Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00005/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00005-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

German Felipe Reyes-Reyes,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-00005-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Petitioner German Felipe Reyes-Reyes filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. On May 20, 2014, United States Magistrate Judge 

Mark E. Aspey issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the 

petition be denied. Doc. 13 at 9. The Court will accept the R&R. 

I. Background. 

 On January 13, 2012, two off-duty Phoenix police officers were providing security 

for an apartment complex at 1717 West Glendale Avenue in Phoenix, Arizona. Doc. 11 

at 3. At about 8:00 p.m., the officers noticed a black Mercedes parked in one of the 

parking coves on the east side of the apartment complex. Id. A registration check on the 

Mercedes revealed that it was registered to Amy Marie Siegel. Id. The officers 

approached the vehicle on foot. Id. Petitioner, the sole occupant of the vehicle, was 

talking on a cell phone. Id. The officers began conversing with Petitioner. Id. After 

performing a warrant search on their mobile data terminal, the officers learned that there 

was an outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest, so they handcuffed him and placed him 

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under arrest. Id. Pursuant to the arrest, the officers searched Petitioner’s person and 

discovered two baggies of methamphetamine in his pockets. Id. at 4. The officers also 

noticed a black handgun protruding from underneath the center console of the Mercedes. 

Id. The officers searched the car and found the loaded handgun. Id. The officers also 

found another baggie of methamphetamine inside the car. Id. 

 On February 6, 2012, Petitioner was charged with one count of possession or use 

of dangerous drugs and three counts of misconduct involving weapons. Doc. 11-1 at 7. 

On March 29, 2012, the State of Arizona filed allegations of aggravating circumstances 

and allegations of prior convictions, including an assertion that Petitioner committed the 

charged offenses while on felony release. Id. at 11, 15, 18. 

 Prior to his trial, Petitioner moved to suppress all evidence collected from the 

January 13, 2012 encounter with the two officers. Doc. 11-3 at 54. Petitioner claimed 

that he had been illegally seized by the officers. Id. at 58. The state trial court denied the 

motion to suppress, concluding that “[a] police officer does not need reasonable suspicion 

or cause to approach a person and ask questions” and that Petitioner “was free to leave or 

not talk to the officers.” Doc. 11-1 at 99. 

 On July 12, 2012, a jury convicted Petitioner on two counts. Doc. 11-2 at 135. 

Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of ten years on each count. Doc. 11-3 at 48. 

 Petitioner appealed, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied his motion to suppress. Id. at 87. On June 20, 2013, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. Id. at 138-41. Petitioner sought review by the 

Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review on December 4, 2013. Id. at 158. 

 On December 18, 2013, Petitioner initiated a state action for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. Id. at 163. Respondents assert that 

the state proceeding is still pending. Doc. 11 at 9. On January 2, 2014, Petitioner filed 

this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 1. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 The Court must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which 

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specific objections are made. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). The Court 

may accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate 

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 “If the state has provided a state prisoner an opportunity for full and fair litigation 

of his Fourth Amendment claim, [a federal District Court] cannot grant federal habeas 

relief on the Fourth Amendment issue.” Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976)). Whether the state court 

correctly decided the Fourth Amendment claim is irrelevant. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 

(“[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth 

Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the 

ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at 

trial.”); Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The relevant inquiry 

is whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact 

do so or even whether the claim was correctly decided.”). 

Stone did not specify a test for determining whether a State has provided an 

opportunity for full and fair litigation of a claim. Stone did, however, cite Townsend v. 

Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), in a footnote. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 n.36. Townsend held 

that a federal court must grant a habeas petitioner an evidentiary hearing if (1) the merits 

of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual 

determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding 

procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; 

(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts 

were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears 

that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. 

372 U.S. at 313. In Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit 

explained that although the Townsend test “must be given great weight in defining what 

constitutes full and fair consideration under Stone,” it need not “always be applied 

literally . . . as the sole measure of fullness and fairness.” 564 F.2d at 901. The Ninth 

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Circuit has also considered the extent to which the claims were briefed before and 

considered by the state trial and appellate courts. Abell v. Raines, 640 F.2d 1085, 1088 

(9th Cir. 1981). 

 Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the state courts did not fully and 

fairly consider his Fourth Amendment claim. Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th 

Cir. 1993). 

III. Analysis. 

 Petitioner objects to the R&R, asserting that the Arizona courts failed to afford a 

full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. Doc. 14 at 1. Petitioner 

bases his assertion on three arguments: (1) a commissioner performed an unauthorized 

review of the evidence in his case, which yielded a defective response to Petitioner’s 

motion for disclosure that tainted the evidentiary universe in which Petitioner’s Fourth 

Amendment motion practice was conducted; (2) the trial court precluded any mention of 

the nature and quality of the arrest warrant in an evidentiary hearing and at trial; and 

(3) the Arizona Court of Appeals chose to simply affirm rather than review the trial court 

decisions. The Court will address each of these arguments below. 

A. Commissioner’s Review of the Evidence. 

 Petitioner argues that a commissioner has “extremely circumscribed authority” 

under A.R.S. § 12-212 and Arizona Supreme Court Rule 96(a)(11) and that the rules 

“distinctly withhold[] power” from a commissioner to consider matters arising under 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 15, 16, and 35, which rules were “essential to the 

determination of present matters.” Doc. 14 at 3. Petitioner is mistaken. Arizona 

Supreme Court Rule 96(a)(11) expressly permits commissioners, if approved by the 

presiding judge, to hear matters governed by Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 15, 

16.2, and 16.3, which are the rules under which Petitioner’s motion for disclosure arose. 

Petitioner does not argue that Commissioner Steven Lynch, the commissioner appointed 

in this case, was not approved by the presiding judge to hear such matters. In addition, it 

is not clear how Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, which governs the form, 

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content, and service of motions and requests, was violated by the commissioner’s 

participation. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s first argument is meritless. 

B. Trial Court’s Evidentiary Rulings. 

 Because the warrant executed by the officers on January 13, 2012 was for a nonextraditable misdemeanor from Yuma County, Petitioner argues that the officers did not 

have probable cause to arrest him and that, without the arrest, the officers would not have 

discovered the contraband on his person or in the vehicle. Doc. 14 at 2, 4. Petitioner 

asserts that the he was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the Fourth 

Amendment issue because the trial court refused to hear evidence regarding the nature 

and quality of the arrest warrant, which would have demonstrated a clear Fourth 

Amendment violation. Id. at 2. 

 The transcript from Petitioner’s July 9, 2012 suppression hearing demonstrates the 

trial court addressed Petitioner’s evidence, or lack thereof, regarding the nature and 

quality of the arrest warrant. Doc. 11-1 at 24-30. At the suppression hearing, which took 

place two days before Petitioner’s trial, the trial court permitted Petitioner to argue that 

the nature and quality of the arrest warrant invalidated the January 13, 2012 seizure. 

Petitioner, however, had previously failed to raise the issue in his written motion and he 

failed to present any statute or case law relevant to the issue at the hearing. Likewise, 

Petitioner’s submissions in this proceeding fail to cite any controlling law suggesting that 

the officers wrongly executed the non-extraditable misdemeanor arrest warrant from 

Yuma County. Applying the Townsend factors, the Court concludes, that Petitioner was 

provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim before the 

trial court. 

C. Appellate Review. 

 Petitioner argues that the Arizona Court of Appeals “in its lock-step effort to 

affirm the result of the inferior tribunal, necessarily had to deny reference to clearly, and 

long established U.S. Supreme Court precedence (sic).” Doc. 14 at 4. Specifically, 

Petitioner asserts that the Arizona Court of Appeals failed to adhere to the holding of 

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Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2010), which circumscribed the ability of law 

enforcement officers to conduct warrantless vehicular searches incident to arrest after a 

vehicle’s occupant(s) have been arrested and secured. 556 U.S. at 335. 

 This argument challenges the state court’s application of the relevant law, not its 

factual determinations. As such, “the Abell factors are more useful than the test 

enunciated in Townsend.” Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Because the Fourth Amendment claim was briefed before the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

Petitioner was provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment 

claim before the state appellate court. Doc. 11-3 at 84-101, 115-130. Interestingly, 

Petitioner did not rely on or otherwise cite Gant in his appeal, which explains why the 

state appellate court did not consider Fourth Amendment arguments founded on Gant. 

The Court concludes that Petitioner’s third argument is meritless. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. The R&R (Doc. 13) is accepted. 

2. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action. 

 Dated this 14th day of July, 2014. 

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