Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-03024/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-03024-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DEANGELEO ANTOINE HUGHES, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JAMES WALKER, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding, through counsel, with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A jury found petitioner guilty of first degree murder 

and attempted robbery and found true sentencing enhancements of felony murder and personal 

use of a firearm. Petitioner challenges his conviction and sentence on the following grounds: 1) 

Confrontation Clause violation by the introduction of prior testimony by Timothy Clay; and 2) 

prosecutorial misconduct by persuading a witness in the case not to appear at trial. 

On December 17, 2014, the court issued an order denying petitioner’s request for an 

evidentiary hearing to determine the credibility of Timothy Clay as it relates to petitioner’s 

claims. ECF No. 74. This order was affirmed by the District Judge, the Honorable William B. 

Shubb, on February 23, 2015, ECF No. 78. That determination having been made, the 

undersigned turns to the merits of petitioner’s claims. Upon careful consideration of the record 

and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas 

corpus relief be denied. 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 1 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

BACKGROUND 

 The facts have been repeated frequently throughout the course of this case. For 

completeness, the undersigned includes the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate 

District’s description below: 

BACKGROUND 

The Crime 

Defendant and his friend Jamar Woodson agreed to help Woodson's 

cousin, Alexander Glaude, find someone to sell him marijuana. 

Glaude followed defendant and Woodson as they drove from 

Fairfield to the apartment of O'Brian Buchanan at 1718 Santa Clara 

Street in Vallejo. 

Buchanan lived on the ground floor of a two-story apartment 

building and a stairway to the second floor units was just outside 

his apartment door. A walkway along the north side of the building 

leads to a rear parking lot. 

Glaude arrived there carrying $1,753 in cash between 11 p.m. and 

midnight with his girlfriend, Lynesse Hamilton. He parked in the 

rear parking lot, told Hamilton he would return soon, and went 

inside. He returned about 15 minutes later and moved the car to a 

spot on Santa Clara Street, across from the apartment building. He 

left Hamilton waiting in the car with the engine running and 

returned to Buchanan's apartment. 

Sometime later Hamilton noticed a man standing near the corner of 

Buchanan's apartment with a white shirt or towel covering his face. 

She thought he had a gun because of the way he was holding his 

hands, but she did not see any weapon. The man was of a medium 

build and dark complected or wearing a dark shirt. Glaude emerged 

from the apartment about 15 feet from where the man was standing 

and tussled with someone near the front of the building. Hamilton 

heard gunshots and was frightened. She ducked and then moved the 

car onto the street. As she did so she heard more gunshots. When 

Glaude did not appear after a couple of minutes, she drove to the 

next block and asked a woman to call 911. 

Eileen Vargas lived on the second floor in Buchannan's apartment 

building. Shortly after midnight she heard men arguing in the 

stairwell area about “weed,” followed quickly by gunshots. She 

heard a muffled voice say “Don't look at my face” and “Do you 

want me to uncover my face?” Then the voice said “Get down on 

the ground” and demanded “Where's the money? and “Where's the 

shit?” After that she heard two series of gunshots that totaled about 

six shots. The first series of shots came from the front corner area 

of the building at the bottom of the stairs. The second series 

sounded like it came from the back of the building. Then she heard 

someone say “I've been shot in the hand.” 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 2 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

Jerry Rozewski lived across the street from Buchanan's apartment 

complex. Shortly after midnight he also heard gunshots coming 

from the apartment. From his window he saw a man holding his left 

arm leave the apartment complex and get in the back seat of a car 

facing the wrong way on Santa Clara Street. Rozewski was unable 

to get a good view, but he could see that the man was an adult 

African-American with probably a shaved head. 

Timothy Clay was 19 years old at the preliminary hearing. He was 

playing video games with four or five friends in Buchanan's 

apartment the night of the shooting, when Woodson (known as 

“Mar”) and defendant (known as “Turtle,” “Wax,” or “Turtle 

Wax”) arrived. Woodson and defendant kept entering and leaving 

the apartment. Their behavior made Clay nervous, so he left. He 

walked out to the front of the apartment complex and tried to call 

his friend Alton, who was still inside. 

Detective Robert Reynolds interviewed Clay two days after the 

shooting. Reynolds testified that Clay initially denied that he 

witnessed the shooting and claimed he was inside the apartment at 

the time, but after further questioning Clay acknowledged that he 

was outside at the time, and he identified defendant as the shooter. 

He was in front of the apartment when he saw a man with a white 

shirt or cloth covering his face. He described the man as about six 

feet tall and weighing 220 to 230 pounds. The assailant was holding 

a gun in each hand and ordered Glaude and Woodson to lie on the 

ground. They complied at first, but then Glaude got up and fled. 

Defendant fired three shots. He hit Glaude at least once and shot 

himself in the hand. Glaude went down, but when defendant 

dropped one of his guns Glaude got up and fled down the walkway 

toward the back parking lot. Defendant picked up his gun and fired 

two or three more shots at Glaude. Then, defendant and Woodson 

ran across Santa Clara Street and got in a car. 

Over defense objections, Clay was declared an unavailable witness 

and his preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. In the 

preliminary hearing Clay denied that he saw the shooting and was 

questioned about the statements he made to Detective Reynolds two 

days after the shooting. He disavowed his earlier statement to 

Detective Reynolds, and claimed he was merely repeating what 

Buchanan had told him might have happened. The prosecution 

impeached Clay's recantation with his prior statement to the 

detective. 

After the shooting defendant and Woodson drove from Vallejo to 

San Francisco General Hospital to get defendant's hand treated. An 

emergency room surveillance tape showed that defendant arrived 

not wearing a shirt. When he was questioned by police in the 

emergency room, defendant said he had been robbed and shot in 

West Point. When officers went to West Point they found no 

evidence of a crime. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 3 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

The Investigation 

Vallejo Police Corporal Steve Darden arrived at the scene at 12:16 

a.m. shortly after the shooting. Glaude was lying in shrubbery in the 

back of the complex. He had been shot and was in bad condition. 

Darden saw two distinct trails of blood leading from the area of the 

shooting, one led down the stairwell along the northeast side of the 

complex to where Glaude was laying in the bushes. The other went 

the opposite direction, to the spot on Santa Clara Street, where the 

injured shooter got in a car. 

Several bullet fragments and two spent casings were found in the 

stairway area next to the entrance to Buchanan's apartment. Three 

more casings and additional bullet fragments were found near the 

driveway. Defendant's white T-shirt was in the stairwell with a 

bullet fragment on top of it. 

DNA testing confirmed that blood on the T-shirt was defendant's. 

[N.1] His blood was also found in samples from both blood trails, 

indicating that defendant pursued Glaude down the north walkway 

to the parking lot before he fled south along the street to his car. 

[N1] The genetic profile in the bloodstain would be 

expected to occur in only one in 433 quadrillion AfricanAmericans. 

A forensic pathologist testified that Glaude was shot four times: 

once through his right hand, twice in the front of his left thigh, and 

once in the center of his back. His hand was shot from a distance of 

a few inches, and the lethal wound to his back was fired from 

approximately one to two feet away. 

Cell phone records showed defendant called Woodson around five 

minutes before the murder. In the four hours before the murder, 

Woodson called Glaude's cell phone 15 times. The final call was 10 

minutes before the murder. 

After he was arrested, defendant told his girl-friend in a telephone 

call from jail: “Hey, you know, where I fucked up at? [¶] ... [¶] 

Going to the hospital.” 

Defense 

Defendant testified that sometime on the day of the shooting, 

Glaude called Woodson to ask about buying marijuana. Woodson 

and defendant met Glaude in a parking lot in Fairfield and Glaude 

followed them in his car to Buchanan's apartment. Defendant went 

into the apartment with Woodson and Glaude and waited as they 

talked, but he grew impatient and left after 10 or 15 minutes. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 4 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

Defendant said he tried to drive to the freeway, but got lost and 

found himself back on Santa Clara Street driving in the wrong 

direction. He parked and walked back towards Buchanan's 

apartment via the rear driveway. As he turned the corner, he said, 

he stumbled into the middle of a robbery. Glaude was lying prone 

on the ground and a man wearing some kind of white mask was 

standing over him holding a gun. Defendant froze. The masked man 

pointed the gun at him and started to approach. Defendant grabbed 

the gun and they wrestled. Glaude got up and came to defendant's 

assistance. The robber started shooting. Defendant managed to free 

himself from the robber's grasp, but more shots were fired as he ran 

up the stairs and he was hit in the hand. 

Defendant fled along the north walkway and around the front of the 

building, and lost his T-shirt as he ran. He ran to his car and drove 

away. As he turned the corner he saw Woodson running and picked 

him up. Defendant testified that they drove to San Francisco rather 

than to a hospital in Vallejo because he was afraid the gunman 

might come after him to “finish [him] off, so I was trying to get as 

far as possible.” He said he lied to the officers who questioned him 

in the emergency room because he was afraid of retribution from 

the assailants if he told the police about their operation. 

The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and 

attempted robbery and found allegations of special circumstance 

felony murder and personal weapon use to be true. Woodson had 

been charged with the same offenses. The court declared a mistrial 

as to him because the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The court 

denied defendant's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to life 

in prison without parole and a consecutive term of 25 years to life 

in prison for the gun use enhancement. This appeal timely followed. 

People v. Hughes, 2008 WL 3889946, at **1-3 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. August 22, 2008). 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal after his conviction and sentence. 

Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 4. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on August 22, 2008. 

See Hughes, 2008 WL 3889946, at *13. Petitioner then filed a petition for review to the 

California Supreme Court. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 8. The Supreme Court summarily denied that 

petition without comment or citation by order dated December 10, 2008. Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 9. 

 On March 3, 2010, petitioner initiated this federal habeas corpus action. ECF No. 1. On 

September 30, 2011, while the case remained under submission, petitioner filed a motion for stay 

and abeyance to afford him an opportunity to exhaust his state judicial remedies with respect to 

newly-discovered claims. ECF No. 23. The newly-discovered claims were based on a postconviction affidavit executed by Timothy Clay. Id. The court granted petitioner’s motion for 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 5 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

stay. ECF No. 31. On September 23, 2013, petitioner filed his first amended petition and the 

Court subsequently lifted stay. ECF Nos. 54, 56. Respondent filed an answer and petitioner filed 

a traverse. ECF Nos. 64, 73. In that traverse, petitioner abandoned his previously stated third 

claim that the prosecutor’s final argument exhibited prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, only the two 

issues set forth below are finally discussed here. 

DISCUSSION 

I. AEDPA Standards 

 The statutory limitations of federal courts’ power to issue habeas corpus relief for persons 

in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The text of § 2254(d) states: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court has recently held and reconfirmed “that § 

2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have 

been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011). Rather, 

“when a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it 

may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any 

indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Id. at 784-785, citing Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265, 109 S.Ct. 1038 (1989) (presumption of a merits determination when it 

is unclear whether a decision appearing to rest on federal grounds was decided on another basis). 

“The presumption may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the 

state court's decision is more likely.” Id. at 785. 

/ / / 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 6 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

The Supreme Court has set forth the operative standard for federal habeas review of state 

court decisions under AEDPA as follows: “For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), ‘an unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Harrington, 

131 S.Ct. at 785, citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). “A state 

court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id. at 786, 

citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140 (2004). 

Accordingly, “a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . 

could have supported[] the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id. “Evaluating whether a rule application was 

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more 

leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.’” Id. Emphasizing the 

stringency of this standard, which “stops short of imposing a complete bar of federal court 

relitigation of claims already rejected in state court proceedings[,]” the Supreme Court has 

cautioned that “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable.” Id., citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (2003). 

 The undersigned also finds that the same deference is paid to the factual determinations of 

state courts. Under § 2254(d)(2), factual findings of the state courts are presumed to be correct 

subject only to a review of the record which demonstrates that the factual finding(s) “resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” It makes no sense to interpret “unreasonable” in § 

2254(d)(2) in a manner different from that same word as it appears in § 2254(d)(1) – i.e., the 

factual error must be so apparent that “fairminded jurists” examining the same record could not 

abide by the state court factual determination. A petitioner must show clearly and convincingly 

that the factual determination is unreasonable. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S.Ct. 

969, 974 (2006). 

The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the objectively 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 7 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court authority. 

Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002). Specifically, the petitioner “must 

show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786-787. “Clearly 

established” law is law that has been “squarely addressed” by the United States Supreme Court. 

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125, 128 S.Ct. 743, 746 (2008). Thus, extrapolations of 

settled law to unique situations will not qualify as clearly established. See e.g., Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653-54 (2006) (established law not permitting state 

sponsored practices to inject bias into a criminal proceeding by compelling a defendant to wear 

prison clothing or by unnecessary showing of uniformed guards does not qualify as clearly 

established law when spectators’ conduct is the alleged cause of bias injection). The established 

Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional principles, or other 

controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules binding only on 

federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 9, 123 S. Ct. 362, 366 (2002). 

When a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but does not 

expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that 

the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 

1088, 1091 (2013). However, if the state courts have not adjudicated the merits of the federal 

issue, no AEDPA deference is given; the issue is reviewed de novo under general principles of 

federal law. Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated awareness 

of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early, 537 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. at 365. Where 

the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in dispute in any reasoned opinion, the 

federal court will independently review the record in adjudication of that issue. “Independent 

review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method 

by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” 

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 8 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

II. Confrontation Clause 

Petitioner contends (1) the state court’s decision upholding the trial court’s introduction of 

prior testimonial statements made by Timothy Clay was an unreasonable application of clearlyestablished federal law; and (2) that decision was also based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts. 

A. Application of Clearly Established Federal Law 

Petitioner asserts that the introduction of prior testimonial statements made by Timothy 

Clay deprived petitioner of the rights to confrontation and cross-examination guaranteed by the 

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment 

provides that a criminal defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him. See U.S. 

CONST. amend. VI. This is a fundamental right which applies to all out-of-court testimonial 

statements (“testimonial hearsay”) offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). Testimonial hearsay is inadmissible, unless (1) the witness 

is unavailable; and (2) the criminal defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant 

at the action or proceeding where the testimony took place. See id.; Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 

1057, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2008). In Crawford, the Supreme Court refused to spell out a 

comprehensive definition of what constitutes “testimonial,” however, the Court explained that it 

applied “at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 

former trial; and to police interrogations.” 541 U.S. at 68. 

A witness is not unavailable for purposes of the exception to the Confrontation Clause 

“unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” 

Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). It is the prosecution’s burden to demonstrate that it 

took reasonable steps to secure the witness’s presence at trial. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 

74–75 (1980), abrogated on other grounds by, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 

The California Court of Appeal analyzed the prosecutor’s due diligence in deciding 

Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim on direct appeal as follows: 

As explained by our Supreme Court, “A defendant has a 

constitutional right to confront witnesses, but this right is not 

absolute. If a witness is unavailable at trial and has testified at a 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 9 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

previous judicial proceeding against the same defendant and was 

subject to cross-examination by that defendant, the previous 

testimony may be admitted at trial. [Citations.] The constitutional 

right to confront witnesses mandates that, before a witness can be 

found unavailable, the prosecution must ‘have made a good-faith 

effort to obtain his presence at trial.’ [Citations.] The California 

Evidence Code contains a similar requirement. As relevant, it 

provides that to establish unavailability, the proponent of the 

evidence, here the prosecution, must establish that the witness is 

absent from the hearing and either that ‘the court is unable to 

compel his or her attendance by its process' [citation] or that the 

proponent ‘has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable 

to procure his or her attendance by the court's process' [Citation]. 

The constitutional and statutory requirements are ‘in harmony.’” 

(People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 609; see also People v. 

Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 896-897; Evid.Code, §§ 1291, subd. 

(a)(2), 240, subd. (a)(5).) 

The diligence required is “‘incapable of a mechanical definition,’ 

but it ‘connotes persevering application, untiring efforts in good 

earnest, efforts of a substantial character.’” (People v. Cromer, 

supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 904.) On the other hand, although the 

prosecution must take reasonable steps to locate an absent witness, 

it “need not do ‘a futile act.’” (People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 

p. 611.) We independently review the trial court's determination 

that the prosecution's efforts to locate an absent witness are 

sufficient to justify an exception to the defendant's right of 

confrontation. (Cromer, at p. 901.) 

Here, our independent review satisfies us that the evidence supports 

the court's determination. The court held an evidentiary hearing on 

the due diligence issue. Solano County District Attorney's 

Investigator Arthur Gerrans testified about his efforts over the 

course of 18 months to find and serve Clay for various court dates 

leading up to and including the trial. Gerrans first attempted to find 

and serve Clay in September 2004, for the November 2004 

preliminary hearing. At that time he had a listing for Clay's address 

at his mother's home at 6 Tolentino Drive. Gerrans went there 

several times but found no one home. He left a business card, but 

was not contacted. He tried Clay's cell phone number and found it 

was no longer in service. 

On October 1, 2004, Gerrans called the home number at 6 

Tolentino Drive and spoke to Clay's mother, Ketora Clay. Ms. Clay 

told him her son still lived there, but that he did not want to talk to 

the police or be involved in the trial. She agreed to help Gerrans, 

and with her assistance Gerrans was able to serve Clay at the 

Tolentino Drive address on October 5, 2004. 

Clay appeared and testified at the preliminary hearing and a second 

preliminary hearing on December 10, 2004. The trial date was 

scheduled for May 23, 2005, and then reset for July 18, 2005, and 

again for February 27, 2006. While it is unnecessary to 

exhaustively recount Gerrans's numerous different attempts to 

locate and serve Clay for these trial dates, we note that he made 23 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 10 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11

attempts for the May 23, 2005, date before he successfully served 

Clay; he then made 11 attempts to serve Clay for the July 18, 2005, 

date before he was able, again with Ms. Clay's intervention, to 

arrange a meeting and serve Clay with a subpoena; and then he 

made another 23 attempts before he managed to effect service for 

the February 27, 2006, trial date. The majority of these attempts 

involved visiting and calling Ms. Clay at the Tolentino Street 

address. Gerrans also ran a criminal history check on Clay, checked 

Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) records and other 

information from the Vallejo Police Department, ran a Solano 

County public records check, gave a subpoena to Detective 

Reynolds with the Vallejo Police Department, contacted Clay's 

former employer, United Parcel Service (UPS), for current 

information, and ran Clay's information through the district 

attorney's “Crimes” database and county welfare records. He did 

not check postal records because Ms. Clay had told him that Clay 

moved out of his parents' house and was transient and staying with 

various friends while “on the run.” 

The trial was ultimately reset for April 10, 2006. Gerrans made 39 

more attempts to serve Clay, but was ultimately unsuccessful. On 

January 11, 2006, he discovered that Clay had been cited on July 

22, 2005, for false impersonation and driving on a suspended 

license. Gerrans checked the district attorney's database but found 

no information about any court appearances on Clay's citation. 

After the trial date was continued until April, he investigated further 

and learned that Clay had a court date scheduled for March 10, 

2006. Gerrans attended the hearing but Clay failed to appear. 

Gerrans put a hold in Clay's file and re-quested to be notified if 

Clay were to be rearrested. He also examined Clay's citation and 

reviewed the court file for any new contact information, but there 

was none. 

Gerrans returned to the UPS facility to ascertain whether Clay had 

resumed his former job or had provided UPS with new contact 

information, also to no avail. An updated DMV records check on 

January 11, 2006, still showed Clay had a suspended license and 

lived at the Tolentino address. A check of county welfare records 

also produced no new information. 

Gerrans met with Clay's parents at their home on February 25 or 

February 26. Clay's father knew nothing about his son's 

whereabouts, and both parents were upset by Clay's failure to keep 

in contact with them. Ms. Clay said that Clay would drop by on 

occasion, but she had no phone number or address for him. She said 

that at one point she knew Clay had been staying with a girlfriend, 

but she refused to give Gerrans the girl's name or phone number. 

She explained that Clay was transient and staying with “all kinds of 

different girls and different people.” Investigator Gerrans last spoke 

with Ms. Clay on April 7, 2006, the Friday before trial began. She 

promised to call Gerrans if her son contacted her over the weekend. 

The court found that Gerrans exercised due diligence in his efforts 

to find Clay. It explained that “defendants are entitled to a fair trial, 

not a perfect one, and as a taxpayer in this county, you know, I, like 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 11 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12

everybody else, hope that our law enforcement agencies that we pay 

for do[ing] a good job and that we get a dollar's worth of work for a 

dollar's worth of our taxpayers' dollars. And I think that although 

the efforts in this case may not have been perfect, and it appears 

they were not successful, that extreme due diligence was 

exercised....” We agree. The record reflects diligent and prolonged 

efforts to locate and serve Clay to compel his attendance at trial, 

starting in September 2004 and continuing intermittently until the 

trial began in April 2006. Although defendant criticizes Investigator 

Garran's efforts to find Clay at his mother's home as “geared toward 

finding him at a place where for at least a year or longer he knew 

that Clay would not be located,” the criticism falls wide of the 

mark. Ketora Clay was Garran's strongest connection to Clay, and 

his painstaking cultivation of that connection, with some success, 

was the most likely means for Gerrans to contact and serve Clay. It 

was eminently reasonable to pursue that avenue of investigation. 

This is a far cry from the situation in Cromer on which defendant 

relies. The prosecution there knew that a witness disappeared in 

June 1997, but made no serious effort to locate her until a month 

before trial in December 1997. Even then, the prosecution's 

investigators' only efforts were to visit the witness's former address 

five or six times after being told she no longer lived there. Two 

days before trial they were told the witness was staying at her 

mother's house, but they delayed going to the mother's house for 

another two days. When they finally did, a woman told them the 

mother would be gone until the following day and that the witness 

did not live there. The investigators left a subpoena for the witness 

but did not return the next day or attempt to contact the mother by 

other means. (People v. Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 903-904.) 

Here, the prosecution began its investigation early and renewed 

efforts to locate Clay over a period of some 18 months each time 

the trial date was reset. Gerrans made numerous visits to Clay's 

mother because she was his best link to Clay, and was willing to 

help the prosecution contact her son. Gerrans also contacted Clay's 

former employer more than once, searched criminal and welfare 

databases, and attempted to serve Clay at a hearing in a different 

matter. No similar effort was shown in Cromer. 

While it is true that Gerrans could have pursued additional avenues 

of investigation-defendant specifically faults him for failing to 

search postal records and pursue potential leads from a civil 

paternity case against Clay-there is no indication that these efforts 

would have borne fruit.[N.2] In any event, “[d]efendant's 

contention that the People should have done more ... is irrelevant to 

our analysis. ‘That additional efforts might have been made or other 

lines of inquiry pursued does not affect [our] conclusion.... It is 

enough that the People used reasonable efforts to locate the 

witness.’” (People v. Wise (1994) 25 Cal .App.4th 339, 344; see

also People v. Guiterrez (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1624, 1641 [the 

prosecution “need not exhaust every potential avenue of 

investigation to satisfy its obligation to use due diligence ....”], 

disapproved on another point in People v. Cromer, supra, 24 

Cal.4th at p. 901, fn. 3.) Diligence, not perfection, is the required 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 12 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

13

standard. We agree with the trial court that the prosecution's efforts 

demonstrate due diligence. 

[N.2] Defendant also complains that Gerrans could have 

tried to serve Clay at three prior court dates in other cases, 

but overlooks that those dates were all well before the 

February 26, 2006, trial date for which Gerrans had 

successfully located and served Clay. 

Hughes, 2008 WL 3889946 at **5–8. 

In Hardy v. Cross, the Supreme Court held that the state court of appeal’s application of 

Confrontation Clause precedent was not unreasonable where the State, in an unsuccessful effort 

to reach the witness, contacted the witness’s family, checked public records, and inquired at local 

hospitals, local institutions, the morgue, and the post office. 132 S.Ct. 490, 493 (2011). In 

addition, the Supreme Court stated that, under AEDPA, a federal court may not overturn a state’s 

decision simply because the federal court would have required the State to do more: 

As we observed in Roberts, when a witness disappears before trial, 

it is always possible to think of additional steps that the prosecution 

might have taken to secure the witness’ presence, see 448 U.S. at 

75, 100 S.Ct. 2531, but the Sixth Amendment does not require the 

prosecution to exhaust every avenue of inquiry no matter how 

unpromising. And, more to the point, the deferential standard of 

review set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not permit a federal 

court to overturn a state court’s decision on the question of 

unavailability merely because the federal court identifies additional 

steps that might have been taken. Under AEDPA, if the state-court 

decision was reasonable, it cannot be disturbed. 

Id. at 495. 

As the appellate court explained, the District Attorney Investigator Arthur Gerrans 

successfully served Clay for the preliminary hearing on December 10, 2004 and the first two trial 

dates. He did so with the help of Ms. Clay. However, in February 2006, Clay’s parents notified 

Gerrans that they had no contact information for Clay. After learning that Clay had a March 10, 

2006 appearance, Gerrans attempted to serve Clay at the courthouse. Clay failed to appear. 

Gerrans utilized the resources that were useful and available to him at the time—Clay’s mother, 

Clay’s former employer, hearings in other matters, and criminal and welfare databases. The state 

court decision that such efforts were not violative of the Confrontation Clause was not an 

unreasonable application of clearly established law. 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 13 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

14

Petitioner contends Gerrans should have served Clay at the courthouse and had several 

opportunities to effectuate such service. Clay appeared in Solano County Superior Court on false 

impersonation charges in September 29, 2005, November 3, 2005, and December 27, 2005 and 

that Gerrans did not attempt to serve Clay at the courthouse until the March 10, 2006 appearance 

where Clay failed to appear. As discussed above, even if the undersigned were to agree with 

petitioner, a federal court may not overturn the state court’s decision on unavailability merely 

because it identifies additional steps that could have been taken. See Hardy, 132 S.Ct. at 495. 

Finally, petitioner contends the declarations of Timothy and Ketora Clay demonstrate a 

violation of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Both Timothy and Ketora Clay 

declared that Gerrans affirmatively told Clay to “get lost during trial.” ECF No. 54-1, Exs. F, G. 

However, as more fully discussed below, the state court found Timothy Clay not credible and 

denied petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim. For reasons expressed in the previous Order and 

again below in part , the court found that petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on 

the issue of Clay’s credibility. As to Ketora Clay, her declaration was never presented to the state 

court. The undersigned refused to consider that declaration in denying petitioner’s request for an 

evidentiary hearing and will do so here. See ECF No. 74, at 18 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, __ 

U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2001) [only those evidentiary submissions 

which were before the state court can be determinative of whether the state court acted AEDPA 

unreasonably]). Because the undersigned considers these declarations either not credible or not 

properly before the court, petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim based on the statements made in 

the declarations of Timothy and Ketora Clay should be denied. The state court’s decision 

rejecting petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim based on Clay’s unavailability was not an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

B. Determination of the Facts 

Petitioner also contends that the state court’s decision is based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts because 1) the California Court of Appeal’s opinion was based on a 

mistaken view of the facts and 2) the state court improperly found Timothy Clay not credible 

without holding an evidentiary hearing. The undersigned rejected petitioner’s first contention 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 14 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

15

reasoning as follows: 

Petitioner contends that footnote two of the California Court of 

Appeal’s opinion was a mistaken view of the facts and thus, the 

state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts. The footnote states that Gerrans successfully served 

Clay for the February 26, 2006 trial date. The court has previously 

found that the “record is at best unclear regarding whether the 

prosecutor was successful in serving Clay with a subpoena after 

May 2005.” ECF No. 30, at 14–15. 

However, as respondent asserts, the footnote was presented as an 

after-thought by the court and thus was not material to its 

conclusion that the State had been diligent in attempt to serve 

Timothy Clay. Hughes, 2008 WL 3889946 at *8. The text 

preceding this footnote dismissed petitioner’s suggestion that the 

district attorney should have done more. Id. The state court’s 

decision relied upon the state’s “diligent and prolonged efforts to 

locate and serve Clay to compel his attendance at trial, starting in 

September 2004 and continuing intermittently until the trial began 

in April 2006.” Id. at *7. As noted above, a federal court may not 

overturn the state court’s decision on unavailability merely because 

it identifies additional steps that could have been taken. See Hardy, 

132 S.Ct. at 495. Accordingly, the state court’s decision rejecting 

petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim based on unavailability was 

not based on a mistaken reading of the state court record. 

ECF No. 74, at 15–16. The undersigned need not elaborate further on that point. 

 As to petitioner’s second contention—that the state court’s determination of Clay’s 

credibility without an evidentiary hearing was an unreasonable determination of the facts—the 

undersigned discussed this contention at length in denying petitioner’s request for an evidentiary 

hearing. ECF No. 74, at 16–22. The Solano Superior Court denied petitioner’s state habeas 

petition requesting that it consider the declaration of Timothy Clay as newly-discovered evidence 

in support of his claims. The Solano Superior Court concluded as follows: 

On April 2, 2012, Petitioner Deangeleo Hughes filed this petition 

for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner seeks to overturn his criminal 

conviction in case number VCR174438 based on newly discovered 

evidence. Namely, Petitioner presents an affidavit allegedly 

authored by Timothy Clay, who testified as a witness at Petitioner’s 

preliminary hearing and whose testimony was introduced at 

Petitioner’s trial, in which Mr. Clay states that he saw another man 

commit the crimes Petitioner was convicted of. Mr. Clay also 

asserts that he lied to police about seeing Petitioner commit the 

crime because he was jealous of Petitioner’s relationship with a 

woman, Petitioner paid him $500.00 to recant statements 

inculpating Petitioner at the preliminary hearing, and the D.A.’s 

investigator instructed Mr. Clay to leave the county so that he 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 15 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

16

would be unavailable at trial. 

Petitioner fails to sate a prima facie case for relief with regard to 

this newly discovered evidence claim. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 

Cal.4th 464, 475.) The affiant here, Mr. Clay, lacks credibility. (In 

re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 723-25; In re Hall (1981) 30 

Cal.3d 408, 418.) Considering Mr. Clay’s lack of credibility, 

Petitioner has failed to show entitlement to the relief on his claim of 

actual innocence. (In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1239 & 

1245-46; People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1246.) 

ECF No. 54-1, at 15–16. The undersigned concluded that state court’s decision was not AEDPA 

unreasonable in determining Clay’s lack of credibility on the face of Clay’s declarations. ECF 

No. 74, at 18. The undersigned noted that recantations of given testimony are generally 

disfavored and “Clay’s declaration/recantation is an example of why the Ninth Circuit adopts this 

view. ECF No. 74, at 19. 

The first, unsanitized declaration given for petitioner’s habeas 

proceeding is then written, but not by Clay. Because Clay asserts 

grammatical and writing insufficiencies, he pours out his “final” 

story on an impulse to a complete stranger at a coffee shop. This 

person then gives Clay the final product which accounts for 

important evidence presented at the trial Clay avoided (but 

somehow Clay knows), most importantly, the DNA evidence tying 

petitioner to the shirt worn and used by the assailant. Not 

surprisingly, Clay is unwilling or unable to identify this scrivener, a 

person learned in the law who performed this service for Clay and 

then vanished. 

Just to recite the back and forth of Clay’s first habeas declaration is 

to recognize the utter disingenuousness of the entire declaration, 

including the most recent “another guy did it” rendition. Clay’s 

credibility has been so irreparably damaged, no credence could be 

placed on his exculpatory version. While what is really motivating 

the present assertion that petitioner did not commit the crime will 

probably never be clear, in light of the entirety of the declaration, a 

reasonable fact finder could not find the most recent Clay version 

credible. 

ECF No. 74, at 20–21. To reiterate, the state court’s determination, without an evidentiary 

hearing, that Clay lacked credibility was not an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Accordingly, the same court’s decision that petitioner’s Sixth Amendment Claim lacked merit 

was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Petitioner’s sixth amendment claim 

should be denied. 

//// 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 16 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

17

III. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

Petitioner also contends the prosecution, via Investigator Gerrans, committed misconduct 

by actively dissuading Timothy Clay from testifying at trial. A prosecutor's error or misconduct 

does not, per se, violate a criminal defendant's constitutional rights. See Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 

F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 

2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review, the standard of 

due process applies to claims of prosecutorial misconduct); Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 

1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1987)). On habeas corpus review, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct 

merit relief “only if the misconduct rises to the level of a due process violation-not merely 

because [the reviewing court] might disapprove of the prosecutor's behavior.” Towery v. 

Schiriro, 641 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir.2010). 

The question to be resolved is whether the alleged prosecutorial misconduct “‘so infected 

the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Hall v. 

Whitley, 935 F.2d 164, 165 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 

643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). In order to determine whether misconduct occurred, 

it is necessary to examine the entire proceedings and place the prosecutor's conduct in context. 

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765–766, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987). Factors to be 

considered in determining whether habeas corpus relief is warranted include whether the 

prosecutor manipulated or misstated the evidence; whether his comments implicated other 

specific rights of the accused; whether the objectionable content was invited or provoked by 

defense counsel's argument; whether the trial court admonished the jurors; and the weight of 

evidence against the defendant. Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 

94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). “[T]he Darden standard is a very general one, leaving 

courts ‘more leeway ... in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations,’ (Yarborough v. 

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004)).” Parker v. Matthews, - - 

- U.S. – – – – , ––– S.Ct. ––––, ––– L.Ed.2d – – – – , 2012 WL 2076341 *6 (2012). Thus, even 

where a prosecutor's argument, questions or behavior is found to be improper, relief is limited to 

cases in which a petitioner can establish that the misconduct resulted in actual, substantial 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 17 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

18

prejudice. 

Criminal defendants have a due process right to present witnesses, compel their 

attendance, and present a defense. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 

L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). “It is well established that ‘substantial government interference with a 

defense witness's free and unhampered choice to testify amounts to a violation of due process.’” 

Earp, 431 F.3d at 1170 (quoting United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

Coercive or threatening behavior towards a potential witness may justify reversal of a defendant's 

conviction. See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972); Williams 

v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 601–02 (9th Cir.2004) (“Undue prosecutorial interference in a 

defense witness's decision to testify arises when the prosecution intimidates or harasses the 

witness to discourage the witness from testifying.”). 

Petitioner alleges that Investigator Gerrans told Clay, a key witness, to not appear in court. 

Petitioner also alleges that the prosecutor also committed misconduct when he claimed a good 

faith effort in attempting to secure Mr. Clay’s attendance, when in fact he told Clay he would not 

be testifying. “It has long been established that the prosecutions’ ‘deliberate deception of a court 

. . . by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of 

justice.’” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 694 (2004) (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 

150, 153 (1972)). In support of these assertions, petitioner submits the declarations of Timothy 

and Ketora Clay. As discussed above, the state court concluded Timothy Clay lacks credibility 

and the declaration of Ketora Clay was never before the state courts. Given that Clay’s 

declaration is the only source of this information properly presented in this habeas action and 

given Clay’s complete lack of credibility, the state court’s denial of petitioner’s prosecutorial 

misconduct claim cannot be found AEDPA unreasonable. Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct 

claim should be denied. 

CONCLUSION 

 Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must 

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A 

certificate of appealability may issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 18 of 19
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

19

denial of a constitution right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons set forth in these findings 

and recommendations, a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right has not been 

made in this case. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied; and 

2. The District Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a documents should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: March 23, 2015 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

GGH:016/Hugh3024fr 

Case 2:10-cv-03024-WBS-GGH Document 79 Filed 03/23/15 Page 19 of 19