Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00438/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00438-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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-1- 07cv0438

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY A. FRANKLIN,

CDCR #E-66269,

Civil No. 07-0438 BTM (LSP)

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

[Doc. No. 39-1]

vs.

L.E. SCRIBNER, D.W. BELL, G.J.

GIURBINO, R. MADDEN, T. OCHOA,

M.E. BOURLAND, E. TRUJILLO,

HALEY, R. NELSON, ORTIZ, VARGAS,

and GREENWOOD,

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff, Gregory Franklin, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se, initially filed a Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 8, 2007 [Doc. No. 1]. On May 21, 2007, this Court

granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) and directed the U.S. Marshal

to effect service of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). See May 21, 2007

Order at 6-7. In addition, the Court denied Plaintiff’s “Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order” because Plaintiff was unable to establish “either an imminent irreparable injury, or the

likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. at 6. However, the Court permitted Plaintiff leave to

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file a Motion for Preliminary Injunction once all named Defendants had been served with the

Complaint. Id.

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) [Doc. No. 39]

Plaintiff has filed a request for “Amended Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary

Hearing.” [Doc. No. 39-1]. 

Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

 A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the

adverse party or that party’s attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific

facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse

party or that party’s attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant’s

attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, is any, which have been made

to give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be

required.

FED.R.CIV.P. 65(b). 

First, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not submitted a sworn affidavit or declaration

certifying that any efforts have been made to give notice of his Motion to any named Defendant,

which is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b). As noted above, under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 65(b), a TRO may be granted without notice to the adverse party or that

party’s attorney only if “it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the

verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the

applicant before the adverse party or that party’s attorney can be heard in opposition.”

FED.R.CIV.P. 65(b). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) also requires the Plaintiff to certify

to the Court “the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the notice and the reasons

supporting the claim that notice should not be required.” Id.

Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO does not comply with this elemental procedural requirement

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b). Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to show the likelihood

of success on the merits required to justify extraordinary injunctive relief. Caribbean Marine

Services Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit recognizes

two tests for determining whether a district court should grant a preliminary injunction. Under

the traditional standard, a plaintiff must show: (1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits;

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(2) a possibility of irreparable injury should the injunction not be granted; (3) that the balance

of hardships tips in his or her favor; and in some cases (4) that an injunction advances the public

interest. See Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 381 F.3d 905, 911-12 (2004) (citing Johnson

v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir.1995)). Alternatively, the plaintiff

may show “either a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of

irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply

in his favor.” Id.

In his motion, Plaintiff claims that he was denied due process when he was charged with

a rules violation and he has been denied yard access seventy five (75) times from March, 2007

to August, 2007. Plaintiff asks this Court to issue a preliminary injunction as the “retaliatory

actions against him will escalate.” Pl.’s Mot. at 6-7. 

With regard to the sporadic deprivation of outdoor exercise, Plaintiff has not alleged

sufficient facts to indicate that he would suffer imminent irreparable injury. “Whatever rights

one may lose at the prison gates, ... the full protections of the eighth amendment most certainly

remain in force. The whole point of the amendment is to protect persons convicted of crimes.”

Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). The Eighth

Amendment, however, is not a basis for broad prison reform. It requires neither that prisons be

comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might find desirable. Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981).

Plaintiff claims that he was denied outdoor exercise seventy five (75) times over a five

to six month time period. The Court finds that these allegations alone do not adequately

demonstrate that he would suffer imminent irreparable injury that would allow this Court to

grant relief before Defendants can be heard. Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims that his disciplinary

hearing following a rules violation report was a retaliatory act is more speculative at this stage

of the proceedings. Plaintiff simply does not adequately allege the threat of an injury that is

required to justify extraordinary injunctive relief. Caribbean Marine Services Co. v. Baldridge,

844 F.2d 668, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1988).

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III. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 65 [Doc. No. 39-1].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 17, 2007

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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