Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05211/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05211-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 1995 Decided January 9, 1996

No. 94-5211

CHESTER KOWALCZYK,

APPELLANT

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cv00522)

Chester Kowalczyk, appearing pro se, filed the brief for appellant.

Dwayne Rawlings, student counsel, argued the cause for appellant, with whom Steven H. Goldblatt,

appointed by the court, Ellen R. Finn, Attorney, and Genevieve Augustin and Michael J. McElroy,

student counsel, were on the brief for amicus curiae in support of appellant.

Daniel F. Van Horn, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellees, with whom

Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States

Attorney, were on the brief. John D. Bates, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Chester Kowalczyk brought this action in the district court for

the District of Columbia seeking an order compelling the Federal Bureau of Investigation to comply

with his request for records under the Freedom of Information Act. The court entered summary

judgment in the Bureau's favor. Kowalczyk appeals from that judgment, claiming that his FOIA

request obligated the Bureau to search for responsive documents not only in the files at its

headquarters, to which he sent the request, but also in the files at its New York field office, to which

he made no reference in the request. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that Kowalczyk's

request did not obligate the Bureau to search its New York field office, and we affirm the judgment

of the district court.

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I. Background

Chester Kowalczyk was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of New York oftampering withmotor vehicle identification numbers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 511,

and attempting to evade federal income tax, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206. On July 31,

1991 he sent to the headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C. a

request under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, for "all records in agency files,

including but not limited to the Federal case number 88 CR 701 and counsel for the defense Louis

E. Diamond and Louis Rosenthal Esq." This request informed the FBI that Kowalczyk was "an

incarcerated federal prisoner ... engaging in post-conviction litigation." Five months later, having

heard nothing from the FBI, Kowalczyk sent a letter "appealing" the agency's apparent

denial-by-silence of his request, which he described as a request for "all Agency records pertaining

to ... Criminal Case Number 88 CR 701, in the Eastern District of New York."

When the FBI then notified Kowalczyk that its FOIA backlog would delay processing of his

request for "many months," Kowalczyk brought this suit in the district court for the District of

Columbia to compel the Bureau to produce the documents promptly. It was at a status conference

in May 1994after the Bureau had moved for summary judgmentthat Kowalczyk says he first

realized that the agency had searched for documents responsive to his FOIA request at its

Washington headquarters only. Kowalczyk argued that the Bureau was obligated to search also at

its New York field office. The district court disagreed and entered summary judgment for the FBI.

II. Analysis

We can affirm the summary judgment for the FBI only if the agency has shown that the

evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Kowalczyk, raises no genuine issue of material

fact. Steinberg v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Materiality is, of course,

a function ofthe applicable legalstandard, which in this case isthat "an agency responding to a FOIA

request must conduct a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents, and, if

challenged, must demonstrate beyond material doubt that the search was reasonable." Truitt v.

Department of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also McGehee v. C.I.A., 697 F.2d

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1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("the burden of persuasion on this matter is properly imposed on the

agency"). Thus, the issue here is not whether there might be any further documents. Truitt, 897 F.2d

at 542.

In considering an agency's motion for summary judgment in a FOIA case, the court may rely

upon affidavits of agency officials "describing [the agency's] search procedures and explaining why

a more thorough investigation would have been unduly burdensome." McGehee, 697 F.2d at 1102.

"If [ ] the record leaves substantial doubt as to the sufficiency of the search, summary judgment for

the agency is not proper." Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542.

Under the FOIA, an agency is obliged to make "promptly available" records that are

"reasonably describe[d]" in a written request therefor and are not exempt from disclosure. 5 U.S.C.

§§ 552(a)(3)(A), 552(b). A request reasonably describes records if "the agency is able to determine

precisely what records are being requested." Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 678 F.2d

315, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Bureau says Kowalczyk's request did not alert its FOIA compliance

staffthat Kowalczyk wanted recordsthat might be in the agency's New York field office. Kowalczyk

says the staff should have realized that.

In resolving this dispute, we begin by setting aside Kowalczyk's letter of appeal. The FBI

searched for records responsive to Kowalczyk's initial request on August 22, 1991within three

weeks of receiving it and about four months before Kowalczyk sent his second letter. A reasonable

effort to satisfy that request does not entail an obligation to search anew based upon a subsequent

clarification. The FBI generally handles requests in the order in which it receives them. Requiring

an additional search each time the agency receives a letter that clarifies a prior request could extend

indefinitely the delay in processing new requests. Cf. Biberman v. F.B.I., 528 F. Supp. 1140, 1143

(S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("It would be untenable to hold that, as the [FOIA] litigation proceeds, a plaintiff,

by continually adding new requests ... could command a priority based on the date of the initial

requests").

Focusing upon Kowalczyk's original FOIA request, we see that he made no reference to the

New York field office or, indeed, to New York. According to the amicus curiae, however, "the

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documents maintained by headquarters ... made it abundantly clear that the investigation which led

to Mr. Kowalczyk's prosecution had originated in the FBI's New York field office." This assertion

is unsupported by any citation to a specific document. Moreover, the amicus concedes that "virtually

none of the documents identified or processed by the FBI related to the issues underlying

Kowalczyk's indictment and conviction. All but one ... related only to the FBI's forfeiture

proceedings against automobiles purchased from Mr. Kowalczyk by third parties."

Despite Kowalczyk's failure to give the court any guidance, we have reviewed all the

documents that the FBI submitted to the district court along with the affidavits describing the search

it made. The Bureau located these documents by running Chester Kowalczyk's name through a

file-subject index of individuals and organizations. The documents do indicate that Kowalczyk was

indicted in the Eastern District of New York and that the Bureau's New York field office had records

of his activitiesinvolving vehicle identification numbers and stolen cars. We have found no document

bearing the case number "88 CR 701," however, and Kowalczyk's FOIA request states nothing about

the nature of the chargesin that case. Indeed, it does not even state that Kowalczyk was a defendant

in that case.

The information in Kowalczyk's request, therefore, did not enable the FBI to determine that

the New York field office had responsive records. The Bureau might, at best, have speculated about

the connection between "Federal case number 88 CR 701," to which Kowalczyk referred, and

Kowalczyk'sindictment in the Eastern District of New York, to which the records coming to Bureau

headquarters from the New York field office referred.

The Bureau's duty, however, is only to "conduct a search reasonably calculated to uncover

all relevant documents." Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542. The agency is not required to speculate about

potential leads. More specifically, the Bureau is not obliged to look beyond the four corners of the

request for leadsto the location of responsive documents. Of course, if the requester discovers leads

in the documents he receives from the agency, he may pursue those leads through a second FOIA

request.

This is not to say that the agency may ignore what it cannot help but know, but we suspect

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that it will be the rare case indeed in which an agency record contains a lead so apparent that the

Bureau cannot in good faith fail to pursue it. If the agency may reasonably interpret the request to

be for records in a specific office or offices onlythe office to which the request was sent or any

office(s) named in the requestthen upon discovering that it has other responsive records elsewhere,

it may reasonably infer that the requester already has those records, is seeking them through a

separate request, or, for whatever reason, does not want them. If, on the other hand, the requester

clearly states that he wants all agency records on a subject, i.e., regardless of their location, but fails

to direct the agency's attention to any particular office other than the one receiving the request, then

the agency need pursue only a lead it cannot in good faith ignore, i.e., a lead that is both clear and

certain.

In any event, Kowalczyk's is not one of those rare cases. His FOIA request contains so little

information that, in order to incur any obligation to search the New York field office, the Bureau

would have had to find a document at headquarters specifically indicating that documents related to

a case bearing the number 88 CR 701 were located in its New York office. Kowalczyk brings no

such document to our attention, nor have we found one among the documents that the FBI located

in Washington.

III. Conclusion

Kowalczyk does not challenge the FBI's response to his FOIA request in any respect other

than the Bureau's failure to search its New York office. For the reasons set out above, we conclude

that the agency reasonably limited its search to files located at its headquarters, which is where

Kowalczyk sent his request. The summary judgment rendered by the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.

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