property loss or damage. Id. Because Plaintiff has an adequate postdeprivation remedy through the prison grievance procedure, he has failed to state a claim

under the Due Process Clause against Defendant Hall in Count IX.

Plaintiff has failed to state an equal protection claim against either Defendant Ryan

or Hall in Count IX because he does not allege in Count IX that he is being treated differently

than other similarly situated individuals and that there was no rational basis for treating him

differently. Also, Plaintiff has failed to state a Takings Clause claim against either Defendant

Ryan or Hall in Count IX because he has not alleged that Defendant Ryan or Hall took his

property and converted it for public use. 

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims in Count IX against Defendant

Hall and will dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protection and Takings Clause claims against

Defendant Ryan for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

J. Count X

In Count X, Plaintiff claims that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to “due

process, equal protection, and freedom from unconstitutional takings” were violated by

Defendant Ryan when he promulgated “an ADC policy that demands that Plaintiff Olmos

surrender all orange-colored clothing purchased at the inmate store to ADC staff on his

release date without any compensation.” Plaintiff alleges that “[u]pon release,” he “will

incur a property injury by having his clothing taken by ADC staff due to Defendant Ryan’s

policy” and he will be injured financially by “being compelled to purchase replacement

clothing.” Although Plaintiff does not allege that he has actually been injured yet, he does

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seek both declaratory and prospective injunctive relief.

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a due process against Defendant Ryan.

Accordingly, the Court will required Defendant Ryan to answer Plaintiff’s due process claim

in Count X. However, for the same reasons discussed above in Count VII, the Court will

dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protection and Takings Clause claims in Count X against Defendant

Ryan for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

K. Count XI

In Count XI, Plaintiff claims that his right to be free from prison mail policies that

either violate the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments or “do not pass the tests of

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), or Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974),” was

violated by Defendant Ryan when he enacted “ADC mail policies that do not pass legal

muster.” Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ryan has “enacted a legal mail definition that is

too narrow in scope” and that has led to his “legal mail being opened on multiple occasions.”

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Ryan has instituted “incoming mail policies” that

“abridg[e] his free speech rights in a manner that does not pass the Turner test” and also has

instituted a “policy that all outgoing legal mail must be mailed using first[-]class postal

delivery” that violates Plaintiff’s rights to “due process, equal protection, freedom from

unconstitutional takings, and freedom from outgoing mail policies that do not pass the strict

scrutiny test of Procunier by compelling Plaintiff Olmos to pay more postage than is

necessary to mail his legal mail.” 

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Ryan’s legal mail definition is “too narrow” will be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This claim is very

conclusory and vague. Plaintiff does not allege what the legal mail definition is or why it is

“too narrow.” 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Ryan’s “policy that all outgoing legal

mail must be mailed using first[-]class postal delivery” will be dismissed for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. This claim is also very conclusory and vague.

Plaintiff does not allege how he is being denied due process or equal protection by this policy

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and does not allege how being required to use first-class postal delivery constitutes an

unconstitutional taking or does not pass the strict scrutiny test of Procunier. The Court is

unaware of any constitutional right requiring an inmate to be allowed to use the cheapest

method of postal delivery for his outgoing legal mail. Indeed, in certain instances the use of

first-class postage is important in federal court. For example, Rule 4(c)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure provides in part that the filing of a notice of appeal by an

inmate in either a civil or criminal case “is timely if it is deposited in the institution’s internal

mail system on or before the last day for filing” and “timely filing may be shown by a

declaration . . . or by a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit

and state that first-class postage was prepaid.” 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a First and Fourteenth Amendment claim

against Defendant Ryan in Count XI regarding his incoming mail policies. Accordingly, the

Court will require Defendant Ryan to answer this claim.

L. Count XII

In Count XII, Plaintiff claims that his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated by Defendants “Unknown ADC mail room staff at ASPC Lewis Complex

and/or Morey” when, on or about November 29, 2007, they “seized a subpoena that Plaintiff

Olmos was informally serving upon the Chandler Unified School District.” Plaintiff alleges

that “unknown ADC staff censured the aforementioned subpoena by faxing a copy of it to

the County Attorney’s Office,”

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) mandates that the Court dismiss a complaint if it is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Moreover,

“an action may be dismissed . . . where the defense is complete and obvious from the face

of the pleadings.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984). In the absence

of waiver, the Court may raise the defense of statute of limitations sua sponte. Levald, Inc.

v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993). 

In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the applicable statute of limitations is the forum

state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266,

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274-76 (1985); Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1991). The Arizona statute

of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1);

Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County, 943 P.2d 822, 824 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Vaughan, 927

F.2d at 478.

Plaintiff’s allegations in Count XII involved actions that occurred on November 2,

2007, over three years before Plaintiff filed the original Complaint in this action. Thus,

Plaintiff’s claim in Count XII is barred by the statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count XII for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

M. Count XIII

In Count XIII, Plaintiff claims that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

by Defendant Ryan when he failed “to protect [Plaintiff’s] personal property against damage

during a non-disciplinary-related institutional move.” Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ryan’s

“property policy requires, that when an inmate is moved a distance of fifteen miles or more,

his appliances are to be packed in boxes.” Thus, Plaintiff asserts that the “onus was on

Defendant Ryan to provide ADC staff with boxes pursuant to ADC policy” and that

Defendant Ryan “personally participated in this deprivation by refusing to provide packing

material to ADC staff as required by the aforementioned ADC policy.” 

Because Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation remedy through the prison

grievance procedure for Defendant Ryan’s allegedly intentional and unauthorized deprivation

of packing boxes to safely transport Plaintiff’s appliances, he has failed to state a claim under

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant Ryan in Count

XIII. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count XIII for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.

N. Count XIV

In Count XIV, Plaintiff claims that his right to be free from prison policies that do not

pass the test set out in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), was violated by Defendant

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Ryan. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ryan is “responsible” for numerous “ADC

Department Orders that do not pass the Turner test,” including “Orders” that deal with such

things as hair length, banning beards, tucking in shirts, the wearing of sweat pants and gym

shorts, going shirtless, covering up thermal shirts, appearance changes, the use of empty

containers to organize living areas, homemade lamp shades, making beds, limiting television

channels, providing legal assistance to other inmates, possessing legal materials of other

inmates, possessing typewriters and computers, limiting clothing and laundry bags, limiting

legal books, regulating the identification and storage of religious items, limiting the value of

an inmate’s property, inmate property specifications, and eating leftovers.

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must show that the conduct

of a Defendant deprived him of a constitutional right. Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350,

1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, Plaintiff has failed to allege the violation of any

specific constitutional provision in Count XIV. The test set out in Turner to which Plaintiff

refers is a test used by the courts to determine if a prison regulation that “impinges on

inmates’ constitutional rights” is valid. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. However, Plaintiff has not

alleged that any of the “Orders” that he complains about in Count XIV impinge on a

particular constitutional right.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count XIV for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. 

O. Count XV

In Count XV, Plaintiff claims that his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated by Defendants “Unknown ADC staff,” Ortega, Cardoza, and Brockman when

they used the “ADC’s disciplinary policy to retaliate” against Plaintiff “without a legitimate

penological interest for properly exercising his right to free speech.” 

Plaintiff alleges that he wrote to the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) “in

order to acquire information regarding the access to the courts it provides to inmates,” and

that “in addition to providing Plaintiff Olmos with the information,” the “KDOC notified

ADC administration of the inquiry out of courtesy and included a copy of Plaintiff Olmos’

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The Court presumes that the Defendant “Unknown ADC staff” that Plaintiff is

referring to is the Defendant named in the First Amended Complaint as “Unknown ADC

Administrator(s).” 

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letter.” Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Unknown ADC staff “ordered Defendant

Ortega to ‘take care’ of Plaintiff Olmos, even though an unbiased review of the letter in

question made it clear that the letter did not violate either state law or ADC policy,” and that

Defendant Ortega “initiated disciplinary proceedings by charging Plaintiff Olmos with

fraud, even though Plaintiff Olmos’ actions did not satisfy the fraud elements.”

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a retaliation claim against Defendant

“Unknown ADC staff” and Defendant Ortega. The Court will therefore require Defendant

Ortega to answer Count XV. However, the Court will not direct that service be made on

Defendant “Unknown ADC Administrator(s)” at ADC at this time.1

Plaintiff may use the discovery processes to obtain the name of the person who he

believes violated his constitutional rights. If Plaintiff discovers the true identity of this

fictitious party through the discovery process, or otherwise, he may seek leave of the Court

to amend his Complaint to name the individual in place of Defendant “Unknown ADC

Administrator(s).”

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Cardoza “called Plaintiff Olmos to defend

himself in a disciplinary hearing, even though the disciplinary clearly showed that Plaintiff

Olmos had not been served a copy of the disciplinary report prior to the hearing,” and that

“Defendant Cardoza abused his discretion by modifying the fraud charge” to a charge that

“not only did not exist in ADC policy as a disciplinable offense, but also did not share a

single element of the original fraud charge.” Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Brockman sustained the “invalid disciplinary report” against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation against Defendants Cardoza and

Brockman because Plaintiff does not allege that they acted with a retaliatory motive. Also,

to the extent that Plaintiff may be attempting to bring a due process claim against them, the

due process claim must fail.

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In analyzing a due process claim, the Court must first decide whether Plaintiff was

entitled to any process, and if so, whether he was denied any constitutionally required

procedural safeguard. Liberty interests which entitle an inmate to due process are “generally

limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an

unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force,

nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (internal

citations omitted).

Therefore, to determine whether an inmate is entitled to the procedural protections

afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court must look to

the particular restrictions imposed and ask whether they “‘present the type of atypical,

significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.’” Mujahid

v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). 

To determine whether the sanctions are atypical and a significant hardship, courts look

to prisoner’s conditions of confinement, the duration of the sanction, and whether the

sanction will affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1088-89.

“Atypicality” requires not merely an empirical comparison, but turns on the importance of

the right taken away from the prisoner. See Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 499 (9th

Cir. 1997). See e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472 (30 days’ disciplinary segregation is not

atypical and significant); Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 151 (3rd Cir. 2002) (four months

in administrative segregation is not atypical and significant); Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d

983 (9th Cir. 1997) (denial of year sentence reduction is not an atypical and significant

hardship); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1998) (two and one-half years of

administrative segregation is not atypical and significant); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703,

706-708 (3rd Cir. 1997) (fifteen months’ administrative segregation is not atypical and

significant); Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997) (six months of confinement

in especially disgusting conditions that were “more burdensome than those imposed on the

general prison population” were not “atypical . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of

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prison life”).

In Count XV, Plaintiff has not alleged or shown that sanctions imposed as a result of

his disciplinary conviction violated a liberty interest he had under the Due Process Clause

itself, or imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” on him. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.

Indeed, Plaintiff has not identified any of the sanctions imposed on him. Therefore, Plaintiff

has failed to state a cognizable due process claim against Defendants Cardoza and Brockman.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Cardoza and Brockman in Count

XV will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

VII. Dismissal of Defendants 

Because no claims remain against them, the Court will dismiss Defendants GEO,

Canteen, Keefe, Brewer, Ahee, Cardoza, “Unknown ADC Security Officer(s)” at the Mail

Room of the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis (ASPC-Lewis) and/or the Morey Unit of

ASPC-Lewis, Hall, Horne, and Brockman from this action for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.

VIII. Motion for Order to Return Documents Not Filed by Clerk

On March 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed a “Motion For Order To Return Of Documents Not

Filed By Clerk” (Doc. 20), in which he moves the Court to order the Clerk of Court to return

the “556-page ‘Complaint Addendum’ (Docs. 2 [part] and 3) and ‘Memorandum Establishing

Conformance With 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)[’] (Doc. 8), which is over 150 pages in length.”

Plaintiff alleges that he cannot afford to recopy these documents.

By Order filed February 9, 2011 (Doc. 11), the Court directed the Clerk of Court not

to file these two lodged documents. For good cause shown, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s

Motion and direct the Clerk of Court to return the unfiled documents to Plaintiff. 

IX. Motion for Assistance in Locating Select Defendants for Service

On May 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed a “Motion For Assistance In Locating Select

Defendants For Service Of Pleadings” (Doc. 25), in which Plaintiff moves the Court to “order

Defendant Ryan and/or the Arizona Attorney General to assist Plaintiff and the U.S. Marshal[]

in locating and serving Defendants Ahee, Hall, Ortega, and Brockman.” Plaintiff’s Motion

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will be denied without prejudice. 

This Order dismisses Defendants Ahee, Hall, and Brockman from this action and

therefore, there is no need for Plaintiff to locate and serve these Defendants. As to Defendant

Ortega, Plaintiff states that his “only confirmed information on Defendant Ortega is his officer

badge number (CO II # 2083) at the time of the incident described in Count XV” and that

Defendant Ortega’s “first name and current employment information/location was provided

to Plaintiff by a prison staff member that did not know Defendant Ortega personally.”

Accordingly, it appears that Plaintiff has sufficient information to complete a service packet

for Defendant Ortega. If Plaintiff’s information proves to be insufficient, and the U.S.

Marshal is unable to obtain enough information to serve Defendant Ortega, then Plaintiff may

approach the Court with this matter again. 

X. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

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D. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s “Motion For Enlargement Of Time To File First Amended

Complaint” (Doc. 19) is granted and Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 21), which

was filed on March 14, 2011, is accepted as being timely filed.

(2) Plaintiff’s “Motion For Leave To Suspend Enforcement Of Local Rules Upon

Pro Se Litigant” (Doc. 23) is granted to the extent that the Court accepts Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint (Doc. 21) in the form in which it was filed. 

(3) Plaintiff’s “Motion For Order To Return Of Documents Not Filed By Clerk”

(Doc. 20) is granted and the Clerk of Court must return Plaintiff’s unfiled “556-page

‘Complaint Addendum’” (Docs. 2 [part] and 3) and “Memorandum Establishing Conformance

With 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)” (Doc. 8) to Plaintiff.

(4) Plaintiff’s “Motion For Assistance In Locating Select Defendants For Service

Of Pleadings” (Doc. 25) is denied without prejudice.

(5) Defendants GEO Group, Inc.; Compass Group – North America Division, d.b.a.

Canteen Correctional Services; Keefe Group, d.b.a. Keefe Commissary Network; Janice K.

Brewer; Ferris D. Ahee; Daniel Cardoza; “Unknown ADC Security Officer(s)” at the Mail

Room of the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis and/or the Morey Unit of ASPC-Lewis;

Eric Hall; Thomas C. Horne; and Timothy Brockman are dismissed from this action. 

(6) The following claims in the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 21) are dismissed

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted:

(a) Plaintiff’s equal protection and Takings Clause claims against Defendant

Charles L. Ryan in Counts VII, IX, and X;

(b) Plaintiff’s legal mail policy claims, including his claim regarding the

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If a Defendant is an officer or employee of the Arizona Department of Corrections,

Plaintiff must list the address of the specific institution where the officer or employee works.

Service cannot be effected on an officer or employee at the Central Office of the Arizona

Department of Corrections unless the officer or employee works there.

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requirement to use first-class postal delivery for legal mail, against

Defendant Ryan in Count XI; and 

(c) Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, XII, XIII, and XIV. 

(7) The following Defendants must answer the following claims in the First

Amended Complaint (Doc. 21):

(a) Defendant Charles L. Ryan—Plaintiff’s due process claims in Counts

VII, IX, and X; Counts III and VIII; and Plaintiff’s free speech claim

regarding his incoming mail policy in Count XI; and

(b) Defendant Allen Ortega—Plaintiff’s retaliation claim in Count XV.

(8) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the First

Amended Complaint (Doc. 21), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms

for Defendants Charles L. Ryan and Allen Ortega.

(9) Plaintiff must complete2

 and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(10) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint on a Defendant within 120

days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is

later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m);

LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i).

(11) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the First

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(12) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants Charles L. Ryan and Allen

Ortega of the commencement of this action and request waiver of service of the summons

pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must

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include a copy of this Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service

of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not

returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent

by the Marshal, the Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, and

this Order upon the Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, First Amended Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process

receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against

the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(13) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and First

Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal,

not the Plaintiff.

(14) Defendants Charles L. Ryan and Allen Ortega must answer the First Amended

Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the

applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(15) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

\ \

\ \ 

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(16) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey pursuant to Rules

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as authorized

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

DATED this 10th day of May, 2011.

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