Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01217/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01217-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 

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• 

PUBLISH . FILED 

Unated States Court or App~tJ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

COORS BREWING COMPANY, a Colorado 

corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

MOLSON BREWERIES, an Ontario 

partnership; MOLSON BREWERIES 

CANADA LIMITED, a Canadian 

corporation, 

OF 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

MILLER BREWING COMPANY, a ) 

Wisconsin corporation; THE MOLSON ) 

COMPANIES LIMITED, a Canadian ) 

corporation; and MOLSON BREWERIES, ) 

U.S.A., INC., a Delaware ) 

corporation, ) 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

MAR 3 0 1995 

PATRICK FISHEL. CI~rk 

No. 94-1217 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 94-M-728) 

Thomas F. Cullen, Jr. of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington 

D.C. (Donald I. Baker, Michael P. Gurdak, Deena B. Jenab also of 

Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington D.C. and Russell 

Carparelli, Tim L. Campbell and Matthew S. McElhiney of Bradley, 

Campbell, Carney & Madsen, Golden, Colorado with him on the 

briefs), Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee Coors Brewing Company. 

A. Paul Victor of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York, New York 

(Debra J. Pearlstein, Ronald C. Wheeler and Eileen S. Simon also 

of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York, New York, and Jane Michaels 

Donald A. Degnan and James E. Hartley of Holland and Hart, Denver, 

Colorado with him on the briefs) attorneys for DefendantsAppellants Molson Breweries and Molson Breweries of Canada 

Limited. 

Appellate Case: 94-1217 Document: 01019282443 Date Filed: 03/30/1995 Page: 1 
Before LOGAN and HENRY, Circuit Judges, and REED*, District Judge. 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Molson appeals the decision of the district court 

denying its motion to stay plaintiff Coors's antitrust suit 

pending contract arbitration. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 9 

U.S.C. § 16. We affirm the decision of the district court in 

part, and reverse in part. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Coors Brewing Company (Coors)1 is a Colorado corporation 

engaged in the business of brewing, marketing, and distributing 

beer. In 1985, Coors entered into a licensing agreement with 

Molson Breweries of Canada Limited (Molson) , a Canadian 

corporation also in the beer industry. Coors and Molson agreed 

that Molson would brew and distribute Coors products in Canada. 

Under the terms of the agreement, Coors gave Molson access to 

Coors trademarks, brewing processes, and marketing information. 

Molson, in turn, agreed to use its best efforts to distribute 

Coors products in Canada and to keep marketing and product 

information confidential. The agreement further provided that 

* Honorable Edward C. Reed, Jr., Senior District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Nevada, sitting by 

designation. 

1 During the term of the agreement, the Coors corporate entity 

involved in the instant transaction changed. Because that change 

is not relevant to our analysis, we refer to the present corporate 

entity involved in this case. 

2 

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• 

either party could terminate the agreement for cause under a 

specified procedure, or without cause by giving the other party 

ten years notice of termination. The agreement also contained an 

arbitration clause: 11 Any dispute arising in connection with the 

implementation, interpretation or enforcement of this Agreement, 

except as provided in 4.02, shall be finally settled under the 

Rules of the American Arbitration Association II 2 License 

Agreement § 6.10, Aplt. App. at 86. 

In 1993, Miller Brewing Company (Miller), a Wisconsin 

¥orporation also in the business of brewing and marketing beer, 

entered into a partnership with Molson.3 Although the MillerMolson agreement is not part of the record in this case, Coors and 

Molson.both represent that the agreement gave Miller one seat on 

Molson's board of directors and created a reciprocal licensing 

arrangement. Under the reciprocal licensing arrangement, Miller 

is the exclusive distributor of Molson products in the United 

States and Molson is the exclusive distributor of Miller products 

in Canada. 

Coors filed a Notice of Arbitration with Molson, alleging 

that Molson breached its contract with Coors, and seeking 

injunctive relief, damages, and termination of the licensing 

agreement. Coors also filed the instant complaint in United 

2 § 4.02 provides for disputes regarding accounting and auditing. 

See License Agreement § 4.02, Aplt. App. at 73-74. 

3 Under the agreement, Miller acquired 20%, Foster's Brewing 

Group acquired 20%, and the Molson entity formerly owning Molson 

retained 40% of the partnership wholly owning Molson. Coors has 

brought suit against both Molson and the new Miller-Molson-Fosters 

partnership that now wholly owns Molson. 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-1217 Document: 01019282443 Date Filed: 03/30/1995 Page: 3 
States District Court against Molson and Miller alleging antitrust 

violations of the Clayton and Sherman Acts. In its exhaustive 

complaint, Coors makes allegations that we divide into three 

general categories. First, Coors alleges that the Miller-Molson 

Alliance is a combination in restraint of trade, lessening 

competition in the United States and North American beer markets.4 

Second, Coors alleges that Miller will have access to Coors's 

confidential product and marketing information. Third, Coors 

alleges that Miller will control the distribution and marketing of 

Coors brands in Canada. Molson brought a motion to stay the 

antitrust proceedings against both Molson and Miller pending the 

resolution of the contract arbitration. The district court denied 

the motion, and Molson sought expedited appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Coors v. Miller 

Molson argues that the district court erred when it denied 

Molson's motion to stay Coors's antitrust action against Molson. 

In short, Molson argues that Coors has dressed up its contract 

claims in antitrust clothes to avoid its own agreement to 

arbitrate. Specifically, Molson argues that a valid arbitration 

agreement exists between Coors and Molson, that arbitration will 

settle factual issues important to the antitrust claims, and that 

a stay is appropriate even if the factual grounds for the contract 

arbitration and antitrust suit are different. 

4 Coors argues that in this era of liberalized trade, Molson has 

the ability to brew American brands in Canada and distribute the 

beer in the·united States as well as Canada. 

4 

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• 

Coors, on the other hand, argues that the contract and 

antitrust claims are separate. It claims two distinct interests: 

protecting its contractual rights, which it concedes are subject 

to arbitration, and protecting its interest in competition in the 

United States and North American beer markets, which it argues is 

not subject to arbitration. In short, Coors argues that it should 

be able to pursue an antitrust suit unrelated to the contract just 

as any other beer manufacturer or consumer could. This court 

reviews the underlying arbitrability of a contract de novo. 

Q'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 901 (lOth Cir. 

1992) . 

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 3, requires a 

district court to stay judicial proceedings where a written 

agreement provides for the arbitration of the dispute that is the 

subject of the litigation.5 "There is a strong federal policy 

favoring arbitration for dispute resolution." Peterson v. 

Shearson/American Express. Inc., 849 F.2d 464, 465 (lOth Cir. 

1988); see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). The policy basis of this statute is 

particularly strong in the context of international transactions. 

5 The Act provides that: 

If any suit or proceeding be brought . . . upon any 

issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in 

writing for such arbitration, the court in which such 

suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue 

involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to 

arbitration under such an agreement, shall ... stay 

the trial of the action until such arbitration has been 

had in accordance with the terms of the agreement . . . 

9 u.s.c. § ·3. 

5 

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Deloitte Noraudit A/S v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, U.S., 9 F.3d 

1060, 1063 (2d Cir. 1993). All "doubts are to be resolved in 

favor of arbitrability." Oil, Chern., & Atomic Workers Int' 1 

Union, Local 2-124 v. American Oil Co., 528 F.2d 252, 254 (lOth 

Cir. 1976). In addition to the general policy favoring 

arbitration, Molson argues that Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 

Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), stands for the 

proposition that antitrust claims within the scope of a contract 

can be subject to arbitration, even if the arbitration clause does 

not specifically mention antitrust disputes. 

In Mitsubishi, Puerto Rican car dealership Soler ChryslerPlymouth Corporation contracted with Mitsubishi to distribute cars 

in Puerto Rico. During the 1981 recession, Soler could not sell 

its allotment of cars. In a strategy designed to avoid breaching 

its contract, Soler asked Mitsubishi to sell Soler certain 

automobile parts such as defoggers and heaters so that it could 

export the cars Mitsubishi manufactured for Puerto Rico's 

relatively gentle climate to North, Central, and South America. 

Citing concerns that Soler would hurt Mitsubishi's reputation 

because Soler could not produce factory-quality cars, had no 

experience in the transshipment of cars, and could not provide 

maintenance in other markets, Mitsubishi refused to sell Soler the 

parts or allow it to transship the cars. When Soler refused to 

accept shipment of the cars it had contracted to sell, Mitsubishi 

brought an action against Soler in United States District Court 

under the FAA.6 Soler counterclaimed, alleging that Mitsubishi 

• 

6 The Mitsubishi arbitration clause provided: 

6 

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• 

had violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to divide markets when 

it refused to cooperate with Soler. Mitsubishi next filed a 

motion to stay the district court proceedings pending the 

arbitration. The district court granted the motion and Soler 

appealed. 

The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 

court's determination that Soler's claims were within the scope of 

the contract and thus the arbitration agreement, Mitsubishi Motors 

Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 159-161 (1st 

Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 473 U.S. 614 (1985), 

but held that the agreement to arbitrate antitrust claims was void 

as against public policy, id. at 164-68. 

The United States Supreme Court adopted the First Circuit's 

determination that the antitrust claims were within the scope of 

both the contract and the arbitration clause. However, the 

Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on whether a clause 

providing for the arbitration of antitrust disputes was void as 

against public policy. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629. The Supreme 

Court emphasized the importance of keeping one's word and reasoned 

that a "'representative of the American business community'" must 

honor its agreement to arbitrate contractual disputes. Id. at 640 

"All disputes, controversies or differences which 

may arise between [Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in 

relation to Articles I-B through V of this Agreement or 

for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by 

arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules and 

regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration 

Association." 

Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 617. 

7 

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(quoting Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 620 (7th Cir. 

1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting), rev'd, 417 U.S. 506 (1974)). 

Coors argues that the FAA and Mitsubishi do not control this 

dispute for two reasons: First, Coors argues that the arbitration 

• 

clause in the Coors-Molson license agreement is a narrow 

arbitration clause and that it does not include antitrust 

disputes. Second, Coors argues that even if the arbitration 

clause includes antitrust disputes, its antitrust claims are 

outside the scope of the contract and thus not subject to the 

contractual arbitration clause. 

1. Arbitration Clause 

Coors first seeks to distinguish Mitsubishi by arguing that 

the Coors-Molson arbitration clause is more narrow than the 

Mitsubishi arbitration clause and does not cover the arbitration 

of antitrust disputes. Coors points to cases discussing the 

differences between general and narrow contractual arbitration 

clauses. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pennsylvania 

Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1988). Coors argues 

that while the arbitration clause in Mitsubishi is a general 

arbitration clause which covers 11 all disputes 11 arising out of the 

contract, the Coors-Molson arbitration clause is a narrow 

arbitration clause covering only 11 any dispute 11 arising from the 

11 implementation, interpretation, and enforcement 11 of the 

agreement. 

However, Coors does not cite any authority holding that the 

arbitration clause at issue is a narrow arbitration clause or that 

8 

Appellate Case: 94-1217 Document: 01019282443 Date Filed: 03/30/1995 Page: 8 
this antitrust dispute does not arise from the "implementation, 

interpretation, and enforcement" of the agreement; it merely 

asserts that the instant clause is a narrow one. In addition, 

Coors does not make an interpretive argument or suggest any 

intuitive reason why the Coors-Molson arbitration clause does not 

cover antitrust disputes. Without a persuasive argument 

explaining why the parties meant this apparently broad language to 

exclude antitrust disputes, the comprehensive nature of the terms 

"implementation" and "enforcement" in the arbitration clause, the 

agreement to arbitrate all ma,tters involving the "interpretation" 

6f the agreement, and the public policy in favor of arbitration 

compel us to read the arbitration clause to include antitrust 

disputes. We therefore conclude that the language "any dispute 

arising in connection with the implementation, interpretation or 

enforcement" in the Coors-Molson arbitration clause covers 

antitrust disputes in this case, provided that those disputes are 

within the scope of the agreement. 

2. Scope of Contract 

Having concluded that the Coors-Molson arbitration clause 

encompasses antitrust disputes, we turn to Coors's second argument 

~nd determine whether Coors's claims are within the scope of the 

contract. Coors argues that its claims are unrelated to the 

contract and that the antitrust dispute is therefore not subject 

to the contractual arbitration agreement. We hold that some of 

Coors's antitrust causes of action are within the scope of the 

9 

Appellate Case: 94-1217 Document: 01019282443 Date Filed: 03/30/1995 Page: 9 
Coors-Molson licensing agreement and that some of Coors's claims 

are outside the scope of the contract. 

Although the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi reversed the First 

Circuit's holding that public policy prohibited the involuntary 

arbitration of antitrust claims, it adopted and affirmed the First 

• 

Circuit's determination that the antitrust claims were within the 

scope of that contract. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 618 n.1, 622 

n.9, 628.7 The First Circuit's discussion of the contract in 

Mitsubishi emphasized that the antitrust claims were closely 

related to the contract because they turned upon specific 

contractual provisions. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 159-61. The 

First Circuit phrased its initial inquiry as "whether the factual 

allegations underlying Soler's counterclaims--and Mitsubishi's 

bona fide defenses to those counterclaims--are within the scope of 

the arbitration clause." Id. at 159. The First Circuit then 

emphasized that Mitsubishi's refusal to allow Soler to transship 

• 

cars was premised upon concerns that Soler would not produce 

quality products and that such considerations were relevant to 

assessing the legality of Mitsubishi's actions under Continental 

T.V .. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) .8 The First 

7 The dissent in Mitsubishi also explicitly noted that it 

understood the First Circuit to have concluded that the antitrust 

claims were within the scope of the contract. Justice Stevens 

noted his disagreement with the "Court of Appeals' construction of 

the arbitration clause" and stated that he would not have 

interpreted the contract to relate to the antitrust dispute. 

Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 641, 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 

8 The First Circuit's citation to Sylvania is important to 

understanding why Soler's claims implicated the contract. Prior 

to Sylvania, the Supreme Court had enforced a per se rule against 

vertical nonprice restrictions. Vertical nonprice restrictions 

~typically involve the allocation of territorial or customer 

10 

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Circuit concluded that because Mitsubishi based its refusal to 

deal on concerns about trademarks, reputation, and goodwill--

considE~ations that the contract specifically addressed--the 

antitrust claims were within the scope of the contract: "We need 

not delve further into the merits of Mitsubishi's defense, 

however, for it is enough for present purposes that its trademark 

and goodwill concerns are plainly germane to Soler's antitrust 

allegations." Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 160. 

Explicitly basing its opinion on this connection between the 

contract and the antitrust claims, the First Circuit concluded 

~hat the antitrust claims were within the scope of the contract. 

An arbitration clause "does not extend to all disputes of any sort 

. . . but only to disputes touching specified provisions of the 

agreement." Id. at 159. The First Circuit's basis for holding 

the antitrust claims to be within the scope of the contract thus 

logically limits the Supreme Court's holding in Mitsubishi to 

antitrust claims that have a reasonable factual connection to the 

contract. In this case, Mitsubishi provides no support for 

categorically concluding that Coors must take all of its antitrust 

markets by a manufacturer to a wholesale distributor or retail 

dealer." 2 Julian 0. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade 

Regulation§ 6.02[1] [e] (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1994). However, 

vertical nonprice restraints could include factors such as 

iocations of outlets or customer service requirements. Id. § 

6.02[2]; Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law§ 

9.4 (1985). In Sylvania, however, the Supreme Court overturned 

its precedent and reinstituted rule of reason analysis for at 

least some vertical restraints. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57; see 

also Hovenkamp § 4.3 (discussing joint-ventures). The First 

Circuit's citation to Sylvania thus suggests that it considered 

Mitsubishi's argument that it was concerned about trademarks and 

reputation a reasonable one under the Mitsubishi-Soler contract. 

Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 160. 

11 

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claims to arbitration. We therefore hold that Coors's antitrust 

claims that do not implicate the contract are litigable. 

In addition to basing our opinion limiting contractual 

arbitration of antitrust suits to those antitrust claims related 

with a contract upon Mitsubishi, there are practical reasons to 

read Mitsubishi in a more limited way than Molson suggests. As 

Molson's counsel acknowledged at oral argument, its interpretation 

of Mitsubishi is that every brewer in America except Coors may 

bring an antitrust action against Molson. Although Mitsubishi 

allowed parties to a contract to compel the arbitration of their 

antitrust disputes, it did not proclaim that all disputes between 

parties who include an arbitration clause in their contracts are 

subject to arbitration. A dispute within the scope of the 

contract is still a condition precedent to the involuntary 

arbitration of antitrust claims. See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. 

Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (holding 

that arbitration is a matter of contract and that a party cannot 

be required to submit to arbitration any suit it has not agreed to 

arbitrate) . A contrary reading of Mitsubishi not only ignores the 

facts of that case, but also could lead to absurd results. For 

example, if two small business owners execute a sales contract 

including a general arbitration clause, and one assaults the 

other, we would think it elementary that the sales contract did 

not require the victim to arbitrate the tort claim because the 

tort claim is not related to the sales contract. In other words, 

with respect to the alleged wrong, it is simply fortuitous that 

the parties happened to have a contractual relationship. 

• 12 

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• 

Similarly, in this case, Coors is entitled to litigate its 

antitrust claims regarding the Miller-Molson relationship in a 

public forum so long as the claims are not related to the 

licensing agreement. 

Molson next argues that the policy behind arbitration 

supports staying the antitrust litigation until the arbitration 

has resolved factual issues that are the basis for the antitrust 

litigation. See, e.g., Institute of Mission Helpers v. Reliance 

Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 72, 76 (D. Md. 1992) (observing that a stay 

can conserve judicial resources and avoid anomalous results) . 

~owever, Molson cites no authority for the proposition that the 

courts of the United States must defer to an ongoing arbitration 

simply because the facts and parties may be similar. Conversely, 

the Supreme Court has held that litigation must proceed in a 

"piecemeal" fashion if the parties intended that some matters, but 

not others, be arbitrated. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc. v. Byrd, 

470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); see also Armco Steel Co. v. CSX Corp., 

790 F. Supp. 311, 317 n.4 (D.D.C. 1991) ("Any alleged 

'intertwining' of [the] contract claim with the other claims of 

[the] complaint does not require the Court to submit the entire 

complaint to arbitration. The 'intertwining' approach ... was 

rejected by the Supreme Court in Dean Witter .... ") . • 

Finally, Molson relies upon one commentator for the 

proposition that a general arbitration clause will subject all 

antitrust disputes to arbitration unless they are specifically 

excluded. "Anyone involved in an ongoing commercial relationship 

must be aware that a general arbitration clause now can require 

13 

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arbitration of an antitrust dispute, even if the clause predates 

Mitsubishi and the arbitration process and arbitrator selected are 

ill-suited to an antitrust dispute." Donald I. Baker & Mark R. 

Stabile, Arbitration of Antitrust Claims: Opportunities and 

Hazards For Corporate Counsel, 48 Bus. Law. 395, 407-08 (1993) .9 

This is good advice, especially for the risk-averse audience of 

corporate counsel for whom it is intended. Had Coors explicitly 

exempted antitrust disputes from its arbitration clause, it could 

have avoided this round of litigation. 

However, a close reading shows that the Baker & Stabile 

article actually supports Coors in this case. The article is 

mainly intended to advise joint-venture partners and others 

engaged in continuing relationships "concerning the terms of their 

contract" how they can avoid arbitrating their antitrust disputes. 

Id. at 398-99.10 In this case, it is only the claims not related 

to Coors's and Molson's continuing contractual relationship that 

• 

are litigable. 

9 Molson notes that although Mr. Baker represents Coors, his 

scholarship is contrary to Coors's position in this case. Whether 

Mr. Baker wrote the article at issue is of course irrelevant to 

our evaluation of its analysis. However, the irony is not lost on 

anyone who has stood with his or her collected writings before the 

Senate Judiciary Committee. 

10 The article divides antitrust causes of action into four 

general categories: (1) Disputes between horizontal partnerships 

and disputes between manufacturers and sellers in vertical 

relationships; (2) Buyer-seller disputes; (3) Disputes involving 

damage to the market; and (4) Disputes between competitors. Id. 

at 399-400. The article then explicitly states that while careful 

planning can enable contracting parties to deal with the first two 

categories of conflicts, the third and fourth categories are not 

suited to arbitration because they do not normally involve 

contractual relationships. Id. In this case, the litigable 

antitrust disputes are in either category three or four and are 

not related to the contract . • 14 

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a. Claims Related to the Market 

We reiterate that Coors may litigate antitrust claims not 

related to the licensing agreement just as anyone else with 

standing may. Coors's claims regarding market concentration are 

not related to the licensing agreement, and Coors may therefore 

litigate those claims. 

b. Claims Related to the Marketing Agreement 

Coors's claims regarding confidentiality and proprietary 

information involve the Coors-Molson licensing agreement. Like 

the First Circuit in Mitsubishi, we conclude that the contractual 

arbitration clause controls this dispute. Molson gained access to 

the Coors information because of the parties' contractual 

relationship. Also under the terms of their contract, both 

parties agreed to arbitrate claims arising from this contract. We 

therefore reverse the district court and hold that Coors must keep 

its promise to arbitrate its allegations involving confidential 

product and marketing information. 

c. Control of Molson 

Coors's least developed and most novel claim is that Miller's 

control over Molson will have an anti-competitive effect on the 

Bnited States and North American beer markets. Coors argues that 

Miller holds a seat on Molson's board of directors, that Molson's 

bylaws require a unanimous vote of all directors, and that Miller 

15 

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may thus be in a position to control the distribution of Coors 

products. This claim presents the most difficult question because 

Coors has not specifically stated how Miller's control over Molson 

will create anti-competitive effects. However, Molson has not 

argued that Coors has failed to meet the requirements of notice 

pleading. See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 

716, 723 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing the advent of notice 

pleading); Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts§ 68, at 

475-76 (5th ed. 1994) (arguing that district courts should not 

require more detailed pleadings in complex antitrust and 

securities litigation than they do in cases of ordinary 

complexity, and collecting cases). In addition, we note that one 

commentator has suggested that advertising may be a legitimate 

antitrust issue in the beer industry.11 

Without making a final judgment as a matter of law on any 

theory, we conclude that Coors has presented a sufficient factual 

~utline to suggest that it might develop a theory unrelated to the 

Coors-Molson licensing agreement. Coors is therefore entitled to 

conduct discovery and refine its theories. However, we do not 

make a final judgment on any control theory because the record 

before us is insufficient to allow it. At a later point in this 

litigation, Molson may again challenge Coors's claims, with 

respect to both their relation to the licensing agreement and 

11 This commentator suggests that the American beer market's 

oligopolistic tendencies and emphasis upon advertising make 

marketing an important antitrust issue: "In terms of traditional 

antitrust criteria ... the beer market simply evades analysis." 

Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, Efficiency and Image: 

Advertising as an Antitrust Issue, 1990 Duke L.J. 321, 371. 

16 

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their legal sufficiency. At that point, with additional briefing 

and discovery, we believe that the district court will be in the 

proper position to make appropriate findings of fact and reach 

conclusions of law. 

B. Coors v. Miller 

Molson also argues that Coors's action against Miller should 

be stayed. We review the failure of a district court to grant a 

stay as to a non-arbitrating party for an abuse of discretion. 

See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosg., 460 U.S. at 20 n.23. 

Staying such a party is based upon considerations of judicial 

efficiency. See Meadows Indem. Co. v. Baccala & Shoog Ins. 

Servs., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1036, 1045 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) In 

addition, courts have held that arbitration should proceed in 

tandem with non-arbitrable litigation. See Armco Steel, 790 F. 

Supp. at 316; Pensacola Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 

Co., 705 F. Supp. 306, 308 (W.D. La. 1989). Finally, the district 

court's control of its docket is an important factor. Moses H. 

Cone Memorial Hosg., 460 U.S. at 20 n.23. Given this authority 

and the current posture of this litigation, we see no evidence 

that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to stay 

Coors's claim against Miller. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the district court's denial of Molson's motion to 

stay this action as to Coors's allegations that Molson and Miller 

are engaged in a conspiracy to monopolize the North American beer 

17 

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market. We REVERSE the decision of the district court as to 

Coors's allegations regarding proprietary information. We make a 

preliminary determination that Coors's allegation that Miller's 

control over Molson will lead to anticompetitive effects is not 

related to the licensing agreement. However, the district court 

~hould reconsider the Molson motion after the parties have had the 

opportunity to conduct discovery and refine their theories. 

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