Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_05-cv-00685/USCOURTS-almd-3_05-cv-00685-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

1. Minix and the Simses’ state-law claims, along

with defendant Fetner, have been dismissed (Doc. No. 36).

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

 

LORENA MINIX, BRENDA SIMS, )

and LINDA SIMS, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 3:05cv685-MHT

) (WO)

JELD-WEN, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

Plaintiffs Lorena Minix, Brenda Sims, and Linda

Sims bring this lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a,

2000e through 2000e-17, against their former employer,

defendant JELD-WEN, Inc., claiming that they were

sexually harassed by their supervisor, Richard Fetner.1

Jurisdiction is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).

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2

This lawsuit is before the court on JELD-WEN’s

motion for summary judgment. As explained below, the

motion will be granted. 

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule

56, the party seeking summary judgment must first

inform the court of the basis for the motion. The

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

demonstrate why summary judgment would not be proper.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see

also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-

17 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing burden-shifting under

Rule 56). The non-moving party must affirmatively set

forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial

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3

and may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials

in the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The court’s role at the summary-judgment stage is

not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of

the matter, but rather to determine only whether a

genuine issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In doing so,

the court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of that party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND

Sometime between late 2001 and early 2002, JELD-WEN

took over a facility, located in Roanoke, Alabama, that

manufactured wooden components used in the construction

of doorframes. 

At various times, Lorena Minix worked for JELD-WEN

from the time it took over the Roanoke facility until

Case 3:05-cv-00685-MHT-VPM Document 67 Filed 10/17/06 Page 3 of 29
2. Plf. Brief in Opp. Summ. J. (Doc. No. 37), 2-5.

3. Id., Exhibit 1, Minix dep. (hereinafter Minix

dep.), 284:2-14.

4. Id., 279:2-3.

4

November 2004; she had also worked for JELD-WEN’s

predecessor. Brenda Sims and Linda Sims (no relation

to Brenda) also worked at the facility from June 2004

through November 2004.

Richard Fetner, the immediate supervisor of Minix

and the Simses, sexually harassed them during their

employment in 2004. Fetner touched their legs and

breasts without their consent, and directed

inappropriate comments, including the following, to

each of them:2

 

(1) He offered to “fix” Minix’s timecard

if she would have sex with him;3

 told her that

he’d “like to eat her from the top of [her]

head to [her] toes”; and repeatedly asked her

to have sex with him.4

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5. Id., Exhibit 2, Brenda Sims dep. (hereafter B.

Sims dep.), 150:2-5.

6. Id., 162:10.

7. Id., Exhibit 3, Linda Sims dep. (hereafter L.

Sims dep.) 134-135:2, 11, 22, 31.

8. Id., 136:18-20.

5

(2) He repeatedly propositioned Brenda

Sims,5

 saying that, if she came home with him,

she would not have to worry about missing work

time. On one occasion, Brenda Sims was sent

home from work, although there was work to do

on her job, and, as a result, lost hours and

wages.6

(3) He told Linda Sims that her “butt

looked like two basketballs” and he “wanted to

go dribbling.”7

 On another occasion, he came

up behind her and said that one of her

“basketballs” looked “deflated” and he “had a

needle that could pump [her] up.”8 He also

mimicked dribbling a basketball when walking

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9. Id., 135:10-13.

10. Id., 153:14-154:2.

11. Id., Exhibit 4, Thornton dep. (hereinafter

Thornton dep.), 87:16-21.

12. Id., 105:15-17. 

13. Id., Exhibit 5, Cook dep. 91:10-15.

14. Id., 208:17-23.

6

past her.9

 Linda Sims was also sent home when

there was still work on her job.10

Fetner sexually harassed three other women at the

facility. Fetner touched and grabbed Kathy Thornton

and stuck broom handles up her skirt while she was

working;11 he also grabbed his crotch in front of her.

Thornton reported Fetner’s conduct to a coordinating

group manager at the plant, but the group manager and

JELD-WEN never pursued the complaint.12 Fetner also

sexually harassed Linda Cook while she was employed at

the Roanoke facility. He touched her between her legs

in her “private” area;13 his attempts to touch her were

an “everyday thing.”14 Fetner forced a third woman to

have sex with him. 

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15. Minix dep., 219:5-11.

16. Id., 222:22-224:13.

17. Id., 229:10-12.

7

Minix was also harassed at the JELD-WEN facility by

a coworker named Ronald Bowen, who masturbated in front

of her.15 She and another plant worker complained to a

manager. A week later, counsel for JELD-WEN visited

the facility,16 and anti-harassment training was given

at the facility, including training on the company’s

sexual harassment policy. Bowen quit his job.17

On October 13, 2004, Minix and the Simses reported

Fetner’s harassment to JELD-WEN. That morning, after

the company began an investigation into his behavior,

Fetner resigned. He was awarded severance. JELD-WEN

closed the Roanoke facility shortly thereafter, in late

2004.

In November and December of 2004, Minix and the

Simses separately filed charges of sexual harassment

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC), and eventually received right-to-sue letters.

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18. Def. M. Summ. J. (Doc. No. 30), Exhibits 22, 31,

43, EEOC charges.

8

The Simses’ EEOC charges indicated that the harassment

stopped in August 2004. Minix’s charge indicated that

the harassment stopped in July 2004.18 

Minix and the Simses brought this lawsuit in July

2005.

III. DISCUSSION

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice

for an employer ... to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual's ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Sexual harassment violates Title VII's prohibition of

discrimination based on sex. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).

The only issue before the court is JELD-WEN’s

liability for Fetner’s actions; JELD-WEN does not, at

this point, dispute that unlawful harassment took

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place. Thus, the discussion that follows is confined

to the issue of JELD-WEN’s liability. 

Where, as here, a supervisor has harassed an

employee, the company is liable for the harassment

where the plaintiff can prove that a tangible

employment action was taken against her in connection

with the harassment. In the absence of a tangible

employment action, the company is still liable unless

it can prove that (1) it exercised reasonable care to

prevent and correct the harassment and (2) the

plaintiff failed to pursue reasonably corrective

opportunities. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775 (1998); Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad.

Service, 234 F.3d 501, 508 (11th Cir. 2000). 

Minix and the Simses contend that a tangible

employment action was taken against each of them, and

that the company is liable even in the absence of such

an action because it did not exercise reasonable care

to prevent or correct the harassment they suffered. 

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A. Tangible Employment Action

“A tangible employment action constitutes a

significant change in employment status, such as

hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with

significantly different responsibilities, or a decision

causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington

Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).

Where there has been a tangible employment action, no

defenses are available to the company. Id. at 765.

Minix and the Simses argue that they have suffered a

tangible employment action.

To establish JELD-WEN’S liability for sexual

harassment based on a tangible employment action, Minix

and the Simses must demonstrate that "[their] reaction

to the unwelcome behavior affected tangible aspects of

[their] compensation, or terms, conditions or

privileges of employment." Brown v. Snow, 440 F.3d

1259 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). Thus, the issue here is whether

Minix’s and the Simses’ reactions to the sexual

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harassment (not responding to Fetner’s propositions)

led Fetner to take a tangible employment action against

them. 

As this case is framed, there are two elements of a

claim based on tangible employment action: first,

whether the employment action was, in fact, tangible;

and, second, whether there was, in fact, a connection

between the harassment, including here the refusal, and

the employment action. Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old

Country Store, 434 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006). 

The Simses contend that two sorts of tangible

actions were taken against them: lost hours and

reassignment. Minix challenges only her reassignment. 

1. The Simses’ Lost Hours

The Simses maintain that they were sent home and

lost hours (and, therefore, wages) as a result of

rebuffing Fetner’s advances. According to them, Fetner

did not send them home himself, but rather instructed

another employee to do so. 

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Employment decisions that alter compensation are

obviously tangible employment decisions, and thus “a

reduction in an employee’s hours, which reduces the

employee’s take home pay, qualifies as a tangible

employment decision.” Cotton, 434 F.3d at 1231. Thus,

the Simses’ loss of hours satisfies the first

requirement of the tangible employment action standard.

The Simses have not, however, adequately

established a fact issue as to the necessary “causal

link between the tangible employment action and the

sexual harassment.” Id. While “[t]emporal proximity

between the harassment and a tangible employment action

can give rise to a genuine issue of fact as to

causation,” id. at 1232, Linda Sims’s loss of hours

happened two months after she acknowledged that the

harassment stopped; this period of time, without more

(that is, standing alone), is too long for a factfinder

to be able to conclude, other than by mere speculation,

that there was a causal relationship between the

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19. L. Sims dep., 151:20. The date of the end of the

harassment is set by the date in the plaintiff’s EEOC

charge.

20. B. Sims dep., 162: 12.

13

harassment and the loss of hours.19 Brenda Sims does

not remember when the harassment occurred,20 and thus,

other through mere speculation, cannot create a fact

issue with respect to it.

2. Minix’s and the Simses’ Reassignments

Minix’s and the Simses’ reassignments to different,

and less personally desirable, workstations do not

survive scrutiny either. While an undesirable

reassignment can be a tangible employment action,

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, the reassignments here cannot

be considered such. 

In Davis v. Town of Lake Park Florida, 245 F.3d

1232 (11th Cir. 2001), after using standards for

tangible employment action to inform those for adverse

employment action, the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals held that the plaintiff's removal as “Officer

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in Charge,” or OIC, of a police station was not an

adverse employment action. First, as the court

explained, the reassignment did not bring with it any

increase in salary or benefits, or unique opportunities

for advancement. Also, the OIC position was a

temporary assignment in addition to his duties as an

officer; it was “solely ... a stop-gap measure to

ensure that certain duties are fulfilled in the event

the officer normally responsible for those duties

becomes unavailable" and was done as “a matter of

course.” 245 F.3d at 1244. Therefore, removal from

the position was not a diminution in prestige or a

demotion. Id. 

Similarly, in Puckett v. Potter, 342 F.Supp.2d 1056

(M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.), this court held that a

one-hour change in an employee's hours was not an

adverse employment action because the plaintiff lost no

pay, and “[did] not allege that the one-hour change in

her shift was accompanied by any loss of prestige,

responsibility, or opportunity for advancement”;

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indeed, as the court said, the plaintiff was “doing the

very same job as before.” 342 F.Supp.2d at 1067. In

addition, because the plaintiff “had her hours changed

not infrequently, ... a reasonable person would view

[the] decision to change [her] hours as just a regular

part of working for the [defendant] and not as an

adverse tangible employment action.” Id.

The situation for Minix and the Simses is analogous

to the situations in Davis and Puckett. Minix’s and

the Simses’ reassignments did not bring with them any

increase or decrease in salary or benefits or in unique

opportunities for advancement; employees were

temporarily and frequently reassigned to make sure that

the work got done. Minix and the Simses introduced no

evidence that there was anything adverse, tangible or

intangible, incident to their reassignments.

Therefore, a reasonable person would view their

reassignments as “just a regular part of working for

[JELD-WEN] and not as an adverse tangible employment

action." Puckett, 342 F.Supp.2d at 1067.

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21. Minix dep., 72:13-73:7, 86:22-87:25; L. Sims dep.

99:1-102:2; B. Sims dep., 50:1-8.

16

Moreover, to the degree that Minix and the Simses

allege, as they must, that their reassignments were

causally related to Fetner’s sexual harassment by

virtue of proximity in time, again this allegation must

fail. Reassignments were so frequent and routine, and

were so much an expected part of their job, that it

would be purely speculative, on the current record, to

assume that there was any causal relationship between

their reassignments and Fetner’s harassment.21 See

Cotton, 434 F.3d at 1233 (“When an employer

contemplates a given action before the harassment takes

place, temporal proximity between the action and the

incident of harassment alone will not suffice to show

causation.”). 

Thus, neither Minix nor either of the Simses has

raised an issue of fact that would preclude summary

judgment in favor of JELD-WEN on whether they were

subjected to a tangible employment action.

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B. Non-Tangible Employment Injury

In the absence of a tangible employment action, a

company may still be held liable for a supervisor’s

harassment. Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad.

Service, 234 F.3d 501, 508 (11th Cir. 2000). However,

where there is no tangible employment action, the

company has a defense available to it. That defense

was established by the Supreme Court in Ellerth and

Faragher.

Balancing the policies expressed in Title

VII--avoidance of harm and compensation to victims--the

Court in Faragher and Ellerth established a defense

that put part of the responsibility for avoiding harm

on the employer and part of the responsibility on the

individual suffering the harassment. Faragher, 524

U.S. at 806. Thus, the defense relates both to the

actions of the company and the actions of the

complainant, even though the company bears the burden

of proving it. First, the employer must prove that it

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18

exercised reasonable care to prevent the harassment, or

to correct it, for example, by creating and

implementing a sexual harassment policy. Second, the

employer must prove that plaintiff failed to pursue

reasonable corrective opportunities. Id. 

Minix and the Simses argue that JELD-WEN failed to

exercise reasonable care in two ways. First, they

argue that JELD-WEN is liable, even if it did not have

any notice of Fetner’s harassment, because the

administration of its sexual harassment policy was

inadequate. Second, they argue that the company had

notice of the harassment and failed to correct it

promptly.

1. The Employer’s Duty

If JELD-WEN failed to exercise reasonable care to

prevent and correct the harassment, it cannot establish

the affirmative defense; if, on the other hand, it did

exercise reasonable care, it must still prove that

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Minix and the Simses failed to take advantage of

corrective opportunities. 

a. Reasonable Care to Prevent the Harassment

An employer will generally satisfy the first prong

of the test where it administers a sexual harassment

policy that is, "comprehensive, well-known to

employees, vigorously enforced, and provides alternate

avenues of redress." Farley v. American Cast Iron Pipe

Co., 115 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1997). The policy cannot

be administered "in bad faith" or be "otherwise

defective or dysfunctional." Madray v. Publix

Supermarkets, 208 F.3d 1290, 1299 (11th Cir. 2000).

While the “wide variety of employment settings”

makes it challenging to determine whether a harassment

policy will fulfill this requirement, id., Faragher

suggests that the policy must be well-distributed and

provide avenues for reporting the harassment to

individuals other than the harasser. 542 U.S. at 808. 

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22. Def M. Summ. J. (Doc. No. 30), Def. Exhibit. A,

sexual harassment policy.

23. Id., Exhibit K, Hees dep., 79:14-25, 80:1-4; id.,

Exhibit M, Strum dep. 118:20-25, 119:1-11.

20

The policy here was well distributed, in that Minix

and the Simses each acknowledge having received a copy,

and the company conducted training on the policy,

including after the incident in which Minix alleged

that Bowen harassed her. The policy also provides

adequate avenues for reporting other than to the

harassing supervisor; the harassment is appropriately

reported to the employee’s supervisor, group manager,

corporate manager, the vice president or subsidiary

president or the legal department.22

However, Minix and the Simses argue that the policy

was inadequately administered, and, in support of their

contention, point to a disagreement between Dan Hees, a

manager with ultimate responsibility for the Roanoke

facility, and one of JELD-WEN’s lawyers, over whether

certain behaviors would violate JELD-WEN’s policy.23

Minix and the Simses argue that this dispute is proof

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21

that the policy was not comprehensive and known to the

employees. 

This dispute is not enough to raise an issue of

fact on the administration of the policy. Although, as

a logical matter, a policy must be reasonably

comprehensible in order to be known to employees, there

is no requirement that the policy be so clear that it

can never be open to disagreement on interpretation.

Indeed, common sense dictates that such a requirement

would be impossible to meet. Even federal courts

frequently disagree on matters of interpretation of

Title VII. There is no evidence that, despite his

interpretive disagreement with one of the company’s

lawyers, Hees was unaware of the policy or that he did

not vigorously administer it in good faith. 

On the other hand, there is ample evidence that the

policy was administered in good faith. For example, in

the wake of the incident where Bowen allegedly harassed

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24. Minix dep., 227:19.

22

Minix, and before Fetner’s harassment of Minix and the

Simses, a training session was conducted at the plant.24

Minix and the Simses also argue that the decision

to award Fetner severance pay is evidence of bad faith

in the administration of the policy. While it is

understandable that Minix and the Simses are outraged

that the company paid severance to an individual who

offended them so deeply, their argument that this is

evidence a lack of reasonable care in preventing and

correcting harassment is without merit. As a result of

Fetner’s resignation, of which his severance pay was

incident, he would be prevented from harassing Minix

and the Simses at work in the future. Far from showing

a lack of seriousness about the policy, Fetner’s

severance in the face of investigation shows that the

policy worked.

b. Reasonable Care to Correct the Harassment

However, having a comprehensive, adequate sexual

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25. Thornton dep., 208:17-23.

23

harassment policy that is adequately administered in

good faith does not insulate the employer from

liability if it had notice of the harassment and failed

to correct it. “[T]he employer's notice of the

harassment is of paramount importance because if the

employer had notice of the harassment then it is liable

unless it took prompt corrective action.” Madray, 208

F 3.d at 1300.

Here, Minix and the Simses assert that JELD-WEN had

actual knowledge of the harassment because another

employee, Kathy Thornton, had reported similar

harassment by Fetner to a Group Manager, Joe Mendoza.25

Mendoza occupied the same level in the plant hierarchy

that Fetner, Minix and the Simses’ supervisor and

harasser, did, albeit in another part of the plant. 

Where a company employs a sexual harassment policy

that lays out the steps an employee should take to

report sexual harassment, it “itself answers the

question of when it [is] deemed to have notice of the

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26. Def M. Summ. J. (Doc. No. 30), Def. Exhibit. A.

24

harassment sufficient to obligate it or its agents to

take prompt and appropriate remedial measures.”

Madray, 208 F.3d at 1300; Coates v. Sundor Brands, 164

F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 1999). The question, when

there is such a policy, is whether the employee made

“reasonably sufficient use of the channels created by

[the company’s] policy to put [the company] on notice

of the ongoing harassment.” Id. (emphasis added). 

JELD-WEN argues that Thornton’s complaint to

Mendoza about the harassment was not a reasonably

sufficient use of its policy, such that the company

could was on notice of the harassment. The policy, of

which both the plaintiff and non-plaintiff complainants

were aware, advises employees to contact “their

supervisor, their General or Corporate Manager, Vice

President or Subsidiary President, or the Legal

Department.”26 Mendoza was not Thornton’s supervisor,

nor was he the supervisor of any of the plaintiffs in

this action.

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25

Thornton’s mere conversation with Mendoza was not

sufficient to have put JELD-WEN on notice. “[I]nformal

complaints to individuals not designated by [the

company’s policy] to receive or process sexual

harassment complaints” do not normally put a company on

notice. Madray, 208 F.3d at 1300. Although Mendoza

was a manager, he was not a person designated by JELDWEN’s policy to receive complaints by those supervised

by others. The reporting hierarchy set forth in JELDWEN’s policy clearly indicates that the appropriate

individual to receive complaints is a supervising

superior--that is, an individual with direct authority

over the complainant in the plant hierarchy. The

policy directs complainants to report complaints to

“their” managers. Mendoza was not, in any sense,

Thornton’s manager. 

While “an employer cannot use its own policies to

insulate itself from liability by placing an increased

burden on a complainant to provide notice beyond that

required by law,” Madray, 208 F.3d at 1302, JELD-WEN

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26

did not impose unreasonable reporting requirements upon

Thornton by requiring that she report to a supervising

superior--someone with responsibility for her. Rather,

this requirement seems aimed at making sure that

employees’ complaints are dealt with responsibly and

appropriately; a supervising superior, by contrast to

someone without authority over a complainant, in theory

has responsibility for the complainant and her work

environment. It is logical that such a person would be

more likely to have both the authority and the

responsibility to deal appropriately with the

complaint. Indeed, the company may be trying to avoid

precisely what happened here: Thornton complained to

someone outside her reporting hierarchy, who had no

responsibility for her area or her personally and who,

as a result, did nothing about it.

This is not to say that a complainant may not put

the company on notice by complaining to someone outside

her hierarchy within a company; it is only to say that

the structure of JELD-WEN’s policy was reasonable and

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27

that, under the law, that structure informs the court’s

view of whether it had notice. 

Finally, Minix and the Simses do not dispute that

JELD-WEN acted promptly to correct Fetner’s harassment

once they reported his harassment to the proper person.

JELD-WEN therefore exercised reasonable care in

preventing and correcting harassment. 

2. The Employee’s Duty 

The second factor of the defense is the employee’s

failure to take advantage of corrective opportunities.

“If the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself

of the employer's preventive or remedial apparatus, she

should not recover damages that could have been avoided

if she had done so.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. It is

undisputed that, for the time period before the plant’s

closure, Minix and the Simses failed to avail

themselves of this policy, and that, when they did,

Fetner resigned. 

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27. Id.

28. Id.

28

Minix and the Simses argue that this failure was

reasonable, given that Minix had reported sexual

harassment before, in the instance of Bowen’s

harassment, and was “dissatisfied” with the outcome of

JELD-WEN’s procedure. However, the procedure in

Bowen’s case seems to have been fully adequate. A week

after Minix complained, a JELD-WEN lawyer came to

investigate and do a sexual harassment training,27 and,

that day, Bowen quit his job.28 Minix complains that

she was forced to work with Bowen for some portion of

that week; however, Minix’s working alongside Bowen for

less than a week cannot render the failure of all three

plaintiffs here to report the harassment reasonable. 

In other words, Minix and the Simses cannot recover

against JELD-WEN because it failed to act when the

reason the company failed to act was that Minix and the

Simses failed to give notice. Put another way, because

Minix and the Simses failed to inform JELD-WEN a

Case 3:05-cv-00685-MHT-VPM Document 67 Filed 10/17/06 Page 28 of 29
reasonable period of time before the facility closed

that they were being harassed, the company could not

have acted earlier (that is, months or weeks before it

closed) to remedy the harassment. The evidence

reflects that, in each instance when the company was

informed of harassment pursuant to its policy, the

offending employee left and thus there was a swift and

effective end to the harassment.

Thus, JELD-WEN has proven that Minix and the Simses

unreasonably failed to take advantage of the policy. 

* * * * 

In conclusion, the record reflects that, while

there was impermissible sexual harassment of Minix and

the Simses, JELD-WEN cannot be held accountable. An

appropriate judgment will be entered. 

DONE, this the 17th day of October, 2006.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 3:05-cv-00685-MHT-VPM Document 67 Filed 10/17/06 Page 29 of 29