Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00077/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00077-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Webster W. Norris III, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

United States of America 

 Respondent.

No. CV-12-00077-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct 

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 9) and United States Magistrate Judge 

David K. Duncan’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R) (Doc. 57). The R&R 

recommends that the Court deny the Motion. Norris filed timely objections to portions of 

the R&R (Doc. 58.) Because objections have been filed, the Court will review those 

portions of the petition de novo. See United States v. Rayna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). For the following reasons, the Court accepts the R&R and 

denies Petitioner’s Motion. 

BACKGROUND

 Norris was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona 

by a jury on November 5, 2009. (Doc. 9 at 1.) He was convicted of second degree murder 

and assault resulting in serious bodily injury. (Id.) He was sentenced to concurrent terms, 

the longest being 324 months. (Id. at 2.) Norris appealed to the Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit on the grounds that the District Court had erred in allowing evidence of his 

prior arrests and convictions for driving under the influence and on the grounds that the 

government’s closing argument put his character at issue. (Id.) The Ninth Circuit 

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affirmed his conviction on March 23, 2011. (Id.) Norris did not file a petition for 

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. (Id.) 

 On January 12, 2012, Norris filed a Motion to Vacate in this Court, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 1.) The Court denied the Motion for failure to use the courtapproved form and for failure to allege a constitutional violation. (Doc. 6.) The Court 

gave Norris leave to amend. (Id.) On March 23, 2012, Norris filed his Amended Motion. 

(Doc. 9.) His Amended Motion alleges eleven grounds for relief. In Ground One, he 

asserts that the district court lacked jurisdiction to try him because the alleged acts 

occurred on the Gila River Indian Community. In Grounds Two through Five, he alleges 

that his trial counsel was ineffective. In Ground Six, he claims he was denied the right to 

an impartial jury. In Grounds Seven through Nine, he alleges prosecutorial misconduct. 

In Ground Ten, he alleges his arrest was unlawful and constituted an unreasonable search 

and seizure. In Ground Eleven, he claims his right to due process was violated when a 

Gila River police officer made false statements during the grand jury proceeding. 

 In their response, the government argues that eight of Norris’s eleven claims are 

procedurally defaulted because he could have but did not raise them on direct appeal and 

that his three remaining claims are without merit. (Doc. 28.) Magistrate Judge Duncan 

issued an R&R on November 22, 2013, and recommended denial of the petition for the 

reasons stated by the government. (Doc. 57.) Norris filed timely objections regarding four 

of his claims on December 3, 2013 (Doc. 58), and the Court will now review those claims 

de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (stating that the district court “may accept, reject, or 

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate”); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the 

recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate 

judge with instructions.”). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Legal Standard 

 “Section 2255 may not be invoked to relitigate questions which were or should 

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have been raised on a direct appeal.” Hammond v. United States, 408 F.2d 481, 483 (9th 

Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982). If a defendant 

could have raised his Section 2255 claim on direct appeal but did not do so, the claim is 

procedurally defaulted. “Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing 

to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can 

first demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice’ or that he is ‘actually innocent.’” 

United States v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007). To demonstrate cause, a 

defendant must show that “some objective factor external to the defense” impeded him 

from raising the claim below. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To 

demonstrate actual prejudice, a defendant must show that the alleged error “worked to his 

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 170. A defendant is “actually innocent” for purposes of 

excusing procedural default if the alleged constitutional violation he wishes to raise “has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 

496. 

II. Application 

 Norris objects to the R&R on four grounds. These grounds are restatements of 

Claims One, Eight, Ten, and Eleven from his Amended Motion. (Doc. 9.) Magistrate 

Judge Duncan recommended that each of these four claims be denied because they could 

have been but were not raised below, and therefore are procedurally defaulted. Further, 

Norris failed to establish cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default of any of 

these four claims. For the following reasons this Court agrees with and accepts Judge 

Duncan’s determinations. 

 Because Norris could have but did not raise any of these four claims on direct 

appeal, he must establish cause and prejudice or actual innocence to excuse his 

procedural default. Petitioner does not seem to allege that he is actually innocent, and any 

such claim would fail in light of the overwhelming evidence against him. Thus, to excuse 

any procedural default, Norris must show cause and actual prejudice. Norris explained 

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that he did not raise any of these claims earlier because he was “represented by counsel . . 

. only counsel can submit filings, the Appellant was stuck with the consequences of 

counsel’s strategy. Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised on direct appeal.” 

(Doc. 9.) 

 In his first objection, Norris restates Claim One from his Motion. He argues that 

the district court lacked jurisdiction to try him for acts committed on the Gila River 

Community because the Community has the authority to enact its own ordinances. (Doc. 

6 at 4.) However, Norris was charged under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, 

which confers federal court jurisdiction over Indians who commit certain crimes on 

Indian Country. These crimes include murder and assault resulting in serious bodily 

injury. Id. The district court therefore had jurisdiction to try Norris for his acts. Because 

this claim lacks merit, Norris’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise 

this claim on direct appeal, and thus Norris has not established cause to excuse his 

procedural default. Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that 

counsel’s failure to raise a meritless argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of 

counsel). 

 In his second objection, Norris restates Claim Eleven from his Motion. He alleges 

that Gila River Police Officer Steve Gonos gave misleading and inaccurate testimony 

before the grand jury and that this left Norris a target for malicious prosecution. (Doc. 58 

at 4.) He further alleges that Gonos used the accident report, which Norris argues is a 

confidential and inadmissible document, before the grand jury, in violation of the Gila 

River Community Traffic Code. (Id.) As stated above, the district court had jurisdiction 

over Norris in this case. It was therefore permissible under the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure to allow the use of the accident report before the grand jury. Beyond the use of 

the accident report, Norris does not explain how any testimony given by Gonos before 

the grand jury was either misleading or inaccurate. He thus fails to demonstrate that this 

testimony actually prejudiced this case, and therefore cannot excuse his procedural 

default. 

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 In his third objection, Norris restates Claim Ten from his Motion. He alleges that 

he was unlawfully arrested and confined in the Gila River Department of Corrections, not 

taken before the Community Court as required by Gila River Community law, and then 

released from custody. (Doc. 58 at 4–5.) Based on the witness statements and evidence 

found at the scene of the accident, the officers had probable cause to arrest Norris. 

Further, his unlawful detention claim is not cognizable under Section 2255. Because this 

claim lacks merit, Norris’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this 

claim on direct appeal, and thus Norris has again not established cause to excuse his 

procedural default. 

 Finally, in his fourth objection, Norris restates Claim Eight from his Motion. 

Norris alleges that the prosecutor knowingly stated misleading and inaccurate 

information when she claimed in a pre-trial motion to admit evidence of other acts that 

Norris signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights. (Doc. 58 at 5.) “When 

prosecutorial misconduct is called in question, the issue is whether, considered in the 

context of the entire trial, that conduct appears likely to have affected the jury’s discharge 

of its duty to judge the evidence fairly.” United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 805 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S.1, 11 (1985)). Here, a DVD was 

played at trial that showed that Norris orally waived his Miranda rights when speaking to 

Officer Gonos. (Doc. 28 at 23.) In a pre-trial motion, the prosecutor misstated that Norris 

had signed a written waiver during the conversation with Officer Gonos. This distinction 

between an oral and written waiver was not relevant to the motion to admit other act 

evidence in order to show malice. (Id.) Further, the misstatement was made in a pre-trial 

motion and was never heard by the jury. It therefore cannot be said that the misstatement 

did or even could have impacted the jury’s discharge of its duty. Because this claim lacks 

merit, Norris’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this claim on 

direct appeal, and thus Norris has again not established cause to excuse his procedural 

default. 

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CONCLUSION 

 The Court finds that each of the four claims to which Norris raised objections are 

procedurally defaulted and that Norris failed to excuse this default. The Court has further 

reviewed the portions of Magistrate Judge Duncan’s R&R to which there were no 

objections, and finds it to be well-taken. Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Magistrate Judge Duncan’s R&R (Doc. 57) is ACCEPTED. 

 2. Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Doc. 9) is 

DENIED. 

 3. The Clerk of Court shall TERMINATE this action and enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 4. Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, in the 

event Movant files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability 

because reasonable jurists would not find the Court's procedural ruling debatable. See 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Dated this 10th day of March, 2014. 

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