Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17804/USCOURTS-ca9-12-17804-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS;

DREAMCATCHER WILD HORSE AND

BURRO SANCTUARY; BARBARA

CLARKE; CHAD HANSON; LINDA

HAY,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT;

SALLY JEWELL,

*

 Secretary of the

U.S. Department of the Interior;

NEIL KORNZE,

**

 Director of the

Bureau of Land Management; KEN

COLLUM,

***

 Field Manager of Eagle

Lake Field Office,

Defendants-Appellees,

SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL;

SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL

FOUNDATION,

Intervenor-Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12-17804

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-01852-

MCE-DAD

OPINION

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2 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Morrison C. England, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 29, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed May 12, 2014

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea;

Dissent by Judge Rawlinson

* Sally Jewell is substituted for her predecessor, Kenneth L. Salazar, as

Secretary of the Interior. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

** Neil Kornze is substituted for his predecessor, Robert Abbey, as

Director of the Bureau of Land Management. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

*** Ken Collum is substituted for his predecessor, Dayne Barron, as

Field Manager of Eagle Lake Field Office. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 3

SUMMARY 

Bureau of Land Management

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of federal defendants in an action alleging that the

roundup, or gather, of wild horses and burros from the Twin

Peaks Herd Management Area on the California-Nevada

border violated the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros

Act and the National Environmental Policy Act.

Pursuant to its authority under the Wild Free-Roaming

Horses and Burros Act (the “Act”), the Bureau of Land

Management (“BLM”) establishes Appropriate Management

Levels for populations of native species - including wild

horses and burros - and introduced animals, such as livestock. 

The BLM removes animals from the Herd Management Area

when the population exceeds the established Appropriate

Management Level.

The panel held that the BLM acted within its authority

under the Act when it implemented the 2010 Gather Plan on

the Twin Peaks Herd Management Area. The panel also held

that the BLM’s decision not to prepare an environmental

impact statement under the National Environmental Policy

Act (“NEPA”) was not arbitrary and capricious because the

BLM provided a convincing statement of reasons why the

gather’s environmental effects would not be significant. The

panel also held that the BLM did not act arbitrarily and

capriciously under NEPA when it responded to comments

** ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

highlighting the possibility of scientific dissent regarding the

administration of the immunocontraceptive PZP.

Judge Rawlinson dissented because she did not agree that

the roundup of the wild horses by the BLM complied with the

Act.

COUNSEL

Rachel M. Fazio, Cedar Ridge, California, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Ignacia S. Moreno, Assistant Attorney General; Nancy

Zahedi, United States Department of the Interior, Office of

Regional Solicitor; Erik E. Petersen, Ayako Sato, and Mark

R. Haag, United States Department of Justice, Environment

& Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C., for

Defendants-Appellees.

Douglas Scott Burdin and Anna Seidman, Safari Club

International, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor-Defendants–

Appellees.

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

Wild horses—mustangs—and burros are part of our

nation’s heritage from the American West; a heritage

Congress has sought to preserve. That these animals should

roam the Western spaces appeals to the nature lover and

historian in each of us.

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 5

But these animals eat and trample. Even in the wide open

West of our nation, there is just so much forage; there are also

many vulnerable cultural artifacts underfoot.

These animals also multiply. And when too many of

them abound in limited land, the congressionally-appointed

stewards of that land must act to protect the environment.

This case is about whether those stewards have followed

Congress’s rules and their own agency’s regulations in acting

to thin the herds of these sympathetic, even inspiring, but

voracious, animals.

Plaintiffs—two non-profit organizations dedicated to

protecting wild horses and burros, and members of these

organizations—appeal the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the United States Department of the Interior and

the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) (collectively

“Defendants”) regarding the roundup, or “gather,” of

approximately 1,600 wild horses and 160 burros from the

Twin Peaks Herd Management Area (“HMA”) on the

California-Nevada border. Plaintiffs claim the gather

violated the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (“the

Act”) and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). 

The district court found no violation of either statute. We

AFFIRM.

Background

This case arises out of a roundup of wild horses and

burros by the BLM. The roundup took place in August and

September 2010 on the Twin Peaks HMA. In 1981, the BLM

designated the Twin Peaks HMA—nearly 800,000 acres of

public and private land on either side of the California-

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6 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

Nevada border—as suitable for the long-term maintenance of

wild horses and burros. Pursuant to its authority under the

Act,1the BLM is charged with managing the Twin Peaks

HMA to “achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological

balance.” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a). The BLM accomplishes this

goal, in part, byestablishingAppropriate Management Levels

(“AMLs”) for populations of both native species—including

wild horses, burros, and other wildlife—and introduced

animals, such as livestock (including cattle and sheep).2

43

C.F.R. § 4710.3-1. The BLM removes animals from an HMA

when the population exceeds the established AML. Under

the Act, the BLM must remove these excess animals in the

following “order and priority”: first, the BLM “shall order

old, sick, or lame animals to be destroyed in the most humane

manner possible”; second, the BLM “shall . . . capture[] and

remove[]” additional excess animals “for private

maintenance,” including adoption; third, the BLM “shall . . .

destroy[]” additional excess animals.3 § 1333(b)(2).

1 The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C.

§ 1331–1340, was enacted in 1971, and states its general purpose as

protecting “wild free-roaming horses and burros [] fromcapture, branding,

harassment, or death; and to accomplish this they are to be considered in

the area where presently found, as an integral part of the natural system of

the public lands.” 16 U.S.C. § 1331.

2 There is a separate AML for each species on a given HMA. The AML

for wild horses is defined by the BLM “as the number of wild horses that

can be sustained within a designated HMA which achieves and maintains

a thriving natural ecological balance in keeping with the multiple-use

management concept for the area.”

3 As the district court noted, “Congress has never appropriated funds for

extermination, as opposed to ongoing maintenance, of excess horses even

if not adopted.” In Defense of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 909

F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 2012); see, e.g., Pub. L. 111-88,

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 7

In 1989, the BLM first set AMLs for wild horses and

burros on the Twin Peaks HMA. Since then, it has adjusted

these AMLs several times to address the degradation of

riparian and wetland sites.4 At the time of the 2010 gather,

the AML amount for the Twin Peaks HMA was set at

448–758 wild horses and 72–116 burros. This amount was

set in 2001 and was confirmed in the 2008 Eagle Lake

Resource Management Plan.

Since 1998, the population of wild horses and burros on

the Twin Peaks HMA has steadily increased despite nine

BLM gathers and consequent removals. In May 2010, before

the challenged gather, the HMA was home to approximately

2,303 wild horses and 282 burros, or close to 300% more

wild horses and 240% more burros than the permissible

highest number of their respective AMLs. At that time, the

BLM projected that, if left unchecked, the wild horse

population on the HMA could exceed 6,000 to 8,000 within

ten years. Compounding this situation, according to the

BLM, wild horses were consuming three to five times as

much forage as was allocated for their use. The BLM

predicted that, if left unchecked, this overpopulation of wild

horses and burros would cause “serious impacts to soil

stability, vegetation, water sources (springs and creeks), and

wildlife habitat,” and “would not allow for sufficient

availability of forage and water for either wild horses or other

123 Stat. 2904, 2907 (2009) (“Appropriations herein made shall not be

available for the destruction of healthy, unadopted, wild horses and burros

in the care of the Bureau of Land Management or its contractors.”).

4 According to the BLM, “riparian and wetland sites” include both

“lentic” and “lotic” sites. Lentic sites consist of springs and seeps. Lotic

sites consist of creeks, streams, and reservoirs.

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animals.” The BLM also noted that the “increased numbers

of wild horses over the past five years appear[ed] to be

having a significant adverse impact [on cultural] sites.”5

In May 2010, after soliciting comments from 250 sources,

and based in part on the BLM’s stated predictions, the BLM

released a 157-pageEnvironmental Assessment (“EA”) for its

Twin Peaks HMA Wild Horse and Burro Gather Plan

(“Gather Plan”). “To reduce the impacts associated with an

overpopulation of wild horses [and to] ensure that rangeland

and riparian resources are capable of meeting land health

standards,” the EA proposed to remove excess wild horses

and burros from the HMA. The EA noted that the proposed

action was “needed at this time to balance wild horse and

burro populations with other resources, including wildlife

habitat, wilderness study area values, cultural resources,

livestock grazing, and soil and vegetation resources.”

According to the proposed action analyzed by the EA, the

BLM would attempt to gather up to 2,300 wild horses and

210 burros from the Twin Peaks HMA and would then return

a certain number of both animals to the HMA such that the

total remaining populations were within the designated

AMLs. The BLM planned to use “a helicopter drive method

of capture, with occasional helicopter assisted roping from

horseback” to steer the animals into “trap sites” where the

animals would be held until they could be transported to

temporary holding facilities on the HMA. Once in the

5

“Cultural sites” refer to areas and artifacts which reflect the Twin

Peaks’ American Indian history. The BLM has estimated that over 1,500

such cultural sites exist within the Twin Peaks HMA, including tool-stone

quarries, prehistoric camp sites and rockshelters, petroglyphs (rock

drawings), and trails.

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 9

temporary holding facilities, the BLM would feed the

animals, sort them based on sex, and examine the animals’

conditions before decidingwhether individual animals should

be euthanized because of injury or age, put up for adoption,

or returned to the HMA.6 To curb future population

increases, the released wild horses would have a 60:40 studsto-mares (male-to-female) ratio, and the released mares

would be injected with an immunocontraceptive, Porcine

Zona Pellucida (“PZP”), which would reduce their fertility

for two years.

The EA described the actions the BLM would take to

ensure the helicopter gather process would not unnecessarily

stress the animals and maintained that the capture methods,

traps, holding facilities, equipment, safety procedures, and

administration of PZP would comply with the BLM’s

Standard Operating Procedures for such gathers. The EA also

provided a detailed analysis of an alternative gather plan that

would not involve any fertility control measures, an

alternative that would use only fertility control measures but

no herd thinning or relocation, and a no-action alternative.7

The EA examined the potential impacts of these alternatives

on the HMA’s environment, looking specifically at the

impact on areas of critical environmental concern, cultural

6 Remember, although the Act authorizes the “humane” destruction of

excess healthy wild horses and burros, Congress has prohibited the

authorization of funds to be spent to do so. See supra n.3. If not adopted,

BLM transfers the healthy excess animals to private long-term holding

facilities, which consist of grassland pastures in the Midwest averaging

approximately 10–11 acres per horse.

7 The EA also gave brief consideration to fourteen additional

alternatives, which the BLM concluded were either impracticable or

unresponsive to the need to remove excess animals.

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10 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

resources, livestock grazing, noxious weeds and invasive

species, riparian and wetland sites, soil resources, special

status plants, upland vegetation, native wildlife, and

wilderness study areas.

In July 2010, based on its detailed consideration in the

EA, the BLM issued a “Finding of No Significant Impact”

(“FONSI”) on the environment for the proposed gather from

the Gather Plan, and therefore did not prepare an

environmental impact statement (“EIS”).8 On the same day,

the BLM announced that it would implement the proposed

gather and also responded to comments it had received on the

EA.

Before the BLM conducted the proposed gather, Plaintiffs

filed suit against the Defendants to enjoin implementation of

the proposed gather. Plaintiffs alleged the proposed gather

would violate the Act and the EIS-requirement of NEPA. 

The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary

injunction, and Plaintiffs appealed.

After a motions panel of this court denied an emergency

motion for injunctive relief pending appeal on August 10,

2010, the gather took place during August and September of

2010. The BLM ultimately gathered approximately 1,639

wild horses and 160 burros. The parties agree that post8 As discussed in more detail infra Part B, NEPA requires an agency to

complete an EIS only when substantial questions are raised as to whether

a proposed project “may cause significant degradation of some human

environmental factor.” Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,

573 F.3d 916, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ctr. for Biological Diversity

v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1219 (9th Cir.

2008)).

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 11

gather, 793 wild horses and 160 burros resided on the HMA.9

The remaining wild horses were made available for adoption

or sale, or placed in long-term holding facilities.

On August 15, 2011, this panel denied Plaintiffs’

preliminary injunction appeal because the injunctive relief

sought had become moot. In Defense of Animals v. U.S.

Dep’t of Interior, 648 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011). The parties

then filed cross motions for summary judgment in the district

court. The district court granted Defendants summary

judgment, holding that the gather did not violate the Act or

NEPA. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

Standard of Review

This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment.

Guatay Christian Fellowship v. Cnty. of San Diego, 670 F.3d

957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We “must determine, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

whether the district court correctly applied the relevant

substantive law and whether there are any genuine issues of

material fact.” Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1050

(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

Because neither NEPA nor the Act contain an internal

standard of judicial review, the Administrative Procedure Act

governs this court’s review of the BLM’s actions. Ocean

Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846,

858–59 (9th Cir. 2005). This court must set aside the BLM’s

actions, findings, or conclusions if they are “arbitrary,

9 According to the BLM, fifty-eight horses and one burro were returned

to the Twin Peaks HMA after the gather and two horses were euthanized

on the HMA due to pre-existing, debilitating leg injuries.

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12 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Although this

review is “searching and careful,” the arbitraryand capricious

standard is narrow, and this court cannot substitute its own

judgment for that of the agency. Ocean Advocates, 402 F.3d

at 858 (citation omitted). An agency’s decision is arbitrary

and capricious if it fails to consider important aspects of the

issue before it, if it supports its decisions with explanations

contrary to the evidence, or if its decision is either inherently

implausible or contrary to governing law. The Lands Council

v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005).

Analysis

A. Plaintiffs’ Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act

claims

The Act directs the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”)

to “protect and manage wild free-roaming horses and burros

as components of the public lands . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a). 

The BLM, as the designate of the Secretary, “shall manage

wild free-roaming horses and burros in a manner that is

designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological

balance on the public lands.” Id. The BLM must also

“maintain a current inventoryof wild free-roaminghorses and

burros on given areas of the public lands.” § 1333(b)(1). As

Congress explained:

The purpose of such inventory shall be to:

make determinations as to whether and where

an overpopulation exists and whether action

should be taken to remove excess animals;

determine appropriate management levels of

wild free-roaming horses and burros on these

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 13

areas of the public lands; and determine

whether appropriate management levels

should be achieved by the removal or

destruction of excess animals, or other options

(such as sterilization, or natural controls on

population levels).

Id.

Congress provided that “[a]ll management activities shall

be at the minimal feasible level . . . .” § 1333(a). Yet the Act

also provides that if the current population inventory reveals

that “an overpopulation exists on a given area of the public

lands,” and if the BLM determines that “action is necessary

to remove excess animals,” the BLM “shall immediately

remove excess animals from the range so as to achieve

appropriate management levels.” § 1333(b)(2). The Act

defines “excess animals” as “wild free-roaming horses or

burros . . . which must be removed from an area in order to

preserve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance

and multiple-use relationship in that area.” § 1332(f). Thus,

while the overarching purpose of the Act is to protect wild

horses and burros from “capture, branding, harassment or

death,” § 1331, the BLM is required to remove wild horses

and burros from a given area of the public lands when an

overpopulation exists.

In removing “excess animals,” the Act instructs the BLM

to take action

in the following order and priority, until all

excess animals have been removed so as to

restore a thriving natural ecological balance to

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14 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

the range, and protect the range from the

deterioration associated with overpopulation:

(A) The Secretary shall order old, sick, or

lame animals to be destroyed in the most

humane manner possible;

(B) The Secretary shall cause such number of

additional excess wild free-roaming horses

and burros to be humanely captured and

removed for private maintenance and care for

which he determines an adoption demand

exists . . . ;

(C) The Secretary shall cause additional

excess wild free-roaming horses and burros

for which an adoption demand by qualified

individuals does not exist to be destroyed in

the most humane and cost efficient manner

possible.

§ 1333(b)(2) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs make five arguments why the BLM violated the

Act by implementing the proposed gather, but none of these

arguments prevail.

First, Plaintiffs claim the BLM failed to determine, before

the gather, that there were “excess” wild horses and burros on

the Twin Peaks HMA. However, as earlier noted, the BLM

had set AMLs for wild horses and burros on the HMA

through the 2008 Eagle Lake Resource Management Plan at

448–758 and 72–116, respectively, and determined, prior to

the gather, that these AMLs had been vastly exceeded. In the

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 15

EA, the BLM specifically found that there were 1,855 excess

wild horses and 210 excess burros within the HMA.10 Given

the undisputed fact that the wild horse and burro populations

greatly exceeded their respective AMLs at the time of the

gather, and the carefully-documented concerns about the

deterioration of riparian areas and cultural sites caused by

overpopulation, as well as the likelihood of insufficient

forage to sustain the growing herd,11the BLM properly

decided action was necessary to restore the AMLs.12

10 This careful determination of AMLs for the wild horses and burros,

and the calculation of the excess population, distinguishes this case from

Colorado Wild Horse and Burro Coalition v. Salazar, 639 F. Supp. 2d 87

(D.D.C. 2009). In Salazar, the BLM proposed the permanent removal of

the entire wild horse herd from the West Douglas Herd Area in Colorado,

but failed to establish an AML for the herd or to demonstrate that there

were excess numbers of wild horses on the public lands. Id. at 95. A nonprofit organization challenged the proposed gather as violative ofthe Act’s

requirement that the BLM keep an inventory of wild horses on public

lands and determine that there are excess animals before removing them. 

Id. at 89. The district court agreed and held that the proposed gather,

which had been planned without any determination that an overpopulation

existed or that there were excess wild horses on the public lands, violated

the Act. Id. at 98. Here, to the contrary, the BLM fulfilled its statutory

duty by keeping an inventory of wild horse and burro populations on the

Twin Peaks HMA and making detailed calculations of the excess animals

on the HMA.

11

Indeed, in its decision to implement the Gather Plan, the BLM

predicted that if no action were taken to restore the AMLs, the wild horse

population would “crash . . . based on a lack of forage and water, and from

extreme competition and stress to the animals.”

12 According to the EA, some riparian/wetland areas were “not meeting

the [Riparian Proper Functioning Condition] standard” in May 2010

because of “[h]igh utilization and trampling by excess numbers of wild

horses.” Moreover, “many [riparian/wetland] sites appear[ed] to be in a

downward trend and [were] at risk of becoming more severely degraded

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16 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

Plaintiffs claim that, to find that there were “excess

animals,” the BLM was required to determine that there was

not a “thriving natural ecological balance” on the HMA due

to the presence of wild horses and burros at the time of the

gather. Plaintiffs cite 16 U.S.C. § 1332(f)(2), which defines

“excess animals” as those animals which “must be removed

from an area in order to preserve and maintain a thriving

natural ecological balance . . . .” This argument fails. 

Preservation efforts can hardly require prior destruction of

what is to be preserved. Simply because removal is required

when necessary to “preserve and maintain” such a “thriving

natural ecological balance” does not mean that removal can

occur only when there is a showing that such a balance no

longer exists. Rather, the use of the phrase “preserve and

maintain” in the definition of “excess animals” suggests that

the BLM may determine removal is necessary to ensure that

the current thriving natural ecological balance does not

deteriorate in the future.

Additionally, as the district court held, the statute

determines “excess animals” through the use of AML levels. 

In Defense of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 909 F. Supp.

2d 1178, 1192 (E.D. Cal. 2012); 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2) (if

“an overpopulation exists,” and if the BLM determines that

“action is necessary to remove excess animals,” the BLM

“shall immediately remove excess animals from the range so

as to achieve appropriate management levels.”) (emphasis

added). Although the statute also provides that “[s]uch action

shall be taken . . . until all excess animals have been removed

if [the then-current] level of use from wild horses [was] not curtailed.” 

Finally, the BLM determined that “[t]he increased numbers of wild horses

over the past five years appear[ed] to be having a significant adverse

impact to [cultural] sites.”

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 17

so as to restore a thriving natural ecological balance,” the

most logical reading of those two phrases together is that the

BLM must achieve a “thriving natural ecological balance” by

maintaining the relevant AMLs. § 1333(b)(2). In this way,

“AML is a vehicle used to move towards a [thriving natural

ecological balance], and a trigger by which [] the BLM is

alerted to address population imbalance.” In Defense of

Animals, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 1192; see also Am. Horse

Protection Ass’n, Inc. v. Watt, 694 F.2d 1310, 1318 (D.C. Cir.

1982) (The Act “directs that horses ‘shall’ be removed

‘immediately’ once the Secretary determines, on the basis of

whatever information he has at the time of his decision, that

an overpopulation exists.”) (emphasis omitted). Thus, the

BLM correctly relied on the AMLs to decide that there were

excess wild horses and burros on the HMA, and Plaintiffs’

assertion that a “thriving natural ecological balance” was

being maintained on the Twin Peaks HMA before the gather

is irrelevant.13

Second, Plaintiffs contend the BLM violated the “order

and priority” provision of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2),14

13 Although Plaintiffs fault the BLM for relying on “decade-old” AMLs

from 2001without conducting a new analysis, the 2008 Eagle Lake

Resource Management Plan “validated” those AMLs. Regardless, nothing

in the Act requires the BLM to determine new AMLs based on current

conditions every time the BLM decides to take action to restore the

already-established AMLs.

 

14 Section 1333(b)(2) provides, in relevant part:

Where the Secretary determines . . . that an

overpopulation exists on a given area of the public

lands and that action is necessary to remove excess

animals, he shall immediately remove excess animals

from the range so as to achieve appropriate

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18 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

by failing to identify and euthanize the “old, sick, or lame”

animals on the HMA before “capturing” or “removing” the

adoptable horses and burros. The BLM responds that the

term “remove” in § 1333(b)(2) should be interpreted to refer

to the permanent removal of animals from the HMA, and not

the temporary gathering of animals on the HMA to determine

which animals should be euthanized and which animals

should be made available for adoption. The BLM therefore

claims that “the Gather Plan’s temporary gathering of animals

on the [HMA] is not itself a removal and is therefore not

governed by Section 1333(b)(2)’s order and priority

provision.” We agree with the BLM.

The Act does not define “remove” as it is used in

§ 1333(b)(2) to prescribe the order for removal of excess wild

horses and burros. However, the Act does direct the BLM to

management levels. Such action shall be taken, in the

following order and priority, until all excess animals

have been removed . . .

(A) The Secretary shall order old, sick, or lame animals

to be destroyed in the most humane manner possible;

(B) The Secretary shall cause such number of additional

excess wild free-roaming horses and burros to be

humanely captured and removed for private

maintenance and care for which he determines an

adoption demand exists . . . ;

(C) The Secretary shall cause additional excess wild

free-roaming horses and burros for which an adoption

demand by qualified individuals does not exist to be

destroyed in the most humane and cost efficient manner

possible.

(emphasis added).

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 19

“immediately remove excess animals from the range.” 

§ 1333(b)(2) (emphasis added). Moreover, none of the three

methods for removal provided for by the “order and priority”

provision (euthanization of old, sick, or lame animals; private

maintenance; and destruction of additional excess animals)

contemplate “removal”of the animals by temporarily

capturing those animals on the HMA. Therefore, we interpret

the term “remove” in § 1333(b)(2) to mean the transfer of

wild horses and burros from the public lands on which they

once lived to private lands for private maintenance, or the

destruction of such animals pursuant to § 1333(b)(2)(A) or

(C).15 Under this interpretation, the gather’s temporary

roundup of nearly all the wild horses and burros on the HMA

was not itself a “removal” that is governed by the order and

priority provision of the Act, and therefore the BLM did not

violate this provision. See In Defense of Animals v. Salazar,

675 F. Supp. 2d 89, 97 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that rounding

up the vast majority of a wild horse herd for sorting in a

nearby holding facility does not “remove” all horses from the

public lands in violation of the Act’s order and priority

provision).

In sum, the BLM’s actions fell within the discretion

which courts have recognized the BLM has to remove excess

15 In the EA, the BLM interpreted “remove” to refer to the permanent

removal of the animals from the HMA, while it used the term “gather” to

describe the temporary herding and holding of the animals for purposes of

identification and diagnosis. We need not determine what, if any, level of

deference this determination is due because we have concluded that the

plain language of the statute is not ambiguous. See, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (“Ifthe intent

of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.”).

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20 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

animals from an HMA.16 When faced with the task of having

to remove a large percentage of the wild horse and burro

population to maintain the AMLs, the BLM reasonably

determined that the most effective way to fulfill its statutory

mandate was to attempt temporarily to gather the entire herd

before making determinations as to which animals should be

euthanized, which animals should be permanently removed

via adoption, and which animals should be released back on

to the HMA.17

Third, Plaintiffs argue that because the gather will likely

result in a level of livestock grazing that is allegedly three

times higher than the level of wild horse and burro grazing,

the gather violated the Act’s purported mandate that the

Twin Peaks HMA be managed “principally but not

necessarily exclusively” for the welfare of wild horses and

burros. Plaintiffs rely on language in the Act which defines

“ranges,” which are to be designated by the Secretary as

“sanctuaries for the protection and preservation” of wild

horses and burros, see 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a), as “the amount of

land . . . which is devoted principally but not necessarily

16 See, e.g., Cloud Found., Inc. v. Kempthorne, 2008 WL 2794741, at

*11 (D. Mont. July 16, 2008) (“The BLM has broad discretion under the

Act, and the arbitrary and capricious standard of review from the APA is

highly deferential”); Am. Horse Protection Ass’n v. Frizzell, 403 F. Supp.

1206, 1217 (D. Nev. 1975) (denying motion for a preliminary injunction,

permitting roundup of 400 wild horses to go forward, and noting the BLM

is given a “high degree of discretionary authority for the purposes of

protection, management, and control of wild free-roaming horses and

burros on the public lands”) (citation omitted).

17 Plaintiffs’ related argument that the BLM impermissibly removed

non-excess wild horses from the HMA when it temporarily gathered

nearly all of the animals fails because we hold that the initial temporary

roundup on the HMA did not constitute a “removal” under the Act.

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 21

exclusively to” wild horse and burro welfare, see § 1332(c). 

We need not determine whether the gather violated these

provisions of the Act because the record is bereft of an

essential foundational fact—designation of the Twin Peaks

HMA as a “range” by the Secretary pursuant to § 1333(a).18

According to the BLM’s summary of public comments for

the Gather Plan, the Twin Peaks HMA has not been

designated a “wild horse and burro range” by the Secretary,

nor have Plaintiffs presented any evidence suggesting that the

Twin Peaks HMA has been so designated. Therefore, any

requirements that might stem from the definition of “range”

in the Act do not apply to the Twin Peaks HMA.

Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that the BLM violated the Act’s

mandate that the BLM manage horses and burros at a

“minimal feasible level” when the BLM “decided to chase

with helicopters and capture up to 100% of the wild horses

from the Twin Peaks HMA, remove[] about 80% [of the

herd], inject mares with immunocontraceptives, and

unnaturally skew the sex ratio.” The Act does provide that

“[a]ll management activities shall be at the minimal feasible

level . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a). But Plaintiffs do not

adequately take into account the full statutory language,

which provides that “[a]ll management activities shall be at

the minimal feasible level and shall be carried out . . . in

order to protect the natural ecological balance of all wildlife

species which inhabit such lands . . . .” § 1333(a) (emphasis

added). Given BLM’s determination that the overpopulation

18 Agency regulations distinguish between “herd management areas,”

such as the Twin Peaks HMA, which need not be managed “principally

but not necessarily exclusively” for the welfare of wild horses and burros

and “wild horse and burro ranges” which must be so managed. See 43

C.F.R. § 4710.3-1, 4710.3-2.

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22 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

of wild horses and burros threatened the natural ecological

balance on the HMA, it reasonably determined that the gather

was necessary to restore the AMLs and thereby protect the

HMA’s natural ecological balance.

Moreover, the BLM had simultaneous duties not only “to

achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance”

on the HMA, § 1333(a), but also to remove excess animals

“immediately” when the BLM determined “that an

overpopulation exist[ed].” § 1333(b)(2). Congress could not

have intended that the “minimal” management requirement

would force the BLM to ignore these other statutory

mandates. Given that this court must defer to the BLM’s

expertise under the APA, see Salmon River Concerned

Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1356 (9th Cir. 1994), we

hold that the BLM reasonably interpreted its statutory

directive that management be at a “minimal feasible level”

when it decided to implement the Gather Plan in light of the

overpopulation at the time of the gather and the fact that

inaction would have led only to further detrimental

population increases.19

19 Given the rapid population growth, the district court also reasoned that

the BLM’s “efforts to slow reproduction . . . through

immunocontraceptives administered to released mares, and through a

skewed sex ratio of mares to stallions, is [] within the Act’s purview . . . .” 

On appeal, Plaintiffs claim that Alternative B to the proposed gather plan,

which called for removing excess horses without fertility controls, would

have achieved the same result but with less impact. However, the EA

concluded that without population controls, the wild horse population

would grow at a faster rate and more animals would need to be removed

in the future to maintain the AMLs. As the district court correctly

reasoned, the BLM’s chosen action constitutes management at the

“minimal” feasible level because the gather was intended to reduce the

size and frequency of future gathers. In Defense of Animals, 909 F. Supp.

2d at 1194.

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 23

Fifth, Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that the storage of

unadoptable excess wild horses at long-term holding facilities

owned by private contractors violated the Act. While the Act

does prohibit the BLM from relocating wild horses and

burros “to areas of the public lands where they do not

presently exist,” the Act does not prohibit such relocation to

private lands. 16 U.S.C. § 1339 (emphasis added). Because

nothing in the Act suggests that Congress intended to bar the

relocation of unadoptable horses to private lands for longterm holding, we decline to read such a prohibition into the

Act.20

Plaintiffs also contend that the privately-owned holding

facilities housing excess animals are “public lands” because

the Act defines “public lands” as “any lands administered by

the Secretary of the Interior through [the BLM].” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1332(e) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs claim the BLM

20 Moreover, as the D.C. Circuit has explained, “[s]ilence . . . may signal

permission rather than proscription,” and can suggest that Congress has

left a “question to agency discretion.” Catawba Cnty., N.C. v. EPA,

571 F.3d 20, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). Here, the BLM’s interpretation ofthe statute—that unadoptable

horses may be relocated to private landsfor long-term holding—deserves

deference precisely because of the “gap” Congress has left in the statute. 

See Schneider v. Chertoff, 450 F.3d 944, 960 (9th Cir. 2006). Congress

has barred the BLM from euthanizing healthy excess horses for which

there is no adoption demand pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)(C) by

continually declining to appropriate funds for the destruction of these

animals. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-88, 123 Stat. 2904, 2907 (2009)

(“Appropriations herein made shall not be available for the destruction of

healthy, unadopted, wild horses and burros in the care of the Bureau of

Land Management or its contractors.”). Thus, the BLM properly

determined that relocation of these animals to private facilities for longterm holding is necessary because the Act simultaneously mandates that

the BLM remove “excess” horses immediately to maintain the established

AMLs. See 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2).

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24 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

“administers” these facilities by exercising oversight over the

lands, thereby converting the facilities into “public lands” to

which excess animals may not be transferred. This argument

fails. To “administer” means “to manage or conduct.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary 65 (4th ed. 1968); Af–Cap, Inc. v.

Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th

Cir. 2007) (“When determining the plain meaning of

language, we may consult dictionary definitions.”). Although

Plaintiffs cite a memo which suggests that two BLM officers

inspected the wild horses in one long-term holding facility by

counting the number of horses and observing their conditions,

such isolated references to the BLM’s oversight practices do

not establish that the BLM “manages or conducts” the land on

which the animals reside. On the contrary, the evidence

suggests that the private land-owners, not the BLM,

“administer” the lands because they effectuate the direct dayto-day operations on the land.21

We therefore hold that the BLM did not violate the Act by

implementing the 2010 gather on the Twin Peaks HMA.

21 While plaintiffs argue that transfer of the horses to long-term holding

facilities is contrary to Congress’s intent to allow these horses to remain

“wild and free-roaming,” the district court rebutted this point by noting

how “transfer to the private facilities . . . would appear to be far more

consistent with that [wild and free-roaming] behavior than the other

options for disposing of excess horses and burros contemplated by the

Act; namely, adoption, euthanasia, or commercial sale.” In Defense of

Animals, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 n.7. Indeed, the record indicates that the

grassland pastures at the private facilities average approximately 10–11

acres per animal.

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 25

B. Plaintiffs’ NEPA claims

Plaintiffs also appeal the district court’s holding that the

BLM did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act

(“NEPA”). In Defense of Animals, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 1198. 

Plaintiffs contend that the BLM violated NEPA by declining

to prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) and

failing to respond adequately to scientific evidence regarding

the adverse effects of the immunocontraceptive PZP.

NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370, requires certain

procedural safeguards before an agency takes an action that

may significantly affect the environment. In particular,

NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS that

discusses the environmental ramifications for “major Federal

actions significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment.”2242 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). To decide whether

an EIS is required because the agency’s action “significantly

affect[s] the quality of the human environment,” an agency

may first prepare an Environmental Assessment (“EA”),

which is a “concise public document” that must “[b]riefly

provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining

whether to prepare an [EIS].” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1); Blue

Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208,

1212 (9th Cir. 1998). When substantial questions are raised

as to whether a proposed project “may cause significant

degradation of some human environmental factor,” an EIS is

22 40 C.F.R. 1508.14 provides that the term “[h]uman environment shall

be interpreted comprehensively to include the natural and physical

environment and the relationship of people with that environment.” In the

context of wild horse gathers, this court has interpreted “human

environment” to encompass “notsolely [the environmental impact] on the

rangelands, but [the environmental impact] on the horses as well.” Am.

Horse Protection Ass’n v. Andrus, 608 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1979).

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26 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

required. Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,

573 F.3d 916, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotingCtr. for Biological

Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d

1172, 1219 (9th Cir. 2008)).

If an agency determines an EIS is not required, it must, as

did the BLM here, issue a Finding of No Significant Impact

(“FONSI”), briefly describing why the action “will not have 

a significant effect on the human environment . . . .” 40

C.F.R. § 1508.13. In reviewing a decision not to prepare an

EIS under NEPA, the reviewing court “employ[s] an arbitrary

and capricious standard that requires us to determine whether

the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at the consequences of its

actions, based [its decision] on a consideration of the relevant

factors, and provided a convincing statement of reasons to

explain why a project’s impacts are insignificant.” Envtl.

Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv. (“EPIC”), 451 F.3d 1005,

1009 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). In making this assessment, we must not “substitute

our judgment for that of the agency.” Okanogan Highlands

Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 473 (9th Cir. 2000).

Agencies consider two broad factors to determine whether

an action may “significantly affect” the environment:

“context” and “intensity.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27; see also

Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722,

731 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2757

(2010). “Context simply delimits the scope of the agency’s

action, including the interests affected.” Babbit, 241 F.3d at

731. Intensity refers to the “severity of impact,” and the

regulations identify ten factors that agencies should consider

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 27

in evaluating intensity. § 1508.27(b)(1)–(10) (listing

factors).23

1. The BLM’s decision not to prepare an EIS

The BLM’s 157-page Gather Plan EA, published in May

2010, reveals a detailed consideration of the then-current and

future status of riparian areas, cultural sites, native wildlife,

and wild horse and burro populations on the Twin Peaks

HMA. The EA based its conclusions on evaluations of the

condition and health of riparian sites between 1995 and 2009

performed by BLM specialists who could determine the

extent of damage caused by wild horses and burros, as

opposed to livestock and other factors. The report included

photos of affected sites and predictions of how the gather

would improve at least 80 riparian and cultural sites currently

damaged by wild horse trampling.

23 The “intensity” factors enumerated by § 1508.27(b) include:

(1) “Impacts that may be both beneficial and adverse”; (2) “The degree to

which the proposed action affects public health or safety”; (3) “Unique

characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to historic or

cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic

rivers, or ecologically critical areas”; (4) “The degree to which the effects

on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly

controversial”; (5) “The degree to which the possible effects on the human

environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks”;

(6) “The degree to which the action may establish a precedent for future

actions . . . ”; (7) “Whether the action is related to other actions with

individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts”; (8) “The

degree to which the action may adversely affect districts, sites, highways,

structures, or objects listed in or eligible for listing in the National

Register of Historic Places or may cause loss or destruction of significant

scientific, cultural, or historical resources”; (9) “The degree to which the

action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its

habitat . . . ”; and (10) “Whether the action threatens a violation of

Federal, State, or local law . . . .”

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28 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

The EA also described the actions that would be taken to

ensure the helicopter gather process would not unnecessarily

stress the animals, and made clear that the capture methods,

traps, holding facilities, equipment, and administration of

immunocontraceptives would be in compliance with the

Standard Operating Procedures set out in the National Wild

Horses Gather Contract. The EA provided a thorough

analysis of numerous alternatives, including an alternative

that would not involve any fertility control measures, an

alternative that would use only fertility control measures, and

a no-action alternative. In short, the EA provided a detailed

analysis of the current environmental conditions on the HMA,

future projections for the environmental condition of the

HMA absent any action, an explanation of the BLM’s

preferred action in comparison to alternative actions that the

BLM could take, and the methodology and data upon which

its conclusions were based.

Relying on this comprehensive analysis, the BLM’s

FONSI determined that the proposed gather would “not

significantly affect the quality of the human environment.” 

The FONSItherefore concluded that the proposed gather was

“not a major federal action” for which an EIS would be

required. That conclusion was supported by a brief but

persuasive analysis of the ten intensity factors enumerated by

40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b). See supra n.23. In particular, the

FONSI incorporated the 27-page environmental “effects”

analysis contained in the EA; noted that standard operating

procedures would be used to conduct the gather; emphasized

that the proposed action was not likely to affect public health

or safety because the Twin Peaks HMA “is located within a

very remote setting with little human habitation”; determined

that “cumulative effects expected would include continued

improvement of upland and riparian vegetation conditions”;

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 29

stated there are no threatened or endangered plants in the

surrounding area; and maintained that a cultural resources

survey of the HMA would occur before the gather and would

guide the choice of temporary trap sites. Plaintiffs challenge

the BLM’s decision not to issue an EIS, citing four of the

intensity factors from 40 C.F.R.§ 1508.27(b) for their

argument that substantial questions have been raised

regarding whether the gather may have a significant impact

on the wild horses and burros of the HMA.

First, Plaintiffs claim the effects of the gather were

“highly controversial.” See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) (listing

as an intensity factor “[t]he degree to which the effects on the

quality of the human environment are likely to be highly

controversial”). An action is “highly controversial” when “a

substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature, or effect of the

major federal action[.]” Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Locke,

626 F.3d 1040, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010). “A substantial dispute

exists when evidence . . . casts serious doubt upon the

reasonableness of an agency’s conclusions.” Babbitt,

241 F.3d at 736. Plaintiffs claim the gather was “highly

controversial” because of its “unprecedented” scope. 

According to Plaintiffs, “[n]one of the previous roundups [on

the Twin Peaks HMA] included intensive manipulations of

the horses left on the range [such as injection of

immunocontraceptives into the mares and the skewing of the

stallion-to-mare ratio], and all of [the previous gathers]

rounded up a much smaller percentage of the overall

population [of wild horses and burros].”

Plaintiffs are correct that the challenged gather was the

largest ever conducted on the Twin Peaks HMA, as the BLM

concedes. The BLM gathered approximately 1,639 wild

horses, almost double the number taken in the previous gather

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30 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

of wild horses. Plaintiffs are also correct that some 2,300

public comments were submitted opposing the Gather Plan

EA.

These considerations notwithstanding, if any opposition

to an agency’s proposed actions created a “substantial

dispute,” an EIS would seemingly always be required. Cf.

Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d

1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the mere “existence

of opposition to a use” does not render a project “highly

controversial”). Even granting that this was the largest gather

ever conducted on the HMA, its foreseeable effect was

entirely precedented and non-controversial: the return of the

wild horse and burro populations to the long-established

AMLs. Indeed, the effects of gathers conducted on the Twin

Peaks HMA are well known to the BLM, as the BLM has

gathered animals on these lands since 1976 and gathered

approximately 4,000 wild horses on the HMA between 1998

and 2009. As for Plaintiffs’ contention regarding the

injection of immunocontraceptives into mares and the

skewing of the stallion-to-mare ratio, these practices have

been in use since at least 1992, and the comments on the EA

do not indicate that these practices are “highly controversial.” 

Overall, given the EA’s clear and lengthy analysis regarding

the effects of the proposed gather, Plaintiffs have not

presented evidence that “casts serious doubt upon the

reasonableness of [the] agency’s conclusions,” and thus the

effects of the gather were not “highly controversial” at the

time the BLM issued its FONSI. See Locke, 626 F.3d at

1057.

Second, Plaintiffs assert that the gather’s “possible effects

. . . on the wild horses and burros in this HMA are highly

uncertain and/or involve unique or unknown risks.” See 40

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 31

C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5) (listing as an intensity factor “[t]he

degree to which the possible effects on the human

environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or

unknown risks”). Plaintiffs cite two studies that claim to

demonstrate that the use of immunocontraceptives such as

PZP may have “potentially significant effects” on wild

horses. Plaintiffs also claim the gather’s combination of PZP

treatment with a large reduction in herd size and the skewing

of the herd’s sex ratio resulted in a high degree of uncertainty.

This argument fails because “regulations do not anticipate

the need for an EIS anytime there is some uncertainty, but

only if the effects of the project are ‘highly’ uncertain.” Ctr.

for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701, 712

(9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). The effects of the gather were not “highly

uncertain” to the BLM, which, as noted above, has used PZP

to manage wild horse populations since 1992 and has made

adjustments to herd sex ratios in numerous gathers. And

Plaintiffs have submitted no evidence in support of their

assertion that the combination of these practices may actually

pose serious unknown risks.

Plaintiffs’ strongest argument regarding the “highly

uncertain” intensity factor is their citation of two studies (a

study by Cooper and Larsen from 2006 and a study by Nunez

et al. from 2009) that discuss possible negative effects PZP

may have on the herd behavior and genetic diversity of wild

horse populations. However, these two articles are ultimately

insufficient to require a full EIS in a case like this where the

agency relied on other scientific findings to support its

conclusion that PZP would not have a significant negative

effect on the animals. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res.

Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)(“When specialists express

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32 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on

the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if,

as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more

persuasive.”) Moreover, the district court correctly noted that

the studies cited by Plaintiffs found only “possible” effects of

PZP, and “therefore can be distinguished on that basis [from

the studies on which the BLM relied in its EA] since effects

that are only ‘possible’ do not represent true ‘dissenting’

views.” In Defense of Animals, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 1197.24

Some wild horse protection groups even commented on the

EA that the BLM should make greater use of contraceptive

treatments. This court has held that when an agency bases a

finding of no significant impact upon relevant and substantial

data, the fact that the record also contains some evidence

supporting a different scientific opinion does not necessarily

render the agency’s decision arbitrary and capricious. See

Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir.

1992). We therefore decline to find that the effects of the

proposed gather were “highly uncertain.”

Third, Plaintiffs claim the gather will “establish a

precedent for future actions with significant effects,” by

encouraging future roundups of this scope and intensity. See

40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(6) (listing as an intensity factor “[t]he

degree to which the action may establish a precedent for

future actions with significant effects”). However, this

argument is foreclosed by Ninth Circuit law which holds that

“EAs are usually highly specific to the project and the locale,

thus creating no binding precedent.” Barnes v. U.S. Dep’t of

24 The district court also distinguished the studies cited by Plaintiffs on

the ground that those studies assessed the effects on wild horses of

repeated doses of PZP, whereas the Gather Plan only proposed to

administer a single dose. In Defense of Animals, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 1197.

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IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR 33

Transp., 655 F.3d 1124, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation

omitted). Thus, the BLM’s finding of no significant impact

in this case will not affect the BLM’s NEPA analysis in

future gathers.25

We conclude that the BLM considered the relevant

intensity factors in making its finding of no significant impact

and “provided a convincing statement of reasons to explain

why [the] project’s impacts [were expected to be]

insignificant.” EPIC, 451 F.3d at 1009 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the BLM did not

violate NEPA when it decided not to issue an EIS.

2. The BLM’s response to contrary scientific

evidence

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the BLM failed to respond

adequately to opposing scientific views regarding potential

negative effects of the immunocontraceptive PZP, once again

citing the Cooper and Larsen (2006) and Nunez et al. (2009)

studies. In response to a comment on the EA that drew the

BLM’s attention to these studies, the BLM simply directed

readers to the sections of the EA that addressed fertility

controls. Those sections, in turn, provided citations to

various studies which supported the BLM’s conclusion that

PZP-treatment would not affect the horses’ hormone health,

the behavior of treated mares, pregnancies currently in

progress, or the health of offspring. Those sections also

25 Plaintiffs also cite a fourth intensity factor, claiming that the gather

“threatens a violation” of the Act. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(10) (listing

as an intensity factor “whether the action threatens a violation of Federal,

State, or local law”). This argument fails because, as discussed supra Part

A, the Gather Plan did not violate the Act.

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determined that the effects of PZP were completely reversible

and that PZP could be easily administered in the field. 

However, the BLM’s response to this comment, and the EA

itself, did not address why the BLM found the studies on

which it relied to be more persuasive than the Cooper and

Larsen, and Nunez et al. studies.

Under NEPA, the panel must assess whether the BLM

“failed to address certain crucial factors, consideration of

which [is] essential to a truly informed decision whether or

not to prepare an EIS.” Found. for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. U.S.

Dep’t of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1982). This

issue presents a close question because, at first blush, it

appears that the BLM did indeed “fail[] to address” the two

studies which suggested that PZP may have detrimental

effects on herd behavior and genetic diversity. The BLM did

not discuss these studies, nor did the BLM explain why it

decided to rely on the studies mentioned in the EA as

opposed to the more recent studies cited in the comment. 

This fact alone, however, does not automatically lead to a

NEPA violation.

First, an agency’s failure to address a “certain crucial

factor” in deciding whether or not to prepare an EIS is not the

same as an agency’s failure to address and disclaim certain

evidence regarding that factor. Here, the “factor” is the effect

of PZP on wild horses. The BLM did consider that “factor”

by directing the reader to sections of the EA which addressed

fertility controls and provided citations to various studies

demonstrating the lack of negative effects resulting from the

administration of PZP. Thus, the BLM did address the

relevant factor. It simply did not write that the earlier studies

rebutted Plaintiffs’ speculations as to possible negative

effects of PZP. Second, one could just as easily argue that the

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BLM did consider the studies because it responded to the

comment-at-issue by explicitly referencing the sections of the

EA that addressed fertility control. This suggests that the

BLM simply did not find the newer studies to be particularly

relevant or as scientifically accurate as the older studies on

which it relied.26 Cf. EPIC, 451 F.3d at 1017 (“When

specialists express conflicting views, we defer to the

informed discretion of the agency.”).

Although a close question, the latter view is more

persuasive given the impracticality of a contrary holding that

would require agencies to address in detail the substance

conveyed in every single comment made on an EA to prove

that the agency“considered” the relevant factors. Indeed, this

court has stated that even for the more comprehensive EISs,

agencies “need not respond to every single scientific study or

comment.” Ecology Ctr. v. Castaneda, 574 F.3d 652, 668

(9th Cir. 2009). Moreover, “NEPA does not require federal

agencies to ‘assess . . . consider . . . [and] respond’ to public

comments on an EA to the same degree as it does for an EIS.”

Cal. Trout v. F.E.R.C., 572 F.3d 1003, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009)

(emphasis added). Therefore, we hold that, despite the fact

that the BLM did not recite its reasons for relying on the

studies cited in the EA as opposed to the studies cited by the

comment, the BLM still performed the “hard look” required

by NEPA. See EPIC, 451 F.3d at 1009.

26 As discussed supra Part B.1, the district court distinguished the two

studies cited by the comment from the studies cited by the BLM on two

grounds. First, the studies cited by the comment found only “possible”

negative effects of PZP. Second, those studies assessed the effects on

wild horses of repeated doses of PZP, whereas the proposed gather only

administered a single dose. In Defense of Animals, 909 F. Supp. 2d at

1197.

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Conclusion

Ultimately, we conclude that the BLM acted within its

authority under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros

Act when it implemented the 2010 Gather Plan on the Twin

Peaks HMA. We also hold that the BLM’s decision not to

prepare an EIS was not arbitrary and capricious because the

BLM provided a convincing statement of reasons why the

gather’s environmental effects would not be significant. 

Finally, we hold that the BLM did not act arbitrarily and

capriciously when it responded to comments highlighting the

possibility of scientific dissent regarding the administration

of the immunocontraceptive PZP. For those reasons, we

AFFIRM the decision of the district court granting summary

judgment to the Defendants.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent because I cannot agree that the

roundup of the wild horses by the Bureau of Land

Management (BLM) complied with the Wild Free Roaming

Horses and Burros Act (the Act).

It is undisputed that Congress enacted this legislation to

protect wild horses and burros “from capture, branding,

harassment or death” and to do so while the horses and burros

are “considered in the area where presently found, as an

integral part of the natural system of the public lands.” 

16 U.S.C. § 1331. Congress made an express finding that

“wild free-roaming horses and burros are living symbols of

the historic and pioneer spirit of the West; that they

contribute to the diversity of life forms within the Nation and

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enrich the lives of the American people.” Id. Congress was

concerned that “these horses and burros are fast disappearing

from the American scene.” Id. From these explicit

Congressional expressions, we can discern four important

legislative purposes: (1) acknowledgment of the importance

of wild horses as “living symbols” of our Western heritage;

(2) recognition that these treasured symbols “are fast

disappearing from the American scene;” (3) articulation of

Congressional policy to protect wild horses “from capture,

branding, harassment or death”; and (4) designation of the

area where the horses are “presently found” to accomplish the

protection of the wild horses. Id.

With these express Congressional purposes in mind, I

now consider 16 U.S.C. § 1333, the specific provision under

which the BLM effectuated removal of the wild horses from

their home on the range.

Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a), the Secretary of the

Interior is directed to first protect and then to manage the wild

horse population. Wild horses and burros are considered

“components of the public lands” who are to be managed “at

the minimal feasible level.” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a).

Section 1333(b) authorizes the Secretary to remove only

“excess animals.” If an overpopulation of wild horses exists,

the Act mandates that any removal take place “in the

following order and priority, until all excess animals have

been removed”:

(A) The Secretary shall order old, sick, or

lame animals to be destroyed in the most

humane manner possible;

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(B) The Secretary shall cause such

number of additional excess wild freeroaming horses and burros to be humanely

captured and removed [for adoption] . . . ; and

(C) The Secretary shall cause additional

excess wild free-roaming horses and burros

for which an adoption demand . . . does not

exist to be destroyed in the most humane and

cost efficient manner possible. 16 U.S.C.

§ 1333(b)(1)–(2).

The Act couldn’t be clearer. Congress, has specifically

listed the order in which excess wild horses are to be

removed. First, and before any horses are captured, “old, sick

or lame animals” are “to be destroyed.” Id. § 1333(2)(A). 

Only after the first listed priority has been completed does the

Act authorize “additional excess wild free-roaming horses

and burros to be humanely captured and removed” for

adoption. Id. at § 1333(2)(B). Finally, any remaining

“additional excess wild free-roaming horses and burros” for

which no adoption demand exists may be destroyed. Id. at

§ 1333(2)(C).

There is absolutely no textual support in the Act for the

Secretary to capture the entire herd of wild horses, excess and

non-excess alike, in total disregard of the explicit priority

articulated in the Act. In addition, it cannot be gainsaid that

the wholesale capture of the wild horse herd is the complete

antithesis of the “minimal feasible level” of management

mandated by the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a).

The majority overlooks this flagrant lack of compliance

with the Act by adopting the BLM’s argument that the

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“gathering” of animals is not a removal governed by the

provisions of § 1333(b)(2). Majority Opinion, p.18–19. 

However, if the BLM is not managing the excess animals

pursuant to § 1333(b)(2), no other portion of the Act

authorizes capture of excess horses for the purpose of

removal. And absolutely nothing in the Act authorizes the

capture of non-excess horses. The definition of removal

adopted by the BLM and parroted by the majority completely

ignores the Act’s admonition against capturing or harassing

the wild horses, and its instruction to manage the horses

where they are found, as part of the public lands. See

16 U.S.C. § 1331. As stated, the BLM’s interpretation allows

the capture of excess and non-excess horses alike, which was

clearly not the intent of the carefully crafted legislation

directed toward the capture and removal of excess horses

only.

If, as the BLM argues and the majority accepts, its

“gather” were not contemplated by § 1333(b)(2), Congress

would not have carefully crafted the priority provisions of the

Act. It is only after old, sick or lame animals are destroyed

that the Act provides for additional excess wild horses to be

captured. See § 1333(b)(2)(A)–(B). The BLM completely

circumvented this statutory mandate and violated the express

purpose of Congress to protect the wild horses from capture

and/or harassment. See 16 U.S.C. § 1331. When an agency’s

interpretation of a statute is totally inconsistent with the

express purpose of the statute, that interpretation is null and

void. See Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v.

Meese, 891 F.2d 1374, 1383 (9th Cir. 1989), as amended

(“This court recognizes that ordinarily an agency’s

interpretation is entitled to deference, however, courts must

reject an administrative construction of a statute that is

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40 IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS V. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR

inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrates

Congress’ purpose. . . .”) (citation omitted).

Unlike the majority, I am not persuaded by the rationale

in the district court decision of In Defense of Animals v.

Salazar, 675 F.Supp. 2d 89 (D. D.C. 2009). As an initial

matter, that case involved the denial of a preliminary

injunction and rested on a balancing of the preliminary

injunction factors rather than a definitive legal ruling on the

merits. See id. at 95–96 (discussing likelihood of success on

the merits). More importantly, although the court purported

to consider the purpose of the statute, see id., it completely

ignored the actual text of the statute defining its purpose as to

protect the wild horses from capture or harassment and to do

so where the horses were “presently found.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1331.

The record in this case reflects that the BLM has

previously identified injured wild horses on the range without

first capturing them. Therefore, no legitimate basis existed

for cavalierly chasing the horses with helicopters for miles

before capturing them, including horses who were admittedly

non-excess.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency

abuses its discretion when its actions are contrary to law. See

Organized Village of Kake v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., No. 11-

35517, – F.3d –, 2014 WL 1229762 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2014)

(articulating that “[a]n agency’s action is arbitrary and

capricious if . . . the agency’s decision is contrary to the

governing law”) (citation omitted). In my view, the BLM

actions completely flouted the Wild Free-Roaming Horses

and Burros Act and thereby abused its discretion. See id. 

Because the BLM’s interpretation and application of the Act

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ignored the text, intent and purpose of the statute, absolutely

no deference was owed to the agency action taken in reliance

on that interpretation. See Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Warehousemen’s Union, 891 F.2d at 1383; see also Dyack v.

Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands, 317 F.3d 1030, 1036

(9th Cir. 2003) (“Although we generally defer to an agency’s

construction of a statute it administers, we will not do so

where the agency’s interpretation is contrary to the legislative

intent. . . .”) (citation omitted).

I respectfully dissent.

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