Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01182/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01182-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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' FILED 

Unit.ed States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOHN F. GARD, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

) 

) 

DIANA M. GARD, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ) 

ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ) 

AGRICULTURE, CONSTANCE HORNER, ) 

Director, U.S. Office of Personnel ) 

Management, RICHARD THORNBERG, Attorney) 

General, United States Department of ) 

Justice, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

AUG 2 8 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1182 

(D.C. Nos. 85-B-2163 

& 

88-B-958) 

( D. Colo.) 

Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

• 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1182 Document: 010110041599 Date Filed: 08/28/1990 Page: 1 
' assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed . R. App . P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff commenced this 

The case is therefore ordered 

action pursuant to the 

Rehabilitation Act, 29 u.s.c. §§ 791, 794, alleging defendants 

wrongfully terminated plaintiff's employment due to plaintiff's 

narcolepsy and in retaliation for plaintiff's request that 

defendants make accommodations in his job duties because of 

plaintiff's narcolepsy. Plaintiff also asserted claims pursuant 

to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and the Freedom of 

Information Act, 5 u.s.c. § 552. 1 After a trial to the court, the 

district court entered judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff 

appeals. 

On appeal, plaintiff asserts fifty-four grounds for relief, 

which essentially fall into four categories: challenges to the 

district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law entered 

following trial to the court; challenges to discovery rulings; 

challenges to the district court's treatment of plaintiff's 

motions for summary judgment; and challenges to the trial court's 

award of costs to defendants. Upon careful review of the record 

on appeal, we affirm the district court's determinations. 

1 Plaintiff commenced two separate actions, which the district 

court consolidated for trial: No. 85-B-2163, which concerned the 

termination of plaintiff's employment, and No. 88-B-958, which 

concerned defendants' allegedly discriminatory conduct after 

plaintiff's termination. During trial, plaintiff abandoned his 

causes of action asserted in No. 88-B-958, and the district court, 

therefore, dismissed that action. Tr. vol. III at 59, 78. On 

appeal, plaintiff asserts the district court's dismissal of No. 

88-B-958 was contrary to law. Because that action was dismissed 

at plaintiff's request, the district court did not err. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-1182 Document: 010110041599 Date Filed: 08/28/1990 Page: 2 
I 

w 

In order to recover under the Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff 

must establish that he was an otherwise qualified handicapped 

individual and that defendants, who received federal financial 

assistance, terminated plaintiff's employment solely on the basis 

of his handicap. 29 U.S.C. § 794; see Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. 

of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1384 (10th Cir. 1981). This court 

reviews legal determinations de novo, see In re Ruti-Sweetwater, 

Inc., 836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988), while reviewing the 

district court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous 

standard, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see Anderson v. City of Bessemer 

City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). 

The district court's determination that plaintiff failed to 

establish that he was entitled to relief under the Rehabilitation 

Act was supported by the record and, therefore, was not erroneous. 

The record further supported the district court's decision in 

favor of defendants on plaintiff's remaining claims. 2 

2 Plaintiff asserts the district court erred by failing to make 

findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing plaintiff's 

sixth cause of action. Plaintiff alleged, in his sixth claim for 

relief, that defendants violated the Privacy Act by breaching an 

agreement with plaintiff not to release information concerning the 

reasons for plaintiff's termination, by denying plaintiff access 

to his personnel records, and by failing to account accurately to 

plaintiff concerning disclosure of plaintiff's personnel 

information. 

Plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief, see 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552a(g)(3)(A), because he eventually gained access to his 

personnel records. See,~, tr. vol. III at 41. Damages are 

available under the Privacy Act in certain situations where the 

government agency has acted willfully or intentionally. See 5 

u.s.c. § 552a(g)(4). See generally Andrews v. Veterans Admin., 

838 F.2d 418, 424-25 (10th Cir.)(addressing standard of conduct 

required for damages liability under the Privacy Act), cert. 

denied, 109 S. Ct. 56 (1988). While plaintiff alleged defendants 

acted intentionally in violating the Privacy Act, plaintiff 

(continued on next page) 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-1182 Document: 010110041599 Date Filed: 08/28/1990 Page: 3 
On appeal, plaintiff asserts challenges to a number of 

discovery rulings. Discovery rulings are left to the sound 

discretion of the trial court; this court will not disturb a trial 

court's discovery decisions absent a showing of an abuse of that 

discretion. See Willner v. Budig, 848 F.2d 1032, 1035-36 (10th 

Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 840 (1989). Review of the 

record on appeal fails to disclose any abuse of the trial court's 

discretion in the conduct of discovery and its rulings on the 

various discovery motions. 

Plaintiff asserts the district court erred in failing to 

conduct a hearing on plaintiff's motions for summary judgment and 

further erred in denying those motions. While a party is entitled 

to a hearing on a summary judgment motion, a formal evidentiary 

hearing with oral argument is not necessarily required; rather, 

"the parties' right to be heard may be fulfilled by the court's 

review of the briefs and supporting affidavits and materials 

submitted to the court." Geear v. Boulder Community Hosp., 844 

F.2d 764, 766 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 312 (1988). 

Review of the record indicates the trial court's treatment of 

plaintiff's summary judgment motions was not deficient. 

(continued from previous page) 

asserted no evidence at trial to support this allegation. 

Plaintiff, therefore, as a matter of law, was not entitled to 

relief under his sixth cause of action. See Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). See also Griess v. 

Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir. 1988)(appellate court may 

affirm district court's decision based on ground supported by the 

record but upon which the district court did not rely). 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-1182 Document: 010110041599 Date Filed: 08/28/1990 Page: 4 
This court reviews a district court's summary judgment 

determinations de novo, see Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 

Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988), viewing the record in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Ewing v. Amoco 

Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10th Cir. 1987). A party is 

entitled to summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because plaintiff's 

motions for summary judgment failed to establish plaintiff's right 

to recover as a matter of law, the district court did not err in 

denying those motions. 

Finally, plaintiff challenges the district court's award of 

costs to defendant. An award of costs shall be allowed as a 

matter of course to the prevailing party unless the trial court, 

in its discretion, determines otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); 

see Montgomery v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 671 F.2d 412, 413 

(10th Cir. 1982). The record does not reveal any exceptional 

circumstances warranting a departure from the general rule that 

the losing party is required to pay costs. See Montgomery, 671 

F.2d at 413; cf. Lewis v. NLRB, 750 F.2d 1266, 1268, 1279-80 (5th 

Cir. 1985)(defendant, an agency of the United States, may be 

entitled to award of costs as prevailing party in Title VII 

action). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

5 

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