Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-md-02096/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-md-02096-52/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

IN RE: Zicam Cold Remedy Marketing,

Sales Practices, and Products Liability

Litigation.

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THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:

All Personal Injury Actions. 

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No. 09-md-2096-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendants’ “Request for Certification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b)” (doc. 1473), plaintiffs’ response (doc. 1489), and defendants’ reply (doc. 1494).

Defendants request that we certify for immediate review our Order denying

defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 1470). We concluded “that to establish

general causation, plaintiffs need not prove a toxic dosage of Zicam.” Summary Judgment

Order at 9 (doc. 1470). Instead, we required plaintiffs to present “sufficient evidence from

which a reasonable person could conclude that it is more probable than not that Zicam caused

their anosmia.” Id. Defendants argue that this conclusion was in error. 

We may certify an order that is not otherwise appealable when the order (1) involves

a controlling question of law, (2) as to which there is substantial ground for difference of

opinion, and (3) where immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination

of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Courts disfavor interlocutory appeals, and we may

use the statutory authorization for immediate appeal in only exceptional circumstances. In

re Cement Antitrust Litig. (MDL No. 296), 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982); see also

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James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1067 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). “The requirements

of § 1292(b) are jurisdictional” and certification is a “narrow” exception to the final

judgment rule. Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010).

There is no dispute that the “toxic dose” issue is a controlling question of law.

Plaintiffs conceded that they did not present evidence of the quantity of Zicam necessary to

cause anosmia, and therefore, had we required plaintiffs to present such evidence, they could

not have met their general causation burden. It is also possible that an immediate appeal

could “materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” A determination that

plaintiffs’ failure to show the toxic dose entitles defendants to summary judgment on general

causation could lead to the dismissal of the remaining cases in this MDL. 

However, we deny defendants’ motion because there is no “substantial ground for

difference of opinion” regarding our toxic dose conclusion. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A

substantial ground exists where “the circuits are in dispute on the question and the court of

appeals of the circuit has not spoken on the point” or “if novel and difficult questions of first

impression are presented.” Couch, 611 F.3d at 633 (quoting 3 Federal Procedure, Lawyers

Edition § 3:212 (2010)). We have noted that the majority of courts that have considered the

issue of general causation in the context of pharmaceutical products liability litigation have

not required a toxic dose showing. See Summary Judgment Order at 8. Defendants cited

only two decisions that directly supported their contention that the toxic dose showing that

is typically required in environmental exposure cases ought to be applied to products liability

litigation. See McClain v. Metabolife Intern., Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir. 2005);

In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1166

(N.D. Cal. 2007). Neither of those decisions is binding on this court. Defendants’ assertion

that we ought to institute a new standard by obligating plaintiffs to establish an element that

most courts have not required does not justify certification. “[J]ust because a court is the first

to rule on a particular question or just because counsel contends that one precedent rather

than another is controlling does not mean there is such a substantial difference of opinion as

will support an interlocutory appeal.” Couch, 611 F.3d at 633. A “dearth of cases” is not

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sufficient to give rise to a substantial ground for difference of opinion. Id. at 634 (citing

Union County, Iowa v. Piper Jaffray & Co., Inc., 525 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2008)). 

In addition, defendants contend that we improperly failed to apply the substantive law

of each state of plaintiffs’ residency. See Motion at 4. This argument is unavailing for two

reasons. First, in contending that plaintiffs must show a toxic dose, defendants did not rely

on the law of particular states. See Motion for Summary Judgment at 18 (doc. 1374).

Failure to argue the issue on summary judgment is fatal to raising it now. Second, we do not

see how the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is in any better position

than we are to evaluate the toxic dose issue with respect to the laws of seven states, none of

which is in the Ninth Circuit. We recognize the expense involved in litigating in several

different districts and, possibly, circuits. However, the MDL process is intended to promote

the just and efficient conduct of the member actions, and requires that this court

“uncomplicate matters.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litig., 460

F.3d 121, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006). If defendants believe the general causation analysis and

results should vary by state, the toxic dose issue may be more appropriately resolved through

appeal from final judgment in the transferor forums. 

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED DENYING defendants’ request for certification (doc.

1473). 

DATED this 15th day of July, 2011.

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