Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01288/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01288-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION -1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JON R. CRAWLEY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

M. KRAMER, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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CASE NO. 2:07-cv-01288-RSL-JLW 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

I. SUMMARY 

Petitioner Jon Crawley is currently incarcerated at the Folsom State Prison in Represa, 

California. He pled guilty to one count of first degree murder in Riverside County Superior 

Court on April 14, 1984, and was sentenced to a term of twenty-five-years-to-life, with a 

possibility of parole, and a consecutive term of five years for two counts of robbery. Having 

exhausted his remedies in the courts of California, petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus 

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Specifically, he challenges his 2006 denial of parole by the 

Board of Parole Hearings of the State of California (the “Board”).1 (See Docket 1.) 

 1 The Board of Parole Hearings replaced the Board of Prison Terms, which was abolished on July 1, 

2005. See California Penal Code § 5075(a). 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION -2 

Petitioner had been in custody for twenty-five years at the time of his 2006 hearing 

and approximately twenty-nine years as of this writing. 

The Court, having thoroughly reviewed the record and the briefing of the parties, finds 

that petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested, and recommends the Court deny the 

petition and dismiss this action with prejudice. 

II. BACKGROUND 

The 2005 Board’s report, upon which the 2006 Board relied, summarizes the facts of 

the crime as follows: 

On December 28, 1980, at approximately 5:00 p.m. the 

Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputies responded to an avocado 

grove near Temecula, California to investigate a reported 

robbery/homicide. Upon arrival they were informed that Jose, 

Abell and Guadalupe Salgado were working at the edge of the 

avocado grove when a Pinto passed by them and the occupants 

waved. Shortly after the car passed again from the other 

direction and then stopped 50 to 60 feet away. The occupants 

got out carrying rifles and motioned for them to lie on the 

ground. Abell and Jose lay down but Guadalupe turned and ran 

up a hill. He ran about ten yards and both suspects pointed their 

rifles at him and shot toward him. He fell to the ground, made 

two noises, and lay still. As the shots were fired Jose got up 

and started to run but Abell told him to stop as he would be shot 

also. After the shots were filed the suspect later identified as 

Crawley went to where Guadalupe lay, took out his wallet, 

removed the money, and then threw it to the ground. The other 

suspect, later identified as Linn, took what money Abell and 

Jose had in their wallets and their watches. The suspects then 

motioned for them to leave the area. Jose and Abell then ran 

into the avocado grove and hid until they saw the ranch 

foreman. They then found Guadalupe but could not detect a 

pulse. The ranch foreman had given a description of the two 

men in the Pinto she had observed in the area earlier. 

Subsequent investigation centered on suspects Crawley and 

Linn. During the interview of family members and friends 

investigators found that Crawley and Linn had bragged earlier 

 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION -3 

that they had previously robbed illegal aliens and stole avocados 

from the area for resale. They indicated they were not told in so 

many words but figured out from Crawley and Linn’s nervous 

actions and statements that they had been involved in the 

murder/robbery. And noted in the probation officer’s report is 

the inclusion of information from Crawley’s jail file specifically 

cited as the District Attorney’s file which contains transcribed 

interviews of many inmates. Jim Crawley confessed [to] the 

crime and expressed a lack of remorse. 

(Dkt. 1, Ex. B at 10-11.) 

 During the 2006 hearing, petitioner agreed with the above facts, with two exceptions -- 

he maintains that he did not rob the dying victim or brag to anyone about the crime. (See id.

at 11-18 and 57-58.) In support of his first contention, petitioner’s attorney during his 

sentencing proceeding and his attorney during his Board hearing argued that petitioner did not 

rob the dying victim as evidenced by the fact that his victim was found with nearly two 

hundred dollars in his wallet after he was shot. (See id. at Ex. B at 57 & 63-64; and Ex. J at 

14.) 

Petitioner pled guilty to one count of first degree murder and two counts of robbery in 

Riverside County Superior Court on April 4, 1984. (See id., Ex. A.) He received an 

indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life to run consecutive to a five-year 

determinate sentence for the robbery and firearm enhancements. (See id. & Ex. J at 21-22.) 

He began serving his life sentence with the possibility of parole in the California Department 

of Corrections on May 17, 1984. (See id., Ex. B at 1.) Petitioner’s minimum eligible parole 

date was set for October 31, 2000. (See id.) Including his time in custody prior to trial, he 

has been incarcerated for more than twenty-nine years for this offense and ten years past his 

minimum eligible parole date. 

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The parole denial, which is the subject of this petition, followed a parole hearing held 

on January 19, 2006. This was petitioner’s third parole application, including his initial 

parole consideration hearing. His previous applications were also denied.2

 After denial of his 

2006 application, petitioner filed habeas corpus petitions in the Riverside County Superior 

Court, and the California Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Those petitions were 

unsuccessful. This federal habeas petition followed. Petitioner contends his 2006 denial by 

the Board violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. Thus, the habeas 

petition before this Court does not attack the propriety of his conviction or sentence, but 

solely challenges the Board’s 2006 decision finding him unsuitable for parole. 

 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND REQUIRED SHOWINGS 

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this 

petition because it was filed after the enactment of AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 326-27 (1997). Because petitioner is in custody of the California Department of 

Corrections pursuant to a state court judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides the exclusive 

vehicle for his habeas petition. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 543 U.S. 991 (2004) (providing that § 2254 is “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas 

petition by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the 

 2 Petitioner has had three subsequent parole hearings since his 2006 parole denial. In 2008, after this 

petition was filed, petitioner had a fourth parole consideration hearing in which the Board denied him a parole 

release date. His habeas corpus petition challenging that decision is currently pending before the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of California in Case No. 2:09-cv-00955-LKK-JFM. Petitioner now 

moves this Court to take judicial notice of the fact that in February 2009 the Board found him suitable for parole; 

Governor Schwarzenegger subsequently reversed the Board’s decision in July 2009. (See Dkt. 22.) In January 

2010 the Board found him unsuitable for parole and gave him a three year denial. (See id.) Because we are 

unable to express a view as to the constitutionality of these subsequent decisions, we decline to take judicial 

notice of the specifics of these decisions by the Board and Governor’s decision. See Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 

846, 850 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, petitioner is free to pursue his due process rights based upon those 

subsequent decisions, see infra at 19. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION -5 

petitioner is not challenging his underlying state court conviction.”). Under AEDPA, a 

habeas petition may not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state 

court unless petitioner demonstrates that the highest state court decision rejecting his petition 

was either “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). 

As a threshold matter, this Court must ascertain whether relevant federal law was 

“clearly established” at the time of the state court’s decision. To make this determination, the 

Court may only consider the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the United States Supreme 

Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). In this context, Ninth Circuit 

precedent remains persuasive but not binding authority. See id. at 412-13; Clark v. Murphy, 

 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Court must then determine whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” See Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the 

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. At all 

 

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times, a federal habeas court must keep in mind that it “may not issue the writ simply because 

[it] concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be 

[objectively] unreasonable.” Id. at 411. It is the petitioner’s burden of establishing that the 

state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 

1996). 

AEDPA also requires federal courts to give considerable deference to state court 

decisions, and state courts’ factual findings are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Federal courts are bound by a state’s interpretation of its own laws. See Murtishaw v. 

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Powell v. Ducharme, 998 F.2d 710, 713 

(9th Cir. 1993)). This deference, however, is accorded only to “reasoned decisions” by the 

state courts. To determine whether the petitioner has met this burden, a federal habeas court 

looks to the last reasoned state court decision because subsequent unexplained orders 

upholding that judgment are presumed to rest upon the same ground. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2007). Where, 

as in this case, the state courts issue summary denials without explaining their reasons, this 

Court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state 

courts’ decisions were contrary or involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court 

holdings. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). 

// 

//

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION -7 

IV. FEDERAL HABEAS CHALLENGES TO STATE PAROLE DENIALS 

A. Due Process Right to be Released on Parole

Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the 

government is prohibited from depriving an inmate of life, liberty or property without the due 

process of law. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. A prisoner’s due process claim must be 

analyzed in two steps: the first asks whether the state has interfered with a constitutionally 

protected liberty or property interest of the prisoner, and the second asks whether the 

procedures accompanying that interference were constitutionally sufficient. Ky. Dep’t of 

Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 

1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Accordingly, our first inquiry is whether petitioner has a constitutionally protected 

liberty interest in parole. The Supreme Court articulated the governing rule in this area in 

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), and Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 

U.S. 369 (1987). See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying 

“the ‘clearly established’ framework of Greenholtz and Allen” to California’s parole scheme). 

The Court in Greenholtz determined that although there is no constitutional right to be 

conditionally released on parole, if a state’s statutory scheme employs mandatory language 

that creates a presumption that parole release will be granted if certain designated findings are 

made, the statute gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7, 

12; Allen, 482 U.S. at 377-78. 

As discussed infra, California statutes and regulations afford a prisoner serving an 

indeterminate life sentence an expectation of parole unless, in the judgment of the parole 

 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION -8 

authority, he “will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” 

Title 15 Cal. Code Regs., § 2402(a). The Ninth Circuit has therefore held that “California’s 

parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.” McQuillion, 

306 F.3d at 902. Similarly, Irons v. Carey held that California Penal Code § 3041 vests all 

“prisoners whose sentences provide for the possibility of parole with a constitutionally 

protected liberty interest in the receipt of a parole release date, a liberty interest that is 

protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause.” 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th 

Cir. 2007). This “liberty interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the 

incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915 (2003). See also Sass, 461 

F.3d at 1127. 

Because the Board’s denial of parole interfered with petitioner’s constitutionallyprotected liberty interest, this Court must proceed to the second step in the procedural due 

process analysis and determine whether the procedures accompanying that interference were 

constitutionally sufficient. “[T]he Supreme Court [has] clearly established that a parole 

board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due process with respect to this interest if the board’s 

decision is not supported by ‘some evidence in the record.’” Irons, 505 F.3d at 851 (citing

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985) (holding the “some evidence” standard 

applies in prison disciplinary proceedings)). The “some evidence” standard requires this 

Court to determine “whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the 

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. Although Hill

involved the accumulation of good time credits rather than release on parole, later cases have 

held that the same constitutional principles apply in the parole context because both situations 

 

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directly affect the duration of the prison term. See Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 

1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (adopting the “some evidence” standard set forth by the Supreme 

Court in Hill in the parole context). Accord, Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 

915; McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. 

“The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require 

courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact,” however. 

Hill, 472 U.S. at 456. Similarly, the “some evidence” standard is not an invitation to examine 

the entire record, independently assess witnesses’ credibility, or re-weigh the evidence. Id. at 

455. Instead, it is there to ensure that an inmate’s loss of parole was not arbitrarily imposed. 

See id. at 454. The Court in Hill added an exclamation point to the limited scope of federal 

habeas review when it upheld the finding of the prison administrators despite the Court’s 

characterization of the supporting evidence as “meager.” See id. at 457. 

B. California’s Statutory and Regulatory Scheme

In order to determine whether “some evidence” supported the Board’s decision with 

respect to petitioner, this Court must consider the California statutes and regulations that 

govern the Board’s decision-making. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. Under California law, the 

Board is authorized to set release dates and grant parole for inmates with indeterminate 

sentences. See Cal. Penal Code § 3040 and 5075, et seq. Section 3041(a) requires the Board 

to meet with each inmate one year before the expiration of his minimum sentence and 

normally set a release date in a manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar 

gravity and magnitude with respect to their threat to the public, as well as comply with 

applicable sentencing rules. Subsection (b) of this section requires that the Board set a release 

 

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date “unless it determines that the gravity of current convicted offense or offenses, or the 

timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration 

of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” Id., § 3041(b). Pursuant 

to the mandate of § 3041(a), the Board must “establish criteria for the setting of parole release 

dates” which take into account the number of victims of the offense as well as other factors in 

mitigation or aggravation of the crime. The Board has therefore promulgated regulations 

setting forth the guidelines it must follow when determining parole suitability. See 15 CCR 

§ 2402, et seq. 

Accordingly, the Board is guided by the following regulations in making a 

determination whether a prisoner is suitable for parole: 

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life 

prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the 

length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable 

for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the 

prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if 

released from prison. 

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information 

available to the panel shall be considered in determining 

suitability for parole. Such information shall include the 

circumstances of the prisoner’s social history; past and present 

mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in 

other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the 

base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before, 

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the 

crime; any conditions of treatment or control, including the use 

of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely be 

released to the community; and any other information which 

bears on the prisoner’s suitability for release. Circumstances 

which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for 

parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of 

unsuitability. 

15 CCR § 2402(a) and (b). 

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 Subsections (c) and (d) also set forth suitability and unsuitability factors to further 

assist the Board in analyzing whether an inmate should be granted parole, although “the 

importance attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a particular case 

is left to the judgment of the panel.” 15 CCR § 2402(c). 

In examining its own statutory and regulatory framework, the California Supreme 

Court in In re Lawrence held that the proper inquiry for a reviewing court is “whether some 

evidence supports the decision of the Board . . . that the inmate constitutes a current threat to 

public safety, and not merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of certain factual 

findings.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1212 (2008). 

With regard to the circumstances of the commitment offense, the court in Lawrence

concluded that: 

 

although the Board . . . may rely upon the aggravated 

circumstances of the commitment offense as a basis for a 

decision denying parole, the aggravated nature of the crime 

does not in and of itself provide some evidence of current 

dangerousness to the public unless the record also establishes 

that something in the prisoner’s pre- or post-incarceration 

history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state, 

indicates that the implications regarding the prisoner’s 

dangerousness that derive from his or her commission of the 

commitment offense remain probative to the statutory 

determination of a continuing threat to public safety. 

 

Id. at 1214. The California State Supreme Court also clarified that a Board’s “focus upon the 

egregiousness of the commitment offense to the exclusion of the other relevant evidence has 

proved in practice to obscure the core statutory emphasis upon current dangerousness. . . .” 

In re Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1254 (2008) (citing Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1213-14.)) 

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In sum, the state’s highest court has determined that the Board’s decision must 

demonstrate “an individualized consideration of the specified criteria, but “[i]t is not the 

existence or nonexistence of suitability or unsuitability factors that forms the crux of the 

parole decision; the significant circumstance is how those factors interrelate to support a 

conclusion of current dangerousness to the public.” Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1204-05, 1212 

(emphasis added). As long as the evidence underlying the Board’s decision has “some indicia 

of reliability,” parole has not been arbitrarily denied. See Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390. Thus, 

while the Board’s discretion in parole release matters is very broad, its decisions must focus 

on public safety and an assessment of a prisoner’s current dangerousness. See Lawrence, 44 

Cal.4th at 1204-06. 

 C. Summary of Governing Principles 

 By virtue of California law, petitioner has a constitutional liberty interest in release on 

parole. The parole authorities may decline to set a parole date only upon a finding that 

petitioner’s release would present an unreasonable present risk of danger to society if he is 

released from prison. Where the parole authorities deny release, based upon an adverse 

finding on that issue, the role of a federal habeas court is narrowly limited. It must deny relief 

if there is “some evidence” in the record to support the parole authority’s finding of present 

dangerousness. That is the determinative issue in this case. 

 V. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS 

 In an exceptionally well-written petition, petitioner contends that the Board violated 

his federal due process rights by finding him unsuitable for parole based solely upon the 

immutable facts of the commitment offense and his prior criminal history. (See Dkt. 1 at 2, 

 

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13 & 20-40.) Specifically, he asserts that there is no nexus between the evidence and whether 

his release would unreasonably endanger public safety, and that the Board failed to 

individually consider all the relevant suitability factors. (See id. at 20-40.) 

Respondent claims that petitioner does not have a constitutionally protected liberty 

interest in being released on parole, that the “some evidence” standard is inapplicable in this 

context, and that even if he does have a protected liberty interest, the Board adequately 

predicated its denial of parole on “some evidence.” (See Dkt. 9 at 4-6 & 8.) Accordingly, 

respondent argues that petitioner’s due process rights were not violated by the Board’s 2006 

decision, and that the Riverside County Superior Court’s Order upholding the Board’s 2006 

parole denial was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. (See id. 

at 8.) Other than the above legal argument, respondent does little to refute petitioner’s claims. 

 VI. ANALYSIS OF RECORD IN THIS CASE 

A. Analysis 

As set forth above, the Board is charged with deciding whether a prisoner is too 

currently dangerous to be found suitable for parole based upon the “circumstances tending to 

show unsuitability” and the “circumstances tending to show suitability.” See 15 CCR 

§ 2402(c)-(d). 

In finding that petitioner was unsuitable for parole at the 2006 hearing, the Board 

relied almost exclusively on the circumstances of the commitment offense, while noting 

almost in passing petitioner’s prior criminal history and unstable social history. And, while a 

petitioner’s commitment offense can constitute a circumstance tending to show unsuitability, 

a denial of parole can only be predicated on the commitment offense when the Board can 

 

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“point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime for which the inmate was 

committed” that demonstrate that the prisoner presents a danger to society at the time of the 

suitability hearing. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1071 (2005). Relevant factors, 

beyond the minimum elements of a crime, include, among others, that “[m]ultiple victims 

were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate incidents,” that “[t]he offense was 

carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human 

suffering, “and “[t]he motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the 

offense.” 15 CCR § 2402(c)(1)(A),(D) & (E). 

In this case, the Board held that the crime was “carried out in an especially cruel and 

callous manner;” that “multiple victims” were involved; that “the motive for the crime was 

trivial in relation to the offense;” and that petitioner admitted to having committed a similar 

robbery prior to the murder. (Dkt. 1, Ex. B at 66-67.) 

The Board’s conclusion is well-supported by the record. As discussed above, 

petitioner and his crime partner planned to rob migrant farm workers because they knew that 

the victims carried large amounts of cash on them and were particularly vulnerable -- they 

worked in remote locations, unarmed, and commonly did not report thefts to the authorities 

because of their immigrant status. In addition to robbing at least two of the victims, petitioner 

killed one of the victims by shooting him in the back as he ran away. All three victims were 

brothers, so two brothers watched their other brother die and were unable to come to his 

assistance. The motive for the crime was to steal money to buy drugs to support the 

petitioner’s drug and alcohol addiction. (See id.) See also 15 CCR § 2402 (c)(1) (A)(B)(D) 

and (E). Petitioner admits that this was not the first time he had robbed migrant farm workers. 

 

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See Dkt. 1, Ex. B at 18-19.) Thus, the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s commitment 

offense and the trivial motive provide “some evidence” to support the Board’s finding that the 

murder was carried out with particular callousness as determined by the Board. 

The second and third unsuitability factors relied upon by the Board in denying 

petitioner a parole release date relate to petitioner’s pre-incarceration history, also immutable 

factors. (See id., Ex. B at 67.) The Board first discussed petitioner’s prior criminal history 

and found that: 

... in terms of a previous record, the inmate does not have a – 

well, he does have an informal juvenile probation, and that was 

in 1976, and that was pursuant to a referral for battery. And 

then as an adult, in 1977 the inmate was arrested for assault 

with a deadly weapon, disposition unknown. And then in 1980 

arrest[ed] for battery. And the inmate received ten days for that. 

(Id. at 67-68.) The applicable guidelines direct the Board to consider all relevant and reliable 

information, which includes a prisoner’s involvement in any criminal misconduct which is 

reliably documented. See 15 CCR § 2402(b). Petitioner candidly reported during the hearing 

that he “got into a fight” with a friend and took his friend’s car when he was seventeen and 

that several years later, when he was still under age for drinking, he “gave some lip, some 

smart aleck talk to the bartender” and ended up in a fight with him. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. B at 30-

31.) Both incidents occurred more than twenty-five years before the 2006 Board hearing, 

when petitioner was young and intoxicated. (See id.) Petitioner also admitted that he had 

robbed illegal migrant workers once prior to committing his life-offense. (See id. at 18-19.) 

Although petitioner is to be commended for his honesty regarding these prior undocumented 

incidents, such information does support the Board’s finding that petitioner had a prior 

criminal history. 

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The Board also cited petitioner’s unstable social history as an unsuitability factor, 

which it defined as his pre-incarceration alcohol and drug abuse. (See id. at 68.) The relevant 

statute defines an “unstable social history” as a “history of unstable or tumultuous 

relationships with others.” See 15 CCR § 2402(c)(3). By contrast, a “stable social history” is 

defined as “reasonably stable relationships with others” and is a factor tending to show parole 

suitability. See id., § 2402(d)(2). While the records supports a finding that petitioner was 

raised in a physically abusive environment by alcoholic parents and that he abused alcohol 

and drugs at an early age, there is no evidence of a history of unstable or tumultuous 

relationships with others. In fact, petitioner has maintained good relationships with his family 

and has a strong support system as evidenced by the Board’s discussion of his “viable” parole 

plans and his 2005 Psychological Assessment. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. B at 68 and Ex. H at 2.) The 

Board’s reliance upon petitioner’s “unstable social history” is therefore inapposite. 

Accordingly, this unsuitability factor does not meet the “some evidence” standard. 

With regard to petitioner’s suitability factors, the Board noted many. Specifically, 

petitioner was commended for: 

being disciplinary free since 1998, and also your extensive work 

in Braille transcribing. You have numerous laudatory chronos 

and also participation at Toastmasters Program, the one hour 

video program that you did, “A Psychological Perspective on 

Re-entry,” the men’s violence seminar, your Alcoholics 

Anonymous participation, and your (indiscernible) on the way 

to happiness, and a certificate of appreciation in the VORG 

program as well as anger management and breaking barriers. 

And you have also done exceptional good work in your 

vocational EDP, food services, as a clerk, rough mail lead man 

construction crew, porter, vocational computer, vocational 

upholstery, butcher shop, storeroom worker, culinary clerk, and 

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again the Braille transcriber. And also you’ve recently passed 

the certification test for mathematical Braille. 

(Dkt. 1, Ex. B at 69.) 

 The Board found that petitioner’s work with Braille had placed him in the category of 

“exceptional inmate.” (Id. at 70.) In addition, petitioner received a favorable psychological 

report (Ex. H), in which Dr. Wagner determined that petitioner “would pose a low risk of 

future violence.” (See id. at 68.) In assessing petitioner’s level of dangerous, Dr. Wagner 

also relied upon petitioner’s 2000 and 2002 Psychological Evaluations, by two different 

psychologists, who both determined that petitioner’s potential for violence in or outside a 

controlled setting was low and that he the “posed very little or no threat to the community if 

he were to be paroled.” (Id., Ex. H at 6.) Dr. Wagner concluded in her 2005 report that 

petitioner’s “ability to perform in a free society is good and his risk for recidivism is low.” 

(Id. at 7.) The Board also found petitioner’s parole plans were “viable and realistic” and that 

he had multiple offers of residence and employment. (See id., Ex. B at 68.) 

 Although the Board praised petitioner’s being disciplinary free for nearly ten years, as 

well as his vocational, educational and self-help programming, it determined that petitioner’s 

commitment offense, prior criminal history, and unstable social history led to a conclusion 

that he remained an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released on parole.3

 (See id.) 

 

 3 The Board does not discuss petitioner’s disciplinary history, appearing to have considered this a factor 

in petitioner’s favor. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. B at 66-73.) In fact, petitioner has received eight 115 Rule Violation 

Reports and eight 128 Counseling Chronos since his incarceration in 1984. (See id., Ex. H at 5.) When 

misconduct is believed to be a violation of law or is not minor in nature, it shall be reported on a CDC Form 115 

(Rev.7/88), Rules Violation Report” and “[w]hen . . . minor misconduct recurs after verbal counseling or if 

documentation of minor misconduct is needed, a description of the misconduct and counseling provided shall be 

documented on a CDC Form 128-A, Custodial Counseling Chrono.” See 15 CCR § 3312(a)(2) & (3). 

Petitioner’s most recent 115 Rule Violation was for fighting in 1991, when he got angry at another inmate who 

ruined his eyeglasses after agreeing to fix them. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. H at 5-6.) His last 128 Counseling Chrono was 

in 1998 for possession of tattoo paraphernalia which he was using to tattoo cups. (See id. at 6.) 

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The Board’s finding is supported by “some evidence,” reflects an individualized consideration 

of the specified criteria, and properly considers petitioner’s rehabilitation efforts. The Board 

clearly set forth its reasoning when it set petitioner’s next hearing out two years: 

[W]e’re keeping you at the two year level primarily because of 

the commitment crime. Your programming behavior, since ’98 

at least, you know, you’re definitely on the right track. I think 

in the working with Braille has put you in another category, the 

category of exceptional inmate. However, we really have to ask 

ourselves the question could this man be paroled next year? 

Looking at this crime, I don’t see a Board doing it. Okay? And 

I’m sure you’re well-versed in the law, so you know that we can 

rely on the commitment crime, but we’re also trying to give you 

realistic expectations and not set you up for, you know, on 

getting out next year or whatever. So you still need to stay here, 

to make sure that those gains are recent, to perhaps get some 

comfort level with the DA as well as the Board, so we can make 

sure your gains are going to be steady and you’re going to keep 

up. And the specific reason for the two year denial, we again, 

the commitment crime. 

(Dkt. 1, Ex. B at 69-70.) The Board subsequently stated that “a longer period of observation 

and evaluation is required before the Board should find that he is suitable for parole. And we 

recommend you remain disciplinary free and also if available continue to participate in any 

self-help and therapy programming that might be available here.” (Id. at 72.) 

 As stated above, it is beyond the authority of a federal habeas court to determine 

whether evidence of suitability outweighs the circumstances of the commitment offense, 

together with any other reliable evidence of unsuitability for parole. The Board has broad 

discretion to determine how suitability and unsuitability factors interrelate to support its 

conclusion of current dangerousness to the public. See Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212. It is 

 

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therefore within the Board’s authority to determine the weight or value of the evidence 

presented. 

 This Court recognizes, however, that the 2006 Board decision relied entirely upon the 

commitment offense and pre-incarceration factors (all immutable factors) in denying 

petitioner a parole release date. As the California courts and the Ninth Circuit have clearly 

held, “[a] continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the 

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused 

by the prison system and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. 

Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has held that a: 

Parole board’s sole . . . reliance on the gravity of the offense 

and conduct prior to imprisonment to justify denial of parole 

can be initially justified as fulfilling the requirements set forth 

by state law. Over time, however, should [petitioner] continue 

to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of 

rehabilitation, denying him a parole release date simply because 

of the nature of [petitioner’s] offense and prior conduct would 

raise serious questions involving his liberty interest. 

Id. at 916. Here, the Board determined that the “gravity” of the commitment offense in 

combination with petitioner’s pre-incarceration conduct as of January 2006 rendered him a 

present danger to society if released. The law in this Circuit still holds that this is a sufficient 

basis for the Board to deem a petitioner unsuitable for parole.4

 See Irons, 505 F.3d at 853. 

Thus, under the minimally stringent “some evidence standard,” petitioner’s prison record 

supports the California courts’ decisions upholding the Board’s decision. 

 4 This Court is aware that Hayward v. Marshall, a case pending for decision before a limited en banc 

panel in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, presents issues sufficiently similar to those in this case 

that it seems likely the en banc decision will have significant implications for the resolution of petitioner’s case. 

512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2008). If Hayward is decided while this 

Report and Recommendation is pending before the presiding U.S. District Judge, he will be able to take that 

decision into account in ruling upon this case. 

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JOHN L. WEINBERG 

United States Magistrate Judge 

 VII. CONCLUSION 

Given the totality of the Board’s findings, there is “some evidence” in the record that 

petitioner’s release date as of the Board’s 2006 decision would have posed an unreasonable 

risk to public safety. The California courts’ orders upholding the Board’s decision were 

therefore not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or 

based on an unreasonable determination of facts. Because the Board and the state courts’ 

ultimate decisions were supported by “some evidence,” there is no need to reach respondent’s 

argument that another standard applies. Accordingly, I recommend the Court find that 

petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated, deny the petition, deny petitioner’s request 

for judicial notice, and dismiss this action with prejudice. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with this Report and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with this Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.” Any response to 

the objections shall be filed and served within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

might waive the right to appeal this Court’s Order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th 

Cir. 1991). A proposed order accompanies this Report and Recommendation. 

DATED this 24th day of March, 2010. 

A 

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