Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02198/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02198-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DIANNE KNOX; WILLIAM L.

BLAYLOCK; ROBERT A. CONOVER;

EDWARD L. DOBROWOLSKI, JR;

KARYN GIL; THOMAS JACOB HASS;

PATRICK JOHNSON; JON JUMPER;

and R. PAUL RICKER, On Behalf

of Themselves and the Class

They Seek to Represent,

NO. CIV. S 05-2198 MCE KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

STEVE WESTLY, Controller,

State of California; and

CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1000,

SERVICE EMPLOYEES

INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIOCLC,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

The above entitled matter came before the Court upon

Plaintiffs’ concurrent requests for a Temporary Restraining Order

and a Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs include state workers

Case 2:05-cv-02198-MCE-CKD Document 23 Filed 11/09/05 Page 1 of 6
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that have elected not to become members or have resigned

membership of Defendant California State Employees Association,

Local 1000, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC

(“CSEA”). Plaintiffs motions seek to restrain CSEA from seizing

that portion of Plaintiffs’ agency fees attributable to a special

assessment (“Special Assessment”) that was approved by a vote of

the CSEA General Council delegates on or about August 27, 2005. 

The motions further request that the portion of agency fees

seized from Plaintiffs on or about September 30, 2005, and

October 31, 2005, be placed into the registry of the Court or a

Court-supervised escrow account until further order of this

Court.

On November 2, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a complaint with this

court and concurrently requested the issuance of a Temporary

Restraining Order. The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’

request for a Temporary Restraining Order that same day.

Plaintiffs’ counsel appeared in person and counsel for defendant

CSEA appeared telephonically. The Court granted the requested

Temporary Restraining Order.

In light of the pending special election to be held in

California on November 8, 2005, the Court set an expedited

briefing schedule on the requested Preliminary Injunction and

heard oral argument on the requested injunctive relief on

November 4, 2005 at which counsel for all parties appeared. At

the conclusion of oral argument, the Court made findings in open

court bearing on the ultimate propriety of granting a preliminary

injunction and, for the reasons set forth below, concluded that

injunctive relief is not warranted in this case.

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Plaintiffs salient contention is that CSEA imposed a twenty

five percent (25%) increase in nonmember state workers’ agency

fees without satisfying the requisite constitutional protections

inherent in the First and Fourteenth Amendments. For support,

Plaintiffs rely on Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFLCIO, et. al., v. Hudson, et. al., 475 U.S. 292 (1986), wherein

the Supreme Court balanced the right of a union to require every

employee to contribute to the cost of collective-bargaining

activities against the right of objecting nonmembers to be free

from compulsory subsidization of ideological activities with

which they disagree. Id. at 303 (citing Abood v. Detroit Board

of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 237 (1977). In striking that

balance, the Court articulated a three part requirement which

protects the constitutional rights and interests of both unions

and individuals. Specifically, in order for a union to

constitutionally seize funds from nonmember workers, the union

must provide an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee,

must provide a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the

amount of the fee before an impartial decision maker, and place

in escrow the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges

are pending. Id. at 310.

In this instance, CSEA provided Plaintiffs with a notice of

proposed dues for 2005-2006 on June 30, 2005 (“June Hudson

Notice”). That notice, while certainly compliant with Hudson for

all regularly collected dues, did not expressly set forth the

Special Assessment imposed on all state workers, including

Plaintiffs, beginning September 30, 2005. The question raised by

the imposition of this Special Assessment is whether the June

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Hudson Notice was sufficient to satisfy the Hudson three part

requirement as to the Special Assessment or whether this Special

Assessment was so unusual as to require an additional Hudson

notice.

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and

Plaintiffs have the burden of proving the propriety of such a

remedy by clear and convincing evidence. See Granny Goose Foods,

Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 442 (1974). In order to warrant

issuance of a preliminary injunction, a party must demonstrate

either: 1) a combination of probable success on the merits and

the possibility of irreparable injury; or 2) that serious

questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in

favor of granting the requested injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l

Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839-

40 (9th Cir. 2001). These two alternatives represent two points

on a sliding scale, pursuant to which the required degree of

irreparable harm increases or decreases in inverse correlation to

the probability of success on the merits. Roe v. Anderson, 134

F.3d 140-0, 1402 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Nutri-cology,

Inc., 982 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). Under either

formulation of the test for granting a preliminary injunction,

however, Plaintiffs must demonstrate a significant threat of

irreparable injury. Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g.

Co., 762 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1985).

Plaintiffs assert that the June Hudson Notice was

constitutionally infirm because the Special Assessment

constituted a twenty five percent (25%) fee increase and was

allocated to purely political purposes in violation of

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The Special Assessment was set forth in a letter dated 1

August 31, 2005, addressed to Local 1000 Members and Fair Share

Fee Payers. (Plf.s’ Exh. D) Therein, CSEA explained that the

Special Assessment would be used to “...create a Political Fight

Back Fund.” Id. The letter went on to provide that the Special

Assessment would be used to “...defeat Proposition 76 and

Proposition 75 on November 8.” Id. 

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Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs go on to argue 1

that if the Special Assessment is used for the purpose of

speaking to specific political issues, they will be irreparably

injured because their First Amendment right to free speech will

be abridged. CSEA rebuts that Hudson does not require additional

notice for a mid-year change in agency fees. Instead, CSEA

argues that Hudson only requires unions to give a yearly notice

based on proposed expenditures computed from the prior year’s

audited figures. In addition, CSEA objects to Plaintiffs’

contention that the Special Assessment is purely for political

purposes. Rather, CSEA avers that some of the Assessment will be

expended for purposes chargeable to all state workers whether

union members or not. This being the case, CSEA argues that it,

too, has a right to speak and enjoining them from doing so would

abridge its First Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court recognized that “...there are practical

reasons why absolute precision in the calculation of the charge

to nonmembers cannot be expected or required.” Hudson, 475 U.S.

at 307, n. 18. In the instant action, while the Special

Assessment does depart from the figures presented to the

Plaintiffs in the June Hudson Notice, such a departure is

unquestionably permitted under the Hudson holding. See id. 

///

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In addition, Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to

preclude Defendants from using their agency fees for certain

expenses even when those expenses are clothed in political garb. 

See Lehnert et. al., v. Ferris Faculty Assoc. et. al., 500 U.S.

507 (1991). 

In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to show that the balance of

hardships tips sharply in favor of granting the requested

injunction. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth fully above, Plaintiffs motion for

a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 8, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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