Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02007/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02007-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED 

United Scates Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cr:.t;i: TENTH CIRCUIT 

ALMARIO M. AVILES, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

WILLIAM LUTZ, ROTH DAVEY, GAYLA ) 

FULLER, ARNOLD BATTISE, MICHEL ) 

LINCOLN, LEWIS TUTT, JONATHAN ) 

SUGARMAN, BRUCE GARDNER, TAYLOR } 

MCKENZIE, JAMES BENALLIE, DEBORAH ) 

DENETCLAW, THERESA NELSON, CAROL ) 

WALKER, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ) 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN ) 

SERVICES, INDIAN HEALTH SERVICES, ) 

and DOES 1 THRU 50, INCLUSIVE, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

OCT 1 7 1989 

ROBERT L.J:-IOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-2007 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 88-0145 JB) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Almario M. Aviles, pro se. 

John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, and John F. Cordes and 

Marilyn S.G. Urwitz, Department of Justice Appellate Staff, 

Washington D.C., for Defendants-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 89-2007 Document: 01019408019 Date Filed: 10/17/1989 Page: 1 
Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.* 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff-appellant, Almario Aviles, is a former medical 

technologist with the Indian Health Service {IHS), a federal 

agency under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services (HHS). See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1683. Between September 

1986 and July 1987, Aviles instituted two civil and five 

administrative suits against HHS, IHS and a myriad of federal 

employees alleging discrimination, defamation and retaliatory 

discharge arising out of the government's failure to promote him 

and subsequent termination of his employment. In January 1988, 

Aviles agreed to dismiss his various claims with prejudice and not 

seek further federal employment in exchange for payment of 

$63,000, and IHS' promise to expunge his personnel file. The 

written settlement agreement, drafted by government attorneys and 

executed by Aviles, provided for his resignation effective July 

23, 1987. 

Apparently dissatisfied with his settlement, Aviles, pro se, 

filed a two count complaint in federal district court two weeks 

later. Count one alleged defamation by HHS, IHS and various 

* After exam~n2ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34{a): lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2007 Document: 01019408019 Date Filed: 10/17/1989 Page: 2 
individuals acting within the scope of their government 

employment, and sought $3,000,000 in damages. Count two alleged 

tortious interference with Aviles' employment rights by the 

Department of Justice (DOJ), HHS and the attorneys responsible for 

drafting the settlement agreement, and likewise sought $3,000,000 

in damages. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding 

that suit against the named federal agencies, employees and 

attorneys was barred under the doctrines of sovereign immunity, 

res judicata and absolute immunity, respectively. Aviles appeals 

invoking our jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. Our review is 

plenary. Gilihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 938 (lOth Cir. 

1989). We affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint 

but remand for entry of judgment dismissing all defendants for 

want of jurisdiction.1 

Aviles' complaint did not state a basis for the district 

court's jurisdiction as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l). 

Affording pro se pleadings the liberal construction to which they 

are entitled under Haines v. Kerner, 404 u.s. 519, 520-21 (1972}, 

we therefore construe Aviles' tort claims as arising under the 

1 Initially, we note that the district court failed to enter a 

"final judgment'' on a separate document as required by Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 58. Notwithstanding, where no question exists as to the 

finality of the district court's decision, the absence of a Rule 

58 judgment will not prohibit appellate review. Kunkel v. 

Continental Casualty Co., 866 F.2d 1269, 1272 n.3 (lOth C~r • . 1989). Under 28 u.s.c. § 1291, the circuit court has jurisdiction 

of "final decisions'' of the district court. Because the district 

court in this case disposed of the entire complaint, we may 

exercise jurisdiction over Aviles' appeal. We remind the district 

courts, however, it is preferable to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 

58 for purposes of clarity. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2007 Document: 01019408019 Date Filed: 10/17/1989 Page: 3 
Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA), 28 u.s.c. §§ 1346(b), 240l(b), 

2671-80. As construed, the district court acted quite properly in 

dismissing Aviles' claims against DOJ, HHS and IHS. A claim for 

money damages against a federal agency is generally considered one 

against the United States, and can proceed only if Congress has 

waived sovereign immunity and consented to the action. Blackmar 

v~ Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 514-16 (1952): Chournos v. United States, 

335 F.2d 918, 918-919 (lOth Cir. 1964). In this case, Aviles only 

possible remedy arose under 28 u.s.c. § 1346(b) which constitutes 

a waiver of the government's immunity from tort actions generally. 

That section, however, does not provide for suits against agencies 

of the United States. Rather, the statute grants the district 

courts exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions against the 

United States for injury caused by the acts or omissions of 

federal employees: 

[T]he district courts ••• shall have exclusive 

jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the 

United States, for money damages ••• for injury or 

loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by 

the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 

employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where 

the United States, if a private person, would be liable 

to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 

Id. Because Congress has not authorized suit against DOJ, HHS and 

IHS in the FTCA, the district court was without subject matter 

jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims against these defendants. 

Similarly, the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over the individual defendants under the Federal 

Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, 

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Appellate Case: 89-2007 Document: 01019408019 Date Filed: 10/17/1989 Page: 4 
Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563. 2 . Under 28 u.s.c. § 2679, the 

remedy provided by § 1346(b) against the United States is 

exclusive: 

The remedy against the united States provided by 

sections 1346(b) and 2672 of this title for injury or 

loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or 

resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission 

of any employee of the Government while acting within 

the scope of his office or employment is exclusive of 

any other civil action or proceeding for money damages 

by reason of the same subject matter against the 

employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim . . . . 

Id. § 2679(b)(l) (emphasis added). Where the attorney general 

certifies that the employees were acting within the scope of their 

employment at the time of the alleged mishap, the individual 

defendants must be dismissed from suit and the United States 

substituted in their place: 

Upon certification by the Attorney General that the 

defendant employee was acting within the scope of his 

office or employment at the time of the incident out of 

which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding 

commenced upon such claim in a United States district 

court shall be deemed an action against the United 

States under the provisions of this title and all 

references thereto, and the United States shall be 

substituted as the party defendant. 

Id. S 2679(d)(l) (emphasis added). Once the attorney general 

decides under subsection (d)(l) to certify an action, the 

substitution of the United States as a defendant does not admit of 

discretion. 

2 The amendments to the FTCA made by the 1988 Act "apply to all 

claims, civil actions, and proceedings pending on, or filed on or 

after, the date of the enactment of this Act," November 18, 1988. 

Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 8, 102 Stat. 4565. This action was filed 

February 4, 1988, and thus was pending on the date of the 

amendments• enactment. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2007 Document: 01019408019 Date Filed: 10/17/1989 Page: 5 
Relying on the provisions of § 2679, the defendants submitted 

the certification of the director of DOJ's tort branch to the 

district court and moved to substitute the United States as the 

sole defendant. The district court never addressed that motion. 

On appeal, the defendants now argue that not only should the 

United States have been substituted as the defendant, .but also the 

complaint then should have been dismissed pursuant to 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2680. We agree. 

Section 2680 encompasses exceptions to the United States' 

general waiver of immunity contained in§ 1346(b). These 

exceptions mark the boundaries "between Congress' willingness to 

impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to 

protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by 

private individuals. 11 United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 u.s. 

797, 808 (1984). In this instance, we are concerned with 

subsection (h) which exempts from the provisions of the FTCA and 

§ 1346(b) "[a]ny claim arising out of ••• libel, slander • 

or interference with contract rights." 28 o.s.c. § 2680(h). 

Undoubtedly, § 2680(h) bars any cause of action Aviles might have 

against the United States. Aviles' allegation that certain 

government employees defamed him falls squarely within the libel 

and slander exception of subsection (h). His allegation that 

government attorneys interfered with his right to contract for 

government employment through the language of the settlement 

agreement meets a like fate under that subsection. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2007 Document: 01019408019 Date Filed: 10/17/1989 Page: 6 
Yet one might ask why, if § 2680 renders the FTCA 

inapplicable to Aviles' claims, he cannot pursue this action 

against the defendants individually. See Newman v. Soballe, 871 

F.2d 969, 972-73 (11th Cir. 1989) (where FTCA is inapplicable, 

military physician performing service in foreign country may be 

held liable for malpractice as an individual); but see id. at 978-

79 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). Apart from our reluctance to apply 

the individual versus official capacity distinction to common law 

torts, ~ Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276-79 (1986), such a 

conclusion is foreclosed by the plain language of § 2679 and its 

legislative history. Subsection (d)(4) plainly states that upon 

the attorney general's certification that a federal employee 

charged with misconduct was acting within the scope of his or her 

employment at the time of the incident, an action subject to 

§ 2679(d)(l) "shall proceed in the same manner as any action 

against the United States filed pursuant to section 1346(b) of 

this title and shall be subject to the limitations and exceptions 

applicable to those actions." 28 u.s.c. § 2679(d)(4) (emphasis 

added). The mandatory language of subsection (d) does not permit 

us to challenge the attorney general's certification. Further, 

the House Report on the 1988 amendments to the FTCA unequivocally 

supports our conclusion that the United States should be 

substituted as a defendant under § 2679 and then dismissed under 

§ 2680: 

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Appellate Case: 89-2007 Document: 01019408019 Date Filed: 10/17/1989 Page: 7 
The "exclusive remedy" prov1s1on of section 5 

[§ 2679] is intended to substitute the United States as 

the solely permissible defendant in all common law tort 

actions against Federal employees who acted in the scope 

of employment. Therefore, suits against Federal 

employees are precluded even where the United States has 

a defense which prevents an actual recovery. Thus, any 

claim against the government that is precluded by the 

exceptions set forth in Section 2680 of Title 28, u.s.c. 

also is precluded against an employee in his or her 

estate. 

H.R. Rep. No. 700, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1988 u.s. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 5950 (emphasis added). See Moreno v. 

Small Business Admin., 877 F.2d 715, 716-717 (8th Cir. 1989) 

(claims of defamation, tortious interference with contractual 

relations and intentional infliction of emotional distress 

cognizable only against the United States). Aviles could 

certainly state a claim against the United States under§ 1346(b). 

But when we account for §§ 2679 and 2680, we must conclude that 

Aviles' suit is barred because in this instance Congress has not 

waived the sovereign immunity of the United States and its 

employees. See Powers v. Schultz, 821 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 

1987) (complaint stating malpractice claim barred by§ 2680). 

Accordingly, we remand to the district court with 

instructions to enter judgment dismissing the complaint for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. As so modified, the judgment is 

affirmed. 

AFFIRMED and REMANDED. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2007 Document: 01019408019 Date Filed: 10/17/1989 Page: 8