Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00716/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00716-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Samuel Antonio Parra, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan; et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 11-716-TUC-JGZ (CRP)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer (Doc. 11)

and Supplement thereto (“Answer, Exh. A-1") (Doc. 14), and Petitioner has filed a Reply

(Doc. 12).

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the

undersigned Magistrate Judge for Report & Recommendation. For the following reasons the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review, dismiss

and deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted in Arizona state court of sexual abuse of

a minor under eighteen, two counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor, molestation

of a child, sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen, and sexual abuse of a minor under

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fifteen, all involving Petitioner’s stepdaughter (the “Victim”). (Answer, Exh. A, pp, 2-3).

As summarized by the appellate court, the evidence at trial established that 

[o]ver a period of years, [Petitioner] engaged in repeated acts of sexual

conduct with his stepdaughter..., who was either fifteen or younger at the time

of the incidents. [Petitioner’s] actions included fondling [the Victim] sexually

in the home when no one else was around, rubbing his genitals on her back,

placing her hand on his genitals, and forcing her to perform an act of oral sex

on him. A final incident occurred one morning when [the Victim] was lying

in bed. [Petitioner] entered her room and rubbed her body under the covers but

over her clothes. He left and then returned a short time later. This time he

reached under the covers and under her clothing; touched her in various places,

including between her legs; and kissed her on the back. When he left the room

the second time, [the Victim] called 911 and reported what he had done. After

an investigation, [Petitioner] was charged with and convicted of multiple

counts of sexual abuse and sexual conduct stemming from these incidents.

(Id. at p. 2). Evidence at trial included testimony from the state’s criminalist about the DNA

analysis she conducted in the case. (See Answer, Exh. A-1 (Doc. 14-1, p.8)). She testified

that certain results were consistent with Petitioner’s or the Victim’s DNA. (Id.). The Victim

was also among the witnesses who testified. (See Answer, Exh. I, p. 7).

Petitioner was sentenced to a total of 37 years of imprisonment. (Answer, Exh. A, p.

2). After his conviction, Petitioner filed a direct appeal raising six ground for relief.

(Answer, p. 2 (citing Exh. A); see also Exh. A-1 (Doc. 14-1)). On March 13, 2008, the

appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id.). 

On April 13, 2007, while Petitioner’s direct appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a

notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR proceeding”) (Answer, p. 2 (citing Exh. F)). The

trial court stayed the notice pending the outcome of Petitioner’s appeal. (Answer, p. 2 (citing

Exh. G)). When the direct appeal had been resolved, the trial count appointed counsel to

represent Petitioner in the PCR proceeding. (Answer, p. 2). Petitioner’s appointed counsel

informed the court that he could find no meritorious issues to raise in the PCR proceeding.

(Answer, pp. 2-3 (citing Exh. I)). Petitioner then filed a timely pro se PCR petition on

November 9, 2009. (Answer, p. 3 (citing Exh. J)). Because there were some delays in

Petitioner receiving some transcripts regarding his claim that the trial court erred in denying

his motion for substitute counsel, the trial court allowed him time to file a supplemental

petition. (Answer, p.3). 

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Respondents state the Habeas Petition appears to be timely. (Answer, p.4). Because

the Habeas Petition appears to be timely and the Court is not required to raise the statute of

limitations sua sponte, the Magistrate Judge will not further address the timeliness of the

Habeas Petition. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006).

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Before Petitioner filed his supplemental petition, the trial court summarily denied

Petitioner’s PCR Petition. (Answer, p.3 (citing Exh. N)). After the ruling, Petitioner filed

two supplemental petitions. (Answer, p. 3). In the first, he supplemented his about the denial

of the motion to substitute trial counsel. (Answer p. 3 (citing Exh. P)). In the second,

Petitioner added claims of ineffective assistance of appellate and PCR counsel. (Answer, p.

3 (citing Exh. R)). 

The trial court, recognizing that it had ruled prematurely, reviewed Petitioner’s first

supplemental petition and denied the claim. (Answer, p.3 (citing Exh. S)). The trial court

did not review the second supplemental petition. (Answer, p. 3). Petitioner filed a motion

for rehearing complaining, inter alia, that the trial court did not review the second

supplemental petition. (Answer, p. 3 (citing Exh. O)). In denying the motion for rehearing,

the trial court addressed and denied Petitioner’s claim raised in his second supplemental

petition that appellate counsel had been ineffective. (Answer, p. 3 (citing Exh. W)). The

trial court did not address Petitioner’s claim that PCR counsel had been ineffective. (Id.).

In his petition for review to the appellate court, Petitioner repeated the claims

advanced in his PCR filings and added that the trial court had erred by ruling on his PCR

petition before receiving his supplemental filings. (Answer, p. 3 (citing Exh. Z)). On

February 15, 2011, the appellate court granted review and denied relief. (Answer, pp. 3-4

(citing Exh. E)).

FEDERAL HABEAS PETITION

On November 14, 2011, Petitioner filed the instant, timely1, Petition raising 15

grounds for relief. Respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed and denied

because: (1) Grounds 1 through 6 were not fairly presented in the state court and, thus, are

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted; and (2) Grounds 7 through 15 are without merit.

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EXHAUSTION

Respondents assert that Grounds 1 through 6 are not exhausted. A state prisoner must

normally exhaust available state remedies before a federal district court can grant a writ of

habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981). To

exhaust, a claim must be fairly presented in the proper forum. In Petitioner’s case, he must

fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing those claims

through the state's direct appeal process or through appropriate post-conviction relief.

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36,

38 (9th Cir.1994). This requirement of exhaustion is designed to give the state an initial

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights. Picard

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).

A claim is fairly presented if the petitioner describes both the operative facts and the

federal legal theory upon which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th

Cir.2003), overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.2007). The

petitioner must have “characterized the claims he raised in state proceedings specifically as

federal claims.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir.2000) (emphasis in original),

as modified, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.2001). “If a petitioner fails to alert the state court to the

fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is unexhausted

regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

830 (9th Cir.1996). “Moreover, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as

due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish

exhaustion.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.1999) (citing Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162–163, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996)).

On direct appeal, Petitioner raised state law issues related to Grounds 1 through 5 of

his Habeas Petition; however he did not present any federal grounds for relief on those

claims. (See Answer, pp. 5-8; Answer, Exh. A-1 (Doc. 14-1, pp. 7-13)). With regard to

Ground 6, Petitioner claims that his rights under the “5th, 6th, and 14th amendment[s]...as to

the due process clause, the confrontation clause, and the equal protection of the laws clause”

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Because these claims are procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule 32.4(a),

Ariz.R.Crim.P., this Court need not determine whether the claims are of “sufficient

constitutional magnitude” to require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. See e.g.

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the procedural timeliness bar of

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were violated when the prosecutor stated in the second closing argument that the Victim

“never made certain statements until after she had met with defense counsel the year of the

trial....” (Petition, p. 11). He argues that the statement was prejudicial. (Id.). In the

Memorandum attached to his Petition, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor’s statement

interfered with his Sixth Amendment right to receive effective assistance of counsel.

(Memorandum, (Doc. 1-1) p. 11). To the extent Petitioner raises due process, confrontation

clause, and equal protection challenges, the record is clear that he did not present the state

court with these claims and, therefore, they are unexhausted. (See Answer, Exh. A-1 (Doc.

14-1, pp. 21-22)). However, Petitioner did argue to the state court that the prosecutor’s

statement interfered with is Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel (see

id.); thus, that aspect of Petitioner’s Ground 6 claim has been exhausted and will be

addressed on the merits.

Petitioner’s return to state court to raise Grounds 1 through 5 and the unexhausted

portion of Ground 6 would be futile given that the claims are precluded as waived under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) because they were not presented on direct appeal or in Petitioner’s

PCR Petition. Further, presentation of such claims in a second post-conviction relief

proceeding would be untimely under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d

975, 987 (9th Cir 2002) (a state post-conviction action is futile when it is time-barred). Nor

do the claims qualify for any of the timeliness exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h).

Thus, any additional petition would be subject to summary dismissal. See State v. Rosario,

195 Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App. 1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432, 897 P.2d

734 (App. 1995); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209 (1998)

(timeliness is a separate inquiry from preclusion). Under such circumstances, the claims are

procedurally defaulted.2 Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir.2007) (“[W]here

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Rule 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P., is clear, consistently applied, and well established. Powell v.

Lambert, 357 F.3d 871 (9th Cir.2004); see e.g., Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 987 P.2d 226 (where

petitioner did not raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d) through (g), the petition could be

summarily dismissed if untimely); Jones, 182 Ariz. at 434, 897 P.2d at 736; see also Wagner

v. Stewart, 2008 WL 169639, *9 (D.Ariz. Jan. 16, 2008).

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a petitioner did not properly exhaust state remedies and ‘the court to which the petitioner

would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would

now find the claims procedurally barred,’ the petitioner's claim is procedurally defaulted.”)

(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 fn. 1 (1991)); Park v. California, 202

F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas review is precluded where petitioner has

not raised his claim in the state courts and the time for doing so has expired). 

 When a petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims, federal habeas review occurs

only in limited circumstances. “A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim

by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.” Martinez v.

Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). “Cause”

requires a showing of “some objective factor” which impeded compliance with a procedural

rule, such as “a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably

available to counsel” or that there was “some interference by officials.” Murray v. Carrier,

477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (internal citations omitted). Prejudice requires “showing, not

merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to

his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in original).

Additionally, a habeas petitioner “may also qualify for relief from his procedural default if

he can show that the procedural default would result in a ‘fundamental miscarriage of

justice.’” Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). This exception to the procedural default rule is limited to habeas

petitioners who can establish that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent[.]” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. See also Murray, 477

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U.S. at 496; Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028. “‘To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness accounts, or critical physical

evidence—that was not presented at trial.’” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Schlup, 513

U.S. at 324).

 Petitioner asserts that any failure to exhaust was the result of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel for failure to raise such claims on appeal. (Reply (Doc. 12), p. 3). To rely

on ineffective assistance of counsel to excuse a procedural default, the claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel for failure to raise the defaulted claims must itself have been fairly

presented to the state court. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451–54 (2000)

(allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel as cause for procedural default “is itself an

independent constitutional claim” and is subject to the same exhaustion requirement as other

habeas claims). Although Plaintiff argued ineffective of appellate counsel during the PCR

proceeding, he did not argue that appellate counsel was ineffective for failure to raise the

federal claims in Grounds 1 through 5 and the defaulted portion of Ground 6. (See Answer,

Exh. S). Moreover, Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice, Frady, 456 U.S. at 170, or a

fundamental miscarriage of justice, Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Petitioner’s procedural default

cannot be excused.

MERITS

As discussed above, Petitioner exhausted a federal claim with regard to a portion of

Ground 6. Additionally, Respondents concede that Petitioner properly exhausted Grounds

7 through 15. (Answer, p. 8). However, Respondents contend that none of these claims

merit relief. 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), the Court may

grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

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of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal questions

resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual questions resolved

by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the

question whether a state court erred in applying the law is a different question from whether

it erred in determining the facts. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006). 

“State-court decisions are measured against...[the Supreme] Court’s precedents, as of

the ‘time the state court renders its decision.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct.

1388, 1399 (2011) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003)). Therefore, to

assess a claim under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established

Federal law,” if any, that governs the claims on habeas review. Habeas relief cannot be

granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional

principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower courts have decided the issue. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000). Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court authority is

binding, circuit precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law is clearly established

and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Additionally, section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the “contrary

to” test and the “unreasonable application” test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th

Cir. 2003). Under the first test, “[a] state-court decision is contrary to... [the Supreme] Court's

clearly established precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth

in [the Supreme Court's] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of...[the Supreme] Court but reaches a different result.”

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141(2005). “Whether a state court’s interpretation of federal

law is contrary to Supreme Court authority...is a question of federal law as to which [the

federal courts]...owe no deference to the state courts.” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929 (emphasis

omitted).

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Under the second test, “[a] state-court decision involves an unreasonable application

of...[the Supreme] Court's clearly established precedents if the state court applies [the

Court's] precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Brown, 544 U.S. at

141. When evaluating whether the state decision amounts to an unreasonable application of

federal law, “[f]ederal courts owe substantial deference to state court interpretations of

federal law....” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929. Further, a federal habeas court can only look to

the record before the state court in reviewing a state court decision under section 2254(d)(1).

Cullen, __ U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct. at 1400 (“If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by

a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of §2254(d)(1) on the

record that was before that state court.”)(footnote omitted); Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S.

649, 652 (2004)(“[W]e have made clear that whether a state court’s decision was

unreasonable must be assessed in light of the record the court had before it.”)(citations

omitted).

Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by the

state court, “the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the

record.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.

2004)(“a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process unless, after

review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but

actually unreasonable.”). In examining the record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court

“must be particularly deferential to our state court colleagues...[M]ere doubt as to the

adequacy of the state court’s findings of fact is insufficient; ‘we must be satisfied that any

appellate court to whom the defect [in the state court’s fact-finding process] is pointed out

would be unreasonable in holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was adequate.’”

Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972 (quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000)(emphasis in original). 

Once the federal court is satisfied that the state court’s fact-finding process was

reasonable, or where the petitioner does not challenge such findings, “the state court’s

findings are dressed in a presumption of correctness....” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000: see also

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28 U.S.C. §2254(c). Thus, factual and credibility determinations by either state trial or

appellate courts are imbued with a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1);

Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082,

1078 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001).

Both section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may apply where the petitioner raises issues of

mixed questions of law and fact. Such questions “receive similarly mixed review; the state

court’s ultimate conclusion is reviewed under section 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual

findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded factual findings under §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1).” Lambert, 393 F.3d at

978.

GROUND 6. In rebutting Petitioner’s closing argument, the prosecutor suggested that the

Victim’s sister, “Samantha’s trial testimony regarding the lengths of time that [Petitioner]

spent in [the Victim’s] bedroom on the morning she called 911 was inconsistent with her

earlier statement to investigators. The prosecutor stated that ‘Samantha didn’t say anything

about the longer time being first or second...until she met with...[Petitioner’s counsel]

earlier this year.” (Answer, Exh. A, p. 10; see also Answer, Exh. A-1 (Doc. 14-1, p. 21)

(quoting RT, 07/14/2007 at pp. 96-97)). When referring to defense counsel, the prosecutor

used his name. (Answer, Exh. A-1 (Doc. 14-1, p. 21)). Defense counsel reserved an

objection and later argued that the nature of the prosecutor’s statement inappropriately

allowed the jury to infer that the defendant’s attorney had “tricked” the Victim. (Id.). “The

[trial] court treated [Petitioner’s] objection as a motion for mistrial and denied it, finding

the comment did not prejudice [Petitioner] and did not imply [Petitioner’s] counsel had

engaged in inappropriate questioning.” (Answer, Exh. A, p. 10). 

On direct appeal, Petitioner claimed the prosecutor’s statement caused unfair

prejudice and “interfered with [Petitioner’s]...Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel.” (Answer, Exh. A-1 (Doc. 14-1), p. 22). The appellate court

rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

The goal of the prosecutor’s comment appears to have been merely to point

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out that Samantha’s statements to the investigating officers were much closer

in time to the incident than her interview or her trial testimony. And during

Samantha’s testimony, both [Petitioner’s] counsel and the prosecutor

specifically referred to what Samantha had said during the interview. The

prosecutor’s comment during closing argument can fairly be regarded as

doing nothing more than pointing out facts relevant to the credibility of

Samantha’s various statements. In any event, to the extent the prosecutor’s

comment may have been improper, [Petitioner] does not explain how it

might have influenced the jury other than to suggest, rather implausibly, that

it appealed “to the fears or passions of the jury.” We conclude that this

isolated comment, which was at worst ambiguous, did not influence the

verdict and therefore the court did not abuse its discretion in denying

[Petitioner’s] motion for mistrial.

(Answer, Exh. A, p. 11). The appellate court’s decision is the last-reasoned opinion on

Petitioner’s claim. 

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor’s comments interfered with his Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner does not explain how this

is so, and the state court did not address Petitioner’s contention. Generally, where, the

state court rejects "a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a federal habeas

court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits..." for AEDPA

purposes unless there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court's decision

is more likely. See Johnson v. Williams, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013);

Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784-785 (2011). Petitioner has provided

no reason to rebut the presumption that the appellate court rejected his federal claim on the

merits.

The “‘Government violates the right to effective assistance when it interferes in

certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to

conduct the defense.’” United States v. Stargell, 738 F.3d 1018, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1989)). Usually such a claim is raised

where the criminal defendant has been prevented from conferring with defense counsel.

See Perry, 488 U.S. 272; United States v. Lucas, 873 F.2d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir.1989). Just

as Petitioner provided no basis as to why the prosecutor’s comment influenced the jury, he

also fails to explain how the comment interfered with his right to effective assistance of

counsel. Clearly, there was no interference with defense counsel’s ability to interview

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Samantha and, as the state court pointed out, defense counsel was permitted to “refer[] to

what Samantha had said during the interview.” (Answer, Exh. A, p. 11). On the instant

record there is no reason to believe that the prosecutor’s comments during rebuttal closing

improperly interfered with Petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel.

Accordingly, the state court’s decision on this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. Nor did the state court’s decision result in

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceeding. Moreover, even if the claim were subject to de novo review, the claim

lacks merit for the same reasons state above. 

GROUNDS 7 THROUGH 15.

NONCOGNIZABLE CLAIMS. In Grounds 7 through 15, Petitioner alleges his due process

rights under the Fifth Amendment were violated. It is the Fourteenth Amendment, not the

Fifth Amendment, that protects a person against deprivations of due process by a state. See

U.S. Const. amend XIV, §1 (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law....”); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002 n.5

(9th Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving

persons of due process, while the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits deprivations

without due process by the several States.”). Because the Fifth Amendment Due Process

Clause does not provide a cognizable ground for relief regarding Petitioner’s state court

conviction, his allegations under the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause must be

dismissed.

STATE COURT’S LAST-REASONED DECISION. Grounds 7 through 15 were raised during the

PCR proceeding. The trial court denied Petitioner’s claims. On review, the appellate court

denied relief stating that Petitioner “fail[ed] to explain how the [trial] court erred in

rejecting [his claims]... and, accordingly, has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the

court abused its discretion in doing so.” (Answer, Exh. Y, p. 3). Additionally, the

appellate court stated that “the trial court correctly rejected [Petitioner’s] claims in

thorough, well-reasoned minute entries and we find no reason to rehash the court’s rulings

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here.” (Id.) (citations omitted). Because the appellate court adopted the trial court’s

rulings, the trial court’s orders denying Petitioner’s PCR Petition, is the last-reasoned state

court decision on this issue. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); State v.

Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993)(“Under Ylst and Coleman

the federal courts will ‘presume that no procedural default has been invoked’ when an

unexplained order leaves in place an earlier decision on the merits. Ylst, 501 U.S. at __, 111

S.Ct. at 2594. We presume that the federal courts will do as the United States Supreme

Court directs and ‘look through’ to the superior court ruling to determine whether the issues

raised in the federal habeas corpus proceeding were resolved in Arizona courts on the

merits or are precluded by procedural default.”).

STANDARD FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. Petitioner’s Grounds 7 through

15 raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court established a

two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To establish that his trial counsel was ineffective under

Strickland, Petitioner must show: (1) that his trial counsel's performance was deficient; and

(2) that trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced petitioner's defense. Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).

 To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that "counsel made errors

so serious...” that “counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688.

The relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the

decisions made by defense counsel were reasonable. Babbit v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170,

1173 (9th Cir. 1998). In considering this factor, counsel is strongly presumed to have

rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit "h[as]

explained that '[r]eview of counsel's performance is highly deferential and there is a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable

representation.'" Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 932 (quoting Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th

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Cir. 1995)). "The reasonableness of counsel's performance is to be evaluated from counsel's

perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and the

standard of review is highly deferential." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381

(1986). Additionally, "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort

be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances

of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at

the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Even where trial counsel's performance is deficient, Petitioner must also establish

prejudice in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To establish

prejudice, Petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694.

Under the prejudice factor, "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable,

does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no

effect on the judgment." Id. at 691. "The likelihood of a different result must be substantial,

not just conceivable." Harrington, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. at 792. Further, because failure

to make the required showing of either deficient performance or prejudice defeats the

claim, the court need not address both factors where one is lacking. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 697-700. 

Additionally, under the AEDPA, the federal court's review of the state court's

decision is subject to another level of deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 689-699

(2002). In order to merit habeas relief, therefore, Petitioner must make the additional

showing that the state court's ruling rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); see also

Cullen, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. at 1403 (federal habeas court's review of state court's decision

on ineffective assistance of counsel claim is "doubly deferential."); Harrington, __U.S. at

__, 131 S.Ct. at 788 ("Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating

unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When §

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3

The diary entry reflected how the Victim “felt about her mother and stepfather [i.e.,

Petitioner].” (Answer, Exh. I, p. 5). The Victim “had written in her diary that

[Petitioner]...had touched her breasts.... in her diary that she had told her mother.” (Id.). The

incident occurred when the Victim was in sixth grade. (Id.).

4

The CPS Letter is addressed to Petitioner and states, in pertinent part:

This letter is to notify you that the CPS investigation involving your family has

been completed. The sexual abuse allegation as to your step-child [name] has

been unsubstantiated and your case has been closed at intake.

(Answer, Exh. K).

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2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The

question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's

deferential standard.").

In Petitioner's case, the trial court cited Strickland when evaluating the claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Answer, Exh. N). The state court, in applying

Strickland, applied the correct law to the issue. See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 484-85

(9th Cir. 2000) (Strickland "is considered in this circuit to be ‘clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) review."). 

CLAIMS REGARDING PRIOR CPS INVESTIGATION AND THE DIARY:GROUNDS 7, 11 & 13.

Many of Petitioner’s claims involve the same set of facts surrounding a CPS

investigation which began when the Victim’s biological father discovered that the Victim’s

diary contained an entry referring to sexual abuse by Petitioner and forwarded a photocopy

of the entry to CPS.3

 (Answer, Exh. N, p. 3 n. 2). CPS investigators interviewed the

Victim who “denied that anything had happened and that the diary entry was hers.” (Id.).

In his PCR Petition, Petitioner cited a 2001 letter from CPS (“CPS Letter”) indicating that

the investigation was closed because allegations that Petitioner sexually abused the Victim

could not be substantiated.4

 (Id.; see also Answer, Exh. K (CPS Letter)). 

Ground 7. Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to interview

witnesses from CPS, and a counselor and psychologist from Counseling and Consultants.

(Petition, (Doc. 1), p. 12). He also argues that counsel was ineffective for failure to review

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a psychologist’s report and failure to obtain a controverting expert in a timely manner.

(Memorandum, (Doc. 1-1), p. 11).

In rejecting this claim, together with Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to investigate the diary which was used against Petitioner at trial, the

trial court stated: 

As best as the Court can make out, the Petitioner claims that Trial Counsel

failed to interview potentially exculpatory witnesses who could have shown

that the Petitioner was investigated by CPS and that CPS determined that the

sexual abuse allegation contained in the Victim’s diary were unfounded, or

alternatively that the handwriting in the diary did not belong to the Victim.

The Petitioner asserts that proof CPS cleared him of any wrongdoing exists

in a letter he received from CPS in 2001. The Court has reviewed the CPS

letter in question and finds that Trial Counsel’s failure to present witness

testimony regarding the CPS investigation, the diary or the letter did not fall

below a reasonable standard of professional competency because the letter

is not clearly exculpatory. The CPS letter cited by the Petitioner states that

sexual abuse allegations regarding the Victim could not be substantiated.

This does not mean, as the Petitioner asserts, that the allegations were

unfounded or invalid. Rather, it means that the investigators could not find

sufficient evidence to corroborate the allegations and so the investigation

was closed. The absence of corroborating evidence at the time of the CPS

investigation does not prove the allegations were untrue, especially if, by the

time of trial additional evidence substantiating the allegations had surfaced.

Moreover, the letter makes no mention of the diary in question. If anything,

the letter bolsters the credibility of the Victim-Witness and the diary entries

adduced as evidence because it shows that the allegations of sexual abuse

against the Petitioner were ongoing and not just an isolated event. Lastly,

even if Trial Counsel’s decision not to introduce the letter or testimony

regarding the diary or the letter was unreasonable, the Petitioner cannot show

that he was prejudiced. The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to

overcome whatever negligible exculpatory effect the letter or witness

testimony regarding the investigation, the diary or the letter would have

created, and thus, the outcome of Petitioner’s trial would not have been

different. Accordingly, the Petitioner is not entitled or relief on these

grounds.

(Answer, Exh. N, pp. 3-4). 

The Supreme Court has held that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520, (2003). Although counsel’s failure to

investigate crucial witnesses may indicate an inadequate investigation, "counsel need not

interview every possible witness to have performed proficiently." Riley v. Payne, 352 F.3d

1313, 1318 (9th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.1983)

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(“[T]he duty to investigate and prepare a defense is not limitless: it does not necessarily

require that every conceivable witness be interviewed or that counsel must pursue []every

path until it bears fruit or until all conceivable hope withers.[]”) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). To determine whether the investigation was reasonable, the court

“must conduct an objective review of...[counsel’s] performance, measured for

‘reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,’ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688..., which

includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen ‘from

counsel’s perspective at the time.’ id. at 689....” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523; see also

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005).

Further, to establish prejudice under Strickland, “with respect to defective

investigations, the test for prejudice is whether the noninvestigated evidence was powerful

enough to establish a probability that a reasonable attorney would decide to present it and

a probability that such presentation might undermine the jury verdict.” Mickey v. Ayers,

606 F.3d 1223, 1236–37 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535). Therefore, to

establish prejudice based on counsel's failure to investigate or call a potential defense

witness, there must be evidence to show what significant and beneficial testimony the

witness would have provided. See Dows, 211 F.3d at 486; Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d

1032, 1042 (9th Cir.1995) (citing James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.1994)).

The events giving rise to Petitioner’s conviction occurred in 2003. That the

Victim’s allegations could not be substantiated during the 2001 CPS investigation does not

mean that the allegations were in fact “untrue” as Petitioner maintains (see Petition, p. 12).

As the trial court pointed out, the discovery of additional evidence substantiating the

allegations before trial refutes any reliance on the earlier CPS investigation and 2001 letter.

Nor is there anything unreasonable about the trial court’s astute observation that, if

anything, the investigation and letter bolstered the credibility of the diary and the Victim

because they showed the abuse was ongoing over a period of years. Moreover, the trial

court also reasonably concluded that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice resulting from

counsel’s failure to interview the CPS witnesses about the 2001investigation and letter in

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light of the evidence adduced at trial. That CPS closed its investigation in 2001 in no way

vitiates the evidence presented against Petitioner at trial.

 Petitioner also claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to interview CPS

witnesses and the counselor and psychologist from Counseling Consultants because they

would have provided “[c]rucial evidence” to discredit the diary. (Petition, p. 12).

Petitioner asserts that he “gave these facts to my attorney...well in advance of the trial....”

(Id.).

“[W]hen the facts that support a certain potential line of defense are generally

known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for further investigation

may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. An

attorney may make strategic choices based on defendant's own statements or actions. Id.

If Petitioner told counsel what the witnesses' likely testimony would be, which he did (see

Petition, p. 12), and counsel made a tactical decision not to interview or call witnesses

based on Petitioner's representations, such decisions would not entitle Petitioner to relief.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Eggleston v. United States , 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1988)

(trial counsel need not interview witnesses whose account is fairly known to counsel).

Petitioner provides no reason why such investigation would have discredited the

diary. Petitioner makes clear that defense counsel was aware that the Victim had

previously denied that the diary belonged to her, therefore, this information did not go

undiscovered. Additionally, the Victim testified that she had previously denied that the

diary belonged to her during the 2001 CPS investigation “because she ‘didn’t really want

to make a big deal out of everything....’” (Answer, Exh. I, p. 5 (citing 7/14/06 RT, pp. 5-8;

7/12/06 RT, pp. 43-45, 50)). There is no showing suggesting that interviewing the

witnesses would have led to any further evidence on the issue or that such evidence would

have changed the outcome of trial.

Petitioner also asserts that he had been interviewed by a state psychologist. He

argues that counsel was ineffective for failure to interview the psychologist, for failure to

review the psychologist’s report, and for failure to timely obtain a controverting expert.

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5

In Ground 9, in part, Petitioner states that counsel was ineffective for failure to find

an “expert witness to refute states [sic] claims.” (Petition, p. 14). He provides no factual

basis for such a claim. Instead his Ground 9 statement of supporting facts addresses his

contention that sentencing counsel was ineffective because he was new to the case. (Id.).

Likewise, in Ground 10, in part, Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective because

he “waited to the last minute to attempt to secure an expert witness to refute the states [sic]

assertions of his guilt and prove his actual innocence as...[to] []the charges in this matter.”

(Petition, p. 15). The statement of supporting facts for Ground 10 addresses what appears

to be an unrelated claim, addressed infra, that counsel was ineffective for failure to object

to the presentence report. (Id.; see also Memorandum, pp. 17-19). Petitioner fails to supply

factual allegations sufficient to resolve a claim regarding counsel’s alleged tardiness in

obtaining an expert witness. To the extent that in Grounds 9 and 10, Petitioner is referring

to an expert to refute the state’s psychologist, his claims fail for the same reasons that render

Ground 7 meritless. Additionally, in Ground 14, in part, Petitioner once again argues that

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(Memorandum, pp. 11-12). Although Petitioner raised this claim in his PCR Petition

(Answer, Exh. J, p. 18), the trial court did not specifically discuss the issue. Nor does

Respondent specifically address this claim. Where, the state court rejects "a federal claim

without expressly addressing that claim, a federal habeas court must presume that the

federal claim was adjudicated on the merits..." for AEDPA purposes. Johnson __ U.S. __,

133 S.Ct. at 1096; Harrington, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. at 784-785. Although the petitioner

may overcome this presumption in some circumstances, see id. __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. at

1098-99; Harrington, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. at 785, Petitioner has not done so here. 

Petitioner does not describe how the psychologist’s interview or report factored into

his case. Nor does he provide facts or theory to support the conclusion that counsel’s

conduct on this issue fell below established norms and that such conduct resulted in

prejudice under Strickland. It is well settled that “[c]onclusory allegations [of ineffective

assistance of counsel] which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not

warrant habeas relief.” James, 24 F.3d at 27; Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 933 (rejecting ineffective

assistance of counsel claim where petitioner failed “to indicate how he was prejudiced by

counsel’s failure...” to conduct cross-examination on a specific issue). On the instant

record, regardless whether this particular claim is reviewed applying AEDPA standards or

de novo, the claim lacks merit.5

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trial counsel was ineffective for failure to interview the state psychologist, review the report,

and obtain a controverting expert in a timely manner. (Petition, p. 20; Memorandum, pp. 24-

25). In Ground 15, he sets out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel virtually identical

to that in Ground 14 at page 20 of his Petition; however, he provides no facts to elaborate on

his Ground 15 claim with regard to trial counsel. On the issue of counsel’s performance

pertaining to the state’s psychologist, Ground 14 lacks merit for the same reasons as Ground

7. To any extent that Petitioner attempts to raise the same claim in Ground 15, it also lacks

merit. 

6

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel are discussed infra.

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On the instant record, the state court’s decision was not contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Nor is there any showing that

the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Therefore, Petitioner’s claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel fails on the merits. 

Ground 11. Petitioner’s Ground 11 initially reads as a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel for failure to protect Petitioner’s right to have a jury determine aggravating factors

that would enhance Petitioner’s sentence.6

 (Petition, p. 16). However, the factual basis for

that claim attacks trial counsel’s failure to obtain a handwriting expert to challenge the

authenticity of the Victim’s diary during trial. (Id.; Memorandum (Doc. 1-1), pp. 19-20).

 Petitioner argued during the state PCR proceeding that trial counsel was ineffective

for failure to obtain a handwriting expert to discredit the diary entry evidence. The trial

court rejected the claim as follows:

The Court essentially repeats its earlier finding that the CPS letter proffered

by the Petitioner here is not clearly exculpatory as it does not invalidate the

diary entry in question. Given the evidence adduced at trial, the Court finds

that Trial Counsel’s decision not to contest the authenticity of the diary entry

was reasonable. Simply because as the Petitioner asserts, a plausible

alternative explanation for the incriminating evidence exists does not mean

that Trial Counsel was obligated to present it. The selection of arguments

and decisions as to which evidence is subject to legitimate challenge are

reserved for trial counsel and the Court will not second guess those decisions

merely because they achieved an unfavorable result for the Petitioner. The

Petitioner is not entitled to a guaranteed outcome in his case, but rather to the

effective assistance of competent counsel. There is no reason to believe that

the Petitioner received anything less here. Furthermore, even if Trial

Counsel’s decision not to secure an expert witness was unreasonable, the

Petitioner cannot show that he has been prejudiced. The Petitioner’s

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assertion that expert witness testimony would have altered the outcome of his

trial is speculative. The record shows that the value of such testimony would

have been negligible given that there was evidence authenticating the diary

entry as well as overwhelming evidence aside from the diary entry from

which the jury could have convicted him. The Court therefore concludes that

the Petitioner received the effective assistance of trial counsel and that he has

not been prejudiced. Consequently, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

(Answer, Exh. N, pp. 8-9).

“[T]he presentation of expert testimony is not necessarily an essential ingredient of

a reasonably competent defense.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 834 (9th Cir.1995).

“Few decisions a lawyer makes draw so heavily on professional judgment as whether or

not to proffer a witness at trial.” Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir.1999). Here,

the diary entry at issue involved events occurring in 2001, long before the 2003 events at

issue in Petitioner’s criminal proceeding. Further, the Victim was questioned at trial about

her previous denial that she made the diary entry. The diary entry was not the sole

evidence against Petitioner. Nor was it the bulk of the evidence against Petitioner, given

that he was on trial for events occurring in 2003. Thus, the trial court’s finding that counsel

was not ineffective on this issue was reasonable. Moreover, the trial court’s conclusion that

Petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice was also reasonable in light of he evidence

adduced at trial. Petitioner’s request for habeas relief is without merit.

GROUND 13. Like Ground 11, the violations alleged do not correlate to supporting factual

statement. Petitioner states that counsel was ineffective for failing to object or otherwise

protect Petitioner’s right to submit information that contradicted the pre-sentence report.

(Petition, p. 18). However, Petitioner’s factual statement argues that the trial court erred

when it denied Petitioner’s request to change counsel. (Id.; see also Memorandum, pp. 22-

24). Petitioner contends that the denial of his request to change counsel forced him to

proceed with ineffective counsel who failed to conduct interviews of CPS witnesses who

would discredit the diary and who would testify about the 2001 letter closing the CPS

investigation. (Petition, p. 18; Memorandum, pp. 22-24). Nor did counsel interview:

counselors; the Victim’s friends or teachers who, according to Petitioner, would testify

about the Victim’s propensity to lie; or the Victim’s biological father or grandmother to

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testify about the diary. (Petition, p. 18; Memorandum, pp. 22-24). According to Petitioner,

“the alleged victim in this case exhibited an inclination and propensity to rebel in all

instances against authority figures who sought to prevent activities she wished to indulge

in and in the instant case this was me.” (Petition, p. 19). 

In his PCR Petition, Petitioner alleged both the sentencing claim and the claim that

the trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s request for counsel. (See Answer, Exh. J, pp.

6-7, 10-13). With regard to the trial court’s alleged error in denying change of counsel,

the trial court held that Petitioner was precluded from raising the issue because it should

have been raised on appeal. (Answer, Exh. N, p. 10). The court went on to reject “the

embedded ineffective assistance of counsel claims...” by

reiterat[ing] its finding that the CPS letter the Petitioner repeatedly refers to

in his Petition is not clearly exculpatory and it was not error to leave the

letter out of evidence. Nor was it unreasonable for Trial Counsel to elect not

to secure witness testimony regarding the authenticity of the diary entry

evidence. The Court presumes these decisions were matters of trial strategy

and it will not question Trial Counsel’s judgment. In addition, the Petitioner

has not shown that the witnesses he cites would have provided favorable

testimony, that the substance of the testimony they might have provided was

not already covered by the testimony of other witnesses or via crossexamination, or that the value of the evidence would not have been overcome

by the weight of the prosecution’s evidence. Consequently, even if it was

unreasonable not to interview or subpoena these witnesses, the Petitioner has

not demonstrated that he has been prejudiced. Absent specific allegations

that the testimony of the potential witnesses would have been relevant,

admissible, non-cumulative, and favorable to the Petitioner, the Court cannot

presume any prejudice resulted from their absence at trial. Lastly, even if the

Court assumes that the potential witnesses’ testimony would have been

favorable to the Petitioner, given the evidence of his guilt adduced at trial,

the Court cannot say such evidence would have altered the outcome of the

case. Consequently the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief on these

grounds.

(Answer, Exh. N, p. 10).

Petitioner raised the issue again in a Motion for Rehearing (Answer, Exh. O, p. 7),

Supplement to PCR Petition (Answer, Exh. P, pp. 4-5), and Second Supplement to PCR

Petition (Answer, Exh. R, pp. 6-7). The trial court again pointed out that the issue of error

should have been raised on direct appeal and, because it was not, the claim was precluded

under Rule 32.2(a) of th Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Answer, Exh. S, pp. 2-3).

As discussed above, the appellate court denied relief because Petitioner failed to

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explain how the trial court’s decisions during the PCR proceeding were erroneous.

(Answer, Exh. Y, p. 3). Additionally, the appellate court adopted the trial court’s “wellreasoned minute entries” during the PCR proceeding. (Id.).

As to Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “[t]he appropriate

inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his lawyer

as such. If counsel is a reasonably effective advocate, he meets constitutional standards

irrespective of his client's evaluation of his performance.” United States v. Cronic, 466

U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,(1983); Morris v. Slappy, 461

U.S. 1 (1983)). “It is for this reason that we attach no weight to...[the defendant’s]...

expression of dissatisfaction[]” with counsel’s performance. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654.

This Court has addressed and rejected Petitioner’s claims regarding the diary, CPS

letter and investigation and witnesses regarding same, see supra. As to the other interviews

Petitioner contends counsel should have conducted to attack the Victim’s credibility, the

trial court’s decision was not unreasonable given that Petitioner’s claims are conclusory

and he fails to establish prejudice under Strickland.

Any argument regarding the trial court’s alleged error in denying Petitioner’s

request to change counsel is precluded on independent and adequate state law grounds

given that the PCR court found the argument was waived under Arizona procedural rules

because Petitioner failed to raise it on direct appeal. See Cook, 538 F.3d at 1026

(“Preclusion of issues for failure to present them at an earlier proceeding under Arizona

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) ‘are independent of federal law because they do not

depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits’”) (footnote omitted).

Additionally, Arizona courts have consistently applied Arizona's procedural rules to bar

further review of claims that were waived at trial, on direct appeal, or in prior

post-conviction proceedings. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that

Rule 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent procedural bar); Cook, 538 F.3d at 1026;

Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 931–32. Nor can Petitioner overcome the procedural bar; he cannot

show cause or prejudice given this Court’s determination that the trial court reasonably

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concluded that counsel’s performance did not contravene Strickland. 

CLAIMS OF EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION: GROUNDS 7, 8, 9, 11, 14 & 15.

In Grounds 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, and 15 Petitioner makes a passing reference that his

rights under the Equal Protection Clause were violated. In his PCR Petition, Petitioner did

not specifically mention the Equal Protection Clause when arguing about ineffective

assistance of counsel. (See Answer, Exhs. J, M, O, P, R). Respondent does not discuss

equal protection claims, but, nonetheless, state that these grounds for relief are exhausted.

It is clear that Petitioner never apprised the state court that he was making a federal equal

protection argument and, thus, such a claim is procedurally defaulted. Yet, it is arguable

that Respondent has waived this defense. See Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th

Cir. 2003); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1229-31 (9th Cir. 2002).

 “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no

State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’

which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v.

Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). 

In Ground 11, Petitioner also states that trial counsel was aware that the Victim’s

biological father “was racially biased against me because of my ethnic background and

against the biological mother because she had dared to enter into a relationship with a man

of Mexican decent [sic].” (Petition, p. 16). Petitioner made a similar statement in his PCR

Petition when challenging counsel’s failure to call a handwriting expert. (Answer, Exh. J,

p, 13). To any extent that Petitioner attempts to bootstrap an equal protection claim on the

alleged biases of the Victim’s biological father, such an effort is futile given that Petitioner

has failed to allege or show that the State acted with any such bias. 

In Grounds 7, 8, 9, 11, 14 and 15, Petitioner’s allegations regarding counsel’s

alleged failures in no way substantiate an equal protection claim, nor does he provide any

explanation as to why they should. The bare assertion that his right to equal protection was

violated is insufficient for habeas relief. See Rule 2, Rules Governing §2254 Cases, 28

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U.S.C. foll. 2254 (requiring petition to state facts to support each claim); Greenway v.

Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Petitioner’s] cursory and vague claim cannot

support habeas relief.”). Petitioner’s equal protection claims should be dismissed as vague,

conclusory and unsubstantiated by any factual or legal statement. Morever, to any extent

that Petitioner states sufficient facts to support an equal protection claim in Ground 11,

such claim is wholly without merit on the facts presented when reviewed under either the

AEDPA standard or de novo.

GROUND 8

Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “follow-up and

i[n]vestigate the evidence available which would have allowed him to...” refute officers’

testimony regarding Petitioner’s contention that his Miranda rights were violated.

(Petition, p. 13). Petitioner’s argument primarily focuses on his encounter with the police

which he claims violated his Miranda rights. (See Memorandum, pp. 12-16). During the

PCR proceeding, the trial court rejected Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel on this issue as follows:

The Court had thoroughly reviewed the record and notes that Trial Counsel

filed a Motion to Suppress Statements on October 11, 2005. In his Motion,

Trial Counsel advanced the very same arguments the Petitioner made here.

On November 10, 2005, the Trial Court heard oral argument on the Motion.

The minute entry for that hearing reflects the court confirmed that it had

viewed portions of the videotape of the Petitioner’s interrogation and that

based on some discrepancies with the interview transcript, it would take the

matter under advisement. On January 9, 2006, the Trial court issued a

detailed ruling where it found that the Petitioner’s Miranda rights were not

violated and that there was no basis for the suppression of the Petitioner’s

incriminating statements. The Trial Court then denied the Petitioner’s

Motion. Given these facts, this Court cannot find any basis whatsoever for

the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Trial Counsel clearly

raised the issue in his written motion and at oral argument. That the Trial

Court issued an unfavorable ruling does not meant that Trial Counsel was

ineffective. Indeed, the Court finds that Trial Counsel’s actions met a

reasonable standard of professional competency and that the Petitioner

received the effective assistance of counsel. Trial Counsel’s actions far

exceeded the Petitioner’s assertion that he merely raised a pro forma

objection to the evidence at issue and the Court is not sure what more

Petitioner could expect. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s claim is wholly

without merit and he is not entitled to relief on these grounds.

(Answer, Exh. N, pp. 4-5 (footnote omitted)). The trial court also noted that defense

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The record reflects that the Victim’s mother and the Victim submitted letters to the

court requesting leniency at sentencing. (See Exh. D, p. 7 (Doc. 11-4, p. 8)). However, the

prosecutor pointed out that recorded jail calls between Petitioner and the Victim’s mother

revealed Petitioner’s instruction that the Victim’s mother “make sure that [the Victim] writes

a letter on [Petitioner’s]...behalf and he want to be able to approve it– read it to make sure

it’s to his advantage. And that it is [the mother’s]...obligation to shake the shit out of [the

Victim]....” (Id. at pp. 7-8 (Doc. 11-4, pp. 9-10)). At sentencing, Petitioner maintained his

innocence. (Id. at p.10 (Doc. 11-4, p. 11)). 

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counsel had attached to the motion to suppress a copy of the transcript of Petitioner’s

interrogation. (Id. at p. 5, n.4). 

The record is clear that trial counsel filed a motion to suppress statements and the

matter proceeded to evidentiary hearing where counsel cross-examined the testifying

officers and held the state to its burden in establishing the admissibility of the statements.

(See Answer, Exh. C (transcript of motion to suppress hearing); see also Answer, Exh. B

(minute entry denying motion to suppress)). Petitioner does not suggest what evidence trial

counsel’s alleged failure to investigate would have uncovered or that such evidence would

have affected the outcome of the suppression hearing. Conclusory allegations will not

support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See James, 24 F.3d at 26-27. 

Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law. Nor is there any showing that the state court’s decision

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state court proceedings. 

CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT SENTENCING:GROUNDS 9,10,11,

12, 13, 14, 15.

As discussed in detail below, Petitioner raises several claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel at sentencing.7

 Petitioner cannot establish that state court’s rulings

on his claims of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel were contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme Court precedent because “there

is no clearly established...” federal law as determined by the Supreme Court regarding the

standard for ineffective assistance of counsel in noncapital sentencing cases.

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Cooper–Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1244 (9th Cir.2005); see also Davis v. Grigas,

443 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006). When the Supreme Court established the test for

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Strickland, the Court expressly declined to

“consider the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which ... may require a different

approach to the definition of constitutionally effective assistance.” Coopersmith, 397 F.3d

at 1244. The Supreme Court has yet to decide what standard should apply to ineffective

assistance of counsel claims in the noncapital sentencing context. See id. Because there is

no clearly established federal law in this context, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) with respect to these claims. See Id.

In resolving Petitioner’s claims, the state court applied Strickland. The Ninth

Circuit has stated that “even though the Strickland standard does not by necessity apply to

the noncapital sentencing context, the [state]...courts were nonetheless free to adopt that

standard for use in this context.” Davis, 443 F.3d at 1158. Further, even if Strickland was

the applicable standard, as discussed below, the state court’s ruling was not an

unreasonable application of Strickland, nor was the state court’s decision based on an

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

GROUND 9. Petitioner argues that sentencing counsel was ineffective in light of the fact

that he was appointed at “the eleventh hour....Counsel was neither prepared to present facts

or information favorable to the [P]etitioner, nor did he have the knowledge of the concise

case history and background to render effective assistance....” (Petition, p. 14; see also

Memorandum, pp. 16-17). 

 The trial court rejected the claim as follows:

[T]he Court is compelled to disagree with the Petitioner’s assertion that he

was assigned substitute counsel for purposes of sentencing ‘at the eleventh

hour.’” In reality, Mr. Roach [sentencing counsel] was appointed as the

Petitioner’s sentencing counsel over thee and one[-]half months before the

Petitioner was actually sentenced. During those 106 days between his

appointment and the Petitioner’s actual sentencing, the Court finds that Mr.

Roach had ample time to familiarize himself with the facts of the Petitioner’s

case. Moreover, the Petitioner’s conclusory assertions aside, there is nothing

in the record which indicates that Mr. Roach was not fully prepared to

represent the Petitioner at his sentencing. In fact, the record reveals the

contrary. Mr. Roach sought additional time, raised a challenge and

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conducted an investigation into alleged juror misconduct, and presented

actual and relevant mitigating evidence at Petitioner’s sentencing. Clearly,

Mr. Roach acted as more than a neutral observer. 

(Answer, Exh. N, p. 7; see also Answer, Exh. D (transcript of sentencing)). 

Petitioner provides only conclusory statements that counsel failed to present

mitigating evidence. His other statements regarding ineffectiveness of counsel at

sentencing rehashes claims raised elsewhere in his Petition that counsel failed to argue that

a jury should determine aggravating factors, failed to seek remand based on an error in the

testimony before grand jury evidence, which are addressed in this Report an

Recommendation, infra. Additionally, Petitioner argues that sentencing counsel was

ineffective because Petitioner was not guilty of the charges. 

Petitioner has provided no basis on which to conclude that sentencing counsel was

ineffective for failure to be adequately prepared for sentencing. Therefore, the state court’s

decision on this issue was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of

Strickland. Nor was the state court’s decision based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 

GROUND 11. Petitioner claims that sentencing counsel was ineffective for failure to protect

Petitioner’s right to have a jury find aggravating factors. Petitioner provides no facts to

support his allegations. The trial court denied Petitioner’s claim on this issue, inter alia,

because “no aggravating factor was alleged, nor was an aggravated sentence imposed at the

Petitioner’s sentencing. As a result, Sentencing Counsel need not have sought a jury

determination of aggravating factors and it was not ineffective assistance that he failed to

do so.” (Answer, Exh. N, p. 7). On this record, Petitioner cannot establish that the state

court’s ruling on this issue was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Strickland

given that no aggravating factors were alleged, found, or used to impose Petitioner’s

sentence. 

GROUNDS 12, 13, 14, & 15. In Ground 12, Petitioner claims that sentencing counsel was

ineffective because he failed “to submit information that contradicted the biased findings

of the pre-sentence report which prejudiced the petitioner....” (Petition, p. 17). The

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Petitioner’s Ground 15 claim of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel is set

forth in the statement of supporting facts of his Petition and in his Memorandum. In the

statement of claim portion of the Petition, Petitioner sets forth virtually the same claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel that he stated in the same portion of Ground 14. He

provides no facts to support such a claim. 

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statement of supporting facts for Ground 12 do not discuss Petitioner’s sentencing claim;

instead, the statement addresses claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to

seek remand to the grand jury, which is discussed infra. (See id.; see also Memorandum,

pp. 20-22). In Ground 13, Petitioner essentially raises the same claim he raises in Ground

12. (See Petition, p. 18 (claiming sentencing counsel was ineffective by failing “to object

or other-wise [sic] protect [Petitioner’s] right to submit information that contradicted the

biased findings of the pre-sentence report....”). Like Ground 12, Petitioner’s supporting

factual statement does not address this claim, but instead challenges actions of trial counsel

on unrelated matters. Additionally, in Ground 14, Petitioner asserts that sentencing counsel

was ineffective for failure to call character witnesses, present mitigating factors, and

“object to the introduction of the presentence report...even though counsel was aware that

the petitioner had mitigating facts to controvert the alleged aggravating facts....” (Petition,

p. 20). Petitioner raises similar claims in Ground 15.8

 (Petition, p. 21; Memorandum, pp.

26-27).

In rejecting the claim of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel, the trial court

stated:

[T]he Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of

Sentencing Counsel for his failure to object to the use of the presentence

report and his failure to present certain mitigating evidence. Specifically the

Petitioner claims that Mr. Roach failed to call character witnesses and other

witnesses who could have given favorable testimony at his sentencing. The

Petitioner argues that presentation of these witnesses would have resulted in

the imposition of a mitigated sentence.

As explained above, the Petitioner’s claim lacks the specificity

necessary to support a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In

addition, the Petitioner’s conclusion that the outcome of his sentencing

would have been different is speculative and he had not demonstrated any

prejudice. The Court disagrees with the Petitioner’s contention that it is

ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel to fail to call all available

witnesses who might offer mitigating evidence. As explained above,

sentencing counsel need only present available pertinent mitigating

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evidence..[State v.] Carriger, 132 Ariz. [301] at 304, 645 P.2d [816] at 819

[(1982)] (emphasis added). The record in Petitioner’s case shows that Mr.

Roach presented mitigating evidence in the form of letters from family

members which were given to the judge prior to the imposition of sentence.

Since the Petitioner has not explained what advantage additional testimony

might have provided, the Court must conclude that Sentencing Counsel’s

decision not to present such witnesses was reasonable and that the Petitioner

has not been prejudiced.

With respect to the Petitioner’s assertion that Sentencing Counsel

failed to object to unfavorable facts in the presentence report, the Court

similarly finds the absence of specificity required to sustain an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. As explained above, presentence reports often

contain a mix of favorable and unfavorable facts about the defendant and

thus prejudice cannot be presumed from their use. “The weight to be given

the [presentence] report is for the trial judge and we need not assume he was

adversely influenced by any statement which might have been improper.”

State v. Dixon, 21 Ariz. App. 517, 521 P.2d 148, 150 (1974). Sentencing

Counsel is only obligated to challenge the admission of aggravating evidence

where reasonably possible. Carriger, 132 Ariz. at 304, 645 P.2d at 819.

Absent an explanation from the Petitioner as to which facts in the

presentence report were subject to legitimate challenge, the Court finds that

Mr. Roach’s failure to object was reasonable. Accordingly, the Petitioner

received the effective assistance of sentencing counsel and he has not been

prejudiced. Relief is therefore, not warranted on these grounds.

(Answer, Exh. N, pp. 7-8).

Petitioner’s conclusory allegations fail to substantiate his claim of ineffective

assistance of sentencing counsel. The state court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of Strickland. Nor was the state court’s decision based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. 

GROUND 12. 

In addition to arguing ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel in Ground 12, see

supra, Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “challenge the

fact that the state relied upon an erroneous statement of the detective in the grand jury

proceedings....” (Memorandum, p. 20; see also Memorandum, pp. 20-22; Petition, p. 17).

When Detective Knuth testified before the grand jury, he stated that Petitioner’s

“son” saw Petitioner enter the Victim’s bedroom prior to the sexual abuse which resulted

in the Victim calling 911. (Petition, p.17; see also Answer, Exh. L, p. 6 (indicating that the

detective testified that Defendant’s son, “Sam”, was the witness)). Instead, it was

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Petitioner’s daughter, Samantha, who witnessed this. (See Answer, Exh. N, p.9 (Samantha

testified at trial that she witnessed Petitioner entering the victim’s room prior to the sexual

abuse taking place); see also Answer, Exh. L, p. 6; Answer, Exh. I, p. 7 (summarizing

Samantha’s testimony)). 

The state court rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

The Court notes at the outset that a trial jury convicted the Petitioner of the

charged offenses on the standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thus, even if it was unreasonable for Trial Counsel not to have filed a

motion for remand, the Petitioner has not been prejudiced as the lower

standard of probable cause necessary to obtain an indictment from the grand

jury was clearly met. The Court also notes that the Petitioner fails to

mention that his daughter did in fact testify that she witnessed him enter the

Victim’s bedroom prior to the sexual abuse taking place. Thus, Detective

Knuth’s testimony that Petitioner’s son was the witness, while erroneous as

to the identity of the witness was not erroneous as to the Petitioner’s actions

leading up to the offense. Since the identity of the witness reaches a

collateral issue, the erroneous testimony did not amount to fundamental

error. Because the Petitioner was not prejudiced by the erroneous testimony

and a motion to remand would have been denied, it was reasonable for Trial

Counsel not to have raised the issue. Thus, the Petitioner has not presented

a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and he is not entitled

to relief.

(Answer, Exh. N, pp. 9-10).

Under Arizona law, a defendant may challenge the grand jury's finding of probable

cause on only two grounds: (1) an insufficient number of jurors concurred in the indictment

or (2) the proceeding denied the defendant a substantive procedural right. Maretick v.

Jarrett, 204 Ariz. 194, 197, 62 P.3d 120, 123 (2003). “In particular, due process...requires

the use of an unbiased grand jury and a fair and impartial presentation of the evidence.”

Crimmins v. Superior Court, 137 Ariz. 39, 41, 668 P.2d 882. 888 (1983) (citation omitted).

Whether to remand a case to the grand jury is a matter within the trial court’s discretion.

Francis v. Sanders, 222 Ariz. 423, 426, 215 P.3d 397, 400 (App. 2009) (citing Maretick,

204 Ariz. at 195, 62 P.3d at 121). The Arizona Supreme Court has directed remand to the

grand jury where the court “believe[d] that the grand jury's inability to determine the case

based on accurately depicted facts and the applicable law flawed their decision....”

Crimmins, 137 Ariz. at 43, 668 P.2d at 886. 

Although the detective incorrectly identified the witness as Petitioner’s son, rather

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than his daughter, the substance of the testimony was correct–Petitioner was witnessed

entering the Victim’s bedroom prior to the sexual abuse taking place. This Court agrees

with the trial court that the identity of the witness who saw Petitioner enter the Victim’s

bedroom was a collateral matter and would not have warranted granting remand in this

case. Further, even if a remand had been ordered, but for the identity of the witness, the

testimony would have been the same–the Petitioner’s child saw him enter the Victim’s

room prior to the sexual abuse taking place. There is no suggestion in the record that the

grand jury’s outcome would have been different had it been Petitioner’s daughter, rather

than his son, who witnessed this. Given the unlikely probability of success of such a

motion, counsel was not ineffective for failure to seek remand on this issue. Consequently,

the state court’s decision was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

Strickland. Nor was the state court’s decision based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state proceeding. Ground 12 is without

merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons Grounds 1 through 5 and portions of Ground 6 should be

dismissed as procedurally defaulted and the portion of Ground 6 alleging violation of

Petitioner’s right to effective of assistance of counsel should be denied on the merits.

Additionally, the portion of Ground 13 alleging that the trial court erred in denying

Petitioner’s request to change counsel should also be dismissed as procedurally defaulted.

Further, Grounds 7 through 15 should be dismissed for failure to raise a cognizable claim

under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and should be denied on the merits to the

extent Petitioner raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, Petitioner’s

bare assertions of violation of his right to equal protection in Grounds 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, and

15 should also be dismissed and, alternatively, Ground 11 should be denied on the merits

if the Court determines that Petitioner has sufficiently alleged such a claim.

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

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after its independent review, dismiss and deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. The Petition should be dismissed as follows:

(1) as procedurally defaulted with regard to Grounds 1 through 5, the portion of

Ground 6 not pertaining to Petitioner’s claim of interference with his right

to effective assistance of counsel, and the portion of Ground 13 regarding

Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s request to

change counsel;

(2) as noncognizable to the extent Petitioner claims violation of his Fifth

Amendment right to due process in grounds 7 through 15;

(3) to the extent Petitioner claims a violation of his right to equal protection in

Grounds 7, 8, 9, 14, and 15.

The Petition should be denied on the merits:

(1) to the extent Petitioner claim of interference with his right to effective

assistance of counsel in Ground 6;

(2) to the extent Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective in Grounds 7

through 15.

Additionally, Ground 11 should be dismissed with regard to Petitioner’s equal

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 protection claim or, alternatively, denied on the merits to the extent that the Petition may

be read as alleging facts sufficient to establish such a claim.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from

the district court to do so. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case

number: CV 11-716-TUC-JGZ.

DATED this 16th day of June, 2014.

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