Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00048/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00048-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Plaintiff has since been transferred to the custody of the Arizona Department of

Corrections and is currently housed in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Douglas, Papago

Unit in Douglas, Arizona (Doc. #15).

JDN

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Steven A. Niemczynski, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph Arpaio,

Defendant. 

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No. CV 09-0048-PHX-DGC (LOA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Steven A. Niemczynski brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (Doc. #12). Before the Court is

Defendant’s second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #26) and Motion for Ruling (Doc. #28). The

Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss and deny the Motion for Ruling as moot.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claim arose during his confinement in the Lower Buckeye Jail in Phoenix,

Arizona (Doc. #12 at 1).1

 In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant

violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free exercise of religion when he ordered

Christian Christmas music to be played continuously for over 10 hours per day from midDecember 2008 to early-January 2009 (id. at 3). 

The Court directed Defendant to respond to Plaintiff’s claim (Doc. #13), and

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Defendant filed an Answer (Doc. #16). Defendant then filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure

to state a claim or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #18). The Court

denied Defendant’s motion (Doc. #22). Thereafter, Defendant filed a second Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. #26).

In his second motion, Defendant contended that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a) (id.). In support, Defendant submitted the declaration of Susan Fisher, a Sergeant

assigned to the Inmate Hearing Unit (id., Ex. 2, Fisher Decl. ¶ 1). Attached to the declaration

are a copy of Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) Policy DJ-3—Inmate Grievance

Procedure (id., Ex. 2-A); an excerpt from the “MCSO Rules and Regulations for Inmates”

(id., Ex. 2-B); and a copy of a blank inmate grievance form (id., Ex. 2-C). 

Fisher described the five steps in the inmate grievance process: (1) the initial

grievance to the line officer and response; (2) a review of the grievance and response by the

shift supervisor; (3) a review of the grievance and decision by the Bureau Hearing Officer;

(4) an Institutional appeal to the Jail Commander and response; and (5) an External appeal

(id., Ex. B, Fisher Decl. ¶ 4). Fisher attested that inmates are informed of the MCSO

grievance procedures during orientation, at which time they receive a copy of the “Rules and

Regulations for Inmates” (id). She further attested that the inmate grievance form itself

contains standard language explaining the sequential steps in the grievance process (id. ¶ 5,

Ex. 2-C). 

According to Fisher, Plaintiff’s complaint about holiday music is a condition-ofconfinement issue, and inmates may grieve issues pertaining to conditions of confinement

(id. ¶¶ 8-9). Fisher averred that she searched the MCSO grievance records and found that

Plaintiff did not file any grievances concerning holiday music played at the jail (id. ¶¶ 7, 10).

On the basis of this evidence, Defendant contended that Plaintiff failed to file a

grievance related to his claim about holiday music (Doc. #26 at 5). Defendant also noted that

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint conceded that he did not exhaust his administrative

remedies (id.). Defendant argued that no exception to the exhaustion requirement applies (id.

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Notice required under Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2003).

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at 5-6). Defendant further argued that Plaintiff’s failure to grieve his complaint denied

Defendant the ability to resolve the issue internally and deprived the Court the benefit of a

record (id. at 6). 

On January 14, 2010, the Court issued an Order informing Plaintiff of his obligation

to respond to the motion and the evidence necessary to rebut Defendant’s contentions (Doc.

#27).2

 Plaintiff has not filed a response, and the time for responding has expired.

Meanwhile, on March 17, 2010, Defendant filed a Motion for Ruling and moved the Court

to summarily grant his Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiff’s failure to respond as required under

the Rules of Procedure (Doc. #28). Plaintiff did not respond to this motion.

II. Exhaustion

A. Legal Standard

Under the PLRA, a prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before

bringing a federal action concerning prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Griffin

v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). Exhaustion is required for all suits about

prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered

through the administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). And a

prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable

rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). 

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). Thus,

the defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt, 315

F.3d at 1119. Because exhaustion is a matter of abatement in an unenumerated Rule 12(b)

motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-

20. Further, a court has broad discretion as to the method to be used in resolving the factual

dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th

Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted).

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B. Analysis

As stated, Defendant bears the burden of proving lack of exhaustion and therefore

must demonstrate that there were remedies available to Plaintiff. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1119; see also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendant submits

evidence that a grievance system was available at the jail for Plaintiff’s claim (Doc. #26,

Ex. 2, Fisher Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. 2-A). 

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff indicated that administrative remedies were

available at the jail, that he submitted a grievance on his claim, but that he did not appeal his

grievance to the highest level (Doc. #12 at 3). Plaintiff wrote that he did not appeal to the

highest level because “the music is scheduled to end on 1/3/09” (id.). This explanation does

not excuse the failure to exhaust. There is no indication that Plaintiff was told he could not

file an appeal or that avenues to appeal were unavailable. See Brown, 422 F.3d at 937;

Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (remedy that officials prevent an inmate

from using is not an “available” remedy). 

In failing to respond to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff has not overcome Defendant’s

evidence of an available remedy. Thus, the Court finds that Defendant has met his burden

to demonstrate failure to exhaust, and the Motion to Dismiss will be granted. 

III. Failure to Respond

Alternately, the Court has the discretion under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i)

to deem Plaintiff’s lack of response as a consent to the granting of Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss. Plaintiff was warned of this possibility (Doc. #27 at 2). The Ninth Circuit has

upheld a dismissal based on a failure to comply with a similar local rule in the District of

Nevada. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995). Before dismissal on this

basis, the Court must weigh “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation;

(2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the

public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less

drastic sanctions.” Id. at 53 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir.

1986)). 

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The first factor “always favors dismissal.” Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983,

990 (9th Cir. 1999). The second factor usually favors dismissal, and this case is no

exception. See Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990). There is no risk

of prejudice to Defendant to resolve the motion in his favor, and judicial efficiency also

favors resolution of this action. Public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits, so

the fourth factor weighs against dismissal. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir.

2002). For the fifth factor, dismissal without prejudice is the least drastic sanction. 

The five-factor analysis weighs in favor of dismissal. The Court will therefore deem

Plaintiff’s failure to respond as a consent to the granting of the motion. 

In light of the Court’s ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant’s Motion for Ruling

is moot and will be denied.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. #26) and Motion for Ruling (Doc. #28).

(2) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #26) is granted; Plaintiff’s action is

dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust or, alternately, for failure to respond. 

(3) Defendant’s Motion for Ruling (Doc. #28) is denied as moot.

(4) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment of dismissal accordingly.

DATED this 24th day of May, 2010.

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