Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02146/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02146-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sportlite, Inc., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Genlyte Thomas Group, LLC and DayBrite Lighting, 

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 04-2146-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is the Special Master Thomas G. Watkins’(“Mr. Watkins”

or “Special Master”) Final Report and Recommendation on Claim Construction (Dkt.#131);

Defendants’ Genlyte Thomas Group, LLC and Day-Brite Lighting (“Defendants”)

Objections to Special Master’s Report and Recommendation (Dkt.#101); Plaintiff Sportlite,

Inc.’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Adopt the Report and Recommendation of the Special Master

(Dkt.#103); Plaintiff’s Motion to Dispense With Further Briefing on Motion to Adopt

(Dkt.#105); and Defendants’ Motion to Disallow Compensation to the Special Master and

to Disgorge Fees Paid (Dkt.#106-3). After reviewing the pleadings and holding oral

argument on February 28, 2007, the Court issues the following Order. 

I. Procedural History

On October 12, 2004, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants asserting a claim of patent

infringement against Defendants with respect to United States Patent No. 36,414 (the ‘414

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Patent). (Dkt.#1). On November 16, 2005, upon agreement of the Parties, this Court

appointed Mr. Watkins to act as Special Master pursuant to Rule 53, Fed.R.Civ.P with

respect to the claim construction phase of this litigation. (Dkt.#52). After briefing was

submitted, Mr. Watkins, in conjunction with the Court, held a Markman hearing to address

the relevant claims on February 22, and 23, 2006. (Dkt.#73,74). Although the Court directed

the Special Master to submit the Report and Recommendation regarding the relevant claims

within 30 days of the Markman hearing (Dkt.#52), the Special Master did not submit the

Final Report and Recommendation until September 13, 2006. The Defendants filed their

objections with respect to several aspects of the Report and Recommendation on October 3,

2006. (Dkt.#101). In addition, on October 5, 2006, shortly after learning of pending

disciplinary action against the Special Master before the Arizona State Bar, the Defendants

moved to vacate the reference to the Special Master, strike the Report and Recommendation

as well as disallow and disgorge the Special Master’s fees. (Dkt.#106). In light of the

disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Watkins, which are not related to this litigation, the

Court held a status conference on December 13, 2006. (Dkt.#122). The Court after

reviewing the previously unknown disciplinary proceedings denied the Defendants’ motion

to vacate the reference and strike the Report and Recommendation. (Dkt.#122). However,

the Court took under advisement the Defendants’ request to disallow and disgorge funds paid

to the Special Master arising from his work during the claim construction phase of this

litigation. (Dkt.#106-3). On February 28, 2007, the Court conducted a lengthy oral argument

regarding Defendants’ objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Dkt.#129). The

Court will address the Defendants’ objections and request to disallow and disgorge

compensation now. 

II. Defendants’ Objections to the Special Masters’ Report and Recommendation

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing the Special Master’s Report, this Court reviews de novo all objections

to findings of fact and/or conclusions of law made or recommended by the special master

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See Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(g)(3)&(4). Matters of procedure are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(g)(5). 

The construction of patent terms is a question of law determined by the court.

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 983-84 (Fed.Cir. 1995). “It is a

‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘claims of a patent define the invention to which the

patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312

(Fed.Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). The words of claims “are generally given

their ordinary and customary meaning.” Id. at 1312 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,

Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim

is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at

the time of the invention . . . .” Id. at 1313. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the

art is deemed to read the claim not only in the context of the particular claim in which the

disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.”

Id. In cases where the ordinary meaning of claim language is not readily apparent to a lay

judge, “the courts look to ‘those sources available to the public that show what a person of

skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean.’” Id. at 1314

(quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111,

1116 (Fed.Cir. 2004)). “Those sources include ‘the words of the claims themselves, the

remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning

relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.” Id.

(citation omitted). The court may in its discretion receive extrinsic evidence to aid the court

in coming to a correct conclusion as to the true meaning of language employed in the patent.

Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. “Extrinsic evidence consists of all evidence external to the patent

and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned

treatises.” Id.

B. Analysis 

Defendants raise objections to the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation with

respect to the following claim terms construed by the Special Master: (1) “substantially

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parallel said reflector;” (2) “substantially parallel the fixture;” (3) “lamp support means;” (4)

“reflector means;” and (5) “substantial uniform distribution of light.”

(1) “Substantially Parallel Said Reflector” 

Defendants object to the Special Master’s recommended construction of “substantially

parallel said reflector” appearing in claims one and thirty-seven of the ‘414 Patent.

Originally, when construing these terms the Parties proposed similar interpretations. For

instance, Plaintiff proposed “[t]he lamps are close enough to parallel or generally parallel to

the reflector such that the uniformity of lighting as generally described in the patent is

achieved.” Defendants proposed that the “[t]he lamps largely, but not wholly, follow the

contour of (i.e. parallel) the reflector.” Even though these proposed constructions were not

substantially different, the Special Master proposed a much different construction which

appears to encompass both a “visual” and “textual” construction. For example, with respect

to the “visual” definition, the Special Master concluded in pertinent part:

The appropriate interpretation of “substantially parallel” neither rests on

concepts of geometry nor concepts of parallelism, nor the application of a rule

to a scaled drawing. Instead, the “generally parallel” relationship between a

linear compact fluorescent lamp and a curved reflector represents a visual

relationship which is both defined in terms of what the language means as well

as what is illustrated in the drawings . . . So, in the context of the present case

. . . the “substantially parallel relationship represents an “eyeball” definition

rather than a textual definition.” 

(Report and Recommendation, pp.14-15). 

Perhaps what is most troubling about this visual construction is that it does not appear

to be a construction of the claim terms. In fact, if the Court were to adopt such a “visual” or

“eyeball” definition, the construction would ultimately be left to the jury as a finding of fact

rather than a determination of law made prior to the trial by the Court. Importantly, as noted

above and by the Defendants, claim construction is a matter of law that is to be determined

by the Court. Markman, 52 F.3d at 983-84. Based upon the Special Master’s proposal the

jury would have to identify certain points on Plaintiff’s patented lighting apparatus and

compare with certain points on the accused device. Such a possibility is not consistent with

the purpose of the claim construction portion of this litigation. 

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Similar to the Special Master’s “visual” or “eyeball” definition, the Special Master’s

textual definition of “substantially parallel said reflector” appears to run contrary to settled

claim construction principles. Specifically, the textual definition recommends in pertinent

part:

A compact fluorescent lamp (such as lamp 45 shown in Fig. 15 of the Tickner

patent) is a linear or straight line device that defines one of the two lines to be

compared to evaluate whether the compact fluorescent lamp is substantially

parallel to the sliced reflector.

The curved exposed edge of the sliced reflector (as illustrated in Fig. 15) from

the top of the slice to the bottom of the slice can be thought of as many short,

straight reflector segments joined end to end.

If any one of those numerous straight reflector segments located anywhere

between the top of (sic) the bottom of the reflector slice is “more or less” or

“about” or “generally” parallel to the compact fluorescent lamp, then you may

find that the compact fluorescent lamp is substantially parallel to the reflector.

(Report and Recommendation, p.15). 

As argued by the Defendants, the Special Master’s textual definition appears to

change or broaden the scope claim. The Special Master takes the original claim language

and broadens it to be “substantially parallel any one of those numerous straight reflector

segments located anywhere between the top [or] the bottom of the reflector slice . . . .” As

evidenced by the prosecution history of the ‘414 Patent, the Special Master’s textual

definition appears to run contrary to the inventor’s intent. For instance, in response to an

office action, regarding the relationship between the instant ‘414 Patent and the relevant prior

art, the Schmidt and McNair patents, Mr. Tickner, in describing the relationship between the

reflector and fluorescent lamps stated the “lamps . . . extend outwardly at an angle along a

line generally parallel to the surface of said reflector means . . . ..” (Defendants’ Objections,

Exhibit E, p.2). At no point does the prosecution history of the ‘414 Patent evidence some

type of relationship where only a point on the reflector is parallel or generally parallel the

fluorescent lamps. Thus, given the Special Master’s apparent rejection or failure to consider

the relevant prosecution history and the Special Master’s proposal that may change the scope

of the claim, the Court will not adopt the Special Master’s proposed construction. Rather,

given the Parties close proposals that appear generally to be in line with the intrinsic

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1

Notably, at the oral argument hearing on February 28, 2007, Plaintiff’s counsel

indicated that Plaintiff would not object to adopting Plaintiff’s proposed version, but urged

the Court to adopt the Special Master’s proposal. 

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evidence regarding the construction of “substantially parallel said reflector” the Court, upon

Defendants’ recommendation, adopts Plaintiff’s proposed construction. Thus, “substantially

parallel said reflector” will be construed to mean “[t]he lamps are close enough to parallel

or generally parallel to the reflector.”1

 

(2) “Substantially Parallel the Fixture” 

Defendants raise issue with the Special Master’s alleged failure to address their

indefiniteness argument within the context of “substantially parallel the fixture” appearing

in Claim 37 of the ‘414 Patent. Defendants argue that it cannot be construed because it is

wholly inconsistent with the previous claim term, discussed above, “substantially parallel

said reflector.” However, in reviewing the Report and Recommendation, it does not appear

that the Special Master failed to consider the argument, but rejected Defendants’ argument

based upon his determination that “fixture” could and should be used interchangeably with

“reflector” in Claim 37. Specifically, the Special Master concluded that “the Claim 37 term

“fixture” should be substituted for the Claim 1 term “reflector.” (Report and

Recommendation, p.25). 

Defendants cite extrinsic evidence from the Lighting Handbook from the Illumination

Engineering Society of North America in support of their argument that it is not possible

what Claim 37 contemplates with its language of “the light generating portions extend

outwardly at an angle . . . to substantially parallel the fixture.” According to Defendants, the

Lighting Handbook demonstrates that a “fixture” encompasses “a lamp or lamps and

ballasting,” thus making it impossible for “a lamp [to] parallel a fixture of which it is a part

. . . .” (Defendants’ Objection, p.14). However, the Defendants’ argument and use of

extrinsic evidence ignores the relevant intrinsic evidence that supports the construction of

this claim term. Notably, the language of the claim suggests that the fixtures and the

reflector are one in the same because of the language “outwardly flared fixtures.” Moreover,

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the specification of the ‘414 Patent refers to the terms interchangeably with such language

as “reflector/fixture” (‘414 Patent, Col. 8, l.1) and that the “reflector . . . is a generally

circular bell-shaped or outwardly flared fixture . . .” (‘414 Patent, Col. 8, ll. 8-10). The

specification further distinguishes between the lamps and fixtures by contemplating “lamps

located within the fixture.” (‘414 Patent, Col. 8, ll. 57-63). As such, contrary to the

Defendants’ argument, the intrinsic record reveals that the lamps and the fixtures are not one

in the same, thus providing for the possibility that the lamps can parallel the fixtures.

Therefore, claim 37, consistent with the Special Master’s determination is not indefinite and

can be construed. 

(3) “Reflector Means”

The Special Master, in construing the “reflector means” limitation “ recommends that

it be construed:

as encompassing either a totally reflective reflector, a partially reflective

reflector, as well as a partially light transmissive reflector, with or without

apertures or openings in the reflector itself, where the reflector is capable of

radiating light through or out of the reflector in all directions, including both

laterally and upwardly. 

(Report and Recommendation, p.5). 

Defendants object to this construction because the Special Master’s proposal

erroneously permits the transmission of light through the reflectors due to the existence of

“apertures or openings” within the reflector itself. According to the Defendants, “the Special

Master errs . . . by not recognizing that light passing through such apertures is irrelevant to

defining what the ‘reflector’ itself must be.” (Defendants’ Objections, p.13) (Emphasis

original). 

However, the Defendants’ argument is not well taken as it appears to import an

additional limitation that is not contemplated in the ‘414 Patent claims or specification; that

is, a reflector that is completely reflective despite the existence of “apertures or openings”

that undoubtedly allow for the transmission of light through the reflector. Notably, Claim

One of the ‘414 Patent does not expressly or impliedly separate the existence of the

“apertures or openings” from the scope of the reflector. Rather, the plain language of the

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claim simply contemplates a reflector which encompass all of its characteristics and aspects

such as “apertures and openings.” In other words, the relevant reflectors with their openings

are not somehow separated out so as to exclude the “apertures or openings” from the

reflector’s scope. To accept Defendants’ position would appear to require this Court to

exclude two of the three preferred embodiments disclosed in the ‘414 Patent. For instance,

as noted by the Special Master, the specification of the ‘414 Patent, when describing the

second embodiment disclosed in Figure 9 discusses the existence of open spaces “to permit

the passage of air into the interior of the fixture” and “to permit the passage of heated air

outwardly from the fixture.” (‘414 Patent, Col.8, ll.30-44). In addition, the specification,

when describing Figure 16 of the third embodiment states that the reflector possesses “slots

. . . to permit the passage of heated air outwardly from the reflector . . . .” (‘414 Patent,

Col.9, ll.53-59). Thus, it is clear that the preferred embodiments and specification of the

‘414 Patent contemplate the existence of holes within the reflectors themselves that would

allow for the transmission of light along with the passage of air. To accept Defendants’

proposed construction of “reflector means” the Court would simply have to ignore the

relevant “apertures or openings” within the reflectors. However, to do so would run contrary

to what is already contemplated within the relevant embodiments and thus would potentially

exclude such embodiments as well as add an additional limitation requiring the reflectors to

be completely reflective despite the existence of holes that permit the passage of light. Such

a construction is contrary to Federal Circuit authority. See Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s

Specialities, Inc., 451 F.3d 841, 848 (Fed.Cir. 2006) (“[W]e also should not normally

interpret a claim term to exclude a preferred embodiment.”).

 In addition to the support of the Special Master’s construction of “reflector means”

within the preferred embodiments and specification of the ‘414 Patent, it appears that the

extrinsic record would support the determination that the reflector may allow the

transmission of light through the reflectors themselves. Notably, the Lighting Handbook

from the Illumination Engineering Society of North America, which both Parties placed

heavy reliance on, contemplates the possibility that a “reflection” provides for the possibility

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2

 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 provides as follows:

An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step

for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material,

or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the

corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and

equivalents thereof. 

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of the transmission of light through the reflecting material. (Defendants’ Markman Hearing

Exhibits, Exhibit 39, p.17). While this extrinsic evidence is by no means controlling it is

consistent with the Special Master’s interpretation and the intrinsic record of the ‘414 Patent.

Accordingly, the Court will adopt the Special Masters’ construction of “reflector means.”

(4) “Lamp Support Means” 

Defendants object to the Special Master’s construction of “lamp support means” as

it appears in Claim One of the ‘414 Patent. The relevant language at issue reads in pertinent

part:

lamp support means located within said reflector means at the base end thereof

for supporting a plurality of compact fluorescent lamps substantially equally

angularly displaced about said center line within said reflector means between

the base end and the light-emitting end thereof, said lamp support means

included at least two lamp support surfaces on said lamp support means on

opposite sides thereof and angled toward the base end of said reflector means

for causing compact fluorescent lamps supported thereby to extend outwardly

at an angle from said center line toward the light-emitting end of said reflector

means to substantially parallel said reflector means . . . 

Specifically, Defendants object to the Special Master’s recommendation that the

presumption created by 35 U.S.C. ¶ 112, ¶ 6 (“112/6")2

 due to the use of the word “means”

in combination with “lamp support” is rebutted due to a finding that the claim (Claim One)

recites sufficient structure or material for performing the function. However, in reviewing

the Special Master’s determination, the Court finds that the Special Master’s finding is

without error. 

As noted by the Special Master, the presumption of the application of 112/6 created

by the use of the word “means” in conjunction with a claim term may be rebutted if: (1) the

claim element that uses the word “means” recites no function corresponding to the means,

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As noted by Defendants, the Special Master did not note the function of supporting

the lamps so that they are substantially parallel to the reflector, but the Court finds this

omission to be insignificant as this function falls within the scope of the Special Master’s

construction and rebuttal of the 112/6 presumption. 

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or (2) the claim element also recites sufficient structure or material for performing the

function. Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech, Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed.Cir. 1999) (citation

omitted). In the instant case, the Special Master determined that the latter basis applied to

rebut the 112/6 presumption because the claim recites sufficient structure as the described

structure is capable of performing entirely the recited function. The Special Master made this

determination because the following functions recited in the above language are provided

with the sufficient structure to perform their function: (1) to support a plurality of compact

fluorescent lamps substantially equally angularly displaced about the center line, or the

vertical axis of the fixture and (2) to support the lamps within the reflector between the base

and light-emitting end so that they are substantially parallel to the reflector.3

 

In opposition to the Special Master’s finding, the Defendants argue that is error

because “there is no evidence . . . to demonstrate (and rebut the presumption) that the ‘lamp

support surfaces’ are ‘sufficiently definite’ structure for performing entirely the abovementioned functions.” (Defendants’ Objections, p.11) (Emphasis original). In support of

this argument, Defendants cite that the recited function completely omits any reference as

to how the “lamp support means” “support” the lamps. In addition, Defendants contend that

the Special Master fails to consider how the “lamp support surfaces” support the lamps

“about said centerline.” In other words, and as articulated at oral argument, Defendants

contend that the most basic issue of how the lamps are actually supported, i.e., fastened, is

an open question and is wholly absent from the claim language, thus bringing “lamp support

means” within the scope of 112/6. 

The Defendants’ argument ignores the relevant evidence that this Court may consider

in determining and construing the language of a claim. In determining whether the 112/6

presumption is properly rebutted this Court considers “evidence intrinsic to the patent and

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“It is well established that, in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look

first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the

specification, and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.” Bell Atlantic Network Services,

Inc. v. Covad, 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed.Cir. 2001). 

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any relevant extrinsic evidence so warrant.” Personalized Media Communications, LLC v.

International Trade Com’n, 161 F.3d 696, 704 (Fed.Cir. 1998), see also, Cole v. KimberlyClark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed.Cir. 1996) (noting that whether [112/6] is invoked

involves an analysis of the “patent and the prosecution history,” and consulting a dictionary

definition of “perforation” to understand if one of skill in the art would understand this term

to connote structure). The intrinsic evidence clearly answers the Defendants’ questions

regarding the support to the lamps identified in Claim One.4

 For instance, and as conceded

at oral argument by the Defendants, the specification of the ‘414 Patent defines what would

constitute sufficient “lamp support.” The Special Master noted such in the Report and

Recommendation by stating that “the written description defines the relevant structure itself

as a “lamp support.” (Report and Recommendation, p.9 (citing ‘414 Patent, Col. 4, l. 65)).

In addition, as noted by Plaintiff, the specification identifies that the “compact fluorescent

lamps” include both the lamps and the sockets to support and secure them. (‘414 Patent,

Column 8, Lines 49-52 - “[t]he base end of the fixture is divided into eight equal segments

125/126 to provide a mounting surface or lamp support surface for mounting compact

fluorescent lamps 40/45 on each of the surfaces . . .”). As such, the Defendants’ argument

is not well taken on this point as it fails to consider the relevant intrinsic evidence in

determining the application of the 112/6 presumption raised by the use of “lamp support

means.” Moreover, this intrinsic record also rebuts Defendants’ argument regarding any

alleged inconsistency between the prosecution history of the ‘414 Patent and the

inapplicability of the 112/6 presumption. In fact, it is relevant to note that Mr. Tickner, in

support of his reissued application, provided a declaration to the USPTO that “it was never

[his] intention to define this element using functional language under [112/6] . . .”

(Defendants’ Markman Hearing Exhibits, Exhibit 12, GT 003701). 

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As such, because the Special Master properly applied and rejected the presumption

of 112/6 raised by “lamp support means,” the Court will overrule Defendants’ objections to

the Report and Recommendation in this respect. 

(5) “Substantial Uniform Distribution of Light” 

At oral argument Defendants did not identify the Special Master’s construction of

“substantial uniform distribution of light” of Claim 37 as being in dispute, but did so in their

written objections to the Court. Specifically, the Defendants object to the Special Master’s

conclusion that the terms “encompass[] relatively wide variations in the extremes of

maximum intensity and minimum intensity over wide variations in either lateral or vertical

positions, while at the same time substantially preserving uniformity with respect to

relatively minor positional displacements, either vertical or lateral.” (Report and

Recommendation, p.26). Defendants contend that nothing in the intrinsic record supports

such a construction. (Defendants’ Objections, p.15). However, Defendants’ objection is not

well taken. In fact, it appears that the Special Master’s construction derives directly from the

intrinsic record of the ‘414 Patent. The chart developed by the Special Master on page 26

of the Report and Recommendation setting forth his findings as to light emitting lighting

apparatuses producing the “substantial uniform distribution of light” is based upon Tables

1 and 2 of the ‘414 Patent. Moreover, such numbers relied on by the Special Master in

formulating “max intensity,” “minimum intensity” average intensity” derive directly from

the ‘414 Patent. As such, in reviewing the Special Master’s interpretation and reliance upon

the relevant intrinsic record, the Court finds that the Special Master’s construction is sound

and will overrule Defendants’ objection. 

III. Summary of Objections

The Court will overrule in part and sustain in part the Defendants’ objections to the

Special Master’s Report and Recommendation. Specifically, the Court will sustain

Defendants’ objection to the Special Master’s construction of “substantially parallel said

reflector.” The Court, upon de novo review, finds that the Special Master’s recommendation

does not withstand scrutiny. Accordingly, the Court, upon Defendants’ recommendation,

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will construe the term consistent with the Plaintiff’s original construction. The Court, upon

de novo review, will overrule all other objections filed by the Defendants to the Special

Master’s Report and Recommendation as the construction of such terms is supported by

principles of patent law and claim construction. 

IV. Defendants’ Motion to Disallow Compensation to the Special Master and to

Disgorge Fees Paid.

As referenced at the outset of this Order, the Court has been apprised of some

troubling circumstances surrounding the Special Master’s conduct and current status as a

member of the Arizona State Bar. As such, based upon the Defendants’ request, and the

Court’s obligation to ensure the reasonableness of the Special Master’s requested fee, the

Court will review the Special Master’s conduct in this case. 

 On October 26, 2005, the Court conducted a Scheduling Conference based upon the

Parties’ request to discuss scheduling matters associated with the claim construction phase

of this litigation. At the hearing, the Parties did not object to the appointment of a special

master to assist in this phase to construe the relevant claims. As such, the Court directed the

Parties to meet and confer and jointly submit a list of three “qualified candidates for possible

appointment as special master in this case.” (Dkt.#45). The Parties submitted only Mr.

Watkins as a “qualified candidate” and the Court accepted the Parties’ proposal on November

16, 2005. (Dkt#47). Mr. Watkins’ acted as Special Master in all of the relevant subsequent

claim construction proceedings which included reviewing the Parties’ briefing, conducting

the day and one-half Markman hearing, submitting a proposed Report and Recommendation

and the submission of the Final Report and Recommendation on September 13, 2006.

However, shortly after the Defendants’ Objections, which are addressed above, the

Defendants discovered significant pending disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Watkins

before the Arizona State Bar. (Defendants’ motion to vacate, Dkt.#106). These proceedings

are based upon Mr. Watkins’ conduct involving his representation of a former client, Taser

International, Inc. In fact, unbeknownst to the Court and apparently the Parties, Taser

International, Inc., was involved in civil litigation against Mr. Watkins in Maricopa County

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Superior Court, CV No. 05-0357, asserting claims of breach of fiduciary duty, constructive

fraud and breach of contract arising out Mr. Watkins’ conduct and claim of ownership of a

Taser patent. On September 11, 2006, in the related disciplinary proceeding, an Arizona

State Bar hearing officer recommended that Mr. Watkins’ be disbarred for multiple ethical

violations arising from his representation of Taser, including deception, lack of candor and

fraud and misrepresentation. (Defendants’ motion to vacate, Dkt.#106, Exhibit A).

Importantly, both the civil and disciplinary proceedings were ongoing prior to Mr. Watkins’

acceptance of his appointment as Special Master in this action and Mr. Watkins did not

disclose his involvement in either of the proceedings during the course of the litigation.

Rather, it was not until after the State Bar hearing officer’s recommendation of disbarment

that the Defendants became aware of the issue and disclosed it to the Court through their

Motion to vacate and strike the Report and Recommendation and Motion to disgorge and

disallow the payment of fees to Mr. Watkins. At the Court’s December 13, 2006 status

hearing, the Court denied the Defendants’ Motion to vacate and strike based upon the de

novo standard of review invoked by the Court, the unrelated aspect of the civil litigation and

State Bar proceedings to this litigation and the lack of indication suggesting Mr. Watkins’

expertise in the patent field was lacking. However, the Court took the Defendants’ request

to disgorge and disallow the payment of fees under advisement and will address the request

now. 

Considering the circumstances surrounding Mr. Watkins’ service as Special Master

in this case and complete failure to disclose, at any time, his involvement in litigation and

disciplinary proceedings calling into his question his legal ethical behavior, the Court finds

that it is appropriate to grant the Defendants’ request, in part. Perhaps what is most troubling

is that Mr. Watkins did not disclose his involvement in such proceedings even though such

proceedings commenced prior to his appointment as Special Master in this case. Given the

troubling circumstances surrounding the disciplinary proceedings involving Mr. Watkins’

representation of a client in other patent proceedings it was clearly relevant and material to

his appointment as a “qualified candidate” in this case. Mr. Watkins’ involvement in these

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 The Court relies on the Parties’ representation of the total amount billed, because the

Special Master failed to submit his final invoice to the Court for approval as required by the

Court’s November 21, 2005 order. (Dkt.#52). 

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other proceedings may explain his delay in submitting his Final Report and Recommendation

in this case. The Court’s Markman Scheduling Order called for the Report to be submitted

within 30-days of the conclusion of the Markman Hearing. (Dkt.#52). However, even though

the Markman Hearing concluded on February 23, 2006, Mr. Watkins did not submit the Final

Report and Recommendation until September 13, 2006, nearly seven months after the

Markman Hearing. Considering Mr. Watkins’ lack of candor with the Court and the Parties

regarding his serious ethical troubles and the significant delay in satisfying his obligation as

the Special Master, the Court finds that it is appropriate to reduce Mr. Watkins’ stated fee.

See Cordoza v. Pacific States Steel Corp., 320 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A special

master is a ‘surrogate’ of the court ‘and in that sense the service performed is an important

public duty of high order in much the same way as is serving in the Judiciary.’”) (citation

omitted). Based upon the Parties’ representations, Mr. Watkins’ has billed a total of

$63,799.50 for his services in this case.5

 The Court finds, based upon the Special Master’s

conduct, it is appropriate to reduce this amount by 1/2 or 50%, thus reducing Mr. Watkins’

compensation from $63,799.50 to $31,899.75. See Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 259

U.S. 101, 106 (1922) (finding special master’s pay excessive and reducing it). Seeing that

the Plaintiff has already paid its original one-half portion of the Special Master’s stated fee

of $63,799.50, the Court directs the Special Master to remit partial payment to reflect

Plaintiff’s one-half obligation of the reduced amount of $31,899.75. In addition, as

Defendants have only submitted partial payment, Defendants are directed to satisfy their onehalf obligation of this reduced amount. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED adopting in part the Special Master’s Report and

Recommendation as the Order of the Court. (Dkt.#131).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED sustaining in part and overruling in part Defendants’

objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Dkt.#101). Defendants’ objections are

sustained with respect to “substantially parallel said reflector.” Defendants other objections

are overruled. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s Motion

to Adopt the Report and Recommendation. (Dkt.#103)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Dispense with Further

Briefing on Motion to Adopt. (Dkt.#105). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendants’

Motion to Disallow Compensation to the Special Master and to Disgorge Fees Paid

(Dkt.#106-3). The Special Master’s total fee is reduced by 1/2 or 50% to $31,899.75. The

Special Master is ordered to remit payment to Plaintiff in the next fourteen (14) business days

reflecting the Plaintiff’s one-half obligation of this reduced fee. The Defendants shall

complete payment of the new reduced fee within the same time period. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED setting this matter for a status hearing on August 20,

2007 at 2:00 p.m. to discuss future proceedings in this litigation. 

DATED this 6th day of August, 2007.

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