Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01124/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01124-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Julie Ann Chavez, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-01124-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff brought this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

after her application for disability benefits was denied. Doc. 1. The Court reversed 

Defendant’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. Doc. 33. 

 Plaintiff has filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to 

Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”). Doc. 36. The motion is fully briefed and no 

party has requested oral argument. For reasons that follow, the Court will grant the 

motion and award Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $7,278.93. 

 “The EAJA creates a presumption that fees will be awarded to prevailing parties.” 

Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff is a prevailing party 

because this matter was remanded pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act, 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 28; see Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 301 (1993);

Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court should award 

reasonable attorney’s fees under the EAJA unless Defendant shows that her position in 

this case was “substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 

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28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258. A position is substantially 

justified “if it has a reasonable basis in fact and law.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 

552, 566 n.2 (1988). 

 Defendant does not contend that an award of fees in this case would be unjust. 

Nor has she shown that the positions taken in defense of the ALJ’s erroneous decision 

were substantially justified. 

 The Court found that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to identify legally 

sufficient reasons for rejecting limitations assessed by Dr. Rossum, Plaintiff’s treating 

cardiologist. Doc. 33 at 11. Defendant argues that her position was substantially 

justified because “a court could have found that the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Rossum’s 

opinion in this circumstance was appropriate.” Doc. 39 at 6. The opinion of a treating or 

examining physician “can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). The Court found that the ALJ failed to address 

concentration and attention limitations assessed by Dr. Rossum and that this error was not 

harmless because the ALJ did not address these limitations at all. Doc. 33 at 11. Because 

the ALJ failed to address limitations assessed by a treating physician, her decision did not 

comport with the Ninth Circuit’s requirement for rejecting the opinion of a treating or 

examining physician. Defendant’s position cannot be said to have a “reasonable basis in 

law,” and was not substantially justified. 

 Plaintiff’s counsel, Mark Caldwell, has filed an affidavit (Doc. 38) and an 

itemized statement of fees (Doc. 38-1) showing that he worked 39.00 hours on this case. 

Having reviewed the affidavit and the statement of fees, and having considered the 

relevant fee award factors, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429-30 & n.3 (1983), 

the Court finds that the amount of the requested fee award is reasonable. Plaintiff’s 

counsel also requests that the Court order any check to be sent to his office because 

Plaintiff has assigned her right to EAJA fees to him. Doc. 37 at 9. The Court will not 

grant this request, however, because, as Defendant correctly notes, this determination 

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must be made by the Commissioner after confirming that Plaintiff does not owe a debt 

that is subject to offset under the Treasury Offset Program. Doc. 39 at 7-8 (citing Astrue 

v. Ratcliff, 560 U.S. 586, 594 (2010) (“EAJA fees are payable to litigants and are thus 

subject to offset where a litigant has outstanding federal debts.”)). 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. 36) is granted. 

 2. Plaintiff is awarded $7,278.93 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 

 Dated this 29th day of August, 2014. 

Case 2:12-cv-01124-DGC Document 43 Filed 08/29/14 Page 3 of 3