Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00115/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00115-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jeremiah Lee Tomlinson, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Laura Escapule, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV 15-00115-PHX-SPL (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Jeremiah Lee Tomlinson (“Petitioner”) has filed a pro se First Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. 9), with a filing date of January 15, 

2015 (Doc. 1). Petitioner was convicted in Cochise County Superior Court, case #2013-

00704, of Promoting Contraband in a Prison Facility, in violation of A.R.S. §13-2505(A), 

and was sentenced to a 1.5-year term of imprisonment. Petitioner names Laura Escapule, 

warden of ASPC – Yuma, as Respondent and the Arizona Attorney General as an 

additional respondent. On April 29, 2015, this Court ordered Respondents to answer 

Tomlinson’s petition, but it permitted Respondents to file an answer limited to 

affirmative defenses (Doc. 10). Respondents have filed a limited answer (Doc. 19), and 

Petitioner has filed a reply (Doc. 21). 

As explained below, the Court recommends that the Petition be denied and 

dismissed with prejudice because 1) he waived the issues raised in the Petition when he 

entered a plea of guilty and 2) he did not exhaust his claims, which are now procedurally 

barred. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Proceedings Leading to Conviction and Sentence 

On December 24, 2013, Tomlinson entered into a stipulated guilty plea, whereby 

he pled guilty to possessing prison contraband on March 5, 2013, a class 5 felony 

(reduced from the charge in Count 1 of the criminal complaint, which was a class 2 

felony) for possessing a green leafy substance (Exhibit A, Doc. 19-1 at pages 1-11; 

Exhibit B, Doc. 19-1 at pages 12-15; Exhibit C, Doc. 19-1 at pages 16-23).1

 Pursuant to 

the plea agreement, the State dismissed Counts 2 and 3, and it did not pursue additional 

prison-contraband charges that Tomlinson could have faced (Exhibit C, Doc. 19-1 at page 

19). The plea agreement section entitled “STIPULATION/RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING SENTENCE” stated: 

The parties stipulate the defendant shall be sentenced to 1.5 years in the 

Arizona Department of Corrections. This sentence shall be served 

consecutively to the sentence currently being served in Maricopa County 

Superior Court Case CR2009-0079580. The State will withdraw the 13-

703 historical prior allegations. All other sentencing provisions shall be left 

to the discretion of the Court. State agrees that it will not file charges for 

promoting prison contraband for events of 3/25/11 & 6/7/13 as set forth in 

Defendant’s ADOC Inmate Search record. 

(Id.). 

The plea agreement also provided that “[u]nless the plea is rejected or withdrawn, 

[Petitioner] waives and gives up any and all motions, defense objections, or requests 

which he had made or raised, or could assert hereafter, to the Court’s entry of judgment 

against [him] and imposition of a sentence upon him consistent with this agreement” 

(Exhibit C, Doc. 19-1 at page 20). Petitioner initialed and signed the agreement 

indicating that he understood and approved every provision in the agreement (Exhibit C, 

Doc. 19-1 at pages 17-23). 

 

1

 The referenced alphabetical exhibits were submitted with Respondents’ Limited Answer, Doc. 19. The document and page references herein are to this Court’s electronic 

record. 

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 The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Tomlinson, in 

accordance with the plea agreement, to a 1.5-year term of imprisonment (Exhibit D, Doc. 

19-1 at pages 24-28). The court imposed sentence as follows: 

The Defendant shall be committed to the Arizona Department of 

Corrections for the minimum term of ONE AND ONE HALF (1 1⁄2) 

years...This sentence shall be served CONSECUTIVELY to the sentence 

currently being served in Maricopa County Superior Court Case CR2009-

0079580. The Defendant is given credit for zero (0) days served. IT IS 

ORDERED that Defendant must serve at least 85% of the sentence 

imposed. IT IS ORDERED pursuant to A.R.S. §13-603(I), the Defendant 

will be required to perform a mandatory community supervision sentence – 

one day for every seven days sentenced to, immediately after his actual 

period of imprisonment. 

(Exhibit D, Doc. 19-1 at page 27).2

 Defendant was advised of his rights of review of the 

proceedings (Exhibit D, Doc. 19-1 at page 28; Exhibit E, Doc. 19-1 at pages 29-31). 

 B. PCR Proceedings. 

On January 27, 2014, Petitioner filed his notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”), 

which timely commenced his PCR proceeding (Exhibit F, Doc. 19-1 at pages 32-36). 

The superior court appointed PCR counsel, who filed a notice stating that he had 

reviewed the record and determined the case did not contain any colorable claims 

(Exhibit G, Doc. 19-1 at pages 37-38). Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se PCR 

petition, wherein he claimed, among other things, that: (1) his right to a speedy trial was 

violated; and (2) his conviction violated “due process and [his] ex post facto rights” 

because the spice that he possessed on March 5, 2013, had not yet been statutorily 

classified as a dangerous drug (Exhibit H, Doc. 19-1 at pages 39-59). The State 

responded to Tomlinson’s PCR petition (Exhibit I, Doc. 19-1 at pages 59-65), and 

Tomlinson filed a reply (Exhibit J, Doc. 19-1 at pages 66-70). 

On July 29, 2014, the superior court dismissed Tomlinson’s PCR petition, 

 

2

 For several Arizona law provisions regarding sentencing structure, including imprisonment, community supervision (i.e. parole), and probation, see A.R.S. §13-603(I), 

(J), and (K); see also A.R.S. §41-1604.07(D). 

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concluding that his claims were without merit (Exhibit K, Doc. 19-1 at pages 71-73). 

Specifically, the superior court found that Tomlinson’s speedy-trial claim was meritless 

because his “case was resolved within ninety days from the initiation of the case” (Id. at 

page 72). His ex post facto claim was also meritless because, as the superior court 

properly found, Tomlinson did not plead guilty to a dangerous-drug offense (Id. at pages 

73). Rather, Tomlinson pled guilty to possessing prison contraband, and “spice” was 

plainly prison contraband when he possessed it on March 5, 2013 (Id. at pages 72-73). 

Tomlinson did not file a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 9 at 

pages 5-7). 

II. PETITIONER’S HABEAS CLAIM 

On January 15, 2015, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

(Doc. 1).3

 Petitioner subsequently filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus on April 20, 2015, wherein he alleges two separate claims: (1) that he was 

subjected to an ex post facto prosecution in violation of the state and federal constitution; 

and (2) that his right to a speedy trial was violated (Doc. 9 at pages 6-7). 

Petitioner names Laura Escapule, warden of ASPC – Yuma, as Respondent and 

the Arizona Attorney General as an additional respondent. On April 29, 2015, this Court 

ordered Respondents to answer Tomlinson’s petition, but it permitted Respondents to file 

an answer limited to affirmative defenses (Doc. 10). Respondents have filed a limited 

answer (Doc. 19), and Petitioner has filed a reply (Doc. 21). 

III. LEGAL ANALYIS 

 A. Guilty Plea/Plea Agreement Waiver 

“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact 

guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent 

claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry 

 

3

 This is the date Petitioner delivered the Petition to prison officials (Doc. 1 at 

page 9), as indicated by the date he inscribed next to his signature, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988) (stating a legal document is deemed filed on the date a 

petitioner delivers it to the prison authorities for filing by mail); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the mailbox rule in the context of a habeas petition). 

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of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); see also Moran v. 

Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 1994) (“As a general rule, one who voluntarily 

pleads guilty to a criminal charge may not subsequently seek federal habeas relief on the 

basis of pre-plea constitutional violations”), overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). Consequently, a petitioner’s guilty plea limits the 

grounds upon which he can subsequently challenge his detention in a federal habeas 

corpus proceeding. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 979 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Unless the petitioner alleges his plea was involuntary, or improperly induced by 

ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”), a conviction based on a guilty plea may not be 

challenged in a federal habeas proceeding, “despite various forms of misapprehension 

under which a defendant might [have] labor[ed].” Id. at 981 n.26 (internal marks 

omitted) (collecting cases).4

 It is also firmly established that a conscious “waiver” is not 

necessary “with respect to each potential defense relinquished by a plea of guilty.” 

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989) (holding that double jeopardy challenge 

was waived by guilty plea, even if defendant and attorney were unaware of the basis for 

the challenge at the time of plea). 

Petitioner cannot, as he tries in his Petition, claim a “deprivation of constitutional 

rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 

258, 267 (1973). Petitioner does not claim that his guilty plea was made involuntarily. 

Nor would the record support such a finding. Because Petitioner has “voluntarily and 

intelligently plead guilty to a criminal charge [and so he] may not subsequently seek 

federal habeas corpus relief on the basis of pre-plea constitutional violations.” Hudson v. 

Moran, 760 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Petitioner also does not claim in his petition that his trial counsel provided 

ineffective representation or advice (Doc. 9). Rather, Petitioner asserts that: (1) his 

 

4

 Further, to the extent that a pleading petitioner claims his guilty plea was improperly induced by ineffective assistance, the petitioner may only do so based upon counsel’s actions as they related to the petitioner’s decision to plead guilty—claims relating to other, earlier actions by counsel are barred. See Moran, 57 F.3d at 700. 

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conviction violates the constitutional protection against ex post facto prosecutions; and 

(2) that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated (Doc. 9 at pages 6-7). 

Because Petitioner guilty; thus, he can no longer challenge those alleged violations.5

 

The terms of plea agreements are controlled by contract-law principles. United 

States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1997). Therefore, courts enforce 

the terms of a plea agreement if its plain language is clear and unambiguous. See United 

States v. Trapp, 257 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Clark, 218 F.3d 

1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000). If a plea agreement contains a clear waiver of the right to 

seek review of a claim, and the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made, federal courts 

will enforce that waiver. United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011); 

United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 

483 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1987) (applying the plain language of a plea agreement and noting that 

“both parties bargained for and received substantial benefits”). 

Here, the plain language in Petitioner’s plea agreement provided that “[u]nless the 

plea is rejected or withdrawn, [Petitioner] waives and gives up any and all motions, 

defense objections, or requests which he had made or raised, or could assert hereafter, to 

the Court’s entry of judgment against [him] and imposition of a sentence upon him 

consistent with this agreement” (Exhibit C, Doc. 19-1 at page 20). Further, Petitioner’s 

initials and signature on the agreement indicate that he understood and approved every 

provision in the agreement (Exhibit C, Doc. 19-1 at pages 17-23). Accordingly, under 

the plea agreement, Petitioner has waived any and all motions, defenses, or challenges 

that he could have potentially asserted, including any ex post facto challenge to his 

conviction, or claim that his right to a speedy trial was violated. Thus, the Petition should 

be dismissed because it raises two claims which each and both Petitioner waived. 

 

5

 In any event, both claims are meritless because, as the superior court correctly found, Petitioner did not plead guilty to a dangerous-drug offense and his “case was 

resolved within ninety days from the initiation of the case” (Exhibit K, Doc. 19-1 at 

pages 71-73). 

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 B. Exhaustion/Procedural Bar 

A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court remedies before this Court 

can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan 

v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). 

Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies by fairly presenting claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 

526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); 

Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To be fairly presented, a claim 

must include a statement of the operative facts and the specific federal legal theory. 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 

(1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

A claim can also be subject to an express or implied procedural bar. Robinson v. 

Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express procedural bar exists if the 

state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural bar “that is both 

‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s 

decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 

(2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of federal law 

because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits”); Johnson 

v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist when a state strictly 

or regularly follows its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 

(1991); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100. An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not 

fairly presented in state court and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 

(1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 

573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). This Court 

can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can demonstrate either cause 

for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a miscarriage of justice. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

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750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 

167-68 (1982). 

Petitioner did not exhaust any of the claims in his habeas petition and an implied 

procedural bar now exists to prevent him from doing so. To meet the exhaustion 

requirement, Petitioner needed to fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals by providing the facts underlying his claim and the federal basis of those claims. 

Petitioner never filed anything in the Arizona Court of Appeals and, therefore, his claims 

are not exhausted. In addition, Petitioner’s claims are now subject to an implied 

procedural bar because his claims were not fairly presented in state court and no state 

remedies remain available to him because he is now precluded or time-barred from 

raising his claims in a successive and untimely Rule 32 petition under Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) & (b), or 32.4(a). Petitioner has not 

demonstrated either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the Court cannot review his claims. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Jeremiah Lee Tomlinson’s 

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 9) be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be 

denied because dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists 

of reason would not find the ruling debatable. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

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result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 31st day of October, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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