Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00366/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00366-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California

Spencer E. Berry,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 04-0366 GEB PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Cheryl Pliler, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff is a prisoner who claims defendants Burciaga,

Pliler, Rosario and Vance were deliberately indifferent to

serious risks to plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff alleges all

defendants knew of recent, escalating attacks with prison-made

weapons between hispanic and white prisoners and that a security

door between two sections of the prison did not lock properly. 

When Burciaga released plaintiff to the shower, two hispanic

prisoners entered the shower area through the unlocked door and 

attacked plaintiff, stabbing him repeatedly. Defendants move for

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summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes. 

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits,

for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Id., at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on

an issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence

to support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on

an issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

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opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the “‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id., at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio

Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id., at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

the party’s burden at trial. Id., at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

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A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.,3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004).

Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no motion to

strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United States

Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979) (incompetent

medical evidence).

The following facts are undisputed: 

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a

prisoner at California State Prison, Sacramento (CSP). Defendant

Burciaga was a guard, defendant Vance was a captain of guards,

defendant Rosario was the Chief Deputy Warden and defendant

Pliler was the Warden. 

August 22, 2002, November 19, 2002, November 27, 2002, and

December 10, 2002, white and hispanic prisoners were placed on

lockdown because of repeated violence between these groups. 

Plaintiff is white. His attackers are hispanic.

The place where plaintiff was confined was divided into

three sections, A, B and C, separated by mechanized doors that

guards operated from a remote control panel. These doors were

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equipped with sensors connected to indicator lights that showed

whether they were open or closed. December 15, 2002, wires in

the control panel were crossed, causing the light signal for the

door between sections B and C always to signal the door was open. 

Defendant Burciaga knew the light was malfunctioning. 

December 15, 2002, defendant Burciaga released prisoners for

showers one cell at a time in sections B and C. About 3:00 p.m.,

Burciaga released plaintiff and his cell mate from cell 116, BSection. At 3:02, defendant Burciaga released two hispanics,

Reyes and Segovia, from cell 128 of C-Section. At 3:04, ASection prisoners returned from the showers to their cells and as

Burciaga locked the A-Section cells, he heard scuffling and saw

Reyes and Segovia attacking plaintiff. 

Defendant Burciaga attempted to sound an alarm but the alarm

did not work. He radioed for assistance and as he reached for a

weapon, the alarm sounded and Reyes and Segovia stopped their

attack.

The malfunction of the signal light for the door between

sections B and C enabled Reyes and Segovia to leave their section

and attack plaintiff. 

Defendants contend they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

 Defendants are immune from suit for damages insofar as their

conduct did not violate plaintiff’s clearly established rights. 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In deciding a claim

of qualified immunity, the court must first determine whether, in

the light most favorable to plaintiff, the facts alleged show

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defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 

Second, the court must determine whether the right

defendants are alleged to have violated was clearly established.

The dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a

reasonable prison official that “his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted,” by reference to decisional law agreeing

that “certain conduct is a constitutional violation under facts

not distinguishable in a fair way from the facts presented in the

case at hand.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Decisional law need

not proscribe the exact conduct in question; it must only make

the conduct’s unlawfulness apparent. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

730 (2002).

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to ensure the

safety of prisoners, including protecting prisoners from each

other. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Hearns v.

Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040-42 (9th Cir. 2005); LeMaire v.

Maass, 12 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993). If they fail, they violate

the Eighth Amendment only if they were deliberately indifferent

to the risk of harm in question viz., they know of it yet fail to

take reasonable measures to ensure prisoners’ safety. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991);

Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Defendants assert that the facts alleged show no violation

of plaintiff’s rights. 

It is undisputed plaintiff is white and his attackers were

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hispanic, for months these groups repeatedly attacked each other,

they were on lock-down the day of the attack, and plaintiff was

housed in a unit separated from his attackers by a security door. 

Defendant Burciaga released prisoners in different sections one

cell at a time, and he released plaintiff two minutes before

releasing his attackers. A security door operated from a control

panel separated the sections housing plaintiff and his attackers

and it was this door, when closed, that made it safe to release

plaintiff and his attackers at the same time. But the indicator

light on the door control panel was malfunctioning such that

guards monitoring the control panel could not rely on it to know

whether the door was closed. Defendants Plier and Rosario were

charged with the safe operation of the prison. Defendant Vance

was in charge of the units in question. Defendant Burciaga knew

the light was malfunctioning. 

Accepting these facts in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated.

Defendants assert it is not clearly established liability

would attach where a prisoner attacks another prisoner because of

a malfunctioning door. 

A reasonable officer in the position of Burciaga and

reasonable administrators in the position of Pliler, Rosario and

Vance would, if they knew the light was unreliable during a

lockdown, take reasonable measures either to fix it or not

simultaneously to release antagonistic prisoners separated by the

door whose status was indiscernible.

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For these reasons, I find defendants are not entitled to

qualified immunity.

Defendants Pliler, Rosario and Vance assert they are not

subject to liability because they were supervisors. 

A person is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if

he commits or directs an act or omission that violates a

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d

740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

(9th Cir. 1989). To hold a supervisor liable for the

unconstitutional acts of his subordinates, there must be a

“causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and

the constitutional violation.” Redman v. County of San Diego,

942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). This connection

may be established by showing the supervisor personally

participated in or directed the violation, Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989), implemented a policy so

deficient as to be the moving force of the violation, Hansen v.

Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989), or by omitting to

perform an act he was legally required to do, Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978), such as failing to take

adequate steps to address a violation of which he knew or should

have known, see, Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 937 & fn. 4

(9th Cir. 2002).

Defendants Pliler, Rosario and Vance do not assert they were

ignorant of the faulty indicator light, they were not responsible

for ensuring the proper functioning of the prison’s security

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equipment or that they were not responsible for changing the

shower procedures during lockdown given the faulty security

equipment.

I find there is a genuine dispute about whether defendants

were aware of specific facts from which they could infer there

existed a serious risk plaintiff would be attacked but failed to

take reasonable measures to protect plaintiff.

Defendant Burciaga asserts there is no genuine question

about whether he was deliberately indifferent. 

It is undisputed Burciaga knew the indicator light on the

control panel was malfunctioning. Defendant Burciaga adduces no

evidence he reported the malfunction to those responsible for

ensuring its proper functioning or that he knew it soon would be

repaired.

I find there is a genuine dispute about whether defendant

Burciaga knew of specific facts from which he could infer there

was a serious risk plaintiff would be attacked but failed to take

reasonable measures to protect plaintiff.

For these reasons, defendants’ July 26, 2005, motion for

summary judgment should be denied and the parties should be

directed to file and serve pretrial statements.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Within 20 days after being

served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may

file written objections. The document should be captioned

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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 

The district judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings

and recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: February 9, 2006. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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