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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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I 

FI T -. D 4J J..,._., 

UNITED ST1\'TES COURT OF APPE_J!,mt,d Stati:.tt(~y.itt'?f Appeals n Tr ·1 - --..•,,;t.. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

BRUCE DONNELL THOMPSON, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

RON CHAMPION; ATTORNEY GENERAL ) 

OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

MAY 19 1~9J 

ROBER'l' L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 93-6035 

(D.C. No. CIV-92-1970-T) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK and KELLY, Circuit Judges.** 

Petitioner Bruce Donnell Thompson appeals the district 

court's dismissal without prejudice of his petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We reverse and remand for 

further findings. 

Petitioner pleaded guilty in Oklahoma state court to numerous 

charges ranging from rape to unauthorized use of an automobile and 

was sentenced to a total of seventy-five years imprisonment. See 

State v. Thompson, Nos. 89-2771, 89-2772, 89-2796, 89-2883 (Okla. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. ~ Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 93-6035 Document: 010110115075 Date Filed: 05/19/1993 Page: 1 
County Dist. Ct. Nov. 2, 1989). Petitioner did not move to 

withdraw his guilty plea and did not appeal his sentence. 

Petitioner did, however, apply for state post-conviction relief, 

see Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22; §§ 1080-1088 (West 1986) (Oklahoma 

Post-Conviction Procedure Act), claiming that he received 

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. 1 The state 

district court denied Petitioner's application, and the Oklahoma 

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, stating that Petitioner 

"failed to show entitlement to relief in a post-conviction 

proceeding in that he has not raised any issues that could not 

have been raised in an appeal" and that he had "not provided 

sufficient reasons for his failure to seek to withdraw his guilty 

pleas and to appeal his conviction. 112 See Thompson v. State, No. 

1 Specifically, Petitioner claimed that his counsel was 

constitutionally ineffective by failing to move to suppress 

Petitioner's allegedly involuntary confession and an allegedly 

tainted in-court identification by the victim, by failing to 

advise Petitioner that his sentences could run consecutively and 

that he would be required to serve at least one third of his 

sentence before being eligible for parole, and by erroneously 

advising him that he would be paroled in five years if he pleaded 

guilty. Petitioner alleged that had his counsel raised these 

defenses, which would have likely succeeded, and/or had his 

counsel not erroneously advisea him about the length of his 

sentence, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 

on going to trial. 

2 Oklahoma requires that ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims be brought on direct appeal. See Cartwright v. State, 708 

P.2d 592, 594-95 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 

1073 (1986). Oklahoma courts will not consider ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims in an application for post-conviction 

relief absent a showing of ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel. See Nguyen v. State, 844, P.2d 176, 178 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 1992). 

In addition to his two ineffective assistance of counsel 

(footnote continued to next page) 

-2-

Appellate Case: 93-6035 Document: 010110115075 Date Filed: 05/19/1993 Page: 2 
PC - 92-333 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. July 23, 1992) (Order Affirming 

Denial of Post-Conviction Relief). 

Petitioner then brought the instant petition raising the 

identical claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See supra 

notes 1 and 2. The district court referred the petition to the 

magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(B) (1) (B). Respondents 

moved to dismiss the petition as procedurally barred claiming that 

Petitioner had procedurally defaulted on his claims in state court 

by not raising his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on 

direct appeal. The magistrate judge found that Petitioner had 

procedurally defaulted on his claims in state court and that 

Petitioner's claims were refuted by the record. 3 The magistrate 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

claims which allegedly led him to plead guilty, see supra note 1, 

Petitioner alleged that his counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective in failing to advise him about withdrawing his guilty 

plea or taking a direct appeal and in failing to contact him 

within the necessary time period to pursue either of these avenues 

of relief. This claim was clearly an attempt to excuse 

Petitioner's procedural default, and the state court rejected it 

by distinguishing Baker v. Kaiser, 929 F.2d 1495 (10th Cir. 1991), 

and stating that "Petitioner has not established that his counsel 

was dismissed prior to the ten day period, and no substitute 

counsel was appointed, such that he had no counsel to contact as 

was the situation in Baker." Without expressing any opinion on 

the state court's resolution of this issue, we note that 

Petitioner has a constitutional right to effective assistance of 

counsel concerning his decision not to appeal, and that 

ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause excusing 

Petitioner's procedural default. ~ Gilbert v. Scott, 941 F.2d 

1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 1991). 

3 The magistrate judge's findings and recommendation also state 

that, because Petitioner failed to respond within fifteen days to 

Respondent's motion to dismiss Petitioner's claims as procedurally 

barred, the motion was deemed confessed under the local rules. 

See W.D. Okla. Loe. R. 14(A) (1992). Dismissal without prejudice 

for failure to respond to a motion does not serve the interests of 

(footnote continued to next page) 

-3-

Appellate Case: 93-6035 Document: 010110115075 Date Filed: 05/19/1993 Page: 3 
judge recommended that the petition be dismissed without 

prejudice, 4 and that Petitioner be denied a certificate of 

probable cause and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 

The district court, having been presented with no objections, 5 

dismissed the petition without prejudice and denied Petitioner 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 

The procedural default rule is derived from the "adequate and 

independent state ground" doctrine. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 

260 (1989); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81-82 (1977). 

Federal courts will not review the lawfulness of a person's 

custody by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus when that 

custody is pursuant to a judgment which rests on independent and 

adequate state grounds. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 

2554 (1991). Failure to comply with a state procedural 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

judicial economy, and to the extent the district court actually 

relied on Local Rule 14(A) in dismissing the petition without 

prejudice, we believe that it abused its discretion. Cf. Meade v. 

Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1519-22 (10th Cir. 1988) (dismissal with 

prejudice of prose complaint for failing to respond to a motion 

to dismiss as required by Local Rule 14(A) of was an abuse of 

discretion). 

4 We do not understand why the magistrate judge recommended 

dismissal without prejudice. If federal habeas review of 

Petitioner's claim is barred by his state procedural default, 

if Petitioner's claims are witho~t merit, the petition should 

dismissed with prejudice. 

or 

be 

5 Although Petitioner failed to object to the magistrate 

judge's findings and recommendations, we cannot invoke our "firm 

waiver rule," which bars appellate review when party fails to 

timely object to a magistrate judge's findings and recommendation, 

because the magistrate judge's order here does not apprise the pro 

se litigant of these consequences. ~ Moore v. United States, 

950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). 

-4-

Appellate Case: 93-6035 Document: 010110115075 Date Filed: 05/19/1993 Page: 4 
I ' 

requirement may constitute an independent and adequate state 

ground "when a state court declined to address a prisoner's 

federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state 

procedural requirement." Id . (citations omitted). To determine 

whether a petitioner's failure to comply with a state procedural 

rule constitutes an adequate and independent state ground which 

may bar federal habeas review, the federal court must look to the 

last reasoned decision of the state court which considered the 

federal habeas petitioner's claims. Id . at 2557; Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2595 (1991). "[I]f the decision of 

the last state court to which the petitioner presented his federal 

claims fairly appeared to rest primarily on resolution of those 

claims, or to be interwoven with those claims, and did not clearly 

and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground, a 

federal court may address the petition." Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 

2557 (footnote omitted). 

Here, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals "clearly and 

expressly" stated that its judgment rested on Petitioner's failure 

to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct 

appeal. While the state court also addressed the merits of the 

claims, its statement that Petitioner "failed to show entitlement 

to relief in a post-conviction proceeding in that he has not 

raised any issues that could not have been raised in an appeal" is 

a "plain statement" that its judgment rests on a state procedural 

bar, see Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1188 (10th Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 112 s. Ct. 1213 (1992), and is therefore sufficient 

-5-

Appellate Case: 93-6035 Document: 010110115075 Date Filed: 05/19/1993 Page: 5 
to invoke procedural bar. See Thomas v. Gunter, 962 F.2d 1477, 

1484 n.9 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that state court relied on 

procedural bar despite state court's discussion of the merits) . 

Thus, we agree with the magistrate judge that the state court 

relied on the state procedural rule as an independent state ground 

to deny Petitioner relief. 

A finding that the last state court decision rejected 

Petitioner's claims on an independent state ground does not end 

the inquiry. The federal court must still determine whether the 

independent state ground is in fact adequate by determining 

whether the state court has strictly and regularly followed the 

state rule. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988). 

Even if a petitioner's failure to comply with a state procedural 

rule is an adequate and independent state ground, the petitioner's 

procedural default is excused if he or she can "demonstrate cause 

for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged 

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider 

the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." 

Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2565. 

Here, the magistrate judge never found that the state 

procedural rule requiring ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

to be brought on direct appeal is an adequate state ground, nor 

did the magistrate judge apply the cause and prejudice standard. 

Thus, we must remand to the district court to determine the 

following: (1) whether Oklahoma's procedural rule requiring 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be brought on direct 

-6-

Appellate Case: 93-6035 Document: 010110115075 Date Filed: 05/19/1993 Page: 6 
appeal is an adequate state ground; (2) whether Petitioner's third 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, regarding his 

counsel's failure to advise him about withdrawing his guilty plea 

or taking a direct appeal, constitutes cause for Petitioner's 

state procedural default,TM supra note 2; and, if it does, (3) 

whether Petitioner was thereby prejudiced. 6 

Finally, the magistrate judge's findings and recommendation, 

which the district court adopted, state that Petitioner's claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel are "refuted by the record" 

and do not overcome the "presumption of reasonable professional 

assistance." Petitioner's allegations that his counsel failed to 

move to suppress his confession and the victim's identification, 

and his counsel erroneously advised him of his potential sentence, 

and that, but for these alleged errors, Petitioner would not have 

pleaded guilty and instead would have insisted on going to trial 

are sufficient to state a constitutional claim. ~ Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-59 (1985). ~ a.l.aQ Tollet v. 

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); Garmon v. Lockhart. 938 F.2d 

120, 122 (8th Cir. 1991). The entire record in the present 

proceeding consists of the petition, Respondents' motion to 

dismiss and its attachments which includes the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals' order, Petitioner's state court brief, and the 

6 The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to the 

procedural default rule does not apply in this case because 

Petitioner does not assert that he is factually innocent of the 

crimes for which he is imprisoned. See Sa:wyer v. Whitley. 112 

s. Ct. 2514, 2518-23 (1992); Gee v. Shillinger, 979 F.2d 176, 178 

(10th Cir. 1992). 

-7-

Appellate Case: 93-6035 Document: 010110115075 Date Filed: 05/19/1993 Page: 7 
guilty plea waivers. While we recognize that Petitioner must 

overcome a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within 

the range of reasonable professional assistance," Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), the record is simply not 

sufficiently developed to dismiss Petitioner's claims on the 

. 7 merits. 

Because Petitioner's appeal has "an arguable basis in law or 

in fact," see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); 28 

u.s.c. § 1915(d), and he has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a federal right, see Lozada v. Deeds, 111 S. Ct. 860, 

861-62 (1991); 28 U.S.C. § 2253, petitioner's requests to proceed 

in forma pauperis on appeal and for a certificate of probable 

cause are GRANTED. The district court's order dismissing the 

petition without prejudice is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to 

the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 

order and judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

7 The magistrate judge could not have relied on the presumption 

of correctness that attaches to state court factual findings, see 

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 544-45 (1981), because the record 

does not indicate that Petitioner ever received a state court 

hearing on any of his present claims. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) 

(presumption of correctness attaches only if state court findings 

were made following hearing). 

-8-

Appellate Case: 93-6035 Document: 010110115075 Date Filed: 05/19/1993 Page: 8 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

.FILLD 

Unitsd St.ates Court of A 

Tenth Circuit ppeaJ 

MAY 19 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKE 

Clerk · R 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

vs. 

No. 92-2157 

(D.C. No. CR 91-500-JP) 

(D.N.M.) 

MOHAMMAD SEYED MOUSSAVI, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ORDER AND * JUDGMENT 

Before McKAY, hhief Judge, TACHA, Circuit Judge, and KANE, Senior 

District Judge . 

** Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior United States District Judge 

for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

* 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for the purposes of establishing the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 93-6035 Document: 010110115075 Date Filed: 05/19/1993 Page: 9