Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00007/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00007-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

MATTHEW WILLIAMS, JR. PETITIONER

v. NO. 5:16-cv-00007 JM/PSH

WENDY KELLEY, Director of the RESPONDENT

Arkansas Department of Correction

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following proposed Findings and Recommendation have been sent to United

States District Judge James M. Moody, Jr. You may file written objections to all or part

of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the

factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this

Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may

waive the right to appeal questions of fact.

Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 1 of 21
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

I. STATE PROCEEDINGS. The record reflects that in September of 2008, counterfeit

checks were passed at convenient stores in Pike County, Arkansas. See Document 23,

Exhibit A at CM/ECF 15. The checks were drawn on a general fund maintained by the City

of Nashville, Arkansas. See Id. Local law enforcement authorities conducted an

investigation into the passing of the checks, and they eventually identified petitioner

Matthew Williams, Jr., (“Williams”) as one of the individuals passing one or more of the

checks. See Id.

In November of 2008, Williams was charged in Pike County, Arkansas, Circuit Court

with forgery in the first degree in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 5-37-201. See Document

23, Exhibit A at CM/ECF 13-14. Williams initially retained an attorney, but counsel

withdrew when he was not paid for his services. See Id. at CM/ECF 8, 19, 32-34, 115-117.

When Williams was unable to retain another attorney, the state trial court judge

appointed LaJeana Jones (“Jones”) to represent Williams. See Id. at CM/ECF 119-121.

Jones represented Williams until the day of the trial, at which time Williams discharged

Jones, and Williams began representing himself. See Id. at CM/ECF 171-183. The state

trial court judge permitted Williams to represent himself only after ensuring that he

knew the consequences of choosing to proceed without counsel. See Id. The state trial

court judge did, though, appoint Jones to serve as stand-by counsel for Williams. See Id.

at CM/ECF 183.

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 2 of 21
Williams was tried in December of 2012. See Document 23, Exhibit A at CM/ECF

10. While the jury was deliberating his guilt, he absconded. See Id. at CM/ECF 371-373.

After the jury convicted Williams of forgery in the first degree, the state trial court judge

re-appointed Jones to represent Williams during the punishment phase of the trial. See

Id. at CM/ECF 373. The jury heard evidence relevant to Williams’ punishment, including

evidence that he had a number of prior felony convictions. See Id. at CM/ECF 376-379.

The jury sentenced him as an habitual offender to a term of forty years in the custody

of respondent Wendy Kelley (“Kelley”). See Id. at CM/ECF 385-387.1

 The state trial court

judge did not impose sentence at that time but instead waited until Williams was

apprehended. See Id. at CM/ECF 387-388. Williams was eventually apprehended and

appeared before the state trial court judge in April of 2013 for sentencing. See Id. at

CM/ECF 391-398. The state trial court judge imposed the sentence recommended by the

jury, and Williams was placed in Kelley’s custody. See Id.

Williams appealed his conviction. During the course of the appeal, Jones was

relieved as Williams’ attorney of record, and Jeff Weber (“Weber”) was appointed to

represent Williams. The Arkansas Court of Appeals found no reversible error and affirmed

Williams’ conviction. See Williams v. State, 2014 Ark.App. 454, — S.W.3d —, 2014 WL

4459116 (2014).

1

The sentencing order did not initially reflect that Williams was sentenced as an habitual offender.

It was subsequently amended to correct the error. See Williams v. State, 2014 Ark.App. 454, — S.W.3d —,

2014 WL 4459116 (2014). 

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 3 of 21
Williams then filed a state trial court petition for post-conviction relief pursuant

to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 (“Rule 37 petition”). The petition was denied,

see Document 23, Exhibit D at CM/ECF 37-40, and he appealed. The Arkansas Supreme

Court found no grounds for disturbing Williams’ conviction, and the court affirmed the

denial of his petition. See Williams v. State, 2015 Ark. 466, 476 S.W.3d 800 (2015).

II. FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS. Williams began this case by filing a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. In the petition, he raised the following claims:

1) Jones failed to challenge an erroneous jury instruction, 2) Jones failed to interview

any witnesses, 3) Jones failed to challenge the admission of certified copies of the

counterfeit checks, 4) Weber failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, and 5)

Weber failed to challenge the admission of certified copies of the checks.2 Williams later

amended his petition and raised the following claims: A) Jones failed to communicate the

terms of a plea bargain, B) Williams was denied counsel at trial, C) he was denied counsel

during the Rule 37 hearing, and D) he was denied a fair and impartial jury.

Kelley filed a lengthy response to the petition. In the response, she maintained

that the petition should be dismissed with prejudice because the claims contained in the

petition were reasonably adjudicated by the state courts of Arkansas, are procedurally

barred from federal court review, are without merit, or are otherwise unavailing.

2

Two of the claims appear to be grounded solely on state law. A violation of state law typically does

not warrant habeas corpus relief. The undersigned assumes, though, that a due process violation may occur

if an erroneous jury instruction or erroneous admission of evidence causes a fundamental defect resulting

in a complete miscarriage of justice or so infects the trial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 4 of 21
Williams filed a reply to the response. Williams maintained that the adjudication

made of his claims by the state courts of Arkansas was entitled to no deference. With

respect to his claims not adjudicated by the state courts of Arkansas, he maintained that

the claims are not procedurally barred from federal court review but have merit.

III. INEFFECTIVE OF COUNSEL. Jones represented Williams up to the day of trial.

Williams represented himself at trial, but Jones was re-appointed to represent Williams

during the punishment phase. Weber was then appointed to represent Williams on direct

appeal. As Williams’ first six claims, he challenges the representation they afforded him.

Some of Williams’ six claims were considered by the Arkansas Supreme Court. To

the extent they were, they are governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), which requires a two-part

inquiry. It requires an inquiry into whether the court’s adjudication of the claim resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law; and whether the adjudication resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

All of Williams’ six claims are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984), which requires its own two-part showing. He must show that counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and he must show

prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the

trial would have been different. See White v. Dingle, 757 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2014). Taken

together with 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), Strickland v. Washington establishes a doubly

deferential standard of review. See Williams v. Roper, 695 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2012).

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 5 of 21
A. Jones’ failure to challenge an erroneous jury instruction. At the close of the

evidence, the jurors were read an instruction allegedly conforming to Arkansas Model

Jury Instruction (Criminal) (“AMCI”) 3702. The instruction provided, in part, that “the

written instrument so drawn, made, completed, altered, counterfeited, possessed, or

uttered was a check, an instrument issued or appears to be issued by a government or

government entity.” See Document 23, Exhibit A at CM/ECF 66, 356. AMCI 3702, though,

does not contain the phrase “appears to be issued.” Williams maintains that Jones erred

when she failed to challenge the instruction on that ground.

Williams raised his claim in his Rule 37 petition. The state Supreme Court rejected

the claim, finding the following:

Williams first argues that the trial court erred by not granting relief on his

claim that his pretrial counsel [i.e., Jones] was ineffective for not

contesting an erroneous jury instruction. He contends counsel should have

objected on the basis that the jury instruction defining the offense of

forgery did not mirror the exact language in the forgery statute in that the

instruction stated that the check was a written instrument that was issued

or “appears to be issued” by the government or a government entity, but

the statute does not contain the words “appears to be issued.”

While Williams is correct that the forgery statute ... does not contain the

words in question, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying

postconviction relief on the issue under the Strickland standard. First,

counsel testified at the Rule 37.1 hearing that she attempted to review the

jury instructions with Williams, but he informed her that he could read and

did not need her help. At trial, when Williams was representing himself, he

did not object when the jury instructions were read to the jury. The right

of self-representation carries the responsibility for one’s own mistakes, and

a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain

that the quality of his self-representation amounted to a denial of effective

assistance of counsel. ...

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 6 of 21
Moreover, even if pretrial counsel failed to point out to Williams the

difference in the wording between the statute and the jury instruction or

if counsel, acting as stand-by counsel, could have suggested that Williams

object to the jury instruction, Williams did not show that the difference in

the wording was sufficient to change the outcome of the trial. Without a

showing of a reasonable probability that the fact-finder’s decision would

have been different absent an error by counsel, Williams did not establish

that he was prejudiced by any error by his pretrial counsel. ...

See Williams v. State, 476 S.W.3d at 804.

The state Supreme Court’s adjudication of Williams’ claim did not result in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. The court applied clearly established federal law as announced

in Strickland v. Washington, and the court’s decision is neither contrary to or involved

an unreasonable application of that law.

The state Supreme Court’s adjudication of Williams’ claim also did not result in

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented. The court could and did credit Jones’ testimony during the Rule 37

hearing that she attempted to review the jury instructions with Williams while serving

as stand-by counsel during the trial, but he told her that he could read and did not need

her help. See Document 23, Exhibit D at CM/ECF 89-90. Moreover, Williams was

representing himself when he could have, and should have, objected to the instruction,

and he bore the consequences of failing to object. There is also no evidence of prejudice,

i.e., there is no evidence the instruction was so prejudicial as to change the outcome of

the trial.

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 7 of 21
B. Jones’ failure to interview witnesses. Williams’ claim is built upon two

assertions. First, law enforcement authorities obtained video footage showing two men

passing some of the counterfeit checks. The authorities eventually identified Williams as

one of the men in the video. Williams maintains that three days before trial, he gave

Jones a list of witnesses who would testify that Williams was not one of the men in the

video. Williams maintains that Jones never interviewed the witnesses. Williams

additionally maintains that Jones erred when she failed to interview Chris Turner

(“Turner”), who was allegedly one of the other men in the video.

Second, two of the convenience store clerks who accepted counterfeit checks

testified at trial. See Document 23, Exhibit A at CM/ECF 246-259, 305-317. The clerks

identified Williams as one of the perpetrators. Williams maintains that the clerks changed

their stories over time, and it was only at trial that they conclusively identified Williams

as one of the perpetrators. Williams maintains that Jones erred when she failed to

interview the clerks prior to trial.

Williams raised his second claim in his Rule 37 petition. The state Supreme Court

rejected the claim, finding the following:

Williams's next point for reversal of the order concerns his assertion that

pretrial counsel [i.e., Jones] did not contact witnesses for the defense. He

claims there were multiple witnesses, but he specifically names only Chris

Turner. Williams alleges that Turner's testimony would have been vital to

the defense because Turner was shown in video footage with Williams

passing a forged check, making him an “unindicted co-conspirator.”

...

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 8 of 21
Here, Williams did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the

outcome of the trial could have been different had Turner testified.

Williams did not set out in his Rule 37.1 Petition or at the hearing on the

petition, and he does not explain in his brief in this appeal, what testimony

Turner would have offered had he been called as a witness. Two store

clerks testified that they were sure that Williams was the person who had

passed the forged checks to them. Even if Turner were in the video with

Williams, the onus was on Williams to state what Turner would have said

at trial that would have affected the outcome of the trial. As Williams did

not meet the threshold requirement of setting out how the defense was

prejudiced by pretrial counsel's failure to secure the testimony of Turner

or any other witness, he did not show that counsel was remiss. ...

See Williams v. State, 476 S.W.3d at 806.

The state Supreme Court’s adjudication of Williams’ claim did not result in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. The court applied clearly established federal law as announced

in Strickland v. Washington, and the court’s decision is neither contrary to or involved

an unreasonable application of that law.

The state Supreme Court’s adjudication of Williams’ claim also did not result in

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented. The court could and did find that save Turner, Williams failed to

identify the witnesses who would have testified on his behalf and failed to provide a

summary of their testimony. In fact, in Williams’ reply to Kelley’s response, Williams

acknowledges that he did not “personalize the name and testimony of [the] witnesses.”

See Document 25 at CM/ECF 3. It is true that Williams identified Turner as a witness, but

Williams acknowledges in the same reply that “[Williams] has never stated specifically

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 9 of 21
what Turner’s testimony might be but has always believed it would be exculpatory.” See

Document 25 at CM/ECF 5. It is also worth observing that Williams called a witness at

trial who testified Williams was not one of the men in the video. See Document 23,

Exhibit A at 342-351. Assuming that Turner would have testified that Williams was not

one of the men in the video, Turner’s testimony would have been cumulative and added

little, if any, to his defense. Given such representations, Williams has not demonstrated

a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had

Turner been called to testify.

Assuming that the undersigned can consider Williams’ claim regarding Jones’

failure to interview the convenience store clerks, there is no evidence of prejudice.

Williams cross-examined the clerks at trial about their prior statements and how the

clerks came to be certain of Williams’ participation in passing the counterfeit checks. See

Document 23, Exhibit A at 251-256, 312-317. It was for the jury to weigh the clerks’

credibility, and the jury obviously chose to credit the clerks’ testimony.

C. Jones and Webers’ failure to challenge the admission of the certified copies of

the counterfeit checks. The State did not introduce the counterfeit checks at trial;

instead, the State introduced certified copies of the checks. Williams maintains that

Jones should have challenged the admission of the copies at trial. Williams additionally

maintains that Weber should have, but failed, to raise the same claim on direct appeal.

Williams raised the two claims in his Rule 37 petition. The state Supreme Court

rejected the claims, finding the following:

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 10 of 21
Williams next contends that the trial court erred with respect to his claim

that pretrial counsel [i.e., Jones] should have filed a motion to suppress the

admission of copies of the forged checks. He further argues that posttrial

counsel [i.e., Weber] was ineffective because counsel did not raise the

issue of the admissibility of the checks on appeal and failed to argue that

there was reversible error at trial because the State did not introduce the

original checks into evidence.

As to pretrial counsel's failure to object to the admission of the checks into

evidence, Williams represented himself when the checks were admitted

into evidence, and he did, in fact, object on the basis that the checks were

copies rather than original documents. As the objection was made, Williams

did not establish that pretrial counsel was remiss.

With respect to whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise the issue of admissibility of the checks on appeal and failing to argue

that the checks introduced into evidence were copies of the original

checks, Williams did not meet his burden of showing that counsel failed to

raise a meritorious issue on appeal. ... Williams presented no argument to

demonstrate that the issue of either the admissibility of the checks or the

introduction of copies of the checks into evidence was an issue on which he

would have prevailed on appeal.

Testimony at trial established that, pursuant to bank policy, the original

checks were destroyed after ninety days and that certified copies of the

forged checks were returned to the convenience stores and given to lawenforcement investigators. Under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 1003 (2013),

a duplicate is held to be admissible to the same extent as the original

unless a genuine question is raised to authenticity of the duplicate or

where it would be otherwise unfair to admit the duplicate. Williams did

not show that there was any basis on which the trial court erred in

holding that the duplicate checks were admissible or any basis on which

appellate counsel could have raised a meritorious argument on appeal

concerning the admissibility of the duplicate checks. Again, the

petitioner who claims that appellate counsel was ineffective bears the

burden of making a clear showing that counsel failed to raise some

meritorious issue on appeal. An attorney is not ineffective merely

because he did not raise every argument on appeal, regardless of merit,

urged by his client. ...

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 11 of 21
See Williams v. State, 476 S.W.3d at 805.

The state Supreme Court’s adjudication of Williams’ claim did not result in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. The court applied clearly established federal law as

announced in Strickland v. Washington, and the court’s decision is neither contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of that law.

The state Supreme Court’s adjudication of Williams’ claim also did not result in

a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented. The court could and did find that Williams was representing

himself when the certified copies of the counterfeit checks were admitted into

evidence, and he was responsible for objecting to their admission. Although he

objected to their admission, the state trial court judge overruled the objection. Given

those facts, it cannot be said that Jones committed any error when the checks were

admitted over Williams’ objection while she was serving as stand-by counsel.

On direct appeal, Weber did not challenge the admission of the certified copies

of the counterfeit checks. He did not err when he failed to do so. The state Supreme

Court could and did find that the checks were destroyed after ninety days pursuant to

bank policy, and certified copies of the checks were provided to law enforcement

authorities and eventually admitted into evidence. As the court could and did find,

Williams has not shown how the state trial court judge erred by admitting the

certified copies or any basis on which Weber could have challenged their admission

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while representing Williams on direct appeal.

D. Weber’s failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. The State

called a witness during the trial who testified that Williams was one of the men in the

video. During cross-examination, the witness mentioned that Williams had previously

been incarcerated. Williams did not make a motion for mistrial at that time but

waited until the State rested. The state trial court judge denied the motion. On direct

appeal, Weber raised only one claim, i.e., the trial court judge erred when he denied

Williams’ motion for a mistrial. Weber did not challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence, and Williams maintains that Weber erred when he failed to raise the claim.

Kelley maintains that Williams’ claim is procedurally barred from federal court

review. Rather than enter the morass of the procedural bar issue, the undersigned

will reach the merits of the claim. In doing so, the undersigned notes that sufficient

evidence supports a conviction if, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Garrison v. Burt, 637 F.3d 849

(8th Cir. 2011). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, see Document

23, Exhibit A at CM/ECF 235-315, the undersigned finds that the evidence of Williams’

guilt is substantial. A bank employee testified that the checks presented to the

convenience stores were drawn on a City of Nashville, Arkansas, account but were

“fraudulent” checks. See Id. at CM/ECF 237. Two convenient store clerks testified

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 13 of 21
that they accepted the counterfeit checks and identified Williams as one of the men

who passed the checks. See Id. at CM/ECF 246-250, 305-312. Still photographs were

taken from the video, and a witness who had known Williams for most of his life

testified that Williams was one of the men in the video. See Id. at CM/ECF 281-285.

Given this testimony, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Assuming Weber committed error

by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, no prejudice resulted because

the claim lacked merit.

E. Jones’ failure to communicate the terms of a plea bargain. Williams next

maintains that Jones failed to communicate the terms of a plea bargain. In support of

the claim, Williams alleges the following:

... [Williams] was informed by pre-trial counsel [i.e., Jones] of a plea

bargain. The plea agreement required [Williams] to plead no-contest to

... Class C Forgery and accept 3 years in the A.D.C. with 2 years

suspended. Also, [he] would be allowed to remain in society until after

the new year. On December 5, 2012, [Williams] e-mailed pre-trial

counsel and informed her of his acceptance of the offer. Counsel

responded to [the] e-mail and expressed her opinion that [Williams] was

making a wise choice. The next morning, [Williams] arrived for court,

fully expecting to plead no-contest and accept the terms of the plea. For

unbeknownst reasons, the state changed the terms of the plea. [He] was

told to accept 3 years in the A.D.C. and surrender immediately. Pre-trial

counsel had not informed [Williams] of this “new deal.” [Williams] has

no idea as to when the state decided to change the terms. In court, pretrial counsel stood silent as opposed to voicing an objection or making

[a] record to the trial court. ... Ultimately, [Williams] was found guilty

and sentenced to serve 40 years in the A.D.C. [He] informed the trial

court of the e-mails exchanged [with counsel]. ... [P]re-trial counsel

produced a document purportedly e-mailed by [Williams]. The document

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 14 of 21
was not the one [he] sent and [was] obviously meant to mis-lead the

court.

See Document 10 at CM/ECF 23-24.

Kelley maintains that Williams’ claim is procedurally barred from federal court

review. Rather than enter the morass of the procedural bar issue, the undersigned

will reach the merits of the claim. In doing so, the undersigned recognizes that

Missouri v. Frye, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.E.2d 379 (2012), extended the Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel to the consideration of plea

offers.

Having reviewed the record, the undersigned finds that Williams’ claim has no

merit because he cannot show an error on Jones’ part. The undersigned so finds for

two reasons.

First, it is not clear what the State’s offer was. Williams maintains that the

offer was for three years with two years suspended and the right to remain free until

the turn of the new year. He maintains that if allowed to pursue discovery, he could

locate an e-mail attesting to those terms.3 Assuming such an e-mail exists, it would

appear to have been from Jones to Williams, not from the State to Jones or Williams.

It is true that Jones thought the offer was as Williams maintains, see Document 23,

3

During the Rule 37 hearing, Williams offered as an exhibit an e-mail he wrote to Jones in which

Williams purported to accept “the plea of 3 years with 2 suspended” and requested “at least 60 days or

an ADC assignment prior to confinement.” See Document 23, Exhibit D at CM/ECF 106.

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 15 of 21
Exhibit D at CM/ECF 85, but her testimony is not a model of clarity in that regard.

Specifically, Jones was not clear whether the State was agreeable to Williams

remaining free until the turn of the new year. In short, the undersigned has no way of

knowing if the State offered the terms Williams alleges.

Second, notwithstanding the foregoing, the plea bargain was never accepted by

the state trial court judge and subsequently embodied in the judgment of the court.

See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984) (plea bargain standing alone is without

constitutional significance; it is mere executory agreement which, until embodied in

judgment of court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or other constitutionally

protected interests); Caldwell v. State, 295 Ark. 149, 747 S.W.2d 99 (1988) (under

Arkansas law, plea bargain is not enforceable and has no legal effect until accepted

by trial court judge).4 The State thus had the right to withdraw the offer, and its

attorney could properly represent that there was “no deal.” See Document 23, Exhibit

A at 182.

F. Conclusion. “There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of professionally reasonable assistance and sound trial

strategy.” See Amrine v. Bowersox, 238 F.3d 1023, 1030 (8th Cir. 2001). Williams has

failed to show that his attorneys’ representation fell outside that range.

4

In Caldwell v. State, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that a plea bargain not yet accepted

may be enforceable if the defendant relied to his detriment on the offer. As Kelley correctly notes, no such

reliance occurred here. Williams took no action or failed to take an action in expectation of pleading guilty.

He did not decide to accept the offer until the night before the trial was scheduled to begin.

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 16 of 21
IV. WILLIAMS WAS DENIED COUNSEL AT TRIAL AND WAS DENIED A FAIR AND

IMPARTIAL JURY. It was not until the day of the trial that Williams notified the state

trial court judge of Williams’ inability to work with Jones and his lack of trust in her.

After the state trial court judge recounted the opportunities he had given Williams to

retain counsel of his own choosing, see Document 23, Exhibit A at CM/ECF 177-178,

the state trial court judge gave Williams the option of either having Jones continue to

serve as counsel or proceed without counsel, which the state trial court judge

“strongly advise[d] against,” see Id. at CM/ECF 178. Williams elected to represent

himself. He now maintains that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated

because he was “forced to proceed pro se.” See Document 10 at CM/ECF 30.

Once Williams elected to represent himself, the state trial court judge began

the jury selection process. See Document 23, Exhibit A at CM/ECF 184-224. Williams

maintains that during the process, he was given only sixty seconds in one instance to

decide whether to seat a juror. Williams maintains that he depleted his peremptory

strikes during the process and was unable to strike a juror allegedly related to one of

the witnesses. Williams also maintains that he was unable to strike a juror who

allegedly dined at some point with the state trial court judge. It is for the foregoing

reasons that Williams maintains that the jury selection process denied him a fair and

impartial jury.

Kelley maintains that Williams’ claims of a denial of the right to counsel at trial

and the denial of the right to a fair and impartial jury are procedurally barred from

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 17 of 21
federal court review. Although the undersigned bypassed the procedural bar issue in

the context of Williams’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the undersigned

will not do likewise with respect to his claims of a denial of the right to counsel at

trial and the denial of the right to a fair and impartial jury.5

Generally, the federal courts will not consider a claim if the petitioner failed to

first present it to the state courts in accordance with the state’s procedural rules. See

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). There are, though, exceptions to the rule. A

claim can be considered if the petitioner can show cause for his procedural default

and actual prejudice or, alternatively, show that the failure to consider the claim will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice because he is actually innocent. See

Wallace v. Lockhart, 12 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 1994).

Williams’ claims of a denial of the right to counsel at trial and the denial of the

right to a fair and impartial jury were not properly raised in, or addressed by, the

state courts of Arkansas. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Williams did not

properly present the claims to the state courts in accordance with the state’s

procedural rules. He therefore procedurally defaulted the claims, and the question is

whether his procedural default can be excused or otherwise overlooked.

Williams offers as cause Weber’s ineffective representation. Specifically,

Williams maintains that Weber should have raised on direct appeal Williams’ claims of

5

The undersigned does so because of the special consideration given claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel. See Martinez v. Ryan, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). 

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Case 5:16-cv-00007-JM Document 26 Filed 06/13/16 Page 18 of 21
a denial of the right to counsel at trial and the denial of the right to a fair and

impartial jury.

Ineffective assistance of counsel can, in certain limited circumstances, serve as

cause for a procedural default. For instance, ineffective assistance of post-conviction

counsel can excuse the procedural default of a “substantial claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel at trial.” See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1309,

1320, 182 L.E.2d 272 (2012) (“Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance

of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural

default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of

ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was

no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.”). Ineffective assistance of

counsel cannot, though, excuse the procedural default of other claims.6

In this instance, Williams offers appellate counsel’s ineffective representation

6

A number of cases stand for the proposition that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel

can only serve as cause for the procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial

and cannot serve as cause for the procedural default of any other claim. See e.g., Dansby v. Hobbs, 766

F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom., Dansby v. Kelley, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 297, 193 L.Ed.2d 46

(2015) (ineffective assistance of counsel cannot serve as cause for the procedural default of a claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); Slocum v. Kelley, 2015 WL 1789027 (E.D.Ark. 2015) (Martinez

only applies to ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims and is not extended to ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel claims). See also Hunton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2013) (Martinez does not

permit resuscitation of a procedurally defaulted Brady claim); Myers v. State of Tennessee, 2016 WL

1230740 (M.D.Tenn. 2016) (Martinez only applies to a defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel and does not apply to a claim that the state suppressed exculpatory evidence); Young v. Colson,

2015 WL 4879117 (M.D.Tenn. 2015) (Martinez only allows for ineffective assistance of post-conviction

counsel to establish cause for the default of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; petitioner’s

claims of, inter alia, conflict of interest, double jeopardy, erroneous jury instructions, and juror

misconduct are claims not arising from alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel and are therefore

outside scope of Martinez).

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as cause for the procedural default of Williams’ claims of a denial of the right to

counsel at trial and the denial of the right to a fair and impartial jury. The

undersigned knows of no authority to support such a proposition; specifically, the

undersigned knows of no authority to support the proposition that ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel will excuse the procedural default of non-ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claims. Martinez v. Ryan does not support such a

proposition. The undersigned therefore finds that Williams can show no cause for the

procedural default of his two claims.

Williams alternatively maintains that the failure to consider his claims of a

denial of the right to counsel at trial and the denial of the right to a fair and impartial

jury will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice because he is actually

innocent. Although not true cause for a procedural default, a showing of actual

innocence can serve as a gateway through which a petitioner can obtain federal court

review of a procedurally barred claim. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). The

petitioner must show that a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Id. “To establish the requisite

probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” See Id.

at 327. Here, Williams has failed to make the requisite showing as he has failed to

produce “new evidence of factual innocence.” See Niederstadt v. Nixon, 505 F.3d

832, 840 (8th Cir. 2007) (Colloton, J., concurring). He simply re-argues the evidence he

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knew, or should have known, of at the time of his trial.

V. WILLIAMS WAS DENIED COUNSEL DURING THE RULE 37 HEARING. Williams last

maintains that he was denied counsel during the Rule 37 hearing. Kelley maintains, in

response, that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction

proceedings. The undersigned agrees. Even after Martinez v. Ryan, there is no right to

counsel in a state post-conviction proceeding. His claim is therefore without merit.

VI. RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that Williams’ petition be dismissed,

all requested relief be denied, and judgment be entered for Kelley. It is also

recommended that a certificate of appealability be denied.

DATED this 13th day of June, 2016.

 _________________________________ 

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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