Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00707/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00707-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:7604 Clear Air Act (Emission Standards)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASSOCIATION OF IRRITATED

RESIDENTS, an Unincorporated

Association

Plaintiff,

v.

FRED SCHAKEL DAIRY, a

California Proprietorship,

FRED SCHAKEL, owner and

operator, SCHAKEL FAMILY

PARTNERSHIP, a California

Limited Partnership, owner and

operator, AG RESOURCES III, a

California Limited Liability

Company, owner and, SOUTH

LAKES DAIRY, a California

General Partnership, owner and

operator, 

Defendants.

1:05-CV-00707 OWW SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS (Doc. 160)

1. INTRODUCTION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Association of

Irritated Residents (“AIR”) third cause of action alleging

Defendants violated the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) section

112(g)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B), because they constructed

a major source of Hazardous Air Pollutants (“HAP”) and failed to

obtain a Maximum Available Control Technology (“MACT”)

determination for methanol emissions prior to initiating

construction of the Fred Schakel Dairy also known as the South

Lakes Dairy (the “Dairy”). (Doc. 160, Motion to Dismiss, Filed

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August 20, 2007) AIR opposes the motion. (Doc. 212, Opposition,

Filed December 28, 2007) This matter was heard on January 28,

2008. Supplemental briefing was permitted by both parties after

the January 28, 2008 hearing to further address mootness and the

recently issued an Authority to Construct (“ATC”) permit by the

San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District (“the

District”) which found the Dairy did not emit more than ten tons

per year of methanol and therefore no MACT determination was

necessary under CAA § 112(g)(2)(B).

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

AIR filed its initial complaint on June 1, 2005. (Doc. 1) 

AIR filed its Fourth Amended Complaint on July 3, 2007 to add the

third cause of action for violation of CAA section 112(g)(2)(B).

(Doc. 153, Complaint) On August 20, 2007, Defendants filed a

Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 160, Motion to Dismiss) AIR opposed the

Motion to Dismiss on December 28, 2007. (Doc. 212, Opposition) 

On January 7, 2008 Defendants filed their reply to Plaintiff’s

Opposition. (Doc. 218, Reply) Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief in

Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was filed on February

4, 2008. (Doc. 253, Suppl. Opposition) Defendants filed their

Reply to Plaintiff’s Suppl. Opposition on February 7, 2008. (Doc.

254, Suppl. Reply) On March 21, 2008, Defendants filed a notice

of supplemental authority in support of their Motion to Dismiss.

(Doc. 272, Suppl. Authority) 

3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The background facts for this entire suit are set forth in

prior rulings, therefore only pertinent facts are repeated and

amplified upon for the purposes of evaluating Defendants’ Motion

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 The eight-hour ozone standard is .08 parts per million 1

measured over the daily maximum eight-hour average. 

3

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of action. See Doc. 36, Order

and Doc. 117, Order.

A. The Clean Air Act

The general purpose of the CAA is to enhance the quality of

the nation’s air quality resources for the benefit of public

health. The CAA requires the United States Environmental

Protection Agency (“EPA”) to set National Ambient Air Quality

Standards (“NAAQS”) for certain pollutants including Ozone. The

CAA requires states to designate areas within its boundaries as

“attainment” areas if the air quality meets the NAAQS for a

particular criteria pollutant. Areas where the air quality does

not meet the NAAQS for a particular criteria pollutant are

designated as “non attainment” areas for that pollutant. Ozone

non attainment areas are divided under the CAA as “marginal,”

“moderate,” “serious,” “severe,” and “extreme” based on the

severity of the ozone problem. The San Joaquin Valley Air Basin

has been designated as a “serious” non attainment area for the

eight-hour ozone NAAQS and an “extreme” non attainment area for 1

the one-hour ozone NAAQS. 

Non attainment areas are required to adopt state

implementation plans (“SIP”) to achieve the NAAQS by the

applicable attainment date. The CAA requires that a SIP shall

“require permits for the construction and operation of new or

modified major stationary sources anywhere in the non attainment

area.” This preconstruction permit is a New Source Review

Case 1:05-cv-00707-LJO-SMS Document 277 Filed 03/28/08 Page 3 of 37
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(“NSR”) permit. 

As part of its obligations under the SIP program, the

District adopted Rule 2010 to implement the ATC permitting

program (permits before construction begins) and the Permit to

Operate permitting program (“PTO”) (permits after construction)

and Rule 2201 to implement the New Source Review (“NSR”)

permitting program. On January 1, 2004 California Senate Bill

700 removed a previously existing agricultural exemption for

issuing NSR permits to agricultural resources. After 2004,

agricultural sources were required to obtain NSR permits prior to

construction of a stationary source facility. Rule 2201 requires

a new or modified stationary source of air pollution or emissions

unit to install Best Available Control Technology (“BACT”) when

the potential to emit volatile organic compounds (“VOC”) exceed 2

pounds per day. The rule also requires that new or modified

stationary sources purchase “offsets” or “emissions reduction

credits” for VOC when the source’s potential to emit exceeds 10

tons per year. 

Section 112 of the CAA requires EPA to set emission

standards for any HAP. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d). In 1990,

Congress amended section 112 to establish a statutory list of

HAPs. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1). Methanol is included on that

list. Id. EPA must promulgate technology-based National Emission

Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (“NESHAPs”) for categories

of sources that emit any HAP. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d). “These

emission standards are to be based not on an assessment of the

risks posed by HAPs, but instead on the maximum achievable

control technology (MACT) for sources in each category.” Sierra

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Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2004). EPA has not yet

promulgated any NESHAPs for dairies or other animal feeding

operations, therefore the EPA or the permitting authority, the

District, must make a final and effective case-by-case

determination that the emissions from a constructed major source

will be controlled to a level no less than MACT. The District

has implemented Rule 2550, Federally Mandated Preconstruction

Review for Major Sources of Air Toxics, “to provide an

administrative mechanism for implementing the preconstruction

review requirements of 40 C.F.R. part 63.40 through 63.44 [CAA

Section 112(g) Regulations for Major Sources] at major air toxic

sources.” San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District,

Regulation II - Permits, Rule 2550, Federally Mandated

Preconstruction for Major Sources of Air Toxics (Adopted June 18,

1998). 

B. Permitting and Construction of the Schakel Dairy

On December 17, 2003, Defendants obtained approval for a

special use permit from the Tulare County Planning Commission in

order to construct the Dairy. On December 18, 2003, Defendants

recorded acceptance of the conditions of approval and agreed to

comply with the conditions within the use permit. On January 6,

2004, Defendants obtained building permits for the Dairy and

obtained a building permit for a manure separator pit on November

1, 2004. Defendants allegedly began actual construction on the

Dairy on or after January 6, 2004, but prior to construction did

not obtain an ATC permit pursuant to CAA 42 U.S.C. 7604(a)(1). 

Nonetheless, Defendants constructed the Dairy to achieve the

maximum operational capacity prescribed by the special use

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permit. On July 16, 2007, the District proposed to grant the ATC

permit. (Doc. 218, Declaration of Melissa Foster (“Foster

Decl.”), Exhibit B1) The District ATC Application Review, stated

that it proposed to find the Dairy emitted less than 10 tons per

year of methanol and was “not a major air toxics source” and

therefore did not necessitate a MACT determination. (Doc. 218,

Foster Decl., Exhibit B2, p. 51) On September 17, 2007, AIR

submitted comments to the District on the proposed permit stating

that the Dairy was a major source of methanol and thus subject to

a MACT determination under Section 112. (Doc. 218, Foster Decl.,

Exhibit A, p. 4 and 9) The District, on December 4, 2007

approved the Dairy’s ATC permit and made a finding that the Dairy

was not a major source of HAP under CAA Section 112, applying its

emission factors for dairies, and therefore the Dairy did not

have to comply with any MACT requirements. (Doc. 218, Foster

Decl., Exhibit A, p. 9)

C. Dairy Cows and Methanol 

The Dairy emits methanol from cows’ enteric emissions,

freshly excreted manure, and decomposing feed stored at the

Dairy. The human health risks from methanol exposure include a

decrease in gestation time, an increase in the number of required

Caesarian-section births, and, in prenatally exposed children,

instances of a severe wasting syndrome, concentration-related

delay in sensorimotor development and lower performance on an

infant intelligence test. See also American Forest and Paper

Association v. EPA, 294 F.3d 113, 118-119 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(denying petition for review of EPA decision that denied industry

petition to delist methanol, citing 66 Fed. Reg. 21929, 21932-

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21935).

The Dairy is designed to house a maximum 5,832 Holstein milk

cows plus 5,058 support stock, as limited by the special use

permit. A 1,000 pound cow produces the waste of approximately 20

people. The Dairy produces the equivalent waste of a city of

approximately 275,000 people. 

Defendants have constructed, or are in the process of

constructing, eight freestall barns, four manure solid separation

lagoons, two liquid manure storage lagoons, corrals with flushed

alleys for support stock, a milking barn, and feed storage

facilities. These components comprise the Dairy facility and are

collectively a stationary source within the meaning of the CAA

and District Rule 2201. These components also constitute the

Dairy facility. The Dairy also has at least one diesel internal

combustion engine that is greater than 50 horsepower. The Dairy

facility will occupy 256 acres. Fred Schakel and the Schakel

Family Partnership own and operate the Dairy. 

Each of the eight freestall barns is 750 feet long and 102.5

feet wide and is equipped with a system that uses wastewater from

the liquid manure storage lagoons to flush the manure from the

freestall barns. The barns’ flush system captures 80% or more of

the 5,832 milk cows’s urine and feces and flushes the waste to

the liquid manure storage lagoons. The milk cows will be milked

three times per day in a centrally located milking barn, which is

equipped with a flush system similar to the freestall barns

except that fresh water is used to flush the cows’s waste to the

liquid manure storage lagoon. The support stock will be confined

in open, dirt lined corrals that are equipped with a flush system

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42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) provides: “Any person may commence 2

a civil action on his own behalf against any person who proposes

to construct or constructs any new or modified major emitting

facility without a permit required under... part D of title I

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on concrete lined feed alleys. The corrals’s flush system

captures 60% or more of the 5,058 support stock’s urine and feces

and flushes the waste to the liquid manure storage lagoons.

The Dairy has four solid separation lagoons where suspended

solids in the liquified waste settle out of the waste stream. 

Each solid separation lagoon is 1,200 feet long and approximately

50 feet wide. The Dairy has two liquid manure storage lagoons,

one measuring 400 feet wide by 1,000 feet long and the other

measuring 400 feet wide by 650 feet long. The total volume of

liquified waste storage is 10,024,848 cubic feet. Liquified

manure from the freestall barns and flushed alleys will enter the

solid separation lagoons, from which a portion of the manure

solids will be removed and composted, and the two liquid manure

storage lagoons will store the remaining liquified waste. The

liquid manure storage lagoons will also contain manure

contaminated wastewater and stormwater. The Dairy will use the

liquified waste from the liquid manure storage lagoons as

fertilizer for crops (alfalfa, wheat, and corn silage) grown on

1,550 acres. Feed will be stored at the southeast corner of the

Dairy facility, and solid manure will be shipped off-site for use

as fertilizer at nearby farming operations. 

D. Citizen Enforcement Action 

On June 1, 2006, AIR filed its complaint under CAA citizen

suit provisions 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 2

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(relating to non attainment).”

42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) provides: “Any person may commence 3

a civil action on his own behalf against any person who is

alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged

violation has been repeated) or to be in violation of (A) an

emission standard or limitation under this Act or (B) an order

issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a

standard or limitation...”

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7604(a)(1). On April 19, 2007, AIR sent a 60-day notice letter 3

for violations of section 112 of the CAA. AIR alleges in its

third claim that Defendants have violated section 112(g)(2)(B) of

the CAA and 40 C.F.R. § 63.42(c) by constructing a major source

of methanol, a HAP, without a Maximum Achievable Control

Technology (MACT) determination from the District. AIR seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief, the imposition of civil fines,

and attorney’s fees.

4. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request judicial notice of Authority to Construct

(ATC) Permit issued to the Dairy by the District on December 3,

2007. (Doc. 218, Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit

A to Foster Decl.) Defendants request judicial notice of San

Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District Application Review

for the Dairy (July 16, 2007). (Doc. 218, Defendants’ Request for

Judicial Notice, Exhibit B to Foster Decl.) The Permit and

Application for Review are proper for judicial notice as they are

self-authenticating documents pursuant to Federal Rules of

Evidence 902(5) - on their face they contain the letterhead of

the San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District (the

District) and the subject line of the ATC Permit materials state

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Plaintiff AIR seeks to have the court take judicial notice 4

of an expert declaration and its accompanying exhibits which

include a draft EPA scientific article and scientific articles to

establish the assertion that Defendants were aware that methanol

emissions existed from dairy cattle. (Doc. 214, Parker Decl. and

Doc. 218, Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice) David P.

Parker, a professor of Environmental Science and Engineering at

West Texas A&M specializing in agricultural waste management,

provides a declaration as an expert. AIR requests judicial

notice of an excerpt, attached as an exhibit to the Parker Decl.,

of an official public record produced by the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency titled “Emissions for Animal Feeding

Operations” and labeled as a “Draft”. (Parker Decl., Exhibit 1) 

AIR requests judicial notice of an excerpt of scientific journal

articles published in the Journal of Agricultural Engineering

Research, Transactions of the ASA, and the Journal of Dairy

Science. (Parker Decl., Exhibits 2, 3, and 4) Defendants object

to Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice on the grounds that

10

“Notice of Final Action - Authority to Construct Project Number:

S-1055047.” The documents therefore suggest they are official

publications issued by a public agency. In doing so this does

not turn this Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment. 

On a motion to dismiss, however, a court may take

judicial notice of facts outside the pleadings. Sears,

Roebuck & Co. v. Metropolitan Engravers, Ltd., 245 F.2d

67, 70 (9th Cir.1956); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal

Practice & Procedure, § 1363 at 659-60 (1969).

Moreover, a court may take judicial notice of “records

and reports of administrative bodies.” Interstate

Natural Gas Co. v. Southern California Gas Co., 209

F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir.1953). Therefore, on a motion

to dismiss a court may properly look beyond the

complaint to matters of public record and doing so does

not convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary

judgment. 

Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279,

1282 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. &

Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 111 (1991).4

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the proffered documents do not meet requirements of Federal Rules

of Evidence 201(b). Federal Rules of Evidence 201(b) states:

A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to

reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial

court or (2) capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned.

Fed. Rules Evid. 201(b). Parker’s Declaration addresses disputed

facts relating to the specific time Plaintiff’s assert the Dairy

should have known of the emissions. The EPA Report is a draft

report and the scientific articles, the basis of which is

disputable. These scientific articles, Draft EPA report and

expert declaration are provided as evidence for Plaintiff’s

allegation in its Complaint that Defendants had knowledge of

methanol emissions from the Dairy. Such an analysis involves a

weighing of evidence as the matters are in dispute and would

convert the Motion to Dismiss to a summary judgment proceeding. 

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is DENIED, except as

to the existence of the articles.

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Defendants request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

5. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to dismiss

may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” However, motions to dismiss under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. Gilligan

v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the Court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

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See also 42 U.S.C. § 7402(g) defining “emission standard 5

or limitation”:

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(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The question before the court is not whether the plaintiff

will ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether the plaintiff

could prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would

entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.

69, 73 (1984). “A complaint should not be dismissed unless it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van

Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted).

B. Mootness

In their third cause of action, AIR alleges that Defendants

are a “major source” of methanol and have failed to obtain a MACT

determination from the EPA or District prior to construction of

the Dairy in violation of section CAA 112(g)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. §

7412(g)(2)(B) and 40 C.F.R. § 63.42(c). AIR alleges such

violations are on-going and will continue unless remedied by an

order from the Court. AIR seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief, the imposition of civil fines, and attorney’s fees. 

These allegations are sufficient if taken as true to allege a

violation of the CAA section 112(g)(2)(B) under § 7604(a) of the

CAA. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a); 42 U.S.C. § 7604.5

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(f) “Emission standard or limitation under this

chapter” defined

For purposes of this section, the term “emission

standard or limitation under this chapter” means--

(3) any condition ...or any requirement under

section 7411 or 7412 [Clean Air Act, Hazardous

Air Pollution section which includes

112(g)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B)] of this

title (without regard to whether such

requirement is expressed as an emission standard

or otherwise);

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Defendants argue that they are not in violation of CAA

Section 112(g)(2)(B) and could not be in violation of CAA Section

112(g)(2)(B) as they did not “construct a major source” of

methanol, a listed HAP. The District recently determined, in

December 2007, in conducting its ATC permit analysis of the

Dairy, that the Dairy emits less than 10 tons per year of

methanol. Defendants argue that as a result they are not

required to obtain a MACT determination from the District since

only “major sources” of HAP, those that emit or have the

potential to emit more than ten tons per year of HAP, are

required to do so. Defendants argue this issue is now moot.

The Ninth Circuit describes the doctrine of mootness as “the

requirement that the controversy remain live even after the

plaintiff demonstrates initial standing.” Skysign Intern., Inc.

v. City and County of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir.

2002). To establish mootness, a defendant must show that the

court cannot order any effective relief. San Francisco Baykeeper,

Inc. V. Tosco Corporation, Diablo Services, Inc., 309 F.3d 1153,

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1159 (9th Cir. 2002). Defendants claiming mootness must satisfy

a “heavy burden of persuasion.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s seek to enforce Clean Air Act section

112(g)(2)(B) which states:

No person may construct or reconstruct any major source

of hazardous air pollutants, unless the Administrator

(or the State) determines that the maximum achievable

control technology emission limitation under this

section for new sources will be met. Such

determination shall be on a case-by-case basis where no

applicable emission limitations have been established

by the Administrator.

42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B).

Federal Regulations 40 C.F.R. § 63.41(1) defines “Construct

a major source” to mean:

To fabricate, erect, or install at any greenfield site

a stationary source or group of stationary sources

which is located within a contiguous area and under

common control and which emits or has the potential to

emit 10 tons per year of any HAP’s or 25 tons per year

of any combination of HAP,

40 C.F.R. § 63.41(1) (emphasis added).

No person may begin actual construction or reconstruction of

a “major source” of HAP unless: (1) the major source is regulated

by a NESHAP, and complies with such standard (in regards to

methanol, EPA has not established a NESHAP); or (2) the

permitting authority has made a final and effective case-by-case

determination pursuant to the provisions of 40 C.F.R. § 63.43

such that emissions from the constructed or reconstructed major

source will be controlled to a level no less stringent than the

MACT emission limitation for new sources. 40 C.F.R. § 63.42(c);

see also 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B).

Defendants argue that AIR’s action, which seeks injunctive

relief, is moot because Defendants have applied and received a

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The District received a letter on September 19, 2007 from 6

the attorney for the Center on Race, Poverty and Environment

(“CPRE”). The District provided a summary of its responses as

well as CRPE’s comments. Comments to District are received after

the District issues its preliminary decision to issue an ATC

permit. (Doc. 218)

The provision is applicable only to “applications to 7

construct or reconstruct a major air toxics source with Authority

15

final ATC permit from the District on December 3, 2007. The

District’s analysis for the ATC included an express calculation

of the methanol levels and found that based on the District’s

emission factors developed in 2005 that the Dairy was not a major

source of methanol, and no further calculations were required. 

As shown above, each individual HAP is expected to be

below 10 tons per year and total HAP emissions are

expected to be below 25 tons per year. The largest

individual HAP is methanol, at 5.5 tons per year (7.49

tons x 1.35 lbs-methanol/1.828 lbs-HAPs). Therefore,

this facility will not be a major air toxics source and

the provisions of Rule 2550 do not apply.

(Doc. 218, Foster Decl., District Application Review for the

Dairy, Exhibit B, p. 50-51). In the District’s response to

comments to the ATC, the District stated: 6

[B]ased on the current dairy emission factors,

emissions of each individual HAP from South Lakes Dairy

are expected to be below 10 tons per year and total HAP

emissions are expected to be below 25 tons per year. 

Therefore, this facility will not be a major air toxics

source and the provisions of Rule 2550 do not apply.

(Doc. 218, Authority to Construct Permit, District’s Responses to

Comments, Exhibit A, p. 6). District Rule 2550 was enacted by

the District to provide an administrative mechanism for

implementing the preconstruction review requirements of 40 CFR

part 63.40 through 63.44 at major air toxic sources. District

Rule 2550, § 1.7

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to Construct issued on or after June 28, 1998.” District Rule

2550, § 2.

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 Plaintiff’s allegations that the Dairy is a “major source”

is based on a study, made public in 2006, claiming the Dairy has

the potential to emit ten tons per year of methanol. Plaintiff

contends that Courts interpreting the CAA and the Clean Water Act

(“CWA”) have held that Congress allows citizen suits to proceed

in circumstances where the agency charged with implementing the

statute had found no permit was required, and the citizen suit

alleged such a permit was required. Here, Plaintiff contends,

while not a suit alleging the State agency failed to issue a

permit when one should be issued, this case is analogous in that

the District (the State Agency) found no MACT determination was

necessary and therefore none was undertaken, and it, alleges such

MACT determination is required. This court agrees.

Plaintiff cites several CAA, CWA and Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) decisions. While no one case and no

court has directly addressed a challenge under § 112(g)(2)(B) of

the CAA, there is guidance on addressing whether a citizen suit

may be brought where a state agency, here, the District, has

determined that the Dairy is not a major source of HAP and

therefore, no MACT determination is required under CAA §

112(g)(2)(B).

In Ass’n to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v.

Taylor Resources, Inc., 299 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002), a citizen

suit was bought under the CWA against a mussel-harvesting company

operating in the Puget Sound. Plaintiffs alleged the company

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 “Although these cases addressed circumstances in which the 8

citizen plaintiff was seeking to enforce the terms of an existing

pollution abatement plan or NPDES permit that had been approved

by the relevant agency, there is no sound reason to distinguish

between the cases cited above and this case. The plain language

of the Clean Water Act has created opportunity for citizen suit

when government agencies do not act.” Taylor, 299 F.3d at 1014

(citation omitted).

17

violated the CWA because it discharged pollutants that emitted

from mussels without an NPDES permit. The state agency in charge

of issuing NPDES permits, Ecology, determined a permit was not

required. Ecology would neither accept nor process an NPDES

permit application. The Court in Taylor permitted the citizen

suit to go forward. “Although the EPA or an authorized state

agency may be charged with enforcement of the Clean Water Act,

neither the text of the Act nor its legislative history expressly

grants to the EPA or such a state agency the exclusive authority

to decide whether the release of a substance into the waters of

the United States violates the Clean Water Act.” Id. at 1012. 

The Court also noted that the CWA citizen suit provision is

similar to the CAA citizen suit provision and relied on CAA cases

as well as CWA cases for its determination that Ecology was not a

necessary party to the citizen suit “when that agency has decided

that an NPDES permit is not required.” Id. at 1014. 

8

Plaintiff also cites Association of Irritated Residents v.

C&R Vanderham Dairy, NO. CIVF051593 AWISMS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

96061 at *26-33, 2006 WL 2644896, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 14, 2006)

(Vanderham II). In Vanderham II, AIR brought suit under CAA 42

U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1), alleging violation of an emission standard

or limitation. The District had determined that no ATC permit

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On the issue of res judicata, the Vanderham II court found 9

that the District's 2005 letter was not res judicata, neither the

letter nor the determination was “litigation,” the letter not

being final judgment. AIR was not a party to the letter nor the

determination by the District. 

“Because of the similarities between the Clean Water 10

Act's, the Clean Air Act's, and the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act's respective citizen suit provisions, cf. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365 with 42 U.S.C. § 7604 with 42 U.S.C. § 6972, courts “have

relied on cases interpreting the citizen suit provisions in each

of these statutes to interpret the other's citizen suit

provision.” Vanderham II, 2006 US DIST LEXIS 96061, at *28(citing

Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1997)).

Under the CAA citizen suit provision, it states, in relevant

part,

(a) Authority to bring civil action; jurisdiction

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any

person may commence a civil action on his own behalf--

(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and

(ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the

extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the

Constitution) who is alleged to have violated (if there is

evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated) or to

be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation

under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the

18

was required. AIR did not challenge the District’s decision

regarding the permit nor had AIR sued the District. The

challenge to AIR’s suit was based on res judicata grounds.9

However, the Court held that AIR could proceed with its citizen

suit notwithstanding the District’s decision that a “permit” was

not required. Id. at *27-28. “The plain language of the statute

is broad enough to cover cases where a defendant has failed to

obtain a permit (for whatever reason), and cases where a

defendant is violating a term or condition of a permit.” Id. at

*27; see also Saint John's Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito 10

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Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or

limitation,

42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1).

Under the CWA citizen suit provision, it states, in relevant

part,

(a) Authorization; jurisdiction

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and

section 1319(g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence a

civil action on his own behalf--

(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and

(ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the

extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the

Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an

effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an

order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to

such a standard or limitation, or

33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).

19

Abatement Dist., No. CV-04-87-S-BLW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63224,

2007 WL 2461990 at *2 (D. Idaho Aug. 27, 2007)(“As long as a

citizen complies with the statutory prerequisites to bringing an

action [under CWA], the district court has jurisdiction to decide

whether a permit is required for a discharge even if the EPA has

determined otherwise.”)

Plaintiff also argues that the District, the state agency,

responsible for implementing CAA is not a required party. This

is correct. See Vanderham II, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96061 at *28

(“In both Weiler and Taylor Res., a citizen suit was brought

against defendants who had been told by the appropriate

permitting agency that various permits were not

required.[citation] In neither Weiler nor Taylor Res. was the

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presence of the governmental agency required.”); Association to

Protect Hammersley, Eld, & Trotten Inlets v. Taylor Resources,

299 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We adopt the views of the

Second Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit in Clean Air

Act cases where they accepted citizen suits without requiring

joinder of a responsible government agency. In those Clean Air

Act cases, it was the EPA that was not joined; in our Clean Water

Act case, it is the delegated state agency that is not joined and

that previously had determined that an NPDES permit is not

required. The principle is the same: Whether a citizen is seeking

to enforce the terms of an NPDES permit or a pollution abatement

plan or, as here, the statutory requirements of the Clean Water

Act, it is the government agency's alleged failure to act that

brings the citizen suit into play.”); Weiler v. Chatham Forest

Products, 392 F.3d 532, 537-539 (2d Cir. 2004). 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on mootness grounds is DENIED

C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants also assert in their Supplemental Reply that

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust it administrative remedies and

“did not, and had not, appealed the District’s determination

pursuant to California Health & Safety Code section 42302.1.”

(Doc. 254, Suppl. Reply, p. 3:7-8) However, the CAA does not

contain an express requirement of exhaustion of state remedies. 

The CAA citizen suit provision provides that “district courts

shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in

controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce an

emission standard or limitation.” 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). The only

requirement under the CAA citizen suit provision is the 60-day

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 Within 30 days of any decision or action pertaining to 11

the issuance of a permit by a district, or within 30 days after

mailing of the notice of issuance of the permit to any person who

has requested notice, or within 30 days of the publication and

mailing of notice provided for in Section 1 of Chapter 1131 of

the Statutes of 1993, any aggrieved person who, in person or

through a representative, appeared, submitted written testimony,

or otherwise participated in the action before the district may

21

notice requirement. AIR asserts that it sent on April 19, 2007,

a 60-day notice to the Dairy “to enforce section 112, 42 U.S.C. §

7412, pursuant to § 304(a)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §

7604(a)(1).” The letter is attached to the Complaint and is

undisputed in this motion. (Doc. 153, Complaint, ¶ 13, Exhibit

3). In Association of Irritated Residents v. C&R Vanderham, 435

F.Supp.2d 1078, 1088 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (Vanderham I), the Court

also stated the same: “With respect to a statutory mandate, the

text of § 7604 does not contain an express exhaustion of state

remedies requirement.” cf. Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Union

Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111, 1119 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Furthermore, 33

U.S.C. § 1365 [CWA citizen suit provision] makes no mention of

exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite for bringing a

citizen suit.”) 

Defendants appear to concede this point in their

Supplemental Reply: “While some courts have required that there

be a statutory exhaustion of state remedies, that is not the case

here.” (Doc. 254, Suppl. Reply, p. 5:7-8) Defendants however,

are requesting a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement. 

Defendants argue that the District rules provide a procedure to

appeal the issuance of a permit, citing to Cal. H&S Code §

42302.1 ; District Regulation V, Rules 5010 et seq. Defendants 11

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request the hearing board of the district to hold a public

hearing to determine whether the permit was properly issued.

Except as provided in Section 1 of Chapter 1131 of the Statutes

of 1993, within 30 days of the request, the hearing board shall

hold a public hearing and shall render a decision on whether the

permit was properly issued.

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contend that Plaintiff could have filed a petition to challenge

the District’s issuance of the ATC permit and determinations

therein and the District’s Hearing Board would have been required

to hold a hearing within thirty days of the filing of Plaintiff’s

petition. Defendants argue that the District would have been

able to develop the necessary factual background, apply any

special expertise and correct its own errors. While these

arguments are compelling, Congress’s failure to require

exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive. 

Congress declined to require exhaustion of administrative

remedies under the citizen suit act of the CAA, and provided more

than one avenue for citizens to challenge alleged violations

under the CAA. The Ninth Circuit in Taylor, addressing the

citizen suit provision under the CWA, noted that the state agency

in charge of issuing the permit did not possess exclusive

authority to decide violations under the CWA. “Although the EPA

or an authorized state agency may be charged with enforcement of

the Clean Water Act, neither the text of the Act nor its

legislative history expressly grants to the EPA or such a state

agency the exclusive authority to decide whether the release of a

substance into the waters of the United States violates the Clean

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Water Act.” Taylor, 299 F.3d at 1012. The Vanderham II, 2006 US

Dist. LEXIS 96061, at *33, Court’s decision is instructive in

that AIR did not challenge the District’s decision nor was the

District sued. The Vanderham II Court held that “[d]espite the

District's determination that Vanderham required no ATC permit

and the absence of the District from this suit, AIR may pursue

its claims under 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) for violations of the SIP

(District Rules 2010 and 2201) in this Court.” Id.

The only requirement for filing a citizen suit is the 60-day

notice, an express procedural requirement, requiring the

plaintiff to provide notice of the alleged violation to the EPA,

the State and to the alleged violator. The CAA citizen suit

provision does not have a requirement that a state agency in

charge of implementing portions of the CAA be sued if a citizen

is challenging a provision under the CAA.. 

(b) Notice

No action may be commenced--

(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section--

(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given

notice of the violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii)

to the State in which the violation occurs, and (iii)

to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or

order, or

42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(A). The only restriction imposed by

Congress is if either the EPA Administrator or the State decides

to bring an enforcement action within the sixty days, the citizen

suit provision forbids a plaintiff from bringing an independent

action. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B). 

Here, the Air Pollution Control Officer of the District was

provided with Plaintiff’s sixty days’ notice but the District did

not bring an enforcement action and therefore, AIR proceeded on

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Defendants are no longer seeking a stay of the suit 12

pending a determination by the District, as the District has made

its determination in the recently issued ATC permit. See Doc.

218, Reply, p. 11:7-10. 

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its own. (Doc. 153, Complaint, Exhibit 3, April 19, 2007 60-day

Notice Letter, p. 7) The sixty-day notice gave the District an

opportunity to address the allegation that the Dairy was to

“construct a major source” and therefore require a MACT

determination. The District declined to take any action or start

proceedings to address this allegation. That is all the CAA

citizen suit provision requires and while Defendants’ arguments

are persuasive, they do not overcome the broad language of the

citizen suit language and the non-exclusive role of the State

Agency under the CAA. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on exhaustion grounds is

DENIED.

D. Primary Jurisdiction and Fair Notice

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss also advances two additional

arguments (1) primary jurisdiction rested with the District and

(2) Defendants did not have fair notice.12

I. Primary Jurisdiction 

Defendants argue that the District and the EPA have primary

jurisdiction over these technical issues raised in Plaintiff’s

third cause of action. In response, Plaintiff contends that this

case does not meet the criteria application of the primary

jurisdiction doctrine and specifically, the CAA does not allow

for primary jurisdiction.

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Defendants cite to four factors under Ninth Circuit

authority to establish primary jurisdiction: (1) the need to

resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by Congress within the

jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory

authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry or

activity to a comprehensive regulatory authority that (4)

requires expertise or uniformity in administration. Syntek

Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 781 (9th

Cir. 2002). Primary jurisdiction applies where “Congress, in

enacting a regulatory scheme, intends an administrative body to

have the first word on issues arising in judicial proceedings.”

U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir.

1987). Because no approved emission factors for determining

emissions of methanol from dairies were available at the time of

construction of the Dairy, Defendants contend that the

determination of whether the Dairy is a major source should wait

until the EPA or the District makes such a determination. 

Defendants in addition, contend that the Court in making a

determination of whether the Dairy is a major source of HAP would

be establishing emission estimating methodology for all dairies

that would require scientific and technical expertise. 

Plaintiff responds that the primary jurisdiction doctrine

undermines Congress's enforcement scheme under the CAA and this

Court should follow the lead of other District Courts that have

not found primary jurisdiction under the CAA. Plaintiff also

contends that Congress did not give the EPA or the States the

exclusive role in determining emissions from sources of pollution

and a court can and should weigh expert testimony including

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testimony on whether the Dairy emits more than ten tons per year

of methanol. There is no need to defer to agencies on this

issue.

Plaintiff cites several CAA cases addressing the primary

jurisdiction doctrine under the CAA, CWA and RCRA. While no

Court has directly addressed whether the primary jurisdiction

applies in a § 112(g)(2)(B) CAA suit, the cases are nonetheless

instructive that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not

apply in this suit and the general direction is to not apply the

doctrine. A Kansas District Court in Anderson v. Farmland

Industries, 45 F.Supp.2d 863 (D. Kan. 1999), addressed the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction in a citizen suit brought under

the CAA for the alleged underreporting of emissions. Relying on

decisions brought under the CAA and RCRA, the Court declined to

apply the doctrine arguing that the CAA expressly provides

conditions under which a citizen suit is barred (e.g. formal

proceedings brought by the state). The Court also stated that

its determination of whether emissions were being underreported

was within its competence to determine and such determination

would not duplicate the agency’s role. The Court further noted

that to apply such doctrine would frustrate the purpose of the

CAA since Congress pre-established the jurisdiction between

Courts through the citizen suit notice provisions. “As set forth

above, plaintiffs essentially are seeking an order precluding

defendant from violating the Clean Air Act and its regulations.”

Id. at 868. Similarly L.E.A.D. Group of Berks v. Exide Corp.,

Civ. No. 96-3030, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2672, 1999 WL 124473 (D.

Pa. Feb. 19, 1999), a Pennsylvania District Court decision is

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instructive in that the Court stated in response to a suit

alleging violations under the CAA and CWA:

In determining liability under the CWA or CAA, there

are no determinations which require technical or policy

considerations because we need only decide whether

Defendants have violated the limitations required by

their NPDES or air quality permits. Finally, there is

no substantial danger of inconsistent rulings or a risk

of interfering with federal and state administrative

oversight because Congress has expressly set forth

situations in which a citizen suit is precluded for

those reasons under the CWA, see 33 U.S.C. §

1365(b)(1), and the CAA, see 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1).

Id. at *21. The Court observed that to apply the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction would greatly reduce the instances in which

a plaintiff could pursue such an action to facilitate broad

enforcement of the environmental protection laws and regulations. 

The case was a simple issue of whether Defendant Exide violated

provisions of statute and applicable federal rules. 

The Colorado District Court in Sierra Club v. Tri-State

Generation and Transmission Ass'n, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 275 (D. Colo.

1997), also addressed a citizen suit brought under the CAA and

the Colorado Air Quality Control Act: “Like the majority of these

courts, I find that applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

to citizen suits would frustrate Congress's intent, as evidenced

by its provisions for citizen suits, to facilitate broad

enforcement of environmental-protections laws and regulations.”

Id. at 284; see also Paper, Allied-Indus., Chemical and Energy

Workers Intern. Union v. Continental Carbon Company, No.

CIV-04-438-F, 2005 WL 1389431, at *15 (W.D. Okla. Jun. 10, 2005)

(“The majority of federal cases addressing the issue have found

the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to be inapplicable to suits

brought under the citizen suit provisions of the CAA.”); Sierra

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Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1271 (D.

Colo. 2002) (overruled on other grounds) (“I am not persuaded on

the record before me that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

applies to this citizen suit [under the CWA] ... The court is

competent to determine whether the defendant has been

‘discharging’ ‘pollutants’ from a ‘point source’ into ‘navigable

waters’ without a permit ... Expert testimony will assist the

court in resolving any complex technical issues presented.”);

PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir.

1998) (refusing to apply doctrine to action filed under RCRA),

cert. denied, 142 L. Ed. 2d 772, 119 S. Ct. 871 (1999); Williams

v. Alabama DOT, 119 F. Supp.2d 1249, 1256 (M.D. Ala. 2000)

(“Primary jurisdiction is particularly inappropriate in

situations involving a statute like RCRA, which expressly allow

for citizens to bring suit in order to ensure uniform enforcement

of federal environmental laws.”); but see Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990 (D. Kan. 1997) (applying

doctrine to action filed under RCRA when agency was in the midst

of its remediation effort and because the relief the plaintiff

sought would have undermined that effort).

In Wilson v. Amoco Corp., 989 F.Supp. 1159, 1170 (D. Wyo.

1997), a citizen suit brought under RCRA and CWA, the District

Court addressed the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,

specifically the Court’s alleged lack of expertise and the

Court’s obligation to hear the suit: 

Determinations regarding the adequacy of groundwater

and contaminant sampling and appropriate remediation

techniques are not dealt with by courts on a daily

basis. That fact alone, however, is not a sufficient

basis for denying jurisdiction. It must be shown that

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courts in general lack the competence to efficiently

and effectively resolve the issue. Other courts have

held, and this Court agrees, that questions posed by

RCRA and the CWA are not so esoteric or complex as to

foreclose their consideration by the judiciary... There

is an additional, overriding reason for courts to hear

RCRA and CWA cases despite their supposed unique

nature: Congress has told us to. Both RCRA and the CWA

explicitly empower citizens to enforce the Acts'

provisions except in certain circumstances not present

here. This Court could not in good faith unilaterally

strip United States citizens of rights given them by

their government.

Id. at 1170; see also Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East

Bay Mun. Util. Dist., NO. CIV. S-91-1372 LKK, 1993 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 8364, at * 29 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 1993) (CWA suit where the

Court declined to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction:

“Deferring to the EPA proceeding on the basis of primary

jurisdiction in this case would undermine the citizen suit

provision of the Act as the primary enforcement mechanism for

water pollution regulation. [citation] As has been observed,

given Congress' judgment, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

should be invoked sparingly where it would serve to preempt a

citizen's suit.”)

Here, Defendants have not shown that it was Congress’s

intent to grant primary jurisdiction to the District and EPA to

the exclusion of the courts. On the contrary, the citizen suit

provision provides limitations and Congress has shown its intent

on balancing the role of the EPA, the District and the Courts to

address violations under the CAA. Congress has provided broad

federal enforcement powers to citizens. In addition, Defendants

have failed to show the Court does not have the competence and

ability to effectively resolve CAA issues. And to abstain from

addressing CAA violations because of the involvement of

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scientific and technical expertise, would foreclose many of the

citizen suits filed, as the CAA regularly involves

specialization, technical and scientific expertise that would in

most cases support the administrative agency deciding the issue. 

Congress, long-aware of this issue, has not prohibited Courts

from addressing such suits under the CAA. A finding by the Court

that the Dairy is a major source of HAP does not conflict with

any orders or plans of the EPA or District. Neither the EPA nor

the District have brought an enforcement action against the

Dairy.

As Wilson states: “In short, Defendants would have this

Court wield the tool of primary jurisdiction to surrender its

statutorily imposed duty to entertain and decide this action.

Such an application of that doctrine would do injustice to the

equally long-standing principal that Courts of the United States

‘have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which

is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the

other would be treason to the Constitution .’” 989 F.Supp. at

1170. (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 403, 5

L.Ed. 257 (1821)). Defendants have not established that the

factors of primary jurisdiction are present.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on primary jurisdiction

grounds is DENIED.

II. Fair Notice

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of

action on the ground that there was a lack of fair notice,

specifically lack of knowledge of the emission factors to

determine if the Dairy was emitting more than the permitted

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Grayned addressed the fair notice doctrine in the 13

criminal context, an area of the law where it most often arises,

and noted three important reasons for due process protection in

the face of a law that is vague. Two of the three factors are

important, the third addresses an issue related to the First

Amendment. One, is the concern that vague laws “may trap the

31

amount of HAP. Plaintiff rejoins that the Fair Notice doctrine

is not applicable; the lack of emission factors at the time of

the construction is not dispositive as to Fair Notice. 

Due process requires that an agency provide “fair notice of

what conduct is prohibited before a sanction can be imposed.”

Stillwater Mining Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review

Comm'n, 142 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting Newell v.

Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir.1996)); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.

FMSHRC, 681 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.1982) (finding that relevant

safety standard under Federal Mine Safety and Health Review

Commission was aimed at preventing electrical shock and did not

provide fair notice that it was applicable to non-electrical

portion of equipment). “Due process requires that parties

receive fair notice before being deprived of property.” General

Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir.1995) “In the

absence of notice-for example, where the regulation is not

sufficiently clear to warn a party about what is expected of

it-an agency may not deprive a party of property by imposing

civil or criminal liability.” Id. Sufficient notice is given

when a “person of ordinary intelligence [has] a reasonable

opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act

accordingly.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108

(1972). 

13

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innocent by not providing fair warning.” Id. at 108. Second, is

the if “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be

prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who

apply them.” Id.

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Fair notice challenges are most common in the criminal

context, the “no punishment without notice” rule, and regarding

challenges to a regulation, the most common challenge to the

agency’s interpretation of the regulatory language. See General

Elec. Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 53 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

Here, Defendants do not challenge the agency’s interpretation of

the regulation or the regulation language itself - because the

regulation language is clear: if Defendants emit more than ten

tons of any HAP per year, they are subject to a MACT

determination. Methanol is a listed HAP and is emitted by

dairies. Rather, Defendants claim lack of fair notice, because

there were no emission factor standards for determining if they

emit more than ten tons per year, as stated by the regulation. 

Defendants argue that they did not have fair notice of CAA

section 112(g)(2)(B) requirements because there were no emission

factors established by the EPA or the District, let alone an

explicit emission factor test for determining whether the Dairy

emitted more than 10 tons per year of methanol (making it a major

source of HAP subject to a MACT determination under CAA §

112(g)(2)(B)) prior to the construction of the Dairy in 2004. 

Defendants cite for support Plaintiff’s previously filed motion

for leave to amend arguments in which Plaintiff alleged that

research released by the California Air Resources Board in June

2006 formed the basis for its assertion that Defendants were

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required to undergo a case-by-case MACT determination for

methanol for the Dairy because they had the potential to emit

more than 10 tons per year of methanol. This evidence had

apparently become publicly available in the summer or fall of

2006. Defendants use this allegation and information proffered

by Plaintiff in its earlier motion for leave to amend, to

demonstrate that the Dairy could not have known before

construction began and at the time of construction of the Dairy,

in the early part of 2004, the emission factors necessary to make

a determination that it was to “construct a major source” of HAP

requiring a MACT determination. 

Defendants rely on a District Court of Columbia District

case General Electric v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

Fair notice is given if “by reviewing the regulations and other

public statements issued by the agency, a regulated party acting

in good faith would be able to identify, with ‘ascertainable

certainty,’ the standards with which the agency expects parties

to conform.” General Electric, 53 F.3d at 1329; see e.g. Hoffman

Const. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Com'n, 546

F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding the regulation that requires

the employer provide protective equipment where a need for such

gear is created, did not provide a specific standard, as the need

for such gear arises when the need arises and therefore such

standard is vague). 

An Indiana District Court addressed the doctrine of fair

notice, U.S. v. Cinergy Corp., 495 F.Supp.2d 892 (S.D. Ind.

2007), in a suit brought by the government against gas and

electric companies for alleged violation of the CAA new source

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review permit provisions, in which the defendants argued they did

not have fair notice of the EPA’s interpretation of the standards

for routine maintenance, repair or replacement exclusion (RMRR)

and standards for determining whether their projects would cause

significant emissions increases. The defendants fair notice

defense failed for several reasons, and the Indiana Court cited

several factors relevant to determine whether a regulated party

has fair notice of an agency’s interpretation of its regulations:

(1) plain language of the regulation; (2) other public statements

by the agency; (3) consistency of agency’s public statements; (4)

an agency’s pre-enforcement efforts; and (5) whether a confused

party makes an inquiry about the meaning of the regulation. Id.

at 900-901; General Electric v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1329-34 (D.C.

Cir. 1995). 

The fair notice doctrine, Plaintiff argues does not require

regulators to provide notice of the factual means to determine

compliance with the law. Further, the CAA is a strict liability

statute making Defendants’ knowledge or intent on the part of

Defendants irrelevant for liability purposes. The Dairy had

notice of methanol emissions, as studies and reports documenting

methanol emissions from livestock predate the Dairy’s 2004

construction.

In determining if a regulation violates the fair notice

doctrine, courts have considered the plain language of the

regulation itself to determine if the defendant had fair notice

or lack of fair notice of how the administrative agency would

interpret the regulation. See U.S. v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds

of Shark Fins, 2008 WL 696907 at *3-4 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2008);

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“The degree of vagueness that the Constitution 14

tolerates-as well as the relative importance of fair notice and

fair enforcement-depends in part on the nature of the enactment.

Thus, economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness

test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because

businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior

carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in

advance of action. Indeed, the regulated enterprise may have the

ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own

inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process. The Court has

also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather

than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision

are qualitatively less severe.” Id. at 498-499.

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Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review

Commission, 790 F.2d 154, 155-156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(finding Gates

& Fox were not given adequate notice. The OSHA regulation

requiring employers to provide emergency breathing equipment for

employees in “advancing face” of tunnel and “areas where

employees might be trapped” could reasonably be read to refer to

areas near advancing face only; OSHA failed to “give fair notice”

that such equipment was necessary in all area where employees

might be trapped.) “[A] scienter requirement may mitigate a

law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of

notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.”

Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,

455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982). There is a strong presumption that

regulations are not unconstitutionally vague if the regulated

party has the means of obtaining clarification either by making

inquiry or through an administrative process. Id. at 498.14

Here the plain language of the regulation provides

sufficient notice to Defendants of their obligations under the

CAA. The standard existed. The Dairy could not “construct a

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major source” of HAP unless the District or the EPA determined

the MACT limitation would be met. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g)(2)(B). The

agency provide regulations identifying a “major source.” The

regulations provided that to “construct a major source” includes

any stationary source(s) which “emits or has the potential to

emit 10 tons per year of any HAP’s or 25 tons per year of any

combination of HAP...” 40 C.F.R. § 63.41. Methanol is listed as

a HAP. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1). There is no legal authority

provided that it was the responsibility of the state or the EPA

to calculate the emissions. It was the responsibility of the

Dairy, who chose to operate in this industry and is knowledgeable

that cows cause emissions that effect air quality to determine

the type of emissions and the quantity of such emissions. The

Dairy may not know the amount, but since it is in this business

it is their responsibility to calculate by reasonable means

necessary the emissions of the Dairy. There is no ambiguity in

the language. Defendants do not allege that they attempted to

make any calculations on whether they emitted more than ten tons

per year of methanol prior to construction of the Dairy and have

not alleged they requested an applicability determination from

the District prior to construction. Defendants have not alleged

that any calculations are so esoteric that no reasonable dairy

operator or owner with the assistance of a knowledgeable expert

would not be able to verify the emissions from its dairy. 

Further, Defendants have not provided any case law requiring the

EPA or the District to provide information on how to calculate

the emissions from the Dairy.

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A further inquiry remains which has not been fully briefed: 

Does the Fair Notice doctrine even apply in this type of

challenge? Since even if the EPA or the District published

emission factors, the EPA and the District do not have the

exclusive authority under the CAA to determine if a party is in

violation of 112(g)(2)(B), and a party could bring a suit in

federal court, similar to the permitting cases, finding that a

MACT determination is required, even though the District found it

was not required.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on fair notice grounds is

DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

bb4ed UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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