Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00962/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00962-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATHANIEL P. BLALOCK, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. 

PATRICK COVELLO, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:21-CV-0962-DMC-P

ORDER

 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 14. 

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 

means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 

1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 

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rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with 

at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, 

vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for 

the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague and 

conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

 As with the original complaint, Plaintiff names the following as defendants: 

(1) Patrick Covello, Warden at Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP); and (2) Sierra Roberts, 

Registered Nurse at MCSP. See ECF No. 14, pgs. 1, 2. Plaintiff alleges two claims for relief. 

See id. at 3-4. 

 In Claim I, Plaintiff alleges retaliation. See id. at 3. According to Plaintiff, 

Defendants Covello and Roberts participated in a meeting in July 2020 of the Inmate Advisory 

Council (IAC). See id. Plaintiff claims a policy emerged from the IAC meeting and was 

disseminated among the inmate population. See id. Plaintiff states that, under this policy, 

inmates could refuse a Covid-19 test “without retaliation.” Id. Next, Plaintiff asserts that, after 

taking 15 such tests, all which were negative, Plaintiff refused further Covid-19 testing. See id. 

Plaintiff states that, after refusing further testing, his cell door, which had not previously been 

locked, was locked and a sign was placed on Plaintiff’s cell door indicating that Plaintiff was 

being denied privileges. See id. Plaintiff does not state who placed the sign on Plaintiff’s cell 

door. Nor does Plaintiff state what was written on the sign.1 Plaintiff states that, after he agreed 

to be tested, the sign was removed and his privileges were “immediately restored.” Id. 

 In Claim II, Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference to his safety. See id. at 4. 

Plaintiff claims that “Administration” and “Custody” moved inmates from cell to cell, section to 

section, thereby breaking quarantines related to Covid-19. See id. Plaintiff further claims that 

nothing was cleaned according to CDC guidelines for Covid-19. See id. According to Plaintiff, 

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 Plaintiff does, however, provide a detailed description of the sign and its content in the original 

complaint. See ECF No. 1, pg. 11. 

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Defendant Roberts, as the infectious disease specialist in the prison, was negligent in her duties 

with respect to the risks to his health posed by Covid-19. See id. 

II. DISCUSSION

 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint plausibly states a 

cognizable claim for relief against Defendant Roberts in Claim II related to the conditions of 

confinement and the threat to Plaintiff’s safety resulting from non-compliance with applicable 

guidelines related to Covid-19. Plaintiff, however, has not alleged any facts to link Defendant 

Covello to the violation alleged in Claim II. Plaintiff also fails to state a cognizable retaliation 

claim in Claim I. 

A. Causal Link

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

§ 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 

specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 

deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 Here, Plaintiff does not reference Defendant Covello in Claim II. Plaintiff will be 

provided an opportunity to cure this defect through further amendment consistent with the 

standards outlined above. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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B. Retaliation

 In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation, the prisoner must 

establish that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right, and that the retaliatory 

action was not related to a legitimate penological purpose, such as preserving institutional 

security. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). In meeting 

this standard, the prisoner must demonstrate a specific link between the alleged retaliation and the 

exercise of a constitutional right. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995); 

Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989). The prisoner must also 

show that the exercise of First Amendment rights was chilled, though not necessarily silenced, by 

the alleged retaliatory conduct. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000), see also

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 569 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the prisoner plaintiff must 

establish the following in order to state a claim for retaliation: (1) prison officials took adverse 

action against the inmate; (2) the adverse action was taken because the inmate engaged in 

protected conduct; (3) the adverse action chilled the inmate’s First Amendment rights; and (4) the 

adverse action did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568. 

 In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to plead all of 

the essential elements for a retaliation claim. First, Plaintiff’s refusal to be tested for the Covid19 virus while in prison was not protected conduct under the Constitution. Second, Plaintiff’s 

placement in what in essence was quarantine pending testing was not an adverse action. Third, 

even if placement in quarantine constituted an adverse action given that Plaintiff was denied 

privileges until he agreed to be tested, the action served the legitimate penological purpose of 

preventing the spread of Covid-19 in the prison. Further, the action was as narrowly tailored as 

possible to achieve the objective, and any loss of privileges was restored upon a minimally 

invasive testing procedure. Finally, though Plaintiff claims that Defendants were involved in the 

IAC meeting, he does not allege any facts to directly connect them to the decision to place 

Plaintiff in quarantine, which is the basis of Plaintiff’s claim. 

 The Court finds that the defects in Plaintiff’s retaliation claim cannot be cured 

through further amendment. 

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III. CONCLUSION

 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 

amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 

1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 

prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 

amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 

complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and 

recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 

further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a second amended 

complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

Dated: August 25, 2023 

____________________________________ 

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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