Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-05554/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-05554-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 375
Nature of Suit: False Claims Act
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELLEN HARDIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

MENDOCINO COAST DISTRICT 

HOSPITAL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-05554-JST (TSH)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

QUASH

Re: Dkt. No. 193

Plaintiff Ellen Hardin has filed a motion to quash Defendant Mendocino Coast District 

Hospital’s deposition subpoenas to Jill Pfatenhauer, Julie Adair, and John Sullivan and to strike 

Defendants’ August 14, 2019 second supplemental initial disclosures, which added Pfatenhauer 

and Adair to the list of Defendants’ witnesses. ECF No. 193. These witnesses worked with 

Hardin at her last two employers before she worked at MCDH – Antelope Valley Hospital and 

Community Regional Medical Center. ECF No. 196-1, ¶¶ 2, 3. Hardin argues that the witnesses’ 

testimony is likely to be irrelevant and invasive of her privacy. She analogizes these deposition 

subpoenas to the document subpoenas the Court rejected at ECF No. 106.

The Court construes this as both a motion for a protective order under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 26(c) and a motion to quash under Rule 45. To obtain a protective order, a party 

must show “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(c)(1). “[B]road allegations of harm, 

unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” 

Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted). The Court may consider numerous factors in deciding whether good cause has 

been shown, such as whether the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose, whether 

disclosure will violate a privacy interest, whether disclosure will cause a party embarrassment, and 

so on. See Rutter Guide, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, Cal.. & 9th Cir. Edition, § 

Case 4:17-cv-05554-JST Document 197 Filed 08/21/19 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

11:1072. Under Rule 45, the Court “must quash or modify a subpoena that . . . requires disclosure 

of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies . . .” “Some courts find 

that a party has standing to move to quash a subpoena seeking testimony or documents from a 

nonparty on the ground that it calls for irrelevant or privileged information.” Id., § 11:2286.

A major problem with Hardin’s motion is that until a deposition happens, the Court does 

not know what questions will be asked or what the witness’s answers will be. Courts typically 

block depositions in advance only when it is obvious that there is a problem, such as an attempt to 

depose opposing counsel or to take depositions in a case that will be decided based on the 

administrative record – situations where you don’t need to know what questions will be asked or 

what the answers will be to know that the deposition simply cannot proceed.

This isn’t that type of situation. Just because Pfatenhauer, Adair and Sullivan worked for 

Hardin’s prior employers doesn’t mean they categorically have nothing relevant to say or that 

everything they might say would be invasive of Hardin’s privacy. MCDH says it wants to take 

these depositions to get a fuller picture of Hardin’s work history to evaluate her damages claim 

for, among other things, lost future earnings. MCDH also argues that these former co-workers 

may be able to give testimony relevant to Hardin’s reputation in the small healthcare community 

in which Hardin alleges MCDH defamed her. The hospital also argues that Hardin’s own 

testimony about why she left these two prior employers was vague and evasive (that is not an 

unfair characterization of her testimony, see ECF No. 196-2), and it believes these witnesses may 

have more information. These are relevant topics for examination, and it seems logical that 

Hardin’s former colleagues could have knowledge about these matters. 

As for exactly what information the witnesses are likely to provide in their testimony, that 

is difficult to say in advance of the deposition. The Court has essentially no information 

concerning these witnesses’ roles at the prior employers. During the telephonic hearing at which

this motion to quash was first discussed, it sounded like Hardin’s counsel also didn’t know much 

about these witnesses. 

Hardin’s motion accordingly rests on “broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by 

specific examples or articulated reasoning,” and does “not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Foltz, 331 

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United States District Court

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F.3d at 1130 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court also cannot say with any 

certainty that the subpoenas “require[] disclosure of privileged or other protected matter” under 

Rule 45. If during the depositions, the questioning attorney veers into irrelevant information that 

is inappropriately invasive of Hardin’s privacy, Hardin may move to terminate or limit the 

deposition under Rule 30(d)(3). See ECF No. 118 (order enforcing Rule 30). To head off an issue 

that seems likely to arise, questions about any performance problems Hardin may have had at her 

prior employment and the reasons why she left those jobs are relevant and appropriate.

Finally, the Court is unpersuaded that its order concerning prior employment records, see

ECF No. 106, is analogous to this situation. In ruling on the document subpoenas, the Court had 

the subpoenas before it and could see what they were asking for and what time period the requests 

covered. The Court could therefore see that documents implicating Hardin’s privacy were at issue 

and that the subpoenas covered 16 years, which seemed disproportional to the needs of this case. 

By contrast, the Court does not know the full scope of what MCDH may ask these witnesses –

although the general topics MCDH plans to ask about seem relevant – and certainly the Court does 

not know what knowledge the witnesses have. Because these aren’t Rule 30(b)(6) depositions

where a witness may be obligated to know lots of things he or she wouldn’t have personally 

known, it strikes the Court as unlikely that these three witnesses could even come close to having 

the breadth of personal information that the previous document subpoenas requested.

1

 

There is also no basis to strike Defendants’ supplemental initial disclosures. 

Hardin’s motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 21, 2019

THOMAS S. HIXSON

United States Magistrate Judge

 

1 Further, the Court is currently evaluating whether newly developed evidence warrants 

reconsideration of the Court’s prior ruling concerning the document subpoenas, see ECF No. 172 

(granting leave to move for reconsideration).

Case 4:17-cv-05554-JST Document 197 Filed 08/21/19 Page 3 of 3