Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00286/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00286-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

DONNELL FLOURNOY, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Case No.: 2:12-cv-286-WHA-WC 

 ) 

OFFICER I. HARRIS, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Before the court is Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint” 

(Doc. 65). On February 16, 2016, the District Judge entered an Order (Doc. 66) referring 

the motion to the undersigned Magistrate Judge “for action or recommendation.” Trial in 

this matter was previously scheduled to proceed on March 7, 2016, but has been 

continued pending further order of the court. See Order (Doc. 58). Plaintiff’s complaint, 

and the only issue surviving the pretrial motions ruled upon in this case, concerns his 

allegation that Defendant employed excessive force against him while he was 

incarcerated, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. See Order (Doc. 31). The 

basis for the instant motion to amend the complaint is that “Plaintiff has determined the 

name Katherine Jessip and Ann Hill both state attorneys representing the defendant be 

amended to the original complaint.” Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 65) at 1. Plaintiff accuses attorneys 

Jessip and Hill of having “conspired co-conspired and collaterately [sic] conspired 

through several phone calls to the Plaintiff’s home asking about this case pending in 

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detail confusing the plaintiff as though they were other state investigators and getting 

information in the court before any legal disposition ordered.” Id. 

 Plaintiff’s motion is due to be denied because the requested amendment is futile 

for at least two reasons. First, Plaintiff has not attached any proposed amended complaint 

to his motion and, to the extent his proposed amendment is contained within his motion 

to amend, he has failed to state a claim for any “conspiracy” against attorneys Jessip and 

Hill. Second, Plaintiff may not amend his complaint at this late stage of the litigation 

over his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim to add allegations of an unrelated 

conspiracy which occurred after he filed the original complaint. 

 In general, pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

leave to amend a complaint after the initial pleadings stage of litigation should be freely 

given when “justice so requires.” However, “[d]espite the rule that leave to amend 

should be given freely, the court may deny leave to amend on numerous grounds, 

including the futility of the amendment. Futility justifies the denial of leave to amend 

where the complaint, as amended, would still be subject to dismissal.” Patel v. Georgia 

Dept. BHDD, 485 F. App’x 982, 982 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 

In this case, Plaintiff has not provided the court with a proposed amended 

complaint to review in consideration of his motion to amend the complaint. For the 

reasons that follow, to the extent Plaintiff intends to amend his complaint with the 

allegations presented in the text of his motion to amend, he has failed to state any viable 

claim of conspiracy for which relief could be granted. As such, any proposed claim of a 

conspiracy involving the attorneys identified in Plaintiff’s motion would be subject to 

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summary dismissal, and, accordingly, the proposed amendment is futile and Plaintiff’s 

motion to amend is due to be denied. 

The court must determine whether Plaintiff’s proposed amendment would be 

subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a plaintiff file a 

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed 

factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In general, then, a pleading is insufficient 

if it offers only mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements 

of a cause of action[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (a complaint does not suffice under Rule 8(a) “if it 

tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”). Thus, in order to 

avoid summary dismissal, Plaintiff’s complaint “‘must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief which is plausible on its face.’” UrquillaDiaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 1051 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678). “A claim is factually plausible where the facts alleged permit the court to 

reasonably infer that the defendant’s alleged misconduct was unlawful. Factual 

allegations that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability,’ however, are not 

facially plausible.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

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 As a general matter, “[i]n the case of a pro se action . . . the court should construe 

the complaint more liberally than it would formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Powell 

v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990). However, although district courts must 

apply a “less stringent standard” to the pleadings submitted by a pro se plaintiff, such 

“‘leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to 

rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air 

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. 

of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)). 

 Upon review of the allegations in Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, the 

undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has fallen far short of stating a plausible claim of 

conspiracy for which any relief could be granted. In essence, Plaintiff only alleges that 

attorneys Jessip and Hill phoned him at his home and asked him questions about this 

case, thus “confuseing [sic] the Plaintiff as though they were other state investigators and 

getting information in the court before any legal disposition[.]” Pl.’s Mot. (Doc. 65) at 1. 

There is no plausible allegation of any conspiracy involving attorneys Jessip and Hill. 

More to the point, however, “[a]n allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of 

conspiracy will not suffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, 

and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts 

adequate to show illegality.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57. In other words, Plaintiff’s 

allegation of a conspiracy is conclusory and patently insufficient. 

 Apart from Plaintiff’s failure to state any conspiracy claim for which relief could 

be granted, leave to amend should be denied because Plaintiff’s claim of a purported 

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conspiracy is wholly distinct from the narrow Eighth Amendment excessive force claim 

that was presented in Plaintiff’s original complaint and has survived the pretrial motions 

already adjudicated by the court. Plaintiff should not be permitted to amend his 

complaint at this late stage of the litigation to present a frivolous and unrelated claim of a 

conspiracy which occurred after the events described in the complaint and involves 

entirely different defendants. 

Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated above, it is the RECOMMENDATION 

of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 65) be DENIED because Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is futile. Further, it is 

 ORDERED that Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before March 2, 2016. A party must specifically identify the 

factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is 

made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file 

written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance 

with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the 

Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district 

court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by 

the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. 

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Stein v. Lanning 

Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 

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F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Plaintiff is advised that this Recommendation is 

not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Done this 17th day of February, 2016. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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