Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02231/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02231-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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NA 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Berry Williams, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Unknown Cisneros, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-2231-PHX-DGC (DKD) 

ORDER 

On October 8, 2014, Plaintiff Berry Williams, who is confined in the Arizona 

State Prison Complex -Yuma in San Luis, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a 

January 14, 2015 Order, the Court granted the Application to Proceed and dismissed the 

Complaint because Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days 

to file an amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 

 On March 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. In an April 24, 

2015 Order, the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint because Plaintiff had 

failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file a second amended 

complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 

 On May 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 11). The 

Court will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and this action. 

. . . . 

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I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

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II. Second Amended Complaint 

 In his one-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues the Arizona 

Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) and ADOC Correctional Officers Unknown 

Cisneros, Unknown Badsted, and Unknown Reigie. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. 

 Plaintiff asserts a failure to protect claim and alleges the following facts: On 

November 22, 2013, Defendants Cisneros, Badsted, and Reigie were working in the 

maximum security housing unit where Plaintiff was housed. Defendants Cisneros, 

Badsted, and Reigie failed to follow procedure by moving unrestrained inmates outside 

of the cells and having more than one inmate out of a cell at a time. As a result of this 

failure to comply with procedure, Plaintiff was assaulted by another inmate identified as 

“Nobles.” Defendant Cisneros walked Plaintiff, who was unrestrained, to the shower. 

Defendants Reigie and Badsted failed to “act by not objecting to behavior [that] 

knowingly plac[ed], not only [Plaintiff], but any other officer at risk.” Defendant 

Badsted held Plaintiff outside of his cell while Defendant Cisneros led another 

unrestrained inmate past Plaintiff and “allowed [Nobles] to attack [Plaintiff].” Plaintiff 

claims that all of the “most violent offenders” are housed in maximum security housing, 

and that the inmates are not allowed any contact with other inmates. Plaintiff further 

claims that Defendant Cisneros failed to comply with “procedure” on three occasions, 

and that “her fellows . . . . turned a blind eye to policy” on those three occasions. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendants are “specifically trained to guard against” the risk 

involved when moving unrestrained inmates outside of the cells and having more than 

one inmate out of a cell at a time. Plaintiff further contends that ADOC is responsible for 

training its employees and ensuring that its employees act in compliance with that 

training. Plaintiff claims he has been injured as follows: he suffers from anxiety, pain in 

his leg and back, and takes a “plethora of medication in an attempt to cope with 

every[]day existence.” 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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III. Failure to State a Claim

 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific 

injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an 

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 at 371-72, 377 (1976). 

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

A. ADOC 

The Arizona Department of Corrections is not a proper Defendant. Under the 

Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a state or state agency may 

not be sued in federal court without its consent. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Furthermore, “a state is not a ‘person’ for purposes of section 1983. Likewise ‘arms of 

the State’ such as the Arizona Department of Corrections are not ‘persons’ under section 

1983.” Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation 

omitted). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Defendant Arizona Department of 

Corrections. 

B. Failure to Protect 

 To state a claim for failure to protect or threat to safety, an inmate must allege 

facts to support that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of 

harm and that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to those risks. Farmer, 511 

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U.S. at 832-33. To adequately allege deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege facts 

to support that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an excessive risk to inmate safety. 

Id. at 837. That is, “the official must both [have been] aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and he must 

also [have] draw[n] the inference.” Id. Thus, Plaintiff must allege facts to support when 

and how any particular defendant knew of a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff and that 

the defendant disregarded or failed to take steps to protect Plaintiff. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a failure to protect 

claim under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff has not adequately alleged facts showing 

that Defendants Cisneros, Badsted, and Reigie knew of any excessive risk to Plaintiff’s 

safety. Although Plaintiff states that due to Defendants failure to follow procedure, he 

was assaulted, he does not allege adequate factual support to show that Defendants acted 

with deliberate indifference. Other than broadly asserting that all inmates housed in the 

maximum security housing unit are the most violent offenders, Plaintiff does not allege 

how any Defendant could have known that he was at risk when he was out of his cell on 

November 22, 2013. For example, Plaintiff does not indicate whether any verbal or 

physical threats were made against him or whether there was any indication that Nobles 

or any other inmate intended to hurt him. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege that 

Defendants knew or should have known that Nobles posed a substantial threat to Plaintiff 

but nevertheless allowed both Plaintiff and Nobles to be out of their cells unrestrained. 

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for failure to protect in Count One, and the 

Court will dismiss Count One. 

IV. Dismissal without Leave to Amend

 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in his Second Amended Complaint, the 

Court will dismiss his Second Amended Complaint. “Leave to amend need not be given 

if a complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 

Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is 

particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously been permitted to amend his complaint. 

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Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Repeated failure to cure deficiencies is one of the factors to be considered in deciding 

whether justice requires granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 

 Plaintiff has made three efforts at crafting a viable complaint and appears unable 

to do so despite specific instructions from the Court. The Court finds that further 

opportunities to amend would be futile. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, will 

dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) and this action are 

dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 (2) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the 

dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

 (3) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of 

this decision would not be taken in good faith. 

 Dated this 9th day of June, 2015. 

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