Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01080/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01080-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER T. ZISKIN,

Petitioner,

v.

MARION SPEARMAN, Warden, et

al.,

Respondents.

 

 

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Case No. 14-CV-1080-W (JMA)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

[ECF No. 8]

In 2006, a jury convicted Petitioner Peter T. Ziskin (“Petitioner”) of

seventeen (17) felony counts of committing a lewd act upon a child. 

Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). (ECF

No. 1.) Respondent Marion Spearman, Warden (“Respondent”), has filed a

motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was untimely filed. 

(ECF No. 8.) Petitioner opposes the motion, arguing, among other things,

that he is entitled to an exception to the statute of limitations because he is

actually innocent. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends

that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED and that the Petition be

DISMISSED as untimely.

//

//

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I. Procedural Background

Petitioner, while a teacher at Rincon Middle School (“Rincon”) in

Escondido, California, was accused by Information with twenty-six (26)

counts of lewd act upon a child in violation of Cal. Penal Code section

288(a). (Lodgment No. 2, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) vol. 1, 12-22.) The jury

trial commenced on April 24, 2006. (Lodgment No. 1, Reporter’s Transcript

(“RT”) vol. 2.) On May 31, 2006, the jury found Petitioner guilty of

seventeen (17) of the lewd act on a child counts, with true findings the

violations were committed against more than one victim in violation of

Penal Code sections 667.61(b), (c)(8), and (e)(5). (Lodgment No. 1, RT

vol. 13; Lodgment No. 2, CT vol. 5, 952-77.) Petitioner was acquitted on

six (6) counts of lewd act on a child, and the jury was unable to reach a

verdict on the remaining three (3) of those counts as well as on a

substantial sexual conduct charge. (Id.) On July 18, 2006, the trial court

sentenced Petitioner to fifteen (15) years to life on each of the guilty

counts, to run concurrently. (Lodgment No. 1, RT vol. 14; Lodgment No. 2,

CT vol. 5, 1055-57.)

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District. 

(Lodgment Nos. 3-5.) On April 23, 2008, the appellate court affirmed the

convictions and sentence. (Lodgment No. 6.) Petitioner filed a petition for

rehearing; the appellate court issued an order modifying its opinion and

denying the petition for rehearing on May 8, 2008. (Lodgment Nos. 7-8.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court,

which was denied without comment on July 23, 2008. (Lodgment Nos. 9-

10.)

On October 22, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

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corpus with the San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 12.)1 An order

for hearing was issued on September 26, 2011, and an evidentiary hearing

was conducted over several days in early 2012. (Lodgment Nos. 13-14.) 

On April 27, 2012, the habeas petition was denied. (Lodgment No. 15.) 

The five claims addressed by the state habeas court included: (1) whether

Petitioner was preventing from testifying at trial by his attorneys; 

(2) whether Petitioner’s trial counsel were incompetent for failing to call a

Stoll2

 expert; (3) whether new testimony provided by victim Juan M. and his

mother required a granting of the writ; (4) whether there was a conspiracy

between some of the boys to get Petitioner convicted; and (5) whether

there had been a Brady3

 violation. (Id.) On August 14, 2012, Petitioner

filed a habeas petition with the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment Nos.

16-17.)4

 On October 3, 2012, the petition was denied. (Lodgment No. 18.) 

Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court,

which was denied without comment on December 12, 2012. (Lodgment

Nos. 19-21.)

On April 29, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

1

Petitioner’s initial state habeas petition bears a file date of January 12, 2010. (See Lodgment No. 12.) It appears that Petitioner initially filed the habeas petition in the Civil Business Office of San Diego Superior Court on October 22,

2009. On January 12, 2010, the petition was filed in the Criminal Business Office

of the court. (See Lodgment No. 11 at 2; Resp.’s Mem., ECF No. 8-1 at 16-17.) 

2

People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136 (1989), which provides that under California’s rules of evidence, an accused may present expert opinion testimony

to show his nondisposition to commit a charged sex offense.

3

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), which holds that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused (exculpatory

information) violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or

punishment, irrespective of the good faith of the prosecutor. 

4

Petitioner initially filed his habeas petition with the California Court of Appeal on July 17, 2012, but the appellate court denied Petitioner’s request for

leave to file an oversized brief and denied the petition without prejudice. (See

Lodgment No. 16 at 3.) Petitioner filed an edited and reduced petition on August

14, 2012. (Id.)

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Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court, setting forth four claims: 

(1) Petitioner was denied his right to testify due to trial counsel’s and the

trial court’s failures to advise him of that right; (2) newly discovered

evidence demonstrates his actual innocence; (3) the prosecutor committed

misconduct by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence; and (4) the trial

court erred by allowing the prosecutor to shift the burden of proof. (Pet. &

Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 1 at 9-12 & 18-38.) Respondent filed a motion to

dismiss the petition as untimely on June 3, 2014. (ECF No. 8.) Petitioner

filed an opposition on August 12, 2014. (ECF No. 12.) 

II. Statute of Limitations Under the AEDPA

The statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) applies to Petitioner’s presentation of claims in this

Court. Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286-87

(9th Cir. 1997), as amended on denial of rhg. and rhg. en banc, cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998), overruled on other grounds in Calderon v.

U.S. District Court, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 523 U.S.

1063 (1999). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1): 

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from

the latest of -- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or 

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The conclusion of direct review of

Petitioner’s conviction occurred on July 23, 2008, when the California

Supreme Court denied the petition for review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A);

see also Clay v. U.S., 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003). Adding the ninety days

within which a petition for a writ of certiorari may be filed, Wixom v.

Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001), the date on which

Petitioner’s conviction became final was October 21, 2008. Petitioner had

until one year later, October 21, 2009, to file his federal habeas petition. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.

2001). Petitioner, however, did not file his federal habeas petition until

April 29, 2014, over four (4) years after the limitations period expired. 

Absent grounds for statutory or equitable tolling, delayed accrual, or some

other exception to the statute of limitations, the Petition is time-barred. 

A. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the “time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). “An application

for post-conviction review is pending while a California petitioner completes

a full round of state collateral review, including during the period between

(1) a lower court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a

notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely

under state law.” Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 724 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citations and internal quotations omitted, emphasis omitted). In California,

“[a]s long as the prisoner filed a petition for appellate review within a

‘reasonable time,’ he could count as ‘pending’ (and add to the 1-year time

limit) the days between (1) the time the lower state court reached an

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adverse decision, and (2) the day he filed a petition in the higher state

court.” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (citing Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 222-23 (2002)).

Here, Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on, at the earliest,

October 22, 2009, one day after the AEDPA statute of limitations ended. 

(See Section I. & n.1, supra.) Thus, the pendency of that petition, or any

other habeas petition filed subsequently by Petitioner, could not toll the

already-expired limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See

Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that statutory

tolling is not available when first state habeas petition is filed after the

AEDPA limitations period has expired). Statutory tolling cannot revive a

limitations period that has already ended; it can only serve to pause a clock

that has not already run. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th

Cir. 2003); Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1247. Once the federal limitations period

has ended, the filing of a state habeas petition cannot revive it. Ferguson,

321 F.3d at 823; Jiminez, 276 F.3d at 482. 

Moreover, as Respondent contends, there is a second period of time

which is also sufficient to find the Petition untimely. Even assuming

Petitioner’s first state habeas petition was timely filed, and tolling was in

effect until the California Supreme Court’s denial of the petition for review

on December 12, 2012, more than one year elapsed between December

12, 2012 and April 29, 2014, when Petitioner filed his federal habeas

petition.

Therefore, unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling or delayed

accrual under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), the limitation period expired on

October 21, 2009.5

5

The Court notes that Petitioner expressly states he does not rely on the applicability of statutory tolling. (Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 4.)

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B. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling requires Petitioner to establish two elements: 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Equitable tolling is available only if some “external

force” beyond the Petitioner’s direct control caused the untimeliness. 

Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2011). Equitable tolling

is unavailable in most cases, and “the threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling . . . is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Although Petitioner does not concede that equitable tolling does not

apply, he states, “[T]he Petition is not premised on the theory that the

statutory time was tolled. Rather, the Petition was prompted by newly

discovered evidence which demonstrates Petitioner’s factual innocence

and premised on the exception discussed in [McQuiggin v. Perkins, --- U.S.

----, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013) ].” (Opp’n, ECF No. 12 at 4 n.2.) Further, he

states, “Whether equitable tolling . . . might apply . . . is not the issue

presented here[,]” as well as “That Petitioner has not relied on . . . equitable

tolling is made clear in the Petition and the Declaration attached to it.” (Id.

at 4 (emphasis in original).) 

As Petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating either

diligence or extraordinariness, the AEDPA’s statute of limitations should

not be equitably tolled in his case.

C. Delayed Accrual

Although neither party has briefed “delayed accrual” under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D), that is, that the belated discovery of exculpatory evidence

may have delayed the commencement of the limitations period until the

date on which Petitioner knew or should have known the factual basis for

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his claims, the Court will briefly address it here. Petitioner contends that,

“The new evidence at issue in this petition was discovered long after trial

and after Petitioner was sentenced to state prison.” (Dunn Decl. in Supp.

of Pet., ECF No. 1 at 16.) Specifically, he states the new evidence was not

discovered until the state court held a hearing on Petitioner’s state habeas

petition in 2012. (Mem. in Supp. of Pet., ECF No. 1 at 24; Lodgment No.

14.) Even if delayed accrual under subsection (D) of section 2244(d)(1)

were appropriate, and the commencement of the limitations period did not

begin until 2012, because the federal habeas petition was not filed until

2014, more than one year later, the limitation period under AEDPA was

expired.

In sum, after considering statutory tolling, equitable tolling, and

delayed accrual, the Court concludes the Petition was not filed within

AEDPA’s one-year limitations period and, absent a showing of actual

innocence, is time-barred.

D. Actual Innocence Exception

Petitioner contends that the statute of limitations does not bar

consideration of the Petition because he is actually innocent. (Dunn Decl.

in Supp. of Pet. & Mem. in Supp. of Pet., ECF No. 1 at 16 & 32-33; Opp’n,

ECF No. 12 at 1-7.) 

The Supreme Court recently held that the statute of limitations under

AEDPA may be overcome by a showing of actual innocence. See

McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct at 1928. This exception to the statute of limitations,

however, applies only when the petitioner shows “that it is more likely than

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the

new evidence.” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327

(1995)). “[A] credible claim of actual innocence constitutes an equitable

exception to AEDPA’s limitations period, and a petitioner who makes such

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a showing may pass through the Schlup gateway and have his otherwise

time-barred claims heard on the merits.” Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929,

932 (9th Cir. 2011). In order to pass through the Schlup gateway, a

petitioner must produce such proof of his actual innocence as to bring him

“within the narrow class of cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage

of justice.” Id. at 937 (quotations and citation omitted). In order to fit within

the exception, a petitioner is required “to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence–whether it be exculpatory

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical

evidence–that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. “The

habeas court then ‘consider[s] all the evidence, old and new, incriminating

and exculpatory,” admissible at trial or not.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 938 (citing

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) and Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d

463, 477-78 (9th Cir. 1997)). The emphasis on “actual innocence” allows

the district court to consider all relevant evidence that was either excluded

or unavailable at trial. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-38. “On this complete

record, the court makes a ‘probabilistic determination about what

reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.’” Lee, 653 F.3d at 938

(citing House, 547 U.S. at 538). 

“[T]enable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare[.]” McQuiggin,

133 S.Ct. at 1928. “[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement

unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no

juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329. In making this assessment,

“the court may consider how the timing of the [petition] and the likely

credibility of the affiants bear on the probable reliability of that evidence.” 

Id. at 332. A petitioner’s diligence is considered not discretely, but rather

“as part of the assessment whether actual innocence has been

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convincingly shown.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1936. “In conducting a

Schlup gateway review, [the court’s] ‘function is not to make an

independent factual determination about what likely occurred, but rather to

assess the likely impact of the evidence on reasonable jurors.’” Stewart v.

Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing House, 547 U.S. at 538). 

“[C]laims of actual innocence are rarely successful.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at

324. Only when the petitioner “presents evidence of innocence so strong

that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the

court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional

error” may the petitioner pass through the Schlup gateway and have the

court consider his petition on the merits. Stewart, 757 F.3d at 937 (quoting

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). 

1. Evidence Presented at Trial

The following summary is taken from the California Court of Appeal’s

opinion in People v. Peter Thomas Ziskin, No. D049152, slip op. (Cal. Ct.

App. Apr. 23, 2008). (See Lodgment No. 6.)6

Ziskin was convicted of committing numerous lewd acts with his

male students from August 2004 through January 2005 while

he was a sixth and seventh grade teacher at Rincon Middle

School. Ziskin’s male students would frequently wrestle with

him, initiating the activity by jumping on him and laughing. 

Ziskin would lift the boys up, flip them over his shoulder, and

spin them around. The lewd touching typically occurred during

the course of this activity.

On January 14, 2005, instructional aide Nancy Kramar was in

Ziskin’s classroom assisting students. After the bell rang and

only a few students were in the classroom, Kramar saw Ziskin

pick up a boy and swing him around, with his hand touching

“outside [the boy’s] pants in the area of the crotch.” Kramar felt

uncomfortable about her observation. On January 18, 2005,

6

After independent review of the record, the Court adopts the California Court of Appeal’s factual summary as a fair and accurate summary of the

evidence presented at trial. The factual summary is entitled to a presumption of

correctness pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See, e.g., Tilcock v. Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

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Kramar went to Ziskin’s classroom during Ziskin’s lunch period

to leave him a message about a change in her assignment. 

When she walked into the classroom, Ziskin was holding a boy

(David) on his shoulders and spinning the boy around. When

Ziskin saw Kramar, he put the boy down. Kramar saw Ziskin’s

hand “struggle a couple of times as he tried to get his hand out

of the boy’s pants.” Kramar observed Ziskin’s hand was “pretty

deep” inside the front of David’s pants because he had to

struggle to get it out. There were no other people in the room

other than Ziskin and David. Kramar reported the incidents to

the school administration.

During the ensuing investigation, numerous boys (including

David) revealed that on some occasions while wrestling with

Ziskin in the classroom, Ziskin put his hand in their pants and

touched their penises. We summarize the boys’ testimony.

David

While lifting David up during wrestling activity, Ziskin touched

David’s “private part” under his clothes with his hand. This

happened in the classroom on more than two occasions. At

first David thought the touching was accidental. Sometimes

Ziskin’s hand was still, and other times his hand rubbed David’s

“dick.” David felt “weird” from the touching, and David stopped

playing with Ziskin because he did not want to be touched in

this manner.

Brandon

While they were wrestling, Ziskin lifted Brandon up and stuck

his hand in his pants under his underwear and touched his

penis. Sometimes Ziskin would just put his hand over

Brandon’s penis and sometimes he would rub Brandon’s penis. 

The touching occurred in the classroom during passing periods,

and happened on more than two occasions.

Juan

When Ziskin was wrestling with Juan and spinning him around,

Ziskin put his hand inside Juan’s pants and touched him on his

“manhood” under his underwear. The touching occurred on

about five occasions in the classroom, when there were about

15 or more students in the classroom. Juan initially thought the

touching was accidental. Juan viewed the touching as a “[b]ad”

touching. The touching made him feel uncomfortable and

“weird” because “no one really touches [him] there.” 

Charles

When Ziskin was wrestling with Charles, Ziskin put his hand

under Charles’s pants, picked him up, and swung him in a

circle. On several occasions during this activity, while Ziskin

was picking Charles up off the floor, Ziskin’s hand touched

Charles’s penis under his boxers. This touching occurred in the

classroom after school on more than two occasions. On one

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occasion it happened when they were alone in the classroom. 

Ziskin’s hand was moving when it was touching Charles’s

penis. At first Charles thought the touching was innocent, until

Ziskin kept touching his penis. One time, when Charles’s penis

was between Ziskin’s ring and middle fingers, Charles said,

“Ow.” Ziskin responded as if the touching was a joke. The

touching felt “wrong” and “uncomfortable.”

Gabriel

On several occasions Ziskin picked Gabriel up off the ground

and swung him around, and while doing so touched Gabriel’s

“dick” with his hand underneath Gabriel’s boxers. Sometimes

Ziskin would put Gabriel back down to “get a better grip” of

Gabriel’s pants and his “dick.” The touching made Gabriel feel

uncomfortable. He viewed it as a “bad kind” of touching,

explaining that “usually if someone was going to pick [him] up,

they wouldn’t pick [him] up underneath the boxers.” The

touching occurred on more than two occasions, and happened

mostly after school when Gabriel would stay for help with

homework. 

On one occasion when Gabriel was in the classroom with

another victim (Luis) and Ziskin picked Gabriel up, Gabriel

stated, “Stop. You’re touching my balls.” Ziskin responded,

“Oh, sorry.” Corroborating Gabriel’s testimony, Luis testified

that he saw Ziskin put his hand under Gabriel’s boxers, and

Gabriel told him to stop because he was touching his “balls.” 

Three or four days after this incident, Ziskin again touched

Gabriel’s penis. 

Luis

When they were wrestling, Ziskin picked Luis up and spun him

around. One two occasions while doing so, Ziskin “cupped

[Luis’s] private,” touching his “balls” with his hand over his

clothes. This happened after school in the classroom. At first

Luis thought the touching was accidental. Luis thought the

touching was a “bad” touching. It made Luis feel “weird,” and

he stated to Ziskin, “What are you doing?” 

Nick G.

On one occasion after school when Nick G. was in the

classroom wrestling with Ziskin, Ziskin straddled Nick while

Nick was laying on the floor. Ziskin “stuck his hand down

[Nick’s] pants” and touched his “private areas.” The touching

felt “[v]ery inappropriate” and Nick G. felt “violated.” Nick G.

told Ziskin to stop, and Ziskin responded that he thought they

could just play around.

Nick M.

On one occasion when Ziskin and Nick M. were alone in the

classroom, Ziskin made Nick M. uncomfortable by “putting [him]

upside down and putting his hand down [his] pants.” When

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Ziskin put his hand down Nick M.’s pants, Ziskin touched his

private part. Ziskin’s hand was moving; Nick M.’s private part

was hard; and the touching lasted for about one minute. After

this touching, Ziskin told Nick M. that they were “buddies” and

that if Nick M. told anyone Ziskin would get into trouble. After

this incident, Nick M. did not engage in the flipping activity

again. Ziskin asked him if he would like to be flipped again,

and Nick M. told him no.

Defense and Rebuttal

In his defense, Ziskin presented numerous character witnesses

who testified that they frequently observed Ziskin play with

children and never observed any inappropriate touching. 

Further, two defense experts (Drs. Phillip Esplin and Thomas

Streed) testified regarding factors that affect memory and

create suggestibility.2 During its rebuttal case, the prosecution

presented four taped interviews of the victims that were made

during the case investigation. In surrebutal, Dr. Streed opined

that one of the taped interviews was conducted in a suggestive

manner.

Jury Verdict

The jury found Ziskin guilty of 17 counts of lewd act on a child

under age 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)), with true findings that the

violations were committed against more than one victim (§

667.61, subds. (b), (c)(8), (e)(5)). The jury acquitted Ziskin of

six alleged lewd act counts. The jury was unable to reach a

verdict on three alleged lewd act counts and was unable to

reach a verdict that Ziskin engaged in substantial sexual

conduct with victim Nick M.3 Ziskin was sentenced to 15 years

to life.

2 Suggestibility is “a term that relates to factors that

can influence or impact the alteration or changing of

memory.”

3 The jury’s verdicts were as follows: (1) three

guilty counts for David; (2) two guilty counts and

one hung count for Brandon; (3) three guilty counts,

two not guilty counts, and one hung count for Juan;

(4) three guilty counts for Charles; (5) two guilty

counts and one hung count for Gabriel; (6) two

guilty counts for Luis; (7) one guilty count for Nick

G.; and (8) one guilty count for Nick M. The jury

was unable to reach a verdict on the sole allegation

of substantial sexual conduct (masturbation), which

was alleged for Nick M. Additionally, the jury found

Ziskin not guilty of three counts involving Rincon

Middle School student Erick R., and not guilty of

one count involving a boy (Jesse) who was not a

Rincon Middle School student and who described a

touching of his upper leg at night while he was

sleeping, which occurred when Ziskin was visiting

the boy’s residence. 

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(Lodgment No. 6 at 2-7.) 

2. “New” Evidence

In support of his claim that he falls within the actual innocence

exception to the statute of limitations, Petitioner relies on the following

evidence: the testimony of Rosa Colima Mendez, the mother of victim

Juan M., that she overheard some of the boys saying at the courthouse

that they might make money if their testimony led to their teacher going to

jail; the testimony of victim Juan M. that he and his friends believed they

would receive money if they testified against Petitioner, and that he did not

tell the truth when he testified at trial; the declaration of former Rincon

student Marcus A. that he talked to other boys at school about making

money by making accusations against Petitioner; the declaration of former

Rincon student Eric Molho that he heard many of his classmates talking

about accusing Petitioner of touching them so they could get money; the

declaration of Kalara Wilk, a former Rincon student, that some of the

victims had “smug” expressions on their faces at school; the declaration of

Victoria Draper Stubblefield, a teacher at Rincon, that the situation with

Petitioner was “a big joke to these kids”; the declaration of Mary Jo Blaze, a

teacher at Rincon, that Petitioner’s “horseplay” with the students “wasn’t

anything sexual”; the declaration of William Bradler, a former student at

Rincon, that there was a “buzz” around the school about how kids would be

getting money and everyone was “jumping on the bandwagon”; the

declaration of Claire Molho, a school volunteer, that there was “scuttlebutt”

around the school that the boys accusing Petitioner were getting money for

testifying; the declaration of Shelby Atkins, a former student at Rincon, that

some of the victims were standing around at school, laughing about telling

the police that Petitioner had “grabbed their junk” so he would get fired; the

declaration of Sheila Atkins, Shelby’s mother, that her daughter was upset

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about boys getting Petitioner into trouble by lying; the declaration of Susan

Scott, a teacher at Rincon, that the accusing students were allowed to talk

to each other in between giving their statements to school administrators

and/or the police; and the declaration of Donald Ziskin, Petitioner’s cousin

and an attorney, that victim Nick G. filed a lawsuit against Petitioner and

the Escondido School District. (Mem. in Supp. of Pet., ECF No. 1 at 24-

30.)7

 

a. Testimony of Rosa Colima Mendez

On February 16, 2012, Rosa Colima Mendez testified at the

evidentiary hearing held by the San Diego Superior Court on Petitioner’s

habeas petition. (CT, Lodgment No. 14 at 4-5; Mendez Test., Lodgment

No. 17 vol. 3, Ex. 4.)8

 Mendez, who speaks Spanish and testified with the

assistance of an interpreter, testified that she accompanied her son to court

for what is believed to have been the preliminary hearing. At that time, she

was sitting in a cafeteria or TV room in the courthouse near three of the

boys, including her son, who were having a conversation in Spanish. 

Mendez testified the boys “were saying that they were all in this case and

in case the teacher would be sent to jail, then they might get some money.” 

(Mendez Test. at 75-76.) Mendez claims she informed the prosecutor,

Tracy Prior, about the conversation during one of Prior’s visits to her

home.9

7

The Court considers all of the documents and exhibits presented by Petitioner without regard to their admissibility, as Schlup makes clear that the

Court “is not bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Moreover, neither party has objected to the Court considering any of the lodged documents or exhibits submitted by the other. 

8

Ms. Mendez also signed a declaration on September 26, 2010 and provided a videotaped interview to an investigator working on behalf of Petitioner

on September 30, 2010. (Lodgment No. 17 vol. 3, Ex. 3.)

9

There is no indication in the record before the Court whether it was ever

established that Mendez indeed notified Prior about this conversation.

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Before Mendez’s son, Juan M., talked to the police about his

allegations, he told her that Petitioner had accidentally touched the area

covered by his pants, around the genital area. Juan told her that he had

been playing with Petitioner, Petitioner tried to grab his pants, and the

pants broke. Prior to her 2012 testimony at the habeas evidentiary

hearing, Mendez had not been aware that Petitioner had once pulled up

Juan’s shirt and blown a “raspberry” on his stomach. Mendez stated she

had seen her son cry on different occasions as he was “so regretful that he

had not done anything to help his teacher” and that “he had continued to

say the same thing because of what his classmates had been saying.” (Id.

at 90.) She has always believed Petitioner was innocent, based on what

she overheard at the courthouse, as well as her own personal observation

of Petitioner as a teacher. 

b. Testimony of Juan M.

Juan M.10 also testified on February 16, 2012 at the evidentiary

hearing held by the San Diego Superior Court on Petitioner’s habeas

petition. (CT, Lodgment No. 14 at 4-5; Morales Test., Lodgment No. 17

vol. 3, Ex. 6.)11 He recalls being brought into a room at the courthouse with

a TV with 10 to 13 of the other kids involved in the case and their parents. 

The parents were speaking in Spanish, and the kids were speaking in

English. He testified, “I personally was excited. And I’m sure a few other

kids were also, because we were, we were under an assumption that we

were probably going to get some money if we kind of went through with this

10Juan’s full name is Juan Carlos Morales. Although he is now an adult, the Court refers to him as “Juan” for consistency with the trial and appellate record in

this case. The Court will do the same with respect to all individuals who provided

trial testimony as a minor.

11Juan also signed a declaration on October 5, 2010 and provided a videotaped interview to an investigator working on behalf of Petitioner on

September 30, 2010. (Lodgment No. 17 vol. 3, Ex. 5.)

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whole thing.” (Morales Test. at 12.) A classmate, Marcus A., led the

discussion of a group of at least five kids, which included Charles,

Brandon, and himself, about receiving money for their testimony. Juan

assumed he would receive money based on what he had seen in the news

about the Michael Jackson and sexual harassment cases, and thought,

“Sweet, like this . . . this thing happened . . . maybe I’m going to get money

. . . .” (Id. at 18.) Marcus first brought up the idea of receiving money after

all the boys had already given their accounts to the police detectives at

school. The boys talked about this multiple times at school and once at

Brandon’s house. Juan elaborated, “We just went with what Marcus was

saying because as kids you don’t want to be the outsider of your group and

you don’t want to be the loser and the one that everyone picks on, . . . so I

went with what they were saying just so I could fit in with our group, my

friends.” (Id. at 23.) When asked exactly what this meant, he stated,

“Specifically that we were kind of going to exaggerate the truth a little bit,

us saying that, uhmm, we did feel molested, because now as an adult I

know the difference between a sexual touching and accidental touching

and a touching that’s completely innocent, . . . .” (Id.) 

Juan further testified:

As kids we thought it was funny, weird, we felt

disturbed that a sort of touching happened on us

but we didn’t understand the real meaning of that

touching . . . . [¶] My exaggeration of the truth is

that really I didn’t feel molested at all because he

wasn’t trying to like give me oral sex or saying come

hang out with me, I’ll take you to the movies, or it’s

raining, do you want a ride home, like let’s hang out

at your house, like none of that ever happened and

I’m sure it wouldn’t have happened anyways . . . .

I think the thing that only really does disturb me a

little bit was, uhmm . . . when he -- he blew on my

stomach and that was really it. Because I think the

time that he did touch my penis it was a complete

accident, I know it is, because . . . I roughhouse,

too, I even wrestled, and sometimes I did happen to

accidentally touch another boy, but I never said do

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you want to come back to my house and have sex

now, like, no, because I know the difference of

when you’re actually playing and when you’re not

and when you mean something for sexual

gratification and when it’s just . . . not . . . when it’s a

complete accident. 

(Id. at 24, 26, 27.) Juan testified that he exaggerated at trial when he

stated that Petitioner had touched him more than six times, when in

actuality, Petitioner touched his “penis and balls” on only one occasion,

hand-to-skin, when his pants broke. (Id. at 32, 67-68.)12 Most of the time

when he wrestled with Petitioner, Petitioner would grab him by the

waistband of his pants. 

Juan testified the following about not being completely truthful:

It even happened when I was talking to the detectives,

uhmm . . . it was mainly about the way I felt about it,

because . . . I didn’t feel molested how I told you, I really

didn’t, and the number of occasions that this thing

happened, I was . . . lying about the numbers. [¶] And I

know I wasn’t because he didn’t do it, I know he didn’t do

it for sexual gratification because he never -- like that

occasion that my pants ripped, he never said why don’t

you just take them off or why don’t you get naked, he

never said that. And I know a pedophile would of, he

would have taken advantage of that situation of having a

student in his classroom with pants broken, he might as

well said just take them off.

(Id. at 41.) Juan adored Petitioner as a student, and still does. He did not

understand, as a kid, the severity of what he was doing when he testified

against Petitioner, and now feels horrible as he feels he wrongfully accused

him. He feels ashamed and guilty that he lied and that Petitioner is in

prison. He has been wrestling with this for a long time and it is emotional

for him. Juan’s mother has always told him that she thought Petitioner was

innocent, because she felt he had lied, and his entire family criticized him

for testifying against Petitioner.

12Juan actually testified at trial that Petitioner touched him around five times. (Lodgment No. 6 at 4.) 

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c. Marcus A. Declaration

Marcus A.,13 the alleged ringleader of the “testify against Ziskin for

money” conversations, signed a declaration on March 22, 2011. (Arguelles

Decl., Lodgment No. 17 vol. 3, Ex. 7.) He states,

The incident occurred right after the Michael

Jackson molestation case. Myself and the other

kids thought we could make a lot of money in this

case also. What started as a game became

serious, and we couldn’t back down. We made a

mistake, but being so young, most of us were 12-13

years of age, we didn’t know any better, and instead

of backing off, we made it worse by making

outlandish allegations against our teacher Peter

Ziskin.

(Id.)

14 

d. Declarations of Eric Molho, Kalara Wilk, Victoria Draper Stubblefield, Mary Jo Blaze, William Bradler,

Claire Molho, Shelby Atkins, Sheila Atkins, Mary Jo

Scott, and Donald Ziskin

Petitioner’s “new” evidence includes ten declarations regarding the

boys allegedly testifying for money, the boys’ demeanor at school, and

students “jumping on the bandwagon” to make allegations against

Petitioner. It is important to note that five of the witnesses are not “new” at

all, as they testified on Petitioner’s behalf at trial (Sheila Atkins, Shelby

Atkins, Eric Molho, William Bradler, and Mary Jo Blaze) and presumably

had an earlier opportunity to inform Petitioner’s defense team of their

observations, now being presented as new evidence, dated six years after

Petitioner’s trial.

Eric Molho, a former student at Rincon, states there was constant talk

at school about kids making money by saying Petitioner had touched them. 

13Marcus’s full name is Marcus Arguelles. 

14Although Marcus testified at Petitioner’s preliminary hearing on September 8, 2005 (see Lodgment No. 17 vol. 3, Ex. 8), for reasons unclear in the record before the Court, the prosecutor elected not to seek charges against

Petitioner in relation to Marcus. 

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(Lodgment No. 17 vol. 3, Ex. 21.) Gabe F. told him, “Oh, yeah, I’m in this

for the money.” (Id.) Kalara Wilk, a former student at Rincon, attests that

the boys, and especially Gabe and Luis, had “smug” expressions on their

faces, and the boys made jokes about Petitioner and the situation all the

time, likening Petitioner to Michael Jackson. (Id., Ex. 22.) Victoria Draper

Stubblefield, a teacher at Rincon, states the boys involved in the case, that

she had in her class, laughed, talked, and made innuendos about the case

all the time. (Id., Ex. 23.) She believes, “[T]his was a big joke to these

kids.” (Id.) Mary Jo Blaze, a teacher at Rincon, states that another teacher

told her, “I wouldn’t believe any of these kids,” because the boys discussed

getting money from the case and the things they were going to buy with the

money. (Id., Ex. 24.) She also observed Petitioner roughhousing with

students: “I saw him once with a kid over his head, and yes, his hand was

inside the waist area of the kid’s pants, but that was only so he didn’t drop

the kid.” (Id.) William Bradler, a former student at Rincon whose family

was close to Petitioner, states there was a “buzz” around school about how

the kids would be getting money, and it felt like everyone was “jumping on

the bandwagon.” (Id., Ex. 25.) He also attests that he spent “an enormous

amount of unsupervised time alone” with Petitioner and Petitioner never

acted inappropriately. (Id.) 

Claire Molho, a school volunteer (her son is Eric Molho, discussed

above), attests that the one of the children being questioned by police

detectives at school “stormed out of the office clearly upset,” looked back,

and yelled, “I told you that nothing happened!” (Id., Ex. 26.) She heard

“scuttlebutt” around the school that the kids were getting money for

testifying. (Id.) Shelby Atkins, a former student at Rincon, overheard

approximately six boys hanging out at school, laughing and joking, saying

they were going to tell the police that Petitioner had “grabbed their junk” so

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he would get fired. (Id., Ex. 27.) The boys stated they hated Petitioner

and this would be a good way to get rid of him. (Id.) Sheila Atkins,

Shelby’s mother, attests that her daughter was very upset by the

allegations and told her before Petitioner was arrested that the boys were

going to make things up to get Petitioner fired. (Id., Ex. 28.) Susan Scott,

a teacher at Rincon, states that students who accused Petitioner were

allowed to talk to each other in between giving their statements to school

administrators and/or the police. (Id., Ex. 29.) She told the vice principal,

“You can’t take these kids out and bring them back to talk to the other kids

because they are all talking to one another; they are contaminating each

interview.” (Id.) She is unable to provide the names of the students who

spoke with one another and would have to see a yearbook to do so. (Id.) 

Donald Ziskin, Petitioner’s cousin, attests that victim Nick G. filed a lawsuit

against Petitioner and the Escondido School District, alleging that

Petitioner had touched him during the interval between instructional aide

Nancy Kramar’s witnessing of incidents involving Petitioner and when she

reported the incidents to school administrators, thereby subjecting the

school district to liability, as the lawsuit claimed the school, via Ms. Kramar,

had notice of the allegations but failed to act upon them. (Id., Ex. 30.) 

e. Analysis

The Court has reviewed the evidence cumulatively, and has

thoroughly considered the additional evidence proffered by Petitioner and

its potential exculpatory effect. The Court finds that Petitioner has not

made the showing required by Schlup that he is actually innocent, as he

has not shown that his new evidence undermines the evidence presented

at trial to such a degree that no reasonable juror, considering fairly all the

evidence presented, would convict him. 

The gist of Petitioner’s new evidence is that the boys who accused

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Petitioner of touching them were motivated by the prospect of receiving

money, planned collectively to say that Petitioner had touched them, and

did not tell the truth at trial. The Court has carefully reviewed the trial

testimony of each of the victims and finds the testimony is not indicative of

shared, planned stories. Although the boys’ testimony was certainly similar

and consistent in many respects, it was not so identical as to appear to

have been contrived. The boys’ stories had varying details, including about

the touchings, and the boys used different terminology to describe which

parts of their bodies had been affected. Importantly, many of the boys

acknowledged details that would not be considered favorable to or

consistent with their accusations, such as that they liked Petitioner as a

teacher, they initially thought the touches were accidental, and they kept

seeking Petitioner out to “wrestle” even after touches had occurred. In the

Court’s view, the boys’ testimony rings of truth, not of perjury. Moreover,

evidence other than the boys’ testimony implicated Petitioner, including

Kramar’s observations (“His hand was inside the boy’s pants and pretty

deep because he had to struggle to get it out”) and that one of the victims

observed by Kramar, David, was questioned by assistant principal Marty

Hranek on the very day of Kramar’s report, before anyone knew about any

accusations against Petitioner, and confirmed Kramar’s observations. 

(Lodgment No. 1, RT vol. 4, 549; vol. 5, 610.)

The state habeas court did not believe the testimony of either Juan

M. or his mother to be accurate or candid (Lodgment No. 15 at 3), and this

Court finds the same. Ms. Mendez’s testimony contained a marked

number of inconsistencies, and she appeared to be guided by her

longstanding belief in Petitioner’s innocence. There is also a discrepancy

between Juan’s and his mother’s testimony about whether the boys were

speaking in English or Spanish during the courthouse conversation,

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bringing into question whether Ms. Mendez actually heard or understood

the conversation, and whether the conversation really ever occurred. 

Juan’s testimony appears to have been motivated by his conflicted and

guilty feelings about having testified against Petitioner, as well as his desire

to help Petitioner, as evidenced by his reaching out to the other boys who

had been involved in the case for their assistance in Petitioner’s habeas

proceedings. 

Even assuming arguendo that the testimony of Ms. Mendez and Juan

at the state court habeas evidentiary hearing was completely credible, it

was not wholly inconsistent with the testimony that Juan provided at

Petitioner’s trial, and has not caused the court to lose confidence in the

outcome of the trial. Although Juan now claims he did not tell the truth at

the trial, only a small portion of his new testimony contradicts what he said

at trial. For example, at trial, he testified that Petitioner touched him on

more than five occasions. He now says Petitioner touched him “hand-toskin” on only one occasion. He does not refute, however, that Petitioner

grabbed him by the waistband of his pants when they wrestled on many

other occasions. Juan now claims that he never felt “molested,” despite

having testified that he felt the touching was “bad.” As an adult with the

benefit of life experience, as well as an understanding of the full

consequences of having testified against Petitioner, Juan believes that

Petitioner had no sexual motivation when he wrestled with Juan or touched

his genital area. Juan, however, is ascribing his own view of Petitioner’s

intent onto the events that transpired, and is speculating about Petitioner’s

intent. At trial, intent was one of the critical elements considered by the

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jury.15 It was up to the jury to determine whether touching had occurred

and if so, whether it was criminal, i.e., whether Petitioner had the requisite

intent for committing lewd acts with children. Juan’s present-day belief

about Petitioner’s state of mind in the past does not change what the jury

found in 2006. And, even if Juan did commit perjury at trial by saying he

felt the touching was “bad” even though he did not truly feel that way, the

crime of lewd act upon a child does not contain an element relating to the

child victim’s state of mind, nor the victim’s belief about the perpetrator’s

state of mind. See Cal. Penal Code § 288, n. 15 supra. In any event,

although Juan apparently no longer believes the touching was “bad,” he

still acknowledges that touching occurred and that it was “weird,” which is

consistent with his testimony at trial. 

Marcus’s statement is far from conclusive evidence that all of the

boys committed perjury at trial when they testified that Petitioner touched

them. Marcus, who did not even testify at the trial as the prosecutor did not

proceed with charges filed against Petitioner on his behalf, provides only a

vague declaration that does not even establish that he lied about or

exaggerated his account of what happened with Petitioner, let alone

establish that all the boys did. Marcus’ s declaration, alone or in

conjunction with the other new evidence presented by Petitioner, does not

constitute evidence of actual innocence, or “evidence of innocence so

strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial . . . .” 

Stewart, 757 F.3d at 937. 

As for the other evidence, consisting of declarations, that the boys

believed they would receive money for testifying against Petitioner, even if

15Cal. Penal Code § 288(a) provided that “any person who willfully and lewdly commits any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or any part

or member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of

arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that

person or the child, is guilty of a felony . . . .” 

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it were demonstrated the boys held this belief (and this has not been

shown because none of the declarations provided are from the victims,

other than Juan, but rather are from third parties), this would not establish

Petitioner’s actual innocence as it does not establish that the boys

fabricated their stories and committed perjury at trial. There is no indication

the conversations about receiving money, even if they occurred, resulted in

any exaggeration or such an exaggeration of the truth that Petitioner would

not have been convicted had the conversations not occurred. Additionally,

testimony provided at trial refutes the notion that all of the boys talked

about their court testimony with the other victims. When asked at trial if

they had spoken with other students about what they had planned to say in

court, David, Luis, and Charles replied they had not. (Lodgment No. 1, RT

vol. 3 at 228, 317 & RT vol. 4 at 361.) 

Importantly, Juan testified at the evidentiary hearing that the idea of

receiving money came up after he and the other boys had already spoken

to police detectives about Petitioner touching them. Moreover, Juan

testified at trial, and still acknowledges today, that Petitioner touched him. 

The jury found the touching occurred with criminal intent. Even if evidence

of the boys’ conversations in the courthouse and elsewhere had been

presented to the jury, it cannot be said that Juan’s belief, and the other

boys’ apparent belief, that they were going to receive money because they

had been touched would have affected the jury’s findings. Similarly, it

cannot be said that evidence concerning the boys’ demeanor at school,

which is subjective and speculative in nature, would have affected the

jury’s findings, considering all of the evidence as a whole.

In sum, the new evidence proffered by Petitioner is insufficient to

establish his actual innocence. The Court does not conclude “that it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted

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[Petitioner] in the light of [this] new evidence.” See McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct at

1935. The Schlup inquiry requires the federal court to assess how

reasonable jurors would react to the overall, newly supplemented record. 

House, 547 U.S. at 538. For all of the reasons discussed above, the Court

believes the jury still would have convicted Petitioner even if it had heard all

of the above evidence, and cannot say that it no longer has confidence in

the outcome of the trial. See Stewart, 757 F.3d at 937; Schlup, 513 U.S. at

316. The Court finds Petitioner has not made a credible claim of actual

innocence that excuses the untimely filing of his federal habeas petition. 

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby recommends that

Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED, that the Petition be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and that judgment be entered

accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Thomas J. Whelan, United States District Judge assigned to this case,

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that

not later than February 19, 2015, any party may file written objections with

the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed not

later than March 2, 2015. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d

//

//

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449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 5, 2015

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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