Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01199/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01199-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIAN ANTHONY GARZA,

Petitioner,

v.

CHRISTIAN PFEIFFER, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:16-cv-01199 LJO MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 8]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent, Christian Pfeiffer, Warden of Kern 

Valley State Prison is hereby substituted as the proper named respondent pursuant to 

Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent is represented in this 

action by Lewis A. Martinez, of the Office of the Attorney General for the State of 

California. 

I. Background

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, upon a June 

8, 2006, jury conviction for premeditated murder, kidnapping and various enhancements. 

On July 18, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of life without 

Case 1:16-cv-01199-LJO-MJS Document 11 Filed 11/21/16 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

the possibility of parole and an additional term of twenty five years to life.

On April 28, 2008, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed 

the judgment. (Lodged Doc. 2.) Review was denied by the California Supreme Court on 

July 30, 2008. (Lodged Docs. 3-4.)

Petitioner proceeded to file three petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California state courts as follows:

1. Kern County Superior Court

Filed: September 14, 20091; 

Denied: November 23, 2009;

2. Kern County Superior Court

Filed: December 24, 20142;

Denied: March 24, 2015;

3. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: July 9, 20153; 

Denied: August 14, 2015.

(Mot. to Dismiss, Exs. 5-10.)

On August 8, 20164, Petitioner filed the instant federal Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus in this Court. On October 13, 2016, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the 

petition as being filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d), failure to state a cognizable claim, and for failure to exhaust state remedies. 

(Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 8.) Petitioner did not file an opposition to the motion to 

dismiss. 

 

1 Under the mailbox rule, the Court deems petitions filed on the date Petitioner handed a petition 

to prison authorities for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 

1056 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Although the petition 

was filed on September 23, 2009, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers the petition filed on 

September 14, 2009, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

2

Although the petition was filed on December 26, 2014, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on December 24, 2014, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

3

Although the petition was filed on July 31, 2015, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court considers 

the petition filed on July 9, 2015, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

4

Although the petition was filed on August 15, 2016, pursuant to the mailbox rule the Court 

considers the petition filed on August 8, 2016, the date Petitioner signed the petition.

Case 1:16-cv-01199-LJO-MJS Document 11 Filed 11/21/16 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

II. Discussion

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to 

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an 

answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being 

in violation of the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 

420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using 

Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); 

Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a 

respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court 

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & 

n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of the oneyear limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), failure to state cognizable claims, 

and failure to exhaust. Because the additional grounds of Respondent's motion to 

dismiss are similar in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust 

state remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal 

answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority 

under Rule 4. The Court will first determine if the petition was timely filed. 

B. Commencement of Limitations Period Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). AEDPA imposes various requirements on all 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 

521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Case 1:16-cv-01199-LJO-MJS Document 11 Filed 11/21/16 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Cir. 1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on August 8, 2016, and is subject to the 

provisions of AEDPA. AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners 

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As 

amended, § 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing 

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 

under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period begins running on the date that the 

petitioner's direct review became final or the date of the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review. In this case, the California Supreme Court denied review on July 30, 2008. 

The state appeal process became final ninety days later, on October 28, 2008, when the 

time for seeking certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. U.S. Supreme 

Court rule 13; Bowen v. Rowe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999). The AEDPA statute of 

limitations began to run the following day, on October 29, 2008. Patterson v. Stewart, 

251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).

Case 1:16-cv-01199-LJO-MJS Document 11 Filed 11/21/16 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Petitioner would have one year from October 29, 2008, absent applicable tolling, 

in which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, Petitioner delayed 

in filing the instant petition until August 8, 2016, over six years after the statute of 

limitations period expired. Absent the later commencement of the statute of limitations or 

any applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred as untimely.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year 

limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held 

the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction 

relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one state court's disposition of 

a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the state court 

system. 536 U.S. 214, 216 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year statute of limitations 

under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction petition was 

timely or was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or 

determined by the federal courts to have been untimely in state court will not satisfy the 

requirements for statutory tolling. Id.

Here, the statute of limitations began to run on October 29, 2008. Even if the time 

was tolled for the pendency of Petitioner’s first appeal, over five years passed between 

the filing of his first and second state petitions. Accordingly, the limitations period expired 

no later than November 23, 2010, one year after the denial of Petitioner’s first state 

habeas petition. 

As the year limitations period expired no later than November 23, 2010, 

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was filed over five years after the limitations period 

expired. Although Petitioner filed two state petitions after the limitations period expired, 

Case 1:16-cv-01199-LJO-MJS Document 11 Filed 11/21/16 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

state petitions filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations period shall have no 

tolling effect. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003) ("section 2244(d) 

does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state 

petition was filed."). The present petition was filed on August 8, 2016, over five years

after the expiration of the year statute of limitations period. The instant federal petition is 

untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560-62 (2010); 

quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo. Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would 

give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th 

Cir. 1993). Petitioner has not presented any evidence regarding equitable tolling. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of equitable tolling and his petition 

remains untimely.

III. Failure to Exhaust; Failure to State Cognizable Claims

Respondent, in his motion to dismiss, also asserts that Petitioner's claims failed to 

state federally cognizable claims and Petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedies. As 

the federal petition is untimely, for the sake of judicial efficiency, the Court shall not 

determine whether Petitioner's claims are cognizable or whether the claims were 

properly exhausted. 

IV. Conclusion

As explained above, Petitioner failed to file the instant petition for Habeas Corpus 

within the one year limitation period required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). While Petitioner is 

entitled to statutory tolling, he is not entitled to equitable tolling. Regardless of tolling, his 

petition remains untimely Based on the foregoing, this Court recommends that 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED.

///

Case 1:16-cv-01199-LJO-MJS Document 11 Filed 11/21/16 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

V. Recommendation

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss for 

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period be 

GRANTED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States 

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and 

Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this Findings and 

Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy 

on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen (14) days after service of the Objections. The Finding and 

Recommendation will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate 

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c). Petitioner is advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 18, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-01199-LJO-MJS Document 11 Filed 11/21/16 Page 7 of 7