Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06680/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06680-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EON WALDEN, et al., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

JANE MOFFETT, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-04-6680 REC/DLB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AND

FOURTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF IN

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT AND

DIRECTING PLAINTIFFS TO FILE

FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN 30 DAYS OF FILING

DATE OF ORDER

On April 3, 2006, the court heard defendants’ motion to

dismiss the Second and Fourth Claims for Relief in the Third

Amended Complaint. No appearance was made at oral argument by

plaintiffs.

Upon due consideration of the arguments of the parties and

the record herein, the court grants defendants’ motion with leave

to amend for the reasons set forth herein.

Plaintiffs, Eon Walden and Corey Victor through his guardian

ad litem Jumoke Walden, proceeding in pro per, have filed a Third

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Amended Complaint (hereinafter referred to as the TAC). The TAC

alleges in pertinent part:

3. ... Plaintiff Corey Victor is now an 11

year old student and is described by Modesto

City Schools as a ‘personable young man of

African-American male heritage who presents

quite friendly.’ Corey has an articulation

disorder, which is below what is expected for

his chronological age and development level. 

This disorder reduces intelligibility and

significantly interferes with communication

and attracts adverse attention. Corey is

classified as a Special Education student. 

Although not an ADHD or ADD student, Modesto

City Schools did determine Corey has a

‘problem attending.’ Corey has never been a

discipline problem, either inside or outside

of the home. He attended Sonoma Elementary

School from kindergarten to fourth grade. He

is a member of the Jehovah’s Witness faith.

Plaintiff Eon Walden, of African-American heritage, is alleged to

be Corey’s maternal grandmother and authorized caregiver as well

as an ordained minister in the Jehovah’s Witness religion. Named

as defendants are Jane Moffett, principal of Sonoma Elementary

School; Marie Lagos, teacher at Sonoma Elementary School; James

Enochs, Superintendent of Modesto City Schools; Jim Pfaff,

Assistant Superintendent of Modesto City Schools; and Does 1-100. 

The TAC further alleges:

9. This action arises out of the racial and

religious discrimination meted out by

defendants Jane Moffett, Marie Lagos, James

Enochs and Jim Pfaff ....

10. Plaintiffs allege that during their time

as student and parent in the Modesto City

School District, they have been the victims

of assault and battery, harassment, and other

violations of their Federally protected

rights.

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11. Plaintiffs allege Modesto City School

officials, teachers and personnel have failed

to address Plaintiffs’ victimizations and

that said failures are to Defendants’ racial

and religious bias.

12. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants’

policies of racial and religious bias have

created a disparate impact on Plaintiffs.

The Second Claim for Relief in the TAC is captioned “Violation of

Plaintiff’s Constitutional Right to Substantive Due Process” and

alleges:

15. Plaintiffs allege their Right to Due

Process was breached when Modesto City School

District officials and personnel denied

Plaintiff Victor the right to fair hearings

conducted in a competent manner.

16. Plaintiffs further allege Defendants

failed to protect Plaintiff Victor’s rights

and that such failures constitute a violation

of the Individuals With Disabilities in

Education Act and the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990.

The Fourth Claim for Relief is captioned “Violation of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964" and alleges:

22. Plaintiffs allege the Defendants have

violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 by encouraging, entrenching and

subsidizing acts and omissions on the part of

the Anglo-American Modesto City School

teachers, officials and students that

resulted in racial discrimination against the

Plaintiffs.

23. Plaintiffs contend Defendants’ flagrant

disregard for Federal law, resulted in

racially based physical and psychological

victimizations of the Plaintiffs. During one

victimization, an older Anglo-American

student assaulted Plaintiff Victor so

severely that Plaintiff Victor’s clothing was

totally destroyed during the physical attack.

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Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion to dismiss was not filed 1

until March 24, 2005. Pursuant to Rule 78-230(c), Local Rules of

Practice, plaintiffs’ opposition was due on March 20, 2006.

Although the court will consider plaintiffs’ untimely opposition,

plaintiffs are advised that their in propria persona status does

not excuse them from complying with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the Local Rules of Practice and any court orders. The

failure to timely comply with the rules setting forth the time to

file motions or oppositions to motions precludes the opposing

parties and the court from being prepared in an efficient manner to

hear matters and resolve them. The court’s docket does not permit

a party to disregard these rules. Plaintiffs’ continued failure to

so comply will result in the imposition of sanctions, which may

include the sanction of dismissal.

4

24. Although Plaintiffs demanded and

received monetary compensation from Modesto

City School officials for Plaintiff Victor’s

destroyed personal property, Plaintiffs

contend Modesto City School officials failed

to take disciplinary action against the older

Anglo-American aggressor.

25. Plaintiffs contend District sanctioned

victimization of this kind are racially based

and denote racial inferiority on the part of

African-American students, and that said

denotation results in racial discrimination

against African-American students and

parents.

26. Plaintiffs further contend this racial

denotation denied Plaintiff Victor the right

to attend school in a racially friendly

educational environment and discouraged

Plaintiff Victor from the enjoyment, service,

aid and benefit of Modesto City School

facilities and programs.

The TAC prays for actual, compensatory and punitive damages.

Defendants move to dismiss the Second and Fourth Claims for

Relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.1

Dismissal of a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if

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5

“it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In testing the

sufficiency of a claim against a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a court

must “accept all material allegations in the complaint as true

and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 

North Star Int’l v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th

Cir. 1983). The court need not, however, “accept legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” 

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9 Cir. 1994). A th

claim may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is a lack of a

cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient facts

alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990). The court must th

determine whether or not it appears to a certainty under existing

law that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that

might be proved in support of plaintiff’s claims. De Le Crux v.

Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9 Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. th

965 (1979). Also, the pleadings of pro se litigants “are held to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980).

A. Second Claim for Relief.

Defendants move to dismiss the Second Claim for Relief based

on the allegation that the failure to provide Corey “the right to

fair hearings in a competent manner” and “failed to protect

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[Corey’s] rights” in violation of the Individuals With

Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA).

Defendants argue that these allegations do not state a claim

upon which relief can be granted because plaintiffs have not pled

and cannot plead that they have exhausted the IDEA’s 

administrative remedies prior to filing this action. 

In so arguing, defendants refer the court to 20 U.S.C. §

1415(l), which provides in pertinent part:

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to

restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and

remedies available under the Constitution,

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

[42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq.] ... or other

Federal laws protecting the rights of

children with disabilities, except that

before the filing of a civil action under

such laws seeking relief that is also

available under this subchapter, the

procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of

this section shall be exhausted to the same

extent as would be required had the action

been brought under this subchapter.

Defendants also refer the court to Robb v. Bethel School

Dist. #403, 308 F.3d 1047 (9 Cir. 2002). th

In Robb, a student with cerebral palsy and her parents

brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages for

lost educational opportunities, emotional distress, humiliation,

embarrassment, and psychological injury after the student was

removed from the classroom for extended tutoring. The Ninth

Circuit held that a plaintiff who seeks only money damages is

required to exhaust administrative remedies before instituting a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 predicated on a violation of the

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IDEA. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit explained:

The IDEA provides federal money to state and

local education agencies to assist them in

educating disabled children, on the condition

that the state and local agencies implement

the substantive and procedural requirements

of the Act. The principal purpose of the Act

is ‘to ensure that all children with

disabilities have available to them a free

appropriate public education that emphasizes

special education and related services

designed to meet their unique needs ... [and]

to ensure that the rights of children with

disabilities and parents of such children and

protected.’ 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d).

To carry out these objectives, the IDEA

provides procedural safeguards to permit

parental involvement in all matters

concerning the child’s educational program

and allows parents to obtain administrative

and judicial review of decisions they deem

unsatisfactory or inappropriate ... Under

this scheme of procedural protections,

parents are entitled to (1) examination of

all relevant records pertaining to evaluation

and educational placement of their child; (2)

prior written notice whenever the responsible

educational agency proposes, or refuses, to

change the child’s placement; (3) an

opportunity to present complaints concerning

any aspect of the local agency’s provision of

a free appropriate public education; and (4)

an opportunity for an ‘impartial due process

hearing’ with respect to any such complaints

... If a party is dissatisfied with or

aggrieved by the findings and decisions made

after the impartial due process hearing, that

party may obtain additional administrative

review by the state educational agency. 20

U.S.C. § 1415(g). 

The IDEA requires a plaintiff to exhaust his

or her administrative remedies before

commencing suit if that person is ‘seeking

relief that is also available under’ the

IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Because money

damages are not ‘available under’ the IDEA

..., it might seem that a plaintiff can avoid

the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement merely by

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limiting the prayer for relief to money

damages ....

With the First, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and

Eleventh Circuits, we hold that a plaintiff

cannot avoid the IDEA’s exhaustion

requirement merely by limiting a prayer for

relief to money damages. We understand

‘available’ relief to mean relief suitable to

remedy the wrong done the plaintiff, which

may not always be relief in the precise form

the plaintiff prefers ... Our primary concern

in determining whether a plaintiff must use

the IDEA’s administrative procedures relates

to the source and nature of the alleged

injuries for which he or she seeks a remedy,

not the specific remedy requested. The

dispositive question generally is whether the

plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be

redressed to any degree by the IDEA’s

administrative procedures and remedies. If

so, exhaustion of those remedies is required. 

If not, the claim necessarily falls outside

the IDEA’s scope, and exhaustion is

unnecessary. Where the IDEA’s ability to

remedy a particular injury is unclear,

exhaustion should be required to give

educational agencies an initial opportunity

to ascertain and alleviate the alleged

problem. 

308 F.3d at 1048-1050.

Before discussing plaintiffs’ opposition that they have

exhausted administrative remedies and/or that such exhaustion

should be excused, the court notes that the gravamen of

plaintiffs’ complaint appears to be that defendants failed to

protect Corey from physical assault as opposed to failing to

provide him with educational services tailored to his specific

needs as required by the IDEA. The Ninth Circuit in Robb

specifically distinguished an earlier decision, Witte v. Clark

County School District, 197 F.3d 1171 (9 Cir. 1999). The th

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distinction is explained in Robb:

Despite the apparent benefits of the

exhaustion requirement, the Robbs argue that

controlling precedent permits them to opt out

of the IDEA simply by proclaiming that it

does not offer them anything of value. They

argue that language in our decision in Witte

v. Clark County School District ... suggests

they can avoid the IDEA’s exhaustion

requirement simply by limiting their prayer

for relief to money damages. The Robbs point

to the following language: ‘Because plaintiff

seeks only monetary damages, which is “not

relief that is available under” the IDEA, ...

exhaustion of administrative remedies is not

required. Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275-76. But

the Robbs have taken this quotation out of

context. The context makes it clear that in

Witte we did not rely merely on the fact that

the plaintiff had requested money damages. 

We stressed:

Because Plaintiff seeks only

monetary damages, which is ‘not

relief that is available under’ the

IDEA, and because all educational

issues already have been resolved

to the parties’ mutual satisfaction

through the IEP process, Plaintiff

is not ‘seeking relief that is also

available’ under the IDEA, 20

U.S.C. § 1415(l).

Id. at 1275 (emphasis added). Before filing

suit, the plaintiff in Witte already had

agreed with the defendant school district -

through informal processes available under

the IDEA or through its formal procedures -

to new educational plans and services that

would address the educational component of

his injuries. Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275-76. 

We stated, in other words, that the

‘[p]laintiff in fact ha[d] used

administrative procedures to secure the

remedies that are available under the IDEA.’ 

Id. at 1276. Moreover, the plaintiff was

seeking only retrospective damages, not

damages to be measured by the cost of

remedial services (such as those offered

under the IDEA). Id. Finally, and perhaps

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most importantly, the plaintiff’s allegations

centered around physical abuse and injuries. 

We wrote, ‘The remedies available under the

IDEA would not appear to be well suited to

addressing past physical injuries adequately;

such injuries typically are remedied through

an award of monetary damages.’ Id. In

Witte, neither the genesis nor the

manifestations of the abuse were educational. 

There was no reason to believe the

plaintiff’s injuries could be redressed to

any extent by the IDEA’s administrative

procedures and remedies. So we permitted the

plaintiff to avoid the IDEA’s exhaustion

requirement. We did not intend to chart a

course away from the holdings of our sister

circuits.

The Robbs are in a very different position

from the claimant in Witte. They have not

taken full advantage of the IDEA

administrative procedures to secure the

remedies available thereunder. They do not

claim physical injury. And they request

money damages to compensate them for

psychological and educational injuries the

IDEA may remedy. Because their injuries

could be redressed to some degree by the

IDEA’s administrative procedures and

remedies, the Robbs’ complaint must be

dismissed. We agree with our sister circuits

that where, as here, a plaintiff has alleged

injuries that could be redressed to some

degree by the IDEA’s administrative

procedures and remedies, then the courts

should require exhaustion of administrative

remedies.

308 F.3d at 1051-1054. See also Blanchard v. Morton School

District, 420 F.3d 918 (9 Cir. 2005), wherein the Ninth Circuit th

held that exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA is

not required prior to a parent bringing an action under Section

1983 for damages for emotional distress and lost wages damages 

caused to the parent:

Blanchard’s complaint sought money damages

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for emotional distress and for lost wages

caused by the District’s alleged deliberate

indifference toward her son’s IDEA claims and

the District’s alleged violations of the

IDEA. Money damages for retrospective and

non-educational injuries are not available

under the IDEA ... That alone is not

dispositive, for a plaintiff cannot avoid the

IDEA’s exhaustion requirement simply by

limiting the prayer for relief to money or

services that are not provided under the IDEA

... The dispositive question therefore is

whether Blanchard is seeking remedy for

injuries that could be redressed to any

degree by the IDEA’s administrative

procedures ....

The remedies available under the IDEA include

educational services for disabled children

... They do not provide an adequate remedy

for Blanchard.

We held in Witte that a plaintiff seeking

monetary relief for alleged past physical and

emotional abuse by school staff was not

required to exhaust administrative remedies

under the IDEA ... We emphasized that ‘all

educational issues already have been resolved

to the parties’ mutual satisfaction through

the [administrative] process.’ ... That is

true here, as well. Following Witte, we hold

that Blanchard had no remedies under the IDEA

to exhaust. Blanchard has resolved the

educational issues implicated by her son’s

disability and has obtained the educational

relief available under the IDEA on behalf of

her son. 

...

We emphasize that our holding is a narrow

one: that there is no procedural barrier to

Blanchard’s claim that the defendants’ acts

(as distinct from her child’s disability)

have caused her to incur damages for

emotional distress .... We hold only that,

because the IDEA provides no remedy for

Blanchard, she need not exhaust

administrative remedies before filing suit.

420 F.3d at 921-922.

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The court points out Robb’s distinction of Witte and

Blanchard’s reliance on Witte because it is very unclear from the

allegations of the TAC exactly what the plaintiffs are

complaining about in regards to their claim that they did not

receive due process, i.e., are plaintiffs complaining that they

did not receive due process in connection with the educational

program (IEP) provided to Corey through the IDEA or are they

complaining that their complaints that Corey was being physically

abused at his school were not accorded a fair hearing, or both? 

In their opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs contend

that:

Plaintiffs have provided sufficient factual

evidence Plaintiff Corey Victor was the

victim of repeated physical assaults and

other abuses while attending Sonoma

Elementary School. Plaintiffs assert every

Defendant as well as other Modesto City

School officials were informed these abuses

were alleged based upon Plaintiff Victors

[sic] race, religion and his inability to

properly communicate his needs due to his

disability. 

Plaintiffs further contend that “[h]arassment of students based

on disability decreases the student’s ability to benefit from

his/her education and can amount to a denial of a FAPE under

IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA.” Because plaintiffs did not

appear at oral argument, the court was unable to seek

clarification from plaintiffs. Because, as discussed infra, the

court grants plaintiffs further leave to amend the Second Claim

for Relief, plaintiffs must be as clear and concise as they

possibly can be about what they are complaining about in terms of

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hearings in which they did not receive due process. If

plaintiffs are complaining about the IEP or educational services

provided to Corey pursuant to the IDEA or the failure to provide

an IEP under the IDEA, plaintiffs must allege that they have

exhausted the specific administrative remedies required to be

exhausted pursuant to IDEA or that exhaustion of those specific

remedies is excused. If plaintiffs are complaining solely that

they did not receive due process in a hearing or hearings

addressing their claims that defendants failed to protect Corey

from physical abuse, plaintiffs must so allege. The court will

require very specific pleading because the failure to exhaust

applicable administrative remedies under the IDEA, unless

excused, see discussion infra, requires dismissal of the Second

Claim for Relief to the extent it is based on the IDEA. 

As noted, plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion to dismiss

also argues that plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative

remedies. Plaintiffs assert:

Harassment of students based on disability

decreases the student’s ability to benefit

from his/her education and can amount to a

denial of a FAPE under IDEA, Section 504 and

the ADA. Plaintiffs assert they did indeed

exhaust all administrative remedies in an

attempt at acquiring prompt and adequate

results. Had discovery begun, it would be

made clear that Plaintiffs met with Defendant

Jane Moffett many times to discuss Plaintiff

Victor’s victimizations. Discovery will also

reveal Plaintiffs called officers of the City

of Modesto Police Department to Sonoma

Elementary School several times in an attempt

at putting an end to the physical abuse,

Plaintiffs appeared before the Modesto City

School Board numerous times to voice their

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There is a California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section 2

4562, but this provision pertains to Crime Prevention and

Corrections and apparently has something to do with standards for

the temporary custody of minors in law enforcement facilities.

These provisions do not appear to have any relevance to the claims

made in this lawsuit. 

14

grievances, Plaintiffs provided the Modesto

City School Board with a written statement of

their complaints, and Plaintiffs requested a

hearing with Modesto City School officials to

voice their grievances. 

On December 19, 2003, Plaintiffs received the

District’s response to their complaints. 

Plaintiffs were appalled their weightier

claims of physical abuse and assault upon

Plaintiff Victor, and the Districts [sic]

failure to provide special education

Plaintiff Victor with a FAPE were not

addressed in the District’s response.

Dissatisfied with District findings (and

pursuant to Uniform Complaint Procedure

(UCP), California Code of Regulations, Title

5, section 4562,) [sic] Plaintiffs forwarded

several written correspondences to

Superintendent of Public Instruction, James

Enochs in an attempt at further mediation.

The Superintendent of Public Instruction

failed to respond to even one of Plaintiffs’

correspondences. Therefore, on January 2,

2004, Plaintiffs forwarded a written appeal

to the California Department of Education ...

Plaintiffs did not receive a response from

the California Department of Education until

mid June 2004, by which time Plaintiffs

concluded they were not benefiting [sic] from

the ‘administrative process’ and had already

removed themselves from the Modesto City

School District.

It is apparent that plaintiffs’ reference to California Code

of Regulations, Title 5, section 4562 is a typographical error

because there is no Title 5, Section 4562. It is clear that 2

plaintiffs intended to refer the court California Code of

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Regulations, Title 5, Section 4560, which sets forth complaint

procedures for complaints filed with the California Department of

Education.

However, as noted by defendants, plaintiffs have not alleged

in the TAC that they have exhausted administrative remedies under

the IDEA. Defendants further note that plaintiffs did not attach

a copy of any written complaint at the local level regarding

claims of denial of FAPE concerning Corey Victor or any other

matter cognizable under the IDEA and provide no copy of a

complaint filed with the Department of Education pursuant to

Title 5, California Code of Regulations, § 4650(a)(7)(B), (D), or

(E). 

Plaintiffs alternatively contend that case law has excused

exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA “where

resort to the administrative process would be either futile or

inadequate.” Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 967 F.2d

1298, 1303 (9 Cir. 1992): th

The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is not

absolute, however, for there are situations

in which exhaustion serves no useful purpose. 

Courts universally recognize that parents

need not exhaust the procedures set forth in

20 U.S.C. § 1415 where resort to the

administrative process would be either futile

or inadequate ... Excusing exhaustion in

cases of futility and inadequacy is based

both on general exhaustion principles ... and

on the legislative history of the IDEA. In

addition to these two exceptions, the

legislative history notes a third exception:

[T]here are certain situations in

which it is not appropriate to

require the use of due process and

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From the court’s research, that the administrative process is 3

time-consuming or cumbersome does not generally constitute an

excuse to avoid that process. Thus, in Stauffer by Demarco v.

William Penn School Dist., 829 F.Supp. 742, 749 (E.D.Pa. 1993), the

district court explained:

Under the second exception, futility or

inadequacy of administrative remedies, parents

are not required to exhaust the administrative

process where resort to this process would be

futile or the available administrative

remedies would be inadequate ... To satisfy

this exception, plaintiffs must produce

evidence that the School District deliberately

interfered with the procedural safeguards of

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review procedures set out in [20

U.S.C. § 1415(b) and (c)] of the

[IDEA] before filing a law suit.

These include complaints that: (1)

it would be futile to use the due

process procedures ...; (2) an

agency has adopted a policy or

pursued a practice of general

applicability that is contrary to

the law; it is improbable that

adequate relief can be obtained by

pursuing administrative remedies

(e.g., the hearing officer lacks

the authority to grant the relief

sought) ....

Here, plaintiffs argue;

[I]t is evident administrative remedies did

not provide for the prompt resolution of

Plaintiffs’ grievances. Under such dire sets

of circumstances, Plaintiffs could not have

been expected to wait indefinitely for

benefits that might be garnered from the

administrative process. 

Plaintiffs’ positions are inconsistent. At one point they

assert that they have exhausted the administrative remedies

provided under the IDEA, but then they also argue that they are

excused from exhausting those remedies because of futility.3

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IDEA, or that the administrative agency would

be unresponsive to the parents, or that the

administrative process is incapable of

granting the relief requested ... Exhaustion

of administrative remedies is not futile

simply because it may be time consuming.

See also Schlude v. Northeast Central School Dist., 892 F.Supp.

560, 566-567 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Howell v. Waterford Public Schools,

731 F.Supp. 1314, 1316 (E.D.Mich. 1990); but see Frutiger v.

Hamilton Central School Dist., 928 F.2d 69, 73 (2 Cir. 1991)( nd

stating in dictum that “if state administrative bodies persistently

fail to render expeditious decisions as to a child’s educational

placement, district courts have the power under [20 U.S.C.] §

1415(e)(2) to assume jurisdiction over the review process on the

grounds that exhaustion would be futile or inadequate”). However,

because the court is dismissing the Second Claim for Relief with

leave to amend, the court expresses no opinion at this juncture

whether exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA is

excused. 

17

Because of the lack of clarity of the allegations in the TAC

concerning whether plaintiffs’ claim or any part of it is covered

by the IDEA and because of the inconsistency of plaintiffs’

position that they have exhausted the administrative remedies

required by the IDEA or that exhaustion of those administrative

remedies is excused as futile, the court will grant defendants’

motion to dismiss the Second Claim for Relief with leave to

amend. Plaintiffs must allege with specificity whether they are

stating a claim for denial of due process in the procedures under

the IDEA, and, if so, allege with specificity whether they have

exhausted the administrative remedies applicable to such claim(s)

or allege with specificity the facts upon which they rely in

contending that they are excused from exhausting those

administrative remedies.

B. Fourth Claim for Relief.

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In the court’s Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for More

Definite Statement or To Dismiss filed on January 30, 2006, the

court ruled in pertinent part:

... The Fourth Claim alleges that it is based

on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 

Title VI is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 

Section 2000d provides:

No person in the United States

shall, on the ground of race,

color, or national origin, be

excluded from participation in, be

denied the benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under

any program or activity receiving

Federal financial assistance.

The pleading requirements for a claim under

Title VI are set forth in Fobbs v. Holy Cross

Health System Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th

Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds,

Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241

F.3d 1131 (9 Cir. 2001). th

The court will grant plaintiffs the

opportunity to amend to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted under Title VI. 

In Fobbs, the Ninth Circuit held in pertinent part:

To state a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000d, et seq., a plaintiff must allege

that (1) the entity involved is engaging in

racial discrimination; and (2) the entity

involved is receiving federal financial

assistance. 

The proper defendant in a Title VI claim is an entity, not an

individual. Jackson v. Katy Independent School Dist., 951

F.Supp. 1293, 1298 (S.D.Tex. 1996). 

Defendants move to dismiss the Fourth Claim for Relief

because the TAC does not name any entity as a defendant in this

action and because the TAC does not allege that any entity is

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receiving federal financial assistance.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion to dismiss on the ground that

defendants “failed to consolidate their pre-answer motions as

required by Rule 12(g), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 12(g) provides in pertinent part:

(g) Consolidation of Defenses in Motion. A

party who makes a motion under this rule may

join with it any other motions herein

provided for then available to the party. If

a party makes a motion under this rule but

omits therefrom any defense or objection then

available to the party which this rule

permits to be raised by motion, the party

shall not thereafter made a motion based on

the defense or objection so omitted, except

as a motion as provided in subdivision (h)(2)

hereof on any of the grounds there stated. 

Rule 12(h)(2) provides in pertinent part:

A defense of failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted ... may be made

in any pleading permitted or ordered under

Rule 7(a), or by motion for judgment on the

pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.

As explained in Wright and Miller, 5C Federal Practice and

Procedure, § 1388, p. 491:

[A] party is only required to consolidate

Rule 12 defenses and objections that are

‘then available to the party.’ A party is

not precluded from making a second motion

based on a defense that he or she did not

have reasonable notice of at the time that

party first filed a motion to dismiss or on a

defense that became available only after a

motion had been made under Rule 12. ...

The filing of an amended complaint will not

revive the right to present by motion

defenses that were available but were not

presented in timely fashion prior to the

amendment of the pleading. 

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Relying on these provisions, plaintiffs argued that

defendants “were aware from the onset Plaintiffs alleged

violations of their ‘civil rights’”. Because defendants failed

in their previous motions to raise their current objections to

the Fourth Claim for Relief, plaintiffs contend that the instant

motion to dismiss is barred “because they are based on issues

that were apparent from the face of the original Complaint.” 

The court does not agree with plaintiffs. In the court’s

Order filed on September 7, 2005, addressing defendants’ motion

to dismiss and/or for more definite statement in regards to the

First Amended Complaint, the court agreed with defendants that

the then Eighth Claim for Relief for violation of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 should be dismissed with leave to amend, the

court ruling in pertinent part:

There is a possibility, on the facts alleged,

that Plaintiffs may be able to state a

legally cognizable claim under the Civil

Rights Act. This makes dismissal with

prejudice inappropriate. However, even

applying the lenient standard for the

pleadings of per se plaintiffs, this claim is

insufficient to enable Defendants to frame a

responsive pleading ... Plaintiffs must, at a

minimum, specify the provision of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 under which their claim

arises and the corresponding facts if not

already alleged.

In their Second Amended Complaint, plaintiffs alleged as the

Fourth Claim for Relief a violation of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 and further alleged in pertinent part:

23. Plaintiffs allege the Defendants have

violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 by encouraging, entrenching and

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Furthermore, the failure to consolidate under Rule 12(g) does 4

not preclude the defendants from alleging the defense of failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted in their Answer, a

motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at trial. All Rule 12(g)

means, if it applies, is that a defendant cannot raise defense of

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subsidizing acts and omissions that have

resulted in racial discrimination against the

Plaintiffs.

24. Plaintiffs contend Defendants’ flagrant

disregard for Federal law, [sic] has resulted

in racially based discrimination of the

Plaintiffs, and that such victimization

forced Plaintiff Victor to attend school in a

hostile learning environment, thereby

creating a disparate impact on the

Plaintiffs.

Defendants then filed a motion for a more definite statement with

regard to the Fourth Claim for Relief in the Second Amended

Complaint, contending that the reference to Title VI of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 is still too broad and vague to allow

defendants to file a responsive pleading. Because plaintiffs

filed a statement of non-opposition to the motion for more

definite statement, the court granted it and set forth in the

Order granting it the pleading requirements for a claim under

Title VI. While the Second Amended Complaint did not name an

entity as a defendant, see discussion infra, defendants did not

move to dismiss or for a more definite statement with regard to

the claim at that juncture. However, because it was unopposed by

plaintiffs that defendants could not file a responsive pleading,

defendants’ failure to argue that an entity was not named as a

defendant does not preclude defendants from raising that

assertion now.4

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failure to state a claim that was available in a motion to dismiss

the Complaint in a motion to dismiss a First Amended Complaint.

Wright and Miller, supra, § 1392, p. 526. 

22

Plaintiffs further argue that the pleading requirements for

a claim under Title VI set forth in Fobbs “is misapplied in that

Holy Cross Health System Corp. is a privately owned Health Care

facility, and it was therefore unnecessary to clearly state

whether or not the defendant was a recipient of federal funds.” 

Plaintiffs contend that, “[i]n cases involving public schools and

public education it is unreasonable to assume Federal Funds are

not involved.” 

Plaintiffs cite no authority for this proposition. While it

may be a reasonable assumption to assume that a public school

receives federal funds, it nonetheless must be pleaded because it

is an element of the cause of action. If plaintiffs do not

actually know whether the school received federal funds,

plaintiffs can make the allegation under information and belief

after naming the appropriate entity as a defendant in this

action. 

Plaintiffs concede in their opposition that Modesto City

Schools is not named as a defendant in this action and request

leave to amend to add it as a defendant in order to allege the

requisite entity for their Fourth Claim for Relief. 

Although plaintiffs were specifically advised of the

pleading requirements of a claim under Title VI, because the

court is requiring plaintiffs to file a Fourth Amended Complaint

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with regard to the Second Claim for Relief, the court grants

leave to amend the Fourth Claim for Relief as well. 

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second and Fourth

Claims for Relief in the Third Amended Complaint is granted with

leave to amend.

2. Plaintiffs shall file a Fourth Amended Complaint in

accordance with this Order within 30 days of the filing date of

this Order. Failure to timely comply will result in the

dismissal of the Second and Fourth Claims for Relief.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 11, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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