Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04635/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04635-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWIN JAY HUTCHISON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA PRISON INDUSTRY 

AUTHORITY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-04635-CW 

ORDER GRANTING, IN PART,

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, 

DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY AND

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

ADDITIONAL TIME TO CONDUCT 

DISCOVERY AND DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND MOTION TO 

APPOINT COUNSEL

Re: Dkt. Nos. 23, 30-32

Plaintiff Edwin Jay Hutchison, a state prisoner incarcerated 

at San Quentin State Prison (SQSP), filed a pro se civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for the 

alleged violation of his constitutional rights by the California 

Prison Industry Authority (CALPIA), operating under the auspices 

of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(CDCR), and individuals who are employees of CALPIA or of SQSP. 

On April 4, 2014 the Court ordered service of the following 

cognizable claims: (1) an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs against Andrew Deems, Chief 

Executive Officer of Health Care Services at SQSP, for creating a 

policy, custom or practice of failing to test inmates who may 

have been exposed to asbestos; (2) an Eighth Amendment claim for 

deliberate indifference to hazardous conditions against CALPIA 

and employees of CALPIA and SQSP; and (3) a state law claim 

against CALPIA for violation of California Government Code 

Case 4:13-cv-04635-CW Document 38 Filed 01/14/15 Page 1 of 16
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section 835 which provides that a public entity is liable for 

injury caused by a dangerous condition on its property if certain 

conditions are met.

On July 7, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss,

arguing that CALPIA is immune from suit under the Eleventh 

Amendment and that res judicata bars the litigation of the Eighth 

Amendment claims against all Defendants. This motion is fully 

briefed.1 Defendants filed a motion and an amended motion for 

judicial notice of documents filed in Plaintiff’s state court 

case, in which he asserted negligence claims against six CALPIA 

employees.

2

 On September 11, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to 

stay discovery pending the ruling on the motion to dismiss, which 

Plaintiff opposes. On November 20, 2014 Plaintiff filed a motion 

for additional time to conduct discovery, which Defendants 

oppose. On November 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed a second motion to 

appoint counsel. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to 

dismiss is granted, in part, the motions to stay discovery and to 

extend the time for discovery are denied as moot and the motion 

 

1

Defendants assert new arguments in their reply based on 

insufficient allegations in the complaint. The Court does not 

address these arguments because, as discussed below, Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss these claims based on res judicata is granted. 

2

The Court takes notice of Exhibits A-C, the state court 

documents, in the amended motion for judicial notice. See Fed. 

R. Evid. 201(b); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 

(9th Cir. 2001) (court may judicially notice facts not subject to 

reasonable dispute, including undisputed matters of public 

record). The Court does not take notice of Exhibits D and E, 

which are not relevant to the issues of res judicata or Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. Plaintiff’s request that Defendants be 

required to re-file this motion as a summary judgment motion 

based on the amended motion for judicial notice is denied because 

the Court only takes notice of documents in Plaintiff’s state 

court case, to which Plaintiff had access. 

Case 4:13-cv-04635-CW Document 38 Filed 01/14/15 Page 2 of 16
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to appoint counsel is denied.

DISCUSSION

I. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for 

damages against CALPIA is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution 

bars from the federal courts suits against a State by its own

citizens, citizens of another State, or citizens or subjects of 

any foreign State. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 

234, 237-38 (1985) (abrogated on other grounds as noted in Lane 

v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198 (1996)). Unless a State has waived 

its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overridden it, a 

State cannot be sued regardless of the relief sought. Kentucky 

v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985). Eleventh Amendment 

immunity extends to suits against a state agency, Brown v. Cal. 

Dep't of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (California 

Department of Corrections and California Board of Prison Terms 

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity), and to suits for 

damages against state officials sued in their official 

capacities, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985). 

California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with 

respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal 

court. Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 

1999). Therefore, if CALPIA is a state agency, both it and its 

employees sued in their official capacities are immune from suit 

for damages on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims.

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that CALPIA is a 

public agency. See Am. Comp. at 48, ¶ 97. Nevertheless, in his 

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opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff, citing California 

Penal Code section 2808, argues that CALPIA is not a public 

agency because it is financially self-supporting and its board of 

directors has all the powers and liabilities of a board of 

directors of a private corporation. 

California Penal Code section 2800 clearly states that 

CALPIA is an entity within the CDCR and California Penal Code 

section 2802 provides that the Prison Industry Board also is an 

entity within the CDCR. The fact that CALPIA is an entity within 

the CDCR, which itself is a state agency, shows that CALPIA also 

is a state agency. The fact that CALPIA may be financially selfsupporting or that its board may have been granted authority 

similar to boards of a private corporation does not overcome the 

simple fact that CALPIA’s existence is derived from that of the 

CDCR. 

Because CALPIA is a public agency, Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claims against CALPIA, and its employees in their 

official capacities, are dismissed as barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment.3 Dismissal is with prejudice because amendment would 

be futile. 

II. Doctrine of Res Judicata

Defendants argue that the doctrine of res judicata bars 

litigation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims in this case 

because his previous state court negligence action arose out of 

the same transactions and occurrences or the same cause of action 

 

3

Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar Plaintiff’s claims 

against Defendants sued in their individual capacities. See

Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66.

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upon which his current claims are based, it was dismissed on the 

merits and the parties in the two actions are the same or 

privies.

A. Legal Standard

Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars 

further claims by parties or their privies based on the same 

cause of action. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 

(1979). 

The Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, 

requires that a federal court give to a state court judgment the 

same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the 

law of the state in which the judgment was rendered. Migra v. 

Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). 

Under California law, res judicata, commonly known as claim 

preclusion, prohibits a second lawsuit involving the (1) same 

controversy (2) between the same parties or their privies (3) so 

long as the prior lawsuit resulted in a final judgment on the 

merits. Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 896–97 

(2002). 

B. Analysis

In the state court action, Plaintiff asserted negligence 

claims against five CALPIA employees and one SQSP employee based 

upon allegations similar to those he asserts in his federal 

complaint. Amended Request for Judicial Notice (ARJN), Ex. A. 

In the state action, the six defendants moved for judgment on the 

pleadings, arguing that Plaintiff’s negligence claims were barred 

by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation law

under California Labor Code sections 3370 and 3601. ARJN, Ex. B. 

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In a two-page order, the state Superior Court granted Defendants’ 

motion, concluding that “Labor Code § 3370(a)(9) is the exclusive 

remedy against the state for injuries occurring while the inmate 

is engaged in assigned work or work under contract. On this 

record, Plaintiff’s alleged injuries are exclusively compensable 

under the Workers’ Compensation law, and he is barred from 

bringing this tort action.” ARJN, Ex. C, Hutchison v. CALPIA, 

case no. CIV-1300339, Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings (Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2013).

1. Privity

Privity, for purposes of res judicata, refers “to a mutual 

or successive relationship to the same rights of property, or to 

such an identification in interest of one person with another as 

to represent the same legal rights . . . and, more recently, to a 

relationship between the party to be estopped and the 

unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is ‘sufficiently 

close’ so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral 

estoppel” or res judicata. Citizens for Open Access to Sand and 

Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1069-70 

(1998); see also Rynsburger v. Dairymen’s Fertilizer Co-op, Inc., 

266 Cal. App. 2d 269, 275-76 (1968)(“Privity involves a person so 

identified in interest with another that he represents the same 

legal right.”). If a particular party, although not before the 

court in the previous action, “is so far represented by others 

that his interest received actual and efficient protection, the 

first judgment will be held to be binding upon that party.” Id.

at 277.

Plaintiff, the party against whom res judicata is asserted, 

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was the unsuccessful party in the state negligence action. 

Therefore, the plaintiff is the same in both actions. 

Plaintiff, citing Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 525 (4th 

Cir. 2000), argues that the defendants in the two cases are not 

the same, or in privity, because government employees sued in 

their official capacity are not in privity with the same 

employees sued in their individual capacity. However, privity is 

relevant with regard to the party against whom res judicata is 

being asserted. Because Plaintiff was the unsuccessful party in 

the prior state court proceeding, the relevant parties are the 

same. 

Furthermore, even if California res judicata law required 

Defendants in this suit to be in privity with the defendants in 

the state suit, they are. This is because Defendants in this 

case are alleged to have engaged in the same conduct as that of 

the state court defendants and the defendants in both cases are 

employees of same state agencies. There is such identification

in interest among all defendants as to represent the same legal 

rights. 

Therefore, the res judicata requirement for privity is 

satisfied.

2. Final Judgment on the Merits

A judgment is considered to be on the merits if it is 

rendered upon consideration of the legal claim, as distinguished 

from consideration of procedural matters such as subject-matter 

or personal jurisdiction, service of process, venue or other 

grounds that do not address the legal or factual sufficiency of 

the claim for relief. Robinson v. Sup. Ct., 35 Cal. 2d 379, 384-

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85 (1950). A dismissal with prejudice is a final judgment on the 

merits which precludes the plaintiff from relitigating that cause 

of action. Alpha Mechanical, Heating, Air Conditioning, Inc. v. 

Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 133 Cal. App. 4th 1319, 1330-31 

(2005).

On September 26, 2013, the state Superior Court dismissed 

with prejudice Plaintiff’s negligence claims by granting the 

defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, determining 

that California’s Workers’ Compensation statutes preempted 

Plaintiff’s negligence claims because they were based on actions 

that occurred within the scope of Plaintiff’s employment. The 

court entered a judgment thereon. Neither party indicates that 

Plaintiff appealed this decision to the California Court of 

Appeal or the California Supreme Court. The Superior Court 

judgment became final when the time for Plaintiff to appeal 

expired. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.212(a) (time to file appeal). 

Therefore, the res judicata requirement for a final judgment 

on the merits is satisfied.

3. Primary Right 

Unlike federal courts, which apply a “transactional nucleus 

of facts” test, in California, a final judgment in state court 

precludes further proceedings if it is based on the same cause of 

action. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

“[A] cause of action is (1) a primary right possessed by the 

plaintiff, (2) a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the 

defendant, and (3) a harm done by the defendant which consists in 

a breach of such primary right and duty.’” Id. (quoting City of 

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Martinez v. Texaco Trading & Transp., Inc., 353 F.3d 758, 762 

(9th Cir. 2003)). “If two actions involve the same injury to the 

plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant, then the same 

primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the 

plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different 

forms of relief, and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.” 

Id.; see also Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 952-53 (defining “primary 

right” as right to be free of the particular injury suffered; 

primary right in state nuisance suit brought by state against 

billboard owner was right to highways free of advertising, 

whereas primary right in federal § 1983 suit by owner was right 

to advertise freely on his property).

Under California law, not all claims that could have been 

brought in the state court case are barred in a later action; 

rather, only those claims that derive from the same primary right 

are precluded. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1268 n.2 (citing Grisham v. 

Philip Morris U.S.A, Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 623, 641 (2007)).

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against CEO Deems does 

not allege the same wrong or harm as Plaintiff’s state court 

negligence claims. The wrong allegedly committed by CEO Deems is 

the creation of a policy, custom and practice of denying 

prisoners, including Plaintiff, adequate medical attention and 

treatment for exposure to asbestos. The harm Plaintiff allegedly 

experienced was his inability to receive adequate and timely 

medical testing and treatment. This is not the same wrong and 

harm alleged in the negligence claims, which focused on 

Defendants’ failure to protect or warn Plaintiff of his exposure 

to hazardous working conditions and Plaintiff’s physical 

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impairments resulting from such exposure. Therefore, Plaintiff’s 

claim against CEO Deems does not involve the same primary right 

as his negligence claims and it is not barred by res judicata.

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate 

indifference to the threat of serious harm and Plaintiff’s state 

negligence claims do involve the same wrong by Defendants——their 

failure to protect and warn Plaintiff against hazardous working 

conditions and their failure to refer Plaintiff for testing for 

physical symptoms resulting from the hazardous conditions. The 

cases also involve the same injury to Plaintiff——serious physical 

impairments resulting from his exposure to the hazardous 

conditions. Accordingly, these claims involve the same primary 

right. Under California law, this Eighth Amendment claim is

barred by res judicata. 

Likewise, Plaintiff’s statutory claim against CALPIA for 

violating California Government Code section 835 involves the 

same primary right as his negligence claims. The statutory claim 

and the negligence claims involve the same harm——allowing 

Plaintiff to be exposed to hazardous conditions at the CALPIA 

work site——and the same injury——Plaintiff’s physical impairments 

resulting from his exposure to such hazardous conditions. 

Therefore, the section 835 claim against CALPIA is barred by res 

judicata.

Plaintiff argues res judicata does not apply because he did 

not assert his Eighth Amendment claims in state court. The fact 

that Plaintiff did not assert his federal claims in his state 

court case does not determine whether res judicata bars his 

federal claims; as discussed above, res judicata applies if the 

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claims in the two suits concern the same primary right.

Plaintiff also argues that res judicata does not apply 

because, one day before his state case was decided, Defendants 

informed the State Compensation Insurance Fund that Plaintiff 

suffered from “industrial lungs injury” as a result of lead and 

asbestos exposure caused by Defendants and that, after his case 

was dismissed, Plaintiff was informed that “liability for his 

injuries has been accepted.” Plaintiff contends that this new 

evidence means that Defendants have a different burden of proof 

on his federal claims than his state claims. This argument is 

unavailing. The acceptance of coverage by the State Compensation 

Insurance Fund only confirms that Plaintiff’s injuries lie within 

the jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation statutes. 

Plaintiff argues that res judicata does not apply because 

his federal claims are not preempted by Workers’ Compensation. 

Workers’ Compensation preemption also is not relevant to whether 

res judicata applies; the only relevant factor is whether the 

claims involve the same primary right. Further, California 

courts have held that claims arising from injuries related to 

asbestos and other hazardous working conditions are preempted by 

Workers’ Compensation. See Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Sup. 

Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 473-74 (1980) (workers’ compensation 

statutes provide exclusive remedy for injuries suffered because 

employer made false representations about, or concealed dangers 

inherent in, a material employee was required to handle; workers’ 

compensation precluded claims based on employer’s malicious 

misconduct in allowing employee to use machine without proper 

instruction). 

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However, Johns-Manville also held that the plaintiff’s 

allegations “that the defendant fraudulently concealed from him 

and from doctors retained to treat him, as well as from the 

state, that he was suffering from a disease caused by ingestion 

of asbestos, thereby preventing him from receiving treatment for 

the disease and inducing him to continue to work under hazardous 

conditions” were sufficient to state a cause of action for 

aggravation of the disease, “as distinct from the hazards of the 

employment which caused him to contract the disease,” and this 

claim was not preempted by workers’ compensation. Id. at 477. 

The Johns-Manville holding supports the conclusion that a 

claim based on the aggravation of Plaintiff’s disease may involve 

a different injury and different wrong than the initial injury 

and wrong associated with the employment conditions that caused 

the disease. This means that a claim for aggravation of 

Plaintiff’s disease would not be barred by res judicata. 

Although Plaintiff does not assert an Eighth Amendment claim for

the aggravation of his disease, based on his allegations, he may 

be able to do so. Therefore, if he wishes to do so, he is 

granted leave to amend to add such a claim against defendants in 

their individual capacities; Eleventh Amendment immunity bars

this claim against the agency or official capacity defendants.

III. Motions to Stay Discovery and to Extend Discovery

Defendants move for a stay of discovery until this Court 

rules on their motion to dismiss. Because this Order addresses 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, their motion to stay discovery is 

denied as moot. 

Plaintiff moves to extend discovery to obtain more 

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documentary evidence relevant to all of his claims.

As discussed above, all but one of Plaintiff’s claims are 

dismissed. Plaintiff’s discovery requests regarding the 

dismissed claims are no longer relevant. Discovery relevant to 

Plaintiff’s claim against CEO Deems, which has not been 

dismissed, may proceed in accordance with the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to extend 

discovery is also denied as moot. 

IV. Second Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff moves for appointment of counsel because cases 

involving asbestos exposure are complex and a lawyer will be able 

to assist Plaintiff in applying federal law appropriately, obtain 

necessary discovery, depose witnesses and investigate the facts. 

“[I]t is well-established that there is generally no 

constitutional right to counsel in civil cases.” United States 

v. Sardone, 94 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the Court has the discretion to 

appoint volunteer counsel for “any person unable to afford 

counsel.” The discretionary appointment of counsel typically is 

reserved for cases involving “exceptional circumstances.” 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “A 

finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of 

both ‘the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of 

the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these 

factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together before 

reaching a decision.” Id. 

In its Order denying Plaintiff’s first request for the 

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appointment of counsel, the Court stated:

Here, exceptional circumstances requiring the 

appointment of counsel are not evident. The 

request for appointment of counsel is DENIED. 

If, in the future, the Court concludes it is 

necessary to appoint counsel to represent 

Plaintiff, it shall do so on its own motion.

Dkt. No. 20 at 2.

For the same reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s second 

motion for appointment of counsel. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted, in part. 

a. Plaintiff’s constitutional claims against CALPIA and 

its employees sued in their official capacities are barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment; these claims are dismissed with prejudice

because amendment would be futile. 

b. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against all 

Defendants, except for CEO Deems, based on deliberate 

indifference to hazardous conditions and Plaintiff’s statutory 

claim against CALPIA are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

These claims are dismissed with prejudice because amendment would 

be futile.

c. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against CEO Deems 

for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs 

is not barred by res judicata; therefore, it is not dismissed.

2. Plaintiff may, but is not required to, file an amended 

complaint asserting an Eighth Amendment claim against specific 

Defendants, in their individual capacity, based on allegations of 

specific conduct undertaken by them that prevented or delayed 

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Plaintiff from receiving medical treatment so as to aggravate his 

disease. 

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff may only assert these 

two claims: (1) an Eighth Amendment claim against CEO Deems; and 

(2) an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his 

medical needs based on actions taken by named Defendants in their 

individual capacities that aggravated his disease. He may not 

include any other claims in his amended complaint. 

The amended complaint is due within twenty-eight (28) days 

from the date of this Order. If Plaintiff does not file an 

amended complaint within this time, his remaining Eighth

Amendment claim against CEO Deems shall proceed.

For his amended complaint, Plaintiff shall use the Court's 

civil rights complaint form, a copy of which is provided 

herewith, and include in the caption both the case number of this 

action, No. C 13-4635 CW (PR), and the heading "SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT."

3. If Plaintiff does not file a Second Amended Complaint, 

CEO Deems’ dispositive motion is due twenty-eight days after 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint was due. Plaintiff’s 

opposition is due twenty-eight days thereafter. CEO Deems shall 

file his reply fourteen days after Plaintiff’s opposition is 

filed. If Plaintiff files a Second Amended Complaint, a new 

briefing schedule for CEO Deems’ dispositive motion shall be 

provided in the Court’s order reviewing the Second Amended 

Complaint. 

4. Defendants’ motion to stay discovery and Plaintiff’s 

motion to extend discovery are denied as moot. Doc. nos. 30, 31. 

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Discovery on the claim against CEO Deems may proceed in 

accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

5. Plaintiff’s second motion to appoint counsel is denied. 

Doc. no. 32.

6. This Order terminates docket numbers 23 and 30-32.

7. The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a blank civil 

rights complaint form with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 14, 2015

_________________________________

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:13-cv-04635-CW Document 38 Filed 01/14/15 Page 16 of 16