Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05401/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05401-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 14, 2008 Decided July 10, 2009 

No. 07-5401 

RUBY TAYLOR, 

APPELLANT

v. 

HILDA L. SOLIS, SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 03cv01761) 

Richard L. Swick argued the cause for appellant. On the 

briefs were David H. Shapiro and Alana M. Hecht. 

Kenneth Adebonojo, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney, and Judith R. Starr, Counsel, Pension Benefit 

Guaranty Corporation. 

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG. 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 1 of 35
2 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS. 

 GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Ruby Taylor, an AfricanAmerican woman, sued her employer, the Pension Benefit 

Guaranty Corporation, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964, claiming her supervisors sexually harassed her to the 

point of creating a hostile work environment and, when she 

complained, retaliated against her. The district court granted 

summary judgment to the Corporation because it concluded, 

as a matter of law, (1) the employer had an affirmative 

defense to Taylor’s claim of sexual harassment and, (2) with 

regard to retaliation, Taylor (a) had not offered a prima facie 

showing that her protected activity caused most of the alleged 

acts of retaliation, (b) had failed to show one such act was a 

materially adverse action, and (c) had failed to rebut the 

Corporation’s nondiscriminatory explanation of another. We 

affirm, holding as a matter of law that the PBGC has an 

affirmative defense to the claim of sexual harassment and that 

Taylor has failed to meet her burden regarding the claim of 

retaliation. 

I. Background 

 We accept as true the evidence offered by, and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of, Taylor, who at all relevant 

times was an auditor in the Pre-Termination Process Division 

(PPD) of the PBGC.*

 Taylor’s direct supervisor was Jonathan 

Henkel, who oversaw all the auditors in the PPD. Robert 

Bacon oversaw all the financial analysts in the PPD. Bacon 

and Henkel reported to Robert Joy, the manager of the PPD, 

 

*

 The PBGC is a nonprofit corporation “established within the 

Department of Labor,” 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a), and the Secretary of 

Labor is the Chairman of its Board of Directors, id. § 1302(d). 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 2 of 35
3 

who reported to Bennie Hagans, Director of the Insurance 

Operations Department (IOD). 

 The Corporation’s policy against sexual harassment 

directs employees who believe they have been sexually 

harassed “immediately [to] contact an EEO Counselor or the 

EEO Manager,” who is to investigate the charge of 

harassment and, if warranted, implement an appropriate 

remedy. The policy also states the “PBGC’s managers and 

supervisors have a particular responsibility for providing a 

work environment free of ... sexual harassment.” 

 Taylor alleges her supervisors created a sexually charged 

atmosphere at the PPD. Henkel, Joy, and Hagans 

occasionally flirted with female employees, but particularly 

offensive to Taylor was a summer 2001 scavenger hunt, 

undertaken as a “team building exercise,” during which, in 

order to earn points for a “wow,” a female coworker produced 

a yellow brassiere from her gym bag, and a male coworker 

asked Taylor, who had red hair, if her hair was red “all over.” 

Bacon and Henkel awarded Taylor’s team bonus points for 

what Henkel referred to as this “embarrassing moment.” 

 According to Taylor, Bacon began in 2001 to engage in 

frequent acts of harassment. Although Taylor and Bacon had 

been running partners for nearly a year, Taylor stopped 

running with him in the summer of 2001 because she felt he 

had overstepped the bounds of a professional relationship. In 

October Bacon told Taylor he could persuade Henkel to give 

her a good performance evaluation. When Henkel did so, 

Bacon asked her, “what are you going to do for me?” Around 

the same time, Taylor posted on her office door an October 2, 

2001 e-mail detailing the Corporation’s policy concerning 

sexual harassment. In or before November Bacon began 

intimating Taylor was not in love with her fiancé, saying he 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 3 of 35
4 

could beat him up. Taylor confided in her friend, David 

Smith, a team leader in the IOD, that she felt harassed; he did 

not advise her to go to the EEO Counselor, nor did he do so 

himself. 

Also in 2001 Taylor confronted Bacon and threatened to 

report him if he did not stop sexually harassing her. Bacon 

said that because he was a “nice guy,” everyone “would think 

... [she was] the problem.” On April 3, 2002 Bacon saw 

Taylor in the hall and, referring to her uncovered arms, said, 

“I see you flaunting that black.” The next day, when Bacon 

entered her office, Taylor kept her back to him; Bacon asked 

repeatedly, “what did I tell you about turning your back to me 

when I’m talking to you,” which Taylor ascribed to a desire 

on his part to “see my legs or chest.” A day later Bacon, 

finding Taylor alone in the copy room, walked toward her 

with his hands raised as if, in her view, he was preparing to 

choke her. When she protested, he did not touch her, but he 

called her “baby” and said he would touch her if he wanted. 

 Taylor reported Bacon’s conduct on April 9, 2002. She 

first filed a complaint with the PBGC’s internal investigator, 

who did not find a violation of the Corporation’s policy. 

When her complaint to the EEO office had proved unavailing, 

she brought this suit in the district court on August 19, 2003. 

 Taylor alleges her supervisors retaliated against her in 

response to her complaint and her lawsuit. In 2002 Hagans 

criticized her “negative behaviors.” Joy and Henkel, who had 

evaluated her job performance as “Outstanding” in 2001, 

rated her work “Excellent” in 2002 and “Fully Effective” in 

2003, and in the third quarter of 2003 required her to submit 

biweekly reports of her progress on pending cases. In 

November 2003, after Taylor had submitted a confusing 

request for leave, Henkel, at the direction of the Human 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 4 of 35
5 

Resources Department, listed Taylor as AWOL. (The listing 

was later rescinded and Taylor received back pay.) Finally, in 

2004 Joy refused to recommend Taylor for a new position the 

PBGC considered creating but ultimately did not create. 

Taylor filed a second EEO complaint on February 5, 2004 

and a second lawsuit on April 22, 2005, claiming continued 

harassment and retaliation. 

 The district court consolidated Taylor’s lawsuits and 

granted the PBGC’s motion for summary judgment. See 

Taylor v. Chao, 516 F. Supp. 2d 128, 130 (2007). With 

respect to Taylor’s claim of sexual harassment, the court held 

the Corporation’s anti-harassment policy and complaint 

procedure together with Taylor’s delay in reporting Bacon 

provided, as a matter of law, an affirmative defense. Id. at 

134–35. In the alternative, the court held Taylor had not 

shown a reasonable jury could find her supervisors’ conduct 

created a hostile environment. Id. at 135–37. As for 

retaliation, the court concluded, with respect to most of 

Taylor’s claims, she had not produced prima facie evidence 

showing her filing the April 2002 complaint caused her 

supervisors to retaliate against her. Id. at 138. The court also 

held Hagans’s criticism of Taylor’s “negative behaviors” was 

not a “materially adverse act.” Id. at 137–38. Finally, the 

court held Taylor had made out a prima facie case of 

retaliation with respect to the performance evaluation she 

received in 2002 but had failed to rebut the PBGC’s 

legitimate explanation for that evaluation. Id. at 138–39. 

II. Analysis 

 We review the judgment of the district court de novo. 

See Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 

929 (D.C. Cir. 2008). We begin with Taylor’s claim of 

sexual harassment and then turn to her claim of retaliation. 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 5 of 35
6 

A. Sexual Harassment 

 Title VII provides: “All personnel actions affecting 

employees ... in executive agencies ... shall be made free from 

any discrimination based on ... sex,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), 

and thus makes it unlawful for a supervisor in a covered 

federal agency to create a hostile environment based upon an 

employee’s sex. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944–46 

(D.C. Cir. 1981). Sexual harassment creates a hostile 

environment only if it is so “severe or pervasive [as] to alter 

the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an 

abusive working environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 

477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). The employer has an affirmative 

defense to a hostile environment claim if (1) the employer 

“exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 

any sexually harassing behavior” and (2) “the plaintiff 

employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 

preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 

employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Faragher v. City of 

Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); see also Burlington 

Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 

The PBGC argues Taylor was not subjected to a hostile 

work environment and, in any event, the district court 

correctly held the employer had an affirmative defense 

because Taylor unreasonably failed to use its complaint 

procedure. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (“any unreasonable 

failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the 

employer ... will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s 

burden”). Taylor does not challenge the adequacy of the 

Corporation’s procedure. Therefore, the PBGC may avoid 

liability if it shows “that, as a matter of law, a reasonable 

person in [Taylor’s] place would have come forward early 

enough to prevent [the] harassment from becoming ‘severe or 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 6 of 35
7 

pervasive.’” Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 

1999). 

We agree with the district court and the PBGC that a 

reasonable employee in Taylor’s position would have come 

forward in October or November 2001, when Taylor instead 

posted the PBGC’s sexual harassment policy on her office 

door and told her friend Smith that Bacon had been sexually 

harassing her. A reasonable employee who believes and tells 

others she is being sexually harassed would report it if she 

knows — as Taylor should have and apparently did know — 

a complaint procedure has been established for that purpose.*

 

When Taylor finally did report Bacon’s conduct in April 

2002, the PBGC duly investigated and, even though it did not 

find harassment, see Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 

428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (occasional vulgar banter not sexual 

harassment), the sort of conduct about which Taylor had 

complained did not recur. 

Taylor argues she effectively notified the PBGC’s 

management of her complaint in the fall of 2001 when she 

confided in her friend Smith. Taylor, however, could not 

reasonably have believed talking to Smith was a substitute for 

using the agency’s complaint procedure. Although Smith, as 

 

*

 The dissent deems it “irrelevant” “[w]hether Taylor herself 

believed she was being sexually harassed,” Dissenting op. at 9, and 

suggests the court is “placing a more stringent reporting 

requirement on a more sensitive plaintiff,” id. at 8. A plaintiff who 

knows about her employer’s complaint procedure and fails to use it 

even as she tells a manager she is being harassed runs head long 

into the prophylactic rule announced in Faragher, which was not 

designed to protect sensitive employees, but rather to encourage all 

employees to “avoid[] harm” when doing so is possible, and to 

ensure a plaintiff is not “reward[ed] ... for what her own efforts 

could have avoided.” 524 U.S. at 806–07. 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 7 of 35
8 

a member of management, may have had, as the policy states, 

a “particular responsibility” to address workplace 

discrimination, he was neither Bacon’s supervisor nor an 

EEO officer. The policy expressly required Taylor, if she 

believed she was being harassed, “immediately [to] contact an 

EEO Counselor or the EEO Manager.” Having ignored the 

complaint procedure, Taylor cannot now complain that Smith 

should have filed a formal complaint on her behalf or himself 

reprimanded Bacon, who did not report to him. 

Taylor also argues her report to Smith was sufficient in 

the light of Bundy, in which we held an employer vicariously 

liable for its supervisors’ harassment of a subordinate. In 

Bundy, however, the employer, unlike the PBGC, had not 

established a sexual harassment policy with a complaint 

procedure. See 641 F.2d at 943, 947–48. 

 Taylor argues in the alternative that her delay in filing a 

complaint, from the fall of 2001 to April 2002, was not 

unreasonable. But, as the PBGC points out, an employee has 

a “prompt reporting duty under the prophylactic rules” 

approved in Faragher, and five or six months is “anything but 

prompt.” Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 

1287, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2007) (three months and two weeks 

held an unreasonable delay). In reply Taylor notes a failure to 

complain may be reasonable in unusual circumstances, such 

as a “genuine [and] reasonable .... fear of retaliation.” Adams 

v. O’Reilly Auto., Inc., 538 F.3d 926, 932–33 (8th Cir. 2008) 

(“fear of retaliation” generally not an excuse for failing to 

report sexual harassment); see also Roebuck v. Washington, 

408 F.3d 790, 795 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“fear and uncertainty” 

about scope of employer’s policy may in certain 

circumstances make employee’s “delay in complaining 

reasonable”). 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 8 of 35
9 

 Taylor suggests various “factors” show her delay was 

reasonable but only one warrants mention. According to 

Taylor’s first EEO complaint, Bacon told her in 2001 “no one 

would believe” her if she reported him; “they would think ... 

[she was] the problem.” A reasonable jury could not find 

Taylor was reasonably deterred by Bacon’s statement. Bacon 

did not threaten Taylor with an adverse employment action 

and, indeed, he could not have done because he was not her 

supervisor and did not have the authority to evaluate her 

performance or to take any action against her. In fact, Bacon 

had no leverage at all with which to intimidate Taylor — 

apart from his assertion that those in authority would believe 

him and not her. And that is not enough to establish a 

credible fear of retaliation. See Barrett v. Applied Radiant 

Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting as 

“speculative” and “generalized” employee’s fear of retaliation 

based upon alleged friendship between president of 

corporation and alleged harasser, her supervisor); id. at 268 

(rejecting view that “friendships should relieve an employee 

of her reporting obligation and effectively impose automatic 

liability on the employer”). Because “failure [would have 

been] the only cost” to Taylor of reporting Bacon in the fall of 

2001, see Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 

2003); see also Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., 347 

F.3d 1272, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2003) (absent credible threat 

of retaliation, subjective fear of reprisal not an excuse for 

failure to report), no reasonable jury could find Taylor 

reasonably waited five or six months before reporting what 

she believed was sexual harassment.*

 We therefore affirm the 

 

* Roebuck, which involved repeated harassment by and a threat 

from the employee’s supervisor, is not to the contrary. See 408 

F.3d at 791–92; Dissenting op. at 3 (noting that employee in 

Roebuck “alleged her supervisor ... had sexually harassed her”). 

Bacon had no supervisory authority over Taylor. In Roebuck, 

moreover, the question was whether “fear and uncertainty made 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 9 of 35
10 

district court’s judgment with respect to Taylor’s first cause 

of action. 

B. Retaliation 

 Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to 

discriminate against any of [its] employees ... because [she] 

has made a charge ... or participated in any manner in an 

investigation” of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see 

Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(“general ban on retaliation in § 2000e-3(a)” applies to 

federal employers through § 2000e-16). In order to prevail 

upon a claim of unlawful retaliation, an employee must show 

“she engaged in protected activity, as a consequence of which 

her employer took a materially adverse action against her.” 

Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2007). A 

materially adverse action is one that “could well dissuade a 

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 

discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 

548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006); see Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219. The 

district court held Taylor had failed to show that her filing the 

April 2002 complaint had been the cause of four of the 

 

[the employee’s] delay in complaining reasonable” under the 

circumstances. 408 F.3d at 795. The dissent suggests Taylor may 

reasonably have been uncertain whether Bacon’s conduct violated 

the PBGC’s policy because the policy “defined sexual harassment 

in objective terms.” Dissenting op. at 7. Taylor, however, was not 

at all uncertain; she believed and told others she was being 

harassed. Nor could a reasonable jury find Taylor was uncertain 

about what the PBGC’s policy required of her: As Taylor 

acknowledged in both her EEO complaint and an affidavit, in 

October 2001 she posted on her door a PBGC e-mail that stated 

“[i]f you believe that you are a victim or witness to workplace 

harassment, please report it immediately to an EEO Official or 

Counselor.” 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 10 of 35
11 

reprisals she alleged, had failed to show material adversity 

with respect to one, and had failed to rebut the PBGC’s 

nondiscriminatory explanation of another.* See Taylor, 516 

F. Supp. 2d at 138–39. We affirm the district court on the 

ground that five of the six alleged reprisals were not 

materially adverse actions and Taylor cannot show the sixth 

was retaliatory.**

First. Hagans criticized Taylor for exhibiting “negative 

behaviors.” The district court held, and we agree, that 

Hagans’s criticism was not a materially adverse action. See 

 

*

 Retaliation claims based upon circumstantial evidence are 

governed by the three-step test of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which requires the employee first to 

establish prima facie the elements of retaliation. See Wiley v. 

Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2007). If the plaintiff does 

so, then the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. If the employer does 

so, then the court “need not — and should not — decide whether 

the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell 

Douglas,” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (disparate treatment claim); Jones v. Bernanke, 

557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (retaliation claim); rather, the 

court should proceed to the question of retaliation vel non. The 

court can resolve that question in favor of the employer based 

either upon the employee’s failure to rebut its explanation or upon 

the employee’s failure to prove an element of her case — here that

her employer took a materially adverse action against her. 

** A circuit court is “justified in resolving an issue not passed on 

below ... where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt.” 

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976); see Jones, 557 F.3d at 

676 (“we may affirm a judgment on any ground the record 

supports,” provided “the opposing party had a ‘fair opportunity’ to 

address” that ground). Taylor, who had the burden of proof, had 

such an opportunity and took it; she engaged in extensive discovery 

aimed at proving retaliation. 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 11 of 35
12 

id. at 138; see also Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68 

(“petty slights [and] minor annoyances” would not deter 

reasonable employee from making charge of discrimination). 

 

 Second. Henkel and Joy slowed the processing of 

Taylor’s cases after she filed her complaint and Joy and 

Henkel required her (as they had some other auditors) to 

submit biweekly reports on the status of her work. Such 

minor “inconveniences and alteration of job responsibilities 

[do] not rise to the level of adverse action” necessary to 

support a claim. Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1135 (D.C. 

Cir. 2002); see Wiley, 511 F.3d at 161 (change in workload a 

trivial harm); cf. Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 897 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006) (“We have consistently declined to serve as a 

‘super-personnel department’”); accord Dale v. Chicago 

Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986). 

Third. Joy did not recommend Taylor for a position the 

PBGC was considering creating but ultimately did not create. 

Although a refusal to promote is a materially adverse action, 

see Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2003), 

because there was no position to which she might have been 

promoted, Taylor was not denied a tangible opportunity to 

advance her career. Cf. Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 

1191, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“evaluations and written 

warnings were not adverse actions because none had ‘tangible 

job consequences’” (construing Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 

F.3d 640, 648 (7th Cir. 2005))); Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 

446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (plaintiff must show “reasonable 

trier of fact could conclude [she] has suffered objectively 

tangible harm”). In any event, Joy’s non-recommendation for 

a hypothetical position would not have dissuaded a reasonable 

employee from coming forward. 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 12 of 35
13 

Fourth and fifth. Taylor’s supervisors twice lowered her 

performance evaluation — from “Outstanding” in 2001, to 

“Excellent” in 2002, and to “Fully Effective” in 2003. In 

order for a performance evaluation to be materially adverse, it 

must affect the employee’s “position, grade level, salary, or 

promotion opportunities.” See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199. 

Taylor’s bare, conclusory allegation that she was denied 

promotional and bonus opportunities “[a]s a result of PBGC’s 

unlawful conduct in violating Title VII’s prohibition against 

retaliation” does not discharge her burden to show the 

evaluations were “attached to financial harms.” Id. 

Sixth. Taylor was temporarily listed as AWOL in the 

first or second week of November 2003. Although the PBGC 

ultimately rescinded the listing and gave Taylor her lost pay, 

the temporary deprivation of wages counts as a materially 

adverse action. See Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1317 

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“diminution in pay or benefits can [be 

adverse] even when the employer later provides back pay”). 

 The Corporation offered a nondiscriminatory reason for 

the challenged action: The Human Resources Department 

directed Henkel to list Taylor as AWOL because the leave 

slip she submitted appeared to indicate Taylor had not 

obtained Henkel’s prior approval, as all auditors were 

required to do. After Taylor had returned to work and the 

confusion was eventually dispelled, the AWOL charge was 

rescinded and Taylor’s pay restored. We therefore move to 

the question of retaliation vel non, see Jones, 557 F.3d at 678, 

which in this instance reduces to whether a reasonable jury 

could find the Corporation’s “proffered explanation is 

unworthy of credence,” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 13 of 35
14 

 Taylor rebuts the PBGC’s explanation by asserting she 

contacted Henkel regarding her request for annual leave 

before she left the leave slip in his in-box. Although Henkel 

denies having given Taylor oral approval, we assume a 

reasonable jury could credit Taylor’s account. Her account, 

however, does nothing to undermine the PBGC’s explanation 

because in her opposition to the motion for summary 

judgment she acknowledged she erred in completing the 

request form by “mistakenly check[ing] the ‘sick leave’ box” 

but entering the dates in the area for annual leave. Henkel 

therefore asked Human Resources for direction and merely 

implemented their decision.*

 Once the confusion, which 

Taylor herself had created, was cleared up, her record was 

corrected and her pay was restored. Therefore, no reasonable 

jury could infer the PBGC retaliated against Taylor when it 

treated her as having taken leave without permission. See 

Greer, 505 F.3d at 1319–20. 

 Taylor’s remaining arguments on this score are even 

further off the mark, but two do deserve mention. First, on 

appeal Taylor newly points out that the PBGC placed her on 

AWOL in November 2003, two and one-half months after she 

filed her first lawsuit; hence, she argues, “there is sufficient 

temporal proximity for a reasonable jury to find” the 

Corporation was retaliating against her.** On the contrary, an 

 

*

 Although, as the dissent notes (at n.6), it appears from the face of 

the leave slip that Henkel first approved Taylor’s request, he 

explained that as a matter of course he signed such slips when he 

received them. His change of position is consistent with the 

PBGC’s explanation that Henkel, confused by Taylor’s error in 

completing the slip, requested guidance from Human Resources. 

** Taylor offers this argument to show she made out a prima facie

case but, because she wants this case remanded to the district court 

for a trial on the merits, we take her argument as equally applicable 

to the issue before us.

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 14 of 35
15 

inference of retaliatory motive based upon the “mere 

proximity” in time between Taylor’s filing her first suit and 

the AWOL listing two and one-half months later would be 

untenable on the record here. See Woodruff v. Peters, 482 

F.3d 521, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“positive evidence beyond 

mere proximity is required to defeat the presumption that the 

proffered explanations are genuine”); Bilow v. Much Shelist 

Freed Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C., 277 F.3d 882, 

895 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting argument that “two-month 

period between [protected activity] and [employee’s] 

discharge establishes a ‘causal connection’ between the two 

events” when employee had not pointed to other 

circumstances suggesting events were related); see also Clark 

County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) 

(stating, “to establish a prima facie case ... the temporal 

proximity must be ‘very close,’” and citing with approval 

case holding three month interval is, as a matter of law, not 

close enough); Kipp v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 280 

F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding employee failed to 

make out “causal link” required for prima facie case of 

retaliation because two months between protected activity and 

challenged action could not, as a matter of law, “justify a 

finding in [her] favor”). 

 Second, Taylor argues the jury could infer either Henkel 

or the Human Resources Department or both retaliated 

against her because on more than one occasion after she filed 

her EEO complaint Henkel criticized her work and yelled at 

her and because her coworkers somehow learned she had 

been listed as AWOL. These incidents do not amount to the 

“pattern of antagonism” required for a reasonable jury to infer 

Henkel, much less Human Resources, was retaliating against 

Taylor. Cf. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920–

21 (3d Cir. 1997) (“plaintiff can establish a link between his 

or her protected behavior and [the alleged reprisal] if the 

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 15 of 35
16 

employer engaged in a pattern of antagonism in the 

intervening period”). The petty slights she describes, which 

would not qualify as adverse actions, see Burlington 

Northern, 548 U.S. at 68, likewise do not suffice to make out 

a case of retaliation, see id. (“Title VII ... does not set forth ‘a 

general civility code for the American workplace’” (quoting 

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 

(1998))).*

 In sum, the PBGC was entitled to summary 

judgment because Taylor has not provided a reasonable jury 

any basis upon which to disbelieve the PBGC’s explanation 

of the AWOL incident. 

III. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is 

Affirmed. 

 

*

 Contrary to the suggestion that Taylor suffered retaliation by “a 

thousand cuts,” Dissenting op. at 17, there is no such pattern of 

abuse here. The dissent merely assumes allegedly retaliatory acts 

were in fact retaliatory. Id. at 13–14, 17–18. Nor does the dissent 

explain how trivial actions on the part of Joy and Henkel could 

support a reasonable inference that the Human Resources 

Department acted with a retaliatory motive. Id. at 17–18.

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 16 of 35
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Because a reasonable

jury could find in appellant Ruby Taylor’s favor, I would

reverse the grant of summary judgment. This is clear but for the

court’s failure in three instances to apply the correct legal

standards.

I.

Upon review of the grant of summary judgment, it is not the

role of the court to evaluate and weigh the proffered evidence.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

Instead, this court must view the evidence before the district

court in the light most favorable to the non-moving party —

here, Taylor — and must accord her the benefit of all reasonable

inferences. Id. at 255; Salazar v. Washington Metro. Transit

Auth., 401 F.3d 504, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Yet the court has

done the opposite, presenting the evidence in the light most

unfavorable to Taylor and denying her the benefit of the

reasonable inferences to which she is entitled. How else could

the court conclude, for instance, that Taylor was the cause of the

temporary denial of a week’s pay when she proffered evidence

that she had cleared her leave from work with her supervisor in

advance, that she had successfully requested leave in a similar

fashion on prior occasions, and that her supervisor remembered

approving the leave request? This example is only one of

several that demonstrates the manner in which applying the

wrong standard of review infects the court’s analysis. 

Applying the correct standard of review, the evidence

shows that Taylor had been an auditor for approximately ten

years and had received an outstanding performance evaluation

in 2001. In a nutshell, she proffered evidence that she had been

subject to casual sexual harassment by Robert Bacon beginning

in the fall of 2001, that she was not fully informed of her options

under her employer’s sexual harassment procedures, that her

harasser used his supervisory authority to intimidate her by

suggesting that if she formally complained about his harassment

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 17 of 35
2

she would be punished and not him, that she complained to a

member of management, David Smith, who did not recommend

she report the harassment to anyone else, and that when the

harassment intensified in the winter of 2001-02 to the point of

becoming physically threatening, she filed a formal complaint

in April 2002, as her employer’s policy contemplated. Her fear

that her supervisors would retaliate if she filed a formal

complaint was realized soon thereafter. For example, Robert

Joy, the manager of the Pre-termination Process Division in

which Taylor worked, refused to recommend her for a job with

another supervisor and told her harasser she had lied. Bennie

Hagans, the head of the Insurance Operations Department and

Joy’s superior, warned her about her “negative behaviors.” Her

immediate supervisor, Jonathan Henkel, required for the first

time that she submit biweekly reports of her progress on pending

cases, which since she filed her complaint had consisted of less

desirable, low priority cases. Her work was reviewed more

slowly, even though her performance evaluations turned on

productivity, with the result that she was downgraded from

“outstanding” to “excellent” in 2002 and further downgraded to

“fully effective” in 2003. Then, a mere two and one half months

after she filed a complaint in the district court, she was denied

a week’s pay for an unknown period of time when Henkel

placed on absent without leave (“AWOL”) status, even though

she had obtained leave permission from him in advance and he

recalled approving it. Taylor filed a second complaint in

February 2004.

Viewing this evidence in the aggregate and according

Taylor favorable inferences, a reasonable jury could find she

proved hostile environment sex discrimination and retaliation.

For purposes of surviving summary judgment, she has overcome

the two hurdles that the court identifies.

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 18 of 35
3

1

 In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), the

Supreme Court held that employers have an affirmative defense

against actionable hostile environment claims when no tangible

employment action is taken against the employee-plaintiff. The

defense has two necessary elements: (1) “the employer exercised

reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing

behavior,” and (2) “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take

advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by

the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807;

see Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).

II.

Delay in reporting sexual harassment. On the question

whether Taylor’s sexual harassment claims are barred because

of her delay in filing a formal complaint, this court held in

Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999), that an

employer is not entitled to summary judgment under the second

element of a Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense1 unless it

shows that, “as a matter of law, a reasonable person in [the

employee’s] place would have come forward early enough to

prevent [the] harassment from becoming ‘severe or pervasive,’”

id. at 675. This is an objective standard, and a genuine issue of

material fact remains as to whether a reasonable person in

Taylor’s position would have reported any occurrences prior to

the April 5, 2002 copy room incident. Contrary to binding

precedent, however, the court converts this objective standard

into one that is subjective, Op. at 7, and so errs. See LaShawn

A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). 

Roebuck v. Washington, 408 F.3d 790 (D.C. Cir. 2005), is

instructive in demonstrating there is a material issue of disputed

fact. There, Linda Roebuck, an administrative assistant in the

D.C. Department of Corrections, alleged her supervisor Mr.

Corbett had sexually harassed her, id. at 791. Roebuck

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 19 of 35
4

presented evidence that Corbett had sexually harassed her “off

and on,” id., for almost two years beginning in 1995, id. When

he was promoted to Deputy Warden in August 1997, he

requested Roebuck’s transfer to his office and “resumed

harassing her.” Id. During October 1997 through January of the

following year, his harassment intensified. For example, he left

a note reading “Sexy” on a stack of her work assignments, made

suggestive hand gestures, and several times tried to kiss her. Id.

at 791-92. The final straw came on January 16, when Corbett

called Roebuck into his office, where he had “bedroom music”

playing, and simply stared at her, saying nothing. Id. at 792.

When Roebuck asked what he wanted, he just kept staring. Id.

Roebuck left, but Corbett immediately called her back and

resumed his silent staring. Id. On January 21, Roebuck

formally complained to a lieutenant that Corbett was sexually

harassing her. Id. The jury rejected her claims against her

employer, finding that two years was an unreasonable amount

of time to wait to file a complaint. Id.. Although this court

affirmed, it concluded that “[u]pon this record, a reasonable

jury certainly could have found in Roebuck’s favor.” Id. at 796

(emphasis added). Cf. Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505 (5th

Cir. 1999).

Assuming the truth of the statements proffered by Taylor,

see Greene, 164 F.3d at 674, and granting her all favorable

inferences from her evidence, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255,

Taylor’s case bears a striking resemblance to the escalating

harassment in Roebuck, and a reasonable jury “could certainly

[find]” in Taylor’s favor, concluding that a reasonable person in

her position would not have reported Bacon’s conduct prior to

April 2002, when his harassment intensified and assumed a

more dangerous and threatening character than it had before.

The “off and on” 2001 incidents were fleeting and resembled the

“simple teasing” and “offhand comments” that do not amount to

actionable harassment, Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, and a jury

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 20 of 35
5

might well find a reasonable person would not report them. The

April incidents, by contrast, were more explicit and physically

charged, centering on Taylor’s physical appearance, and

occurred on consecutive days. On April 3, Bacon told Taylor

that she was “flaunting that black,” referring to her exposed

arms. On April 4, when she turned her head but not her body to

acknowledge him as he came into her office, he motioned with

his hand that she should turn around. After she refused , he kept

motioning with his hand that she should turn around, saying,

“What did I tell you about turning your back to me? You’d

better turn around when I’m talking to you.” Taylor averred that

“this was the entire conversation,” and that he wanted her to turn

around so that he could see her chest and legs. On April 5, the

two met in the copy room, at which point Bacon approached her

with his hands raised as if he were going to choke her. When

she told him not to touch her, he said, “I’ll touch you if I want

to. I can do what I want to.” During that incident, he also called

her “baby” and told her to “go ahead [and report him]. Go tell

Robert [Bacon’s supervisor]. He won’t do anything. He likes

me too much.” Taylor formally reported this behavior on April

9.

This increasingly physical and aggressive series of April

incidents stand in stark contrast to prior incidents — the most

serious of which were the “red all over” comment made, not by

Bacon, but by Taylor’s coworker whom Bacon awarded with

bonus points for the “embarrassing” moment, and Bacon’s

inquiry after she received an outstanding performance

evaluation about what was she going to do for him. Other

incidents were on the level of Bacon mentioning to Taylor that

he wanted to be “her friend” or that she did not actually love her

fiancé and that he could “beat him,” conduct that could be

described as casual “off and on” harassment, Roebuck, 408 F.3d

at 791. Furthermore, the challenged events lasted, at most,

seven months until Taylor formally reported them, as opposed

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 21 of 35
6

2

 The court makes no attempt to explain how Bacon’s conduct

prior to April 2002 differs from the “off and on” harassment that

Roebuck endured before Corbett’s harassment escalated and she filed

a formal complaint. Although it attempts to distinguish Roebuck on

the ground that “the question [there] was whether ‘fear and uncertainty

made [the employee’s] delay in complaining reasonable,’” Op. at 9-

10 n.* (quoting Roebuck, 408 F.3d at 795) (second alteration in

original), Roebuck’s supervisor threatened retaliation less than a

month before she complained in January 1998, and her uncertainty

about whether the employer’s sexual harassment policy applied to

conduct outside of the workplace extended at most to October of the

previous year. Yet her supervisor had been harassing her “off and on”

for nearly two years prior; “fear and uncertainty” thus came into play

only after a long period of ongoing harassment. The court offers no

reason why Roebuck’s two-year delay in reporting any of this “off and

on” harassment was excusable, see Roebuck, 408 F.3d at 796, while

Taylor’s at most seven month delay is not.

to the two years during which Roebuck endured such harassment

before it intensified and she formally complained.2

Although the lesser “off and on” incidents contribute to the

atmospheric element of a hostile environment sex discrimination

claim, see Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,

115 (2002), a reasonable jury could find they were not yet so

startling or foreboding that a reasonable person in Taylor’s

position would have come forward earlier to prevent Bacon’s

harassment from becoming as severe and pervasive as it became

in April 2002. Her employer’s sexual harassment policy

contemplated that employees would not file formal complaints

until the harassment had become objectively severe, when the

employee “reasonably perceived [such conduct] as creating a

hostile or abusive work environment.” Policy Statement on the

Prevention of Sexual Harassment, PBGC Notice No. 96-11

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 22 of 35
7

3

 The Policy Statement defined “sexual harassment” as:

[v]erbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, including

unwelcome sexual advances and requests for sexual favors

. . . when:

a. submission to such conduct is made explicitly either

a term or condition of an individual’s employment;

b. submission to or rejection of such conduct by an

individual is used as the basis for employment

decisions affecting such individual; or

c. such conduct is reasonably perceived as creating a

hostile or abusive work environment.

Policy Statement on the Prevention of Sexual Harassment, PBGC

Notice No. 96-11 (emphasis added).

(emphasis added).3 In doing so, the employer sought to curb

“sexual harassment” in terms of “unwelcome sexual advances

and requests for sexual favors” that have real work-related

consequences, not casual, unwanted flirtation or trivial slights.

Reviewing Taylor’s proffered evidence, however, the court

errs with respect to the legal standard for determining when,

under Faragher and Greene, an employee must take advantage

of her employer’s corrective procedures. Despite directly

relevant precedent and the employer’s sexual harassment policy

that defined sexual harassment in objective terms, the court

holds, as a matter of law, that Taylor should have reported

Bacon’s harassment in “October or November of 2001” because

“[a] reasonable employee who believes and tells others she is

being sexually harassed would report it.” Op. at 7. This holding

abandons binding precedent by converting what was heretofore

a legally objective inquiry into when an employee should have

reported harassment, Greene, 164 F.3d at 675, into one that is

now subjective. The court accomplishes this conversion by

sleight of hand, recasting Greene’s objective standard in terms

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 23 of 35
8

of the employee’s subjective belief. Yet the purpose of an

objective standard is to provide a frame of reference that

excludes an individual’s subjective belief. Otherwise, an

objective test would be meaningless and, in this type of case,

would have the unintended consequence of placing a more

stringent reporting requirement on a more sensitive plaintiff,

who may believe she is being sexually harassed when, in fact, a

reasonable person would disagree. 

Under the correct legal standard — whether an employee

who reasonably believes she is being sexually harassed would

report it or was unreasonable in not reporting it — it is for a jury

to decide whether Taylor should reasonably have believed she

was being sexually harassed in a manner that required reporting.

On this record, a reasonable jury could find that the fall 2001

incidents were not so startling or foreboding a reasonable person

would have reported them to prevent escalation and/or that the

employer’s objective sexual harassment policy did not cover

Bacon’s pre-April 2002 conduct, which became reportable only

when it escalated from “off and on” comments to physically

aggressive advances. In either instance, Taylor’s decision not to

report earlier would be reasonable. The affidavit of supervisor

David Smith supports both of these inferences, stating that

Taylor became more and more upset with Bacon’s behavior, that

Smith “guess[ed]” Bacon’s behavior began around September

or the fall of 2001, and that “[i]t was a gradual thing. . . . [I]t

gradually over the months, it got to be pretty severe.” Smith Aff.

6-7 (emphasis added). The court’s response, that Taylor

believed she was being harassed in “October or November

2001” because she “posted the [employer’s] sexual harassment

policy on her office door and told her friend Smith that Bacon

had been sexually harassing her,” Op. at 7, is a red herring,

ignoring both the objective tests articulated in Faragher and

Greene as well as the employer’s objective sexual harassment

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 24 of 35
9

4

 The court misreads Taylor’s EEO complaint, Op. at 7, 10

n.*, which does not state that she posted the sexual harassment policy

on her door in response to Bacon’s conduct towards her, but rather —

and only — that she posted it in response to “several incidents with the

PPD management staff that I think are incidents of harassment so that

was my subtle way to say look at this, stop, you are behaving in this

manner, be careful.” EEO Compl. Att. 8. Taylor makes no mention

here whether these “incidents” related to her specifically; at the

summary judgment stage, the court must view the facts in the light

most favorable to her and conclude they did not. 

Moreover, the court fails to acknowledge what the court in

Roebuck presumed, namely the wide gulf between a layperson’s use

of the word “harassment” to try to prevent inquiry into her personal

affairs, and a court’s use of the same word as a term of art to express

a legal conclusion under Faragher and Meritor. For instance, a male

boss who calls a female employee “honey” or “sweetie” may provoke

a response to stop “sexually harassing me” or a complaint to a friend

that she is being “sexually harassed,” but she would be wrong as a

legal matter if she thought such conduct, without more, was actionable

or that the incident merited reporting under the policy of Taylor’s

employer. So too with Taylor’s statements to Bacon in response to

him telling her he “bet [he] could beat [her boyfriend]” or to Smith

when she complained about Bacon’s behavior.

policy, and misdirecting the relevant inquiry.4 Whether Taylor

herself believed she was being sexually harassed is irrelevant

under all applicable standards.

As further evidence on which a jury could base a finding

that Taylor did not unreasonably delay in reporting Bacon’s

conduct, Taylor proffered evidence that Bacon at least twice

threatened retaliation if she complained about him. In addition

to the copy room incident, Bacon had previously told Taylor that

if she “said something, they would think that [she was] the

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 25 of 35
10

problem, not him.” In Roebuck, the court held “whether fear [of

retaliation] and uncertainty [about the scope of the employer’s

policy] made Roebuck’s delay in complaining reasonable was

for the jury to decide.” Roebuck, 408 F.3d at 795. Here too

there is a material issue of fact for the jury to resolve. To avoid

this conclusion the court instead evaluates Taylor’s evidence to

find that Bacon had “no leverage at all with which to intimidate

Taylor” because he was not her supervisor. Op. at 9. But

Taylor proffered undisputed evidence that Bacon had told her he

could get her an outstanding performance evaluation because he,

her immediate supervisor (Henkel), and their supervisor (Joy)

would as a group discuss what ratings to give subordinates, and

that Bacon took credit when she received her outstanding

evaluation. Further, it was undisputed that Bacon and Henkel

socialized together and were “golfing buddies” who played golf

approximately ten times a year. A reasonable jury could find

that, faced with such management solidarity, any perceived

delay in reporting Bacon’s conduct was reasonable. 

The cases on which the court relies do not dictate a contrary

conclusion. For instance, although the Fourth Circuit in Barrett

v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2001),

rejected the “argument that reporting sexual harassment is

rendered futile merely because members of the management

team happen to be friends,” id. at 268, the court overlooks both

the different evidence Taylor offered regarding Bacon’s ability

to get her an outstanding evaluation and the difference that the

Fourth Circuit drew between fear of futility and fear of

retaliation. That court’s statement referred to futility and

responded to employee Barrett’s contention that she failed to

report her supervisor’s behavior because he was friends with

management and she “did not think it would do any good.” Id.

In this respect, “the only cost” to Barrett would have been

failure to prevail upon filing a complaint, as she had no

objective reason to fear retaliation. See Reed v. MBNA Mktg.

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 26 of 35
11

Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2003). Yet the Fourth Circuit

made no similar statement regarding fear of retaliation, stating

only that “generalized” and “nebulous” fear of retaliation would

not suffice to explain a delay in reporting. Barrett, 240 F.3d at

267. Here, by contrast, Taylor presented evidence from which

a reasonable jury could find that she had a specific, “credible,”

Reed, 333 F.3d at 36, reason to fear retaliation that was not

merely “generalized,” Barrett, 240 F.3d at 267, “nebulous,” id.,

or “subjective,” Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., 347 F.3d

1272, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003). “[F]ailure” was therefore not “‘the

only cost’ to Taylor of reporting Bacon in the fall of 2001,” Op.

at 9 (quoting Reed, 333 F.3d at 36), and a jury could find that

any reasonable delay was justified under the circumstances.

With favorable inferences, Taylor’s fear was no less

substantiated than Roebuck’s, whose supervisor commented

only once, vaguely, that he did not want to “find out [she] was

taking sides with Lieutenant Clark,” who had witnessed him

trying to kiss Roebuck. Roebuck, 408 F.3d at 792. Indeed,

Taylor’s proffered evidence of retaliatory threats and conduct is

stronger than was Roebuck’s. 

III.

Retaliation. The evidence Taylor proffered to show

retaliation illustrates why an employee would hesitate before

filing a complaint pursuant to an employer’s sexual harassment

policy. A complaint leads to an investigation that alerts the

accused and other employees, including, as occurred here, the

complaining employee’s immediate supervisor ( Henkel) and his

superiors (Joy and Hagans), that the employee has filed a

complaint against another supervisor (Bacon). That process

may itself cause negative consequences for an employee

regardless of the outcome of the employer’s remedial process.

Nonetheless, the high bar set for discrimination claims is no less

high for claims of retaliation, see Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446,

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 27 of 35
12

457 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and an employee may recover damages

only for those instances of retaliation that resulted in a

“materially adverse” action. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v.

White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 68-69 (2006).

 

As with Taylor’s sexual harassment claim, the court

improperly, and with great consequence, denies Taylor the

benefit of reasonable and favorable inferences from the

evidence. E.g. Op. at 15 (concluding an inference of retaliatory

motive would be “untenable on the record here” where based on

“‘mere proximity’” between the time she filed suit and the

AWOL listing). It also disaggregates her evidence, Op. at 11-

13, when the legal standard requires it to be viewed in the

aggregate. Although correctly concluding that the withholding

of pay due pursuant to the “AWOL” incident was a materially

adverse action, Op. at 13, the court weighs and evaluates

conflicting evidence in holding that Taylor failed to rebut her

supervisor’s non-discriminatory reason for placing her on

AWOL status, Op. at 14. Dissecting the portrait of her work

experiences after she formally complained, Op. at 11-16, and

failing to view the evidence in the aggregate, the court

concludes that “Taylor herself had created” “the confusion”

with regards to this incident. Viewed under the correct legal

standard, however, Taylor has raised a material issue of disputed

fact on which a reasonable jury could find in her favor. 

Taylor’s retaliation claim is governed by the three-step

framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). Under this framework, Taylor proffered evidence

establishing a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation. After

engaging in statutorily protected activity when she reported

Bacon, her supervisor (Henkel) claimed she was AWOL even

though she had followed the usual procedures for requesting

leave, and denied her a week of earned pay, withholding it for

an unknown period of time. As the court holds, that withholding

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 28 of 35
13

was a materially adverse action. Op. at 14. However, the

court’s subsequent analysis fails both to acknowledge the

aggregate effect of Taylor’s evidence of a causal connection

between the protected activity and the adverse action and to

accord her favorable inferences.

In Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007), this

court held, “After the employer offers a non-[retaliatory]

justification for its actions, the McDonnell Douglas []

framework falls away, and [the court] must determine whether

a reasonable jury . . . could infer [retaliation] from the

combination of (1) the plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) any

evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered

explanation for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of

[retaliation] that may be available to the plaintiff,” id. at 1318

(third alteration and ellipsis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)); see Singletary v. Dist. of Columbia,

351 F.3d 519, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying McDonnell

Douglas to a retaliation claim). Greer makes clear that all

instances of retaliation, whether or not they are individually

actionable under Burlington Northern, are relevant to this

determination because they shed light on whether actionable

conduct was retaliatory in nature. As the First Circuit has

pointed out, “the critical inquiry becomes whether the aggregate

evidence of pretext and retaliatory animus suffices to make out

a jury question.” Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co, 950 F.2d 816, 827

(1st Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).

Taylor’s proffered evidence pointed to a series of actions

that adversely affected her ability to do her job. For example,

there was evidence that as a result of her formal complaint, her

immediate supervisor (Henkel) held up her work, delaying its

submission to the Office of General Counsel, and assigned her

low priority cases, all resulting in a lower level of productivity

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 29 of 35
14

for the twelve-month period than in previous years. Where

performance evaluations are directly correlated to productivity,

as was true in Taylor’s employment situation, these actions

necessarily resulted in steadily declining evaluations, from

“outstanding” to “excellent” in 2002, and from “excellent” to

“fully effective” in 2003. Taylor expressed fear that if they

continued to decline she might receive an “unacceptable,” which

is grounds for dismissal. As further examples, there was

evidence that her second level supervisor (Joy) with whom she

rarely spoke, had recommended she not be hired by another

supervisor because he did not trust Taylor, that he had advised

Bacon not to go by her office “because she could take this, you

know, as a way to tell another lie,” Bacon Depo. at 102, and that

her third-level supervisor (Hagans) warned her about her

“negative behaviors.” 

When viewed in context with other proffered instances of

management retaliation, and contrary to the court’s

impermissible weighing and disaggregation of the evidence

against Taylor, a reasonable jury could disbelieve her

supervisor’s claimed reason for placing her on AWOL status

and instead credit Taylor’s account of what transpired. See Aka,

156 F.3d at 1290 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)) . According to Taylor, she requested

leave in person and Henkel approved it informally, a practice

that he admits is standard, acknowledging that in the past he

signed her leave slips even after her leave had begun. Henkel

thus knew exactly what type of leave she was requesting and

which dates she would be out of the office. Nonetheless, seeing

an opportunity to make her life more difficult in view of her

complaint against his supervisor-friend and golfing buddy,

when he noticed she checked the box for sick leave but placed

the dates she would be out on a line above (next to annual

leave), he claimed “confusion” and reported her to Human

Resources, which, as an experienced supervisor, he knew would

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 30 of 35
15

5

 To the extent the court interprets this statement, which

appeared only as a parenthetical in Taylor’s opposition to the motion

for summary judgment, as an acknowledgment of her error in

completing the form, the court ignores the more obvious contextual

interpretation that Taylor was recounting Henkel’s claimed basis for

“confusion,” not confessing error. Again, the court views the record

in the light least favorable to Taylor. 

instruct him to designate her AWOL. There was no evidence

that Human Resources would have so instructed had he not

referred her request or had he advised, based on the

conversation Taylor avers she had with him, what type of leave

she wanted. There is no evidence, in fact, that Human

Resources routinely reviewed these request forms when they

were approved by the employee’s supervisor.

The court would instead improperly credit her employer’s

account of the events, stating that Henkel, “confused” by

Taylor’s “err[or] in completing the request form by ‘mistakenly

check[ing] the sick leave box’ but entering the dates in the area

for annual leave,” Op. at 14 & n.* (second alteration in original)

(quoting Taylor’s Opp. to Mot. Summ. J. at 37), requested

guidance from Human Resources.5 The court relies on her

supervisor’s incomprehensible affidavit testimony: “Well, there

was some confusion as to whether it was sick leave or annual

leave. When I talked to personnel basically they said if it was

sick leave cause [sic] she put the sign at the time for leave in the

annual spot, but she checked off the sick leave portion of it, so

I didn’t know if she was on sick leave or annual leave.” Henkel

Aff. 9. This hardly establishes undisputedly that Taylor was the

cause of any “confusion.” Admitting in the same affidavit that

during the years he had been her supervisor there had never

been a problem with Taylor’s leave, Henkel claimed

“personnel” directed she be placed on AWOL because she had

not received his prior approval. Id. at 10. This is not the same

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 31 of 35
16

6

 Taylor’s leave request form has a typed “X” only in the box

marked “Accrued Sick Leave,” which appears in a column listing

various types of leave, and a typed listing of the dates on the first line

to show when she would be out and the number of work hours she

would miss. Beside her signature in the “CERTIFICATION” box is

typed “10/31/03” for the date of the request. By contrast, on the

signature line for “OFFICIAL ACTION ON REQUEST,” the “X”

next to “APPROVED” is scratched out and an “X” appears next to

“DISAPPROVED”. On the signature line, following Henkel’s

signature is the handwritten date “11/04/03,” which is written over the

handwritten date, “10/31/03,” effectively crossing out that date.

explanation for disapproval as the “confusion” he identified

earlier. Moreover, the leave request slip, on which the court

also relies, belies the “confusion” explanation.6 On that request

Henkel wrote in longhand that he “did not receive [the leave

request] until Friday afternoon 10/31” and that “I’m assuming

prior arrangements were made for this leave but no

arrangements were made with me.” This explanation makes no

reference to “confusion” about the type of leave requested.

Moreover, Taylor averred that she had requested leave in person

and cleared her leave with Henkel informally, a practice that he

admits is standard and which in this instance would undermine

any “confusion” claim about what type of leave she sought.

Given Taylor’s evidence, Henkel’s affidavit, and the leave

request form showing what appear to be Henkel’s handwritten

alterations to a previously signed and approved document, a

material issue of disputed fact remains as to whether Henkel

approved her leave as she claimed on October 31 or

disapproved it on November 4 because of “confusion.”

Although his apparent change of position may, as the court

suggests, be “consistent with the [employer]’s explanation that

Henkel [was confused],” Op. at 14 n.*, the employer’s

explanation must be more than “consistent” to prevail on

summary judgment; it must exist to the exclusion of another

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 32 of 35
17

also consistent explanation that favors the nonmoving party in

order to demonstrate entitlement to a judgment as a matter of

law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247.

Here, that other explanation is that Henkel conjured up a

“confusion” rationale, an account supported by, for example,

the inconsistency between his affidavit testimony that he did not

find out about Taylor’s leave until he came back to work in

November 2003 and the leave slip itself, on which he

acknowledged receiving it on October 31, 2003, and which he

appears to have signed and dated the same day. See supra n.6;

Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290.

Reaching the opposite conclusion by crediting the

employer’s “confusion” explanation, the court compounds its

error by improperly disaggregating Taylor’s evidence and

disregarding all proffered instances of retaliation that it

concludes were not materially adverse. In doing so, the court

fundamentally misconceives the relevance of this evidence.

Even assuming these events are not themselves legally viable

adverse actions, they are nonetheless evidence that the

withholding of pay, an undisputedly viable adverse action, was

retaliatory, and the court offers no good explanation for its

disregard of those acts when it concludes otherwise. Nor can

it. Just as Taylor’s counsel offered “revenge is a dish best

served cold,” Oral Arg. at 32:04, retaliation can involve “a

thousand cuts,” Patterson v. Whitman, No. 02-2213, 2003 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 26726, at *8 (D.D.C. June 9, 2003). Where one of

those cuts was a materially adverse action, it blinks reality to

suggest the other 999 shed no light on whether that cut was

intentional and retaliatory. 

The court objects that it cannot “merely assume[] allegedly

retaliatory acts were in fact retaliatory.” Op. at 16 n.*. At

summary judgment, however, that is exactly what the court

must do. Taylor proffered evidence of a pattern of managerial

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 33 of 35
18

retaliation, and properly viewed, her evidence is not so

untenable as to merit dismissal at this stage of the proceedings.

Verbal reprimands for “negative behaviors,” telling other

supervisors that an employee cannot be trusted and tells “lie[s],”

and slowed work processing that inevitably results in steadily

declining performance evaluations that — if continued — could

result in dismissal are not “trivial actions,” id., even assuming

they do not constitute actionable retaliation, but see Russell v.

Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 818, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Weber v.

Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2007). On this record, a

reasonable jury could find that her supervisor’s reporting her to

Human Resources, when in similar circumstances in the past he

had not, was one of a series of retaliatory acts that resulted in

the denial of a week’s pay for an unknown amount of time. The

merits of this question are for the jury to decide, not this court.

* * *

In summary, circuit courts of appeal have acknowledged

the difficult position that employees face as a result of the

Supreme Court’s efforts in Faragher and Ellerth to limit

vicarious liability for workplace sexual harassment. See Reed,

333 F.3d at 35; Walton, 347 F.3d at 1290; Barrett, 240 F.3d at

268. The dilemma for the victim is real: reporting casual

flirtation too early likely results in exoneration for the harasser

and workplace condemnation of the victim; reporting too late

may bar relief altogether, even though the conduct has become

progressively more severe. Navigating this tricky terrain, in

Roebuck this court acknowledged on facts similar to Taylor’s

that a jury could have found the plaintiff was reasonable in not

immediately reporting unwanted advances. See also Greene,

164 F.3d at 674-75. Because this court must accord Taylor as

the nonmoving party all favorable inferences from the evidence,

a reasonable jury could find she did not unreasonably delay in

reporting harassment under her employer’s policy establishing

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 34 of 35
19

an objective standard for reporting. It is no response to ignore,

as the court does, the required standard of review and binding

precedent on the substantive legal standards to be applied. The

standard for reporting is an objective one, not the subjective one

the court fashions today. A reasonable jury, viewing her

proffered evidence in the aggregate, as the correct legal standard

requires, also could find that her supervisor unlawfully

retaliated against her for filing a formal complaint. The court

can reach the opposite conclusion only by discarding that

standard of review when it disaggregates and thereby discounts

favorable evidence, denies Taylor the benefit of favorable

inferences, and ignores the real world retaliatory consequences

of the employer’s actions. Whether a reasonable jury would

find in Taylor’s favor or conclude she is not credible is not the

question before this court, only whether she can survive

summary judgment. Essentially, the court overlooks that “all

that is required [from the nonmoving party to defeat summary

judgment] is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank

of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968).

Accordingly, on this record I would reverse the grant of

summary judgment and remand the case to the district court.

USCA Case #07-5401 Document #1195654 Filed: 07/10/2009 Page 35 of 35