Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05353/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05353-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 2013 Decided June 18, 2013

No. 11-5353

IN RE: POLAR BEAR ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT LISTING AND

SECTION 4(D) RULE LITIGATION–MDL NO. 1993,

SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

SALLY JEWELL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-mc-00764)

Douglas S. Burdin argued the cause for appellants. With 

him on the briefs were Anna M. Seidman and Paul Minnich. 

Sean E. Summers entered an appearance.

Katherine W. Hazard argued the cause for appellees. On 

the brief were Maggie B. Smith and David Shilton. 

Howard M. Crystal, Eric R. Glitzenstein, Brendan R. 

Cummings, Kassia R. Siegel, and Rebecca J. Riley were on 

the brief for intervenors Humane Society of the United States, 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 1 of 15
2

et al. in support of appellee. Benjamin H. Longstreth and 

Jason C. Rylander entered appearances.

Before: ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: After listing the polar bear as a 

threatened species under the Endangered Species Act, the 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, acting pursuant to a related 

statute—the Marine Mammal Protection Act—barred the 

importation of polar bear trophies. Hunters and hunting 

organizations challenge this determination, raising both 

statutory and procedural arguments. Finding them all without 

merit, the district court granted summary judgment to the 

Service. We affirm. 

I.

“[T]he largest of the living bear species,” polar bears are 

characterized by their “large body size, a stocky form, and fur 

color that varies from white to yellow.” Determination of 

Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) 

Throughout Its Range (“Listing Rule”), 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 

28,212 (May 15, 2008). Evolutionarily adapted to sea-ice 

habitats, polar bears live in “ice-covered seas” in Russia, 

northern Europe, the Canadian Arctic, and parts of Alaska. Id.

at 28,212–13. A 2006 study estimated the “total number of 

polar bears worldwide” to be 20,000–25,000, comprised of 

“19 relatively discrete populations” in different geographic 

regions. See id. at 28,215. 

This case is not about living polar bears. Instead, it 

concerns polar bear trophies—“mount[s], rug[s] or other 

display item[s] composed of the hide, hair, skull, teeth, 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 2 of 15
3

baculum, bones, and claws of the specimen which [were] 

taken . . . during a sport hunt for personal, noncommercial 

use.” 50 C.F.R. § 18.30(b)(1). Plaintiffs, Safari Club

International and Safari Club International Foundation, along 

with individual hunters Ronald Kreider and Donald Hershey, 

seek to import polar bear trophies from sport hunts in the 

Canadian Arctic. 

Two federal statutes, the Marine Mammal Protection Act 

(“MMPA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361 et seq., and the Endangered 

Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq., govern the 

importation of polar bear trophies. Congress enacted the first 

of these statutes, the MMPA, because “certain species and 

population stocks of marine mammals are, or may be, in 

danger of extinction or depletion as a result of” human 

activities. Id. § 1361(1). The MMPA restricts the importation 

and “taking”—i.e., harassing, hunting, capturing, or killing, 

see id. § 1362(13)—of polar bears, as well as other marine 

mammals such as seals, dolphins, walruses, and sea lions.

The MMPA establishes a “stepwise approach” to the 

conservation of marine mammals. Appellees’ Br. 5. At step 

one, the statute imposes a general “moratorium on the taking 

and importation” of all marine mammals, regardless of the 

species’ scarcity or abundance. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a). This 

moratorium has several enumerated exceptions, including one 

for importation of sport-hunted polar bear trophies. Id.

§ 1371(a)(1) (providing an exception to the general 

moratorium for “importation of polar bear parts . . . taken in

sport hunts in Canada”). Specifically, section 104(c)(5) 

authorizes the Service to “issue a permit for the importation of 

polar bear parts (other than internal organs) taken in sport 

hunts in Canada” and provides that the Service “shall” do so 

when certain criteria are satisfied. Id. § 1374(c)(5)(A). 

Pursuant to this provision, the Service approved the issuance 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 3 of 15
4

of permits for importation of trophies from certain Canadian 

polar bear populations. See 50 C.F.R. § 18.30(i)(1).

Going beyond the general moratorium, step two of the 

MMPA’s conservation scheme imposes additional protections 

for species the Secretary designates as “depleted.” See 16 

U.S.C. §§ 1371(a)(3)(B), 1372(b)(3). The MMPA defines the 

term “depleted” as “any case in which” (1) the Secretary 

“determines that a species or population stock is below its 

optimum sustainable population”; (2) an authorized State 

makes the same determination; or (3) “a species or population 

stock is listed as an endangered species or a threatened 

species under the Endangered Species Act of 1973.” Id.

§ 1362(1). Two provisions of the MMPA prohibit importation 

of species that have been designated as depleted. Section 

101(a)(3)(B) provides that:

Except for scientific research purposes, photography 

for educational or commercial purposes, or 

enhancing the survival or recovery of a species or 

stock as provided for in paragraph (1) of this 

subsection, or as provided for under paragraph (5) of 

this subsection, during the moratorium no permit 

may be issued for the taking of any marine mammal 

which has been designated by the Secretary as 

depleted, and no importation may be made of any 

such mammal.

Id. § 1371(a)(3)(B). And section 102(b)(3) reads:

Except pursuant to a permit for scientific research, or 

for enhancing the survival or recovery of a species or 

stock, issued under section 1374(c) of this title, it is 

unlawful to import into the United States any marine 

mammal if such mammal was . . . taken from a 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 4 of 15
5

species or population stock which the Secretary has, 

by regulation published in the Federal Register, 

designated as a depleted species or stock . . . .

Id. § 1372(b)(3).

On May 15, 2008, the Service published a rule listing the 

polar bear as a threatened species under the ESA. See 

Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus 

maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (May 

15, 2008). In the same rule, the Service also determined that 

the listing had the effect of designating the polar bear as 

“depleted” under the MMPA and that MMPA sections 

101(a)(3)(B) and 102(b)(3) thus barred continued importation 

of sport-hunted polar bear trophies under that statute. Id. at 

28,236, 28,242, 28,301–02. As a consequence, the Service 

administratively closed Kreider’s and Hershey’s permit 

applications, which sought to import polar bears killed prior 

to the bear’s threatened listing. In identical letters sent to 

Kreider and Hershey, the Service explained that, due to the 

polar bear’s depleted status, the MMPA provision “allow[ing] 

for the import of sport-hunted polar bear trophies from 

Canada is no longer available, even if your bear was hunted 

prior to the effective date of the ESA listing.” 

A number of industry groups, environmental 

organizations, hunters, and states challenged the Listing Rule 

in several district courts. These challenges, including those by 

Kreider, Hershey, and the Safari Club, were consolidated as a 

Multidistrict Litigation case in the United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia. With respect to the actions 

challenging the Service’s decision to list the polar bear as a 

threatened species under the ESA, the district court granted 

summary judgment to the Service, and we sustained that 

ruling earlier this year. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 5 of 15
6

Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litigation, 709 F.3d 1 (D.C. 

Cir. 2013). In a separate ruling, the district court also granted 

summary judgment to the Service on the issue now before 

us—whether the MMPA authorizes importation of sporthunted polar bear trophies following the Listing Rule.

According to the district court, the Service “properly 

concluded that the polar bear is a depleted species within the 

meaning of the MMPA as of the publication of the Listing 

Rule,” meaning that “the MMPA mandates the Service’s 

conclusion that sport-hunted polar bear trophies are no longer 

eligible for import as a result of the species’ depleted status.” 

In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 

4(d) Rule Litigation, 818 F. Supp. 2d 240, 245 (D.D.C. 2011).

The Safari Club now appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment on the importation issue, raising both 

statutory and procedural challenges. Several conservation 

groups, including the Humane Society of the United States, 

have intervened on behalf of the Service. “In a case like the 

instant one, in which the District Court reviewed an agency 

action under the APA, we review the administrative action 

directly, according no particular deference to the judgment of 

the District Court.” Holland v. National Mining Association, 

309 F.3d 808, 814 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In reviewing the 

Service’s interpretation of the MMPA, a statute the agency 

has sole authority to administer with respect to polar bears 

and certain other marine mammals, we apply the familiar twostep analysis set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 

Because we conclude that Congress has “directly spoken to 

the precise question[s] at issue” here, we have no need to 

resolve the parties’ debate about whether the Service’s 

interpretation of the MMPA qualifies for Chevron step two 

deference. Id. at 842–43; see also Pharmaceutical Research 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 6 of 15
7

& Manufacturers of America v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 224 

(D.C. Cir. 2001).

II.

We begin with the Service’s argument that the Safari 

Club’s claims are unripe for review. See Wyoming Outdoor 

Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 165 F.3d 43, 48 (D.C. Cir. 

1999) (“[A]n Article III court cannot entertain the claims of a 

litigant unless they are ‘constitutionally and prudentially 

ripe.’ ” (quoting Louisiana Environmental Action Network v. 

Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1996))). Although 

conceding that Hershey’s and Kreider’s challenges to the 

disposition of their permit applications are ripe, the Service 

contends that the Safari Club’s challenge to the Listing Rule’s 

import determination was “not fit for judicial review” “[a]t 

the time the Final Rule was published” because the Service 

had yet to “appl[y] the legal reasoning [in the Rule] to any 

particular case.” Appellees’ Br. 21. But because “ripeness is 

peculiarly a question of timing, it is the situation now . . . that 

must govern,” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 

U.S. 102, 140 (1974), not the situation at the time the Listing 

Rule was published. Viewed through this lens, the Safari 

Club’s challenge to the Listing Rule is indisputably fit for 

judicial resolution. Not only does the Safari Club raise

“purely legal” issues of statutory interpretation, but the 

Service has now applied the Listing Rule to dispose of 

individual permit applications, including those filed by 

Hershey and Kreider, thus demonstrating the finality of the 

agency’s action and rendering further factual development 

unnecessary. See Clean Air Act Implementation Project v. 

EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (ripeness 

doctrine’s first requirement is concerned with “whether the

issue ‘is purely legal, whether consideration of the issue 

would benefit from a more concrete setting, and whether the 

agency’s action is sufficiently final’ ” (quoting NRDC v. EPA, 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 7 of 15
8

22 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1994))). Moreover, the Service 

nowhere disputes that the Safari Club will suffer hardship 

associated with the inability to import polar bear trophies if 

court consideration is withheld. See Abbott Laboratories v. 

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) (ripeness doctrine’s 

second requirement requires us to consider “the hardship to 

the parties of withholding court consideration”), overruled on 

other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).

We thus turn to the merits.

The Service’s challenged determination rests on three 

premises: (1) that the polar bear’s ESA listing had the effect 

of “designating” the species as depleted within the meaning of 

MMPA sections 101(a)(3)(B) and 102(b)(3); (2) that once 

these import prohibitions were triggered, polar bears could no 

longer be imported under section 104(c)(5)’s trophy import 

authorization; and (3) that these import prohibitions apply 

even to bears taken before the species was designated as 

depleted. The Safari Club disputes all three propositions and 

adds two procedural challenges. We consider each claim in 

turn.

A.

The Safari Club argues that sections 101(a)(3)(B) and 

102(b)(3) pose no bar to trophy importation because the polar 

bear was never “designated” as a depleted species within the 

meaning of those provisions. Recall that the MMPA specifies 

three methods by which a species can become “depleted”: 

(1) the Secretary “determines that a species or population 

stock is below its optimum sustainable population”; (2) an 

authorized State makes the same determination; or (3) “a 

species or population stock is listed as an endangered species 

or a threatened species under the [ESA].” 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1362(1). According to the Safari Club, a species is 

“designated” as depleted only when an affirmative 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 8 of 15
9

determination is made, through the procedures set forth in 

MMPA section 115(a), that the species has fallen below its 

optimum sustainable population. When a species is instead 

listed as threatened under the ESA, the Safari Club contends 

that the species becomes depleted automatically and thus is 

not “designated” as depleted within the meaning of MMPA 

sections 101(a)(3)(B) and 102(b)(3).

The Safari Club places far too much emphasis on the 

term “designate.” As the district court explained, because “the 

MMPA expressly identifies three methods by which a species 

earns ‘depleted’ status” and “[n]one of these methods is 

particularly defined or otherwise referred to as a 

‘designation,’ ” the “most natural reading of the statute” is 

“that a species may be designated as depleted through any one 

of these three methods.” In re Polar Bear Endangered Species 

Act Listing, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 254. Indeed, other MMPA 

provisions refer to a species as being “designated” as depleted 

“because of” or “on the basis of” its listing as an endangered 

or threatened species under the ESA, thus demonstrating that 

Congress believed an ESA listing could amount to a 

“designation.” See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a)(5)(E)(i); 1387(a)(2).

Under the Safari Club’s interpretation, moreover, 

whether a particular species is protected by the import 

prohibitions would turn on the procedural mechanism by 

which that species became depleted. Nothing in the legislative 

record, however, suggests that Congress intended such an odd 

result. The Safari Club insists that threatened species should 

be treated differently because, unlike species found to be 

presently below their optimum sustainable population, 

threatened species may “currently enjoy historically high 

population numbers” but be ESA-listed “because of 

predictions about [future] conditions.” Appellants’ Br. 41. But 

Congress thought otherwise: “species that are listed under the 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 9 of 15
10

Endangered Species Act are, a fortiori, not at their optimum 

sustainable population and, therefore, should be considered 

depleted.” H.R. Rep. No. 97-228, at 16 (1981), reprinted in

1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1458, 1466. In any event, even were a 

species in fact at its optimum sustainable population and 

listed as threatened based solely on predicted future

conditions, the Safari Club fails to explain why, given the 

MMPA’s overarching goal of protecting species “in danger of 

extinction or depletion,” 16 U.S.C. § 1361(1), Congress 

would have wanted that species to drop below its optimum 

sustainable population before the MMPA’s import 

prohibitions for depleted species could apply. We thus think it 

quite clear that Congress intended to extend the protections of 

sections 101(a)(3)(B) and 102(b)(3) to all depleted species, 

regardless of how they achieve their depleted status.

B.

The Safari Club next argues that MMPA section 

104(c)(5) requires the Service to authorize importation of 

sport-hunted polar bear trophies even where the polar bear is 

designated as depleted under the MMPA. The district court 

rejected this argument, finding “the intent of Congress . . . 

clear” that section 104(c)(5) “must give way to restrictions on 

importing depleted species.” In re Polar Bear Endangered 

Species Act Listing, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 253. We agree. 

Sections 101(a)(3)(B) and 102(b)(3) prohibit importation of 

depleted species, unless the importation falls into one of the 

narrow exceptions for specific purposes such as scientific 

research and enhancing survival of the species. See 16 U.S.C. 

§§ 1371(a)(3)(B), 1372(b). Importation of sport-hunted 

trophies is not among these enumerated exceptions. See 

Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 

(1980) (“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain 

exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 10 of 15
11

not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary 

legislative intent.”). 

Conceding the obvious—that neither section 101(a)(3)(B) 

nor section 102(b) exempts trophy importation—the Safari 

Club nonetheless insists that these provisions must give way 

to section 104(c)(5)’s “express and mandatory Congressional 

authorization of imports of legally harvested polar bears.” 

Appellants’ Br. 27. As the Safari Club sees it, these 

provisions are in irreconcilable conflict: section 104(c)(5) 

requires the Service to authorize importation of sport-hunted 

polar bear trophies (and contains no exception for depleted 

polar bears), whereas sections 101(a)(3)(B) and 102(b)(3) 

prohibit any such importation. Invoking a bevy of statutory 

construction canons, the Safari Club argues that section 

104(c)(5) should govern because the provision (1) is “narrow, 

precise and specific” to importation of polar bear trophies; 

(2) was enacted later in time; and (3) would otherwise be 

rendered superfluous. Appellants’ Br. 29–31 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

These arguments rest on a mistaken premise. Read in 

context, the provisions in question do not conflict but instead 

operate in different spheres of the MMPA’s stepwise scheme. 

Although section 104(c)(5) does authorize trophy importation, 

that provision—like the statute’s other permit 

authorizations—remains subject to the MMPA’s more 

stringent protections for depleted species. When Congress 

wanted permit authorizations, such as those for scientific 

research and enhancement, to apply even to depleted species, 

it made this clear by including exceptions for those purposes 

in sections 101(a)(3)(B) and 102(b). But Congress included 

no such exception for trophy importation, thus demonstrating, 

as the district court explained, that although “importation of 

sport-hunted polar bear trophies from Canada is a permissible 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 11 of 15
12

exception to the general moratorium on importing marine 

mammals and marine mammal products, it is not an 

authorized exception where depleted marine mammals are 

concerned.” In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing, 

818 F. Supp. 2d at 253.

C.

In support of its argument that the import prohibitions 

apply only to polar bears taken after the species became 

depleted, the Safari Club first points to section 102(b)(3), 

which prohibits importation of any marine mammal “taken 

from a species or population stock which the Secretary has, 

by regulation published in the Federal Register, designated as 

a depleted species or stock.” 16 U.S.C. § 1372(b)(3). 

According to the Safari Club, this provision applies only to 

mammals taken from species that had already been 

designated as depleted at the time they were taken. The 

district court disagreed, as do we. See In re Polar Bear 

Endangered Species Act Listing, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 256 & 

n.11. The provision refers not to mammals taken from species 

the Secretary had designated as depleted but instead mammals 

taken from species the Secretary has so designated. If 

Congress intended section 102(b)(3) to apply only to 

mammals taken after the species became depleted, it would 

have replaced the verb “has” with “had.”

Reinforcing this conclusion, other provisions of section 

102(b) are expressly limited by the phrase “at the time of 

taking.” Specifically, sections 102(b)(1) and 102(b)(2), 

respectively, prohibit importation of mammals “pregnant at 

the time of taking” and “nursing at the time of taking.” 16 

U.S.C. § 1372(b)(1)–(b)(2). By contrast, section 102(b)(3) 

contains no language limiting its operation to species 

designated as depleted “at the time of taking.” See Barnhart v. 

Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002) (“[W]hen 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 12 of 15
13

‘Congress includes particular language in one section of a 

statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 

generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 

purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’ ” (quoting 

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). 

Alternatively, the Safari Club relies on section 

101(a)(3)(B), but that provision cannot permit what section 

102(b)(3) expressly prohibits without rendering the latter 

superfluous. See Davis County Solid Waste Management v. 

EPA, 101 F.3d 1395, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is of course 

a well-established maxim of statutory construction that courts 

should avoid interpretations that render a statutory provision 

superfluous.”). Indeed, counsel for the Safari Club conceded 

as much at oral argument, stating that if the trophies in 

question cannot be imported under section 102(b)(3), “it 

doesn’t help that they might be able to [be imported] under 

the other provision.” Oral Arg. Rec. 15:13–15:19. 

D.

This brings us finally to the Safari Club’s procedural 

challenges.

The Safari Club first argues that the Service failed to 

comply with MMPA section 115(a) when it promulgated the 

Listing Rule. That provision requires the Service, in taking 

“any action . . . to determine if a species or stock should be 

designated as depleted,” to follow certain procedural 

requirements, such as publishing in the Federal Register a call 

for assistance in obtaining scientific information and utilizing 

informal working groups to the extent feasible. 16 U.S.C. 

§ 1383b(a). Acknowledging that it did not follow section 

115(a)’s requirements, the Service contends that it had no 

obligation to do so. We agree. Section 115(a) applies only to 

actions “to determine if a species or stock should be 

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 13 of 15
14

designated as depleted.” Id. (emphasis added). This clearly 

refers to the first mechanism for designating a species as 

depleted—where “the Secretary . . . determines that a species 

or population stock is below its optimum sustainable 

population.” Id. § 1362(1)(A). By contrast, where a species is 

listed under the ESA, it automatically becomes designated as 

depleted under the MMPA. See id. § 1362(1)(C). 

Accordingly, because an ESA listing results in a depleted 

designation under the MMPA but entails no “determination” 

to that effect, section 115(a) is inapplicable.

Next, the Safari Club argues that the proposed Listing 

Rule failed to provide adequate notice that the Service “was 

designating the polar bear as a depleted marine mammal 

under the MMPA.” Appellants’ Br. 47. Had it been given 

notice, the Safari Club claims it “would have argued . . . that 

simply listing a species as threatened was not a ‘designation’ 

of a marine mammal as depleted.” Appellants’ Br. 49. The 

district court rejected this argument, finding that the proposed 

rule in fact “provided sufficient notice of the potential effects 

of the Listing Rule and of the polar bear’s depleted status.” In 

re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing, 818 F. Supp. 

2d at 255. Again, we agree. 

The notice of proposed rulemaking clearly advised

stakeholders that the ESA listing could have the effect of 

designating the polar bear as a depleted species within the 

meaning of the MMPA’s import prohibitions. The proposed 

rule explained that: 

Regarding ongoing importation of polar bear 

trophies taken from approved populations in Canada 

into the United States, we anticipate conducting an 

evaluation of the merits of continuing the presently 

authorized imports. Under the MMPA Section 102—

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 14 of 15
15

Prohibitions [Importation of pregnant or nursing 

animals; depleted species which includes those listed 

as threatened or endangered under the ESA] it is 

unlawful to import into the United States any marine 

mammal if the mammal was taken from a species or 

population stock that the Secretary has, by regulation 

published in the Federal Register, designated as a 

depleted species or stock. 

Proposed Rule to List the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) as 

Threatened Throughout Its Range, 72 Fed. Reg. 1064, 1098 

(Jan. 9, 2007) (bracketed text in original). In other words, the 

proposed rule not only explained the Service’s view that 

“depleted species . . . include[] those listed as threatened or 

endangered under the ESA,” but also alerted interested parties 

that the MMPA could therefore bar continued trophy 

importation. Id. Indeed, the Safari Club seems to have 

understood this: it submitted comments to the Service 

warning that “[l]isting under the ESA would make it 

impossible for U.S. citizens to import sport-hunted polar bear 

trophies into the United States, at least without the adoption 

of special rules and permits to allow such imports.” Thus, the 

Safari Club “should have anticipated”—and did in fact 

anticipate—“the agency’s final course in light of the initial 

notice,” rendering the final rule a “logical outgrowth of its 

notice.” Covad Communications Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 

548 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

 So ordered.

USCA Case #11-5353 Document #1441735 Filed: 06/18/2013 Page 15 of 15