Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02625/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02625-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JACKLYN HADDIX, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

GENERAL MILLS, INC.; GENERAL 

MILLS SALES, INC.; GENERAL MILLS 

OPERATIONS, LLC, and DOES 1–50, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-02625-MCE-AC 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Jacklyn Haddix (“Plaintiff”) filed this putative class action against 

Defendants General Mills, Inc., General Mills Sales, Inc., and Does 1-50 (collectively 

“Defendants”), alleging seven claims for relief: (1) violation of California’s Unfair 

Competition Law (“UCL”); (2) violation of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”); 

(3) violation of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CRLA”); (4) violation of 

Kentucky’s Consumer Protection Act (“KCPA”); (5) unjust enrichment; (6) breach of 

express warranty; and (7) negligence. Presently before the Court are Defendants’ 

Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)1

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 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise indicated. 

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and Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s class allegations pursuant to FRCP 12(f). 

ECF No. 7. 2 For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part.3

BACKGROUND4

Beginning in July 2015, Defendants began a manufacturing process to produce 

certain of their Cheerios cereal products without gluten. Defendants labeled these 

Cheerios products as “gluten free.” After Defendants began selling these gluten free 

products, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) received complaints about the 

products’ gluten level. Subsequent FDA testing confirmed that a sample of Defendants’ 

gluten free products had levels of gluten that exceeded applicable FDA regulations. 

On October 5, 2015, Defendants announced a voluntary recall of approximately 

1.8 million units of Cheerios products produced in their Lodi, California, packaging 

facility. Defendants maintain that there was an isolated incident at the Lodi facility that 

resulted in wheat flour, which contains gluten, being inadvertently introduced into select 

batches of the gluten free Cheerios packaged at that facility. 

Plaintiff Jacklyn Haddix is a citizen and resident of Fayette County, Kentucky. In 

late September 2015, Plaintiff purchased two boxes of Defendants’ purportedly gluten 

free Cheerios from the Kroger store in Lexington, Kentucky. She subsequently learned 

that the Cheerios she purchased were recalled for containing gluten. She returned the 

Cheerios to the Kroger store on or about October 9, 2015. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself 

/// 

 2

 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g). 

3

 Defendants also requested that the Court take judicial notice of various documents in support of 

the instant motions (ECF No. 8). Plaintiffs failed to oppose that request, and it is therefore GRANTED on 

that basis. 

4

 The following recitation of facts is taken, sometimes verbatim, from Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF 

No. 1) and Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13). 

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and all those similarly situated, seeks redress for damages caused by Defendants’ 

allegedly unlawful conduct in advertising and selling products labeled as gluten free. 

In February 2016, Defendants filed the instant motions. Defendants’ Rule 

12(b)(1) motion argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her claims because 

Defendants’ recall program provides her with all of the relief they seek. The motion to 

strike seeks to excise Plaintiff’s class action allegations from the Complaint. Finally, 

Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the sufficiency of each of Plaintiff’s claims. 

STANDARD 

 

A. 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are presumptively without 

jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). The burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Id. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by either party at any 

point during the litigation, through a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1). Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also Int’l 

Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Cnty. of Plumas, 559 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2009). 

There are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: a 

facial attack, and a factual attack. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 

F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, a party may either make an attack on the 

allegations of jurisdiction contained in the nonmoving party’s complaint, or may 

challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, despite the formal 

sufficiency of the pleadings. Id. 

In the case of a factual attack, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s 

allegations.” Thornill, 594 F.2d at 733 (internal citation omitted). The party opposing the 

motion has the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction does exist, and must 

present any necessary evidence to satisfy this burden. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 

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880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). If the plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdictional facts are 

challenged by the adversary in the appropriate manner, the plaintiff cannot rest on the 

mere assertion that factual issues may exist. Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Ind., 

Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Touche 

Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1976)). Furthermore, the district court may 

review any evidence necessary, including affidavits and testimony, in order to determine 

whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 

(9th Cir. 1988); Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. If the nonmoving party fails to meet its 

burden and the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must 

dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 

B. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 80 F.3d 336,337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 

47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 

detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of 

his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right 

to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan 

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating 

/// 

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that the pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely 

creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.”)). 

 Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 

to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 

the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202). A pleading must contain “only enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . 

have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their 

complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed 

even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a 

recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 

232, 236 (1974)). 

C. Leave to Amend 

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 

carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 

“the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, 

Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 

1013 (9th Cir. 2005)); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 

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1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 

constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)). 

D. 12(f) Motion to Strike (Class Allegations) 

The Court may strike “from any pleading any insufficient defense or any 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he 

function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that 

must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to 

trial . . . . ” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). An 

immaterial matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for 

relief or the defenses being pleaded. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th 

Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). An impertinent matter also consists of statements that do not pertain, and are 

not necessary, to the issues in question. Id. 

ANALYSIS 

The Court first addresses Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Where the Court finds 

a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and grants Defendants’ 12(b)(1) motion, it does not 

address the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings in stating a claim. The Court then 

addresses Defendants’ 12(f) motion to strike. 

A. First, Second, and Third Claims for Violation of California’s UCL, FAL, 

and CLRA 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ labeling and advertising certain Cheerios 

products as gluten free violated California’s UCL, FAL, and CLRA. Plaintiff’s UCL claim 

contends that Defendants’ gluten free Cheerios products contained gluten and as such 

the gluten free label constitutes an “unlawful” business practice within the scope of the 

UCL. ECF No. 1 ¶ 47. Plaintiff also contends that the gluten free label constitutes a 

“fraudulent” business practice under the UCL because Defendants’ use of the label 

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“created the misimpression that their products do not contain gluten and are therefore 

safe for those persons who may be sensitive to gluten.” Id. at ¶ 48. In addition, Plaintiff 

alleges Defendants violated the UCL’s “unfair” prong because the public harm stemming 

from the gluten free label outweighs any utility of the label. Id. at ¶ 50. 

Plaintiff’s FAL claim alleges Defendants committed acts of disseminating untrue 

and misleading statements under the purview of the FAL by inducing the public to 

purchase the gluten free products. Id. at ¶ 55. Public inducement was allegedly 

achieved by: representing that the gluten free products were safe for consumption by 

gluten-sensitive individuals, advertisements that created the “image, impression and 

belief by consumers that Cheerios cereals were free of gluten and safe for consumption 

by those sensitive to gluten,” and representing that Defendants had developed a reliable 

method for ensuring the Cheerios were gluten free. Id. Finally, Plaintiff’s CLRA cause of 

action alleges that Defendants intentionally sold misbranded gluten free Cheerios 

products to consumers. 

By way of her FAL and UCL claims, Plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief. As to her 

CLRA claim, Plaintiff requests an order enjoining Defendants’ actions as well as 

attorneys’ fees and costs and states that she will amend her Complaint to seek damages 

as well. 

Defendants move to dismiss all three claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

and for failure to state a claim, arguing that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue injunctive 

relief. Defendants also challenge the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claim for damages 

under the CLRA pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

1. Standing to Pursue Injunctive Relief 

The Article III “case or controversy” requirement of the United States Constitution 

“restricts the authority of federal courts to resolving the legal rights of litigants in actual 

controversies.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symcyzk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1528 (2013). 

Thus, for a federal court to have subject matter jurisdiction, there must be a “live” 

controversy for the court to adjudicate. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). 

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Plaintiff’s UCL and FAL causes of action both seek injunctive relief only. More 

specifically, Plaintiff’s UCL cause of action seeks “an order requiring Defendants to 

immediately cease such acts of unlawful, unfair and fraudulent business practices and 

requiring Defendants to correct their actions.” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 52. Plaintiff’s FAL 

cause of action seeks “judgment against Defendants for injunctive relief afforded under 

the FAL, and attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at ¶ 57. 

For injunctive relief to be proper, however, Plaintiff must show she and the 

proposed class suffered an injury that is “likely” to be “redressed by a favorable 

decision.” Lujan v. Def. Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Moreover, Plaintiff must 

demonstrate “a sufficient likelihood that [he or she] will again be wronged in a similar 

way.” Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting City 

of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)). 

 When the moving party makes a factual attack in a motion to dismiss for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, the Court is not required to accept Plaintiff’s allegations as 

true. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Rather, “[o]nce the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual 

motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the 

party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy 

its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 

373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 

343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir.2003)). 

Defendants make a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction by attaching an 

affidavit from their Director of Global Consumer Relations. ECF No. 9-2. The affidavit 

declares that there was an isolated incident at General Mills’ production facility in Lodi, 

California, resulting in the inadvertent introduction of gluten into certain Cheerios 

products. Id. ¶ 2. The affidavit also details the nature and availability of Defendants’ 

voluntary recall program. Id. ¶¶ 3-7. With the affidavit as support, Defendants argue 

there is no likelihood that Plaintiff or any member of the putative class or public will be 

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wronged again by the gluten free Cheerios products because all contaminated batches 

were successfully identified and recalled. Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 7 at 6-11. Defendants 

therefore contend that there is no live controversy for the Court to adjudicate and 

Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 

Plaintiff responds that the Court does have subject matter jurisdiction because the 

Complaint challenged the adequacy of the recall program. Pl’s Opp’n., ECF No. 13 at 3. 

However, Plaintiff makes this assertion in her Opposition brief and the portions of the 

Complaint cited to as support do not even tangentially mention Defendants’ recall 

program, let alone challenge it. Id. Moreover, because Defendants attached an affidavit 

to their motion detailing the comprehensive nature of the recall program, Plaintiff could 

not simply rely on contrary assertions in her Opposition brief to establish subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. Instead, it was incumbent on 

Plaintiff to furnish affidavits or other evidence challenging the efficacy of the recall 

program. Id. The bare assertion in Plaintiff’s Opposition papers, unsupported by her 

Complaint, is not enough to carry the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff also maintains that Defendants’ Motion must be denied because the 

merits of her claims are intertwined with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and 

“[w]here factual jurisdictional issues are intertwined with factual questions going to the 

merits, a court may not decide those factual issues on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.” Pl.’s 

Opp’n., ECF No. 13 at 3-4; Nino v. United States, No. 13CV0469, 2015 WL 5032644, at 

*5 (S.D.. Cal. Aug. 25, 2015) (citing Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enters., Inc., 

711 F.2d 138, 140-41 (9th Cir. 1983)). However, for Plaintiff’s argument to apply, a 

statute would have to provide the basis for both subject matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff’s 

substantive claims for relief. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (the merits of an 

action and subject matter jurisdiction are intertwined where “a statute provides the basis 

for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiff's substantive 

claim for relief.”). 

/// 

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Plaintiff does not identify a statute that provides both the basis for subject matter 

jurisdiction and the basis for her substantive claims for relief. Rather, Plaintiff summarily 

states that the merits of her case are necessarily intertwined with the question of 

whether Defendants’ recall program is adequate. Pl.’s Opp’n., ECF No. 13 at 3. 

Plaintiff’s bald statement and coinciding failure to provide a statute precludes her from 

availing herself of Safe Air’s “intertwined with the merits” jurisdictional exception. 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments in her Opposition, the Court has not determined 

whether Defendants’ recall program was adequate; the Court has only determined that 

Plaintiff did not satisfy her burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction in the face of 

Defendants’ factual attack. 

Defendants challenge the Court’s jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s request for injunctive 

relief under the CLRA for the same reasons. As with her UCL and FAL claims, Plaintiff 

lacks standing because she failed to present affidavits or other evidence establishing 

subject matter jurisdiction as was required when confronted by Defendants’ factual 

attack on subject matter jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

Consequently, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL and FAL causes of 

action is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED. Furthermore, to the extent 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief under her CLRA claim, that claim is DISMISSED as well. 

Plaintiff may, however, be able to satisfy Article III’s requirements if she can make 

factual allegations showing some continued threat of harm from Defendants’ Gluten Free 

Cheerios products. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend. See Figy v. 

Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1085-86 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (granting leave to 

amend because the Court was not persuaded that amendment would be futile although 

Plaintiffs failed to offer evidence that the Court had subject-matter jurisdiction in the face 

of Defendants’ factual attack). 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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2. Damages 

a. Subject matter jurisdiction 

Unlike the claim for injunctive relief, Plaintiffs’ claim for damages under the CLRA 

is not dismissed for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.5 Defendants’ argument that all 

claims for economic damages are “moot” because Plaintiff was entitled to a refund 

through Defendants’ voluntary recall program and indeed received that refund when she 

returned the Gluten Free Cheerios that she purchased is rejected. Def’s Mot., ECF 

No. 7 at 7. 

Mootness resulting in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction occurs when “an 

opposing party has agreed to everything the other party has demanded.” GCB 

Commc’ns v. U.S. S. Commc’ns, 650 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, however, 

Defendants have not so agreed. While Defendants have provided a full recall and 

offered replacement of contaminated boxes of their Cheerios products or a full refund of 

the purchase price of gluten free Cheerios products, that covers only a portion of 

Plaintiff’s purported damages. Def’s Mot., ECF No. 7 at 9. Indeed, Plaintiff requests 

damages that exceed the scope of the recall program and relate to Defendants’ 

business practices prior to instituting the recall program. ECF No. 1 at 18. As 

Defendants have not provided all of the damages that Plaintiff seeks, Defendants have 

not “agreed to everything the other party has demanded,” and Plaintiff’s CLRA claim 

cannot be considered moot. GCB Commc’ns, 650 F.3d 1267. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s CLRA damages claim for a 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED and the Court must assess whether 

Plaintiff’s pleadings are sufficient to state a claim. 

b. The pleadings are sufficient to state a claim 

The CLRA enables a consumer to bring a class action if the consumer has 

suffered “any damage” from any “method, act, or practice” made unlawful by the Act. 

 5

 Although Plaintiff has yet to amend her Complaint to specifically seek damages under the CLRA, 

Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief seeks an award of “compensatory, exemplary, punitive and statutory penalties 

and damages, including interest, in an amount to be proven at trial.” ECF No. 1 at 18 

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Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1780(a), 1781(a). The CLRA makes it unlawful for anyone to 

misrepresent “the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services.” 

Id. § 1770(a)(2). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ gluten free Cheerios are a “good” that 

Defendants misrepresented as not containing gluten. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 66. The CLRA 

also makes it unlawful for anyone to represent that “goods or services have sponsorship, 

approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not 

have....” Id. § 1770(a)(5). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ gluten free label 

represented that the Cheerios products had “sponsorship, approval, characteristics, 

uses, and benefits which they do not have under the governing law.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 67. 

The CLRA also makes it unlawful for anyone to represent “that goods or services are of 

a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if 

they are of another.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(7). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ 

gluten free label represented that the Cheerios products were “to be of a particular 

standard, quality, or grade which they are not under the governing law.” ECF No. 1 at 

¶ 68. The CLRA similarly makes it unlawful for anyone to “advertis[e] goods or services 

with intent not to sell them as advertised.” Cal Civ. Code § 1770(a)(9). Plaintiff alleges 

that “[b]y introducing Cheerios products which contained gluten, but were labeled ‘Gluten 

Free’ into the stream of commerce ... Defendants thus intentionally sold misbranded 

products.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 69. 

Defendants narrowly construe Plaintiff’s request for damages under the CLRA as 

a request for the purchase price of the contaminated Cheerios products. ECF No. 7 at 7, 

11. Based on this assumption, Defendants argue that they have already provided the 

damages relief sought by Plaintiff because all of the affected cereal products are eligible 

for a full refund from Defendants. Id. Defendants thus contend that Plaintiff cannot bring 

claim for damages under the CLRA. Id. 

As indicated above, Plaintiff seeks more than a mere refund. Rather, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint seeks “compensatory, exemplary, punitive and statutory penalties and 

damages, including interest, in an amount to be proven at trial.” ECF No. 1 at 18. 

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Moreover, whether Defendants’ recall program correctly and fully identified all batches of 

contaminated Cheerios products is a factual question that can only be resolved after 

Plaintiff has an opportunity to pursue discovery. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 

F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that motions to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim require a Court to accept all allegations of material fact as true and “[a] complaint 

should not be dismissed unless a Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 

claim which would entitle him to relief.”). Because Plaintiff has stated sufficient facts to 

state a plausible claim for relief under the CLRA, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim is DENIED. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

C. Fourth Claim – Violation of KCPA 

Plaintiff purchased her gluten free Cheerios in Kentucky and accordingly brings a 

claim under the KCPA. The KCPA makes unlawful any “[u]nfair, false, misleading, or 

deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Ky. Rev. Stat. 

Ann. § 367.170. Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the KCPA “by the use of false and 

misleading representations or omissions of material fact in connection with the 

marketing, promotion, and sale of the recalled Products, including the fact that the 

Cheerios were advertised as ‘Gluten Free’ when in fact, they contained 43 ppm of 

gluten.” ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 74-76. Defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

on the ground that Kentucky law requires privity of contract between the parties. 

Defendants contend that because Plaintiff purchased her Cheerios at the Kroger grocery 

store rather than directly from Defendants, there is no privity of contract and as such her 

KCPA must be dismissed. Id. at 18. 

The Court disagrees. The KCPA does not require privity of contract where a 

defendant provided express warranties to the ultimate purchaser. Naiser v. Unilever 

U.S., Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 727, 743 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (citing Skilcraft Sheetmetal, Inc. v. 

Ky. Mach., Inc, 836 S.W. 2d 907, 909 (Ky. App. 1992).6 As the packaging on 

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warranty and KCPA claims without privity with the manufacturer” is inaccurate. Compare ECF No. 14 at 8 

with Bosch v. Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 730, 748-749 (W.D. Ky. April 8, 

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Defendants’ gluten free Cheerios included an express warranty for Plaintiff’s benefit, her 

KCPA claim falls within this exception. Defendants’ motion is therefore DENIED as to 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim for Violation of the KCPA. 

D. Fifth Claim – Unjust Enrichment 

Plaintiffs also assert a cause of action for unjust enrichment. ECF No. 1 at 16. 

Defendants argue this cause of action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim 

because California does not recognize a cause of action for unjust enrichment and “it is, 

in fact, not a claim at all.” ECF No. 7 at 18 (quoting McVicar v. Goodman Glob., Inc., 

1 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2014). The Court agrees. “Courts consistently 

have held that unjust enrichment is not a proper cause of action under California law.” 

McVicar v. Goodman Glob., Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting 

In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration, Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. 

Liab. Litig., 754 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2010)). Thus, Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is GRANTED without leave to amend. 

E. Sixth Claim – Breach of Express Warranty 

To state a claim for breach of express warranty, a plaintiff is required to “allege 

the exact terms of the warranty, plaintiff’s reasonable reliance thereon, and a breach of 

that warranty which proximately causes plaintiff injury.” Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition 

Corp., 185 Cal. App. 3d 135, 142 (Ct. App. 1986). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ 

gluten free label expressly warranted that products bearing that label complied with all 

laws and regulations relating to gluten free foods, and that the products “would indeed 

be gluten free and could be consumed by persons who were sensitive to gluten or 

desired to exclude foods containing gluten from their diets.” ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 92-93. 

Plaintiff also alleges that she relied on Defendants’ advertising and gluten free label in 

purchasing the gluten free Cheerios and that Defendants breached the express warranty 

 2014) (applying the Naiser exception to Kentucky’s privity requirement). Furthermore, Defendant’s 

reliance on Taylor v. Southwire Tools & Equipment is misplaced because the defendant in that case, 

unlike Defendants here, “neither manufactured nor packaged” the product in question. Taylor v. Southwire 

Tools & Equipment, 130 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1023 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 11, 2015). 

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“by failing to ensure that the oats used in the Cheerios met the regulatory guidelines, by 

failing to ensure the oat flour was free of gluten, and failing to test the finished cereal 

products.” Id. at ¶¶ 93-96. Defendants nonetheless claim that Plaintiffs’ claim should be 

dismissed because Plaintiff was required to allege that she provided Defendants with 

pre-suit notice of the breach and failed to do so.7 ECF No. 7 at 18-19 (citing Alvarez v. 

Chevron Corp., 656 F.3d 925, 932 (9th Cir. 2011)). 

Under most circumstances, plaintiffs are required to provide defendants with 

pre-suit notice within a reasonable time after discovering an alleged breach of warranty. 

Cal. Com. Code § 2607; Alvarez, 656 F.3d at 932 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff concedes that 

notice was not given, but contends this failure should be excused because Defendants’ 

were on actual notice of the alleged breach. ECF No. 13 at 17. Indeed, the California 

Supreme Court has construed a previous, analogous statute and found that pre-suit 

notice is not required where a breach of express warranty claim is “brought by injured 

consumers against manufacturers with whom they have not dealt.” Greenman v. Yuba 

Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 61 (Cal. 1963); see also, e.g., McVicar v. Goodman 

Global, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Sanders v. Apple Inc., 

67 F. Supp. 2d 978 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 

Plaintiff’s argument that pre-suit notice was not required here is persuasive. 

While Alvarez succinctly states the general rule, the Ninth Circuit had no reason to 

consider the Greenman exception because the plaintiffs in in that case had dealt directly 

with the defendant manufacturers. See Alvarez, 656 F. 3d at 928. The Greenman 

exception remains good law in California, and its application here is reinforced by the 

fact that the purpose of § 2607’s pre-suit notice requirement is to “allow the breaching 

party to cure the breach and thereby avoid the necessity of litigating the matter in court.” 

Alvarez, 656 F.3d at 932. Because of the fact that Defendants were indisputably aware 

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to Kentucky law because “Plaintiff asserts” that she brought her claim under the laws of that state. ECF 

No. 14 at 8, n.3. That argument is specious. While the Complaint does not specify whether Plaintiff’s 

breach of warranty claim is brought under California or Kentucky law, Plaintiff’s Opposition is utterly devoid 

of any such assertion and, in fact, opposes Defendants’ notice argument under California law. 

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of the alleged breach prior to Plaintiff’s filing of the instant action, imposing § 2607’s presuit notice requirement here would fail to serve its purpose. Accordingly, Defendants’ 

motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s breach of express warranty claim. 

F. Seventh Claim – Negligence 

Plaintiff also brings a claim for negligence on behalf of the Kentucky Class. To 

state a negligence cause of action under Kentucky law, a plaintiff must plead factual 

allegations plausibly giving rise to (1) a duty on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of 

that duty; and (3) consequent injury. Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 839 S.W.2d 

245, 247 (Ky. 1992). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants owed Plaintiff and the proposed 

class a duty “to use reasonable care to provide true, reliable and safe information 

regarding the Cheerios.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 99. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants 

breached that duty by intentionally selling gluten free Cheerios when Defendants “could 

not provide the promised gluten free benefits.” Id. at ¶ 100. Plaintiff also alleges that 

she and the proposed class suffered damages “in an amount to be proven at trial.” Id. at 

¶ 104. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the economic loss rule 

because the Complaint does not allege any injury apart from the economic loss Plaintiff 

suffered from the purchase of Defendants’ gluten free Cheerios. This argument lacks 

merit. First, Plaintiff alleged that she and the proposed class were “damaged in an 

amount to be proven at trial.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 104. In addition, Plaintiff has provided 

enough information regarding gluten sensitivity in the Complaint for the Court to infer that 

Plaintiff and the proposed class suffered physical injury as a result of consuming 

Defendants’ gluten free Cheerios. See Compl. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 4-6. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim is DENIED. 

G. Motion to Strike Class Allegations 

Finally, Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s class allegations arguing that the 

class certification requirements of FRCP 23 cannot be met. ECF No. 7 at 11-15. 

Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish that a class action is a 

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superior procedure, Plaintiff is an inadequate class representative and the proposed 

class is overbroad. Id. at 12-15. An argument that Plaintiff has not met the class 

certification requirements of FRCP 23 is more properly brought at the class certification 

stage. See Long v. Graco Children's Products Inc., No. 13-CV-01257-JD, 2014 WL 

7204652, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014) (“[M]any courts have recognized that the 

sufficiency of class allegations are better addressed through a class certification motion, 

after the parties have had an opportunity to conduct some discovery.”). Accordingly, 

Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION 

Defendants’ Motions (ECF No. 7) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part: 

(1) Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action under California’s Unfair Competition Law is 

DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

(2) Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for Violation of the California False 

Advertising Law is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

(3) Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Violation of California’s Consumer Legal 

Remedies Act is DISMISSED with leave to amend to the extent that it seeks 

injunctive relief. Defendants’ motion is DENIED to the extent that it seeks to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s CRLA claim for damages. 

(4) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action for Violation of 

the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act is DENIED. 

(5) Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment is DISMISSED without 

leave to amend. 

(6) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action for Breach of 

Express Warranty claim is DENIED. 

(7) Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action for 

Negligence claim is DENIED. 

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(8) Plaintiff may, but is not required to, file an amended complaint with respect to 

those causes of action that have been dismissed with leave to amend. If no 

amended complaint is filed within twenty-one (21) days from the date this 

Order is electronically filed, the causes of action dismissed by this Order shall 

be dismissed with prejudice without further notice to the parties. 

(9) Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 17, 2016 

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