Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01193/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01193-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JEFFREY E. WALKER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MOHADJER, Clinical Psychologist, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-1193 WBS AC P 

ORDER & 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 

 On January 7, 2014, plaintiff’s recent motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction was 

denied. ECF No. 50.1

 Evidently, this denial has crossed in the mail with yet another request for 

immediate injunctive relief, filed on January 10, 2013. ECF No. 51. Plaintiff continues his 

pattern of repeatedly filing of deficient motions for immediate injunctive relief, recounting in 

each filing the most recent events related to his housing and classification status. 

In his latest “urgent” request, plaintiff apparently seeks to update his prior request 

wherein, inter alia, he claimed to be the victim of retaliation for filing lawsuits (including the 

instant one). Plaintiff includes a copy of a lockup order dated July 15, 2013 [sic], in which it is 

stated that plaintiff on July 5, 2013 was being placed in Administrative Segregation at California 

 

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 Plaintiff has appealed an earlier denial of his requests for immediate injunctive relief. ECF Nos. 

41, 42. 

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Medical Facility (CMF) due to the safety concerns of C. Mohadjer and Cain-Mathis (two of the 

defendants named in the operative second amended complaint) which arose in relation to 

plaintiff’s alleged disruptive behavior on June 26, 2013. ECF No. 51 at 10. The order also 

references plaintiff’s having yelled angrily at Mohadjer and unnamed custody staff on June 28, 

2013. Id. Plaintiff now avers that defendant Mohadjer told him that she never expressed safety 

concerns about him or told custody staff (non-parties Sgt. Swann and Lt. Torez) who authorized 

the lockup that plaintiff ever yelled at her, and that has been documented in plaintiff’s mental 

health records in the presence of Dr. Reyes (non-party) a week and a half ago. Thus, plaintiff 

contends the lock-up order has been “falsified.” 

Plaintiff also includes a copy of an Institutional Classification Committee (ICC) review 

(stamped July 25, 2013), which plaintiff states shows that an investigation resulted in no finding 

that a threat was made. However, the committee decision actually reads: 

Subject became increasingly disruptive and threatening i[n] his 

behavior during his visits to the U-wing Clinic, which resulted in a 

possible staff safety concern. Committee is in possession of CDC128B’s authored by LPT V. Cain-Mathis and Dr. Mohadjer. After 

reviewing these documents, it is very clear that Subject was quite 

disruptive in his actions with staff in the U-wing clinic; however, 

committee sees no overt threat towards staff, nor any other reason 

to conclude that a realistic threat to their safety exists. In discussing 

the matter with Ms. Cain-Mathis, she indicated that she was 

agreeable to Subject being released from ASU as long as he wasn’t 

housed back in Unit IV (as Subject has received a level of 

carechange to EOP, he would not be housed in Unit IV). During 

the course of today’s committee, a confidential memorandum was 

discovered that had just been scanned into ERMS. This 

memorandum outlined an investigation into Subject’s allegations of 

staff sexual misconduct. While the result of the investigation 

yielded no corroborating evidence or information, it was agreed that 

Subject should remain in ASU and be referred for transfer. A new 

CDC-114 D shall therefore be issued and Subject will be returned 

to ICC in one week for transfer consideration. ICC ACTS TO 

RETAIN IN ASU DUE TO ALLEGATIONS OF STAFF 

MISCONDUCT. SET MAX R CUSTODY AND WG/PG D1/D 

EFFECTIVE 7/5/13. ISSUE NEW CDC-114D AND RETURN TO 

ICC IN ONE WEEK. 

Plaintiff then asserts that he was “on mainline” for nearly two months from July 2013 to 

September 2013, when defendant Cain-Mathis and non-parties Swann and Torez conspired on 

September 12, 2013 to use illegitimate safety concerns “to get rid of plaintiff.” ECF No. 51 at 2-

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3. Plaintiff includes a copy of a CDC 128-B chrono dated September 12, 2013 in which 

defendant Cain-Mathis expresses her safety concern with regard to plaintiff’s housing and also 

states her concern for Dr. Mohadjer then on maternity leave. Id. at 14. 

 Plaintiff’s final exhibit is a copy of an ICC ASU review stamped October 23, 2013 

indicating that plaintiff had been placed in ASU after his discharge from the Mental Health Crisis 

Bed (MHCB) on September 18, 2013. Id. at 16. Following plaintiff’s subsequent return to 

MHCB, plaintiff was returned to the ASU with the EOP level of care, rendering prior transfer 

recommendations inappropriate. After the committee’s review of defendant Cain-Mathis’ 

September 2013 CDC-128B, the ICC found her concerns “sincere” and determined that plaintiff 

should not be returned to CMF’s general population based on concerns of staff safety. He was to 

be retained in non-disciplinary segregation status. It was noted that he “is deemed Limited Duty 

with High Medical Risk” and “requires adaptive equipment.” Plaintiff was referred for an 

adverse transfer to LAC-IV EOP-270 PSYCH O/R. Id. 

Plaintiff asks the court to order defendant Cain-Mathis to show cause why she feels 

threatened by plaintiff. He asks the court to see to it that he receive all reports from the 

investigation of the U-wing incident. Id. at 3. He asks the court to have defendant Cain-Mathis 

reassigned elsewhere if she feels threatened. Plaintiff alleges that he is being put up for transfer 

to RJ Donovan, far from home based on false information. Id. at 3-5. 

 Standards Governing Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order 

 The purpose in issuing a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending 

a fuller hearing. The cases contain limited discussion of the standards for issuing a temporary 

restraining order due to the fact that very few such orders can be appealed prior to the hearing on 

a preliminary injunction. It is apparent, however, that requests for temporary restraining orders 

which are not ex parte and without notice are governed by the same general standards that govern 

the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 

U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.); Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. United States Dist. 

Court, 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ferguson, J. dissenting); Century Time Ltd. v. 

Interchron Ltd., 729 F. Supp. 366, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In many cases the emphasis of the court 

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is directed to irreparable harm and the balance of hardships because the merits of a controversy 

are often difficult to ascertain and adjudicate on short notice. 

Standards Governing Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction 

“A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy’ . . . never awarded as 

of right.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689 90 (2008) (internal citations omitted). “A plaintiff 

seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he 

is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities 

tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Assn, Inc. v. City 

of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). A preliminary injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff 

demonstrates . . . “serious questions going to the merits and a hardship balance [] tips sharply 

toward the plaintiff, . . . assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.” 

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The Ninth Circuit has reiterated that under either formulation of the principles, if the 

probability of success on the merits is low, preliminary injunctive relief should be denied: 

Martin explicitly teaches that “[u]nder this last part of the 

alternative test, even if the balance of hardships tips decidedly in 

favor of the moving party, it must be shown as an irreducible 

minimum that there is a fair chance of success on the merits.” 

Johnson v. California State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 

Martin v. International Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any preliminary 

injunction “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the 

court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the 

harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 

Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

The court is unable to assess the likelihood of plaintiff’s success on the merits of the 

second amended complaint at this early juncture. Only defendant Mohadjer has yet to have 

returned an executed waiver of service and she has filed, as of November 21, 2013, a motion to 

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revoke plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status and to dismiss the case. ECF No. 48. Plaintiff has 

failed to respond to the motion. 

Likelihood of Irreparable Harm 

Plaintiff does not demonstrate that he is being or will be subjected to irreparable harm. 

Balance of the Equities 

 Whereas petitioner’s prior requests sought a transfer to a state hospital both for psychiatric 

treatment and as a remedy for his allegedly improper and retaliatory ad seg placement, plaintiff 

here appears to simply be contending that defendant Cain-Mathis, as well as non-parties, have 

acted in retaliation against him. On screening, the court did not find that the second amended 

complaint states a claim of retaliation. See ECF No. 14. Moreover, as plaintiff has previously 

been told, the federal courts are generally loath to interfere with internal discipline in federal or 

state prisons. Winsby v. Walsh, 321 F. Supp. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 1971). In general, prison 

officials’ housing and classification decisions do not implicate a prisoner’s constitutional rights. 

See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Nor does the Constitution guarantee a 

prisoner placement in a particular prison or protect an inmate against being transferred from one 

institution to another. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-225 (1976). 

The challenge . . . in prison condition cases, is to uphold the 

Constitution in such a manner that respects the state’s unique 

interest in managing its prison population. It is a challenge that 

requires us to draw constitutional lines when necessary, yet 

minimize any intrusion into state affairs. 

Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 

Regarding mental health treatment, the balance of the equities does not favor judicial 

intervention at this stage of the proceedings. Plaintiff does not demonstrate that his mental health 

is not being adequately monitored. 

 Public Interest 

No identifiable public interest would be served by the court’s interference with plaintiff’s 

treatment or housing. 

For all the reasons set forth above, plaintiff has not established his entitlement to 

immediate injunctive relief. The court will recommend denial of this latest motion for immediate 

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injunctive relief and recommend that plaintiff be cautioned that he will be sanctioned for an abuse 

of process should he continue to engage in insubstantial but burdensome seriatim filings. 

Pending Motion to Revoke IFP/Dismiss 

As noted above, plaintiff has failed to respond to defendant Mohadjer’s motion to revoke 

IFP status and to dismiss. ECF No. 48. Local Rule 230(l) provides in part: “Failure of the 

responding party to file written opposition or to file a statement of no opposition may be deemed 

a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion . . . .” On August 7, 2013 and again on 

October 28, 2013, plaintiff was advised of the requirements for filing an opposition to the motion 

and that failure to oppose such a motion may be deemed a waiver of opposition to the motion. 

Local Rule 110 provides that failure to comply with the Local Rules “may be grounds for 

imposition of any and all sanctions authorized by statute or Rule or within the inherent power of 

the Court.” 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, within thirty days of the date of this order, 

plaintiff shall file an opposition, if any, to defendant Mohadjer’s November 21, 2013 motion to 

revoke IFP status and to dismiss. Failure to file an opposition will be deemed as a statement of 

non-opposition and shall result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed pursuant 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s insufficiently supported motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction (ECF 

No. 51) be denied; 

2. Plaintiff be cautioned that he will be sanctioned for an abuse of process should he 

continue to engage in insubstantial and burdensome seriatim filings. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

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parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: January 13, 2014 

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