Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03516/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-03516-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MILES ORLONDO BONTY,

Plaintiff,

v.

K. KUMAR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-03516-HSG (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

REVOKE PLAINTIFF’S IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS STATUS; VACATING 

DOCKET NO. 10; DIRECTING 

PLAINTIFF TO PAY FULL FILING 

FEE

Re: Dkt. Nos. 64, 82

Plaintiff, an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) proceeding pro se, filed this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On February 15, 2018, the Court found that 

plaintiff stated a cognizable claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs as against nine 

defendants and issued an order of service. Dkt. No. 25. On June 21, 2018, the Court reviewed 

plaintiff’s second amended complaint (“SAC”), the operative complaint herein, and ordered 

service on an additional three defendants.1 Dkt. No. 53. Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”) at the outset of this action. Dkt. No. 10.

Defendants have filed a motion to revoke plaintiff’s IFP status under 42 U.S.C. 1915(g), 

the so-called “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.2 Plaintiff has filed an 

opposition, and defendants have filed a reply. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to 

revoke plaintiff’s IFP status is GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted thirty (30) days to pay the full 

filing fee or the case will be dismissed without prejudice. 

 

1 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed one defendant who was deceased. See Dkt. Nos. 32, 35. Three 

additional defendants were later dismissed without prejudice after the Court was unable to serve 

them, and plaintiff was unable to provide location information to effectuate service. See Dkt. No. 

96.

2 The motion was originally filed by defendants Lott, Kumar, Gamboa, and Bourne. Dkt. No. 64. 

The remaining defendants later filed notices of joinder in the motion. Dkt. Nos. 74, 82, 83.

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DISCUSSION

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) was enacted, and became effective, 

on April 26, 1996. It provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in 

a civil action or proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (i.e., may not proceed in forma pauperis) “if 

the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, 

brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that 

it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the 

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Section 

1915(g) requires that this Court consider prisoner actions dismissed before, as well as after, the 

statute’s 1996 enactment. Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1997). 

For purposes of § 1915(g), the phrase “fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted” parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and carries the same 

interpretation, i.e., the word “frivolous” refers to a case that is “‘of little weight or importance; 

having no basis in law or fact,’” and the word “malicious” refers to a case “filed with the 

‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(citation omitted). Defendants bear the burden of establishing that plaintiff has three or more 

qualifying dismissals under § 1915(g) (or “strikes”), which requires the submission of evidence 

sufficient to demonstrate at least three prior qualifying dismissals. Id. at 1120.

B. Plaintiff’s Prior “Strikes”

Defendants argue that plaintiff has previously brought at least three lawsuits that have been 

dismissed on the basis that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. In support of 

their motion, defendants request judicial notice of court records from five prior cases that plaintiff 

brought in federal court: (1) Bonty v. Escutia, No. 1:07-cv-00428-LJO-GSA (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 

2007) (hereafter “Escutia”); (2) Bonty v. Reynoso, No. 1:07-cv-00732-AWI-SMS (E.D. Cal. Sept. 

8, 2008) (hereafter “Reynoso”); (3) Bonty v. Hedgpeth, No. 5:09-cv-5797 LHK (N.D. Cal. May 24, 

2011) (hereafter “Hedgpeth”); (4) Bonty v. Neotti, No. 5:09-cv-3838 LHK (N.D. Cal. May 24, 

2011) (hereafter “Neotti”) sub nom. Bonty v. Stevenson; and (5) Bonty v. Stevenson, No. 11-16478

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(9th Cir. Sept. 15, 2011) (hereafter “Neotti Appeal”). The request for judicial notice of these court 

records(which are filed as exhibits to the request at docket number 64-1) is GRANTED. See Fed. 

R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

The court records show that three of the five cases were dismissed for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted: Escutia (Dkt. No. 64-1 at 5-10), Reynoso (id. at 16-17), 

and Neotti (id. at 28-31). A fourth case was dismissed as frivolous: Neotti Appeal. Id. at 38-39. 

See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (dismissed appeal counts as strike if 

appellate court relied on district court findings that appeal was not taken in good faith). As such, 

these four dismissals clearly qualify as “strikes.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Andrews, 398 F.3d at 

1121.3 

Based on the foregoing, defendants have shown that plaintiff has suffered at least three 

“strikes” under § 1915(g). Plaintiff’s opposition does not argue otherwise. Accordingly, the 

instant complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to § 1915(g) unless plaintiff can show that he 

was in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed the instant complaint.

C. Imminent Danger

A plaintiff who has three strikes under § 1915(g) may still proceed IFP by showing that he 

or she “is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This 

exception only “applies if the complaint makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced 

‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of [the] filing” of the complaint. 

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Andrews II”). The conditions that 

existed at some earlier or later time are not relevant. See Andrews II, 493 F.3d at 1053. 

In his opposition, plaintiff describes the medical care he received before and after he filed 

the complaint. He appears to argue that the care was inadequate over that period of time, that it 

caused him injury, and that it amounted to deliberate indifference by defendants. Specifically, 

 

3 The Court declines to reach herein whether Hedgpeth, which was a habeas action, counts as a 

qualifying strike. Defendants correctly point out that the dismissal of a habeas petition may count 

as a strike where the habeas petition is little more than a § 1983 action mislabeled as a habeas 

petition. See Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1122 n.12. The Court need not decide whether Hedgpeth was 

such a case given that it has already identified four other qualifying strikes.

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plaintiff alleges that he had a previous ineffective knee surgery and received treatment for 

testicular cancer. Dkt. No. 85 at 2. There are no allegations that defendants were involved with 

these procedures. Moreover, these allegations are not related to the SAC, which focuses on 

plaintiff’s lumbar degenerative disc disease and apparent replacement of his opioid medication 

with Tylenol and nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs. See Dkt. No. 43-1 at 7, 10-18. Plaintiff 

claims that the alternative medication he was prescribed at the time he filed the SAC has caused 

him respiratory problems, hypertension, and muscle spasms. Dkt. No. 85 at 3. There is no 

support in the record for these allegations, and the Court rejects them as “conclusory” and 

“speculative.” See Andrews II, 493 F.3d at 1050 n.11; see also White v. State of Colorado, 157 

F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) (imminent danger exception does not 

apply because prisoner’s allegation that he has “been deprived of life sustaining medication and 

medical attention/treatment, ha[s] been beaten, and/or otherwise tortured and allowed to suffer 

great pain, so that [his] health degenerated to a[n] extremely life-threatening degree” are “vague 

and utterly conclusory”). It is unfortunate that plaintiff—a 61-year-old-inmate4—suffers from so 

many medical conditions. Defendants’ alleged indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs, however,

is an issue relating to the substance of his Eighth Amendment claim and is not determinative of 

whether or not he is excused from Section 1915(g)’s limitations on proceeding IFP. In sum, 

plaintiff’s allegations do not indicate that he was in imminent danger when he filed his SAC, and 

therefore the exception does not apply to him. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows: 

Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status is GRANTED pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The Order entered September 28, 2017 (Dkt. No. 10), granting plaintiff 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis, is VACATED. 

Because plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status has been revoked, plaintiff may proceed with 

this action only if he pays the $400 filing and administrative fee in full. Plaintiff must pay the full

 

4 Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that his date of birth is October 3, 1957. See ECF No. 43-1 at 

80.

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United States District Court

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filing fee within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. If the full filing fee is not received by 

that date, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice to plaintiff re-filing upon payment of 

the full filing fee.

This order terminates Docket Nos. 64 and 82.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

2/11/2019

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