Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02445/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02445-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:227 Telephone Consumer Protection Act

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-02445-PSG

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT BE GRANTED-IN-PART

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

GERALD ROYLANCE, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

ALG REAL ESTATE SERVICES, INC. d/b/a 

AMERIFUND LENDING GROUP, MARK 

AUGUSTUS, DONECIA LA SHAUN 

AUGUSTUS and DOES 1-200,

 

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 5:14-cv-02445-PSG

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT BE 

GRANTED-IN-PART

(Re: Docket No. 14)

Approximately five years ago, Plaintiff Gerald Roylance received the first of multiple 

unwanted telephone calls offering him a home mortgage at a supposedly “incredible” rate.1The 

calls came at the direction of Defendants ALG Real Estate Services, Inc., Mark Augustus and 

Donecia La Shaun Augustus.

2 Not satisfied with the Defendants’ response—or lack thereof—

Roylance filed this suit, alleging that Defendants’ actions violated the Telephone Consumer 

 

1

See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 25, 37-41.

2

See id. at 2, 6-10. Roylance alleges that the California Department of Real Estate states that ALG 

Real Estate Services, Inc. does business as Amerifund Lending Group. See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 6; 

Docket No. 14 (Roylance Decl.) at ¶ 2. The court will refer to this defendant as ALG. Roylance 

also alleges that Donecia La Shaun Augustus has a broker’s license from the California Department 

of Real Estate that lists a former name of Donecia La Shaun Montgomery. See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 8. 

The court will refer to this defendant as Donecia Augustus. 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-02445-PSG

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT BE GRANTED-IN-PART

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Protection Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, California’s False Advertising Law and the 

California Public Utilities Code.

Because Defendants have not appeared, following an entry of default, Roylance now moves 

for a default judgment.3 While the undersigned is persuaded that a default judgment is warranted

with respect to at least some of Roylance’s claims, Defendants have not consented to magistrate 

judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The court 

therefore ORDERS reassignment to a district judge, and recommends that default judgment against 

defendants be granted in part.

I.

When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought “has failed to plead 

or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise,” the court may enter 

default judgment against that party.

4

The court has “broad latitude to impose the sanction of 

default” at any point to ensure the “orderly and expeditious conduct of litigation.”5“The district 

court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.”6

The factors the court may consider include: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff;

(2) the substantive merits of plaintiff’s claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the amount 

of money at stake; (5) the possibility of dispute as to any material facts in the case; (6) whether 

default resulted from excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.7

 

3

See Docket No. 14.

4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)-(b). 

5

See Ringgold Corp. v. Worrall, 880 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citation omitted).

6

See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980). 

7

See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-02445-PSG

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT BE GRANTED-IN-PART

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According to his complaint, Roylance received an anonymous prerecorded message on his 

residential telephone line in May 2010 from a blocked telephone number.

8

 The message offered a 

“thirty-year loan at an incredible interest rate of four point five percent.”9The message did not 

state the identity of the caller, provide the caller’s telephone number or ask permission to play the 

message.10 Instead, Roylance was invited to “press one” to receive more information about the 

program.

11 After Roylance complied in order to identify the caller, the automated message asked 

him to provide his name and telephone number, which Roylance did.12

Roylance then received a live call about the loan described in the prerecorded call.13 The 

call came from a blocked number, but the person on the phone identified himself as Mark 

Augustus.14 After some discussion Mark Augustus told Roylance that he would send Roylance 

some papers.

15 He then called Roylance again from a blocked number seeking more information 

and told Roylance that “he would mail the papers that day.”16

The next day, Roylance received papers which offered a mortgage at an interest rate of 4.5 

percent for thirty years and identified ALG and listed Donecia Augustus under her former name of 

Donecia Montgomery as the broker’s representative.17 The papers stated that Roylance should 

 

8

See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 20-25.

9

See id.

10 See id. at ¶¶ 22-25.

11 See id. at ¶ 29.

12 See id.

13 See id. at ¶ 30.

14 See id.

15 See id.

16 See id. at ¶ 31.

17 See id. at ¶ 32.

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-02445-PSG

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT BE GRANTED-IN-PART

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return them to ALG and listed addresses for ALG and Mark Augustus.18 These papers provided 

the same telephone name for Mark Augustus and Donecia Augustus.

19

The next day after that Roylance sent letters by certified mail to the addresses listed for 

ALG and Mark Augustus on the loan papers.20 These letters stated that the solicitation was 

unlawful and asked ALG to place Roylance on and send him a copy of its do-not-call list.21

Defendants did not respond to his letters.22 Roylance subsequently received five identical 

anonymous prerecorded calls on his residential telephone line.23 All of these calls blocked caller 

identification.24

Roylance then filed this suit, claiming that the defendants violated the Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, California’s False Advertising Law and the 

California Public Utilities Code.

25 A summons was subsequently issued.26

After Defendants did not appear or otherwise respond to the suit, Roylance moved for entry 

of default.27 The Clerk entered default as requested.

 

18 See id.

19 See id. 

20 See id. at ¶ 33.

21 See id. at ¶ 34.

22 See id. at ¶ 35.

23 See id. at ¶¶ 37-41.

24 See id. 

25 See id. at 6-10.

26 See Docket No. 5. 

27 See Docket Nos. 5, 6. 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-02445-PSG

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT BE GRANTED-IN-PART

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II.

At issue is whether default judgment should be granted. Because the Eitel factors weigh in 

favor of default judgment as to some but not all of Roylance’s claims, the court recommends that 

default judgment be granted in part.

First, the potential prejudice to Roylance weighs in favor of default judgment. If the court 

does not grant Roylance’s motion for default judgment, Roylance has no alternative recourse.28

Second, Roylance’s complaint sets forth facts sufficient to state causes of action under the 

TCPA and California Civil Code Section 3294, at least against ALG and Mark Augustus. “In 

considering the sufficiency of the complaint and the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive claims, 

facts alleged in the complaint not relating to damages are deemed to be true upon default.”29

Section 227(b)(1)(B) of the TCPA prohibits the initiation of “any telephone call to any 

residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the 

prior express consent of the called party,” subject to exceptions. Roylance has standing to assert 

this claim because Section 277(b)(3)(A)-(B) provides that a person may bring “an action based on 

a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such 

violation” or an action “to receive $500 in damages for each such violation.”

Roylance has established that the six prerecorded calls he received violated Section

227(b)(1)(B) because these calls were prerecorded, were made to his residential telephone line and

advertised mortgages.30 Further, as Roylance notes, the fact that he did not answer all of the calls 

does not take the unanswered calls outside of the scope of the TCPA because Section 227(b)(1)(B)

 

28 See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Security Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“If

Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is not granted, Plaintiffs will likely be without other 

recourse for recovery.”).

29 Bd. of Trustees of Sheet Metal Workers v. Moak, Case No. 4:11-cv-04620-CW, 2012 WL 

5379565, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 

(9th Cir. 1977); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)).

30 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 20-25, 37-41.

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does not require the plaintiff to answer each call.31 That he “did not have a business relationship 

with any [d]efendant prior to the prerecorded call” and had not given defendants prior permission 

to transmit prerecorded messages to his telephone line shows that Roylance did not give prior 

express consent to these calls.

32

Calls that are “initiated for emergency purposes” or which the FCC otherwise exempts do 

not violate Section 227(b)(1)(B). The FCC may exempt “calls made for commercial purposes” that 

“will not adversely affect the privacy rights that this section is intended to protect” and “do not 

include the transmission of any unsolicited advertisement.”33 The urgency with which one might 

desire to respond to an offer of a loan at supposedly “incredible” interest rate aside, calls 

advertising mortgages are clearly not initiated for emergency purposes.

34 Roylance has alleged 

facts sufficient to show that the prerecorded calls cannot be within any exemption under Section

227(b)(2)(B) because he alleges that the calls transmitted “unsolicited advertisement[s]” for 

mortgages.

Roylance’s allegations also establish the six prerecorded calls and two live calls he received

violate Section 227(c). Section 227(c)(5) provides a private right of action for a “person who has 

received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same 

entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection.” Roylance has standing to 

pursue a claim under Section 227(c) because he alleges that he had received eight calls in violation 

of Section 227(c) within a twelve month period by on or behalf of the same entity.

35

 

31 See Docket No. 14 at 2.

32 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 12-13.

33 See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(B)(ii)(I)-(II). The FCC exempts calls that are made for “commercial 

purpose[s] but do[] not include or introduce an advertisement or constitute telemarketing.” See 47 

C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(iii).

34 See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 25.

35 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 20, 30-31, 37-41.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT BE GRANTED-IN-PART

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Roylance alleges facts sufficient to establish that the identified caller and Mark Augustus 

was subject to but did not comply with several FCC regulations. Roylance alleges that the calls he 

received violated the do-not-call procedures set forth in 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(d).

36 These 

procedures apply to any person or entity initiating “any call for telemarketing purposes to a 

residential telephone subscriber.”37 The term “telemarketing” is defined as “the initiation of a 

telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment 

in, property, goods or services which is transmitted to any person.”38 Roylance’s allegation that the 

calls he received made to “encourage the sale of mortgage[s]” is sufficient to show that that Section

64.1200(d) applies to these calls.

39

Roylance also sufficiently alleges the prerecorded calls violated the FCC regulation which 

requires that a “person or entity making a call for telemarketing purposes must provide the called 

party with the name of the individual caller, the name of the person or entity on whose behalf the 

call is being made and a telephone number or address at which the person or entity may be 

contacted.”40 Roylance alleges that the six prerecorded calls violated this regulation because none 

of these calls identified the caller or provided a telephone or address at which the caller could be 

contacted.41 Further, as Roylance notes, the fact that the prerecorded call offered Roylance the 

option to find out more about the offer by “pressing 1” is not sufficient identification.42 Even if 

this option is deemed to provide a telephone number, the telephone number provided is merely for

 

36 See id. at 7-8.

37 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d).

38 47 U.S.C. § 64.1200(f)(12).

39 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 25, 30-31, 37-41, 58.

40 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(4).

41 See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 58.

42 See Docket No. 14 at 3; see also Docket No. 1 at ¶ 29.

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the prerecorded message player that placed the call, not for “the person or entity on whose behalf 

the call is being made.”43

Roylance’s allegations also establish that ALG and Mark Augustus violated the 

requirement that “[p]ersons or entities making calls for telemarketing purposes must have a written 

policy, available upon demand, for maintaining a do-not-call list.”44 As stated above, Roylance 

alleges that Mark Augustus and ALG did not respond to the letters Roylance sent asking them to

provide him with a copy of ALG’s do-not-call policy.

45

The five subsequent calls Roylance received after he requested that Defendants place him 

on their do-not-call listed also violated the FCC’s regulation that telemarketers must “maintain a 

record of a consumer’s request not to receive further telephone telemarketing calls” and honor 

these consumer requests for five years from the time the request is made.

46 A residential 

subscriber’s do-not-call request applies to entities that are affiliated with particular business entity 

on whose behalf a call is made if “the consumer reasonably would expect them to be included 

given the identification of the caller and the product being advertised.”47

Roylance alleges that he received these five prerecorded calls less than a year after he

requested that ALG and Mark Augustus place him on their do-not-call list.

48 Although the 

subsequent calls were anonymous, as Roylance notes, the fact that they were “identical” to the first 

call establishes that “the person with the identical message” is “the same caller.”49 These 

 

43 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(4).

44 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(1).

45 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 33-36.

46 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(6).

47 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(5).

48 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 33, 37-41.

49 See Docket No. 14 at 3.

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subsequent prerecorded calls thus violated Section 64.1200(d)(6) because Roylance could 

reasonably believe that his do-not call request to Mark Augustus and ALG would “stop all 

anonymous prerecorded calls about mortgages.”50 

All six prerecorded calls and the two live calls Roylance received also violated the FCC’s 

requirement that “[a]ny person or entity that engages in telemarketing...must transmit caller 

identification information” and “is prohibited from blocking the transmission of caller 

identification information.”51 “The telephone number so provided must permit any individual to 

make a do-not-call request during regular business hours.”52 Roylance alleges that the six 

prerecorded calls and two live calls blocked the identity of the caller.

53

Roylance also has alleged facts sufficient to show that ALG is vicariously liable for the 

conduct described above. Section 227(b)(1)(B) imposes liability on “any person” who “initiate[s] 

any telephone call” and Section 227(c)(5) provides a private right of action to a person who has 

received one or more telephone calls “by or on behalf of the same entity.” Because Roylance 

alleges that all the prerecorded calls were anonymous and that all calls blocked caller 

identification,54 Roylance’s allegations do not definitively establish that ALG itself made these 

calls. However, the Ninth Circuit holds that imposition under the TCPA of “vicarious liability 

where an agency relationship, as defined by federal common law, is established between the 

defendant and a third-party caller” is “consistent” with the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA.55

The FCC has “repeatedly acknowledged the existence of vicarious liability under the TCPA” and 

 

50 See id. 

51 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1601(e).

52 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1601(e)(1).

53 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 23, 30-31, 37-41.

54 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 20, 23, 30-31, 37-41.

55 See Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871,877-78 (9th Cir. 2014).

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JUDGMENT BE GRANTED-IN-PART

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“has clarified that vicarious liability is imposed ‘under federal common law principles of agency 

for violations of either Section 227(b) or (c) that are committed by third-party telemarketers.’”

56

Vicarious liability is appropriate when the plaintiff can demonstrate that a defendant

“controlled or had the right to control [the entity that committed the TCPA violation], and more 

specifically, the manner and means of the [telemarketing campaign] it conducted.”57 The “FCC 

observed in its declaratory ruling...that it does ‘not believe it is appropriate to limit vicarious 

liability to the circumstances of classical agency (involving actual seller, or right to control, of the 

telemarketing call)...Principles of apparent authority and ratification may also provide a basis for 

vicarious seller liability for violations of section 227(b).’”

58 Apparent authority “can only ‘be 

established by proof of something said or done by the [alleged principal], on which [the plaintiff] 

reasonably relied.’”59 

ALG is vicariously liable for the unlawful conduct described above because Roylance’s 

allegations establish that ALG gave the unidentified caller who made the prerecorded calls and 

Mark Augustus apparent authority to conduct telemarketing on its behalf.

60 Roylance’s conclusory 

allegations that the defendants “use telemarketing to sell their services” and that “telemarketing 

companies are agents of their principles” are not sufficient to establish that ALG is vicariously 

 

56 See id. at 878 (citing In re Joint Petition Filed by Dish Network, LCC, 28 FCC. Rcd. 6574, 6574 

(2013)). 

57 See Thomas v. Taco Bell Corp., 582 Fed. Appx. 678, 679 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Thomas v. Taco 

Bell Corp., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citing United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 

495, 506 (9th Cir. 2010))).

58 See id. (citing 28 F.C.C. Rcd. at 6590 n. 124).

59 See id. (citing NLRB v. Dist. Council of Iron Workers of Cal. & Vicinity, 124 F.3d 1094, 1099 

(9th Cir. 1997); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 265 cmt. a (1958) (“Apparent authority exists 

only as to those to whom the principal has manifested that an agent is authorized. There is, 

therefore, tort liability only if such a manifestation and its execution by the apparent agent results 

in harm.” (internal citations omitted)).

60 As Roylance notes, the allegedly “identical” nature of all six rerecorded calls establishes that the 

same entity made all of these calls. See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 37-41; see also Docket No. 14 at 3.

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liable for telemarketer’s conduct.61 However, Roylance also alleges that Amerifund Lending 

Group, a name under which ALG does business, was identified on the papers included in the loan 

package and that the “papers were to be returned to Amerifund Lending.”62 In his declaration in 

support of his motion for default judgment, Roylance further alleges that the shipper of the loan 

package that he received was Amerifund Lending.

63 Roylance alleges that this loan package 

offered a refinance at a rate of 4.5 percent for thirty years, the same rate and time period as the 

mortgage the prerecorded call offered.64

By shipping a loan package to Roylance regarding same mortgage that the prerecorded 

caller and Mark Augustus offered to Roylance, ALG thus represented to Roylance that Mark 

Augustus and the unidentified caller had the authority to advertise mortgages for ALG. Roylance 

then reasonably relied on this representation to his detriment because he spent money to send 

letters by certified mail to Mark Augustus and to ALG asking to be placed on their do-not-call 

lists.

65

 

Likewise, Roylance has established that Mark Augustus is liable for the conduct described 

above. Roylance’s allegation that Mark Augustus called Roylance twice is sufficient to establish 

that Mark Augustus is directly liable for those calls because he made those calls himself.66 Mark 

Augustus also called Roylance to follow up on the first prerecorded call that Roylance received and 

told Roylance that he would mail Roylance loan papers regarding the mortgage.67 Like ALG, 

 

61 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 17-19.

62 See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 32.

63 See Docket No. 14 (Roylance Decl.) at ¶ 126. 

64 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 25, 32.

65 See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 33.

66 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 30-31.

67 See id. at ¶¶ 30-32.

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Mark Augustus represented to Roylance that the unidentified caller had authority to conduct 

telemarketing on his behalf. As stated above, Roylance relied on these representations to his 

detriment because Roylance tried to stop the unidentified caller from calling him again by spending 

money to send a letter to Mark Augustus.68

Roylance’s allegations do not, however, establish that Donecia Augustus is personally 

liable under the TCPA. Direct liability is not proper here because Roylance does not allege that 

Donecia Augustus made the calls herself or allege facts sufficient to show that she had the calls 

made on her behalf. Roylance also does not establish that Donecia Augustus is vicariously liable 

for the prerecorded and live calls he received because Roylance does not allege facts that show that 

Donecia Augustus took actions that cloaked the unidentified caller, ALG or Mark Augustus with 

apparent authority to act on her behalf.

69 In particular, Roylance alleges that Donecia Augustus’

former name Donecia Montgomery appeared as the “broker’s representative” and “originator” on 

the loan papers that he received, but Roylance does not claim that Donecia Augustus made any of 

the live or prerecorded calls or sent those loan papers to him.70

Although the inclusion of her name suggests that Donecia Augustus was involved in the 

mailing of the papers to Roylance, Roylance’s allegations leave open the possibility that Mark 

Augustus or someone else listed her name on the papers without her consent or knowledge. 

Likewise, the fact that the papers listed the same telephone number for both Mark and Donecia 

Augustus does not show that Donecia Augustus give permission for her name to be listed on these 

papers.71 As a result, Roylance’s allegations are not sufficient to establish that Donecia Augustus 

is vicariously liable for Mark Augustus, ALG or the unidentified caller’s conduct because 

 

68 See id. at ¶ 33.

69 See Thomas, 582 Fed. Appx. at 679-80.

 

70 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 8, 32.

71 See id. at ¶ 32.

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Roylance does not allege that Donecia Augustus has “said or done” something to give these entities

apparent authority to act on her behalf.72

Roylance also has not established that Donecia Augustus should be held liable under the 

TCPA based on her alleged status as an employee of ALG. Roylance alleges that the California 

Department of Real Estate listed Donecia Augustus as a “salesperson” under the name Donecia La 

Shaun Montgomery for whom ALG was “the employing broker” in June 2010, around the same 

time that Roylance received the first prerecorded call and the calls from Mark Augustus.73 

Roylance therefore has established that Donecia Augustus was an employee of ALG at the time the 

first prerecorded call was made. 

However, Donecia Augustus’ employment status does not establish that she is liable for 

ALG’s acts because “[a]s a general rule of agency law, the personal liability of a corporate director 

or officer must be ‘founded upon specific acts by the individual director or officer.’”

74 “Although 

the Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this issue, numerous district courts have held that corporate

actors may be held individually liable for violating the TCPA where they had direct, personal 

participation in or personally authorized the conduct found to have violated the statute.”75 In 

 

72 See Thomas, 582 Fed. Appx. at 679.

73 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 8, 20, 30-31. Roylance also alleges that the National Mortgage Licensing 

System and Registry states that Amerifund employed Donecia Augustus from May 2008 to July 

2010. See Docket No. 14 (Roylance Decl.) at ¶ 42 and Ex. B. Roylance acknowledges that because 

this NMLS report “suggests that [Donecia Augustus’] representation of ALG” ended after “the first 

prerecorded call but before the subsequent five prerecorded calls” the “individuals and ALG may 

have gone their separate ways after the first call.” See Docket No. 14 at 9. However, as Roylance 

notes, ALG has not appeared in this case and thus “has not raised that defense.” See id. Further, as 

stated above, ALG is vicariously liable for these five subsequent calls because it gave the 

unidentified caller apparent authority to act on its behalf. Accordingly, the possibility that Donecia 

Augustus and ALG may not have had a connection at the time that Roylance received the five 

subsequent prerecorded calls does not negate ALG’s liability for those calls. 

74 See Ott v. Mortgage Investors Corp. of Ohio, Inc., Case No. 3:14-cv-00645-ST, 2014 WL 

6851964, at *9 (D. Or. Dec. 3, 2014) (citing United States v. Reis, 366 Fed. Appx. 781, 782 (9th 

Cir. 2010)).

75 See id (internal citations omitted).

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contrast, “courts have declined to find personal liability [when] there has been little evidence of the 

corporate officer’s direct participation in the wrongdoing.”76

Roylance has not established that Donecia Augustus had “direct, personal participation” in 

the unlawful conduct.77 Courts have generally imposed liability upon individual defendants based 

upon their status as employees of an entity that committed TCPA violations when those defendants 

had significant authority over the corporation that committed the TCPA violations. For instance,

individual defendants were held personally liable when they were “the only corporate officers” of 

the corporation and “set company policies and oversee day-to-day operations” and thus “were 

clearly involved in the business practices that led” to the unlawful conduct.78 Likewise, in Texas v. 

American Blastfax, the court held individual defendants liable when they “controlled all of [the 

corporation’s] day-to-day operations” and thus “were the ‘guiding spirits’” and the “‘central 

figures’ behind the TCPA violations.”79

In contrast, Roylance does not allege facts here that establish that Donecia Augustus had 

the ability to direct the “day-to-day” operations of ALG or any entity that conducted telemarketing 

on its behalf. Roylance alleges that the California Department of Real Estate website shows that 

ALG is a California corporation with 268 branches and 93 salespersons.80 The inclusion of 

Donecia Augustus’ former name as a broker’s representative on the loan package Roylance 

received and her alleged status as a “salesperson” for ALG do not establish that Donecia Augustus 

has the authority to control the telemarketing activities or daily operations of a corporation of this 

 

76 See id. (internal citation omitted).

77 See id. 

78 See Covington & Burling v. Int'l Mktg. & Research, Inc., Case No. CIV.A-01-0004360, 2003 

WL 21384825, at *6 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2003).

79 See Texas v. American Blastfax, Inc., 164 F.Supp.2d 892, 898 (W.D. Tex. 2001).

80 See Docket No. 14 (Roylance Decl.) at ¶ 2.

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size or any telemarketer with whom it was associated.81 Roylance’s allegations thus do not 

establish that Donecia Augustus was a “central figure” or “guiding force” but rather at most show 

only that Donecia Augustus was “tangentially involved” in the unlawful conduct.82

In addition to stating facts sufficient to support his TCPA claims, Roylance’s allegations 

state a claim that Mark Augustus but not Donecia Montgomery is liable under the California’s 

False Advertising Law.83 California Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500.3 makes it “unlawful for any 

person to solicit a sale or order for sale of goods or services at the residence of a prospective 

buyer...by means of telephone” without “[s]tating the identity of the person making the 

solicitation.” To establish standing under the False Advertising Law, “a plaintiff must have 

‘suffered injury in fact’ and ‘lost money or property’ as a result of the defendant’s challenged 

conduct.”

84

Roylance has standing to pursue this claim because he alleges that his receipt of an illegal 

prerecorded call injured him and because he lost money when he sent defendants a certified letter

asking to be placed on their do-not-call list.

85 Further, Roylance has alleged that “the prerecorded 

message did not provide an actual company name, a telephone number or an address.”86 As noted 

above, Mark Augustus is vicariously liable for these calls because he gave the unidentified caller 

 

81 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 8, 32.

82 See American Blastfax, 164 F.Supp.2d at 898.

83 Roylance’s complaint also claims that all defendants violated California’s Unfair Competition 

Law and that ALG violated California’s False Advertising Law. See Docket No. 1 at 9-10. 

Because Roylance does not seek default judgment based upon his ULC claim or damages or an 

injunction based upon ALG’s alleged violation of California’s False Advertising Law, the court 

deems these claims abandoned. See Docket No. 14.

84 See Hall v. Diamond Foods, Inc., Case No. C-14-2158-MMC, 2014 WL 5364122, at *1 (N.D.

Cal. Oct. 21, 2014) (citing Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1103-4 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17535))). 

85 See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 77.

86 See id. at ¶ 79.

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apparent authority to make the calls on his behalf. These facts are thus sufficient to state a claim

that Mark Augustus is liable under Section 17500.3. In contrast, because Roylance has not alleged 

facts that establish that Donecia Augustus is responsible for the unidentified caller’s actions, 

Roylance has not stated a claim against Donecia Augustus under Section 17500.3.

Likewise, Roylance has not alleged facts sufficient to support a claim under the California 

Public Utilities Code. Roylance’s complaint does not state which sections of this code defendants 

allegedly violated, but in his motion for default judgment Roylance seeks to enjoin Mark and 

Donecia Augustus from violating Sections 2871-2876 of the California Public Utilities Code.87

These sections prohibit certain conduct with respect to the use of “automatic dialing-announcing 

devices,”88 which is defined as “any automatic equipment” which stores telephone numbers to be 

called or can generate such numbers and has the ability “to disseminate a prerecorded message to 

the telephone number called.”89 Roylance alleges that he received prerecorded messages on his

telephone line, but he does not claim that defendants used an “automatic dialing-announcing 

device” to make such messages.90 Accordingly, Roylance has not alleged facts sufficient to state a 

claim that defendants violated the California Public Utilities Code.

Third, the amount of money at stake is reasonable in light of Defendants’ conduct. 

“Default judgment is disfavored where the sum of money at stake is too large or unreasonable in 

light of defendant’s actions.”91 “The [c]ourt considers [Roylance’s] declarations, calculations and 

other documentation of damages in determining if the amount at stake is reasonable.”92 Roylance 

 

87 See id. at ¶ 74; see also Docket No. 14 at 11.

88 See Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 2871-6; see also § 2872(b) (“No person shall operate an automatic 

dialing-announcing device except in accordance with this article.”).

89 See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 2871.

90 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 20-27, 37-41.

91 See Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea Corp., Case No. C-06-03594-JSW, 2007 WL 1545173, 

at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007).

92 See id.

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seeks a judgment against Mark and Donecia Augustus of $22,500 in statutory damages under the 

TCPA and $96,000 in punitive damages under California Civil Code Section 3294 and a judgment 

against ALG of $7,500 in statutory damages under the TCPA and $16,000 in punitive damages or, 

in the alternative, that ALG be held joint and severally liable for the same damages as Mark and 

Donecia Augustus.

93 “As the TCPA allows for the award of such damages and the [c]ourt has 

discretion as to these damages as well as the punitive damages [Roylance] seeks...this factor 

weights in favor of entry for default judgment.”94

Fourth, no material facts are in dispute. Following entry of default, the court “takes all 

well-pleaded facts, except those pertaining to damages, as true.”95 As stated above, Roylance has 

sufficiently alleged facts to support his claims. Defendants have not appeared in this action and 

thus did not dispute any of Roylance’s allegations.

Fifth, the default did not result from excusable neglect. When “the defendant has been 

properly served or the plaintiff demonstrates the defendant is aware of the lawsuit,” this factor 

weighs in favor of default judgment.96

All defendants have been served.

97 No defendant appeared or otherwise responded to the 

suit, and the clerk entered Defendants’ defaults in September 2014.98 Since then, none of the 

 

93 See Docket No. 14 at 2.

94 See Heidorn v. BDD Marketing & Management Co., LLC, Case No. C-13-00229-JCS, 2013 WL 

6571629, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013), report and recommendation adopted 2013 WL 6571168 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013).

95 See Truong, 2007 WL 1545173 at *12.

96 See Coach Services, Inc. v. YNM, Inc., Case No. 2:10-cv-02326-JST(PLAx), 2011 WL 1752091, 

at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2011) (internal citation omitted).

97 See Docket No. 7-1.

98 See Docket No. 8.

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defendants have notified the court or tendered any excuse for their continued absence from this 

case. No circumstances suggest that Defendants’ failure to appear was due to excusable neglect.

Sixth, granting default judgment will not harm public policy. “While the Federal Rules 

favor decisions on the merits, this preference standing alone is not dispositive. A decision on the 

merits is not possible where defendants [are not participating] in the proceedings. The baseline 

preference to adjudicate cases on the merits thus does not preclude a trial court from entering 

default judgment.”99 Here, although the Rules of Civil Procedure favor decisions on the merits, 

such a decision is not possible because defendants are not participating in the proceedings of this 

case. 

On balance, the Eitel factors support entry of default judgment against ALG and Mark 

Augustus but not against Donecia Augustus under Section 227(b) and (c) of the TPCA. The Eitel 

factors also support default judgment against Mark Augustus but not Donecia Augustus under 

California’s False Advertising Act. The factors do not support the entry of default judgment for 

Roylance’s claim under the California Public Utilities Code against any defendant. 

The court turns next to the question of remedies. Roylance has established that he is 

entitled to treble damages for ALG and Mark Augustus’ violations of the TCPA but not to punitive

damages under California Civil Code Section 3294. Although “factual allegations relating to 

liability are taken as true upon entry of default, allegations as to amount of damages are not 

automatically accepted.”100 The plaintiff “is required to prove all damages sought in the 

complaint.”101 A “judgment by default shall not be different in kind [or] exceed in amount that 

 

99 See Trindale v. Reach Media Group, LLC, Case No. 5:12-cv-04759-PSG, 2014 WL 3572132, at 

*4 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2014) (internal citations omitted).

100 Truong, 2007 WL 1545173 at *13.

101 Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Castworld Products, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 

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prayed for in the [complaint].”

102 The court may base its award on the declarations submitted by 

the plaintiff.

103

The TCPA provides that a person may receive up to $500 in damages for each violation of 

Section 227(b) and (c).104 Both of these subsections also provide that “if the court finds that the 

defendant willfully or knowingly violated [Section 227(b) or the regulations prescribed pursuant to 

Section 227(b)-(c)], the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount 

equal to not more than 3 times the amount available [in the case of non-willful conduct].”105

Roylance contends that the individual defendants are liable for six violations of Section 227(b) and 

nine violations of Section 227(c) and that ALG is liable for one violation of Section 227(b) and 

four violations of Section 227(c) or in the alternative for the same violations as the individual 

defendants.

106 Based on this count, Roylance argues that he is entitled to trebled damages of 

$22,500 against the individual defendants and that ALG be held jointly and severally liable for this 

amount or individually liable for $7,500 in statutory damages.107

The court first addresses the question of how many separate violations of the TCPA 

Roylance has established. As stated above, Roylance argues that he is entitled to statutory 

damages for fifteen separate TCPA violations.108 Roylance has established six violations of 

Section 227(b) because the six rerecorded calls he received violated this subsection. Roylance also 

has established that these six prerecorded calls and the two live calls he received from Mark 

 

102 See id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c)).

103 See id.

 

104 See § 227(b)(3)(B), (c)(5)(B).

105 See § 227(b)(3), (c)(5). 

106 See Docket No. 14 at 6, 10.

107 See Docket No. 14 at 6, 10.

108 See id. at 6.

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Augustus as well as ALG and Mark Augustus’ failure to provide him with a copy of their do-notcall policy violated Section 227(c).109 Roylance thus has established that he is entitled to statutory 

damages for a total of fourteen separate TCPA violations based upon the six prerecorded calls that 

he received that violated both Section 227(b) and (c) and the two live calls that Mark Augustus 

made that violated Section 227(c).

The court next finds that Roylance can recover statutory damages for his claims under both 

Section 227(b) and Section 227(c). Roylance claims that recovery of damages under both causes 

of actions is proper because “different violations must be shown in the different causes” since 

Section 227(b) concerns automated calls and Section 227(c) concerns the FCC’s do-not-call 

regulations.

110 The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on this issue, but the court finds persuasive the 

Sixth Circuit’s holding that “the fact that the statute includes separate provisions for statutory 

damages in subsections (b) and (c) suggests that a plaintiff could recover under both.”

111

Accordingly, Roylance may recover damages for both of his TCPA claims because “a person may 

recover statutory damages for violations of the automated-call requirements” and for violations of 

“the do-not-call-list requirements...even if both violations occurred in the same telephone call.”112

Roylance also is entitled to treble damages because his allegations establish that ALG and 

Mark Augustus’ conduct was willful and knowing. “The court observes that a split in authority 

 

109 Roylance is not entitled to statutory damages for nine separate violations of Section 227(c) 

because the failure to send Roylance a written policy of ALG’s do-not-call list is not a separate 

violation of Section 227(c) for which Roylance can recover damages. “The plain language of the 

statute allows...an individual who has received ‘one telephone call within any 12–month period by 

or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection’ to 

bring ‘an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation.’ This language indicates 

that a telephone call that violates more than one provision of the regulations is considered to be a 

single violation rather than multiple violations.” See Heidorn, 2013 WL 6571629, at *16 (emphasis 

in original). Further, Section 227(c)(5) does not provide a separate cause of action for someone 

who did not receive a written do-not-call policy but who did not receive any calls in violation of 

the TCPA.

110 See Docket No. 14 at 4.

111 See Charvat v. NMP, LLC, 656 F.3d 440, 448 (6th Cir. 2011).

112 See id. at 449.

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exists regarding what qualifies” as knowing or willful conduct “warranting trebling.”113 “Some 

courts have held that a defendant must know that the making of the call violates the TCPA, while 

others have held that a defendant need only know that the call is being made.”114 Roylance argues

in favor of the later interpretation, claiming that defendants did not need to know they were 

violating the TCPA in order to act willfully.115 Roylance claims that “[i]ntent to do a wrongful act 

is not an essential element of willfulness” and that the FCC interprets willfulness to mean “simply 

that the act of which a violation arises was not an accident or mistake, even if the resulting 

violation was unintended.”116

The case law supports Roylance’s position that a person need not have intent to commit an 

unlawful act in order to act willfully or knowingly under the TPCA. For instance, in Sengenberger

v. Credit Control Services, Inc., the court held that “intentionally” making phone calls that violated 

the TCPA was sufficient to warrant treble damages because “[a]lthough neither the TCPA nor the 

FCC regulations define the terms ‘willfully or knowingly’...courts have generally interpreted 

willfulness to imply only that an action was intentional.”117 Further, Sengenberger noted that 

 

113 See Trindale, 2014 WL 3572132, at *5 n. 59 (citing J2 Global Commc’ns, Inc. v. Blue Jay Inc., 

Case No. 4:08-cv-4254-PJH, 2009 WL 4572726, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2009) (“There appears to 

be a split in authority as to what predicate conduct is required before a treble damages award may 

be issued.”).

114 See id. (internal citations omitted). 

115 See Docket No. 14 at 4-6.

116 See id. at 5.

117 Case No. 09-c-2796, 2010 WL 1791270, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2010) (internal citation 

omitted); see also Bridgeview Health Care Center Ltd. v. Clark, Case No. 09-C-5601, 2013 WL 

1154206, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2013) (finding that plaintiff “need not prove that defendant had 

knowledge of the TCPA’s provisions in order to establish that the defendant willfully or knowingly 

violated the TCPA”) (internal citations omitted); Davis v. Diversified Consultants, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 

3d 217, 226 (D. Mass. 2014) (“While neither the TCPA nor FCC regulations provide a definition 

for willful and knowing, most courts have interpreted the willful or knowing standard to require 

only that a party’s actions were intentional, not that it was aware that it was violating the statute.”) 

(internal citations omitted).

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“[w]hile the TCPA does not define willful, the Communications Act of 1943, of which the TCPA 

is a part, defines willful as ‘the conscious or deliberate commission or omission of such act, 

irrespective of any intent to violate any provision[ ], rule or regulation.’”118 

Roylance’s allegations show that ALG and Mark Augustus’ TCPA violations were 

knowing and willful. ALG and Mark Augustus were aware that the first prerecorded call was 

made because Mark Augustus followed up on this call and ALG sent a loan package to Roylance

regarding this call.119 As Roylance notes, the demand letters he sent to Mark Augustus and ALG

also provided the defendants with actual notice that five subsequent prerecorded calls he received

were illegal.120 Further, as Roylance states, blocking the identification of the caller on all the calls 

he received was a “deliberate choice.”121

“Because Congress chose to employ a low threshold to assess treble damages, by requiring 

a caller’s actions to be ‘knowing’ or ‘willful’ it is important to highlight” that the TCPA gives 

courts discretion to determine whether treble damages are appropriate.”122 The court finds that 

enhanced damages are appropriate here. As Roylance notes, “there is no indication that [the 

individual defendants] have stopped using prerecorded calls.”

123 To the contrary, Roylance alleges 

that Mark Augustus continued “to use prerecorded calls and violate do-not-call requests.”124

 

118 See 2010 WL 1791270, at *6.

119 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 30-32; see also Docket No. 14, Roylance Decl. at ¶ 126.

120 See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 33-36; see also Ohley v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 993 F.Supp.2d 1220, 

1227 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that plaintiff stated a cause of action for treble damages under 

§ 227(b)(1)(A) when plaintiff alleged defendant continued to call him after he told defendant that 

he “was dialing the wrong number”).

121 See Docket No. 14 at 6.

122 See Charvet v. Ryan, 116 Ohio St. 3d 394, 400 (2007). 

123 See Docket No. 14 at 11.

124 See id. (Roylance Decl.) at ¶¶ 144-157.

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Awarding treble damages “would serve to deter [defendants] from [making calls that violate 

TCPA] in the future and thereby promote the purpose of the TCPA.”125 As stated above, the court 

finds that ALG and Mark Augustus are jointly and severally liable for fourteen TCPA violations 

but Donecia Augustus is not liable. Accordingly, the court recommends that Roylance be awarded 

treble statutory damages in the amount of $21,000 against ALG and Mark Augustus.

Roylance has not shown that punitive damages are proper here. Roylance requests $96,000 

in punitive damages, based upon “six prerecorded calls at $16,000 each.”126 Roylance claims that 

these damages are warranted under Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 which provides:

In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by 

clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or 

malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of 

example and by way of punishing the defendant.

“In order to determine whether punitive damages should be awarded, the [c]ourt considers: (1) the 

nature of defendant’s acts; (2) the amount of compensatory damages awarded; and (3) the wealth 

of the defendant.”

127 In determining whether punitive damages are appropriate, the court “cannot 

make a fully informed determination of whether an award of punitive damages is excessive unless 

the record contains evidence of a defendant’s financial condition.”128

Roylance has not presented sufficient evidence regarding ALG and Mark Augustus’ wealth

to justify an award of punitive damages. Roylance claims that the punitive damages he seeks are 

reasonable because the statutory damages available under the TCPA are “an inadequate deterrent 

for large telemarketers” like defendants.129 Roylance notes that ALG is a large operation, which 

 

125 See J2 Global Commc’ns, Inc., 2009 WL 4572726, at *8.

126 See Docket No. 1 at 10.

127 Brantley v. Boyd, Case No. C-07-6139-MMC, 2013 WL 3766911, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 16, 

2013) (citing Prof'l Seminar Consultants, Inc. v. Sino Am. Tech. Exch. Council, Inc., 727 F.2d 

1470, 1473 (9th Cir.1984)). 

128 See id. (internal citation omitted).

129 See Docket No. 14 at 7.

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allegedly includes 268 branches and 93 licensed salespeople.130 Roylance also argues that 

defendants were probably making telemarketing calls “throughout the state” because they were 

located in Southern California but calling into North California.131 Roylance further claims that 

because the papers given to him stated the loan originator would be paid $1,200, “closing twenty 

loans would cover the requested statutory damages.”132 Roylance argues that, taken together, these 

facts show that “the individual [d]efendants could easily have made more than $96,000 by making 

prerecorded calls throughout the state.”133 

“These facts do not adequately establish [ALG and Mark Augustus’] net worth or 

wealth.”134 The fact that ALG has a certain number of branches and employees does not establish 

the net worth or profitability of the corporation. Further, even if Roylance is correct that ALG and 

Mark Augustus mounted a large telemarketing campaign, Roylance has not shown that this 

campaign was successful or profitable. Likewise, the fact that the loan papers he received listed a 

fee for the loan originator of $1,200 does not show that ALG and Mark Augustus actually 

convinced people to sign up for these loans or received any fees from these loans. It is true that, as 

Roylance notes, by not participating in the case, the defendants have deprived Roylance of the 

ability to “learn[] the extent of their profits” and whether there have been “complaints or objections

by other consumers.”135 However, without adequate evidence of ALG and Mark Augustus’ wealth

 

130 See id. at 8; see also Docket No. 14 (Roylance Decl.) at ¶ 2.

131 See Docket No. 14 at 9.

132 See id. at 7.

133 See id. at 9.

134 See Brantley, 2013 WL 3766911 at *9.

135 See Docket No. 14 at 9.

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or net worth, the court “does not have a sufficient basis to determine the appropriateness of 

punitive damages.”136

Roylance also has shown that he is entitled to an injunction against Mark Augustus. In

addition to damages, Roylance asks that the individual defendants be permanently enjoined from 

violating the TCPA, the regulations made under it, California Business & Professions Code Section

17500.3 and California Public Utilities Code Sections 2871-2876.

137 As stated above, because 

Roylance has not established that Donecia Augustus was liable for any unlawful conduct, the court 

recommends that Roylance’s request for an injunction against her be denied. Further, Mark 

Augustus need not been enjoined from violating the California Public Utilities Code because 

Roylance has not established that Mark Augustus violated this code.

However, Roylance has shown that he is entitled to an injunction against Mark Augustus 

based upon Roylance’s TCPA and California’s Fair Advertising Law claims. The TCPA provides 

for injunctive relief as a remedy.138 Likewise, California’s Fair Advertising Law “explicitly

permit[s] injunctive relief to be sought by any person who has lost money or property as a result of 

a violation” of that law.

139 “[I]n order to grant injunctive relief under...section 17535, there must 

 

136 See Brantley, 2013 WL 3766911 at *9. Roylance alleges that Mark Augustus and Donecia 

Augustus state that they are connected to an entity called “First Global” and that a website states 

that a corporation with the similar name of 1st Global Diversified Financial Group, Inc. has at least 

$500,000 in annual revenue. See Docket No. 14 (Roylance Decl.) at ¶¶ 26-32. However, Roylance 

acknowledges that none of the papers he received identified this entity’s “involvement in the 

prerecorded calls” and that he did not see a “clear connection” between this entity and those 

prerecorded calls. See id. Accordingly, Roylance’s allegations regarding 1st Global Diversified 

Inc., which is not a defendant here, do not establish that Mark and Donecia Augustus “make 

$500,000 in annual revenue with illegal telemarketing” or establish ALG’s net worth. See Docket 

No. 14 at 8.

137 See Docket No. 1 at 10-11; Docket No. 14 at 2.

138 See § 227(b)(3)(A), (c)(5)(A).

139 See iYogi Holding PVT Ltd. V. Secure Remote Support, Inc., Case No. C-11-0592-CW, 2011 

WL 6291793, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2011); see also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17535 

(providing that “[a]ny person” who “violates or proposes to violate this chapter may be enjoined by 

any court of competent jurisdiction”).

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