Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00281/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00281-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 245
Nature of Suit: Real Property Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brian Matthew Winstanley,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Royal Consumer Information Products,

Inc., et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-06-281-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendant Royal Consumer Information Products (“RCIP”) seeks to preclude

discovery of correspondence between itself and the Consumer Products Safety Commission

(“CPSC”) concerning the paper shredder at issues in this litigation, as well as documents and

information related to accidents involving another model of paper shredder produced by

RCIP.

A. A.R.S. § 12-687. 

Defendant first argues that discovery of its communications with the CPSC is barred

by ARS § 12-687. The statute, however, concerns the admissibility of evidence at trial, not

discovery. Furthermore, the statute specifies that “[t]he existence and contents of a product

safety analysis or review and any resulting reasonable remedial measures are discoverable

and subject to disclosure in a products liability action unless otherwise privileged.” A.R.S.

§ 12-687(4) (emphasis added). The statute clearly does not protect Defendant's

correspondence with the CPSC from discovery. 

Case 2:06-cv-00281-DGC Document 51 Filed 06/27/06 Page 1 of 4
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B. Consumer Product Safety Act

Defendant argues that the Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”) precludes the

discovery, citing 15 U.S.C § 2055(b)(5), 2055(e), 2074(b) and 16 C.F.R. § 1101. The Court

concludes, however, that none of these statues applies in this case. 

Section 2055(b)(5) is inapplicable because it pertains only to disclosure by the CPSC.

Plaintiffs are seeking discovery from Defendant, not the CPSC. The statute also states that

“[t]he provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to the public disclosure of information . . .

in the course of or concerning a judicial proceeding,” further evidence that the prohibitions

do not apply to discovery of materials held by a private party in a civil action. See Lawson

v. Fisher Price, Inc., 191 F.R.D. 381, 383 (D. Vt. 1999); Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107

F.R.D. 678, 682 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Lamitie v Emerson Elec. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653

(N.Y. App. Div. 1988). 

Defendant relies on § 2055(e), which governs disclosure of reports submitted to the

CPSC pursuant to § 2084. But this section also applies to disclosures by the CPSC.

Moreover, because this is not a case where the CPSC is disclosing information, 16 C.F.R. §

1101 does not apply – it merely prescribes procedures for CPSC disclosures.

Section 2074(b) is inapplicable because that section again concerns admissibility of

evidence, not discovery, and applies only if the CPSC has failed to take action. Here, the

CPSC has taken action by initiating and continuing correspondence with Defendant and by

suggesting a recall. See also Morales v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 151 F.3d 500, 513

(6th Cir. 1998) (Congress sought only to exclude instances where CPSC completely failed to

act, rather than those in which the CPSC ultimately decided against regulation). 

C. Relevancy.

Defendant claims that Plaintiffs should be precluded from discovering documents

related to another model of shredder involved in similar incidents on the basis of irrelevance.

The Court finds Defendant's argument that the shredders are manufactured by two different

companies to be without merit because the complaint in this case is based on a design defect,

not a manufacturing defect. Defendant's other contention is that Plaintiffs must illustrate

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some “threshold relevance” by showing reasonable similarity between the model involved

in this case, the HT500X, and the model involved in other cases, the 7X. Defendant cites

United Oil Co. v. Parts Associates, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 404 (D. Md. 2005), and Piacenti v.

General Motors Corp., 173 F.R.D. 221 (E.D. Ill. 1997), in support of its position. 

In United Oil, the court recognized that the resisting party generally has the burden

during discovery to show irrelevance, but qualified the rule by stating that a party seeking

discovery must first show some “threshold relevance.” United Oil, 227 F.R.D. at 411-12.

In Piacenti, discovery was denied because the plaintiff gave conclusory statements as to

similarity and the defendant presented detailed evidence to the contrary. Piacenti 173 F.R.D.

at 225-26. Here, Plaintiffs assert that the size of the opening leading to the blades in both

shredders differs only by .04 inches, the housing around the opening in both models is made

of flexible plastic, each shredder has the same auto-start feature, and similar incidents

involving children's fingers and moving blades have occurred with each shredder. Even

under a “threshold relevance” standard, Plaintiffs have met their burden. Plaintiffs have

detailed the common characteristics between the shredders, but Defendant has provided only

a conclusory affidavit that states the shredders have “completely different designs” and that

the distances between the openings and the cutting blades are “different.” Defendant has

provided no technical specifications, and has done little else to illustrate to the Court why the

shredders are not similar. Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery of the documents related to the

7X.

D. Self-Critical Analysis Privilege.

Arizona recognizes a common law self-critical analysis privilege, but has yet to extend

it beyond cases involving hospitals. See Jolly v. Superior Court of Pinal County, 540 P.2d

658, 662 (Ariz. 1975); State ex rel Corbin v. Weaver, 680 P.2d 833, 840 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1984). This Court will not recognize an Arizona common law privilege without some

indication that Arizona courts would adopt the privilege, and Defendant has provided no

reason to conclude that Arizona courts will extend the privilege beyond the hospital context.

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s discovery are overruled.

DATED this 27th day of June, 2006.

Case 2:06-cv-00281-DGC Document 51 Filed 06/27/06 Page 4 of 4