Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01460/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01460-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN D. TERRITO,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-1460 MCE EFB P

vs.

RICHARD W. SANDHAM, et al. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff is a prisoner, with appointed counsel suing for alleged civil rights violations. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 7, 2008, defendants filed a motion to modify the pretrial

scheduling order to allow them time to file a motion for summary judgment. Defendants made

this same request in their January 2, 2008, pretrial statement. On January 3, 2008, plaintiff filed

an opposition to that request which the court construes as an opposition to this motion as well. 

Although noticed for hearing on March 7, 2008, the motion was heard on January 9, 2008,

contemporaneously with the Final Pretrial Conference. Steven S. Kimball, Esq. appeared on

behalf of the plaintiff. John M. Feser, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the

defendants. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned recommends that the motion be

denied.

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 At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that plaintiff’s designation of an expert

was proper, and simply argued that another summary judgment motion should be permitted. As

explained below, good cause has not been shown to modify the pretrial scheduling order to reopen law and motion.

2

As a threshold matter, the scheduling order does not need to be revised to provide

defendants an opportunity to file a motion of summary judgment. Defendants are well aware

that they timely sought summary judgment and that, on March 8, 2007, the court denied their

motion, finding that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants were

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s need for adequate treatment for his Type I diabetes. It

appears from defendants’ arguments on this motion that they do not, in fact, seek an order

modifying the schedule, but instead seek a second bite at the summary judgment apple. Thus,

the court construes their request as one for reconsideration.

A party seeking reconsideration of an order has the burden of setting forth the material

facts and circumstances surrounding each motion for which reconsideration is sought, including

“what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were

not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion,” and “why the

facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.” Local Rule 78-

230(k)(3), (4). Defendants assert they did not learn the identity of plaintiff’s expert until

December 19, 2007, when plaintiff filed his pretrial statement, suggesting that plaintiff was, in

essence, sandbagging by not presenting expert testimony in his opposition to their motion for

summary judgment. They also complain that plaintiff did not in his pretrial statement

demonstrate that the expert’s testimony will create a triable issue of material fact.

Defendants’ first argument is that “plaintiff disclosed his medical expert in this case for

the first time on December 19, 2007.” Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. at 4 (emphasis in original). The

suggestion is that plaintiff’s designation was untimely,1 and that defendants were prejudiced by

the designation in some way that denied defendants a fair opportunity to move for summary

judgment. Neither contention has merit.

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2

 Use of experts in custodial inmate cases, where most plaintiffs proceed in pro se, is

rare.

3

 During the final pretrial conference the trial date was set for April 6, 2009.

3

There was nothing improper or untimely about the plaintiff’s expert designation here. A

party is required to disclose the identity of any expert who may be called to give an opinion at

trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). A party must also provide all other parties with a written

report prepared by the expert. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). However, the timing of the

disclosure here is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Unless the court sets times and sequences

(normally in a pretrial scheduling order) for disclosing the identity and reports of experts who

will be called to give substantive testimony, the disclosures must be made no later than 90 days

before the trial date. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). The purpose of paragraph (2) is to ensure

disclosure of

information regarding expert testimony sufficiently in advance of trial that

opposing parties have a reasonable opportunity to prepare for effective cross

examination and perhaps arrange for expert testimony from other witnesses.

Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 26.

In ordinary, non-custodial inmate cases, the schedule ordered pursuant to Rule 16 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the parties to identify experts and exchange reports

before the close of discovery.2

 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (permitting courts to modify the

times for disclosures under Rule 26(e)(1). See also, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993

Amendments to Rule 26 (Normally the court should provide a time for these disclosures in a

scheduling order under rule 16(b)). However, the schedule in this case did not specify when the

identity of experts must be disclosed. It only gave a time for general discovery to close. 

Because the order did not direct that expert disclosures be made at any particular time or in any

particular sequence, the portion of subdivision (C) making disclosure due at least 90 days before

the trial date controls. At the time plaintiff designated his expert, there was no trial date set.3

Therefore, the designation was timely. Additionally, defendants themselves included a

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designation of a medical expert in their recently filed pretrial statement and they are in no way

prejudiced by plaintiff’s expert designation.

Likewise, there is no basis for the suggestion that plaintiff’s designation in some way

prejudiced the defendants’ ability to file a motion for summary judgment. To the contrary, they

had every opportunity to litigate such a motion, and in fact, did. Significantly, their motion was

supported by several expert declarations from the defendant doctors. Plaintiff had no such

expert assistance. In spite of that advantage, as the court previously explained in its analysis

recommending denial of that motion for summary judgment, defendants’ own declarations and

the medical records established triable issues of fact as to whether there was deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s need for adequate treatment for his Type I diabetes.

Defendants’ second argument is difficult to discern. They argue that plaintiff has not

“made the requisite showing that a medical expert will provide testimony that creates a triable

issue of material fact.” Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. at 5. Whatever is meant by that, they are

mistaken as to the requirements for use of an expert. They also appear to disregard the point that

in denying defendants’ summary judgment motion the court found that there were genuine issues

of material fact that could not be resolved on summary judgment. Plaintiff has not designated an

expert for purposes of opposing or re-arguing a summary motion which has already been denied. 

The purpose of the designation is to inform the defendants of plaintiff’s expert witness who will

testify at trial. The use of the expert, like the one defendants designated, is for presenting expert

medical testimony at trial to assist the jury in understanding the internal medicine and

endocrinology issues as well as the medical records as the jury performs its function of resolving

the disputed factual issues. That is precisely the grounds upon which an expert may be used. 

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

In short, the instant motion seeks a second attempt at arguing a summary judgment

motion, but neither argument presented in the motion establishes “new or different facts or

circumstances . . . which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion. . .” and “why

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the facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.” Local Rule 78-

230(k)(3), (4). More to the point, defendants have not shown that the earlier ruling finding

genuine disputes over material issues of fact was erroneous. For these reasons, the undersigned

recommends that the motion to modify, construed as a motion for reconsideration, be denied.

Finally, the parties have agreed to produce their respective experts for deposition. The

parties shall produce expert reports no later than 30 days after the pretrial order is signed and

complete the depositions no later than 90 days after the pretrial order is signed.

Accordingly, it hereby ORDERED that expert reports shall be produced no later than 30

days after the pretrial order is signed and complete the depositions no later than 90 days after the

pretrial order is signed.

Further, it is RECOMMENDED that defendants’ January 7, 2008, motion to modify the

schedule, construed as a motion for reconsideration, be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: January 31, 2008.

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