Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01978/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01978-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1446nr Notice of Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARL BOX, an individual; and JEAN 

VILSAINT, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BROADWAY CENTER, LLC; 

BROADWAY CENTER 

ASSOCIATIONS, LLC; THOMAS 

ABBATE, an individual; EXCELL 

SECURITY, INC.; JOHN KNIGHT, 

an individual; CAM COMMERCIAL 

PROPERTIES, INC.; and DOES 1–40, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-CV-1978 JLS (MSB)

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION 

FOR REMAND TO STATE COURT; 

(2) REMANDING ACTION TO THE 

SUPERIOR COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN 

DIEGO; AND (3) AWARDING 

PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

AND COSTS

(ECF No. 8)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs Carl Box and Jean Vilsaint’s Motion for 

Remand to State Court (“Mot.,” ECF No. 8). Also before the Court are Defendants 

Broadway Center Associates LLC d/b/a Broadway Village Shopping Center; Thomas 

Abatte; and Cam Commercial Properties, Inc.’s (the “Removing Defendants”) Opposition 

to (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 11) and Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of (ECF No. 13) the Motion. 

The Court vacated the hearing on the Motion and took the matter under submission without 

oral argument. ECF No. 12. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

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BACKGROUND

On July 17, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a state court complaint against the Removing 

Defendants; John L. Knight; and Excell Security, Inc. (“Excell”), asserting causes of action 

for false imprisonment, battery, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 

violation of the Bane Act, California Civil Code section 52.1. See generally ECF No. 1 at 

23–371

; see also Declaration of Ranjan A. Lahiri, Esq., ECF No. 11-1, ¶ 2 & Ex. A. The 

Removing Defendants and Excell were served on July 26, 2018. See Lahiri Decl. ¶¶ 4, 10.

On August 24, 2018—the deadline for removal to this Court—the Removing 

Defendants’ counsel contacted Excell’s agent for service of process, Yale & Baumgarten, 

LLP, to obtain Excell’s consent to removal. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12, 14. Yale & Baumgarten, LLP 

informed the Removing Defendants’ counsel that, although it had previously represented 

Excell in similar cases, the current claim had been tendered to Excell’s insurance carrier, 

and Yale & Baumgarten, LLP was not aware what law firm had been assigned to defendant 

Excell and Mr. Knight. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15–16. Yale & Baumgarten, LLP forwarded the 

Removing Defendants’ request to Excell, but the Removing Defendants received no reply 

before filing their notice of removal. Id. ¶ 16–18.

Later that day, the Removing Defendants removed the action to this Court, claiming 

that this Court has original jurisdiction over this action because “one or more of the claims 

against [Rem]oving Defendants arise under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

U.S. Constitution.” ECF No. 1 at 2. The Removing Defendants further note that 

“Plaintiffs’ state court action . . . is substantially related to and arises from the same 

transaction and occurrence at issue in a related federal action, NAACP et al. v. County of 

San Diego, et al., . . . in which Plaintiffs are suing state actors for federal civil rights 

violations stemming from the same incidents at issue in the instant state court action.” Id. 

The Removing Defendants contend that “Plaintiffs’ operative Complaint in the instant state 

 

1 Citations to ECF No. 1 refer to the CM/ECF page numbers electronically stamped at the top of each 

page.

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court action alleges that the instant action arises under the same facts and circumstances.” 

Id. The Removing Defendants also claimed that the consent of Mr. Knight and Excell was 

not “required” because Mr. Knight had not yet been served and “Defendant Excell Security, 

Inc. was served at the office of its former attorney who is not representing Defendant Excell 

Security, Inc. in the instant action” and “Defendant Excell Security, Inc. has not yet 

appeared in the state court action, and its attorney of record is presently unknown to counsel 

for [Rem]oving Defendants.” Id. at 3. 

On September 10, 2018, Plaintiffs and Excell filed a joint motion to extend the time 

for Excell to respond to the Complaint. See ECF No. 5. In the motion, Excell explained 

that it first learned of the removal of this action when it called the calendar clerk for 

Department C68 in the San Diego Superior Court to obtain a hearing date for a demurrer 

and motion to strike. Id. at 2. Excell further indicated in the joint motion that it “does not 

consent to removal” of this action. Id.

The instant Motion was filed on September 24, 2018. See generally ECF No. 8.

LEGAL STANDARD

In cases “brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States 

have original jurisdiction,” defendants may remove the action to federal court. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(a). Section 1441 provides two bases for removal: diversity jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction. Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction “where the amount in 

controversy” exceeds $75,000, and the parties are of “diverse” state citizenship. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332. Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising 

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

The party invoking the removal statute bears the burden of establishing that federal 

subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th 

Cir. 1988). Moreover, courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal 

jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Boggs v. Lewis, 

863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988); Takeda v. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 

(9th Cir. 1985)). Therefore, “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as 

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to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (citing Libhart v. Santa 

Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)). 

ANALYSIS

In their Motion, Plaintiffs argue that this action must be remanded because 

“[r]emoval lacks consent by defendant Excell . . . and the federal court lacks original 

jurisdiction over the matter” because “Plaintiffs only assert state law claims in their 

complaint.” Mot. at 2. Plaintiffs also request that the Court grant them $8,000 in attorneys’ 

fees because removal was not objectively reasonable. Id. at 5–7. The Court addresses each 

of Plaintiffs’ arguments in turn.

I. Unanimity of Consent

The Removing Defendants concede—as they must—that neither Excell nor 

Mr. Knight has consented to removal in this action; nonetheless, the Removing Defendants 

contend that this “is a procedural flaw that does not automatically divest this court of 

removal jurisdiction or render Defendants’ removal invalid or improper,” Opp’n at 11, 

because this “defect[ is] curable by amendment in federal court.” Id. at 13 (citing Smith v. 

Mylan Inc., 761 F.3d 1042, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2014)). 

 What the Removing Defendants overlook, however, is that they cannot cure this 

defect in this case by filing an amended notice of removal because Excell does not consent 

to removal. See ECF No. 5 at 2. Although the Removing Defendants make much of their 

“good faith” attempts to obtain consent from Excell, see Opp’n at 11–13, had they 

attempted to ascertain Excell’s views before the eleventh hour, they may well have learned 

before the removal deadline that Excell would not consent and that removal was therefore 

futile. 

Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent from 1900, the Ninth Circuit has 

long recognized that “[a]ll defendants must join in a removal petition.” Hewitt v. City of 

Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); Chicago, 

Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 248 (1900); Tri-Cities Newspapers, 

Inc. v. Tri-Cities Printing Pressman & Assistants’ Local 349, 427 F.2d 325, 326–27 (5th 

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Cir.1970)). Admittedly, the consent of all Defendants is lacking here and Plaintiffs timely 

moved to remand. Accordingly, the Court must GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion. See, e.g., 

Sullivan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. C 04-00326 MJJ, 2004 WL 828561, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. Apr. 15, 2004). 

II. Original Jurisdiction

Although the procedural deficiencies in the notice of remand are sufficient to grant 

Plaintiffs’ Motion without reaching the merits of the Parties’ jurisdictional arguments, see 

supra Section I, the Removing Defendants claim that this Court has original jurisdiction 

because Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for violation of the Bane Act is predicated upon 

violation of Plaintiffs rights under “Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution and 

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Const.” Opp’n at 7–8 (quoting Compl. 

¶ 65). The Removing Defendants also note that Plaintiffs seek punitive damages “to make 

an example of Defendants and deter future violations of the Constitution in similar 

circumstances.” Id. at 8 (quoting Compl. Prayer ¶ 2). Plaintiffs counter that “[t]here is 

simply not a federal claim” here because “it is only through the State Bane Act that either 

of th[]e Constitutional provisions are applicable against private actors” and “Plaintiffs 

could not and cannot bring state claims in Federal court unless there is a federal claim.” 

Reply at 3.

The Ninth Circuit held over two decades ago that “[t]he invocation of [a federal 

statute] as a basis for establishing an element of a state law cause of action does not confer 

federal question jurisdiction when the plaintiff also invokes a state constitutional provision 

or a state statute that can and does serve the same purpose.” Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 

80 F.3d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 1996). Although Rains arose in the Title VII context, Rains was 

recently cited by a court in this District to reject an argument similar to that raised by the 

Removing Defendants regarding removal of a complaint on federal question grounds 

because of a Bane Act claim predicated on violations of the California or United States 

Constitution. Estate of Gomez ex rel. Gomez v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 3:18-CV-00868-

GPC-NLS, 2018 WL 3154878, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 28, 2018). The court in Gomez

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remanded the case because “the California Constitution provides an independent basis for 

Defendants’ liability as to the [Bane Act] cause of action,” therefore concluding that “th[e 

Bane Act] claim does not present a substantial federal question.” Id.

The same is true here. Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action for violation of the Bane Act 

could be decided wholly on whether there was a violation of Article I, Section 2 of the 

California Constitution. See Compl. ¶ 65. Further, to the extent it is relevant, Plaintiffs’ 

prayer for punitive damages does not refer specifically to the United States Constitution 

and may, in fact, refer to the California Constitution. See Compl. Prayer ¶ 2. The Court 

therefore concludes that the Removing Defendants have failed to demonstrate that this 

Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. See Gomez, 2018 WL 3154878, at *2

& n.2.

III. Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiffs request that, in the event the Court grants their Motion, they be awarded 

attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $8,000. See Mot. at 5–7; see also Declaration 

of Todd T. Cardiff ¶ 8. Plaintiffs claim that the Removing “Defendants did not have a 

reasonable basis for seeking removal based on the lack of a federal claim . . . [and] the lack 

of consent . . . from Excell.” Mot. at 7. The Removing Defendants, on the other hand, 

argue that they “acted in good faith” because “Plaintiffs filed a verified complaint in state 

court that contained allegations that they were seeking relief for violations of Federal law” 

and the Removing Defendants “attempted, in good faith, to obtain consent from Excell, but 

were unable to do so prior to the deadline for filing the Notice of Removal.” Opp’n at 14.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “[a]n order remanding the case may require 

payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result 

of the removal.” “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under 

§ 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking 

removal.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). 

The Court concludes that there was no objectively reasonable basis for removal here. 

First, it is clear that there was no substantial federal question presented by any of Plaintiffs’ 

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causes of action. Had the Removing Defendants done basic legal research concerning 

removal or remand and the Bane Act, they would have found the Gomez case, decided by 

a court in this District mere months before the Removing Defendants filed their notice of 

removal. In any event, Gomez is premised upon sound Ninth Circuit precedent from 1996. 

Basic legal research would have revealed to the Removing Defendants that their argument 

for subject-matter jurisdiction was not objectively reasonable.

Second, the Removing Defendants failed to secure consent of all Defendants. 

Although the Removing Defendants argue that they acted in “good faith,” their filings 

reveal that they did not attempt to secure Excell’s consent until the very day of their 

deadline to seek removal. In any event, it became clear to the Removing Defendants on 

September 10, 2018, when Excell filed a joint motion with Plaintiffs making clear that 

Excell objected to removal, that the Removing Defendants could not secure the consent of 

all Defendants. Once Plaintiffs timely moved to remand, it was objectively unreasonable 

for the Removing Defendants to oppose the motion.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that there was no objectively reasonable basis for 

the Removing Defendants to remove this action. Plaintiffs’ request for $8,000 in fees, 

representing sixteen hours of work at $500 per hour, is reasonable. The Court therefore 

GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $8,000.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (ECF 

No. 8) and REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of California, County of San 

Diego (ECF No. 1). The Court also GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and 

costs in the amount of $8,000.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 14, 2018

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