Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02129/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02129-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Maurice Carter,

Petitioner,

v.

Cynthia Y. Tampkins,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16-cv-02129-WQH-BGS

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO 

DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Maurice Carter (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1 [“Petition”]). Petitioner is serving a negotiated 

sentence of six years, eight months following his guilty pleas in San Diego County Superior 

Court to one count of felon in possession of a firearm and two counts of grand theft, as 

well as his admission that he had sustained a prior strike conviction in 1999. In the Petition, 

Petitioner raises a single challenge. (Pet. at 6.1) He argues that his counsel was ineffective 

in failing to challenge the validity of a prior 1999 conviction and in failing to negotiate that 

his prior conviction could not be used against him. (Id.) 

 

1 The Court cites the CM/ECF pagination when referencing the Petition and attached exhibits (ECF No. 

1). Page citations as lodgments reference the lodgment’s pagination unless otherwise noted. 

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This case is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to Southern District 

of California Civil Local Rule 72.1(d) for a report and recommendation. The Court submits 

this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge William Q. Hayes

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of California.

The Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, the lodgments, and all 

supporting documents submitted by both parties. For the reasons discussed below, the 

Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner’s Charges and Plea

On May 8, 2014, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a complaint in case 

number CN331975 charging Petitioner with four counts of possession of a firearm by a 

felon, four counts of possession of ammunition by a felon, two counts of commercial 

burglary and one count of grand theft. (Lodgment 1.) The complaint also alleged that 

Petitioner’s 1999 conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor with a great 

bodily injury enhancement qualified as a strike under California’s Three Strikes Law. 

(Lodgment 1 at 5.)

On July 15, 2014, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a complaint in case 

number CS2377328 charging Petitioner with one count of burglary and one count of grand 

theft. The district attorney alleged on-bail enhancements as to both counts and alleged the 

same strike prior based on Petitioner’s 1999 conviction that was alleged in the first 

complaint. (Lodgment 2 at 2.) Thus, in total, Petitioner was charged with thirteen counts

between the two complaints. 

On October 15, 2014, pursuant to a global plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty in

case number CN331975 to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon and one count 

of grand theft and admitted the 1999 strike prior in exchange for a stipulated sentence of 

six years, eight months. (Lodgment 3 at 9; Lodgment 4.) In case number CS2377328, he 

pled guilty to one count of grand theft and admitted the same strike prior. (Lodgment 3 at 

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10; Lodgment 5.) Petitioner faced a maximum sentence in the two cases of eight years, 

eight months. (Lodgment 3 at 7.)

On December 3, 2014, the trial court imposed the stipulated sentence for the two 

cases of six years, eight months as follows: four years for possession of a firearm by a felon 

(double the two-year midterm pursuant to California’s Three Strikes law) and two 

consecutive terms of sixteen months for the grand thefts (one third the two-year midterm 

doubled). (Lodgments 6-8, Lodgment 9 at 5.) Petitioner did not appeal. (Pet. at 2-3.)

B. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in San Diego County Superior 

Court

On June 16, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San

Diego County Superior Court, claiming that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing 

to inform him that he had a constitutional right to a hearing or a bifurcated trial on the prior 

strike 1999 conviction allegation, and (2) his prior strike 1999 conviction was improperly 

used to enlarge his sentence in violation of due process and equal protection.2 (Lodgment 

10.) 

On August 4, 2015, the San Diego County Superior Court denied the petition on the 

merits, finding that Petitioner “cannot establish it is reasonably probable he would have 

obtained a more favorable result” if he had gone to trial. (Lodgment 11.) Further, the court 

found Petitioner’s claim that his 1999 conviction was improperly used as a strike prior 

lacked merit. In 1999, Petitioner pled guilty to Penal Code § 261.5(d) and admitted to a 

Penal Code § 12022.7(a) great bodily injury allegation, based on sex with a minor that 

resulted in pregnancy. The Court noted that per California Supreme Court authority, a 

pregnancy without medical complications that results from unlawful but nonforcible 

intercourse can support a finding of great bodily injury. (Lodgment 11 at 2 [citing People 

v. Cross, 45 Cal. 4th 58, 63 (2008).]) Thus, his claim failed. 

C. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in California Court of Appeal

 

2 Petitioner does not assert this claim in the instant habeas petition. 

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On May 31, 2016, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, 

claiming that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the validity of his prior 

strike conviction allegation, properly consult with him regarding the prior conviction, and 

negotiate a more favorable sentence. (Lodgment 12.) His requested relief was to “have 

lower court grant sentence modification.” (Id. at 7.3) The Court of Appeal denied the 

petition the same day, noting that the “petition, filed more than 19 months after [Petitioner]

was sentenced without any explanation for the delay, is barred as untimely.” (Lodgment 

13 at 1 [citing In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th 428, 459 (2012), In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 302

(1949)].) The court also held that, to the extent Petitioner was challenging the validity of 

his guilty plea, his petition was barred because he failed to obtain a certificate of probable 

cause under California Penal Code section 1237.5. (Lodgment 13 at 1 [citing In re Chavez, 

30 Cal. 4th 643, 651 (2003)].) Finally, the court found that even if Petitioner’s petition 

were not procedurally barred, it would still be denied as he had not satisfied his pleading 

burden because he did not support his claim with documentation or declarations regarding 

the plea negotiations or prior strike conviction. (Lodgment 13 at 2 [citing People v. Duvall,

9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995), In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th at 499-500].)

D. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in California Supreme Court

On June 15, 2016, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, 

raising the same ineffective assistance of counsel claim that he raised in the California 

Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 14.) On July 27, 2016, the California Supreme Court

summarily denied the petition in a decision that reads in full: “The petition for writ of 

habeas corpus is denied. (See People v. Duvall, (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474; In re Swain, 

(1949) 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304.).” (Lodgment 15.)

E. Instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On August 22, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant Petition claiming that his counsel 

 

3 Because of the poor quality of the lodged copy of Petitioner’s state appellate court petition, this page 

number refers to the CM/ECF generated number. 

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was ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of his prior conviction from 1999 and 

failing to negotiate that the prior conviction not be used against him.4 (Pet. at 6.) The 

totality of his argument regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is:

Trial counsel failed to challenge the validity of a prior conviction from 1999. 

Trial counsel also failed to negotiate the prior conviction from 1999 should 

not be used against petitioner. Petitioner is actually prejudice. 

(Id.) Respondent filed an answer on October 31, 2016, arguing that (1) Petitioner’s claim

is barred by his guilty plea; (2) the Petition is conclusory; and (3) relitigation of Petitioner’s 

claim is barred because the California Supreme Court properly rejected it on the merits, or 

in the alternative, Petitioner is not entitled to relief even if the Court were to review his 

claim de novo. (ECF No. 7-1.) Plaintiff did not file a traverse. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). A federal 

court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus made by a person in state custody 

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless it: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2245(d)(1); or (2) resulted in a decision that 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

at the state court proceeding, id. § 2254(d)(2). See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 

(2011). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002); Moses v. Payne, 555 

 

4 Under California law, the decision whether to grant a motion to vacate a strike rests within the discretion 

of the trial court as provided for in People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497 (1996) (a “Romero

motion”). 

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F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2008). A state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when 

resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as 

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court 

precedent,]” the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal 

law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing 

principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its 

decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). A court may grant relief under the 

“unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal 

principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to the 

facts of a particular case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000); Bell, 535 U.S. at 

694. To satisfy the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), the state court 

decision must be “objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong.” Woods v. 

Donald, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75. 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so 

long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks 

through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the basis for 

the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-

06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” 

federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine 

whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 

336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

AEDPA requires federal habeas courts to accord deference to a state court’s 

adjudication of federal issues. Lounsbury v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2004). 

When a state court has not reached the merits of a properly raised issue, however, the 

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question is reviewed de novo. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); 

Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 

U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (“When it is clear, however, that the state court has not decided an 

issue, we review that question de novo.”). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the validity 

of his prior conviction from 1999 and failing to negotiate that the prior conviction not be 

used against him. (Pet. at 6.) Respondent counters that (1) Petitioner’s claim is barred by 

his guilty plea; (2) the Petition is conclusory; and (3) relitigation of Petitioner’s claim is 

barred because the California Supreme Court properly rejected it on the merits, or in the 

alternative, Petitioner is not entitled to relief even if the Court were to review his claim de 

novo. (ECF No. 7-1.) The Court will address each argument in turn. 

A. Preclusive Effect of Petitioner’s Plea 

First, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s guilty plea bars consideration of his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim per Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) 

because it rests upon an alleged constitutional violation that preceded his guilty plea. (ECF 

No. 7-1 at 9-10.) 

1. Applicable Standard

“As a general rule, one who voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty to a criminal 

charge may not subsequently seek federal habeas relief on the basis of pre-plea 

constitutional violations.” Mitchell v. Superior Court, 632 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir. 1980). 

In Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), the United States Supreme Court explained:

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it 

in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in 

open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he 

may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of 

constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may 

only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by 

showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards 

set forth in McMann.

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411 U.S. at 267. Following Tollett, the Supreme Court has recognized that certain 

challenges can be made regarding pre-plea constitutional errors when the defect is a 

“jurisdictional” one that implicates the government’s general power to prosecute the 

defendant. United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015, 1019 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574-76 (1989) (“The Court has subsequently limited 

the scope of those exceptions to include only those claims in which, judged on the face of 

the indictment and record, the charge in question is one which the state may not 

constitutionally prosecute.”); see also Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1975) (per 

curiam) (bar on collateral challenges to pre-plea errors did not preclude defendant from 

asserting double jeopardy to indictment under which he pleaded guilty); Blackledge v. 

Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (guilty plea did not foreclose claim of vindictive 

prosecution).

Critically for Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “claims of pre-plea 

ineffective assistance of counsel are cognizable on federal habeas review when the action, 

or inaction, of counsel prevents petitioner from making an informed choice whether to 

plead.” Mahrt v. Beard, 849 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Tollett, 411 U.S. at 

267-69).5 Thus, as recently stated by the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he Tollett exception is not as 

narrow as the State contends.” Mahrt, 849 F.3d at 1170-71 (holding that Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised upon counsel’s failure to file a motion to 

suppress was not barred by Tollett). 

2. Analysis 

i. Petitioner’s Claim as Pled in His Federal Petition is Barred 

under Tollett

 

5 The Court acknowledges that at the time of Respondent’s briefing, the Ninth Circuit had not yet issued 

its ruling in Mahrt v. Beard, 849 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2017). However, the scope of this exception is 

touched upon in Tollett itself. See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266-67 (“Counsel’s failure to evaluate properly 

facts giving rise to a constitutional claim, or his failure properly to inform himself of facts that would have 

shown the existence of a constitutional claim, might in particular fact situations meet this standard of 

proof.”) 

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Here, the totality of Petitioner’s argument regarding his ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim is:

Trial counsel failed to challenge the validity of a prior conviction from 1999. 

Trial counsel also failed to negotiate the prior conviction from 1999 should 

not be used against petitioner. Petitioner is actually prejudice. 

(Pet. at 6.) The Petition does not include a memorandum of points and authorities 

in support of Petitioner’s single claim or any additional pages in which he expands upon 

his claim. And while Petitioner did include a copy of the petition he submitted to the 

California Supreme Court, he fails to incorporate the arguments contained in that petition 

by reference into his current federal Petition. See Ross v. Williams, 896 F.3d 958, 967 (9th 

Cir. 2018) (quoting Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1, 4 (2005) (per curiam)) (“When a 

petitioner incorporates by making ‘clear and repeated references to an appended supporting 

brief,’ and the brief presents the petitioner’s claims ‘with more than sufficient 

particularity,’ it does not impose a significant additional burden on the courts to identify 

the petitioner’s claims or assess their merit.”); (see generally Pet. at 1-12 [containing no

memorandum of points and authorities in support of Petitioner’s claim and not 

incorporating by reference prior arguments made before the California Supreme Court]; 

compare Lodgment 14 [habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court], with Pet. at 

14-47 [copy of all documents submitted to the California Supreme Court].) Further, the 

Court is under no obligation to “wade through two thousand pages of irrational, prolix, and 

redundant pleadings, to the detriment of judges and petitioners alike” to ascertain 

Petitioner’s arguments in support of his claim. Ross, 896 F.3d at 967 (internal quotations 

omitted); see Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c); Ross, 896 F.3d at 967 (Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c) 

requires petitioner specificity to “alleviate the court’s burden of deciphering lengthy poorly 

organized petitions”). 

Accordingly, looking to what is actually pled in the federal Petition, Petitioner does 

not assert that his counsel’s conduct had any bearing on the voluntary or intelligent nature 

of his plea. According to Petitioner, his counsel’s purported errors all stem from actions 

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he failed to take to reduce the amount of time Petitioner served pursuant to the plea 

agreement itself, not that they “prevent[ed] petitioner from making an informed choice 

whether to plead.” Mahrt, 849 F.3d at 1170 (emphasis added). 

Because Petitioner’s allegations do not implicate the intelligent or voluntary nature

of his plea, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is foreclosed by Tollett. See Moran 

v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 1994) (petitioner’s claim that his attorneys were 

ineffective for failing to prevent use of his confession at trial precluded by plea), overruled 

on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76; Sapp v. Marshall, No. CV 08-3997-CAS 

FFM, 2010 WL 5598525, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2010) (finding petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s purported “failure to research 

and argue that petitioner’s prior conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence” was 

barred by his guilty plea per Tollett), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 

165186 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2011); Creighton v. Perez, No. 15-CV-00943-JD, 2016 WL 

3136901, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2016). Further, no “jurisdictional” exception to the 

Tollett rule applies, as none of petitioner’s challenges concern the power of the State to 

prosecute him. Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s guilty plea precludes 

federal habeas relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Tollett, 411 U.S. 

at 267; Sapp, 2010 WL 5598525, at *3-4.

Further, if Petitioner were in fact attempting to claim that his plea was involuntarily 

or unintelligently made based on his federal Petition, such a claim is belied by the record. 

At his change of plea hearing, he twice admitted his prior strike conviction in open court 

after being advised of and waiving his trial rights6:

The Court: All right. Each of you have the following constitutional rights. 

And for you Mr. Carter they apply to both cases and they also apply to your 

strike prior. 

You have the following constitutional rights: a right to a speedy and 

public jury trial; a right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against 

 

6 Petitioner pled guilty at the same time as another defendant. References to the other defendant are 

removed for clarity. 

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you; a right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against you; a right 

to remain silent unless you choose to testify; and a right to present evidence 

on your own behalf and have witnesses subpoenaed at no cost to you. 

Do you understand you have those rights Mr. Carter? 

Defendant Carter: Yes.

...

The Court: You realize when you plead guilty you give those right up? Do 

you understand that, Mr. Carter?

Defendant Carter: Yes.

...

The Court: And is that what you want to do, Mr. Carter, as to both your cases 

and your strike prior?

Defendant Carter: Yes.

...

The Court: And the maximum for you, Mr. Carter, would be on – the total of 

eight years, eight months in state prison. That would be the total maximum if 

you didn’t have a plea agreement. Do you understand that?

Defendant Carter: Yes.

...

The Court: All right. Directing your attention, Mr. Carter, then to case ending 

975, the one from North County. As to Count 1, violation of Penal Code 

section 29800(A)(1), which is possession of a firearm by a former felon. How 

do you plead? Guilty or not guilty? 

Defendant Carter: Guilty.

The Court: As to Count 11, a violation of Penal Code section 487(a), grand 

theft. How do you plead to that? Guilty or not guilty?

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Defendant Carter: Guilty. 

The Court: As to your strike prior from Case SCD143717 from 10-25 of ’99 

for a PC 261.5(d) with a 12022.7 allegation as alleged under Penal Code 

section 667(B) through (I), 1170.12 and 668, do you admit that strike prior?

Defendant Carter: Yes. 

The Court: Are you pleading guilty and making those admissions because 

you unlawfully possessed a firearm and – after previously convicted of a 

felony. You also unlawfully took property – stole property from another with 

a value great than $950. You also had a strike prior. Is that all true?

Defendant Carter: Yes. 

...

The Court: And as to your other case from South Bay case ending in 328, 

directing your attention to Count 2, a violation of Penal Code section 487(A), 

grand theft, how do you plead to that? Guilty or not guilty? 

Defendant Carter: Guilty

The Court: As to that same strike prior from SCD143717 from 10-29 of –

10-25 of ’99 as alleged under Penal Code Section 667(B) through (I), 1170.12 

and 668, do you admit that same strike prior as to this case?

Defendant Carter: Yes. 

The Court: And are you pleading guilty and making that admission because 

on the date in question you unlawfully took property from Playa Bonita Target 

with a value greater than $950 with the intent to steal and you have a strike 

prior? Is that all true?

Defendant Carter: Yes. 

(Lodgment 3 at 6-7, 9-10.) Further, Petitioner signed two sets of guilty plea forms 

regarding his cases (Lodgments 4, 5), in which he wrote out the details of his global plea 

agreement with the District Attorney. In addition to requiring him to plead guilty to three 

of the thirteen charged counts, he was required to expressly admit his strike prior with 

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respect to both cases in exchange for a stipulated six year, eight month sentence and 

dismissal of the remaining charges. (Lodgment 4 at 1; Lodgment 5 at 1.) On the forms for 

both cases, he signed his initials indicating that he was: (1) entering his guilty pleas “freely 

and voluntarily”; (2) admitting his strike prior; (3) giving up his right to appeal issues 

related to his strike priors and any stipulated sentence; and (4) giving up his right to trial 

and present evidence on his behalf regarding both the charges and prior convictions filed 

against him. (Lodgment 4 at 1; Lodgment 5 at 1.) Additionally, Petitioner’s counsel signed 

that he “explained to the defendant the entire contents of this plea form” and that he 

“discussed all charges and possible defenses with the defendant, and the consequences of 

this plea . . . .” (Lodgment 4 at 3; Lodgment 5 at 3.) 

Thus, nothing in the record supports a suggestion that Petitioner’s guilty plea, which 

was made pursuant to a global plea bargain that required him to admit his 1999 conviction 

as a strike prior in exchange for a stipulated sentence regarding three out of the thirteen 

charges filed against him, was anything less than knowingly and voluntarily made. 

ii. Looking to Arguments in State Habeas Petition

Looking beyond the federal Petition to the petition filed with the California Supreme 

Court, which was submitted by Petitioner with his federal Petition, Petitioner states that his 

trial counsel failed to properly consult with him regarding his prior conviction and should 

have sought to dismiss the 1999 conviction “in the interest of justice” because there was 

insufficient evidence to prove that prior conviction. (Pet. at 17.) Petitioner argues that, 

given the lack of evidence to support the 1999 conviction, his counsel erred in not arguing 

that, even if the conviction was not dismissed, it should not be considered in the guilty plea 

or sentencing. (Id.) He appears to be referring to his attorney’s failure to file a meritorious 

motion pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497 (1996), which 

provides the framework for a California trial court’s exercise of discretion to “strike” a 

prior conviction under the Three Strikes Law. Petitioner claims in a declaration attached 

to his petition to the California Supreme Court that his attorney failed to make any such 

motion and argue that his prior 1999 conviction is “outside the 3-Strikes spirit.” (Pet. at 

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42.) 

Taking into account the arguments made by Petitioner in his petition to the 

California Supreme Court, and in light of relevant authority, it appears the only plausible 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim Petitioner could make in order to overcome the 

Tollett bar, is that (a) his attorney failed to inform him of his ability to challenge the use of 

his 1999 conviction as a strike prior for sentencing purposes via a Romero motion, and 

(b) if Petitioner had known that, he would have rejected the global plea deal and insisted 

on going to trial on all of his pending charges so as to be able to attempt to have his 1999 

conviction stricken for sentencing purposes. In this scenario, counsel’s inaction, could 

have “prevent[ed Petitioner] from making an informed choice whether to plead.” See 

Mahrt, 849 F.3d at 1170. This necessarily would implicate the “intelligent character” of 

his plea, as if he had known about his ability to challenge his 1999 conviction for use as a 

strike prior, he would not have accepted the condition in his plea agreement that he admit 

to the 1999 strike prior. Instead he would have rejected the global plea deal and gone to 

trial on all thirteen charged counts. See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. 

For purposes of this Report and Recommendation, the Court assumes arguendo that 

this liberally construed version of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not 

barred by Tollett and addresses it below. 

B. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition Is Conclusory

Next, Respondent contends that Petitioner makes merely conclusory allegations in 

his Petition, not the persuasive grounds for relief required by 28 U.S.C. § 2242. (ECF No. 

7-1 at 5-6.) A habeas petition that simply alleges constitutional violations without 

explaining their grounds is subject to summary dismissal. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 

418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner show that “counsel’s 

performance was deficient” and that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984). 

Specifically, Petitioner was required to allege, among other assertions, that there is

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“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 

and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-60 (1985). 

This is Strickland’s resultant prejudice requirement. Id.; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In 

his Petition, Petitioner merely alleges that “Petitioner is actually prejudice[d] [sic.].” (Pet.

at 6.) He does not allege that but for counsel’s purported errors, he would have pled in the 

alternative and gone to trial. 

Furthermore, in his petition submitted to the California Supreme Court, Petitioner 

states that his “sentence would have been less severe had counsel filed a meritorious motion 

to challenge the 1999 prior conviction prior to coercion of the plea agreement” and he 

requests that the California superior court “modify the sentence.” (Pet. at 16-17.) Thus, it 

appears Plaintiff is only requesting a reduction of his sentence, not the ability to alter his 

guilty plea and go to trial. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not pled, let alone established, the 

prejudice requirement under Strickland necessary to assert an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim following a guilty plea.7

Therefore, as Respondent contends, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel is conclusory, vague and unsupported by factual assertions. As discussed above, 

the entirety of his claim is three sentences. (See Pet. at 6.) On this basis alone, his claim 

should be denied. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory 

allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas 

relief”); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); see Habeas Corpus Rule 

2(c) (specifying the content of a habeas petition requiring the petition to “specify all 

grounds for relief available to the petitioner”, “state the facts supporting each ground”, and 

“state the relief requested,” among other requirements). Accordingly, the Court FINDS

that Petitioner’s claim contains merely conclusory allegations and he has failed to 

sufficiently plead to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement in the context of a guilty 

plea. The Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be denied on this basis. 

 

7 Petitioner’s failure to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement is discussed in full below. 

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C. Petitioner’s Claim Fails on Its Merits under De Novo Review

Finally, Respondent argues that relitigation of Petitioner’s claim is barred because 

the California Supreme Court properly rejected it on the merits. (ECF No. 7-1 at 11-15.) 

In the alternative, Respondent argues that Petitioner would not be entitled to relief even if 

his claim is subject to de novo review. (Id. at 15.) 

As discussed above, the California Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas 

petition included citations to In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949) and People v. Duvall, 

9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995), cases which set forth the pleading requirements for habeas 

petitioners in California. See Curiel v. Miller, 830 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 

(“the cases cited by the California Supreme Court here—In re Swain and People v. 

Duvall—both concern the pleading requirements that apply to a state habeas petitioner’s 

claims”). The Ninth Circuit has held a denial order with citations to these two cases in 

conjunction is “in effect, the grant of a demurrer, i.e., a holding [that petitioner ha[s] not 

pled facts with sufficient particularity.” Id. (quoting Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 

1039 (9th Cir. 2005), modified on other grounds, 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006)); see

Seeboth v. Allenby, 789 F.3d 1099, 1104 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015) (a “citation to Duvall and

Swain together constitutes dismissal without prejudice, with leave to amend to plead 

required facts with particularity”), cert. denied sub nom. Seeboth v. Ahlin, 136 S. Ct. 1168 

(2016). 

As is the case here, in Curiel the California Supreme Court also issued a summary 

denial with citations to In re Swain and People v. Duvall. The Ninth Circuit held these 

citations demonstrated that the California Supreme Court found the petitioner’s petition to 

be deficiently pleaded. But because the California Supreme Court did not cite a case 

dealing with untimeliness in its order, it overruled prior untimeliness rulings of the Superior 

Court and the Court of Appeal. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit stated “We have no cause 

to treat a state court’s summary order with citations as anything but a ‘reasoned’ decision, 

provided that the state court’s references reveal the basis for its decision.” Curiel, 830 F.3d 

at 870. 

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Respondent argues that “Curiel is inconsistent with the California Supreme Court’s 

determination of state habeas law” and that the “California Supreme Court reasonably 

applied Strickland in denying [Petitioner’s] claim on the merits.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 12-13.) 

However, this Court is bound by Ninth Circuit precedent unless a case is heard en banc and 

the earlier decision is overruled. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Curiel is an en banc 

decision. It unequivocally states that the California Supreme Court’s issuance of a 

summary denial with citations to In re Swain and People v. Duvall is “in effect the grant 

of a demurrer . . . .” and is to be considered a “reasoned decision.” Curiel, 830 F.3d at 869-

70; see Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the AEDPA 

inquiry applies “to a single state court decision, not some amalgamation of multiple state 

court decisions”). 

Accordingly, because here the California Supreme Court denied relief on a 

procedural ground via its citations to In re Swain and People v. Duvall and did not address 

the merits of Petitioner’s claim, we are required to review Petitioner’s constitutional claim 

de novo rather than under the AEDPA’s deferential standard. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 

449, 472 (2009); Seeboth, 789 F.3d at 1103 (noting that if the California Supreme Court 

dismissed on a procedural ground, the court would review petitioner’s claims de novo, in 

light of the state’s failure to raise procedural default); Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1109; Pirtle, 

313 F.3d at 1167 (holding de novo review applies “when it is clear that a state court has 

not reached the merits of a properly raised issue”).

8

 

The Court conducts a de novo review of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim below. 

 

8 Respondent does not allege that Petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred. Further, “[c]ourts can . . . deny 

writs of habeas corpus under § 2254 by engaging in de novo review when it is unclear whether AEDPA 

deference applies, because a habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if his or her 

claim is rejected on de novo review, see § 2254(a).” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010). 

Accordingly, because Petitioner’s claim fails on its merits even on de novo review as discussed below, 

even if there were a question about whether AEDPA deference applies as Respondent asserts, de novo

review is permissible here. 

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1. Applicable Law

“Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel’s representation is a 

most deferential one.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). The Sixth 

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel “applies to all critical stages of criminal 

proceedings,” including “the entry of a guilty plea”, Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140

(2012), and “during plea negotiations”, Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012). “In 

the context of a guilty plea, the ineffectiveness inquiry probes whether the alleged 

ineffective assistance impinged on the defendant’s ability to enter an intelligent, knowing 

and voluntary plea of guilty.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 979-80 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A guilty plea must be intelligent, voluntary, and “done with sufficient awareness of 

the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 

742, 748 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). “The standard was and 

remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the 

alternative choices of action open to the defendant.” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 

(1992). “[W]hen the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has become final and the 

offender seeks to reopen the proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the 

underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary.” United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 

569 (1989). If the plea is counseled and voluntary, “then the conviction and plea, as a 

general rule, foreclose collateral attack.” Id.

“Where . . . a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters 

his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether 

counsel’s advice ‘was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases.’” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 

U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). “[A] defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel ‘may 

only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing” ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Hill, 474 U.S. 

at 56-57 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) and extending Strickland’s

standard to “claims arising out of the plea process.”); see also Mahrt, 849 F.3d at 1170.

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First, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show his 

attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must “show that 

counsel’s performance was deficient.” 466 U.S. at 687. This “first prong sets a high bar.” 

Buck v. Davis, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017). Counsel’s constitutional 

obligation under Strickland is satisfied “so long as his decisions fall within the ‘wide range’ 

of professionally competent assistance.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690); see 

also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104 (reviewing court must indulge “‘a strong presumption’ 

that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional 

assistance.”). “The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to 

incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it deviated from best 

practices or most common custom.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 690.) “It is only when the lawyer’s errors were ‘so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment’ that Strickland’s first 

prong is satisfied.” Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 

Strickland requires that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance . . . be highly 

deferential.” 466 U.S. at 689. 

Second, assuming a defendant can establish deficient performance under this highly 

deferential standard, a petitioner must satisfy the “prejudice” requirement, which asks 

whether “counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the 

plea process.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. In the context of a guilty plea, a petitioner “must show 

that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. The petitioner “must 

convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under 

the circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010). 

Finally, the Court need not address both the deficiency prong and the prejudice prong 

if the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of either one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

697. 

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2. Analysis 

Even if Petitioner’s liberally construed claim were not barred by Tollet as discussed 

above, he is not entitled to habeas relief based on the merits of his ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim. Once again, the Court is proceeding under the assumption that Petitioner 

was attempting to claim (a) his attorney failed to inform him of his ability to challenge the 

use of his 1999 conviction as a strike prior for sentencing purposes via a Romero motion, 

and (b) if Petitioner had known that, he would have rejected the six year, eight month global 

plea deal and insisted on going to trial on all of his pending charges so as to be able to 

attempt to have his 1999 conviction stricken for sentencing purposes.

Petitioner’s claim fails to satisfy the standard articulated in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He fails to show that: (1) his counsel’s performance 

was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been more favorable to Petitioner. See id. at 686-87. Specifically, 

he has failed to show that but for counsel’s purported error, he would have changed his 

plea and gone to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. While the Court need not address both the 

deficiency prong and the prejudice prong if the petitioner fails to make a sufficient showing 

of either one, Strickland, 466 at 697, for the purpose of this Report and Recommendation 

it does so below. 

i. Petitioner Has Failed to Establish Counsel’s Deficient 

Performance 

Here, Petitioner has not shown that his counsel’s decision to not challenge 

Petitioner’s 1999 prior conviction via a Romero motion was not within the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57; 

McMann, 397 U.S. at 771. As acknowledged by the California superior court, Petitioner 

“failed to show that his retained attorney’s advice to plead guilty rather than face a greater 

sentence after trial was not an informed choice among tactical alternatives.” (Lodgment 

11 at 2.) 

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As discussed by the California superior court, Petitioner’s 1999 prior conviction was 

the result of his guilty plea to Penal Code § 261.5(d), “any person 21 years of age or older 

who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is under 16 years 

of age”, and Penal Code § 12022.7(a), a great bodily injury allegation based on sex with a 

minor which resulted in pregnancy. (Id.) According to his stipulated sentence report, 

Petitioner’s victim was 15 years old at the time of intercourse and became pregnant. 

(Lodgment 16 at 4; Lodgment 17 at 5.) The victim had a “spontaneous abortion”, and 

DNA tests subsequently indicated that Petitioner was the father. (Lodgment 16 at 4-5; 

Lodgment 17 at 5.) Petitioner admitted during police questioning to having sex with the 

victim and subsequently pled guilty. (Id.) Critically, as noted by the California superior 

court, under California law a pregnancy even without medical complications that results 

from unlawful but nonforcible intercourse can support a finding of great bodily injury. 

(Lodgment 11 at 2 [citing People v. Cross, 45 Cal. 4th 58, 63 (2008)].) Thus, to the extent

Petitioner is attempting to argue that his 1999 conviction should not have qualified as a 

strike prior, such claims are without merit. 

As alluded to in discussions above, it appears based on language Petitioner used in 

his petition to the California Supreme Court that his primary argument is that his retained 

counsel failed to bring a Romero motion to strike his prior 1999 conviction for use as a 

strike prior for sentencing purposes under California’s Three Strikes regime. (See Pet. at 

16 [“trial counsel failed to challenge petitioner’s 1999 prior conviction under penal code 

§ 1385 and Williams (1998)”)]; id. at 17 [“trial court should have stricken/dismiss the 1999 

prior conviction in the interest of justice”]; id. [“Petitioner’s sentence would have been 

less severe had counsel filed a meritorious motion to challenge the 1999 prior conviction 

prior to the coercion of the plea agreement”]; id. at 26 [“counsel failed to argue/negotiate 

the prior felony should not have been used. And then it would have been up to the judge 

whether to strike the 1999 old prior conviction, based upon it was the petitioner’s only

prior conviction and the stable life style since the prior conviction.”].) Critically, at no 

point in his petition does Petitioner establish or argue that his attorney did not inform him 

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of his ability to bring a Romero motion, only that his attorney failed to “consult with 

Petitioner on the old prior conviction.” (Pet. at 17.) 

An order granting a Romero motion “embodies [a] court’s determination that in the 

interests of justice a defendant should not be required to undergo a statutorily increased 

penalty that would follow from a judicial determination of [the alleged] fact[s].” People v. 

Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 508 (1996) (quoting People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 

2d 45, 50 (1956) (en banc)), as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 21, 1996). To disregard 

a prior felony in this context, a judge “must determine that the defendant lies ‘outside the 

spirit’ of the [three-strikes] scheme such that he ‘should be treated as though he had not 

previously been convicted of one or more’ of the strikes.” Daire v. Lattimore, 818 F.3d 

454, 466 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 4th 148, 161 (1998)). As 

noted by the Ninth Circuit, because a defendant must overcome the “strong presumption 

that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper”, 

People v. Carmony, 33 Cal. 4th 367, 378 (2004), “denial of a Romero motion is generally 

the expectation, not the exception.” Daire, 818 F.3d at 466; see People v. McGlothin, 67 

Cal. App. 4th 468, 474 (1998) (“The striking of a prior serious felony conviction is not a 

routine matter. It is an extraordinary exercise of discretion, and is very much like setting 

aside a judgment of conviction after trial.”). 

A trial court’s “discretion to strike prior felony conviction allegations in furtherance 

of justice is limited.” Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 530. A trial court cannot strike “a prior 

conviction solely to accommodate judicial convenience or because of court congestion, or 

simply because a defendant pleads guilty, or due to personal antipathy for the effect that 

the three strikes law would have on a defendant, while ignoring defendant’s background, 

the nature of his present offenses, and other individualized considerations.” People v. 

Wallace, 33 Cal. 4th 738, 747 (2004) (brackets, citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Instead, the court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and 

circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, 

and the particulars of his background character, and prospects, the defendant may be 

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deemed outside the scheme’s spirit . . . .” Williams, 17 Cal. 4th at 161. 

Here, the only bases for a Romero motion provided by Petitioner is that the 1999 

conviction was his only prior conviction and he has led a stable lifestyle since the prior 

conviction. (Pet. at 26.) He offers no other reasons beyond these general assertions, both 

of which are refuted by his stipulated sentence report. (See Lodgment 16.) Because of the 

aggravating factors identified in the stipulated sentence report regarding his 1999 prior 

conviction, that the 15 year old victim alleged Petitioner forcefully raped her, Petitioner 

admitted to having intercourse with the victim, the victim became pregnant, and that DNA 

tests showed Petitioner to be the father, it is unlikely that a Romero request would have 

been successful based solely on the argument that it was Petitioner’s only conviction. (See

Lodgment16 at 4-5 [setting forth details of Petitioner’s rape of 15 year old].) Further, the 

stipulated sentence report details Petitioner’s lengthy history of criminal charges following 

his 1999 conviction, including charges for battery, multiple charges of attempted theft, 

multiple charges of providing false identification to a peace officer, multiple charges of

unlawful use of a driver’s license, and multiple charges of driving with a suspended license. 

(Id. at 5-6.) This refutes Petitioner’s assertion that he has been living a “stable lifestyle” 

since the 1999 conviction. Accordingly, it is unlikely that a Romero motion would have 

been granted under these circumstances. 

Further, in order to bring such a motion, Petitioner would not have been able to 

accept the global six year, eight month plea bargain offered by the District Attorney, 

because as Petitioner himself admitted in his guilty plea forms for both cases, admitting to 

the strike prior was a requirement of the plea deal. (See Lodgment 4 at 1, Lodgment 5 at 

1; also Lodgment 16 at 1.) Petitioner did not have the ability to file a Romero motion to 

strike the use of his 1999 strike prior for sentencing purposes after he accepted the plea 

bargain. Instead, he would have had to reject the global plea offer and have opted to go to 

trial on all thirteen of his charged counts facing a much longer potential sentence if 

convicted. Accordingly, given the strong presumption that defense counsel “rendered 

adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 

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professional judgment[,]” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, coupled with the well-known 

infrequency of Romero motions being granted, the Court cannot conclude that counsel’s 

failure to bring a Romero motion amounts to deficient performance under these 

circumstances. See Sanders v. Cullen, 873 F.3d 778, 815 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The failure to 

raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”); 

Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he failure to take a futile action 

can never be deficient performance.”); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(“Failure to raise a meritless argument does not constitute ineffective assistance.”).

ii. Petitioner Has Failed to Establish Prejudice 

Even setting aside the question of deficient performance, Petitioner’s claim fails 

because he has not demonstrated prejudice as required by Strickland. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 

59. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel’s advice to accept 

the six year, eight month global plea offer by showing that “there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 

going to trial.” Id. 

As discussed above, Petitioner fails to state anywhere in his federal Petition, or his 

petition to the California Supreme Court, that but for his counsel’s purported error in not 

challenging the use of his 1999 conviction as a strike prior, he would have rejected the 

global plea deal and insisted on going to trial on all charged counts. Rather, in his 

underlying state court petitions, he asserts that his “sentence would have been less severe 

had counsel filed a meritorious motion to challenge the 1999 prior conviction prior to the 

coercion of the plea agreement” and merely requests a sentence reduction. (Lodgment 12 

at 3-4; Lodgment 14 at 3-4, 10 [“have the lower court modify the illegal sentence”].) 

Repeatedly, Petitioner asks for a reduction of his sentence, not to reverse his plea and go 

to trial on all charges. Further, there is no indication in the record that Petitioner would 

have insisted on going to trial if he had known about the possibility of bringing a Romero

motion to challenge his 1999 conviction. Petitioner’s failure to make this showing 

precludes relief. See Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 132 (2011) (“The added uncertainty 

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that results when there is no extended, formal record and no actual history to show how the 

charges have played out at trial works against the party alleging inadequate assistance. 

Counsel, too, faced that uncertainty. There is a most substantial burden on the claimant to 

show ineffective assistance.”) 

Finally, the six-year, eight month plea agreement counsel negotiated requiring 

Petitioner to plead guilty to three out of the thirteen counts he was charged with was far 

better than a potential sentence Petitioner could have received if he had lost at trial on all 

charged counts. Per the stipulated sentence report, video footage recorded one of 

Petitioner’s thefts and he admitted to authorities, “I guess that is me.” Further, a search of 

his home uncovered multiple firearms. (Lodgment 16 at 2-3.) Accordingly, it cannot be 

said that Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s advice to accept the global plea offer and 

Petitioner’s resultant inability to file a Romero motion challenging his 1999 prior 

conviction, because it cannot be said that a decision to reject that offer “would have been 

rational”, especially in light of the limited success of Romero motions. See Padilla, 559 

U.S. at 372; Daire, 818 F.3d at 466 (denial of Romero motion is the “expectation, not the 

exception”). 

Thus, Petitioner provides nothing in his Petition sufficient to establish he was

prejudiced by the purported deficiencies of counsel. Instead, it appears that this is a case 

of buyer’s remorse once Petitioner was faced with the realities of incarceration. Prior to 

his acceptance of the global plea offer, Petitioner weighed the costs and benefits of pleading 

guilty to three charged counts and admitting his prior conviction as a condition of his plea 

agreement in exchange for a stipulated sentence lower than what he could have received if 

he had gone to trial and been found guilty of all thirteen charged counts. Following a 

review of the record, he has not establish, and cannot establish, that counsel’s purported 

action or inaction has prejudiced him in any way. 

Accordingly the Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s claim for habeas relief on his 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel be DENIED as he has failed to satisfy 

Strickland’s standards to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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V. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court issue 

an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) denying

the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 7, 2018, any party to his action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties by November 14, 2018.

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 

158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: October 17, 2018

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