Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03127/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03127-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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28 The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances

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underlying the present motion.

ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

REVOLUTIONARY SOFTWARE, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ECLIPSYS CORPORATION,

Defendant.

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Case No.: C 05-3127 JW (PVT)

ORDER RE DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 

On May 29, 2007, the parties appeared before Magistrate Judge Patricia V. Trumbull for

hearing on Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order. Based on the briefs and arguments presented, 1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for protective order is DENIED.

Federal courts may issue a protective order if the moving party shows “good cause” for its

issuance. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). A party asserting good cause must demonstrate that specific harm

or prejudice will result without the requested protection. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific

examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Beckman Indus., Inc., v.

International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Defendant has not shown good

Case 5:05-cv-03127-JW Document 107 Filed 06/07/07 Page 1 of 4
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28 The fact Defendant is even making this argument suggests that Defendant has little

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confidence that it did include such protections in its contracts.

ORDER, page 2

cause that would warrant entry of a protective order. Defendant’s motion is based on no more than

the kind of unsubstantiated broad allegations of harm that are insufficient to warrant issuance of a

protective order under Ninth Circuit case law.

Defendant is not seeking an order precluding Plaintiff from all contact with Defendant’s

customers because it concedes that Plaintiff is entitled to use public information statutes such as the

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) to obtain

non-confidential information from Defendant’s government customers. Instead, Defendant is

seeking an order requiring Plaintiff to: 1) identify all of Defendant’s customers that Plaintiff has

already contacted; 2) refrain from directly contacting Defendant’s customers, other than government

customers contacted solely pursuant to FOIA, CPRA or analogous statutes; 3) refrain from ex parte

communications with those customers (or provide Defendant with copies of any documents and

transcripts of any discussions); and 4) when it contacts customers, inform them of the pending

litigation between the parties. Defendant has not shown that any of the requested protection is

warranted.

1. Identification of the Customers Plaintiff Has Already Contacted

No protective order is necessary for the first item of relief Defendant seeks. The proper

procedure for obtaining such information is to propound an interrogatory.

Defendant argues it needs the information more quickly, so that it can have an opportunity to

remind its customers what information should not be disclosed. However, lack of an opportunity to

provide such reminders will only “harm” Defendant if Defendant has failed to include in its

customer contracts adequate protections for its confidential information. Under those 2

circumstances, the failure to include protection for the information renders the information nonconfidential because it is readily available to the public through FOIA and similar statutes. 

Protection would thus not be warranted under Rule 26 (c), because Rule 26(c) is not intended to

protect public information from public disclosure.

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The other customer-contact cases cited by Defendant are from district courts outside of 3

the Ninth Circuit. To the extent those courts issued protective orders precluding a party from contacting

another party’s customers without first requiring the moving party to show the specific harm or prejudice

that would result without the requested protection, those cases are contrary to Ninth Circuit law and

inapplicable in this jurisdiction.

ORDER, page 3

2. Contact with Defendant’s Customers, Other than Pursuant to FOIA, CPRA or

Analogous Statutes

Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff has contacted, or intends to contact, any of

Defendant’s customers other than pursuant to FOIA, CPRA or analogous statutes. Nor has

Defendant shown any likelihood that Defendant would suffer any harm or prejudice if Plaintiff does

contact customers outside of the context of a public records act request. Cf. Murata Manufacturing

Co., Ltd. v. Bel Fuse, Inc., 2004 WL 1194740 (N.D.Ill. 2004) (“Bel Fuse has come forward with a

factual basis demonstrating that there is a significant risk that it [sic] customer relationships would,

in fact, be disrupted”). 

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Defendant argues, without any factual support, that Plaintiff’s contacts with Defendant’s

customers somehow puts Defendant’s trade secrets at risk and “may” damage Defendant’s business

relationships with its customers. Defendant has submitted the declaration of one of its Senior Vice

Presidents, Jay Colfer, which sets forth facts regarding the confidentiality of Defendant’s pricing and

“other” contract terms with its customers, and of unspecified technological and methodological data

regarding its software products. However, Defendant has submitted no declaration or other evidence

showing that any confidential information has actually been disclosed to Plaintiff. And any

information a customer does produce to Plaintiff is by definition likely not a trade secret, because

such production would raise a strong inference that Defendant had not taken reasonable steps to

ensure the information was kept secret. See, e.g., CAL.CIV.CODE § 3426.1(d) (“‘Trade secret’ means

information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or

process, that: . . . . [i]s the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain

its secrecy.”)

Further, Defendant has submitted no declaration at all discussing what impact on its customer

relationships, if any, results from Plaintiff contacting Defendant’s customers. Defendant’s

governmental customers are routinely subjected to public information requests. Defendant has made

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ORDER, page 4

no showing that such requests in any way interfere with the relationships between the governmental

entity and the various companies about whom information is requested.

3. Ex Parte Contacts with Defendant’s Customers

As discussed above, Defendant has not shown that it is likely to suffer any harm or prejudice

if its customers are contacted by Plaintiff. Because Defendant has failed to make any such showing,

it is immaterial whether the contacts are “ex parte.”

4. Notice Regarding Pendency of this Litigation

Defendant has not shown it is likely to suffer harm or prejudice if Plaintiff does not disclose

the pendency of this litigation to the customers it contacts. Defendant argues that if informed of this

litigation, a customer could invoke the protections of the blanket Protective Order filed herein. 

While such a procedure might be of benefit to Defendant, there is no “harm” to Defendant if the

customers are not informed of the litigation. In the latter situation, the customer presumably will not

produce information that is subject to confidentiality agreements with Defendant. Mere speculation

that a governmental entity might on occasion mistakenly disclose information it has agreed to keep

confidential is not a sufficient basis for issuance of an order placing restrictions on Plaintiff’s right to

investigate its claims through public information statutes such as FOIA and CPRA.

Dated: 6/6/07

 

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:05-cv-03127-JW Document 107 Filed 06/07/07 Page 4 of 4