Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-00287/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-00287-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 368
Nature of Suit: Asbestos Personal Injury - Prod.liab.
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Asbestos Litigation

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AVERY FONG, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B*P),

et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C10-0287 TEH

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

TO REMAND

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. After carefully

reviewing the parties’ written arguments, the Court finds oral argument to be unnecessary

and now GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

Sherman Fong filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California for the County of

San Francisco on August 21, 2009, alleging asbestos-related injuries against various

defendants, including Defendant Metalclad Insulation Corporation. Mr. Fong alleges that he

was exposed to asbestos while working as a shipfitter at Mare Island Naval Shipyard from

1956 to 1986. Metalclad’s alleged liability stems from its involvement in brokering shipment

of Unibestos thermal insulation from Pittsburgh Corning Corporation to Mare Island. It is

undisputed that Unibestos, which was used in the nuclear reactor compartments of four

submarines on which Mr. Fong worked, contained asbestos.

Mr. Fong passed away in September 2009, and Plaintiffs Avery Fong, Sing Yee Fong,

Connie Wong, and Arlene Young subsequently filed an amended complaint for survival and

wrongful death. The amended complaint identifies Avery Fong as Sherman Fong’s

Case 3:10-cv-00287-TEH Document 20 Filed 04/15/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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successor-in-interest and the other three Plaintiffs as Sherman Fong’s siblings and legal heirs. 

The summons on the amended complaint was issued on December 30, 2009.

Metalclad timely removed the case to this Court on January 21, 2010, under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1442(a)(1). Plaintiffs now seek remand back to state court.

DISCUSSION

The federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), provides for removal of a

state action to federal court by “[t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or

any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an

official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office.” A party seeking

removal under this section “must demonstrate that (a) it is a ‘person’ within the meaning of

the statute; (b) there is a causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to a federal

officer’s directions, and plaintiff’s claims; and (c) it can assert a ‘colorable federal defense.’” 

Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Jefferson

County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 124-25,

131-35 (1989)). Although removal statutes are generally to be construed strictly, “when

federal officers and their agents are seeking a federal forum, we are to interpret section 1442

broadly in favor of removal.” Id. at 1252. Thus, for example, the asserted federal defense

need only be “colorable” and not “clearly sustainable . . . . The officer need not win his case

before he can have it removed.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969).

Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Metalclad has failed

to raise a colorable federal defense to Plaintiffs’ claims. Metalclad relies on the government

contractor defense, which “immunizes contractors who supply military equipment to the

Government from the duties imposed by state tort law.” In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases,

960 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1992). This defense can be invoked “when (1) the United States

approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those

specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of

the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.” Boyle v. United

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). However, “[w]here the goods ordered by the

military are those readily available, in substantially similar form, to commercial users, the

military contractor defense does not apply.” In re Hawaii, 960 F.2d at 811.

Based on the same evidence presented in this case, another court in this district

recently concluded that:

At most, Metalclad demonstrates that the Unibestos was subject

to testing by the United States Navy and that the Navy approved

Unibestos as a material to be used. In fact, the witness Metalclad

relies on to demonstrate that the Unibestos qualifies as “military

equipment,” Dan H. Helfin [sic], Jr. (“Heflin”), testified that he

does not know whether the Unibestos brokered to the military

was altered, manipulated or redesigned in any way. Heflin said

that he did not know what physical differences there were, that he

did not know what made it a special run of Unibestos, and that he

did not know if [it] was manufactured differently than any other

Unibestos made by Pittsburgh Corning. He further testified that

he has no knowledge regarding whether or not the exact kind of

Unibestos brokered by Metalclad for use on the submarines was

sold to the private sector. Moreover, Donald Trueblood, the

person Metalclad offered at the deposition of the “person most

knowledgeable,” testified that he could not say that there were

any changes in the formulation of the Unibestos that was used on

the four submarines Plaintiff worked on, as opposed to the

Unibestos available to the general public.

Delahaye v. Asbestos Defs., Case No. C09-5504 JSW, 2010 WL 366611, at *3 (N.D.

Cal. Jan. 25, 2010) (citations omitted). Consequently, the court found “that Metalclad has

not met its burden to demonstrate a colorable federal defense” and remanded the case to the

state court from which it was removed. Id. at *4.

Metalclad failed to distinguish – or even cite – Delahaye, and this Court finds no basis

for distinguishing that case or departing from that court’s reasoning. Accordingly, the Court

finds that Metalclad’s removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) was improper because

Metalclad has not demonstrated that it has a colorable federal defense to Plaintiffs’ claims.

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Case 3:10-cv-00287-TEH Document 20 Filed 04/15/10 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is GRANTED. The

hearing scheduled for April 26, 2010, is VACATED. This matter is hereby remanded

forthwith to the Superior Court of California for the County of San Francisco. The Clerk

shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 04/15/10 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:10-cv-00287-TEH Document 20 Filed 04/15/10 Page 4 of 4