Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-01956/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-01956-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRANT NAPEAR,

Plaintiff,

v.

BONNEVILLE INTERNATIONAL 

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

No. 2:21-cv-01956-DAD-DB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 13)

This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) filed on behalf of defendant Bonneville International Corporation. (Doc. No. 

13.) The pending motion was taken under submission by the previously assigned district judge 

on August 15, 2022.1 (Doc. No. 35.) For the reasons explained below, defendant’s motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint will be granted, with leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

On October 21, 2021, plaintiff Grant Napear filed this employment discrimination and 

retaliation lawsuit against defendant Bonneville International Corporation contending that he was 

terminated due to his religion, race, gender, and political views. (Doc. No. 1.) On December 2, 

1

 On August 25, 2022, this case was reassigned to the undersigned. (Doc. No. 36.)

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2021, plaintiff filed his operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) against defendant. (Doc. No. 

12.) Plaintiff alleges as follows in his FAC.

For over 25 years, plaintiff was an on-air talk show host for a popular sports radio talk 

show—the Grant Napear Show With Doug Christie—that aired regionally throughout 

Sacramento from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. on weekdays. (Doc. No. 12 at ¶¶ 11, 13, 17.) In this 

position, plaintiff’s employer was KHTK until defendant purchased KHTK in 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 

16.) In 2019, defendant renewed plaintiff’s employment contract for the 26th consecutive year as 

the host of the Grant Napear Show With Doug Christie for a one-year term from August 1, 2019 

through July 31, 2020. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 23.) In addition to his position as a radio talk show host,

plaintiff was separately employed by the Sacramento Kings, a professional basketball team, as the 

television play-by-play announcer for all televised games played by the Sacramento Kings dating 

back to 1988.

2

 (Id. at ¶¶ 9–11.) 

In addition to having a career in sports commentary, plaintiff is a lifelong and devout 

member of the Unitarian Universalist Church and embraces the seven principles espoused by the 

church including, among others, “[t]he inherent worth and dignity of every person.” (Id. at ¶ 6.) 

However, plaintiff also believed that religion and politics were inappropriate on-air material

during a sports broadcast and therefore “always kept his religious and political beliefs to himself,” 

even though his employment contract did not require him to do so. (Id. at ¶ 27.)

On the evening of May 31, 2020, plaintiff was at his home watching regional and national 

news broadcasts that were televising events involving protests over the death of George Floyd in 

Minnesota. (Id. at ¶ 29.) At approximately 8:30 p.m., DeMarcus Cousins, a former Sacramento 

Kings player, posted a tweet on his Twitter account that was directed at plaintiff and asking

plaintiff for his opinion: “What’s your take on [Black Lives Matter]?” (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 31.) 

Plaintiff responded to Mr. Cousins’ tweet with a tweet of his own: “Hey!!! How are you? 

2

 Although not alleged in the FAC, defendant clarified in its pending motion that plaintiff was an 

employee of defendant in connection with his position as a talk show host and was employed by 

the Sacramento Kings in connection with his position as a play-by-play television announcer. 

(Doc. No. 13 at 8 n.1.) However, plaintiff brought this action only against defendant Bonneville 

International Corporation; the Sacramento Kings are not a party to this action.

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Thought you forgot about me. Haven’t heard from you in years. ALL LIVES 

MATTER...EVERY SINGLE ONE.” (Id. at ¶ 32.) Plaintiff maintains that his statement that 

“ALL LIVES MATTER...EVERY SINGLE ONE” was an expression of his sincerely held 

religious beliefs as a member of the Unitarian Church, his “opinion with regards to the sanctity of 

all lives.” (Id. at ¶¶ 33, 40, 56.) Plaintiff also maintains that the statement “all lives matter” is 

“entirely non-racist, factually true and inherently inoffensive.” (Id. at ¶ 40.)

The following day, on June 1, 2020, defendant’s representative, Steve Cottingim, 

informed plaintiff that he was suspended from his radio show. (Id. at ¶ 34.) The day after that, 

on June 2, 2020, defendant informed plaintiff that he was being terminated for cause as defined in 

his employment contract, specifically, pursuant to paragraph 6(c)(vii), which states that “the term 

‘Cause’ shall be defined as any of the following conduct by Employee, as determined by the

Company in its reasonable discretion: . . . Any act of material dishonesty, misconduct, or other 

conduct that might discredit the goodwill, good name, or reputation of the Company.” (Id. at ¶ 

37.) Following plaintiff’s termination, defendant published the following statement on social 

media:

We were saddened by the comments Grant Napear recently made 

on Twitter. While we appreciate Grant’s positive contributions to 

KHTK over the years, his recent comments about the Black Lives 

Matter movement do not reflect the views or values of Bonneville 

International Corporation. The timing of Grant’s tweet was 

particularly insensitive. After reviewing the matter carefully, we 

have made the difficult decision to part ways with Grant.

Bonneville’s purpose is to build up, connect, inform and celebrate 

communities and families. In the wake of George Floyd’s tragic 

death and the events of the last several days, it is crucial that we 

communicate the tremendous respect that we have for the black 

community and any other groups or individuals who have cause to 

feel marginalized. Bonneville remains committed to fostering calm 

and promoting human dignity in the face of unrest. We plead to all 

to work together for peace and mutual respect.

(Id. at ¶ 39.) Plaintiff further alleges that after he was terminated, defendant informed him that 

the termination was not only based on the May 31, 2020 tweet. (Id. at ¶ 41.) Rather, defendant 

had decided to terminate plaintiff’s employment only after the Sacramento Kings held a team 

meeting regarding plaintiff’s continued employment and the players and executives within the 

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Sacramento Kings organization voted to end its relationship with plaintiff, which defendant 

contended amounted to an “act of misconduct” that “discredited” the “goodwill, good name, or 

reputation” of defendant. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that this explanation by defendant —that the 

Kings basketball team’s reaction was the impetus for plaintiff’s termination pursuant to his 

employment agreement—is a “complete fiction.” (Id. at ¶¶ 41, 42.) 

Moreover, plaintiff alleges that neither defendant nor any members of its management 

were offended by or objected to plaintiff’s May 31, 2020 tweet. (Id. at ¶ 43.) As plaintiff alleges, 

defendant is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, i.e., 

the Mormon Church, and is essentially its “media arm,” and that, like the Mormon Church, 

defendant “does not now and never has supported, endorsed, adopted or agreed with the beliefs, 

ideas or doctrine of the Black Lives Matter movement.” (Id. at ¶¶ 43, 45.) In fact, the Mormon 

Church has embraced a message tantamount to “All Lives Matter.” (Id. at ¶ 47.) Plaintiff also 

alleges that the phrase “All Lives Matter” is not offensive “to any particular group or to Black 

people.” (Id. at ¶¶ 48–50.)

At the same time, in his FAC plaintiff alleges, somewhat contradictorily, that he was 

terminated for expressing his personal political opinion in violation of defendant’s “ad hoc (and 

unpublished) policy supporting the Black Lives Matter movement.” (Id. at ¶¶ 56, 59.) Plaintiff 

also alleges that he was terminated because he had publicly expressed his religious views via his

May 31, 2020 tweet and due to his race, gender, and “personal political opinion.” (Id. at ¶¶ 56, 

59.) Plaintiff maintains that defendant’s “decision to falsely accuse [plaintiff] of racist 

misconduct and publicly terminate his employment . . . has completely and permanently damaged 

[his] 26-year Emmy award winning career as a sports broadcaster . . . [and] has had serious 

negative effects on Plaintiff’s personal life and his public reputation.” (Id. at ¶ 60.)

Based on these allegations in the FAC, plaintiff asserts the following six claims: (1) 

wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (2) discrimination on the basis of religion in 

violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Government Code § 

12940, et seq. (“FEHA”); (3) racial discrimination in violation of FEHA; (4) discrimination on 

the basis of gender in violation of FEHA; (5) retaliation in violation of California Labor Code §§ 

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1101 and 1102; and (6) retaliation in violation of California Labor Code § 98.6. (Id. at ¶¶ 61–96.)

On December 23, 2021, defendant filed its pending motion seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s 

FAC in its entirety. (Doc. No. 13.) On January 28, 2022, plaintiff filed his opposition to 

defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 19.) On February 4, 2022, defendant filed his reply 

thereto. (Doc. No. 22.)

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 

1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the 

court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). However,

the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. 

U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not 

require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers 

mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements 

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is 

inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the 

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. 

Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

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ANALYSIS

Before addressing the merits of the pending motion to dismiss, the court will first address 

defendant’s request for judicial notice made in support of its pending motion. (Doc. Nos. 14, 15, 

16, 17.) The court will then turn to the parties’ arguments regarding whether plaintiff has 

sufficiently stated his FEHA, retaliation, and wrongful termination claims.

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests that the court take judicial notice of two exhibits attached to a 

declaration of its counsel, Tanner Camp, and one exhibit attached to a declaration of Krystal On, 

an employee of DigiStream Investigations, a company that provides investigative services. (Doc. 

Nos. 14, 16, 17.) Plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s request for judicial notice, and 

defendant filed a reply to plaintiff’s response. (Doc. Nos. 20, 23). Defendant has also filed a 

declaration of Steve Cottingim, defendant’s Senior Vice President and Market Manager, in 

support of its pending motion, to which two exhibits are attached. (Doc. No. 15.) Although 

defendant does not request judicial notice of the two exhibits attached to Mr. Cottingim’s 

declaration, defendant does contend that those two exhibits have been incorporated by reference 

into plaintiff’s FAC. (Doc. No. 13 at 10 n.2.) 

“As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in 

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). However, courts recognize two exceptions to this rule: 

“the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, and judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 

201.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). 

As to the first exception, the Ninth Circuit has explained that: “incorporation-byreference is a judicially created doctrine that treats certain documents as though they are part of 

the complaint itself. The doctrine prevents plaintiffs from selecting only portions of documents 

that support their claims, while omitting portions of those very documents that weaken—or 

doom—their claims.” Id. at 1002. Even if not directly attached to a complaint, a document “may 

be incorporated by reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or 

the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 

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908 (9th Cir. 2003). That said, a complaint’s “mere mention of the existence of a document is 

insufficient to incorporate the contents of a document.” Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 

1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002 (“[I]f the document merely creates a 

defense to the well-pled allegations in the complaint, then that document did not necessarily form 

the basis of the complaint. Otherwise, defendants could use the doctrine to insert their own 

version of events into the complaint to defeat otherwise cognizable claims.”). Whether the 

district court incorporates a document by reference is a matter of discretion. See Davis v. HSBC 

Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he district court may, but is not 

required to incorporate documents by reference.”).

As to the second exception, “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to 

reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial 

jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The court “must take judicial notice if a party

requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2). 

However, “[j]ust because the document itself is susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that 

every assertion of fact within that document is judicially noticeable for its truth.” Khoja, 899

F.3d at 999. For this reason, courts should not take judicial notice of a fact contained within a 

document if that fact “is subject to varying interpretations, and there is reasonable dispute as to 

what [the document] establishes.” Reina-Rodriguez v. United States, 655 F.3d 1182, 1193 (9th 

Cir. 2011).

The court will first address the two exhibits attached to Mr. Cottingim’s declaration that 

defendant seeks to have deemed incorporated by reference into plaintiff’s FAC: (i) plaintiff’s 

employment agreement with defendant for the term August 1, 2019 through July 31, 2020, and 

(ii) a letter purporting to terminate plaintiff’s employment with defendant dated June 2, 2020. 

(Doc. No. 15.) Plaintiff does not appear to object to the incorporation by reference of plaintiff’s 

employment agreement into the FAC. (Doc. No. 20 at 2.) Indeed, in his FAC plaintiff mentions 

the existence of the August 1, 2019 employment agreement several times, refers to the contents of 

its terms, and even quotes from the agreement, specifically, with respect to a provision regarding 

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termination of employment for cause. (Doc. No. 12 at ¶¶ 17–19, 21, 23, 37.) Because the 

contents of the employment agreement are part of the allegations of the FAC, its authenticity is 

not in question, and there is no dispute as to the document’s relevance, the court will consider the 

employment agreement as incorporated into the FAC. See Coto Settlement, 593 F.3d at 1038. 

However, the court declines to incorporate by reference into the FAC the termination letter dated 

June 2, 2020, which, contrary to defendant’s contentions, is not referenced anywhere in the FAC, 

either directly or by implication. The allegations in the FAC that plaintiff was terminated the day 

that the termination letter was dated is an insufficient basis to incorporate it by reference because 

it is not alleged to be the means by which plaintiff was notified of his termination. See

Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1007 (finding that “references” to certain facts in the complaint that were also 

contained in a press release was insufficient to incorporate the press release by reference because 

the “facts alleged could have come from other sources”). 

The court next addresses the three exhibits that defendant seeks to be judicially noticed. 

The two exhibits attached to attorney Camp’s declaration are news articles dated May 31, 2020 

“regarding the death of George Floyd and ensuing protests around the country,” (Doc. No. 17 at 

20), titled Grief, Outrage Over George Floyd Spread Further published by National Public Radio

and Saturday at Capitol: Bottles thrown, cops hit protestors with batons at freeway in 

Sacramento published by the Sacramento Bee. (Doc. Nos. 14-1, 14-2.) In addition, the exhibit 

attached to Ms. On’s declaration is a compilation of all “the comments to and retweets of” the 

May 31, 2020 tweet published by plaintiff. (Doc. No. 16.) Defendant maintains that the 

information contained in the news articles “was widely-known (in Sacramento and elsewhere) 

and is not subject to reasonable dispute” and that the compilation of comments and retweets to 

plaintiff’s May 31, 2020 tweet was gathered from a “publicly-available website ... [and] [t]he 

parties cannot reasonably question the existence of these tweets.” (Doc. No. 17 at 2–3.) 

“Courts may take judicial notice of publications introduced to ‘indicate what was in the 

public realm at the time, not whether the contents of those articles were in fact true.’” Von Saher 

v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (taking judicial 

notice of “various newspapers, magazines, and books . . .solely as an indication of what 

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information was in the public realm at the time”) (quoting Benak ex rel. All. Premier Growth 

Fund v. All. Cap. Mgmt. L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 401 n.15 (3d Cir. 2006)). Similarly, courts have 

taken judicial notice of tweets because “the existence of the publicly-available articles and tweets

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Unsworth v. Musk, No. 19-mc-80224-JSC, 2019 WL 

5550060, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2019); see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. City of Los Angeles, 

441 F. Supp. 3d 915, 933–34 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (“The Court therefore takes judicial notice of 

O’Farrell’s statements via his verified Twitter account.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the 

court takes judicial notice of the two news articles and compilation of tweets in response to 

plaintiff’s May 31, 2020 tweet “solely as an indication of what information was in the public 

realm at the time” and not as to whether the contents of those articles or tweets are in fact true. 

Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 960.

B. Religious, Race, and Gender Discrimination under FEHA (Claims 2–4)

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s FEHA claims for discrimination on the basis of 

religion, race, and gender. (Doc. No. 13 at 12–15.)

Under the FEHA, it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against [a] person in 

compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of a person’s 

religious creed, race, or gender. Cal. Gov’t. Code § 12940(a). To state a prima facie case of 

discrimination under the FEHA, a plaintiff must allege and ultimately show that: (i) he was a 

member of a protected class; (ii) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing 

competently in the position he held; (iii) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as a 

termination; and (iv) some other circumstances that suggest a discriminatory motive. See Lawler 

v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 2013); Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 

Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000); see also Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 706 (2009). As to 

the fourth element, plaintiff can demonstrate an employer’s discriminatory motive through direct 

evidence, or by offering “circumstantial evidence of discrimination that tends to show that the 

employer’s proffered motives were not the actual motives because they are inconsistent or 

otherwise not believable.” Achal v. Gate Gourmet, 114 F. Supp. 3d 781, 801 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 

2015) (“Applying California law, the Ninth Circuit has held that a mere comment suggesting the 

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existence of bias can be direct evidence of discriminatory animus.”); see also Godwin v. Hunt 

Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 1998). At the pleadings stage, a plaintiff must 

allege some facts supporting the inference that his termination was because of his religion, race, 

or gender. See Whitehead v. Pacifica Senior Living Mgmt. LLC, No. 21-15035, 2022 WL 

313844, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 2022); Broadnax v. Adams & Assocs., Inc., 817 F. Appx. 512, 513 

(9th Cir. 2020);3see also Mayes v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 917 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1079 (E.D. Cal. 

2013) (granting a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s discrimination claim because the complaint lacked 

“meaningful detail suggesting the termination was because of [plaintiff’s protected class]”). 

Here, the alleged circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s termination do not give rise to an 

inference of religious, race, or gender discrimination. According to plaintiff, the public statement

defendant issued following his termination—that plaintiff’s “recent comments about the Black 

Lives Matter movement do not reflect the views or values of [defendant]”—gives rise to an 

inference that plaintiff was terminated because of his religious beliefs as a member of the 

Unitarian Universalist Church, including his belief of “the inherent worth and dignity of every 

person.” (Doc. Nos. 12 at ¶ 6–7, 39, 56; 19 at 7.) However, as defendant points out, notably 

absent from the FAC are any allegations of fact indicating that defendant had any reason to know 

that plaintiff even was a member of the Unitarian Church or that his May 31, 2020 tweet was 

somehow an expression of a religious belief on his part. Cf. Achal, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 801

(finding that the plaintiff stated a plausible religious discrimination claim, in part, because the 

complaint included allegations from plaintiff’s supervisor said that it was “ridiculous for a 

religious ceremony to take so long” when commenting on plaintiff’s absence from work and as a 

result the court could “infer that [the employer] was aware of [plaintiff’s] Hindu faith”); Viloria v. 

Adams & Assocs., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00314-TLN-KJN, 2017 WL 4422363, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 

5, 2017) (finding that the plaintiff had stated a plausible religious discrimination claim because 

the complaint alleged that plaintiff “informed Defendant she was religious and that she used her 

breaks to pray” when plaintiff was purportedly terminated for sleeping on the job). To the 

3

 Citation to these unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions is appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit 

Rule 36-3(b).

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contrary, plaintiff alleges in his FAC that he “always kept his religious and political beliefs to 

himself” and that he “believed that discussing religion or politics during a sports broadcast was 

inappropriate on-air material,” thus at least suggesting that defendant was unaware of plaintiff’s 

religious beliefs. (Doc. No. 12 at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff also does not contend that his tweet was selfevidently religious in nature, nor are there any other facts alleged in the FAC, such as comments 

regarding plaintiff’s religion made by defendant or that plaintiff was replaced by someone of a 

different religious creed, from which an inference could be drawn that defendant terminated 

plaintiff because his religious beliefs. See Ravel v. Hewlett-Packard Enter., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 

1086, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (granting a motion to dismiss where there were no facts alleged 

“indicating that defendant’s decision to place [the plaintiff] on leave was because of her age,” and 

plaintiff failed to allege that she was “replaced by a younger employee, that she overheard any 

negative comments about her age, or that age was ever a point of discussion at any time during 

her communications with defendant about an accommodation for her back problems”); Ali v. 

Silicon Valley Bank, No. 18-cv-03999-JSW, 2019 WL 8752054, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2019) 

(dismissing a religious discrimination claim where the plaintiff’s allegations that his interviewer 

“identified himself regarding his ‘tendency toward his Christian values’” during the job interview 

did “not necessarily imply that the decision not to hire Plaintiff was as a result of his race, 

national origin, or religion”), aff’d, 797 F. Appx. 318 (9th Cir. 2020).

In his opposition to the pending motion, plaintiff maintains that his FAC contains 

sufficient allegations indicating that the proffered reason for his termination was pretextual. 

(Doc. No. 19 at 8.) Specifically, plaintiff notes that he alleges in the FAC that: “no one at 

[defendant] actually was offended or objected to [plaintiff’s] tweet”; defendant “does not now, 

and never has, supported the ‘Black Lives Matter movement’ because [defendant] is a wholly 

owned subsidiary of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints”; “every executive and/or 

member of management of [defendant] is a member of the Mormon Church”; and “the Mormon 

Church never has supported, endorsed or approved of the Black Lives Matter movement.” (Doc. 

No. 12 at ¶¶ 43–45.) Plaintiff argues that his allegations in this regard directly contradict 

defendant’s purported reasons for terminating him, i.e., that plaintiff’s tweet “do not reflect the 

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views or values of [defendant]” or that an alleged “vote” by the Sacramento Kings organization to 

ends its employment relationship with plaintiff constituted an act of misconduct under plaintiff’s 

employment agreement with defendant (Doc. No. 12 at ¶¶ 39, 41–42), thereby suggesting that 

“the proffered reason was insufficient to motivate discharge.” (Doc. No. 19 at 8–9) (citing Soria 

v. Univision Radio L.A., Inc., 5 Cal. App. 5th 570, 594 (2016)). However, even if these 

allegations by plaintiff were sufficient to indicate that defendant’s proffered reasons were 

pretextual, the allegations still do not plausibly allege a discriminatory motive because plaintiff 

has not alleged a plausible connection between plaintiff’s religious beliefs and his termination. 

See Bess v. Adams & Assocs., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00173-TLN-KJN, 2018 WL 4801951, at *4 (E.D. 

Cal. Oct. 3, 2018) (finding the plaintiff’s allegations “sufficient” at the pleadings stage “to infer 

pretext” but “not sufficient for the Court to infer a discriminatory motive” because there was no 

“link to [plaintiff’s] protected characteristics”). Indeed, “simply showing the employer was lying, 

without some evidence of discriminatory motive, is not enough to infer discriminatory animus.” 

Soria, 5 Cal. App. 5th at 594; see also Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 360–61 (“[A]n inference of intentional 

discrimination cannot be drawn solely from evidence, if any, that the company lied about its 

reasons. The pertinent statutes do not prohibit lying, they prohibit discrimination.”). At bottom, 

plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support the inference that his termination was because 

of his religion as opposed to an obvious alternative explanation, such as that the substance and 

timing of plaintiff’s May 31, 2020 tweet were “particularly insensitive,” or did “not reflect the 

views or values of [defendant],” or constitute “cause” for termination under the terms of 

plaintiff’s employment agreement. (Doc. No. 12 at ¶¶ 37, 39); see Whitehead, 2022 WL 313844, 

at *2 (upholding the dismissal of a complaint where the plaintiff “had not pleaded facts to support 

the inference that her termination was because of her [protected class] as opposed to her 

unwillingness to return to work because of a dispute with a colleague”); see also Eclectic Props.

E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (“When considering 

plausibility, courts must also consider an ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for defendant’s 

behavior.”).

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Finally, as to his race and gender discrimination claims, plaintiff maintains that “[m]any 

of the same facts also provide the basis for the reasonable inference that [defendant’s] termination 

decision was based on Plaintiff’s race.” (Doc. No. 19 at 8–9.) In addition, plaintiff argues that

because the statement published by defendant following plaintiff’s termination stated that 

defendant has “tremendous respect” for “the black community” and included reference to the 

“Black Lives Matter movement,” these allegations plausibly give rise to an inference of a 

discriminatory motive because plaintiff is a Caucasian male who is not a member of the black 

community or the Black Lives Matter movement. (Doc. No. 19 at 9.) 

The court finds plaintiff’s argument in this regard unavailing. To begin with, plaintiff 

makes no argument in support of his gender discrimination claim in his opposition to the pending 

motion, nor are there any facts alleged in the FAC that even hint at discrimination on the basis 

gender, aside from legal conclusions or recitations of the elements of such a claim, which are

clearly insufficient to state a cognizable gender discrimination claim. (Doc. No. 12 at ¶¶ 59, 75, 

81); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Next, as to race discrimination, defendant’s reference to the “Black 

Lives Matter movement” and respect for “the black community” in its public statement do not 

give rise to a plausible inference that defendant terminated plaintiff merely because he is a 

“Caucasian male.” Moreover, as defendant points out, plaintiff’s position as to this claim is 

illogical because “an expression of respect for one community says nothing about the respect (or 

lack thereof) for another.” (Doc. No. 22 at 7–8.) Even taking plaintiff’s allegations as true and 

viewing them in the light most favorable, as the court must do at the pleading stage, it would be 

unreasonable to infer that the foregoing allegations indicate discriminatory motive because 

plaintiff has not alleged: 1) any facts connecting his race or gender to defendant’s decision to 

terminate him; 2) that plaintiff was replaced by a non-Caucasian female, or 3) that defendant 

made any comments or took any actions suggesting that race or gender played any role in its 

termination decision. See Bess v. Adams & Assocs., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00173-TLN-KJN, 2017 

WL 6017015, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017) (granting a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s race and age 

discrimination claims where plaintiff had not “alleged any facts connecting his age or race to 

Defendant’s decision” nor “alleged [that] Defendant treated differently other employees who 

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were different ages or races than Plaintiff”); see also Cooper v. Templeton, No. 21-cv-04692-RA, 

2022 WL 4367445, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2022) (finding that the plaintiff, who was 

terminated from her employment the day after a video of her calling the police on an African

American birdwatcher in New York City’s Central Park went viral, failed to state a claim for race 

or sex discrimination because she failed to allege facts supporting an inference of discriminatory 

motive by her employer).

Accordingly, because plaintiff has failed to allege facts that plausibly suggest any 

inference of discriminatory motive by defendant when it terminated him, the court will grant 

defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s religious, race, and gender discrimination claims. 

Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his discrimination claims. See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. 

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that “[r]ule 15’s policy of favoring 

amendments to pleadings should be applied with ‘extreme liberality’”) (citation omitted). 

However, plaintiff is advised that if he chooses to amend his discrimination claims, he must do so 

in good faith and consistent with the dictates of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

C. California Labor Code §§ 1101, 1102 and § 98.6 (Claim 5–6)

Next, defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claims brought under California 

Labor Code §§ 1101, 1102, and 98.6. (Doc. No. 13 at 15–19.)

In 1937, “the California Legislature, recognizing that employers could misuse their 

economic power to interfere with the political activities of their employees, enacted Labor Code 

sections 1101 and 1102 to protect the employees’ rights.” Gay L. Students Ass’n. v. Pac. Tel. & 

Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 486–87 (1979) superseded by statute as stated in In re Marriage Cases, 

43 Cal. 4th 757, 835 n.56 (2008). California Labor Code § 1101 provides that “[n]o employer 

shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy: (a) Forbidding or preventing 

employees from engaging or participating in politics . . . [or] (b) Controlling or directing, or 

tending to control or direct the political activities or affiliations of employees.” Cal. Lab. Code 

§ 1101. Similarly, § 1102 provides that “[n]o employer shall coerce or influence or attempt to 

coerce or influence his employees through or by means of threat of discharge or loss of 

employment to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line 

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of political action or political activity.” Cal. Lab. Code § 1102. “These sections serve to protect 

‘the fundamental right of employees in general to engage in political activity without interference 

by employers.’” Gay L. Students Ass’n, 24 Cal. 3d at 487 (citation omitted); see also Couch v. 

Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 1:14-cv-00010-LJO-JLT, 2015 WL 4716297, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 

7, 2015) (“Sections 1101 and 1102 therefore ‘prohibit an employer from attempting to coerce or 

influence its employees’ political activities through the threat of discharge . . . [and] [t]he purpose 

of sections 1101 and 1102 [] is ‘to protect employees’ political freedom.’”) (quoting Nava v. 

Safeway Inc., No. F063775, 2013 WL 3961328, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2013) (unpublished) 

and Wade v. Rackauckas, No. G034650, 2006 WL 1086259, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2006)

(unpublished)), aff’d, 656 F. Appx. 841 (9th Cir. 2016).

4

 Employees can assert a private action 

against their employers under §§ 1101 and 1102. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1005; Lockheed Aircraft 

Corp. v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 28 Cal. 2d 481, 486 (1946). 

Importantly, “liability under §§ 1101(a) and 1102 is triggered only if an employer fires an 

employee based on a political motive.” Couch, 656 F. Appx. at 843. In addition, employers are 

prohibited from terminating, discriminating, or retaliating against an employee who engaged in 

political activity protected under §§ 1101 and 1102. See Cal. Lab. Code § 98.6(a). For purposes 

of §§ 1101 and 1102, the California Supreme Court has defined “political activity” “as extending 

beyond ‘partisan activity’ to include ‘the espousal of a candidate or a cause, and some degree of 

4

 The Ninth Circuit has stated that federal courts “may consider unpublished state decisions, even 

though such opinions have no precedential value.” Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Granite State Ins. 

Co., 330 F.3d 1214, 1220 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 

F.3d 935, 943 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Couch, 2015 WL 4716297, at *11 (“Given the dearth 

of relevant published decisions concerning sections 1101 and 1102, the Court must resort to 

unpublished ones.”). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has itself cited the unpublished decision in Nava. 

See Couch v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., 656 F. Appx. 841, 842–43 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Nava,

2006 WL 1086259, at *4). In the past, the undersigned has adopted the view that because 

California specifically prohibit citation to such opinions “by a court or a party in any other 

action” absent two exceptions not applicable here (see California Rule of Court 8.1115(a)–(b)), 

federal courts should not do so either. Having now become aware of the Ninth Circuit’s position 

that unpublished/noncitable California appellate court opinions may be considered and cited by 

federal courts, the undersigned will do so while keeping firmly in mind that such decisions have 

no precedential value and may merely lend some support to a position regarding the status of 

California law. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 330 F.3d at 1220 n.8. 

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action to promote the acceptance thereof by other persons.’” Ross v. Indep. Living Res. of Contra 

Costa Cnty., No. 08-cv-00854-TEH, 2010 WL 2898773, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (quoting 

Gay L. Students Assn., 24 Cal. 3d at 487). 

In its pending motion to dismiss, defendant argues that plaintiff’s claim brought under §§

1101 and 1102 is insufficiently alleged because plaintiff does not identify a “rule, regulation, or 

policy” within the meaning of § 1101, which defendant contends is a required element of such a 

claim. (Doc. No. 13 at 16.) The few courts that have addressed this purported requirement at the 

pleadings stage have not thoroughly analyzed the issue but rather have either accepted the 

argument or rejected it without much, if any, analysis. Compare Ross v. Indep. Living Res. of 

Contra Costa Cnty., No. 08-cv-00854-TEH, 2010 WL 1266497, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010)

(rejecting the defendant’s argument that plaintiff had “failed to identify a ‘rule, regulation, or 

policy’ that limited [plaintiff’s] political activities” and explaining that it was “unnecessary” at 

the pleadings stage for plaintiff to do so because “[t]he allegation that [plaintiff] was terminated 

as a result of his political activity is sufficient to plausibly suggest the existence of such a 

policy”); Snyder v. Alight Sols., LLC, No. 21-cv-00187-CJC-KES, 2021 WL 4622392, at *3 (C.D. 

Cal. May 5, 2021) (finding that the plaintiff had adequately alleged a violation of §§ 1101 and 

1102 where the plaintiff alleged that she was terminated for political reasons after visiting the 

Capitol on January 6 without reference to any particular “rule, regulation, or policy”) with 

Brahmana v. Lembo, No. 09-cv-00106-RMW, 2010 WL 965296, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2010)

(dismissing the plaintiff’s claims brought under §§ 1101 and 1102, in part, due to plaintiff’s 

failure to “allege the existence of any rule, regulation, or policy forbidding CyberData employees 

from participating in politics or controlling their political activities” or to allege that “plaintiff 

was coerced by threat of discharge to adopt or refrain from adopting any course of political 

activity”); Prem v. Access Servs., Inc., No. 11-cv-01358-ODW-JEM, 2011 WL 3516170, at *5 

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011) (granting a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims under §§ 1101 and 

1102, in part, because the plaintiff had failed to allege the existence of a “rule, regulation, or 

policy”) (citing Brahmana, 2010 WL 965296, at *5).

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Here, however, plaintiff actually does allege in his FAC that he was terminated for 

violating “the Company’s ad hoc (and unpublished) policy supporting the Black Lives Matter 

movement.” (Doc. No. 12 at ¶ 59.) But confusingly, plaintiff appears to contradict this very 

allegation by also alleging that defendant “does not now and never has supported, endorsed, 

adopted or agreed with the beliefs, ideas or doctrine of the Black Lives Matter movement.” (Id.

at ¶ 45.) The court will not attempt to parse a distinction between these two contradictory 

allegations or speculate as to which of them plaintiff would prefer the court to accept as true. 

This is because the court generally need not accept as true “unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences,” and in this case the court will therefore disregard plaintiff’s 

contradictory allegations. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 

2001). Indeed, despite defendant having identified the contradiction in the pending motion, 

plaintiff failed to address the contradictory allegations of the FAC or provide any clarification 

regarding them in the brief in opposition to the pending motion. (Doc. No. 13 at 17 n.5.) 

Plaintiff also does not allege any facts that defendant was coercing or influencing its employees 

“to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line of political 

action or political activity” through the “threat of discharge or loss of employment.”5 Cal. Lab. 

5

 The court declines to decide whether a plaintiff must always identify a particular policy, rule, or 

regulation when stating a claim under § 1101 but does conclude that plaintiff’s contradictory 

allegations in this case fail to state a plausible claim. Plaintiff’s termination may be viewed as a 

warning or threat to other employees that certain political activities or viewpoints would not be 

tolerated by defendant, and plaintiff’s termination may be considered a declaration of a particular 

policy regarding the Black Lives Matter movement by defendant. See Surdak v. DXC Tech., No. 

5:22-cv-00921-SB-KK, 2022 WL 18142545, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2022) (finding that “a 

reasonable jury could conclude that [the employer] disagreed with the political views expressed in 

or suggested by the tweet [concerning Lyndon Baines Johnson] and wanted to punish Plaintiff 

for, or discourage other employees from, expressing similar speech”); Nava, 2013 WL 3961328, 

at *8 (explaining that if plaintiff alleged that he “was fired for his particular political perspective . 

. . [of] being against same-sex marriage . . . it may be inferred that . . . [the employer] was in 

effect declaring that the espousal or advocacy of such political views will not be tolerated—then 

[the employer’s] action constituted a violation of Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102”); see also 

Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 28 Cal. 2d at 485–86 (defining “policy” as used in § 1101 as “[a] settled 

or definite course or method adopted and followed by a government, institution, body, or 

individual”). But, in light of the conflicting allegations in the FAC and its dearth of factual 

allegations to support this claim, the court concludes plaintiff has failed to allege any facts in his 

FAC that would give rise to such reasonable inferences in this case.

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Code § 1102. 

Defendant also argues that plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendant 

fired him because of his political views.

6

 (Doc. No. 13 at 17–19.) Specifically, defendant argues 

that plaintiff was terminated for an apolitical business decision pursuant to paragraph 6(c)(vii) of 

its employment agreement plaintiff—i.e., that plaintiff’s tweet “might discredit” the goodwill of 

defendant given its subject matter and timing. (Doc. No. 13 at 17–18.) In contrast, plaintiff 

maintains that the allegations in the FAC support an inference that his termination was politically 

motivated. (Doc. No. 19 at 11.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges in the FAC that he was terminated 

because he expressed “his personal political opinion” and that it can be inferred that his

termination was politically motivated because defendant’s public statement stated that it chose to 

“part ways” with plaintiff due to his “particularly insensitive” tweet regarding the “Black Lives 

Matter movement.” (Doc. Nos. 12 at ¶ 39; 19 at 11.) 

“When faced with two possible explanations, only one of which can be true and only one 

of which results in liability, plaintiffs cannot offer allegations that are merely consistent with their 

favored explanation but are also consistent with the alternative explanation.” Eclectic Props., 751 

F.3d at 996. Instead, “[s]omething more is needed, such as facts tending to exclude the 

possibility that the alternative explanation is true, in order to render plaintiffs’ allegations 

plausible.” Id. at 996–97. Here, the allegations of plaintiff’s FAC are convoluted and do not tend 

to exclude one plausible alternative explanation over another. For example, plaintiff alleges that 

his May 31, 2020 tweet was not actually offensive, presumably, to suggest that his tweet could

not serve to “discredit” the “goodwill, good name, or reputation” of defendant. (Doc. No. 12 at 

¶¶ 37, 48–50.) On the other hand, plaintiff alleges that, due to defendant’s affiliation with the 

6 The parties do not appear to dispute that plaintiff’s May 31, 2020 tweet could constitute 

“political activity” within the meaning of §§ 1101 or 1102. In this regard, the court notes that the 

tweet might be considered a “political activity” under the statutes because it could be construed as

espousing a particular view regarding a cause, i.e., the Black Lives Matter movement. See Ross, 

2010 WL 2898773, at *9; see also Gay L. Students Assn., 24 Cal. 3d at 487–88 (finding that “the 

struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights, particularly in the field of employment, 

must be recognized as a political activity”). However, the court need not reach this issue because 

plaintiff’s claim brought under §§ 1101 and 1102 will be dismissed with leave to amend.

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Mormon Church, defendant holds a political view that is anti-Black Lives Matter or pro-All Lives 

Matter. (See id. ¶¶ 45–47.) Plaintiff’s allegations in this regard simply do not support plaintiff’s 

contention that defendant terminated him due to his expression of a particular (anti-Black Lives 

Matter) political opinion because plaintiff also alleges that defendant holds that very same 

political opinion. In the court’s view, the allegations in the FAC regarding this claim are 

confusing, convoluted, and generally out of step with plaintiff’s contention that he was terminated 

for expressing a political opinion, as opposed to for making a public statement that may have 

been unpopular and detrimental to defendant’s “good will, good name, or reputation.” (Id. at ¶ 

37.) Notably, for example, plaintiff does not even directly allege that his May 31, 2020 tweet and 

its message constituted his personal political opinion. (Id. at ¶¶ 40, 59.)

Due to plaintiff’s failure to plausibly allege that defendant’s decision to terminate him was 

politically motivated or that it was the expression of a policy or an act of coercion by defendant 

with respect to defendant’s employees’ political activities, the court will grant defendant’s motion 

to dismiss plaintiff’s claim brought under §§ 1101 and 1102. In addition, because plaintiff’s §§ 

1101 and 1102 claim is insufficiently alleged, his derivative claim brough under § 98.6 predicated 

on plaintiff having engaged in protected politically activity is also insufficiently alleged. See 

Couch, 2015 WL 4716297, at *17 (granting summary judgment on § 98.6 claim in favor of 

defendant where the undisputed evidence showed that the employer did not terminate plaintiff 

due to his engaging in conduct protected under §§ 1101 and 1102). Although the court will grant 

defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s §§ 1101, 1102, and 98.6 claims, plaintiff will be granted 

leave to amend to attempt to cure the deficiencies noted above as to those claims.

7

7

 In the FAC, plaintiff also alleges that his § 98.6 claim is predicated on a violation of California 

Labor Code § 96(k). (Doc. No. 12 at ¶¶ 93–94.) However, that statute is not applicable here. 

Section 96(k) addresses “[c]laims for loss of wages as the result of demotion, suspension, or 

discharge from employment for lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away from 

the employer’s premises.” Cal. Lab. Code § 96(k). California courts have found that the scope of 

§ 96(k) is limited to “‘lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away from the 

employer’s premises’ asserting ‘recognized constitutional rights.’” Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice 

Corp., 120 Cal. App. 4th 72, 86 (2004) (quoting Barbee v. Household Auto. Fin. Corp., 113 Cal. 

App. 4th 525, 533 (2003)). Thus, to state a § 98.6 claim predicated on a violation of § 96(k), 

plaintiff must allege that his discharge occurred because he asserted a recognized constitutional 

right. See id. Here, plaintiff does not allege that he asserted any constitutional right at all. (Doc. 

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D. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy (Claim 1)

Finally, defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of wrongful termination in violation 

of public policy because it is derivative of plaintiff’s other claims, which defendant contends are 

all insufficiently pled. (Doc. No. 13 at 21.)

As a matter of California common law, “when an employer’s discharge of an employee 

violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort 

action and recover damages traditionally available in such actions.” Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 

27 Cal. 3d 167, 170 (1980); see also Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 

2003). To prevail on a claim for wrongful discharge, a plaintiff must show that: (1) an employeremployee relationship existed; (2) plaintiff’s employment was terminated; (3) the violation of 

public policy was a motivating factor for the termination; and (4) the termination was the cause of 

plaintiff’s damages. Haney v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 121 Cal. App. 4th 623, 641 (2004); see 

also Wright v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-01681-KJM, 2013 WL 5718937, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 

Oct. 15, 2013). Here, plaintiff alleges that he was terminated “in violation of the public policy set 

forth in the [FEHA], California Government Code section 12940, et seq., as well as California 

Labor Code sections 96(k), 98.6, 1101, and 1102.” (Doc. No. 12 at ¶ 62.) As discussed above, 

plaintiff has failed to adequately allege both his discrimination claims under FEHA and his 

retaliation claim brought under California Labor Code §§ 96(k), 98.6, 1101, and 1102. Thus, 

plaintiff’s derivative claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy must also be 

dismissed because it is based on these insufficiently alleged violations of public policy. See 

Whitehead, 2022 WL 313844, at *2 (dismissing a “derivative” “wrongful discharge in violation 

Nos. 12 at ¶¶ 92–93; 19 at 11–12.) Even if plaintiff were to allege that he was asserting the 

protection of free speech rights under the First Amendment, that would be insufficient basis to 

allege the assertion of a recognized constitutional right in this case where the termination of 

employment was by a private employer. See Grinzi, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 84 (“[W]e conclude the 

First Amendment free speech provision does not support a public policy on which to base a 

tortious discharge claim [under § 98.6], against a private employer’s termination of an employee 

for the employee’s exercise of such First Amendment rights.”). Thus, plaintiff has failed to state 

a § 98.6 claim based on a purported violation of § 96(k). Although plaintiff will be granted leave 

to amend this claim, he should only attempt to assert a violation of California Labor Code § 96(k) 

in any second amended complaint he elects to file if he can do so in good faith and consistent 

with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

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of public policy” claim where the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a claim of discrimination); 

Dauth v. Convenience Retailers, LLC, No. 13-cv-00047 MEJ, 2013 WL 5340396, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 24, 2013) (dismissing a wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim to the 

extent it rested on an asserted violation of the fundamental public policy established by a 

California Labor Code retaliation statute).

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim will 

also be granted, with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, 

1. Defendant’s request for judicial notice (Doc. No. 17) is granted;

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 13) is granted in its entirety; and

3. Any second amended complaint that plaintiff may elect to file in this action shall 

be filed within twenty-one (21) days after the date of entry of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 19, 2023 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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