Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05002/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05002-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 8, 1998 Decided April 17, 

1998

No. 97-5002

Anthony Summers,

Appellant

v.

Department of Justice,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 87cv03168)

Daniel S. Alcorn argued the cause for appellant. James

H. Lesar was on the briefs.

Melanie A. Pustay, Senior Counsel, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee, with whom

Mary Lou Leary, United States Attorney at the time the

brief was filed, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United

States Attorney, were on the brief.

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Before: Silberman, Williams and Sentelle, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Williams.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: In this case arising under the

Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. s 552 (1997),

author Anthony Summers seeks to compel release of the

official and confidential records of former FBI Director J.

Edgar Hoover. Summers and the government filed crossmotions for summary judgment on the issue of Summers's

entitlement to disputed documents. The district court granted the motion of the government and denied that of the

plaintiff in a summary order without explanation. Although

we review grants of summary judgment de novo, and the law

does not require district judges to enter findings of fact or

conclusions of law in the grant of such motions, because of the

unique nature of FOIA litigation our precedents under that

statute permit remand for the development of an adequate

explanation when we find an abuse of discretion in the failure

of the district court to provide one. As this is such a case, we

remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

J. Edgar Hoover maintained an extensive array of FBI

files in his office at FBI Headquarters. These documents--

the so-called "official and confidential" files--include FBI files

that Hoover had charged out of the FBI's central records

system; Hoover's official and personal correspondence; as

well as various FBI memoranda. In December of 1986,

Anthony Summers, appellant here, filed a FOIA request with

the FBI seeking release of Hoover's official and confidential

files.

In response to Summers's FOIA request, the FBI first

released approximately 6,500 pages of material that had

previously been made public under an earlier FOIA request.

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In addition, the FBI reprocessed the official and confidential

files, ultimately releasing about 12,000 additional pages to

Summers. In doing so, the FBI withheld portions of these

files pursuant to exemptions 1, 2, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E) of

the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. s 552(b).

Challenging the FBI's claimed exemptions, Summers filed

a lawsuit against the United States Department of Justice in

November 1987. By agreement of the parties, Summers

selected 500 pages of the official and confidential files to serve

as the basis for the FBI's Vaughn index, setting forth its

justifications for refusing disclosure. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment addressing

the FBI's withholding of certain documents and portions of

documents. In support of its motion, the government submitted eight affidavits prepared by FBI Special Agents. These

affidavits purported to explain the nature of the withheld

information, and stated which FOIA exemption or exemptions

were intended to justify the withholding.

After the cross-motions for summary judgment became

ripe for decision, the district court scheduled a statuscall/motions hearing for November 1, 1996. A transcript of

the hearing, which lasted approximately three minutes, appears below:

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Civil Action 87-3168, Anthony

Summers v. Department of Justice. Mr. Lesar for the plaintiff, Melanie Pustay for the defendant.

MR. LESAR: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I have come to the

onclusion in reviewing this

case that it is a dead stalemate

at the moment, that there are

going to be no more documents

released, there's going to be no

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settlement, and that there is really no alternative left to simply

deciding the motions. I take it

you concur?

MR. LESAR: I certainly concur, yes.

THE COURT: Well, we have reviewed the file,

reviewed the documents, made

more than a cursory, but less

than a total review of the affidavits, the documents that have

been withheld and the exemptions claimed for them, and I

am satisfied that the exemptions are properly claimed, Mr.

Lesar, so I'm going to grant the

government's motion and deny

yours. If you can persuade the

court of appeals to the contrary,

more power to you.

MR. LESAR: I'll try.

THE COURT: All right. This case has been

around since 1987. It would be

nice--it's coming up on its tenth

anniversary, in other words.

MR. LESAR: Yes.

THE COURT: It would be nice if there was

some prospect that there were

going to be further reviews, further release of documents, a little flexibility on the part of Mr.

Summers, but I gather that

there won't be, and so let's--

let's just move it along.

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MR. LESAR:All right.

MS. PUSTAY:Thank you, your honor.

MR. LESAR:Thank you, your honor. I assume that the court will be issuing a written order?

THE COURT:I'm not going to write an opinion, just a summary order, and

then you can reiterate everything that you've said on the

fifth floor.

MR. LESAR:All right, thank you.

THE COURT:Let them worry with it for a

while.

MR. LESAR:All right.

The district court issued its "summary order" on the same

day that the hearing took place. The order stated that "upon

consideration of" the record, including the affidavits of three

FBI agents and "the Court's own review of a sampling of the

redacted documents and Vaughn indices, ... the materials

withheld by defendant are, in fact, properly withheld under

the Freedom of Information Act." The two-page order did

not refer to any particular withheld document, nor did it refer

to any of the specific FOIA exemptions raised by the government.

Three days after the district court issued its decision, the

government notified the court that it is reversible error not to

make "specific findings of segregability regarding each of the

withheld documents." See Krikorian v. Department of State,

984 F.2d 461, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Attempting to correct this

problem, the government submitted a proposed order stating

that "all legal requirements for the exemptions invoked by

defendant pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ...

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have been satisfied, and that all reasonably segregable, nonexempt material has been disclosed." The proposed order

further stated that it was "just and proper" to grant the

government's summary judgment motion "for the reasons set

forth in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and

supporting papers." The district judge signed the government's proposed order verbatim, without waiting for Summers to file a response.

Summers filed a timely notice of appeal from the district

court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government.

II. Discussion

A

Our analysis of this case focuses not on whether our review

of the district court's decision discloses error, but rather on

the nature of our review. As the government rightly points

out, it is well-understood law that "[w]e review orders granting summary judgment de novo." Gallant v. NLRB, 26 F.3d

168, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1994). This is so because in our review of

decisions granting summary judgment we must decide the

same question that was before the district court: "[t]hat is,

we must determine whether there is on the record 'no genuine issue as to any material fact.' " Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)). For that reason, we normally do not require the

district court to make findings of fact or conclusions of law in

support of orders granting summary judgment. Indeed, the

Federal Rules specifically provide "findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under

Rule ... 56." Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

Not only is it the general rule that we do not require

findings of fact and conclusions of law in decisions allowing

summary judgment, in the ordinary run of cases this rule is a

most sensible one. As the granting of summary judgment

depends in the first instance on the lack of issues of material

fact, if the trial judge had to engage in the weighing of

evidence and the finding of fact in order to reach a decision,

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then a grant of summary judgment would not be in order.

Further, as noted above, our task on appeal is the same as

the task faced by the district court--reviewing the record de

novo to determine whether genuine issues of material fact

would preclude summary judgment. Thus, because our own

review is coterminous with that of the district court, the

findings and legal conclusions of a district court could be no

more than useful and desirable in ordering our review.

However, due to the peculiar nature of the FOIA, we have

created exceptions to the normal summary judgment review

processes applicable to litigation under that statute. The

FOIA, enacted in 1966, reflects "a general philosophy of full

agency disclosure." United States Dep't of Defense v. FLRA,

510 U.S. 487, 494 (1994) (citation omitted). In keeping with

this goal, the Act requires every agency, "upon any request

for records which ... reasonably describes such records," to

make such records "promptly available to any person." 5

U.S.C. s 552(a)(3). Although "disclosure, not secrecy, is the

dominant objective of [the FOIA]," United States Dep't of

Defense, 510 U.S. at 494, the statute contains nine exemptions

under which agencies may refuse to disclose requested information. 5 U.S.C. s 552(b). These exemptions stem from

Congress's recognition that the release of certain information

may harm legitimate governmental or private interests.

When an agency declines to produce a requested document,

the agency bears the burden before the trial court of proving

the applicability of claimed statutory exemptions. 5 U.S.C.

s 552(a)(4)(B). To carry this burden, an agency must submit

a "Vaughn index" to explain why it has withheld information.

See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The

Vaughn index "must adequately describe each withheld document or deletion from a released document," and "must state

the exemption claimed for each deletion or withheld document, and explain why the exemption is relevant." Founding

Church of Scientology v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 949 (D.C. Cir.

1979).

Under the FOIA, district courts reviewing agency decisions

must "determine the matter de novo, and may examine the

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contents of [requested] agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be

withheld under any of the [applicable] exemptions...." 5

U.S.C. s 552(a)(4)(B). If a district court determines that an

agency has withheld information improperly, the court may

order the agency to produce that information. Id. Each of

the nine exemptions requires the withholding agency in the

first instance and the reviewing court in the second to make

distinct decisions as to factual questions. When the district

court reviews an agency's Vaughn index to verify the validity

of each claimed exemption, its determination resembles a

fact-finding process. Such a review usually, if not always,

comes in the context of cross-motions for summary judgment

which we then review de novo, which means "in the FOIA

context ... that we ascertain whether the agency has sustained its burden of demonstrating that the documents requested are not 'agency records' or are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA." Gallant, 26 F.3d at 171 (quoting

United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136,

142 n.3 (1989)).

While the process of reviewing a Vaughn index and the

accompanying documents for fact-specific questions may be

an onerous one for a district court, it is at least triply so for

an appellate court. We do not underestimate the task of the

district judge in having to acquire access to reams of paper,

make intensive review of that material, and reach documentspecific conclusions. Nonetheless, for three judges to either

simultaneously or seriatim acquire and peruse the same documents and then attempt a collegial decision is still more

daunting. As the Ninth Circuit has put it, "[t]he appellate

court is particularly ill-equipped to conduct its own investigation into the propriety of claims for non-disclosure." Van

Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 1356,

1358 (9 th Cir. 1981) (citing Vaughn, supra).

In Vaughn, we recognized the burden placed upon the

district court when the government fails to establish with

sufficient specificity the basis of claimed exemption from

FOIA disclosure of specific documents. To alleviate that

burden, we established the requirement for a Vaughn index

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so that a district judge could "examine and rule on each

element of the itemized list." 484 F.2d at 827. In so doing,

we further recognized that "[w]hen appealed, such an itemized ruling should be much more easily reviewed than would

be the case if the government agency were permitted to make

a generalized argument in favor of exemption." Id. When

the government has submitted such an itemized list, but the

district court has made only a generalized ruling, the burden

upon the district court has been (at least potentially) alleviated but the triple burden on the appellate court has not.

In recognition of the judicial efficiency to be gained by

requiring the district court to review the Vaughn index with

some specificity as we have required of the agency in its

filing, we determined in 1975 that it constitutes an "abuse of

discretion" for a district court "to deny a plaintiff's reasonable

request for clarification of an adverse summary judgment

order in an FOIA case." Schwartz v. Internal Revenue

Service, 511 F.2d 1303, 1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Furthermore, it is an abuse of discretion for the district court not to

make "specific findings of segregability regarding each of the

... documents" withheld in response to a FOIA application,

upon the plaintiff's reasonable request. Krikorian, 984 F.2d

at 467. The concerns of efficiency that apply to the question

of segregability vel non are relevant to all aspects of a

summary judgment upholding an agency's claimed exemptions. We hold that the plaintiff's statement in the district

court assuming "that the court [would] be issuing a written

order" constituted a "reasonable request for clarification"

under Schwartz. We must therefore remand this controversy

as falling within the Schwartz exception to normal summary

judgment review process.

Later decisions of this and other circuits have reaffirmed

and clarified the Schwartz exception to Rule 52(a). See

Founding Church of Scientology, 603 F.2d at 950 ("District

Court decisions in FOIA cases must provide statements of

law that are both accurate and sufficiently detailed to establish that the careful de novo review prescribed by Congress

has in fact taken place."); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 980 (3d Cir. 1981) (A

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district court's obligation to state the legal basis for its

resolution of a FOIA summary judgment motion "is, in a

sense, implicit in the statutory duty of de novo review.").

Most similar to the present case is Truitt v. Department of

State, 897 F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In Truitt, as in the

present case, the agency from which the documents were

requested invoked several FOIA exemptions--in that case

five.1 In Truitt, the district court found "that the exemptions

claimed for the eight specific documents ... [were] appropriately invoked and justified by the detailed descriptions given

of those documents." Id. at 547. We reversed, holding that

the district court's generalized treatment "leaves us unable to

engage in effective appellate review." Id. In the present

case, where there are thousands of documents, the district

court's generalized acceptance of the government's exemption

claims leaves us with the same inability.2

B

A brief review of the exemptions claimed and the nature of

the Hoover files starkly illustrates the reasons the Schwartz

rule is necessary for effective appellate review of complex

FOIA cases. Our comments in this review are not intended

to decide the questions which we raise, but only to highlight

the problems which the district judge should resolve before

this case is resumed at the trial level.

As we suggested above, the so-called "official and confidential" files were not kept in the FBI's central records system,

nor were they accessible by FBI personnel-at-large in the

regular course of their duties. All concerned generally agree

that Hoover maintained the files for his own purposes which

many, including the appellant, allege to have included improp-

________

1In the present case the FBI invokes either four or six, depending upon how one views the subsections of exemption 7.

2In fairness, there were more than eight documents in the Truitt

case also, but eight apparently was the number of sample documents sought for in camera review. 897 F.2d at 547 n.53. In the

present case, 500 selected documents made up the Vaughn index.

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er ones. For example, Summers and other writers assert

that Hoover's system of secret files constituted an important

means of exercising power in the political arena. See generally Athan Theoharis, From the Secret Files of J. Edgar

Hoover (1991); and Anthony Summers, Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover (1993). Although

the government may not have formally conceded the breadth

of the allegations against the late Director, neither has it

contended that Summers's characterization of the files and

their reason for being is without basis in fact. It is against

that background that the district court must measure the

applicability of the asserted FOIA exemptions. As we noted

above, the FBI withheld documents under several FOIA

exemptions: specifically, exemptions 1, 2, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and

7(E). The district court did not address in its summary order

which exemptions it found to be applicable, therefore we

presume it approved them all. Likewise, in its supplemental

order, entered after the appellee called to the attention of the

court that a failure to specifically address segregability of

nonexempt material was reversible error under Krikorian,

the court only generally cited to 5 U.S.C. s 552. Therefore,

we will highlight a few of the fact-related inquiries necessary

to determine the applicability of each of the listed categories

of exemption. We intend our discussion to illustrate, not

exhaust, those matters that are better handled in the first

instance by a court designed for the processing of fact than

by a collegial court better equipped for review.

After establishing the general availability of agency records, the FOIA provides that "this section does not apply to

matters that are" listed in subsections thereafter. 5 U.S.C.

s 552(b). The FBI submissions claim exemption of some

documents under subsection (b)(1), which exempts matters

that are

(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by

an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of

national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact

properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.

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5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(1). To justify exemption under this subsection, the government must establish compliance with an appropriate Executive Order and proper classification pursuant

to that Order. See generally Baez v. United States Dep't of

Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1331-37 (D.C. Cir. 1980). As to the

documents before us, this analysis is complicated by an

apparent change in the applicable Executive Order between

the time of classification (apparently January or February of

1989 as to most of the documents) and the time of litigation.

The newer order, Executive Order No. 12,958, differs considerably from its predecessor, Executive Order No. 12,356.

Significantly, the newer order is less restrictive, reflecting

what it refers to as "dramatic changes" in national security

concerns in the late 1980's following the United States' victory in the Cold War.

We are not able to tell from the record which of these

Executive Orders the district court construed in concluding

that material withheld under the exemption met its criteria.

While we accept the government's argument that "substantial

weight" must be accorded agency affidavits "concerning the

details of the classified status" of the records at issue, Krikorian, 984 F.2d at 464, we are ill-equipped to determine

whether the district court properly concluded that those

affidavits carried the day without an express determination of

which order's criteria he used as his template. We offer this

"two-orders" problem only as illustrative and not exhaustive

of the decisions that the district court must make in order to

determine the applicability of exemption 1, and that we

expect all district courts to elucidate in cases of this complexity in order to provide a foundation for appellate review.

Exemption 2 arises from 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(2), which exempts from disclosure documents that are "related solely to

the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency."

While the FBI made but little use of this exemption in its

claims before the district court, and the parties do not

address it on appeal, it does appear in the FBI's original

claim. Because the district court did not sort out its acceptances and rejections, we would expect after remand to learn

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what, if any, material is covered by that exemption and why

such material is covered.

Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(6), permits withholding of

material "the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." This exemption

and the exemptions under subsection 7 may most clearly

demonstrate that a single-judge trial court is better suited to

perform the FOIA analysis in the first instance than a

multiple-judge appellate court. In order to uphold a claim

under exemption 6, the reviewing court must balance the

individual's right to privacy against the public's interest in

disclosure. See, e.g., Department of the Air Force v. Rose,

425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976). To make this decision, the court

must determine, inter alia, the nature of the public's right to

know and the extent of the privacy interest involved. A

similar balancing approach extends to claims of exemption

under subsections (7)(A) and (C). United States Dep't of

Justice v. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749, 776-80 (1989).

Significantly, for exemptions requiring such an analysis, the

Supreme Court has observed that the public interest rationale

of the FOIA "focuses on the citizens' right to be informed

about 'what their government is up to.' " Id. at 773. As the

appellant's FOIA request was designed to disclose misconduct at the highest levels of the FBI, he rightly expects a

court to carefully assess that public interest in the balancing

process. We expect on remand that the district court will

provide a record of having done so.

On the other side of the balance, the privacy interests

involved in Hoover's files, or at least some of them, may not

be of the sort most esteemed by the statute. At oral argument, the government articulated a privacy interest purportedly involving the interest of individuals in not being known

to have associated with Hoover in his intelligence-collection

process. As the Supreme Court observed in Reporters Committee, "the privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) is

in fact at its apex" when the information sought "is in the

Government's control as a compilation, rather than as record

of 'what the Government is up to.' " Id. at 780. That being

the case, when, as here, the information is not a compilation

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but rather a direct record of "what the government is up to,"

it would seem likely that any privacy interest is at its nadir.

Be that as it may, all of these inquiries are fact-intensive,

delicate, and far better suited in the first instance for the

ruminations of a single trial judge, expert at finding facts,

rather than for the deliberations of a three-judge committee

far more adept at finding fault.

Finally, subsection 7 exempts from the FOIA

records or information compiled for law enforcement

purposes, but only to the extent that the production of

such law enforcement records ... (C) could reasonably

be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to

disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a

State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private

institution which furnished information on a confidential

basis, ... [or] (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions,

or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law....

5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(7). As we have already noted, our review

of the district court's interest-balancing under exemptions 6

and 7(C) requires that it fully articulate the balance it reaches; in addition, all three sections of exemption 7 suggest

additional fact-intensive tasks which the district court must

perform if our review is to be both efficient and meaningful.

At the very threshold of section 7 exemption, the government

must show that the withheld material consists of "records or

information compiled for law enforcement purposes." Usually that question might be readily determined without the

creation of an extensive record. In this case, if the United

States is to establish that files kept in the office of the

director in Washington and not readily available to field

agents constitute law enforcement records or information for

FOIA purposes, then we would expect a clear demonstration

of how it has met that burden. Similarly, we would expect a

showing as to records exempted under 7(D) of how the

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persons protected are "confidential sources" within the meaning of the statute. On remand, the district court should

record why it concluded that the government met this burden.

Again, the matters discussed in this section of our opinion

are offered as illustrative and not exhaustive of the type of

problem ill-suited to explication in the first instance by an

appellate court. Presumably, a first review by a district

court would not only provide gains in efficiency of any ultimate review, but it might be expected to truncate or even

eliminate such review. That is, when a district court adequately explains its ruling, the losing party might be convinced that the district court is correct, or at least has not

fallen into reversible error, as to some or all of the matters in

controversy, and therefore bring such matters to rest at a

much earlier stage and at much less cost to the system.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the record is

not adequate for us to afford proper review to the summary

judgment entered below. For that reason, we order that the

judgment be vacated and this case remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. In so doing, we

note that this matter has lingered long in the court system

and express the hope that it may be resolved before the

passage of too much more time.

So ordered.

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Silberman, Circuit Judge, concurring: I find myself in a

rather strange situation in this case because, unlike the

district judge, I have in a sense reviewed Hoover's official and

confidential files "in camera," but did so almost 25 years ago

as the Deputy Attorney General (and Acting Attorney General) of the United States. The Washington Post caused an

uproar when it revealed their existence in early 1975, and I

was obliged to read them in preparation for testimony before

the House Judiciary Committee. Strangely, although the

Washington Post knew about the files (and may well have

known about them for some time) senior officials in the

Justice Department did not. Even Clarence Kelley, thenDirector of the FBI, never realized that the file cabinets in

his outer office contained the long-rumored secret files of J.

Edgar Hoover.1

As is now generally known, the files revealed that Hoover,

through bureau agents, had collected over many years scandalous material on public figures to be used for political

blackmail. They also contained shocking information as to

how the FBI had been used by several Presidents, most

notably Lyndon Johnson, as a political investigative unit to

gather dirt on political opponents. The Bureau even sought

to accommodate President Johnson by frustrating at least one

criminal investigation that would prove politically embarrassing--and subsequently informing the White House as to the

identity of Treasury officials who aided the investigation.

There can be no doubt that these documents as a group are

of the very highest public interest. The public concern over

presidential misuses of power has been amply demonstrated

by the Act of Congress ensuring that "Watergate" material

from the Nixon White House be preserved and disclosed.

Indeed, these files may well cast some light on Watergate's

genesis. I suspect that Richard Nixon, who was reputed to

have threatened darkly during the Watergate investigation to

expose the misdeeds of prior Presidents (and probably wished

that the Post story had appeared a year earlier), was prompt-

________

1 That is not to say that I am confident that all of Hoover's files

were in those cabinets.

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ed to gather political intelligence through private actors because he wanted what Johnson had obtained, yet did not trust

the FBI to provide it. Although the Bureau had the unmitigated gall to claim in an affidavit before the district court that

the files "are of minimal public interest," counsel for the

government at least conceded at oral argument that the

public interest in the documents was high.

Turning to the other side of the equation, targets of the

FBI's dirt-gathering activities may have an overwhelming

privacy interest. The FBI, however, has made no reasonable

effort to determine whether these targets are now dead or

alive. If they are deceased, their privacy interest is almost

certainly diminished. And even for those who are alive, the

privacy interest may vary. Those who were investigated to

determine their political connections to Robert Kennedy--

whether President Johnson's White House staffers or certain

newspaper owners--might be rather proud to have been

targeted. Those who provided information to Hoover, inside

and outside government, which was not for law enforcement

purposes, are not, in my view, at all entitled to privacy. The

government seems to have taken the position in this case that

anyone, including those in the news media, who gave Hoover

or the FBI information about potential political enemies is

entitled to protection from exposure. I think that is absurd;

that the statute explicitly protects law enforcement confidential sources implies that non-law enforcement sources--here,

confidential sources of political information ("Hoover Friendlies")--are not protected. To be sure, some of the material in

the files may have been collected originally for law enforcement purposes and therefore should be treated as such, but

having read the files I can confidently state that they were

not, repeat not, compiled for enforcement. The government

should not be allowed to claim the law enforcement privilege

merely by asserting that a file or document contains descriptions of conduct that would be a crime under some law,

somewhere.

We are remanding to the district court and urging it to

proceed with alacrity. I know how busy our district judges

are and how formidable a pile of material this case presents,

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but I urge Judge Jackson to read in camera as much of these

files as he can so that he will fully understand the enormous

public interest in these materials. Given their importance, I

would hope senior officials in the Justice Department, rather

than just an Assistant United States Attorney, would also

review the files. That could expedite proceedings.

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Williams, Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur but wish to

add that one of the obstacles to granting the government's

motion for summary judgment may be that its affidavits are

obscure about how much effort it makes to find out if the

persons whose privacy it invokes are alive or dead. The

affidavit of Special Agent Llewellyn says that the Bureau did

not invoke either of the privacy exemptions (6 or 7(C)) if "the

FBI had knowledge from the responsive files or independently that a person is deceased." That of Special Agent Superneau similarly says that she did not withhold information

relating exclusively to "individuals that I know to be deceased." It would seem to be consistent with these affidavits

that the agents have been completely passive on the issue,

taking death into account only if the fact has happened to

swim into their line of vision. If that is true, there would be a

question whether the Bureau's invocation of the privacy interest represented a reasonable response to the FOIA request,

at least if the Bureau has, or has ready access to, data bases

that could resolve the issue.

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