Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02050/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02050-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

LMH

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ronald T. Flood, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 03-2050-PHX-DGC (VAM)

ORDER

The remaining claim in this state prisoner’s civil rights action concerns his

opportunities for exercise while housed in Special Management Unit II, the highest custody

level in the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC). Defendants have filed a Second

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #35-36). Plaintiff responded, and Defendants replied

(Doc. ##37-38). The Court will grant Defendants’ second motion. 

I. Background

Plaintiff was validated as a member of a Security Threat Group known as the Aryan

Brotherhood and placed in a maximum custody arrangement called Special Management

Unit II (“SMU II”) on June 6, 2003. Defendants are ADC Director Dora Schriro, Deputy

Warden Conrad Luna, and Classification Committee Specialist Barbara Shearer. In a

previous order, the Court denied Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion and granted summary

judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s due process, retaliation and Eighth

Amendment claims, except for Plaintiff’s claim regarding his opportunities for exercise (Doc.

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 40 Filed 10/12/06 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

#34). It was undisputed that prisoners in SMU II were allowed 3 hours of exercise per week

in a yard that was 23 feet by 11 feet wide, with cements walls, cement floor, and a steel mesh

top. The Court permitted Defendants an additional thirty days to file a second summary

judgment motion in light of a recent change in ADC policy to allow 6 instead of 3 hours of

exercise per week (Id. at 10).

Defendants filed their second motion for summary judgment, contending that effetive

December 29, 2005, the ADC increased the hours in the exercise yard from 3 to 6 per week

(Doc. #35 at 4 & DSOF, Ex 1, McWilliams Aff. ¶ 15, Doc. #36). They contend that 6 hours

is constitutionally sufficient. They also assert that the yard is exposed to fresh air and

sunlight, and the inmate can see the sky through the steel mesh top (McWilliams Aff. ¶ 7,

Doc. #36). During some times of the year and some times of the day, the sun is not directly

visible (Id.). A staggered exercise scheduled, however, ensures that each inmate may

exercise while there is sun in the yard (Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiff uses the yard regularly and also

exercises in his cell (Id. ¶ 13). 

Plaintiff responds that depending on the time of year, the recreation yard may not

receive any direct sunlight and that because of the height of the walls, the air movement was

limited because not many breezes come straight down (Doc. #37 at 1). He also contends that

a cement floor and a handball are not exercise equipment, and he expresses a desire for pullup bars and push-up stations (Doc. #37 at 2).

 Defendants reply that the amount of sunlight depends upon the weather and not the

defendants, and that the lack of a breeze does not violate the Constitution (Doc. #38 at 3).

They further contend that Plaintiff can work his major muscle groups by doing jumping

jacks, running in place, walking, playing handball, and doing callisthenics (Id.). 

II. Summary Judgment Standard

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 40 Filed 10/12/06 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

When considering a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the non-movant is “to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). These inferences are limited, however, “to those

upon which a reasonable jury might return a verdict.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co.,

68 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who, after

adequate time for discovery, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof

at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Rule 56(e) compels the nonmoving party to “set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” and not to “rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of [the party’s] pleading.” The nonmoving party must do more than

“simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). There is no issue

for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 249. Summary judgment is warranted if the evidence is “merely colorable” or “not

significantly probative.” Id. at 249-50. 

III. Analysis

Under the Eighth Amendment, punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it

contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

346 (1981). Only deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities

are sufficiently grave for an Eighth Amendment violation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726,

731 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). These are “deprivations of essential food, medical

care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452

U.S. at 348. 

The deprivation of outdoor exercise for inmates who are under long-term segregation

violates the Eighth Amendment. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). Five

hours of exercise per week has been found to be constitutionally sufficient. See Baptisto v

Ryan, 2006 WL 798879, at *33 (D. Ariz. March 28, 2006) (collecting decisions of the

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 40 Filed 10/12/06 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits). Plaintiff does not dispute that he

has the opportunity for exercise six hours per week.

Instead, he contends that he does not always have sunlight, that the air has limited

movement, and he does not have enough exercise equipment. It is undisputed that Plaintiff

has light, but some days and some times there is no direct sunlight. Infrequent deprivation

of sunlight, direct or indirect, does not constitute a denial of the “minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 542 U.S. at 347. Defendants assert that the exercise schedule

is staggered so inmates each have an opportunity to be in the yard at times when there is

light, and Plaintiff has not controverted this assertion. Plaintiff also asserts that the air has

limited movement. He is constitutionally entitled to fresh air, not a breeze, and it is

undisputed that the yard has a mesh top for fresh air. Finally, Plaintiff’s contention that the

yard needs more exercise equipment does not show that his constitutional rights have been

violated. He is not constitutionally entitled to exercise equipment of his choice, and the yard

has ample space for his physical movement. There is no evidence to show that his Eighth

Amendment rights were violated, and he therefore is not entitled to declaratory or injunctive

relief on this claim.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

#35) is granted. The Clerk of Court must enter a judgment of dismissal accordingly.

DATED this 12th day of October, 2006.

Case 2:03-cv-02050-DGC-VAM Document 40 Filed 10/12/06 Page 4 of 4