Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00277/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00277-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 330
Nature of Suit: Federal Employers' Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle

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1

 Defendant John S. Leonardo is the United States Attorney, District of Arizona.

Defendant Brian R. Decker is an Assistant United States Attorney. (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 3 at

2). The other individual Defendants are Border Patrol Agents. (Id.). Plaintiff commenced

this action in the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, Arizona and the case was removed

by the United States. (Doc. 1). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Tony Nixon,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

William Stiness, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-15-00277-TUC-CKJ (CRP)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint that originally named as Defendants

William Stiness, Daniel Guzman, Henry Lopez, Tony Rowe, John S. Leonardo, Ricardo

Novoa, and Brian R. Decker. (Doc. 1-4).1

 A Notice of Substitution was filed substituting

the United States of America as Defendant in place of the individual Defendants. (Doc. 3).

Defendant United States (“Defendant”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4,

Motion). Plaintiff has filed a “Motion Against Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Claim”

Case 4:15-cv-00277-CKJ-CRP Document 37 Filed 02/16/16 Page 1 of 9
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construed as a Response (Doc. 14), Defendant has filed a Reply in Support of United States’

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15), Plaintiff has filed another “Motion Against Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss Claim” which is construed as a Supplemental Response (Doc. 16) and

Defendant United States has filed a Surreply. (Doc. 22). 

This case has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for a Report and

Recommendation. (Doc. 12, Order). On February 11, 2016, the Magistrate Judge heard oral

argument on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 35). For the reasons that follow, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) filed by Defendant United

States should be granted and the Complaint dismissed.

Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff has filed a Complaint seeking money damages as a result of alleged unlawful

actions involving his arrest and prosecution that appear to be related to the criminal case

United States v. Tony Nixon, Case No. CR-14-00668-TUC-DCB. (Doc. 1-4 at 38,

Attachment [“Motion to Suppress Material Witness Statements” showing the case caption

United States v. Tony Nixon, Case No. CR-14-00668]). Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint

that on March 10, 2014, he drove to Arivaca, Arizona to pick up a young man at the request

of a family member. The young man allegedly asked Plaintiff to pick up his “two friends”

and Plaintiff was stopped by Border Patrol agents. Plaintiff alleges that an agent drove

Plaintiff’s vehicle to the border patrol checkpoint and Plaintiff was told he was under arrest.

Plaintiff has asserted numerous claims that include pain and suffering, false incarceration,

loss of family life and personal property, perjury, harassment, racial profiling, theft of money

and property, and wrongful indictment. 

Standards of Review

Defendant United States moves to dismiss the Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 4, Motion at 1). A motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the court’s subject

matter jurisdiction. “It is to be presumed that a cause of action lies outside this limited

jurisdiction,” and the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists rests upon the party

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asserting jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A

Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be either facial, where the inquiry is confined to the allegations

in the complaint, or factual, where the court is permitted to look beyond the complaint to

extrinsic evidence. Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] plaintiff’s complaint must have sufficient facts ‘to state

a facially plausible claim to relief.’” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041

(9th Cir. 2010)). That is, a “plaintiff must ‘plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”

Telesaurus VPC, LLC. v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The factual allegations asserted in the complaint must be

sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Dismissal can be based on the “lack of a cognizable legal theory

or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Conservation

Force, 646 F.3d at 1241-42. The allegations of a pro se plaintiff are liberally construed.

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007).

The Parties’ Arguments 

Defendant United States asserts three grounds for dismissal of the Complaint.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s tort claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not

demonstrated a waiver of sovereign immunity and Plaintiff has not alleged or shown that he

exhausted administrative remedies as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28

U.S.C. § 2675(a). (Doc. 4, Motion at 4-5). Defendant next contends that all of Plaintiff’s

claims are barred based on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Doc. 4, Motion at 6-7).

Defendant last argues that the Complaint should be dismissed as to U.S. Attorney Leonardo

and AUSA Decker because claims asserted against them in their individual capacity are

barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. (Id. at 7-9). Defendant United

States requests that the Court take judicial notice of the pleadings filed in United States v.

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Tony Nixon, Case No. CR-14-00668-TUC-DCB (D. Ariz.), in resolving these issues. (Id. at

2, n.3).

Dismissal of Claims Based on the FTCA 

“[T]he United States may not be sued without its consent” and “the existence of

consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 903 (9th

Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)). The FTCA grants

the federal court jurisdiction to hear claims for certain torts allegedly caused by the negligent

or wrongful act or omission of any federal employee acting within the scope of his office or

employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). To fall within the waiver of sovereign immunity for state

tort claims pursuant to the FTCA, the plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies prior

to filing suit, meaning that the plaintiff must first file an administrative claim with the

appropriate federal agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). This requirement is a “threshold

jurisdictional requirement” and failure to comply results in an absolute bar to suit in the

federal district court. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“the FTCA bars

claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative

remedies.”); Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1442 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Exhaustion of

the claims procedures established under the [FTCA] is a prerequisite to district court

jurisdiction”). See also, Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2011). The

time limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) by which an administrative claim must be filed

are non-jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling. United States v. Wong, 135 S.Ct.

1625, 1638 (2015). 

In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant has submitted the Declaration of

Brandon Brokaw, Deputy Administrative Officer in the United States Attorney’s Office,

District of Arizona, who states in the June 16, 2015 Declaration that an examination of

records indicated that Plaintiff has not filed an administrative claim. (Doc. 4-1, Ex. 1).

Defendant also has submitted the Declaration of Brian McBride, Acting Deputy Assistant

Chief Counsel with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency, who states in his June

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18, 2015 Declaration that an examination of records indicated that Plaintiff has not filed an

administrative claim. (Doc. 4-2, Ex. 2). 

In his first Response, Plaintiff contends that he filed administrative remedies with the

Border Patrol but he was not told about filing a separate administrative claim as to AUSA

Decker. (Doc. 14). In response to this argument, Defendant submitted the August 28, 2015

Declaration of Elaine O’Hara, Deputy Assistant Chief Counsel with the U.S. Customs and

Border Protection Agency, who states that an examination of records indicates that no

administrative claim has been filed by or on behalf of Tony Nixon. (Doc. 15-1). 

Plaintiff reasserted his argument in his Supplemental Response and submitted copies

of a Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death (Standard Form 95), dated August 30, 2015, signed

by Tony Nixon, and which show the forms were allegedly sent to the U.S. Department of

Justice, United States Attorney, and to the Border Patrol agency. (Doc. 16). In his recently

filed “Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Motion,” Plaintiff contends that in 2014 he filed

administration paperwork with the Border Patrol agency and he has a copy of the receipt and

paperwork. (Doc. 27 at 2). Plaintiff contends that he could not file two “administration”

claims because the Border Patrol agency stated on the application that he had to make a

choice. (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiff additionally contends that the prosecutor wrongfully seized his

vehicle and that his former defense attorney was assisting the prosecutor in violating

Plaintiff’s rights. (Id. at 4-5). Defendant argues that the administrative forms Plaintiff has

submitted are not sufficient to waive sovereign immunity because they are dated after the

lawsuit was filed and because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the appropriate federal

agencies actually received the forms. (Doc. 22). Defendant points out that the previously

submitted Declarations confirm that the Border Patrol has not received a claim form from

Plaintiff and therefore Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that sovereign

immunity has been waived. (Doc. 29 at 5). 

During the oral argument hearing, Plaintiff clarified that the administrative paperwork

he filed in 2014 with the Border Patrol agency concerns the seizure and forfeiture of his

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vehicle. Plaintiff said he had not known about filing an administrative claim form regarding

the allegations asserted in the Complaint. 

The FTCA bars a claimant from bringing suit in federal court unless the claimant has

filed an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency and either obtained a

written denial of the claim or waited six months with no disposition of the claim. See 28

U.S.C. § 2675(a). A plaintiff’s failure to comply with this requirement is a jurisdictional

defect that cannot be cured by administrative exhaustion after a lawsuit has been filed.

McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112. A prematurely filed FTCA lawsuit “cannot become timely by the

passage of time after the complaint is filed.” Price v. United States, 69 F.3d 46, 54 (5th Cir.

1995); Davis v. United States, 944 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2013). Here, the

administrative claim forms Plaintiff has submitted are dated August 30, 2015 which is after

the lawsuit was filed.

The court must dismiss a complaint that fails to allege that any administrative claim

was filed. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111-13. However, the action may be refiled if and when the

plaintiff can fully satisfy the FTCA’s exhaustion requirement. See Cureton v. United States

Marshal Service, 322 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2004); Robinson v. United States, Civil

Action No. 3:13-CV-1106, 2014 WL 2940454 (M.D. Pa. June 30, 2014). 

Application of Heck v. Humphrey

Plaintiff appears to assert in the Complaint allegations claiming unlawful arrest and

prosecution. He has attached to his Complaint an unfiled “Motion to Suppress Material

Witness Statements” that shows the case caption as United States v. Tony Nixon, Case No.

CR-14-00668. (Doc. 1-4 at 38). “A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a

pleading is part of the pleading for all purposes.” Rule 10(c), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. 

The Court may take judicial notice of “matters of public record” without converting

a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d

668, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court therefore may take judicial notice of the pleadings

and documents filed in United States v. Tony Nixon, Case No. CR-14-00668-TUC-DCB

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(District of Arizona). The docket in this criminal case shows that Plaintiff was indicted on

April 9, 2014 on charges of transporting illegal aliens for profit, that he was found guilty of

the charges after a bench trial on February 26, 2015, and that on September 14, 2015, he was

sentenced to 18 months in prison. (See Doc. 27, 113, 158 in Case No. CR-14-00668-TUCDCB). The docket shows that Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on September 15, 2015. (See

Doc. 159, Case No. CR-14-00668-TUC-DCB). AUSA Decker served as the prosecutor in

the case.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is premature because his conviction has not been reversed,

expunged, or otherwise invalidated. The Supreme Court has held:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 plaintiff must

prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized

to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages

bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487-88 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The rationale of Heck

has been extended to cases brought under the FTCA or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Erlin v. United States, 364 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2004)

(FTCA); Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (Bivens).

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks damages for actions undertaken by government

officials that allegedly resulted in his unlawful arrest, imprisonment, prosecution and

conviction, no cause of action for damages has yet accrued based on Heck. The claims

based on the FTCA do not accrue until the plaintiff has successfully challenged his

conviction in a direct or collateral attack. See Erlin, 364 F.3d at 1130-34. Plaintiff’s claims

must be dismissed at this stage of the proceedings.

Doctrine of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity

In determining whether the actions of government officials come within the scope of

absolute immunity, courts consider the “nature of the function performed, not the identity of

the actor who performed it.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993). Under this

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approach, absolute immunity extends to the conduct of prosecutors that is “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 270 (citing Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). Actions found to be “intimately associated” with

criminal judicial proceedings include initiating a prosecution and presenting the State’s case,

including out-of-court efforts by the prosecutor to control the presentation of his witness’

testimony, Imbler, 424 U.S., at 430, n.32; the gathering of evidence to present to the trier of

fact, Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003); and the gathering of evidence

after indictment to prepare the prosecutor for trial, KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th

Cir. 2004). Prosecutorial immunity may appropriately be asserted as a defense in cases

where the United States has been substituted as the defendant. See Buck v. Stewart, No. 07-

cv-774-SPF, 2008 WL 901716, at *3-4 (D. Utah Mar. 31, 2008) (citing Doe v. United States,

829 F. Supp. 59, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). 

Plaintiff mentions AUSA Decker and United States Attorney Leonardo regarding his

request for money damages without asserting any specific allegation against them. (Doc. 4-

1, Compl. at 33). The “Motion to Suppress Material Witness Statements” related to United

States v. Tony Nixon, Case No. CR-14-00668 refers to AUSA Decker’s actions in

interviewing witnesses for trial. During the oral argument hearing, Plaintiff argued that when

a prosecutor acts unlawfully, it is unfair to apply the doctrine of absolute immunity. Plaintiff

contends that the prosecutor went beyond his duties and he should not be granted immunity.

The Court has carefully considered Plaintiff’s argument. Plaintiff’s criminal case is on

appeal and there has been no determination that the prosecutor acted unlawfully. 

To the extent that Plaintiff has asserted any claim regarding actions taken by U.S.

Attorney Leonardo and AUSA Decker, the claims arise out of their actions in indicting and

prosecuting Plaintiff’s criminal case. Such actions are “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process” and any claims asserted against them are barred by

absolute immunity.

//

//

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Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

after its independent review:

(1) grant Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4); and

(2) dismiss the Complaint. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and LRCiv 7.2(e) of the Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within Ten (10) Days after being

served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another

party’s objections within Ten (10) Days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P.

72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District

Court to do so. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV15-00277-TUC-CKJ.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).

DATED this 16th day of February, 2016.

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