Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06110/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06110-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN HACKETT,

Plaintiff,

v.

SGT. CRAMER, et al.,

Defendants.

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1:01-cv-06110 OWW LJO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P.

60(B) (DOCS. 44 & 97)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Brian Hackett (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. On March 4, 2004, the

district court adopted in full the findings and recommendations

of the magistrate judge, dismissing certain claims and defendants

from the case for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 39, “First

Dist. Ct. Order”) On May 6, 2005, the district court adopted the

magistrate judge’s findings in full, dismissing the remaining

claims and defendants for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. (Doc. 94, “Second Dist. Ct. Order”) Plaintiff moves

for reconsideration of both orders. (Doc. 44, “Pl.’s First

Mem.”; Doc. 97, “Pl.’s Second Mem.”) 

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II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, brings this civil rights action

against several California state prison officials under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Plaintiff filed his original complaint (Doc. 1) on

August 27, 2001 and a supplemental complaint (Doc. 5) on October

10, 2001. The magistrate judge reviewed Plaintiff’s complaints

sua sponte pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed them with

leave to amend on July 19, 2002 for failure to state a claim. 

(Doc. 13) Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on August

22, 2002. (Doc. 14) On February 24, 2003, Plaintiff terminated

his First Amended Complaint and filed a Second Amended Complaint. 

(Doc. 25) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint was reviewed

under § 1915A and dismissed in part by the magistrate judge on

April 17, 2003. Plaintiff was ordered to file a Third Amended

Complaint or to notify the Court that he wishes to proceed on the

Second Amended Complaint on the remaining claims. (Doc. 28) 

Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint on September 23, 2003. 

(Doc. 34)

The magistrate judge reviewed Plaintiff’s Third Amended

Complaint pursuant to § 1915A, and on February 9, 2004, issued a

findings and recommendations recommending dismissal of certain

claims and defendants for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 36) 

Defendants Lewis, Jackson, Smith, Cramer, Ms. May, Lee, Gonzales,

Mr. May, Diez, and Perez were dismissed from the action for

failure to state any claims against them. Specifically, the

following claims were dismissed: (1) Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process claim (deprivation of liberty interest); (2) First

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Amendment retaliation; (3) Eighth Amendment claim based on

conditions of confinement; (4) Sixth Amendment confrontation

clause claim; (5) Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim

(deprivation of property); (6) Fourteenth Amendment Equal

Protection claim; and (7) conspiracy claim. Plaintiff filed

objections to the magistrate’s findings. (Doc. 37) On March 4,

2004, the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations were

adopted in full by the district court after de novo review. 

(Doc. 39, First Dist. Ct. Order) Two Eighth Amendment claims and

the defendants associated with those claims remained. The action

proceeded on Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint for these two

claims: (1) excessive physical force against Defendants Nash,

Motta, Lopez, Wagner, Herrera, Jasso, and Vieria; and (2) acting

with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs

against Defendants Klarich and Nuebarth. (Id. at 2) Plaintiff

now seeks reconsideration of the district court’s order adopting

the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations to dismiss

all but the Eighth Amendment claims against certain defendants. 

(Doc. 44, Pl.’s First Mem., filed March 26, 2004)

On July 7, 2004, the remaining Defendants moved to dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. (Docs. 70-72) Plaintiff opposed. (Doc. 78) The

magistrate judge recommended that the remaining Defendants’

motion be granted on December 22, 2004. (Doc. 81) Plaintiff

filed objections to the magistrate judge’s findings on April 22,

2005. (Doc. 91) After de novo review of the law and facts, the

district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and

recommendations in full on May 6, 2005. (Doc. 94) Plaintiff now

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moves for reconsideration of this order as well. (Doc. 97, Pl.’s

Second Mem., filed June 16, 2005)

This memorandum decision relates to Plaintiff’s two pending

motions for reconsideration (Docs. 44, 97).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) permits reconsideration of a judgment

or order of the district court on grounds of: (1) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly

discovered evidence that supports grounds for a new trial under

Rule 59; (3) fraud of an adverse party; (4) judgment is void;

(5) judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; or

(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the

judgment. 

Rule 60 reconsideration is generally appropriate in three

instances: (1) when there has been an intervening change of

controlling law; (2) new evidence has come to light; or (3) when

necessary to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. 

School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1236 (1994); see also Local Rule

78-230(k), Local Rules for the Eastern District of California. 

“A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to reargue a

motion or to present evidence which should have been raised

before.” Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of Am., 820 F. Supp. 834, 856

(D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1485 (3rd Cir. 1994). “A party

seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with

the Court's decision.... [R]ecapitulation of the cases and

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arguments considered by the Court before rendering its original

decision fails to carry the moving party's burden.” Id.

(internal quotations and citations omitted). To succeed, a party

must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to

induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See, e.g.,

Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656,

665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other

grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.

1015 (1988).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) permits reconsideration of a

judgment or order for “any other reason justifying relief from

the operation of the judgment.” This provision “is residual and

must be read as being exclusive of the preceding clauses.”

LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791 F.2d 1334,

1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Rule 60(b)(6) “is reserved for ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” 

Id. 

Motions to reconsider under Rule 60(b) are committed to the

discretion of the trial court. Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456,

460 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc).

V. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s submissions are lengthy and difficult to follow. 

His Third Amended Complaint, approximately three inches thick, is

forty-six pages long, plus attachments. Plaintiff’s first motion

for reconsideration (Doc. 44, Pl.’s First Mem.) is nineteen

handwritten pages long and has attachments that total about one

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inch. Plaintiff’s second motion for reconsideration (Doc. 97,

“Pl.’s Second Mot.”) is nine handwritten pages long and is about

a quarter of an inch thick, with attachments. Based on a review

of these documents and other parts of the record, it does not

appear that Plaintiff argues for reconsideration based on an

intervening change of law. Instead, Plaintiff appears to argue

for reconsideration on the two separate grounds of clear error

and new evidence.

A. Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Certain Claims and

Defendants for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 39).

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint was reviewed by the

magistrate judge pursuant to § 1915A. The magistrate judge

recommended dismissal of various claims and defendants and

allowed Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action to proceed

on two Eighth Amendment claims against various other defendants. 

The district court adopted in full the magistrate’s findings and

recommendations. Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the district

court’s order dismissing some of his claims for failure to state

a claim based on clear error. “In order for a party to

demonstrate clear error, the moving party’s arguments cannot be

the same as those made earlier. [citation] If a party simply

inadvertently failed to raise the arguments earlier, the

arguments are deemed waived.” Glavor v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,

Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1028, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also United

States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (“A

motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to reargue the

motion....”) (internal quotations omitted). 

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A total of seven claims were dismissed. Plaintiff appears

to argue that it was clear error to dismiss three of these

claims: (1) Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim based on the

July 2, 2000 incident; (2) Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement claim; and (3) First Amendment retaliation claim. 

Plaintiff also appears to argue that the court erred in not

considering his claim for municipal liability against the warden

based theories of failure to supervise and ratification.

1. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process (Liberty

Interest).

On July 2, 2000, Plaintiff was issued a Rules Violation

Report for displaying his genitals during a visit with his

fiancee. As punishment, Plaintiff’s visitation privileges were

suspended for ninety days and he was given six classification

points. Plaintiff claims his due process rights were violated

with respect to this incident. Plaintiff’s claim based on this

incident was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a

claim. Plaintiff’s claim was dismissed on the basis that he

alleged no facts to support the existence of a liberty interest,

which is required to state a due process claim. Kentucky Dept.

of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989) (two-step

analysis for due process claims is to inquire (1) whether a

protectable liberty interest exists; and (2) whether the

procedure employed was constitutional). The magistrate judge

found, and the district court agreed, that Plaintiff’s suspension

of visitation privileges and increased classification score, even

if true, are not, as a matter of law, liberty interests because

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1 It is not clear from Plaintiff’s submissions whether he

also claims that prison officials failed to view the videotape at

the other disciplinary hearings that were the subject of his

complaint. To the extent Plaintiff is making such claims, this

analysis applies to those claims as well.

2 Plaintiff’s complaint is forty-six pages long. However,

as noted in Document 36, the pages are not numbered consecutively

from one to forty-six. When a page number is referenced, it is

not the number assigned by Plaintiff but instead what the number

should be.

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they do not impose “atypical and significant hardships.” Sandin

v. O’Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-4 (1995).

Plaintiff does not appear to dispute this finding that

visitation privileges and increased classification score are not

protectable liberty interests. Instead, Plaintiff appears to

argue that he was deprived of his due process rights in the

course of the prison disciplinary hearing by Defendants’ refusal

to consider or provide him with the surveillance camera videotape

of the July 2, 2000 incident that was the subject of the

hearing.1 (Doc. 44, Pl.’s First Mem. at 5; see also Doc. 34,

Third Am. Compl. at 7, 20, 22, 23)2 

Plaintiff’s allegation that the prison officials did not

consider the video during the hearing and did not provide

Plaintiff with the video was addressed in the April 17, 2003

Order dismissing his complaint with leave to amend. (Doc. 28,

Order at 5) That order informed Plaintiff that he “does not have

a constitutionally protected right to demand that a certain piece

of evidence be produced at his disciplinary hearing.” Id. There

is no clear error in this finding. As discussed above, Plaintiff

cannot base his due process claim on a deprivation of a liberty

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3 A review of the attachments to the Third Amended Complaint

reveal that there was testimony by the guards that Plaintiff did

expose his genitals in violation of the applicable rules and

regulations. (Doc. 34, Third Am. Compl. Ex. B at 25-38) 

Furthermore, another document indicates no video of the July 2,

2000 incident even existed. (Id. at 30) While the content of

these documents is hearsay and cannot be considered for the truth

of the matter asserted, they do establish that there was some

evidence supporting the prison’s adverse finding against

Plaintiff in the hearing relating to the July 2, 2000 incident.

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interest because he has identified no such protectable interest. 

While it is possible to sustain a due process claim even in the

absence of a liberty interest, this is only the case if the

prisoner alleges an adverse finding based on no evidence at a

disciplinary hearing. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645-

6 (1997); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875 n. 3 (9th Cir.

2002); Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 197 F.3d 771, 775 (9th Cir.

1999). If the finding was based on some evidence, no due process

claim can be sustained. See id. Plaintiff only asserts he was

not provided with the video; he does not assert there was no

evidence against him and does not deny there was some evidence

against him at the hearing.3 Plaintiff’s request for

reconsideration on this basis is DENIED.

2. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement.

Next, Plaintiff appears to argue that it was clear error to

dismiss his claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel

and unusual punishment clause based on conditions of confinement. 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is based on his allegation

that the punishment imposed after his disciplinary hearings

(including loss of visitation privileges, his increased

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classification score, and his loss of time credits) constituted

cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff’s claim was dismissed

for failure to state a claim because Plaintiff failed to allege

facts that support that the prison officials actions in with

“deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” 

“To violate the Eighth Amendment, the deprivation alleged must

objectively be sufficiently serious; and the prison official must

subjectively have a culpable state of mind.” Estate of Ford v.

Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Plaintiff’s

allegations in Claim I relating to deprivation of visitation

privileges and increased classification score do not, as a matter

of law, state a claim under the cruel and unusual punishment

clause of the Eighth Amendment. See id; see also Hearns v.

Terhune, -- F.3d --, 2005 WL 1529730, *5 (9th Cir. June 30,

2005). There is no clear error in the earlier holding. 

Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration on this basis is DENIED.

3. Allegations of Mental or Emotional Injury

Resulting From Conditions of Confinement and First

Amendment Retaliation.

The basis of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement claim is discussed in the preceding section. 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim is based on his

allegation that prison officials falsified Rules Violation

Reports and evidence during Plaintiff’s various disciplinary

proceedings. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim was dismissed on the

basis that Plaintiff failed to allege any facts that he was

retaliated against for exercise of his own First Amendment Rights

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or that his own First Amendment rights were chilled as a result

of the Defendants’ actions. (Doc. 36, Order 5-6)

In his current motion, Plaintiff appears to assert that he

does state a claim for violation of his Eighth and First

Amendment rights because he complied with the requirements of 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(e). This section provides that prisoners who

bring suits under § 1983 based on an emotional injury must also

allege a physical injury. Id. (“No Federal civil action may be

brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered

while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”) 

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered mental and emotional injury as

a result of the punishments imposed at the disciplinary

proceedings and as a result of the alleged retaliation by prison

officials (i.e., the falsification of evidence against him). 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he suffered depression and

“mental anguish.” (Doc. 44, Pl.’s First Mem. at 8) Plaintiff’s

Eighth and First Amendment claims, however, were not dismissed on

the basis that they were barred by § 1997e(e). These claims were

instead dismissed because Plaintiff failed to allege facts that

could support a violation of his constitutional rights. 

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on this basis is DENIED.

4. Municipal Liability.

In is motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff appears to raise

the issue of his claim against Warden Gail Lewis based on

supervisory liability. Plaintiff alleges in the Third Amended

Complaint that he wrote letters to Warden Lewis informing her of

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4 The magistrate judge applied official capacity analysis to

Defendants Lewis, Jackson & Smith. To the extent Plaintiff

continues to attempt to allege official capacity claims against

Jackson and Smith, this analysis applies to those Defendants as

well.

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the prison staff’s alleged falsification of evidence and their

failure to produce the videotape. (Doc. 34, Third Am. Compl. 26,

33) Plaintiff attaches one letter to Warden Lewis, which in turn

attaches a complaint describing, among other things, the July 2,

2000 incident, the purported existence of the videotape, and the

subsequent disciplinary proceedings. (Id. at Ex. B)

Although Plaintiff’s official and personal capacity claims

against Warden Lewis were not addressed in the order under

reconsideration (Doc. 36), they were addressed in the previous

order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims with leave to amend. (Doc.

28, Order at 7-8) The earlier order addressed Plaintiff’s claims

against supervisory officials, which can be either personal or

official capacity claims. Plaintiff was informed that to allege

a prima facie case of supervisory liability, he must allege facts

supporting “that the supervisory defendants either: personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights;

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or ‘implemented a policy so deficient that the policy

itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the

moving force of the constitutional violation.’”4 (Id. (quoting

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal

quotations omitted))

There is no clear error in this finding. First and

foremost, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to

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5 The question whether Plaintiff exhausted his

administrative remedies was the subject of the subsequent order

dismissing plaintiff’s remaining claims, which is discussed in

section B below. 

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support a violation of his rights under the constitution or

federal law. Second, there is no clear error in the analysis of

§ 1983 claims against supervisory officials as set forth in the

order. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on this basis is

DENIED. 

5. Other Arguments for Reconsideration.

In his brief, Plaintiff sets forth several other arguments

and purported bases for reconsideration, none of which meet the

standard under for relief Rule 60(b). 

First, Plaintiff moves for reconsideration on the basis that

he “he did in fact file a ‘late claim’ with the Board of Control

Government Claim under Claim No. #GS32317” and that he did

exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. (Doc.

44, Pl.’s Mem. #1 at 3, 9, Ex. D) However, the magistrate

judge’s analysis under § 1915A was not based on failure to comply

with the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement. 

Document 36 dealt only with the question whether Plaintiff’s

complaint stated a claim. The magistrate judge correctly found

that Claim I did not state a claim for which relief could be

granted.5 

Second, Plaintiff reasserts his Eighth Amendment excessive

force and inadequate medical care claims. These claims, however,

were not dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff had

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no reason to reassert them in his motion for reconsideration for

dismissal because they were not dismissed by that order.

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on these bases is

DENIED.

B. Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Remaining Claims

and Defendants for Failure to Exhaust Administrative

Remedies (Doc. 81).

After Documents 36 and 39 dismissed Claim I for failure to

state any claim for relief, the only remaining claims were

(1) excessive force arising out of an alleged incident on August

31, 2001; and (2) inadequate medical care arising out of

Defendants Klarich and Neubarth’s alleged failure to adequately

treat Plaintiff during the course of approximately nine months

from September 3, 2001 to about June 2002. 

The remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss these

claims on the basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. After

considering administrative appeals forms provided by both

Plaintiff and Defendants, the magistrate judge found that

Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to

the two remaining claims pursuant to the inmate administrative

appeals process as set forth in the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The district court conducted a de

novo review and adopted the magistrate judge’s findings in full. 

Plaintiff now appears to move for reconsideration on the basis of

newly discovered evidence. To succeed on a motion for

reconsideration based on new evidence under Rule 60(b)(2), the

evidence must be “newly discovered...which by due diligence could

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not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under

Rule 59(b).” Evidence is not ‘newly discovered’ if it was in a

party’s possession at the time judgment was rendered or could

have been discovered at that time. Coastal Transfer Co. v.

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 1987);

see also Westlands Water, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1131, n. 45. Such

new evidence will only be considered if it is of such a material

and controlling nature that it demands a probable change in the

outcome. Id.

Plaintiff attaches to his motion a photocopy of what appears

to be his personal daily calendar and several grievance/appeals

forms dated August 8, 2004.

1. Excessive Force.

One of the bases upon which the magistrate judge grounded

his findings was that the 602 administrative appeals form that

purportedly related to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim was

untimely. Plaintiff filed the 602 form on May 23, 2002,

approximately nine months after the August 31, 2001 incident. 

Under Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.6(c) (2004), a prisoner

must file the informal grievance within fifteen days of the event

to be grieved. The magistrate did not err in finding that the

form was untimely. 

Plaintiff asserts that he did file a timely 602 form. The

only evidence the Plaintiff provides, however, is his daily

calendar with a handwritten entry on September 12, 2001 that

states “Filed Excessive Force 602 Mailed to Appeals Coordinator.” 

(Doc. 97, Pl.’s Second Mot. at Ex. A) 

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6 If the prison officials were in possession of a September

12, 2001 602 form, it would have been their duty to produce it,

as it is Defendants’ burden to establish exhaustion. Since the

Defendants produced no such 602 form, the court is left to infer

it does not exist.

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Plaintiff’s handwritten personal daily calendar cannot be

considered for several reasons. First, it is hearsay lacking in

foundation and is not the type of document which the court is

entitled to judicially notice. Second, even if it were properly

judicially noticeable, a personal calendar entry does not

establish the existence of a 602 form; it is better established

by the 602 form itself and the institution’s record of receipt. 

Third, Plaintiff provides no reason why he did not raise the

existence of the purported September 12, 2001, 602 form earlier. 

A Rule 60(b) motion will only be granted on the basis of new

evidence if, among other things, the Plaintiff shows he could not

have earlier discovered the evidence by due diligence. Coastal

Transfer, 833 F.2d at 212; see also Westlands Water, 134 F. Supp.

2d at 1131, n. 45. Plaintiff has offered no such reason.6 

Plaintiff also attaches to his 60(b) motion a 602 appeals

form dated August 8, 2004. This form relates to his excessive

force claim. It cannot be considered as new evidence either,

however, since it is dated almost three years after the incident

giving rise to it. Administrative remedies must be exhausted

before filing suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201

(9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on this basis is

DENIED.

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2. Inadequate Medical Care.

Plaintiff also asserts his inadequate medical care claim was

dismissed in error. The magistrate judge found that, based on

the appeals forms submitted by both Plaintiff and Defendants,

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The

district court conducted a de novo review and adopted the

magistrate judge’s findings in full.

Plaintiff appears to argue the order should be reconsidered

on the basis of new evidence. Again, Plaintiff’s argument has no

merit. The only new evidence Plaintiff attaches is an August 8,

2004 ADA 1824 reasonable request form requesting a wheelchair and

other medical relief. This form, like the August 8, 2004, 602

appeals form relating to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, was

filed about three years after the incident(s) giving rise to the

complaints contained therein. Administrative remedies must be

exhausted before filing suit. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201.

Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration of the finding that

he failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to his Eighth

Amendment claim for inadequate medical care is DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motions for

reconsideration (Docs. 44 & 97) are DENIED. No further

motions or fillings will be accepted on the issues of

the dismissals discussed above.

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SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July _22__, 2005. 

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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