Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02046/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02046-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:402 Social Security Benefits

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE ANTHONY PAUL, JR., Civil

No.

12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

GRANT DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 20, 2012, Lawrence Paul (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint pursuant to the Social

Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), challenging the Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration’s (“Commissioner”) denial of disability benefits. (Doc. No. 1.) On

November 5, 2012, the Commissioner filed an answer. (Doc. No. 10.) On March 7, 2013,

1 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 1 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting reversal of the Administrative Law

Judge’s (“ALJ”) final decision. (Doc. No. 17.) Plaintiff seeks reversal on the basis that the ALJ

failed to: (1) properly consider Plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinions; (2) properly consider the

Plaintiff’s testimony; (3) properly support his finding that the Plaintiff can return to his work as a

jewelry store owner; and (4) properly consider the testimony of a vocational expert.1

 (See Doc.

No. 22.) On April 9, 2013, the Commissioner filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary

judgment, claiming that Plaintiff failed to challenge any aspect of the ALJ’s decision, and

therefore waives all of the claims he may bring. (Doc. No. 18, 19.) On May 24, 2013, Plaintiff

filed a response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and raised the arguments

presented above. (See Doc. No. 22.) On May 30, 2013, Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff’s

response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment reiterating that Plaintiff failed to present

any legal challenges in his opening brief. (See Doc. No. 23.) For the foregoing reasons, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 22, 2007, Plaintiff protectively filed a Title II application for a period of

disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning August 6, 2006.2

 (AR

22.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on May 24, 2007, and upon reconsideration on

1

It should be noted that the Plaintiff failed to raise any cognizable arguments in his opening brief

of his motion for summary judgment. The arguments presented were first raised in Plaintiff’s response.

The Court, however, based on the reasoning below, will consider Plaintiff’s arguments raised in his

response. 

2

In his application for Social Security disability benefits, Plaintiff does not specify what his

disabling condition is. However, based on the motions currently before the Court, and the

Administrative Record on file, it appears that Plaintiff claims he suffers, and has suffered, from severe,

debilitating, headaches for over 15 years. (See Doc. No. 17-1 at 1.) 

2 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 2 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

September 14, 2007. (Id.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a written request for hearing on September

20, 2007. (Id.) Plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing held on May 28, 2010, before ALJ

Carletti, represented by his attorney, Michael T. Keating. (Id.) Also appearing and testifying

were Gerald F. Winkler, M.D., an impartial medical expert, and Gloria J. Lasoff, an impartial

vocational expert. (Id.)

A. Relevant Medical Evidence

The record reviewed by the ALJ at the hearing and before this Court contains medical

examination records dating back to 1999, shortly after the motor vehicle accident that Plaintiff

alleges caused the onset of his daily headaches. (AR 409.) On January 6, 1999, Dr. John Ford

conducted an MRI and found that Plaintiff’s brain was normal with no focal lesions, no evidence

for hemorrhages, and no appreciation. (AR 408.) The record also contains medical examinations

conducted by Dr. Sandoz from January 31, 2005 until May 5, 2009. (AR 415-424, 322-336.) Dr.

Sandoz’s examinations reflect that Plaintiff has been neurologically intact with normal cranial

nerves and 5/5 extremity strength. (Id.) Besides a drop in weight to 150 pounds on February 15,

2008, Plaintiff’s recorded weight hovered around 173 to 183 pounds, with at most an eightpound difference in a span of one and a half months. (Id.) Plaintiff always appeared to be well

groomed and in moderate distress. (Id.) In particular, on March 10, 2006, Dr. Sandoz reported

that a medication he previously prescribed reduced approximately 50–75% of the headaches

Plaintiff suffered from. (AR 325.) Additionally, on February 15, 2008, Dr. Sandoz recorded that

Plaintiff “has been doing well” after being prescribed medication. (AR 416.)

On June 22, 2009, Dr. Isaac Bakst conducted a neurological evaluation on Plaintiff and

found that his headaches required Plaintiff to lie down every other day. (AR 426.) Dr. Bakst

3 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 3 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

found that Plaintiff had full power of his motor systems and was responsive to clinical

examinations. (Id.) His assessment states that the examination is relatively unremarkable, and

that he suspects that the headaches may be due to rebound from Imitrex and ibuprofen. (Id.)

B. Hearing Testimony 

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony

The administrative hearing was held on May 28, 2010. (AR 22.) At the hearing, Plaintiff

testified to his work capabilities and the symptoms of his condition. (AR 47-51.) He stated that

he used to work as a bar tender after graduating college and owned a jewelry store from 1995 to

2006. (AR 46.) The business closed in 2006 for financial reasons. (AR 45.) Plaintiff also

testified that his cluster headaches require him to lie down in a dark room for a few hours about

three times everyday, which hinders his work ability and active lifestyle. (AR 47, 50, 51, 54.) He

listed the medications that he had tried, his current medications (Imitrex, ibuprofen, and

Pamelor), the dosages, and the side effects of depression and stomach problems. (AR 48, 56-57.)

Lastly, Plaintiff claimed that he had seen Dr. Sandoz for five years and saw Dr. Bakst only once

before. (AR 54-55.) 

2. Medical Expert’s Testimony

After Plaintiff’s testimony, the medical expert questioned Plaintiff and gave his opinion

on what caused the Plaintiff’s headaches. (AR 58.) He stated that a complicating factor existed,

citing to Dr. Bakst’s hypothesis that the medication causes rebound headaches. (Id.) He

explained that the body develops a dependence on abortive medication, such as the kind Plaintiff

takes daily, that causes a withdrawal reaction in the form of headaches when taken for longer

than ten days in a month. (AR 59.) Although he found Plaintiff’s symptom testimony consistent

4 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 4 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with chronic daily headaches, he did not draw any conclusions as to Plaintiff’s functional

capacity but suspected that a combination of the migraine and withdrawal headaches caused the

pain. (Id.) Additionally, he stated that cluster headaches are different from regular migraines as

they are severe but brief, last only an hour or two, and occur for a few weeks but may go away

for a few weeks or months at a time. (AR 62.) 

3. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

Lastly, the vocational expert, Gloria Lasoff testified that Plaintiff’s former employment

skills do not transfer to any sedentary position employment. (AR 63.) Further, when presented

with a hypothetical situation of an individual who has to miss work four or more days a week

due to headaches, or who has to lie down three times a day in a dark and quiet place, she

responded that the individual would not be able to do Plaintiff’s past work. (AR 64.) She also

stated that no other position existed for an individual with those limitations. (AR 65.)

C. ALJ’s Findings 

On June 29, 2010, the ALJ issued his decision denying benefits to Plaintiff. (AR 27.) In

arriving at his decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff using the five-step sequential evaluation

process set forth in the Commissioner’s regulations, 20 C.F.R. section 416.920(a), and described

below. The ALJ found that the Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the

period from his alleged onset date of August 6, 2006 through his date last insured of December

31, 2009. (AR 24.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff satisfied step one. (Id.)

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairment: chronic

headaches. (Id.) In support of this finding, the ALJ noted that “[t]he record documents that the

claimant has chronic headaches.” (Id.) Additionally, MRI of Plaintiff’s brain has been normal

5 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 5 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and Plaintiff is being treated with medications including Imitrix, Cymbalta, Tramadol, and

ibuprofen. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairment was severe, and

therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff satisfied step two and moved on to step three. (Id.)

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.) In support of this finding, the ALJ noted that “no physician has

opined that the claimant’s condition meets or equals any listing, and the state agency program

physicians opined that it does not. (Id.) The ALJ, therefore, proceeded to step four. 

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant

work as a jewelry store owner. (AR 25-26.) In reaching his conclusion, the ALJ considered

Plaintiff’s testimony from the hearing regarding his reasons for leaving his job, the objective

evidence from medical examinations and MRI scans, and the type of treatment and

accommodations provided for Plaintiff due to the condition. (AR 25.) The ALJ also considered

Dr. Sandoz’s examination records and found inconsistent statements made about Plaintiff’s

symptoms, as well as a lack of supporting physical evidence. (AR 26.) Furthermore, the ALJ

considered Plaintiff’s claims of nausea and severe pain, and the medical expert’s testimony

affirming Dr. Bakst’s suggestion of withdrawal headache symptoms. (AR 26.) In light of these

facts, the ALJ found at step four that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security

Act and could return to his old job as a jewelry store owner. (AR 27.) Because the ALJ found at

6 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 6 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

step four that Plaintiff is capable of doing work he performed in the past, his analysis was

complete and it was not necessary to evaluate Plaintiff under step five.3

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To qualify for disability benefits under the Act, an applicant must show that: (1) she

suffers from a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to result in death or that

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of twelve months or more; and (2)

the impairment renders the applicant incapable of performing the work that she previously

performed or any other substantially gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 42

U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A).

A. Sequential Evaluation of Impairments

The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step process to determine whether an

applicant is “disabled.” The five steps are as follows: (1) Whether the claimant is presently

engaging in any substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the

evaluation proceeds to step two. (2) Whether the claimant's impairment is severe. If not, the

claimant is not disabled. If so, the evaluation proceeds to step three. (3) Whether the impairment

meets or equals a specific impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments (“listings”). If so, the

claimant is disabled. If not, the evaluation proceeds to step four. (4) Whether the claimant is able

to do any work she has done in the past. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the evaluation

proceeds to step five. (5) Whether the claimant is able to do any other work. If not, the claimant

is disabled. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1509; see also Tackett

3

 If a claimant is found to be “disabled” or “not disabled” at any step in the sequence, there is no

need to consider subsequent steps. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

7 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 7 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 1999). The claimant bears the initial burden of

proving disability in steps one through four of the analysis. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676,

679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir.1989)). If a claimant

establishes an inability to carry on past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five

to show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work. Id.

B. Judicial Review

A claimant may seek judicial review of an unfavorable decision of the Commissioner.

The district court will not disturb the Commissioner's decision unless it is based on legal error or

not supported by substantial evidence. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996).

Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. (citing

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119

n.10 (9th Cir. 1975)). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would consider

adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,

resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.1995). If the evidence is subject to more than one rational

interpretation, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

The district court may enter a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the

Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court may also remand the matter to the

Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

8 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 8 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. Plaintiff’s Arguments Not Raised In His Opening Brief Can Be Considered By 

The Court

Defendant argues in her cross-motion for summary judgment and response in opposition

that Plaintiff failed to challenge any aspect of the ALJ’s decision in his motion for summary

judgment, and therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should be denied and

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment should be granted. (Doc. No. 18-1 at 3; Doc.

No. 19-1 at 3.) In his reply to Defendant’s opposition and opposition to Defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment, Plaintiff, for the first time, raises his arguments challenging the

ALJ’s decision. (See Doc. No. 22.) In her reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff waived all

arguments challenging the ALJ’s decision by not raising them in his opening brief. (Doc. No. 23

at 3.) For the following reasons, the Court finds that although Plaintiff failed to raise any proper

challenges to the ALJ’s decision in his opening brief, the Court may still consider the arguments

presented in Plaintiff’s response. 

The Ninth Circuit clearly states that the ordinary approach in reviewing appeals excludes

consideration of new claims not mentioned in the opening brief but presented instead in a reply

brief. Eberle v. City of Abraham, 901 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Northwest

Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equipment, Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1988));

Fed.R.App.P. 28(a)(4). However, exceptions exist to override the default approach. U.S. v.

Ullah, 976 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1992). Courts are given discretion to review such claims in

cases of good cause, unjust results, claims raised in the appellee’s brief, or lack of prejudice to

the opposing party’s defense. Id. 

9 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 9 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to present any legal or factual claims in his initial motion

for summary judgment, merely stating that he meets the criteria to qualify for disability benefits.

(See Doc. No. 17.) After Defendant illuminated Plaintiff’s failure to raise specific contentions,

Plaintiff presented three grounds for relief in his response to Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. (See Doc. No. 22.) Here, Defendant will not be unfairly prejudiced by Plaintiff’s

failure to raise his arguments in his opening brief because Defendant was given the opportunity

to respond to Plaintiff’s newly raised arguments in her reply. (See Doc. No. 23.) On the other

hand, Plaintiff would be deeply prejudiced, and the result would be unjust if Plaintiff’s newly

raised arguments were not considered at this stage. Therefore, the Court finds good cause to

review those arguments presented in Plaintiff’s response and evaluates them below accordingly.

B. The ALJ Properly Disregarded the Opinion of Plaintiff’s Treating Physician

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting

the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician and therefore erred in dismissing the treating

physician’s opinion. (Doc. No. 22 at 1, 5.) Defendant does not argue the merits of this issue and

instead claims that Plaintiff waived this argument by not presenting it in his opening brief. (Doc.

No. 23 at 2.) 

In evaluating medical opinions, Ninth Circuit case law and Social Security regulations

distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant

(treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining

physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (non examining

physicians). Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996); see also C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)

(prescribing the respective weights to be given the opinion of treating sources and examining

10 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 10 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sources). “As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source

than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citation

omitted); see also Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). This is so because

the treating physician “is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe

the patient as an individual.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation

omitted). “The opinion of an examining physician is, in turn, entitled to greater weight than the

opinion of a nonexamining physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citations omitted).

Where the treating physician’s “opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be

rejected only for ‘clear and convincing’ reasons.” Benton, 331 F.3d at 1036; see also Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (“While the ALJ may disregard the opinion of a

treating physician, whether or not controverted, the ALJ may reject an uncontroverted opinion of

a treating physician only for clear and convincing reasons.” (citation omitted)). “Even if the

treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the [ALJ] may not reject this opinion

without providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record

for doing so.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In rejecting Dr. Sandoz’s opinion, the ALJ gave the following reasons: (1) Dr. Sandoz’s

functional assessment was not supported by the MRI scan of the brain that was normal; (2) Dr.

Sandoz’s opinion is not substantiated by his own clinical findings that reveal that the Plaintiff

has been neurologically intact with normal cranial nerves; (3) Dr. Sandoz’s opinion is

inconsistent with his report that the medication InnoPran XL had “reduced about 50-75% of the

headaches” with no side effects; (4) Dr. Sandoz’s opinion is inconsistent with the findings and

opinions of consulting neurologist Isaac Bakst, M.S., who thoroughly evaluated Plaintiff on June

11 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 11 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22, 2009; and (5) Dr. Sandoz’s opinion is also inconsistent with the findings of the medical

expert who noted that Plaintiff’s headaches were very severe but brief and lasted one or two

hours. (AR 26.) 

Here, the ALJ properly disregarded the contradicted opinion of Dr. Sandoz, and gave

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing so. Dr.

Sandoz concluded that Plaintiff is not able to obtain any gainful or low-stress employment

because he is likely to miss work at least four times a week. (AR 431-32; see AR 364.)

However, on March 10, 2006, Dr. Sandoz found that Plaintiff’s headaches decreased by 50-75%

after taking InnoPran XL, contrary to his conclusion of complete disability. (AR 325.) Dr.

Sandoz’s records from routine examinations from 2005 to 2009 also show that Plaintiff was

neurologically intact with normal cranial nerves, which does not support a finding that Plaintiff

is unable to work. (AR 363, 415, 429-35, 323-33.) Dr. Sandoz failed to provide any support from

his own clinical findings that affirm the intensity of the headaches and instead, based his

conclusions on Plaintiff’s own complaints. (Id.) As stated in Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947,

957 (9th Cir. 2002), the ALJ may choose to dismiss conclusory opinions inadequately supported

by clinical findings at its discretion. Here, Dr. Sandoz’s opinion is not supported by his clinical

findings and the ALJ properly disregarded it for those reasons. 

Furthermore, the ALJ correctly dismissed Dr. Sandoz’s opinion because it conflicts with

opinions given by Dr. Bakst, Plaintiff’s examining physician, and the medical expert who

testified at the hearing. Contrary opinions of a medical expert, if consistent with other evidence

in the record, may be considered substantial evidence in support of dismissing a treating

physician’s opinion. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). First, Plaintiff’s

12 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 12 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

consulting neurologist, Dr. Bakst, found that the headaches may be caused in part by the

medication prescribed by the treating physician and could be alleviated by altering the

prescriptions. (AR 427.) Dr. Bakst’s opinion implies that a chance of partial recovery exists and

undermines Dr. Sandoz’s conclusion that Plaintiff is permanently disabled and cannot return to

work. (Id.) Second, the medical expert stated at the hearing that Plaintiff’s headaches were

severe but only lasted for one or two hours at a time, with weeks or months in between each

series of episodes. (AR 62.) Contrarily, Dr. Sandoz stated that the severe daily headaches

incapacitate him for at least 25% of the day, which impairs him from sustaining work activities

on a regular schedule. (Doc. No. 22 at 18-19.) The medical expert also observed that Plaintiff’s

condition was complicated by the medication he was taking. (AR 59.) The opinion of Dr. Bakst

and the medical expert are consistent with evidence in the record (which includes Dr. Sandoz’s

own clinical findings). Therefore, the ALJ properly disregarded Dr. Sandoz’s opinion for these

reasons. 

For the above reasons, the ALJ did not err in rejecting the Dr. Sandoz’s opinion because

he provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for

doing so. The ALJ specifically identified the inconsistencies in the treating physician’s opinion

and provided a summary of facts explaining the conflicting clinical evidence. (AR 26.)

Additionally, the ALJ pointed out contradictory opinions of Dr. Bakst and the medical expert

which were consistent with evidence in the record. Thus, the ALJ properly disregarded Dr.

Sandoz’s testimony

///

///

13 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 13 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. The ALJ Properly Discredited Plaintiff’s Credibility

After the claimant establishes a medical impairment that likely causes the pain

complained of, the ALJ must consider the claimant’s credibility to determine if the severity of

the pain is valid even though it is based on the claimant’s subjective experience. Bunnell v.

Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991). In determining the credibility of a claimant’s

allegations of disabling pain, the ALJ is required to consider a number of factors, these include:

(1) the nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of any pain; (2)

precipitating and aggravating factors (e.g., movement, activity, environmental conditions); (3)

type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse side-effects of any pain medication; (4) treatment, other

than medication, for relief of pain; (5) functional restrictions; and (6) the claimant’s daily

activities. Id. at 346 (citing Social Security Regulation (SSR) 88–13). The ALJ may also

consider any prior inconsistent statements, failure to seek treatment, and daily activities in his

evaluation. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346.

Furthermore, if the ALJ finds the claimant not credible without any evidence of

malingering, he must make specific statements identifying which claims are not credible, along

with evidence to support them. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1993). Merely

stating that the claimant seems to be experiencing more pain than normally expected is not

sufficient to discount the claimant’s testimony. Swenson v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 683 (9th Cir.

1989). Additionally, a claimant’s testimony may not be dismissed for being unsubstantiated by

objective medical evidence alone. Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin, 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir.

2006). 

14 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 14 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In finding that Plaintiff’s allegations were not credible to the extent they were

inconsistent with the ALJ’s opinion, the ALJ properly considered the relevant factors before

making his decision. Prior to the ruling, the ALJ held a hearing to question Plaintiff about his

condition and work abilities. (AR 42-66.) Plaintiff provided the ALJ with descriptions of the

pain, stating that the “spasm cluster” headaches occurred everyday, varied in length, and

required him to lie down. (AR 47.) Plaintiff also mentioned his sensitivities to light and sound,

which are often aggravating factors when the headaches return. (Id.) Plaintiff addressed his past

and current medications and side effects, and stated that Dr. Sandoz’s treatment plan in

prescribing the medication was for maintenance purposes. (AR 48, 56-57.) Lastly, he described

the hobbies that he discontinued due to his condition, and his limitations at work when the

headaches occur. (AR 50, 51, 54.)

After review, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments could reasonably be expected to

cause the alleged headaches, but disagreed with Plaintiff’s credibility as to the severity and

limiting effects of the symptoms. (AR 25.) In support of his decision, the ALJ made the

following findings. First, the ALJ found that the record and objective evidence do not support

Plaintiff’s claims of the severity of the headaches. (Id.) The medical expert testified that cluster

headaches are generally severe but brief, and may appear, then disappear for a few weeks at a

time. (AR 62.) In contrast, Plaintiff claims that his headaches were ongoing and lasted for a few

hours each time. (AR 50.) Furthermore, Dr. Sandoz’s observation of Plaintiff being

neurologically intact with normal cranial nerves and movements, the medical expert’s agreement

of normal objective evidence other than an unrelated skin disorder, and the normal MRI of the

brain collectively do not support Plaintiff’s symptoms. (AR 25.) Lastly, the ALJ found that the

15 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 15 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

record lacks evidence of special accommodations, weight loss, sleep deprivation from pain, or

cognitive dysfunction for a more restrictive residual functional capacity. (AR 26.) Plaintiff

disagrees with this finding and states in his brief that daily nausea causes weight loss. (Doc. No.

22). Dr. Sandoz’s examining records, however, show that Plaintiff’s weight has been consistent

over the years. (AR 415-424, 322-336.).

Although the lack of support from objective medical evidence alone is not sufficient to

dismiss the claimant’s credibility, the ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s inconsistent statements in

his decision. (AR 25.) Specifically, Plaintiff’s claim of the disability onset coincides with the

date he closed his business. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged in his disability report that he had to close his

business due to his disability (AR 198), but stated at the hearing that it was for financial reasons

and not because of his inability to work. (AR 25.) Additionally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff does

not exhibit any loss of strength or difficulty moving that is indicative of severe pain, though he

claims to be weak and fatigued due to his condition. (Id.) Indeed, the record reflects that

Plaintiff’s extremities were consistently 5/5 in strength. (AR 415-424, 322-336.)

As discussed above, the ALJ made specific reasons for finding Plaintiff’s allegations not

credible and supported them with evidence from the record. Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ

impermissibly discounted his testimony without pointing to facts or opinions other than the

medical expert’s opinion. (Doc. No. 22 at 2.) The ALJ supported his decision, however, with

evidence from both Dr. Sandoz’s and Dr. Bakst’s examinations, as well as Plaintiff’s own

statements at the hearing. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in his finding that Plaintiff’s allegations

were not credible. 

16 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 16 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

D. The ALJ’s Determination at Step Four that Plaintiff was Capable of Performing His

Past Relevant Work as a Jewelry Store Owner was Supported by Substantial 

Evidence and Free of Legal Error

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff can return to his work as a

jewelry store owner. (Doc. No. 22 at 13.) In support of this contention, Plaintiff claims that he

cannot withstand the minimal rigors of being able to work every day. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff

claims that the residual functional capacity finding by the ALJ that Plaintiff can do “medium

exertional work” was not supported by any evidence in the record. (Id.)

1. Pertinent Law

At step four of the sequential evaluation process, the Administration may deny benefits

when the claimant can perform the claimant’s past relevant work as “actually performed,” or as

“generally” performed. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (2001). “Social Security

Regulations name two sources of information that may be used to define a claimant’s past

relevant work as actually performed: a properly completed vocational report, [Social Security

Ruling] 82-61, and the claimant’s own testimony, [Social Security Ruling] 82-41.” Id.

Although the claimant has the burden of proving an inability to perform his past relevant

work, “the ALJ still has a duty to make the requisite factual findings to support his conclusion.”

Id. at 844. To determine whether a claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform his

past relevant work, the ALJ must ascertain the demands of the claimant’s former work and then

compare the demands with his present capacity. Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 797-98 (9th Cir.

1986). In finding that an individual has the capacity to perform a past relevant job, the

determination or decision must contain the following specific findings of fact: (1) a finding of

fact as to the individual’s residual functional capacity; (2) a finding of fact as to the physical and

17 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 17 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

mental demands of the past job/occupation; and (3) a finding of fact that the individual’s residual

functional capacity would permit a return to his past job or occupation. Porto v. Colvin, 2013

WL 1207464, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Social Security Ruling 82-62).

2. Analysis

 Plaintiff is challenging steps one and three of the analysis set forth in Porto v. Colvin,

2013 WL 1207464, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2013). (Doc. No. 22 at 13.) Specifically, Plaintiff is

challenging the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to do medium

exertional work, as well as the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity would

permit a return to his past job or occupation. (Id.) The Court addresses each of Plaintiff’s

arguments in the context of the three-step analysis set forth in Porto v. Colvin, 2013 WL

1207464, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2013), below.

a. The ALJ’s Finding as to Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity

The ALJ found that Plaintiff “had the residual functional capacity to do medium

exertional work.”4

 (AR 25.) According to Plaintiff, “[t]here is no valid opinion testimony by any

expert which would support [the ALJ’s finding]. [The ALJ’s finding] ignores all the

documentary and opinion testimony presented. Not a single individual testified and not a single

document was provided that would support this finding.” (Doc. No. 22 at 13.) For the following

reasons, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s assessment of the record.

4 Medium work requires lifting up to 50 pounds at a time, with frequent lifting or carrying of objects

weighing up to 25 pounds. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c). A job which requires the employee to stand

and/or walk for virtually the entire day is medium work, even if it requires very little lifting. Social Security

Ruling 83-10 (1983). Most medium work requires more than occasional stooping and bending. Pinto, 249 F.3d at

846. To do the full range of medium work requires the ability to perform “frequent bending-stooping.” Social

Security Ruling 83-10 (1983). 

18 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 18 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity, an ALJ must consider all

relevant evidence in the record, including, inter alia, medical records, lay evidence, and “the

effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable

impairment.” See Social Security Regulations 96-8, 1996 WL 374184, at *5; accord 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). Here, the ALJ has satisfied this requirement. In his decision,

the ALJ begins by stating, “In making this finding, the undersigned has considered all symptoms

and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the

objective medical evidence and other evidence . . . [t]he undersigned has also considered opinion

evidence . . . ” As discussed above, the ALJ went on to properly discredit the Plaintiff’s

credibility regarding the severity of his symptoms and found that the Plaintiff’s “allegations are

not credible to establish a more restrictive residual functional capacity then that found” by the

ALJ. (AR 25-26.) The ALJ also discussed the opinion evidence of treating physician Dr. Sandoz

and consulting neurologist Dr. Bakst. (AR 26.) As discussed above, the ALJ properly

disregarded the opinion evidence of Dr. Sandoz and supported his decision with medical

evidence in the record, as well as with the opinions of Dr. Bakst and the medical expert who

testified at the hearing. (Id.) Lastly, the ALJ noted that the “State Agency Doctors felt the

[Plaintiff] was capable of substantial work activity.” (Id.) A review of the record reveals that two

medical consultants completed a residual functional capacity assessment of Plaintiff. (AR 337-

44, 365-72.) Both medical consultants found that Plaintiff could lift 50 pounds occasionally, lift

25 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour work day, sit about 6 hours

in an 8-hour work day, and push and/or pull for an unlimited duration (other than as shown for

lift and/or carry). (AR 338, 366.) The medical consultants also found that Plaintiff had no

19 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 19 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

postural limitations, no manipulative limitations, no visual limitations, no communicative

limitations, and no environmental limitations. (AR 339-41, 367-369.) For these reasons, the

Court finds that the ALJ properly considered all of the evidence in the record in determining the

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, and that the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial

evidence. Therefore, the Court will consider step two of the analysis, the ALJ’s findings as to the

physical and mental demands of Plaintiff’s past job. See Porto, 2013 WL 1207464, *3.

b. The ALJ’s Findings as to the Physical and Mental Demands of 

Plaintiff’s Past Job

As noted above, “Social Security Regulations name two sources of information that may

be used to define a claimant’s past relevant work as actually performed: a properly completed

vocational report, [Social Security Ruling] 82-61, and the claimant’s own testimony, [Social

Security Ruling] 82-41.” Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845 (2001). Here, the ALJ based his findings of the

physical and mental demands of Plaintiff’s former work as a jewelry store owner on Plaintiff’s

own description of the work he performed. (AR 27.) In Plaintiff’s work history report, he

indicates that he was a retail jewelry store owner from July, 1995 to August, 2006. (AR 205.)

According to Plaintiff, his position as a jewelry store owner involved the use of machines, tools,

or equipment, the use of technical knowledge or skills, and required writing and completion of

reports or similar duties. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff noted that he would be required to walk,

stand, sit, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, reach, and write, type or handle small objects a total of two

hours each day. (Id.) Plaintiff’s job also required lifting and carrying small objects for short

distances. (Id.) The heaviest weight Plaintiff would lift was less than 10 pounds frequently. (Id.)

Plaintiff did not supervise other people at his job and was not a lead worker. (Id.) The Plaintiff’s

20 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 20 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

testimony, which the ALJ adopted, was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s findings of fact

as to the physical and mental demands of Plaintiff’s past work. Plaintiff does not challenge these

findings. (See Doc. No. 22.) 

c. The ALJ’s Findings as to Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity to 

Return to His Past Job or Occupation

The ALJ found that the Plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant work as a

jewelry store owner. (AR 26.) In support of this finding, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s work as a

jewelry store owner “did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the

[Plaintiff’s] residual functional capacity.” In comparing the Plaintiff’s residual functional

capacity with the physical and mental demands of Plaintiff’s work as a jewelry store owner as

performed and as he described, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to perform this work as

actually performed. (AR 26-27.) Plaintiff generally contends that he cannot withstand the

minimal rigors of being able to work every day, but does not provide any evidence to support this

argument. (Doc. No. 22 at 13.) 

For the reasons discussed above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination

that Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity would permit a return to Plaintiff’s past relevant job as

a jewelry store owner. As the ALJ determined—and Plaintiff does not credibly dispute—the

exertional and mental demands of Plaintiff’s former job as a jewelry store owner do not exceed

Plaintiff’s exertional and mental capabilities. The ALJ properly found that Plaintiff had the

residual functional capacity to do medium exertional work, which according to Social Security

Regulations and Rulings, is work that requires lifting up to 50 pounds at a time, with frequent

lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds, 20 C.F.R. sections 404.1567(c),

21 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 21 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

416.967(c), requires the employee to stand and/or walk for virtually the entire day, Social

Security Ruling 83-10 (1983), and requires the ability to perform “frequent bending-stooping,”

Social Security Ruling 83-10 (1983). According to Plaintiff’s work history report of his past work

as a jewelry store owner, he was required to lift only small objects (less than 10 pounds) short

distances, and would walk, stand, sit, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, reach, and write type or handle

small objects for only two hours a day. (AR. 206.) Therefore, based on Plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity to do medium exertional work and the physical and mental demands of his

past relevant work as a jewelry store owner as described by Plaintiff, the ALJ’s finding that

Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a jewelry store owner is supported by substantial

evidence. 

E. The ALJ Did Not Err in Failing to Properly Question a Vocational Expert at the 

Hearing

Lastly, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that the vocational expert called at the hearing

was not properly questioned through a hypothetical posing all of Plaintiff’s functional limitations,

both physical and mental, Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. (Doc. No. 22 at 16.) Since the ALJ

determined at step four that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work, and therefore was not

disabled, the ALJ was not required to call a vocational expert. See Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251,

255 (9th Cir. 1996) (testimony from vocational expert not required where ALJ determines at step

four that claimant is able to perform past work); Wade v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4500863, *10 (E.D.

Cal. Sept. 27, 2011) (“[A]t step four an ALJ’s determination that a claimant can perform past

work need not be supported by the testimony of a vocational expert.” (citations omitted); see also

Gomez v. Chater, 74 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir.) (“At the most, the Commissioner need use a

22 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 22 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

vocational expert only if there is an absence of other reliable evidence of the claimant’s ability to

perform specific jobs.”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 881 (1996). Because the ALJ properly determined

at step four that Plaintiff could return to his past relevant work as a jewelry store owner, the

testimony of a vocational expert was not necessary. Therefore, the ALJ did not err by failing to

question a vocational expert through a hypothetical posing all of Plaintiff’s limitations because

the ALJ was not required to call a vocational expert. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment be DENIED, and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED, and the ALJ’s decision be AFFIRMED. This Report and Recommendation of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 1, 2013, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy to all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than October 8, 2013.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 11, 2013

_____________________________

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

23 12-CV-02046-AJB-BGS

Case 3:12-cv-02046-AJB-BGS Document 25 Filed 09/11/13 Page 23 of 23