Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02416/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02416-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

----oo0oo---- 

CONSERVATION CONGRESS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, 

and UNITED STATES FISH AND 

WILDLIFE SERVICE, 

Defendants. 

CIV. NO. 2:12-02416 WBS KJN 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO LIFT THE 

INJUNCTION 

----oo0oo---- 

 Plaintiff Conservation Congress brought this action 

against the United States Forest Service (“Forest Service”) and 

the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) challenging 

defendants’ actions in connection with three proposed vegetation 

clearance projects in the Mendocino National Forest. In its June 

6, 2013 Order, this court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment with respect to the Tatham Ridge Fuels Project (“Tatham 

Project”) and enjoined the Forest Service from beginning its 

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proposed actions until it prepared “legally adequate NEPA 

documentation for the Tatham Project.” (June 6, 2013 Order at 18 

(Docket No. 55).) Presently before the court is defendants’ 

motion to lift the injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b)(5). (Docket No. 74.) 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

 According to the Forest Service, the Tatham Project is 

designed to reduce wildfire hazard, accelerate tree growth for 

sustained timber productivity, and develop late-successional 

habitat in accordance with the Buttermilk Late Successional 

Reserve. The Tatham Project will involve (1) 1,300 acres of 

plantation thinning by removing small trees to allow larger trees 

to grow more quickly; (2) 879 acres of fuel break construction; 

and (3) 1,800 acres of prescribed burning of the understory to 

reduce fuel loading of forests. 

 The Forest Service created a biological assessment 

(“BA”) for the Tatham Project and authorized the project by a 

decision memorandum issued on May 25, 2012. The Forest Service 

did not prepare an environmental assessment (“EA”) or an 

environmental impact statement (“EIS”) because it determined the 

project qualified for a categorical exclusion and no 

extraordinary circumstances existed. 

 In its June 6, 2013 Order, this court found that 

defendants’ determination that no extraordinary circumstances 

existed was arbitrary and capricious. (June 6, 2013 Order at 16, 

18.) As a result, the court ordered the Forest Service to 

“prepare legally adequate NEPA documentation” and enjoined the 

Tatham Project. (Id. at 18.) 

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 In an effort to comply with this Court’s Order, the 

Forest Service issued a supplement to its decision memorandum 

(“Supplement”) explaining why it does not believe extraordinary 

circumstances preclude the use of a categorical exclusion for the 

Tatham Project. (Defs.’ Mem. Ex. A, Suppl. to Decision Mem. 

(“Suppl.”) (Docket No. 75-1).) 

II. Discussion 

A. Standard of Review 

 Under Rule 60(b)(5), the court may relieve a party 

“from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” if “the judgment 

has been satisfied, released or discharged” or if “applying it 

prospectively is no longer equitable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). 

Applying the injunction prospectively is no longer equitable if 

“‘a significant change either in factual conditions or in law’ 

renders continued enforcement ‘detrimental to the public 

interest.’” Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009) (citation 

omitted). 

B. The National Environmental Policy Act and Categorical 

Exclusions 

 When a major federal action may affect the environment, 

the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires the 

acting agency to undergo a scoping process in which it solicits 

comments and input from the public and other agencies to identify 

specific issues to address and study. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7. An EA 

shall be prepared when the agency has not yet determined whether 

an EIS is necessary and must discuss the need for the proposed 

project, alternatives, and the environmental impacts of the 

proposed action and alternatives. Id. § 1508.9; 36 C.F.R. 

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§ 220.7. If the agency determines that the proposed action will 

significantly impact the environment, it must prepare an EIS and 

present it to the public for notice and comment. 40 C.F.R. 

§§ 1501.4, 1503.1(a). 

 Agencies may also develop “categorical exclusions” from 

the EA/EIS requirement for classes of actions that do not “have a 

significant impact on the human environment.” Id. § 1508.4; 

Alaska Ctr. for Env’t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 857 

(9th Cir. 1999). “Application of a categorical exclusion is not 

an exemption from NEPA; rather, it is a form of NEPA compliance, 

albeit one that requires less than where an environmental impact 

statement or an environmental assessment is necessary.” Ctr. for 

Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 706 F.3d 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2013). In this case, the Forest Service applied its categorical 

exclusion for “[t]imber stand and/or wildlife habitat improvement 

activities that do not include the use of herbicides or do not 

require more than 1 mile of low standard road construction.” 36 

C.F.R. § 220.6(e)(6). 

 Even where an action falls within a categorical 

exclusion, an agency must ensure “there are no extraordinary 

circumstances related to the proposed action.” Id. § 220.6(a); 

Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1096. An 

extraordinary circumstance is when “a normally excluded action 

may have a significant environmental impact.” 40 C.F.R. 

§ 1508.4. One resource condition that must be considered in 

determining whether extraordinary circumstances warrant further 

analysis in an EA or an EIS is “federally listed threatened or 

endangered species or designated critical habitat.” 36 C.F.R. 

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§ 220.6(b). The “mere presence of” this resource condition “does 

not preclude use of a categorical exclusion.” Id. Rather, it is 

“the degree of the potential effect of a proposed action on these 

resource conditions that determines whether extraordinary 

circumstances exist.” Id. If “there is substantial evidence in 

the record that exceptions to the categorical exclusion may 

apply, the agency must at the very least explain why the action 

does not fall within one of the exceptions.” California v. 

Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 In Norton, the government applied a categorical 

exclusion and approved lease suspensions without preparing any 

environmental documentation. Id. at 1175. The Ninth Circuit 

held that because there was substantial evidence in the record 

that exceptions to the categorical exclusion were applicable, a 

brief statement that the categorical exclusion was being invoked 

was insufficient. Id. at 1176. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 

district court’s order that the government provide “a reasoned 

explanation for its reliance on the categorical explanation, 

including an explanation of why the exceptions do not apply.” 

Id. at 1178. The Ninth Circuit did not, however, specifically 

require an EA or EIS. Instead, it affirmed the district court’s 

decision to leave open the question of whether an EA or EIS would 

be required. Id. 

 Plaintiff argues that the Supplement the Forest Service 

prepared is legally inadequate under NEPA because, at a minimum, 

the Forest Service was required to prepare an EA subject to 

public comment. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 9-10 (Docket No. 76).) However, 

as discussed above, an agency need not prepare an EA or EIS if a 

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categorical exclusion applies and there are no extraordinary 

circumstances. A categorical exclusion is a legitimate form of 

NEPA compliance. 

 Further, this court’s June 6, 2013 Order did not hold 

that the potential impact of the Tatham Project on the northern 

spotted owl--a listed endangered species--constituted an 

extraordinary circumstance necessitating further analysis in an 

EA. Instead, the court found that the Forest Service’s 

“explanation was not sufficient to establish that extraordinary 

circumstances were not present.” (June 6, 2013 Order at 16-17 

n.4 (emphasis added).) The court found substantial evidence in 

the record that the Tatham Project would occur in the 

nesting/roosting and foraging habitat of the northern spotted owl 

but insufficient explanation of why this did not constitute an 

extraordinary circumstance. Accordingly, the court imposed an 

injunction unless and until the Forest Service issued “a reasoned 

explanation” but did not necessarily require it to prepare an EA 

or EIS.1 See Norton, 311 F.3d at 1178. As will be discussed in 

 1

 On page twenty-five of the Order the court held that 

the record did not enable the court to determine that the Tatham 

Project would have significant impacts on the environment 

warranting an EIS. (June 6, 2013 Order at 25.) This court 

quoted from Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Department of 

Agriculture, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007), which found 

that where an agency has invoked a categorical exclusion and not 

prepared an EA that considers whether significant effects would 

exist, the court should not make a determination that an EIS is 

necessary. Citing to this case, this court stated: “Only after 

preparation of an EA will the matter be ready for judicial 

review, id. at 1090, and if the USFS chooses to prepare an EIS, 

this claim would be moot.” The court was not suggesting that the 

Forest Service needed to prepare an EA in order to comply with 

its Order but rather agreeing with the finding in Citizens for 

Better Forestry that a determination regarding the necessity of 

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greater detail below, the Forest Service’s Supplement provides a 

reasonable and detailed explanation of why there are no 

extraordinary circumstances and is therefore an adequate NEPA 

document. 

C. Sufficiency of the Supplement 

 Plaintiff next argues that even if defendants did not 

need to prepare an EA, the Supplement does not refute the 

evidence in the record suggesting an extraordinary circumstance 

because of the potential impacts of the Tatham Project on the 

northern spotted owl. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 9.) Among other 

arguments, plaintiff contends that the Supplement fails to 

acknowledge the importance of removing foraging habitat, the 

cumulative effects of the treatment activities in the context of 

other regional projects, and that the project area is surrounded 

by private land that does not provide habitat where the northern 

spotted owl can relocate during treatment activities. (Id. at 

10-21.) Lastly, plaintiff argues that because the Forest Service 

failed to conduct surveys to locate northern spotted owls in the 

two-and-a-half years since this court’s decision, it does not 

know where owls are present and the limited operating periods 

(“LOPs”) for historic nesting sites will not necessarily protect 

current nesting areas. (Id. at 14.) 

 Despite plaintiff’s objections, the court finds that 

the Forest Service’s Supplement sufficiently explains why it does 

not believe any extraordinary circumstances exist. First, as 

discussed in detail in the June 6, 2013 Order, the Forest Service 

 

an EIS cannot be made without an EA. 

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does not need to address the cumulative impacts of regional 

projects in the abbreviated categorical exclusion process. (June 

6, 2013 Order at 21.) Further, while the Forest Service did not 

conduct surveys to identify new northern spotted owl nest sites, 

it explained that if nests are discovered during project 

activities a wildlife biologist will determine the buffer 

necessary for nest protection and an LOP will be implemented. 

(Suppl. at 8.) The Forest Service also “conservatively assumed 

any nesting/roosting habitat to be potentially occupied, and 

therefore imposed LOPs on all such areas.” (Id. at 7.) 

 More importantly, the Supplement makes clear that while 

the BA reported that the Tatham Project “may affect, but is not 

likely to adversely affect” the northern spotted owl, the degree 

of potential effects on the species is low enough that a 

categorical exclusion is still appropriate. (Id. at 3.) The 

Forest Service discussed at length how the Tatham Project will 

lessen, not aggravate, the threat of habitat loss by decreasing 

the risk of wildfires and density-related insect and disease 

outbreaks. (Id. at 6.) It will not aggravate the threat posed 

by barred owls or downgrade or remove any nesting/roosting or 

foraging habitat. (Id.) 

 The Forest Service also found that it is “extremely 

unlikely” that the Tatham Project will directly harm or harass 

individual northern spotted owls not only because nest sites will 

be protected by LOPs but also because the treatment activities 

will “be short-term, and confined to a sub-set of treatment units 

at any given time.” (Id.) As a result, individuals will be able 

to move to nearby suitable habitat temporarily. (Id.) While 

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plaintiff counters that there is not “abundant” nearby habitat 

because the project area is surrounded by private property, the 

Forest Service makes clear that the northern spotted owls will be 

able to move within the project area because the treatment units 

will be “worked on sequentially” so that “only a small portion of 

the Project would be active at any given time” and each unit will 

be completed within one to three weeks. (Id. at 6 n.7.) 

 The Supplement also explains that the Tatham Project 

will not have significant adverse effects on northern spotted owl 

habitat as all nesting/roosting and foraging habitat will 

continue to function as habitat after treatment. (Id. at 10.) 

While certain habitat characteristics will be altered, the Tatham 

Project seeks to protect the key habitat components, such as 

canopy closure in the overstory, large trees and snags, and 

decadent conifers. (Id.) Lastly, clearing vegetation for 

landing construction on twelve half-acre landings scattered 

throughout 7,528 acres of dispersal habitat will not adversely 

affect dispersal. (Id. at 11.) 

 Accordingly, the court must find that the Forest 

Service provided a reasoned explanation for why the presence of 

northern spotted owl habitat within the Tatham Project does not 

constitute an extraordinary circumstance in its Supplement. The 

Supplement satisfies the court’s judgment and qualifies as a 

significant change in the factual conditions that makes applying 

the injunction prospectively inequitable. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to lift 

the injunction (Docket No. 74) be, and the same hereby is, 

GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in 

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favor of defendants and to close this case. 

Dated: March 23, 2016 

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