Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00722/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00722-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARIUS SIMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. R. WALKER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-00722-CAB-JLB

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

[ECF No. 15]

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. 

(ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff Darius Sims brings this action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 for the medical care he received while incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility (“RJDCF”). (ECF No. 1 at 3–6.)

1

 In his complaint, Plaintiff names 

as defendants Drs. Walker, Chau, Clayton, Barenchi, and Correctional Officer Strayhorn. 

(Id.) Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them, arguing that Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing suit and that the complaint fails to 

state a claim against any Defendant. (ECF No. 15-1.) Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 20.) 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Cathy 

Ann Bencivengo pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rule 72.3 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

 

1 All page citations in this Order refer to those automatically generated by the CM/ECF system.

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After a thorough review of Plaintiff’s complaint, the parties’ motion and opposition papers, 

and all supporting documents, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 

No. 15). 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Darius Sims, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

initiated this action by filing a complaint in this Court on April 10, 2017. (ECF No. 1.) On 

June 15, 2017, Plaintiff filed exhibits in support of his complaint. (ECF No. 5.) On June 

29, 2017, the Honorable Cathy Ann Bencivengo found Plaintiff’s complaint sufficient to 

survive the low threshold for proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). (ECF No. 6.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ provision of medical care violated the Eighth 

Amendment. (ECF No. 1.)2 Specifically, he asserts Defendants acted with deliberate 

indifference when they (1) failed to adequately treat his chronic pain; (2) prescribed a 

medication that previously caused Plaintiff’s kidneys to fail; (3) refused to designate

Plaintiff as a full-time wheelchair user; (4) interfered with Plaintiff’s transfer to another 

facility; (5) harassed Plaintiff during and after his medical appointments; and (6) denied 

his healthcare appeals. (Id.) 

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his complaint:3 Plaintiff suffers from 

chronic and severe pain as a result of his many aliments, which include gout, migraines, 

severe back pain, kidney disease, cardiac issues, vision impairment, hypertension, and 

 

2

In his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff makes reference to medical treatment by 

his current primary care physician, Dr. Santos, and the processing of Plaintiff’s grievances by Warden 

Din. (ECF No. 20 at 5–6, 8–9.) The Court does not consider Plaintiff’s statements regarding Dr. Santos 

or Warden Din as Plaintiff did not name these individuals as defendants and has not sought leave to amend 

his complaint to include claims against these individuals. 

3 The allegations contained in Plaintiff’s complaint are accepted as true for purposes of assessing 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss only. In addition, this Report and Recommendation does not provide a 

summary of all of the facts presented in the complaint but only those that are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims 

against Defendants Walker, Chau, Clayton, Barenchi, and Strayhorn. 

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nerve damage. (Id. at 3–5.) Some of these ailments require Plaintiff to use a wheelchair 

for mobility. (Id.) Plaintiff’s primary care physicians, Defendants Walker and Chau, did 

not adequately treat his pain when they failed to prescribe the medication Plaintiff 

requested, did not refer him to the pain management committee, and failed to treat his 

migraines. (Id.) In addition, Defendant Chau prescribed Plaintiff the medication

allopurinol, which previously caused Plaintiff’s kidneys to fail, as evidenced by his medical 

records. (Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff further alleges that he was transferred to RJDCF in retaliation for a prior 

lawsuit he filed against officials at another facility. (ECF No. 5 at 2.) Plaintiff was 

previously housed at Mule Creek State Prison (“Mule Creek”), but was transferred to 

California Health Care Facility, Stockton (“CHCF”) after receiving two heart stints in 

December 2015. (Id.) At that time, he was litigating a case against Mule Creek officials 

for the medical care he had received. (Id.) Plaintiff was required to leave his legal 

documents at Mule Creek when he was transferred to CHCF. (Id.) He was subsequently

transferred back to Mule Creek to retrieve his legal documents, with the understanding that 

he would be transferred back to CHCF after retrieving his documents. (Id.) Instead, he 

was transferred to RJDCF. (Id.) Plaintiff was transferred to RJDCF on or about May 2, 

2016 as a “high risk patient.” (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff was transferred from Mule Creek to 

RJDCF, instead of CHCF, as punishment for initiating a lawsuit against Mule Creek

officials. (Id. at 2.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he was previously housed at RJDCF in 2011, but was 

transferred to another facility in early 2012 because of his “problems” with Defendant 

Walker. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff’s history with Defendant Walker affected the medical 

care he received at RJDCF. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff’s history with Defendant Walker 

resulted in the denial of his request to be transferred back to CHCF and his request to be 

designated as a full-time wheelchair user, instead of a part-time wheelchair user. (Id.) 

Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Strayhorn, a correctional officer, interfered 

with his ability to obtain medical treatment by once forcibly removing Plaintiff from 

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Defendant Chau’s office during an appointment and by refusing to call a wheelchair pusher 

after Plaintiff’s appointments on several occasions, leaving Plaintiff outside in hot weather

for over an hour. (Id. at 2–3.) 

Plaintiff filed three grievances regarding his medical treatment at RJDCF. The first 

grievance, filed on September 12, 2016, stated that Defendants Walker and Chau were not 

adequately treating his pain and requested that Plaintiff be prescribed stronger pain 

medication or sent to a facility that was equipped to treat his illnesses. (ECF No. 5 at 27–

29.) Plaintiff alleges that he spoke with Defendants Walker and Chau “several times” about 

this first grievance, but never received a response. (Id. at 3.) However, Plaintiff states in 

his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that he received a response to this 

grievance on May 31, 2017 and “never saw it again” after resubmitting the grievance for 

review. (ECF No. 20 at 7.) On November 9, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a second grievance 

inquiring about the status of his September 12, 2016 grievance. (ECF No. 5 at 31.) The 

record does not indicate when or whether Plaintiff received a response to this second 

grievance.

On November 29, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a third grievance stating that Defendants 

Walker and Chau were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, 

resulting in “life threatening situations.” (Id. at 54.) Plaintiff warned that the failure to 

treat his condition could result in further significant injury. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that 

Defendants Walker and Chau were aware of Plaintiff’s pain but refused to respond to his 

pain as past doctors had. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that he asked Defendant Chau to provide 

him with a full-time wheelchair use accommodation, refer him to the pain management 

committee, and reinstate his outpatient housing status so that he could be transferred to 

CHCF. (Id.) In this grievance, Plaintiff requested a reinstatement of his past pain 

medication, a full-time wheelchair use accommodation, and a transfer to CHCF. (Id. at 

52.) Plaintiff also referenced his first (September 12, 2016) grievance, stating that he spoke 

with Defendant Walker about this grievance but had not received it back. (Id. at 54.) 

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On January 13, 2017, Defendant Clayton interviewed Plaintiff about his third 

grievance. (Id. at 46.)4 On February 4, 2017, Defendant Barenchi denied Plaintiff’s appeal 

of his grievance at the first level of review. (Id. at 46–47.) Plaintiff’s request to be 

designated as a full-time wheelchair user was denied because Defendant Barenchi found 

that Plaintiff was able ambulate with a cane. (Id.) Plaintiff’s request to be transferred to 

outpatient housing at CHCF was denied because Defendant Clayton had found no medical 

indication for a transfer. (Id.) Lastly, Plaintiff’s request to have his prior pain medication 

reinstated was denied as Defendant Clayton had found no clear medical indication for 

reinstatement of Plaintiff’s narcotic pain medications. (Id.) 

On April 7, 2017, Plaintiff’s appeal of his third grievance was denied at the second 

level of review by Chief Medical Executive Dr. S. Roberts. (Id. at 48.) Dr. Roberts denied 

Plaintiff’s request to be designated as a full-time wheelchair user because examinations of 

Plaintiff and his medical records indicated that Plaintiff was appropriately designated as a 

part-time wheelchair user. (Id.) Plaintiff’s request to be transferred was denied because 

there was no current medical indication that Plaintiff’s condition required a transfer. (Id.) 

Dr. Roberts denied Plaintiff’s request to reinstate his prior medication because he found 

that Plaintiff was being appropriately treated with acetaminophen and gabapentin. (Id.) 

Three days later, on April 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action. (ECF 

No. 1.)

Plaintiff appealed his grievance to the third level of review on May 24, 2017. (ECF 

No. 5 at 51.) The record does not contain a decision at the third level of review; however, 

Plaintiff states in his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that he received a denial 

of this appeal at the third level on September 29, 2017. (ECF No. 20 at 4.)

///

 

4 The first level denial of Plaintiff’s appeal of his grievance states that Plaintiff was given the opportunity 

to fully explain his appeal issue(s). (ECF No. 5 at 46.)

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II. FAILURE TO EXHAUST

Defendants argue that this case should be dismissed because the face of the 

complaint indicates that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing 

suit. (ECF No. 15-1 at 10.) Plaintiff argues that he exhausted all available remedies 

because RJDCF’s grievance process is “broken.” (ECF No. 20 at 4.) For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative 

remedies prior to filing suit and RECOMMENDS dismissal without prejudice. 

A. Legal Standards

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires 

a prisoner challenging prison conditions to exhaust available administrative remedies 

before filing suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002); 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 

of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”). 

Exhaustion is a precondition to suit; exhaustion during the pendency of the litigation is 

insufficient. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199–1200.

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 This requirement promotes the PLRA’s 

goal of efficiency by: “(1) ‘giv[ing] prisoners an effective incentive to make full use of the 

prison grievance process’; (2) reducing prisoner suits as some prisoners are ‘persuaded by 

the proceedings not to file an action in federal court’; and (3) improving the quality of any 

remaining prisoner suits ‘because proper exhaustion often results in the creation of an 

 

5

In Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1220 (2014), the Ninth Circuit held that new claims that arose prior 

to the filing of an initial complaint may be added to the complaint via amendment so long as they are 

administratively exhausted prior to amendment. Cano is inapplicable here because Plaintiff has not filed 

an amended complaint and cannot argue that he seeks to add new claims. See Giles v. Felker, 689 F. 

App’x 526, 527 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies before filing an amended 

complaint alleging the same claims does not constitute proper exhaustion.”).

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administrative record that is helpful to the court.’” Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 94–95 (2006)). 

“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other 

critical procedural rules.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. These rules are defined by the prison 

grievance process itself, not by the PLRA. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). “[A] 

prisoner must ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with the 

applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in 

federal court.’” Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Marella v. 

Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009)). In California, a grievance must be timely 

appealed through the third level of review to complete the administrative review process. 

Harvey, 605 F.3d at 683; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b). 

An inmate must exhaust available remedies, but is not required to exhaust 

unavailable remedies. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). “To 

be available, a remedy must be available ‘as a practical matter’; it must be ‘capable of use; 

at hand.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

“Accordingly, an inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures 

that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’” Ross v. 

Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016) (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)).

In Ross v. Blake, the Supreme Court found “three kinds of circumstances in which an 

administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain 

relief.” Id. at 1858–59. These circumstances include: “(1) when the administrative 

procedure ‘operates as a simple dead end’ because officers are ‘unable or consistently 

unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates’; (2) when the administrative scheme 

is ‘so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use’ because ‘no ordinary 

prisoner can discern or navigate it’; and (3) when prison administrators ‘thwart inmates 

from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or 

intimidation.’” Andres v. Marshall, 867 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ross, 

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136 S. Ct. at 1858–59). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[w]hen prison officials improperly 

fail to process a prisoner’s grievance, the prisoner is deemed to have exhausted available 

administrative remedies.” Andres, 867 F.3d at 1079 (finding inmate’s administrative 

remedies effectively unavailable when a state court found that prison improperly failed to 

process plaintiff’s timely filed grievance). See also Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1192 (9th Cir. 2015). “In such circumstances, prison officials have ‘thwart[ed] inmates 

from taking advantage of [the] grievance process,’ making that process unavailable.” 

Andres, 867 F.3d at 1079 (quoting Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859). 

Failure to exhaust under the PLRA is “an affirmative defense the defendant must 

plead and prove.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 204. It is the defendant’s burden to prove that there 

was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner failed to exhaust that remedy. 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. In most circumstances, the appropriate procedural mechanism 

is a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, with the 

defendant attaching the evidence necessary to demonstrate a failure to exhaust. Id. at 1166. 

“In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, a defendant 

may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id.

B. Analysis

Plaintiff concedes that he did not receive a third level response to the appeal of his 

November 29, 2016 grievance prior to filing this action, but argues that he nonetheless 

exhausted available administrative remedies for two reasons: First, because prison 

administrators failed to respond to his first (September 12, 2016) grievance. (ECF No. 20 

at 7.) Second, Plaintiff argues that the appeal process is “broken” because it “take[s] 

months to respond to my HC 602’s to run out of time or to get Plaintiff to lose interest in 

filing grievances.” (Id. at 4.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed because he concedes

that he failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him for his November 29, 

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2016 grievance before filing suit. (ECF No. 21 at 2.)6 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff 

failed to exhaust his claims against Defendants Strayhorn, Barenchi, and Clayton as he 

makes no mention of these Defendants in his grievances. (ECF No. 15-1 at 12.)

Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as 

to Defendants Strayhorn, Barenchi, and Clayton because he did not name them in his 

grievances fails at this early stage of the litigation. A prison’s grievance procedures

determine the level of detail an inmate must include in an administrative grievance to 

properly exhaust a claim. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. The California Code of Regulations 

requires that Plaintiff’s CDCR Form 602 grievance “list all staff members involved,” and 

“describe their involvement in the issue under appeal,” including the “dates of the staff 

member’s involvement.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3). Further, he must 

“describe the specific issue under appeal and the relief requested,” and “state all facts

known and available to him/her regarding the issue being appealed at the time of submitting 

the Inmate/Parolee Appeal form.” Id. at 3084.2(a)(4). An appeal generally “suffices to 

exhaust a claim if it puts the prison on adequate notice of the problem for which the prisoner 

seeks redress.” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 824 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Plaintiff refers to Defendants Barenchi and Clayton in his appeal by stating in his 

objection to the first level response, “If this prison wants another civil suite [sic] because 

of my failing health problems, here we go again; Clayton, Barenchi, Walker, Chau.” (ECF 

No. 5 at 53.) In addition, Plaintiff states in his objection to the second level denial of his 

appeal that, “in speaking to Dr. Clayton, he states that I should be sent back to CHCF.” 

(Id. at 51.) The documentation of Plaintiff’s grievances and appeals that the Court has 

before it do not in any manner identify Defendant Strayhorn as a staff member involved in 

the issues under appeal. (See id. at 27–29, 52–59.) However, Plaintiff’s November 29, 

 

6 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Reply do not address Plaintiff’s argument that prison officials’ 

failure to respond to his first (September 12, 2016) grievance exhausted his remedies, or even make 

mention of this grievance. (See ECF Nos. 15-1, 21.)

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2016 grievance indicates that Plaintiff attached “25 pages listed as Exhibits,” which are not 

contained in the record before the Court. (Id. at 52.) Without the benefit of the exhibits 

attached to Plaintiff’s grievance, this Court cannot find that it is clear from the face of the 

complaint that Plaintiff failed to put the prison on notice of his claims against Defendants 

Strayhorn, Clayton, or Barenchi. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169–70. It may well be that 

Plaintiff failed to properly identify these Defendants in his grievances, but this argument 

is more properly raised in a motion for summary judgment. See id.

Regardless of whether Plaintiff adequately identified Defendants Strayhorn, 

Clayton, and Barenchi in his grievances, it is clear from the face of the complaint that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Exhaustion 

is measured at the time the operative complaint is filed. Andres, 867 F.3d at 1079 (citing 

McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199); Cano, 739 F.3d at 1220–21. Plaintiff filed his complaint on 

April 10, 2017. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s appeal of the decision on his November 29, 2016 

grievance was denied at the second level of review just three days before he filed his 

complaint. (See ECF No. 5 at 48.)7 Plaintiff did not appeal this denial until May 24, 2016. 

(Id. at 51.) In fact, Plaintiff concedes in his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

that he did not receive a third level response to his appeal until September 29, 2017, over 

five months after he filed his complaint. (ECF No. 20 at 4.)8 It is clear from the face of 

the complaint that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him 

for his November 29, 2016 grievance before he filed suit. 

Plaintiff argues that he nonetheless properly exhausted administrative remedies 

before filing suit because prison officials did not respond to his first (September 12, 2016)

grievance. 

 

7

In fact, in his appeal to the third level of review, Plaintiff refers to this action, stating that the same type 

of mistreatment that prompted Plaintiff to file a former lawsuit also “prompted a suit here: Sims v. Walker 

et al.” (ECF No. 5 at 53.) 

8

In the complaint, Plaintiff indicates that he exhausted all forms of available relief prior to filing suit, but 

in explaining this alleged exhaustion, refers only to his prior claims against Mule Creek officials. (See 

ECF No. 1 at 6, 8.) 

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Whether administrative remedies are available is a practical inquiry into the 

functional availability of remedies. See Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1858–59 (grievance procedures 

are available when they “are capable of use to obtain some relief for the action complained 

of”) (internal citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that administrative remedies 

were unavailable when prison officials improperly failed to process a prisoner’s grievance. 

Andres, 867 F.3d at 1079. In Andres, the plaintiff filed a grievance alleging that staff 

members used excessive force against him. Id. at 1077. Approximately six months later, 

having received no response to his grievance, plaintiff filed an action in federal court 

alleging the use of excessive force. Id. Before filing in federal court, plaintiff filed a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court regarding his attempt to exhaust his 

excessive force claim. Id. The state court held an evidentiary hearing and found that 

plaintiff had timely filed a grievance and ordered the prison to accept and process plaintiff’s 

grievance. Id. at 1078. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff had exhausted his available 

remedies because at the time he filed suit, prison officials had not processed plaintiff’s 

grievance. Id. at 1078–79. 

Plaintiff’s situation here differs from that of Andres. At the time Plaintiff filed his 

complaint he was actively pursuing administrative remedies for his claims and the 

grievance process was proceeding without excessive delay. Plaintiff raised the same issues

regarding pain management and transfer to another institution in his November 29, 2016 

(third) grievance as were raised in his September 12, 2016 (first) grievance. (See ECF No. 

5 at 27–28, 50–54.) On the date Plaintiff filed his complaint, his November 29, 2016 (third) 

grievance had been denied at the second level of review and Plaintiff had not yet appealed 

this decision to the final level of review. (Id. at 48–49.) As a practical matter, 

administrative remedies were “capable of use; at hand” because Plaintiff was utilizing these 

processes at the time he filed suit. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171. Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

these remedies before filing his complaint.

Plaintiff further argues that the appeal process is “broken” because prison officials 

generally fail to respond to grievances, and cites as evidence the fact that RJDCF officials 

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did not timely respond to grievances Plaintiff filed on incidents unrelated to his claims in 

this case. (ECF No. 20 at 2–4.) The question here is whether administrative remedies were 

available to Plaintiff “for the action complained of” in this case. See Ross, 136 S. Ct. at

1858–59 (emphasis added). The argument that prison officials failed to respond to 

Plaintiff’s unrelated grievances does not supplant the fact that the face of the complaint 

indicates that officials responded to the grievance that raised the claims Plaintiff alleges in 

this case. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint 

without prejudice on the basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 

before filing suit.

III. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS

In the event the District Judge does not adopt the recommendation to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice due to a failure to exhaust, the Court addresses the 

other bases of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and makes the following, alternative 

recommendations.

A. LEGAL STANDARDS

1. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to include a “short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the 

court does not look at whether the Plaintiff will “ultimately prevail but whether the 

[Plaintiff] is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 

232, 236 (1974). The court may consider allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits 

attached to the complaint, and documents and matters properly subject to judicial notice. 

Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007); Roth 

v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal sets forth a two-step approach for evaluating the sufficiency of a 

complaint, whereby a court may first identify legal conclusions in the complaint not 

entitled to an assumption of truth, and then analyze the remaining well-pled factual 

allegations to determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. 556 U.S. 

662, 678–79 (2009). At the first step, a court identifies all well-pled factual allegations 

contained in the complaint, which the court must accept as true. Id. at 678. But 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements” are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Id. “[D]etailed factual allegations” 

are not required, but a complaint must contain “more than an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. Thus, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the 

framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. 

Second, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The mere possibility of misconduct falls 

short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; see also Moss v. 

U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “In sum, for a complaint to survive 

a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from 

that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the Plaintiff to relief.” Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969 (quotations omitted).

2. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants in Civil Rights Actions

With respect to an inmate who proceeds pro se, his factual allegations, “however 

inartfully pleaded,” must be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 

by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (reaffirming that this standard applies to pro se pleadings postTwombly). Thus, where a Plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the Court must 

construe the pleadings liberally and afford Plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Hebbe v. 

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Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a 

pro se civil rights complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of the claim that 

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 

(9th Cir. 1982). “The Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt 

acts which defendants engaged in that support the Plaintiff’s claim.” Jones v. Cmty. 

Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal 

quotation omitted). 

3. Eighth Amendment Claims

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and 

unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious 

medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). For a prisoner to demonstrate 

an Eighth Amendment violation, two components must be satisfied. McGuckin v. Smith, 

974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. 

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the alleged deprivation must be 

sufficiently serious. Id. at 1059–60. A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat 

a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). The existence of “any 

injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or 

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s 

daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain,” for example, would 

indicate that a prisoner has a “serious” need for medical treatment. Id.; accord Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Second, the prison officials involved must have acted with deliberate indifference to 

the inmate’s serious medical needs. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302–04 (1991). 

This is a subjective requirement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994). To act 

with deliberate indifference, a prison official must know of and disregard a serious medical 

need or an excessive risk to the inmate’s health and safety. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

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1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 

2002)); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “Under this standard, the 

prison official must not only ‘be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the 

inference.’” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The court must 

focus on “what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was (or is), rather than what it should

have been (or should be).” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838–39. “Even if a prison official should

have been aware of the risk, if he ‘was not, then he has not violated the Eighth Amendment, 

no matter how severe the risk.’” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188). 

To amount to an Eighth Amendment violation, deliberate indifference to an inmate’s 

serious medical needs must be substantial; inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even 

gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; 

Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional 

violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; accord 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The deliberate indifference 

doctrine is limited in scope.”). To amount to deliberate indifference, a defendant must 

purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need. 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 

Furthermore, differences in judgment between a prisoner and a prison official 

regarding an appropriate medical diagnosis and course of treatment are not enough to 

establish a deliberate indifference claim. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107–08; Sanchez v. Vild, 891 

F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). To establish deliberate indifference, the prisoner “must 

show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances . . . and . . . that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive 

risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). On the 

other hand, if the prison official responded reasonably to a risk to the prisoner’s health, he 

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or she cannot be found liable, even if harm was not ultimately avoided. Farmer, 511 U.S. 

at 844. 

B. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for failure to state 

a claim. (ECF No. 15-1.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff merely alleges a difference of 

medical opinion between himself and his medical providers, or at best, a theory of 

negligence or medical malpractice, neither of which amount to an Eighth Amendment 

violation. (Id. at 5.) The Court finds that Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to state a claim

that (1) Defendant Walker acted with deliberate indifference when he denied Plaintiff’s

request to be designated as a full-time wheelchair user, and (2) Defendant Strayhorn acted 

with deliberate indifference and interfered with treatment of Plaintiff’s serious medical 

needs. Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state any other claim. Plaintiff may, 

however, be able to cure some of the defects of his claims, so the Court recommends these 

claims be dismissed with leave to amend. See Karim–Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 

839 F.2d 621, 624–25 (9th Cir. 1988). 

1. Claims Against Defendants Walker and Chau

Plaintiff alleges claims against Defendants Walker and Chau, his primary care 

physicians, for failure to treat his chronic pain, prescription of certain medication, refusal 

to designate Plaintiff as a full-time wheelchair user, and interference with Plaintiff’s 

transfer to CHCF. (ECF No. 1 at 3–5.) 

a. Chronic Pain Treatment

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a host of conditions, including gout, migraines, 

severe back pain, kidney disease, cardiac issues, vision impairment, hypertension, and 

nerve damage. (Id. at 3–5; ECF No. 5 at 2–3.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he 

experiences severe, chronic pain. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed 

to adequately treat his pain. (Id. at 3–5.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

Chau and Walker failed to refer him to a pain management committee for treatment, did 

not treat his severe migraines, and failed to prescribe Plaintiff the specific pain medication 

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he requested. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he asked Defendant Chau to refer him to the pain 

management committee. (ECF No. 5 at 29.) Plaintiff alleges that he was informed that he 

would be referred, “but they9 did not even submit any pain intake information and has left 

me to suffer day in - day out with unnecessary pain.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges 

that he suffers from migraines, which he characterizes as his “season of hell,” that require 

him to receive meals in his cell because the pain is so severe that Plaintiff is sometimes 

unable to leave his bed. (ECF No. 5 at 55.) Plaintiff alleges that “Drs. Walker and Chau 

are aware of my severe pain problems + they fail to take action to relieve my pain as past 

doctors did.” (Id. at 54.) Plaintiff alleges that he requested prescriptions for morphine and 

gabapentin. (Id.) Instead, Plaintiff alleges, Defendant Chau prescribed Tylenol and 

allopurinol. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the Tylenol “does nothing for me” and that

allopurinol “is the cause of my acute renal failure.” (Id.)10 Plaintiff attaches medical 

records indicating that prior doctors, including Defendant Walker, prescribed Plaintiff 

morphine in 2011. (Id. at 2, 6–8.) Plaintiff’s medical records also indicate that Dr. Chau

prescribed Plaintiff gabapentin beginning on December 12, 2016, with the prescription 

continuing at least through April 30, 2017. (Id. at 41.) His medical records further indicate 

that Defendant Clayton prescribed Plaintiff morphine on April 7, 2017, with the 

prescription continuing at least through June 1, 2017. (Id. at 41–43.) 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severe, chronic pain he experiences sufficiently 

state the existence of a serious medical need as he alleges that his severe pain affects his 

daily activities and ability to access basic needs. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059–60. 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Chau for treatment of Plaintiff’s pain are 

insufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference.11 Plaintiff fails to make any non-

 

9 Plaintiff refers generally to “Defendants” and “they” throughout his complaint without specifying which 

Defendants he refers to. Here, the Court construes “they” as a reference to Defendants Walker and Chau.

10 Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendant Chau’s prescription of allopurinol are addressed below.

11 Plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations that Defendant Chau failed to provide him with any

treatment for his pain. (See ECF No. 1 at 4–5; ECF No. 5 at 55.) Plaintiff’s statements in his grievances,

and his medical records, instead indicate that Defendant Chau treated Plaintiff’s pain with Tylenol and 

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conclusory allegations regarding Defendant Chau’s subjective knowledge of Plaintiff’s 

condition when he decided on a course of treatment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Chau 

was his primary care physician, but fails to allege how, when, or if Defendant Chau learned 

of the severe and debilitating nature of Plaintiff’s chronic pain and migraines. (See ECF 

No. 5 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant Chau is “aware of my severe pain 

problems.” (Id. at 54.) Plaintiff also fails to allege that Defendant Chau knew that the 

Tylenol and allopurinol he prescribed were ineffective. As a result, Plaintiff fails to 

adequately allege that Defendant Chau was subjectively aware of Plaintiff’s condition. See 

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Even if the Court were to assume that Defendant Chau knew the severity of 

Plaintiff’s chronic pain and knew that his medication was inadequate, Plaintiff fails to 

allege that Defendant Chau deliberately disregarded this pain. Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Chau prescribed Tylenol and allopurinol, and that these medications were 

insufficient to treat Plaintiff’s pain. (ECF No. 5 at 29, 55.) Plaintiff fails to specify when 

Defendant Chau declined to prescribe Plaintiff the other pain medication he requested or 

when he failed to refer Plaintiff to the pain management committee. This is problematic 

because Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that Defendant Chau prescribed Plaintiff 

several pain medications, including gabapentin, to treat his pain in 2016 and 2017. (See 

id. at 41, 43.) And Defendant Clayton prescribed Plaintiff morphine in 2017. (Id.) So 

these Defendants prescribed the very pain medications Plaintiff complains he was wrongly 

denied. 

Even if the Court infers that for a period of time Plaintiff was not prescribed the

specific medications he is requesting here, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant Chau’s 

course of treatment was medically unacceptable under the circumstances, or that Defendant 

Chau chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. 

 

other pain medications. (ECF No. 5 at 29, 41, 43, 55.) Plaintiff’s objection, then, arises not from a failure 

to treat, but from Defendant Chau’s chosen course of treatment. 

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Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332. As pled, Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Chau—that he

failed to refer Plaintiff to a pain management committee and prescribe Plaintiff the specific 

pain medication he requested—amount to no more than a difference in medical opinion 

between himself and Defendant Chau. Nor are Plaintiff’s claims saved by the allegation

that Defendant Chau failed to address Plaintiff’s pain in the same manner as his past 

doctors, as this amounts to no more than a difference in medical opinion between 

Defendant Chau and Plaintiff’s prior physicians. Without more, such differences in 

opinion are insufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference. Id. (“[A] plaintiff’s 

showing of nothing more than a difference of medical opinion as to the need to pursue one 

course of treatment over another [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate 

indifference.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. As a result, 

Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim of deliberate indifference against 

Defendant Chau for treatment of Plaintiff’s pain. 

For similar reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Walker for his

treatment of Plaintiff’s pain. Plaintiff alleges that the deliberate “indifference manifested 

by these prison doctors in their non-action to my medical requirements is a violation of the 

8th Amendment,” but fails to identify which doctors were deliberately indifferent, or how 

or when these doctors were deliberately indifferent. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) As to Defendant 

Walker’s treatment of Plaintiff’s pain, Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant Walker “is 

aware of my heart attacks, damage to spine, nerve damage to entire leftside [sic], kidney 

disease, limited use of left leg and hands, and failed to take action to relieve my pain.” (Id. 

at 2.) Plaintiff fails to allege how or when Defendant Walker was made aware of Plaintiff’s 

pain. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant Walker responded to Plaintiff’s 

pain with purposeful action or inaction that caused Plaintiff harm. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 

1096. Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant Walker “fail[ed] to take action to relieve” his 

pain. (ECF No. 5 at 54.) Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim that 

Defendant Walker was deliberately indifferent in his treatment of Plaintiff’s pain. See 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. 

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b. Prescription of Allopurinol

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Chau was deliberately indifferent to the risk that 

Plaintiff’s kidneys would fail when he prescribed Plaintiff allopurinol. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) 

On July 18, 2014, Plaintiff’s prior physician, Dr. Do, stated in his consultation notes that 

he was “100% convinced the allopurinol is the reason” Plaintiff experienced acute kidney 

failure earlier that year. (ECF No. 5 at 40.) Dr. Do noted that he would immediately stop 

prescribing Plaintiff allopurinol. (Id.) Approximately two years later,12 at RDJCF, Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant Chau prescribed him allopurinol. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges 

that he “tryed [sic] to show my health problems by showing documents of past doctors[’] 

medications I used to combat my illness and Chau then trys [sic] to prescribed [sic] the pill 

‘Allopurinol’ in which this pill destroyed my kidneys.” (Id.) He also alleges, “These 

doctors don’t seem to read my file before prescribing me medication.” (Id.) In his 

September 12, 2016 grievance, Plaintiff alleges that the allopurinol does not relieve his 

chronic pain and “is the cause of my acute renal failure.” (ECF No. 5 at 29.)13 Plaintiff’s

medical records indicate that Defendant Chau referred Plaintiff back to nephrologist, Dr. 

Do, on August 19, 2016. (Id. at 20.)14

Plaintiff alleges a serious medical need—the risk that his kidneys may fail. See 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059–60. Plaintiff does not, however, allege facts sufficient to state 

a claim of deliberate indifference. For a prison official to be held liable for deliberate 

indifference he “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that 

 

12 Plaintiff does not indicate when Defendant Chau prescribed him allopurinol.

13 It is not clear from Plaintiff’s complaint or the attached exhibits whether Plaintiff alleges that his kidneys 

have once again failed as a result of taking allopurinol, or if Plaintiff instead alleges only that he was at 

risk of kidney failure. (See ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 5 at 29.) Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss states that, “Allpurinol is not allopurinol and Dr. Chau did not prescrib [sic] this 

allpurinol or allopurinol to treat Plaintiff’s kidney disease, it is to combat ‘gout’ outbreaks in which the 

medication allopurinol did effect Plaintiff’s kidneys, which are now stage four kidney disease.” (ECF No. 

20 at 7.) This statement does not clarify the chronology. 

14 As noted above, Plaintiff fails to identify when Defendant Chau prescribed him allopurinol. Thus, the 

Court cannot determine if Defendant Chau referred Plaintiff back to Dr. Do before or after he prescribed 

allopurinol. 

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a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

“Thus, ‘there is no Eighth Amendment violation when jail officials give the wrong 

medication to an inmate unless they were aware the inmate would react negatively to the 

medication.’” Martinez v. United States, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 

(quoting Scott v. Bick, No. S-08-0117 LKK JFMP, 2008 WL 449798, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 

15, 2008); Murillo v. Thornton, No. 07-CV-0197 W POR, 2008 WL 110899, at *4 (S.D. 

Cal. Jan. 9, 2008)). See also Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (defendant’s prescription of 

medication plaintiff previously had a negative reaction to did not amount to deliberate 

indifference when defendant did not believe that the medication presented a serious risk of 

harm to plaintiff at that time); Montano v. Solomon, No. 2:07-cv-0800 KJN P, 2013 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 72033, at *20–22 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2013) (finding defendant’s alleged 

failure to review medical file before prescribing medication that previously caused an 

allergic reaction amounted to no more than negligence).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant Chau knew that prescribing allopurinol 

presented a risk that Plaintiff’s kidneys would fail. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838–39. 

Plaintiff alleges that he “tryed [sic] to show my health problems,” but it is not clear who 

Plaintiff provided with documents, and Plaintiff further alleges his belief that the doctors 

did not read his file before prescribing the medication. (See ECF No. 1 at 4.) Even if the 

Court infers that Defendant Chau saw the documents, Plaintiff fails to allege that these 

documents would inform Defendant Chau of the risk of prescribing Plaintiff allopurinol. 

Plaintiff alleges he showed “documents of past doctors[’] medications I used to combat my 

illness.” (Id.) The fact that Plaintiff’s previous doctors prescribed him medication other 

than allopurinol does not convey that prescription of allopurinol may cause Plaintiff’s 

kidneys to fail. Plaintiff does not allege that he ever communicated the risk of prescribing 

allopurinol to Defendant Chau. Nor does Plaintiff allege that Defendant Chau had 

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knowledge of this risk by some other means.15 As pled, the Court cannot reasonably infer

that Defendant Chau knew that prescribing allopurinol presented the risk that Plaintiff’s 

kidneys may fail; much less, that he subjectively disregarded this risk.

c. Wheelchair Status

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical 

needs when they declined to provide him with a full-time wheelchair use accommodation 

and instead designated him as a part-time wheelchair user. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff 

alleges that, even with a cane, he “can’t walk 10 feet, and I have to hold on to a wall or 

something, this is an everyday struggle just to get to the toilet in my cell.” (Id. at 4.) He 

further alleges that at some point he lost fifty percent of the use of his left leg. (ECF No. 

5 at 55.) Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that on January 22, 2016, a Mule Creek doctor 

issued Plaintiff a permanent accommodation as a full-time wheelchair user. (Id. at 24.) 

When he arrived at RJDCF, however, Plaintiff was not provided the same accommodation. 

(See id. at 54.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Walker and Chau denied his request to be 

designated as a full-time wheelchair user. (Id.; ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that he 

informed Defendant Walker that a doctor from CHFC stated that Plaintiff should be 

designated as full-time wheelchair user because of his kidney, cardiac, migraine, and spine 

conditions. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Walker denied his request 

for an improper, non-medical reason. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was 

previously transferred from RJDCF to a different institution “because of difficulty’s [sic] 

with medical personel [sic] (Dr. Walker) and custody.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that it “[m]ay 

be because of my problems with Dr. Walker, I am having these problems with these other 

doctors Chau, Clayton and Barechi.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[t]he actions of 

 

15 In his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that “all that I said to these Dr. 

[sic] were ignored by them in which under their care my illnesss [sic] got worst [sic]” and that “these 

doctors are not reading my medical file correctly.” (ECF No. 20 at 7.) Plaintiff’s argument fails to shed 

any light on whether Defendant Chau had knowledge of the risk of prescribing Plaintiff allopurinol as he 

does not identify which doctors ignored Plaintiff’s statements, what Plaintiff said to these doctors, or who 

misread his medical file and in what manner. 

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Dr. Walker past with me shows an improper motive to how I am being treated—non 

medically. He stated he remembered our past and now I am being treated with deliberate 

indifferent [sic] to all medical treatment, to any of my medical requests.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff states a serious medical need as he alleges that his immobility affects his 

daily activities and access to basic needs. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059–60. 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim, however, that Defendant Chau was deliberately 

indifferent to this serious need when he declined to reinstate Plaintiff’s designation as a 

full-time wheelchair user. As discussed above, for a prison official to be held liable for 

deliberate indifference he “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant Chau knew of 

Plaintiff’s alleged immobility or his other conditions warranting full-time wheelchair use. 

Plaintiff does not allege that he, or anyone else, communicated Plaintiff’s mobility 

challenges to Defendant Chau, or that Defendant Chau was otherwise made aware of 

Plaintiff’s condition. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant Chau deliberately 

disregarded this serious medical need. Plaintiff’s allegation that he “may” be having 

“problems” with Defendant Chau, among other Defendants, because of his prior history 

with Defendant Walker fails to allege that Defendant Chau denied Plaintiff’s request

because of his past with Defendant Walker. (See ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff fails to allege 

why, when, or how Defendant Chau denied his request. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state 

a claim that Defendant Chau was deliberately indifferent when he declined to designate 

Plaintiff as a full-time wheelchair user. 

Plaintiff states a claim, however, that Defendant Walker was deliberately indifferent 

to his medical needs when he refused to provide Plaintiff with a full-time wheelchair

accommodation. Plaintiff alleges that he communicated to Defendant Walker that he 

needed to use his wheelchair full time because of his kidney, cardiac, migraine, and spine 

conditions. (Id.) Construing Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

Walker denied his request, not based on his evaluation of Plaintiff’s medical condition, but 

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based on a past history with Plaintiff. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he is unable 

to access basic necessities and has trouble accessing the toilet. (Id. at 4.) Accordingly, 

Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that Defendant Walker was aware of 

Plaintiff’s serious medical need, but nonetheless purposefully disregarded this need, 

resulting in harm to Plaintiff. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

d. Transfer to CHCF

Plaintiff alleges that he should be classified for outpatient housing and transferred to 

CHCF because his many health conditions cannot be properly treated at RJDCF. (ECF 

No. 5 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that “it seems Walker and Chau stopped my transfer” to CHCF. 

(ECF No. 1 at 3.) As stated above, Plaintiff was previously housed at CHCF, but was 

transferred to Mule Creek and then to RJDCF. (ECF No. 5 at 2.) Plaintiff was transferred 

to RJDCF on or about May 2, 2016 as a “high risk patient.” (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff alleges 

that he was transferred from Mule Creek to RJDCF, instead of CHCF, as punishment for 

initiating a lawsuit against officials at Mule Creek. (Id. at 2.) In August or September 

2016, Plaintiff alleges that officials from CHCF called Plaintiff to ask why Plaintiff was 

sent to RJDCF instead of CHCF. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he spoke to Defendants Walker 

and Chau about being transferred to CHCF after this phone call. (Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff 

alleges that he told Defendant Walker that he needed to be transferred to CHCF and 

classified for outpatient housing because of his kidney, cardiac, migraine, and spine 

conditions. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) As with Plaintiff’s request to be placed on full-time 

wheelchair status, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Walker stopped the transfer to CHCF 

not for a medical reason, but because of his “past” with Plaintiff. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff 

alleges, he is “not and will not be able to receive adequate medical treatment at this 

institution.” (ECF No. 5 at 53.) 

Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a serious medical need—inadequate treatment of his 

many medical conditions. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059–60. Plaintiff fails, however, 

to state a claim that Defendants Walker or Chau were deliberately indifferent to this serious 

medical need when they declined Plaintiff’s request for a transfer to CHCF. First, Plaintiff 

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makes only conclusory allegations that he is unable to receive adequate medical care at 

RJDCF. (See ECF No. 5 at 53; ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff fails to explain why his health

conditions cannot be properly treated at RJDCF, but would be properly treated at CHCF. 

(See id.) Plaintiff states only that he is “not and will not be able to receive adequate medical 

treatment at [RJDCF].” (ECF No. 5 at 53.) To the extent Plaintiff alleges that he cannot 

receive adequate medical treatment at RJDCF because of his past history with Defendant 

Walker, Plaintiff has not alleged facts that would allow the Court to reasonably infer that 

Defendant Walker exhibits such broad, unchecked control over his medical care and all of 

Plaintiff’s medical providers. At most, Plaintiff’s allegations amount to a difference in 

medical opinion between Plaintiff, CHCF personnel, and Defendants. As discussed above, 

a mere difference in medical opinion is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate 

indifference. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. 

Second, Plaintiff alleges only that “it seems Walker and Chau stopped my transfer” 

to CHCF. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support this conclusion. 

Without such facts, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Defendants Walker and Chau 

prevented Plaintiff’s transfer; much less that they acted with deliberate indifference in 

doing so. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (a court is “not bound to accept 

as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to 

state a claim against Defendants Walker or Chau for interference with his transfer to CHCF. 

2. Claims Against Defendant Strayhorn

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Strayhorn intentionally interfered with his medical 

treatment by once forcibly removing Plaintiff from Defendant Chau’s office during an 

appointment and by refusing to call a wheelchair pusher after Plaintiff’s appointments on 

several occasions. (ECF No. 1 at 2–3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Strayhorn once 

roughly pulled him out of the doctor’s office in his wheelchair while Plaintiff was speaking 

to Defendant Chau and stated, “Your time is up, nobody cares about what you are saying.” 

(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff also alleges that on several occasions Defendant Strayhorn refused to 

call for a wheelchair pusher to transport Plaintiff back to his housing unit, causing Plaintiff 

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to sit in 80 to 100 degree heat for over an hour. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

Strayhorn “harasses” him every time he has an appointment at c-yard medical center, and

that because of this, Plaintiff sometimes decides not to go to his appointments. (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Strayhorn is “a cruel man as he has many complaints on 

him for mistreatment of prisoners at the c-yard medical center.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that 

“these delays in my medical treatment have involved life threatening situations and is [sic] 

apparent that delay would exacerbate my medical problems.” (Id.)

Delay of, or intentional interference with, medical treatment can amount to 

deliberate indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. To state a deliberate indifference claim on 

these grounds, however, a plaintiff must also sufficiently allege harm caused by the delay 

or interference. See id. In addition, “[i]f the harm is an ‘isolated exception’ to the 

defendant’s ‘overall treatment of the prisoner [it] ordinarily militates against a finding of 

deliberate indifference.’” Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105). 

Plaintiff states a claim that Defendant Strayhorn was deliberately indifferent to his 

serious medical needs when he intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s medical care. 

Plaintiff alleges a serious medical need as he suffers from numerous illnesses that cause 

him chronic pain and require frequent medical treatment. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 

1059–60. Plaintiff alleges that on one occasion, Defendant Strayhorn physically forced 

Plaintiff to leave a medical appointment by roughly pulling him out of the doctor’s office. 

(ECF No. 1 at 3.) Physically removing Plaintiff from a medical appointment while Plaintiff 

was still speaking with the doctor can constitute a purposeful act of interference with 

Plaintiff’s medical needs. See Jett, F.3d at 1096. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s assertion that 

Defendant Strayhorn said, “[N]obody cares about what you are saying,” suffices to allege 

subjective intent. (See id.) Specifically, if established, this statement by Defendant 

Strayhorn would suggest that Defendant Strayhorn physically removed Plaintiff from his 

appointment not for a legitimate reason, but as a result of animus. In addition, Plaintiff 

alleges that on several occasions Defendant Strayhorn refused to call for a wheelchair 

pusher after Plaintiff’s appointments, abandoning Plaintiff outside in the heat. This could 

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also constitute an act of intentional interference with Plaintiff’s medical care. Plaintiff 

alleges that he suffered harm as a result of Defendant Strayhorn’s actions—he was left to 

sit in eighty to one hundred degree heat for over an hour after appointments. See Jett, F.3d 

at 1096. Plaintiff alleges that these were not isolated incidents, but that Defendant 

Strayhorn repeatedly interfered with Plaintiff’s medical treatment by harassing Plaintiff

every time he had an appointment in the c-yard, in addition to abandoning Plaintiff in the 

heat and forcibly removing him from the one medical appointment. These allegations are 

sufficient to state a claim that Defendant Strayhorn acted with deliberate indifference and 

interfered with Plaintiff’s medical care.

3. Claims Against Defendant Barenchi

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Barenchi as he makes only 

conclusory allegations against him. Plaintiff names Defendant Barenchi16 as a defendant 

and states, “Federal civil rights statute arises when supervisor is liable for constitutional 

violation of his subordinate when he participated in directed [sic] violation and failed to 

act to prevent them, case in point I suffer with chronic pain and am unable to walk because 

of this pain as displayed in medical 602.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff further alleges the 

that “Doctors Clayton, Walker, Chau, Barenchi’s diagnosis are [sic] wrong when speaking 

about my health problems;” and, “[a]s to my 11.29.16 healthcare medical 602 was 

overlooked by doctors Clayton, Walker, Chau and Barenchi, ‘8th Amendment violation of 

serious medical needs,’ stated ‘negligent misdiagnosis is when the doctor diagnosis is 

wrong!’” (Id. at 4.) The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Barenchi 

as a claim that Defendant Barenchi is liable for a constitutional violation because he 

personally participated in a constitutional violation, directed his subordinates to commit a 

constitutional violation, and/or failed to act to prevent a constitutional violation.

 

16 Plaintiff refers to Defendant Barenchi as both “Barechi” and “Barenchi” throughout his complaint. The 

Court refers to him as Defendant Barenchi because the response to Plaintiff’s first level appeal of his 

November 29, 2016 grievance identifies “R. Barenchi” as the Chief Physician & Surgeon at RJDCF. (ECF 

No. 5 at 47.) 

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There is no vicarious liability for civil rights violations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Under § 1983, “[a] supervisor may 

be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) 

there is a ‘sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 

constitutional violation.’” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 

F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). To demonstrate a sufficient causal connection, “a plaintiff 

must show the supervisor breached a duty to plaintiff which was the proximate cause of 

the injury.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 

1447 (9th Cir. 1991)). “‘The requisite causal connection can be established by setting in 

motion a series of acts by others’ . . . or by ‘knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts 

by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause others 

to inflict a constitutional injury.’” Id. at 1207–08 (quoting Redman, 942 F.2d at 1447, then 

Dubner v. City & Cty. Of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that could reasonably be construed as 

Defendant Barenchi’s personal participation in a constitutional violation. Plaintiff alleges 

only that the diagnosis of Defendant Barenchi, and all other named defendants, is “wrong 

when speaking about my health problems.” (Id. at 4.) A negligent misdiagnosis cannot, 

without more, amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 

In the absence of personal involvement, Plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a 

sufficient causal connection between Defendant Barenchi’s conduct and a constitutional 

violation. See Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977. Plaintiff fails to do so. Plaintiff’s allegations 

against Defendant Barenchi in his supervisory capacity are unclear, but the Court construes

them as a claim that Defendant Barenchi oversaw, or directed his subordinates to commit,

a constitutional violation, resulting in Plaintiff’s ongoing pain. (See ECF No. 1 at 2.) This 

claim fails for two reasons. First, Plaintiff does not identify what constitutional violation 

was committed. In the absence of an alleged underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff 

cannot allege a sufficient causal connection between Defendant Barenchi’s conduct and a 

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constitutional violation committed by one of his subordinates. See Hallman v. Cate, 483 F. 

App’x 381, 381 (9th Cir. 2012); Roman v. Knowles, 07-cv-1343 JLS (POR), 2009 WL 

1675863, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 15, 2009). Second, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that 

establish a causal connection between any conduct of Defendant Barenchi and any 

constitutional violations committed Defendant Barenchi’s subordinates.

To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Barenchi’s denial of his appeal 

amounted to a constitutional violation, in reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Ramirez 

v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003), this Court has consistently held that a prison 

official’s mere administrative review of a prisoner’s health care appeal cannot serve as the

basis of the official’s liability under § 1983. See Bell v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 

14-cv-1397-BEN-PCL, 2016 WL 8736865, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016); Esposito v. 

Khatri, 08-cv-742-H-WMC, 2009 WL 702218, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2009); accord 

Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (dismissing § 1983 claims against 

several prison officials whose only alleged misconduct involved the denial of the inmate’s 

administrative grievances and holding that “the denial of administrative grievances or the 

failure to act” cannot be the basis of liability under § 1983); Wright v. Shapirshteyn, CV 1-

06-0927-MHM, 2009 WL 361951, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2009) (“[W]here a defendant’s 

only involvement in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct is the denial of administrative 

grievances, the failure to intervene on a prisoner’s behalf to remedy alleged 

unconstitutional behavior does not amount to active unconstitutional behavior for purposes 

of § 1983.”). Here, Plaintiff does not plead any facts that would allow the Court to 

reasonably infer that Defendant Barenchi acted with deliberate indifference when he denied 

Plaintiff’s appeal. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state an Eighth 

Amendment claim against Defendant Barenchi.

4. Additional Claims

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants prescribed him blood pressure medication that 

caused him to experience dizziness and nausea and failed to provide him with medical 

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supplies. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) For the reasons stated below, these allegations fail to state a 

claim against any Defendant. 

Plaintiff alleges that on one occasion he asked for an increase in pain medication and 

Defendants Chau and/or Clayton instead increased his blood pressure medication, which 

caused Plaintiff to experience dizziness and feel as if he was “about to throw up all the 

time.” (Id.) Plaintiff fails to state a claim of deliberate indifference for several reasons. 

First, Plaintiff fails to identify which defendant(s) took the allegedly wrongful action of 

prescribing him the blood pressure medication. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 

(9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties 

and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to 

have caused a constitutional deprivation.”). Second, the complaint fails to allege that any 

defendant acted with deliberate indifference when prescribing the blood pressure 

medication. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d 1057–58. Even if the prescription of the blood pressure 

medication amounted to negligence or malpractice, this is insufficient to establish liability 

under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that he 

experienced a negative reaction to an unspecified blood pressure medication on one 

occasion. Alleged harm that “is an ‘isolated exception’ to the defendant’s ‘overall 

treatment of the prisoner . . . ordinarily militates against a finding of deliberate 

indifference.’” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105). Accordingly, the 

complaint fails to state a claim that Defendants Chau or Clayton were deliberately 

indifferent when one or both of them prescribed Plaintiff blood pressure medication.

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference when they 

failed to provide him with medical supplies also fails to state a claim. Plaintiff alleges that 

he asked “for medical supplies, in which doctors Chau and Clayton aggreed [sic] to, then 

never write the order . . .” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff fails to identify what “medical 

supplies” he requested, whether Defendants Chau or Clayton acted with deliberate 

indifference when they did not order the medical supplies, or what harm, if any, Plaintiff 

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experienced as a result. Plaintiff’s vague allegation is insufficient to state a claim of 

deliberate indifference. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss be GRANTED on the basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies. In the alternative, in the event that the District Court declines to adopt the above 

recommendation, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be 

DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claims that (1) Defendant Walker acted with deliberate 

indifference when he denied Plaintiff’s request to be designated as a full-time wheelchair 

user, and (2) Defendant Strayhorn acted with deliberate indifference when he interfered 

with treatment of Plaintiff’s serious medical needs; and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be 

GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s remaining claims against all Defendants, but grant Plaintiff 

leave to amend.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 2, 2018, any party to this action may file 

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than July 12, 2018. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

Dated: June 4, 2018

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