Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance,

the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

AMY McCONNELL and AMY

McCONNELL on behalf of her

four minor children, A.B.,

A.B. J.M. and J.M.,

NO. CIV. S-05-0909 FCD DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LASSEN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et

al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendant Barbara

Coy’s (“Coy”) motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth

below,1 defendant’s motion is GRANTED. 

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2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts herein are

undisputed. (See Pls.’ Objections to Def.’s Stmt. of Undisp.

Facts (“RUF”), filed Apr. 23, 2007). Where the facts are in

dispute, the court recounts plaintiffs’ version of the facts.

Plaintiffs “dispute” defendant’s facts that are based upon

defendant Coy’s deposition testimony and declaration on the

grounds that such statements lack credibility. However,

plaintiffs cannot sufficiently raise a triable issue of fact

simply by raising issues regarding the credibility of defendant’s

evidence. See Nat’l Union Fire. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs also assert that many

facts are disputed, but their proffered evidence does not

contradict defendant’s assertion. Therefore, where plaintiffs

fail to point to any contrary evidence or direct contradictions

in defendant’s own statements, the court will not consider such

facts to be in dispute. 

2

BACKGROUND2

This case arises out of the alleged sexual abuse of female

minor plaintiffs J.M. and A.B. by Marion (“Hank”) Coy, defendant

Barbara Coy’s husband, while in foster care at the Coy’s home in

Doyle, California. At all relevant times, Barbara Coy has been a

certified, foster parent in good standing with defendant

Environmental Alternatives, a not-for-profit organization that

provides foster homes for children in Lassen County. (RUF ¶ 3;

2d. Am. Compl. (“Compl.”), filed Nov. 10, 2005, ¶ 11). On or

about May 1, 2003, the minor plaintiffs J.M., A.B., J.M., and

A.B. were placed with Hank and Barbara Coy as foster children. 

(RUF ¶ 6). Between May 1, 2003 and September 29, 2003, Hank and

Barbara Coy were the sole guardians and caretakers for the minor

children. (RUF ¶ 7).

On or about September 29, 2003, Sue Durand and Ronald Durand

(“Durand”), the biological grandparents of the minor plaintiffs,

informed Hank and Barbara Coy that the female plaintiff J.M. had

told them that Hank Coy had made her do “bad things.” (RUF ¶

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47). Specifically, Durand informed Barbara Coy that J.M. had

stated that Hank Coy made her kiss his peepee or touch it. (RUF

¶ 48; Dep. of Ronald James Durand (“Durand Dep.”), Ex. 6 to Decl.

of Treva J. Hearne (“Hearne Decl.”), filed Apr. 23, 2007, at

54:13-21). Durand testified that he was cautious about accusing

Hank Coy of molestation because J.M. had a reputation for seeking

attention. (Id. at 144:9-12). In response, Barbara Coy stated

that J.M. had been saying similar things to her. (Id. at 54:20-

21).

Immediately thereafter, Barbara Coy talked to the male

plaintiff A.B. and the female plaintiff A.B. alone about the

allegations made by the female plaintiff J.M. (RUF ¶ 50). At

that time, both A.B. plaintiffs indicated that Hank Coy had not

molested or inappropriately touched them. (RUF ¶ 5). Barbara

Coy then spoke to the female plaintiff J.M. and Hank Coy in the

laundry room of the Coy home. (RUF ¶ 52). Hank Coy did not

admit or deny the allegations by the female plaintiff J.M., but

it was apparent from his reaction that he had molested the minor. 

(RUF ¶ 53). Barbara Coy then spoke with Hank Coy alone inside a

vehicle where he admitted to molesting the female plaintiff J.M. 

(RUF ¶¶ 54-55). 

After Hank Coy admitted to the abuse, he went into the

master bedroom where he stayed the entire night. (RUF ¶ 56). 

During the night of September 29, 2003 and the early morning of

September 30, 2003, Barbara Coy stayed awake in the living room,

which is located between the master bedroom and the rooms where

the minor plaintiffs slept. (RUF ¶ 57). Barbara Coy did not

call the authorities the night of September 29, 2003 because

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Environmental Alternatives was not open and because Hank Coy had

a medical appointment the next morning to refill necessary

medication. (RUF ¶ 58). When Hank Coy exited the bedroom the

next morning, Barbara Coy informed him that he could not return

to the house and would likely be arrested. (RUF ¶ 59). She

subsequently called Judi Oliviera at Environmental Alternatives

and informed her that she should come to the Coy home with the

Sheriff because Hank Coy had molested the female plaintiff J.M. 

(RUF ¶ 60). Hank Coy was arrested for the sexual abuse of J.M.

and is currently incarcerated on these charges. (See RUF ¶ 1). 

Defendant Barbara Coy asserts that she never knew of any

molestation by her husband until September 29, 2003. (RUF ¶ 65). 

She contends that neither the female plaintiff J.M. or the female

plaintiff A.B. informed her of the molestation until after

September 29, 2003. (RUF ¶ 64). Defendant also contends that

during the minor childrens’ placement in her home, she was never

told by anyone nor observed that the minor plaintiffs were

experiencing feelings of depression, loneliness, hopelessness,

anxiety, or tension. (RUF ¶¶ 9-19). Plaintiffs assert that the

children were required to seek counseling during their time in

foster care, two of the minor children were suspended from

school, one threatened to run away, and one was acting out at

school as well as hitting, kicking, and spitting on Hank Coy. 

(RUF ¶¶ 8-9). 

On November 10, 2005, plaintiffs filed their Second Amended

Complaint, the operative pleading in this matter, asserting a

claim of negligence against defendant Barbara Coy for her alleged

failure to protect the minor plaintiffs from the sexual abuse

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inflicted by her husband Hank Coy. (Compl. ¶¶ 46, 115-20). On

March 12, 2007, defendant Barbara Coy filed this motion for

summary judgment, asserting that under the circumstances of this

case, she is not liable for negligence under California tort law

because she did not owe a duty to the minor plaintiffs. 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

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standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

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Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation

to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224,

1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs allege that defendant Barbara Coy “negligently

failed to protect the minor children from harm perpetrated by the

foster father, Hank Coy, who repeatedly sexually molested and

physically abused the children while she was present and had a

duty to protect the minor children placed in her care.” (Compl.

¶ 46). More specifically, plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that

defendant Coy: (1) “knew or had reason to know that her home was

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not safe for the minor children;” (2) that she “had a duty to

protect the minor children in her care;” (3) that she “breached

that duty by failing to protect [the] children from the physical

and sexual acts of abuse by her husband;” and (4) that the

children “have suffered emotional and physical damages” as a

result. (Compl. ¶¶ 117, 119-20). By this motion, defendant

Barbara Coy argues that she should not be held liable for the

conduct of Hank Coy because she was never aware of such deviant

conduct by her husband toward any of the foster children in their

care.

The issue before the court is not whether plaintiffs were

the victims of terrible wrongs at the hands of Hank Coy or

whether they suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result

of those wrongs. Hank Coy admitted to molesting at least one of

the minor female foster children, J.M., and, as a result, is

currently incarcerated in Solano State Prison. Rather, the issue

before the court in this case is whether defendant Barbara Coy is

liable under California tort law for the injuries alleged by

plaintiffs because Hank Coy’s abusive conduct was reasonably

foreseeable.

A. Nonfeasance

The gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim for negligence against

defendant Coy is that she negligently failed to take action to

protect the minor plaintiffs in her care from physical or sexual

abuse. Generally, under California law, there is “no duty to act

to protect others from the conduct of third parties.” Margaret

W. v. Kelley R., 139 Cal. App. 4th 141, 150 (2006) (quoting

Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 36 Cal. 4th 224, 235 (2005)). “This

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rule derives from the common law’s distinction between

misfeasance and nonfeasance, and its reluctance to impose

liability for the latter.” Delgado, 36 Cal. 4th at 235 n.12; see

also Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp., 9 Cal. App. 4th 88,

114 n.16 (“Misfeasance is the improper performance of an act that

is otherwise proper and nonfeasance is the nonperformance of an

act that should be performed.”). However, a defendant “may owe

an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third

parties if he or she has a ‘special relationship’ with the other

person.” Id. at 235 (citations omitted). In this case,

defendant Coy concedes that there was a special relationship

between her and the minor plaintiffs by nature of her role as

their foster parent. 

The inquiry into whether a defendant owes a duty to a

plaintiff under a theory of nonfeasance does not end with the

determination of whether a special relationship exists. Romero

v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1081 (2001). The

secondary inquiry is whether the assailant’s conduct was

reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Id.; see Chaney v.

Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 152, 158 (1995).

“Duty, being a question of law, is particularly amenable to

resolution by summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Parsons v. Crown

Disposal Co., 15 Cal. 4th 456, 465 (1997)). “While it is the

province of the jury, as trier of fact, to determine whether an

unreasonable risk of harm was foreseeable under the particular

facts of a given case, the trial court must still decide as a

matter of law whether there was a duty in the first place, even

if that determination includes a consideration of

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foreseeability.” Id. (quoting Clarke v. Hoek, 174, Cal. App. 3d

208, 214 (1985)). Whether a duty of care exists in a given

circumstance must be determined as a matter of law on a case-by

case basis. Parsons, 15 Cal. 4th at 472. 

Because of the similarity to the facts in this case, the

Chaney decision offers valuable guidance regarding the standard

to be applied in determining whether conduct was reasonably

foreseeable to a defendant charged with negligent supervision. 

In Chaney, the plaintiff, a 22-year-old woman, alleged that a

family friend sexually assaulted her while she was in his home

over an eight-year period, beginning when she was ten-years-old. 

39 Cal. App. 4th at 155. The plaintiff also filed a claim

against the assailant’s wife on the basis that she negligently

supervised plaintiff while in the home. In dismissing the

plaintiff’s claim for failure to allege facts giving rise to a

duty to act, the Chaney court held that public policy requires

that a wife have actual knowledge of her husband’s deviant

propensities in order for the court to impose a duty to take

measures to prevent an assault. Id. at 157. The court further

explained that while a wife’s knowledge may be proven by

circumstantial evidence, 

such inference must reflect the wife’s actual knowledge

and not merely constructive knowledge or notice. Actual knowledge can be inferred from the circumstances

only if, in the light of the evidence, such inference

is not based on speculation or conjecture. Only where

the circumstances are such that the defendant “must

have known” and not “should have known” will an

inference of actual knowledge be permitted.

Id. (emphasis added); see also Romero, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 1082. 

As such the Chaney court adopted a “must have known” test (the

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“Chaney duty rule”), which has subsequently been adopted by other

California courts in similar contexts. See Margaret W. v. Kelley

R., 139 Cal. App. 4th at 152-60 (applying the Chaney duty rule

where the minor plaintiff alleged that she was sexually assaulted

after she left the defendant’s home where she had arranged to

spend the night with the defendant’s minor daughter); Romero, 89

Cal. App. 4th at 1086-89 (applying the Chaney duty rule where the

minor plaintiff alleged that she was sexually assaulted by

another minor while visiting at the defendants’ home); Juarez v.

Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 81 Cal. App. 4th 377, 396-97 (2000)

(applying the Chaney duty rule where the plaintiff brought a

claim of negligent supervision against the defendants based upon

the alleged molestations by the plaintiff’s scoutmaster). But

see M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 110 Cal. App.

4th 508, 524-25 (2003) (declining to apply the Chaney duty rule

in the context of a school district’s supervisory duties due to

differing public policy concerns related to providing mandatory

education, the existence of statutory duties mandating adequate

supervision, the expectations and reliance of parents and

students, and the importance to society of the learning

activities that take place at school).

While the court acknowledges that Chaney and subsequent

California cases invoking the Chaney duty rule do not address the

circumstance of a special relationship arising out of a foster

parent relationship, the court finds that the public policy

considerations relevant to imposing a duty to act are similar to

those considered in Chaney and its progeny. In Chaney, as in

this case, the plaintiff sought to impose liability upon the

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assailant’s wife. 39 Cal. App. 4th at 158. The Chaney court

found that in most cases, a man harboring “deviant sexual

preferences and desires” would “wish to – and undoubtedly does –

keep them secret, especially from his wife.” Id. The Chaney

court also found that it would be contrary to public policy to

require a wife to assume that her husband is likely to molest a

child and thus, “armed with the proper fear . . . examine every

aspect of her husband’s behavior to determine whether he is

exhibiting signs indicating that he is contemplating molesting

the minor.” Id. These same policy concerns are raised in the

circumstances presented by this case. Cf. M.W., 110 Cal. App.

4th at 524-25. As such, the court finds that California courts

would likely extend the Chaney duty rule to cases addressing

nonfeasance claims against an assailant’s wife where the special

relationship arises out of a foster care relationship. 

Therefore, a wife’s duty of reasonable care depends on whether

she had actual knowledge or “must have known” of her husband’s

deviant propensities before he sexually assaulted the plaintiff. 

Chaney, 39 Cal. App. 4th at 157; see Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112

Cal. App. 3d 206, 210-12 (1980) (finding that the assailant’s

wife had actual knowledge of her husband’s deviant propensities

sufficient to confer a duty to protect because she had knowledge

that he had molested women and children in the past).

Defendant Barbara Coy presents evidence that she did not

have knowledge of her husband’s deviant sexual propensities prior

to his molestation of J.M. In her declaration, defendant Coy

asserts that prior to September 29, 2003, she had no reason to

suspect that her husband of over 40 years was engaging in

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inappropriate or illegal activities with an minor child. (Decl.

of Barbara Coy (“Coy Decl.”), filed Mar. 12, 2007, ¶ 45). 

Specifically, she asserts that she never observed nor was

informed by anyone that Hank Coy was entering any of the bedrooms

occupied by a minor child, (id. ¶¶ 40-41), that she had no

knowledge through observation or information that Hank Coy

inappropriately touched any minor child, including the

plaintiffs, (id. ¶¶ 42-43), and that the minor plaintiffs

displayed no visible or implied indications of depression,

loneliness, hopelessness, anxiety, or nervousness, (id. ¶¶ 16-

20). Defendant also contends that on or about September 29,

2003, after the biological grandparents of the minor plaintiffs

informed her that the female plaintiff J.M. indicated that Hank

Coy had made her do “bad things,” she questioned all the minor

children and confronted her husband about the molestation

accusations. (Id. ¶¶ 48, 50, 54). Subsequently, Hank Coy

admitted to molesting the female plaintiff J.M. (Id. ¶ 56). The

next morning, defendant Coy contacted Environmental Alternatives

to inform them they should come to the house with the Sheriff

because Hank Coy had molested one of the plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 61).

Plaintiffs argue that the court cannot rely on defendant

Barbara Coy’s declaration or deposition testimony because her

statements are “subjective, self-serving, and incredible.” (RUF

¶ 2). Therefore, plaintiffs “dispute” various facts solely on

the basis that the court should wholly reject Coy’s statements. 

In support of this assertion, plaintiffs submit a document laying

out portions of defendant Coy’s testimony and alleged

contradictions. Plaintiffs cite no authority for their request

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3 The court also notes that many of alleged

“contradictions” are not actually contradictory to the statements

or testimony of defendant Coy.

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that the court disregard the entirety of defendant’s statements

on the basis that there is inconsistent evidence relating to

immaterial facts. On a motion for summary judgment, the relevant

inquiry is whether any of the disputes of fact pointed to by

plaintiffs are material to the critical issue presently before

the court, i.e. whether defendant Coy must have known of Hank

Coy’s deviant propensities prior to the molestation. Many of the

statements made by defendant are not actually contradicted by the

evidence pointed to by plaintiffs. Further, to the extent that

there are inconsistencies between defendant Coy’s statements,

such “contradictions” are not statements that defendant has

subsequently contradicted through her own deposition or

declaration. Cf. Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 952 F.2d

262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The general rule in the Ninth Circuit

is that a party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit

contradicting [her] prior deposition testimony.”). Rather, these

“contradictions” are disputes of fact for which defendant has

presented the testimony of Barbara Coy and plaintiffs have

presented other testimony or evidence.3

 Most importantly, much

of the testimony that plaintiffs seek to discredit does not

relate to issues that are material to this motion. Therefore,

the court will not wholly reject the statements of defendant Coy

in resolving this motion. 

Turning to plaintiff’s affirmative arguments regarding

defendant Coy’s liability under tort law, plaintiffs first

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4 Plaintiffs argue that plaintiff was “deaf.” (RUF ¶

30). The evidence cited to does not support this proposition as

the deponent, Durand, merely stated that Hank Coy had trouble

hearing and that most conversations were with Barbara Coy. 

(Durand Dep. at 146:23-25). 

5 To the extent that plaintiffs are attempting to assert

a new theory of negligence based upon Hank Coy’s Alzheimer’s

disease, such a claim was not asserted in the plaintiffs’

complaint. For the reasons set forth infra, the court will not

consider any new claims presented in plaintiffs’ opposition. 

Further, plaintiffs dispute that Hank Coy demonstrated any signs

of Alzheimer’s or reduced mental deficiency. (RUF ¶ 30). 

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contend that defendant was negligent because for approximately

one year before the removal of the minor plaintiffs from their

home, she had observed that Hank Coy began experiencing some

signs of Alzheimer’s disease such as lethargy. (RUF ¶ 30). 

Plaintiffs also present evidence that Hank Coy did not hear very

well.4

 However, plaintiffs present no evidence that Alzheimer’s

disease, lethargy, or hearing loss are predictors of child

molestation, such that defendant Coy was aware of her husband’s

deviant propensities as a result of these circumstances. As

such, these assertions have no bearing on defendant’s actual

knowledge.5

Second, plaintiffs contend that defendant Coy must have

known about allegations made by her neighbor Ron Cuevas that her

husband had attempted to sexually molest Cuevas’ fourteen-yearold daughter two years before the minor plaintiffs were placed in

defendant’s home. However, plaintiffs present no evidence

indicating that Barbara Coy had any knowledge of these

accusations. Cuevas testified that he never spoke to Barbara Coy

at any time about any type of sexual allegations made against her

husband and that he was not aware that defendant had any

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knowledge of the allegation. (Dep. of Ron Cuevas, Ex. 15 to

Hearne Decl., 89:10-16). Cuevas also testified that up until the

time that Hank Coy was arrested and confessed to molesting J.M.

in late September 2003, he never saw nor heard anything that

caused him to think that Hank Coy was sexually molesting foster

children. (Id. 25:3-10). Plaintiffs also fail to present any

evidence demonstrating when Cuevas reported or made public his

allegations of attempted sexual abuse. Plaintiffs argue that

because defendant lived in Doyle, California, a small town,

defendant must have heard about Cuevas’ allegations. This

argument, wholly without evidentiary support, is insufficient to

raise a triable issue of fact that Barbara Coy had prior actual

knowledge of her husband’s propensity. While actual knowledge

can be inferred by circumstantial evidence, such inference cannot

be based on speculation or conjecture. Chaney, 39 Cal. App. 4th

at 157. In essence, plaintiffs ask this court to impose

liability on the basis that at some point, either before or after

the molestation of J.M., small town gossip could have reached

defendant’s ears. The court will not do so.

Third, plaintiffs assert that defendant Coy must have known

about her husband’s predilections based upon conversations that

she had with Judy Oliviera, an employee of Environmental

Alternatives. Plaintiffs present evidence that in September

2003, defendant Coy spoke to Oliviera regarding J.M.’s behavior,

such as striking and spitting on Hank Coy. (Dep. of Barbara Coy

(“Coy Dep.”), Ex. 4 to Hearne Decl., at 99:8-13, 102:19-25). 

Oliviera informed defendant that these behaviors sounded like

what a child would do if they had been molested. (Id. at 99:12-

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6 Plaintiffs also mischaracterize evidence in their

opposition, stating that other foster children had been

previously removed from the Coy home for bed-wetting, a symptom

of sexual abuse. Barbara Coy testified at her deposition that

she asked Environmental Alternatives to remove the children from

her home because all of the children wet the bed and one of the

children had diarrhea, which she wiped throughout the Coy home. 

(Coy Dep. at 34:5-35:19). There was no indication that sexual

abuse was the cause of these behaviors or even suspected. As

such, the prior removal of these children did not put Barbara Coy

on notice of her husband’s deviant propensities. 

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17). Oliviera further informed defendant that she thought that

the children had probably been molested before they were placed

in defendant’s care. (Id. at 100:3-6). While this evidence may

demonstrate that defendant had notice that J.M. was exhibiting

signs of molestation, this information did not put defendant on

notice of when the molestation occurred or that her husband was

the perpetrator.6 Therefore, this evidence is also insufficient

to demonstrate that defendant had actual knowledge of her

husband’s deviant propensities. 

Finally, plaintiffs assert that when the minor plaintiffs’

grandparents informed defendant Coy that J.M. had made statements

regarding inappropriate touching, defendant admitted that J.M.

had made prior statements about her husband engaging in sexual

touching. Plaintiffs’ assertion mischaracterizes the deposition

testimony. Durand testified that when he shared J.M.’s

statements with defendant, defendant stated that J.M. had said

“similar things” to her. The allusion to “similar things,”

alone, is wholly insufficient to show that defendant had actual

knowledge of Hank Coy’s deviant tendencies prior to the

molestation. Plaintiffs present no evidence regarding when these

alleged prior “similar” statements were made to defendant Coy or

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what the content of these “similar” statements were. If such

statements were made after the molestation, defendant would not

have actual knowledge prior to the offensive conduct. Further,

the female plaintiff J.M. testified that the first grownup she

told about the sexual abuse was her grandfather. (Dep. of J.M.,

Ex. B to Decl. of Valerie A. Arce (“Arce Decl.”), filed Mar. 12,

2007, at 13:15-22). J.M. also testified that she never told

defendant Coy about what had happened. (Id. at 14:18-21). Under

these circumstances, defendant’s alleged vague “admission” to

Durand regarding “similar” statements by J.M. are insufficient to

raise an issue of fact regarding whether defendant had actual

knowledge of her husband’s proclivities prior to the molestation. 

In order for the court to impose a duty to act upon

defendant Coy, there must be evidence from which a trier of fact

could reasonably find that defendant had prior actual knowledge

of her husband’s propensity to sexually molest minor children. 

See Romero, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 1089. In this case, the record

is devoid of any such evidence. Plaintiffs presented no

evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which the trier of fact

could reasonably conclude that Barbary Coy must have known of

Hank Coy’s propensity to molest a foster child in their care. 

See id. Therefore, defendant Coy’s motion for summary judgment

regarding plaintiffs’ negligent claim based upon a failure to

protect is GRANTED.

B. Misfeasance

Plaintiffs also allege that Barbara Coy made representations

to Environmental Alternatives that her home was a safe placement

for foster children, which resulted in the minor plaintiffs’

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7 Because neither of the parties has addressed the last

Rowland factor, the court does not consider it in deciding the

duty issue presented in this case. See Romero, 89 Cal. App. 4th

at 1091 n.11. 

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placement in the Coy home. This allegation indicates that

plaintiffs are claiming not only that defendant Coy failed to

protect them from Hank Coy’s abuse, but also that she increased

the risk that such harm would occur by her own acts. As such,

plaintiffs have adequately pled a claim for negligence based upon

defendant’s misfeasance, which “exists when the defendant is

responsible for making the plaintiff’s position worse, i.e.

defendant has created a risk.” Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal.

3d 40, 49 (1975).

“Where the act complained of is one of misfeasance, the

question of duty is governed by the standards of ordinary care.” 

Romero, 89 Cal. App. 4th at 1091 (quoting Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at

49). California courts have applied a “policy-driven,

multifactor weighing process for determining whether in a

particular case a defendant owed a tort duty to a given

plaintiff.” Id. (citing Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,

113 (1968)). These factors are non-exclusive and generally

include:

(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (2)

the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered

harm; (3) the closeness of the connection between the

defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (4) the

moral blame attached to defendant’s conduct; (5) the

policy of preventing future harm; (6) the extent of the

burden to the defendant; (7) the consequences to the

community of imposing a duty to exercise care with

resulting potential liability for breach of that duty;

and (8) the availability, cost, and prevalence of

insurance for the risk involved.7

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Id. (citing Parsons, 15 Cal. 4th at 472-73). However, “[t]he

most important factor remains foreseeability.” Margaret W., 139

Cal. App. 4th at 161. 

Under the circumstances in this case, the consideration and

balance of the Rowland factors militates against finding that

defendant Barbara Coy owed a duty of care to plaintiffs under

principles of ordinary negligence. First, as set forth above,

plaintiffs have presented no evidence to support a reasonable

inference that defendant had notice that her husband of 40 years

would sexually molest a child. As such, the risk of the harm

that occurred in this case was not reasonably foreseeable, a

critical aspect of imposing a legal duty on defendant that

informs many of the following factors. See Romero, 89 Cal. App.

4th at 1092; see also Margaret W., 139 Cal. App. 4th at 161

(finding that the remaining Rowland factors could not overcome

the lack of foreseeability).

None of the parties dispute that at least one of the minor

plaintiffs was molested by Hank Coy. However, where there is no

evidence that defendant knew her home would be unsafe due to her

husband’s deviant propensities, there is only a tenuous

connection between defendant Barbara Coy’s conduct in

representing that her home was safe for foster children and the

subsequent abuse of a foster child by her husband. Further,

because the conduct of her husband was not reasonably

foreseeable, defendant’s representation that her home was safe

for foster children is not morally blameworthy. See id. at 1093. 

Moreover, the policy of preventing future harm would not be

served by imposing liability in this case, where the risk of harm

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to the children was not reasonably foreseeable by defendant. See

id at 1093-94. Additionally, the imposition of a duty to protect

against an unforeseeable sexual assault by a foster father would

require a foster mother to not only “examine every aspect of her

husband’s behavior to determine whether he is exhibiting signs

indicating that he is contemplating molesting the minor,” but

also to ensure that a foster father is never left alone with any

of the children. See Chaney, 39 Cal. App. 4th at 158. In the

absence of any knowledge of a risk of particular harm associated

with a spouse and foster father, this burden is great. Finally,

the imposition of such a duty would also dissuade individuals

from entering the foster care system for fear that without hypervigilance to potential hidden proclivities of a long-term spouse,

one could be civilly liable for attempting to provide a safe home

environment for children in need.

As such, after consideration of the Rowland factors in the

circumstances of this case, the court finds that defendant

Barbara Coy did not owe plaintiffs a duty of care under general

negligence principles. Therefore, defendant Coy’s motion for

summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ negligence claim based

upon a theory of misfeasance is GRANTED. 

C. Negligence Per Se

In their opposition, plaintiffs for the first time contend

that defendant Barbara Coy is liable for negligence per se for

failing to report allegations of abuse pursuant to California

Penal Code § 11165.9. Even under liberal notice pleading

standards, plaintiffs did not allege a claim for negligence in

their complaint based upon defendant Coy’s failure to report. 

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8 See Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d

895, 910 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that when issues are raised in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment which are outside the

scope of the complaint, the court should construe the opposition

as a motion to amend the pleadings). 

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Rather, the crux of plaintiffs’ claim is that defendant had

knowledge of her husband’s propensity for abuse and failed to

protect the children from the subsequent physical and sexual

abuse perpetrated by her husband. Nowhere in plaintiffs’

complaint is there an allegation regarding defendant’s failure to

report.

Even if the court construes plaintiffs’ assertion of a new

theory as a motion to amend their complaint,8 plaintiffs have not

shown “good cause” to amend the pleading under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 16(b), as is required by the court’s Pretrial

Scheduling Order. (Pretrial Scheduling Order, Docket # 59, filed

Apr. 18, 2006). The good cause requirement of Rule 16 primarily

considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. See

Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th

Cir. 1992). When the proposed modification is an amendment to

the pleadings, the moving party may establish good cause by

showing “(1) that [he or she] was diligent in assisting the court

in creating a workable Rule 16 order; (2) that [his or her]

noncompliance with a rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur,

notwithstanding [his or her] diligent efforts to comply, because

of the development of matters which could not have been

reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16

scheduling conference; and (3) that [he or she] was diligent in

seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent

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9 This omission is particularly glaring in light of the

fact that plaintiffs sought to add allegations that the District

Attorney, as a mandated reporter, failed to report a prior sexual

assault attempt by Hank Coy. Plaintiff did not seek to add the

District Attorney as a defendant. (Reply to Opp’n to Am. Mot. to

Amend, Docket # 124, filed Apr. 5, 2007, at 2). 

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that [he or she] could not comply with the order.” Jackson v.

Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (citations

omitted). Whether or not defendant Coy properly reported the

allegations after statements were made by one of the minor

plaintiffs is a fact that has not changed since the filing of the

complaint. To the extent that facts were obtained in discovery

which led to the assertion of this theory, plaintiffs do not

identify when such facts were obtained, nor do they contend that

amendment of the complaint was requested promptly after the

plaintiffs obtained such knowledge. Moreover, plaintiffs did not

seek to allege a claim for either negligence per se or negligence

based upon defendant Coys’s failure to report in their recently

filed Motion to Amend, which was denied by the court.9 (See Am.

Mot. to Amend, Docket # 106, filed Feb. 15, 2007). Therefore,

plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate “good cause” to add a claim

based upon defendant Coy’s alleged failure to report. 

Furthermore, even if such “good cause” could be

demonstrated, in order to successfully amend the complaint,

plaintiffs would also have to show that leave to amend is

warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) which

states “leave [to amend] is to be freely given when justice so

requires.” Plaintiffs have failed to proffer any argument that

the interests of justice require granting plaintiffs leave to

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10 All discovery has closed, and the deadline for filing

dispositive motions is June 8, 2007. (Pretrial Scheduling Order,

at 2-3).

Further, plaintiffs’ claim for failure to report is premised

on their assertion that Coy admitted to J.M.’s grandfather that

these allegations of molestation had come up before. (Pls.’

Opp’n, filed Apr. 23, 2007, at 5). As set forth above,

defendant’s alleged admission about “similar things” was vague

and inconclusive regarding any prior statements by J.M. and any

inference that molestation accusations were referred to by

defendant is inconsistent with J.M.’s deposition testimony that

she never told Barbara Coy about what happened and that the first

adult she told about the molestation was her grandfather. The

undisputed evidence reveals that the morning after Hank Coy

admitted to the molestation, defendant Barbary Coy called Judy

Oliviera at Environmental Alternatives, reported the incident,

and told her to bring the Sheriff. (RUF ¶ 60).

11 Plaintiffs also argue that “the children were

physically and psychologically abused by Barbara Coy.” (Pls.’

Opp’n, filed Apr. 23, 2007, at 3). Such an allegation was not

made in plaintiffs’ the complaint. For the reasons set forth in

the court’s analysis of plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim based

upon a failure to report, the court does not address the merits

of this claim. 

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amend their complaint at this late stage in the proceedings.10

As such, the court does not consider the merits of plaintiffs’

negligence per se claim.11

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Barbara Coy’s motion

for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 14, 2007 

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