Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00529/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00529-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1391 Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK ORTEGOZA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PETER KHO, M.D., et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No. 12-cv-00529-L-KSC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR REMAND [DOC. 82]

Plaintiffs Portia Ortegoza and Frank Ortegoza, who were married at all times relevant to

this complaint, were both patients of Defendant Peter Kho, M.D.. This action arises from Dr.

Kho’s extramarital relationship with Mrs. Ortegoza. 

Pending before the Court is Dr. Kho’s motion to remand. [Doc. 82-1.] The Court found

this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See

Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). [Doc. 86.] For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Dr. Kho’s motion

for remand. [Doc. 82-1.] 

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I. BACKGROUND1

Portia and Frank Ortegoza are married and have been at all times relevant to the TAC.

(TAC ¶ 9.) The Ortegozas are entitled to receive medical care through the federal TRICARE

program by virtue of Mr. Ortegoza’s service in the Navy. (Id.) Accordingly, the Ortegozas

received medical care at a Navy medical clinic that is operated by TRICARE. (JSUF ¶¶ 6, 9.)

Mrs. Ortegoza had worked in this clinic in a clerical capacity since 2000 or 2001, at which time

she met Dr. Kho, a physician at the clinic. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 4.) The Ortegozas received medical care

from a variety of doctors, including Dr. Kho. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9.)

Mrs. Ortegoza and Dr. Kho had a sexual relationship that lasted from January 2009 until

June 2010. (Id. ¶ 1.) Mrs. Ortegoza alleges that Dr. Kho induced her to participate in sexual

conduct under the guise that it would “help” her deal with the psychological conditions for

which she had sought treatment. (Id. ¶ 13.) She also alleges that she disclosed to Dr. Kho that

Frank Ortegoza had hit her, and that Dr. Kho failed to report this disclosure. (TAC ¶ 17.)

However, the parties agree that no physical abuse occurred subsequent to Dr. Kho’s failure to

report the abuse. (JSUF ¶ 8.) In June 2010, Frank Ortegoza discovered the sexual relationship

between Dr. Kho and his wife, which prompted Dr. Kho to end the relationship. (Id. ¶ 7.) 

On March 1, 2012, Defendant United States of America removed this medical

malpractice action to this Court from the San Diego Superior Court. (Notice of Removal [Doc.

1].) On May 20, 2013, the Ortegozas filed their consolidated TAC, alleging two causes of

action: (1) Mrs. Ortegoza’s medical malpractice claim against Dr. Kho, and (2) Mr. Ortegoza’s

medical malpractice claim against Dr. Kho. On June 11, 2013, Dr. Kho moved for summary

adjudication on the following issues only: 

1) Whether DEFENDANT PETER KHO, M.D. is liable for medical

malpractice by engaging in sexual conduct with PLAINTIFF

PORTIA ORTEGOZA under the guise of medical treatment

pursuant to the controlling test set forth in Atienza v. Taub, 194 Cal.

App. 3d 388 (Ct. App. 1987); 

 The parties filed a Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (“JSUF”). Much of the 1

following background is based on that Joint Statement.

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2) Whether DEFENDANT PETER KHO, M.D.’s alleged failure to

report physical abuse resulted in additional physical abuse, giving

rise to a civil action by PLAINTIFF PORTIA ORTEGOZA under

California Penal Code § 11160; and 

3) Whether DEFENDANT PETER KHO, M.D. is liable for medical

malpractice by breaching a duty of care to PLAINTIFF FRANK

ORTEGOZA independent from the abolished tort of “criminal

conversation” and Alienation of Affection pursuant to Cal. Civ.

Code §§ 43.4, 43.5; Smith v. Pust, 19 Cal. App. 4th 263 (4th Dist.

1993). 

(Def.’s Mot. 1:11-26.) On December 4, 2013, this Court denied Dr. Kho’s motion. (Order

Denying Summary Judgment [Doc. 78].) On December 16, 2013, this Court granted the parties

joint motion to dismiss the United States as a defendant. (Order Dismissing United States [Doc.

80].) 

Dr. Kho now moves for remand, arguing that the dismissal of the United States as a party

has divested this Court of original jurisdiction and that this Court should decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). (Mot. Remand 2.) The

Ortegozas do not dispute that the Court no longer has original jurisdiction over this matter, but

instead suggest that the Court should use its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over

the matter. (Opp’n [Doc. 84] 4.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 1367, which applies to cases commenced after December 1, 1990, provides

the basis for supplemental jurisdiction:

Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and (c) or as expressly provided

otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have

original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all

other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of

the United States Constitution.

A court can decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction over a pendent claim only if one of the

four categories below, specifically enumerated in section 1367(c), applies: 

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

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(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the

district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining

jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)

As an initial matter, the Court notes that application of § 1367(c) is more nuanced than

either party has indicated. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, the Court must exercise supplemental

jurisdiction unless one of the factors of § 1367(c) is satisfied. Executive Software North

America, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of California, 24 F.3d 1545, 1555 (9th Cir.

1994) overruled on other grounds by Cal. Dep’t of Water Res v. Powerex Corp., 555 F.3d 1087

(9th Cir. 2008). “Considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants”

guide this Court’s discretion only after one of the four § 1367(c) statutory factors is satisfied. 

See Palmer v. Hospital Authority of Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir. 1994). 

B. Remand is Inappropriate Here2

1. The pending claims do not raise novel or complex issues of state law.

Dr. Kho first argues that there are novel and complex issues of state law which this Court

should not determine. (Mot. Remand 5.) Specifically, Dr. Kho claims that while “Plaintiffs

argue that there is negligence per se under California Business & Professions Code Section §§

726-729 (prohibiting sex with a patient),” it is his position that “Portia Ortegoza must prove she

entered into the sexual relationship with Dr. Kho under the belief that it was a form of medical

 The parties appear to agree that the Court has a basis for supplemental jurisdiction. The 2

Court agrees, as the claims here are “so related to claims in the action within such original

jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Indeed,

the claims are identical.

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care and treatment” pursuant to Atienza v. Taub, 194 Cal. App. 3d 388 (1987). Essentially, it is

Dr. Kho’s position that the Ortegozas’ negligence per se theory is contradicted by state law and

this Court’s possible ruling on the issue “has the potential to either drastically expand the Atienza

ruling, or to overrule Atienza altogether.” (Mot. Remand 5.) The Court disagrees.

First, the Court has already analyzed the viability of a negligence per se cause of action

with respect to California Business & Professions Code Section §§ 726-729. In its order

denying summary judgment, the Court explained why the doctrine of negligence per se can

apply to the case at bar. (Order Denying Summ. J. 6-9.) Second, the Atienza holding does not

directly address or hinge on the doctrine of negligence per se, and thus would not be affected by

a ruling based upon that doctrine in the case at bar. Therefore, the Court finds that the claims

here do not raise novel or complex issues of state law, as the legal issues that Dr. Kho identifies

have already been resolved.

 

2. The claims do predominate over the claims over which the district

court had original jurisdiction, and the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Dr. Kho next argues that remand is appropriate because the remaining claims will be

determined under state law and this Court has “no interest in deciding a case based on

California’s complex history [sic] Medical Malpractice cases and California law, now that the

United States of America has been dismissed with prejudice.” (Mot. Remand 5.) Although it is

unclear which statutory factor for remand that Dr. Kho advances this argument under, it appears

that he is suggesting that the court has no original jurisdiction over either of these claims. Thus,

the Court evaluates this argument as an attempted invocation of § 1367(c)(2) and (3). The

Ortegozas’ appear to address the argument in the same manner. For the following reasons, the

Court agrees that it no longer has original jurisdiction over these claims. 

As the Ortegozas articulated in the Third Amended Complaint, this Court’s jurisdiction

over this case is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), which vests jurisdiction in district courts for

claims against the United States. (TAC ¶ 5.) When this Court dismissed the United States as a

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defendant, it effectively dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. The only

claims that remain are state law claims against Dr. Kho. On this point, both parties agree. (See

Mot. Remand 5; see also Opp’n 4.) Thus, the Court must decide whether or not to retain

supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. 

3. Although there are statutory grounds that permit the Court to decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the Court will exercise

supplemental jurisdiction.

Dr. Kho argues that the Court should exercise its discretion and remand the case because

relinquishing jurisdiction is judicially economical. (Mot. Remand 5.) Dr. Kho suggests that in

light of the recent government shutdown, and “the possibility of future shutdowns,” the Court

should relinquish jurisdiction so “that its limited resources can be used most effectively.” (Id.) 

Dr. Kho goes on to say this case “is very unlikely to settle and will likely take an inordinate

amount of this Court’s time” and “[t]rial will be lengthy because there are two Plaintiffs, unusual

factual circumstances, multiple witnesses, and multiple experts regarding damages.” (Id. 6.) 

The Court disagrees.

 The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction here will promote judicial economy. Dr. Kho

fails to recognize the difference between wasting judicial resources, and using them

“effectively.” The fact that this case will go to trial and be “lengthy” is of no moment here. This

Court has conducted numerous “lengthy” trials in the past, and is prepared to do so in the future. 

This is precisely what judicial resources are intended to be used for. Moreover, this Court is

intimately familiar with the facts and issues in this case, making it wasteful to pass the buck to

another court to hear the trial. Remand of this case to another court would also waste time. Dr.

Kho’s “shutdown” argument is equally unimpressive. He provides no explanation as to how this

Court conducting trials contributed to the last government shutdown, or how the trial of this case

would lead to a government shutdown in the future. 

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that exercising supplemental jurisdiction over

the claims here is the most efficient way of bringing this case to an expeditious resolution. 

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Because the Court finds, in its discretion, that it is judicially economical to assert supplemental

jurisdiction, the Court DENIES the motion to remand. See Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1569. 

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for remand. [Doc. 82-

1.]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 24, 2014

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

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