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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 13, 2001 Decided June 26, 2001

No. 00-5070

Augustine David Henderson,

Appellant

v.

Roger A. Kennedy, et al.,

Appellees

Consolidated with

No. 00-5071

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(95cv00850)

(95cv01081)

James M. Henderson, Sr. argued the cause and filed the

briefs for appellant.

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Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Wilma

A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R.

Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: Henderson, Randolph, and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs Henderson and Phillips

allege that they are evangelical Christians. They want to sell

t-shirts on the National Mall--a practice presently prohibited

by a regulation of the National Park Service. Initially they

claimed that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment

guaranteed them this right. When we ruled against that

claim in another case, they amended their complaints to add,

among other claims, causes of action based on the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act and the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause. For the reasons that follow,

we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in

favor of the government.

I.

The Park Service's regulation, promulgated in 1995, flatly

prohibits the sale of goods in designated sections of the

National Mall such as the areas immediately surrounding the

Lincoln Memorial and the Washington Monument. 36 C.F.R.

s 7.96(k)(2). In other Mall areas, during "special events or

demonstrations," the sale of "books, newspapers, leaflets,

pamphlets, buttons and bumper stickers" is permitted. Id.

Before this regulation, t-shirts could be sold in conjunction

with demonstrations or special events. But "excessive commercialism" had "degraded aesthetic values" and converted

much of the Mall area into a "flea market." National Capital

Region Parks; Sales, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,855, 25,857 (May 18,

1994). The Park Service therefore decided to ban certain

commercial transactions from the Mall, including the sale of

t-shirts. National Capital Region Parks; Special Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,639 (Apr. 8, 1995).

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Lawsuits challenging the regulation included one brought

by seven non-profit organizations that had been selling

t-shirts on the Mall, and separate pro se complaints by

Henderson and Phillips. See Friends of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial v. Kennedy, 899 F. Supp. 680 (D.D.C. 1995)

("Friends I"), rev'd, 116 F.3d 495 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Friends

II"), on remand, 984 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1997) ("Friends

III"), rev'd sub nom. Henderson v. Stanton, 172 F.3d 919

(table), 1998 WL 886989 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion) ("Henderson III"); Henderson III, on remand, 76

F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 1999) ("Henderson IV").1 The suits

alleged that the ban on the sale of t-shirts abridged the

freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment.

The International Society of Krishna Consciousness

(ISKCON) also brought an action claiming, among other

things, that an earlier Park Service regulation violated the

First Amendment to the extent that it prohibited the sale of

audio tapes and religious beads on the Mall. Our decision,

rendered in August 1995, sustained the regulation's ban on

the sale of beads and audio tapes. ISKCON of Potomac, Inc.

v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, the

district court later granted summary judgment in favor of the

non-profit organizations. Friends I, 899 F. Supp. at 688.

The district court reasoned that message-bearing t-shirts

were "a unique and especially effective means" of communicating a viewpoint, id. at 684, and that the Park Service's

allowing other forms of commercial activity on the Mall

undercut the rationale of its ban. Id. at 686. We reversed,

holding that the case was controlled by ISKCON, and that

the regulation did not violate the First Amendment. Friends

II, 116 F.3d 495.

After Friends II, counsel for Henderson and Phillips entered an appearance, and moved for leave to file an amended

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1 Henderson I, Henderson v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.

1991), and Henderson II, Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.3d 1179 (D.C.

Cir. 1992), challenged different provisions of an earlier version of

the same regulation, and are not relevant here.

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complaint, seeking to add equal protection claims and claims

under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and

the Administrative Procedure Act. Friends III, 984 F. Supp.

at 20. The district court initially granted leave to amend, but

reconsidered, and denied leave on the ground that the amendments would be futile in light of Friends II. Id. In

Henderson III, an unpublished opinion, we reversed because

the court had not explained its holding. 172 F.3d 919 (table).

Henderson and Phillips then amended their complaints to

add the new causes of action and to allege that they "hold[ ]

the sincere religious belief that [they are] obliged by the

Great Commission to preach the good news, the gospel, of

salvation through Jesus Christ to the whole world." The

amended complaints also alleged that they have "a religious

vocation to communicate by all available means the message

of the Gospel." As part of their religious "outreaches" on the

National Mall, both had sold t-shirts in the past, and both

want to continue doing so. To that end, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The government moved to dismiss

or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Both sides

submitted declarations in support of their pleadings. The

district court, apparently treating the government's motion as

one for summary judgment, granted it. Henderson IV, 76

F. Supp. 2d at 16.

II.

A.

We begin with plaintiffs' claims that the regulation's ban on

selling t-shirts on the Mall violates their rights under the

Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C.

s 2000bb et seq. Congress enacted RFRA in response to

Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The

Smith Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment--"Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting

the free exercise" of religion--did not exempt individuals

from complying with "neutral, generally applicable" laws,

even if the laws substantially burdened religious exercise.

494 U.S. at 881. In RFRA Congress sought to overturn the

Smith decision by restoring the test set forth in Sherbert v.

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Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), as the standard for Free Exercise challenges to laws of general applicability. See City of

Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1997); Michael W.

McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of

City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 157 (1997).

Under Sherbert, the question had been whether the law

"substantially burdened" a religious practice and, if so, whether the burden was justified by a compelling governmental

interest. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

RFRA incorporated the "substantial burden" standard. It

prohibited any "branch, department, agency, instrumentality,

[or] official" of a state or federal government or "other

persons acting under color of law" from "substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion" unless the government demonstrated that the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a

compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that ... interest." 42 U.S.C.

s 2000bb-1. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137,

144 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

City of Boerne struck down the portion of RFRA regulating state and local governments because Congress had exceeded its power under s 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

521 U.S. 507. RFRA was not "remedial, preventive legislation." Id. at 532. It did not enforce the Free Exercise

Clause. Id. at 519, 532. Instead Congress had attempted to

alter the Supreme Court's interpretation of that constitutional

provision.

An initial question in light of City of Boerne is whether the

remainder of RFRA--the portion applicable to the federal

government (and not enacted pursuant to the s 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment)--survives the Court's decision. If

severance of the invalid part of a statute results in legislation

that it is evident Congress would not have enacted, then the

entire statute should be considered invalid. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1987); United

States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 23 (1960). We mentioned this

issue at oral argument, but the government failed to argue

the point in its brief. And so we will leave to another day the

question whether RFRA is severable, as the Eighth and

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Tenth Circuits believe. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d

950, 959 (10th Cir. 2001); In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 858-59

(8th Cir. 1998).

As to the validity of the regulation under RFRA, we start

with the proposition that the regulation is neutral; it is

generally applicable and it does not discriminate among viewpoints. Our decision in ISKCON settled as much. 61 F.3d at

957-58. Under RFRA, then, the question is: does the ban on

selling t-shirts on the Mall "substantially burden" plaintiffs'

exercise of their religion? The answer is clearly no. We are

not aware of any religious group that has as one of its tenets

selling t-shirts on the National Mall, even if the t-shirts bear

a religious message. Plaintiffs do not claim to belong to any

such group, nor do they allege that selling t-shirts in that

particular area of the District of Columbia is central to the

exercise of their religion. In their identical declarations,

submitted in opposition to summary judgment, Henderson

and Phillips stated only that they "hold the sincere religious

belief that [they] are obligated by the Great Commission to

preach the good news, the gospel, of salvation through Jesus

Christ to the whole world ... by all available means...."

With respect to t-shirts, they stated that in "obedience to

[their] vocation, [they] have distributed at a price publications

and t-shirts that [they have] written or designed, or containing content that conforms with [their] beliefs, because the

preparation of these materials requires money; [their] vocation includes the distribution of such materials for an amount

that covers the cost to create them and to enable [them] to

carry out [their] vocation."

Given these representations, plaintiffs cannot claim that the

regulation forces them to engage in conduct that their religion forbids or that it prevents them from engaging in

conduct their religion requires. See Goodall by Goodall v.

Stafford Country Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172-73 (4th Cir.

1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1995);

Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

Their declarations do not suggest that their religious beliefs

demand that they sell t-shirts in every place human beings

occupy or congregate. There is no indication that they have

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followed--or attempted to follow--any such practice. If they

had, there is no doubt that they would have come in conflict

with a host of federal, state and local restrictions on commercial activities in many areas, including for instance the interiors of government buildings open to the public. Nor does the

regulation "significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of [Henderson's or

Phillips's] individual beliefs." Wener v. McCotter, 49 F.3d

1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs have not treated selling

t-shirts on the Mall as rising to that level of significance in

their religion. Further, plaintiffs have merely alleged that it

is their vocation to spread the gospel by "all available means."

Because the Park Service's ban on sales on the Mall is at

most a restriction on one of a multitude of means, it is not a

substantial burden on their vocation. Plaintiffs can still

distribute t-shirts for free on the Mall, or sell them on streets

surrounding the Mall. See Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817 (8th

Cir. 1997) (considering alternatives in determining whether

burden was "substantial"); Bryant, 46 F.3d 948 (no "substantial burden" where alternatives were available).

We acknowledge that the Seventh Circuit, in a pre-Boerne

state prison case arising under RFRA, listed among the tests

for determining whether there is a substantial burden on the

exercise of religion the question whether the governmental

restriction forced "adherents of a religion to refrain from

religiously motivated conduct," Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d

1175, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d

68, 70 (8th Cir. 1994)).2 We are not applying that standard

for several reasons. First, plaintiffs did not advocate it.

Second, our opinion in Branch Ministries relied on a narrow-

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2 The full text of the court's holding is as follows:

We hold, therefore, that a substantial burden on the free

exercise of religion, within the meaning of the Act, is one that

forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that

manifests a central tenet of a person's religious beliefs, or

compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.

Mack, 80 F.3d at 1179.

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er test. 211 F.3d at 142. To our court, "substantial burden"

in RFRA is what the Supreme Court had in mind in its preSmith opinion in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of

Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1990): the proper free

exercise inquiry was whether "the government has placed a

substantial burden on the observation of a central religious

belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden." The idea that a restriction

on religiously motivated conduct requires a compelling governmental interest is inconsistent with the formulation just

quoted. One can conceive of many activities that are not

central or even important to a religion, but nevertheless

might be religiously motivated. In fact it is hard to think of

any conduct that could not potentially qualify as religiously

motivated by someone's lights. To make religious motivation

the critical focus is, in our view, to read out of RFRA the

condition that only substantial burdens on the exercise of

religion trigger the compelling interest requirement. Despite

the language we have quoted from the Mack opinion, see

supra note 2, we do not think this is what the Seventh Circuit

intended. Later in its opinion, the court of appeals indicated

that under its test courts must "separate center from periphery in religious observances," that only practices that are

"important" (if not central) to the religion qualify, and that

the "proper and feasible question for the court is simply

whether the practices in question are important to the votaries of the religion...." 80 F.3d at 1179-80.

B.

Plaintiffs also mount an equal protection attack on the

t-shirt sales ban. They argue that the Park Service has not

applied its regulations equally because there have been demonstrations in which--they allege--t-shirts were sold on the

Mall without the Park Service taking action against the

vendors. The contention is, in essence, one of selective

enforcement, a claim plaintiffs have not come close to making

out.

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The Park Service submitted the declaration of Richard

Merryman, Chief of the Division of Park Programs, National

Capital Parks-Central, who explained that the Service "seeks

to monitor the activities of permittees on parkland to ensure

permit and regulatory compliance.... Whenever violations

are discovered ... action is taken to ensure compliance with

permits and regulations." Plaintiffs presented nothing in

rebuttal. Even if there had been lapses in enforcement,

there was no indication that these were attributable to impermissible discrimination. Plaintiffs, in short, failed to adduce

admissible evidence showing inconsistent treatment based on

"an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other

arbitrary classification." United States v. Armstrong, 517

U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citing Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 456

(1962)); see also Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85, 92 n.9 (D.C.

Cir. 1995); United States v. Grace, 778 F.2d 818, 822 n.7

(D.C. Cir. 1985).

Plaintiffs also allege an equal protection violation because

the Park Service permits Guest Services, Inc., a concessionaire, to operate a number of facilities on the Mall in which it

sells various items, including food and t-shirts. In Friends II

we rejected an argument, based on these kiosk sales, that "in

areas where the Park Service already allows a certain degree

of commercialism," the First Amendment's Free Speech

Clause requires that it also allow t-shirt sales. 116 F.3d at

498. So here. Plaintiffs have not shown that they are

"similarly situated" to the commercial vendor. See Cleburne

v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1984);

Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corrections v. District of

Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The concessions

at issue are expressly authorized by statute, 16 U.S.C.

ss 5951-5966, they are carefully regulated to ensure that

they do not have a negative impact on the Mall, and they are

"limited only to those facilities and services necessary and

appropriate for the convenience of the public." 60 Fed. Reg.

at 17,647. So far as the record reveals, plaintiffs have not

applied to become concessionaires and they have not sought

to meet any of the regulatory requirements governing concessionaires. Id.

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In essence, plaintiffs ask us to hold that equal protection

requires the Park Service to ban t-shirt sales by all possible

vendors, or by none. However, "[i]t is not a requirement of

equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated

or none at all." Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336

U.S. 106, 110 (1949). Congress has decided that some concessions may be appropriate to serve park visitors, and the Park

Service has adopted a reasonable scheme to accomplish that

end while preserving the aesthetic integrity of the National

Mall. The classification of which plaintiffs complain "does not

contain the kind of discrimination against which the Equal

Protection Clause affords protection." Id. The district court

rightly held that they had not made out a colorable equal

protection claim.

C.

Plaintiffs also attempted to raise several First Amendment

claims. We say "attempted" because it is not clear to us what

arguments plaintiffs were trying to convey. For a few pages

of their brief they characterized themselves as members of

the press entitled to the protection of the freedom of the

press guarantee in the First Amendment. The argument, to

the extent it may be considered as such, goes nowhere. The

Washington Post is no more entitled to sell t-shirts on the

Mall than anyone else. In Friends II and ISKCON, we

applied time, place and manner analysis to determine that the

Park Service's regulation was valid under the First Amendment because it was content neutral, narrowly tailored to

achieve a significant government interest, and left open ample

alternative channels of communication. Friends II, 116 F.3d

at 497; ISKCON, 61 F.3d at 958. Those decisions are

controlling here, regardless of the identity of the prospective

t-shirt sellers.

We also reject plaintiffs' contention that the regulation

should receive some heightened scrutiny because they are

presenting some sort of "hybrid claim" resting on both the

Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause of the

First Amendment. For this argument to prevail, one would

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have to conclude that although the regulation does not violate

the Free Exercise Clause, see Employment Division, 494

U.S. 872, and although they have no viable First Amendment

claim against the regulation, see Friends II, 116 F.3d at 498,

the combination of two untenable claims equals a tenable one.

But in law as in mathematics zero plus zero equals zero.

Plaintiffs appear to recognize as much in their reply brief,

where they admit that their "hybrid claim" "depends for its

success on [plaintiffs] succeeding with either their free speech

or free press claims." At any rate, we have already rejected

the sort of "hybrid claim" they are making here. See

ISKCON, 61 F.3d at 958.

Plaintiffs' remaining arguments have insufficient merit to

warrant discussion. We have considered and rejected each of

them. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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