Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02414/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02414-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESLEY W. HUNTER,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06cv2414

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING THE REPORT &

RECOMMENDATION OF THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE; (Doc. No.

33.)

(2) REJECTING PETITIONER’S

OBJECTIONS; (Doc. No. 35)

(3) GRANTING RESPONDENTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS THE 

PETITION; (Doc. No. 24) and

(4) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY. 

vs.

JAMES E. TILTON, MICHAEL

KNOWLES, and BILL LOCKYER, Attorney

General of the State of California,

Respondents.

Petitioner Wesley W. Hunter (“petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His petition challenges a prison

disciplinary action taken against him in which he received a Rules Violation Report for battery on a

peace officer and forfeited 150 days of behavioral credits. This matter was referred to United States

Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On December 4, 2007,

Magistrate Judge Major issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) recommending the Court

deny the petition. (Doc. No. 33.) Petitioner filed objections to the Report on January 15, 2008. (Doc.

No. 35.) 

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The writ petitioner filed that day with the California Supreme Court related to a distinct RVR for possession of

a controlled substance. Petitioner claims to have filed two writs on the same day relating to separate RVRs which were

then consolidated due to a clerical error, and thus his claims with respect to the battery RVR were never filed. Petitioner

filed another petition in the California Supreme Court raising separate claims related to the battery RVR on October 25,

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Following de novo review of petitioner’s claims, the Court finds Magistrate Judge Major’s

Report to be thorough, complete, and an accurate analysis of the legal issues presented in the petition.

For the reasons explained below, the Court: (1) adopts in full Magistrate Judge Major’s Report; (2)

rejects the petitioner’s objections; (3) grants respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition; and (4)

denies a certificate of appealability. 

BACKGROUND

Factual Background

The magistrate judge accurately summarized the facts of petitioner’s case. While

incarcerated at Centinela State Prison Facility, petitioner intentionally bumped his chest against

the chest of Correctional Officer Quinn during a verbal altercation on April 22, 2002. Correctional

Officer Gutierrez, assigned to investigate the incident, issued petitioner a Rules Violation Report

(“RVR”) for battery on a peace officer on May 8, 2002. At a hearing on May 22, 2002,

Correctional Lieutenant Granish found petitioner guilty by a preponderance of the evidence, and

assessed a forfeiture of 150 days of behavioral credits. The Director of the Department of

Corrections granted petitioner’s appeal in part on March 24, 2003 and remanded for a new

hearing. At a hearing held May 20, 2003, Correctional Lieutenant Daubenspeck found petitioner

guilty and petitioner again forfeited 150 days of behavioral credits. The Director denied

petitioner’s second round of appeals on November 18, 2003. Warden G. J. Giurbino granted

petitioner’s third appeal, specifically directed at the classification score resulting from the RVR,

on January 26, 2004. As a result, correctional staff deducted eight points from petitioner’s custody

classification score. 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the Superior Court. The court denied

the writ on March 25, 2005. On May 23, 2005, the California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s

appeal of the denial of the writ. Petitioner then filed a writ of habeas corpus to the California

Supreme Court on May 10, 2006, which the court denied on June 14, 2006.1

 

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2006, which was denied on November 15, 2006. 

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Federal Procedural Background

Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 30, 2006 (Doc. No.

1) which the Court dismissed due to petitioner’s failure to pay the filing fee and name a proper

respondent. (Doc. No. 2.) After two extensions of time, petitioner filed a first amended petition

on April 13, 2007. (Doc. No. 15.) Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on July 11, 2007. (Doc.

No. 24.) Petitioner opposed the motion on September 14, 2007. (Doc. No. 30.) On December 4,

2007, Magistrate Judge Major issued a Report recommending the motion to dismiss be granted. 

(Doc. No. 3.) Petitioner filed objections to the Report on January 15, 2008. (Doc. No. 35.) 

DISCUSSION

Respondents have filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition on the grounds (1) the

petition is barred by the statute of limitations and (2) petitioner has failed to exhaust his state court

remedies. The magistrate judge recommended the Court dismiss the petition on either of these

grounds. 

1. Statute of Limitations

Legal Standard

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a state court

prisoner may only file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus within the one-year statutory

period of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The statute of limitations applies to habeas petitions

contesting administrative decisions. Shelby v. Barlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). The

period runs from the later of four dates: the date the judgment became final upon direct review, the

date a state-created impediment to filing such an application is removed, the date a constitutional

right was initially recognized, or the date the factual predicate of the claim could have been

discovered. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

Magistrate Judge’s Report

The magistrate judge found the statute of limitations began to run on November 14, 2003,

the date the Department of Corrections denied petitioner’s second round of appeals. The

magistrate judge found statutory tolling applied from October 27, 2004, to May 23, 2005, while

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petitioner’s state petition for writ of habeas corpus was pending. The magistrate judge then found

petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling for the period in which the Department of Corrections

transferred him between prisons and thus he had no access to his legal materials, from July 26,

2006 through September 29, 2006. Despite petitioner’s entitlement to these periods of tolling,

more than one year passed in which the limitations period was not tolled. The magistrate judge

therefore recommended the petition be denied. 

Petitioner’s Objections

Petitioner objects that the limitations period should be tolled for several additional periods

of time, which total more than 23 months. (Objections at 1-2.) Petitioner argues the period from

April 1, 2004, through September 16, 2004, should be tolled because his “access to the law library

and legal materials [was] limited” and he was “just then learning of the writ process.” (Petitioner’s

Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 2.) Petitioner also argues he is entitled to tolling for the period from 

September 2, 2005 through “late March/early April of 2006,” while petitioner was in

administrative segregation. Finally, petitioner argues the Report incorrectly began the limitations

period after his second round of administrative appeals, rather than at the conclusion of this third

appeal. 

Analysis

In order to establish his right to equitable tolling, petitioner must establish his diligent

pursuit of his rights and also that “extraordinary circumstances beyond [his] control . . . made it

impossible to file a petition on time.” Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 799-800 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal numbering omitted). Limited access to legal materials does not constitute “extraordinary

circumstances” justifying equitable tolling, especially where petitioner did not formally request

legal materials and where limitations on his access were only for part of a lengthy period of time. 

See Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e [recently] rejected the argument

that lack of access to library materials automatically qualified as grounds for equitable tolling.”);

Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding no equitable tolling for one-month

period of time in which petitioner had no access to legal materials because he later had eleven

months of access); see also Williams v. Sheperd, 238 F. App’x 260, 261 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining

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to toll statute because petitioner did not “formally challenge his allegedly limited library access

with prison authorities” and “made only sporadic and minimal efforts to obtain his case

materials”). Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Report and finds that this time should not be

tolled. 

Because this time is not tolled, the petition is untimely even if the Court accepts all of

petitioner’s other arguments. If the limitations period began at the time petitioner’s third appeal

was granted, on January 26, 2004, nine months elapsed before petitioner filed his state court

petition on October 27, 2004. Moreover, more than six months admittedly elapsed in between the

periods which petitioner claims should be tolled due to his movement between prisons and

placement in administrative segregation. Accordingly, at least fifteen months passed in which

petitioner is not entitled to any tolling, and the petition is barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of

limitations. 

2. Lack of Exhaustion

The Report also recommended the petition be dismissed because petitioner has not

presented claims one, three, and four of the Amended Petition to the California Supreme Court. 

Because the petition is barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations, the Court does not address this

alternative basis for dismissal. 

3. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner complaining of detention arising from state court proceedings must obtain a

certificate of appealability to file an appeal of the final order in a federal habeas proceeding. 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). The district court may issue a certificate of appealability if the petitioner

“has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). To

make a “substantial showing,” the petitioner must “demonstrat[e] that ‘reasonable jurists would

find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable[.]’” Beaty v. Stewart,

303 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

Petitioner has not made a “substantial showing” as to any of the claims raised by his petition, and

thus the Court sua sponte denies a certificate of appealability. 

//

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CONCLUSION

The Court therefore REJECTS petitioner’s objections, ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s

report, GRANTS respondents’ motion to dismiss, and DENIES petitioner a certificate of

appealability. The Clerk of the Court is ordered to close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 14, 2008

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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