Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08302/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08302-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Steven Guardado,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-18-8302-PCT-JAT (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus which is now ripe for 

consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of 

fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 

72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

San Luis, Arizona, commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October 15, 2018 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s Petition 

asserts the following two grounds for relief:

In Ground One, Petitioner claims the trial court violated his Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to grant Petitioner a 

continuance to retain counsel of his choice. In Ground Two, he 

contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of 

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, because his attorney [(a)] 

failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating witnesses at 

sentencing and [(b)] failed to adequately investigate a confidential 

informant’s prior criminal history [including (1) false information, 

(2) bad check, and (3) shoplifting].

(Order 11/30/18, Doc. 6 at 2.) 

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Response - On February 22, 2019 Respondents filed their Answer (“Response”)

(Doc. 17). Respondents argue Petitioner failed to fairly present his claims in Ground 2(a) 

(ineffectiveness re mitigation) and Ground 2(b)(3) (ineffectiveness re shoplifting criminal 

history), and has now procedurally defaulted on his state remedies. Respondents argue 

Grounds 1 and 2(b)(1) and (2) are without merit. 

Reply – The Court set a reply deadline of April 1, 2019 and directed that “any 

assertions in the reply that Petitioner’s claims were fairly presented to the state appellate 

courts shall be supported by specific references to the location of the presentation of the 

claim.” (Order 2/26/19, Doc. 18.) 

Petitioner then moved (Doc. 19) to strike the Answer on the basis that it had not 

been received by him and thus not properly served. That motion was denied without 

prejudice, Respondents were directed to renew service of their Answer (Doc. 17) and 

Petitioner granted 35 days from such renewed service to reply. (Order 3/12/19, Doc. 20.) 

Respondents filed a Notice of Service of Answer (Doc. 21) reflecting renewed service by 

mail on March 13, 2019, making a reply due April 22, 2019. 

Petitioner then moved (Doc. 23) to strike the Answer pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 

11 based on a misstatement of the service date, which was denied without prejudice under 

Rule 11’s safe harbor provisions. (Order 4/2/19, Doc. 24.) He again renewed his motion 

(Doc. 25), which was denied on the merits. (Order 5/8/19, Doc. 28.) Petitioner moved 

(Doc. 29) for reconsideration, which was denied. (Order 5/21/19, Doc. 30.) Petitioner 

objected (Doc. 31) to the order on reconsideration (Doc. 30), but the order was affirmed 

by District Judge Teilborg. (Order 6/24/19, Doc. 32.) Petitioner then filed a Motion for 

Default Judgment (Doc. 33) and filed an interlocutory appeal (Doc. 36). The appeal was 

dismissed. (9th Cir. Order 8/20/19, Doc. 34.) The motion for default judgment was denied. 

(Order 9/17/19, Doc. 37.) 

Petitioner has not replied in support of his Petition. 

Motion for Disposition - On December 4, 2019, Petitioner filed a “Motion for 

Expeditious Final Disposition” (Doc. 39). In that motion, Petitioner argues he filed a 

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“Reply in the form of a Motion to Strike the Answer.” (Doc. 39 at 1.) He notes the Ninth 

Circuit found the rulings on the motion to strike was not a final appealable judgment, 

review on a final judgment would extend to the ruling, and the matter was not certified for 

interlocutory appeal. Petitioner’s motion askes for “an expeditious final disposition of the 

present petition,” and certificate of appealability on the issues raised in the motion to 

strike.

Because the issues raised in that Motion to Strike have otherwise been fully 

addressed in this proceeding, and they do not respond to the procedural and merits defenses 

raised in the Answer, the undersigned does not further address the arguments in the Motion 

to Strike as a basis for resolving the Petition.

Petitioner posits no justification for an accelerated ruling on any issues. The 

undersigned will recommend the motion for expeditious disposition be granted to the 

extent that this Report & Recommendation has now addressed the Petition, and that the 

Report & Recommendation be addressed in due course. 

The request for a certificate of appealability will be addressed hereinafter.

III. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Viewing “the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in the light 

most favorable to upholding the verdict,” the Arizona Court of appeals summarized the 

factual background as follows:

¶2 Guardado was watched by the Lake Havasu City Police 

Department as he sold methamphetamine to an informant once in 

February 2013 and twice in May 2014. After the police secured a 

search warrant and searched Guardado' s home and vehicle, they 

found a gun in his bedroom; recovered some of the money he had 

received from the informant, of which the police had photocopies; 

and recovered syringes, a pill bottle filled with methamphetamine, 

and a glass pipe for smoking methamphetamine. Guardado also 

admitted to using and selling methamphetamine.

(Exh. O, Mem Dec. 3/31/16 at ¶ 2 and n. 1.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 17, are 

referenced herein as “Exh. ___.”) 

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B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

In May 2014, Petitioner was indicted in Mohave County Superior Court on three 

counts of selling dangerous drugs; possession of dangerous drugs; possession of drug 

paraphernalia; and misconduct involving weapons. (Exh. A, Indictment.) The Mohave 

County Public Defender’s Office appeared on Petitioner’s behalf. (Exh. B, Not. Appear.)

¶5 At the final management conference, some two weeks before 

trial, Guardado requested a thirty-day continuance to hire a lawyer. 

After discussion, including a determination that the prosecutor and 

defense lawyer were ready for trial as scheduled, the court found there 

was no legitimate reason for the delay and denied the request.

* * * 

¶ 9 Guardado did not have a counsel of choice. He did not name 

the private lawyer he wanted to hire to represent him, and that lawyer 

never appeared before or at trial to attempt to represent him. Instead, 

when he sought the thirty-day trial continuance, his first, Guardado 

stated he had the money and had met with a lawyer, who had said "he 

would take it." As a result, he was only looking for the opportunity to 

attempt to hire a private lawyer of his choosing.

¶10 Although the court denied his request for a continuance even 

though the State did not oppose it, or even a short continuance of the 

final management conference, the court did not foreclose Guardado's 

right to hire a lawyer. Moreover, the court did not foreclose the 

newly-hired lawyer from seeking a continuance for reasons unrelated 

to merely being newly hired. Specifically, the court told Guardado 

that "you certainly have a chance to still hire a lawyer [ and] [i]f you 

hire an attorney between now and [the trial date] and ... if [that 

lawyer] ha[s] some other reason [he or she] wan[ts to] continue the 

trial, then [the lawyer] can certainly make that request." And the court 

advised him that if he was going to hire a lawyer he should do it 

quickly, and Guardado responded, "I will." Guardado did not hire a 

lawyer, and proceeded to trial with appointed counsel.

¶11 ...Guardado had unsuccessfully requested a different 

appointed lawyer some four months earlier, and was told by the court 

that "[i]f you want, you can hire whoever you want to hire to represent 

you [and] [i]f you hire somebody to represent you, then you get to 

pick your own attorney." Guardado did not hire a lawyer at that time, 

nor at any time before trial.

(Exh. O, App. Mem. Dec. at ¶ 5.)

¶ 3 After the jury was selected, but before opening statements, the 

trial court conducted an impeachment hearing at which Guardado' s 

attorney, Ira Shiflett, asked to impeach the state's confidential 

informant (CI). The CI had three prior misdemeanor offenses, which 

included providing a false statement to a police officer, shoplifting 

and issuing a check with insufficient funds. Rule 609(a)(2), Ariz. R. 

Evid., provides that evidence of a criminal conviction for any crime 

"must be admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing 

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the elements of the crime required proving- or the witness's 

admitting- a dishonest act or false statement." Subsection (b) further 

provides "if more than 10 years have passed since the witness's 

conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later," 

evidence of the offense is admissible only if its probative value 

"substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect," and "the proponent 

gives [the] adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use 

it."

¶4 At the impeachment hearing, the trial court noted that although 

providing false information to a police officer "certainly involves a 

dishonest act or a false statement," because it "appear[ed]" that 

offense had occurred more than ten years earlier, it was inadmissible. 

The court also found that while issuing a bad check and shoplifting 

do not "necessarily implicate" dishonesty or a false statement, it did 

not have sufficient information to determine whether the facts in the 

CI' s convictions rose to that level. Based on the "limited information" 

presented, the court precluded Shiflett from impeaching the CI on any 

of the convictions.

(Exh. Y, PCR Mem. Dec. at ¶¶ 3-4.)

Petitioner was convicted by a jury, and found guilty on all counts, and various 

aggravating sentencing factors. (Exh. O, App. Mem. Dec. at ¶ 3; Exh. G, R.T. 2/11/15; 

and Exh. H, Verdicts.) Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 10 years on the first sale 

charge, and consecutive thereto but otherwise concurrent terms of 10 years each on the 

other two sale charges, 12.5 years on the possession charge, 1.75 years on the 

paraphernalia charge, and 4.5 years on the weapons charge, for an effective term of 22.5 

years. (Exh. J, Sentence.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, raising through counsel a claim that he was denied 

his federal and state constitutional rights to counsel of his choice by the denial of the 

continuance. (Exh. L, Opening Brief.) The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the claim 

on the merits, and affirmed his convictions and sentences. (Exh. O, App. Mem. Dec.)

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exh. P, Pet. Rev.), which 

summarily denied review (Exh. Q, Order 10/18/16). 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and (through counsel) a PCR 

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Petition asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on: (a) failure to 

adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence (e.g. affidavits from family and 

friends on Petitioner’s good character); and (b) failure to adequately investigate the 

criminal history of the police informant (false information, bad check, shoplifting) and 

failing to present information to be allowed to impeach the informant with such history.

(Exh. R) Without a response from the prosecution, the PCR court set the matter for an 

evidentiary hearing. (Exh. S, Order 8/8/17.) 

At the hearing, testimony was taken from trial counsel (Mohave County Deputy 

Public Defender Ira Shiflett), D.C. (Petitioner’s fiancée), and J.W. and S.D. (Petitioner’s 

neighbors). (Exh. T, R.T. 10/19/17.) 

Shiflett testified that, consistent with his intention to impeach the CI, 

he had planned to, but did not, have the relevant "certified prior 

convictions" and police reports available at the impeachment hearing.

(Exh. Y, PCR Mem. Dec. at ¶ 5.) 

The PCR court found the claims without merit and denied the petition. (Exh. U, 

Order 10/25/17.) 

In its written ruling, the trial court rejected Guardado' s claims of 

ineffective assistance, noting that although Shiflett had not presented 

the court with "any documentation or other information to support" 

the CI' s misdemeanor convictions at the impeachment hearing, he 

nonetheless had been "diligent in researching" the CI's criminal 

history and his conduct was not deficient. The court summarized the 

factual evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, which included 

the police reports and conviction paperwork, and determined it would 

not have allowed the CI to be impeached even if it had reviewed those 

documents before making its initial ruling, and thus concluded 

Guardado was not prejudiced by Shiflett' s conduct. It also found that 

issuing a check with insufficient funds "does not involve a[] dishonest 

act or false statement" under Rule 609(a)(2).

(Exh. Y, PCR Mem. Dec. at ¶ 5.) 

Petitioner moved for rehearing (Exh. V), which was denied (Exh. W, Order 1/3/18).

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exh. X) raising only the claim of ineffective 

assistance based on the informant’s criminal history. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief, concluding that 

Petitioner had failed to show the requisite prejudice from exclusion of the false statement 

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and bad check convictions, or to counter the trial court’s conclusion “that it would have 

denied Shiflett' s request to impeach the CI even had the additional information been 

presented.” (Exh. Y, PCR Mem. Dec. at ¶ 8.) 

With regard to the claims in habeas grounds 2(a) (mitigation) and 2(b)(3)

(ineffectiveness re shoplifting criminal history), the appellate court ruled that “[b]ecause 

Guardado does not challenge on review the trial court's denial of his claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel related to sentencing and the CI' s prior shoplifting conviction, he 

has waived them.” (Id. at ¶ 5, n.1 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(4)(D)). 

With regard to the claim in habeas ground 2(b)(1) (ineffectiveness re bad check 

criminal history), the court appellate court ruled that by failing to argue it, Petitioner had 

waived any claim based on the trial court’s error in concluding the bad check was 

inadmissible as not requiring a false statement. 

And with regard to the claims in all of habeas Ground 2(b) (ineffectiveness re 

criminal history), the appellate court ruled that Petitioner had waived by failing to raise 

it any argument of prejudice based on the state’s heavy reliance on the CI’s testimony. 

(Id. at ¶ 8, n. 2, 3.) 

IV. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT OF GROUNDS 2(A) AND 2(B)(3)

Respondents argue Petitioner failed to fairly present to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals his claims in Ground 2(a) (ineffectiveness re mitigation) and 2(b)(3)

(ineffectiveness re shoplifting prior), and thus these claims are barred from federal habeas 

review. Petitioner asserts in the Petition that he raised Ground 2 in his PCR petition, but 

does not allege he raised it to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and denies presenting it to the 

Arizona Supreme Court. 

1. Unexhausted State Remedies

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) 

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(per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been codified at 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the petitioner to 

show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 

(9th Cir. 1981).

Ordinarily, to exhaust his state remedies, the petitioner must have fairly presented 

his federal claims to the state courts. “A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the 

state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: 

(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

Ground 2(a) (Mitigation) - Respondents argue that although Petitioner raised this 

claim to the PCR court, he has not properly exhausted his state remedies because he failed 

to raise it to the Arizona Court of Appeals. “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the 

death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal 

habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 

F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 

1999)).

Indeed, Petitioner did not raise this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct 

appeal or in his PCR petition for review. In the latter proceeding, the appellate court 

observed:

Because Guardado does not challenge on review the trial court's 

denial of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to 

sentencing and the CI' s prior shoplifting conviction, he has waived 

them. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(4)(D).1

(Exh. Y, PCR Mem. Dec. at ¶ 5, n.1)2

1 That Rule, now at Rule 32.16(c)(4), provides: “A party's failure to raise any issue that 

could be raised in the petition for review or cross-petition for review constitutes a waiver 

of appellate review of that issue.” See 2019 Arizona Court Order 0016 (C.O. 0016)

(Arizona Supreme Court No. R-19-0012, filed 8/29/19) (general renumbering and 

revisions of Rule 32). 

2 The undersigned finds this did not amount to the application of an independent and 

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It is true that Respondents single out portions of Petitioner’s claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. But ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, and must each 

be specifically argued. See Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294, 1295 (9th Cir. 1982)

(presentation of “additional facts of attorney incompetence” transformed claim into one 

not presented to state court); and Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1992)

(rejecting argument that presentation of any claim of ineffectiveness results in fair 

presentation of all claims of ineffective assistance). Accordingly, the question is not 

whether Petitioner has properly exhausted his state remedies on any ineffective assistance 

claim, but on each ineffective assistance claim raised herein. 

Accordingly, Ground 2(a) was not fairly presented by Petitioner nor foreclosed 

from further review by the appellate court, and thus his state remedies on this claim were 

not properly exhausted.

Ground 2(b)(3) – Respondents also argue that Petitioner has not properly 

exhausted his state remedies on Ground 2(b)(3), the portion of his ineffectiveness claim 

founded on ineffective assistance in impeaching the CI based on her criminal history. 

Here, the call is a little closer. Respondents concede Petitioner exhausted a claim 

of ineffective assistance in impeachment based on the CI’s other criminal convictions. 

In comparison, Petitioner’s mitigation claim (Ground 2(a)) is clearly a separate 

claim from his impeachment claim (Ground 2(b)). It involves trial counsel’s actions at 

sentencing, a time and issue wholly separate from counsel’s actions at the hearing on 

impeachment (or later at trial). While new factual allegations do not ordinarily render a 

claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not "fundamentally alter the legal claim already 

considered by the state courts." Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). "[N]ew 

factual allegations do not render a claim unexhausted unless they 'fundamentally alter the 

adequate state procedural bar. It is unclear whether the referenced rule forecloses all future 

review. Although if read in combination with Arizona’s waiver bar under Ariz. R. Crim. 

Proc. 32.2(a) the effect would be the same, the state court must have actually relied on the 

barring rule. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1989).

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legal claim already considered by the state courts.' " Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 

(9th Cir.1994) (quoting Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 260). Shifting from counsels conduct on 

separate issues at separate times is a fundamental alteration in the claim made, requiring 

the application of different laws to evaluate the underlying issues, and consideration of 

distinct portions of the proceedings. 

But the various parts of the impeachment claim in Ground 2(b) all relate to 

counsel’s actions on one issue (impeachment with criminal history) at the same moments

in the proceeding (investigation, the hearing, at trial during cross examination of the CI). 

Nonetheless, impeachment with various prior convictions is a highly fact and law 

dependent determination, involving at least questions of the time of conviction, the 

elements of the offense of conviction, and the method of establishing the elements in the 

individual case, and the relative probity and prejudicial effect of each conviction. (See 

Exh. Y, PCR Mem. Dec. at ¶ 3 (reviewing standards under Ariz. R. Evid. 609).) For 

example, counsel may be deficient in failing to pursue impeachment if the conviction 

qualifies under the rules, but not deficient if the conviction does not qualify. Prejudice 

may have resulted if the conviction would have qualified, but otherwise not. Moreover, 

degree of investigation may change based on the prior conviction. For example, the kinds 

of records required to qualify the prior as admissible may depend on the particular offense 

and whether it had alternative means of commission, some of which qualified, and some 

which would not. Moreover, the existence of prejudice will depend on the impact of such 

impeachment on the juror’s credibility determination, which may vary markedly based on 

such issues as the facts surrounding the earlier crime, its relevance to the present facts, the 

time and stages of life of the witness that have passed, etc. For example, a teenage 

indiscretion nine years before may have little effect on a jury, while a recent and repeated 

pattern may have great effect. 

There may be instances where the distinction between a witnesses’ priors may be 

so minimal that the addition of another prior does not fundamentally alter the claim. For 

example, a claim is not fundamentally altered where a petitioner argues to the state court 

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an investigation would have revealed five shoplifting offenses by the witness within a year, 

but argues on habeas that further research revealed it was actually six. 

But here, that is not the case. Counsel had unearthed and argued the priors. Thus,

the decision of counsel being challenged was how to act and argue on three very different 

prior convictions. While those separate actions may have occurred all at the same 

proceedings, they were very different decisions by counsel. Accordingly, each part of 

Ground 2(b) must be treated as a separate claim. 

As with Ground 2(a), Petitioner’s state remedies were not properly exhausted on 

the claim in Ground 2(b)(3) because it was not argued on review to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (See Exh. Y, PCR Mem. Dec. at ¶ 5, n.1)

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. Lewis, 

929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to properly 

exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are now no 

longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of 

a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of justice” 

which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims to 

the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s waiver bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. 

Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 17 at 

11-12.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no 

provision is made for a successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer 

available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s preclusion, waiver and 

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timeliness bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Preclusion Bar – 32.2(a)(2) – Although not argued by Respondents, under the rules 

applicable to Arizona’s post-conviction process, a claim may not be brought in a petition 

for post-conviction relief if the claim was “[f]inally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or 

in any previous collateral proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2).3 Because Petitioner’s 

claims were raised in his first PCR proceeding, albeit only to the trial court, under

32.2(a)(2) he cannot again assert them in a new PCR petition.

Waiver Bar – 32.2(a)(3) – Even if not deemed precluded by presentation to the trial 

court in this first PCR proceeding, under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction 

process, a claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that 

"has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral 

proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed 

waived if the State simply shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on 

appeal, or in a previous collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 

P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) (quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). But see State v. Diaz, 

236 Ariz. 361, 340 P.3d 1069 (2014) (failure of PCR counsel, without fault by petitioner, 

to file timely petition in prior PCR proceedings did not amount to waiver of claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel). 

For others of "sufficient constitutional magnitude," the State "must show that the 

defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground 

or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is limited to those constitutional rights “that 

can only be waived by a defendant personally.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 

P.3d 945, 954 (App. Div. 2, 2007). Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v. 

Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver 

of the right to a jury trial, and (3) waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the 

3 Effective January 1, 2020, Arizona has adopted separate rules governing post-conviction 

relief proceedings by pleading defendants, including its own preclusion rule. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 33.2. Rule 32.2 continues to govern defendants like Petitioner who were 

convicted at trial.

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Arizona Constitution, as among those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. 

at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071. Claims based upon ineffective assistance of counsel are 

determined by looking at “the nature of the right allegedly affected by counsel’s ineffective 

performance. Id.

Here, the claims underlying the ineffective assistance claims in Grounds 2(a) and 

2(b)(3) are not of the sort requiring a personal waiver, but rather presentation of mitigation 

evidence and impeachment of a witness. Accordingly, they would be barred from review 

under Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 32.2(a)(3).

Timeliness Bar – 32.4 - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be 

barred from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within 

ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance 

of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 

185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting 

that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the 

rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appear that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely 

cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment 

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evidence substantially undermines testimony which was of critical 

significance at trial such that the evidence probably would have 

changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a claim 

is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the state 

courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims 

of actual innocence, has no application to the procedural claims Petitioner asserts in this 

proceeding.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars would 

prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that were not 

fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal 

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse 

the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

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1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13). The 

Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause should ordinarily turn on some 

objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner asserts no basis on which this Court could find cause to excuse his 

procedural defaults. The undersigned finds none. 

4. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure 

to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional 

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although not explicitly limited 

to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a "miscarriage of 

justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, 

Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc. §26.4 at 1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. 

Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to claims of actual innocence. Johnson 

v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Petitioner offers no basis for a finding of actual innocence, and the undersigned 

finds none. Accordingly, his procedurally defaulted claims must be dismissed with 

prejudice. 

/ /

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B. GROUND 1 – COUNSEL OF CHOICE

In Ground 1, Petitioner argues that his constitutional right to counsel of his own 

choosing was violated when the trial court refused to grant a continuance to permit him to 

retain counsel. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) Respondents argue that the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court law, nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence before it, and thus Petitioner cannot be granted relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

(Answer, Doc. 17 at 20, et seq.)

1. Deferential Standard of Review

While the purpose of a federal habeas proceeding is to search for violations of 

federal law, in the context of a prisoner “in custody pursuant to the judgment a State court,” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e), not every error justifies relief. 

In evaluating state court decisions, the federal habeas court looks through summary 

opinions to the last reasoned decision. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2004). On the claim in Ground 1, the relevant decision is that of the Arizona Court of 

Appeals on direct appeal. (See Exh. O, App. Mem. Dec.) That decision was on the merits 

of the claim. 

Where the state court has rejected a claim on the merits, “a federal habeas court 

may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment 

that the state-court decision applied [the law] incorrectly.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. 

S. 19, 24– 25 (2002) (per curiam). See Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091-92 

(2013) (adopting a rebuttable presumption that a federal claim rejected by a state court 

without being expressly addressed was adjudicated on the merits).

Rather, in such cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides restrictions on the habeas 

court’s ability to grant habeas relief based on legal or factual error. This statute “reflects 

the view that habeas corpus is a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal 

justice systems,’ not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Harrington 

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v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011). Two types of error justify relief: (1) errors of 

federal law; and (2) errors of fact.

2. No Cognizable Error of Law

Standard of Review - To justify habeas relief based on legal error, a state court’s 

merits-based decision must be “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” before 

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). 

The Supreme Court has instructed that a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law 

set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if the state court confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless 

arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 

(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To show an unreasonable application, “a state prisoner must show that the state 

court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification 

that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. 

Here, Petitioner points to no cognizable legal error in the decision of the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. The undersigned finds none.

The Supreme Court has long held that where the right to counsel exists, “a 

defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.” 

Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). “[T]he right to select and be 

represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). That right is not boundless, but is 

commensurate with its purpose. “[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one's 

preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the 

Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than 

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to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.” 

Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. 

This right of counsel of one’s choosing routinely bumps up against efforts by trial 

courts to manage trial calendars. The Supreme Court has addressed the competing 

concerns:

Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling 

trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the 

witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and 

this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling 

reasons. Consequently, broad discretion must be granted trial courts 

on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary 

“insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request 

for delay” violates the right to the assistance of counsel. 

Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 

(1964)). There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so 

arbitrary as to amount to a constitutional violation. “The answer must be found in the 

circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge 

at the time the request is denied.” Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589. 

Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals employed a fact based analysis to conclude that 

the trial court’s denial of a continuance was not an abuse of discretion. 

¶4 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel, and counsel of 

choice. The right is not absolute, and a trial court is granted "wide 

latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs 

of fairness, and against the demands of its calendar." In fact, the 

decision to grant a defendant's request for a continuance to acquire 

counsel of choice is "left to the sound discretion of the trial [court]," 

and will only be disturbed for an abuse of discretion and if the 

defendant demonstrates prejudice. 

(Exh. O, App. Mem. Dec. at ¶ 4 (citations omitted).) That is what Slappy requires. 

It is true that the state court referenced a requirement that, after an abuse of 

discretion has been shown, “the defendant demonstrates prejudice.” (Exh. O, App. Mem. 

Dec. at ¶4.) And, it is true that in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) 

the Supreme Court concluded that “erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, 

‘with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably 

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qualifies as ‘structural error,’ ’ ” and thus no further prejudice need be shown. Id. at 150. 

Thus, the defendant could not be required to establish that the counsel he had was 

ineffective. Thus, the Arizona court’s recitation of the law would appear to be contrary to 

Supreme Court law in Gonzalez-Lopez. 

However, there is no indication that the state court relied on that mistaken notion 

in rejecting this claim. For example, the state court did not conclude that the trial court 

had abused its discretion, but the lack of prejudice precluded relief. It is not sufficient 

that the state court’s dicta be in contravention of Supreme Court law. Rather, it’s 

“decision” must have been. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Further, Petitioner points to nothing suggest that the factors to which the state court 

looked were inappropriate. The state court hung its discretion determination on the 

following facts:

(a) Petitioner had not already retained counsel who was attempting to appear, 

rather “he was only looking for the opportunity to attempt to hire a private 

lawyer of his choosing” and asserting that “he had the money and had met 

with a lawyer, who had said ‘he would take it’” (Exh. O, App. Mem. Dec. at 

¶ 9);

(b) the trial court expressed its willingness to allow retained counsel to appear 

and seek continuances on bases other than “merely being newly retained” 

(Exh. O, App. Mem. Dec. at ¶ 10); and 

(c) the trial court had, some four months earlier, addressed Petitioner’s 

dissatisfaction with appointed counsel and his alternative to retain counsel, 

and yet Petitioner had not timely acted to do so (Exh. O, App. Mem. Dec. at 

¶ 11). 

Each of these factors reflect a reasoned attempt to balance Petitioner’s rights with 

the needs of the Court’s calendar, not “an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon 

expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’.” Slappy, 461 U.S. at 11-12. 

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3. No Cognizable Error of Fact

Similarly, the habeas courts may grant habeas relief based on factual error but only 

if a state-court merits decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

"Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court's fact-finding 

process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was 

not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th 

Cir. 2004). 

Petitioner points to no factual errors in the appellate court’s decision, and the 

undersigned finds none.

Petitioner does point to his earlier assertion of a breakdown in communications with 

appointed counsel, and the lack of a prior continuance of the trial date. (Petition, Doc. 1 

at 6, ¶¶ (a)(1) and (2). But neither of those factors are controlling. Petitioner has not 

claimed nor shown that the trial court erred in not replacing appointed counsel. And, the 

lack of earlier continuances may have been significant if the request had not come at the 

eleventh hour (roughly two weeks before the trial date (see Exh. E. R.T. 1/21/15 at 3)). 

Managing early requests creates far less disruption. Once trial approaches, however, 

witnesses are being subpoenaed and/or their time reserved to appear, jury pools are being 

summoned, and court and attorney time has been blocked which is not easily refilled with 

other matters on short notice. Moreover, the appellate court did find that this trial 

continuance request was petitioner’s “first.” (See Exh. O, App. Mem. Dec. at ¶ 9 and n. 

3.) 

In sum, the undersigned does not find the state court’s decision resulted from an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 

4. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Ground 1 is without merit 

and must be denied.

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C. GROUND 2(B) – INEFFECTIVENESS AT SENTENCING

In Ground 2(B), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

adequately investigate the confidential informant’s criminal history, particularly 

convictions on bad checks and false reporting, resulting in the refusal of the trial court to 

allow impeachment of the CI. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) As with Ground 1, Respondents 

argue that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of this claim was not sufficiently 

erroneous as to justify relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (Answer, Doc. 17 at 24, et seq.)

Factual Background - At trial, counsel sought to impeach the CI with the bad 

checks and false reporting priors. The trial court refused, concluding that the false 

reporting conviction was outside the 10 year limit, it was not admissible. The court also 

found that it did not have sufficient information to conclude the bad check conviction 

"necessarily implicate[d]" dishonesty or a false statement. (Exh. Y, PCR Mem. Dec. at ¶¶ 

3-4.) 

Nothing in the record reflects that the false reporting conviction was less than 10 

years old. Indeed, Petitioner has never argued that it was. At best, he conceded “this 

conviction is older than ten years,” but argued that “it was passed [sic] the ten-year 

restriction by mere days,” and “additional information contained in the arrest report-that 

Petitioner's trial counsel had not provided-may have persuaded the Court to allow 

Petitioner's trial counsel to impeach Herrick with this conviction despite its age.” (Exh. 

E, PCR Pet. at 10.)4

According to the PCR petition, the misdemeanor complaint on the bad check 

indicated that the CI had “passed a check in the amount of $95.00 knowing that there were 

insufficient funds to cover the check,” which Petitioner argued was sufficient to show a 

false statement. (Id. at 11.)5

4

Indeed, convictions more than 10 years old are not automatically excluded. Rather, they 

may only be admitted if certain conditions are met (sufficient probative value in light of 

prejudicial effect, and prior notice). See Ariz. R. Evid. 609(b).

5

 The Arizona Court of Appeals appears to have agreed that this was not an inadmissible 

prior: 

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State Court Decision – The Arizona Court of Appeals addressed these claims in 

Petitioner’s PCR proceeding. That is the last reasoned decision on this claim. That court 

found in pertinent part:

The court...determined it would not have allowed the CI to be 

impeached even if it had reviewed those documents before making 

its initial ruling, and thus concluded Guardado was not prejudiced by 

Shiflett' s conduct. It also found that issuing a check with insufficient 

funds "does not involve a[] dishonest act or false statement" under 

Rule 609(a)(2).

(Exh. Y, PCR Mem. Dec. at ¶ 5.) 

The appellate court rejected the claim, finding: 

Guardado has failed to describe on review any discernable prejudice 

stemming from the court's preclusion of these convictions. Nor has 

he meaningfully addressed the court's determination that it would 

have denied Shiflett' s request to impeach the CI even had the 

additional information been presented. 

(Exh. Y, PCR Mem. Dec. at ¶ 8.) 

The court observed in a footnote:

Although Guardado argued below that he was prejudiced by the trial 

court's preclusion of the impeachment evidence because "the state's 

case relied heavily" on the CI' s testimony, he has not raised this 

argument on review. Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing, the state 

pointed out that the CI' s testimony did not result in Guardado' s 

convictions, rather, her testimony was corroborated by a "video and 

audio," the "buy money" that was found in Guardado' s home, and his 

own admission that he had previously sold drugs. Guardado has not 

addressed these arguments on review, nor has he explained how the 

CI' s credibility was central to the jury's verdicts.

(Id. at ¶ 8, n.3.) 

Applicable Standard on Ineffective Assistance Claims – Generally, claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 

We note, however, that because making a false statement appears to 

be an inherent element of issuing a bad check under A.RS.§ 13-

1807(A), see State v. Clough, 171 Ariz. 217, 223 (App. 1992), the 

trial court erred as a matter of law by not allowing Guardado to 

impeach the CI with the bad check conviction under Rule 609(A)(2). 

Guardado could have, but did not, raise this claim on appeal. 

(Exh. Y, PCR Mem. Dec. at ¶ 8, n. 2.) Nonetheless, prior convictions are subject to a 

probative value/prejudicial effect exclusion under Arizona Rule of Evidence 403. See

Ariz. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(A) (“subject to Rule 403”). 

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U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, Petitioner must show: (1) deficient 

performance - counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard for 

reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687-

88. Although the petitioner must prove both elements, a court may reject his claim upon 

finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable or that the claimed error was not 

prejudicial. Id. at 697.

No Error – Petitioner points to no legal error in the appellate court’s reasoning. 

Citing, inter alia, Strickland, the court properly restated the applicable standard:

To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

Guardado "must show both that counsel's performance fell below 

objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced 

[him]." To show prejudice, he must demonstrate that there is a 

"reasonable probability" -- that is “a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome" of the trial-that "but for 

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different." 

(Exh. Y, PCR Mem. Dec. at ¶ 7 (citations omitted).) 

Nor does Petitioner explain how the appellate court erred in concluding that he had 

failed to show prejudice. If the evidence against Petitioner about his dealings with the CI 

was limited to the CI’s testimony then the credibility of the CI would have been critical, 

and failure to impeach her prejudicial. But, as recognized by the state court, the testimony 

of the CI was corroborated by substantial evidence (audio/video, physical evidence, and 

Petitioner’s admissions) that would not have been made less credible even if the jury 

concluded the CI was not credible.6

In sum, the undersigned finds no basis to conclude that the appellate court’s 

decision on Grounds 2(b)(1) and (2) was contrary to law or the facts.

D. SUMMARY

Based on the foregoing, Grounds 2(a) and 2(b)(3) must be dismissed as 

6 For the same reasons, even if Ground 2(b)(3) (ineffectiveness re shoplifting prior) were 

not procedurally defaulted, it would be without merit. 

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procedurally defaulted and Grounds 1, 2(b)(1), and 2(b)(2) must be denied as without 

merit.

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that 

in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases 

concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention 

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in 

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a 

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on 

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it 

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debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and jurists of 

reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable 

or wrong. 

Petitioner argues in his Motion for Expeditious Final Disposition (Doc. 39) for a 

certificate of appealability on the issues raised in his motions seeking to strike the answer 

based on untimeliness and the erroneous certificate of service. Petitioner proffers no 

argument in his motion to show why the Court’s ruling was erroneous. The undersigned 

finds that reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether this Court was correct in 

those procedural rulings.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as 

to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

VI. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED

(A) Petitioner’s Motion for Expeditious Resolution (Doc. 39) be GRANTED to the 

extent that the Report & Recommendation has been filed and will be addressed in due 

course. 

(B) Grounds 2(a) and 2(b)(3) of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) 

be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

(C) The remainder of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), including 

Grounds 1, 2(b)(1) and 2(b)(2) be DENIED.

(D) To the extent the foregoing findings and recommendations are adopted in the District 

Court’s order, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.

VII. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

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Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th 

Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 

issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 

Dated: April 27, 2020

18-8302r RR 20 04 10 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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