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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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t It~ :O 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Unit~ Stllfff (:pun of A.ppe ls 

Tenth Circuit 

MAR ._ 6 fg§O 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

JAMES H. BURT; JOSEPH B. HALL; MARTIN A.) Clerk 

BALOGA; E. CLINTON DRAKE, individually ) 

and as representative of a class of ) 

29 USC 216(b) "Opt-In" plaintiffs ) 

similarly situated; MICHAEL H. ) 

KENNEDY; TOM RUDDY; ROBERT E. WENK; ) 

HERBERT H. TAYLOR, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

MANVILLE SALES CORPORATION, a Delaware 

Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-2331 

(D.C. No. 86-F-2546) 

( D. Colo. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, Circuit Judges, and THOMPSON,** Chief Judge. 

**The Honorable Ralph G. Thompson, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Plaintiffs-appellants instituted the underlying action 

pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 

(ADEA), 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-34 (1982). Each plaintiff was between 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2331 Document: 01019966046 Date Filed: 03/06/1990 Page: 1 
the ages of forty and seventy, and thus a member of the protected 

group under the ADEA, at the time he was terminated by defendant 

in 1985, when it underwent a reduction in force. 

Each plaintiff asserted claims against defendant for 

discrimination through disparate treatment, disparate impact, and 

failure to rehire. In a variety of orders, the trial court 

granted summary judgment against all plaintiffs on their 

respective disparate impact claims and against all plaintiffs 

except Messrs. Ruddy and Taylor on their respective failure to 

rehire claims. 

The parties proceeded to trial on the remaining claims. 

Before the case was submitted to the jury, plaintiff's counsel 

withdrew Mr. Ruddy's failure to rehire claim because of 

insufficient evidence. (Supp. R. Vol. XIII, Tr. Vol. XI, at 

1361-62.) After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict in 

favor of defendant and against each plaintiff. (Supp. R. Vol. I, 

Doc. 33.) 

Plaintiffs raise four issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial 

court erred in denying plaintiffs' first motion to compel 

discovery; (2) whether the trial court erred in entering summary 

judgment against each plaintiff on his disparate impact claim; (3) 

whether the trial court erred in excluding certain documentary 

evidence proffered at trial; and (4) whether the trial court erred 

in awarding defendant the costs of taking each plaintiff's 

deposition. Plaintiffs raised their third issue in a motion for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for 

new trial (R. Vol. I, Doc. 4), which the trial court denied. See 

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Appellate Case: 88-2331 Document: 01019966046 Date Filed: 03/06/1990 Page: 2 
Burt v. Manville Sales Corp., 706 F. Supp. 755, 757 (D. Colo. 

1988). In the same order, the trial court awarded the deposition 

costs to defendant that plaintiffs challenge on appeal. See id. 

at 758. 

"Discovery rulings are within the broad discretion of the 

trial court." Willner v. Budig, 848 F.2d 1032, 1035-36 (10th Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 840 (1989). Therefore, we will 

reverse the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to compel 

only if the trial court abused its discretion. 

The discovery that plaintiffs assert the trial court 

erroneously denied them related largely to statistical information 

concerning defendant's work force. Plaintiffs concede, and the 

record reflects, that they received a great deal of statistical 

information about defendant's work force that was pertinent to 

their claims. They contend, however, that they did not receive 

information in as much detail as requested in the interrogatories 

and requests for production of documents at issue. 

Plaintiffs have not shown how the absence of such detailed 

information, in light of the information they did receive, 

impaired their ability to present their claims effectively. 

Furthermore, the record reflects that when plaintiffs prepared 

their portion of a joint statement of disputed discovery issues 

after written discovery was mostly complete, they did not set 

forth any of the discovery matters at issue on appeal. (Supp. R. 

Vol. I, Doc. 20, Exhibit A.) Based upon our review of the record, 

the parties' briefs on appeal, and the pertinent law, we conclude 

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Appellate Case: 88-2331 Document: 01019966046 Date Filed: 03/06/1990 Page: 3 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

plaintiffs' first motion to compel. 

Turning to the propriety of the trial court's entry of 

summary judgment against each plaintiff on his disparate impact 

claim, we review such ruling de novo, "appl[ying] the same 

standard employed by the trial court under Rule 56(c) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Osgood v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). 

The trial court entered summary judgment on the ground that 

plaintiffs failed to show any specific neutral criteria which 

resulted in a disparate impact on employees within the protected 

age group. (Supp. R. Vol. I, Docs. 25 and 29.) 

As this court has recognized, a "disparate impact theory of 

discrimination has been applied where clearly identifiable 

employment requirements or criteria, regardless of whether there 

was an intent to discriminate, resulted in a less favorable impact 

on a protected group." Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 646 F.2d 

444, 450 (10th Cir. 1981). Therefore, to prevail on their 

disparate impact claims, plaintiffs had both to identify an 

employment requirement or criterion and show that its application 

resulted in a discriminatory impact. 

The United States Supreme Court has held that 

the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of 

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and 

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party's case, and on which that party 

will bear the burden of proof at trial. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2331 Document: 01019966046 Date Filed: 03/06/1990 Page: 4 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Our review of 

the record reveals that plaintiffs failed to identify any 

employment requirements or criteria that defendant used which 

resulted in a less favorable impact on employees in the protected 

age group. Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the trial court's 

denial of their first motion to compel deprived them of the 

statistical information necessary to show the discriminatory 

impact, but they ignore, as they did in response to summary 

judgment, their burden of identifying and demonstrating the use of 

the criteria that led to the allegedly discriminatory impact. We 

conclude the trial court properly granted summary judgment against 

plaintiffs on their respective disparate impact claims. 

We review the trial court's rulings on evidentiary matters 

under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. 

Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs 

contend that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 

admit plaintiffs' exhibit Nos. 5, 6, 7, 57, 58, 59, 68, 69, and 

85. Exhibit No. 5 consisted of a list of management terminations 

in 1985. 

1984-87. 

Exhibit Nos. 6 and 7 were new hire lists for the years 

Exhibit Nos. 57-59 and 68-69 were human resource 

development plans from the years 1979-82. Exhibit No. 85 was a 

list of current job openings for the years 1985-86. 

The trial court excluded the exhibits at issue for one or 

more of the reasons set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 403, which 

provides: 

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2331 Document: 01019966046 Date Filed: 03/06/1990 Page: 5 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 

cumulative evidence. 

See Burt v. Manville Sales Corp., 706 F. Supp. at 757. After 

reviewing each of the exhibits at issue on appeal (see Addendum to 

Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants), we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit any 

of them. 

Finally, we turn to the trial court's award, pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1920, of the costs defendant incurred in deposing each 

plaintiff prior to trial. Plaintiffs contend the award was 

erroneous because with the exception of one, the depositions were 

neither introduced as exhibits nor otherwise used at trial. We 

review the award or denial of costs under an abuse of discretion 

standard. See Willner v. Budig, 848 F .2d at 1035. 

We have said that "[t)here is a presumption in favor of an 

award of costs," and have held that a trial court would abuse its 

discretion if it followed "a general policy to disallow reporter 

costs of all depositions not marked as exhibits, whether or not 

they are 'published' and used at trial." Furr v. AT & T 

Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d 1537, 1550-51 (10th Cir. 1987). 

In awarding costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the trial court 

below was required to determine whether the depositions were 

"'reasonably necessary to the litigation of the case.'" Id. at 

1550 (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 560 (10th Cir. 1983)). 

The court found that "[i)n order to properly prepare for trial and 

evaluate each of the individual plaintiff's claims, it was 

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reasonable for defendant to depose each plaintiff," and, 

therefore, the depositions were "reasonably necessary for 

defendant's preparation of this case." Burt v. Manville Sales 

Corp., 706 F. Supp. at 758. Under the circumstances, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in awarding defendant the costs 

incurred in deposing each plaintiff. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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