Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06059/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06059-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IRENE THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-06059 WHA

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this social security appeal, this order finds that neither the administrative law judge

nor the Appeals Council erred in the decision to deny benefits to plaintiff. Accordingly,

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and defendant’s cross-motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED.

SUMMARY

Plaintiff asserts she was wrongly denied benefits due to the ALJ’s failure to

(i) accurately reflect the medical evidence; (ii) properly evaluate her reported cervical neck

strain as a severe impairment; (iii) properly credit her testimony; (iv) properly assess her

residual functional capacity; and (v) pose a legally adequate hypothetical to the vocational

expert. As detailed in this order, and summarized below, plaintiff is mistaken that the ALJ

erred in these respects.

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As to the reflection of medical evidence, the ALJ need not discuss every piece of

evidence in interpreting and developing the record. Nonetheless, the ALJ did discuss the

opinions of the physicians cited by plaintiff. Furthermore, these opinions were consistent with

the ALJ’s ultimate determination that plaintiff could not perform her past work. Finally, with

respect to the opinions issued in August 2002, even had the ALJ accorded them little weight,

he would have been justified in so doing as they predated plaintiff’s alleged onset date of

disability.

As to the neck pain, that plaintiff reported the impairment does not mean the ALJ had

to find it severe. Instead, the burden was on plaintiff to prove medically-severe impairments

substantially limiting her ability to work. Moreover, in evaluating plaintiff’s proffered proof,

the ALJ need not have accepted any physician’s opinion, regardless of whether it was

contradicted. Here, the ALJ assessed plaintiff’s subjective reports and her physician’s opinions

and cited substantial evidence to support his conclusion that the reported functional limitations

were at most de minimis.

As to the subjective testimony, the ALJ is responsible for determinations of credibility;

thus, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s

decision must be upheld. Here, the ALJ properly gave specific, clear and convincing reasons

for rejecting plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms. It was within the ALJ’s authority to

interpret this evidence as grounds for discrediting plaintiff’s testimony of subjective symptoms. 

As to the residual functional capacity, plaintiff asserts the ALJ ignored her need for

periodic breaks, the limitations imposed by her neck pain, and her subjective testimony. 

Regarding the periodic breaks, this need is not inconsistent with any job. Regarding the neck

pain and subjective testimony, because the ALJ appropriately found the neck pain non-severe

and articulated specific, clear and convincing reasons for discrediting the subjective testimony,

he need not have included either in his analysis of plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.

As to the hypothetical, because it included all of the limitations that the ALJ found

credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record, it was properly posed. Further, that

plaintiff is of limited English proficiency is inconsistent with neither the vocational expert’s

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conclusions nor the ALJ’s ultimate determination in reliance thereon. Lastly, contrary to

plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ did direct the vocational expert to alert him when giving titles of

jobs that conflicted with those in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the vocational expert

acted accordingly.

STATEMENT

1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

On January 22, 2004, plaintiff Irene Thomas applied for disability insurance benefits,

alleging an onset of disability since September 23, 2002, due to bilateral carpal tunnel

syndrome, wrist tendinitis de Quervain’s tenosynovitis, and bilateral, lateral medial epicondylitis

(AR 70–72, 108). Plaintiff was insured through at least December 31, 2007 (id. at 20, 91–92). 

Her application was denied both initially (id. at 29–32) and upon reconsideration (id. at 34–39). 

An administrative hearing was timely requested (id. at 40).

On January 9, 2006, plaintiff had a hearing before ALJ Steven B. Berlin (id. at 547–75). 

The ALJ rendered a decision on July 21, 2006, finding plaintiff was not disabled (id. at 16–24). 

Plaintiff requested administrative review (id. at 14–15). The Appeals Council denied the

request (id. at 5–7). Plaintiff filed this action on May 6, 2008, seeking judicial review pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. 405(g). The parties now make cross-motions for summary judgment.

2. TESTIMONY AT THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING.

Before the ALJ, plaintiff testified with the assistance of interpreter, Eduardo Cabrera

(id. at 549). Plaintiff stated she last worked in September 2002 at Fidelity National

Management where she sorted documents (id. at 552–53). This was when her physical

problems began. At first, plaintiff explained, her thumb was nearly stiff. Then, she could no

longer move it. Plaintiff reported the disability to her employer and her employer sent her to

a doctor. The doctor gave her an injection (id. at 558). The doctor also told plaintiff to rest

every hour. Plaintiff noted this meant she should work for 45 minutes then rest for 15 minutes

(id. at 564). Plaintiff did so for three months (id. at 558, 564). She then told Fidelity National

Management she was unable to continue (id. at 558) because she could no longer move her left

thumb (id. at 555). 

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Earlier, plaintiff worked at St. Michael Convalescent Hospital where she served food

in the kitchen and washed clothes (ibid.). Plaintiff also worked at the convalescent hospital,

Vintage Estates of Hayward, found work through the employment agency, Spectrum Personnel,

worked at a printing press, Treasure Chest Advertising, and was a jewelry packer for a short

time (id. at 555–57, 566–67). 

Plaintiff testified that she underwent three surgeries, the first for her left-hand carpal

tunnel syndrome, the second for her right-hand carpal tunnel syndrome, and the third for her

thumb (id. at 558–59). Plaintiff said she was also treated with physical therapy and acupuncture

(id. at 559). Plaintiff stated she was not doing better at the time of the hearing and that pain

continued in her hands and neck (id. at 559–60). She said she could do everything but the pain

in her hands was always there (id. at 560).

Plaintiff testified that on a normal day, she would get up, take a shower, prepare her food,

and have breakfast (ibid.). She would go out for a short walk lasting about an hour (id. at 560,

563). Plaintiff would do the therapy recommended by the doctor (id. at 560). She did exercises

for her hands in the morning, afternoon, and night (id. at 565). She used “machines, electrodes”

three times a day for fifteen-to-twenty minute intervals (id. at 560, 565). At night, plaintiff used

an ice pack on her neck (id. at 560). 

Plaintiff testified that she went grocery shopping with her husband, that her husband

helped her to prepare the food, and that she and her husband did the laundry together (id. at 561). 

Plaintiff stated she used her computer very little, but only to read emails and write seven or

eight lines in reply (id. at 562).

Plaintiff testified that she used Carisoprodol to relax her muscles and Ibuprofen as an

anti-inflammatory (ibid.). The drugs helped a little, but sometimes made her stomach hurt

and Carisoprodol made her sleepy (id. at 562–63). Plaintiff said the surgery on her left hand

helped at first, but it had been two years and the pain was still there. The same was true of

her right hand. Her thumb, though, was better and she was able to move it (id. at 563). 

Plaintiff indicated her neck pain was the worst problem she had, at the time of the hearing (id.

at 560). Plaintiff said her hands were hurting as the hearing was being conducted (id. at 564).

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Vocational expert, Malcolm Brodzinsky, also testified at the hearing. In response to

hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ, he concluded plaintiff could not perform any of her

past work, but that should could perform other jobs existing in the local and national economies. 

Specifically, she could work as a machine tender in textiles (id. at 572–73).

3. MEDICAL EVIDENCE.

The medical evidence was summarized in the ALJ’s decision (id. at 19–24). This order

will also briefly review both plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms and the findings of each

physician who examined her.

From July through October 2002, plaintiff was treated by Medical Express Family

Practice (id. at 159–73). She was prescribed Lodine for pain in her left thumb, left thumb

tendinitis, and first metacarpal arthritis (id. at 160–73).

On August 12, plaintiff went to the East Bay Hand Medical Center and was examined

by Dr. Andrew J. Stein, M.D. (id. at 147–50). Dr. Stein’s impression was bilateral carpal tunnel

syndrome, left trigger thumb, and nonindustrial cervical spondylosis (id. at 149). He advised

plaintiff she could work with restrictions of no lifting over five pounds, no repetitive forceful

pinching, gripping or torquing with either arm, frequent breaks, and data entry and handwriting

limited to four hours per day (id. at 150). On August 16, Dr. Stein administered a thumb

injection which relieved plaintiff’s pain, though triggering continued. Testing showed

moderately severe bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (id. at 147). 

On August 27, plaintiff went to The Rhodes-Jacobs Chiropractic Corporation and was

examined by Dr. Ruben Amezquita, D.C. (id. at 151–58). Dr. Amezquita diagnosed plaintiff

as having cervical IVD displacement without myelopathy and sprain/strain of the cervical

spine, right shoulder, and left thumb, elbow, and shoulder (id. at 157). He felt plaintiff was

temporarily totally disabled but he was unable to comment regarding permanent residual

disability (id. at 158). 

On September 9, plaintiff consulted Dr. Eduardo Lin, M.D. (id. at 183–88). Dr. Lin

conducted an electromyogram study which confirmed Dr. Stein’s finding of bilateral carpal

tunnel syndrome (id. at 188). 

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On September 10, plaintiff returned to The Rhodes-Jacobs Chiropractic Corporation

and was treated by Dr. Randolph Paul Rhodes, D.C. (id. at 226). Plaintiff continued to receive

chiropractic care at this facility through January 2005 (id. at 189–30, 340–66).

On October 5, plaintiff underwent magnetic-resonance imaging of her cervical spine at

the University of California at San Francisco Medical Center (id. at 231–34). The results

showed mild degenerative disc disease (id. at 233).

On November 22, plaintiff returned to the office of Dr. Lin (id. at 180–82). Dr. Lin’s

examination found decreased cervical range of motion, tenderness to palpitation of multiple

body sites including the elbows, writs and hands, positive Tinel, Phalen, and Tinkelstein tests,

and medial and lateral epicodylar areas tender to palpation. He wrote that further treatment

would be aggressive but conservative in nature. He prescribed Vioxx for inflammation and

pain, and Ultracet for more severe pain. He recommended acupuncture, trigger point injection,

and a thumb spica splint and wrist brace.

Dr. Lin saw plaintiff again on December 23 (id. at 178–79) and February 14 (id. at

175–77). In December, Dr. Lin diagnosed repetitive strain injury with bilateral carpal tunnel

syndrome, De Quervain tenosynovitis, and lateral and medial epicondylitis. In February, Dr. Lin

diagnosed repetitive strain injury with myofascial pain syndrome, bilateral carpal tunnel

syndrome, and lateral and medial epicondylitis. His records indicate plaintiff continued to take

Vioxx and Ultracet in conjunction with chiropractic management.

In May 2003, plaintiff underwent a consultation by Dr. Mathias Masem, M.D. (id. at

316–18). Dr. Masem’s impression was bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, bilateral wrist and

forearm flexor tenosynovitis, bilateral elbow lateral epicondylitis and radial tunnel syndrome,

and cervical strain (id. at 317). In November, Dr. Masem performed a left carpal tunnel and

thumb flexor decompression. Dr. Masem’s January 2004 records indicate plaintiff was healing

well postoperatively, with residual symptoms and compensatory overuse in the right upper

extremity (id. at 310). 

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From December 2003 through February 2004, plaintiff underwent hand therapy at

NovaCare Rehabilitation (id. at 239-79). At the time of discharge, plaintiff was progressing

toward treatment goals (id. at 249). 

In April 2004, plaintiff was seen by consultative examiner Dr. Michael Murray, M.D.

(id. at 235-38). Dr. Murray found positive Phalen’s and compression tests and limited plaintiff

to no excessive pulling, overhead activities, or prolonged repetitive activities, no lifting over

twenty pounds, and no standing or walking over six hours (id. at 238).

In May 2004, Dr. Masem performed right carpal tunnel decompression and application

of pain-control electrodes. Dr. Masem’s pre and post-operative diagnoses were right carpel

tunnel syndrome (id. at 292). 

In June 2004, plaintiff resumed physical therapy at NovaCare (id. at 240–42). The final

treatment status report issued the following month indicates plaintiff had demonstrated progress

with her grip strength and range of motion, but that she fatigued very easily (id. at 241).

In June and July 2004, Dr. Masem’s records indicate plaintiff was healing well

postoperatively (id. at 288, 282). His September records found full range of motion of the

cervix and of the hand and wrist, apart from pain with left lateral bending and rotation to the

right, tightness in the right upper trapezius, crepitus with motion of the shoulder, and pain with

full forward elevation and with supraspinatus loading (id. at 388). His October examination

found minimal tenderness over the A1 pulley of the flexors, with no crepitation and full motion,

very slight bilateral palmar wrist tenderness and full hand and wrist motion, cervical pain with

lateral bending and tenderness over the trapezius bilaterally (id. at 386). He noted plaintiff’s

pain level did not correspond to her physical examination with the exception perhaps of her

neck. He recommended plaintiff seek the services of a pain management doctor (id. at 387). 

In November, Dr. Masem diagnosed plaintiff as residually symptomatic and injected

plaintiff with Corticosteroid with some relief of her symptoms (id. at 384). In December,

Dr. Masem found tenderness over the A1 pulley of the right thumb and actual locking of the

thumb interphalangeal joint with thumb flexion, slight bilateral palmar wrist tenderness and full

hand and wrist motion, persistent cervical spine pain with lateral bending and tenderness over

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the trapezius bilaterally (id. at 382). In January, Dr. Masem diagnosed plaintiff as residually

symptomatic from right thumb flexor tenosynovitis (id. at 380). In March, Dr. Masem

performed a right thumb flexor decompression and application of pain control electrodes (id. at

376). In April, plaintiff resumed physical therapy at the request of Dr. Masem. She continued

the therapy through August 2005 (id. at 391–27).

In May 2005, Dr. Masem diagnosed plaintiff with flare-up of bilateral wrist tendonitis,

with improved thumb motion (id. at 373). Three weeks later he found plaintiff was healing well

postoperatively with exacerbation of cervical spine complaints (id. at 372). In June, Dr. Masem

noted plaintiff was progressing well with residual neck pain (id. at 371, 395). She experienced

pain only upon lifting heavy objects and was able to perform most tasks in her home (id. at 452,

473). Dr Masem rendered a final examination of plaintiff in August, describing her condition

as medically stable and precluding bilateral repetitive manipulation only (id. at 368–70).

In September 2005, Dr. Stephen Dell, M.D. prepared a “Qualified Medical Examiner

Report” (id. at 508–26). He diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome status post

decompression, right thumb base deformity (possibly de Quervain’s) status post decompression,

and cervical radiculopathy and strain/sprain on findings of mildly positive Phalen’s and Tinel’s

signs and decreased range of motion in the neck. Dr. Dell also found plaintiff’s pinch and grip

strength were within normal limits. He concluded that, while plaintiff could not perform her

past job, she was a “medically feasible candidate” for vocational rehabilitation with an ability to

perform work not involving repetitive manipulation with either hand, repetitive use of the arms,

heavy work, twisting, torquing, or repetitive wrist motions, or work at or above shoulder level

with the right upper extremity.

4. THE ALJ’S ANALYSIS.

An ALJ evaluates disability claims using a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. In the

first four steps, the burden of proof lies with the claimant. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1040 (9th Cir. 1995). Based upon the claimant’s proffered proof, the ALJ must determine: 

(i) whether the claimant is working; (ii) the medical severity and duration of the claimant’s

impairment; (iii) whether the disability meets any of those listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P,

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Regulations No. 4; and (iv) whether the claimant is capable of performing his or her previous

job. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(iv). In step five, “the burden shifts to the Secretary to show

that the claimant can engage in other types of substantial gainful work that exists in the national

economy.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040. This last step involves a determination of whether the

claimant is capable of making an adjustment to other work. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the

ALJ chooses to use a vocational expert to make this determination, hypothetical questions asked

“must ‘set out all of the claimant’s impairments.’” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 (9th Cir.

2001) (internal citation omitted).

Here, the ALJ found at step one of the sequential evaluation process that plaintiff had

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of September 23, 2002

(AR 20). At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff suffered from medically determinable

impairments, diagnosed as “bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (status post bilateral decompression

surgeries), repetitive stress injury, and right thumb de Quervain’s tenosynovitis (status post

surgery).” The ALJ found such impairments to be “severe” (ibid.). The ALJ found plaintiff’s

reports of pain and diminished range of motion in her neck to be non-severe (id. at 20 n.1). 

At step three, the ALJ found that none of plaintiff’s impairments, considered separately or

cumulatively, met or equaled any of the impairments listed in the Social Security regulations

(id. at 20). 

The ALJ next determined plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, finding that at all

relevant times she retained the capacity to lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten

pounds frequently, stand or walk six hours of an eight-hour workday with normal breaks, do

no more than frequent overhead reaching or handling, do no repetitive movement with either

upper extremity, and do no more than frequent pushing and pulling (id. at 21). At step four,

the ALJ found plaintiff was precluded from performing her past relevant work by her medically

determinable impairments (id. at 24). At step five, the ALJ found plaintiff was able to perform

work existing in significant numbers in the local and national economies, as delineated by the

vocational expert in his testimony at the administrative hearing (id. at 22–23). Accordingly, the

ALJ found plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (id. at 23).

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Plaintiff now argues the ALJ failed to: (i) accurately reflect the medical evidence;

(ii) properly evaluate her reported cervical neck strain as a severe impairment; (iii) properly

credit her testimony; (iv) properly assess her residual functional capacity; and (v) pose a legally

adequate hypothetical to the vocational expert.

ANALYSIS

A decision denying disability benefits must be upheld if it is supported by substantial

evidence and free of legal error. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. Substantial evidence is “more than

a scintilla,” but “less than a preponderance.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir.

1996). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Ibid. The Court must “review the administrative record as a whole,

weighing both the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” 

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving

conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities;” thus, where the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the decision of the ALJ must be upheld. 

Ibid.

For the following reasons, this order finds that neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council

erred in the decision to deny benefits to plaintiff.

1. THE ALJ ACCURATELY REFLECTED THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE.

Plaintiff maintains the ALJ failed to accurately reflect the medical evidence including

the opinions of her treating and examining physicians. Specifically, plaintiff contends the ALJ

failed to reflect: Dr. Stein’s August 2002 opinions regarding plaintiff’s residual functional

capacity; Dr. Amezquita’s August 2002 determination that plaintiff was temporarily totally

disabled; Dr. Lin’s November 2002 request that plaintiff wear a thumb splint and wrist brace;

Dr. Masem’s May 2003 opinion that plaintiff’s condition had not responded to conservative

treatment and that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome would not improve without surgery;

Dr. Murray’s April 2004 opinion that plaintiff needed breaks every two hours in an eight-hour

work day, and; Dr. Dell’s September 2005 finding that plaintiff was precluded from repetitive

neck motions.

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Plaintiff’s assertion of error on these counts lacks merit. First, in interpreting the

evidence and developing the record the ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence. 

Howard ex rel. Wolff v. BARNHART, 341 F.3d at 1012. Second, the ALJ did discuss the

opinions of these physicians. He cited to, inter alia, Exhibits 1F, 2F, 4F, 75, 9F, and 14F of the

administrative record issued, respectively, by Dr. Stein in August 2002, Dr. Amezquita in

August 2002, Dr. Lin between September 2002 and February 2003, Dr. Murray in April 2004,

Dr. Masem between May 2003 and August 2004, and Dr. Dell in September 2005. Third, the

opinions of these physicians were consistent with the ALJ’s ultimate determination that plaintiff

could not perform her past work. Fourth, with respect to the August 2002 opinions of Dr. Stein

and Dr. Amezquita, even had the ALJ accorded them little weight, he would have been justified

in so doing as they predated plaintiff’s alleged onset date of disability. The ALJ did not err in

his reflection of the medical evidence.

2. THE ALJ PROPERLY ASSESSED PLAINTIFF’S 

REPORTED NECK IMPAIRMENT.

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her reported cervical neck strain as

a severe impairment. In support of this assertion, plaintiff cites several portions of her medical

records assessing her reported neck and shoulder pain. For example, plaintiff contends: 

“Dr Stein stated that any overhead work, reaching at or above chest height, awkward neck

movements, or sustained overhead work with lifting, would aggravate and accelerates symptoms

of cervical spondylosis” (Br. 21). This is a mischaracterization of the record. In fact, Dr. Stein

wrote that plaintiff complained of arm and neck pain, that cervical spondylosis had not been

documented but would, in any event, be considered nonindustrial and, moreover, that plaintiff’s

job did not “involve any overhead work, reaching at or above chest height, awkward neck

movements, or sustained overhead work with lifting, which could aggravate or accelerate

symptoms of cervical spondylosis” (AR 149).

That plaintiff alleged a neck impairment does not mean the ALJ had to find it severe. 

Instead, the burden was on plaintiff to prove medically-severe impairments substantially limiting

her ability to work. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040. Furthermore, in evaluating plaintiff’s proffered

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proof, the ALJ need not have accepted any physician’s opinion, regardless of whether it was

contradicted. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, the ALJ assessed plaintiff’s subjective reports and her physician’s opinions and

cited substantial evidence to support his conclusion that the claimed functional limitations were

at most de minimis. In particular, the ALJ acknowledged plaintiff’s reported neck pain and

diminished range of motion, but noted that a magnetic resonance imaging of plaintiff’s cervical

spine in October 2002 showed only mild degenerative disc disease, an examination of plaintiff’s

cervical degenerative disc disease in April 2002 again showed it to be only mild and without

radiculopathy, and a diagnosis in September 2005 found plaintiff’s strain or sprain would cause

no limitations on work. The ALJ did not err in his finding at step two of the sequential

evaluation process.

3. THE ALJ’S DISCOUNTING OF PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY 

HAD A LEGITIMATE BASIS.

Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s conclusion that he could accord little weight to her

report of subjectively experienced symptoms. Plaintiff asserts the ALJ reached this conclusion

without a legitimate basis. Plaintiff is mistaken. 

In rejecting a plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms, the ALJ must give specific,

clear and convincing reasons. Thomas v. BARNHART, 278 F. 3d 947, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The ALJ is responsible for determinations of credibility; thus, where the evidence is susceptible

to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld. Andrews, 53 F.3d

at 1039. 

In support of his finding that plaintiff’s testimony was not fully credible, the ALJ pointed

to the following evidence: treating physician Dr. Masem’s express finding in November 2004

that plaintiff’s reported subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective findings;

medical records indicating plaintiff recovered quickly from each surgery, was able to tolerate

pain with relatively minor medications, and experienced only limited periods of decreased grip

strength; and plaintiff’s acknowledgment at the administrative hearing that she no long had

thumb symptoms and engaged in activities including cooking, computer keyboarding and, with

her husband’s assistance, grocery shopping and laundry (AR 22). It was within the ALJ’s

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authority to interpret this evidence as grounds for discrediting plaintiff’s testimony of subjective

symptoms. He did not err in so doing.

4. THE ALJ PROPERLY ASSESSED PLAINTIFF’S 

RESIDUAL FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY.

Plaintiff asserts that in determining her residual functional capacity, the ALJ ignored

crucial limitations assessed by her treating and examining physicians including her need for

breaks every two hours of an eight-hour workday and her inability to perform work requiring

repetitive motions of the neck. She maintains the ALJ also rejected her testimony regarding

her chronic pain, manipulative limitations, and therapeutic need to use “machines, electrodes”

three times a day for fifteen-to-twenty minute intervals and to perform hand exercises

throughout the day. 

Regarding plaintiff’s need for periodic rest breaks, this is not inconsistent with any job. 

As noted by defendant, Social Security Ruling 96-9p provides that “[i]n order to perform a

full range of sedentary work, an individual must be able to remain in a seated position for

approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday, with a morning break, a lunch period, and an

afternoon break at approximately 2-hour intervals.” Regarding plaintiff’s reported neck

problems, the ALJ did not ignore these limitations. Rather, as discussed above, the ALJ

appropriately found at step two that they did not constitute a medically determinable severe

impairment. Regarding plaintiff’s subjective testimony, the ALJ did not improperly reject

plaintiff’s accounts. Rather, as noted earlier, the ALJ articulated specific, clear and convincing

reasons for discrediting plaintiff’s accounts and acted within his authority to interpret the

evidence as grounds for so doing. Failing to include these limitations in the analysis of

plaintiff’s residual functional capacity was not error.

5. THE ALJ POSED A LEGALLY ADEQUATE HYPOTHETICAL.

Plaintiff contends that the hypothetical posed by the ALJ to the vocational expert

was faulty, that the vocational expert’s answers were hence of no evidentiary value and that,

therefore, the ALJ’s ultimate determination that she was not disabled was in error. Plaintiff

grounds her contention on an assertion that the hypothetical omitted plaintiff’s need for periodic

breaks, her neck pain, and her chronic pain impacting her ability to perform sustained work

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activity. Just as the omission of these limitations in the analysis of plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity was not in error, their omission from the hypothetical was likewise proper. 

In hypotheticals posed to a vocational expert the ALJ must only include those limitations

supported by substantial evidence. Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir.

2006). Because the ALJ’s hypothetical included all of the limitations that he found credible

and supported by substantial evidence in the record, the hypothetical was properly posed.

Plaintiff also faults the ALJ for “avoiding the problem” of plaintiff’s limited English

by finding her to be “moderately fluent” (Br. 29). This finding, however, was inconsistent

with neither the vocational expert’s testimony nor the ALJ’s ultimate determination in reliance

thereon. Plaintiff testified to her ability to read and write only some English words (AR 553). 

The vocational expert thus stated plaintiff was “monolingual” and unable to “deal with the

public” (id. at 572). The vocational expert factored this stated limitation into his answer to the

final hypothetical. The ALJ relied upon this answer in finding jobs available to plaintiff in the

local and national economies. 

Lastly, plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred by failing to inquire of the vocational expert

whether his testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. This assertion is

inaccurate. In fact, the ALJ directed the vocational expert to alert him when giving titles of

jobs that conflicted with those in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (id. at 567). That the

vocational expert followed this instruction is evidenced by his qualification of plaintiff’s ability

to perform certain jobs with the phrase “but not the way it’s performed in the DOT” (id. at 569).

The ALJ’s questioning of and reliance upon the vocational expert were not in error.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and

defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered

accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 2, 2008. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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