Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_99-cv-02506/USCOURTS-cand-3_99-cv-02506-36/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 18:1962 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY BOWOTO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CHEVRON CORP., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 99-02506 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO COMPEL

Now before the court is a long-standing discovery dispute in this matter. Defendants seek to

compel plaintiffs’ counsel to answer interrogatories concerning a forged signature on a verification for

one of the plaintiffs’ interrogatory responses. Having carefully considered the arguments of the parties

as well as the evidence submitted, the Court hereby DENIES defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

In January 2005, plaintiffs’ counsel served interrogatory responses purportedly on behalf of

plaintiff Obele Ignoni with a verification dated December 22, 2004. The verification indicated that the

content of the responses was based on Ignoni’s personal knowledge and that the documentation was

signed in Wirra, Nigeria. However, when defense counsel deposed Ignoni on May 6, 2005 and

questioned him about the verification, Ignoni testified that the signature on the document was not his

and that he had not been in Wirra on the date in question. He further stated that he had not authorized

anyone to sign the document in his name. Plaintiffs’ counsel later admitted that they discovered the

forgery a day before the deposition, but did not notify the defendants. They claimed that up until the

deposition, they were uncertain as to whether the verification had been served. 

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In one of their many letter briefs, defendants suggest that the court vacate its prior order

dismissing Uroupa as a plaintiff and issue a new order of dismissal subject to the condition that Uroupa

respond to the interrogatories. The Court DENIES this request.

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On May 10, 2005, defendants served plaintiffs’ counsel with formal discovery concerning the

forgery. In their June 8, 2005, response, plaintiffs’ counsel objected to defendants’ interrogatories to

“the extent that they [the interrogatories] seek information that is protected from disclosure by the

attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine, as well as any other applicable

privileges including the joint prosecution privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination.”

Plaintiffs’ counsel further stated that they would only answer the interrogatories with information

derived from “unprivileged” sources.

Plaintiffs later moved to be relieved from responding to defendants’ interrogatories on the

ground that securing authenticated responses from 20 individuals in Nigeria was an undue burden. The

Court denied plaintiffs’ motion, but attempted to ease the burden on plaintiffs by granting plaintiffs’

request that plaintiffs’ counsel, rather than plaintiffs themselves, be allowed to answer the

interrogatories. Plaintiffs’ counsel then asserted that they could not provide any additional information

without violating California rules of ethics governing attorneys. The Court thereafter removed its

limitation on defendants’ discovery and ordered each of the plaintiffs to respond to the interrogatories.

The interrogatory response for one plaintiff, John Ikenyan, stated that another plaintiff, Robinson

Uroupa, had admitted to being the forger. By the time defendants received that interrogatory response,

however, Uroupa had voluntarily dismissed his claims with prejudice, removing any obligation on his

part to answer the interrogatories. Defendants attempted to reopen Uroupa’s deposition, but, despite

a number attempts, Uroupa either refused or failed to appear. Thus, defendants were never able to

obtain any information from Uroupa about the forgery.

Because of the difficulty they have experienced in obtaining answers to their questions about

the forgery, defendants have repeatedly requested that the Court order plaintiffs’ counsel to state what

they know about the forgery.1

 Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that they may not ethically divulge the

information defendants seek. The Court agrees with plaintiffs’ counsel, and therefore DENIES

defendants’ motion.

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DISCUSSION

The initial question this Court must resolve is whether the information defendants seek is

protected from disclosure. The Court finds that it is. It is undisputed that plaintiffs’ counsel learned the

information through communications with their clients. In California, such communications are

“presumed to have been made in confidence.” Cal. Evid. Code § 917. As the communications at issue

were confidential and were made by the client to his attorney in the course of that attorney’s

representation of the client, the Court finds that the attorney-client privilege applies. See, e.g., United

States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996). It is perfectly appropriate for plaintiffs’ counsel to

raise the attorney-client privilege in refusing to answer a question. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.

391, 402 (1976) (“[I]t it is universally accepted that the attorney-client privilege may be raised by the

attorney.”).

Defendants argue that the privilege protects only the underlying communications and not the

facts that they seek to discover. While it is true that information provided by a client to his attorney is

not protected from disclosure just because it was the subject of an attorney-client communication, that

is not the end of the matter. The issue here is not the clients’ refusal to answer interrogatories – the

current plaintiffs in this case have provided their responses. Rather, the issue is whether plaintiffs’

counsel must provide interrogatory responses containing information derived from attorney-client

communications.

California law is explicit about the ethical duties of lawyers to their clients. The California

Evidence Code provides that “[t]he lawyer who received or made a communication subject to the

privilege under this article shall claim the privilege whenever he is present when the communication

is sought to be disclosed.” Cal. Evid. Code § 955 (emphasis added). Similarly, the California Business

and Professional Code requires attorneys “[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to

himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e)(1).

These provisions clearly prevent plaintiffs’ counsel from disclosing information they learned from their

clients. While their clients may be compelled to provide the information, compelling their attorney to

provide the information is a wholly different matter.

Given the Court’s finding that the privilege applies, defendants raise two arguments as to why

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the information is discoverable: (1) the communications sought by defendants fall under the crime fraud

exception to the privilege; and (2) plaintiffs implicitly waived the privilege.

1. Crime Fraud Exception

First, defendants argue that the information they seek falls under the crime-fraud exception to

the privilege. They assert that “any attorney-client communication in the process of preparing for or

committing the forgery or passing it off as genuine falls within the crime-fraud exception to the

privilege.” However, in order for defendants to invoke this exception successfully, they must

demonstrate more than just that plaintiffs engaged or intended to engage in the illicit act when seeking

the advice of counsel. Instead, the information sought must be in furtherance of that act. In re Grand

Jury Proceedings (Corporation), 87 F.3d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1996). While the crime-fraud exception

applies whether or not counsel knew of their client’s criminal purpose – the intent of the client controls

– defendants have presented insufficient evidence to this Court that the communications at issue were

used in furtherance of the forgery. Indeed, one would not expect a relatively uncomplicated crime like

forgery to involve any legal advice before it was committed. More importantly, the communications

at issue all appear to have been made after the forgery took place, meaning that they could not have been

used in furtherance of the forgery. Accordingly, the Court finds that the communications in question

do not fall under the crime-fraud exception.

2. Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs implicitly waived the privilege by placing the authenticity

of the verifications and the veracity of the interrogatories at issue through the submission of the forgery.

Their argument relies on two cases: Chevron Corporation v. Pennzoil Company, 974 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir.

1992); and In re Southern and Eastern District Asbestos Litigation, 730 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).

In Chevron, a dispute arose concerning the basis upon which the defendants made a tax decision.

Chevron, 974 F.2d at 1162. As part of their defense, the defendants maintained that they made the

decision pursuant to the advice of counsel, but that documents relating to this advice, which plaintiff

sought, were protected by attorney-client privilege. Id. The plaintiff responded that defendants

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implicitly waived the privilege by placing the information contained in the documents at issue in its

defense. Id. The Chevron court agreed, reasoning that the privilege “may not be used both as a sword

and a shield.” Id. at 1162. In other words, defendants could not invoke the attorney-client privilege to

deny the plaintiff access to the very information that the plaintiff must refute in order to meet its burden.

Id. at 1162-63. 

The facts in the present case are not analogous to those in Chevron. The party asserting the

privilege in Chevron used the information contained in the communications as an affirmative defense

and in doing so put those communications at issue. The opposing party in that case could not have

defeated the defense without access to the privileged documents. In contrast, plaintiffs here do not use

the advice of counsel in any affirmative capacity and therefore do not use the privilege as a “sword.”

Since plaintiffs do not dispute that the signature on the verification was indeed forged, defendants do

not have to obtain proof of forgery by accessing what otherwise would be privileged communications.

The mere existence of the forgery coupled with the desire of defendants to probe for additional

misrepresentations is insufficient for finding waiver.

In Asbestos Litigation, the defendants, who were asbestos manufacturers, argued that a

memorandum was inadmissible because it was privileged. Asbestos Litig., 730 F. Supp. at 582. The

document at issue was comprised of an attorney’s summary of a doctor’s opinions concerning the

hazards at one of defendant’s plants. Id. at 584. Its contents, which indicated that the defendant’s

operations might constitute an “occupational hazard,” became known to one witness who was instructed

by the defendant’s counsel to provide false testimony concerning the document. Id. at 584. In holding

that the privilege for the memorandum had been waived, the court agreed with the reasoning from

another case that “a failure to produce the document while allowing a witness to continue to give

inaccurate testimony which can be easily corrected and explained by the document effectively distorts

the search for truth and constitutes a fraud upon the parties, the witness, and the Court.” Id. at 585

(internal citations omitted).

As with the Chevron case, the facts of the asbestos case differ significantly from those of the

present case. The evidence at issue was not a communication between the defendants and counsel, but

instead a document comprised of counsel’s notes. Accordingly, the privilege at issue was not derived

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from the attorney-client relationship, but instead from the work-product doctrine. Moreover, the

defendants’ counsel in the asbestos case instructed the witness to deny any knowledge of the

memorandum, which would have proven his testimony false. In contrast, there is no indication here that

plaintiffs’ counsel instructed any witness to testify falsely and thus, no indiction that the plaintiffs

abused the privilege. Again, plaintiffs do not dispute that the verification was forged.

The Court finds that the communications at issue constituted privileged communications

between plaintiffs’ attorneys and their clients. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ counsel may not reveal the

contents of those communications absent permission from their clients. Defendants’ motion is therefore

DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES defendants’

motion to compel. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2006 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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