Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02153/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02153-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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08cv2153 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW JAMES KOONTZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant.

 

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Civil No. 08-2153-LAB(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. Nos. 18, 19)

Plaintiff Matthew James Kontz (hereafter “Plaintiff”), filed

a Complaint For Judicial Review And Remedy On Administrative

Decision Under The Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. §405(g)].

Defendant Michael J. Astrue (hereafter “Defendant”), filed an Answer

to the Complaint and the administrative record (hereafter “Tr.”),

pertaining to this case. Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment. Defendant has filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment and a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and the

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08cv2153 2

administrative record filed by Defendant, hereby finds that

Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief requested and therefore

RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED

and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED. 

 I

 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 2, 2005, Plaintiff filed applications for adult

child’s disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income, alleging that he was disabled since March 1, 1994. (Tr. 109-

127). Plaintiff had received disability benefits as a child, but

those benefits terminated upon his attaining age 18 in March 2006.

The Commissioner of Social Security denied his applications

initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 53-56). Thereafter,

Plaintiff requested a hearing. On March 13, 2008, a hearing was held

at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified before an

Administrative Law Judge (hereafter “ALJ”) (Tr. 17-52). On March

27, 2008, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled during the

relevant time period, on and after his 18th birthday in March 2006,

because given his residual functional capacity for repetitive work,

he could perform a significant number of jobs in the occupations of

packager and linen attendant. (Tr. 9-16). The ALJ’s decision became

the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when the

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr. 1-3).

 II

 SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE LAW

Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “Act”), as

amended, provides for the payment of insurance benefits to persons

who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a physical

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08cv2153 3

or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a)(1)(D). Title XVI of the

Act provides for the payment of disability benefits to indigent

persons under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. § 1382

(a). Both titles of the Act define disability as the “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months...” Id. The Act further provides that an individual:

shall be determined to be under a disability only if

his physical or mental impairment or impairments are

of such severity that he is not only unable to do his

previous work but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other

kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the

national economy, regardless of whether such work

exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or

whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or

whether he would be hired if he applied for work. Id.

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has

established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial

gainful activity.” If he is, disability benefits are denied. 20

C.F. R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is not, the decision

maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant

has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.

That determination is governed by the “severity regulation” at issue

in this case. The severity regulation provides in relevant part:

If you do not have any impairment or combination of

impairments which significantly limits your physical

or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will

find that you do not have a severe impairment and are,

therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your

age, education, and work experience. §§ 404.1520(c),

416.920(c). 

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08cv2153 4

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the

abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1521(b), 416.921(b). Such abilities and aptitudes include

“[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,

pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling”; “[c]apacities

for seeing, hearing, and speaking;” “[u]nderstanding, carrying out,

and remembering simple instructions; ”[u]se of judgment;”

“[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual

work situations;” and “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work

setting.” Id. 

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or

combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. 

If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the

third step, which determines whether the impairment is equivalent to

one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or

equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively

presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is

conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to

the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment prevents

the claimant from performing work he has performed in the past. If

the claimant is able to perform his previous work, he is not

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant

cannot perform his previous work, the fifth and final step of the

process determines whether he is able to perform other work in the

national economy in view of his age, education, and work experience.

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1/

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 5.2 states in pertinent part:

(a)... in an electronic or paper filing with the court that contains

an individual’s... birth date... a party or non-party making the

filing may include only:

...

(2) the year of the individual’s birth

...

(b) The redaction requirement does not apply to the following:

...

(2) the record of an administrative or agency proceeding.

Here, Plaintiff’s birth date is prominently noted in the

administrative record because it is the start date upon which

Plaintiff claims benefits are due him.

08cv2153 5

The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if he is not

able to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). 

 III

 ALJ’S FINDINGS

The ALJ made the following pertinent findings:

1. (Plaintiff) was born on March 1, 1988 and

became age 18 on March 1, 2006.1/

2. The period of adjudication begins on March 1,

2006 when (Plaintiff) turned 18.

3. (Plaintiff) has not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since March 1, 2006.

4. (Plaintiff) has the following severe impairments: attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,

learning disorder NOS, Tourette’s syndrome and a

depressive disorder.

(Plaintiff) has been diagnosed with, and treated

for, the above named impairments which cause more than

a minimal limitation in his ability to perform

sustained work activity.

(Plaintiff’s) alleged mixed receptive expressive

language disorder and developmental disorder are

nonsevere as they do not significantly limit (his)

ability to perform work related activities.

5. (Plaintiff) has not had an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically

equals a listed impairment.

In activities of daily living, (Plaintiff) has no

restriction. In social functioning, (Plaintiff) has

no difficulties. With regard to concentration, 

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08cv2153 6

persistence or pace, (Plaintiff) has experienced one

or two episodes of decompensation.

6. After careful consideration of the entire

record, the undersigned finds that, since attaining

age 18, (Plaintiff) can perform simple repetitive

tasks.

(Plaintiff) alleges disability due to his

impairments, including his symptoms of random outbursts, making loud noises at random, and low reading

ability.

After considering the evidence in the record, the

undersigned finds that (Plaintiff’s) medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected

to produce the alleged symptoms; however, (his)

statements concerning intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to

the extent they are inconsistent with the residual

functional capacity assessment for the reasons stated

below.

At the hearing, the medical expert, Dr.

Sherman, a board certified psychiatrist, testified to

her thorough review of the medical record. Dr. Sherman

stated that (Plaintiff) suffers from a learning

disorder NOS which is mild and is primarily in

reading, spelling and mathematics. Further, his IQ has

been tested by Dr. Whitehead in 2006 and it is normal

with a described learning disorder. (Plaintiff)

suffers from Tourette’s syndrome which is being

maintained with medication and is considered mild.

Moreover, there are school reports which indicate that

(Plaintiff) is sweet, courteous and well behaved.

However, he does have a history of vocal ticks in his

school records.

Dr. Sherman specifically discussed the report

from Dr. Whitehead, a licensed psychologist, who

diagnosed (Plaintiff) with a learning disability NOS,

a reported treatment history of ADHD, depression and

Tourette’s syndrome. He noted that (Plaintiff) had a

GAF of 70-80. Dr. Whitehead stated that (Plaintiff’s)

full scale IQ score was in the average range as was

his verbal and performance scores. His working memory

index score indicated an ability to use concentration,

attentional abilities and memory process in the low

average range. His reading was at the 5th grade level,

his spelling was at the 6th grade level and his

arithmetic was at the 5th grade level. Dr. Whitehead

stated that he did not observe any signs of ADHD or

Tourette’s but this might be due to an effective

medication intervention. Nonetheless, (Plaintiff) does

have signs of mild learning disability, but he is

functional in general. With regard to his work

related abilities, Dr. Whitehead stated that (PlainCase 3:08-cv-02153-LAB-WVG Document 21 Filed 07/26/10 Page 6 of 19
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08cv2153 7

tiff) could perform simple repetitive tasks, and even

a higher level of task as long as his academic skills

are not stressed. His ability to complete simple and

complex/detailed tasks is in the low average range, as

are his ability to respond appropriately with others,

respond to usual work conditions appropriately and to

deal with changes in a routine work setting.

Dr. Sherman also noted that, although (Plaintiff’s) treating records dated January 2006 show

depressive symptoms, treating records dated August 30,

2006 show improvement and that (Plaintiff) denied

current depressive symptoms. His thoughts were clear

and his sleep and appetite were fine. He stated that

he could play computer games.

Dr. Sherman also noted that (Plaintiff’s) IEP report

of May 3, 2006 showed that (Plaintiff) was thinking

about attending community college and was kind,

respectful and hard working, and it was reasonable to

believe that (Plaintiff) would follow through on his

future plans.

In summary, Dr. Sherman stated that (Plaintiff’s)

main impairment is (a) language processing problem.

She noted that (Plaintiff’s) Tourette’s syndrome does

not impose any danger to the public. Finally, (Plaintiff) can perform simple repetitive tasks on a

sustained basis.

As for the opinion evidence, I have given the

January 2, 2007 opinion from Dr. Hurwitz, a psychiatrist, significant weight as it was consistent with

the testimony of the medical expert and with the

opinion from Dr. Whitehead who had the opportunity to

evaluate (Plaintiff). I have also given the opinion of

Dr. Sherman significant weight.

7. (Plaintiff) has no relevant past work.

8. (Plaintiff) is currently a “younger individual

age 18-44.”

9. (Plaintiff) has a high school education with

special education classes and is able to communicate

in English.

10. Transferability of job skills is not an issue

because (Plaintiff) does not have past relevant work.

11. Since attaining age 18, considering (Plaintiff’s) age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, jobs have existed in significant

numbers in the national economy that (Plaintiff) has

been able to perform.

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08cv2153 8

Since attaining age 18, (Plaintiff’s) ability to

perform work at all exertional levels has been

compromised by nonexertional limitations. To determine the extent to which these limitations erode the

occupational base of unskilled work at all exertional

levels, the ALJ asked the vocational expert whether

jobs exist in the national economy for an individual

with (Plaintiff’s) age, education, work experience,

and residual functional capacity. The vocational

expert testified that given all of these factors the

individual would be able to perform the requirements

of representative occupations such as a hand packager,

which is an unskilled medium job described at the DOT

920.587-018 and as a linen room attendant which is

described at DOT 222.387-030 which is an unskilled

medium job. Ms. Katsell also stated that (Plaintiff’s) Tourette’s syndrome would have no effect on

his ability to perform these jobs.

Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the vocational expert’s

testimony is consistent with the information contained

in the DOT.

Based on the testimony of the vocational expert,

the undersigned concludes that, considering (Plaintiff’s) age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, (Plaintiff) is capable of making

a successful adjustment to work that exists in

significant numbers in the national economy. A finding

of “not disabled” is therefore appropriate under the

testimony of the vocational expert’s opinion.

12. (Plaintiff) has not been under a disability,

as defined in the Social Security Act, since March 1,

2006, the day (Plaintiff) attained age 18, through the

date of this decision.

(Tr. 11-15)(citations omitted.)

 IV

THE ALJ’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE OPINION

 OF PLAINTIFF’S TREATING PHYSICIAN

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to grant

controlling weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician,

Dr. Ashok Parameswaran. Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to

identify any conflict between Dr. Parameswaran’s opinion and the

ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can engage in simple repetitive work.

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08cv2153 9

Dr. Parameswaran’s opinion, in the form of a one-page letter,

states that Plaintiff’s current diagnoses include Attention Deficit

Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Depression, Tourette’s Syndrome,

language processing disorders and various learning disorders

including Dyslexia, involving reading, written expression and

arithmetic. Further, Dr. Parameswaran states that Plaintiff’s

condition requires that he take medication on a regular basis, that

he is compliant in taking his medication, and that his condition

often leaves him overwhelmed by life’s stressors and limits his

ability to cope with significant changes in his daily routine. Dr.

Parameswaran opines that Plaintiff will likely be able to maintain

part-time, low stress level occupations. (Tr. 273).

Here, Plaintiff does not indicate nor explain how Dr.

Parameswaran’s opinion conflicts with the ALJ’s findings and

conclusions. Rather, the ALJ specifically found, based on Dr.

Sherman’s review of Plaintiff’s medical records, that Plaintiff

suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),

depressive symptoms, Tourette’s Syndrome, language processing

disorders and learning disorders involving reading, spelling and

mathematics. Further, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s ability to

appropriately respond to usual work conditions and to deal with

changes in a routine work setting were in the low average range.

Finally, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform simple

repetitive tasks such as the tasks required of a hand packager and

a linen room attendant. (Tr. 12-15). 

Pursuant to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (hereafter,

“DOT”), these occupations appear to involve low stress in that they

involve performing repetitive work with little or no supervision.

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08cv2153 10

(DOT 920.587-018 Hand Packager, DOT 222.387-030 Linen Room Attendant).

Therefore, the ALJ’s findings and conclusions comport with,

rather than conflict with, Dr. Parameswaran’s opinion. Moreover, the

Court can not find in the record any evidence upon which the ALJ

relied which conflicts with Dr. Parameswaran’s opinion.

While the ALJ did not mention Dr. Parameswaran’s opinion, he

did give significant weight to the opinion of Dr. Sherman. Dr.

Sherman’s opinion was substantially consistent with Dr.

Parameswaran’s opinion. Consequently, the Court can not find that

the ALJ committed error in this regard. Therefore, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this

regard be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this

regard be GRANTED.

 V

 THE ALJ DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO MENTION

 PLAINTIFF’S MOTHER’S STATEMENT

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in ignoring the statement

of Plaintiff’s mother. (Tr. 128-136). Defendant argues that the ALJ

was not obligated to address the statement of Plaintiff’s mother

because the statement is irrelevant to the time period under

adjudication.

Plaintiff cites Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9 th

Cir. 1996), for the proposition that according to Social Security

regulations, the “Commissioner’s rulings require the ALJ to consider

lay witness testimony ... where a claimant alleged pain or other

symptoms that ‘are not supportable by medical evidence in the file,’

the adjudicator shall obtain detailed descriptions of daily

activities by directing specific inquiries about the pain and its

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08cv2153 11

effects... to third parties who would likely have such knowledge.”

(emphasis added in bold, italics in original). Plaintiff argues

that the ALJ failed to comply with the dictates of Smolen.

However, Smolen is inapplicable to this case. Smolen

discusses the testimony of the claimant’s family members at the

hearing before the ALJ in that case regarding the claimant’s

symptoms of fatigue and pain. Here, Plaintiff’s mother did not

testify at the hearing before the ALJ. Therefore, the statement of

Plaintiff’s mother is not testimony. Instead, it is simply a checkbox questionnaire, dated December 14, 2005, that someone completed

regarding Plaintiff’s functionality. While the name of Plaintiff’s

mother is on the first page of the questionnaire, it is not signed

by her, much less signed under penalty of perjury. Therefore, the

Court can not consider the statement of Plaintiff’s mother to be

competent testimony which the ALJ was obligated to consider.

Additionally, the questionnaire does not supply information

regarding Plaintiff’s functionality between March 1, 2006 and the

date of the hearing before the ALJ. Since the questionnaire does

not address the relevant time period under consideration, the Court

fails to see how the questionnaire is relevant to the ALJ’s

determination.

Further, while Plaintiff’s mother’s purported statement

contains information regarding Plaintiff’s functionality that does

not appear in Plaintiff’s medical records reviewed by the ALJ, that

information is irrelevant to the proper adjudication of Plaintiff’s

claim. For example, some of the information contained in the

statement is that Plaintiff can not tell time (Tr. 132), and can not

make new friends (Tr. 133). This information has no bearing on the

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08cv2153 12

ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s functional limitations and

disability determination. Most, if not all of the balance of the

information contained in the statement is indeed included in the

medical records reviewed by the ALJ.

Moreover, even if the Court considers the purported statement

of Plaintiff’s mother to be competent testimony, (which it does

not), the ALJ commits harmless error in failing to discuss competent

lay testimony favorable to a claimant, unless the reviewing court

can “confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully

crediting the testimony, could have reached a different disability

determination.” Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir.

2006). Here, Plaintiff does not indicate, nor can the Court find,

that Plaintiff’s mother’s statement contains anything that the ALJ,

or any reasonable ALJ, in fully crediting Plaintiff’s mother’s

“testimony,” could have reached a different disability determination. In fact, Plaintiff concedes that his “mother’s statement

corroborates the severe medical impairments found by the ALJ in

communication, understanding and social behavior, maintain attention.” (Memo of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-6). 

Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment in this regard be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment in this regard be GRANTED.

 VI

 THE ALJ’S REASONS FOR DISCREDITING PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY

 WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reasons for discrediting his

allegations with regard to his limitations was legally insufficient.

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28 2/ In Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986), the court set out

a threshold test for evaluating symptom testimony. 

08cv2153 13

Defendant argues that the ALJ properly addressed Plaintiff’s

credibility.

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he suffers from

Tourette’s Syndrome which manifests itself by daily yelling, making

random loud noises and making irregular body movements, but that

these symptoms did not manifest while he was at a previous job that

he had held. (Tr. 34-35).

When an ALJ evaluates a claimant’s subjective symptom

testimony, he/she must perform two stages of analysis: the Cotton2/

test and an analysis of Plaintiff’s credibility. Smolen, 80 F.3d

at 1281-82. The Cotton test requires the ALJ to determine whether

the claimant has produced objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment and whether the symptoms alleged could reasonably be

produced by the impairment. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-

47 (9th Cir. 1991). If the claimant meets the Cotton test, and

there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must offer specific,

clear and convincing reasons to reject Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff satisfied the Cotton test

because he presented objective medical evidence that could reasonably produce his self-reported symptoms. The ALJ determined that

Plaintiff suffered from Tourette’s Syndrome (Tr. 12), and that

Tourette’s Syndrome could reasonably be expected to produce the

symptoms about which Plaintiff testified. (Tr. 13). 

The ALJ did not find that Plaintiff was malingering, nor did

any of the presented evidence suggest that he was doing so.

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08cv2153 14

Therefore, the ALJ may reject Plaintiff’s testimony only if he/she

provides clear and convincing reasons. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282-84.

Some factors the ALJ may consider to determine the credibility of

Plaintiff’s testimony include: 1) the claimant’s reputation for

lying, prior inconsistent statements and other testimony from the

plaintiff that appears less candid; 2) unexplained or inadequately

explained failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course

of treatment; or 3) claimants daily activities. Id. at 1284. The

ALJ’s determination or decision must contain specific reasons for

findings on credibility, supported by evidence in the case record,

and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual

and any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the

individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight. Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 1989). “Impairments that can

be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the

purpose of determining eligibility for (Social Security) benefits.

Warre v. Commissioner 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006).

Here, the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms of

Tourette’s Syndrome for two reasons:

First, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff is being effectively

treated for all of the symptoms of all his disorders, including the

symptoms of Tourette’s Syndrome. Further, the ALJ noted that

Plaintiff has no restrictions in the activities of daily living and

no difficulties in social functioning. The ALJ also noted that

Plaintiff has mild difficulties with regard to concentration,

persistence and pace. (Tr. 12, 13, 29-30).

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3/ Section E of Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities at pp.

11-13 repeats much of the same argument that Plaintiff posits in

Section C of the Memorandum of Points and Authorities (continued)

(continued) 

08cv2153 15

Second, the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s testimony regarding

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms of

Tourette’s Syndrome because Dr. Sherman noted that Plaintiff’s

symptoms of Tourette’s Syndrome were being effectively treated with

medications. (Tr. 13). Plaintiff also so testified at the hearing.

(Tr. 29-30). Additionally, Plaintiff testified that the symptoms

of Tourette’s Syndrome did not manifest when he was working at a

previous job. (Tr. 35). Further, Dr. Sherman noted that Plaintiff

suffers from a mild form of Tourette’s Syndrome. (Tr. 13).

Additionally, Dr. Sherman noted that Plaintiff’s school reports

indicate that he is sweet, courteous and well behaved. (Tr. 13).

Moreover, Dr. Sherman noted that Plaintiff is considering attending

community college, and is kind, respectful and hard working. (Tr.

14).

Dr. Sherman’s assessment of Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s own

testimony amount to clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff’s

testimony regarding the effects of the symptoms of Tourette’s

Syndrome were not credible. Since Plaintiff was being effectively

medically treated for the symptoms of Tourette’s Syndrome, has no

difficulties in activities of daily living and social functioning,

was found to be courteous, well behaved and hard working, it was

reasonable for the ALJ to discredit Plaintiff’s testimony in this

regard.

As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment in this regard be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment be GRANTED.3/

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at pp. 7-9. To the extent the argument in Section E is not discussed

in this section of this Report and Recommendation, see Section VII

of this Report and Recommendation. 

08cv2153 16

 VII

 THE ALJ DID NOT ERR IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY

 OF THE VOCATIONAL EXPERT

1. Reasoning Levels

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when he relied on the

vocational expert’s testimony. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that

while Dr. Sherman limited Plaintiff to simple repetitive work, the

ALJ cited two jobs that Plaintiff could perform, based on the

vocational expert’s testimony, that require reasoning levels of 2

and 3, which Plaintiff does not have. Defendant argues that the

jobs about which the vocational expert testified, and the ALJ

adopted, are consistent with Plaintiff’s reasoning level.

At the hearing, the vocational expert testified that

Plaintiff could perform the work of a hand packager and linen room

attendant. (Tr. 50). The reasoning level required of a hand packager

is “Level 2 - Apply common sense understanding to carry out detailed

but uninvolved written or oral instructions. Deal with problems

involving concrete variables in or from standardized situations.”

(DOT 920.587-018 Hand Packager). The reasoning level for a linen

room attendant is “Level 3 - Apply common sense understanding to

carry out instructions furnished in written, oral or diagrammatic

form. Deal with problems involving several concrete variables in

or from standardized situations.” (DOT 222.387-030 Linen Room

Attendant).

In this case, Dr. Sherman limited Plaintiff to simple

repetitive work. Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, there is no

conflict between simple repetitive work and reasoning levels of 2

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08cv2153 17

and 3 that the DOT assigns to the hand packager and linen attendant

jobs. Several courts have rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that

reasoning levels of 2 and 3 preclude simple repetitive work. Renfrow

v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007); Hackett v. Barnhart,

395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005); Meissl v. Barnhart, 403 F.

Supp. 2d 981, 983-986 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Perry v. Astrue, 2009 WL

435123 (S.D. Cal., February 19, 2009); Moua v. Astrue, 2009 WL

997104 (E.D. Cal., April 14, 2009). Based on these cases, the Court

rejects Plaintiff’s assertion.

Therefore, the ALJ did not err in relying on the testimony

of the vocational expert. The jobs about which the vocational

expert testified, and the ALJ adopted, are consistent with Plaintiff’s reasoning levels and limitation of simple repetitive work.

Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment in this regard be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment in this regard be GRANTED.

2. Symptoms of Tourette’s Syndrome

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to ask the

vocational expert whether Plaintiff’s symptoms of Tourette’s

Syndrome affected her opinion, making incomplete his hypothetical

question to her. Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s argument

misconstrues the record.

At the hearing, the vocational expert opined that Plaintiff

could perform the work of a hand packager and linen room attendant.

(Tr. 50). Then, the following question was asked: “The same

limitations that the Judge had indicated to you, but add a hypothetical individual that, at times, has uncontrolled Tourette’s Syndrome

symptoms such as verbal tics, grunting, maybe some shaking. Would

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08cv2153 18

that affect any of the jobs (the individual would) be able to do?”

The vocational expert’s response to this hypothetical question was,

“No.” (Tr. 51)(emphasis added).

Here, it is clear that the vocational expert specifically

testified that an individual with symptoms of Tourette’s Syndrome

could perform the jobs of hand packager and linen room attendant.

Further, the vocational expert specifically testified that an

individual with uncontrolled symptoms of Tourette’s Syndrome could

perform the jobs of a hand packager and linen room attendant. In

this case, Plaintiff’s symptoms of Tourette’s Syndrome were not

uncontrolled. Instead, Dr. Sherman testified that Plaintiff’s

symptoms of Tourette’s Syndrome were mild and effectively controlled

by medication. Therefore, the Court reasons that if an individual

with uncontrolled symptoms of Tourette’s Syndrome could perform the

work of a hand packager and linen room attendant, the vocational

expert’s response to a hypothetical question would be the same if

the individual’s symptoms of Tourette’s Syndrome were, in fact,

controlled. Therefore, Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ failed to

elicit testimony from the vocational expert regarding the effect of

symptoms of Tourette’s Syndrome on her opinion of what jobs

Plaintiff could do, is erroneous. As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard be

DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this regard

be GRANTED.

 

 VIII

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08cv2153 19

 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 16, 2010, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

September 7, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 26, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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