Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01495/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01495-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

v.

ERNEST SOQUI, 

Defendant/Petitioner.

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Civil No. 11CV1495-JLS

Criminal No. 09CR0710-002-JLS

ORDER:

1) DISMISSING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. §

2255;

2) DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION TO EXPAND THE

RECORD; and 

3) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY 

Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Vacate and Correct

Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. No. 377) and Motion to Expand the Record

(Doc. No. 421). The Court has reviewed the record in this case and, for the reasons set

forth below, will dismiss Petitioner’s § 2255 Petition for lack of jurisdiction and deny

Petitioner’s motion to expand the record as moot.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner Ernest Soqui was charged with fourteen others in a nineteen count

indictment alleging various racketeering and drug offenses. Petitioner was named in six

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counts: Count 1, which alleged a RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d);

Counts 11 and 15, which alleged conspiracies to distribute methamphetamine (in excess

of 50 grams) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 846; and Counts 12, 16, and 17,

which alleged distribution of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 

With respect to the substantive distribution counts, Counts 12 and 16 alleged quantities of

methamphetamine in excess of 50 grams, while Count 17 alleged a quantity in excess of

5 grams.

On March 11, 2010, Defendant entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to Count

15 of the indictment which alleged a conspiracy to distribute 50 grams and more of

methamphetamine beginning on a date unknown and continuing to December 10, 2008. 

Under the terms of the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to waive any right to appeal or

to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence. (Plea Agreement, Doc. No. 193 ¶ XI). 

As part of the factual basis set forth in the plea agreement, Defendant admitted that he

was personally involved in the distribution of approximately 175 grams of

methamphetamine (actual) in the San Diego area between June and December 2008. (Id.

¶ II(B)(3)). Petitioner was sentenced by this Court on July 2, 2010 to a term of

imprisonment of 169 months and 5 years of supervised release. 

ANALYSIS

In his §2255 motion, Petitioner contends that his conviction is invalid because he

was denied effective assistance of counsel in three respects. First, Petitioner contends

that the his plea agreement was not entered voluntarily and that the plea agreement was

poorly negotiated. Second, Petitioner maintains that his counsel failed to object to an

allegedly improper criminal history calculation used at sentencing. Third, Petitioner

faults counsel for her failure to challenge a Guidelines sentence enhancement applied by

the Court. 

Petitioner’s first objection is pivotal to the Court’s resolution of this matter, for if

Petitioner’s plea agreement was entered knowingly and voluntarily, his waiver of

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collateral attack would bar his further claims. See Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d. 864,

871 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that if sentencing agreement’s waiver of the right to file

a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was valid, district court lacked

jurisdiction to hear the case). 

The court determines voluntariness by looking at the totality of the circumstances

surrounding the signing and entry of the plea agreement. United States v. Kaczynski, 239

F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001). In assessing the voluntariness of the plea, the court

must accord great weight to statements made by the defendant contemporaneously with

his plea. Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986). The representations of the

defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor, as well as the judge’s findings in accepting the

plea, “constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” 

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).

“A claim of ineffective assistance [of counsel] may be used to attack the

voluntariness and hence the validity of a guilty plea.” United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d

1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990); see Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985). To prevail

on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d

1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 2005). In the context of guilty pleas, to satisfy the “prejudice”

requirement “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 

Petitioner contends that he did not voluntarily plead guilty because his attorney

told him that he had to accept the plea agreement and there was nothing else that could be

done. Petitioner further contends that his attorney should have negotiated a plea to Count

17 of the indictment because that count alleged a lesser quantity of methamphetamine and

thus would have lessened Petitioner’s sentencing exposure. 

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Petitioner fails to establish, however, that his attorney’s performance fell below

professional standards. Assuming that Petitioner’s allegations are true, advising an

accused to plead guilty is not invariably improper. In fact, a guilty plea is often the best

option available to an accused in the face of overwhelming evidence. While the Court is

not aware of the extent of the Government’s evidence in this case, Petitioner has

presented nothing to suggest that going to trial would have been a plausible option for

him. To the contrary, Petitioner merely suggests that counsel could have obtained a more

favorable plea agreement. This speculation is not sufficient to demonstrate that counsel’s

performance was deficient, or that Defendant was prejudiced by entering the negotiated

plea agreement. 

In the written plea agreement, Petitioner acknowledged he understood the elements

of the offense to which he pleaded guilty, and that he had “fully discussed the facts of this

case with defense counsel.” (Plea Agreement, Doc. No. 193, at 2). Petitioner admitted

he “committed each of the elements of the crime” and admitted the factual basis for the

guilty plea, which included an admission that he was “personally involved in the

distribution of approximately 175 grams of methamphetamine (actual) in the San Diego

area.” Id. Petitioner further acknowledged having reviewed the Plea Agreement with his

attorney and his understanding of its terms. Id. at 4, 9. Significantly, Petitioner

represented he entered the guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. As stated in the Plea

Agreement:

Defendant represents that:

A. Defendant has had a full opportunity to discuss all the facts and circumstances of this case with defense counsel, and has a clear

understanding of the charges and the consequences of this plea;

B. No one has made any promises or offered any rewards in return for this guilty plea, other than those contained in this

agreement;

C. No one has threatened Defendant or Defendant’s family to induce this guilty plea; and 

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D. Defendant is pleading guilty because in truth and in fact Defendant is guilty and for no other reason.

Id. at 4. 

This record undermines Petitioner’s argument his counsel was ineffective by

forcing Petitioner into signing the plea agreement. Furthermore, Petitioner makes no

showing of any reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and insisted on going to trial. Nor does Petitioner make any showing

that ineffective assistance of counsel caused him to miss out on a more favorable earlier

plea offer. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012) (recognizing that Hill v. Lockhart

does not necessarily provide the sole means for demonstrating prejudice arising from the

deficient performance of counsel during plea negotiations.)

 Although a plea bargain to Count 17 instead of Count 15 would certainly have

lowered Petitioner’s sentencing exposure, there is no legal requirement that a defendant

be afforded the opportunity to plead guilty to the least severe offense. The record

establishes that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to Count 17, conspiring

to distribute methamphetamine in excess of 50 grams, a plea fully supported by his

admission that he was personally involved in the distribution of approximately 175 grams

of methamphetamine in the San Diego area. Accordingly, having considered the

substantial weight accorded Petitioner’s on-the-record statements, Petitioner’s challenge

to the voluntariness of his plea because of his counsel’s performance in advising

Petitioner to enter the plea is without merit.

Petitioner also alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the time of

sentencing because counsel failed to object to an allegedly improper criminal history

calculation used at sentencing and failed to challenge a Guidelines sentence enhancement

applied by the Court. Because these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not

challenge the validity of his guilty plea or waiver of the right to collaterally attack his

conviction and sentence, these claims is barred and the Court does not have jurisdiction

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over them. See United States v. Racich, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1218 (S.D. Cal. 1999)

(holding that a plea agreement’s waiver provision bars claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel that do not implicate the validity of the waiver itself). 

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Expand the Record, which seeks to provide

additional information regarding Defendant’s criminal history, is DENIED AS MOOT.

 CONCLUSION

Having carefully considered Petitioner’s claims in view of the case files and

records, the Court finds the record sufficiently developed to conclusively show that

Petitioner is entitled to no relief. The Court finds Petitioner’s waiver of collateral attack

to be valid and enforceable. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction and Petitioner’s

Motion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is DISMISSED. Additionally, the Court DENIES

Petitioner a certificate of appealability, as Petitioner has not made a substantial showing

that he has been denied a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (providing that a

certificate shall issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of a denial of

a constitutional right.”). The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 17, 2013

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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