Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05944-491/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT)

ANTITRUST LITIGATION

This Order Relates To:

ALL ACTIONS

 MDL No. 1917

Case No. C-07-5944 JST

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 

RELATING TO WITHDRAWAL AND 

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 2

II. Facts .......................................................................................................................................... 2

III. Legal Standard........................................................................................................................... 3

IV. Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 4

A. Substantive Legal Standards ................................................................................................. 4

1. Withdrawal........................................................................................................................ 4

2. Statute of Limitations and Fraudulent Concealment ........................................................ 6

B. The Instant Motions ............................................................................................................ 10

1. Hitachi Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon Withdrawal and the 

Statute of Limitations...................................................................................................... 10

2. Toshiba Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Concerning Withdrawal............ 15

3. Defendant LG Electronics, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Withdrawal 

Grounds........................................................................................................................... 19

4. Philips Electronics North America Corporation, Philips Taiwan Ltd., and Philips Brasil 

Ltda.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment .............................................................. 22

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5. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Dell and Sharp Plaintiffs on Statute of 

Limitations Grounds....................................................................................................... 25

V. Conclusion............................................................................................................................... 30

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court are various motions for summary judgment against certain Direct 

Action Plaintiffs (“DAPs”) on issues related to withdrawal and the statute of limitations. Oral 

argument was held on February 9, 2016. The Court has consolidated its rulings into a single order 

and finds as follows:

Name of Motion Motion

ECF No.

Opp’n

ECF No.

Reply

ECF No.

Ruling

Hitachi Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment Based Upon Withdrawal and 

the Statute of Limitations

2972 

(“Hitachi 

Mot.”)

3268

(“Hitachi 

Opp’n”)

3433-6 

(“Hitachi 

Reply”)

Granted in 

part, denied in 

part 

Toshiba Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment Concerning Withdrawal

2995 

(“Toshiba 

Mot.”)

3280 

(“Toshiba 

Opp’n”)

3437 

(“Toshib

a 

Reply”)

Denied

Defendant LG Electronics, Inc.’s Motion 

for Partial Summary Judgment on 

Withdrawal Grounds

3086

(“LGE 

Mot.”)

3262-4 

(“LGE 

Opp’n”)

3441-3 

(“LGE 

Reply”)

Denied

Philips Electronics North America 

Corporation, Philips Taiwan Ltd., and 

Philips Brasil Ltda.’s Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment

3027

(“Philips 

Mot.”)

3241

(“Philips 

Opp’n”)

3461

(“Philips 

Reply”)

Granted

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

Against Dell and Sharp Plaintiffs on 

Statute of Limitations Grounds

3044

(“Dell/

Sharp 

Mot.”)

3231

(“Dell 

Opp’n”); 

3284-4 

(“Sharp 

Opp’n”)

3472

(“Dell/

Sharp 

Reply”)

Denied

II. FACTS

The history of this case is well known to parties. By way of summation, this case is 

predicated upon an alleged conspiracy to price-fix cathode ray tubes (“CRTs”), a core component 

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of tube-style screens for common devices including televisions and computer monitors. This 

conspiracy ran from March 1, 1995 to November 25, 2007 (the “Conspiracy Period”), involved 

many of the major companies that produced CRTs, and allegedly resulted in overcharges of 

billions of U.S. dollars to domestic companies that purchased and sold CRTs or products 

containing CRTs (“CRT Finished Products”) for purposes such as personal use. A civil suit was 

originally filed in 2007, ECF No. 1, consolidated by the Joint Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 

shortly thereafter, see ECF No. 122, assigned as a Multidistrict Litigation case (“MDL”) to Judge 

Samuel Conti, see id., and ultimately transferred to the undersigned, see ECF No. 4162.

In addition to two class actions, this MDL involves various direct actions from individual 

plaintiffs who have opted out of the class actions, including the DAPs opposing the instant 

motions. Each DAP alleges that it bought at least one CRT Finished Product from a Defendant or 

an entity owned or controlled by a Defendant. The DAPs, despite their label, are classified as 

indirect purchasers under antitrust law, not direct purchasers. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when a “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). “A party asserting that a fact 

cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by” citing to depositions, documents, 

affidavits, or other materials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party also may show that such 

materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). An issue is 

“genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A fact is 

“material” if the fact may affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248. “In considering a motion for 

summary judgment, the court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, and 

is required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Freeman v. 

Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). However, unsupported conjecture or conclusory 

statements do not create a genuine dispute as to material fact and will not defeat summary 

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judgment. Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). 

For claims on which the defendant does not carry the ultimate burden of persuasion, 

defendant as the moving party has the burden of producing evidence that negates an essential 

element of each claim on which it seeks judgment or showing that the plaintiff cannot produce 

evidence sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof at trial. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 

Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party satisfies its initial burden of 

production, then the nonmoving party must produce admissible evidence to show that a genuine 

issue of material fact exists. Id. at 1102-1103. The non-moving party must “identify with 

reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 

F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). “Specific citations, not bulk references, are essential to pinpoint 

key facts and factual disputes. [A] district court [i]s not required to put the puzzle together from a 

boxful of facts, and . . . may permissibly decide the motion without mining [an] entire document 

for more substantiation” when a citation offers only a “breezy reference” to a part of an “82-page 

report” not otherwise cited or explained in briefing. Stanislaus Food Products Co. v. USS-POSCO 

Indus., 803 F.3d 1084, 1094-95 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2015). “A mere scintilla of evidence will not be 

sufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving 

party must introduce some significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” 

Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). If the 

non-moving party fails to make this showing, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Substantive Legal Standards

1. Withdrawal

Once a corporation has joined a price-fixing conspiracy, it is jointly and severally liable for 

any actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy until the objectives of the conspiracy are 

completed or the defendant withdraws. See Krause v. Perryman, 827 F.2d 346, 350-51 (8th Cir.

1987) (affirming summary judgment for defendant because he had “withdrawn from the alleged 

conspiracy prior to the events that resulted in [the plaintiffs’] alleged injuries”); In re Brand Name 

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Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 616 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Potash Antitrust 

Litig., 954 F. Supp. 1334, 1339, 1390–91 (D. Minn.1997) (granting summary judgment to antitrust 

defendant who withdrew from conspiracy), aff’d sub nom Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash 

Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Lothian, 976 F.2d 

1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant cannot be held liable for substantive offenses 

committed before joining or after withdrawing from a conspiracy.”). Because it is an affirmative 

defense, the burden of proving withdrawal lies with the defendant. See United States v. Brown, 

332 F.3d 363, 374 (6th Cir. 2003). 

At a minimum, “[a]ffirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and 

communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators [are] sufficient to 

establish withdrawal or abandonment.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464–65 

(1978); see also Lothian, 976 F.2d at 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Loya, 807 

F.2d 1483, 1493 (9th Cir.1987)) (“To withdraw from a conspiracy a defendant must either 

disavow the unlawful goal of the conspiracy, affirmatively act to defeat the purpose of the 

conspiracy, or take ‘definite, decisive, and positive steps to show that the [defendant’s] 

disassociation from the conspiracy is sufficient.’”).

There is no set list of affirmative acts sufficient to establish withdrawal. See United States 

v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 582 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Of course, there is no single way withdrawal can be 

established; in large part whether a particular action constitutes withdrawal depends on context.”), 

overruled on other grounds, Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532, 534 (3d Cir. 2001); Virginia v. 

McKesson Corp., No. C 11-02782 SI, 2013 WL 1287423, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013) (“A 

defendant can establish withdrawal from a conspiracy in various ways.”). Although mere 

inactivity or passive nonparticipation is not proof of withdrawal, see Smith v. United States, 133 

S. Ct. 714, 720 (2013), courts have been willing to grant summary judgment where the defendant: 

(1) severed all ties to the conspiracy; (2) severed all ties with the business through which it

participated in the conspiracy; and (3) either communicated its withdrawal in a manner reasonably 

calculated to give notice co-conspirators or took affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the 

conspiracy. See Morton’s Mkt., Inc. v. Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc., 198 F.3d 823, 839 (11th Cir. 

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1999) amended in part, 211 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793, 804 

(3d Cir. 1982); Krause v. Perryman, 827 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1987); cf. Antar, 53 F.3d at 583 

(resignation from a corporation insufficient to establish withdrawal because defendant retained 

stock in the corporation); Reisman v. United States, 409 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1969) (“Although 

appellant Reisman resigned . . . and ceased to participate in the company’s day-to-day business 

operations, he remained a major stockholder and took no affirmative action to disavow or defeat 

the promotional activities which he had joined in setting in motion.”); United States v. Lothian, 

976 F.2d 1257, 1264 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that “[t]he defendant in Reisman had not taken 

‘definite, decisive, and positive steps’ to disassociate himself from the scheme because he 

remained a major stockholder”).

Finally, even if a defendant severs its ties with an enterprise that is participating in a 

conspiracy, that defendant cannot assert a withdrawal defense if after withdrawing it engages in 

additional conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, see United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950, 

958 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Bullis, 77 F.3d 1553, 1561-63 (7th Cir. 1996), or if it 

continues to receive benefits from the conspiracy, see, e.g., United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246,

269 (2d Cir. 1992) (the defendant’s resignation from the conspiring law firm was not sufficient to 

constitute a withdrawal because he “‘continued to be entitled to a percentage of the recovery on all 

cases he tried including those giving rise to his pre-[resignation] racketeering acts.’”).

2. Statute of Limitations and Fraudulent Concealment

The Sherman and Clayton Acts provide for a four-year statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 15b. An antitrust “cause of action accrues and the statute [of limitations] begins to run when a 

defendant commits an act that injures the plaintiffs’ business.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 

Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971). As the Supreme Court has explained, however,

[a]ntitrust law provides that, in the case of a “continuing violation,” 

say, a price–fixing conspiracy that brings about a series of 

unlawfully high priced sales over a period of years, “each overt act 

that is part of the violation and that injures the plaintiff,” e.g., each 

sale to the plaintiff, “starts the statutory period running again, 

regardless of the plaintiff’s knowledge of the alleged illegality at 

much earlier times.” But the commission of a separate new overt act 

generally does not permit the plaintiff to recover for the injury 

caused by old overt acts outside the limitations period.

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Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189 (1997).

The statute of limitations is tolled, however, if the plaintiff can prove the defendant 

fraudulently concealed the existence of the conspiracy. E.W. French & Sons, Inc. v. Gen. 

Portland, Inc., 885 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989). To toll the statute of limitations under a

theory of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff “must do more than show that it was ignorant of its 

cause of action. It must prove that [the defendant] ‘fraudulently concealed the existence of the 

cause of action so that [the plaintiff], acting as a reasonable person, did not know of its 

existence.’” Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), 858 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 

Hennegan v. Pacifico Creative Service, Inc., 787 F.2d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1986)). It follows that 

a court should grant a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on fraudulent concealment if and 

only if (1) the plaintiff fails to submit evidence of an affirmative act of concealment, see Stutz 

Motor Car of Am., Inc. v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 909 F. Supp. 1353, 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1995); or (2) 

“the uncontroverted evidence irrefutably demonstrates” that the plaintiff had actual or constructive 

knowledge of the facts underlying its claim. Conmar, 858 F.2d at 502. 

a. Affirmative Acts of Concealment

“A plaintiff alleging fraudulent concealment must establish that its failure to have notice of 

its claim was the result of affirmative conduct by the defendant.” Conmar, 858 F.2d at 505. 

Although the affirmative acts can be integral to the underlying conspiracy itself, see In re 

Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., No. 14-CV-04062-LHK, 2015 WL 4974343, at *16 (N.D. 

Cal. Aug. 20, 2015) (citing id. at 499-501), passive concealment is not enough, Volk v. D.A. 

Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A]ppellees passively concealed the 

reports by not disclosing them to the investors. In such situations, the federal tolling doctrine does 

not apply.”). “[T]he line between active and passive concealment,” however, “is very fine 

indeed.” Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 320e (4th ed. 2013). 

Affirmative acts to conceal can include the following: using plain envelopes without return 

addresses, Kan. City v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 284 n.2 (8th Cir. 1962); using public 

pay telephones, id.; contacting company representatives at their residences rather than at their 

offices, id.; destroying records, id.; communicating in code, id.; circulating the “rules” of the 

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conspiracy, In re Milk Products Antitrust Litig., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1023 (D. Minn. 1997), aff’d,

195 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litig., 128 F.R.D. 262, 266 

(D. Minn. 1989)); avoiding the use of telephones, id.; marking conspiracy-related correspondence 

“personal and confidential,” id.; engaging in certain actions to create the illusion of active 

competition, id.; and meeting secretly regarding the conspiracy while falsely representing that the 

meetings were legitimate trade association meetings, id.. 

Courts differ somewhat as to whether secret meetings on their own constitute affirmative 

actions. Compare Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 1980 WL 1819, at *4 (E.D. La. 

1980) (holding that clandestine meetings in hotel rooms were not affirmative actions) and In re 

Milk Products, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1023 (same), with Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. 

Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1474 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that leaving price-fixing meetings off of a 

trade association meeting agenda in violation of other regulations was an affirmative act). In an 

order on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, however, Judge Conti, the undersigned’s predecessor in 

this case, held that a pattern of secret meetings among alleged coconspirators was enough to 

establish fraudulent concealment. See In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-

5944-SC, 2014 WL 1091589, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2014).

b. Actual or Constructive Knowledge

A plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of its claim is essential to establish fraudulent 

concealment. Once the plaintiff has knowledge or constructive knowledge of all the operative 

facts underlying its claim, the statute begins to run, even the plaintiff does not believe the 

information it received or is not convinced of the defendant’s culpability. Stegeman v. Aetna Ins. 

Co., 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10754, at *16 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Philco Corp. v. RCA, 186 F. Supp. 

155, 165-66 (E.D. Pa. 1960).

 A plaintiff has constructive knowledge if it has “enough information to warrant an 

investigation which, if reasonably diligent, would [lead] to the discovery” of the facts underlying 

its claims. Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos Polymers, Inc., 681 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Beneficial Standard Life Ins., Co. v. Madariaga, 851 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1988)). A majority of 

circuits have held that the issue of when a plaintiff has constructive knowledge of his claim is 

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normally a question of fact for the jury. Lundy v. Union Carbide Corp., 695 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.

1982); Morton’s Mkt, 198 F.3d at 832 (citing Ballew v. A.H. Robins Co., 688 F.2d 1325 (11th 

Cir. 1982); Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1387 (10th Cir. 1985); Renfroe v. Eli 

Lilly & Co., 686 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1982)). Nevertheless, courts will grant summary judgment 

based on a plaintiff’s constructive knowledge where (1) the plaintiff is aware of facts1such that its 

“suspicions have been or should have been excited,”2 Conmar, 858 F.2d at 504; and (2) the 

plaintiff would have discovered the facts underlying its claims if it had been reasonably diligent in 

investigating those suspicions,

3

id.; see also, e.g., Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 

1417 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding investors had constructive knowledge because they received an 

annual report and a letter that made it clear they had paid more for their investment than it was 

worth); Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1978) 

(finding constructive knowledge where the plaintiff had litigated similar issues in an earlier case 

and had expressed suspicions about the defendants’ wrongdoing); Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos Polymers, 

Inc., 681 F.3d 1055, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding constructive knowledge where the plaintiff 

authored a report detailing its involvement in a related federal price-fixing investigation).

4

 

1 Mere suspicion is not enough. See Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 

698 (9th Cir. 1977) vacated on other grounds, 437 U.S. 322 (1978) (quoting Friedman v. Meyers, 

482 F.2d 435, 439 (2d Cir. 1973) (“The record shows that Mt. Hood suspected Greyhound of 

unlawful conduct prior to December 14, 1960, but ‘(s)uspicion will not substitute for knowledge 

of facts from which fraud could reasonably be inferred.’”).

2

It is not enough, however, “to point to facts which might have caused a plaintiff to inquire, or 

could have led to evidence supporting [the plaintiff’s] claim. Morton's Mkt, 198 F.3d at 832-33. 

“A defendant who does this has succeeded in demonstrating only that there is a jury question 

regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations by fraudulent concealment.” Id. 

3

 Because this is an objective standard, it does not matter whether the plaintiff actually conducted 

a diligent inquiry. See Sterlin v. Biomune Sys., 154 F.3d 1191, 1202 n.20 (10th Cir. 1998). 

Assuming the defendant can show the plaintiff had facts that should have excited its suspicions, 

the defendant must also show that a diligent inquiry, had it been performed, would have revealed 

the facts underlying the plaintiff’s claims. See Morton's Mkt., 198 F.3d at 833; see also In re 

Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litig., 782 F. Supp. 487, 493 

(C.D. Cal. 1991) (“Nor is there constructive knowledge if, even upon investigating, plaintiffs 

might reasonably be unable to uncover their claims.”).

4

See also Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 218 (4th Cir. 

1987) (holding no fraudulent concealment where antitrust action alleged interrelationships 

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B. The Instant Motions

1. Hitachi Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon 

Withdrawal and the Statute of Limitations

Five of the six Hitachi entities named as Defendants in this case brought the instant 

motion: Hitachi, Ltd. (“HTL”), Hitachi Displays, Ltd. (“HDP”), Hitachi Asia, Ltd. (“HAS”), 

Hitachi America, Ltd. (“HAL”) and Hitachi Electronic Devices (USA), Inc. (“HED(US)”) 

(collectively, the “Hitachi Defendants”). HDP, HAS, HAL, and HED(US) are wholly owned 

subsidiaries of HTL.

The Hitachi Defendants’ motion asks the Court to find as a matter of law (1) that the 

Hitachi Defendants withdrew from the alleged conspiracy by March 20, 2003 (the point at which 

the Hitachi Defendants exited the CRT industry), and (2) that the DAPs’ claims are barred by the 

statute of limitations because they were filed more than four years after the Hitachi Defendants 

(purportedly) withdrew from the conspiracy. The Hitachi Defendants have since settled, but their 

motion is sustained by Defendants LG, Mitsubishi, and Toshiba who filed joinders on the 

withdrawal issue only. ECF Nos. 3864, 3898, 3011. 

The DAPs respond that the Hitachi Defendants did not withdraw from the conspiracy 

because (1) “cessation of manufacturing and sales, without more, does not establish withdrawal,” 

and (2) “the evidence reflects that Hitachi continued to participate in the CRT conspiracy after 

 

between defendant companies, and those interrelationships were readily discoverable on 

consultation of public mining records); United Klans of America v. McGovern, 621 F.2d 152, 

154-55 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding constructive knowledge where there was a national press 

conference, coverage in two local newspapers, a Senate report, and a letter to president of 

plaintiff); Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 1975) 

(finding constructive knowledge there where congressional hearings on same antitrust violations 

and industry-wide publicity of FTC suit); GO Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 508 F.3d 170, 

178-79 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding constructive knowledge where plaintiff was twice involved in FTC 

antitrust investigations for which the plaintiff provided a declaration and where plaintiff wrote a 

book that reported conversations related to alleged violation); Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. 

Intel Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21529, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 1992) (finding that statements 

made by plaintiff’s counsel, internal memoranda, and an internal report demonstrated “an 

awareness sufficient to excite inquiry into potential antitrust claims”); Southwire Co. v. J.P. 

Morgan Chase & Co., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1062 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (finding constructive 

knowledge where reports were published that investigation was being launched); Insulate SB, Inc. 

v. Advanced Finishing Sys., 2014 WL 943224 (D. Minn. Mar. 11, 2014) (finding constructive 

knowledge based on FTC action).

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2003.” Hitachi Opp’n at 12, 15. 

The motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is granted as to HAS and 

HAL. It is denied, however, as to HTL, HDP, and HED(US). That portion of the motion relating 

to the statute of limitations is denied as moot.

a. Facts

It is undisputed that none of the Hitachi Defendants produced or sold CRTs after March 

2003: HTL manufactured and sold CRTs until 2002; HDP never manufactured or sold CRTs; 

HAS sold CRTs until 2002; HAL sold CRTs manufactured by HED(US) until April 1998; and 

HED(US) sold CRTs until March 20, 2003. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the Hitachi 

Defendants’ decision to sell their CRT business in 2003 was publicly announced, and that their 

alleged coconspirators were aware of the sale. 

The sixth Hitachi entity in this case – SEG Hitachi Shenzhen Color Display Devices Co., 

Ltd. (“Hitachi Shenzhen”) – did not join the instant motion but is central to the issues on which the 

motion turns. Hitachi Shenzhen allegedly joined the conspiracy in 2000 and continued to 

participate throughout the balance of the conspiracy period. Unlike the Hitachi Defendants, 

Hitachi Shenzhen was not a wholly owned subsidiary of HTL and does not claim to have exited 

the CRT industry. HDP, however, owned a 25% interest in Hitachi Shenzhen until November 7, 

2007. ECF No. 3268-4 at 1. HDP also appointed three members to Hitachi Shenzhen’s seven 

member board and received production reports from Hitachi Shenzhen on a regular basis. See

ECF No 3270-8, Exs. 21-22. 

The events immediately following the Hitachi Defendants’ exit from the CRT industry are 

relevant. In April 2003, shortly after the Hitachi Defendants ceased production and sales of CRTs, 

HED(US) sold its production line for 27- to 32-inch color picture tubes (“CPTs”) – a type of CRT 

– to Thomson, an alleged coconspirator. ECF No. 3270-5, Ex. 5 (Heiser Depo) at 238:19-239:7. 

HED(US) retained its production line for 36-inch CPTs, however, and ultimately transferred this 

line to Hitachi Shenzhen. Id. Prior to the asset sale to Thomson, the Hitachi Defendants and 

Thomson entered into an agreement “whereby Hitachi would refrain from selling 34[-inch] CPTs 

to North America.” ECF No 3270-5, Ex. 9. This agreement apparently bound Hitachi Shenzhen 

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as well. See id. After the agreement with Thomson expired, HED(US) began working with 

Hitachi Shenzhen to develop a strategy for Hitachi Shenzhen to sell 34-inch CPTs into the North 

American market. See id.; id., Ex. 10. 

The DAPs provide evidence that HDP employees continued to meet with cartel members 

after March 2003 to exchange production plans and to discuss CRT market forecasts. See, e.g., 

ECF No. 3270-9, Exs. 36 at 96:4-11; 37; 38. There is also evidence that HDP employees provided 

alleged coconspirator MTPD with production information for Hitachi Shenzhen after March 2003. 

See, e.g., ECF No. 3270-4, Ex. 38. Finally, there is evidence that Mr. Toniguchi, a HED(US) 

employee, was “in charge of manufacturing . . . production, [or] engineering” at Hitachi Shenzhen. 

ECF No. 3270-5, Ex. 5 at 312:23-313:1. 

b. Discussion

There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether HDP and HED(US) withdrew 

from the conspiracy. Defendants do not point to any affirmative action by HDP to withdraw.5 

Even if the sale of other Hitachi Defendants’ CRT businesses could be imputed to HDP, the sale 

of a conspiring business does not qualify as an affirmative act of withdrawal if the defendant fails 

to “sever[] all ties” with the conspiracy and the business through which it participated in the 

conspiracy. See Morton’s Mkt., 198 F.3d at 839; see also Reisman, 409 F.2d at 793 (holding 

defendant did not withdraw because he remained a major stockholder); Lothian, 976 F.2d 1264

(same); Antar, 53 F.3d at 583 (same). Here, HDP did not sever all ties because it continued to 

 

5

That HDP never manufactured CRTs is not relevant to whether HDP withdrew, assuming it 

joined the conspiracy in the first place. In any event, a defendant does not need to produce the

price-fixed good in order to be liable for a conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 

F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding Apple liable for facilitating a conspiracy among book publishers). 

Defendants also try to distinguish Reisman and Antar. They argue the defendants in those cases 

did not qualify for withdrawal because they did not take affirmative acts. Instead of selling the 

business, as here, the Reisman and Antar defendants merely retired. That is a distinction without a 

difference. The defendants in Reisman and Antar did not effectuate their withdrawal because they 

retained an ownership interest and therefore failed to sever all ties. Antar, 53 F.3d at 583; 

Reisman, 409 F.2d at 793; cf. Morton's Mkt, 198 F.3d at 839. Regardless, other Hitachi 

Defendants sold the CRT business, not HDP. As Defendants point out, HDP never manufactured 

or sold CRTs in the first place. Defendants cannot lament that traditional lines of corporate 

separateness have been crossed by the DAPs, see infra note 6, only to blur those same lines when 

it is convenient.

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own a 25% interest in a co-conspirator – Hitachi Shenzhen – to whom HED(US) also sold part of 

its CRT business.

6

 Further, HDP was not simply a passive investor in Hitachi Shenzhen. See, 

e.g., ECF No 3270-5, Ex. 9 (stating that HDP would work with Hitachi Shenzhen to sell CRTs 

into the North American market). HDP exercised some amount of control over Hitachi Shenzhen 

and had the ability to appoint three of seven members of Hitachi Shenzhen’s board. Finally, even 

if HDP had affirmatively withdrawn, however, its withdrawal would have been negated by 

evidence that it continued to exchange competitive information with coconspirators. See Lowell, 

649 F.2d at 958 (acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy after the point of withdrawal will 

negate a withdrawal defense); Bullis, 77 F.3d at 1561-63 (same); see, e.g., ECF No. 3270-9, Exs. 

36 at 96:4-11; 37; 38.

There is also evidence that HED(US) failed to sever ties. For example, HED(US) worked 

with coconspirator Hitachi Shenzhen to develop a strategy for Hitachi Shenzhen to sell 34-inch 

CPTs into the North American market. See ECF No 3270-5, Ex. 10. In addition, there is evidence 

that an HED(US) employee named Mr. Toniguchi was placed at Hitachi Shenzhen and put “in 

charge of manufacturing . . . production, [or] engineering.” ECF No. 3270-5, Ex. 5 at 312:23-

313:1.

On the other hand, it is undisputed that HAS and HAL exited the CRT industry and cut all 

ties as of March 2003. This is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of withdrawal. See

Morton’s Mkt., 198 F.3d at 839; Steele, 685 F.2d at 804 (3d Cir. 1982); Krause, 827 F.2d at 351; 

Antar, 53 F.3d at 583. The DAPs do not attempt to rebut Defendants’ showing as to HAS and 

 

6

The Hitachi Defendants argue that HDP’s 25 percent ownership interest in Hitachi Shenzhen is 

irrelevant given principles of corporate separateness. Indeed, the Hitachi Defendants cannot be 

held liable for the acts of Hitachi Shenzhen, a separate corporate entity, absent alter ego liability or 

some other legal theory that would allow the DAPs to impute the acts of Hitachi Shenzhen onto

the Hitachi Defendants. See U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 68 (1998) (“It is a general principle 

of corporate law deeply ingrained in our legal system that a corporation is not liable for the acts of 

its subsidiaries.”). The question before the Court, however, is whether the Hitachi Defendants

have met the elements of withdrawal as a matter of law, not whether the DAPs can hold the 

Hitachi Defendants liable for the acts of Hitachi Shenzhen. HDP fails to meet the elements of 

withdrawal as a matter of law, in part, because it continued to own a 25 percent stake in a 

coconspirator. Cf. Morton’s Market, 198 F.3d at 830 (“With the sale of its dairy, [the defendant] 

certainly ‘retired’ and totally severed its ties to the milk price-fixing conspiracy.”) (emphasis 

added).

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HAL specifically. Instead, without argument or explanation, they treat the Hitachi Defendants as 

a single entity, referring to them throughout their brief simply as “Hitachi.” Finding no reason to 

find otherwise, the Court declines to discard traditional notions of corporate separateness and does 

not treat the Hitachi Defendants as a single entity. 

The DAPs also argue that the Hitachi Defendants – including, presumably, HAS and HAL 

– failed to effectuate their withdrawal insofar as their exit from the industry benefited the 

conspiracy by making the market more concentrated. Exiting an industry does not necessarily 

make the market more concentrated, though the sale of one’s business to a competitor does. Here, 

the Hitachi Defendants sold their CRT business to competitors and alleged coconspirators 

Thomson and Hitachi Shenzhen. The Court recognizes that a sale to a competitor is not

necessarily “inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy” insofar as concentrated industries are 

more prone to collusion. Cf. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 464-65 (requiring that the affirmative act be 

“inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy”). The Court declines, however, to adopt a rule 

that would effectively prohibit sales to competitors in order to effectuate withdrawal. In many 

cases, competitors will be a firm’s only potential buyers. Regardless, the authority on this issue is 

clear that a defendant has withdrawn if it severs all ties to the conspiracy and to the business 

through which it participated in the conspiracy. See Morton’s Market, 198 F.3d at 839; Steele, 

685 F.2d at 804; Krause, 827 F.2d at 351. Here, Defendants have met that burden as to HAS and 

HAL.

Whether HTL withdrew as a matter of law is a more difficult question. The DAPs urged 

the Court at the hearing to find that HTL did not effectuate its withdrawal because it continued to 

possess an indirect interest in coconspirator Hitachi Shenzhen beyond March 2003. Specifically, 

HTL wholly owned HDP, which in turn owned 25% of Hitachi Shenzhen. Although HTL’s 

connection to the conspiracy beyond March 2003 was not as significant as HDP’s or HED(US)’s

involvement, HTL failed to cut all ties by retaining an indirect interest in a coconspirator and 

therefore did not meet the high bar for establishing withdrawal as a matter of law. See Antar, 53 

F.3d at 583; Reisman, 409 F.2d at 793; see also Eisen, 974 F.2d at 269 (no withdrawal if 

defendant continues to benefit from the conspiracy). Cf. Morton’s Market, 198 F.3d at 839

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(cutting all ties to the industry), Steele, 685 F.2d at 804 (same), and Krause, 827 F.2d at 351

(same).

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It is 

granted with respect to the withdrawal issue as to HAS and HAL, but it is denied in all other 

respects.7

2. Toshiba Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Concerning 

Withdrawal

The five Toshiba entities in this case brought the instant motion: Toshiba Corporation 

(“Toshiba Corp.”), Toshiba America, Inc. (“TAI”), Toshiba America Consumer Products, LLC 

(“TACP”), Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc. (“TAIS”), and Toshiba America 

Electronic Components, Inc. (“TAEC”) (collectively, the “Toshiba Defendants”).8 Their motion 

asks the Court to rule as a matter of law that Toshiba Defendants withdrew from the conspiracy by 

April 1, 2003, the date on which Toshiba Defendants transferred their CRT business to Matsushita 

Toshiba Picture Display Co., Ltd. (“MTPD”), a joint venture between Toshiba and alleged 

coconspirator Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. (“Matsushita”). Further, their motion asks 

the Court to dismiss the DAPs’ claims because the amount of time between Toshiba Defendants’

purported withdrawal and the filing of the DAPs’ complaint exceeds the statute of limitations. 

The Court will deny the motion.

a. Facts

The DAPs present evidence that Toshiba Defendants joined the conspiracy at least as early 

as 1997 by attending meetings with competitors to discuss price and coordinate supply. The

DAPs also present evidence that Toshiba Defendants took steps to conceal their involvement in 

the conspiracy, including attending secret meetings in hotels, recording information on a 

 

7 After filing their Reply, Defendants filed objections to evidence submitted in support of the 

DAPs’ Opposition. ECF Nos. 3449, 4359. Local Rule 7-3(c) states that “[a]ny evidentiary and 

procedural objections to the opposition must be contained within the reply brief or memorandum.” 

The Court strikes Defendants’ objections for failure to comply with the Local Rules.

8 Unlike the Hitachi motion, see supra Section IV.B.1, Toshiba Defendants treat themselves as a 

single entity for the purposes of this motion. 

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blackboard instead of committing it to paper, instructing recipients of internal emails to destroy 

the emails after reading them, and communicating in code in order to avoid detection. 

On September 26, 2002, Toshiba Corp. and Matsushita publicly announced that they were 

combining their CRT businesses and forming MTPD, a joint venture owned and controlled by 

both companies. See ECF No. Ex. A at 1 (issuing a press release stating that Toshiba and 

Matsushita were “consolidating their cathode ray tube (CRT) business into a single company.”).

Toshiba Defendants transferred their relevant CRT operations to MTPD on March 31, 2003, and 

MTPD commenced operations on April 1, 2003. Toshiba, however, retained rights to certain 

intellectual property used in the CRT business and licensed those rights to MTPD.

Toshiba Corp. owned a 35.5% share of MTPD, appointed four out of ten directors on 

MTPD’s board, and indirectly exercised veto power over important decisions of the Board as a 

result of the Joint Venture Agreement’s requirement that there be consent of at least one Toshibaappointed director. Toshiba also assisted in preparing MTPD’s Initial Business Plan and secured 

the right to approve any changes to that plan in future years. 

b. Discussion

Toshiba Defendants assert that their exit from the CRT industry on April 1, 2003 

constitutes withdrawal. Toshiba, however, did not exit the CRT industry; they merely restructured 

their involvement through a joint venture in partnership with another alleged coconspirator. The 

joint venture, MTPD, in turn, allegedly joined the conspiracy shortly after its creation. As a result 

of their shared ownership and control of MTPD with alleged coconspirator Matsushita, not only 

did Toshiba Defendants retain a significant ownership interest in a conspiring corporation, they 

continued to actively participate in the CRT industry beyond their purported “exit.” Toshiba 

Defendants appointed members to MTPD’s board, exercised veto power over important decisions, 

assisted in developing MTPD’s business plan, and leased intellectual property related to the 

manufacture of CRTs to MTPD. There is at least a genuine issue of material fact therefore as to 

whether Toshiba Defendants severed all ties to their CRT business and to the conspiracy. See

Antar, 53 F.3d at 583; Reisman, 409 F.2d at 793.

Toshiba Defendants attempt to distinguish their case from Reisman and Antar. They note 

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that whereas they sold their businesses, the defendants in Reisman and Antar merely resigned.

They contend that the act of selling a business constitutes an affirmative act that the defendants in 

Reisman and Antar lacked. The Court disagrees. A defendant’s resignation from a conspiring 

business, like a sale, is sufficient to establish withdrawal only if the defendant severs all ties in the 

process. See, e.g., Lothian, 976 F.2d at 1264 (holding that the defendant’s resignation effectuated 

his withdrawal because he did not retain an ownership interest upon his resignation); Lowell, 649 

F.2d at 955 (“[A]ffirmative action sufficient to show withdrawal as a matter of law from the 

conspiracy . . . may be demonstrated by the retirement of a coconspirator from the business, 

severance of all ties to the business, and consequent deprivation to the remaining conspirator 

group of the services that constituted the retiree’s contribution to the fraud.”). Thus, that the

defendants in Reisman and Antar resigned as opposed to selling their business is irrelevant. The 

question is whether Toshiba Defendants cut off all ties. They did not. In fact, because in addition 

to retaining ownership they also shared control of MTPD, Toshiba Defendants’ withdrawal was 

even more incomplete than that of the defendants in Reisman and Antar.

Next, because MTPD was not born a conspirator, Toshiba Defendants argue their 

withdrawal was complete the moment they created MTPD and sold their CRT business in 

exchange for MTPD stock. The Court remains unconvinced. Because MTPD allegedly joined the 

conspiracy almost immediately after its formation, there is an issue of material fact as to whether 

Toshiba Defendants severed all ties with the conspiracy or whether they merely restructured those 

ties by manipulating their corporate umbrella. Further, by merely restructuring their CRT business 

as a joint venture, Toshiba Defendants failed to cut all ties with the business through which it 

participated in the conspiracy. True, Toshiba Defendants no longer manufactured CRTs 

themselves, but it can hardly be said that they “severed all ties to the business” in light of their 

shared ownership and control of MTPD. Morton’s Mkt., 198 F.3d at 839.

Toshiba Defendants assert the foregoing analysis violates traditional notions of corporate 

separateness and holds them liable for the acts of a separate company, MTPD. Indeed, absent a 

legal theory that would allow the DAPs to impute the acts of MTPD onto Toshiba Defendants, 

Toshiba Defendants cannot be held liable for the acts of MTPD. But that is not the issue. The 

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question before the Court is whether Toshiba Defendants have met the high bar for establishing 

withdrawal as a matter of law. To meet that burden, Toshiba Defendants must show there is no 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether they severed all ties with the conspiracy and the 

business through which they participated in the conspiracy. See Morton’s Mkt., 198 F.3d at 839; 

Steele, 685 F.2d at 804; Krause, 827 F.2d at 351; Antar, 53 F.3d at 583; Reisman, 409 F.2d at 793; 

Lothian, 976 F.2d at 1264. Because of their ownership and control of MTPD, Toshiba Defendants 

fail to meet their burden. 

Separate but related, Toshiba Defendants’ motion as to withdrawal fails for the 

independent reason that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Toshiba Defendants 

adequately communicated their purported withdrawal. The DAPs do not dispute that press 

releases and news coverage are means reasonably calculated to reach Toshiba Defendants’

coconspirators; rather, they argue the content of the communications was inadequate. Toshiba and 

alleged coconspirator Matsushita publicly announced they were combining their CRT businesses 

and forming MTPD, a joint venture owned and controlled by both companies. See ECF No. Ex. A 

at 1 (issuing a press release stating that Toshiba and Matsushita were “consolidating their cathode 

ray tube (CRT) business into a single company.”). Toshiba Defendants’ coconspirators, however, 

could have easily interpreted that announcement as a restructuring of Toshiba Defendants’

involvement in the CRT industry via a joint venture. That is not the same as announcing a

complete exit.

Finally, Toshiba Defendants’ motion also fails as to fraudulent concealment. The DAPs 

provided evidence suggesting that Toshiba Defendants attended secret meetings in hotels, 

recorded information on a blackboard instead of committing it to paper, instructed recipients of 

emails to destroy them after reading them, and used codes in correspondence in order to hide the 

conspiracy. These are the types of affirmative acts that courts have found sufficient to establish

fraudulent concealment. See, e.g., Pinney, 838 F.2d at 1472 (holding secret meetings); In re 

Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 1091589, at *9 (same); Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 

310 F.2d at 284 n.2 (destroying records and encoding information). 

Accordingly, Toshiba Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

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3. Defendant LG Electronics, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment on Withdrawal Grounds

LGE Electronics (“LGE”) brought the instant motion asking the Court to rule that LGE 

withdrew from the conspiracy as of July 1, 2001, the date on which it transferred its CRT assets to 

LG. Philips Displays (“LPD”), a joint venture between LGE and alleged coconspirator Philips. 

Although LPD allegedly continued to participate in the conspiracy, LGE argues that it should not 

be held liable for those acts according to principles of corporate separateness. Further, LGE 

argues that its shift from seeking to increase CRT prices as a CRT seller to seeking the lowest 

price possible as a CRT buyer constitutes an affirmative act inconsistent with the object of the 

conspiracy such that the Court should grant its withdrawal defense as a matter of law.

The DAPs respond that the motion should be denied because, according to the DAPs, (1) 

LGE did not sever ties from the CRT conspiracy through its formation of LPD; (2) LGE benefited 

from LPD’s participation in the conspiracy; and (3) LGE never communicated its purported 

withdrawal to its coconspirators. 

The Court will deny the motion. 

a. Facts

LGE and Philips allegedly joined the conspiracy around 1995. On July 1, 2001, LGE and 

Philips formed LPD, a joint venture to which LGE and Philips transferred their CRT businesses. 

The DAPs allege that LPD joined the conspiracy shortly after its creation and continued its 

participation until it declared bankruptcy in January 2006.

LPD’s formation was widely reported in the media. Further, the undisputed evidence 

shows that coconspirators were aware that LPD was a joint venture between LGE and Philips to 

which LGE and Philips transferred their CRT businesses. The announcements and media reports, 

however, did not state that LGE and Philips were exiting the CRT industry. Instead, they 

indicated that LGE and Philips were consolidating their CRT businesses. 

LGE held 50% of LPD’s shares, minus one share, and Philips held the rest. LGE also had 

the right to appoint three members to LPD’s six-member Supervisory Board, which was 

responsible for “provid[ing] high-level strategic advice to LPD’s management and aid[ing] LPD in 

determining business policies and how to implement those policies.” LGE Mot. at 4. Finally, in 

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addition to arranging initial financing, LGE provided LPD with a $125 million capital injection on 

May 31, 2002 and a $250 million capital injection on June 25, 2004.

After transferring its CRT business to LPD, LGE became exclusively a CRT purchaser, 

buying CRTs for incorporation into its finished products. LGE purchased CRTs from LPD and 

other suppliers. LGE presents evidence that these purchases were done at arm’s length and that 

LGE sought the lowest purchase price possible. 

b. Discussion

LGE did not sever ties with the CRT industry or its CRT manufacturing business. Instead, 

it transferred its CRT business to a joint venture that it owned and controlled jointly with another 

coconspirator. LGE seems to concede that point, see LGE Reply at 6-7, but argues that although 

“severing all ties . . . is one way to show withdrawal, [it is] not the only way. Id. at 6. LGE 

quotes from the Third Circuit’s opinion in Antar wherein the court held that “if the defendant has 

not completely severed his ties with the enterprise, then in order to establish a prima facie case, he 

must demonstrate . . . that he did acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy.” Antar, 53 

F.3d at 582. LGE contends that “becoming a CRT purchaser and consistently negotiating for 

lower CRT prices [was an act] squarely inconsistent with continued support of a CRT price-fixing 

conspiracy.” LGE Reply at 7. 

The Court is not convinced. Negotiating the lowest price possible for LGE’s own inputs is 

entirely unremarkable and does not constitute an “affirmative[] act” or a “definite, decisive, and 

positive step[].” Lothian, 976 F.2d at 1261; see United States v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 603 F.2d 444,

467 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.150, 224 n.59

(1940)) (resuming normal competitive behavior is insufficient to establish withdrawal); Plymouth 

Dealers’ Ass’n of No. Cal. v. United States, 279 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1960) (same). Indeed, 

there is nothing inconsistent with LGE seeking to lower the cost of its own CRT purchases while 

simultaneously supporting a conspiracy that raised prices for its competitors and increased profits 

for its joint venture, LPD. At most, LGE’s transition from CRT producer to CRT purchaser

suggests it was no longer actively supporting the conspiracy. Cf. Smith, 133 S. Ct. at 720 (holding 

that mere cessation of activity in furtherance of the conspiracy is insufficient). Because LGE 

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failed to cut all ties with its former CRT manufacturing business, however, more is required. See

Antar, 53 F.3d at 583 (“[I]f the defendant has not completely severed his ties with the enterprise, 

then in order to establish a prima facie case, he must demonstrate . . . that he did acts inconsistent 

with the object of the conspiracy.”). 

LGE also contends that the DAPs are seeking to hold LGE “liable for the actions of LPD 

because [LGE] held a minority ownership interest in the newly formed organization.” LGE Reply 

at 10. “This theory,” according to LGE, “conflicts with fundamental principles of corporate 

separateness.” Id. LGE mischaracterizes the issue. The question before the Court is whether 

LGE took actions sufficient to establish withdraw as a matter of law. Whether it took adequate

steps depends on whether it retained stock in a conspiring corporation, see Antar, 53 F.3d at 583; 

whether it continued to be involved in the CRT industry and its former CRT manufacturing 

business, see Morton’s Mkt., 198 F.3d at 839; and whether it continued to interact and 

communicate with coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, see Lowell, 649 F.2d at 958. 

LGE’s relationship to LPD is relevant for these reasons, not because the DAPs are trying to hold 

LGE liable for the acts of LPD.

LGE’s motion also fails for the independent reason that there is a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether the announcements regarding the creation of LPD communicated 

LGE’s exit from the CRT industry or merely that LGE and Philips were consolidating their CRT 

efforts through a joint venture. 

Finally, at the end of its Reply, LGE states that “[e]ven if this court finds that LGE did not 

withdraw from the conspiracy in 2001, at the very latest, the undisputed facts show that it 

withdrew by January 2006. . . . LPD declared bankruptcy in 2006, at which time LGE’s minority 

ownership interest cannot be said to have any relevance.” Reply at 12. LGE did not make this 

argument in their motion; it is not responsive to the DAPs’ Opposition; and it was not raised at the 

hearing. The Court therefore declines to consider it. 

The motion is DENIED.9

 

9

LG objects to Plaintiffs’ use in its Opposition of a European Commission decision and an 

opinion from a Delaware court. LGE Reply at 9 n.7. Those decisions are irrelevant to the issues 

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4. Philips Electronics North America Corporation, Philips Taiwan Ltd., 

and Philips Brasil Ltda.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Koninklijke Philips N.V. (“Royal Philips”), an alleged coconspirator in this case, is the 

parent company to hundreds of subsidiaries across the world. Some of those subsidiaries are also 

defendants in this case. Three of those subsidiaries – Philips Electronics North America 

Corporation (“PENAC”), Philips Taiwan Limited (f/k/a Philips Electronics Industries (Taiwan) 

Ltd.) (“PTL”), and Philips do Brasil Ltda. (f/k/a Philips da Amazonia Industria Electronica Ltda.) 

(“PDBL”) (collectively, the “Philips Subsidiaries”) – brought the instant motion. Royal Philips, 

itself, however, is not a party to the motion. 

Defendants ask the Court to rule that the Philips Subsidiaries withdrew from the 

conspiracy as a matter of law after June 2001 when the Philips Subsidiaries transferred their CRT 

businesses to LG Philips Displays (“LPD”), a joint venture between Philips and alleged 

coconspirator LGE. Although Royal Philips continued to be involved in the CRT industry through 

its shared ownership and control of LPD, the Philips Subsidiaries argue that they severed all ties to 

the CRT industry after June 2001 and that Royal Philips’ ongoing involvement should not be 

imputed onto them given principles of corporate separateness. 

The DAPs’ respond that the motion should be denied because Royal Philips continued its 

involvement in the conspiracy through LPD. Further, the DAPs contend that the Philips 

Subsidiaries did not communicate their alleged withdrawal to their coconspirators. Finally, the 

DAPs argue that the Philips Subsidiaries continued to benefit from the conspiracy after their 

purported withdrawal insofar as the Philips conglomerate as a whole benefited.

Because the DAPs fail to provide (1) any evidence that Philips Subsidiaries continued their 

involvement in the CRT industry after June 2001, or (2) a legal theory that would allow them to 

impute Royal Philips’ alleged involvement in the conspiracy through LPD after June 2001 onto 

the Phillips Subsidiaries, the Court will grant the motion. 

a. Facts

 

presented by this motion and the Court did not consider them in making its decision. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ objection is overruled as moot. 

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In addition to the facts provided below, the Court incorporates the relevant facts from 

Section IV.B.3.a, supra, which explain the LPD joint venture between LGE and Philips in detail.

Royal Philips is the Netherlands-based parent company of the Philips Group, a 

multinational business conglomerate. ECF No. 3238-11, Ex. 3 at 1. Its business activities are 

organized through Product Divisions and Country Organizations, and its legal structure is 

organized through a large number of directly and indirectly held subsidiaries throughout the 

world. See id. The two Product Divisions relevant to this case are the Philips Consumer 

Electronics Division (“PCE”) and the Components Division. PCE was responsible for finished 

televisions and monitors. A business group within the Components Division called Philips 

Display Components (“PDC”) was responsible for the production of CRTs.

At Royal Philips’ 30(b)(6) deposition, its corporate representative provided a brief 

overview of the company’s corporate structure. See ECF No. 3238-14, Ex. 7 at 30:1-34:12. As he 

explained it, Royal Philips is the top of the Philips Group, with a seat in the Netherlands, governed 

by the Board of Management. Id. Below the Board of Management are the Product Divisions, 

comprised of different business groups, which are also directed centrally by Royal Philips from 

the Netherlands. Id. Philips, however, is a global operation and is active throughout the world 

through different corporate entities. In North America, for example, Philips is active under 

PENAC, one of the Philips Subsidiaries that brought the instant motion. Id. Activities like 

production and manufacturing are under the responsibility of subsidiaries like PENAC. Id. The 

policies for operating the display components and consumer electronics divisions under PENAC 

are largely determined, however, by PCE and PDC out of Royal Philips in the Netherlands. Id.

The Philips Subsidiaries manufactured and sold CRTs from March 1995 through June 

2001 and are alleged to have participated in the conspiracy (along with Royal Philips itself) 

throughout that time. As part of Royal Philips’ joint venture agreement with LGE, all of the CRT 

operations of the Philips Subsidiaries were transferred to LPD in June 2001. Philips Subsidiaries’

divestment was widely reported in the press. LPD, in turn, allegedly joined the conspiracy shortly 

after its creation. 

Royal Philips shared ownership and control of LPD with LGE. The DAPs do not present 

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any evidence, however, that Philips Subsidiaries owned or were otherwise involved in LPD’s 

operations. 

b. Discussion

Philips Subsidiaries’ exit from the CRT industry in June 2001 constitutes a prima facie 

showing of withdrawal. See Lothian, 976 F.2d at 1264; Morton’s Mkt., 198 F.3d at 839; Krause, 

827 F.2d 346. Their exit was also adequately communicated to coconspirators given the extensive 

press coverage. See Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 464-65; Morton’s Mkt., 198 F.2d at 839. The DAPs’ do 

not attempt to rebut this evidence. Instead, they focus on Royal Philips’ continued involvement in 

the CRT industry through LPD. Although the DAPs assert that “the period following LPD’s 

formation was marked by tight integration between the entire Philips corporate family and LPD,” 

Philips Opp’n at 17, they fail to present a legal theory that would allow them to impute Royal 

Philips’ ongoing involvement in the CRT industry through LPD onto the Philips Subsidiaries. Cf.

Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 68 (“It is a general principle of corporate law deeply ingrained in our legal 

system that a corporation is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries.”); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear 

Films Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 273 (D. Del. 1989) (“Courts do disregard the corporate form in some 

instances where such disregard is necessary to prevent injustice to a person or entity that would be 

harmed by refusing to impose liability on the basis of the corporate structure. The party seeking to 

disregard the corporate form bears the burden of showing that there are good reasons for doing 

so.”). 

At the hearing, the DAPs argued that PENAC’s decision to purchase most of its CRTs 

from LPD negated its withdrawal defense because those purchases benefited the conspiracy. 

Presumably, the DAPs’ theory is that PENAC furthered the conspiracy by providing LDP with a 

dedicated market. Actions taken subsequent to the point of withdrawal will negate a withdrawal 

defense if those actions further the conspiracy itself – for example, by concealing the conspiracy

from authorities. See Lowell, 649 F.2d at 958. Benefiting a conspirator, however, is not the same 

as furthering the conspiracy.

Because the DAPs fail to provide any evidence that Philips Subsidiaries continued their 

involvement in the CRT industry after June 2001 or a legal theory that would allow them to 

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impute Royal Philips’ ongoing involvement in the CRT industry through to the Phillips 

Subsidiaries, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. See Steele, 685 F.2d at 804 (ruling that the 

defendant had established withdrawal as a matter of law after the evidence showing the defendant 

had severed his ties with the enterprise went unrebutted by the government).

5. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Dell and Sharp 

Plaintiffs on Statute of Limitations Grounds

The instant motion asserts Dell and Sharp had knowledge or constructive knowledge of the 

facts constituting their claims as of 1998 and 2002, respectively. Because fraudulent concealment 

cannot continue to toll the statute of limitations once a plaintiff has actual or constructive 

knowledge of facts giving rise to its claim, Defendants assert that Dell’s and Sharp’s claims 

relating to conduct occurring before November 27, 2003 – four years after the Direct Purchaser 

Plaintiff (“DPP”) class action was filed – are time-barred. 

The Court will deny the motion.

a. Dell

As the moving party, Defendants have the burden of producing evidence that shows Dell 

had knowledge or constructive knowledge of the facts underlying their claims prior to November 

23, 2007. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins., 210 F.3d at 1102. The burden then shifts to Dell to

produce admissible evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact as to its knowledge or 

constructive knowledge. See id. at 1102-1103. 

Defendants’ evidence consists mainly of internal Dell emails discussing possible collusion 

in the CRT market:

 In 1998, Sue Lee, a member of Dell’s World Wide Procurement group, reported to 

sixteen other members of the procurement group that “Japanese CDT suppliers had 

discussion among themselves of raising 17” CDT pricing” and that “Korean and 

Taiwanese CDT supplier[s] would be glad to ‘follow’ if the raise worked.” ECF No. 

3067-19, Ex. 17. Later, Ms. Lee wrote that “Japanese CDT supplier – led by Hitachi 

was secretly working on to raise 17” CDT price . . . .”. ECF No. 3067-23, Ex 21.

 In 1999, an internal Dell email written by Dell employee Angela Ford states that Dell 

suspected there was collusion among CRT suppliers to control the output of CRT 

products. ECF No. 3067-10, Ex. 8 at DELL-LCD00000675.

 That same month, members of the procurement team had a meeting to discuss Dell’s 

strategy to combat price increases. Subsequently, an email was sent summarizing the 

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discussion. The summary stated that “[t]he CRT Cartel has come back that they are 

not, in fact, raising their prices – they will probably try again in Q2 . . . The Newspaper 

reports that the Cartel failed to increase pricing (1/17 - China Economic News?).” ECF 

No 3067-14, Ex. 12.

 In January 2002, Dell’s procurement team learned information that it believed showed 

that “CRT suppliers are banding together to raise their cost.” ECF No. 3067-12, Ex. 

10.

 In January 2002, in a weekly report to the procurement group, a Dell employee wrote 

that the “cartel like big three suppliers did advice [sic] the monitor suppliers of price 

increase on the CDT . . . They agree setting target for example the 17” tube at $58, any 

supplier who currently sells under it should raise price to reach that level.” ECF No. 

3067-16, Ex. 14.

 A few weeks later, Dell employee Eric Korman wrote an email to Dell employee Julie 

Newmiller proposing a meeting to “discuss the CDT industry’s cooperative pricing 

association.” ECF No. 3067-24, Ex. 22.

 In a February email from Eric Korman among procurement group members, a senior 

manager wrote, “The other question I had was if we invited CPT – we are going to 

need their support on 15” LCD panels and they are trying to play ball with the CRT 

pricing cartel.” ECF No. 3067-22, Ex. 20.

 In a March 2002 email, Eric Korman wrote that “the CRT consortium is holding 

together well regarding pricing” and that “the CRT consortium is difficult to manage at 

this point.” ECF No. 3067-21, Ex. 19.

 In a February 2003 email, Dell employees and managers discussed how “CRT 

inventory is building” and how it was an opportunity to “do a little cartel breaking.” 

ECF No. 3067-20, Ex. 18.

These emails, taken on their own, suggest Dell’s “suspicions” regarding the existence of a 

CRT price-fixing conspiracy were “excited.” See Conmar, 858 F.2d at 504. The burden therefore

shifts to Dell to produce admissible evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact. See Nissan 

Fire & Marine Ins., 210 F.3d at 1102-1103. In response, Dell submits the deposition testimony of 

various Dell employees who testified that Dell did not, in fact, have suspicions of a conspiracy. 

See, e.g., ECF No. 3230-40, Ex. 36 (Deposition of Julie French)10 158:4-159:2 (had no knowledge 

or suspicions about CRT makers colluding); id. at 92:10-93:23 (“We would have never expected 

[CRT suppliers] to be talking to their competitors about pricing. So it would not have entered our 

minds to ask them to tell us if they’re talking to their competitors about pricing.”); id. at 156:9-

 

10 Julie French was the global commodity manager for CRT monitors and senior manager for CRT 

monitor procurement.

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157:7 (“We had no reason to suspect this . . . And I guarantee you if I had an inkling that it was 

real or my team, who is very ethical as well, had an inkling that it was real, something would have 

been done.”); ECF No. 3230-32, Ex. 28 (Deposition of Gerry Smith (“Smith Depo”)) at 156:6-19, 

270:15-272:25 (he was not aware of any companies fixing prices of CRT tubes or CRT monitors 

and did not have suspicions of price fixing); ECF No. 3230-33, Ex 29 (Deposition of Angela Ford) 

at 146:9-147:11 (“I did not suspect that they were discussing pricing . . . I didn’t believe they were 

talking to raise prices.”); id. at 179:8-9 (“I didn’t think the CRT makers or the tube makers were 

meeting to set prices.”); ECF No. 3230-34, Ex. 30 (Deposition of Glen Neland) at 249:19-25 (he 

did not recall anyone at Dell reporting to him suspicions of cartel activity with respect to CRTs or 

CRT monitors); ECF No. 3230-35, Ex. 31 (Deposition of Mac Stringfellow) at 91:14-92:22 (never 

heard from anyone at Dell that the companies that were supplying CRTs were colluding on 

price); id. at 155:15-16 (“I had no suspicions that there was collusion.”); ECF No. 3230-36, Ex. 32 

(Deposition of Jon Melnick) at 259:7-260:13 (no suspicions that CRT tube manufacturers were 

discussing price and that he did not recall any rumors of others discussing such suspicions); ECF 

No. 3230-37, Ex. 33 (Deposition of Dennis Selman) at 177:1-178:23 (did not recall having 

suspicions about CRT collusion or price-fixing); ECF No. 3230-38, Ex. 34 (Deposition of Shutuan 

Lillie (“Lillie Depo”)) at 250:3-21 (never suspected CRT tube suppliers or monitor suppliers were 

fixing prices and did not hear of such suspicions from anyone else at Dell); ECF No. 3230-39, Ex. 

35 (Deposition of Ricky Ratley) at 150:1-12 (did not recall hearing any rumors or suspicions with 

respect to CRT tubes or monitor makers); ECF No. 3230-31, Ex. 27 (Deposition of Martin Garvin

(“Garvin Depo.”)) at 105:13-17 (did not recall whether he suspected there was a CRT cartel).

Dell employees also testified that the word “cartel” was used loosely in company 

communications to refer to the fact that the CRT market was heavily concentrated or 

oligopolistic. See, e.g., Smith Depo. at 121:18-122:1, 126:23-127:2 (“A lot of people at Dell use 

the term ‘cartel’ in a broad sense, meaning you only have a couple suppliers in an industry space, 

which made it more difficult . . . from a procurement perspective.”); Ratley Depo. at 142:4-143:3 

(“My definition of cartel was more or less a market or industry, in a market or industry that linked 

companies together by product or technology, perhaps even business.”); Lillie Depo. at 121:1-16, 

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125:6-8; 126:1-21.

Finally, when asked about emails in which he referred to “cartel breaking,” Dell’s Chief 

Procurement Officer, Martin Garvin, explained that the statement referred to LCD suppliers and 

that “cartel breaking” was a ”metaphor” to see if “there might be an opportunity to get some lower 

pricing” and that reference to “cartel breaking” was “generically referring to panel providers.” 

Garvin Depo. at 118:14-121:7; see also In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. M 07-

1827 SI, 2012 WL 6000154, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (“[A]cording to Dell, the evidence 

shows that employees used the term ‘cartel’ loosely to refer to the fact that a heavy concentration 

of LCD business resided with a handful of companies.”).

Defendants reply that Dell must have had knowledge of the conspiracy given the strength 

and credibility of their documentary evidence relative to the deposition testimony submitted by 

Dell. “In considering a motion for summary judgment,” however, the Court “may not weigh the 

evidence or make credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light most 

favorable to the non-moving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). As to 

Dell’s purported constructive knowledge, Defendants neither point to specific facts that should 

have excited Dell’s suspicions of which Dell was irrefutably aware, nor show that Dell would have 

discovered the facts underlying its claims had it been reasonably diligent in investigating those 

suspicions. See Conmar, 858 F.2d at 504; Mt. Hood Stages, 555 F.2d at 698; Morton’s Mkt, 198 

F.3d at 832-33; In re Petroleum Products, 782 F. Supp. at 493. The Court therefore finds that 

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to Dell’s actual and constructive knowledge. See also

In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. M 07-1827 SI, 2012 WL 6000154, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (finding on a similar motion with similar facts that “[w]hile defendants have 

submitted powerful evidence suggesting that Dell knew about defendants’ alleged price-fixing 

activities prior to December 2002, the Court concludes that summary judgment is not appropriate 

because the parties submitted conflicting evidence regarding what Dell employees knew and when 

they knew it.”). 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion as to Dell is DENIED.

b. Sharp

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As with Dell, Defendants have the initial burden of producing evidence to show that Sharp 

had knowledge or constructive knowledge of the facts underlying its claims prior to November 23, 

2007. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins., 210 F.3d at 1102. Defendants have failed to meet this

burden.

Defendants first point to a June 2002 report regarding CRT pricing trends. The report is 15 

pages pertaining to over a dozen companies. One line in the report states, “There is a possibility

that Samsung and LGPD are conspiring.” ECF No. 3067-4, Ex. 2 at SHARP-CRT-00212458 

(emphasis added). Merely suspecting that certain Defendants were possibly conspiring, however, 

is not enough to establish constructive knowledge as a matter of law. See Mt. Hood Stages, 555 

F.2d at 698; see also F. Buddie Contracting, 595 F. Supp. at 431 (“[W]here a plaintiff remains 

ignorant of at least some of the facts required to make out his claim, the plaintiff does not have 

knowledge of its claim.”). Further, when asked about the document at deposition, the head of 

procurement at SEMA – one of the Sharp plaintiffs – testified that the language would not have 

caused him to believe that Samsung and LGPD were conspiring because he believed the prices 

were improperly characterized in the report. See ECF No. 3283-2, Ex. A (Nakanishi Deposition) 

at 144:24-146:2; 355:22-356:1; 356:3-14. Thus, even if Defendants had satisfied their burden, 

there would still be a fact issue as to Sharp’s knowledge.

Defendants next point to a report that was received by Sharp from CRT manufactures in 

2002 providing CRT production estimates for 2003. Defendants note that Sharp is using the same 

document as an example of a meeting or communication among competitors in the CRT industry. 

Defendants conclude that “[i]f, as Sharp contends, a CRT supplier’s possession of such 

information evidences improper communications between competitors in violation of the Sherman 

Act, then Sharp has known about such communications, and thus the basis for its claims, since at 

least 2002.” Dell/Sharp Mot. at 23. Not so. Just because the 2002 report is potentially probative 

of a conspiracy does not mean that it is sufficient to establish, as a matter of law, that Sharp had 

knowledge of the conspiracy or was put on notice of its claims. In order to establish constructive 

knowledge as a matter of law, the plaintiff must have been aware of “facts from which fraud could 

reasonably be inferred,” Mt. Hood Stages, 555 F.2d at 698, such that its “suspicions have been or 

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should have been excited, Conmar 858 F.2d at 504. A report providing CRT production estimates 

does not come close. See also Morton’s Mkt, 198 F.3d at 832-33 (holding it is not enough “to 

point to facts which might have caused a plaintiff to inquire, or could have led to evidence 

supporting [the plaintiff’s] claim . . . A defendant who does this has succeeded in demonstrating 

only that there is a jury question regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations by fraudulent 

concealment”). Further, even if the report had raised Sharp’s suspicions, Defendants do not show 

that a diligent inquiry, had it been performed, would have revealed the facts underlying the 

Sharp’s claims. See id., Morton’s Mkt., 198 F.3d at 833; see also In re Petroleum Products, 782 F. 

Supp. at 493 (“Nor is there constructive knowledge if, even upon investigating, plaintiffs might 

reasonably be unable to uncover their claims.”). 

Defendants motion as to Sharp is therefore DENIED.11

V. CONCLUSION 

The Court rules as follows:

Motion Ruling

Hitachi Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon 

Withdrawal and the Statute of Limitations

Granted in part, 

denied in part

Toshiba Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Concerning 

Withdrawal

Denied

Defendant LG Electronics, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

on Withdrawal Grounds

Denied

Philips Electronics North America Corporation, Philips Taiwan Ltd., and 

Philips Brasil Ltda.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Granted

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Dell and Sharp Plaintiffs 

on Statute of Limitations Grounds

Denied

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

 

11 Sharp’s Objection to Reply Evidence, ECF No. 3503, is overruled as moot. 

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Motion Ruling

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Dell and Sharp Plaintiffs 

on Statute of Limitations Grounds

Denied

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2016

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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