Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03444/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03444-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Keldrick Jamal Black,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-03444-PHX-DWL (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Keldrick Jamal Black’s (“Petitioner”) Amended 

“Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “Amended 

Petition”) (Doc. 7). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that 

the Court deny habeas relief. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On March 29, 2013, a Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner and codefendant Robert Baker (“Baker”) on the following six counts: 

1. Count 1: First-Degree Murder, a Class 1 dangerous felony; 

2. Count 2: Armed Robbery, a Class 2 dangerous felony;

3. Counts 3 and 4: Kidnapping, a Class 2 dangerous felony;

4. Count 5: Aggravated Assault, a Class 3 dangerous felony; and

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5. Count 6: Misconduct Involving Weapons, a Class 4 felony.

(Bates No. 1-4).1 Petitioner pled guilty to Count 6. Following trial, a jury found 

Petitioner guilty as charged on Counts 1 through 5. (Bates Nos. 1727-28). The jury also 

found that the State had proven its aggravating factor allegations. (Bates No. 1751-57).

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to the following prison terms (i) life 

imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 25 years on Count 1; (ii) 30 years on 

Count 2; (iii) 17.75 years each on Counts 3 and 4; (iv) 13.25 years on Count 5; and (v) 12 

years on Count 6. (Bates No. 1817-18). All sentences are to be served concurrently. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal. (Bates Nos. 1871-94). On August 25, 2015, the

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Bates Nos.

1896-1907). Petitioner sought further review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was 

denied. (Bates No. 1895).

On May 4, 2016, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). 

(Bates Nos. 1908-10). Following briefing, the trial court denied relief. (Bates No. 1928). 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Bates Nos. 1929-

41). The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. (Bates Nos. 1951-

53). Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for further review.

On May 23, 2019, Petitioner initiated this federal habeas proceeding. (Doc. 1). 

The Court allowed the Amended Petition to proceed. (Doc. 8). On November 27, 2019, 

Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 13) to the Amended Petition. Petitioner did not file a 

Reply. The Amended Petition raises two grounds for relief, with each ground containing 

multiple sub-claims.2 Respondents have enumerated the sub-claims as Ground 1(a)-(d) 

and 2(a)-(c).

1 Citations to the state court record submitted with Respondents’ Limited Answer 

(Doc. 8) refer to the Bates-stamp numbers affixed to the lower right corner of each page 

of the record.

2 Petitioner utilized the court-approved form in preparing the Amended Petition. 

Petitioner’s supporting facts in furtherance of Ground One continue onto the form’s preprinted space for “Ground Two” and “Ground Three.” (Doc. 7-2 at 36-37). Petitioner’s 

second claim for habeas relief is written on the form’s pre-printed space for “Ground

Four.” (Id. at 38).

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Affirmative Defenses Raised with Respect to Grounds 1(b) and 2(c)

Respondents concede that Grounds 1(a), 1(c), 1(d), 2(a), 2(b), and 2(d) should be 

reviewed on the merits, but Respondents assert that Ground 1(b) is procedurally 

defaulted. (Doc. 13 at 9-18). Respondents also assert that Ground 2(c) is time-barred. 

(Id. at 24). Although a procedural issue should ordinarily be resolved first, “judicial 

economy sometimes dictates reaching the merits [of a claim] if the merits are easily 

resolvable against a petitioner while the procedural bar issues are complicated.” Barrett 

v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1162 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts 

of the State.”); Barrett, 169 F.3d at 1162 (seeing no need to “belabor” the “difficult 

question” of a procedural bar when the claim was easily resolvable against the petitioner 

on the merits); Miller v. Mullin, 354 F.3d 1288, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004) (in the interest of 

judicial economy, choosing not to address issues of whether habeas claims were 

procedurally barred “because the case may be more easily and succinctly affirmed on 

the merits”).

Here, the undersigned finds that it is more efficient to resolve all claims for habeas 

relief on the merits. See Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 564 n.4 (8th Cir.

1998) (“The simplest way to decide a case is often the best.”).

B. Deference to Last Reasoned State Court Decision

In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner’s claims, the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) requires federal courts to defer to the 

last reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 

2014); Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a 

state prisoner must show that the state court’s adjudication of his or her claims either:

A. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

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B. resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 

132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” refers 

to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions applicable at the time of the 

relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. 

Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly 

established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. 

Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 

(2000)). 

As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), factual determinations by state courts 

are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to 

the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th 

Cir. 2011). A state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be 

overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir.

2004) (as amended) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

C. Merits of Ground One

Petitioner’s convictions arise out of a shooting death that occurred outside the

Pantera Show Club at approximately 2:00 a.m. in December 2011. As recounted in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision on direct appeal:

¶4 At trial, the State presented testimony from more than 

20 witnesses, including eyewitnesses and expert testimony, as 

well as surveillance video and exhibits. The evidence showed 

that the victim, G.P., was shot and killed outside a club after 

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his necklace was taken from him. After the shooting, two 

males forced their way into the car of E.L. and S.R. and made 

them drive to a location some distance from the club. When 

the males left the car, E.L. and S.R. returned to the club and

were interviewed by the police. E.L. identified Black from a 

photo-lineup as one of the men who forced his way into the 

car. E.L. also identified Black as the shooter during her trial 

testimony. S.R., when given an identical photo-lineup shortly 

after the shooting, put her initials next to Black’s photo and

another photo; she was not able to identify Black in open 

court but identified a picture of him taken after his arrest as 

being one of the individuals who forced his way into the car. 

V.C., during a one-on-one identification shortly after the 

shooting, identified Black as being one of the shooters and 

identified Black in open court.

¶5 Police officers testified that, hours after the shooting, a 

vehicle was pulled over and three of the six occupants 

matched descriptions of the shooting suspects. The police 

performed gunshot residue tests on all three suspects, which 

detected particles “indicative of gunshot residue.” All three 

suspects were taken into custody for questioning.

(Bates No. 1898) (footnote omitted). Ground One of the Amended Petition contains four 

sub-claims alleging a violation of Petitioner’s rights under the Sixth Amendment, which 

Respondents have enumerated as Grounds 1(a)-(d). (Doc. 7-2 at 35; Doc. 13 at 1). In 

Ground 1(a), Petitioner alleges a violation of his right to confront witnesses. In Ground

1(b), Petitioner alleges the ineffective assistance of counsel. Ground 1(c) asserts that

Petitioner was denied the right to an effective defense. Finally, Ground 1(d) contends 

that Petitioner was denied the right to a jury trial. 

1. Ground 1(a)

Petitioner severed the trial from co-defendant Baker’s case. The trial court

allowed Petitioner’s counsel to elicit testimony from State witness T.W. that Baker

admitted to shooting victim G.P. (Bates Nos. 1014-16, 1073-74). To rebut this 

testimony, the State sought to introduce testimony that Baker told an interviewing police 

detective, Lois Weiss, that Petitioner had the gun after arguing with victim G.P. The trial 

court overruled defense counsel’s objection, finding that Baker’s statements to Detective 

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Weiss were admissible to impeach the credibility of Baker’s prior statement to T.W. 

(Bates Nos. 1088-1091, 1246-51). The trial court instructed the jury that the statements 

could be considered only for the limited purpose of determining the credibility of Baker’s 

prior hearsay statement to witness T.W. and not for any other purpose. (Bates No. 1263, 

1598).

In Ground 1(a), Petitioner asserts that the admission of Baker’s statements to 

Detective Weiss violated Petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment. (Doc. 7-2 at 35). Respondents concede that Petitioner raised Ground 1(a)

on direct appeal. (Doc. 13 at 7). 

The relevant U.S. Supreme Court case regarding the Confrontation Clause is 

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that 

the Confrontation Clause prohibits the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness 

who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a 

prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. at 53-54. Such “testimonial” statements are 

subject to exclusion under the Confrontation Clause even if they meet a “firmly rooted 

hearsay exception” or bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. at 40, 59, 

68. As to “nontestimonial hearsay,” however, the Court concluded, “it is wholly 

consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of 

hearsay law.” Id. at 68. As to what defines a “testimonial” statement, Crawford provides 

that “‘[t]estimony’ ... is typically, ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 

purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’” Id. at 51 (citation omitted).

Here, in denying relief, the Arizona Court of Appeals correctly recounted that

“[t]he Confrontation Clause ‘does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes 

other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.’” (Bates No. 1901) (quoting 

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59). The Court of Appeals further explained that “[t]o satisfy the 

Confrontation Clause, the superior court ‘must instruct the jury as to the limited purpose 

for which [non-testifying codefendant’s] statement is introduced.’” (Id.) (quoting State v. 

Huerstel, 75 P.3d 698, 709 (Ariz. 2003)). The Arizona Court of Appeals found that the

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trial court’s admission of Baker’s statements comported with the Confrontation Clause 

for the following reasons:

¶17 After admitting Detective Weiss’ rebuttal testimony, 

the superior court gave a limiting instruction informing the 

jurors “[t]his evidence has been admitted only for the limited 

purpose of determining the credibility of the statements made 

by Mr. Baker” to T.W. and that the jurors “may only use that 

evidence and consider that evidence for that limited purpose 

of determining his credibility, not for any other purpose.” The 

court gave a similar admonition in final instructions, stating 

the jury could only “consider Robert Baker’s statements to 

Detective . . . Weiss for the very limited purpose to determine 

the credibility of Robert Baker’s prior hearsay statement to 

[T.W.], and not as evidence of Keldrick Black’s guilt.” Black 

has not argued that these limiting instructions were 

inadequate and the jury is presumed to have followed the 

instructions. Elliott v. Landon, 89 Ariz. 355, 357, 362 P.2d 

733, 735 (1961). Moreover, given the limited purpose for 

which the rebuttal testimony was admitted and the limiting 

instructions given, there was no error in admitting this 

evidence. See State v. Ruggiero, 211 Ariz. 262, 266-67 ¶¶ 

17-21, 120 P.3d 690, 694-95 (App. 2005) (finding admission 

of rebuttal testimony for limited use was authorized under 

Rule 806). 

(Bates No. 1901).

After reviewing the record, the undersigned finds that the Arizona Court of 

Appeals reasonably concluded that the State did not introduce Baker’s statements to 

Detective Weiss to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to assess the credibility of 

Baker’s prior hearsay statement to witness T.W. (B.N. 1246–51). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals correctly recounted that the trial court instructed the jury that they could 

consider Baker’s statements to Detective Weiss only for the limited purpose of evaluating 

the credibility of Baker’s prior hearsay statement. (Bates No. 1263, 1598). The 

undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to show that the Arizona Court of Appeals’

rejection of Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim is contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner also 

has failed to show that the decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts based 

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on the evidence in the record. It is recommended that the Court deny Ground 1(a).

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Presented in Grounds

1(b)(i)-(iv) 

Ground 1(b) alleges that Petitioner’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective 

for (i) not objecting to allegedly false testimony during the grand jury proceeding; (ii) not 

moving to strike one of the jurors for cause on the ground that the juror previously served 

on a grand jury; (iii) not moving to strike another juror for cause on the basis that the

juror stated that he was previously a victim of aggravated assault; and (iv) inadequately 

representing Petitioner at the aggravation hearing. (Doc. 7-2 at 36-37). As mentioned, 

the undersigned finds that the interests of judicial economy are best served by reviewing 

the merits of Ground 1(b) rather than resolving Respondents’ affirmative defenses. As 

the state courts have not addressed Ground 1(b), the de novo standard applies. See 

Cone, 556 U.S. at 472 (where state procedural default bar is not applied, federal habeas 

court reviews claim de novo because state courts did not reach merits of claim, and 

AEDPA’s deferential standard of review does not apply). 

a. Legal Standards

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to the effective 

assistance of counsel. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a habeas 

petitioner arguing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must establish that his or her 

counsel’s performance was (i) objectively deficient and (ii) prejudiced the petitioner. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This is a deferential standard, and “[s]urmounting 

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 725 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)). In the habeas context, 

the issue is whether there is a “reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the [ineffective assistance of

counsel] claim was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted 

only if no reasonable jurist could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 

882 F.3d 778, 825 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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In assessing the performance factor of Strickland’s two-part test, judicial review 

“must be highly deferential” and the court must try not “to second-guess counsel’s 

assistance after conviction.” Clark, 769 F.3d at 725 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). To be constitutionally deficient, counsel’s representation must fall 

below an objective standard of reasonableness such that it was outside the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. A reviewing court considers

“whether there is any reasonable argument” that counsel was effective. Rogovich v. 

Ryan, 694 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012). 

To establish the prejudice factor of Strickland’s two-part test, a petitioner must 

demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694. In other words, it must be shown that the “likelihood of a different result [is] 

substantial, not just conceivable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 112. 

b. Analysis

i. Ground 1(b)(i)

In the claim that Respondents have enumerated as Ground 1(b)(i), Petitioner

asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the “outragious [sic]

false testimony given to the Grand Jury by the State and Detective Weiss leading into 

trial.” (Doc. 7-2 at 36). Petitioner also asserts that his appellate and PCR counsel were 

ineffective for failing to raise this issue in his direct appeal and PCR proceeding. (Id.).

As Respondents correctly note (Doc. 13 at 15), “any constitutional error in 

the grand jury proceedings is harmless because [Petitioner] was ultimately convicted of 

the offenses charged.” Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir. 

2006) (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986) (“[T]he petit jury’s 

subsequent guilty verdict means not only that there was probable cause to believe that the 

defendants were guilty as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Measured by the petit jury’s verdict, then, any error in the grand jury 

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proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt.”)). Petitioner thus is unable to satisfy the prejudice prong of the two-prong 

Strickland test. It is recommended that the Court deny the ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim presented in Ground 1(b)(i). 

ii. Grounds 1(b)(ii) and 1(b)(iii)

In Ground 1(b)(ii), Petitioner asserts that during voir dire on September 18, 2013, 

“trial counsel went against [Petitioner’s] wishes and did not strike a juror that confessed 

to being on a Grand Jury and other jury panels many times prior to being here when 

advised to do so.” (Doc. 7-2 at 36). During jury selection, the trial court asked the

potential jurors to raise their hand if they have ever served on a federal, state, or local 

grand jury. (Bates No. 221). Only Juror 46 raised his hand. (Id.). Juror 46 stated that he 

served on a Maricopa County grand jury from November 2011 through February 2012. 

(Id.). The trial court verified that Juror 46 was not on the grand jury that indicted 

Petitioner. (Bates No. 266-68, 281-85).

In Ground 1(b)(iii), Petitioner asserts that:

During viore [sic] dire counsel did not object to Juror #24 

when advised to by client after Juror #24 admitted he was a 

victim of a aggravated assault where the same superior court

judge presided over the trial and made a statement that his

culperate [sic] ‘got what he deserved’ Here trial counsel 

should have objected to this juror remaining on the jury panel 

on grounds that by leaving him on the jury panel is clearly a 

conflict of interest.

(Doc. 7-2 at 36). During jury selection, Juror 24 told the trial court that approximately 

three years ago, he had “[p]ersonal experience with somebody pointing a gun at my head. 

And the case was settled, and it was settled with you.” (Bates No. 309-10). Juror 24 

affirmed that he could be fair and impartial. (Bates No. 310). In his direct appeal, 

Petitioner argued that the trial court should have excused Juror 24. (Bates No. 1905). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals explained that “if the juror assures the court that he or she 

can be fair and impartial, the juror need not be excused.” (Id.) (quoting State v. 

Reasoner, 742 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)). Because Petitioner did not offer 

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any evidence that Juror 24 could not be fair and impartial, the Arizona Court of Appeals

found that Petitioner failed to establish error. (Id.).

“Establishing Strickland prejudice in the context of juror selection requires a 

showing that, as a result of trial counsel’s [error], the jury panel contained at least 

one juror who was biased.” Davis, 384 F.3d at 643. Here, there is no indication that any 

of the selected jurors had an implied bias. The record contains no evidence suggesting 

that any of the selected jurors were incapable or unwilling to decide the case solely on the 

evidence presented at trial. See United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1112 n. 3 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (although not dispositive, “significant weight [is given] to a juror’s definitive 

statement that he can serve impartially”). Because there is no evidence that any of the

selected jurors were actually or impliedly biased, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has 

failed to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. It is recommended that the 

Court deny Grounds 1(b)(ii) and 1(b)(iii).

iii. Ground 1(b)(iv)

In presenting Ground 1(b)(iv), Petitioner states that

On Oct 23, 2013 during aggravating circumstances defense 

counsel showed no interest in opening and closing 

arguements [sic], made only one objection and made no effort 

to argue any mitigating facts or any arguement [sic] at all 

against the state’s alleged aggravating factors. Because of 

defense counsel lack of performance and only making one 

objection throughout the whole aggravating phase rendered 

the Defendant from bringing up any credible issues in later 

appeal proceedings and receive a fair sentencing.

(Doc. 7-2 at 37). As to Petitioner’s assertion that his trial counsel should have presented 

mitigating evidence at the aggravation phase, Respondents correctly note that the

aggravation phase is not the appropriate proceeding to present mitigating evidence as 

Arizona juries are not tasked with finding the existence of mitigating circumstances. 

(Doc. 13 at 16) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-701(D), 13-701(E) and State v. Snelling, 

236 P.3d 409, 417, ¶ 38 n.7 (Ariz. 2010) (explaining that Arizona law provides “that the 

penalty phase at which mitigation evidence may be presented is held only after one or 

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more aggravating circumstances has been found”). After reviewing the record, the

undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance 

was constitutionally deficient with respect to the aggravation phase of Petitioner’s

criminal proceeding. (See Bates Nos. 1731-57). The undersigned recommends that the 

Court deny Ground 1(b)(iv).

3. Ground 1(c)

Defense counsel hired audio/video forensic expert Bryan Nuemeister 

(“Nuemeister”) to enhance the surveillance footage that captured the shooting for which 

Petitioner was charged. On September 9, 2013, the trial court held a Daubert hearing

concerning the admissibility of Nuemeister’s testimony. (Bates Nos. 56-176). 

Neumeister explained his qualifications and the process he used to enhance the footage. 

Neumeister further explained that he used his eyes to track the individuals and objects in 

the footage. (Bates No. 112). The State had no objection to the admission of 

Nuemeister’s enhanced video, but objected to the admission of Nuemeister’s opinion as 

to what was depicted in the video. (Bates No. 166). As Nuemeister had no specialized 

knowledge concerning the lighting conditions at the time of the shooting, the trial court

ruled that Nuemeister could not testify what he saw on the video or provide his opinions

as to whether objects in the video were shadows or bodies. (Bates No. 1902). 

At trial, defense counsel called Nuemeister as a witness. (Bates Nos. 1266-1333). 

Video footage was played for the jury. The State called its own audio/video expert 

witness, Brewster Rolland-Keith (“Rolland-Keith”). (Bates Nos. 1440-1569). The State 

asked: “One of the other things that you were asked to do was to look at, I guess, a dark 

shape in the video to determine whether or not there was a shadow case vs. a solid object, 

is that correct?” (Bates No. 1554). Rolland-Keith answered affirmatively. The State 

then asked: “Were you able to make any opinions or conclusions based you’re your

review of the video in that regard?” Defense counsel objected. In response, the State 

told the court that Neumeister 

didn’t have any scientific reason for determining whether 

something was a shadow or not. He didn’t have any idea 

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what the light sources were in any way, shape, or form. That

was his lack of foundation.

This witness, on the other hand, can. What he is 

basically going to say, this isn’t a shadow versus a solid 

person because it blocks out a light source, which is a 

scientifically valid reason.

(Bates No. 1555). The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection. (Bates No.

1557-58). Rolland-Keith testified that one of the figures moving in the video was not a 

shadow, but a solid object as it was capable of blocking a light source. (Bates No. 1558-

60). Defense counsel requested to recall Nuemeister as a sur-rebuttal witness, stating that

he would like to have Nuemeister testify that it is his opinion

that there was one figure, this large man, [a bouncer called 

Tiny], and there was also his shadow and that Tiny, the

second shadow was actually Tiny’s shadow . . . . And this is 

material to the defendant’s case because our theory of defense 

is that Mr. Black was by the back of his car, between his car 

and the building and moved to his vehicle.

(Bates No. 1572). The trial court denied defense counsel’s request to recall Nuemeister, 

noting that additional foundation was laid for the State’s expert and that the State’s expert 

“was able to show that the quote ‘shadow’ blocks out the light source and that’s 

something Mr. Nuemeister never made the connection with.” (Bates No. 1573).

In Ground 1(c), Petitioner contends that the trial court denied his right to present 

an effective defense by limiting the scope of Nuemeister’s testimony. (Doc. 7-2 at 37). 

Respondents concede that Petitioner presented this claim on direct appeal. (Doc. 13 at 

18). In rejecting the claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated:

¶20 Black argues the superior court improperly limited his 

defense in several ways. Black argues the preclusion of 

Neumeister’s testimony of the movement and number of 

figures in the surveillance video was error, an issue this court 

reviews for an abuse of discretion. See Boggs, 218 Ariz. at 

334 ¶ 38, 185 P.3d at 120. As applicable here, the test for 

preclusion of expert testimony “is whether the subject of 

inquiry is one of such common knowledge that people of 

ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently 

as the witness . . . .” State v. Owens, 112 Ariz. 223, 227, 540 

P.2d 695, 699 (1975). 

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¶21 During a pre-trial hearing, Neumeister testified that he 

did not use anything other than his eyes to track the 

movement of objects within the surveillance video. 

Neumeister also testified he never visited the crime scene and 

never looked at any crime scene photographs to note available 

light at the scene at the time of the shooting. As a result, 

Neumeister provided no specialized knowledge on the 

lighting conditions at the time of the shooting. Accordingly, 

the superior court ruled that Neumeister could not tell jurors 

what he saw on the video nor testify whether certain objects 

were shadows or bodies. Neumeister was allowed, however, 

to testify about how he enhanced the video and defense 

counsel was allowed to direct the jurors’ attention to specific 

locations as the video was being played. Black has not shown 

how the court abused its discretion in this ruling. 

¶22 Black also argues the superior court erred in not 

allowing Neumeister to testify in surrebuttal. “Because trial 

courts must be able to limit the presentation of witnesses and 

other evidence on collateral issues, only rarely will a trial 

court abuse its discretion in denying surrebuttal.” State v. 

Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, 79–80 ¶ 82, 280 P.3d 604, 623–24 

(2012). Here, Black requested surrebuttal after the State’s 

expert testified he saw two figures as opposed to a single 

figure and a shadow; the superior court did not allow 

Neumeister to testify in surrebuttal. However, the court noted 

“factually that additional foundation was laid for this opinion 

by [the State’s] expert and that testimony was that he was 

able to show that the quote ‘shadow’ blocks out the light 

source and that’s something Mr. Neumeister never made the 

connection with.” Black fails to address how Neumeister 

would have gained the knowledge required under Rule 702 to 

provide that opinion when he failed to do so during the 

pretrial hearing. Accordingly, Black has not shown that the 

superior court abused its discretion in precluding Neumeister 

from providing surrebuttal testimony. 

(Bates Nos. 1902–03).

“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of 

the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful 

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opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690

(1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As part of this right to present a 

defense, criminal defendants have the right to compel the attendance of favorable 

witnesses at trial and the right “to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as 

the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.” Washington v. 

Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). “Just as an accused has the right to confront the 

prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to 

present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of 

due process of law.” Id. 

However, a defendant “does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is 

incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988). The Supreme Court has “never questioned 

the power of States to exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that 

themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability—even if the defendant would 

prefer to see that evidence admitted.” Crane, 476 U.S. at 690 (citing Chambers v. 

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). Evidentiary rules do not violate a defendant’s 

constitutional rights unless they “infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused and are 

arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Holmes v. South 

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (alteration in original and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[W]ell-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if 

its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Id. at 226.

Here, Neumeister stated at the Daubert hearing that by looking at the surveillance 

video, it was his opinion that one of the figures in the video was a shadow. (Bates No.

94). Upon questioning by the State, Neumeister explained that his opinion was based 

only by watching the video with his unaided eyes. (Id.). Neumeister also stated that

since the Pantera Show Club no longer exists, “there’s no way to go down and analyze 

the light sources.” (Bates No. 139). The undersigned finds that the Arizona Court of 

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Appeals correctly found that Neumeister provided no specialized knowledge on the

lighting conditions at the time of the shooting. The undersigned further finds that the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ upholding the trial court’s limitation of Neumeister’s 

testimony was objectively reasonable under the above-described established federal 

standards. The undersigned recommends that the Court deny Ground 1(c).

4. Ground 1(d)

The Amended Petition states “right to a jury trial denied” as a fourth sub-claim in 

Ground One. (Doc. 7-2 at 35). The record shows that Petitioner was found guilty by a 

jury following trial. As Respondents observe (Doc. 13 at 21), Petitioner does not explain 

how his right to a jury trial was denied. 

To plead a cognizable federal habeas claim, a petitioner must set forth in his or her 

petition the facts supporting the specific ground upon which relief is sought. Rule 2(c), 

foll. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. “‘[N]otice’ pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected 

to state facts that point to a ‘real possibility of constitutional error.’” Advisory Committee 

Note to Rule 4, foll. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see 

also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (noting that the rules governing pleading 

for Section 2254 habeas petitions are “more demanding” than the notice pleading allowed 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8); Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir.

1979) (concluding that a habeas petitioner “failed to satisfy the specificity requirement 

of § 2254 pleadings or to show that there is a ‘real possibility’ of constitutional error” by 

“merely alleg[ing] that he ‘. . . was not informed of the consequences of his plea. . .

.’”); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which are 

not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”); Greenway 

v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[C]ursory and vague claim[s] cannot 

support habeas relief.”).

It is recommended that the Court dismiss Ground 1(d) as it is too vague

and conclusory to support habeas relief.

3

3 Respondents suggest that Petitioner may be attempting to allege that he was 

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5. Appellate Counsel

In the portion of the Amended Petition pertaining to Ground 1(b), Petitioner states: 

During opening brief appellant counsel misstates testimony

and evidence throughout the brief to the point it clearly 

showed her performance lacked knowledge from not 

investigating properly and made a rush through job. Nothing 

in her opening brief matches any testimony nor facts, therefor 

[sic] it shows why she filed California v. Anderson brief. Her

unperffesionalism [sic] caused an domino effect on my appeal 

process and denied me an opportunity for relief or a new trial 

in the direct appeal proceedings in appeal courts.

(Doc. 7-2 at 37). To the extent that the above is intended to be a separate claim for

habeas relief, it is too vague and conclusory to warrant habeas relief. James, 24 F.3d at 

26; Greenway, 653 F.3d at 804. Moreover, Petitioner submitted a pro se appellate brief 

that raised a number of issues. The Arizona Court of Appeals did not find that any of the

claims had merit. (Bates Nos. 1896-1907). Petitioner has not identified any issues that

his appellate counsel should have raised that he did not raise in his pro se appellate brief. 

Neither deficient performance nor prejudice can be found when an appellate attorney fails 

to raise a claim on appeal that lacks merit. See Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 429 

(9th Cir. 1992) (appellate counsel’s failure to raise an issue on appeal does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel if no constitutional violation has been shown, and 

thus, counsel had no reasonable likelihood of success in arguing the issue); Boag v. 

Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985) (failure to raise meritless argument on 

appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). Therefore, to the extent that

the Court finds that Petitioner has sufficiently pled a claim alleging the ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel, the undersigned recommends that it be denied.

denied a fair trial based on the cumulative nature of the alleged errors in Ground One. 

(Doc. 13 at 21). Respondents are correct that such a claim is meritless. Where there is 

no single constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level of a 

constitutional violation. See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(“Because there is no single constitutional error in this case, there is nothing to 

accumulate to a level of a constitutional violation.”), overruled on other grounds by Slack 

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).

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D. Merits of Ground Two

Ground Two contains three sub-claims, which Respondents assert are without 

merit. (Doc. 13 at 21-25).

1. Ground 2(a)

Ground 2(a) alleges prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. 7-2 at 38). The clearly 

established federal law applicable to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is “the narrow 

one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.” Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). “[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in 

cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of 

the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). Thus, to prevail on 

a prosecutorial misconduct claim, a petitioner must show that not only were the 

prosecutor’s actions improper, but that the actions “so infected the trial with unfairness as 

to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 

416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974); Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (it “is not enough that the

prosecutor[’s] remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

In rejecting Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals stated:

¶31 A claim of prosecutorial misconduct warrants reversal 

only if “(1) misconduct is indeed present and (2) a reasonable 

likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the 

jury’s verdict, thereby denying defendant a fair trial.” State v. 

Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 459 ¶ 145, 94 P.3d 1119, 1154 (2004) 

(citation omitted). Black argues that because S.R. was unable 

to identify him in open court, the prosecutor should not have 

stated during closing arguments that S.R. identified him. 

However, S.R. did identify Black in the photo-lineup by 

putting her initials next to his picture. S.R. also identified the 

picture of Black taken after his arrest as being the person who 

got in the car the night of the shooting. Black further argues 

several other instances of alleged misconduct, none of which 

rise to the level of misconduct. On this record, Black has not 

shown that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct or that any 

alleged misconduct could have affected the jury’s verdict. See 

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Moody, 208 Ariz. at 459 ¶ 145, 94 P.3d at 1154.

(Bates No. 1905-06). The Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of Ground 2(a) was not 

“so lacking in justification” that it resulted in “an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. “[W]hile a defendant is entitled to a fair trial; he is not 

entitled to a perfect trial, for there are no perfect trials.” United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 

1458, 1477 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioner has 

failed to show that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of 

his prosecutorial misconduct claims was contrary to, or an objectively unreasonable 

application of, any clearly established Federal law as determined by the United States 

Supreme Court. The undersigned recommends that the Court deny Ground 2(a).

2. Ground 2(b)

In Ground 2(b), Petitioner alleges that there was insufficient evidence from which 

the jury could find Petitioner guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. (Doc. 7-2 

at 39). 

In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Court held that a 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim must be rejected unless, based on the evidence

presented at trial, “no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 324. All evidence must be considered in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 319; Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 

1997). While the standard under Jackson is deferential, AEDPA applies an additional 

layer of deference in federal habeas cases. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 

(9th Cir. 2005). A federal court may overturn a state court decision rejecting a 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge “only if the state court decision was ‘objectively 

unreasonable.’” See Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (per curiam); see also Juan 

H., 408 F.3d at 1275 n. 13. This “double dose of deference . . . can rarely be 

surmounted.” Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 

S.Ct. 2723 (2012); see also Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (per 

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curiam) (“We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas 

proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference.”). 

Moreover, because “a court under Jackson makes no ‘determination of the facts’ 

in the ordinary sense of resolving factual disputes,” a Jackson claim presented in a 

federal habeas petition is evaluated under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (unreasonable 

application of federal law), not 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (unreasonable determination of 

the facts). Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We have recently 

joined our sister circuits in using § 2254(d)(1) to evaluate a state court’s sufficiency-ofthe-evidence determination under Jackson.”), vacated in part on other grounds, 503 F.3d 

822 (9th Cir. 2007), reversed on other grounds, 555 U.S. 179 (2009); see also Flores v. 

Beard, 533 F. App’x 730, 731 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Because we ‘evaluate a state court’s 

resolution of a Jackson sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim in all cases under § 2254(d)(1) 

rather than § 2254(d)(2),’ we do not address [petitioner]’s § 2254(d)(2) argument.”); 

Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2011) (“When we undertake collateral 

review of a state court decision rejecting a claim of insufficiency of the evidence pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), . . . we ask only whether the state court’s decision was 

contrary to or reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson to the facts of a particular 

case.”). 

The following are excerpts of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision rejecting 

Petitioner’s claim:

¶28 Black argues there was insufficient evidence to show 

that he committed the crimes and there was no direct physical 

evidence tying him to the shooting. This court will not 

reverse a defendant’s conviction for insufficiency of the

evidence unless there is no substantial evidence to support the 

jury’s verdict. See State v. Scott, 187 Ariz. 474, 477, 930 P.2d 

551, 554 (App. 1996). Here, among other evidence, along 

with bullet casings found at the scene, three witnesses 

identified Black as the shooter who got into the car of E.L. 

and S.R. Moreover, Black was found to have residue 

“indicative” of gunshot residue on his hands. On this record, 

there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. See 

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Scott, 187 Ariz. at 477, 930 P.2d at 554. 

(Bates Nos. 1904-05). 

After reviewing the record, the undersigned finds that the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decision accurately recounts the evidence introduced at trial. State witness E.L 

identified Petitioner as the shooter during her trial testimony. (Bates Nos. 687-734). 

Another State witness, V.C., identified Petitioner in open court as the shooter. (Bates 

Nos. 620-46). State witness S.R. identified a picture of Petitioner taken after his arrest as 

being one of the individuals who forced his way into the vehicle she was in following the

shooting. (Bates Nos. 559, 577-78). In addition, a police officer testified that he 

collected gunshot residue from Petitioner following the shooting. (Bates Nos. 736-37). 

It is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the 

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319; see Walters, 45 F.3d at 1358. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[t]he 

question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is

whether rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. 

Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). After 

reviewing the record, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to establish that the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

Jackson. The undersigned recommends that the Court deny Ground 2(b).

3. Ground 2(c)

In his final claim, Petitioner states that the trial court violated his “due process 

rights by denying Petitioner an evidentiary hearing on post conviction relief on newly 

discovered evidence . . . .” (Doc. 7-2 at 40). Respondents correctly assert (Doc. 13 at 24-

25) that alleged error in the state post-conviction process is not reviewable in a federal 

habeas proceeding. See Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (“a 

petition alleging errors in the state post-conviction review process is not addressable 

through habeas corpus proceedings”); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 

(1991) (explaining that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to 

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reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions”). Accordingly, the 

undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Ground 2(c).

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court (i) deny Grounds 1(a), 1(b), 1(c), 2(a), 

and 2(b) of the Amended Petition (Doc. 7) and (ii) dismiss Grounds 1(d) and 2(c). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right in his claim for relief.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 12th day of June, 2020.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

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