Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00504/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00504-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Maria Jesus Santacruz, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-09-00504-TUC-CRP

ORDER

 Maria Santacruz is 37 years old. She completed six years of schooling in Mexico 

and less than two years in the United States. She speaks and understands only Spanish. 

She lives with her mother and two children. Her work experience consists of jobs as a 

cashier, a motel maid, a chili picker, and an assembly worker. She has had multiple back 

and knee surgeries and suffers, among other things, from low back and knee pain, 

cognitive deficits, anxiety, and depression. 

Ms. Santacruz filed a claim for supplemental security income in February 2005, 

alleging to be disabled as of January 1, 2004. Doc. 17, Tr. 177-80. The claim was denied 

initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 51-54, 86-96. After a hearing on the claim 

(Tr. 724-40), an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued an unfavorable decision on 

November 24, 2006 (Tr. 61-67). The Appeals Council remanded the case for further 

consideration of Ms. Santacruz’s mental impairments, her subjective complaints, her 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”), and vocational evidence. Tr. 68-72. A hearing 

before the ALJ was held on October 15, 2008. Tr. 741-61. The ALJ issued a second 

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 1 of 13
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

decision on March 24, 2009, finding Ms. Santacruz not to be disabled within the meaning 

of the Social Security Act. Tr. 38-48. This decision became Defendant’s final decision 

when the Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 6-10. 

Ms. Santacruz then brought this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). Doc. 1. The issues have been briefed. Docs. 24, 27. Oral argument has not 

been requested. For reasons stated below, the Court will reverse Defendant’s decision 

and remand for further proceedings. 

I. Standard of Review.

The Court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of record, a 

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

decision denying benefits “should be upheld unless it is based on legal error or is not 

supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2008). “This is a highly deferential standard of review: ‘Substantial evidence’ 

means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Valentine v. Comm’r 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). In determining whether the decision 

is supported by substantial evidence, however, the Court “must consider the entire record 

as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting 

evidence.’” Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (citation omitted). 

II. Discussion. 

Whether a claimant is disabled is determined using a five-step evaluation process. 

To establish disability, the claimant must show she has not worked since the alleged 

disability onset date, she has a severe impairment, and her impairment meets or equals a 

listed impairment or her RFC precludes her from performing past work. Where the 

claimant meets her burden, the Commissioner must show that the claimant is able to 

perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Valentine, 574 F.3d at 689. 

 Plaintiff has met her burden. She has not worked successfully since the alleged 

onset date. Tr. 210-11, 746-47. She has multiple severe impairments: low back pain, 

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 2 of 13
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

status post lumbar microdiscectomy, status post right knee meniscectomy, panic attacks, 

major depressive order, and borderline intellectual functioning. Tr. 40-43, ¶ 2. While 

those impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment (Tr. 44, ¶ 3), they do 

preclude Plaintiff from performing her past work (Tr. 47, ¶ 5). Plaintiff is not disabled, 

the ALJ found, because she has the RFC to perform the sedentary unskilled job of 

assembly production worker. Tr. 45-47, ¶¶ 4, 9. 

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ committed multiple errors in connection with the 

nature and severity of her impairments, her functional limitations, the medical opinions, 

her symptom testimony and the statement of her mother, and the relevant occupational 

base. Doc. 24. Defendant argues that the ALJ did not err and his decision is supported 

by substantial evidence. Doc. 27. 

As explained more fully below, the Court finds that the ALJ erred by ignoring the 

opinion of examining psychiatrist Dr. James Reed and by discrediting the testimony of 

Plaintiff and the statement of her mother. Those errors require reversal of Defendant’s 

decision and a remand for further proceedings. The Court accordingly need not address 

Plaintiff’s other arguments. 

A. The Opinion of Dr. James Reed.

 After the Appeals Council remanded the case, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Reed 

on June 26, 2008. Tr. 696-700. Dr. Reed diagnosed severe major depression, panic 

disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning, and found Plaintiff’s condition to be 

“rather static.” Tr. 698. In a medical source statement concerning the ability to do workrelated activities, Dr. Reed opined that Plaintiff has extreme limitations in the ability to 

make judgments on complex decisions and understand, remember, and carry out complex 

instructions. He further opined that Plaintiff has moderate limitations with respect to 

simple decisions and instructions and the ability to respond appropriately to usual work 

situations and to changes in a routine work setting. Noting evidence of borderline 

intellectual functioning in psychological testing, Dr. Reed found an “inability to recall” 

and an “impaired ability to concentrate.” Tr. 701-03. 

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 3 of 13
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider the opinion of Dr. Reed. 

Doc. 24 at 4-8. She is correct. 

The law is clear: “The ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence.” 

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). The regulations explicitly 

provide that, “[r]egardless of its source, we will evaluate every medical opinion we 

receive.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d). Opinions from any medical source, even on issues 

reserved to the Commissioner, “must never be ignored.” SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, 

at *3 (July 2, 1996). Instead, the ALJ “is required to evaluate all evidence in the case 

record that may have a bearing on the determination or decision of disability[.]” Id. 

The opinion of Dr. Reed, an examining physician, clearly is material to the 

question whether Plaintiff is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1) (more weight is to 

be given to “the opinion of a source who has examined [the claimant] than to the opinion 

of a source who has not”); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing 

the weight an ALJ should give to various medical opinions). The ALJ’s failure to 

consider and evaluate the opinion of Dr. Reed constitutes legal error. See Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1037 & n.10 (9th Cir. 2007) (ALJ erred where he only briefly 

mentioned one treating physician’s opinion and ignored another opinion that the claimant 

was disabled); Robinson v. Barnhart, 469 F. Supp. 2d 793, 797-98 (D. Ariz. 2006) 

(ALJ’s decision was in error and not supported by substantial evidence where he ignored 

aspects of a doctor’s opinion). 

 Defendant proffers reasons to support the ALJ’s disregard of Dr. Reed’s opinion. 

Specifically, Defendant asserts that based on mental limitations resulting in substantial 

loss of ability to perform basic work activities, such as the marked limitations found by 

Dr. Reed (Tr. 701), “the unskilled sedentary occupational base ‘may or may not’ be 

significantly eroded[.]” Doc. 27 at 20; see Doc. 24 at 20-22. But even if the record 

supported a finding that the relevant occupational base is not significantly eroded, the 

Court is “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts” – not the post hoc

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 4 of 13
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

contentions of Defendant. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 Defendant further asserts that the failure to consider Dr. Reed’s opinion in no way 

undermines the ALJ’s decision because the vocational expert testified that a person with 

the limitations found by Dr. Reed would be able to perform a production assembly job. 

Doc. 20 at 20. Harmless error has been found where “it was clear from the record that an 

ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” Robbins 

v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

 Careful consideration of Dr. Reed’s narrative report reasonably could have 

affected the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. Plaintiff’s statements to Dr. Reed 

regarding her daily activities and symptoms (Tr. 697) are entirely consistent with her 

hearing testimony (Tr. 750-52), and Dr. Reed specifically found that the medical records 

support Plaintiff’s statements (Tr. 698). Given the clear requirement that every medical 

opinion be evaluated, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d), the Court cannot “confidently 

conclude” that the ALJ’s silent disregard of Dr. Reed’s opinion is harmless. Stout, 454 

F.3d at 1056; see Lawley v. Astrue, No. CV-10-5105-JPH, 2012 WL 214588, at *5 (E.D. 

Wash. Jan. 24, 2012) (ALJ’s error with respect an examining psychologist’s opinion was 

not harmless where the opinion was consistent with the claimant’s testimony). 

B. The Testimony of Plaintiff.

 A claimant’s subjective complaints, including pain, must be considered when 

making a disability determination. 20 C.R.F. § 404.1529. “Pain of sufficient severity 

caused by a medically diagnosed ‘anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormality’ may provide the basis for determining that a claimant is disabled.” Light v. 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omited). “Once a claimant 

produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject 

a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on lack of objective medical evidence to 

fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 5 of 13
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(9th Cir. 2004); see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. '

416.929(c)(2); SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *1 (July 2, 1996). 

 Plaintiff testified that her knees, feet, and hands “hurt a lot” and that she 

sometimes falls down and drops things due to loss of strength. Tr. 747-48. She can sit 

for about two hours but then needs to lie down for a while. Tr. 750. While she has both 

“good days and bad days,” the latter happen two or three times a week. Tr. 750-51. She 

also suffers panic attacks a few times a week, which make her feel like she is choking and 

leave her “very tired.” Tr. 752; see Tr. 697. 

The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s testimony using the two-step analysis established by 

the Ninth Circuit. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. Applying the test of Cotton v. Bowen, 

799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986), he determined that Plaintiff’s medically determinable 

impairments reasonably could cause her alleged symptoms. Tr. 45. Given this 

conclusion, and because he found no evidence of malingering, the ALJ was required to 

present “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for finding Plaintiff’s testimony not 

credible. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. This standard is “the most demanding required in 

Social Security cases.” Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th 

Cir. 2002). 

 The ALJ gives several reasons for finding Plaintiff’s symptom testimony not 

credible. Tr. 46. None is convincing. 

 The ALJ first asserts that Plaintiff’s treatment for back and knee pain has been 

“essentially routine and/or conservative in nature,” but cites no evidence in support of 

this assertion. Plaintiff had surgery on her left knee in 2003 (Tr. 549), surgery on her 

right knee in 2004 and again in 2007 (Tr. 617, 682), and back surgery in 2004 (Tr. 548). 

The ALJ does not explain, and it otherwise is not clear to the Court, how undergoing 

multiple surgeries constitutes routine and conservative treatment. 

 The ALJ recognizes that Plaintiff’s surgeries suggest that her alleged symptoms 

are genuine and this fact normally would weigh in her favor. He nonetheless finds the 

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 6 of 13
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

symptom testimony not credible because “the record reflects” that the surgeries and 

mental health treatment have been “successful.” Tr. 46. The ALJ cites no evidence in 

support of this assertion. This Circuit has made clear that “general findings are an 

insufficient basis to support an adverse credibility determination.” Holohan v. 

Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ “must specifically identify the 

testimony [he] finds not to be credible and must explain what evidence undermines the 

testimony.” Id.; see Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 The ALJ has not met his burden. He does not identify the evidence purportedly 

showing that Plaintiff’s surgeries and mental health treatment have been successful. In 

short, the ALJ fails to state “specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and 

what facts in the record lead to that conclusion.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (emphasis 

added). It is worth noting that certain evidence shows Plaintiff’s back surgery failed, 

resulting in “no improvement postoperatively in her pain.” Tr. 607; see Tr. 407. 

 The ALJ further asserts that the alleged symptoms “are not corroborated by the 

objective medical evidence.” Tr. 46. The ALJ erroneously “imposed a burden on 

[P]laintiff she did not have under the governing Ninth Circuit law.” Battle v. Astrue, 

No. CV 09-2162-DTB, 2010 WL 2569235, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2010). Once a 

claimant has presented medical evidence of an underlying impairment, as Plaintiff has 

done in this case, “the ALJ may not discredit the claimant’s testimony regarding 

subjective pain and other symptoms merely because the symptoms, as opposed to the 

impairments, are unsupported by objective medical evidence.” Perez v. Astrue, No. CV 

09-4600-MLG, 2010 WL 1051128, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2010); see Lingenfelter, 504 

F.3d at 1035-36; Robbins, 466 F.3d at 884. The ALJ himself recognizes that the 

credibility determination was necessary because Plaintiff’s “statements about the 

intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not 

substantiated by objective medical evidence[.]” Tr. 45; see SSR 96-7p, at *2. 

 Contrary to the ALJ’s assertion (Tr. 46), there is evidence showing Plaintiff 

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 7 of 13
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

experiences auditory and visual hallucinations. According to the report of Dr. Reed, 

Plaintiff hears voices, “which she believes are coming from the next room, that people 

are laughing and/or talking about her[.]” Tr. 696. Plaintiff also sees “shadows 

approaching her from the periphery of her vision which startle her, even though she has 

never been able to find a reason for the shadows.” Tr. 697. It is not surprising that the 

ALJ found no evidence of hallucinations given that he failed to consider Dr. Reed’s 

report. 

 The final reason the ALJ gave for finding Plaintiff not credible is that she has 

“described daily activities which are not limited to the extent one would expect, given the 

complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” Tr. 46. The ALJ states that Plaintiff 

is able to cook, shop, and do household cleaning. Id. But the ALJ ignores the limited 

nature of those activities. 

 Plaintiff testified that she needs to “sit down for a while” when cooking and her 

mother helps with both the cooking and shopping. Tr. 751. She further stated that she 

“cannot even wash dishes” and back pain keeps her from doing the “most minimal 

chore.” Tr. 199. She reported to Dr. Reed that “her mother takes responsibility for 

cooking, for the major chores and shopping.” Tr. 697. Her mother also “takes care of the 

children and her on most days” given that the pain renders her “unable to follow through 

on simple tasks.” Tr. 696. These limitations are nowhere to be found in the ALJ’s 

decision. 

 Plaintiff has stated that she has “difficulty getting up in the morning and doing 

personal hygiene” and “cannot wash or dry [her] hair.” Tr. 196, 199. She “no longer 

wants to put on make-up or fix herself up.” Tr. 262-63. The report of examining 

psychologist Dr. Huntley Hoffman notes that Plaintiff has depression with symptoms that 

include “reduced hygiene and grooming[.]” Tr. 611. Some days Plaintiff does not feel 

like bathing or grooming, and she “has gone up to three days without bathing.” Tr. 612. 

Her mother helps “with everything, even dressing and bathing her.” Tr. 262-63. The 

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 8 of 13
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

ALJ clearly erred in finding that Plaintiff “requires no assistance in personal grooming or 

dressing.” Tr. 46. 

 The ALJ concludes that Plaintiff “has maintained a somewhat normal level of 

daily activity and interaction.” Tr. 46. But even if the record supported such a finding, 

this Circuit has made clear that “disability claimants should not be penalized for 

attempting to lead normal lives in the face of their limitations.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 

F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). Stated differently, the mere fact that a claimant engages in 

normal daily activities “does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall 

disability. One does not need to be ‘utterly incapacitated’ in order to be disabled.” 

Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ may consider a 

claimant’s activities in assessing credibility, but “[t]his line of reasoning clearly has its 

limits[.]” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Because “many home 

activities are not easily transferrable to what might be the more grueling environment of 

the workplace,” an ALJ may reject symptom testimony based on activities only where the 

ALJ makes a “specific finding” that they “are transferrable to the work setting” and form 

a “substantial part” of the claimant’s day. Id. (emphasis in original). 

 The ALJ has not met his burden. He fails to account for the limited nature of 

Plaintiff’s activities. He notes that Plaintiff spends time with her children and mother 

(Tr. 46), but fails to explain how that activity translates into an ability to perform 

regularly in the workplace. 

 The Court finds, and Defendant does not genuinely dispute (Doc. 27 at 21), that 

the ALJ failed to provide a convincing reason for concluding that Plaintiff’s activities 

render her symptom testimony not credible. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (the claimant’s limited activities did not constitute convincing evidence that he 

could function regularly in a work setting); Benecke v Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 594 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (rejecting the ALJ’s credibility finding where it was based in large part on the 

claimant’s ability to carry out certain routine tasks); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 9 of 13
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(9th Cir. 2007) (the ALJ erred where the claimant’s activities did not contradict his 

symptom testimony and failed to meet the threshold for transferable work skills); 

20 C.F.R. § 416.972(c) (“we do not consider activities like taking care of yourself [and] 

household tasks . . . to be substantial gainful activities”). 

 The Court recognizes that questions of credibility are the province of the 

Commissioner. See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 693. Absent evidence of malingering, 

however, “‘the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be 

clear and convincing.’” Id. (citation omitted). Considering the entire record as a whole 

and in the proper context, see Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198, the Court concludes that the 

reasons provided for finding Plaintiff not credible are neither convincing nor supported 

by substantial evidence. 

C. The Statement of Plaintiff’s Mother.

 In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ “must consider lay witness 

testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to work.” Stout, 454 F.3d at 1053; see 

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.913(d)(4). Indeed, because testimony from family and friends may 

provide insight into the severity of the impairments and how they affect the claimant’s 

ability to function, see SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2 (Aug. 9, 2006), such 

testimony constitutes “‘competent evidence’” and therefore cannot be disregarded 

without comment. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1053 (citation omitted). If the ALJ wishes to 

discount the testimony of lay witnesses, he must give legitimate reasons that are germane 

to each witness. Id.; see Lewis, 236 F.3d at 511. 

 Plaintiff’s mother, Analicia Borquez, completed a third-party statement on 

April 19, 2007. She stated that after the back surgery, Plaintiff has had “trouble walking 

and bending” and “loses strength.” Her “pain is stronger from the back to the feet” 

following the second surgery on the right knee. She no longer attends church given that 

she is unable to remain seated. She cries a lot due to her back and leg pain, and the pain 

has “given her much depression, anxiety attacks, and insomnia.” She feels hurt that her 

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 10 of 13
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

mother must be “in charge of her two children” and must “do everything to take care of 

[the] household.” Tr. 262-63. 

 The ALJ does not explicitly discredit Ms. Borquez’s statement, but instead finds 

that it corroborates Plaintiff’s allegations. Tr. 45. The Court agrees with that finding 

with respect to Plaintiff’s testimony that she is able to engage in only limited daily 

activities due to severe pain, depression, and anxiety attacks. Ms. Borquez’s statement 

clearly does not support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff has maintained a “normal level” 

of daily activity and interaction. Tr. 46. 

Defendant cites Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2006), for the 

proposition that lay testimony may be rejected where the witness and the claimant have a 

close relationship. Doc. 22 at 26. But the ALJ did not reject Ms. Borquez’s statement on 

that ground. The Court “cannot affirm the decision of an agency on a ground the agency 

did not invoke in making its decision.” Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 

2001). The ALJ, not this Court, “is required to provide specific reasons for rejecting lay 

testimony.” Stout, 454 F.3d at 1054. 

Moreover, the fact that a lay witness has a close relationship with the claimant 

“cannot be a ground for rejecting his or her testimony.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 972. “To the 

contrary, testimony from lay witnesses who see the claimant every day is of particular 

value.” Id.; see Solorzano v. Astrue, No. ED CV 11-369-PJW, 2012 WL 84527, at *4 

(C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012). The statement of Ms. Borquez is of particular value given that 

she has “seen all [of Plaintiff’s] suffering.” Tr. 262-63. 

Defendant’s reliance on Greger is misplaced. The witness’s testimony in Greger, 

unlike that of Ms. Borquez, was rejected in part because it was inconsistent with the 

claimant’s presentations to treating physicians. 464 F.3d at 972. While the ALJ in 

Greger noted the close relationship between the witness and the claimant, the relationship 

was not the sole reason for rejecting the witness’s testimony. Indeed, Defendant himself 

recognizes that the lay testimony in Greger was rejected based on both “medical 

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 11 of 13
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

evidence and [a] close relationship to the claimant[.]” Doc. 27 at 26. 

In summary, the Court concludes that the ALJ erred in evaluating the statement of 

Plaintiff’s mother. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 972. 

III. Remedy.

 The legal errors committed by the ALJ require that the decision denying benefits 

be reversed. The Court has discretion to remand for further development of the record or 

for an award benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1173-74 

(9th Cir. 2000). This Circuit has held that a remand for further administrative 

proceedings is appropriate where “enhancement of the record would be useful.” Benecke 

v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Harman, 211 F.3d at 1178). 

 In this case, enhancement of the record clearly would be useful. There has been 

no vocational expert testimony as to whether Plaintiff would be able to work if her 

symptom testimony and the statement of her mother were to be credited as true. Nor is it 

clear from the opinion of Dr. Reed that Plaintiff is disabled. The finding that Plaintiff is 

unable to perform her past work as a cashier, a motel maid, a chili picker, and an 

assembly worker does not establish disability as those jobs require greater than sedentary 

work. Tr. 757. 

 In addition, medical records from Plaintiff’s rheumatologist, Dr. Deborah Powers, 

have not been made part of the administrative record. See Doc. 24-3. Those medical 

records were discussed at the hearing (Tr. 748) and counsel for Plaintiff claims to have 

provided them to the ALJ (Tr. 49-50, Doc. 24-3 at 1), but they are not included in the 

record and therefore were not evaluated by the ALJ. Further development of the record 

in this regard would be useful. 

 The Court concludes that the case should be remanded for further administrative 

proceedings pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Given this ruling, it need not 

be determined whether remand is required based on Plaintiff’s other challenges to the 

decision denying benefits. Under a sentence six remand, the Commissioner shall 

consider the new evidence and modify or affirm the findings of fact or decision, “and 

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 12 of 13
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

sh

4

w

ev

hall file wit

2 U.S.C. § 

will then be

vidence wa

IT IS

1. 

2. 

3. 

Dated

th the court

405(g). Sh

e able to c

as considere

S ORDERE

Defendan

The case 

The Clerk

d this 15th d

t any such a

hould the de

onsider all

ed. 

ED:

nt’s decision

is remande

k is directed

day of Febr

- 13

additional an

ecision on r

 challenges

n denying b

d for furthe

d to enter ju

ruary, 2012.

3 - 

and modifie

remand be u

s to that d

benefits is re

er administr

udgment acc

. 

d findings o

unfavorable

decision in 

eversed. 

rative proce

cordingly. 

of fact and 

e to Plaintif

light of ho

eedings. 

decision[.]”

ff, the Cour

ow the new

”

rt 

Case 4:09-cv-00504-CRP Document 28 Filed 02/17/12 Page 13 of 13