Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02592/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02592-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v.

FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE 

COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-02592-SI 

ORDER DENYING BURNS & 

WILCOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 76

Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment by Burns & Wilcox seeking 

dismissal of plaintiff Hartford Casualty Insurance Company’s professional negligence claim. Dkt. 

No. 76, Motion (“Burns”); Dkt. No. 42, Compl. (“Hartford”). The parties appeared before the 

Court on July 8, 2016 on Burns’s motion. After careful consideration of papers submitted, and for 

the reasons articulated in open court, the motion will be DENIED.1 Dkt. No. 76. Hartford’s claim 

against Burns for professional negligence is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

The cases advanced by Burns narrowly address attorney malpractice claims and are inapposite to 

 

1 Burns’s request for judicial notice and Hartford’s request for judicial notice will be 

granted for the limited purpose of determining whether the statute of limitations bars the litigation 

of the present action. See Dkt. No. 77 & Exhs.; Dkt. No. 96 & Exhs; see also U.S. ex rel. 

Robinson Ranchiera Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(reasoning that a court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without 

the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue” (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted)); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 

1980) (reasoning that a court may take judicial notice “of its own records in other cases, as well as 

the records of an inferior court in other cases” (citations omitted)). 

Case 3:15-cv-02592-SI Document 114 Filed 07/08/16 Page 1 of 2
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

the present action.2 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 8, 2016

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

 

2

In the attorney malpractice case Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & 

Harrison, 18 Cal. 4th 739 (Cal. 1998) (“Jordache”), the California Supreme Court held that the 

statute of limitations for attorney malpractice accrues when the “fact of damage, rather than the 

amount” is determined. See Jordache, 18 Cal. 4th at 752. But Jordache also emphasized the 

difference in legislative intent between sustaining “damage” and sustaining “actual injury” (i.e., 

the fact of damage). See id. at 748. While the statute governing attorney malpractice claims 

commences upon “actual injury,” the statute governing professional negligence “commence[s] . . . 

after the cause of action shall have accrued”; in negligence, when the plaintiff suffered “damage.” 

Compare Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.6 with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 312; see also Norgart v. 

Upjohn Co., 21 Cal.4th 383, 389 (Cal. 1999) (“Under the statute of limitations, a plaintiff must 

bring a cause of action within the limitations period applicable thereto after accrual of the cause of 

action. The general rule for defining the accrual of a cause of action sets the date as the time when 

the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.”). Here, the “damage” necessary for 

Hartford’s cause of action against Burns accrued on August 21, 2013, after the plaintiffs in the 

Underlying Action accepted the remittitur. See RJN (Dkt. 96-3) at 1-2; see also Williams v. Hilb, 

Rogal & Hobbs Ins. Servs. Of California, Inc., 177 Cal. App. 4th 624, 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960). 

Before then, no damage had yet been sustained and the statute of limitations had not accrued. See

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 339 (setting forth a two-year statute of limitations); Thomson v. Canyon, 198 

Cal. App. 4th 594, 606 (Cal. 2011) (“The shorter two-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil 

Procedure section 339, subdivision (1) has been consistently applied to a range of professional 

negligence actions from those against accountants to those against real estate appraisers. It is that 

statute of limitations that applies here, to the alleged professional negligence of a real estate agent 

and broker.” (citations omitted)). Hartford’s complaint was filed in this Court on June 10, 2015. 

Dkt. No. 1. Burns’ motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Hartford’s claim on the 

basis of the statute of limitation is accordingly DENIED.

Case 3:15-cv-02592-SI Document 114 Filed 07/08/16 Page 2 of 2