Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00858/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00858-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 through 304. 

Pending before the Court is the Respondent’s motion to dismiss the 

petition, which was filed on August 11, 2014. Petitioner filed 

opposition on October 9, 2014, and Respondent filed a reply on 

October 17, 2014. 

I. Proceeding by a Motion to Dismiss

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the 

RODNEY BROOKS,

 Petitioner,

v.

M. MACOMBER, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00858-LJO-BAM-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS THE PETITION (DOC. 12)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. 1), 

DECLINE TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY, AND DIRECT 

THE CLERK TO CLOSE THE CASE

OBJECTIONS DEADLINE:

THIRTY (30) DAYS 

Case 1:14-cv-00858-LJO-BAM Document 18 Filed 02/05/15 Page 1 of 14
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effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies to the petition. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 

1499 (9th Cir. 1997).

A district court must award a writ of habeas corpus or issue an 

order to show cause why it should not be granted unless it appears 

from the application that the applicant is not entitled thereto. 28 

U.S.C. § 2243. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in 

the United States District Courts (Habeas Rules) permits the filing 

of “an answer, motion, or other response,” and thus it authorizes 

the filing of a motion in lieu of an answer in response to a 

petition. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption and 2004 

Amendments. This gives the Court the flexibility and discretion 

initially to forego an answer in the interest of screening out 

frivolous applications and eliminating the burden that would be 

placed on a respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer. Advisory 

Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption. Rule 4 confers upon the Court broad 

discretion to take “other action the judge may order,” including 

authorizing a respondent to make a motion to dismiss based upon 

information furnished by respondent, which may show that a 

petitioner’s claims suffer a procedural or jurisdictional infirmity, 

such as res judicata, failure to exhaust state remedies, or absence 

of custody. Id.

The Supreme Court has characterized as erroneous the view that 

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is appropriate in a habeas corpus proceeding. 

See, Browder v. Director, Ill. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 

269 n. 14 (1978); but see Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 325-26 

(1996). However, in light of the broad language of Habeas Rule 4, 

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it has been held in this circuit that motions to dismiss are 

appropriate in cases that proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2254 and 

present issues of failure to state a colorable claim under federal 

law, O=Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420-21 (9th Cir. 1990); 

procedural default in state court, White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 

602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); and failure to exhaust state court remedies, 

Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 n.12 (E.D.Cal. 1982). 

Analogously, a motion to dismiss a petition for failure to 

allege facts entitling a petitioner to relief in a proceeding 

pursuant to 2254, such as Respondent’s motion in the instant case, 

is appropriate because a federal court is a court of limited 

jurisdiction with a continuing duty to determine its own subject 

matter jurisdiction and to dismiss an action where it appears that 

the Court lacks jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); CSIBI v. 

Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing City of 

Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511-512 (1973)); Billingsley v. 

C.I.R., 868 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, the Court will consider Respondent’s motion 

pursuant to Habeas Rule 4.

II. Background

In the petition filed on June 2, 2014, Petitioner alleges that 

he suffered a denial of due process of law resulting from the 

failure of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) to permit Petitioner to call witnesses at a 

prison disciplinary hearing held in 2012 at which Petitioner was 

found guilty of willfully delaying an officer in the performance of 

duty by depositing feces in a study cell. Petitioner was sanctioned 

with a loss of ninety (90) days of custody credit in addition to 

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loss of privileges. (Pet., doc. 1 at 6, 13-26.)

Petitioner is serving an indeterminate sentence of eighteen 

years to life1 for second degree murder imposed in 1992 in the 

Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego. 

(Mot., exh. 1, doc. 12-1, 1-6.) Petitioner reached his minimum 

eligible parole date (MEPD) on May 21, 2003. (Mot., exh. 5, doc. 

12-5, 56-50.) In 2012, California’s Board of Parole Hearings (BPH)

found that Petitioner was not suitable for parole and denied 

Petitioner parole consideration for seven years. (Id. at 56.)

III. Likelihood of Effect on Duration of Confinement 

Respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground that the

petition does not implicate the legality or duration of Petitioner’s 

confinement, and thus Petitioner has not stated facts that would 

entitle him to relief in a proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Respondent argues that because Petitioner is serving an 

indeterminate life term and has passed his MEPD, any effect of the 

credit loss on the duration of his confinement is too speculative to 

warrant proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is not 

challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment

or seeking an immediate or speedier release; thus, his claim lies 

without the core of this Court’s habeas jurisdiction. See Nelson v. 

Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643-46 (2004).

A federal court may only grant a state prisoner’s petition for 

writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner can show that "he is in 

 

1 Petitioner has also been sentenced to serve determinate sentences totaling six 

years and eight months for weapons offenses committed in prison in 2002 and 2008. 

(Mot., exh. 1, doc. 12-1, 1-4.) However, those sentences were ordered to run 

consecutively to his indeterminate term, and under state law the determinate terms 

will commence when Petitioner is found suitable for parole and is discharged from 

the previous sentence. See In re Tate, 135 Cal.App.4th 756, 765 (2006).

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custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A habeas corpus petition is 

the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the legality or 

duration of his confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973)); 

Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 1, 1976 Adoption. In 

contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the 

proper method for a prisoner to challenge the conditions of that 

confinement. McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141 42 (1991); 

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499; Badea, 931 F.2d at 574; Advisory Committee 

Notes to Habeas Rule 1, 1976 Adoption.

With respect to Petitioner’s claim that he suffered a denial of 

due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding that resulted in a 

loss of conduct credits, it is established that a constitutional 

claim concerning the application of rules administered by a prison 

or penal administrator that challenges the duration of a sentence is

generally a cognizable claim of being in custody in violation of the 

Constitution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See, e.g.,

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (determining a 

procedural due process claim concerning loss of time credits 

resulting from disciplinary procedures and findings). The Supreme 

Court has held that challenges to prison disciplinary adjudications 

that have resulted in a loss of time credits must be raised in a 

federal habeas corpus action and not in a § 1983 action because such 

a challenge is to the very fact or duration of physical

imprisonment, and the relief sought is a determination of 

entitlement to immediate or speedier release. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 

411 U.S. at 500. Thus, such claims are within the core of habeas 

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corpus jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court's decisions concerning any boundaries between 

habeas jurisdiction and jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have 

arisen in cases involving § 1983 proceedings, where it is 

established that, regardless of the precise relief sought, an action 

pursuant to § 1983 concerning prison administrative processes is 

barred if success in the action would necessarily demonstrate the 

invalidity of the confinement or its duration, or necessarily imply 

the invalidity of a conviction or sentence. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 

544 U.S. 74, 81–82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 1247-48 (2005) (parole 

processes). However, the limits on habeas jurisdiction, or the 

appropriate extent of any overlap between habeas and § 1983, have 

not been definitively addressed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme 

Court has adverted to the possibility of habeas as a potential 

alternative remedy to an action under § 1983 for unspecified 

additional and unconstitutional restraints during lawful custody. 

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499–500. Nevertheless, the Court has declined 

to address whether a writ of habeas corpus may be used to challenge 

conditions of confinement as distinct from the fact or length of 

confinement itself. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n.6, 99 

S.Ct. 1861, 1868 (1979). However, it appears that the Court 

continues to recognize a “core” of habeas corpus that refers to 

suits where success would inevitably affect the legality or duration 

of confinement. For example, in Wilkinson, the Court noted that if 

success on a claim would mean at most a new opportunity for review 

of parole eligibility, or a new parole hearing at which authorities 

could discretionarily decline to shorten a prison term, then success 

would not inevitably lead to release, and the suit would not lie at 

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the core of habeas corpus. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82.

Cases in this circuit have recognized a possibility of habeas 

jurisdiction in suits that do not fall within the core of habeas 

corpus. Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1989) (where the 

petitioner sought expungement of a disciplinary finding that was 

likely to accelerate eligibility for parole); Docken v. Chase, 393 

F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (where the petitioner sought only 

equitable relief regarding the constitutionality of the frequency of 

parole reviews, a claim sufficiently related to the duration of 

confinement). However, relief pursuant to § 1983 remains an 

appropriate remedy for claims concerning administrative decisions 

made in prison where success would not necessarily imply the 

invalidity of continuing confinement. Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d at 

1030 (characterizing Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997) 

as holding that a § 1983 suit is an appropriate remedy for 

challenges to conditions [there, administrative placement in a sex 

offender program affecting eligibility for parole] which do not 

necessarily imply the invalidity of continuing confinement); see

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, Petitioner is serving an indeterminate life sentence. 

There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person 

to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid 

sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional 

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979). Under state 

law, Petitioner will complete his indeterminate sentence when the 

BPH determines that Petitioner is suitable for parole. Cal. Pen.

Code § 3041; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402. The decision to set 

a parole release date is entrusted to the discretion of the BPH, 

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which is to consider whether in light of the gravity of the current 

convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current 

or past convicted offenses, consideration of the public safety 

requires a more lengthy period of incarceration before a parole date 

is set. Cal. Pen. Code §§ 3041, 3041.5.

Because Petitioner had passed his MEPD when he suffered the 

sanction of loss of custody credits, any relationship between the 

credit loss and the ultimate duration of Petitioner’s confinement is 

merely speculative. Under California law, a gain or loss of custody 

credits can affect the setting of an indeterminately sentenced 

inmate’s MEPD. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2400. However, once 

an inmate’s MEPD passes and the inmate begins receiving parole 

consideration hearings, assessing a credit loss does not affect the 

inmate’s sentence; conduct credits are not awarded unless and until 

the BPH grants parole. Cal. Penal Code § 3041; Cal. Code. Regs., 

tit. 15, §§ 2400, 2403, 2410, 2411; see Wilder v. Dickinson, no. CV 

08–1698–VBF (PLA), 2011 WL 1131491, at *6 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 10, 2011) 

(unpublished); Garnica v. Hartley, no. 1:10–CV–01279 GSA HC, 2010 WL 

3069309, at *2 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (unpublished); Alley v. 

Carey, no. 09–15328, 2010 WL 4386827, at **1 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010) 

(unpublished). Here, because Petitioner had already begun receiving 

parole consideration hearings before the challenged forfeiture of 

credit, any restoration of the credit would not affect the 

scheduling of his next parole consideration hearing or his release 

on parole.

 The fact that the BPH may consider Petitioner’s disciplinary 

violation at a future parole hearing does not create a sufficient 

nexus to the length of imprisonment or a sufficient likelihood of 

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affecting the overall length of Petitioner’s confinement. As in 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859, expungement of the 

disciplinary finding would not necessarily shorten the overall 

sentence. Indeed, it is not shown that it would be likely to 

accelerate parole eligibility; rather, success would mean only an 

opportunity to seek parole from a board that could deny parole on a 

multitude of other grounds already available to it. It is entirely 

speculative that a future parole suitability decision would hinge on 

the single disciplinary offense presently before the Court because 

the suitability decision is entrusted to the discretion of the BPH 

to consider how all parole suitability factors operate together to 

demonstrate a presence or absence of current dangerousness to the 

public. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1212 (2008); Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 15, § 2400 (providing that all available relevant, 

reliable information shall be considered in determining suitability 

for parole, including the prisoner’s social history; past and 

present mental state; criminal history, including the base and other 

commitment offenses, and behavior before, during, and after the 

crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of 

treatment or control; and any other information which bears on the 

prisoner's suitability for release). The parole suitability 

decision depends on “an amalgam of elements, some of which are 

factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisals by the 

Board members based on their experience with the difficult task of 

evaluating the advisability of parole release.” Greenholtz v. 

Inmates of Nebraska Corr. & Penal Complex, 442 U.S. at 9–10.

Petitioner does not show an expectation of release that could 

form the basis of a liberty interest. A liberty interest arises 

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under state law when an inmate is subjected to restrictions that 

impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation 

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995). The mere possibility, 

however, of a denial of parole at some later, yet undetermined, 

time, where one of the considerations for parole is a potentially 

improper disciplinary finding, does not amount to the denial of a 

liberty interest. In Sandin, the Supreme Court concluded that a 

possible loss of credits due to a disciplinary conviction was 

insufficient to give rise to a liberty interest where nothing in the 

state’s statutes required the parole authority to deny parole 

because of a misconduct record or to grant parole in its absence,

even though misconduct was by regulation a “relevant consideration.”

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. The Court noted that “[t]he decision to 

release a prisoner rests on a myriad of considerations,” and an 

inmate is generally “afforded procedural protection at this parole 

hearing in order to explain the circumstances behind his misconduct 

record.” Id. at 487. The Court held that “[t]he chance that a 

finding of misconduct will alter the balance is simply too 

attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process 

Clause.” Id. After Sandin, in order to demonstrate a liberty 

interest, an inmate must show a disciplinary conviction will 

inevitably lengthen the duration of the inmate's incarceration. Id.

Petitioner has not shown that there is a due process interest at 

issue that would provide a basis for this Court to assert its habeas 

jurisdiction. 

Petitioner has not alleged or documented specific facts that 

would demonstrate or even suggest the existence of a nexus between 

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the credit forfeiture and the length of his imprisonment such that a 

sufficient likelihood exists of its affecting the overall length of 

confinement. See Docken, 393 F.3d at 1030-31. Petitioner has not 

shown that even if he were entitled to relief on the merits of his 

claim concerning due process violations in the disciplinary 

proceedings, relief would have any effect on the legality or 

duration of his confinement. Cf. Montue v. Stainer, no. 1:14–cv–

01009–LJO–JLT-HC, 2014 WL 6901853, at *9-*11 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 5, 2014) 

(unpublished); Garcia v. Neotti, no. 11-cv-1639–WQH-KSC, 2012 WL 

3986278, at *3 (S.D.Cal. July 27, 2012), adopted in Garcia v. 

Neotti, 2012 WL 3986229, at *2 (S.D.Cal. Sept. 11, 2012)

(unpublished). Any conceivable effect on the duration of 

Petitioner’s confinement is speculative at best.

In his opposition, Petitioner cites state enactments2 and a 

settlement agreement in a state court proceeding3 that appear to 

extend to Petitioner, who was a juvenile when he committed murder, 

an opportunity to have a base term set and/or a parole suitability 

hearing where the discretionary parole authority is to consider the 

relatively diminished culpability of a minor offender. However, as 

 

2

 Petitioner refers to portions of Cal. Pen. Code §§ 3041, 3046, 3048, and 3051, 

which provide that some life inmates who committed their offenses before they were 

eighteen years old will receive parole consideration hearings where the BPH will 

give “great weight to the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to 

adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased 

maturity of the prisoner in accordance with state law.” Cal.Pen.Code §§ 3051, 

4081.

3 Petitioner submits a copy of an order and stipulation regarding a settlement 

agreement filed December 16, 2013, in In re Roy Butler, nos. A139411 & A 137273, 

pending in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate 

District, Division 2, which appears to indicate that instead of waiting until an 

inmate is found suitable for parole, the BPH will begin setting base terms or 

adjusted base terms for life inmates at the initial parole consideration hearing 

or the next parole hearing at which parole is denied. (Doc. 16, 4-12.) 

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Respondent notes, the opportunity for a suitability hearing, even 

with a direction to consider relative culpability, does not 

circumscribe the broad discretion otherwise entrusted to the BPH to 

determine when a prisoner will actually be released on parole. 

In summary, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claim or 

claims relate only to the conditions of confinement and do not lie 

at the core of habeas corpus jurisdiction. Petitioner has not 

stated facts that would entitle him to relief in a proceeding 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Thus, it will be recommended that the 

petition be dismissed. 

Further, because the defects in Petitioner’s claims result not 

from a dearth of factual allegations, but rather from state law that 

renders any effect on the duration of confinement remote and 

speculative, Petitioner could not state a tenable claim for relief 

even if leave to amend were granted.

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the petition be 

dismissed without leave to amend. 

IV. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Habeas Rule 11(a). 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

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' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338.

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. 

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the Court decline to 

issue a certificate of appealability.

V. Recommendations

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is RECOMMENDED 

that: 

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition be GRANTED; and 

2) The petition be DISMISSED without leave to amend for failure 

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to state a cognizable claim; and

3) The Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealability; 

and 4) The Clerk be DIRECTED to close the case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United 

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served 

with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court 

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and 

Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if served by 

mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review 

the Magistrate Judge=s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may “waive their right to challenge the magistrate’s 

factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 

1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 4, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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