Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08004/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08004-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OLIVER J. FOUST, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MANUEL LUJAN, JR., Secretary of 

the Interior, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

NORTHERN ARAPAHO AND SHOSHONE 

INDIAN TRIBES OF THE WIND RIVER 

INDIAN RESERVATION, 

Defendants/intervenorsAppellees. 

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FILED 

Uaired States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cirqiit 

AUG 141991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-8004 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Wyoming 

(D.C. No. C-88-235-K) 

John R. Hursh (Maureen T. Donohoue with him on the briefs) of 

Hursh & Donohoue, Riverton, Wyoming, for plaintiff-appellant. 

Andrew c. Mergen, Attorney, Department of Justice, Environment and 

Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C. (Richard B. Stewart, 

Assistant Attorney General; Richard A. Stacey, United States Attorney, and David A. Kubichek, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Cheyenne, Wyoming; Robert L. Klarquist, Attorney, Department of 

Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Washington, 

D.C., with him on the brief) for defendant-appellee. 

Robert S. Thompson, III (Sandra Hansen, also of Whiteing & 

Thompson, Boulder, Colorado; Susan M. Williams of Gover, Stetson, 

Williams & West, Albuquerque, New Mexico, with him on the brief) 

for defendants-intervenors-appellees. 

Before MCKAY, SETH, and LOGAN, Circuit Judges. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-8004 Document: 01019670305 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Oliver Foust applied, pursuant to § 316 of the 

Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1746, 

to correct an error in a land patent issued by the United States 

to Byron Smith, his predecessor in title. The Bureau of Land 

Management (BLM) approved Foust's application, and intervenorsdefendants the Northern Arapaho and Shoshone Indian Tribes 

(Indians) appealed. The Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) 

reversed the BLM's decision, and the district court upheld the 

reversal. Foust now appeals. 

The land at issue is within Section 28, T. 6N., R. 6E., Wind 

River Meridian, Wyoming, which was part of a federal reserved 

water power site at the time the United States issued the patent 

to Smith. In 1929 and 1930, Smith filed homestead entry applications for the NE!SEt and lots 4 and 5. His applications were 

denied initially but then granted after he appealed. In 1935, 

Smith filed a final proof for his entries onto these three lots, 

listing his improvements as follows: a house, double garage and 

other buildings on the NEtSEi; a house, garage, and cellar on lot 

4; and a fenced garden on lot 5. In 1936, the United States 

issued to Smith patents for the NEtSEt and lots 4 and 5. 

In 1942, the United States restored all undisposed land 

within Section 28, T. 6N., R. 6E., to the ownership of the 

Northern Arapaho and Shoshone Indian Tribes of the Wind River 

Reservation. In 1963, Smith's widow conveyed the NEtSEi and lots 

4 and 5 to Foust by warranty deed. A 1979 resurvey of the area 

showed that the buildings that Smith had built and indicated as 

being on the NEtSEt were, in actuality, located within the SWtNE!. 

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Foust applied for a patent correction in 1982, ultimately 

proposing to deed back the NEtSEt and lot 5 to the United States 

in exchange for roughly equal acreage on which the buildings are 

actually located. The Indians, who have title to the SWtNEi, 

filed an action in the district court to nullify the patents, 

which was dismissed without prejudice to enable the patent 

correction proceedings to continue. 

Foust argues that because of the difficulty in surveying the 

mountainous terrain and ascertaining lot boundaries, both the 

United States and Smith believed that the land on which Smith 

built was within the boundaries of the lots conveyed by the 

patents. Foust contends that this mutual mistake of fact can be 

corrected under 43 u.s.c. § 1746. The IBLA and the district court 

rejected Faust's arguments on several alternative grounds: 1) the 

land on which Smith built, SW!NE!, was not open to entry at the 

time the patents were issued and therefore cannot be subject to a 

patent correction under 43 u.s.c. § 1746; 2) Foust did not prove 

that a mistake of fact was made in granting him the NEtSEt and 

lots 4 and 5; and 3) the equities of the case support a ruling for 

the Indians. See Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, 102 IBLA 256 

(1988), IR. tab 1, Ex. B; Order Affirming Decision of the 

Interior Board of Land Appeals (D. Wyo. Nov. 13, 1989) 

(hereinafter "Order of Nov. 13, 1989"), IR. tab 33. 

We review the IBLA's decision to determine if it is 

"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with the law," or is "unsupported by substantial 

evidence ••.• " 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) & (E). 

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"Under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard the scope 

of review is a narrow one. A reviewing court must 

'consider whether the decision was based on a 

consideration of the relevant factors and whether there 

has been a clear error of judgment. . • • Although this 

inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, 

the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The 

court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for 

that of the agency.'" 

Bowman Transp. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285 

(1974) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 

U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). Under the "substantial evidence" test, our 

inquiry is whether the agency's decision is based on "'such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.'" Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 

U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 

U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). This is something more than a mere 

scintilla but something less than the weight of the evidence. 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Consolo, 383 U.S. 

at 620. "'The substantiality of evidence must take into account 

whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.'" Bowman 

Transp., 419 U.S. at 284 n.2 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. 

NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)). 

I 

We consider first whether 43 u.s.c. § 1746 permits a patent 

correction involving an exchange of the SWiNEi for other lots to 

which Foust has title. The statute provides: 

"The Secretary [of Interior] may correct patents or 

documents of conveyance . . . relating to the disposal 

of public lands where necessary in order to eliminate 

errors. In addition, the Secretary may make corrections 

of errors in any documents of conveyance which have 

heretofore been issued by the Federal Government to 

dispose of public lands." 

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Appellate Case: 90-8004 Document: 01019670305 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 4 
43 u.s.c. § 1746. The IBLA and the district court found that 

§ 1746 does not allow what Foust proposes, because the SWtNEt had 

been withdrawn from homestead entry for the purpose of a power 

reserve at the time the patents were issued. The district court 

acknowledged Faust's argument that Congress amended FLPMA in 1976 

to remove language requiring that patent corrections be based on 

the land's availability for entry. Compare 43 u.s.c. § 697 (1964) 

with 43 U.S.C. § 1746 (1982). However, the court found the deletion of the entry language to be ambiguous and interpreted it to 

be "part of a concerted effort to simplify public land administration while retaining the basic precepts of public land law." 

Order of Nov. 13, 1989, at 18. We disagree. 

The meaning of the congressional amendment deleting the entry 

language is clear: the statute no longer requires the land's 

availability for entry to correct a patent. We will not speculate 

as to what Congress might have intended, because no ambiguity 

exists. If Congress had intended something more subtle, it surely 

would have substituted language, rather than entirely deleting it. 

Furthermore, nothing in the legislative history supports the 

district court's analysis of congressional intent. See id. at 17-

18 (legislative history fails to show why the entry language was 

deleted). A finding that the Secretary of Interior (Secretary) 

cannot correct a patent to include lands that were not subject to 

entry by the original patentee is not in accordance with the law. 

We are similarly unpersuaded by the Indians' argument that 

the Secretary cannot correct a patent when doing so would require 

conveyance of tribal land. We agree that lands now held by the 

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United States in trust for Indians are not public lands .. See 43 

u.s.c. § 1702(e). The relevant inquiry, however, is whether the 

lands in question were public lands at the time the patent was 

issued. The lot in question here, the SWtNEi, was owned by the 

United States, administered by the Secretary, and not held in 

trust for the Indians in 1936, and it therefore was public land 

under the statutory definition. See id. 

We believe the Secretary's fiduciary duty to the Indians does 

not prevent him from correcting a patent to land that was public 

at the time the patent was issued and the alleged mistake made. 

If the responsible officers of the United States believed that the 

land on which Smith had built and claimed was the land described 

in the patent, and that the United States had already conveyed 

that land, the Congress could not have intended to restore that 

same land to the Indians in 1942. Thus, the Indians took the land 

subject to any mistaken description resulting from boundary 

uncertainties. The fact that the Secretary is vested with 

responsibilities both to correct patent errors and to act as 

trustee for the Indians cannot operate against patentees who have 

Indians, rather than non-Indians, as neighbors. We hold that the 

SWiNEi is subject to the patent correction mechanism of 43 u.s.c. 

§ 1746. 

II 

The IBLA found, and the district court agreed, that Foust 

failed to prove that Smith's patent contained an error. Our 

inquiry is limited to whether this determination is supported by 

substantial evidence, 5 u.s.c. § 706(2)(E), in light of the entire 

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administrative record, see Bowman Transp., 419 U.S. at 284 n.2; 

Roberts v. Morton, 549 F.2d 158, 160 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. 

denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977). Errors in patents are defined as: 

"the inclusion of erroneous descriptions, terms, conditions, covenants, reservations, provisions and names or 

the omission of requisite descriptions, terms, conditions, covenants, reservations, provisions and names 

either in their entirety or in part, in a patent or 

document of conveyance as a result of factual error. 

This term is limited to mistakes of fact and not of 

law." 

43 C.F.R. § 1865.0-5(b). If both the United States and Smith 

intended that the land on which Smith built be conveyed to him but 

were mistaken about the boundaries or legal description, this 

would be a correctable mistake of fact. 

Foust argues that the IBLA and district court ignored 

overwhelming evidence of this mutual mistake of fact. We agree. 

First, the topography of the area is such that ascertaining correct lot boundaries would have been difficult. Smith built in a 

small canyon among steep, rocky slopes and cliffs. It was not 

until 1979, when the area was resurveyed by modern surveying 

standards, that anyone was able to determine with certainty that 

the entry had been made on the SWiNEi, rather than the NEtSEi. 

Second, the SWtNEt was the only place that was not too steep to 

build a house. This fact alone is not enough to convince us that 

the United States intended to convey the land on which Smith 

built, but it does raise questions about why Smith would have 

filed a homestead application, and why the United States would 

have issued a patent, for land that was too steep for a home. 

Third, on several separate forms, Smith referred to the 

NEtSEi but clearly described the SWiNEi. In his December 3, 1929, 

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petition for designation of the NEtSEl for stock-raising homestead 

entry, Smith described the lot as having "one small permanent 

spring," IIA R. Petition for Designation Stock-raising Homestead 

Law; the spring is located on the SWtNE!. In the testimony of 

claimant form, filed August 30, 1935, for his final proof, he 

stated that he had built a house, double garage, and other 

buildings on the NE!SE!. His non-water reserve affidavit, filed 

December 3, 1929, and his application for reduction of the 

required area of cultivation, dated September 11, 1935, referred 

to a spring being located on the NE!SE!. 

Witnesses also mistakenly assumed that the land on which 

Smith built was the NEtSE!. His final proof of homestead included 

the affidavits of two witnesses, who stated that Smith had built a 

dwelling and garage on the NE!SE!. One affiant had been familiar 

with the land for seven years and had visited the Smith home about 

twenty-five times; the other had been familiar with the land for 

twenty years and had visited the Smith home at least four times 

per year. Foust also presented with his application for patent 

correction the affidavit of Bonnie Bleak, who has lived near the 

land in question since Smith entered and built on it. She 

attested to her good faith belief that the improvements were on 

the lands described in the patents. 

Finally, and most significantly, the responsible officials of 

the United States erroneously believed that Smith had built on the 

NE!SE!. Because of a protest against Smith's entry, the General 

Land Off ice would not issue the patent until a special agent for 

the Department of Interior conducted a field investigation and 

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determined that Smith had resided on the land he claimed he had 

entered. The special agent inspected the land and recommended 

granting Smith the patent to the NEtSEi (as well as lots 4 and 5) 

because of his residence on the land. In his Favorable Report of 

November 18, 1935, the special agent described the NEtSEi as 

"extremely rough and rocky, containing scattered scrub cedars not 

commercially valuable and two small springs sufficient for 

domestic use. . . . There is on the original entry [the NEtSEt) a 

stone and log house, double garage, storeroom, and frame bath 

house, having a reasonable value of $2,300.00." IIA R. Favorable 

Report. The description matches the land that has since been 

discovered to be the SWtNEi. The United States would not have 

issued a patent for the NE!SEi unless the officials responsible 

for investigating and issuing the patent were satisfied that Smith 

had entered the lot and was residing on it. Therefore, the United 

States erroneously described the lot that it intended to convey. 

The IBLA and the district court found that Foust had not met 

his burden of proving a mutual mistake based on three sets of 

facts: (1) Smith's description of the lands he sought as "rough," 

"broken," and "uneven"; (2) the lack of an adjoining boundary 

between the NEiSEi and the SWtNEi; and (3) the location of the 

SWtNEi within a powersite withdrawal and thus unavailable for 

entry. Nothing about the description of the land as rough, 

mountainous, uneven, and rocky is inconsistent with the mistake of 

fact that Foust alleges. The SWiNEi is apparently rough and 

rocky; just because it is less so than the NEiSEi does not mean 

that Smith or the United States were describing anything other 

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than the land on which Smith built. In fact, the Department of 

Interior's special agent, at the time he investigated Smith's 

entry, described the NEtSEi as being "extremely rough and rocky" 

and as containing a house, double garage, and other improvements 

that were later discovered to be on the SWtNEi. IIA R. Favorable 

Report. Viewing Smith's descriptions in context, it is apparent 

that he was concerned that he would be required to cultivate this 

rocky, uneven land in order to receive the patent. His failure to 

note that there was enough even ground to build a house cannot be 

fatal, especially when the special agent who inspected the land 

used similar descriptive terms. 

The lack of a common boundary between the NE!SEt and the 

SWtNEi does raise a question about how the mistake could have been 

made. The two pieces of land touch only at one corner. The difficulty of surveying the area at the time because of the rough and 

steep topography could account for everyone's mistaken belief that 

Smith had built on the NEtSE!. Regardless of the reason, the lack 

of an adjoining border cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence 

that both Smith and the United States referred to the NEtSEi but 

described the SW!NE!. See Bowman Transp., 419 U.S. at 284 n.2. 

(evidence in administrative record detracting from weight of 

evidence on which agency makes decision). 

The availability of the SW!NEt for entry at the time is irrelevant. The United States believed that the land on which Smith 

had built was part of the NE!SEi, land available for homesteading. 

The fact that the United States might not have conveyed this land 

if it had known its true description does not mean that the United 

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States did not make a correctable mistake. The record shows that 

the United States intended to convey the land that Smith entered 

and improved. Accordingly, the IBLA's determination was not based 

on substantial evidence. 

III 

"Once the fact of error in the patent is established, the 

other circumstances of the case must be examined to determine 

whether considerations of equity and justice warrant amendment of 

the patent." Ben R. Williams, 57 IBLA 8, 13 (1981). The IBLA 

found that Foust was not entitled to relief as a matter of equity, 

because he failed to survey the land at the time he purchased the 

property and because the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) opposed 

the patent correction as·detrimental to the Indians' interests. 

The district court affirmed on the same grounds. We review under 

the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

Foust presents several equitable considerations in his favor. 

He is elderly, widowed, and living on the land in question. He 

has lived there for twenty-eight years, paid the taxes, maintained 

the property, and made further improvements. He would suffer 

severe economic hardship if he were to lose his home. 

Foust asserts that he made a title search before purchasing 

the property but admits that he did not have the property 

surveyed. However, there is no apparent reason why he should have 

been on notice that the property required a survey. The original 

entryman Smith and his wife, who sold the land to Foust in 1963, 

believed that the lot with the house, other improvements, and 

stream was the NE!SE!. So did the government and nearby 

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residents. In fact, no one suspected the mistake until 1969, and 

the mistake could not be confirmed until an extensive resurvey in 

1979. 

Foust was a good faith purchaser, apparently paying full 

value for the land. Although he could have been more diligent by 

having the land surveyed, under the circumstances we do not 

believe he should lose the land just because he relied on the 

representations of the one who conveyed to him and on the other 

information that he did obtain. It is too much to expect every 

purchaser to resurvey on the chance that a patent issued decades 

before might have misdescribed the land. 

The BIA's opposition to the patent correction, while a 

relevant consideration, i·s also insufficient under the 

circumstances to prevent the correction. The correction would 

involve an exchange of land roughly equal in acreage, thus not 

diminishing the overall number of acres in the Wind River Reservation. Although the SWtNEt quite likely is more valuable than the 

land the Indians would receive in return, the Indians have 

presented no evidence of a difference in land values or of any 

other harm. A win for the Indians would appear to be a windfall 

to the extent of the excess value of the improvements. 

Furthermore, the Indians took no action with respect to the land 

until the early 1980s, some fifty years after Smith entered the 

land and nearly forty years after the remaining undisposed land in 

the area was conveyed to them. Although adverse possession does 

not run against the Indians, their failure to take some action 

against the alleged trespass for nearly forty years is a relevant 

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consideration in evaluating the equities of the case. If they did 

not know that Smith had built on land for which he did not have a 

patent, this would strongly suggest that they were under the same 

mistaken assumptions about lot boundaries that were held by the 

United States, Smith, Foust, and the other area residents. On the 

other hand, if they did know of the mistake but did nothing about 

it, they did not value the SW!NE! highly enough to protect their 

property rights; they cannot assert now that the land is so 

valuable that an exchange would prejudice their interests. 

Because of the severe hardship that Foust would face if he 

were to lose his home and the insufficiency of the factors on 

which the IBLA relied, we hold that the IBLA made a clear error of 

judgment in finding that Foust was not entitled to relief as a 

matter of equity. The determination was arbitrary and capricious. 

See Bowman Transp., 419 U.S. at 285. 

REVERSED. 

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Appellate Case: 90-8004 Document: 01019670305 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 13 
No. 90-8004 - Oliver J. Foust v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., etc., et al. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

Had I been the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), I would 

have weighed the facts largely as the majority has done. Because 

our commission does not give us the weighing function, we are not 

at liberty to do what the majority has done. For that reason I 

must respectfully dissent. 

While I agree with the majority that 43 U.S.C. § 1746 provides statutory authority to reform the deed at issue, I believe 

that the majority has clearly undervalued the facts and judgments 

the IBLA relied on and overvalued its own view of the facts. The 

trial court's summary of the facts which support the IBLA's discretionary decision adequately demonstrates my point. I set it 

out here in haec verba, omitting only two introductory paragraphs 

and the judgment paragraph: 

The Wind River Indian Reservation, encompassing 

over 2,000,000 acres in west central Wyoming, was established by treaty between the United States and the 

Eastern Band of the Shoshone Indians, represented by 

Chief Washakie and others, on July 3, 1868 at Fort 

Bridger, Utah Territory. Amidst hopes for peace between 

the Indians and the whites following an especially violent time in our nation's history, the United States 

gave back to the Indians in the form of reservations 

acreage which at best represents a mere fraction of the 

lands once populated by the Indians. Since the 1868 

treaty, the Arapahoes have shared the reservation with 

the Shoshones. See Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United 

States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937). 

By the turn of the century, the Shoshone and 

Arapahoe Indians ceded a portion of the Wind River 

Indian Reservation to the United States as evidenced by 

an act of Congress. See Pub.L. 58-185, March 3, 1905, 

Appellate Case: 90-8004 Document: 01019670305 Date Filed: 08/14/1991 Page: 14 
33 Stat. 1016. On July 2, 1910, certain of the reservation lands were withdrawn by executive order and 

reserved for water power sites. Plaintiff's Exhs. 59, 

60. Included in the withdrawal and reservation was a 

tract described as Section 28, T. 6N., R. 6E., Wind 

River Meridian (W.R.M.)--the tract which contains the 

lands at issue at the administrative level and here. 

Plaintiff's Exh. 59, p.3. On November 12, 1927, a survey plat for the above-described township was approved 

and apparently filed on October 5, 1928. Plaintiff's 

Exhs. 9, 62. Before the year was out, the lands shown 

in the survey plat were opened to homestead entry. 

On December 9, 1929, one Byron H. Smith filed a 

petition for designation of the NE1/4SE1/4 of Section 

28, T. 6N., R. 6E., W.R.M. as stock raising lands, along 

with an application, serialized by the Cheyenne land 

office as 050733, for entry onto that parcel. 

Plaintiff's Exhs. 42, 43. Smith's petition was denied 

with the explanation that the land was not subject to 

homestead entry under the Act of March 3, 1905. On 

December 15, 1929, Smith appealed the denial and eventually prevailed. Plaintiff's Exhs. 45, 50. 

On July 9, 1930 Smith filed a supplemental homestead entry application C-050733 for the NE1/4SE1/4 set 

out above. Later, he filed a petition/application C051835 for stock raising homestead entry onto lots 4 and 

5 (see appendix) of Section 28, T. 6N., R. 6E., W.R.M., 

which lots adjoin the NE1/4SE1/4. See A.R. Part 2. On 

August 29, 1930, lots 4 and 5, previously withdrawn for 

power sites, were restored to entry pursuant to section 

24 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), as amended, 16 u.s.c. 

§ 818 (1982). Plaintiff's Exh. 58. By October 4, 1930, 

Smith had filed for designation of lots 4 and 5 as stock 

raising homestead lands. Plaintiff's Exh. 34. Smith 

filed a final proof for entries C-050733 and C-051835 on 

September 3, 1935, listing the improvements made to 

these lands, to-wit: a house, double garage, and other 

buildings on the NE1/4SE1/4, a house, garage, and cellar 

on lot 4, and a fenced garden on lot 5. Plaintiff's 

Exh. 35 at 11 12(a). In November 1936, Smith received 

patents for lots 4 and 5 and the NE1/4SE1/4. 

Plaintiff's Exhs. 31, 32. In 1942, all undisposed ceded 

land east of the Big Horn River (Wind River) and within 

Section 28, T. 6N., R. 6E. became tribal land. 

Plaintiff Foust entered the picture on June 19, 

1963 when he and his now deceased wife received title to 

lots 4 and 5 and the NE1/4SE1/4 by warranty deed from 

Smith's widow. Plaintiff's Exh. 7. The Fousts, in 

turn, conveyed a part of lot 4 to Erwin and Donna 

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Roberts by warranty deed on May 4, 1979. Plaintiff's 

Exh. 78. 

Problems began to arise shortly after Foust 

obtained the lands. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), 

in 1968 or 1969, suspected that Foust's home and the 

other improvements were located on tribal lands and 

asked that the BLM perform an official survey. Between 

October and November 1979, a resurvey of the subject 

plat was undertaken resulting in the redesignation of 

the Sl/2NE1/4 of Section 28, T. 6N., R. 6E., W.R.M. as 

lots 9, 10, 11, and 12. The resurvey revealed that the 

house and other buildings Smith had built and indicated 

as being on the NE1/4SE1/4 were, in actuality, located 

within the SW1/4NE1/4 on lot 11.l Various options to 

remedy the trespass were advanced by Foust and the 

Government, including such proposals as exchanges of 

land, payments of past rentals, and entering into a 

lessor-lessee arrangement with the tribes. None were 

deemed acceptable. So the Fousts applied to the BLM for 

a patent correction on May 3, 1982 whereby lot 5 would 

be deeded back to the United States in exchange for lots 

9, 11, and 12, a quantitatively similar transaction. 

A.R. Part 3. (Plaintiff's Exh. 20). The tribes subsequently sought declaratory relief in this Court to nul1 ify the patents, an action which was later dismissed in 

order to enable patent correction proceedings to continue at the administrative level. See Plaintiff's 

Exhs. 2, 3. 

On December 30, 1985, the BLM issued a decision 

approving Foust's application for correction. A.R. Part 

4 (Plaintiff's Exh. 28). The tribes appealed and 

obtained a reversal from the IBLA in a lengthy decision 

authored by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Franklin 

Arness. Plaintiff's Exh. 1. Foust now appeals the IBLA 

decision to this Court, contending that the agency 

action was arbitrary and capricious. 

Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 

u.s.c. § 500 et .§filL. 1 the scope of judicial review of 

final agency action is a very deferential one whereby a 

reviewing court can set aside agency action which is 

found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ..•. " 5 

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). See also Citizens to 

Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) and 

1 Aside from the trespass question, the significance of this 

discovery lies in the fact that at the time Smith built his home 

and other improvements, the area now designated as lot 11 was 

still reserved as a powersite and had not been restored to entry. 

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Edwards v. Califano, 619 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1980). 

This narrow standard of review requires the Court to 

ascertain whether the agency based its decision on relevant factors or whether it made a clear error of judgment. Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best 

Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974), reh'g denied, 

420 U.S. 956 (1975). 

A reviewing court may also set aside an agency 

decision it finds to be unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. 5 u.s.c. § 706(2)(E) (1982). Substantial evidence means "'more than a mere scintilla'"; 

it is "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting 

Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 

(1938)). While it is permissible for a court to engage 

in substantial inquiry into the facts, absent clear 

error, it must be wary to substitute its judgment for 

that of an expert agency. Independent Meat Packers 

Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 238 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. 

denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976). See also FCC v. National 

Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) 

and New Mexico Environmental Imp. Div. v. Thomas, 789 

F.2d 825, 835 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Section 316 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 u.s.c. § 1746, gives the Secretary 

of the Interior (Secretary) the authority, in permissive 

terms, to "correct patents or documents of conveyance . • . relating to the disposal of public lands where necessary in order to eliminate errors." A further regulatory provision explains the errors subject to 

correction: 

'Error' means the inclusion of erroneous 

descriptions, terms, conditions, covenants, 

reservations, provisions and names or the 

omission of requisite descriptions, terms, 

conditions, covenants, reservations, provisions and names either in their entirety or in 

part, in a patent or document of conveyance as 

a result of factual error. This term is 

limited to mistakes of fact and not of law. 

43 C.F.R. § 1865.0-5(b) (1988) (emphasis added). 

Although the BLM found that circumstances warranted 

a patent correction, the IBLA was not so easily convinced. It found that Foust had not, and indeed could 

not, show that the patents in question suffered from a 

mistake of fact. The IBLA reviewed Smith's petitions 

and applications for the NE1/4SE1/4 and lots 4 and 5 and 

the descriptions he gave for these lands and concluded 

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that Smith's descriptions fit the lands contained in his 

patents. They could not have referred to what is now 

lot 11, colloquially known as the "draw," since this 

small parcel is the only area within Section 28 flat 

enough to support a homestead. 

Another inconsistency militating against a factual 

mistake, in the view of the IBLA, came from a statement 

of Foust to the effect that Smith intended to build his 

homestead on lot 5. Such a statement, the IBLA found, 

was simply incongruous to Smith's own written submissions describing the house and other improvements as 

being situated on the NE1/4SE1/4, not on lot 5. With 

that the case, the relative locations of the SW1/4NE1/4, 

which contains lots 9, 11, and 12, and the NE1/4SE1/4, 

touching as they do at one corner and not sharing any 

common boundaries made it that much more unlikely, as 

far as the IBLA panel was concerned, that a mistaken 

description was involved. 

Then came the area of land in which lot 11 is 

located, the SW1/4NE1/4. As the IBLA observed, the SWl/ 

4NE1/4 was withdrawn from entry for power site purposes 

during all pertinent periods and remained so until its 

restoration to tribal ownership in 1942. Had Smith 

applied for entry onto what is now lot 11, the IBLA 

points out, no patent would have issued for this 

reason.2 This fact alone, in the words of ALJ Arness, 

"negates entirely the possibility that a mistake was 

made in the description of the patented land." Shoshone 

and Arapahoe Tribes, 102 IBLA at 256, 268 (May 23, 1988) 

(footnote omitted). 

With the law against Foust, the IBLA turned to a 

consideration of the equities. It concluded that equity 

was not on Foust's side because he did not exercise due 

diligence in verifying the correctness of the property 

being conveyed to him. When Foust was in the process of 

acquiring the lands, he asked about a survey and apparently was told that no reliable survey was available 

given the terrain. This, according to the IBLA, should 

have alerted Foust that problems with description might 

be present. Influential to the IBLA was the fact that a 

BIA range conservationist had discovered the trespass 

after an aerial overview as early as 1968, an event 

2Foust disputes this, regarding the withdrawal status of the SWl/ 

4NE1/4 as a minor impediment which, upon application for entry, 

would have been removed as a matter of routine. As explained in 

greater detail below, this position is entirely unpersuasive. 

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which led to a dependent resurvey in 1980 after a somewhat unusual delay in notifying the tribes of the suspected trespass. Any argument that discovery of the 

trespass was impossible prior to this resurvey was discounted by the IBLA. In the words of ALJ Arness: 

Both the 1928 homestead opening and 

powersite withdrawal were described by reference to the 1928 survey, which was available 

both to Smith and Foust. The 1928 survey 

shows the lots and quarter quarters of sec. 28 

and the general topography of the land. The 

1928 survey also shows the draw where Smith 

built, and it shows that the draw was not 

within the land patented to Smith, but that it 

was located instead within the powersite withdrawal in the SW1/4NE1/4. The BIA range conservationist who detected the trespass did not 

need to leave his off ice to see that there was 

a trespass. 

102 IBLA at 271 (emphasis added). 

On appeal, Foust maintains that the IBLA misapplied 

the law by ignoring the corrective mechanism of the 

FLPMA. Plaintiff's basic argument revolves around the 

FPA, 16 u.s.c. § 818, which provides for entry onto 

withdrawn lands upon a determination of the Federal 

Power Commission (FPC) that the value of the reserved 

lands for powersite purposes will not be diminished if 

location is permitted. Under § 818, the Secretary is 

given no alternative but to open lands so determined to 

entry under any terms imposed by the FPC. Plaintiff 

treats this process as a mere formality, arguing that 

had Smith filed an application for entry onto lot 11, 

the § 818 determination would have been made as a matter 

of course as evidenced by the many similar determinations the FPC has made for other homesteaders in the 

region. Moreover, to allow a decision regarding an 

application for patent correction to turn upon the 

availability for entry of the land sought to be included 

at the time such entry was made, as the IBLA did, especially when placed in the light of § 1746, amended as it 

was to exclude previous language requiring consideration 

of the status of the land, is clearly erroneous insists 

Foust. 

Plaintiff maintains that Smith mistakenly described 

the land upon which he built his home and other buildings. Anyone who looks at the lay of the land, says 

Foust, will see that lot 11 is the only parcel in close 

proximity to the patented lands which is unencumbered by 

rocky, mountainous terrain and cliffs and thus suitable 

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for building purposes. As further support for the mistake theory, Foust points to: (1) sworn statements of 

subscribing witnesses who live and have grown up in the 

canyon, relating their beliefs that Smith's improvements 

were on lots 4 and 5; (2) an abstract of title, given to 

Foust, wherein the Smith improvements are described as 

being on lots 4 and 5; (3) BLM and General Land Office 

worksheets showing the improvements as being on lots 4 

and 5; and (4) the warranty deed to Foust as well as his 

affidavit to the effect that Smith's widow told him the 

improvements were located on lot 5. 

Aside from all this, the plaintiff argues that the 

equities are with him. According to Foust, who has 

lived on the disputed lot for over 25 years, the only 

reason the tribes are pursuing what will amount to an 

ejectment action if they prevail, is out of vindictiveness for Faust's sale of a portion of lot 4 to a nonIndian who offered a higher price than the tribes did. 

This bad faith theory, believes Foust, is supported by 

the fact that no other entrymen on lands which were subject to the powersite reservation in the canyon area 

have had their claims challenged by the tribes. 

The United States and the tribes rely on the 1942 

restoration order which gave back to the Indians all 

lands opened under the 1905 Act and undisposed of. This 

included the SW1/4NE1/4--lots 9, 11, and 12. So, if 

Smith had described lot 11 in his application, a patent 

would have been denied. More than twenty years after 

this restoration, Foust purchased the Smith property. 

Had plaintiff exercised due diligence in ascertaining 

the propriety of the conveyance, urge these parties, the 

discrepancy would have been readily discovered. 

As for plaintiff's mistake theory, the United 

States and the tribes simply point to statements of 

Smith which describe the subject improvements as being 

on the NE1/4SE1/4. Other indicia negating this theory 

include Smith's descriptions of the patented lands as 

"rough," "rocky," "very hilly," and "very mountainous" 

as well as the stockraising designation he sought for 

lots 4 and 5 when, according to a range conservationist, 

section 28 contains very little grass and no access to 

suitable open range land in other sections. Rather, the 

tribes allege, Smith built on lot 11 when he saw the 

desirability of the land for a scenic home. 

The tribes remind the Court that the equities are 

not with the plaintiff, principally because he failed to 

exercise reasonable diligence before purchasing from 

Smith's widow. Foust could have easily performed the 

necessary verification but chose not to. Other relevant 

equity considerations advanced by the Indians include 

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length of residence on the land and expenditures to 

acquire and improve it, factors which would weigh 

heavily in favor of the original patentee Smith or his 

heirs but not an arms-length transferee like plaintiff. 

The United States holds tribal lands in trust for 

the Indians. Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 

365, 368 (1968). See also Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 

556, 557 (10th Cir. 1977). The BIA is charged with 

carrying out this trust obligation. Poafpybitty, 390 

U.S. at 374. So strong is our commitment to protect 

Indian lands that whenever a dispute develops between a 

white person and an Indian over lands where an Indian 

presumption of title has been established, it is the 

white person who shoulders the burden of persuasion and 

the burden of producing evidence to the contrary. 25 

u.s.c. § 194. See also Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 

442 U.S. 653, 669 (1979). Such provision was seen as a 

means of preventing non-Indian squatters from setting up 

residence on tribal lands. Id. at 667. 

Whether or not Smith was a squatter is left for 

history. All that can be said is that Smith received 

patents to certain lands. A government patent is the 

most accredited type of conveyance known to the law. 

United States v. Cherokee Nation, 474 F.2d 628, 634 n.16 

(Ct. Cl. 1973). Only the lands set forth in a patent 

pass to an entryman; nothing passes by implication. 

Walton v. United States, 415 F.2d 121, 123 (10th Cir. 

1969). As set out above, Smith received patents for 

lots 4, 5, and the NE1/4SE1/4--nothing more, nothing 

less. Yet he built a home and other improvements on 

land not designated in the patent--land withdrawn from 

entry at the time and later tribal land, not public 

land. 

Notwithstanding this, plaintiff, as Smith's 

successor-in-interest, asks this Court to allow the patents to be corrected, giving him rights to a parcel of 

land which Smith, as the original patentee, had no right 

to in the first place not only because of its absence in 

the patent documents but also by virtue of the reserved 

status of the SW1/4NE1/4 at the time of Smith's entry. 

Foust's argument to the effect that the IBLA misapplied 

§ 1746 of the FLPMA is for naught. Likewise, the afterthe-fact justification for Smith's intrusion, namely 

that had he applied for entry onto the then withdrawn 

SW1/4NE1/4, the application would have been granted as a 

matter of routine following the § 818 determination is 

unpersuasive. The fact of the matter remains that Smith 

never made any inroads in that direction but, more 

importantly, no evidence before this Court supports 

plaintiff's assertion regarding the frequency with which 

applications for entry onto withdrawn lands are 

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approved. Moreover, approval of applications for entry 

under § 818 are not as quick as plaintiff would seem to 

suggest. Under § 818, following the notice of determination of no injury, the Secretary is required to give 

the governor of the state within which the lands sought 

to be entered are located ninety days from the date of 

such notice to determine whether the land should be 

reserved to the state rather than approved for entry by 

a private person. At any rate, "[a] patent cannot convey what has been reserved by law.". Leo Sheep Co. v. 

United States, 570 F.2d 881, 888 (10th Cir. 1977), rev'd 

on other grounds, 440 U.S. 668 (1979). 

Admittedly, plaintiff's point regarding the difference between § 1746 of the FLPMA and its predecessor, 

primarily from the standpoint of the excision of 

language where the decision on whether to approve a 

request for a patent correction turned on the availability of the land sought to be included for entry, 

deserves closer attention. Although the legislative 

history is silent as to why the prior language was 

deleted, the 1976 amendments to the FLPMA were a 

response to calls for the modernization of the nation's 

public land laws, many of which were regarded as obsolete. 1976 U.S. Code ·Cong. & Admin. News 6175. While 

on-the-record clarification by Congress would have been 

helpful to disposition of this issue, the lack of such 

elaboration is not fatal because any ambiguity in a 

statute is interpreted in favor of the Indians whenever 

Indian treaty rights or nontreaty matters involving 

Indians are at stake. Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 939 (10th 

Cir. 1989). The Court views the deletion of the entry 

language from § 1746 as part of a concerted effort to 

simplify public land administration while retaining the 

basic precepts of public land law. 

Were the Court to sanction plaintiff's interpretation of § 1746, the question of availability of entry 

would become irrelevant, conceivably threatening all 

lands in the public domain. Such wholesale exploitation 

of the purposes behind the public land laws and, more 

particularly, the trust status of Indian lands was not 

intended by Congress. 

Foust cannot be regarded as a bona fide purchaser 

under the circumstances of this case. When told that no 

reliable survey of the area was available, a reasonable 

person would have exercised diligence in attempting to 

ascertain the propriety of his purchase. As shown 

above, the pertinent materials which would have disclosed the defect in the conveyance were available at 

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the time of and before Faust's purchase, but he chose 

not to pursue the matter. 

His reliance on a prior IBLA decision, Mantle Ranch 

Corp., 47 IBLA 17 (April 11, 1980), as supportive of a 

patent correction is misplaced; f.or, in that case, the 

successors-in-interest were heirs to the original 

patentee who mistakenly described the lands entered. 

All concerned agencies expressed their approval of the 

correction sought. The IBLA described the equities 

thus: 

Not only has the land been occupied and 

claimed since 1919, the tract in sec. 17 has 

actually been the site of the family home for 

more than 40 years and is the place where Tim 

Mantle, the present occupant, was born. The 

heirs of Charles Mantle are entitled to what 

their father and husband actually earned by 

his compliance with the homestead law. 

Id. at 38. No such circumstance exists here.3 Foust is 

merely an arms-length transferee whose equitable 

interest, if existent, is minimal. 

Of particular importance, the BIA, as executor of 

the trust responsibility to the tribes, opposes the 

patent correction sought by Foust, as shown in the 

following excerpt from the IBLA decision: 

'Please be advised that the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs opposes the application to correct Mr. Faust's homestead patent. Based on 

the facts of this case, it is our opinion that 

a correction of the patent would be detrimental to the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes. Further, it is not clear that an error of the 

description was made.' 

Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, 102 IBLA at 274 (quoting 

Memorandum dated June 16, 1983 from BIA Director to 

BLM). 

In sum, an extensive review of the administrative 

record compiled in this matter convinces the Court that 

the IBLA decision is not arbitrary and capricious but, 

rather, is supported by substantial evidence and is in 

conformity with the law. Unlike the BLM, the IBLA 

3

Mantle, unlike Smith, enlisted the help of a surveyor to draw the 

application and relied upon him to describe the lands correctly. 

Mantle Ranch Corp., 47 IBLA at 21. 

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carefully considered all relevant issues and correctly 

applied equitable and legal principles to the facts 

before it. 

The mistake theory plaintiff propounds is simply 

unsupportable. So many facts and circumstances surrounding Smith and his applications exist, only some of 

which have been addressed above, that a conclusion of 

mistaken description would stretch the benefit of the 

doubt to its breaking point. As can be seen from the 

appendix which accompanies this decision, the relative 

proximities of the NE1/4SE1/4 (where Smith indicated he 

built his house and other buildings), lot 5 (where 

others say Smith built his house but Smith says he only 

had a garden fence), and lot 11 (where Smith actually 

built his house and other buildings) are such that it 

was not reasonably likely for Smith to have mistakenly 

built on lot 11 in the SW1/4NE1/4. 

As for Foust, he owed a duty, as a purchaser of 

real property, to exercise that diligence any reasonable person would have exercised to verify the identity 

of the lands he was purchasing prior to accepting the 

conveyance. Instead, he remained indifferent and took 

his chances. Now comes the time to pay the price for 

that indifference. 

Foust v. Lujan, No. C88-235-K (D. Wyo. Nov. 15, 1989). 

I add only these two observations. The reason for the 

grossly erroneous description by the original entryman who was 

otherwise so fulsome in description seems patent: the correct 

quarter section description would not have been open to entry. 

Finally, to argue that the tribe has presented no evidence of a 

difference in land values is refuted by the court's own earlier 

recitation of why the original entryman chose the site in issue. 

I would affirm. 

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