Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01576/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01576-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Sex Discrimination

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HALEMA BUZAYAN, as an

individual; DR. BUZAYAN

MOHAMED BUZAYAN, an

individual; NAJAT ABDALLA

DARRAT, an individual; MOHAMED

BUZAYAN, by and through DR.

BUZAYAN MOHAMED BUZAYAN, as

Guardian Ad Litem for a minor;

YOUSEF BUZAYAN,by and through

DR. BUZAYAN MOHAMED BUZAYAN,

as Guardian Ad Litem for a

minor; ALI BUZAYAN, by and

through DR. BUZAYAN MOHAMED

BUZAYAN, as Guardian Ad Litem

for a minor,

2:06-cv-01576-MCE-DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF DAVIS POLICE

DEPARTMENT; THE CITY OF DAVIS;

JAMES HYDE, individually and

in his capacity as Chief of

Police of the City of Davis

Police Department; STEVEN

PIERCE, individually and in

his official capacity with the

City of Davis Police

Department; PHENG LY,

individually and in his

capacity as an officer of the

City of Davis Police

Department; GINA ANDERSON,

individually and as Seargant

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 SLAPP is an acronym denoting a so-called “Strategic 1

Lawsuit Against Public Participation”.

2

of the City of Davis Police

Department; DAVID HENDERSON,

individually and in his

capacity as District Attorney

for the YOLO COUNTY OFFICE OF

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY;

PATRICIA FONG, individually

and in her capacity as Deputy

District Attorney for the YOLO

COUNTY OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT

ATTORNEY; DEBBIE DAVIS, as an

individual; DAVIS ENTERPRISE

NEWSPAPER; and LAUREN KEENE,

as an individual,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Halema Buzayan and the Buzayan

family (“Plaintiffs”) allege nineteen causes of action against

the Davis Police Department and various individual police

officers; the Yolo County Office of the District Attorney and

individuals from the District Attorney’s Office; and the City of

Davis (collectively “Defendants”). The Plaintiffs also brought

claims against the Davis Enterprise, Debbie Davis, and Lauren

Keene, which were dismissed by Order of this Court on June 22,

2007.

Presently before the Court is the Defendants’ Special Motion

to Strike pursuant to California Civil Procedure Code § 425.16,

California’s anti-SLAPP statute. 

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3

The Defendants seek to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims of

defamation, statutory invasion of privacy, constitutional

invasion of privacy, and portions of the claims of Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress and Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress which are predicated on the alleged invasions

of privacy. These are all state law claims which supplement the

federally-based claims brought against the Defendants for

violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Defendants have also submitted a Partial Motion to

Dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for alleged violations of the

California Constitution. Additionally, the Defendants filed a

Motion to Strike portions of the Complaint pursuant to Rule

12(f). 

For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant’s anti-SLAPP

Motion to Strike is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Defendant’s Motion

to Strike portions of the Complaint is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

 On June 7, 2005, an incident took place in a parking lot in

Davis, California, wherein a Toyota Highlander allegedly hit a

parked car. The Highlander was traced to the Buzayan family and

led to a police investigation of the incident. Officer Pheng Ly

of the Davis Police Department conducted the investigation. 

Officer Ly interviewed members of the Buzayan family as well as

Ms. Wonhof, the victim, and made audio tapes of these interviews. 

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On June 13, 2005, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Officer Ly

arrested 16-year-old Halema Buzayan on suspicion of a hit and run

misdemeanor. Officer Ly took Ms. Buzayan to the Davis Police

Station and questioned and fingerprinted her. Officer Ly made

audio tapes of the arrest and the subsequent questioning. Prior

to her arrest, the Buzayan family paid for the damages done to

the other car, while maintaining that they were not at fault for

the incident.

After the arrest, Jamal Buzayan, Halema’s father, informed

the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and complained to the

Davis City Council about his daughter’s arrest. A few days

later, Mr. Buzayan filed a complaint against the Police

Department. Sergeant Gina Anderson conducted interviews into

Plaintiff’s allegations. According to Plaintiffs, the Police

Department rejected Mr. Buzayan’s complaint.

On or about September 20, 2005, the Plaintiffs filed a

Government Tort Claim against the City of Davis and the Davis

Police Department. On October 26, 2005, Mr. Buzayan and his

former attorney met for a settlement conference with Douglas

Thorn, the attorney representing the City of Davis. The

Plaintiffs allege that during this meeting Douglas Thorn

inappropriately threatened them with retaliation.

The Buzayan’s claims against the Police Department created a

public outcry within the City of Davis. Protests were held in

Ms. Buzayan’s honor and there were public calls for additional

police oversight. 

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On January 27, 2006, the Davis Human Relations Commission (HRC)

submitted a report to the Davis Police Department entitled

“Civilian Oversight to Strengthen and Improve the Davis Police

Department.” Jim Hyde, the Chief of Police, published a written

report in response to the various allegations made by the HRC. 

Included was a response to the allegations made by the Buzayan

family.

On or about November 18, 2005, Patricia Fong, on behalf of

the Yolo County Office of the District Attorney, filed

misdemeanor charges against Halema Buzayan. In March and April

of 2006, the Buzayans gave interviews to the media wherein they

released portions of Officer Ly’s audio tapes. The Yolo County

Superior Court dismissed the case against Halema Buzayan on April

17, 2006. Subsequently, Patricia Fong gave an interview to the

Davis Enterprise in which Ms. Fong discussed the Buzayan case and

released the audio tapes made by Officer Ly. The Davis

Enterprise published an article on the subject and made the full

content of the audio tapes available on its website. Included in

the audio tapes were references to Plaintiffs’ home telephone

number, address, and other allegedly private information. 

On July 14, 2006, Ms. Buzayan, through her father as

Guardian Ad Litem, filed suit against the City of Davis Police

Department and individual Police Department employees for

seventeen causes of action. The Defendants filed a Partial

Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) and a Partial

Motion to Strike under Rule 12(f) and California Code of Civil

Procedure § 425.16. 

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6

Since Ms. Buzayan had reached the age of majority prior to filing

the suit, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(7), and granted Plaintiff leave to amend the

complaint. 

On November 3, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint

which substituted Ms. Buzayan as an individual, and added the

additional members of the Buzayan family as Plaintiffs. The

First Amended Complaint also added the Davis Enterprise, Debbie

Davis, Lauren Keene, the City of Davis, and individuals from the

Yolo County Office of the District Attorney as Defendants, and

included additional causes of action. The Defendants filed their

Special Motion to Strike and Partial Motion to Dismiss on

February 9, 2007. Oral argument on this Motion was held on April

16, 2007.

STANDARDS

1. Anti-SLAPP Motion

California’s Anti-SLAPP law is aimed at curtailing civil

actions designed to deter private citizens from exercising their

rights of free speech. U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles

& Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth

Circuit permits the use of anti-SLAPP motions in federal court on

state law claims like those asserted herein against the moving

Defendants. Id. at 973.

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The court engages in a two-step process when ruling on a

special motion to strike. Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause,

Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53, 67 (Cal. 2002). The first step is to

determine that the defendant’s act upon which the complaint is

based was done “in furtherance of the person’s right of petition

or free speech ... in connection with a public issue ...” Cal.

Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1); Equilon Enterprises, 20 Cal. 4th

at 67. This is defined in § 425.16(e) as:

(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a

legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other

official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or

oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue

under consideration or review by a legislative, executive,

or judicial body, or any other official proceeding

authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or

writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum

in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any

other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the

constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right

of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue

of public interest. 

 

 

Once a defendant shows that his or her conduct is covered

under the anti-SLAPP statute, the second step is to determine if

the plaintiff has a probability of prevailing on the underlying

claim. Equilon Enterprises, 20 Cal. 4th at 67. The court may

examine “pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits

stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.”

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(2).

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2. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)

requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.

Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). While a complaint attacked by a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of

his “entitlement to relief” requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 2007

U.S. LEXIS 5901, 20-22 (U.S. 2007) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. at 21 (citing

5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216,

pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must contain something

more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. 

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The court should “freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no

“undue delay, bad faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the

movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

. . . the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment. . . .” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

Generally, leave to amend is only denied when it is clear that

the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. 

DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir.

1992).

3. Motion to Strike

The Court may strike “from any pleading any insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “(T)he function of a 12(f)

motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money

that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing

with those issues prior to trial....” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H.

Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Immaterial matter

is that which has no essential or important relationship to the

claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded. Fantasy, Inc. v.

Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)(rev'd on other

grounds Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 114 S. Ct. 1023,

127 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1994))(internal citations and quotations

omitted). Impertinent matter consists of statements that do not

pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question. Id.

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ANALYSIS

I. Special Motion to Strike

A. Defendants’ Conduct as Protected Speech

In an anti-SLAPP suit, the burden is on the defendant to

show that the allegedly harmful conduct in which they engaged is

protected under California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16.

Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1042-43

(Cal. Ct. App. 1997). “A defendant meets this burden by

demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff’s cause fits

one of the categories spelled out in [§ 425.16(e)].” Id. As

enumerated above, those categories include statements made either

in connection with a judicial proceeding or on a matter of public

interest. The defendant need not show that the purpose of the

plaintiff’s complaint is to chill the defendant’s exercise of

constitutional speech. Equilon Enterprises, 20 Cal. 4th at 57.

1. Defamation

Plaintiffs’ defamation charges are aimed primarily at Chief

Hyde’s report to the Human Relations Commission and statements

made by and to government officials. Additionally, Plaintiffs

allege in their Opposition that Defendants disparaged the Buzayan

family in the Muslim Community and that Chief Hyde sent a

defamatory email to ABC television. 

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Defendants argue that these statements fall under the antiSLAPP protections of § 425.16(e)(3) and § 425.16(e)(4), both of

which require a showing that the statements concerned an issue of

public interest. Although not defined in the anti-SLAPP statute,

a matter of public interest is one that is “something of concern

to a substantial number of people.” Weinberg v. Feisel, 110 Cal.

App. 4th 1122, 1132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Dun & Bradstreet

v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985)).

 Here, Ms. Buzayan’s arrest led to public criticism of the

Davis Police Department and calls for a civilian oversight board. 

The Plaintiffs gave interviews to the media and public protests

were held in support of Ms. Buzayan. Indeed, the Davis

Enterprise, before being named as a Defendant in this case,

called the Buzayan case the top story of the year. Consequently,

the Buzayan case was an issue of public interest.

a. Chief Hyde’s Report to the HRC

The Human Relations Commission was established by the Davis

City Council to address issues of discrimination within the Davis

community. In January, 2006, The HRC issued a report entitled

“Civilian Oversight to Strengthen and Improve the Davis Police

Department.” Police Chief Jim Hyde issued a written memorandum

to the Davis City Council responding to the allegations in the

report. Plaintiffs allege that Chief Hyde’s response contained

defamatory statements. 

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Section 425.16(e)(3) protects “any written or oral statement

or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum

in connection with an issue of public interest.” A public forum

is “defined as a place that is open to the public where

information is freely exchanged.” Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism

Club, 85 Cal. App. 4th 468, 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). City

Council meetings are open to the public and allow for public

comments to be heard on various topics. As such, City Council

meetings are a public forum for purposes of an anti-Slapp motion. 

Since the controversy surrounding the Buzayan case and the calls

for police oversight were issues of public interest, Chief Hyde’s

report is protected under § 425.16.

b. Statements made to government officials

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Steven Pierce made a false

statement to Yolo County Supervisor Mariko Yamada regarding the

timing of the Buzayan’s payment of damages to Ms. Wonhof. 

Plaintiffs make the same allegation about Carlos Matos, another

government official. Plaintiffs also allege that Davis City

Council Member Stephen Souza received disparaging information

about the Buzayans and passed it to Ms. Yamada.

Section 425.16(e)(4) protects “any other conduct in

furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of

petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection

with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” This

includes private statements which concern an issue of public

interest. 

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Terry v. Davis Cmty Church, 131 Cal. App. 4th 1534, 1546 (Cal.

Ct. App. 2005). Therefore, the private communications between

any Defendants and government officials are protected by the

anti-SLAPP statute.

 

c. Disparaging comments in the Muslim community

Plaintiff’s allege that Stephen Pierce and others made false

statements about the Buzayans to Hamza el Nakhal, a local Muslim

cleric, and disparaged the Buzayan family within the Muslim

community. It appears that Hamza el Nakhal was a member of the

HRC at the time the comments were made and was involved with the

proposals for the civilian oversight board. See Human Relations

Commission, Minutes of September 22, 2005 Meeting,

http://www.city.davis.ca.us/meetings/human/MIN09-22-05_reg.pdf. 

Regardless, the statements made to Hamza el Nakhal are private

communications about an issue of public interest and are

therefore protected under § 425.16(e)(4).

d. Chief Hyde’s email to ABC

The Plaintiffs further allege that an email that Jim Hyde

sent to ABC television in March 2006 contained defamatory

statements. Mr. Hyde sent the email after an apparent attempt to

conduct an interview with ABC. In the email, Mr. Hyde noted that

he could not comment on the pending juvenile case but he was

willing to give the Police Department’s perspective on Mr.

Buzayan’s allegations. 

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This is conduct in furtherance of free speech on a matter of

public interest and therefore falls § 425.16(e)(4).

2. Invasion of Privacy

Plaintiff’s two invasion of privacy claims are predicated on

the Defendants’ release of the audio tapes to the Davis

Enterprise and the statement made about the juvenile proceedings. 

Defendants argue that this falls under § 425.16(e)(3) because

they were made in a public forum on an issue of public interest. 

However, Plaintiffs argue that the information released by the

Defendants violated Welfare and Institutions Code § 827 and

therefore does not qualify for anti-SLAPP protection. 

Welfare and Institutions Code § 827 governs the inspection

and release of juvenile court records. Section 827 provides, in

pertinent part, “A juvenile case file, any portion thereof, and

information relating to the content of the juvenile case file,

may not be disseminated ... other than [to] those ... authorized

to receive documents ...” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 827(a)(4). 

There is a strong public policy in keeping juvenile court records

confidential, and it is up to the juvenile court to determine

when disclosure of such records is allowed. In re Keisha T., 38

Cal. App. 4th 220, 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).

Here, the Defendants have not shown that they had a court

order allowing them to disseminate any information relating to

Ms. Buzayan's criminal case. 

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To the contrary, the Plaintiffs allege that the Yolo County

Superior Court denied the District Attorney’s motion to release

information from the juvenile proceedings. Moreover, while

Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs had previously given

portions of the audio tapes to other news outlets, the Defendants

do not show that the Plaintiffs had in fact released the entire

contents of the tapes. Thus, the Defendants have not met their

burden to qualify for anti-SLAPP protection for purposes of

Plaintiffs' invasion of privacy claims. The Defendants’ Motion

to Strike Plaintiff’s fifteenth and seventeenth causes of action

is DENIED. Additionally, the Court denies Defendant’s attempt to

strike portions of the emotional distress claims as well as

paragraphs 81-104 of the Complaint.

B. Merits of Plaintiff’s Defamation Claims

Since Defendant’s allegedly defamatory acts are protected

under the anti-SLAPP statute, the Plaintiffs now have the burden

of demonstrating a probability of prevailing on the claims.

Equilon Enterprises, 20 Cal. 4th at 67. “In determining whether

plaintiffs will probably prevail on the merits, we consider the

pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both sides, but we do

not weigh credibility or comparative strength of the evidence.”

Terry, 131 Cal. App. 4th at 1551. However, the evidence

presented must be admissible, and “declarations that lack

foundation or personal knowledge, or that are argumentative,

speculative, impermissible opinion, hearsay, or conclusory are to

be disregarded.” 

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Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal. App. 4th 13, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).

Plaintiffs allege that Chief Hyde’s response to the HRC

contained demonstrably false or misleading statements. 

Defendants argue that the report is privileged under California

Civil Code § 47(b). Section 47(b) provides an absolute privilege

for statements made “[i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2)

judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding

authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any

other proceeding authorized by law.” California Civil Code §

47(b). The privilege extends to administrative and quasijudicial proceedings. Kashian v. Harriman, 98 Cal. App. 4th 892,

913 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). It has been applied broadly and

without regard to malice. Jacob B. v. County of Shasta, 40 Cal.

4th 948, 955 (Cal. 2007).

As mentioned above, the HRC is a committee created by the

Davis City Council. In response to public complaints of police

misconduct, the HRC issued a report entitled “Civilian Oversight

to Strengthen and Improve the Davis Police Department.” Police

Chief Jim Hyde issued a written response to this report, which

included a response to the HRC’s characterizations of the

Plaintiffs’ complaints. Therefore, Chief Hyde’s statements were

issued in a legislative proceeding and are privileged. 

The Plaintiffs’ remaining defamation claims are based on

more private communications. Defamation claims require a

provably false statement of fact. Gilbert, 147 Cal. App. 4th at

27. 

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Additionally, Plaintiffs, if they are deemed to be limited public

figures, “must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an

allegedly defamatory statement was made with knowledge of falsity

or reckless disregard for truth. Ampex Corp. v. Cargle, 128 Cal.

App. 4th 1569, 1577 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (citing New York Times

Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). Limited public

figures are those persons who voluntarily enter or are drawn into

a public controversy. Id.

There are several elements to determine if a plaintiff is a

limited public figure. Ampex, 128 Cal. App. 4th at 1577. 

First, there must be a public controversy, which means

the issue was debated publicly and had foreseeable and

substantial ramifications for nonparticipants. Second,

the plaintiff must have undertaken some voluntary act

through which he or she sought to influence resolution

of the public issue. In this regard it is sufficient

that the plaintiff attempts to thrust him or herself

into the public eye. And finally, the alleged

defamation must be germane to the plaintiff's

participation in the controversy. 

 

Id. Here, the issue of whether the Davis Police Department was

adequately and constitutionally protecting the residents of the

City of Davis was a public controversy. The City Council had

listened to public calls for additional police oversight and

responded with the HRC report discussing a possible civilian

oversight board. The Plaintiffs state in their Complaint that

they were associated with the movement to reform the Police

Department and allege that this led to the Police Department

issuing defamatory statements. Additionally, the Plaintiffs

conducted several interviews with the media and kept their case

in the public eye. 

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Consequently, the Plaintiffs meet the elements of limited public

figures for purposes of their defamation claims.

As limited public figures, the burden is on the Plaintiffs

to prove malice in the defamatory statements. In their

Complaint, the Plaintiffs make broad reference to a series of

allegedly defamatory statements made by the Defendants. In their

Opposition to the Motion to Strike, Plaintiffs clarify the

allegations into specific statements made by Stephen Pierce,

Carlos Matos, and Stephen Souza to Mariko Yamada and Hamza El

Nakhal. In support of these accusations, Plaintiffs have put

forth declarations by their Counsel and by Mr. Buzayan that they

believe these statements occurred. Neither Plaintiffs or their

Counsel were parties to the conversations in which these

statements took place, and Plaintiffs have not put forth

declarations from the participants themselves. Thus, the

Plaintiffs have not provided admissible evidence as to these

allegedly defamatory statements.

Plaintiff’s final defamation claim rests on an email that

Mr. Hyde sent to ABC after an attempt by Mr. Hyde to conduct an

interview with one of ABC’s reporters. Mr. Hyde included a

statement which gave the Police Department’s version of the

events that transpired after the June 7, 2005 traffic incident.

In including this statement, Mr. Hyde, as Chief of Police, was

responding to the serious allegations leveled at the Police

Department by Mr. Buzayan. Plaintiffs have not provided any

evidence that this statement was either false nor made with

actual malice. 

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Therefore, Plaintiffs have not met their burden on any of the

defamation claims and the Defendants Motion to Strike as to these

claims is GRANTED.

II. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ third and

fourth causes of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The third

cause of action alleges that Defendants violated Ms. Buzayan’s

due process and equal protection rights under the California

Constitution, article I, § 7(a). The fourth cause of action

alleges a violation of article I, § 13, the right to be free from

unreasonable seizure. The Plaintiffs seek only monetary damages

for violations of these rights.

The California Supreme Court has held that monetary damages

are not available for violations of article I, § 7(a) of the

California Constitution. Katzberg v. Regents of the Univ. of

Cal., 29 Cal. 4th 300, 329 (Cal. 2002). The Court noted that the

language of the due process clause did not indicate an intent to

allow monetary damages for its violation. Id. at 318. 

Additionally, article I, § 7(a) did not contain any “guidelines,

mechanisms, or procedures” by which the Court could infer a

damages remedy. Id. at 321-322. Similarly, the equal protection

clause in article I, § 7(a) does not give rise to a claim for

monetary damages. Gates v. Sup. Ct., 32 Cal. App. 4th 481, 525

(Cal. Ct. App. 1995). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ third cause of

action is dismissed.

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The issue of whether article I, § 13 of the California

Constitution, the right to be free from unreasonable seizures,

gives rise to a claim for monetary damages, has not been

definitively decided by California courts. Nevertheless, several

unpublished district court decisions have dismissed such claims.

Weimer v. County of Kern, 2006 WL 3834237 (E.D. Cal. 2006);

Wigfall v. City and County of S.F., 2007 WL 174434 (N.D. Cal.

2007). In Wigfall, the district court examined article I, § 13

using the analytical framework described in Katzberg. The court

noted that the plain language of the provision does not provide

for monetary damages. Wigfall, 2007 WL 174434 at *5. 

Additionally, the Plaintiff had other available remedies.

Wigfall, 2007 WL 174434 at *6. 

This Court agrees with the reasoning of the district court

and finds that there is no remedy of monetary damages under

California Constitution article I, § 13. The language of the

provision does not indicate an intent to provide monetary damages

and the Plaintiffs have other remedies by which they may be

awarded such damages. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of

action is dismissed.

Inasmuch as the two Constitutional provisions do not provide

relief for the Plaintiffs there is no way to cure the defect in

the pleading. Therefore, Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss

is GRANTED without leave to amend.

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III. Motion to Strike

The Defendants seek to strike several paragraphs from the

Plaintiffs Complaint which allege that attorney Douglas Thorn

acted improperly in a settlement negotiation. However,

“[m]otions to strike are generally disfavored because of the

limited importance of pleadings in federal practice.” RDF Media

Ltd. v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 372 F.Supp.2d 556, 561 (C.D.Cal.

2005); see also William Schwarzer, et al., Federal Civil

Procedure Before Trial § 9:375 (2006). Here, Plaintiffs allege

that Douglas Thorn threatened them with retaliation and that

later his threats were carried out. Since these allegations are

related to Plaintiffs claims, the Motion to Strike is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants Motion to Strike

the sixteenth cause of action for defamation is GRANTED. The

Motion to Strike the fifteenth and seventeenth causes of action

for invasion of privacy is DENIED. The Partial Motion to Dismiss

the third and fourth causes of action for violations of the

California Constitution is GRANTED without leave to amend. The

Motion to Strike portions of the Complaint is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 8, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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