Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07140/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07140-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL IAN BROWN,

Petitioner,

 vs.

IVAN D. CLAY, Acting Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 06-7140 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the

reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

After a jury trial in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for

the County of San Francisco, petitioner was found guilty of inflicting corporal

injury on a cohabitant, assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury,

grand theft, pimping, and pandering. With enhancements for a prior “strike”

conviction and for having served two prior prison terms, he was sentenced on

August 1, 2003, to ten years in state prison. 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence and

the California Supreme Court denied a petition for review. Petitioner also filed

four state habeas petitions, all of which were denied.

///

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 Petitioner numbered his claims one through thirty-nine in his First Amended Petition. 

There is no issue thirty-five, however, and there are two claim twelves and two claim twentyones. In consequence, he presented forty issues in the First Amended Petition. With the

dismissal of twenty-two as unexhausted, eighteen remain. 

2

On November 17, 2006, petitioner filed the petition in this case. The court

issued an order to show cause on February 26, 2007. After several extensions of

time, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that some of

the claims were not exhausted. The motion to dismiss was granted on March 19,

2008. Petitioner was given the options of withdrawing his unexhausted claims,

dismissing the entire petition, or asking for a stay. He elected to withdraw the

unexhausted claims. As a result, only eighteen of his forty claims remain in the

case.1

Respondent filed an answer on the merits of the exhausted claims on

December 29, 2008. Petitioner filed a traverse on February 12, 2009, and on

April 3, 2009, filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. 

 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case as

follows:

Trial began in October 2002. At the start of trial, the court introduced

the members of the jury to the support advocate and explained that “she

is from the victim witness assistance program” and that she “may be

present throughout the trial at different times.” When Christie R., the

19-year-old prosecuting witness, took the stand, the prosecutor greeted

her and said, “Are you a little nervous? It's understandable. I am, too,

so there. Anyway, hang in there as best you can. You have your

advocate there. If you need a break, we will certainly accommodate. So,

do the best you can.”

Christie testified that she met defendant in March 2002, six months

after moving to San Francisco from Los Angeles. The two began dating

and she moved into his family's apartment. Christie had worked

previously as an exotic dancer in Los Angeles, and she and defendant

agreed that she would take a job stripping at a club in San Francisco.

Christie quit, however, after only one week.

Thereafter, defendant suggested that Christie work as a prostitute. He

instructed her on what to do and how much to charge for her services.

Each night she gave defendant the money she had earned because

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defendant told her that after a few months they would get an apartment

and he would pay for her to go to school. Christie continued living with

defendant, working as a prostitute, and giving her money to him until

July 2002.

On July 2, 2002, Christie and defendant quarreled over a bizarre

incident involving the release of a female friend from jail and she

decided to leave defendant and return to Los Angeles. However, on

July 4, she was arrested in Oakland on an outstanding warrant. When

she was released from jail on July 10, she ran into defendant outside of

the building. She told defendant to leave her alone, but he said he

wanted to talk to her. While they were talking, Christie's pager went off

and defendant grabbed it. Christie testified that they went back inside

the building where defendant hit her in the mouth, causing her lip to

bleed. Christie ran to get help from a sheriff's deputy and defendant left.

The deputy confirmed that Christie had a “fat lip” when she approached

him.

There was testimony from additional witnesses, including a project

coordinator for SAGE (Standing Against Global Exploitation),

defendant's sister, and the owner of the strip club where Christie had

worked. However, both the prosecution and defense agreed in closing

argument that the case turned on Christie's credibility. The prosecutor's

argument in support of Christie's credibility spans more than five pages

in the reporter's transcript, at the conclusion of which the prosecutor

urged the jury to “recall Christie's entire ... testimony. Recall her

earnest, sincere way of testifying,” and to “find her testimony

concerning all of the[ ] charges credible.” Defendant's attorney told the

jury that “this case is about credibility. And this is the complete defense

argument, credibility. Credibility and lack of corroboration.”

The jury acquitted defendant of the July 2, 2002 charges, but convicted

him of the remaining offenses. The trial court found true the special

allegations. Thereafter, the court sentenced defendant to ten years in

state prison. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

People v. Brown, No. A103791, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub., 2005 WL 1399655 *1-2

(Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2005).

 DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner has filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. 

An evidentiary hearing is held in federal habeas cases only under the most

limited circumstances. Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077-79 (9th Cir. 1999). 

An evidentiary hearing on a claim for which the petitioner failed to develop a

factual basis in state court can be held only if petitioner shows that: (1) the claim

relies either on (a) a new rule of constitutional law that the Supreme Court has

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made retroactive to cases on collateral review, or (b) a factual predicate that could

not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence, and (2)

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(2)(A)-(B). In short, if petitioner did not attempt to present in state court

the facts he wishes to present now, for instance by attempting to develop them in

his state habeas proceedings, he cannot do so now unless he can show that he

meets the provisions of section 2254(e)(2) outlined above. 

A prisoner "fails" to develop the factual basis of a claim, triggering §

2254(e)(2), if "there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the

prisoner or the prisoner's counsel." Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,

432 (2000). "Diligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a

minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by

state law." Id. at 437. Accordingly, where the prisoner has met the burden of

showing he was diligent in efforts to develop the facts supporting his claims in

state court, an evidentiary hearing may be held without regard to whether the

"stringent" requirements of § 2254(e)(2) apply. Id. at 437.

It is petitioner's burden to show that he attempted to develop the facts in

state court but was prevented from doing so, for instance by the state court's denial

of an evidentiary hearing. Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 747 (6th Cir.

2002)(requiring petitioner to demonstrate "sufficient diligence"); Baja, 187 F.3d at

1078-79. 

Petitioner does not even address the issue of whether he attempted to

develop the facts in state court; he simply asks that a hearing be granted to allow

him to present certain evidence. He thus has not carried his burden to show that he

acted with due diligence in attempting to develop the facts in state court, whether

by requesting an evidentiary hearing in state court or submitting declarations there. 

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He also has not attempted to show that the exceptions contained in section

2254(e)(2) apply to him. The motion for an evidentiary hearing will be denied. 

II. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] 

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the]

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

 “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application

must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court's application

of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

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The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court

as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are

binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. 

Id.

III. Claims

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner contends that: (1) the state

court of appeal failed to reach merits of issues; (2) permitting the prosecuting

witness to testify with a victim support advocate without holding a hearing

violated his right to a fair trial; (3) the use of the support advocate violated his

right to confrontation because the defense had no opportunity to cross examine the

support advocate; (4) the state court did not “start Mr. Brown[’]s trial within 60

days,” violating his right to a speedy trial and due process; (5) prosecution

witnesses perjured themselves, violating his right to a fair trial; (6) his due process

and equal protection rights were violated “when he was denied a ten day

preliminary hearing;” (7) he was denied due process and equal protection “when

the State court continued Mr. Brown’s Arrai[gn]ment without holding a hearing to

justify the delay;” (8) the court improperly instructed on lesser included offenses,

violating his due process and equal protection rights; (9) the trial court erred in

giving lesser included offense instructions which “thwarted the defenses;” (10)

“[without] underlying the offense of prostitution there shouldn’t be any reason to

commit Brown to prison/false imprisonment;” (11) petitioner’s constitutional

rights were violated when “the S.A.G.E. program failed to provide patent material

to the defense;” (12) the state secured a conviction by using false testimony,

violating his right to a fair trial and confrontation; (13) “Government officials

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2 In several of these issues petitioner contends that in addition to other rights, his equal

protection rights were violated. In none of them has he provided any factual allegations

regarding other persons who were similarly situated but treated differently. See City of Cleburne

v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216

(1982)) ("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State

shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike."). The equal

protection claims therefore are summarily denied. See Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes

(“‘[N]otice’ pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a

‘real possibility of constitutional error.’”) (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir.

1970)); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Nicolaus), 98 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“Habeas petitions which appear on their face to be legally insufficient are subject to summary

dismissal.”) (Schroeder, J., concurring). 

7

convened fraudulently falsifying police reports,” violating his right to due process;

(14) his counsel was ineffective; (15) his Fourth Amendment rights were violated

when the state failed to provide a prompt judicial probable cause hearing; (16) the

testimony of victim Christie was inadmissible hearsay; (17) the state court failed to

properly instruct the jury under CALJIC 17.01, which deals with the offense of

pandering; (18) the presence of a support advocate pursuant to Penal Code section

868.5 violated his right to confrontation and a fair trial.2

A. Failure to Consider Supplemental Brief on Appeal

Petitioner’s first exhausted claim, which is claim seventeen in the First

Amended Petition, is that on direct appeal the California Court of Appeal failed to

rule on claims he raised in a pro se supplemental brief. Petitioner was represented

by counsel throughout the appeal.

Respondent contends that this claim is without merit because even

constitutional errors in collateral review proceedings cannot be the basis for

federal habeas relief. See Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Although the second half of this proposition is true, respondent provides no

explanation why he considers a supplemental brief in a first appeal as of right to be

“collateral.” See Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1990) ( rule that

federal habeas relief not available for errors on collateral review not applicable to

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3 Petitioner also contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the use of

the support advocate, a claim which is discussed in section N, contention five, below.

8

errors on direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, which California

guarantees). Perhaps it is, but because the claim is without merit for another

reason, that issue need not be resolved.

Petitioner was represented on appeal. The Supreme Court has held that

there is no constitutional right to represent oneself on direct appeal. Martinez v.

Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152, 154, 163 (2000). Furthermore, a 

"defendant does not have a constitutional right to 'hybrid' representation." United

States v. Kienenberger, 13 F.3d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1994). Petitioner thus did not

have a right to represent himself on appeal while simultaneously being represented

by counsel, and the court of appeal’s failure to consider his pro se brief, assuming

that in fact the court did fail to consider it, was not a constitutional violation. See

McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 684 (2000) (no constitutional right for

represented prisoner to file additional brief pro se). This claim is without merit. 

B. Support Advocate

Two of petitioner’s issues involve the trial court’s allowing a “support

advocate” to support the victim in her testimony.3

 He characterizes the first of

these claims, number eighteen in the First Amended Petition, as being that the trial

court violated his right to a fair trial by “[p]ermitting the prosecuting witness to

testify with a victim support advocate – without even holding a hearing to

determine whether the witness needed support.” In the facts section of this claim

he refers to the presence of the support advocate as also violating his confrontation

rights.

Petitioner characterizes the second of the support advocate claims, number

thirty-seven in the First Amended Petition, as “[t]he presence of a support

advocate . . . [p]rejudicially violated [petitioner’s] rights to confrontation and a fair

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trial.” In support of this claim he refers to an attached memorandum of points and

authorities, which appears to be a relabeling of his opening brief in the direct

appeal.

Respondent treats claim eighteen as being that petitioners’s due process

rights were violated by the failure to hold a hearing, and claim thirty-seven as

being that his confrontation and due process rights were violated by the use of a

support advocate at all, but in fact the two claims differ only in that claim eighteen

contains a contention that petitioner had a free-standing constitutional right to a

hearing. The procedural default analysis below applies to both claim eighteen and

claim thirty-seven. 

California law provides that “a prosecuting witness in a case involving a

violation of section . . . 273.5 [] . . . shall be entitled, for support, to the attendance

of up to two persons of his or her won choosing, one of whom may be a witness, at

the preliminary hearing and at the trial . . . during the testimony of the prosecuting

witness. Only one of those support persons may accompany the witness to the

witness stand, although the other may remain in the courtroom during the witness’s

testimony.” Cal. Penal Code § 868.5(a). The victim in this case had a “support

advocate” who accompanied her to the witness stand. 

In ruling on this claim, the only one brought on direct appeal, the California

Court of Appeal said:

Defendant contends that the presence of a support advocate pursuant to

section 868.5 affects the jury's observation of the witness's demeanor,

in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation,

and erodes the presumption of innocence, violating the defendants right

to due process. Defendant acknowledges, however, that the Courts of

Appeal have unanimously rejected these arguments in holding that

section 868.5 is not unconstitutional per se or inherently prejudicial.

(See People v. Adams (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 412, 442-443 (Adams );

People v. Patten (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1727 (Patten ).) We agree

with the reasoning in these cases.

“The confrontation clause requires that a witness give a statement under

oath and submit to cross-examination, and that the jury be able ‘ “to

observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus

aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.”’” (Adams, supra, 19

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Cal.App.4th at p. 437, citing Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836,

846.) In Adams, the court recognized “that the procedure of allowing

a witness to testify accompanied by another person at the witness stand

has an effect on jury observation of demeanor” (Adams, supra, at p.

441) and that “[d]emeanor evidence is of considerable legal

consequence. It can have a dispositive effect in the outcome of a case

‘in which the existence or nonexistence of a determinative fact depends

upon the credibility to be given to testimonial evidence.’” (Id. at p.

438.) Nonetheless, the court rejected the argument that section 868.5 is

unconstitutional per se. (Adams, supra, at pp. 441-442.) The court

found a compelling state interest in the protection of child witnesses

and concluded that the statute is narrowly drawn to further that interest.

(Ibid.) The court also rejected the defendant's claim that the support

person procedure necessarily interferes with the presumption of

innocence. “The procedure whereby the support person accompanies

the witness at the stand is also not inherently prejudicial.... [¶] ... [¶]

The presence of a support person at the stand does not necessarily rob

an accused of dignity or brand him or her with an unmistakable mark

of guilt. The presence of a second person at the stand does not require

the jury to infer that the support person believes and endorses the

witness's testimony, so it does not necessarily bolster the witness's

testimony. Finally, the presence of a support person does not interfere

with the decorum of the judicial proceedings.” (Id. at pp. 436-437.)

However, based on decisions of the United States Supreme Court

involving the use of special procedures to protect child witnesses (Coy

v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012, 1021; Maryland v. Craig, supra, 497 U.S.

836), the court held that before a witness may be accompanied by a

support person during trial, the court must make an individualized

finding that the support person is necessary to protect the psychological

well-being of the witness. (Adams, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp.

443-444; but see People v. Lord (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1721-1722

(Lord) [individualized finding need only be that the support person's

attendance is desired by the prosecuting witness for support and will be

helpful to the prosecuting witness].) In Patten, the court also held that

section 868.5 is not unconstitutional because a support person can be

utilized in a manner that does not interfere with the defendant's

constitutional rights. (Patten, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1726-1727; see

also People v. Johns (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556 [use of

support person does not interfere with confrontation right where support

person sits unidentified in the public area of the courtroom].) The court

noted, however, that “[i]n those cases where the procedures employed

in the use of the support person might unfairly influence the jury's

determination of credibility, the court should explore on the record the

necessity of the procedure and explore the viability of other

alternatives.” (Patten, supra, at p. 1733.)

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing to

determine whether the support advocate was necessary to protect

Christie's well-being. However, defendant “waived any claim of error

by failing to request a hearing and determination of necessity, or

otherwise object to the presence of a support person.” (Lord, supra, 30

Cal.App.4th at p. 1722.) As explained in Lord, “The absence of an

objection deprived the trial court of the opportunity to correct any

procedural error and make an evidence-based finding that [the witness]

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4 Defendant's brief in support of his motion for a new trial asserted that defendant's trial

counsel was ineffective because she “never objected to the presence of an alleged ‘support

person’ who sat with Christie R. during the proceedings.” However, the attorney who wrote the

brief was not present during the trial and in all events the brief is not an adequate evidentiary

record of the precise location and activities of the support person. Defendant has not raised this

ineffective assistance of counsel argument on appeal.

11

needed a support person.” (Ibid.) Moreover, by failing to object or

otherwise raise this issue in the trial court, defendant deprived this court

of a sufficient record on which to base our review. “[T]here are

numerous factors which come into play on the questions of whether

there has been error or prejudice and whether the error rises to a

constitutional level of a due process violation. It is critical that the

appellate record reflect as clearly as possible all the factors bearing on

the issue. At the least, the record should reflect who the support person

is, the precise location of the support person during the witness's

testimony, and any activities of the support person during the

testimony.... Without a record detailing how the procedure was carried

out, we can find no particular factors demonstrating that the jury may

have been unfairly influenced by the presence of support persons.”

(Patten, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1733.)

Defendant argues that the waiver rule is inapplicable because the

constitutionality of a criminal statute may be challenged for the first time

on appeal. This contention was properly rejected in Lord. (Lord, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 1722, fn. 2.) Defendant's argument “merely asserts

the denial of a constitutional right to a necessity hearing, which like any

right may be waived.” (Ibid.) Not only did the absence of an objection

deny the trial court the opportunity to correct the situation, but the

record now before this court simply does not contain the information

necessary to evaluate defendant's challenge. The record does not even

indicate where the support advocate was located in relationship to the

witness or to the jury,4

[footnote numbered 3 in original] much less why

the advocate was deemed necessary, what interaction, if any, she had

with the witness or the jury, or what alternatives might have ameliorated

any problems that were perceived in the procedure that was used. In

short, the record before this court provides no basis to conclude that the

procedure utilized in this case violated any rights of the defendant or

compromised his right to a fair trial.

People v. Brown, 2005 WL 1399655 at *2-4. 

Respondent argues that this claim is procedurally defaulted and cannot be

pursued here. 

A federal court will not review questions of federal law decided by a state

court if the decision also rests on a state law ground that is independent of the

federal question and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

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U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his

federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state

procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner

can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 750. A petitioner must

establish factual innocence in order to show that a fundamental miscarriage of

justice would result from application of procedural default. Gandarela v. Johnson,

275 F.3d 744, 749-50 (9th Cir. 2002).

The court of appeal held that petitioner’s failure to request a hearing on the

necessity of a support advocate or to object her presence waived the claim. The

Ninth Circuit has recognized and applied the California contemporaneous objection

rule in affirming denial of a federal petition on grounds of procedural default where

there was a complete failure to object at trial. See Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d

1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005). There was a complete failure to object here, so this

claim is procedurally defaulted, and because petitioner has not attempted to show

cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice, the failure to object bars this court’s

consideration of claims eighteen and thirty-seven 

Federal habeas relief cannot be granted on these claims.

C. Right to Cross Examine Support Advocate at Preliminary

Hearing

Petitioner contends that the “support advocate” was used at the preliminary

hearing as well as at the trial, and that his confrontation rights were violated when

he was not able to cross examine her at the preliminary hearing. As he concedes,

there is nothing in the record to show that the victim was assisted by a support

advocate at the preliminary hearing. The transcript of the preliminary hearing is in

the record, as exhibit two, volume one, and nowhere in it is there any indication that

the victim was assisted by a support advocate.

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In the absence of any record that the victim was assisted by a support

advocate at the preliminary hearing, this claim is without merit.

D. Speedy Trial

Petitioner contends that his federal due process and speedy trial rights were

violated by the state’s failure to bring him to trial within sixty days. 

The “sixty days” standard to which petitioner refers in this issue is a state

statutory standard. See Cal. Penal Code § 1382 (a)(2). Because violations of state

law cannot be the basis for federal habeas relief, any violation of that standard is

irrelevant here. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, 68 (1991). Petitioner’s claim

also will be considered under the federal constitutional speedy trial standard,

however.

A speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed the accused by the Sixth

Amendment to the Constitution and imposed by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment on the states. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223

(1967). Although there are four factors that courts can consider in determining if

there has been a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the first of

these, the length of the delay, is both a factor and a triggering mechanism. Unless

the delay was long enough to be considered "presumptively prejudicial," there is no

necessity for inquiry into the other factors. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647,

651-52 (1992). 

Depending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally

found post-accusation delay presumptively prejudicial at least as it approaches one

year. Id. at 652 n.1; see, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 525 F.3d 836, 839 (9th

Cir. 2008) (ten year-delay was presumptively prejudicial); McNeely v. Blanas, 336

F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2003) (three-year delay was presumptively prejudicial);

United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003) (22-month delay

between first superseding indictment and trial date was presumptively prejudicial

but did not weigh heavily in defendant's favor because it was not excessively long);

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United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (delay of thirteen

months between arrest and trial is presumptively prejudicial); United States v. Lam,

251 F.3d 852, 856 (9th Cir.), amended, 262 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that

Ninth Circuit has found that a six month delay constitutes a "borderline case" and

that there is a general consensus among the courts of appeals that eight months is

the threshold). 

The delay in this case was approximately eighty-four days, from arrest to the

commencement of trial; not even three months. This delay was not presumptively

prejudicial. See United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 1991) (four

month delay not presumptively prejudicial). 

This claim, whether considered as a state law claim as petitioner has

presented it or as a federal constitutional claim, cannot be the basis for federal

habeas relief.

E. Witness Perjury

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated when

prosecution witnesses committed perjury. This is the first of two claim twenty-ones

in the First Amended Petition. Petitioner lists a number of rather minor

discrepancies between statements witnesses made at trial on direct and on cross, or

at different times; and inconsistencies, again minor, between pretrial statements and

testimony at trial. Many of these inconsistencies were pursued in cross

examination, as respondent points out. 

Although there is no federal constitutional right not to have perjured

testimony introduced at a trial, there is a right not to have the prosecutor knowingly

introduce such testimony. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). In

this case, however, petitioner has failed to identify anything in the record that

suggests that the State was aware that the testimony was perjured. Without such

evidence he does not have a basis for habeas relief. See Morales v. Woodford, 388

F.3d 1159, 1179 (9th Cir.2004). This claim is without merit. 

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F. Preliminary Hearing 

Petitioner contends that he did not receive a preliminary hearing within ten

days of his arraignment or plea, as required by California law. See Cal. Penal Code

§ 859b. Respondent contends that the hearing was held within the time allowed by

Section 859b, but regardless of whether this is true, a state law violation cannot be

the basis for federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68

(1991) (federal habeas unavailable for violations of state law or for alleged error in

the interpretation or application of state law). This claim is without merit. 

G. Continuance of Arraignment

Petitioner contends that his due process and equal protection rights were

violated “when the State court continued Mr. Brown’s Arrai[gn]ment without

holding a hearing to justify the delay.” Section 825(a)(1) of the California Penal

Code requires that a defendant be taken before a magistrate with 48 hours after his

or her arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays.” Petitioner was arrested on July 10,

2002, and on July 11 taken before a magistrate who found probable cause to detain

him. The next two days were Saturday and Sunday. It is unclear whether there was

another court proceeding immediately after the weekend; apparently a public

defender represented him at some point, before private counsel appeared with

petitioner on July 16, waived time, and pleaded not guilty. All of this, however, is

beside the point; as noted above, whether or not section 825(a)(1) was complied

with, violations of state law cannot be the basis for federal habeas relief. Estelle,

502 U.S. at 67-68. 

It is possible that petitioner’s complaint is not the actual delay in

arraignment, if there was one, but rather the lack of a hearing to decide if the

proceeding should be continued. He provides no basis for believing that the

federal Constitution requires such a hearing, although arguably if section 825(a)(1)

contained “substantive predicates” and “mandatory language” it could create a

liberty interest, of which he could not be deprived without due process. See

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Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989). The

statute does not, however, contain substantive predicates, i.e., it is not in “if X than

Y” form, in which X would be the substantive predicate. And in any event the

statute creates only a procedural requirement – hold the arraignment within 48

hours – which cannot be the basis for a federal due process requirement. See Olim

v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1983) (state statute imposing purely

procedural requirement cannot create a liberty interest protected by federal due

process). 

This claim is without merit.

H. Jury Verdict on Lesser Included Offenses

Petitioner contends that his due process and equal protection rights were

violated when he was found guilty of the charged offenses on counts one and two, 

infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant and assault by means likely to produce

great bodily injury, but not guilty on the lesser included offenses. He points out

that he could not have committed the greater offenses without having also

committed the lesser.

Petitioner is wrong on the facts. The jury in fact did not return a verdict on

the lesser offenses in counts one and two, because it had found him guilty of the

charged offenses. CT at 92-93. Petitioner may be confusing these verdicts with

those on counts six and seven, but there was no error as to those counts either; the

jury found him not guilty of the charged offenses in counts six and seven, and also

acquitted him of the lesser included offenses in those counts. CT at 97-102.

Federal habeas relief cannot be granted on this claim.

I. Lesser Included Offense Instructions

Petitioner complains about the lesser included offenses that were instructed

upon. This claim is very unclear, but it appears he is contending that giving the

lesser included offense instructions violated his right to present a defense. 

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As respondent points out, under California law, simple assault and battery

are lesser included offenses of infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, People

v. Gutierrez, 171 Cal. App. 3d 944, 952 (1985), and simple assault is a lesser

included offense of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, People

v. Jones, 119 Cal. App. 3d 749, 754 (1981). And it is apparent from the court of

appeal opinion, quoted above in the “Statement of the Facts” section, that there

was evidence to support giving the instructions. The question, then, is whether

giving the instructions, proper under California law, nevertheless violated the

federal Constitution. 

There is a constitutional right to put on a defense. Holmes v. South

Carolina,, 547 U.S. 319, 1731 (2006) (whether right is rooted in the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Compulsory Process Clause or

Confrontation Clause, Constitution guarantees meaningful opportunity to present

defense). But because petitioner’s defense was to attack the victim’s credibility,

see RT at 477 (closing argument), giving instructions on the lesser included

offenses could not have impeded the defense. That is, the defense was not of the

“either/or” sort; it would not have been inconsistent with the defense for the jury to

have believed the victim as to some points and disbelieved her as to others, and

thus returned a guilty verdict on a lesser included offense. Giving the instructions

at issue did not violate petitioner’s constitutional right to present a defense.

It is also possible that petitioner is attempted to argue that giving the

instructions on lesser included offenses allowed the jury to return a verdict based

on the applicable penalty and that doing so created statute of limitations problems. 

The statute of limitations argument is irrelevant, given that petitioner was arrested

two days after the offenses of which he was convicted. And his contention that

giving the lesser included offenses somehow encouraged the jury to return a

verdict based on the applicable penalty cannot be the basis for federal habeas relief

because there is no clearly established United States Supreme Court authority

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holding that doing so violates the Constitution.

Federal habeas relief cannot be granted on this claim.

J. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner contends that there was not any evidence that the victim engaged

in prostitution, so there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions of

pandering and pimping.

The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except

upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the

crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A

state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction

cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional claim, Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas

relief, id. at 324. The federal court determines only whether, "after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Id. at 319. Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt, may the writ be granted. Id. at 324 

California law says that a person is guilty of pandering if he or she

“[p]rocures another person for the purpose of prostitution” or “[b]y promises,

threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, persuades or

encourages another person to become a prostitute.” Cal. Penal Code §§ 

266i(a)(1)&(2). Pimping is committed by “any person who, knowing another

person is a prostitute, lives or derives support or maintenance in whole or in part

from the earnings or proceeds of the person’s prostitution, or from money loaned

or advanced to or charged against that person by any keeper or manager or inmate

of a house or other place where prostitution is practiced or allowed, or who solicits

or receives compensation for soliciting for the person.” Id. at § 266h(a). 

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Petitioner’s argument here is essentially that the victim’s testimony should

not have been believed. But when considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim,

the Court must “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 321. The court therefore must assume the truth

of Christie’s testimony. That testimony, summarized on pages two and three

above, is more than sufficient to support the verdicts. 

K. Exculpatory Material

Petitioner contends that his rights were violated when the prosecutor failed

to turn certain evidence over to the defense. Postconviction counsel, who was

preparing a motion for new trial, filed what he captioned a “Motion to Compel

Discovery” in which he cited Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and

contended that the prosecutor had an obligation to turn over (1) contact

information for the victim; (2) the “969(b) packet,” which is a packet of documents

the prosecutor puts together to prove strikes; (3) a police report on the victim’s

arrest for prostitution in Oakland; and (4) “[d]efense witness Engstrom Wheeler

material.” CT 2-3. Counsel conceded that the dispute as to the last three items had

been resolved, the 969(b) packet being in the court file and the other two items

having been provided. RT (3/21/2003) at 24. As to the contact information for the

victim, the prosecutor agreed to ask the inspector in charge of the case to check

again whether he had any more information than had been provided, and at a later

hearing confirmed that the police had only a pager number for the victim. Id. 

In Brady the Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution

of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the

evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith

or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87. The Supreme Court has since made

clear that the duty to disclose such evidence applies even when there has been no

request by the accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and that

the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence,

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5 “SAGE” stands for “Standing Against Global Exploitation.” It is an “outpatient

center” that helps “[those] who have suffered domestic violence, prostituted women, and

exploited [sic].” RT 340. 

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United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Evidence is material "if there

is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Brady, 373 U.S.

at 682. 

“There are three components of a true Brady violation: [t]he evidence at

issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because

it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either

willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene,

527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). 

As to the items sought by postconviction counsel from the prosecutor,

petitioner has not established any of these three components. First, because there

is no showing what the sought evidence would have been, petitioner has not shown

that it was favorable to him. Secondly; he has not shown that the prosecution

suppressed the evidence he sought; postconviction counsel conceded he had

received three of the four items, and there is no evidence here to show that the

prosecution had any better contact information than was provided to the defense. 

Thirdly, he has not shown that the evidence he sought was material, that is, has not

shown he was prejudiced. To the extent this claim involves the discovery sought

by postconviction counsel, it is rejected.

Petitioner also appears to contend that his due process rights were violated

when his counsel was unsuccessful in subpoenaing information from SAGE and

the Job Corps.5

 The only information in the record is that SAGE is an independent

nonprofit group, and that the Job Corps is a federal agency. Information in the

possession of either thus would not be Brady material constructively in the hands

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6 Postconviction counsel conceded that Brady did not apply to the Job Corps

information. RT (4/14/03) at 28. 

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of the prosecutor.6

 To whatever extent petitioner may be attempting to claim that

his Brady rights were violated when the SAGE and Job Corps information was not

turned over, the claim is denied because the information was not Brady material. 

And if petitioner is trying to contend that the trial court’s failure to enforce

the subpoenas was a violation of due process in itself, independently of Brady, that

claim is without merit because there is no federal Constitutional right to

compliance with a subpoena.

Federal habeas relief cannot be granted on this claim.

L. False Testimony

Petitioner contends that much of the victim’s testimony was false, and that

its admission violated his right to a “fair trial” and right to cross examine. This is

claim twenty-eight in the First Amended Petition.

Petitioner contended in the claim discussed in section E, above, that his due

process rights were violated when prosecution witnesses committed perjury. The

discussion in section E covered the constitutional right to a fair trial, which is part

of the right to due process, and the right to cross-examine, which is a

Confrontation Clause claim. For the reasons discussed in section E, this claim is

without merit.

M. Police Reports

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because police

reports were falsified. This is issue twenty-nine in the First Amended Petition.

The only way in which this could state a federal constitutional claim is if it

is construed as a claim that the prosecution knowingly presented the falsified

police reports. So construed, it is without merit for the reasons set out in section E,

above.

N. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

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Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. This is issue thirty

in the First Amended Petition.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of

denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only

assistance, but effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 686 (1984). In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of

counsel claim, petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient,

i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing

professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, he must establish that he was

prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

It is unnecessary for a federal court considering a habeas ineffective

assistance claim to address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test if the

petitioner cannot even establish incompetence under the first prong. Siripongs v.

Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998). Similarly, a court need not determine

whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice

suffered by the defendant as the result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697.

Petitioner first contends that counsel was ineffective in not raising the

constitutional issues discussed in section G, above, in a motion to dismiss. There

was no constitutional violation for the reasons discussed in section G, so such a

motion would have failed if made. Counsel therefore was not ineffective in failing

to make it. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005) ( trial

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7 Although petitioner does not argue it, counsel also was not ineffective in failing to

contend that the arraignment was untimely under state law, because he was brought before a

magistrate within the 48-hour period allowed by California law and because he was not

prejudiced. 

23

 counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless motion).7

Petitioner’s second contention is that counsel was ineffective in not

objecting to the purported failure to hold the preliminary hearing within ten days,

which would have been a violation of state law. This claim is the subject of

section F, above. As respondent points out, the preliminary hearing was held

within ten days. See CT 6, 14-15. Counsel therefore was not ineffective in failing

to object.

 Petitioner’s third contention is that counsel was ineffective in not moving

to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, the subject of section D, above. To the extent

petitioner contends counsel should have raised a federal issue, doing so would

have been futile for the reasons discussed in section D. Petitioner is also claiming

that counsel should have moved to dismiss on state law speedy trial grounds,

however. California law allows sixty days from arraignment to bring a defendant

to trial, absent waiver. Cal. Penal Code § 1382(a)(2). The arraignment in this case

was on July 16, 2002. Petitioner waived time form July 24, 2002, to August 12,

2002, a total of nineteen days. Jury selection began on October 2, 2002. There are

seventy-eight days between July 16 and October 2, of which nineteen were

waived. There thus were only fifty-nine chargeable days between arraignment and

commencement of trial. The state speedy trial law was not violated, and counsel

was not ineffective in failing to raise it as an issue. 

Petitioner’s fourth contention is based on his belief that counsel did not do

enough to challenge the victim’s testimony, testimony that he contends was

perjured. He seems to argue that counsel should have filed a motion of some sort

to exclude her testimony or to dismiss the case, but there is no obvious procedural

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8 Petitioner also contends that counsel should have objected to the victim’s testimony as

irrelevant. Such an objection would have been frivolous. 

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method by which counsel could have done that, at least on the basis that the

testimony was expected to be at least partly false.8

 In any event, counsel crossexamined the victim very thoroughly over two days, and the additional

inconsistencies petitioner points to are quite minor and could not have affected the

outcome. See RT 216-302 (cross). Counsel was not ineffective in challenging the

victim’s testimony. 

Petitioner’s fifth contention is that counsel was ineffective in not objecting

to the presence of the “support advocate.” As the court of appeal noted, “the

Courts of Appeal have unanimously rejected these arguments in holding that

section 868.5 is not unconstitutional per se or inherently prejudicial.” People v.

Brown, 2005 WL 1399655 at *2. The court stated that it agreed. Id. Thus it is

clear that an objection based on the proposition that the statute was

unconstitutional on its face would have failed. In addition, petitioner has not

pointed to anything in the record that provides facts about the support advocate’s

participation, such as where she sat or what she did during the victim’s testimony. 

Because the propriety of a support advocate’s presence is heavily dependent on the

circumstances of the case, id. at *4, it is not possible to say in the circumstances of

this case that counsel’s decision not to object on the record was deficient

performance. Equally, because there is no way to tell whether an objection would

have been successful and because there was overwhelming evidence of petitioner’s

guilt, petitioner has failed to establish prejudice. Counsel was not ineffective in

failing to object.

 Petitioner’s sixth contention is that counsel failed to investigate the case

adequately and did not interview some witnesses. Petitioner does not even allege 

what he thinks additional investigation would have revealed, much less point to

anything in the record to support the claim. The claim is without merit. See Bragg

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v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001)

(defendant's mere speculation that witness might have given helpful information if

interviewed not enough to establish ineffective assistance). 

Petitioner’s seventh contention is that counsel was ineffective in not

objecting to the trial court’s giving CALJIC 2.90, regarding the presumption of

innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, on the grounds that it violated his

right to a fair trial. As that instruction is not unconstitutional, objection would

have been futile. See Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Failure to object to the instruction was not ineffective assistance. 

Petitioner’s eighth contention is that counsel was ineffective in not

objecting to the presence of a support advocate at the preliminary hearing. There

is nothing in the record indicating that a support advocate was used there. This

claim is without merit.

None of petitioner’s ineffective assistance contentions have merit. The

denials of his ineffective assistance claims by the state courts were not contrary to,

or unreasonable applications of, clearly established United States Supreme Court

authority. 

O. Probable Cause for Detention Hearing

Petitioner contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when

he was not provided with a probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours of his

arrest. This is claim thirty-one in the First Amended Petition. Petitioner describes

this claim in the section heading as being based on his “14 Amendment right;” in

the facts section he claims his Fourth Amendment right was violated and also

mentions due process.

 First, petitioner was arrested on July 10, 2002, and received a probable

cause hearing on July 11. CT 1. The hearing thus was held within forty-eight

hours. This disposes of all his claims, whatever amendment is invoked. 

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Secondly, to the extent this is a Fourth Amendment claim, it cannot be the

basis for federal habeas relief. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82, 494

(1976) (no federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims unless state did not

provide opportunity for full and fair litigation of those claims); Anderson v.

Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by

Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002) (Stone v. Powell bars federal

habeas review of prompt presentation claim because it arises from the Fourth

Amendment). 

Petitioner’s right to a prompt probable cause hearing before a magistrate

was not violated. 

P. Hearsay

Petitioner’s claim that certain statements of the victim to police were

inadmissible hearsay cannot be the basis for federal habeas relief. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (federal habeas unavailable for violations of

state law or for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law). 

The claim is without merit.

Q. Pandering Instruction

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated by the

pandering instruction given by the trial court. The instruction given by the court,

CALJIC 10.71, set out the elements of pandering. It lists various means of

procuring a person for purposes of prostitution, and requires that “the person

procuring, causing, inducing, persuading, or encouraging, engaged in that conduct

with the specific intent to influence the other person to become or continue to be a

prostitute.” RT 449 [emphasis added]. Petitioner claims that in the form

instruction the words italicized in the quotation above are in brackets, suggesting

that one or the other should be chosen: [become] [or] [continue to be]. He

contends that the court’s failure to chose one or the other violated his due process

rights.

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Under California law, pandering can be committed even if the other person

already is a prostitute. See People v. Cason, No. E047440, 2009 WL 4548313 at

*9 (Cal. App. Dec. 7, 2009). The instruction as given thus was a correct statement

of California law. It may not have been narrowly tailored to the circumstances of

this case, but there was no violation of California law, much less due process. This

claim is without merit. 

CONCLUSION 

Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing (document number 44 on the

docket) is DENIED. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED.

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: Dec. 30, 2009 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge 

G:\PRO-SE\CRB\HC.06\Brown, D.merits.wpd

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