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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE 

PUBLISH Flt1liD 

Y Toited St1HP.~ C~ut.r '?f Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEA:GS- 'fenth C!rr.u1t 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FELIX MARTINEZ, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

AUG J 1999 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

GEORGE SULLIVAN, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

No. 87-1534 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 85-0550M) 

Peter Schoenburg, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico (Tova Indritz, Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, was also on the brief) for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Katherine Zinn, Assistant Attorney Geneial, Santa Fe, New Mexico 

(Hal Stratton, Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, was also on 

the brief) for Respondent-Appellee 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Petitioner Felix Martinez appeals from the district court's 

order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We 

affirm. 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 1 
I 

On the evening of August 1, 1981, Scott Thompson, a prisoner 

at Camp Sierra Blanca in New Mexico, was stabbed and beaten to 

death. Fellow prisoners Lujan, Sedillo, and petitioner Martinez 

were charged by the State of New Mexico with capital murder. 

Martinez was twice tried alone. Both trials resulted in 

mistrials. At his third trial, Lujan and Martinez were tried 

together. Sedillo, who had previously plead guilty to second 

degree murder, testified for the defense that he alone was 

responsible for Thompson's murder. Martinez also testified. He 

admitted only having a minor fracas with Thompson in their dorm 

and pushing him out the back door; he denied having anything to do 

with Thompson's death. Lujan was acquitted. Martinez was found 

guilty of second degree murder. 

The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed Martinez' 

conviction. State v. Martinez, 691 P.2d 887 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984). 

The New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari. Martinez v. 

State, 691 P.2d 881 (N.M. 1984). Martinez then petitioned the 

United States District Court for the District of New Mexico for a 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 2254. The district 

court adopted the magistrate's proposed findings and recommended 

disposition and dismissed with prejudice 

Martinez appeals. 

Martinez' petition. 

In this appeal Martinez raises the same constitutional issues 

he presented in the New Mexico courts and in the federal district 

court by his habeas petition. He claims: (1) admission of Sam 

Love's preliminary hearing testimony violated his Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 2 
because Love was not unavailable; (2) admission of codefendant 

Lujan's out-of-court declarations.under the excited utterance and 

present sense impression exceptions to the hearsay rule violated 

his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to confront Lujan; (3) 

admission of codefendant Lujan's out-of-court declarations under 

the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule also violated his 

right to confront Lujan because there was insufficient evidence of 

a conspiracy; (4) a conflict of interest under which his attorney 

labored deprived him of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right 

to effective assistance of counsel; (5) exclusion of jurors who 

under no circumstances would impose the penalty of death violated 

his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a jury selected from a 

fair cross-section of the community; and (6) denial of severance 

of his trial from Lujan's violated his Fourteenth Amendment right 

to due process of law. 

II 

1. Unavailability of Witness Love 

Sam Love, a witness to Thompson's murder, testified for the 

prosecution at Martinez' preliminary hearing and second trial. 

II R. 70-209; V R. Transcript of Testimony of Sam Love, Jr. At 

the preliminary hearing, Love testified he saw Martinez, Lujan, 

and Sedillo "whipping on another dude." II R. 75. Shortly 

afterwards, Love looked out his bathroom window and saw someone 

lying face down. Sedillo was hitting the person in the head with 

a pool cue and Martinez was kicking him. II R. 80-82. Later, 

Love saw Martinez enter the lodge with blood on his forearm. II 

R. 87. When Love failed to appear at Martinez' third trial, the 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 3 
prosecution introduced his preliminary hearing testimony. VI R. 

1366. 

Martinez contends that admission of Love's preliminary 

hearing testimony violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 

right to confront Love. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation· 

Clause, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 

Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-406 (1965), 

provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 

the right ••• to be confronted with the witnesses against him 

• " If applied literally, the Confrontation Clause would 

require the exclusion of any statement made by· a declarant not 

present at trial. Nevertheless, an out-of-court statement by a 

declarant who does not testify at trial is admissible against an 

accused if two conditions are satisfied. "[W]hen a hearsay 

declarant is not present for_ cross-examination at trial, the 

Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is 

unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it 

bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be 

inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a 

firmly rooted hearsay exception." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 

66 (1980). As with other evidentiary proponents, the prosecution 

bears the burden of establishing the predicate of unavailability. 

Id. at 74-75. 

Martinez contends the prosecution did not establish the first 

predicate; he asserts it failed to show Love was unavailable. 

"[A] witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of the 

exception to the confrontation requirement unless the 

prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 4 
his presence at trial." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-725 

.. (1968). _"The lengths .to.which the-prosecution must go to produce 

a witness is a question of reasonableness." Ohio v. 

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 

149, 189 n. 22 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring)). 1 

Love was to have arrived in New Mexico on September 8 when 

Martinez' trial began. VI R. 1291. The state trial court held a 

hearing on September 15 to determine whether Love was unavailable. 

VI R. 1287-1348. The prosecution presented testimony that it had 

employed the same procedure to obtain Love's appearance that had 

proved successful at Martinez' two previous trials. VI R. 1290. 

First, the prosecution served Love with a witness subpoena, 

through his Oklahoma parole officer, approximately one month 

before trial. VI R. 1290-91, 1316. Although the New Mexico 

subpoena had no legal authority in Oklahoma, where. Love resided, 

he had twice responded to similar subpoenas. VI R. 1290, 1313. 

Second, the prosecution purchased an airplane ticket to New Mexico 

for Love and mailed him a travel itinerary. VI R. 1291. Finally, 

the prosecution telephoned Love twice, once approximately eleven 

1 

The dissent would adopt a per se rule requ1r1ng use of the 

Uniform Act in all cases as a necessary prerequisite to a finding 

of unavailability for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. We 

think this rule would be contrary to decisions of the Supreme 

Court. The Court has said that "a witness is not "unavailable" 

••• unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good faith 

effort to obtain his presence at trial." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 

719, 725 (1968). The Court has also said that "[t]he lengths to 

which the prosecution must go to produce a witness ... is a 

question of reasonableness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 

(1980). We think that deciding whether a prosecutor's efforts are 

"reasonable" and in "good-faith" requires us to consider all the 

circumstances rather than to apply a per se rule. 

5 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 5 
days before trial and agaJn the day before trial. VI R. 1290-91. 

Love confirmed he would appear to testify. 

Love, however, did not appear. As the New Mexico prosecution 

in Martinez' trial was aware, Love had been released on bond in 

Oklahoma pending his trial on an unrelated criminal charge. 

Unknown to them, however, Love's trial was scheduled to begin in 

Oklahoma on September 8, the same day he was to testify at 

Martinez' trial in New Mexico. But the Oklahoma authorities were 

aware that Love was scheduled to testify·at Martinez' trial in New 

Mexico, and so had anticipated they would obtain a continuance of 

Love's trial. VI R. 1292. Nevertheless, at Love's request his 

trial in Oklahoma began on September 8. VI R. 1292. Love was 

present at his trial during the morning session, but he did not 

return in the afternoon. VI R. 1293. When the prosecution in 

Martinez' trial learned Love had disappeared, it procured a 

subpoena that same day pursuant to the New Mexico version of the 

Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a 

State in Criminal Proceedings, N.M.Stat.Annot. § 31-8-3. VI R. 

1293-1294. Three certified copies of the request for Love to be 

detained and held for a New Mexico officer to bring him to the 

trial were sent to the Clerk of the Oklahoma City District Court 

and three certified copies were likewise sent to the Sheriff's 

Department, all by Federal Express overnight service. VI R. 1294. 

Oklahoma has adopted the Act and so enforces such subpoenas. 22 

Okla.Stat.Annot. § 722. Although seven days passed between 

September 8, when the New Mexico 

disappeared, and September 15, 

prosecution learned Love had 

when the New Mexico trial court 

held the hearing on his unavailability, the record contains no 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 6 
evidence that the New Mexico prosecution took further steps to 

locate Love during that time. As of September ... 15, when the state 

trial court held the hearing on his unavailability, Love had not 

been located. 

The state trial court found ''that. the State has made a 

reasonable good faith effort to procure the attendance of the 

witness Sam Love •••• I find that the unavailability of the 

witness, and the reasonable good faith efforts to procure his 

attendance, creates an exception to the sixth amendment right." 

VI R. 1346. The court further ruled that Martinez could introduce 

extrinsic evidence of Love's conviction in the Oklahoma trial 

mentioned above and of an alleged incident in which Love stole 

some jewelry. These events occurred after Martinez' second trial 

and so the court felt "there would be fundamental unfairness in 

the pre$entation of the ••• transcript without allowing this 

extrinsic evidence." VI R. 1347. The court also allowed Martinez 

to introduce the transcript of Love's testimony at Martinez' 

second trial to establish prior inconsistent statements. 

1347. 

VI R. 

The New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled that the prosecution 

had exercised due diligence in attempting to obtain Love's 

presence and that he was unavailable as a witness. Martinez, 691 

P.2d at 888-890. In federal habeas proceedings we must presume 

factual determinations by state courts to be correct, unless an 

enumerated exception applies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Sumner v. 

Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982). However, here we are concerned with 

both the factual determinations of the New Mexico courts and their 

ultimate conclusion that Love was unavailable for Confrontation 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 7 
Clause purposes. Unavailability has been viewed as a mixed 

question of fad: .and_-law. Bur.ns v. Clusen, .798. F.2d .931, 941-42 

(7~h Cir. 1986). This court has discussed the issue of 

unavailability under the rubric of § 2254(~). See Ewing v. 

Winans, 749 F.2d 607, 609 (10th Cir. ·1984); Valenzuela v. Griffin, 

654 F.2d 707, 710-11 (10th Cir. 1981). In these cases, however, 

it does not appear that we were presented with the issue whether 

unavailability of a witness and of a good faith effort to obtain 

his attendance at trial are factual determinations under§ 2254(d) 

or a mixed question of law and fact. 2 

In the instant case the parties agree that the question is a 

mixed question of fact and law, reviewable de novo .. We are 

persuaded by the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Burns v. 

Clusen, 798 F.2d at 940-942, that this position is correct. Burns 

h.eld that while the presumption of correctness applies to the 

basic, primary, or historical facts, the ultimate issue of 

unavailability for purposes of the Confrontation Clause is a mixed 

question of fact and law, reviewable de novo. See also Dres v. 

Campoy, 784 F.2d 996, 998 (9th Cir.' 1986); Rosario v. Kuhlman, 839 

F.2d 918, 923 n.3 (2d Cir. 1988). This rationale follows the 

reasoning in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341 (1980), which 

treated basic, primary, and historical facts as determinations 

entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption, but viewed an ultimate 

holding on multiple representation and effectiveness of counsel as 

2 

Insofar as our holding below may modify recognition of a rule 

adopted under§ 2254(d) in Ewing and Valenzuela, we are authorized 

to state that the full court approves our holding today that the 

determinations of unavailability of a witness and a good faith 

effort to obtain his attendance at trial are mixed questions of 

fact and law, reviewable de novo. 

--8 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 8 
a mixed determination of law and fact open to plenary federal 

review on collateral attack. Id. at 342. Thus, the 

determinations of a good faith effort to obtain a witness' 

presence and his unavailability, Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. at 724-

725, are mixed questions of fact and law, reviewable de novo. 

Considered in this light, we think the.factual determinations 

that Love was absent, that the New Mexico prosecution took several 

steps to obtain his presence at trial, and that he failed to 

appear at the New Mexico trial are fairly supported by the record. 

VI R. 1345-1348. The ultimate conclusion of the New Mexico Court 

of Appeals of due diligence by the prosecution and of Love's 

unavailability, Martinez, 691 P.2d at 888-890, we likewise accept. 

Viewing this as a ruling on a mixed question, we hold it is 

correct under the constitutional requirements of the Confrontation 

Clause. 3 The indicia of reliability of the prior testimony are 

3 

The dissent would hold that under the totality of the 

circumstances of this case the prosecution's efforts to obtain 

Love's presence at trial were not reasonable and in good faith. 

The dissent primarily relies on three factors to reach this 

conclusion: (1) Love had been arrested in Oklahoma after the 

second trial; (2) Love had skipped bond before; and (3) Love had a 

reputation and history of dishonesty. 

Regarding Love's arrest, it is significant that the Oklahoma 

authorities had full knowledge of Love's prior acts and the 

consequences to him of the Oklahoma charge. Nevertheless, they 

allowed him to remain free on bond. We think this undercuts the 

notion that the New Mexico authorities should have suspected Love 

would skip bond in Oklahoma. As to Love's prior bond skipping and 

unsavory reputation, we think it is significant that these factors 

were present before the first and second trials. Love, 

nevertheless, appeared voluntarily. Finally, we stress that the 

issue before us is not whether the New Mexico authorities made a 

mistake. With hindsight, we know that is true. The issue is 

whether they made a reasonable and good-faith effort to obtain 

Love's presence at trial. We think that considering all the 

circumstances, we canot say there was not a reasonable effort, in 

good faith. See State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Utah 

1982). 

9 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 9 
not challenged, and the determination of unavailability was 

proper; thus the requirements of the Confrontation .Clause. were 

met. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972). 

2. Excited Utterance 

Fellow inmate Garza testified regarding the events leading up 

to Thompsons's murder. VI R. 844-914. Early on the day of 

Thompson's murder, Martinez asked Garza if he knew who Martinez' 

new roomate was. Garza replied, "It's a white man." Martinez 

said, "I don't want him herE:'!. I'm going to take him out." VI R. 

879. Later about 10:00 p.m., Garza entered the lounge of the 

building where he lived with Thompson and Martinez. VI R. 847. 

Garza sat down next to Thompson and the two began talking. VI R. 

847, 870. Lujan was also present. VI R. 875. Soon Martinez 

entered and approached Thompson saying, "~ told you I don't want 

you in my room. You punk." VI R. 871. 

Martinez and Thompson began arguing. VI R. 872. Sedillo 

arrived and asked Garza, "What's happening?" Sedillo urged 

Martinez, "Do something if you're going to do it." VI R. 873. 

Sedillo then approached Thompson and poked him twice in the 

shoulder with a laundry pin and kicked him. VI R. 858. Martinez 

hit Thompson. VI R. 896. Thompson covered himself and began 

crying and said, "Please don't hit me." VI R. 912. Sedillo 

ordered Garza to watch the door, but Garza slipped out of the 

lounge and into his room. VI R. 875. 

About five minutes later Lujan entered Garza's room. Garza 

testified: "[Lujan) said, 'They're going to rape him.' That they 

had taken him outside. And then I said, 'No, they're going to 

10 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 10 
kill him.' And then he [Lujan] added, 'I believe so.'" VI R. 892. 

Martinez contends that through Garza's._testimony, Lujan became a 

witness against him. Martinez asserts that admission of. Lujan's 

statements violated his· Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to 

confront witnesses against him because Lujan exercised his Fifth 

Amendment privilege not to testify. 

At trial Lujan's statement was admitted over Martinez' timely 

objection, directly against Martinez. It was admitted under the 

New Mexico hearsay rule 1 s 4 present sense impression and excited 

utterance exceptions. 5 Martinez' attorney objected when the 

prosecution asked Garza to repeat what Lujan said. VI. R. 879-

880. At the request of Martinez' attorney, Garza was questioned 

outside the presence of the jury regarding the foundation for the 

hearsay exceptions. VI R. 881, 884-891. Finally, the state trial 

judge ruled: "The court finds that the matter falls within the 

exceptions set forth in 803(1) or (2) [sic] •••• " VI R. 891. 

4 

N.M. R. Evid. 802 provides: Hearsay is not admissible except 

as provided by these rules or by other rules adopted by the 

supreme court or by statute. 

5 

N.M. R. Evid. 803 provides in part: 

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even 

though the declarant is available as a witness: 

(A) Present sense impression. A statement 

describing or explaining an event or condition made 

while the declarant was perceiving the event or 

condition, or immediately thereafter. 

(B) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a 

startling event or condition made while the 

declarant was under the stress of excitement caused 

by the event or condition. 

11 

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These exeptions are the present sense impression and excited 

utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule. N.M~ R. Evid. 803. 

The New Mexico Court of Appeals, however, concluded that 

Lujan's statement had been admitted only against Lujan, not 

against· Martinez. It held that because Lujan's statement did not 

explicitly name Martinez, an instruction admonishing the jury to 

consider the statement only against Lujan, and not against 

Martinez, would have adequately protected Martinez from prejudice. 

The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that "[h]aving failed to 

request [a limiting jury instruction], defendant cannot now be 

heard to complain." Martinez, 691 P.2d at 893. 

The New Mexico Court.of Appeals' determination that Lujan's 

statement was admitted only against Lujan, and not against 

Martinez, cannot be reconciled with the trial record. The state 

trial judge seems clearly to have intended the admission of 

Lujan's statement to be against Martinez, as well as Lujan, due to 

his express reliance on the excited utterance and present sense 

impression hearsay exceptions. If Lujan's statement was admitted 

only· against Lujan, it was not hearsay. N.M. R. Evid. 801 

provides, among other things, that "[a] statement is not hearsay 

if ••• [t]he statement is offered against a party and is .•• 

his own statement •••• " Thus the only possible reason for the 

state trial court's reliance on the hearsay exceptions is that 

Lujan's statement was being admitted against Martinez. Moreover, 

because Lujan's statement was being admitted directly against 

Martinez, it made no sense for his attorney to request an 

instruction limiting the statement to Lujan. Therefore, we cannot 

12 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 12 
follow the analysis of the New Mexico Court of Appeals that there 

was a procedural default by Martinez' attorney. 

The federal district court also presumed that Lujan's 

statement had been admitted only against Lujan, not against 

Martinez. The court held that admission of Lujan's statement did 

not violate Martinez' confrontation right because the statement 

was only "linkage evidence. 116 

While we agree that admission of Lujan's statement did not 

violate Martinez' rights under the Confrontation Clause, our 

reasons differ. As noted, admission of a hearsay statement is 

permissible under the Confrontation Clause if the declarant is 

unavailable and the statement bears adequate indicia of. 

reliability. We hold that both conditions were met here. First, 

Lujan was unavailable within the meaning of the Confrontation 

Clause because he ipvoked his right not to testify. Second, 

although the statement must bear adequate indicia of reliability, 

"[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the 

evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Ohio v. 

6 

The New Mexico Court of Appeals and the federal district 

court used the reasoning that Lujan's statement was merely linkage 

evidence, not involving the risks of directly incriminating 

statements coming within Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 

(1968). Linkage evidence is evidence admitted against one 

codefendant which only indirectly implicates a codefendant against 

whom the evidence was neither admissible nor admitted. Cf. 

Richardson v. Marsh, U.S. , 107 s.ct. 1702, 1707-08 (1987); 

United States v. Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (10th Cir. 

1988). However here Lujan's statement was directly admitted 

against Martinez, and the linkage analysis is improper. Moreover, 

we do not decide whether the statement in question merely 

indirectly incriminated Martinez. 

13 

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Roberts, 446 U.S. at 66. 7 

The admissibility of spontaneous_ .. utterances one ground 

relied on by the state trial court -- was recognized by the 

Supreme Court over a century ago in Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 

U.S. 397, 406-07 (1869) (decedent's spontaneous utterances shortly 

after injury part of res gestae and admissible to show cause of 

death). Wigmore documents the evolution of the spontaneous 

exclamation as a separate exception to the rule against hearsay. 

Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 1745-1757 (Chadbourn ed. 1976). The 

Advisory Committee's notes on the proposed Federal Rules of 

Evidence remark that "it finds support in cases without number." 

Fed. R. Evid. 803 Advisory Committee's notes. We are persuaded 

that the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule is 

firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence so that reliability can 

be inferred within the rationale of Roberts. 

We agree with the state trial court's determination here that 

Lujan's statement was admissible against Martinez as an excited 

utterance. Garza had previously testified about the fracas he and 

Lujan witnessed in the lounge approximately five minutes before 

Lujan entered Garza's room. Garza further testified that when 

Lujan entered his room "he seemed like he was scared." VI. R. 

890. In light of this testimony, we think the state trial judge's 

determination that Lujan's statement was admissible as an excited 

7 

See ~' Bourjailly v. United States, U.S. , , 107 

s.ct. 2775, 2783 (1987) (co-conspirator's statements); Mattox v. 

United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892) (dying declarations); 

Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-216 (1972) (cross-examined 

prior-trial testimony); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 

(1895) (cross-examined preliminary hearing testimony of deceased 

witness). 

14 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 14 
utterance was fairly supported by the record. Thus both the 

unavailability of _the declarant and.~he-indicia of reliability of 

his statement were establisned. 

We hold that the admission of Lujan's statement did not 

violate Martinez' rights under the Confrontation Clause. 

3. Co-conspirator's Statement 

During his trial testimony, fellow inmate Andrew Mitchell 

recounted a conversation he had with Lujan and Martinez about 

preparing a false affidavit to exculpate them. The state trial 

court admitted Lujan's statements during this conversation 

directly against Martinez under the co-conspirator exception to 

the hearsay rule. 8 VI R. 1206. 

The state trial court found: "Under the proffer, the State 

has established, for evideotiary purposes, a common scheme or 

plan, a conspiracy to prepare and publish that affidavit." VI R. 

1206. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed. It summarized 

the evidence and found: "This evidence, particularly defendant's 

statement that the three should n6t get together to execute the 

8 

N.M. R. Evid. 80l(D) provides: 

A statement is not hearsay if: 

(2) The statement is offered against a party and 

is 

. . . . 

(e) a statement by a 

during the course and 

conspiracy. 

15 

co-conspirator of a party 

in furtherance of the 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 15 
statement, shows a combination between defendant, Lujan, and 

Mitchell tQ create and execute the .. false.-~statement." Martinez, 

691 P.2d at 891. 

Martinez does not contend that admission of Lujan's statement 

under the co-conspirator exception would have violated his rights 

under the Confrontation Clause if these findings by the state 

courts were correct. As discussed above, out-of-court statements 

are admissible against the accused if the declarant is unavailable 

and the statements bear adequate "indicia of reliability." Ohio 

v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Unavailability is not required, 

however, when the statement is the out-of-court declaration of a 

co-conspirator. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399-400 

(1986). Further, no independent inquiry into reliability is 

required when the statement falls within the co-conspirator 

exception to the rule against hearsay. Bourjailly v. United 

States, UoS. , 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782 (1987). 

Martinez contends, however, that admission of Lujan's 

statement violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause 

because the state courts' findings were incorrect. Martinez says 

that we should not presume these factual determinations to be 

correct because they are not fairly supported by the record. See 

28 u.s.c. § 2254(d)(8). We disagree. 

The New Mexico Court of Appeals summarized the evidence that 

it thought was sufficent to establish a conspiracy between 

Martinez, Lujan, and Mitchell. Martinez, 691 P.2d at 891. The 

summary is an accurate reflection of the record and fairly 

supports the determination that there was sufficient evidence of a 

conspiracy between Martinez, Lujan, and Mitchell to admit Lujan's 

16 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 16 
statements against Martinez under the co-conspirator exeption to 

the hearsay rule... Thus .. the . admission of. Lujan' s out-:of-court 

statements did not violate Martinez' rights under the 

Confrontation Clause. 

4. Effectiveness of Assistance of Counsel 

Martinez contends he was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his 

attorney labored under a conflict of interest. 

Martinez asserts that his and Lujan's attorneys should be 

considered as one attorney. Mitchell represented Martinez; Wall 

represented Lujan. III R. 41. Before trial, Mitchell and Wall 

became law partners. III R. 41-42. ,They cooperated in preparing 

their clients' defenses. III R. 42-43. During the hearing on 

Martinez' motion for a new trial Mitchell testified: 

After the motion to consolidate [Martinez' and 

Lujan's] trials, we proceeded to prepare. 

Everything was open. Wall brought his files over. 

I had all our files. They were all combined. We 

went through them time and time again, and 

interviewed witnesses, read transcripts, the whole 

works, together .•.. 

III R. 42-43. Under these circumstances, we will assume without 

deciding that the two law partners are appropriately considered as 

one attorney. Cf. Burger v. Kemp, U.S. 101 s.ct. 

3114, 3120 (1987). 

The Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, made applicable to 

the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Gideon v. Wainwright, 

372 U.S. 335 (1963), provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the 

accused shall enjoy the right to •• have the Assistance of 

Counsel for his defence." This guaranty includes the right to 

17 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 17 
counsel's effective assistance. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 

759, 771 n.14 (1970). 

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court 

adopted a two-part test for determining whether a criminal 

defendant's representation was constitutionally ineffective. 

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 

deficient -- that is, "that counsel's representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. Second, he 

must show this deficiency prejudiced his defense -- that is, "that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different." Id. at 694; .Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 

1233 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 s. Ct. 2491 (1987). 

However, because it is difficult to measure the precise 

effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting 

interests, prejudice is presumed if "the defendant demonstrates 

that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that 

an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's 

performance." Kemp, U.S. at , 107 s. Ct. at 3120. If, 

therefore, Martinez can demonstrate Mitchell and Wall actively 

represented conflicting interests, and that an actual conflict of 

interest adversely affected his counsel's conduct of his defense, 

we must presume he was thereby prejudiced. To this end, Martinez 

refers to two situations which arose during trial in which he 

asserts his and Lujan's interests conflicted •. 

First, as discussed above, Sam Love's 

testimony was admitted against Martinez. 

preliminary hearing 

That testimony was in 

some ways inconsistent with Love's testimony at Martinez' second 

18 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 18 
trial. VI R. 1357-1358. Therefore, Mitchell, representing 

Martinez, wanted to introduce Love's triaL testimony to impeach 

Love's credibility. VI R. 1357-1358. Wall, representing Lujan, 

on the other hand, did not want Love's trial testimony admitted. 

VI R. 1357-1358. At this juncture Martinez' and Lujan's 

interests conflicted, and Mitchell and Wall actively represented 

those conflicting interests. This was obviously a serious 

conflict of interest problem under the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, 

if Lujan had been convicted and raised the conflict issue, he 

would have a very serious claim of constitutional error. 

However, Mitchell's representation of Martinez was not 

actually adversely affected. He urged the admission of Love's 

trial testimony and after argument for and against admission by 

the two attorneys the state trial judge ruled in favor of 

Mitchell. He allowed Mitchell to introduce Love's trial 

testimony; Martinez' interests prevailed. VI R. 1347. Thus, any 

loyalty that Mitchell felt toward Lujan did not adversely affect 

his representation of Martinez under the Kemp test. 

Second, as discussed above, Lujan's out-of-court statements 

were admitted against Martinez. Martinez argues that admission 

of Lujan's statements created for his attorney a conflict of 

interest. Mitchell wanted Lujan to testify and subject himself to 

cross-examination regarding the statements; Wall advised Lujan not 

to testify because it would allow introduction of his prior crimes 

to impeach his credibility. III R. 29. In the end, Lujan 

exercised his right not to testify. 

Martinez asserts Mitchell and Wall actively represented his 

and Lujan's conflicting interests in the process of Lujan's 

19 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 19 
decision. Lujan however was entitled to invoke his right not to 

testify. _ The magistrate's _finding. adopted .by the district cou.rt, 

stated "once Lujan had decided not to testify, there was no way 

that [Martinez] could have required [Lujan] to testify, separate 

counsel or not." We agree. 

Martinez has failed to establish grounds for a presumption of 

prejudice because he has not shown that his attorney actively 

represented conflicting interests which adversely affected his 

performance. He also has failed to establish actual prejudice. 

Consequently, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. 

5. The Witherspoon Excludables 

Martinez' claim that removal for cause of "Witherspoonexcludables" violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to 

a jury selected from a fair cross~section of the community is 

foreclosed by Lockhart v. Mccree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Coleman v. 

Brown, 802 F.2d at 1233. 

6. Denial of Severance 

Martinez' claim that denial of severance of his trial from 

that of Lujan violated his right to due process of law under the 

Fourteenth Amendment is based upon his arguments that Lujan's outof-court statements were improperly admitted. We have rejected 

those arguments. The joint trial did not violate Martinez' right 

to due process. 

Accordingly the judgment is 

AFFIRMED .. 

20 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 20 
No. 87-1534, Martinez v. Sullivan, Seymour, Circuit Judge, 

dissenting. 

Although I agree with the majority in all other respects, I 

respectfully dissent from its view that the prosecution acted in 

good faith in attempting to secure the presence of witness Sam 

Love, and that Love was "unavailable." I am convinced that Felix 

Martinez was impermissably deprived of his Sixth Amendment 

confrontation right, and I would grant his habeas petition 

contingent upon the State of New Mexico's decision to conduct a 

new trial. 

My concern about the majority's treatment of the 

unavailability issue is twofold. First, its presentation of the 

facts does not include record evidence demonstrating Love's 

unreliability and supporting Martinez' argument that the 

prosecution should not have relied on Love's prior cooperation or 

his assurances of continued cooperation. The prosecution was 

aware of all this evidence. Most critically, no reference is made 

in the opinion to Love's testimony at Martiriez' second trial that 

he skipped bond in 1975 while awaiting trial for forgery in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico. 1 Rec., vol. v, State Court Transcripts, 

1 Ironically, Love was serving time for this forgery when he 

allegedly witnessed Martinez murder fellow inmate Thompson. 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 21 
Transcript of Testimony of Sam Love, Jr. (hereinafter "Love 

Testimony"), at 38-39. This testimony was elicited by Bert 

Atkins, the prosecutor with primary responsibility for both New 

Mexico v. Martinez and New Mexico v. Lujan throughout the 

investigation and prosecution of the two cases. Rec., vol. VIII, 

Transcript of Proceedings (hereinafter "Proceedings"), vol. 5, at 

1289. In addition, although the opinion mentions that Love was 

awaiting trial in Oklahoma, slip op. at 5, it does not indicate 

that Love's probation officer, Elaine Hargrove, notified the 

prosecution of Love's arrest for grand larceny in Oklahoma on May 

27, 1982, by letter dated June 9, 1982. Rec., vol. VIII, 

Proceedings, vol. 5, at 1298. It is unclear whether the letter 

stated that Love could receive a twenty year sentence if 

convicted, but the prosecution knew that Love faced possible 

prosecution for probation violation in New Mexico as a result, id. 

at 1301-1302, and the nature of the charge clearly put the 

prosecution on notice that he faced the possibility of receiving a 

substantial jail term as well. 

Nor does the majority accord any significance to the fact 

that the prosecution worked closely with Love's probation officer 

to make arrangements for his various trips to New Mexico, id. at 

1299, although it acknowledges that the probation officer served 

Love with the invalid State of New Mexico subpoena for the 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 22 
September 8, 1982, Martinez trial, id. at 1316. Despite this 

close working relationship, the prosecution apparently never 

asked, and allegedly did not discover, when Love was scheduled for 

trial in Oklahoma until September 8, 1982, the first day of the 

Martinez trial. Id. at 1300. These circumstances suggest that 

the state had a rather cavalier attitude about securing Love's 

presence at the third trial, especially considering the 

significance of Love's testimony and the fact that a capital 

offense was involved. Similarly, the majority attaches no 

significance to the prosecution's knowledge that Oklahoma 

authorities had released Love on bond pending his criminal trial 

there. 

I also am concerned about the majority's resolution of the 

unavailability issue. I agree that the related questions of 

whether a party acted in good faith to secure a witness' 

attendance at trial and whether the witness is unavailable are 

mixed questions of fact and law reviewable de novo by this court. 

I disagree, however, with the evaluation of these questions under 

what I understand to be a "totality of the circumstances" 

standard, and also with the outcome of this evaluation. 

I would adopt a per se rule requiring use of the Uniform Act, 

when available and applicable, as a condition precedent to 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 23 
findings that a party made a good-faith attempt to secure a 

witness, and ·that the witness is unavailable. In my view, the 

reasoning of Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968), and 

Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 210~214 (1972), support this 

position, although neither opinion expressly so holds. 2 Barber 

identified the Uniform Act as one of several contemporary 

procedures responsible for "largely depriv[ing] of ••. any 

continuing validity" the traditional rule that a witness' absence 

from a jurisdiction supports a finding of "unavailability." 

Barber, 390 U.S. at 723 & n.4. More importantly, in announcing 

the good-faith standard, the Court outlined the standard's 

parameters by juxtaposing it against a position it clearly 

indicated.fell outside those parameters: the appellate court's 

reasoning that it is unnecessary to invoke a particular procedure 

if requests thereunder might be refused. Id. at 724. In so 

doing, the Court effectively held that the potential 

ineffectiveness of available procedural process is not a valid 

basis under the good-faith standard for not invoking that process. 

2 The majority asserts that adoption of a per se rule would 

contravene the Supreme Court's decisions in Barber v. Page, 390 

U.S. 719 (1968), and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), because 

these cases hold that the prosecution's efforts to secure a 

witness' presence are to be measured against a "good faith'' and 

"reasonableness" standard. Slip op. at 5 n.l. The Uniform Act 

offers the only legally effective means of securing the presence 

of an out-of-state witness. In the context of dealing with an 

out-of-state witness, therefore, good faith and reasonableness 

necessarily require use of the procedures available under the Act. 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 24 
Mancusi reinforced the importance placed by the Court on the 

invocation of the Uniform Act and other available methods as a 

predicate to a finding of good faith. See 408 U.S. at 212. 

Numerous state courts have adopted a per se rule relying on 

Barber and Mancusi, albeit without analysis. See~' State v. 

Gray, 616 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Mo.App. 1981) (characterizing the per 

se approach as the "majority rule"); State v. Hills, 379 So.2d 

740, 743-44 (La. 1980); State v. Ray, 598 P.2d 990, 992 (Ariz. 

1979) (en bane); Ormound v. Sheriff, Clark County, 591 P.2d 258, 

259 (Nev. 1979) (per curiam); State v. Kim, 519 P.2d 1241, 1244-45 

(Haw. 1974); In re Terry, 484 P.2d 1375, 1389-90 (Cal. 1971); cf. 

Brooks v. State, 371 A.2d 674, 678 (Md. 1977). State court 

support for this position is not unanimous, however. See,~' 

Utah v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1122-23 (Utah 1982) (noting per se 

approach is majority rule, but declining to follow it); Wisconsin 

v. Zellmer, 301 N.W.2d 209, 214 (Wi. 1981) (declining to read 

Barber as requiring use of the Uniform Act). 

Two federal district court cases, Eastham v. Johnson, 338 

F.Supp. 1273, 1281 (E.D. MI. 1972), and Poe v. Turner, 353 F.Supp. 

672, 674 (D. Utah 1972), have read Barber, standing alone or in 

conjunction with Mancusi, to require that the Uniform Act be 

utilized. The Ninth Circuit is apparently the only circuit court 

5 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 25 
that has considered whether Barber mandates the use of the Uniform 

Act as a condition precedent to a finding of good faith. 3 In 

Daboul v. Craven, 429 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1970), the court 

read Barber as "indicat[ing] that if the prosecution fails to make 

use of the Uniform Act it has not made the required 'good 

faith effort •••• '" The precedential value of Daboul is 

limited, however, because the court found the petitioner's state 

remedies unexhausted as to this issue, and so did not reach the 

merits. In Gorum v. Craven, 465 F.2d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1972), 

the court acknowledged Daboul's reading of Barber. 

Whatever precedential vitality Daboul once possessed is 

called into question by the reasoning and holding of Ores v. 

Campoy, 784 F.2d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 1986). The context of the 

court's reference to Daboul suggests that it considered the case 

binding precedent, but inapplicable because the prosecution did 

not-know the witness' current location. However, the court also 

rejected the petitioner's argument that the prosecution's efforts 

were not in good faith because the prosecution knew the witness' 

previous address for months before the scheduled date of the 

3 The Fifth Circuit in Mechler v. Procunier, 754 F.2d, 1294, 

1297 (5th Cir. 1984), held that the prosecution acted in good 

faith in attempting to secure the presence of an out-of-state 

witness when, inter alia, it obtained two subpoenas pursuant to 

the Uniform Act, but Illinois authorities were unable to locate 

the witness. 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 26 
second trial, yet never resorted to the procedures established by 

the Uniform Act. It consttued the prosecution's actions as a 

legitimate response to a tactical dilemma: subpoena the witness 

under the Uniform Act and risk her fleeing (as shi had before the 

preliminary hearing), or use another method and risk the court 

finding a lack of good faith. 4 In distinguishing a California 

state court case, the court expressly stated that 

"[t]he prosecution should not have to comply with the 

procedures of the Uniform Act when it appears that an 

out-of-state witness is cooperative or more likely to· 

testify on the basis of an informal agreement than under 

the compulsion of a subpoena." 

Id. at 1001. 

I am not persuaded by the majority's reasoning in Ores. As 

the dissent there points out, the majority's assumption that the 

witness was more likely to flee when faced with a court order to 

appear than when faced with her mother's promise to produce her 

seems far-fetched at best. Id. at 1002 (Hug, J. dissenting). The 

specious nature of this assumption is readily apparent because of 

the lack of evidence that the issuance of the subpoena caused the 

witness to flee before the preliminary hearing. On the face of 

4 The alternative of detaining the witness for trial pursuant 

to the Uniform Act was not available according to the court. The 

California courts have interpreted the California Constitution to 

limit the amount of time a material witness can be held for trial 

to approximately two weeks, and the witness fled three weeks 

before the trial. 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 27 
it, it seems far more likely that the prospect of having to attend 

the impending hearing, not the subpoena itself, caused her to 

flee. Even assuming that the issuance of a subpoena pursuant to 

the Uniform Act would have increased the likelihood of the witness 

fleeing, this possibility must be counterbalanced by the fact that 

California could legally compel her presence only by means of a 

Uniform Act subpoena. The analytical framework used by the Dres 

majority is thus defective in terms of Barber's holding that the 

potential ineffectiveness of available procedural process cannot 

be relied on to justify the failure to invoke that process under 

the good-faith standard. In sum, I believe that the circumstances 

of Dres present precisely the type of situation in which use of 

the Uniform Act should be required as a condition precedent to a 

finding of good faith. 

In addition to the support for a per se rule found in the 

case law, policy considerations militate in favor of such a rule. 

As both Dres and this case demonstrate, the application of a 

"totality of the circumstances" approach lends itself to attempts 

to manipulate the determination of the unavailability question. 

There will likely always be some circumstances to justify a party 

asserting that they acted in good faith in not using the Uniform 

Act: the witness appeared to be cooperative, or had been so in 

the past, the party faced a tactical dilemma, etc. Parties are 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 28 
encouraged to be less than rigorous in securing witnesses' 

attendance where such arguments might prove effective. The 

possibility of such tactical manipulation is especially offensive 

where, as here, the testimony of the out-of-state witness is 

central to the case. Adopting a per se rule that requires timely 

resort to the Uniform Act, when applicable and available, would 

discourage this kind of tactical maneuvering. In my view, drawing 

the line at use of the Uniform Act makes sense because the Act 

provides the onl~ means of issuing legally effective process 

against an out-of-state witness. 

We need not adopt a per se rule, however, in order to 

conclude that the prosecution failed. to establish its good faith 

in attempting to secure the presence of witness Love. On de novo 

review, this court must make an independent determination of the 

issues before it, reviewing the record in light of its own 

independent judgment. Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 

F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988). This record amply demonstrates 

that under a "totality of the circumstances" test, the state 

should have employed the Uniform Act. It is significant that Love 

was arrested in Oklahoma after the second trial. This fact 

clearly undercuts the prosecution's contention that its efforts to 

bring Love to New Mexico for Martinez' third trial occurred "under 

the same set of circumstances" as the prior occasions. 

9 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 29 
Proceedings, vol. 5, at 1296. On these other occasions, Love was 

not facing criminal charges with the possibility of receiving a 

twenty year sentence and/or having his probation revoked. 

The most critical fact is the prosecution's knowledge that 

Love once before had skipped bond while awaiting trial. This 

knowledge standing alone casts doubt on the prosecution's 

assertion that it had ''[n]o reason whatsoever" to suspect that 

Love would not appear as scheduled. Id. Combined with its 

awareness of Love's arrest in Oklaho~a, this knowledge of Love's 

previous behavior completely undermines the prosecution's claim. 

The prosecution could not but have been aware that Love's arrest 

was likely to dr~matically alter his assessment of whether to 

continue cooperating. Returning to New Mexico could not any 

longer have seemed advantageous to Love, for even though he had 

received consideration for his earlier cooperation, rec., vol. 

VIII, Proceedings, vol. 5, at 1308, 1317-18, 1326; rec., vol. v, 

Love Testimony, at 72-75, he could not have expected such 

consideration to extend to protecting him from prosecution for 

such a serious probation violation, an event he knew could result 

in his reincarceration, id. at 76. And reincarceration meant Love 

would likely be the target of reprisals because he had testified 

against fellow inmates. These facts, combined with Love's 

reputation with prison officials as a "con man," rec., vol. IX, 

10 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 30 
Proceedings, vol. 7, at 1999, and his history of criminal activity 

involving dishonesty and misrepresentation, rec. vol. V, Love 

Testimony, at 35-43, made unreasonable the state's reliance on 

Love's previous cooperation and his assurances of continued 

cooperation. 

These circumstances are closely analagous to those in State 

v. Case, 752 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1987). In Case, the state 

subpoenaed to a preliminary nearing a victim-witness hospitalized 

in-state. The victim-witness subsequently left the state but gave 

the prosecuting attorney's office a forwarding address in Alabama. 

She acknowledged receipt of a State of Utah subpoena for the 

trial, and contacted the prosecuting attorney's secretary 

approximately 8 other times, each time indicating her willingness 

to attend the trial. On the morning of the trial, she called to 

inform the prosecution she would not appear. As here, her 

testimony was central to the case. The court noted the Utah 

Supreme Court's holding that use of the Uniform Act is permissive, 

but concluded that the victim-witness' "lifestyle and nomadic 

habits ma(d]e it clear that she possessed the potential to 

disappear or refuse to appear at trial." Id. at 358. In light of 

her potential unreliability, the court held that the prosecution's 

reliance on the victim-witness' telephoned assurances was 

unreasonable and that it should have invoked the procedures of the 

11 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 31 
Uniform Act. Id. Similarly, Love's prior history of skipping 

bond, his arrest subsequent to the second trial, and his extensive 

criminal record made his potential unreliability so unmistakably 

clear, in my ·opinion, that it was unreasonable for the prosecution 

not to resort to the Uniform Act, notwithstanding Love's prior 

cooperation and assurances of continued cooperation. 5 · 

My conclusion that the trial court deprived petitioner of his 

Sixth Amendment right· to confront witnesses by finding Sam Love 

unavailable and by admitting his preliminary hearing testimony 

does not end the inquiry, for not all errors of constitutional 

dimension are reversible errors. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 

s.ct. 1792, 1797 (1988); Graham v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 656, 659 (10th 

Cir. 1987); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1967). The 

Supreme Court has held as a general rule that a constitutional 

error is harmless if the beneficiary of the error can prove beyond 

5 The majority disputes the significance of facts I rely on in 

reaching this conclusion. Slip op. at 9 n.3. The majority's 

first argument, that Oklahoma's decision to release Love on bond 

supports New Mexico's contention that it had no reason to suspect 

Love would skip bond, is misfocused. Even assuming that Oklahoma 

and New Mexico authorities were equally well equipped to assess 

Love's reliability, the prosecution had responsibility for making 

its own independent assessment. Love was a crucial witness in a 

murder trial in New Mexico, an important additional consideration. 

The majority's second contention, that the incident of Love 

skipping bond had occurred prior to the first and second trials 

and yet he appeared voluntarily, disregards the changed 

circumstances before the third trial; namely, that Love was facing 

reincarceration in Oklahoma, and likely probation revocation in 

New Mexico. 

12 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 32 
' . ( 

a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict. Id. 

at 24. The harmless error rule thus "focus[es] on the underlying 

fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable 

presence of immaterial error." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 

673, 681 (1986). 

Notwithstanding the general rule, the Court has recognized 

that some constitutional errors are "so fundamental and pervasive 

that they require reversal without regard to the facts or 

circumstances.of the particular case." Id. Errors of this type 

include the introduction of a coerced confession, Payne v. 

Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (cited in Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 

n.8); the complete denial of the right to counser, Gideon v. 

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); the absence of counsel from an 

arraignment when that results in the irretrievable loss of 

unasserted defenses, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); the 

adjudication of a case before a biased judge, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 

U.S. 510 (1927); and the existence of a conflict of interest in 

representation throughout a proceeding, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 

U.S. 475 (1978). "Harmless-error analysis thus presupposes a 

trial, at which the defendant, represented by counsel, may present 

evidence and argument before an impartial judge and jury." Rose 

v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1985). 

13 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 33 
In addition, the Court has indicated that in assessing the 

appropriateness of applying harmless-error analysis to a specific 

constitutional error, it is concerned with ensuring that the 

record contains the information necessary for reviewing courts to 

determine whether the error was harmless. Thus, the Court in 

Satterwhite observed that 

"'[i]n the normal case where a harmless-error rule is 

applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope is 

readily indentifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court 

can undertake with some confidence its relatively narrow 

task of assessing the likelihood that the error 

materially affected the deliberations of the jury .•.• 

[~]ny inquiry into a claim of harmless error ..• [for 

a violation such as a deprivation of the right to 

conflict-free representation which cannot be discerned 

from the record] would require, unlike most cases, 

unguided speculation.'" 

Satterwhite, '108' s.ct. at 1797 (quoting Holloway, 435 u.s. at 490-

91). If a Sixth Amendment violation "abort(s] the basic trial 

process" or "denie[s] it altogether," Rose, 478 U.S. at 578 n.6 

(citations omitted), or is of a kind that contaminates the whole 

proceeding, leaving no easily identifiable trace in the record and 

necessitating "difficult inquiries concerning matters that might 

have been, but were not, placed in evidence," id. at 579 n.7, then 

harmless-error analysis is inappropriate. 

The trial court's admission of Love's preliminary hearing 

testimony based on it's erroneous conclusion that he was 

unavailable does not fall within any of these categories. 

14 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 34 
Moreover, although I have found no case directly on point, the 

Court's reliance on the harmless-error standard in closely 

analagous cases makes clear that the standard applies here as 

well. Cf. Satterwhite, 108 s.ct. 1792 (harmless error rule 

applies to admission of expert psychiatric testimony based on 

examination conducted in violation of Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (applying 

harmless error analysis to admission of non-testifying 

co-defendants' confessions in violation of Bruton); Schneble v. 

Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) (same); Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684· 

("the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's 

opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other 

Confrontation Clause ·errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error 

analysis") (emphasis added). 

Harmless-error review is de novo. Graham, 828 F.2d at 659; 

see also Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254. Applying the harmless-error 

doctrine to this case convinces me that the admission of Love's 

preliminary hearing testimony was not harmless. The State of New 

Mexico relied primarily on the testimony of six men who were 

inmates at Camp Sierra Blanca the night of Scott Wayne Thompson's 

death, August 1, 1981. Five of these men, Martin Garza, Robert 

Keener, Billy Ray Hughes, Andrew Mitchell, and Thomas Hayward, 

lived in Bonito Lodge, the residence of defendant Martinez and the 

15 

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 35 
victim Thompson. The sixth individual, Sam Love, resided in 

Desert Lodge, the front of which faced the back of Bonito Lodge. 

The testimony of all the witnesses was impeached to greater and 

lesser degrees, primarily on the basis of prior inconsistent 

statements and their receipt of early parole or shortened parole 

periods. In addition, the reliability of their testimony was 

called into question by the numerous conflicts between their 

versions of the events. 

Garza testified that earlier in the day on August 1, ·1981, 

Martinez told him "I don't want him [Thompson] there. I am going 

to take him out." Rec., vol. VII, Proceedings, vol. 3, at 879. 

Later that evening, Garza saw Martinez hit Thompson once when they 

were in the t.v. room, id. at 896, and heard Martinez ask Thompson 

if he wanted to go outside and fight, id. at 912. He never saw 

Martinez take Thompson outside, id. at 896, 903, because he went 

to his room after trying to dissuade David Sedillo6 from getting 

involved, id. at 875. Before leaving the t.v. room, Garza 

witnessed Sedillo poke Thompson in the shoulder with a safety pin 

he had pulled out of his pocket, and kick him. Id. at 872-73. 

Garza testified that after returning to his room, he looked out 

6 The original criminal complaint for Thompson's murder named 

David Sedillo, as well as Martinez. Rec., vol. IV, State Court 

Record, at 10. Sedillo pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement 

with the State on June 15, 1982. Id. at 236. 

16-

Appellate Case: 87-1534 Document: 01019831193 Date Filed: 08/04/1989 Page: 36 
his window when he heard "very loud" screams from the direction of 

Desert Lodge, and he saw pool players run out the back door of 

Desert Lodge. Id. at 876-77. Finally, Garza testified to the 

following interchange with co-defendant Richard Lujan when Lujan 

came into his room about 5-10 minutes after he returned to it: 

"Lujan said, 'They're going to rape him.' That they had 

taken him outside. And then I said, 'No, they're going 

to kill him.' And then he [Lujan] added, 'I believe 

SO• I II 

Id. at 892. 7 

Robert Keener similarly testified to seeing Martinez hit 

Thompson in the t.v. room, but he claimed to have seen blood on 

Thompson's face. R~c., vol. VII, Proceedings, vol. 4, at 920. 

Keener further stated that after hearing Thompson verbally refuse 

to go outside, he heard the screen door of Bonito Lodge slam, id. 

at 923, but he never heard any commotion or scuffling outside, id. 

at 957. Although Keener never testified that he saw Martinez 

leave Bonito Lodge, he asserted that he saw Martinez enter Bonito 

Lodge's back door about 20-30 minutes after he heard the screen 

door slam. Id. at 924, 937. 

7 The last sentence of this statement, "I believe so," was not 

admitted into evidence at the second trial. Rec., vol. VII, 

Proceedings, vol. 3, at 910-11. 

17 

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Billy Ray Hughes testified that he saw Martinez in the t.v. 

room standing over Thompson, who was bleeding from his mouth or 

nose, but that Lujan prevented him from intervening. Id. at 996-

97. He also claimed to have seen Martinez pick up a pool cue from 

the other end of the couch at that time. Id. at 1117. When he 

returned later with fellow inmates Robert Shaw and Thomas Hayward, 

he saw Martinez hitting Thompson about his face and chest area, 

and Sedillo kicking Thompson in the face. Id. at 998. Hughes 

never saw anybody, or anything happen, outside of Bonito Lodge 

that evening. Id. at 1119. 

Like Billy Ray Hughes, Andrew Mitchell testified that he saw 

Martinez standing over Thompson, and Thompson bleeding from the 

face. Id. at 1175=76. Mitchell asserted, though, that Martinez 

was kicking Thompson in the face while Sedillo and Lujan stood 

watch. Id. at 1174-75. Somewhat later he heard Martinez tell 

Thompson to,go outside, heard more than one set of footsteps go 

outside, and then heard the screen door close. Id. at 1178. Yet 

still later, Mitchell claimed that as Lujan was wiping up blood 

from the t.v. room floor, someone rattled the window and Lujan 

went to the window and talked to the person. Lujan then got 

Martinez and both of them went outside. Id. at 1179-80. 

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Thomas Hayward testified that although he heard a fight going 

on in Bonito Lodge, he did not see anything because Lujan stopped 

him and fellow inmates Joey Swint, Andrew Mitchell, Robert Shaw, 

Billy Ray Hughes, and Robert Keener, from entering the t.v. room. 

Rec., vol. VIII, Proceedings, vol. 5, 1216-18. He also heard the 

fight move outside, and when he later looked out his window, saw 

Martinez hitting, and Sedillo kicking, a bloody-faced but still 

conscious Thompson as he lay on the ground six feet behind Bonito 

Lodge. Id. at 1218-20. Hayward did not see any weapons when he 

looked out his window. Id. at 1280~ 

Disregarding all the conflicts in the testimony and the 

impeachment of the witnesses, which are matters for the jury in 

weighing the credibility of the evidence, the testimony of five of 

the state's eyewitnesses indicated that Martinez, Sedillo, and 

Thompson were involved in an altercation in Bonito Lodge's t.v. 

room the night of August 1. 8 The altercation included Martinez 

and Sedillo hitting and kicking Thompson, and Sedillo poking 

Thompson with a safety pin, to such an extent that Thompson was 

bleeding. Only one witness' testimony linked Martinez and Sedillo 

to Thompson later the same evening in back of Bonito Lodge. 

8 Martinez testified that he yelled at and hit Thompson in 

t.v. room. Rec., vol. IX, Proceedings, vol. 7, at 2138-40. 

Sedillo also recounted the altercation between Martinez and 

Thompson. Id. at 2033. 

19 

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Against this evidentiary backdrop, the state called its final 

inmate witness, the "unavailable" Sam Love. The state read into 

the record substantially all of his preliminary hearing 

testimony. 9 Love testified that moaning and groaning sounds from 

the direction of Bonito Lodge prompted him to turn around just as 

he was entering Desert Lodge. When he turned he saw Martinez, 

Sedillo, and Lujan "whipping on another dude.'' Rec., vol. II, 

Preliminary Hearing Transcript, at 75. Love was unable to see the 

person being beaten to identify him, but his description of the 

person's clothes matched those Thompson had on when his body was 

discovered. Id. at 137-138. Sometime later, Love stated, he 

looked out the front door and saw Martinez, Sedillo, and Lujan 

carrying the person they had been beating towards Desert Lodge. 

Id. at 78. Still later, Love looked out the bathroom window and 

saw Martinez kick the person a couple of times, saw Sedillo hit 

him with a pool cue once, and saw Lujan watching the events. Id. 

at 79-83, 165-66. Five to ten minutes after he looked out the 

bathroom window, Love saw Martinez enter Desert Lodge and say 

9 Sam Love's testimony at the second trial, rec., vol. v, State 

Court Transcripts, Transcript of Testimony of Sam Love, Jr. (Love 

Testimony), was also read into the record, primarily for purposes 

of impeachment by defense counsel. Rec., vol., VII, Proceedings, 

vol. 5, at 1347, 1376-1386. Love testified to the same basic 

events at the second trial, but numerous details differed such as 

his claim that he saw Martinez with a ''shank," or homemade knife. 

Rec., vol. v, Love Testimony, at 19-20. 

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something to someone, and saw Sedillo enter Desert Lodge and heard 

him showering. Id. at 84-87. As Sedillo left the bathroom, Love 

saw him sticking something in his pocket, the imprint of which 

looked like a "shank" or homemade knife 3 to 4 inches in length, 

with a blade 1 to 1 & 1/2 inches wide. Id. at 93, 190-91. 

The question we face is whether we can be sure "beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the error complained of [the admission of 

Love's prior testimony] did not contribute to the verdict 

obtained." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; see also Satterwhite, 108 

s.ct. at 1798. Viewed in this context, the critical nature of Sam 

Love's testimony is readily apparent. Prior to Love's testimony, 

only Mitchell and Hayward placed Martinez out of doors the night 

of August 1, and only Hayward connected Martinez with Thompson 

outside of Bonito Lodge. Love not only corroborated Hayward's 

testimony by linking Martinez to the beating of someone outside of 

Bonito Lodge, he also linked Martinez to the carrying of that 

person from behind Bonito Lodge to behind Desert Lodge, and the 

further beating of the person in back of Desert Lodge where 

Thompson's body ultimately was discovered. Love's testimony thus 

was the only evidence actually connecting Martinez to a person 

wearing clothes identical to Thompson during a sequence of events 

out of doors the night of August 1, and placing Martinez at the 

location where Thompson's body was discovered. The prosecution 

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even acknowledged that Love was the only state's witness who ·would 

so testify. Rec., vol. VIII, Proceedings, vol. 5, at 1328-29. 

Moreover, Sedillo, who had pled guilty to second degree murder, 

testified that he alone was responsible for the murder. Rec., 

vol. IX, Proceedings, vol. 7, at 2030-32. In the second trial, 

where the jury assessed Love's credibility, the vote was 10-2 for 

acquittal. Rec., vol. VIII, Proceedings, vol. 5, at 1329. 

Consequently, I cannot "confidently say, on the whole record, that 

the constitutional error [here] was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt." Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681. 

I am persuaded by my review of the case law that use of the 

Uniform Act, when applicable and available, should.be a condition 

precedent to a finding of good faith and unavailability. Because 

the prosecution failed to employ the Act's procedures, I conclude 

that it did not act in good faith and that Love therefore was not 

unavailable. My review of the record under the majority's 

"totality of the circumstances'' standard also convinces me that 

the prosecution's efforts were not in good faith and that Love 

therefore was not unavailable. Because I conclude that the state 

court's error in finding Love unavailable is not harmless, I would 

grant Martinez' petition for habeas corpus contingent on the State 

of New Mexico's decision to conduct a new trial. 

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