Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00960/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00960-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALDO GONZALEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

KATHLEEN ALLISON, Warden,

Defendant.

Case No. 11cv960-DMS (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Court Judge

Dana M. Sabraw pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of

the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. On May 2, 2011,

Petitioner Aldo Gonzalez, a state prisoner who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,

commenced these habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to 28. U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1.

("Pet."). Petitioner challenges his conviction of first degree murder and personally and

intentionally discharging a firearm. Id. at 2 and ECF No. 7 ("Answer”) at 2. Respondent filed

an answer on October 4, 2011 and Petitioner filed a traverse on May 4, 2012. ECF Nos. 7

& 21 ("Traverse").

This Court has considered the Petition, Answer, Traverse, and all supporting

documents filed by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS

that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal's opinion in People

v. Gonzalez, Appeal No. D052827, slip op. (Cal. Ct. of App. Nov. 17, 2009). Lodgment 6. 

This Court presumes the state court's factual determinations to be correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 340 (2003); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35 (1992) (holding findings of

historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory

presumption of correctness).

A. People's Case

1. The shooting

Thomas Tweedie belonged to a gang or tagging crew called the "Looney Mob."

In addition to putting up graffiti, members of the Looney Mob fought and

engaged in violent acts. The Varrio Clairemont gang was a rival of the Looney

Mob.

Jordan Ingram hung around with members of the Looney Mob, including

Tweedie, but was not a member himself. Near the end of 2004, Ingram was

driving his car with two affiliates of the Looney Mob. One of the passengers

believed he had spotted a Varrio Clairemont member. They got out of the car

and beat him up. Ingram stole his cell phone.

About 25 minutes later, Ingram drove by a car with approximately six people

in it. One of the passengers in Ingram's car yelled out, "West Side." Three

people got out of the other car and shot at and hit Ingram's car. Ingram drove

away. Ingram later told friends belonging to the Looney Mob, including

Tweedie, about the incident.

Ingram lived with his mother. Starting about a week prior to May 3, 2005,

Tweedie stayed at Ingram's house.

Ernesto Arana, also known as "Flaco", and his brother Marco, also known as

"Termite", lived approximately two-tenths of a mile from Ingram's house. They

were members of Varrio Clairemont. Ernesto drove a white Ford Ranger truck.

Gonzalez, also known as "Krow," was friends with Ernesto and Marco, and was

also a Varrio Clairemont member.

On the afternoon of May 3, 2005, Tweedie, Ingram, and their friends Andrew

Shaver and James Rachels, were at Ingram's house. That day Rachels and

Shaver had used methamphetamine and smoked marijuana with Tweedie.

Shaver had been awake for much of the previous two days.

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At approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening, Ricky Martin and Joe Salas rode their

bicycles to Ingram's house to look at a car belonging to Ingram's mother. After

they arrived they smoked some methamphetamine and marijuana with

Ingram. Martin and Salas had been "partying" for a couple of days, and Martin

was high that evening. Thereafter, Ingram drove Martin and Salas to a storage

unit where Martin had some methamphetamine.

Meanwhile, Tweedie and Rachels were outside Ingram's house talking. A white

truck with about three people drove by. Tweedie stated, "There goes

Clairemont ... [t]hat's V.C." Rachels turned to look at the street and saw a

white truck "creeping, like driving real slow" in front of the house. It came to

a complete stop one house down from Ingram's.

Tweedie ran into the house. Shaver saw Tweedie come inside. Tweedie

seemed "agitated." He went to the room he shared with Ingram and came

back with .22-caliber rifle. He told Shaver that a white truck had driven by with

members of Varrio Clairemont in it and he had thrown up the gang sign for

West Side, which Varrio Clairemont would take for an insult. Shaver followed

Tweedie outside.

By the time they joined Rachels outside, the truck was gone. Rachels saw the

gun in Tweedie's hand. Rachels told him the gun was not necessary and that

if the people in the truck came back they would fight them. Besides, Rachels

had a knife. Tweedie replied that it was more serious than that. The look in

Tweedie's eyes suggested he was prepared to use the gun if necessary.

Rachels insisted that Tweedie get rid of the gun. Tweedie set the gun up

against the house between some shrubs.

About 15 minutes later, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Ingram, Martin and Salas

returned from the storage facility. Tweedie seemed agitated and was looking

down the street. He told Ingram he had seen Arana's truck drive slowly by with

a couple of Varrio Clairemont members in it about five minutes earlier.

Ingram was scared that the Varrio Clairemont members "had come to finish

the job they started when they shot at [his] car...." Tweedie assured him that

he didn't need to worry because he had a gun "outside with them." Ingram

saw the rifle leaning against the house. Ingram went inside and Rachels

followed shortly thereafter.

Shaver saw a group of what appeared to be five men coming down the street.

Shaver sensed something was wrong and went inside to tell Rachels.

Martin and Tweedie remained outside chatting. Tweedie was facing the street

and Martin was facing Tweedie. Tweedie suddenly seemed to be looking at

something fearfully just beyond Martin. Martin saw the group out of the corner

of his eye and turned to look at them. There were five or six Latino men

moving quickly, purposefully, and in unison. Gonzalez was in front and

appeared to be "steering the group." They walked around the rear of Ingram's

car and "set up" at the foot of the driveway. Martin thought there was going

to be a fist fight and assumed he would have to help Tweedie.

Then Tweedie suddenly yelled, "Oh, fuck," and twisted his body away as if to

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"pull something" from behind him or "lift something out from his back." Martin

thought he may have been reaching for "a bag of pot." However, on

cross-examination, Martin admitted to testifying at the preliminary hearing that

when Tweedie twisted, he went to his left and swung something up from his

hip, "as if to shoot," and that Tweedie at that time raised "the gun."

Martin saw all the men in the group raise their arms. He saw "the muzzle flash

come out" of Gonzalez's arm. Martin saw the bullets strike Tweedie. The shots

corresponded to the flashes coming from Gonzalez's arm. Gonzalez was no

more than five feet away from Martin when he fired his gun. Martin was

looking right at Gonzalez because he was the closest and "most of the fire"

was coming from him. Martin testified at trial that he was certain it was

Gonzalez that shot Tweedie.

Tweedie fell onto Martin's backpack, which was lying nearby. The group then

fled on foot. Martin grabbed his backpack and ran towards the front door

screaming, "He's shot. He's shot.... He's dead."

Salas was right behind Martin and was just as scared. He had seen the group

of Latinos with shaved heads walk up to the driveway right before he heard a

popping sound and saw "gun flash."

During this time, Ingram was inside fixing a bottle for his baby, and Shaver

had convinced Rachels to go outside with him because of the group of men he

had seen coming down the street. As Rachels and Shaver went out the front

door, Shaver heard voices demand in an aggressive way, "What's up." Shaver

heard Tweedie respond, "West Side. Looney Mob." The group replied,

"Clairemont Trese." Both Rachels and Shaver then heard three gunshots in

rapid succession.

Rachels and Shaver ran back into the house. Rachels then crept back outside

slowly. At first he could not see anything, but then he saw Tweedie lying face

down in the front yard near the sidewalk. Rachels yelled out to Tweedie, but

Tweedie only moaned in response. Rachels urged Tweedie to get up, but he

was silent. He tried to get closer to Tweedie, but at that moment the police

arrived and told him to get on the ground.

Meanwhile, Martin and Salas had grabbed their bikes and left. Martin was

frightened of the shooters and did not want to be arrested for the drugs in his

backpack. However, they got lost and ended up back at the house. An officer

took Martin to the ground, believing he was the shooter because he had blood

on him.

Tweedie's friends told police that when they last saw him, Tweedie did not

have the rifle in his possession. Officers securing the scene found it on the

front lawn near the sidewalk, several feet from Tweedie. The gun's safety was

on.

An officer examined Tweedie and he still had a pulse, but his breathing was

shallow. He was taken to a hospital, but died shortly thereafter. A blood test

showed the presence of methamphetamine and marijuana in his system.

Tweedie was shot three times with a .38-caliber handgun. All three rounds

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were fired from the same gun. One bullet pierced his left arm and then

travelled [sic] into his left chest. Another went through his upper left chest,

crossed two ribs, punctured his aorta and right lung. The third bullet struck

him in the lower back, travelled through his ribs then punctured his left lung.

Either of the second and third wounds would have been fatal.

Shortly after the shooting a neighbor, Sheri Christman, was walking home from

a friend's house with her son, Nicholas, when a group of five young men

passed them, walking fast. Christman knew the Arana family, and she thought

she recognized Marco Arana's voice when he said, "What's up," as they

passed. After they had passed, one said to her son, who was good friends with

the youngest Arana son, "Hey, Nick."

Gustavo Arana, the father of the Arana brothers, had a white Ford Ranger

pickup. It belonged to a friend, but Mr. Arana was allowed to use it at will, and

he allowed his sons to use it regularly. The truck was at his house the day of

the shooting and his family had access to it.

Cynthia Arana, the Arana brothers' mother, testified Gonzalez was at her house

that night and left with them to go to the store about an hour before the

shooting. She insisted they were gone for only 10 minutes. Although at first

she insisted they did not drive, she eventually admitted that the closest store

was 10 minutes away by foot and they could not have gone by foot or bicycle.

She admitted that the truck keys were available in the kitchen and she was not

guarding them the whole time.

Cynthia Arana claimed Gonzalez and her sons returned home from the store

before the shooting and were within her sight when the shots were fired. She

said they came in the house afterward and were not at all excited. When the

prosecutor confronted her with her statement to the police that they came

running into the house excitedly after the shooting, she admitted that they ran

in, but only to ask her if she heard the shots. She denied telling the police that

they were excited.

2. Rosa Gonzalez

At approximately 7:00 a.m. the morning after the shooting, Rosa, Gonzalez's

younger sister, was crying and "very sad" at school. Lori Schuman, a teacher's

aide, asked Rosa what was wrong. Rosa asked Schuman if she had heard

about the shooting the night before. Schuman replied that she had heard it on

the news. Rosa told her, "It was my brother." Rosa said her family was "talking

about needing to hide [Gonzalez]." Rosa also named two Arana brothers by

their gang monikers as being involved. Schuman cautioned Rosa not to talk to

anyone about the matter and walked her to class.

On the way, Rosa showed Schuman a letter she had written to her friend, Ana,

about the shooting. The letter read as follows:

"Hey, wud up, Flaka. How you been? I hope good. I've been in a bad

mood since yesterday cuz of what happened. Man, that shit is fucken

stupid. Okay, this is how it all happened.... [¶] A few months ago my

brother had beat up Tommy [from] BR (Brown Ridaz) & none of them

did nothing about it (the Brown Ridaz) but on Tuesday at 9:30 p.m. my

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brother Krow, Flako, Termite, Solo, and Pwee were cruising and they

saw Tommy, all of the CLMT fools had guns at that time. [¶] So Tommy

had said that he was gonna kill Krow & PWee. So my brother rolled da

window down and I guess ... el Krow and Flako shot him cuz ... the 1st

time they shot him the 2nd time they ... my bother shot him in his

chest, Flako then shot him another time making sure he was dead.

That's what happened Tuesday."

As discussed above, "Krow" was Gonzalez's gang moniker, "Flaco" was Ernesto

Arana's, and "Termite" was Marco Arana's. "PWee" was Gonzalez's younger

brother, and "Solo" was another Arana brother.

The letter also described a subsequent encounter with members of the "Brown

Riders," a rival gang to Varrio Clairemont, who went to Gonzalez's house to

retaliate shortly after the shooting. Rosa bragged that she challenged and

intimidated one of the gang's female members. The letter ended with Rosa

asking Ana not to repeat its contents to anyone.

Rosa gave the letter to Ana, who gave it to a boy she knew, Jonathon

Mendoza, who was in a rival gang to Varrio Clairemont that was friendly with

the Looney Mob. Within a few days, police had the letter. When Rosa found

out, she told Schuman that she regretted writing the letter and that Gonzalez

was upset with her for doing so. Later, when Gonzalez was arrested, Rosa

cried and told Schuman she felt responsible for his arrest. She stated she

would try to help her brother by denying she wrote the letter.

3. Police investigation

Police searched Gonzalez's room.It was covered with Varrio Clairemont graffiti,

including Gonzalez's gang moniker, Krow. The phrase "Varrio Clairemont

Trese" was written on his door. Police did not find any guns, ammunition, or

gunshot residue. Police also impounded the white Ford Ranger pickup. They

found fingerprints belonging to Marco Arana on the rearview mirror, but no

prints matching those of Gonzalez.

Five days after the shooting, San Diego Homicide Detectives Jana Beard and

Anthony Johnson went to Rosa's school to interview her. Rosa seemed curious

and a bit nervous, but not frightened or intimidated. She appeared willing to

be interviewed and was "very congenial" during the interview.

Initially, Rosa told detectives she " "d[id]n't know anything." But when police

confronted her with her letter, she became more forthcoming. Rosa said that

on the night of the shooting, Gonzalez came home late and "acting

aggressive." He knocked on the door and yelled to be let in. When he got

inside, he acted "really, really, weird." He acted excited, but also scared. He

said he and Ernesto Arana "shot the guy." He told her the shooting was

payback for a previous fight.

Rosa said she wrote the letter to Ana the following day. She said the letter was

her understanding of what happened, but admitted to embellishing it to make

it sound more dramatic.

Rosa was also interviewed by the detectives at the police station. Rosa told

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police that when Gonzalez came home the night of the shooting, she heard

him talking on the phone. Gonzalez was excited and said, "Hey dude guess

what happened!" and "[O]h yeah we shot this guy ..." [and] "me and Flaco

had a gun...." Yeah we saw the one dude last night and we shot him and I

don't know what happened to him. If he is dead or something...." She heard

him on another call talking about confronting the victim and saying, "[F]uck

BR." The person responded, "[F]uck Clairemont," so they shot him. Gonzalez

did not mention anything about the victim having a gun. She also heard him

bragging about the shooting a few days later with Ernesto Arana. Ernesto said

to Gonzalez, "[D]o you remember when I passed the gun to you and you shot

and just left." Rosa also told the police that Gonzalez went to his godmother's

house the day after the shooting and "holed up" there, refusing to venture

outside for any reason.

Gonzalez was brought in to be interviewed while Rosa was still at the station.

Gonzalez denied any involvement in the shooting. He also denied being a

member of Varrio Clairemont, although he admitted he used to claim

membership in the gang. He claimed not to know the Arana brothers' gang

monikers, but then understood and responded to questions using those

monikers.

Midway through the interview, the detectives left the room and allowed Rosa

to go inside with her brother. Gonzalez immediately told her not to say

anything "because [of] the camera...." He tried to direct her to say the letter

was not hers. He then told Rosa, "If they ask you something else, you don't

know anything. Do you understand?"

Detective Johnson reentered the room and, after sending Rosa outside to her

parents, resumed the interview. Gonzalez admitted he was with Ernesto and

Marco Arana the night of the shooting. At first he said that he was at their

house all night and never left, but when confronted with other witness's

statements he had left in a white truck that evening, Gonzalez replied that he

was "too damn high" to remember what happened. Gonzalez said he and the

Arana brothers were hanging out in front of their house when they heard a

noise like firecrackers and they went inside. They remained there until they left

for a friend's house at midnight, after which he got home about 1:30 a.m.

Detective Johnson told Gonzalez that police had found a rifle on the ground at

the crime scene and then told Gonzalez that "if a guy pulled a gun and that's

what happened, then it's self defense, but you need to tell me that, because

I can't speculate...." Gonzalez insisted he was not involved in the shooting and

did not even know about it until he saw it the next day on the news. Detective

Johnson asked him again, "At any time on Tuesday, May third, in the evening

did you ever feel like your life was in danger or like you had to defend

yourself, for the record?" Gonzalez replied, "No."

4. Gang evidence

District Attorney Investigator Joseph Winney testified that the graffiti found in

Gonzalez's room was unique to members of the Varrio Clairemont gang and

indicated that the person living in the room was a member. Moreover, he had

met Gonzalez less than a month before the shooting when conducting a

probation search of Marco Arana. At the time, Gonzalez identified himself as

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a Varrio Clairemont gang member.

Investigator Winney testified concerning gang structure, colors or articles of

clothing used to identify gangs, gang rivalries, and gang members' motivation

to commit crimes to increase their status within gangs.

Investigator Winney testified that if a person were to call out a West Side

slogan or make that gang's sign to a Varrio Clairemont member, it would anger

and provoke the Varrio Clairemont member into retaliating. He said it would

be typical for the gang member to round up other members and return to

punish the offender when that person was alone or otherwise vulnerable, and

it would not be unusual for the confrontation to end in a shooting death.

5. Martin's lack of cooperation/fears of retaliation

Martin initially refused to cooperate with police, angry with them about his

treatment after the shooting and his belief they had stole money and property

from his backpack. He was also fearful of getting involved because he did not

want to invite retaliation. He testified that when police asked him to look at

photographic lineups, he pretended not to recognize anyone, even though he

recognized Gonzalez as the shooter.

Months later, Martin changed his mind and decided to cooperate with police.

He had been living on the streets of Clairemont and felt threatened. He asked

for witness protection in exchange for his cooperation. At trial, he was still so

frightened of retaliation that he initially refused to tell defense counsel the

location of his drug rehabilitation program.

When defense counsel asked Martin if he testified in exchange for a promise

to "hook [you] up," Martin responded, "That's a bald face lie." He pointed out

that the defense investigator offered him "a better deal" than the district

attorney's office, including housing and a stipend, to try to "sway him in favor

of [the defense]," but he refused.

An investigator testified Martin was relocated to a remote part of the county

under the state's witness protection program and that the fund, which was

separate from the district attorney's office, paid most of Martin's expenses

directly so that Martin himself received only minimal amounts of cash. The last

payment on Martin's behalf ended roughly a year before trial.

B. Defense Case

Toxicologist Darrell Clardy testified about the effects of methamphetamine on

the body. Use of the drug, especially when accompanied by little sleep,

impacts a person's ability to perceive an event. It can cause a person to see

or hear things that did not actually happen, to confuse things, or to focus on

certain things and nothing else. That person may have trouble processing and

accessing the memory of the event and may include things that did not

happen when recalling it, even if not under the influence at the time of recall.

A chronic methamphetamine user under the influence of the drug would likely

act irrationally, confused, or disoriented, and have a tendency toward violence

and exhibit psychotic or paranoid behavior.

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Gonzalez also called his father, Luciano, who testified he heard about the

shooting on the news. Gonzalez was not home at the time, arriving at

approximately 1:00 a.m. He did not seem upset or act unusually the next day.

It did not trouble his father "at all" that his son's room was covered with gang

graffiti. He believed Gonzalez was honest.

Gonzalez's mother and father did not have a landline at their house, and

Gonzalez did not have a cell phone. His father and brother Jose had cell

phones at the time, but Gonzalez would not typically use them. Jose testified

that Gonzalez did not use his cell phone on May 3, 2005, or on the following

days.

Defense investigator Michael Reyes spoke with Martin while he was in jail two

times during the middle of 2006. Martin told him the district attorney's office

"would help him set up for about two or three months to make a comfortable

living after this whole case was finished." Reyes testified he thought it was

"obvious" the district attorney's office was paying Martin's way in exchange for

"winning the case with the DA." He admitted, however, that he did not actually

ask why Martin was being housed out of town at government expense. He did

not record his conversation with Martin. He denied offering Martin anything in

exchange for his cooperation.

Brian Gilbert, an individual who was not a licensed investigator, but "work[ed]

for" one, testified he interviewed Kelly Martinez three days before trial. He

testified that Shaver came to her house the day after the shooting and told her

that he and Ingram "tried to get the gun off [Tweedie] after [Tweedie] was

shot to put the lock back on." Like Reyes, he did not record his conversation

with Martinez. He also admitted that when he interviewed Martinez a year

earlier, she did not mention this event, her sudden recollection of the event

seemed odd, and he should have followed up on it but did not.

Martinez disagreed with Gilbert's testimony. She said that Shaver and Ingram

had come to her house and talked about the shooting, but she could not recall

the conversation in detail. When asked if she had recently told Gilbert that

Shaver said they tried to take the rifles off of Tweedie's body and engage the

safety, she said, "No, I don't think I said that." Shaver also denied he said that

to Martinez or handled the rifle after the shooting.

Lodgment 6 at 2-16.

In December 2007, the People of the State of California filed an amended information

charging Petitioner with murder. Lodgment 1 at 5. Following a trial, the jury found

Petitioner guilty of first degree murder. Id. at 463. The jury also found true allegations that

Petitioner intentionally and personally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great

bodily injury or death to a person within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53(d)

and that Petitioner personally used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section

12022.5(a). Id. at 5, 463 & 553. On March 20, 2008, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner

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to an indeterminate term of fifty years to life. Id. at 555. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction, arguing that (1) there was insufficient evidence to

sustain his first degree murder conviction, (2) the trial court committed prejudicial error and

violated his rights to due process and to present a defense by refusing to instruct the jury

on imperfect self-defense, and (3) the trial court committed prejudicial error and violated his

right to a fair trial by allowing the prosecution to introduce prejudicial gang evidence against

him. Lodgment 3. On November 17, 2009, the court of appeal published a written opinion

affirming the judgment of the trial court. Lodgment 6. 

Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing in the court of appeal on December 1, 2009,

which was summarily denied on December 7, 2009. Lodgments 7 & 8. On December 24,

2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court reasserting the

same three claims. Lodgment 9. On February 3, 2010, the California Supreme Court

summarily denied the petition for review without citation or authority. Lodgment 10. 

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 2012).

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

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the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (West 2012). In making this determination, a court may consider a

lower court's analysis. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991) (authorizing a

reviewing court to look through to the last reasoned state court decision). Summary denials

are presumed to constitute adjudications on the merits unless "there is reason to think some

other explanation for the state court's decision is more likely." Harrington v. Richter, 131

S.Ct. 770, 784-785 (2011).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state

court: (1) "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court]

cases"; or (2) "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court]

precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).

A state court's decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal

law where the state court "‘identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the

Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner's case.'" Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S.

at 413). "[A] federal habeas court may not issue [a] writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must be

objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the

dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

If the state court provided no explanation of its reasoning, "a habeas court must

determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state

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court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree

that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the

Supreme Court]." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786. In other words, a federal court may not

grant habeas relief if any fairminded jurist could find the state court's ruling consistent with

relevant Supreme Court precedent. 

Finally, habeas relief also is available if the state court's adjudication of a claim

"resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1996);

Wood v. Allen, 130 S.Ct. 841, 845 (2010). A state court's decision will not be overturned on

factual grounds unless this Court finds that the state court's factual determinations were

objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in state court. See Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006)

(the fact that "[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree" does not render a

decision objectively unreasonable). This Court will presume that the state court's factual

findings are correct, and Petitioner may overcome that presumption only by clear and

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465,

473-474 (2007).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises three grounds for relief in his Petition. First, he contends that "since

the evidence at trial raised a 50% or less probability that [Petitioner] and not some one [sic]

else shot the victim," there was insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction. Pet.

at 6. Next, Petitioner alleges that his right to Due Process was violated by the trial court's

refusal to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense. Id. at 7. Finally, Petitioner contends

that his right to Due Process and a fair trial was violated when the trial court admitted unduly

prejudicial testimony from a gang expert regarding criminal street gangs. Id. at 8. 

Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because the state court's

determination of Petitioner's case was objectively reasonable. Answer. 

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A. Sufficiency Of The Evidence

Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Pet.

at 6. Petitioner states that the prosecution failed to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting

and instead only focused on their theory that Petitioner fired the three bullets that killed the

victim. Id. Additionally, Petitioner argues that the evidence presented by the prosecution

"at best established that [Petitioner] was one of two or more possible shooters." Id. Finally,

Petitioner notes that he is "appealing the fact that there was no physical evidence, no gun

powder residue, nothing ever tying petitioner to the case." Traverse at 5. 

Respondent contends that Petitioner's claim lacks merit because the state court's

determination of the matter was objectively reasonable and "was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law." Answer at 18-20. 

Petitioner presented his first claim to the state supreme court in a petition for review. 

Lodgment 9. The petition for review was summarily denied without a statement of reasoning

or citation of authority. Lodgment 10. Petitioner presented this claim to the appellate court

in the same manner as it was presented to the state supreme court. Lodgment 3 at 26. The

appellate court denied the claim in a reasoned opinion. Lodgment 6. The Court will

therefore look through the silent denial by the state supreme court to the appellate court

opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. The appellate court stated:

A. Standard of Review

The critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the

record reasonably supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

"[T]his inquiry does not require a court to ‘ask itself whether it believes that

the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'

[Citation.] Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt." ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61

L.Ed.2d 560; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431,

606 P.2d 738.) Thus, " ‘ "[i]f the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of

fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might

also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a

reversal of the judgment." ' [Citations.]" ( People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d

919, 933, 251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996; People v. Stanley (1995) 10

Cal.4th 764, 793, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) A reviewing court must

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accord deference to the jury and not substitute its evaluation of a witness's

credibility for that of the fact finder. ( People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199,

1206, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 864 P.2d 103.)

B. Analysis

Section 189 provides in relevant part, "All murder which is perpetrated by

means of ... willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing ... is murder of the first

degree." Personal discharge of a firearm requires that the defendant himself

intended to and did discharge a firearm, causing a death. (§ 12022.53, subd.

(d).)

Gonzalez asserts that the evidence is insufficient to show he was the shooter.

However, while attacking the credibility of Martin and Rosa, Gonzalez ignores

the substantial evidence pointing to him as the shooter. Martin, an eyewitness

to the shooting, identified Gonzalez as the shooter. Rosa wrote in a letter, and

told a teacher's aide, that Gonzalez shot Tweedie. She later admitted to police

that Gonzalez told her he had shot Tweedie, and she overheard him bragging

about the shooting. Further, the forensic evidence of the three gunshot

wounds to Tweedie, fired from one gun, supported Martin's claim Gonzalez

was the shooter. Circumstantial evidence of Gonzalez's own actions following

the shooting, including his fleeing to his godmother's house and hiding there

for a week, were evidence of a consciousness of guilt. Gonzalez's inconsistent

and false statements to police, were also probative of his guilt. Finally,

Gonzalez's status as a member of Varrio Clairemont, and the fact one of the

Looney Mob had beat up one of his fellow gang members earlier, supplied a

motive for the shooting.

Gonzalez cites the "grave credibility problems" with Martin's testimony,

including the fact he was high on methamphetamine and failed to pick out

Gonzalez from a police lineup. He also argues the inaccuracies in Rosa's letter

as to how the shooting occurred and the fact she later changed her story when

she talked to police rendered her testimony "unreliable."

However, the weight and credibility of Martin's and Rosa's testimony were

matters for the jury to decide, which we may not reweigh on appeal: "In

deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court resolves neither

credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution of conflicts and

inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.

[Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently

improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction."

( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d

487.)

The jury in this matter heard the testimony of Martin and the evidence of

Rosa's statements, as well as the other witnesses and evidence admitted at

trial. To the extent there were weaknesses or inconsistencies in the evidence

at trial, the jury resolved these doubts against Gonzalez. We may not question

their credibility determinations and conclusion that Gonzalez was the shooter.

Thus, substantial evidence supports his conviction for first degree murder and

the allegation that he personally used a firearm in committing that crime.

Lodgment 6 at 16-18.

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The clearly established federal law regarding sufficiency of the evidence claims in the

criminal context is set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Jackson claims face

a high bar in federal habeas proceedings. Coleman v. Johnson, --- S.Ct. ----, 2012 WL

1912196, *1 (U.S. 2012). In Jackson, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due

Process Clause is violated, and an applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief, "if it is found

that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. In making this

determination, habeas courts must respect “the province of the jury to determine the

credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from

proven facts by assuming that the jury resolved all conflicts in a manner that supports the

verdict." Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). "Circumstantial evidence

and inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction." United States v.

Cordova Barajas, 360 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.

Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir.1992)). “Although it might have been possible

to draw a different inference from the evidence, [a federal habeas court is] required to

resolve that conflict in favor of the prosecution." Ngo v. Giurbino, 651 F.3d 1112, 1114-15

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Coleman, --- S.Ct. ----, 2012 WL 1912196 at *1 (stating that "a

federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence

challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court

instead may do so only if the state court decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.'") (quoting

Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4, 181 L.Ed.2d 311 (2011) (per curiam));

and Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ("[A] federal habeas corpus court faced with a

record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does

not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in

favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution"). Federal habeas courts also

must analyze Jackson claims "with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the

criminal offense as defined by state law." Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir.

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2004) (en banc) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16). When assessing the evidence

presented at trial, a reviewing court must conduct a thorough review of the state court

record. Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 1997).

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that "[a]n additional layer of deference is added to

this standard by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which obliges [Petitioner] to demonstrate that the

state court's adjudication entailed an unreasonable application of the quoted Jackson

standard." Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Juan H. v. Allen,

408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005)). In Allen, the Ninth Circuit first reviewed the standard

of review applied by the state appellate court to a sufficiency of the evidence claim, and

found that although the state court did not cite to the relevant federal case law, "such a

citation is not required ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court

decision contradicts' Supreme Court precedent." Id. at 1274 n.12, quoting Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). Accordingly, it falls to this Court to determine whether the state

appellate court opinion here "reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson . . . to the

facts of this case." Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275.

As an initial matter, it is clear from the appellate court's citation to the case, that the

state court applied the Jackson standard in reviewing Petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence

claim. Lodgment 6 at 16. The question, then, is whether it did so reasonably. See Briceno,

555 F. 3d at 1078; Juan H., 408 F. 3d at 1274. 

As the appellate court correctly stated, under California law, a person is guilty of

committing murder in the first degree when she or he commits murder "which is 1

perpetrated by means of . . . willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing." Lodgment 6 at

17 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 189). In this case, Petitioner does not contest the sufficiency

of the evidence with respect to any particular element of the crime. ECF. No. 1 at 6. Rather,

Murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought." 1

Cal. Penal Code § 187. 

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Petitioner challenges the validity of the verdict because there was no physical evidence

linking him to the crime and the evidence presented, "at best established that he was one

of two or more possible shooters." Id. & Traverse at 5. Petitioner argues that the testimony

of one witness was not sufficient to support his conviction and notes that there were serious

concerns about the credibility of that witness. Id. & Traverse at 5. Petitioner further argues

that the prosecution should have pursued a theory of aiding and abetting instead of focusing

only on their theory that he fired all three bullets that killed the victim. ECF No. 1 at 6. 

While Petitioner correctly states that there was no physical evidence such as gun

powder residue or the murder weapon (Lodgment 2 at 363, 1497 & 1594), the Constitution

does not require such evidence. See Jackson, 442 U.S. at 324-25 and Schad v. Ryan, 671

F.3d 708, 717 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that “[c]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable

inferences drawn from it may properly form the basis of a conviction.”). Here, there was

substantial evidence, both direct and circumstantial, supporting the verdict. For example,

Ricky Martin identified Petitioner as the individual who shot and killed the victim and stated

that he saw the “muzzle flash” come out from the end of Petitioner’s arm. Lodgment 2 at

390-404. Petitioner’s sister, Rosa Gonzalez also identified Petitioner as being involved in the

murder. In a letter to a friend, Rosa wrote that Petitioner and his friends killed the victim

in retaliation for the victim stating that he was going to kill Petitioner and Petitioner’s brother. 

Lodgment 2 at 1020-1023. Rosa wrote that Petitioner fired one of the shots. Id. While

Rosa testified during the trial that she did not write the letter and that the contents of the

letter were not accurate (id. at 1064-1068, 1110, 1118-1119, 1181, 1189), the jury was free

to disregard Rosa’s testimony and credit the contents of the letter. Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358. 

The forensic evidence showed that the three bullets that killed the victim were shot from the

same 38 special or 357 hand-gun, which supports Martin’s testimony that it looked like the

shots that hit the victim were all fired by Petitioner and Mr. Shaver’s testimony that he heard

three quick shots before the victim was killed. Lodgment 2 at 362, 404 & 805. Additionally,

the jury was presented with testimony and evidence demonstrating that Petitioner was a

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member of a gang (Varrio Clairemont) that had been insulted when the victim (a member

of the rival Looney Mob tagging crew) threw up a rival gang sign and that had recently had

one of its other members assaulted by members of Looney Mob. Id. at 147-148, 162, 206,

1110, 1181, 1334, & 1371-1372. An expert witness on criminal gangs testified that after an

attack or a real or perceived act of disrespect, aggrieved gang members frequently will

retaliate against the member of a rival gang and that the retaliation usually involves violence,

such as firing weapons. Id. at 1326-1397. This evidence provided the jury with a possible

motive for Petitioner to kill the victim. Finally, the prosecution also presented evidence

showing that following the shooting, Petitioner left his home and spent a week hiding out

at his godmother's house and provided false and inconsistent statements to the police. Id.

at 1248, 2121. This evidence was more than sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude

that Petitioner was guilty as charged. 

While labeled a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, Petitioner is really

challenging the jury’s credibility determinations. Petitioner argues that Martin was not

credible and without his testimony, there was insufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s

conviction. Pet. at 6. As set forth above and in the state court’s opinion, there was

substantial evidence in addition to Martin’s testimony that supported Petitioner’s conviction. 

Lodgment 6 at 17-18. Moreover, while there was evidence challenging Martin’s credibility

(see, e.g., Lodgment 2. at 425-437), there also was evidence corroborating it (see, e.g., 

Lodgment 2 at 362 & 803-805). As previously stated, this Court must respect “the province

of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw

reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming that the jury resolved all conflicts in

a manner that supports the verdict." Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358. As such, Petitioner’s

challenge to the jury’s apparent credibility determinations fails.

Finally, there is no legal or factual merit to Petitioner’s argument that the government

should have pursued an aiding and abetting theory or that there was only one unreliable

witness supporting the verdict. As summarized above, there was substantial evidence

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supporting the verdict. And, even if there was only a single witness, the Constitution does

not prohibit a verdict based upon such evidence. See e.g. Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 563

(9th Cir. 2000) (finding sufficient evidence to support a murder conviction where the

evidence was almost entirely circumstantial and relatively weak).

There was substantial evidence to support Petitioner's conviction for first degree

murder and Petitioner has not established that “no rational trier of fact could have found

proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. Accordingly, the state court’s

analysis and decision denying the sufficiency of evidence claim was not “contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). For these reasons, this

Court finds Petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claim to be without merit and

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner's Petition be DENIED on ground one.

B. Imperfect Self-Defense Jury Instruction

Petitioner argues that "the trial court erroneously refused to instruct on imperfect

self-defense in violation of [his] constitutional rights to due process and to present a

defense." Pet. at 7. In support, Petitioner states that despite evidence indicating that the

victim claimed his gang affiliation and raised up a rifle as if to shoot it before he was shot,

the court only instructed the jury regarding perfect self-defense. Id. According to Petitioner,

the jury should have also received an instruction regarding imperfect self-defense and the 2

failure to do so "made it impossible for the jury to accurately evaluate [his] culpability for the

shooting incident." Id. Petitioner further claims that the court's failure to give the instruction

precluded the jury from considering his defense which is critical to a fair trial. Traverse at

6.

Respondent contends that the trial court's determination of the matter was objectively

reasonable. Answer at 20. Respondent further contends that in order to receive habeas

Under the imperfect self-defense doctrine, if a defendant subjectively believed it was necessary to use 2

deadly force in self-defense, but was objectively unreasonable in doing so, then the defendant lacked the

requisite element of malice necessary for a conviction of murder, and thus can be convicted only of voluntary

manslaughter. See Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1028 (9th Cir.2005).

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relief, Petitioner was required to show that omitting the jury instruction for imperfect self

defense "so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated his federal

constitutional right to due process," which he failed to do. Id. at 22. Respondent notes that

there was insufficient evidence to support a defense of imperfect self-defense and that

Petitioner "did not rely on self-defense, imperfect or otherwise, as his primary defense at

trial." Id.

The state trial court discussed the issue of jury instructions with counsel and

presented both sides with an opportunity to voice their position as to whether or not the

imperfect self-defense jury instruction was warranted. As the appellate court summarized, 

[a]fter both sides rested, jury instructions were discussed. The court agreed

to instruct the jury on self defense, whereupon defense counsel stated, "I

think the imperfect self-defense applies." The court responded, "Tell me how?

[B]ecause there has to be some evidence to support the instruction." Defense

counsel argued that Tweedie was high on a drug that can cause aggression

and was talking "about blowing somebody down." He also argued that Tweedie

"went to his left, pulling something up as if to draw a weapon," although

Martin denied that occurred when he testified.

The court stated that, given the state of the evidence, the only way to justify

an imperfect self-defense instruction would be for Gonzalez "to testify and say

that he was acting in self-defense, which we don't have, and the facts [don't]

support it." The court stated that imperfect self-defense "requires an actual,

but unreasonable, belief [in] the necessity to defend oneself." The court

opined that absent Gonzalez testifying to an "actual ... belief" in the need to

defend himself, it was "pure speculation" that he felt such a need.

The court ruled imperfect self-defense was not applicable, but invited defense

counsel to provide authority supporting his position at the next court session.

When discussion of jury instructions resumed the next day, defense counsel

made no further argument on imperfect self-defense and did not submit any

authority to the court.

Lodgment 6 at 19. The trial court did instruct the jury on murder in the second degree,

voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, and self-defense. Lodgment 2 at 2071-2083. 

Petitioner raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the California Supreme

Court, which denied the petition without citation of authority. Lodgment 10. Accordingly,

this Court must "look through" to the state appellate court's opinion denying the claim as the

basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. That court analyzed the claim as follows:

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B. Analysis

In a criminal case, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct " ‘on the

general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.

[Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those

principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and

which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case.' [Citations.]

Included within this duty is the ‘ ... obligation to instruct on defenses, ... and

on the relationship of these defenses to the elements of the charged offense

... ‘ where ‘ ... it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or

if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense....' [Citation.]" (

People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140, 127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d

1317.)

In People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921

P.2d 1, the California Supreme Court explained the defenses of perfect and

imperfect self-defense: "For killing to be in self-defense, the defendant must

actually and reasonably believe in the need to defend. [Citation.] If the belief

subjectively exists but is objectively unreasonable, there is ‘imperfect

self-defense,' i.e., ‘the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and

cannot be convicted of murder,' but can be convicted of manslaughter.

[Citation.] To constitute ‘perfect self-defense,' i.e., to exonerate the person

completely, the belief must also be objectively reasonable."

In this case there is no evidence in the record to support an imperfect

self-defense instruction. All the evidence showed Gonzalez and his companions

were the aggressors who approached Tweedie and shot him. There was no

evidence presented that Gonzalez had any belief that he needed to defend

himself, reasonable or unreasonable. Even if the evidence could be construed

to show that Tweedie was trying to pull a gun out from behind his back, it

would only show that he was attempting to defend himself.

Further, to the extent the court erred in failing to instruct on imperfect

self-defense, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have

convicted Gonzalez of manslaughter instead of first degree murder. The

evidence was overwhelming that there was no imminent threat to Gonzalez's

safety. Rather, all the evidence from eyewitnesses, and statements by

Gonzalez himself, pointed only to his intentionally shooting Tweedie as an act

of retaliation. He approached Tweedie, called out his gang affiliation, and then

shot Tweedie three times. Afterwards, he bragged about shooting him.

Accordingly, any error in failing to instruct on imperfect self-defense was

harmless.

Lodgment 6 at 20-21.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. Generally, challenges

to jury instructions based solely on alleged errors of state law do not state cognizable claims

in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72, 112 S.Ct. 475,

116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (stating that "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to

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reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions."). Here, Petitioner's claim is

cognizable because he alleges that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on imperfect

self-defense violated his constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense. Pet.

at 7. However, where the alleged error is the failure to give an instruction, the burden on

the petitioner is “especially heavy” and, in order to qualify for federal habeas relief, Petitioner

must show that the lack of jury instruction "so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violated due process." Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973) and Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099,

1106 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Moreover, the alleged error must be

considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the entire trial record (including

the arguments of counsel). Oquendo v. Jacquez, 2011 WL 3205351 at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 9,

2011) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72). Therefore, even if the court's failure to provide this

instruction was error, Petitioner still would not be entitled to habeas relief unless the error

had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id.

(citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38). Additionally, a state trial court's

finding that the evidence does not support a claim of imperfect self-defense is entitled to a

presumption of correctness on federal habeas review. Mendendez, 422 F.3d at 1029 (citing

Hartman v. Summers, 120 F.3d 157, 161 (9th Cir. 1997)).

The record supports the California Court of Appeal's conclusion that the trial court did

not err by omitting the imperfect self-defense instruction because the evidence did not

support the position that Petitioner unreasonably believed that he needed to defend himself

from the victim. Petitioner did not present any evidence that, at the time of the killing, he

had an actual fear of an imminent danger to his life or of great bodily injury or that he felt

the need to defend himself. The evidence presented at trial, including that Petitioner and

four or five of his fellow gang members walked down the street and approached the victim,

a member of a rival tagging crew, called out a gang sign, and then shot the victim three

times, does not support an inference that Petitioner subjectively believed that he was in

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imminent peril at the moment he fired his gun. Lodgment 2 at 389-395 & 801-806; see also

Menendez, 422 F.3d at 1030 (holding that imperfect self-defense instruction was not

warranted where the evidence was insufficient to show that “at the moment he shotgunned

his parents to death, he feared he was in imminent peril”). The evidence does not suggest

that Petitioner was attempting to protect himself or leave when he fired his gun. 

The only evidence potentially bearing on whether Petitioner believed he was in

imminent peril at the time of the shooting was testimony that the victim raised a rifle as if

to shoot it. Lodgment 2 at 450-451. However, in light of all of the other evidence, this

information does not present a case for imperfect self-defense as Petitioner and his fellow

gang members were the ones who sought out, approached and challenged the victim. Id.

at 390-392, 804-805. As the appellate court reasoned, if the victim did pull out a rifle, likely

he was trying to defend himself against the five or six gang members who had just

approached him, not creating a scenario in which Petitioner had to shoot to protect himself. 

Lodgment 6 at 21. This evidence that Petitioner wrongly insists the court did not consider,

is not sufficient to require the trial court to have issued a jury instruction on imperfect

self-defense. Even if the lower court erred, Petitioner has not shown a “substantial and

injurious effect” from that error. For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that

Petitioner's Petition be DENIED on ground two.

C. Prejudicial Gang Evidence

Petitioner's final claim is that his federal constitutional dues process right to a fair trial

was violated when the trial court "admitted extensive amounts of extraneous, yet unduly

prejudicial gang evidence." Pet. at 8. Petitioner states that while "some of the evidence was

relevant to the issue at trial, much of it was irrelevant, yet unduly prejudicial, and merely

demonstrated for the jury a predisposition on [Petitioner's] part toward criminal activity." 

Id. Petitioner argues that the testimony was particularly prejudicial given the fact that the

prosecution did not charge him "with a criminal street gang allegation" and that the reason

the prosecution provided to the trial court in support of their motion in limine to introduce

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gang evidence was that without the evidence, "I can't tie defendant to the crime." Id. and

Traverse at 7.

Respond contends that Petitioner's claim fails to state a federal question and lacks

merit because the state court's determination of the matter was objectively reasonable. 

Answer at 23. Respondent notes that whether or not evidence is properly admitted is a

function of state evidence law and, therefore, not a basis for federal habeas relief. Id.

Before trial began, the state trial court considered arguments from counsel on both

sides regarding the introduction of expert testimony. Lodgment 2 at 79-134 & 137-152. The

court held multiple hearings on the admissibility of gang evidence and ultimately found that

there would probably be sufficient foundation for the gang testimony once other evidence

was introduced. Id. In accordance with the court’s ruling, District Attorney Investigator,

Joseph Winney, testified about his experience with gangs as a law enforcement officer, the

structure and habits of Southern California Latino Gangs, retaliation for perceived disrespect,

the evolution of tagging crews into gangs, emerging gangs, aspects of Varrio Clairemont and

its rivals, evidence that Petitioner was a Varrio Clairemont member, and a motive for the

victim's shooting: the throwing of a gang sign or shouting a gang slogan. Id. at 1326-1397.

Petitioner raised the issue of gang evidence in the petition for review he filed in the

California Supreme Court, which denied the petition without citation of authority. Lodgment

10. The Court will therefore look through the silent denial by the state supreme court to the

appellate court opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. The court of appeal found that:

Here, the court did not err in admitting Winney's gang testimony. It assisted

the jury by explaining a motive for Gonzalez's shooting of Tweedie. It was

relevant to show that Ingram and his associates could be targeted for

retribution for beating up a Varrio Clairemont member and also for merely

making a gang sign as members of Varrio Clairemont drove by. It explained

the particular structure of the groups involved in the shooting and their rivalry.

It is "difficult to imagine a clearer need for expert explication than that

presented by a subculture in which this type of mindless retaliation promotes

‘respect.' " (People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1384, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d

596 .)

Moreover, any prejudice that resulted from the introduction of this evidence

was far outweighed by its relevance. "The prejudice which exclusion of

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evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not the

prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly

probative evidence. ‘[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or

damaging to the defendant's case. The stronger the evidence, the more it is

"prejudicial." The "prejudice" referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies

to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the

defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. In

applying section 352, "prejudicial" is not synonymous with "damaging.' "

[Citation.]" ( People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638, 250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758

P.2d 1189.)

Finally, the court instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which the jury

could consider the gang evidence:

"You may consider evidence of gang activity only for the limited purpose of

deciding whether the defendant had a motive to commit the crime charged,

the defendant actually believed in the need to defend himself, the defendant

acted in the heat of passion, and the defendant was the person who

committed the crime charged. You may also consider this evidence when you

evaluate the credibility or believability of a witness and when you consider the

fact and evidence relied upon by an expert witness in reaching his or her

opinion. You may not consider this evidence for any other purpose. [¶] You

may not conclude from the evidence that the defendant is a person of bad

character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes."

We presume the jury heeded this instruction. (People v. Delgado (1993) 5

Cal.4th 312, 331, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 529, 851 P.2d 811.

Lodgment 6 at 24-26.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief due to the trial court's admission of

the gang evidence. Generally speaking, federal habeas courts do not review questions of

state evidence law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68. Only when evidence renders the trial so

fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process, is federal habeas relief available. 

Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2009). However, "[A] habeas petitioner

bears a heavy burden in showing a due process violation based on an evidentiary decision." 

Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005). "Under AEDPA, even clearly

erroneous admissions of evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit

the grant of federal habeas corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,'

as laid out by the Supreme Court." Ojito v. Clark, 2011 WL 4626013, *7 (S.D.Cal., March

02, 2011) (quoting Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009)). Since there

is no clearly established Federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, on the issue

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of whether "admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process

violation," the court of appeal's decision could not have been contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. Id. (quoting Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101). 

Furthermore, the admission of evidence will only rise to the level of a due process violation

if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence. Jammal

v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d at 918 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Here, the gang evidence introduced by the prosecution assisted the jury in

determining whether or not Petitioner was affiliated with a criminal street gang and

understanding why Petitioner may have been motivated to shoot the victim, how disrespect

and retaliation play into gang relationships, and the credibility of various witnesses. As such,

there were numerous permissible inferences that the jury could draw from this evidence.

Additionally, the scope of the evidence was limited and the jury was instructed as to how

they were allowed to consider the information. 

Because the gang evidence could have led the jury to a permissible inference, the

admission of the evidence did not violate Petitioner's right to due process of law. Jammal,

926 F.2d at 920. Even if Petitioner is correct and the gang evidence was irrelevant and

unduly prejudicial, Petitioner has not established that the evidence rendered the trial

fundamentally unfair given the significant amount of evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. 

Finally, even if the evidence was improper and it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair,

"habeas relief still would not be warranted under the AEDPA because the Supreme Court 'has

not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence

constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ'” and this Court

“cannot find a state court ruling to be unreasonable based on Ninth Circuit precedent.” 

Pacheco v. Busbe, 2011 WL 2437480, *8 (C.D. Cal. March 22, 2011) (citing Holley, 568 F.3d

at 1101 & Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77); see also Smith v. Tilton, 2012 WL 125106, *8 (March

29, 2012) (citing Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101).

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner's Petition be

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DENIED on ground three.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Judge

issue an order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2)

directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 16, 2012, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later that July 30, 2012. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court's order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.

1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 18, 2012

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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