Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02016/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02016-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIMBERLY J. HAMILTON

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-2016-KJN

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and 

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social 

Security Act (“Act”).1 In her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff principally contends that 

the Commissioner erred by finding that plaintiff was not disabled from June 3, 2012, her alleged

disability onset date, through the date of the final administrative decision. (ECF No. 17.) The 

Commissioner filed an opposition to plaintiff’s motion and a cross-motion for summary 

judgment. (ECF No. 18.) Thereafter, plaintiff filed a reply brief. (ECF No. 19.) 

 

1

This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(15), and both parties 

voluntarily consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (ECF 

Nos. 8, 9.) 

Case 2:15-cv-02016-KJN Document 20 Filed 08/25/16 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

2

After carefully considering the parties’ written briefing, the court’s record, and the 

applicable law, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, GRANTS the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and AFFIRMS the final decision of the 

Commissioner. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on September 17, 1961; has a high school education along with 

certification as a nursing assistant; is able to communicate in English; and previously worked 

primarily as an in-home caregiver. (Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 23, 43-44, 97-98, 236, 

238.)2 On September 27, 2012, and December 13, 2012, plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI,

respectively, alleging that her disability began on June 3, 2012, and that she was disabled 

primarily due to chronic pancreatitis, hepatitis C, diabetes, high blood pressure, and chronic leg 

pain. (AT 12, 97-98, 189, 192, 237.) After plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on 

reconsideration, plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which 

took place on September 23, 2014, and at which plaintiff, represented by an attorney, and a 

vocational expert (“VE”) testified. (AT 12, 38-72.) The ALJ subsequently issued a decision

dated December 10, 2014, determining that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in 

the Act, from June 3, 2012, plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, through the date of the ALJ’s 

decision. (AT 12-24.) The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when 

the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on July 28, 2015. (AT 1-7.) Plaintiff

then filed this action in federal district court on September 23, 2015, to obtain judicial review of 

the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1.)

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

On appeal, plaintiff raises the following issues: (1) whether the ALJ erroneously 

discounted the opinion of the consultative examining psychiatrist; and (2) whether the ALJ 

improperly relied on the VE’s testimony at step five. 

 

2 Because the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, including plaintiff’s 

medical and mental health history, the court does not exhaustively relate those facts in this order. 

The facts related to plaintiff’s impairments and treatment will be addressed insofar as they are 

relevant to the issues presented by the parties’ respective motions.

Case 2:15-cv-02016-KJN Document 20 Filed 08/25/16 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

3

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “The 

court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of the ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ evaluated plaintiff’s entitlement to DIB and SSI pursuant to the Commissioner’s 

standard five-step analytical framework.3 As an initial matter, the ALJ determined that plaintiff 

 

3 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the Social 

Security program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to disabled 

persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in part, as 

an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). A parallel 

five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-

42 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the 

claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to step 

three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or 

equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the 

claimant is automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing her past relevant work? If so, the 

Case 2:15-cv-02016-KJN Document 20 Filed 08/25/16 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

4

met the insured status requirements of the Act for purposes of DIB through September 30, 2016. 

(AT 14.) At the first step, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since June 3, 2012, plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date. (Id.) At step two, the ALJ 

found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus with neuropathy, left 

knee degenerative joint disease, hepatitis C, pancreatitis, hypertension, affective disorder, and 

alcohol dependence in remission. (AT 14-15.) However, at step three, the ALJ determined that 

plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled 

the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AT 15.)

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) as follows:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) 

to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b) except the claimant cannot climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, 

and occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl. The 

claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dust, 

and gasses. The claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to 

poorly ventilated areas. The claimant’s work is limited to simple, 

as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) as SVP 

levels 1 and 2, routine and repetitive tasks. Her work is limited to 

occasional changes in the work setting, and occasional interaction 

with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors. The claimant 

would require the use of a cane or a walker for ambulation.

(AT 16-17.) 

At step four, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant 

work. (AT 23.) However, at step five, the ALJ found that, in light of plaintiff’s age, education, 

 

claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to perform any 

other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

Case 2:15-cv-02016-KJN Document 20 Filed 08/25/16 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

5

work experience, and RFC, and based on the VE’s testimony, there were jobs that existed in 

significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform. (AT 23-24.) Thus, the 

ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from June 3, 

2012, plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AT 24.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Substantive Challenges to the Commissioner’s Determinations

Whether the ALJ erroneously discounted the opinion of the consultative examining 

psychiatrist4

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by 

treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 

1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally speaking, 

a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining physician’s opinion, and an 

examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a non-examining physician’s opinion. 

Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202.

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 830-31. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons. Id. at 830. The opinion of a non-examining 

professional, by itself, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining professional. 

Id. at 831.

On June 7, 2013, plaintiff was evaluated by consultative examining psychiatrist, Dr. 

Antoinette Acenas. (AT 366-69.) Dr. Acenas did not review any of plaintiff’s records, other than 

plaintiff’s disability report. (AT 366.) Plaintiff informed Dr. Acenas that she suffered from 

paranoia that people were “out to get her” and auditory hallucinations, including mumbling 

 

4

 On appeal, plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s evaluation of the evidence that relates to 

plaintiff’s physical limitations. Plaintiff’s briefing focuses solely on the ALJ’s evaluation of the 

evidence concerning plaintiff’s mental limitations. 

Case 2:15-cv-02016-KJN Document 20 Filed 08/25/16 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

6

voices that were trying to hurt her. (Id.) After performing a mental status examination, Dr. 

Acenas diagnosed plaintiff with chronic paranoid schizophrenia, and opined that plaintiff could

manage her funds, had basic mathematical skills, and could perform simple and repetitive tasks, 

but could have problems accepting instructions from supervisors due to her auditory 

hallucinations and paranoid thinking. (AT 368-69.) Dr. Acenas further opined that plaintiff may 

not be able to perform work on a consistent basis, maintain regular attendance, finish a normal 

workweek, or deal with the usual stress encountered in a competitive workplace. (AT 369.) 

In this case, the ALJ accepted Dr. Acenas’s assessment that plaintiff was capable of 

performing simple and repetitive tasks, but rejected the remainder of Dr. Acenas’s severe 

limitations. (AT 22.) Because Dr. Acenas’s opinion was contradicted by other opinions in the 

record, the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. 

Acenas’s opinion. The court concludes that the ALJ properly discharged his obligation in that 

regard.

The ALJ reasonably found that Dr. Acenas’s severe limitations were inconsistent with the

relatively mild findings of mental status examinations performed by plaintiff’s treating 

psychiatrist at San Joaquin County Behavioral Health Services, Dr. Saba Rizvi. (AT 22.) At her 

initial intake assessment by a marriage and family therapist intern, Jane Sanchez, plaintiff 

complained of debilitating mental symptoms, but Ms. Sanchez nonetheless noted that plaintiff’s 

prognosis was good, and that plaintiff was on time and cooperative. (AT 375-80.) Subsequent 

visits with plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Rizvi, largely confirmed Ms. Sanchez’s prognosis 

and assessment. For example, on October 25, 2013, Dr. Rizvi noted that plaintiff had a depressed 

mood and anxious affect, but had excellent hygiene and grooming; was very verbal, cooperative, 

and organized with good eye contact; had no suicidal or homicidal ideations; and had fair insight 

and judgment. (AT 271, 416.) On November 26, 2013, Dr. Rizvi found that plaintiff had 

excellent grooming and hygiene, was cooperative and pleasant, had good eye contact, was very 

verbal, was not depressed and not irritable with a slightly elevated affect, was organized, had no 

suicidal or homicidal ideations, and had fair insight and judgment. (AT 273, 414.) Thereafter, on 

December 23, 2013, Dr. Rizvi again made virtually identical findings, except noting that 

Case 2:15-cv-02016-KJN Document 20 Filed 08/25/16 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

7

plaintiff’s mood was “trying to change to the positive” and that her affect was bright. (AT 269, 

412.)

The ALJ also rationally determined that Dr. Acenas’s opinion was largely based on 

plaintiff’s subjective complaints, which the ALJ found not fully credible. (AT 22.) See

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Because the present record supports 

the ALJ in discounting Tonapetyan’s credibility, as discussed above, he was free to disregard Dr. 

Ngaw’s opinion, which was premised on her subjective complaints.”).

As an initial matter, Dr. Acenas’s opinion itself provides little explanation by reference to 

any clinical findings for the severe limitations assessed related to accepting instructions from 

supervisors, work attendance, and work stress. Upon her mental status examination, Dr. Acenas 

found that plaintiff had a depressed mood with some memory impairment, but otherwise was 

fully oriented, had good grooming and hygiene (except for poor dentition), was friendly and 

cooperative, had spontaneous speech, was coherent and able to present a cohesive history, and 

had normal judgment and insight. (AT 367-68.) Thus, it was not unreasonable for the ALJ to 

conclude that Dr. Acenas relied heavily on plaintiff’s subjective complaints in formulating her 

severe limitations.

Moreover, the ALJ properly discounted plaintiff’s subjective complaints of extreme

paranoia and auditory hallucinations, at least to the extent that they were alleged to be present at a 

disabling level. As the Commissioner points out, plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s

assessment of plaintiff’s credibility on appeal. In any event, the ALJ provided several specific, 

clear, and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s credibility. As the ALJ observed, 

although plaintiff reported having visual hallucinations since she was 8 years old, and auditory 

hallucinations since 2009, plaintiff nevertheless worked for years until June 2012, plausibly

suggesting that such mental symptoms were not disabling. (AT 20, 22, 375-76.) Furthermore, 

the ALJ noted that plaintiff had a limited mental health treatment record and was not always 

compliant with prescribed treatment, which suggested that her mental impairments were not as 

disabling as alleged. (AT 20.) After plaintiff’s first visit at San Joaquin County Behavioral 

Health Services in May 2013, she did not return to that clinic until October 2013, with no further 

Case 2:15-cv-02016-KJN Document 20 Filed 08/25/16 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

8

visits after December 2013, even though the record was left open at the September 2014 

administrative hearing to allow plaintiff’s attorney to submit any additional treatment records. 

(AT 19-20, 72.) Notably, at the administrative hearing, plaintiff testified that she had not seen her 

treating psychiatrist for more than six months, because she did not like her. (AT 20, 53.) She 

also testified that she had stopped taking the medication prescribed by her psychiatrist, because it 

made her feel strange, and “the main thing she was giving them to me for sleeping, and my 

primary doctor gave me something that helps me sleep, so I didn’t think I needed to take them 

anymore.” (AT 20, 53-54.) 

Therefore, the ALJ appropriately discounted Dr. Acenas’s opinion on the basis that it 

heavily relied on plaintiff’s subjective complaints, which were found not fully credible. 

Finally, the ALJ also properly relied on the opinions of the state agency psychologists. 

(AT 21-22.) On July 3, 2013, state agency psychologist Dr. Heather Barrons reviewed plaintiff’s 

records and opined that plaintiff was capable of understanding and remembering simple 

instructions/procedures and workplace locations; maintaining concentration, pace, and persistence 

for simple routines throughout a normal workday or workweek; interacting with co-workers,

supervisors, and the public; and adapting to a work environment, recognizing hazards, traveling, 

and setting goals independently within the above-outlined framework. (AT 82.) Thereafter, on 

January 22, 2014, state agency psychologist Dr. Patrice Solomon reviewed plaintiff’s records and 

affirmed Dr. Barrons’s assessment. (AT 108.) Because the opinions of Drs. Barrons and 

Solomon are more consistent with the relatively mild findings of the mental status examinations 

performed by plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, as well as plaintiff’s limited mental health treatment 

record, the ALJ properly relied on those opinions to discount the opinion of Dr. Acenas. See

Tonapetyan , 242 F.3d at 1149 (“Although the contrary opinion of a non-examining medical 

expert does not alone constitute a specific, legitimate reason for rejecting a treating or examining 

physician’s opinion, it may constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent with other 

independent evidence in the record.”). Nevertheless, the court also notes that the ALJ, giving 

plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, imposed additional mental limitations to account for plaintiff’s 

impaired memory, reported auditory hallucinations, and some history of interpersonal conflicts by 

Case 2:15-cv-02016-KJN Document 20 Filed 08/25/16 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

9

limiting plaintiff to only occasional social contact and only occasional changes in the work 

setting. (AT 20-21.) 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of Dr. Acenas’s opinion. 

Whether the ALJ improperly relied on the VE’s testimony at step five

At step five, the ALJ determined, based on the VE’s testimony, that there were jobs that 

existed in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform. (AT 23-24.) 

In particular, the VE testified that plaintiff could perform the alternative representative 

occupations of packer, office helper, and electronics worker, even if plaintiff required the use of 

either a cane or a walker for ambulation. (AT 24, 69-70.) On appeal before this court, plaintiff 

contends that the ALJ impermissibly relied on the VE’s testimony, because the VE’s testimony

purportedly presented a “clear conflict” with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”).

As an initial matter, plaintiff failed to raise this evidentiary issue before either the ALJ or 

the Appeals Council. The Ninth Circuit has held that, unless manifest injustice would result, 

claimants must generally “raise all issues and evidence at their administrative hearings in order to 

preserve them on appeal,” at least when claimants are represented by counsel. Meanel v. Apfel, 

172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999). This is because the ALJ as the fact-finder, rather than a 

federal court reviewing under a substantial evidence standard of review, is the appropriate person 

to resolve factual and evidentiary inconsistencies, including alleged conflicts with the DOT. 

Indeed, at the administrative hearing, the vocational expert is subject to cross-examination by 

plaintiff’s attorney, and is on hand to address any perceived inconsistencies between the expert’s 

own testimony and the DOT. To generally permit claimants to later second-guess a vocational 

expert’s testimony in their federal court appeals, when the claimants failed to challenge such 

testimony in the administrative proceedings below, would inject a significant amount of 

inefficiency into an already-delayed claim resolution process, and also impermissibly alter the 

scope of judicial review of Social Security claims.

In this case, plaintiff, who was represented by an attorney, did not object to the VE’s 

qualifications or challenge the VE’s testimony at the hearing. (AT 67.) Indeed, plaintiff’s 

attorney declined to even question the VE, let alone inquire regarding any potential inconsistency 

Case 2:15-cv-02016-KJN Document 20 Filed 08/25/16 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

10

with the DOT. (AT 71.) As such, the issue is waived.

Moreover, no manifest injustice would result from the waiver here. Although plaintiff’s 

counsel did not question the VE, the ALJ properly discharged his responsibilities by (a)

specifically confirming with the VE that the use of a cane or walker for ambulation would not 

affect the number of jobs available; and (b) twice confirming with the VE that the VE’s testimony 

was consistent with the DOT. (AT 66, 71.) See Wentz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 401 Fed. 

App’x 189, 191 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2010) (unpublished) (holding that ALJ’s reliance on VE’s 

testimony was proper where ALJ asked the VE to identify any conflicts with the DOT, the VE 

identified none, and the claimant’s attorney did not challenge that testimony). Furthermore, even 

if plaintiff’s counsel were somehow unable to discern the alleged “clear conflict” at the time of 

the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel had an opportunity, after consideration of the VE’s testimony and 

further reflection on the record, to raise any such issue before the Appeals Council. Nevertheless, 

plaintiff’s counsel failed to put forth any argument regarding the VE’s testimony in plaintiff’s 

brief to the Appeals Council. (AT 266-68.)

Even assuming that plaintiff’s argument regarding the VE testimony were not waived, it is 

unpersuasive on the merits. Plaintiff argues that the VE’s testimony presents a “clear conflict”

with the DOT in light of SSR 96-9p. However, that Social Security Ruling addresses the 

implications of a RFC for less than a full range of sedentary work, whereas plaintiff was found 

capable of performing a reduced range of light work, which has a much larger occupational base. 

As such, the applicability of SSR 96-9p is doubtful at best. But even if it applies, SSR 96-9p 

states that, in the case of a medically-required hand-held assistive device, “[t]he adjudicator must 

always consider the particular facts of a case...In these situations, too, it may be especially useful 

to consult a vocational resource in order to make a judgment regarding the individual’s ability to 

make an adjustment to other work.” SSR 96-9p, at *7. That is exactly what the ALJ did in this 

case, and no more was required. 

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, the court finds that the ALJ’s decision was free from prejudicial legal error and 

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY 

Case 2:15-cv-02016-KJN Document 20 Filed 08/25/16 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

11

ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is DENIED.

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18) is 

GRANTED.

3. The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and judgment is entered 

for the Commissioner.

4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 25, 2016

Case 2:15-cv-02016-KJN Document 20 Filed 08/25/16 Page 11 of 11