Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_93-cv-00767/USCOURTS-caed-2_93-cv-00767-55/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM ROUSER,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-93-0767 LKK GGH P

vs.

THEO WHITE, et al.,

Defendants. O R D E R

 /

Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding with counsel bringing

claims arising out of the alleged failure of prison officials to

accommodate the practice of his religion. At issue here is

plaintiff’s most recent motion for a preliminary injunction

enjoining various officials. The motion seeks an order allowing

plaintiff to obtain and maintain certain articles, which he

characterizes as religious, and to satisfy certain requirements

with respect to his religious services. For the reasons stated

below, plaintiff’s motion is granted as to most of the relief he

seeks.

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I. BACKGROUND

On May 7, 1993, plaintiff filed his original complaint

seeking damages and injunctive relief from, inter alia, defendant

Theo White (“White”), warden of California State Prison -

Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”), and defendant James H. Gomez (“Gomez”),

former director of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), under several theories of liability

alleging their infringement of his religious practice. On

December 5, 1997, the court dismissed the case pursuant to the

parties’ private settlement. On March 23, 2004, the court

reopened the case pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

which provides that the only way for courts to enforce private

settlement agreements is to reinstate civil proceedings. 18

U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2).

On January 30, 2006, plaintiff filed an amended complaint

adding defendants and claims relating to his treatment at Mule

Creek State Prison (“MCSP”). In June 2007, plaintiff was

transferred to Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”). On

September 23, 2008, plaintiff filed his third amended complaint,

bringing claims against four defendants, White, Gomez, Matthew

Cate (“Cate”), Secretary of CDCR, and James A. Yates (“Yates”),

warden at PVSP. This complaint sued all defendants in their

individual and official capacities, and plaintiff sought both

damages and injunctive relief. 

On May 14, 2009, this court granted in part and denied in

part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The motion was

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denied insofar as plaintiff sought injunctive relief.

Specifically, the court concluded that “were the factfinder to

credit even some of plaintiff’s evidence of the violations he has

suffered since 1992 in attempting to exercise his religious

rights, a factfinder could infer a pattern of Constitutional

violations sufficient to call into question the permanence of any

changes defendants have voluntarily made now.” May 14, 2009

Order, Doc. 420, at 74. The court discusses the specific holdings

of this decision and the relevance of the holding below. 

On December 10, 2009, this court granted plaintiff’s motion

to supplement his complaint to include claims for conduct

occurring after he filed his Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiff

sought to add three defendants to his complaint. Plaintiff

alleges that defendant correctional counselors P. Ortiz (“Ortiz”)

and B. Flores (“Flores”) retaliated against his filing of

grievances and litigation of this case by placing plaintiff in

administrative segregation and then causing plaintiff to be

transferred from PVSP to California State Prison Los Angeles

County (“LAC”). Plaintiff also added defendant Brian Haws

(“Haws”), warden of LAC.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR FED. R. CIV. P. 65 MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

A preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary remedy."

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., ___ U.S. ___,

129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008) (internal citation omitted). When a

court considers whether to grant a motion for a preliminary

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injunction, it balances "the competing claims of injury, . . .

the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the

requested relief, . . . the public consequences in employing the

extraordinary remedy of injunction," and plaintiff's likelihood

of success. Id. at 374, 376-77 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v.

Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,

456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). In order to succeed on a motion for a

preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must establish that "he is

likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is

in the public interest." Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374. 

An even more stringent standard is applied where mandatory,

as opposed to prohibitory, preliminary relief is sought. The

Ninth Circuit has noted that although the same general principles

inform the court's analysis, "where a party seeks mandatory

preliminary relief that goes well beyond maintaining the status

quo pendente lite, courts should be extremely cautious about

issuing a preliminary injunction." Martin v. International

Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984). Thus, an

award of mandatory preliminary relief is not to be granted unless

both the facts and the law clearly favor the moving party and

extreme or very serious damage will result. See Anderson v.

United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 1979). "[I]n

doubtful cases" a mandatory injunction will not issue. Id.

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III. ANALYSIS

Rouser is a practicing Wiccan, who argues that defendants

have infringed upon his ability to practice his religion.

Plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction against defendants

Cate and Haws. Specifically, plaintiff argues that these

defendants are violating his rights under the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the Free Exercise

and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, as incorporated

through the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff seeks the following

injunctive relief:

(1) that defendants allow Mr. Rouser to keep and maintain

religious texts (including but not limited to A Witches' Bible

Compleat (the "Wiccan Bible")), to the maximum extent allowed

under CDCR policies and as applied to all inmates; this includes

allowing Mr. Rouser to have his Wiccan Bible while he is in

Administrative Segregation;

(2) that defendants allow Mr. Rouser to obtain group Wiccan

items prior to Wiccan group services;

(3) that defendants cannot take and/or destroy Mr. Rouser's

approved religious articles; 

(4) that defendants provide a means for Mr. Rouser to order

and receive religious items;

(5) that when Wiccan services are scheduled, defendants must

allow Mr. Rouser to access the nature-based religious area for

group services for the entire scheduled time, unless the Yard is

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on modified program and no religious group is allowed to meet

that day;

(6) that defendants grant Mr. Rouser access to a fire pit

during religious services; 

(7) that defendants provide Mr. Rouser an outdoor

nature-based religious area, similar to the outdoor nature-based

religious area at Pleasant Valley State Prison, in which Mr.

Rouser may participate in Wiccan group services;

(8) that defendants cannot take unreasonable steps to

interrupt Mr. Rouser's group services, including but not limited

to blaring Christian music in the direction of Mr. Rouser's group

services or turning on the sprinkler system during Mr. Rouser's

group services; and

(9) that defendants announce Wiccan services to the same

extent they announce services for the main stream faiths (i.e.,

Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, and Native American).

Defendants oppose this motion on several grounds. First,

defendants argue that the motion should be denied for several

jurisdictional reasons. Second, defendants argue that the motion

should be denied under the requirements to issue a preliminary

injunction. The court will first dispose of defendants’

jurisdictional concerns, and then turn to the preliminary

injunction factors.

A. Whether the Court Has Jurisdiction to Issue a

Preliminary Injunction.

1. Whether Defendants Gomez’s and Ortiz’s

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Interlocutory Appeal of this Court’s Decision

Denying Qualified Immunity Bars this Court’s

Ability to Issue a Preliminary Injunction.

On May 14, 2009, this court denied defendants Gomez’s and

Ortiz’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that they are

entitled to qualified immunity for violation of the Free Exercise

Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The court also denied

defendants’ motion on the grounds that they were entitled to

qualified immunity for violation of the Establishment Clause, but

only insofar as plaintiff was denied access to a Witches Bible

while in administrative segregation. The court held that

defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s

other claims for violation of the Establishment Clause. The court

granted defendants’ motion insofar as plaintiff’s claim for

violation of the Establishment Clause concerned his denial of

Tarot cards, candles, incense, and access to a chapel. On June

12, 2009, defendants filed a notice of appeal as to the “denial

of their motion for summary judgment asserting the defense of

qualified immunity from all damages asserted in plaintiff’s Third

Amended Complaint . . . .” Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, Doc. No.

421, at 2. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendants Cate and Haws,

successors in office to defendants Gomez and White, the

defendants who are appealing this court’s decision on qualified

immunity. Defendants argue that this court does not have

jurisdiction to enter a preliminary injunction against Cate and

Haws because their liability for injunctive relief is

“necessarily intertwined with the question on appeal” and,

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Throughout this section defendants’ refer to the court’s 1

analysis in the December 10, 2009 order as if these were

arguments merely raised by plaintiffs.

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therefore, the court cannot grant a preliminary injunction.

As this court held in its December 10, 2009 order,

“[i]nterlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity may

deprive the district court of jurisdiction.” December 10, 2009

Order at 8. Specifically, the court “is automatically divested of

jurisdiction to proceed with trial pending appeal.” Id. (quoting

Shuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1992)). Because

qualified immunity is only immunity from damages, this court held

that it “presently [only] lacks jurisdiction over the claims for

damages against Gomez and White.” The court continued to state

that “[a]ppeal does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over

other aspects of this case, including plaintiff’s claims for

injunctive relief and as to other defendants.” December 10, 2009

Order at 9 (citing Plotkin v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 688 F.2d

1291 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

Defendants argue that this court’s reliance on Plotkin is

misguided. Specifically, defendants argue that “Plotkin holds 1

that an appeal from an interlocutory order does not divest the

court of jurisdiction to proceed with all ‘other aspects’ of the

case, but divests the court of jurisdiction only as to those

issues that do implicate issues on appeal.” Opposition at 35.

However, as this court explained in its previous order, Plotkin

held that “an appeal from an interlocutory order does not stay

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the proceedings, as it is firmly established that an appeal from

an interlocutory order does not divest the trial court of

jurisdiction to continue with other phases of the case.” Plotkin,

688 F.2d at 1293. Defendants contend that any matter that seems

somewhat related to the matter on appeal constitutes the same

“phase[] of the case.” That is not so. For example, in Plotkin,

the Ninth Circuit held that the district court could entertain

defendant’s motion for summary judgment while denial of

plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction was on appeal.

December 10, 2009 Order (citing Plotkin, 688 F.2d at 1293). The

subject matter of the two motions in Plotkin was virtually

identical. Specifically, the preliminary injunction was denied

because plaintiff failed to exhaust the available administrative

remedies, and the motion for summary judgment was granted for the

same reason. Plotkin, 688 F.2d at 1292. Nonetheless, the Ninth

Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction over the

summary judgment motion while its order denying the preliminary

injunction order was on appeal. Clearly, the Ninth Circuit did

not hold that district courts lack jurisdiction only as to those

issues that do not implicate the issues raised in the appeal. 

Here, the only similarity between the issues on appeal and

the issue at bar is the possibility that the Ninth Circuit would

adopt reasoning that could conflict with this court’s

understanding of the constitutional and statutory requirements

concerning plaintiff’s religious practice. As an initial matter,

defendants are mistaken to argue that if the Ninth Circuit

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reverses this court’s decision on qualified immunity that then

Cate and Haws would necessarily be dismissed from the case. The

appeal only concerns the extent to which White and Gomez are

liable in their individual capacity for damages, and not in the

official capacity for injunctive relief. Despite this difference,

the ruling of the Ninth Circuit may only possibly effect this

court’s reasoning under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and

not under RLUIPA. For example, if the Ninth Circuit were to

reverse this court’s decision as to whether Gomez and White are

entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the law was

not clearly established, this decision would not effect Cate’s

and Haws’ liability. First, Gomez and White would only be

dismissed from the action because they are retired, and thereby

no longer liable for injunctive relief. Cate and Haws, as active

officials, remain liable for injunctive relief even if Gomez and

White were entitled to qualified immunity. Second, it is not

clear that Cate and Haws would even be entitled to such immunity

where Gomez and White acted before this court issued orders

concerning the constitutional and statutory requirements, and

Cate and Haws allegedly infringed plaintiff’s rights after the

court described these requirements. The only possibility for the

Ninth Circuit’s decision on defendant’s qualified immunity appeal

to implicate the instant motion would be for the court of appeals

to decide that this court was wrong as to whether a reasonable

jury could conclude that Gomez and White violated the

constitution. If the Ninth Circuit were to so decide, the proper

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avenue for defendants would be to file a motion to reconsider an

order granting a preliminary injunction based on those theories,

and not to preemptively oppose a motion for a preliminary

injunction on the grounds that there is a chance that the Ninth

Circuit could resolve their appeal in a way that could implicate

this order. As such, defendants’ argument does not prevent the

court from issuing a preliminary injunction.

2. Whether this Court’s Decision on Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims of

Retaliation Against Flores and Ortiz Bars the

Court’s Ability to Issue a Preliminary Injunction.

Defendants also argue that the court lacks jurisdiction to

issue injunctive relief as to the alleged retaliation claim

against defendants Flores and Ortiz because they anticipated that

this court will grant its motion to dismiss this claim for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On March 10, 2010,

this court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss on this ground.

Moreover, even if the court had granted the motion to dismiss,

this argument is irrelevant in that Rouser is seeking to enjoin

Cate and Haws, the officials responsible for his treatment at

LAC, and not Ortiz and Flores, the officials at PVSP, plaintiff’s

previous place of institution. Accordingly, defendants’ have not

demonstrated this court’s lack of jurisdiction for failure to

exhaust a retaliation claim against Flores and Ortiz.

3. Whether Plaintiff’s Motion Is Moot.

Defendants also argue that the court should not issue a

preliminary injunction here because plaintiff’s motion is moot.

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Defendants seem to contend that their conduct at the correctional

institutions where plaintiff was previously incarcerated should

not bear on whether plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary

injunction at the institution where he is currently incarcerated.

In support of this argument, defendants refer to this court’s

previous order dismissing a preliminary injunction as moot where

plaintiff sought to enjoin officials at Mule Creek State Prison,

but was later transferred to PVSP. This argument conflates two

issues. While it is clear that plaintiff could not seek to enjoin

officials at prisons where he is no longer incarcerated, evidence

of conduct from those prisons is nonetheless relevant in deciding

whether defendants are engaging in a pattern and practice of

preventing plaintiff from practicing his religion. This is

especially so where Cate, one of the defendants plaintiff seeks

to enjoin, is secretary of the entire California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Because plaintiff does

not seek to enjoin officers at his prior prisons, his motion is

not moot. Evidence from the previous institutions, however, is

relevant to plaintiff’s claims and shall be considered when

evaluating plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits. 

Given that the court concludes it has jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, I now turn to

whether such an injunction should issue.

B. Whether Plaintiff Is Entitled to a Preliminary

Injunction.

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

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 The court construes defendants’ argument as to causal 2

connection as an argument under the likelihood of success element

for a preliminary injunction even though defendants did not

include this discussion under the likelihood of success on the

merits section of their opposition. The reason for including it

in this section is that if plaintiff has not sufficiently shown a

causal connection, he would not be likely to succeed on the

merits. This argument is not a jurisdictional bar to entry of an

injunction, but rather goes to the strength of plaintiff’s

claims.

 The court notes that this analysis only applies to 3

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, and not for his claim under RLUIPA.

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a. Whether Plaintiff Has Demonstrated a Causal

Connection Between the Actions of Defendants

Haws and Cate and His Treatment at LAC.

Defendants assert that plaintiff “has not shown any causal

connection between the actions of Warden Haws and the alleged

conduct of prison staff at CSP-Los Angeles County; . . .”2

Opposition at 37. Defendants do not argue that plaintiff has not

demonstrated such a connection between CDCR Secretary Cate and

the alleged conduct at LAC, but because the reasoning is

identical, and because the court decides that plaintiff has

demonstrated such a connection, the court considers defendants’

argument as if it sought to deny a connection between both

defendants that plaintiff seeks to enjoin and the alleged conduct

at LAC. 

To succeed on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff 3

must show “(1) that a person acting under color of state law

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by

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the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Leer v. Murphy,

844 F.2d 626, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal citations

omitted). The Ninth Circuit construes the second element to

require that plaintiff show that a defendant deprived him “of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, [where]

he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff

complains].” Id. at 633 (internal quotation omitted). “The

inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the

duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose

acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

deprivation.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit applies a less stringent standard for

causation where plaintiffs seek injunctive relief as opposed to

damages. Id. Because the inquiry here is whether plaintiff is

likely to succeed on the merits of his claim for an injunction,

the court need only address whether he is likely to show

sufficient causation for injunctive relief. The circuit’s

standard for injunctive relief is “whether the combined acts or

omissions of the state officials responsible for operating the

state's penal system created living conditions that violate the”

constitution. Id. While this analysis “undeniably focuses on the

duties and responsibilities of each of the individual defendants

whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused the

constitutional deprivation,” it nonetheless “is broader and more

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generalized than when that same prisoner seeks damages for the

harmful effects” of the constitutional violation. Id.

Accordingly, in order to demonstrate that he is entitled to

injunctive relief under § 1983, plaintiff need not demonstrate

Cate’s and Haws’ personal participation in each allegedly

unconstitutional act, as defendants contend, but rather that they

are responsible for policies or practices that resulted in

violations of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.

Plaintiff has clearly met this standard to the extent that

he seeks injunctive relief for policies that burden his religious

practice. While not completely clear from plaintiff’s motion, it

appears to the court that the injunctive relief that plaintiff is

seeking under § 1983 only concerns “prison policies that prevent

Mr. Rouser [from] access to group worship, religious articles,

and a fire pit.” Motion at 19. As the court reasoned in Rouse v.

Washington State Dep’t of Corrs., No. C08-5620 FDB, 2009 WL

1011623, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 15, 2009), “the proper defendant

for injunctive relief regarding the implementation of a [CDCR]

policy would be the Secretary of the [CDCR], [Cate] in his

official capacity” or, to the extent that the policy is

institution-specific, the warden of LAC, Haws in his official

capacity. Id. These policies are discussed in greater depth below

in the court’s description of the scope of preliminary relief.

Accordingly, plaintiff has met his burden of alleging a causal

connection sufficient to entitle him to injunctive relief against

Cate and Haws. The court addresses in the next section, whether

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 The court notes that this approach only considers 4

admissible evidence. While inadmissible evidence may be

considered when determining the likelihood of success on the

merits, doing so here is not warranted. See Flynt Distrib. Co.,

Inc. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984). Where

discovery is complete as to actions occurring before April 3,

2009, plaintiff’s likelihood of success is closely tied to the

admissible evidence he can present at trial. However, the court

will give some weight to inadmissible evidence for more recent

occurrences in that the parties have not yet conducted discovery

on those matters. See id.

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plaintiff is likely to succeed on these claims upon review of the

evidence provided in support and in opposition to this motion.

b. Whether Plaintiff Has Demonstrated That it Is

Likely That Defendants Are Violating His

Federal Constitutional and Statutory Rights.

i. Evidence Before April 2009

As an initial matter, this court has already considered

evidence provided by both parties as to whether defendants were

engaging in a pattern and practice of violating his rights under

RLUIPA and the Constitution by preventing him from practicing his

faith as of May 14, 2009 in response to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. The court need not discuss these facts in depth

again. But, rather, suffice to say, these findings of fact also

reveal that plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his

claims as of, at earliest, April 3, 2009, the date plaintiff

submitted his opposition to defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.4

In particular, the claims for which plaintiff has a

sufficient likelihood of success as to his entitlement to

injunctive relief include the following:

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 Testimony from Lisa Morgenstern indicates that Wiccan 5

practice is sufficiently individual that it is unlikely any

article is required. Nonetheless, there is no suggestion that

the articles in question are not generally used in group worship.

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(1) Defendants Cate and Yates substantially burdened

plaintiff’s religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA and of the

Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by:

(a) Inhibiting plaintiff’s timely receipt of religious

articles through policies at PVSP surrounding the ordering and

receipt of religious items from vendors;

(b) Inhibiting group worship by plaintiff and other

Wiccans through, inter alia, restrictions on Wiccans’ use of

chapel space, failure to announce Wiccan group worship to the

general population, prohibition of Wiccans’ use of certain items,

such as a fire pit, that are part of group worship, and a policy

for use of lockers by religious groups that has resulted in

plaintiff and other Wiccans being unable to access the items

desired for group religious worship;5

(c) Inhibiting plaintiff from attending group worship

approximate 46 times due to actions by the guards in failing to

escort him to the outdoor area on time, requiring him to return

to his cell early, or interrupting his worship; and

(d) Failing to retain a paid chaplain for plaintiff and

other Wiccans at PVSP, in that only paid chaplains can approve

religious order forms, retrieve orders from the mailroom, approve

or deny grievances, access prison keys, and ensure inmates are

released on time for services.

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(2) Defendants Gomez and White inhibited plaintiff’s free

exercise rights in violation of the First Amendment through:

(a) Preventing plaintiff from accessing Tarot cards,

candles, incense, and a Witches Bible, which made the exercise of

plaintiff’s religion significantly more difficult; and

(b) Denying some grievances filed by plaintiff

concerning his access to these items.

(3) Defendants violated the Establishment Clause of the

First Amendment by:

(a) Promulgating the CDCR policy which allows wardens

to hire chaplains only of “Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant .

. . and Native American” faiths;

(b) Allowing Native American inmates to access a sweat

lodge and fire pit at PVSP, while Wiccan inmates are not allowed

access;

(c) Securing the locker containing Wiccan items at PVSP

with a keyed lock where only the guards have access to the key,

while the lockers for the Native American and Catholic items are

secured with a combination lock of which Native American and

Catholic inmates know the combination, and the locker containing

Protestant items has no lock; and

(d) Rarely announcing Wiccan services to the general

population, while frequently announcing Protestant, Catholic, and

Muslim services.

(4) Defendants violated plaintiff’s rights under the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by impeding his

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practice of the Wiccan faith in ways that other religious

practitioners are not. In particular, the actions include those

described above of denial of a paid chaplain, denial of his

Witches Bible in Administrative Segregation in 1993, denial of

access to a firepit and sweat lodge, denial of access to a chapel

for a period of time, and policies regarding access to items from

third-party vendors, use of lockers by religious groups, and

announcements of religious services.

ii. Evidence During and After April 2009

a. Evidence from PVSP

Rouser ordered religious items from a vendor in early 2009.

Declaration of William Rouser in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion

for a Preliminary Injunction (“Rouser’s First Decl.”) ¶ 113-15.

On April 14, 2009, Rouser was informed by prison officers that

the items had arrived, yet would be returned to the sender if he

did not have a copy of an official religious order request form.

Id. Because Rouser was not allowed to make religious copies, he

did not have the copy. Id. Accordingly, his order was returned to

the vendor. Id.

On or about June 2009, prison officers confiscated Rouser’s

candle holders, even though these candle holders were previously

approved religious items. Id. at ¶ 117; Declaration of Tramaine

Hunter in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary

Injunction (“Hunter Decl.”) ¶ 9.

Twice in June 2009, prison officers released Rouser one hour

late for his two and a half hour religious service. Rouser’s

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First Decl. at 120. Other Wiccan inmates have testified to

similar experiences. Declaration of James J. Burian in Support of

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction ¶¶ 7-12; Hunter

Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8; Declaration of Douglass Hysell in Support of

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Hysell’s First

Decl.”) ¶¶ 10-11; Second Declaration of Douglass Hysell in

Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

(“Hysell’s Second Decl.”) ¶¶ 6-8. Rouser has presented evidence

that at around the same time Muslim inmates were allowed to have

services fairly on time. Declaration of Kajauna Irvin in Support

of Motion for Preliminary Injunction ¶ 28. 

On or about June 21, 2009, the sprinklers went off in the

nature based religious area for about five minutes while Wiccan

inmates were celebrating Sabbat. Rouser’s First Decl. ¶ 125;

Hunter Decl. ¶ 10. Defendants have presented evidence that the

sprinklers would have only gone off at that time if someone went

to the sprinkler controls, turned them on, and remained there for

five minutes, and then turned them off or if there was a

malfunction. Lynch-Auniga Decl. ¶ 5. Defendants also claim that

if a person were at the sprinkler controls, he would have been

visible from the nature based religious area. Id.

Rouser was placed in Administrative Segregation on July 2,

2009, yet did not receive his Wiccan bible until July 24, 2009.

Id. at ¶ 128. Others in Administrative Segregation were promptly

given Christian Bibles and Qurans. Id. at ¶ 129. See also

Declaration of Claude Powell in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for

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Rouser argues that his transfer to LAC was in retaliation 6

for this litigation, which defendants deny. However, this

argument is not relevant here where plaintiff does not seek

injunctive relief prohibiting or requiring his transfer to

different prisons. For this reason, the court does not consider

the evidence offered in support of and in opposition to Rouser’s

claims of retaliation.

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Preliminary Injunction ¶ 9 (“After being placed in Administrative

Segregation [in April of 2009], I received my personal belongings

and my Christian Bible. I saw a property officer going to the

cells passing out Christian Bibles and Qurans.”). Rouser has also

presented some evidence that prison officers have gone through

and thrown out his personal items including Rouser’s legal

documents and religious items. Declaration of Rickey Adams in

Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction ¶¶ 5-8; Declaration

of Marcus Barnhardt in Support of Motion for Preliminary

Injunction ¶¶ 8-9.

b. Evidence from LAC6

On August 7, 2009, plaintiff was transferred to LAC.

Rouser’s First Decl. ¶ 130. Rouser was informed by prison

officers at the time of his transfer that there is no religious

program for Wiccans at LAC. Id.

On August 27, 2009, the Muslim Chaplain at LAC informed

Rouser that a Wiccan volunteer chaplain, Lisa Morgenstern,

volunteers at LAC. Second Declaration of William Rouser in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Rouser’s Second Decl.”)

¶ 9. As of September 4, 2009, the Wiccans were not scheduled for

group services, even though there are approximately thirty

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 According to Ms. Morgenstern’s testimony, Rouser is a 7

magician, which the court takes to mean he is the Wiccan

equivalent of a religious leader in more conventional faiths.

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inmates interested in such services, and Wiccans do not have a

locker of any kind to keep their religious items. Id. at ¶ 14;

Rouser’s First Decl. ¶ 131. Furthermore, there is no nature based

religious area at LAC. Rouser’s Second Decl. ¶¶ 15-16. Rouser has

also been told by LAC officers that he cannot practice his

religion unless he has a sponsor or a court order. Id. at ¶¶ 17-

19. 

Between November 9, 2009 and January 8, 2010, Rouser has

only been released for services on three occasions. Third

Declaration of William Rouser in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion

for Preliminary Injunction (“Rouser’s Third Decl.”) ¶ 4. Rouser

was able to lead one service, but did not have access to all of

the items necessary for such a service nor was he able to light

candles and incense as necessary for the service. Id. at 6-7.7

Rouser attempted to purchase these items, but his request was

denied, as was his appeal of the denial. Id. at ¶ 8. Rouser was

also not able to participate in the Yule service on December 23,

2009 because he was not released for the service. Id. at 12. 

Native American inmates are released to outdoor areas for

services at LAC on Saturday mornings. Id. at 11.

Defendants have presented some evidence that rather than

contradicting Rouser’s evidence, differently interprets the

course of events. As to these arguments, Rouser has at least

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presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude

that his interpretation of the events is correct. The remaining

evidence presented by defendants concerns the extent to which

they are already in compliance with many elements of Rouser’s

proposed preliminary injunction. This evidence will be discussed

in the following section.

Nonetheless, the evidence presented by Rouser at least shows

that he is as likely to succeed on the merits of his claims of

constitutional and RLUIPA violations at LAC as he was in May

2009, when this court denied defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on these claims. Moreover, plaintiff has presented

evidence that strongly suggests that he is likely to succeed on

the merits on his argument that defendants’ treatment of him

constitutes a continuing violation as opposed to individualized

incidents. Rouser is similarly inhibited in the practice of his

religion at different prisons and under the supervision of

different prison officers. Thus, plaintiff has shown that he is

likely to succeed on the merits of his claims under the

Constitution and RLUIPA. 

c. Evidence Relating to Lisa

Morgenstern’s Testimony.

On March 3, 2010, this court held an evidentiary hearing

concerning the experiences of Lisa Morgenstern, a Wiccan

volunteer chaplain at LAC. In response to this testimony

defendants filed an declaration of Chaplain A. Omeira,

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 Precisely what this means is uncertain. Clearly Omeira 8

cannot supervise Ms. Morgenstern’s performance of religious

services. Thus, the court assumes he is her supervisor in

relation to administrative matters.

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characterized as Morgenstern’s supervisor at LAC. In turn, 8

Rouser submitted an additional declaration in response. The

parties have submitted numerous objections to each other’s

declarations. Initially, as discussed above, the evidentiary

objections are of little weight. The Ninth Circuit has held that,

“The trial court may give even inadmissible evidence some weight,

when to do so serves the purpose of preventing irreparable harm

before trial.” Flynt Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389,

1394 (9th Cir. 1984). The remaining objection is that of

defendants who claim that significant sections of Rouser’s

declaration should be stricken because they are beyond the scope

of Morgenstern’s testimony. 

Ultimately, however, this is a situation where most of the

evidence provided in Morgenstern’s testimony and the responsive

declarations is beyond the scope of this motion. Plaintiff seeks

specific enumerated relief. The court’s inquiry is limited to

plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits insofar as he is

likely to obtain such injunctive relief at trial. For example,

plaintiff is not now seeking as preliminary injunctive relief the

hiring a Wiccan chaplain. Nonetheless, a large part of Ms.

Morgernstern’s testimony and portions of the responsive

declarations only concern this issue. Further, a significant

portion of the relevant testimony is uncontested. For example,

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the parties agree that plaintiff does not have access to outdoor,

nature-based religious practice at LAC. The remaining facts

concern to what extent Wiccan practitioners are treated

differently than members of other religions. While these facts

may ultimately be relevant in determining the extent to which

Rouser is entitled to damages, they are not pertinent here where

(1) plaintiff has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in

proving at trial that defendants have in the past treated Wiccans

less favorably than other faiths and (2) plaintiff seeks

preliminary relief of equal treatment. Specifically, if

defendants’ treatment of Wiccan religious activity over the past

few months is equal to that of other religious activity, it does

not make moot his claims for injunctive relief. Voluntary

cessation of unconstitutional behavior does not preclude an

order. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental

Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). Accordingly, the

court does not resolve these disputes as they have no or little

bearing on the likelihood of plaintiff’s success on the merits of

his claims for injunctive relief.

2. Irreparable Injury.

In order for the court to award a preliminary injunction,

plaintiff must demonstrate that he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm without preliminary relief. Winter v. Nat’l Res.

Def. Council, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).

Here plaintiff seeks relief for alleged constitutional

violations. Such violations generally constitute irreparable harm

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Defendants also raise some arguments that more properly 9

concern the scope of the preliminary injunction than whether

plaintiff is likely to experience irreparable injury. These

arguments will be addressed in the final section of this order

addressing the scope of the injunction.

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because they “cannot be adequately remedied through damages.”

Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1138 (9th Cir. 2009)

(interpreting Winter and quoting Nelson v. N.A.S.A., 530 F.3d

865, 881 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Mayweathers v. Newland, 258

F.3d 930, 938 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]nmates suffer irreparable

injury when they are unable to attend religious services that are

commanded by” their religion.). Inhibition of religious practice

is a clear example of such constitutional injury that cannot be

adequately remedied through damages. As such, to the extent that

plaintiff is likely suffering or likely to suffer injuries

arising from the inhibition of his religious practice, his

injuries are irreparable. In other words, if “a trial on the

merits shows that such [inhibition] violates [his] constitutional

rights, [plaintiff] will have suffered irreparable injury.”

Stormans, Inc., 586 F.3d at 1138. 

Defendants do not challenge whether constitutional

violations constitute irreparable injuries. Rather, defendants

argue that Rouser is unlikely to experience irreparable injury

because defendants are already in compliance with most of the

terms of his proposed preliminary injunction. The court need not 9

address the factual dispute between the parties as to defendants’

current compliance with the proposed terms of the preliminary

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injunction. Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that

voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct by a defendant

does not moot a plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief. Friends

of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 189 (2000). Doing so would “leave

the defendant free to return to his old ways.” Id. (internal

quotation omitted). Rather, a case does not become moot by a

defendant’s voluntary cessation of the allegedly illegal conduct

unless the defendant satisfies the “heavy burden of persuading

the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be

expected to start up again . . . .” Id. (internal quotation

omitted). 

While this reasoning concerns mootness, and not whether a

plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction, it is

immediately relevant to defendant’s argument. Specifically,

plaintiff would be entitled to injunctive relief at trial even if

defendants could demonstrate that at the time of trial they were

not infringing the practice of his religion. Here, where the

alleged conduct infringing Rouser’s religious practice extends

through decades, it would be nearly impossible for defendants to

show that their conduct could not be expected to start up again.

This is especially so where the court reopened the case due to

defendants’ alleged failure to comply with the terms of the

settlement agreement. Similarly, because a preliminary injunction

is only awarded where plaintiff has shown that he is likely to

receive such a permanent injunction after trial, the same

reasoning applies. Accordingly, even if Rouser’s religion were

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not currently being infringed by defendants, plaintiff’s claim

for injunctive relief has not become moot because defendants

could resume their conduct at any time. Furthermore, to the

extent that defendant is actually currently in compliance with

the terms of plaintiff’s proposed preliminary injunction,

plaintiff’s burden is merely to show that the voluntary cessation

does not demonstrate assurance of revival of the conduct. 

3. Balance of Hardships and Public Interest.

Defendants do not make any arguments as to the balance of

hardships or the public interest. Suffice to say, the court is

persuaded that the balance of hardship tips sharply in favor of

plaintiff to the extent that he is unable to practice his

religion and allowing inmates to practice religion while

incarcerated is clearly within the public interest in that

Congress specifically passed the RLUIPA to serve such a purpose.

C. Scope of Preliminary Injunction.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) allows courts to

enter an order for preliminary injunctive relief. 18 U.S.C. §

3626(a)(2). This relief, however, “must be narrowly drawn, extend

no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds

requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means

necessary to correct that harm.” Id. Courts are also instructed

to “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public

safety or the operation of a criminal justice system.” Id.

Defendants similarly do not raise any specific concerns with

whether plaintiff’s proposed preliminary injunctive relief

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conforms with PLRA. Nonetheless, it seems to the court that the

relief described below is directly responsive to specific conduct

of defendants, and conforms with these requirements. For example,

plaintiff has provided evidence that defendants have prevented

him from practicing his religion by taking his religious items

and plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendants from taking these items.

Further, because defendants have presented no evidence as to how

any of this narrowly drawn relief would have an adverse impact on

public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system and

because the court is not otherwise aware of the possibility of

this relief causing such an adverse impact, this relief is proper

under the PLRA.

The relief the court grants results from institutional

policies and practices. Specifically, Rouser’s claims concerning

his religious articles are the result of policies and practices

concerning Rouser’s ability to maintain possession of his

religious articles and to obtain new articles. Similarly,

Rouser’s claims concerning his access to group worship, with

respect to location and announcement, result from policies that

prohibit access to a nature-based religious area and a fire pit

at LAC and the administrative difficulties in announcing Wiccan

services because LAC does not have a paid Wiccan chaplain.

To this extent, the court orders the following preliminary

injunctive relief:

(1) that defendants allow Mr. Rouser to keep and maintain

religious texts (including but not limited to A Witches' Bible

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Defendants argue that Rouser is not entitled to this 10

relief because “Rouser did not exhaust his claim for a fire pit

prior to commencing this action.” Opposition at 42. To the extent

that defendants are arguing that Rouser need to have exhausted

his claim for access to a fire pit before he filed his original

complaint, such an argument is not grounded. See Order Denying

Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 501. To the extent that defendants

are arguing that the claim for access to a fire pit was not

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Compleat (the "Wiccan Bible")), to the maximum extent allowed

under CDCR policies and as applied to all inmates; this includes

allowing Mr. Rouser to have his Wiccan Bible while he is in

Administrative Segregation;

(2) that defendants allow Mr. Rouser to obtain the group

Wiccan items prior to Wiccan group services;

(3) that defendants cannot take and/or destroy Mr. Rouser's

approved religious articles; 

(4) that defendants provide a means for Mr. Rouser to order

and receive religious items;

(5) that defendants announce Wiccan services to the same

extent they announce services for the mainstream faiths (i.e.,

Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, and Native American).

(6) that when Wiccan services are scheduled, defendants must

allow Mr. Rouser to access the outdoor, nature-based religious

area at LAC for group services for the entire scheduled time,

unless the Yard is on modified program and no religious group is

allowed to meet that day; and

(7) that defendants grant Mr. Rouser access to the fire pit

adjacent to the Native American sweat lodge during religious

services. The parties represented at the hearing on this motion 10

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exhausted before filing of the Fourth Amended Complaint, the

court notes that G. Duran, Correctional Counselor II, has

declared that Rouser has filed two grievances requesting access

to the fire pit. Declaration of G. Duran, ¶ 6. The first was

filed on March 5, 2009 and the second was filed on April 7, 2009.

Defendants have not made any arguments that these claims were not

properly appealed through the administrative system.

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that practitioners of Native American faiths have access to a

sweat lodge. Outside of this sweat lodge is a area where rocks

are heated by fire to be moved into the sweat lodge. Plaintiff

stated that access to this fire pit would be sufficient.

Defendant stated that it was unsure whether the use of the fire

pit by Rouser would desecrate the site, but presented no evidence

one way or the other on this issue. Based on the evidence before

it, the court holds that Rouser is entitled to use this fire pit

during group services because (1) it is narrowly drawn with

respect to the constitutional violations described above and (2)

defendants have presented no evidence that doing so would have an

adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal

justice system.

The court nonetheless declines to order defendants to

construct an outdoor nature-based religious area, similar to the

outdoor nature-based religious area at PVSP because plaintiff has

not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the naturebased religious area at LAC is insufficient. Rather, plaintiff

has only argued that he has not been allowed to access this area.

The court also declines to grant plaintiff’s request that the

court enjoin defendants from taking unreasonable steps to

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interrupt Mr. Rouser's group services, including but not limited

to blaring Christian music in the direction of Mr. Rouser's group

services or turning on the sprinkler system during Mr. Rouser's

group services because plaintiff has not demonstrated that these

actions were the result of CDCR or LAC policy.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court orders that plaintiff’s

motion for a preliminary injunction, Dkt. No. 425, is GRANTED as

to the relief described above. 

Defendants are hereby ordered as follows,

(1) that defendants allow Mr. Rouser to keep and maintain

religious texts (including but not limited to A

Witches' Bible Compleat (the "Wiccan Bible")), to the

maximum extent allowed under CDCR policies and as

applied to all inmates; this includes allowing Mr.

Rouser to have his Wiccan Bible while he is in

Administrative Segregation;

(2) that defendants allow Mr. Rouser to obtain the group

Wiccan items prior to Wiccan group services;

(3) that defendants cannot take and/or destroy Mr. Rouser's

approved religious articles; 

(4) that defendants provide a means for Mr. Rouser to order

and receive religious items;

(5) that defendants announce Wiccan services to the same

extent they announce services for the main stream

faiths (i.e., Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, and

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Native American).

(6) that when Wiccan services are scheduled, defendants

must allow Mr. Rouser to access the outdoor,

nature-based religious area for group services for the

entire scheduled time, unless the Yard is on modified

program and no religious group is allowed to meet that

day; and

(7) that defendants grant Mr. Rouser access to the fire pit

adjacent to the Native American sweat lodge during

religious services.

The court further orders that plaintiff shall not be

required to post bond.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 15, 2010.

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