Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01008/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01008-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EMMA KAHN, an incompetent minor1 by 

and through her guardians ad litem, 

ANDREW KAHN AND MAUREEN 

RUCHHOEFT; et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01008-BEN-WVG

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS; and 

(2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

INTRODUCTION

This action is brought by Plaintiffs Andrew Kahn and Maureen Ruchhoeft, both 

individually and on behalf of their daughter, Emma Kahn (“Emma”),2 who allege 

educational harms based on purported violations of Emma’s right to receive a free and 

 

1 The Court notes that, according to the Complaint, Emma was a minor at the time 

the Complaint was filed, but has since reached adulthood.

2 Andrew Kahn and Maureen Ruchhoeft are hereinafter referred to together as 

“Emma’s parents.”

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appropriate public education (“FAPE”) pursuant to provisions of the Individuals with 

Disabilities Education Improvement Ace, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (“IDEA”). Plaintiffs 

further allege related violations of Title II of the American’s with Disabilities Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 

U.S.C. § 794 (“Section 504”), and California statutes, including civil rights violations. 

Defendant San Diego Unified School District (the “District”) and individual 

Defendants Cindy Marten (“Marten”), Lorelei Olsen (“Olsen”), Lisa Dryer (“Dryer”), 

Aimee Sage (“Sage”), and Yolanda Hiller (“Hiller,” collectively, “individual 

Defendants”) now move to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 9.) The motion is fully briefed. 

For the reasons that follow, the Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND3

At all relevant times to this action, Emma was entitled to receive educational 

services from the District; Marten was the District’s Superintendent, Olsen was a 

Director of Special Education for the District, Dryer and Sage were Program Managers 

for the District, and Hiller was a Mental Health Related Services Residential Coordinator 

for the District. 

Since June 2003, Emma has been qualified to receive Special Education and 

Related Services for her autism and mental illness diagnoses.4 From September 2013 to 

May 3, 2016, Emma’s Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) team placed her at The 

Institute for Effective Education – Cook Center (“Cook Center”), a Non-Public School. 

During the 2015-2016 academic year, Emma’s academic performance, social and 

emotional behavior, and mental well-being rapidly deteriorated, resulting in 5 

 

3 The following overview of the facts is drawn from the allegations of the 

Complaint (Docket No. 1). The Court is not making factual findings.

4 According to the Complaint, in addition to Autism, Emma was diagnosed with 

Disruptive Dysregulated Mood Disorder, Obsessive Compulsive disorder with Psychosis, 

Oppositional Defiance Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and Depression.

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psychiatric-based hospital admissions, 7 psychiatric-based involuntary holds, and 10 

emergency calls and other episodes involving Emma’s danger to herself or others. 

On May 3, 2016, Cook Center’s director notified the District that it was 

terminating Emma’s services under the Master Contract with the District due to “Emma’s 

disability becoming worse and putting others and herself at risk.” (Compl. ¶ 23.) The 

District suggested the Copper Hills Youth Center (“Copper Hills”) in Utah as a potential 

new placement for Emma. However, Emma’s parents researched Copper Hills and 

became concerned based on reports of prior incidents of student riots, violence, and 

sexual abuse at the facility, and questioned the District about the appropriateness of the 

placement. 

Ultimately, the District did not place Emma at Copper Hills. Nor did she receive 

any academic instruction, special education services, therapy or mental health services 

from May 3, 2016 to December 2, 2016. On May 16, 2017, Plaintiffs filed the instant 

action, from which Defendants now seek dismissal.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint if 

the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007). All 

factual allegations are accepted as true and “courts must consider the complaint in its 

entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) 

motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, 

and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 

Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).5 Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to 

 

5

In support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants filed a Request for Judicial 

Notice (Docket No. 9-3, “RJN”) and simultaneously filed a motion to seal those 

documents (Docket No. 10). Plaintiffs’ oppose Defendants’ RJN. (Docket No. 14.) The 

Court has reviewed the documents and finds them unnecessary to resolve the instant 

motion. Therefore, Defendants’ RJN and motion to seal are DENIED.

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state enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 

the matter complained of, or if the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory under which 

relief may be granted. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 

“A claim is facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.’” Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678). While the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s

favor, it need not “necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they 

are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 

F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Nevertheless, “[t]he 

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & 

Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend each of Plaintiffs’ eight claims for relief must be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim. The Court agrees.

A. Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Claims for Relief

Plaintiffs’ Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Claims for Relief are against 

all Defendants6for alleged violations of California Government Code § 11135, the 

California Unruh Act (Civil Code § 51, et seq.), California Education Code §§ 200, 201, 

and 220, Emma’s Constitutional Right to Education, and California Government Code § 

815.6, respectively. (Compl. ¶¶ 44-69.) Defendants argue that each of these claims must 

be dismissed against the District because it enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from 

 

6 Defendants correctly identify that Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts the First through 

Fifth Claims against “All Defendants,” but does not specify against whom the Sixth 

through Eighth Claims for relief are asserted against. However, based on the allegations, 

the Court construes the Complaint as alleging these claims against all named defendants.

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being sued by a private individual in federal court, and has not waived its immunity for 

any of these claims. Defendants further argue that the individual Defendants, as District 

employees, enjoy the same Eleventh Amendment immunity insofar as Plaintiffs’ claims 

are brought against them in their official capacity for their official conduct, and therefore 

these claims must also be dismissed. Plaintiffs did not address Defendants’ immunity 

arguments, but appear to generally argue this Court should “exercise ancillary 

jurisdiction” and hear all of the claims against the defendants. (Opp’n at p. 9.) The Court 

agrees with Defendants that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies.

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States 

shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 

any Foreign State.” Sato v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., 861 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 

2017) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XI). “It is well established that agencies of the state 

are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from private damages or suits for injunctive 

relief brought in federal court.” Sato, 861 F.3d at 928 (quoting Savage v. Glendale Union 

High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“State sovereign immunity does not extend to county and municipal governments, unless 

state law treats them as arms of the state.” Sato, 861 F.3d at 928 (citing Savage, 373 F.3d 

at 1040-41). The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed its prior holdings that “California 

school districts . . . remain arms of the state and continue to enjoy Eleventh Amendment 

immunity” from suit in federal court, Sato, 861 F.3d at 934, unless the immunity is 

waived or the claim is authorized by Congress. 

Thus, the District, which according to the Complaint is a California school district 

(Compl. ¶ 13), properly invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Plaintiffs 

cannot advance their Fourth through Eighth Claims against it. As a result, the individual 

Defendants also enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity for these claims, to the extent 

these claims are asserted against them in their official capacity as District employees and 

predicated upon their official conduct. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 

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U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a 

suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. . . . As such, it is 

no different from a suit against the State itself.”) (internal citations omitted). 

Regarding Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual Defendants brought against 

them in their personal capacities, the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for 

Claims Four through Eight because the Complaint lacks specific allegations about any 

individual Defendant’s conduct that would give rise to liability. Defendants accurately 

argue that although each individual Defendant is generally alleged to have engaged in 

official and unofficial conduct (see Compl. ¶¶ 6-10), the Complaint lacks specific 

allegations as to what any of the individual Defendants did to violate the statutes or

Emma’s right to education. Rather, throughout the Complaint, Plaintiffs generally 

attribute all actions to “Defendants.” Plaintiffs’ only specific allegation that is 

attributable to an individual defendant (Defendant Hiller) asserts “Hiller indicated 

[Copper Hills] was [an] appropriate [placement] for Emma and that she would be 

accepted into the program.” (Compl. ¶ 24.) This is not sufficient to survive Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss.

In sum, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and 

Eighth Claims against all Defendants is GRANTED. Because the Court finds the 

Eleventh Amendment immunity would render amendment futile, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 

Seventh, and Eighth Claims against the District are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

Likewise, these claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities are 

DISMISSED with prejudice. 

However, inasmuch as Plaintiffs seek recovery from the individual Defendants’ in 

their personal capacity based on their extra-official conduct, these claims are 

DISMISSED without prejudice. The Court shall permit Plaintiffs to amend these 

claims and further instructs Plaintiffs that any amended claims must set forth specific 

allegations such that each individual Defendant may infer the specific alleged conduct 

attributable to him or her that is the basis for his or her liability. 

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B. First, Second, and Third Claims for Relief Against Individual 

Defendants

Plaintiffs’ First, Second, and Third Claims for Relief for violations of the IDEA, 

ADA, and Section 504, respectively, against each of the individual Defendants must also 

be dismissed. As discussed above, the Complaint is deficient of specific allegations as to 

what any individual Defendants did to violate these statutes. More importantly, contrary 

to Plaintiffs’ assertion otherwise, the IDEA, ADA, and Section 504 do not provide a 

private right of action against a private person, whether they are sued in their personal or 

official capacity. See Everett H. v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary Sch. Dist., 5 F. Supp. 3d 

1167, 1180-82 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (dismissing with prejudice claims under IDEA, ADA, 

and Section 504 against individual defendants after concluding none of the statutes 

authorize individual capacity suits). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss Plaintiffs First, Second, and Third Claims against the individual Defendants

and, because the Court finds amendment would be futile, these claims against the 

individual Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

C. First, Second, and Third Claims for Relief Against the District

1. IDEA Claim

According to Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief, they seek “[c]ompensatory damages to 

Plaintiffs for injury, emotional distress and for medical expenses,” attorney’s fees and 

costs, and any other relief the Court deems just and proper, from the District for each of 

their claims. However, the Ninth Circuit “has repeatedly held that the IDEA creates a 

‘comprehensive enforcement scheme’ in which compensatory damages play no part. 

C.O. v. Portland Pub. Sch., 679 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Blanchard v. 

Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2007)). Therefore, inasmuch as Plaintiffs 

seek compensatory damages under the IDEA, this prayer for relief is STRICKEN

without leave to amend. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a 

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous 

matter.”)

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The Court construes Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees and other appropriate 

relief as a request for reimbursement of expenses and recovery of attorney’s fees related 

to their efforts to secure Emma’s free appropriate public education under the IDEA, 

which are recoverable. Blanchard, 509 F.3d at 937. But the Complaint lacks factual 

allegations to support this prayer for relief; Plaintiffs do not identify the amount of 

attorney’s fees and/or costs they incurred to secure Emma’s FAPE.

7

 Notably, Plaintiffs’ 

opposition represents they are “agreeable to amend the Complaint to eliminate” this claim 

in its entirety “based on their own investigation.” (Opp’n at p. 2.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief is DISMISSED with leave to 

amend. If Plaintiffs elect to amend this claim, they must set forth facts to cure the 

deficiencies identified above.

2. ADA & Section 504 Claims

In general, to survive a motion to dismiss, “[a] plaintiff bringing suit under section 

504 or Title II of the ADA” must allege: “(1) she is a qualified individual with a 

disability; (2) she was denied ‘a reasonable accommodation that [she] needs in order to 

enjoy meaningful access to the benefits of public services;’ and (3) the program 

providing the benefit receives federal financial assistance.” A.G. v. Paradise Valley 

Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815 F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mark H. v. 

Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010)). To establish an ADA or Section 504

claim for damages, a plaintiff must also sufficiently allege the defendant’s “mens rea of 

‘intentional discrimination,’” which may be established by alleging “deliberate 

 

7 The Court acknowledges that Defendants specifically seek dismissal with 

prejudice of Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees for the IDEA claim based on a 

purported settlement agreement between the District and Plaintiffs, which they sought to 

admit into evidence via their request for judicial notice. (Mot. at pp. 4-5, 7-9.) As noted 

above, the Court finds judicial notice of the requested document unnecessary to resolve 

the motion, and further notes the evidence does not appear appropriate for consideration 

at the motion to dismiss stage. 

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indifference” in addition to “discriminatory animus.” Id., 815 F.3d at 1205 (quoting 

Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008)).

However, where, as here, a plaintiff seeks relief under the ADA or Section 504 for 

a denial of a free and appropriate public education under the IDEA, she must first allege 

she exhausted the IDEA’s administrative procedures. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. 

Ct. 743, 754 (2017) (concluding that application of “§ 1415(l)’s exhaustion rule hinges 

on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education. If 

a lawsuit charges such a denial, the plaintiff cannot escape § 1415(l) merely by bringing 

her suit under a statute other than the IDEA—as when, for example, the plaintiffs in 

Smith claimed that a school’s failure to provide a FAPE also violated the Rehabilitation 

Act.”). In other words, the plaintiff must “first submit her case to an IDEA hearing 

officer.” Id. at 754.

Plaintiffs effectively concede they have not pleaded administrative exhaustion of 

their ADA and Section 504 claims. (Opp’n at p. 2) (“Plaintiffs are also agreeable to 

amending the Complaint to allege that all administrative remedies have been exhausted.”) 

For this reason alone, the Court could dismiss this claim. But, even assuming Plaintiffs 

pleaded exhaustion of IDEA’s administrative procedures, the Court further concludes that 

Plaintiffs’ claims are deficient for failure to sufficiently allege the District’s mens rea of 

either discriminatory animus or deliberate indifference to state a plausible claim for 

discrimination under both the ADA and Section 504. At best, Plaintiffs have established 

that on September 22, 2016 (i.e., over four months after Emma allegedly stopped 

receiving services due under the IDEA), the District received letters advising them that 

“Emma was being discriminated against because of her disability and that [the District 

was] violating her civil rights,” and that Emma did not receive her services, programs, 

and activities until December 2, 2016. (Compl. ¶ 34.) Other than their own conclusory 

allegations, which the Court need not assume true, nowhere in the Complaint do 

Plaintiffs allege conduct to support an inference that the District discriminated against 

Emma based on her disability either intentionally or with deliberate indifference. In 

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short, these allegations fall well below the standard to provide the District (and the other 

Defendants) a meaningful opportunity to respond. Therefore, the Second and Third 

Claims for relief against the District are DISMISSED without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and Defendants’ motion 

to seal is DENIED. For all of the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ First, Second, and 

Third Claims against the individual Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

Plaintiffs’ Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Claims against the District and the 

individual Defendants (in their official capacities for their official conduct) are 

DISMISSED with prejudice. 

Finally, Plaintiffs’ First, Second, and Third Claims against the District, and 

Plaintiffs’ Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Claims against the individual 

Defendants in their individual capacities, are DISMISSED without prejudice. The 

Court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend the specified claims to correct the deficiencies 

identified in this Order. If Plaintiffs elect to file a First Amended Complaint, it must be 

filed on or before May 4, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 25, 2018

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