Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01320/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01320-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE ESTATE OF CHRISTOPHER 

MCDANIEL, CAMERON MCDANIEL,

individually and as Successor 

in Interest to CHRISTOPHER 

MCDANIEL, DAMON MCDANIEL, 

individually, and GUNNER 

MCDANIEL, individually, by 

and through his Guardian Ad 

Litem, CATHY LOWELL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF KERN, KERN COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, AARON 

WARMERDAM, JEFFREY KELLY, and 

DOES 1-25, INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-01320-JAM-JLT

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6) 

submitted by Defendants County of Kern (“Kern County”), Kern 

County Sheriff’s Department (“KCSD”), Aaron Warmerdam 

(“Warmerdam”), and Jeffrey Kelly (“Kelly”) (collectively 

“Defendants”) (Doc. #10). Plaintiffs The Estate of Christopher 

McDaniel (“Estate”), Cameron McDaniel (“Cameron”) (individually 

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and as Successor in Interest to Christopher McDaniel), Damon 

McDaniel (“Damon”), and Gunner McDaniel (“Gunner”) (collectively 

“Plaintiffs”) oppose the motion (Doc. #14). For the reasons 

stated below, the Court grants in part and denies in part

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that on March 26, 2014, in Bakersfield, 

California, KCSD officers Warmerdam and Kelly pursued and fatally 

shot Christopher McDaniel (“Christopher”). First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 12-15. The parties agree that any claims 

related to Christopher’s death were required to be presented to 

Kern County by September 24, 2014. Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2; Opp., 

Exh. B, at 1; September 4, 2015 Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN 

1”), Exh. 4, at 1 (Doc. #11). Christopher’s sister, Jennifer 

Dials (“Dials”), submitted a claim on behalf of herself on 

September 22, 2014. Opp., Exh. A. Plaintiffs did not file a 

claim by the deadline imposed by the Government Claims Act. RJN 

1, Exh. 4. Instead, on February 18, 2015, Estate, Cameron, and 

Damon filed with the Kern County Board of Supervisors an 

“Application for Permission to Present Late Claim.” Id. The 

application was rejected on February 24, 2015. Opp., Exh. C. On 

April 22, 2015, Plaintiffs filed in Kern County Superior Court a 

petition for relief from Government Code section 945.4. RJN 1, 

Exh. 2. This petition was rejected on September 17, 2015. 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for October 21, 2015.

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(October 14, 2015 Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN 2”), Exh. A

(Doc #16)).

Estate, Cameron, and Damon filed a separate lawsuit against 

Defendants in Kern County Superior Court on March 20, 2015. 

Removal, Exh. A (Doc. #1). On July 28, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an 

amended complaint to add Gunner, by and through his Guardian Ad 

Litem, Cathy Lowell. Id. Cameron, Damon, and Gunner are 

surviving sons of Christopher. FAC ¶¶ 1-3. Gunner is a minor. 

FAC ¶ 3. 

Plaintiffs brought seven causes of action in the FAC. FAC 

at 1. The first cause of action was on behalf of all Plaintiffs 

against all Defendants for wrongful death. FAC at 5. The second 

cause of action was on behalf of all Plaintiffs against all 

Defendants for federal civil rights violations pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. FAC at 7. The third cause of action was on 

behalf of all Plaintiffs against all Defendants for negligent 

hiring, training, and supervision. FAC at 12. The fourth, 

fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action were brought as 

survival actions by Estate on behalf of Christopher against all 

Defendants for, respectively, assault, battery, intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the 

California Bane Act, Civil Code section 52.1.2 FAC at 13, 15, 

16, 18.

Defendants removed the case to federal court (Doc. #1), and 

filed this motion to dismiss the state law causes of action for 

 

2 As pointed out in Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs misidentified 

the seventh cause of action in the FAC as an “Unruh Act 

Violation.” Plaintiffs clarified that this cause of action is in 

fact brought pursuant to the Bane Act. Opp. at 10. 

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failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Doc. 

#10). Plaintiffs oppose the motion (Doc. #14). 

The Court has original jurisdiction over the 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 

state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

II. OPINION

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of the 

following five facts pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 

(“FRE”) 201: (1) Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in Kern 

County Superior Court (RJN 1, Exh. 1); (2) Plaintiffs filed a 

Petition for Relief from Government Code section 945.4 in Kern 

County Superior Court, which held a hearing on the matter on 

July 22, 2015 (RJN 1, Exh. 2); (3) Dials submitted a declaration 

in support of Cameron and Damon’s petition for relief from 

Government Code section 945.4 in which she stated that she filed 

a claim with Kern County on September 22, 2014, but did not 

include the names of Cameron or Damon (RJN 1, Exh. 3); 

(4) Plaintiffs’ attorney Nichelle D. Jones stated in a 

declaration that a separate claim on behalf of Cameron and Damon 

was not submitted to Kern County (RJN 1, Exh. 4); and (5) the 

Kern County Superior Court rejected Cameron and Damon’s petition 

for relief on September 17, 2015 (RJN 2, Exh. A).

In addition to the facts submitted by Defendants for 

judicial notice, Plaintiffs attached the following documents to 

their opposition: (1) Dials’ September 22, 2014 Claim Against 

the County of Kern (Opp., Exh. A); (2) Estate, Cameron, and 

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Damon’s Application for Permission to Present Late Claim

pursuant to Government Code section 911.4 (Opp., Exh. B); and 

(3) Kern County’s notice of denial of Estate, Cameron, and 

Damon’s Application for Permission to Present Late Claim (Opp., 

Exh. C).

A court may take judicial notice of a fact that is not 

reasonably disputed if it “can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). On a motion to dismiss, 

courts are allowed to consider “matters of public record.” 

Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Investments, 779 F.3d 

1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Coto Settlement v. 

Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010)).

The five facts submitted for judicial notice by Defendants

and the three documents attached by Plaintiffs to their 

opposition are public records and are not subject to reasonable 

dispute. Indeed, neither party objected to the Court taking 

judicial notice of the opposing party’s exhibits. Previous 

courts, including this one, have allowed records submitted in 

accordance with a Government Claims Act to be judicially 

noticed. See, e.g., Avila v. California, No. 1:15-cv-00996-JAMGSA, 2015 WL 6003289, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2015). As such, 

the Court will take judicial notice of the five facts formally 

submitted for judicial notice by Defendants, as well as the 

three attachments to Plaintiffs’ opposition.

B. Analysis

1. California Government Code Section 945.4

Defendants first move to dismiss all of the state law 

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causes of action for wrongful death, negligence, assault, 

battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Bane 

Act violations, arguing that all Plaintiffs, except Gunner, have 

failed to abide by the requirements of the Government Claims 

Act. Mot. at 2-3. Specifically, Defendants argue that Estate, 

Cameron, and Damon failed to properly submit a claim with Kern 

County prior to initiating this lawsuit, as required by 

Government Code section 945.4. Id. Defendants agree that 

Gunner is exempt from the requirements of Government Code 

section 945.4 because he is a minor. Mot. at 3. 

Plaintiffs make two arguments in response. First, 

Plaintiffs argue that the purpose of the Government Claims Act 

is to provide governments with notice of potential litigation

and that Dials’ September 22, 2014 Claim Against the County of 

Kern provided the required notice. Opp. at 7-8. Second, 

Plaintiffs claim that the issue of whether Dials’ declaration is 

sufficient to meet the requirements of Government Code section 

945.4 is a factual matter that should not be decided at this 

stage of the proceedings. Opp. at 8. Defendants reply that the 

factual question of whether Plaintiffs met the requirements of 

Government Code section 945.4 is now moot and barred by the 

legal conclusion that Plaintiffs did not file a timely claim and 

failed to receive relief from the filing requirements.

California law requires that “no suit for money or damages 

may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action . . . 

until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public 

entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed 

to have been rejected by the board.” Cal. Gov't Code § 945.4. 

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“Failure to timely present a claim . . . to a public entity bars 

a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” City of 

Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 (2007) (quoting 

State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 (2004)). 

Though the purpose of the Government Claims Act is to provide 

notice to public entities of potential liability, claims must be 

submitted regardless of whether or not the public entity is 

already and independently knowledgeable about the potential 

lawsuit. Id.; Lewis v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 21 

Cal.App.3d 339, 341 (1971) (“Mere knowledge by the public body of 

the accident and of the proposed claim is not sufficient.”). 

Claims must be submitted on behalf of each claimant: “a claim by 

one party with respect to a particular prospective cause against 

a public entity does not serve to relieve another prospective

party from so doing.” Roberts v. State of California, 39 

Cal.App.3d 844, 848 (1974).

Here, there can be no dispute that Plaintiffs failed to file 

a claim with Kern County before the end of the required time

period. Plaintiffs cannot remedy this failure by attaching their 

claims to Dials’ timely claim. The fact that a public entity

already had notice of potential claims does not excuse a 

plaintiff’s failure to submit the required claim. City of 

Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th at 738 (“It is wellsettled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of 

the public entity’s actual knowledge of the circumstances 

surrounding the claim.”).

Several cases have decidedly resolved this issue in favor of 

the Defendants. Roberts involved an allegation that the State of 

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California negligently maintained a state highway, thereby 

causing a man’s death. The decedent’s employer and workmen’s 

compensation carrier filed a timely wrongful death claim with the 

State Board of Control, but the decedent’s wife and children 

filed late claims. Because the wife filed a late claim, she was 

precluded from pursuing her case in court. On appeal, she 

argued, just as plaintiffs do here, that the employer’s timely 

claim provided the State with sufficient notice of her eventual 

lawsuit. This argument was rejected by the court, which stated 

that “a claim by one party with respect to a particular 

prospective cause against a public entity does not serve to 

relieve another prospective party from so doing.” Roberts, 39 

Cal.App.3d at 848. 

Lewis involved tort claims brought by the surviving family 

members of a decedent. Before decedent died, she had filed a 

claim against the City and County of San Francisco for damages in 

relation to her bus accident. But the plaintiffs in Lewis —

decedent’s surviving husband and daughter — had not filed a 

timely claim. In rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that decedent’s 

claim “put the city fully upon notice,” the court ruled that 

“[t]he filing of a wrongful death claim by one heir for herself 

alone . . . does not excuse absence of a claim by another heir.” 

Lewis, 21 Cal.App.3d at 341. The same holds true for the 

Plaintiffs in this case.

Plaintiffs’ secondarily argue that the issue of whether they 

have complied with the Government Claims Act is a factual issue 

that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The Court 

disagrees. As of September 17, 2015, when the Kern County 

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Superior Court rejected Plaintiffs’ Petition for Relief from 

Government Code § 954.4, there is no longer a dispute over 

whether they have complied with, or may be granted relief from, 

the Government Claims Act. 

Thus, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

state law wrongful death, negligence, assault, battery, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Bane Act causes 

of action brought by Estate,3 Cameron, and Damon. As agreed to 

by Defendants, Gunner’s state law claims remain. Mot. at 3, n.2. 

Since Gunner’s state law claims remain intact, the Court must 

take up Defendants’ remaining arguments for dismissal.

2. Wrongful Death

Under their wrongful death cause of action, Plaintiffs seek 

recovery of three types of damages. First, they seek recovery 

for the “economic and non-economic damages resulting from the 

loss of the love, comfort, society, attention, services, and 

support of Decedent.” FAC ¶ 27. Second, they seek recovery for 

their “funeral and burial expenses.” FAC ¶ 28. Third, 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ actions caused Plaintiffs to 

“employ physicians to examine, treat and care for them, and 

 

3 Though Plaintiffs did not raise this issue, the Court notes 

that Estate’s claims cannot survive separately under Dials’ 

September 22, 2014 claim. That claim does not list Estate as a 

claimant, did not identify Dials as Christopher’s personal 

representative, and did not seek damages recoverable by the 

estate. Exh. B. Several courts have found that the Government 

Claims Act requires an estate to be listed in a claim for the 

Estate to later bring a cause of action in court. See, e.g.,

Nelson v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 113 Cal.App.4th 783, 796-97

(2003); Garcia v. Santa Clara Cnty., No. C-02-04360-RMW, 2004 WL 

2203560, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2004) aff'd, 268 F. App'x 

588 (9th Cir. 2008); Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, No. C-05-1143-SI, 

2005 WL 1656887, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2005).

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incurred additional medical expenses for emergency treatment, 

hospital bills, and other incidental medical expenses.” FAC ¶ 

29. Defendants essentially ask this court to strike paragraph 

twenty-nine of the FAC, arguing that “California law 

specifically does not allow the recovery of medical expenses for 

a wrongful death claim.” Mot. at 4. Plaintiffs oppose 

dismissal and argue that Defendants’ motion relies on 

inapplicable cases. Opp. at 9.

Wrongful death damages “are measured by the financial 

benefits the heirs were receiving at the time of death, those 

reasonably to be expected in the future, and the monetary 

equivalent of loss of comfort, society and protection.” Corder 

v. Corder, 41 Cal.4th 644, 661 (2007) (quoting Benwell v. Dean, 

249 Cal.App.2d 345, 349 (1967)). With respect to loss of comfort 

damages, “it is only the pecuniary, and not the sentimental, 

value of such loss which may be taken into consideration.” Krouse 

v. Graham, 19 Cal.3d 59, 69 (1977). Thus, heirs cannot receive 

damages for their nonpecuniary grief or sorrow. Corder, 41 

Cal.4th at 662.

Here, Defendants fail to cite any applicable authority for 

their claim that “case law does not support the recovery of 

[Gunner’s] medical expenses.” Reply at 4 (emphasis in original). 

Gunner correctly points out that both cases relied upon in 

Defendants’ motion involve situations in which plaintiffs were 

seeking to recover the decedent’s medical expenses, not an heir’s 

medical expenses. Opp. at 9; Pac. Emp. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Steam 

Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 143 Cal.App.2d 646, 648 (1956); 

Gallup v. Sparks-Mundo Eng'g Co., 43 Cal.2d 1, 10-11 (1954). 

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FAC paragraph twenty-nine does not specify how Gunner 

incurred his personal medical expenses. To the extent that 

Gunner seeks damages for his grief and sorrow, such recovery is

clearly barred by California law. Krouse, 19 Cal.3d at 72

(“damages for mental and emotional distress . . . are not 

recoverable in a wrongful death action.”). But to the extent 

that Gunner seeks recovery of his pecuniary loss related to the 

death of Christopher, such damages are recoverable. Corder, 41 

Cal.4th at 661 (“[D]amages [are] . . . limited to the pecuniary 

loss suffered by the person or persons for whose benefit the 

right of action is given by reason of the death of the victim.”). 

Given that FAC paragraph twenty-nine alleges that Gunner incurred 

pecuniary expenses in the form of personal medical treatment as a 

result of Defendants’ actions, the Court must deny at this stage 

of the proceedings Defendants’ motion to dismiss Gunner’s first 

cause of action for wrongful death.

3. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision

Defendants argue that Gunner’s third cause of action for 

negligent hiring, training, and supervision incorrectly seeks 

damages for Christopher’s pain and suffering, which is barred by 

California law. Mot. at 4-5. In their opposition, Plaintiffs 

state that they “do not seek to recover pain and suffering on 

behalf of the decedent for this cause of action.” Opp. at 10.

In a survivor action, damages “are limited to the loss or 

damage that the decedent sustained or incurred before death.”

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.34. Damages that are recoverable 

include the “deceased[‘s] lost wages, medical expenses, and any 

other pecuniary losses incurred before death, [including] 

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punitive or exemplary damages.” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Superior 

Court, 21 Cal.4th 292, 304 (1999). Damages for a decedent’s 

“pain, suffering, or disfigurement,” are not recoverable because 

“[t]he Legislature considered such injuries strictly personal to 

the decedent.” Id. at 307.

Defendants’ motion is essentially a motion to strike FAC 

paragraph fifty, which alleges that Christopher suffered mental 

pain. Defendants are correct, and Gunner concedes, that Gunner 

cannot recover for Christopher’s pain and suffering under his 

negligent hiring, training, and supervision cause of action. 

However, the Court cannot dismiss this entire cause, because 

Gunner makes a permissible claim to recover Christopher’s medical 

expenses. FAC ¶ 51. Thus, the motion to dismiss Gunner’s third 

cause of action is denied, but the Court will not consider any 

claims under this cause for the recovery of damages associated 

with Christopher’s pain and suffering.

4. Bane Act

The Bane Act cause of action was brought solely by Estate. 

FAC at 16. Since Estate’s state law claims, including the Bane 

Act cause of action, are barred under the Government Claims Act, 

there is no need for the Court to decide this issue. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH 

PREJUDICE Defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law wrongful 

death, negligence, assault, battery, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, and Bane Act causes of action brought by 

Estate, Cameron, and Damon. Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

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Gunner’s wrongful death cause of action is DENIED. The motion to 

dismiss Gunner’s negligent hiring, training, and supervision 

cause of action is DENIED. The case will proceed on Gunner’s

wrongful death and negligent hiring, training, and supervision 

causes of action, as well as Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause 

of action, which Defendants did not move to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 17, 2015

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