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Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

HAROLD WALKER, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER ALEXANDER,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 5:18-cv-01618-LCB-SGC

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The plaintiff filed a pro se amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

violations of his civil rights. (Doc. 9). The plaintiff names as the sole defendant 

Correctional Officer Grady Alexander. (Id. at 2). The plaintiff requests that criminal 

charges be brought against the defendant and also seeks punitive damages. (Id. at 5). In 

accordance with the usual practices of this court and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the amended 

complaint was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a preliminary report and 

recommendation. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 (1991).

I. Procedural History

On January 10, 2019, the undersigned entered an Order for Special Report directing 

the Clerk to forward copies of the amended complaint to the named defendant and directing 

the defendant to file a special report addressing the plaintiff’s factual allegations. (Doc.

10). The undersigned advised the defendant that the special report could be submitted 

under oath or accompanied by affidavits and, if appropriate, the court would consider it as 

a motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

FILED

 2020 Feb-14 AM 09:09

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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Procedure. (Id.). The order advised the plaintiff that, after he received a copy of the special 

report, he would have twenty-one days to file his initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 

26(a)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff submitted initial disclosures on 

January 25, 2019, supplemented by affidavits and/or other evidence. (Doc. 11).

On March 12, 2019, the defendant filed a special report, supplemented by affidavits 

and/or other evidence. (Doc. 18). On March 14, 2019, the undersigned notified the parties 

the court would construe the special report as a motion for summary judgment and notified 

the plaintiff he had twenty-one (21) days to respond to the motion for summary judgment 

by filing affidavits or other material. (Doc. 20). The undersigned also advised the plaintiff 

of the consequences of any default or failure to comply with FED. R. CIV. P. 56. (Id.). See 

Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985). That deadline has expired, and 

the court has received no additional response from the plaintiff.

This matter is now before the court on the defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment.

II. Standard of Review

Because the court has construed the defendant’s special report as a motion for 

summary judgment, FED. R. CIV. P. 56 governs the resolution of the motion. Under Rule 

56(a), summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In making 

that assessment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Chapman 

v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000). The burden of proof is upon the 

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moving party to establish his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by showing the 

absence of genuine issues of material fact and that he is due to prevail as a matter of law. 

See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Unless the plaintiff, 

who carries the ultimate burden of proving his action, is able to show some evidence with 

respect to each element of his claim, all other issues of fact become immaterial, and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1990). As 

the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

Facts in dispute cease to be “material” facts when the plaintiff fails to 

establish a prima facie case. “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine 

issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the non-moving party’s case necessarily renders all other 

facts immaterial.” [citations omitted]. Thus, under such circumstances, the 

public official is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because the plaintiff 

has failed to carry the burden of proof. This rule facilitates the dismissal of 

factually unsupported claims prior to trial. 

Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1532. 

However, any “specific facts” pled in a pro se plaintiff’s sworn complaint must be 

considered in opposition to summary judgment. See Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 

748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Perry v. Thompson, 786 F.2d 1093, 1095 

(11th Cir. 1986)). Additionally, because the plaintiff is pro se, the court must construe the 

complaint more liberally than it would pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449

U.S. 5, 9 (1980). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings 

drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Boxer X v. Harris, 437 

F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). 

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III. Summary Judgment Facts

The plaintiff was incarcerated at the North Alabama Community Based 

Facility/Community Work Center in August 2018. (Doc. 9 at 4; Doc. 18-1 at 1). On 

August 24, 2018, Correctional Sergeant Howard directed the defendant to search the 

plaintiff’s property thoroughly for contraband and pack the property for transfer with the 

plaintiff to Limestone Correctional Facility. (Doc. 18-1 at 1). Sergeant Howard advised 

the defendant not to allow the plaintiff to distract him during the search. (Id.). 

Correctional Officers Scott Raper, Justin Horton, and Jonathan Nichols assisted the 

defendant in searching and packing the plaintiff’s property. (Id. at 2; Doc. 18-4 at 1; Doc. 

18-5 at 1). More specifically, the defendant and Officer Raper searched and packed the 

plaintiff’s property, while Officers Horton and Nichols stood alongside the plaintiff and 

watched. (Doc. 18-1 at 2). As the defendant was searching the plaintiff’s documents, the 

plaintiff told the defendant not to lose his paperwork. (Id.). The defendant assured the 

plaintiff he would keep the paperwork together, told the plaintiff he had to search the 

plaintiff’s property thoroughly, instructed the plaintiff to be quiet, and stated the officers 

would complete the search and packing process as soon as possible. (Id.). 

Then as the defendant was searching the plaintiff’s family photographs, the plaintiff 

told the defendant not to bend the photographs. (Id.). The defendant reassured the plaintiff 

and told him to be quiet. (Id.). At this point, the defendant suspected the plaintiff was 

attempting to distract him. (Id.).

As the defendant placed the plaintiff’s documents and photographs in a laundry bag, 

the plaintiff pointed to the bag – a gesticulation which alerted the defendant that the 

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plaintiff was not handcuffed – and loudly stated the defendant was bending a hand-drawn 

picture that was already in the bag. (Id.). The defendant told the plaintiff the picture was 

not bent, and the plaintiff responded in what the defendant characterizes as a loud and 

condescending voice, “Well, it won’t do me any good if it gets bent, will it!”. (Id.). The 

following exchange ensued:

The defendant: “[S]hut [your] mouth[,] and let me do my job!”

The plaintiff: “You don’t tell a grown man to shut his mouth! F**k you[,] 

b**ch!”

The defendant: “You are the b**ch[,] and you certainly were not worried 

about other people’s property when you were committing your crimes!”

The plaintiff: “You don’t know me[,] b**ch! I am from Huntsville[,] and 

I’ll kill you[.] I’ll see you when I EOS!”

(Id.).

The defendant claims that at this point he approached the plaintiff to assist Officers 

Horton and Nichols in restraining him. (Id. at 3). The plaintiff “postured up” in a 

threatening manner, and his spittle blew into the defendant’s face as he yelled, “You ain’t 

gonna do nothing[,] b**ch!”. (Id.). According to the defendant, he slapped the right side 

of the plaintiff’s face with the open palm of his left hand because of the plaintiff’s 

threatening posture. (Id.). Affidavits submitted by Officers Raper and Horton corroborate 

that the defendant slapped the plaintiff in the face. (Doc. 18-4 at 1; Doc. 18-5 at 1). 

Moreover, the Incident Report states the defendant struck the plaintiff in the face with the 

open palm of his left hand. (Doc. 18-6 at 1). However, the plaintiff claims the defendant 

punched, as opposed to slapped, him in the face. (Doc. 9 at 5). He has submitted affidavits 

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of seven inmates who testify they witnessed the defendant either punch or hit him in the 

face. (Doc. 11 at 3-9). 

Although the parties and their witnesses disagree about the manner in which the 

defendant struck the plaintiff, they agree the plaintiff was in handcuffs at the time the 

physical contact occurred. (Doc. 9 at 5; Doc. 11 at 3-9; Doc. 18-1 at 3; Doc. 18-4 at 1; 

Doc. 18-5 at 1; Doc. 18-6 at 1). The affidavits of Officers Raper and Horton, as well as 

the Incident Report, indicate Officers Horton and/or Nichols placed the plaintiff in

handcuffs during the verbal exchange between the plaintiff and the defendant, before the 

defendant struck the plaintiff. (Doc. 18-4 at 1; Doc. 18-5 at 1; Doc. 18-6 at 1). The 

defendant claims he did not know the plaintiff had been handcuffed until it was brought to 

his attention after he slapped the plaintiff. (Doc. 18-1 at 3).

Following the incident, Officers Horton and Nichols escorted the plaintiff to the 

health care unit. (Doc. 18-4 at 1; Doc. 18-5 at 1; Doc. 18-6 at 1). Nurse Sandra Ellis 

completed a body chart, noting the plaintiff complained of “touch pain” to the right side of 

his face, but that no bruising or open areas were observed. (Doc. 18-3 at 1).1

 

The plaintiff claims that as a result of the incident he suffered a sore jaw, blurred 

vision, and migraines. (Doc. 9 at 5). He asserts an excessive force claim against the 

defendant in his official and individual capacities and, as stated, requests that criminal 

charges be brought against the defendant and also seeks punitive damages. (Id. at 2-3, 5). 

 1 The plaintiff also told Nurse Ellis the defendant hit him in the face with his fist. (Doc. 18-3 at 

1).

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IV. Analysis

A. Request for Criminal Charges

A private citizen has no judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution of another 

person, Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973), and the decision whether to 

prosecute a crime “is entrusted by the Constitution not to the judiciary, but to the executive 

who is charged with seeing that laws are enforced,” United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 

807 (11th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s request seeking injunctive relief in the 

form of criminal charges is due to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

B. Official Capacity Claim

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages against a state by its 

citizens, unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has 

abrogated it. Carr v. City of Florence, Alabama, 916 F. 2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990). 

The State of Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, nor has Congress 

abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in actions brought pursuant to § 1983. Id. at 

1525. Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state officials sued in their official 

capacities, provided the state is the real, substantial party in interest. Harbert Intern., Inc. 

v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998). In this context, correctional officers are 

considered state officials. Bailey v. Hughes, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1271 (M.D. Ala. 2011). 

Because the defendant is a correctional officer employed by the Alabama Department of 

Corrections, an agency of the State of Alabama, Eleventh Amendment immunity bars the 

excessive force claim asserted against him in his official capacity. Accordingly, the motion 

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for summary judgment is due to be granted to the extent the excessive force claim asserted 

against the defendant in his official capacity is due to be dismissed with prejudice. 

C. Individual Capacity Claim

An excessive force claim implicates the Eight Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause. The clause is violated when a prisoner is subjected to an “

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” which in the context of an excessive force 

claim turns on “ ‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 

1, 5-7 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1986)). Factors that may 

indicate for which of these purposes force was applied include (1) the need for application 

of force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (3) the threat 

reasonably perceived by the responsible official; (4) any efforts to temper the severity of a 

forceful response; and (5) the extent of the injury suffered by the inmate. Id. at 7 (citing 

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). “The use of force must stop when the need for it to maintain or 

restore discipline no longer exists.” Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 

2002). However, not every malevolent touch gives rise to an Eighth Amendment excessive 

force claim. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and 

unusual” punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis

uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not a sort repugnant to the 

conscience of mankind.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Qualified Immunity

The defendant asserts the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in response to 

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the excessive force claim brought against him in his individual capacity. (Doc. 18 at 3). 

“Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions 

from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Adujar 

v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In 

[the] [Eleventh] Circuit, a defense of qualified immunity is not available in cases alleging 

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, because the use of force 

‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm’ is clearly established to be a violation of the 

Constitution by the Supreme Court decisions in Hudson and Whitley.” Skrtich, 280 F.3d 

at 1301. Where a plaintiff asserts an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, “[t]he only 

question, then, is whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion to 

dismiss or motion for summary judgment. If he has done so, that is the end of the inquiry.” 

Id. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is due to be denied as to the 

defendant’s qualified immunity affirmative defense, and the remainder of this report 

addresses whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment excessive force claim.

2. Factual Sufficiency to Survive Summary Judgment

Even if the defendant did not realize the plaintiff was in handcuffs at the time he 

struck him, a reasonable jury could conclude the defendant’s actions were not for the 

purpose of restoring order but, rather, for the purpose of gratuitously inflicting pain. This 

conclusion would be supported by the presence of Officers Horton and Nichols alongside 

the plaintiff. The proximity of these officers to the defendant could be viewed as obviating 

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the need for the defendant to approach and strike the defendant. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 

7 (identifying need for application of force as factor relevant to analysis of excessive force 

claim). This conclusion also would be supported by the profanity the defendant directed 

toward the plaintiff immediately preceding the use of force. The defendant’s choice of 

words suggests he was angry with the plaintiff, and to the extent the defendant struck the 

plaintiff out of anger, his use of force was gratuitous. See id. Finally, even assuming the 

defendant was justified in using some amount of force to restore the plaintiff to order, it 

would be reasonable to conclude the amount employed – whether a slap or a punch –

exceeded the amount necessary under the circumstances. See id. (identifying relationship 

between need for application of force and amount of force used as factor relevant to 

analysis of excessive force claim). 

Although the defendant takes the position his use of force was de minimis, this is a 

matter of factual dispute. To support his characterization, the defendant notes the body 

chart completed by Nurse Ellis indicated no bruises or open areas were observed. (Doc. 8 

at 5). Nonetheless, the plaintiff alleges that as a result of the incident he suffered a sore 

jaw, blurred vision, and migraines (Doc. 9 at 5), and to the extent true, these injuries are 

indicative of the use of more-than-de minimis force. Moreover, these alleged injuries 

themselves are more than de minimis. See Payne v. Dickerson, 334 F. App’x 629, 631 (5th 

Cir. 2009) (holding in context of Fourth Amendment excessive force claim plaintiff’s 

allegation he suffered chronic migraine headaches indicated more than de minimis injury); 

see also Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that while a 

prisoner’s injuries must be more than de minimis to support a 1983 claim, they “need not 

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be significant”), vacated in part on other grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000); Wilkins 

v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (emphasizing “[t]he ‘core judicial inquiry,’ we held [in 

Hudson], was not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather ‘whether 

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm’”) (quoting Hudson, 929 F.2d at 7).

V. Recommendation

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the motion for 

summary judgment (Doc. 18) be DENIED and this action be REFERRED to the 

undersigned for further proceedings.

VI. Notice of Right to Object

Any party may file specific written objections to this report and recommendation. 

A party must file any objections with the Clerk of Court within fourteen (14) calendar days 

from the date the report and recommendation is entered. Objections should specifically 

identify all findings of fact and recommendations to which objection is made and the 

specific basis for objecting. Objections also should specifically identify all claims 

contained in the complaint that the report and recommendation fails to address. Objections 

should not contain new allegations, present additional evidence, or repeat legal arguments. 

An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections on each other party to this action.

Failing to object to factual and legal conclusions contained in the magistrate judge’s 

findings or recommendations waives the right to challenge on appeal those same 

conclusions adopted in the district court’s order. In the absence of a proper objection, 

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however, the court may review on appeal for plain error the unobjected to factual and legal 

conclusions if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

On receipt of objections, a United States District Judge will review de novo those 

portions of the report and recommendation to which specific objection is made and may 

accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the undersigned’s findings of fact and 

recommendations. The district judge must conduct a hearing if required by law. 

Otherwise, the district judge may exercise discretion to conduct a hearing or otherwise 

receive additional evidence. Alternately, the district judge may consider the record 

developed before the magistrate judge, making an independent determination on the basis 

of that record. The district judge also may refer this action back to the undersigned with 

instructions for further proceedings.

A party may not appeal the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation directly 

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. A party may only appeal 

from a final judgment entered by a district judge.

DONE this 14th day of February, 2020.

 ______________________________

STACI G. CORNELIUS

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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