Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03799/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-03799-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Claude Ranger III,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-03799-PHX-JJT (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Claude Ranger III’s (“Petitioner”) First Amended 

“Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” (the “First Amended 

Petition”) (Doc. 20). For the reasons explained herein, the undersigned recommends that 

the Court dismiss the First Amended Petition (Doc. 20) as untimely. 

I. BACKGROUND

In 2014, a jury sitting in the Superior Court of Arizona in and for Maricopa 

County convicted Petitioner of six counts of sexual assault. (Bates Nos. 14-21).1 The

jury found that aggravating factors were proven as to all six counts. (Id.). The trial court

sentenced Petitioner to a total of thirty years in prison. (Bates Nos. 22-27). Petitioner

filed a direct appeal. On February 2, 2016, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed 

1 Citations to the state court record submitted with Respondents’ Answer (Doc.

21) refer to the Bates-stamp numbers affixed to the lower right corner of each page of the

record.

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Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Bates Nos. 8-13). On July 12, 2016, the Arizona 

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s request for further review. (Bates No. 48). 

On October 24, 2014, while Petitioner’s direct appeal was pending, Petitioner

initiated a post-conviction relief (“PCR”) proceeding. (Bates Nos. 49-54). The trial court

appointed counsel, who moved to dismiss without prejudice in light of Petitioner’s 

pending direct appeal. (Bates Nos. 55-58). The trial court dismissed the proceeding on 

May 11, 2015. (Bates Nos. 233). Petitioner petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for 

review, which the Court of Appeals dismissed as untimely filed. (Bates Nos. 59, 69). 

On February 24, 2016 and February 25, 206, Petitioner filed duplicate PCR 

Petitions. (Bates Nos. 61-68). The trial court appointed PCR counsel, who could not 

find a colorable claim to raise. (Bates Nos. 76-77, 79-81). Petitioner filed several 

documents in support of his request for relief. (Bates Nos. 84-99). After observing that

the documents did not contain the declaration required by Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.5, the trial court granted Petitioner additional time to file a rule-compliant

PCR Petition. (Bates Nos. 100-01). The trial court subsequently directed Petitioner’s 

advisory counsel to confer with Petitioner. (Bates Nos. 117-18). On October 5, 2016, 

Petitioner submitted the required declaration along with supplemental authority in 

support of relief. (Bates Nos. 119-25). On November 17, 2016, after the matter was 

fully briefed, the trial court summarily dismissed the PCR proceeding. (Bates Nos. 150-

51). Petitioner did not seek further review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

On November 23, 2016 and November 30, 2016, Petitioner filed documents that

the trial court construed as another PCR Notice. (Bates Nos. 152-61, 162-64). The trial 

court dismissed the proceeding. (Bates Nos. 162-64). The Arizona Court of Appeals

granted Petitioner’s request for review, but denied relief. (Bates Nos. 168-69). Petitioner

filed an untimely petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Bates No. 170). 

Respondents state that the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on October 5, 2018. 

(Doc. 21 at 7). 

In April 2017, Petitioner filed in the trial court several documents that the trial 

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court deemed a single PCR Notice. (Bates Nos. 174-85, 186-87). The trial court

dismissed the PCR proceeding as untimely. (Bates Nos. 186-87). On August 23, 2018, 

the Arizona Court of Appeals denied further review. (Bates No. 194-98). 

Petitioner initiated another PCR proceeding on January 22, 2018, which the trial 

court dismissed as untimely. (Bates Nos. 216-18). The Arizona Court of Appeals

denied further review. (Bates Nos. 221-22). 

In April 2019, Petitioner filed additional documents in the trial court that the trial 

court construed as a PCR Notice. (Bates Nos. 223-30, 231-32). The trial court dismissed 

the PCR proceeding. (Bates Nos. 231-32). 

On April 28, 2019, Petitioner initiated this federal habeas proceeding.2 (Doc. 1). 

The Court permitted Petitioner to file the First Amended Petition (Doc. 20), which 

Respondents answered on October 11, 2019 (Doc. 21). Petitioner filed a Reply on 

December 16, 2019 (Doc. 25). 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

110 Stat. 1214, a state prisoner must file his or her federal habeas petition within one year

of the latest of: 

A. The date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review;

B. The date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the petitioner was 

prevented from filing by the State action; 

C. The date on which the right asserted was initially 

2 The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) was docketed by the Clerk of 

Court on May 28, 2019. The Petition contains a certificate of service indicating that 

Petitioner placed the Petition in the prison mailing system on April 28, 2019. (Doc. 1 at 

14). Pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, the undersigned has used April 28, 2019 as the 

Petition’s filing date. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A 

petition is considered to be filed on the date a prisoner hands the petition to prison 

officials for mailing.”).

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recognized by the United States Supreme Court, if that right 

was newly recognized by the Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

D. The date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 

2007). The one-year limitations period, however, does not necessarily run for 365 

consecutive days as it is subject to tolling. Under AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision, 

the limitations period is tolled during the “time during which a properly filed application 

for State post-conviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); Roy v. 

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) (limitations period is tolled while the state 

prisoner is exhausting his or her claims in state court and state post-conviction remedies 

are pending) (citation omitted). 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have 

considered the question, we hold that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in 

appropriate cases.”). Yet equitable tolling is applicable only “if extraordinary 

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Roy, 465 F.3d at 969 (citations omitted); Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 888 n.8 (9th 

Cir. 2014). A petitioner must show (i) that he or she has been pursuing his rights 

diligently and (ii) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his or her way. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Roy, 465 F.3d at 969.

III. DISCUSSION 

A. This Proceeding is Untimely 

In this case, the relevant triggering event for purposes of AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations is the date on which Petitioner’s judgment became “final by the conclusion of 

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direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on

February 2, 2016. (Bates Nos. 8-13). The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on July

12, 2016. (Bates No. 48). The ninety-day time period in which to file a petition for writ 

of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court applies in determining the date on which 

Petitioner’s convictions became final. See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir.

2010) (“[D]irect review is considered final when the certiorari petition would have been 

due, which is 90 days after the decision of the state’s highest court.”). The undersigned 

finds that Petitioner’s conviction became final on October 11, 2016.

3

 Accordingly, the 

one-year statute of limitations began running on October 12, 2016. See Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 654 (2012) (AEDPA’s statute of limitations commences upon the 

expiration of the time for seeking review of petitioner’s judgment in a state’s highest 

court); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the 

“anniversary method” of Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to calculate 

the expiration date of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations). Consequently, unless 

statutory or equitable tolling applies, Petitioner’s one-year deadline to file a federal 

habeas petition expired on October 11, 2017, rendering this proceeding untimely.

1. Statutory Tolling

Statutory tolling does not apply to collateral review petitions that are not “properly 

filed.” Pace v. DiGuiglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A collateral 

review petition is “properly filed” when its delivery and acceptance comply with state 

rules governing filings. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000); Orpiada v. McDaniel,

750 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2014) (court looked to Nevada state filing requirements in 

3 Ninety days from July 12, 2016 is October 10, 2016. However, because 

Monday, October 10, 2016 was a legal holiday (Columbus Day), the date was extended 

to Tuesday, October 11, 2016. See Supreme Court Rule 30 (“The last day of the period 

shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, federal legal holiday listed in 5 U. S. C. 

§ 6103, or day on which the Court building is closed by order of the Court or the Chief 

Justice, in which event the period shall extend until the end of the next day that is not a 

Saturday, Sunday, federal legal holiday, or day on which the Court building is closed.”).

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determining whether habeas petitioner’s PCR petition was a “properly filed” application 

that is eligible for tolling). This includes compliance with filing deadlines. Hence, an 

untimely state collateral review petition is not “properly filed.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 417 

(holding that “time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions,” and that a state 

PCR petition is therefore not “properly filed” if it was rejected by the state court as 

untimely).

If the collateral review petition was “properly filed,” then the Court must 

determine the dates it was “pending.” In Arizona, a PCR petition becomes “pending” as 

soon as the notice of PCR is filed. Isley v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 

1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The language and structure of the Arizona postconviction rules 

demonstrate that the proceedings begin with the filing of the Notice.”). It remains 

“pending” until it “has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction 

procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). This includes “[t]he time

between (1) a lower state court’s adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a 

notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state 

law.” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006) (citing Carey, 536 U.S. 214). 

Here, on February 24, 2016, before Petitioner’s conviction became final, Petitioner

initiated a PCR proceeding. (Bates Nos. 61-64). The limitations period therefore was 

immediately tolled when Petitioner’s conviction became final on October 11, 2016. On 

November 17, 2016, the trial court dismissed the PCR proceeding. (Bates Nos. 150-51). 

As Petitioner did not seek further review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, the one-year 

limitations commenced on November 18, 2016. As Respondents correctly explain (Doc.

21 at 12), Petitioner’s PCR proceedings initiated on November 23, 2016 and April 11, 

2017 did not toll the limitations period as the state court dismissed the proceedings as 

untimely. Pace, 544 U.S. at 417. As such, the one-year limitations period expired on 

November 17, 2017. Petitioner’s PCR proceedings initiated on January 22, 2018 and

April 19, 2019 did not restart the limitations period. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 

(9th Cir. 2001) (once the statute of limitations has run, subsequent collateral review 

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petitions do not “restart” the clock). Accordingly, this proceeding is untimely unless 

equitable tolling applies.

2. Equitable Tolling is Unavailable

Regarding equitable tolling, Petitioner has the burden to show that extraordinary 

circumstances beyond Petitioner’s control made it impossible for him to file a timely 

federal petition. Roy, 465 F.3d at 969; Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 888 n.8. A petitioner’s pro se 

status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling. See, e.g., Johnson v. United 

States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005). In addition, a petitioner’s miscalculation of when the 

limitations period expired does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting 

equitable tolling. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see

also Alexander v. Schriro, 312 F. App’x 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Ultimately [the 

petitioner] made an incorrect interpretation of the statute and miscalculated the 

limitations period. This does not amount to an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ warranting 

equitable tolling.”).

There is no indication in the record that the circumstances of Petitioner’s 

incarceration made it “impossible” for Petitioner to timely file a federal habeas petition. 

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1049 (finding that equitable tolling did not apply where there was 

“no indication in the record that [circumstances] made it ‘impossible’ for [prisoner] to 

file on time”); Wilson v. Bennett, 188 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 

(allegations that the petitioner lacked legal knowledge and had to rely on other prisoners 

for legal advice and in preparing his papers “cannot justify equitable tolling” as such 

circumstances are not “extraordinary”). Petitioner has failed to show the existence of 

“extraordinary circumstances” that were the proximate cause of the untimely filing of this 

proceeding. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (for equitable 

tolling to apply, a “prisoner must show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the 

cause of his untimeliness”). Equitable tolling therefore is unavailable. Accordingly, this 

federal habeas proceeding is untimely.

B. The Actual Innocence/Schlup Gateway Does Not Apply to Excuse the 

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Untimeliness of this Proceeding

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013), the Supreme Court 

announced an equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The Court held that 

the “actual innocence gateway” to federal habeas review that was applied to procedural 

bars in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) and House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) 

extends to petitions that are time-barred under AEDPA. The “actual innocence gateway”

is also referred to as the “Schlup gateway” or the “miscarriage of justice exception.”

Under Schlup, a petitioner seeking federal habeas review under the miscarriage of 

justice exception must establish his or her factual innocence of the crime and not mere 

legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); Jaramillo v. 

Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). “To be credible, such a claim requires 

petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence–

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical 

physical evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; see also Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 

(9th Cir. 2011); McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1927 (explaining the significance of an 

“[u]nexplained delay in presenting new evidence”). A petitioner “must show that it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 

new evidence.” McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

Because of “the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the allegation of actual 

innocence has been summarily rejected.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 

2000) (citing Calderon v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)).

To the extent Petitioner asserts the actual innocence/Schlup gateway, Petitioner

has not presented any new reliable evidence establishing that he is factually innocent of 

his convictions. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In order to present 

otherwise time-barred claims to a federal habeas court under Schlup, a petitioner must 

produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence to bring him “within the ‘narrow class of 

cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”) (citations omitted); 

Shumway, 223 F.3d at 990 (“[A] claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable 

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evidence not presented at trial.”); Larsen v. Soto, 742 F.3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013)

(“[W]e have denied access to the Schlup gateway where a petitioner’s evidence of 

innocence was merely cumulative or speculative or was insufficient to overcome 

otherwise convincing proof of guilt.”). Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden 

of producing “new reliable evidence” of his actual innocence, the undersigned 

recommends that the Court find that Petitioner cannot pass through the actual 

innocence/Schlup gateway to excuse the untimeliness of this federal habeas proceeding. 

See Smith v. Hall, 466 F. App’x 608, 609 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that to pass through 

the Schlup gateway, a petitioner must first satisfy the “threshold requirement of coming 

forward with ‘new reliable evidence’”); Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“To meet [the Schlup gateway standard], [petitioner] must first furnish ‘new 

reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.’”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the First Amended Petition (Doc. 20) be 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the First Amended 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

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States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72.

Dated this 8th day of April, 2020.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

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