Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01767/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01767-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brandon Hullaby,

Movant/Defendant

-vsUnited States of America,

Respondent/Plaintiff.

CV-14-1767-PHX-SRB (JFM)

CR-09-1406-PHX-SRB

Report & Recommendation 

on Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or

Correct Sentence

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Movant, following his conviction in the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 on August 7, 2014 (Doc. 1). On May 7, 2015 Respondent filed its 

Response (Doc. 9). Movant filed a Reply on July 24, 2015 (Doc. 19).

The Movant's Motion is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 10, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases , Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In disposing of Movant’s direct appeal of his conviction, the Ninth Circuit 

summarized the facts as follows:

In this operation, undercover ATF agents, working with [an 

informant], met with Hullaby and others to plan and carry out a 

robbery of a fictional cocaine stash house. Hullaby's part in the plan 

was to enter the stash house, along with three others, and subdue the 

guards that the ATF agents said would be present.

On the appointed day, the ATF agents, [the informant], and 

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the other conspirators met in a parking lot from which they were 

supposed to proceed to the stash house. As the participants prepared 

to leave, one of the agents gave a signal and ATF personnel arrested 

the conspirators.

United States v. Hullaby, 736 F.3d 1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 2013)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Movant and five co-defendants were eventually indicted on November 10, 2009 

on charges of (1) conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute; (2) attempt to 

possess cocaine with intent to distribute; and (3) possession of firearm in furtherance of a 

drug trafficking crime and aiding and abetting. (CR 17.)1 

Movant eventually proceeded to trial, and was convicted on Counts 1 and 3, with 

a mistrial declared on Count 2. (CR 289, ME 12/10/10; CR 305, 306 Jury Verdicts.) 

Movant appeared for sentencing on March 14, 2011. (CR 429, RT 3/14/11.) The 

Court noted the applicability of 10 and 25 year consecutive mandatory minimum 

sentencing. (Id. at 7.) The Court further addressed assertions that there was sentencing 

entrapment (e.g. that the government chose drugs and the quantity of drugs in the sting 

operation solely to result in higher sentencing). The Court reasoned that the defense’s 

theory was flawed because the mandatory minimum was triggered by five kilograms of 

the drugs, an amount less than what would have been necessary to evoke interest in the 

multi-party conspiracy, and thus the investigators’ use of 25 kilograms in the sting was 

not entrapment. (Id. at 17-19) The Court concluded:

THE COURT: Okay. The Court does not accept under the facts of 

this case with respect to Mr. Hullaby and the fact that the 

mandatory-minimum is triggered by five kilograms or more that the 

quantity of drugs use or the fact that drugs were used triggers a valid 

sentencing entrapment argument. 

(Id. at 19.) 

Movant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum, consecutive sentences of 120 

 

1 Documents in the underlying criminal case, CR-09-1406-PHX-SRB-3, are referenced 

herein as “CR ___.”

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months on Count 1, and 300 months on Count 3. (CR 388, Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Movant filed two notices of direct appeal to the Ninth Circuit, cases 11-10118 

(CR 387, 393) and 11-10170, (CR 412, 413) which were consolidated. (AR 7.)2 In his 

Opening Brief, Movant argued: (1) instructional error regarding withdrawal from 

conspiracy; (2) insufficiency of the indictment; (3) evidentiary error regarding prior 

conviction; (4) cumulative error; (5) outrageous government conduct; (6) sentencing 

error in (a) abuse of discretion in not sentencing below the statutory minimum based on 

sentencing entrapment; (b) cruel and unusual punishment; (c) statutory minimums 

violated separation of powers; and (d) denial of right to jury on prior offenses and facts 

used to increase sentence above statutory minimum. (AR 16.)

Following oral argument, Movant also filed a Motion to Supplement (AR 65), 

seeking to address the effect on Movant’s sentencing entrapment claim under the then 

recent decisions in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), and United States v. 

Cortes, 757 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2014), arguing that they required that claims of sentencing 

entrapment are required to be tried to a jury when they raise the possibility of changing 

the applicable statutory maximum or minimum. The Government opposed the motion to 

supplement, arguing that the claim had been waived. (AR 66.) The Ninth Circuit 

summarily denied the motion. (AR 70, Order 11/1/13.) 

In a published opinion, the Ninth Circuit rejected the (5) outrageous government 

conduct argument. See United States v. Hullaby, 736 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 2013). In an 

unpublished memorandum decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected the (1) instructional error, 

(2) insufficiency of the indictment, (3) evidentiary error, (4) cumulative error, and (6) 

sentencing error claims. With regard to the portion of the latter related to sentencing 

entrapment, the court concluded:

 

2 Documents in the Ninth Circuit appellate consolidated cases, 11-10118 and 11-10170, 

are referenced herein as “AR ___.”

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The district court did not err in rejecting Hullaby’s sentencing 

entrapment argument, because there was “no evidence of the type of 

reluctance and inducement present in cases where we have found 

sentencing entrapment.” United States v. Biao Huang, 687 F.3d 

1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. YumanHernandez, 712 F.3d 471, 475–76 (9th Cir. 2013). The district court 

reasonably determined that the amount of cocaine at issue was set 

above the amount that would trigger a mandatory minimum 

sentence in order to have a high enough value to interest the 

conspirators, not to enhance the sentence artificially. 

United States v. Hullaby, 552 Fed. Appx. 620, 622 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Petitioner filed with the U.S. Supreme Court a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 

which was denied on October 14, 2014. (AR 86.) 

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Movant commenced the current case by filing his Motion to Vacate, Set 

Aside or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on August 7, 2014 (Doc. 1). 

Movant’s Motion asserts a single ground for relief.

Movant alleges there has been an intervening change in law that 

would require the “sentencing entrapment” defense he employed at 

trial to be decided by a jury. Specifically, he contends the United 

States Supreme Court’s holding in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. 

Ct. 2151 (2013), “shifted the burden of proof” on his entrapment 

defense to the government, “as such defense and evidence . . . 

thereof are facts that could affect the mandatory minimum or 

maximum sentence to be imposed.”

(Order 11/17/14, Doc. 4 at 2.)

Response - On May 7, 2015 Respondent filed its Response (Doc. 9). Respondent

argues that Movant’s claim is procedurally defaulted (id. at 16), that Alleyne is not 

retroactively applicable on collateral review (id. at 17),3and the claim is without merit 

(id. at 18, et seq.). 

Reply - On July 24, 2015, Movant filed a Reply (Doc. 19). Movant argues that 

the Government’s conduct was outrageous, and amounted to entrapment and sentencing 

 

3 Respondent does not explain why Alleyne, decided January 14, 2013, would need to 

apply “retroactively” when Movant’s direct appeal was pending until December 4, 2013, 

and his Petition for Writ of Certiorari until October 14, 2014.

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entrapment. (Id. at 1-6.) Movant argues that his claim is not procedurally defaulted 

because he raised it in the district court and court of appeals. (Id. at 6.) Movant argues 

that Alleyne is retroactively applicable, and mandates a new trial. (Id. at 7-11.) 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondent argues that Ground 1 was not properly raised on direct appeal, and is 

barred as procedurally defaulted. 

The general rule is “that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on 

collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.” Massaro v. U.S., 538 

U.S. 500, 504 (2003). Thus, a Section 2255 movant raising a claim for the first time in 

post-conviction proceedings is in procedural default, and is precluded from asserting the 

claim. Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (finding default where petitioner 

challenging his guilty plea did not raise claim in direct appeal); U.S. v. Frady, 456 U.S. 

152, 165 (1982) (noting that a motion to vacate or modify a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 

2255 cannot be used as a substitute for a direct appeal).4

Not Raised in Appellate Briefs – Movant argues that he raised his present claim 

on direct appeal, pointing to pages 60 to 63 of his Opening Brief, and pages 27 to 28 of 

his Reply Brief. (Reply, Doc. 19 at 6.) 

While Movant raised a challenge based on “sentencing entrapment” in his 

appellate briefs, he did so only by directly attacking the sentencing judge’s rejection of 

the argument as an abuse of discretion. (AR 16, Opening Brief at 60-63.) The claim he 

now makes is not that the trial court’s decision was an abuse of discretion, but a denial of 

his right to a jury determination and the burden of proof was improperly placed on 

 

4

The parties discuss whether the claim was preserved in the trial court. While the 

preservation of the claim in the trial court might be relevant had Movant attempted to 

properly bring the claim in his opening brief on direct appeal, (e.g. to show that it was 

waived in the trial court) it is not necessary to a conclusion that he procedurally 

defaulted the claim in the Court of Appeals.

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Movant. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 5.) The only challenge he made regarding his right to a jury 

determination was concerned with prior convictions, and sentencing above the statutory 

minimum. (AR 16, Opening Brief at 66.) It did not address findings of facts relevant to 

establishing the statutory minimum, as he now asserts. He raised no objections related to 

the burden of proof, but conceded that he “carrie[d] the burden of proving that sentence 

factor manipulation occurred by a preponderance of the evidence.” (AR 16, Opening 

Brief at 61.) 

In his Reply Brief on direct appeal, Movant again attacked only the trial court’s 

rejection of the argument (cast as “sentence factor manipulation”). (AR 41, Reply Brief 

at 27-28.) Again, he made no objection to the trial court having made the determination 

(rather than the jury) or the burden of proof.

5

 

Accordingly, Movant failed to raise the claim he now makes in his appellate 

briefs.

Presentation in Motion to Supplement – Movant did argue in his Motion to 

Supplement at least a portion of the claim he now asserts, i.e. that the jury should have 

made the factual determinations on the sentencing manipulation. (AR 65.) However, the 

Ninth Circuit denied that motion, and thus refused to permit Movant to belatedly raise 

that new claim.

Although more fully developed in the context of state prisoner habeas petitions 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the concept of “fair presentation” applies as well to federal 

prisoners filing a motion to vacate under §2255. “Where the petitioner-whether a state 

or federal prisoner-failed properly to raise his claim on direct review, the writ is 

available only if the petitioner establishes ‘cause’” for the waiver and shows “actual 

 

5 Movant seems to argue in his Reply that his present claim is simply a re-urging of 

his argument that the “court should have been free to sentence him below the otherwiseapplicable statutory minimum sentence because of the government sentencing 

entrapment ‘or’ sentencing factor manipulation.” (Reply, Doc. 19 at 6.) But that claim 

was raised and disposed of in Movant’s direct appeal. The Ninth Circuit has long held 

that "[i]ssues disposed of on a previous direct appeal are not reviewable in a subsequent 

petition under 2255." Stein v. U.S., 390 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1968).

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prejudice resulting from the alleged ... violation.’ ” Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354

(1994) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977); id., at 87) (emphasis 

added). 

Here, Movant did not properly present his claim in his appellate briefs, but only in 

his Motion to Supplement. That is not fair presentation of an issue. “Generally, an issue 

is waived when the appellant does not specifically and distinctly argue the issue in his or 

her opening brief.” United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005). See 

also Valentine v. City of Chicago, 452 F.3d 670, 680 (7th Cir. 2006), as amended (July 6, 

2006) (“Just as arguments raised for the first time at oral argument are waived...so too 

are arguments made in supplemental filings following oral argument”). 

Accordingly, Movant failed to fairly present his claim to the Ninth Circuit, and as 

a result procedurally defaulted the claim.

Cause and Prejudice - “Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim 

by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the 

defendant can first demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that he is 

‘actually innocent’.” Bousley, 523 U.S at 622 (citations omitted). Movant does not 

assert his actual innocence, nor any cause to excuse his procedural default. 

Movant’s claim does rely upon the relatively recent decision in Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. 

2151, decided January 14, 2013, over a year after briefing closed in Movant’s direct 

appeal. “[A] claim that ‘is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to 

counsel’ may constitute cause for a procedural default.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622

(quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)). But the legal basis for the decision in 

Alleyne was not novel. 

Alleyne explicitly overruled the Court’s decision in Harris v. U.S., 536 U.S. 545 

(2002), that facts increasing the statutory minimum sentence could be found by a judge

rather than the jury. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163. In her concurrence in Alleyne, Justice 

Sotomayor (joined by Justices Ginsberg and Kagan) observed that five justices in Harris 

had deemed the conclusion in Alleyne mandated by the reasoning in Apprendi v. New 

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Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2165 (Sotomayor, J. concurring). 

Thus, Alleyne was not some surprising turn in jurisprudence, but one that had 

been deemed inevitable by a majority of the Supreme Court in 2002, when Harris was 

decided. That was some nine years before Movant filed his Opening Brief (AR 16). 

Thus, the legal basis for Movant’s current claim was reasonably available to counsel.

Movant asserts no other cause to excuse his procedural default, and the 

undersigned finds none.

Actual Innocence – The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion 

intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a 

“miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 

(9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in an 

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 

(1986) (emphasis added). Although not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the 

Supreme Court has not yet recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion 

outside of actual innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & 

Proc. §26.4 at 1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly 

limited it to claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup

gateway.” Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Moreover, an actual innocence analysis does not invite a simple reconsideration 

of the evidence at trial, but requires consideration of new evidence. “To meet this 

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standard, [the Petitioner] must first furnish ‘new reliable evidence ... that was not 

presented at trial.’ ” Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).

Here, Movant proffers no new, reliable evidence of his actual innocence. Instead, 

he simply argues the evidence presented at trial, and conclusory allegations of his lack of 

intent to complete the crimes. Thus, Movant fails to make a showing that no reasonable 

juror would have found him guilty. 

Accordingly his procedurally defaulted claim, and the Motion to Vacate, must be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Because the undersigned concludes that Movant’s claims are plainly barred as 

procedurally defaulted, Respondent’s other procedural and substantive defenses are not 

reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Motion to Vacate is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and 

challenges Movant’s federal criminal judgment or sentence. The recommendations if 

accepted will result in Movant’s Motion being resolved adversely to Movant. 

Accordingly, a decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

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constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Motion to Vacate, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Movant's Motion to Vacate, 

Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed August 7, 2014 (Doc. 

1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

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of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 10, Rules 

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9

th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: November 9, 2015

14-1767r RR 15 11 03 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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