Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00679/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00679-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO MDR

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Aaron Emmanuel Soto, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 10-679-PHX-GMS (JRI)

ORDER

Plaintiff Aaron Emmanuel Soto, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex-Tucson in Tucson, Arizona, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. #1), a “Motion for Leave to File Complaint on other than a CourtApproved Form” (Doc. #3), a “Motion to Exceed Page Limitation for Civil Rights

Complaint” (Doc. #4), and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. #5). The

Court will order Defendants Stapley, Brock, Wilson, Kunasek, Garrido-Wilcox, and Adams

to answer the Complaint and will dismiss the remaining Defendants without prejudice. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $27.15. The remainder of the fee will be

collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the amount

in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate

Case 2:10-cv-00679-GMS Document 7 Filed 03/31/10 Page 1 of 10
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Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according

to the statutory formula. 

II. Motions

The Court, in its discretion, will grant Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to File Complaint

on other than a Court-Approved Form” and “Motion to Exceed Page Limitation for Civil

Rights Complaint.”

III. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

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IV. Complaint

In his Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: Maricopa County Sheriff

Joseph M. Arpaio; Maricopa County Supervisors Don Stapley, Fulton Brock, Max Wilson,

Andrew Kunasek, and Mary Rose Garrido-Wilcox; Correctional Health Services (CHS)

Director Betty Adams; CHS counselors Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2; CHS employees Jane

Doe 3, Jane Doe 4, John Doe 1, and John Doe 3; and CHS psychiatrist John Doe 2.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his mental health

needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, while he was confined at the Maricopa County

Jails. He claims that during intake processing on March 17, 2008, he informed CHS

personnel that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and anxiety disorder and that he

had been prescribed medication to treat those ailments. He was told that he would receive

a follow-up visit from CHS staff once he arrived at his assigned housing unit. A few days

after Plaintiff arrived at his housing unit, he met with Defendant Jane Doe 1, who was

hesitant to note Plaintiff’s request to resume his medication and informed Plaintiff that she

would return in a week to confirm that he wanted to resume his medication; she did not

return.

On April 18, 2008, Plaintiff submitted a request for psychiatric services. Defendant

John Doe 3 informed Plaintiff that he was scheduled to be “seen by psych.” A week later,

Plaintiff saw Defendant Jane Doe 2 and related to her the symptoms he was experiencing

while unmedicated. At that time, and again in May and June, Defendant Jane Doe 2

informed Plaintiff that he would be seen by a psychiatrist “soon.”

On July 8, 2008, Plaintiff submitted another request for psychiatric services.

Defendant Jane Doe 3 informed Plaintiff that there was one doctor who was working only

three days a week and was responsible for 2,700 inmates and that Plaintiff was scheduled to

be seen by the psychiatrist. In July, Defendant Jane Doe 2 met with Plaintiff and told him

that he was “on the schedule” and would be seen within a few weeks.

 On August 21, 2008, Plaintiff submitted another request for heath services, again

requested to see a psychiatrist, and reiterated symptoms. Defendant Jane Doe 3 again

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informed Plaintiff that it had been very difficult to schedule his appointment. In August

2008, Plaintiff also requested a copy of the health services polices, but the request was

rejected by Defendant John Doe 1, who informed Plaintiff that he had been seen by mental

health staff on six occasions and that he was scheduled to be seen by a psychiatrist. 

On September 3, 2008, Plaintiff filed a formal grievance regarding his deteriorating

mental health and his inability to see a psychiatrist. That day, Plaintiff was seen by the jail

psychiatrist, Defendant John Doe 2, who determined that Plaintiff needed medication for his

mental conditions and prescribed medications for Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder and anxiety

disorder. The following day, Plaintiff met with Defendant Jane Doe 4, who was sympathetic

to Plaintiff’s situation, was disgusted by the manner in which Plaintiff’s situation had been

handled, and suggested that the delay was caused by “resource issues” and by Defendant

Adams’s failure to allocate necessary resources to meet the health care demands of the jails.

On September 5, 2008, Plaintiff began taking his medications.

In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, monetary damages, his costs

of suit, and a jury trial.

V. Failure to State a Claim

A. Defendant Arpaio

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Arpaio, as a matter of policy and practice, acted with

deliberate indifference because he failed to adequately train, supervise, or direct his staff

regarding the need for adequate and timely psychiatric care and has “ignor[ed] and/or

allow[ed] CHS’[s] shortcomings.” 

CHS is an administrative subdivision of Maricopa County. Maricopa County, not

Defendant Arpaio, is responsible for providing medical care to county jail inmates. See Ariz.

Rev. Stat. § 11-291(A). Therefore, it is not Defendant Arpaio’s responsibility to train CHS

staff or rectify CHS’s “shortcomings.” Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice

Defendant Arpaio.

. . . .

. . . .

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B. Doe Defendants

Plaintiff alleges that the Doe Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

psychiatric needs because Defendant Jane Doe 1 failed to acknowledge Plaintiff’s desire to

see a psychiatrist and failed to facilitate a timely appointment; Jane Doe 2 failed to facilitate

a timely psychiatric appointment; Defendants Jane Doe 3, John Doe 1, and John Doe 3

“repeatedly falsely insisted” that Plaintiff was scheduled to be seen by the psychiatrist or

would be seen soon; Defendant Jane Doe 4 failed to supervise or manage her staff to prevent

Plaintiff’s unreasonable wait for timely and adequate psychiatric care; and Defendant John

Doe 2 failed to organize, prioritize, and otherwise effectively manage his time to meet with

Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff’s psychiatric issues.

A pretrial detainee’s claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement arises from

the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than from the Eighth Amendment

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535

(1979). Nevertheless, the same standards are applied, requiring proof that the defendant

acted with deliberate indifference. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

To state a claim of deliberate indifference, plaintiffs must meet a two-part test. First,

the alleged constitutional deprivation must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious”; the

official’s act or omission must result in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Second, the prison official must

have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., he must act with deliberate indifference to

inmate health or safety. Id. In defining “deliberate indifference” in this context, the Supreme

Court has imposed a subjective test: “the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw

the inference.” Id. at 837 (emphasis added). 

Not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states

a violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

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U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating

that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent.

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know

of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and

he must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate indifference in the

medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain

or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies,

delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the

prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due

care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of

Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). The indifference must be

substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.

Plaintiff’s allegations against the Doe Defendants suggest indifference or negligence,

but do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s psychiatric needs. The

Court, therefore, will dismiss without prejudice the Doe Defendants.

VI. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Stapley, Brock, Wilson, Kunasek, and GarridaWilcox were deliberately indifferent to his psychiatric needs because, as final policymakers

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for Maricopa County, they failed to “properly fund and/or encourage CHS” and Defendant

Arpaio to ensure sufficient staffing and resources to remedy the failure to provide timely and

adequate health care services to inmates. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Adams was

deliberately indifferent to his psychiatric needs because she failed to “employ and orchestrate

the appropriate resources to ensure timely and adequate health services.”

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim against

Defendants Stapley, Brock, Wilson, Kunasek, Garrido-Wilcox, and Adams. The Court will

require these Defendants to answer the Complaint.

VII. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

D. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

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963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to File Complaint on other than a CourtApproved Form” (Doc. #3) is granted.

(2) Plaintiff’s “Motion to Exceed Page Limitation for Civil Rights Complaint”

(Doc. #4) is granted.

(3) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. #5) is granted. 

(4) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $27.15.

(5) Defendants Arpaio, Jane Does 1-4, and John Does 1-3, are dismissed without

prejudice.

(6) Defendants Stapley, Brock, Wilson, Kunasek, Garrido-Wilcox, and Adams

must answer the Complaint.

(7) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the

Complaint (Doc. #1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

Defendant Stapley, Brock, Wilson, Kunasek, Garrido-Wilcox, and Adams.

(8) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 20 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(9) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the

action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv

16.2(b)(2)(B)(i).

(10) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Complaint,

and a copy of this Order for future use.

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(11) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal must immediately file requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable and

waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by a

Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the

Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order upon

Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2)of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and

return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the

personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(12) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint

must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(13) Defendants must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate

motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

(14) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

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(15) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Jay R. Irwin pursuant to Rules 72.1

and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as authorized

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

DATED this 31st day of March, 2010.

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