Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01916/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01916-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1333 Admiralty

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PNC BANK, N.A., a National Association, 

as successor in interest to National City Bank, 

Plaintiff, No. 2:10-cv-1916-JAM-EFB PS

vs.

BELINDA L. SMITH, in personam; 

JACOB WINDING, in personam; 

B & B DREAMIN’, Hull No. GMKD283C505 

(the “Vessel”), its engines, machinery, ORDER AND

appurtenances, etc., in rem; FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants. 

 /

This case is before the undersigned pursuant to Eastern District of California Local Rule 

302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On November 7, 2012, the undersigned heard plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment. Dckt. No. 39. Attorney Sandra Tiveri appeared at the hearing

on behalf of plaintiff; defendants Jacob Winding and Belinda Smith appeared pro se.1

 As stated

on the record, and for the reasons stated on the record, the undersigned recommends that the

motion be denied.

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1

 Ms. Smith appeared telephonically.

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I. BACKGROUND/ PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 20, 2010, plaintiff filed a verified complaint in rem and in personam for

foreclosure of a vessel owned by defendant owner Belinda Smith (defendant B & B DREAMIN',

Hull No. RGMKD283C505). Dckt. No. 1. On September 10, 2010, the assigned district judge

issued an order authorizing issuance of a warrant for arrest of the vessel, Dckt. No. 11, and on

March 30, 2011, issued an order deeming the vessel arrested and appointing National Maritime

Services as substitute custodian of the vessel, Dckt. No. 19.

On November 22, 2011, defendant Smith filed an answer to the complaint, Dckt. No. 31,

and defendant Winding filed an answer and counterclaim, Dckt. No. 32. Then, on January 5,

2012, plaintiff filed an answer to Winding’s counterclaim. Dckt. No. 35.

Plaintiff filed the present motion for summary judgment on July 31, 2012 and noticed it

for hearing on September 5, 2012. Dckt. No. 39. However, both defendants requested a

continuance of the hearing, stating that they had not received a copy of the motion from plaintiff. 

Dckt. Nos. 44, 47. Therefore, on August 29, 2012, the court issued an order granting the request

for a continuance and continuing the hearing on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment to

November 7, 2012. Dckt. No. 46. The court also provided warnings to defendants about how to

oppose a summary judgment motion and ordered plaintiff’s counsel to re-serve defendants with a

copy of the summary judgment motion and to file a proof of such service. Dckt. Nos. 46, 49. 

Defendant Smith then filed an opposition to the motion on October 17, 2012, Dckt. No. 51, and

defendant Winding filed an opposition on October 18, 2012, Dckt. No. 52.

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on plaintiff's complaint against Defendants, B &

B DREAMIN', Hull No. RGMKD283C505, her engines, tackle, accessories, equipment,

furnishings and appurtenances, In Rem (collectively “the Vessel”); Belinda Smith, In Personam;

and Jacob Winding, In Personam. Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on Winding’s

counterclaim against plaintiff. Dckt. No. 39. 

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A. Plaintiff’s Version of the Facts

Plaintiff contends that this is a straight-forward collection case. According to plaintiff,

defendant Smith materially breached the terms of a written Fixed Rate Promissory Note and

Security Agreement- Multi-State Dealer (hereinafter the “Note”) that Smith executed and

delivered to National City Bank (“National City”) on or about July 12, 2005 in the principal sum

of $336,653.69 plus interest for the purchase of the Vessel. Separate Statement of Undisputed

Facts (“SSUF”) No. 1.2

 Plaintiff’s interest in the Vessel was secured by a Preferred Ship

Mortgage (hereinafter the “Mortgage”) against the Vessel which was duly recorded at the

National Vessel Documentation Center against the Vessel on August 15, 2005 as a Preferred

Mortgage. SSUF 2, 3. 

On July 11, 2005, Smith allegedly executed a second Promissory Note Secured By A

Marine Vessel Called B&B Dreamin’ (Straight Note-Interest Only) (hereinafter “Note 2”) in the

amount of $110,000.00 with defendant Winding. SSUF 4. A Preferred Ship Mortgage

(hereinafter the “Winding Mortgage”) securing Note 2 was allegedly recorded by Winding on or

about May 29, 2009. SSUF 5. 

In November 2009, plaintiff merged with National City as a result of which plaintiff

assumed all of the deposits and loans of National City and thereby plaintiff became the holder

and owner of what is now PNC Loan No. 6244x6130, including the Note and the Mortgage on

the Vessel. SSUF 6, 7.

Smith defaulted under the Note and the Mortgage by failing to make the monthly

payment due on August 10, 2008 and all payments accruing thereafter. SSUF 8. As a result,

plaintiff elected to charge off this account in April 2009 and accelerate the entire balance due

under the Note and the Mortgage. SSUF 9. There is now due and owing to plaintiff under the

Note the principal sum of $288,648.57, and accrued interest through April 30, 2009 in the

2

 All references to the Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts incorporate by reference

the exhibits and evidence cited to therein.

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amount of $31,794.65, and thereafter at the rate of 6.75% per annum. SSUF 10. On or about

May 29, 2009, plaintiff repossessed the Vessel for the purpose of re-marketing same in order to

apply the net proceeds to the balance owing under the Promissory Note and Mortgage. SSUF

11. 

B. Smith’s Version of the Facts

Smith opposes plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that summary judgment

should be denied because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute. Dckt. No. 51. 

Specifically, Smith contends that she closed out her debt with National City and that therefore

there was no active contract between her and National City. She contends that after she closed

out the account she gave up possession of the vessel to Winding because of his lien. She

contends that plaintiff “is a secondary bank that is not the actual holder of all the discrepancies

that went on with [her] account.” Id. at 2. 

Smith disputes nearly all the facts in plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts. Dckt. No.

51-1. She also submits an affidavit under penalty of perjury in which she contends that she

originally purchased a 3860 Commodore Regal Boat on July 9, 2005 and that National City was

to carry the note on the boat in the amount of $292,431.00. Dckt. No. 51-2, ¶¶ 3-5, Ex. A. 

However, instead of financing the boat, Smith paid the total sum owed on the boat. Id. ¶ 6. 

According to Smith, she returned the boat the next day on July 10, 2012 to get a larger boat

called the Regal 4260 Commodore (the “Vessel”). Id. ¶ 7. Because the amount for the boat was

greater than the amount Smith had already paid, Smith took a loan out with defendant Winding

in the amount of $110,000.00 on July 11, 2012. Id. ¶ 9, Ex. B. 

The contract with National City was rewritten to reflect the larger vessel. Id. ¶ 10. After

crediting Smith for the money she paid for the smaller boat ($292,431.00), the balance owed/due

on the Vessel was approximately $36,000 excluding finance charges. Id. ¶ 11. Smith contends

that upon receiving a payment statement from National City months later, she saw that the

amount owed was overstated and that she was erroneously not given credit for the $292,431.00

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she had already paid. Id. ¶¶ 12, 13. Smith contends that she called the dealer and National City

concerning the payment statement and that National City agreed to make the adjustments after

speaking to the dealer. Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.

Smith contends that she made payments every month for over a year, and that she paid

National City close to $80,000 while they were attempting to correct the loan amount. Id. ¶ 16. 

When Smith called National City about the loan amount, she was told that the adjustments were

being worked on. Id. ¶ 17. She called in so regularly that National City would tell her that no

payment was due on the account. Id. ¶ 18. National City began issuing Smith monthly

installment statements showing no amount was due on the account while they corrected/adjusted

the loan amount in their system, and in January 2008, National City corrected the error in their

system and the account was closed out. Id. ¶¶ 19, 20. Smith specifically avers that she has paid

in full the debt owed for the Vessel. Id. ¶ 21.

By March 2008, Smith turned over the vessel to Winding as he had an outstanding lien

on the vessel in the amount of $110,000; thereafter, Winding paid docking fees, maintenance,

insurance and all other fees required on the Vessel. Id. ¶ 22. On March 17, 2009, Smith began

to receive information concerning a past due amount for the Vessel from National City. Id. ¶ 23. 

Smith called to speak with National City as it had been approximately two years since she had

last heard from them after correcting and closing out the loan. Id. ¶ 24. National City reviewed

the entire account and again closed the account without Smith having to send any additional

money. Id. ¶ 25. 

On or about June 1, 2009, Winding called Smith to tell her that the Vessel was missing

along with all of his property and belongings. Id. ¶ 26. Smith and Winding called the Stockton

police to make a report and found out that the boat had been repossessed for nonpayment. Id. 

¶ 27. Smith has been attempting to regain possession of the Vessel ever since. Id. ¶ 31.

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C. Winding’s Version of the Facts

Winding also opposes the motion for summary judgment, arguing that there are genuine

issues of material fact in dispute. Dckt. No. 52. Winding contends that he executed a contract

on July 11, 2002 for $110,000.00 which was secured by the Vessel and that thereafter he took

possession of the Vessel. He contends that he was residing on the Vessel when it was

repossessed by plaintiff “under a false pretense of having an open and outstanding debt of the

Vessel.” Id. at 2. Winding contends that plaintiff’s removal of the vessel resulted in his personal

possessions and cargo being spoiled, stole, damaged, and destroyed. Id. Winding also contends

that there was no contract for plaintiff to collect upon. Id. at 4. 

Winding also disputes nearly all the facts in plaintiff's statement of undisputed facts, 

Dckt. No. 52-2, and submits an affidavit under penalty of perjury attesting to facts very similar

to those contained in Smith’s affidavit, Dckt. No. 52-1. Specifically, Winding avers that he is

the lien holder of the Vessel. Dckt. No. 52-1 ¶ 1, Ex. A. He contends that Smith borrowed

$110,000 from him on July 11, 2012 to purchase a boat. Id. ¶ 2, Ex. B. He adds that the ship

mortgage was an interest only note and that Smith made good on her payments. Id. ¶ 3.

Winding contends that in March 2008, Smith turned the Vessel over to him due to his

lien on the Vessel, the fact that Smith was having to hire someone to drive the Vessel each time

she wanted to take it out on the water, and the fact that the sale price for large boats had dropped

significantly and, as such, the Vessel was only worth around the value of the lien. Id. ¶¶ 4-7.

Winding contends that he used the boat as his living quarters and residence, and that he

placed insurance on the boat, paid for its docking fees, and regular maintenance. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. On

May 29, 2009, when Winding came home to the Vessel, it was gone, along with Winding’s

personal possessions. Id. ¶ 10. He called Smith and they both discovered from the Stockton

Police Department that the Vessel had been repossessed. Id. ¶ 11. 

Winding adds that Smith has paid the debt balance plaintiff is referring to in this case and

that he was in the office the day National City apologized for the mistake made to Smith’s

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account back in 2007. Id. ¶ 24. According to Winding, the only lien that should be standing on

the Vessel is the ship mortgage between Smith and Winding. Id. ¶ 25. However, Winding

contends that if the court finds otherwise, his ship mortgage was executed prior to plaintiff’s and

therefore holds a senior position to plaintiff’s lien. Id.

C. Requests for Admission

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is predicated in part, on its contention that the

facts material to the motion have been or must be deemed admitted by defendants. 

On or about February 14, 2012, plaintiff’s counsel served Smith and Winding with 

Requests for Admission. SSUF 17. Plaintiff contends that because defendants failed to timely

respond thereto, SSUF 18, the matters contained within the Requests for Admission should be

deemed admitted under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3). Dckt. No. 39 at 7-11. 

However, both Smith and Winding state under penalty of perjury that they did not receive

the Requests for Admission.3

 Dckt. No. 51 at 3, 4-5; Dckt. No. 52 at 4; Smith Decl. ¶¶ 41-43;

Winding Decl. ¶ 21. Although plaintiff argues that whether defendants received them is

irrelevant since the were properly sent, Dckt. No. 53 at 3, as an initial matter, it does not appear

that the discovery was even proper since the discovery requests were served before the parties

held a Rule 26(f) discovery conference. See Smith Decl. ¶ 46 (stating that no such conference

was ever held); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (which provides that a party may not seek discovery until a

Rule 26(f) conference has been held, except in proceedings that are exempt from the initial

disclosure requirements or when authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, stipulation,

or court order).4

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3

 Both Smith and Winding also reiterated that at the November 7, 2012 hearing.

4

 Also, at the November 7, 2012 hearing, plaintiff’s counsel stated that she was unaware

of a Rule 26(f) conference having been conducted. Therefore, the court directed the parties to

conduct such a conference.

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Regardless, even if the Requests for Admission had been properly issued and served,

defendants’ statements in their oppositions regarding the Requests for Admission may be

construed as motions for relief from those admissions pursuant to Rule 36(b), which provides

that “a matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court, on motion,

permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.” A party may be permitted to withdraw or

amend an admission if the court finds: (1) withdrawal will aid in presenting the merits of the

case; and (2) no substantial prejudice to the party who requested the admission will result from

allowing the admission to be withdrawn or amended. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); see Conlon v. United

States, 474 F.3d 616, 625 (9th Cir. 2007) (court must consider both factors in deciding motion to

withdraw or amend). Here, assuming that the requests are deemed admitted, defendants should

nonetheless be permitted to withdraw those admissions because withdrawal will aid in presenting

the merits of the case and because plaintiff will not be substantially prejudiced by allowing the

admissions to be withdrawn. Therefore, as stated at the hearing, plaintiff cannot rely on any

deemed admissions for purpose of its summary judgment motion.5

D. Analysis

Apart from the request for admissions issue, plaintiff contends that it is entitled to

summary judgment on its foreclosure claim based on the evidence submitted with the motion. 

Specifically, plaintiff seeks an order providing that (1) plaintiff has a first priority security

interest in the Vessel; (2) defendant Smith is in default of her obligations to plaintiff; (3) plaintiff

is entitled to possession of the Vessel; (4) plaintiff is entitled to a deficiency judgment against

Smith pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 31325(b)(2)(A); and (5) plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against

Smith for attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff also seeks summary judgment on defendant

5

 At the November 7, 2012 hearing, the court directed defendants to respond to the

Requests for Admission within thirty days. It appears that defendants have now done so, as they

lodged copies of their responses to the Requests for Admission, as well as copies of their

responses to plaintiff’s Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, and proofs of

service of those responses on plaintiff’s counsel. 

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Winding’s counterclaims for declaratory relief, conversion, and/or negligence. Specifically,

plaintiff seeks an order providing that (1) defendant Winding’s interest in the Vessel is

subordinate to that of plaintiff; (2) plaintiff is not liable to Winding for conversion; (3) plaintiff

is not liable to Winding for tort; and (4) plaintiff is not liable to Winding for attorney’s fees or

court costs. 

A preferred mortgage is a lien on the mortgaged vessel in the amount of the outstanding

mortgage indebtedness secured by the vessel. 46 U.S.C. § 31325(a). On default of any term of a

preferred ship mortgage, the mortgagee may enforce the preferred mortgage lien in a civil action

in rem for a documented vessel, a vessel to be documented, a vessel titled in a state, or a foreign

vessel. Id. § 31325(b)(1) (“On default of any term of the preferred mortgage, the mortgagee

may– (1) enforce the preferred mortgage lien in a civil action in rem for a documented vessel, a

vessel to be documented under chapter 121 of this title, a vessel titled in a State, or a foreign

vessel”); see also Capital Bank PLC v. M/Y Birgitta, 2010 WL 2902740 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (A

borrower’s failure to pay any of the monthly installments on a marine loan after the bank’s arrest

of the borrower’s foreign vessel for insufficient insurance constituted a default and thus made the

entire unpaid principal due and owing under the marine loan and marine mortgage.); Bogle v.

M/Y Cajun Princess, 2010 WL 1949550 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (A lien holder was entitled to summary

judgment where there were no fact issues as to whether the preferred mortgage lien was valid;

the current outstanding mortgage indebtedness secured by the vessel for principal and interest

was $7,110,525.80, and the vessel owner conceded they were in default for nonpayment.).

The mortgagee may also enforce a claim for the outstanding indebtedness secured by the

mortgaged vessel in a civil action in personam in admiralty against the mortgagor, maker,

comaker, or guarantor for the amount of the outstanding indebtedness or any deficiency in full

payment of that indebtedness and a civil action against the mortgagor, maker, comaker, or

guarantor for the amount of the outstanding indebtedness or any deficiency in full payment of

that indebtedness. 46 U.S.C. § 31325(b)(2). Such an action may be brought following a

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foreclosure sale which produces insufficient proceeds to satisfy an outstanding preferred

mortgage. Wilmington Trust Co. v. M/V Miss B. Haven V, 760 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

The district courts have original jurisdiction of a civil action brought under § 31325(b)(1) or (2). 

Id. § 31325(c). 

Here, although plaintiff has submitted significant evidence in support of its motion for

summary judgment, given the factual disputes created by defendants’ affidavits, which are

signed under penalty of perjury, summary judgment must be denied.6

 Specifically, defendants’

affidavits create genuine issues of material fact as to whether Smith owed National City anything

at all – and therefore there are disputes as to whether plaintiff has or had any proper interest in

the Vessel or any right to repossess the Vessel. The court cannot find that plaintiff is entitled to

summary judgment given genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether plaintiff has a first

priority security interest in the Vessel; (2) the amounts Smith actually paid on the account and

whether she was properly credited for the vessel she allegedly returned the next day to exchange

for the defendant Vessel, and whether Smith is, in fact, in default of her obligations to plaintiff;

(3) whether plaintiff is entitled to possession of the Vessel; (4) whether plaintiff is entitled to a

deficiency judgment against Smith under § 31325(b)(2)(A); (5) whether plaintiff is entitled to a

judgment against Smith for attorney's fees and costs; (6) whether Winding’s interest in the

6

 Plaintiff makes numerous evidentiary objections to defendants’ affidavits. Specifically,

plaintiff objects to paragraphs 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 45, and 47 of

Smith’s affidavit, arguing that those paragraphs lack foundation, lack proper authentication,

constitute inadmissible hearsay, are impermissibly self-serving, and violate the Best Evidence

Rule. Dckt. No. 53-1. Plaintiff also objects to paragraphs 1, 2, 15, 19, 24, 25, 27, and 27 of

Winding's affidavit on similar grounds. Dckt. No. 54-2. However, because plaintiff has

provided insufficient support or explanation for those conclusory objections, they are overruled. 

First, defendants’ affidavits are claimed to be based on their own percipient knowledge about

facts that they personally experienced; therefore, the foundation and authentication objections

lack merit. Additionally, to the extent plaintiff is objecting to Smith’s references to statements

from National City Bank employees regarding Smith’s account/mortgage, those statements are

non-hearsay statements by plaintiff’s employees under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). At

the very least, the statements would fall under the statement against interest hearsay exception

(Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)) since Smith presumably will be unable to procure

testimony from National City employees given that the company is no longer in existence.

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Vessel is subordinate to that of plaintiff; (7) whether plaintiff is liable to Winding for

conversion; (8) whether plaintiff is liable to Winding for other torts; and (9) whether plaintiff is

liable to Winding for attorney’s fees or court costs. Although plaintiff dismisses the statements

made in the defendants affidavits as mere “allegations,” they are factual assertions made in

written declarations verified under penalty of perjury and constitute evidence sufficient to

establish genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment on each of the claims

at issue. Whether a trier of fact will credit the individual defendants’ version of the facts, or that

of plaintiff will be determined at trial.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment, Dckt. No. 39, be denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

1. A status (pretrial scheduling) conference is set for March 6, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. in

Courtroom No. 8 before the undersigned.

2. Not later than fourteen (14) days prior to the status conference, the parties shall file

status reports7

 briefly describing the case and addressing the following:

a. Progress in service of process;

b. Possible joinder of additional parties;

c. Expected or desired amendment of pleadings;

d. Jurisdiction and venue;

e. Anticipated motions and their scheduling;

f. The report required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 outlining the

proposed discovery plan and its scheduling, including disclosure of expert witnesses;

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 The parties are encouraged, when possible, to file a joint status report.

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g. Cut-off dates for discovery and law and motion, and dates for pretrial

conference and trial;

h. Special procedures, if any;

I. Estimated trial time;

j. Modifications of standard pretrial procedures due to the simplicity or

complexity of the proceedings;

k. Whether the case is related to any other cases, including bankruptcy;

l. Whether a settlement conference should be scheduled;

m. Whether counsel will stipulate to the magistrate judge assigned to this matter

acting as settlement judge and waiving disqualification by virtue of his so acting, or whether they

prefer to have a settlement conference conducted before another judge;

n. Any other matters that may add to the just and expeditious disposition of this

matter.

DATED: January 14, 2013.

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