Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01077/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01077-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL ANTHONY HOLLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

E. EVANS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01077-VC 

ORDER SERVING COGNIZABLE 

CLAIMS; DISMISSING ONE CLAIM 

WITH PREJUDICE; DISMISSING ONE 

CLAIM WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

Joel Anthony Holley, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison proceeding pro se, filed a civil 

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officers at San Quentin. Holley has filed a 

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which is granted in a separate order. The Court 

now addresses the claims asserted in Holley’s complaint. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A federal court must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 

governmental entity, or officer or employee of a governmental entity, to dismiss any claims that: 

(1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or 

(3) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 

699 (9th Cir. 1988).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 

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violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988). 

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the 

plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the 

deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corrections & 

Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 

1988). A person deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of § 1983 if he does 

an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act or fails to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. Leer, 844 F.2d 

at 633. 

But there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074. That 

is, a supervisor is not liable merely because the supervisor is responsible, in general terms, for the 

actions of another. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. Reno 

Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). A supervisor may be 

liable only on a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012). It is insufficient for a 

plaintiff to allege generally that supervisors knew about the constitutional violation or that they 

generally created policies and procedures that led to the violation, without alleging “a specific 

policy” or “a specific event” instigated by the supervisors that led to the constitutional violation. 

Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012).

II. Holley’s Allegations

Holley’s complaint alleges the following:

In April 2014, Lieutenant Hal Williams and Sergeant B. Dutton moved Holley from a cell 

with a compatible cellmate to a cell with an incompatible cellmate. A few days later, Holley 

informed Williams and Dutton that he was afraid his cellmate would attack him, but they stated 

they did not care. When Holley refused to go to the assigned cell, Williams, Dutton, and 

Lieutenant S. Kluger charged him with threatening the safety and security of the institution and 

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placed him in administrative segregation. Lieutenant S. Kluger reviewed Holley’s appeal and, 

although he interviewed staff witnesses, he refused to interview Holley’s witnesses.

After Holley was released from administrative segregation, Dutton insisted that Holley 

return to the same cell with the same hostile cellmate. On April 30, 2014, Holley was issued 

another rules violation report and, on May 5, 2015, Williams held a hearing on it. Williams 

refused to appoint an investigative employee to assist Holley with gathering evidence and denied 

Holley’s request to present testimony of his witnesses. Williams gave false testimony at the 

hearing. 

On May 20, 2014, Holley requested the appointment of an investigator to gather evidence 

and a new disciplinary hearing at which he could present his evidence and the testimony of his 

witnesses. His request was denied up to the Director’s Level of Review. Captain E. Evans was 

aware of these events because he interviewed Holley and then released him from administrative 

segregation.

Based on these allegations, Holley asserts the following claims: (1) violation of his 

Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair hearing against Williams because he presented false 

evidence at Holley’s disciplinary hearing; (2) violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to a 

fair hearing because Kluger and Williams denied Holley’s requests to present witnesses at his 

disciplinary hearings and Williams did not provide a written explanation for his findings of guilt; 

(3) violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair hearing against Kluger, who ordered 

Holley to be placed in administrative segregation and also reviewed Holley’s appeal, thus 

violating prison regulations about avoiding conflicts of interest; (4) violation of his Fourteenth 

Amendment right to a fair hearing because the guilty findings by Kluger and Williams were not 

supported by some evidence; (4) violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from 

deliberate indifference to his safety against Williams, Dutton and Kluger who forced Holley to 

live with a potentially violent cellmate; and (5) violation of his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment 

rights by Evans because he failed to supervise his officers and stood “by the code of silence which 

protected prison officials.” 

Liberally construed, the allegations in the complaint state a cognizable Fourteenth 

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Amendment claim against Williams and Kluger for failing to provide Holley with procedural due 

process at his disciplinary hearings and for finding him guilty without “some evidence” of guilt. 

See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-71 (1974) (Due Process Clause entitles prisoner to 

certain procedural protections when he is charged with a disciplinary violation, such as 

opportunity to present witnesses and a written statement by fact-finder as to the evidence relied 

upon and reasons for disciplinary action taken); Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 472, 454 

(1985) (due process requires "some evidence" to support the disciplinary decision). Liberally 

construed, the allegations state a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Williams for presenting 

false evidence at Holley’s disciplinary hearing. See Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th 

Cir. 1989) (allegations of false evidence at disciplinary hearing in conjunction with allegations of 

due process violations at same hearing state a due process claim); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 

949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986) (same). Liberally construed, the allegations state a cognizable Eighth 

Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to Holley’s safety against Williams, Dutton and 

Kluger for placing him in a cell with a potentially violent inmate. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (Eighth Amendment imposes duty on prison officials to provide for personal 

safety of inmates). 

However, the allegations do not state a cognizable claim against Kluger for violating state 

administrative regulations. See West, 487 U.S. at 48 (claims brought under § 1983 must allege 

violations of the federal constitution or federal law). Nor do the conclusory allegations that Evans 

failed to supervise his officers or “stood by the code of silence” state a constitutional claim against 

him. See Henry A., 678 F.3d at 1003-04 (supervisor liable only on a showing of (1) personal 

involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation). The claim against Kluger is 

dismissed with prejudice because amendment would be futile. The claim against Evans is 

dismissed with leave to amend for Holley to cure the deficiencies, if he truthfully can do so. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. The claim against Kluger for violating state administrative regulations is dismissed with 

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prejudice. The due process claim against Evans is dismissed with leave to amend. Holley may, 

but is not required to, file an amended complaint to remedy the deficiencies in this claim. If 

Holley chooses to file an amended complaint, he must do so within twenty-eight days from the 

date of this Order. He must file the amended complaint on the Court's civil rights complaint form 

with the words “First Amended Complaint,” on the upper right hand side of the cover page. He 

must use in the caption of the Amended Complaint the name of this case and the case number 

C 15-1077 VC (PR). Holley is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original 

complaint, so that he must state all his allegations in the amended complaint. See London V. 

Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff waives all claims alleged in 

original complaint which are not alleged in amended complaint); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 

1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (defendants not named in amended complaint are no longer 

defendants). If Holley does not file an amended complaint within twenty-eight days from the date 

of this Order, the claim against Evans will be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Holley’s allegations appear to state the following cognizable claims: (1) a due process 

claim against Williams and Kluger for failing to provide procedural due process at Holley’s 

disciplinary hearing and for finding him guilty without some evidence; (2) a due process claim 

against Williams for presenting false evidence at Holley’s disciplinary hearing; (3) an Eighth 

Amendment claim against Williams, Dutton and Kluger for deliberate indifference to Holley’s 

safety by forcing him to live with a potentially violent inmate. 

3. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 

Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint

(docket no. 1) and all attachments thereto and a copy of this Order to Williams, Kluger and Dutton 

at San Quentin. The Clerk shall also mail a courtesy copy of the complaint with all attachments

and a copy of this Order to the State Attorney General’s Office in San Francisco, and a copy of 

this Order to Holley.

4. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires 

them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and the complaint. 

Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the Court, on 

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behalf of Holley, to waive service of the summons, fail to do so, they will be required to bear the 

cost of such service unless good cause be shown for their failure to sign and return the waiver 

forms. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date 

that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(ii), Defendants will not be 

required to serve and file an answer or other responsive pleading before sixty days from the date 

on which the request for waiver was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be 

required if formal service of summons is necessary.)

 Defendants are advised to read the statement set forth at the foot of the waiver form that 

more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of service of the 

summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before Defendants have 

been personally served, the answer shall be due sixty days from the date on which the request for 

waiver was sent or twenty days from the date the waiver form is filed, whichever is later. 

5. The following briefing schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than thirty days from the date the answer is due, Defendants shall file a 

motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If Defendants file a motion for 

summary judgment, it shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in 

all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. If Defendants are of the opinion that this case 

cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the Court prior to the date the 

summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on 

Holley. 

At the time of filing the motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, 

Defendants shall comply with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th 

Cir. 2012), and provide Holley with notice of what is required of him to oppose a summary 

judgment motion. If the motion is based on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, 

Defendants must comply with the notice and procedural requirements in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 

1162 (9th Cir. 2014). 

b. Holley’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment or other dispositive 

motion shall be filed with the Court and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight days 

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after the date on which Defendants’ motion is filed. 

Before filing his opposition, Holley is advised to read the notice that will be provided to 

him by Defendants when the motion is filed, and Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (party opposing summary judgment must come 

forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his 

claim). Holley is cautioned that because he bears the burden of proving his allegations in this 

case, he must be prepared to produce evidence in support of those allegations when he files his 

opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Such evidence may include sworn 

declarations from himself and other witnesses, and copies of documents authenticated by sworn 

declaration. Holley will not be able to avoid summary judgment simply by repeating the 

allegations of his complaint.

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen days after the date 

Holley’s opposition is filed.

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date.

6. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. No further court order pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) is required before the parties may 

conduct discovery.

7. All communications by Holley with the Court must be served on Defendants, or 

Defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to 

Defendants or counsel.

8. It is Holley’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Holley must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of 

Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so 

may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(b).

9. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. Any 

motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than fourteen days prior to the deadline 

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sought to be extended.

10. The Clerk of the Court shall send Holley a blank civil rights form with this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

April 22, 2015

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