Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00743/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00743-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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- 1 - 07cv0743

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANTZ E. ARNELL,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv0743-LAB (RBB)

ORDER STRIKING THIRD

SUCCESSIVE MOTION FOR

RECUSAL, AND AMENDED

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE:

SANCTIONS

vs.

JUDGE W. McADAM, Department 8

Superior Court of California, County of

San Diego, South County Judicial

District,

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

On June 29, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting the recusal of Judge Larry Burns

(“First Recusal Motion”). On July 10, 2007, the Court denied this motion, noting factual

deficiencies in it. On July 17, 2007, without leave, Petitioner again filed a motion seeking

Judge Burns’ recusal (the “Second Recusal Motion,” attached hereto as Appendix 1). In the

Second Recusal Motion, Plaintiff re-asserted his previous contentions of bias. In addition,

he alleged mental incapacitation on the part of Judge Burns for allegedly misreading his

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1

 On calendar for August 13, 2007 at 10:30 a.m. is a hearing on Defendant’s motion

to dismiss. Plaintiff apparently selected this date to coincide with that hearing.

2

 This pleading has a signature date of July 14, 2007. The Court signed its order on

July 21 before this pleading was received in chambers or entered into the docket. Thus,

Plaintiff had no notice of the Court’s July 23 order when he filed the Third Recusal Motion,

and the Court had no notice of Plaintiff’s Third Recusal Motion when it issued its order that

was later docketed on July 23, 2007.

3

 Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) as the basis for his filing. (Third Recusal Motion

at 1:27–2:9.) However, this section specifically states that the complaint should be filed with

the clerk of the court of appeals. Plaintiff is aware of this provision, because he has directly

quoted it in his Third Recusal Motion. (Id. at 2:2–3 (“. . . file with the clerk of the court of

appeals for the circuit a written complaint . . . .”)) There is no suggestion that any such

request should be filed in the district court. 

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complaint. In the caption, Plaintiff identified August 13, 2007 as the hearing date on this

motion.1 

The Court issued an order signed on July 21, 2007 and entered on July 23, 2007,

striking the Second Recusal Motion and ordering Plaintiff to appear at a hearing to be held

on August 13, 2007 at 12:00 noon and show cause why he should not be sanctioned

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for filing the Second Recusal Motion for an improper purpose.

On July 20, 2007,2 Plaintiff again submitted to the Court a pleading, captioned

“Complaint to Chief Justice that Judge Burns is Mentally Incapacitated.” The heading,

however, identifies the court as the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California,

the case number identifies this case, and the caption indicates that the hearing is to be held

in courtroom 9 before Judge Burns. The Court therefore construes this as a successive

motion for recusal.3 This motion (the “Third Recusal Motion,” attached hereto as Appendix

2) also purports to set August 13, 2007 at 10:30 a.m. as the hearing date.

The Third Recusal Motion suffers from the same deficiencies and appears to commit

the same violations as did the Second Recusal Motion, although in the Third Recusal Motion

the accusations are magnified so as to include charges of confabulation (Third Recusal

Motion at 4:6) and repeated suggestions that Judge Burns suffers from “diminished mental

capacity” or “mental incapacity.” (Id. at 3:28, 4:4–5.)

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4

 This includes two introductory pages and 18 pages in the body of the complaint.

The remainder consists of a jumble of mostly unlabeled exhibits. Plaintiff has attempted a

table of contents of the exhibits, but has mixed number and letter designations and used

some exhibit numbers twice (Complaint at i:12–22), and has failed to paginate the exhibits

as required under Civ. Loc. Rule 5.1(e). The exhibits are also given designations that do not

clearly identify them (e.g., “California Appellate Court misconduct,” and “Attorney

misconduct. Witness affidavit.”) and are interspersed with pages announcing exhibit

numbers, which have nothing to do with the actual exhibits (e.g., Complaint at 31 (“Exhibit

1")). Citations to exhibits are therefore given with reference to pages of the complaint, such

that the first page of the exhibits would be cited as Complaint at 19.

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II. Rule 11

As noted, the Court previously identified Rule 11 violations in connection with the

Second Recusal Motion, and ordered Plaintiff to appear at a hearing to show cause why he

should not be sanctioned. In light of Plaintiff’s submission of the Third Recusal Motion, the

Court now reconsiders and amends its order of July 23, 2007.

A. Summary of the Underlying Incident

The complaint, which spans well over 170 pages,4 is disjointed, contradictory, and

chronologically disordered; and makes reference to events and persons whose relevance

is never fully explained. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s representations regarding his complaint, as

well as regarding the record, are replete with inconsistencies and inaccuracies. The following

summary is based on materials submitted by Plaintiff and representations made by Plaintiff

to the Court, and is included for purposes of providing clarifying background information.

The Court’s reference to these materials does not imply they will be admissible as evidence

nor should this background summary be construed as the Court’s factual findings.

According to the police report made after the incident, which Plaintiff attaches as an

exhibit to his complaint, Dr. Arnell and his neighbors had been involved in “continuing

disputes concerning the property line” dividing their two residential properties in the city of

Coronado. (Complaint at 37 (undifferentiated exhibit identified as police report of the

incident).) Two residents of the neighboring property, a married couple, Valerie and Greg

Hebert were involved in a dispute with Plaintiff over a wall being built on or near the property

line. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Valerie and Greg Hebert at some point in the past had poured 

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5

 The explanation for this apparent inconsistency may be that Lawrence and

Rosenthal were married after the incident but before the deposition, although the complaint

does not elaborate on this.

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concrete on his driveway, blocking what he calls “the only commercial entrance to [his]

research office and facilities.” (Id. at 4:25–27.)

The house in which Valerie and Greg Hebert resided was, according to the police

report, owned by a trust. (Complaint at 37.) The trust is identified with the name of Valerie

Hebert’s mother, Elizabeth Rosenthal. (Id. at 4:15, 37.) In the portion of a deposition

transcript submitted by Plaintiff, the police officer who arrived on the scene identifies

Elizabeth Rosenthal as a beneficiary of the trust that owned the house. (Id. at 84–85.)

Plaintiff also includes a portion of the deposition transcript of Randlett Lawrence, the man

he says attacked him, in which Lawrence identifies the neighboring house as “her [Elizabeth

Rosenthal’s] house.” (Id. at 88 (Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis, quoting Deposition of

Lawrence).) Plaintiff, however, believed the house was owned by Valerie Hebert (Id. at

4:15–16.) 

On September 26, 2004, the day the incident occurred, Rosenthal came to Plaintiff’s

house, which adjoined her property, accompanied by Lawrence. While the police report

merely says Rosenthal as “acquainted with” Lawrence, Lawrence himself says they were

married. (Cf. Complaint at 37; id. at 88 (petition for writ of coram nobis, citing a deposition

of Lawrence, in which Lawrence identifies the woman accompanying him as his wife).)5 The

police report indicates Rosenthal and Lawrence were at the scene in order to check on the

property. (Id. at 38 (police report summarizing statement of Elizabeth Rosenthal).) Plaintiff

alleges that this was merely a pretext and that the two were in fact there to attack him.

(Second Recusal Motion at 2:8–9 (stating that Rosenthal and Lawrence arrived at Plaintiff’s

property “allegedly to check on the grounds at the home next door”).)

Plaintiff disputes what happened next. He contends Rosenthal and Lawrence

approached him in his driveway while he was using string to mark the property line.

(Complaint at 5) and Lawrence “armed himself with a deadly weapon” (id. at 5:4) which 

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 Although the police report says this typewritten statement is attached, it is omitted

from earlier exhibits that include the police report.

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was a “sword used for cutting concrete,” (id. at 5:26–27), after which Lawrence engaged in

an unprovoked attack on Plaintiff. 

By contrast, in the statement Lawrence gave to police, Lawrence says first that

Rosenthal confronted Plaintiff because he was marking the property line, apparently in

violation of an agreement to take no action until the property had been surveyed. (Complaint

at 122.)6 Lawrence says he then pulled the stake out of the ground, at which Plaintiff

demanded to know what he was doing, and demanded that Plaintiff give him the stake. (Id.)

When he gave Plaintiff the stake, Lawrence says, Plaintiff then threatened him, and began

punching and attacking him. (Id.)

Two passers-by with apparently no connection to either property or any property

owner gave statements to police, stating that Plaintiff was the aggressor and that Lawrence

had done nothing provocative other than to pull a stake or bar out of the ground and hand

it to Plaintiff. (Complaint at 37–38.) The police report notes statements given by Rosenthal

and Lawrence which appear to agree with statements given by the other witnesses. (Id. at

38.) The police report notes that when he officer arrived on the scene, Plaintiff’s wife was

present but refused to answer any questions. (Id.) Plaintiff alone reported the version of

events he now propounds. (Id.) The police report also notes that the iron stake weighed 7.2

pounds and appeared to be too heavy to be handled by Lawrence in the manner described

by Plaintiff, whom the officer described as an elderly man who walked with the aid of a cane.

(Id. at 37.)

B. Altercation with Lawrence and Rosenthal

Plaintiff believes it was obviously wrong to provide the summary that “Plaintiff was

involved in an altercation with a neighbor . . . .” (Second Recusal Motion at 3:15–16; Third

Recusal Motion at 3:20–21.) He apparently believes his complaint made clear that the

altercation was with Lawrence only, and that Lawrence is not and has never been a

neighbor. 

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7

 Sifting through the record to find information not cited to in the body of a pleading

is not the Court’s role. See, e.g., United States v. Voigt, 877 F.2d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir.),

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982, 110 S.Ct. 517, 107 L.Ed.2d 518 (1989). Cf. Independent Towers

of Washington v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that courts “review

only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party's opening brief”) (quoting

Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994)).

- 6 - 07cv0743

In the Second Recusal Motion, Plaintiff portrays Lawrence as a man of uncertain

identity having no clear connection to the property occupied by Valerie and Greg Hebert

other than an unexplained murderous grudge against Plaintiff. (Second Recusal Motion at

2:5–10 (“. . . a man carrying the identification of Lawrence drove from his residence in Point

Loma, California with premeditation and malice aforethought, picked up an accomplice and

drove down [Plaintiff’s street], allegedly to check on the grounds at the home next door .

 . .”); cf. Complaint at 91 (Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis) (“Lawrence and his accomplice

could have called the police when they saw [Plaintiff] with the string. Lawrence didn’t have

to attack him with the deadly weapon. They didn’t want him arrested. They wanted him

dead. They still do.”)) 

Although Plaintiff now says Lawrence lived in Point Loma (Second Recusal Motion

at 2:7; Third Recusal Motion at 2:16), the body of the complaint never says this. Rather, it

merely says Lawrence “came to Coronado,” (Complaint at 5:17) but does not say when he

came, or where he resided. After searching through the exhibits,7 the Court has located

references to Lawrence residing either in Point Loma (Complaint at 88 (Petition for Writ of

Coram Nobis) or Loma Portal (id. at 122 (statement of Lawrence to police)).

 Plaintiff apparently does not dispute, however, that Rosenthal did live in Coronado

and was his neighbor. (Complaint at 5:17–19 (alleging that Lawrence picked up Rosenthal

in Coronado before seeking out Plaintiff).) Lawrence says Rosenthal lived roughly three

blocks away in Coronado. (Id. at 122.) The police report indicates that Rosenthal regarded

Plaintiff as her “next-door neighbor,” (id. at 38), apparently referring to her ownership of the

house adjacent to Plaintiff’s.

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Lawrence’s account identifies Rosenthal as having confronted Plaintiff about his

marking the property line. (Complaint at 122.) Plaintiff agrees Rosenthal was involved in

the dispute, repeatedly referring to her as Lawrence’s accomplice and suggesting she was

there to help attack him. (See, e.g., Second Recusal Motion at 2:5–10.) 

It appears obvious, even judging by Plaintiff’s own statements, that Plaintiff was

involved in ongoing disputes with his neighbors, and that the assault arose out of those

disputes. It is likewise clear that Plaintiff was involved that day in a disagreement with

Lawrence and Rosenthal that immediately culminated in violence. It is accurate to say that

Rosenthal was and is Plaintiff’s neighbor, but it was not clear from the body of the complaint

whether Lawrence also was or is now his neighbor. On the basis of information the Court’s

more extensive review of the exhibits has uncovered, it appears accurate to say Lawrence,

a neighboring property owner’s husband, was or is also Plaintiff’s neighbor. Furthermore,

the Court notes that Defendant refers to the incident as a “neighborhood altercation.”

(Memo of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 2:6.) Therefore, it is the Court’s opinion that

the brief summary represented a fair reading of the complaint. 

Even if this summary were not accurate, however, the fault lies with Plaintiff, who did

not clearly present the facts in the body of his complaint or in his moving papers. As

discussed previously, it is not the Court’s role to scour lengthy exhibits to locate information

not found in the complaint. This is particularly true when the information at issue is

tangential, as was the case here.

C. Proceedings Before Judge McAdam

Judge McAdam is the sole named Defendant in this case. Judge McAdam is a

Superior Court judge. A coram nobis petition is roughly equivalent to a motion to vacate and

is thus decided by the trial court. People v. Gallardo, 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 982 (Cal. App. 1

Dist. 2000). The fact that Judge McAdam was involved in denying Plaintiff’s coram nobis

petition gives no indication regarding whether he also presided at trial. See, e.g., People v.

Chaklader, 24 Cal.App.4th 407, 410 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1994) (noting that the same judge who

had presided at trial also denied appellant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis); see also

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8

 Plaintiff for unexplained reasons repeatedly refers to himself in the plural.

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id. at 413 (affirming denial of the writ). A coram nobis petition cannot be used to correct

legal error, except where the error is jurisdictional. People v. Ibanez, 76 Cal.App.4th 537,

543 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1999). 

Plaintiff finds fault with the Court’s summary of the procedural history which stated

that Plaintiff “was tried on criminal charges before Judge McAdam.” (Second Recusal

Motion at 3:16–17; Third Recusal Motion at 3:21–22.) He contends, “There was no trial and

Judge McAdam did not find us8 guilty.” (Second Recusal Motion at 3:19–20; Third Recusal

Motion at 3:24–25.)

The complaint and other pleadings, however, can fairly be read to suggest that Judge

McAdam was involved during the trial phase. Plaintiff represents Judge McAdam’s

involvement at the trial phase and his denial of the writ of coram nobis as separate actions

on Judge McAdam’s part, and cites both as the basis for this action:

[T]he District Attorney’s office dropped the charges against [Lawrence] and

pressed charges against [Plaintiff] who was at his residence minding his

own business. . . . Judge McAdam became aware of these facts and could

have dropped the charges against [Plaintiff] but did not. He could have

granted a writ of coram nobis to review the evidence but did not[,] and this

is in direct defiance of his responsibility as an official of the Court.

(Opp’n to Defendant’s Mot. to Dismiss at 2:4–10.) Plaintiff also repeatedly mentions as the

basis for his complaint Judge McAdam’s refusal to “drop” charges after learning that charges

against Lawrence had been dropped and before additional charges were filed against

Plaintiff. (See, e.g., First Recusal Motion at 2:8–9; see also generally id. at 1:20–2:14

(setting forth events apparently in chronological order).)

The complaint suggests that Plaintiff at first pled not guilty and some trial proceedings

were held. (See Complaint at 1:23–24 (“Again and again the [Plaintiff] pled not guilty”),

5:9–13 (summarizing the testimony of witnesses, comparing their testimony to their

depositions, and accusing witnesses of perjury).) How far the trial phase proceeded,

however, is left unexplained. The complaint also says that at some point Plaintiff pled guilty.

(Id. at 2:3–5 (contending that, after more than one court appearance, Plaintiff was “forced

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to plead guilty”).) Plaintiff also repeatedly makes references that appear to refer to evidence

presented at trial and other events normally associated with a trial (See, e.g., id. at 2:12–14

(“[Plaintiff] petitioned the superior court for a writ of Coram nobis presenting the new

evidence which proved his innocence.”); 3:1–2 (“Judge McAdam acknowledged that there

was prosecutorial misconduct.”); 5:13 (“multiple counts of perjury”).)

In view of the contradictory nature of the complaint and Plaintiff’s Second and Third

Recusal Motions, the Court has looked to pleadings and exhibits filed by Defendant in his

motion to dismiss, and has concluded that Plaintiff’s representations regarding the nature,

type, and extent of proceedings in the state court were misleadingly incomplete. For

example, civil proceedings were in fact held in which Lawrence successfully sought

sanctions against Arnell. (See Memo of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 2, n.4; see

also id., Ex. D (copy of order in Randlett T. Lawrence v. Lantz E. Arnell, California Court

Case No. GIS20077).)

It appears Plaintiff’s criminal case was not tried to a verdict, but that at some point he

pled guilty. Nevertheless, the Court’s reference to Plaintiff’s having been “convicted,” and

reference to Plaintiff “unsuccessfully attacking his conviction”are accurate, because the term

“convict” means to find a defendant guilty, whether upon a trial or upon a plea. See, e.g.,

Fletcher v. City of New York, 54 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“The definition of

‘conviction’ includes a plea of guilty.”) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 333 (6th ed. 1990)).

As before, the Court concludes that, even if Plaintiff was not tried before Judge

McAdam, its brief summary represented a fair reading of the complaint. If the Court’s

reading is inaccurate, the inaccuracy is fairly attributable to inaccuracies in the complaint and

in Plaintiff’s other pleadings.

D. Statements Regarding Mental Incapacity

The analysis in sections II.B and II.C above demonstrates in part the basis for the

Court’s conclusion that its one-sentence summary represented a fair reading of the

complaint and that, if Plaintiff had considered the actual contents of his complaint and other

pleadings, he would have realized they did not clearly state the facts he now sets forth.

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9 See supra note 8.

10 See supra note 8.

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However, even assuming the Court’s reading of the complaint and other pleadings

represented such an obvious error as Plaintiff contends it does, his statements regarding

Judge Burns’ purported mental incapacity appear to violate Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (See

Second Recusal Motion at 3:21–4:15; Third Recusal Motion at 3:27–6:9, 7:22–23.)

Courts sometimes misread pleadings or records, and provisions are made in law for

the correction of such errors through the Court’s own reconsideration, or a writ or appeal.

Such misreadings, while regrettable, are not considered cause for alarm or reason to

question the court’s competence. See, e.g., Bohemia, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 725 F.2d 506,

511 (9th Cir. 1984) (frankly noting district court’s clearly erroneous reading of the record but

affirming the district court’s finding as supported by other evidence). Indeed, common sense

suggests that simple, isolated errors or misstatements are everyday occurrences and not

evidence of brain damage or mental illness.

It is apparent to the Court that Plaintiff is not making assertions of mental incapacity

in good faith. Plaintiff claims he is a medical doctor, and couches his challenge in medical

terms, feigning concern for the Court’s health and well-being. (Second Recusal Motion at

3:18–4:15 (“[L]egally, if not for his own good[,] he should be disqualified. We9 hope Judge

Burns recovers without residual effects.”); Third Recusal Motion at 4:7 (“We10 hope Judge

Burns recovers without residual effects.”)) He suggests that his medical expertise is the

basis for his conclusions. (Id. at 4:13–14 (suggesting that non-physicians might not realize

Judge Burns is impaired).)

However, even assuming Plaintiff is a qualified medical doctor, he has no basis for

diagnosing neurological or cerebrovascular disease, or recommending medical screening

procedures based solely on a sentence in a writing sample. (See Second Recusal Motion

at 3:21–28; Third Recusal Motion at 3:27–4:5; 5:3–8.) Furthermore, even accepting

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11 Confabulation refers to filling in of gaps in memory by unconstrained fabrication.

Merriam-Webster's Medical Desk Dictionary 164 (2005). 

12 See supra note 8.

13 Sanctions are appropriate under Rule 11(b)(2) when a pleading which has been

filed is objectively “frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even though

the paper was not filed in subjective bad faith.” Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d

823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,

496 U.S. 384 (1990).

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Plaintiff’s accusations at face value, his charges of confabulation11 (Third Recusal Motion at

4:6) and “[l]oss of the ability to understand the written word” (Second Recusal Motion at

3:21–22; Third Recusal Motion at 3:27) have no basis whatsoever. Nor, if he is speaking

from a medical point of view, does he have any reason to describe his medical conclusions

as legal certainties — i.e., “We

12 are left with proof that Judge Burns is reading without

comprehension.” (Second Recusal Motion at 3:18–19 ; Third Recusal Motion at 3:23–24.)

Plaintiff’s pretended belief that Judge Burns is mentally incapacitated appears to be

mere posturing. It is apparent to the Court that Plaintiff’s motion was not in fact filed

because Plaintiff in good faith believed recusal was proper, but was filed for an improper

purpose, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). It is also apparent to the Court that either

1) Plaintiff either did not make reasonable inquiry to confirm the bases for his legal and

factual contentions and allegations, as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) and (3), or

else 2) if he did, he knew his contentions and allegations were unwarranted and filed the

Second Recusal Motion and Third Recusal Motion anyway, either of which also violates Rule

11(b). 

It therefore appears Plaintiff has violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) by filing his Second

Recusal Motion. Although the Third Recusal Motion addresses the “Chief Justice,” the Court

need not consider at this point whether Plaintiff hoped it would be ruled on by someone other

than Judge Burns or what his subjective motivation was for submitting this paper for filing.13

By signing it and presenting it to this Court, Plaintiff brought his Third Recusal Motion within

Rule 11's purview. It therefore appears Plaintiff has also violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) by

filing his Third Recusal Motion.

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III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff is again directed to review the Civil Local Rules and Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, particularly Civil Local Rule 7.1 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Plaintiff is hereby

ORDERED to appear at a hearing on August 13, 2007 at 12:00 noon in Courtroom 9, 940

Front Street, San Diego, California, and to show cause why he should not be sanctioned

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for having filed his Second Recusal Motion and Third Recusal

Motion in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Defendant may, but need not, be present for this

hearing. No briefing is required.

Plaintiff’s Third Recusal Motion is hereby REJECTED for filing. Plaintiff is hereby

ORDERED to file no further motions, requests, or other documents seeking recusal or

disqualification or Judge Burns without prior consent of the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 31, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 12 of 29
Appendix 1: Second Recusal Motion

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 13 of 29
- -- - ------------------------------------------------------------------

WHEREAS the appellant, LANTZ ARNELL,-MD, is a business man

engaged in interstate commerce defined as purchasing supplies directly from

United States District Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

vs.

LAB

Docket # '07 CV 0743 J(RBB)

juD \CoIA L... REV fEW R~Gu~->T6D

REQUEST that Judge Burns be

Disqualified because he is mentally

Incapacitated.

Points and Authorities

Date: August 13, 2007 -

Time:

10:30 AM

Room:

9

" Judge

Bums

Appellant! Petitioner

Judge W. McAdam

Respondent

1 LANTZ ARNELL, MD

2 P.O. BOX 181583 Coronado, CA 92178

3 I Tel. (619) 435-4064

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141 LANTZ ARNELL, MD

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Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 14 of 29
----.--.----------------------------------------------------------------------

1 manufactures in other states for research performed in the State of California,

2 copyrighted, and made for sale to publishers nationwide. And the appellant has

3 been paid to do research for other entities in California and other states involving

4 I interstate commerce for decades.

5 WHEREAS it has been established in a police report that a man carrying the

. 6 identification of Randlett T. Lawrence, (herein after Lawrence), drove from his

7 I residence in Point Lorna, California with premeditation and malice aforethought,

8 picked up an accomplice and drove down Adella Ave. allegedly to check on the

9 grounds at the home next door, instead stopped when they saw the appellant

10 I unarmed in his driveway.

11 I WHEREAS in deposition Lawrence admits to walking down the appellant's

12 I driveway without saying a word, disrupting his work and arming himself with a

13 I deadly weapon.

14 I WHEREAS Lawrence admits to assault with a deadly weapon while in

151 criminal trespass in the police report and there is medical evidence that Lawrence 16 stabbed the appellant in the abdomen with that weapon tearing the transverse

17 I abdominal muscle at the umbilicus. (The navel stalk was tom from it's base

18 I internally.) The wound was intended to be fatal and would have been were it not

19 I for the agility of the appellant (herein after we).

20 I WHEREAS The police officer who made the police report in deposition

21 I admits that there were important factual errors and his opinion was based on

22 I assumptions that he could not substantiate.

23 I WHEREAS the D .A.'s office dropped the charges against Lawrence, who

24 I was the assailant and pressed charges against the victim.

251 26 force usWHEREAS into a plea Judge bargainKerry although WellsJudge and Judge 0 Campo 0 Campo had reason workedto inbelieve concertthattoher

27 actions violated federal constitutionallaws, and we have reason to believe Judge

28 Wells should have recused herself.

.2

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 15 of 29
WHEREAS, Judge Bums read the complaint and issued a statement

summarizing the contents of what he read.

WHEREAS the second sentence, (line 20, page 1), "According to the

complaint, which exceeds 170 pages in length, Plaintiff was involved in an

altercation with a neighbor and was tried on criminal charges before Judge

McAdam." The statement is false and that false information is not in our complaint

nor in Judge McAdam's opposition to our complaint. Weare left with proof that

Judge Bums is reading without comprehension. There was no tri~l and Judge

McAdam did not fmd us guilty. Lawrence, according to our complaint and his own

statements does not live in Coronado and cannot be considered our neighbor. Loss

of the ability to understand the written word is a sign of cerebrovascular disease, (a

stroke or a tumor). It is imperative that Judge Bums be examined by a good

neurologist and a cardiologist who should use appropriate laboratory studies as soon

as possible to rule out other less common but more lethal forms of incapacitating

organic brain disease. Untreated, most of these conditions are progressive.

The best case scenario is that this is a stroke which could resolve in 6-8

months. There is substantial evidence in his four page statement of diminished

1

2 I WHEREAS Judge McAdam became aware of these facts and could have

3 I dropped the charges against the appellant but did not.

4 I We flied a complaint which was 18 pages including the memorandwn of

5 I points and authorities. And included with that complaint evidence in the form of

6 I depositions, police reports and photographs. The complaint, taken by this Federal

7 I Court named Judge McAdam as a king pin in organized crime in this state and we

8 I have. evidence showing that he took orders to refuse a writ of coram nobis.

9 I WHEREAS there has been a 2 year intensive investigation into organized crime in

10 the state of California and the complaint documents assassinations over 30 years

11 ago.

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Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 16 of 29
---------------------------------------------------- --

Signed

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2. C.C.P. § 170.1 "Disqualification of a judge occurs when the facts creating

disqualification arise, not when disqualification is established.

4. Christy v. City ofEI Centro Cal App. 4th 767 (2006) "The standard for

disqualification of a judge ...is fundamentally an objective one and not limited to

actual bias."

3. CCP § 170.1 [c] "A trial judge may be disqualified when a person aware of the

facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be

impartial: it need not be detennined whether there is actual bias.-in re Wagner, 25

Cal Rptr. 3d 201, 127 (2005).

1. Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine. 15th Edition p. 131 "Confusion is a

mental and behavioral state of reduced comprehension, coherence and c~pacity to

reason." p. 133 "Poor mental perfonnance ...is the inability to retain new

information ...and factual knowledge." 'The iTontallobe disinhibition syndrome, p.

146, "The impairments may emerge only in reatlife situations and may not be

apparent in the medical office."

1 I t\1ENT AL INCAPACITY ancL legally, if not for his own good he should be

2 I disqualified.

3 I We hope Judge Burns recovers without residual effects.

4 I The foregoing is true to the best of my knowledge.

5

6 DATE: July 14, 2007

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Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 17 of 29
CONCLUSION

6. CCP § 170.6 "The object of the statutory right to disqualify a judge is to provide

a party ...with a substitution ...to safeguard the right to a fair trial or hearing;"

This c~se is about long entrenched organized crime in the 9th Circuit. Our

investigation goes back 100 years from the inception of organized crime at the turn

of the century on the east coast to present day California. The issues require a

serious commitment to eliminating racketeering and violence in the 9th circuit.

There are well fmanced people dedicated to blocking this case. In 1993 President

Clinton purchased enough vaccine to immunize every child in San Diego County

and sent the vaccine to the County Health Dept. An epidemic of measles was

killing white children. Organized crime forced through legislation in Sacramento to

prevent the distribution of the vaccine .. Clinton either underestimated their greed or

didn't know they existed. The children kept dyiIig and the vaccines expired on the

shelves. One of those children could have been yours. Ifwe don't stop them now,

one of those children will be yours.

Organized crime is based on illusions. The illusion that one lunatic is

invincible. The illusion that people of color are not as good as white. If these

illusions were re~l, this complaint by a pro per plaintiff wouldn't terrify them.

Organized crime knows that one person with no legal training can take them apart

in court. That's how weak they really are. A witness 'will testify that when Judge

McAdam was served, his biographical information was removed from 2 law

libraries along with Judge 0 Campo's. The internet hackers who work for them

-- --.----- ----- -----------.------------------------

1 I 5. CCP § 170.6 Heiningway v. Sup. Ct., 19 Cal Rptr. 3rd 363, 122 Cal App. 4tJ1

2 I 1148 (2004) "The statutory right to disqualify a judge is automatic in a sense that a

3 I good faith belief. ..is alone sufficient."

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Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 18 of 29
Signed

_0" _

1 erased them from the internet. They are afraid of one individual. We're not trying

2 to tear down their organization. We just ask for these bogus charges to be dropped.

3 I Their fear tells us that organized crime in the 9th Circuit is run by one ruthless

4 I paranoid psychopath ...(who could be cured with medication.)

5 I Respectfully, we have explained and documented Judge Burns' mental

6 I incapacity. We ask that he be disqualified on those grounds but do not retra~t the

7 I allegation that he is biased against the plaintiff and, if he were well, disqualification

8 I on those grounds would be reasonable and appropriate.

9

10 I Date: July 14,2007

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Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 19 of 29
- -------- ---------------------------------------------------------_._---- ..

PROOF OF SERVICE-CIVIL

to

P05-040

(Do sot use tills Proof of Sew1c8 ~ #taW AnI/r:O of 8 SUIrImona and ComplalnL)

1. Atttletlme ofll8lVicelwas aver 18 yea.-ofllQll and nota pary to Ih!a action.

2. My addnIaa fa (specify ona):

a. 4i=I Bualneas:

ATroRIEYQR PNnY'MnIQVT ATtORNEY,.,.... _Ibr ____ _ CIOIZIITI.IIIl~" •

Arnell. 

Glorietta Ca B1 yd. Coronado, , 92118

06.fAX NO. ~ &&IAILADIIRESSATTORIIE'I' C'OI*ooO:FOR ~

SUPERIOR COURT ~~ OJ' CAL!FORHIA. CherylCOUNtY L.OF Brieton, San Die go

Litigation A t.

dway ~ 1IIWOt_ San Diego, Ca •.92101

, . 

HT: . - CAS& MAIBER:

VIC~ML

CV 0743 #07 Docket

oIIw'I'WraoMISerVice

CJ IIw'Gallw'1IaIJ ~1It 1WIwIIy .amGe .. 'Burns 

D BYe.MaIIIEIoo:tnr TnnamIAIoa

D6'T" U ,,~s nT ~ ("If'

.::

P. O. BOX 1 B'1S'C>3

C6r.onado, CA 92178

b.0 ResIdence:

3~On {dam}: I salVed the following documenlll {specJIy}:

REQUEST JUDGE BURNS BE DISQUALIFIED

::".

",' "':"'-'," ..:-'", .~'.'" .'. - .

. Cal •• ' a. f\'IIC;,p1011. --P' 1OQ. ·Ioa., 2D1U .

:::'I:::-~~f:

PROOFOFS~C~L

(Proof Of ServIce)

o The documants erullaled In the AtIBdItrI8I1/ to Proof of ServiaJ-CM1 (Documents SeMKl) (fonn POS-04D(D».

4. I eeNed \he documenl& on the P8fSOI18 below. 118 fnl1ow&:

8. N~ of person served:

b. AddreB8af~&erved:

c. Fax number or e-mail addl'86S of per&OlIlI8M!d, If GeNlce waa by fax or e-msit

d. TIme of 88Nlce. if pelllOnBI&ervico was used:

,DThe names. addresses. and a\t1er appOcable InformalJon about the persons served is'on lite AI!Bctim8n/'w Proof of

5eTVk»-CMI (PenilJnsSetv8d] (farm POS-04O(P».

6. The doc:umen1B _ served by the foRowlng IT\88JIS (~):

a.D By psrllOnaleervlc8, I pel8Ona!Iy deBveredtlle dOaDnenls IDthe pel1lO/l8 at the 8ddres8881!5ted In Item 4.

(1) For a party represented by anatlomey. dellverywas made to lt1eattamey or at the attome(s office by leaving the .

doc:urnen1IIlrun enwlope.orpac:ksu&d8adywbe!ed ID ldentifylhe attomeybelngserved wItI1a receptlDnliltoran '

Indtvldualln charge of the aftIcD. (2) For a party, deliv8ly was made to the par1y or.by ~Ing the doC:um8nta at the : ,

~ I'8Bldence with IlOl116 p8I8On not Iesa Ulan 1B'yeal'll of age ~ the hours of eight In the momIng8nd sblin ?,:'

th8~_,.,

, .

.,

,

;

,

i~~~t .

t~~~ ~q" .~

;f1! ~::i ~:

J

~::

•. J, ••••

~l>:

~l;)

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 20 of 29
Appendix 2: Third Recusal Motion

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 21 of 29
United States District Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

1 I LANTZ ARNELL, MD

2 I P.O. BOX 181583 Coronado, CA 92178

3 I Tel. (619) 435-4064

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141 LANTZ ARNELL, MD

15 I Appellant/ Petitioner

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19 Judge W. McAdam

20 Respondent

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27 I PURSUANT to U.S.C. 28 § 35] (a) "Any person alleging that a judge has

28 I engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the effective and expeditious

And request for his disqualification.

Points and Authorities

Docket # '07 CV 0743~~~f>~ - ~ ""m

Bums

August 13, 2007

10:30 AM

Room: 9

Date:

COMPLAINT to CHIEF JUSTICE

THAT JUDGE BURNS IS

MENTALLY INCAPACITATED

Time:

Judge

vs.

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 22 of 29
1 I administration of the courts, OR alleging that such judge is unable to discharge all

2 I the duties of office by reason of MENTAL. .. DISABILITY, MAY file with the

3 I clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit a written complaint... "

4 I (b) "'''the chief judge may, by written order stating reasons therefore, identify a

5 I complaint... and thereby dispense with the filing of a written complaint."

6 I ( c ) "Upon the receipt of a complaint...the clerk shall promptly transmit the

7 I complaint to the chief judge of the circuit..." "The clerk shall simultaneously

8 I transmit a copy of the complaint to the judge whose conduct is the subject of the

9 I complaint.

10 I WHEREAS the appellant, LANTZ ARNELL, MD, is a business man

11 I engaged in interstate commerce defined as purchasing supplies directly from

12 I manufactures in other states for research performed in the State of California,

13 I copyrighted, and made for sale to publishers nationwide.

14 I WHEREAS it has been established in a police report that a man carrying the

15 I identification of Randlett T. Lawrence, (herein after Lawrence), drove from his

16 I residence in Point Lorna, California with premeditation and malice aforethought,

17 I picked up an accomplice and drove down AdelIa Ave. allegedly to check on the

18 grounds at the home next door, instead stopped when they saw the appellant

19 unarmed in his driveway.

20 I WHEREAS in deposition Lawrence admits to walking down the appellant's

21 I driveway without saying a word, disrupting his work and arming himself with a

22 I deadly weapon.

23 I WHEREAS Lawrence admits to assault with a deadly weapon while in

24 I criminal trespass in the police report and there is medical evidence that Lawrence

25 I stabbed the appellant in the abdomen with that weapon tearing the transverse

26 I abdominal muscle at the umbilicus. (navel). The wound was intended to be fatal

27 I and would have been were it not for the agility of the appellant (herein after we).

28 I WHEREAS TIle police officer who made the police report in deposition

2

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 23 of 29
1 I admits that there were important factual errors in the police report and his opinion

2 I was based on assumptions that he could not substantiate.

3 I WHEREAS the D.A.'s office dropped the charges against Lawrence, who

4 I was the assailant and pressed charges against the victim.

5 I WHEREAS Judge McAdam became aware of these facts and could have

6 I dropped the charges against the appellant but did not.

7 I We filed a complaint which was 18 pages in length including the

8 I memorandum of points and authorities. And included with that complaint evidence

9 I in the form of depositions, police reports and photographs. The complaint, taken by

10 I this Federal Court named Judge McAdam as a member of organized crime in the

11 19th circuit and we have evidence showing that he took orders to refuse a writ of

12 I coram nobis indirectly from an individual who is not a member of the legal

13 I community.

14 I WHEREAS there has been a 2 year intensive investigation into organized

15 crime in the 9th circuit and the complaint documents assassinations over 30 years

16 ago.

17 I WHEREAS, Judge Bums read the complaint and issued a statement

18 I summarizing the contents of what he read.

19 I WHEREAS the second sentence, (line 20, page 1), "According to the

20 I complaint, which exceeds 170 pages in length, Plaintiff was involved in an

2 I I altercation with a neighbor and was tried on criminal charges before Judge

22 I McAdam." The statement is false and that false information is not in our complaint

23 I nor in Judge McAdam's opposition to our complaint. Weare left with proof that

24 I Judge Bums is reading without comprehension. There was no trial and Judge

25 I AkA dam did notfind us guilty. Lawrence, according to our complaint and the

26 I police report does not live in Coronado and cannot be considered our neighbor.

27 I Loss of the ability to understand the written word is a sign of cerebrovascular

28 I disease, brain tumor, or, most commonly, excessive alcohol intake. (See Harrison's

3

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 24 of 29
Signed L ,T=--- ,J /

1 I Principles of Internal Medicine, 15111 Edition © 2001, p. 2561-2564.)

2 I WHEREAS Judge Bums has refused to recuse himself in this case, where he

3 I shows a bias in favor of the respondent, it is unlikely that he will voluntarily recuse

4 I himself because we note that he is mentally incapacitated, especially if his mental

5 I incapacity is due to alcohol. ( Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy 18th Edition

6 I © 2006 p. 1689.) "Confabulation is often a striking early feature."

7 I We hope Judge Bums recovers without residual effects.

8 I CONCLUSION

9 I Pursuant to U.S.c. 28 § 455(a) "Any judge of the United States shall disqualify

10 I himself if his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." This is a racketeering

11 I case. Judge Bums' diminished mental capacity causes reasonable question of his

12 I ability to be impartial.

13 I The Chief justice or panel she designates are not physicians and may find

14 I that Judge Bums is not impaired. His written statements and associations with

15 I individuals who are the subject of this case establish a personal bias that no

16 I reasonable person can ignore. A reasonable person will recognize that Judge Bums

17 I has personal relationships that bring into question his ability to be impartial in this

18 I case. [See 28 § 455(b)]. See also Local 338,RWDSU v. Trade fair Supermarkets,

19 I EONY (2006),455 F.Supp.2d 143.

20 I Respectfully, Judge Bums does not have the mental capacity nor the

21 I prerequisite impartiality to Judge the racketeering-corruption aspects of this case.

22 I We ask for his recusal because it is an "expeditious administration" of this

23 I complaint. 24

25 The foregoing is true to the best of my knowledge.

26

27 DATE: July 14,2007

28

4

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 25 of 29
1 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2

3 11. Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 15th Edition p. 131 "Confusion is a

4 I mental and behavioral state of reduced comprehension, coherence and capacity to

5 I reason." p. 133 "Poor mental performance ...is the inability to retain new

6 I information ...and factual knowledge." "The frontal lobe disinhibition syndrome, p.

7 I 146, "The impairments may emerge only in real life situations and may not be

8 I apparent in the medical office."

9

10 I 2. c.c.P. § 170.1 "Disqualification of a judge occurs when the facts creating

II I disqualification arise, not when disqualification is established.

12

1313. CCP § 170.1 [c] "A trial judge may be disqualified when a person aware of the

14 I facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be

15 I impartial: it need not be determined whether there is actual bias.-in re Wagner, 25

161 Cal Rptr. 3d 201,127 (2005). 17

18 14. Christy v. City ofEI Centro Cal App. 4th 767 (2006) "The standard for

19 I disqualification of a judge ...is fundamentally an objective one and not limited to

20 I actual bias."

21

22 I 5. CCP § 170.6 Hemingway v. Sup. Ct., 19 Cal Rptr. 3rd 363, 122 Cal App. 4th

23 I 1148 (2004) "The statutory right to disqualify ajudge is automatic in a sense that a

24 I good faith belief...is alone sufficient."

25

261 6. CCP § 170.6 "The object of the statutory right to disqualify ajudge is to provide

27 I a party ...with a substitution ...to safeguard the right to a fair trial or hearing;"

28

5

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 26 of 29
9. Nichols v. Alley, C.A. 10 (Okla) 1995,718 F. 3d 347. "If question of judges'

impartiality ...is a close one, balance tips in favor ofrecusal."

8. US. v. Burger, CA 10 (Kan) 1992, 964 F.2d 1065 "A recusal ...is committed to

the sound discretion of district judge." Judge Burns' abil ity to think is impaired,

therefore sound discretion is not within his intellectual grasp.

CONCLUSION

11. Williams v. Anderson C.A. 6 (Ohio) 480 F.3rd 789 (2006) "Prejudice or bias

that may require ajudge's recusal under federal statute means ...disposition or

opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate because it rests upon knowledge

that the subject ought not to possess or because it is excessive in degree."

1 I 7. 28 § 455 A judge may be disqualified where his or her impartiality might

2 I reasonably be questioned." Judge Burns' ability to think is impaired. His ability to

3 I be impartial requires complete mental capacity. Evidence of an impaired mental

4 I capacity creates a situation where every decision made "might reasonably be

5 I questioned."

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14 I 10. Local 338 v. Trade Fair Supermarkets (2006) 455 F. Supp. 2d 148 "Recusa] of

15 I ajudge based on an appearance of impropriety is warranted if an

]6 I objective ...observer... would entertain significant doubt that justice would be done

17 I absent recusal.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 I This case is about long entrenched organized crime in the 9th Circuit. Our

27 I investigation goes back 100 years from the inception of organized crime at the turn

28 I of the century on the east coast to present day California. The issues require a

6

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 27 of 29
1 I serious commitment to eliminating racketeering and violence in the 9th circuit.

2 I There are well fmanced people dedicated to blocking this case. In 1993 President

3 I Clinton sent enough vaccine to immunize every child in San Diego County to the

4 I County Health Dept. An epidemic of measles was killing white children.

5 I Organized crime forced through legislation in Sacramento to prevent the

6 I distribution of the vaccine. They held our children for ransom until the boss got his

7 I "cut" of the distribution money. The children kept dying and the vaccines expired

8 on the shelves. No one in the criminal network was warned. When one of their

9 children got sick, the boss told them it was the drug companies' fault or the doctors'

10 I fault. The boss only cares about money. Everyone else is divided and conquered.

11 I Organized crime is based on i11usions. The illusion that one lunatic is

12 I invincible. The lllusion that people of color are not as good as white. If these

13 I illusions were real, this complaint by a pro per plaintiff wouldn't terrify them.

14 I Organized crime knows that one person with no legal training can take them apart

15 I in court. That's how weak they are. A witness will testify that when Judge

16 I McAdam was served, his biographical information was removed from 2 law

17 I libraries along with Judge 0 Campo's. The internet hackers who work for them

18 I erased them from the internet. They are afraid of one individual. We're not trying

19 I to tear down their organization. We just ask for these bogus charges to be dropped.

20 I Their fear tells us that organized crime in the 9th Circuit is run by one ruthless

21 I psychopath ...(who could be cured with medication.)

22 I Respectfully, we have explained and documented Judge Bums' mental

23 I incapacity. We ask that he be disqualified on those grounds but do not retract the

24 I allegation that he is biased against the plaintiff and, if he were well, disqualification

25 I on those grounds would be reasonable and appropriate.

26

27 Date: July 14,2007

28

Signed ~

7

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 28 of 29
PROOF OF SERVICE--CIVIL

POs.o40

ATroRNEYOR PNnYWITHOUI' A'Il'ORNEY jNIne, __ .-;_ •••••

Lantz E. Arnell

1516 Glorietta Blvd, Coro~ado, CA 92118

TELEPHONE8't 9-435-4064 FAXNO. /OpIIanIO: &UAlLHXJRES$~

A1l'aIIEY FOR(NemI):

SUPERIOR COUR1' OF CAUFORHIA" COUNTY OF San Die go ::::::: Cheryl L. Brierton, Litigation Att.

CltUHDZlPc:orJe 220 West Broadway IIfWQt I'WIE:

~ Lawrence

~: v ~FOFSER~E-CML Arnell I Docket#07 C\SE_BER: CV 0743

Check method 01 service (only one):

oo Dy~Serllce Dy--.a-s.mce aD0 ByFacslmU. ByIlaU CJ 0 DyOvemlgbtDelJYary ByE-llalllEledronJc:TnnsmlAlon . I~DEPT; Burns

(Do not use tIJIsProof of S81Vlt:e to ~how SlIIVlce of a SUntmon$ and Complaint)

,. At the !me of service I was over '8years of age and not a PAr:!:Yto this action.

2. My address Is (3pecifyone):

8.Q BusIneSs:

P.O. BOX 181503

Coronado, CA 92178

3~On{dafB,I: 7:"'20-07

b.D Residence:

I served the follOWIngdocumenbl (specify):

Complaint to Chief Justice that Judge

Burns is mentally incapacitated and

request for his disqualification.

CJ The documents are Uated In the Atfachm8nt to Proof of Sef1Iioo-Clvll (Documents Served) (form POS-04q(D».

4. I served the documents on the p&rwollS below, as follows:

9. Name of person served:

b. Address of person 6erved:

C. Fax number or e-mail address of person served, if service was by fax or e-mail:

d. TIme of service, if penloool service was used: D The names. addresses, and other appfltable information about the persons served Is Onthe Attal:tIm9nt to Proof of

SeTVfc&-Cfvi1 (Persons Served) (form POS-04O(P».

5. The documen1s were served by the following means (specify): ~

a.0 By peraonalservk:e. I personally delivefedthe documents to the pemons at the addresses listed In item 4.

(1) For a party represented by an attorney, delivery was made to the attorney or at the attomey's oftIce by leaving the

documents In an envelope orpackage cl88Jfylabeled to Identify the attorney being served with a reooptionist or·an

individual In chaJge of the otftce. (2) Fora party, delivery was made to the par1y orby leaving tho doCuments at the

party's residence with some penwn not 1es81han 18years of age between !he hours of eigbt In !he morning and six in:

the evening.

PROOF OF SERVICE-CML

(Proof Of Service)

QxlaClfQoo. f'II)C.. H1011.

1013, 1000000:zDI!i.5·

_.....-~-

'I~~I ..

Case 3:07-cv-00743-LAB-RBB Document 18 Filed 08/03/07 Page 29 of 29