Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01310/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01310-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 05:0552fi Freedom of Information Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID SCOTT HARRISON,

Plaintiff,

v.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEYS,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16-CV-1310 JLS (BGS)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

RENEWED MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(ECF No. 21)

Presently before the Court is Defendant Executive Office for United States 

Attorneys’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. (“Renewed MSJ,” ECF No. 21.) 

Also before the Court are Plaintiff David Scott Harrison’s Response in Opposition to 

Defendant’s Renewed MSJ, (“Renewed MSJ Opp’n,” ECF No. 23), and Defendant’s Reply 

in Support of its Renewed MSJ, (“Renewed MSJ Reply,” ECF No. 24). The Court vacated 

the hearing on the matter and took it under submission pursuant to Civil Local Rule 

7.1(d)(1). (ECF No. 25.) After considering the parties’ arguments and the law, the Court 

GRANTS Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for improper withholding of public documents, 

records, and writings pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).1(See 

generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) On February 10, 2015, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Judge Larry 

A. Burns. (Id. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) The letter addressed Plaintiff’s belief that his federal conviction 

was invalid, and Plaintiff sent a copy of this letter to the Office of the United States 

Attorney, Southern District of California, San Diego County Office. (Id.) On March 10, 

2015, Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Michael G. Wheat responded to the 

letter, noting that Plaintiff’s letter to Judge Burns served “no legitimate purpose” and that 

Plaintiff has a long “history of engaging in various forms of harassing and threatening 

communications.” (Id. Ex. B.) Wheat concluded the letter by stating that he was “sending 

a copy of [Plaintiff’s] letter and this response to the appropriate investigative agencies so 

that they are aware of, and can monitor your activities.” (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) Plaintiff responded 

to Mr. Wheat’s letter by asserting that he would file a FOIA request “concerning acts you 

claim in your letter to have taken against me” and that he would contact United States 

Attorney Laura E. Duffy concerning the same. (Id. ¶ 5, Exs. C, D.) Plaintiff filed his FOIA 

request with Duffy, requesting four categories of records. (Id. ¶ 6, Ex. E.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff requested

all records, documents, information, writings, and tangible 

things, including electronically stored and/or transmitted:

1. that identify each and every one of the “appropriate 

investigative agencies” suggested in the March 10, 2015, 

letter; provide also street addresses;

2. that identify each and every other agency that was provided 

information about me due to my letter of February 10, 2015 

 

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5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.

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(copy attached), as addressed to Judge, Larry A. Burns; 

provide also street addresses;

3. that identify each and every law enforcement agent, non-law 

enforcement and other persons, department/agency 

employees, heads, functionaries, office holders, officials, 

public servants, and all other persons and citizens, to whom 

were sent information, at the identified agencies (see, #1 and 

#2, above) and to any other location; identify also, the agency 

and location each identified individual is attached to; provide 

also the street address for each identified individual; and

4. from November 14, 1988 through March 10, 2015, provide 

copies of all “harassing and threatening 

communications, . . . vexing, harassing, or threatening 

letters[]” suggested by the March 10, 2015, letter that I have 

ever sent. Identify in each communication and/or letter the 

offending part, and identify to whom, and the address sent to, 

of any communication and/or letter I am accused of sending.

(Id. Ex. E.2)

On March 30, 2015, Plaintiff was notified that his FOIA request had been rerouted 

to the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit at the Executive Office for United States 

Attorneys (“EOUSA”) in Washington, D.C. (Id. ¶ 7, Ex. F.)

On April 9, 2015, the EOUSA rejected Plaintiff’s FOIA request, finding that “[t]he 

Freedom of Information Act only applies to records already in existence and does not 

require an agency to conduct research, create new records, or answer questions presented 

as FOIA requests.” (Id. ¶ 8, Ex. G.) Plaintiff appealed the denial of his FOIA request to the 

Director, Office of Information Policy on April 16, 2015. (Id. ¶ 9, Ex. H.) On August 31, 

2015, the Office of Information Policy affirmed, on partly modified grounds, the denial. 

 

2 As Defendant notes, Plaintiff “abandoned request number 4 in correspondence with EOUSA.” (Renewed 

MSJ 6 n.2 (citing Compl. Ex. M, at 2).) Thus, Defendant did not search for responsive documents for 

request number 4. (Id.)

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(Id. ¶ 10, Ex. I.) The letter suggested contacting the Office of Government Information 

Services (“OGIS”) for mediation services to resolve FOIA disputes as a non-exclusive 

alternative to litigation. (Id.) On September 16, 2015, Plaintiff wrote to the OGIS for help 

resolving the dispute. (Id. ¶ 10, Ex. J.) But on October 7, 2015, Plaintiff received a letter 

from the EOUSA notifying him of its receipt of his “Freedom of Information Act/-Privacy 

Act request dated September 16, 2015.” (Id. ¶ 12, Ex. K.) And on October 8, 2015, the 

OGIS notified Plaintiff of receiving his request for mediation services. (Id. ¶ 13, Ex. L.) 

On October 30, 2015, Plaintiff notified the OGIS that the EOUSA was processing the FOIA 

request, and thus Plaintiff no longer needed mediation services. (Id. ¶ 15, Ex. N.)

On November 16, 2015, the EOUSA informed Plaintiff that “[a] search for records 

located in the United States Attorney’s Office(s) for the Southern District of California has 

revealed no responsive records regarding the above subject.” (Id. ¶ 16, Ex. O (emphasis in 

original).) Plaintiff appealed this decision on November 21, 2015. (Id. ¶ 17, Ex. P.) The 

Office of Information Policy affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s FOIA request on January 6, 

2016, and again offered mediation services through the OGIS. (Id. ¶ 18, Ex. Q.) On January 

15, 2016, Plaintiff again sought mediation services through the OGIS. (Id. ¶ 19, Ex. R.) 

And on April 14, 2016, the OGIS informed Plaintiff that the “EOUSA confirmed the field 

office completed a search and determined there were not responsive records.” (Id. ¶ 20, Ex. 

S.) 

Plaintiff filed this FOIA case against Defendant on May 31, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) 

Defendant answered on September 28, 2016. (ECF No. 8.) Defendant filed its original MSJ 

on November 3, 2016. (ECF No. 11.) On March 30, 2017, the Court denied Defendant’s 

original MSJ on the grounds that Defendant failed to conduct an adequate search in 

response to Plaintiff’s FOIA requests. (See generally “MSJ Order,” ECF No. 20.)

Specifically, the Court found inadequate (1) a single phone call to the target of the FOIA 

request asking for responsive documents and (2) a conclusory statement that there were no 

other searches that could possibly yield responsive documents. (Id.)

/ / /

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Defendant filed its Renewed MSJ on April 28, 2017, attaching a declaration in 

support of its argument that it has conducted an adequate search. (ECF No. 21.) The Court 

now considers this Renewed MSJ and the supporting evidence.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a party may move for summary 

judgment as to a claim or defense or part of a claim or defense. Summary judgment is 

appropriate where the Court is satisfied that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect 

the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

genuine dispute of material fact exists only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. When the Court considers the evidence

presented by the parties, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all 

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls 

on the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party may meet this burden by 

identifying the “portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’” that show an absence of dispute 

regarding a material fact. Id. When a party seeks summary judgment as to an element for 

which it bears the burden of proof, “it must come forward with evidence which would 

entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” See C.A.R. 

Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Once the moving party satisfies this initial burden, the nonmoving party must 

identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

324. This requires “more than simply show[ing] that there is some metaphysical doubt as 

to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 

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586 (1986). Rather, to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “by her own 

affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ 

designate ‘specific facts’” that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for 

the non-moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by “rest[ing] 

on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

II. Summary Judgment in FOIA Cases

“The Freedom of Information Act was enacted to facilitate public access to 

Government documents.” U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991). The 

purpose of the Act is “‘to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency 

action to the light of public scrutiny.’” Id. (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 

352, 361 (1976)). “Consistently with this purpose, as well as the plain language of the Act, 

the strong presumption in favor of disclosure places the burden on the agency to justify the 

withholding of any requested documents.” Id.

Courts faced with a motion for summary judgment in a FOIA case generally must 

conduct a two-step inquiry. Berman v. CIA, 501 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007). The first 

step assesses whether the agency involved met its investigative obligations under FOIA. 

Zemansky v. U.S. EPA, 767 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1985). An agency can prove that it met 

its obligations by showing that it conducted a search “reasonably calculated” to uncover 

all relevant documents requested under FOIA. Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 797 F.3d 

759, 770 (9th Cir. 2015). “An agency can demonstrate the adequacy of its search through 

reasonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good faith.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Affidavits submitted by an agency to demonstrate the adequacy 

of its response are presumed to be in good faith.” Id. (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. 

v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). “In evaluating the adequacy of the search, the 

issue ‘is not whether there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the 

request, but rather whether the search for those documents was adequate.’” Id. (emphasis 

in original) (quoting Lahr v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 987 (9th Cir. 2009)).

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The second step requires the court to consider whether the agency has adequately 

demonstrated that any information not disclosed to the FOIA requester is protected by at 

least one of the enumerated exemptions. Id. at 769. 

“Summary judgment is the procedural vehicle by which nearly all FOIA cases are 

resolved.” Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1094 (C.D. 

Cal. 2005) (quotations omitted). “In order to prevail on summary judgment, the agency 

must prove ‘it has fully discharged [its burdens] under FOIA, after the underlying facts and 

the inferences to be drawn from them are construed in the light most favorable to the FOIA 

requester.’” Id. (quoting Miller v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1382 (8th Cir. 1985)).

“Courts are permitted to rule on summary judgment in FOIA cases solely on the basis of 

government affidavits describing the documents sought.” Lion Raisins v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Animal Legal 

Def. Fund v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 836 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2016). “[I]f there are 

genuine issues of material fact in a FOIA case, the district court should proceed to a bench 

trial or adversary hearing. Resolution of factual disputes should be through the usual 

crucible of bench trial or hearing, with evidence subject to scrutiny and witnesses subject 

to cross-examination. The district court must issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.” 

Animal Legal Def. Fund, 836 F.3d at 990 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

In light of the Court’s previous Order, Defendant conducted additional search efforts 

that it now contends are adequate. (Renewed MSJ 7 (citing Supp. Decl. of Katherine L. 

Parker (“Supp. Parker Decl.”), ECF No. 21-2).) Defendant’s search efforts did not yield 

any responsive documents. (Id.) Thus, Defendant argues that summary judgment should 

be granted in its favor. (Id.) 

This time the Court agrees. Ms. Parker, the AUSA with primary responsibility for 

handling this FOIA litigation, (Supp. Parker Decl. ¶ 1), explains her additional efforts as 

follows:

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10. Following the Court’s March 30, 2017 Order, I engaged in

additional efforts to determine whether my office maintains any 

records responsive to Plaintiff David Scott Harrison’s FOIA 

request.

11. For example, on April 11, 2017, I met with AUSA Michael 

Wheat in my office. Mr. Wheat and I discussed Mr. Harrison’s 

FOIA request, to discuss what additional searches might yield 

responsive documents.

12. During my April 11, 2017 conversation with Mr. Wheat, I 

inquired whether Mr. Wheat had forwarded Mr. Harrison’s letter 

to any other employees of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. He stated 

that he had not. I therefore determined that reaching out to other 

employees of my office would not be likely to yield responsive 

documents. Nevertheless, on April 24, 2017, I emailed every 

employee of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, asking if anyone had or

was aware of communications between the USAO and 

investigative agencies regarding David Scott Harrison from 

February 2015 to the present. I received only two responses, both 

from individuals who do not have any responsive documents. A 

true and correct copy of my office-wide email is attached to this

declaration as Exhibit A.

13. During my April 11, 2017 conversation with Mr. Wheat, I 

also inquired whether he had opened a case file related to 

Harrison’s February 10, 2015 letter to Judge Burns, or his own 

March 10, 2015 letter to Harrison. He told me that he had not. 

Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, I coordinated a search 

for responsive documents in my office’s case files. Case files in 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office are tracked in a database called 

LIONS. Each case is given a USAO case number, which is 

different from the Court’s case numbering system. The USAO 

case number begins with the four-digit year in which the case file 

was opened, and the USAO number contains the letter “V” for 

civil cases and the letter “R” for criminal cases. Case files are

searchable by the name of an individual who is the plaintiff, 

defendant, or target.

14. On April 24, 2017, I requested that Sr. Docket Specialist 

Mary Wiggins search the entire LIONS database using Plaintiff’s 

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name. She then explained to me that she had conducted that 

search using the first name “David” and last name “Harrison,” 

and there were 10 responsive files. Reviewing the list of files, I 

determined that most of them related to previous civil suits that 

Mr. Harrison had filed against federal employees and agencies.

Ms. Wiggins, who maintains all case files in the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office civil division, explained to me that only two files that 

mention Mr. Harrison’s name are still physically located in the 

USAO (the rest were previously closed and sent to the federal 

records center). One is case file 2015V00121, the file that was 

opened when my office received Mr. Harrison’s 2015 FOIA 

request. I reviewed the entire contents of that file, and it does not 

contain any responsive records, rather, it contains records related 

to the FOIA request itself, and the processing of that FOIA

request. The other case file maintained in the civil division is the 

case file pertaining to this FOIA litigation, USAO number

2016V00425 (Dist. Ct. Number 16-cv-1310). I reviewed the 

entire contents of that file, and it does not contain any responsive 

records. Rather, it contains copies of the court’s docket entries in 

this case.

15. The only criminal case files that contain Plaintiff’s name are 

the district court and appeals files related to District Court case 

no. 88-cr-0200. Ms. Wiggins informed me that, according to the 

LIONS system, the criminal file had been closed in 2003. 

Nevertheless, on April 24, 2017, I asked Ernesto Magana, Jr., 

Records Management Specialist in the criminal division,

whether any records related to David Scott Harrison are 

maintained in the USAO criminal division. Three hours later, Mr. 

Magana informed me that after conducting a thorough search of 

the criminal division’s files and file storage room, he determined 

that these closed files are no longer physically located at the 

USAO.

16. Also during my April 11, 201[7] meeting with Mr. Wheat, he

volunteered to search his emails and electronic files for records 

regarding Mr. Harrison. In a follow up conversation on April 24, 

2017, Mr. Wheat informed me that he had searched all of his 

emails and all of his electronically stored folders using the name 

“Harrison” and did not locate any records responsive to Mr. 

Harrison’s FOIA request.

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17. Also on April 24, 2017, I asked Mr. Wheat whether his legal

assistant maintains all of his correspondence and he stated that 

she does. He said that she likely could perform additional 

searches for records, and that his legal assistant is Jenna Ruiz de 

Chavez. On April 26, 2017, I spoke with Ms. Ruiz de Chavez on 

the phone. She told me she has been Mr. Wheat’s legal assistant 

for four years. She told me that she maintains an electronic folder

on a network drive for each of her attorneys, and that each 

attorney folder has subfolders such as “correspondence” and 

“pleadings.” While I was on the phone with Ms. Chavez, she 

explained to me that she was searching Mr. Wheat’s 

correspondence subfolder for “Harrison,” and that search did not 

yield any results. She then explained that she was searching all 

of Mr. Wheat’s subfolders for “Harrison,” and that search did not 

yield any results.

18. None of the search efforts described above yielded any 

records responsive to Mr. Harrison’s FOIA request.

(Supp. Parker Decl. ¶¶ 10–18.) 

Based on these additional search efforts, the Court concludes that Defendant has met

its investigative obligations under FOIA. For one, these searches were reasonably 

calculated to locate responsive documents. See, e.g., Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 771 (concluding 

that the FBI’s search was reasonably calculated to locate responsive records where it 

searched relevant databases even though plaintiff claimed more could have been done).

Specifically, Defendant went far beyond its original search efforts (consisting of a single 

phone call), and (1) conversed with Mr. Wheat several more times; (2) sent an office-wide 

email to all employees of the U.S. Attorney’s Office seeking responsive records; (3) 

searched the U.S. Attorney’s Office case file system and reviewed the files containing Mr. 

Harrison’s name; (4) searched Mr. Wheat’s electronic files and emails; and (5) searched 

Mr. Wheat’s legal assistant’s electronic files. (Renewed MSJ 7.) 

In addition, Plaintiff has not offered, and the Court cannot find, any reason to doubt 

the good faith of Ms. Parker’s declaration that despite all of these search efforts no 

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responsive records were found. See, e.g., Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 771 (concluding that the 

State Department’s search was adequate where, among other things, the court found “no 

reason to doubt the good faith of the Department’s declaration that there [was] no apparent 

connection between [plaintiff] and the military matters within the Bureau’s purview”). 

While Plaintiff argues that these records might exist because Mr. Wheat is otherwise trying 

to cover up his actions,

3

(see generally Renewed MSJ Opp’n), his “[s]peculative claims 

about the existence of additional documents are insufficient to rebut the presumption of 

good faith” to which Ms. Parker’s declarations are entitled. See Freedom of the Press 

Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, –– F. Supp. 3d ––, No. 15-CV-03503-HSG, 2017 WL 

952885, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2017) (quoting Coleman v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 

134 F. Supp. 3d 294, 301 (D.D.C. 2015)); see also Lahr, 569 F.3d at 987–88 (concluding 

that an agency had conducted an adequate search in response to a FOIA request after 

finding that there was “no evidence of either agency’s bad faith in conducting their 

searches, and [that], aside from his general allegations of government cover-up, [plaintiff] 

presents no evidence [to the contrary]”).

Nor does it matter that this search produced no responsive documents since “the 

adequacy of a FOIA search is generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but by 

the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the search.” Coleman, 134 F. Supp. 

3d at 303 (citing Iturralde v. Comptroller of the Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir.

2003)); see also D’Angelica v. IRS, No. Civ. S-9401998 WBS/GGH, 1996 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 6681 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1996) (granting summary judgment where no responsive 

 

3 Specifically, Plaintiff muses that

[i]f, as Mr. Wheat now prays this Court will believe, he did not follow through on his 

oppression and retaliation, then wouldn’t he have notified Ms. Duffy, notified Plaintiff, 

and later have notified the Executive Office for United States Attorneys? Isn’t that what a 

not guilty person would have done? Mr. Wheat took a different course; one might argue 

that course of action was to erase all evidence of his oppression and retaliation.

(Renewed MSJ Opp’n 6.)

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documents existed).

In sum, under FOIA Plaintiff was “entitled to a reasonable search for records, not a 

perfect one. And a reasonable search is what [he] got.” Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 772.

Accordingly, Defendant has met its burden under FOIA and thus the Court GRANTS 

Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.

As before, Plaintiff argues that this case cannot be decided without discovery. 

(Renewed MSJ Opp’n 7.) The Court again disagrees. As previously explained above and 

in the Court’s prior Order, “[c]ourts are permitted to rule on summary judgment in FOIA 

cases solely on the basis of government affidavits describing the documents sought.” Lion 

Raisins, 354 F.3d at 1082. Moreover, “in [FOIA] cases courts may allow the government 

to move for summary judgment before the plaintiff conducts discovery.” Lane v. Dep’t of

Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). While discovery may be 

appropriate in some cases, see, e.g., id. at 1135 (discussing possibility of discovery for 

violation of a separate act by improperly accessing a personnel file), Plaintiff fails to 

demonstrate that discovery is appropriate in this case. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that 

discovery is necessary to assess “Mr. Wheat’s conflicting and irreconcilable actions . . . and 

his later self-serving statements that he did not follow through on his earlier oppression 

and retaliation against Plaintiff.” (Renewed MSJ Opp’n 7.) In other words, Plaintiff seeks 

to discover whom Mr. Wheat contacted regarding Plaintiff’s letter. But this is exactly what 

Plaintiff unsuccessfully sought in his three FOIA requests. Thus, Plaintiff fails to convince 

the Court that discovery is appropriate, much less necessary, in this case. Cf. Lane, 523 

F.3d at 1135 (“[T]his circuit has affirmed denials of discovery where, as here, the plaintiff’s 

requests consisted of ‘precisely what defendants maintain is exempt from disclosure to 

plaintiff pursuant to the FOIA.’” (quoting Pollard v. FBI, 705 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 

1983))).

At core, it seems that Plaintiff wants this Court to determine why Mr. Wheat first 

stated that he was sending Plaintiff’s letter to various investigative agencies, and then 

apparently did not actually send the letter to those agencies. (See generally Renewed MSJ 

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Opp’n.) But, as Defendant correctly explains, there is no basis under FOIA for the Court 

to reach that issue. (Renewed MSJ Reply 3.) Rather, the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to 

determining whether the agency has (1) improperly (2) withheld (3) agency records. 

Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980) (citing 

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)). Once Defendant has demonstrated an adequate search for 

responsive documents and has found none, it has met its burden and summary judgment is 

appropriate. See, e.g., Zemansky, 767 F.2d at 574 (noting that agencies do not have an 

obligation to respond to questions posed as FOIA requests, and that the district court 

“properly limited itself to a determination of the responsibilities of the EPA under the 

FOIA”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Renewed Motion for 

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21). This Order ends the litigation in this matter. The Clerk 

of Court SHALL close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2017

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