Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03026/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03026-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ryan Joseph Proper,

Petitioner,

v. 

Phoenix City Prosecutor’s Office, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-03026-PHX-SRB (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Ryan Joseph Proper’s (“Petitioner”) Second Amended 

“Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “Second Amended 

Petition”) (Doc. 7). For the reasons explained herein, the undersigned recommends that 

the Court dismiss the Second Amended Petition (Doc. 1) as untimely. 

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2014, Petitioner was charged with violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-

1381(A)(1) (driving under the influence if impaired to the slightest degree) and ARIZ.

REV. STAT. § 28-1381(A)(3) (driving under the influence with a drug or metabolite in the

person’s body). (Doc. 36-1 at 2). As recounted by the Superior Court of Arizona:

The charges were the result of a three car collision that

occurred on May 20, 2014. The vehicle Defendant was 

driving rear-ended another vehicle, which caused that vehicle 

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to rear-end the vehicle in front of it. Defendant was 

transported to the hospital where he consented to a blood 

draw. Defendant informed the officer that he had taken a 

Valium that morning and had consumed one beer with his 

lunch. Testing of Defendant’s blood later revealed the

presence of five drugs/metabolites: Alprazolam, 7-

Aminoclonazepam, Diazepam, Nordiazepam, and Oxazepam. 

Defendant also had a BAC of .038.

(Id. at 2). Following trial, a jury sitting in the Phoenix Municipal Court convicted 

Petitioner of driving with a drug or its metabolite in violation ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-

1381(A)(3). (Id.). The Phoenix Municipal Court sentenced Petitioner to ten days in jail, 

followed by a three-year term of probation. (Id.). On May 19, 2015, the Phoenix

Municipal Court suspended the imposition of nine days in jail upon Petitioner’s 

successful completion of substance abuse screening. (Id.). Petitioner filed an appeal in 

the Superior Court of Arizona in and for Maricopa County. (Id. at 7-11). 

On March 25, 2016, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) in 

the Phoenix Municipal Court. (Id. at 37). Following briefing, the Phoenix Municipal 

Court denied PCR relief. (Id. at 73). Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the

Superior Court. (Id. at 75-88). The Superior Court granted review, but denied relief. (Id.

at 115-17). Petitioner filed a Petition for Special Action in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Id. at 119-34). The Court of Appeals declined to exercise jurisdiction. (Id. at 136). The

Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the Court of Appeals’ denial. (Id. at 156). 

On September 25, 2018, Petitioner initiated this federal habeas proceeding. (Doc.

1). Pursuant to the Court’s Screening Order (Doc. 11), Respondents have answered the

Second Amended Petition (Doc. 7). (Doc. 36). Petitioner has filed a Reply (Docs. 37, 

38). 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

110 Stat. 1214, a state prisoner must file his or her federal habeas petition within one year

of the latest of: 

A. The date on which the judgment became final by the

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conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

B. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

C. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

D. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007). The one-year limitations period, however, does not necessarily run for 365 

consecutive days as it is subject to tolling. Under AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision, 

the limitations period is tolled during the “time during which a properly filed application 

for State post-conviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); Roy v. 

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (limitations period is tolled while the state 

prisoner is exhausting his or her claims in state court and state post-conviction remedies 

are pending) (citation omitted). 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have 

considered the question, we hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.”). Yet equitable tolling is applicable only “if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (citations omitted); Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 n.8 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A petitioner must show (i) that he or she has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (ii) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his or her way. Pace v. 

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DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roy, 465 F.3d at 969.

III. DISCUSSION 

A. This Proceeding is Untimely 

In this case, the relevant triggering event for purposes of AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations is the date on which Petitioner’s judgment became “final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

The Superior Court of Arizona affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on 

March 25, 2016. (Doc. 36-1 at 2-3). Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 22-375,

1 Petitioner

was precluded from appealing the decision to a higher state court. Petitioner therefore

correctly asserts (Doc. 38 at 5) that the ninety-day time period in which to file a petition 

for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court applies in determining the date 

on which Petitioner’s conviction became final. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 

(9th Cir. 2010) (“[D]irect review is considered final when the certiorari petition would 

have been due, which is 90 days after the decision of the state’s highest court.”). The 

undersigned finds that Petitioner’s conviction became final on June 23, 2016, which is

ninety days from March 25, 2016.

2

 See Salman v. Arpaio, No. CV-12-01747-PHX-ROS, 

1 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 22-375(B) provides that except in certain limited 

circumstances, “there shall be no appeal from the judgment of the superior court given in 

an action appealed from a justice of the peace or a municipal court.”

2 After dismissing Petitioner’s PCR proceeding, the Phoenix Municipal Court set a 

hearing date for “imposition of the sentence.” (Doc. 7-3 at 2). The record reflects that

the Phoenix Municipal Court imposed the sentence on August 7, 2017. Petitioner asserts 

that “the latest date his judgment of conviction could have become final was August 7, 

2017 . . . .” (Doc. 38 at 5) (emphasis in original). The record reflects that the Phoenix

Municipal Court sentenced Petitioner on May 19, 2015. (Doc. 36-1 at 2, 5). Because the

Phoenix Municipal Court did not modify Petitioner’s sentence at the August 7, 2017 

hearing, the undersigned rejects Petitioner’s argument. See, e.g., Houston v. Harris, No. 

1:17-CV-218, 2020 WL 38618, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2020) (“[T]he state court here 

did not impose a new sentence in the nunc pro tunc entry from what was announced at 

the sentencing hearing and included in the original sentencing judgment entry. . . . The 

Court concludes that the nunc pro tunc sentencing judgment entry did not reset the 

federal habeas statute of limitations.”). This case is distinguished from those cases in 

which a habeas petitioner is challenging a court’s resentencing judgment. See, e.g., 

Hepburn v. Moore, 215 F.3d 1208, 1209 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The judgment Appellant 

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2014 WL 4977680, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2014) (adding ninety days to finality date of 

municipal court conviction where ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 22-375 prevented petitioner from 

appealing Superior Court ruling affirming the conviction). Accordingly, the one-year 

statute of limitations began running on June 24, 2016. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 

641, 654 (2012) (AEDPA’s statute of limitations commences upon the expiration of the 

time for seeking review of petitioner’s judgment in a state’s highest court); Patterson v. 

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the “anniversary method” of Rule 

6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to calculate the expiration date of AEDPA’s 

one-year statute of limitations). Consequently, unless statutory or equitable tolling 

applies, Petitioner’s one-year deadline to file a federal habeas petition expired on June

23, 2017, rendering this proceeding initiated in September 2018 untimely.

1. Statutory Tolling

Statutory tolling does not apply to collateral review petitions that are not “properly 

filed.” Pace v. DiGuiglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A collateral 

review petition is “properly filed” when its delivery and acceptance comply with state 

rules governing filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000); Orpiada v. McDaniel,

750 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2014) (court looked to Nevada state filing requirements in 

determining whether habeas petitioner’s PCR petition was a “properly filed” application 

that is eligible for tolling). This includes compliance with filing deadlines. Hence, an 

untimely state collateral review petition is not “properly filed.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 

(holding that “time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions,” and that a state 

PCR petition is therefore not “properly filed” if it was rejected by the state court as 

untimely).

If the collateral review petition was “properly filed,” then the Court must 

determine the dates it was “pending.” In Arizona, a PCR petition becomes “pending” as 

seeks to challenge is the judgment at resentencing. The statute of limitations therefore 

began to run on October 23, 1998, the date the resentencing order became final by the 

conclusion of direct review.”). Moreover, Respondents correctly argue that this 

proceeding would remain untimely even if the Court concluded that the August 7, 2017 

sentencing order delayed finality of Petitioner’s conviction. (Doc. 36 at 7 n.3).

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soon as the notice of PCR is filed. Isley v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 

1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The language and structure of the Arizona postconviction rules 

demonstrate that the proceedings begin with the filing of the Notice.”). It remains 

“pending” until it “has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction 

procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). This includes “[t]he time

between (1) a lower state court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a 

notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state 

law.” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006) (citing Carey, 536 U.S. 214). 

Here, the one-year statute of limitations began running on June 24, 2016. On 

March 25, 2016, before Petitioner’s conviction became final, Petitioner filed a PCR 

Notice. (Doc. 36-1 at 37). The limitations period therefore was immediately tolled when 

Petitioner’s conviction became final on June 23, 2016. On May 12, 2017, the Superior 

Court affirmed the Phoenix Municipal Court’s denial of PCR relief. (Id. at 115-17). 

Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 22-375, Petitioner could not seek further review by the

Arizona Court of Appeals or Arizona Supreme Court. See also Rule 13(b), Arizona 

Superior Court Rules of Appellate Procedure—Criminal (“No further appeal may be 

taken from a final decision or order under these rules, except as provided by A.R.S. §§ 

22-375, pursuant to Rule 31, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.”). The undersigned 

finds that the PCR proceeding concluded on May 12, 2017.

The undersigned rejects Petitioner’s argument that his Petition for Special Action

filed in the Arizona Court of Appeals tolled the limitations period. (Doc. 38 at 7-8). In 

Arizona, a petition for special action is the equivalent of a petition for writ of mandate. 

Ariz. R.P. Special Actions 1, 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. “Special action jurisdiction is 

appropriate when there is no equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by way of 

appeal.” State ex rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage, 200 Ariz. 582, 585, 30 P.3d 649, 652 (Ct. 

App. 2001) (citing Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a)). “Special action jurisdiction is more likely 

to be accepted in cases involving a matter of first impression, statewide significance, or 

pure questions of law.” Id. 

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In the context of federal habeas proceedings, “[p]etitions for writ of mandate do 

not toll the limitations period because they are not application[s] for State post-conviction 

or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claims within the 

meaning of § 2244(d)(2).” Hardiman v. Galaz, 58 F. App’x 708, 710 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Meadows v. Jacquez, 242 F. 

App’x 453, 455 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that mandamus petitions are not petitions for 

collateral review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). Because a petition for 

special action is not a request for collateral review, it therefore has no tolling effect on 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See Simmons v. Ryan, No. CV-14-01415-PHX-SRB, 

2015 WL 2234932, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 12, 2015) (“With respect to the tolling of the 

one-year statute of limitations, Petitioner argues that the Petition for Special Action to the 

Arizona Supreme Court that he filed to challenge the Arizona Superior Court’s denial of 

his Petition for Post–Conviction Relief rather than filing a Petition for Review to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals should result in the tolling of the statute of limitations. 

However, as noted by the Magistrate Judge in his Report and Recommendation, a special 

action is not an application for state post-conviction or other collateral review within the 

meaning of § 2244(d)(2) . . . .”).

The undersigned concludes that the AEDPA’s limitations period recommenced on 

May 13, 2017. As the limitations period recommenced on May 13, 2017 and no time had 

previously run off the limitations “clock,” Petitioner had until May 12, 2018 to file his 

federal habeas petition. This federal habeas proceeding, filed on September 25, 2018, is 

untimely unless equitable tolling applies. 

2. Equitable Tolling is Unavailable

Regarding equitable tolling, Petitioner has the burden to show that extraordinary 

circumstances beyond Petitioner’s control made it impossible for him to file a timely 

federal petition. Roy, 465 F.3d at 969; Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 888 n.8. A petitioner’s pro se 

status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling. See, e.g., Johnson v. United 

States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005). In addition, a petitioner’s miscalculation of when the 

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limitations period expired does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting 

equitable tolling. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see

also Alexander v. Schriro, 312 F. App’x 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Ultimately [the 

petitioner] made an incorrect interpretation of the statute and miscalculated the 

limitations period. This does not amount to an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ warranting 

equitable tolling.”).

There is no indication in the record that the circumstances of Petitioner’s 

incarceration made it “impossible” for Petitioner to timely file a federal habeas petition. 

Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that equitable tolling 

did not apply where there was “no indication in the record that [circumstances] made it 

‘impossible’ for [prisoner] to file on time”); Wilson v. Bennett, 188 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353-

54 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (allegations that the petitioner lacked legal knowledge and had to

rely on other prisoners for legal advice and in preparing his papers “cannot justify 

equitable tolling” as such circumstances are not “extraordinary”). Petitioner has failed to 

show the existence of “extraordinary circumstances” that were the proximate cause of the 

untimely filing of this proceeding. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 

2003) (for equitable tolling to apply, a “prisoner must show that the ‘extraordinary 

circumstances’ were the cause of his untimeliness”). Equitable tolling therefore is 

unavailable. Accordingly, this habeas proceeding is untimely.

B. The Actual Innocence/Schlup Gateway Does Not Apply to Excuse the 

Untimeliness of this Proceeding

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013), the Supreme Court 

announced an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The Court held that 

the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that was applied to procedural 

bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. The “actual innocence gateway”

is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” or the “miscarriage of justice exception.”

Under Schlup, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review under the miscarriage of 

justice exception must establish his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere 

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legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. 

Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires 

petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical 

physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; see also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 

(9th Cir. 2011); McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining the significance of an 

“[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). A petitioner “must show that it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 

new evidence.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the allegation of actual 

innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 

2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

Petitioner argues that the actual innocence/Schlup gateway applies in this case. 

(Doc. 38 at 9-10). As mentioned, Petitioner was convicted of violating ARIZ. REV. STAT.

§ 28-1381(A)(3) (driving under the influence with a drug or metabolite in the person’s 

body). Petitioner raises the defense contained in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-1381(D), which

provides that: “A person using a drug as prescribed by a medical practitioner who is 

licensed pursuant to title 321 and who is authorized to prescribe the drug is not guilty of 

violating subsection A, paragraph 3 of this section.” Attached to Petitioner’s Reply are 

copies of certified medical and pharmacy records that were not presented at trial, which 

Petitioner asserts “convincingly establishes the second element of his A.R.S. § 28-

1381(D) defense, which is a complete defense to the charge for which he was convicted.” 

(Doc. 38 at 10) (emphasis in original).

The record reflects that Petitioner testified at his trial that he was taking all of the

prescription drugs found in his blood as prescribed by his doctor. (Doc. 38-1 at 5). The

medical and pharmacy records submitted by Petitioner corroborates Petitioner’s 

testimony that he had valid prescriptions for the drugs, but it does not show that he was 

using them as prescribed. The records reflect that Petitioner has a history of drug 

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addiction and psychiatric issues. (Id.). The undersigned finds that despite the records, a

reasonable jury could have concluded that Petitioner was not using the medications as 

prescribed. Petitioner has not presented any new reliable evidence establishing that he is 

factually innocent of his convictions. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2011)

(“In order to present otherwise time-barred claims to a federal habeas court under Schlup, 

a petitioner must produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence to bring him “within the 

‘narrow class of cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”) (citations

omitted); Shumway, 223 F.3d at 990 (“[A] claim of actual innocence must be based on 

reliable evidence not presented at trial.”); Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2013) (“[W]e have denied access to the Schlup gateway where a petitioner’s evidence of 

innocence was merely cumulative or speculative or was insufficient to overcome 

otherwise convincing proof of guilt.”). Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden 

of producing “new reliable evidence” of his actual innocence, the undersigned 

recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass through the actual 

innocence/Schlup gateway to excuse the untimeliness of this federal habeas proceeding. 

See Smith v. Hall, 466 F. App’x 608, 609 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that to pass through 

the Schlup gateway, a petitioner must first satisfy the “threshold requirement of coming 

forward with ‘new reliable evidence’”); Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“To meet [the Schlup gateway standard], [petitioner] must first furnish ‘new 

reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.’”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Second Amended Petition (Doc. 7) be 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Second 

Amended Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar.

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This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72.

Dated this 3rd day of April, 2020.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

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