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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 2, 2024*

Decided December 2, 2024 

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge

No. 24-2051 

RUBEN SANTOYO,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

VILLAGE OF OAK LAWN, ILLINOIS,

et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 24 C 1365 

Charles P. Kocoras, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ruben Santoyo seeks to hold Oak Lawn, Illinois, liable 

for the conduct of two police officers who, relying on a report that he was trespassing in 

* Santoyo sued the “Oak Lawn Police Department” in addition to several 

individual officers. A police department is not a suable entity, so we have reformed the 

caption to reflect the municipality of which the department is a part. See Rogers v. City of 

Hobart, 996 F.3d 812, 819 n.13 (7th Cir. 2021). We have agreed to decide the case without 

oral argument because the appeal is frivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(A).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

Case: 24-2051 Document: 7 Filed: 12/02/2024 Pages: 3
No. 24-2051 Page 2 

a store, asked for his identification and removed him from the store. The district court 

dismissed Santoyo’s complaint for failure to state a claim; we agree and affirm.

Santoyo visited a Panera Bread store in Oak Lawn in February 2024. While there, 

store employees called the police to report that Santoyo was trespassing. Santoyo 

alleges that this report was a lie; he maintains that he was peacefully working on his 

laptop, an assertion that at this stage we take as true. Smykla v. Molinaroli, 85 F.4th 1228, 

1234 (7th Cir. 2023). Following the report, two police officers came and demanded that 

Santoyo show them his identification. He complied, but the officers still removed him 

from Panera. Afterwards, Santoyo asked Oak Lawn’s police department to investigate 

the employees for making a false report. The department never did. Santoyo then sued

Oak Lawn under § 1983, contending that his constitutional rights were violated when 

the officers sought his identification (an alleged search) and removed him from Panera

(an alleged seizure), and when the department did not investigate the false reports. 

The district court screened Santoyo’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and 

dismissed it for failure to state a claim. It reasoned that his search-and-seizure claims 

failed because the officers received a report about trespassing, as Santoyo alleged 

happened, and they thus had probable cause for their actions; further, none of Santoyo’s 

allegations supported an inference that the officers should have known that the report 

was false. Relying on Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2015), which 

states that the Constitution does not obligate local police to investigate a case, the court 

also dismissed the failure-to-investigate claim. Santoyo moved for reconsideration, but 

the court denied that motion. In that motion, besides repeating his original arguments, 

Santoyo protested that the court had not recruited counsel for him. The court explained 

that Santoyo had never filed the necessary motion for counsel, see N.D. Ill. R. 83.36(a), 

and the court knew that Santoyo was already aware of this obligation because he had 

filed a motion for counsel in a different case in the district.

On appeal, Santoyo renews three arguments: Rossi does not block his claims, the 

police lacked probable cause because the report about trespassing was false, and he 

deserved counsel. But his arguments are cursory, unsupported by authority, and do not 

engage with the district court’s reasoning. Although we construe pro se briefs 

generously, an appellate brief must still contain a discernible argument with citations to 

supporting authority. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8); Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 

545–56 (7th Cir. 2001). We could dismiss this appeal on that basis alone, but we prefer to 

address the merits when possible, and we can do so here.

Case: 24-2051 Document: 7 Filed: 12/02/2024 Pages: 3
No. 24-2051 Page 3 

This appeal is frivolous. The district court properly relied on Rossi, which states 

that a person “does not have a constitutional right to have the police investigate his 

case.” 790 F.3d at 735 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 

189, 196 (1989)). It also properly dismissed the claim that the police wrongly asked for 

his identification: “In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for 

identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.

Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004). Next, because Santoyo alleged that Panera’s 

workers called the police to report a trespassing, the officers had probable cause to 

arrest him for that crime. The alleged falsity of a report about a crime does not negate 

probable cause unless the officers had reason to know that the report was false, which

Santoyo has not alleged. See Askew v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 894, 895–96 (7th Cir. 2006). 

What we have said so far shows why Santoyo fails to state a claim against the officers; 

also, he has not alleged any independent basis for municipal liability against Oak Lawn. 

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Last, Santoyo’s failure to 

comply with the local rule for seeking counsel justified the refusal to recruit counsel, 

see McDaniel v. Syed, 115 F.4th 805, 814 (7th Cir. 2024), and in any case, declining to 

recruit counsel for frivolous claims is never an abuse of discretion, see Watts v. Kidman, 

42 F.4th 755, 766 (7th Cir. 2022). 

We conclude with a warning about sanctions. In addition to this appeal, Santoyo 

has filed in a separate case that we ruled was frivolous a petition for a writ of 

mandamus. Order on Pet. for Writ of Supervisory Control, In re Ruben Santoyo,

No. 23-3048 (7th Cir. Oct. 31, 2023). In another appeal from that case, we denied his 

request to appeal in forma pauperis because the appeal did not present any potentially 

meritorious arguments. Order on Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Santoyo v. City of 

Chicago, No. 24-2352 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 2024). And again in that case, the district court 

ruled that he has engaged in an “extended pattern” of filing frivolous motions (despite 

frequent warnings) that have required “considerable judicial resources to address.” 

Minute Entry at Docket 151, Santoyo v. City of Chicago, No. 1:22-cv-03559 (N.D. Ill. Mar 6, 

2024). We now warn him that any further frivolous appeals in this court may result in 

sanctions, including fines that, if unpaid, may result in a bar on filing papers in any 

court within this circuit. See Support Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 

1995). 

AFFIRMED

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