Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06879/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06879-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ADONAI EL-SHADDAI, 

AKA JAMES RAY WILKERSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

WILLIAM MUNIZ, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 18-cv-06879-YGR (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO REVOKE IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS STATUS AND TO DISMISS 

ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE; 

AND TERMINATING ALL OTHER 

PENDING MOTIONS AS MOOT 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Deuel Vocational Institution and frequent 

litigant in federal court, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

alleging constitutional violations that took place during his previous incarceration at Salinas 

Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 

Dkt. 18. The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) is the operative pleading in this action. Dkt. 

20. 

The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP 

status, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and to dismiss the action without prejudice. Dkt. 38. 

Also pending before this Court are various pending motions filed by both parties, including 

Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment (dkt. 33) and his motion to strike Defendants’ 

motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status and to dismiss the action (dkt. 40), as well as Defendants’ 

Motion to Stay Pending Resolution of Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Status (dkt. 39) and their 

Motion for Extension of Time to File Opposition to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Answer and Motion 

for Partial Summary Judgment (dkt. 42). 

Having read and considered the papers submitted, and being fully informed, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status and to dismiss the action for the 

reasons set forth below, and it terminates all other remaining pending motions as moot. 

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II. BACKGROUND 

On November 14, 2018, Plaintiff filed his complaint seeking injunctive, declaratory, and 

monetary relief over the infringement of his right to practice his religion, which he claims is the 

“Messianic Kabbalistic1

 Order of Melchizedek.” Dkt. 1 at 14.2 Plaintiff claims the “aim of the 

Messianic Kabbalistic Order of Melchizedek is to teach the Kabbalistic Science of Occult 

Knowledge, the Pure and Holy Magick [sic] of Light, the secrets of M[ys]tic attainment of the 

Secret Wisdom of the Ancients, after the Messianic Kabbalistic Order of Melchizedek.” Id. 

As mentioned above, the SAC is the operative pleading in this action. Dkt. 20. Plaintiff 

named the following Defendants at SVSP: Wardens William Muniz and T. Foss; Acting Warden 

S. Hatton; Chief Deputy Wardens J. Stein and Captain R. Binkele; Religious Review Committee 

Chairperson J. McCall; Community Resources Manager Carol Hernandez; Inmate Appeals Chief 

M. Voong; Correctional Officers C. Lopez, P. Sullivan, R. Gamboa, A. Ware, M. Barroso, J. 

Young, H. Corona, and T. Frost. Id. at 1, 3. 

On March 11, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. Dkt. 18. 

Also on March 11, 2019, the Court issued an order entitled, “Order of Service; Granting Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint; and Denying his Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction and/or TRO As Premature.” Dkt. 19. The following background is taken from the 

Court’s March 11, 2019 Order, which states as follows: 

In the SAC, Plaintiff claims that he is the “inmate facilitator of the 

Kabbalistic Studies and Meditation” at SVSP. Dkt. 15-1 at 14. He 

adds that “[a]s a metaphysical practitioner, Ritual Herbal Smoke 

Blend3

 [is] utilized in ceremoniously as a sacrament with mystical 

[o]bservance and magickal [sic] enchantment when engaged in 

magickal [sic] rites, are used as a way to encourage intuition, 

clairvoyance or psy[c]hic attention.” Id. 

On July 30, 2017, Plaintiff alleges that he “received a Religious 

Special Purchase [of] four ounces of approved Kinni-Kinnick 

1

 In order to elaborate on the “Kabbalistic Religion,” Plaintiff explains that “Kabbalah is 

Jewish Mysticism.” Dkt. 15-1 at 10. 

2

 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by the parties. 

3

 Plaintiff explains that Ritual Herbal Smoke Blend “includes tobacco, cannabis and 

hashish.” Dkt. 15-1 at 4. 

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Ceremonial Tobacco,” which was immediately confiscated as 

contraband. Id. at 5. Plaintiff claims that he informed Defendants 

that he “ha[d] an ex[c]eption to receive[] and possess Ritual Herbal 

Smoke Blends pursuant to Directive IAB Case No. 1410572 and 

LAC-13-02830.” Id. However, Defendants “refus[ed] to issue 

[Ritual] Herbal Smoke Blends after receiv[ing] three directive[s] to 

issue in Second Level Appeal Response #18-02234, Third Level 

Appeal Response 1807639 and Appeal LAC-B-13-02958.” Id. at 14-

15. Plaintiff claims that the Ritual Herbal Smoke Blend is “essential, 

necessary, and central to the exercise and practice of his Faith.” Id.

at 15. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have substantially burdened the 

practice of his religion by denying him the use of tobacco (i.e., KinniKinnick Ceremonial Tobacco or Ritual Herbal Smoke Blend) in 

religious rituals. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations appear to 

state cognizable section 1983 claims for violation of his First and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and due 

process/equal protection. See, e.g., Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 

736 (9th Cir. 1997) (prison officials may not burden the practice of 

prisoner’s religion, by preventing him from engaging in conduct 

mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests). These allegations also implicate the 

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 

which provides: “No government shall impose a substantial burden 

on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an 

institution, as defined in section 1997 [which includes state prisons, 

state psychiatric hospitals, and local jails], even if the burden results 

from a rule of general applicability, unless the government 

demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in 

furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 

restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 

interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). 

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ aforementioned actions 

in violation of his federal constitutional rights also violate various 

provisions of California constitutional and statutory law. The federal 

supplemental jurisdiction statute provides that “‘district courts shall 

have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related 

to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form 

part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United 

States Constitution.’” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Plaintiff asserts 

supplementary state law claims that the actions of Defendants 

violated rights afforded to him by California constitutional and 

statutory law. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the 

statutory requirement. Therefore, the Court exercises supplemental 

jurisdiction over his state law claims. 

Id. at 3-5. Upon its initial review of the complaint, as mentioned above, the Court determined 

that: (1) the SAC appeared to state cognizable section 1983 claims for violation of Plaintiff’s First 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and due process/equal protection; 

(2) such allegations also implicated RLUIPA; and (3) it would exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

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over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Id. at 4-5. 

As mentioned above, Defendants filed a motion requesting the Court revoke Plaintiff’s IFP 

status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and to dismiss the instant action. Dkt. 38. Plaintiff filed an 

opposition. Dkt. 40. Defendants filed a reply. Dkt. 41. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) was enacted, and became effective, 

on April 26, 1996. It provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action IFP under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Section 1915(g) requires that this Court consider prisoner actions dismissed before, as well as 

after, the statute’s 1996 enactment. Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Section 1915(g) is commonly referred to as the “three strikes rule.” The three strikes rule 

“requires so-called ‘frequent filer’ prisoners to prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts 

may consider their civil actions and appeals.” Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1127 (10th Cir. 

2001). 

For purposes of a dismissal that may be counted under section 1915(g), the phrase “fails to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted” parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) and carries the same interpretation, the word “frivolous” refers to a case that is 

“of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact,” and the word “malicious” refers to 

a case “filed with the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (“Andrews I”). Only cases within one of these three 

categories can be counted as strikes for section 1915(g) purposes. See id. Dismissal of an action 

under section 1915(g) should only occur when, “after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an 

[earlier] action, and other relevant information, the district court determines that the action was 

dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim.” Id. 

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Andrews I requires that the prisoner be given notice of the potential applicability of 

section 1915(g), by either the district court or the defendants, but also requires the prisoner to bear 

the ultimate burden of persuasion that section 1915(g) does not bar pauper status for him. Id. A 

defendant seeking to challenge a prisoner’s IFP status has the burden of producing evidence that 

allows the district court to conclude that the prisoner plaintiff has suffered at least three prior 

dismissals that count as strikes under section 1915(g). Id. at 1120. Once the defendants have met 

this initial burden, the burden shifts to the prisoner to show why a prior dismissal should not count 

as a strike, or why he is entitled to the imminent danger of serious physical injury exception. Id. 

A dismissal under section 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot proceed with his action as 

a pauper under section 1915(g), but he still may pursue his claims if he pays the full filing fee at 

the outset of the action. See Tierney, 128 F.3d at 1311-12 (affirming district court’s denial of IFP 

status and dismissing complaint without prejudice under section 1915(g)). 

B. Plaintiff’s Prior “Strikes” 

Defendants allege that Plaintiff has filed, while incarcerated, at least three actions that were 

dismissed on the basis that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state claim. At the time 

Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed IFP, the Court was unaware that Plaintiff had filed any of 

these cases or the basis of the dismissals of any such cases in other districts, i.e., the United States 

District Court for the Central District of California and the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of California. 

This Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the court documents 

provided in support of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff is barred from 

proceeding IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).4

 Dkt. 38-1. Defendants argue that the following 

dismissals may be counted as dismissals for purposes of section 1915(g): (1) El-Shaddai v. 

4

 The district court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and 

without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” 

Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted) (granting request to take judicial notice in section 1983 action of five prior cases in which 

plaintiff was pro se litigant, to counter her argument that she deserved special treatment because of 

her pro se status). 

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Stainer, No. 2:14-cv-09313 GHK (JC) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2016) (dismissing SAC for failure to 

state a claim); (2) Wilkerson v. Terhune, No. S-99-1539 LKK DAD P (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2000) 

(dismissing amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon plaintiff’s failure to file a timely 

SAC to cure deficiencies); and (3) Wilkerson v. Popke, C 94-0035 FMS (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994) 

(denying IFP status because civil rights complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted). See Dkt. 38 at 3-4; Dkt. 38-1 at 4-182 (Exs. 1-7).5 

Only three prior dismissals need qualify under section 1915(g). This Court must review at 

least three dismissals to determine whether they qualify as strikes under section 1915(g). See 

Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1121. Here, the Court will review all three aforementioned dismissals, 

which were all entered before the instant action was brought by Plaintiff on November 14, 2018, 

in order to determine whether they may be counted as dismissals for purposes of section 1915(g). 

As further explained below, these dismissals all qualify as “strikes” under section 1915(g). See id.

1. Case No 2:14-cv-09313 GHK (JC) – First Strike 

 In El-Shaddai v. Stainer, No. 2:14-cv-09313 GHK (JC), the Central District screened 

Plaintiff’s SAC and dismissed all but one of his claims for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 38-1 at 

12-69 (Ex. 2). The district judge found that Plaintiff’s final claim, arising out of his first request 

for religious name change, was time-barred. Id. at 55-60. Judgment was entered on December 13, 

2016. Id. at 70. 

Plaintiff challenges Case No. 2:14-cv-09313 GHK (JC) as a strike on the basis that one out 

of his numerous claims was dismissed because it was time-barred and that negates this case from 

qualifying as a strike. Dkt. 40 at 3-5. Plaintiff does not challenge Case No. 2:14-cv-09313 GHK 

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 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants attempted to list seven prior dismissals that they 

argued qualified as “strikes” under section 1915(g). Dkt. 38 at 3-6. However, in his opposition, 

Plaintiff identified four cases that do not qualify as strikes because they were removed from state 

court and were “not ‘brought’ under the federal in forma pauperis provisions but under the rules 

of the state court . . . .” Dkt. 40 at 3-4. In their reply, Defendants concede that the following four 

cases do not qualify as “strikes” under section 1915(g): (1) El-Shaddai v. Murray, No. 2:17-cv06534 SJO (RAOx); (2) Wilkerson v. Mericle, No. S-00-0960 DFL GGH P; (3) Wilkerson v. 

Melching, No. S-00-0959 FCD DAD P; and (4) Wilkerson v. Castro, No. S-00-0866 GEB DAD P. 

Dkt. 41 at 2 fn. 2. Therefore, the Court will only focus on the other three prior dismissals in order 

to determined whether they qualify as “strikes” under section 1915(g). 

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(JC) qualifying as a strike for any other reason. See id.

Defendants argue that a dismissal with prejudice on the ground that an action was barred 

by the statute of limitations should serve as a section 1915(g) strike. Dkt. 38 at 5 (citing Jones v. 

Bock, 549 U.S 199, 215 (2007) (if relief is barred by applicable statute of limitations, the 

complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim); Bayramoglu v. Cate, No. C 13-1094 

YGR (PR), 2014 WL 3704798 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2014) (finding that claims barred by statute of 

limitations constituted a strike)). 

Plaintiff fails to provide persuasive evidence that rebuts the showing by Defendants. As 

mentioned, Plaintiff claims that dismissals on statute of limitations grounds do not count as strikes 

for purposes of section 1915(g), and he relies on Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 553 (7th 

Cir. 2005), and Daniels v. Woodford, No. CV 07-6975 PA (JC), 2008 WL 2079010, *6, *8 (C.D. 

Cal. May 13, 2008). However, the Court finds Plaintiff argument and reliance on these two cases 

unavailing. In Daniels, the district judge noted that the defendants failed to cite any authority for 

their argument that the dismissal on statute of limitations grounds constituted a strike. Daniels, 

No. CV 07-6975 PA(JC), 2008 WL 2079010, at *8. Here, Defendants provided relevant 

authority, including one from this district and by this Court, in support of their argument. 

Meanwhile, this Court is not bound by Seventh Circuit authority in Myles. And, in any event, 

Myles, which was issued in 2005, predates the Supreme Court’s 2007 holding in Jones v. Bock,

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and thus any holding in Myles that could have a persuasive effect on the issue of whether a 

dismissal because of a time-barred claim can qualify as a strike is outdated. 

Finally, this Court has previously found that a dismissal with prejudice on the ground that 

an action was barred by the statute of limitations should serve as a section 1915(g) strike. See 

Bayramoglu, 2014 WL 3704798, at *3. In Bayramoglu, this Court relied on the following 

authority: 

6

 Defendants also rely on a Ninth Circuit case (which Myles also predates) named Belanus 

v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1027-30 (9th Cir. 2015), in which they claim that the Ninth Circuit had 

found a complaint dismissed on the grounds that it was time-barred qualified as a strike. Dkt. 41 

at 4. However, this Court notes that the Ninth Circuit did not specifically focus on such a holding 

in that case, and instead, it held that a dismissal of an action or appeal can count as a strike 

regardless of whether the filing fee was paid. See Belanus, 796 F.3d at 1028. 

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The Ninth Circuit has held that a “claim may be dismissed under Rule 

12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by the applicable statute of 

limitations only when ‘the running of the statute is apparent on the 

face of the complaint.’” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art 

at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) quoting Huynh v. 

Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006). As 

mentioned above, the phrase “fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted” parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) and carries the same interpretation. 

Id. (footnote added). Thus, this Court again finds that where the allegations of the pleading 

affirmatively demonstrate a prisoner’s failure to comply with procedural requirements, such as the 

statute of limitations, dismissal on such grounds constitutes dismissal for failure to state a claim 

for purposes of the PLRA. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 215. Because Case No. 2:14-cv-09313 GHK 

(JC) was dismissed in its entirety at the screening stage on grounds that constitute failure to state a 

claim, this Court finds that it should count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Therefore, Defendants have met the burden of establishing that Case No. 2:14-cv-09313 

GHK (JC) was dismissed for a qualifying reason under section 1915(g), and therefore counts as a 

strike. See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 

2. Case No. S-99-1539 LKK DAD P – Second Strike 

In Wilkerson v. Terhune, No. S-99-1539 LKK DAD P, the magistrate judge of the Eastern 

District screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and, on May 8, 2000, 

issued an order dismissing the amended complaint with leave to file a SAC correcting certain 

deficiencies. Dkt. 38-1 at 104-10 (Ex. 4). Plaintiff did not file a SAC by the deadline. Id. at 121-

22. Thus, on August 29, 2000, the magistrate judge issued Findings and Recommendations, in 

which the magistrate judge recommended that the action be dismissed for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. Id. at 112-13. On October 11, 2000, the district judge of the 

Eastern District issued an Order adopting in full the Findings and Recommendations issued by the 

magistrate judge on August 29, 2000. Id. at 115-16. Also on October 11, 2000, judgment was 

entered. Id. at 118. 

In his opposition, Plaintiff challenges Case No. S-99-1539 LKK DAD P as a strike by 

relying on Williams v. Grannis, in which the plaintiff requested a voluntary dismissal, and thus the 

Eastern District found that “a voluntary dismissal does not constitute a dismissal on the grounds 

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that the action is ‘frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’” 

Dkt. 40 at 4 (citing Wiliams v. Grannis, 2008 WL 4078664, *4 (E.D. Cal. 2008)). Plaintiff thus 

argues that “a voluntary dismissal following [a] dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a 

claim, with leave to file an amended complaint, is not a strike.” Id. Meanwhile, Defendants argue 

that the Court should reject Plaintiff’s challenge because nothing in the record “could be 

interpreted as a request for voluntary dismissal.” Dkt. 41 at 3. This Court agrees. In Case No. S99-1539 LKK DAD P, Plaintiff received leave to amend but failed to file his SAC. Dkt. 38-1 at 

104-10, 121-22. Plaintiff’s challenge fails because the Eastern District did not dismiss the lawsuit 

because of a voluntary dismissal. Id. 

Plaintiff fails to provide persuasive evidence that rebuts the showing by Defendants that 

failure to state a claim is a qualifying reason for a strike under section 1915(g). Therefore, the 

Court finds that Defendants have met the burden of establishing that Case No. S-99-1539 LKK 

DAD P was dismissed for a qualifying reason under section 1915(g), and therefore counts as a 

strike. See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 

3. Case No. C 94-0035 FMS – Third Strike 

On March 18, 1994, in Wilkerson v. Popke, No. C 94-0035 FMS, the Honorable Fern M. 

Smith, a former district judge in this district, denied Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP because his 

complaint failed to state a claim for relief. Dkt. 38-1 at 173-76 (Ex. 7). Also on March 18, 1994, 

judgment was entered. Id. at 177-78. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a case is “dismissed” for the purposes of section 1915(g) 

“when the court denies the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of the 

filing fee on the ground that the complaint is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim, and 

thereupon terminates the complaint.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008). 

When a district court disposes of an IFP complaint on such grounds, the complaint is “dismissed” 

for purposes of section 1915(g) “even if the district court styles such dismissal as denial of the 

prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” Id. at 1153 

(finding that the district court necessarily reviewed the complaints and made an assessment on 

their merits in making the determination whether the actions qualified for IFP status). This was 

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indeed the case in Case No. C 94-0035 FMS, wherein Judge Smith denied Plaintiff’s request to 

proceed IFP because the complaint failed to state a claim for relief. Dkt. 38-1 at 173-76. 

 Defendants point out that Plaintiff conceded that Case No. C 94-0035 FMS constituted a 

strike in his case before the Ninth Circuit. See Dkt. 41 at 2 (citing El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 

F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2016)). However, in his opposition, Plaintiff seems to backtrack from 

what he conceded previously and argues that a case dismissed based on a qualifying reason prior 

to the enactment of the PLRA (which was signed into law on April 26, 1996) cannot constitute a 

strike. Dkt. 40 at 3. 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s position is unsupported by law and further point out that 

Plaintiff does not cite to any authority holding that cases dismissed for one of the qualifying 

reasons before the enactment of the PLRA cannot constitute strikes. The Court agrees with 

Defendants and notes that because section 1915(g) is a procedural rule that does not raise 

retroactivity concerns, cases dismissed before the effective date of § 1915(g), i.e., April 26, 1996, 

may be counted as qualifying dismissals or “strikes.” Tierney, 128 F.3d at 1311-12. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff “misreads the cases that he has cited to support his 

position.” Dkt. 41 at 2-3 (citing Dkt. 40 at 3). Defendants state as follows: 

Those cases hold, very narrowly, that the 3-strikes provision in the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) do not apply retroactively to 

cases where IFP status was granted prior to the enactment of the 

PLRA, but challenged under 3-strikes provision for revocation of IFP 

status post-enactment. See Gibbs v. Ryan, 160 F.3d 160, 162-63 (3d 

Cir. 1998); Chandler v. D.C. Dept. of Corr., 145 F.3d 1355, 1359 

(D.C. Cir. 1998); Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 

1998). His citations do not speak to whether cases dismissed for a 

qualifying reason before the enactment of the PLRA can or cannot 

constitute strikes. [Case No. C 94-0035 FMS] was dismissed due to 

a qualifying reason. Therefore, [Case No. C 94-0035 FMS] is a strike. 

Id. (emphasis added). Again, the Court agrees with Defendants and rejects Plaintiff’s challenge. 

Therefore, the aforementioned decision in Case No. C 94-0035 FMS constitutes a qualifying strike 

under section 1915(g). See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s four aforementioned dismissals constitute “strikes” under section 

1915(g). Thus, Plaintiff’s IFP status must be revoked unless he can show that he is entitled to the 

imminent danger of serious physical injury exception under section 1915(g). 

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C. Imminent Danger Exception 

A plaintiff barred from bringing an action IFP because he has three strikes may still 

proceed without prepaying court fees if he can show he is “under imminent danger of serious 

physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The availability of the exception turns on the “conditions a 

prisoner faced at the time the complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time.” Andrews v. 

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Andrews II”). As this is merely a “threshold 

procedural” question, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that district courts should not conduct an 

overly detailed inquiry into whether a particular danger is serious enough under the serious 

physical injury prong. Id. at 1055. Rather, “the exception applies if the complaint makes a 

plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 

of filing.” Id. In order to satisfy the imminence prong, the prisoner must allege that the danger is 

ongoing. See id. at 1056-57. 

A district court should liberally construe the allegations in a complaint filed by a pro se

prisoner facing a section 1915(g) bar. See McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709, 710-11 (8th Cir. 

2002) (liberally construing allegations in complaint for initial determination of whether prisoner is 

under imminent danger of serious physical injury). It is sufficient if any part of the complaint 

plausibly alleges that the prisoner is in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of 

filing. Andrews II, 493 F.3d at 1053. 

Here, the question is whether Plaintiff was in imminent danger on November 14, 2018, the 

date he filed his complaint. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to show that he was. 

As mentioned above, Plaintiff’s allegations in his SAC are related to the denial of various requests 

for religious accommodations. See Dkt. 20. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s SAC does not allege 

that he faced an imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his complaint. See 

generally Dkt. 20. However, in his opposition, Plaintiff claims he suffers from various medical 

conditions, including prostate cancer, degenerative disc disease, lumber spondylosis, and 

osteoarthritis. Dkt. 40 at 6. The Court notes that Plaintiff fails to make reference to any of these 

aforementioned conditions in his complaint, amended complaint, or SAC. See Dkts. 1, 6, 20. 

Such allegations of Plaintiff’s medical conditions and health problems do not show he “faced 

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‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” See Andrews II, 493 F.3d at 

1055 (emphasis added). Said differently, Plaintiff’s argument that he currently suffers from 

certain health problems—almost a year after filing—is of no consequence because imminent 

danger for purposes of the section 1915(g) exception is assessed at the time the action at issue was 

filed, “not at some earlier or later time.” Id. at 1053. 

“[A] prisoner who alleges that prison officials continue with a practice that has injured him 

or others similarly situated in the past will satisfy the “ongoing danger” standard and meet the 

imminence prong of the three strikes exception.” See id. at 1056-57. In Andrews II, the plaintiff 

alleged in his complaint that the ongoing practice of not screening and segregating inmates with 

HIV and hepatitis C threatened his health, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 1050. 

The Ninth Circuit determined that plausible allegations by the plaintiff in Andrews II that prison 

conditions may cause or worsen a chronic condition such as HIV or hepatitis C was sufficient to 

bring the complaint within the imminent danger exception. See id. at 1056-57. In contrast, in the 

present action, Plaintiff’s allegations of his current medical conditions do not trigger the imminent 

danger exception because they are completely unconnected to Plaintiff’s religious practices 

claims. Cf. id. (an ongoing danger, such as prison officials continuing with a practice that had 

caused injury to plaintiff or other similarly situated inmates will satisfy the imminent danger 

exception). 

In sum, Plaintiff cannot show that his religious practices claims, arising from the denial of 

various requests for religious accommodations, impacted his health conditions such that it created 

a serious danger of physical harm to him, imminent or otherwise. Therefore, Plaintiff has not 

shown that he is entitled to the imminent danger exception under section 1915(g) to avoid 

dismissal without prejudice. Plaintiff’s IFP status is therefore revoked. See Banos v. O’Guin, 144 

F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1998) (revoking IFP status on appeal on three strikes grounds); Patton v. 

Jefferson Corr. Center, 136 F.3d 458, 461, 465 (5th Cir. 1998) (district court correctly revoked 

IFP upon discovering on remand that plaintiff had five prior strikes). Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status and to dismiss the action without 

prejudice. Dkt. 38. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows: 

1. This Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the court 

documents provided in support of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff is barred 

from proceeding IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Dkt. 38-1. 

2. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status, pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and to dismiss the action without prejudice. Dkt. 38. Leave to proceed 

IFP is REVOKED, and the Court’s April 11, 2019 Order granting Plaintiff IFP status (dkt. 18) is 

VACATED. 

3. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing a motion to reopen 

no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order accompanied by the full filing fee 

of $350.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). If Plaintiff fails to file a motion to reopen and pay the 

full filing fee within the twenty-eight-day time frame, then he may pursue his claims by filing 

a new civil rights case in which he pays the full filing fee.

4. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all remaining pending motions as moot 

(dkts. 33, 39, 40, 42) without prejudice to refiling if Plaintiff files a motion to reopen with the new 

filing fee. 

5. The Clerk shall also close the case. 

6. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 33, 38, 39, 40, and 42. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 9, 2020 

______________________________________ 

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 

United States District Judge 

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