Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_04-cv-01129/USCOURTS-ared-4_04-cv-01129-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

THOMAS E. HOPE PLAINTIFF

vs. CASE NO. 4:04CV01129GH

ANTHONY J. PRINICIPI, SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS DEFENDANT

ORDER

Plaintiff filed this action pro se alleging that defendant discriminated and

retaliated against him when he was not selected for three different nursing assistant

positions with the Veterans Administration Medical Center (VAMC) . Defendant has

filed a motion for partial dismissal contending that (1) the Americans with Disability

Act (ADA) does not apply to federal employees and plaintiff’s discrimination claim

under the Rehabilitation Act must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies; (2) plaintiff’s allegations of age discrimination must be dismissed for failure

to exhaust; and (3) plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages must be dismissed for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Plaintiff, through appointed counsel, has responded. He agrees that the ADA

does not apply to federal employees and that he has not stated a claim for age

discrimination. He disagrees that he is barred from pursuing his disability

discrimination claim and from seeking compensatory damages.

A brief summary of the facts of the case is necessary before proceeding to the

merits. Plaintiff sought a transfer from his position as a Nurse Assistant/Medical

Instrument Technician, at the VAMC in Richmond, Virginia, to a similar position at

the VAMC in Little Rock. Plaintiff applied for a Nursing Assistant position in the

Surgical Intensive Care Unit (Announcement Number 01-136) and was interviewed

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for the position. On October 11, 2001, plaintiff was notified that his application was

considered but he was not selected for the position. 

The same position was reannounced on October 25, 2001, under Certificate No.

DEU-02-006-SO and plaintiff’s name was submitted. By letter dated December 6,

2001, plaintiff was informed that his application was considered but that the position

would not be filled. 

On February 11, 2002, the Little Rock VAMC issued Announcement Number

DEU-02-033-SO for ten nursing assistants. Plaintiff applied, was found eligible and

was referred for consideration. In April or May 2002, plaintiff was selected and

offered a Nursing Assistant position pending satisfactory completion of a physical

examination. On May 16, 2002, a physical examination concluded that plaintiff could

perform the duties of a Nursing Assistant without limiting conditions but noted that

he had a history of knee and back pain and injury. The examining physician stated

that plaintiff must use good body mechanics when lifting. On May 21, 2002, another

physician completed plaintiff’s duty status report and stated that plaintiff could only

work 8 hours per day, could not lift, push or pull over 25 pounds, was to avoid

prolonged standing or walking that causes knee or lower back pain, and was to

adhere strictly to his modified duties. 

On May 23, 2002, the Nursing Service notified the Human Resources

Management Service (HRMS) that based on plaintiff’s preemployment physical

plaintiff had limitations that it could not accommodate. Therefore, on May 24, 2002,

Daniel Peterson, Chief of HRMS, notified plaintiff that the VAMC had sent an

objection of plaintiff’s suitability for employment as a Nursing Assistant to the Office

of Personnel Management (OPM). The objection stated that plaintiff was not able to

perform the functional duties of a Nursing Assistant position due to his inability to

lift, push, pull or stand for prolonged periods, without risk of harm to himself or

patients. The objection stated that no accommodation could be made, and requested

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that plaintiff’s name be removed from OPM’s list of 30% disabled veterans eligible for

Nursing Assistant positions. On July 17, 2002, OPM approved the agency’s request

to remove plaintiff from eligibility as a Nursing Assistant.

Plaintiff filed a formal administrative EEO complaint on February 21, 2002.

The formal complaint does not contain a checklist like that used in the private sector;

rather a complainant is asked to state the basis for the discrimination. Plaintiff

indicated reprisal and failure to hire. (Exhibit 1 to Defendant’s motion for partial

dismissal). The agency accepted the complaint and identified the following issue for

investigation: was plaintiff discriminated against based on reprisal (for prior EEO

activity) when he was not hired on October 11, 2001, and December 6, 2001, for the

Nursing Assistant positions? (Exhibit 2 to Defendant’s Motion for Partial Dismissal)

On July 25, 2002, plaintiff wrote to Joan Hanson, Chief, Policy & Compliance,

contending that Peterson “was a dupe.. .” He further stated in the letter that .”Mr.

Peterson is denying a 30% service connected veteran a job at the VA Hospital. A U.S.

Department of Labor Duty Status Report: Employee advised to resume work with

accommodation. The occup. specialist in ORM stated he would not file this duty

status with U.S. Department of Labor even though I presented my OWCP file

number. I am eligible for reinstatement, with veteran preference. Is there something

you could do to help this service connected veteran with this matter. I believe this is

a continuation of race discrimination and denial of benefits and fair employment. “

(Exhibit 3 to Defendant’s motion for partial dismissal).

The agency accepted the letter of July 25th as an amendment to the original

complaint of discrimination dated February 26, 2002. (Exhibit 4 to defendant’s motion

for partial dismissal). The agency found that the new allegation, which alleged that

management in an attempt to deny him employment, had posed on objection on

plaintiff’s suitability for employment as a Nursing Assistant, was like or related to

his original claim, failure to hire, and could have reasonably grown out of his original

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The September 30, 2002, letter to plaintiff accepting the amendment is confusing. It states

that plaintiff in his original EEO complaint alleged discrimination on the basis of age. The

September 30th letter then states “[b]ased on the information presented in your original complaint, it

was concluded that the actual claim in your age based complaint of discrimination was Failure to

Hire.” (emphasis added). The rest of the letter then correctly refers to the issues identified in the

May 21st agency letter. 

The Court has reviewed the record of the administrative proceedings and is unable to find

that plaintiff has alleged, or even implied, age discrimination. The formal EEO charge doesn’t even

contain plaintiff’s date of birth, which was included by the agency in its September 30, 2002, letter. 

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complaint. The claims identified and accepted by the agency for investigation were:

(1) Was plaintiff discriminated against based on Reprisal (for prior EEO

activity),when he was not hired for the position of Nursing Assistant on October 11,

2001 and December 6, 2001, and (2) was he discriminated against on the basis of Race

(Black) when the agency posed an objection on his suitability for employment as a

Nursing Assistant? 1

A Final Agency Decision (FAD) was issued on July 17, 2003, finding that the

agency did not discriminate with respect to the allegations in the complaint.

(originally included as exhibit to complaint; included as defendant’s exhibit 1 to

defendant’s reply to plaintiff’s response to the motion for partial dismissal). Of note

is an entire page in the FAD devoted to a discussion of disability discrimination. The

agency stated that plaintiff had not alleged disability discrimination, but went on to

state that if plaintiff were disabled or perceived as disabled, the agency’s actions

would be found to be discriminatory. An analysis for this conclusion follows in the

FAD. 

Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC), which affirmed the FAD on July 15, 2004. Plaintiff filed a

Request for Reconsideration before the EEOC which was denied on August 31, 2004.

(attached as exhibits to plaintiff’s complaint). Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint

in federal court on October 4, 2004. 

Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot pursue a disability discrimination

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The administrative complaint did not contain a checklist for plaintiff to identify the bases

for the discriminatory conduct, thereby leaving it to the agency to interpret plaintiff’s allegations. 

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claim in his federal lawsuit because he did not raise the issue in his formal EEO

complaint. 

A federal employee asserting a discrimination claim must exhaust his or her

administrative remedies as a precondition to filing an action in federal district court.

McAdams v. Reno, 64 F. 3d 1137, 1141 (8th Cir.1995). An exception to the exhaustion

requirement may be made if the allegations contained in the complaint are like or

reasonably related to charges brought in the administrative charges. 

“The permissible scope of an EEOC lawsuit is not confined to the specific

allegations in the charge; rather, it may extend to any discrimination like or related

to the substance of the allegations in the charge and which reasonably can be expected

to grow out of the investigation triggered by the charge.” E.E.O.C. v. Delight

Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir. 1992). The administrative complaint is

to be construed liberally and plaintiff "’may seek relief for any discrimination that

grows out of or is like or reasonably related to the substance of the allegations in the

administrative charge.’ The breadth of the civil suit is, therefore, as broad as the

scope of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from the

initial charge of discrimination. “ Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 631 (8th

Cir. 2000)(citations omitted). 

Although the agency identified only race and reprisal as the bases for

discrimination, the agency, during its investigation, raised concerns of disability

discrimination. After a very thorough discussion of the law regarding disability

discrimination, and applying the law to the facts of the charge, the FAD found that the

agency had erred in evaluating plaintiff’s fitness for duty, although it was not based

on race or prior EEO activity.

The agency, in this instance, defined the issues.2

 It limited those allegations

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Plaintiff was informed on a number of occasions as to the claims the agency would investigate and

the need to inform the agency of an “improperly formulated claim.” Plaintiff was, however,

proceeding pro se ,and it is unclear whether plaintiff was ever informed of the possibility of alleging

disability discrimination.

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to race and reprisal, although a fair reading of the plaintiff’s pro se assertions could

include disability discrimination. The circumstances surrounding the failure to hire

plaintiff for one of the nursing assistant positions announced in February 2002 were

investigated by the agency. In its investigation, disability discrimination was

addressed by the agency. Defendant was on notice of the possibility of disability

discrimination allegations. The disability claim is like or is reasonably related to the

substance of the administrative complaint as accepted and investigated by the agency.

Thus, the Court finds that the plaintiff’s disability claim under the Rehabilitation Act

should not be dismissed.

Defendant also contends that plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages should

be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. This contention is without

merit.

Here, the failure to raise compensatory damages in the administrative process

would have had no effect on the administrative process. Defendant had found that

plaintiff had not been discriminated against, therefore there would have been no need

for defendant to obtain any additional information relevant to plaintiff’s claim for

compensatory damages. cf. Crawford v. Babbitt, 186 F. 3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999),

(plaintiff failed to exhaust administrate remedies when failed to respond to agency’s

request for information regarding her claim for compensatory damages where agency

had found plaintiff was subjected to sexual harassment and retaliation). In this case,

the agency did not need any information substantiating plaintiff’s claim for

compensatory damages because it was not going to either settle with plaintiff or find

in favor of plaintiff. The agency was not going to investigate any claim for

compensatory damages, thus, the rationale for exhaustion, that is to investigate and

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conciliate, has no relevance in this instance. Furthermore, the Court will not read the

administrative charge as narrowly as proposed by defendant. While plaintiff was

seeking back pay, he also stated that he was “shocked at race relations” which should

have provided notice to defendant that plaintiff might be seeking additional damages.

Additionally, nowhere is plaintiff advised that he must set forth a claim specifically for

compensatory damages. See Seay v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 340 F. Supp. 2d 884,

849 (E. D. Tenn. 2004) (noting that nothing in EEOC complaint forms and

accompanying instructions advised pro se plaintiff that he had to explicitly assert claim

for emotional or mental injury which would help explain why plaintiff did not make

such a specific demand).

In sum, the Court finds that plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages should

not be dismissed for failure to exhaust.

Accordingly, the motion for partial dismissal is hereby denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of July, 2005.

___________________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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