Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00226/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00226-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IBERIABANK, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 15-0226-WS-B

 )

CASE CONSTRUCTION, LLC, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider and Amend 

Default Judgment (doc. 21).

On August 3, 2015, the undersigned entered an Order (doc. 19) and Default Judgment 

(doc. 20), the collective effects of which were to grant plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default 

Judgment; to enter default judgment against defendant Case Construction, LLC, in the amount of 

$395,828.73; to enter default judgment against defendant Stephen G. Case in the amount of 

$1,493,400.26; and to enter default judgment against defendant Tracey S. Case in the amount of 

$1,097,571.53.

As part and parcel of the requested default judgment, plaintiff sought an award of 

attorney’s fees based on contractual fee-shifting provisions, as well as $1,220 in costs. 

Specifically, the Proposed Order submitted by plaintiff with the Motion for Entry of Default 

Judgment included language providing “that Judgment of attorneys’ fees and costs is entered 

against the defendants Case Construction, L.L.C., Stephen G. Case, and Tracey S. Case in favor 

of plaintiff IBERIABANK in the amount of $26,220.00.” (Doc. 17-4, at 2.) This figure was 

echoed both in the Application for Entry of Default Judgment (doc. 17, ¶ 11) and in the 

accompanying Affidavit of Michel Nicrosi, Esq., which stated that “[t]he total fees incurred by 

the plaintiff in this cause, and anticipated to be incurred through the entry of default judgment, 

will total $25,000.00.” (Doc. 17, Exh. C, ¶ 4.) The Affidavit reflected that the fees sought were 

for timekeepers Michel Nicrosi and Jerrod Maddox. (Id., ¶ 3.)

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However, plaintiff did not adequately support its request for attorney’s fees. As the 

August 3 Order observed, plaintiff failed to disentangle which fees were attributable to which 

contract, thereby creating a situation in which one defendant might be held liable for attorney’s 

fees incurred by Iberiabank in enforcing a contract to which that defendant was not a signatory. 

More fundamentally, the August 3 Order noted, plaintiff’s submission omitted the necessary 

detailed information to enable the Court to evaluate the reasonableness of the claimed fees. On 

that basis, the August 3 Order concluded as follows:

“Under the circumstances, and given these substantial flaws in plaintiff’s proof, 

the Court exercises its discretion to disallow recovery of attorney’s fees. Plaintiff 

has not met its burden of showing which fees go with which collection efforts for 

which defendant, much less that the requested fee award is reasonable in terms of 

either hours or rates.”

(Doc. 19, at 9.) Notwithstanding the denial of plaintiff’s request for $25,000 in attorney’s fees, 

the August 3 Order otherwise granted Iberiabank’s request for default judgment to the tune of 

$1.49 million.

On August 31, 2015, Iberiabank filed its Motion to Reconsider and Amend Default 

Judgment, pursuant to Rule 59(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. The stated purpose of the Motion is to shore up 

the deficiencies in attorney’s fee proof cited by the August 3 Order as grounds for denial of that 

aspect of the Motion for Default Judgment. The factual showing accompanying the Motion to 

Reconsider is extensive. Plaintiff has provided copies of itemized invoices that delineate all 

billable charges, including detailed time entries specifying which tasks were performed by which 

timekeepers. Those invoices also break out the time entries, on an entry by entry basis, showing 

how much time relates to collection efforts for the home equity line of credit extended to Stephen 

and Tracey Case versus how much time relates to collection efforts for the promissory note 

executed by Case Construction (and guaranteed by Stephen Case). Plaintiff also furnishes the 

Supplemental Affidavit of Michel Nicrosi, wherein she further details the nature of the work 

performed by Iberiabank’s counsel in attempting to collect on the subject line of credit and 

commercial loan. (Doc. 21, Exh. A.)

Motions to reconsider are disfavored in federal court and are granted only in narrowly 

circumscribed circumstances. See, e.g., Hughes v. Stryker Sales Corp., 2010 WL 2608957, *2 

(S.D. Ala. June 28, 2010) (rejecting notion that motions to reconsider “are appropriate whenever 

the losing party thinks the District Court got it wrong,” but finding that they seek “an 

extraordinary remedy” that must be “employed sparingly”) (citations omitted). Movant neither 

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addresses the legal standard for the Motion to Reconsider nor explains how the circumstances 

presented here fit within the narrow confines of Rule 59(e). Nonetheless, under the particular 

circumstances presented here, the Court in its discretion will allow Iberiabank to supplement its 

previous evidentiary submission to flesh out the factual basis for the requested award of 

attorney’s fees.

There are limits to the permissible scope of that supplementation, however. In its original 

Application for Entry of Default Judgment and accompanying exhibits, Iberiabank requested an 

attorney’s fee award of $25,000 to cover work performed by attorneys Nicrosi and Maddox. 

Plaintiff expressly represented that the requested $25,000 sum constituted the “total fees incurred 

by the plaintiff in this cause, and anticipated to be incurred through the entry of default 

judgment.” In the Motion to Reconsider, however, plaintiff drastically expands the requested fee 

award from $25,000 to $40,151 – an increase of more than 60% – including thousands of dollars 

in pre-default judgment billings by at least four other timekeepers at plaintiff’s counsel’s law 

firm. Plaintiff neither explains this substantial enlargement in scope of the attorney’s fees sought

nor reconciles it with previous submissions in these default proceedings, except by indicating 

that collection efforts have continued in the interim. While Iberiabank may reasonably

supplement its previous evidentiary submission to substantiate its previous request for an award 

of $25,000 in attorney’s fees as part and parcel of the default judgment entered in this case, 

plaintiff may not receive a windfall arising from the shortcomings of its previous evidentiary 

submission by ratcheting the requested attorney’s fees upward by more than 60%. Nor is it 

appropriate to use Rule 59 to effectuate a parade of amendments to a default judgment each time

a new monthly invoice is issued from law firm to client for ongoing collection activities.

In light of the foregoing, it is ordered as follows:

1. Plantiff’s “Motion to Reconsider Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Application and 

Amend Default Judgment” (doc. 21) is granted in part and denied in part;

2. The Motion is granted insofar as plaintiff would supplement its previous 

evidentiary submission to bolster the original request for a $25,000 attorney’s fee 

award, in terms of both allocation of fees between the two loans and 

reasonableness of fees incurred;

3. Upon review of plaintiff’s supplemental evidentiary submission, the Court finds 

that plaintiff reasonably incurred the sum of $25,000 in attorney’s fees in its 

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efforts to collect on defendants’ debts owed on the subject line of credit and 

commercial loan, with such funds to be allocated 47.8% toward the line of credit 

(for which defendants Stephen G. Case and Tracey S. Case are jointly and 

severally responsible) and 52.2% toward the commercial loan (for which 

defendants Case Construction, LLC and Stephen G. Case are jointly and severally 

responsible), in accordance with the itemized breakdown of time entries presented 

in plaintiff’s supplemental filing;

4. Pursuant to the above-referenced attorney’s fee award and allocation of same 

among defendants, the Default Judgment will be amended to provide for an 

additional $11,963.43 awarded against Stephen G. Case and Tracey S. Case on 

Count Three; and an additional $13,036.57 awarded against Case Construction, 

LLC on Count One and against Stephen G. Case on Count Two; and

5. In all other respects, the Motion to Reconsider and Amend is denied.

1

DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of September, 2015.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 1 In support of the Motion, plaintiff filed redacted copies of approximately 40 pages 

of attorney invoices / billing statements. (See Nicrosi Supp. Aff., at Exh. 1.) The redactions are 

minor and primarily involve deletions of names and substance of privileged communications. 

Certainly, the gist of the work performed and the reasonableness of the itemized fee entries can 

be readily ascertained without knowing the contents of the subject redactions. Nonetheless, 

without leave of court, plaintiff indicated that “unredacted invoices will be delivered to the Court 

in camera for the Court’s review” (Nicrosi Supp. Aff., ¶ 6 & n.1) and in fact provided an 

unredacted hard copy to the undersigned’s chambers on the date the Motion was filed. The 

proper procedure would have been to file the unredacted documents under seal with an 

accompanying motion, in accordance with General L.R. 5.2 and Section III.A. of this District 

Court’s Administrative Procedure for Filing, Signing, and Verifying Documents by Electronic 

Means. Nonetheless, the Court concludes that the unredacted versions of the subject invoices 

need not be maintained in the court file at all, inasmuch as the redacted versions are adequate to 

support the requested award of attorney’s fees. The Court therefore will not direct the Clerk of 

Court to file these in camera materials under seal. Should plaintiff wish to retain the original in 

camera documents, it should make appropriate arrangements to retrieve same from the 

undersigned’s chambers on or before September 23, 2015, barring which the in camera

submission materials will be shredded.

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