Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00038/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00038-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KELTON WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13-CV-38- IEG (BLM)

ORDER:

1. GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

 MOTIONS TO DISMISS; AND

[Doc. Nos. 44, 51]

2. GRANTING LEAVE TO 

 AMEND.

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF FAIR

EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING, et

al.

Defendants.

Before the Court are two motions to dismiss by Defendants.1

 [Doc. Nos. 44,

51.] For the reasons and to the extent below, both motions are GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action against his former employer

American Specialty Health Group, Inc. (“American Specialty”), the EEOC

Defendants, and the DFEH Defendants asserting a host of claims for employment

discrimination and retaliation in violation of his civil rights. [Doc. No. 1, 33.] All

claims against American Specialty are stayed pending arbitration. [Doc. No. 41.]

1 “Defendants” refers herein to Karrie Maeda and Olophious Perry, both employees of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), (the “EEOC Defendants”), and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”), and DFEH employees Mark Albert, Mary Bonilla, Phyllis Cheng, Timothy Muscat, Claudia Quintanilla, Elizabeth Ramirez, Cathy Ray, Monica Rea, and Lottie Woodruff (the “DFEH Defendants”).

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Twenty claims remain variously against the EEOC and DFEH Defendants in their

individual and official capacities.2

 Here, Defendants move to dismiss all individual

capacity claims for insufficient service of process under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), and

all official capacity claims for insufficient pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

[See Doc. Nos. 44, 51.] 

DISCUSSION

I. Individual Capacity Claims

“Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), a complaint may be

dismissed for insufficient service of process.” U.S. ex rel. Casady v. American

intern. Group, Inc., 2013 WL 1702777, at *7 (S.D. Cal. April 19, 2013) (internal

quotation omitted). Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) requires that persons sued in their

individual capacities receive personal service of the summons and complaint. 

Hutchinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1982). “Without

personal service in accordance with Rule 4, the district court is without jurisdiction

to render a personal judgment against a defendant,” id., and service at the individual

defendant’s place of employment is insufficient, Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d

348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, Plaintiff merely mailed the complaint to the EEOC

and DFEH; he has not effected personal service on any of the individual defendants.

[See, e.g., Doc. Nos. 9-11, 13-16, 48.] Accordingly, all claims against Defendants in

their individual capacities are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

II. Official Capacity Claims

“A claim for damages against a federal agency [or federal employees in their

2 Plaintiff’s federal claims include alleged violations under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985,

1986, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, and for declaratory judgment. Plaintiff’s supplemental state law claims include fraud in violation of California Civil Code§ 1572, breach of fiduciary duty, discrimination in state-funded programs in violation of California Government Code

§§ 11135 and 11139, violations of Article 28 1, § 7(a) of the California Constitution, violation of Cal. Civil Code§52.1(b), conspiracy to defraud in violation of Penal Code§ 182(a)(l), intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

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official capacities] is barred by sovereign immunity unless Congress has consented

to suit,” i.e., waived sovereign immunity. Gilbert v. Da Grossa, 756 F.2d 1455,

1460 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1985). This notion of “sovereign immunity extends to state

agencies and to damage claims against state officials acting in their official

capacity.” Braunstein v. Arizona Dept. of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir.

2012). “[T]he EEOC is . . . an agency of the federal government,” Persik v. Tucci

Learning Solutions, Inc., 2007 WL 2298039, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007), and the

“DFEH is a state agency,” Rubino v. ACME Bldg. Maintenance, 2008 WL 2340575,

at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2008). Thus, the EEOC and DFEH Defendants in their

official capacities are immune from Plaintiff’s claims, except to the extent sovereign

immunity has been waived. Akins v. San Diego Community College Dist., 2013 WL

40976, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2013) (citing Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528

U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000)). 

Sovereign immunity has not been waived as to RICO claims. See Dees v.

California State University, Hayward, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 1998)

(“The RICO statutes do not indicate that the United States has waived its sovereign

immunity” and thus “a RICO claim cannot be maintained against the United

States.”); Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir.1991) (“it is clear that there

can be no RICO claim against the federal government”); Dahmer v. Hamilton, 238

F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2000) (“RICO does not override states’ sovereign immunity”). 

Nor as to civil rights claims under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, or 1986. See Pittman v.

Oregon, Employment Dept., 509 F.3d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (“under § 1983 and

§ 1981 . . . states enjoy sovereign immunity from suits brought under both statutes,”

thus “actions against arms of the state under both § 1983 and § 1981 cannot be

brought in either federal or state court”); Mueller v. U.S. Corp., 2009 WL 273283, at

*9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009) (“sovereign immunity bars Section 1985[] and 1986

claims against the United States and its officers acting in their official capacities.”);

Robinson v. Tripler Army Medical Center, 2009 WL 688922, at *2 (9th Cir. March

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17, 2009) (“State agencies . . . can[not] be sued under § 1983 and § 1985, and the

Eleventh Amendment bars suits against them.”). Nor as to Plaintiff’s supplemental

state law claims. See, e.g., Ranton-Ried v Alcazar, 2007 WL 2669714, at *2 (D. Or.

Sept. 7, 2007) (“Sovereign immunity is applicable to . . . supplemental state law

claims”). Thus, barred by sovereign immunity, Plaintiff’s RICO, §§ 1981, 1983,

1985, 1986, and supplemental state law claims against the EEOC and DFEH

Defendants in their official capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

On the other hand, Congress has “expressly abrogated States’ sovereign

immunity against suits brought in federal court to enforce Title VI.” Alexander v.

Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (citing 42 U.S. § 2000d-7(a)(2)). Nevertheless,

Plaintiff fails to state a Title VI claim. “To state a claim under [Title VI], a plaintiff

must allege that (1) the entity involved is engaging in racial discrimination; and (2)

the entity involved is receiving federal financial assistance.” Fobbs v. Holy Cross

Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds,

Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001). Here,

Plaintiff provides only conclusory allegations of discrimination without any factual

support suggesting a connection between Defendants’ conduct and racial bias. [See

Doc. No. 33 at ¶¶ 85-94.] Nor does Plaintiff provide any facts suggesting that other

persons similarly situated received disparate treatment. [Id.] Because no facts are

pled plausibly suggesting that Defendants’ conduct was discriminatory or motivated

by racial bias, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title VI. See Travis v. Folsom

Cordova Unified School Dist., 2007 WL 529840, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Feb 20, 2007)

(“Because the Complaint lacks factual allegations to support its legal conclusions

and fails to allege racial discrimination, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim under Title VI for failure to state a claim.”). Amendment is

not necessarily futile, and thus Plaintiff’s Title VI claims are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED as

follows:

• Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their individual capacities are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

• Plaintiff’s RICO, §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, and supplemental state law claims against the EEOC and DFEH Defendants in their

official capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

• Plaintiff’s Title VI claims against Defendants DFEH and Cheng in her official capacity are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file no later than September 30, 2013 a

second amended complaint curing the defects addressed above as to, and including

only, those claims dismissed without prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 21, 2013 ______________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

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