Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02175/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02175-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KHYLE BRISCOE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-04-2175 FCD GGH P

vs.

A.K. SCRIBNER, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This action is proceeding on the amended petition

filed September 15, 2006. Petitioner challenges his 1999 conviction for murder, robbery,

burglary and the finding that he personally used a firearm in the commission of all three counts. 

Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole after the jury further found as a

special circumstance that count one was committed while petitioner engaged in the commission

of robbery and burglary. 

Pending before the court is respondent’s July 27, 2007, motion to dismiss. On

September 27, 2007, a hearing was held regarding this motion. Moona Nandi appeared on behalf

of respondent. Stephanie Adraktas appeared on behalf of petitioner.

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 A petition may be denied on the merits without exhaustion of state court remedies. 28 1

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

2

 Respondent moves to dismiss claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 on grounds that they are not

exhausted. At oral argument on this motion, respondent’s counsel conceded that claims 2, 3, and

4 are exhausted. After carefully considering the record, the court recommends that respondent’s

motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part as to claims 1 and 7. 

II. Discussion

Legal Standard for Exhaustion

The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). If exhaustion is to be waived, it must

be waived explicitly by respondent’s counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). A waiver of exhaustion, 1

thus, may not be implied or inferred. A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before

presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S. Ct. 509, 512

(1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 

Factual Background

Respondent’s November 14, 2006, opposition to petitioner’s motion to amend

contains a factual summary of petitioner’s offense which appears accurate. For purposes of these

findings and recommendations only, it is adopted below. 

On April 2, 1998, robbery victim Ben Parovel shot and killed perpetrator Shaun

Pina. Petitioner, who was Pina’s co-perpetrator, was charged with Pina’s murder

under a provocative act theory. People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777 (1965);

People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d 690 (1965).

On the night of the murder, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Alisha Rozadilla went to

her boyfriend Ben Parovel’s home in Vacaville. While Parovel was out of the

house, petitioner and Pina came to the door looking for him. Rozadilla said he

was not home and closed the door. When Parovel returned to the house a few

minutes later, he found the pair waiting for him outside the house. They said they

wanted to purchase some marijuana. Parovel agreed to sell them some and invited

them in.

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When Parovel entered the house, he picked up his Beretta gun, which Rozadilla

had brought out in fear of petitioner and Pina, and put it in his pocket. He took

Pina into his bedroom to get the marijuana, and turned around to find him holding

a Glock. Pina pointed the gun at Parovel’s head and demanded money. Parovel

gave him $1500 out of his dresser drawer but Pina wanted more. In the meantime,

petitioner came into the bedroom holding a .38 gun to Rozadilla’s head.

Parovel gave Pina marijuana and his Beretta. When petitioner and Pina continued

to demand more money, Parovel walked into the living room. Rozadilla escaped

while the three men struggled. While Parovel and Pina were fighting, Pina’s

Glock slid across the floor. Petitioner picked it up and pistol whipped Parovel

about the head, hitting him four or five times while Pina held his legs down. At

some point, Parovel saw the magazine slide out of the Glock. Petitioner still had

the .38 in his other hand. Parovel believed Pina still had Parovel’s Beretta.

A few minutes later, Parovel broke free and ran to the front door. Petitioner ran

after him and the two struggled. Parovel wrested the .38 away from petitioner and

fired twice at Pina, killing him. At the time, Pina was thirteen or fourteen feet

away, moving his arm as if signaling to someone. His body was partially

obscured by a hedge and Parovel could not see if he still had Parovel’s Beretta. 

When police arrived shortly thereafter, Parovel went to talk to them, but before

doing so, threw his marijuana, digital scale, and a magazine for his Beretta out the

bathroom window. 

Claim 1

Claims 1 alleges that there was insufficient evidence that petitioner committed

provocative act murder. See Amended Petition, pp. 30-35. To put this argument in context, the

court will summarize the relevant law regarding provocative act murder:

A provocative act murder case necessarily involves at least three people–in our

case, the perpetrator of the underlying offense, an accomplice, and a victim of

their crime. (See People v. Superior Court (Shamis) (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 833,

845-846 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 388] (Shamis).) Under the provocative act murder

doctrine, the perpetrator of a crime is held vicariously liable for the killing of an

accomplice committed by the third party. (See People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d

690, 705 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365], judg. vacated on other grounds (1967)

388 U.S. 263 [87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178]; see also Pizano v. Superior Court

(1978) 21 Cal.3d 128, 135 [145 Cal.Rptr. 524, 577 P.2d 659]; Taylor v. Superior

Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 578, 582-583 [91 Cal.Rptr. 275, 477 P.2d 131], overruled

on another ground in People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 92 fn. 12 [123

Cal.Rptr. 475, 539 P.2d 43].) By law, the felony-murder rule does not apply when

an accomplice is killed at the hands of a crime victim rather than by the defendant. 

As such a killing does not occur in the perpetration of a felony, malice cannot be

ascribed to the defendant under the felony-murder rule. [Citations.] However,

when the perpetrator of a crime–with a conscious disregard for life–intentionally

commits an act that is likely to result in death and the crime victim kills in

reasonable response to that act, the perpetrator is guilty of murder. In this

situation, the killing is attributable–not merely to the commission of a felony–but

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to the intentional act of the perpetrator committed with conscious disregard for

life. The victim’s killing in self-defense is not deemed to be an independent

intervening cause relieving the perpetrator of liability because the killing is a

reasonable response to the dilemma thrust on the victim by the perpetrator’s

intentional act. [Citations.] 

As with most criminal offenses, a provocative act murder has both a physical and

a mental element that the prosecution must establish. [Citation.] To constitute the

actus reus of provocative act murder, the defendant must commit an act that

provokes a third party to fire a fatal shot. The mens rea element is satisfied if the

defendant knows that his or her provocative act has a high probability–not merely

foreseeable possibility–of eliciting a life threatening response from the person

who actually fires the fatal bullet. [Citations.] Cases often discuss these two

elements in terms of whether the defendant committed a provocative act which

proximately caused the killing. [citations.] 

The prosecution must establish that the defendant [footnote omitted] committed a

provocative act. [Citations.] In cases in which the underlying crime does not

involve an intent to kill–offenses such as robbery [footnote omitted] and burglary,

the mere participation in the underlying criminal offense is not sufficient to

invoke the doctrine of provocative act murder. The provocative act must be

something beyond that necessary to commit the underlying crime. [Citations.] In

every robbery, the possibility exists that a victim will resist and kill. The robber

has little control over such a killing once the robbery is undertaken. To impose an

additional penalty for the killing improperly discriminates between robbers, not on

the basis of any difference in their conduct, but solely on the basis of a victim’s

response that the robber’s conduct induced. [Citations.] However, circumstances

set in motion by the defendant which are fraught with grave and inherent danger

to life are sufficient to constitute a provocative act that allows a jury to raise an

inference of malice. [Citation.]

*****

The prosecutor must also establish that the defendant’s conduct proximately

caused the killing. Courts use traditional notions of concurrent and proximate

cause in order to determine whether the killing was the result of the defendant’s

conduct. [Citations.] To be considered the proximate cause of the victim’s death,

the defendant’s act must have been a substantial factor contributing to the result,

rather than insignificant or merely theoretical. [Citations.] A defendant’s

provocative act must actually provoke a victim’s response resulting in an

accomplice’s death.

The timing of the events is critical. By necessity, the provocative act must occur

before a victim may make a lethal response. [Citations.] There may be more than

one act constituting the proximate cause of the killing. [Citations.] If the

defendant commits several acts but only one of them actually provoked a lethal

response, only that act may constitute the provocative act on which culpability for

provocative act murder can be based. [Citations.] When the chain of causation is

somewhat attenuated, the jury decides whether murder liability attaches or not.

[Citations.]

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People v. Briscoe, 92 Cal. App. 4th 568, 581-584, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 401, 411-414 (2001).

Respondent argues that part of claim one is unexhausted. In particular, at oral

argument respondent’s counsel argued that petitioner’s claim that his alleged provocative acts of

pistol whipping Parovel and putting a gun to Rozadilla’s neck did not proximately cause the

killing of Pina were not exhausted. Respondent’s counsel argued that in his petition for review

petitioner exhausted a claim that these acts did not constitute provocative acts per se but did not

raise the issue of proximate cause.

In the petition for review, petitioner argued, in relevant part, 

6. Can one of two armed robbers be convicted of murder under the 

provocati v e acts doctrine when he commits no provocative acts during the

initial stage of the robbery, but forcibly intervenes in a struggle between an

intended victim bent on escape, and a second armed robber, resulting in

the death of the second robber at the hands of the intended victim? (In re

Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557;

Fiore v. White (2001) 531 U.S. 225; Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S.

307.)

The Court of Appeal rejected a claim of insufficiency of evidence based on both

an inaccurate rendition of the record [footnote 4] and a flawed application of this

[Footnote 4: The numerous factual inaccuracies were brought to the Court

of Appeal’s attention in Argument I of the petition for rehearing.]

Court’s sufficiency analysis in provocative acts murder cases. [Footnote 5]

[Footnote 5: See Exhibit A, pp. 11-16.]

(In re Joe R., supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 506-508; People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d

79, 90-92; U.S.. Const. 14th Amendment.) In so holding, the Court of Appeal not

only violated petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of conviction

except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but also arbitrarily denied

petitioner of his federal due process rights by depriving him of a liberty interest

created by state law....

Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit 1.

The reference in the petition for review to petitioner’s intervention in the struggle

between Pina and Parovel indicates that petitioner is challenging his pistol whipping of Parovel,

which occurred during the struggle. By asking whether petitioner could be convicted of

provocative act murder based on this conduct when he had committed no provocative acts during

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 Thus, the situation here is quite different from that where the petitioner is affirmatively 2

pointing to facts or circumstances on which to base his claim. In that situation, he must present

the specific facts in his argument. 

6

the initial stages of the robbery indicates that petitioner is arguing that the pistol whipping did not

proximately cause Pina’s death. Although not a model of clarity, the court finds that the petition

for review raised the claim that the pistol whipping of Parovel did not proximately cause Pina’s

death. Accordingly, the court finds that petitioner has exhausted this issue.

The petition for review does not focus upon an argument that petitioner’s holding

a gun to Rozadilla’s head did not proximately cause Pina’s death. The facts in the petition for

review refer to petitioner intervening in the struggle between Pina and Parovel, but petitioner

held the gun to Rozadilla’s head before this struggle occurred. The question becomes whether a

claim, whose legal basis is certainly exhausted, becomes unexhausted because a petitioner refers

in his federal petition to another possible theory or factual circumstance which respondent might

raise that could be used to defeat petitioner’s argument. The undersigned will not stretch the

reasons for exhaustion to defeat or delay the adjudication of this petition in such a situation. 

Petitioner made a general argument that the facts and circumstances were insufficient to establish

causation for provocative act murder. While more of the established facts were discussed before

the Court of Appeal than in the petition for review, this circumstance does not defeat exhaustion. 

Petitioner was in the position before the state supreme court of focusing upon the circumstance

that he thought respondent would most likely raise to defeat the claim. Petitioner does not have

to focus upon or negate all defensive arguments he thinks respondent would make in order to

exhaust his claim.2

In this action, respondent is free not to refer to the Rozadilla circumstances if

respondent so desires. In that instance, the Rozadilla circumstances are immaterial. If

respondent desires to argue that the Rozadilla circumstances are facts upon which provocative act 

\\\\\

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murder may be based – so be it. But, that will be respondent’s argument within an exhausted

claim. 

Claim 7

Respondent argues that claim seven is not exhausted. Claim seven alleges that

two statements petitioner made were taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86

S.Ct. 1602 (1966) and that he was denied a full and fair hearing as to these issues in state court. 

At oral argument, respondent’s counsel argued that this claim was not exhausted because in state

court, petitioner only alleged that he was denied a full and fair hearing. Respondent’s counsel

argued that the petition for review did not argue that the statements were taken in violation of

Miranda. 

The petition for review raised the following claim regarding Miranda violations:

8. Does a trial judge violate due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments when he (a) utilizes Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (I) to

adjudicate a motion to exclude an inculpatory statement (the post-operation

statement) on Miranda/voluntariness grounds [footnote omitted] where he heard

the motion previously, while sitting as a magistrate; (b) refuses to afford de novo

review based on a standard that took into account the truth or falsity of the

statement; and (d) refuses to conduct any type of hearing upon a trial objection on

Miranda/voluntariness grounds to another inculpatory statement (the emergency

room statement)? (People v. Smithson (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 480; People v.

Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63; Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157;

Rogers v. Richmond (1961) 365 U.S. 534.)

The decision of the Court of Appeal did not find a constitutional infirmity

with the trial court’s enigmatic procedural choices, relying on the analysis

of the Third District in People v. Smithson, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th 480, as

well as People v. Hansel (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1211 (See Exhibit A, pp. 30-34). 

However, the opinion of the Court of Appeal did not accurately set forth

the facts concerning the procedures utilized by a trial judge sitting either as

a magistrate or at trial. [Footnote omitted.] As a consequence of this

misapprehension, the Court of Appeal neglected to address whether the

magistrate’s explicit reliance on a standard inconsistent with the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the first ruling fatally

infected the subsequent ruling at trial. (See Exhibit A, p. 34, fn. 16.) This

Court denied appellant’s petition for review in People v. Smithson, supra,

79 Cal.App.4th 480; two justices voted to grant the petition. (See order of

this Court dated July 19, 2000.) Because the Court of Appeal has

improperly expanded any legitimate language in Smithson, this Court

should grant review to review the legitimacy of Smithson.

Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit 1, Petition for Review, pp. 8-9. 

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 If these Findings and Recommendations are adopted, petitioner will face a choice of 3

deleting Miranda claims, or seeking to exhaust it. Both options are problematic.

8

The petition for review clearly did not raise a claim alleging that petitioner’s

statements were taken in violation of Miranda. At oral argument, petitioner’s counsel argued that

his claim alleging that he did not receive a full and fair hearing necessarily implicated a claim

that the statements were taken in violation of Miranda. 

A state court’s finding that statements were not taken in violation of Miranda is

entitled to AEDPA deference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). State court factual findings regarding a

Miranda issue are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Pursuant to these standards, in

order to exhaust his Miranda claim, petitioner must directly present this issue to the California

Supreme Court. Petitioner may challenge the findings of fact made regarding this claim by, for

example, demonstrating that did not receive a full and fair hearing in state court regarding this

issue. By merely challenging the procedures used by the state court to evaluate his Miranda

claim, petitioner does not exhaust this claim. A finding by the California Supreme Court that the

correct procedures were followed in evaluating petitioner’s Miranda claim does not necessarily

address the issue of whether a Miranda violation occurred. Accordingly, this claim is not

exhausted. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s July 27, 2007,

motion to dismiss be denied as to claim one; respondent’s motion as to claim 7 be granted.3

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 02/21/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

bris2175.mtd

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