Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00862/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00862-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Because Maribel is a minor, the complaint should have been filed

by John Castillo and/or Maria Castillo, Maribel’s parents, on behalf

of Maribel.

06cv0862

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIBEL D. ROSARIO CASTILLO,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant.

 

 

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Case No. 06-CV-0862-WQH (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

RE GRANTING OF PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR REVERSAL AND/OR

REMAND [DOC. NO. 7] AND DENIAL

OF DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DOC. NO.

11]

Plaintiff Maribel D. Rosario Castillo (“Maribel”)1 seeks

judicial review of Social Security Commissioner Michael J.

Astrue’s determination that she is not entitled to Supplemental

Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. Plaintiff has filed a motion

for reversal and/or remand (construed by the Court as a motion

for summary judgment), and Defendant has filed a cross-motion for

summary judgment. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that

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Plaintiff’s motion focuses on Maribel’s alleged mental rather

than physical impairments; the Court has thus focused its summary of

records accordingly. 

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Plaintiff’s Motion for Reversal and/or Remand be GRANTED, that

Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED, and that

the case be remanded to the Social Security Administration

(“SSA”) for further administrative proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Maribel was born on August 28, 1991, and was 13 years old

and in the ninth grade at the time of the administrative hearing. 

(Admin. R. at 23.) She has allegedly been disabled since January

1, 2002 due to a blood disorder and mental problems. (Id. at

83.) Maribel’s father, John Castillo, filed an application for

SSI benefits on Maribel’s behalf pursuant to Title XVI of the

Social Security Act on June 3, 2004. (Id. at 59-63.) Maribel’s

application was denied initially on September 16, 2004, and again

upon reconsideration on March 25, 2005. (Id. at 27-31, 34-38.) 

An administrative hearing was conducted on November 16, 2005 by

Administrative Law Judge Leland H. Spencer (“ALJ”), who

determined that Maribel was not disabled and thus not eligible

for SSI benefits. (Id. at 15-24.) The Appeals Council for the

SSA declined further review. (Id. at 4-6.) Maribel then

commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

II. SUMMARY OF RECORDS2

A. Maribel’s School Records - San Ysidro Middle School

(February 2004 - July 2004)

The San Ysidro School District conducted an academic

assessment of Maribel in February 2004. (Id. at 140-52.) The

assessment indicated that there was a severe discrepancy between

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Maribel’s academic achievement and cognitive ability in Broad

Written Language due to an Auditory Processing Deficit. (Id. at

149.) The assessment also indicated a level of depression that

was above average in comparison with other children her age. 

(Id.) As a result, Maribel was provided with an Individualized

Education Program. (Id. at 132-37.) Maribel was noted to have

below average written language skills, and average reading and

math skills. (Id. at 133.) She was also noted to be “at risk”

in her social and emotional development in that she had

“emotional problems that currently mainly affect her home life.” 

(Id.) She was referred to the Resource Specialist program. (Id.

at 137.) 

On July 15, 2004, Sally Menze, Maribel’s 7th grade resource

specialist, completed a Teacher Questionnaire. (Id. at 124-31.) 

She had seen Maribel daily, for one school period, since February

2004. (Id. at 124.) Ms. Menze indicated that Maribel had

obvious problems with expressing ideas in written form,

organizing her own things and school materials, and completing

class and homework assignments. (Id. at 125-26.) She also noted

that Maribel’s auditory processing deficit made carrying out

multi-step directions difficult. (Id. at 126.) Ms. Menze did

indicate that Maribel had made substantial progress in meeting

her English written language and auditory processing skills

goals. (Id. at 131.)

B. Roberto J. Velasquez, Ph.D - Examining Psychologist

(August 2004)

Dr. Roberto J. Velasquez conducted a psychological

evaluation of Maribel at the request of the Department of Social

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Services on August 5, 2004. Maribel’s parents described the

following symptoms to Dr. Velasquez: anxiety, poor concentration,

mistrust of others, depression, hyperactivity, forgetfulness, and

irritability. (Id. at 156.) They indicated that Maribel was

being seen by a counselor, Leticia Velasquez, at the Youth

Enhancement Services (YES) Program in San Ysidro, and that she

had an appointment with a psychiatrist at the facility, Dr.

Fajerman, the following week to be evaluated for psychotropic

medication. (Id. at 155-56.) 

Dr. Velasquez conducted a mental status examination, and

found Maribel to possess below average social skills, to be

immature for her age, and to have a vocabulary significantly

below that of a person of her age and level of education. (Id.

at 156.) He administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for

Children-IV (WISC-IV) and determined that Maribel had a Verbal

Comprehension Index score of 65, a Perceptual Reasoning Index

score of 92, and a Working Memory Index score of 86. The

Perceptual Reasoning and Working Memory indexes were within an

acceptable range. The Verbal Comprehension score, however,

indicated a significant impairment involving problems with

comprehension and acquisition of knowledge, use of information in

daily functioning, and poor vocabulary. (Id.) Dr. Velasquez

also found that Maribel’s scores on reading, spelling, and

arithmetic tests were significantly below her grade level. (Id.) 

Dr. Velasquez diagnosed Rule Out Expressive Language and/or

Receptive Disorder and Rule Out Borderline Intellectual

Functioning, and assessed Maribel’s Global Assessment of

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The Global Assessment of Functioning scale, or GAF scale, is a

numeric scale (0 through 100) used by mental health practitioners to

rate social, occupational, and psychological functioning, with lower

numbers representing more severe symptoms, difficulties, or

impairments. The scale is presented in the Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-IV-TR”). See

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Assessment_of_Functioning (as

visited May 7, 2007). A GAF score between 41 and 50 suggests “Serious

symptoms OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school

functioning.” Id.

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Functioning (GAF) score to be 45. (Id. at 157.)3 

Dr. Velasquez concluded that Maribel was not capable of

completing detailed and complex tasks, but could complete some

simple and repetitive tasks; that she was not likely to possess a

long attention span or patience; that she had the capacity to

understand very simple instructions, but would have major

problems with advanced or complex instructions; that she would

require assistance in building up her social skills; and that she

was not able to handle the usual stresses encountered in a

competitive school setting. (Id.) 

C. San Ysidro Health Center - Treating Physicians

(September 2003 - January 2005) 

The majority of Maribel’s records from the San Ysidro Health

Center pertain to treatment of her physical health issues,

including idiopathic thrombocytopenic purpura (“ITP”), a bleeding

disorder, and left knee injuries. The records do, however,

contain reference to Maribel’s mental issues as well. In March

2004, Maribel was refusing to go to school. (Id. at 202.) In

November and December 2004, Maribel was found to have selfinflicted scratches and abrasions on her body, and a selfinflicted burn on her hand. (Id. at 190, 192.) 

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D. Leon Fajerman, M.D. - Treating Psychiatrist 

(September 2004 - March 2005)

Dr. Leon Fajerman of the YES Program saw Maribel one time

per month between September 2004 and March 2005. (Id. at 236.) 

In March 2005, he indicated that Maribel’s diagnoses included

Depressive Disorder, “ODD” (Oppositional Defiant Disorder) and

“PTSD” (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder). (Id.) He found, inter

alia, that Maribel had poor impulse control, was apathetic, that

her mood and affect were “often inappropriate,” that her judgment

was moderately impaired, and that her progress in treatment was

“slow and limited due to personal and family psychopathology.” 

(Id. at 236-38.) 

Dr. Fajerman opined that Maribel had “poor” abilities to

maintain concentration, attention and persistence; to complete a

normal workday and workweek without interruptions from

psychologically based symptoms; and to respond appropriately to

changes in a work setting. (Id. at 238.) He rated her abilities

to understand, remember, and carry out complex instructions, and

to perform activities within a schedule and maintain regular

attendance, as “fair,” and her ability to understand, remember,

and carry out simple instructions as “good.” (Id.) 

E. Paradise Valley Hospital - Treating Physicians

(April 2005)

Maribel attempted suicide with a razor blade on April 3,

2005. (Id. at 105.) She was hospitalized for five days at

Paradise Valley Hospital due to her suicide attempt. (Id. at

107, 249.) A head CT scan taken at the hospital on April 6, 2005

to determine a possible cause of Maribel’s headaches, nightmares,

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The record is unclear as to whether Dr. Littman was a treating

or examining physician.

5

A GAF score between 31 and 40 reflects, “Some impairment in

reality testing or communication OR major impairment in several areas,

such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking or mood.” 

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Assessment_of_Functioning (as

visited May 7, 2007). 

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and aggressive behavior was negative. (Id. at 250.) 

F. Robert Littman, M.D. - Treating or Examining Psychiatrist4

(July 2005)

Dr. Robert Littman of the County of San Diego conducted an

mental status examination of Maribel on July 26, 2005. (Id. at

264-65.) He diagnosed Bipolar II and a cannabis dependency, and

determined that Maribel’s GAF score was 35. (Id. at 265.)5 He

recommended that Maribel continue taking Zoloft (an

antidepressant) and Risperdal (an antipsychotic medication), that

she participate in individual, family and group therapy, and that

she be admitted to the Day Treatment Program (apparently offered

by or through the school district). (Id. at 264-65.) 

G. Maribel’s School Records - Southwest Senior High School

(November 2005)

Another Individualized Education Program was created for

Maribel in November 2005. (Id. at 253-60.) Maribel was found to

be in the 34th percentile for reading, 9th percentile for

writing, 30th percentile for math, and 7th percentile for

functional skills. (Id. at 254.) Maribel’s behavior, described

as “distractable, off-task and withdrawn,” was noted to impede

her learning. (Id. at 255.) Maribel had made progress, however,

since entering the Day Treatment Program, and her motivation and

behavior were noted to have been “good.” (Id. at 260.) 

// 

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See infra section V. B. for a more detailed description of the

six domains of functioning. 

8 06cv0862

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING

A. Father’s Testimony

Maribel’s father testified at the administrative hearing on

her behalf. He testified that Maribel’s behavior at home was

“not very good” and that she had problems controlling her temper,

taking care of herself, taking her medications on time, with

concentrating, and with following rules. (Id. at 277.) He also

testified that Maribel was not in a “regular school” but rather

was attending “special classes.” (Id. at 281.) 

B. Medical Expert Testimony

Medical expert witness Kent B. Layton (“ME”), a clinical

psychologist, also testified at the hearing. He testified that

he had reviewed the medical records in the case. (Id. at 282.) 

He stated that Maribel’s diagnosis was “Bipolar number two” and

that her prognosis was good as “Bipolar twos” do well with proper

medication. (Id. at 283, 286-87.) He testified that he had not,

however, seen a list of Maribel’s medications. (Id. at 283,

286.) He opined that the verbal IQ of 65 found by Dr. Velasquez

was not valid as the Wechsler test and Maribel’s school records

indicated that she had a low average to average range of

intelligence in most areas. (Id. at 287-89.) He also observed

that these tests had been conducted before Maribel was on

medication. (Id. at 288.) The ME testified further that he

disagreed with the GAF scores of 35 and 45. (Id.) 

With respect to the six domains of functioning considered in

childhood disability cases,6 the ME testified that Maribel’s

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The ALJ reserved determination on the sixth domain (health and

physical well-being) for himself.

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limitations were “less than marked” in four of the domains

(acquiring and using information, attending and completing tasks,

interacting and relating with others, and moving about and

manipulating objects) and “none” in one of the domains (caring

for self). (Id. at 286.)7

IV. THE ALJ DECISION

After considering the record, ALJ Spencer made the following

findings:

. . . .

2. The child has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since the alleged onset date [citation

omitted].

3. The child has “severe” impairments [citation omitted].

4. The child’s bipolar disorder, language disorder,

thrombocytopenia, and left knee patellar dislocation

with instability do not meet or medically equal the

severity of the impairment[s] listed in [the Social

Security Regulations].

5. The child does not have an “extreme” limitation in any

domain of functioning, a “marked” limitation in two

domains of functioning, and does not functionally equal

the severity of the listings [citations omitted]. 

6. The claimant’s subjective complaints are considered

credible only to the extent they are supported by the

evidence of record as summarized in the text of this

decision.

7. The claimant has not been under a “disability,” at any

time from the alleged onset date through the date of

the decision [citation omitted]. 

(Id. at 23.) 

V. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Judicial Review

Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act

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allow unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of the

Commissioner's final agency decision. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g),

1383(c)(3). The scope of judicial review is limited. The

Commissioner’s final decision should not be disturbed unless: 

(1) the ALJ's findings of fact are not supported by substantial

evidence or (2) the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal

standards. See Flaten v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d

1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).

The term “substantial evidence” refers to evidence that a

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support the ALJ's

conclusion, considering the record as a whole. See Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence means “more than

a scintilla but less than a preponderance” of the evidence. 

Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997). The

Court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the

evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s

conclusions. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir.

2001); Desrosiers v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d

573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). Even if the ALJ's findings are

supported by substantial evidence, they must be set aside if the

ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the

evidence and reaching his or her decision. See Benitez v.

Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Section 405(g) permits this Court to enter a judgment

affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 

42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). The matter may also be remanded to the SSA

for further proceedings. Id.

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B. Governing SSA Regulations for Defining Childhood Disability

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security

Act, a child under the age of eighteen must have “a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in

marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(C)(i). 

The SSA has enacted a three-step sequential analysis to

determine whether a child is eligible for SSI benefits on the

basis of a disability. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) (2006). First,

the ALJ considers whether the child is engaged in “substantial

gainful activity.” Id. at § 416.924(b). Second, the ALJ

considers whether the child has a “medically determinable

impairment(s) that is severe,” which is defined as an impairment

that causes “more than minimal functional limitations.” Id. at §

416.924(c). Third, if the ALJ finds a severe impairment, he or

she must then consider whether the impairment “medically equals”

or “functionally equals” a disability listed in the “Listing of

Impairments” in the regulations. See id. at § 416.924(d) & pt.

404, subpt. P, app. 1. 

A child’s impairment will “medically equal” a listed

impairment if the medical findings are “at least equal in

severity and duration to the criteria of any listed impairment.” 

Id. at § 416.926(a). A child’s impairment will be found

“functionally equivalent” to a listed impairment if the child’s

condition results in a “marked” limitation in two of six domains

of functioning or an “extreme” limitation in one of the six

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domains. The six domains of functioning are intended to capture

all of what a child can or cannot do, and include: (1) acquiring

and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3)

interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and

manipulating objects; (5) caring for oneself; and (6) health and

physical well-being. Id. at § 416.926a(a)-(b). An impairment is

a “marked” limitation if it “interferes seriously with [the]

ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete

activities.” Id. at § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). “Marked” limitation

also means a limitation that is “more than moderate” but “less

than extreme.” Id. An “extreme” limitation is one that

“interferes very seriously with [the] ability to independently

initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” Id. at §

416.926a(e)(3)(i) (emphasis added). “Extreme” limitation is the

rating given to the worst limitations. Id. 

VI. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision to deny her claim

for SSI benefits was legally improper and was not supported by

substantial evidence. Plaintiff argues, in particular, that the

ALJ erred by rejecting the opinions of Drs. Velasquez, Fajerman

and Littman regarding her mental condition in favor of the

opinion of the ME, a non-examining, non-treating physician, as

well as the ALJ’s own opinion.

Here, steps 1 and 2 of the three-step sequential analysis

applied to childhood disability cases are not in dispute, as the

ALJ found that Maribel has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity (step 1) and that her impairments are “severe” (step 2). 

Therefore, the Court must determine whether the ALJ’s finding at

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step 3 -- that Maribel’s impairments do not “medically equal” or

“functionally equal” a disability listed in the Listing of

Impairments -- is supported by substantial evidence and free of

legal error. 

A. The ALJ Erred In His Consideration of the Opinions of Drs.

Velasquez, Fajerman and Littman

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of

three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant

(treating physicians), (2) those who examine but do not treat the

claimant (examining physicians), and (3) those who neither

examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians). Lester

v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d). Generally, a treating physician’s opinion carries

more weight than an examining physician’s opinion, and an

examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a

nonexamining physician’s opinion. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. While

the ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion regardless

of whether that opinion is contradicted, Magallanes v. Bowen, 881

F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989), “where the treating doctor’s

opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected

only for ‘clear and convincing’ reasons” supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Baxter v.

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991)). The same rule

applies to the opinions of an examining physician in the absence

of any legitimate conflicting testimony and any reason for the

ALJ’s rejection of the examining physician’s opinion. Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). 

If the treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by

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another doctor, it may be rejected only for “specific and

legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Murray v. Heckler, 722

F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). Similarly, an ALJ may reject the

testimony of an examining, but nontreating physician, in favor of

a nonexamining, nontreating physician when the ALJ gives specific

and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. “The ALJ can meet this

burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the

facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes, 881

F.2d at 751 (citing Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th

Cir. 1986)). 

In this case, although the ALJ briefly mentioned the reports

of Drs. Velasquez (examining physician), Fajerman (treating

physician) and Littman (examining or treating physician) in his

summary of Maribel’s medical records (see Admin. R. at 17), he

did not explicitly “reject” any of these doctors’ opinions or

findings. Rather, he simply ignored them throughout the rest of

his decision. The ME, while testifying at the administrative

hearing, contradicted portions of the opinions of Drs. Velasquez

(verbal IQ and GAF score) and Littman (GAF score), and rendered a

different diagnosis than Dr. Fajerman (Bipolar II versus

Depressive Disorder, ODD and PTSD). To the extent the treating

and examining doctors’ opinions were contradicted, then, the ALJ

was required to proffer specific, legitimate reasons to reject or

discount the opinions. Although the ALJ appears to have

implicitly rejected the opinions of the doctors by ignoring them

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and relying virtually exclusively instead upon the opinions of

the ME and of the state agency reviewing physicians, this was not

a sufficient rejection of the treating and examining doctors’

opinions under the relevant authority. See, e.g., Hammock v.

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the ALJ’s

failure to offer any reasons as to why he disregarded the

claimant’s treating physician’s opinions was error); Lester, 81

F.3d at 830-31 (requiring articulation of specific and legitimate

reasons supported by substantial evidence to discount testimony

of examining physicians). 

Additionally, it was insufficient for the ALJ to merely rely

on the fact that the ME and the state agency reviewing physicians

had reviewed all evidence in the record in giving their opinions

more weight than the opinions of the treating and examining

physicians. Unless the opinions of a nontreating source are

based on independent clinical findings, they may serve as

substantial evidence only when they are supported by and

consistent with other evidence in the record. See Andrews, 53

F.3d at 1041. The opinions of the ME and of the state agency

reviewing physicians, none of whom ever examined Maribel, were

not based on their own independent clinical findings and were not

consistent with all other evidence in the record, and thus their

opinions alone could not constitute substantial evidence. See

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. In fact, the Court views the ME’s

opinion, in particular, to be questionable. For example, despite

stating that he had reviewed Maribel’s records in full, and

basing at least a part of his opinion that Maribel had “less than

marked” functional limitations on the presumption that

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medications were helping her, the ME was unable to testify as to

which medications Maribel was taking. See Admin. R. at 283, 286.

Moreover, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in

the medical testimony and resolving ambiguities. Id. at 1039. 

Determining whether inconsistencies are material, or are in fact

inconsistencies at all, falls within the ALJ’s responsibility. 

Morgan v. Commissioner, 169 F.3d 595, 603 (9th Cir. 1999). “The

ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth

his own interpretations and explain why they . . . are correct.” 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988). The ALJ,

by not providing any meaningful discussion of the observations

and findings of Drs. Velasquez, Fajerman and Littman, and by not

resolving the inconsistencies in the record regarding Maribel’s

mental diagnoses and functional limitations, failed to meet these

requirements. 

In sum, the record does not support the ALJ’s implicit

rejection of, or failure to adequately discuss, the opinions of

Drs. Velasquez, Fajerman and Littman. The Court finds, absent a

proper rejection or discounting of these doctors’ opinions, that

their opinions should have been considered at the ALJ’s step

three analysis of whether Maribel’s impairments “medically

equaled” or “functionally equaled” a disability listed in the

Listing of Impairments. The regulations require as much. See 20

C.F.R. § 416.926(c) (when determining if an impairment medically

equals a listing, the SSA considers “all evidence in your case

record about your impairment(s) and its effects on you that is

relevant to this finding”) (emphasis added); id. at §

416.926a(e)(1)(i) (when determining if an impairment results in a

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“marked” or “extreme” limitation, for the purpose of deciding

whether the impairment functionally equals a listing, the SSA

considers “all the relevant information in your case record that

helps . . . determine your functioning . . . .”) (emphasis

added). The observations and opinions of Drs. Velasquez,

Fajerman and Littman are certainly pertinent to Maribel’s

functional limitations, and, absent a proper rejection of those

opinions, should have been considered by the ALJ in reaching his

decision. As the ALJ’s decision currently stands, the ALJ’s

findings as to Maribel’s functional limitations are not supported

by substantial evidence, and the ALJ erred by not giving proper

consideration to the treating and examining doctors’ opinions in

determining her limitations. 

B. Remand is Appropriate

“If additional proceedings can remedy defects in the

original administrative proceedings, a social security case

should be remanded.” Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th

Cir. 1981). Accordingly, remand is proper in this case. 

See McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)

(“[A] remand for further proceedings is appropriate. There may

be evidence in the record to which the Secretary can point to

provide the requisite specific and legitimate reasons for

disregarding the testimony of [the] treating physician. Then

again, there may not be. In any event, the Secretary is in a

better position than this court to perform this task.”).

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reversal and/or Remand should be GRANTED, Defendant’s CrossCase 3:06-cv-00862-WQH-JMA Document 13 Filed 05/17/07 Page 17 of 18
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Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED, and the case should

be remanded to the Social Security Administration for further

administrative proceedings consistent with the discussion above. 

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the

Honorable William Q. Hayes, United States District Judge assigned

to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties on or before June 7, 2007. 

The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” Any reply to the Objections shall be served and

filed on or before June 21, 2007. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 17, 2007

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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