Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-57297/USCOURTS-ca9-12-57297-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BEAR VALLEY MUTUAL WATER

COMPANY; BIG BEAR MUNICIPAL

WATER DISTRICT; CITY OF

REDLANDS; CITY OF RIVERSIDE;

CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO

MUNICIPAL WATER DEPARTMENT;

EAST VALLEY WATER DISTRICT;

RIVERSIDE COUNTY FLOOD

CONTROL AND WATER

CONSERVATION DISTRICT; SAN

BERNARDINO VALLEY MUNICIPAL

WATER DISTRICT; SAN BERNARDINO

VALLEY WATER CONSERVATION

DISTRICT; WESTERN MUNICIPAL

WATER DISTRICT; WEST VALLEY

WATER DISTRICT; YUCAIPA VALLEY

WATER DISTRICT,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the

United States Department of the

Interior; UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;

DANIEL M. ASHE, Director, United

States Fish and Wildlife Service;

UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE

SERVICE,

Defendants-Appellees,

No. 12-57297

D.C. No.

8:11-cv- 01263-

JVS-AN

OPINION

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2 BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL

CALIFORNIA TROUT, INC.; CENTER

FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY; SAN

BERNARDINO AUDUBON SOCIETY;

SIERRA CLUB,

Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 5, 2015 – Pasadena, California

Filed June 25, 2015

Before: Harry Pregerson, Barrington D. Parker, Jr.*

,

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Parker

* The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge for the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.

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BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL 3

SUMMARY**

Environmental Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of federal defendants in an action brought by plaintiff

municipalities and water districts challenging a 2010 Final

Rule designating areas for the threatened Santa Ana sucker as

critical habitat.

In 2000, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service

designated the sucker as a “threatened” species pursuant to

the Endangered Species Act. In 1999, a coalition of parties

developed the Western Riverside County Multiple Species

Habitat Conservation Plan, a regional, multi-jurisdictional

plan that encompassed nearly 1.26 million acres and provided

participating agencies with a 75-year permit for the incidental

taking of 146 protected species, including the sucker, in

exchange for implementing conservation measures; the

Service formally approved the Conservation Plan in 2004. In

the 2010 Final Rule, the Service designated additional critical

habitat within the Conservation Plan.

The district court held that the Service satisfied its

statutory obligation to cooperate with state agencies, that the

critical habitat designation was not arbitrary or capricious,

and that any claims under the National Environmental Policy

Act were barred by this court’s decision in Douglas County

v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), which held that the

statute does not apply to critical habitat designations.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL

The panel held that section 2(c)(2) of the Endangered

Species Act did not create an independent cause of action,

and rejected appellants’ argument that the Service violated

the provision by failing to cooperate with State and local

agencies on water resource issues. 

The panel held that the critical habitat designation of land

covered by the Conservation Plan was proper. Specifically,

the panel affirmed the district court’s holding that the

Service’s decision not to exclude land covered by the

Conservation Plan was not subject to review. The panel also

held that the Service’s designation of lands included in the

Conservation Plan was not arbitrary or capricious. The panel

further held that the designation of habitat in areas covered by

the Conservation Plan did not violate the Services’s “No

Surprises Rule,” which provides that the Service may not

require permittees to pay for additional conservation and

mitigation measures absent unforeseen circumstances. The

panel also held that appellants had adequate opportunity to

comment on the Service’s scientific citations.

The panel held that the Service’s designation of critical

habitat in unoccupied areas was proper.

The panel rejected appellants’ claim that the Service

violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to

prepare an environmental impact statement in connection

with its 2010 Final Rule because the Act does not apply to the

designation of a critical habitat.

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BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL 5

COUNSEL

Gregory K. Wilkinson (argued), Wendy Wang, Melissa

Cushman, and Kira Johnson, Best Best & Krieger LLP,

Riverside, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants City of

Riverside, Riverside County Flood Control and Water

Conservation District, and Western Municipal WaterDistrict.

Jean Cihigoyenetche, Brunick, McElhaney & Kennedy, San

Bernardino, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant East Valley

Water District.

David G. Moore, Reid & Kellyer, Riverside, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellant Bear Valley Mutual Water Company.

Daniel J. McHugh, Office of the City Attorney, Redlands,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellant City of Redlands.

David R.E. Aladjem and M. Max Steinheimer, Downey

Brand LLP, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant

San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water District.

David L. Wysocki, Aklufi & Wysocki, Redlands, California,

for Plaintiff-Appellant Yucaipa Valley Water District.

Gerald W. Eagans, Redwine &Sherrill, Riverside, California,

for Plaintiff-Appellant West Valley Water District.

Gregory Priamos and Susan D. Wilson, Office of the City

Attorney, Riverside, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant City

of Riverside.

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6 BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL

Wayne Lemieux, Lemieux & O’Neill, Thousand Oaks,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellant Big Bear Municipal Water

District.

David B. Cosgrove, Rutan & Tucker LLP, Costa Mesa,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellant San Bernardino Valley

Water Conservation District.

Andrew M. Hitchings, Somach Simmons & Dunn,

Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant City of San

Bernardino Municipal Water Department.

Robert G. Dreher, ActingAssistant AttorneyGeneral, Andrea

Gelatt, and Allen M. Brabender (argued), Attorneys, United

States Department of Justice, Environment & Natural

Resources Division, Washington, D.C.; Lynn Cox, Office of

the Solicitor, United States Department of the Interior, for

Federal Defendants-Appellees.

John Buse (argued) and D. Adam Lazar, Center for

Biological Diversity, San Francisco, California, for

Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees.

M. Reed Hopper and Anthony L. François, Pacific Legal

Foundation, Sacramento, California, for Amicus Curiae

Pacific Legal Foundation.

Michelle Ouellette, Ward H. Simmons, and Lucas I. Quass,

Best Best & Krieger LLP, Riverside, California, for Amicus

Curiae Western Riverside County Regional Conservation

Authority.

Daniel J. O’Hanlon, Hanspetter Walter, Rebecca R. Akroyd,

and Elizabeth L. Leeper, Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann &

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BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL 7

Girard, Sacramento, California; Marcia L. Scully, General

Counsel, and Linus S. Masouredis, Chief Deputy General

Counsel, The Metropolitan Water District of Southern

California, for Amici Curiae Association of California Water

Agencies and State Water Contractors, and the Metropolitan

Water District of Southern California.

Frederic A. Fudacz, Robert D. Thornton, and Susan G.

Meyer, Nossaman LLP, Irvine, California; John Krattli,

County Counsel, and Michael L. Moore, Deputy Couty

Counsel, Office of CountyCounsel, Los Angeles, California,

for Amici Curiae Los Angeles County Flood Control District

and the Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster.

OPINION

PARKER, Senior Circuit Judge:

The Santa Ana sucker (Catostomus santaanae) is a small

freshwater fish native to several California rivers and streams,

including the Santa Ana River. In 2000, the United States

Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”), after being sued by

conservation groups, designated the sucker as a “threatened”

species pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). In

2004, the FWS promulgated a Final Rule designating

particular areas as critical habitat for the sucker. In a

subsequent 2005 Final Rule and in a 2009 Proposed Rule, the

FWS excluded certain areas covered by local conservation

plans from critical habitat designation. But in a 2010 Final

Rule, the FWS changed course and designated as critical

habitat several thousand acres of land that had previously

been excluded.

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8 BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL

In August 2011, in response to this change, several

municipalities and water districts sued the FWS, the

Department of the Interior, and other federal officials,

alleging, in essence, that the FWS (1) did not cooperate with

the state in resolving water resource issues that arose from the

critical habitat designation; (2) acted arbitrarily and 

capriciously in revising the critical habitat designation to

include the previously excluded land; and (3) violated the

National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) by failing to

prepare an environmental impact statement prior to

designation. Shortly thereafter, several conservation groups

previously involved in the litigation to secure critical habitat

designation for the sucker successfully moved to intervene.

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. In

October 2012, the United States District Court for the Central

District of California (James V. Selna, J.) granted defendants

summary judgment on all claims. The court held that the

FWS satisfied its statutory obligation to cooperate with state

agencies, that the critical habitat designation was not arbitrary

or capricious, and that any claims under NEPA were barred

by this Court’s decision in Douglas County v. Babbitt,

48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), which held that the statute does

not apply to critical habitat designations. This appeal

followed. For the reasons set forth, we AFFIRM the district

court’s judgment.

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BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL 9

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

A. The Santa Ana River

Appellants are municipalities and water districts that

divert water from the Santa Ana River for various uses and

conduct maintenance activities within its watershed. The

Santa Ana River travels through southwestern San

Bernardino County and Riverside County, continues through

Orange County, and flows into the Pacific Ocean between

Newport Beach and Huntington Beach. The Santa Ana River

is prone to flooding; consequently, two dams—the Prado and

the Seven Oaks Dam—work in tandem to assist with flood

control. The dams require ongoing maintenance work, some

of which may be done in areas designated as critical habitat.

The Santa Ana River also serves as a source of water for

its watershed communities. Water rights are allocated to

municipalities and water districts subject to two state court

decisions, Orange County Water District v. City of Chino et

al., No. 117628 (Super. Ct. Orange County, CA Apr. 17,

1969) and Western Municipal Water District of Riverside

County et al v. East San Bernardino County Water District et

al., No. 78426 (Super. Ct. Riverside County, CA Apr. 17,

1969). In 2009, the California State Water Board granted the

San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water District and the

Western Municipal Water District permits to divert additional

water captured by the Seven Oaks Dam “for beneficial uses.”

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10 BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL

B. Local Conservation Plans and Partnerships

In the late 1990s, two coalitions formed to develop

conservation plans for the sucker. In 1998, the first coalition,

consisting of the FWS, the United States Army Corps of

Engineers, the Santa Ana Watershed Project Authority, and

various local agencies, including several Appellants in this

case, agreed to the Santa Ana Sucker Conservation Plan

(“SASCP”). Under the SASCP, the FWS allowed permittees

to incidentally “take” (i.e., harm or kill) a limited number of

suckers, in exchange for various conservation and mitigation

measures. In 1999, a second coalition of 22 parties developed

the Western Riverside County Multiple Species Habitat

Conservation Plan (“MSHCP”), a regional, multijurisdictional plan that encompasses nearly 1.26 million acres

and provides participating agencies with a 75 year permit for

the incidental taking of 146 protected species, including the

sucker, in exchange for implementing conservationmeasures. 

Several Appellants, including the City of Riverside and

Riverside County Flood Control, are among the permittees

covered by the MSHCP.

In 2004, the MSHCP was formally approved by the FWS. 

Under the terms of the Implementation Agreement

(“MSHCP-IA”), the FWS stipulated that:

[T]o the maximum extent allowable after

public review and comment, in the event that

a Critical Habitat determination is made for

any Covered Species Adequately Conserved,

and unless the [Service] finds that the

MSHCP is not being implemented, lands

within the boundaries of the MSHCP will not

be designated as Critical Habitat.

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BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL 11

Although the MSHCP continues to be implemented, the

FWS, in the 2010 Final Rule, designated additional critical

habitat within the MSHCP. A crucial issue on this appeal is

whether, and to what extent, this stipulation binds the FWS’s

designation decisions.

C. History ofListing andCriticalHabitatDesignation

1. 1994-2003

Efforts to list the sucker as an endangered species date

back to September 1994, when two conservation groups

petitioned the FWS to consider the listing. When the FWS

did not respond to the petition within the 90 days mandated

by statute, the groups sued to compel a determination. In

May 1996, the United States District Court for the Northern

District of California found that the FWS violated the ESA

and ordered the Service to make a preliminary determination

as to the sucker’s status. See Cal. Trout v. Babbitt, No. 95-

cv-3961, Dkt. No. 30 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 1995).

In July 1996, the FWS published a preliminary

determination that a listing of the sucker could be warranted,

but took no further action. 61 Fed. Reg. 36,021 (July 9,

1996). The district court then ordered the FWS to publish a

proposed rule regarding listing, as required by the ESA. In

March 1997, the FWS determined that while listing the

sucker as endangered or threatened was warranted, other

listing actions commanded higher priority. 62 Fed. Reg.

15,872 (Apr. 3, 1997). The conservation groups then filed a

new lawsuit in response to which the district court set a

schedule for the FWS to publish a proposed and final listing

determination.

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12 BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL

In April 2000, the FWS released a Final Listing Rule,

listing the sucker as a “threatened” species. The FWS noted

that the sucker had been eliminated from approximately 75%

of its former native range, due to “habitat destruction, natural

and human-induced changes in streamflows, urban

development and related land-use practices, and the

introduction of nonnative competitors and predators.” 

65 Fed. Reg. 19,686, 19,691 (Apr. 12, 2000). The FWS did

not, however, designate critical habitat for the sucker in the

2000 Final Listing Rule on the ground that its “knowledge

and understanding of the biological needs and environmental

limitations of the Santa Ana sucker and the primary

constituent elements of its habitat are insufficient to

determine critical habitat for the fish.” Id. at 19,696. In such

circumstances, the ESA requires the FWS to conduct

additional research and issue a final determination of critical

habitat no later than two years after the proposed listing rule.

16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii)(II).

The district court supervising the California Trout

litigation retained jurisdiction to monitor the FWS’s

compliance with the statutory deadline. After the FWS failed

to comply, the conservation groups amended their complaint

and moved for summary judgment. The district court found

the FWS in violation of the ESA and ordered a final critical

habitat designation by February 2004. Cal. Trout v. Norton,

No. 97-cv-3779, 2003 WL 23413688, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb.

26, 2003).

2. 2004 Final and Proposed Rules

In February 2004, the FWS concurrently issued identical

proposed and final critical habitat designations. The 2004

Final Rule designated 21,129 acres of critical habitat in three

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BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL 13

areas: the Santa Ana River (indicated as Unit 1, further

divided into subunits 1A and 1B), the San Gabriel River (Unit

2), and the Big Tujunga Creek (Unit 3). The 2004 Final Rule

found that the “primary constituent elements” (“PCEs”) for

the sucker are “a functioning hydrological system that

experiences peaks and ebbs in the water volume and

maintains a sand, gravel, and cobble substrate in a mosaic of

sandy stream margins, deep water pools, riffles [and] runs;

sufficient water volume and quality; and complex, native

floral and faunal associations.” 69 Fed. Reg. 8,839, 8,843

(Feb. 26, 2004). Although the FWS found that Units 1A and

1B “are not known to be occupied, they are essential for the

conservation of the Santa Ana sucker because they provide

and transport sediment necessary to maintain the preferred

substrates utilized by this fish . . . , convey stream flows and

flood waters necessary to maintain habitat conditions for the

Santa Ana sucker; and support riparian habitats that protect

water quality in the downstream portions of the Santa Ana

River occupied by the sucker.” Id. at 8,844–45 (citations

omitted).

Notwithstanding these findings, the FWS exercised its

authority under Section 4(b)(2) of the ESA to exclude

“essential habitat” that included areas encompassed by the

MSHCP and the SASCP. The FWS concluded that “the

benefits of excluding essential habitat within the boundaries

of” these agreements, such as fostering continuing

cooperative spirit with local agencies, educational value, and

likely changes in conservation, “outweigh the benefits of

including these areas as critical habitat,” and that this

exclusion “will not result in the extinction of the sucker.” Id.

at 8,846–48.

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14 BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL

3. 2005 Final Rule and Subsequent Litigation

Because the 2004 Final Rule had been promulgated

without an opportunity for public review and comment in

order to comply with the district court’s order, the FWS

accepted review and comment on the simultaneously released

2004 Proposed Rule, which was ultimately promulgated as a

new 2005 Final Rule. The 2005 Final Rule revised the PCEs

for the sucker and reduced the designated critical habitat to

8,305 acres. Specifically, all portions of the habitat in the

Santa Ana River and its tributaries (Unit 1) were removed

from designation because they were no longer considered

“essential.” However, this change rendered the 2005 Final

Rule internally inconsistent, because the rationale for

designating certain unoccupied portions of other river

systems as essential was the same as the rationale used to

reject designation for the units along the Santa Ana River. 

For example, while unoccupied areas in Unit 3 (the Big

Tujunga Creek) were designated as essential because they

transported sediment downstream to occupied areas,

unoccupied areas in Unit 1A were now deemed “not

essential,” even though they also transported sediment to

downstream occupied areas. Additionally, while certain

sections of the 2005 Final Rule state that Units 1A and 1B are

not essential, the FWS did not remove other language in the

Final Rule that refers to habitat within these units as essential. 

See, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg. 426, 443 (Jan. 4, 2005) (“[W]e

analyzed the impacts of the MSHCP . . . on the Santa Ana

sucker and its essential habitat within the plan boundaries.”).

Various conservation groups pressed the FWS on these

inconsistencies, raising questions about the integrity of the

scientific information used and whether the decision was

consistent with appropriate legal standards. In response, the

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BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL 15

FWS announced in July 2007 that it would review the 2005

Final Rule. In November 2007, the conservation groups

again sued the FWS, alleging that the 2005 Final Rule

violated the ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act

(“APA”), and that the rule making resulted from improper

political influence not grounded in reliable science. The

parties settled in 2009. The settlement agreement approved

by the district court required the FWS to “reconsider its

critical habitat designation for the Santa Ana sucker,” and to

submit a proposed rule by December 2009, with a final rule

due by December 2010. Cal. Trout v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Serv., No. 08-cv-4811, Dkt. No. 41 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2009).

4. 2009 Proposed Rules and 2010 Final Rules

The FWS released a new proposed rule in December

2009, with a slight revision in July 2010, designating 9,605

acres of habitat from the three river systems, including 1,900

acres of unoccupied habitat from the Santa Ana River that

was previously found not essential in the 2005 Rule

(identified as new subunit 1A). 74 Fed. Reg. 65,056

(proposed Dec. 9, 2009), revised by 75 Fed. Reg. 38,441

(proposed July 2, 2010). The FWS noted that it was

considering exercising its discretion to exclude 5,472 acres of

designated habitat, consisting of areas within the SASCP and

MSHCP (identified as new subunits 1B and 1C).

In connection with the Proposed Rule, the FWS held two

open 60-day comment periods, hosted two public hearings in

July 2010, and contacted “appropriate Federal, State, and

local agencies; scientific organizations; and other interested

parties and invited them to comment on the proposed rule and

D[raft] E[conomic] A[nalysis] during these comment

periods.” 75 Fed. Reg. 77,961, 77,989 (Dec. 14, 2010). The

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16 BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL

FWS also subjected its rule to peer review, responded to

several Congressional inquiries, and met with various

stakeholders, including Appellants’ representatives. See id.

at 77,989–94. Various agencies participating in the SASCP

and MSHCP, including Appellants, commented extensively

on the 2009 Proposed Rule, supporting an exclusion and

asking the FWS to adhere to its commitment in the MSHCPIA to exclude MSHCP land.

In December 2010, the FWS issued its Final Rule. The

2010 Final Rule designated 9,331 acres of critical habitat

across the three river systems. The 2010 Final Rule

designated habitat closely along the lines of the 2009

Proposed Rules, except that it removed approximately 400

acres from subunit 1A. The 2010 Final Rule designated

approximately 1,500 acres of unoccupied habitat in subunit

1A on the ground that these areas are “essential to the

conservation of the species” because they function as

pathways to transport storm and stream waters and sediments

“necessary to maintain” preferred substrates to occupied

portions of the Santa Ana River further downstream. 75 Fed.

Reg. at 77,972, 77,978. The FWS also decided not to exclude

the areas in subunits 1B and 1C, which included 3,048 acres

of land covered by the MSHCP. The FWS found that the

benefits of continued exclusion did not outweigh the benefits

of inclusion, and declined to exercise its discretion to exclude

those areas because of the sucker’s conservation status.

II. Procedural History

In August 2011, the plaintiff municipalities and water

districts sued the FWS, challenging the 2010 Final Rule on

multiple grounds, and requested declaratory and injunctive

relief. As relevant to this appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that the

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BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL 17

FWS (1) failed to cooperate with them to resolve water

resource concerns pursuant to Section 2(c)(2) of the ESA

(claim 1); (2) designated lands along the Santa Ana River or

within the MSHCP in a manner that was arbitrary and

capricious, in violation of the ESA and the APA (claims 2

and 4); and (3) violated NEPA by failing to prepare an

Environmental Impact Statement (claim 6).1

In November 2011, California Trout, Inc., the Center for

Biological Diversity, the San Bernardino Audubon Society,

and the Sierra Club successfully moved to intervene as

defendants. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment

and in October 2012, the district court granted defendants

summary judgment on all claims. Bear Valley Mut. Water

Co. v. Salazar, No. 11-cv-1263, 2012 WL5353353 (C.D. Cal.

Oct. 17, 2012). In sum, the district court concluded that

(1) the FWS complied with its statutory obligations to

cooperate with state and local authorities and Section 2(c)(2)

of the ESA does not impose additional substantive or

procedural obligations on federal agencies, see id. at *9–11;

(2) an agency’s decision not to exclude areas from critical

habitat is a discretionary action not subject to judicial review,

see id. at *14, and the FWS’s critical habitat designation was

not arbitraryor capricious because it was rationallyconnected

to the best available science, see id. at *15, 19–34; and

(3) any claim under NEPA is barred by Douglas County, see

id. at *37.

1 Because Appellants did not address several other claims raised before

the district court in their opening brief, we consider those claims to be

abandoned. See Christian Legal Soc. Ch. v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 485 (9th

Cir. 2010).

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18 BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL

The municipalities and water districts appealed and the 

Pacific Legal Foundation successfully moved to appear as

amicus curiae in support of Appellants.2 We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. Cnty. of San Diego,

670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). “We must determine,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of

material fact and whether the district court correctly applied

the relevant substantive law.” McFarland v. Kempthorne,

545 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). 

“This Court also reviews de novo the district court’s

evaluations of an agency’s actions.” San Luis & DeltaMendota Water Auth. v. Locke, 776 F.3d 971, 991 (9th Cir.

2014).

2 The Association of California Water Agencies, State Water

Contractors,MetropolitanWater District ofSouthernCalifornia, MainSan

Gabriel Basin Watermaster, County of Los Angeles, and the Western

Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority (“RCA”) have also

moved for leave to file three separate amicus curiae briefs in support of

Appellants. The RCA further requests that this Court take judicial notice

of several documents. These motions are opposed by the IntervenorsAppellees. All pending motions for leave to file amicus briefs are hereby

granted. RCA’s request for this Court to take judicial notice is denied

because “judicial review of an agency decision is [generally] limited to the

administrative record onwhich the agency based the challenged decision,”

and RCA has not shown why the additional materials are “necessary to

adequately review” the decision here. See Fence Creek Cattle Co. v. U.S.

Forest Serv., 602 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010).

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BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL 19

Claims brought against an agency under the ESA are

evaluated under the APA. Pursuant to the APA, an agency

decision will be set aside only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “Under this standard, we will ‘sustain

an agency action if the agency has articulated a rational

connection between the facts found and the conclusions

made.’” San Luis &Delta-Mendota, 776 F.3d at 994 (quoting

Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of

Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005)). A federal

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 

See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 7 (2001).

ANALYSIS

I. Section 2(c)(2) Does Not Create an Independent Cause

of Action

Section 2 of the ESA is entitled “Congressional findings

and declarations of purposes and policy.” 16 U.S.C. § 1531. 

Section 2(c) provides:

(c) Policy

(1) It is further declared to be the policy of

Congress that all Federal departments and

agencies shall seek to conserve endangered

species and threatened species and shall

utilize their authorities in furtherance of the

purposes of this chapter.

(2) It is further declared to be the policy of

Congress that Federal agencies shall

cooperate with State and local agencies to

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resolve water resource issues in concert with

conservation of endangered species.

16 U.S.C. § 1531(c). Appellants argue that the FWS violated

Section 2(c)(2) because it failed to cooperate with State and

local agencies on water resource issues, by, for example,

failing to give sufficient weight to the California State Water

Board’s determination that the issuance of permits for the

proposed diversion from the Santa Ana River at Seven Oaks

Dam for municipal purposes would have no impact upon

public trust resources, including the sucker, and otherwise

declining to engage Appellants in negotiating the critical

habitat designation.

This argument fails as a matter of law because, as the

district court correctlyheld, Section 2(c)(2) is a non-operative

statement of policy that “does not create an enforceable

mandate for some additional procedural step.” Bear Valley,

2012 WL 5353353, at *11. By its own terms, Section 2(c)(2)

is a subsection of the ESA’s declaration of purposes and

policy. It is well established that such declarations do not

create substantive or enforceable rights. See Hawaii v. Office

of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 175 (2009) (“[W]here the

text of a clause itself indicates that it does not have operative

effect. . . . , a court has no license to make it do what it was

not designed to do.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Although we believe the text is clear, we note that this

reading is further supported by the statute’s legislative

history. When Congress amended the ESA to include Section

2(c)(2) in 1982, the Senate Committee report expressly

provided that this provision was “not intended to and does not

change the substantive or procedural requirements of the

Act.” S. Rep. 97-418, at 25–26 (May 26, 1982). We also

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note that no court has ever construed Section 2(c)(2) to set

forth a substantive or procedural requirement.

Appellants claim that this reading renders statutory

language superfluous and violates established canons of

statutory interpretation. They note that Section 2(c)(2) uses

the word “shall,” which is typically considered to be a

mandate. Appellants contend that the Eighth Circuit’s

decision in Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator, EPA,

882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989) supports their position. There,

the court concluded that the ESA “imposes substantial and

continuing obligations on federal agencies,” citing Section

2(c)(1), which expresses the policy “that all Federal

departments and agencies . . . shall utilize their authorities in

furtherance of the purposes of this Act.” 882 F.2d at 1299. 

According to Appellants, if Section 2(c)(1) imposes a

“substantial and continuing obligation,” then so must Section

2(c)(2). However, the substantive provisions enforced by the

Eighth Circuit were Sections 7 and 9 of the ESA, which set

forth the procedures reflecting the policy statement in Section

2(c)(1). Nothing in Defenders of Wildlife establishes or

recognizes a free-standing claim based on Section 2(c)(1).

Contrary to what Appellants contend, the policy goals

embodied in Section 2(c)(2) are implemented through the

substantive and procedural requirements set forth in Section

4, which direct the FWS to “give actual notice of the

proposed regulation (including the complete text of the

regulation) to the State agency in each State in which the

species is believed to occur, and to each county or equivalent

jurisdiction in which the species is believed to occur, and

invite the comment of such agency, and each such

jurisdiction, thereon,” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(A)(ii), and to

provide a “written justification” for any rule that was issued

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without “adopt[ing] regulations consistent with the [State]

agency’s comments or petition.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(i). In

other words, the procedures set forth in Section 4 outline the

scope of “cooperation” required between the FWS and state

and local agencies in designating critical habitat. This process

is an enhanced level of notice and comment compared to that

afforded to the general public through notice in the Federal

Register and publication in a newspaper that circulates in the

area in which the species is believed to occur. It is

undisputed that the FWS complied with Section 4 of the ESA.

Appellants argue that Section 2(c)(2)’s mandate of

“cooperation” is not satisfied by Section 4’s procedures, and

that the provision creates additional obligations where “water

resource issues” are involved. As support for this contention,

Appellants cite to California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S.

Department of Energy, which held that a provision of the

Energy Policy Act that required “consultation with affected

States” in conducting a study concerning certain transmission

corridors issues mandated that the DOE “confer with the

affected States before . . . complet[ing]” the study, rather than

rely on the statute’s notice and comment procedure. 631 F.

3d 1072, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011). But as the district court noted,

both relevant provisions of the Energy Policy Act at issue in

California Wilderness are substantive and distinct because

“the opportunity to comment provision applie[s] to the

issuing of a . . . . report based on the congestion study

previously subject to consultation.” Bear Valley Mut. Water

Co., 2012 WL5353353, at *10. But here, Section 2(c)(2)

merely announces a general policy goal that is reflected in the

substantive and procedural requirements of Section 4.

Finally, Appellants’ citation to legislative history is

unavailing. Although Appellants cite some portion of the

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legislative history which suggests that Congress intended for

“most of the potential conflicts between species conservation

and water resource development [to] be avoided through

close cooperation,” this same text later makes explicitly clear

that Section 2(c)(2) does not “change the substantive or

procedural requirements of the Act.” Accordingly, we affirm

the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

Appellees as to claim 1.

II. The Critical Habitat Designation of Land Covered by

the MSHCP Was Proper

A. Legal Framework

Section 4(b)(2) requires the FWS to designate critical

habitat “on the basis of the best scientific data available and

after taking into consideration the economic impact, the

impact on national security, and any other relevant impact, of

specifying any particular area as critical habitat.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1533(b)(2). “The determination of what constitutes the

‘best scientific data available’ belongs to the agency’s

‘special expertise . . . .When examining this kind of scientific

determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a

reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.” 

San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Jewell,

747 F.3d 581, 602 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Baltimore Gas &

Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103

(1983)).

A critical habitat designation must describe the PCEs,

which are the “physical and biological features essential to

the conservation of the species and which may require special

management considerations or protection.” 50 C.F.R.

§ 424.12(b). The FWS “may exclude any area from critical

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habitat if [it] determines that the benefits of such exclusion

outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the

critical habitat, unless [it] determines, based on the best

scientific and commercial data available, that the failure to

designate such area as critical habitat will result in the

extinction of the species concerned.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).

B. Appellants’ Challenge to the FWS’s Decision Not

to Exercise Its Discretion to Exclude Land

Covered by the MSHCP Fails

Judicial review of agency decisions under the APA does

not apply to an “agency action [that] is committed to agency

discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). An action is

committed to agency discretion where there is no

“meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s

exercise of discretion.” See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,

830 (1985). Typically, where a statute is written in the

permissive, an agency’s decision not to act is considered

presumptively unreviewable because courts lack “a focus for

judicial review . . . to determine whether the agency exceeded

its statutory powers.” Id. at 832. Here, the district court

found that, to the extent Appellants argued that the FWS

violated the ESA and the APA by not exercising its discretion

to exclude land covered by the MSCHP, that agency decision

is unreviewable because “[t]he statute is written in the

permissive,” and authorizes the FWS to exclude essential area

from a critical habitat designation but does not compel it to

do so. Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 2012 WL 5353353, at

*14. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the

district court that an agency’s decision not to exclude critical

habitat is unreviewable.

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Appellants’ principle argument is that if there is a

manageable standard to review an agency’s decision to

exclude, which all parties agree is subject to review, the same

standard can, and should be, used to review an agency’s

decision not to exclude. Their authority for this proposition

is the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in Amador County v. Salazar,

640 F.3d 373, 379–83 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and Dickson v. Sec’y

of Def., 68 F.3d 1396, 1401–02 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cases in

which the court held that a statute is not made unreviewable

by the use of permissive language alone. This argument is

unavailing.

In Amador County, the D.C. Circuit analyzed a provision

of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which states that the

Secretary of Commerce “may disapprove a [Tribal-State]

compact [entered into between an Indian tribe and a State

governing gaming on Indian lands of such Indian tribe] . . .

only if such compact violates (i) any provision of this chapter,

(ii) any other provision of Federal law . . . , or (iii) the trust

obligations of the United States to Indians.” 25 U.S.C.

§ 2710(d)(8)(B). The court found that subsection (d)(8)(B)’s

“use of ‘may’ is best read to limit the circumstances in which

disapproval is allowed.” Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 381. In

Dickson, the D.C. Circuit analyzed a statute directing that the

Army Board for Correction of Military Records “may excuse

a failure to file [a request for a correction of military records]

within three years after discovery if it finds it to be in the

interest of justice.” 68 F.3d at 1399 (quoting 10 U.S.C.

§ 1552(b)). The court concluded that Congress did not intend

“may” to confer complete discretion because “this

construction would mean that even if the Board expressly

found in a particular case that it was in ‘the interest of justice’

to grant a waiver, it could still decline to do so.” Id. at 1402,

n.7.

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Appellants, however, misunderstand the standard under

which a decision to exclude is reviewable. Unlike Amador

County and Dickson, where the government argued that it was

not obligated to take any action, the FWS is obligated to take

an action under Section 4(b)(2), i.e., designate essential

habitat as critical. The decision to exclude otherwise

essential habitat is thus properly reviewable because it is

equivalent to a decision not to designate critical habitat.

But the statute cannot be read to say that the FWS is ever

obligated to exclude habitat that it has found to be essential. 

Such a decision is always discretionary and the statute

“provides absolutely no standards that constrain the Service’s

discretion” not to exclude, unlike the statute reviewed in

Amador County, which cabined the agency’s discretion to

disapprove compacts to a set of specified conditions. See

Conservancy of Sw. Fla. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv.,

677 F.3d 1073, 1084, n. 16 (11th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing

Amador County and finding that the use of the word “may” in

another section of the ESA precludes the review of an

agency’s exercise of discretion); see also Ekimian v. INS,

303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that where the

Board of Immigration is permitted to reopen proceedings in

“exceptional circumstances,” its decision not to reopen a case

is unreviewable because there are no “statutory, regulatory,

or caselaw definition[s] of ‘exceptional circumstances’” and

thus no manageable standard to apply on review).3

 

3

 We note that our holding today also comports with every lower court

that has addressed this issue to date. See Aina Nui Corp. v. Jewell, 52 F.

Supp. 3d 1110, 1132 n.4 (D. Haw. 2014) (“The Court does not review the

Service’s ultimate decision not to exclude . . . , which is committed to the

agency’s discretion.”);Cape HatterasAccess Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Dep’t.

of the Interior, 731 F. Supp. 2d 15, 29 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The plain reading

of the statute fails to provide a standard by which to judge the Service’s

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s holding that the

FWS’s decision not to exclude land covered by the MSHCP

is not subject to review.

C. The FWS’s Designation of Lands Included in the

MSHCP Was Not Arbitrary or Capricious

Even if an agency’s decision not to exclude is

unreviewable, courts undisputedly have the authority to

review whether the FWS properly included an area in a

critical habitat designation. This inquiry turns on whether the

designation was based on “the best scientific data available,”

and whether the FWS took into consideration the economic,

national security, or any other relevant impacts, of

“specifying any particular area as critical habitat,” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1533(b)(2).

Appellants do not argue that the FWS relied on faulty

scientific data, or that there is no rational relationship

between the facts underlying the determination that the

MSHCP lands were essential and the FWS’s designation of

critical habitat. Rather, Appellants contend that “[b]y

executing the MSHCP and its ImplementationAgreement, the

FWS assured [p]ermittees that it would not designate MSHCP

land unless it first found that the plan was not being

implemented.” According to Appellants, the inclusion of this

land in the 2010 Final Rule was a “radical departure from

decision not to exclude an area from critical habitat.”); Home Builders

Ass’n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 05-cv-629, 2006 WL

3190518 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006) (“[T]he court has no substantive

standards by which to review the [agency’s] decisions not to exclude

certain tracts based on economic or other considerations, and those

decisions are therefore committed to agency discretion.”).

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prior precedent and in contravention of assurances provided

in the IA,” and the FWS’s failure to consider the

consequences of violating those assurances makes the 2010

Final Rule arbitrary and capricious. We disagree.

The MSHCP-IA states that the FWS will not designate

land within the agreement “to the maximum extent allowable

after public review and comment.” While Appellants read

this provision to require that the FWS exercises its discretion

under Section 4(b)(2) to exclude MSHCP land unless

absolutely barred from doing so under the law, the Federal

Appellees respond that the MSHCP-IA does not constitute a

“contractual assurance[] that the agency would not designate

as critical habitat lands covered by the MSHCP” because

“[t]he FWS did not, nor could it, promise to ignore its ESA

obligations.” Further, the Federal Appellees argue that it

would be inappropriate and unlawful for an agency to

“commit to the substantive outcome of a future rulemaking in

an agreement with a specific group like the MSHCP

signatories.”

To the extent Appellants believe the MSHCP-IA creates

an enforceable guarantee not to designate critical habitat, they

are mistaken. Although Appellants raise valid concerns about

the permittees’ reliance on the FWS’s promise not to

designate lands “to the maximum extent allowable,” the FWS

may not relinquish its statutory obligation to designate

essential critical habitat by contract with third parties. 

Nevertheless, Appellants correctly argue that the MSHCP is

a “relevant impact” that should have been considered in the

process of rulemaking. Contrary to Appellants’ assertions,

the FWS fully considered the MSHCP as a “relevant impact,”

and its conclusion that designation of critical habitat was

nevertheless warranted is, consequently, permissible.

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At the time the 2010 Final Rule was promulgated, the

FWS’s duty to consider “any other relevant impact” under

Section 4(b)(2) required that the Service “identify any

significant activities that would either affect an area

considered for designation as critical habitat or be likely to be

affected by the designation,” and “consider the probable

economic and other impacts of the designation upon proposed

or ongoing activities.” 50 C.F.R. § 424.19 (2010), revised by

78 Fed. Reg. 53,058 (Aug. 28, 2013).

The FWS fully considered the impact of including the

areas covered by the MSHCP (as well as the SASCP) in the

2010 Final Rule, including the potentially deleterious impact

on future local cooperation efforts. See 75 Fed. Reg. at

77,985–87 (“Rationale for Including the Western Riverside

County MSHCP and SAS Conservation Program in This

Final Critical Habitat Designation”). Nevertheless, the FWS

found that the designation of critical habitat was warranted.

Specifically, the FWS noted that “the status of the Santa Ana

sucker and the status of its habitat continue to decline

throughout the Santa Ana River system,” and that because

mitigation under the MSHCP is to be implemented over a 75

year period, the continued decline warranted inclusion of

essential habitat within the MSHCP area.4Id. at 77,985. The

FWS also noted that designation will provide a significant

4 Appellants argue that this conclusion is not supported by the factual

record because a large percentage of sucker habitat had already been

conserved under the terms of the MSHCP. However, as the RCA admits,

“the acquisition of additional conservation land was intended to be a

multi-step, gradual process where land is acquired in rough proportionality

to development” over the first 25 years of the plan. Thus, the FWS’s

conclusion that the MSHCP would likely benefit the sucker in the long

term, but would not necessarily resolve short-termconservation problems,

is not arbitrary and capricious.

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public educational benefit, and may strengthen other laws in

a manner beneficial to the sucker. Id. at 77,986.

Appellants contend that the FWS’s decision was arbitrary

and capricious because the 2010 Final Rule (1) failed to cite

or address the specific assurance not to designate critical

habitat in the MSHCP-IA, or (2) to explain the decision to

reverse the exclusion in the 2004 and 2005 Final Rules. But

as Appellants admit, the FWS specifically determined that

“‘the partnership benefits of exclu[sion] . . . do not outweigh

the regulatory and educational benefits afforded . . . as a

consequence of designating critical habitat in this area.’” 

Thus, the 2010 Final Rule fully addresses the impact on

conservation plans and local partnerships. Further, the Final

Rule explains the changed circumstances requiring

designation and articulates the reasons for why the benefits of

inclusion outweigh the benefits of exclusion. This is clearly

adequate even in the absence of a specific citation to the

assurance in the MSHCP-IA.

D. The Designation Does Not Violate the “No

Surprises Rule”

Alternatively, Appellants argue that the designation of

habitat in areas covered by the MSHCP violates the FWS’s

“No Surprises Rule.” The “No Surprises Rule” provides that

once a permit has been issued pursuant to a habitat

conservation plan, and assuming that the terms of the

underlying plan are being implemented, the permittee “may

remain secure regarding the agreed upon cost of conservation

and mitigation.” Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No

Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8,859, 8,867 (Feb. 23, 1998). 

In other words, the FWS may not require permittees to pay

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for additional conservation and mitigation measures absent

“unforeseen circumstances.” 50C.F.R. §§ 17.32(b)(5)(ii–iii).

We agree with the district court that, although the FWS

cites the possibility of “conservation not currently provided

under the plan” as a potential benefit in the critical habitat

designation, nothing in the 2010 Final Rule discusses

“additional measures by the [MSHCP] permittees in

undertaking covered activities,” nor does the 2010 Final Rule

require the permittees to undertake any additional acts for

conservation. Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 2012 WL

5353353, at *15. Appellants admit that the FWS has not yet

imposed such a requirement, but contend that the “additional

regulatory benefit” rationale is arbitrary and capricious

because it could violate the No Surprises Rule in the future. 

At this juncture, these concerns are speculative. Tellingly,

the Appellants can point to no additional conservation or

mitigation measures that have been imposed on them. 

Consequently, based on the record on this appeal, we

conclude that the 2010 Final Rule does not violate the No

Surprises Rule.

E. Appellants Had Adequate Opportunity to

Comment on the FWS’s Scientific Citations

Next, the Appellants argue that the FWS committed error

by citing to two new studies—SMEA 2009 and Thompson et.

al., 2010—in the 2010 Final Rule to support its conclusion

that the status of the sucker and its available habitat have

continued to decline. We see no impropriety in the use of

those studies.

The ESA’s notice and comment procedures require that

the public be given an opportunity to provide comments on

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the contents of a proposed rule. The contents of a proposed

rule for a revised habitat designation “shall contain the

complete text of the proposed rule, a summary of the data on

which the proposal is based (including, as appropriate,

citation of pertinent information sources), and shall show the

relationship of such data to the rule proposed.” 50 C.F.R.

§ 424.16(b) (effective prior to May 31, 2012). While “[a]n

agency commits serious procedural error when it fails to

reveal portions of the technical basis for a proposed rule in

time to allow for meaningful commentary . . . . the public is

not entitled to review and comment on every piece of

information utilized during rule making. . . . [A]n agency,

without reopening the comment period, may use

supplementary data . . . that expands on and confirms

information contained in the proposed rulemaking . . . so long

as no prejudice is shown.” Kern Cnty. Farm Bureau v. Allen,

450 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations

omitted); accord Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt,

58 F.3d 1392, 1402 (9th Cir. 1995).

The Federal Appellees correctly contend that the

Thompson and SMEA studies simply expand upon and

confirm the data used to support two conclusions in the 2009

Proposed Rule—the decline of the sucker and its habitat. 

Further, the Thompson study was cited in the Proposed Rule

in its draft form, and was thus available to the public for

comment. While the SMEA study was not available at the

time of the Proposed Rule, it was supplementary to the

otherwise cited studies, which also found that the sucker and

its habitat have declined over time.

Appellants do not challenge the reliability of the studies,

but disagree with the FWS’s interpretation and use of the

studies. Specifically, Appellants argue that the majority of

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the studies in the 2009 Proposed Rule predate 2004, while the

FWS based its decision to designate critical habitat in the

2010 Final Rule on a conclusion, supported by the new

studies, that there has been a continued decline of the sucker

since the MSHCP was finalized in 2004.

Appellants’ contention that the FWS used these studies to

show decline since 2004 is not correct. Rather, the FWS used

these studies to supplement the previous studies which

showed the persistent decline of the sucker and its habitat

over time. Appellants fail to explain why the pre-2004

studies would not tend to support the conclusion that the

habitat continues to decline. More importantly, Appellants do

not explain why the 2009 Proposed Rule’s citation to the pre2004 studies did not put them “on notice” that the decline of

the sucker and its habitat were relevant factors in the FWS’s

decision making process, and did not afford Appellants an

opportunity to comment on those issues.

Even if the FWS somehow erred in failing to reopen the

comment period after the addition of these two studies,

Appellants fail to demonstrate how this error prejudiced

them. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (requiring that a court reviewing

agency decisions take “due account . . . of the rule of

prejudicial error”).” Appellants do not challenge the studies’

reliability or conclusions or cite to studies supporting

alternative findings. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees on

all claims arising out of the designation of critical habitat in

areas covered by the MSHCP.

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III. The FWS’s Designation of Critical Habitat in

Unoccupied Areas Was Proper

The ESA authorizes the FWS to designate unoccupied

areas “upon a determination by the [Service] that such areas

are essential for the conservation of the species.” 16 U.S.C.

§ 1532(5)(A)(ii). The implementing regulation further

provides that “critical habitat areas outside the geographical

area presently occupied by a species” should be designated

“only when a designation limited to its present range would

be inadequate to ensure the conservation of the species.” 50

C.F.R. § 424.12(e).

The 2010 Final Rule designated unoccupied habitat in

subunit 1A of the Santa Ana River as essential because areas

within subunit 1A are the primary sources of high quality

coarse sediment for the downstream occupied portions of the

Santa Ana River. The Final Rule determined that coarse

sediment was essential to the sucker because provided a

spawning ground as well as a feeding ground from which the

sucker obtained algae, insects, and detritus. The Final Rule

also determined that Subunit 1A assisted in maintaining

water quality and temperature in the occupied reaches of the

river. 75 Fed. Reg. at 77,972–73, 77,977–78.

Appellants claim that this justification fails to establish

that subunit 1A is essential to the conservation of the species

and that the designated occupied areas are inadequate to

ensure the conservation of the species. Although Appellants

consider these to be two separate requirements, they are

identical. The ESA requires the FWS to demonstrate that

unoccupied area is “essential” for conservation before

designating it as critical habitat. The implementing

regulation phrases this same requirement in a different way,

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and states that the FWS must show that the occupied habitat

is not adequate for conservation. As the district court

properly found, “[i]f certain habitat is essential, it stands to

reason that if the [Service] did not designate this habitat,

whatever the [Service] otherwise designated would be

inadequate. . . . [T]he regulation provides only elaboration

and not an additional requirement or restriction.” Bear Valley

Mut. Water Co., 2012 WL 5353353, at *22. The Final Rule

sufficiently explained why the designation of unoccupied

habitat in subunit 1A was essential, and conversely, why

designation of solely occupied habitat was inadequate for the

conservation of the species.

Appellants further contend that the FWS’s justification

for designating this unoccupied land was arbitrary and

capricious because “uninhabitable source areas do not meet

the statutory requirement for critical habitat.” There is no

support for this contention in the text of the ESA or the

implementing regulation, which requires the Service to show

that the area is “essential,” without further defining that term

as “habitable.” Finally, Appellants argue that the FWS’s

reliance on the fact that PCEs exist in the designated

unoccupied habitat is contrary to the statute because it is the

same test used for occupied habitat. But the 2010 Final Rule

does not designate subunit 1A as essential only because it

contains PCEs. Rather, the area is designated as essential

because it provides “sources of water and coarse sediment

. . . . necessary to maintain preferred substrate conditions” for

the sucker. 75 Fed. Reg. at 77,972–73 (emphasis added). For

these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Appellees as to all claims pertaining to

the designation of unoccupied habitat in subunit 1A.

 Case: 12-57297, 06/25/2015, ID: 9587234, DktEntry: 75-1, Page 35 of 36
36 BEAR VALLEY MUT. WATER CO. V. JEWELL

IV. Appellants’ NEPA Claim Fails as a Matter of Law

Finally, Appellants contend that the FWS violated NEPA

by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement in

connection with its 2010 Final Rule. Any such claim is

foreclosed by the controlling law of this Circuit, which holds

“that [the] NEPA does not apply to the designation of a

critical habitat.” Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1502. Although

Appellants ask this Court to revisit and overrule Douglas

County, “in the absence of intervening Supreme Court

precedent, one panel cannot overturn another panel.” Hart v.

Massanari, 266 F.3 115, 1171–72 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Appellees on any claim arising under

NEPA.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.

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