Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01294/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01294-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JAMES ALLEN,

NO. CIV. S-03-1294 WBS GGH

Plaintiff, 

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RE: MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

COUNTY OF TEHAMA (also known

as TEHAMA COUNTY), TEHAMA

COUNTY COUNSEL’S OFFICE,

COUNTY OF TEHAMA BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS, NELSON DEAN BUCK,

Individually and as the Tehama

County Counsel, and DOES 1

through 1,000, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This action arises out of plaintiff’s termination from

the position of Deputy County Counsel in the Tehama County

Counsel’s Office. The court dismissed several of plaintiff’s

claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

(“Rule 12(b)(6)”) in October 2003, and defendants prevailed on

their motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims in

December 2004. Defendants now move for an award of attorneys’

fees against plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 12205 and 1988,

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A more complete recitation of the facts leading to this 1

suit can be found within previous court orders.

2

and against plaintiff’s counsel, K. Stephen Swenson, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the inherent ability of the court to

sanction attorneys. 

I. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff was, at all times relevant to this action,

employed as a Deputy County Counsel in the Tehama County

Counsel’s Office. (December 2004 Order at 2). Plaintiff was

fired on October 28, 2002 for being “malignant” and for writing

improper “meet and confer” letters. (Id. at 3).1

A. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint

Plaintiff filed suit in this court against defendants

in June 2003. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff brought his first five

causes of action against all defendants. His first cause of

action was a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violations of his

constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-31). In his second cause

of action, plaintiff also invoked § 1983 and claimed that he had

been deprived of a property interest without due process. 

Plaintiff claimed a constitutionally protected property interest

in payment for one day of unused vacation time, payment that he

alleged was still owing. (Id. ¶¶ 32-36). In his third cause of

action, plaintiff invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging that

defendants had conspired to deprive him of his civil rights. 

(Id. ¶¶ 37-44). His fourth cause of action alleged a violation

of California Labor Code § 1102.5, a whistleblower protection

statute. (Id. ¶¶ 45-51). The fifth cause of action was for what

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plaintiff labeled “torts in essence.” (Id. ¶¶ 52-59). 

Plaintiff alleged his sixth through ninth causes of

action against all defendants except Buck. The sixth cause of

action was for “negligent employment/retention/supervision”;

plaintiff’s theory was that defendant Tehama County Counsel

negligently retained Allen’s supervisor Buck after Buck was

diagnosed with cancer. (Id. ¶¶ 60-66). Plaintiff’s seventh

cause of action was for breach of contract. (Id. ¶¶ 67-70). 

Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action was for disability

discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing

Act (the “FEHA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the

Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). (Id. ¶¶ 71-80). 

Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action, styled “wrongful termination

in violation of public policy,” was a restatement of plaintiff’s

ADA, § 1983, FEHA, and common law claims. (See id. ¶¶ 81-86). 

Plaintiff sought relief in the form of general and special

damages, costs and attorneys’ fees, punitive damages, and

interest. (Id. (Prayer for Relief)).

B. The October 2003 Order

Defendants moved to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

all of plaintiff’s claims except for those for disability

discrimination The court issued its order on this motion on

October 8, 2003. 

The court dismissed plaintiff’s § 1983 claim alleging

violations of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. (October

2003 Order at 24). The court reasoned that, since the government

may regulate the speech of its employees when they are speaking

on behalf of the government, defendants did not violate

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plaintiff’s constitutional rights when they restrained him from

writing improper “meet and confer” letters to opposing counsel. 

Id. at 7-8; see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of

Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

claim was dismissed because plaintiff alleged neither a search

nor a seizure. (October 2003 Order at 8). The court also

dismissed plaintiff’s claim arising under the Fifth Amendment due

process clause. Plaintiff’s due process claim was properly

analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also

dismissed plaintiff’s § 1983 claim invoking the Fourteenth

Amendment right to procedural due process in relation to his

termination. (Id. at 24). The court found plaintiff to be an

at-will employee with no property interest in his job. (Id. at

11). Finally, all of plaintiff’s claims under state law were

dismissed except for that arising under the FEHA. (Id. at 24-

25). 

The October 2003 order permitted some claims to go

forward. Defendants did not challenge the claims based on

disability discrimination, and therefore those claims survived. 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the § 1985(3) action was granted,

but plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint to reallege a

claim under that statute. (Id. at 24). Finally, the court held

that plaintiff’s § 1983 allegation that defendants had wrongfully

deprived him of pay for his unused vacation time stated a claim,

and therefore defendant’s motion on this point was denied. Id.

///

///

///

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5

C. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”), filed

November 7, 2003, contained four causes of action. In the first

cause of action, under § 1983, plaintiff claimed that all

defendants had deprived him of a liberty right in his reputation.

(FAC ¶¶ 28-37). This first cause of action in the FAC was not

included in the original complaint. Plaintiff’s second cause of

action claimed that defendants had deprived him of pay for his

unused vacation time without affording him due process. (Id. ¶¶

38-42). Plaintiff’s third cause of action restated the § 1985

claim in the original complaint, but this time more clearly

alleged that defendants had conspired to discriminate against

plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 43-51). Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action,

against all defendants except Buck, was based on the ADA, the

FEHA, and Title VII. (Id. ¶¶ 52-61). 

D. The December 2004 Order

The court granted summary judgment to defendants on all

causes of action in an order filed December 28, 2004. Regarding

plaintiff’s first claim, that he had been deprived of a liberty

interest in his reputation, the court held that the level of

stigmatization that plaintiff alleged he suffered at the hands of

defendants was not enough to get to the jury on a Roth

stigmatization claim. (December 2004 Order at 5-9); see Bd. of

Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). At worst

defendants had told others that plaintiff was “malignant” and was

“more of a detriment than an asset” to his employer. (Id. at 7-

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Defendants vigorously argued in their motion for 2

summary judgment, and again in this motion, that plaintiff also

failed to show the publication element of the Roth stigmatization

claim. The court did not reach that issue in its December 2004

order.

6

8).2

Plaintiff’s second cause of action was that he had been

deprived of pay for one day of unused vacation without due

process of law. The court held that, although plaintiff had a

property interest in that day’s pay, plaintiff had not taken

advantage of the process that was available to him to protect his

interest. (Id. at 14). The court also held that plaintiff

received the process due him under the Constitution. (Id. at

16).

The court granted defendants summary judgment on

plaintiff’s disability discrimination causes of action because

plaintiff had suffered no injury as a result of defendants’

conduct. (Id. at 16-21). Plaintiff admitted that “Mr. Allen’s

vision problems did not play a role in Mr. Buck’s decision to

terminate Mr. Allen.” (Id. at 17-18)(quoting Pl.’s Response to

Def.’s Am. Statement of Undisputed Facts at ¶ 168). Because

plaintiff did not show that he suffered an adverse employment

action as a result of his disability, plaintiff did not make a

prima facie case under the ADA. (Id. at 18); see Sanders v.

Arenson Prods., 91 F.3d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1996). The court

granted defendants summary judgment on the FEHA claim because

plaintiff had no standing to bring the claim. (December 2004

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The court also granted summary judgment to defendants 3

on plaintiff’s Title VII claim because Title VII does not cover

employment discrimination based on disability. (December 2004

Order at 16 n.9). 

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 4

sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of

this title . . ., the court, in its discretion, may

allow the prevailing party, other than the United

States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the

costs . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1988.

In any action or administrative proceeding commenced 5

pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than

the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee,

including litigation expenses, and costs, and the

United States shall be liable for the foregoing the

same as a private individual.

42 U.S.C. § 12205.

7

Order at 19-21).3

Similarly, defendants were granted summary judgment on

plaintiff’s § 1985 claim because he was not deprived of any right

or privilege due to his disability and therefore was not injured. 

(Id. at 22). In addition, plaintiff showed no conspiracy against

disabled persons. (Id.). 

II. Discussion

A. The Standard Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 12205

Attorneys’ fees may be sought only against the losing

party, but not his counsel, under §§ 1988 and 12205. Roadway 4 5

Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 756-57 (1980). In contrast,

28 U.S.C. § 1927 “deals only with attorney conduct and involves

taxing costs against counsel.” Id. at 757. 

In the context of civil rights statutes, strong policy

considerations support awarding attorneys’ fees to prevailing

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plaintiffs. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.

411, 418 (1978)(interpreting the fees shifting provision of Title

VII, and holding that “plaintiff is the chosen instrument of

Congress to vindicate a policy that Congress considered of the

highest priority”)(citation omitted). These policy

considerations are not present when a court considers awarding

attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant in a civil rights case. 

Id. at 418-19. Therefore, a prevailing defendant in a civil

rights case may recover only where the plaintiff’s action was

“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id. at 421. 

An action is “frivolous” where it lacks an arguable basis in law

or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The

court need not find that plaintiff brought his action(s) in

subjective bad faith to award fees to defendant. Christiansburg,

434 U.S. at 421. But “if a plaintiff is found to have brought or

continued such a claim in bad faith, there will be an even

stronger basis for charging him with the attorney’s fees incurred

by the defense.” Id. at 422(emphasis in original). Where some

claims are frivolous and others are not, the court may award fees

for the charges incurred as a result of defending the frivolous

claims if the frivolous claims are separable from those that are

not. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435

(1983)(“unrelated claims [must] be treated as if they had been

raised in separate lawsuits”).

In analyzing a claim to determine whether it is

frivolous, a court must resist any temptation to engage in post

hoc reasoning. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22. “Even when

the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the

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outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for

bringing suit.” Id. at 422. However, a plaintiff cannot simply

bury his head in the sand before filing a civil rights claim; he

has the duty, through his attorney, to make a reasonable inquiry

into the applicable facts and law before filing his action. 

Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 854 (9th Cir. 1998); see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 

The claim need not be frivolous at the time of filing

for defendant to recover under Christiansburg. “Under the

Christiansburg standard, a prevailing defendant may also be

entitled to fees if the plaintiff continued to litigate the suit

after it clearly became frivolous.” Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt,

182 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Although Christiansburg applied this “frivolous or

unreasonable” test to a case brought under Title VII, the Ninth

Circuit has applied it to cases in which defendants sought

attorneys’ fees under § 1988 and the ADA. Margolis, 140 F.3d at

854(§ 1988); Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150,

1154 (9th Cir. 1997)(ADA).

B. Applying the Christiansburg Standard

1. The dismissed claims

Plaintiff’s original complaint alleged nine causes of

action, and plaintiff’s FAC alleged one more. Defendants do not

move the court for attorneys’ fees in connection with the five

state law causes of action, but only in connection with the ADA

claim, the § 1983 claims, and the § 1985(3) claim.

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim invoking the First, Fourth,

and Fifth Amendments was frivolous. Plaintiff himself apparently

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thought so little of these claims that he did not bother to

defend their merit in his opposition to the motion to dismiss. 

Not only was the First Amendment claim foreclosed by the Supreme

Court in Rosenberger, it defies common sense to argue that a

lawyer employed by a county has an unfettered First Amendment

right to insert whatever language he chooses into papers he files

on behalf of the county. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim was

also frivolous: he never alleged any search or seizure. 

Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim was frivolous because it was

entirely duplicative of his Fourteenth Amendment due process

claim. It is black letter law that the due process clause of the

Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government and the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states. 

See Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1044 fn.2.

Plaintiff advanced two theories under § 1983 as to why

his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated. 

Plaintiff alleged that he had both a property interest in his job

and in his unpaid vacation time. He alleged that defendants

deprived him of these property interests without due process. 

The first Fourteenth Amendment cause of action, that he had a

property interest in his job, was not frivolous under the

Christiansburg standard. Although the court held plaintiff to be

an at-will employee under the county code and also held that a

Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) did not apply to plaintiff as

to the procedure his employer had to follow when terminating him,

it was understandable that plaintiff would misinterpret this MOU. 

(See October 2003 Order at 9-11). In fact, the court found that

the MOU applied to the salary, vacation, medical, and other

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The second Fourteenth Amendment theory advanced by 6

plaintiff, that he was denied pay for his unused vacation time

and that the MOU did not afford him due process, survived the

motion to dismiss and is discussed below.

11

benefits of employment that plaintiff received. (December 2004

Order at 11).6

2. Plaintiff’s Roth stigmatization claim 

After this court’s October 2003 order, plaintiff filed

his FAC alleging four causes of action. His claims included a

due process claim for his unpaid vacation time, a § 1983 claim

based on his liberty interest in his reputation, a § 1985 claim

alleging a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of equal protection of

the laws, and a disability discrimination claim. 

It is a close question whether plaintiff’s

stigmatization claim was frivolous. All that plaintiff alleged

in his FAC was that, at worst, defendants informed others that

plaintiff had written “improper meet and confer letters” and that

plaintiff was “malignant” and “more of a detriment than an asset”

to his employer. (December 2004 Order at 7-8). The court found

that these comments did not rise to the level of stigmatization

required by Roth and its progeny. (Id. at 9). A claim alleging

stigmatizing charges of “insubordination, incompetence, hostility

towards authority, and aggressive behavior” is not enough to

support a Roth stigmatization claim, Gray v. Union County

Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1975), and

the comments plaintiff claims damaged his reputation fall short

of these types of charges. Indeed, an attorney being called

“malignant” is hardly damaging at all. In the world of

aggressive litigation, some clients may want the most malignant

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Plaintiff might argue that his claims were also made 7

under the California FEHA, and that therefore the attorneys’ fees

analysis must be analyzed under that standard. However, the

standard is the same for awarding attorneys’ fees to prevailing

defendants under both the ADA and the FEHA. Moss v. Associated

Press, 956 F.Supp. 891, 893 (C.D. Cal. 1996)(“The court’s

discretion in granting attorney fees to a prevailing defendant

12

lawyer they can find.

Plaintiff argues that his claim was not frivolous

because the Roth stigmatization threshold should be lowered for

attorneys in small legal communities like Tehama County. He

argues that no other legal employer in the area would hire him

after it became known that he had written improper meet and

confer letters. The Ninth Circuit does not consider the size of

the community in determining whether a plaintiff has a viable

stigmatization claim. In Gray, for example, the plaintiff was a

special education school teacher in a rural county. 520 F.2d at

804. Gray did not hold that the small size of the Union County

educational community was a distinguishing factor lessening the

standard by which comments are adjudged to be stigmatizing. 

In light of the Christiansburg standard, however, the

court does not find that plaintiff’s Roth stigmatization claim

was frivolous. Although this court’s reading of the law

forecloses plaintiff’s arguments, plaintiff could have argued to

the Ninth Circuit that a lawyer’s good name is his primary asset,

and that the standards for lawyers in small communities should be

different. 

3. Plaintiff’s ADA claim 

The next question is whether the claims made under the

ADA were frivolous. After eighteen months of litigation, 7

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under the California FEHA is governed by the Supreme Court’s

decision in Christiansburg”).

13

plaintiff finally admitted on December 20, 2004 that “Mr. Allen’s

visual problems [related to his diabetes] did not play a role in

Mr. Buck’s decision to terminate Mr. Allen.” (See Pl.’s Response

to Def.’s Am. Statement of Undisputed Facts at ¶ 168)(plaintiff

responded that the quoted statement was “[u]ndisputed for the

purposes of this motion”). This was not a typographical error. 

At the hearing on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the

court and plaintiff’s counsel had the following exchange:

THE COURT: Are you retracting your statement, then?

[Defendants’ counsel] Mr. Smith points out that you admitted

that his [plaintiff’s] termination had no relation to his

disability.

MR. SWENSON: Your Honor, no, I don’t do that. And, in fact,

in all candor, we don’t have direct evidence of that, and

that’s what this admission is. We concede that point, there

is not direct evidence.”

(Rep.’s Tr. on Mot. for Summ. J. at 9). Later in the hearing,

plaintiff’s counsel also conceded that plaintiff “was able to

perform the essential functions of his job with or without [any]

accommodations.” (Id. at 12).

Defendants have made a strong argument that the ADA

claim was frivolous from its inception. Plaintiff was told that

he was terminated because he was malignant and had written

improper letters to opposing counsel. (December 2004 Order at

3). There was a good deal of evidence accessible to plaintiff at

the time he filed suit that tended to show that these were the

real reasons for his termination. Plaintiff’s supervisor Buck

had told plaintiff numerous times throughout plaintiff’s tenure

as a deputy counsel that his litigation style was objectionable. 

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(See Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Am. Statement of Undisputed

Material Facts ¶ 27, 31-35, 39, 43, 45, 52, 56, 58-59, 62-67, 87,

100)(admissions of plaintiff).

Plaintiff now argues that minor discrepancies in what

Buck and others said about plaintiff’s termination and how the

office sought to accommodate plaintiff’s disability led plaintiff

to believe that the reasons Buck gave him for his dismissal were

a pretext. The court has serious questions about this line of

argument because of the overwhelming evidence that plaintiff was

fired due to his job performance. Nevertheless, given the policy

considerations highlighted in Christiansburg, and

Christiansburg’s admonition to courts to avoid the temptation to

engage in post hoc reasoning, the court accepts plaintiff’s

reasoning and finds his ADA claim not frivolous.

4. Plaintiff’s § 1985 Claim

Plaintiff’s § 1985(3) claim was not frivolous. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that “Mr. Buck was the only person

involved in the decision to terminate [plaintiff].” (Pl.’s

Response to Def.’s Am. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶

99). In his opposition, plaintiff does not dispute that this

claim was frivolous. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Attorneys’

Fees). However, because the court finds plaintiff did not file

his disability discrimination cause of action frivolously, and

because evidence of the lack of conspiracy may have only become

available to plaintiff late in the litigation, the court finds

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Defendants might also argue that plaintiff does not 8

belong to a class protected by § 1985(3). (See December 2004

Order at 21-22). However, plaintiff could have made a good faith

argument that the disabled should be protected by § 1985(3). 

15

plaintiff’s § 1985 not frivolous.8

5. Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim For Unpaid Vacation 

Time 

Defendants concede that plaintiff’s due process claim

for the $275 in unpaid vacation time was plausible. (Defs.’ Mot.

for Attorneys’ Fees at 2). The court agrees. Although plaintiff

did not follow the procedure outlined in the MOU to recover the

money, and although the court held that procedure to adequately

protect plaintiff’s property interest, (see December 2004 Order

at 11-16), this outcome was not so obvious as to render the claim

frivolous.

C. Claims for Attorneys’ Fees Under § 1927 and the Court’s 

Inherent Power

Section 1927 of Title 28 provides:

Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any

case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the

court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and

attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.

Section 1927 does not displace the court’s inherent power to

sanction attorneys. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46

(1991). That inherent power includes the power to impose

attorneys’ fees but is limited to situations where the litigant

has acted in bad faith or in willful disobedience of a court’s

orders. Id. at 47. Where an attorney files frivolous pleadings,

the inherent power of the court may be used to sanction the

attorney. In re Keegan Mgmt. Co. Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 435

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(9th Cir. 1996).

In the Ninth Circuit, attorneys’ fees may only be

awarded to the opposing party under § 1927 when a court finds

that an attorney acted in bad faith. New Alaska Dev. Corp. v.

Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1989). “Bad faith is

present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a

frivolous argument or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose

of harassing an opponent.” Id.(citation omitted). For fees to

be awarded under § 1927 against an attorney, there must be a

causal link between the attorney’s multiplication of the action

and the fees incurred by the other party. Kirschner v. Uniden

Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Section 1927 fees cannot be charged an attorney on the

basis of frivolous pleadings. In re Keegan Mgmt. Co. Sec.

Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 435 (9th Cir. 1996)(reasoning that it is the

multiplication of proceedings that makes an attorney liable for

attorneys’ fees under § 1927). Where an attorney proceeds to

litigate a cause of action after being made aware of its

frivolity by opposing counsel, a court may find him liable for

attorneys’ fees under § 1927. Schutts v. Bently Nevada Corp.,

966 F.Supp. 1549, 1559-60 (D. Nev. 1997)(citing Trulis v. Barton,

67 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Mr. Angelo alleges numerous instances of bad faith on

the part of Mr. Swenson. (See Angelo Decl. in Supp. of Mot. for

Attorneys’ Fees). Angelo alleges that Swenson routinely refused

to return his phone calls and faxes, was dilatory in responding

to defendants’ discovery requests, and refused to extend

discovery to allow defendants to take a deposition to preserve

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the testimony of defendant Buck, who had been diagnosed with two

forms of cancer. (See id.). Angelo effectively argues that

Swenson did not extend any professional courtesies to Angelo’s

firm in the discovery process. He also effectively argues that

Swenson asked some argumentative questions at depositions. 

However, the court finds that these behaviors alone do not rise

to the level of subjective bad faith required to impose § 1927

liability upon Swenson.

Some of defendants’ allegations, however, do raise

serious questions about Swenson’s conduct during this litigation. 

First, Swenson signed and filed a complaint alleging that

defendant County of Tehama had negligently retained defendant due

to his being diagnosed with cancer. This cause of action made a

matter of public record Buck’s personal medical information,

including his chemotherapy and radiation treatments, and also

accused Buck of having “impaired abilities and judgment” due to

his cancer. (See compl. ¶¶ 61-62). Not only was the county

immune from the cause of action, (October 2003 Order at 21-22),

but plaintiff had no facts showing that Buck had “impaired

abilities and judgment.” (See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss)(not addressing this cause of action at all). The court

dismissed this claim in its October 2003 order. 

While attorneys’ fees are not available to defendants

under § 1927 on the basis of the filing of the negligent

retention cause of action, the court may use its inherent power

to sanction Swenson. See In re Keegan, 78 F.3d at 435. However,

the use of the court’s inherent power to sanction attorneys is an

extraordinary remedy that should only be exercised with extreme

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caution. Id. Although this cause of action seems to have been

inserted to harass defendants, the court finds that its inclusion

does not warrant the court’s use of the extraordinary remedy of

ordering Swenson to pay attorneys’ fees to defendants.

Defendants’ next allegation that warrants closer

scrutiny is the letter that Swenson authored, signed, and sent to

defendants’ counsel Angelo on September 14, 2004. (See Angelo

Decl. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees Ex. C (Swenson

September 2004 letter)). That letter contains the following

passage:

The defendants and your law firm can also avoid the risks

attending the actual, existing, material factual conflicts

your firm has in representing defendants with conflicting

versions under penalty of perjury regarding material facts:

[In the next paragraph, plaintiff shows that some of

defendants’ witnesses said conflicting things. The court

found the allegations of conflict of interest to be without

merit. (December 2004 Order at 10 n.5)]

Settlement “hides a lot of sin,” and your firm benefits by

not having to deal with the conflict issues . . .

(Id. at 2-3)(emphasis in original). The language in this letter

violates California Rule of Professional Conduct 5-100, which

provides that “[a] member shall not threaten to present criminal,

administrative, or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in

a civil dispute.” However, the letter itself does not multiply

the proceedings, and defendants’ counsel conceded as much at oral

argument. Therefore, awarding attorneys’ fees under § 1927 would

be contrary to the language of that statute. The court also

declines to exercise its discretion to award attorneys’ fees

under its inherent power because Swenson’s letter is not related

to the attorneys’ fees that defendants incurred. 

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Finally, defendants allege that Mr. Swenson acted in

bad faith with regard to his knowledge of the frivolity of the

claims. In a letter dated July 6, 2004, defendants’ counsel sent

Swenson a letter noting that discovery had closed and outlining

the strong case against Swenson’s client. (Angelo Decl. in Supp.

of Defs.’ Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees Ex. A (Smith July 2004

letter)). His continued prosecution of a case he knew to be

frivolous left Swenson susceptible to liability for attorneys’

fees under § 1927. Schutts, 966 F.Supp. at 1560.

The reality of this unique case, however, leads the

court not to award attorneys’ fees under § 1927 to defendants on

the basis of Swenson’s knowledge of the strong case against his

client. Over the course of the last 22 months, the court has had

the opportunity to observe plaintiff Allen, his attorney Swenson,

and the management of the case. It has become increasingly clear

that Allen, a licensed attorney, was calling the shots during

this litigation. Therefore, if Swenson, after reading Smith’s

letter, had refused to further prosecute the case, the court is

convinced that Allen would have proceeded to litigate the case on

his own or found another attorney to do so. That state of

affairs would have led to further delays and would have had no

salutary effect on the number of motions and documents filed. 

Swenson’s continued representation of Allen did not, therefore,

multiply the proceedings. The court also does not impose

sanctions on Swenson on the basis of its inherent power. 

D. Calculation of Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees

Where attorneys’ fees are appropriate, the district

court is to determine their amount by using the lodestar method –

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The court may adjust the lodestar figure on the basis 9

of the Kerr factors:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and

difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4)

the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due

to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) 

time limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results

obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability

of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the

case, (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client, and (12) awards in

similar cases.

Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.

1975). Many of the Kerr factors have been subsumed in the

lodestar approach. Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d

481, 487 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, the court should consider

the factors established by Kerr, but need not discuss each

factor. Sapper v. Lenco Blade, Inc., 704 F.2d 1069, 1073 (9th

Cir. 1983). 

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the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433

(1983). There is a strong presumption that the lodestar amount

is reasonable. Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119

n.4 (9th Cir. 2000). The court may adjust the lodestar figure if

various factors overcome the presumption of reasonableness.9

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34.

Where a prevailing defendant is awarded attorneys’ fees

in a civil rights action, the financial resources of the

plaintiff should be considered. Patton v. County of Kings, 857

F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1988). The award should not subject

the plaintiff to financial ruin. Id. 

The court computes the attorneys’ fees due defendants

for the effort they expended in defending against the frivolous

claim. See Hensley, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)(“unrelated claims

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[must] be treated as if they had been raised in separate

lawsuits”). The court adopts the method used in Schneider v.

Elko County Sheriff’s Department. See 17 F.Supp. 2d 1162, 1166

(D. Nev. 1998). Schneider found the most natural way to

calculate attorneys’ fees in a situation with separable frivolous

and non-frivolous claims is to “compar[e] the amount of the

motion for partial summary judgment devoted solely to the

[frivolous claims] to the amount devoted to legal argument on all

other claims.” Id. Schneider went on to divide the number of

lines in the motion devoted to the frivolous claims by the total

number of lines in the motion, and then multiplied that

percentage by the lodestar amount. Id.

Defendants have presented the court an itemized list,

from July 8, 2003 to the present, of the fees charged their

clients. (Smith Decl. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Attorneys’

Fees Ex. A (fee invoices)). Partners at the law firm of Angelo,

Kilday and Kilduff charged $150 per hour, associates charged $130

per hour, and paralegals charged $75 per hour. The total billed

on this matter is $206,956.25. Id. ¶ 2. Defendants would offset

this amount by the $600 already recovered in sanctions against

plaintiff’s counsel, so they seek $206,356. 

Plaintiff does not object to the rates charged by

defendants’ counsel. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Attorneys’

Fees at 27-28). Indeed, the court finds those rates to be

extremely reasonable under the circumstances. Plaintiff does not

point to any specific charge he considers excessive, but he makes

the argument that defendants’ fees must be inflated because

$206,325 is too much to pay to defend against frivolous and

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On May 1, 2004, Plaintiff served nine sets of discovery 10

on Defendants, including requests for production of

documents, special interrogatories and requests for

admissions. It was the first discovery initiated by

Plaintiff during the entire litigation. Responses to

all sets of discovery were due June 3, 2004. The

special interrogatories consisted of 155

interrogatories when subparts were counted under Fed.

R. Civ. Proc. 33(a). The requests for production

demanded 74 categories of documents, very few of which

required singular responses such as particular books or

letters. The requests for admissions requested the

admission of 122 alleged facts. Although many of the

requests were similar or the same between defendants,

many were not. A full response required production of

a large number of documents and a review of almost all

of the litigation correspondence in matters handled by

James Allen as a Tehama Deputy County Counsel.

(Angelo Decl. in Supp. of Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees ¶ 47). 

There was a safeguard in place to prevent defendants’ 11

fees from being inflated. Tehama County has kept current in

their payments to Angelo, Kilday, & Kilduff, and so has had an

interest in keeping taxpayer expenditures on this matter to a

minimum. (See Smith Decl. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Attorneys’

Fees Ex. A (fee invoices))

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groundless claims. First, the court notes that plaintiff’s openended discovery requests tended to produce these kinds of fees.10

Second, plaintiff’s counsel’s tendency to not return phone calls

or faxes and to fight every step of the way on minor discovery

matters also tended to make defendants’ fees balloon. (See

Angelo Decl. in Supp. of Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees ¶¶ 3-89). 

Plaintiff might also argue that the fees defendants

incurred after December 28, 2005 should not be recoverable. 

However, the fees incurred by defendants in preparing a motion

for attorneys’ fees are recoverable against the plaintiff where

the plaintiff has pursued a frivolous civil rights claim. 

Schutts, 966 F.Supp. at 1565. The court finds the entire

$206,325 to have been reasonably expended. Neither plaintiff 11

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The court rounds this and following numbers to reflect 12

the necessarily inexact nature of the court’s determination of

the amount of time spent on frivolous and nonfrivolous claims. 

The number of lines spent on a given argument is not always

determinative, but is a good indicator in this case.

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nor defendants argue that the court should adjust this lodestar

figure based on the Kerr factors. The court has considered the

Kerr factors and holds that they do not provide grounds for

adjusting the lodestar amount.

The court proceeds to compute the fees plaintiff must

pay defendants for filing and pursuing a frivolous claim under

Schneider. See 17 F.Supp. 2d at 1166 (D. Nev. 1998). The only

frivolous claim on which defendants may recover their fees was

dismissed on October 8, 2003. (See October 2003 Order at

24)(dismissing plaintiff’s § 1983 claims based on the First,

Fourth, and Fifth Amendments). 

Not counting the preliminary exposition of facts,

defendants’ motion to dismiss contains 84 lines dedicated to the

frivolous § 1983 claim out of a total of 625 lines dedicated to

argument, for an approximate percentage of 13.4%. The total 12

billed from the inception of the suit to October 7, 2003 was

$35,517. (Smith Decl. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Attorneys’

Fees Ex. A (fee invoices)). Therefore, defendants are entitled

to $4,759 for this period.

Because there were no other frivolous claims,

defendants are due $4,759 for the period between this case’s

inception and Decmeber 27, 2004, the date defendants were granted

summary judgment on the remaining causes of action. This amount

is 2.8% of the $172,545 in total fees incurred by defendants for

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that time period. Applying that 2.8% figure to the remaining

$34,411.25 incurred from December 28, 2004 to January 26, 2005,

the date of this motion’s submission to the court, plaintiff owes

additional attorneys’ fees of $964 for this period.

Therefore, the court computes that plaintiff owes

defendants attorneys’ fees in the amount of $4,759 + $964 =

$5,723.

The next question is how much, if at all, the court

should discount these awards for plaintiff’s income. Plaintiff

has filed a supplemental declaration in which he states his net

worth and his annual salary. In 2004 plaintiff had an adjusted

gross income of $101,162. His annual salary is $110,000. His

wife, whom he supports, does not work. He does not own a home,

and his other assets, including his retirement account, do not

exceed $75,000. His annual medical expenses exceed $15,000.

This is not the financial picture of a man who is

extremely wealthy, nor is it one of a man living in poverty. The

court finds that a sanction of $5,723 against Allen would not

subject him to undue financial hardship. Compare Schutts, 966

F.Supp. at 1553, 1565(finding that plaintiff convicted felon, who

did not have independent means, could afford attorneys’ fees

award of $6,281).

///

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

attorney’s fees and costs be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in

the amount of $5,723 against plaintiff James Allen.

DATED: April 15, 2005

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