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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FREDERICK M. RUSSILLO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

United St&.Uis Cour!. of Appeals Tenth eireuit 

JUN 18 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 90-2018 

THE HONORABLE TONY SCARBOROUGH, ) 

Chief Justice of the New Mexico ) 

Supreme Court; ROBERT J. LOVATO,) 

Court Administrator; TOMMY E. ) 

JEWELL, Presiding Judge of the ) 

Metropolitan Court of Bernalillo) 

County, ) 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 

OF NEW MEXICO; THE METROPOLITAN 

COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 1 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of New Mexico 

D.C. No. 88-1412-JB 

Harry Z~erman, San Diego, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

John B. Pound of Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., Santa Fe, New Mexico, 

for Defendants-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 90-2018 Document: 01019297918 Date Filed: 06/18/1991 Page: 1 
Before MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER, District 

Judge.* 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

*The Honorable G. Thomas Van Bebber, United States District Court 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2018 Document: 01019297918 Date Filed: 06/18/1991 Page: 2 
Frederick Russillo was terminated as court administrator of a 

New Mexico Metropolitan Court at the direction of the New Mexico 

Supreme Court. Mr. Russillo appeals the district court's decision 

on summary judgment that he was not unconstitutionally deprived of 

a property or liberty interest, and the New Mexico Supreme Court 

did not exceed its power of superintending control. Russillo v. 

Scarborough, 727 F. Supp. 1402 (D. N.M. 1989). We agree with the 

district court on all grounds and affirm. 

I. 

The judges of the Metropolitan Court of Bernalillo County, 

New Mexico, 1 appointed Mr. Russillo in January 1986 to serve as 

court administrator. In that capacity, he was directly 

responsible to and subject to discipline by the presiding judge of 

the Metropolitan Court, Judge Tommy E. Jewell. 2 

1The Metropolitan Court is an inferior court created by the state 

legislature under the authority of article VI, § 1 of the New 

Mexico Constitution. 

2N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-8A-7(A) (1990) provides: 

The metropolitan judges of a metropolitan court 

shall select and appoint a court administrator who shall 

supervise all matters relating to the administration of 

the metropolitan court. The court administrator shall, 

after his appointment, be directly responsible to and 

work at the direction of the presiding judge of the 

metropolitan court. 

Mr. Russillo was also a "confidential" employee governed by 

Rule 32(C) of the New Mexico Judicial Branch Personnel Rules 

(1985): 

The responsibility 

administering disciplinary 

unclassified or confidential 

the justice or judge to 

responsible. 

for initiating and 

action applicable to 

employees is vested in 

whom the employee is 

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Appellate Case: 90-2018 Document: 01019297918 Date Filed: 06/18/1991 Page: 3 
In January 1988, the New Mexico Supreme Court initiated an 

investigation of accounting irregularities at the Metropolitan 

Court. During the investigation, Mr. Russillo was placed on 

administrative leave, but he was reinstated when the investigation 

ended. 

In April 1988, approximately $29,000 was stolen from the 

accounting department of the Metropolitan Court. Mr. Russillo 

submitted a written resignation to Judge Jewell, stating: "While 

I had felt the security measures we had instituted were adequate 

to meet our needs, this is apparently not the case." Judge Jewell 

rejected the tendered resignation, but a few days later terminated 

Mr. Russillo at the instruction of Chief Justice Tony Scarborough 

of the New Mexico Supreme Court. In his affidavit, Justice 

Scarborough stated that while Mr. Russillo was not accused of 

stealing the money, the incident had occurred because of lax 

procedures plaguing the Metropolitan Court administrative office 

and reflected poorly on the state judiciary. 

Mr. Russillo filed suit for wrongful termination against 

Justice Scarborough; the New Mexico Supreme Court; Robert J. 

Lovato, the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts; 

Judge Jewell; and the Metropolitan Court. On summary judgment, 

the district court dismissed the claims against the courts based 

on Eleventh Amendment immunity, and rejected Mr. Russillo's breach 

of contract claim. The district court also dismissed his § 1983 

property and liberty interest claims and his challenge to the 

state supreme court's exercise of superintending control. On 

appeal, Mr. Russillo disputes the last three rulings. 

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We review summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the 

same standards employed by the trial court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 

dispute over a material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. We view the record in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

II. 

Mr. Russillo claims under § 1983 that defendants deprived him 

of due process protection for his property interest in his job 

when they fired him without pre-termination notice or a posttermination hearing. The district court held as a matter of law 

that Mr. Russillo does not have a constitutionally protected 

property interest in his job. We agree. 

In the employment context, the Supreme Court has defined a 

property interest as a legitimate expectation in continued 

employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 u.s. 564, 577 (1972). 

The existence of a property interest is "defined by existing rules 

or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 

state law -- rules or understandings that secure certain benefits 

and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Id. 

Under New Mexico law, a public employee has a protected 

property interest only if he has an express or implied right to 

continued employment. Lovato v. City of Albuquerque, 106 N.M. 

287, 289-90, 742 P.2d 499, 501-02 (1987). Mr. Russillo does not 

dispute the district court's finding that under applicable 

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personnel rules and New Mexico law he was an at-will employee, 

serving at the pleasure of the Metropolitan Court. Ordinarily, an 

employee's at-will status forecloses a property interest claim 

because the employee has no legitimate expectation of future 

employment. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 u.s. 341, 345-47 (1976). 

Mr. Russillo focuses his appeal on the novel claim that he 

has a property interest in the expectation that he will only be 

terminated 

authority. 

New Mexico 

him. 

by the Metropolitan Court independently exercising its 

He contends that expectation was violated because the 

Supreme Court ordered the Metropolitan Court to fire 

Mr. Russillo's theory redefines the nature of a protected 

property interest to include the manner of his termination. 

However, the Supreme Court rejected this approach in Cleveland Bd. 

of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985), stating: 

"'Property'" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its 

deprivation .... " Although this statement was made in the 

context of holding that the scope of a property interest cannot be 

limited by accompanying procedures, we believe it also supports 

the converse conclusion that the scope of a property interest 

cannot be expanded by reference to procedures. We have followed 

the Supreme Court's dictate in this circuit, stating for instance 

that a property interest is defined by substantive rather than 

procedural restrictions on an employer's discretion to terminate 

an employee. Campbell v. Mercer, 926 F.2d 990, 993 (lOth Cir. 

1991), citing Asbill v. Housing Auth. of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 

1499 (lOth Cir. 1984). Similarly, we have held that grievance 

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procedures, such as meetings with particular authorities, do not 

themselves create a property interest in continued employment. 

Carnes v. Parker, 922 F.2d 1506, 1511 (lOth Cir. 1991). 3 

Any suggestion in New Mexico case law that procedures create 

a property interest is erroneous. Mr. Russillo relies on 

Jacobs v. Stratton, 94 N.M. 665, 667, 615 P.2d 982, 984 (1980), 

which stated without elaboration that "procedures gave [the 

employee] an entitlement" and cited Roth. See also Graff v. 

Glennen, 106 N.M. 668, 748 P.2d 511 (1988) (in dicta, repeated 

language from Jacobs). However, in an appeal after remand in 

Jacobs, the New Mexico Court of Appeals acknowledged Loudermill 

and declined to decide the case based on a property interest 

claim. Jacobs v. Meister, 108 N.M. 488, 493-94, 775 P.2d 254, 

259-60 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 582, 775 P.2d 1299 

(1989). 

Given the Metropolitan Court's unrestricted authority to 

terminate Mr. Russillo for any reason, we discern no legitimate 

expectation of continued employment, whatever Mr. Russillo's 

expectations about how he would be fired. We agree with the 

district court's assessment that "provisions that outline who is 

responsible for employee discipline do not, standing alone, 

support a claim of a protected property right in future 

employment." Russillo, 727 F. Supp. at 1410. 

3Although procedures do not create constitutional property 

interests, we did state in Carnes that "[p]rocedural 

protections . . . can sustain an entitlement to the procedures 

themselves." Id. If Mr. Russillo had a right to be terminated 

only by the Metropolitan Court, that right was satisfied because 

Judge Jewell, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Court, did 

discharge him. 

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III. 

Mr. Russillo also asserts under § 1983 that his liberty 

interest in his good name and reputation was violated when he was 

discharged without a name-clearing hearing. He was terminated 

shortly after $29,000 had been stolen from the Metropolitan Court 

and publicity accompanying the two events implied he was guilty 

of wrongdoing, Mr. Russillo contends. The following excerpts from 

an article appearing on April 28, 1988, in the Albuquerque Journal 

are typical of the publicity: 

Metropolitan Court administrator Fred Russillo was 

fired this week by order of Tony Scarborough, chief 

justice of the state Supreme Court. 

Metro Court Presiding Judge Tommy Jewell said 

Wednesday that Scarborough told him to ask for 

Russillo's resignation, or fire him. 

Scarborough did not tell Jewell why Russillo had to 

step down, Jewell said. Russillo had been Metro Court 

administrator since January 1986. 

About $26,000 in fines and fees paid to Metro Court 

was stolen from the court's accounting offices last 

week. Two court employees were fired over the theft, 

but Jewell said he did not know if Russillo's firing was 

related to the incident. 

In our recent en bane decision, Melton v. City of Oklahoma 

City, 928 F.2d 920, 927 (lOth Cir. 1991), we stated that a liberty 

interest claim exists "[w]hen a public employer takes action to 

terminate an employee based upon a public statement of unfounded 

charges of dishonesty or immorality that might seriously damage 

the employee's standing or associations in the community and 

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Appellate Case: 90-2018 Document: 01019297918 Date Filed: 06/18/1991 Page: 8 
foreclose the employee's 

employment opportunities . 

freedom to take advantage of future 

. . . " we held that a city did not 

violate a police officer's liberty interest when a police 

department spokesperson accurately told the press that the 

department was investigating perjury allegations against the 

officer. Id. at 922, 924. Several controlling factors were: (1) 

the police department's statements were not false nor were they 

intended to create false implications, (2) the police department 

did not "charge" the officer with perjury, and (3) the police 

department was not the original source of the potentially 

stigmatizing information. Id. at 928-29. 

Here, New Mexico court officials did not make any false 

statements. Judge Jewell stated the New Mexico Supreme Court had 

sought Mr. Russillo's termination, and he did not know whether 

there was any connection to the recent theft incident. None of 

the defendants "charged" Mr. Russillo with stealing the funds. 

Any possible impression that Mr. Russillo was fired for financial 

wrongdoing was created by the newspaper's juxtaposition of that 

information with news about missing funds, not by Judge Jewell's 

statements. Moreover, we agree with the district court that the 

article may have implied that Mr. Russillo was fired for 

mismanagement but did not suggest he actually stole the money, 

Russillo, 727 F. Supp. at 1412; mismanagement is not equivalent to 

"dishonesty or immorality that might seriously damage an 

employee's standing ... in the community." Melton, 928 F.2d at 

927. Because defendants did not disseminate any false and 

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stigmatizing charges against Mr. Russillo, they did not violate 

his liberty interest in his reputation. 

IV. 

Mr. Russillo also contends Justice Scarborough exceeded the 

scope of his authority under the New Mexico constitution by 

ordering the Metropolitan Court to fire him, and therefore "the 

actions initiated by the Honorable Tony Scarborough, The Supreme 

Court and Robert J. Lovato and carried out by Tommy E. Jewell are 

unlawful." He seeks a writ of mandamus reinstating him to his 

position as the remedy for this alleged wrong.

4 We review this 

4Fed. R. Civ. P. 8l(b) abolished the writ of mandamus, but federal 

courts retain the power to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the 

usages and principles of law," under 28 u.s.c. § 1651. 

Although neither party raises the issue, we recognize that 

the question of federal courts' authority to command the actions 

of state courts is a sensitive one. In Van Sickle v. Holloway, 

791 F.2d 1431, 1436 n.5 (lOth Cir. 1986), we stated in dicta that 

a federal court does not have the authority to issue a writ in the 

nature of mandamus to alter a final state court judgment. See 

also Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1988) (defendant 

sought writ compelling state judge to seat certain jurors; court 

stated in dicta that "federal courts have no general power to 

compel action by state officials .... "); Clark v. State of 

Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 681-82 (9th Cir. 1966) (federal court 

has no power to issue writ of mandamus directing state court in 

the performance of its duties, including disbarment proceedings). 

But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 654 F.2d 268, 278-79 (3d 

Cir.), cert. denied, Wright v. United States, 454 u.s. 1098 (1981) 

(federal district court may order state court judge to confer with 

United States attorney because "ban on federal directives to state 

courts is not absolute .... "). Because we agree with the 

district court's assessment that the New Mexico Supreme Court 

acted within its constitutional authority, we do not decide 

whether we would have the authority to issue a writ commanding 

reinstatement if the state supreme court had acted 

unconstitutionally. 

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state law issue de novo, 5 Salve Regina College v. Russell, 

u.s. _____ , 111 s. Ct. 1217, 1221 (1991), and conclude Justice 

Scarborough acted within the bounds of his authority. 

Mr. Russillo acknowledges that the state supreme court has 

superintending control over the Metropolitan Court. Article VI, 

S 3, of the New Mexico Constitution gives the state supreme court 

such control over inferior courts. 6 The Metropolitan Court is an 

inferior court established by the state legislature under the 

authority of article VI, S 1, of the constitution. 7 

5Again, neither party raises the issue, but we note that 

jurisdiction over state claims when the federal claims have been 

dismissed is discretionary. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 

U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); Enercomp. Inc. v. McCorhill Pub., Inc., 

873 F.2d 536, 545 (2d Cir. 1989); Graf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 

790 F.2d 1341, 1347-48 (7th Cir. 1986); 13B Wright & Miller, 

Federal Practice & ProcedureS 3567.1, at 134-37, n.20 (1991). 

Considerations of comity are strong when, as here, the state claim 

involves purely state law and policy and raises a novel issue. 

However, countervailing considerations of judicial economy are 

also strong when the federal claims are dismissed on the merits, 

after the parties have briefed and argued the state law issue; 

fairness to the parties is an additional factor which supports 

retaining jurisdiction because the state courts are a party to 

this dispute. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in deciding the state law issue on the merits. 

6 N.M. Canst. art. VI, S 3: 

The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in 

guo warranto and mandamus against all state officers, 

boards and commissions, and shall have a superintending 

control over all inferior courts; it shall also have 

power to issue writs of mandamus, error, prohibition, 

habeas corpus, certiorari, injunction and all other 

writs necessary or proper for the complete exercise of 

its jurisdiction and to hear and determine the same. 

7The state constitution, N.M. Canst. art. VI, S 1, authorizes the 

legislature to create inferior courts: 

The judicial power of the state shall be vested in the 

senate when sitting as court of impeachment, a supreme 

(Continued to next page.) 

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The disputed issue is whether the power of superintending 

control includes the authority to order the Metropolitan Court to 

terminate its court administrator. Mr. Russillo argues that 

superintending control applies only to matters occurring in the 

ordinary course of litigation, not to administrative matters. We 

believe his argument rests on a false dichotomy. Administrative 

matters ultimately affect the progress of litigation in the court 

system as much as issues tied directly to specific cases. 

Although the New Mexico courts have not squarely addressed 

the issue before us, we find sufficient guidance to conclude 

Justice Scarborough acted within the bounds of the state 

constitution. In State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646, 660 

(1936), the New Mexico Supreme Court exercised superintending 

control to promulgate uniform rules of pleading, practice and 

procedure. The court stated, "The power of superintending control 

is the power to control the course of ordinary litigation in 

inferior courts, as exercised at common law by the Court of King's 

Bench and by the use of writs " However, the 

also stated: 

(Continued from prior page.) 

court, a court of appeals, district courts; probate 

courts, magistrate courts and such other courts inferior 

to the district courts as may be established by law from 

time to time in any district, county or municipality of 

the state. 

court 

The legislature exercised that authority to create metropolitan 

courts, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-BA-2 (1981): 

[T]he metropolitan court shall constitute a state 

magistrate court which is inferior to the district 

courts and is established by law pursuant to the prov~s~ons of Section 1 of Article VI of the state 

constitution. 

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The superintending control over inferior courts 

does not limit this court to the promulgation of 

rules of court which have for their purpose the 

regulation of matters of relatively minor 

importance, which merely govern the everyday 

routine of courts and enable them to act as such. 

These should rightly be left to the district courts 

themselves. For example, the trial judge in each 

district is better able to determine what routine 

rules will expedite the business of his particular 

court. We are concerned with the more important 

rules of adjective law governing the trial of 

lawsuits and furnishing the machinery by which 

litigants may secure effective enforcement of their 

substantive rights. 

Id. at 661. The statement that superintending control "does not 

limit" the state supreme court to directing routine matters 

implies that the court has the authority to oversee such matters, 

although the Roy court also emphasized that administrative matters 

should generally be left to the inferior courts for practical 

reasons. The power of superintending control "'is hampered by no 

specific rules or means for its exercise .. It is unlimited, 

being bounded only by the exigencies which call for its 

exercise, I II Id. at 662 (citation omitted). 

The New Mexico Supreme Court later clarified the purpose of 

superintending control: 

to make the Supreme Court responsible to see that 

inferior courts do not depart from proper judicial 

activity, become dictatorial or oppressive in their 

conduct, or otherwise behave improperly so as to 

interfere with or reflect upon the court system, or 

shake public confidence in the administration of justice 

and the judiciary. 

New Mexico ex rel. Anaya v. Scarborough, 75 N.M. 702, 706, 410 

P.2d 732, 734 (1966). In Anaya, the New Mexico Supreme Court 

exercised superintending control to disqualify a judge from a case 

because of allegations of personal bias. Although the dispute 

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arose out of a particular lawsuit, the court did not confine its 

discussion of the purpose of superintending control to such 

contexts. 

Here, the New Mexico Supreme Court acted within the scope of 

its superintending control authority to maintain "public 

confidence in the administration of justice and the judiciary." 

Id. As the district court noted, the situation was unusual: 

The New Mexico Supreme Court, and Chief Justice 

Scarborough in particular, were of the op~n~on that 

plaintiff's job performance as Metropolitan Court 

Administrator was not satisfactory. They felt that he 

was partly responsible for the accounting and cash 

security problems at the Metropolitan Court. . When 

the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Court failed to 

remedy the situation by calling for or accepting 

plaintiff's resignation, it became necessary for the 

Supreme Court to exercise its power of superintending 

control and to direct Judge Jewell to terminate 

plaintiff. 

Russillo, 727 F. Supp. at 1413-14. 

Mr. Russillo raises several other unavailing arguments. He 

asserts, without supporting argument, that state supreme court 

control over administrative matters must be authorized by statute. 

Although the court administration statute makes the Metropolitan 

Court administrator "directly responsible" to the Metropolitan 

Court, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-8A-7(B), that language does not 

preclude the supreme court's exercise of overriding superintending 

control. Similarly, the statutory provision that the Director of 

the Administrative Office of the Courts shall be subject to 

removal by the state supreme court, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-9-1, does 

not limit the supreme court's authority over the Metropolitan 

Court. In fact, because the Director "supervise[s] all matters 

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relating to administration of the courts," N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-9-

3(A), it demonstrates that the state supreme court has ultimate 

authority over administrative matters. 

Mr. Russillo's discussion of the law in other states provides 

interesting background but no binding authority. We find no 

guidance in those cases, having satisfied ourselves that the New 

Mexico courts have sufficiently delineated the superintending 

authority of the New Mexico Supreme Court. Finally, Mr. Russillo 

contends that "any administrative authority granted by 

superintending control . . . is limited to constitutionallycreated courts and not extended to legislatively-created courts." 

The district court did not explicitly address this twist on the 

issue, and Mr. Russillo provides no evidence that he raised this 

issue at trial. Thus, the issue is not properly before us. lOth 

Cir. R. 28.2(d); see Farmers Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 869 F.2d 565, 

570 (lOth Cir. 1989) (appellate court does not address new issues 

on appeal). 

v. 

Mr. Russillo has failed to show that he has a protected 

property interest or that his liberty interest in his reputation 

was violated by defendants. Therefore, the district court 

correctly dismissed on summary judgment his § 1983 claims that he 

was denied due process protection for those interests. The 

district court also correctly decided the New Mexico Supreme Court 

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acted within its constitutional authority when it ordered his 

termination. 

AFFIRMED. 

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