Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00216/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00216-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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 Defendants’ motion to dismiss also seeks sanctions against Plaintiff for its allegedly

unreasonable refusal to amend the FAC to correct certain pleading deficiencies without involving the

Court. According to Defendants, Plaintiff agreed to amend certain claims without requiring

Defendants to file a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(e), and

later refused to honor this agreement. The record, however, does not indicate any bad faith conduct

by Plaintiff with respect to amending the FAC. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ request

for sanctions.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SDS KOREA CO., LTD., a South Korean

corporation,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10 CV 0216 MMA (BGS)

ORDER:

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK

OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

AND IMPROPER VENUE

[Doc. No. 14]

GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ EX PARTE

APPLICATION

[Doc. No. 35]

vs.

SDS USA, INC., a New Jersey corporation;

iBEND, LLC., a Montana LLC and SIMON

SONG, an individual; and DOES 1-100,

inclusive,

Defendants.

On May 5, 2010, Defendants SDS USA, Inc., iBEND, LLC and Simon Song (collectively

“Defendants”), filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff SDS Korea Co., Ltd.’s first amended complaint

(“FAC”) for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim, or in the

alternative for a more definite statement of its claims. [Doc. No. 14.]1

 Plaintiff opposed

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 The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) registration number for

EasyBender® is 3405475. Plaintiff also owns trademarks for “SDS” and “SDS Korea” with

registration numbers 3582433 and 3582411, respectively. [FAC ¶12.]

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Defendants’ motion [Doc. Nos. 19-26], and Defendants submitted a reply, including objections to

Plaintiff’s evidence [Doc. Nos. 29, 30]. On June 15, the Court took Defendants’ motion to

dismiss under submission on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to its discretion under

Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). [Doc. No. 31.] On June 17, Plaintiff submitted a response to

Defendants’ objections, as well as objections to Defendants’ evidence. [Doc. Nos. 32, 33.] On

June 21, Defendants filed an ex parte application requesting the Court strike these “late-filed”

documents, or in the alternative, permit Defendants an opportunity to respond. [Doc. No. 35.] 

Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ ex parte request on June 22. [Doc. No. 22.] For the reasons set

forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and GRANTS IN PART and

DENIES IN PART Defendants’ ex parte application. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a South Korean “machine tooling” company involved in, among other things,

“pioneering technology for bending and cutting” metallic materials. [FAC ¶¶4, 9.] Plaintiff’s

principal place of business is located in San Diego, California. [Id. at ¶9.] Defendant SDS USA is

a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Norwood, New Jersey. [Id. at ¶5;

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 14, p.2.] Individual Defendant Simon Song is the president and

CEO of SDS USA. [Doc. No. 14, p.1.] Mr. Song is domiciled in New Jersey. [Id. at p.2.] 

Defendant iBend LLC is a Missouri limited liability company with its principal place of business

in Riverside, Missouri. [Id. at p.3; FAC ¶7.] 

Plaintiff produces an automated system that processes and bends steel rule, which is sold in

the United States under the trademark “EasyBender.” [FAC ¶¶10, 15.]2

 iBend sells “automatic

bending machines for the die making and sign making industries.” [Doc. No. 14, p.1.] SDS USA

provides “technical support [for] automatic bending machines for the die making and sign making

industries.” [Id.] Until 2007, SDS USA provided services for Plaintiff’s products sold in the

United States. [FAC ¶34.] The relationship terminated when SDS USA allegedly breached its

contract with Plaintiff by selling its own products that infringed Plaintiff’s patents. [Id.] In

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addition, Plaintiff asserts Defendants are using an infringing domain name—EasyBender.com—to

confuse consumers and redirect traffic to iBend’s website (www.ibend.net). [Id. at ¶18.] Plaintiff

alleges Defendants are wrongfully using its EasyBender mark in various locations on iBend’s

website, including for example, to provide links to proprietary “EasyBender Online Manual(s).” 

[Id. at ¶¶19, 22.] Plaintiff asserts Defendants’ unauthorized use of its proprietary manuals online

constitutes copyright infringement. [Id. at ¶22.] 

Accordingly, on January 28, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, trademark

and copyright infringement claims. [Doc. No. 1.] On March 9, 2010, Plaintiff filed its FAC to add

patent infringement claims, alleging ten causes of action for: (1) Trademark Infringement (15

U.S.C. § 1114); (2) Unfair Competition under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a)); (3)

Injunctive Relief under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1116); (4) Copyright Infringement; (5)

Unfair Competition and Infringement under California Business and Professions Code § 17790;

(6) Negligent Interference with Economic Relations; (7) Infringement of ‘919 Patent; (8)

Infringement of ‘940 Patent; (9) Infringement of ‘574 Patent; and (10) Infringement of Patent

Application 12/111,857. [Doc. No. 7.]

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff then bears the burden of demonstrating that

jurisdiction exists. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004).

The plaintiff “need only demonstrate facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the

defendant.” Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). Uncontroverted allegations in

the complaint must be taken as true. AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588

(9th Cir. 1996). However, the court may not assume the truth of such allegations if they are

contradicted by affidavit. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280,

1284 (9th Cir. 1977). In a case such as this, where a court considers only affidavits and discovery

materials, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Id. at 1285. Further,

“conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in [the plaintiff’s]

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 Defendants timely filed their objections on June 14 in connection with their reply brief

submitted in support of their motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. 30.]

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favor for purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.” Id.

(quoting AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

There are two independent limitations on a court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction

over a non-resident defendant: the applicable state personal jurisdiction rule and constitutional

principles of due process. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). California’s

jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements; therefore, jurisdictional

inquiries under state law and federal due process standards merge into one analysis. Rano v. Sipa

Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 587 (9th Cir. 1993); see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10. The exercise of

jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant violates the protections created by the due process

clause unless the defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum state so that the exercise of

jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” International

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Personal jurisdiction may be either general or

specific. Here, Plaintiff asserts the Court may exercise both general and specific jurisdiction over

each Defendant, whereas Defendants contend personal jurisdiction does not exist under either

standard. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with Defendants.

DISCUSSION

I. DEFENDANTS’ EX PARTE APPLICATION

As a preliminary matter, the Court considers Defendants’ ex parte application to strike

certain late-filed documents that Plaintiff submitted after Defendants filed extensive objections to

Plaintiff’s evidence. [Doc. No. 35.]3

 On June 17, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’

objections, as well as objections to Defendants’ evidence that was submitted with their moving

papers on May 5, 2010. [Doc. Nos. 32, 33.] On June 21, Defendants moved to strike both

documents, or in the alternative, allow Defendants time to respond. [Doc. No. 35.] For the

reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ ex

parte application. 

/ / /

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(A) Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendants’ Evidence [Doc. No. 32]

Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on May 5, 2010, which was scheduled for hearing

on June 21, 2010. [Doc. No. 14.] Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(e), Plaintiff’s opposition,

including any objections to Defendants’ evidence submitted on May 5, was due no later than June

7. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(e)(2). Thus, Plaintiff’s objections filed ten days later on June 17 are

untimely. Plaintiff asserts the late-filed objections should not be stricken because “Defendants

were the ones who decided to commence filing objections to evidence in a 12(b)(6) motion, where

the case has not yet commenced and therefore the evidence on both sides cannot be properly be

authenticated through discovery.” [Doc. No. 36, p.2.] The Court disagrees. On a motion to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court may consider evidence outside the allegations

in the complaint. See, Oakley, Inc. v. Jofa AB, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113-14 (C.D. Cal. 2003). If

Plaintiff desired to object to evidence Defendants submitted in support of their moving papers, it

was required to do so when it filed its opposition, no later than June 7. See, e.g., Hong v. Right

Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15252 *53-54 (N.D. Cal.). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s untimely objections to Defendants’ evidence [Doc. No. 32] are STRICKEN.

(B) Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Objections [Doc. No. 33]

Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff’s response (filed June 17) to Defendants’

objections (filed June 14) on the ground that it is “tantamount to an improper sur-reply.” [Doc.

No. 35, p.2.] Unlike Plaintiff’s untimely objections to Defendants’ evidence, however, which

could (and should) have been made in connection with its opposition, Plaintiff did not have an

opportunity to respond to Defendants’ objections filed with their reply brief. Because the Court

took Defendants’ motion to dismiss under submission on June 15, Plaintiff was prevented from

responding to Defendants’ objections at the hearing. The Court therefore finds Plaintiff’s

response, promptly filed within three days of receiving Defendants’ objections, reasonable. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ request to strike Plaintiff’s response [Doc. No. 33]. 

In addition, the Court DENIES Defendants’ request to be allowed to file a reply to Plaintiff’s

responses. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the parties’ respective positions regarding the

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 Except as otherwise stated herein, Defendants’ objections are OVERRULED for purposes

of the pending motion to dismiss.

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evidence submitted in connection with Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and concludes additional

briefing is unnecessary.4

 

II. GENERAL JURISDICTION

Before the Court can exercise general jurisdiction over SDS USA, iBend, and Mr. Song,

Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate each Defendant has “continuous and

systematic business contacts” with California, such that the exercise of jurisdiction is “reasonable

and just.” Helicopteros Nacionales v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984). This so called “minimum

contacts” standard for establishing general jurisdiction is high, requiring that the defendant’s

contacts approximate physical presence in the forum. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta

National Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). “This is an exacting standard, as it should be,

because a finding of general jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court in the forum

state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in the world.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801

(citation omitted). In addition, each defendant’s contacts with the forum state must be considered

individually, unless the plaintiff establishes the defendant’s actions are reasonably attributable to

the other defendants. See Indiana Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. Standard of Lynn, Inc., 880 F. Supp.

743, 750-51 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 

Here, Plaintiff suggests the conduct of SDS USA, iBend, and Mr. Song should be

considered collectively to determine if Defendants engaged in sufficient minimum contacts with

the forum to establish jurisdiction. [See Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 19, p.4.] In

support, Plaintiff offers evidence indicating the two companies “share some corporate officers,”

advertise together, and share an address in Montana. [Id.] However, Plaintiff does not identify

any legal theory or authority that would allow the Court to impute the individual Defendant’s

conduct to one another based on this limited evidence. Thus, the Court declines to impute each

Defendant’s conduct to the others, and will consider each Defendant’s alleged contacts with

California separately. 

/ / /

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(A) Simon Song

Mr. Song argues this action should be dismissed because he lacks the requisite minimum

contacts with California for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. In support of

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Mr. Song provides a declaration stating: (i) he is domiciled in New

Jersey; (ii) he does not own any real or personal property in California; (iii) he does not own any

vehicles registered in California; (iv) he does not have any bank accounts in California; (v) he

does not maintain an office, a mailing address, a telephone or fax number, nor an answering

service in California; (vi) he does not own or lease any storage or warehouse space in California;

(vii) he has not been physically present in California for any purpose related to Plaintiff’s

allegations; and (viii) he has not purposefully availed himself of any activities directed toward

California. [Doc. No. 14, p.8-9; Declaration of Simon Song ¶¶3-13.] Plaintiff asserts Mr. Song is

subject to personal jurisdiction because he has specifically directed advertisements toward

California and solicited business from California residents—albeit, on behalf of SDS USA and

iBend. [Doc. No. 19, p.1, 3.] 

In support, Plaintiff provides a declaration from Tony Lim (President of Plaintiff SDS

Korea) stating, he “discovered” that Mr. Song exhibited iBend equipment at the “2009 Sign Expo

trade show in Las Vegas, Nevada.” [Declaration of Tony Lim ¶¶1, 7.] Although the trade show

did not take place in California, Plaintiff asserts Mr. Song’s exhibition of iBend products at the

Las Vegas show supports a finding of jurisdiction because it is the only one offered in the western

United States, and there were over 2,400 southern California residents in attendance. [Doc. No.

19, p.13; Lim Decl. ¶7.] Plaintiff also offers a declaration from Mike Adams (president of Adams

Technologies, a distributor for Plaintiff), which states that he witnessed Mr. Song’s exhibition at

the Las Vegas trade show, and he is aware of several emails and letters from Mr. Song soliciting

business from California companies. [Doc. No. 19, p.13; Declaration of Mike Adams. ¶¶6-10, 12.]

(i) Trade Show in Las Vegas, Nevada

First, Plaintiff does not indicate Mr. Song engaged in any contact with the forum in his

individual capacity. Mr. Adams testifies he witnessed Mr. Song exhibiting iBend’s products at the

trade show in Las Vegas, Nevada. [Adams Decl. ¶12.] “[A] person’s mere association with a

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corporation that causes injury in the forum state is not sufficient in itself to permit that forum to

assert jurisdiction over the person.” Indiana Plumbing Supply, 880 F. Supp. at 750. Thus, Mr.

Song’s actions at the show, even if directed toward the forum, do not subject him to personal

jurisdiction. 

Second, the Court finds that Mr. Song’s participation in a single trade show in Las Vegas,

Nevada, does not weigh in favor of exercising general jurisdiction over him in California. Even if

the Court accepts as true that Mr. Song participated in infringing product demonstrations at the

2009 Las Vegas trade show, which approximately 2,400 California residents attended, this

evidence does not demonstrate conduct directed toward California. The trade show Mr. Song

allegedly attended is the “primary trade show in the western United States for the Sign Making

industry.” [Adams Decl. ¶12.] As such, the trade show is presumably open to all members of the

public associated with these industries, regardless of residence. There is no indication Mr. Song

participated in soliciting attendees for the trade show, that he sought out California residents

during the show, that he interacted with any California residents at the trade show, nor that he sold

any equipment to California residents or entered any contracts or obligations with customers in

California. While an exhibitor could reasonably anticipate residents from any of the western

states, including California, would attend the event, without more, Mr. Song’s involvement in an

out-of-state trade show open to the general public does not support exercising jurisdiction over

him in California. See Kransco Manufacturing, Inc. v. Markwitz, 656 F.2d 1376, 1377 (9th Cir.

1981) (no general jurisdiction where defendant attended trade show in the forum and mailed

several letters to forum alleging infringement).

(ii) Emails and Letters from Simon Song

Second, the Court finds the remaining contacts Plaintiff identifies—two letters from Mr.

Song in his capacity as president of SDS USA—are inadmissible, and otherwise insufficient to

demonstrate sufficiently continuous and systematic contacts to support general jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff provides testimony from Mr. Adams that David Reynolds of US Steel Rule Die Co., Inc.

of Cerritos, California forwarded him an email, including a two-page letter attachment, that Mr.

/ / /

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 In paragraph nine of his declaration, Mr. Adams indicates Walt Marrs of Marrs Printing

(located in the City of Industry, California), also received the same letter from Mr. Song. [Adams

Decl. ¶9.] Defendants assert this testimony is inadmissible because it lacks foundation, Mr. Adams

does not have personal knowledge regarding the letter Marrs Printing allegedly received, and the

testimony is inadmissible hearsay. The Court agrees, and SUSTAINS Defendants’ objections to

paragraph nine for purposes of this motion only. 

Similarly, Mr. Adams testifies in paragraph eight that Mr. Song likely sent similar letters to

approximately 29 other companies because SDS USA shared the same database with Adams

Technology. [Adams Decl. ¶8.] Defendants object to this statement on several grounds, including:

Mr. Adams lacks personal knowledge that other SDS USA customers received similar letters; Mr.

Adams’s statements are hearsay because he is offering other customers’ statements that they received

the letter for the truth of the matter asserted; and Mr. Adams’s statement that SDS USA likely sent

the letter to approximately 29 companies is speculative. [Doc. No. 30, p.3-5.] The Court agrees the

testimony in paragraph eight is inadmissible. Mr. Adams does not identify the “several other

customers” that presumably contacted Adams Technologies, how the customers contacted Adams

Technologies, who the customers spoke to, what was said during the conversation, or why the letters

were not forwarded to Adams Technology. Accordingly, for purposes of this motion, Defendants’

objections are SUSTAINED.

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Reynolds received from Mr. Song. [Adams Decl. ¶¶6-7; Exh. A.]5 Defendants object to this

evidence on numerous grounds, including that Mr. Adams’s testimony lacks foundation, he lacks

personal knowledge and he does not (and cannot) authenticate the email and letter from Mr. Song,

attached as Exhibit “A.” The Court agrees, and SUSTAINS Defendants’ objections to paragraphs

six and seven of Mr. Adams’s declaration, including the documents attached as Exhibit A. 

Although Mr. Adams can testify he received an email from David Reynolds, as that matter is

within Mr. Adams’s personal knowledge, he does not demonstrate he has personal knowledge

regarding purchases made by US Steel Rule Die Co., Inc. Similarly, Mr. Adams has not

established he is in a position to authenticate Mr. Song’s email and attached unsigned letter. 

Even if the Court considers the email and attached letter, however, the documents do not

support a finding of general jurisdiction over Mr. Song. At best, the unsigned letter demonstrates

Mr. Song may have sent a form letter to a “Valued Customer” in his capacity as president of SDS

USA; the letter is written on SDS USA letterhead, and “President” appears below Mr. Song’s

signature block. Thus, nothing indicates Mr. Song acted in his individual capacity. In addition,

the letter is not addressed to a California resident or business. Although Mr. Adams testifies he

received the email and attached letter from David Reynolds—who is allegedly associated with a

California business—the email from Mr. Reynolds to Mr. Adams merely states, “I am traveling up

North but received this email.” [Adams Decl. ¶6; Exh. A.] Mr. Reynolds does not indicate he

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actually received the correspondence from Mr. Song, and the forwarded portion of the original

email identifies both the sender and the recipient as “info@iBEND.net.” [Id.] 

The second email correspondence allegedly sent by Mr. Song is similarly unhelpful to

Plaintiff. Mr. Adams testifies that, “On May 14, 2009, I received an email forwarded by a leasing

agent. Adams Tech sold a machine in Sacramento, Simon Song sent this forwarded email to try

and get the customer to cancel the order and purchase an iBend instead.” [Adams Decl. ¶10; Exh.

C.] In support of Mr. Adams’s testimony, Plaintiff offers a string of email correspondence,

beginning with an email from Mr. Song on April 29, 2009, addressed to “Whom it may concern.” 

[Adams Decl. ¶10; Exh. C.] Defendants object to Mr. Adams’s testimony and the supporting

documents in Exhibit C, in part, on the grounds his testimony lacks foundation, and he does not

have personal knowledge regarding the accuracy and authenticity of the email correspondence or

Mr. Song’s reasons for sending it. [Doc. No. 30, p.7-8.] The Court agrees Mr. Adams’s statement

that, “Simon Song sent this forwarded email to try and get the customer to cancel the order and

purchase an iBend instead” is not admissible, and SUSTAINS Defendants’ objections to this

portion of paragraph ten and Exhibit C. Mr. Adams does not appear as a recipient on the email

correspondence, nor does Mr. Adams establish how he knows why Mr. Song sent the initial email.

Even if admissible, however, the email correspondence in Exhibit C does not demonstrate

Mr. Song engaged in contact with the forum. Although it appears the email was ultimately

received by companies that have California offices, this fact does not indicate Mr. Song directed

his email to California. In addition, the correspondence reveals Mr. Song’s email was repeatedly

forwarded before ending up in the hands of the “leasing agent” who forwarded it to Mr. Adams. 

Thus, even viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Mr. Song’s email does not provide an

adequate basis for personal jurisdiction. 

Based on the record before the Court, Plaintiff has not satisfied its burden to establish Mr.

Song is subject to general jurisdiction in California. Not only has Plaintiff failed to produce any

evidence Mr. Song engaged in contact with the forum in his individual capacity, the only

admissible evidence even involving Mr. Song is his alleged attendance at a trade show in Las

Vegas, Nevada—outside of California. It is undisputed Mr. Song is a New Jersey resident, who

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6

 Declaration of Simon Song in his capacity as president and CEO of SDS USA, Inc.

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does not own or lease any property in California. Mr. Song does not maintain any telephone, fax,

or answering services in California, he does not have a California driver’s license, nor does he

have a California bank account. Mr. Song’s actions taken on behalf of SDS USA and iBend at the

out-of-state trade show do not demonstrate he engaged in continuous or systematic contacts with

California. Accordingly, this Court does not have general jurisdiction over Mr. Song.

(B) SDS USA

SDS USA similarly asserts it “lacks sufficient contacts with California to be subject to this

Court’s jurisdiction.” [Doc. No. 14, p.9.] SDS USA is a New Jersey corporation, with its

principal place of business in Norwood, New Jersey. [SDS USA Decl.6 ¶3.] SDS USA is not

qualified to do business in California, nor does it have any subsidiaries in California. [Id. at ¶4.] 

“None of SDS USA’s officers or directors reside or are domiciled in California,” nor do any of

SDS USA’s employees reside or conduct business in California. [Id. at ¶¶5-6.] In addition, SDS

has not held any of its board meetings in California, or attended business conferences in

California. [Id. at ¶¶ 15.] SDS USA does not maintain a bank account in California, does not

have any vehicles registered in California, and does not maintain any telephone, facsimile, or

answering services in California. [Id. at ¶¶7, 10-12.] SDS USA does not lease any storage space

nor own any real property in California. [Id. at ¶¶ 9, 13.] “SDS USA does not direct any of its

advertising specifically toward California residents, nor does it advertise in any publications that

are targeted or directed primarily toward California residents.” [Id. at 14.]

Plaintiff asserts SDS USA’s statements regarding its advertising are untrue because: SDS

USA participated in a trade show in Long Beach, California in 2008 [Doc. No. 19, p.5]; SDS USA

advertises that it has two tool sharpening locations available to its clients, one of which is “ABL”

in San Diego, California [Id.; Exh. F]; and SDS USA advertises on Advanced Dye Supplies’s

website, a company which has an office in Santa Fe Springs, California [Doc. No. 19, p.4-5]. 

/ / /

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7

 Plaintiff also relies on the two emails Mr. Song allegedly sent on behalf of SDS USA to

solicit business from California companies. [Id. at p.5.] However, because the Court sustained

Defendants’ objections to these emails and related testimony, it will not consider the emails in its

jurisdictional analysis.

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Plaintiff also alleges SDS USA and iBend provided a quote for a machine to a company located in

San Diego, California. [Doc. No. 19, p.2, 5 n.1.]7

 

(i) 2008 Trade Show in Long Beach, California

Mr. Lim testifies that in 2008, one of SDS USA’s distributors, Arete Corp., participated in

“The Sign Business & Digital Graphics Show” in Long Beach, California, and “SDS USA was

displaying their products at this show.” [Lim Decl. ¶8.] Mr. Lim spoke to Jeff Brown, of SDS

USA, at the booth during the event. [Id.] Because this trade show took place in California, the

Court finds Mr. Lim’s testimony adequately demonstrates SDS USA engaged in contact with the

forum through its participation in the Long Beach show. Without more, however, SDS USA’s

presence at a single event does not establish sufficient systematic and continuous contacts to create

general jurisdiction. See Kransco Manufacturing, 656 F.2d at 1377.

(ii) Quote to California Business

With respect to the alleged quote SDS USA and iBend provided to Sign Graphix in San

Diego, California, Plaintiff provides testimony from Mr. Adams stating, “I have discovered that

Jolly Limqueco of SIGN GRAPHIX received a quote for an iBEND machine from SDS USA in

July 2009.” [Adams Decl. ¶16.] Defendants object to this testimony on the grounds that it lacks

foundation, Mr. Adams does not have personal knowledge regarding the quote, and it constitutes

inadmissible hearsay. [Doc. No. 30, p.15.] The Court agrees, and SUSTAINS Defendants’

objections for purposes of this motion only. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. Mr. Adams does not

demonstrate the requisite personal knowledge required to testify that Sign Graphix received a

quote from the Defendants.

(iii) Website Advertisement & Referral for Services 

SDS USA’s alleged marketing activities with two different companies that maintain

California offices are likewise unhelpful to Plaintiff. Mr. Lim testifies, “I have discovered that

SDS USA advertises on the website for Advanced Die Supplies . . . Advanced Die Supplies[’s]

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8

 For similar reasons, Exhibit “G” to Mr. Lim’s declaration lacks foundation and is

inadmissible. Although Mr. Lim declares, “I have knowledge that SDS USA has corresponded with

ABL, Inc. discussing making attempts to lure service customers away from SDS Korea’s distributor

Adams Technology” [Lim Decl. ¶14], he fails to authenticate the supporting email correspondence

in Exhibit G, and Mr. Lim is not an identified recipient on any of the correspondence.

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west coast office is located in Santa Fe Springs, California.” [Doc. No. 19, p.4-5; Lim Decl. ¶10.] 

Plaintiff asserts this advertisement is “highly relevant to establish that SDS USA does business in

California with Advanced Die Supplies.” [Doc. No. 33, p.10.] While SDS USA’s logo appears on

the website, the logo does not link to information about SDS USA, it does not invite people to

contact SDS USA, and it does not provide an opportunity to interact with SDS USA in any way. 

In addition, that Advanced Die Supplies has a California location is inapposite. Plaintiff provides

no evidence SDS USA has had any contact with the California office, nor that any contacts with

potential customers in California arose from this advertisement. 

Similarly, Mr. Lim testifies that SDS USA refers customers who need tools sharpened to

SDS USA’s New Jersey location, or to a company named ABL, Inc. in San Diego, California,

depending on the customer’s location. [Doc. No. 19, p.5; Lim Decl. ¶¶12-14.] Mr. Lim states, in

relevant part, “it is my understanding that in some instances a customer who has purchased an

EasyBender sends [a] purchase order to SDS USA for the sharpening which is done in San Diego

by ABL, Inc. It is my understanding that SDS USA then pays ABL, Inc. for the service.” [Lim

Decl. ¶13.] Defendants object to these statements on the grounds that the testimony lacks

foundation and Mr. Lim lacks personal knowledge. [Doc. No. 30, p.27.] For the following

reasons, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ objections. 

Mr. Lim is not affiliated with SDS USA or ABL, Inc.—he is the president of Plaintiff SDS

Korea. [Lim Decl. ¶1.] Mr. Lim’s declaration does not establish how he has personal knowledge

regarding SDS USA’s relationship (if any) with ABL, Inc. Nor does he indicate how he has

personal knowledge of SDS USA’s alleged practices for coordinating the sharpening services

provided by ABL, Inc.8

 In the absence of evidence to establish Mr. Lim has personal knowledge

regarding these matters, his testimony is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 602. 

Accordingly, in the absence of admissible evidence beyond SDS USA’s isolated

attendance at the Long Beach trade show in 2008, the Court finds SDS USA has not engaged in

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9

 Jay Joo is the president and sole member of iBend, LLC. [Joo Decl. ¶1.]

10 Plaintiff also refers to an “attempted sale” where iBend allegedly attempted to convince a

customer in Sacramento, California to cancel its order with Adams Technology and purchase a

machine from iBend instead. [Adams Decl. ¶10.] Because the Court previously sustained

Defendants’ objections to paragraph ten of Mr. Adams’s testimony and the corresponding emails in

Exhibit “C” thereto, the Court does not consider this alleged contact in its jurisdictional analysis.

The Court also notes the FAC alleges—without elaboration—that iBend advertises infringing

products on its website, http://ibend.net [FAC ¶39], but Plaintiff does not raise the iBend website in

its opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. However, without more, a passive informational

website that has not resulted in any identifiable contacts or sales with California residents does not

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contact with California that can reasonably be considered equivalent to physical presence in the

forum. See Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086. Thus, this Court does not have general

jurisdiction over SDS USA.

(C) iBend, LLC

iBend also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction because it has not

engaged in sufficient contacts with California to establish personal jurisdiction. iBend is a

Missouri limited liability company with its principal place of business in Riverside, Missouri. 

[Declaration of Jay Joo ¶3.]9 None of iBend’s employees, officers or directors are domiciled in

California, nor do they conduct business for iBend or attend meetings or seminars on its behalf in

California. [Id. at ¶¶4-6, 15.] iBend does not maintain any office space in California, nor a

mailing address, telephone or facsimile number in California. [Id. at ¶¶11-12.] In addition, iBend

does not maintain any bank accounts in California, does not own any vehicles registered in

California, and does not own or lease any property in California. [Id. at ¶¶7, 8-10, 12-13.] Nor

does iBend direct any advertising specifically toward California. [Id. at ¶14.]

Plaintiff asserts Mr. Joo’s testimony is untruthful because Mr. Song exhibited iBend’s

equipment at the trade show in Las Vegas, which was attended by over two thousand California

residents, and for the past two years iBend has advertised in a monthly trade publication, Cutting

Edge, which has a “large subscription base in California.” [Doc. No. 19, p.4, 12; Adams Decl.

¶¶12-13; Exh. D.] In addition, Plaintiff asserts iBend entered at least one contract with a

California business, and that iBend currently advertises on Advanced Dye Supplies’s website,

which has an office in Santa Fe Springs, California. [Doc. No. 19, p.4-5.]10

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create personal jurisdiction. See CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

*11-12, 15-16 (S.D. Cal.) (citing Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1082; Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130

F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997)).

11 The Court notes several portions of Exhibit D are illegible.

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(i) Trade Show in Las Vegas, Nevada

Mr. Adams testifies he witnessed Mr. Song exhibiting iBend’s equipment at the 2009 trade

show in Las Vegas, Nevada. [Adams Decl. ¶12.] Plaintiff argues that because over 2,400

California residents attended the Las Vegas trade show, iBend purposefully directed its conduct

toward California. For the reasons previously set forth above in section II(A)(i), iBend’s presence

at the Las Vegas trade show, through Mr. Song, does not demonstrate contact with California. 

(ii) Trade Publication

Plaintiff argues iBend actively directs advertisements toward the forum because the trade

publication, Cutting Edge, has a “large subscription based in California.” [Adams Decl. ¶13.]

However, there is nothing in the record to support this statement. Plaintiff asserts the “distribution

list for the Cutting Edge magazine is posted on the internet and a listing of the Southern California

recipients was attached as Exhibit “D” to Plaintiff’s Notice of Lodgement.” [Doc. No. 33, p.9.] 

But Exhibit D, which consists of excerpts from Cutting Edge, including copies of iBend’s

advertisements in October 2009 and February 2010, do not indicate any significant connection to

California.11 [Adams Decl. ¶13; Exh. D.] Accordingly, iBend’s advertisements in Cutting Edge

do not establish contact with the forum.

(iii) Sale to California Business

Plaintiff also contends iBend engaged in contact with California because it has identified at

least one allegedly infringing device sold to a California business. [Doc. No. 19, p.12.] iBend

asserts the identified device “was sold by a non-party distributor in North Hollywood, California.” 

[Doc. No. 14, p.3; Nielson Decl. ¶11.] Plaintiff interprets this statement as an admission that

iBend “entered into at least one contract with a California business.” [Doc. No. 19, p.12.] Based

on the record, however, iBend merely acknowledges that a third party distributor—not

iBend—sold the device identified by Plaintiff. Without more, a single sale by an unidentified

distributor to a California business does not establish that iBend had contact with the forum. 

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Accordingly, because iBend is not registered to do business in California, has no employees in

California, and has no assets in California, the Court finds the contacts alleged by Plaintiff are not

sufficient to support general jurisdiction over iBend. 

III. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION

“Where general jurisdiction is inappropriate, a court may still exercise specific jurisdiction

if the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state in relation to the cause[s] of action.” 

Sher, 911 F.2d at 1361 (citing Data Disc, Inc., 557 F.2d at 1286). Specific jurisdiction is analyzed

using a three-prong test: (1) the non-resident defendant must purposefully direct its activities

towards, or consummate some transaction with, the forum or a resident thereof, or perform some

act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum,

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises

out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction

must be reasonable. Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987). Each of these conditions

is required to assert jurisdiction. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266,

1270 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Plaintiffs may satisfy the first prong in the analysis by demonstrating that the defendant

“purposefully directed” its conduct toward the forum state, or “purposefully availed” itself of the

privilege of doing business in the forum. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. Courts typically

utilize the purposefully directed standard in tort cases, whereas the purposeful availment test is

most useful for contract-based claims. Id. 

To establish the defendant “purposefully directed” its conduct toward the forum, the

plaintiff usually produces “evidence of the defendant’s actions outside the forum state that are

directed at the forum, such as the distribution in the forum state of goods originating elsewhere.” 

Id. at 803. Conversely, the “purposeful availment” inquiry usually involves evidence of the

defendant’s actions in the forum to determine whether the defendant should reasonably anticipate

being haled into the forum state court based on its contacts. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802;

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). The purposeful availment

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test is met where “the defendant has taken deliberate action within the forum state or if he has

created continuing obligations to forum residents.” Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1498.

The second prong in the analysis requires that the claim arise out of or result from the

defendant’s forum-related activities. A claim arises out of a defendant’s conduct if the claim

would not have arisen “but for” the defendant’s forum-related contacts. Panavision Int’l v. L.P.v.

Toeppa, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998). 

If the plaintiff satisfies the first two factors, the defendant bears the burden of overcoming

a presumption that jurisdiction is reasonable, by presenting a compelling case that specific

jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985);

Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986). Seven factors

are considered in assessing whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is

reasonable: (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into the forum state’s affairs;

(2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) conflicts of law between the forum

state and the defendant’s home jurisdiction; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the

dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the dispute; (6) the plaintiff’s interest in

convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. Caruth v.

International Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 128 (9th Cir. 1995).

(A) Simon Song

The only admissible evidence in the record regarding Mr. Song’s contact with California

involves his presence at the 2009 trade show in Las Vegas, Nevada. But, as previously discussed,

Plaintiff has not demonstrated Mr. Song acted in his individual capacity at the show, and the Court

may not assert jurisdiction over him based only on his association with iBend. Accordingly, this

Court lacks specific jurisdiction over Mr. Song. 

(B) SDS USA

Plaintiff asserts this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over SDS USA, because the

company attended a trade show in 2008 in Long Beach, California, and it currently advertises on

/ / /

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28 12 The Court does not consider evidence of the other alleged contacts previously deemed

inadmissible in section II(B), supra.

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the website for Advanced Die Supplies, which has an office in Santa Fe Springs, California.12 As

Plaintiff acknowledges, however, it is not merely the number of contacts the defendants have with

California, it is “the quality and nature of those contacts which is important for establishing

jurisdiction.” [Doc. No. 19, p.7-8; see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 

(1985).] 

Plaintiff asserts SDS USA directly solicited business from California through its

advertisement on Advanced Die Supplies’s website. [Doc. No. 19, p.13.] The Court disagrees. 

First, the record does not contain any evidence SDS USA’s advertisement was deliberately

directed toward the forum. Although Advanced Die Supplies has a California location, SDS

USA’s placement of its logo on the company’s website, which is accessible nationwide, does not

establish SDS USA was specifically seeking business from California. SDS USA’s mere presence

on a website that is accessible nationwide does establish personal jurisdiction in California. See,

e.g., CollegeSource, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *15 (citing Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419). Second,

Plaintiff has not demonstrated SDS USA purposefully availed itself of the benefits of conducting

business in the forum through the placement of its logo on Advanced Die Supplies’s website. The

record contains no evidence the ad resulted in any interaction with potential customers in the

forum, nor any sales to California residents or businesses.

Plaintiff’s reliance on iBend’s presence at the Long Beach trade show is similarly

unavailing. According to Mr. Lim’s testimony, SDS USA displayed its products at one of its

distributor’s booths at the Long Beach show; SDS USA did not purchase its own booth. [Lim

Decl. ¶8.] Plaintiff does not offer evidence that SDS USA sold any products at the show to

California residents or businesses, or that SDS USA otherwise entered any negotiations,

agreements, or contracts with any California customers. Thus, the location of the trade show,

which SDS USA had no control over, is the only evidence indicating any contact with the forum. 

In addition, even assuming SDS USA’s participation in the Long Beach trade show is

sufficient to satisfy the first prong in the specific jurisdiction analysis, Plaintiff has not

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demonstrated its claims arise out of or relate to SDS USA’s exhibition at the Long Beach show. 

“To satisfy th[e] second prong, the Ninth Circuit requires a plaintiff to show that [it] would not

have suffered an injury “but for” the defendant’s forum-related conduct.” CollegeSource, Inc.,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *18-19 (citing Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

Here, Plaintiff does not assert any of its alleged injuries resulted from SDS USA’s participation in

the Long Beach trade show. Notably, although Mr. Lim testifies SDS USA displayed its products

at the show, he does not specify whether the products displayed were those that allegedly infringe

Plaintiff’s patents. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not satisfied the second prong in the specific

jurisdiction analysis because Plaintiff’s claims do not arise out of SDS USA’s attendance at the

show. SDS USA is not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California. 

(C) iBend, LLC

Finally, Plaintiff asserts iBend’s exhibition at the Las Vegas trade show, its monthly

advertisements in the trade publication, Cutting Edge, and one sale involving an allegedly

infringing iBend machine in northern California establish specific jurisdiction over iBend. The

Court disagrees. 

As previously discussed, Mr. Adams testified he saw Mr. Song exhibiting “iBend

equipment in the ARETE booth” at the trade show in Las Vegas, Nevada. [Adams Decl. ¶12.] 

Notably, this trade show took place outside of California. Although there were California

residents in attendance at the trade show, there is no indication the potential access to California’s

residents motivated iBend’s participation. In addition, Plaintiff does not assert iBend interacted

with any California residents or businesses at the trade show, sold any products to California

attendees, nor entered any negotiations or other agreements involving California consumers. The

Ninth Circuit has held, “that a non-resident defendant’s act of soliciting business in the forum state

will generally be considered purposeful availment if that solicitation results in contract

negotiations or the transaction of business.” Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381

(9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Thus, iBend’s mere presence at a trade show

in Las Vegas, Nevada does not establish it purposefully directed any conduct toward California.

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13 See Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 324 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Similarly, Plaintiff asserts iBend specifically directed marketing activities toward the

forum by placing monthly ads in Cutting Edge for the past two years. Because the record contains

no evidence indicating where the publication is distributed, the existence of iBend’s

advertisements in Cutting Edge do not establish any contact with California. Lastly, Plaintiff

identifies one sale of an allegedly infringing iBend machine to a business in San Francisco,

California. While Plaintiff asserts iBend admits it entered this sales contract in California, the

evidence demonstrates that an unidentified third-party distributor actually sold the iBend machine. 

Without more, the Court concludes the sale of an iBend machine by an unnamed third party does

not establish iBend purposefully availed itself to the benefits and protections of California’s laws

such that it could reasonably be expected to be haled into California’s courts. Accordingly, the

conduct identified by Plaintiff does not demonstrate iBend is subject to specific jurisdiction. 

IV. VENUE

Even if Plaintiff had produced admissible evidence of sufficient contacts with California to

exercise personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants, venue in the Southern District is not

proper. Plaintiff asserts it properly initiated this action in San Diego under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)

because a “substantial part of the events giv[ing] rise to the claim occurred” in this district. [Doc.

No. 19, p.14.] The record, however, belies Plaintiff’s position.

Setting aside the admissibility problems with Plaintiff’s evidence, none of the alleged

events that give rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in the Southern District of California. Indeed,

the only link Plaintiff provides to the Southern District is an alleged quote from iBend to a San

Diego company (Sign Graphix). Yet Plaintiff does not even allege the quote was given for an 

infringing machine. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, which they need

not be on a motion to dismiss for improper venue,13 the facts before the Court do not demonstrate

that any events, let alone a substantial part of the events, giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred

/ / /

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14 For the same reasons, venue is not proper in San Diego under the patent venue statute, 28

U.S.C. § 1400(b), which provides: “Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the

judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of

infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” (emphasis added).

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in the Southern District.14 Because the Southern District of California is not a proper venue for

Plaintiff’s claims, its complaint is subject to dismissal.

Although the Court agrees with Plaintiff that transferring the case to an appropriate venue

is often preferable to dismissing the action, Plaintiff has not identified an appropriate venue for

transfer. Similarly, Defendants did not identify a potentially acceptable venue until their reply

brief, which identifies the Eastern District of New York. Because the record is devoid of any

reference to parties or events in New York, the Court does not find New York to be an acceptable

venue for transfer. Accordingly, dismissal is appropriate.

V. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY

Lastly, Plaintiff requests that it be granted an opportunity to conduct jurisdictional

discovery if the Court finds the existing evidence does not demonstrate an adequate basis for

personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. [Doc. No. 19, p.18-19.] “Courts are afforded a

significant amount of leeway in deciding whether parties may conduct discovery relating to

jurisdictional issues while a motion to dismiss is pending. It is clear that the question of whether

to allow discovery is generally within the discretion of the trial judge. However, where pertinent

facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are in dispute, discovery should be allowed.” Orchid

Biosciences, Inc. v. St. Louis Univ., 198 F.R.D. 670, 672 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (emphasis added)

(internal marks and citations omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff has not shown that pertinent facts bearing on jurisdiction are in dispute. 

Plaintiff asserts there are inconsistencies between Mr. Song’s and Mr. Joo’s declarations that

warrant discovery, but fails to identify a single discrepancy between the two declarations. 

Similarly, Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempts to contradict Defendants’ assertions that they have not

engaged in advertising activities specifically directed toward California. As discussed more fully

above, Plaintiff is unable to identify any advertising that specifically targeted the forum. Sheer

speculation and conclusory statements regarding Defendants’ alleged activities are insufficient to

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15 Magistrate Judge McCurine recently permitted briefing on Plaintiff’s request for

jurisdictional discovery, and denied the request on June 11, 2010. [Doc. No. 28; see also Doc. No.

29-1, Exhs. 10-13.] 

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satisfy the showing require by Orchid Biosciences. Thus, in the absence of any credible evidence

that pertinent facts are in dispute, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional

discovery.15 

CONCLUSION

Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over each of the Defendants, and none of the

events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in the Southern District of California, the Court

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. The Clerk of Court

is instructed to terminate the case file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 4, 2010

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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