Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00407/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-00407-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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No. C 13-0407 RS (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEF’S. MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

*E-Filed 11/4/15*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

VINCENT PRICE MCCOWAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. AVALOS, et al., 

Defendants. /

No. C 13-0407 RS (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT 

INTRODUCTION

In this federal civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff, a state

prisoner proceeding pro se, claims that A. Avalos, a prison guard at Salinas Valley State

Prison and the sole remaining defendant in this action, violated his due process rights by

filing a false disciplinary report. Defendant Avalos moves for summary judgment, and has

provided plaintiff with the required warnings under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962–63

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). For the reasons stated herein, the motion is GRANTED in favor of

Avalos as to all claims. 

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1 In a separate grievance filed in April 2012 against another prison employee, plaintiff

stated that he intended to file a petition against Avalos, but he provided no specific allegations

against her. (MSJ, Medina Decl., Ex. B at 2.) 

No. C 13-0407 RS (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEF’S. MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

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BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are undisputed. In April 2012, defendant Avalos

filed a report against plaintiff for indecent exposure after allegedly seeing him masturbate in

front of her. In May, a disciplinary hearing was held on the resulting charge. Plaintiff was

given prior notice of the hearing, a copy of the report, the services of an investigator, and the

opportunity to call witnesses and to present evidence. He refused to attend the hearing,

however, and therefore presented no witnesses or evidence. He was found guilty of the

charge and assessed a 90 day forfeiture of good time credits. The prison then provided him a

written report of the ruling, and instructions on how to appeal the decision. (Def’s. Mot. for

Summ. J. (“MSJ”) at 3.) 

Plaintiff thereafter filed a grievance against Avalos (Log Number SVSP-L-12-02141)

in June 2012. (Id. at 5.) When it reached the second level of review, an interviewer,

Sergeant Correa, attempted to talk to plaintiff about this grievance, but he refused to

participate in the interview or cooperate with Correa. Plaintiff’s grievance was cancelled

because he refused to participate in the necessary grievance process. He did not appeal the

cancellation of his grievance or attempt to refile it.1

 (Id. at 5–6.) 

In his suit, plaintiff alleges that defendant Avalos violated his due process rights by

filing a false report which then resulted in a disciplinary hearing and a loss of credits. 

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing this suit. She also moves to dismiss his allegations on

grounds that they fail to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff offers the following statement

regarding whether he exhausted his claims: “Petitioner [sic] has executed [sic] his grievance

process and he would never circumvent, or avoid, the appeal[]s coordinator’s office, when he

is addressing very important issues ... that’s always rejected.” (Docket No. 64 at 2.) 

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No. C 13-0407 RS (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEF’S. MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

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DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits

demonstrate that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those

which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where

the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively

demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. On an

issue for which the opposing party by contrast will have the burden of proof at trial the

moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. 

The Court is only concerned with disputes over material facts and “factual disputes

that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It is not

the task of the court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v.

Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of

identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id. 

If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

II. Exhaustion

Defendant moves for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing this suit. Prisoners must exhaust their administrative

remedies properly before filing suit in federal court. “No action shall be brought with respect

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No. C 13-0407 RS (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEF’S. MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

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to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies

as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and is no

longer left to the discretion of the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006)

(citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). The PLRA exhaustion requirement

mandates “proper exhaustion” of all available administrative remedies. Id. at 93. 

The State of California provides its prisoners the right to appeal administratively “any

policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the [CDCR] or its staff that the inmate . . .

can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or

welfare.” 15 CCR § 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within

this system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal review,

submitted on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form; (2) first formal level appeal, to an institution

appeals coordinator; (3) second formal level appeal, to the institution warden; and (4) third

formal level appeal, to the Director of the CDCR. See id. § 3084.7; Brodheim v. Cry, 584

F.3d 1262, 1264–65 (9th Cir. 2009). 

If the inmate refuses to be interviewed or to cooperate with the interviewer, the appeal

may be cancelled. 15 CCR § 3084.6(c)(8). Although a cancelled appeal may not be

submitted for further review, the inmate may separately appeal the cancellation. Id. 

§ 3084.6(e). A cancelled appeal does not exhaust administrative remedies. Id. § 3084.1(b).

Defendants have presented evidence that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies prior to filing this suit. Such evidence shows that his jailors cancelled his 

grievance prior to the final stage of exhaustion because he failed to participate in the

necessary processes, informed him of the decision, and provided instructions on how to

appeal the cancellation. This evidence also shows that plaintiff did not appeal the

cancellation or file another grievance regarding Avalos. 

Plaintiff has not met his burden under Rule 56 to set out specific facts showing a

genuine dispute for trial. That is, he has not specifically disputed defendant’s evidentiary

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2 Immediately following this statement, plaintiff directs the reader’s attention to exhibits.

These exhibits are grievance forms detailing his complaints about prison mail, and do not relate

at all to the issues in this case. (Docket No. 64, Ex. A.) 

No. C 13-0407 RS (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEF’S. MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

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assertions that he failed to exhaust his claims in this action. Rather, he offers a generalized

statement that he “has executed his grievance process and he would never circumvent, or

avoid, the appeals coordinator’s office when addressing very important issues . . . that’s

always rejected.”2

 This is too vague (and confusing) to satisfy Rule 56’s specificity

requirement, especially in light of the highly specific evidence presented by defendant. See

Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770, 780 (9th Cir. 2010) (nonmoving party’s

opposition was too vague to meet rule 56’s specificity requirement in view of the detailed

evidence contained in the movant’s papers). Merely saying in a conclusory fashion that he

exhausted the grievance process and that he, as a general matter, would never avoid the

process, is not sufficient. Without specific details about what he filed, what level his

grievance reached, what decisions his jailors issued, etc., the Court cannot tell whether he

complied with the prison’s grievance process requirements, which define the boundaries of

proper exhaustion, Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 923 (2007). His statement, then, is not a

statement (or evidence) that he attempted to, or that he did indeed, exhaust his claims against

Avalos prior to filing suit. Defendants, then, have presented evidence, which plaintiff has not

disputed successfully, that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Even if

plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies, his allegations fail to state a claim, as

discussed in the next section.

III. Due Process

Plaintiff alleges that Avalos violated his right to due process by falsely reporting that

he masturbated in front of her. He does not allege, however, that he failed to receive due

process at his hearing on the charge of indecent exposure. 

A prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly

accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.

Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949,

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No. C 13-0407 RS (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEF’S. MOT. FOR SUMM. J.

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951 (2d Cir. 1986). As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the

disciplinary hearing, allegations of a fabricated charge fail to state a claim under § 1983.

Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140–41 (7th Cir. 1984). A false charge that results in

discipline that does not amount to a deprivation of a protected liberty interest under Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), is not actionable under § 1983 if it does not implicate another

constitutional right (e.g., the First Amendment right to be free of retaliation). See Smith v.

Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653–54 (3d Cir. 2002); see, e.g., id. at 654 (even if the charges that

led to disciplinary confinement were false, no claim was stated because the disciplinary

confinement imposed was too short to amount to an atypical and significant hardship under

Sandin).

Under these standards, plaintiff’s allegations that Avalos filed a false report, even if

true, do not state a claim under section 1983. Furthermore, he has made no allegation (much

less a showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact) that he did not receive due

process at his hearing or at any other time, or that any other constitutional right was

implicated by Avalos’s actions. 

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 55) is GRANTED in favor of

defendant Avalos as to all claims. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Avalos, 

terminate Docket No. 55, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 4, 2015 

 RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

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