Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01210/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01210-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARVIN JOHNSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

KATHLEEN ALLISON, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:12-cv—01210-SKO-HC

ORDER TO PETITIONER TO SHOW CAUSE

IN THIRTY (30) DAYS WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

FOR PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO

EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES

(Doc. 1)

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 and 303. Pending before

the Court is Petitioner’s petition, which was filed in this Court

on July 25, 2012. 

I. Screening the Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make

a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly

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appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....”

Habeas Rule 4; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all

grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts

supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. 

Notice pleading is not sufficient; the petition must state facts

that point to a real possibility of constitutional error. Rule

4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O’Bremski v. Maass,

915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75

n. 7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition that are vague,

conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to summary

dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d at 491.

The Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus

either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the

respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the

petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule

8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner is an inmate of the California Substance Abuse

and Treatment Facility (CSATF) located at Corcoran, California,

serving a nineteen-year sentence for convictions sustained in

2010 in the Kern County Superior Court. Petitioner raises the

following claims in the petition: 1) Petitioner’s counsel in his

direct appeal rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, in

violation of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, by

failing to raise the ineffective assistance of trial counsel; 2)

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Petitioner’s right to due process of law under the Fourteenth

Amendment was violated because the evidence was insufficient to

support a conviction of violating Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(a); and

3) Petitioner’s right to due process of law under the Fourteenth

Amendment was violated because the evidence was insufficient to

support a conviction of violating Cal. Pen. Code § 186.22(b). 

(Pet., doc. 1, 4.) 

II. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and

gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the

state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.

1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before

presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no

state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court

was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the

petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10

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(1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood,

133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United

States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.

2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th

Cir. 2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982)), or the underlying

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claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as

amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir.

2001). 

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to

the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine,

the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,

481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed

petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims

has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted

claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Petitioner states that he raised the insufficiency of the

evidence in his direct appeal and that both the intermediate

state court of appeal and the state’s highest court affirmed his

conviction. (Pet. 2.) However, he affirmatively alleges that he

raised the claim concerning appellate counsel’s allegedly

ineffective assistance in the California Supreme Court by way of

a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and further that the

petition is presently pending. (Id. at 2-3.) Reference to the

official website of the California courts reflects that a habeas

petition was filed on July 5, 2012, in the California Supreme

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Court, in In re Johnson on Habeas Corpus, case number S203822,

and that the case remains pending. 

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Therefore, upon review of the instant petition for writ of

habeas corpus, it appears that Petitioner has not presented his

numerous claims to the California Supreme Court and received a

decision from that court. If Petitioner has not presented all of

his claims to the California Supreme Court, the Court cannot

proceed to the merits of those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

It is possible, however, that Petitioner has otherwise presented

his claims to the California Supreme Court and simply neglected

to inform this Court. 

Petitioner must inform the Court if his claims have been

presented to the California Supreme Court, and if possible,

provide the Court with a copy of the petition filed in the

California Supreme Court, along with a copy of any ruling made by

the California Supreme Court. If Petitioner has exhausted only

some of his claims, the petition must be dismissed as a mixed

petition. Without knowing what claims have been presented to the

California Supreme Court, the Court is unable to proceed to the

merits of the petition.

III. Order to Show Cause 

Accordingly, Petitioner is ORDERED to show cause why the

The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are capable of

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accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned, including undisputed information posted on official

web sites. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331,

333 (9th Cir. 1993); Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d

992, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the

docket sheet of a California court. White v Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th

Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 332 (2010). The address of the official

website of the California state courts is www.courts.ca.gov.

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petition should not be dismissed for Petitioner’s failure to

exhaust state remedies as to all the claims in his petition. 

Petitioner is ORDERED to inform the Court what claims have been

presented to the California Supreme Court within thirty (30) days

of the date of service of this order. 

Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order

will result in dismissal of the petition pursuant to Local Rule

110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2012 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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