Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00362/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00362-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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28 * This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RACHEL SPADE and RHONDA MYERS, )

) 2:07-cv-362-GEB-DAD

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

PEPSI BOTTLING GROUP, INC.; RAY )

MEEK; MARK PERIZOLO; SCOTT WELCH; )

BUCK PRICE; KIRT DUNCAN; SCOTT )

PAPILLION; RONILLA PRASAD; and )

RICHARD LLADO, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants Mark Perizolo (“Perizolo”), Buck Price (“Price”),

Kirt Duncan (“Duncan”), Scott Papillion (“Papillion”), Ronilla Prasad

(“Prasad”), and Richard Llado (“Llado”) move under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), to dismiss all claims against them

in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”). (Mot. at 1:14-

15, 17:14-17.) Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

///

/// 

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2

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Rachel Spade (“Spade”) is an employee of Defendant

Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc. (“Pepsi”). (Complaint ¶¶ 1, 15-17.) 

Beginning in August 2002, and continuing to the present, Spade was

subjected to sexual jokes, statements, and actions, and comments

derogatory to women. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.) These acts and statements

include, but are not limited to: “Perizolo commenting about the

placement of a vending machine [near Spade] saying ‘now that’s

diversity at work’”; and “Price asking Spade ‘I hope you don’t take

this the wrong way, but why aren’t you in the office with the rest of

the other women, why would you want to do this hard job?’” (Id.) 

Plaintiff Rhonda Myers (“Myers”) was an employee of

Defendant Pepsi. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 18-25.) Beginning in April 2002, and

continuing through July 2006, Myers was subjected to sexual jokes,

statements and actions, and numerous derogatory comments about her

gender. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 18.) These acts and statements include, but are

not limited to: “Duncan mak[ing] inappropriate comments followed

quickly by ‘oh I better be careful someone might report me to HR,’”

and when asked if he was referring to Myers, merely laughing at her;

Papillion routinely talking about his “lack of respect for women,

blacks, and gay men,” referring to women as “bitches and cunts,” and

postulating that one of his sales representatives was a homosexual by

saying he “writes in purple” and was a “cigar or pole smoker.” 

(Id. ¶¶ 21, 25.)

 Prasad, Pepsi’s Human Resources Manager, allowed these

sexual jokes, statements, and actions to take place in her presence. 

(Id. ¶ 14.) At one point, Spade attempted to raise these concerns

with Llado, a management employee, “who cut her off and said ‘I hear

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1 Defendants ask this court to take judicial notice of Myers’

complaints to DFEH and EEOC. (Req. for Judicial Notice Exs. A, B.) In

general, the court may not consider material other than the facts

alleged in the complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss. Anderson v.

Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the court may

consider materials of which it may take judicial notice, including

matters of public record. Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d

646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (defining the scope of

judicial notice); see also Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279,

1282 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. &

Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991) (“A court may take judicial

notice of ‘records and reports of administrative bodies.’”) (quoting

Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th

Cir. 1953)). Accordingly, these two exhibits will be considered.

3

the same thing out of Rhonda in Reno and frankly, I am sick of it!’” 

(Id. ¶ 16.) Myers complained about this treatment on multiple

occasions, but was ignored and labeled a “complainer.” (Id. ¶ 21.) 

Following Spade and Myers’ complaints, both were ignored at meetings,

ostracized, and denied promotional opportunities. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 22, 23,

28.) As a result of this continuing course of conduct, Myers was

forced to quit her position with Pepsi in July 2006. (Id. ¶ 29.)

On July 17, 2006, and September 28, 2006, Plaintiffs filed

complaints of harassment, discrimination and retaliation with the

California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) and the

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),

respectively, and received “right to sue” letters from both.1 (Id. ¶

31.) Subsequently, on April 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a First

Amended Complaint against Pepsi, as well as eight Pepsi employees and

managers, alleging twelve causes of action. (Id. ¶¶ 32-113.) Only

four of those twelve claims are directed against Duncan, Prize,

Perizolo, Llado, and Papillion and only two are directed against

Prasad. Plaintiffs allege that Duncan, Price, Perizolo, Llado, and

Papillion are liable for: relation in violation of the California Fair

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4

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Government Code

section 12940(k) (fifth claim for relief); sexual harassment in

violation of FEHA (sixth claim for relief); sexual harassment in

violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (eighth claim for

relief); and unfair business practices, California Business and

Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (eleventh claim for relief). 

Plaintiffs allege that Prasad is liable for retaliation in violation

of FEHA (fifth claim for relief) and unfair business practices

(eleventh claim for relief). Duncan, Price, Perizolo, Llado,

Papillion, and Prasad now move to dismiss all claims against them.

DISCUSSION

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if Plaintiffs

fail to (i) present a cognizable legal theory in their Complaint, or

(ii) plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. 

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th

Cir. 1984). To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs need to plead

“only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). When

considering a motion to dismiss, all material allegations in the

Complaint must be accepted as true and construed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d

336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs are given the benefit of

every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the allegations in

the Complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). In addition, the district

court must “assume that all general allegations embrace whatever

specific facts might be necessary to support them.” Peloza v.

Capistrano Unified School Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994)

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(citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990);

Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1990)).

I. Retaliation in Violation of FEHA (Fifth Claim for Relief)

To establish a claim for retaliation in violation of FEHA,

Plaintiffs must show that (i) they engaged in a protected activity;

(ii) they were subjected to an adverse employment action; and (iii)

there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse

action. Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power, 144

Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1229 (2006) (citing Flait v. N. Am. Watch Corp., 3

Cal. App. 4th 467, 476 (1992)). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’

claim for retaliation under FEHA must fail “because their allegations

do not satisfy the second or third elements of a prima facie claim for

retaliation.” (Mot. at 4:25-26.)

A. Adverse Employment Action

Defendants argue under the second element that none of their

conduct constituted an “adverse employment action” because

“Plaintiffs’ allegations against the Moving Defendants are . . .

relatively minor slights that . . . cannot reasonably be likely to

alter the terms and conditions of employment.” (Id. at 5:21-23.) 

Defendants, however, misstate the standard for what constitutes an

“adverse employment action.” The Ninth Circuit has adopted a “broad[]

deterrence test which . . . views adverse action as ‘any adverse

treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably

likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in

protected activity.’” Taylor, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 1230 (quoting Ray

v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-1243 (9th Cir. 2000)). The

Complaint alleges specific examples of inappropriate comments, stating

the actions “include, but were not limited to” those examples; as well

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as allegations that Defendants engaged in a pattern of inappropriate

conduct. (Complaint ¶¶ 15, 17, 18, 21-24.) The Complaint further

alleges that following Plaintiffs’ complaints about the inappropriate

conduct, they were “ostracized,” “denied promotional opportunities,”

and “ignored during staff meetings.” (Id. ¶¶ 17, 21-24.) The truth

or strength of these allegations need not be determined at this stage. 

See Cahill, 80 F.3d at 337-38 (on a motion to dismiss, all material

allegations are accepted as true). It is sufficient to note that such

allegations undoubtedly encompass “adverse treatment” that could deter

Plaintiffs from making subsequent complaints.

B. Causal Link Between Activity and Adverse Action

Defendants argue under the third element that Plaintiffs

have not alleged “that any of the conduct of which they complain was

done in retaliation for their alleged complaints of harassment or

discrimination.” (Mot. at 7:26-27.) This contention is plainly

contradicted by the Complaint, wherein Spade alleges that “[f]ollowing

her complaint, Spade was ostracized and denied promotional

opportunities.” (Complaint ¶ 17.) Further, the Complaint alleges

that “Myers complained on multiple occasions, each time being ignored

or labeled ‘the complainer’ [or] ridiculed for complaining to her

manager,” and “[f]ollowing Myers’ complaints . . . Meek and others

began retaliating against Myers [including] ignor[ing her] during

staff meetings and generally ostraciz[ing her].” (Id. ¶¶ 21, 23.)

Defendants focus their attack on Plaintiffs’ purported

failure to allege specific facts which might be necessary to

ultimately prevail on their claim (i.e. that the Complaint contains

“no factual allegations that Price, Perizolo or Papillion knew about

Plaintiffs’ complaints” or that “Duncan’s alleged retaliatory comment

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in May 2002 occurred” years prior to their complaints). 

(Mot. at 7:28-8:5.) Defendants, however, have overstated the burden

that Plaintiffs must meet to survive a motion to dismiss. Peloza, 37

F.3d at 521. For the purposes of the present motion, Plaintiffs have

raised numerous specific and general allegations of Defendants’

improper conduct, and have further alleged that conduct was

retaliation for Plaintiffs’ complaints. Therefore, Plaintiffs’

allegations of retaliation are sufficient to withstand Defendants’

motion, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifth claim for

relief is denied.

II. Sexual Harassment in Violation of FEHA (Sixth Claim for Relief)

Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ respective

sexual harassment claims asserted under FEHA. A claim of sexual

harassment under FEHA requires Plaintiffs to show that i) they were

subject to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, ii) the

conduct was unwelcome, and iii) the complained of conduct was

sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of

their employment and create an abusive working environment. Sheffield

v. Los Angeles County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 109 Cal. App. 4th 153

(2003); Guthrey v. State of Cal., 63 Cal. App. 4th 1108 (1998). 

Defendants do not challenge the first two elements, but argue that the

conduct alleged by Plaintiffs is “not sufficiently pervasive or severe

so as to alter the conditions of Plaintiffs’ employment and create an

abusive work environment.” (Mot. at 11:6-7.) 

Defendants contend that to satisfy this element, each

“plaintiff must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated,

routine or a generalized nature.” (Mot. at 10:17-20) (quoting Fisher

v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 609 (1989)).) 

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Defendants argue that the Complaint contains only one specific factual

example of harassing conduct by each of the Defendants, and this is

insufficient as a matter of law. (Mot. at 10:3-11.) However,

Plaintiffs have alleged a pattern of pervasive and repeated sexual

harassment by multiple Pepsi employees spanning over four years. 

(See Complaint ¶¶ 14 (“Prasad allowed sexual jokes, statements, and

actions that were demeaning to women to take place in her presence”);

15 (“the acts and statements include, but are not limited to”); 18

(“numerous derogatory comments . . . included, but were not limited

to”)). Accordingly, Defendants Perizolo, Price, Duncan, Papillon and

Prasad’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ sixth claim for relief is

denied.

Defendant Llado argues he cannot be held personally liable

for Plaintiffs’ sixth claim of alleged sexual harassment under FEHA

because Plaintiffs do not allege that Llado ever “personally engaged

in harassing behavior.” (Mot. at 11:22-24.) The extent of

Plaintiffs’ allegations against Llado are that when Spade raised her

concerns with Llado, he “cut her off and said ‘I hear the same thing

out of Rhonda in Reno and frankly, I am sick of it.’” (Complaint ¶

16.) Since “a supervisory employee is not personally liable under

FEHA . . . for failing to take action to prevent the sexual harassment

of a subordinate employee,” Llado’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’

sixth claim for relief against him is granted. Fiol v. Jon

Doellstedt, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1326 (1996). If Plaintiffs can

allege facts which would cure the deficiencies stated herein,

Plaintiffs shall have ten days from the date this order is filed

within which to amend their sixth claim for relief against Llado.

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III. Sexual Harassment in Violation of Title VII (Eighth Claim for

Relief)

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ eighth claim for

sexual harassment against Defendants Duncan, Price, Perizolo, Llado

and Papillion under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. fails as a matter of

law because there can be no individual liability under Title VII. 

(Mot. at 12:25-13:13.) Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has unequivocally

held that “individual defendants cannot be held liable for damages

under Title VII.” Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587

(9th Cir. 1993). Therefore, Defendants Duncan, Price, Perizolo,

Llado, and Papillion are dismissed as Defendants in Plaintiffs’ eighth

claim for relief.

IV. Unfair Business Practices (Eleventh Claim for Relief)

Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ eleventh

claim, which is alleged under California Business and Professions Code

section 17200 et seq. Plaintiffs agree in their Opposition to

voluntarily dismiss moving Defendants from this claim. (Opp’n at

11:26-27.) Therefore, Defendants Duncan, Price, Perizolo, Llado,

Papillion, and Prasad are dismissed as Defendants in Plaintiffs’

eleventh claim for relief. 

V. Time Bar as to Duncan

Defendant Duncan argues that all of Plaintiffs’ claims

against him must be dismissed because they are “barred by the statutes

of limitation applicable to [] FEHA [and] Title VII.” (Mot. at 17:15-

16.) FEHA requires an employee to file a charge with the DFEH within

one year of the date of the allegedly wrongful act, and Title VII

requires an employee to file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days

(or 180 days if no charges have been filed with a comparable state

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agency). Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Duncan

argues that the sole “factual allegation against [him] is that he made

an inappropriate comment to Meyers in a meeting that took place in May

2002,” which is more than four years prior to when Plaintiffs filed

their claims with the EEOC (July 17, 2006) and DFEH (September 28,

2006). (Mot. at 17:13-14, 17:22-24.)

However, Plaintiffs make general allegations, against all

Defendants, that the harassing and discriminatory treatment

constituted an ongoing course of conduct. The 2002 comment made by

Duncan was merely an example. Specifically, the Complaint alleges

that “[t]he discriminatory treatment and sexual harassment of Rachel

Spade began in August 2002 and has continued to the present” and that

“[b]eginning in April 2002 and continuing through July 2006, several

male employees and managers have made numerous derogatory comments

about Myers’ gender.” (Complaint ¶¶ 15, 18.) Accordingly, because

Plaintiffs allege that the improper conduct continued up until the

present, Duncan has not shown that Plaintiffs’ claims against him are

barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the motion to dismiss is granted in

part and denied in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 29, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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