Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01006/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01006-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE KAYODE GANSAH, )

)

Petitioner, )

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v. )

)

)

ALBERTO GONZALES, et al., )

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Respondents. )

)

 )

1:07-CV-01006 AWI GSA HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Petitioner is being detained by the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) pending removal from the United States. Petitioner is proceeding pro se with a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

In the petition filed on July 16, 2007, Petitioner claims Respondent lacks the statutory

authority to indefinitely detain him. He also contends that his indefinite detention violates his

substantive and procedural due process rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution. He

further contends that Respondent’s current detention of Petitioner is punitive in nature and

constitutes punishment without due process of law.

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On September 12, 2007, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. Petitioner filed a traverse

on September 26, 2007.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nigeria. See Petition at 3. On May 16, 2001, Petitioner

was ordered removed from the United States by an Immigration Judge. Id. at 2. Petitioner did not

appeal the order; he is currently subject to a final order of removal. Id. 

Petitioner was released from custody on orders of supervision and bond until October 5,

2006, when he violated parole on a felony conviction. See Answer at 2. Petitioner was returned to

ICE custody on April 4, 2007, after he had served his sentence. On July 5, 2007, ICE determined

Petitioner would continue to be held in detention pending removal. See Exhibit A, Answer.

Petitioner has been in custody since then. 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction.

Habeas corpus relief is appropriate when a person “is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Habeas corpus

proceedings pursuant to § 2241 remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional

challenges to the authority of the Attorney General to order post-removal-period detention; in such a

proceeding, the petitioner is not seeking review of the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion, but

rather is challenging the extent of the authority to detain under the statute, which is not a matter of

discretion. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001); Magana Pizano v. Immigration and

Naturalization Service, 200 F.3d 603, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court has subject

matter jurisdiction over this action.

With respect to jurisdiction over the person, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides that writs of

habeas corpus may be granted by the district courts “within their respective jurisdictions.” A writ of

habeas corpus operates not upon the prisoner, but upon the prisoner’s custodian. Braden v. 30th

Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-495 (1973). A petitioner filing a petition for

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial district of the

petitioner's custodian. Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). It is sufficient if

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the custodian is within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at the time the petition is filed; transfer

of the petitioner thereafter does not defeat personal jurisdiction that has once been properly

established. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 193 (1948), overruled on other grounds in Braden v. 30th

Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. at 193, citing Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 305 (1944);

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9 Cir. 1990). th

Review of the petition shows that Petitioner is detained at the Lerdo Pretrial Facility in

Bakersfield, California. Bakersfield is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts is

required where Congress specifically mandates it; however, when Congress has not clearly required

exhaustion, the necessity of exhaustion is entrusted to sound judicial discretion. McCarthy v.

Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (holding exhaustion of a prison grievance procedure unnecessary

before a federal prisoner brought a Bivens action seeking only monetary damages, superseded by

statutory amendment as noted in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)). Even if exhaustion is

not mandated, judicially fashioned principles of exhaustion should be consistent with congressional

intent and the applicable statutory scheme. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. at 144. 

In determining whether to excuse exhaustion, the Court should consider the claim asserted,

the agency’s interest in resolving the issue, and the administrative procedure provided. McCarthy,

503 U.S. at 146; Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9 Cir.1987). In th

cases concerning immigration proceedings, the Ninth Circuit has found that due process claims may

be exempted from the exhaustion requirement if they involve more than a mere procedural error that

the administrative tribunal can easily remedy. See Bagues-Valles v. Immigration and Naturalization

Service, 779 F.2d 483, 484 (9 Cir.1985) (exempting from exhaustion requirement Petitioner's claim th

that BIA's retroactive interpretation of “continuous presence rule” violated due process). 

The Court will excuse exhaustion in the instant case. There does not appear to be any statute

embodying Congressional intent to require exhaustion in this instance. Moreover, Petitioner’s

claims concern issues that are collateral to ICE’s decision to remove Petitioner. It is doubtful the

issues raised by Petitioner would be addressed in the course of the administrative process. As is

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more fully discussed below, in this proceeding the Court must determine the authority of ICE to

detain Petitioner, and, in doing so, it thereby largely determines the constitutionality of Petitioner’s

detention. The Court is mindful of the importance of deference to executive expertise on questions

such as immigration, the status of repatriation agreements, and the likelihood of issuance of travel

documents in a particular case. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700. 

However, the Court exercises its discretion to decline to require Petitioner to resort to 

administrative remedies and thereby to surrender an imminent judicial remedy. At the time the

petition was filed in this Court, no meaningful administrative remedy existed. Therefore, the Court

will excuse exhaustion. 

III. Authority to Detain Petitioner.

Title 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) provides generally that except as otherwise provided in that

section, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the

United States within a period of ninety days, the “removal period.” Title 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)

provides:

An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this

title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of 

this title or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be risk to 

the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be 

detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the 

terms of supervision in paragraph (3).

In addition to those aliens found to be risks to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of

removal, aliens subject to this detention provision include inadmissible aliens, criminal aliens, aliens

who have violated their non-immigrant status conditions, and aliens removable for certain national

security or foreign relations reasons. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 688.

In Zadvydas v. Davis, in order to avoid serious doubts as to the constitutionality of

§ 1231(a)(6), the Court interpreted it not to permit indefinite detention, but rather to limit an alien’s

post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien’s removal

from the United States. Id. at 688-89. The Court determined that aliens who had been ordered

removed had a liberty interest in being released subject to supervision which was strong enough to

raise a serious question as to whether, irrespective of the procedures used, the Constitution permits

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detention that is indefinite and potentially permanent. Id. at 696. Once removal is no longer

reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by the statute. Id. at 699. The

authority of the government to detain is thus coextensive with the reasonable likelihood of removal,

and the question of the extent of that authority is for the federal judiciary to decide in proceedings

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Id. With respect to the process of decision that this Court is to

follow, the Court instructed: 

In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether the 

detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure

removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute's 

basic purpose, namely assuring the alien's presence at the moment of removal. 

Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold 

continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute. In that 

case, of course, the alien's release may and should be conditioned on any of the 

various forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances, 

and the alien may no doubt be returned to custody upon a violation of those 

conditions. See supra, at 2501 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(3), 1253 (1994 ed., 

Supp. V); 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 (2001)). And if removal is reasonably foreseeable, 

the habeas court should consider the risk of the alien's committing further

crimes as a factor potentially justifying confinement within that reasonable 

removal period. See supra, at 2499.

We recognize, as the Government points out, that review must take 

appropriate account of the greater immigration-related expertise of the

Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns inherent 

in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute, and 

the Nation's need to "speak with one voice" in immigration matters. (Citation 

omitted.) But we believe that courts can take appropriate account of such 

matters without abdicating their legal responsibility to review the lawfulness 

of an alien's continued detention.

Ordinary principles of judicial review in this area recognize primary 

Executive Branch responsibility. They counsel judges to give expert

agencies decisionmaking leeway in matters that invoke their expertise. See

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-652, 

110 S.Ct. 2668, 110 L.Ed.2d 579 (1990). They recognize Executive Branch 

primacy in foreign policy matters. See Container Corp. of America v. 

Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 196, 103 S.Ct. 2933, 77 L.Ed.2d 545 (1983). 

And they consequently require courts to listen with care when the 

Government's foreign policy judgments, including, for example, the status of 

repatriation negotiations, are at issue, and to grant the Government 

appropriate leeway when its judgments rest upon foreign policy expertise.

Id. at 699-700.

In order to further uniform administration in the federal courts and to limit the frequency with

which courts would be faced with difficult judgments regarding matters which are the subject of

executive expertise, the Court adopted six months as a period within which detention is

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presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. The Court instructed:

After this [six]-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe 

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 

future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that 

showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable 

future” conversely would have to shrink. This [six]-month presumption, of 

course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six 

months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been 

determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 

foreseeable future.

Id.

 

IV. Suspension of Removal Period.

Respondent argues that continued detention is not indefinite because there is a significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Respondent further argues that Petitioner

has not cooperated with the government’s attempts to secure travel documents. Respondent’s

arguments are persuasive. 

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C) provides:

The removal period shall be extended beyond a period of 90 days and 

the alien may remain in detention during such extended period if the alien fails

or refuses to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents

necessary to the alien's departure or conspires or acts to prevent the alien's 

removal subject to an order of removal.

In this case, Petitioner has failed to cooperate with the government in good faith to obtain

travel documents. According to ICE’s decision of July 5, 2007, Petitioner on two prior occasions

attempted to prevent issuance of a travel document by stating to the Nigerian Embassy that he was a

citizen of Ghana. See Exhibit A, Answer. Pursuant to § 1231(a)(1)(C), the removal period must be

suspended if the alien acts to prevent his removal. 

In addition, there appears to be a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal to Nigeria in

the reasonably foreseeable future. The Nigerian Embassy is cooperating with ICE’s attempts to

remove Petitioner as evidenced by their interviews of Petitioner. 

Moreover, as pointed out by Respondent, Petitioner was not in continuous custody longer

than the presumptively reasonable period of six months before he filed the instant petition.

Therefore, his claims were not ripe at the time he filed the instant petition.

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Accordingly, the petition should be denied without prejudice, because Petitioner’s current

detention is lawful and authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B-C). In the event that Petitioner

cooperates with ICE and removal is still not effected within the near future, Petitioner should be

allowed to file another habeas petition challenging his indefinite detention. 

RECOMMENDATION

The Court hereby RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED

without prejudice and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii,

United States District Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California.

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The Court will then review the Magistrate

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 29, 2007 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

60kij8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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