Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02072/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02072-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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- 1 - 06CV2072

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER STEVENS, SR.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06CV2072-LAB (LSP)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION AND

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

[Dkt No. 12]

vs.

COUNSELOR ROBLES,

Defendant.

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner civil rights matter is before the court on defendant

Counselor Robles' ("Defendant") Motion To Dismiss plaintiff Christopher Stevens, Sr.'s

("Stevens") First Amended Complaint ("FAC") for failure to state a claim ("Motion"). Stevens

is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. He

challenges denial of family visitations, and the fact and process of imposing an "R" suffix

custody classification he alleges caused the deprivation of his family visitation rights, as

infringing his Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests and Due Process rights. Stevens filed

no opposition to the Motion. Under Civil Local Rules, failure to object to a Motion may be

construed as consent to the granting of the motion. CIV. L. R. 7.1(f)(3)(c). Magistrate Judge

Leo S. Papas entered a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") recommending Defendant's

Motion be granted. Stevens filed no Objections to the R&R. For the reasons discussed

below, the R&R is ADOPTED and the FAC is DISMISSED in its entirety for failure to state

a claim.

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1

 Stevens also alludes in this regard to prison administration "willfully treating the plaintiff

with 'deliberate indifference' by not relying on the facts of case just going on the police report which

maliciously circumvents their authority." FAC p. 4. To the extent key words in those allegations

suggest he attempts to state an Eighth Amendment claim, the court notes he abandoned any such

express foundation for his claims in the FAC, although his original Complaint purported to proceed

under a "cruel and unusual punishment" theory as well.

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I. DISCUSSION

A. Background

Stevens alleges the state prison has wrongfully assigned an "R" suffix to his custody

classification designating him a sex offender. He contends the "erroneous" placing of the

"R" suffix violates his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights because it is predicated

"on a[n] alleged police report not a[n] arrest or conviction for the said offense." FAC p. 3.

The only liberty interest consequence he purports to elaborate in the FAC is elimination of

family visitations. He identifies the visitation rights as those set forth in the "policies,

procedures, and protocols" of the state's " 'Family Visitation' guidelines." FAC p. 3. Stevens

acknowledges "there has to be a liberty int[e]rest created by state regulations" in order for

due process requirements to attach to visitation deprivations. FAC p. 3, citing Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). He argues deprivation of family visitation

constitutes "a dramatic departure from the basic conditions [of prison confinement] which

[sic] he was never ever arrested, charged, or convicted of a sex offense, that requires a "R

suffix," warranting Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protections.1 FAC p. 4. 

Defendant construes the FAC as attempting to state two civil rights claims: wrongful

denial of family visitations (construed as conjugal visits, applying a formal regulatory

definition), and wrongful custody classification. Defendant contends neither theory

implicates a protected liberty interest, so both fail to state a Section 1983 claim and must be

dismissed. As to the first, "it is well-settled that prisoners have no constitutional rights while

incarcerated to contact visits or conjugal visits." Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th

Cir. 2002), citing Kentucky Dep't of Corrs. v Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 461 (1989) ("[t]he

denial of prison access to a particular visitor is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a prison sentence, therefore is not independently protected by the Due

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2

 In moving to dismiss, Defendant construes the "family visitation" deprivation Stevens

complains of as denial of "conjugal" visitation. Mot. pp. 3-4. However, a fairer reading of the

Complaint makes clear his allegations are broader than that. He alleges he is being denied

"visitation with my family" (FAC p. 3), "the legal right of reasonable family visitation and visitation with

their children and family members in the best interest of inmate and the family members to obtain

positive relationships" (FAC pp. 3-4), he is consequently enduring "an [a]typical and significant family

hardship" (FAC p. 4), and "without family visitation a prisoner may be entirely cut off from his only

contacts with the outside world" (FAC p. 5). The relief he seeks is "family visitation with his family

in the interest of justice and in the best interest of the family." FAC p. 5. He does not suggest

overnight visits with his wife are the gravamen of his complaint, but rather consistently alludes to

"family members" in the plural and mentions his children in particular. Moreover, although the FAC

supersedes the original Complaint in its entirety, the Complaint made clear his allegations are much

broader than Defendant's characterization of his claim as seeking conjugal visits. In particular, he

originally alleged with specificity: "I have not seen my wife and 4 children and mother in 2 years"

Compl. p. 3 (emphasis added)..

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Process Clause"); Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 137 (2nd Cir. 1994) (neither the

Constitution nor state law created any protected guarantee to conjugal visitation privileges

while incarcerated). However, as noted in the R&R, Defendant too narrowly construes

Stevens' "family visitation" allegations as referring only to conjugal visits. Mot. 1:13; 3:2, 21-

28. The R&R found "unclear" whether Stevens intended to use the term in the conjugal visit

context or in a "more colloquial application," properly opting for the broader reading. KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). R&R p. 4 n.2, 6:7-9.

This court finds the claim must be construed from the face of the FAC as

encompassing all family visitation. Not only does the liberal construction of pro se and civil

rights pleadings obligation require the court to accept that broader inference, but also his

express language mandates that reading.2 However, this court does not concur with the

statement in the R&R that Stevens does not claim "he is in any[]way denied regular visiting

privileges that are available to the general prison population." R&R 6:9-10. He alleges he

is permitted no visitations from relatives, presumably contrary to privileges accorded the

general prison population under the "Family Visitation" policies he cites. Nevertheless, to

survive Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the FAC must substantiate a liberty interest in the visitation

deprivation he alleges, absent which he can state no cognizable right to Due Process

protections attendant on that consequence of the addition of an "R" suffix custody

classification or otherwise.

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B. Legal Standards

1. Motions To Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim

A FED. R. CIV. P. ("Rule") 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the

complaint. The Rule 12(b)(6) issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but

whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Scheuer v. Rhoades,

416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800

(1982). Dismissal is warranted where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory.

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) ("Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on

the basis of a dispositive issue of law"). A complaint may also be dismissed where it

presents a cognizable legal theory, but fails to plead facts essential to the statement of a

claim under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534; see Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.,

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so

requires." Rule 15(a); see DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir.

1992) (when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, leave to amend is ordinarily denied only

when it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment). In

civil rights cases, courts must liberally construe the pleadings and resolve doubts in favor of

the plaintiff, and "[a] pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless

it is 'absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by

amendment.'" Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24 (citation omitted); see also Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

does not need detailed factual allegations; . . . a plaintiff's

obligation to provide "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief"

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . .

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level . . . .

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3

 Conley's "no set of facts" language "has earned its retirement. The phrase is best

forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has

been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the

allegations in the complaint." Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1969. "It is not . . . proper to assume that

[the plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the [laws]

in ways that have not been alleged." Id. at 1969 n.8 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, -- U.S. --, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (May 21, 2007), quoting and

abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).3 

 In deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the court assumes the truth of all factual

allegations, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts alleged, and

construes them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal conclusions need not be taken as

true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations, nor need the court

accept as true conclusory allegations or unreasonable inferences. Roberts v. Corrothers,

812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). In construing the pleading, courts also may not "supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.

of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Vague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss").

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Actions

Stevens seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), which provides,

in pertinent part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . ." Accordingly, to sustain a Section 1983 action, the allegations

must show (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of

state law, and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. See Balistreri,

901 F.2d at 699; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

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3. Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interests

 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive a person of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law. These procedural guarantees apply only

when a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest is at stake. Board of Regents

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972) (the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause

does not trigger the need for procedural protections in every instance involving the state's

deprivation of an individual's liberty, but only when there is a cognizable liberty interest at

stake); see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977). Protectable liberty interests arise

from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause itself, or from state laws or

regulations deemed to have created a liberty interest cognizable as a civil right. Meachum

v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-27 (1976); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557-58 (describing minimum

safeguards applicable before a cognizable liberty interest may be infringed, such as before

withdrawing sentence credits a prisoner has already acquired). 

To survive Rule 12(b)(6) review, the complaint must allege facts permitting a finding

the plaintiff has a liberty interest at stake, arising from either the Due Process clause or from

state-created sources. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1995) (examining whether

state prison regulations or the Due Process Clause afforded inmate a protected liberty

interest that would entitle him to procedural protections before transfer into segregation); see

Roth, 408 U.S. at 569 ("The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the

deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty

and property"). 

These interests will be generally limited to freedom from

restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an

unexpected manner as to give rise to the protection by the Due

Process Clause of its own force . . . , nonetheless imposes

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482.

Changes in a prisoner's conditions of confinement can amount to a deprivation of a

liberty interest constitutionally protected under the Due Process Clause, but only if the liberty

interest in question is one of real substance. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-78. Only in those

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cases where a sufficiently substantial liberty interest is at stake must the court evaluate

whether the process received comported with minimum procedural due process

requirements. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003), quoting Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). If the court

answers the first question in the negative, the plaintiff has failed to state a Section 1983

claim for a Fourteenth Amendment violation.

In order to find a liberty interest conferred by state law, the analysis focuses on the

nature of the deprivation rather than on the language of any particular regulation, to avoid

involvement of federal courts in day-to-day prison management. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at

479-82, 483 (abandoning prior test of Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), which focused

on the mandatory or discretionary language of a regulation to identify whether it created a

liberty interest: "The time has come to return to the due process principles we believe were

correctly established in [Wolff, 418 U.S. 539] and [Meachum, 427 U.S. 215]"); see also May

v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir.1997) (convicted inmate's due process claim fails

because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within sentence

imposed, and administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily

contemplated by a sentence). Protectable liberty interests created by state law are

"generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S.

at 483-84; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996) (prison

classification created no "atypical and significant hardship" because it would not invariably

affect the duration of the inmate's sentence) (interpreting Sandin). 

4. R&R Review Standards

A district judge "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive

further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions" on a

dispositive matter prepared by a magistrate judge proceeding without the consent of the

parties for all purposes. Rule 72(b); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). An objecting party may

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"serve and file specific objections to the proposed findings and recommendations," and "a

party may respond to another party's objections." Rule 72(b).

In reviewing an R&R, "the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions

of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made."

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980) (when objections

are made, the court must make a de novo determination of the factual findings to which

there are objections). The court also reviews de novo the magistrate judge's conclusions of

law. Gates v. Gomez, 60 F.3d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1995). "If neither party contests the

magistrate's proposed findings of fact, the court may assume their correctness and decide

the motion on the applicable law." Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir.

1979). "[D]eterminations of law by the magistrate judge are reviewed de novo by both the

district court and [the court of appeals]. . . ." Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th

Cir. 2007). Here, the court need only address the disposition of the Petition based on

conclusions of law, as no party has filed objections to the R&R.

C. Dismissal Is Warranted

Stevens urges the court to find denial of family visitation privileges to be a violation

of his "constitutional rights to due process, life, and liberty" because he alleges he has been

wrongly assigned a custody classification as a sex offender, resulting in the visitation

restrictions. The court's threshold inquiry, accordingly, is whether Stevens' deprivation of

family visitation imposed "atypical and significant hardship" implicating a protected liberty

interest. If so, the court must then determine what process he was due and whether he

received it. See, e.g. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (holding that segregated

confinement of indefinite duration in a "supermax" prison that rendered inmates ineligible for

parole consideration created a combination of factors that implicated a liberty interest, but

the state's informal, nonadversary procedures for placement there were adequate to

safeguard inmates' liberty interest in not being assigned to supermax prison). Stevens relies

on Hoversten v. Superior Court, 74 Cal.App.4th 636 (1999) for the proposition

"inmates/parolees retain the legal right of family visitation and visitation with their children

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4

 Stevens appears to have abandoned any Eighth Amendment claim that might have been

attempted in the statement of his claims in his original Complaint. "[E]xtreme deprivations are

required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim." R&R 11:26-27, quoting LeMaire v. Maass,

12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted) (holding none of the practices in a

disciplinary segregation unit challenged under the Eighth Amendment was unnecessary or caused

the plaintiff harm rising to the level of a constitutional violation).

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and family members. . . ." FAC p. 3. However, that case is distinguishable on its facts,

addressing an access to courts question in circumstances where the inmate had not been

able to appear, due to his incarceration, at marital dissolution hearings where his parental

rights were adjudged.

The Supreme Court has identified few protected liberty interests within the prison

context requiring procedural due process protections. See Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d

1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003).4 Stevens has no liberty interest in family visitation while

incarcerated arising under the Constitution itself adequate to trigger the due process

protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490

U.S. 454, 460-61 (1989) (no liberty interest in visits with "a particular visitor"); Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1113 (9th Cir. 1986) (contact visitation); Hernandez v. Coughlin,

18 F.3d 133, 137 (2nd Cir. 1994) (conjugal visitation); see also Lynott v. Henderson, 610

F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Convicted prisoners have no absolute constitutional right to

visitation"); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136-37 (2003) (upholding prison regulations

banning visitation privileges entirely for a two-year period for inmates with two substance

abuse violations and regulating the conditions of visitations by others as not affecting

constitutional rights that survive incarceration), citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. Any such

liberty interest must accordingly be conferred by state regulations.

California prison regulations consistently refer to visitation as a "privilege" rather than

a "right," and one which may be granted, denied or modified for any number of reasons

within the discretion of the CDC. See e.g. 15 CAL. CODE REGS. §§ 3176.4, 3177(b).

California has not created liberty interests enforceable by prisoners in either classification

or in visitation. Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied. 128 S.Ct.

396 (Oct. 9, 1007) (classification); Torricellas v. Poole, 954 F.Supp. 1405, 1414-15 (C.D.Cal.

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5

 That opinion also canvases several circuit's treatment in the negative of the question

whether deprivation of family visitation privileges implicates a "liberty interest" subject to the Due

Process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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1997), aff'd 141 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 1998) (visitation). As Stevens himself acknowledges,

absent a liberty interest in family visitation privileges, he cannot invoke the due process

protections elaborated in Wolff to challenge his "R" classification that allegedly cut them off.

The only regulations relied on in the FAC relate to the "R" classification process and the

policies and procedures associated with institutional "guidelines" permitting "Family

Visitation" Stevens contends have not been followed in his case. FAC p. 3. The facts of

this case are similar to those presented in a Section 1983 action decided by the undersigned

District Judge while serving as a magistrate judge, Cooper v. Garcia, 55 F.Supp.2d 1090

(S.D. Cal. 1999). That plaintiff alleged he lost his conjugal visitation privileges after prison

officials decided to classify him as an "R" suffix prisoner without first conducting an

"individualized assessment" of his risk to others to justify the classification. That ruling

discussed at length California's Family Visitation program and its status as a privilege from

which several categories of prisoners are excluded.5 See Cooper, 55 F.Supp. at 1098-99.

The court finds the visitation privileges of the Family Visitation protocols Stevens

contends constitute an actionable deprivation do not embody a cognizable liberty interest

upon which he may base a Due Process violation claim. Loss of privileges associated with

a change in custody status simply do not "impose[] atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" (Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484) compared

to other similarly classified inmates, a showing Stevens does not attempt. The "R" suffix

classification designating Stevens as a sex offender could give rise to a liberty interest only

if the Sandin deprivations are implicated. As noted in the R&R, prisoners have no

constitutional right to a particular classification status arising directly from the Fourteenth

Amendment or from state law because they have no liberty interest vested in custody

classification decisions. Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987);

Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); see Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442, 445 (7th

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6

 Stevens also relies on Edward v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) for the proposition Due

Process requires he receive an audit of his "C-file Central File" in order "to legally correct" the

resulting "injustice" of family visitation deprivations. FAC p. 5. However, the Balisok case is also

distinguishable. That case addressed a prisoner's claim his due process rights were violated by

procedures used in a disciplinary hearing that resulted in the deprivation of good time credits he had

earned.

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Cir. 2006) (sex offender classification not subject to procedural protection when there is no

impact on non-discretionary programs).

Stevens relies on Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997) for the

proposition "an inmate whom the prison intends to identify as a sex offender is legally and

lawfully entitled to be notified of the alleged reasons for his classification as a sex offender,

and to legally have a hearing where he must be provided an opportunity to call witnesses

and to present documentary evidence in his defense produce [sic] the police report of said

offense." FAC pp. 4-5. However, Neal is distinguishable. As pertinent here, the Neal court

held the state's requirement a prisoner complete a sex offender treatment program and

confess to past sex offenses as a precondition to parole eligibility created a liberty interest

protected by due process, triggering the Fourteenth Amendment's protections.6 Neal, 131

F.3d at 827 ("[T]he stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the 'sex offender' label

coupled with the subjection of the targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment program whose

completion is a precondition for parole eligibility create the kind of deprivations of liberty that

require procedural protections") (emphasis added). The "sex offender" label standing alone

apparently would not have caused the Neal court to recognize a liberty interest in remaining

free from that classification. The cognizable liberty interest arose only when the custody

classification was coupled with the mandatory treatment program which the inmate had to

successfully complete before becoming eligible for parole, which the court found implicated

the "kind of deprivations of liberty that require procedural protections." Neal, 131 F.3d at

830; see also Cooper, 55 F.Supp.2d at 1102 (finding, in consideration of the Neal authority,

"the liberty interest at stake must be more than a mere 'sex offender' classification," requiring

in addition "some mandatory coercive treatment" associated with the classification "which

affects a liberty interest, such as parole").

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Stevens alleges no facts from which it may be inferred that his parole eligibility or

good time credits or any other effect that could impact the fact or duration of his conviction

and sentence is implicated, nor that he is compelled to complete a sex offender program

before he can be parole-eligible, nor that he confess to past sex offenses or the like, from

which a combination of factors could be found to trigger a liberty interest. Those distinctions

preclude a finding the institution's mere withholding from Stevens application of its Family

Visitation guidelines created a cognizable liberty interest deprivation. He has alleged no

facts to substantiate the fact or duration of his imprisonment is in any way affected by the

"R" suffix attached to his custody classification. 

This court finds no basis to deviate from its prior assessment of the visitation issue

expressed in Cooper: inmates do not have a liberty interest in the state family visitation

program within the meaning of Sandin, and therefore cannot state a claim for procedural due

process violations associated with visitation deprivation. Implementation of the Family

Visitation "guidelines" within prisons is a matter of institutional discretion. As this court

observed in Cooper, a person in plaintiff's position, barred from family visits even though

never convicted of a sex offense, may deserve sympathy, but the court is not empowered

to act in the absence of a constitutional violation. It may not fashion a remedy in a Section

1983 action without a cognizable liberty or property interest at stake. The court finds

Stevens' FAC does not allege claims upon which relief may be granted, and leave to amend

would be futile.

II. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the R&R is ADOPTED. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

Defendant's unopposed Motion is GRANTED, and Stevens' FAC is DISMISSED, without

leave to amend his pleading a third time to attempt to state a claim, terminating this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 6, 2008

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-02072-LAB-LSP Document 15 Filed 03/07/08 Page 12 of 12