Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08207/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08207-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

---

WO IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

JEFFREY A. STILLMAN, )

) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

COLUMN 5 CONSULTING, L.L.C., )

) No. 3:14-cv-8207-HRH

 Defendant. ) (Prescott Division) 

__________________________________________) 

O R D E R

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,

or in the alternative, for Reconsideration

Defendant moves1for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff’s ADA retaliation

claim, or in the alternative, for reconsideration of the portion of the court’s summary

judgment order2that dealt with plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Plaintiff opposes this motion3

and moves4

to strike defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in the

1Docket No. 53. 

2Docket No. 47. 

3Docket No. 59. 

4Docket No. 55. 

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alternative, for reconsideration. Defendant opposes the motion to strike.5 Oral argument

was requested but is not deemed necessary. 

Background

Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant, brought three ADA claims against

defendant: 1) a failure to accommodate, 2) unlawful termination, and 3) retaliation. 

Defendant moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims, arguing that plaintiff

was not disabled for purposes of the ADA. In response, plaintiff argued that he was

disabled for purposes of the ADA. The court agreed with defendant and concluded that

defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s failure to accommodate and

unlawfulterminationclaims.

6 As forplaintiff’s retaliation claim, defendant’s argument was

limited to a conclusory statement that it took no adverse actions once it learned of

plaintiff’s alleged disability. Plaintiff in turn did not focus on his retaliation claim in his

opposition brief. Despite the limited argument on the retaliationclaim, the court addressed

this claim because defendant had moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims. 

The court noted that “[a] retaliation claim does not necessarily depend on a plaintiff

proving that he or she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.” Davis v. Tri-County

Metropolitan Transp. Dist. of Oregon, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1255 (D. Or. 2014). Instead, as

5Docket No. 64. 

6Order re Motion for Summary Judgment at 18, Docket No. 47. 

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the Ninth Circuit has explained “‘[a] prima facie case of retaliation requires a plaintiff to

show: (1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action and (3) a

causal link between the two.’” Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co., 588 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir.

2004)). The court found that plaintiff might be able to make out a prima facie case of

retaliation, that defendant had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

terminating plaintiff, and that plaintiff had come forward with specific and substantial

evidence of pretext.7 Thus, plaintiff’s retaliation claim survived defendant’s motion for

summary judgment.

Defendant now moves forjudgment on the pleadings on plaintiff’s retaliation claim,

or in the alternative, for reconsideration of the denial of its motion for summary judgment

on plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Plaintiff moves to strike defendant’s motion for judgment

on the pleadings, or in the alternative, for reconsideration. If plaintiff’s motion to strike is

granted, plaintiff requests sanctions pursuant to Rule 16(f), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

Discussion

“Judgment on the pleadings is proper when, taking all the allegations in the

pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Honey v.

7

Id. at 19-20. 

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Distelrath, 195 F.3d 531, 532 (9th Cir. 1999). Defendant argues that it is entitled to judgment

on plaintiff’s retaliation claim because plaintiff did not allege or argue that he had a good

faith belief that he was disabled. Defendant does not dispute that a plaintiff may maintain

an ADA retaliation claim even if he is not disabled for purposes of the ADA. But,

defendant argues that plaintiff must either have alleged in his complaint or argued in his

response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment that he had a good faith belief that

he was disabled. Defendant’s argument is based primarily on Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d

1032 (9th Cir. 2003). There, Fraser suffered from “a very onerous and life-threatening form

of diabetes” and argued that this disability significantly limited her ability to eat, care for

herself, and think and communicate. Id. at 1035, 1039, 1043-44. The court held that “Fraser

presented a genuine issue of material fact that her diabetes significantly limits her major

life activity of eating.” Id. at 1045. But, the court held that Fraser had not presented a

genuine issue of material fact that her diabetes significantly limited her ability to care for

herself or her ability to think and communicate. Id. At the Ninth Circuit, “Fraser argue[d]

that even if she was not disabled in the major life activities of caring for self, thinking, and

communicating, she nonetheless has a good faith belief that she was disabled.” Id. at 1044. 

The Ninth Circuit declined to address Fraser’s “good faith belief” argument because she

had not raised it below. Id. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that Fraser did not allege in her

complaint that she had a good faith belief that she was disabled nor did she raise such an

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argument in response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Id. Instead, she

took the position that she was disabled. Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district

court’s summary judgment on Fraser’s retaliation claims based on her ability to care for

herself and her ability to think and communicate. Id. at 1044-45. 

Defendant argues that the same is true here, that plaintiff did not allege in his

complaint that he had a good faith belief that he was disabled nor did he argue in response

to defendant’s motion for summary judgment that he had a good faith belief that he was

disabled.

As an initial matter, plaintiff moves to strike defendant’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings because it is untimely. Plaintiff argues that defendant’s motion forjudgment

on the pleadings is untimely because it is a dispositive motion and the deadline for filing

dispositive motions in this case was November 27, 2015.8

Defendant’s attempt to side-step the dispositive motiondeadlineby filing its motion

as a Rule 12(c) motion fails. In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, “a court may consider only

allegations made in the complaint and the answer[.]” Qwest Communications Corp. v.

City of Berkeley, 208 F.R.D. 288, 291 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Here, defendant wants the court to

consider not only plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint but also plaintiff’s response to

defendant’s motion for summary judgment. “When material outside the pleadings is

8

Scheduling and Planning Order at 6, Docket No. 17. 

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considered, a 12(c) motion is converted to one for summary judgment.” Robinson v. Fred

Meyers Stores, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 905, 909 n.2 (D. Ariz. 2002). Defendant’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings would have to be converted to a motion for summary

judgment, thereby making it a dispositive motion. Because the time for filing dispositive

motions has closed, defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is untimely. 

However, defendant requests that the court treat its Rule 12(c) motion as “implicitly

requesting relief from the court’s case management orders.” Rambus Inc. v. Hynix

Semiconductor Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2008). In order to be entitled to

such relief, defendant must show good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Defendant argues

that it has shown good cause to modify the court’s dispositive motion deadline because it

could not have filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings prior to the November 2015

deadline. Defendant argues that it could not have filed its motion for judgment on the

pleadings until after the court’s summary judgment ruling. Defendant contends that the

court’s conclusion that plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of the ADA was a

prerequisite forits motion forjudgment on the pleadings. Defendant insists thatthe court’s

ruling that plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of the ADA raised for the first time the

issue of whether plaintiff had adequately alleged a good faith belief that he was disabled.

This argument fails. Defendant could have raised the issue of whether plaintiff had

a good faith belief that he was disabled priorto the court’s decision on defendant’s motion

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for summary judgment. Defendant could have, and probably should have, raisedthis issue

in its motion for summary judgment since defendant was moving for summary judgment

on all of plaintiff’s claims. The court’s order on defendant’s motion for summary judgment

was not a prerequisite for defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because

whether plaintiff was disabled or not for purposes of the ADA had little if anything to do

with plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim. Defendant has not shown good cause to modify the

scheduling orderto extend the dispositive motion deadline. Thus, defendant’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings is untimely and it is stricken. 

But even if defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings were timely, the

motion would be denied. It can be implied or inferred from the allegations in plaintiff’s

complaint that he had a good faith belief that he was disabled. See Wehrley v. Amer.

Family Mut. Ins. Co., Case No. 12–1079, 2013 WL 1092856, at *6 (10th Cir. March 18, 2013)

(allegations of the conditions that the plaintiff experienced at the time of his protected

activity “is at least sufficient to create a factual issue regarding [p]laintiff’s good faith belief

that he was disabled”). Defendant’s argument to the contrary is unavailing. Defendant

argues that if it could be implied from a complaint that a plaintiff had a good faith belief

that he was disabled, Fraser would have been decided differently. However, there is a

significant difference between this case and Fraser. In Fraser, the plaintiff was raising an

argument for the first time on appeal, an argument that she had not preserved below. 

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Here, the case is still in the district court and plaintiff can, and is, arguing that the

allegations in his complaint are sufficient to suggest that he had a good faith belief that he

was disabled. Although defendant questions whether plaintiff had a good faith belief that

he was disabled, it is reasonable to infer from the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint that

he had a good faith belief that he was disabled when he requested an accommodation.

In the alternative, defendant moves forreconsideration of the court’s order denying

its motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Local Rule 7.2(g)(2)

provides that “[a]bsent good cause shown, any motion forreconsideration shall be filed no

laterthan fourteen (14) days afterthe date of the filing of the Orderthat is the subject of the

motion.” The court’s order on defendant’s motion for summary judgment was filed on

April 19, 2016. Defendant did not file its motion forreconsideration until May 12, 2016 and

has offered no explanation why it did not file its motion sooner. Thus, defendant’s

alternative motion for reconsideration is also untimely and it also is stricken. 

But even if defendant’s motion forreconsideration were timely, it would be denied. 

“‘[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed

clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.’” Marlyn

Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quoting 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)). “A motion

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for reconsideration ‘may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first

time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.’” Id. (quoting

Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). Here, defendant

is raising an argument that could have been raised earlier in the litigation. As discussed

above, defendant could have raised its argument that plaintiff had not alleged that he had

a good faith belief that he was disabled when defendant moved for summary judgment on

all of plaintiff’s claims. 

Finally, plaintiff’s requests that sanctions be imposed against defendant for failing

to obey the scheduling order and the trial setting order. Rule 16(f)(1), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, authorizes the court to issue “any just orders” if a party or its attorney “fails to

obey a scheduling or other pretrial order.” Although plaintiff does not expressly state what

sanctions he thinks should be imposed, he does point out that Rule 16(f)(2) provides that

“[i]nstead of or in addition to any other sanction, the court must order the party, its

attorney, or both to pay the reasonable expenses--including attorney’s fees--incurred

because of any noncompliance with this rule, unless the noncompliance was substantially

justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” 

Sanctions are appropriate here. In the parties’ certificate of readiness, filed on May

3, 2016, defendant indicated that it would “file a motion seeking judgment on Plaintiff’s

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ADA retaliation claim....”9

In its trial setting order, which was entered on May 9, 2016, the

court reminded the parties that “[t]he time for filing dispositive motions is closed[.]”10

Defendant nonetheless filed a dispositive motion, disguised as a Rule 12(c) motion, thus

disobeying the scheduling order and the court’s trial setting order. If this case does not

settle at the June 30, 2016 settlement conference, the court will entertain plaintiff’s

application for attorney’s fees incurred in responding to defendant’s motion forjudgment

on the pleadings, or in the alternative for reconsideration.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s motion to strike11is granted. Defendant’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings, or in the alternative, for reconsideration12 is stricken.

DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 14th day of June, 2016. 

/s/ H. Russel Holland 

United States District Judge

9Certificate of Readiness at 1, Docket No. 49. 

10Order re Request for Settlement Conference; Trial Setting at 1, Docket No. 50. 

11Docket No. 55. 

12Docket No. 53. 

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