Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00006/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00006-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW D. HORN,

 Petitioner,

 v. 

BERNIE ELLIS, Warden, Taft

Correctional Institution,

 Respondent.

1:06-CV-0006 OWW TAG

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

(28 U.S.C. § 2241) 

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Matthew D. Horn (Horn) petitions for writ of

habeas corpus. Respondent Bernie Ellis (Respondent) opposes the

petition. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The petition was filed as case number CV-05-0405-EFS in the

Eastern District of Washington on December 14, 2005, and was

transferred to the Eastern District of California where venue is

proper, on January 3, 2006. Doc. 1, Pet. The response was filed

on April 14, 2006. Doc. 11, Resp. 

III. FACTS

This dispute centers on Petitioner’s entitlement to early

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release to a CCC under applicable BOP regulations. On February

17, 2005, Horn was convicted of four drug offenses, in violation

of Title 21, Sections 841(A)(1), 846, 952(A), and 963, of the

United States Code, in the Federal District Court for the Eastern

District of Washington. He was sentenced to eighteen months of

imprisonment. Doc. 11, Resp., 3. The sentencing judge

recommended that Horn “be given the full benefit of [the Federal

Bureau of Prisons’] pre-release program.” Doc. 1, Pet., Ex. A,

3. He was committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of

Prisons (BOP) on March 25, 2005. Id. 

Horn is currently incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp at

the Taft Correctional Institution (TCI) in Taft, California, with

a projected release date of July 11, 2006. Doc. 1, Pet., 2. 

Horn has been granted a forty-three-day placement in a CCC, to

begin on May 30, 2006. Doc. 11, Resp., 4. Horn alleges that the

BOP is wrongfully denying him consideration for placement into a

community corrections center (CCC) for the last six months of his

eighteen-month sentence. Doc. 1, Pet., 2. 

Title 18, Section 3621(b), of the United States Code grants

the BOP discretion to designate a prisoner’s place of

incarceration in “any available penal or correctional facility

that meets minimum standards of health and habitability[.]” On

March 25, 1992, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal

Counsel (“OLC”) issued an opinion that interpreted Section

3621(b) to allow the BOP unlimited authority to place prisoners

in any appropriate facility for incarceration, including those

operated by the private sector. 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 65, 67

(1992).

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On December 13, 2002, however, the OLC changed its

interpretation of Section 3621(b). Op. Off. Legal Counsel, slip.

op., 2002 WL 31940146 (December 13, 2002). The OLC determined

first that Section 5C1.1 of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines did not permit the BOP to substitute confinement in a

CCC for a minimum term of imprisonment imposed under that

guideline. The OLC also concluded that Section 3621(b) does not

give the BOP general authority to place an offender in community

confinement from the outset of his sentence or to transfer the

offender from prison to community confinement at any time the BOP

chooses during the course of the offender’s sentence. Instead,

under the new interpretation of Section 3621(b), front-end

placements are not authorized and back-end offenders are only

eligible for confinement in CCCs for the lesser of (i) ten

percent of their sentence or (ii) six months-periods specifically

authorized by Title 18, Section 3624(c), of the United States

Code. The OLC reasoned that, while Section 3621(b) gave the BOP

the discretion to choose an inmate’s place of imprisonment

generally, a CCC did not constitute a place of imprisonment for

purposes of that section. Op. Off. Legal Counsel, 2002 WL

31940146 (December 13, 2002). Instead, the OLC determined that

the authority to transfer a prisoner to a CCC came solely from

Section 3624(c), which limits the time a prisoner may spend in a

CCC to “a reasonable part, not to exceed six months, of the last

10 per centum of the term.” Id. 

Shortly after the 2002 OLC opinion was issued, a memorandum

written by Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson instructed the

BOP to transfer all offenders residing in CCCs with more than 150

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days remaining on their sentence to a traditional prison facility

because the use of CCCs was “unlawful.” Memorandum of Deputy

Attorney General Larry D. Thompson, December 16, 2002, at 1. The

operative language of the Thompson memorandum is as follows:

OLC has now issued a formal opinion finding that BOP's policy is

unlawful. Accordingly, BOP immediately should take all steps

necessary to ensure that its sentencing placement decisions are

in full compliance with the governing law. In addition, BOP

should transfer to an actual prison facility all federal

offenders currently residing in a CCC who, as of today, have more

than 150 days remaining on the imprisonment component of their

sentence. BOP shall give at least 30 days written notice to each

such offender prior to the transfer.

Id. 

The Thompson memorandum proceeded to describe the

conclusions of the OLC memorandum. Id. at 1-2. The Thompson

memorandum concluded by explaining that a concern regarding the

BOP’s previous CCC placement policy was its “potentially

disproportionate, and inappropriately favorable, impact on socalled ‘white-collar’ criminals.” Id. at 2-3. On December 20,

2000 the Director of the BOP issued a memorandum to all federal

judges stating that the BOP would no longer honor judicial

recommendations to place inmates in CCCs for the imprisonment

portions of their sentences. Memorandum of BOP Director Kathleen

Hawk Sawyer, December 20, 2002, at 1. “Effective immediately,

this practice will no longer be followed. The Bureau will not

use CCCs as a substitute for imprisonment.” Id. The memorandum

explained briefly:

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This procedure change follows recent guidance from the

U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel

(OLC), finding that the term “community confinement” is

not synonymous with “imprisonment.” OLC has determined

that the Bureau’s practice of using CCCs as a

substitute for imprisonment contravenes wellestablished caselaw, and is inconsistent with [Section

5C1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines].

Id.

Dismas Charities, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Justice, 401

F.3d 666, 670-71 (6th Cir. 2005).

The First and Eighth Circuits found this 2002 policy

unlawful because it did not recognize the BOP’s discretion to

transfer an inmate to a CCC at any time, and therefore contrary

to the plain meaning of Section 3621. See Elwood v. Jeter, 386

F.3d 842 (8th Cir.2004); Goldings v. Winn, 383 F.3d 17 (1st

Cir.2004). The rationale of these decisions was that the time

constraints of Section 3624(c) limited only the affirmative

obligation of the BOP, not the agency’s discretion to place a

prisoner in a CCC for a longer period of time.

In response to decisions such as Elwood and Goldings, on

August 18, 2004, the BOP proposed new regulations “announcing its

categorical exercise of discretion for designating inmates to

community confinement when serving terms of imprisonment.” 69

Fed.Reg. 51, 213 (Aug. 18, 2004). While acknowledging the BOP’s

general discretion to place an inmate at a CCC at any time, the

2005 regulations limit CCC placement to the lesser of 10 percent

of a prisoner’s total sentence or six months, unless special

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statutory circumstances apply. Id. The final rules were

published on January 10, 2005, and became effective on February

14, 2005.

The final CCC designation regulations read:

§ 570.20 What is the purpose of this subpart?

(a) This subpart provides the Bureau of Prisons’

(Bureau) categorical exercise of discretion for

designating inmates to community confinement. The

Bureau designates inmates to community confinement only

as part of pre-release custody and programming which

will afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to

adjust to and prepare for re-entry into the community.

(b) As discussed in this subpart, the term “community

confinement” includes Community Corrections Centers

(CCC) (also known as “halfway houses”) and home confinement.

§ 570.21 When will the Bureau designate inmates to

community confinement?

(a) The Bureau will designate inmates to community

confinement only as part of pre-release custody and

programming, during the last ten percent of the prison

sentence being served, not to exceed six months.

(b) We may exceed these time-frames only when specific

Bureau programs allow greater periods of community

confinement, as provided by separate statutory

authority for example, residential substance abuse

treatment program (18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(A)), or shock

incarceration program (18 U.S.C. 4046(c)).

Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 240-41 (3rd

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Cir. 2005).

IV.LEGAL STANDARD

When Congress expressly delegates regulatory authority to an

agency, any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless

procedurally defective, arbitrary and capricious in substance, or

manifestly contrary to the statute. Zurich American Ins. Co. v.

Whittier Properties, Inc., 356 F.3d 1132, 1137 n. 25 (9th Cir.

2004) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227

(2001)). 

V. ANALYSIS

Respondent argues that Horn’s suit should be dismissed

because he has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Doc.

11, Resp., 4-6. “In the ordinary course of business, indexes of

all administrative appeals filed by inmates are maintained by the

BOP SENTRY computerized system of records. A review of the

records indicated [Horn] has not filed any administrative

remedies with the Bureau of Prisons on any issue.” Id., 5.

The Ninth Circuit requires as a prudential matter that

habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative

remedies before seeking relief under Section 2241. Huang v.

Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Futility is an exception to the exhaustion requirement.

Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2004). Horn

argues pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile. 

Respondent claims that giving Horn only forty-three days in a CCC

is a correct application of the regulations; Horn disputes only

the regulations’ validity. See Laing, 370 F.3d at 1001;

Woodsall, 432 F.3d at 238-39 n.2 (3rd Cir. 2005). Respondent

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refuses to consider any early release, except that which it has

provided under its interpretation of the statute. Horn’s

exhaustion of his administrative remedies is not a pre-requisite

to the district court’s jurisdiction over the case, as the BOP

has an intractable and immutable policy against the relief

sought. 

Respondent argues that Horn has no protected liberty

interest in selecting his place of confinement or in a guaranteed

CCC pre-release placement. Doc. 11, Resp., 6. Respondent claims

that “the gravamen [sic] of Petitioner’s argument is that because

the sentencing court recommended he receive the ‘full benefit’ of

BOP’s pre-release program the BOP must release him to a CCC for

six whole months, as part of his reintegration into society.” 

Id., 6. 

Horn does not argue that he has a liberty interest in

selecting his place of confinement or in a guaranteed CCC prerelease placement, but rather that the regulations which prevent

the BOP from considering whether to place him in a CCC until

after he has served nine-tenths of his sentence violate Title 18,

Section 3621(b), of the United States Code. He seeks an order

requiring the BOP to consider in good faith the appropriateness

of transferring him to a CCC in light of the factors set forth in

Section 3621(b) without reference to those regulations. Doc. 1,

Pet., 5-6. 

Respondent argues that the BOP has already exercised its

discretion by basing its CCC recommendation on an assessment of

Horn’s personal needs. Doc. 11, Resp., 8-9. However, the BOP’s

recommendation that Horn receive forty-seven days in CCC, limited

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to forty-three days based on space availability, was based on

regulations that limit the possible amount of time that Horn may

spend in a CCC to the last tenth of his sentence. Horn argues

this regulation is itself invalid because it limits the BOP’s

discretion in a way not consistent with Section 3621. 

As in Woodall, the issue is whether the new regulations are

contrary to, or a permissible construction of, Section 3621. See

Woodall, 432 F.3d at 241. 

Categorical Exercise of Discretion under United States v. Lopez

Respondent argues that the February 2005 regulations are a

permissible construction of the relevant CCC statutes. Doc. 11,

Resp., 9. Respondent argues, first, that the regulation is a

categorical exercise of administrative discretion of the kind

upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 531 U.S.

230, 243-44 (2001). Doc. 11, Resp., 11-13. 

In Lopez, the Supreme Court addressed the BOP’s categorical

exercise of discretion under Title 18, Section 3621(e)(2)(b), of

the United States Code, which stated that an inmate convicted of

a non-violent offense could have his or her period of

incarceration reduced after successfully completing a drug

treatment program. The BOP had issued a regulation excluding

inmates from early release under this provision if they were

convicted of non-violent crimes involving firearms. 28 C.F.R.

§ 550.58(a)(1)(vi)(B). The Supreme Court upheld the regulation

stating that nothing in the statute at issue prohibited

“categorical exclusions.” Lopez, 531 U.S. at 243.

Lopez is distinguishable from this case. As the Lopez Court

noted, “constraints . . . requiring the BOP to make

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individualized determinations based only on post-conviction

conduct are nowhere to be found in [Section] 3621(e)(2)(b).” Id.

at 241-42. In fact, the subsection at issue in Lopez offers no

specific criteria to be considered other than the overarching

criterion that only nonviolent offenders are eligible for early

release. Accordingly, the BOP can make categorical decisions

within that class of offenders without violating that subsection.

Subsection 3621(b) is different from Section 3621(e)(2)(b),

as it prescribes criteria the BOP must consider in making

placement determinations:

The Bureau shall designate the place of the prisoner’s

imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available

penal or correctional facility that meets minimum

standards of health and habitability established by the

Bureau, whether maintained by the Federal Government or

otherwise and whether within or without the judicial

district in which the person was convicted, that the

Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable,

considering -

(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;

(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;

(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;

(4) any statement by the court that imposed the

sentence -

(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to

imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or

(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional

facility as appropriate; and

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(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the

Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of

title 28.

In designating the place of imprisonment or making

transfers under this subsection, there shall be no

favoritism given to prisoners of high social or

economic status. The Bureau may at any time, having

regard for the same matters, direct the transfer of a

prisoner from one penal or correctional facility to

another. The Bureau shall make available appropriate

substance abuse treatment for each prisoner the Bureau

determines has a treatable condition of substance

addiction or abuse.

18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). 

Three of these factors – the nature and circumstances of the

offense, the history and characteristics of the prisoner, and any

statement by the court that imposed the sentence – cannot be

fully considered without evaluating inmates on a case-by-case

basis. Accordingly, Lopez, which dealt with a subsection void of

any individual criteria, is not controlling.

In invalidating the February 2005 regulation, the Woodall

court stated:

The regulations do not allow the BOP to consider the

nature and circumstances of an inmate’s offense, his or

her history and pertinent characteristics, or most

importantly, any statement by the sentencing court

concerning a placement recommendation and the purposes

for the sentence. And yet, according to the text and

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history of Section 3621, these factors must be taken

into account. The regulations are invalid because the

BOP may not categorically remove its ability to

consider the explicit factors set forth by Congress in

Section 3621(b) for making placement and transfer

determinations. 

Woodall, 432 F.3d at 244; see Fults v. Sanders, — F.3d —, 2006 WL

870745, *2-3 (8th Cir. 2006).

Administrative Agency Deference

Respondent argues that since the BOP is the agency

responsible for administering 18 U.S.C. § 3621, the BOP’s

interpretation of that statute is entitled to deference. Doc.

11, Resp., 13-14. 

When reviewing an agency’s construction of a statute it is

charged with administering, a court looks first to the statutory

text to see whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue. 

If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the

matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to

the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the

statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific

issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer

is based on a permissible construction of the statute. If so,

the court defers to the agency’s interpretation. Throughout this

inquiry, considerable weight is given to an executive

department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted

to consider and deference is afforded to the agency’s

administrative interpretations. Contract Management, Inc. v.

Rumsfeld, 434 F.3d 1145, 1146-47 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing

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Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467

U.S. 837, 842-43, 844 (1984)).

Congress’s intent in promulgating Section 3621 was to assure

that pre-release conditions of confinement be used to facilitate

a prisoner’s re-entry to the community. This purpose is not

ambiguous. 

The intent of Congress is clear as to consideration of

factors for grounds for placement. “Even for an agency able to

claim all the authority possible under Chevron, deference to its

statutory interpretation is called for only when the devices of

judicial construction have been tried and found to yield no clear

sense of congressional intent.” Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v.

Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004). Section 3621(b) provides

unequivocally that the BOP must consider several factors in CCC

placement to effectuate the transition. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). 

The BOP regulation, however, provides that the BOP may not

consider those factors in full. 28 C.F.R. § 570.20-21. The

conflict between the regulations and the statute is unavoidable. 

See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 248-49.

Construction with Section 3624(c)

Respondent argues that “the more specific language of [Title

18, Section 3624(c), of the United States Code] operates as an

express limitation on [Section] 3621(b)’s broad grant of general

authority[,]” and that “[t]o hold otherwise would vitiate a

fundamental principle of statutory construction.” Doc. 11,

Resp., 14 (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996)

(specific statutory provision governs more general)). 

Section 3624(c) provides:

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The [BOP] shall, to the extent practicable, assure that

a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a

reasonable part, not to exceed six months, of the last

10 per centum of the term to be served under conditions

that will afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity

to adjust to and prepare for the prisoner’s re-entry

into the community. The authority provided by this

subsection may be used to place a prisoner in home

confinement. 

18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). 

This argument was rejected in Goldings v. Winn, 383 F.3d 17,

21-25 (1st Cir. 2004), Elwood v. Jeter, 386 F.3d 842, 845-47 (8th

Cir. 2004), and Woodall, 432 F.3d at 250:

[Section] 3624 does not determine when the BOP should

consider CCC placement, but when it must provide it. 

The clear language of [Section] 3624(c) mandates that

the BOP “shall” assure that a prisoner is given

appropriate pre-release conditions that are focused on

re-entry, if “practicable.” The statute requires the

BOP not just to consider, but to actually place an

inmate in a CCC or like facility, during the last ten

percent or six months of the sentence, when that is

possible. 

Woodall, 432 F.3d at 250. There is no time limit when the BOP

may consider a pre-release change of confinement. However, the

BOP must consider such status and is not free to re-write

Congress’s prescription of the factors to be considered in making

the determination. While Section 3624(c) limits the BOP’s

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discretion not to consider community confinement or other prerelease alternatives at the end of a prisoner’s term, it does not

prohibit the BOP from doing so earlier pursuant to a different

grant of discretionary authority. Goldings, 383 F.3d at 24. 

This is has failed to do by an arbitrary application of a tenpercent maximum for pre-release alternative confinement. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the BOP shall show cause why the

writ should not be granted with its return to the OSC to be filed

within three (3) days of the date of service of this order, not

to exceed twenty (20) days, if extension is requested for good

cause. 

FURTHER ORDERED that the BOP shall immediately and in good

faith determine whether Petitioner should be transferred to a CCC

for more than forty-three days in completion of his prison

sentence. In making this decision, the BOP shall consider the

sentencing judge’s recommendation and all other Section 3621

factors, as well as any other appropriate factors the BOP, in its

discretion, finds applicable. This determination shall be made

without reference to the BOP’s 2002 and 2005 policies, including

28 C.F.R. § 570.20-.21. The BOP’s determination shall be filed

with the court within fourteen days following date of service of

this order.

 

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SO ORDERED

DATED: April 21, 2006.

 

/s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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