Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02073/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02073-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID WELLS,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-02073 CW

ORDER GRANTING,

IN PART, and

DENYING, IN PART,

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS

AND MOTION TO

STRIKE 

Defendants move to dismiss several of Plaintiff's causes of

action and to strike Plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages. 

Plaintiff opposes the motion. The matter was heard on September

30, 2005. The Court having considered all of the papers filed by

the parties and oral argument, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

According to his complaint, Plaintiff David Wells was hired by

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Humboldt State University in September, 1980 as a track coach on a 

one-year contract. Wells alleges that it was the custom and

practice of the Athletic Department routinely to renew contracts so

long as the coach was successful in inter-collegiate competition

and demonstrated skills in management, fund-raising and interaction

with the community, administration and alumni. Wells claims he far

exceeded these standards and, consequently, his contract was

renewed each year from 1981 through 2000. 

In late 1998 and early 1999, Wells learned that women's sports

were disproportionately funded relative to men's sports in

violation of Title IX. At that time, Wells raised the issue with

his supervisors and suggested they equally apportion the funding

between men's and women's athletics. Despite his advocacy for

Title IX compliance, Wells received a Faculty Merit Award in

November, 2000 and his contract was renewed on January 25, 2001.

In March, 2001, because Wells raised the Title IX issue,

California State University (CSU) appointed a faculty member to

conduct an internal investigation and to report to administration

at Humboldt State University. The investigation confirmed a

violation of Title IX, yet the administration failed to respond.

On or about June 1, 2001, Wells and Humboldt State University

students submitted a Title IX grievance with the Office of Civil

Rights of the United States Department of Justice and sent a copy

of the grievance to the President of Humboldt State University. 

Wells claims that, as a result, the athletic director at the time,

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1

 Wells does not provide Swan's full name or name him as a

defendant in this action.

3

Swan1, resigned on or about June 15, 2001. Wells alleges that he

discovered that Swan had illegally transferred funds within the

Athletic Department to conceal his intent to deprive women's

athletics of equal funding. Furthermore, Wells alleges that Steven

Butler, Vice President of Humboldt State University, conspired with

Swan to make the transfer. Wells declares that his own two-year

investigation revealed that approximately $270,000.00 of Athletic

Department funds was unaccounted for.

Wells filed another formal complaint with the Office of Civil

Rights regarding Humboldt State University's failure to comply with

Title IX. Meanwhile, in December, 2001, Butler appointed Dan

Collen interim athletic director. Wells alleges that on June 5,

2002, Collen rated his performance generally as "unsatisfactory" on

a "Coaching Performance Evaluation" in retaliation for raising the

issue of the missing funds.

Wells states that, on or about April 15, 2003, his contract

was renewed for only ten months instead of twelve months and the

two-year budget for cross-country and men's and women's track was

reduced by $104,000.00. Wells alleges that these actions were

taken because of his complaints regarding Title IX and the missing

funds. Wells alleges that, between 2002 and 2004, the

administration repeatedly refused to account for the source and

application of Athletic Department funds. On March 5, 2004, Wells

responded by filing a complaint concerning the missing funds with

the State Auditor. That same day, Wells filed a formal complaint

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with the California State University Whistleblower Office alleging

that Defendants retaliated against him for reporting the missing

funds and the Title IX non-compliance.

Wells was advised that on March 31, 2004, his contract would

not be renewed when it expired. Wells alleges that, also as a

result of his complaints, the track and cross-country budgets for

the 2003-2004 academic year were reduced by forty percent. 

Moreover, the remaining sixty percent of each budget was divided

into thirty percent for track and thirty percent for cross country. 

Butler and Collen informed Wells that he could apply for one, but

not both, of the thirty-percent-funded positions. Wells applied

for the positions but was not hired. The candidate who was hired

was offered $50,000.00 in salary and benefits which was

inconsistent with the amount of Wells' contract.

On May 20, 2005, Wells filed this action against the Board of

Trustees of CSU; Rollin Richmond, President of Humboldt State

University; Steven Butler; and Dan Collen. Wells sued the

individuals Defendants personally and in their official capacity as

employees of CSU. Wells alleges eight causes of action: (1) and

(2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against CSU and Richmond, Butler

and Collen individually and in their official capacities for

retaliation based on his exercise of free speech; (3) conspiracy

under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against Richmond, Butler and Collen

individually and in their official capacities; (4) violation of 20

U.S.C. § 1681 against CSU for retaliation for reporting Title IX

non-compliance; (5) wrongful termination in violation of public

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2

 Wells has voluntarily dismissed his fifth cause of action

against Defendants Richmond, Bulter and Collen, as individuals.

5

policy against CSU 2; (6) violation of the prohibition against

discharge of whistleblowers under California Government Code §§

12653 and 8547.12 against CSU; (7) violation of public policy

against discharge of whistleblowers under California Labor Code §

1102.5 against CSU; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional

distress against Defendants Richmond, Butler and Collen.

 Defendants move to dismiss the first, second, third and

fifth causes of action and move to strike Wells' prayer for

punitive damages.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be

denied unless it is “clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1132 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506

(2002)). All material allegations in the complaint will be taken

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). “Each averment of a pleading shall be simple,

concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are

required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). These rules “do not require a

claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his

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claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair

notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds on which it

rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).

II. Motion to Strike Under Rule 12(f)

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that a party may move to strike "any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent or scandalous matter." A Rule 12(f) motion may be used

to strike a prayer for relief when the damages sought are not

recoverable as a matter of law. Tapley v. Lockwood Green

Engineers, Inc., 502 F.2d 559, 560 (8th Cir. 1974) (prayer for

damages exceeded maximum allowed by statute); Serpa v. SBC

Telecomms., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18307, *7 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

DISCUSSION

I. First and Second Causes of Action Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendants assert that Plaintiff's first and second causes of

action should be dismissed because Defendants are entitled to

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and because they

are not "persons" for purposes of § 1983 actions. Plaintiff

contends that Congress abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity for

actions brought under Title IX. Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that

there is no Eleventh Amendment immunity for individuals sued in

their individual capacity. 

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced

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28 7

or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens

of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign

State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI 

 The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to shield States

from suits by individuals absent the State's consent. Seminole

Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Nevertheless,

Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when

it both unequivocally intends to do so and "acts pursuant to a

valid grant of constitutional authority." Bd. of Trs. of the Univ.

of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (quoting Kimel v.

Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)). However, the

Court has held that Congress did not express an intent to abrogate

State immunity with regards to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan

Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1989). States, State

agencies, and State officials sued in their official capacity are

not considered "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Id. at 71;

Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir.

2002). 

Defendant CSU is an instrumentality of the State of

California. Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir.

1982). Thus, CSU and its officers acting in their official

capacity are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from § 1983

actions. On this point, Wells' argument that the State does not

have immunity for actions brought under Title IX is non-responsive.

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The Eleventh Amendment does permit suits for prospective

injunctive relief against State officials in their official

capacities. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (citing Ex

Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). In such a case, a federal court

may order prospective relief and measures ancillary to prospective

relief but may not award money damages or its equivalent. Edelman

v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64,

71-73 (1985). Wells sues Defendants CSU and Richmond, Butler and

Collen in their official capacity seeking monetary relief and

punitive damages but he does not request prospective injunctive

relief. At the hearing, Plaintiff's attorney stated that he did

not wish to amend to sue Defendants for injunctive relief. 

Therefore, the first and second causes of action are dismissed

against Defendants CSU and Richmond, Butler and Collen acting in

their official capacities. 

 Wells also sues Defendants Richmond, Butler and Collen as

individuals. The Ninth Circuit has held that the Eleventh

Amendment does not prohibit individual capacity suits. Blaylock v.

Schwinden, 862 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, "under 

§ 1983, a plaintiff may sue a state official in his individual

capacity for alleged wrongs committed by the officer in his

official capacity." Price v. Akaka, 915 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir.

1990) (citing Blaylock, 862 F.2d at 1354). Therefore, Wells may

proceed with his first and second causes of action for damages

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against Defendants Richmond, Butler and Collen in their individual

capacities. 

II. Third Cause of Action for Conspiracy Under § 1985(3) 

 Defendants Richmond, Butler, and Collen contend that

Plaintiff's third cause of action should be dismissed because of

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that a State entity possesses

Eleventh Amendment immunity from individual suits arising under 

§ 1985. Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.

1991); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Cmty College Dist., 861 F.2d 198,

201 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, Defendants Richmond, Butler and Collen,

acting in their official capacities as State officers, are immune

from Wells' third cause of action. Because Wells seeks money

damages, he may only proceed against Defendants as individuals. 

Austin, 939 F.2d at 679 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 437 U.S. 159,

166-67 (1985)). Therefore, the third cause of action against

Defendants Richmond, Bulter and Collen acting in their official

capacities is dismissed. 

 Defendants also contend that Wells has failed to plead his

conspiracy claim with sufficient specificity. Under § 1985, "[a]

mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is

insufficient." Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d

621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). The elements of a § 1985(3) claim are

(1) the existence of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the

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equal protection of the laws; (2) an act in furtherance of the

conspiracy; and (3) a resulting injury. Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d

1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1998). In addition, an indispensable element

of the conspiracy claim is "some racial, or perhaps otherwise

class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the

conspirators' action." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102

(1971). 

 Wells points to paragraph thirty-seven of his complaint in

which he alleges several acts undertaken by Defendants in

retaliation for his exercise of free speech. However, Wells fails

to allege that Defendants agreed among themselves to deprive him of

the equal protection of the laws. Furthermore, Wells does not

allege that the actions taken against him were motivated by any

racial or class-based discriminatory animus. Rather, Wells asserts

throughout his complaint that Defendants retaliated against him

because of his advocacy on behalf of the students. Yet, Wells

cites no authority which recognizes as a protected class the

victims of retaliation for advocacy on behalf of others. 

Accordingly, Wells' third cause of action against Defendants as

individuals is not sufficiently plead and is dismissed. 

 However, the Court grants Wells leave to amend to allege that

(i) Defendants agreed to deprive him of equal protection, and 

(ii) he is a member of a protected class and Defendants' actions

were motivated by discriminatory animus against him because of his

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membership in that class. In considering such an amendment, Wells

should take notice that courts have held consistently that

whistleblower status does not support a § 1985 claim. See Childree

v. UAP/GA AG Chem, Inc., 92 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (11th Cir. 1996);

Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 970 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 1992);

Deretich v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1153 (8th

Cir. 1986); Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1258 (4th Cir. 1985);

McEvoy v. Spencer, 49 F. Supp.2d 224, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 

IV. Fifth Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination 

 Defendants assert that Plaintiff's fifth cause of action

should be dismissed because Plaintiff was not terminated and

because there is no individual liability for wrongful termination. 

Wells agrees that the fifth cause of action against Defendants

Richmond, Butler and Collen should be dismissed. Pl's Opp. Memo at

1, n. 2. Nevertheless, he maintains that California State

University is liable for his termination. 

 Under California law, the termination of an employee is

tortious when it violates a fundamental public policy. Tameny v.

Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176 (1980). Such a claim

has become known as a Tameny claim. A plaintiff must show that the

public policy is delineated in a constitutional or statutory

provision, or in administrative regulations that serve a statutory

objective. Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., 19 Cal. 4th 66, 79-80

(1998). 

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 Wells alleges that he was terminated for exercising his free

speech rights and for reporting Defendants' non-compliance with

Title IX. As alleged, Wells' termination would contravene public

policies. See U.S. Const. amend. I; 20 U.S.C. 1681, et. seq.

(Title IX); Jackson v Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497,

1504-05 (2005)(retaliation for asserting Title IX rights on behalf

of victims of discrimination); Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12653 and 8547.12. 

However, Wells had a one-year employment contract with CSU, which

was renewed each year from 1981 until 2004. In California, an

employee whose fixed-term contract is not renewed cannot state a

claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 

Motevalli v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 122 Cal. App. 4th 97,

112-13 (2004). 

 In Motevalli, the plaintiff, a probationary teacher, also held

a one-year employment contract. When her contract was not renewed,

she sued, claiming she was terminated for asserting her free speech

rights by refusing to cooperate with the school's random weapons

searches. Id. at 104-05. The California appellate court held

that, for purposes of stating a Tameny claim, this did not

constitute termination. Id. at 113. The court held that an

employer could not be held liable in tort for not renewing an

employment contract which expired on its own terms. Id. at 113

(citing Daly v. Exxon Corp., 55 Cal. App. 4th 39, 45-46 (1997)). 

 Wells argues that his case can be distinguished from Motevalli

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because that case involved a probationary teacher with an emergency

credential working under a written contract. But these facts are

immaterial; the court did not limit its holding to probationary

teachers with emergency credentials. Rather, it spoke generally

about the liability of employers. Moreover, in terms of the

validity of Wells's fifth cause of action, the facts and claims

asserted in Motevalli closely mirror those in the instant

complaint. Like the plaintiff in Motevalli, Wells had a one-year

contract, which he alleges was not renewed because he asserted his

free speech rights. 

 Wells also contends that Daly suggests that an employer may be

liable if the claimant could prove that "but for" her complaints,

the employer would have renewed the employment contract. Daly, 55

Cal. App. 4th at 44. But Daly does not support Wells' contention

because the court was addressing a cause of action under section

6310(b) of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act. Daly

did not state that the plaintiff could amend her complaint in order

to allege a Tameny claim. In fact, it specifically ruled out this

possibility. Id. at 46. 

 Wells states that Defendants engaged in a two-year course of

conduct that led to his constructive termination. He explains that

this conduct included a negative evaluation, a reduction in his

budget and a rejection of his application for the "fractional"

coaching position. Under California law, the test for constructive

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discharge is whether conditions were so "intolerable or aggravated"

that a reasonable employee would have resigned, and whether the

employer knew about the conditions and their effect on the employee

and could have remedied them but did not. See Turner v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238 (1994) (citation omitted). Here,

Wells does not allege that conditions were so intolerable that he

was forced to resign. Rather, Wells admits that his employment

ended when his one-year contract was not renewed. Therefore, Wells

was not constructively discharged.

Referring to Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3rd 654

(1988), Wells argues that the continual renewal of his contract

from 1980 to 2004 gave rise to a covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. Even if Wells' assertion were correct, however, this fact

alone would not create a Tameny claim. Indeed, in Foley the court

held that tort remedies are not available for breach of an implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Foley, 47 Cal. 3rd at

700. 

 Wells believes that Defendants argue against liability because

there was no express contract. This characterization is incorrect. 

Defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the

ground that Wells was employed under a contract which ended by its

own terms and, thus, Defendants did not cause Wells' termination. 

Wells also contends that a Tameny claim may arise in an at-will

employment relationship, citing Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 1 Cal.

4th 1083, 1090 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Green v. Ralee

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Engineering Co., 19 Cal. 4th 66 (1998). However, Wells

acknowledges that his employment was governed by a one-year

contract. Compl. ¶ 28. He was not an at-will employee. This is

the relevant fact that bars Wells' Tameny claim against CSU. 

Therefore, the fifth cause of action is dismissed. 

V. Punitive Damages 

 Defendants move to strike Wells' request for punitive damages

on the ground that there can be no recovery against a State entity

or State officials sued in their official capacities. Wells argues

that a State agency can indemnify its employees for punitive

damages in its discretion and such damages are recoverable against

individual defendants. 

 Punitive damages are not available in suits under § 1983

against government entities. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United

States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 785 (2000) (citing Newport v.

Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)). State officials acting

in their official capacities are also immune from punitive damages.

Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989);

Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527 (9th Cir. 1996). However,

punitive damages are available in an individual capacity suit

against a State official. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35 (1983). 

 Therefore, Wells' request for punitive damages against

Defendants CSU, and against Richmond, Bulter and Collen acting in

their official capacities, is stricken. The Court, however, denies

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Defendants' motion to strike Wells' request for punitive damages

against Defendants Richmond, Butler and Collen as individuals.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1) Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice as

to all claims in the first and second causes of action against

Defendants CSU and Richmond, Butler and Collen acting in their

official capacities. 

 2) Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED as to all claims in

the first and second causes of action against Defendants Richmond,

Butler and Collen acting in their individual capacities.

3) Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to all claims

in the third cause of action against Defendants Richmond, Butler

and Collen acting in their official capacities. 

4) Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED, with leave to

amend, as to Plaintiff's third cause of action against Defendants

Richmond, Butler and Collen as individuals. The Court grants

Plaintiff leave to amend as instructed. If Plaintiff decides to

amend, he will have twenty days from the date of this order to file

his amended complaint.

5) Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice as

to all claims in the fifth cause of action. 

6) Defendants' motion to strike is GRANTED, without leave to

amend, as to paragraphs 40 and 46 and prayer (d) for relief against

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24

25

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Defendants CSU and Richmond, Butler and Collen acting in their

official capacities. 

7) Defendants' motion to strike is DENIED as to paragraphs 40

and 46 and prayer (d) for relief against Defendants Richmond,

Butler and Collen as individuals. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

10/4/04

Dated: 

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

 

Case 4:05-cv-02073-CW Document 26 Filed 10/04/05 Page 17 of 17