Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01044/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01044-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rich Brady, 

Plaintiff, 

Universal Technical Institute of Arizona,

Inc., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-1044-PHX-FJM

ORDER

Plaintiff filed this action against his former employer asserting that he was terminated

from his employment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)

and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”). We dismissed plaintiff’s claims, concluding

that they were precluded by the parties’ arbitration agreement (doc. 20). 

We now have before us defendant’s motions for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant

to A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01 and 12-349 (docs. 23 and 24), plaintiff’s response (doc. 26), and

defendant’s reply (doc. 29).

An award of attorney’s fees is available under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(a) only in an action

“arising out of contract, express or implied.” A matter arises out of contract “if it could not

exist but for the contract.” Kennedy v. Linda Brock Auto. Plaza, Inc., 175 Ariz. 323, 325,

Case 2:09-cv-01044-FJM Document 30 Filed 04/29/10 Page 1 of 2
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856 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Ct. App. 1993). The contract must be the essential basis of the action.

Id. If a cause of action is purely statutory, section 12-341.01 does not apply. Id. 

We first reject defendant’s argument that this action arose out of the parties’

arbitration agreement. On the contrary, this action arose out of statutory rights created by

the ADEA and the ACRA. The arbitration agreement had no relevance to the merits of

plaintiff’s underlying claims. 

We also reject defendant’s argument, raised for the first time in its reply, that all

employment relationships are contractual in nature and therefore plaintiff’s discrimination

claims could not exist but for the implied employment contract. Not only will we not

consider an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief, but we will not adopt a rule that

would convert every employment discrimination claim into a claim arising out of contract

subject to attorney’s fees. This is clearly beyond the scope of A.R.S. § 12-341.01(a). 

Finally, we decline to award fees under A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01(c) or 12-349. We cannot

say that plaintiff’s claims were without substantial justification or brought solely for the

purpose of delay or harassment such that an award of attorney’s fees is justified. As is

evidenced by defendant’s claim for attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(a), lawyers and

parties too often assert claims of questionable merit. Only in extreme cases do they justify

fees. 

IT IS ORDERED DENYING defendant’s motions for attorney’s fees (docs. 23 and

24).

DATED this 29th day of April, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-01044-FJM Document 30 Filed 04/29/10 Page 2 of 2