Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02308/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02308-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAURICE JACKSON, No. 2:13-cv-2308-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS MEDICAL

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means

1

Case 2:13-cv-02308-JAM-CMK Document 5 Filed 05/08/14 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,

1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff’s claims are unclear and vague. It appears he is claiming that he was

improperly placed on suicide watch with no evidence and no justification to do so. While in the

crisis center, he alleges he was required to withstand unpleasant conditions, including being

placed in a cell naked, with no bed and no toilet facilities, for twenty-four hours. It therefore

appears he is claiming a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. However, he appears to

claim his equal protection rights were violated. He names two individual defendants, Nicholes

and Howell, who he claims acted in their professional capacity, as well as the medical

department presumably at High Desert State Prison. 

II. DISCUSSION

As to his claims that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated, those

claims are vague and unclear. The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions

under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which

prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993);

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “embodies broad and

idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble,

2

Case 2:13-cv-02308-JAM-CMK Document 5 Filed 05/08/14 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Temporary unconstitutional conditions of

confinement do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. See Anderson v. County of

Kern, 45 F.3d 1310 (9th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious

such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

Here, plaintiff states he was put in the crisis center where he was housed for

twenty-four hours without clothing, a bed, or toilet facilities. While apparently harsh, he does

not clearly explain how these harsh conditions violated his Constitutional rights. He does not

state what the condition of the cell was nor what he had to do in order to use toilet facilities. 

Without more facts, the court is unable to evaluate this claim. In addition, plaintiff fails to allege

who was responsible for the condition of the cell. He names the medical department, Howell and

Nicholes as defendants. He states the individual defendants were the ones responsible for

assigning him to suicide watch, but not whether they were the ones responsible for the cell

conditions. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. 

See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

3

Case 2:13-cv-02308-JAM-CMK Document 5 Filed 05/08/14 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and

conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations

are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the

plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff also appears to claim defendants Nicholes and Howell violated his rights

by assigning him to the crisis center without justification. If this is the basis of his equal

protection claim, it is unclear. 

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated

individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 

See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are protected from

invidious discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

Racial segregation is unconstitutional within prisons save for the necessities of prison security

and discipline. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). Prisoners are also

protected from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio,

125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial

and religious discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir.

2001) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the

disabled do not constitute a suspect class) see also Tatum v. Pliler, 2007 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal.

2007) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim based on denial of in-cell meals

where no allegation of race-based discrimination was made); Hightower v. Schwarzenegger,

2007 WL 732555 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2008). 

In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with

intentional discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff,

and that such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See Village of

4

Case 2:13-cv-02308-JAM-CMK Document 5 Filed 05/08/14 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims may be

brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir.

2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.

Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010

(9th Cir. 1985). 

There are no allegations made in plaintiff’s complaint that he was treated

differently than any other inmate, nor that he was discriminated against by defendants Howell

and Nicholes in their decision to place him on suicide watch. 

Finally, as to naming the medical department as a defendant, and to the extent

plaintiff names the individual defendants Howell and Nicholes in their official capacities, such

claims are prohibited under the Eleventh Amendment.

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought

against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v.

Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition

extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t

of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state

agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782

(1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th cir. 1993) (en banc).

The Eleventh Amendment also bars actions seeking damages from state officials

acting in their official capacities. See Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1995);

Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The Eleventh Amendment

does not, however, bar suits against state officials acting in their personal capacities. See id. 

Under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment does not

bar suits for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their official

capacities. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). The Eleventh

5

Case 2:13-cv-02308-JAM-CMK Document 5 Filed 05/08/14 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Amendment also does not bar suits against cities and counties. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978). Thus any claim against the medical department or the

individual defendants acting in their official capacity must be dismissed without leave to amend.

III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the

entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original

complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following

dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged

in the amended complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order

to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint

must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Because some of the defects identified in this order cannot be cured by

amendment, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend as to such claims. Plaintiff, therefore, now

has the following choices: (1) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which does not allege the

claims identified herein as incurable, in which case such claims will be deemed abandoned and

the court will address the remaining claims; or (2) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which

6

Case 2:13-cv-02308-JAM-CMK Document 5 Filed 05/08/14 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

continues to allege claims identified as incurable, in which case the court will issue findings and

recommendations that such claims be dismissed from this action, as well as such other orders

and/or findings and recommendations as may be necessary to address the remaining claims.

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

2. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

service of this order.

DATED: May 8, 2014

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

7

Case 2:13-cv-02308-JAM-CMK Document 5 Filed 05/08/14 Page 7 of 7