Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-01978/USCOURTS-alnd-1_15-cv-01978-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES STRONG,

Plaintiff,

v.

BLUE BELL CREAMERIES,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:15-CV-1978-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case comes before the court on the Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the

Complaint, which was filed on July 5, 2016. (Doc. 31). The Defendant filed an

opposition to the motion, arguing that the proposed amendment would be futile. (Doc.

32). The time for the Plaintiff’s reply to his motion has expired

1

, and no reply has been

filed. For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is a civil action filed by the Plaintiff, James Strong, against the Defendant,

Blue Bell Creameries. The Complaint alleges that the Defendant discriminated against

1 This Court’s “Uniform Initial Order,” entered in this case on February 18, 2016, provides

that the reply brief was due “no later than seven (7) calendar days after the date on which the

opponent’s responsive brief was due.” (Doc. 22 at 23) (emphasis in original). The Defendant’s

response to the motion was due on July 19, 2016. (See doc. 22 at 23–“The opponent’s responsive

brief shall be filed no later than fourteen (14) calendar days [after the motion is filed].”) (emphasis

in original). The reply brief was therefore due on July 26, 2016.

FILED

 2016 Jul-27 PM 03:24

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:15-cv-01978-VEH Document 33 Filed 07/27/16 Page 1 of 11
Strong on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Count

One). The Complaint also alleges that the Defendant has discriminated against Strong due

to his disability, and failed to reasonably accommodate his disability, in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq. (the “ADA”), and the

amendments thereto.

2 Both counts arise out of the Plaintiff’s employment with the

Defendant.

On January 14, 2016, the Defendant filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss the

Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(Doc. 8). In particular, the Defendant sought to dismiss any potential “constructive

discharge” claim. The Court granted the motion, writing, in pertinent part:

The Eleventh Circuit has noted:

“Constructive discharge occurs when an employer

deliberately makes an employee’s working conditions

intolerable and thereby forces him to quit his job.” Munday

v. Waste Mgmt. of North America, Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 244

(4th Cir.1997); accord Young v. Southwestern Savings and

Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir.1975) (“The general

rule is that if the employer deliberately makes an employee's

working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced

into an involuntary resignation, then the employer has

encompassed a constructive discharge and is as liable for any

2 The Complaint actually alleges a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

Amendments Act of 2008 (the “ADAAA”), which broadens the definition of “disability” under the

ADA.

2

Case 1:15-cv-01978-VEH Document 33 Filed 07/27/16 Page 2 of 11
illegal conduct involved therein as if it had formally

discharged the aggrieved employee.”).

3 A plaintiff must show

“the work environment and conditions of employment were

so unbearable that a reasonable person in that person's

position would be compelled to resign.” Virgo v. Riviera

Beach Assoc., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1363 (11th Cir.1994); see

also Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d

551, 553 (11th Cir.1997); Kilgore v. Thompson & Brock

Mgmt., Inc., 93 F.3d 752, 754 (11th Cir.1996). Establishing

a constructive discharge claim is a more onerous task than

establishing a hostile work environment claim. Landgraf v.

USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir.1992) (“To

prove constructive discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate

a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than the

minimum required to prove a hostile working environment.”),

aff'd, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994);

see also Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d

1311, 1316–18 (11th Cir.1989) (affirming district court's

finding that plaintiffs established that they were subjected to

a hostile work environment but were not constructively

discharged); Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845

F.2d 900, 905–06 (11th Cir.1988) (same).

Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2009).

In the instant case, the Complaint explains the difficult conditions

under which a Palletizer is expected to work, and explains that the Plaintiff

“knew that he was not physically able to perform those duties and

responsibilities.” (Doc. 1 at 4). However, the Complaint lacks any factual

allegations that the Defendant knew that the Plaintiff could not perform the

functions of the position and deliberately placed him into that position to

force him to resign. Although, as alleged in the Complaint, the Defendant

knew the Plaintiff had diabetes, there are no allegations that the Defendant

knew that that condition, which the Plaintiff alleges only required him to

3

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), the

Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to October 1, 1981.

3

Case 1:15-cv-01978-VEH Document 33 Filed 07/27/16 Page 3 of 11
take frequent bathroom breaks, would make his working conditions so

intolerable that he would be forced to quit.

4 Too, there are no allegations

that the position ultimately turned out to be intolerable. Although the

Complaint alleges that two weeks after starting the job, the Plaintiff

“suffered complications from his diabetes, to include neuropathy in his feet

which required his hospitalization,” there is no allegation that the Palletizer

position caused the complications. While these allegations create the

possibility of a constructive discharge, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts

that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

Finally, the law in the Eleventh Circuit is clear that “[a] constructive

discharge will generally not be found if the employer is not given sufficient

time to remedy the situation.” Kilgore v. Thompson & Brock Mgmt., Inc.,

93 F.3d 752, 754 (11th Cir.1996). Even if the position ultimately turned

out to be intolerable, there are no allegations in the Complaint that, after

working in the position, the Plaintiff explained to the Defendant the nature

of the problem, and gave the Defendant sufficient time to remedy it.

Instead, exactly the opposite is true. The Complaint alleges that the

Plaintiff resigned “[u]pon his release from the hospital.” (Doc. 1 at 5, ¶ 15).

See Robinson v. Koch Foods of Alabama, No. 2:13-CV-557-WKW, 2014

WL 4472611, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 11, 2014) (dismissing constructive

discharge claim on motion for judgment on the pleadings where plaintiff

resigned because of sexual harassment by a co-worker on the same day she

reported the harassment; holding that “[the] constructive discharge claim

fails as a matter of law because there is no possibility she can prove that

she gave [the defendant] sufficient time to remedy the situation.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that the Plaintiff has

4 The Defendant labels the Complaint’s allegation that “[u]pon information and belief, the

Defendant knew that Strong could no longer physically work as a Palletizer,” as mere

“speculation.” (Doc. 19 at 4, quoting doc. 1 at 4-5). The Court agrees. The Complaint states that

after he was assigned to the position he “expressed to the Defendant that working in the warehouse

would be deleterious to his health, but his concerns were ignored.” (Doc. 1 at 4, ¶13). These

allegations, if proven to be true, do not establish that the Defendant was aware, at the time it

assigned him to this position, that the work as a Palletizer may cause him health problems.

4

Case 1:15-cv-01978-VEH Document 33 Filed 07/27/16 Page 4 of 11
failed to properly allege facts which plausibly support a claim for wrongful

discharge. Accordingly, any such claim is DISMISSED.

5 This dismissal is

without prejudice, since the time for the Plaintiff to amend his Complaint

has not yet expired.

(Doc. 29 at 10-13) (emphasis in original) (footnotes fromoriginal quote).

6

The Plaintiff has proffered a proposed “Amended Complaint,” the pertinent

allegations of which are compared to the originalComplaint in the following chart:

5

In his response to the Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff does not ask for leave to amend his

Complaint.

6 The originalscheduling order provided that “Plaintiff(s) may amend pleadings and/or join

additional parties, in accordance with FED. R. CIV. P. 15, until May 20, 2016.” (Doc. 25 at 2). In its

margin order dated June 9, 2016, the Court stayed “all deadlines.” (Doc. 28). The Plaintiff’s

deadline to amend had already expired at the time of the stay. The Court only intended, but did not

say, that all unexpired deadlines be stayed. Accordingly, there arguably is a question as to whether

the deadline to amend has passed. Regardless, the Court treats the present motion as, in part, a

motion to amend out of time. There being “good cause” for an extension, FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4),

the motion is GRANTED in that respect only.

5

Case 1:15-cv-01978-VEH Document 33 Filed 07/27/16 Page 5 of 11
Allegations in the Original

Complaint

Changed (in Bold) Allegations in the

Proposed Amended Complaint

12. On May 16, 2014, the Defendant

informed Strong that because of his

overtime numbers he was being demoted

back to a [sic] stacking pallets in the

warehouse (Palletizer). This work is

very labor intensive and requires the

employee to work in freezing

conditions.

12. On May 16, 2014, the Defendant

informed Strong that because of his

overtime numbers he was being demoted

back to a [sic] stacking pallets in the

warehouse (Palletizer). This work is

very labor intensive and requires the

employee to work in freezing

conditions. Strong weighs upward of

450 pounds, has trouble walking even

short distances, cannot work a fast

paced job, is unable to tell when his

feet are too cold due to diabetic

neuropathy, has heart trouble, and

severe joint pain.

13. Due to his diabetes, Strong knew that

he was not physically able to perform

the duties and responsibilities of a

Palletizer. Strong expressed to the

Defendant that working in the warehouse

would be deleterious to his health, but

his concerns were ignored.

13. Due to his diabetes and its

attendant conditions, Strong knew that

he was not physically able to perform

the duties and responsibilities of a

Palletizer. Strong expressed to the

Defendant that he suffered from

diabetes and the other

aforementioned health ailments and

that these conditions would not allow

him to work as a Palletizer.

Moreover, it was visible to the casual

observer that Strong was

ill-suited for any kind of labor

intensive work.

6

Case 1:15-cv-01978-VEH Document 33 Filed 07/27/16 Page 6 of 11
14. Strong did as he was told and began

working in the warehouse. Upon

information and belief, the Defendant

knew that Strong could no longer

physically work as a Palletizer and

hoped that he would resign his

employment.

14. The Defendant ignored Strong’s

warning that he could not perform

the labor intensive work of a

Palletizer. Therefore, Strong did as he

was told and began working in the

warehouse. Upon information and belief,

the Defendant knew that Strong could no

longer performthe physically

demanding and labor intensive work of a

Palletizer. [ . . . ]

15. After about two-weeks of working as

a Palletizer, Strong suffered

complications fromhis diabetes, to

include neuropathy in his feet which

required his hospitalization. While

hospitalized[,] Strong contracted

pneumonia which exacerbated his

condition causing himto remain

hospitalized for an extended period.

Upon his release fromthe hospital,

Strong turned in his resignation.

15. After about two-weeks of working as

a Palletizer, Strong suffered

complications fromhis diabetes which

required his hospitalization. While

hospitalized Strong contracted

pneumonia which exacerbated his

condition causing himto remain

hospitalized for an extended period. [. . .

]

7

Case 1:15-cv-01978-VEH Document 33 Filed 07/27/16 Page 7 of 11
16. Representatives from the

Company visited Strong in the

hospital and informed him that his

job as a Palletizer was still available.

Strong again expressed that his

physical condition would not allow

him to perform the duties associated

with that job. The Company never

reconsidered Strong for truck

driver’s position. Therefore, upon his

release from the hospital, Strong

turned in his resignation because he

could no longer physically work in

the warehouse. The Defendant knew

that Strong could no longer

physically perform the warehouse

duties and refused to consider him

for a truck driver’s position, thereby

constructively discharging him.

II. ANALYSIS

As the Eleventh Circuit has noted:

[A] district court may properly deny leave to amend the complaint under

Rule 15(a) when such amendment would be futile. This court has found that

denial of leave to amend is justified by futility when the complaint as

amended is stillsubject to dismissal.

Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

The Defendant argues that the proposed Amended Complaint would be dismissed

if allowed because “[t]he Amended Complaint still fails to allege the basic elements of

a constructive discharge claim.” (Doc. 32 at 6). Importantly, “notice pleading [does] not

8

Case 1:15-cv-01978-VEH Document 33 Filed 07/27/16 Page 8 of 11
require that the pleader allege a ‘specific fact’ to cover every element or allege ‘ with

precision’ each element of a claim.” Lee v. Caterpillar, Inc., 496 Fed. App'x 914, 915

(11th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted); Frazile v. EMC Mortgage Corp., 382 Fed.

App'x 833, 836 (11th Cir. 2010); Fin. Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276,

1282 (11th Cir. 2007). It is however, “still necessary that a complaint contain either

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain

a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Fin. Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500

F.3d 1276, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

7

In the Amended Complaint, like in the original Complaint, “there are no allegations

that the Defendant knew that that condition [diabetes], which the Plaintiff alleges only

required him to take frequent bathroom breaks, would make his working conditions so

intolerable that he would be forced to quit.” (Doc. 29 at 11-12). The only plausible

inferences from the facts as now alleged are that, when it assigned the Plaintiff to the

Palletizer position, the Defendant knew: that the Plaintiff had diabetes, needed frequent

bathroom breaks, and that he was overweight. The Court finds conclusory and vague the

allegation that “it was visible to the casual observer that Strong was ill-suited for any kind

of labor intensive work.”

8

Similarly, the allegations that the Plaintiff, after he was

7 The Court set out the detailed standard for ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, which is also

applicable here, in its previous Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Doc. 29 at 2-3).

8 The Court has already rejected as speculation the following allegation, which appears in

both versions of the Complaint: “Upon information and belief, the Defendant knew that Strong could

9

Case 1:15-cv-01978-VEH Document 33 Filed 07/27/16 Page 9 of 11
assigned to the position, “expressed to the Defendant that he suffered from diabetes and

the other aforementioned health ailments and that these conditions would not allow him

to work as a Palletizer,” do not establish that the Defendant knew that the Plaintiff could

not perform the functions of the job when it assigned the Plaintiff to it. Further, as with

the original Complaint, the Amended Complaint contains no allegation that the job as a

Palletizer actually caused himto suffer the complications fromhis diabetes.

The Amended Complaint contains a new allegation that the Plaintiff, while in the

hospital, told unnamed representatives from the Defendant that his physical condition

would not allow him to perform the duties associated with the Palletizer position. (Doc.

31-1 at 5). The Plaintiff then states vaguely that “[t]he Company never reconsidered

Strong for truck driver's position. Therefore, upon his release from the hospital, Strong

turned in his resignation because he could no longer physically work in the warehouse.”

(Doc. 31-1 at 5, ¶16). Even assuming that this was sufficient notice of an “unbearable”

condition

9

, the Amended Complaint lacks specific allegations regarding to whom this was

told, whether the persons(s) who were told had the authority to assign the Plaintiff to a

different position, and, most importantly, how long before the Plaintiff resigned they

no longer perform the physically demanding and labor intensive work of a Palletizer.” (Doc. 1 at 4-

5, ¶14; doc. 31-1 at 5, ¶14).

9 These allegations do not establish that the Defendant in fact placed the Plaintiff into a

position that was so unbearable that a reasonable person in that person's position would be

compelled to resign. It establishes only that the Plaintiff told the Defendant that his physical

condition would not allow him to work in that position any longer.

10

Case 1:15-cv-01978-VEH Document 33 Filed 07/27/16 Page 10 of 11
were told. Without that information, it is impossible to gauge whether the Defendant had

sufficient time to remedy the allegedly unbearable conditions in which the Plaintiff was

working. Further, other than to vaguely state that the Defendant “refused” to return the

Plaintiff to his driver position, the Amended Complaint contains no facts as to what the

Defendant’s “representatives” did or did not do, or could or could not have done.

10

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint is

DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 27th day ofJuly, 2016.

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

10 The Court does not treat these allegations as an entirely new claim of constructive

discharge which occurred when the Defendant, after the Plaintiff’s hospitalization, kept the Plaintiff

in the Palletizer position.

11

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