Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05088/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 10, 1995 Decided September 29, 1995

No. 94-5088

JAMES E. AKINS, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS 

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

APPELLEE 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cv01864)

Daniel M. Schember argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants.

David B. Kolker, Attorney, Federal Election Commission, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Lawrence M. Noble,

General Counsel, and Richard B. Bader, Associate General Counsel,

Federal Election Commission. Vivien Clair, Attorney, Federal

Election Commission, entered her appearance for appellee.

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and SENTELLE, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Appellants sought review in district

court of the Federal Election Commission's dismissal of their

administrative complaint alleging various violations of the Federal

Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1994). The district

court granted summary judgment for the Federal Election Commission.

Because we agree that the Commission acted in a reasonable manner

in its interpretation and application of the Federal Election

Campaign Act as to the administrative complaint, we affirm.

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 1 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

I. BACKGROUND

James E. Akins, Richard Curtiss, Paul Findley, Robert J.

Hanks, Andrew Killgore, and Orin Parker (collectively,

"appellants") are former ambassadors, congressmen or government

officials. They are politically active people who seek to

influence policymakers and the public and who oppose the views of

the American Israel Public Affairs Committee ("AIPAC") regarding

United States foreign policy in the Middle East.

AIPAC is an incorporated, tax-exempt organization with

approximately 50,000 supporters nationwide that lobbies Congress

and the Executive Branch for military and economic aid to Israel.

AIPAC has an annual budget of close to $10 million. AIPAC's stated

purpose is to encourage close relations between the United States

and Israel.

On January 9, 1989, appellants filed a complaint with the

Federal Election Commission ("FEC" or "Commission"), the

independent government agency responsible for enforcement of the

Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA" or "Act"), claiming that

AIPAC was a political committee under 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(4) and

431(9)(A)(i) because it made expenditures, including contributions,

aggregating in excess of $1,000 in a year for the purpose of

influencing any election for federal office. As a political

committee, AIPAC would be subject to registration and reporting

requirements involving disclosure of its donors and the amounts it

had contributed to candidates, as well as the $1,000 limit for

contributions to individual candidates. 2 U.S.C. §§ 433, 434(a)(1)

and (b), 441a(1) and (2) (1994).

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 2 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The FEC investigated the allegations and after a substantial

investigation, the General Counsel issued a report regarding

AIPAC's corporate expenditures, campaign-related activities and

political activities. While the FEC found that AIPAC has made

contributions that likely crossed the $1,000 threshold, it

concluded that AIPAC is not a political committee under the statute

because its campaign-related activities constitute only a small

portion of its overall activities and are not AIPAC's major

purpose. The FEC stated that AIPAC is primarily a lobbying

organization interested in promoting U.S.-Israel relations and its

campaign-related activities are undertaken as an adjunct to its

lobbying efforts.

Adopting the General Counsel's recommendations, the Commission

found that there was no probable cause to believe that AIPAC was a

political committee in violation of the disclosure and reporting

requirements of sections 433 and 434 of the Act. The Commission

did find probable cause to believe that AIPAC violated section

441b, which restricts expenditures and contributions by

corporations, but unanimously voted to take no action.

Appellants filed suit in district court claiming that the

FEC's final agency actionits determination of no probable cause to

believe that AIPAC was a political committee under the Actwas

arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law. Appellants allege that

the FEC's major purpose standard is contrary to law and that the

Commission's findings, reasons, and investigation were insufficient

to support its conclusion that there is no probable cause to

believe that AIPAC's campaign-related activities were at such a

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 3 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

level as to make them a major purpose of the organization. The

district court granted summary judgment on the basis that the FEC's

construction and application of the major purpose standard was

proper under the Supreme Court's and this Circuit's interpretations

of the Act. The court found no evidence that the Commission failed

to investigate adequately appellants' administrative complaint.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

Before addressing appellants' claim on the merits, we must

first resolve a jurisdictional issue: whether appellants have

standing, both constitutional and prudential, to pursue their

claims in federal court at all. In order to establish

constitutional standing, appellants "must show injury in fact that

is fairly traceable to the defendant's action and redressable by

the relief requested." Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23

F.3d 496, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("ALDF") (citing Allen v. Wright,

468 U.S. 737 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans

United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-

75 (1982)).

Section 437g(a)(1) of FECA allows any person who believes that

there has been a violation of the Act to file a complaint with the

FEC. In turn, section 437g(a)(8)(A) states that any party

aggrieved by an order of the FEC dismissing its complaint may file

a petition with the U.S. District Court for the District of

Columbia.

Appellants allege that the FEC's action has denied them their

right as citizens, registered voters, and members of the public to

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 4 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1Appellants have also alleged that their ability to compete

in the political arena with AIPAC is weakened without the

information. We do not recognize standing on that basis in this

case. 

obtain information that AIPAC as a political committee would be

required to disclose. They contend that their ability to influence

and inform policymakers and the public is impaired by the lack of

information about AIPAC's contributors and expenditures.1 While

arguably an injury of this type would not appear to meet the

requirements of Article III standing, a line of circuit precedent,

beginning with a footnote in Scientists' Inst. for Public Info.,

Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973), has

recognized certain "informational injuries" resulting from agency

action. Id. at 1087 n.29 (finding appellants have standing to

challenge AEC decision not to issue environmental impact statement

because agency action limited appellants' ability to inform public

about social issues and questions of public policy); see also

Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 937-38

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding organization adequately alleged

informational injury in regulations restricting flow of information

regarding services available to the elderly); Foundation on

Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 83-85 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

(assuming that Agriculture Department's failure to prepare impact

statement with respect to germplasm program injured Foundation

because its mission is to provide information to its members and

general public about such matters, but holding that appellants

lacked standing on grounds that they failed to show particular

agency action that triggered violation and caused injury). This

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 5 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

court recently found informational injuries that satisfied the

minimum requirements of Article III standing in Animal Legal

Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding

constitutional standing, but dismissing case for lack of prudential

standing); ALDF, 23 F.3d 496 (same). Although we acknowledge that

this broad approach raises "complex and difficult considerations,"

Lyng, 943 F.2d at 84 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1042 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1979)), circuit

precedent compels that we find that appellants in this case meet

the requirements of Article III standing with the informational

injury they have alleged.

Appellants must also satisfy the prudential prerequisites of

standing; they must show that they fall within the statute's "zone

of interests" by demonstrating "either a congressional intent to

protect or regulate the interest asserted, or some other indication

that the litigant is a suitable party to pursue that interest in

court." ALDF, 23 F.3d at 502 (citations omitted).

Given the broad purposes of FECA, appellants appear to meet

this test. Two of the three purposes of the Act's disclosure

requirements were intended to serve the information interests of

the public, the electorate, and individual voters. These purposes

were noted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976):

First, disclosure provides the electorate with

information "as to where political campaign money comes

from and how it is spent by the candidate" in order to

aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal

office.... Second, disclosure requirements deter actual

corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by

exposing large contributions and expenditures to the

light of publicity.... A public armed with information

about a candidate's most generous supporters is better

able to detect any post-election special favors that may

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 6 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

be given in return.

Id. at 66-67 (footnotes omitted). Because appellants allege that

they are voters and persons who seek to communicate to policymakers

and the public about AIPAC's campaign contributions, their interest

in information about campaign contributions falls within the "zone

of interests" intended to be served by the statute. While arguably

this interest is so generalized as to encroach upon the separation

of powers concerns underlying Article III standing requirements,

see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992), to

reject standing on that basis would put us at odds with circuit

precedent on informational injury as discussed above.

B. Standard of Review

The district court's grant of summary judgment is subject to

de novo review. Petersen v. Dole, 956 F.2d 1219, 1221 (D.C. Cir.

1992). In conducting that review, we must determine anew whether

the Commission's dismissal of the portion of appellants'

administrative complaint alleging that AIPAC violated the Act by

failing to register and report as a political committee is

"contrary to law." 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(C). It is well settled

that judicial review under this provision is limited. Common Cause

v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The Commission's

dismissal of an administrative complaint cannot be disturbed unless

it was based on "an impermissible interpretation of the Act" or was

"arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Orloski v.

FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See also FEC v.

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981)

("DSCC").

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 7 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

2Section 431(4) also includes two other definitions of the

term "political committee" not pertinent to this case:

(B) any separate segregated fund established under the

provisions of section 441b(b) of the title; or

(C) any local committee of a political party which

receives contributions aggregating in excess of $5,000

during a calendar year, or makes payments exempted from the

Appellants bear the difficult burden of demonstrating that the

Commission's interpretation was impermissible and contrary to law.

The Commission must show only that its disposition of the

administrative complaint was "sufficiently reasonable." DSCC, 454

U.S. at 39 (citations omitted). Thus, the Commission's

construction of its own statute cannot be disturbed if it is a

permissible one. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). Under this standard of

review, the court will presume that the Commission's action was

valid, even if the court would have interpreted the Act in a

different manner. See American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Yeutter,

917 F.2d 594, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Indeed, the Supreme Court has

held that the Commission "is precisely the type of agency to which

deference should presumptively be afforded." DSCC, 454 U.S. at 37.

Accord Common Cause, 842 F.2d at 448 ("Deference is particularly

appropriate in the context of the FECA....").

C. Analysis

FECA defines a "political committee" as "any committee, club,

association, or other group of persons which receives contributions

aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which

makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a

calendar year." 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A).2 The Act limits

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 8 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

definition of contribution or expenditure as defined in

paragraphs (8) and (9) aggregating in excess of $5,000

during a calendar year, or makes contribution aggregating in

excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or makes

expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a

calendar year. 

contributions to political committees, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C),

and requires any organization that qualifies as a political

committee to register with the Commission and file periodic reports

of all its receipts and disbursements for disclosure to the public.

2 U.S.C. §§ 433 and 434.

The Act defines "contribution" to include "any gift,

subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of

value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any

election for Federal office...." 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i). The

definition of "expenditure" includes "any purchase, payment,

distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything

of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any

election for Federal office...." 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i). An

expenditure "for a communication expressly advocating the election

or defeat of a clearly identified candidate" is a "contribution in

kind" unless it is "not made with the cooperation or with the prior

consent of, or in consultation with, or at the request or

suggestion of, a candidate...." 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(a), (c) (1995).

The debate in this case centers around the definition of

"political committee" and the FEC's application of the major

purpose standard. Appellants argue that the Act's language

governing whether an organization making contributions is a

political committee depends on a single quantitative standard: if

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 9 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

its aggregate contributions are in excess of $1,000 in a calendar

year. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4). They assert that because the statutory

language is clear, the Commission's interpretation is not entitled

to deference under Chevron. Appellants also argue that the major

purpose test conflicts with the fundamental purposes of the Act,

which are to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption

that arise when large contributions are given to secure a political

quid pro quo from current and potential officeholders. Buckley,

424 U.S. at 26.

We recognize that the Act has a broad definition of political

committee; Congress intended to "address[ ] broadly the problem of

political campaign financing," and wanted to "promote full

disclosure of campaign-oriented spending" with FECA. Id. at 78.

The Commission, however, has construed the words "political

committee" narrowly and applied a major purpose standard in

determining whether AIPAC was a political committee. Under this

narrow interpretation, gleaned from case law, an organization is

not a political committee unless, in addition to crossing the

$1,000 threshold, it is under the control of a candidate or its

major purpose is the nomination or election of a candidate.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79; FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,

479 U.S. 238, 252 n.6 (1986). Accord FEC v. Machinists

Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380, 391-92 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). A more expansive definition

would be constitutionally dangerous due to interference with

"fundamental First Amendment interests." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23;

Machinists, 655 F.2d at 392.

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 10 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

We agree with appellants that the statutory language is clear

in that it broadly defines political committee in economic terms.

But our inquiry does not end there. Rather, we must determine

whether the Commission acted contrary to law by going beyond the

text of the statute to narrow the definition of the term "political

committee." To answer this question, we must look to case law

interpreting the Act.

In Buckley, one of the plaintiffs' claims was that the

reporting and disclosure provisions applicable to political

committees were overbroad in their application to minor-party and

independent candidates and in their extension to small

contributions. 424 U.S. at 26. The Court cautioned that the

phrase "for the purpose of ... influencing" an election or

nomination in section 431's definition of "expenditure" could raise

vagueness problems and "could be interpreted to reach groups

engaged purely in issue discussion." Id. at 79. Noting that the

lower courts had construed the term "political committee" more

narrowly, the Court went on to state that to fulfill the purposes

of the Act the term "need only encompass organizations that are

under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is

the nomination or election of a candidate." Id. It further noted

that expenditures by political committees can be assumed to fall

within the core area Congress sought to address because "[t]hey

are, by definition, campaign related." Id.

Prior to Buckley, at least two lower courts were concerned

with the Act's broad-based definition of political committee

because it would likely include groups that were not meant to be

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 11 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

subject to the restrictions of the Act. See United States v.

National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1141-42 (2d Cir.

1972) ("NCFI"); American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F.

Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 1030

(1975).

In NCFI the Second Circuit considered whether a newspaper

advertisement was an "expenditure," and whether the National

Committee must be deemed a political committee. 469 F.2d at 1138.

The court articulated a test that construed "the Act to apply only

to committees soliciting contributions or making expenditures the

major purpose of which is the nomination or election of

candidates." Id. at 1141. It concluded that the advertisement was

not an "expenditure," but noted that its interpretation of the

phrase "for the purpose of influencing ... [an] election" might

make "enforcement of the Act ... somewhat more burdensome, as the

supervisory officials will be forced to glean the principal or

major purpose of the organizations they seek to have comply with

the Act." Id. at 1142. This test was later adopted by the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia in ACLU v.

Jennings, supra.

Appellants argue that the major purpose test set forth in NCFI

and Jennings is the correct one because it centers on the major

purpose of the expenditure as opposed to the purpose of the

organization itself. We reject this argument for three reasons.

First, it is inconsistent with the language in NCFI noting that

"supervisory officials will be forced to glean the principal or

major purpose of the organizations they seek to have comply with

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 12 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

3The Court also based its holding on the fact that the

citizens group had no shareholders or other persons having a

claim on its assets or earnings and that the group was not formed

by a labor union or business corporation, and its policy was not

to accept contributions from these entities. Massachusetts

Citizens, 470 U.S. at 264. 

the Act." 469 F.2d at 1142. Second, the statutory definition of

"expenditure" includes the requirement that it be made "for the

purpose of influencing any election for Federal office," 2 U.S.C.

§ 431(9)(A)(i), making the test that every expenditure have the

major purpose of nomination or election of a candidate and

rendering appellants' test a tautology. Third, Supreme Court

precedent supports a conclusion that the focus is on the major

purpose of the organization, rather than the major purpose of

individual expenditures by an organization.

For example, in Massachusetts Citizens, the Supreme Court

again mentioned the major purpose test while discussing whether a

small-issue advocacy group could be considered a political

committee. 479 U.S. at 262. The Court found that although the

group had made $10,000 in independent expenditures to influence

federal elections, it had not violated the restriction on

independent spending by corporations contained in section 441b.

The Court based its holding on three features of the citizens

group, one of which was that its purpose was promoting political

activities, not amassing capital.3 Id. at 263-64. The Court

further noted that if the group's independent spending became "so

extensive that the organization's major purpose may be regarded as

campaign activity," then it would be classified as a political

committee. Id. at 262 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79).

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 13 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

This Circuit also adopted a narrow construction to determine

whether a "draft group," that is, an organization that seeks to

encourage a specific candidate to run for office, is a political

committee under FECA. See Machinists, 655 F.2d at 394-96. In

Machinists, we expressed concern about finding a fair reading of

the statute that "comports with first amendment safeguards," and

recognized the "grave constitutional difficulties inherent in

construing the term "political committee' to include groups whose

activities are not under the control of a "candidate' or directly

related to promoting or defeating a clearly identified "candidate'

for federal office." Id. at 393. We declined to extend the term

"political committee" to cover draft groups and noted that in doing

so we would "avoid the constitutional problems which Buckley and

its lower court predecessors were able to avoid by narrowly

construing the term...." Id. at 394. Because we found the

Machinists Non-Partisan Political League's activities did not

support an existing candidate, it was not a political committee

under the Act. Id. at 396.

Appellants ask that we disregard both Buckley and

Massachusetts Citizens as mere dicta. However, the scope of our

inquiry is limited to the issue of whether the Commission's

interpretation of the Act was contrary to law. Thus, even if the

Court's discussion of the major purpose test in these decisions was

dictaand we do not necessarily agreethat would not make it an

abuse of discretion for the Commission to follow this construction

of the Act by the Supreme Court, particularly in light of our

decision in Machinists. The Supreme Court's dicta may not bind

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 14 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

federal courts and agencies, but an agency's reliance on dicta may

nonetheless be reasonable. See generally McCoy v. Massachusetts

Inst. of Technology, 950 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504

U.S. 910 (1992).

Although Buckley and Massachusetts Citizens concern

expenditures under the Act, the Court's rationale concerning the

constitutional implications of a broad application of the Act to

expenditures applies equally to the Act's reach over contributions.

A broader construction of "political committee" would likely

require advocacy groups to disclose their contributors even though

the group is not principally involved in advancing the election or

defeat of a candidate. This could raise a First Amendment issue of

the sort seen in cases like NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460

(1958). It is our duty in the interpretation of a federal statute

to avoid serious constitutional doubt. United States v. Rumely,

345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953).

We find that it was reasonable for the Commission to follow

the Court's and this Circuit's narrow interpretation of "political

committee." Because a judicial gloss on the statute has limited

the application of FECA's restrictions for political committees to

groups whose major purpose is the nomination or election of a

candidate, the FEC's interpretation of the major purpose test was

not contrary to law.

Having established the validity of the Commission's major

purpose test, we must next determine whether its application of

that test and its determination that AIPAC is not a political

committee under the Act was contrary to law. 2 U.S.C. §

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 15 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

437g(a)(8)(C). The Commission determined that AIPAC's

campaign-related expenditures, while likely to have exceeded $1,000

in some years, were not its major purpose but were made as an

adjunct to, and in support of, the lobbying efforts that were the

organization's primary focus. The Commission correctly applied the

major purpose test, the concern of which is the core purpose of the

organization itself, not the individual expenditure or

contribution. We are convinced that the Commission's determination

was not so arbitrary or capricious to render it contrary to law.

Appellants' final and related argument is that the

Commission's findings, reasons, and investigation were inadequate

to support its conclusion that "only a small portion" of AIPAC's

activities are campaign related. They assert that the inadequacy

of the FEC's findings, reasons, and investigation preclude

affirmance of the Commission's decision. In challenging the extent

and techniques of the Commission's investigation, appellants are

asking that we review the Commission's exercise of prosecutorial

discretion, a sensitive matter within the Commission's expertise.

See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). We are mindful

that "[i]t is not for the judiciary to ride roughshod over agency

procedures or sit as a board of superintendance directing where

limited agency resources will be devoted. We are not here to run

the agencies." FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

Under FECA, the Commission enjoys a "broad grant of

discretionary power in determining whether to investigate a claim

or to bring a civil action...." Common Cause v. FEC, 655 F. Supp.

619, 623 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 842 F.2d 436 (D.C.

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 16 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Cir. 1988). A review of the General Counsel's report reveals that

the Commission conducted a fairly extensive inquiry into

appellants' claims, even if it was not as in-depth an investigation

as appellants would have liked. The Act does not require the

Commission to invoke any particular investigatory techniques, nor

does it require the Commission to exhaust every last inquiry.

Moreover, appellants suggest no specific areas that the FEC failed

to investigate that would have undermined its determination. The

Commission has broad discretion to decide whether further

investment of resources is worthwhile, Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831,

and we defer to its expertise regarding the direction and extent of

the investigation. Based on all of the evidence, it was reasonable

for the Commission to conclude that campaign-related activities

were not a major purpose of AIPAC. There is no evidence that the

Commission failed to investigate adequately the administrative

complaint.

III. CONCLUSION

The Commission's interpretation of the statute was

permissible, its application of the interpretation was reasonable,

and its underlying investigation was adequate. Thus, we are unable

to find that the Commission's actions were "contrary to law" or

arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The decision of

the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part: Although the FEC did not challenge appellants' standing, we

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 17 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

were sufficiently troubled over our jurisdiction to ask the parties

to submit supplemental briefs on the issue. I have come to the

conclusion that my colleagues are correct that appellants have

standing, but my analysis differs from the majority. I disagree

with my colleagues on the merits.

I.

The dispute over standing turns entirely on whether appellants

have established injury in fact. Appellants assert that they

compete with AIPAC in lobbying Congress and seeking to persuade the

American people on their views of American interests regarding

Arab-Israeli disputes. Although appellants do not allege that they

make political contributions, it is asserted that AIPAC's secret

contributions to congressmen have disadvantaged appellants in this

political competition. Of course, many cases in both our court and

the Supreme Court have recognized Article III injury when economic

marketplace actors assert that a competitor has received a

regulatory advantage. See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus.

Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400

U.S. 45, 46 (1970) (per curiam); International Ladies' Garment

Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 805-12 (D.C. Cir. 1983),

cert. denied sub nom. Breen v. International Ladies ' Garment

Workers ' Union, 469 U.S. 820 (1984). We have not before now

encountered a case in which the competition takes place in the

political arena. I am mindful that a plaintiff may not rely for a

claimed injury on a mere ideological interest, see Competitive

Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic & Safety Admin., 901 F.2d

107, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1990), but I think appellants' case must be

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 18 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

thought of as akin to one brought by an economic competitor, not to

one brought by a litigant who can muster only an ideological

interest.

The statute, by requiring any organization that makes or

receives campaign contributions or expenditures aggregating over

$1,000 per year to register as a political committee and meet

certain reporting and disclosure requirements, has the clear

purpose of leveling the playing field by reducing the value of

campaign contributions and expenditures to both spender and

recipient. Any campaign contribution or expenditure is worth less

to give and receive if it must be disclosed. It is of less value

to the spender because interests adverse to the spender will take

notice, and the recipient may be politically pressured to avoid any

appearance of quid pro quo in policy positions. It is, at the same

time, worth less to the recipient because undesirable publicity can

be brought to bear on the transaction. And, in any event, the

recipient's competitor will notice, and if the competitor should

win the spender will not be among his favorite constituents.

Essentially, then, a failure of the FEC to require an organization

to disclose its contributions is equivalent to adding to the value

of those contributions. Thus, a candidate running for office is

certainly injured if his or her opponent, through the failure of

the FEC to require disclosure, is enabled to receive secret

contributions. It follows that individuals or organizations that

can show that they are competing with the donor or spender on the

other side of this political market are similarly injured if the

FEC does not require disclosure. Appellants therefore have

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 19 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

standing as competitors of AIPAC.

The FEC's primary argument against the application of this

reasoning, which, to be sure, is only sketchily presented in

appellants' complaint and supplementary brief, is that appellants

only compete in the lobbying market with AIPAC, not in actual

election campaigns. (AIPAC claims that it does not normally make

campaign contributions, and as part of the settlement of this case

in which the FEC treated AIPAC's disbursements as illegal corporate

contributions under § 441(b), AIPAC promised to stop making such

contributions.) But, the lobbying "market" is intertwined with

election competition. Many campaign contributors expect that if

the candidate should win, he or she will be more inclined to listen

to a contributor's views on proposed legislation than would be so

if no contribution were made. In this very case, the Commission

found that AIPAC's "campaign-related activities and communications

[were] undertaken as an adjunct to, and in support of, its lobbying

efforts." AIPAC presumably will be a less effective lobbyist, and

the congressmen to whom it contributed will be less likely to

present AIPAC's position effectively (if they are so inclined), if

AIPAC is required to disclose its contributions.

The Commission relies on In re United States Catholic

Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom.

Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. U.S. Catholic Conference, 495

U.S. 918 (1990), to support its argument that only direct

competitors in the campaign election market would have standing to

challenge its refusal to require AIPAC to register and disclose.

In that casea rather confusing onethe Second Circuit rejected a

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 20 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1Of course, as the Commission indicates, the appellants are

in one sense seeking a more severe sanction for AIPAC's illegal

expenditures than the FEC determined was appropriate, but that

does not undermine their standing. Under most statutes, this

sort of action could not be brought because of Heckler v.

Chaney's bar on judicial review of an agency's nonenforcement

decision. 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). But this statute squarely

directs review of the Commission's determination. See §

437(g)(8)(c) ("In any proceeding under this paragraph the court

may declare that the [FEC's] dismissal of the complaint or the

failure to act is contrary to law."). 

challenge brought by pro-choice advocacy groups to the Catholic

Church's § 501(c)(3) status under the I.R.S. Code based on the

church's illegal campaign expenditures. The court did note that

the plaintiffs did not engage in election activity, but it seems

clear to me that the case would not have come out differently even

if the plaintiffs had been direct electioneering competitors of the

church. The federal judiciary has rarely allowed one private party

to challenge the tax status of another. See, e.g., Simon v.

Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40-41 (1976).

Furthermore, the general advocacy market in which both the church

and the plaintiffs were competing is so broad and amorphous as to

defy measurement of plaintiffs' injury.1

The majority rests appellants' standing on what is sometimes

referred to as informational standingthat appellants are injured

by failing to receive information that the government should compel

AIPAC to disclose. That approach is problematic here because

recognition of informational standing in this case allows a

generalized, undifferentiated interest in information to satisfy

Article III requirements. "Informational injury" confers standing

only in narrowly defined circumstances. It was first mentioned in

a footnote in Scientists' Inst. for Public Info., Inc. v. Atomic

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 21 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

2The footnote was subsequently declared "unnecessary to the

decision." Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79,

83 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 

Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1086 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (SIPI).2

We recognized that the AEC's decision not to provide an impact

statement on a reactor program established Article III injury

because the Institute's main function was to distribute such

information to the public. Similarly, we determined informational

injury satisfied Article III in Action Alliance of Senior Citizens

v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other

grounds, 494 U.S. 1001 (1990), where new government regulations

restricting the availability of information on services for the

elderly impaired AASC's ability to provide information, counseling

and referral services for its members. By contrast, in Competitive

Enter. Inst., 901 F.2d at 122-23, the plaintiff organization lacked

informational standing because it failed to show how the NHTSA's

decision not to issue an EIS significantly diminished its ability

to disseminate information or to continue its activities.

Two cases relied on by the majority to find informational

standing are not determinative. In Foundation on Economic Trends

v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1991), we only assumed that the

organization's alleged injurythe Foundation's diminished ability

to provide information to its members and the public due to the

Agriculture Department's failure to prepare an EISwas sufficient

to confer informational standing without resolving the issue,

because there was no prudential standing. We suggested, however,

that informational injury alone is insufficient to establish

Article III standing. We worried that a broad definition of

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 22 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

informational standing would controvert the separation of powers

principles enunciated in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727

(1972), and would allow plaintiffs to manufacture standing every

time an agency was not creating information a member of the public

would like to have. Lyng, 943 F.2d at 84-85. And in Animal Legal

Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the

decision merely asserted without discussion that Article III

requirements were met by informational injurythe Fund's impaired

ability to gather and disseminate information on laboratory

conditions under the Agriculture Department's definition of

"animal"before going on to find no prudential standing.

Thus, under our precedent, "informational injury" satisfies

Article III requirements only when the plaintiff is able to

demonstrate an actual, concrete injury, that impinges on the

plaintiff's daily operations or makes normal activities infeasible,

and that is caused by the lack of access to particular information.

To call appellants' injury an informational one is to accept their

alternative claim that they are entitled to AIPAC's disclosures

merely because they are members of the voting public. This sort of

general interest cannot suffice to show Article III injury. See

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 (1992); Sierra

Club, 405 U.S. at 739; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760-61, 763

(1984). If, instead, appellants' interest is thought more

"particular" because of their political positions and their

lobbying interests, then the claim of informational injury really

reduces to the competitive injury claim. Thus, as I analyze

appellants' injury, it is the Commission's failure to require AIPAC

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 23 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

3Plaintiffs in this case clearly meet prudential standing

requirements in that they are within the statutory "zone of

interest." See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. at

394-99; Animal Legal Defense Fund, 23 F.3d at 503. As the

majority notes, FECA's purposes are broadly stated. But FECA's

"zone of interest" cannot, as the FEC asserts, include only

individuals' interests as voters and not individuals' interests

as both competitors and voters. The logical implication of the

FEC's argument is that prudential standing exists (as a "pure"

voter) only where Article III standing is precluded (as a general

interest under Lujan ), so that no one would have standing. This

result is absurd. Clearly a direct competitor of a political

candidate, as the party most directly injured by improper

campaign activities, is within the zone of interests intended to

be protected by the statute. Thus, the statutory zone of

interest is not limited to voters, but includes other political

interests as well.

Moreover, FECA's broad language may in fact make a

prudential standing inquiry irrelevant. If all voters are

beneficiaries of the statute and are thus "aggrieved" within the

meaning of § 437(g)(8), Article III always would impose a more

restrictive standard, such that meeting Article III requirements

alone would establish standing. 

to disclose to the world its past campaign expenditures that

disadvantages appellantsnot appellants' inability to themselves

gain that information.3

II.

Section 431(4)(A) defines "political committee" solely in

terms of "expenditures" and "contributions": a political committee

is "any committee, club, association, or other group of persons

which receives contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during

a calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess

of $1,000 during a calendar year." "Contribution" is defined in

turn by § 431(8)(A)(i) as "any gift, subscription, loan, advance,

or deposit of money or anything of value, made by any person for

the purpose of influencing any election." "Expenditure" is defined

in similar terms by § 431(9)(A)(i) as "any purchase, payment,

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 24 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

4This is apparently the first time the FEC has formulated

this test; it has pointed to no Advisory Opinion that

articulates either explicitly or implicitly a major purpose test,

even 10 years after the Supreme Court cases on which it primarily

reliesBuckley, 424 U.S. 1, and MCFL, 470 U.S. 238supposedly

imposed this test on the definition of political committee. 

distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything

of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any

election."

The FEC tacitly concedes that the language of § 431(4)(A) is

unambiguous and sets clear requirements for classification as a

political committee, but asserts that the Supreme Court has

narrowed the reach of the statutory language in response to First

Amendment concerns. The FEC relies on language in Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and Federal Election Comm 'n v.

Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (MCFL),

in claiming that an organization should only be classified as a

political committee ifin addition to exceeding the $1,000

contribution or expenditure limitsthe organization's major purpose

is the nomination or election of a candidate or the organization is

controlled by a political candidate, i.e., the so-called major

purpose test.4 This interpretation of "political committee" is

owed deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

Appellants respond by asserting that the statutory language is

clear, and that it has not been narrowed by the Supreme Court.

Tracing the development of the term "major purpose," appellants

argue that the test is properly employed to determine whether an

organization's independent disbursements constitute "expenditures"

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 25 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

within the meaning of § 431(9)(A)(i), i.e., whether they are "made

... for the purpose of influencing any election," such that they

count toward the $1,000 limit defining political committee status.

Buckley and MCFL endorse this test; any references to the major

purpose of an organization, rather than an expenditure, merely

establish the presumption that the expenditures of an organization

the major purpose of which is election activity will fall within

the statutory definition. Further, MCFL noted that independent

expenditures raise more serious First Amendment concerns and

therefore require more compelling justification for government

restrictions, than do contributions like those made by AIPAC here.

Appellants point out that the FEC's major purpose test has the

anomalous result of allowing large organizations that spend only a

small portion of their budgets on direct campaign contributions to

avoid the requirements placed on political committees, undermining

FECA's emphasis on disclosure as a means of curbing the threat or

appearance of election abuse.

The FEC's assertion that its interpretation of "political

committee" is entitled to deference is simply wrong. It is

undisputed that the statutory language is not in issue, but only

the gloss put on this language by Supreme Court decisions. We are

not obliged to defer to an agency's interpretation of Supreme Court

precedent under Chevron or any other case. Appellants thus do not

bear "the difficult burden of demonstrating that the Commission's

interpretation was impermissible and contrary to law," Maj. Op. at

7; they need only show that their interpretation better reflects

the statutory language and purpose, as interpreted by the Supreme

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 26 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Court, than does the FEC's.

While there is language in Buckley and MCFL that can literally

be read to support the FEC's position, both cases focused on the

constitutional concerns raised by independent expenditures.

Independent expenditures are the most protected form of political

speech because they are closest to pure issue discussion and

therefore farthest removed from the goal of preventing election

corruption. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-23, 78-81; MCFL, 479 U.S. at

259-60. They raise graver First Amendment concerns because it is

difficult to determine when an expenditure is independentrather

than coordinated with or by a particular candidateand regulation

therefore risks chilling protected speech.

Thus, in Buckley the Supreme Court determined that expenditure

limits are more likely to violate the First Amendment because they

place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability to engage

in political speech. See Buckley at 39-59. Contribution

limitations, on the other hand, raise fewer constitutional

concerns, it was thought, because they serve the basic governmental

interest of protecting the electoral process without restricting

political debate and discussion. See id. at 28 (such limits

"focus[ ] precisely on the problem of large campaign

contributionsthe narrow aspect of political association where the

actuality and potential for corruption have been identified"); see

also id. at 23-38. To support its major purpose test, the FEC

relies on the Court's discussion of § 434(e), which imposes

disclosure requirements on "[e]very person" making contributions or

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 27 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

5Section 434(e) has subsequently been amended and is now §

434(c): "Every person (other than a political committee) who

makes independent expenditures in an aggregate amount or value in

excess of $250 during a calendar year" shall be subject to

certain reporting and disclosure requirements. 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)

(West 1985 & Supp. 1995). 

expenditures exceeding $100.5 The Court rejected the claim that §

434(e) imposed burdens that would deter individuals "from making

expenditures for their independent political speech." See id. at

74-75. It was determined that "contributions"when defined as

direct or indirect contributions to a candidate, political party,

or campaign committee, or expenditures placed with the cooperation

or consent of a candidate"have a sufficiently close relationship

to the goals of the Act," and therefore limits on them are

constitutional. Id. at 76. The Court noted that the meaning of

"expenditure," however, posed line-drawing difficulties because it

created the danger of "encompassing both issue discussion and

advocacy of a political result." Id. at 77. Therefore, the reach

of § 434(e) was limited by "constru[ing] "expenditure' for purposes

of that section ... to reach only funds used for communications

that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly

identified candidate." Id. at 80. Coming in the midst of its

analysis of the scope of "expenditures," the Court's language that

apparently refers to the major purpose of an organization is at

best ambiguous:

To fulfill the purposes of FECA [political committees]

need only encompass organizations that are under the

control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is

the nomination or election of a candidate. Expenditures

of candidates and of "political committees" so construed

can be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be

addressed by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign

related.

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 28 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

6Buckley cited both United States v. National Comm. for

Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972) and American Civil

Liberties Union, Inc. v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C.

1973) (three-judge court), vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v.

American Civil Liberties Union, Inc., 422 U.S. 1030 (1975), as

developing this "major purpose" test. These two cases applied a

"major purpose" test to determine whether a particular

disbursement was "made ... for the purpose of influencing any

election" under § 431(9)(A)(i). 

Id. at 79 (emphasis added).6 When parsed carefully, this wording

does not support the FEC's major purpose test for "political

committee" status as applied to contributions. Perhaps the best

interpretation of this language is that an organization controlled

by a candidate or the major purpose of which is election-related

will presumptively have expenditures falling within the statutory

definition. In any event, the Court clearly distinguished

expenditures and contributions and referred to a "major purpose"

test only with regard to the former.

While certain language in MCFL can also be read to support the

FEC's position, the Court was again addressing First Amendment

problems with the regulation of independent expenditures. The

Court held that § 441(b), which prohibits corporate contributions

or expenditures "in connection with any election," was

unconstitutional as applied to MCFL, a non-profit advocacy group

that had made independent expenditures violating § 441(b). The

Court's concern was that the reporting and disclosure requirements

of FECA might discourage protected political speech of advocacy

groups. See id. at 253-56. While MCFL 's references to the major

purpose of an organization may thus have relevance for the issue of

when independent expenditures suffice to establish political

committee status, MCFL does not control cases involving

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 29 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

7The Court's references to a "major purpose" test, on which

the FEC relies so heavily, were joined by only a plurality of

justices. Justice O'Connor's concurrence, which did not join

that part of the opinion, emphasized that Buckley still applied

and that disclosure requirements for independent expenditures

were generally valid. Id. at 265-66. 

8Contrary to the FEC's assertion, we did not endorse its

"major purpose" test in Federal Election Comm 'n v. Machinists

Non- Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). In Machinists, we held that "draft

groups" that promoted the acceptance of particular individuals

prior to their actual nomination did not fall within § 441(a)'s

contributions or coordinated spending. The Court's analysis

clearly distinguishes contributions and expenditures: "should

MCFL's independent spending become so extensive that the

organization's major purpose may be regarded as campaign activity,

the corporation would be classified as a political committee." Id.

at 262 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79) (emphasis added).7 As in

Buckley, this language can plausibly be read as merely creating a

presumption that certain organization's expenditures are "made ...

for the purpose of influencing any election." Also as in Buckley,

the underlying concern is that congressional regulation, in its

effort to achieve full disclosure, may impermissibly discourage

protected independent expenditures. In short, the Court's

rationale in MCFL and Buckley is simply inapplicable to the present

case. There is no longer a constitutional problem with applying §

431(4)(A) to AIPAC or to other organizations making campaign

contributions exceeding the statutory limits.

The FEC's conception of the major purpose test does not make

this distinction between expenditures and contributions, and it

therefore imposes an unduly narrow definition of "political

committee."8 It allows a large organization to contribute

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 30 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

definition of political committee because the expenditures and

contributions were not made to a "candidate." Id. at 296. While

our language suggested that it is not the "purpose" of the

organization itself but of its disbursement (its "activities")

that is relevant to determining whether a group is a political

committee, our decision was based on Congress' expressed intent

to exclude draft groups from the definition of political

committee. See id. at 394-96. 

substantial sums to campaign activity, as long as the contributions

are a small portion of the organization's overall budget, without

being subject to the limitations and requirements imposed on

political committees. This ignores the $1,000 limit in §

431(4)(A)'s definition of "political committee," even in the

absence of significant First Amendment concerns with regulating

contributions. Moreover, that such an organization may be limited

by other provisions of FECA as well is irrelevant. There is no

indication that Congress intended to limit one section in light of

others or to make their application mutually exclusive. Various

provisions impose different, if overlapping, limits and

requirements on organizations; these differences represent the

sound exercise of congressional judgment as to the various degrees

of risk to the election process posed by certain activities. While

the FEC's "major purpose" test may therefore be valid in

determining whether an organization making independent expenditures

is subject to the requirements imposed on "political committees,"

it cannot legitimately be used to place contributions exceeding

$1,000 outside the scope of § 431(4)(A)'s definition of "political

committee."

There is no contention that AIPAC's disbursements were

independent expenditures, so there is no constitutional barrier to

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 31 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

9Appellants alternatively claimed that the FEC's

investigation was inadequate. The FEC's decisions on how and to

what extent to investigate, while reviewable, command substantial

deference. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (judicial

review particularly circumscribed in area of prosecutorial

discretion); Federal Election Comm 'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081,

1091 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (courts have limited role in supervising

agency use of limited resources). And the statute imposes no

particular investigatory techniques or obligations. Here, even

though appellants note several leads that the FEC could have

pursued more vigorously, the investigation probably passes the

minimal level of sufficiency. To require a full-blown court

examination of each investigatory decision would intrude too

deeply into the FEC's proper area of authority. Moreover, under

the circumstances of this case, the factual findings already made

by the FEC indicate that AIPAC should be classified as a

political committee. 

application of § 431(4)(A)'s plain terms. The FEC found that AIPAC

likely made direct campaign contributions in excess of $1,000. The

FEC's decision that no probable cause existed to believe AIPAC was

a political committee, and its consequent dismissal of appellants'

complaint, were therefore based on its mistaken interpretation of

§ 431(4)(A). This error requires that we reverse the dismissal of

the complaint and remand to the FEC for further considerationand

if necessary further investigation9of AIPAC's status. I

respectfully dissent.

There is no contention that AIPAC's disbursements were

independent expenditures, so there is no constitutional barrier to

application of § 431(4)(A)'s plain terms. The FEC found that AIPAC

likely made direct campaign contributions in excess of $1,000. The

FEC's decision that no probable cause existed to believe AIPAC was

a political committee, and its consequent dismissal of appellants'

complaint, were therefore based on its mistaken interpretation of

§ 431(4)(A). This error requires that we reverse the dismissal of

the complaint and remand to the FEC for further considerationand

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 32 of 33
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

if necessary further investigationof AIPAC's status. I

respectfully dissent.

USCA Case #94-5088 Document #152590 Filed: 09/29/1995 Page 33 of 33