Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05453/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05453-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH WAYNE CANDLER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

J.S. WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________

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No. C 04-5453 MMC (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS; DENYING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO COMPEL

(Docket Nos. 26 & 44)

On December 27, 2004, plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se and

currently incarcerated at California State Prison-Sacramento, filed the above-titled civil

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 13, 2005, after reviewing the complaint, the

Court found plaintiff had stated cognizable Eighth Amendment claims against several

officials at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), where plaintiff was incarcerated when the

events giving rise to his claims arose. In the same order, the Court directed defendants to file

a dispositive motion or, in the alternative, a notice indicating defendants are of the opinion

such a motion is not warranted. 

On January 27, 2006, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground plaintiff has failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 810 (2003) (providing nonexhaustion claim should be raised in

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than in motion for summary judgment). As an

alternative ground for dismissal, defendants argue that one of plaintiff’s claims should be

dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

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granted. 

On February 2, 2006, plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. 

Thereafter, on August 23, 2006, the Court granted plaintiff leave to file a supplemental

opposition, in accordance with Wyatt. See id. at 1120 n.14 (holding court must assure pro se

prisoner plaintiff has “fair notice of his opportunity to develop a record” in opposition to

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). In correspondence filed October 3, 2006, plaintiff

advised the Court he would not file supplemental briefing or further evidence in this matter. 

On October 11, 2006, defendants filed a reply to plaintiff’s opposition. Also before the Court

is plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery, filed December 5, 2005.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

The following summary of plaintiff’s factual allegations is taken from the Court’s

order of service:

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his complaint. On October

10, 2003, defendants J. Pacheco (“Pacheco”), R. Machuca (“Machuca”) and J.

Abuyen (“Abuyen”), all correctional officers, escorted him back to his cell

from the showers. After plaintiff entered his cell, defendant M. Banuelos

(“Banuelos”), a correctional officer in charge of opening and closing the cell

doors, did not close plaintiff’s cell door. Abuyen followed plaintiff into the

cell and punched him in the head and face with his fists while Pacheco and

Machuca watched from just outside the cell. When plaintiff began “swinging

wild” to protect himself, Pacheco and Machuca rushed in and began hitting

plaintiff in the face and head until he fell to the ground. Abuyen sat on his

lower back, while Pacheco and Machuca kept punching him in the face. 

Plaintiff was then handcuffed, and Banuelos set off the alarm. Abuyen

resumed punching plaintiff in the head and face, splitting open plaintiff’s lip,

after which he scraped plaintiff’s forehead along the cell floor. Plaintiff was

bleeding; a spit net was placed over plaintiff’s head, preventing him from

breathing properly; and he was placed in leg irons. 

Plaintiff was next taken to an outside holding cell, where he was

handcuffed to a steel ring. Defendants J. Vasquez (“Sgt. Vasquez”) and two

other guards who had responded to the alarm, defendants H. Gonzalez

(“Gonzalez”) and D. Rocha (“Rocha”), were present while plaintiff was in the

outside cell. Plaintiff complained to these three guards that the handcuffs were

too tight, but they refused to loosen them. Plaintiff thereafter lost

consciousness for two hours. After he awoke, defendant M. Starr (“Starr”), a

nurse, came to the holding cell and wrote down the injuries to plaintiff’s face

and head. When plaintiff told Starr about the injuries to his wrists and ankles

from the tight handcuffs and the leg irons, Starr responded that they weren’t

serious enough to write down. Sgt. Vasquez, Gonzalez, Rocha and Starr did

not provide plaintiff access to medical care during the approximately five hours

he was in the outside holding cell. After that time, plaintiff was taken to the

office of Lieutenant Ortiz (“Ortiz”), where plaintiff related his version of the

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If the court looks beyond the pleadings in deciding an unenumerated motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust, the court must give the prisoner fair notice of his opportunity

to develop a record. Id. at 1120 n.14. As noted above, plaintiff was given such notice by the

Court on August 23, 2006. 

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incident on videotape, and also wrote it down. Ortiz had plaintiff escorted to

the medical clinic, where plaintiff received treatment for his injuries, including

stitches in his lip. 

Plaintiff was disciplined for committing battery on a peace officer in

connection with the above-described events. 

(Order of Service, filed May 13, 2005, at 1:20-2:22.)

DISCUSSION

In its order of service, the Court found plaintiff’s complaint stated two cognizable

claims. First, the Court found plaintiff’s complaint stated a claim against defendants

Abuyen, Banuelos, Machuca and Pacheco, for allegedly using excessive force during the

altercation with plaintiff in plaintiff’s cell (hereinafter “cell claim”). Second, the Court found

plaintiff’s complaint stated a claim against defendants Gonzalez, Rocha and Vasquez, for

allegedly using excessive force when they refused to loosen plaintiff’s handcuffs over a fivehour period following the cell incident (hereinafter “handcuffs claim”). Defendants argue

that both claims must be dismissed because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies. Defendants further argue that plaintiff’s cell claim must be dismissed because it

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons discussed below, the

motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

1. Standard of Review

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense; defendants have the

burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. A

nonexhaustion defense should be raised in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. Id. In

deciding such a motion, the district court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed

issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20.1

 If the court concludes the prisoner has not exhausted

nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the complaint without prejudice. Id.

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at 1120. 

Dismissal of the entire complaint is not required when a prisoner has failed to exhaust

some, but not all, of the claims included in the complaint. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910,

925-26 (2007); Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005). The proper treatment

of a mixed complaint, that is, a complaint with both exhausted and unexhausted claims, will

depend on the relatedness of the claims contained within. Id. at 1175. When a prisoner has

filed a mixed complaint and wishes to proceed with only the exhausted claims, the district

court should dismiss only the unexhausted claims, provided the unexhausted claims are not

intertwined with the properly exhausted claims. Id. On the other hand, when a plaintiff’s

mixed complaint includes exhausted and unexhausted claims that are closely related and

difficult to untangle, the proper procedure is dismissal of the defective complaint with leave

to amend to allege only fully exhausted claims. Id. at 1176.

2. The Exhaustion Requirement

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321

(1996) (“PLRA”) provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,

or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and not left to the discretion of

the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006). Exhaustion is a

prerequisite to all prisoner lawsuits concerning prison life, whether such actions involve

general conditions or particular episodes, whether they allege excessive force or some other

wrong, and even if they seek relief not available in grievance proceedings, such as money

damages. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). The exhaustion requirement requires

“proper exhaustion” of all available administrative remedies. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

 The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to appeal

administratively “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In

order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must

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proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal review, (2) first formal written appeal

on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second formal level appeal to the institution head or

designee, and (4) third formal level appeal to the Director of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“Director”). See Barry v Ratelle, 985 F. Supp 1235, 1237

(S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5). A final decision from the

Director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). See id. at

1237-38. 

3. Analysis

Defendants argue that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to either

the cell claim or the handcuffs claim, because he did not receive a decision from the

Director’s level of review as to either claim before he filed the instant action. 

In support of their argument, defendants submit a declaration by N. Grannis

(“Grannis”), Chief of the Inmate Appeals Branch (“IAB”) at the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation. The IAB keeps an electronic record of each inmate appeal

that has proceeded through the Director’s level of review since 1997. (Decl. N. Grannis

Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Grannis Decl.”) ¶ 3.) Grannis searched the database containing

records of all administrative appeals submitted to the Director’s level of review between

October 10, 2003, the date of the incidents that give rise to the claims in plaintiff’s

complaint, and December 27, 2004, the date plaintiff filed the instant action. (See id. ¶ 4). 

The search revealed that during that time period plaintiff submitted and received a decision

for one appeal at the Director’s level of review. (See id. ¶ 5 & Exs. A, B). That appeal,

Appeal No. 04-00032, did not concern the claims raised in plaintiff’s complaint; it concerned

an unrelated incident that occurred on December 16, 2003, when Officer Marin, who is not a

defendant in the instant action, allegedly tightened plaintiff’s handcuffs improperly. (See id.

¶ 6 & Ex. B).

a. The Handcuffs Claim

Plaintiff does not contest defendants’ assertion that he did not exhaust his

administrative remedies with respect to the handcuffs claim. Accordingly, because

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The Court finds the handcuffs claim is not intertwined with the cell claim, which, as

discussed below, the Court finds is exhausted. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the

handcuffs claim without requiring plaintiff to file an amended complaint alleging only the

cell claim. See Lira, 427 F.3d at 1175.

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Plaintiff has attached supporting documents to his declaration. The documents are

not numbered as exhibits. Accordingly, the Court identifies the documents with a brief

description of their contents.

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defendants have presented evidence showing plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative

remedies as to said claim, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss the claim as

unexhausted, and the claim will be dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff’s refiling the

claim after all available administrative remedies have been exhausted.2

b. The Cell Claim

Plaintiff argues he exhausted his administrative remedies concerning the cell claim. In

their motion to dismiss, defendants acknowledge that plaintiff filed an administrative appeal

concerning this claim. They assert, however, that plaintiff’s central file contains only a

partial copy of the appeal, and that the partial copy shows only that the appeal was bypassed

at the informal level of review. (Mot. Dismiss at 5:3 & Decl. A. Cattermole Supp. Defs.’

Mot. Dismiss (“Cattermole Decl.”) Ex. C.) There is no record that the appeal ever completed

the Director’s level of review. (Grannis Decl. Ex. A.) Consequently, defendants argue, the

claim is unexhausted.

In opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff asserts the claim is exhausted

because he received a second-level decision partially granting the appeal, and that no further

administrative remedy remained available to him. In support of his opposition plaintiff has

submitted a declaration along with attached documents that show the appeal was sent to the

second level of review when the informal level of review was bypassed. (Decl. K. Candler

(“Candler Decl.”) Supp. Opp. to Mot. Dismiss Appeal No. 03-03788.)3

 At the second level

of review, the appeal was classified as a “staff complaint” and an investigation was ordered

into the matter. (Candler Decl. Second Level Reviewer’s Response.) The second-level

decision informed plaintiff that his appeal had been partially granted, insofar as an

investigation had been ordered and plaintiff would be advised of the findings of the

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investigation upon completion, but any disciplinary action taken against prison staff would

be confidential. (Id.) While the investigation was pending, plaintiff submitted an appeal to

the Director’s level of review, complaining about the actions of Abuyen, Banuelos, Machuca

and Pacheco. (Candler Decl. Appeal No. 03-03788.) In response, Grannis, Chief of the IAB,

sent the appeal back to the SVSP Appeals Coordinator with a letter asking for additional

information about the appeal. (Candler Decl. Letter to SVSP Appeals Coordinator dated

March 30, 2004.) The SVSP Appeals Coordinator returned the appeal to plaintiff, informing

plaintiff that his appeal did not need Director’s level review because it had been partially

granted at the second level of review. (Candler Decl. at 1-2.) Plaintiff sent correspondence

to Grannis at the IAB, asking how to proceed. (Candler Decl. Letter to Grannis dated June

29, 2004.) On two separate occasions, Grannis wrote letters informing plaintiff that the IAB

was still waiting for materials from the SVSP Appeals Coordinator, and that plaintiff would

receive “further resolution” of his appeal from the IAB once the materials were received. 

(Candler Decl. Letters to Candler August 6, 2004; December 9, 2004.) By the time plaintiff

filed the instant action on December 27, 2004, he had received no Director’s-level decision

on his appeal. 

In their reply to plaintiff’s opposition, defendants do not contest the appeal history set

forth by plaintiff. Rather, they maintain that even though plaintiff received a partial grant of

his appeal at the second level of review, he still was required to exhaust his administrative

remedies through the Director’s level of review, and the lack of a Director’s-level decision

renders his claim unexhausted. 

Defendants’ argument is foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Brown v. Valoff,

422 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2005). In Brown, the Ninth Circuit addressed a case where, as here, a

California prisoner had filed an appeal using the California Department of Corrections’

(“CDC”) internal grievance procedures, complaining that a prison guard had used excessive

force against him. Id. at 930. The appeal was denied at the first level of review. Id. At the

second level of review, a decision was issued characterizing the prisoner’s appeal as a “staff

complaint,” and informing the prisoner that an investigation would be conducted, that the

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administration would decide on the appropriate action to be taken if necessary, and that the

prisoner would not be apprised of any disciplinary action taken as a result of his appeal. Id.

at 937. The second-level decision told the prisoner that his appeal had been partially granted

because the matter would be investigated. Id. The decision did not tell the prisoner that any

further review was available. Id. 

In deciding whether, under such circumstances, the prisoner was required to proceed

beyond the second level of review in order to exhaust his administrative remedies, the Ninth

Circuit found that “the reasonable import of [the second-level decision] is that no further

relief will be available through the appeals process, but the confidential staff complaint

investigation would go forward and could result in some administrative action based on [the

prisoner’s] complaint.” Id. at 937-38. This interpretation of the second-level decision was

confirmed by the CDC’s policies and manuals, which required that staff misconduct

grievances be investigated only through the specialized staff complaint process, thereby

negating any possibility of a parallel investigation through the usual appeals process. Id. at

938. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded, no further relief is available to a prisoner

through the CDC’s appeals process once his appeal is partially granted at the second level of

review and a confidential investigation into a staff complaint is launched. Id. at 938-39. 

Under such circumstances, the prisoner has exhausted his available administrative remedies

when the second-level decision is issued, and has no obligation to pursue a Director’s-level

appeal before proceeding to federal court. Id. at 939.

Applying Brown to the facts of the instant case, the Court finds plaintiff has exhausted

his available administrative remedies. As in Brown, plaintiff’s appeal complaining of the use

of excessive force by prison guards was designated a staff complaint at the second level of

review; the second-level decision partially granted the appeal by ordering an investigation;

the second-level decision informed plaintiff that any disciplinary action taken against the

prison guards would be confidential; and the second-level decision did not counsel plaintiff

that any further review was available. Further, plaintiff was advised by the SVSP Appeals

Coordinator that he could not appeal the second-level decision to the Director’s level of

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review. Accordingly, the Court will deny defendants’ motion to dismiss the cell claim for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

B. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendants argue that even if plaintiff’s cell claim is exhausted, the claim cannot

proceed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff has not

addressed this argument in his opposition to the motion to dismiss. 

1. Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a claim “if as a matter of law it is clear that

no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). In considering a motion to

dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and

accept all factual allegations as true. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38

(9th Cir. 1996). Federal courts are particularly liberal in construing allegations made in pro

se civil rights complaints. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). In

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may not consider any material outside the

complaint but may consider exhibits attached thereto. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley

Transportation Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (treating

exhibits attached to complaint as part of complaint for purposes of ruling on 12(b)(6)

motion). 

A motion to dismiss may not be granted solely because a plaintiff has not filed an

opposition. Even if the plaintiff does not file a response to a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), the district court must examine the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and

determine whether the plaintiff states a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Issa v.

Comp USA, 354 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Vega-Encarnacion v. Babilonia,

344 F.3d 37, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2003) (same); McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322-23 (2nd Cir.

2000) (same). A pro se plaintiff who has not responded to a motion to dismiss can rest on the

assumed truthfulness and liberal construction afforded his complaint. See Curtis v.

Bembenek, 48 F.3d 281, 287 (7th Cir. 1995).

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In support of their argument, defendants have submitted a copy of the results of the

disciplinary proceeding. Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of the results as

evidence of the fact that the length of plaintiff’s sentence was altered thereby. As a general

rule, a district court may not consider material outside the pleadings in ruling on a Rule

12(b)(6) motion. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). A court

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2. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Abuyen, Banuelos, Machuca and Pacheco used

excessive force against him when Banuelos intentionally left plaintiff’s cell door open and

Abuyen, Machuca and Pacheco beat plaintiff in his cell without cause. Defendants argue that

plaintiff cannot proceed with his claims against these defendants because, as a result of the

same incident, plaintiff was found guilty at a disciplinary hearing of battery on a peace

officer (Abuyen) and was assessed 150 days forfeiture of good-time credits. Consequently,

defendants argue, plaintiff’s excessive force claim is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994). 

Heck holds that in order to state a claim for damages for an allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or term of imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff asserting a violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed or declared invalid. Id.

at 486-487. Heck’s rationale bars a claim for damages for harm caused by the

unconstitutional deprivation of good-time credits because such a claim necessarily calls into

question the lawfulness of the plaintiff’s continued confinement, insofar as it implicates the

duration of the plaintiff’s sentence. See Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir.

1996). 

In the instant action plaintiff neither challenges the constitutional validity of the

disciplinary proceeding finding him guilty of battery on a peace officer, nor seeks the

restoration of the good-time credits that were assessed as a result thereof. Defendants argue,

however, that plaintiff’s excessive force claim is barred under Heck because, if the excessive

force claim were proven, it would necessarily imply the invalidity of the finding of guilt on

the charge of battery on a peace officer.4

 By analogy, defendants cite to cases finding Heck

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may, however, consider material that is properly submitted as part of the complaint, without

converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. If the documents

are not physically attached to the complaint, they may be considered if the documents’

authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff’s complaint “necessarily relies” on them. Id. In

the instant matter, in support of plaintiff’s claim that Abuyen, Banuelos, Machuca and

Pacheco used excessive force against him, plaintiff’s complaint references and necessarily

relies upon the results of the disciplinary proceeding. (Compl. at 9-10.) Accordingly, the

Court will grant defendants’ request for judicial notice of the fact that plaintiff was found

guilty of battery on Abuyen, and was assessed a forfeiture of 150 days of good-time credits

as a result thereof. 

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bars a § 1983 action for the use of excessive force during an arrest, where the plaintiff has

been convicted of resisting arrest or assaulting a police officer. (Mot. Dismiss at 7.) 

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that Heck does not bar all such excessive force

actions, however. In Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc),

the Ninth Circuit explained that “a § 1983 action is not barred under Heck unless it is clear

from the record that its successful prosecution would necessarily imply or demonstrate that

the plaintiff’s earlier conviction was invalid.” The plaintiff in Smith had been convicted of

resisting a police officer under California Penal Code section 148, and claimed that the

officer had used excessive force against him. Id. at 694. In order to determine whether the

excessive force claim was barred under Heck, the Ninth Circuit looked to the elements of a

conviction for resisting a police officer under section 148, and found that an essential

element of such a conviction is that the police officer was “engaged in the performance of his

official duties.” Id. at 695. Under California law, if such element is admitted or proved, the

police officer necessarily was engaged in “lawful” conduct, which, in turn, necessarily

excludes the use of excessive force. Id. at 695-96. 

The Ninth Circuit thus concluded that where a plaintiff has been convicted under

section 148 for resisting a police officer during the course of an arrest, his subsequent § 1983

claim that the police officer used excessive force at the time the arrest was effected would, if

successful, necessarily undermine the conviction, and would be barred under Heck. Id. at

697-98. By contrast, if the plaintiff claims the police officer used excessive force either

before or after the conduct on which the plaintiff’s conviction was based, Heck would not bar

his claims that the force was excessive, because the alleged acts of excessive force would not

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necessarily invalidate the conviction. Id. at 698. Looking to the record before it in Smith,

the Ninth Circuit could not identify the factual basis for the plaintiff’s guilty plea to resisting

a police officer; consequently, it could not determine whether the acts underlying the

conviction occurred during the course of the plaintiff’s arrest; accordingly, the Ninth Circuit

reversed the district’s court’s grant of summary judgment, which ruling had been predicated

on Heck. Id. at 699.

In the instant action, defendants have not shown that if plaintiff were to prevail on his

excessive force claims the validity of the finding that he committed battery on a peace officer

necessarily would be implicated. The essential reason defendants’ argument fails is because

they have not set forth the elements of the charge of which plaintiff was found guilty, battery

on a peace officer under California Code of Regulations tit. 15, § 3005(c). Consequently,

because defendants have not shown that a finding of their use of excessive force would

necessarily negate an element of the battery offense, the Court cannot conclude that

plaintiff’s claims are barred under Heck. As Smith made clear, a § 1983 claim alleging the

use of excessive force will be barred under Heck only where “it is clear from the record that

its successful prosecution would necessarily” imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s

underlying conviction. Smith, 394 F.3d at 699. Accordingly, the Court will deny

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s excessive force claim as barred under Heck.

C. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

On December 5, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery. Defendants have

filed an opposition to the motion to compel, and plaintiff has filed a reply.

In his declaration in support of the motion to compel, plaintiff argues that he requires

the following evidence in order to properly pursue his claims in this case: (1) all video-taped

evidence related to the case, including video-taped interviews of inmate witnesses conducted

by internal affairs, and (2) transcripts relating to the recorded use of the “retention ring”

device used on inmates in administrative segregation. Plaintiff also seeks documents

concerning: (1) defendants’ disciplinary history, (2) use-of-force and restraining training

defendants received, and (3) a picture of the “retention ring” device. (Candler Decl. Supp.

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Mot. Compel at 4). 

Defendants have agreed to allow plaintiff to view his own video-taped interview, but

object to producing the evidence generated by the internal affairs investigation, including the

video-taped interviews of other inmates. Defendants also object to producing any transcripts,

should any exist, of the recorded use of the “retention ring” device on other inmates. (Opp.

Mot. Compel at 2.) 

When plaintiff filed his motion to compel, and when defendants responded thereto,

two claims were pending in the present action – the cell claim and the handcuffs claim. 

Plaintiff’s discovery requests appear to seek evidence pertinent to both claims, although it is

unclear to the Court which requests correspond to which claim or claims. Because the Court

determined earlier in this order that plaintiff’s handcuffs claim must be dismissed, some of

plaintiff’s discovery requests may no longer be at issue. Accordingly, in the interest of the

efficient use of the Court’s judicial resources, the Court will deny plaintiff’s motion as

premature. Such denial is without prejudice, and plaintiff may file a renewed motion to

compel, containing only those discovery requests pertaining to plaintiff’s one remaining

claim, the cell claim. The motion shall be briefed according to the schedule set forth below. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s handcuffs claim for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is GRANTED, and defendants Gonzalez, Rocha and Vasquez are

hereby DISMISSED from this action. The dismissal of this claim is without prejudice to

plaintiff’s refiling the claim after all available administrative remedies have been exhausted.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s cell claim against defendants Abuyen,

Banuelos, Machuca and Pacheco for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and,

alternatively, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is DENIED. 

3. Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery is DENIED without prejudice. No later

than thirty (30) days from the date of this order plaintiff may file with the Court and serve on

defendants a renewed motion to compel discovery. Defendants’ opposition to the motion

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shall be filed no later than twenty (20) days from the date they are served with plaintiff’s

motion. Plaintiff’s reply shall be filed no later than fourteen (14) days from the date he is

served with defendants’ opposition. 

4. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, defendants shall file a

motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s remaining claim, or shall inform the

Court that they are of the opinion such a motion is not warranted. 

The motion for summary judgment shall be supported by adequate factual

documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified immunity found, if material

facts are in dispute. If any defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by

summary judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment

motion is due. 

5. Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment shall be filed with the

Court and served on defendants no later than thirty (30) days from the date defendants’

motion is filed. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should be given to plaintiffs

facing summary judgment:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by which

they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for

summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there

is no genuine issue of material fact--that is, if there is no real dispute about any

fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary

judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is

properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot

simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific

facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the

defendants’ declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue

of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary

judgment is granted in favor of defendants, your case will be dismissed and

there will be no trial.

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Plaintiff is advised to read

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Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317

(1986) (holding party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence

showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is

cautioned that failure to file an opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment may

be deemed to be a consent by plaintiff to the granting of the motion, and granting of

judgment against plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir.

1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1994). 

6. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after plaintiff’s

opposition is filed. 

7. The motion will be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No

hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

8. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants’

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants’ counsel.

9. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

10. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline

sought to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

This order terminates Docket Nos. 26 and 44 on this Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 1, 2007

_____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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