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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 1, 2009 Decided August 4, 2009

No. 08-7046

ISMAIL ABDUL MALIK, ALSO KNOWN AS ROY THOMAS,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:05-cv-01374-RMC)

David J. Shaw, Student Counsel, argued the cause for

amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on the briefs

were Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, Cecily E.

Baskir, Supervising Attorney, and Rupal M. Doshi, Student

Counsel.

Lori L. Voepel argued the cause for appellees. With her on

the brief were Daniel P. Struck, Paul J. Maloney, and William

J. Carter. Mariana del Valle Bravo entered an appearance.

Before: GARLAND, BROWN, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

USCA Case #08-7046 Document #1199725 Filed: 08/04/2009 Page 1 of 12
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Pro se appellant Ismail Malik, a

District of Columbia prisoner, sued the District of Columbia, the

Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), and TransCor

America, alleging that the defendants violated his rights under

the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the District and CCA on the ground that

Malik had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and in

favor of TransCor on the ground that Malik had failed to

respond to TransCor’s summary judgment motion. We reverse

the former decision because CCA and the District had no

administrative remedies for Malik to exhaust. We reverse the

latter because the pro se plaintiff was plainly and reasonably

confused over whether TransCor’s motion remained pending.

I

Malik is a District of Columbia prisoner. The District

contracted with CCA, a private company, to house District of

Columbia prisoners at CCA’s Northeast Ohio Correctional

Center and Central Arizona Detention Center. TransCor, a CCA

subsidiary, was responsible for transporting District inmates

between the two CCA facilities. See Malik v. District of

Columbia (Malik II), 538 F. Supp. 2d 50, 51 (D.D.C. 2008).

From July 2 through July 4, 2001, TransCor transported

Malik (and other D.C. prisoners) on a forty-hour bus ride from

CCA’s Ohio facility to its facility in central Arizona. Malik

contends that he was handcuffed at the waist with a belly chain,

that the belly chain was attached to the chain of another inmate,

and that all of the prisoners wore leg shackles. Those restraints

made it impossible to use a restroom, forcing the prisoners to

urinate and defecate on themselves. The restraints also

precluded Malik from using an inhaler that he needed because

USCA Case #08-7046 Document #1199725 Filed: 08/04/2009 Page 2 of 12
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1

Because the district court granted summary judgment against

Malik, we “must view the evidence in the light most favorable” to

him. Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

2

TransCor states that it did not receive Malik’s letter. Appellees’

Br. 9. The district court found that this dispute raised a genuine issue

of material fact. Malik v. District of Columbia, 512 F. Supp. 2d 28, 32

(D.D.C. 2007); see infra note 3.

he was asthmatic. Malik further alleges that he was deprived of

water during the trip. See id.; Compl. at J.A. 16-17; Letter from

I. Malik to TransCor (July 27, 2001) (J.A. 178-79); Appellees’

Br. 23.1

After arriving at the CCA facility in Arizona, Malik filed a

grievance on July 12, 2001, requesting the address and

telephone number of the CCA main office in order to pursue a

civil action. J.A. 74. On July 18, CCA compliance coordinators

responded, advising Malik as follows: “Transcor, not [CCA]

staff, provided the transportation. This issue is out of this

facilit[y’s] control. . . . We are unable to further process your

grievance . . . .” Memorandum from M. Sherman & C. Richey

(July 18, 2001) (J.A. 75). The response gave Malik a name and

address at TransCor and told him that he could send a complaint

there. Id.

Thereafter, Malik filed two additional grievance forms

requesting paperwork to file an administrative appeal. J.A. 78,

80. On July 27, Malik submitted an appeal to CCA, see J.A. 76,

and on the same day sent TransCor a letter asking the company

to process his grievance, see J.A. 178-79.2

 On August 14, 2001,

the CCA warden/administrator responded to Malik’s appeal,

instructing Malik “to write to Transcor to file your grievance[;]

CCA did not transport you.” J.A. 76. 

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On July 11, 2005, Malik brought suit against the District of

Columbia, CCA, and TransCor in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia. His pro se complaint, filed

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that the defendants

subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment during the fortyhour bus trip in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also

alleged that transporting officers said they were punishing him

and the other prisoners because they had been members of a

class action lawsuit against the District and CCA. Compl. at

J.A. 18-19.

On February 12, 2007, the defendants filed a “Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary

Judgment,” contending that Malik had failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Malik responded to

the motion on March 30. On August 1, the defendants filed a

second summary judgment motion, arguing on the merits that

Malik had failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact

that would allow him to demonstrate the elements of a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On August 24, 2007, Malik filed a

motion for extension of time to reply to the second summary

judgment motion, which the district court granted in part on

September 5, giving Malik until September 25, 2007, to file his

opposition.

On September 6, 2007 -- the day after the district court

granted Malik’s motion for an extension of time to reply to the

second summary judgment motion -- the court issued an opinion

granting the first summary judgment motion as to the District of

Columbia and CCA only. The court granted the motion on the

ground that Malik had failed to properly exhaust his

administrative remedies by filing his first grievance one day

later than CCA’s grievance policy permitted. Malik v. District

of Columbia (Malik I), 512 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2007). The

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court declined to grant summary judgment for TransCor on that

ground, however, because the record showed there was a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Malik had sent a

timely complaint letter to TransCor. Id. at 32; see FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(c) (providing that summary judgment should be granted

only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact”). 

On September 20, Malik filed a “Motion in Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.” The pleading evidenced

Malik’s confusion about the scope of the district court’s

September 6 opinion. Malik asked the district court to

“reconsider its order of September 6, 2007,” stating that the

September 6 order came “19 days before a response [was] due,”

and objecting that “it appears the Court has decided the motions

without awaiting a response from the Plaintiff.” Pl.’s Mot. in

Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 4-6. Malik’s pleading

mentioned only the exhaustion issue raised in the first summary

judgment motion; it did not mention any issue raised in the

second.

 TransCor filed four responses to Malik’s September 20

pleading, including an opposition to Malik’s request to

reconsider the September 6 order. Malik responded to that

opposition on October 23, 2007, again evidencing confusion

about the import of the district court’s September 6 opinion. He

stated: “[N]otwithstanding the . . . extension of time, the court,

on September 6, 2007, granted the defendants’ motions in part

and denied them in part. At any rate, the order was entered 19

days before a response was due.” Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to

Pl.’s Mot. to Reconsider the Court’s Sept. 6, 2007 Order ¶ 4. He

also charged that “[t]he court erred in entering an order of

whatsoever type, nature, and kind before September 25, 2007,”

and that the court’s September 6 opinion was “premature in

every respect.” Id. ¶ 5. 

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On March 10, 2008, the district court granted TransCor’s

second summary judgment motion, treating the motion as

conceded because Malik had failed to respond. Malik II, 538 F.

Supp. 2d at 53. Malik filed a timely appeal, and a special panel

of this court appointed amicus curiae to present arguments in

support of his position. Order, Malik v. District of Columbia,

No. 08-7046 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2008). We review the district

court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Aliron Int’l,

Inc. v. Cherokee Nation Indus., Inc., 531 F.3d 863, 865 (D.C.

Cir. 2008). 

II

We begin with the district court’s grant of the defendants’

first summary judgment motion in favor of the District of

Columbia and CCA. The court granted the motion on the

ground that Malik had failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies.

The exhaustion provision of the PLRA provides as follows:

“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA requires “proper

exhaustion,” which includes “compliance with an agency’s

deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). 

Both CCA and the District rely on CCA’s grievance policy

to argue that Malik did not properly exhaust his administrative

remedies. The CCA policy requires that grievances be filed

within seven days of the incident being grieved. Richey Aff.

¶ 5. The bus trip about which Malik complained ended on July

4, 2001, but he did not file his first grievance until July 12 --

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eight rather than seven days after the transfer. As a

consequence, the defendants maintain that Malik failed to

properly exhaust his administrative remedies.

The problem with this argument is that the same CCA

grievance policy renders a complaint like Malik’s nongrievable.

Under the policy, “‘grievable matters’ include[] issues regarding

the application of policies, rules and procedures; individual staff

and inmate actions, including any denial of access to the

grievance procedure; reprisals and retaliation against inmates for

filing an appeal; loss of property; and any other matter relating

to the conditions of care and supervision within the authority of

CCA.” Id. ¶ 6. But the policy also provides that “[i]nstitutional

transfers . . . are not grievable matters.” Malik I, 512 F. Supp.

2d at 30 (emphasis added); see Richey Aff. ¶ 6. In its briefs and

at oral argument, CCA conceded what is apparent on the face of

its policy: claims related to institutional transfers are not

grievable. Appellees’ Br. 26; Oral Arg. Recording at 11:40-

12:15. Nonetheless, the district court concluded that “[t]he

untimely filing of an inmate grievance alone supports the

conclusion that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his

administrative remedies.” Malik I, 512 F. Supp. 2d at 32.

Although the PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust their

administrative remedies before suing under § 1983, it reasonably

requires exhaustion only of “such administrative remedies as are

available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). As we have previously held,

the Act’s exhaustion requirement does not apply in a case “in

which there is no administrative process to exhaust.”

Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In

such a case, “the PLRA does not prevent the prisoner from

bringing his or her claim directly to the district court.” Id.

Accordingly, the fact that Malik filed his grievance one day later

than CCA policy permits is irrelevant because Malik was not

required to file a grievance at all. 

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While the defendants concede that Malik’s Eighth

Amendment claim regarding the conditions of his transport was

not grievable, they contend that his complaint also included a

retaliation claim -- which they maintain was grievable under

CCA’s policy. See Appellees’ Br. 27; Richey Aff. ¶ 6 (stating

that “‘grievable matters’ included . . . reprisals and retaliation

against inmates for filing an appeal.”). Even if defendants’

characterization of Malik’s complaint and CCA’s policy were

correct, that would not get them all the way home. When a

complaint contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, a

court may dismiss only the latter. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.

199, 219-21, 224 (2007). But it is not obvious that defendants

have correctly construed either the complaint or the policy.

Amicus contends that Malik’s complaint should be read as

asserting only an Eighth Amendment claim, with retaliation

alleged merely as one motive -- not an unreasonable reading of

the pro se complaint. Moreover, even if we were to construe the

complaint as setting out a separate claim for retaliation, it is not

evident that such a claim would have been covered by CCA’s

policy. The policy simply does not make clear the status of a

claim for reprisal (a covered subject) that took place during an

institutional transfer (a non-covered event). The parties

submitted no evidence on this issue, the district court made no

finding, and this court is an inappropriate place to make such an

argument for the first time.

III

As we have noted, the district court denied the defendants’

first motion for summary judgment as to TransCor because it

found there was a genuine dispute as to whether Malik had

properly exhausted his administrative remedies under

TransCor’s grievance policy. The court granted the defendants’

second summary judgment motion as to TransCor (the only

defendant remaining at the time), however, on the ground that

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Malik had conceded it. Malik II, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 52-53. In

so holding, the court relied on Local Civil Rule 7(b), which

provides that if an opposing party does not file an opposition to

a summary judgment motion, “the Court may treat the motion as

conceded.” D.D.C. LOCAL RULE 7(b). We review the district

court’s application of Rule 7(b) for abuse of discretion. See Fox

v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2004);

F.D.I.C. v. Bender, 127 F.3d 58, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

In Fox v. Strickland, we reversed an order of a district court

dismissing the complaint of an incarcerated pro se plaintiff who

had failed to file an opposition to a defendant’s summary

judgment motion. “‘[A]s a bare minimum,’” we said, reiterating

circuit precedent, “the district court should give the pro se

imprisoned plaintiff ‘fair notice of the requirements of the

summary judgment rule.’” Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507, 509

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Ham v. Smith, 653 F.2d 628, 630

(D.C. Cir. 1981)). “That notice . . . should include an

explanation that the failure to respond to an adverse party’s

summary judgment motion may result in the district court

granting the motion and dismissing the case.” Id.; see Ham, 653

F.2d at 630 (same); Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094

(D.C. Cir. 1968) (same). 

In its March 10, 2008, opinion granting the defendants’

second motion for summary judgment as to TransCor, the

district court observed that “[o]rdinarily [it] issues an Order to

a pro se litigant to advise him of his obligation to file an

opposition or other response to a summary judgment motion, to

warn him of the potential consequences for his failure to do so,

and to set a deadline for such filing.” Malik II, 538 F. Supp. 2d

at 53 n.2. As the court also acknowledged, “[t]he record shows

that [it] did not issue such an order in this case.” Id.

Nonetheless, the court concluded that no order was required

because it had advised Malik of his obligations in February,

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when the defendants filed their first summary judgment motion,

and because Malik had been a plaintiff in other civil actions in

the district court. Id. 

But the problem here is not simply that Malik lacked notice

that he had to respond to TransCor’s summary judgment motion.

Rather, it is that he erroneously thought the district court had

granted both the first (February) and second (August) motions

on September 6 -- before his response to the second motion was

due. This is apparent from Malik’s filings. On September 5, the

district court granted him an extension until September 25 to

reply to the second motion for summary judgment. One day

later, on September 6, the court granted the defendants’ first

motion. In his filing on September 20, Malik objected that “it

appears the Court has decided the motions without awaiting a

response from the Plaintiff,” and that it did so “19 days before

a response [was] due.” Pl.’s Mot. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to

Dismiss ¶¶ 4-5 (emphasis added). In his filing of October 23,

Malik registered the same objection:

In an order dated September 5, 2007, the court granted

the plaintiff an extension of time until September 25,

2007, to file an opposition to the defendants’ motions.

However, notwithstanding the foregoing extension of

time, the court, on September 6, 2007, granted the

defendants’ motions in part and denied them in part.

At any rate, the order was entered 19 days before a

response was due.

Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Reconsider ¶ 4.

“The court erred,” Malik declared, “in entering an order of

whatsoever type, nature, and kind before September 25, 2007.”

Id. at ¶ 5. In his view, this rendered the September 6, 2007,

opinion “premature in every respect.” Id.

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Malik’s confusion was not unfounded, given the

complicated sequence of motions and orders set forth in Part I

above. The defendants insist that Malik should have known that

the district court’s September 6 decision granted only their

February motion because “the court’s decision addressed only

the exhaustion issues, which were raised solely in the [February]

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.” Appellee’s Br. 10.

Because the defendants’ August motion was a “Motion for

Summary Judgment” and not for “Judgment on the Pleadings,”

defendants maintain that Malik should have realized that the

September 6 decision -- which assertedly ruled “only on the

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings” -- did not resolve it. Id.

at 36.

The flaw in this argument is that the full title of the

defendants’ February motion was “Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment.”

Moreover, the court’s September 6 Memorandum Opinion only

discussed the standard for “summary judgment”; it did not

address the standard for granting judgment on the pleadings.

See Malik I, 512 F. Supp. 2d at 29. Thus, there was nothing in

the distinction between summary judgment and judgment on the

pleadings to dispel the confusion exhibited by the plaintiff.

In light of both the objectively confusing procedural history

and the subjective confusion that Malik plainly manifested, “it

was incumbent upon the district court . . . to inform [Malik] of

the pendency of the defendants’ motion and to accord him an

‘explanation of the risks attending failure to respond.’” Fox,

837 F. 2d at 509 (quoting Ham, 653 F.2d at 630). Such

clarification would have imposed little burden on the litigation,

but it would have constituted the “fair notice” that Fox requires.

Id. “[B]ecause the district court dismissed [Malik’s] complaint

without providing him” the requisite notice, we reverse “the

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3

TransCor urges that if we find, as we have, “that the district

court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground that Malik

conceded Defendants’ Motion on the merits,” we should nonetheless

affirm on the ground that Malik failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies under TransCor’s grievance policy. Appellees’ Br. 15.

Although the district court found that TransCor did have an informal

grievance policy applicable to complaints concerning conditions of

transport, it also determined that there was a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether Malik sent TransCor a complaint letter in

compliance with that policy. Malik I, 512 F. Supp. 2d at 32.

TransCor asserts that Malik’s claim to have mailed the letter was not

credible, but such an assertion generally provides no warrant for

reversing the denial of summary judgment by a district court. See

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)

(noting that, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court

“may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence”);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (same).

dismissal order and remand the case to the district court for

further proceedings.” Id.3

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s

grants of summary judgment and remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Reversed and remanded.

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