Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01215/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01215-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Holly Vesely, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-01215-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 On February 27, 2013, the Court issued an order denying Plaintiff’s appeal of the 

Commissioner’s social security decision. Doc. 18. Plaintiff has filed a motion for 

reconsideration. Doc. 19. She argues that the Court’s finding that the Commissioner’s 

decision was based on substantial evidence is error because the evidence cited by the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) originated outside of the time period for which she 

claimed to meet Listing 1.02A. The Court will deny the motion. 

Motions for reconsideration “are ‘disfavored’ and will be granted only upon a 

showing of ‘manifest error’ or ‘new facts or legal authority that could not have been 

raised earlier with reasonable diligence.’” In re Rosson, 545 F.3d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citation and brackets omitted). Here, Plaintiff claims that Dr. Russo’s opinion – 

submitted after the ALJ issued his opinion – is uncontroverted evidence that Plaintiff met 

the 1.02A listing from May 19, 2008 through July 2009. Because she claims it is 

uncontroverted, Plaintiff argues that it was error for the Court to find that the ALJ’s 

decision was based on substantial evidence. 

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 The ALJ had reason to cite evidence from outside the range of dates mentioned in 

Dr. Russo’s opinion because the scope of the original disability claim was not limited to 

May 2008 through July 2009. Plaintiff wrongly suggests that the ALJ cited no evidence 

from the relevant time period that runs contrary to Dr. Russo’s opinion. As the Court 

observed in its previous order: 

The ALJ noted that the claimant had a right total knee arthroplasty in 2008, and records from her physical therapy sessions for that knee from October 16, 2008, through 

December 29, 2008, show that physical therapy was largely successful. Tr. at 34 (citing Exhibit 33F); see Tr. at 907-16. 

The last note from that series of sessions stated that she had 

made significant progress. Tr. at 916. 

Doc. 18 at 5. Additionally, the ALJ cited a statement by Dr. Russo in which he observed 

that Plaintiff had “done well” with her right knee anthroplasty and notes from physical 

therapy showing that she continued to improve function. Id. at 5-6. 

 Plaintiff states that Dr. Russo’s opinion was corroborated by treatment notes from 

The Center for Pain and Supportive Care. Tr. at 1211-1220.1

 While these notes evidence 

pain, they are not unequivocal evidence that Plaintiff met listing 1.02A. 20 C.F.R. pt. 

404, subpt. P, app.1 § 1.02A (detailing the requirements to meet the listing, including 

gross anatomical deformity and major dysfunction). At one visit in December 2008, 

Plaintiff reported that her pain was under “fair control.” Tr. at 1208. During several 

visits Plaintiff claimed that her ability to perform work activities “had not changed” 

(Tr. at 1208, 1215), and at a September 24, 2008, visit she reported that her ability to 

work had improved (Tr. at 1218). She also stated during a November 11, 2008 visit that 

she participated in biking, cardio, and yoga. Tr. at 1211. Other portions of the notes 

contain evidence that could be used to support a different conclusion, but it is not for this 

court to re-weigh the evidence that was before the ALJ. 

 This case required the Court to consider whether the decision of the ALJ was 

 

1

 Plaintiff refers to paragraph 25 of her “statement of facts” that appears in her opening brief. That paragraph only cites Tr. 1211-1220. The relevant notes from The 

Center for Pain and Supportive Care are in Exhibit 38F and begin at Tr. 1192. The Court considered the notes from the entire exhibit. 

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supported by substantial evidence even after the introduction of the additional evidence 

that the ALJ did not have the opportunity to consider. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 659 

F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff does not argue that the Court has applied the 

wrong legal standard. The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision, adopted as the 

Commissioner’s final decision, was based on “substantial evidence.” Robbins v. Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (“‘Substantial evidence’ means more than 

a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”). 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Doc.19) is denied. 

 Dated this 15th day of March, 2013. 

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