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Nature of Suit Code: 130
Nature of Suit: Miller Act
Cause of Action: 

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F I LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL~oitc<l S~~re~ Co~rc ':f Appeals 1 enth C1ram 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, for the use 

of G.L.'s Plastering Co., Inc., an 

Oklahoma corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ENFIELD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a ) 

California Corporation; AETNA INSURANCE) 

COMPANY, a California Corporation, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

FEB ( 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6282 

(D.C. No. CIV-88-561-T) 

( W. D. Okla . ) 

Before MOORE, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and SPARR,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Daniel 

District Court for 

designation. 

B. Sparr, District Judge, 

the District of Colorado, 

United States 

sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6282 Document: 010110098438 Date Filed: 02/04/1991 Page: 1 
• 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff, a subcontractor, commenced this action pursuant to 

the Miller Act, 40 u.s.c. SS 270a-d, against the general 

contractor and its surety, asserting the general contractor failed 

to pay plaintiff fully for work plaintiff performed on a federal 

construction project at Fort Sill Army Base in Lawton, Oklahoma. 

The district court granted the surety's motion for summary 

judgment and dismissed plaintiff's claim against the surety as 

untimely commenced. Following a jury trial, which resulted in a 

determination that the general · contractor owed plaintiff 

$133,048.45, the district court denied plaintiff's motion for an 

award of attorney's fees against the general contractor. 

Plaintiff appeals. 

Plaintiff's first and second arguments on appeal challenge 

the district court's determination, in granting the surety's 

motion for summary judgment, that plaintiff failed to commence its 

Miller Act claim against the surety within the Act's one-year 

limitations period. See 40 u.s.c. S 270b(b). This court reviews 

a summary judgment award de novo, applying the same standards 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) as the district court. See Osgood v. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 

1988). 

On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the limitations period 

in section 270b(b) was modified by a condition precedent to the 

performance of the subcontract which obligated the general 

contractor to pay plaintiff the remaining ten percent of the total 

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subcontract price retained by the general contractor only after 

the federal government accepted the work completed under its 

primary contract with the general contractor. Plaintiff further 

argues that, because the government did not accept the project 

until January 25, 1988, plaintiff timely commenced its Miller Act 

claim against the surety by filing the amended complaint naming 

the surety as a party defendant within four months of the 

occurrence of the condition precedent. 

Plaintiff's second argument on appeal is that, because the 

surety's liability is derived from the liability of the general 

contractor, the surety remained liable on the payment bond 

regardless of whether the surety had been named as a party 

defendant. Because plaintiff failed to assert these theories 

before the district court, this court will not address the merits 

of these arguments. See Doelle v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 

872 F.2d 942, 944 n.4 (10th Cir. 1989). See also 10th Cir. R. 

28.2(d)("With respect to each issue raised on appeal, the party 

shall state where in the record the issue was raised and ruled 

upon."). 

Section 270b(b) requires that no "suit instituted under [the 

Miller Act] •.. shall be commenced after the expiration of one 

year after the day on which the last of the labor was 

performed. . " The parties agreed that plaintiff completed its 

work under the subcontract on April 6, 1987. Plaintiff, 

therefore, timely commenced this action against the general 

contractor by filing the original complaint against the general 

contractor on April 4, 1988. 

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• 

Pursuant to an order of the district court, plaintiff amended 

the original complaint, on June 24, 1988, to add the surety as a 

party defendant. Because plaintiff filed the amended complaint 

naming the surety well beyond the one-year limitations period, the 

district court correctly determined that the claim against the 

surety was untimely. United States ex rel. Statham 

Instruments, Inc. v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 359 F.2d 521, 

522-24 (6th Cir. 1966). Further, the district court correctly 

determined that the amended complaint did not relate back, under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), to the filing of the original complaint. 

See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29-31 (1986); see also 

Statham Instruments, 359 F.2d at 523. 

Plaintiff's third claim on appeal is that the district court 

erred in denying plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees against 

the general contractor after a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff. 

Absent an enforceable contract provision, attorney's fees are 

generally not available to the prevailing party in Miller Act 

litigation. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. 

Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1974). 

The subcontract between plaintiff and the general contractor 

provided: 

Should the Contractor be required to initiate any legal 

action or proceedings to enforce this contract, or to 

recover damages for the breach thereof, the 

Subcontractor agrees to pay court costs and reasonable 

attorney's fees incurred by the Contractor. Should the 

Contractor be required to incur attorney's fees to 

effectuate the enforcement of the terms of the 

agreement, the Subcontractor shall pay such fees 

although no actual legal action or proceedings are 

initiated. 

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Subcontract, 1 XVIII (emphasis added). The express language of 

this provision provides only that the general contractor, rather 

than p~aintiff, as the subcontractor, may recover attorney's fees. 

The subcontract, however, also expressly provides that 

California law applied to the subcontract. 

S 1717(a) (amended 1987) requires that 

California Code 

[i]n any action on a contract, where the contract 

specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, 

which are incurred to enforce the provisions of that 

contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties 

or to the prevailing party, then the party who is 

determined to be the prevailing party, whether he or she 

is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be 

entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to 

costs and necessary disbursements. 

Because the parties expressly incorporated California law 

into the subcontract and because California law requires the 

subcontract's attorney's fees provision allowing the general 

contractor to recover attorney's fees to be interpreted as 

reciprocally providing for the subcontractor's recovery of 

attorney's fees as well, plaintiff was entitled to an award of 

attorney's fees in this action. The district court's order 

denying plaintiff attorney's fees is, therefore, reversed, and the 

cause is remanded to the district court for a determination of the 

amount of attorney's fees to which plaintiff is entitled. See 

generally United States ex rel. C.J.C., Inc. v. Western States 

Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 834 F.2d 1533, 1548-50 (10th Cir. 

1987)(discussing appropriate standards to apply in determining 

amount of attorney's fees under Miller Act litigant's motion for 

attorney's fees arising from contract provision). 

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The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in 

part, and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this order and 

judgment. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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