Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01570/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01570-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 (hereafter, “Motion,” Docket Item No. 439.) Defendants Echostar Satellite LLC and

Echostar Technologies Corporation filed the Motion, which was joined by the following Defendants:

DIRECTV Group, Inc.; Ademia Multimedia, LLC; ACMP, LLC; AEBN, Inc.; Audio

Communications, Inc.; Cyber Trend, Inc.; Cybernet Ventures, Inc.; Game Link, Inc.; Global AVS,

Inc.; Innovative Ideas International; Lightspeed Media Group, Inc.; National A-1 Advertising, Inc.;

New Destiny Internet Group, LLC; and VS Media, Inc. (See Docket Item Nos. 431, 440.)

Other Defendants have also filed their own Motions for fees based on the same grounds. (See

Docket Nos. 428, 429, 432, 433.)

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

In re: Acacia Media Technologies Corp.

 /

NO. M 05-01665 JW

NO. C 05-01114 JW

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS RE EXCEPTIONAL CASE

AND FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Presently before the Court are Defendants’ Motions Re Exceptional Case and for Attorney

Fees.1 Defendants seek a determination by the Court that they are entitled to an award of attorney

fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. These Motions were taken under submission for a decision without oral

argument. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Based on the papers submitted to date, the Court DENIES

Defendants’ Motions.

A. Background

This case involves Plaintiff’s assertion of the following patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,132,992

(‘992 Patent), 5,253,275 (‘275 Patent), 5,550,863 (‘863 Patent), 6,002,720 (‘720 Patent), and

6,144,702 (‘702 Patent). The technological background and procedural history are laid out in the

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 1 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

Court’s previous orders. (See Docket Item Nos. 266, 312, 350, 354.) On October 23, 2009, the

Court entered Judgment in favor of Defendants against Plaintiff Acacia, and set a briefing schedule

for Defendants’ anticipated motions for attorney fees. (Docket Item Nos. 355, 356.)

B. Legal Standards for Award of Attorney Fees Under 35 U.S.C. § 285

“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 

35 U.S.C. § 285. “The award of such fees is discretionary with the trial court, but such discretion

may only be exercised upon a specific finding of exceptional circumstances.” Stevenson v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 712 (Fed. Cir. 1983). “The determination of whether a case is

exceptional and, thus, eligible for an award of attorney fees under § 285 is a two-step process. First,

the district court must determine whether a case is exceptional, [which is] a factual determination 

. . . . After determining that a case is exceptional, the district court must determine whether attorney

fees are appropriate . . . .” Wedgetail Ltd. v. Huddleston Deluxe, Inc., 576 F.3d 1302, 1304 (Fed.

Cir. 2009). Thus, even if a court finds a case to be exceptional, it has discretion whether to award

attorney fees, and “must weigh factors such as degree of culpability, closeness of the questions, and

litigation behavior.” Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 528 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

“The exceptional nature of the case must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” 

Wedgetail Ltd., 576 F.3d at 1304. “[O]nly a limited universe of circumstances warrant a finding of

exceptionality in a patent case: ‘inequitable conduct before the PTO; litigation misconduct;

vexatious, unjustified, and otherwise bad faith litigation; a frivolous suit or willful infringement.’” 

Id. A “multiplicity” of acts in one of these categories, viewed as a whole, may support finding a

case exceptional, even if the acts viewed individually would be insufficient. Nilssen, 528 F.3d at

1359. The Federal Circuit “has rejected an expansive reading of § 285, which would permit findings

of exceptionality in circumstances other than those listed above.” Id. at 1305 (quotation marks

omitted). Rather, absent litigation misconduct or inequitable conduct before the PTO, the Federal

Circuit “has permitted the award of attorney fees to a prevailing accused infringer only if both (1)

the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.” Id.

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 2 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 (Plaintiff Acacia Media Technologies Corporation’s Opposition to Defendant Echostar’s

Motion Re Exceptional Case at 1, 18, hereafter, “Opp’n,” Docket Item No. 444.)

3

C. Litigation Misconduct

Defendants move the Court to find this case exceptional on the ground that Plaintiff engaged

in litigation misconduct. Defendants contends that the following acts, taken as a whole, constitute

litigation misconduct: 

(1) Filing new actions involving the ‘992 and ‘702 Patents after the Court issued its first

Claim Construction Order, in which it found that two claim terms were “arguably

indefinite.”

(2) Filing new actions outside of the Central District of California after the Court had

ordered that any new actions shall be filed in the Central District.

(3) Submitting declarations from its expert with its opposition to one of Defendants’

motions for summary judgment.

(4) Changing its position regarding the proper construction of certain claims.

(5) Seeking clarification of the Court’s Order appointing a technical advisor.

(6) Filing covenants not to sue as to several claims at various times during the litigation.

(7) Moving for summary judgment against itself.

(Motion at 4-13.) Plaintiff contends that its conduct was not extraordinary, and that the Court never

once found it to have violated any rule of procedure, never imposed sanctions for any conduct, and

never made a finding that Plaintiff engaged in wrongful or vexatious litigation.2

 The Court

addresses each act in turn.

1. Filing New Actions Involving Patent Claims Found “Arguably Invalid”

The Federal Circuit has cautioned that, in the context of a court’s decision whether a case is

exceptional, “a patentee should not be automatically penalized for pursuing an infringement action

after a determination of invalidity in another suit. There must be some finding of unfairness, bad

faith, or inequitable conduct on the part of the unsuccessful patentee.” Stevenson, 713 F.2d at 712. 

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 3 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 (Declaration of Jason A. Crotty in Support of Echostar’s Motion Re Exceptional Case,

hereafter, “Crotty Decl.,” Ex. 8, Docket Item No. 439-2.)

4

Here, Defendants rely on the fact that the Court, in its first Claim Construction Order issued

on July 12, 2004, found two terms in the ‘992 and ‘702 Patents “arguably invalid.”3

 In its Order, the

Court invited Acacia to move for an evidentiary hearing as to whether one of skill in the art could

identify a corresponding structure for one of the terms deemed “arguably invalid,” and invited

Defendants to move for summary judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1-2. (Id. at 21.) 

Soon after the Order, prior to any evidentiary hearings on invalidity, Plaintiff filed new actions

involving the ‘992 and ‘702 Patents against other Defendants. (See Opp’n at 5-6.)

Based on the above facts, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s filing of new actions after the Court

found certain claims of the asserted patents to be “arguably indefinite” is not clear and convincing

evidence of misconduct. Rather, under Federal Circuit law, even the filing of new actions after an

actual determination of invalidity would not compel a finding of exceptional circumstances. 

Moreover, there is no evidence that Plaintiff acted in bad faith. In any event, these cases were

eventually transferred to the Court as part of the multi-district litigation, and therefore, did not

somehow escape the effect of the Court’s determination as to the validity particular claims. Thus,

the Court finds that this act by Plaintiff does not support finding the case exceptional.

2. Filing New Actions Outside of the Central District of California

In its December 12, 2003 Order, the Court stated:

Plaintiff shall file any case involving the ‘992 patent or a patent which is a continuation or

divisional of the ‘992 patent in the Central District of California, Southern Division. 

Plaintiff shall file a notice of related cases with this Court in any action that involves U.S.

Patent Nos. ‘702, ‘992 or other patents held by Plaintiff filed outside of California.

(Crotty Decl., Ex. 7 at 3:2-5.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff violated the Court’s December 12,

2003 Order by subsequently filing new actions outside of the Central District of California. (Motion

at 6.) Plaintiff contends that it did not violate the Court’s Order because the language of the Order

contemplates filing actions “outside of California” if venue is not present in the Central District, so

long as Plaintiff filed a notice of related cases. (Opp’n at 6-7.)

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 4 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 (See Declaration of Alan P. Block in Support of Plaintiff Acacia Media Technologies

Corporation’s Opposition to Defendant Echostar’s Motion Re Exceptional Case, hereafter, “Block

Decl.,” Ex. 5, Docket Item No. 445.)

5

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s filing of new actions outside of the Central District of

California is not clear and convincing evidence of misconduct. The language of the Order does not

clearly rule out Plaintiff’s filing of cases outside of the Central District. In fact, after Plaintiff filed

its new actions outside of the Central District, rather than finding that Plaintiff violated the

December 12, 2003 Order, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause as to why the new actions

should not be related to the action in the Central District.4 Thus, the Court finds that this act by

Plaintiff does not support finding the case exceptional.

3. Plaintiff’s Submission of Expert Declarations in Opposition to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity

Prior to the Court’s first Claim Construction Order, the Court issued an Order Setting Claims

Construction Hearing in which it instructed the parties that “no party shall file [an] expert

declaration in support of its claim construction contentions.” (Crotty Decl., Ex. 7 at 2:16-18.) 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff violated the Court’s Order by filing expert declarations with its

Opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of invalidity following the

Court’s first Claim Construction Order. (Motion at 5; Crotty Decl., Ex. 11.)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s filing of expert declarations with its Opposition to

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is not clear and convincing evidence of misconduct. 

Rather, the Court’s Order pertained to claim construction, not a motion for summary judgment on

the issue of invalidity. Thus, the Court finds that this act by Plaintiff does not support finding the

case exceptional.

4. Changing Positions Regarding the Proper Construction of Certain Claims

Defendants contend that Plaintiff engaged in litigation misconduct by “repeatedly chang[ing]

its positions [as to claim construction], thus adding to the length and complexity of the briefing,”

and that Plaintiff’s “flip-flopping appears to have been designed to evade the Court’s Markman

order and further add to the cost and complexity of the case.” (Motion at 7-9.) Plaintiff contends

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 5 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 See Javelin Investments, LLC v. McGinnis, No. H-05-3379, 2007 WL 781190, *4 n.14

(S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2007) (declining to infer bad faith from the plaintiffs’ “admittedly head-swerving

changes of position”).

6

that it’s claim construction arguments naturally evolved over the course of the Court’s six claim

construction orders, and that Defendants have not presented any evidence of bad faith or litigation

misconduct. (Opp’n at 10-11.)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s changing of position as to certain terms to be construed

by the Court is not clear and convincing evidence of misconduct. Over the course of the litigation,

the Court issued six claim construction orders addressing dozens of claim terms. The Court finds no

evidence of bad faith in Plaintiff’s decision to change or adapt its position as to the proper

construction of certain claim terms in light of the Court’s construction of certain terms in each of its

orders. Defendants have provided no evidence of bad faith by Plaintiff.5 Additionally, the Court has

discretion whether to consider any changed claim construction position held by the parties. The

Court finds that it would hinder litigation and the claim construction process to find a change in

claim construction position to be vexatious or improper, since the Court’s role is to determine the

proper construction, which may entail an evolving understanding of the claim terms. Thus, the

Court finds that this act by Plaintiff does not support finding the case exceptional.

5. Plaintiff’s Seeking Clarification of the Court’s Order Appointing a Technical

Advisor

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s request for clarification of the Court’s Order appointing a

technical advisor was improper because it required “defendants to brief more unnecessary issues.” 

(Motion at 11.) Plaintiff contends that its request for clarification was made in good faith. (Opp’n

at 12-13.)

On April 7, 2004, the Court appointed an advisor to assist it on technical matters. (See

Crotty Decl., Ex. 20.) On February 18, 2005, Plaintiff moved for clarification of the Court’s Order

appointing the technical advisor. (See id., Ex. 21.) On June 21, 2005, the Court issued an Order

clarifying the role of the technical advisor. (See Docket Item No. 21.)

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 6 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for clarification is not clear and convincing

evidence of misconduct. Plaintiff requested clarification as to whether the advisor was a “technical

advisor” or a Rule 706 expert, because, inter alia, the Order appointing the advisor simultaneously

stated that he was being appointed as an expert pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 706 and as a consultant to

the Court. In the Court’s June 21, 2005 Order, the Court did not criticize or sanction Plaintiff for

making its request, but instead clarified that the advisor was appointed as “a technical adviser only.” 

(See Docket Item No. 21 at 2.) Thus, the Court finds that this act by Plaintiff does not support

finding the case exceptional.

6. Plaintiff’s Filing of Covenants not to sue and Moving for Summary Judgment

Against Itself

Defendants contend that Plaintiff engaged in misconduct by serially filing covenants not to

sue in order to prolong litigation as long as possible and by moving for summary judgment against

itself on the issue of invalidity. (Motion at 12-13.) Plaintiff contends that it made these strategic

decisions when it determined that certain claims were no longer viable, and in the interest of judicial

efficiency. (Opp’n at 13-14.)

The Federal Circuit, in affirming a denial of attorney fees, has recognized that “[c]laims and

defendants frequently are dropped and amended during the course of a lawsuit. Moreover, sound

judicial policy encourages a narrowing of issues.” Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy

Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 694 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that it in fact withdrew certain claims at various times over

the course of the litigation. (See Opp’n at 13.) On January 20, 2006, Plaintiff moved for summary

judgment against itself as to noninfringement and invalidity of the ‘702 Patent in order to take up an

appeal immediately. (See Docket Item No. 120.) On October 19, 2007, the Court denied Plaintiff’s

motion without prejudice to be renewed following the completion of claim construction. (See

Docket Item No. 259 at 17.) On June 17, 2008, Plaintiff again moved for summary judgment against

itself on the issues of noninfringement and invalidity of certain claims. (See Docket Item No. 287.) 

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 7 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

The Court ultimately denied the motion after issuing an order to show cause as to why summary

judgment should not be granted. (See Docket Item Nos. 312, 318.)

Based on the above facts, the Court finds that Defendants have presented no evidence that

Plaintiff withdrew claims at various times in bad faith or in any manner that would constitute

litigation misconduct. The fact that Plaintiff withdrew certain claims following a claim construction

order unfavorable to Plaintiff does not show bad faith. (See Motion at 12.) Rather, as a general

matter, the Court encourages parties to withdraw claims if they determine that assertion of those

claims cannot be maintained. Thus, the Court finds that this act by Plaintiff does not support finding

the case exceptional.

Additionally, the Court finds that Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff’s motions for

summary judgment against itself constitute litigation misconduct. Rather, in the Order to Show

Cause, the Court stated “[a]lthough the motion is unusual in that Plaintiff moves for summary

judgment against itself and in favor of Defendants, the Court finds that the motion is meritorious.”

(Docket Item No. 312.) Thus, the Court finds that this act by Plaintiff does not support finding the

case exceptional.

In sum, the Court finds that the acts relied on by Defendants, whether taken individually or

as a whole, do not support a finding that the case is exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion as to the ground of litigation misconduct.

D. Inequitable Conduct Before the Patent Office

In the alternative, Defendants move the Court to find this case exceptional on the ground that

Plaintiff committed inequitable conduct before the Patent Office in procuring the ‘992 Patent. 

(Motion at 16-18.) Plaintiff contends that there has been no finding of inequitable conduct in this

case, the references relied on by Defendants are not prior art, are not material to patentability, were

not withheld with intent to mislead the Patent Office, and that the record before the Court is

insufficient to support the detailed factual analysis that a finding of inequitable conduct would

entail. (Opp’n at 20.)

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 8 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

In deciding whether a case is exceptional, a district court must address the issue of

inequitable conduct, even if raised for the first time in a motion for attorney fees. See Enzo

Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 1999); A.B. Chance Co. v. RTE

Corp., 854 F.2d 1307, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “[W]here the existence of bad faith during

proceedings before the PTO fails to rise to the level of inequitable conduct, no gross injustice is

prevented by ordering payment of attorney fees, and . . . proper application of the law dictates that

the award of attorney fees be reversed.” McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. L. Perrigo Co., 337 F.3d 1362, 1372

(Fed. Cir. 2003).

“Patent applicants and those substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of a

patent application owe a duty of candor and good faith to the PTO. A breach of this duty may

constitute inequitable conduct, which can arise from a failure to disclose information material to

patentability, coupled with an intent to deceive the PTO. Both of these elements, intent and

materiality, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v.

Fisher Tooling Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 1335, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “Once the record supports the

threshold levels of materiality and intent, the ultimate determination of inequitable conduct is within

the discretion of the district court. In making this determination, the court must conduct a balancing

test between the levels of materiality and intent, with a greater showing of one factor allowing a

lesser showing of the other.” Union Pac. Res., 236 F.3d at 693.

“Intent to deceive [cannot] be inferred solely from the fact that information was not

disclosed; there must be a factual basis for a finding of deceptive intent.” M. Eagles Tool

Warehouse, Inc., 439 F.3d at 1340. Intent need not be proven by direct evidence. Id. at 1341. 

However, “[w]hen the absence of a good faith explanation [for failure to disclose] is the only

evidence of intent,[] that evidence alone does not constitute clear and convincing evidence

warranting an inference of intent.” Id.

Here, Defendants rely on a report (the “Sarnoff Report”) commissioned by one of the

inventors of the ‘992 Patent during the application process. (See Crotty Decl., Ex. 2.) It is

undisputed that the application for the ‘992 Patent was filed on January 7, 1991. (See Motion at 2;

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 9 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 (Motion at 3-4; Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion Re Exceptional Case at 2-3,

hereafter, “Reply,” Docket Item No. 446.)

10

Opp’n at 4.) On March 6, 1992, one of the inventors of the ‘992 Patent commissioned the David

Sarnoff Research Center to provide a technical analysis of the invention of the ‘992 Patent. (See

Crotty Decl., Ex. 5.) On April 20, 2002, the Sarnoff Report was provided to the inventor. (See id.) 

The Report states in its “scope” section that “our review . . . is at a general technical level, and is not

intended as an expert evaluation of patentability.” (Id. at 2.) The Report’s “summary” states as

follows:

The patent document supplied by [the inventor] outlines a generic set of technologies

necessary for a video-on-demand system. The general principles of the system described in

the patent are believed to be technically correct, though significant additional design detail

will have to be developed before a proof-of-concept prototype can be implemented. Based

on our review of published material (see references) in the area of video-on-demand,

interactive multimedia, etc., we do not consider the overall system architecture to be novel in

a scientific/technological sense.

(Id.)

Defendants contend that the Report as well as 28 references cited by the Report—some of

which were published after the ‘992 application date—constitute material information that Plaintiff

withheld with intent to deceive the Patent Office.6

 However, Defendants provide the Court with

almost no factual analysis as to why each reference was material to patentability, other than the

general statement that they “disclosed various aspects of the system outlined in the [patent]

application.” (Motion at 3.) More significantly, even assuming that the Report and its references

were material to patentability, Defendants have offered no evidence of intent other than the fact of

nondisclosure. Nondisclosure, even without a good faith explanation, is insufficient by itself to

satisfy the element of intent for inequitable conduct. M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc., 439 F.3d at

1341. Defendants contend that because Plaintiff has failed to provide any explanation whatsoever

for the failure to disclose the 20+ references listed in the Sarnoff Report, intent to deceive should be

imputed to Plaintiff. (Reply at 3.) The Court finds that this contention is misplaced because it is

Defendants who must show materiality and intent by clear and convincing evidence. Defendants

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 10 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

have failed to meet that burden. Thus, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to present

sufficient evidence of inequitable conduct.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions as to the ground of inequitable

conduct.

E. Conclusion

The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions Re Exceptional Case and for Attorney Fees. 

As Judgment has been entered, the Clerk of Court shall close this file and all member cases.

Dated: May 25, 2010 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 11 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

Adam R. Alper aalper@kirkland.com

Alan P. Block blocka@hbdlawyers.com

Albert L. Underhill aunderhill@swlaw.com

Annamarie A. Daley aadaley@rkmc.com

Asim M. Bhansali amb@kvn.com

Benjamin Hershkowitz bhershkowitz@gibsondunn.com

Bobby T. Shih bshih@mount.com

Bradford P. Lyerla blyerla@marshallip.com

Bryant Carroll Boren bryant.c.boren@bakerbotts.com

Christopher Scott Marchese marchese@fr.com

Christopher W Kennerly chris.kennerly@bakerbotts.com

Daniel Reisner dreisner@kayescholer.com

Daniel E. Jackson djackson@kvn.com

Daralyn J. Durie ddurie@durietangri.com

David Benyacar dbenyacar@kayescholer.com

David A. York david.york@lw.com

David Jason Silbert djs@kvn.com

Emmett J. McMahon ejmcmahon@rkmc.com

Harold J. McElhinny HmcElhinny@mofo.com

J. Timothy Nardell tim@jtnlaw.com

James Michael Slominski jslominski@hh.com

Jason A. Crotty jcrotty@mofo.com

Jeffrey D. Sullivan jeffrey.sullivan@bakerbotts.com

Jeffrey H. Dean jdean@marshallip.com

John C. Englander jenglander@goodwinprocter.com

Jon-Thomas Bloch jbloch@marshallip.com

Jonathan Elliot Singer singer@fr.com

Juanita R. Brooks brooks@fr.com

Kevin D. Hogg khogg@marshallip.com

Kevin G. McBride kgmcbride@jonesday.com

Marc Morris morrism@hbdlawyers.com

Maria Kara Nelson mknelson@jonesday.com

Marsha Ellen Mullin memullin@jonesday.com

Matthew Ian Kreeger mkreeger@mofo.com

Michael J. McNamara michael.mcnamara@bakerbotts.com

Mitchell D. Lukin mitch.lukin@bakerbotts.com

Morgan William Tovey morgantovey@quinnemanuel.com

Patrick J. Whalen pwhalen@spencerfane.com

Paul A. Friedman pafriedman@mofo.com

Rachel Krevans rkrevans@mofo.com

Richard R. Patch rrp@cpdb.com

Robert Donald Carroll rcarroll@goodwinprocter.com

Roderick G. Dorman dormanr@hbdlawyers.com

Sean David Garrison sgarrison@lrlaw.com

Stephen P. Safranski spsafranski@rkmc.com

Todd Glen Miller miller@fr.com

Victor de Gyarfas vdegyarfas@foley.com

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Victor George Savikas vgsavikas@jonesday.com

William Joseph Robinson wrobinson@foley.com

William R. Overend woverend@reedsmith.com

William R. Woodford woodford@fr.com

Dated: May 25, 2010 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: /s/ JW Chambers 

Elizabeth Garcia

Courtroom Deputy

Case 5:05-cv-01570-JW Document 8 Filed 05/25/10 Page 13 of 13