Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02999/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02999-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REZA BARANI, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12CV2999-GPC(KSC)

ORDER PRELIMINARILY 

APPROVING CLASS ACTION

SETTLEMENT; AND

CERTIFYING PROVISIONAL

SETTLEMENT CLASS; AND

PROVIDING FOR NOTICE TO

THE SETTLEMENT CLASS AND

SETTING FINAL APPROVAL

HEARING

[Dkt. No. 21.]

vs.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Defendant.

From December 18, 2008 to June 20, 2013, Defendant Wells Fargo sent

unsolicited text messages to non-Wells Fargo customers in connection with its

send/receive money product program. Plaintiff alleges that Wells Fargo violated the

Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., by sending

text messages to non-Wells Fargo customers without their prior express consent, using

an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). 

Plaintiff initiated this Action on December 18, 2012. The Complaint alleges (1)

negligent violation of the TCPA; and (2) knowing and/or willful violation of the

TCPA. Plaintiff's claims were brought on behalf of a class of individuals who are not

Wells Fargo customers, yet received text messages on their cellular telephones from

Wells Fargo, via an ATDS, in connection with its send/receive money product

program, during the class period. Plaintiff sought $500 per negligent violation and

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$1500 per willful violation, as well as injunctive relief. 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of a

Class Action Settlement and Certification of Settlement Class. (Docket No. 21.)

Defendant does not oppose this Motion. (Docket No. 21.)

DISCUSSION

Once parties reach a settlement agreement prior to class certification, the court

must “peruse the proposed compromise to ratify both the propriety of the certification

and the fairness of the settlement.” Stanton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir.

2003). The court must (1) assess whether a class exists, and (2) determine whether the

proposed settlement is “fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” (Id.) (internal

quotations omitted.) Here, the Court will first examine the propriety of the class

certification, then the fairness of the Settlement Agreement, followed by the questions

of Class Counsel and Class Notice. 

I. CLASS CERTIFICATION

A plaintiff seeking a Rule 23(b)(3) class certification must: (1) satisfy the

prerequisites of Rule 23(a); and (2) satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Here,

the Parties seek provisional certification for settlement purposes only of the following

class: “The Class consists of all wireless phone subscribers and users within the United

States of America, who received any text message/s from Defendant in connection

with, or as a result of, its send/receive money product program, who were not

customers of Defendant at the time the text/s were sent, which text messages were sent

during the Class Period.” (Settlement Agreement (“SA”) § 2.08(A).) “Excluded from

the Class are Defendant, their parent companies, affiliates or subsidiaries, or any

employees thereof, and any entities in which any of such companies has a controlling

interest; the judge or magistrate judge to whomthe Action is assigned, and anymember

of those judges’ staffs and immediate families.” (SA § 2.08(b).)

A. Rule 23(a) Requirements

Rule 23(a) establishes four prerequisites for class action litigation: (1)

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numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also Stanton, 327 F.3d at 953. The Court will examine each

prerequisite in turn.

1. Numerosity

The numerosity prerequisite is met if “the class isso numerousthat joinder of all

members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). In the present case, Wells Fargo

has identified 76,189 Class Members. (SA § 5.04.) Class Members are too numerous

to be joined as plaintiffs in this Action. Accordingly, the numerosity requirement is

met.

2. Commonality

The commonality requirement is met if “there are any questions of law or fact

common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The commonality requirement is

construed “permissively.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.

1998). Not all questions of law and fact need to be common, but rather “[t]he

existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a

common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” 

Id. In addition, commonality requires that class members “have suffered the same

injury.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2001). 

Here, the proposed Class Members’ claims stem from the same factual

circumstances, in that Wells Fargo sent non-customerstext messages; using an ATDS,

without their prior express consent. There are also several common questions of law,

including: (1) whether Wells Fargo negligently violated the TCPA; (2) whether Wells

Fargo willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA; and (3) whether Wells Fargo had

prior express consent for the text messages. Accordingly, the commonality

requirement is met.

3. Typicality

Typicality requiresthat “the claims or defenses of the representative parties[be]

typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The Ninth

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Circuit interprets typicality permissively. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. The

representative claims are “typical” if they are “reasonably co-extensive with those of

absent class members,” though they “need not be substantially identical.” Id.; see also

Cal. Rural Leal Assistance, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 917 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir.

1990). The named plaintiff must be a member of the class they seek to represent and

they must “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” as putative class

members. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (internal

quotations omitted). It is sufficient for the plaintiff's claims to “arise from the same

remedial and legal theories” as the class claims. Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Cir.,

Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 449 (N.D. Cal. 1994).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same factual basis asthat of the class: text

messages sent by Wells Fargo, to non-Wells Fargo customers, on their cellular

telephones, via an ATDS, without their prior express consent. In addition, Plaintiff’s

claims are based on the same legal theory as that applicable to the class: that the text

messages violated the TCPA. Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 117 F.R.D. 641, 644 (N.D. Cal.

1987). Accordingly, the typicality requirement is met.

4. Adequacy of Representation

Representative partiesmust be able to “fairly and adequately protect the interests

of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Representation is adequate if the plaintiff: (1)

“[does] not have conflicts of interest with the proposed class" and (2) is "represented

by qualified and competent counsel.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1185

(9th Cir. 2007). At the heart of this requirement is the “concern over settlement

allocation decisions.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.

Plaintiff and Class Counsel have no conflicts of interest with other Class

Members. For the purposes of settlement, Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of

other class members. (Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 36; Swigart Decl. ¶ 30; Barani Decl. ¶ 7.) 

Plaintiff and the Class Members share the common goal of protecting and improving

consumer and privacy rights. Plaintiff and Class Counsel have been prosecuting this

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action vigorously on behalf of the class. (Swigart Decl. ¶¶ 3-6.)

In addition, Class Counsel have experience prosecuting class actions relating to

privacy and consumer rights, including TCPA action. (Id. ¶ 27.) Joshua B. Swigart

was admitted to the State Bar of California in 2003 and is a founding partner at Hyde

& Swigart. (Id. ¶ 25.) Mr. Swigart practices exclusively in the area of consumer rights

litigation, primarily in the area of fair debt collections, defense of debt collections

lawsuits, and class action litigation under the TCPA. (Id. ¶ 26.) Abbas S. Kazerounian

was admitted to the State Bar of California in 2007. (Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 25.) He is

a founding partner of Kazerouni Law Group, APC. (Id. ¶ 28.) Mr. Kazerounian has

been appointed class counsel in several class actions brought under the TCPA. (Id. ¶

32.) In addition, he has experience in commercial litigation and large-scale products

liability litigation. (Id. ¶27.) Class Counsel are qualified to conduct this litigation.

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs have satisfied the prerequisites of Rules

23(a).

B. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements

Rules 23(b)(3) requires the court to find that: (1) “the questions of law or fact

common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual

members” (“predominance”); and (2) “a class action is superior to other available

methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy” (“superiority”).

1. Predominance

The predominance inquiry tests “whether proposed classes are sufficiently

cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022

(internal quotations omitted). This analysis requiresthat common questions oflaw and

fact “present a significant aspect of the case and [that] they can be resolved for all

members of the class in a single adjudication.” Id. (Internal quotations omitted.) The

relevant inquiry is whether issues “subject to generalized proof predominate over those

issues that are subject only to individualized proof.” Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC,

267 F.R.D. 625, 634 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

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Here, Plaintiff’s claims present common questions of law and fact, as explained

above. The central inquiry is whether Wells Fargo violated the TCPA by sending text

messages to the Class Members. Accordingly, the predominance requirement is met.

2. Superiority

The superiority requirement focuses on the determination of “whether the

objectives of the particular class action procedure will be achieved in the particular

case.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1023. The class-action method is considered to be superior

if “classwide litigation of common issues will reduce litigation costs and promote

greater efficiency.” Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir.

1996).

Here, considerations ofjudicial economy favorlitigating a predominant common

issue once in a class action, instead of many times in separate lawsuits. In addition,

because of the small individual claims of Class Members, it is unlikely that individual

actions will be filed. If each of the 76,189 eligible claimants filed claims, they would

receive approximately $7 each. If only 5% of the eligible claimants filed claims, they

would receive approximately $156 each. Accordingly, the superiority requirement is

met.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule

23(b)(3). The Court GRANTS preliminary certification of the class for the purposes

of the proposed settlement. The Court however, may review this finding at the Final

Approval Hearing.

II. THE SETTLEMENT

Rule 23(e) requires the Court to determine whether a proposed settlement is

“fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Stanton, 327 F.3d at 959 (internal

quotations omitted). In making this determination, a court may consider: (1) the

strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) “the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration

of further litigation;” (3) “the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the

trial;” (4) “the amount offered in settlement;" (5) “the extent of discovery completed

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and the stage of the proceedings;” (6) "the experience and views of counsel;” (7) “the

presence of a governmental participant;” and (8) “the reaction of the class members to

the proposed settlement.” See id. (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the

settlement may not be the product of collusion among the negotiating parties. In re

Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000).

Because some of these factors cannot be fully assessed until the Court conducts

the Final Approval Hearing, “a full fairness analysis is unnecessary at this stage.” See

Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 652, 665 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (internal quotations

omitted). At the preliminary approval stage, the Court need only review the parties’

proposed settlement to determine whether it is within the permissible “range of possible

approval” and thus, whether the notice to the class and the scheduling of formal

fairness hearing is appropriate. Id. at 666.

A. The Strength of Plaintiff's Case and the Risk, Expense, Complexity

and Likely Duration of Further Litigation, and the Risk of Maintaining Class

Action Status Throughout the Trial

Both sides recognize that there are risks to continuing litigation of this action. 

Class Counsel understands that there are uncertainties associated with complex class

action litigation as well as the risk that a contested certification motion would not be

granted. Wells Fargo will likely contend that the requirement of “generalized proof”

of the absence of consent cannot be met because “consent” cannot be ascertained

without an individual inquiry into how Wells Fargo obtained each class member's

cellular telephone number, and the circumstances surrounding each text. See Gene &

Gene LLC v. Biopay, LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 327-29 (5th Cir. 2008). In addition, the law

interpreting the TCPA and its consent requirement has been under flux, making it

difficult for Class Members to prove lack of consent on a class-wide basis. Moreover,

Wells Fargo has also strongly contested the allegation regarding the use of an ATDS.

On the other hand, Wells Fargo also understands the risks of litigation. Even if

only a small percentage of Class Members recover damages, a large demand award

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would result. Further litigation would be very expensive. Wells Fargo has expended

considerable effort to ascertain the 76,189 unique non-Wells Fargo customers who

were sent text messages during the Class Period by comparing their call records against

existing customer's records. (Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 9.)

Taken together, the costs, the rights to both sides, and delays of continued

litigation weigh in favor of preliminary approval of the proposed Settlement.

B. The Extent of Discovery and the Stage of the Proceedings

In regards to class action settlements, “formal discovery is not a necessary ticket

to the bargaining table where the parties have sufficient information to make an

informed decision about settlement.” Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234,

1239 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the Parties appear to have engaged in substantial discovery. In addition

to participating in formal discovery (including the exchange of requests or admissions,

interrogatories, and document requests), the Parties engaged multiple lengthy direct

negotiations, as well as a full day of mediation before Honorable Leo S. Papas (ret.).

(Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 5.)

In addition, the Parties engaged in informal discovery (id. ¶ 4), followed by

confirmatory discovery to ensure that the method Wells Fargo used to ascertain Class

Members was appropriate and effective (id. ¶ 9). Wells Fargo provided confirmatory

discovery describing the method in which it identified non-Wells Fargo customer

cellular telephone numbers that were sent text messages regarding its send/receive

money product program. (Id.) To do this, Wells Fargo extracted a list of unique

mobile numbers that received the SMS text messages at issue from its dialer, then

compared that list of numbers against its system of record, which stores profile

information for all Wells Fargo customers. (Id.) If the number existed in its system of

record, it is a customer's cellular number and thus, excluded from the Class List. (Id.)

The Parties appear to have thoroughly investigated and evaluated the factual

strengths and weaknesses of this case and engaged in sufficient discovery to support

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the Settlement. Accordingly, the extent of discovery and stage of the proceedings

weigh in favor of preliminary approval. 

C. Experience of Class Counsel

Class Counsel have experience prosecuting class actionsrelating to privacy and

consumer rights, including TCPA actions, as explained above. Counsel on both sides

believe that this is a fair and reasonable settlement in light of the uncertainties of

certification and litigation. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of preliminary

approval. See Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility, 87 F.R.D. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1980); In

re Omnivision Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“The

recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of

reasonableness.” (internal quotations omitted.))

D. The Amount Offered in Settlement

A settlement is not judged against only the amount that might have been

recovered had the plaintiff prevailed at trial, nor must the settlement provide 100% of

the damages sought to be fair and reasonable. Linney, 151 F.3d at 1242. There is a

“range of reasonableness” in determining whether to approve settlements “which

recognizesthe uncertainties of law and fact in any particular cause and the concomitant

risks and costs necessarily inherent in taking any litigation to completion.” Frank v.

Eastman KodakCo., 228 F.R.D. 174, 186 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Newman v. Stein,

464 F.2d 689, 693 (2d. Cir. 1972)). The adequacy of the amount recovered must be

judged as “a yielding of absolutes...Naturally, the agreement reached normally

embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the

parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with

litigation.” Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir.

1982) (internal quotations omitted). “It is well-settled law that a cash settlement

amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery will not per se render the

settlement inadequate or unfair.” Id. at 628.

Here, the Complaint alleges: (1) negligent violation of the TCPA; and (2)

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knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. The TCPA provides for statutory

damages of $500 for each negligent violation and $1,500 for each willful violation. 

The maximum exposure for Defendants, based on 76,189 non-Wells Fargo customers

that were sent text messages via an ATDS, at a negligent statutory violation of $500

per text message, is approximately $38 million. 

Wells Fargo has agreed to establish a Settlement Fund in the amount of

$950,000. (SA § 5.01.) Class Counsel intends to apply to the Court for an award of

attorneys’ fees, costs, and expensesto be paid from the Settlement Fund, including: (1)

attorneys’ fees not to exceed the amount of $237,500 (Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 19; SA §

6.01); (2) costs of litigation incurred by class counsel, estimated at $25,000 (id. ¶ 19;

SA § 6.01); (3) costs of claims administration, including costs of notice, estimated at

$100,000 (Mullins Decl., Ex. B; SA § 6.01); and (4) an incentive payment to the Class

Representative Reza Barani not to exceed the amount of $1,500. (Kazerounian Decl. 

¶ 19; SA § 6.02.)

The Class Members will be paid a pro rata amount for their approved claims,

with the amount paid for each claim dependent upon the total dollar amount of all

Approved Claims as well as the Settlement Costs deducted from the Settlement Fund

equally. (SA § 5.02.) Each Settlement Class Member shall be entitled to make only

one claim per cellular telephone number, regardless of the number of text messages

received by each cellular telephone number. (Id. § 10.01.) As explained above, if each

of the 76,189 eligible claimants filed claims, they would receive approximately $7

each. However, if only 5% of the eligible claimants filed claims, they would receive

1

The Court questions whether $7 per claimant isfair and reasonable. See Arthur 1

v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 10cv198-JLR, 2012 WL 4075238, at *1 (W.D. Wa. Sept. 17,

2012) (class claimants to receive over $100 each); Bellows v. NCO Fin. Sys., No.

07cv1413-W(AJB), 2008 WL 5458986, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 1008) (class

claimants to receive $70); Lo v. Oxnard European Motors, LLC, No. 11cv1009-

JLS(MDD), 2011 WL 6300050, at 5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011 (class claimants

anticipated to receive a minimum of about $131.69); and Lemieux v. Global Credit &

Collection, Case No. 08cv 1012-IEG(POR), Dkt. No. 46 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011)

(class claimants to receive $70.) However, once the number of claimants are

determined, the Court will be able to determine whether the settlement amount is fair

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approximately $156 each. 

In addition, the Class Members will benefit from Wells Fargo’s new procedures

to ensure future compliance with the TCPA by eliminating the use of text messages for

payment notification to non-customers as a part of its send/receive money program. 

(Kazerouian Decl. ¶ 21.) Instead, if a customer wishes to send funds using a mobile

phone number, one of several notification sequences occurs. (Id.) If the cellular

number is registered to a Wells Fargo customer, the payee will be notified via e-mail

or via a secure online message center of the payment. (Id.) If the wireless number

belongs to a non-Wells Fargo customer that is registered with clearXchange, Wells

Fargo will notify clearXchange of the payment and clearXchange will contact its

member bank to notify the payee of the payment. (Id.) If the number belongs to a

non-Wells Fargo and non-clearXchange customer, Wells Fargo's website will prompt

its customer to enter an e-mail address instead. (Id.) These procedures were largely

developed and implemented after the Complaint was filed in December 2012. (Id.)

In addition, the Settlement provides that in the event that there are uncashed

settlement checks 210 days after the Effective Date of the Final Approval Order, those

amounts remaining in the Settlement Fund for the uncashed checks shall be provided

to a cy pres recipient, to be agreed upon by the parties and approved by the Court. (SA

§ 8.05(f).) In Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit

held that “[t]o avoid the ‘many nascent dangers to the fairness of the distribution

process,’ we require that there be ‘a driving nexus between the plaintiff class and the

cy pres beneficiaries.’” Id. at 865. This “‘driving nexus’ between the class and the cy

pres beneficiaries...is more than a simple alignment of interest. ‘Nexus’ implies that

there be an actual connection, not just between the class and the cy pres beneficiary.” 

In re Groupon, Inc. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., Case No. 11-MD-2238 DMS

(RBB), Docket No. 97, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012); see also Nachshin v. AOL,

LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011). The parties are cautioned that there must

and reasonable. 

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be a driving nexus between the class and the cy pres beneficiary.

The Settlement award that each class member will receive is fair, appropriate,

and reasonable given the purposes of the TCPA and in light of the anticipated risk,

expense, and uncertainty of continued litigations, as discussed above. In addition, the

proposed Settlement may be acceptable even though it amounts to only a small

percentage of the potential recovery that might be available to class members at trial. 

See Nat’y Rural Tele Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 527 (C.D. Cal. 2004);

In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the

Court finds the amounts offered in the settlement to be adequate, at least at this stage

of the proceedings. See e.g., Arthur v. Sallie Mae, Inc., 2012 WL 4075238 (W.D.

Wash. Sept. 17, 2012) (approving a TCPA settlement of $24.15 million where

7,880,040 text messages were sent); Gutierrez v. Barclays Grp., No. 10-CV-1012,

Docket No. 58 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012) (approving a TCPA settlement of $8.2 million

where 66,000 text messages were sent); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., No. 10-CV-2722,

Docket No. 148 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012) (approving a TCPA settlement of $12.2

million where over 47,000,000 text messages were sent).

E. Collusion Between the Parties

The collusion inquiry concerns the possibility that the Settlement Agreement is

the result of either the negotiators' overt misconduct or improper incentives for certain

class members at the expense of other members of the class. Stanton, 327 F.3d at 960. 

Here, there is no evidence of misconduct. The Court will focus only on the aspects of

the Settlement that lend themselves to self-interested action.

Class counsel will request an incentive award for Class Representative Reza

Barani not to exceed $1,500. (SA § 6.02.) Reza Barani understands the obligation of

serving as class representative, has adequately represented the interests of the putative

class, and has retained experienced class counsel. (Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 37; Swigart

Decl. 31; Barani Decl. ¶ 8.) The proposed Class Representative enhancement does

not appear to be the result of collusion.

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In addition, the attorneys’ fees do not appear to be the result of collusion. It is

permissible for plaintiffs to simultaneously negotiate the merits of the action and

attorneys’ fees. Stanton, 327 F.3d at 971. Here, the Settlement provides that Class

Counsel may apply for an award of attorneys’ fees in an amount not to exceed 25% of

the Settlement Fund, or $237,500. (SA § 6.01.) In addition, Class Counsel intends to

request that their costs and expenses be paid from the Settlement Fund, which will

include: (1) the costs of litigation, estimated to be $25,000 (Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 19);

and (2) any costs of notice and claims administration costs, estimated by the ILYM

Group to be $100,000. (SA § 8.03; Mullins Decl., Ex. B.)

“[T]he choice of whether to base an attorneys' fee award on either net or gross

recovery should not make a difference so long asthe end result isreasonable.” Powers

v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1258 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, the “benchmark” for

recovery of attorneys’ fees is 25%. Id. at 1256-57. The Court has reservation about

the substantial recovery of attorneys’ fees sought by Plaintiff's counsel. However, the

Court need not decide this issue at this time. At this point, the Court merely notes that

25% recovery does not appear to be the result of collusion.

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS preliminary approval ofthe proposed

settlement.

III. APPOINTING CLASS COUNSEL

The choice of counsel has traditionally been left to the parties, “whether they sue

in their individual capacities or as class representatives.” In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d

726, 734 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). Here, Class Counsel have

experience prosecuting class actionsrelating to privacy and consumer rights, including

TCPA actions, as discussed above. Accordingly, because Plaintiff's counsel appears

to be competent to represent the classes, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to

appoint Abbas Kazerounian of Kazerouni Law Group, APC and Joshua Swigart of

Hyde & Swigart as class counsel.

/ / / /

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IV. APPOINTING THE CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR

The Parties propose that the Court appoint the ILYM Group as the Claims

Administrator. (SA § 8.01.) The ILYM Group specializesin providing administrative

services to class action litigation and has experience in administering consumer

protection and privacy class action settlements. (Kazerounian Decl. ¶ 12.) 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to appoint the ILYM Group as the

claims administrator.

V. APPROVING CLASS NOTICE

Class notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to

apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity

to present their objections.” See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.

306, 314 (1950). Moreover, the Class Notice must satisfy the content requirements of

Rule 23(c)(2)(B), which provides that the notice must clearly and concisely state in

plain, easily understood language:

(i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class certified; (iii)

the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class member may enter

an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; (v) that

the court will exclude from the class any member who requests

exclusion; (v) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii)

the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3).

Here, the proposed notice provides: (1) information on the meaning and nature

of the Class; (2) the terms and provisions of the proposed settlement; (3) the costs and

fees to be paid out of the Settlement Fund; (4) the procedures and deadlines for

submitting claimforms, objections, and/orrequests for exclusion; and (5) the date, time

and place of the Final Approval Hearing. (See Kazerounian Decl., Exs. B, C, D, E.) 

In addition, the methods of Notice, more fully set forth below are reasonable.

CONCLUSION

THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. JURISDICTION: TheCourt has jurisdiction over the subject matter ofthe

Action and over all settling parties hereto. 

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2. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT: The

Court preliminarily findsthat the Settlement of the Action, on the terms and conditions

set forth in the Agreement, including all exhibits thereto, is in all respects,

fundamentally fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement

Class Members, taking into consideration the benefits to Settlement Class Members;

the strengths and weaknesses of Plaintiff’s case; the complexity, expense, and probable

duration of further litigation, and the risk and delay inherent in possible appeals. The

Court finds that the Notice of the Settlement should be given to persons in the

Settlement Class and a full hearing should be held on approval of the Settlement.

3. CAFA NOTICE: In compliance with the Class Action Fairness Act of

2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, and as set forth in the Agreement, the ILYM

Group shall serve written notice of the proposed settlement on the U.S. Attorney

General and the Attorney General of each state.

4. CLASS MEMBERS: Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(b)(2) and (b)(3), the Action is hereby preliminarily certified, for settlement purposes

only, as a class action on behalf of the following Class Members:

a. The Class consists of all wireless phone subscribers and users

within the United States of America, who received any text message/s from Defendant

in connection with, or as a result of, its send/receive money product program, who were

not customers of Defendant at the time the text/s were sent, which text messages were

sent during the Class Period.

b. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, their parent companies,

affiliates or subsidiaries, or any employees thereof, and any entities in which any of

such companies has a controlling interest; the judge or magistrate judge to who the

Action is assigned, and any member of those judges’ staffs and immediate families.

5. CLASSREPRESENTATIVEANDCLASSCOUNSELAPPOINTMENT: 

For purposes of the Court considering preliminary approval, the Court appoints

PlaintiffReza Barani asthe Class Representative and Abbas Kazerounian of Kazerouni

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Law Group, APC and Joshua B. Swigart of Hyde & Swigart as class counsel.

6. NOTICE AND CLAIMS PROCESS: The Court approves the form and

method of Notice as set forth in the Settlement Agreement. Wells Fargo shall provide

the Class List for those Settlement Class Members whose cellular telephone numbers

were identified from its databases to the Claims Administrator, The ILYM Group, and

Class Counsel. The ILYM Group shall mail a postcard-type Direct Mail Notice to each

known Class Member at the address obtained through a reverse directory lookup, and

update those addresses for which a postcard isreturned with a forwarding address. The

Direct Mail Notice and the Publication Notice shall reference a website established for

this Settlement, and that website shall contain the full details of the Settlement and

permit the filing of claims on the website. The mailed and published notices shall also

contain the Claims Administrator’s toll free telephone number so that Class Members

can inquire about the Settlement and make a claim over the telephone. At least ten (10)

days prior to the Final Approval Hearing, the Claims Administrator shall file a

declaration of compliance with the notice procedures set forth in the Agreement. The

Court findsthat the form and methods of Notice set forth in the Agreement satisfies the

requirements of Federal rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B), due process, and

constitutes the best practicable procedure under the circumstances.

7. SETTLEMENT AND CLAIMS PROCESS: The Court preliminarily

approves the $950,000 Settlement as fair, reasonable and adequate for members of the

class. The Court preliminarily approves the process set forth in the Agreement for

reviewing, approving and paying claims from the Settlement Fund on a pro rata basis,

after deducting Settlement Costs.

8. CLASS CERTIFICATION: TheCourt preliminarily findsthat the Action

satisfies the applicable prerequisites for class action treatment under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23, for purposes of settlement only.

9. EXCLUSIONS: Any Class Member who desiresto be excluded from the

class must send a written request for exclusion to the Claims Administrator,

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postmarked no later than ten (10) days after the last date to file claims. The Claims

Administrator’s address shall be provided in the Direct Mail Notice to the Class

Members and shall be posted on the website. The Claims Administrator shall provide

a list of those persons requesting exclusion to Class Counsel and Defendant’s counsel

after the deadline for exclusions passes, but no later than ten (10) days prior to the

Final Approval Hearing. A copy of that list will be filed with the Motion for Final

Approval of the Class Action Settlement.

10. To be effective, a written request for exclusion must contain the Class

Member’s full name, address, telephone number, and be signed by the Class Member. 

The request must also state generally that the person wishes to be excluded from the

Settlement.

11. Any Class Member who submits a valid and timely request for exclusion

shall not be a member of the Settlement Class, and shall not be bound by the Settlement

Agreement.

12. OBJECTIONS: Any Class Member who intends to object to the fairness

of the Settlement must file a written objection with the Court, at United States District

Court, Southern District of California, Office of the Clerk, 333 West Broadway, Suite

420, San Diego, CA 92101, no later than ten (10) days after the last date to file claims. 

Further, any such Class Member must within the same period, provide a copy of the

written objection to Class Counsel and Defense counsel, whose addresses shall be set

forth in the website’s Notice advising the Class Members about objections.

13. To be considered, the written objection must be signed by the Class

Member and state: the Class Members full name, address, telephone number, the

reasons for objecting, and whether the objector intends to appear at the Final Approval

Hearing on their own behalf or through counsel. Further, the Class Member must

attach to the written objection any documents supporting the objection.

14. Any Class Member who does not file a valid and timely objection to the

Settlement shall be barred from seeking review of the Settlement by appeal or

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otherwise.

15. FINAL APPROVAL HEARING: The Court shall conduct a hearing

(hereinafter the “Final Approval Hearing”) on September 19, 2014 at 1:30 p.m. at 221

West Broadway, Courtroom 2D, San Diego, CA 92101. The Final Approval Hearing

may be rescheduled or continued by the Court without further notice to the Class

Members. At the hearing, the Court will consider the following issues:

a. Whether this Action satisfies the applicable prerequisites for class

action treatment for settlement purposes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23;

b. Whether the proposed settlement isfundamentally fair, reasonable,

adequate, and in the best interest of the Settlement Class Members and should be

approved by the Court;

c. Whether theFinal Judgment and Order ofDismissal With Prejudice,

as provided under the Agreement, should be entered, dismissing the Action with

prejudice and releasing the Released Parties;

d. Such other issues, as the Court deems appropriate.

16. Attendance at the Final Approval Hearing is not necessary. Settlement

Class Members need not appear at the hearing or take any other action to indicate their

approval ofthe proposed class action Settlement. However, Settlement Class Members

wishing to be heard are required to indicate in their written objection whether they

intend to appear at the Final Approval Hearing. 

17. If the Agreement is not finally approved for any reason, then this order

shall be vacated, the Agreement shall have no force and effect, and the Parties’ rights

and defenses shall be restored, without prejudice, to their respective positions as if the

Agreement had never been executed and this order never entered.

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

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18. The hearing on Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval,

currently set for April 11, 2014 is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 9, 2014

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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