Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00096/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00096-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DANIEL R. BASHAM and CAROLE

BASHAM,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

PACIFIC FUNDING GROUP, a

California business entity,

form unknown; MORTGAGE

ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION

SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware

corporation; WELLS FARGO HOME

MORTGAGE, INC., a California

corporation, dba AMERICA’S

SERVICE COMPANY; CITIBANK N.A.

AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE FOR BSARM

2007-2, a business entity,

form unknown; and NDEX WEST,

L.L.C., a Delaware

corporation,

Defendants. /

NO. 2:10-cv-96 WBS GGH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Daniel R. Basham and Carole Basham brought

this action against defendants Pacific Funding Group (“Pacific”),

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Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), Wells

Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., dba America’s Service Company (“ASC”),

Citibank N.A. as Indenture Trustee for BSARM 2007-2 (“Citibank”)

and NDEX West, L.L.C. (“NDEX”) alleging various federal and state

claims arising out of plaintiffs’ mortgage transaction. 

Presently before the court is defendant ASC’s motion to dismiss

the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 30.) 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On or about September 27, 2005, plaintiffs obtained a

loan from the now-bankrupt subprime loan originator and reseller

American Home Mortgage (“AHM”) in order to refinance their home,

located at 110 Bewicks Circle in Sacramento, California (the

“Subject Property”). (FAC ¶ 15.) This loan was secured by a

Deed of Trust on the property. (Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”)

(Docket No. 39) Ex. A.) The Deed of Trust listed North American

Title Company as Trustee, American Brokers Conduit as the lender,

and MERS as the nominal beneficiary for the lender and the

lender’s successors and assigns. (Id.) 

In October 2008, plaintiffs began experiencing

financial problems and defaulted on their mortgage; sometime

thereafter they allegedly contacted ASC to discuss loan

modification. (Id.) In May 2009, plaintiffs requested a loan

modification from ASC which was subsequently denied. (Id. ¶ 19.) 

NDEX recorded a Notice of Default on July 8, 2009. (RJN Ex. B.) 

In September 2009, plaintiffs submitted a second loan

modification application to ASC. This application was also

denied. (FAC ¶ 20.) 

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A Trustee’s sale of plaintiffs’ property was scheduled

for January 14, 2010, but plaintiffs were granted a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction against the sale. 

(See Mot. to Dismiss (Docket No. 38), at 4; Docket Nos 1, 24-25.) 

Plaintiffs initiated this action on January 13, 2010, and filed a

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on April 5, 2010. (Docket Nos.

1, 34.) 

II. Discussion 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead

“only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). This “plausibility standard,” however, “asks for more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,”

and where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent

with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566

U.S. ---, ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (U.S. 2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57). In deciding whether a plaintiff

has stated a claim, the court must assume that the plaintiff’s

allegations are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556,

561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court is not required to

accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory,

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In

re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).

In general, a court may not consider items outside the

pleadings in deciding a motion to dismiss, but may consider items

of which it takes judicial notice. Barron v. Raich, 13 F.3d

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1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). A court may take judicial notice of

facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” because they are either

“(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the

trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by

resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. ASC requests that the court

take judicial notice of the following publicly recorded documents

associated with the Subject Property: (1) the Deed of Trust, (2)

the Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust,

(3) the Assignment of Deed of Trust, (4) the Substitution of

Trustee, and (5) the Notice of Trustee’s Sale. (RJN Exs. A-E

(Docket No. 39).) The court will take judicial notice of these

documents, since they are matters of public record whose accuracy

cannot be questioned. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d

668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).

A. Negligence Per Se

Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for negligence per se

alleges that all defendants are negligent because they violated

California Civil Code sections 2923.5 and 2924. (FAC ¶ 29.) 

Negligence per se is an evidentiary presumption that a party

failed to exercise due care if: 

(1) he violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of

a public entity; 

(2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to

a person or property; 

(3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence of

the nature within the statute, ordinance, or regulation

was designed to prevent; and 

(4) the person suffering the death or the injury to his

person or property was one of the class of persons for

whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation

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was adopted. 

Cal. Evid. Code § 669. California Civil Code section 2924

provides a “comprehensive statutory framework” that governs the

non-judicial foreclosure process. Moeller v. Lien, 25 Cal. App.

4th 822, 834 (1994); see Cal. Civ. Code § 2924 (listing, inter

alia, the requirements for a properly filed notice of default and

the timing and process for the foreclosure sale). Section 2923.5

regulates who can file and when and how a notice of default can

be filed to initiate a non-judicial foreclosure. Cal. Civ. Code

§ 2923.5 (requiring, inter alia, that the mortgagee, beneficiary,

or authorized agent must use due diligence contact the borrower

to explore options to avoid foreclosure). 

The negligence per se doctrine does not establish a

cause of action distinct from negligence. Cal. Serv. Station &

Auto. Repair Ass’n v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 62 Cal. App. 4th

1166, 1178 (1998) (“[A]n underlying claim of ordinary negligence

must be viable before the presumption of negligence of Evidence

Code section 669 can be employed.”). Rather, the negligence per

se doctrine treats a statutory violation as evidence of

negligence. See Sierra-Bay Fed. Land Bank Assn. v. Superior

Court, 227 Cal. App. 3d 318, 333 (1991) (“[I]t is the tort of

negligence, and not the violation of the statute itself, which

entitles a plaintiff to recover civil damages. In such

circumstances the plaintiff is not attempting to pursue a private

cause of action for violation of the statute; rather, he is

pursuing a negligence action and is relying upon the violation of

a statute, ordinance, or regulation to establish part of that

cause of action.”). Plaintiffs are not entitled to a presumption

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of negligence in the absence of an underlying negligence action. 

Coyotzi v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 09-1036, 2009 WL 2985497,

at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2009) (quoting Quiroz v. Seventh Ave.

Ctr., 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1285 (2006)). 

The FAC simply makes a general allegation as to five

defendants, with no factual elaboration as to how ASC might have

violated either section 2923.5 or section 2924. Indeed,

plaintiffs generally allege that ASC had no authority to modify

their loan, yet their first cause of action alleges that

defendants failed to comply with section 2923.5's foreclosure

avoidance and workout plan requirements to avoid the foreclosure

of plaintiffs’ property. (See FAC ¶¶ 18-21, 29, 31, 33.) This

general allegation gives ASC insufficient notice of whether they

have committed any conduct to violate section 2923.5 or section

2924, and ASC should not be forced to guess whether it is

individually liable for this conduct. See Associated Gen.

Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,

459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

B. Negligence

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for negligence

against ASC is based on the alleged violation of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09, 6803(a)(3), (c)(3) and 66

Federal Register 8616. (FAC ¶¶ 41, 43.) The Gramm-Leach-Bliley

Act provides that financial institutions have an obligation to

protect the security and confidentiality of their customers’

nonpublic personal information, and requires such institutions

regularly to disclose to their customers their information

security policies. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6803(a)(3). As previously

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explained, the violation of a statute can be used to satisfy an

element of a negligence cause of action. See Sierra-Bay, 227

Cal. App. 3d at 333. Plaintiffs allege that ASC violated the

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and its duty of care to plaintiffs when it

failed to safeguard plaintiffs’ loan modification packet and the

sensitive and confidential information it contained. (FAC ¶ 41.) 

Plaintiffs do not, however, allege any facts that

indicate they have been harmed by ASC’s security failings. 

Rather, the FAC merely alleges that ASC’s alleged loss of

plaintiffs’ documents “poses a potential anticipated threat of

dissemination and disclosure of plaintiffs’ personal nonpublic

information.” (FAC ¶ 41.) “To be actionable, harm must

constitute something more than nominal damages, speculative harm,

or the threat of future harm--not yet realized.” Aguilera v.

Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir.

2000). Plaintiffs’ further assertion that “as a direct and

proximate result of wrongful conduct described herein, plaintiffs

have suffered compensable damages according to proof” epitomizes

the type of conclusory statement that fails Rule 8's pleading

standard. (FAC ¶ 44); see Iqbal, 566 U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937

(2009).

C. Truth in Lending Act

Plaintiffs allege that ASC, among other defendants,

violated TILA 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667(f) and 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 by

not informing plaintiffs of their right to rescind, by failing to

acknowledge plaintiffs’ alleged rescission, and by failing to

inform plaintiffs of alleged “kickbacks paid to [Pacific].” (FAC

¶ 47.)

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1. Rescission Claim 

In a consumer credit transaction where the creditor

acquires a security interest in the borrower’s principal

dwelling, TILA provides the borrower with “a three-day

cooling-off period within which [he or she] may, for any reason

or for no reason, rescind” the transaction. McKenna v. First

Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 421 (1st Cir. 2007)

(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1635). A creditor must “clearly and

conspicuously disclose” this right to the borrower along with

“appropriate forms for the [borrower] to exercise his right to

rescind.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). If a creditor fails to provide

the borrower with the required notice of the right to rescind,

the borrower has three years from the date of consummation to

rescind the transaction. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); see 12 C.F.R. §

226.23(a)(3) (“If the required notice or material disclosures are

not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after

consummation.”). “[Section] 1635(f) completely extinguishes the

right of rescission at the end of the 3-year period.” Beach v.

Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412, (1998); see also Miguel v.

Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“[S]ection 1635(f) represents an ‘absolute limitation on

rescission actions’ which bars any claims filed more than three

years after the consummation of the transaction.” (quoting King

v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1986))).

Plaintiffs signed the deed of trust on September 19,

2005 (RJN Ex. A), and filed this action on January 13, 2010, more

than three years after closing. Because tolling is not available

for a claim for rescission under TILA, plaintiffs’ rescission

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claim must be dismissed. 

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that rescission

under TILA “should be conditioned on repayment of the amounts

advanced by the lender.” Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d

1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). District

courts in this circuit have dismissed rescission claims under

TILA at the pleading stage based upon the plaintiff’s failure to

allege an ability to tender loan proceeds. See, e.g., Garza v.

Am. Home Mortgage, No. 08-1477, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7448, at

*15 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009) (stating that “rescission is an

empty remedy without [the borrower’s] ability to pay back what

she has received”); Ibarra v. Plaza Home Mortgage, No. 09-3926,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73299, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2009); Ing

Bank v. Korn, No. 09-124, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73329, at *7

(W.D. Wash. May 22, 2009). Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts

indicating that they are able to tender sufficient funds to repay

the loan principal. Without such facts, plaintiffs cannot

receive the equitable remedy of rescission.

2. Kickbacks Disclosure Claim

Plaintiffs’ claim that they were not informed of the

kickbacks paid to Pacific is not an actionable claim under TILA. 

TILA grants private remedies for failure to properly disclose the

annual percentage rate, the finance charge, the amount financed,

the total of payments, the payment schedule or the three day

right to rescind. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2)-(6), (9). It does not

grant a private remedy for failure to disclose kickbacks. 

Furthermore, plaintiffs have not pleaded any facts that show how

ASC, who was not involved in the origination of their loan, could

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be liable for failing to disclose kickbacks that allegedly

occurred at that time. As such, it fails to cross the line

between possibility and plausibility as required under Iqbal. 

Accordingly, the court will grant ASC’s motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ TILA claim. 

D. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act

Plaintiffs complain that all defendants violated the

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. §§

2601-2617, in two ways: (1) by failing to respond to plaintiffs’

Qualified Written Request (“QWR”) and (2) “by receiving money

and/or other things of value for referrals of settlement service

business . . . including secret kickbacks and yield spread

premiums to loan brokers such as [Pacific].” (FAC ¶ 55.) As a

preliminary matter, the court notes that plaintiffs’ fourth cause

of action fails to distinguish among the defendants and

adequately put ASC on notice as to how it might have violated

RESPA. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 459 U.S.

at 526. This is reason enough for the court to grant ASC’s

motion to dismiss. 

1. Failure to Respond to Qualified Written Request

RESPA provides that borrowers must be provided certain

disclosures relating to the mortgage loan settlement process. 

See 12 U.S.C. § 2601. Section 2605 of RESPA relates to the

disclosures and communications required regarding the servicing

of mortgage loans, and provides that loan servicers have a duty

to respond to QWRs from borrowers asking for information relating

to the servicing of their loans. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e). Under

RESPA, lenders of federally related mortgage loans must disclose

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whether servicing of a loan may be assigned, sold or transferred

to loan applicants. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(a). Additionally,

borrowers may send QWRs under RESPA to loan servicers for

information relating to the servicing of their loan. 12 U.S.C. §

2605(e)(1). Loan servicers have sixty days after the receipt of

a QWR to respond to the borrower inquiry. 12 U.S.C. §

2605(e)(2).

Section 2605(f) imposes liability on servicers that

violate RESPA and fail to make the required disclosures. 

Although this section does not expressly make a showing of

damages part of the pleading standard, “a number of courts have

read the statute as requiring a showing of pecuniary damages in

order to state a claim.” Allen v. United Fin. Mortgage Corp.,

No. 9-2507, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26503 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22,

2010). Alleging a breach of RESPA duties alone does not state a

claim under RESPA. Plaintiffs must, at a minimum, also allege

that the breach resulted in actual damages. Hutchinson v. Del.

Sav. Bank, FSB, 410 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D.N.J. 2006). 

This pleading requirement has the effect of limiting

the cause of action to circumstances in which plaintiffs can show

that a failure to respond or give notice has caused them actual

harm. See Singh v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 09-2771, 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 73315, *16, 2009 WL 2588885 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009)

(dismissing RESPA claim because, “[i]n particular, plaintiffs

have failed to allege any facts in support of their conclusory

allegation that as a result of defendants’ failure to respond,

defendants are liable for actual damages, costs, and attorney

fees”) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs here have not offered any

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facts to support that ASC’s failure to respond to their QWR

resulted in pecuniary damages. Plaintiffs’ claim that they “have

suffered and continue to suffer compensable damages” (FAC ¶ 58)

is conclusory and fails even under a liberal pleading standard.

2. Kickbacks and Illegal Fees

 RESPA § 2607 prohibits any person from giving or

accepting “any fee, kickback or thing of value pursuant to any

agreement or understanding . . . that business incident to or a

part of a real estate service . . . shall be referred to any

person,” and from accepting any unearned fee in relation to a

settlement service. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a), (b). Plaintiffs’

allegation that “defendants” gave or received “secret kickbacks

and yield spread premiums to loan brokers” (FAC ¶ 57) lacks any

factual enhancement whatsoever. Plaintiffs do not explain what

these kickbacks were, when they occurred, or whether ASC

specifically even received them. ASC should not be forced to

guess how it violated RESPA. Gavin v. Trombatore, 682 F. Supp.

1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Plaintiffs’ allegations are exactly

the type of “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual

enhancement” that fail to meet the pleading standard. Iqbal, 566

U.S. --- at ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(citation omitted).

Moreover, any RESPA kickback claim must be brought

within one year of the violation. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614; Edwards

v. First Am. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 2007);

Blaylock v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1106

(W.D. Wash. 2007). Plaintiffs’ loan was executed on September

19, 2005. As any alleged kickbacks would have occurred at this

time--more than four years before this suit began--the RESPA

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claim is time barred. For the reasons discussed above,

plaintiffs’ RESPA claims must be dismissed.

E. Breach of Contract

The elements of a cause of action for breach of

contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) performance

by the plaintiff, (3) breach by the defendant, and (4) damages. 

First Commercial Mortg. Co. v. Reece, 89 Cal. App. 4th 731, 745 

(2001). Plaintiffs allege that ASC entered into an oral

agreement with them to “provide plaintiffs with a loan

modification at a fixed rate . . . so long as [plaintiffs] paid

down some of their existing debt” (FAC ¶¶ 60-61) and that ASC

breached this contract by failing to facilitate the approval of

plaintiffs’ promised loan modification. 

A contract to modify a loan must be in writing. “A

mortgage or deed of trust comes within the statute of frauds.” 

Secrest v. Sec. Nat’l Mortg. Loan Trust 2002-2, 167 Cal. App. 4th

552, 552 (2008). As any “agreement to modify a contract that is

subject to the statute of frauds is also subject to the statue of

frauds,” a loan modification also requires a written agreement. 

Id. at 552 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1698); see Justo v. Indymac

Bancorp, No. 9-1116, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22831 (C.D. Cal. Feb.

19, 2010) (dismissing with prejudice a claim that defendant

breached an oral contract to modify plaintiff’s loan and prevent

foreclosure proceedings). Plaintiffs do not allege that there is

any written agreement to modify the terms of their loan. Absent

a writing, there can be no contract, much less a breach of

contract. Plaintiffs’ claim must therefore be dismissed.

F. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair

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Dealing

Under California law, every contract “imposes upon each

party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance

and its enforcement.” McClain v. Octagon Plaza, LLC, 159 Cal.

App. 4th 784 (2008) (quoting Carma Developers, Inc. v. Marathon

Dev. Cal., Inc., 2 Cal. 4th 342, 371 (1992)). The covenant “is

based on general contract law and the long-standing rule that

neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the

other to receive the benefits of the agreement.” Waller v. Truck

Ins. Exchange, Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 1 (1995). 

Plaintiffs allege that ASC breached the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing by “failing to provide

the promised loan modification approval.” (FAC ¶ 68.) The

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “cannot impose

substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond

those incorporated in the specific terms of their agreement.” 

Agosta v. Astor, 120 Cal. App. 4th 596, 607 (2004) (internal

citation omitted). “Absent [a] contractual right . . . the

implied covenant has nothing upon which to act as a supplement,

and should not be endowed with an existence independent of its

contractual underpinnings.” Waller, 11 Cal. 4th at 36 (internal

citations omitted). Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead that a

contract to modify the loan agreement existed. The court must

therefore grant ASC’s motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiffs also claim that defendant breached the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by violating

California Civil Code section 2923.5. A contract, not a statute,

must be the basis for an implied covenant of good faith and fair

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dealing, id., nor have they articulated how a failure to comply

with section 2923.5 frustrated plaintiffs’ rights under the loan

contract. Any alleged independent violation of section 2923.5

has been inadequately plead as described above. Plaintiffs’

claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing against ASC will therefore be dismissed.

G. California’s Unfair Competition Law

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus.

& Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210, prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or

fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v.

L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). This cause

of action is generally derivative of some other illegal conduct

or fraud committed by a defendant, and “[a] plaintiff must state

with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory

elements of the violation.” Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc., 14

Cal. App. 4th 612, 619 (1993).

Plaintiffs’ claim under the UCL is vague and

conclusory, simply alleging that “by engaging in the abovedescribed acts and practice, Defendants have committed one or

more acts of unlawful business practices.” (FAC ¶ 78.) 

Plaintiffs’ claim lumps all defendants together and fails to

identify any specific act taken by any one of the named

defendants. (See FAC ¶¶ 77-81.) Such vague and conclusory

allegations are insufficient to inform ASC as to its liability. 

See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983); Gauvin, 682 F.

Supp. at 1071; see also Lingad v. Indymac Fed. Bank, No Civ.

2:09-02347 GEB JFM, --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2010 WL 347994, at *11

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(E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010). The court has already eliminated

plaintiffs’ other claims which serve as the basis for this cause

of action. Since plaintiffs have failed to state a claim on any

of these grounds, and because these grounds appear to be the sole

basis for plaintiffs’ UCL claim, they by necessity have failed to

state a claim against ASC under the UCL. Accordingly the court

will grant ASC’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ UCL claim. 

H. Quiet Title

Plaintiffs cannot sustain a quiet title claim as a

matter of law. The purpose of a quiet title action is to

establish one’s title against adverse claims to real property. A

basic requirement of an action to quiet title is an allegation

that plaintiffs “are the rightful owners of the property, i.e.,

that they have satisfied their obligations under the Deed of

Trust.” Kelley v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 642 F. Supp.

2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2009). “[A] mortgagor cannot quiet his

title against the mortgagee without paying the debt secured.” 

Watson v. MTC Fin., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63997 (E.D. Cal.

July 17, 2009). As plaintiffs concede that they have not paid

the debt secured by the mortgage, they cannot sustain a quiet

title action against defendants. 

I. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs purport to state a cause of action for

declaratory and injunctive relief. Declaratory and injunctive

relief are not causes of action; rather, they are remedies. See

McDowell v. Watson, 59 Cal. App. 4th 1155, 1159 (1997)

(“Injunctive relief is a remedy and not, in itself a cause of

action”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nat’l Union

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Fire Ins. Co. v. Karp, 108 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1997). Because

plaintiffs’ other causes of action have been dismissed and

declaratory and injunctive relief are not independent claims, the

court will dismiss this claim as well.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion of defendant Wells

Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., dba America’s Service Company, to

dismiss the causes of action against it be, and the same hereby

is, GRANTED. 

Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date of this Order

to file an amended complaint, if they can do so consistent with

this Order.

DATED: July 21, 2010

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