Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01590/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01590-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 130
Nature of Suit: Miller Act
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Miller Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRONTIER CONTRACTING, INC., CASE NO. CV F 11-1590 LJO DLB

et al., 

ORDER ON FRONTIER CONTRACTING,

Plaintiffs, INC.’S F.R.Civ.P. 12 MOTION

 (Doc. 39.)

vs.

ALLEN ENGINEERING CONTRACTOR,

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff/counter-defendant Frontier Contracting, Inc. (“Frontier”) seeks to dismiss as

insufficiently pled defendant/counterclaimant Allen Engineering Contractor, Inc.’s (“Allen’s”) claims

that Frontier committed subcontractor breaches on two separate construction projects in Sequoia

National Park (“Park”). Allen responds that its counterclaim sufficiently alleges that Frontier is liable

for defective work and failure to complete the scope of its subcontract work. This Court considered

Frontier’s F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the record and VACATES the May 11, 2012

hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons discussed below, this Court DISMISSES with

leave to amend Allen’s counterclaim.1

This Court need not consider Frontier’s alternative F.R.Civ.P. 12(e) motion for more definite statement

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given dismissal of the counterclaim.

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BACKGROUND2

Construction Projects

Allen entered into two separate contracts with the Federal Highway Administration (“FHA”) to

improve and rebuild in the Park the Generals Highway (“highway project”) and Cedar Grove Bridge

(“bridge project”). The highway and bridge projects (collectively “projects”) are more than 70 miles

apart at opposite Park ends. Allen subcontracted work to Frontier and, at Frontier’s request, performed

certain work required of Frontier.

Allen’s Claims

The counterclaim alleges (first and second) breach of contract claims that “the parties entered

into a part oral and part written contract whereby Frontier was to perform a certain scope of work” for

the projects. The breach of contract claims further allege that “Frontier breached the contract, inter alia,

by failing and refusing to perform all obligations it was required to perform on its part, and by

performing in a defective and deficient manner.” The breach of contract claims seek to recover $1.8

million for the highway project and nearly $4.2 million for the bridge project.

The counterclaim alleges (third and fourth) reasonable value claims that “Allen and Frontier

entered into a part oral and part written contract whereby Frontier was to perform a certain scope of

work” and that “Allen furnished labor, materials, services, and equipment to assist Frontier” for which

Allen is entitled to “reasonable value.”

The counterclaim alleges (fifth and sixth) negligence claims that “Frontier breached it duties by

negligently, carelessly, and wrongfully failing to use due and reasonable care on the project, by failing

to construct the project according to industry standards, the plans and specifications, current codes, and

current law” to damage Allen.

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Standards

Frontier globally attacks the counterclaim’s failure to satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 8 pleading standards to

warrant F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal.

The factual recitation is derived generally from Allen’s “Counterclaim for Damages” (“counterclaim”), the

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target of Frontier’s challenges.

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“When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any

evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether

a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco Development

Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either th

a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling v. Village of th

Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion “tests the legal sufficiency th

of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9 Cir. 2001). th

In addressing dismissal, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine whether plaintiff

can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80

F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a court is not required “to accept as true allegations that

are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead

Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9 Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court “need not th

assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations,” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v.

Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643, n. 2 (9 Cir.1986), and must not “assume that the [plaintiff] can prove facts th

that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.

519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897 (1983). A court need not permit an attempt to amend if “it is clear that the

complaint could not be saved by an amendment.” Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,

416 F.3d 940, 946 (9 Cir. 2005). th

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 

Moreover, a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan Marketing

Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, a complaint “must contain either

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direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under

some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.

Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7 Cir. 1984)). th

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court

explained:

. . . a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . The plausibility standard is not

akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.) 

After discussing Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized: “In sum, for a complaint

to survive [dismissal], the non-conclusory‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content,

must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572

F.3d 962, 989 (9 Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). th

The U.S. Supreme Court applies a “two-prong approach” to address dismissal:

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in

a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Second,

only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . .

. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not

“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can

choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, theymust be supported by factual allegations. When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950.

F.R.Civ.P. 8 Pleading Standards

F.R.Civ.P. 8 requires a party to “plead a short and plain statement of the elements of his or her

claim, identifying the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the claim and the elements of the prima

facie case.” Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 840 (9 Cir. 2000). th

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F.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1) requires each allegation to be “simple, concise, and direct.” This requirement

“applies to good claims as well as bad, and is the basis for dismissal independent of Rule 12(b)(6).” 

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9 Cir. 1996). Moreover, a pleading may not simply allege a

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wrong has been committed and demand relief. The underlying requirement is that a pleading give “fair

notice” of the claim being asserted and the “grounds upon which it rests.” Yamaguchi v. United States

Department of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9 Cir. 1997). Despite the flexible pleading policy of th

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the

claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9 Cir. 1984). th

A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt facts which defendant engaged

in to support plaintiff’s claim. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649. A complaint does not suffice “if it tenders

‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The U.S. Supreme Court has explained:

While, for most types of cases, the Federal Rules eliminated the cumbersome

requirement that a claimant “set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim,”

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (emphasis added),

Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a “showing,” rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to

relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant

could satisfy the requirement of providing not only “fair notice” of the nature of the

claim, but also “grounds” on which the claim rests.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

With these F.R.Civ.P. 8 and 12(b)(6) standards in mind, this Court turns to Frontier’s challenges

to the counterclaim.

Breach Of Contract And Negligence Elements

Frontier contends that the counterclaim fails to satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 8. Frontier chiefly focuses on

the counterclaim’s absence of facts to identify breach of contract elements.

“The standard elements of a claim for breach of contract are: ‘(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's

performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff

therefrom.’” Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co., 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178, 80

Cal.Rptr.3d 6 (2008). “To form a contract, an ‘offer must be sufficiently definite . . . that the

performance promised is reasonably certain.’” Alexander v. Codemasters Group Limited, 104

Cal.App.4th 129, 141. 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 (2002).

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“A written contract may be pleaded either by its terms-set out verbatim in the complaint or a copy

of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference-or by its legal effect. In

order to plead a contract by its legal effect, plaintiff must allege the substance of its relevant terms.”

McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc., 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 227 (2006) (internal

citations omitted). 

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are (1) a legal duty to use reasonable care, (2)

breach of that duty, and (3) proximate [or legal] cause between the breach and (4) the plaintiff's injury.”

Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 (1998) (citation

omitted). “The existence of a duty of care owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is a prerequisite to

establishing a claim for negligence.” Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn., 231 Cal.App.3d

1089, 1095, 283 Cal.Rptr. 53 (1991). “[A]bsent a duty, the defendant's care, or lack of care, is

irrelevant.” Software Design & Application, Ltd. v. Hoefer & Arnett, Inc., 49 Cal.App.4th 472, 481, 56

Cal.Rptr.2d 756 (1996). “The existence of a legal duty to use reasonable care in a particular factual

situation is a question of law for the court to decide.” Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc., 118

Cal.App.4th 269, 278, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 (2004) (citation omitted).

Frontier challenges the counterclaim’s lack of facts as to the two contracts for the projects

(“projects contracts”). Frontier points to the absence of allegations as to formation and terms of the

projects contracts and how they were breached. Frontier continues that the counterclaim lacks

cognizable of facts of Frontier’s purported wrongdoing in that the counterclaim merely references

Frontier’s “purported failures and refusals without tying any (unstated) misdeeds to particular (again,

unstated) facts.”

Allen responds that the claims of its counterclaim are simple and that Frontier, as plaintiff, is not

“whollyunaware” of the facts underlying the counterclaim. Allen arguesthat its counterclaim “identifies

the cause of damages (failure to perform its scope of work and performing in a defective and deficient

manner) as well as the fact that the damages result from a breach of contract.” Allen contends that the 

counterclaim’s general allegations provide “enough facts such that Allen’s claims are plausible.”

Frontier raises valid points as to the sparsity of the counterclaim’s factual allegations. The

counterclaim is bare bones and devoid of facts to support its claims. At most, the counterclaim recites

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elements of breach of contract and negligence, and Allen’s opposition papers rely chiefly on mere recital

of the bare bones allegations. The counterclaim reveals only that Frontier and Allen entered into a part

oral and part written agreement by which Frontier was to provide subcontract work. The counterclaim

fails to define Frontier’s obligations and wrongdoing and is merely a blanket assertion that Frontier is

guilty of unspecified wrongdoing. The counterclaim fails to provide fair notice ofFrontier’s wrongdoing

to warrant dismissal of its claims.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. DISMISSES with leave to amend all of the counterclaim’s claims:

2. ORDERS Allen, no later than May 22, 2012, to file and serve either: (a) a first amended

counterclaim which satisfies F.R.Civ.P. 8, other federal pleading requirements, and this

order; or (b) a statement that Allen elects not to pursue counterclaims against Frontier;

3. ADMONISHES Allen that failure of its first amended counterclaim to satisfyF.R.Civ.P.

8, federal pleading requirements, and this order will warrant dismissal with prejudice of

Allen’s claims in that this Court sees no grounds to permit Allen further attempts to

amend; 

4. ORDERS Frontier, no later than June 12, 2012, to file and serve a response to Allen’s

first amended counterclaim, if Allen elects to pursue a counterclaim against Frontier; and

5. DENIES as moot Frontier’s alternative F.R.Civ.P. 12(e) motion for a more definite

statement. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2012 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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