Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-03096/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-03096-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL DAVID CATA,

Petitioner,

 v.

SILVIA GARCIA, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 03-3096 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

(Docket no. 24)

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. In response to the court’s order to show cause, respondent has filed an answer and

a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and has lodged supporting

exhibits. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. The case is ready for decision. 

BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal summarized the detailed underlying facts as follows:

Irene S.

Fifty-one-year-old Irene S. used to be a homeless person living at the

shelter in Santa Cruz. Although she moved to Watsonville, she maintained

contacts with some of the people who ran the shelter, as well as some of the

residents of the shelter. On October 25, 1999, Irene returned to Santa Cruz

to settle a ticket she received there. She spent the night with a friend at an

encampment by Granite Construction Company, near the homeless shelter.

Irene left the campsite the next morning and started to walk to the 

homeless shelter. While walking along a pathway towards the shelter she

met appellant. Irene had seen appellant before at the shelter. At that time

appellant had a cast on his leg. Irene and appellant talked for a while and he

offered her a Cobra beer. After about an hour, appellant asked Irene to go

with him to the other side of the campground to drink another beer. Irene

agreed to go along with appellant, however, when they arrived at the other

campground appellant asked Irene to orally copulate him. When she refused

he became angry and called Irene a “bitch,” “whore,” “stupid” and “redskin.” 

When Irene attempted to leave, appellant refused to let her go and pushed

her to the ground.

As Irene lay on the ground, appellant pushed her face into the dirt. He

sat on her back. He turned her over, took off her clothes, and stuffed her

socks into her mouth to try to keep her from screaming. When Irene fought

appellant he threatened to kill her. He tied her hands and feet with the laces

from her shoes. Appellant fondled Irene’s breasts and placed his penis on

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her face, breasts and stomach. Also, he tried to place his penis in her mouth,

but was prevented from so doing by the sock in her mouth. Appellant stuck

his hand in her vagina and ejaculated onto her face and breasts.

Irene passed out several times during the assault. She continued to

struggle, fearing that she would die. Appellant continued striking Irene and

threatened to stick the “Cobra bottle inside [her] vagina and sticks and all

kinds of things.” He said that he would keep her prisoner for three days. 

Irene could not recall how long the assault lasted. Nor could she remember

when appellant left. She passed out for a while. When she regained

consciousness, it was dark and appellant was nowhere to be seen. Irene

tried to untie herself and was partially successful. However, she could not

see to untie her feet. She was not able to accomplish that until the next

morning, after which she put on some of her clothes before she went to the

shelter to look for help.

Irene reported the assault to someone at the shelter. When Officer

Christina Bentley responded to the shelter she found paramedics attending to

Irene. Irene had a brace around her neck and had been crying. Officer

Bentley noticed that Irene was shaking, her fists were in her lap and she was

very nervous. The officer did not notice any odor of alcohol on Irene. Irene

was taken from the shelter by ambulance to the hospital where she

underwent an examination. She complained of a great deal of pain in her

neck, lower back, jaw area, back of her head, and arms. Irene had bruises on

her face and mouth. There were cuts and dried blood on her lips, and her lips

and cheeks were swollen. Also, her arms were bruised and she had trouble

talking because her jaw was very sore. It was difficult for her to open her

mouth to speak.

Christina Gonzales, a nurse with the Santa Cruz Sexual Assault

Response Team, conducted an examination of Irene later that day. Gonzales

noticed that Irene appeared to be in a great deal of pain and moved very

slowly. Due to the extent and severity of Irene’s injuries the examination took

eight hours. Leaves and debris were found in Irene’s hair, dried blood was in

her mouth, and there were numerous bruises over her entire body.

Irene’s injuries included abrasions, lacerations and bruises on her

forehead, nose, lips, eye, neck, cheek, arm, elbow, ankle, knee, buttocks,

back and groin. Also, there were injuries to Irene’s vaginal area consistent

with forced trauma. Gonzales opined that the injuries were probably caused

by non-consensual sex. The injuries to Irene’s mouth were consistent with

her being tied around the mouth. The neck injuries were consistent with

someone trying to choke her.

Using a special fluorescent lamp to examine Irene for sperm and

saliva, Gonzales collected swabs of a dried white crusty material on Irene’s

eye and forehead. These swabs were examined by Department of Justice

criminalists and found to contain semen. DNA from the semen sample

exactly matched appellant’s DNA profile. The chance of this profile occurring

in another individual was 1 in 5.3 to 15 trillion African Americans, 1 in 1.2

trillion to 5.1 trillion Caucasians, and 1 in 26 to 39 trillion Hispanics.

Officer Bentley collected Irene’s boots as evidence and noticed that the

boots were not completely laced up. Irene’s socks had been stretched

beyond their normal size. When Officer Bentley went to the scene of the

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alleged attack she found leaves that matched the leaves in Irene’s hair. In

one spot, the leaves had been spread out and matted into the dirt. Irene’s

underwear and a 40-ounce bottle of King Cobra were recovered from the

spot.

Dr. Weinstein, a psychiatrist at Dominican hospital, treated Irene on

January 22, 2000. She was brought into Dominican in a disorganized mental

state with delusional beliefs about being killed and/or raped. The doctor

believed these thoughts were delusional because Irene was alive and not

being killed. She was uncooperative and was unable to answer a lot of

questions asked of her.

Gary Reaves, a client specialist at County Mental Health, treated Irene

on January 21, 2000. She complained that her primary care doctor was 

cutting people into pieces and that all her bones were broken. Following an

evaluation of Irene, none of her claims were substantiated. Irene left the

emergency room, but instead of returning home, she went back and

proceeded to walk around. Reaves evaluated Irene a second time. Irene told

Reaves that there was a contract out on her life and that she could not return

to the shelter because she had been raped there. A check by Reaves

confirmed there had been a documented recent sexual assault. However,

Irene did not give him any information regarding being raped at the River

Street shelter.

Dr. Teverbaugh of County Mental Health treated Irene on several

occasions. On February 18, 2000, Irene saw him for a mental health status

examination and for a refill of her medications. The doctor found Irene’s

relatedness was good. She spoke spontaneously, was neither depressed nor

excited and was goal-directed. He noted that she had been recently

hospitalized for psychosis and Irene felt that she had been raped recently. 

She stated that she was still in pain from broken ribs and a broken jaw,

although he could find no evidence of this.

On July 27, 2000, when Dr. Teverbaugh saw Irene again, she reported

that she was still hearing voices and having paranoid feelings. She gave the

doctor more details of the rape, stating that it occurred in October and that

she was still receiving medical treatment for kidney and bladder problems,

which she attributed to the rape.

Dr. Teverbaugh saw Irene on August 10, 2000. At this time, Irene

complained of joint pain as well as gynecological problems. She attributed

these problems to the rape she suffered the previous fall. Dr. Teverbaugh

thought that Irene was holding persistent delusions about the rape. He

changed his opinion after reviewing records that showed Irene was examined

at Dominican for sexual assault.

Nancy B.

Forty-nine-year-old Nancy B. was a homeless woman living in Santa

Cruz. She camped near the River Street [s]helter. During July 1997, she was

staying at a camp that everyone called “Camp Crusty.” Appellant approached

her while she was alone listening to the radio. Appellant had a cast on his

foot. Nancy B. had seen appellant around the homeless shelter once or twice

and she knew his name was Mike. Appellant asked her if she wanted to

smoke some marijuana. She agreed and took a puff of appellant’s marijuana

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pipe.

When she tried to hand back the marijuana pipe, appellant grabbed the

back of her hair and slammed her down onto the dirt. Appellant placed his

elbow against her throat. She struggled to breathe and was unable to

scream. While appellant was lying on top of her, he removed her pants and

raped her. 

After the assault, which lasted about ten minutes, appellant got up and

left the camp. Nancy B. was scared and in shock. She felt pain in her chest,

neck, and legs. Pain in her vaginal area lasted a few days. She did not

report the assault to the police at the time because she was afraid that she

had done something to encourage appellant. After the assault, Nancy B. saw

appellant on a few occasions around the shelter. Whenever she saw him she

would turn and walk away. She told people at the soup kitchen about the

assault and warned other women that appellant was dangerous. While

Nancy B. knew Irene, she never told her about the assault by appellant. At

the time of trial, Nancy B. had not seen Irene for over three years and had not

spoken to her for over four years.

After the assault, Nancy B. moved across the river to another

homeless encampment where a friend would be with her. She was too

frightened to be in the other camp. One day when her friend left to buy

cigarettes, appellant appeared unexpectedly at the camp. Nancy B. tried to

get up from the ground where she was sitting, but again appellant grabbed

her hair and slammed her into the ground. She tried to scream and fight

back, but appellant put his knee on her throat, preventing her from moving.

Appellant pulled out his penis and stuck in into her mouth. He said

something about “kissing daddy.” After about 10 to 15 minutes, appellant

ejaculated into Nancy B.’s mouth. Then, he got up and left. The assault left

her with bruises on her throat. Eventually, she reported this assault to a

police officer. Officer Perry took her to the police station and she made a

formal report. She asked Officer Perry to not leave her on the street because

she thought she was going to die. He took her to Dominican Hospital

(Dominican) where she stayed for about two weeks.

Dr. Paul Luther, a psychiatrist at Dominican, treated Nancy B. He

diagnosed Nancy with a schizoaffective disorder and mixed substance abuse. 

He testified that schizoaffective disorder is an illness with both mood and

thought disorders. The mood disorders can be episodes of mania or

depression. In addition, people with this disorder also suffer from

schizophrenic symptoms, such as hearing voices, having delusions, and

having disorganized thought processes. While these episodes may last for

weeks, the individual is functional at other times. Dr. Luther opined that being

homeless and being sexually assaulted could exacerbate the situation. 

Furthermore, people with this disorder are particularly vulnerable and easily

victimized because their judgment is impaired.

Nancy B. made reports of rape during two separate hospitalizations. 

She was hospitalized from July 19 to July 28, 1997. At that time, she

reported that she had been raped about 10 days earlier. During a second

hospitalization from August 20 to September 8, 1997, she told the doctor she

had been raped following her release from the hospital. Dr. Luther testified

that someone with Nancy B.’s mental condition could have trouble correctly

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Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 states in pertinent part; “When any person,

as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely

disabled, a peace officer, . . . may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the

person into custody and place him or her in a facility designated by the county and

approved by the State Department of Mental Health as a facility for 72-hour treatment and

evaluation.” 

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placing a time when things happened because there is “a certain amount of

confusion connected with the episode of their illness.”

On August 16, 1997, Officer Mario Leon of the Santa Cruz Police

Department responded to a call regarding an act of vandalism in Santa Cruz. 

He interviewed Nancy B. as a witness in the case. During the course of the

interview, she mentioned someone named “Mike” had assaulted her two or

three times. The first incident occurred two to three weeks prior to August 16,

1997. The second happened about three days after the first. The last

incident occurred about a week after the second. She reported that the first

assault was at the homeless campsite where Mike pushed her to the ground

and forced her to engage in sexual intercourse with him. During the last

incident, which took place just the night before the interview, Mike held her

down and forced her to orally copulate him. She was unable to give any

details of the second incident.

Officer David Perry recalled taking Nancy B. into custody on a 72-hour

mental health hold pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 51501

(section 5150) on August 19, 1997. She had been walking on some loose

and jagged rocks and talking irrationally when he detained her as being a

danger to herself. This was not the first time that he had detained her under

section 5150. On August 3, 1997, when he first detained Nancy B., she had

been walking in and out of traffic, banging on windows, and making irrational

statements. Officer Perry had other contacts with Nancy B. when she was

not disabled. On February 28, 1997 he arrested her for petty theft of

cigarettes. At that time, she was acting rationally and did not appear mentally

ill. On July 28, 1997, Nancy B. was rational and lucid when Officer Perry met

with her at Dominican. He met with her in order to issue her a citation for

theft of a motor vehicle. She understood the citation process and appeared to

be mentally stable.

Santa Cruz Police Officer Nicholas Richards remembered that on July

19, 1997, he responded to a report of a reckless driver. When he arrived at

the scene he saw Nancy B. sitting inside a car. She was rambling and talking

very rapidly. When he asked her what was going on she said she was dying

of AIDS and was starving to death. Officer Richards placed Nancy B. on a

72-hour mental health hold.

Two weeks later, Officer Michael Harms found Nancy B. wandering

around in traffic. She was half-naked. She made a lot of irrational statements

alleging that everyone was trying to cut off her breasts and face. Officer

Harms took her to Dominican.

On August 19, 1997, Officer Harms had contact with Nancy B. when

he saw her standing on some rocks. She was talking to herself. The officer

took her to Dominican again. Since his beat was around the homeless

shelter, Officer Harms saw Nancy B. frequently. Other than on the two

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occasions when he took her to Dominican, the officer did not think that she

acted differently than the other residents of Santa Cruz. Nancy B. never

mentioned to Officer Harms that she had been raped. He was present when

another officer issued a citation to her. At that time, the officer found her lucid

and able to carry on a rational conversation.

Nancy R.

During trial Nancy R. testified about an incident in 1978. During the

summer, in Yosemite National Park, a man sexually assaulted her. She

worked in a gift shop in the park and the company provided its employees

with housing. Nancy R. lived in a tent cabin. She had seen a man hanging

around the gift store and he came into the store to buy cigarettes and beer.

On May 10, 1978, Nancy R. and some of the other employees were

outside their tent cabins after work. They were talking and relaxing. The

same man approached Nancy R.’s friend and asked if her friend would trade

his beer for a joint of marijuana. Her friend said he did not have another beer

to trade. Nancy R. recognized the man as one of the men the park

employees called “park bums.”

Nancy went into her tent cabin and the man followed her in. Nancy did

not invite the man in and it made her feel very uncomfortable. The man

began to talk about himself and wanted to show her a document that proved

that he was part native American. He asked if Nancy R. lived alone in the

cabin. She did not want the man inside her cabin and said she was going to

make a phone call. The man followed her outside and walked away in the

opposite direction. Nancy R. returned to her cabin.

Nancy R. left her cabin later that evening and returned after midnight. 

She was awakened by the sound of scratching at the door. She thought that

it was bears looking for food. However, the same man appeared at the door

of the cabin and asked Nancy R. to let him in. The man left after she ordered

him to go away.

The man returned to Nancy R.’s cabin a few hours later. He cut a hole

in the screen door of the cabin and entered. He held a knife to her neck and

when she tried to pull away, he put his hand over her mouth and ordered her

to take her shirt off. He touched Nancy R. all over her body. When she tried

to resist he restrained her by holding her down. He prevented her from

screaming by holding his hand over her mouth and threatened to hurt her if

she yelled out. She was very frightened.

The man began to orally copulate Nancy R. He became more

aggressive whenever she tried to resist. She hoped to escape from him by

waiting for a chance when he was more relaxed. Nancy R. warned him that

he could get into a lot of trouble for his conduct, but he replied that he did not

care if he went to jail because he had been to jail before and would probably

end up there again. The man’s response made her feel even more frightened

and anxious. At this time she realized she needed to escape.

Nancy R. noticed the knife the man was holding was a kitchen or

cafeteria knife. She tried to convince the man that she needed to go to the

bathroom. Initially he refused, however, he relented and said that she could

go outside as long as he had hold of her arms. She tried to break away when

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 All exhibits referenced in this order are those lodged by respondent in support of the

answer to the petition, unless otherwise noted.

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she put on her bathrobe. The man restrained her and told her that was a

mistake and made her lie on her back on the bed. He forced Nancy to put her

hand on his penis. By this time it was almost 6:30 a.m. Nancy told the man

that people would be up and would hear him. The man responded that he

was planning to keep her in the cabin all day. When Nancy R. warned him

that he could get into a lot of trouble, the man replied, “Oh, yeah, I can just

see it now, ‘Girl gets raped.’”

When the man relaxed his hold, she ran out of the cabin. She

screamed and yelled for help. People were getting up at this point and a

woman park employee came to Nancy R.’s aid. The man had apparently left

his wallet in the tent cabin and he returned and demanded his wallet, which

he said contained his Native American identity card. The police were notified

and came and arrested the man.

Nancy R. was unable to positively identify appellant as the man who

attacked her. However, on cross-examination, when asked “And the person

in the courtroom you don’t recognize?” She replied, “You know, vaguely, but

it’s been a long time.” However, she did remember that she had learned that

her assailant’s name was Michael “Caita[.]” She described “Caita” as 5 feet

10 inches tall, with sandy color hair that was “shaggy.” He was not cleanshaven. She thought he had a moustache.

In the rebuttal phase of the trial, Nancy R. testified that while she was

working in the gift store, she had seen and talked to the person that assaulted

her. On one occasion, he was purchasing some beer. He told Nancy R. that

he was going to have a party because it was his birthday. He said he was 25

and was feeling old. This conversation occurred sometime after Nancy R.

started working in the store in late April 1978, and before her assault on May

11, 1978.

Respondent's Ex. E (Unpublished Opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate

District, People v. Cata, No. H022414 (Jan. 24, 2003) at 2-12.2

Following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of one count of sexual penetration by

means of force, violence or duress (Cal. Penal Code § 289(a)(1)), two counts of sexual

battery (Cal. Penal Code § 243.4(a)), false imprisonment (Cal. Penal Code § 236), rape by

means of force, violence or duress (Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(2)), and oral copulation by

means of force, violence or duress (Cal. Penal Code § 288a(c)(2)). The jury found true the

allegations that petitioner engaged in tying or binding his victim (Cal. Penal Code 

§ 667.61(e)(6)), and committed specified sexual offenses against more than one victim

(Cal. Penal Code § 667.61(e)(5)). The trial court sentenced petitioner to a total term of fifty

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nine years and eight months-to-life in state prison. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal which, in a

reasoned opinion, affirmed the judgment, but modified it to stay execution of sentence on

two counts pursuant to California Penal Code section 654, which prohibits multiple

punishments for the same act. Petitioner filed a petition for review, which the California

Supreme Court denied. Petitioner did not seek state habeas corpus review.

Petitioner filed the instant petition on July 2, 2003. The court directed respondent to

show cause why the writ should not be granted with respect to the following claims: (1) the

admission of evidence of petitioner’s prior sexual assault violated his constitutional right to

confrontation, (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately object to a statement

made by the victim of the prior assault, (3) admission of evidence of the prior assault and

the trial court’s instruction to the jury on how to consider the evidence violated petitioner’s

constitutional right to due process, and (4) joinder of the counts relating to the two victims

deprived petitioner of a fair trial. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

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differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340;

see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Section 2254(d)(2) applies

to intrinsic review of a state court’s process, or situations in which the petitioner challenges

the state court’s findings based entirely on the state court record. Taylor v. Maddox, 366

F.3d 992, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004). The relevant question under § 2254(d)(2) is whether

an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could reasonably

conclude that the state court findings are supported by the record. Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The state court decision to which 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of

the state court, see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming,

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). 

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted only if the error had a

“‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.’” Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638

(1993)).

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DISCUSSION

A. Admission of Evidence of Petitioner’s Prior Assault on Nancy R. in 1978

During in limine motions, the prosecutor moved to introduce evidence of two prior

sexual assaults by petitioner. Over objection by defense counsel, the trial court ruled that

the evidence was admissible. At trial, the prosecutor introduced evidence of only one of

the prior incidents, the 1978 sexual assault on Nancy R. in Yosemite. The prosecutor

called Nancy R. to testify regarding the assault. Because Nancy R. was unable to

positively identify petitioner as the person that sexually assaulted her, the prosecutor

sought to introduce evidence of petitioner’s Federal Bureau of Investigation rap sheet

(hereinafter federal rap sheet) to link petitioner to the assault. The trial court allowed

admission of the rap sheet. 

On appeal, petitioner raised four challenges relating to the admission of this

evidence: (1) that its admission was unduly prejudicial, and the state evidentiary code

section which allowed for its admission violates due process, (2) that the trial court’s

instruction to the jury on how to consider the evidence violated due process, (3) that use of

the federal rap sheet to link petitioner to the prior assault violated state law and petitioner’s

right to confrontation, and (4) that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay

testimony given by Nancy R. on direct examination. The court of appeal rejected each of

petitioner’s claims.

In the instant petition, petitioner argues that the aforementioned errors violated his

federal constitutional rights to due process, confrontation, and the effective assistance of

counsel. The court discusses each claim in turn, below.

1. Violation of Due Process

a. Background

Petitioner argues that the admission of his prior sexual misconduct violated his

constitutional right to due process. 

During in limine motions, the prosecutor moved to introduce into evidence

petitioner’s two prior sexual assaults pursuant to California Evidence Code sections 1108

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and 1101. Evidence Code section 1108 permits the admission, in a sex offense case, of

the defendant's other crimes or bad acts for the purpose of showing a propensity to commit

sexual offenses. The law creates an exception to Evidence Code section 1101(a), which

states that "evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character is inadmissible

when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion." Section 1108(a)

provides that "[i]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense,

evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made

inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352." 

California Evidence Code section 352 permits courts to "exclude evidence if the probative

value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate

undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of

confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury."

The first prior assault the prosecutor sought to admit was the sexual assault on

Nancy R. in 1978 that resulted in a six-year federal prison term. CT 94-96. The second

prior assault occurred in 1986, when petitioner sexually assaulted Francis K. in Colorado. 

CT 96. Petitioner pleaded guilty to assault in the third degree and was sentenced to

eighteen months in the Arapahoe County Jail. CT 96-97. Following argument on the

matter, the trial court ruled as follows:

Okay. So here's what I think I'm going to do. This is the one motion I

took home and read here yesterday and read at home and reread early this

morning. And that's motion in limine number two, and this refers to whether

or not the court should allow in the testimony of the two victims, one Nancy R.

in 1978 and one Francis K. for Christmas day 1986, and it appears to me that

they should, both cases. The evidence in both cases should be allowed in

under both 1101(b) and 1108, or in the alternative, and I've gone through the

352 weighing here, and the charges in the present case with regard to Irene

S. and Nancy B. -- we have got two Nancies here, Nancy B., and is it Nancy .

. . . Nancy R. So Nancy B. is the alleged victim in counts – they're two of the

counts in the information on file with the court.

So it would seem to me that there is no danger of prejudice,

particularly because the allegations of this case are approximately the same. 

I mean it's, it's not like someone being tried for a small offense and then you

threw against them a big, prior conduct. For instance, if he was charged with

fondling or something in this case and then you brought in a 22-year-old

rape, you might have that point. But here approximately the same results

occurred in all four cases, that he gratified himself sexually, or went a long

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way towards it.

Also, it appears in all four cases he used force of some sort or another

and came at each of the four victims in approximately, although not the exact,

same way both – that is in 1999, '97, '86 and '78. Those are referring to

years.

My 352 weighing, although it's remote in time – I am somewhat

surprised to see that the authorities do allow one to go back 20 years or

more, and since . . . there's not a lot of distinctions between those four

events, it's pretty much the same thing and the parallels are very close.

RT 35-37.

At trial, the prosecutor introduced evidence of only the prior 1978 sexual assault on

Nancy R.

On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the

evidence under Evidence Code section 352 because its prejudicial effect outweighed its

probative value. He also argued that Evidence Code section 1108 violated his federal

constitutional right to due process because it allowed the admission of other crimes

evidence to show the propensity of a defendant to commit a charged offense. The

California Court of Appeal rejected both of these contentions.

With respect to petitioner's challenge under Evidence Code section 352, the

appellate court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion, finding as follows:

 The probative value of Nancy R.'s testimony was its tendency to

establish appellant's propensity to employ force and threats against women in

order to obtain sexual gratification. The probative value of the prior acts

evidence was enhanced by the fact that its source was "independent of the

evidence of the charged offense[s]." (People v. Ewoldt [(1994) 7 Cal.4th 380]

[ ] at p. 404.) Furthermore, since the assault on Nancy R. occurred in 1978,

no risk existed that the evidence concerning this offense could have been

influenced by knowledge of the charged crimes. (Ibid.)

Moreover, where the evidence of the sexual assault on Nancy R. was

"no stronger and no more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the

charged offenses," the "potential for prejudice" was decreased because it was

"unlikely" the jury would have disbelieved the victim's testimony but

nonetheless have convicted appellant because of the other offense or that the

jury's passions would have been "inflamed" by the prior acts. (People v.

Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 405.)

Considering all the circumstances of this case, whether the evidence

was admitted under Evidence Code section 1101 or Evidence Code section

1108, [footnote omitted] it cannot be said that the trial court's exercise of

discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in admitting Nancy R.'s

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testimony exceeded "the bounds of reason." (People v. Stewart, [(1985) 171

Cal.App.3d 59] [ ] at p. 65.)

Ex. E. at 20-21. 

The court also rejected petitioner's due process challenge, citing to People v.

Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th 903 (1999), in which the California Supreme Court upheld the

constitutionality of Evidence Code section 1108. See id. at 915-22.

In his federal habeas corpus petition, petitioner challenges the constitutionality of

Evidence Code section 1108 on its face, and also as applied by the trial court in his case. 

b. Applicable Federal Law

A state's criminal law (such as an evidence law pertaining to criminal trials) does not

violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause "unless it offends some principle

of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as

fundamental." Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (citation omitted). The

defendant bears the burden of showing that the principle or procedure violated by the rule

is fundamental. Id. at 47. Moreover, a state court's evidentiary ruling is not subject to

federal habeas review unless the ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a

specific federal constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41

(1984); Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). Failure to comply with state

rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting federal habeas

relief on due process grounds. See id. While adherence to state evidentiary rules

suggests that the trial was conducted in a procedurally fair manner, it is certainly possible

to have a fair trial even when state standards are violated. See id. The due process

inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the admission of evidence was arbitrary or so

prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d

1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). Only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may

draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. See Jammal v. Van de

Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991).

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c. Analysis

No published federal appellate court opinion has yet reached the question whether

California Evidence Code section 1108 meets the requirements of federal due process. Cf.

Schroeder v. Tilton, No. 06-15391, slip op. 7981, 7989-90 (9th Cir. Jul. 3, 2007) (holding

that section 1108 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause). However, section 1108 is

analogous to Federal Rule of Evidence 414, which governs the admission of prior conduct

evidence in federal criminal trials concerning child molestation. The Ninth Circuit has

rejected due process and equal protection challenges to Rule 414, and its reasoning guides

this court's consideration of the very similar California law. See United States v. LeMay,

260 F.3d 1018, 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1166 (2002). Rule 414

states that "evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of child

molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it

is relevant." Rule 414 does not violate due process because Rule 403 (the federal analog

to California Evidence Code section 352) functions as a filter, resulting in the exclusion of

evidence that is so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Id. at

1026. In other words, the "application of Rule 403 to Rule 414 evidence eliminates the due

process concerns posed by Rule 414." Id. at 1027 (quoting United States v. Castillo, 140

F.3d 874, 881 (10th Cir. 1998)).

California Evidence Code section 1108 functions in a similar fashion to Federal Rule

of Evidence 414. Section 1108 allows for the introduction of evidence of prior sex offenses

committed by a defendant accused of a sex offense and is subject to section 352, which

excludes unduly prejudicial evidence. Like Rule 414, section 1108 does not pose a due

process concern because the section 352 filter does not allow the admission of section

1108 evidence which is so prejudicial as to preclude the right to a fair trial guaranteed by

the Due Process Clause. Petitioner has not shown "that the traditional ban on propensity

evidence involves a 'fundamental conception of justice'" which is violated by section 1108. 

See id. at 1025. He thus has not shown that section 1108, which allows propensity

evidence in the limited area of sex offense cases, on its face violates due process.

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Section 1108 also did not violate due process as it was applied in petitioner's case. 

The prior assault was relevant because of its similarity to the assaults against Irene S. and

Nancy B. In each case petitioner first initiated conversation and then used physical force

and threats against women in isolated locations to obtain sexual gratification. The

probative value of the prior assault was especially strong because Nancy R. had no

connection in time or place to the other victims. Moreover, as noted by the California Court

of Appeal, because the testimony regarding the prior assault was no more inflammatory

than the testimony regarding the charged offenses, it was unlikely that the jury would have

convicted petitioner because it believed Nancy R. but disbelieved Irene S. and Nancy B. 

Thus, the prejudicial impact of the evidence did not outweigh its probative value. In short,

the introduction of the prior assault fulfilled the basic purpose of section 1108 by giving the

jury more to assess than the relative credibility of victim and accuser. See Falsetta, 21 Cal.

4th at 915 ("[T]he Legislature's principal justification for adopting section 1108 was a

practical one: By their very nature, sex crimes are usually committed in seclusion without

third party witnesses or substantial corroborating evidence.") 

Finally, petitioner has not shown that the court of appeal's rejection of his due

process claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of "clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1). As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, there is not much in the way of clearly

established law on the question of the admission of propensity evidence. 

[T]he Supreme Court has never expressly held that it violates due

process to admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of showing conduct in

conformity therewith, or that it violates due process to admit other crimes

evidence for other purposes without an instruction limiting the jury's

consideration of the evidence to such purposes. Indeed, the Supreme Court

has expressly declined to answer these questions, see [Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991)] ([“]Because we do not reach the issue, we

express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process

Clause if it permitted the use of [‘]prior crimes[‘] evidence to show propensity

to commit a charged crime[“]). 

Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 774-75 (9th Cir. 2001), reversed on other grounds,

538 U.S. 202 (2003).

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The state court’s rejection of petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceedings, id. § 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, this claim for habeas corpus

relief is denied.

2. Instructional Error

a. Background

Petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of the trial court's instruction informing

the jury how to consider the evidence of the prior assault. 

The trial court, quoting the 1999 revision of California standard jury instruction

(CALJIC) No. 2.50.01, instructed the jury as follows:

Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the

defendant engaged in a sexual offense on one or more occasions other than

that charged in the case. "Sexual offense" means a crime under the laws . . .

of a state or of the United States that involves the following: Contact without

consent between any part of the defendant's body and the genitals of another

person.

If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you

may, but are not required, to infer that the defendant had a disposition to

commit the same or similar type sexual offenses. If you find that the

defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not required, to infer that the

defendant had a disposition to commit the same or similar type sexual

offense. 

If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not

required, to infer that he was likely to commit and did commit the crime or

crimes of which he is accused in this trial. However, if you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed a prior sexual

offense, that is not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

he committed the charged crimes in this case. The weight and significance of

the evidence, if any, are for you to decide. Unless you are otherwise

instructed, you must not consider this evidence for any other purpose.

RT 1870. The trial court also gave standard California instructions on the definition of

"preponderance of the evidence" and "reasonable doubt," RT 1870-71, 1874, and

instructed the jury that it must consider all of the instructions as a whole and in light of all of

the other instructions, RT 1856.

On appeal, petitioner argued that the instruction permitted the jury to find that he

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was guilty based on propensity evidence alone, thereby allowing him to be found guilty on

proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of due process. The court of

appeal rejected petitioner's challenge, relying on the California Supreme Court's opinion in

Falsetta, supra, which found that the 1999 revised version of CALJIC 2.50.01 properly

instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence to find that the defendant had a

propensity to commit such crimes, but that it could not convict him for the current crimes

solely in reliance on the evidence that he committed prior sex offenses. 21 Cal. 4th at 922-

23. 

The court also looked to the trial court's instructions as a whole, and concluded: 

Reading the instructions as whole, it is not reasonably likely that the

jury would have been misled into believing it could dispense with these

instructions and leap from a finding that appellant committed the prior sexual

offenses by a standard higher than a preponderance to the conclusion that he

had committed the same offenses against both Nancy B. and Irene S. To so

interpret the language appellant attacks would be to ignore the clear meaning

of the other instructions given, as well as the specific admonition in CALJIC

No. 2.50.01 that prior sexual offenses were insufficient alone to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the charged offenses. We

presume that the jury followed the instructions given, not that it ignored them. 

(See, e.g., People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1121.) We conclude

that CALJIC No. 2.50.01 as given did not result in appellant being convicted

of the current charges based solely on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that

appellant committed the prior sexual offense to which Nancy R. testified.

Ex. E at 27.

In the instant petition, petitioner similarly argues that CALJIC 2.50.01

unconstitutionally diluted the burden of proof necessary to find him guilty of the charged

offenses.

b. Applicable Federal Law

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a

claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that

the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process. See id. at 72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see also

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (“[I]t must be established not merely

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that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally condemned,’ but that it

violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth

Amendment.”) (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146). The instruction “may not be judged in

artificial isolation,” but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and

the trial record. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147). 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he or she is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

(1970). This constitutional principle prohibits the state from using evidentiary presumptions

in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the state of its burden of persuasion beyond

a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S.

391, 400-03 (1991). 

c. Analysis

In Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit found that

instructing the jury with the pre-1999 version of CALJIC 2.50.01 and its companion

instruction CALJIC 2.50.1 violates a defendant’s right not to be found guilty except upon

proof beyond a reasonable doubt, because that version of 2.50.01 says that the jury may,

but is not required to, infer from evidence of previous offenses that the defendant

committed the crime with which he is charged, and 2.50.1 says that such previous offenses

need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Together, the instructions allow conviction by a preponderance, rather than requiring proof

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 822-25.

In this case, however, petitioner was instructed with the 1999 revision of 2.50.01,

which added the following language: "However, if you find by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, that is not sufficient by itself

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged crimes in this case. 

The weight and significance of the evidence, if any, are for you to decide." RT 1870. After

the opinion of the California Court of Appeal was issued in petitioner's case, the California

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Supreme Court held in People v. Reliford, 29 Cal. 4th 1007 (2003), that the revised version

of CALJIC 2.50.01 does not dilute the prosecution's burden of proof. See id. at 1013-14,

1016. 

This court finds that the revised instruction addresses the Gibson court's concern

that the pre-revision instructions provided “two routes of conviction, one by a

constitutionally sufficient standard and one by a constitutionally deficient one.” 387 F.3d at

823. When it is impossible to know whether a jury used the impermissible legal theory or

the one which meets constitutional requirements, the unconstitutionality of one of the routes

requires that the conviction be set aside. Id. at 825. In petitioner's case, however, the

constitutionally deficient route was blocked off – the court instructed the jury in unequivocal

words that it could not find petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt just because it had

found by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed prior bad acts. See McGee v.

Knowles, 218 Fed. Appx. 584, *1 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The revised version of CALJIC 2.50.01

expressly instructs the jury that a preponderance of the evidence finding that McGee

committed a prior sexual offense is not sufficient to prove the charged offenses beyond a

reasonable doubt.”) The jury is presumed to have followed the instructions, Weeks v.

Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000), and in so doing it could not have taken the

constitutionally impermissible route to a guilty verdict. Petitioner’s due process rights were

not violated. 

The state court’s rejection of petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Accordingly, this claim for habeas corpus relief is denied.

3. Violation of Right to Confrontation

a. Background

Petitioner claims that the trial court erroneously allowed the admission of his federal

rap sheet, which the prosecutor used to prove that petitioner was the person who assaulted

Nancy R. in 1978.

On the stand, Nancy R. testified that she was sexually assaulted by a man when she

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worked at Yosemite National Park during the summer of 1978. RT 908-24. She learned

afterwards that the man’s name was “Michael Caita.” RT 917. On direct examination, the

prosecutor asked Nancy R. if she could recognize her assailant:

Prosecutor: Do you see him in the courtroom today?

Nancy R: Well, it’s been a long time, so I don’t really

recognize him from – 

Prosecutor: Do you recall – looking back at the person, do you

recall how tall that person was that came into your

tent?

Nancy R: You know, maybe 5-10 or so, not – not –

extraordinarily tall, as I recall.

Prosecutor: Do you recall the color of hair?

Nancy R: Sandy hair. He had kind of long, shaggy, sandy

hair.

Prosecutor: Well, clean shaven, not clean shaven?

Nancy R: I don’t think that he was clean shaven. As far as I

recall, at least a moustache.

RT 917-18.

On cross-examination, defense counsel again asked Nancy R. if she recognized

petitioner. RT 924. Nancy R. responded, “You know, vaguely, but it’s been a very long

time.” RT 924.

The prosecutor then moved the court, out of the presence of the jury, to admit

petitioner’s federal rap sheet to link him to the 1978 assault on Nancy R. Stating her belief

that Nancy R.’s testimony alone was sufficient to link petitioner to the 1978 assault, the

prosecutor sought to strengthen the connection by presenting evidence of petitioner’s

California rap sheet for a 1997 petty theft arrest which, in turn, would connect petitioner

through identifying information to a federal rap sheet, which identified petitioner as the

person who committed the assault in 1978. RT 1251-54. After holding a California

Evidence Code section 402 hearing to determine the reliability of the evidence, the trial

court concluded that the federal rap sheet could come in under the official records

exception to the hearsay rule, but agreed to sanitize the evidence so that the witnesses

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would testify about a “contact” with petitioner without referring to a petty theft, and would

refer to “official records” instead of rap sheets. RT 1267, 1343, 1405.

On appeal, petitioner conceded that the prosecutor had made a sufficient

foundational showing that the California rap sheet was admissible as an official record, but

argued that the foundational showing for admission of the federal rap sheet was

insufficient. The court of appeal rejected this contention, finding that defense counsel had

failed to show that the federal rap sheet did not meet state evidentiary requirements for

admission as a public record or that it was not trustworthy. Ex. E at 17. The court also

noted that, during opening statements, defense counsel had admitted that petitioner

suffered a conviction as the result of an incident that occurred in Yosemite twenty two years

earlier. Based on this record, the court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in

admitting the federal rap sheet. Ex. E at 18. 

In the instant petition, petitioner argues that admission of the federal rap sheet

violated state law and his federal constitutional right to confrontation.

b. Applicable Federal Law

As discussed above, the admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas

review unless a specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such

magnitude that the result is a denial of due process. Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031. The failure

to comply with state rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for

granting federal habeas relief on due process grounds. See id. Even where it appears that

evidence was erroneously admitted, a federal court will interfere only if it appears that its

admission violated fundamental due process and the right to a fair trial. Id.

Out-of-court statements constitute hearsay when offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219 (1974). The

Confrontation Clause does not necessarily bar the admission of hearsay statements, but it

may prohibit introducing evidence that otherwise would be admissible under a hearsay

exception. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813, 814 (1990). At the time petitioner's

conviction became final, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and its progeny, Idaho v.

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After petitioner’s conviction became final, the United States Supreme Court handed 

down its opinion in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which revised the

standard for assessing Confrontation Clause claims pertaining to the admissibility of

“testimonial hearsay” statements. Crawford is not applicable to petitioner’s claim, however,

because it announces a “new rule” that does not come within the “watershed rules”

exception to non-retroactivity. See Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1184 (2007)

(applying Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-316 (1989)). Thus, Crawford does not apply

retroactively on collateral attack. Id. Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim therefore must

be analyzed under Roberts and Wright.

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Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), governed the admissibility of hearsay evidence in a criminal

case under the Confrontation Clause.3

 Roberts held that a hearsay statement is

presumptively inadmissible against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is unavailable

and the statement bears “adequate indicia of reliability” – that is, the statement falls within a

“firmly rooted hearsay exception” or contains “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Wright, 497 U.S. at 815-16.

Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness may be present if the totality of

circumstances surrounding the statement itself – without regard to corroborating evidence

separate from the statement – indicate that the statement is “so trustworthy that adversarial

testing would add little to its reliability.” Id. at 821. “Courts have considerable leeway in

their consideration of appropriate factors.” Id.; see Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197,

1204 (9th Cir.2000) (“There is no mechanical test for determining reliability nor a prescribed

list of reliability elements” in the Confrontation Clause analysis). What the Supreme Court

has “clearly established” is that the relevant circumstances in the Confrontation Clause

analysis are limited to “those that surround the making of the statement and that render the

declarant particularly worthy of belief.” Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir.

2004)

Confrontation Clause claims are subject to harmless error analysis. United States v.

Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 2004). For purposes of federal habeas corpus review,

the standard applicable to violations of the Confrontation Clause is whether the

inadmissible evidence had an actual and prejudicial effect upon the jury. See Hernandez v.

Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

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637 (1993)).

c. Analysis

Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred when it determined that the federal rap

sheet met the foundational requirements of state evidentiary law is not cognizable on

federal habeas corpus. Rather, the only question for this court is whether admission of the

federal rap sheet – irrespective of the correctness of the trial court’s ruling under state law 

– violated his rights to confrontation or due process. 

Here, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court had not erred by

relying upon federal statutes and implementing regulations to find that the federal rap sheet

satisfied the “official record” requirement. Ex. E. at 16-17. In addition, the court of appeal

found that,

. . . the trustworthiness of the federal rap sheet was enhanced by

evidence that the federal rap sheet had the same identifying information as

the California rap sheet, except for a difference in height. Appellant’s name,

weight, place of birth and other identifying information was the same. 

Additionally, the federal rap sheet was located using an identifying number

located on appellant’s California rap sheet. Furthermore, Inspector Flores

testified that fingerprints are used for verification in the federal and state

system.

Ex. E at 17-18. 

The court also considered the fact that, consistent with the federal rap sheet, during

opening argument defense counsel made the following statement:

You’re going to hear also regarding another thing that we don’t dispute. 

We agree that, yes, Mr. Cata did suffer a conviction 22 years ago in federal

court regarding allegations that occurred in Yosemite. But what you’re going

to hear regarding that conviction 22 years ago, you’re going to find out, has

absolutely nothing to do with the facts of these cases.

Ex. E at 18.

The court of appeal’s consideration of these factors to find that the federal rap sheet

was properly admitted was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court precedent, which holds that there is no mechanical test for determining the

particularized guarantee of trustworthiness of a hearsay statement, and that courts must

look to the totality of the circumstances. See Parle, 387 F.3d 1039 (discussing Supreme

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Court cases). Nor were the court’s findings of fact objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented to the trial court. See id. at 1040 (applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).

Moreover, even if the federal rap sheet was erroneously admitted, the error was

harmless. Even without the federal rap sheet, Nancy R.’s testimony independently linked

petitioner to the 1978 assault. Although she could not positively identify petitioner as the

assailant, she nevertheless testified that, after such a long period of time, she still “vaguely”

recognized him as the person who attacked her. Also, her descriptions of the assailant,

which matched petitioner’s description, were based not only on the assault, but also on her

contacts with petitioner in the gift shop prior thereto. And she knew that her assailant had

just turned twenty five years old when he attacked her, which coincided with petitioner’s

birthday (as established by the California rap sheet), and that his name was Michael

“Caita.” 

Finally, and decisively for purposes of federal habeas corpus review, the error did

not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638, because the evidence that petitioner committed the charged

crimes against Irene S. and Nancy B. was strong. See Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 571

(9th Cir. 2005) (federal courts may assess the strength of the state’s evidence apart from

the erroneously admitted evidence to determine whether the error was harmless.) Irene

S.’s identification of petitioner as her assailant was corroborated by DNA evidence of

petitioner’s semen on her face; Nancy B. identified petitioner as “Mike;” both women

identified petitioner as wearing a cast on his foot, and both women were homeless and

attacked in similarly violent ways under similar circumstances. 

The state court’s rejection of petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceedings, id. § 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, this claim for habeas corpus

relief is denied.

4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

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a. Background

During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Nancy R. about the events that

occurred in Yosemite in 1978, the following colloquy took place:

Prosecutor: Do you remember the person’s name that did this

to you?

Nancy R: Well, I learned afterwards that his name is Michael

Caita (phonetic).

RT 917.

Petitioner’s counsel did not object to Nancy R.’s answer. On appeal, petitioner

argued that this amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, because the answer directly

linked petitioner to the prior assault even though Nancy R. had not been able to positively

identify petitioner in court.

The court of appeal found no merit to petitioner’s claim. Citing to state law cases

which relied upon Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the court found as

follows:

In this case, even if counsel had objected, the prosecution was still

able to show appellant’s connection to the 1978 assault on Nancy R. through

the state and federal rap sheets. Since appellant has failed to show that he

was prejudiced by the admission of Nancy R.’s statement, his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

Ex. E at 19. 

In the instant petition, petitioner similarly claims that counsel’s failure to object

violated his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.

b. Applicable Federal Law

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. The benchmark for judging any claim

of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning

of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just

result. Id. In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, a

petitioner must make two separate showings. 

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First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, that is, that it fell

below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Id.

at 687-88. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and a

court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. 

Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance, that is, that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 

Id. Where the defendant is challenging his conviction, the appropriate question is “‘whether

there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a

reasonable doubt respecting guilt.’” Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). A court need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the

result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is

considered to be “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Williams (Terry),

529 U.S. at 404-408.

c. Analysis

The court of appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim

was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. Even if this court

assumes, without deciding, that counsel’s performance was deficient, petitioner did not as a

result suffer prejudice sufficient to warrant habeas corpus relief.

Nancy R.’s testimony linked petitioner to her assault even without her statement that

she had learned, after the fact, that the name of her assailant was Michael “Caita.” As

discussed above, Nancy R. still “vaguely” recognized petitioner as the person who had

attacked her twenty two years earlier, her descriptions of the assailant matched petitioner’s

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description, she knew petitioner’s age at the time of the assault, which coincided with

petitioner’s birthday, and the federal rap sheet (which this court has found was properly

admitted), conclusively identified petitioner as the assailant.

Admission of Nancy R.’s statement also does not create “a reasonable probability

that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” 

Luna, 306 F.3d at 961 (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, as discussed in detail

above, the evidence that petitioner committed the charged crimes against Irene S. and

Nancy B. was strong. 

The state court’s rejection of petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Accordingly, this claim for habeas corpus relief is denied.

4. Joinder of the Charged Offenses

a. Background

Prior to trial defense counsel moved for severance of the charges involving Irene S.

from the charges involving Nancy B. The motion was denied. On appeal, petitioner

conceded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his severance motion,

but argued that the conviction nevertheless must be reversed because joinder of the counts

deprived him of a fair trial or due process of law. 

The court of appeal rejected petitioner’s claim, holding as follows:

Here we have looked at the evidence actually introduced at trial and

determined that no “‘gross unfairness has occurred such as to deprive

[appellant] of a fair trial or due process of law.’ [Citation]” (People v. Bean

[(1988) 46 Cal.3d 919] at p. 940.) Having reviewed the record, we find

neither actual nor potential prejudice such as to render the trial grossly unfair

or deny due process. At trial, both women testified to violent sexual assaults

perpetrated while they were homeless. In each case, appellant used force

and threats during the assaults and left both victims bruised and battered. 

Furthermore, both victims positively identified appellant as their assailant, and

DNA evidence corroborated Irene’s testimony that appellant had ejaculated

on her face.

Appellant’s characterization of Nancy B.’s case as weak and ordinary

is not well taken. Nancy B. testified that she was attacked on two separate

occasions. During the first violent assault appellant raped her. During the

second, he forced her to orally copulate him. Both assaults left her battered

and bruised. Nancy B. reported these attacks to medical personnel when she

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was hospitalized, and to law enforcement when she had contact with Officer

Leon.

Appellant contends that joinder of the two cases resulted in gross

prejudice because the multiple victim enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667.61,

subd., (e)(5)) [footnote omitted] would not have existed had the cases been

tried separately. We do not agree. If appellant’s cases had been tried

separately, the multiple victim enhancement could have been pled and

proved and appellant would have been convicted in the “present case or

cases of committing [a specified sexual assault] against more than one

victim.” (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (e)(5), italics added.)

Ex. E at 22-23. 

In the instant petition, petitioner claims that joinder of the counts against him violated

his federal constitutional right to due process.

b. Applicable Federal Law

Joint trials conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public

authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial. Bruton v. United

States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968). Improper joinder does not, in itself, violate the

Constitution. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986). However, a joinder of

counts may prejudice a defendant sufficiently to render his trial fundamentally unfair in

violation of due process. See Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1997); Herd v.

Kincheloe, 800 F.2d 1526, 1529 (9th Cir. 1986). 

There is a "high risk of undue prejudice whenever . . . joinder of counts allows

evidence of other crimes to be introduced in a trial of charges with respect to which the

evidence would otherwise be inadmissible." United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1322

(9th Cir. 1986). But joinder generally does not result in prejudice if the evidence of each

crime is simple and distinct (even if the evidence is not cross-admissible), and the jury is

properly instructed so that it may compartmentalize the evidence. Bean v. Calderon, 163

F.3d 1073, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 1998); see Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638-39 (9th Cir.

2004) (denial of motion to sever trial of capital and noncapital charges based on separate

incidents not a violation of due process because evidence was cross-admissible, the weight

of evidence with respect to each incident was roughly equal, the evidence as to each

incident was distinct, and the jury was properly instructed); Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d

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765, 773 (9th Cir. 2000) (given the strength of the prosecution's case against petitioner on

both sets of murders and the cross-admissibility of the evidence on each set, petitioner's

trial was not actually prejudiced by the joinder).

A federal court reviewing a state conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 does not

concern itself with state law governing severance or joinder in state trials. Grisby, 130 F.3d

at 370. Its inquiry is limited to the petitioner's right to a fair trial under the United States

Constitution. Id. To prevail, therefore, the petitioner must demonstrate that the state

court's joinder resulted in prejudice great enough to render his trial fundamentally unfair. 

Id. In addition, the impermissible joinder must have had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict. Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772.

c. Analysis

In denying petitioner's claim, the California Court of Appeal relied upon California

case law which holds that severance is required if joinder of the offenses resulted in “gross

unfairness” and the “deprivation of a fair trial or due process.” The court’s analysis was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of governing federal legal principles. The court

correctly identified the critical question whether petitioner's right to a fair trial had been

prejudiced, and in order to make its determination looked to the similar, yet distinct, nature

of the evidence presented in each case, the relative strength of each case, and whether a

weak case had been joined with a strong one. The court also reviewed the trial record as a

whole to see if petitioner had been prejudiced by the joinder. This comports with federal

constitutional standards. See Davis, 384 F.3d at 638-39 (finding no prejudicial error where

incidents were similar in many respects and weight of the evidence in both cases was

roughly equivalent); Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772-73 (finding no prejudicial error where

evidence cross-admissible and no disparity in relative strength of joined counts). Review of

the record also confirms that the court of appeal's conclusion was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the entire trial record. 

The state court’s rejection of petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or

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based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceedings, id. § 2254(d)(2). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

Petitioner’s motion for an expedient hearing and determination of his case is

DENIED as moot. (Docket no. 24.)

The clerk of the court shall enter judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/3/07 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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