Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03049/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03049-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-3049

MEANITH HUON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NICK DENTON, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11 CV 3054 — John J. Tharp, Jr. Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 31, 2016 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 14, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and 

YANDLE, District Judge.∗

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Meanith Huon sued the website 

Above the Law for implying that he was a rapist in an article 

published on the same day he was acquitted of rape. When 

 

∗ Of the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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another website, Jezebel (which was owned by Gawker at 

the time), reported on the lawsuit in an article entitled, “Acquitted Rapist Sues Blog for Calling Him Serial Rapist,” Huon added Gawker to the lawsuit. He accused Gawker of defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress with regard to (i) the article’s 

headline, (ii) its description of Huon’s criminal trial and subsequent complaint against Above the Law, and (iii) certain

comments posted by a number of anonymous third-party 

users (at least some of whom Huon claimed were Gawker 

employees). The district judge granted Gawker’s motion to 

dismiss as to all of Huon’s claims, and later denied him 

leave to file a fifth amended complaint. Huon appeals both 

decisions. 

We conclude that the district judge correctly rejected Huon’s defamation claim as to the article. The title can be construed innocently when viewed with the rest of the article as 

a whole, and the article’s text fairly reported on both Huon’s 

criminal trial and his initial complaint against Above the 

Law. In addition, the district judge did not err in denying 

Huon leave to file a fifth amended complaint, since Huon 

had ample opportunity to cure any deficiencies.

However, we reverse and remand the district judge’s rejection of Huon’s defamation claim as to the third-party user 

comments. Huon adequately alleged that Gawker helped 

create and develop at least some of the comments, and one 

of the comments constitutes defamation under Illinois law. 

We also reverse and remand the district judge’s rejection of 

Huon’s false-light and intentional-infliction claims, which 

were dismissed against Gawker based solely on the rejection 

of his defamation claims. Since part of his defamation claim 

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No. 15-3049 3

can proceed, so too can his false-light and intentionalinfliction claims.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2008, Plaintiff Meanith Huon was charged with 

criminal sexual assault in connection with a sexual encounter he had with Jane Doe. Huon pleaded not guilty, claimed 

that the encounter was consensual, and was acquitted by a 

jury. On the day Huon was acquitted, the legal website 

Above the Law (ATL) published an article entitled, “Rape 

Potpourri” (ATL article). The article discussed two “rape 

stories,” one of which concerned Jane Doe’s allegations and 

Huon’s opening statement at his criminal trial. At some 

point after its initial publication, the ATL article was updated to note that Huon was acquitted.

One year after publication of the ATL article, Huon filed 

suit against ATL, alleging defamation, intentional infliction 

of emotional distress, and false light invasion of privacy. 

Several days later, the website Jezebel published an article 

entitled, “Acquitted Rapist Sues Blog for Calling Him Serial 

Rapist” (Jezebel article). The article superimposed Huon’s

2008 mugshot onto the ATL article and briefly explained the 

circumstances of Huon’s criminal trial and subsequent lawsuit against ATL. The article’s title was later changed to read, 

“Man Acquitted of Sexual Assault Sues Blog for Calling Him 

Serial Rapist” (emphasis added), but otherwise remained the 

same. The Jezebel article generated over 80 comments from 

anonymous third-party users. 

Huon amended his complaint in response to the publication of the Jezebel article, adding several new allegations 

and nearly a dozen new defendants, including Irin Carmon, 

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the Jezebel article’s author; Gawker Media, Jezebel’s thenowner; and Nick Denton, Gawker’s founder (Gawker Defendants1). After Huon amended his complaint several additional times to cure certain jurisdictional defects, the Gawker 

Defendants moved to dismiss Huon’s fourth amended complaint. 

The district judge granted the motion in full. He rejected 

Huon’s defamation claims as to the third-party user comments, finding insufficient allegations that Gawker employees had actually authored the comments, and concluding 

that the Communications Decency Act protects online publishers like Gawker from third-party comments. The judge 

also dismissed Huon’s defamation per se claim, finding that

the Article’s headline was protected by the innocent construction rule and its text by the fair report privilege, and 

concluded that Huon had failed to plead the requisite special 

damages to maintain his defamation per quod claim. In addition, the judge dismissed Huon’s false-light and intentionalinfliction claims, noting that the failure of his defamation 

claims was dispositive. The district judge later denied Huon’s motion to reconsider and for leave to file a fifth amended complaint. This appeal followed.2

 1 Following oral argument, we were notified that Defendants Gawker Media LLC and Nick Denton had separately filed petitions for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. Counsel for both Defendants tells us 

that the automatic stays in both bankruptcy proceedings have been modified so as to permit us to render a decision. We proceed accordingly.

2 The ATL Defendants separately moved to dismiss Huon’s fourth 

amended complaint. After the district judge granted their motion in part 

and denied it in part, the ATL Defendants and Huon settled. The ATL 

Defendants are not parties on appeal.

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II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo the district judge’s grant of the 

Gawker Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 

2008). A complaint need only contain enough factual content 

to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, the complaint 

must contain more than mere “labels and conclusions” and 

“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). We review the complaint in the 

light most favorable to Huon and accept all well-pleaded 

facts as true. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081.

A. Jezebel Article’s Title and Content Defamation 

Claim Properly Dismissed

A statement is defamatory under Illinois law if “it tends 

to harm a person’s reputation to the extent that it lowers that 

person in the eyes of the community or deters others from 

associating with that person.” Tuite v. Corbitt, 866 N.E.2d 

114, 121 (Ill. 2006). The per se designation applies if the 

statement’s “defamatory character is obvious and apparent 

on its face and injury to the plaintiff’s reputation may be 

presumed.” Id. A statement will usually constitute defamation per se if it falls into one of five categories; the only one at 

issue here concerns “statements imputing the commission of 

a crime.” Id.

On appeal, Huon contends that two aspects of the Jezebel 

article constituted defamation per se: (1) the headline and adjacent graphic containing his mug shot, to which the district 

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judge applied the innocent construction rule; and (2) the article’s description of the criminal trial and subsequent civil 

suit, to which the judge applied the fair report privilege. We 

consider each issue in turn.3

1. Innocent Construction Rule Applies to Headline

and Graphic

A statement that is defamatory per se will not be actionable “if it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction.” 

Green v. Rogers, 917 N.E.2d 450, 463 (Ill. 2009). Under this 

rule, a court must give the defendant’s words their natural 

and obvious meaning, after having considered “both the 

substance of defendant’s alleged statements and the context 

in which they allegedly were made.” Id. at 464. “[I]f a statement is capable of two reasonable constructions, one defamatory and one innocent, the innocent one will prevail.” 

Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 925 (7th 

Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 667 N.E.2d 1296, 

1302 (Ill. 1996)). Nevertheless, “when the defendant clearly 

intended and unmistakably conveyed a defamatory meaning, a court should not strain to see an inoffensive gloss on 

the statement.” Green, 917 N.E.2d at 463. 

Here, Huon maintains that the Jezebel article’s headline, 

“Acquitted Rapist Sues Blog For Calling Him Serial Rapist,” 

is defamatory because it imputes to him the commission of a 

crime (rape), and is not subject to an innocent construction. 

 3 Huon’s fourth amended complaint also alleges defamation per 

quod. But since Huon does not press this claim on appeal, we consider it 

forfeited. See, e.g., Milligan v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 686 F.3d 378, 386 

(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 

1991).

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According to Huon, the most reasonable meaning of the 

headline is that Huon has committed rape at least once, and 

that the word “acquitted,” by itself, does not controvert this 

false insinuation. 

We need not decide whether the headline itself defamed 

Huon because, even if it did, it is subject to an innocent construction. As the Gawker Defendants correctly note, headlines must be considered alongside the accompanying article 

and not in isolation. See, e.g., Harrison v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 

793 N.E.2d 760, 772 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“As a general rule in 

applying the innocent construction rule, a newspaper headline and the text of the article to which it refers are to be considered as one document and read together as a whole.”); 

accord Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Pub. Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 

846 (Ill. 2006); Seith v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 861 N.E.2d 1117, 

1127 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); cf. Tuite, 866 N.E.2d at 127–28 (examining allegedly defamatory statements in the context of 

the entire book in which they were published); Bryson v. 

News Am. Publ’ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1217 (Ill. 1996) (examining allegedly defamatory word in magazine article 

alongside the adjacent sentences). 

Huon argues that “[h]eadlines alone may be enough to 

make libelous per se an otherwise innocuous article,” but the 

small handful of cases he relies on are unhelpful. All of them 

involve the laws of states other than Illinois, and many are 

distinguishable on their facts insofar as the allegedly defamatory front-page headline was not next to the underlying article. See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that “the magazine is displayed for 

sale in plastic wrapping, making the cover the key to what a 

reader can expect to find inside the magazine”); Kaelin v. 

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Globe Commc’ns Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the magazine article “was too far removed [17 pages] from the cover 

headline to have the salutary effect that [defendant] 

claims”). Here, in contrast, the complaint indicates that the 

headline and article were directly adjacent to one another. 

The content of the underlying Jezebel article makes clear 

that the only instance of alleged rape was the one Huon was 

acquitted of. Indeed, one need only read the first sentence to 

see that this is so: “A Chicago man who was acquitted on a 

sexual assault charge is suing the legal blog Above The Law 

for implying that he’s a serial rapist.” And two paragraphs 

later, after having discussed Huon’s acquittal, the article explains that ATL “mistakenly believes that news accounts of 

the same incident are different incidents that should have 

tipped the woman off that Huon was a serial offender.” 

(emphasis added). 

Huon also contends the graphic containing his mugshot 

and the phrases “Above the Law” and “Rape Potpourri”

constitutes defamation per se. We disagree. Above the Law 

was the name of the website that Huon had sued, “Rape 

Potpourri” was the headline of the ATL article, and the 

mugshot illustrated the subject matter at issue. So the innocent construction rule applies to the Jezebel article’s headline 

and graphic.

2. Fair Report Privilege Applies to Discussion of 

Criminal Trial and Civil Lawsuit

Under Illinois law, a defamatory statement is not actionable if it falls within the fair report privilege, which applies 

to statements that are “complete and accurate or a fair 

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No. 15-3049 9

abridgment of [an] official proceeding.” Solaia Tech., LLC v. 

Specialty Pub. Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 843–44 (Ill. 2006). Illinois 

courts have repeatedly stressed the importance of a robust 

privilege, as it “promotes our system of self-governance by 

serving the public’s interest in official proceedings, including judicial proceedings.” Id. at 842; see also, e.g., Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 746, 747–48 (Ill. 1966) (“The 

right to speak and print about such actions of government is 

well established; denial of this right would be a serious infringement of both State and Federal constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.”). 

A report constitutes a fair abridgment if it conveys “a 

substantially correct account” to readers. Solaia Tech., 852 

N.E.2d at 844–45 (citation omitted). Because the summary of 

a legal proceeding “is bound to convey a somewhat different 

impression than the ... proceeding itself,” an abridgment is 

typically unfair only if it “significantly change[s] the defamation appearing in the governmental or public proceeding.” O’Donnell v. Field Enters., Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1212, 1217 

(Ill. App. Ct. 1986). A determination “is made by comparing 

the gist or sting of the alleged defamation in the official report or proceedings with the gist or sting in the news account.” Harrison v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 760, 773 

(Ill. App. Ct. 2003). Contrary to Huon’s contention, the fair 

report privilege typically raises a question of law, not a question of fact, and is not concerned with the defendant’s alleged subjective intent. E.g., Solaia Tech., 852 N.E.2d at 842–

43; Missner v. Clifford, 914 N.E.2d 540, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).

Huon argues that the privilege should not apply to the 

following sentence from the Jezebel article concerning his 

criminal trial: “Huon’s version was that it was a consensual 

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encounter, and partly on the strength of the bartender’s testimony that the woman had been drinking and asked where 

to go to have fun, the jury believed him.” It bears noting, 

however, that the district judge did not apply the fair report 

privilege to this sentence, concluding instead that it did not

amount to defamation. See Huon v. Breaking Media, LLC, 75 F. 

Supp. 3d 747, 768 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (statement “bolster[ed] rather than defame[d] his reputation” because it suggested

that “the jury found reason to discredit Jane Doe’s claims 

and therefore acquitted Huon of the charges”).

We agree with the Gawker Defendants that the fair report privilege applies to the Article’s references to consent 

and the bartender’s testimony, since they appear to accurately capture the gist of what occurred at the trial. Huon’s 

counsel emphatically and repeatedly referenced consent 

during opening statements, and the multiple facts that Huon 

points to as grounds for his acquittal, taken together, dovetail with a consent-focused defense strategy. In addition, 

Huon makes no attempt to explain how the statement about 

the bartender’s testimony mischaracterizes what she actually 

said at trial. 

We cannot, however, easily dismiss Huon’s argument 

about the Article’s statement about the jury’s beliefs—

especially since there is no indication as to what swayed any 

particular juror’s vote. The Gawker Defendants insist that 

the statement is nothing more than a non-actionable opinion, 

but we are dubious. The statement does not appear to be the 

kind of subjective claim that courts applying Illinois law 

have typically viewed as non-actionable, see, e.g., Wynne v. 

Loyola Univ., 741 N.E.2d 669, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (explaining that non-actionable statements typically contain no “obCase: 15-3049 Document: 61 Filed: 11/14/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3049 11

jectively verifiable factual assertion”), and the article’s context more closely resembles a news article than an editorial.

However, we need not decide the issue, since we agree with 

the district judge that the statement could not have injured 

Huon’s reputation in the eyes of the public. (If anything, the 

statement improved it.)

Huon also maintains that the Jezebel article failed to capture the gist of his lawsuit against the ATL Defendants in 

two ways. First, he faults the article for omitting the fact that 

the ATL Defendants called him a rapist on the same day he 

was acquitted. However, we fail to see how omitting this 

fact, by itself, caused the gist to be inaccurate. The Jezebel 

article accurately conveyed the crux of Huon’s complaint 

against the ATL Defendants—that ATL erroneously indicated Huon had committed multiple sexual assaults, and that 

he was acquitted in the only case brought against him—and 

Huon makes no attempt to explain why omitting the temporal relationship between Huon’s acquittal and publication 

of the ATL article misrepresents the nature of his lawsuit. In 

essence, Huon complains that the Jezebel article omitted a 

factual allegation of only modest significance; yet without 

such omissions, abridgments of legal proceedings could 

never occur.

Second, Huon faults the Jezebel article for republishing 

the ATL article’s defamatory comments. See Brennan v. Kadner, 814 N.E.2d 951, 970 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“The republisher 

of a defamatory statement made by another is himself liable 

for defamation even if he gives the originator’s name.”). But 

the Jezebel Article did not simply parrot the rape-based allegations in the ATL article; rather, it summarized Huon’s criticism of these allegations, and, if anything, indicated that the 

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criticism was founded, insofar as it noted that Huon was 

“acquitted” and that the ATL article was based on a “mistaken[] belie[f].” So the fair report privilege applies to the 

Jezebel article’s statements regarding Huon’s criminal trial 

and subsequent lawsuit against ATL.

B. District Judge Erred in Dismissing Defamation 

Claim Involving Third-Party User Comments

1. Communications Decency Act Not Applicable

The Communications Decency Act states, “[n]o provider 

or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 

the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see 

also id. § 230(f)(3) (defining “information content provider” 

as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in 

part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 

service”). This means that for purposes of defamation and 

other related theories of liability, a company like Gawker 

cannot be considered the publisher of information simply 

because the company hosts an online forum for third-party 

users to submit comments. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for 

Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 

671–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that Craigslist “is not the 

author of the ads and could not be treated as the ‘speaker’ of 

the posters’ words, given § 230(c)(1)”); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 

F.3d 655, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “entities that 

know the information’s content do not become liable for the 

sponsor’s deeds,” and noting that § 230(c) preempts contrary 

state law).

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A company can, however, be liable for creating and posting, inducing another to post, or otherwise actively participating in the posting of a defamatory statement in a forum 

that that company maintains. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 

F.3d at 671; see also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 

Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (concluding that a website was not a “passive 

transmitter of information provided by others” but instead 

helped develop the information by “requiring subscribers to 

provide the information as a condition of accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of pre-populated answers”); FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199–1200 

(10th Cir. 2009) (concluding that a website developed the information by “solicit[ing] requests” for the information and 

then “pa[ying] researchers to obtain it”).

Huon argues that the Act is inapplicable here because 

Gawker’s comments forum was not a mere passive conduit 

for disseminating defamatory statements. Rather, Gawker 

itself was an information content provider, insofar as the 

Gawker Defendants: (1) “encouraged and invited” users to 

defame Huon, through selecting and urging the most defamation-prone commenters to “post more comments and continue to escalate the dialogue”; (2) “edited,” “shaped,” and 

“choreographed” the content of the comments that it received; (3) “selected” for publication every comment that 

appeared beneath the Jezebel article; and (4) employed individuals who authored at least some of the comments themselves.

The district judge concluded that these arguments failed 

to plausibly state a claim for relief. But we see nothing 

farfetched about Huon’s factual allegations—in particular, 

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his contention that one or more of the comments were authored by Gawker employees. Rather than asserting one or 

two standalone factual allegations concerning Gawker’s control over comments, Huon’s fourth amended complaint devotes over four pages to detailing Gawker’s alleged activities. Critically, the complaint hints at why Gawker employees might have anonymously authored comments, alleging 

that increasing the defamatory nature of comments can increase traffic to Gawker’s websites, which can in turn enhance the attractiveness of Gawker’s commenting system for 

prospective advertisers. In doing so, the complaint quotes 

several passages from a Reuters article that explains precisely how Gawker was planning to “monetize” comments, and 

why advertisers might find this commenting system appealing.

The Gawker Defendants may well be correct in contending that none of Huon’s various allegations actually occurred, but this doesn’t mean that the allegations are so implausible as to warrant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (explaining that a complaint need 

only plead enough facts to “raise a right to relief above a 

speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations 

in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)” (footnote 

and citations omitted)); id. at 556 (“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is 

very remote and unlikely.” (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Discovery is the proper tool for Huon to 

use to test the validity of his allegations, and if he is unable 

to marshal enough facts to support his claim the Gawker Defendants can move for summary judgment. Moreover, to the 

extent Gawker and other publishers are concerned that our 

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No. 15-3049 15

ruling will result in a flood of frivolous lawsuits, we remind 

them that sanctions are available under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11 if it is determined that a plaintiff’s factual allegations were plead with improper purpose, are frivolous, or 

were known by plaintiff’s counsel to be lacking any factual 

basis. 

The Gawker Defendants proffer several arguments in 

support of the Act’s application here, but none are availing. 

For example, they argue that Huon’s allegations amount to 

the kind of “traditional publishing activities” that other 

courts of appeals have found warrant protection under the 

Act. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th 

Cir. 1997) (Under § 230, “lawsuits seeking to hold a service 

provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, 

withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.”); accord 

Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18–20 (1st 

Cir. 2016); Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 

F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014). But we need not wade into that 

debate, since Huon has adequately pleaded that at least 

some of the allegedly defamatory comments were authored 

by Gawker employees—thus making Gawker an “information content provider” under § 230(f). 

In addition, the Gawker Defendants argue that Huon’s 

allegation that the Defendants induced the comments is belied by Gawker’s terms of use for commenters, which, 

among other things, prohibited the posting of “harassing, 

defamatory or libelous material.” But the mere fact that a 

terms-of-use statement exists does not establish that all 

comments complied with it. 

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The Gawker Defendants also argue that Huon failed to 

plead facts plausibly establishing that Gawker authored the 

allegedly defamatory comments. As discussed above, however, there is nothing implausible about this allegation, and 

we reject the Gawker Defendants’ invitation to interpret 

Rule 8, Twombly, and Iqbal as requiring more. Indeed, potentially meritorious claims could be prematurely and improperly dismissed if we were to accept the Gawker Defendants’ 

position, since the information necessary to prove or refute 

allegations like Huon’s is typically available only to defendants. Cf. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 914 (7th Cir. 2005) 

(“Where pleadings concern matters peculiarly within the 

knowledge of the defendants, conclusory pleading on ‘information and belief’ should be liberally viewed.” (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2. One Comment Is Defamatory

The fact that Huon has plausibly alleged that Gawker 

employees created the defamatory comments, by itself, does 

not allow him to press forward with his defamation per se

claim; the comments must actually constitute defamation.

We have already discussed the general principles of defamation per se under Illinois law. But given the fact that the 

statements at issue were shared in a comments forum, a brief 

discussion of the distinction between actionable factual assertions and non-actionable opinions is in order.

Opinions that do not misstate actual facts are protected 

by the First Amendment and thus non-actionable. E.g., Madison v. Frazier, 539 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990)); Moriarty v. 

Greene, 732 N.E.2d 730, 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)). Illinois 

courts consider the following three factors in differentiating 

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No. 15-3049 17

between factual assertions and opinions: “(1) whether the 

statement has a precise and readily understood meaning; (2) 

whether the statement is verifiable; and (3) whether the 

statement’s literary or social context signals that it has factual content.” J. Maki Const. Co. v. Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 882 N.E.2d 1173, 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). Notably, 

“[w]ords that are mere name calling or found to be rhetorical 

hyperbole or employed only in a loose, figurative sense have 

been deemed nonactionable.” Pease v. Int’l Union of Operating 

Eng’rs Local 150, 567 N.E.2d 614, 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); see 

also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (statements that are not reasonably understood as stating actual facts should not be actionable, in order to ensure that “public debate will not suffer for 

lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or the ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ 

which has traditionally added much to the discourse of our 

Nation”).

Here, most—but not all—of the comments do not constitute defamation per se. Some comments are not defamatory 

because they do not directly concern Huon himself, but instead relate to acquittal and guilt more generally. For example:

SarahMc:

Just because a man is acquitted of rape does 

not mean he did not commit rape. That a 

jury would decide “not guilty” does not 

magically erase what he did--if he did, in 

fact, rape someone. The vast majority of 

rapists are never convicted of rape. Does 

that make them not rapists?

Dinosaurs and Nachos, girlfriend!:

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Innocent until proven guilty is a widely 

misunderstood concept. It basically means 

that the mere fact that someone is charged 

with a crime is not itself evidence that the 

person committed a crime.

Then you go to court. In court, there will be 

evidence presented. This evidence is where 

an actual, legal determination is made. Nobody is declared “innocent” in a court of 

law, they are found guilty or not guilty.

“Not guilty” is absolutely not the same 

thing as “innocent” from a legal standpoint. 

Those words do not mean the same thing in 

the world of law. “Innocent until proven 

guilty” is merely a concept for laymen to 

try to keep their non-lawyer brains from 

jumping to (nonlegal) conclusions.

Other comments amount to hyperbole that cannot be reasonably understood as asserting objectively verifiable facts. 

For example:

SorciaMacnasty: 

Nevermind [sic] “serial rapist,” he sounds 

like a foreal [sic] crazy person.

Still other comments, while referencing certain alleged facts 

surrounding Huon’s criminal trial, do not directly accuse 

him of committing a crime and are better classified as nonactionable opinions—specifically, a rhetorical decrying of 

general notions of “rape culture” and “victim blaming.” For 

example:

Case: 15-3049 Document: 61 Filed: 11/14/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3049 19

cool_as_KimDeal:

Well shit! I didn’t know kicking back at a 

bar and asking where I should go to have 

fun meant that I hereby consent to any and 

all sexual activity, with anybody, with this 

bartender here as my witness. Can I sign 

away my right to consent here on my bar 

tab? Okay, great.

JadeSays:

Weird. I didn’t know “where do I go to 

have fun” meant the same thing as “where 

do I go to get raped.” It’s great that that jury made that clear to me, otherwise I could 

get myself in some sticky situations like 

apparently accidentally begging to be 

raped. 

AWE. SOME.

rachel723 (in reply to JadeSays’s comment):

you know it’s women like you who don’t 

understand the rules that make the rest of 

us ladies look bad.

I’m glad you learned before you actually 

got raped not to complain now if you do, 

you were asking for it!!

/sarcasm

HeartRateRapid:

Yea, all those crazy bitches going to the 

cops and lying about being raped. Except

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20 No. 15-3049

that false reports for stolen cars are more 

common. False rape reports make up less 

than 3% of all reported rapes, and as I’m 

sure you know, it horrendously underreported.

Only the following comment qualifies as defamation per 

se under Illinois law: 

vikkitikkitavi:

She jumped out of a moving car, leaving 

her shoes and purse behind and ran barefoot through a cornfield and pounded on a 

stranger’s door to help her?

Fuck this “he’s been acquitted” noise. He’s 

a rapist alright, so we may as well call him 

one.

This comment unequivocally accuses Huon of committing a 

crime (rape), and nothing in its context suggests it is more 

appropriately viewed as mere name-calling or stylistic exaggeration. So Huon’s defamation per se claim as to this comment may proceed.

C. False Light Invasion of Privacy and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims Improperly 

Rejected

The district judge rejected Huon’s false-light and intentional-infliction claims based solely on the dismissal of Huon’s defamation claims. It appears that this tethering is consistent with Illinois law. See Madison v. Frazier, 539 F.3d 646, 

659 (7th Cir. 2008) (When an “unsuccessful defamation per se

claim is the basis of [a plaintiff’s] false-light claim, his falseCase: 15-3049 Document: 61 Filed: 11/14/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3049 21

light invasion of privacy claim fails as well.”). But that reasoning no longer holds, since Huon’s defamation per se claim 

as to one third-party user comment was improperly dismissed. And because the false-light and intentional-infliction 

claims have not been adequately briefed on appeal, we reverse the dismissal of those claims and remand for further 

proceedings.

D. No Error in Denying Motion for Leave to File Fifth 

Amended Complaint

Finally, Huon argues that the district judge erred in 

denying him leave to file a fifth amended complaint to cure 

certain alleged deficiencies relating to his defamation per 

quod claim. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) instructs

that courts should freely give plaintiffs leave to amend their 

complaints “when justice so requires.” However, district 

judges have “broad discretion” to deny leave to amend, 

“where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the 

defendants, or where the amendment would be futile.” Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). “We review a 

district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion and reverse only if no reasonable person could agree 

with that decision.” Schor v. City of Chi., 576 F.3d 775, 780 

(7th Cir. 2009).

Huon has not satisfied this high bar. The district judge 

explained that in each of his previously amended complaints, Huon had added new factual and legal allegations, 

added or removed defendants, or revised certain statements 

in an attempt to cure jurisdictional deficiencies. In addition, 

the judge emphasized that the modifications in the proposed 

complaint could have been made earlier, since they purport 

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22 No. 15-3049

to cure deficiencies highlighted in the Defendants’ motions 

to dismiss Huon’s second amended complaint. Why Huon 

did not modify his third or fourth amended complaints accordingly remains a mystery. So the district judge did not err 

in finding that Huon had ample opportunity to plead his 

claims, and justice does not require an additional bite of the 

apple. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 

328, 347–48 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding no abuse of discretion in 

denying leave to amend where plaintiffs had already had 

three opportunities to state a claim); Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., 

Inc., 134 F.3d 1321, 1322–23 (7th Cir. 1998) (same).

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and 

REVERSED in part, and the case is REMANDED for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

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