Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00411/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00411-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAYNA PADULA, et al., No. 2:05-cv-00411-MCE-EFB

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROBERT MORRIS, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Adjudication seeking judgment against three Plaintiffs, Christina

Pistorius, Pamela Hall, and Dayna Padula (collectively

“Plaintiffs”), for failure to file their federal claims within

the time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations,

California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1, and failure to file

their state claims in compliance with the California Government

Tort Claims Act(“the GTCA”), California Government Code § 810 et

seq. Because Defendants have proved that Plaintiffs’ claims are

so barred, and because Plaintiffs’ have failed to provide any

countervailing evidence, Defendants’ Motion is granted.

Case 2:05-cv-00411-MCE-EFB Document 110 Filed 05/02/08 Page 1 of 15
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BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims

Plaintiffs’ claims are derived from allegations of sexual

harassment brought by various students of Dunsmuir High School

(“Dunsmuir”) against, inter alia, the Dunsmuir Joint Unified High

School District, Southern Humboldt Unified School District,

school administrators, and members of the school board. The

following claims are germane to the current dispute: 

Christina Pistorius

a. Federal Claims:

Count 1 - Title IX Discrimination and Sexual

Harassment Based on Gender

Count 2 - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Denial of Title

IX Rights

Count 3 - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Equal

Protection/Substantive Due Process

Count 4 - 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) - Conspiracy

b. State Claims:

Count 7 - CA Civil Code §§ 51-52 - Unruh

Civil Rights Acct

Count 8 - Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress

Count 9 - Sexual Battery

Count 10- Failure to Discharge Mandatory Duty

Imposed By Statute

Count 11- Negligent Supervision and Retention

of Employees

Pamela Hall

a. Federal Claims:

Count 3 - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Equal

Protection/Substantive Due Process

Count 4 - 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) - Conspiracy

b. State Claims:

Count 7 - CA Civil Code §§ 51-52 - Unruh

Civil Rights Acct

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Dayna Padula

a. State Claims:

Count 7 - CA Civil Code §§ 51-52 - Unruh

Civil Rights Acct

Count 8 - Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress

Count 9 - Sexual Battery

Count 10- Failure to Discharge Mandatory Duty

Imposed By Statute

Count 11- Negligent Supervision and Retention

of Employees

B. Factual Background

Because Defendants’ current Motion is based entirely on

Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to comply with the statute of

limitations applicable to the federal claims and the presentment

requirements applicable to the state claims, the only facts

pertinent to this Motion, none of which are disputed, are

procedural in nature. 

1. Christina Pistorius

Ms. Pistorius graduated from Dunsmuir in June of 2002. She

acknowledges that no acts of sexual harassment occurred after

that point. Ms. Pistorius filed a claim pursuant to the GTCA on

July 30, 2004. That claim was rejected on September 1, 2004, and

Ms. Pistorius filed the current action on March 1, 2005. 

Ms. Pistorius is a party to Counts 1-4 (federal claims) and

Counts 7-11 (state claims). 

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Defendants move for summary adjudication as to

Ms. Pistorius’ federal claims under Counts 1-4 arguing that those

claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

Defendants also move for summary adjudication as to

Ms. Pistorius’ state claims under Counts 7-11 arguing that those

claims are barred since Ms. Pistorius failed to file her

California Government Tort Claim within six months of the last

alleged act of harassment as required by California Government

Code § 911.2.

2. Pamela Hall

Ms. Hall brings claims arising from the alleged sexual

harassment of her daughter, Jessica Hall. Jessica Hall attended

Dunsmuir until September 30, 2002, when she transferred to

Mt. Shasta High School. It is undisputed that any acts of sexual

harassment relevant to Ms. Hall’s claims occurred prior to

Jessica’s transfer. Ms. Hall filed her Government Tort Claim on

July 30, 2004. That claim was rejected on September 1, 2004, and

she filed the current action on March 1, 2005. Ms. Hall is a

party to Counts 3-4 (federal claims) and Count 7 (state claim). 

Defendants move for summary adjudication as to Ms. Hall’s

federal claims under Counts 3-4 arguing that those claims are

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Defendants also

move for summary adjudication as to Ms. Hall’s state claim under

Count 7 arguing that the claim is barred because Ms. Hall failed

to file her California Government Tort Claim within six months of

the last alleged act of harassment. 

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3. Dayna Padula

Ms. Padula attended Dunsmuir until the spring of 2004. She

testified that the last alleged act of harassment occurred on or

before March 23, 2004. Ms. Padula timely filed a Government Tort

Claim on May 14, 2004. The claim was rejected on May 26, 2004

and she filed the current action on March 1, 2005. Ms. Padula is

a party to Counts 7-11 (state claims). 

Defendants move for summary adjudication as to Ms. Padula’s

state claims under Counts 7-11 arguing that she failed to file

the current action within six months of the rejection of her

Government Tort Claim. 

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

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Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

claiming relief may move...for summary judgment on all or part of

the claim.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Twp. of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

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The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention

is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine,

i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169,

Assoc. of W. Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir.

1987). Stated another way, “before the evidence is left to the

jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether

there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon

which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the

party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81

U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1872)). As the Supreme Court

explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under

Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of

fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue

for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. 

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Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45

(E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987). 

ANALYSIS

This case comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Adjudication as to the straightforward issues of whether

or not certain of Plaintiffs’ claims are procedurally barred.

Defendants have met their burden as to each cause of action by

proving that each claim brought by each Plaintiff is so barred. 

Nevertheless, without enlisting the aid of any facts, Plaintiffs

respond by arguing that Defendants have not in fact met that

burden. 

It is Plaintiffs’ position that, in order for Defendants to

shift the burden to them, thereby requiring Plaintiffs to produce

evidence to counter Defendants’ current Motion, Defendants must

prove that they should not be equitably estopped from raising the

above defenses. Likewise, Plaintiffs argue that, in order to

seek summary adjudication as to Count 4, Plaintiffs’ conspiracy

claim, Defendants must prove that no acts in furtherance of the

conspiracy occurred within two years of Plaintiffs’ filing of the

claim. 

In keeping with that strategy, Plaintiffs have produced no

evidence raising even the most remote “metaphysical doubt” as to

the relevant facts. Relying solely on the unsubstantiated

allegations in their First Amended Complaint, they have presented

no facts to support their equitable estoppel argument. 

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They have presented no facts showing the existence of a

conspiracy or that any acts in furtherance of the alleged

conspiracy occurred within two years of the filing of this

action. Instead, Plaintiffs’ have put all of their eggs into one

basket, relying solely on their hollow assertion that Defendants

never met their requisite burden, and thus, that Defendants never

shifted that burden to Plaintiffs. Hence, Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Adjudication is granted. 

A. Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims (Counts 1 through 4) are

Barred by the Applicable Statute of Limitations

Code sections 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Title IX), 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) do not provide express statutes of

limitations. However, each of these sections borrows the state

statute of limitations for personal injury, in this case

California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1. See Stanley v. Tr.

of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding

that California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1 applies to Title

IX cases); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, (9th Cir. 2004)

(stating that California’s statute of limitations for personal

injury actions applies to § 1983 claims); McDougal v. County of

Imperial, 942 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that § 1985(3)

actions are governed by the state personal injury statute of

limitations). Hence, all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims at issue

in the current Motion are subject to a two-year statute of

limitations. Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 335.1. Those claims

accrued on the last date Plaintiffs’ suffered an incident of

sexual harassment relevant to their causes of action. 

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Goldrich v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc., 25 Cal. App.

4th 772, 778-789 (2d Dist. 1994) (personal injury claims accrue

on the date of injury). 

Ms. Pistorius’ federal claims under Counts 1-4 accrued prior

to June of 2002, and Ms. Hall’s federal claims under Counts 3-4

accrued prior to September 30, 2002. Both Ms. Pistorius and

Ms. Hall filed this action on March 1, 2005, well after the twoyear statute of limitations prescribed by California Code of

Civil Procedure § 335.1 had expired. Therefore, Plaintiffs’

federal claims are barred by that statute of limitations. 

B. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims (Counts 7 through 11) are

Barred for Failure to Comply with the California

Government Tort Claims Act

The GTCA provides that, “[N]o suit for money or damages may

be brought against a public entity...until a written claim

therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been

acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected

by the board...” Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4. “A claim relating to a

cause of action for...injury to person...shall be presented...not

later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” 

Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2(a). This presentment requirement is

mandatory. Taylor v. Mitzel, 82 Cal. App. 3d 665, 671 (3d Dist.

1978). Additionally, “...the claim filing requirements apply

with equal force to minors.” Dujardin v. Ventura County Gen.

Hosp., 69 Cal. App. 3d 350, 358 (2d Dist. 1977). 

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Thereafter, “any suit brought against a public entity on a

cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented

must be commenced...not later than six months after the date such

notice is personally delivered or deposited in the mail.” Cal.

Gov. Code § 945.6(a)(1). Finally, subject to certain exceptions

not applicable here, “a cause of action against a public employee

or former public employee for injury resulting from an act or

omission in the scope of his employment as a public employee is

barred if an action against the employing public entity for such

injury is barred” under, inter alia, California Government Code

§§ 911.2 or 945.6. Cal. Gov. Code § 950.2. 

Ms. Pistorius’ state claims under Counts 7-11 accrued prior

to her graduation from Dunsmuir in June of 2002, and she filed

her Government Tort Claim on July 30, 2004. Ms. Hall’s federal

claim under Count 7 accrued prior to her daughter’s transfer from

Dunsmuir to another school on approximately September 30, 2002,

and she filed her Government Tort Claim on July 30, 2004. Since,

under the GTCA, presentment is mandatory and must occur within

six months of the accrual of the cause of action, Ms. Pistorius’

and Ms. Hall’s state claims are barred. 

Additionally, Ms. Padula’s causes of action accrued on or

before March 23, 2004. She timely filed her Government Tort

Claim on May 14, 2004. That claim was rejected on May 26, 2004,

and she then filed this action on March 1, 2005. Since

California Government code § 945.6(a)(1) requires that suits

subject to the presentment requirement be filed no later than six

months after they are rejected, Ms. Padula was required to file

the current action no later than November 26, 2004. 

Case 2:05-cv-00411-MCE-EFB Document 110 Filed 05/02/08 Page 11 of 15
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Because she filed her suit well after that deadline, her federal

claims under Counts 7-11 are barred. 

C. Plaintiffs Failed to Produce Any Facts Showing that

Defendants Should Be Equitably Estopped From Asserting

the Statute of Limitations and Government Tort Claims

Act as Bars to Plaintiffs’ Claims

Plaintiffs have not raised any facts to show that Defendants

should be equitably estopped from asserting that Plaintiffs’

claims are barred. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that, since they pled

facts in their First Amended Complaint alleging that Defendants

should be so estopped, Defendants now bear the burden of proving

that they are not equitably estopped from asserting those

defenses. Plaintiffs misconstrue the nature of their burden. 

In Campanelli v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., the Ninth Circuit

discussed the burden on plaintiffs to show that the defendant was

equitably estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense

on summary judgment: 

The [plaintiffs’] case for equitable estoppel appears

strong, as it is alleged in their complaint. They

claim that they received fraudulently-prepared

engineering reports from [the defendant] that

understate the damage to their homes and that they

relied on these reports to their detriment. The

difficulty in their cases arises from their failure to

present certain evidence to oppose [defendant]'s

summary judgment motion. 

[Plaintiffs] cannot succeed on their claim for

equitable estoppel because they did not present any

evidence that showed that they had received the

engineering reports mentioned in the complaint or that

[the defendant] had made any representations of fact

regarding the extent of the damage to their homes.

Without this evidence, these [plaintiffs] cannot claim

to have reasonably relied on a misrepresentation by the

defendant. Therefore, defendant is not estopped from

asserting the limitations period as a defense against

these [plaintiffs]. 

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322 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003). Though that court did not

explicitly state as much, it is clear from the court’s

disposition of that case that the burden of proving equitable

estoppel is on the party raising the issue. Id.; see also Stitt

v. Williams, 919 F.2d 516, (affirming summary judgment in favor

of defendants because plaintiffs “failed to present the

persuasive evidence needed to show” that there was a triable

issue of fact supporting their argument that defendants should be

estopped from relying on a statute of limitations defense). 

The burden is on Defendants to raise the statute of

limitations and GTCA defenses. Until Plaintiffs raise a triable

issue of fact as to why Defendants should be equitably estopped

from relying on those defenses, Defendants are not required to

prove anything further. 

Additionally, as is evidenced by Campanelli, Plaintiffs’

reliance solely on their Complaint to raise a triable issue of

fact is insufficient to withstand the current Motion. 322 F.3d 

at 1094. That court specifically found that the plaintiffs’

complaint contained strong allegations supporting their equitable

estoppel argument, but those allegations were insufficient to

create triable issues of fact on summary judgment. This language

comports with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), which

requires that the party opposing summary judgment do so via

actual evidence in the form of affidavits and other admissible

discovery material. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e). Plaintiffs have

submitted no evidence to support their equitable estoppel

arguments. Therefore, all claims are barred as discussed above.

///

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

14

CONCLUSION

Defendants have shown that, pursuant to California Code of

Civil Procedure § 335.1, Plaintiffs’ federal claims are barred by

the two-year statute of limitations and, pursuant California

Government Code § 810 et seq., Plaintiffs’ state claims are

barred by the California Government Tort Claims Act’s presentment

requirements. Plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence

supporting their equitable estoppel and conspiracy allegations. 

Hence, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED . 

1

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to

Ms. Pistorius’ claims under Count 1 (Title IX Discrimination and

Sexual Harassment Based on Gender), Count 2 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 -

Denial of Title IX Rights), Count 3 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Equal

Protection/Substantive Due Process, Count 4 (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),

Count 7 (CA Civil Code §§ 51-52 - Unruh civil Rights Acct), Count

8 (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), Count 9 (Sexual

Battery), Count 10 (Failure to Discharge Mandatory Duty Imposed

By Statute), and Count 11 (Negligent Supervision and Retention of

Employees). 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to

Ms. Hall’s claims under Count 3 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Equal

Protection/Substantive Due Process, Count 4 (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),

and Count 7 (CA Civil Code §§ 51-52 - Unruh civil Rights Acct). 

/// 

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Finally, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication is

GRANTED as to Ms. Padula’s claims under Count 7 (CA Civil Code

§§ 51-52 - Unruh Civil Rights Acct), Count 8 (Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress), Count 9 (Sexual Battery),

Count 10 (Failure to Discharge Mandatory Duty Imposed By

Statute), and Count 11 (Negligent Supervision and Retention of

Employees). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 1, 2008

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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