Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05206/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05206-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405g Review of HHS Decision (RSI)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of 1

 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne

 B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

BILLY J. WILLIS PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 06-5206

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff Billy J. Willis appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court. On

February 26, 2007, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 20). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $4,135.60 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 28.55 hours of work before the court at an

hourly rate of $144.00, and $24.40 in expenses. (Doc. # 21-22). The defendant has filed a

response, expressing no objection to this award. (Doc. #23).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

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sentence-four judgment reversing theCommissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. 

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter. The Commissioner does not oppose the

award of a reasonable attorney'sfee under the EAJA, does not object to the hourly rate requested

by plaintiff’s counsel for attorney’s fees and does not dispute the number of hours expended by

counsel. (Doc. # 23). The court construes this lack of opposition to the award of a reasonable

fee as an admission that the government's decision to deny benefits was not "substantially

justified."

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

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In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

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The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $144.00 an hour based on

an increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per

hour- the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase

in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys

justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not

automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074

(8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the

hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living

sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the

Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index

as an exhibit (Doc. # 22) and has presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living.

Therefore, the undersigned believes her argument for enhanced fees based on a cost of living

increase has merit. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's counsel is entitled to an award at the rate

of $144.00 per hour.

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claimsshe spent working on this

case. Plaintiff's counsel seeks a total of 2.75 hours of work from October 5, 2006, through

October 9, 2006. The Complaint was not filed in this court until October 18, 2006. (Doc. # 1).

We note, time spent at the administrative level is not compensable under the EAJA. See

Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984). However, some of the time

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submitted on the above referenced dates was clearlyin preparation for the filing of the Complaint

with this court. Therefore, we will allow 2.00 hours. Accordingly, 0.75 hour must be deducted

from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.25 hour on October 18, 2006 (receive and review order

granting application to proceed In Forma Pauperis), from which we deduct 0.15 hour; 0.25 hour

on November 6, 2006 (receive and review order reassigning case to magistrate and consent to

magistrate filed by defendant), from which we deduct 0.15 hour; 0.25 hour on December 28,

2006 (receive and review briefing schedule for plaintiff’s brief), from which we deduct 0.15

hour; 0.15 hour on January 4, 2007 (receive and review memorandum of reassignment), from

which we deduct 0.05 hour; 0.25 hour on January 18, 2007 (receive and review order granting

additional pages), from which we deduct 0.15 hour; 0.25 hour on February 13, 2007 (receive and

review motion for extension of time by defendant), from which we deduct 0.15 hour; 0.25 hour

on February 14, 2007 (receive and review order granting defendant’s motion), from which we

deduct 0.15 hour; 0.25 hour on February 26, 2007 (receive and review magistrate’s order

granting defendant’s motion to remand), from which we deduct 0.15 hour; and 0.50 hour on

February 26, 2007 (receive and review magistrate’s judgment and memorandum opinion), from

which we deduct 0.40 hour. This court concludes that the time submitted on the above

referenced dates, should not have taken an attorney experienced in handling social security cases

more than five or six minutes to review these documents. Bowman v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744

F.Supp 898 (E.D.Ark. 1989). Accordingly, 1.50 hours must be deducted from the total

compensable time sought by counsel. 

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Plaintiff’s counsel requested 0.50 hour, on February 14, 2007, and February 26, 2007,

to draft a one sentence reply expressing no objection to defendant’s motions. We find the time

submitted to be excessive and reduce it by 0.40 hour for each date submitted. We also find the

0.75 hour submitted to review defendant’s motion to remand to be excessive and reduce 0.58

hour. Accordingly, 1.38 hours must be deducted from the total compensable time sought by

counsel. 

Plaintiff counsel seeks 0.25 hour on October 25, 2006 (dictation of affidavit of service

and review), from which we deduct 0.15 hour; 0.25 hour on October 25, 2006 (dictated and

reviewed summons and letters of service and completion of consent to magistrate), from which

we deduct 0.15 hour; and 0.15 hour on November 22, 2006 (receive and review confirmation of

receipt of affidavit of service), from which we deduct 0.15 hour. This time cannot be

compensated, in full, under the EAJA. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d

881, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff is not

compensable under the EAJA). Accordingly, we deduct 0.45 hour from the total number of

compensable hours sought.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 16.25 hours for reviewing the transcript, researching

and writing plaintiff’s appeal brief. There were no unique or complex issues to be developed in

this particular case. Plaintiff’s counsel frequently represents social security plaintiff’s before this

court and should be well versed in social security law and we find that the time submitted for

preparing this brief to be excessive. Therefore we are reducing the number of hours submitted

for the preparation of plaintiff’s brief to 13.00 hours.

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Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.50 hour on January 15, 2007, to draft a motion to exceed the

page limitation. We find the time submitted to be excessive and reduce it by 0.33 hour. 

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $24.40 in expenses incurred with regard to

postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $24.40 to be a reasonable

award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 20.89

(28.55-7.66) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $144.00 per hour, and $24.40 in expenses

for a total attorney's fee award of $3,032.56. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not

out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 11 day of June 2007. th

/s/ J. Marschewski 

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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