Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00743/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00743-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GABRIEL ANDREW RANGEL,

Booking No. 16173523,

Plaintiff,

vs.

PACHECO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00743-BTM-JLB

ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL 

ACTION AS FRIVOLOUS 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

GABRIEL ANDREW RANGEL (“Plaintiff”), while detained at the San Diego 

County Jail (“SDCJ”) and proceeding pro se, has filed a 2-page Complaint drafted in the 

form of a letter, claiming he is the target of “political assassina[tion]” by Defendants, 

identified only as “Sheriff’s Officers” and “DDA’s of past and presen[t]” who have 

connected his “biometric[] nano central nervous system” to “electric fields” and are 

committing “neurocognitive ... torture upon [his] person.” See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff further 

claims he has been a “torture victim before birth” due to his “rare blood of double OO ODT 

plus positive,” and his Apache Chiricahua descent, and he seeks injunctive relief from an 

“appropriate federal agency” pursuant to the War Crimes Act, Federal Tort Claims Act, 

“Alien Statu[t]e Tort Claim,” the “Embryonic Embryo Act,” the Geneva Convention, and 

the “Law of England 186 (1789).” Id. at 1-2.

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Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 filing fee required to commence civil action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), nor has he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Plaintiff has, however, filed miscellaneous supplemental documents including a 

Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 3) and a Motion for Leave to Appear (ECF 

No. 7). In his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiff repeats allegations that he is a 

“human subject to a ... program of savant talent,” and a “bio blood extraction victim” of 

“radiation clandestine crystalline army sigma elite CIA 805th Chemical Corporation,” and 

on that basis, he seeks “emergency release [from] incarceration” due to his torture through

“illegal securus technologies thermal heat mazer lazers,” employed by the Ku Klux Klan, 

“Luminati,” and “Freemasons,” who together with “law enforcement officials, “murder ... 

Afro-American m[e]n and young virgin women as sacrifice every month for four years,” 

“then Monday through Friday pass out double life sentences for [the] same offenses.” See 

ECF No. 3 at 1-3.

I. Discussion

Because Plaintiff has not paid the filing fees required to commence a civil action, 

his case is subject to immediate dismissal on that basis alone. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 

And while “a federal litigant who is too poor to pay court fees may proceed in forma 

pauperis,” Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 17621 (2015), Plaintiff does not seek 

leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 

1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007).

Ordinarily, under these circumstances, the Court would grant Plaintiff leave to 

submit a properly supported IFP Motion in order to proceed further. However, the Court 

finds such leave unnecessary and unjustified in this case because a preliminary review of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and his other supplemental 

documents reveal a suit that is patently frivolous. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 

25-26 (1992). A pleading is “factual[ly] frivolous[]” if “the facts alleged rise to the level 

of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts 

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available to contradict them.” Id.

“A court may screen a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A ... if, at the time 

the plaintiff files the complaint, he is “incarcerated or detained in any facility [because he] 

is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary 

program.” Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), 1915A(c); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h)). 

Section 1915A “mandates early review—‘before docketing [] or [] as soon as 

practicable after docketing’—for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v. Robinson, 

817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016). The mandatory screening provisions of § 1915A 

apply to all prisoners, no matter their fee status, who bring suit against a governmental 

entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 

2000). “On review, the court shall ... dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the 

complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 

Olivas, 856 F.3d at 1283 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

While it is difficult to discern any arguable legal basis for Plaintiff’s suit, it is clear 

that his allegations of being a “vampire biotech super soldier” and an “underground clone 

top shelf prime target of savant talent,” who is subject to nanotechnology torture” at the 

hands of “DDAs” and unidentified SDCJ Sheriff’s Department officials, while rambling, 

disjointed, and practically incoherent, are also “irrational” or “wholly incredible,” and 

therefore, factually frivolous and subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1). See Denton, 504 U.S. at 25-26; see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 

324 (1989) (an action is frivolous if it lacks “an arguable basis in either law or fact.”).

Section 1915 gives courts “the unusual power to pierce the veil” of a Complaint like 

Plaintiff’s and to “dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” 

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; see also Athans v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. CV-06-1841-PHXCase 3:17-cv-00743-BTM-JLB Document 10 Filed 07/31/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 4
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DGC, 2007 WL 1673883, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 11, 2007) (dismissing complaint presenting 

a “fantastic and delusional scenario” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 in which Starbucks and 

law enforcement were alleged to have conspired to conduct surveillance of Plaintiff in his 

home, and administered drugs to him at various Starbucks stores in order to prevent him 

from stalking and murdering women); Golden v. Clinton, No. C 94–0499 EFL, 1994 WL 

118280, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1994) (dismissing as frivolous action involving various 

private and public officials alleged to have conspired to control the plaintiff through 

electronic and “telemetric” devices); Kierstead v. Suter, 903 F. Supp. 801, 802–03 (D.N.J.

1995) (dismissing as frivolous civil complaint alleging government had conducted various 

biomedical studies on plaintiff and had kept her under constant surveillance); Adams v. 

FBI, No. C 06–07321 CRB, 2007 WL 627912, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2007) 

(dismissing as frivolous complaint painting a “delusional portrait of extreme persecution” 

involving hidden cameras in plaintiff’s home and having blood drawn while she was 

rendered unconscious by a chemical substance).

If claims are classified as frivolous, “there is by definition no merit to the underlying 

action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

II. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons discussed, the Court DISMISSES this civil action as frivolous 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction and for Leave to Appear (ECF Nos. 3, 7) as moot, and CERTIFIES that an IFP 

appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter a final judgment of dismissal and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/31/17 _______________________________________

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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