Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00836/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00836-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATHRYN M. VILLAVICENCIO,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv836-LAB (MDD)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

CROSS MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Doc. Nos. 15 & 16]

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Defendant.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge

Larry A. Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(c) of

the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

I. Procedural History

On November 30, 2007, Plaintiff Kathryn Villavicencio filed a claim under

Title II of the Social Security Act alleging disability as of March 2, 2007, and seeking

disability insurance benefits. (A.R. at 137). On April 9, 2008, the Commissioner

denied Plaintiff’s claim. (A.R. at 74). Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration was also

denied. (A.R. at 82). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge (ALJ), and a hearing was held on March 12, 2010. (A.R. 31-70). On April 23,

2010, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (A.R.

at 14). Plaintiff appealed, but the Appeals Council denied review. (A.R. at 6). 

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On April 20, 2011, Plaintiff filed her Complaint with this Court. (Doc. No. 1). 

Defendant filed an answer on September 15, 2011. (Doc. No. 11). Plaintiff filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment on November 15, 2011 (Doc. No. 15), and Defendant

filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on December 5, 2011. (Doc. No. 16). 

Defendant also filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion on December 5,

2011 (Doc. No. 17). 

II. Statement of the Facts

On November 28, 2007, Plaintiff filed an application under Title II for a period

of disability and disability insurance benefits alleging disability beginning March 2,

2007. Plaintiff’s claim was denied on April 9, 2008 and upon reconsideration on July

24, 2008. (AR at 17). Plaintiff requested a hearing on September 16, 2008. A

hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on March 12, 2010 at

which Plaintiff testified. Id. Also testifying at the hearing were Dr. Charles M. Plotz,

an impartial medical expert, and Katie Macy-Powers, an impartial vocational expert. 

Id. 

The ALJ issued a written decision on April 23, 2010. (AR at 17-25). The ALJ

found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: (1) major

depression, moderate; and, (2) pain of unknown etiology. (AR at 19). After

determining these medical impairments did not meet or equal any of the listed

impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, Appendix 1, the ALJ assessed

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. Id. at 19-20. The ALJ determined that

Plaintiff had the capacity to:

perform medium work activity, specifically, the claimant is able to lift

and carry 50 pounds occasionally, 25 pounds frequently, stand/walk for

six hours in an eight hour workday, with postural limitations to include

frequent climbing, stooping, kneeling and crouching and mental

functional limitations to include the ability to understand, carry out,

and remember simple and complex instructions as well as interact with

co-workers, supervisors, and the general public. The claimant is able to

withstand the stress and pressures associated with an eight-hour

workday and day-to-day activities (Exhibits 19F and 31F). 

(Id. at 20). The ALJ also summarized the medical evidence on record. As there is no

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dispute between the parties as to the objective medical records, the Court will provide

only a brief summary of the medical record. 

In 2004, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Boris Khamishon, a neurologist, after

complaining of stress related headaches. (AR 297-340). Plaintiff complained of rightsided numbness of unexplained etiology, but all clinical findings were negative. 

Plaintiff was started on new medications for her headaches. Id.

On December 15, 2006, Plaintiff saw Dr. Christopher Glazener. (AR at 258). 

Plaintiff was given steroid injection therapy for right low back, leg, and thoracic pain. 

Id. Plaintiff initially responded well to the treatment and her low back pain

improved, but Plaintiff later returned with complaints of pain on her left side. Id.

Plaintiff underwent a repeat procedure on January 2, 2007. Id. Plaintiff returned

again on January 22, 2007, and reported that the pain in the mid to upper thoracic

area was much improved, especially on the left side. Id. A repeat injection was

performed on the right side.

In November 2006, Plaintiff saw Dr. M. Hertzel Soumekh after complaining of

lower thoracic spine pain. The examination revealed pain with motion of the spine. 

In January 2007, Plaintiff returned and showed improvement after a thoracolumbar

epidural block. In April 2007, Plaintiff returned with complaints of severe back pain. 

An MRI was ordered, but Dr. Soumekh was unable to find any cause for the spinal

pain. 

On January 18, 2007, Dr. Khamishon provided progress notes indicating that

Plaintiff’s headaches had ceased for two months. Further progress notes from May

30, 2007, indicated that Plaintiff’s headaches were better after Botox treatments. 

On June 12, 2007, Dr. Corey Marco reported that Plaintiff had been placed in a

pain-management program for chronic pain and headache pain. Plaintiff’s migraines

became less frequent, and Plaintiff was referred to long-term pain management for

spinal pain. Further treatment notes indicated that Plaintiff reported relief from her

chronic pain following facet joint injection at the thoracolumbar junction. 

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Plaintiff also underwent weekly psychotherapy sessions with Dr. Chad Cox,

M.A., P.A., beginning on June 14, 2006. On August 3, 2007, Plaintiff reported

improved mood and decreased symptoms of agoraphobia and decreased safety

concerns. Further improvement was expected.

On March 20, 2008, Plaintiff saw Dr. Mounir Soliman, a psychologist and

neurologist for a consultation after complaining of depression, panic attacks, and

agoraphobia. Plaintiff was diagnosed with major depression, moderate, and an

anxiety disorder. Dr. Soliman opined that, from a psychiatric standpoint, Plaintiff

could work an eight-hour day. 

On November 2, 2009, Plaintiff saw Phong T. Dao, D.O., a board eligible

internist, for an internal medical evaluation of her complaints of a history of lupus

and Sjogren’s syndrome. Plaintiff claimed that she had an eight year history of lupus

for which she takes medication. Plaintiff also complained of chronic fatigue and joint

pain. Examination revealed that Plaintiff’s range of motion was normal in her upper

and lower extremities, and neurological examination revealed no significant

abnormalities. 

On January 21, 2010, Dr. William L. Wilson stated that Plaintiff reported

significant relief in her pain, decreased muscle spasm and cramping, and increased

daily activities. 

III. Legal Standard

The supplemental security income program established by Title XVI of the Act

provides benefits to disabled persons without substantial resources and little income. 

42 U.S.C. § 1383. To qualify, a claimant must establish an inability to engage in

“substantial gainful activity” because of a “medically determinable physical or mental

impairment” that “has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A). The disabling impairment must be

so severe that, considering age, education, and work experience, the claimant cannot

engage is any kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner makes this assessment through a five-step analysis. First,

the claimant must currently be not working. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Second, the

claimant must have a “severe” impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, the

medical evidence of the claimant’s impairment is compared to a list of impairments

that are presumed severe enough to preclude work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the

claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, benefits are

awarded. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). Fourth, if the claimant can do his past work,

benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). Fifth, if the claimant cannot do his past

work and, considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, cannot do other work that exists in the national economy,

benefits are awarded. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). The last two steps of the analysis are

required by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B).

In addition, when evaluating the severity of a claimant’s alleged mental

impairments, the Commissioner uses a “special technique” at each level of the review

process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1520a. In order to be considered disabled under the Act, the

claimant must have: (1) a medically determinable mental impairment(s), 20 C.F.R. §

416.1520a(b)(1)4

, and (2) exhibit specified functional limitations as a result of that

impairment(s) that prohibit the claimant from engaging in any gainful activity. 20

C.F.R. § 416.1520a(b)(2). If the claimant has a medically determinable mental

impairment but does not exhibit the requisite functional limitations, the claimant

may nevertheless still be considered disabled if the claimant exhibits clusters of

symptoms or a syndrome that indicate the inability to engage in gainful activity. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00.A. (impairment(s)

must either pose functional limitations or cause symptoms or a syndrome to support

4

There are nine diagnostic categories that the Act considers to be medically determinable mental impairment(s):

Organic mental disorders (12.02); schizophrenic, paranoid, and other psychotic disorders (12.03); affective disorders

(12.04); mental retardation (12.05); anxiety related disorders (12.06); somatoform disorders (12.07); personality disorders

(12.08); substance addiction disorders (12.09); and autistic disorder and other pervasive developmental disorders (12.10). 

20 C.F.R.Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00.A.

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a finding of disabled). Section 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, through Section

405(g) of the Act, allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of a final

agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3), 405(g). The scope of

judicial review is limited, however, and the Commissioner’s denial of benefits “will be

disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal

error.” Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433(9th

Cir. 1988) (quoting Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a

preponderance. Sandqathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). “[I]t is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

The court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that

supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Secretary

of Health & Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576, (9th Cir. 1988). If the evidence

supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ’s

decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). When the evidence is

inconclusive, “questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony are

functions solely of the Secretary.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir.

1982). 

The ALJ has a special duty in social security cases to fully and fairly develop

the record in order to make an informed decision on a claimant’s entitlement to

disability benefits. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). Because

disability hearings are not adversarial in nature, the ALJ must “inform himself about

the facts relevant to his decision,” even if the claimant is represented by counsel. Id.

(quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 n.1 (1983)).

Even if the reviewing courts finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

conclusions, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the proper

legal standards in weighing the evidence and reaching his or her decision. Benitez v.

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Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978). Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a

judgment affirming, modifying or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the Social Security

Administrator for further proceedings. Id. 

IV. Discussion

In her Motion, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ committed two reversible errors. 

(Doc. No. 15 at 3). First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discredited

Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her symptoms and physical limitations. Id. at 4. 

Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to consider lay witness testimony

provided by Jennifer Podwoski. Id. at 12. In his Cross-Motion, Defendant counters

that the ALJ provided sufficient reasons to discredit Plaintiff’s testimony and that

the ALJ’s failure to discuss Ms. Podwoski’s testimony is harmless error. (Doc. No. 16

at 2). The Court addresses each argument in turn. 

A. The ALJ’s Credibility Determination of Plaintiff

 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony

regarding her functional capacity. (Doc. No. 15 at 4). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause Plaintiff’s

alleged symptoms. (AR at 23). The ALJ also found, however, that Plaintiff’s

statements regarding the “intensity, persistence and limiting effects of those

symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the [RFC]

assessment.” Id.5

 The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s credibility as follows:

The claimant told Dr. Soliman that she is able to cook, clean, shop,

and run errands as well as care for her own personal hygiene and

financial responsibilities. However, she told Dr. Dao that she has

symptoms of chronic fatigue with joint pain, and she spends most of

5

Plaintiff erroneously contends that the ALJ did not perform the mandated two-step analysis

required by Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Under that ruling, the commissioner must first determine

if there is a medical impairment that could cause the claimant’s pain or other symptoms, and then

evaluates the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms to determine their effect

on the claimant’s abilities to perform work activities. Here, the ALJ expressly followed the two-step

approach, noting first that the medically determinable impairments could reasonably cause Plaintiff’s

alleged symptoms, and then considering the Plaintiff’s statements regarding her symptoms’ intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects. (AR at 23-24). 

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her day lying down to relieve symptoms and relies on other family

members to perform household chores and do laundry. The record

reflects that the claimant has been receiving conservative

treatment, specifically ongoing psychotherapy, pharmaceutical

intervention as well as epidural facet injections, for her impairments

which have been successful in providing relief, and her medications

resolve symptoms with no reported disabling side effects. The

medical expert, Dr. Plotz testified that: the record does not reveal

any objective evidence of record that she has been diagnosed with

Sjogrens or lupus; there are no diagnostic laboratory findings

confirming a diagnosis of lupus; he does not see a psychiatric

confirmation of bipolar disease; the record reflects that the claimant

takes large amounts of opiates, and opium itself, for back pain, and

the medical records do not reveal any clinical physical reason for her

to be in pain; the claimant’s benzodiazepine use should not be

causing fatigue; the claimant is not limited from a physical point of

view by any of her alleged impairments; there is no evidence in the

record to support the claimant’s allegations. Consequently, the

claimant’s allegations of disabling pain and limitation are

inconsistent with the evidence of record and are not credible. 

(A.R. at 24). Plaintiff acknowledges the ALJ listed some reasons for discrediting

Plaintiff’s statements, but contends that these reasons are legally insignificant. 

Generally, “questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the testimony

are functions solely” for the agency. Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th

Cir.1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ must provide “clear and

convincing” reasons to reject a claimant's subjective testimony, by specifically

identifying “what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the

claimant's complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.1995). 

An ALJ is not “required to believe every allegation of disabling pain” or other

impairment. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). However, an ALJ

must provide specific, cogent reasons for rejecting a plaintiff’s testimony. Morgan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. 

The reasons provided by the ALJ must be “sufficiently specific to permit the court to

conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony. Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002). The factors that an ALJ may consider in

deciding whether to reject a claimant’s testimony are specified in the Social Security

Administration rules, and the ALJ may not cite to reasons which do not comport with

the Agency’s rules. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635-37 (9th Cir. 2007). Those

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reasons include “reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies in the testimony or

between testimony and conduct, daily activities, and unexplained or inadequately

explained failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.’” Id. at

636 (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 603). 

Furthermore, even if one or more reasons listed by the ALJ are invalid, so long

as the ALJ provides some valid reasons, the ALJ’s credibility determination will be

upheld. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1227; Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d

1155, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008); Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190,

1195–97 (9th Cir. 2004).

1. Support in the Objective Medical Evidence

First, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s statements are

not supported by the objective medical evidence of record. (Doc. No. 15 at 6). Plaintiff

states that such a determination is prohibited by the social security regulations. Id. at

7. Defendant counters that the ALJ may consider, in conjunction with other factors,

whether the objective medical evidence supported Plaintiff’s statements. (Doc. No. 16

at 5). 

Where the ALJ has found that medically determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, the ALJ may not reject a

plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity or severity of pain or its effect on the

ability to work solely because it is not supported by the objective medical evidence. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2). The ALJ may, however, reject a claimant’s statements

regarding symptoms so long as the ALJ provides specific findings stating clear and

convincing reasons for doing so. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 834). The ALJ must specifically identify “what testimony is

not credible and what evidences undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Parra, 481

F.3d at 750. For example, in Parra, the Ninth Circuit found that the ALJ could

properly discount the claimant’s complaint of bursitis-related knee pain where

laboratory tests showed that knee function was within normal limits and where the

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claimant was only receiving “conservative treatment.” Id. at 750-51. Thus, while it is

true that an ALJ may not discredit the plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain on a

lack of medical evidence alone, the ALJ may consider the lack of objective medical

findings in conjunction with other clear and convincing reasons. Id.

Here, the ALJ did not rely on the lack of medical evidence alone to discredit

Plaintiff’s statements. (AR at 24). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s statements

regarding her daily activities conflicted with her statements regarding her symptoms,

that Plaintiff’s treatment had been conservative, and that medication had been

effective in controlling Plaintiff’s symptoms. (AR at 24). The ALJ was also specific

regarding the objective evidence that undermined Plaintiff’s complaints. Id. The ALJ

noted that Dr. Plotz, a testifying medical expert, could find no reason that the Plaintiff

should be in pain, and that diagnostic tests did not show any ailment which would

explain Plaintiff’s complaints of pain. Id. 

Plaintiff herself notes that the ALJ provided additional reasons for discrediting

Plaintiff’s testimony. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by relying “solely”

on the lack of objective medical evidence is without merit. While the ALJ cannot rely

only the lack of objective medical evidence, the ALJ did not err by considering it along

with the other clearly stated reasons.

2. Plaintiff’s Daily Activities

Second, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s statements are

inconsistent with her reported daily activities. Plaintiff states that the ALJ

improperly considered Plaintiff’s ability to perform daily activities without explaining

how it affected Plaintiff’s credibility. (Doc. No. 15 at 8-9). Plaintiff contends that,

even if she can perform some activity, nothing in these statements indicate that she

can perform at an eight hour job, five days a week. (Doc. No. 15 at 9). Respondent

counters that the ALJ was referring to the inconsistency in Plaintiff’s statements as a

grounds for questioning her credibility. (Doc. No. 16 at 4). 

 Plaintiff correctly notes that “[d]isability does not mean that a claimant must

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vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms of human and social activity.” Cooper

v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). The ALJ may, however, discredit a

claimant's testimony when the claimant reports participation in everyday activities

indicating capacities that are transferable to a work setting. See Morgan v. Comm'r

Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir.1999); Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. Even where

those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for

discrediting the claimant's testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a

totally debilitating impairment. See Turner, 613 F.3d at 1225; Valentine v. Comm’r

Soc Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The Social Security regulations explicitly instruct the ALJ to evaluate the

claimant’s daily activities when determining the claimant’s credibility. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(c)(3)(I); Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Furthermore, the ALJ is permitted to

use “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation” such as inconsistent prior

statements when determining credibility. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148

(9th Cir. 2001). 

Here, the ALJ drew a direct comparison between Plaintiff’s conflicting

statements to Dr. Soliman and Dr. Dao. (AR at 24). Plaintiff told Dr. Soliman that

she is able to cook, clean, shop, and run errands as well as care for her own personal

hygiene and financial responsibilities. (AR at 525). She later told Dr. Dao that she

has symptoms of chronic fatigue with joint pain, and she spends most of her day lying

down. (AR at 605). Plaintiff stated that she relies on her daughter to do some of the

chores, and relies on her mother to do her laundry. Id. While the statements are not

directly contradictory, and were made more than a year apart from each other, they

are inconsistent. It is not clear whether the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s statements

because they conflict with the limitations she described or because they are

inconsistent with each other. Either use, however, is a permissible consideration for

the ALJ in determining the Plaintiff’s credibility. Thus, the ALJ did not err in

considering these inconsistencies along with the other specified factors. 

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3. Plaintiff’s Conservative Treatment and the Effectiveness of

Medication

Plaintiff does not address the two other rationales stated by the ALJ- that

Plaintiff received only conservative treatment, and that Plaintiff’s medication was

effective in treating her symptoms. In their Motion, Defendants note that these two

rationales further support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s statements were not

credible. (Doc. No. 16 at 4-5). 

The fact that the claimant only received conservative treatment is a valid

ground for questioning claimant’s statements regarding severity of pain or symptoms. 

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the ALJ is

permitted to consider the effectiveness of medication in treating Plaintiff’s symptoms. 

Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346; Social Security Ruling 88-13. Here, the ALJ identified the

specific treatments Plaintiff received and explained that many of Plaintiff’s symptoms

had been relieved through treatment. (AR at 24). Accordingly, the ALJ was within

her discretion to question Plaintiff’s credibility regarding the severity and persistence

of her symptoms. Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1434; Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346. Both reasons

represent clear and convincing reasons for questioning Plaintiff’s credibility. 

4. Conclusion

The ALJ did not err by discrediting Plaintiff’s statements regarding the severity

and persistence of her symptoms. While any of the above-listed reasons, on their own,

may not be sufficient to support the ALJ’s conclusion, taken together they represent

clear and convincing reasons for questioning Plaintiff’s credibility and are adequately

supported by the record. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

Motion be DENIED on this ground and Defendant’s Motion be GRANTED.

B. The ALJ’s Failure to Address Lay Witness Statement

In her Motion, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed reversible error by

failing to consider testimonial evidence in the form of a questionnaire provided by

Jennifer Podwoski regarding Plaintiff’s functional ability. (Doc. No. 15 at 12). 

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Plaintiff asserts that such evidence must be considered, and although the ALJ need

not accept the evidence as true, the ALJ must provide specific reasons for discrediting

it. Id. In their Motion, Defendants acknowledge that the ALJ erred by failing to

address Ms. Podwoski’s statement, but contend that this failure was harmless error

and that the ALJ’s ultimate determination should stand. (Doc. No. 16 at 6). 

In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ generally must consider

lay witness testimony concerning a claimant's ability to work. See Dodrill v. Shalala,

12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir.1993); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(4) & (e), 416.913(d)(4) & (e). 

Indeed, “lay testimony as to a claimant's symptoms or how an impairment affects

ability to work is competent evidence ... and therefore cannot be disregarded without

comment.” See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir.1996). Consequently,

“[i]f the ALJ wishes to discount the testimony of lay witnesses, he must give reasons

that are germane to each witness.” Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. The failure of the ALJ to

either consider the lay witness testimony or to provide a germane reason for rejecting

it is error. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Such error does not automatically require that the ALJ’s decision be

overturned. Id. at 1122. In Molina, the Ninth Circuit stated

We have not, however, required the ALJ to discuss every witness's

testimony on a individualized, witness-by-witness basis. Rather, if the

ALJ gives germane reasons for rejecting testimony by one witness, the

ALJ need only point to those reasons when rejecting similar testimony

by a different witness. See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694 (holding that

because “the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting

[the claimant's] own subjective complaints, and because [the lay

witness's] testimony was similar to such complaints, it follows that the

ALJ also gave germane reasons for rejecting [the lay witness's]

testimony”). The applicable regulations are in accord; they require the

ALJ to consider testimony from family and friends submitted on behalf

of the claimant, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 404.1545(a)(3), but do

not require the ALJ to provide express reasons for rejecting testimony

from each lay witness, see id.; see also SSR 06–03p (recognizing that

“there is a distinction between what an adjudicator must consider and

what the adjudicator must explain in the disability determination or

decision”). 

674 F.3d at 1114 (citing Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 560 (8th Cir. 2011). If the

ALJ’s failure to discuss testimony favorable to the claimant was “inconsequential to

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the ultimate nondisability determination in the context of the record as a whole” then

the failure is harmless error. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1122 (internal citations omitted). In

Molina, the court concluded that even though the ALJ committed error by failing to

discuss lay testimony from the claimant’s family members, that error was harmless. 

Id. The court noted that the testimony did not describe limitations beyond what the

claimant herself described, and the ALJ had properly rejected the claimant’s

testimony. Thus, the additional testimony would not affect the disability

determination as a whole, and was no more than harmless error. Id. If, however, the

reviewing court cannot confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when crediting

the testimony, could reach a different result, then the error is not harmless. Stout v.

Comm’r. Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Defendant argues that the ALJ’s error was harmless because the

“statement merely mirrors Plaintiff’s own allegations, which the ALJ gave good

reasons for discounting.” (Doc. No. 16 at 6-7). In her opinion, the ALJ only discussed

the statements made by Plaintiff to her physicians (AR at 24, citing Exs. 19F and

31F), although the ALJ also heard Plaintiff’s testimony at her hearing. It is not clear

from those statements that the limitations described by Ms. Podwoski are the same as

those described by the Plaintiff. 

Furthermore, the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s statements regarding her

functional limitations, in part, because they were inconsistent. Thus, Ms. Podwoski’s

statements may be useful in determining which of those statements more accurately

reflect Plaintiff’s condition. As Defendant points out, the ALJ likely used these

inconsistent statements to make a credibility determination. (Doc. No. 16 at 4). The

ALJ did not discuss if Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, if accepted, would preclude her

from employment. 

 While the medical evidence on record still weighs against Plaintiff’s claims, the

Court cannot say with certainty that the additional lay witness testimony would have

no effect on the ultimate outcome. Thus, the failure to consider the evidence was not

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harmless error. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion be

DENIED as to this claim. 

While Plaintiff requests a judicial award of benefits, the Court finds that

remand for further consideration by the ALJ is the appropriate recourse. When the

ALJ has failed to consider lay witness testimony, the preferable course is to remand

for consideration of that evidence. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056-57. An immediate award

of benefits is only appropriate when: (1) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient

reasons for rejecting the evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be

resolved before a determination of disability can be made; and (3) it is clear from the

record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled upon review. 

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). As it is not clear that the ALJ

would be required to find Plaintiff disabled on review, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Plaintiff’s Motion also be DENIED and the matter be REMANDED to allow the

ALJ to consider the lay witness testimony of Ms. Podwoski. 

IV. Conclusion

As the Court finds that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to

consider lay witness testimony, it is RECOMMENDED that both Plaintiff’s Motion

and Defendant’s Motion be DENIED and the matter REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this ruling. . 

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988). 

Any party may filed written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties

by July 24, 2012. The document shall be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed by August 6,

2012. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specific time

may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 3, 2012

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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