Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-01463/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-01463-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

T.M., a minor, by and through her

guardian LATANYA BENSON; and LATANYA

BENSON, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, ANGIE SHARBAUGH and DOES 1-

20,

Defendants.

____________________________________/

No. C 09-01463 CW

ORDER GRANTING, IN

PART, DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING MOTION TO

STRIKE

INTRODUCTION

Defendants San Francisco Unified School District and Angie

Sharbaugh, a Content Specialist employed by the District, move to

dismiss some of Plaintiffs’ claims and to strike portions of

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (SAC). Plaintiffs oppose this

motion. The motion was taken under submission and decided on the

papers. Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties,

the Court GRANTS, in part, Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denies

the motion to strike.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from the placement of T.M, a minor who has

been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and

hearing loss, in a special day class (SDC) offered by the District. 

Plaintiffs are T.M. and Latanya Benson, T.M.’s aunt and legal

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 1 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

guardian. In the First Amended Complaint (FAC) the District was

the only named Defendant and Plaintiffs alleged claims based on

violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1990; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701; and the Equal Protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment by way of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District

moved to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act and § 1983 Equal Protection

claims. At the July 16, 2009 hearing on the District’s motion, the

Court indicated that it would grant Defendant’s motion with leave

to amend and that Plaintiffs should file an amended complaint

within two weeks from the date the Court issued its written order. 

However, on July 30, 2009, due to a misunderstanding, Plaintiffs

filed their SAC without waiting for the guidance of the Court’s

written order. On September 1, 2009, the Court issued a written

order dismissing the Rehabilitation Act claim because the FAC did

not allege that T.M. was discriminated against based upon her

disabilities and dismissed the § 1983 Equal Protection claim

because the District was immunized from suit for damages by the

Eleventh Amendment. The Court granted leave to amend for

Plaintiffs to allege discrimination based on T.M.’s disabilities

and to bring a § 1983 Equal Protection claim against the District

for injunctive relief and against an individual for monetary

relief. 

In Plaintiffs’ SAC, they sue the District and Sharbaugh in her

individual and official capacities and re-allege many of the facts

they asserted in their FAC. The following are allegations that are

asserted for the first time in the SAC. On the third day of the

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 2 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Angie Sharbaugh

testified on behalf of the District and stated that “Defendants’

decision to place T.M. at the El Dorado SDC was in part based on

the fact that T.M. is African-American and ‘looks like’ the other

children in that classroom . . . that 90% of all of the children

that Defendants place in segregated SDC classes are minorities and

that it is ‘the norm’ that students of color are placed in special

day class.” SAC at ¶ 12. The District’s actions were intentional

and motivated, at least in part, by racial animus towards

Plaintiffs. SAC at ¶ 31. Defendant Sharbaugh “made her

determination regarding a special education program based in part

on T.M.’s race as opposed to her unique educational needs; and

intentionally placed T.M in a racially segregated special day class

so that she could be with other students that ‘look like’ her,

instead of allowing her to integrate with majority children.” SAC

at ¶ 53. As a result of Defendant Sharbaugh’s action or inaction,

in her individual capacity, T.M was denied the benefits of a free

appropriate public education (FAPE) to which she was entitled under

the IDEA. SAC at ¶ 54. “By virtue of her position in which she

was an employee of the District, Defendant Sharbaugh knew or should

have known that her actions in making her determination regarding a

special education program based on T.M.’s race as opposed to her

educational needs denied Plaintiff the benefits of a FAPE to which

T.M. was entitled under the IDEA.” SAC at ¶ 56. 

Based upon these allegations, in addition to the IDEA claims

alleged in the FAC, Plaintiffs assert against both Defendants the

following claims: violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 3 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

1964; violation of California Government Code § 11135; violation of

California Civil Code § 51, the Unruh Civil Rights Act; racial

discrimination in violation of California Education Code § 220;

and, by Plaintiff T.M. only against Defendant Sharbaugh as an

individual, a § 1983 claim for violation of her Fourteenth

Amendment Equal Protection rights. Plaintiffs do not re-assert the

Rehabilitation Act claim and, in their opposition, concede they

cannot bring IDEA claims against Sharbaugh. Plaintiffs seek

injunctive relief, compensatory damages and punitive damages. 

Defendants move to dismiss all claims, with the exception of the

IDEA claims against the District, and move to strike certain

paragraphs in the SAC.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

 A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate

only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of

a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007). In considering

whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, the court

will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan,

792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally

required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 4 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

would be futile, the court examines whether the complaint could be

amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal "without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint." 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97.

II. Motion to Strike Under Rule 12(f)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the Court

may strike from a pleading “any insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.” The

purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid spending time and money

litigating spurious issues. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d

1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517

(1994). 

DISCUSSION

I. Benson’s Standing to Bring Non-IDEA Claims on Her Own Behalf

In every federal case, the court must make a threshold

determination of standing. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498

(1975). "The question of standing 'involves both constitutional

limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential

limitations on its exercise.'" Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162

(1997) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498). To satisfy the case or

controversy requirement of Article III, which is the "irreducible

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 5 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

constitutional minimum" of standing, a plaintiff must have suffered

(1) an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the actions

of the defendant, (3) which will likely be redressed by a favorable

court decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560-61 (1992). An "injury in fact" is more than an injury to a

cognizable interest; to satisfy this requirement, the injury must

be concrete and particularized. Id. According to the Lujan court,

"particularized" means that the injury must have affected the

plaintiff "in a personal and individual way." Id. at 560 n.1. 

 In addition to the immutable, constitutional requirements of

Article III, "the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of

prudential principles that bear on the question of standing." 

Valley Forge v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982). 

Among these prudential limits is the doctrine that a plaintiff's

grievance must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected

or regulated by the statute invoked in the suit. Allen v. Wright,

468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75. 

Another prudential limit is the principle that the plaintiff

"generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and

cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of

third parties." Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. Unlike the Article III

requirements, however, the prudential limitations can be modified

or abrogated by Congress. Id. at 501.

Defendants argue that Benson has standing to bring only the

IDEA claims on her own behalf because the allegations in the

complaint assert injuries to T.M., not to Benson. Citing Winkelman

v. Parma City School Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007), Benson contends

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 6 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

that she is a victim of Defendants’ illegal practices as well as

T.M. and that, unlike non-minority parents, she is forced either to

pay for a private education for T.M. or to allow T.M. to be placed

in a segregated class. 

Winkelman provides that the IDEA grants parents independent,

enforceable rights in federal court. Id. at 526, 535. The Court

noted that there are two means of cost recovery in the IDEA:

reimbursement to parents for the cost of private school enrollment

in the event the court finds the agency has not made a FAPE

available to the child; and an award of attorneys’ fees. Id. at

526. However, Winkelman addressed parents’ standing to sue only

under the IDEA and cannot be construed to confer standing on

parents to sue in their own right on any other cause of action.

Plaintiffs’ SAC does not assert allegations of injury to

Benson. Therefore, Benson lacks standing to assert the non-IDEA

claims on her own behalf. All non-IDEA claims brought by Benson

are dismissed. However, because Plaintiffs filed their SAC before

the Court issued its written order, Benson is granted leave to

amend to assert allegations that she herself was harmed by

Defendants' illegal conduct, as specified below. 

II. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment provides, in relevant part, that the

"judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to

extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States . . . ." U.S. Const., Amend. XI. 

States are protected by the Eleventh Amendment from suits by

citizens in federal court unless the defendant has waived immunity

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 7 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

or Congress has exercised its Fourteenth Amendment power to

override immunity. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54

(1996); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66

(1989). Eleventh Amendment protection extends to suits brought

against state agencies, Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.

Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993), and to suits for

damages brought against state officials acting in their official

capacity, Will, 491 U.S. at 71. However, the Eleventh Amendment

does not bar a request for prospective injunctive relief, based on

federal law, against a state official acting in his or her official

capacity. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974). The

Eleventh Amendment does not bar individual capacity suits. 

Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1988).

Plaintiffs concede that they can bring federal claims against

the District only for prospective injunctive relief and, in their

opposition, acknowledge that their state claims for monetary relief

against the District are barred also. They ask that these claims

be dismissed without prejudice to re-filing in state court. 

However, Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent their state claims

seek injunctive relief against the District, they are not barred,

and that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims for damages

against Sharbaugh acting in her individual capacity. 

In Pennhurst State Schl. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

105-06 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment

affords protection from suit in federal court to states and state

officials on state claims whether damages or prospective injunctive

relief is requested. See also, Air Transport Ass'n of America v.

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 8 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

Public Utilities Com'n of State of Cal., 833 F.2d 200, 204 (9th

Cir. 1987) (same). Therefore, all state claims against the

District and Sharbaugh in her official capacity are dismissed

without prejudice to re-filing in state court.

Defendants argue that Sharbaugh is immune from suit in her

individual capacity because the allegations in the SAC indicate

that, in regard to the events at issue, she was acting in her

official capacity. In their § 1983 Equal Protection claim,

Plaintiffs allege that Sharbaugh, as an individual, decided on a

special education program based on T.M.'s race and intentionally

placed T.M. in a racially segregated special day class so that she

could be with students that look like her. SAC at ¶¶ 53-54. In

addition, the caption of the SAC indicates that Sharbaugh is being

sued individually as well as in her official capacity. 

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint are

taken to be true. Thus, for purposes of this motion, Plaintiffs'

allegation that Sharbaugh was acting in her individual capacity

when she discriminated against T.M. will be taken as true. 

Although Plaintiffs do not repeat, in their claims under Title VI,

California Government Code § 11135, California Education Code § 220

and the Unruh Act, that Sharbaugh, as well as the District,

discriminated against T.M., it can be inferred that their

allegations apply to these causes of action as well. Thus, the

Eleventh Amendment does not immunize Sharbaugh from suit on these

claims.

However, the Title VI claim and the California Government Code

§ 11135 claim must be dismissed for different reasons. As to the

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 9 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

Title VI claim, several district courts in this circuit have held

that, because Title VI is directed at programs that receive federal

assistance, there is no right of action against individual

employees or agents of those entities. See Clemes v. Del Norte

County Unified Sch. Dist., 1994 WL 317546, *4-5 (N.D. Cal.);

Johnson v. Telew, 2007 WL 414346, *3 (D. Or.) (the text of Title VI

precludes liability against those who do not received federal

funding, including individuals); Atkins v. The Bremerton Sch.

Dist., 2005 WL 1356261, *2 (W.D. Wash.). The Court finds this

reasoning persuasive and holds there is no right of action against

individuals under Title VI. Therefore, the Title VI claim against

Sharbaugh in her individual capacity is dismissed. In regard to

the Government Code § 11135 claim, Plaintiffs concede that they

have failed to exhaust state administrative remedies and cannot

bring this claim for damages against Sharbaugh individually. Thus,

the Government Code § 11135 claim is dismissed in its entirety. 

In sum, the motion to dismiss the state claims against the

District and against Sharbaugh in her official capacity is granted

without leave to amend. The Government Code § 11135 and Title VI

claims against Sharbaugh individually are dismissed without leave

to amend. The Education Code § 220 and Unruh Act claims against

Sharbaugh individually are not dismissed.

III. Title VI Claim 

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et

seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis of race by any program

or activity that receives federal financial assistance. 

Discriminatory intent is required to obtain compensatory relief,

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 10 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

but it is not required for declaratory and injunctive relief. 

Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Com’n of City of New York, 463 U.S.

582, 584 (1983).

Plaintiffs allege a Title VI claim for injunctive and monetary

relief against both Defendants. Based on the above Eleventh

Amendment immunity analysis, Plaintiffs may assert a Title VI claim

only for prospective injunctive relief against the District and

Sharbaugh in her official capacity. Defendants claim that

Plaintiffs’ allegations do not state a claim against the District

for prospective injunctive relief. 

Under the Title VI caption in their SAC, Plaintiffs allege

that they are minorities and that the District intentionally made

its determination regarding T.M.’s special education placement

based on her race as opposed to her educational needs, thus

depriving her of equal access to the public education programs and

activities offered by the District. These allegations are

sufficient to state a Title VI claim against the District and

Sharbaugh in her official capacity. 

Citing Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008),

Defendants argue that these allegations fail to state a claim

because Plaintiffs must assert that T.M. has been treated

differently than other similarly situated person outside her

protected class. However, Shakur addressed a motion for summary

judgment. Id. at 883. On a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff is

required only to put the defendants on notice of the claims against

them. Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to provide notice to

the District as to why it is being sued under Title VI. 

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 11 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

Title VI claim for prospective injunctive relief against the

District and Sharbaugh in her official capacity. The motion is

granted in regard to the Title VI claim for monetary relief.

IV. Section 1983 Equal Protection Claim Against Sharbaugh

First, Defendants argue that Sharbaugh, in her official

capacity, has Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit and she cannot

be sued as an individual because none of the allegations address

actions she took as an individual. Defendants are correct that

Sharbaugh, in her official capacity, is immune from suit for money

damages. However, as discussed above, Plaintiffs allege that

Sharbaugh, acting as an individual, discriminated against T.M. On

a motion to dismiss, where the allegations in the complaint are

taken as true, this is sufficient to state a claim against

Sharbaugh in her individual capacity.

Next, Defendants argue that all the allegations against

Sharbaugh are based upon her testimony at the administrative

hearing and that testimony is privileged under California Civil

Code § 47. Plaintiffs respond that the § 1983 Equal Protection

claim is based upon Sharbaugh’s conduct, not her testimony. 

Paragraph 56 of the SAC alleges that, by virtue of her actions,

Sharbaugh discriminated against T.M. This is sufficient to state a

§ 1983 Equal Protection claim against Sharbaugh based upon her

conduct.

Next, citing Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion to dismiss

the FAC and Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 938 (9th

Cir. 2007) (ruling that § 1983 claim for violations of IDEA

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 12 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1Defendants present no authority for their argument that these

costs are not recoverable because they were not litigated before

the ALJ. 

13

precluded by IDEA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme), Defendants

argue that the § 1983 Equal Protection claim is based impermissibly

upon the IDEA. However, from the allegations in the SAC, it is

clear that the § 1983 Equal Protection claim arises from

discrimination against T.M. based upon her race, which is

prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. These allegations are adequate to state a 

§ 1983 Equal Protection claim. 

Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss T.M.’s § 1983 Equal

Protection claim against Sharbaugh in her individual capacity is

denied.

V. Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike any allegations seeking damages

under the IDEA for pain and suffering. Plaintiffs do not respond

to this argument. As stated above, under the IDEA, parents are

entitled to recover the cost of private school enrollment and

attorneys’ fees. Therefore, all other requests for damages under

the IDEA are stricken.1

Defendants argue that all other requests for damages should be

stricken because all claims have been dismissed. As discussed

above, the claims under the Unruh Act, Education Code § 220 and 

§ 1983 against Sharbaugh as an individual have not been dismissed. 

Therefore, requests for damages under these claims are not

stricken.

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 13 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

Defendants argue that all requests for punitive damages should

be stricken. Plaintiffs state that they are seeking punitive

damages only against Sharbaugh in her individual capacity under the

§ 1983 Equal Protection claim. Punitive damages against an

individual under § 1983 are allowed when the defendant’s conduct is

shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent or when it involves

reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights

of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). 

Plaintiffs allege that Sharbaugh’s conduct was willful,

wanton, malicious and oppressive and justifies the awarding of

punitive damages. Although these allegations are conclusory, on a

motion to dismiss the Court will not strike the request for

punitive damages under § 1983.

Defendants move to dismiss various allegations relating to the

claims they seek to dismiss. This motion is denied.

VI. Leave to Amend

In their opposition, Plaintiffs request leave to amend to seek

injunctive relief against the District on the § 1983 Equal

Protection claim and to add a § 1983 Equal Protection claim by

Benson in her own right. Defendants do not respond to this

request, and it is granted.

Although Plaintiffs have amended their complaint twice, leave

to amend will be granted because, due to a misunderstanding,

Plaintiffs filed their SAC before the Court issued its written

order. As stated above, Plaintiffs also are granted leave to

allege causes of action under Title VI, the Unruh Act, and

California Education Code § 220 on Benson’s behalf, based on claims

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 14 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

of injury to herself. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

granted, in part, and the motion to strike is denied (docket # 22). 

The remaining claims are Count One, by both Plaintiffs against the

District appealing the administrative hearing; Count Two, by both

Plaintiffs against the District based on the IDEA; Count Three,

T.M.’s Title VI claim against the District for prospective

injunctive relief; Count Five, T.M’s claim for violation of the

Unruh Act against Sharbaugh in her individual capacity; Count Six,

T.M’s claim for violation of Education Code § 220 against Sharbaugh

in her individual capacity; and Count Seven, T.M’s § 1983 Equal

Protection claim against Sharbaugh in her individual capacity. 

Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend. They may allege the

following on Benson’s behalf: a § 1983 Equal Protection claim for

damages against Sharbaugh in her individual capacity; a Title VI

claim against the District for prospective injunctive relief, and

claims under the Unruh Act and Education Code § 220 against

Sharbaugh in her individual capacity. Plaintiffs may also seek

injunctive relief against the District under the § 1983 Equal

Protection claim. 

If Plaintiffs wish to file a third amended complaint (TAC),

they must do so within twenty-one days from the date of this Order;

they may only add the allegations indicated in this Order and are

advised to state separately the conduct of each Defendant upon

which each cause of action is premised. If they do not file an

amended complaint within this time period, the case will proceed

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 15 of 16
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 16

based on the surviving claims in the SAC. 

If Plaintiffs file a TAC, Defendants’ answer or motion to

dismiss is due three weeks from the date the TAC is filed. 

Plaintiffs’ opposition is due two weeks thereafter and Defendants’

reply is due one week later. The motion will be submitted on the

papers. If Plaintiffs do not file a TAC, Defendants’ answer to the

SAC is due two weeks from the date of this Order. A case

management conference is scheduled for April 20, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:09-cv-01463-CW Document 32 Filed 01/19/10 Page 16 of 16