Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02122/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02122-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 RAUL AGUIRRE BARAJAS, Case No.: 16cv2122-BTM (KSC)

12 Petitioner,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO

DISMISS

13 v.

14 R. GRAVES,

15 Respondent.

[Doc. No. 17] 16

17 Before the Court is a First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Amended Petition”) filed on September 26, 2016, by petitioner Raul Aguirre Barajas

(“petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis. [Doc. Nos. 9, 11.] On

January 4, 2017, respondent R. Graves (“respondent”) filed a Motion to Dismiss the

Amended Petition as untimely. [Doc. No. 17.] Petitioner did not respond to respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss. After a thorough review of Amended Petition [Doc. No. 11],

respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 17], and the supporting documents submitted

by respondent [Doc. No. 18], the Court RECOMMENDS that respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED, and that the Amended Petition be DISMISSED.

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1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

2 Petitioner is an inmate currently serving a third strike 45-year-to-life term for

murder. [Doc. No. 18-2, at p. 1.] He is also serving an indefinite administrative term in the

secure housing unit (“SHU”) as a result of being validated as an associate ofthe Mexican

Mafia prison gang. Id.

On July 10,2013, while incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison, petitioner received

a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) for willfully delaying a peace officer by participating in

a hunger strike and missing nine consecutive state issued meals. [Doc. No. 11, at p. 41;

Doc. No. 18-1, at pp. 30-31.] After a disciplinary hearing on July 25, 2013, the hearing

officer found petitioner guilty of willfully delaying a peace officer in the performance of

duty arising from his participation in the hunger strike. [Doc. No. 11, at p. 43; Doc. No.

18-1, at pp. 21-22.] The hearing officer imposed a forfeiture of ninety days of conduct

credits as petitioner’s penalty. [Doc. No. 11, at p. 44; Doc. No. 18-1, at pp. 21-22.]

Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the disciplinary decision by filing administrative

appeals within the prison system. [Doc. No. 11, atpp. 19, 57-58; Doc. No. 18-1, atpp. 26-

35.] On December 23, 2013, the Pelican Bay State Prison issued the third (and final) level

appeal decision affirming the RVR and finding petitioner guilty of willfully delaying a

peace officer for his participation in the hunger strike. [Doc. No. 11, at pp. 19, 57-58.]

On May 8,20141, petitioner filed a petition for writ ofhabeas corpus in the Superior

Court of Del Norte County.2 [Doc. No. 18-1, at pp. 1-13.] Petitioner argued that “the

disciplinary guilty finding was unlawful.” Id. at p. 4. Specifically, petitioner argued that

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24 i Because petitioner is a pro se, incarcerated prisoner, the “mailbox rule” applies, meaning that his

petition is deemed filed on the date ofits submission to the prison authorities for mailing. See Noble v.

Adams, 676 F.3d 1180,1182 (9th Cir. 2012). The application ofthe mailbox rule is not disputed by

respondent in the Motion to Dismiss; in fact, throughout respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, respondent

refers to the filing date of documents by petitioner as the “constructive filing date.” [See, e.g., Doc. No.

4:5; 4:13; 4:20.]

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28 2 Case Number HCPB14-5070

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“the decision not to eat is a medical decision” and defendants violated his “right ofprivacy

when they chose to punish him for his right to make a medical decision.” Id. at p. 6.

Petitioner further argued that defendants gave “no evidence offorce and violence, nor any

evidence of delaying a peace officer.” Id. at p. 8. In a four-page order filed on March 9,

2015, the Del Norte Superior Court denied petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. [Doc. No.

18-2, at pp. 1-4.] The Del Norte Superior Court found that “[petitioner is statutorily

precluded from earning credits against his sentence because ofhis three-strikes conviction

(Penal Code §2933.2(a)), because is serving a sentence for murder (Penal Code §1933.5)

and because he is a validated prison gang affiliate housed in the SHU (Penal Code §

2933.6).” Id. at pp. 1-2. In denying the petition, the Court noted that “[petitioner is not

eligible to earn custody credits.” Id. “Nevertheless, the hearing officer, as punishment for

this disciplinary offense, assessed a 90-day credit forfeiture, but advised Petitioner that if

he remained discipline free for six months he may qualify for restoration of credits.” Id.

On May 18, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court ofAppeal.3 [Doc. No. 18-3, at p. 20.] Petitioner contended in his petition

to the California Court ofAppeal that:

He did not seek to have his credits restored but rather to have his record

cleared of a frivolous conviction for a non-existent prison rule violation.

. . . Petitioner’s requested remedy is dismissal [ofthe guilty finding of

willfully delaying a peace officer] because, when Petitioner finally

appears before the Parole Board for a suitability hearing, ‘institutional

behavior’ is a statutory factor which the Parole Board is mandated to

consider on determining whether to grant Parole or not.

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22 Id. at p. 16. (internal citation omitted).

The California Court ofAppeal denied petitioner’s writ ofhabeas corpus on July 9,

2015 in a one sentence decision stating “[t]he petition for a writ of a habeas corpus is

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1 denied.” [Doc. No. 11, at p. 92.] On August 10, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court.4 [Doc. No. 11, at pp. 15-35.] The

California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on January 13, 2016. [Doc. No.

18-4, atp. 1.]

The first federal Petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus in this case was filed on August

1,2016 (hereinafter “First Federal Petition”). [Doc. No. 1.] On August 30,2016, the Court

dismissed without prejudice the First Federal Petition for failure to name a proper

respondent. [Doc. No. 9, at pp. 2-3.] On September 22, 2016, petitioner filed the instant

Amended Petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus before the Court. [Doc. No. 9]. The instant

Amended Petition alleges that the disciplinary decision finding petitioner guilty was

unlawful and deprived petitioner of his rights to due process oflaw, among other things.

[Doc. No. 11, at p. 7.] On October 11, 2016, this Court issued a briefing schedule. [Doc.

No. 12.] Respondent filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the Amended Petition on January

4, 2017. [Doc. No. 17.] To date, petitioner has not filed an Opposition.5

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Amended Petition is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the 1996

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Section 2254(a) sets forth the

scope ofreview for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court

shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of Constitution or laws or

treatises ofthe United States.

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23 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

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4 Case Number S228819

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5 As set forth in the Court’s briefing schedule issued on October 11,2016, the deadline for petitioner to

file an opposition to respondent’s Motion to Dismiss was January 9,2017. [Doc. No. 12.] 28

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The AEDPA created a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of a

federal habeas petition by a state prisoner. The applicable statute oflimitations is

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) as follows:

1. A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment ofa State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of:

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A. the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration ofthe time for seeking such review; 7

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B. the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

the State action in violation ofthe Constitution oflaws ofthe United

States is removed, ifthe applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

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C. the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right had been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review; or

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15 D. the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

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2. The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

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21 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d).

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1 III. DISCUSSION

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A. Timeliness ofthe Petition

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Respondent moves to dismiss petitioner’s petition on the basis that it is untimely.6

[Doc. No. 17-1, at p. 2.] Respondent contends “for the 952-day period between the third

level administrative appeal decision upholding [petitioner’s] disciplinary ruling and the

filing of his federal Petition, [petitioner] is not entitled to 407 days oftolling.” Id. at p. 5.

Respondent admits that a petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling during the time that a

“properly filed” state post-conviction or other collateral-review petition is “pending.” Id.

at p. 2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Carey v. Gil, 536 U.S. 214, 217-21 (2002)).

Respondent argues, however, that “applications must be filed within a ‘reasonable time,’

to be considering pending.” [Doc. No. 17-1, at p. 3 (citing Gil, 536 U.S. at 217-21; Evans

v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2002)).] Respondent further argues that petitioner is not entitled

to equitable tolling. [Doc. No. 17-1, at p. 5.] Asa result, respondent contends that petitioner

filed his First Federal Petition 42 days after the applicable statute of limitations expired.

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The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file an

application for writ ofhabeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year limitations period

applies to all “habeas petitions filed by persons in ‘custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State Court,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), even if the petition challenges a pertinent

administrative decision rather than a state court judgment.” Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d

1061, 1063 (9th. Cir. 2004). In Shelby, the Ninth Circuit held that the statute oflimitation

period applies “even if the petition challenges a pertinent administrative decision rather

than a state courtjudgment.” Id. at 1063. The Ninth Circuit took this same position inRedd

v. McGrath, in which the AEDPA’s statute of limitations was applied to an inmate’s

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27 6 For purposes of calculating timeliness, the Court uses the date that petitioner filed his First Federal

Petition, August 1,2016, not the filing date ofhis Amended Petition. Respondent does not dispute using

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1 petition challenging the denial of his administrative appeal. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d

1077 (9th Cir. 2003). Because petitioner is “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State Court,” his petition is governed by the AEDPA’s one-year statute oflimitations.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The one-year statute oflimitations begins to run from the “date on which the actual

predicate ofthe claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). In Shelby, the prison board’s denial ofthe

inmate’s administrative appeal formed “the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented,” and so the limitations period began to run on the day after the inmate learned

of the prison board’s decision. Shelby at 1066. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)). The

limitations period in Redd also began to run on the day after the inmate learned the prison

board had denied his administrative appeal. Redd at 1082.

Here, on December 23,2013, petitioner learned his third-level administrative appeal

had been denied. [Doc. No. 11, at pp. 57-58.] The one-year limitations period thus began

to run on the following day, December 24, 2013.7 Absent sufficient tolling of the

limitations period, the petition filed on August 1,2016, is untimely.

1. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA tolls its one-year limitations period for the “time during which a

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is

pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999)

overruled on other grounds by Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). An

application for state post-conviction review is considered “pending” during the interval

between the lower state court’s adverse decision and the prisoner’s filing of a notice of

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25 7 Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying FRCP 6(a) to compute the time at

which the statute oflimitations commences under the AEDPA). The Court rejects respondent’s

contention in the Motion to Dismiss that petitioner had 365 days from December 23,2013 to file his

petition, absent relevant tolling. [Doc. No. 17-1, at p. 4.] Rather, the Court finds that petitioner had 365

days from December 24, 2013 to file his petition, absent relevant tolling.

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1 appeal in the higher state court, provided that the filing ofthat notice is timely under state

law. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222-25 (2002). In California, where habeas decisions

are not appealed but may be filed originally in each court, “pending” includes a reasonable

time, such as 30 to 60 days, between decision and subsequent filing. Evans v. Chavis, 546

U.S. 189 (2006) (holding that an unjustified and unexplained six-month delay is

presumptively unreasonable). The statute of limitations is not tolled however, “from the

time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal [to] the time the first state collateral

challenge is filed.” Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. Similarly, the limitations period is not tolled

after state post-conviction proceedings are final and before federal habeas proceedings are

initiated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

Here, petitioner filed his first state habeas petition in the Del Norte Superior Court

on May 8,2014. [Doc. No. 18-1, atpp. 1-13.] The AEDPA’s one-year statute oflimitations

was not tolled during the 135 day period between the end of petitioner’s direct appeal on

December 24, 2013, and petitioner’s first state collateral challenge on May 8, 2014. Nino,

183 F.3d at 1006 (no tolling between finality ofjudgment and filing ofapplication for postconviction relief). Thus, petitioner had 230 days left to file his federal habeas petition once

he finished the state collateral review process. The Del Norte Superior Court denied

petitioner’s first habeas petition on March 9,2015. [Doc. No. 18-2, at pp. 1-4.] The Court

indicated that it need not decide “the merits ofthe petition” because petitioner is statutorily

precluded from earning credits against his sentence because ofhis three-strikes conviction

and because he is a validated prison gang affiliate housed in the SHU. Id. at pp. 1-2.

Seventy days later, on May 18, 2015, petitioner filed his habeas petition in the California

Court ofAppeal. [Doc. No. 18-3, at pp. 1-18.]

Respondent contends petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the period between the

Del Norte Superior Court’s denial of the petition and the refiling of the petition in the

California Court of Appeal because the “unexplained and unjustified 70-day delay is

‘unreasonable.’” [Doc. No. 17-1, at p. 4.] In Evans, the Supreme Court indicated that a

delay ofsix months is unreasonable. 546 U.S. at 201. The Court stated “[s]ix months is

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far longer than the short period[s] oftime, 30 to 60 days, that most States provide for filing

an appeal to the state supreme court.... We have found no authority suggesting, nor found

any convincing reason to believe, that California would consider an unjustified or

unexplained 6-month filing day reasonable.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).

In Culver v. Director ofCorrections, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1135,1140-41 (C.D. Cal. 2006), the

court found a delay of 71 days and 97 days was unreasonable. Here, petitioner provides

no explanation orjustification for the 70-day delay period between the Del Norte Superior

Court’s denial of his petition and the refiling of the petition in the California Court of

Appeal, and precedent dictates that such delay is unreasonable under California law. See,

e.g., Huntv. Felker, 2008 WL 364995 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (70-day delay unreasonable).

Accordingly, the period between the Del Norte Superior Court’s denial of

petitioner’s first petition on March 9,2015 and the refiling ofthe petition in the California

Court ofAppeal on May 18,2015, was not tolled. White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 884 (9th

Cir. 2010) (“Tolling under section 2244(d)(2) is unavailable where a state habeas petition

is deemed untimely under California’s timeliness standards.”) The statute of limitations

clock thus started again when the Del Norte Superior Court denied petitioner’s first state

habeas petition on March 9, 2015. Therefore, when petitioner refiled his habeas petition

in the California Court ofAppeal on May 18,2015, an additional 70 days had lapsed against

the one-year federal statute of limitations period, leaving petitioner with 160 days to file

his federal habeas petition once he completed the state collateral review process.

The California Court ofAppeal denied his petition on July 9,2015. [Doc. No. 11, at

p. 92.] Then, 31 days later, on August 10,2015, petitioner filed a petition for writ ofhabeas

corpus with the California Supreme Court. [Doc. No. 11, at pp. 15-35.] The Court finds

that the 31 day delay is reasonable, and therefore the statute oflimitations was tolled during

that period. On January 13,2016, the California Supreme Courtsummarily denied petition.

Id. At that point, petitioner still had 160 days to file his federal petition. Two hundred and

one days later, on August 1, 2016, petitioner filed the First Federal Petition. [Doc. No. 1.]

Thus, the petition is untimely unless petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling.

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1 2. Equitable Tolling

The United States Supreme Court has held that the AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S.

631 (2010). While equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases,” Miles v. Prunty, 187

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), it is appropriate where a habeas petitioner demonstrates

two specific elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing hisrights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 632 (citing Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). It is a high standard to meet the “AEDPA’s

statutory purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in order to protect the

federal system from being forced to hear stale claims.” Guillory v. Rose, 329 F.3d 1015,

1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted).

Petitioner has not filed any document requesting equitable tolling or otherwise

demonstrated he is entitled to equitable tolling. As evidenced by the record, petitioner has

failed to establish that he was diligent in pursuing his rights. Petitioner filed his federal

petition 41 days after the 365-day AEDPA statute-of-limitations period had expired,

without any explanation regarding why his petition was late. Similarly, petitioner has

failed to establish that there were any extraordinary circumstance(s) that prevent him from

filing a timely petition. Accordingly, the Court finds equitable tolling is not warranted in

this case.

B. Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction

Respondent also argues that the Court should dismiss petitioner’s federal petition

“because success on his claims will not necessarily accelerate his release.” [Doc. No. 17-

1, at p. 6.] Respondent further asserts that “the challenges to [petitioner’s] disciplinary

decision cannot invoke habeasjurisdiction underthe facts ofthis case.” Id. at pp. 6-7 (citing

Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 574, 579 (2006)).

“The Supreme Court has recognized that ‘[fjederal law opens two main avenues to

relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §

2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871... 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’” Nettles

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1 v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922,927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert, denied, 137 S.Ct. 645 (2017)

(quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam)). “‘Challenge to the

validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of

habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be

presented in a §1983 action.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).

In Nettles, the petitioner filed a habeas petition in federal court seeking, among other

things, “restoration of good time” in connection with a loss of 30 days ofpost-conviction

credits as a result of a disciplinary decision. 830 F.3d at 927. Petitioner argued “that the

disciplinary decision impacted the duration of his confinement because it delayed his

parole hearing and constituted grounds for future denial of parole.” Id. The court found

that “because success on [petitioner’s] claims would not necessarily lead to his immediate

or earlier release from confinement, [petitioner’s] claim does not fall within the core of

habeas corpus, and he must instead bring his claim under 1983.” Id. at 935 (internal citation

omitted). The Nettles court reasoned that because the parole board has the authority to deny

parole based on any of the information presented to it, the presence of a disciplinary

infraction does not compel the denial of parole, nor does an absence of the infraction

compel grant ofparole. Id.

Pursuant to Title 15, § 2281 of the California Code of Regulations, the California

Board of Parole Hearings (the Board), shall conduct suitability hearings in order to

determine whether a prisoner shall be released on parole. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 2281(a).

In making a suitability determination, the Board shall consider all relevant, reliable

information available to them. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 2281(b) (emphasis added). “A rules

violation is merely one ofthe factors shedding light on whether a prisoner constitutes a

current threat to public safety.” Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935 (internal quotations and citations

omitted).

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Here, petitioner’s claims do not implicate the fact or duration ofhis confinement and

success on petitioner’s claim would not necessarily result in the shortening ofhis sentence.

Petitioner is serving an indeterminate term of45-years-to-life. [Doc. No. 18-2, at p. 1.] He

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is also serving an indefinite administrative term in the secure housing unit (SHU) as a result

of being validated as an associate ofthe Mexican Mafia prison gang (now referred to as a

“security threat group”). Id. Petitioner is statutorily precluded from earning credits against

his sentence. Id. at pp. 1-2. Petitioner contended in his traverse in support of his state

habeas petition in the Del Norte County Superior Court that “the disciplinary conviction

jeopardizes parole suitability, apparently when he becomes eligible for parole

consideration in about 30 years.” Id. at p. 2. Notwithstanding petitioner’s contention, he

will continue to be eligible for parole consideration and may be released once he is found

suitable, notwithstanding his July 10, 2013 RVR.

Under applicable law and the circumstances of petitioner’s case, the Board could

deny parole to petitioner even ifhe succeeded in expunging the RVR at issue. Nettles, 830

F.3d at 935. Because success on petitioner’s claims would not necessarily lead to his

immediate or earlier release from confinement, petitioner’s claims do not fall within the

core ofhabeas corpus.

Here, for the reasons explained, supra, the petitioner’s claims do not even invoke

habeas jurisdiction. For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the District Court

DENY petitioner’s federal petition in its entirety.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

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Amended Petition on September 22,2016. [Doc. No. 9.] However, petitioner filed his First

Federal Petition 41 days after the 365-day AEDPA statute oflimitations period, including

all applicable statutory tolling, had expired. Further, petitioner has failed to carry his

burden of establishing that he qualifies for equitable tolling. Accordingly, this Court

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Ifpetitioner’s claims were not time-barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute oflimitations, petitioner

could have chosen to file a new and separate complaint asserting his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 28

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RECOMMENDS that respondent’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 17], be GRANTED

and that the Amended Petition [Doc. No. 9] be DISMISSED as time-barred by AEDPA.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Judge pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b), and Civil Local Rules

72.1 (d) and HC.2 ofthe United States District Court forthe Southern District ofCalifornia.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 30 days from issuance ofthis Order, any party

to this action may file and serve written objections to this Report and Recommendation.

The document should be captioned “Objection to Report and Recommendation”.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection shall be filed and

served no later than 10 days after beine served with the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appear ofthis Court order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th

Cir. 1991).

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14 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May^,2017 15

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Hon. Kapm S. Crawford

United States Magistrate Judge 17

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16rv9 199-RTM (TtSf!!

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