Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00919/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00919-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABE WILLIAMS, 

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-0919 LKK GGH P

vs.

M.L. KNOWLES, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 1987 petitioner was convicted of second degree murder

and sentenced to fifteen years to life with three one year consecutive sentences.

This action is proceeding on the third amended petition filed May 9, 2005, which

challenges the 1999 decision by the California Board of Prison Terms (BPT) finding petitioner

unsuitable for parole. The third amended petition raises the following three claims: 1) violation

of Cal. Penal Code § 190; 2) violation of Cal. Penal Code § 3041; and 3) imposition of an illegal

no-parole policy.

On May 9, 2005, petitioner also filed a motion to file a separate habeas petition in

this action raising the grounds raised in case no. S107538 filed in the California Supreme Court,

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which also appeared to challenge the 1999 suitability hearing. On November 7, 2005, the court

granted this request. On December 30, 2005, petitioner filed a supplemental petition. On

January 31, 2006, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the supplemental petition on grounds that

the claims raised in it are barred by the statute of limitations, not exhausted and procedurally

barred.

After carefully reviewing the record, the court recommends that the claims raised

in the third amended petition be denied. The court also recommends that respondent’s motion to

dismiss the supplemental petition be denied, but that the claims raised in the supplemental

petition be denied on the merits. 

II. Third Amended Petition

A. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle,

138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The AEDPA “worked

substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential standards of

review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication of a criminal

defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

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“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 9, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

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court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

On July 24, 2001, the Superior Court of Monterey County issued a reasoned

opinion addressing the merits of petitioner’s claims. Respondent’s Exhibit 2. The California

Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court denied petitioner’s habeas petitions raising these

claims without comment or citation. Respondent’s Exhibits 3, 4. Accordingly, the court

considers whether the denial of these claims by the Monterey Superior Court was an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. Shackleford v.

Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9 Cir. 2000) (in reviewing a state court’s summary denial th

of a habeas petition, this court must “look through” the summary disposition to the last reasoned

decision).

B. Analysis

Violation of Cal. Penal Code § 190

In claim one, petitioner alleges that the BPT improperly denied him credits to

which he was entitled pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 190. In 1978, California Penal Code § 190

was amended, in relevant part, to provide that inmates sentenced to 15 years to life for second

degree murder were eligible to earn conduct credits toward their sentences. In re Oluwa, 207

Cal. App.3d 439, 442, 255 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1989). In the third amended petition, petitioner argued

that had the BPT properly awarded these credits, he should have been released no later than his

“maximum eligible parole date” of April 18, 2001. Third Amended Petition, p. 3. By maximum

eligible parole date, petitioner is apparently referring to his three year determinate sentence

combined with the fifteen year sentence (minus the life term) for his murder conviction without

application of any credit reduction. 

In his traverse, petitioner expands on this claim:

Therefore, petitioner contends he has liberty interest credits and parole, derived

from the following statutes: PC §§ 190, 2931, 2932(e) and most particularly 3000.

These statutes, jointly and separately, limit the paroling discretion of the Board as

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 As discussed, infra, petitioner’s supplemental petition raises the same claim but 1

includes briefing expanding on petitioner’s legal theory regarding why the interpretation of § 190

by the state courts is incorrect. 

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it pertains to PC § 190 prisoners and their initial parole release dates. As noted,

these code sections limits the Board to paroling § 190 prisoners between their

MEPD and their Max-MEPD at the expiration of their minimum terms. Once the

Board fails to release by the expiration of the minimum-term, the Board loses

jurisdiction over releasing on the “initial” parole and only the courts or CDC has

the authority to release the prisoner. However, the Board does not lose

jurisdiction over the § 190 prisoner, and once the prisoner is released by the courts

or CDC, the Board maintains all its powers pursuant to PC § 3040 et seq.

Traverse, p. 16: 1-14. 

Respondent first argues that this claim should be denied because petitioner has no

liberty interest in parole. This argument, as applied to California prisoners, is foreclosed by

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, (9 Cir. 2002) and Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9 Cir. th th

2003). 

Respondent next argues that petitioner’s claim alleging a violation of § 190

alleges a violation of state law only. The court finds that petitioner is challenging the

interpretation and application of state law as it applies to his sentence. By finding that the state

courts have ruled on petitioner’s claims concerning the interpretation and application of state

sentencing law, it necessarily follows that the alleged improper application of state law is not

subject to review by federal court. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 2102 (1990). 

Petitioner is, in essence, urging a new interpretation of state law. This court must

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defer to a state court’s interpretation of its own laws unless that interpretation is untenable or

amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional violation. Oxborrow v.

Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9 Cir. 1989). While petitioner urges his own interpretation of th

state law, this court finds that the interpretation of the at-issue state law by the California courts

is neither untenable nor a subterfuge to avoid federal review. Accordingly, this claim should be

denied on this ground. 

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The court makes the following observations about petitioner’s claim. First,

petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to life. His maximum term is life in prison and he has

not been kept in beyond the end of that term. Petitioner has apparently confused the minimum

term necessary to be served before parole could be implemented at its earliest, the minimum

eligible parole date (MEPD) with a determinate sentence of fifteen years. Indeed, the BPT is not

required to find petitioner even eligible for a parole setting within fifteen years. Petitioner could

spend the rest of his life in prison without ever becoming eligible for parole.

Second, the court notes that under California law, petitioner is no longer entitled

to earn credits toward his release date. In In re Dayan, 231 Cal. App. 3d 184, 282 Cal. Rptr. 269

(1991), the petitioner, serving a sentence of fifteen years to life for second degree murder, alleged

that he was entitled to application of good behavior credits toward his statutory minimum term of

fifteen years and toward his actual term set by the Board of Prison Terms (BPT). The California

Court of Appeal found that Cal. Penal Code § 190(a) mandates application of good behavior

credits by the CDC against the minimum term for second degree murder (fifteen years) imposed

by statute for purposes of establishing the MEPD. Id. at 188, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 271. However,

nothing in the statute requires the BPT to reapply the same credits to the actual term it sets. Id.,

282 Cal. Rptr. at 271. Thus, theoretically, if a prisoner were determined to be parole eligible at

the earliest possible time, credits might be of some use in actually reducing the absolute

minimum time to be served before release on parole. See People v. Rowland, 134 Cal. App.3d 1,

13-14, 184 Cal. Rptr. 346, 352 (1982). However, if a prisoner’s incarceration time passes his

MEPD, and he has yet to be found eligible for parole, computation of time credits is meaningless

– he will be released if and when found eligible, and then only after a computation of a release

date under BPT matrices.

In the instant case, petitioner has already passed his MEPD without any finding of

parole eligibility. Amended Petition, Exhibit G; Respondent’s Exhibit 1, p. 1. Pursuant to

Dayan, petitioner is no longer entitled to any credit reduction. To the extent petitioner is

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claiming that the BPT (or CDC) has failed to award him credits, this claim is without merit.

The denial of this claim by the Monterey Superior Court was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, this claim should be

denied.

Violation of Cal. Penal Code § 3041

Petitioner argues that Cal. Penal Code § 3041 requires the BPT to give him a

parole date. Section 3041 provides that one year prior to the inmate’s minimum eligible parole

release date a panel consisting of at least two commissioners of the BPT shall meet with the

inmate and shall normally set a parole release date. Petitioner appears to argue that because §

3041 provides that the BPT shall normally set parole release dates, the BPT violated due process

by failing to set his parole release date. 

California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole. Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003). “In the parole context, the

requirements of due process are met if ‘some evidence’ supports the decision.” Id. If there is not

some evidence to support a decision denying parole, due process is violated. Therefore, even

though California law states that the BPT shall normally set parole release dates, due process

does not require the BPT to state a date where some evidence exists demonstrating that petitioner

should not be paroled. As will be discussed infra, some evidence existed to support the 1999

decision finding petitioner unsuitable for parole. Accordingly, petitioner’s claim that the BPT

was required to set his parole release date pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 3041 is without merit.

Because the denial of this claim by the Monterey Superior Court was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority, this claim should be

denied.

No-Parole Policy

Petitioner argues that he has been denied parole pursuant to a no-parole policy. In

support of this claim, petitioner cites Coleman v. Board of Prison Terms, CIV S-96-0783 LKK

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PAN P. In Coleman, the Honorable Lawrence K. Karlton found that under Governors Wilson

and Davis, the BPT disregarded regulations ensuring fair suitability hearings and instead operated

under a sub rosa policy that all murderers be found unsuitable for parole. See December 22,

2004, findings and recommendations, adopted by the district court on December 2, 2005.

Petitioner’s assertion of a “no parole” policy in 1999 raises profoundly complex

issues in light of the Findings and Recommendations/Order of Adoption/Judgment in Coleman v.

Board of Prison Terms, CIV-S-96-0783 LKK PAN P, appeal pending. In Coleman, the court

found that a no parole policy was in effect for California “lifers” in 1999 which infected

Coleman’s BPT proceeding in 1999. Coleman rejected the BPT’s “so what” assertion that the

presence of some evidence would ameliorate the policy because Coleman properly found a

biased decision maker to be structural error not susceptible to a harmless error standard. The

remedy in Coleman required that petitioner be given a new hearing before an unbiased panel of

BPT commissioners. 

Complex issues abound insofar as Coleman is urged by petitioner as applicable to

his 1999 BPT hearing. Some of those issues are as follows: (1) was the holding in Coleman

applicable to all BPT panels or just the panel at issue in Coleman; (2) how does one reconcile

state court holdings contrary to Coleman ,which are also entitled to res judicata/collateral

estoppel effect in federal court; (3) did petitioner waive his objection to a no parole policy

occasioned by biased BPT panel members when he expressly “temporarily” waived his bias

objection when proceeding before the panel; (4) what is the effect of Coleman in this case where

the BPT commissioners expressly disavowed that any “no parole” policy would motivate their

decision. There may be other issues upon further reflection. However, in this case the

complexity of the trees (issues) admit to a rather easy decision in respect to the forest – which has

the effect of mooting the “no parole” policy issue. The solution hinges upon the appropriate

remedy even if the petition were to be granted in this case on the “no parole” policy.

\\\\\

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In Coleman, the appropriate remedy given was an order that Coleman receive a

hearing before unbiased commissioners. As Judge Karlton noted in a follow-up order in

Coleman when denying petitioner’s request for immediate release, the fact that Coleman had a

hearing in 2005 more or less obviated the structural error found for the 1999 hearing. That is,

Judge Karlton found that no evidence had been presented to suggest that the 2005 BPT panel was

affected by a no parole policy. In late 2004, a new Governor had been elected in the latter part of

2004 for whom the record was silent with respect to an enunciated “no parole” policy. Petitioner

had received, in effect, the remedy ordered by the initial decision – a hearing from a panel

unaffected by the found “no parole” policy – or at least there was no evidence to suggest that the

2005 panel was biased.

In this case, as far as the record demonstrates, petitioner had parole eligibility

hearings in 2002, 2003, and 2004. It is highly likely that petitioner has had another eligibility

hearing by 2006, or he will very shortly have one. There is no indication that any 2006 panel

would be affected by a historical “no parole” policy assertedly instituted by two previous

governors. Thus, the only remedy to be ordered here based on a “no parole” policy in 1999 is for

petitioner to have another parole eligibility hearing in 2006 or 2007 (whenever this case reached

finality). In all likelihood, the regularly recurring BPT hearing would take place (if it has not

taken place already) prior to the time this case reached any finality. The “no parole” policy issue

would certainly be moot by that time, if it is not moot already.

Petitioner does not desire another hearing; he wants the court to simply order a

parole date on account of the “no parole” policy. Petitioner discounts the ability of the BPT, or

presumably the court as well, to ever find that “some evidence” to warrant eligibility denial is not

present. Petitioner specifically states: “Of course, there was some evidence to support the denial;

and, there will always be some evidence under California law.” Traverse at 31. However, the

undersigned disagrees. One cannot both embrace the liberty interest created by the California

parole eligibility statute, the cornerstone of which is “some evidence” must exist if parole

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eligibility is denied, see Biggs, supra, and also disclaim that cornerstone as having any

applicability. Federal law recognizes the liberty interest created by state law, and it is federal law

which defines the process which is due. That process includes a provision that parole eligibility

may be denied if there exists “some evidence” of the factors categorized as making one

unsuitable for parole. 

Moreover, in practice petitioner’s point is not well taken. The undersigned, Judge

Karlton, and other courts have found a lack of “some evidence” in several cases. See e.g., Irons

v. Warden etc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 936 (E.D. Cal. 2005). In that case, the undersigned found that

continuing and undue reliance on unchanging factors, such as the seriousness of the crime, could

not constitute “some evidence.” Because in that case, no other evidence could warrant a denial

of parole, the court ordered the computation of a parole date. Petitioner has the same opportunity

for a “some evidence” review here as did petitioner Irons. That review commences in the

following section. 

Some Evidence

For the following reasons, the court finds that petitioner has not demonstrated that

he was denied parole eligibility pursuant to the no-parole policy because sufficient evidence

supported the BPT’s decision.

The court will first set forth the relevant law and regulations regarding suitability

hearings. 

Cal. Code of Regulations, section 2402(c), sets forth the circumstances tending to

show unsuitability. The court lists those of significance here:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in

an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be

considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate

incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style manner.

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*****

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an 

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous

occasions inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a

victim, particularly if the prisoner demonstrated serious assaultive

behavior at an early age. 

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable

or tumultuous relationships with others.

*****

*****

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in 

prison or jail.

Section 2402(d) sets forth the circumstances tending to indicate suitability:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of

assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a

potential of personal harm to the victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably

stable relationships with others.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to

indicate the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the

damage, seeking help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or

indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the

offense.

(4) Motivation for the Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as

the result of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has

built over a long period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome . . .

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant

history of violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of

recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made

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realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that

can be put to use upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release.

As discussed above, California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty

interest in release on parole. Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d at 914. Only one aspect of that liberty

interest is of pertinence here: “In the parole context, the requirements of due process are met if

‘some evidence’ supports the decision.” Id. The evidence underlying the board’s decision must

have some indicia of reliability. Id. 

In Biggs, the Ninth Circuit indicated that a continued reliance on an unchanging

factor such as the circumstances of the offense could result in a due process violation. Biggs was

serving a sentence of twenty-five years to life following a 1985 first degree murder conviction. 

In the case before the Ninth Circuit, Biggs challenged the 1999 decision by the BPT finding him

unsuitable for parole despite his record as a model prisoner. 334 F.3d at 913. While the Ninth

Circuit rejected several of the reasons given by the BPT for finding Biggs unsuitable, it upheld

three: 1) petitioner’s commitment offense involved the murder of a witness; 2) the murder was

carried out in a manner exhibiting a callous disregard for the life and suffering of another; 3)

petitioner could benefit from therapy. 334 F.3d at 913.

The Ninth Circuit cautioned the BPT regarding its continued reliance on the

gravity of the offense and petitioner’s conduct prior to the offense:

As in the present instance, the parole board’s sole supportable

reliance on the gravity of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment to justify denial of parole can be initially justified as

fulfilling the requirements set forth by state law. Over time,

however, should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary

behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date

simply because of the nature of his offense would raise serious

questions involving his liberty interest.

334 F.3d at 916.

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The Ninth Circuit stated that “[a] continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs

contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation.” 334 F.3d at 917. 

Petitioner’s 1999 hearing was a subsequent suitability hearing. Although the

court cannot determine precisely how many prior suitability hearings petitioner had, because his

MEPD date was December 28, 1996, this was clearly either his second or third suitability

hearing. Respondent’s Answer, Exhibit 1, part 2, p. 1.

The BPT first found that the offense was carried out in a dispassionate manner

and demonstrated a callous disregard for human suffering. Section 2402(c)(1)(B) & (D). In

support of this finding, the BPT relied on the circumstances of the offense:

On May ‘84 between the hours of 6 a.m. and 11 p.m., Williams was at 922 E

Street, (inaudible) with the victim, age three, and the victim’s mother, Deborah

Harris. Williams tied the victim’s hands to one door and her feet to another and

beat her until she lost consciousness. The child was taken to Merritt, M-E-R-R-IT-T, Hospital emergency room with Deborah Harris and was pronounced dead

upon arrival. The cause of death was blunt trauma to the head. 

Respondent’s Answer, Exhibit 1, part 1, p. 15. 

Based on the description of the offense, the court finds that the BPT’s

characterization of it as having been carried out in a dispassionate manner and demonstrating a

callous disregard for human suffering was supported by some evidence. Because this was either

petitioner’s second or third suitability hearing, the BPT’s reliance on this unchanging factor did

not violate due process. Biggs, supra.

The panel next found petitioner unsuitable based on his criminal history. 

Petitioner had been to prison at least twice before and had violated parole three times. 

Respondent’s Answer, Exhibit 1, part 1, p. 16. Petitioner’s convictions were for forgery,

burglary, receiving stolen property and passing bad checks. Id., Exhibit 1, part 2, p. 36. This

criminal record did not demonstrate a previous record of violence or a history of violence. See §

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2402(c)(2) (previous record of violence tends to show unsuitability); § 2402(d)(6) (lack of

significant history of violent crime tends to show suitability). However, a lengthy criminal

history of non-violent crimes fits into other categories such as stability of social relationships and

may constitute evidence, if not too remote, indicating the inappropriateness of release. 

Nevertheless, the history at issue here predates the current decision by many years. It should not

constitute “some evidence” warranting denial of parole eligibility.

The BPT found petitioner unsuitable because he had a history of drug use and had

not sufficiently participated in self-help therapy. Id., Exhibit 1, part 2, p. 3. See § 2402(d)

(institutional activities indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release). At

the hearing, petitioner admitted that he had been using more than $100 a day worth of heroin. 

Id., Exhibit 1, part 1, p. 18. Petitioner had attended AA since 1993. Id., p. 19. Petitioner’s

psychological report dated July 1, 1999, diagnosed petitioner as having “opiate dependence,

alcohol dependence, and cocaine abuse in sustained and full remission.” Id., p. 24. The report

also stated that petitioner’s polysubstance abuse represented a possible risk factor which could be

a precursor to violence by petitioner upon release, and recommended that petitioner continue

participation in AA and NA upon release. Id. 

The court record does not include the psychology report. Without reviewing this

document, the court cannot determine whether the BPT’s finding that petitioner had not

participated in sufficient therapy was supported by some evidence. 

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that some evidence supported the

BPT’s decision finding petitioner unsuitable for parole.

The denial of this claim by the Superior Court was not an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, this claim should be

denied.

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III. Supplemental Petition

The supplemental petition filed December 30, 2005, raises two claims. First,

petitioner argues that he should have been released on parole on April 18, 2001, had the BPT

properly applied his time credits pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 190. The court is unable to

distinguish this claim from the claim raised in the third amended petition regarding credits

pursuant to § 190, particularly as clarified in the traverse. In claim two of the supplemental

petition, petitioner argues that he was entitled to be released on April 18, 2001, based on

heightened expectations created by state officials over many years.

Respondent argues that the supplemental petition should be dismissed because the

claims are barred by the statute of limitations, procedurally defaulted and not exhausted. To the

extent petitioner is raising the same claim regarding § 190 in the supplemental petition as he

raised in the third amended petition, which as far as the court can tell is the case, this claim is not

barred for the reasons argued by respondent. If the claim is properly raised in the third amended

petition, which respondent apparently concedes, it cannot now be barred because it is not

properly raised in the supplemental petition. 

The court first considers whether the supplemental petition is barred by the statute

of limitations. The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions is set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1):

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

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recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

Because petitioner is challenging an administrative decision, the limitations period

began to run on the date the BPT denied his administrative appeal. Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d

1061, 1065 (9 Cir. 2003). On April 11, 2000, the BPT denied his administrative appeal. th

Supplemental Petition, Exhibit O. Accordingly, petitioner had until April 12, 2001, to file a

timely federal petition. 

Respondent argues that petitioner did not file his first state petition raising the

claims contained in the supplemental petition until March 27, 2002, which was well after the

statute of limitations period had expired. Supplemental Petition, Exhibit N. Therefore,

respondent argues, the claims raised in the supplemental petition are barred by the statute of

limitations.

An analysis of whether the claims raised in the supplemental petition are barred

by the statute of limitations requires a discussion of issues not raised by respondent. Respondent

does not address whether the claims in the supplemental petition relate back to the claims raised

in the third amended petition. See Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct. 2562, 2566 (2005) (a new claim

first asserted after the limitations period has run out does not relate back “when it asserts a new

ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original

pleading set forth.”). 

Assuming no relation back, respondent has not addressed the issue of whether

petitioner was entitled to interval tolling, see Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9 Cir. 2003). th

Respondent also does not address whether petitioner’s habeas petition filed in the California

Court of Appeal was properly filed based on the denial of these claims for petitioner’s failure to 

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exhaust administrative remedies and to include supporting documents, see Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000).

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that respondent has not met his

burden of demonstrating that petitioner’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Day v.

McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 1675, 1681-82 (2006) (statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and is

akin to an affirmative defense). In Day v. McDonough, the Supreme Court held that district

courts may sua sponte consider the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition. Based on the

lack of briefing regarding the issues discussed above, the court’s consideration of the timeliness

of the supplemental petition would, in essence, be sua sponte. However, the Supreme Court in

Day v. McDonough also stated that before acting on its own initiative, the court must “accord the

parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions. Id. at 1684. Because the parties

have not had an opportunity to address the issues discussed above, the court declines to sua

sponte consider the timeliness issue. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss on grounds that the

claims raised in the supplemental petition are untimely should be denied.

Respondent next argues that the claims raised in the supplemental petition should

be dismissed because they are not exhausted. The exhaustion of state court remedies is a

prerequisite to the granting of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). If

exhaustion is to be waived, it must be waived explicitly by respondent’s counsel. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(3). A waiver of exhaustion, thus, may not be implied or inferred. A petitioner satisfies

the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to

consider all claims before presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

276, 92 S. Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 

Respondent argues that petitioner’s claims are not exhausted because the

California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s habeas petition raising these claims based on

petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Supplemental Petition, Exhibit J. The

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California Supreme Court denied the petition raising these claims without comment or citation. 

Id., Exhibit K. Applying the look through doctrine, see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-

04, 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991), respondent argues that petitioner’s claims are barred because the

California Supreme Court rejected them for the procedural reasons given by the California Court

of Appeal rather than on the merits.

Respondent is confusing the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default. As

stated above, exhaustion requires petitioners to provide the highest state court with a full and fair

opportunity to consider all claims before presenting them to the federal court. Petitioner did just

that when he filed his habeas petition raising these claims in the California Supreme Court. That

petitioner’s claims were denied on procedural grounds does not mean that the claims are not

exhausted. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss on this ground should be denied.

Respondent next argues that the claims raised in the supplemental petition are

procedurally defaulted because they were denied for petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative

remedies and to include supporting evidence. Applying the look through doctrine discussed

above, the court finds that the California Supreme Court denied these claims on these grounds. 

Whether a claim is procedurally barred involves a burden-shifting analysis: “Once

the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural

ground as an affirmative defense, the burden to place that defense in issue shifts to petitioner. 

The petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual allegations that demonstrate

the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate burden is the state’s.” 

Powell v. Lambert, 357 F.3d 871, 875 (9 Cir. 2004). th

The court is concerned that petitioner was unaware of the burden-shifting analysis

set forth above, as respondent’s briefing contains no mention of it. The court is reluctant to find

claims procedurally defaulted in a situation where the pro se petitioner was not given notice of

his pleading burden. Rather than ordering additional briefing, the court recommends that motion

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to dismiss on this ground be denied because petitioner did not have adequate notice. See

Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524-25, 117 S. Ct. 1517 (1977) (court bypassed question of

procedural default to reach the merits of petitioner’s claims). See also Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d

708, 720 (5 Cir. 2004) (same). th

Having determined that review of the merits of petitioner’s claims is warranted,

the court considers the standard of AEDPA review. As stated above, the California Supreme

Court and California Court of Appeal did not address the merits of the claims raised in the

supplemental petition. However, the Solano County Superior Court issued a reasoned decision

denying the petition which raised these claims. Supplemental Petition, Exhibit I. Accordingly,

the court will consider whether the denial of these claims by the Solano County Superior Court

was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. 

As discussed above, the claim in the supplemental petition alleging violation of

Cal. Penal Code § 190 appears virtually identical to the claim raised in the third amended

petition. Accordingly, the court need not further address the merits of this claim.

In his second claim for relief, petitioner argues that he was entitled to be released

on parole no later than his “maximum eligible parole date” of April 18, 2001, based on a

heightened expectation of parole release created by state officials over many years. Petitioner

claims that soon after entering prison, he was told by members of a classification committee that

he could expect to serve roughly between ten and fifteen years on his sentence of fifteen years to

life. Petitioner claims that BPT officials later told him the same thing. 

Petitioner’s claim that prison and BPT officials misled him to believe that he

would be released no later than his “maximum eligible parole date” does not state a federal

claim. No clearly established Supreme Court authority provides for such a claim. The court

observes that petitioner is not claiming, for example, that his failure to parole earlier violated his

plea agreement. The denial of this claim by the Solano County Superior Court was not an 

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unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, this claim

should be denied. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s January 31, 2006, motion to dismiss the supplemental petition be

denied;

2. The claims raised in the supplemental petition be denied;

3. The claims raised in the third amended petition be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 7/5/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

will919.157

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