Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03580/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03580-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Libel,Assault,Slander

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The request for oral argument is denied because the parties have thoroughly discussed the

law and evidence and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Mahon v. Credit

Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allen G. Hutchens, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Teresa Jean Hutchens, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-3580-PCT-DGC

ORDER

Defendant Teresa Jean Hutchens and Defendants City of Kingman and Bryan

Bredenkamp have filed motions for summary judgment. Dkt. ##94, 95. Plaintiff Allen

Hutchens has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Dkt. #99. The Court has

reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties. Dkt. ##94, 95, 99, 102, 104. For the

reasons stated below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and

deny Plaintiff’s motion.1

I. Background.

The facts are largely undisputed. On September 7, 2005, Defendant Hutchens called

the City of Kingman Police Department and stated that she wanted to file a report regarding

unwanted contacts at work. Dkt. #94-2, Ex. 1 at 94-95. Defendant Bryan Bredenkamp, a

Kingman police officer, responded to Defendant Hutchens’ request. Id., Ex. 2 at 17, 60.

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Defendant Hutchens reported that she had been sued in federal court in Oregon by her

“crazy” uncle, Plaintiff Allen Hutchens. Id., Ex. 1 at 17-19; Dkt. #101, Ex. 11. There is

some dispute over whether Defendant Hutchens, an attorney, was representing herself pro

se at this point in the Oregon litigation or whether she was still represented by counsel to

whom all of Plaintiff’s contacts should have been directed. See, e.g., Dkt. ##98; 104 at 4.

Defendant Hutchens told Defendant Bredenkamp that although the litigation was over,

Plaintiff was still contacting her at her place of work, the Mohave County Mediation Office.

Dkt. #94-2, Ex. 1 at 93-94. The letters Plaintiff sent and phone calls he made were upsetting

to Defendant Hutchens and her coworkers, and her supervisor requested that she contact the

police. Id. Defendants Hutchens and Bredenkamp agreed that Defendant Bredenkamp

would call Plaintiff and warn him to stop contacting Defendant Hutchens or face possible

harassment charges. Id., Ex. 1 at 96. 

Later that day, Defendant Bredenkamp contacted Plaintiff by telephone at his Florida

home. Id., Ex. 2 at 62. Defendant Bredenkamp states that he merely warned Plaintiff against

contacting Defendant Hutchens at her workplace and told him that further contact could

result in charges of harassment. Id. Plaintiff admits that it was his understanding that

Defendant Bredenkamp was calling to warn him against contacting Defendant Hutchens, and

that Defendant Bredenkamp did not state that he was planning to have Plaintiff arrested. Dkt.

#94-2, Ex. 4 at 98, 112. Plaintiff claims, however, that Defendant Bredenkamp told him that

if Defendant Hutchens filed another complaint, Plaintiff would be arrested, extradited, and

sent to prison. Id. at 99. 

During the call, Plaintiff requested that Defendant Bredenkamp serve him with a court

order requiring him to refrain from contacting Defendant Hutchens at her workplace. Id. at

99-100. Defendant Bredenkamp advised Plaintiff that no court order would be served, and

that the phone call was simply a warning. Dkt. #94-2, Ex. 2 at 29-30, 62-63; Ex. 4 at 89-90.

When Plaintiff became argumentative, Defendant Bredenkamp ended the call. Id., Ex. 2 at

30. Virgilio Santana, who apparently helped Plaintiff around his house, testified that he

heard this telephone conversation and that Plaintiff was visibly upset, but that he does not

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The parties disagree over other facts that are immaterial. Much of Plaintiff’s opposition

brief is comprised of digressive passages that contradict minor facts and assertions by

Defendants. For example, Plaintiff explains in detail why he called Defendant Bredenkamp

by his first name (Dkt. #102 at 7-8), why Defendant Bredenkamp “knowingly lied” in stating

that he did not believe Plaintiff was using a speaker phone (Id. at 11-19), why he does not

consider himself unemployed as alleged by Defendant Hutchens (Dkt. #104 at 12-14), and

why his conviction and imprisonment for firing a gun at his wife in a Shoney’s restaurant

should not have caused Defendant Hutchens to fear him (Id. at 8-10). The Court will

consider only those disputed questions of fact that are material to a disposition on the

motions for summary judgment. 

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recall specifically what Defendant Bredenkamp told Plaintiff. Dkt. #106, Ex. 3 at 26.

Defendant Bredenkamp and Plaintiff spoke again on September 26, 2005, when the

officer returned a phone call that Plaintiff had placed to him. Plaintiff discussed with

Defendant Bredenkamp whether he could file a complaint against Defendant Hutchens for

filing a false police report. Id., Ex. 4 at 102-03. Plaintiff stated that Defendant Hutchens had

lied when she told Defendant Bredenkamp the Oregon litigation was over. See Dkt. #102

at 16-18. Defendant Bredenkamp told Plaintiff that he was quite sure Defendant Hutchens

would not face criminal charges. Id. This was the final time Defendant Bredenkamp spoke

with Plaintiff. Defendant Bredenkamp testified that he did not know or believe that either

phone call would inflict fear on Plaintiff. Dkt. #94-2, Ex. 2 at 33-34. Plaintiff filed this

complaint on November 8, 2005. Dkt. #1.2

II. Legal Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The disputed evidence must be

“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.

/ / /

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III. Discussion.

A. Defendants City of Kingman and Bryan Bredenkamp.

1. Negligence.

To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) that defendants owed a

duty to conform to a certain standard of care, (2) that defendants breached that standard, (3)

that defendants’ conduct caused the resulting injury, and (4) that the plaintiff incurred actual

damages. Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (Ariz. 2007). The first element is a question

of law for the court to decide. Id. The second element – whether there has been a breach of

duty – “is an issue of fact that turns on the specifics of the individual case.” Id. Summary

judgment may be granted, however, “if no reasonable juror could conclude that the standard

of care was breached.” Id. n.1.

Arizona law broadly states that police officers “have a duty to act as would a

reasonably careful and prudent police [officer] in the same circumstances.” Austin v. City

of Scottsdale, 684 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984); Newman v. Maricopa County, 808 P.2d 1253,

1256 (Ariz. App. 1991). When responding to Defendant Hutchens’ complaint and contacting

Plaintiff, Defendant Bredenkamp therefore had a duty to conduct himself as would a

reasonably careful and prudent police officer. 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has not

presented testimony of a police officer on whether Defendant Bredenkamp’s actions

breached the standard of care of a reasonable police officer in his position. Dkt. #94 at 5.

Defendants claim that to prevail on a negligence claim against a defendant in a particular

profession, a plaintiff must present expert testimony by a member of that profession. Id.

Defendants are incorrect. In Arizona, the rule is merely that expert testimony “may be

required in those cases in which factual issues are outside the common understanding of

jurors.” Rossell v. Volkswagen of America, 709 P.2d 517, 524 (Ariz. 1985). While

Defendants cite cases suggesting that expert testimony regarding the standard of care may

be necessary in the fields of air conditioning repair, civil engineering, and medicine (Dkt. #94

at 5), they cite no case suggesting that the standard of care for police officers is outside the

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ken of jurors. As Plaintiff argues, the jury could determine whether Defendant Bredenkamp

breached his duty without expert testimony. See, e.g., Dkt. #102 at 21-22. 

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bredenkamp was negligent in several

ways: (1) “by not asking to see the . . . letters Defendant [Hutchens] claimed w[ere] mailed

to her by Plaintiff,” (2) “by not checking with the District Court in Oregon to verify that

Defendant[] [Hutchens’] story was true and the case had in fact ended,” (3) by not asking

[Defendant Hutchens’] supervisor, if the supervisor did instruct the Defendant to phone the

police,” (4) “[by phoning] the elderly Plaintiff, while knowing the Plaintiff was elderly and

venerable [sic], and wrongfully inform[ing] the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff would be arrested;

extradited and imprisoned (without due process) if the defendant Teresa Jean Hutchens ever

filed another harassment complaint against the Plaintiff,” (5) “by conspiring with the

Defendant Teresa Jean Hutchens to use scare tactics and inflict fear and severe emotional

distress upon the elderly crippled Plaintiff,” and (6) “[by not] check[ing] in any manner

whatsoever, contrary to basic common sense, and rather than making a simple phone call to

the United States District Court in Oregon and asking the question, “Has the civil case, Allen

Hutchens vs. Teresa Hutchens ended.” Dkt. #1 at 12. These allegations essentially claim

that Defendant Bredenkamp was negligent in failing to investigate Defendant Hutchens’

claims more carefully and in threatening Plaintiff with arrest, extradition, and imprisonment.

See, e.g., Dkt. ##1-4 at 12. 

The Court must first determine whether Defendant Bredenkamp breached his duty by

failing to investigate the veracity of everything Defendant Hutchens told him. The

undisputed facts show that Defendant Hutchens told Defendant Bredenkamp that the Oregon

litigation was over, that Plaintiff was “crazy,” that Plaintiff had been contacting her at her

workplace, that her supervisor had requested that she file a police report, and that she hoped

Defendant Bredenkamp would call Plaintiff and ask him to leave her alone. See, e.g., Dkt.

#101, Ex. 11. Had Defendant Bredenkamp investigated further, he may have discovered that

the Oregon litigation was not over. (Defendant Hutchens was granted summary judgment

in the Oregon litigation on November 30, 2006. Dkt. #101, Ex. 1.) He may have formed a

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In his opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff asserts that the testimony admitting that

he did not believe Defendant Bredenkamp was going to arrest him, but was merely issuing

a warning, is fabricated. Dkt. #102 at 7. Plaintiff does not explain the basis for this bold

assertion. Plaintiff does state in an affidavit that during his deposition he “was incoherent

to the point that [the attorneys] both laughed at some of [his] questions and answers, and . . .

even asked [him] if [he] could read.” Dkt. #99 at 22. In the same affidavit and attached

letter, however, he states that he has no objection to Defendants using his deposition

testimony in any lawful manner. Id. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s deposition and finds

no basis to believe that any portion of it is fabricated.

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belief that Plaintiff had a right to contact Defendant Hutchens for purposes relating to the

Oregon litigation. But further investigation would not have changed the undisputed facts that

Plaintiff was making repetitive phone calls and sending letters to Defendant Hutchens at her

workplace, in a manner perceived as harassing and distracting to Defendant Hutchens and

her co-workers. In the face of such repeated and apparently harassing conduct, Defendant

Bredenkamp acted reasonably and prudently in choosing to call Plaintiff rather than launch

an investigation. Defendant Bredenkamp did not breach his duty to act as a reasonably

careful and prudent police officer under the circumstances.

 The Court must also determine if Defendant Bredenkamp breached his duty during

his conversation with Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff testified, and the Court must accept as

true, that Defendant Bredenkamp told him he would be extradited, arrested, and placed in

prison if Defendant Hutchens filed another complaint, it is clear from Plaintiff’s own

testimony that Plaintiff interpreted Defendant Bredenkamp’s call as merely a warning.

Plaintiff testified during his deposition that he understood Defendant Bredenkamp was

calling simply to request that he stop harassing Defendant Hutchens and to warn him that

future unwelcome contact could result in criminal charges of harassment. Plaintiff further

testified that he knew Defendant Bredenkamp was not going to arrest him, and that he

believed Defendant Bredenkamp’s phone call was based on the officer’s true belief of

Plaintiff’s conduct toward Defendant Hutchens.3

 Plaintiff even told Defendant Bredenkamp

in a second phone conversation that he would have responded to Defendant Hutchens’ report

in precisely the same manner. See Dkt. #102 at 15-16. 

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While Plaintiff alleges there was a conspiracy between Defendants to inflict emotional

distress (Dkt. #1 at 12), he has absolutely no evidence of a plan between Defendants

Hutchens and Bredenkamp, and Defendant Hutchens testified that no such plan existed.

Dkt. #98, T. Hutchens Depo. In addition, although Virgilio Santana testified that Plaintiff

appeared disturbed by the contact from Defendant Bredenkamp, he also stated that he could

not recall specifically what Defendant Bredenkamp said. See, e.g., Dkt. #106, Ex. 3 at 26.

Because Plaintiff’s own testimony corroborates Defendant Bredenkamp’s assertion

that he merely issued a warning to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has produced no

evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Bredenkamp breached

his duty to act as a reasonable police officer under the circumstances. 

In addition to this holding, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has produced no

evidence of actual damages. The only negligence damages he alleges are various types of

emotional distress. Dkt. #1-4 at 13. Under Arizona law, however, a plaintiff may recover

for negligent infliction of emotional distress only if “the shock or mental anguish of the

plaintiff [is] manifested as a physical injury. Damages for emotional disturbance alone are

too speculative.” Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668, 669 (Ariz. 1979). Plaintiff repeatedly

states that he is elderly, crippled, and ill (Dkt. #102 at 3, 7, 9, 10, 19, 20, 21), but he has not

alleged that any of these physical ailments occurred as a result of Defendant Bredenkamp’s

conduct. In fact, he specifically states that Defendant Bredenkamp’s conduct resulted only

in “severe and lasting emotional distress[.]” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). Plaintiff has not

shown that he experienced other actual damages that are recoverable in negligence actions

in Arizona, such as physical harm, Felder v. Physiotherapy Assocs., 158 P.3d 877, 889 (Ariz.

App. 2007); greater susceptibility to illness or a decreased physical ability, Destories v. City

of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705, 709 (Ariz. App. 1987); or pecuniary damages, Standard Chartered

PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317, 345 (Ariz. App. 1996). 

Because the Court will grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence claim

against Defendant Bredenkamp, the Court will also grant summary judgment to Defendant

City of Kingman, whose alleged liability is based solely on a theory of respondeat superior.

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See Hernandez v. Maricopa County, 673 P.2d 341, 343 (Ariz. App. 1983). 

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 

To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), a plaintiff must

prove that (1) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, (2) the defendant either

intended to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the near certainty that distress

would result from the conduct, and (3) the conduct caused the plaintiff severe emotional

distress. See Lucchesi v. Stimmell, 716 P.2d 1013, 1015-16 (Ariz. 1986) (citing Watts v.

Golden Age Nursing Home, 619 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Ariz. 1980)).

Under the first element, a plaintiff “may recover for [IIED] only where the

defendant’s acts are ‘so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond

all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a

civilized community.’” Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Phoenix, 578 P.2d 152,

155 (Ariz. 1978) (quoting Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 460 P.2d 666, 668 (Ariz. 1969)). It

is not enough “that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal,

or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been

characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to

punitive damages for another tort.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 cmt. d (1965).

No reasonable jury could find that Defendant Bredenkamp’s actions were so

outrageous or extreme as to be utterly intolerable. He received a complaint from Defendant

Hutchens that Plaintiff was harassing her. He called Plaintiff at his home in Florida and

warned him to stop contacting Defendant Hutchens. Defendant Bredenkamp believed

Defendant Hutchens’ reports of harassment to be true. Defendant Bredenkamp’s conduct in

attempting to act on these reports does not come close to the outrageous and extreme conduct

required for IIED claims.

 Further, Defendant Bredenkamp testified that he did not believe that he would invoke

fear in Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has not contradicted this testimony. Dkt. #94-2, Ex. 2 at 33-34.

In fact, Plaintiff has testified that he interpreted Defendant Bredenkamp’s call as only a

warning. Id., Ex. 4 at 97-98, 112. When Plaintiff called Defendant Bredenkamp after their

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first phone conversation, he told Defendant Bredenkamp that he understood Defendant

Bredenkamp’s position and that Defendant Bredenkamp must have believed Defendant

Hutchens was telling the truth. Id. at 103. Plaintiff has produced no evidence that Defendant

Bredenkamp either intended to cause or recklessly disregarded the near certainty that his

conduct would cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress. The Court will therefore grant

summary judgment to Defendant Bredenkamp on Plaintiff’s IIED claim.

Because the Court will grant summary judgment to Defendant Bredenkamp on

Plaintiff’s IIED claim, the Court will also grant summary judgment to Defendant City of

Kingman, whose liability is based solely on a theory of respondeat superior. See Hernandez,

673 P.2d at 343.

B. Defendant Hutchens.

1. Abuse of Process.

Defendant Hutchens argues that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from bringing an 

abuse of process or IIED claim because of a temporary restraining order issued by a federal

court in Oregon that precluded Plaintiff from contacting Defendant Hutchens “for any reason

whatsoever.” Dkt. #97 at 3. This argument fails for two reasons. First, there is no evidence

that the temporary restraining order lasted long enough to preclude Plaintiff from contacting

Defendant Hutchens in Arizona. Second, the issue of whether Plaintiff was or was not

allowed to contact Defendant Hutchens is not the same issue as whether Defendant Hutchens

committed abuse of process, defamation, or IIED. Collateral estoppel does not apply because

“the issue at stake [is not] identical to the one alleged in the prior litigation.” See Town of

Bonneville v. Calloway, 10 F.3d 1505, 1508 (9th Cir. 1993). Contrary to Defendant

Hutchens’ assertion, Plaintiff is not trying to relitigate whether he had a right to contact

Defendant. 

To prevail on an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must show that a defendant

committed (1) a willful act in the use of judicial process (2) for an ulterior and primary

purpose not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings. Niendstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d

876, 881 (Ariz. App. 1982). Arizona courts, following authority from other jurisdictions,

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have defined the first part of the test as “encompassing the entire range of court procedures

incident to the litigation process.” Id.; see also Gray v. Kohlase, 502 P.2d 169, 173 (Ariz.

App. 1973) (granting summary judgment when “defendants took no action pursuant to

authority of court, directly or by ancillary proceedings, [and] no judicial process was

abused”). “Thus, the essence of the tort ‘abuse of process’ lies in the misuse of the power

of the court; it is an act done in the name of the court and under its authority for the purpose

of perpetrating an injustice.” Gray, 502 P.2d at 173 (quoting Meadows v. Bakersfield Sav.

& Loan Ass’n, 59 Cal.Rptr. 34, 37 (1967)).

Defendant Hutchens did not use the judicial process when she filed a report with

Defendant Bredenkamp. The police report was not part of the Oregon litigation, which was

the only ongoing litigation between Plaintiff and Defendant Hutchens. The police report was

entirely removed from the judicial process. Even if Defendant Hutchens lied to Defendant

Bredenkamp, an abuse of process claim does not provide the means to remedy such deceit.

Because Plaintiff cannot satisfy the first element of a claim for abuse of process, the Court

will grant summary judgment to Defendant Hutchens on this claim.

2. Defamation.

Defendant Hutchens correctly argues that any statements she made to Defendant

Bredenkamp were absolutely privileged. Dkt. #97 at 8-9. Arizona recognizes an absolute

privilege for formal and informal statements or complaints made to police officers. See

Ledvina v. Cerasani, 146 P.3d 70, 74 (Ariz. App. 2006). While Plaintiff cites cases that he

alleges contradict Defendant’s argument, these cases deal with qualified, not absolute

privilege. Dkt. #104 at 20 (citing, e.g., Green Acres Trust v. London, 688 P.2d 617, 624

(Ariz. 1984)). An absolute privilege for statements made to police furthers the sound public

policy of protecting speech in “those situations where the public interest is so vital and

apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant’s

motives.” Ledvina, 146 P.3d at 72 (citing Sobol v. Alarcon, 131 P.3d 487, 490 (Ariz. App.

2006)). Because all of Defendant Hutchens’ allegedly defamatory statements were made

during the course of her report to Defendant Bredenkamp, the Court will grant summary

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judgment to Defendant Hutchens on Plaintiff’s defamation claim.

3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Defendant Hutchens’ actions were not so extreme and outrageous as to satisfy the first

element of the claim for IIED. Much of Plaintiff’s opposition is dedicated to showing that

Defendant Hutchens either had no grounds to believe that Plaintiff lacked the right to contact

her or, alternatively, no grounds to feel harassed or threatened by Plaintiff. Dkt. #104 at 5-

10. Even if Defendant Hutchens knew that Plaintiff might have a right to contact her, the

filing of a police report to stop distracting conduct she considered harassment – contact from

Plaintiff at her place of work – is not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to make out a claim

for IIED under Arizona law. See Patton, 578 P.2d at 155. 

 In addition, Plaintiff has produced no evidence that Defendant Hutchens intended to

cause Plaintiff distress or recklessly disregarded the near certainty that severe distress would

occur. While Plaintiff argues that he had a right to contact Defendant Hutchens because she

was representing herself in the Oregon litigation (Dkt. #104 at 4), no reasonable jury could

find that Defendant Hutchens’ attempt to stop workplace contact from Plaintiff was intended

to cause him severe emotional distress. Rather, the evidence leads only to the conclusion that

Defendant Hutchens wanted Plaintiff to stop contacting her. In addition, although Plaintiff

repeatedly accuses Defendant Hutchens of lying to police (see, e.g., Dkt. #104 at 11-12),

such bare accusations do not suffice to demonstrate a question of fact regarding Defendant

Hutchens’ intent. 

4. Punitive Damages.

Punitive damages are not permitted when no underlying tort has been committed.

Quiroga v. Allstate Ins. Co., 726 P.2d 224, 226 (Ariz. App. 1986). The Court will grant

summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants City of Kingman and Bryan Bredenkamp’s motion for summary

judgment (Dkt. #94) is granted.

2. Defendant Teresa Jean Hutchens’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #95)

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is granted.

3. Plaintiff Allen G. Hutchens’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #99) is

denied.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 10th day of August, 2007.

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