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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 19-1791

KENYATTA BRIDGES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THOMAS J. DART, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:16-cv-04635 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 23, 2020 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 19, 2020

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Kenyatta Bridges was a pretrial

detainee at the Cook County Department of Corrections

(“Department”) when he fell out of the upper bunk to which

he had been assigned and injured himself. He sued Thomas J.

Dart, the Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois (“Sheriff”) in his

Case: 19-1791 Document: 39 Filed: 02/19/2020 Pages: 7
2 No. 19-1791

official capacity,1 and Cook County, Illinois (“County”),

asserting that the injuries he sustained were caused by the

defendants’ practice of ignoring medically necessary lower

bunk prescriptions. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the defendants and we affirm.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff and construing all reasonable inferences from the

evidence in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255 (1986); Lapre v. City of Chicago, 911 F.3d 424, 430 (7th

Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are

no genuine disputes of material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson,

477 U.S. at 247–48; Lapre, 911 F.3d at 430. 

Bridges entered the Department as a pretrial detainee in

February 2014. Cook County Hospital medical records from

March 26, 2014 indicated that Bridges had suffered blunt head

trauma. The “Patient Care” portion of the record indicated a

prescription for a lower bunk: “Alert CCDOC (Order):

3/26/2014 09:36, Lower Bunk, Routine, 26, WEEK, 9/24/2014

09:35.” September 24, 2014 was precisely twenty-six weeks

after March 26, 2014, and so we may infer that the order for a

lower bunk covered the period between March 26 and September 24 of that year. The Sheriff’s records showed a correspond1

 “As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to

respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be

treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166

(1985). In this instance, the suit against the Sheriff in his official capacity is

treated as a suit against the County.

Case: 19-1791 Document: 39 Filed: 02/19/2020 Pages: 7
No. 19-1791 3

ing alert on that same day, noting that Bridges was to be

assigned to a lower bunk with an “Alert Start Date” of

March 26, 2014 and an “Alert End Date” of September 24, 2014.

Despite that alert, Bridges was assigned to a top bunk and on

April 24, he fell out of the top bunk and injured himself.

Bridges sued the Sheriff and the County under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a claim for deliberate indifference to his

medical needs.2 According to Bridges, the defendants had a

policy, practice or procedure to ignore medically necessary

prescriptions for lower bunk placements. In support of this

claim, Bridges cited in his complaint five lawsuits filed by

Department detainees who alleged that, between 2005 and

2012, they were injured when using upper bunks after their

lower bunk prescriptions were ignored. 

In order to hold a government entity such as a municipality

or county liable under section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the government entity (here, a county) itself caused

the constitutional violation at issue. City of Canton, Ohio, v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social

Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)). 

2

 For pretrial detainees asserting due process claims for inadequate medical

care, the standard of objective reasonableness, and not deliberate indifference, governs. McCann v. Ogle County, Ill., 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018).

See also Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353–54 (7th Cir. 2018)

(pretrial detainees bringing due process medical claims must demonstrate

that the defendant acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly, and then

must show that the defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable). The

district court correctly recognized both that objective reasonableness was

the applicable standard, and that Bridges’ claim would fail under either the

objectively reasonable standard or the deliberate indifference standard.

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4 No. 19-1791

[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983

for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or

agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may

fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the

injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. A policy or custom need not have

received formal approval through official decisionmaking

channels. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91; Thomas v. Cook County

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). A practice that

is widespread and well settled may also result in liability.3

Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303. See also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.

51, 61 (2011) (“Official municipal policy includes the decisions

of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking

officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to

practically have the force of law.”). We have not adopted

bright-line rules defining “widespread custom or practice,” but

there must be some evidence demonstrating that there is a

policy at issue rather than a random event or even a short

series of random events. Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303. As we noted

3

 There are several ways in which a plaintiff may prove the “policy or

custom” element. As we recently summarized, “[e]ither the content of an

official policy, a decision by a final decisionmaker, or evidence of custom

will suffice.” Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir.

2017). In this case, the plaintiff does not contend that the defendants acted

under an official policy or according to a decision by a final decisionmaker.

Bridges argues instead that there was a widespread, unofficial custom at

play.

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No. 19-1791 5

in Thomas, we have rejected claims of widespread custom or

practice in cases involving a single incident, or three incidents.

604 F.3d at 303–04. “It is not enough to demonstrate that

policymakers could, or even should, have been aware of the

unlawful activity because it occurred more than once. The

plaintiff must introduce evidence demonstrating that the

unlawful practice was so pervasive that acquiescence on the

part of policymakers was apparent and amounted to a policy

decision.” Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 790 (7th Cir.

2006), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises,

Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016).

In the district court, Bridges relied on five inmate complaints over a seven-year period to demonstrate that the

defendants had a widespread practice of refusing to honor

lower bunk prescriptions. On appeal, Bridges relies on only

three of those cases. Two of them settled without any admission of liability and the third was dismissed. Bridges nevertheless asserts that these lawsuits put the defendants on notice

that lower bunk prescriptions were being ignored with enough

frequency to constitute a widespread practice. 

The district court assumed for the purposes of deciding the

motion that the complaints initiating these lawsuits constituted

admissible evidence.4

 But the court concluded that this

4

 Unverified complaints in other cases are simply out-of-court statements

that are admissible only to the extent of any other out-of-court statements.

Cf. Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 901-02 (7th Cir. 2017) (a verified complaint is

not just a pleading; it is also the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of

summary judgment because it contains factual allegations that if included

(continued...)

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6 No. 19-1791

evidence was inadequate to demonstrate that lower bunk

prescriptions were being ignored so frequently that the

defendants essentially acquiesced in the practice. The court

also noted that Bridges had presented no evidence that would

allow an inference that these incidents were anything other

than isolated instances of possible misconduct or negligence on

the part of individual employees. Nothing connected the

incidents and they were not so common as to place the

defendants on notice of a widespread practice. That was a

sound analysis and the court correctly granted summary

judgment in favor of the defendants. These incidents were so

few and far between that they could not plausibly be described

as “so persistent and widespread as to practically have the

force of law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. See also Grieveson v.

Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2008) (four incidents fail to

meet the test of widespread unconstitutional practice that is so

well settled that it constitutes a custom or usage with the force

of law); Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 760 (7th Cir.

2005) (three incidents do not amount to a widespread practice);

Gable v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 2002) (three

4

 (...continued)

in an affidavit or deposition would be considered evidence); Ford v. Wilson,

90 F.3d 245, 246-47 (7th Cir. 1996) (same). Bridges argues that he is not citing

the complaints for the truth of the allegations contained therein but rather

to demonstrate that the defendants were on notice that jail personnel were

ignoring valid prescriptions for lower bunks. At most, however, the

complaints demonstrate that the defendants were aware that detainees had

accused Department staff of ignoring lower bunk prescriptions. Without

any evidence regarding the defendants’ knowledge of the legitimacy of

those complaints, the complaints do little to advance Bridges’ argument. 

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No. 19-1791 7

incidents in a four-year period are too few to indicate that a

city had a widespread custom of which city policymakers had

reason to be aware).5

We suppose that if the Cook County Department of

Corrections housed as few inmates as Sheriff Andy Taylor’s

two-cell lockup in small town Mayberry, three or five incidents

in a short period of time might create a question for a jury

regarding whether a practice is widespread. But more than five

million people reside in Cook County, and the Department

houses thousands of detainees, with hundreds entering and

leaving on a daily basis. In this context, three or five incidents

over a seven-year period is inadequate as a matter of law to

demonstrate a widespread custom or practice. 

AFFIRMED.

5

 We have also considered Bridges’ argument regarding the answers to the

complaints in his cited cases, where the defendants claimed insufficient

knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of certain

allegations regarding prescriptions for lower bunks. Finding no merit in

that argument, we decline to address it further.

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