Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02011/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02011-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

James Cornell Harrod, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-16-02011-PHX-GMS

DEATH PENALTY CASE 

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Respondents’ Motion to Preclude Juror Contact 

Absent Court Permission Upon a Showing of Good Cause. (Doc. 15.) The Court heard 

oral argument on October 7, 2016. The Motion is granted in part and denied in part. 

 This case is a habeas review of a state capital conviction. Although there are rules 

in both state and federal court that restrict post-trial juror contact in various ways, no rule 

in state or federal court absolutely prohibits such contact. 

 Rule 18.3 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure1

 precludes a party from 

utilizing or disseminating a juror’s biographical information2

 for any use other than jury 

selection. The jurors’ personal identification information, including addresses and 

telephone numbers, is kept entirely confidential absent a showing of good cause. 

 

1

 Although Arizona Revised Statute § 21-312 precludes the release of juror contact information in the absence of a court order, the parties agreed at oral argument that this statute is inapplicable to cases decided before January 1, 2008. Petitioner was resentenced in 2005, and thus this statute is not applicable in this case. 

2

 This information includes the zip code, employment status, occupation, employer, residency status, education level, prior jury duty experience, and felony conviction status of potential jurors. 

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Ariz.R.Crim.P. 18.3; see also Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona, Rule 123(e)(10) 

(“The home and work telephone numbers and addresses of jurors, and all other 

information obtained by special screening questionnaires or in voir dire proceedings that 

personally identifies jurors summoned for service, except the names of jurors on the 

master jury list, are confidential, unless disclosed in open court or otherwise opened by 

order of the court.”) Counsel for Petitioner have represented to the court that they will 

not use information contained in the state court’s record, other than publically available 

transcripts, to identify or locate jurors. Respondents point to no state authority prohibiting 

post-trial contact with jurors through the use of publically available information to 

ascertain their identity 

 Ninth Circuit law further makes clear, however, that interviewing jurors about 

their deliberative process is both improper and unethical. “We do hold for future 

guidance that it is improper and unethical for lawyers . . . to interview jurors to discover 

what was the course of deliberation of a trial jury.” Northern. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mely, 219 

F.2d 199, 202 (9th Cir. 1954). Thus, except where the inquiry is authorized by statute, 

“intrusion into the ‘expressions, arguments, motives, and beliefs’ of jurors during 

retirement is unanimously condemned.’” Id. at 205 (quoting 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 

2348, et seq. (3rd Ed., 1940)).3

 Further, Federal courts have long recognized that unduly speculative questioning 

of juries poses significant problems and should be discouraged. In Tanner v. United 

States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), the Supreme Court noted that allegations “raised for the first 

time days, weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the process” 

 

3

 This Court’s Local Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83.2(e), subjects attorneys practicing 

in this Court to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Arizona Supreme Court. In 

addition to the requirements above, those rules require that a lawyer “shall not . . . 

communicate with a juror or perspective juror after discharge of the jury if . . . the juror 

has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or . . . the communication 

involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, E. R. 

3.5 

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and could undermine “full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to 

return an unpopular verdict, and the community’s trust in a system that relies on the 

decisions of laypeople.” Id. at 120–21; see also McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267–

68 (1915) (noting that public investigation of juror deliberations would lead to “the 

destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference”). Because 

evidence concerning the manner at which a jury arrived at its verdict is inadmissible to 

test the validity of a verdict, “the practice of counsel in propounding questions on these 

subjects to jurors after trial should be discouraged.” Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 941 

(9th Cir. 1980). Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is grounded in the 

common-law rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict. 

 On the other hand, although jurors may not be questioned about their deliberations 

and most matters related thereto, they may be questioned regarding any extraneous 

influence on their verdict. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117; Traver, 627 F.2d at 941. 

Accordingly, Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) allows jury testimony in limited circumstances to 

show that (1) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s 

attention, (2) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) 

there was a mistake in the verdict form. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 121; FED.R.EVID. 

606(b). 

 The Court recognizes that the United States Supreme Court, in Pena-Rodriguez v. 

Colorado, 350 P.3d 287 (Colo. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S.Ct. 1513 (Apr. 4, 2016) (No. 

15-606), is now considering whether an exception may be made into the general 

prohibition of inquiry into jury deliberations when issues of racial prejudice may be 

involved, but counsel has acknowledged to the Court that no such issues appear to 

present themselves in this case. Further Petitioner’s counsel have represented to the court 

that their sole intention in interviewing jurors is to discover the possible existence of 

extraneous improper outside influence on jurors, and they will not delve into improper or 

inadmissible areas of inquiry such as jury deliberations. Counsel has however noted that 

some flexibility may be required in determining whether extraneous influences took place 

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to the extent that such alleged extraneous influences arose during deliberations. 

 While recognizing the need for some such flexibility, investigation directed at 

discovering the inadmissible considerations of motives and influences that led to a juror’s 

verdict, including questions designed to elicit a juror’s thoughts on what their verdict 

might have been in response to evidence not presented at trial, is inappropriate and 

unethical. Mely, 219 F.2d at 202; Traver, 627 F.2d at 941; cf. Com. v. Moore, 474 Mass. 

541, 52 N.E.3d 126 (2016) (holding that communications “prohibited by law” under state 

ethical rules include communications in violation of statutory law, specific court orders 

and court rules, and common-law limitations on post-verdict juror inquiry). Counsel for 

Petitioner have assured this Court that they will not pursue such information. To the 

extent, however, that counsel deem it necessary to conduct inquiries other than those 

designed to uncover extraneous influences on the jury, they are ordered to seek 

authorization from this Court to do so. 

 The Court declines to adopt the State’s view that a broader prohibition is merited. 

Rule 39.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure applies to trials conducted in federal 

court, not trials conducted within state court which result in subsequent federal habeas 

proceedings. The language of Local Rule 39.2(b), which provides that proposed 

interrogatories must be submitted to the Court “within the time granted for a motion for a 

new trial,” indicates that the rule was drafted to govern contact with federal jurors 

following trials in federal district court. This conclusion is strengthened when the rule is 

read in pari materia with Local Rule of Civil Procedure 39.1, which governs the 

procedure for trial by jury in federal district court. See LRCiv 39.1. In contrast to this 

Court’s local rule, at least one district court has drafted a local rule that broadly prohibits 

contact with any juror, see D. Or. LR 48-2 (“[e]xcept as authorized by the Court, 

attorneys, parties, witnesses, or court employees must not initiate contact with any juror 

concerning any case which that juror was sworn to try”), and has been interpreted to 

require federal habeas petitioners to seek leave of court before contacting state jurors. See 

Moen v. Czerniak, Case No. 02-10-JE, 2004 WL 1293920, at *2, n.1 (D. Or. June 10, 

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2004) (the parties agreed that local rules and ethics opinions prevented petitioner from 

contacting jurors without a court order). This Court’s prohibition does not reach that far. 

 Unlike some courts that strictly prohibit all post-verdict interviews of jurors, see 

e.g. United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 967 (1st Cir. 1985) (prohibiting the postverdict interview of jurors by counsel, litigants or their agents except under the 

supervision of the district court, and then only in such extraordinary situations as are 

deemed appropriate), there is no absolute prohibition of post-verdict interviews of jurors 

in the Ninth Circuit. See Hard v. Burlington Northern R.R., 812 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir. 

1987) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit has not joined other courts in holding that 

evidence acquired in post-verdict interviews conducted without leave of the court makes 

the evidence obtained inadmissible) abrogated on other grounds by Warger v. Shauers, 

135 S. Ct. 521 (2014). Though it may be the “the better practice . . . for the attorney to 

seek leave of the court to approach the jury,” the Ninth Circuit indicated that the district 

court could not refuse to consider the evidence obtained in that case from post-verdict 

juror interviews on that ground. Id. at 485 & n.3. 

 Respondents also assert that a presumptive prohibition on juror contact is 

consistent with the principle that habeas petitioners are not entitled to discovery “as a 

matter of ordinary course.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). Because 

Petitioner is not requesting formal discovery and seeks only to informally interview 

jurors at this stage of the proceedings, Rule 6(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 

requiring leave of court to conduct formal discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, does not apply. No rule requires a petitioner in a § 2254 habeas proceeding to 

seek leave of a federal court to contact state trial jurors or prohibit counsel from 

conducting informal interviews of those jurors. Furthermore, requiring Petitioner to 

show good cause before interviewing jurors, who in some instances may be the only 

source of evidence of extraneous misconduct, presents a Catch-22 situation that is better 

addressed through evidentiary rules and ethical considerations. 

/ / / 

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 To the extent that this court has ‘wide discretion’ to restrict contact with jurors to 

protect jurors from ‘fishing expeditions’ by losing attorneys,” United States v. Wright, 

506 F.3d 1293, 1303 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Journal Pub. Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 

1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986)), it is disinclined to exercise that discretion to prevent 

inquiry into any extraneous influence that may have inappropriately influenced jurors. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Respondent’s Motion (Doc. 15) to the extent that 

it prohibits Petitioner from using the information deemed confidential under Arizona 

Criminal Rule 18.3 to locate and interview jurors. Petitioner is, however, not otherwise 

restricted from using other publicly available information for locating the juror’s in this 

case. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING the Motion to the extent it would 

prevent Petitioner from questioning jury members on the course of their deliberations or 

other matters that are not admissible in evidence absent further authorization of this 

Court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Respondents’ Motion to the extent it 

would prevent Petitioner from questioning jurors’ concerning any extraneous influences 

on the jury. 

 Dated this 18th day of October, 2016. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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