Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01195/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01195-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH M. ESTRADA ROBERTS, No. 2:14-CV-1195-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

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Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action under 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 

Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding

judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending

before the court are plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 20) and defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment (Doc. 21). 

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, who was a child under age 18 at the time, applied for social security

benefits on March 21, 2011. Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied. Following denial of

reconsideration, plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which was held on October 9,

2012, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mark C. Ramsey. In a November 20, 2012,

decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled based on the following relevant

findings:

1. The claimant had the following severe impairment(s) before attaining age

18 on April 27, 2011: Marfans syndrome with deformity of the ankles on

standing, obesity, hyperlipidemia, and borderline intellectual functioning;

2. Before attaining age 18, the claimant did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment

listed in the regulations;

3. The claimant has not developed any new impairment or impairments since

attaining age 18;

4. Since attaining age 18, the claimant has continued to have a severe

impairment or combination of impairments;

5. Since attaining age 18, the claimant does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment

listed in the regulations;

6. The claimant has the following residual functional capacity since attaining

age 18: the claimant can perform sedentary work; the claimant can

lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; he can only

stand for two hours in an 8-hour workday; he can sit for six hours in an 8-

hour workday; he can occasionally climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds; he can occasionally balance or stoop; he can frequently kneel or

crouch; he can occasionally crouch or crawl; he is limited to simple,

repetitive tasks with limited contact with the public or co-workers; and

7. Since attaining age 18, considering the claimant’s age, education, work

experience, residual functional capacity, and the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy that the claimant can perform.

After the Appeals Council declined review on March 24, 2014, this appeal followed.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether it is: 

(1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence” is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

(9th Cir. 1996). It is “. . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole,

including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, must

be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner’s

decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v.

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative

findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the

Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

which supports the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal

standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

III. DISCUSSION

In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues that ALJ impermissibly

rejected the opinion of Dr. Cormier. The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on

whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. See Lester v.

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a

treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an

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individual, than the opinion of a non-treating professional. See id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The least

weight is given to the opinion of a non-examining professional. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d

502, 506 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1990).

In addition to considering its source, to evaluate whether the Commissioner

properly rejected a medical opinion the court considers whether: (1) contradictory opinions are

in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. The Commissioner may reject an 

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and

convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 

While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted

by an examining professional’s opinion which is supported by different independent clinical

findings, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1041 (9th Cir. 1995). A contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be

rejected only for “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Lester,

81 F.3d at 830. This test is met if the Commissioner sets out a detailed and thorough summary of

the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, states her interpretation of the evidence, and makes a

finding. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989). Absent specific and

legitimate reasons, the Commissioner must defer to the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The opinion of a non-examining professional,

without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See id. at 831. In any event, the Commissioner need not give weight to any

conclusory opinion supported by minimal clinical findings. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting treating physician’s conclusory, minimally supported opinion);

see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

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As to Dr. Cormier, the ALJ provided the following detailed discussion of the

doctor’s clinical findings and opinions:

On appeal of the initial denial of his claim, the claimant as noted above

alleged worsening of his condition and that he had attention deficit

disorder (ADD), dyslexia, and low comprehension of math (9E). Thus,

the Disability Determination Service reviewing procured a psychological

consultative examination. On July 28, 2011, consultative psychologist,

Sid Cormier, examined the claimant who reported his primary worklimiting problems included difficulty interacting socially, low self-esteem,

anger issues, difficulty with memory, and inability to walk or stand for

longer than ten minutes, and complications associated with Marfan’s

syndrome. . . .

Dr. Cormier noted the claimant exhibited an abnormal gait walking with

both feet pointing outward. His fine motor performance was mildly

hypotonic. He was able to read, comprehend, and respond in writing to

the history questionnaire but asked his mother to complete the majority of

it. He did not exhibit obvious signs of psychological distress. The

claimant reported his mood was typically “good” although his mother

indicated he becomes frustrated easily. The claimant then indicated that

he participated in anger management classes at school which he found

“incredibly beneficial.” He sleeps all day and stays up all night. He said

he as low energy. He said he loses his balance easily attributing it to his

Marfan’s. Dr. Cormier had the benefit of review of the Teacher’s

Questionnaire, and the echocardiagram study. 

The claimant reported graduating from high school in 2001 after a long

history of special education classes. He struggled to earn good grades but

earned a “C” average in his senior year. He completed high school in a

continuation high school setting because of his behavioral issues and [he

stated] that his anger management class helped him cope. He reported

having ten friends which his mother contradicted stating he has none. He

said his friends come over. He does not like large groups and is selfconscious in social situations. He likes to play video games, draw, and

write. He can care for his own self hygiene, prepare his own meals, and do

routine household chores. He has never paid his own bills but said he

could do so if taught. He requires assistance shopping in order to make

healthy choices. He does not have a driver’s license. 

On mental status examination, the claimant was alert and oriented. His

sensorium was clear and he denied any history of hallucinations or

delusions. Dr. Cormier noted his thought processes proceeded in a

somewhat slow and lethargic fashion which he opined was consistent with

possible psychomotor retardation. His mood appeared good although

somewhat lethargic and he presented with a slightly flattened affect. Dr.

Cormier indicated the claimant’s concentration capacity was borderline as

he was able to recall up to 7 digits forward and 5 digits in sequence but

only 3 digits backwards His abstract thinking appeared borderline range. 

His foresight appeared below average as he seemed to have a basic grasp

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of anticipating consequences of his own and other peoples’ behaviors. His

vocabulary was within normal limits. Dr. Cormier opined the claimant’s

general vocabulary, word usage, reported history, and ability to

conceptualize suggests an individual of high borderline intellectual

functioning whose verbal abilities are stronger than his nonverbal abilities.

Dr. Cormier administered a battery of psychometric tests including the

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale IV, the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt

Test II, the Trials A and B, and the Wechsler Memory Scale III. On the

intelligence test, the claimant achieved a verbal comprehension index of

96, a perceptual reasoning index of 75, a working memory index of 80, a

processing speed in index of 79, and a full scale 10 score of 79. This

places his current level of overall intellectual functioning within the higher

end of the borderline. Furthermore, his verbal comprehension abilities

were significantly stronger than the rest of his abilities. On the Bender

Visual Motor Gestalt test, the claimant performed within the average and

below average ranges on the copy and recall trials of this test, respectively. 

His performance was not suggestive of any significant improvement in

areas of perceptual/motor or recall/reproductive functioning. On the Trials

tests, he was able to complete both trials of this test without errors; the

amount of time it took was slightly longer than his agemates, suggesting

mild impairment in processing speed. This is consistent with the other

measures of processing speed given in this evaluation. On the Memory

test, the claimant demonstrated average visual memory, on both immediate

and delayed tasks. However, his auditory memory ranged from the

borderline to average ranges, suggesting possible impairment in

remembering spoken information. 

Dr. Cormier diagnosed the claimant with learning disorder, not otherwise

specified, rule out dysthymic disorder, rule out cognitive disorder, not

otherwise specified, and borderline intellectual functioning. He assessed

the claimant’s Global Assessment of Functioning score as 60. . . .

Functionally, Dr. Cormier opined that psychologically and behaviorally,

the ramifications of the claimant’s borderline intellectual functioning,

impaired nonverbal abilities, impaired auditory memory functioning, and

possible dysthymic disorders are likely to seriously impair his ability to

perform complex and detailed tasks, but perhaps only mildly to moderately

impair his ability to perform simple and repetitive ones. The

aforementioned conditions may mildly impair his ability to maintain

regular attendance but moderately impair his ability to perform work

activities on a consistent basis. He may benefit from special or additional

supervision, particularly in training in new tasks. His ability to complete a

normal workday or workweek without interruptions resulting from the

ramifications of his borderline intellectual functioning, learning disorder,

auditory memory impairments, and possible dysthymic disorder overall

appeared moderately impaired. Formal memory testing suggested mild to

moderate impairment regarding his ability to accept and remember

instructions from supervisors. His history and interview behavior

suggested mild to moderate impairment regarding his ability to interact

with co-workers and the general public, and he admitted to feeling

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extremely self-conscious and somewhat paranoid in social situations due

to his abnormal height and weight. His history in response to the stress of

the evaluation suggested mild impairment regarding his ability to deal with

typical stresses that he might encounter [in] any competitive work

situation. He demonstrated mild concentration lapses, as well as mild

impairment in pace, although no significant impairment in persistence. He

neither described nor evidenced any suggestive indications of

decomposition [sic] in a work or work-like setting. Cognitively, he may

become compromised regarding his ability to adjust to routine changes in a

work situation. However, he does not appear to represent a psychological

or behavioral safety concern [in] any work setting up [to] this time. He

indicated that he is currently capable of performing most activities of daily

living but does not yet have a driver’s license and does not know how to

pay bills. Ostensibly, he did not appear psychologically functional outside

of a moderately supportive situation at this time (3F). 

The ALJ concluded that Dr. Cormier’s findings “are consistent with an ability to perform simple

repetitive tasks and that the claimant has some difficulty socially.” The ALJ rejected the doctor’s

opinion regarding plaintiff’s functionality outside a “moderately supportive situation.” The ALJ

concluded:

. . .Dr. Cormier’s opinion that the claimant cannot function outside of a

moderately supportive situation is not supported by these findings. He

takes college level courses with some assistance with his education plan

and some accommodation for his size. He said he was provided more

comfortable seating and some tutoring help. The claimant demonstrates a

greater level of independent functioning than opined by Dr. Cormier. 

Thus, the undersigned assigns limited weight to his opinion but great

weight to his clinical observations and examination results. . . .

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide sufficient reasons to reject Dr.

Cormier’s opinion that plaintiff “cannot function outside of a moderately supportive situation.” 

According to plaintiff:

. . .The ALJ states that Mr. Roberts demonstrates a greater level of

independent functioning than opined by Dr. Cormier. (A.R. 29). In

support of this claim, the ALJ relies on the fact that Mr. Roberts is

enrolled in college level courses and receives assistance with “some

tutoring” and “some assistance” with his education plan as well as

comfortable seating due to his size. Id.

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Plaintiff contends that the ALJ misstated the evidence in concluding that plaintiff’s enrollment in

college classes demonstrates independent functioning. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s analysis is

“void of any details as to the extent of the assistance Mr. Roberts receives.” Plaintiff asserts that

the ALJ’s conclusion “that the unspecified degree of assistance is inconsistent with Dr.

Cormier’s opinion regarding a moderately supportive situation is nothing more than an

unsupported conclusion and not supportive of rejection.” Plaintiff adds:

Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Roberts requires tutoring and

assistance with education planning for three college level classes at Shasta

College and is enrolled in the Disabled Students Program arguably

provides the best evidence confirming Dr. Cormier’s opinion that Mr.

Roberts requires a moderately supportive environment, not the other way

around. Mr. Roberts cannot take classes without accommodation. . . .

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly ignored Dr. Cormier’s opinion that

plaintiff is moderately impaired in his ability to perform work activities on a consistent basis and

complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions, and that plaintiff “may benefit

from special or additional supervision, particularly in the training of new tasks.” According to

plaintiff: “The ALJ does not offer any reason for rejecting the aforementioned limitations at [sic]

that is error.” 

As to the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Cormier’s opinion that plaintiff cannot function

outside a “moderately supportive situation,” defendant argues:

At the 2012 hearing, Plaintiff testified that at the time of the

hearing he was taking three courses at college, including math, figure

drawing, and ceramics (AR 59). He had previously taken two semesters of

art courses (AR 59, 63, 68). Plaintiff indicated that he was not taking

more courses because he found it physically demanding to walk around the

campus, not because he found it intellectually challenging (AR 51, 70,

233). Plaintiff stated that he was eligible for assistance at Shasta (AR 70). 

The crux of Plaintiff’s argument revolves around this assistance at

Shasta. Plaintiff contends in his brief that this evidences a “moderately

supportive” environment. However, he provided no such testimony at the

hearing, and provided no such evince elsewhere in support of his claim. 

Plaintiff testified that he could get accommodations for seating if it was

uncomfortable, get tutors, or help with his education plan (AR 70). 

Plaintiff did not testify that he found college intellectually challenging, or

that he was unable to attend classes without intellectual accommodation or

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assistance (AR 51, 59, 63, 68, 70). . . . While it appears that Plaintiff was

eligible for assistance, the evidence of record supports the ALJ’s finding

that Plaintiff’s successful completion of three semesters of college evinced

his ability to intellectually function independently. . . .

At the outset, the court observes that Dr. Cormier’s statement that plaintiff cannot

“psychologically function outside of a moderately supportive situation” represents a generalized

summary of the doctor’s specific opinions and is not itself a specific opinion. This observation is

indicated by the doctor’s use of the word “ostensibly” preceding this statement, which concludes

the doctor’s assessment. 

In any event, defendant’s argument is persuasive. Contrary to plaintiff’s

contention that “the fact that Mr. Roberts requires tutoring and assistance with education

planning for three college level classes at Shasta College and is enrolled in the Disabled Students

Program arguably provides the best evidence confirming Dr. Cormier’s opinion that Mr. Roberts

requires a moderately supportive environment,” plaintiff provided no evidence that he actually

required tutoring or other academic assistance with the classes he was taking at Shasta College. 

While there is evidence that academic assistance was available to plaintiff, there is no evidence

he required it or sought it.1

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Cormier’s statement that

plaintiff is moderately impaired in his ability to perform work activities on a consistent basis. 

Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Cormier’s statement that plaintiff

may benefit from special or additional supervision. In his report, Dr. Cormier stated that

plaintiff’s conditions “may . . . moderately impair his ability to perform work activities on a

consistent basis.” (emphasis added). Dr. Cormier also stated: “He may benefit from special or

additional supervision, particularly in the training of new tasks.” (emphasis added). As to these

Evidence that plaintiff actually received physical accommodations is irrelevant to 1

review of the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Cormier’s opinions regarding plaintiff’s mental functional

capabilities. 

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limitations, the doctor expressed nothing more than a possibility, as indicated by the use of the

word “may.” The ALJ did not err in disregarding these statements.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Cormier’s opinion as

to plaintiff’s ability to complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions. In this

regard, Dr. Cormier opined that plaintiff’s “ability to complete a normal workday or workweek

without interruptions. . . appeared moderately impaired.” The court does not agree with plaintiff

that the ALJ “does not offer any reason” for rejecting this limitation. To the contrary, the ALJ

stated that Dr. Cormier’s opined limitations – but not his objective clinical findings – were

inconsistent with plaintiff’s demonstrated level of intellectual functioning. As defendant notes: 

“Once again, Plaintiff’s success at college for three semesters is powerful evidence

demonstrating that he was able to complete assigned tasks on a consistent basis, and undermined

Dr. Cormier’s opinion.” As defendant also notes, the reviewing doctors’ assessments – to which

the ALJ assigned great weight – provide substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s final

decision is based on substantial evidence and proper legal analysis. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 20) is denied;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 21) is granted; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this file.

DATED: March 11, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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