Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02852/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02852-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's complaint.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIM Y. TREVILLION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DEBORAH TARANTINO, ET AL.,

Defendant.

No. C 05-02852 SBA

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Kim Trevillion's ("Plaintiff") application to

proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") and complaint. Having read and considered the papers submitted by

Plaintiff, and being fully informed, the Court hereby DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's IFP

Application and DISMISSES Plaintiff's complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background1

Plaintiff was employed by the United States Department of Agriculture as a part time Office

Automation Clerk in the Redwood Sciences Laboratory. Complaint at Exhibit A. In a letter dated

March 25, 2005 ("March 2005 Letter"), she was informed that her employment would be terminated

within seven calendar days from the date of the letter unless she brought her performance up to a

satisfactory level. Id.

According to the March 2005 Letter, Plaintiff had been hired to perform the following duties:

serving as a Laboratory receptionist, greeting office visitors, answering the telephone, providing routine

information and referring inquiries to the appropriate person, as well as other clerical duties. Id.
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Additionally, Dr. Lee ("Lee") and Deborah Tarantino ("Tarantino"), Plaintiff's supervisors, highlighted

the importance of fostering and maintaining positive working relations with others since her primary

assignment depended upon other employees finding her approachable, competent, and willing to help.

Id.

The March 2005 Letter indicated that Plaintiff's interactions with other employees and visitors

had been negative. Id. For example, on October 12, 2004, Plaintiff sent an email to Lee complaining

that ten different employees displayed racial prejudices and treated her with rudeness and hostility. Id.

Lee discussed the alleged incidents with Plaintiff, found no evidence to support her assertions, and

suggested that perhaps she had misinterpreted the employees' behavior. Id.

Lee recommended that she be more open and accepting of other employees. Id. Plaintiff,

however, continued to send him email messages regarding what she perceived to be negative

interactions with employees, including an allegation that two of her colleagues had tampered with her

vehicle and accosted her in the parking lot. Id. Again, no evidence of tampering or threatening behavior

was discovered. Id.

Additionally, the March 2005 Letter described Plaintiff's response to an individual who inquired

whether there was a frisbee range in the building. Id. In an email dated February 15, 2005, Plaintiff

stated, "I was startled and interrupted from my duties by a Caucasian male intruder." Id. Plaintiff

described his physical characteristics and stated "when intruder was told there was no Frisbee range in

the building, intruder who had entered from the back of the building, sarcastically stated, 'sorry to bother

you'." Id.

The March 2005 Letter further indicated that on March 17, 2005, Plaintiff complained that she

had received "annoying" telephone calls when upon answering the telephone she would only hear

beeping sounds and that such calls interrupted her from performing her duties. Id. Plaintiff was

informed that it was not unusual to accidently receive calls from individuals intending to send a fax who

simply dialed the wrong number. Id. She was told that although such calls are "annoying," it could not

be helped since her job was to answer the telephone. Id.
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2

 This letter is being referred to as the "June 9, 2005" letter because Plaintiff has not assigned

it an Exhibit number but has nonetheless attached it to her complaint.

3

 This letter is being referred to as the June 10, 2005 Letter. see FN2.

4

 This letter is being referred to as the May 17, 2005 Letter. see FN2.

3

In addition to informing Plaintiff that she had seven calendar days to bring her performance to

a satisfactory level, the March 2005 Letter provided that failure to maintain satisfactory performance

would result in her immediate termination without further notice. Id.

Plaintiff was not terminated seven days later. On May 9, 2005, however, Plaintiff sent a letter

to her supervisor Tarantino claiming that her calls were being illegally recorded. See June 9, 2005

Letter2. Tarantino responded, in a letter dated June 9, 2005 stating, "I want to assure you that your

telephone calls are not being recorded" and "this office has no authorization for recording anyone's

telephone conversations nor have we asked for any authorization." Id.

Still, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Office of the Inspector General of the United States Department

of Agriculture, dated June 10, 2005, in which she alleged that her calls were being illegally recorded

at her workplace. See June 10, 2005 Letter3

. She stated that every 15 seconds she distinctly heard a

beep tone when she answered the telephone. Id. Further, she claimed that she had been "telephonically

harassed" at her residence by her supervisor who "left a false and malicious message on her answering

machine" claiming that Plaintiff had not reported to work and had not called in. Id. Plaintiff stated, "a

trap has been installed on my residential line." Id.

Plaintiff also sent a letter dated May 17, 2005 to the United States Marshals Service in which

she claimed that she had been stalked and intimidated by a Caucasian female who had parked near her

residence and watched her when she returned from work. See May 17, 2005 Letter4

. She stated, "this

female has a cell phone and she has been observed slouched down in the passenger side of the vehicle."

Id. Plaintiff provided the license plate number of the vehicle and noted that she had already alerted the

Arcata Police Department. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff stated that she "had been subjected to harms such

as stalking, telephone harassment, and illegal telephone recordings at the Redwood Sciences Lab and
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5

 This letter is being referred to as the May 9, 2005 Letter. see FN2.

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 Although Plaintiff claims she was assaulted, she has provided no facts supporting an assault

claim and failed to include assault in any of her claims for relief.

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at [her] residence." Id. She alleged that her supervisors, Tarantino and Lee, were responsible for these

illegal activities and called for an investigation. Id.

The United States Marshals Service responded to Plaintiff's letter by informing her that their

office "does not have the authority for conducting investigations of this type." See May 9, 2005 Letter5

.

In a letter dated June 27, 2005 ("June 2005 Letter"), Plaintiff was informed that her part time

employment with the Redwood Sciences Laboratory was terminated. Complaint at Exhibit C. The June

2005 Letter indicated that her supervisor had received several verbal complaints about her rude behavior

toward fellow employees and customers. Id.

B. Procedural Background

On July 13, 2005, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint along with an IFP application in this

Court against her supervisors, Lee and Tarantino, as well as specific employees with whom she

interacted. Complaint at ¶ 3. Plaintiff claims that "all defendants solicited others, met and conspired

secretly, and manufactured slanderous and libelous documentation to terminate [Plaintiff] from her

position because she was the only African American female employed in the laboratory." Id. at ¶ 7. 

She further claims that the Redwood Sciences laboratory "openly discriminated against [her] when

she refused to engage in lesbian activities with a co-worker," and that the laboratory "employs

lesbians who engages [sic] in sexual misconduct with new employees." Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff

describes the nature of her claim as "an action of assault6

, slander and libel and violation of Title VII

. . ." Id. at ¶ 1.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts must review a case filed in forma pauperis prior to service of process. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e). An in forma pauperis complaint shall be dismissed if the allegation of poverty is

not true, or if the court determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on
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which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Depot, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). However, when reviewing a complaint, the Court does not accept as true

unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. See

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir.

1988) ("conclusory allegations without more are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim"). Leave to amend is properly denied "where the amendment would be futile." 

DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., 957 F.2d 655, 659 (9th Cir. 1992). If a plaintiff's complaint is found

to be deficient and an amendment could possibly cure the deficiency, the complaint must be

dismissed with leave to amend. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION

I. The IFP Application

The benefit of proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right. Franklin v. Murphy,

745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, to obtain this privilege, a plaintiff must demonstrate, to

the Court's satisfaction, her inability to pay the requisite fees and costs. Williams v. Marshall, 795 F.

Supp. 978, 979 (N.D. Cal. 1992). The facts concerning her poverty must be stated with some

"particularity, definiteness and certainty." United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir.

1981). The Court has discretion to make a factual inquiry into the plaintiff's financial status and to

deny her request to proceed in forma pauperis where she is unable or unwillling to verify her poverty. 

Id. If the Court determines that a plaintiff's allegation of poverty is untrue, it shall dismiss the case. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A).

In her IFP application, Plaintiff states that she is unemployed and has no income. See IFP

App. ¶ 1. Plaintiff does not receive any federal or state public assistance. Id. ¶ 2. Although she

currently has $206 in her checking account, Plaintiff's monthly expenses include $475 for rent and
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 In her third claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her on the

basis of national origin. Plaintiff has not provided any factual support for this claim. The Court notes

elsewhere in her complaint, Plaintiff erroneously referred to her race, African-American, as her national

origin. Complaint at ¶ 2. It is not clear to the court whether Plaintiff intended to allege race

discrimination and mistakenly pled her claim as national origin discrimination. If Plaintiff intended to

allege race discrimination, she must properly plead so, consistent with the concerns raised by the Court

herein.

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$100 for food. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges that she has no other debt. Id. ¶ 9.

Based on the information in her IFP application, Plaintiff appears to have no job, no income,

and no assets, yet her monthly expenses total $575. It is not clear to this Court how Plaintiff 

manages to meet her monthly obligations of food and rent in light of her lack of employment and

income. Though Plaintiff specified she owns $206 in cash, that amount is insufficient to cover even

one month’s worth of expenses. Given this apparent inconsistency between Plaintiff’s regular

expenses and her means to pay for those expenses, the Court cannot properly determine whether

Plaintiff’s allegations of poverty are true. Consequently, this Court DENIES WITHOUT

PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s IFP application to permit the Plaintiff an opportunity to file a more complete

IFP Application that addresses the concern raised by the Court above. 

II. Plaintiff's Complaint

Plaintiff alleges a federal cause of action against Defendants for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§

2000e-2(a) and 2000e-16. Though it is not entirely clear from her complaint, Plaintiff also attempts

to join her state law slander and libel claims.

A. Title VII: Gender and Race Discrimination7

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As a preliminary matter, Title VII claims are asserted against employers. 42 U.S.C. section

2000e. Plaintiff has not brought the present lawsuit against the Redwood Sciences Laboratory, but

rather, initiated an action against her individual supervisors and colleagues.

For Title VII purposes, 42 U.S.C. section 2000e provides that the term employer "means a

person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any

agent of such a person." According to the Supreme Court, "Congress' decision to define "employer"

to include an "agent" of an employer evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees

for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible." Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
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The formulation presently applied is a modification of the McDonnell Douglas test applied by

the California Supreme Court in Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 355. This modification is appropriate to

accommodate the facts in this case, which alleges gender motivated termination rather than a failure to

hire like in McDonnell Douglas. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 (noting test should be

modified to fit the facts of each case).

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477 U.S. 57, 58 (1986).

In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court held that an employer was subject to

vicarious liability for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate or

successively higher authority over the employee. 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998). The Court determined

that "a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of

the employer." Id.

As a general proposition, however, "only a supervisor, or other person acting with the

authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury." Id. While "a co-worker can break a coworker's arm as easily as a supervisor, and anyone who has regular contact with an employee can

inflict psychological injuries by his or her offensive conduct," a co-worker "cannot dock another's

pay, nor can one co-worker demote another." Id.

Accordingly, the Court will analyze Plaintiff's Title VII claims against her supervisors only

and disregard her allegations with respect to fellow employees.

1. Legal Standard

Plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie

case of gender discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In

order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff must show (1) membership in a

protected class, (2) that she was competently performing in her position, (3) that she suffered an

adverse employment action, and (4) that circumstances suggest a discriminatory motive. See Guz v.

Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000); see also Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).8 The prima facie case functions to eliminate "at the outset the

most patently meritless claims, as where plaintiff is not a member of the protected class or was

clearly unqualified." Id. at 354 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). 

Once a Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant “to
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articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for the allegedly discriminatory conduct.” Godwin v. Hunt

Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998).

If the Defendant articulates a non-discriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the Plaintiff

to demonstrate that the non-discriminatory reason offered by the Defendant was a pretext for

discrimination. Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1220. There are two methods for establishing this: the Plaintiff

can offer either direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive. Id. at 1221.

2. Analysis

Plaintiff has made a showing that as an African American and female, she is a member of a

protected class. She was subjected to an adverse employment action when her employment was

terminated. There is evidence, however, that Plaintiff was not performing her job competently.

On several occasions Plaintiff was informed that her job demanded that she foster and

maintain positive working relationships with her colleagues. Complaint at Exhibit A. The March

2005 Letter indicated, however, that of the approximately 35-40 employees working out of the

Redwood Sciences Laboratory, Plaintiff had complained about her interactions with at least 18

employees. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff's supervisors received complaints from customers and

employees based on her "rude demeanor to visitors and telephone callers." Complaint at Exhibit C. 

The March 2005 Letter notified Plaintiff of her failure to perform satisfactorily and provided her with

an opportunity to improve her performance such that she would avoid termination of her

employment. When Plaintiff failed to perform satisfactorily, however, her employment was

terminated. 

Other than her membership in a protected class, Plaintiff has failed to allege any additional

facts which would meet her prima facie burden of proving gender discrimination on the part of her

former employer. Namely, Plaintiff has not pled facts supporting the contention that she was

performing competently, or the nature and any details referring thereto of the adverse employment

actions she suffered as a result, other than the termination. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim appears to
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lack merit. 

B. Retaliation

Plaintiff also alleges that her involvement in protected activities led to retaliatory behavior by

the Defendants. Complaint at ¶ 21.

1. Legal Standard

In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show that "she engaged in

a protected activity, that she was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment action by her

employer, and there was a causal link between the two." Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hospitals, Inc.,

726 F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs who have opposed any unlawful employment practice

under Title VII engage in protected activities. EEOC v. Dinuba Medical Clinic, 222 F.3d 580, 586

(9th Cir. 2000). As long as a plaintiff reasonably believed that Title VII forbade the employment

actions she opposed, she receives opposition clause protection. EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,

720 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1983).

2. Analysis

Here, Plaintiff claims that her membership in the “National [sic] Advancement for Colored

People” (“NAACP”) and the USDA Coalition for Minorities was a protected activity. Complaint at

¶ 20. According to Plaintiff, her membership in such groups subjected her to numerous adverse

actions including Defendants denying her of numerous promotions, monitoring her work

performance, denying her training opportunities, illegally recording her telephone calls in the

workplace, tampering with her official time and attendance records for various pay periods, and

releasing unknown chemicals in the workplace to cause Plaintiff to suffer repeated illnesses. Id. at ¶

21. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that on July 1, 2005, Defendants solicited her property manager

and the Landlord's Eviction Service "to tape an eviction notice on Plaintiff's apartment and

subsequently mailed three similar notices with the intent to harass Plaintiff." Id.

Plaintiff's membership in the NAACP and the USDA Coalition for Minorities does not
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constitute involvement in a protected activity. An employee engages in a protected activity when she

opposes "any practice made an unlawful employment practice" under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a). Plaintiff has not alleged that her employer banned such membership, nor has she intimated that

she became involved with the NAACP and the USDA Coalition for Minorities to oppose an unlawful

employment practice or policy in operation at the Redwood Sciences Laboratory. Accordingly,

Plaintiff has not shown that her membership constituted involvement in a protected activity. 

Moreover, there is also no evidence to suggest that Plaintiff was subjected to such egregious

actions by her employer. She has not indicated which promotions she applied for that were

subsequently denied. She has not specified the training she was denied. Her claims regarding the

illegal recordings of her telephone calls were denied by her supervisors. She has not provided the

date of the chemical releases, who released the chemicals, or the sicknesses she suffered as a result. 

No other employee has corroborated the release of such chemicals in the workplace or complained of

sicknesses as a result.

Finally, Plaintiff has not shown a nexus between her membership and the alleged adverse

employment actions she claims to have suffered. She has not indicated that her employer and

colleagues were even aware of her membership in the NAACP and USDA Coalition for Minorities. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations of retaliation appear to lack merit.

C. State Law Libel and Slander Claims

Since Plaintiff was unable to make out a prima facie Title VII and Retaliation claim, she lacks

a federal cause of action over which this Court would possess original jurisdiction. Thus, her state

law claims may not be joined under supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Court lacks

jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's IFP application is DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE and Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If Plaintiff

chooses to file another IFP application she must do so consistent with the concerns raised by
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this Court above. Additionally, if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, she must

allege, in good faith, facts - not merely conclusions of law - that demonstrate that she is entitled

to relief under the applicable federal statutes. Plaintiff may not, for example, allege in

summary fashion that she was discriminated against because she was denied promotions;

rather, she must allege not only that the denials occurred, but also offer facts that establish that

the denial violated federal law. Plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate she was performing

her job competently and that others similarly situated were treated differently on the basis of

their sex and/or race. If Plaintiff chooses to do so, she must file an amended complaint within

thirty (30) days of the date of this order. Plaintiff is expressly warned that failure to file an

amended complaint that complies with this Order within the allotted time period shall

constitute sufficient grounds to support a finding that further leave to amend would be futile,

and Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.

Date: August 22, 2005 ___________________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge