Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01883/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01883-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KEVIN ANTHONY MACGREGOR, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DIAL, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-1883 JAM AC P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is a California inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 34, for 

violations of plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth Amendment. Presently before the court are 

defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on statute of limitations grounds and defendants’ 

motion for partial summary judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Both 

motions are fully briefed. 

I. Background 

Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed on September 5, 2013, alleged that defendants Dr. Dial 

and Dr. James violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights when they were deliberately 

indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical need for treatment of a hernia. ECF No. 1. Defendants 

Dial and James brought a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s original complaint. ECF No. 30. Plaintiff 

then filed a first amended complaint, ECF No. 34, and defendants brought a motion to dismiss 

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plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 36. By order dated March 27, 2014, the court ruled 

that the first amended complaint superseded the original complaint, and vacated defendants’ 

motion to dismiss the original complaint. ECF No. 38. 

Defendants’ March 12, 2014 motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint raised 

statute of limitations and administrative exhaustion issues. In light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision 

in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014), which held that exhaustion issues should in 

most cases be presented in a motion for summary judgment rather than in a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b), the court vacated defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF No. 43. The court 

permitted defendants to file a motion for summary judgment on the issue of administrative 

exhaustion and to re-file the portion of the vacated motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) in a 

separate motion or in combination with a motion for summary judgment. 

On May 6, 2014, defendants brought a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds, 

ECF No. 45, and a separate motion for partial summary judgment alleging failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies, ECF No. 46. Plaintiff filed an opposition to defendants’ motion to 

dismiss and a separate opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 51, 52. 

Defendants replied on June 26, 2014 and filed objections with respect to both of plaintiff’s 

oppositions. ECF No. 53, 54, 55. 

II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint 

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint on the grounds that 

plaintiff’s claims against defendants are barred by the statute of limitations. 

A. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6 ) 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a 

complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it 

must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “The pleading must contain 

something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally 

cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 

' 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

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accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), 

construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all 

doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh=g denied, 396 U.S. 

869 (1969). The court will “‘presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that 

are necessary to support the claim.’” National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 

U.S. 249, 256 (1994) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). 

Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. Durning 

v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also consider facts 

which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 

(9th Cir. 1987); and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed 

with the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). The 

court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” 

B. Allegations of the First Amended Complaint1

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) and brings this action alleging violations of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

rights “during his confinement by the [CDCR] at High Desert State Prison.” ECF No. 34 at 5. 

Plaintiff was transferred from San Quentin State Prison to High Desert State Prison on 

December 13, 2005. ECF No. 34 at 6. At this time, defendants Dr. Dial and Dr. James were 

 

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 The court relies only the allegations contained in plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 

34, and the attached exhibits. See Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 

1987). To the extent plaintiff alleges new facts in his opposition to defendants’ motion to 

dismiss, the court has not included them here. 

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licensed physicians working in a medical capacity in the delivery of health care services at High 

Desert State Prison. Id. at 6. Dr. James was plaintiff’s designated physician. Id. at 11. Plaintiff 

states that between December 13, 2005 and March 5, 2006, he had six hernia-related 

emergencies, id. at 11, and alleges as follows: 

December 26, 2005 

On December 26, 2005 at approximately 11:30 p.m., plaintiff experienced “unbearable 

pain” when his hernia “protruded out.” ECF No. 34 at 7. Plaintiff was taken to the clinic and 

examined by R.N. Flaughty, who informed defendant Dial of plaintiff’s condition. Id. Dr. Dial 

instructed Flaughty to return plaintiff to his cell and to put plaintiff on the list for the doctor’s line 

“ASAP.” Id. Plaintiff complained to Flaughty that he was in too much pain to be returned to his 

cell without pain medication, but Flaughty said that decision was up to the doctor at the doctor’s 

line and that plaintiff would have to ask the doctor for medication the following day. Id. Plaintiff 

was returned to his cell without treatment and suffered “extreme pain,” vomiting, nausea, and 

hiccups while curled up on the floor of his cell for over ten hours. Id. 

January 10, 2006 

On January 10, 2006 at approximately 1 a.m., plaintiff’s hernia protruded to “the size of 

an egg.” ECF No. 34 at 7. Plaintiff was taken to the clinic where Nurse Haherty examined 

plaintiff’s hernia and gave him Ibuprofen, which did not relieve his pain. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff 

requested stronger pain medication and informed the nurse that at San Quentin he had been 

prescribed Vicodin for his hernia pain, but the nurse advised plaintiff that she could not give him 

anything stronger than Ibuprofen. Id. at 8. Plaintiff was returned to his cell in severe pain with 

his hernia “still bulging.” The nurse advised plaintiff that he was “on Doctor’s Line for the 

morning.” Id. 

January 13, 2006 

On January 13, 2006, plaintiff was examined by Dr. James at the doctor’s line. ECF No. 

34 at 8. Plaintiff explained that he had ongoing pain from a hernia “the size of an egg” and told 

Dr. James that prior to his transfer to High Desert State Prison, plaintiff had been scheduled for 

surgery. Id. Plaintiff asked Dr. James to schedule plaintiff for surgery, but James refused. Id. 

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Dr. James explained that he saw no evidence of a hernia and that if plaintiff did have a hernia, it 

was not to the point where surgery was required. Id. Dr. James also told plaintiff that “Ibuprofen 

400 mg is the strongest relief they give to inmates.” Id. Plaintiff explained that as many as five 

such tablets fail to provide him with “even slight relief,” but James denied plaintiff’s request for 

stronger medication. Id. 

January 27, 2006 

On January 27, 2006 at approximately 8 p.m., plaintiff’s hernia protruded again. ECF No. 

34 at 9. Plaintiff was taken to the clinic where a nurse examined his hernia, which was “the size 

of a baseball.” Id. Plaintiff was then transported to the Correctional Treatment Center (CTC) 

where he was examined by the Chief Medical Officer, Dr. Roche. Id. Dr. Roche instructed the 

nurse to give plaintiff a shot for the pain and tried to “reduce” plaintiff’s hernia by massaging it. 

Id. Dr. Roche called Dr. James at home and Dr. James arrived at CTC about 45 minutes later. 

Dr. Roche ordered Dr. James to make arrangements for plaintiff to be accepted at an outside 

hospital for immediate surgery. Plaintiff was then transported to Washo Medical Center, but his 

emergency surgery was cancelled when plaintiff’s hernia went back in at the last minute. At this 

point plaintiff’s hernia had been “out” for five hours. Upon returning to High Desert State Prison, 

plaintiff was issued a prescription for Vicodin for his pain by the doctors at Washo Medical 

Center. Id. at 9. However, Dr. James cancelled the Vicodin order and instead gave plaintiff 

“Ibuprofen 400 mg,” which he knew would not relieve plaintiff’s pain. Id. at 8-9. 

February 15, 2006 

On February 15, 2006 at approximately 9 p.m., plaintiff’s hernia again protruded to “the 

size of a baseball.” ECF No. 34 at 10. Plaintiff was taken to the clinic and then to CTC in 

unbearable pain. Id. At CTC, Dr. Dial instructed a nurse to give plaintiff a shot of medicine for 

his pain and to massage the hernia “back in.” Id. Approximately four hours later, plaintiff’s 

hernia went back in. Id. Dr. Dial then instructed the correctional officers to return plaintiff to his 

cell. Id. 

February 26, 2006 

On February 26, 2006 at approximately 11 p.m., plaintiff experienced “severe pain” when 

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his hernia protruded again. ECF No. 34 at 10. Plaintiff was taken to the clinic and examined by 

Nurse Haherty, who called Dr. Dial. Dr. Dial instructed the nurse to return plaintiff to his cell 

and to “schedule plaintiff for Doctor’s Line in the morning.” Id. Dr. Dial was aware of plaintiff’s 

“severe condition,” but plaintiff was returned to his cell without treatment or pain medication. Id. 

at 10-11. Plaintiff spent the next eight hours “balled-up” on the floor of his cell, hiccupping, 

groaning in pain, and experiencing nausea. Id. 

March 2006 

On March 3, 2006, plaintiff was transported to an outside specialty clinic where he was 

examined by a surgeon and scheduled for surgery on March 22, 2006. ECF No. 34 at 11. After 

the examination, plaintiff was returned to High Desert State Prison. Id. 

On March 5, 2006 at approximately 7 p.m., plaintiff’s hernia came out again. ECF No. 34 

at 11. Plaintiff experienced “extreme” pain and was taken to the clinic. Id. Dr. James examined 

plaintiff and had him taken to CTC, where he was given a shot and other medicine for his pain. 

Id. Dr. James got approval for plaintiff to be transported to Banner Lassen Medical Center for 

surgery the following day. Id. at 11-12. 

On March 6, 2006, plaintiff underwent surgery for his hernia. ECF No. 34 at 12. 

On March 8, 2006, plaintiff returned to High Desert State Prison. ECF No. 34 at 12. His 

pain medication was “instantly” changed from “Tylenol #3 codine” to 800 mg of Ibuprofen. Id. 

Plaintiff had a single follow up visit with Dr. James approximately one week later and was then 

“forgotten about.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that he “experienced pain continuously” and asserts that 

he should have been kept on “Tylenol #3 codine” and “monitored for pain and healing” for at 

least up to 90 days after his operation. Id. 

 Following the hernia operation, plaintiff’s lower left abdomen remained swollen and he 

developed a large keloid scar as well as large bulge or protrusion on his right side. ECF No. 34 at 

12. Since plaintiff did not have the bulge prior to the operation, he believes it was caused by 

mesh that was inserted inside him during his hernia operation. Id. 

“Since the operation until this day,” plaintiff has experienced sharp pain where the hernia 

was as well as nightly urinary dysfunction. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he “continuously complained 

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to medical2 over the years, but [was] repeatedly ignored.” Id. Plaintiff’s “on-going problems 

stemming from [his] hernia operation . . . were only recently addressed by medical.”3 Id. 

Plaintiff did not receive a proper examination until 2012, when he was transferred to Solano State 

Prison. Id. 

Plaintiff summarizes his allegations, stating that each defendant denied him adequate 

medical treatment for severe pain on three “separate documented occasions.” ECF No. 34 at 13. 

Plaintiff specifies that Dr. Dial denied him adequate treatment on December 26, 2005; January 

10, 2006; and February 26, 2006. Id. Dr. James denied plaintiff treatment and adequate pain 

medication on January 13, 2006; January 27, 2006; and February 15, 2006. Id. Plaintiff alleges 

that when he needed medical attention for severe pain caused by his hernia, he was denied 

adequate treatment “an unreasonable number of times without any/or adequate pain medication, 

compounding [his] suffering.” ECF No. 34 at 13. He alleges that the harm he suffered “resulted 

from the defendants [sic] actions on the (above) specific dates.” Id. 

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for the pain and suffering that resulted 

from defendants’ deliberate indifference to his serious medical need for immediate treatment of 

his “hernia condition.” Id. at 6, 14. His original complaint was filed on September 5, 2013.4

C. Defendants’ Argument 

Defendants assert that plaintiff’s action is barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants 

contend that plaintiff’s claim is based on five or six specific instances of alleged misconduct, all 

of which occurred in 2005 and 2006. ECF No. 45-1 at 1. Defendants provide a chart containing 

individual calculations as to when the four-year statute of limitations expired for each specific 

instance referenced by plaintiff.5 Id. at 8. By defendants’ calculations, the statute of limitations 

 

2

 In the first amended complaint, plaintiff references “medical” but does not identify any specific 

individuals. 

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 Plaintiff again references “medical” but fails to identify any specific individuals. 

4

 The date on plaintiff’s proof of service controls for purposes of timeliness analysis. See 

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275-76 (1988 ) (pro se prisoner filing is dated from the date 

prisoner delivers it to prison authorities); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(holding that “the Houston mailbox rule applies to § 1983 complaints filed by pro se prisoners”). 

5

 These dates include December 26, 2005; January 10, 2006; January 13, 2006; January 27, 2006; 

February 15, 2006; and February 26, 2006. ECF No. 45-1 at 8. 

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for the last alleged instance of misconduct (February 26, 2006) ran in 2010. Id. Defendants 

argue that plaintiff’s complaint was filed in September 2013 and is therefore time-barred because 

it was filed several years outside of the limitations period.6 Id. 

D. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

In opposition, plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations did not start to run until at 

least October 25, 2012, the date that he finally secured proper medical treatment, i.e. was seen by 

a hernia specialist. ECF No. 52 at 18-19. Plaintiff’s opposition includes new factual allegations 

that were not alleged in the first amended complaint. Specific to defendants Dial and James, 

plaintiff alleges that after his March 6, 2006 surgery, Dr. James was his primary care physician 

until the time plaintiff left High Desert State Prison in November 2007. Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges 

that in the period following his surgery through November 2007, he continuously complained to 

Dr. Dial and Dr. James, but was denied adequate treatment. Id. at 9, 13, 15. Plaintiff then makes 

a number of factual allegations against other doctors at Folsom State Prison, Centinela prison, and 

Solano State Prison, spanning the period of November 2007 through October 2012. Id. at 16-17. 

Plaintiff contends that because all of his allegations are related to his lack of adequate hernia 

treatment at the various prisons, they constitute a “continuing violation” and therefore are not 

barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 18-19. 

E. Defendants’ Reply 

Defendants argue that in resolving the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint, the 

court should not consider the new factual allegations contained in plaintiff’s opposition. ECF No. 

53. Defendants contend that even if the new factual allegations are considered, plaintiff’s claim is 

still time-barred because plaintiff does not allege any misconduct by defendants Dial or James 

after November 2007, when plaintiff left High Desert State Prison. Thus, the latest plaintiff’s 

claim could have accrued was November 2007 and plaintiff would have had to file within four 

years of that date. Since plaintiff did not file until 2013, plaintiff’s complaint is time-barred. 

 

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 Defendants also request that the court take judicial notice of the fact that the drug “Toradol IM” 

is used to treat pain. ECF No. 45-2. This request is not a matter appropriate for resolution under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the request is denied. 

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ECF No. 53 at 1-2. 

Defendants further contend that the continuing violation rule does not apply because, even 

assuming defendants’ acts were part of a series of related acts against plaintiff, plaintiff did not 

allege that Dial or James committed any acts of deliberate indifference within the limitations 

period. ECF No. 53 at 2, 4-5. Accordingly, defendants contend that the continuing violation 

doctrine does not operate to delay the start of the limitations period in this case and plaintiff’s 

claims should be dismissed as time-barred. 

F. Statute of Limitations 

Actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the forum state’s statute of 

limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 265 (1985); Jones v. 

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). In California, a two-year statute of limitations applies. 

See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 335.1; Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. The federal court also applies the forum 

state’s law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling when not in conflict with federal law. 

Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 537-39 (1989); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 

1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1117 (2000). California provides that the applicable limitations 

period is tolled for two years on grounds of “disability” when a litigant is incarcerated. Cal. Code 

Civ. P. § 352.1(a). This tolling provision operates to delay the running of the limitations period, 

effectively extending the two-year personal injury limitations period to four years for inmates. 

See Carlson v. Blatt, 87 Cal.App.4th 646, 650 (2001) (imprisonment tolls running of limitations 

period for two years from accrual of cause of action); Fink, 192 F.3d at 914 (same); Ellis v. City 

of San Diego, 176 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th Cir.1999) (same). Accordingly, California inmates have 

a total of four years from the accrual of a cause of action to file a complaint. This four-year 

period is also tolled while administrative remedies are being exhausted. Brown v. Valoff, 422 

F.3d 926, 942–43 (9th Cir.2005) (prisoners are entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of 

limitations while completing the mandatory exhaustion process). 

Accordingly, defendants are correct that plaintiff had four years from the date of accrual 

of this cause of action to file his complaint. With respect to tolling based on administrative 

exhaustion, the exhibits attached to plaintiff’s complaint indicate that a director’s level appeal 

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decision was issued on July 3, 2006, denying plaintiff’s request for pain medication and hernia 

surgery. ECF No. 34 at 48. Plaintiff was therefore entitled to tolling of the limitations period 

until this date. See Brown, 422 F.3d at 942–43. 

G. Date of Accrual 

The point of contention in this case is not the length of the limitations period but rather the 

date on which plaintiff’s claim accrued, thereby starting the clock on the limitations period. 

Federal law governs when a cause of action accrues in the § 1983 context. Cabrera v. City of 

Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998). A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff 

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Knox v. Davis, 260 

F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2001). When the claim is based on an allegation of deliberate 

indifference to serious medical need, the claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or had reason to 

know of the defendants’ deliberate indifference. See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991-92 

(9th Cir. 1999). In TwoRivers, for example, the plaintiff alleged that two Arizona Department of 

Corrections employees were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs after he 

underwent a surgical procedure to remove a cancerous growth while incarcerated at the Tuscon 

prison complex. 174 F.3d at 990. In determining when the cause of action accrued, the Ninth 

Circuit held that the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the defendants’ deliberate 

indifference on the date he was returned to the Tuscon prison complex after receiving the alleged 

improper medical care. Id. at 991-92. 

In the present case, plaintiff’s claim accrued when he knew or had reason to know of Dr. 

Dial and Dr. James’ acts of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. With respect to 

defendant Dial, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Dial was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical 

needs on December 26, 2005; January 10, 2006; and February 26, 2006. These are the only 

allegations made against Dr. Dial in the first amended complaint. Accordingly, plaintiff knew or 

had reason to know of Dr. Dial’s deliberate indifference on February 26, 2006. See TwoRivers, 

174 F.3d at 991-92. 

As to defendant James, plaintiff alleges that Dr. James was deliberately indifferent to his 

serious medical needs on January 13, 2006; January 27, 2006; and February 15, 2006. Id. 

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Plaintiff follows these specific allegations with a more general claim that following his March 6, 

2006 hernia surgery, plaintiff was given Ibuprofen and received only one follow up visit with Dr. 

James, when he should have been given “Tylenol #3 codine” and monitored for up to 90 days 

after surgery. Construed in plaintiff’s favor, this allegation gives rise to the inference that Dr. 

James failed to adequately treat plaintiff for up to 90 days after his hernia operation. Thus, 

plaintiff had reason to know of Dr. James’ deliberate indifference on or about June 6, 2006 (90 

days after plaintiff’s March 6, 2006 operation). See TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991-92. 

The conclusion that plaintiff knew or had reason to know of defendants’ deliberate 

indifference in 2006 is not altered by plaintiff’s vague allegation that he continuously complained 

“to medical” and was repeatedly ignored until 2012. This general allegation cannot reasonably be 

interpreted to refer to any actions by defendants James or Dial, particularly in light of the 

specificity of plaintiff’s other allegations, which include dates, times, and names of nurses and 

other medical personnel. Because plaintiff failed to allege that his complaints “to medical” were 

directly connected to either defendant, these allegations do not affect the date on which plaintiff 

knew or had reason to know of deliberate indifference by James or Dial. See Monell v. 

Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (claims 

under § 1983 require an actual connection or link between the actions of defendants and the 

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff). 

Even if the court were to consider the facts alleged in plaintiff’s opposition, this would not 

connect any actions by defendants to plaintiff’s generic allegation that he was ignored until 2012. 

In his opposition, plaintiff alleges that he complained to defendants Dial and James until 

November 2007, when plaintiff was transferred to Centinela State Prison. ECF No. 52 at 16. 

Thus, even if the court were to consider these allegations, plaintiff knew of Dr. James and Dr. 

Dial’s deliberate indifference at the latest in November 2007, when plaintiff left High Desert 

State Prison. See TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991-92; see also Marroquin v. Cate, C 11-4535 SMA 

(PR), 2014 WL 4954717, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014) (plaintiff’s deliberate indifference 

claim based on inadequate medical care while at Salinas Valley State Prison accrued at the latest 

on the date plaintiff was transferred to a prison in Arizona). Accordingly, even considering the 

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facts alleged in his opposition, plaintiff’s cause of action against defendants James and Dial 

accrued at the latest in November 2007. In the absence of another doctrine that could delay the 

date the cause of action accrued, the statute of limitations period started to run in November 2007 

and expired four years later in November 2011, making plaintiff’s 2013 complaint untimely. 

H. Continuing Violation Doctrine 

“The continuing violations theory applies to § 1983 actions . . . allowing a plaintiff to seek 

relief for events outside of the limitations period.” Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 

2001). The doctrine has the “effect of . . . restart[ing] the statute of limitations” when there are 

“repeated instances or continuing acts of the same nature, as for instance, repeated acts of sexual 

harassment or repeated discriminatory employment practices.” Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe 

v. United States, 895 F. 2d 592, 597 (9th Cir. 1990); Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1184, 

1189-90 (9th Cir. 1984). However, the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that a mere continuing 

impact from past violations is not actionable.” Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013 (quotations and citations 

omitted); Abramson v. Univ. of Haw., 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir.1979) (“The proper focus is 

upon the time of the ... acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most 

painful.”). Discrete “acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts 

alleged in timely filed charges.” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 

(2002). Rather, “[t]he doctrine applies where there is no single incident that can fairly or 

realistically be identified as the cause of significant harm.” Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 

1126 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In order to establish that the continuing violation theory applies, a plaintiff must allege 

either a serial violation or a systemic violation. Douglas v. Cal. Dept. of Youth Authority, 271 

F.3d 812, 822 (9th Cir. 2001). In other words, plaintiff must allege either (1) “a series of related 

acts against [him], of which at least one falls within the relevant period of limitations,” or (2) a 

systematic policy or practice . . . that operated, in part, within the limitations period.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is based on allegations of discrete acts of deliberate indifference by 

defendants in 2005 and 2006, to which the continuing violation theory does not apply. See 

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122. While plaintiff states that he suffered “ongoing” harm after his hernia 

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operation, ECF No. 34 at 12, the substance of plaintiff’s complaint indicates that he brought suit 

to address violations that occurred “during his confinement by the [CDCR] at High Desert State 

Prison,” ECF No. 34 at 5. Plaintiff specifically alleges that the harm he suffered was caused by 

defendants’ “actions on the (above) specific dates.” ECF No. 34 at 13-14. Accordingly, this is 

not a case “where there is no single incident that can fairly or realistically be identified as the 

cause of significant harm.” See Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1126. 

Moreover, it is clear that plaintiff’s continuing violation argument must fail because 

plaintiff has not alleged any acts by defendants Dial or James within the statute of limitations 

period (i.e. within four years prior to the date the complaint was filed). The first amended 

complaint includes no allegations with respect to James or Dial after 2006, and even plaintiff’s 

opposition contains no allegations with respect to either defendant after November 2007. To the 

extent that plaintiff’s allegation that he complained “to medical over the years” may fall within 

the limitations period, plaintiff does not allege that this was part of a series of related acts 

committed against plaintiff by James or Dial. Accordingly, the continuing violation rule does not 

apply. See Douglas, 271 F.3d at 822. 

Furthermore, even if the court were to ignore the fact that plaintiff’s new allegations 

regarding inadequate medical treatment at other prisons were raised for the first time in his 

opposition, plaintiff’s claims still would not be saved because these allegations are based on the 

deliberate indifference of defendants who are not parties to this lawsuit. The court has found no 

authority, and plaintiff cites none,7 for the proposition that allegations against defendants who are 

not parties to the lawsuit can be used to establish the applicability of the continuing violation 

doctrine in order to bring untimely claims against the named defendants within the limitations 

period. To the extent plaintiff contends that the allegations against doctors at other prisons can be 

considered because he was not required to name all defendants in his complaint, ECF No. 52 at 

16, the court rejects plaintiff’s argument. If plaintiff intends to allege claims against defendants 

 

7

 Plaintiff cites a number of cases, including Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 2001), and 

Lavelle v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1980), where the continuing violation doctrine was 

applied. However, none of these cases turned on allegations against defendants who were not 

parties to the lawsuit. 

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other than James and Dial, such a request is properly raised in a motion to amend the complaint, 

which is not currently before the court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 15(a). 

Because the continuing violation doctrine does not apply on the facts presently before the 

court, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference against Dr. Dial and 

Dr. James could not have accrued later than November 2007. Accordingly, plaintiff’s 2013 

complaint is time-barred because it was not filed within the four-year statute of limitations period, 

which expired at the latest in 2011. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims on statute of 

limitations grounds should therefore be granted.8 

III. Amendment 

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed without leave to amend, 

arguing that amendment would be futile because plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of 

limitations. ECF No. 45-1 at 14. 

The Federal Rules provide that leave to amend pleadings “shall be freely given when 

justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). “[T]his policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” 

Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.1990) (citing DCD 

Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir.1987)). In determining whether to grant 

leave to amend or to dismiss the complaint with or without prejudice, the court should consider 

facts raised for the first time in plaintiff’s opposition papers. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 

1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Here, the allegations in plaintiff’s opposition papers regarding the inadequate hernia 

treatment he received at other California prisons suggest that it may be possible for plaintiff to 

amend his complaint to state a cognizable and timely claim for deliberate indifference. See, e.g., 

Watson v. Sisto, No. 2:07-CV-01871 LKK, 2011 WL 533716, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011) 

(applying the continuing violation doctrine where plaintiff’s claim alleged that the prison health 

system, as administered by various doctors and staff, consistently failed to provide adequate care 

for plaintiff’s chronic and deteriorating back condition); Evans v. County of San Diego, No. 06 

 

8

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should be dismissed, the court does not reach these arguments. 

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CV 0877 JM (RBB), 2008 WL 842459, at *11-12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008) (applying the 

continuing violation doctrine in an action against the County of San Diego, the sheriff, and the 

chief medical officer, where plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim was based on the 

“aggregation of failures to treat plaintiff” during a specified time period, rather than on 

complaints about discrete failures of the doctors who treated him). Accordingly, the undersigned 

recommends that plaintiff be given thirty days to file a motion for leave to amend the complaint. 

This motion should be accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. 

IV. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Defendants contend that plaintiff did not fully exhaust administrative remedies and move 

for partial summary judgment with respect to the unexhausted portions of plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint. ECF No. 46. Because the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint be dismissed, the court does not reach the summary judgment issue. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment is vacated as moot. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Defendants’ request for judicial notice (ECF No. 45-2) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 45) be granted; 

2. Plaintiff be given 30 days to file a motion for leave to amend the complaint, 

accompanied by a proposed amended complaint; and 

3. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 46) be vacated as moot. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court, which shall be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

and Recommendations.” Due to exigencies in the court's calendar, no extensions of time will be 

granted. A copy of any objections filed with the court shall also be served on all parties. The 

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parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 3, 2015 

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