Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02082/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02082-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Oscar Lee Traynor, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Winnebago Industries, Inc. &

Workhorse Custom Chassis Inc.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 03-2082-PHX-DGC

ORDER

On August 3, 2005, the Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims

against Winnebago. Doc. #159. The Court held that Winnebago’s warrant y was limited

and that Plaintiff therefore was not entitled to the statutory refund or replacement remedies

of 15 U.S.C. § 2304. Id. at 2-5. The Court also held that Plaintiff had failed t o raise a

question of fact as to whet her Winnebago had breached its limited warranty. Id. at 5-8.

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of this ruling. See Doc. ##164, 170, 174. 

Plaintiff argues that the Sunova’s steering problem was caused by improper weight

distribution in the Winnebago body and not solely by the Workhorse chassis, citing

paragraph 39 of his amended statement of facts in op position to Winnebago’s motion for

summary judgment. But Plaintiff did not make this argument in response to Winnebago’s

mot ion. Plaintiff briefed the motion extensively. He filed a response (Doc. #134), an

amended response (Doc. #136), a statement of facts (Doc. #135), an amended statement of

facts (Doc. #137), a motion to supplement his response (Doc. #149), a second motion to

Case 2:03-cv-02082-DGC Document 181 Filed 12/01/05 Page 1 of 4
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supplement (Doc. #150), a third motion to supplement (Doc. #155), and a fourth motion to

supplement (Doc. #157). In all of t his briefing Plaintiff never argued that the Sunova’s

steering problem was caused by improper weight distribution. 

Although it is now appears that the latter portion of the thirty-line paragraph 39 in

his amended statement of facts contained the assertion that the steering problem was

caused by improper weight distribution, Plaintiff never cited p aragraph 39 for this

proposition in his response to Winnebago’s motion. Plaintiff cited p aragraph 39 for the

entirely different propositions that he purchased the motor home (amended response at 1)

and that it was a single product (id. at 3, 6, 9). 

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court does not have an

obligation to “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact .” Keenan v.

Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). As another court has famously stated, “[j]udges

are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the briefs.” United States v. Dinkel, 927 F.2d

955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991). Moreover, motions for reconsideration are not the place for parties

to make new argument s not raised in their original briefs. See Northwest Acceptance

Corp. v . Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988). For this reason, the

Court will not reconsider its ruling that Plaintiff failed to create an issue of fact as to

whether Winnebago breached its limited warranty.

The Court also disagrees with Plaint iff’s remaining arguments. Despite the evidence

that Plaintiff does not understand “exactly what components make the chassis,” Affidavit

¶ 16, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that he expected the term “chassis” to exclude the

steering when he bought the Sunova and agreed to the terms of the limited warranty.

Moreover, this issue is not central to the Court’s conclusion that the Sunova warrant y was

limited and excluded certain parts of t he Sunova, thereby excusing the warranty from the

requirements of § 2304. See Order at 4. 

Likewise, Plaintiff’s evidence does not show that Winnebago made rep resentations

in its marketing materials that contradicted the limited warranty. Plaintiff’s evidence merely

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recites his general expectation t hat t he warranty would be full because none of

Winnebago’s advertisements specified that the warranty was limited. See PSOF ¶ 2, 18-19.

Plaintiff’s evidence still falls short of showing affirmative conduct by Winnebago to

“induce[] [Plaintiff] to believe in certain material facts” regarding the warrant y. Ray v.

Mangum, 788 P.2d 62, 67 (Ariz . 1989). The evidence shows that Winnebago gave a limited

warranty and never conveyed any contrary information to Plaintiff.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in concluding that the remedies of the

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act are not available in this case. The Court has already

addressed this issue at length. See Order at 2-5. A motion for reconsideration is not the

time to ask the Court to rethink what it has already t hought. United States v. Rezzonico,

32 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998). 

Citing to footnote 11 in his amended response to Winnebago’s mot ion, Plaintiff

suggests that his reasonableness argument is asserted under § 2310, not § 2304, and that

the Court therefore erred in basing its ruling on § 2304. Plaintiff argued in his amended

resp onse (Doc. #136) that the refund and replacement remedies of § 2304 were available,

notwithst anding the limited nature of this warranty, because the standards of § 2304 spoke

only to limitations on t he duration of implied warranties, the exclusion of certain damages,

and remedies for a breach of warranty, none of which – Plaintiff asserted – applied to this

warranty. Id. Clearly, Plaintiff was trying to maintain his right t o obtain the remedies of

§ 2304. To the extent Plaint iff now seeks to change his argument, he may not do so in a

motion for reconsideration.

Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to consolidate this case with

CV-03-1290. Doc. #158. The Court is advised that Judge Bolton, presiding over

CV-03-1290, has already denied the mot ion and that the parties have settled that action.

The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion to consolidate as moot.

Because of the delay caused by ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the

deadlines established in the Order of Oct ober 26, 2005 (Doc. #179) will be extended by

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approximately 30 days. The Court will issue an Amended Order Setting Final Pretrial

Conference that establishes the new deadlines.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. #164) is denied.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate Cases (Doc. #158) is denied.

3. Plaintiff's Joint Motion for Extension of Time is granted in part as will be set

forth in an Amended Order Setting Final Pretrial Conference.

DATED this 1st day of December, 2005.

Case 2:03-cv-02082-DGC Document 181 Filed 12/01/05 Page 4 of 4