Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02229/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02229-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Cozzolino, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa County, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-04-2229-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 28), plaintiff's

response (doc. 33), and defendants' reply (doc. 45). On July 25, 2005, we granted in part and

denied in part defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings (doc. 19). The only issues

remaining in this case are count III against defendants Maricopa County and Sheriff Joseph

Arpaio, alleging a state law claim of wrongful intrusion upon plaintiff's private affairs; and

count VII, against all the defendants, alleging violation of plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

I

Plaintiff is an outspoken critic of Sheriff Arpaio. He has actively campaigned against

Arpaio, and has publically criticized him on his website and in editorials and letters published

in a local newspaper. Plaintiff claims that as a result of this criticism, he has become the

target of harassment by Arpaio and certain Maricopa County Sheriff's officers. Plaintiff

Case 2:04-cv-02229-FJM Document 46 Filed 06/28/06 Page 1 of 4
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Defendants contend, as they did in their motion for judgment on the pleadings (doc.

16), that the count III invasion of privacy claim must fail because defendant did not comply

with the notice requirement of A.R.S. § 12-821.01. We have already considered and rejected

this argument in our previous order (doc. 19) and we will not revisit it here. 

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claims that defendants have used their offices and authority to illegally bug his home and

telephone, search his garbage, and wrongfully seize his vehicle. He also alleges that

defendants have attempted to frame him on false criminal charges. 

Defendants argue, on the other hand, that Arpaio was the subject of plaintiff's ongoing

abuse and harassment. Defendants contend that plaintiff made death threats against Arapio,

and engaged in a campaign of sending abusive and harassing emails to the Maricopa County

Sheriff's office. On March 7, 2001 and June 12, 2002, Sheriff Arpaio obtained two different

injunctions against harassment related to plaintiff's threatening behavior. 

II

Defendants first move for summary judgment on count III wherein plaintiff alleges

that defendant Maricopa County and Sheriff Arpaio wrongfully invaded his privacy by

illegally wiretapping his phone and searching his trash.1

 Arizona recognizes the tort of

"intrusion upon seclusion" as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977),

which provides that "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the

solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the

other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable

person." See Hart v. Seven Resorts Inc., 190 Ariz. 272, 279, 947 P.2d 846, 853 (Ct. App.

1997) (citing Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 783 P.2d 781 (1989)).

The invasion may be conducted "with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the

plaintiff's private affairs, as by . . . tapping his telephone wires." Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 652B cmt. b. 

Defendants claim that, as a matter of law, the allegation that they searched plaintiff's

trash cannot form the basis of an invasion of privacy claim. We agree. The defendant is

subject to liability for invasion of privacy only when he has intruded into a private place.

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We reject outright defendants' argument that plaintiff waived his right to privacy, and

therefore subjected himself to an allegedly illegal wiretap, when he became a vocal critic of

Sheriff Arpaio. See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 9. A citizen does not

forfeit his rights once he chooses to publically criticize a government official.

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Hart, 190 Ariz. at 279, 947 P.2d at 853; see also Medical Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC,

Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2002) (to prevail on invasion of privacy claim in Arizona,

plaintiff must have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy). Here, plaintiff had no

objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left for collection outside the home.

See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1629 (1988). Accordingly,

this allegation will not support an invasion of privacy claim.

The wiretap allegation presents a different issue. Plaintiff alleges that he discovered

a wiretap on his telephone and that the wife of defendant Mark Koppinger admitted to a

reporter that her husband was illegally wiretapping plaintiff's home. PSOF ¶¶ 38, 39.

Defendants make no attempt to refute these allegations, either by denying that a wiretap

occurred, or alternatively by establishing that it was supported by a valid search warrant.

Instead, defendants simply argue that even if such an intrusion occurred, it was not "highly

offensive" as a matter of law because it was "routine police work done as part of the

investigation of Plaintiff's violent and criminal behavior." Id. at 9.2

 Whether this alleged

conduct was highly offensive, however, is a fact question based in large part on whether the

police were justified if a wiretap in fact occurred. Because a material issue of fact exists, we

deny defendants' motion for summary judgment on count III.

III

Plaintiff also claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that defendants violated his

constitutional rights by seizing his automobile without a warrant and by framing him with

a false drug test while he was incarcerated. Plaintiff was arrested and charged with attempted

murder. He claims that while incarcerated, defendants seized his automobile, even though

the car had no relevance to the criminal charge. He further contends that, despite specific

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requests, defendants have failed to produce any evidence establishing probable cause to seize

the car. 

Plaintiff also claims that defendants attempted to frame him on false criminal charges

while he was incarcerated in the Maricopa County jail. He claims that a detention officer

conducted a drug test in a highly unusual manner and then advised him that he had failed the

test and that his probation would be revoked. Two independent agencies subsequently

conducted additional tests, however, and concluded that plaintiff was in fact drug free. Less

than a week after the test, plaintiff's lawyer asked the County to preserve the urine sample

and test results, but none of this evidence has been produced during discovery. 

Defendants' only response is that these allegations are "related to legitimate police

activity." Reply at 3. This is wholly insufficient to support their motion for summary

judgment. Without attempting to justify the seizure of the car or explain the circumstances

of the drug tests, material facts exists as to whether these incidents were in fact "related to

legitimate police activity" and therefore not in violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED DENYING defendants' motion for summary judgment

(doc. 28). 

DATED this 27th day of June, 2006.

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