Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07133/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07133-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 14, 1997 Decided April 29, 1997

No. 96-7133

HARRIET ALICKE,

APPELLANT 

v.

MCI COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,

APPELLEE 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cv00517)

Steven R. Rhoads argued the cause for appellant, with 

whom Richard S. Kohn and Michael S. Fried were on the 

briefs.

Paul M. Smith argued the cause for appellee, with whom 

Anthony J. DeLaurentis was on the brief. Julie M. Carpenter entered an appearance.

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Before: WALD, GINSBURG and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Harriet Alicke brought this class 

action against MCI Communications Corporation for allegedly deceiving its residential customers by reporting their longdistance telephone calls in full-minute increments on their 

bills. Specifically, like most other telephone companies, MCI 

rounds up the length of each long-distance telephone call to 

the next full minute for the purpose of billing. The appellant 

does not challenge the reasonableness of MCI's rounding up, 

nor dispute that MCI fully discloses this practice in its federal 

and state tariffs; rather, she contends that MCI's practice 

of billing in full-minute increments without disclosing its 

rounding-up policy on the bill itself misleads customers about 

the cost of their long-distance phone calls.

The district court granted MCI's motion to dismiss Alicke's 

complaint on the ground that her claims are barred under the 

filed tariff doctrine. We affirm the decision of the district 

court without considering whether the filed tariff doctrine 

precludes this action. Instead, we rely upon the anterior 

ground that, taking the facts as alleged in the complaint, the 

appellant has failed to state a claim for fraud, negligent 

misrepresentation, or deceptive acts or practices in violation 

of D.C. Code §§ 28-3901 et seq., because she has not adequately alleged that MCI's billing practice actually deceived 

her or is capable of deceiving any reasonable customer.

I. BACKGROUND

MCI charges its customers for long-distance service in 

rounded-up increments of one minute. For a partial minute 

of service, that is, MCI bills its customers as if they received 

a full minute of service; the bill may be for two minutes of 

service even if the phone call lasted only one minute and one 

second. On the bills MCI sends to its customers, it reports 

only the rounded-up figure, not the actual length of the phone 

call. MCI does not disclose its practice of rounding up in its 

advertising, in its customers' bills, or in any other document 

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routinely sent to its customers. The appellant contends that 

this billing practice deceives customers because it misleads 

them into thinking that they have received more service than 

they have in fact received and thereby "dupe[s] them into 

using MCI long distance service more frequently than they 

would if they knew the true facts regarding MCI's billing 

practices." In addition, the appellant alleges that MCI does 

not disclose this policy because it wants to prevent customers 

from switching to a long-distance carrier that bills in smaller 

increments of time. The appellant does not dispute that MCI 

discloses its practice of rounding up in its federal and state 

tariffs, nor does she challenge the reasonableness either of 

MCI's rounding up or of its rates.

The complaint contains six counts: (1) fraud in violation of 

federal and District of Columbia common law; (2) negligent 

misrepresentation; (3) deceptive acts or practices and (4) 

false advertising in violation of the D.C. Consumer Protection 

Act, §§ 28-3901 et seq.; (5) unjust enrichment and imposition 

of constructive trust; and (6) injunctive relief. At oral argument counsel for Alicke clarified that, notwithstanding the 

reference to advertising in the complaint, her allegations are 

directed only to the representations contained in MCI's bills.

In the district court MCI moved to dismiss the complaint 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief could be granted. MCI made alternative 

arguments in support of its motion: (1) the filed tariff doctrine bars the action, and (2) the complaint fails to allege any 

fraud or misrepresentation by which MCI deceived its customers. The district court granted MCI's motion to dismiss 

on the ground that Alicke's claims are barred under the filed 

tariff doctrine because the "misrepresentation charged to 

[MCI] is in the nature of or relates to the rates it charges its 

customers."

On appeal Alicke challenges the district court's order only 

to the extent that it bars her claim for injunctive relief. In 

her complaint, Alicke requested a permanent injunction requiring MCI to state in each customer bill the "true length" 

of each long-distance call and to state in all its advertisements 

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for 12 months that it had previously charged its customers for 

service they never received but has discontinued that practice 

pursuant to court order. In her reply brief and at oral 

argument, however, Alicke narrowed somewhat her prayer 

for injunctive relief: If we reverse the district court and 

remand this case for further proceedings, we are told, then 

she will move for leave to amend the complaint so as to 

request only that MCI do one of three things: (1) show on its 

bills the actual length of each call, (2) state on the bills that it 

rounds up the length of each call to the next minute, or (3) 

discontinue altogether showing the length of long-distance 

calls on its bills.

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo the district court's dismissal of a 

complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Moore v. Valder, 65 

F.3d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1995). A complaint should not be 

dismissed "unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 

which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1955). Although we must construe the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, we "need not accept inferences 

drawn by the plaintiff[ ] if such inferences are not supported 

by the facts set out in the complaint." Kowal v. MCI, 16 F.3d 

1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

The appellant first argues that the district court's holding 

that the filed tariff doctrine requires the dismissal of her 

complaint is in error because she is neither challenging the 

reasonableness of MCI's rates nor seeking to obtain a rate 

different from the rate in the filed tariff. In addition, Alicke 

contends that she has adequately stated a claim for fraud 

because she has alleged that MCI's bills report that calls last 

longer than they really do and that MCI's failure to disclose 

its rounding-up policy in its bills induces customers to use 

more service and to pay for service that MCI does not 

actually provide.

MCI's first response is that the district court correctly held 

that the filed tariff doctrine bars this action because under 

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that doctrine a common carrier has no duty to disclose its 

rates except in its tariffs, of which customers are presumed to 

have knowledge. MCI also argues that Alicke has failed to 

state a claim for fraud because the non-disclosure of its billing 

practice outside of its filed tariffs does not constitute an 

affirmative misrepresentation and because no reasonable customer receiving a bill listing the length of her calls in oneminute increments could be deceived into thinking that every 

phone call she made terminated precisely at the end of a full 

minute.

We affirm the district court's dismissal of Alicke's complaint because the appellant does not therein adequately 

allege all the elements necessary for any of the causes of 

action she invokes. A claim for common law fraud or negligent misrepresentation requires, among other things, an allegation that the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the alleged 

misrepresentation, see Pence v. United States, 316 U.S. 332, 

338 (1941) (federal common law); Esteves v. Esteves, 680 A.2d 

398, 401 n.1 (D.C. 1996) (D.C. common law); Hall v. Ford 

Enterprises, Ltd., 445 A.2d 610, 612 (D.C. 1982) (negligent 

misrepresentation); and we assume that such reliance must 

be reasonable. Similarly, to state a claim based upon an 

unfair trade practice, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant made a material misrepresentation or omission that has 

a tendency to mislead. D.C. Code § 28-3904(e) and (f). 

Alicke has failed to state a claim for any of these causes of 

action because there is nothing in the way MCI reports the 

length of long-distance phone calls that could mislead a 

reasonable customer into thinking that she received more 

service than she really did receive and thereby cause her 

either to use more of MCI's service than she otherwise would 

have or to refrain from switching to another carrier that bills 

for service in smaller increments.

MCI lists the length of each phone call in whole-minute 

incrementswhich, the court notes and counsel for Alicke 

confirmed at oral argument, is how long-distance service has 

always been listed and billed until some companies began 

recently to bill in smaller increments. Because no reasonable 

customer could actually believe that each and every phone 

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call she made terminated at the end of a full minute, the 

customer must be aware that MCI charges in full-minute 

increments only. Accordingly, MCI's billing practices could 

not mislead a reasonable customer. See Bootel v. MCI 

Communications Corp., No. 95-8270, memo. op. at 10-11 

(D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 1996) (dismissing identical claim for 

unlawful trade practices based upon D.C. Code § 28-3904(e) 

and (f)); cf. Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 938 F. Supp. 1158, 1174 

(S.D.N.Y.1996) (dismissing similar claim brought under New 

York Consumer Protection Act).

In reaching our decision we do not consider whether the 

district court correctly held that the filed tariff doctrine bars 

all the claims made in the complaint. As such we leave for 

another day the question whether there are any circumstances in which injunctive relief may be based upon a billing 

practice disclosed in a filed tariff.

III. CONCLUSION

Because we hold that the appellant has failed to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted, the judgment of the 

district court is

Affirmed.

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