Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02208/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02208-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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1

 Petitioner states that he has been confined at the Bureau of Immigration

and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detention facility in Eloy, Arizona, since October

15, 2004. [Doc. # 1].

2

 Petitioner previously filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court which contained claims related to the claims in the

instant Petition and Amended Petition. [See CV 03-699-PHX-MHM (MS)]. That

Petition was dismissed without prejudice. [Doc. # 20]. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ky Ngoc Truong, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Alberto Gonzales, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 04-2208-PHX-MHM (MS)

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner, who is represented by counsel,1 filed a "Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus with Stay of Removal" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2241 on October 18,

2004 ("original Petition"). [Doc. # 1].2

 Pursuant to the Court's Order (Doc. # 42), a

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Second Amended Petition ("Amended Petition") was subsequently filed. [Doc. # 31].

The undersigned submitted a Report and Recommendation on February 22, 2006

recommending that Grounds One and Two of Petitioner's habeas petition be

transferred to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to the REAL ID Act of

2005, and that Ground Three be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. (Doc. # 60). On March 31, 2006, the Report and Recommendation was

rejected in part and adopted in part, remanding Grounds One and Two to the

undersigned for an analysis on their merits.

Upon review of the Second Amended Petition, the response, reply, and

record, the undersigned reports and recommends as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of Petitioner's case have been articulated in detail in the

undersigned's original Report and Recommendation [see Doc. # 60 at 2-12]. As a

result, the facts will not be recited here. 

II. JURISDICTION

District courts generally have subject matter jurisdiction over habeas petitions

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C section 2241 where the petition alleges constitutional or

statutory error. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 305, 308 (2001); Flores-Miramontes v. INS,

212 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2000); Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 1999).

Section 2241 "does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals

before filing petitions for habeas corpus." Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th

Cir. 2004) (citing Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Because Petitioner has alleged both statutory and constitutional error in the

adjudication of his adjustment of status application and in his I-360 petition, this

Court has jurisdiction to review Petitioner's claims. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Ground One - The BIA's Decision Terminating Proceedings

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Petitioner first argues that the BIA's January 6, 2003 order terminating

Petitioner's adjustment of status and removal proceedings was legal error because

the BIA misinterpreted the facts of Petitioner's adjustment of status application under

relevant law. [Doc. # 43 at 3]. 

In support of this contention Petitioner argues that his case is governed by

Molina-Camacho v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2004), where the Ninth Circuit

determined that the BIA was without authority to enter an order of removal, and

therefore remanded the case to the IJ for further proceedings. In so holding, the

Ninth Circuit regarded the BIA's decision as a "legal nullity." Id. at 940. Petitioner

argues that Molina-Camacho applies with equal force to his case as it presents

another scenario where the BIA acted without statutory authority. As a result,

Petitioner argues, he has been unable to file a petition for review or motion to

reconsider the BIA's decision because the BIA's order terminating proceedings is

also "a legal nullity," thereby leaving Petitioner in open removal proceedings before

the IJ. 

Molina-Camacho invalidated an order of deportation issued by the BIA after

an Immigration Judge granted relief from removal. The Ninth Circuit explicitly found

that the BIA was statutorily without jurisdiction to issue orders of removal, and

therefore deemed the order of deportation void. Molina-Camacho, 393 F.3d at 941.

The Ninth Circuit succinctly explained that 8 C.F.R. Part 1240.12(c) enumerates the

power of Immigration Judges, "[t]he order of the Immigration Judge shall direct the

respondent's removal, or the termination of the proceedings, or such other

disposition of the case as may be appropriate." Molina-Camacho, 393 F.3d at 940

(emphasis added). This power is contrasted with the authority granted to the BIA,

that "[t]he Board shall function as an appellate body charged with the review of

those administrative adjudications under the Act." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). 

Petitioner interprets Molina-Camacho's effect on BIA issued orders of removal

to extend to BIA orders terminating proceedings. The Court agrees with Petitioner.

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The Ninth Circuit's opinion is crystal clear. Immigration judges are empowered to

terminate proceedings. The BIA is not. As in Molina-Camacho, Respondents here

have not identified a statute which empowers the BIA to terminate proceedings,

instead arguing that Molina-Camacho's holding only impacts BIA-issued orders of

removal. That interpretation is not consistent with a fair reading of MolinaCamacho. As a result, the Court will recommend that Ground One of Petitioner's

habeas petition be granted and Petitioner's case remanded to the IJ for further

proceedings pursuant to Molina-Camacho.

This leaves the question of what should occur upon remand to the IJ. At a

minimum, the undersigned recommends that this case be remanded to the IJ to

terminate proceedings, from which Petitioner can appeal to the BIA. However,

Petitioner further argues that he is entitled to adjust his status to that of a lawful

permanent resident. 

1. The IJ's Decision to Adjust Petitioner's Status

The IJ granted Petitioner's adjustment of status application pursuant to INA

§245(a) holding that "'any alien admitted as a visa waiver pilot program visitor under

the provisions of Section 217 of the Act, and part 217 of this chapter, other than an

immediate relative as defined in Section 201(b) of the Act.' Section 201(b)(2)(A) of

the Act clearly includes the children of citizens of the United States." [Doc. # 25, Ex.

8]. The IJ further held that "the application for adjustment of status under Section

245(i) of the Act is granted." In essence, the IJ granted Petitioner's adjustment

application under two different provisions of Section 245. 

Respondents correctly argue that the IJ's approval of Petitioner's adjustment

application under § 245(a) was based on legal error. Petitioner is not a "child" under

the definition of INA Section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) as he was over 21 years of age when his

status was adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. However, Petitioner

never raised this issue in his appeal to the BIA. Petitioner has maintained the he

has not appealed the denial of his adjustment of status application because the

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3

 Because the IJ based his decision on two provisions of § 245, and one of

those provisions does not support the IJ's decision, Petitioner should have an

opportunity to present his argument in favor of an adjustment of status pursuant to

only § 245(i). This conclusion is bolstered by the USCIS's determination that

Petitioner's adjustment application was granted "under section 245(i) of the Act, 8

U.S.C. § 1255(i), based upon an approved petition as an unmarried son." [Doc. #

31, Ex. 5]. 

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BIA's order terminating proceedings was ultra vires, and therefore jurisdiction

remains with the IJ. As this Court has found, Petitioner's case should be remanded

to the BIA for further proceedings and the Court recommends that Petitioner be

permitted to present his argument regarding adjustment of status at that time.3

Respondents urge this Court to find that Petitioner is without recourse as he

entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program, and is thus ineligible for

any relief other than an asylum petition. Petitioner argues that the recent decision

by the Ninth Circuit specifically addresses the scenario where an alien enters the

United States under the Visa Waiver Program and applies to adjust his or her status

to that of a lawful permanent resident. Freeman v. Gonzales, No. 04-35797, 2006

WL 1044220, at *3 (9th Cir. April 21, 2006). The Ninth Circuit observed that "VWP

entrants waive their right to challenge any removal action other than on the basis of

asylum (the no-contest clause). They are, however, allowed to seek adjustment of

their status by filing an immediate relative petition." Id. See also U.S.C. §

1255(c)(4); Faruqi v. Dep't of Homeland Security, 360 F.3d 985, 986-87 (9th Cir.

2004) (articulating that VWP visitors are eligible for adjustment of status). 

Freeman is inapposite to Petitioner's case. Section 1255(c)(4) permits an

alien who enters the United States under the VWP to adjust his status as "an

immediate relative as defined in section 1151(b)" of the United States Code.

Petitioner is not an immediate relative as defined under 1151(b) of the code.

Instead, Petitioner falls into the category described in 1151(a) of the code as an

unmarried son over the age of 21 of a United States citizen. See 8 U.S.C. §

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4

 Section 245(i) of the INA provides that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of

subsections (a) and (c) of this section, an alien physically present in the United

States" who may be ineligible for adjustment of status may adjust his status to that

of a lawful permanent resident if he pays a penalty fee. 

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1151(a). As a result, Freeman does not support Petitioner's argument that he was

entitled to adjust his status. 

However, as the Court has found, because the IJ used two different bases for

granting Petitioner's adjustment of status application, on remand the BIA shall

determine whether Petitioner is entitled to adjust his status pursuant to §245(i) of the

INA.4

 

As a result, this Court will recommend that Ground One of Petitioner's habeas

petition be granted and remanded to the BIA for a new adjudication of whether

Petitioner may adjust his status. 

B. Ground Two - Denial of Petitioner's I-360 Petition

Petitioner's second ground for relief challenges the USCIS's decision denying

Petitioner's I-360 petition seeking protection as a battered spouse of a United States

citizen.

The USCIS's decision should be upheld if it is supported by substantial

evidence. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (the deferential standard

announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S.

867 (1984), which applies to agency determinations, applies with equal force in

immigration cases). The substantial evidence standard will require this Court to

uphold the USCIS's determination as to Petitioners I-360 petition if it is supported by

"reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record." INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 479, 481 (1992). For Petitioner to demonstrate that the USCIS's

determination was not supported by substantial evidence, Petitioner must show that

evidence compels the conclusion that the findings and decisions were erroneous.

Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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The I-360 petition provides that:

A spouse may file a self-petition under section

204(a)(1)(A)(iii) or 204(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act for his or her

classification as an immigrant relative or as a preference

immigrant if he or she: 

(A) Is the spouse of a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United

States;

(B) Is eligible for immigrant classification under

201(b)(2)(A)(i) or 203(a)(2)(A) of the Act based on that

relationship;

(C) Is residing in the United States;

(D) Has resided with the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse;

(E) Has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty

perpetrated by, the citizen or lawful permanent resident during the

marriage; or is the parent of a child who has been battered by, or has

been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the citizen or lawful

permanent resident during the marriage;

(F) Is a person of good moral character; [and]

(G) Entered into the marriage to the citizen or lawful permanent

resident in good faith.

8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(i). Petitioner claimed that he was subjected to extreme

emotional cruelty by his wife. He did not argue that he was subjected to physical

abuse, nor did he argue that their child was subjected to abuse of any kind.

Petitioner's I-360 petition was denied by USCIS for two reasons. First, USCIS

found that Petitioner had not established that Petitioner and his spouse shared a

residence. USCIS noted that Petitioner's I-360 petition stated that Petitioner and his

spouse stopped living together on May 1, 2004. 

Petitoner submitted evidence that he and his wife shared a residence. This

evidence included: (1) a 2003 property tax statement addressed to Petitioner and his

spouse at 19012 N. 39th Street, Phoenix, Arizona; (2) a quitclaim deed dated July

21, 2002, conveying a community property interest in Lot 81, Trovare Unit 11, to

Petitioner's wife; (3) a 2004 and 2005 property valuation addressed to the petitioner

and his spouse at 19012 N. 39th Street, Phoenix Arizona; (4) two joint bank account

statements dated September 28, 2004 and October 27, 2004; (5) an undated void

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check from Bank of America; (6) joint tax returns for 2002 and 2003 addressed to the

petitioner and his spouse at 19012 N. 39th Street, Phoenix, Arizona; and (7) a motor

vehicle registration in the petitioner's name alone dated January 16, 2003. 

USCIS found the Petitioner had not established a shared residence with his

spouse. In support of this finding, USCIS stated that the bank statements post-dated

Petitioner's separation from his wife, and therefore they are not evidence of a shared

residence. Additionally, USCIS determined that a blank check is not evidence of a

shared residence. As to the property records, USCIS stated that Petitioner's failure

to produce "joint mortgages or rental agreements," "coplies of insurance policies

listing a common address for the petitioner and his spouse, or "copies of utility bills

listing a common address" led to the conclusion that Petitioner had not

demonstrated his shared residence with his wife. 

The only probative evidence that Petitioner submitted to demonstrate a shared

residence was the property tax valuations and joint tax returns. However, all of the

other evidence Petitioner submitted did not support a finding of shared residence.

Because Petitioner was informed of the types of evidence he should submit to prove

a shared residence, see Doc. # 31, Ex. 5 at 4, and Petitioner failed to do so, the

Court finds that USCIS's determination that Petitioner did not show a shared

residence with this spouse is supported by substantial evidence. 

The second reason USCIS denied Petitioner's I-360 petitioner was Petitioner's

failure to produce evidence amounting to extreme cruelty, defined in 8 C.F.R. §

204.2(c)(1)(vi) as, "[p]sychological or sexual abuse or exploitation . . . ." Hernandez

v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003) specifically addresses the conduct which

would rise to the level of extreme cruelty and warrant relief under an I-360 petition.

Hernandez involved an extremely violent relationship between a husband and wife.

The Ninth Circuit explained that extreme cruelty can indicate nonphysical aspects

of domestic violence, including acts that "may not initially appear violent but that are

part of an overall pattern of violence." Id. at 839; 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi). 

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5

 Petitioner averred that his wife threatened to change their child's name if

they divorced. 

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Petitioner submitted his I-360 petition, which included a "checklist" of items to

identify if the petitioner was subjected to abuse. Petitioner identified the following

as being present in his relationship with his wife: (1) locked him out of his house; (2)

criticized him sexually; (3) forced him to engage in sex with her; (4) ignored his

feelings; (5) ridiculed or insulted him; (6) withheld approval, appreciation, or affection

as punishment; (7) continually criticized him, calling him names; (8) shouting at him,

"nothing is ever good enough"; insulted my friends and/or family; (9) humiliated him

in private or public; (10) refused to socialize with him; (11) kept him from working,

controlled his money, made all the decisions; (12) refused to work or share money;

(13) taken money away; (14) regularly threatened to leave or told him to leave; (15)

punished or deprived the children when she was angry at him; (16) threatened to

kidnap the children if he left5

; (17) blamed him for any problems with the children.

[Doc. # 46, at 1147-51]. 

In support of these contentions, Petitioner submitted two letters from family

friends, a letter from Alvin C. Burnstein, M.D. based on a one-hour clinical interview,

and a letter from Gray Buchik indicating that Petitioner was in counseling. [Doc. # 46,

at 1138-47]. 

These letters do not detail specific instances of emotional abuse as required

by USCIS. [See Doc. # 46, at 1154-57] They demonstrate, at best, that Petitioner

and his wife had a very tumultuous marriage. However, they do not demonstrate

that Petitioner's wife was abusive toward Petitioner. Petitioner avers that the

relentless phone calls his wife made to his place of employment caused him to lose

his job. While this is evidence of a troubled marriage, it does not rise to the level of

abuse articulated in Hernandez, as Petitioner alleges. 

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Based on the letters Petitioner submitted in support of his I-360 petitioner, this

Court cannot say that the USCIS's determination denying Petitioner relief was not

supported by substantial evidence. As a result, the Court will recommend that

Ground Two of Petitioner's habeas petition be denied. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing analysis,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Ground One of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

GRANTED and his case REMANDED to the BIA for further proceedings. 

2. Ground Two of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED

and DISMISSED with prejudice. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1),

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. The parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the

Court. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Rules 72, 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo

consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to

the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.

DATED this 12th day of May, 2006.

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