Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-15864/USCOURTS-ca9-09-15864-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARCIANO PLATA; RALPH COLEMAN, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

J. CLARK KELSO, No. 09-15864

Receiver,

D.C. No.

v.  3:01-cv-01351-THE

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, OPINION

Governor; MICHAEL GENEST; JAMES

E. TILTON,

Defendants-Appellants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Thelton E. Henderson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 16, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed April 30, 2010

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, William C. Canby, Jr. and

Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges.

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COUNSEL

Rebekah Evenson, Prison Law Office, Berkeley, California,

for the plaintiffs-appellees.

George C. Harris, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco,

California, for the receiver.

Paul B. Mello, Hanson Bridgett LLP, San Francisco, California, for the defendants-appellants.

OPINION

CANBY, Circuit Judge:

This class action was brought by California prisoners to

challenge deficiencies in prison medical care that allegedly

violated the Eighth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. The parties consented to the entry of stipulated orders providing steps to

remedy the deficiencies. When the State was unable to comply with the consent orders, the court imposed a receivership

on the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to administer and improve prisoner health

care. 

Although the State did not oppose or appeal from the

appointment of the Receiver, it now seeks, after several years,

to terminate the receivership on the ground that the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (“PLRA” or “Act”),

deprived the district court of the power to appoint a receiver

in prison litigation. In addition, the State contends that the

receivership was not “the least intrusive means necessary to

correct the violation of the Federal right,” as the Act requires

the district court to find in granting prospective relief. Id.

§ 3626(a)(1)(A). Finally, the State challenges the Receiver’s

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planning for construction of additional prison facilities on the

ground that the Act implicitly prohibits such planning.

We conclude that the Act does not deprive the district court

of its equitable power to appoint a receiver in prison litigation. We also reject the State’s challenge to the district court’s

finding that a receivership was the least intrusive means of

remedying constitutional violations in prisoner health care.

Finally, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the

district court’s refusal to terminate the Receiver’s construction plan. We accordingly affirm the portion of the district

court’s order that denied the State’s motion to terminate the

receivership, and we dismiss the appeal of the portion rejecting the challenge to the Receiver’s construction planning. 

I. Background

The plaintiffs brought this action on behalf of all inmates

of California state prisons. The complaint alleges that the

State has provided inmates with inadequate medical care in

violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Americans with

Disabilities Act.1 In January 2002, after almost three years of

informal negotiations and prior to discovery or any ruling on

the part of the court, the parties entered into a “Stipulation and

Order for Injunctive Relief” (“Relief Order”) designed to remedy the alleged violations. The court approved the Relief

Order that June.

As part of the Relief Order, the State agreed to implement

specific remedial procedures to ensure the provision of constitutionally adequate medical care in prisons statewide. These

1This case is one of four pending class actions concerning the provision

of constitutionally inadequate medical care in California state prisons. The

other three are Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. 2:90-cv-00520 (E.D.

Cal.) (mental health care); Perez v. Cate, No. 3:05-cv-05241 (N.D. Cal.)

(dental care); and Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, No. 4:94-cv-02307 (N.D.

Cal.) (compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act). 

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measures were to be taken on a rolling basis with seven prisons implementing the procedures in 2003 and five additional

prisons implementing them each year through 2008. The

Relief Order provides that it shall be “binding upon, and faithfully kept, observed, performed and be enforceable by and

against the parties” and empowers the district court to enforce

its terms through “specific performance and all other remedies

permitted by law.” In accord with this authorization, the district court convened monthly status conferences, toured one of

the subject prisons, enlisted experts to monitor compliance

with the Relief Order, and encouraged the parties to devise a

joint plan for attaining the goals of the Relief Order. The

going was slow. In September 2004, after two years of little

progress, the parties entered into a Stipulated Order Regarding the Quality of Patient Care and Staffing (“Care Order”),

which the court promptly approved. This Care Order was

meant to ensure the competency of medical staff and to establish procedures for the identification and treatment of highrisk patients.

Three years after entering into the consent decree, not a single prison had successfully implemented the remedial procedures, despite the fact that a “significant number” of inmates

had died as a direct result of substandard medical care—a fact

the State openly acknowledges. Reckoning that the medical

delivery system was “too far gone to be corrected by conventional methods,” the district court issued an order directing the

State to show cause as to why it should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with prior orders and, also, why

the court should not appoint a receiver to manage the delivery

of constitutionally adequate medical care in state prisons.

Because the Relief Order was the product of a settlement,

attained without findings of fact, the district court conducted

a six-day evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause. At

the hearing, the court received dozens of exhibits into evidence and took testimony from various experts and state

employees. Numerous experts testified as to the “incompe6440 PLATA v. SCHWARZENEGGER

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tence and indifference” of prison physicians and medical staff

and described an “abysmal” medical delivery system where

“medical care too often sinks below gross negligence to outright cruelty.” Despite such damning revelations, the State let

the reports and testimony of those experts go, in the words of

the court, “essentially uncontested.” Indeed, the State candidly admitted in its response to the order to show cause “that

to date [it had] failed to attain compliance with all aspects of

[prior] Court Orders.”

In October 2005, after briefing by the parties and amici

curiae, the district court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the order to show cause. After

cataloguing “extensive and disturbing” constitutional violations in the delivery of medical care to inmates, the court

declared its intention to hold the citation for contempt in

abeyance and to establish a receivership to remedy the violations. Echoing the PLRA, see 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), the

court found that the receivership and “those actions necessary

to effectuate its establishment, are narrowly drawn to remedy

the constitutional violations at issue, extend no further than

necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right, and are the least intrusive means necessary to correct these violations.” “[I]f the system is not dramatically

overhauled,” the court observed, an “unconscionable degree

of suffering and death is sure to continue.”

In February 2006, the district court issued an order appointing a Receiver and conferring upon the Receiver all of the

powers of the Secretary of the CDCR with respect to the

delivery of medical care, while concurrently suspending the

Secretary’s exercise of the same. Notwithstanding the “unprecedented . . . scope and dimension” of the receivership, as

noted by the court, the State neither objected to nor appealed

the orderSee 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) (authorizing appeals

from “[i]nterlocutory orders appointing receivers”). Among

other things, the order requires that all costs related to the

receivership be borne by the State and directs the Receiver to

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prepare a “Plan of Action” for remedying the constitutional

violations and to file regular progress reports with the court.

In May 2007, the Receiver filed a draft Plan of Action calling for the construction of 10,000 new beds and a motion to

modify the original stipulated orders to accommodate “the

changed circumstances reflected by the need for [the Receiver’s] appointment, and in order to facilitate implementation of

the [Plan of Action].” Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 560 F.3d 976,

979 (9th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (internal quotation

marks omitted). California’s response was to join the motion,

which the district court subsequently granted. Over the course

of the next fourteen months, the Receiver filed numerous

motions and revised plans of action, many of which concerned the construction of new facilities and all of which,

until mid-2008, met with the approval or acquiescence of the

State. Id. at 979-80. 

In July 2008, the Receiver requested $204.6 million in previously appropriated funds from the State for the implementation of its final, court-approved plan of action. Id. at 980.

When the State denied its request, the Receiver moved the

district court to cite State defendants Schwarzenegger and

Chiang for contempt of court for failing to transfer the funds.

Id. Following the submission of briefs and a hearing, in which

the State averred that it was “unable to provide any of the

unencumbered [previously appropriated] funds to the Receiver,” the court issued an order directing the State to transfer

$250 million to the Receiver no later than November 5, 2008,

or risk being cited for contempt. Id. (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The State appealed the

order, but, in March 2009, we dismissed the appeal as nonfinal because further proceedings relating to the contempt

were clearly contemplated. Id. at 982. 

Meanwhile, in January 2009, the State had filed in district

court the motion that is the subject of this appeal. The State

moved to end the receivership and replace the Receiver with

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a special master. The motion also sought to terminate the

Receiver’s construction plan. The State contended that, as a

matter of law, the PLRA barred the district court from both

appointing a receiver and “ordering the construction of prisons.” The Receiver made two requests of the district court:

first, that it convene an evidentiary hearing on the Motion to

Terminate, and, second, that the district court grant it leave to

conduct limited discovery regarding certain factual issues

implicated in the motion. The State opposed the requests,

arguing that the Motion to Terminate was “based on the plain

language of the PLRA and present[ed] discrete legal questions” and, therefore, could be decided without an evidentiary

hearing.

Observing that the State sought to terminate the receivership on purely legal grounds, the district court denied without

prejudice the Receiver’s request to schedule an evidentiary

hearing, and denied as premature the Receiver’s request to

conduct limited discovery. Three weeks later, the district

court issued an order denying the entire Motion to Terminate,

which the State now appeals. 

II. Standards of Review

“We review de novo the district court’s construction or

interpretation of a statute.” United States v. Carranza, 289

F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). We review mixed questions of

law and fact for clear error when the factual issues predominate. See Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 681-85 (9th Cir.

1999) (en banc).

III. Discussion

A. The PLRA Does Not Bar the Appointment of 

Receivers in Prison Litigation. 

The heart of the State’s argument is that the PLRA implicitly bars the district court from appointing a receiver because

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it provides for the appointment of a special master. The State

relies on the general intent of the PLRA to limit judicial intervention into prison management, and contends that the Act’s

provision for a special master must be read to exclude the

appointment of receivers.

[1] Certainly nothing in the PLRA expressly prohibits the

appointment of a receiver. Receiverships were far from

unknown in prison litigation before the enactment of the

PLRA in 1990. The best known example was the appointment

by Chief Judge Frank Johnson of a receiver (the state governor) to oversee the entire Alabama prison system. See Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 635 (M.D. Ala. 1979).

Other receivers were employed to govern city or county jails

or jail systems. See Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 158 F.3d

1357, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (jail’s medical and mental health

services); Shaw v. Allen, 771 F. Supp. 760, 763-64 (S.D. W.

Va. 1990) (county jail); Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne

County Chief Executive Officer, 444 N.W.2d 549, 560-61

(Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (county jail system). Receiverships

were also a recognized tool for taking over other governmental agencies that could not or would not comply with the law.

See Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 532-34 (1st Cir.

1976) (school desegregation); Gary W. v. Louisiana, Civ. A.

No. 74-2412, 1990 WL 17537, at *30-33 (E.D. La. Feb. 26,

1990) (state children’s services agencies); Turner v. Goolsby,

255 F. Supp. 724, 730 (S.D. Ga. 1966) (county school system); Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Comm’r of Dep’t of

Mental Retardation, 677 N.E.2d 127, 150 (Mass. 1997)

(Department of Mental Retardation), abrogated on other

grounds by In re Birchell, 913 N.E.2d 799, 813 (Mass. 2009).

[2] There can be little question, therefore, that receiverships are recognized equitable tools available to the courts to

remedy otherwise uncorrectable violations of the Constitution

or laws. The State accordingly has a high burden in attempting to show that the PLRA revoked this power by implication.

In Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2000), we

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recognized “the principle that a statute should not be construed to displace courts’ traditional equitable powers

‘[a]bsent the clearest command to the contrary.’ ” Id. at 997

n.12 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705

(1979)) (alteration in Gilmore). 

[T]he comprehensiveness of . . . equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of

a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in

equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.

Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). We

find no such clear command or inescapable inference in the

PLRA.

[3] The provisions of the PLRA on which the State focuses

are codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f) and (g), which provide in

pertinent part: 

(f) Special masters.—

(1) In general.—(A) In any civil action in

a Federal court with respect to prison

conditions, the court may appoint a

special master who shall be disinterested and objective and who will give

due regard to the public safety, to conduct hearings on the record and prepare proposed findings of fact.

. . . .

(6) Limitations on powers and duties.—A

special master appointed under this

subsection—

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(A) may be authorized by a court to

conduct hearings and prepare proposed findings of fact, which shall

be made on the record;

(B) shall not make any findings or

communications ex parte;

(C) may be authorized by a court to

assist in the development of remedial plans; and

(D) may be removed at any time, but

shall be relieved of the appointment upon the termination of relief.

(g) Definitions.—As used in this section—

. . . .

(8) the term “special master” means any

person appointed by a Federal court

pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure or pursuant

to any inherent power of the court to

exercise the powers of a master,

regardless of the title or description

given by the court . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3626(f)-(g). These provisions clearly authorize

the appointment of a special master in prison litigation to hold

hearings, make recommended findings, and perform certain

other related functions. They do not, however, provide that

the court may appoint a special master with these powers and

no one else. Nor does anything in § 3626(f) or (g) purport to

address the quite different office of a receiver, appointed by

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the court to take over the day-to-day management of a prison

system or a segment of it.2

The State invokes, however, the canon of expressio unius

est exclusio alterius, arguing that, by providing for special

masters, Congress implicitly negated the appointment of

receivers. But that canon does not work when a single thing

provided for is quite different from another thing omitted. The

canon “does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping;

it has force only when the items expressed are members of an

‘associated group or series,’ justifying the inference that items

not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168

(2003) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65

(2002)); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S.

73, 81 (2002). The role of a special master as envisaged by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 and the PLRA is sufficiently distinct from that of a receiver appointed under the

pre-existing inherent authority of a court so that Congress’s

treatment of one without the other does not imply a prohibition against receivers. Instead, “the better inference is that

what we face here is nothing more than a case unprovided

for.” Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 169. We also note that, even if

expressio unius did apply, the negative implication arguably

drawn from it scarcely could qualify as “the clearest command” of Congress, Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 705, or a “necessary and inescapable inference,” Warner Holding Co., 328

U.S. at 398, required to limit the traditional equity powers of

the district court.

The State argues, however, that we should draw a prohibition against receivers from the general intent behind the

2Section 3626(g)(8) does include in the definition of “special master” a

person appointed under the inherent authority of the court, but the inclusion is limited to persons appointed “to exercise the powers of a master.”

18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(8). The Receiver here was appointed to exercise quite

different powers. 

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PLRA. There is no doubt that one of the purposes of the Act

was to restrict severely the intrusion of the judiciary into the

operation of prisons. See Gilmore, 220 F.3d at 996-97. Much

of that goal was achieved by § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the Act,

which provides that all prospective judicial relief (necessarily

including the appointment of receivers) must be accompanied

by findings that the relief is “narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the

violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). We

are not convinced, however, that Congress effectuated an

intent to prohibit receivers when it wrote the provision governing special masters into the Act.3

[4] There is little legislative history attending the final

enactment of the PLRA because it was tacked onto an omnibus bill. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-34, § 802(a), 110 Stat.

1321, 1321-66. The PLRA had its origins in three bills earlier

addressed by both chambers of Congress: the Violent Crime

Control and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 1995, S.

3, 104th Cong. § 103 (1995); the Stop Turning Out Prisoners

Act (“STOP”), S. 400, 104th Cong. (1995), and the PLRA bill

itself, S. 866, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted). Another predecessor was considered by the House alone, the Violent

Criminal Incarceration Act of 1995, H.R. 667, 104th Cong.

(1995). The legislative history of these bills includes varying

statements of intent to limit judicial management of prisons,

but this general intent appears to have undergone considerable

refinement as the bills were shaped into the enacted PLRA.

For example, the Violent Criminal Incarceration bill included

3

It is clear, of course, that the PLRA does not authorize the appointment

of receivers. As we have explained, federal courts have inherent power

under their equity jurisdiction to appoint receivers, and do not need the

PLRA to confer on the courts what they already have. The only issue presented here is whether the PLRA prohibits the appointment of receivers,

a question that we answer in the negative. 

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a provision regulating special masters that applied to “any

special master or monitor” and provided that such master or

monitor, who had to be a magistrate judge, shall make proposed findings of fact on issues submitted by the court but

that they “shall have no other function.” See, e.g., H.R. Rep.

No. 104-21, at 6 (1995) (emphasis added).4 The House Judiciary Committee Report on this bill stated that this broad language was intended to apply to all kinds of persons, including

receivers, that might aid the court in enforcing judicial relief

in a prison lawsuit. Id. at 27-28. But this expansive language

was discarded before the PLRA was enacted. Monitors (or

other court agents) were not included in the limitations applicable to special masters, and even special masters no longer

had to be magistrate judges and they were not expressly limited to making recommended factual findings. “Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill

but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the

limitation was not intended.” Russelloo v. United States, 464

U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983). We conclude that § 3626(f) as finally

enacted neither applies to receivers nor prohibits their use in

implementing judicial relief in prison litigation.

We are supported in our reasoning and conclusion by Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2003), abrogated in part

on other grounds by Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 70-72

(2d Cir. 2009). In that case, the Second Circuit was faced with

the question whether the PLRA’s provisions regarding special

masters applied to a neutral organization, the Office of Compliance Consultants, appointed by the district court to monitor

relief ordered by the district court for fourteen jails in New

York City. Id. at 39. The Second Circuit noted that the functions of a monitor differed greatly from those of a special

master, and concluded:

4The special-masters clause in the Senate version of STOP is identical.

See S. 400; see also Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 1995,

S. 816, 104th Cong. (1995). 

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Nothing in the text of § 3626(f) expressly reveals

Congress’s intent either to treat all court-appointed

agents as special masters or to prohibit a court from

appointing agents to perform functions that differ

from the quasi-judicial activities of special masters.

Indeed, to the extent the PLRA’s definition of “special master” is not entirely circular, by limiting its

reference to court-appointed agents to those performing the duties of a master, the Act, we believe,

implicitly incorporates the long-recognized principle

that Article III courts may appoint agents to engage

in a variety of activities essential to the performance

of judicial responsibilities.

Id. at 45-46. Relying as well on the deletion of the reference

to “monitors” in predecessor bills, the Second Circuit concluded that the court’s inherent power to appoint and employ

monitors was unaffected by § 3626(f). Id. at 46-47.

[5] For parallel reasons, we conclude that the special master provisions of § 3626 neither apply to nor prohibit the district court’s appointment of a receiver in the present litigation.

B. The District Court Did Not Err in Finding That the

Receivership Was the Least Intrusive Means of

Remedying the Constitutional Violation.

The State next contends that the district court was required

to terminate the receivership because, when it initially

imposed the receivership, it failed to meet the following

requirements of § 3626(a)(1)(A):

Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to

prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a

particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not

grant or approve any prospective relief unless the

court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn,

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extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive

means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). The State complains that the district court ran afoul of this provision when it failed to appoint

a special master and proceeded to the more drastic remedy of

appointing a receiver. 

At the outset, we are compelled to point out that, as a matter of equity, if not estoppel, the State is in a poor position to

assert this objection to the receivership. The receivership was

imposed only after the State admitted its inability to comply

with consent orders intended to remedy the constitutional violations in its prisons. After a hearing on the court’s order

requiring the State to show cause why it should not be held

in contempt, the district court issued findings and conclusions

establishing the need for further measures to remedy gross

constitutional violations, and held the contempt proceeding in

abeyance while a receivership was imposed. The State

acknowledged without reservation the court’s authority to

appoint a receiver. That was in 2005. The district court

appointed the Receiver the following year, and the State took

no appeal. Since that time—a period of more than three years

—the State has unstintingly cooperated with the Receiver in

his efforts to develop remedial plans and renovate existing

medical facilities. And, as recently as November 2008, the

appellant argued to the three-judge court in parallel proceedings in Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, see supra n.1, that the

Receiver is the least intrusive means of remedying constitutional violations in the provision of medical services to California’s prisoners. (S.E.R. 1369.) 

[6] Be that as it may, the record simply does not support

the State’s contention that anything less than a receivership

would have remedied the undisputed constitutional deficiencies in prisoners’ health care at the time the receivership was

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imposed. The State stipulated to two orders intended to remedy the deficiencies and it later confessed its inability to carry

out those orders. The State never suggested how it could,

through its own machinery, comply with those orders or otherwise rectify the constitutional deficiencies in its prison

health care. The court imposed the receivership not because

it wanted to, but because it had to. After attempting less drastic remedies, and after long periods of working closely with

State authorities to try to bring them into compliance with the

orders to which they had stipulated, the district court justifiably concluded that the State’s personnel simply could not or

would not bring the State into constitutional compliance in the

foreseeable future.

The State further argues that, whatever the situation at the

time the receivership was imposed, the receivership no longer

is the least intrusive means of remedying the constitutional

violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b); Morales Feliciano v.

Rullan, 378 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2004). It is not at all clear

that the State raised this issue in the district court. The question whether there are present constitutional violations is factintensive, see Morales Feliciano, 378 F.3d at 52-53, but the

State opposed the Receiver’s request for an evidentiary hearing and insisted that its Motion to Terminate raised only questions of law. 

In any event, nothing in the record supports the State’s contention regarding the current necessity for a receivership, and

a great deal of evidence in the record contradicts it.5 The State

to this day has not pointed to any evidence that it could rem5The State contends that the district court improperly placed on the

State the burden of proving that the receivership was not the least intrusive

method of remedying the constitutional violations. We need not address

that issue because, regardless of the burden of proof, overwhelming evidence in the record supports the district court’s finding that termination of

the receivership and appointment of a special master would not remedy

the constitutional violations. See Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d

1190, 1206 & n.16 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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edy its constitutional violations in the absence of the receivership. The district court appointed the Receiver to stand in the

stead of the Secretary of the CDCR. The State’s motion to

replace the Receiver with a special master contains no hint of

how a special master, with the limited functions set by the

PLRA, could remedy the violations. A special master is primarily useful for conducting hearings and making recommended findings of fact. The State has not raised any factual

issues to be addressed in such hearings, and it has not asked

for those hearings. 

[7] At its most relevant, the PLRA permits a special master

to assist in developing remedial plans. But there has been no

shortage of remedial plans; the State admitted that it could not

comply with two plans to which it had stipulated. Others have

been developed by the Receiver. The problem has not been

with a lack of plans, but with the State’s inability to execute

them. The district court did not err in ruling that a special

master could not remedy the constitutional violations.

The State in its briefing has raised various complaints that

the Receiver has taken unnecessary particular actions, or has

made inappropriate expenditures, beyond those required to

remedy constitutional violations. These individual complaints,

however, do not address the legality or propriety of the

receivership as the least intrusive means of remedying constitutional violations. Whether the Receiver has violated instructions or gone beyond his mandate in any given instance—

allegations that the Receiver denies—is a matter that must be

addressed to the district court, and be resolved in an evidentiary hearing if necessary. The State successfully opposed an

evidentiary hearing in the district court. It cannot now, on

appeal, make use of its untested allegations in challenging the

legality of the receivership.

[8] We therefore reject the State’s challenge to the receivership. We conclude that the record amply supports the district court’s initial findings that the relief of a receivership

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was narrowly drawn, extended no further than necessary to

correct the constitutional violations, and was the least intrusive means to correct them. The record also supports the

court’s determination that nothing has cast doubt on the continuing validity of these findings. There has been no violation

of §§ 3626(a)(1)(A) or 3626(b). We accordingly affirm the

district court’s denial of the State’s motion to terminate the

receivership and appoint a special master.

C. The State’s Challenge to the District Court’s

Refusal to Terminate the Receiver’s Construction

Plan is Not Appealable.

In the district court, the State moved to terminate the

Receiver’s construction plan, asserting that the plan to construct 10,000 health care beds at a cost of $8 billion went well

beyond what was needed to cure the constitutional violations

and lacked the necessary § 3626(a)(1)(A) findings by the district court. The district court rejected the motion in part

because the Receiver’s plan had been superseded, and present

plans were still under consideration and in flux, rendering the

challenge premature.

On appeal, the State has shifted its ground somewhat and

argues that the Receiver has no power to engage in planning

for the construction of prison facilities, and that this purported

exercise of power must be terminated. The reason, according

to the State, is that the PLRA deprives the district court and

its Receiver of the power to order prison construction. To the

extent that this argument was presented to the district court,

that court found no need to address it because it had authorized no construction other than renovations to which the

State had not objected.

[9] Whichever form of argument the State now pursues on

appeal, we conclude that we have no jurisdiction to entertain

it. The district court’s ruling rejecting the challenge to the

Receiver’s particular construction plan is not a final judg6454 PLATA v. SCHWARZENEGGER

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ment; the plan itself was in flux and, as the district court

stated, the challenge was premature. More important, the ruling did not end the litigation. We therefore have no jurisdiction to review the district court’s ruling as a final judgment

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

[10] We also have no jurisdiction over the district court’s

order refusing to terminate the construction plan under

§ 1292(a)(2), which permits interlocutory appeals of orders

“appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof.” Id.

§ 1292(a)(2). That statute clearly gave us authority over the

district court’s refusal to terminate (i.e., “wind up”) the

receivership. But the district court’s refusal to block the

Receiver’s construction plan (or to deny the Receiver the

power to plan, as the State now presents it) is not a refusal to

terminate the receivership, nor is it a refusal to take a step to

accomplish the winding up of the receivership. See SEC v.

Am. Principals Holdings, Inc., 817 F.2d 1349, 1350-51 (9th

Cir. 1987) (interpreting § 1292(a)(2)’s “take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof” to apply only to orders refusing to

take steps to wind up a receivership). The State’s motion to

terminate construction planning clearly was not intended as a

step toward termination of the receivership; if its motion to

terminate the receivership were granted, no such “step” as

limiting the Receiver’s power would have been necessary or

useful. Instead, the motion to terminate the construction plan

was an alternative to limit the Receiver’s power in the event

that the receivership were to continue. The district court’s

denial of the motion therefore is not a refusal to take a step

to accomplish the winding up of the receivership, and we lack

jurisdiction over the appeal under § 1292(a)(2).

[11] Thus, the order denying the motion to terminate the

Receiver’s construction plan (whether or not based on a

denial of power to plan) is simply one more event in the

administration of the receivership that is not appealable prior

to a final judgment. It does not gain appealability by being

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joined to the appeal of an order over which we do have statutory jurisdiction. See Morales Feliciano, 378 F.3d at 48 &

n.3. We accordingly dismiss the appeal of the portion of the

district court’s order refusing to terminate the Receiver’s construction plan.

IV. Conclusion

The portion of the district court’s order denying the motion

to terminate the receivership is affirmed. The appeal from the

portion of the district court’s order denying termination of the

Receiver’s construction plan is dismissed.

AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part.

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