Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00817/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00817-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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1 The Wal-Mart entity appearing in this action has been Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.,

rather than Wal-Mart, Inc. For purposes of the jurisdictional issues addressed in this Order, however,

the distinction is of no consequence, and both entities will be referred to herein as “Wal-Mart.”

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DEBRA T. SHARP, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0817-WS-C

 )

WAL-MART STORES, INC., et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (doc.

2) and Motion to Remand (doc. 7). The Motions have been briefed and are ripe for disposition at this

time.

I. Background.

On August 30, 2006, plaintiff Debra T. Sharp (“Sharp”) initiated this personal injury action

against defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”)1 and Kevin Delony (“Delony”) in the Circuit

Court of Clarke County, Alabama. The Complaint alleged that Sharp sustained personal injuries when

she was hit on the head by plastic containers falling from a shelf while a business invitee in a Wal-Mart

store in Jackson, Alabama on September 1, 2005. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) According to the Complaint,

Delony was manager of the Jackson store and was responsible for ensuring that the premises were

maintained in a safe condition. (Id.) The Complaint asserted claims against Wal-Mart and Delony for

negligence and wantonness, predicated on the theory that Delony, in the line and scope of his

employment for Wal-Mart, had failed properly to secure or store the containers, or caused and allowed

such containers to remain in a dangerous condition without adequately warning Sharp of the danger

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2 Specifically, in interrogatory responses served on November 6, 2006, Wal-Mart

responded to a query requesting the name and address of the manager of the Jackson store at the time

of plaintiff’s injury by identifying David Favor. (Defendants’ Interrogatory Responses, at #11.) WalMart’s response did not address the portion of the interrogatory requesting Favor’s address. Likewise,

in response to an interrogatory requesting the name and address of the Wal-Mart employee(s) who

placed the merchandise on the shelf where Sharp was injured, Wal-Mart identified Delores Alford and

Tiffany Davis, but did not acknowledge plaintiff’s request for their respective addresses. (Id. at #12.)

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they posed. (Id., ¶¶ 6-7, 11-12.) Both Sharp and Delony were alleged to be citizens of Alabama. 

(Id., ¶¶ 1, 3.) Further, the Complaint named as fictitious defendants the persons who “negligently

and/or wantonly stored and/or secured the containers that caused the plaintiff’s injuries, ... the names

and addresses of said persons ... presently being otherwise unknown to the plaintiff.” (Id., ¶ 4.)

On November 28, 2006, Wal-Mart filed a Notice of Removal (doc. 1) in this District Court,

removing this action from Clarke County on the basis of diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332. Although defendant Delony is of non-diverse citizenship from Sharp, in that both are Alabama

citizens, Wal-Mart argued that Delony’s citizenship is jurisdictionally irrelevant because he was

fraudulently joined. To support this contention, Wal-Mart presented the Affidavit of non-party Sabrina

McGhee, Assistant Manager of the Jackson store. McGhee averred that as of the accident date,

“Delony was not working in the store nor was he the manager of that store during that time period. He

recently had transferred to the Wal-Mart Store located in Semmes, Alabama, Store #5174 and in the

meantime, David Favor served as the manager ....” (McGhee Aff., ¶ 4.) Because Delony had

“recently” transferred to another store, Wal-Mart reasons, he could not possibly be liable to Sharp in

connection with the September 1, 2005 accident in the Jackson store.

Just two days after the case was removed, Sharp filed a Motion for Leave to Amend

Complaint, in which she seeks to add as additional defendants David Favor, Delores Alford and Tiffany

Davis, without abandoning her claims against Wal-Mart and Delony. (Doc. 2, at 1.) As grounds for

her request, Sharp states that discovery responses obtained shortly before removal reflected that Favor

was the manager of the Jackson store on the date of the accident and that Alford and Davis were the

Wal-Mart employees responsible for shelving the containers that had injured plaintiff.2 On that basis,

plaintiff wishes to amend her Complaint to state claims against Favor, Alford and Davis (all of whom

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3 The proposed amendment would also correct the name of the Wal-Mart entity by

substituting Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., as named defendant.

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are alleged to be Alabama citizens) for negligence and wantonness in connection with the storage and

stacking of the containers on the shelf and the failure to ensure that the premises were maintained in a

safe condition or to warn Sharp of any unsafe condition.3

At the close of briefing on the Motion for Leave to Amend, Sharp filed a Motion to Remand

(doc. 7), asserting that remand is appropriate because Wal-Mart has not shown that Delony was

fraudulently joined and, in any event, Sharp’s proposed amendment would negate diversity jurisdiction. 

Wal-Mart opposes remand.

II. Analysis.

As a general matter, leave to amend the pleadings should be freely given in the absence of such

countervailing factors as undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, undue prejudice or futility of

amendment. McKinley v. Kaplan, 177 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Spanish

Broadcasting System of Fla., Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065, 1077

(11th Cir. 2004) (“leave to amend must be granted absent a specific, significant reason for denial”);

Rule 15(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. (leave to amend pleadings “shall be freely given when justice so requires”). 

But this permissive standard must yield to a specific statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), when a plaintiff

seeks to amend her complaint following removal in a manner that would join additional defendants

whose presence would destroy diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bevels v. American States Ins. Co.,

100 F. Supp.2d 1309, 1312 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (“This court agrees with the reasoning of other federal

courts that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), rather than Rule 15(a), should apply when a plaintiff seeks to amend a

complaint to destroy diversity jurisdiction after removal.”); Clinco v. Roberts, 41 F. Supp.2d 1080,

1086-87 & n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (adopting prevailing view that § 1447(e) trumps Rule 15(a) when

proposed amendment would eliminate diversity). Sharp’s proposed amendment would join certain new

non-diverse defendants, precluding § 1332 jurisdiction; therefore, her Motion to Amend is properly

examined through the prism of § 1447(e), and not the liberal Rule 15(a) standard.

Section 1447(e) provides as follows: “If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional

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4 One district court succinctly summarized the options available in the § 1447(e) context

as follows: “[A]fter a case has been properly removed to federal court, if a plaintiff seeks to amend the

complaint in a way that would destroy jurisdiction, the court has discretion to deny the amendment and

maintain jurisdiction, or grant the amendment and remand the case to state court. What the court

cannot do is allow an amendment that destroys federal jurisdiction and exercise jurisdiction over the

case.” Smith v. White Consol. Industries, Inc., 229 F. Supp.2d 1275, 1278 (N.D. Ala. 2002).

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defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or

permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.” Id. Decisions applying § 1447(e) have made

clear that the statutory language means just what it says. For example, in Ingram v. CSX Transp.,

Inc., 146 F.3d 858 (11th Cir. 1998), the court explained that where § 1447(e) applies, “the district

court was left with only two options: (1) deny joinder; or (2) permit joinder and remand [plaintiff]’s

case to state court.” 146 F.3d at 862; see also Kabakjian v. United States, 267 F.3d 208, 212 (3rd

Cir. 2001) (describing § 1447(e) as a circumstance in which district court can, “after suit is filed, permit

the destruction of subject matter jurisdiction”).4

As is implicit in the text of § 1447(e), the decision to grant or deny a post-removal motion to

amend a complaint which would destroy federal subject matter jurisdiction is discretionary. See, e.g.,

Mayes v. Rappaport, 198 F.3d 457, 462 (4th Cir. 1999)(“Under Section 1447(e), the actual decision

on whether or not to permit joinder of a [non-diverse] defendant ... is committed to the sound discretion

of the district court”); Town of Gordon v. Great American Ins. Co., 331 F. Supp.2d 1357, 1359

(M.D. Ala. 2004) (recognizing discretion in § 1447(e) context); Carter v. Dover Corp., Rotary Lift

Div., 753 F. Supp. 577, 579 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (“Virtually every court to address the joinder question

since the enactment of § 1447(e) views the statute as ... providing for a flexible, broad discretionary

approach”). Such discretion does not imply that § 1447(e) amendments should be granted as a matter

of course. To the contrary, “[t]he district court, when faced with an amended pleading naming a new

nondiverse defendant in a removed case, should scrutinize that amendment more closely than an

ordinary amendment.” Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1987); see also

Dasma Investments, LLC v. Realty Associates Fund III, L.P., 459 F. Supp.2d 1294, 1299-1300

(S.D. Fla. 2006) (explaining that a plaintiff “is not automatically entitled to add non-diverse defendants

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5 See Dasma, 459 F. Supp.2d at 1300 (“The factors a court should consider include the

plaintiff's motivation for joinder of the non-diverse parties, the prejudice to the plaintiff if the amendment

is not allowed, the timing of the amendment, the original defendant's choice of forum (through removal),

and the likelihood of multiple litigation.”); Jones v. Rent-A-Center East, Inc., 356 F. Supp.2d 1273,

1275 (M.D. Ala. 2005); Smith, 229 F. Supp.2d at 1280; Jerido v. American Gen. Life & Accident

Ins. Co., 127 F. Supp.2d 1322, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 2001); Bevels, 100 F.Supp.2d at 1313; Sexton v.

G & K Services, Inc., 51 F. Supp.2d 1311, 1312 (M.D. Ala.1999); Weathington v. United

Behavioral Health, 41 F. Supp.2d 1315, 1318 (M.D. Ala 1999); Jarriel v. General Motors Corp.,

835 F. Supp. 639, 641 (N.D. Ga. 1993). In that regard, some courts have characterized § 1447(e) as

a mere codification of the Hensgens rule. See Cobb v. Delta Exports, Inc., 186 F.3d 675, 677 n.4

(5th Cir. 1999) (citing cases).

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following removal to destroy diversity”).

The leading appellate authority guiding district courts in the exercise of this discretion is

Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987), in which the Fifth Circuit identified four

factors germane to this inquiry, to-wit: (1) the extent to which the purpose of the amendment is to

defeat federal jurisdiction, (2) whether the plaintiff has been dilatory in seeking amendment, (3) whether

the plaintiff would be significantly injured if the amendment were not permitted, and (4) any other

factors bearing on the equities. Id. at 1182. This framework is designed to facilitate the balancing of

the defendant’s interests in maintaining a federal forum with the competing interest disfavoring parallel

lawsuits in federal and state courts. Id.; see also Hughes v. Promark Lift, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 985,

987 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“In determining whether joinder pursuant to § 1447(e) is appropriate, the district

court is required to balance the equities involved.”). Although Hensgens predates the 1988 creation of

§ 1447(e), district courts in this Circuit routinely apply its teachings today when faced with a postremoval motion to amend that would compromise federal jurisdiction.5

Application of the Hensgens factors in the case at bar reveals that the balance of equities

squarely favors amendment. Contrary to Wal-Mart’s position, the amendment does not appear to have

the purpose of defeating federal jurisdiction; rather, its purpose is nothing more sinister than naming the

proper individual defendants who were responsible for the status and security of the plastic containers

that fell on Sharp. The Complaint initially named Delony as a defendant on the understanding that he

was the manager of the Jackson store on September 1, 2005, and also named certain unknown

Case 1:06-cv-00817-WS-C Document 9 Filed 01/25/07 Page 5 of 10
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fictitious defendants who were responsible for securing the containers in an unsafe manner. Thus,

plaintiff’s intent since the inception of this lawsuit in Clarke County Circuit Court has been to sue not

only Wal-Mart, but also the store manager and other employees responsible for stacking the

merchandise that caused her injuries. The proposed amendment would merely effectuate plaintiff’s

intent in this regard, by plugging in the correct identities of the persons who managed the store and

stacked the merchandise at the Jackson store during the time period in question. Such circumstances

are not fairly attributed to the improper objective of sabotaging federal jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Wal-Mart insists that a nefarious purpose can be adduced from

the fact that plaintiff knew the identities of Favor, Alford and Davis prior to removal, but failed to seek

to name them as defendants until after removal. The reality of the situation is more complicated. The

record reflects that, on November 6, 2006, Sharp first learned through discovery responses that Favor

was the store manager, and that Alford and Davis were the Wal-Mart employees who had stocked the

shelves that led to her injuries. The Notice of Removal was filed on November 28, and the Motion to

Amend Complaint followed on November 30; however, plaintiff was not idle during the three-week

interval between disclosure and removal. Wal-Mart’s November 6 discovery responses omitted the

addresses of Favor, Alford and Davis, even though plaintiff had specifically requested them. Without

these addresses, it would be difficult to serve process on any of these persons if they were added as

party defendants. As such, it was an entirely proper and appropriate strategy for plaintiff to attempt to

procure those addresses before moving forward with the amendment. To that end, within a reasonable

time after receipt of the incomplete discovery responses, plaintiff’s counsel contacted Wal-Mart’s

attorney in writing and specifically requested the addresses of Favor, Alford and Davis. (Reply Brief

(doc. 6), at Exh. D.) Wal-Mart’s response dated November 21, 2006 ignored that request and failed

to furnish addresses for any of those persons. (Id. at Exh. E.) Plaintiff followed up with an e-mailed

request for addresses on November 27, 2006, one day before removal. (Id. at Exh. F.) In response,

Wal-Mart’s counsel advised plaintiff’s counsel later that same day that he did not have their addresses,

but that he would try to locate them if plaintiff wished. (Id. at Exh. G.) Shortly thereafter, plaintiff’s

counsel discovered the addresses of Alford and Davis by other means, and resolved to serve Favor

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6 The cases on which Wal-Mart relies are distinguishable. For example, Wal-Mart cites

Smith v. White Consol. Industries, Inc., 229 F. Supp.2d 1275 (N.D. Ala. 2002) and Sexton v. G &

K Services, Inc., 51 F. Supp.2d 1311 (M.D. Ala.1999) for the proposition that attempts to add

diversity-destroying defendants post-removal despite prior knowledge of those defendants strongly

suggests an improper purpose. Both cases are distinguishable. In Smith, the identity of the new

defendant was known to the plaintiff at least 10 months before filing his initial complaint and 20 months

before filing the proposed amendment. In Sexton, the plaintiff could have ascertained the new

defendant’s identity merely by looking at the contract at issue in the case. Here, by contrast, Sharp did

not know, and could not reasonably ascertain, the new defendants’ identities without the discovery

process. To the contrary, the information available to Sharp (e.g., the picture of Delony on the wall of

the Jackson store identifying him as manager; the listing of his name as manager on the Incident Report

relating to Sharp’s injury) prior to filing suit misled her into believing that Delony, and not Favor, was

the manager of the Jackson store, and she acted promptly and diligently to obtain the correct

information via the discovery process even before this action was removed.

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through the Jackson store that he managed. This paper trail confirms that, far from sitting on her hands

with respect to Favor, Alford and Davis, after learning their identities plaintiff undertook reasonably

prompt and diligent measures to obtain their addresses, with an eye towards amending the complaint

and serving them with process upon obtaining same. The Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint was

filed less than two days after plaintiff learned the addresses of Alford and Davis.

These circumstances cannot reasonably support a finding that plaintiff’s amendment is

calculated to defeat federal jurisdiction. From the very inception of this action, Sharp has sought to

bring negligence and wantonness claims against not only Wal-Mart, but also the individual managers

and employees whom she contends are responsible for her injuries. She did not tarry upon learning the

identities of Favor, Alford and Davis, but acted promptly through multiple avenues to ascertain their

addresses (which plaintiff had requested but which Wal-Mart had failed to provide in its discovery

responses) for service of process. Upon learning the locations of Alford and Davis, and confirming

Favor’s status as manager at the Jackson store, plaintiff had service addresses for all three proposed

new defendants and proceeded without delay to seek to amend her complaint to state colorable statelaw claims against each of them. Nothing in these facts suggests either an improper purpose or dilatory

conduct.6 Accordingly, the first two Hensgens factors weigh in favor of allowing the amendment.

The next Hensgens factor is whether plaintiff will be significantly injured if the amendment is

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7 Additionally, depending on how Sharp were to structure her state court lawsuit and

how the applicable agency principles were resolved, she might encounter difficulty under Alabama

Code § 6-5-440, which generally prohibits plaintiffs from prosecuting two actions in the courts of this

state at the same time for the same cause and against the same party.

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disallowed. Wal-Mart argues that this factor militates against amendment because Favor, Alford and

Davis are not indispensable parties; Wal-Mart can fully satisfy any judgment that Sharp might receive;

plaintiff can obtain discovery from these proposed new defendants through Wal-Mart because they are

employed by Wal-Mart; and plaintiff can sue the proposed individual defendants in state court. Implicit

in these contentions are several assumptions, the most crucial of which is that the proposed new

defendants were acting in the line and scope of their employment, such that Wal-Mart would be liable

for their acts and omissions. To be sure, Wal-Mart is correct that it “has not denied that the individuals

were acting in the line and scope of their employment at all relevant times” (Opposition Brief, at 9), but

it has not admitted it either. At this early stage of the litigation, there is no evidence before the Court

that lends any clues as to whether a dispute might arise as to agency / respondeat superior issues. 

Certainly, nothing in the pleadings would foreclose such a defense, and Wal-Mart has not affirmatively

waived it. As such, it is impossible to rule out at this juncture the possibility that the liability of the

proposed individual defendants may diverge from that of Wal-Mart. Moreover, Wal-Mart trivializes

the additional hassle, expense and inconvenience that would arise if Sharp were to initiate parallel

litigation against Favor, Alford and Davis in state court. Unquestionably, it would be a significant

burden to prosecute a redundant case. Finally, should Favor, Alford or Davis leave their employment

with Wal-Mart during the pendency of these proceedings, plaintiff may encounter substantially greater

obstacles in securing discovery from them as third-party witnesses than she would if they were named

defendants.7 For all of these reasons, the Court is of the opinion that there is a substantial risk of injury

to plaintiff if the requested amendment is rejected.

Lastly, in considering all of the equities, the Court observes that the interests of efficiency and

judicial economy strongly favor litigating all of Sharp’s claims relating to the September 2005 incident in

a single lawsuit. The deleterious effects of duplicative litigation concerning the same subject matter and

similar parties must be weighed in the balance of equities. See Hensgens, 833 F.2d at 1182

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8 Because the Court has concluded that the amendment to name non-diverse defendants

should be allowed, it is not necessary to reach the question of whether Delony was fraudulently joined

as a defendant. Nonetheless, the record does not support a finding of fraudulent joinder. Under well

established law, fraudulent joinder is appropriate in the circumstances presented here only if “there is no

possibility the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the resident defendant. ... The defendant

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(defendant's interest in federal forum must be weighed against “the danger of parallel federal/state

proceedings with the inherent dangers of inconsistent results and the waste of judicial resources”). 

More generally, this is not a case in which the plaintiff has engaged in inequitable conduct. There is no

indication that she has been manipulative, deceptive, or dilatory in any respect. Certainly, the balance

of the equities should encompass consideration of defendant’s right to choose a federal forum. See id.

But here that right was mitigated, if not altogether eliminated, by the fact that, since Day 1, Sharp has

attempted to sue the Wal-Mart store manager and the Wal-Mart employees who stacked the shelves

with the falling containers. Those defendants were always of non-diverse citizenship from Sharp, even

if she did not name the correct manager in her first Complaint. Moreover, it appears that Wal-Mart’s

hands are unclean because, through misidentifying Delony as store manager both on the requisite

incident report and on the physical store itself, Wal-Mart created the confusion that led to Sharp

incorrectly identifying him as store manager in her Complaint. Likewise, by failing to respond to

discovery requests for the new defendants’ addresses, Wal-Mart effectively delayed Sharp’s

amendment (which it must have suspected was in the offing) as it prepared its removal papers. To deny

the amendment here would allow Wal-Mart to profit from its own misleading and foot-dragging

conduct by preserving a federal forum to which Wal-Mart would never have been entitled absent such

conduct.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds, based on the balance of equities, that plaintiff’s

proposed amendment should be permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). The Motion for Leave to

Amend Complaint (doc. 2) is therefore granted, and the proposed First Amended Complaint

appended to the Motion shall be deemed the operative complaint. Because defendants Favor, Alford

and Davis are all of non-diverse citizenship to plaintiff, § 1447(e) requires that this action be remanded

to the state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.8

Case 1:06-cv-00817-WS-C Document 9 Filed 01/25/07 Page 9 of 10
must make such a showing by clear and convincing evidence.” Henderson v. Washington National

Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006). In assessing a fraudulent joinder objection, “the

district court must evaluate factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve any

uncertainties about the applicable law in the plaintiff’s favor.” Pacheco de Perez v. AT & T Co., 139

F.3d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir. 1998). Wal-Mart’s only evidence to meet its heavy burden of proof on

this issue is the statement in the McGhee Affidavit that Delony “recently had transferred” to another

store and that he did not manage the Jackson store “during that time period”. What “time period”? 

When is “recently”? Surely, if Delony had been the manager of the Jackson store one day before the

accident occurred, he could be liable in negligence or wantonness for unsafe conditions that he created

and that persisted in that store the following day. The McGhee Affidavit does not rule out this

possibility. Furthermore, if Delony were the manager when Wal-Mart employees stacked the shelves

in an unsafe manner, and if he allowed or instructed them to proceed in that manner, he could be liable. 

Again, the McGhee Affidavit is silent on this point. McGhee’s statement that Delony was not

responsible for keeping the store safe or securing the containers is a legal conclusion that, on its face,

flows exclusively from the premise that he was not the manager of the Jackson store on the date in

question. (McGhee Aff., ¶ 5.) McGhee cannot properly testify as to what legal responsibility Delony

may or may not have had, and this passage reduces to the unremarkable (and ultimately unhelpful)

proposition that Delony was not the manager on September 1, 2005. She says nothing about what

involvement Delony might have had in creating or overseeing the dangerous condition that culminated in

the September 1, 2005 accident. On this scant evidentiary showing, Wal-Mart has not satisfied its

heavy burden of proving fraudulent joinder. This finding constitutes a separate and independent basis

for remanding this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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III. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (doc. 2) and

plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (doc. 7) are both granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). Because

subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, this action is hereby remanded to the Circuit Court of Clarke

County, Alabama for further proceedings.

DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of January, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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