Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01557/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01557-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBIN ANDREW DUNN, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

DAVID B. LONG, Secretary, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 14-cv-1557-H-BLM 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

(2) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; AND 

(3) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

 On June 26, 2014, Petitioner Robin Andrew Dunn, a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se and in forma pauperis, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254, challenging his state court conviction. (Doc. No. 1.) On September 5, 2014, 

Respondent David B. Long filed a response to the petition. (Doc. No. 6.) On September 

29, 2014, Petitioner filed a traverse. (Doc. No. 8.) On March 12, 2015, the magistrate 

judge issued a report and recommendation, recommending that the Court deny the petition 

for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 9.) On May 20, 2015, Petitioner filed objections to 

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the magistrate judge’s R & R, (Doc. No. 13), and on June 24, 2015, Petitioner filed an 

amendment to his objections to the R & R. (Doc. No. 16.) After careful consideration, the 

Court denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus and adopts the magistrate judge’s R & 

R. 

Background 

I. Factual History

 The Court adopts the facts from the California Court of Appeal opinion denying 

Petitioner’s direct appeal and affirming his conviction. See People v. Dunn, 205 Cal. App. 

4th 1086 (2012). (See Doc. No. 7-29, Lodgment No. 8.) This Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1), presumes the following facts to be correct: 

A. [Petitioner]’s Molestation of Minor 

 In the summer of 2007, [Petitioner] and a relative who was eight years 

old at the time (hereafter Minor) lived in an apartment with [Petitoner]’s 

girlfriend, Ava Loftis. Several relatives of Loftis also lived in the apartment. 

 One night, while Loftis was at work, Minor watched a movie with 

[Petitioner] in the master bedroom and then went to sleep on the floor. 

[Petitioner] picked Minor up from the floor, laid her supine on the bed, 

removed her pajama bottoms and underwear, and lowered his own underwear. 

Then, in the words of Minor, Dunn got “on top of [her],” “humped” her, and 

touched his “private part” to her “private part” in a way that hurt her. [FN1] 

As Minor tried to push Dunn away, she told him “to get off [her] and [she] 

wasn’t his girlfriend,” but Dunn told her to be quiet. 

FN1: At trial, when Minor was given diagrams depicting frontal views 

of a man and a woman, she circled the genital areas to indicate what 

she meant by “private parts.” 

 Dunn eventually got off Minor, who went back to the floor and lay 

down. Approximately five minutes later, Dunn lifted Minor back onto the 

bed, and again touched his “private part” to her “private part.” 

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B. Minor’s Reports of the Molestation 

 The following morning, Loftis’s son told Minor he heard her say, “Stop. 

You’re nasty. I’m not Ava,” and asked her why she said that. [FN2] Minor 

told him what Dunn had done to her in the bedroom. 

FN2: One of Loftis’s nephews also heard Minor say, “I’m not Ava”; 

and another nephew heard her say, “Stop. Get off me. You’re nasty. 

I’m not Ava.” 

 When Loftis returned home from work, Minor also told her that Dunn 

“was feeling on her and humping on her.” A few days later, Loftis and Minor 

telephoned and reported the molestation to Minor’s mother (hereafter 

Mother), who immediately went to Loftis’s apartment to pick up Minor. 

 Mother took Minor to a hospital. While there, Minor met with a social 

worker and informed her that she (Minor) was in the hospital because 

[Petitioner] had “humped” her and touched her with his penis “inside [her] 

pants.” 

 Minor also spoke to a police officer at the hospital. She told the officer 

she was at the hospital because “she had humped [Petitioner],” and explained 

that “‘humped’ meant that two people lie down, one on top of the other, and 

they don’t wear any clothes and then they go up and down.” Minor also told 

the officer that Dunn had taught her what “humped” means. 

 Minor later repeated this account of the molestation to a forensic 

interviewer. During the videotaped interview, which was played for the jury, 

Minor used anatomically correct dolls to illustrate how [Petitioner] had 

“humped” her. Minor pointed to the “private” on the male doll and stated 

Dunn put that “[i]nside” her “private.” 

C. Minor’s Sexual Assault Examination 

 After Mother and Minor left the hospital, Mother immediately took 

Minor to be examined by Marilyn Kaufhold, a pediatrician specializing in 

child abuse. Kaufhold examined Minor’s genitalia and anus, but found 

nothing of significance that was abnormal. 

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 Kaufhold testified that a normal physical examination was consistent 

with Minor’s report that [Petitioner] had “humped” her and it hurt, provided 

[Petitioner] had rubbed his penis against Minor’s vulva (or external genitalia) 

but had not inserted it into her vagina. Kaufhold explained that young children 

generally do not know the anatomy of their genitals or understand how the 

various parts “fit together.” Thus, a girl might say something went “inside” 

her if it went “inside the labia and in the vestibule without going into the 

anatomic vagina.” If Dunn’s penis had actually penetrated Minor’s vagina, 

however, Kaufhold would expect to have found “serious tears” requiring 

surgical repair. 

D. Minor’s Diagnosis with Syphilis 

 Approximately six weeks after Mother took Minor to Kaufhold, Mother 

took Minor to her regular pediatrician, Genevieve Minka, for a scheduled 

appointment. Mother informed Minka that Minor had a discharge in her 

underwear, and Minor’s vulva “had a sore spot” and “looked swollen like 

somebody was messing with her.” Minka observed a circular ulcer with a 

raised edge on Minor’s right labium majus. The lesion extended from the 

outer to the inner aspect of the right labium majus; to visualize it fully, Minka 

had to separate Minor’s labia majora. Minka also detected redness and 

enlarged lymph nodes in Minor’s groin. Based on these physical findings and 

the history of sexual abuse, Minka suspected Minor might have a sexually 

transmitted disease and ordered her blood tested. The test came back positive 

for syphilis. 

 Before this diagnosis of Minor with syphilis, neither Minor nor Mother 

had been diagnosed with or treated for that disease. Subsequently, Mother’s 

blood tested negative for syphilis, but [Petitioner]’s tested positive. 

 Kenneth Katz, a public health practitioner who specializes in sexually 

transmitted diseases, testified at trial about the transmission of syphilis. Katz 

explained that syphilis is a sexually transmitted disease caused by a bacterium 

that infects the body at the site of exposure and then spreads throughout the 

whole body. According to Katz, the disease spreads from one person to 

another when the skin or mucous membrane of an infected person comes into 

contact with the skin or mucous membrane of another person. 

 Katz further explained that the initial stage of syphilis produces a 

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characteristic ulcer called a “chancre,” which appears between 10 and 90 days 

after initial exposure and expands concentrically outward from the point of 

exposure. According to Katz, a chancre is highly infectious; and in the vast 

majority of cases, a person contracts syphilis when the person’s skin or 

mucous membrane comes into contact with a chancre of an infected person. 

 The prosecutor presented Katz with a hypothetical based on the facts of 

this case and asked whether he had an opinion as to how Minor contracted 

syphilis. Katz testified it was “likely” she got it from [Petitioner]. 

 

Dunn, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 1088-91. In addition, the Court adopts the detailed discussion 

of the facts presented at Petitioner’s trial set forth in the magistrate judge’s R & R. (Doc. 

No. 9 at 4-14.)

II. State Procedural History

 On June 8, 2010, the State filed an Amended Information charging Petitioner with 

one count of sexual intercourse with a child 10 years of age or younger in violation of 

California Penal Code § 288.7(a) (count one); and one count of committing a lewd act on 

a child under the age of 14 years of age in violation of California Penal Code § 288(a) 

(count two). (Doc. No. 7-2, Lodgment No. 1 at CT 6-7.) With respect to count two, the 

Amended Information also contained two sentencing enhancement special allegations: (1) 

that Petitioner had engaged in substantial sexual conduct with the minor victim within the 

meaning of California Penal Code § 1203.066(a)(8); and (2) that Petitioner personally 

inflicted great bodily injury upon the minor victim within the meaning of California Penal 

Code § 12022.8. (Id.) The Amended Information also alleged that Petitioner had four 

prior felony convictions and had served three prior prison terms. (Id. at CT 7-9.) 

 On July 23, 2010, the jury found Petitioner guilty on both counts. (Doc. No. 7-4, 

Lodgment No. 1 at CT 283-84.) With respect to the conviction on count two, the jury also 

found true the two sentencing enhancement special allegations. (Id. at CT 284.) On July 

30, 2010, the trial court found true the allegations concerning Petitioner’s prior felony 

convictions and prison terms. (Id. at CT 288.) On September 24, 2010, the trial court 

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sentenced Petitioner to 28 years to life in state prison and entered judgment. (Id. at CT 

289-90.) 

 Petitioner appealed the judgment. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the judgment 

should be reversed because “(1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion 

for mistrial, which was based upon the failure of his retained expert witness to appear at 

trial; and (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to subpoena the expert 

witness to appear at trial.” Dunn, 205 Cal. App. at 1088. (See Doc. Nos. 7-26, 7-28, 

Lodgment Nos. 5, 7.) On May 7, 2012, the California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s 

argument and affirmed the judgment in a published decision. See Dunn, 205 Cal. App. at 

1088, 1102. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court raising 

the same claims. (Doc. No. 7-30, Lodgment No. 9.) On August 8, 2012, the California 

Supreme Court denied the petition for review in an order stating: “The petition for review 

is denied.” (Doc. No. 7-31, Lodgment No. 10.) 

 On June 27, 2013, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in San Diego County 

Superior Court. (Doc. No. 7-32, Lodgment No. 11.) The Superior Court denied the habeas 

petition. (Doc. No. 7-33, Lodgment No. 12.) 

On October 9, 2013, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Court 

of Appeal, alleging claims that the trial court erred in making certain evidentiary rulings 

and that his counsel was ineffective for various reasons. (Doc. No. 7-34, Lodgment No. 

13.) On October 24, 2013, the California Court of Appeal denied the habeas petition on 

the grounds that “[t]he petition is procedurally barred because the claims here could have 

been raised on appeal.” (Doc. No. 7-35, Lodgment No. 14.) The Court of Appeal also 

denied the petition on the grounds that the claims are “unsupported, speculative and 

conclusory, and fail to state a prima facie case for relief.” (Id.) 

On January 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California 

Supreme Court, again alleging claims that the trial court erred in making certain evidentiary 

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ruling and that his counsel was ineffective for various reasons. (Doc. No. 7-36, Lodgment 

No. 15.) On April 23, 2014, the California Supreme Court denied the petition, stating that 

the petition is “denied on the merits with regard to petitioner’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel.”1

 (Doc. No. 7-37, Lodgment No. 16; Doc. No. 1 at 17.) 

III. Federal Procedural History

 On June 26, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) In the habeas petition, Petitioner alleges due process 

violations and also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment. (Id. at 6-7.) On September 5, 2014, Respondent filed a response to the 

petition. (Doc. No. 6.) On September 29, 2014, Petitioner filed a traverse. (Doc. No. 8.) 

 On March 12, 2015, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, 

recommending that the Court deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 9.) 

On May 20, 2015, Petitioner filed objections to the magistrate judge’s R & R, (Doc. No. 

13), and on June 24, 2015, Petitioner filed an amendment to his objections to the R & R. 

(Doc. No. 16.) 

 On July 9, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion to amend his habeas petition to add a claim 

challenging the state trial court’s fine and restitution order. (Doc. No. 18.) On September 

15, 2015, the Court denied Petitioner’s motion to amend the habeas petition on the ground 

of futility. (Doc. No. 19.) In the order, the Court explained that the proposed amendment 

would be futile because: “The Ninth Circuit has ‘repeatedly recognized that the imposition 

of a fine, by itself, is not sufficient to meet § 2254’s jurisdictional requirements.’ Thus, § 

2254 ‘does not confer jurisdiction over a state prisoner’s in-custody challenge to a 

restitution order imposed as part of a criminal sentence.’” (Id. at 2-3 (quoting Bailey v. 

                                                                

1

 In addition, Petitioner went through a second round of state habeas review, raising a claim 

challenging the trial court’s order imposing a restitution fine. (See Doc. Nos. 7-38, 7-42, Lodgment 

Nos. 17-21.) 

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Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2010).) See also Dunn v. McDowell, No. 15-cv-93-

H (WVG), Docket No. 4 (S.D. Cal., Order filed Mar. 10, 2015). 

Discussion

I. Legal Standards for § 2254 Habeas Petition

 A federal court may review a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a person in 

custody pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 

accord Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does 

not lie for errors of state law.” (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). “Habeas corpus is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ available 

only to those ‘persons whom society has grievously wronged . . . .’” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 

F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34 

(1993)). Because Petitioner filed the present petition after April 24, 1996, the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs the petition. See 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997); Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (en banc). 

Under AEDPA, a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to a state court judgment “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was 

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim”: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). “This is a ‘difficult 

to meet,’ and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands 

that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181 

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(citations omitted). “Section 2254(d) thus demands an inquiry into whether a prisoner’s 

‘claim’ has been ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court; if it has, AEDPA’s highly 

deferential standards kick in.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015). “The 

petitioner carries the burden of proof.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. 

Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s 

decision was “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The 

Supreme Court has explained that “§ 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable 

application’ clauses have independent meaning.’” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002); 

see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000) (distinguishing the “contrary to” and 

the “unreasonable application” standards). “A state-court decision is ‘contrary to’ [the 

Supreme Court’s] clearly established precedents if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the 

governing law set forth in our cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from our precedent.’” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 405-06). A state court decision is “an unreasonable application” of the Supreme Court’s 

clearly established precedent if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule 

from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular 

state prisoner’s case” or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle 

from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or 

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. Under the “unreasonable application” prong, “the state court’s 

decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 

510, 520 (2003). The state court’s application of the relevant precedent must have been 

objectively unreasonable. Id.; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003); see also 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011) (“A state court’s determination that a claim 

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lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on 

the correctness of the state court’s decision.”). 

 “Section 2254(d)(1)’s ‘clearly established’ phrase ‘refers to the holdings, as opposed 

to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court 

decision.’” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71; accord Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011); see 

also Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (“[C]ircuit precedent does not 

constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.’”). 

Further, “review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the 

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. 

 Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s 

decision “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Under this provision, 

“a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas 

court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 

U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (“[E]ven if ‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree’ 

about the finding in question, ‘on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial 

court’s . . . determination.’”). “Instead, § 2254(d)(2) requires that [the federal habeas court] 

accord the state trial court substantial deference.” Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 

(2015). 

 In conducting an analysis under AEDPA, a federal habeas court looks to the last 

reasoned state-court decision. Castellanos v. Small, 766 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). Where there is an unexplained 

decision from the state’s highest court, the federal habeas court “looks through” to the last 

reasoned state court decision and presumes that the unexplained opinion rests upon the 

same ground. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); see, e.g., Brumfield, 135 

S. Ct. at 2276. Where no state-court decision furnishes a basis for the state court’s 

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underlying reasoning, the court must engage in an independent review of the record and 

ascertain whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. Castellanos, 766 

F.3d at 1145; see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 98 (“Where a state court’s decision is 

unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by 

showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”). 

 In addition, even if a federal habeas petitioner has established that a constitutional 

error occurred, the petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on a trial error unless the 

petitioner can establish that the error “resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); accord Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2197. “Under that 

standard, an error is harmless unless it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Further, “[t]here must be more than a ‘reasonable possibility’ 

that the error was harmful.” Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2198. 

 A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(3). If a party objects to any portion of the magistrate’s report, the district court 

reviews de novo those portions of the report. Id.; see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“The statute makes it clear that the district 

judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if 

objection is made, but not otherwise.” (emphasis in original)). 

II. Petitioner’s Due Process Claims 

 Petitioner alleges due process violations based on: (a) the denial of a motion for 

mistrial based on the unavailability of a defense medical expert witness; (b) the exclusion 

of evidence of an investigation of the victim’s mother by child welfare authorities; (c) the 

denial of a motion to substitute defense counsel; (d) prosecutorial misconduct; and (e) bias 

by the trial court. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) The Court addresses the merits of each of these claims. 

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 A. The Trial Court’s Denial of Petitioner’s Motion for Mistrial 

 Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated when the trial court denied 

his motion for mistrial based on the unavailability of a defense medical expert witness. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 6.) This claim was raised on direct appeal and denied by the state courts. 

(See Doc. Nos. 7-26, 7-29, 7-30, 7-31, Lodgment Nos. 5, 8, 9, 10.) Thus, in conducting 

the § 2254(d) review, the Court looks through the California Supreme Court’s summary 

denial of Petitioner’s petition for review and evaluates the California Court of Appeal’s 

reasoned decision denying Petitioner’s due process claim. See, e.g., Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. 

at 2276; Cannedy, 706 F.3d at 1156. In denying Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of 

Appeal explained: 

 If Dunn was proceeding on the theory that penetration of Minor’s 

vagina was required for conviction, he was wrong on the law. The conviction 

on count 1 required proof that Dunn had “sexual intercourse” with Minor (§ 

288.7, subd. (a)), which required penetration of her labia majora, not her 

vagina. (People v. Quintana (2001) 89 Cal. App. 4th 1362, 1364, 108 Cal. 

Rptr. 2d 235; People v. Karsai (1982) 131 Cal. App. 3d 224, 232, 182 Cal. 

Rptr. 406, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 

585, 600, fn. 8, 250 Cal. Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165.) The offense charged in 

count 2 (lewd act on minor, § 288, subd. (a)) “was committed when [Dunn] 

placed his . . . exposed penis on [Minor’s vulva], thereby touching her body 

with the specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify his or her sexual desires. 

Penetration is irrelevant for this charge . . . .” (In re Asencio (2008) 166 Cal. 

App. 4th 1195, 1206, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 400.)[FN8] The trial court correctly 

instructed the jury on these legal principles, including the modification 

requested by the People that labial penetration was sufficient for conviction 

on count 1 (see CALCRIM Nos. 1110, 1127), and the jury was bound to 

follow these instructions (§ 1126; In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 391, 399, 

220 Cal. Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260). Nothing in [the proposed expert’s] 

testimony could have had any impact on the controlling law the jury had to 

apply. (See, e.g., Staten v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal. App. 4th 1628, 1635, 

53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 657 [expert witness may not give opinion on question of 

law].) 

 If instead Dunn was proceeding on the theory that Minor was claiming 

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Dunn had inserted his penis into her vagina, Ticson’s expected testimony that 

such insertion was inconsistent with the lack of any observable injury to 

Minor’s genitalia would have added nothing of value at trial. As noted earlier, 

the People’s expert witness, Kaufhold, had already testified she found no 

injuries when she examined Minor’s genitalia, but she would have expected 

to see “serious tears” requiring surgical repair if Dunn had actually inserted 

his penis into Minor’s vagina. Moreover, during closing arguments the 

prosecutor argued: “There’s no evidence here and no one’s saying that Mr. 

Dunn penetrated [Minor’s] anatomical vagina . . . . [But] if his penis is 

rubbing up and down and it broke the barrier of her labia majora, that’s 

penetration.” Thus, because [the proposed expert’s] testimony concerning 

penetration would not have contradicted Kaufhold’s testimony or negated the 

People’s legally sufficient theory of the case, [the proposed expert]’s 

testimony would not have affected the result of the trial, a factor further 

supporting the trial court’s denial of Dunn’s mistrial motion. (See People v. 

Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 353, 473, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408, 966 P.2d 442 [no 

abuse of discretion in denying new trial motion based on new testimony when 

defendant failed to show different result was probable on retrial]; Goodale, 

supra, 33 Cal. App. 2d at pp. 88–89, 91 P.2d 163 [“An appellate court is not 

permitted to grant a new trial to allow a defendant to introduce evidence that 

is cumulative.”].) 

 

Dunn, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 1098-99 (footnotes omitted). 

 The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. “‘[T]he Constitution 

guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 

defense.”’” Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 

476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)). This right includes “[t]he right to offer the testimony of 

witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 

14, 19 (1967). This constitutional guarantee is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See 

Holmes v. S. Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006); Crane, 476 U.S. at 690; see also Moses 

v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 757 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court has indicated that a 

defendant’s right to present a defense stems both from the right to due process provided by 

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the Fourteenth Amendment, and from the right ‘to have compulsory process for obtaining 

witnesses in his favor’ provided by the Sixth Amendment.” (citations omitted)). 

However, “[a] defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but 

rather is subject to reasonable restrictions.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 

(1998). “A defendant’s interest in presenting such evidence may thus bow to accommodate 

other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Specifically, “[i]n the exercise of this right,” a criminal defendant “must comply 

with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and 

reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 

284, 302 (1973). Further, the right is only implicated when the testimony the defendant 

seeks to admit is “relevant and material to the defense.” Washington, 388 U.S. at 23; see 

Crane, 476 U.S. at 689 (explaining that the Constitution leaves trial judges “‘wide 

latitude’” to exclude evidence that is repetitive, only marginally relevant, or poses an undue 

risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues). A trial court only violates a 

defendant’s right to present a defense through the exclusion of evidence pursuant to a rule 

of evidence when the exclusion is arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes the 

exclusionary rule applied is designed to serve and “where it has infringed upon a weighty 

interest of the accused.” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308; accord Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 

56 (1987). 

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial based on the 

unexpected unavailability of his expert witness Dr. Tiscon violated his due process rights 

because it deprived him of the opportunity to present evidence on a critical element of his 

case, specifically the penetration element. (Doc. No. 1 at 6; Doc. No. 7-26, Lodgment No. 

5 at 13-26.) See Dunn, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 1092, 1097. In affirming the trial court’s 

denial of Petitioner’s motion for mistrial, the California Court of Appeal noted that 

Petitioner never clearly articulated his precise position on the issue of penetration and how 

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Dr. Tiscon’s expected testimony would support his theory. Dunn, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 

1097. (See Doc. No. 7-16, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 1001-05.) The Court of Appeal then 

determined that Dr. Ticson’s expected testimony would not have changed the result of the 

trial because the expected testimony from Dr. Tiscon, would not have contradicted the 

testimony of the State’s expert witness, Dr. Kaufhold, and would not have negated the 

State’ theory of the case as to Petitioner’s guilt. See Dunn, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 1096-99. 

The California Court of Appeal’s determination with respect to this issue was reasonable.

 To the extent Dr. Tiscon would have testified consistent with the theory that 

penetration of the victim’s anatomical vagina was required for a conviction, such testimony 

would have been inconsistent with the applicable law and irrelevant to the ultimate 

determination of the Petitioner’s guilt. Here, Petitioner was charged with one count of 

sexual intercourse with a child 10 years of age or younger in violation of California Penal 

Code § 288.7(a); and one count of committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 

years of age in violation of California Penal Code § 288(a). (Doc. No. 7-2, Lodgment No. 

1 at CT 6-7.) With respect to count one, California courts have held that the term “sexual 

intercourse” contained in section 288.7(a) “means any penetration, no matter how slight, 

of the vagina or genitalia by the penis.” People v. Mendoza, 240 Cal. App. 4th 72, 79 

(2015); see also CALCRIM No. 1127. California courts have further held that the term 

“penetration” does not require penetration of the anatomical vagina. See People v. 

Quintana, 89 Cal. App. 4th 1362, 1371 (2001) (“[C]ontact with the hymen as well as the 

clitoris and the other genitalia inside the exterior of the labia majora constitutes ‘sexual 

penetration’ . . . .”); People v. Karsai, 131 Cal. App. 3d 224, 232 (1982) (“The penetration 

which is required is sexual penetration and not vaginal penetration. Penetration of the 

external genital organs is sufficient to constitute sexual penetration and to complete the 

crime of rape even if the rapist does not thereafter succeed in penetrating into the vagina.”), 

disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585 (1988). With respect 

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to count two, California courts have explained that section 288(a) does not require 

penetration.2

 See In re Asencio, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1195, 1206 (2008) (“Penetration is 

irrelevant for this charge.”). The trial court properly instructed the jury consistent with 

these holdings. (Doc. No. 7-18, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 1174-77; Doc. No. 7-4, Lodgment 

No. 1 at CT 161-62.) Accordingly, any testimony by Dr. Tiscon in support of a theory that 

penetration of the victim’s anatomical vagina was necessary for a conviction would have 

been contrary to the applicable law. 

Further, to the extent Dr. Tiscon would have testified consistent with the theory that 

Petitioner never penetrated the victim’s anatomical vagina, such testimony would have 

been consistent with the State’s own expert witness. The State’s expert witness Dr. 

Kaufhold testified before the jury that she found no signs of trauma or injury when she 

examined the victim’s genitalia on September 21, 2007, and that if penetration of the 

anatomical vagina had occurred, she would have expected to see serious injuries. (Doc. 

No. 7-15, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 901, 907-08, 919, 921-22.) Consistent with this 

testimony, the prosecutor told the jury during closing arguments: “There’s no evidence 

here and no one’s saying that [Petitioner] penetrated [the victim’s] anatomical vagina.”3

 

(Doc. No. 7-18, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 1208; see also id. at RT 1189.) 

                                                                

2

 With respect to count two, Petitioner was also charged with the sentencing enhancement 

allegation of engaging in substantial sexual conduct with a victim under 14 years of age under California 

Penal Code § 1203.066(a)(8). (Doc. No. 7-2, Lodgment No. 1 at CT 6-7.) This sentencing enhancement 

also does not require penetration as a necessary element. See Cal. Pen. Code § 1203.066(b) 

(“‘Substantial sexual conduct’ means penetration of the vagina or rectum of either the victim or the 

offender by the penis of the other or by any foreign object, oral copulation, or masturbation of either the 

victim or the offender.”); People v. Terry, 127 Cal. App. 4th 750, 771-72 (2005). 

3

 In addition, any contention that Dr. Tiscon’s expected testimony would have rebutted Dr. 

Minka’s testimony is entirely speculative. In moving for a mistrial, defense counsel stated that he 

planned on asking Dr. Tiscon to review Dr. Minka’s notes, which defense counsel contended showed 

that the chancre was actually on the outside of the victim’s labia. (Doc. No. 7-17, Lodgment No. 3 at 

RT 1079-80.) Defense counsel never proffered that Dr. Tiscon had actually formed an opinion as to Dr. 

Minka’s notes. (See id.) 

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In sum, Dr. Tiscon’s expected testimony was repetitive of Dr. Kaufold’s testimony 

and the prosecution’s concession that there was no evidence that Petitioner had penetrated 

the victim’s anatomical vagina, and Dr. Tiscon’s expected testimony was irrelevant to 

ultimate determination of Petitioner’s guilt as to the penetration element. Therefore, the 

trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion for mistrial based on the unexpected 

unavailability of Dr. Tiscon did not violate Petitioner’s right to present a defense. The right 

present a defense is not implicated where a defendant seeks to introduce evidence that is 

irrelevant or repetitive. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 689; Washington, 388 U.S. at 23. 

Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s decision affirming the trial court’s denial of 

Petitioner’s motion for a mistrial was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent regarding the right to present a defense. 

 Moreover, even assuming that the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion for a 

mistrial constituted a constitutional error, it is clear from the record that any such error was 

harmless under the standard set forth in Brecht. As explained above, Dr. Ticson’s expected 

testimony regarding the issue of penetration would have been repetitive of Dr. Kaufhold’s 

testimony and would have irrelevant to the jury’s determination as to Petitioner’s guilt 

because neither of the charged offenses required penetration of the victim’s anatomical 

vagina as an element of the offense. Further, Dr. Ticson’s proposed testimony would not 

have rebutted or undermined the other evidence of penetration in the record -- in particular, 

(1) the victim’s testimony that Petitioner touched his private part to her private part and 

that it hurt,4

 (Doc. No. 7-15, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 779-80, 783); (2) evidence showing 

that Petitioner’s blood tested positive for syphilis, (id. at RT 857-58); (3) Dr. Minka’s 

testimony that after the incident, she diagnosed the victim with syphilis and that she had to 

                                                                

4

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Tansey during an interview at the hospital and what she had earlier said during a videotaped interview 

conducted by a forensic interviewer. (See Doc. No. 7-3, Lodgment No. 1 at CT 108-09; Doc. No. 7-15, 

Lodgment No. 3 at RT 835-37.) 

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manipulate the victim’s labia majora to see the full extent of the syphilitic lesion, (Doc. 

No. 7-16, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 980-88); (4) Dr. Katz’s testimony that a syphilitic lesion 

forms at the point of contact within 10 to 90 days of exposure, (id. at RT 1022-24); and (5) 

Dr. Kaufhold’s testimony that Petitioner could have penetrated the vestibule right outside 

the victim’s vaginal opening and that would have been consistent with her finding of no 

injuries during the examination she performed, (Doc. No. 7-15, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 

904-07). Accordingly, the Court denies this claim of the petition. 

 B. The Trial Court’s Exclusion of Evidence Related to an Investigation of the 

Victim’s Mother by Child Welfare Authorities 

Petitioner argues that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court’s 

refusal to allow Petitioner to cross-examine the victim’s mother about an investigation by 

the Atlanta child welfare authorities. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) During the trial, on crossexamination, the victim’s mother responded “no” when Petitioner’s counsel asked her if 

there was a reason why she moved back to San Diego from Atlanta. (Doc. No. 7-13, 

Lodgment No. 3 at RT 538.) Defense counsel then asked her: “Was there an investigation 

that took place in Atlanta by the Welfare Department --.” (Id.) The prosecution objected 

to this question based on lack of relevance and that any probative value would be 

outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, consumption of time, or misleading the jury. 

(Id.) The trial court then held a side bar on the issue. (Id. at RT 539.) 

During the side bar, defense counsel proffered that there was an investigation by the 

Welfare Department in Atlanta where the victim had admitted that she had orally copulated 

her brother. (Id. at RT 539-40.) Defense counsel argued that this evidence was relevant to 

the credibility of the victim’s mother as to why she moved her family back to San Diego 

from Atlanta, and it was relevant to rebut the prosecution’s suggestion that the victim was 

sexually inexperienced. (Id. at RT 539-40, 556-58.) 

After reviewing the evidence at issue, the prosecution again objected to the evidence 

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on relevancy grounds and also objected to it on hearsay grounds and on the grounds that 

delving into the investigation would require a trial within a trial. (Id. at RT 551-52.) A 

summary of the Atlanta investigation stated: “‘The family was being investigated by 

authorities in the state of Georgia. And during this time, [the victim] disclosed that she 

orally copulated [her brother]. The family fled the state and was in San Diego County. 

The mother contacted the investigating social worker once but did not disclose her 

whereabouts or follow through with meeting the social worker.’” (Id. at RT 552-53.) The 

report stated that its disposition was “‘inconclusive’” and showed an entry of date of June 

15, 2007. (Id.) 

After hearing argument from defense counsel regarding the relevancy of the 

investigation, the trial court noted that depending on how the evidence related to the 

investigation would be ultimately presented at trial, there could be a hearsay or relevancy 

issue. (See id. at RT 558-60, 564.) But, the trial court noted that the evidence was likely 

relevant, (Id. at RT 560 (“But on the relevance issues, I – I think it is relevant.”); see also 

id. at RT 561 (“I’m not prepared to say it’s irrelevant.”)), and rejected the prosecution’s 

argument that the evidence was inadmissible because the disposition of the investigation 

was inconclusive. (Id. at RT 563, 569.) After a brief recess, the prosecution then stated 

that if the defense chose to present evidence of the Atlanta investigation as evidence of the 

victim’s sexualization, then the prosecution would likely seek to introduce evidence that 

Petitioner had previously molested the victim when she was four years old – evidence the 

prosecution had not been planning on introducing at trial. (Id. at RT 570-72.) 

The trial court never made a definite ruling regarding the admissibility of the 

evidence related to the Atlanta investigation. When the victim’s mother re-took the stand, 

defense counsel never asked her any questions about the Atlanta investigation or sought to 

introduce evidence of the investigation. (See Doc. No. 7-14, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 727-

31, 737-40.) 

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“‘[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’” Estelle, 502 

U.S. at 67. Therefore, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on a claim that the 

trial court violated a state evidentiary rule. See id.; see also Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 

F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[F]ailure to comply with the state’s rules of evidence is 

neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting habeas relief.”). Rather, to establish 

entitlement to habeas relief, a petitioner must show that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling 

constituted a violation of his constitutional rights. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-70; see also 

Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Even where it appears that 

evidence was erroneously admitted, a federal court will interfere only if it appears that its 

admission violated fundamental due process and the right to a fair trial.”). 

“‘[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to 

present a complete defense.”’” Jackson, 133 S. Ct. at 1992. But, “[a] defendant’s right to 

present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions.” 

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). The Constitution leaves trial judges 

“‘wide latitude’ to exclude evidence that is ‘repetitive . . . , only marginally relevant’ or 

poses an undue risk of ‘harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues.’” Crane, 476 

U.S. at 689. 

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence related to the Atlanta 

investigation violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) But, a review of the 

record shows that the trial court never actually excluded this evidence. During a hearing 

outside the presence of the jury, the trial court noted that depending on how defense counsel 

chose to present the evidence of the investigation at trial, there could be a relevancy or 

hearsay issue, but the trial court declined to exclude the evidence at that time. (See Doc. 

No. 7-13, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 558-65, 569-75; see, e.g. id. at RT 561 (“I’m not prepared 

to say it’s irrelevant.”).) When the victim’s mother re-took the stand on cross-examination, 

defense counsel never asked her any questions about the Atlanta investigation or sought to 

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introduce evidence of the investigation.5

 (See Doc. No. 7-14, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 727-

31, 737-40.) Because the trial court did not exclude this evidence from the trial, the trial 

court’s decision did not violate Petitioner’s constitutional rights, including his right to 

present a defense. 

Moreover, even assuming that the trial court excluded the evidence, any potential 

constitutional error would have been harmless under the standard set forth in Brecht. The 

evidence related to the Atlanta investigation did not directly rebut the large amount of 

evidence in the record showing that Petitioner had “sexual intercourse” with the victim as 

defined by the California Penal Code on the night of the incident. (See Doc. No. 7-3, 

Lodgment No. 1 at CT 108-09; Doc. No. 7-15, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 779-80, 783, 835-

37, 857-58, 904-07; Doc. No. 7-16, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 980-88, 1022-24.) Accordingly, 

the exclusion of the evidence related to the Atlanta investigation from the trial would not 

have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.6

 Accordingly, 

the Court denies this claim on the merits.7

                                                                

5

 Defense counsel also did not ask questions about or seek to introduce evidence related to the 

Atlanta investigation when he cross-examined the victim. (See generally Doc. No. 7-15, Lodgment No. 

3 at RT 786-814.) 

6

 In his traverse and his objections to the R & R, Petitioner argues that his constitutional rights 

were violated when a San Diego County Sheriff’s deputy destroyed his evidence related to the Atlanta 

investigation that Petitioner wanted presented at trial. (Doc. No. 8 at 3-4; Doc. No. 13 at 3-4.) Although 

it was improper for Petitioner to raise this claim for the first time in his traverse and in his objections to 

the R & R, see Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A Traverse is not the 

proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief.”); Nazarzai v. Hutchens, No. SACV 11-1160-

DMG JPR, 2012 WL 3518538, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2012) (“Objections to a Report and 

Recommendation are not the appropriate vehicle for raising a new habeas claim.”), nevertheless, the 

Court denies this claim on the merits for the same reasons that the Court denies the above claim. Even 

assuming a constitutional violation occurred, any such error was harmless under Brecht. Because, at 

trial, defense counsel ultimately declined to introduce any evidence related to the Atlanta investigation, 

the alleged destruction of evidence related to the investigation could not have had a substantial and 

injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. 

7

 Since the Court denies the claim on the merits, the Court need not reach the issue of procedural 

default. (See Doc. No. 9 at 32-37.) See also Flournoy v. Small, 681 F.3d 1000, 1004 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) 

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 C. Petitioner’s Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct 

 Petitioner argues that the prosecution violated his due process rights by stating 

during a pre-trial hearing that Petitioner had threated Ava Loftis. (Doc. No. 1 at 6; see 

Doc. No. 7-9, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 166-68.) “A prosecutor’s improper comments will 

be held to violate the Constitution only if they so infected the trial with unfairness as to 

make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 

2148, 2153 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 

U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). In determining whether a comment infected the trial with 

unfairness, a court must view the remark in the context of the entire trial. See Greer v. 

Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765-66 (1987); see, e.g., Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 

643 (1974). 

 Petitioner has failed to identify anywhere in the record where the prosecutor 

mentioned or referenced the threat accusations at issue before the jury during the trial. The 

prosecution did not refer to or ask about these alleged threats during his direct examination 

of Ava Loftis. (See generally Doc. No. 7-14, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 657-666, 677-80.) 

And the prosecution did not refer to the alleged threats during his closing statement. (See 

generally Doc. No. 7-18, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 1184-1211, 1250-59.) Because the 

comments at issue were never made before the jury, the comments could not have infected 

the trial with such unfairness as to constitute a due process violation. Accordingly, the 

Court denies the claim on the merits.8

/// 

/// 

                                                                

(holding that a court may reach the merits of a habeas claim despite an asserted procedural bar when the 

claim “clearly fails on the merits”); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). 

8

 Since the Court denies the claim on the merits, the Court need not reach the issue of procedural 

default. (See Doc. No. 9 at 39.) 

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 D. The Trial Court’s Denial of Petitioner’s Motion to Substitute Counsel 

Petitioner alleges a due process violation based on the trial court’s denial of his 

Marsden9

 motion to substitute counsel. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Prior to trial, Petitioner moved 

to substitute his counsel pursuant to Marsden, and the trial court denied the Marsden 

motion. (See Doc. No. 7-4, Lodgment No. 1 at CT 246; Doc. No. 7-7, Lodgment No. 3 at 

RT 3-4, 32.)10 In alleging that the trial court’s denial of his Marsden motion violated his 

constitutional rights, Petitioner fails to articulate any reason why the trial court’s decision 

was erroneous or how the decision prejudiced him in anyway. (See Doc. No. 1 at 6.) 

“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not 

warrant habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994); see Greenway v. 

Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Petitioner’s] cursory and vague claim cannot 

support habeas relief.”). Accordingly, the Court denies this claim on the merits.11

E. Judicial Bias 

Petitioner alleges a due process violation based on the trial judge’s failure to act 

impartially and diligently. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) But Petitioner fails to articulate any factual 

basis for his claim that the trial judge failed to act impartially or diligently. Petitioner fails 

to identify any potential bias held by the trial judge or explain how he was prejudiced by 

such an alleged bias. “Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of 

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James, 24 F.3d at 26; see Greenway, 653 F.3d 

                                                                

9

 People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970). Under California law, a request for a Marsden motion 

is when a criminal defendant requests substitution of court-appointed counsel. See Schell v. Witek, 218 

F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2000). 

10 The transcript of the Marsden hearing was sealed and is not contained in the Lodgment. (See 

Doc. No. 7-7, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 4.) 

11 Since the Court denies the claim on the merits, the Court need not reach the issue of procedural 

default. (See Doc. No. 9 at 38.) 

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at 804. Accordingly, the Court denies this claim. 

III. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 

 Petitioner alleges that he was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) 

 A. Legal Standards for § 2254 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 

 The Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to the effective assistance of 

counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 

1385-86 (2012). In order to prove a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, the petitioner must establish (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) 

that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009). 

 In order to satisfy the first prong of the test, the petitioner must show his counsel’s 

performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688. “The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under 

prevailing professional norms.” Id. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be 

highly deferential,” and “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689; see also 

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010) (“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is 

never an easy task.”). 

 In order to satisfy the prejudice prong of the test, the petitioner “must show that there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

 In evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised in a § 2254 habeas 

petition, a federal habeas court “must take a ‘highly deferential’ look at counsel’s 

performance through the ‘deferential lens of § 2254(d).’” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 190 

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(citations omitted); see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (“The standards created by Strickland 

and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential.’”). Thus, a federal habeas court’s review of an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a § 2254 habeas petition is “‘doubly deferential.’” 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 190. The reviewing court must determine “whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 562 

U.S. at 105. 

 B. IAC Claim Raised on Direct Appeal 

 Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective due to counsel’s failure to 

subpoena Dr. Tiscon to testify at Petitioner’s trial. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) This particular IAC 

claim was raised on direct appeal and denied by the state courts. (See Doc. Nos. 7-26, 7-

29, 7-30, 7-31, Lodgment Nos. 5, 8, 9, 10.) Thus, in conducting the § 2254(d) review, the 

Court looks through the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of Petitioner’s 

petition for review and evaluates the California Court of Appeal’s reasoned decision 

denying Petitioner’s IAC claim. See, e.g., Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2276; Cannedy, 706 

F.3d at 1156. The relevant portions of the California Court of Appeal’s decision are as 

follows: 

 Dunn also contends the judgment must be reversed because his trial 

counsel’s failure to serve Ticson with a subpoena to attend the trial violated 

his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. 

 Under both the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article 

I, section 15 of the state Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to the 

effective assistance of counsel. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 171, 

215, 233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839 (Ledesma).) To prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there 

is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different had 

counsel’s errors not occurred. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 

668, 687-688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (Strickland); People v. 

Benavides (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 69, 92-93, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507, 105 P.3d 1099.) 

Where, as here, “a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether 

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there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would 

have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” (Strickland, at p. 695, 104 S. 

Ct. 2052; accord, Ledesma, at p. 218, 233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) “A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.” (Strickland, at p. 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052; accord, Ledesma, at p. 

218, 233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) 

 As we explained earlier (see pt. III.A.3., ante), we are confident the 

absence of Ticson’s testimony did not affect the outcome of Dunn’s trial. The 

evidence against Dunn was strong and largely undisputed. The testimony 

expected from Ticson would merely have duplicated part of the testimony of 

the People’s expert and did not respond to the People’s theory of guilt. Under 

these circumstances, even if counsel were deficient in not serving Ticson with 

a subpoena to appear at trial, it is not reasonably probable the jury would have 

had a reasonable doubt about Dunn’s guilt. He is, therefore, not entitled to 

reversal based on ineffective assistance of counsel. (Strickland, supra, 466 

U.S. at p. 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052 [“deficiencies in counsel’s performance must 

be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under 

the Constitution”]; accord, Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 217, 233 Cal. Rptr. 

404, 729 P.2d 839.) 

 

Dunn, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 1101 (footnote omitted). 

 The California Court of Appeal’s decision reasonably applied the Supreme Court’s 

clearly established precedent governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the 

Sixth Amendment – Strickland v. Washington. In order to satisfy the prejudice prong of 

the Strickland test, the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The California Court of Appeal reasonably 

concluded that Petitioner failed to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong because the 

testimony expected from Dr. Tiscon would not have affected the outcome of Petitioner’s 

trial. Dunn, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 1101. 

The appellate court correctly explained that Dr. Tiscon’s expected testimony would 

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merely have been duplicative of the testimony of the prosecution’s expert and would not 

responded to the prosecution’s theory of guilt. Id. The prosecution’s expert witness Dr. 

Kaufhold testified before the jury that she found no signs of trauma or injury when she 

examined the victim’s genitalia on September 21, 2007, and that if penetration of the 

victim’s anatomical vagina had occurred, she would have expected to see serious injuries. 

(Doc. No. 7-15, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 901, 907-08, 919, 921-22; see also Doc. No. 7-18, 

Lodgment No. 3 at RT 1208 (“There’s no evidence here and no one’s saying that 

[Petitioner] penetrated [the victim’s] anatomical vagina.”).) In addition, neither of the 

charged offenses required penetration of the victim’s anatomical vagina as an element of 

the offense. See Mendoza, 240 Cal. App. 4th at 79 (“Sexual intercourse [in section 

288.7(a)] means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the 

penis.”); Karsai, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 232 (“The penetration which is required is sexual 

penetration and not vaginal penetration. Penetration of the external genital organs is 

sufficient to constitute sexual penetration . . . .”); Asencio, 166 Cal. App. 4th at 1206 

(“Penetration is irrelevant for [a] charge [under section 288(a)].”); see also CALCRIM 

Nos. 1110, 1127. 

Further, the California Court of Appeal correctly explained that the evidence against 

Dunn was strong and largely undisputed. Dunn, 205 Cal. App. 4th at 1101. Specifically, 

Dr. Ticson’s proposed testimony would not have rebutted or undermined the other evidence 

of penetration in the record -- in particular, (1) the victim’s testimony that Petitioner 

touched his private part to her private part, (Doc. No. 7-15, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 779-80, 

783; see also id. at RT 835-37; Doc. No. 7-3, Lodgment No. 1 at CT 108-09); (2) the 

evidence showing that Petitioner’s blood tested positive for syphilis, (Doc. No. 7-15, 

Lodgment No. 3 at RT 857-58); (3) Dr. Minka’s testimony that after the incident, she 

diagnosed the victim with syphilis and that she had to manipulate the victim’s labia majora 

to see the full extent of the syphilitic lesion, (Doc. No. 7-16, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 980-

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88); (4) Dr. Katz’s testimony that a syphilitic lesion forms at the point of contact within 10 

to 90 days of exposure, (id. at RT 1022-24); and (5) Dr. Kaufhold’s testimony that 

Petitioner could have penetrated the vestibule right outside the victim’s vaginal opening 

and that would have been consistent with her finding of no injuries during the examination 

she performed, (Doc. No. 7-15, Lodgment No. 3 at RT 904-07). 

The California Court of Appeal’s determination that Petitioner failed to satisfy 

Strickland’s prejudice prong was reasonable in light of the record that was before the state 

court. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s IAC claim on direct appeal was 

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

Accordingly, the Court denies this claim of the petition. 

 C. IAC Claim Raised In State Habeas Proceedings 

 Petitioner also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because: (1) counsel 

harbored animosity toward Petitioner due to Petitioner submitting a Marsden motion; and 

(2) counsel failed to preserve witnesses that would prove his innocence. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) 

These two IAC claims were raised in Petitioner’s state habeas petition which was 

summarily denied by the California Supreme Court in an order stating: “The petition for 

writ of habeas corpus is denied on the merits with regard to petitioner’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel.” (Doc. No. 7-37, Lodgment No. 16; Doc. No. 1 at 17.) Because 

the California Supreme Court and the lower state courts did not articulate the reasons for 

the denial of these claims, in evaluating these IAC claims, the Court must “engage in an 

independent review of the record and ascertain whether the state court’s decision was 

objectively unreasonable.” Castellanos v. Small, 766 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2014). In 

so doing, the Court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could have supported 

. . . the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists 

could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. 

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 After conducting an independent review of the record, the Court concludes that the 

California Supreme Court’s denial of these IAC claims was not objectively unreasonable. 

With respect to his claim that defense counsel was ineffective because counsel harbored 

animosity towards Petitioner for submitting a Marsden motion, Petitioner fails to identify 

any portion of the record showing where defense counsel exhibited animosity towards him. 

Further, Petitioner fails to adequately explain how he was prejudiced by such alleged 

animosity. Petitioner does not explain what specific actions he contends defense counsel 

either did or did not take due to his alleged animosity, or explain how those actions or 

inactions prejudiced his case. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show that defense 

counsel’s performance was deficient on this basis, or that he was prejudiced by his 

counsel’s performance with respect to this issue. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of 

this IAC claim on collateral review was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law, and, therefore, the Court denies this federal habeas claim. 

 With respect to his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve 

witnesses, Petitioner has failed to identify any specific witness that defense counsel 

allegedly failed to preserve. (See also Doc. No. 7-36, Lodgment No. 15 at 17.) In addition, 

Petitioner has failed to explain what testimony would have come from these alleged 

witnesses or how it would have been favorable to his defense. Therefore, Petitioner has 

failed to show that defense counsel’s performance was deficient on this basis, or that he 

was prejudiced by counsel’s performance with respect to this issue. See Bragg v. Galaza, 

242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting IAC claim where petitioner failed to identify 

any information that would be gained from the witness that defense counsel did not already 

have from other witnesses, and petitioner’s claim was based on “nothing more than 

speculat[ion] that, if interviewed, [the witness] might have given information helpful to 

[petitioner]”); Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting IAC claim 

where there was no evidence in the record that the witness actually exists or evidence 

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showing that the witness would have provided testimony helpful to the defense). 

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this IAC claim on collateral review was not contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and, therefore, the 

Court denies this federal habeas claim. 

 D. Remaining Trial Counsel IAC Claims 

 In the remaining aspects of Petitioner’s IAC claims related to his trial counsel, 

Petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective because: (1) counsel failed to adequately 

investigate, prepare, and present mental health evidence in support of a diminished capacity 

defense; (2) counsel did not take adequate steps to maintain petitioner’s innocence due to 

a conflict of interest; and (3) counsel failed to challenge the prosecutor. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) 

Petitioner did not raise these specific IAC claims on direct appeal or through a state habeas 

petition. 

 With respect to his claim that defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to 

adequately investigate, prepare, and present mental health evidence in support of a 

diminished capacity defense, Petitioner has failed to allege that he suffers from any mental 

disease or defect or that any such mental health evidence could have been obtained that 

would have been material to his defense. Petitioner’s speculation as to what an 

investigation into his mental health might have produced is insufficient to satisfy 

Strickland’s prejudice prong. See Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 

2008) (“Such speculation is plainly insufficient to establish prejudice”); Bible v. Ryan, 571 

F.3d 860, 871 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). Accordingly, the Court denies this claim on the 

merits. 

 With respect to his claim that defense counsel was ineffective due to a conflict of 

interest, Petitioner has failed to identify any conflict of interest defense counsel may have 

had, how that alleged conflict of interest affected counsel’s representation of Petitioner, or 

how Petitioner was prejudiced by the alleged conflict of interest. “Conclusory allegations 

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which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” 

James, 24 F.3d at 26; see Greenway, 653 F.3d at 804; see also Washington v. Lampert, 422 

F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To prove an IAC claim premised on an alleged conflict of 

interest, a petitioner must ‘establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his 

lawyer’s performance.’” (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980))). 

Accordingly, the Court denies this claim on the merits. 

With respect to his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 

the prosecution, Petitioner has failed to identify what specific challenges defense counsel 

should have raised or how he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s alleged failure to raise 

certain challenges. “Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of 

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.” James, 24 F.3d at 26; see Greenway, 653 F.3d 

at 804. Accordingly, the Court denies this claim on the merits.12

IV. Additional Claims 

 In his objections to the R & R, Petitioner argues for the first time (1) that his appellate 

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise all of Petitioner’s potentially meritorious issues; 

and (2) that the prosecution committed a Brady13 violation. (Doc. No. 13 at 3-7.) Although 

it was improper for Petitioner to raise these claims for the first time in his objections to the 

R & R, see Nazarzai, 2012 WL 3518538, at *1 (“Objections to a Report and 

Recommendation are not the appropriate vehicle for raising a new habeas claim.”), 

nevertheless, the Court denies these claims on the merits. 

With respect to Petitioner’s Brady claim, Petitioner argues that the prosecution 

violated Brady by failing to further investigate the activities of the victim in Georgia. (Doc. 

No. 13 at 5-7.) In order to establish a Brady claim, a petitioner must show that the evidence 

                                                                

12 Since the Court denies these claims on the merits, the Court need not reach the issue of 

procedural default. (See Doc. No. 9 at 46-47.) 

13 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

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at issue satisfies the following three “essential elements”: “‘The evidence at issue must be 

favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that 

evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and 

prejudice must have ensued.’” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (quoting 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). Petitioner does not state what additional 

information could have been obtained regarding the victim’s activities in Atlanta that 

defense counsel did not already have access to through the investigation by the Atlanta 

Child Welfare authorities. Thus, Petitioner has failed to show that the evidence at issue 

was material. See id. at 698 (stating that Brady’s materiality requirement is satisfied when 

“‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different 

light as to undermine confidence in the verdict’”, i.e., a “‘reasonable probability of a 

different result’”); see also United States v. Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(holding that the suppression of evidence that is merely cumulative does not violate Brady). 

Further, Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by any alleged failure by the 

prosecution to further investigate the victim’s activities in Atlanta because, at trial, defense 

counsel ultimately declined to introduce any evidence related to the Atlanta investigation. 

Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s Brady claim. 

 With respect to Petitioner’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective, 

Petitioner has failed to identify a nonfrivolous issue that his appellate counsel could have 

raised on direct appeal. All of the claims raised in his federal habeas petition and in 

Petitioner’s other federal filings fail on the merits. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to 

establish that his appellate counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable or that 

Petitioner was prejudiced by his appellate counsel’s actions. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 

U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (explaining that to succeed on a claim that appellate counsel was 

ineffective, the petitioner must show that his “counsel unreasonably failed to discover 

nonfrivolous issues and to file a merits brief raising them”); Moormann v. Ryan, 628 F.3d 

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1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that appellate counsel does not act unreasonably 

“in failing to raise a meritless claim” and a petitioner is not prejudiced by the failure to 

raise a meritless claim); Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e 

cannot hold counsel ineffective for failing to raise a claim that is meritless.”). Accordingly, 

the Court denies Petitioner’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective. 

V. Certificate of Appealability

 A certificate of appealability may issue only if the defendant “has made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district 

court has denied the petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, a defendant satisfies 

the above requirement by demonstrating “that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not find the 

Court’s assessment of Defendant’s claims debatable or wrong. Accordingly, the Court 

declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 

Conclusion

 For the reasons stated, the Court denies Petitioner’s § 2254 petition for habeas corpus 

and adopts the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Additionally, the Court 

denies Petitioner a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 1, 2016 

 

 MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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