Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02551/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02551-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 12:2605 RESPA: Servicing of Mortgage Loans

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Gentleman Marshall as AGENT obo His 

Granted Federal Franchise MARSHALL 

PFEIFFER Known as #222703407-

g38455581,

Plaintiff,

v.

GENERAL MOTORS/ CORPORATION

SERVICE COMPANY; ALLY

FINANCIAL INC/ CORPORATION

SERVICE COMPANY; FEDERAL

HOME LOAN MORTGAGE

CORPORATION/AGENT; THE BANK

OF NEW YORK MELLON

CORPORATION/AGENT; NEWREZ 

LLC F/K/A NEW PENN FINANCIAL, 

LLC, D/B/A/SHELLPOINT

MORTGAGE SERVICING LLC;

QUALITY LOAN SERVICE

CORPORATION,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-CV-2551-GPC-JLB

ORDER 

(1) GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS [ECF Nos. 36, 37, 38, 40, 42];

(2) DENYING EX PARTE MOTION 

TO SET ASIDE ALLEGED SALE 

[ECF No. 13].

INTRODUCTION

The present litigation arises out of a loan obtained by pro se Plaintiff Marshall 

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Pfeiffer (“Plaintiff”), secured by a Deed of Trust on his property, located in El Cajon, 

California. The several motions pending before the Court all relate to Plaintiff’s underlying 

complaint. 

Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against the above-captioned 

defendants (“Defendants”) alleging that Defendants unlawfully initiated foreclosure 

proceedings against Plaintiff. (ECF No. 33.) The parties have very different ideas of how 

the allegations in the FAC are to be resolved. Plaintiff, in his Ex Parte Emergency Motion 

to Set Aside Alleged Sale (a motion that mirrors many of the allegations contained in the 

FAC), asks the Court to set aside the foreclosure sale. (ECF No. 13.) Defendants, on the 

other hand, have filed five separate motions to dismiss the FAC on various grounds. 

General Motors filed a motion to dismiss on December 28, 2018 (ECF No. 36); Magnum 

Property Investments LLC (“Magnum”) and Strategic Acquisitions, Inc. (“Strategic 

Acquisitions”) filed a motion on January, 2, 2019 (ECF No. 38); Ally Financial Inc.

(“Ally”) filed a motion to dismiss on January 2, 2019 (ECF No. 39); Federal Home Loan 

Mortgage Corporation, NewRez LLC, New Residential Investment Corp., the Bank of New 

York Mellon Corporation filed a motion to dismiss on January 7, 2019 (ECF No. 40), and 

Quality Loan Service Corporation (“Quality Loan”) followed suit on January 8, 2019 (ECF 

No. 42). 

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds the foregoing motions

suitable for adjudication without oral argument. For the reasons explained below, 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss will be granted, and Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to set aside 

will be denied. 

I. Background

A. Factual History 

On January 8, 2008, Plaintiff obtained a $475,000.00 Promissory Note (the “Loan”) 

(ECF No. 33, at 5), from Homecomings Financial, LLC, secured by a Deed of Trust in 

Plaintiff’s property at 4382-4384 Mississippi Street, El Cajon, California 92104. (ECF No. 

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40-3.)1 This Loan was recorded on January 11, 2008. The Deed of Trust listed Chicago 

Title as Trustee and identified Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) 

as the nominee beneficiary for the lender and lender’s successors and assigns. (Id.)

After origination, the Deed of Trust was assigned five times: (1) on March 8, 2011, 

MERS assigned the DOT to GMAC Mortgage, LLC (“GMAC”) (ECF No. 40-4); (2) on 

July 17, 2013, GMAC assigned the DOT to Ocwen Loan Servicing (ECF No. 40-6); (3) on 

September 14, 2015, Ocwen assigned the DOT to Residential Credit Solutions Inc. (ECF 

No. 40-7); (4) on October 10, 2016, Residential Credit Solutions Inc. assigned the DOT to 

Ditech Financial LLC (ECF No. 40-8); (5) on November 13, 2017, Ditech Financial LLC 

assigned the DOT to NewRez (ECF No. 40-9). During this period, the identity of the 

Trustee also changed several times. On April 26, 2011, GMAC substituted CAL-Western 

Reconveyance Corporation as Trustee. (ECF No. 40-5.) Thereafter, on June 28, 2018, 

NewRez substituted Quality Loan. (ECF No. 40-10.)

At some point in 2012, Plaintiff stopped paying his monthly payments under the 

Loan. (ECF No. 33, at 37 (referring to default in April 2012); ECF No. 37-1, at 43

(referring to default in August 2012).) Plaintiff’s default persisted for approximately six 

 

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, Defendants have moved the Court to take judicial 

notice of various documents related to Plaintiff’s claims. The documents include the Deed of Trust 

executed by Plaintiff, several assignments of the Deed of Trust, two Substitution of Trustees under the 

Deed of Trust, a Notice of Default, and an Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust. All of these documents 

have been recorded in the Official Records of the San Diego County Recorder’s Office. Plaintiff has 

also proffered documents, like the Notice of Trustee’s sale, evidencing the initiation of foreclosure 

proceedings by Quality Loan. 

The Court will grant the requests for judicial notice. Courts routinely take judicial notice of 

deeds of trust, notice of trustee’s sales, substitutions of trustee, and other foreclosure-related documents. 

See Fimbres v. Chapel Mort. Corp., No. 09-CV-0886-IEG (POR), 2009 WL 4163332, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 

Nov. 20, 2009) (taking judicial notice of trust, notice of default, notice of trustee’s sale, assignment of 

deed of trust, and substitution of trustee); see also Gerard v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 

CV1403935MMMSHX, 2014 WL 12599606, at *2 (C. D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2014) (taking judicial notice of 

grant deeds, a deed of trust, notice of trustee’s sale). The Court’s acknowledgment of these documents 

does not change the nature of the present proceedings, as courts are permitted to “consider certain 

materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporate by reference in the complaint, 

or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 

judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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years, until June 28, 2018, when Quality Loan, acting as Trustee for NewRez, recorded a 

Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust (ECF No. 37-1,at 42.) 

Thereafter, on October 8, 2018, Quality Loan recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale 

indicating that Plaintiff had been in arrears in the amount of $257,460.73. (ECF No. 40-

12.)2 The foreclosure sale took place on November 9, 2018, when Plaintiff’s property was 

sold to Magnum. (ECF No. 13, at 20.) 

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff’s FAC and ex parte motion rest on the similar arguments. Both contest the 

validity of the foreclosure sale and request injunctive and declaratory relief. Although 

Plaintiff invokes many different statutes and common law prohibitions, such as the Real 

Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., it is clear from his request 

to set aside the foreclosure sale that Plaintiff’s unifying theory of liability sounds in 

wrongful foreclosure. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that various communications with the Defendants 

between August 30, 2013 until present have revealed a fraudulent chain of transfers of the 

promissory Note. He also alleges that the Note became separated from the Deed of Trust, 

and that, as a result of the aforementioned defects, NewRez had no authority to foreclose 

on his property because it was not the true beneficiary. (ECF No. 13, at 22, at 42.) Plaintiff 

further asserts that Defendants have foisted his attempts to ascertain the true Note Holder 

at every turn, and that the copies of the Note they have sent to him were ineffective and 

invalid because some of the transfers detailed therein were not specifically endorsed to any 

party. (ECF No. 33-1, at 8, 17.) Plaintiff urges the Court to hold Defendants’ feet to the 

fire and compel them to reveal “verifiable” evidence that they have physical possession of 

 

2 A significantly different sum was stated in the Notice of Trustee’s Sale, which indicates that the 

amount of unpaid balance and other charges amounted to $672, 213.10. (ECF No. 37-1, at 47.) But 

because neither party has specifically addressed the precise amount of Plaintiff’s indebtedness, the Court 

will assume the lower amount for the purposes of this Order. 

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the Note. (ECF No. 33-1, at 35, 36.) 

Defendants have filed many motions to dismiss in response. Although their 

arguments run the gamut, three main themes emerge from their filings. First, Defendants 

complain that the scattershot, inscrutable nature of Plaintiff’s pleadings run afoul of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to 

challenge the foreclosure sale because Plaintiff has alleged only the separation of Note 

from the Deed of Trust and the fact that some notes were endorsed in blank. Neither of 

these allegations, if true, would render the assignments at issue void, rather than voidable. 

Finally, Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s failure to tender the full amount of the 

outstanding debt precludes him from claiming wrongful foreclosure. For these reasons, 

Defendant ask that Plaintiff’s ex parte motion be denied, and that his FAC be dismissed in 

full. 

II. Legal Standards 

Because the present dispute comes before the Court upon motions to dismiss under 

Rule 12, and a motion for injunctive relief, i.e., Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to set aside, the 

Court finds it expedient to survey the applicable legal standards. Furthermore, because 

Defendants have challenged the clarity of Plaintiff’s filings, the Court will discuss the 

requisite pleading standards under Rule 8 as well. 

A. Rule 8

As the Court previously detailed in its December 6, 2018 Order, which granted 

Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint, (ECF No. 29), Plaintiff is beholden to the 

dictates of Rule 8. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that pleadings that state a claim for relief must 

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Furthermore, “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, 

and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). 

Complaints that are too confusing and prolix to “perform the essential functions of 

a complaint” are subject to dismissal under Rule 8. See, e.g., McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 

1172, 1177–80 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a Rule 8(a) dismissal of a complaint that was 

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“argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant”); Hatch v. 

Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding a Rule 8(a) dismissal of a 

complaint that was confusing and conclusory). Although the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs 

are liberally construed, the basic pleading requirements of Rule 8 apply to self-represented 

and counseled plaintiffs alike. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995); Wynder 

v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 79 n. 11 (2d Cir. 2004).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the complaint as not containing sufficient factual 

allegations to state a claim for relief. “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 

12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) 

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In this respect, 

“[d]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a 

cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 

Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).

While “detailed factual allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint must allege more than 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to 

dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, 

must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“Generally, a court may not consider material beyond the complaint in ruling on a 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion.” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 

1052 (9th Cir. 2007). However, “[a] court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public 

record’ without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment,” as

long as the facts noticed are not “subject to reasonable dispute.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Ritchie, 342 

F.3d 903, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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C. Injunctive Relief

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” 

Winter v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The “grant of a 

preliminary injunction is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge[.]” Evans

v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Comm’n, 736 F.3d 1298, 1307 (9th Cir. 2013). 

District courts exercise their discretion according to a four-factor test mandated by 

traditional principles of equity. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391

(2006). The test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, 

(2) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance 

of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. 

III. Motions to Dismiss the FAC

A. Failure to Plead with Clarity, Brevity, and Specificity

Defendants have recommended the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC for being

irredeemably incomprehensible and muddled. Besides being unclear, Plaintiff’s FAC 

stands accused of failing to “perform the essential functions of a complaint” as required by 

Rule 8. McHenry, 84 F.3d at 80. 

Defendants complain that Plaintiff’s pleadings do not distinguish between the many 

defendants sued, contain nothing but cursory allegations, and lack cognizable claims. They 

point out that Plaintiff has painted with exceedingly broad strokes, articulating claims of 

fraud and misrepresentation against all named defendants without delineating the 

particulars of who was engaged in wrongdoing, at what point, and through what means. 

For example, Defendants Strategic Acquisitions and Magnum point out that besides a few 

background-historical mentions of their names in Plaintiff’s FAC, they are not otherwise 

implicated in any of the alleged wrongdoing, since neither was a trustee, beneficiary, or 

owner of the Loan. (See ECF No. 37-2, at 4.) Defendants Ally and General Motors mount 

similar objections, arguing that there were no allegation in the FAC which ties them to any 

conduct that is alleged to have resulted in injury to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 36-1, at 2; ECF No. 

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38-1, at 4.)

The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has manifestly defaulted on his 

responsibility to comply with Rule 8. Despite the Court’s entreaties for Plaintiff to file his 

an amended complaint with Rule 8 in mind (see ECF No. 29, at 4), Plaintiff has produced 

a FAC that largely mirrors the unruly, disjointed, and confusing pleading he submitted as 

his original complaint. Such a complaint defies Rule 8’s demand for a “short and plain 

statement of the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cty. 

Sch. Bd., 261 F. App’x 274, 276–77 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that a pro se complaint which 

was “disjointed, repetitive, disorganized and barely comprehensible” was correctly 

dismissed because such a pleading did not articulate claims with sufficient clarity to allow 

defendant to frame a responsive pleading). Put another way, by submitting imprecise and 

sprawling claims, Plaintiff effectively “calls on the court to disentangle and interpret his 

allegations.” Kuzmicki v. Hanrahan, No. 317CV00342RCJVPC, 2018 WL 2088745, at *6 

(D. Nev. May 4, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 317CV00342RCJVPC, 

2018 WL 3577246 (D. Nev. July 25, 2018). This the Court is loath to do. See Jacobson 

v. Schwartzenegger, 226 F.R.D. 395, 397 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“[N]either the Court nor 

opposing counsel should be required to expend time and effort searching through large 

masses of conclusory, argumentative, evidentiary and other extraneous allegations in order 

to discover whether the essentials of claims asserted can be found in such a mélange.” 

(Silver v. Queen’s Hosp., 53 F.R.D. 223, 226–27 (D. Haw. 1971)). 

Indeed, the Court finds Defendants’ proffered analogy to Herrejon v. Ocwen Loan 

Servicing, LLC, quite apt. 980 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (E.D. Cal. 2013). In that case, the district 

court dismissed the complaint under Rule 8 because, like the FAC in this case, it “lacks 

facts of defendants’ specific wrongdoing to provide fair notice as to what each defendant 

is to defend . . . . rests on overbroad conclusions that defendants are prohibited to foreclose 

on the property . . . . makes passing conclusions without supporting facts . . . . [and] lumps 

defendants . . . together and fails to distinguish adequately claims and alleged wrongs 

among defendants.” Id. at 1196–97. As observed in Herrejon, “[s]pecific identification 

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of the parties to the activities alleged by the plaintiffs is required . . . to enable the defendant 

to plead intelligently.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Upon review of the FAC, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to connect the alleged 

wrongful acts to the specific wrongdoer, and has pleaded allegations of fraud and deception 

only in the most general of terms. In doing so, Plaintiff has run roughshod not only over 

Rule 8, but also Rule 9(b), which requires Plaintiff to state fraud claims to include “the 

who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged misconduct. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 

567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009). The dearth of specific, clearly-defined allegations 

against each defendant is sufficient to warrant dismissal of the action. In addition to these 

fatal pleading deficiencies, Plaintiff’s claims are premised on legally-untenable theories 

and are subject to dismissal on the merits, as discussed below. 

B. Allegations Regarding Invalidity of Transfers and Assignments

 Even if the Court were to assume the arduous task of “disentangl[ing] and 

interpret[ing Plaintiff’s] allegations,” Kuzmicki, 2018 WL 2088745, at *6, those allegations 

would fail under Rule 12(b)(6). As far as the Court can discern, Plaintiff posits three

theories for why the foreclosure sale should be set aside. 

First, Plaintiff argues that there has been a separation of the Note and the Deed of 

Trust, the occurrence of which precludes any valid foreclosure attempt. (ECF No. 33-1, 

at 7.) Second, Plaintiff contends that irregularities in the transfer of the Note made the 

transfers ineffectual. (Id. at 8, 12, 14.) Third, Plaintiff suggests that by failing to produce 

the Note upon request, Defendants have violated RESPA, FDCPA, and committed fraud. 

(Id. at 29–31.) At their core, all three allegations rest on Plaintiff’s belief that he has a right 

to demand the Note holder to produce the actual copy of the Note, and that the Note is 

indispensable to a valid foreclosure sale.

Defendants hotly contest not only the legal basis for Plaintiff’s arguments, but also

dispute that he has standing to bring a wrongful foreclosure claim in the first place. 

Defendants point out that under California law, a borrower lacks standing to challenge an 

assignment unless the alleged defect would render the assignment voidable, not void. See 

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Yvanova v. New Cent. Mortgage Corp., 62 Cal. 4th 919, 923 (2016); see also 7 Cal. Jur. 

3d (2012) Assignments § 43 (“Where an assignment is merely voidable at the election of 

the assignor, third parties, and particularly the obligor, cannot avoid the obligation or 

successfully challenge the validity or effectiveness of the transfer.” (emphasis added)).

They argue that, although Plaintiff bears the burden of pleading that a defect in assignment 

renders the assignment void, Saterbak v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 245 Cal. App. 4th 

808, 814 (2016), Plaintiff has failed to plead any cognizable theory under which the 

assignments in question would be void. 

1. Whether Plaintiff Lacks Standing 

Plaintiff asserts that NewRez, the entity that caused Quality Loan as Trustee to 

initiate non-judicial foreclosure, lacked the requisite beneficial interest in the Loan. 

Allegations of this sort—i.e., “that the entity on whose behalf foreclosure proceedings are 

initiated lacks any legal interests in the property,”—have generally given rise to standing

“‘where the specific facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true as at the pleading stage, 

demonstrate a failure to effect a valid transfer for a beneficial interest in a manner that 

renders void the initiation of nonjudicial foreclosure.’” Sato v. U.S. Bank Trust N.A., No. 

CV 13-08469 MMM (MRWx), 2014 WL 12589339, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2014)

(quoting Mena v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 12-1257 PSG, 2012 WL 3987475, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2012)). Thus, the question becomes whether Plaintiff has sufficiently 

alleged that a void transfer occurred. 

2. Separation of the Note from the Deed of Trust

Plaintiff’s first argument for the invalidity of Defendants’ assignments rests on his 

assertion that the Note and Deed of Trust are inseparable, and that Defendants must 

produce the actual Note in order to foreclose. (See ECF No. 33-1, at 7.) For this 

proposition, Plaintiff leans on the common law rule recited by the Ninth Circuit in In re 

Veal, 450 B.R. 897, 916 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the 

former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage 

with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.” (quoting Carpenter v. Longan, 

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83 U.S. 271, 274–75 (1875)). 

Poignantly, courts have repeatedly rejected the contentions advanced by Plaintiff. 

As stated by the Court of Appeals in Debrunner, California’s comprehensive non-judicial 

foreclosure statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 2924, “does not require a beneficial interest in both 

the Note and the Deed of Trust to commence a non-judicial foreclosure sale,” and 

accordingly, the separation of the note and deed of trust does not prevent a party from 

concluding a non-judicial foreclosure sale. Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 

204 Cal. App. 4th 433, 441 (2012) (quoting Lane v. Vitek Real Estate Indus. Grp., 713 F. 

Supp. 2d 1092, 1098 (E.D. Cal. 2010)). Nor is there a rule prohibiting the separation of 

the Note from the Deed of Trust. On the contrary, both California courts and federal courts 

interpreting California law have concluded that nothing “precludes foreclosure when the 

foreclosing party does not possess the original promissory note.” Id. at 440.

Because a “party need not possess [the] promissory note to foreclose,” there is no 

reason to credit Plaintiff’s assertion that the assignments are void for want of the Note. 

Robertson v. Citibank, NA, 713 F. App’x. 612, 613 (9th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (citing 

Debrunner, 204 Cal. App. 4th at 440). Nor is there any legal basis for Plaintiff’s contention 

that the alleged separation of the Note and the Deed of Trust poses a bar to foreclosure on 

the subject property. 

3. Irregularities in the Transfer of the Note

Plaintiff also argues that missing endorsements in the chain of transfer of the Note 

vitiate Defendants’ ability to legally foreclose on his property. This argument does not 

long detain the Court.

As previously discussed, there is no requirement that the foreclosing entity be in 

possession of the note. Gamboa v. Trustee Corp. No. 09-0007 SC, 2009 WL 656285, at 

*4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009) (“[T]he statutory framework governing non-judicial 

foreclosures contains no requirement that the lender produce the original note to initiate 

the foreclosure process.”). On the contrary, foreclosure is proper when there is a valid 

chain of assignments of the Deed of Trust, and the beneficiary thereunder (or the trustee), 

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initiates foreclosure proceedings. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(a)(6) (“No entity shall record or 

cause a notice of default to be recorded or otherwise initiate the foreclosure process unless 

it is the holder of the beneficial interest under the mortgage or deed of trust, the original 

trustee or the substituted trustee under the deed of trust, or the designated agent of the 

holder of the beneficial interest.”). 

Here, Plaintiff cursorily alleges that NewRez does not have the right to initiate 

foreclosure (nor the right to direct Quality Loan to foreclose and sell the property) because 

the Note was not properly endorsed. But, these allegations are directly contradicted by 

judicially-noticed documents which show that the Deed of Trust was properly assigned—

from MERS to GMAC Mortgage, LLC, from GMAC Mortgage, LLC to Ocwen Loan 

Servicing, LLC, from Ocwen to Residential Credit Solutions, Inc. to Ditech Financial LLC, 

from Ditech to NewRez. See Gamboa, 2009 WL 656285, at *4 (rejecting borrower’s 

assertion that a beneficiary was not the holder of a properly-endorsed note because record 

documents demonstrated an unbroken chain of assignments of the Deed of Trust

concluding with the foreclosing party). Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that NewRez was 

not a beneficiary entitled to foreclose, then, cannot be heeded in light of facts which the 

Court could properly judicially notice. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 

979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (courts need not accept as true allegations that “contradict matters 

properly subject to judicial notice”)

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s argument vis-à-vis the blank endorsements on the Note fails 

for an additional reason: even assuming that the Note was necessary to foreclose (it is not), 

the blank endorsements of which Plaintiff complains do not render the Note ineffective. 

On the contrary, California permits endorsements to be made in blank. See Cal. Comm. 

Code § 3205 (providing that endorsements may either be addressed to an “identified 

person” or “indorsed in blank”). Given their clear permissibility, courts have rejected 

challenges to foreclosures based on the purported impropriety of Notes which have been 

transferred by way of blank endorsements. See, e.g., In re Smith, 509 B.R. 260, 261–66 

(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2014.) 

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4. Allegations of fraud and noncompliance with RESPA and 

FDCPA

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the assignments are void because Defendants have 

violated RESPA, FDCPA, and committed fraud during the course of their interactions with 

Plaintiff. The precise contours of Plaintiff’s pleadings are somewhat hazy, but they appear 

to allege that Defendants’ various letter communications about the Note were 

unsatisfactory, false, or misleading. 

With respect to the RESPA and FDCPA allegations, Plaintiff has defaulted on his 

obligation to prove that violations of either statute would render an assignment void. With 

respect to the former, the RESPA statute disclaims that wrongdoing thereunder may 

constitute grounds for setting aside a foreclosure sale. See 12 U.S.C. § 2615 (“Nothing in 

this Act shall affect the validity or enforceability of any sale or contract for sale of real 

property or any loan agreement, mortgage, or lien made or arising in connection with a 

federally related mortgage loan.”). And courts have remarked upon the dearth of authority 

for the proposition that noncompliance with RESPA may render an instrument void. See 

Allen v. United Financial Mortg. Corp., No. 09-2507 SC, 2010 WL 1135787, at *5 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 22, 2010). 

Plaintiff’s invocation of the FDCPA is also off the mark because, as the Ninth Circuit 

has recognized, “actions taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure . . . are not attempts 

to collect a ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.” Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 

568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017). Because Plaintiff’s purported FDCPA claim rests on attempts to 

collect on his mortgage, and the subsequent foreclosure of his property, Plaintiff has failed 

to allege facts sufficient to show defendants engaged in debt collection activity. See 15 

U.S.C. 1692(a)(5), (6); see also Banares v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-13-4896 EMC, 

2014 WL 985532, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2014) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim for 

wrongful collection of mortgage payments “fails as a matter of law because ‘foreclosing

on real property under a deed of trust is not an act to collect debt, as contemplated under 

the FDCPA.’” (quoting In re Nordeen, 495 B.R. 468, 488 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013)). 

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Plaintiff’s assertion of fraud fares no better. Plaintiff appears to claim that his 

foreclosure occurred as a result of misleading and deceptive letters issued by Defendants. 

This claim is doomed for two independent reasons. First, as discussed supra, Plaintiff has 

failed to plead fraudulent activity with the specificity demanded by Rule 9(b). Assuming 

counterfactually that Plaintiff is not halted by the Rule 9(b) bar, Plaintiff has not 

sufficiently pleaded the elements of fraud. “The necessary elements of fraud are: (1) 

misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of 

falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and 

(5) resulting damage.” Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell, 10 Cal. 4th 1266, 1239 (2016). 

Here, the Plaintiff has failed to identify any damage resulting from Defendants’ alleged 

fraudulent representations, and the Court cannot contemplate how he might go about doing 

so. 

Plaintiff became in default of his loan obligations in 2012, but asserts injury arising 

out of Defendants’ responses to Plaintiff’s questions regarding his Loan. To the best of the 

Court’s knowledge, the earliest of Plaintiff’s inquiries was submitted on August 30, 2013. 

(See ECF No. 33, at 37 (Letter from Cal-Western Reconveyance LLC, identifying 

Plaintiff’s “August 30, 2013 correspondence”).) Given that any fraudulent representations

would have taken place after Plaintiff’s default, the Court cannot see how any of the 

Defendants’ alleged actions could have caused Plaintiff any damages. See Banares, 2014 

WL 985532, at *7 (“Plaintiff alleges that she suffered damages as a result of Defendants’ 

‘illegal and fraudulent foreclosure activities,’ but does not allege how Wells Fargo’s 

response to the questions regarding her Loan servicing would have helped her avoid 

foreclosure, especially since Plaintiff was already in default prior to ending the letter.”).

5. Conclusion as to Standing

“A third party to an assignment lacks standing to challenge its effectiveness unless 

the assignment is void, as opposed to voidable.” Banares, 2014 WL 985532, at *3. Here, 

Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts and legal theories would render the assignments 

in this case void. As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his 

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claims. 

C. Failure to Tender

In any event, dismissal of Plaintiff’s FAC is overdetermined. Even if the Court were 

to assume that Plaintiff had standing, his failure to tender the amount of his indebtedness 

would doom his case. 

As Defendants point out, a defaulted borrower is “required to allege tender of the 

amount of [the lender’s] secured indebtedness in order to maintain any cause of action for 

irregularity in the sale procedure.” Abdallah v. United Savings Bank, 43 Cal. App. 4th 

1101, 1109 (1996). “The tender rule requires a plaintiff to (1) ‘demonstrate a willingness 

to pay’ and (2) ‘show the ability to pay.’” Farah v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, No. 

5:13-cv-01127-PSG, 2014 WL 261562, at *2 (Jan. 23, 2014 (quoting In re Worcester, 811 

F.2d 1224, 1231 (9th Cir. 1987)). “The rationale behind the rule is that if plaintiffs could 

not have redeemed the property had the sale procedures been proper, any irregularities in 

the sale did not result in damages to the plaintiffs.” FPCI RE-HAB 01 v. E & G 

Investments, Ltd., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 1022 (1989). 

Plaintiff has not made any offer to tender the amount still owing on the Loan. His

failure to tender the amount of his indebtedness is yet another reason why his claims cannot 

prevail. 

D. Conclusion as to the Motions to Dismiss

In sum, Plaintiff’s FAC fails for three independent reasons: it verges on the 

incomprehensible, alleges facts that do not suffice to give him standing to mount a claim 

for wrongful foreclosure, and is subject to dismissal for want of tender. As such, 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. This dismissal is without prejudice and 

Plaintiff may amend his pleading if he is inclined to cure deficiencies noted in this Order. 

Plaintiff is warned, for the second time, that a failure to comply with the strictures of Rule 

8 may result in the dismissal of his case. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion 

Because Plaintiff’s FAC was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure 

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to state a claim, Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to set aside the foreclosure sale—which was 

predicated on substantially identical arguments—necessarily fails to show a strong 

likelihood of success of the merits. See Doe v. Fed. Dist. Court. , 467 F. App’x 725, 728 

(9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (underlying the logical relationship between a complaint 

detained by Rule 12 and a request for preliminary injunction based on the same). Plaintiff’s 

Ex Parte Motion is DENIED.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s ex parte motion, (ECF No. 

13), and GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 36, 37, 38, 40, 42) with 

leave to amend. If Plaintiff seeks to avail himself of the opportunity to file a Second 

Amended Complaint, he must do so within 30 days of the entry of this order. Any such 

filing must address the deficiencies outlined in this Order. The motion hearing set for 

March 15, 2019 at 1:30 PM is hereby VACATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 11, 2019

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