Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00424/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00424-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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SVK

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Davis, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al.

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-0424-PHX-DGC (MEA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Michael Davis brought this civil rights action against various officials of the

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office. Defendants Sergeant Despain, Officer Gilliam, Sergeant

Glee, Officer Grubs, and Officer Hoffine (Defendants) move to dismiss the matter for failure

to state a claim. (Doc. #17.) Specifically, they argue that because Plaintiff failed to allege

in his Complaint that he suffered any physical injury as a result of the alleged conduct of

Defendants, Plaintiff’s claim is precluded under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The motion is fully

briefed. (Doc. ##20, 21.) The Court will deny the motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff alleged that his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

when Gilliam, Glee, Grubbs, and Hoffine falsified disciplinary action reports against him.

(Doc. #1, Ex. A.) Plaintiff further alleged that in response to a falsified disciplinary ticket,

Despain placed Plaintiff on an administrative food-loaf diet and placed certain restrictions

on him. (Id.). 

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II. Constitutional Claims

At all times relevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee. The

inquiry with respect to pretrial detainees is whether the prison conditions amount to

“punishment” without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). “[A] detainee may not be punished prior to an

adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” Id. “There are, however, limits

on the extent to which pretrial detainees may claim that they are being punished in violation

of the fourteenth amendment. The government has ‘legitimate interests that stem from its

need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained.’” Redman v. Co. of San

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440 (9th Cir. 1991). The issue in Bell was whether the conditions

of confinement amounted to punishment; the Court held that they did not. Bell, 441 U.S. at

541. 

“Claims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). “Because pretrial detainees’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

are comparable to prisoners’ rights under the Eighth Amendment, however, we apply the

same standards.” Id. “[A]n institution’s obligation under the Eighth Amendment is at an

end if it furnishes . . . prisoners with adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care,

and personal safety.” Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981); see also

LeMaire v. Maas, 12 F.3d 1444, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993) (a temporary nutraloaf diet does not

deny an inmate the minimal civilized necessities of life).

Moreover, notwithstanding Bell, pretrial detainees are not free to violate jail rules with

impunity. Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1996). But pretrial detainees may

be subjected to disciplinary segregation only if they are provided with a due process hearing

to determine whether they have, in fact, violated a rule. Id. Procedural due process

safeguards in a prison disciplinary hearing require that the defendant receive: (1) written

notice of the charges, no less than twenty-four hours prior to the hearing; (2) a written

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statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary

action; and (3) a limited right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when it

would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals to allow the

defendant to do so. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565-66 (1974).

Once these Wolff procedural protections are followed, the only function of a federal

court is to review the statement of evidence upon which the committee relied in making its

findings to determine if the decision is supported by “some facts.” Hanrahan v. Lane, 747

F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Due process requires simply “that there

be some evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary hearing.” Superintendent

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985). Where an inmate is provided procedural due process

protections, the filing of false disciplinary charges is not actionable under § 1983. Freeman

v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986); Hanrahan, 747 F.2d at 1141; Price v.

Bjelland, 2005 WL 3273557,*3 (D. Ariz. 2005).

III. Motion

A. Parties’ Contentions

Defendants argue that this action should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged

a “physical injury” as an element of his claim. The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides

that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The physical injury “need not be

significant but must be more than de minimis.” Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 627 (9th Cir.

2002). 

Plaintiff responds that as a result of Defendants’ actions, he experienced denial of

various rights, such as clothing, hygiene, and legal calls; and privileges, such as recreations

and library access; and that he was subjected to medical problems, sleep deprivation, and

other conditions. (Doc. #20 at 2.) Defendants argue in their reply that Plaintiff’s Complaint

alleges no injury, let alone a sufficiently serious one. (Doc. #21 at 2.)

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B. Analysis

The term “physical injury” is a term of art particular to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which

provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action for mental or emotional injury without

a prior showing of “physical injury.” Oliver, 289 F.3d at 629. This means that a prisoner

may not obtain compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury if the “physical injury”

is de minimis. Id. But the Ninth Circuit has held that to the extent that a plaintiff has

actionable claims for compensatory, nominal, or punitive damages premised on violations

of constitutional rights, and not on mental or emotional injuries, § 1997 is not a bar to such

claims. Id. at 630. In Oliver, the plaintiff’s complaint sought punitive damages and was

construed to be “consistent with a claim for nominal damages.” Id. at 630 (citing Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (pro se complaints are to be liberally construed)). The

Court determined that even absent physical injury, a prisoner was entitled to seek

compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages premised on violations of his Fourteenth

Amendment rights. Oliver, 289 F.3d at 629-30; see also Cannell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210,

1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (§ 1997 does not apply to First Amendment claims). 

Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff has actionable claims for compensatory, nominal, and

punitive damages based on violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, his claims are not

barred by § 1997e(e). Moreover, Plaintiff does not bring any claims for mental or emotional

injuries; rather, he alleged violations of his constitutional rights and specifically sought

damages. (Doc. #1, Ex. A.) 

The issues raised in the Defendants’ motion may be addressed in a motion for

summary judgment.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #17) is denied.

DATED this 22nd day of April, 2008.

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