Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01706/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01706-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL JAMES,

Plaintiff,

v.

YATES, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:08-cv-01706-DLB PC

ORDER DISREGARDING MOTION

(Doc. 24)

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE

GRANTED

(Doc. 28)

DISMISSAL COUNTS AS STRIKE

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(G)

Screening Order

I. Background

Plaintiff Michael James (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his action Fresno County Superior

Court on April 10, 2008. On October 8, 2008, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. On

November 7, 2008, Defendant Yates filed a notice of removal. On March 17, 2009, the Court

screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and dismissed with leave to file an amended

complaint within thirty days. On May 13, 2009, after receiving an extension of time, Plaintiff

filed his second amended complaint. On September 23, 2009, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s

second amended complaint with leave to file a third amended complaint within thirty days. On

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October 26, 2009, Plaintiff filed his third amended complaint, which is the operative pleading.

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal

conclusions are not. Id.

II. Summary of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint

Plaintiff is currently a state prisoner at Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”) in

Coalinga, California. Plaintiff names as Defendants: director of CDCR Matthew Cate, Warden

James Yates, medical doctor Robert Meyers, RN Jane Robinson, DJO Steven Ritter, RN Jackie

Clark, medical doctor Nadim Khoury, medical doctor Glenn Thiel, RN Susan Odegaard Turner,

Ph.D. Tim Rougeux, RN Susan Scott, RN Karen Rea, director of division of adult institutions

John Dovey, regional medical director Scott Kernan, medical director Janet Rodriquez, chief

On February 26, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion to expedite the screening of his complaint. (Doc. 24.)

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Because the Court is screening Plaintiff’s third amended complaint with this order, Plaintiff’s motion is disregarded

as unnecessary.

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classification service unit Terri McDonald, and chief medical health care services Robin

Dezember, Plaintiff also names as defendants medical doctor Peter Farber-Szdrenyi, medical

doctor Dwight Winslow, associate warden R. Hansen, medical director Frank Igbinosa, and

Kanan, who appears to be a medical doctor.

Plaintiff alleges the following. Plaintiff contends that he arrived at PVSP on April 28,

1999. (TAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with asthma and bronchitis prior to his transfer. 

(TAC ¶ 2.) Plaintiff has requested a transfer out of PVSP every year because of valley fever

contamination in the area. (TAC ¶ 3.) Plaintiff was not warned of the risks of contracting valley

fever. (TAC ¶ 6.) In 2004, Plaintiff began to have difficulties breathing, experiencing chest

pains, night sweats, body ache, along with other infirmities. (TAC ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was

misdiagnosed as having hearing problems. (TAC ¶ 7.) In 2005, Plaintiff continued to experience

chest heaviness, shortness of breath, and lesions on his body. (TAC ¶ 8.) The medication he was

receiving was not working and his condition worsened. (TAC ¶ 9.) In 2006, Plaintiff was taken

to a radiologist for x-rays. (TAC ¶ 10.) Plaintiff was seen by doctor Coleman, who noticed

white blotches in Plaintiff’s lungs from the x-rays. (TAC ¶ 12.) Doctor Coleman gave Plaintiff

an incorrect prescription, but later corrected it. (TAC ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff was transferred to

Hanford Medical Center in August 2006 for valley fever infection. (TAC ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges

that the CDCR issued two memoranda, one in August 3, 2006 and the other in January 16, 2007, 

regarding valley fever and high risk of exposure for inmates. (TAC ¶¶ 19-20.) Plaintiff alleges

that valley fever is known to be more dangerous to African Americans than any other race or

ethnicity. (TAC ¶ 18.) Plaintiff contends that he was made to wait an irrational and

unreasonably lengthy period of time between treatments and examinations. (TAC ¶ 21.) Plaintiff

contends that defendants knew of the severity of the valley fever, including the death of inmates.

(TAC ¶¶ 22-23.) 

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Cate, Yates, and Hansen failed to remove Plaintiff

from the area when he requested, despite knowing Plaintiff’s medical condition. Plaintiff

contends that Defendants Dovey, Cate, Yates, McDonald, Kernan, Rodriquez, Igbinosa and

Hansen refused to approve Plaintiff’s transfer out of the area causing Plaintiff to contract valley

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fever. (TAC ¶ 25.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants Cate, Yates, Igbinosa, Winslow,

McDonald, Hansen, Rougeux, Dovey, Kanan, Kernan, and Rodriquez failed to clean up the soil

known to be contaminated with valley fever spores or make accommodations for prisoners to be

moved out of PVSP until the soil was cleaned. (TAC ¶ 26.) Plaintiff contends that defendants

Cate, Yates, Igbinosa, Hansen, Dezember, Farber-Szedrenyi, Meyers, Robinson, Ritter, Clark,

Khoury, Thiel, Odegaard-Turner, Scott, and Rea failed to ensure that medical staff screened and

examined prisoners prior to transfer to PVSP. (TAC ¶ 27.) Plaintiff contends that all defendants

made no effort to correct the cause of valley fever infection and still allow prisoners to enter the

area, which is very dangerous to the large population of African American male prisoners at

PVSP. (TAC ¶ 28.)

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of a transfer out of PVSP, decontamination of

valley fever in the area, and monetary damages.

III. Analysis

A. Due Process

Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As

previously stated in the Court’s September 23, 2009 order, “[t]o establish a violation of

substantive due process . . . , a plaintiff is ordinarily required to prove that a challenged

government action was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the

public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Where a particular amendment provides an

explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government

behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be

the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citations, internal quotations, and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1845 (1997); see

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). In this case, the Eighth Amendment

“provides [the] explicit textual source of constitutional protection . . . .” Patel, 103 F.3d at 874. 

Therefore, the Eighth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment governs Plaintiff’s claims.

///

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B. Eighth Amendment - Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff is seeking relief for violation of the Eighth Amendment, which protects prisoners

from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan

v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make

out a conditions of confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment

violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In

order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient

to support a claim that officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to

him. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128

(9th Cir. 1998). General allegations about the dangerous conditions at PVSP and the failure to

warn Plaintiff of those conditions, or risks, are not sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment

claim. Mere negligence on the part of the official is not sufficient to establish liability, but

rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d

at 1128. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not screen prisoners prior to transferring them

to PVSP. This is not sufficient to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim, as it fails to

demonstrate that Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or

safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Going to an area which contains valley fever and contracting

valley fever are not sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim.

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Cate, Yates, and Hansen failed to remove Plaintiff

from the area when he requested, despite knowing Plaintiff’s medical condition. Plaintiff

contends that Defendants Dovey, Cate, Yates, McDonald, Kernan, Rodriquez, Igbinosa and

Hansen refused to approve Plaintiff’s transfer out of the area causing Plaintiff to contract valley

fever. Plaintiff contends that Defendants Cate, Yates, Igbinosa, Winslow, McDonald, Hansen,

Rougeux, Dovey, Kanan, Kernan, and Rodriquez failed to clean up the soil known to be

contaminated with valley fever spores, or make accommodations for prisoners to be moved out

of PVSP until the soil was cleaned.

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Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Defendants knew of and disregarded a serious

risk to Plaintiff’s health. Prisoners may state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment by

alleging that prison officials, with deliberate indifference, exposed Plaintiff to a serious,

communicable disease that poses “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to [the prisoner’s]

future health.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). Even assuming Plaintiff is more

susceptible to contracting valley fever, exposure in this instance is not sufficient by itself to

establish a deliberate indifference claim. When responding to Plaintiff’s inmate grievance

requesting transfer because of valley fever, prison officials found Plaintiff did not meet the

criteria for a prison transfer. (TAC ¶ 17.) This demonstrates that Defendants considered

Plaintiff’s request, which would thus fail to indicate that Defendants were deliberately

indifferent. If Defendants had, with deliberate indifference, failed to treat Plaintiff for his valley

fever, Plaintiff would state an Eighth Amendment claim. However, Plaintiff has not sufficiently

plead facts that support a finding that Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to

Plaintiff’s health merely for housing Plaintiff in PVSP and denying him a prison transfer.

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges liability based on Defendants’ roles as supervisory

officials, the Supreme Court recently emphasized that the term “supervisory liability,” loosely

and commonly used by both courts and litigants alike, is a misnomer. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 

“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their

subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Id. at 1948. Rather, each government

official, regardless of his or her title, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id. at 1948-49.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against any of the

above-named Defendants.

C. Eighth Amendment - Medical Care

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). The deliberate

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indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation

must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[]

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Id. at 837.

Plaintiff’s contention that he was made to wait an irrational and unreasonably long period

of time between examination and treatment fails to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim,

as Plaintiff fails to link any defendants to an act that violated Plaintiff’s medical care. To the

extent that Plaintiff is attempting to allege a claim for inadequate medical care, Plaintiff must

demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v.

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added); see Iqbal, 129. S. Ct. at 1948-49

(holding that each government official is liable for his or her own conduct, not the actions of his

or her subordinates). Plaintiff fails to link any named defendant to any act or omission that

would support a claim under the Eighth Amendment based on inadequate medical care.

IV. Conclusion and Order

 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim regarding medical care or

conditions of confinement against any Defendants. Plaintiff was previously provided with two

opportunities to amend his complaint and cure the deficiencies identified. Plaintiff has been

unable to do so, and further leave to amend will not be granted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED, with prejudice,

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed

to close this action. This dismissal counts as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 15, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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