Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04122/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04122-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH FILED eaJs 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UnltedStatesCourt'!fApp Tenth Clrcuat 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

KELLY GALLAGHER, DONOVAN K. 

GALLAGHER, BARTH ROBINSON, 

GRETCHEN ROBINSON, WILLIAM VAN 

GELDEREN, SUSAN LARSEN, BRAD 

LARSEN, HAROLD WARDELL, and 

MARY C. WARDELL, personally and 

on behalf of two classes of 

similarly situated persons, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

P. CONSTABLE, D. CONSTABLE, 

F.G. MAESTAS, D.R. MAESTAS, CHRIS 

FORNELIUS, KIM SLOAN, RICHARD S. 

ALLEN I JR. I LAURA A. ALLEN I 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

"NEIL YOUNG FREEDOM CONCERT," 

RICK JAMES, Director of the 

Huntsman Center, University 

of Utah, UNITED CONCERTS, INC., 

a corporation, CONTEMPORARY 

SERVICES CORPORATION, a California 

corporation, RICHARD ROES 1-6, 

JANE DOES 1 through 12, and JOHN 

DOES 1 through 12, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

FEB 2 8 1995 

PATRICK FISHER - Clerk 

No. 93-4122 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 

(D.C. No. 91-C-898J) 

Brian M. Barnard (John Pace with him on the briefs), Utah Legal 

Clinic, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

PaulS. Felt (Cameron M. Hancock with him on the brief), Ray, 

Quinney, & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee 

Rick James; Raymond M. Berry, Richard A. Van Wagoner, Snow, 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 1 
Christensen, & Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah, for DefendantAppellee United Concerts, Inc.; Tracy H. Fowler, Campbell, Maack, 

& Sessions, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee 

Contemporary Services Corp. with him on the brief. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, HENRY, Circuit Judge, and DAUGHERTY, 

Senior District Judge.* 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellants challenge the district court's order granting 

summary judgment against them in an action filed pursuant to 42 

u.s.c. § 1983. They assert that, prior to entering an arena on 

the University of Utah campus to attend a concert, they were 

subjected to unreasonable pat-down searches in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment. The district court found that because the 

searches were conducted by employees of a private security 

company, they did not constitute the state action necessary to 

support a Section 1983 claim. 

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same standard as the district court under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c). Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 

(lOth Cir. 1991). Summary judgment is warranted when there is no 

dispute over the material facts such that the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Applied Genetics Int'l. 

Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec .. Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (lOth 

* The Honorable Frederick A. Daugherty, Senior United States 

District Judge for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of 

Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

2 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 2 
Cir. 1990). The court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. 

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of 

the district court. 

I . BACKGROUND 

On March 20, 1991, singer Neil Young performed a concert at 

the John M. Huntsman Center on the University of Utah campus in 

Salt Lake City, Utah. The defendant-appellee United Concerts, 

Inc., promoted the concert and leased the Huntsman Center from the 

University on the evening of the concert. United Concerts hired 

the defendant-appellee Contemporary Services Corp. to provide 

certain security services for the concert. 

United Concerts negotiated the lease of the Huntsman Center 

pursuant to a University operations manual that required sponsors 

of events to offer a discount to University students, faculty, and 

staff and to pay specified rental charges and direct expenses 

incurred by the University. The manual also stated that the 

requirements for "support personnel" for each Huntsman Center 

event, including police and internal security, "shall be 

determined by the Director after consultation with the sponsor of 

the event." Aplt. App. at 268. The manual explained the 

University's obligation to provide security as follows: 

The University Public Safety department shall 

provide, for each JMHC event, qualified personnel for crowd control, building security, 

public safety and fire control, traffic 

control, and any other services at the cost of 

the sponsoring organization. 

3 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 3 
Aplt. App. at 270. 

United Concerts' lease established a base rental charge as 

well as an additional fee calculated as a percentage of gross 

ticket sales up to a maximum amount. The lease stated that United 

Concerts was responsible for costs incurred by the University in 

.Providing certain support personnel for the concert, including 

sound technicians, electricians, and ushers. It also stated that 

United Concerts would pay the University an hourly fee for 

security and police services provided by officers from the 

University's Department of Public Safety. 

Prior to the concert, United Concerts contacted Contemporary 

Services, and the two companies entered into an oral contract 

under which Contemporary Services agreed to provide crowd 

management services for the concert. United Concerts had 

contracted with Contemporary Services to provide similar services 

for other concerts, including several concerts at the Huntsman 

Center at which pat-down searches were performed. The decision to 

hire Contemporary Services for security for the Neil Young concert 

was made by United Concerts personnel and not by University 

officials. However, the lease reflected United Concerts' 

decision, stating that United Concerts would supply and pay crowd 

management personnel and specifically designating Contemporary 

Services as the firm that would provide crowd management. Aplt. 

App. at 263. 

Contemporary Services had previously adopted a written policy 

that provided, "For 'rock', [sic] 'rap' or a 'go-go' concert, we 

will always conduct a full pat down search." Aplt. App. at 286. 

4 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 4 
Contemporary Services' policy described the procedure for conducting these searches and listed the items that were not allowed 

at most events. Prohibited items included bottles, cans, cameras, 

drugs, tape recorders, video cameras, and weapons. Aplt. App. at 

286. Representatives from Contemporary Services indicated that 

the company's practice was to follow this policy unless 

specifically directed to do otherwise by the firm that hired it. 

The defendant-appellee Rick James, in his capacity as Director of 

the Huntsman Center, had previously hired Contemporary Services 

directly to provide security at several events at the Huntsman 

Center. Pat-down searches were not performed at those Universitypromoted events. 

Approximately two weeks before Mr. Young's Huntsman Center 

performance, representatives of United Concerts, Contemporary 

Services, and the University met to discuss arrangements for the 

concert. United Concerts representatives directed Contemporary 

Services personnel to perform the pat-down searches generally 

performed by Contemporary Services at rock concerts. At a meeting 

held approximately two hours before the concert, United Concerts 

representatives discussed the procedures for the pat-down searches 

with Contemporary Services personnel and with University 

officials. According to United Concerts officials, Mr. James was 

present at both meetings. Mr. James acknowledged that he attended 

the meeting on the day of the concert, but did not remember 

attending the earlier meeting. 

On March 20, 1991, outside the Huntsman Center, Contemporary 

Services employees performed pat-down searches of individuals 

5 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 5 
attending the concert. 1 Contemporary Services employees wore 

yellow jackets with the initials "C.S.C." on the front and the 

words "Event Staff" on the back. They sought to discover the 

items specifically barred from the concert by Contemporary 

Services' policy.2 Uniformed officers from the University's Department of Public Safety observed entering concert patrons from 

inside the Huntsman Center, approximately six to ten feet away. 

According to Contemporary Services officials, their employees 

distributed fliers to the concert patrons informing them of the 

items that would not be allowed in the Huntsman Center. 

Contemporary Services officials also indicated that their 

employees informed concert patrons if they did not wish to be 

1 In the district court proceedings, several of the appellants 

presented affidavits stating that the pat-down searches were 

performed by individuals wearing clothing identifying them as 

working for the University and the Huntsman Center. Aplt. App. at 

27, 33. The appellants did not specify the identifying 

information on the clothing. However, at a hearing before the 

district court, appellants' counsel acknowledged that the 

individuals performing the challenged searches wore jackets with 

the initials "C.S.C." on the front and "Event Staff" on the back. 

Aple. App. at 335-36. In addition, appellants' counsel 

acknowledged that Contemporary Services employees conducted all of 

the challenged searches. Id. 

2 One of the appellants stated that the individual performing the 

search "patted down my arms and legs, my groin, my underarms and 

my torso." Aplt. App. at 32. Another appellant stated that she 

was six months pregnant when she attended the concert and that the 

female employee of Contemporary Services who conducted the search 

"patted down my entire stomach at least twice and kept insisting 

that my stomach was 'too hard.'" Aplt. App. at 38. 

It should be noted that, under Utah tort law, a plaintiff may 

recover on a claim for battery if she has been subjected to an 

intentional, unprivileged touching that is harmful or offensive. 

See D.D.Z. v. Molerway Freight Lines, 880 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 

1994); Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 322 n.1 (Utah 1980). 

Whether the pat-down searches constituted battery under Utah law 

is a question not presented for our review. 

6 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 6 
searched they could obtain a refund of the ticket price. However, 

several concert patrons stated that they were never informed of 

this opportunity to obtain a refund. After the concert began, 

Contemporary Services employees assisted University officers with 

security and crowd control inside the building. 

Approximately 8,000 people attended the Neil Young concert at 

the Huntsman Center. After collecting the revenue from ticket 

sales and deducting appropriate amounts for sales taxes, rental 

charges, and direct expenses incurred, the University paid United 

Concerts $112,282.51. The rental charges retained by the 

University totalled $11,500.00. 

The appellants, a group of individuals who attended the Neil 

Young concert and were subjected to pat-down searches before 

entering the Huntsman Center, filed this action alleging that the 

searches violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. They 

named Mr. James, United Concerts, and Contemporary Services as 

defendants. The district court dismissed the appellants' state 

law claims without prejudice and granted summary judgment in favor 

of all the defendants on the Fourth Amendment claims, reasoning 

that the pat-down searches did not constitute state action and 

were not performed under color of law. Invoking the various tests 

for state action, the appellants contend that the district court 

erred in reaching this conclusion. 

II. DISCUSSION 

7 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 7 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides in part: "No State shall ... deprive any person of 

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." That 

language establishes an "essential dichotomy" between governmental 

action, which is subject to scrutiny under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and private conduct, which "'however discriminatory or 

wrongful,'" is not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's 

prohibitions. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 

349 (1974) (quoting Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). 

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence establishes this same distinction: 

only unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by the 

government and its agents are prohibited. United States v. 

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 

787, 796 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

The statute that provides a remedy for constitutional 

violations committed by state officials, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

establishes a similar dichotomy. Under Section 1983, liability 

attaches only to conduct occurring "under color of law." Thus, 

the only proper defendants in a Section 1983 claim are those who 

"'represent [the state] in some capacity, whether they act in 

accordance with their authority or misuse it.'" National 

Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) 

(quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)). Accordingly, 

the conduct that constitutes state action under the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments necessarily constitutes conduct "under color 

of law" pursuant to Section 1983. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 

u.s. 922, 935 (1982). 

8 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 8 
The Supreme Court has identified several principles underlying the constitutional distinction between governmental action 

and private conduct. First, it "preserves an area of individual 

freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial 

power." Id. at 936. Second, it "avoids imposing on the State, 

its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which 

they cannot fairly be blamed." Id. 

Application of the state action doctrine has been characterized as "'one of the more slippery and troublesome areas of 

civil rights litigation.'" International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Air Canada, 727 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1984) 

(per curiam) (quoting Graseck v. Mauceri, 582 F.2d 203, 204 (2d 

Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1129 (1979)). Other 

commentators have found the doctrine to be "the paragon of 

unclarity," Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court. 1966 Term--

Foreword: "State Action." Equal Protection. and California's 

Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 89 (1967), and a "protean 

concept," Thomas P. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. 

L. Rev. 1083, 1085 (1960). The Supreme Court has acknowledged 

that the determination as to whether particular conduct 

constitutes state action "frequently admits of no easy answer." 

Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350. 

The Court has taken a flexible approach to the state action 

doctrine, applying a variety of tests to the facts of each case. 

In some instances, the Court has considered "whether there is a 

sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged 

action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter 

9 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 9 
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at 351. 

The Court has also inquired whether the state has "so far 

insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with the 

private party, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 

725 (1961), that there is a "symbiotic relationship" between them, 

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972). In 

addition, the Court has held that if a private party is "'a 

willful participant in joint activity with the State or its 

agents,'" then state action is present. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & 

Co., 398 u.s. 144, 152 (1970) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 

U.S. 787, 794 (1966)). Finally, the Court has ruled that a 

private entity that exercises "powers traditionally exclusively 

reserved to the State" is engaged in state action. Jackson, 419 

U.S. at 352. See generally 1 Martin A. Schwartz & John E. 

Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses, and Fees, §§ 

5.10 to 5.15 (2d ed. 1991) (explaining various tests for state 

action) . 

Under each of these four tests, "the conduct allegedly 

causing the deprivation of a federal right" must be "fairly 

attributable to the State." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. In order to 

establish state action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights was "caused by the 

exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a 

rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the 

State is responsible." Id. In addition, "the party charged with 

the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a 

state actor." Id. In order to resolve the state action question 

10 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 10 
before us, we will apply these general principles and each of the 

tests articulated by the Supreme Court. 

A. Nexus Test 

Under the nexus test, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 

."there is a sufficiently close nexus" between the government and 

the challenged conduct such that the conduct "may be fairly 

treated as that of the State itself." Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351. 

Under this approach, a state normally can be held responsible for 

a private decision "only when it has exercised coercive power or 

has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or 

covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the 

State." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). The test 

insures that the state will be held liable for constitutional 

violations only if it is responsible for the specific conduct of 

which the plaintiff complains. Id. 

As is the case with all of the various tests for state action, the required inquiry is fact-specific. Nevertheless, the 

Supreme Court has established a number of important general 

principles. First, the existence of governmental regulations, 

standing alone, does not provide the required nexus. Id. at 1004; 

Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350. Similarly, the fact that a private 

entity contracts with the government or receives governmental 

funds or other kinds of governmental assistance does not 

automatically transform the conduct of that entity into state 

action. Rendell-Eaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-42 (1982); San 

Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 

11 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 11 
483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987) ("The Government may subsidize private 

entities without assuming constitutional responsibility for their 

actions."). Finally, under the nexus test, "[m]ere approval of or 

acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not 

sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for those 

initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 

1004-05. 

Blum illustrates the application of the nexus test. There, 

the plaintiffs alleged that decisions made by nursing homes to 

discharge or transfer patients without notice or an opportunity 

for a hearing violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. They named as defendants the Commissioners of 

the New York Department of Social Services and the Department of 

Health. 

The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to 

establish the necessary state action. In reaching that 

conclusion, the Court examined various statutes, regulations, and 

state constitutional provisions that: (1) required nursing home 

physicians to complete state-devised forms concerning patients' 

health; (2) required nursing homes to make all possible efforts to 

transfer patients to appropriate levels of care; (3) authorized 

the state to assess fines against facilities that violated 

applicable regulations; (4) required the state to approve or 

disapprove continued payment of Medicaid benefits to nursing homes 

on the basis of decisions to discharge or transfer particular 

patients; and (5) authorized the New York Legislature to provide 

funds for the care of the needy. The Court concluded that none of 

12 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 12 
these provisions demonstrated that state officials were 

responsible for the decision to discharge or transfer specific 

patients. Id. at 1008. Instead, it reasoned, "Those decisions 

ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties 

according to professional standards that are not established by 

the State." Id. 

In Gilmore v. Salt Lake Community Action Program, 710 F.2d 

632 (lOth Cir. 1983), we applied the nexus test to a due process 

claim brought by a discharged employee of a community action 

agency. Although we found that the agency could fairly be considered a state actor, we concluded that the discharged employee 

had failed to establish state action. We reasoned that there was 

no indication that a state official participated in the decision 

to terminate the plaintiff or that a state policy resulted in the 

decision. Because the decision to discharge the plaintiff was 

made by a private employee without reference to state standards or 

rules, the required nexus was lacking. Id. at 638-39. 

Several other courts of appeals have applied the nexus test 

to alleged constitutional violations arising out of leases of 

government owned facilities. For example, in Wagner v. 

Metropolitan Nashville Airport Auth., 772 F.2d 227 (6th Cir. 

1985), an airline passenger alleged that a baggage search violated 

his Fourth Amendment rights. He sued the municipal authority that 

owned the airport where the search occurred, the airline on which 

he flew (which leased a section of the airport from the airport 

authority), the woman who conducted the search, and the woman's 

employer, a private security company hired by the airline. The 

13 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 13 
plaintiff claimed that the federal regulations that required 

airport operators to present security plans to the Federal 

Aviation Administration established the required nexus. The 

Wagner court rejected this argument, reasoning that under 

applicable regulations the airport was responsible for "overall 

base security operations," but did not regulate the airline 

security program that directly resulted in the search. Id. 

Significantly, the court added that even if the municipal airport 

authority had the authority to regulate, approve, and disapprove 

the private airline's security program, "such a tenuous connection 

would still not rise to the level of significant state 

involvement." Id. 

The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in NBC v. 

Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 1022 (11th 

Cir. 1988). There, the plaintiff broadcasting company filed suit 

to enjoin the defendant union from excluding it from a meeting 

held in a facility leased from a municipality. Like the Sixth 

Circuit in Wagner, the Eleventh Circuit applied the nexus test and 

found no state action, concluding that the city's execution of the 

lease was not sufficient to implicate it in the decision to 

exclude the broadcasting company from the convention. It added 

that there was no indication in the record that city officials had 

actually participated in the challenged decision. 

In contrast, in D'Amario v. Providence Civic Center Auth., 

783 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986), the First Circuit found state action. 

There, a commercial photographer alleged that a policy barring 

photographic equipment from certain performances at the Providence 

14 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 14 
Civic Center, a municipally owned building, violated his First 

Amendment rights. The plaintiff photographer named as defendants 

the Providence Civic Center Authority, a public corporation 

created by the state to operate the Civic Center, and a promotion 

company that leased the Civic Center from the Authority for 

specific events. The defendants argued that because the policy 

barring photographic equipment from the Civic Center was enforced 

only when certain performers demanded its inclusion in their 

contracts with the concert promoter, there was no state action. 

The court rejected this argument, reasoning that although the 

policy arose out of negotiations between two private parties (the 

performer and the promoter), "the enforcement of the 'no camera' 

rule by the Civic Center employees supplies the state involvement 

nexus." Id. at 3. 

The Supreme Court's analysis in Blum, our decision in 

Gilmore, and the decisions of the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits under analogous factual scenarios frame our application of 

the nexus test to this case. Following the reasoning of these 

decisions, we must determine whether there was a sufficiently 

close nexus between University rules, policies, decisions, and 

actions and the pat-down searches outside the Huntsman Center. 

The appellants maintain that the following factors establish 

the requisite nexus: (1) the sections of the Hunstman Center's 

operations manual and the parts of the job description of its 

Executive Director that, according to the appellants, established 

a duty to provide security; (2) the fact that Mr. James was aware 

of the decision to perform pat-down searches; and (3) observation 

15 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 15 
of the pat-down searches by University Department of Public Safety 

officers. These factors are insufficient to establish the 

requisite nexus. 

As to the first factor, appellants rely on the provisions of 

the Huntsman Center's operations manual that stated that officers 

from the University's Department of Public Safety "shall provide 

security" at Huntsman Center events. They also note that the 

University's job description for the Executive Director of the 

Huntsman Center provided that the Director was ultimately 

responsible for final decisions regarding the number of support 

personnel, including security officers, at Huntsman Center events. 

Following Blum, Gilmore, and cases from other circuits 

regarding the leasing of public facilities, we conclude that these 

University rules and policies, standing alone, are simply too 

general to supply the required nexus to the pat-down searches. In 

this regard, it is noteworthy that both the federal regulations 

analyzed by the Sixth Circuit in Wagner and the lease considered 

by the Eleventh Circuit in NBC contained similarly general 

language conferring broad responsibility on the government entity. 

See Wagner, 712 F.2d at 230 (noting that, pursuant to federal 

regulations, the Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority "was 

responsible for overall base security operations"); NBC, 860 F.2d 

at 1024 (quoting section of lease under which the City of Miami 

Beach, as lessor, reserved the right "to control or supervise 

radio, movie and/or television broadcasting or recording and 

transcription rights and equipment"). In spite of this general 

language in the federal regulations in Wagner and in the lease of 

16 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 16 
a public facility in NBC, both courts focused their analysis on 

whether the particular conduct at issue resulted from a government 

policy or decision. Following Wagner and NBC, we conclude that 

the language in the Huntsman Center's operations manual and in the 

Director's job description is not dispositive. 

To be sure, if the appellants could demonstrate that the patdown searches directly resulted from the University's policies 

then the required nexus would be established. However, evidence 

of such a specific causal connection is lacking. In particular, 

it is uncontroverted that the challenged searches were conducted 

pursuant to a policy formulated by Contemporary Services. There 

is no evidence in the record indicating that the University's 

rules and policies influenced the formulation or execution of this 

policy. Indeed, there is nothing in the record that suggests that 

if United Concerts and Mr. Young had decided to hold the concert 

at a privately owned facility in which the University's policies 

and procedures did not apply the pat-down searches would have been 

conducted any differently than they were at the Huntsman Center. 

Therefore, we conclude that the requisite nexus between the 

University's policies and procedures and the pat-down searches is 

absent. Compare United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1228 (9th 

Cir. 1980) (concluding that airport search was part of a national 

security program specifically required by federal regulations); 

United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 1973) (same). 

The remaining factors advanced by the appellants are 

similarly insufficient. As to Mr. James's involvement, the record 

establishes only that sometime prior to the concert he learned 

17 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 17 
that Contemporary Services would conduct the pat-down searches. 

Although there is some dispute in the record as to precisely when 

he learned about the decision to conduct the searches and about 

whether the University's rules and policies gave him the authority 

to prevent the searches from occurring, these disputes are not 

material here. As we have noted, it is well established that a 

state official's mere approval of or acquiescence to the conduct 

of a private party is insufficient to establish the nexus required 

for state action. See. e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 

u.s. at 547; Flagg Bros .. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 

(1978); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357. 

Finally, as to the observation of the searches by uniformed 

officers from the University's Department of Public Safety, we 

note that a number of courts have held that the mere presence of 

police officers does not transform the conduct of private parties 

into state action. See. e.g., Soldal v. County of Cook, 942 F.2d 

1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1991) (en bane), rev'd on other grounds, 113 

S. Ct. 538 (1992); Greco v. Guss, 775 F.2d 161, 168 (7th Cir. 

1985); United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961, 964 (6th Cir. 

1980); Menchaca v. Ch£Ysler Credit CokP., 613 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). The fact that the University 

officers only observed the pat-down searches distinguishes this 

case from D'Arnario, where the employees of a government entity 

actually enforced the challenged rules barring photographic 

equipment from the Providence Civic Center. Here, because 

Contemporary Services employees conducted the pat-down searches 

pursuant to Contemporary Services policies, the observation of 

18 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 18 
these searches by University officers does not supply the required 

nexus. 

Accordingly, because the factors identified by the appellants 

do not establish a sufficiently close nexus between the University 

and the pat-down searches at the Huntsman Center, we hold that the 

nexus test for state action is not satisfied. 

B. Symbiotic Relationship 

State action is also present if the state "has so far 

insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with a 

private party that "it must be recognized as a joint participant 

in the challenged activity." Burton, 365 U.S. at 725. The test 

is based on the Burton Court's analysis, but it was christened in 

Moose Lodge, when the Court referred to "the symbiotic 

relationship between lessor and lessee that was present in 

Burton." 407 U.S at 175. 

In Burton, the Court held that a privately owned restaurant's 

refusal to serve an African-American customer constituted state 

action because the restaurant leased space from a parking garage 

owned by a state agency. The Court reasoned that the state's 

leasing of space to the restaurant conferred a variety of mutual 

benefits on each party. The restaurant obtained tax benefits and 

convenient parking for its customers. Public funds were used for 

building maintenance. In turn, the restaurant was "a physically 

and financially integral and, indeed, indispensable part of the 

State's plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit." 

Burton, 365 U.S. at 723-24. Significantly, because the restaurant 

19 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 19 
claimed that serving African-Americans would injure its business, 

the Burton Court found that "profits earned by discrimination not 

only contribute[d] to, but also [were] indispensable elements in, 

the financial success of a governmental agency." Id. at 724. 

However, the Court was careful to emphasize that its finding of 

state action was not dispositive as to every lease of government 

property. Id. 

Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have read Burton narrowly. 

See generally 1 Schwartz & Kirklin, supra, § 5.11, at 274 ("The 

present Supreme Court . . . has not found state action in any case 

that has relied upon Burton. In each case in which the 

applicability of Burton has arisen, the Court has distinguished 

Burton on its facts as part of its justification for not finding 

state action."). The Court has held that extensive state 

regulation, the receipt of substantial state funds, and the 

performance of important public functions do not necessarily 

establish the kind of symbiotic relationship between the 

government and a private entity that is required for state action. 

See. e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 u.s. at 547 n.29 

(no symbiotic relationship between the federal government and the 

United States Olympic Committee even though the government gave 

the Committee the exclusive right to use the word "Olympic"); 

Blum, 457 u.s. at 1011-12, 1027 (state licensing of nursing homes, 

subsidization of capital and operating costs, and payment of 

medical expenses of ninety percent of patients do not establish 

symbiotic relationship); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842, 846 

(private school receiving ninety percent of its operating budget 

20 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 20 
~ 

i 

from public funds not in symbiotic relationship with the state) ; 

Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358 (no symbiotic relationship between 

utility company and state even though company was heavily 

regulated and enjoyed a partial monopoly and the state approved a 

tariff setting forth challenged method of terminating service) . 

Post-Burton decisions have emphasized the Burton Court's finding 

that the restaurant was an indispensable part of a state project 

and that the state profited from the restaurant's discrimination. 

See, e.g., Rendell-Eaker, 457 U.S. at 842; Vincent v. Trend w. 

Technical CohP., 828 F.2d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 1987); Frazier v. 

Board of Trustees, 765 F.2d 1278, 1287-88 (5th Cir.), modified, 

777 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986) 

In Milo v. Cushing Mun. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1194 (lOth Cir. 

1988), we applied Burton to find that the suspension of the staff 

privileges of two physicians at a municipally owned hospital 

constituted state action. In addition to the hospital, the 

plaintiff physicians named as defendants a private corporation 

that had entered into an agreement to manage the hospital, as well 

as various officials of both the hospital and the corporation. In 

determining whether these defendants were state actors, we noted 

that the city had established a public trust to oversee the 

hospital and that the public trust had then entered into an 

operating agreement with the private corporation. The governing 

board of the hospital trust consisted of three city commissioners 

and two officials from the private corporation. Id. at 1196. A 

bond indenture governed the manner in which the private 

corporation could use revenues generated from operation of the 

21 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 21 
hospital. Id. Citing Burton, we found the state action necessary 

to support the physicians' claims. 

The applicable decisions clearly establish no bright-line 

rule for determining whether a symbiotic relationship exists 

between a government agency and a private entity. Questions as to 

how far the state has insinuated itself into the operations of a 

particular private entity and when, if ever, the operations of a 

private entity become indispensable to the state are matters of 

degree. Nevertheless, in this case, we find no symbiotic 

relationship between United Concerts, Contemporary Services, and 

the University of Utah 

In arguing that such a relationship existed, the appellants 

focus on two factors: (1) the fact that challenged searches 

occurred on University property; and (2) the fact that the 

University profited from Mr. Young's concert. Appellants maintain 

that our decision in Milo and the Fifth Circuit's decision in 

Jatoi v. Hurst-Euless-Bedford Hosp. Auth., 807 F.2d 1214 (5th 

Cir.), opinion modified on denial of rehearing, 819 F.2d 545 (5th 

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988), demonstrate that 

the required symbiotic relationship is present here. 

As we have noted in our discussion of the nexus test, the 

first factor is clearly not sufficient. The fact that certain· 

conduct occurs on public property does not establish state action. 

See, e.g., Wagner, 772 F.2d at 229 ("Contemporary decisions stress 

the necessity of a close nexus between the state and the 

challenged conduct rather than application of a mechanistic 

formula based on business relationships such as the mere leasing 

22 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 22 
of space by the state."); NBC, 860 F.2d at 1027-28. Moreover, in 

the decisions on which the appellants rely, the finding of a 

symbiotic relationship between a government body and a private 

lessee was based on a number of factors not present here. In 

particular, in Milo several officials from the private management 

company sat on the board of the public trust that was responsible 

for overseeing the municipal hospital's operations. Milo, 861 

F.2d at 1196. The private company and the municipal hospital were 

thus functionally intertwined in a way in which the University, 

United Concerts, and Contemporary Services were not. Similarly, 

in Jatoi, in finding a symbiotic relationship between a government 

hospital authority and a private corporation, the Fifth Circuit 

found that the government entity depended upon the private 

management company's successful operation of the hospital to repay 

its bonds and mortgages. Jatoi, 807 F.2d at 1221. Such long-term 

dependence on the operations of a private entity is absent here. 

As to the University's profits from the concert, appellants 

note that the income earned from Mr. Young's concert constituted 

approximately five percent of the total income generated by the 

Huntsman Center during the 1991 fiscal year. They also observe 

that, excluding income from concession sales, novelty sales, and 

parking, approximately nineteen percent of the Huntsman Center's 

total income for 1991 came from concerts promoted by guest 

sponsors such as United Concerts. According to appellants, the 

University also obtained several noneconomic benefits as a direct 

result of the pat-down searches. They maintain that the searches 

enhanced the University's ability "to draw the public to concerts 

23 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 23 
and to seal contracts with popular performers." Aplt. Brief in 

Chief at 35. The appellants also claim that searches assisted 

University officials in enforcing the University policies 

prohibiting alcohol, drugs, and video and tape recorders from the 

Huntsman Center. 

Appellants read Burton and its progeny too broadly. Here, in 

contrast to Burton, the record does not establish that the 

allegedly unconstitutional conduct generated profits that were 

indispensable elements in the University's financial success. The 

economic benefits that the University derived from leasing the 

Huntsman Center are indistinguishable from those that could be 

obtained through contracts generally. See Rendell-Eaker, 457 U.S. 

at 843 (concluding that no symbiotic relationship existed where 

"the school's fiscal relationship with the State [was] not 

different from that of many contractors performing services for 

the government"); Vincent 828 F.2d at 569 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting 

that although private firm "may have been dependent economically 

on its contract with the Air Force," the contract in question "was 

most certainly not an indispensable element in the Air Force's 

financial success"). Payments under government contracts and the 

receipt of government grants and tax benefits are insufficient to 

establish a symbiotic relationship between the government and a 

private entity. See Rendell-Eaker, 457 U.S. at 830; New York City 

Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856, 859 

(2d Cir. 1975); Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593, 595-96 (lOth 

Cir. 1969). Therefore, as to the profits that the University 

24 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 24 
received from the Neil Young concert, the element of 

indispensability is clearly lacking. 

The noneconomic benefits alleged by appellants are similarly 

insufficient to establish the requisite symbiotic relationship. 

The fact that the policies of both United Concerts and the 

Vniversity policies prohibited many of the same items (including 

drugs and recording equipment) does not mean that the two 

entities were functionally intertwined under the Burton standard. 

In certain instances, the pat-down searches performed by 

Contemporary Services employees may have revealed items prohibited 

by University policies, thereby assisting in their enforcement. 

However, this assistance falls far short of the degree of 

indispensability required by Burton and, again, is 

indistinguishable from a variety of benefits that government 

entities generally derive from public contracts. See RendellEaker, 457 U.S. at 843. 

In summary, although the University derived benefits from 

leasing the Huntsman Center to United Concerts and, in some 

instances, may have obtained assistance in the enforcement of its 

policies from pat-down searches of some concert patrons, these 

benefits are insufficient to establish a symbiotic relationship 

between the University, United Concerts, and Contemporary 

Services. Accordingly, the symbiotic relationship test for state 

action has not been satisfied. 

C. Joint Action 

25 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 25 
State action is also present if a private party is a "willful 

participant in joint action with the State or its agents." Dennis 

v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980); see also Adickes, 398 U.S. at 

152. Unlike the symbiotic relationship inquiry undertaken in 

Burton and its progeny, the focus of this test is not on long-term 

interdependence between the state and a private entity. Instead, 

courts examine whether state officials and private parties have 

acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of 

constitutional rights. See. e.g., Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 

1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990); 

Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing Ass'n, 778 F.2d 1068, 1076-80 (5th 

Cir. 1985). Just as with the other tests for state action, the 

mere acquiescence of a state official in the actions of a private 

party is not sufficient. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164 ("This 

Court ... has never held that a State's mere acquiescence in a 

private action converts that action into that of the State."); 

McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 

Educ., 24 F.3d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1994). 

In applying this test, some courts have adopted the 

requirements for establishing a conspiracy under Section 1983. 

These courts conclude that "[a] requirement of the joint action 

charge . . . is that both public and private actors share a 

common, unconstitutional goal." Cunningham v. Seattle Ctr. for 

Mental Health. Inc., 924 F.2d 106, 107 (9th Cir. 1991). Under 

this conspiracy approach, state action may be found if a state 

actor has participated in or influenced the challenged decision or 

action. See. e.g., Malak v. Associated Physicians. Inc., 784 F.2d 

26 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 26 
277, 281-84 (7th Cir. 1986) (reversing grant of summary judgment 

to members of hospital management committee in light of testimony 

that state official participated in allegedly unconstitutional 

employment decision); Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 209-11 

(1st Cir. 1987) (affirming finding that private citizen was a 

state actor because of evidence that he exerted influence over 

police investigation) . 

Other courts applying the joint action test have focused on 

the manner in which the alleged constitutional deprivation is 

effected. These decisions hold that, if there is a "substantial 

degree of cooperative action" between state and private officials, 

Collins, 878 F.2d at 1154, or if there is "overt and significant 

state participation," Hoai v. Vo, 935 F.2d 308, 313 (D.C. Cir. 

1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1578 (1992), in carrying out the 

deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, state action 

is present. Courts have found such cooperative action and overt 

participation in a variety of circumstances. See, e.g., Howerton 

v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding state 

action based on police intervention at "every step" of eviction) ; 

Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding 

bail bondsman to be a state actor because he obtained "significant 

aid" from a police officer in the arrest of the plaintiff); Murray 

v. Wal-Mart. Inc., 874 F.2d 555, 559 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding 

state action when police officer relied on store manager's 

investigation in making arrest instead of conducting independent 

investigation); Sims, 778 F.2d at 1079 (finding state action when 

state racing officials issued order denying privileges in response 

27 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 27 
to request of private party). However, some state involvement is 

too minimal to establish that a private actor and a state official 

have jointly participated in a deprivation of constitutional 

rights. See. e.g., Cobb v. Saturn Land Co., 966 F.2d 1334, 1337 

(lOth Cir. 1992) (holding that filing of a lien statement by a 

court clerk is a ministerial act and does not constitute overt, 

significant assistance in a private party's allegedly 

unconstitutional seizure of property) . 

We have applied the joint action test in several cases 

involving allegations that private citizens acted in concert with 

police officers in making arrests. In both Carey v. Continental 

Airlines Inc., 823 F.2d 1402 (lOth Cir 1987), and Lee v. Town of 

Estes Park, 820 F.2d 1112 (lOth Cir. 1987), we held that citizens 

who made complaints to police officers that resulted in arrests 

were not state actors. We found nothing in the record in either 

case from which we could infer that the allegedly unconstitutional 

arrests "resulted from any concerted action, whether conspiracy, 

prearranged plan, customary procedure, or policy that substituted 

the judgment of a private party for that of the police or allowed 

a private party to exercise state power.'' Carey, 823 F.2d at 

1404. In both cases, the record indicated that the police 

officers had made an independent decision to make the challenged 

arrest. In contrast, in Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores. Inc., 749 F.2d 

1423, 1429 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985), we 

concluded that a store security guard who reported a suspected 

shoplifter to the police was a state actor. We noted that the 

28 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 28 
officer that made the arrest did not make an independent 

investigation but relied on the judgment of the security guard. 

In Coleman v. Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341 (lOth Cir. 1982) (per 

curiam), we applied the joint action test by focusing on the 

manner in which the alleged constitutional deprivation was carried 

out. There, the plaintiff challenged the seizure and sale of his 

property and named as defendants not only state officials but also 

the wrecking company that towed his truck and subsequently sold 

it. We found the company to be a state actor because it had 

"jointly participated in seizing the truck by towing it away" and 

because the company's sale of the plaintiff's property was "an 

integral part of the deprivation." Id. at 1345. 

In the instant case, the appellants contend that several 

factors indicate that United Concerts and Contemporary Services 

acted in concert with University officials in conducting the patdown searches such that they should be considered state actors 

under the joint action test. First, appellants focus on the 

University policies and regulations that gave Mr. James, as 

director of the Huntsman Center, broad authority over security for 

the facility. Second, appellants maintain that the University, 

United Concerts, and Contemporary Services shared a common aim: 

"to produce a musical concert from which each would benefit 

financially." Aplt. Brief in Chief at 40. 

Neither of these factors supports a finding of state action 

under the joint action test. As we have noted in discussing the 

requirements of the nexus test, the University's policies 

regarding the Huntsman Center established general obligations to 

29 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 29 
provide security and various support services at events but were 

silent as to the kind of security provided by lessees such as 

United Concerts. This silence establishes no more than the 

University's acquiescence in the practices of the parties that 

leased the Huntsman Center and is insufficient to establish state 

action under the joint action test. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 

157; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352; McKeesport, 24 F.3d at 524. 

Similarly, the fact that the University, United Concerts, and 

Contemporary Services arguably shared the common goal of producing 

a profitable music concert does not establish the necessary degree 

of concerted action. Under this approach, state and private 

entities must share a specific goal to violate the plaintiff's 

constitutional rights by engaging in a particular course of 

action. See Cunningham, 924 F.2d at 108. The record here 

contains no evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude 

that the University shared with United Concerts and Contemporary 

Services the common goal of performing pat-down searches on 

concert patrons. As noted, the searches were conducted pursuant 

to a policy adopted by Contemporary Services and approved for the 

Neil Young concert by United Concerts. There is no indication in 

the record that the decision to follow this policy of conducting 

pat-down searches was influenced in any way by Mr. James or any 

other University official. Appellants have also failed to 

identify any evidence in the record that suggests that University 

officials played any role in United Concerts' decision to hire 

Contemporary Services to provide security for the concert. 

30 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 30 
Moreover, just as under the nexus test, the fact that 

officers from the University's Department of Public Safety 

observed the searches is not sufficient to establish state action. 

"[T]he mere presence of police at the scene of a private act ... 

in which they do not participate does not transform the private 

act into a public one." Soldal, 942 F.2d at 1075. Accord Greco, 

771 F.2d at 168. Generally, in instances in which courts have 

found state action based on concerted action between police 

officers and private parties, the police have substantially 

assisted in the allegedly wrongful conduct. See, e.g., Pantazes, 

810 F.2d at 429; Howerton, 708 F.2d at 385. Here, there is no 

indication that the officers from the University Department of 

Public Safety provided assistance to the Contemporary Services 

employees conducting the pat-down searches outside the Huntsman 

Center. 

The appellants' reliance on Jones v. Gutschenritter, 909 F.2d 

1208 (8th Cir. 1990) is unavailing. There, the Eighth Circuit 

reversed a district court's directed verdict in favor of a utility 

company employee and a police officer, finding sufficient evidence 

of joint action to warrant consideration of the plaintiff's 

constitutional claims by a jury. In Jones, the plaintiff 

presented evidence that, at the specific request of the utility 

company employee, a police officer accompanied him to the 

plaintiff's apartment to disconnect the plaintiff's electricity. 

The plaintiff also testified that he did not attempt to interfere 

because he was fearful of the police officer. In contrast, in 

this case the appellants have identified no evidence indicating 

31 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 31 
that the presence of University officers influenced their 

responses to the pat-down searches. In addition, unlike the 

utility company official in Jones, there is no indication that 

United Concerts or Contemporary Services employees requested the 

University officers to observe the searches. Thus, Jones does not 

establish that the pat-down searches constituted state action 

under the joint action test. 

Accordingly, because there is no evidence in the record from 

which a jury could reasonably conclude that University officials 

jointly participated in the pat-down searches at the Huntsman 

Center, we hold that the joint action test is not satisfied. See 

Moore v. City of Paducah, 890 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1989) 

(affirming grant of summary judgment because of insufficient 

evidence to establish joint action between state and private 

entity); Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 435 (7th Cir. 1986) 

(same), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028 (1987); Moore v. Marketplace 

Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1349 (7th Cir. 1985) (same) .3 

3 Appellants also argue that the Supreme Court's decision in 

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988), establishes that the joint 

action test for state action is satisfied here. For several 

reasons, we disagree. 

In West, the Supreme Court concluded that a physician under 

contract to provide medical services to inmates at a state prison 

was a state actor. The Court did not expressly undertake any of 

the four state action inquiries that we have outlined, but instead 

concluded that the physician was "'clothed with the authority of 

state law,'" id. at 55 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 

299, 326 (1941)), and that he was "'a person who may fairly be 

said to be a state actor,'" id. at 55 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 

937). The Court reasoned that "[c]ontracting out prison medical 

care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to 

provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody, and it 

does not deprive the State's prisoners of the means to vindicate 

their Eighth Amendment rights." Id. at 56. 

Here, the appellants maintain that University officials had 

32 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 32 
D. Public Function 

If the state delegates to a private party a function 

"traditionally exclusively reserved to the State," Jackson, 419 

U.S. at 352, then the private party is necessarily a state actor. 

See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2085-87 

(1991); Rendell-Eaker, 457 U.S. at 842; Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011; 

Flagg Bros. 436 U.S. at 155. This test is difficult to satisfy. 

"While many functions have been traditionally performed by 

governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the 

State.'" Flagg Bros. 436 U.S. at 158 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. 

at 356) . 

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has found some functions to 

satisfy this test. These traditional state functions include 

administering elections of public officials, Terry v. Adams, 345 

U.S. 461, 468-70 (1953); the operation of a company-owned town, 

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-09 (1946); and the management 

of a city park, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298-302 (1966). 

the same kind of nondelegable duty to provide security at the 

Huntsman Center. Appellants read West too broadly. Unlike the 

physician in West, the Contemporary Services employees who 

conducted the pat-down searches at the Huntsman Center were not 

carrying out an affirmative constitutional obligation of the 

state. The enforcement of a policy established by a private 

security firm and subject to the approval of a private concert 

promoter is clearly distinguishable from the provision of 

constitutionally required medical care to individuals incarcerated 

by the state. See generally 1 Schwartz & Kirklin, supra, § 5.6, 

at 262 (concluding that the holding of West is based upon "a 

unique coalescing of factors, namely, (1) the provision of 

services, pursuant to state contract, which the state is 

constitutionally obligated to provide, (2) in a state facility, 

(3) to individuals having no other access to those services, and 

(4) under the heavy influence of state authority"). 

33 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 33 
However, the Court has also declined to find an exclusive state 

function in a wide variety of circumstances. See, e.g., Blum, 457 

U.S. at 1011-12 (nursing horne care); Rendell-Eaker, 457 U.S. at 

842 (education of children); Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 161-64 

(enforcement of statutory lien by a private warehouse) . 

Here, the appellants contend that, by safeguarding public 

property, United Concerts and Contemporary Services performed a 

public function such that they should be considered state actors. 

For several reasons, we disagree. Most importantly, appellants' 

characterization of the function performed by United Concerts and 

Contemporary Services is too broad. Planning the searches 

independently and conducting them without the assistance of 

University officials, these two private firms acted pursuant to 

their own policies. Thus, the function here at issue may be more 

accurately described as providing security for a company that 

leases a government-owned facility for an evening. 

We have unearthed no decision that specifically addresses the 

proper characterization of providing security at a building leased 

from a government entity. However, courts considering private 

entities performing analogous tasks have refused to find a 

traditionally exclusive public function. For example, in NBC, the 

Eleventh Circuit concluded that a union leasing a municipally 

owned facility was not a state actor under the public function 

test when it excluded a broadcasting company from one of its 

meetings. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "[s]electing media 

stations to cover a speech has never been an exclusive function of 

the government, nor has constructing and renting space in which to 

34 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 34 
conduct meetings." 860 F.2d at 1026. Similarly, "The courts have 

consistently held that the mere fact that an individual's job 

involves the investigation of crime does not transform him into a 

government actor." United States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 443-44 

(8th Cir. 1994); see also State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614, 620 

(Minn. 1990) (race track security officer not state actor), cert. 

denied, 499 U.S. 906 (1991); United States v. Lima, 424 A.2d 113, 

118-19 (D.C. App. 1980) (store detective not a state actor). 

"This is true even when the government requires that certain 

security measures be taken." Garlock, 19 F.3d at 444; see also 

White v. Scrivner, CokP., 594 F.2d 140, 142-43 (5th Cir. 1979) 

(detaining suspected shoplifter is not an exclusive state 

function). 

Our cases involving citizens' arrests also militate against 

finding an exclusive state function here. In both Carey and Lee 

we found that a citizen making such an arrest was not a state 

actor. Although we did not apply the public function analysis 

directly, our conclusion that private citizens making arrests were 

not state actors because they did not act in concert with state 

officials suggests that the mere performance of security functions 

such as those here at issue is not traditionally an exclusive 

function of the state.4 

4 In support of their contention that conducting the pat-down 

searches constituted a traditional state function, the appellants 

also rely on Citizens to End Animal Suffering & ExPloitation, Inc. 

v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 65, 70-72 (D. 

Mass. 1990). There, the court held that security guards employed 

by a private corporation performed a traditional state function by 

arresting citizens who distributed leaflets on public walkways. 

The arrests occurred on property that the private corporation had 

leased from the City of Boston, and the walkways were encumbered 

35 ' 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 35 
We therefore conclude that conducting the pat-down searches 

did not constitute a traditionally exclusive state function, and 

that, as a result, the public function test for state action is 

not satisfied. 

III. CONCLUSION 

The pat-down searches conducted at the Huntsman Center on 

March 20, 1991 cannot be fairly attributed to the State of Utah 

under any of the tests for state action. Accordingly, we AFFIRM 

the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Mr. 

James, United Concerts, and Contemporary Services. 

by an easement for public access. In finding that the security 

officers were state actors, the Faneuil Hall court noted that the 

public walkways were "similar to public streets, the regulation of 

which is a 'public function.'" Id. at 71. The court reasoned 

that "[b]y prohibiting protesters from assembling in the lanes, 

the Marketplace is deciding who can use the public easement and 

under what circumstances they can use it. Rather than acting as a 

private contractor, therefore, the function performed by the . Marketplace is more akin to that of a policeman." Id. at 71-72. 

Faneuil Hall is distinguishable. In contrast to the Faneuil 

Hall Marketplace, there is no indication in the record here that 

on the evening of March 20, 1991, the Huntsman Center was 

encumbered by a public easement. Unlike the function performed by 

the security guards in Faneuil Hall, the actions of Contemporary 

Service employees in carrying out a privately formulated policy 

pursuant to a contract with a private concert promoter cannot be 

equated with those performed by a policeman. 

36 

Appellate Case: 93-4122 Document: 01019283554 Date Filed: 02/28/1995 Page: 36