Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02417/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02417-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

 On April 15, 2004, the court screened plaintiff’s amended complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A and found that the amended complaint states cognizable claims against these

defendants. Accordingly, the court ordered that these defendants be served with process. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DURRELL HOLCOMB,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-02-2417 LKK KJM P

vs.

HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding with an action for violation of civil rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The motion to dismiss or for summary judgment brought by defendants

Cloud, Barton, Wilson, Baron, Dunn, Sanders, Crofoot and Hibbits1 on January 27, 2005, is

before the court.

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

I. Motion To Dismiss

A. Failure To Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants Crofoot, Sanders and Hibbits assert that plaintiff’s claims against

them must be dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to

those claims prior to filing suit. 

A motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing

suit arises under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d

1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). In deciding a motion to dismiss for a failure to exhaust non-judicial

remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at

1120. If the court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted non-judicial remedies, the proper

remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice. Id.

Section 1997e(a) of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that “[n]o action

shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, . . . until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). California

prison regulations provide administrative procedures in the form of one informal and three

formal levels of review to address plaintiff’s claims. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1-

3084.7. Administrative procedures generally are exhausted once a prisoner has received a

“Director’s Level Decision,” or third level review, with respect to his issues or claims. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5. All available steps must be completed before a civil rights action is filed;

exhaustion during the pendency of the litigation will not save an action from dismissal. 

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit recently, however,

has determined that denial of a grievance on purely procedural grounds serves to exhaust that

grievance, in light of the institution’s election not to accept the complaint despite the discretion

to do so. Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2005). 

/////

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

 Citations are to pages of the handwritten complaint attached to the form complaint. 

3

 Defendants suggest that the grievance was never actually filed because there is no

“filed” stamp on the document. 

3

Plaintiff claims defendants Crofoot, Sanders and Hibbits violated his Eighth

Amendment rights at High Desert State Prison on April 6, 2000. Compl. at 17-20.2 It appears

that plaintiff drafted a grievance concerning his claims on April 11, 2000, but the parties agree

that the grievance was never answered.3 Mot. at 7: 17-21; Opp’n at 4:10-12. The parties also

agree that Plaintiff filed a second grievance on September 25, 2000, which was “screened out.” 

Mot. at 7: 22-25; Opp’n at 4:12-13. 

Defendants claim plaintiff did not submit his grievance a third time and have

submitted an affidavit from the appeals coordinator at High Desert State Prison in support of

their position. Mot., Ex. A at 2:5-6. In his opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff claims,

under the penalty of perjury, that he did submit the grievance a third time, but there was no

response. Opp’n at 4:13-15 & Ex. A. Defendants have not filed a reply to plaintiff’s opposition.

In light of Ngo, defendants’ acknowledged receipt of the grievance at least once,

followed by its rejection on procedural grounds, appears to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. 

Ngo, 403 F.3d at 631. In any case, under Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119, it is defendants’ burden to

show failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Defendants have not met their burden

of showing that plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies with respect to his

claims against defendants Crofoot, Sanders and Hibbits before bringing this action. Defendants’

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against these defendants accordingly should be denied. 

B. Statute of Limitations

Defendants assert plaintiff’s claims against defendants Cloud and Barton are timebarred. Plaintiff claims Cloud and Barton denied plaintiff medical care in violation of the Eighth

Amendment on September 10, 1999. Am. Compl. at 7-9. The limitations period applicable to

this action is a total of three years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 340(3), 352.1(a) (West 2002);

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying both California’s prior

personal injury one-year statute of limitation and two-year tolling provision under section

352.1(a)). The limitations period generally begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or should

have known, of the injury that is the basis of his cause of action. Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911,

914 (9th Cir. 1999). This action was commenced on October 24, 2002.

At first glance, plaintiff’s claims against Cloud and Barton appear to be timebarred. However, in cases such as this, where the plaintiff must first exhaust administrative

remedies prior to filing suit, the limitations period is equitably tolled until exhaustion is

complete. See Donoghue v. County of Orange, 848 F.2d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 1987) (under

California law, a statute of limitations is equitably tolled when the claimant has “several formal

legal remedies and reasonably and in good faith pursues one”); Conley v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec.

Workers Local 639, 810 F.2d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 1987) (equitable tolling is “most appropriate

when the plaintiff is required to avail himself of an alternate course of action as a precondition to

filing suit”). 

Defendants admit that plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies with respect to

his claims against defendants Cloud and Barton on May 17, 2001. Def’ts’ Separate Statement of

Undisputed Facts (SUF) at 1:25-2:2; Mot., Ex. A, Attach. at 3-6 (Director’s Level Decision). 

Because defendants fail to present any reason why plaintiff should not be entitled to equitable

tolling for exhaustion of administrative remedies, their motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims

against defendants Cloud and Barton as time-barred should be denied. 

II. Motion For Summary Judgment

A. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, or other admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of thin air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On April 15, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

B. Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff claims defendants Wilson, Dunn and Baron provided plaintiff with

constitutionally inadequate medical care. Defendants argue they are entitled to summary

judgment as to all of plaintiff’s denial of medical care claims. 

A violation of the Eighth Amendment occurs if a prison official is deliberately

indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 

Proving such a claim contains both an objective and a subjective component: an inmate must

show that his condition is objectively serious and that prison officials had a sufficiently culpable

state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991).

A medical need is serious if “the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result

in further significant injury,” apart from the “routine discomfort” that results from incarceration. 

Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Regarding the subjective

component, a prison official displays deliberate indifference when he knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “[T]he

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

Before it can be said that a prisoner's civil rights have been abridged, “the

indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or

‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d

458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). In addition, mere differences of

opinion concerning the appropriate treatment cannot be the basis of an Eighth Amendment

violation. Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). Further, the delay in

medical treatment without more is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference. 

Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985). In order to

state a claim of deliberate indifference, the delay must cause substantial harm. Wood v.

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

 A plaintiff’s verified complaint may be considered as an affidavit in opposition to

summary judgment if it is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in

evidence. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000). 

8

1. Defendant Wilson

In his amended complaint, which is signed under the penalty of perjury,4 plaintiff

makes several allegations against defendant Wilson, a nurse. Am. Compl. at 9:9-14, 11:13-

12:28. Only those allegations amounting to a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment are

recounted here.

During the end of May 2001, plaintiff was scheduled to attend the prison medical

clinic for an ankle injection and to obtain pills for back pain. Am. Compl. at 11:16-21. The visit

was cancelled due to prison staff leaving early to evacuate their homes, evidently due to a nearby

fire. Id. at 11:22-25, 12:4-6. Defendant Wilson told plaintiff she would reschedule the visit, but

never did. Id. at 11:26-12. Wilson is responsible for scheduling medical visits at High Desert. 

Id. at 11:26-12:3. 

Wilson has provided evidence that plaintiff was seen for back and ankle pain on

August 9, 2001. Mot., Ex. C at 2:10-14. Wilson claims plaintiff never requested a medical visit

until July 30, 2001. Id. at 1:27-2:2.

Based on plaintiff’s and Wilson’s contrasting accounts of when plaintiff first

sought medical care, a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether defendant

Wilson knew plaintiff was in need of medical care in May of 2001 and deliberately failed to

schedule a visit with a doctor after a previously scheduled visit was canceled. Accordingly,

Wilson should not be granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim that she violated his

Eighth Amendment rights.

2. Defendant Dunn

Plaintiff claims defendant Dunn, a dentist, was deliberately indifferent to

plaintiff’s serious medical needs by failing to provide plaintiff with adequate dental care. 

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

 Plaintiff also alleges the tooth filled was the wrong tooth, but does not explain why,

given the cavity in the tooth that was filled. 

9

Plaintiff claims he saw Dunn on some unspecified date, that Dunn filed one tooth “that had a

hole in it,”5 and, after he saw Dunn, he still had pain in one of his other teeth. Am. Compl. at

14:3-12. Defendants claim defendant Dunn was not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff and

present evidence that Dunn worked on plaintiff four times between August 9 and December 5,

2001. Mot., Ex. D at 2:5-24. Dunn also presents evidence that none of the problems presented

by plaintiff were serious. Id. at 2:5-20. 

Plaintiff has not presented anything suggesting that he requested that defendant

Dunn take any particular course of action or attempt to relieve any particular source of pain, and

Dunn refused. To the extent Dunn’s treatment was not effective, or to the extent Dunn simply

did not choose the correct course of treatment, Dunn actions could be considered, at worst,

negligence, but do not constitute deliberate indifference. Broughton, 622 F.2d at 460. 

Accordingly, Dunn should be granted summary judgment. 

3. Defendant Baron

While it is not entirely clear, it appears that plaintiff claims in his amended

complaint that defendant Dr. Baron was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by

failing to adequately supervise other medical personnel and by failing to adequately respond to

plaintiff’s grievances. Am. Compl. at 13:11-16, 14:17-26; cf. Opp’n at 17:18-18:2. 

Defendants correctly point out that there is generally no liability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for failure to adequately supervise. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Defendants also correctly assert that plaintiff does not allege with particularity how any response

(or lack thereof) by defendant Baron to a grievance filed by plaintiff led to plaintiff’s receiving

constitutionally inadequate medical care. In his opposition, plaintiff fails to present any evidence

indicating defendant Baron personally did anything that might be construed as deliberate

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 6

 See note 4 supra.

10

indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Accordingly, defendants should be granted

summary judgment concerning plaintiff’s claim against defendant Baron.

C. Excessive Force / Failure To Protect

An inmate is subjected to “excessive force” in violation of the Eighth Amendment

if the degree of force used by prison officials was applied maliciously and sadistically for the

very purpose of causing harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). Force used is not

excessive if it was used in a good faith effort to restore discipline. Id. The Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment also imposes on officials a duty to “take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). To prove a claim for failure to protect an inmate from

harmful prison conditions, the inmate must show he was incarcerated under conditions posing a

“substantial risk of serious harm,” and that a prison official displayed “deliberate indifference” to

that risk. Id. at 834.

Plaintiff alleges the following in his verified6 amended complaint concerning

defendants Crofoot, Sanders and Hibbits:

On April 6, 2000, between 1000-1030 hours, during building D-2

lockdown shower for black inmates defendant Crofoot and Sanders

informed both plaintiff and his cellmate that a signed 128-B

Chrono and a interview statement with a cell search was required

for release from lockdown status. Upon plaintiff and his cellmate 

filling out the issued form, plaintiff handed them to defendant

Sanders then proceeded to prepare for showers.

Once plaintiff and his cellmate were in mechanical restraints the

cell-door opened as defendant Crofoot asked; who is showering

upstairs”. Plaintiff cellmate responded in an audible voice that he

was showering upstairs at which point plaintiff proceeded to exit

the cell in the direction of the lower showers which also was an

everyday lockdown shower routine. Where plaintiff shower on the

lower tiers and plaintiff cellmate shower on the top tier shower.

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

As plaintiff was going the normal route but between a roll away

cart that defendant Sanders had all the forms on, plaintiff was stop

and aggressively pulled by the arm by defendant Crofoot and again

asked who is going to the upper tier shower, and for the second

time my cellmate spoke up loud and clear he was going upstair.

As plaintiff again started to walk in the direction of the lower tier

shower, defendant Crofoot aggressively started pulling and

twisting plaintiff right arm; which caused plaintiff to say too c/o

Crofoot that he wish to decline taking a shower and requested to be

placed back into his cell . . . do to c/o Crofoot inappropriate

behavior and misconduct of inflicting unnecessary pain upon

plaintiff.

After verbally declining a shower plaintiff was told that all blacks

cell had to be searched, which plaintiff temporarily forgot due to

defendant Crofoot misconduct. Before plaintiff could comment

defendant Crofoot just started twisting and pulling plaintiff right

arm again, hard and forceful, causing what appeared to feel a little

dislocation of plaintiff right elbow. In the process of defendant

Crofoot rage he took and (jerked) plaintiff off balance twisting

plaintiff left ankle, causing it to be re-injured, as from a September

10, 1999 incident, which had not fully rehabilitated. 

Then defendant Crofoot threw plaintiff against the wall, causing

plaintiff to hit his face, bust his lip, and develop a knot on his left

eye. Defendant Crofoot then placed on of his knee in plaintiff

lower back causing what felt like a dislocation in plaintiff lumbar

region.

After excessively inflicting pain upon plaintiff, defendant Crofoot

started pushing and pulling plaintiff in the direction of the lower

shower with plaintiff blue shirt wrapped around both his left and

right wrist which were tangled up around the handcuff.

At the shower defendant Crofoot pushed plaintiff in, bumping his

head and right elbow against the shower door, before he slammed

the door shut. Defendant Sanders nor defendant Hibbits, say

anything or try to prevent the brutal attack by Crofoot.

All defendant Sanders did was escorted plaintiff cellmate Patterson

to the upstairs shower. And then proceeded to search plaintiff cell

with defendant Crofoot help. Upon completion of the cell search,

defendant Sander[s] came to the shower were plaintiff was at and

untangle plaintiff shirt and took the handcuff off so plaintiff could

shower.

Upon plaintiff walking to the shower nozzle and the water hit

plaintiff body the shock and confusion try to set in on defendant

Crofoot behavior. So as plaintiff started moving with the water

hitting his body more plaintiff began to experience excruciating

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

pain in his left ankle, right elbow, lower back and head throbbing. 

Plaintiff finish showering in which he was given over thirty

minutes.

Am. Compl. at 20:22-23:2. 

1. Defendant Crofoot

Defendants present evidence indicating that the force used by Crofoot against

plaintiff was not excessive. See Mot., Ex. E. Specifically, the evidence suggests plaintiff

instigated Crofoot’s use of force on the way to the shower, id. at 2:17-3:2, and the injuries

sustained by plaintiff were relatively minor. Id. at 3:10-23. However, the evidence presented by

defendants does nothing more than establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact with

respect to whether the force used against plaintiff on the way to the shower was excessive. The

court will recommend that defendants’ summary judgment motion be denied with respect to

plaintiff’s excessive force claims against defendant Crofoot.

2. Defendants Sanders and Hibbits

Defendants assert the following with respect to plaintiff’s claims against

defendants Sanders and Hibbits:

[Plaintiff] does not claim that Officers Sanders and Hibbits used

force against him, rather he claims they just watched Officer

Crofoot and failed to intervene. Since there was no excessive use

of force, there was no reason for Officers Sanders and Hibbits to

intervene. 

 

Mot. at 18:15-18. The court rejects this argument in light of the finding that there is a genuine

issue of material fact with respect to whether defendant Crofoot used excessive force against

plaintiff. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. Hibbits and Sanders should not be granted summary

judgment.

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. The January 27, 2005 motion to dismiss or for summary judgment brought by

defendants Cloud, Barton, Wilson, Baron, Dunn, Sanders, Crofoot and Hibbits be granted in part

and denied in part as follows:

A. Granted as to defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect

to plaintiff’s claims against defendants Baron and Dunn; and 

B. Denied in all other respects 

2. Defendants Baron and Dunn be dismissed from this action.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: August 30, 2005.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1/holc2417.57

Case 2:02-cv-02417-LKK -EFB Document 38 Filed 08/30/05 Page 13 of 13