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Nature of Suit Code: 990
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 10, 1999 Decided December 3, 1999

No. 98-5495

Roberto Saavedra Bruno, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cv00252)

Jonathan P. Graham argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs was Max Stier.

Meredith Manning, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

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al, U.S. Department of Justice, and Alison Marie Igoe,

Attorney.

Before: Sentelle, Randolph, and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the

judgment of the district court dismissing an action for judicial

review of the decision of the American Consulate in Panama

refusing to issue a visa to Roberto Saavedra Bruno, and the

decision of the American Consulate in La Paz, Bolivia, revoking another visa Saavedra held. Both consular decisions

rested on information, not revealed to Saavedra, that he had

engaged in illicit drug trafficking. Saavedra unequivocally

denies the charge and complains that he has never had an

opportunity to confront and counter the evidence relied upon

by the consular officers. He insists that the Administrative

Procedure Act, and the grant of jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law, entitles him to put the government to

its proof.

I

Saavedra is a Bolivian national. He moved to Washington,

D.C. with his family in 1993. At the time, he held an F-1 visa

(student) and a B-1/B-2 visa (temporary visitor for business

or pleasure) set to expire in May 2002. Shortly after settling

in Washington, Saavedra and his family moved again, to Coral

Gables, Florida. There he formed a corporation--Musicanga,

Inc.--for the purpose of recording and promoting Latin

American music. Saucedo Wichtendahl, a United States citizen, was hired as the company's artistic director and interim

manager.

In May 1995, Saavedra's company filed a petition for a

nonimmigrant worker with the INS, seeking to have Saavedra classified as a managerial employee qualified for an L-1

visa. The INS approved the classification for a one-year

period, until May 17, 1996. A month before this was to

expire, the company filed a petition to extend the classification for another year, which the INS granted. Saavedra then

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traveled abroad to seek the renewal of his visa, as is required,

presenting himself to the American consul in Panama City on

May 16, 1996. See 8 U.S.C. s 1201(a).

Upon finding Saavedra listed in the State Department's

computer "lookout" system, the American consul in Panama

City denied his visa application. Saavedra's name had been

entered by the U.S. Consul General in Bolivia, who had

received classified reports from federal agencies that Saavedra had been involved in narcotics trafficking. Saavedra

quickly returned to the United States. He was detained

briefly at the border but allowed to enter after an immigration hearing had been scheduled. At the hearing the following week, the immigration officer told him to leave the

country and to resolve the matter with the United States

Embassy in Bolivia. He therefore departed on June 11, 1996.

In the meantime, Saavedra's lawyer provided information to

the Consul General in Bolivia, trying to persuade her of his

client's eligibility for a visa. The Consul General reviewed

this information along with the classified reports and made a

formal determination that Saavedra was ineligible to be admitted to the United States under s 212 of the Immigration

and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. s 1182(a)(2)(C), because there was reason to believe that he had been an illicit

trafficker of controlled substances, or had knowingly assisted

and abetted, or conspired and colluded with, others in the

illicit trafficking of controlled substances. The Consul General sent a letter to Saavedra at his Florida address revoking

his B-1/B-2 visa.

Thereafter, the State Department issued an advisory opinion supporting the Consul General's finding that Saavedra

was ineligible for a visa under s 212(a)(2)(C) of the INA.

The State Department issued a Certificate of Revocation on

August 1, 1996, providing that the revocation of the B-1/B-2

visa would be effective as of Saavedra's next departure from

the United States. Saavedra wrote to the Consul General

requesting her and the Department of State to recommend

that the Attorney General grant him a waiver pursuant to 8

U.S.C. s 1182(d)(3), which would allow Saavedra to return

temporarily to the United States. No action was taken on

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the waiver request until April 1998 when the State Department notified Saavedra that it had been denied.

In January 1998, Saavedra, his company, and its officer,

Wichtendahl, filed suit in the district court seeking review

under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C.

s 701 et seq., of the revocation of his B-1/B-2 visa and the

refusal to renew his L-1 visa. The complaint also challenged

the State Department's failure to act on the request for a

waiver of inadmissibility under s 212(d)(3) of the INA, 8

U.S.C. s 1182(d)(3). The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability

barred the first two claims and that the third claim was moot.

Bruno v. Albright, 20 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998).

II

The main question is whether, under the Administrative

Procedure Act, an alien is entitled to judicial review of a

consul's denial of his application for a visa, and of the

revocation of a visa he already held. To put the question in

perspective, we must begin with some history.

A

After a century of unimpeded alien migration to the United

States, Congress in 1875 established grounds upon which

aliens might be refused entry, and, seven years later, enacted

the first general immigration statute. See Act of Mar. 3,

1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (barring prostitutes and convicts);

Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214. Further legislation

soon followed, including a general revision of the immigration

laws in 1903, enlarging the classes of aliens ineligible for

entry, and another general revision in 1917. See Act of Mar.

3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213; Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39

Stat. 874. In the same year, 1917, the Departments of State

and Labor issued a Joint Order to Diplomatic, Consular and

Immigration Officers requiring for the first time that aliens

coming to the United States have visas issued by an American consulate. See generally 3 Green Haywood Hackworth,

Digest of International Law 741 (1942); Leon Wildes, Review of Visa Denials: The American Consul as 20th Century

Absolute Monarch, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 887, 892 (1989). In

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the next year, while the country was at war, the President

designated the Secretary of State as the official in charge of

granting permission to aliens to enter. See 3 Hackworth,

supra, at 741. In implementing this system, American consuls in foreign countries simply advised aliens of the various

exclusionary provisions of the immigration laws, leaving the

determination of excludability to immigration officers at the

port of entry. See Wildes, supra, at 892. This resulted in

large numbers of foreigners making the arduous trip to the

United States only to be detained at the border and then

excluded. See 3 Hackworth, supra, at 741-42. To cure this

problem, Congress passed the Act of 1924 (ch. 190, 43 Stat.

153), transferring the responsibility for determining the admissibility of aliens from the Secretary of State to consular

officers. See 3 Hackworth, supra, at 742.

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.

s 1101 et seq., now governs visa processing. The INA confers upon consular officers exclusive authority to review

applications for visas, precluding even the Secretary of State

from controlling their determinations. See 8 U.S.C.

ss 1104(a), 1201(a). The powers afforded to consular officers

include, in particular, the granting, denying and revoking of

immigrant and non-immigrant visas. See 8 U.S.C. s 1201(a),

(i). Consular officers exercise this authority subject to the

eligibility requirements in the statute and corresponding regulations. 22 C.F.R. ss 41.121-.122.

Obtaining a visa from an American consul has never guaranteed an alien's entry into the United States. A visa merely

gives the alien permission to arrive at a port of entry and

have an immigration officer independently examine the alien's

eligibility for admission. See 8 U.S.C. s 1201(h). See generally James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1991). It is the immigration officer's responsibility to make certain that the alien does

not fall within any of the statutory categories barring admission. Among the categories are past criminal behavior. See

8 U.S.C. s 1182. Since 1952, the law has specifically excluded

aliens engaged in the illicit drug trade. See 5 Charles

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Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure s 63.03[1][a]

(1997).

The following provision, barring drug traffickers, led the

consular officer to determine that Saavedra was ineligible for

a visa: "any alien who the consular or immigration officer

knows or has reason to believe is or has been an illicit

trafficker in any such controlled substance or is or has been a

knowing assister, abettor, conspirator, or colluder with others" in the illicit trafficking in drugs is ineligible for entry. 8

U.S.C. s 1182 (a)(2)(C). In order to exclude an alien on this

basis, the consular officer "must have more than a mere

suspicion--there must exist a probability, supported by evidence, that the alien is or has been engaged in trafficking." 9

U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs Manual s 40.23

(1999). Consular officers possessing such evidence enter the

alien's name in the worldwide visa lookout system as "P2C",

possible narcotics trafficker. When visa denials are based on

an applicant's listing in the lookout system, the consular

officer informs the applicant that the denial rested on a

finding of ineligibility, but the officer is not required to

disclose the existence or details of the INS lookout entry.

See id.

B

Saavedra's argument against the district court's dismissal

of his action proceeds as follows: under the Administrative

Procedure Act, judicial review of agency action is the norm,

preclusion of review the exception; consular discretion in

determining whether to deny or revoke a visa is not unbounded; Congress has not expressly barred judicial review of visa

decisions; no statute strips the federal courts of jurisdiction

over such cases; and this court's decision in Abourezk v.

Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1049-52 (D.C. Cir. 1986), stands for

the proposition that consular visa determinations are subject

to judicial scrutiny.

Saavedra's general description of the APA is quite correct.

Numerous opinions, of the Supreme Court and of the lower

federal courts, speak in terms of the APA's "presumption" of

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judicial review of agency action. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil,

508 U.S. 182, 190 (1993); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.

136, 140 (1967); Dixie Fuel Co. v. Commissioner of Social

Security, 171 F.3d 1052, 1057 (6th Cir. 1999); Ball, Ball &

Brosamer, Inc. v. Reich, 24 F.3d 1147, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

The presumption is said to derive from APA s 702: a "person

suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely

affected or aggrieved by agency action ... is entitled to

judicial review thereof," 5 U.S.C. s 702. There are two

notable qualifications. The validity of agency action may not

be tested in court if "statutes preclude judicial review" or if

"agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5

U.S.C. s 701(a)(1)-(2).

Sometimes it is suggested that s 701(a)(1) and (2) are the

only exceptions to review under s 702. See Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154, 175 (1997); Florida Power & Light Co. v. EPA,

145 F.3d 1414, 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Comsat Corp. v. FCC,

114 F.3d 223, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The suggestion is, we

think, not entirely accurate. As revised in 1976, s 702 itself

contains another qualifying clause. It provides that "Nothing

herein"--which includes the portion of s 702 from which the

presumption of reviewability is derived--"affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to

dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate

legal or equitable ground," 5 U.S.C. s 702(1). The House

Report accompanying this amendment described these "other

limitations" as including "express or implied preclusion of

judicial review." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656, at 12 (1976).1 The

__________

1 For the most part, the Department of Justice supported the

amendment of APA s 702, the main purpose of which was to

eliminate the defense of sovereign immunity of the United States in

actions in federal court seeking relief other than money damages.

Then-Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia told the Senate

subcommittee that "one of the very premises of the proposal" was

that actions seeking judicial review could still be disposed of on

grounds such as "lack of standing; lack of ripeness; availability of

an alternative remedy in another court; express or implied statutory preclusion of judicial review; commission of the matter by law to

agency discretion; privileged nature of the defendant's conduct;

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Administrative Conference of the United States, which had

proposed the specific language enacted as s 702(1), explained

that the courts would still refuse "to decide issues about

foreign affairs, military policy and other subjects inappropriate for judicial action." 1 Recommendations and Reports of

the Administrative Conference 191, 225. On the same subject, the Administrative Conference pointed out that "much of

the law of unreviewability consists of marking out areas in

which legislative action or traditional practice indicate that

courts are unqualified or that issues are inappropriate for

judicial determination." Id.

Whether analyzed in terms of s 702(1), or in terms of

s 701(a)(1), the conclusion is the same--the district court

rightly held that it could not entertain Saavedra's lawsuit.

The overriding consideration is the nature of consular visa

decisions.2 To the history just discussed, more must be

added.

In prescribing the conditions for allowing aliens to enter

the country, Congress acted in accordance with the ancient

principle of international law that a nation state has the

inherent right to exclude or admit foreigners and to prescribe

applicable terms and conditions.3 This firmly-established

__________

failure to exhaust administrative remedies; discretionary power to

refuse equitable relief; and the 'political question' doctrine." H.R.

Rep. No. 94-1656, supra, Exh. C, at 26-27.

2 Our discussion in this part applies both to the revocation of

Saavedra's B-1/B-2 visa and the denial of his L-1 visa. Consular

officers have complete discretion over issuance and revocation of

visas. See 8 U.S.C. ss 1104(a), 1201(i). The INA provides, "After

the issuance of a visa or other documentation to any alien, the

consular officer or the Secretary of State may at any time, in his

discretion, revoke such visa or documentation." 8 U.S.C. s 1201(i);

see also 22 C.F.R. s 41.122. The same eligibility criteria apply

whether the consular officer refuses to renew a visa or decides to

revoke a previously issued one. See 8 U.S.C. s 1182(a)(2)(C). In

Saavedra's case, once the Consul General in La Paz received

information rendering him ineligible for an L-1 visa, that same

information resulted in the revocation of his B-1/B-2 visa.

3 See, e.g., Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892);

Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596 (1952) (Justice

principle, dating from Roman times,4 received recognition

during the Constitutional Convention5 and has continued to

be an important postulate in the foreign relations of this

country and other members of the international community.6

For more than a century, the Supreme Court has thus

recognized the power to exclude aliens as " 'inherent in

sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international

relations and defending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers--a power to be exercised exclusively by

the political branches of government' "7 and not "granted

__________

Frankfurter, concurring); C. BouvE, Exclusion and Expulsion of

Aliens, 4 & n.3 (1912), and authorities there cited; II Emerlich de

Vattel, Le Droit Des Gens ss 94, 100 (1758).

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4 E. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 33, 44-

48 (1915).

5 See 3 Papers of James Madison 1277 (1840), in which Madison

reports Gouverneur Morris' observation during the debates that

"every society, from a great nation down to a club, ha[s] the right of

declaring the conditions on which new members should be admitted." Article I, Section 9, Clause 1, of the Constitution is an

implicit recognition of Congress's authority to regulate immigration.

In addition, Article III of the Jay Treaty of 1794, 8 Stat. 116, 117,

provided that British and American subjects could freely cross the

Canadian border. See Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231

(1929). As to the Colonial understanding of the sovereign's power

to control the admission of aliens, see Thomas Jefferson, Notes on

the State of Virginia 83-85 (Peden ed. 1955).

6 See, e.g., Convention Between the United States of America and

other American Republics Regarding the Status of Aliens, art. I,

46 Stat. 2753, 2754 (1928); Constitution of the Intergovernmental

Committee for European Migration, 6 U.S.T 603, 604 (1955); Hines

v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); 3 Hackworth, supra, at 725-29;

W. Hall, International Law 211-12 (6th ed. 1909); 4 John Bassett

Moore, International Law Digest 151-74 (1906); Borchard, supra

note 5, at 44-48.

7 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972), quoting the

Solicitor General's brief; see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)

(quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).

away or restrained on behalf of anyone." The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).

These considerations underlie the Court's long-standing

recognition that "any policy toward aliens is vitally and

intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and

the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such

matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches

of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry

or interference." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,

588-89 (1952); see also Reno v. American-Arab Comm., 119

S. Ct. 936, 947 (1999). Though it may be "error to suppose

that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations

lies beyond judicial cognizance," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,

211 (1962), it is nevertheless "not within the province of any

court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the

determination of the political branch of the Government to

exclude a given alien." United States ex rel. Knauff v.

Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).8

In view of the political nature of visa determinations and of

the lack of any statute expressly authorizing judicial review of

consular officers' actions, courts have applied what has become known as the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.

The doctrine holds that a consular official's decision to issue

or withhold a visa is not subject to judicial review, at least

unless Congress says otherwise.9 For the greater part of this

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8 Justice Harlan put it this way in Lem Moon Sing v. United

States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895): "The power of Congress to exclude

aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms

and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to

have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through

executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by our

previous adjudications."

9 Historically, disputes arising from the denial of a visa application have been handled through diplomatic channels, not by courts.

In United States ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.

1927), a British subject challenged the denial of a visa, which

prevented her from traveling from Montreal to visit her children in

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century, our court has therefore refused to review visa decisions of consular officials. United States ex rel. Ulrich v.

Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1929), held that the thencurrent immigration law did not provide for an official review

of a consular officer's denial of a visa. Under succeeding

incarnations of federal immigration law through to the present, this court and other federal courts have adhered to the

view that consular visa determinations are not subject to

judicial review. See, e.g., Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564

F.2d 417, 428 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Chi Doan v. INS, 160

F.3d 508, 509 (8th Cir. 1998); Centeno v. Shultz, 817 F.2d

1212, 1213 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Li Hing of Hong

Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1986); Rivera de

Gomez v. Kissinger, 534 F.2d 518, 518 (2d Cir. 1976) (per

curiam); Romero v. Consulate of the United States, Barranquilla, Colombia, 860 F. Supp. 319, 322-24 (E.D. Va. 1994);

Kummer v. Schultz, 578 F. Supp. 341, 342 (N.D. Tex. 1984);

Licea-Gomez v. Pilliod, 193 F. Supp. 577, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1960).

In Castaneda-Gonzalez, we dealt with the subject tersely, in a

footnote, because the law was so settled: a consular officer,

we wrote, could refuse to issue a visa to an alien "without fear

of reversal since visa decisions are nonreviewable." 564 F.2d

at 428 n.25.

In terms of APA s 702(1), the doctrine of consular nonreviewability--the origin of which predates passage of the

APA--thus represents one of the "limitations on judicial

review" unaffected by s 702's opening clause granting a right

of review to persons suffering "legal wrong" from agency

action.10 As the report of the Administrative Conference on

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New York. The Second Circuit, holding the denial nonreviewable,

noted that the "[u]njustifiable refusal to vise a passport may be

ground for diplomatic complaint by the nation whose subject has

been discriminated against [but is] beyond the jurisdiction of the

court." See id. at 290 (citing 3 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of

International Law 995-97 (1906)).

10 The same result would follow if "legal wrong" in s 702 were

interpreted, as the Attorney General's Manual suggested in 1947, to

mean "such wrong as ... the courts have recognized as constituting

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s 702(1) put it, this is an area "in which legislative action

[and] traditional practice indicate that courts are unqualified

or that issues are inappropriate for judicial determination."11

Or from the principles just discussed we may infer that, in

the words of APA s 701(a)(1), the immigration laws "preclude

judicial review" of the consular visa decisions. The inference

is, we believe, unmistakable in light of the severe limitation of

remedies afforded aliens who--unlike Saavedra--are physically present at the United States border when they are

denied entry. Again, some history needs to be recounted.

Until the Supreme Court's decision in Brownell v. We

Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956), aliens detained by immigration

officials at ports of entry had but one legal recourse--habeas

corpus. See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953); Ekiu v.

United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892). The right to seek

__________

ground for judicial review." United States Department of Justice,

Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act

96 (1947). Hence, in certain areas--and visa determinations are

one of them--judicial non-intervention is the norm and the presumption of review "runs aground." Department of the Navy v.

Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988); Peoples v. United States Dep't of

Agric., 427 F.2d 561, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

11 As to s 701(a)(2)--"agency action committed to agency discretion by law"--the Supreme Court has not as yet adopted Justice

Scalia's view, expressed in his dissenting opinion in Webster v. Doe,

486 U.S. 592, 608-10 (1988), that s 701(a)(2) was meant to incorporate the common law of judicial review "--a body of jurisprudence

that had marked out, with more or less precision, certain issues and

certain areas that were beyond the range of judicial review." Id. at

608. Rather, in Webster v. Doe, id. at 599-600, as in Heckler v.

Chaney, 470 U.S. 820 (1985), the Court interpreted s 701(a)(1) to

preclude judicial review when statutes are written so broadly that

"there is no law to apply" (Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.

v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)). In Abourezk v. Reagan, 785

F.2d 1043, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided Court,

484 U.S. 1 (1987), this court held that "the Immigration Act

emphatically did not commit the decision to exclude an alien to

standardless agency discretion...."

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habeas relief arose as a consequence of the alien's being in

custody; it did not rest on any right to entry. In We Shung,

the Court considered whether, in addition to habeas corpus,

an alien could challenge an exclusion order under the APA.

The Court held that the 1952 INA, unlike the prior Immigration Act of 1917, did not limit detained aliens to habeas

corpus. See We Shung, 352 U.S. at 184-86. Citing the

legislative history of the 1952 Act, the Court concluded that

Congress had intended the APA to apply both to exclusion

and to deportation proceedings. See id. at 186; see also H.R.

Rep. No. 82-2096, at 127 (1952). The Court limited its ruling

to aliens present in the United States, stating: "We do not

suggest, of course, that an alien who has never presented

himself at the borders of this country may avail himself of the

declaratory judgment action by bringing the action from

abroad." 352 U.S. at 184 n.3.

In 1961, Congress overruled We Shung, amending the INA

to make clear that habeas corpus was the only method for

judicial review of exclusion orders. The House Report explained:

For three-quarters of a century, prior to the decision in

the Shung case, habeas corpus was the sole and exclusive

method for testing in court an administrative determination that an alien was not entitled to enter the United

States....

* * *

... Such a restriction to habeas corpus does not deprive

the alien of any constitutional rights. It is well settled

that aliens seeking admission to the United States cannot

demand that their applications for entry be determined

in a particular manner or by use of a particular type of

proceedings. For those aliens, the procedure fixed by

Congress is deemed to be due process of law. (Knauff v.

Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)).

H.R. Rep. No. 87-1086, at 31-32 (1961). Under the INA

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sion has been made heretofore or hereafter under the provisions of [this Act] may obtain judicial review of such order by

habeas corpus proceedings and not otherwise." Pub. L. No.

87-301, s 5(b), 75 Stat. 651 (1961); 8 U.S.C. s 1105a(b).

By restoring habeas corpus as the sole remedy, Congress

ensured that only aliens in custody could challenge exclusion

orders, a legislative decision implicitly precluding review to

aliens located abroad, such as Saavedra. See H.R. Rep. No.

87-1086, supra, at 33. The House Report pointed out that

"habeas corpus actions are necessarily determined in the

locality where the alien is, where he has been excluded, and

where he is 'knocking at the door.' " Id. The amendments

reflect Congress's sense that habeas provided "a full, complete, and adequate method for judicial review of an exclusion

order." Id. at 32-33. To allow APA review would "give

recognition to a fallacious doctrine that an alien has a 'right'

to enter this country which he may litigate in the courts of

the United States against the United States as a defendant."

Id. at 33. Moreover, the amended statute provided that "an

order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by a

court if the alien has not exhausted [his] administrative

remedies ... or if he has departed from the United States."

Id. at 3, 28 (emphasis added).

It is not plausible then, that in restricting review of exclusion orders to habeas corpus, Congress intended to allow

aliens residing abroad to have greater remedies than those

detained by immigration officials at United States ports of

entry. To put the matter in terms of APA s 701(a)(1), we

may infer that the immigration laws preclude judicial review

of consular visa decisions. There was no reason for Congress

to say as much expressly. Given the historical background

against which it has legislated over the years, including even

the congressionally-overruled We Shung decision, 352 U.S. at

184 n.3, Congress could safely assume that aliens residing

abroad were barred from challenging consular visa decisions

in federal court unless legislation specifically permitted such

actions. The presumption, in other words, is the opposite of

what the APA normally supposes. In this respect the case is

similar to Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527

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(1988). See Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agric., 427 F.2d

561, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1969). When it comes to matters touching

on national security or foreign affairs--and visa determinations are such matters--the presumption of review "runs

aground." 484 U.S. at 527. This much follows from the

Court's instruction that APA review may be foreclosed by

virtue of "the collective import of legislative and judicial

history behind a particular statute ... [or] by inferences of

intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole." Block v.

Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984), relied

upon in Egan (484 U.S. at 530). It follows as well from the

Court's recurring statements, of which United States ex rel.

Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. at 543, is an example, that

there may be no judicial review of the decisions to exclude

aliens unless Congress has "expressly authorized" this.

For many of the reasons just given and for another about

to be discussed, the government maintains that federal courts

have no jurisdiction over actions such as Saavedra's. We

agree, of course, that in light of Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.

99, 105, 107 (1977), APA s 702 cannot be considered a jurisdictional grant and that Saavedra must therefore rest on the

general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. s 1331. But this

general jurisdictional provision, the government tells us, is

subject to preclusion-of-review legislation and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, s 306(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009,

546, is such legislation. There Congress further restricted

judicial review of exclusion orders, now called removal orders,

in actions brought by aliens present in the United States. As

matters now stand, federal courts have no jurisdiction "to

review any final order of removal against an alien who is

removable by reason of having committed [certain] criminal

offense[s]"--including trafficking in controlled substances. 8

U.S.C. s 1252(a)(2)(c); cf. Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1192

(7th Cir. 1997). The IIRIRA also amended the immigration

law provision giving general jurisdiction to the district courts.

The amended provision now reads: the "district courts of the

United States shall have jurisdiction of all causes, civil and

criminal, brought by the United States that arise under the

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provisions of this subchapter," 8 U.S.C. s 1329, thus making

clear that district court jurisdiction founded on the immigration statute is confined to actions brought by the government.

See Reno v. American-Arab Comm., 119 S. Ct. at 940 n.4.

The "provisions of this subchapter," to which s 1329 refers,

include the provisions dealing with consular visa decisions.

Read in light of the long history of judicial noninterference

with the judgments of consular officers regarding visas, one

might characterize IIRIRA s 1329 as a restriction on district

court jurisdiction to review claims such as those set forth in

Saavedra's complaint, a restriction superseding general federal question jurisdiction. Or one might view this recent legislative history as reinforcing the judgment, to which we subscribe, that the immigration laws preclude judicial review of

consular visa decisions and that the doctrine of consular

nonreviewability remains intact, until Congress provides otherwise. Both views amount to the same thing and lead to the

same conclusion--namely, that Saavedra's claims cannot be

heard.

C

All that remains of this aspect of the case is Saavedra's

argument that our decision in Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d

1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 484

U.S. 1 (1987), forecloses any contention that consular visa

decisions are immune from judicial review. We think Saavedra reads more into the Abourezk opinion than the court

intended.

Each plaintiff in the three consolidated actions on appeal in

Abourezk was an American citizen. On constitutional and

statutory grounds, they contested the denial of visas to

foreigners they had invited to come to the United States and

give speeches. 785 F.2d at 1048-49. In that respect the case

was akin to, but different from, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408

U.S. 753 (1972). Different because in Mandel, professors in

this country, claiming a First Amendment right to hear a

Belgian journalist talk in the United States, challenged not

the consular officer's denial of the journalist's request for a

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visa, but the Attorney General's refusal to waive his ineligibility for a visa (he was a Marxist).12 See id. at 756-59. The

Supreme Court held in Mandel that so long as the Attorney

General gave a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason," as

he did, the courts will not test the decision by balancing the

justification against the supposed First Amendment interests

of those who wished to converse with the alien face-to-face.

Id. at 770.

Citing Mandel, the court in Abourezk rejected the State

Department's contention that the district court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction. Judicial review was proper, the court

held, when United States sponsors of a foreign individual

claim that the State Department's denial of a visa to an alien

violated their constitutional rights. See id. at 1050. As a

decision of a panel, Abourezk cannot be treated as an overruling of Castaneda-Gonzalez, 564 F.2d at 428 n.25,13 and it

cannot be read as expressing disagreement with other decisions recognizing the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.

The Abourezk court went out of its way to distinguish those

decisions, and it did so on grounds that are against Saavedra.

Thus, the Abourezk court did not take issue with the "longstanding judicial practice of refusing to review [visa denial]

claims like those raised here" at the behest of a disappointed

alien. 785 F.2d at 1051 n.6 (citations omitted). Instead, the

court found this judicial practice inapplicable to the cases

before it, because they involved "claims by United States

citizens rather than by aliens ... and statutory claims that

are accompanied by constitutional ones." Id.14

__________

12 The INA authorizes the Attorney General to grant a waiver of

ineligibility upon recommendation of the Secretary of State or of

the consular officer that the alien be admitted temporarily despite

his inadmissibility. See 8 U.S.C. s 1182(d)(3).

13 One panel cannot overrule another panel. See LaShawn v.

Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

14 We take note of Judge Bork's point that plaintiffs' statutory

claims had to be reviewed in order for the court to reach their

constitutional claims. See id. at 1062 n.1 (Bork, J., dissenting).

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Whatever one might think of these distinctions, they serve

to undermine Saavedra's position. Unlike Abourezk, Saavedra's American sponsors--Musicanga, Inc. and Wichtendahl--asserted no constitutional claims. Furthermore, in our

view, neither Musicanga, Inc., nor its officer Wichtendahl,

have standing to challenge the denial or the revocation of

Saavedra's visa. With respect to purely statutory claims,

courts have made no distinction between aliens seeking review of adverse consular decisions and the United States

citizens sponsoring their admission; neither is entitled to

judicial review. See Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc., 800 F.2d at

970. Saavedra's American sponsors are attempting to assert

rights not afforded to them by the INA. The INA permitted

them to file a petition with the Attorney General to have

Saavedra classified as a managerial employee so that he

might qualify for an L-1 visa. See 8 U.S.C. s 1154(a)(1)(D).

When their petition was granted and Saavedra received that

classification, their cognizable interest terminated. Because

their interest has already been satisfied, the citizen sponsors

have not been aggrieved "within the meaning of the relevant

statute" and have no right of review under the APA even if

APA review were available. National Credit Union Admin.

v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct. 927, 933 (1998); 5

U.S.C. s 702.

Thus, Saavedra cannot by any stretch bring himself within

the narrow holding of Abourezk. Any doubts on this score

are laid to rest by City of New York v. Baker, 878 F.2d 507

(D.C. Cir. 1989), an appeal from the judgment of the district

court rendered on remand from Abourezk. Citing

Castaneda-Gonzalez, the court held that neither it nor the

district court has the "power to serve as a proxy consular

officer": "This circuit has recognized, as has every circuit to

consider the issue, that the courts are without authority to

displace the consular function in the issuance of visas." 878

F.2d at 512.15

__________

15 Given the fact that Abourezk was the "law of the case," the

court in Baker engaged in no discussion regarding preclusion of

judicial review. The statement we quote dealt with the question of

remedy, but is important nonetheless in light of the court's citation,

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In addition, Abourezk rested in large measure on the

provision of the INA-8 U.S.C. s 1329 (1982)--then giving

federal district courts jurisdiction over "all causes, civil and

criminal, arising under any of the provisions" of the immigration statutes. See 785 F.2d at 1049-50. In light of s 1329,

the Abourezk court determined that APA s 701(a)(1) did not

apply: "the Immigration Act, far from precluding review,

affirmatively provides for it." 785 F.2d at 1051. No such

statement can be made today. As we have discussed (pp. 15-

16 supra), the amendment to s 1329 now makes clear that

district courts do not have general jurisdiction over claims

arising under the immigration laws and that their jurisdiction

extends only to actions brought by the government.

III

The remaining portion of Saavedra's complaint sought an

injunction compelling the State Department to act on Saavedra's request for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8

U.S.C. s 1182(d)(3). Though the State Department has since

denied the waiver request, Saavedra maintains that the claim

is not moot because "voluntary cessation of challenged conduct" does not render the controversy ended. Brief for

Appellants at 42, citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345

U.S. 629, 632 (1953). Saavedra now seeks a declaration that

the government must respond in a timely fashion to waiver

requests that he is likely to file in the future. The State

Department's one-time delay in acting on Saavedra's request

does not satisfy this court that such relief is necessary.

Because Saavedra has not shown a "cognizable danger of

recurrent violation," we decline to issue the declaration he

requests. Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S.

753, 765 n.3 (1994) (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co.,

345 U.S. at 633).

Affirmed.

__________

with approval, to this court's opinion in Castaneda-Gonzalez and

the opinions of other courts sustaining the doctrine of consular

nonreviewability.

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