Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01084/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01084-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD GARCIA,

CDCR # T-77914,

Civil No. 12cv1084 IEG (KSC)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 

OF COUNSEL PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

[ECF No. 18]; 

AND

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR STAY AND

EXTENSION OF TIME IN 

WHICH TO FILE OPPOSITION 

[ECF No. 16] 

vs.

C.D.C.R., et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at California State Prison–Los Angeles

County (“CSP-LAC”), in Lancaster, California, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with

this civil action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges his rights to adequate

medical care, due process, and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment were violated while

he was an inmate at Centinela State Prison in 2011. See Compl. [ECF No. 1] at 1-6.

/ / /

/ / /

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Case 3:12-cv-01084-H-KSC Document 19 Filed 02/06/13 Page 1 of 5
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I. Procedural Background

On November 30, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b) and 12(b)(6) [ECF No. 13]. Because Defendants move to dismiss, in part, based on

Plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to suit pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), the Court provided Plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to develop the

record regarding exhaustion. See Dec. 20, 2012 Order [ECF No. 14] at 1-2 (citing Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff was directed to file and serve his

opposition, including evidentiary materials related to exhaustion, by January 14, 2013. 

Defendants were ordered to reply by January 22, 2013, and the Motion was set for hearing

without oral argument as submitted on January 28, 2013. Id.

II. Plaintiff’s Pending Motions

On January 30, 2013,1

 however, Plaintiff submitted a Motion to Appoint Counsel [ECF

No. 18], accompanied by a Motion to Stay Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and “expansion of

time.” [ECF No. 16]. 

A. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

“[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.” Hedges v. Resolution Trust

Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Thus, federal courts

do not have the authority “to make coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States

District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S.

Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995).

Districts courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to “request”

that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of “exceptional circumstances.”

 See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). “A finding

of the exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance requires at least an evaluation

1

 Plaintiff’s Motions were received by the Clerk of Court on January 30, 2013, but are timely

because they are considered “filed” as of January 14, 2013–the date Plaintiff’s proof of service indicates

he delivered them to prison officials for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-72 (1988)

(undre the prisoner “mailbox rule,” a notice of appeal filed by a pro se prisoner is deemed to be “filed”

when it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the district court); Douglas v. Noelle, 567

F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Houston mailbox rule applies to § 1983 suits filed by pro se

prisoners.”). 

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of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability

to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Id. (quoting

Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935

F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

No doubt most pro se litigants “find it difficult to articulate [their] claims,” and would be

better served with the assistance of counsel. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. For this reason, in the

absence of counsel, federal courts employ procedures which are highly protective of a pro se

litigant’s rights. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding pro se complaint to

less stringent standard) (per curiam). In fact, where a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights

case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the

doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, so long as a pro se litigant, is able to “articulate his

claims” in light of the relative complexity of the matter, the “exceptional circumstances” which

might require the appointment of counsel do not exist. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331; accord

Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009).

Here, Plaintiff requests counsel on grounds that he is indigent, has only a “5.3 grade point

level,” has been proceeding thus far with the help of another inmate, and has limited access to

the law library. See Pl.’s Mot. [ECF No. 18] at 1-2. However, these circumstances are typical

of almost every pro se prisoner civil rights cases, and alone are insufficient to demonstrate the

type of “exceptional” circumstances which are necessary to justify the appointment of counsel

under Wilborn and its progeny. In fact, Plaintiff has shown that he has a good grasp of basic

litigation procedure, has effected service of his own Complaint and summons via the U.S.

Marshal, and has to date been able to articulate the facts underlying the basis of his suit

adequately in light of its relative legal complexity. Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103; Terrell, 935

F.2d at 1017; Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (finding district court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to appoint counsel when pro se prisoner “had done ‘quite a good job’ putting on his case

and was able to “present evidence effectively.”).

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For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel without

prejudice (ECF No. 18).

B. Motion to Stay and/or Extend Time

Plaintiff also asks the Court to stay the proceedings in this case, and to defer ruling on

Defendants’ Motion until it either appoints him counsel for him or, in the alternative, grants him

additional time in which to file his Opposition. See Pl.’s Mot. to Stay [ECF No. 16] at 1-2. 

Plaintiff claims he “has practically had no access to the law library” at CSP-LAC, is “proceeding

with the assistance of another ... inmate,” and did not receive this Court’s Dec. 20, 2012 Wyatt

Notice until January 9, 2013.2

 Id.

“‘[S]trict time limits . . . ought not to be insisted upon’ where restraints resulting from a

pro se prisoner plaintiff’s incarceration prevent timely compliance with court deadlines.” 

Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Tarantino v. Eggers, 380 F.2d

465, 468 (9th Cir. 1967)); see also McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 1992),

overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997); Bennett

v. King, 205 F.3d 1188, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000) (district court erred in not extending pro se

prisoner’s time for filing an amended complaint [which court held prisoner had the “right” to file

under Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000)] when prisoner’s failure to meet 30-day

leave-to-amend deadline was result of alleged lockdown and confiscation of prisoner’s legal

materials and where amended complaint was submitted within 30 days of original deadline);

Ordonez v. Johnson, 254 F.3d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding abuse of discretion “where pro

se prisoner delivered his amended complaint to the district court before the filing deadline,” but

district court rejected the timely complaint solely for non-compliance with a local rule” which

required the prisoner to provide an extra copy for the judge’s use). 

2

 It appears that while Plaintiff was at Kern Valley State Prison when he filed his Complaint in

April 2012, he was transferred to CSP-LAC at some point before October 9, 2012, when he submitted

a “Notice of Compliance” related to U.S. Marshal Service which includes a return address at CSP-LAC

[ECF No. 6]. While no filings in this case have been returned as undeliverable, and the Certificate of

Service attached to Defendants’ Motion [ECF No. 13] indicates it was served upon Plaintiff at CSPLAC, Plaintiff is hereby cautioned that while the Clerk of Court has now changed his address to CSPLAC in the docket, it is his responsibility to file a separate Notice of Change of Address if he is

transferred or released, and to “keep the court and opposing parties advised as to [his] current address.” 

See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 83.11(b).

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Thus, to the extent Plaintiff claims the consequences of confinement, including limited

access to CSP-LAC’s law library, have already prevented timely and meaningful compliance

with the January 14, 2013 deadline previously set for filing his Opposition, see Eldridge, 832

F.2d at 1136, the Court finds good cause exists to defer ruling on Defendants’ Motion and grant

Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to oppose it. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR 12.1 (“Extensions

of time ... shall only be secured by obtaining the approval of a judicial officer, who shall base

the decision on a showing of good cause.”).

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby:

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 16]; but

2) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay and Extend Time [ECF No. 18]. 

Plaintiff shall have until Monday, March 18, 2013, to file and serve his Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 13]. Defendants, for their part, shall likewise be

provided additional time, or until Monday, March 25, 2013, to file and serve their Reply. 

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that the January 28, 2013 hearing date previously set

for consideration of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 13] is VACATED. Defendants’

Motion is taken off-calendar and shall be considered submitted as of Monday, April 1, 2013.

Unless otherwise Ordered, the Court shall thereafter enter its written decision on the papers

without requiring appearances of any kind or holding any oral argument. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR

7.1(d)(1). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 5, 2013 _________________________________________

HON. IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge 

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