Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05016/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rickey Mora,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-05016-PHX-DLR (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Petitioner Rickey Mora has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.)

I. Summary of Conclusion.

Petitioner was sentenced to 22.5 years imprisonment and lifetime probation on 

January 5, 2001 following a guilty plea. Petitioner filed an initial notice for post-conviction 

relief; however, he did not timely follow through with a petition, and that proceeding was 

dismissed. Seventeen years later, Petitioner filed a successive PCR petition, which was 

dismissed as untimely without excuse. The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal. 

Subsequently, Petitioner filed a habeas petition with this court. The Petition is untimely as 

it was filed well past the one-year statute of limitations provided under the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Therefore, the Court will recommend 

the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

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II. Background.

a. Facts and Trial Procedural History. 

On November 30, 2000, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of child molestation 

and one count of attempted sexual conduct with a minor. (Doc. 11-1, Ex. E.) On January 

5, 2001, the court sentenced Petitioner to 22.5 years of imprisonment for the crime of child 

molestation, to be served consecutively to a sentence he was serving in the California 

Department of Corrections, and lifetime probation for the crime of attempted sexual 

conduct with a minor. (Doc. 11-1, Ex. G.) 

b. Petitioner’s First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On March 30, 2001, Petitioner signed a notice of post-conviction relief (PCR), 

which was filed with the Superior Court of Maricopa County on April 11, 2001. (Doc. 11-

1, Ex. H.) Counsel was appointed (doc. 11-1, Ex. I), and after reviewing the case, found no 

colorable claims for relief. (Doc. 11-1, Ex. J.) On August 29, 2001, the Superior Court 

granted Petitioner until October 11, 2001 to file a pro per PCR petition. (Doc. 11-1, Ex. K.)

On October 26, 2001, having received no filing from Petitioner, the Superior Court 

dismissed the proceeding. (Doc. 11-1, Ex. L.) Petitioner did not appeal.

c. Petitioner’s Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding.

On December 28, 2018, Petitioner completed a second PCR notice, which was filed 

with the Superior Court on January 2, 2019. (Doc. 11-1, Ex. M.) On January 28, 2019, the 

Superior Court dismissed Petitioner’s notice as untimely “by more than 17 years” without 

excuse. (Doc. 11-1, Ex. N.) On February 6, 2019, Petitioner completed a petition for review 

with the Arizona Court of Appeals, which was filed on February 14, 2019. (Doc. 11-1, Ex. 

O.) On August 6, 2019, the Court of Appeals granted review and denied relief, holding the 

Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the PCR petition. (Doc. 11-1, Ex. P.)

The Court of Appeals issued the mandate on September 17, 2019. (Doc. 11-1, Ex. Q.)

d. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition.

On August 19, 2019, Petitioner executed the instant petition, which was filed on 

August 22, 2019. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner alleges his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 

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violated because, during “post-indictment and pre-trial lineup of a criminal proceeding,”

his defense counsel “did not guard against suggestive procedures given by the 

prosecution.” (Id. at 5.) Petitioner is not seeking a reversal of his conviction, rather, he is 

seeking a reduction in his prison sentence and a modification from lifetime probation to 

standard probation. (Id. at 16.) In his discussion regarding the timeliness of his petition, 

Petitioner alleges he “only recently discovered” that he had the “opportunity” to present 

his legal issues to this court under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. (Id. at 14.)

After requesting an extension of time, Respondents filed their limited response on 

January 10, 2020. (Doc. 11.) On February 14, 2020, Petitioner filed his reply. (Doc. 12.)

III. The Petition.

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § § 2241 (c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations concerning Petitions for Habeas Corpus. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), (d)(2).

a. Statutory Tolling.

AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction review 

is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed. See Isley v. Arizona Dep’t of 

Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (“A 

proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the court 

in which the conviction occurred.”).

Here, Petitioner’s first post-conviction relief proceedings ended when the Superior 

Court dismissed the proceeding on October 26, 2001. Petitioner had 90 days to seek further 

review, but he did not. Therefore, Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was final on 

January 24, 2002. The period of direct review includes the 90-day period following entry 

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of judgment “within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the 

United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.” 

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Petitioner’s one-year limitation 

period to file a timely Petition ended on January 25, 2003, absent equitable tolling. 

Petitioner’s subsequent but untimely PCR petition did not entitle Petitioner to 

statutory tolling. A state petition that is not filed within the state’s required time limit is not 

“properly filed,” and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a post-conviction petition is untimely 

under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”); Allen v. 

Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 6 (2007) (finding that inmate’s untimely state post-conviction petition 

was not “properly filed” under the AEDPA’s tolling provision). Petitioner’s untimely PCR 

proceeding did not restart his deadline when AEDPA’s statute of limitations had already

run. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding “that section 

2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the 

state petition was filed.”).

b. Equitable Tolling.

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he has not shown extraordinary 

circumstances. “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year filing 

deadline must show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing 

on time, and (2) he has diligently pursued his rights.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 

(2010); Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2015). Petitioner bears the burden of 

showing that equitable tolling should apply. Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external forces, 

rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely habeas 

action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling is to be 

rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 

(9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were the cause 

of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a 

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petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the 

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citation omitted).

Here, the Petition was due by January 25, 2003, but was not executed until August 

19, 2019, over sixteen years later. In the Petition, Petitioner argues that his defense counsel 

was ineffective during a “post-indictment and pre-trial lineup.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) The facts of 

Petitioner’s claim were known to him at the time of his sentencing on January 5, 2001. 

Petitioner’s argument that he only “recently discovered” (id. at 13) his constitutional right 

to apply for habeas relief does not entitle him to equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. 

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal 

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable 

tolling.”); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011 (“To apply the doctrine in ‘extraordinary 

circumstances’ necessarily suggests the doctrine’s rarity, and the requirement that 

extraordinary circumstances ‘stood in his way’ suggests that an external force must cause 

the untimeliness, rather than, as we have said, merely ‘oversight, miscalculation or 

negligence on [the petitioner's] part, all of which would preclude the application of 

equitable tolling.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Petitioner is not entitled to 

equitable tolling.

IV. Conclusion.

Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claim is untimely. 

Petitioner’s claim was not statutorily tolled, and Petitioner fails to make any showing of 

extraordinary circumstances necessary for equitable tolling. The Court will therefore 

recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. 1) be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling

debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 8th day of April, 2020.

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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