Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-02943/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-02943-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT CHRISTOPHER JIMENEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. WHITFIELD, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:10-cv-2943 KJM KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Defendants move to dismiss this 

action. For the reasons stated below, the motion should be partially granted.

II. Procedural Background

On appeal, following settlement negotiations, the parties agreed that plaintiff would 

withdraw the appeal without prejudice to its reinstatement, to allow the district court to vacate 

certain dispositive orders. (ECF No. 88-2 at 2.) In the parties’ joint motion to vacate judgments 

and modify dispositive orders, plaintiff’s claims were identified as:

• Mr. Jimenez’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process 

rights were violated because he was not given the requisite 

opportunity to be heard before he was validated as a member of a 

prison gang;

• Mr. Jimenez’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process 

rights were violated because the evidence that was used to validate 

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him was legally insufficient to constitute evidence of gang activity 

and serve as a basis for validation; and

• Mr. Jimenez’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated by his 

validation and his indefinite confinement to SHU, the deprivation 

of necessary medical care in connection with hepatitis C, and the 

named Defendants’ alleged indifference.

(ECF No. 88 at 2.) This action was reopened following the district court’s order vacating the 

judgment, denying defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, and granting plaintiff leave 

to file an amended pleading “for the purpose of pleading additional facts to support his claim that 

defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights.” (ECF No. 90 at 2.) On December 16, 2014, 

the undersigned confirmed that two claims should be renewed in any amended pleading: 

(1) it is undisputed that there is a material dispute of fact as to 

plaintiff’s claim that defendant Whitfield denied plaintiff an 

opportunity to be heard regarding purported evidence used to 

classify him as a gang member, and that plaintiff is entitled to a jury 

trial on such claim; and

(2) plaintiff’s claim that his due process rights were violated by 

defendant Whitfield when plaintiff was validated as a gang member 

in the absence of sufficient evidence. 

(ECF No. 94 at 3.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file a second amended complaint to plead 

additional facts to support his Eighth Amendment claims. (ECF No. 94 at 3.) Plaintiff was 

informed that § 1983 requires “an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants 

and the deprivation alleged.” (ECF No. 94 at 3.) Plaintiff was also informed of the objective and 

subjective components of an Eighth Amendment claim brought under Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 832 (1994). (ECF No. 94 at 4.) In addition, plaintiff was provided a copy of his 

appellate counsel’s opening brief pertinent to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. (ECF No. 94 

at 5.) 

On January 8, 2015, the undersigned addressed the pleading deficiencies in plaintiff’s 

second and third amended complaints, and noted that plaintiff again failed to link or connect each 

named defendant to the alleged Eighth Amendment violations. (ECF No. 100 at 2.)

On September 2, 2015, the undersigned screened plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint, 

and again found that plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support his Eighth Amendment 

claims. (ECF No. 102.) Specifically, the undersigned noted that plaintiff’s conclusory statement 

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that defendants were “fully aware” of the conditions, “standing alone, was insufficient to 

demonstrate that each defendant acted with the requisite state of mind, or to satisfy plaintiff’s 

pleading burden,” citing, inter alia, Cervantes v. Adams, 2013 WL 491559, at *1 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(holding that district court had properly dismissed a claim that confinement in the SHU 

constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to 

show that defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk of harm to his health or safety). 

(ECF No. 102 at 9.)

On September 22, 2015, plaintiff filed his fifth amended complaint in which he alleged

violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights related to his validation as 

a gang member and subsequent long term detention in the Secured Housing Unit (“SHU”). (ECF 

No. 104.) Specifically, plaintiff renewed his due process claim that defendant Whitfield failed to 

provide plaintiff an opportunity to be heard prior to his gang validation on June 7, 2007. Plaintiff 

renewed his claims that defendants Whitfield and Bond failed to ensure the source items bore 

some indicia of reliability, arguing that there was not “some evidence” to support the decision to 

validate him as a gang member.1 Plaintiff also added the following due process claims based on 

his allegation that the gang validation was wrongfully decided: defendants Melgoza, Singh, and 

Grannis reviewed plaintiff’s administrative appeals concerning the alleged wrongful validation 

and denied plaintiff’s right to due process by using the same information reviewed by defendant 

 

1

 On June 7, 2007, plaintiff was validated as a Northern Structure gang member by the Law 

Enforcement and Investigative Unit (“LEIU”) at Pelican Bay State Prison. (ECF No. 11 at 25.) The 

LEIU received a gang validation package from Institution Gang Investigator R.L. Bond on November 

21, 2006, consisting of five items: 

1. CDC 128B dated September 23, 2006 (Staff Information)

2. Confidential Memorandum dated September 5, 2006 (Informants)

3. CDC 128B dated July 27, 2006 (Communications-direct link)

4. Confidential Memorandum dated January 11, 2005 (Written Material)

5. CDC 128B dated September 9, 2006 (Tattoos)

(ECF No. 11 at 25.) However, the committee determined that item 5 (tattoos) did not meet the 

validation requirements and were not used to validate plaintiff as a gang member. (Id.) Lt. Bond 

provided a report describing the source items and recommending that plaintiff be validated. (ECF 

No. 48 at 7.)

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Bond; defendant Sisto was the chief decisionmaker, and defendant Sequira questioned plaintiff 

about his gang membership; and defendants Sisto and Sequira were involved in the decision to 

continue plaintiff’s SHU detention, despite the alleged wrongful validation, by allegedly ratifying 

the wrongful gang validation. 

In addition, plaintiff claimed he suffered indefinite and solitary housing in the SHU at 

California State Prison, Solano (“CSP-SOL), and Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”). 

Specifically, plaintiff alleged the indefinite SHU housing deprived him of critical medical 

treatment required for his Hepatitis C at PBSP, and that, as a result, his health worsened and he 

sustained permanent physical injury. Also, plaintiff contended that he had no access to education, 

and that the SHU at CSP-SOL had a roof that leaks when it rains, air circulation and temperature 

controls that didn’t work for months, and that the yards where inmates were strip-searched were

covered in fungus. All of the named defendants were employed at CSP-SOL.

On June 13, 2016, defendants filed their motion to dismiss. Plaintiff opposed the motion, 

and defendants filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 115-17.) 

III. Motion to Dismiss

A. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss based on 

the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A 

motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged. 

See Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). In considering such a 

motion, a court must take all allegations of material fact as true and construe them in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party, although “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 

1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of his 

“entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555.

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In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the issue is “not whether a plaintiff will ultimately 

prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims” advanced in 

his or her complaint. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). While “a complaint need not 

contain detailed factual allegations . . . it must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 

(2009); see also Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than sheer possibility that a defendant acted 

unlawfully.” Id.

In deciding whether to dismiss, a court may consider only the facts alleged in the 

complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and 

matters of which the court may take judicial notice. See U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (“A court may . . . consider certain materials -- documents attached to the complaint, 

documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice -- without 

converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”).

“[T]o ensure that pro se litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits of their 

claim due to ignorance of technical procedural requirements [,]” the pleadings of pro se litigants 

“are liberally construed, particularly where civil rights claims are involved.” Balistreri v. Pacifica 

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). However, a court’s “liberal interpretation of a 

civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of [a] claim that were not initially pled.” 

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Thus, a pro se 

plaintiff’s complaint which offers only “vague and conclusory allegations of official participation 

in civil rights violations” does not state a claim “sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants request judicial notice of plaintiff’s state court filings and orders, as follows:

1. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed on March 24, 2009, in Del Norte County

Superior Court, Case HCPB 09-5058. (ECF No. 115-2 at 4-7.)

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2. Order to Show Cause Re: Habeas Corpus, filed on April 9, 2009, in Del Norte County

Superior Court, Case HCPB 09-5058. (ECF No. 115-2 at 9.)

3. Return to the Order to Show Cause; Memorandum of Points and Authorities, filed on

June 26, 2009, in Del Norte County Superior Court, Case HCPB 09-5068. (ECF No. 115-2 at 11-

22.)

4. Traverse to Respondent’s Return, filed on June 23, 2009, in Del Norte County Superior

Court, Case HCPB 09-5068. (ECF No. 115-2 at 24-34.)

5. Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Discharging Order to Show

Cause, filed on July 14, 2009, in Del Norte County Superior Court, Case HCPB 09-5068. 

(ECF No. 115-2 at 36.)

6. First Amended Complaint, filed on November 5, 2009, in the Northern District of

California, Case C 09-2328. (ECF No. 115-2 at 38-59.)

7. Order of Service, filed on July 28, 2010, in the Northern District of California, Case C

09-2328. (ECF No. 115-2 at 61-66.)

8. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on July 25, 2011, in the Northern

District of California, Case C 09-2328. (ECF No. 115-2 at 68-78.)

9. Judgment, filed on July 25, 2011, in the Northern District of California, Case C 09-

2328. (ECF No. 115-2 at 80.)

In his opposition, plaintiff did not object to judicial notice of the above documents, and it 

appears that they are proper subjects for such notice. See Headwaters Inc. v. United States Forest 

Service, 399 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (taking judicial notice of docket in another 

case); Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(taking judicial notice of “pleadings, orders and other papers on file in the underlying bankruptcy 

case”). Accordingly, defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted.

C. Res Judicata

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims concerning treatment for his 

Hepatitis C in the SHU at PBSP as well as his due process claims are barred by the doctrine of res 

judicata. 

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“The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, 

which are collectively referred to as ‘res judicata.’” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). 

It is well settled that the rules of preclusion apply with equal measure to section 1983 actions. 

See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980). In determining whether a state court decision is 

preclusive, federal courts are required to refer to the preclusion rules of the relevant state. 

Miofsky v. Superior Court of California, 703 F.2d 332, 336 (9th Cir. 1983). Under California 

law, res judicata applies where: 

(1) the issues decided in the prior adjudication were identical to the 

issues raised in the present action, (2) the prior proceeding resulted 

in a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the party against whom 

the plea is raised was a party or was in privity with a party to the 

prior adjudication. 

Citizens for Open Access to Sand and Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053 (Cal. 

Ct. App. 1998). In determining whether the issues raised in a prior case are identical to the ones 

raised in the present action California courts apply the ‘primary rights’ theory under which the 

violation of one primary right gives rise to a single cause of action. Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 

3d 791, 795 (1975). Specifically,

[A] cause of action is (1) a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, 

(2) a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant, 

and (3) a harm done by the defendant which consists in a breach of 

such primary right and duty. Claims are ‘identical’ if they involve 

the same ‘primary right.’

Acuna v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 56 Cal. App. 4th 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). If this cause of 

action test is satisfied, then the same primary right is at stake, even if in the later suit the plaintiff 

pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief, and/or adds new facts 

supporting recovery. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Gonzales v. 

California Dep’t of Corr., 739 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014) (“California’s doctrine of claim 

preclusion does not require identity of relief sought”). “However . . . a given set of facts may 

give rise to the violation of more than one primary right, thus giving a plaintiff the potential of 

two separate lawsuits against a single defendant.” Sawyer v. First City Fin. Corp., 177 Cal. Rptr. 

398, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Finally, a party has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate if the state proceedings 

satisfied the minimum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 

Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982).

i. Eighth Amendment - Treatment for Hepatitis C

In his fifth amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that the indefinite SHU housing at PBSP 

deprived him of critical medical treatment required for his Hepatitis C, and that, as a result, his 

health worsened and he sustained permanent physical injury. In his opposition, plaintiff states he 

was not provided proper Hepatitis C treatment while housed in the PBSP SHU in 2011. (ECF 

No. 116 at 1.) Plaintiff argues that his complaint “differ[s] in characteristics” because he did not 

have cirrhosis of the liver in 2006, but because his due process rights were violated, his health 

worsened and he sustained permanent physical injury. (ECF No. 116 at 2-3.) 

Plaintiff previously provided a copy of Hepatitis C treatment and testing results 

demonstrating he was receiving Ribavirin dosing while he was housed at CSP-SOL. (ECF No. 

95 at 34-35.) While he was housed at CSP-Corcoran, a medical record reflects that, “Dr. Wang 

discontinued your Hepatitis C medications because “you don’t need them anymore.” (ECF No. 

95 at 38.) Plaintiff provided an appeal response confirming that plaintiff’s Hepatitis C treatment 

was discontinued at PBSP. (ECF No. 95 at 39.) 

a. Northern District § 1983 Action - Case No. C092328

In an amended complaint filed on November 5, 2009, in the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of California (“Northern District”), plaintiff sued medical professionals 

at CSP-SOL, CSP-Corcoran, and PBSP claiming such individuals were deliberately indifferent to 

plaintiff’s Hepatitis C, in violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 115-2 at 

38-41.) Specifically, plaintiff alleged that Dr. Rowe discontinued plaintiff’s Hepatitis C treatment 

in PBSP in July of 2008, and that Dr. Sayre, Chief Medical Officer, and Nurse Practitioner 

Risenhoover agreed with the decision of Dr. Rowe. (ECF No. 115-2 at 3.) 

On July 28, 2010, the district court screened plaintiff’s amended complaint, and dismissed 

as improperly joined plaintiff’s claims concerning the care he received at CSP-SOL and CSPCorcoran, noting that the adequacy of medical care at those prisons would be judged based on 

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plaintiff’s medical condition while housed there. (ECF No. 115-2 at 63.) The district court found 

that plaintiff’s medical care at PBSP concerned a unique inquiry: “whether treatment stopped

when it was determined that [plaintiff] was a ‘non-responder’ amounted to deliberate 

indifference.” (ECF No. 115-2 at 63.) 

In addressing the medical defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court 

described the protocol for the treatment of inmates with Hepatitis C at PBSP from May 2004 to 

February 2010, noting that inmates whose test results do not show sufficient reductions in viral 

loads for three months are considered “non-responders,” and the combination therapy must be 

discontinued. (ECF No. 115-2 at 69.) 

The Northern District court found undisputed the following facts:

Plaintiff was diagnosed in June 2007 as having grade 3-4 Hepatitis C, and therapy began 

on July 19, 2007, while he was housed at CSP-SOL. (ECF No. 115-2 at 69.) On or about May 9, 

2008, plaintiff was transferred to CSP-Corcoran, where he received some therapy, but which was 

stopped in May of 2008. (ECF No. 115-2 at 70.) Plaintiff’s viral load had increased between 

October 2007 and February 2008; thus, his treatment was stopped because he was a nonresponder. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was transferred to PBSP on June 10, 2008;2because medical staff did not yet 

have plaintiff’s medical records, the anti-viral therapy was started again as a precautionary 

measure. (ECF No. 115-2 at 70.) Once medical staff reviewed plaintiff’s medical records 

showing that plaintiff was a non-responder, and test results showed that he remained a nonresponder, plaintiff’s therapy was again stopped on July 24, 2008. (ECF No. 115-2 at 70.) 

Because plaintiff had very advanced liver damage, the medical providers consulted with 

University of California San Francisco (“UCSF”) liver specialists, who recommended anti-viral 

therapy be tried again. (ECF No. 115-2 at 71.) On April 13, 2009, therapy began again, but after 

three months, his viral count had not dropped the required amount. Dr. Imperial, an expert at 

 

2

 The district court also found undisputed that the three week disruption in therapy, before 

plaintiff was transferred to PBSP and treatment was resumed in mid-June, would not have 

increased plaintiff’s viral load. (ECF No. 115-2 at 71.)

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UCSF, recommended plaintiff be given one last try with a higher dose of medication. Plaintiff 

received the higher dose for another three months, but his viral count again did not decrease. 

After consultation with UCSF experts, plaintiff’s therapy was discontinued on or about October 

29, 2009, because he was a non-responder. (ECF No. 115-2 at 71.) The district court noted that 

Dr. Sayre “summed up the grim state of affairs,” stating: 

This last round of therapy was well beyond what is required under 

the CDCR protocol. It was university-level therapy at the cusp of 

current treatment, given under the direction of Dr. Imperial and 

with her follow-up of the results. The best therapy currently 

available to treat Hepatitis C does not work on Jimenez. There is 

nothing in our present state of medical knowledge that can cure him 

of Hepatitis C.

(ECF No. 115-2 at 72.)

Based on such undisputed facts, the Northern District court granted the motion for 

summary judgment on July 25, 2011, finding that “no reasonable jury could find in Jimenez’s 

favor on his Eighth Amendment claim.” (ECF No. 115-2 at 75.) 

b. Discussion

In plaintiff’s operative pleading, he claims his placement in the PBSP SHU deprived him 

of medical treatment allegedly required for his Hepatitis C. However, the issue of plaintiff’s 

medical treatment for Hepatitis C while housed in the PBSP SHU was resolved against him by 

the Northern District court in Case No. C092328 on July 25, 2011. Such claim plainly invokes

plaintiff’s alleged primary right to receive medical treatment for his Hepatitis C – the same right 

which is at issue in this case, and the claim is predicated on the same core facts. Thus, plaintiff’s 

allegation that defendants deprived him of treatment for his Hepatitis C by placing him in the 

PBSP SHU is inconsistent with the Northern District’s July 25, 2011 conclusion on the same 

issue. The Northern District decision is final, and was rendered on the merits. Plaintiff, the party 

against whom res judicata is asserted, was the unsuccessful party in the prior § 1983 action. 

Therefore, the plaintiff is the same in both actions, and privity is satisfied.

Thus, plaintiff is barred from raising his Eighth Amendment claim concerning Hepatitis C 

treatment at PBSP in this action.

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ii. Due Process

a. Del Norte Superior Court Case No. HCPB 09-5058

The record reflects that plaintiff challenged the 2007 gang validation decision in his state 

habeas petition filed in Del Norte County Superior Court on March 24, 2009. (ECF No. 115-2 at 

4-11.) Specifically, plaintiff challenged the reliability and accuracy of the source items used to 

validate him as a gang member, and claimed he was denied adequate notice and an opportunity to 

be heard. (ECF No. 115-2 at 4-7.) The Del Norte Superior Court ordered the respondent to show 

cause why the petition should not be granted, and appointed counsel to represent plaintiff. (ECF 

No. 115-2 at 9.) In the return to the order to show cause, the warden argued that plaintiff received 

all the process he was due, and provided confidential information under seal for the superior court 

to review in camera. (ECF No. 115-2 at 12.) The warden discussed the source items used to 

validate plaintiff as a gang member, and explained how each item satisfied the criteria for

reliability. (ECF No. 115-2 at 13-15; 17-18.) The warden submitted evidence showing that on 

October 16, 2006, Officer Whitfield provided plaintiff with the source items and told plaintiff that

Whitfield would return in 24 hours to discuss the documents, but when Whitfield returned 24 

hours later, plaintiff refused to discuss the documents. (ECF No. 115-2 at 15:11-17.) 

Plaintiff’s appointed counsel filed a traverse, denying that the source items were sufficient 

to validate plaintiff as a gang member, or that the source information was timely provided, and 

requested an in camera review of the source items during which counsel could lodge his 

objections thereto. (ECF No. 115-2 at 26-27; 28-31.) In addition to the Eighth Amendment, 

counsel relied on the Due Process Clause. (ECF No. 115-2 at 28-31.) Further, counsel appended 

the declaration of plaintiff (ECF No. 115-2 at 34), pointing out that the declaration “establish[ed] 

further issues of disputed fact as to timing of notice and waiver of rights to the end that a hearing 

is needed since not all issues are solely ones of law, but also of fact.” (ECF No. 115-2 at 31.) 

The traverse was signed June 23, 2009. (ECF No. 115-2 at 31.)

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On July 14, 2009, the Del Norte County Superior Court issued the following order:

The Petition is denied, and the Order to Show Cause is discharged.

Ample evidence supported the administrative decision. No abuse 

of administrative discretion is shown.

(ECF No. 115-2 at 36.)

b. Discussion

Issue preclusion does not bar plaintiff’s first due process claim, but does bar plaintiff’s 

remaining due process claims. 

First, as to all of his due process claims, the privity element is satisfied even if Warden R. 

Horel was the only party named in plaintiff’s habeas petition. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. 

v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (“There is privity between officers of the same government so 

that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the United States is res judicata 

in relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the government.”) See 

also Hutchison v. California Prison Indus. Auth., 2015 WL 179790, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 

2015) (privity existed between state prison system employees who were employed by same state 

agencies and engaged in the same conduct). Also, plaintiff was the petitioner in his prior habeas 

petition and is the claimant herein. 

Second, the previous state habeas petition raised both due process claims at issue in this 

case, namely: (1) the failure to grant him an opportunity to be heard; and (2) the sufficiency and 

reliability of the evidence used to validate him as a gang member. Both claims plainly invoke his 

primary right to be free from gang validation and SHU confinement without adequate due process 

– the same right which is at issue in this case. Further, the due process claims are predicated on 

the same core facts. 

Third, plaintiff’s habeas petition resulted in a final judgment on the merits. “[R]easoned 

denials of California habeas petitions” have claim-preclusive effect. Gonzales, 739 F.3d at 1231. 

Such denials also have issue-preclusive effects. “[B]ecause of the nature of a state habeas 

proceeding, a decision actually rendered should preclude an identical issue from being relitigated 

in a subsequent § 1983 action if the state habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the 

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issue to be heard and determined under federal standards.” Silverton v. Dep’t. of the Treasury, 

644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981). In Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Silverton 

stands for the proposition that a decision actually rendered in a California habeas action precludes 

an identical issue from being re-litigated in a subsequent § 1983 action if the habeas court 

afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to be heard. Gonzales, 739 F.3d at 1231. 

Here, the Del Norte Superior Court’s decision demonstrates that plaintiff’s challenge to 

the source items used to validate him as a gang member received a full and fair hearing, and was 

decided on the merits. In addition, the claims based on an alleged wrongful review of such 

evidence are also barred because the state court found that there was ample evidence to support

the gang validation decision. Thus, all such due process claims are barred by res judicata. 

However, the superior court’s ruling does not reflect a decision on plaintiff’s claim that 

defendant Whitfield failed to provide plaintiff an opportunity to be heard, or that such claim was 

actually decided on the merits. Because of the procedural history of this case, set forth above, 

and the parties’ stipulation that a material dispute of fact exists as to whether defendant Whitfield 

granted plaintiff an opportunity to be heard before the gang validation decision, this court must 

narrowly view the state court’s decision on plaintiff’s habeas petition. Plaintiff’s traverse filed in 

the superior court reflects that counsel requested a hearing so that the superior court could address 

disputes of fact concerning “timing of notice” and “waiver of rights.” Here, defendants provide 

no evidence that the Del Norte Superior Court took evidence concerning these factual disputes, or 

held a hearing to resolve such factual disputes.

3

 Therefore, because it does not appear that 

plaintiff was provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of whether defendant 

Whitfield afforded plaintiff an opportunity to be heard before plaintiff was validated as a gang 

member, and the brief decision by the superior court does not reflect that such due process issue 

was necessarily decided on the merits, or under federal due process standards, the undersigned 

recommends that such claim is not barred by res judicata. 

 

3

 The traverse was signed on June 23, 2009, and the superior court’s decision was entered on July 

14, 2009, only 21 days later. Given plaintiff’s incarceration, this 21 day period suggests no 

hearing was held.

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Defendants argue that even a summary denial by a California court may preclude a later 

civil action if the court considered the merits of the habeas claims, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 

750, 769-70 & n.9 (Cal. 1993). However, defendants did not address Gonzalez or explain how 

plaintiff was afforded a full and fair opportunity for the alleged failure to provide him an 

opportunity to be heard, or that the disputed factual issue was necessarily decided and determined 

under federal standards, as required under Silverton. 

The argument raised by plaintiff against claim preclusion on the remaining due process 

claims is unpersuasive. He appears to argue that defendants delayed raising the affirmative 

defense of res judicata and should not be allowed to invoke the argument now because it is 

“unfair.” (ECF No. 116 at 3.) However, defendants timely raised the affirmative defense of res 

judicata/issue preclusion in their answer filed on June 8, 2011. (ECF No. 32 at 2.) 

Therefore, because plaintiff’s due process challenges to the sufficiency or validity of the 

evidence was previously decided in his state habeas petition, such due process claims are barred

and should be dismissed with prejudice. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim that 

defendant Whitfield failed to provide plaintiff an opportunity to be heard should be denied.

D. Failure to State a Claim

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff’s remaining Eighth Amendment claims based on 

poor housing conditions in the CSP-SOL SHU fail because he alleges no facts linking any 

defendant to such conditions or showing that the conditions caused him harm. Also, defendants 

state that plaintiff’s claim that he had no access to education while housed in the SHU fails as a 

matter of law because plaintiff has no constitutional right to education in prison. (ECF No. 115-1 

at 9, n.2.) 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

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Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“Congress did not intend § 1983 

liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent.”); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (no 

affirmative link between the incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy 

demonstrating their authorization or approval of such misconduct). “A person ‘subjects’ another 

to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Although supervisory government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional 

conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 676 (2009), they may be individually liable under Section 1983 if there exists “either (1) [the 

supervisor’s] personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation; or (2) a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Hansen 

v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). The requisite causal connection between a 

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights can be 

established in a number of ways, including by demonstrating that a supervisor’s own culpable 

action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates was a cause of 

plaintiff’s injury. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011); Larez v. City of Los 

Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). A plaintiff must also show that the supervisor had 

the requisite state of mind to establish liability, which turns on the requirement of the particular 

claim -- and, more specifically, on the state of mind required by the particular claim -- not on a 

generally applicable concept of supervisory liability. Oregon State University Student Alliance v. 

Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2012).

Defendants are correct that prisoners have no constitutional right to education. Rhodes v. 

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (deprivation of rehabilitation and educational programs does 

not violate Eighth Amendment). Thus, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim that he was denied 

access to education must be dismissed. 

////

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Plaintiff again failed to allege any facts demonstrating that any of the named defendants 

were responsible for housing conditions in the SHU at CSP-SOL, or that plaintiff suffered injury 

as a result of such conditions. (ECF No. 104, passim.) In opposition to the motion, plaintiff 

provided the declaration of another inmate concerning the conditions of housing in the SHU. 

(ECF No. 116 at 4.) However, plaintiff did not address the individual responsibility of the 

defendants, if any, in connection with the alleged housing conditions, and failed to identify any 

injury plaintiff allegedly sustained as a result of such conditions. (ECF No. 116.) As plaintiff has 

been repeatedly informed, he must allege facts showing some affirmative act on the part of 

defendants that deprived him of a constitutional right. (ECF Nos. 94 at 3-4; 100 at 2; 102 at 9.) It 

is not enough to state that defendants were aware of the conditions, or should have known of the 

alleged constitutional violations. Thus, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims based on the 

conditions of the SHU housing at CSP-SOL are dismissed for failure to state a claim.

E. Leave to Amend - Conditions of Confinement Claim

If the court finds that a complaint or claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, 

the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible 

that the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-

31; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be 

given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is 

absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) 

(citation omitted). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear that a claim cannot be cured 

by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1005-06.

Here, since December 16, 2014, plaintiff has been provided numerous opportunities to 

amend his complaint. Plaintiff was previously informed that he must link or connect each named 

defendant to the alleged Eighth Amendment violations. (ECF Nos. 94 at 3-4; 100 at 2; 102 at 9.) 

Defendants Bond, Whitfield, Sisto, and Sequira were involved in the gang validation process, and 

defendants Melgoza, Singh, and Grannis were involved in resolving administrative appeals

concerning the gang validation. Plaintiff identified no acts or omissions tying any of these 

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defendants to the housing conditions in the SHU at CSP-SOL. Moreover, given the stale nature 

of such claims, the undersigned would not be inclined to grant a motion to name any new 

defendants, over eleven years after plaintiff was housed in the SHU at CSP-SOL in 2005. 

For all of these reasons, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff not be granted leave to 

file a sixth amended complaint. 

IV. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ request to take judicial notice (ECF No. 115-

2) is granted; and 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 115) be granted in part, and denied in part, as 

follows:

a. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, as barred by res judicata, plaintiff’s claim that 

defendant Whitfield did not provide plaintiff with an opportunity to be heard regarding the 

evidence used to classify plaintiff as a gang member, be denied;

b. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims concerning treatment for Hepatitis C at 

PBSP, and his remaining due process claims concerning the sufficiency and reliability of the 

evidence used to validate him as a gang member, are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and 

should be dismissed with prejudice; and

c. Plaintiff’s remaining conditions of confinement claims concerning his housing 

in the SHU at CSP-SOL be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. 

2. Defendant Whitfield be required to answer plaintiff’s claim that defendant Whitfield 

did not provide plaintiff with an opportunity to be heard within fourteen days from any district

court order adopting these findings and recommendations. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

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objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: January 12, 2017

/jime2943.mtd.resj

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