Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02302/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02302-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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1 “Doc.” refers to the document number in the related criminal matter, CR

02-0155-PHX-JAT, unless otherwise noted.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

John Derrick Martin, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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CV 06-2302-PHX-JAT (BPV)

CR 02-0155-PHX-JAT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On September 26, 2006, John Derrick Martin, (“Movant”), presently confined in the

United States Penitentiary, Coleman, Florida, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence By a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Motion") (Doc.

316)1

. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter an order denying the

Motion.

Ordinarily, a court must conduct a hearing on a motion unless it "and the files and

records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief ...." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. The Motion, as well as the files and records, do conclusively establish that Martin

is not entitled to relief. See Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1989).

Hence, no hearing is required. 

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2

“RT” refers to the reporter’s transcripts in the related criminal matter, 02-0155-PHXJAT. 

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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 20, 2002, Martin was charged by a grand jury indictment in the District

of Arizona with Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 846, 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(A)(ii) and Attempted Possession with the Intent to

Distribute Cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 841 (a)(1);(b)(1)(A)(ii). (Doc. 1.) 

Ricardo Buelna and Steve Dobson were charged as co-defendants in both counts. (Id.) Prior

to trial, Martin filed a motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants. (Doc. 43.)

The motion was denied. (Doc. 79.) 

On November 25, 2002, all three defendants proceeded to trial. (Doc. 119.) On

December 10, 2002, defendant rested without testifying. (Doc. No. 140, RT2

 12/10/02 at

180) The jury returned with verdicts of guilty as to all defendants on all counts. (Doc.

148-152.) On October 16, 2003, Martin was sentenced to serve the mandatory statutory

minimum sentence of 240 months on Counts 1 and 2, to run concurrently, followed by ten

years supervised release. (Doc. 247.) 

A notice of appeal was filed on October 22, 2003. (Doc 251.) The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision on November 23, 2004 addressing Martin's

argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and affirming the convictions and

sentence. See United States v. John Derrick Martin, et al., 117 Fed. Appx. 509 (9th Cir.

2003) (unpublished disposition) (Doc. 295). The Court of Appeals issued its mandate

affirming the decision of the District Court on September 27, 2005. (Doc. 304) 

Martin, acting pro se, next filed the present § 2255 action. (Doc. 316.) He raises

three grounds for relief. Martin alleges that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel

because: (1) Trial counsel did not file a pretrial motion to suppress the identification

procedure; (2) trial counsel did not file a motion to sever from his co-defendants; and (3) trial

counsel failed to investigate the scene where the crimes occurred. (Doc. 316, p.8-11.)

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Petitioner also renewed his argument that "under the Booker rule his sentence is excessive.

..." (Id., at 11.) 

On October 5, 2006, the District Court called for an answer from the United States

Attorney. (Doc. 320.) The United States filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Vacate,

Set Aside or Correct Sentence on March 28, 2007. (Doc. 347.) On April 11, 2007, the

United States filed a Notice of Filing Affidavit in Support of the Government's Response in

Opposition to Motion to Vacate Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,

along with an affidavit from Martin's trial counsel, James C. Braden. (Doc. 349.) No reply

was filed. 

The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision denying the motion as barred

by the statute of limitations, as recommended by the Magistrate Judge in the first Report and

Recommendation, and, on July 13, 2010, the District Court re-referred this case to the

Magistrate Judge for the preparation of a Report and Recommendation on the merits of the

motion. (CV 06-2302, Doc. 18.) 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Magistrate Judge has reviewed the docket and transcripts prepared in conjunction

with this case. They are adequately and accurately summarized by the United States in the

"Facts" section of Respondent's Response. (Doc. No. 347, at 3-10) It would serve no

additional purpose to summarize those details in this Report and Recommendation, for the

use of District Judge Teilborg, who, "sat through, presided over the trial" and had first hand

observations of the trial attorney in question. (See RT 3/10/03, 4-5) To the extent specific

citations are required to elucidate a specific claim, they will be specifically referenced. 

III. MERITS

Martin raises three grounds for relief, each ground alleging the ineffective assistance

of trial counsel. (Doc. 316.) Martin alleges that trial counsel was ineffective because:

 (1) He failed to file pretrial motions to suppress the identification procedure

utilized by the police to identify Martin as the co-conspirator known by the

nickname “Rabbit.”

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3

The trial testimony of several witnesses was transcribed separately during the course

of the trial. Accordingly, more than one transcript exists for several trial dates. On those

trial dates, the witness’s name is provided for clarity.

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(2) He failed to file a motion to sever Martin from his co-defendants.

(3) He failed to properly investigate the case against the defendant. 

(Id., at 4-5.) 

A. Ground One

In ground one, Martin contends that his trial attorney should have examined Agent

Goodman regarding his previous history with the petitioner, and that this line of questioning

would have enabled counsel to attack the identification of the defendant as “Rabbit” because

the agents asserted they did not recognize the driver of the Suburban, and it would have been

“extremely doubtful these officers would not have recognized the petitioner if he had truly

been the driver of that [S]uburban.” (Doc. 316, at 8.)

The present case was initiated when a confidential informant advised Special Agent

Patrick Campbell, with the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), that

he had received information that Ricardo Buelna was in possession of 10 kilograms of

cocaine that Buelna intended to ship or have transported to his customers in Nashville,

Tennessee. (RT 11/26/02 , at 51.) Working with the confidential informant, Undercover

DEA Task Force Agent Angelo Calderone, agreed to deliver cocaine to co-defendant

Buelna’s customers in Nashville, TN. “Rabbit” was the nickname of the person who was to

receive the shipment of cocaine in Nashville, Tennessee.(RT 11/27/02 [Verdugo] 18-19.)3

 Martin’s identity and involvement as the co-conspirator known as “Rabbit” was

summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:

...during several phone conversations co-defendant Buelna called his customer

“Rabbit” to meet the undercover officer for delivery of the duffel bag, and it

was “Rabbit” who provided the description of the person who would pick up

the bag. The Suburban driven by “Rabbit” the day of the transaction was

registered to John Martin. Three different officers identified Martin both

before and during trial as the man who was driving the Suburban. One of the

cell phones used during the transaction was unlocked using the last four digits

of Martin’s social security number. After seizure of the bag, Buelna and

Martin spoke on the phone, at which time Buelna learned that Dobson was

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Martin’s uncle.

(Doc. 304, p. 4-5.) 

The prosecution presented evidence that Defendant Martin has been known as

“Rabbit” since at least 1993. During a prior law enforcement contact in 1993, Martin stated

that his nickname or street name was “Rabbit.” (RT 12/5/02 [Donegan] 14-15.) Additionally,

defendant Martin admitted to Agent Goodman at the time of his arrest on the current charges

that some people called him “Rabbit.” (RT 12/5/02 [Goodman] 47-48.) 

Martin argues that counsel “could have examined agent Goodman regarding his

previous history with the petitioner especially the 1993 conviction” and that this “would have

enabled counsel to attack the identification of the defendant as ‘[R]abbit’ because the agents

asserted they did not recognize the driver of the [S]uburban and only got his name after a

DMV check and an officer viewing his license photograph.” (Doc. 316, at 8.) Martin seems

to be arguing that, because he had a prior conviction and contact with law enforcement in

1993, and was known by the street name “Rabbit” at that time, the credibility of the three

officers who identified him as the driver of the Suburban but failed to identify him personally

would have been called into question at a suppression hearing. In other words, had he

actually been driving the Suburban, the officers should have recognized him.

Martin’s argument rests on the premise that the three officers who testified in this case

that they viewed Martin in the Suburban, and later identified him as the man who was driving

the Suburban, Agents Goodman, Baggett, and Hardcastle, should have recognized him when

they saw him in the Suburban because of their “previous history” with Martin. It was,

however, Officer Gene Donegan, with the Metro Nashville Police Department, and not any

of the three agents who identified Martin in the present case, who testified that he knew

Martin by his nickname “Rabbit” in 1993. (RT 12/5/02 [Donegan] 13-15.) Officer Donegan

was not involved in the investigation which led to the convictions in the case at hand, and

testified only to the fact that he established Martin’s nickname, in 1993, as “Rabbit.” Martin

alleges no facts that support his contention that Agents Goodman, Baggett, and Hardcastle,

knew, or should have known, Martin’s identity from their “previous history” with him. 

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The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth by

the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. 

Deficient performance requires that counsel’s errors “so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced

a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Defendant must also show prejudice resulting

from deficient performance by counsel. To show prejudice Defendant must demonstrate a

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the

proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Luna v. Cambra, 306

F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002). A reviewing court

can reject a claim based upon a failure to meet either part of the two prong test. See Thomas

v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir.1998); United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1461

(9th Cir. 1994); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

The Magistrate Judge finds that Martin’'s allegations of ineffective assistance of

counsel for failure to are entirely unsupported by the record. Martin has failed to

demonstrate that any of the three agents who identified him in the present case had a

“previous history” with Martin. Moreover, Martin has not alleged any facts suggesting that

a motion to suppress would have been likely to succeed. There is no allegation of any facts

which would support a challenge to the pretrial identification procedure, such as a specific

allegation that the pretrial identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Movant

having failed to support his claim with anything more than vague, conclusory, and inaccurate

statements, the Magistrate Judge recommends that ground one of the motion to vacate be

denied. 

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B. Ground Two

Martin alleges that counsel should have moved prior to trial to sever him from codefendant Dobson, because it is Martin’s belief that “co-defendant Dobson wished to testify

on [Martin’s] behalf but was admonished by counsel not to do so. (Doc. 316, at 8-9.)

Respondent asserts that this claim is factually incorrect because Martin in fact filed

a motion to sever on June 28, 2002. (Doc. 43.) The motion was denied. Respondent argues

that Martin’s claim is thus procedurally defaulted because he did not raise the issue on direct

appeal. 

Respondent’s argument, however, misses the mark for two reasons. First, Martin did

not argue the same grounds for severance to the trial court that he is raising here; that

severance should be granted because his co-defendant refused to give exculpatory testimony

in a joint trial due to a potential for self-incrimination. The basis for Martin’s motion before

the trial court was that the Government would be presenting evidence against a different codefendant, Buelna, that would be hearsay as to the identification of Martin as “Rabbit” and

Martin could not cross-examine him regarding the references to Rabbit if Buelna didn’t

testify. (RT 8/28/02, at 37-40.) Additionally, Martin argued that the bulk of the evidence in

the case was against the co-defendants, and there was very little evidence linking Martin to

the case. (Id.) 

Second, Martin is not asserting in his motion to vacate that the trial court’s denial of

the motion was error; Martin asserts that there was another basis for a motion to sever

altogether, and counsel was ineffective for not raising it. Martin’s claim rests on the mere

assertion that it is his belief that “co-defendant Dobson wished to testify on [Martin’s] behalf

but was admonished by counsel not to do so.” Because this claim is both vague and

conclusory it does not require further consideration by the court. See Shah, 878 F.2d at 1161

(“Mere conclusory allegations do not warrant an evidentiary hearing.”). 

Martin has not established, or even alleged, that Dobson would in fact have testified

if a severance would have been granted, or that the testimony would be favorable to the

moving defendant, a necessary condition for severance. See United States v. Mariscal, 939

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F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1991) (“a moving defendant must show more than that the offered

testimony would benefit him; he must show that the codefendant’s testimony is ‘substantially

exculpatory’ in order to succeed.”). A showing that the testimony would merely contradict

portions of the government’s proof is insufficient. Id. 

It is also not clear from Martin’s claim whether he believed that Dobson was

admonished by Dobson’s counsel, or Martin’s counsel, not to testify. If in fact it was

Dobson’s counsel, this does not support Martin’s claim. If Martin is alleging that it is his

belief that his own counsel advised Dobson not to testify, the claim is vague and conclusory,

as noted above. Martin has not demonstrated why he believes counsel advised Dobson not

to testify, and what evidence supports such a belief. In opposition to Martin’s belief, the

Government has submitted an affidavit from Martin’s trial counsel avowing that, based on

contact with Dobson’s counsel, he determined that Dobson would not testify on Martin’s

behalf. (Doc. 349-1, ¶ 4.) 

To be entitled to relief from counsel’s failure to move for severance, Martin must

show both that the motion would have been granted and that he suffered prejudice as a result

of the unsevered trial. See United States v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 777 F.2d 454, 458 (9th Cir.

1985)(no ineffective assistance of counsel when defendant failed to show severance motion

“could have been granted” and he “suffered prejudice as a result of the unsevered trial”).

Martin has not made any significant showing that his counsel’s failure to file a pretrial

motion for severance of his trial from that of Dobson constituted ineffective assistance.

Martin has made no showing that Dobson would have testified had Dobson and Martin’s

trials been separated, nor has he shown that Dobson’s testimony would have been

substantially exculpatory. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds that Martin has not

established a violation of Strickland based on counsel’s alleged failure to move for severance

and recommends that ground two of the motion to vacate be denied. 

C. Ground Three

Martin asserts in ground three that his counsel was ineffective in not requesting funds

for an investigator. Martin alleges that most of the incriminating witnesses resided in

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Nashville prior to the trial, and if counsel was not going to seek to interview these witnesses

or examine the scene, “he should have applied for funds for an investigator to do so.”

Specifically at issue, Martin asserts, is whether “from the Shoney’s restaurant one can view

the occupants and activities of a vehicle across the street and behind a Kinko’s print shop.

Or, could one in a sedan drive around that Kinko’s parking lot and view upwardly to the

occupant of a Suburban so as to later make a sufficient out of court identification?” (Doc.

316, at 9.) Martin argues that “[p]roper impeachment of the testifying officers regarding

lighting, distance and opportunity to view was essential to an effective defense.” (Id.)

Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 691. This includes a duty to investigate a defendant's "most important defense" and to

"investigate and introduce into evidence records that demonstrate factual innocence, or that

raise sufficient doubt on that question to undermine confidence in the verdict." Bragg v.

Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001), amended on denial of reh’g 253 F.3d 1150 (9th

Cir. 2001)(citations omitted). 

Martin’s suggestion that viewing the scene would have allowed for proper

impeachment is conclusory and speculative. “[I]neffective assistance claims based on a duty

to investigate must be considered in light of the strength of the government's case.” Eggleston

v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir.1986) As noted by the court of appeals, the

evidence implicating Martin as Buelna’s customer in Tennessee was extensive. Buelna

referred to his customer as “Rabbit” and it was “Rabbit” who provided the description of the

person who would pick up the bag. The Suburban driven by “Rabbit” the day of the

transaction was registered to Martin. One of the cell phones used during the transaction was

unlocked using the last four digits of Martin's social security number. After seizure of the

bag, Buelna and Martin spoke on the phone, at which time Buelna learned that Dobson was

Martin's uncle. Additionally, in 1993, Martin had stated to law enforcement officers that his

nickname was “Rabbit” and admitted to Agent Goodman at the time of his arrest on the

current charges that some people called him “Rabbit.” Additionally, Respondent asserts that

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pretrial discovery included a videotape shot by a stationary surveillance vehicle located in

the Shoney’s parking lot, and numerous photographs of the Nashville locations. Martin’s

trial counsel avows that he thoroughly reviewed the disclosure, including the surveillance

videotape and photographs of all relevant locations. (Doc. 349-1, ¶ 7.) Martin fails to

demonstrate how additional examination of the location would have produced any

impeaching evidence. The Magistrate Judge finds that, given the information counsel had

previously obtained through pretrial disclosure, counsel’s failure to conduct further

examination of the scene was not unreasonable. 

Martin does not identify any information that trial counsel had not obtained from law

enforcement reports that he would have gained from interviewing the agents in Tennessee.

There is no evidence that interviewing the witnesses would reveal evidence “demonstrat[ing]

factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt on that question to undermine confidence on

the verdict." In fact, Martin does not even speculate what these interviews would have

produced. 

Martin has not made a persuasive showing that counsel’s failure to investigate was

"unreasonable under prevailing professional standards." The Court is not aware of counsel’s

precise reasons for not requesting interviews of the witness or examining the scene, though

it is clear that counsel had obtained relevant discovery regarding both the witnesses and the

location of the transaction. On this record, however, the Magistrate Judge can conclude that

Martin has not made a sufficient showing of cause to demonstrate ineffective assistance of

counsel for failure to investigate.

Even if the failure to examine the scene or interview witnesses was unreasonable,

Martin has failed to demonstrate prejudice. The test for prejudice with respect to defective

investigations is “whether the noninvestigated evidence was powerful enough to establish

a probability that a reasonable attorney would decide to present it and a probability that such

presentation might undermine the jury verdict.” Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1236-37

(9th Cir. 2010)(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535 (2003)). Martin has not shown that

he was prejudiced as a result of his defense attorney’s failure to interview the law

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enforcement officers or examine the scene. Petitioner has not made any showing that, but

for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the

proceeding would have been different. "[T]he duty to investigate and prepare a defense is

not limitless: it does not necessarily require that every conceivable witness be interviewed."

Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir.1995) (citations and quotations omitted).

Petitioner has not provided evidence that interviewing any of the witnesses in Tennessee

would have revealed information that did not otherwise come to light. See Bragg, 242 F.3d

at 1088 (“A claim of failure to interview a witness cannot establish ineffective assistance

when the person’s account is otherwise fairly known to defense counsel.”). Respondent

asserts that all of the Tennessee witnesses were law enforcement officers. Martin was

provided copies of all law enforcement reports made in connection with the investigation,

and Martin’s counsel thoroughly reviewed the reports. (Doc. 349-1, ¶ 8.) When the record

clearly shows that the lawyer was well-informed, and the defendant fails to state what

additional information would be gained by the discovery he now claims was necessary, an

ineffective assistance claim fails. Eggleston, 798 F.2d at 376. The law enforcement officers

were under no legal obligation to be interviewed by counsel. Martin’s bare assertion that

these witnesses should have been interviewed cannot support an ineffective assistance claim

absent any evidence that these witnesses would have submitted to an interview or how those

interviews would have changed the outcome at trial. 

Finally, Martin cannot establish prejudice from counsel’s failure to examine the scene

because he does assert any facts at all that could have been discovered by viewing the scene,

or how viewing the scene would have effected the outcome of the trial. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds that Martin has not established a violation

of Strickland based on counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and recommends that ground

three of the motion to vacate be denied. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

After careful consideration of the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

and all papers filed in this action, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

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deny Movant's motion.

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation.

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).

 If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir 2003) (en banc).

If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case numbers: CV 06-

2302-PHX-JAT and CR 02-155-PHX-JAT. 

DATED this 15th day of September, 2010.

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