Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01154/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01154-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERTO HERRERA,

Plaintiff,

v.

P. STATTI, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:10-cv-1154 MCE DAD P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action. Pending before the 

court are several of the parties’ motions, which the court will address in turn.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is proceeding on an amended complaint against defendant Medina based upon 

the defendant’s alleged failure to provide him with adequate medical care. Specifically, plaintiff 

alleges that while he was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”), correctional officers

engaged in excessive use of force against him, and defendant Medina failed to provide him with 

adequate medical care after the use of force incident. According to plaintiff, defendant Medina 

falsely reported that plaintiff refused medical care. Plaintiff further alleges that he was 

transferred to California State Prison, Corcoran, but upon his return to HDSP defendant Medina 

took him off of his pain medication for no reason. (Am. Compl. Attach. at 2.) 

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Case 2:10-cv-01154-MCE-DB Document 137 Filed 07/29/14 Page 1 of 4
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THE PARTIES’ MOTIONS

First, plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration of the undersigned’s screening order 

issued more than two years ago on July 20, 2012. In that order, the undersigned found that 

plaintiff’s amended complaint appeared to state an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care 

claim against defendant Medina but failed to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment inadequate 

medical care claim against defendants Johnson, Kissinger, Marsh, and Pena. In his pending 

motion, plaintiff contends that under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 

F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013), his allegations state a cognizable claim against defendants Johnson, 

Kissinger, Marsh, and Pena for putting him on contraband watch prior to giving him medical 

attention. 

As an initial matter, the court has reviewed plaintiff’s amended complaint and once more 

finds that, at most, plaintiff has alleged that proposed defendants Johnson, Kissinger, Marsh, and 

Pena were indifferent or negligent with regard to his medical care. As the court previously 

advised plaintiff, “mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support 

this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980). In addition,

the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chappell has no bearing here. In that case the Ninth Circuit 

addressed whether, for purposes of qualified immunity, subjecting a prisoner to certain conditions 

while on contraband watch – including continuous lighting and mattress deprivation – violated

clearly established law. The decision of the court in Chappell did not concern the elements 

required to state a cognizable claim for inadequate medical care. Accordingly, the court will deny 

plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, and this action will proceed solely on plaintiff’s inadequate 

medical care claim against defendant Medina.

The court now turns to defendant Medina’s motion for terminating sanctions. In that

motion, defense counsel moves for terminating sanctions based on plaintiff’s failure to respond to 

defendant’s special interrogatories and request for production of documents. By way of 

background, on March 25, 2014, the court granted defendant’s motion to compel and ordered 

plaintiff to serve on defense counsel further responses to defendant’s discovery requests. On May 

6, 2014, the court granted plaintiff a thirty-day extension of time to comply with the court’s order. 

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According to defense counsel, plaintiff never served his responses to the discovery requests.

Plaintiff has filed two oppositions to defendant Medina’s motion for terminating 

sanctions.1 In the first opposition, plaintiff declares that he sent his discovery responses to the 

court instead of defense counsel as ordered. In his second opposition, plaintiff reiterates that he 

tried to file his discovery responses with the court, but the Clerk of the Court recently returned the 

documents to plaintiff because, pursuant to Local Rule 250.2(c), parties are not supposed to file 

their responses to discovery requests until they are at issue. Plaintiff has attached a copy of the 

Clerk’s notice rejecting his filing and discovery responses.

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the court, in its discretion, to 

dismiss an action in whole or part if a party fails to comply with an order compelling discovery. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). In determining whether to impose terminating sanctions, the court must 

weigh the following five factors:

(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) 

the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to 

the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring 

disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less 

drastic sanctions. The sub-parts of the fifth factor are whether the 

court has considered lesser sanctions, whether it tried them, and 

whether it warned the recalcitrant party about the possibility of 

case-dispositive sanctions.

Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(footnotes omitted). 

Terminating sanctions are very severe, and therefore, the court should only impose them 

when a party’s noncompliance with a discovery order is “due to willfulness, bad faith, and fault.” 

New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d at 1096; Computer Task Group v. Brotby, 364 F.3d 1112, 

1115 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1997)). Here, 

plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s order by not serving his discovery responses directly on 

defense counsel. However, plaintiff attempted to file his responses with the court. Under these

 

1 Defendant Medina has moved to strike plaintiff’s second opposition as not procedurally 

recognized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court. In the interest 

of justice and judicial economy, the court has considered both of plaintiff’s oppositions to 

defendant’s motion for terminating sanctions and will deny defendant’s motion to strike. 

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circumstances, the court cannot say that dismissal of this action for failure to comply with the 

court’s order is warranted at this time. Accordingly, the court will deny defendant Medina’s 

motion for terminating sanctions without prejudice.

Finally, plaintiff has recently filed two motions to compel discovery and a motion for 

summary judgment. Under the court’s initial discovery and scheduling order, the parties were 

required to complete discovery and file any motions to compel on or before January 24, 2014. In 

addition, the parties were required to file all pretrial motions on or before April 18, 2014. On 

January 16, 2014, the court extended the discovery deadline to February 24, 2014. Plaintiff’s 

motions to compel filed on June 26, 2014, and July 14, 2014, and motion for summary judgment 

filed on July 14, 2014, are therefore untimely. Accordingly, the court will strike them, and 

defendant Medina will not be required to respond to them. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. No. 117) is denied;

2. Defendant Medina’s motion for terminating sanctions (Doc. No. 120) is denied without 

prejudice;

3. Defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s second opposition (Doc. No. 129) is denied;

4. Plaintiff’s motions to compel (Doc Nos. 122 & 132) are stricken as untimely; and

5. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 133) is stricken as untimely.

Dated: July 29, 2014

DAD:9

herr1154.term

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