Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00813/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00813-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

G.H. by and through his Guardian Ad 

Litem ALEJANDRO HERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUTTER DAVIS HOSPITAL; 

BETHELEN JOHNSON, M.D.; UNITED 

STATES, and DOES 1 through 100, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-00813-MCE-KJN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Presently before the Court is Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss the 

Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 4. For the reasons discussed 

below, the Motion is GRANTED.1

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 1

 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

matter submitted on the briefs. See E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g). 

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff G.H. (“Plaintiff”) was born on April 27, 2013 at Sutter Davis Hospital.

Dr. Bethelen Johnson and Christi Stone, C.N.M. assisted with Plaintiff’s delivery. 

Compl., ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 7. Plaintiff remained in the hospital until May 1, 2013. Id. ¶ 8. 

Plaintiff received follow-up care from Dr. Betsy Meux and Nidia Ochoa, P.A. on May 2 

and again on May 6, 2013 at Davis Community Clinic. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. From May 2 to May 

5, 2013, Plaintiff was readmitted to Sutter Davis Hospital and treated by Dr. Janice Kim.2 

Id. On May 7, 2013, Plaintiff was once again readmitted to Sutter Davis Hospital, this 

time with recognized seizure activity and a diagnosis of intracerebral hemorrhage. Id.

¶ 11. 

Plaintiff, through his Guardian Ad Litem, brought the present action in Yolo 

County Superior Court on January 29, 2014. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges medical 

malpractice against Sutter Davis Hospital, Davis Community Clinic, and the various 

medical staff involved in his birth and follow-up care. Pursuant to the Federally 

Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (“FSHCAA”), Davis Community Clinic is a 

supported health center and, thus, its employees are deemed federal employees for the 

purpose of liability protection under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). ECF No. 1-3; 

42 U.S.C. § 233(g)-(n). Defense counsel notified Plaintiff on or about March 18, 2014,

that defense of the Clinic and its employees had been tendered to the United States 

government. 

On July 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the United States 

Department of Health and Human Services. The administrative claim was denied in 

March 2015.3 On April 15, 2015, the United States substituted in for Davis Community

Clinic and its employees and removed the action to this Court. On April 22, 2015, 

 2 The Attorney General later determined that Dr. Kim was in fact an employee of Davis Community 

Hospital. See ECF No. 1-3. 

3 Plaintiff states that the claim has yet to be decided, but the United States has submitted evidence 

showing the claim was indeed denied via a letter dated March 19, 2015. See Reply, ECF No. 11-1, at 4. 

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Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that this Court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as 

required by the FTCA. 

STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and are presumptively without 

jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). The burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction. Id. Because subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s power to hear a 

case, it can never be forfeited or waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 

(2002). Accordingly, lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by either party at 

any point during the litigation, through a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).1 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also

Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Cnty. of Plumas, 559 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 

2009). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may also be raised by the district court sua 

sponte. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Indeed, “courts 

have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, 

even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) 

(requiring the court to dismiss the action if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking).

There are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: a 

facial attack, and a factual attack. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, a party may either make an attack on the 

allegations of jurisdiction contained in the nonmoving party’s complaint, or may 

challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, despite the formal 

sufficiency of the pleadings. Id.

 1 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted.

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When a party makes a facial attack on a complaint, the attack is unaccompanied 

by supporting evidence, and it challenges jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings. 

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). If the motion to 

dismiss constitutes a facial attack, the Court must consider the factual allegations of the 

complaint to be true, and determine whether they establish subject matter jurisdiction. 

Savage v. Glendale High Union Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2003). In the case of a facial attack, the motion to dismiss is granted only if the 

nonmoving party fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 

However, in the case of a facial attack, district courts “may review evidence beyond the 

complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” 

Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

In the case of a factual attack, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s 

allegations.” Thornill, 594 F.2d at 733 (internal citation omitted). The party opposing the 

motion has the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction does exist and must 

present any necessary evidence to satisfy this burden. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 

880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). If the plaintiff’s allegations of jurisdictional facts are 

challenged by the adversary in the appropriate manner, the plaintiff cannot rest on the 

mere assertion that factual issues may exist. Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Ind., 

Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Touche 

Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1976)). Furthermore, the district court may 

review any evidence necessary, including affidavits and testimony, in order to determine 

whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 

(9th Cir. 1988); Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. If the nonmoving party fails to meet its 

burden and the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must 

dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

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ANALYSIS

The government contends that Plaintiff’s claims against the United States should 

be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff filed his Complaint 

before exhausting his administrative remedies under the FTCA.

Under the FSHCAA, “[u]pon a certification by the Attorney General that the 

defendant was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the incident out of 

which the suit arose, any such civil action . . . shall be [removed] and deemed a tort 

action brought against the United States . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 233(c). Here, the Attorney 

General certified that Defendants Betsy Meux, M.D., Nidia Ochoa, P.A., Janice Kim, 

M.D., and Christi Stone, C.N.M., were at all relevant times employees of Davis 

Community Clinic, a deemed and supported health center and grantee of the United 

States Department of Health & Human Services. ECF No 1–3. Accordingly, the instant 

action is a tort action brought against the United States, along with Sutter Davis Hospital 

and Dr. Johnson. As a result, the FTCA is the exclusive remedy available to Plaintiff for 

his claims against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). 

The FTCA requires “that before [a party] can file an action against the United 

States in district court, [it] must seek an administrative resolution of [its] claim.” Jerves v. 

United States, 966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1992). Administrative resolution is satisfied 

when the claim is officially denied or has been pending for six months with the agency. 

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The Ninth Circuit “[has] repeatedly held that the exhaustion 

requirement is jurisdictional in nature and must be interpreted strictly.” Vacek v. U.S. 

Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Plaintiff filed his lawsuit on January 29, 2014, but did not submit his 

administrative claim to the United States Department of Health and Human Services until 

July 17, 2014. The United States argues that under McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 

106 (1993), this action must be dismissed. In McNeil, the Supreme Court affirmed 

dismissal of a FTCA lawsuit filed by a pro se inmate prior to the exhaustion of his 

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administrative remedies. Some circuit courts had previously held that a plaintiff did not 

need to meet the exhaustion requirements prior to filing if “no substantial progress” had 

been made in the case when exhaustion occurred. The Supreme Court disagreed, 

finding that it was clear “Congress intended to require complete exhaustion of Executive 

remedies before invocation of the judicial process.” Id. at 112. 

Plaintiff counters that unlike the situation in McNeil, this case did not originally 

contain an FTCA claim; rather, the action was based only on state malpractice law. 

Further, Plaintiffs note that by the time the United States substituted into the action on 

April 15, 2015, it had been more than six months since the administrative claim was 

filed, thus satisfying the exhaustion requirements. Plaintiff cites to two cases in support 

of his argument, but neither compels the Court to deny the pending Motion. 

In Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2011), an immigration 

detainee filed suit against federal and local officials and simultaneously filed an 

administrative claim. Six months later, Valadez-Lopez amended his complaint to add a 

claim against the United States under the FTCA. The Ninth Circuit found that ValadezLopez had properly exhausted his administrative remedies under the FTCA because his

“original complaint neither named the United States as a defendant nor stated a claim 

under the Act. He only amended his complaint to name the United States and include 

an FTCA cause of action after the government had failed to respond to his administrative 

claims within six months.” Id. at 855. 

In Walters v. Mercy Hospital Grayling, No. 13-cv-13282, 2013 WL 5775367 (E.D. 

Mich. Oct. 25, 2013), the district court relied on the Valadez-Lopez decision to decide a 

case similar to the case now before the Court. There, the plaintiff filed an administrative 

law claim with the Department of Health and Human Services but did not wait the 

requisite time before filing a state law action against a Federally Qualified Health Center 

and its physicians. However, one month prior to the substitution by the United States

and the addition of a FTCA claim by plaintiff, plaintiff’s administrative claim was denied, 

thereby exhausting the administrative remedies. The district court held that this 

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sequence of events satisfied McNeil because the original complaint did not name the 

United States or include an FTCA claim. Additionally, the district court held that 

dismissing the case only to have the plaintiff refile “would undermine the objectives of 

the exhaustion requirement recognized in McNeil: saving judicial resources and 

promoting settlement.” Id. at *3 (quoting Valadez-Lopez, 656 F.3d at 857). 

What distinguishes this case from the binding precedent in Valadez-Lopez, is that 

Plaintiff is not seeking to add an FTCA claim by amendment. Rather, this case was 

deemed an FTCA action once the Attorney General certified that the Davis Community 

Clinic Defendants were acting within the scope of their employment during all relevant 

times. See J.H. ex rel. Gallegos v. Cnty. of Kern, No. 1:13-CV-00500-LJO, 2014 WL 

1116985, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014) (“Although plaintiffs do not explicitly state a 

FTCA claim against the United States; pursuant to the FSHCAA, their claims against 

Dr. Garcia are ‘deemed a tort action brought against the United States.’”) (quoting 

42 U.S.C. § 233(c)). It was only Plaintiff’s lack of due diligence in researching the Davis 

Community Clinic Defendants that caused this case to be brought under state law claims

and not the FTCA. 

The Court is tempted to follow the reasoning in Walters and extend the leniency 

displayed by the Ninth Circuit in Valadez-Lopez to the current case.

4

 Certainly there is 

little to be gained from dismissing the United States only to have Plaintiff quickly amend 

the Complaint to add the United States under the precedent set in Valadez-Lopez. But 

ultimately, in its attempt to avoid a perceived inequitable result, the court in Walters

draws too fine of a distinction with McNeil. In McNeil, the Supreme Court made clear 

that the “FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit . . . until they have exhausted their 

administrative remedies.” 508 U.S. at 113. The Supreme Court even acknowledged 

that such strict adherence to the statutory language would often lead to inequitable 

 4 The holding in Walters is not binding on this Court. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 

2033 n.7 (“A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial 

district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.”). 

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results, but held that “in the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the 

procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.” Id. at 113. Thus, while the Court is sympathetic to 

Plaintiff’s predicament, Courts may not “proceed in the absence of fulfillment of the 

conditions merely because dismissal would visit a harsh result upon the plaintiff.” Vacek, 

447 F.3d at 1250. Accordingly, the United States is dismissed from this action without 

prejudice. See Frigard v. United States, 862 F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir.1988) (per curiam) 

(“a case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be dismissed without 

prejudice so that a plaintiff may reassert his claims in a competent court”).

With respect to the state-law negligence claims that are alleged against 

Defendants Sutter Davis Hospital and Dr. Johnson, this Court does not appear to have 

original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because complete diversity of citizenship is 

lacking. The Plaintiff is a California resident and the two Defendants are a California 

hospital with its principal place of business in Yolo County and a California resident, 

respectively. Compl., ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 1-2. Additionally, the remaining claims against 

these Defendants are based on state malpractice law. See Compl. (alleging two causes 

of action: one for medical negligence and one under Elam v. College Park Hospital, 

132 Cal. App. 3d 332 (1982)).5 Therefore, the Court must remand this case to Yolo 

County Superior Court. 

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 5 To the extent the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over these additional state-law claims 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), exercise of such jurisdiction is declined. See 28 U .S.C. § 1367(c)(3) 

(“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if

. . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”).

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 

No. 4) is GRANTED. The United States is DISMISSED from this action without 

prejudice. The case is REMANDED to Yolo County Superior Court. The Clerk of the 

Court is directed to close this case. 

IT S SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 1, 2015

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